Title: Ex parte City of Homewood
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1151310
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2017

rel: 03/24/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1151310
____________________
Ex parte City of Homewood et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Bria Mines
v.
City of Homewood et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-15-904768)
STUART, Justice.
Officer J.C. Clifton and Officer Jason Davis, law-
enforcement officers for the City of Homewood, and the City of
1151310
Homewood petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing
the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in
their favor on the ground of immunity.  We grant the petition
and issue the writ.  
Facts and Procedural History
In December 14, 2013, Officer Clifton and Officer Davis
were dispatched to the Babies "R" Us specialty retail store
located in the Wildwood Shopping Center in response to a
shoplifting incident involving Bristinia Fuller and Bria
Mines.  When the officers arrived, they learned that Fuller
and Mines were leaving the parking lot of the store in a
vehicle being driven by Fuller.  Officer Clifton and Officer
Davis, driving separate patrol cars, attempted to stop the
vehicle.  Instead of stopping, Fuller eluded the officers by
speeding through the parking area and onto Lakeshore Drive. 
The officers pursued.  Fuller continued speeding on Lakeshore
Drive and ran through multiple red traffic lights before
losing control of her vehicle while attempting to turn onto
Oxmoor Road.  Fuller's vehicle struck a light pole and a
vehicle stopped at the intersection.  Fuller was killed and
Mines was seriously injured.
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On December 13, 2015, Mines sued Officer Clifton and
Officer Davis, both in their official and individual
capacities; Homewood; and others not before this Court in the
petition.1  Mines alleged that she was injured as a result of
the negligent, reckless, and/or wanton conduct of 
the 
officers
and Homewood during the officers' pursuit of 
Fuller's vehicle. 
She also alleged that Homewood was vicariously liable for the 
officers' conduct and was negligent in hiring and supervising
the officers.  Mines served interrogatories with the
complaint.
On March 11, 2016, Homewood, Officer Clifton, and Officer
Davis moved to dismiss the claims against them on the bases
that Homewood was statutorily immune from the wantonness
claim, see § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975; that the claim
alleging negligent training and supervision against Homewood
was not a cognizable claim, see Ott v. City of Mobile, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Ala. 2001); that Alabama does not
recognize an independent cause of action for 
liability arising
out of a law-enforcement officer's pursuit of a criminal
1The others were Fuller's estate and ACCC Insurance
Company.  The claim against ACCC was dismissed on April 8,
2016.
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suspect, see Ex parte Brown, 182 So. 3d 495 (Ala. 2015),
Gooden v. City of Talladega, 966 So. 2d 232 (Ala. 2007), and
Doran v. City of Madison, 519 So. 2d 1308 (Ala. 1988); that
the officers are entitled to peace-officer immunity (§ 6-5-
640, Ala. Code 1975); that the officers are entitled to State-
agent immunity, see Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117 (Ala.
2002), and Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala.
2006); and that all of Mines's claims are barred by Fuller's
intervening criminal acts, see Gooden, supra, and Prill v.
Marrone, 23 So. 3d 1 (Ala. 2009).
  
Homewood, Officer Clifton, and Officer Davis attached to
the motion to dismiss a copy of a video recording of the
pursuit and Fuller's accident made by the dashboard camera in
Officer Clifton's vehicle.  The video recording indicates that
the officers were engaged in a high-speed pursuit of Fuller's
vehicle, that Officer Clifton was driving the lead vehicle in
pursuit of Fuller's vehicle, that Fuller was driving
recklessly, and that, as Mines stated in her complaint,
"Fuller lost control of the vehicle while attempting to turn
onto Oxmoor Road [and] struck a pole and another vehicle." 
The video recording shows Officer Clifton slowing his vehicle
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at times during the pursuit to safely negotiate the traffic
and shows that, although law-enforcement vehicles were
pursuing Fuller's vehicle, no law-enforcement vehicle made 
contact with Fuller's vehicle during the pursuit.  Indeed, the
video recording establishes unequivocally that no law-
enforcement vehicle was near Fuller's vehicle when Fuller
attempted to turn onto Oxmoor Road and struck a light pole and
another vehicle.
  
On May 9, 2016, Mines filed her opposition to the motion
to dismiss, maintaining that because Homewood, Officer
Clifton, and Officer Davis had relied on matters outside the
pleadings in their motion, the motion to dismiss had been 
converted to a summary-judgment motion.  She argued that
because the motion had been converted to a summary-judgment
motion she needed a reasonable opportunity to discover
evidence and to respond.  Mines did not attach an affidavit
proffering what she expected discovery to reveal, and she did
not challenge the authenticity of the video recording.
On July 6, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the motion to dismiss.
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On August 4, 2016, Mines moved the trial court to order
Homewood, Officer Clifton, and Officer Davis to answer the
interrogatories she had served with her complaint. 2  
On August 10, 2016, the trial court ordered:
"This matter comes before the court on the
defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Ala. R. Civ. P.  Since the defendants request
that this court consider matters outside the
pleadings, the court will treat this motion as a
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Ala. R. Civ. P..
"Is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is
hereby DENIED.
"Both 
parties are 
hereby informed that the 
court
will again entertain those issues presented in the
defendants' motion after the discovery phase of this
litigation, upon the filing of a properly crafted
motion."
On August 19, 2016, Homewood, Officer Clifton, and
Officer Davis moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate
the order denying their motion, arguing that the trial court
erred in not entering a summary judgment in their favor
because, they said, they were entitled to immunity from
liability as a matter of law and that, in light of the video
recording, discovery would not establish otherwise.  They
2Mines did not attach a copy of the interrogatories to her 
response to the petition for the writ of mandamus.
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pointed out that Mines did not identify what specific
discovery was necessary to respond to any of the grounds
asserted in their motion.  On September 13, 2016, the trial
court conducted a hearing on the motion to alter, amend, or
vacate.  Mines argued that additional discovery was needed but
again did not state what evidence she expected discovery to
reveal that would create a genuine issue of material fact with
regard to the issue of immunity.  
On September 21, 2016, Homewood, Officer Clifton, and
Officer Davis timely petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order denying
their motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary
judgment in their favor.  On January 8, 2017, Mines filed her
response to the petition.    
Standard of Review
"'"This Court has stated:
"'"'"While 
the
general rule is that
the denial of a motion
for summary judgment is
not 
reviewable, 
the
exception is that the
denial 
of 
a 
motion
grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable
by petition for writ of
7
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mandamus. 
 
