Title: Curry v. Young
Citation: 173 N.W.2d 410
Docket Number: 41678
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 1969

173 N.W.2d 410 (1969) David CURRY, et al., Respondents, v. Maurice YOUNG, et al., Defendants, Maurice Young, et al., Respondents, City of Minneapolis, Appellant. No. 41678. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 26, 1969. Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., Jerome F. Fitzgerald, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for appellant. Sherman Bergstein, Minneapolis, for David Curry and others. *411 G. D. Giancola, Minneapolis, for Maurice Young and others. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. Defendant city of Minneapolis appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment in this action brought by plaintiffs as owners of the southerly portion of Lot 14, Block 3, Lowry's First Subdivision of Columbia Heights, to compel the city to grant a setback variance from a zoning ordinance and a building permit to enable plaintiffs to build a dwelling house on the lot.[1] The zoning ordinance, which was adopted in 1963, requires a setback of 25 feet from the street. The trial court found that plaintiffs' lot, in the absence of a variance, would be unusable for any purpose and granted the relief plaintiffs sought, issuing an order requiring the "City of Minneapolis, through its appropriate agents and employees, to forthwith issue to plaintiffs a building permit for the construction of a single family dwelling unit of at least 24 feet by 40 feet dimensions plus a one car garage" on the premises. The court did not specify the exact setback which the variance should provide for, but simply provided that a dwelling of the size stated above should be permitted, leaving it to the city what variance should be granted so as to permit construction of a building of that size. The history of the ownership of the lot plaintiffs own is of some significance in determining the issues involved in this appeal. In 1936 one John Tracy owned all of Lot 14. That year he conveyed the northerly part to Minnesota Federal Savings &amp; Loan Association. In 1941 he conveyed the southerly part, which is involved here, to one Carl Edlund, who transferred it to the Carland Company. In September 1944 Minnesota Federal transferred the northerly part to Mr. and Mrs. Maurice Young. In October 1945 the Carland Company conveyed the southerly part to Mr. and Mrs. Young, so that they then became owners of the entire lot and were such when the zoning ordinance was adopted in 1963. In October 1966 Mr. Young transferred the northwesterly part of the lot to one Richard Phaneuf, and in June 1967 the Youngs transferred the southerly part of the lot to plaintiffs, who have been the owners since that time. When the lot was originally divided, a deed for the southerly part was duly recorded. While the metes and bounds descriptions of the lots are not important, the southerly portion of the lot is 42.6 feet fronting on Architect Avenue, 127.9 feet fronting on Columbia Boulevard, 32.4 feet at the rear lot line and 130.6 feet adjacent to the northern portion of Lot 14. The result is that if the zoning-ordinance setback is adhered to plaintiffs could build a structure only 11.6 feet wide on the side closest to Architect Avenue, and 6 feet wide on the other side. The structure could be 40 feet long. Plaintiffs seek a variance from the setback requirement from 25 feet to 7 feet which, if granted, would permit building a structure 24 feet by 40 feet. Prior to purchasing the property, plaintiffs received assurances from Minneapolis city employees that a setback variance could be obtained. It does not appear from the record who these employees were, but apparently they were members of neither the board of adjustment nor the city council. The board was established under Minn. St. 462.354, subd. 2, which reads in part: It would seem, from reading the statute and the city charter, that under the plan established by the city the decision of the adjustments board is advisory only. A hearing was held by the board at which numerous people appeared, most of whom objected to the granting of the variance. On November 16, 1967, the board advised the city council that the variance should be granted. On November 21, 1967, a hearing was held by the zoning and planning committee of the city council to consider plaintiffs' request. Plaintiffs were not notified of this hearing and all those who appeared objected to the granting of the variance. The city then denied the application. The Minneapolis zoning ordinance authorizes variances if the board of adjustment makes six specific findings. Article VI, Paragraph 6c, contains the following provisions: While the board of adjustment did not make specific findings on all of these standards, it stated: Article VIII, Section A, Paragraph 4b, of the zoning ordinance provides: Article III, Section B, Paragraph 64, defines a lot of record as follows: The city claims, among other things, that the southerly portion of Lot 14 is not a lot of record under this definition. It argues that when the Youngs acquired both parcels, even though there had been a division, they became reunited and the whole lot was one lot of record. The board of adjustment felt that plaintiffs' lot alone was a lot of record. The court has so found, and originally the city stipulated to that fact, but apparently it withdrew the stipulation when it realized that the stipulation might be conclusive against it. The city devotes much of its brief to an argument that mandamus is not the proper procedure for reviewing a decision of the city council in a matter of this kind. It claims that plaintiffs may not seek review by mandamus but must proceed by certiorari. Mandamus was abolished for a time under Rule 81.01(2), Rules of Civil Procedure. See, 254 Minn. supp. p. 77. The remedy formerly available under mandamus remained by petition. State ex rel. Stubben v. Board of County Commrs., 273 Minn. 361, 141 N.W.2d 499; Marine v. Whipple, 259 Minn. 18, 104 N.W.2d 657; Scoles v. Hurd, 275 Minn. 569, 148 N.W.2d 164. The abolition of the writ of mandamus caused nothing but confusion,[2] so it was readopted in later amendments to our rules. See, Rule 81.01(2), Rules of Civil Procedure, effective February 1, 1968, 278 Minn. supp. p. 85; 3 Youngquist &amp; Blacik, Minnesota Rules Practice, 1968 Pocket Part, p. 117. Plaintiffs contend that they are seeking relief by way of a mandatory injunction. Whether we call the proceeding mandamus or a mandatory injunction