Title: In the Interest of Lamont G.
Citation: 304 S.C. 456, 405 S.E.2d 404
Docket Number: 23398
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 1991

304 S.C. 456 (1991) 405 S.E.2d 404 In the Interest of KEITH LAMONT G., a minor under the age of seventeen years, Respondent. 23398 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard April 1, 1991. Decided May 13, 1991. *457 Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Amie L. Clifford, Columbia, and Sol. Charles M. Condon, N. Charleston, for appellant. Asst. Appellate Defender Wanda Hagler Haile of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for respondent. Heard April 1, 1991. Decided May 13, 1991. HARWELL, Justice: Respondent Keith Lamont G., a juvenile, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a stolen vehicle. The family court judge committed respondent to the Department of Youth Services for an indeterminate period not to extend beyond respondent's twenty-first birthday. The State appeals, arguing that the family court judge was obligated to include a provision in the commitment order providing that respondent could be transferred to the Department of Corrections upon his twenty-first birthday. We affirm. On April 24 and 25, 1989, juvenile petitions were sworn against respondent charging him with murder and possession of a stolen vehicle. The murder charge against respondent *458 was subsequently reduced to voluntary manslaughter. A petition to transfer respondent's charges to the Court of General Sessions was filed and, after a hearing, denied. At the adjudicatory hearing in Family Court, respondent pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a stolen vehicle and was temporarily committed to a reception and evaluation center. Upon respondent's return from the center, the family court judge held a dispositional hearing. At the dispositional hearing, the State asked the family court judge to include a provision in the commitment order, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-2170 (1985), which would provide that respondent would be transferred to the Department of Corrections upon his twenty-first birthday to continue serving his sentence. The family court judge refused to include such a provision, finding that under the limited jurisdiction of the Family Court, he could commit respondent to the Department of Youth Services only for an indeterminate period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The State argues this was error. Section 20-7-2170 provides in pertinent part: The State contends that the emphasized portion of the statute mandates that a family court judge include a provision in a commitment order providing for the transfer of a juvenile to the Department of Corrections upon his twenty-first birthday in instances where the juvenile is sentenced for a crime which, if committed by an adult, would carry a maximum sentence of thirty years or more.[1] We disagree. The first paragraph of the statute provides that all children under the age of seventeen shall be committed to the Board of Youth Services and cannot be committed or sentenced to any other penal or correctional institution. Thus, regardless of whether a juvenile's case is heard in Family Court or in the Court of General Sessions, if the juvenile is under the age of seventeen, the juvenile is sent to the Board of Youth Services. However, there is a crucial distinction between Family Court and the Court of General Sessions; while a family court judge can commit a juvenile only for an indeterminate sentence not extending beyond the juvenile's twenty-first birthday, a trial judge in the Court of General Sessions can impose a sentence for a definite term of years. Sanders v. State, 281 S.C. 53, 314 S.E. (2d) 319 (1984) (the maximum sentence a juvenile can receive in Family Court is an indeterminate period of confinement not to extend past the juvenile's twenty-first birthday; only the Circuit Court can impose an adult term sentence); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-400 *460 (1985) (jurisdiction of Family Court terminates when child attains the age of twenty-one years). Further, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1330 (Supp. 1990) sets forth the alternatives available to a family court judge for dealing with a child under the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Section 20-7-1330(c) provides that a family court judge can commit a child "for an indeterminate period but in no event beyond the child's twenty-first birthday." Sections which are part of the same general statutory law of the state must be construed together. Smalls v. Weed, 293 S.C. 364, 360 S.E. (2d) 531 (Ct. App. 1987). When the South Carolina Children's Code is read as a whole, it is clear that a family court judge can commit a juvenile only for an indeterminate period not to exceed the juvenile's twenty-first birthday and that a juvenile can be held beyond the age of twenty-one only if the juvenile is committed by order of the Court of General Sessions. Thus, a child cannot be held accountable as an adult for his criminal conduct unless the child's case is transferred to the Court of General Sessions pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-430 (1985 and Supp. 1990).[2] Since a family court judge can commit a juvenile only until his twenty-first birthday, we conclude that the portion of the statute which authorizes the transfer of a juvenile to the Department of Corrections upon his twenty-first birthday is only applicable when the juvenile has been tried and sentenced as an adult offender in the Court of General Sessions. See In the Matter of Westbrooks, 277 S.C. 410, 288 S.E. (2d) 395 (1982) (a Family Court cannot impose probation to extend beyond a child's twenty-first birthday because the jurisdiction of the Family Court terminates when a child becomes twenty-one). Accordingly, the order of the family court judge is Affirmed. GREGORY, C.J., and CHANDLER, FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., concur. [1] S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-50 (1985) provides that the offense of voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment for no more than thirty years nor less than two years. [2] Furthermore, if we construed § 20-7-2170 as the State suggests, there could potentially be serious constitutional problems as such a construction would allow a juvenile tried in Family Court to be punished as an adult without affording the juvenile the constitutional protections provided to all criminal defendants, such as indictment by grand jury and trial by jury.