has little significance. In State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minnesota, 236 Minn. 452, 463, 54 N.W.2d 122, 129, we discuss the difference between the two. There we said: See, also, Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, 200 Minn. 599, 275 N.W. 300, 120 A.L.R. 297. The use of mandamus to obtain relief similar to that sought here has been denied in some cases and permitted in others. See, for instance, Romsdahl v. Town of Long Lake, 175 Minn. 34, 220 N.W. 166; Powell v. Township of Carlos, 177 Minn. 372, 225 N.W. 296; Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn. 55, 21 N.W.2d 203, where the use of mandamus to obtain relief was denied; State ex rel. Foster v. City of Minneapolis, 255 Minn. 249, 97 N.W.2d 273, where its use was permitted. In State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 518, 75 N.W.2d 780, 783, we said: In State ex rel. Lewis v. City Council of Minneapolis, 140 Minn. 433, 434, 168 N.W. 188, we said: See, also, Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Nadasdy, 247 Minn. 159, 76 N.W.2d 670. In an article by Riesenfeld, Bauman, and Maxwell entitled Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 33 Minn.L.Rev. 569, 593, we find the following: Where, as here, attack upon acts of the city council is made on the grounds that the action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, it would appear that some remedy should be available to correct the action if the court finds that plaintiffs' claims are well founded. Whether we call it mandamus or mandatory injunction does not seem too important if we reach the merits of the dispute. We are content to leave the technical distinctions to authors of law review articles and to try to arrive at some solution that will afford relief to a litigant deprived of a right. Thus, about the only rule we can glean from our cases is that mandamus ordinarily will not lie to control the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies, but it will lie if there is no other adequate and complete remedy. We think that is the situation here. A review by certiorari might lead to a decision that the city was wrong, but it would not provide the relief plaintiffs seek. An example of the evils that can exist in review by certiorari and the multiplicity of suits it creates is found in State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 32 N.W.2d 574. In that case, and in State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 253, 32 N.W.2d 583, we held that mandamus is a proper remedy to compel an administrative agency to perform duties required under a decision in a case reviewed by certiorari. See, also, State ex rel. Jenkins v. Ernest, 197 Minn. 599, 600, 268 N.W. 208, 209, where we said: These decisions are not always easy to reconcile, but in the present case it comes down to a question of whether plaintiffs have a right to the variance which they seek and to a building permit after such variance is granted. To compel plaintiffs to review the action of the city council by certiorari and then, if the right is found to exist, to enforce it by mandamus simply requires two actions where relief ought to be available in one. Under these circumstances we conclude that the rights of plaintiffs can be determined and enforced in this action, no matter what name we give to the proceeding. We come, then, to the merits of the case. The purposes of a variance in a zoning ordinance were aptly stated in Flagstad v. City of San Mateo, 156 Cal. App. 2d 138, 141, 318 P.2d 825, 827: It would seem to us that this is the proper function of a variance. To determine, then, whether the variance should have been granted, we must begin with the premise that the part of Lot 14 owned by plaintiffs was a "lot of record" within the definition of Article III, Section B, Paragraph 64, of the zoning ordinance at the time it was adopted in 1963. The lot had been severed and a deed of the part that plaintiffs now own had been recorded. The mere fact that the Youngs acquired both parts of the lot after severance did not reunite the two so as to constitute them a single lot. The parcel, being a "lot of record," was entitled to a variance if the conditions of the zoning ordinance were complied with. The adjustment board, while it failed to make as complete findings as might be desired, did make the findings we have mentioned above. Implicit in these findings, we believe, are the others required for the granting of a variance. In the light of these facts, the city acted arbitrarily in denying the variance. To take away from this lot the right to a variance by the adoption of this ordinance would be, as the trial court found, a violation of due process, in that it would deprive the property of any value. It might be added that the objections of adjacent owners are not without merit when esthetic values are taken into consideration. All other adjacent homes are set back from the street a considerable distance, and it cannot be denied that zoning ordinances requiring definite setback, so that the appearance will be uniform, are proper. But in this case, due to the peculiar size and shape of the lot, to deny a variance would deprive plaintiffs of any use of their property; and even though granting the variance may work some hardship upon adjoining property owners, we believe the trial court was right in determining that the ordinance itself, when the conditions it prescribes are complied with, requires that the variance be granted. Defendant also claims that the court has no authority to issue a building permit. All that need be said in answer to this claim is that if plaintiffs are entitled to this variance they are also entitled to a building permit. The variance would be of no value if plaintiffs still could not build upon the lot. Consequently, the court had power to order the issuance of a building permit as well as to determine the right to a variance. In so doing, the court tried to balance the equities as best it could be providing only the size of the house that could be built, leaving to the city a determination of the location and width of the variance. Affirmed. ROGOSHESKE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] Plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants are not in issue on this appeal. [2] See, Baird, Judicial Review of Administrative Procedures in Minnesota, 46 Minn. L.Rev. 451, 458. [3] See, Riesenfeld, Bauman, and Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 37 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 22.