Ex 
parte
Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794
(Ala. 1996)....
"'"'"...."'
"'"Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d
132, 135 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911,
912–13 (Ala. 2000)). A writ of
mandamus 
is 
an 
extraordinary
remedy available only when the
petitioner can demonstrate: '"(1)
a clear legal right to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court."'  Ex parte Nall, 879
So. 
2d 
541, 
543 
(Ala.
2003)(quoting Ex parte BOC Group,
Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.
2001))."
"'Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299, 303–04
(Ala. 2008).'
"Ex parte Jones, 52 So. 3d 475, 478–79 (Ala. 2010).
"'In reviewing a trial court's ruling
on a motion for a summary judgment, we
apply the same standard the trial court
applied initially in granting or denying
the motion.  Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins.
Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999).
"'"The principles of law
applicable 
to 
a 
motion 
for
summary 
judgment 
are 
well
settled. To grant such a motion,
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the trial court must determine
that the evidence does not create
a genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.
When the movant makes a prima
facie showing that those two
conditions are satisfied, the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to
present 'substantial evidence'
creating 
a 
genuine 
issue 
of
material fact."
"'742 So. 2d at 184.  "[S]ubstantial
evidence is evidence of such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the
exercise 
of 
impartial 
judgment 
can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact
sought to be proved."  West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So. 2d 1075, 1077–78
(Ala. 2005)."
Ex parte Brown, 182 So. 3d 495, 502 (Ala. 2015).
Discussion
Officer Clifton and Officer Davis contend that the trial
court erred in refusing to enter a summary judgment in their
favor because, they say, at the time of the accident they were
acting as agents of the State, that none of the exceptions to
State-agent immunity apply, and that, therefore, they are
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entitled to immunity from suit by Mines, pursuant to § 6-5-
338(a), Ala. Code 1975.  
In Ex parte City of Midfield, 161 So. 3d 1158, 1163-64
(Ala. 2014), this Court recognized:
"'Section 6–5–338(a)[, Ala. Code 1975,]
provides: 
"'"Every peace officer, except
constables, who is employed or
appointed 
pursuant 
to 
the
Constitution or statutes of this
state 
... 
and 
whose 
duties
prescribed by law, or by the
lawful terms of their employment
or 
appointment, 
include 
the
enforcement 
of, 
or 
the
investigation and reporting of
violations of, the criminal laws
of 
this 
state, 
and 
who 
is
empowered by the laws of this
state to execute warrants, to
arrest and to take into custody
persons who violate, or who are
lawfully 
charged 
by 
warrant,
indictment, 
or 
other 
lawful
process, with violations of, the
criminal laws of this state,
shall at all times be deemed to
be officers of this state, and as
such shall have immunity from
tort liability arising out of his
or her conduct in performance of
any discretionary function within
the line and scope of his or her
law enforcement duties."
"'The restatement of State-agent immunity
as set out by this Court in Ex parte
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Cranman, [792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)],
governs the determination of whether a
peace officer is entitled to immunity under
§ 6–5–338(a).  Ex parte City of Tuskegee,
932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005).  This
Court, in Cranman, stated the test for
State-agent immunity as follows:
  "'"A State agent shall be
immune from civil liability in
his or her personal capacity when
the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based
upon the agent's 
"'"....
"'"(4) 
exercising
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement 
of 
the
criminal laws of the
State, including, but
not 
limited 
to,
l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t
officers' arresting or
attempting 
to 
arrest
persons; ...
"'"....
"'"Notwithstanding anything
to the contrary in the foregoing
statement of the rule, a State
agent shall not be immune from
civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"'"(1) 
when 
the
Constitution or laws of
the United States, or
the 
Constitution 
of
this State, or laws,
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1151310
rules, or regulations
of this State enacted
or promulgated for the
purpose of regulating
the 
activities 
of 
a
governmental 
agency
require otherwise; or
"'"(2) 
when 
the
State 
agent 
acts
willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, 
in 
bad
faith, beyond his or
her authority, or under
a  
m i s t a k e n
interpretation of the
law."
"'Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  Because the
scope of immunity for law-enforcement
officers set forth in § 6–5–338(a) was
broader 
than 
category 
(4) 
of 
the
restatement 
adopted 
in 
Cranman, 
this 
Court,
in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d
300, 309 (Ala. 2006), expanded and modified
category (4) of the Cranman test to read as
follows:
"'"'A State agent shall be
immune from civil liability in
his or her personal capacity when
the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based
upon the agent's
"'"....
"'"'(4) exercising
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement 
of 
the
criminal laws of the
State, including, but
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1151310
not 
limited 
to,
l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t
officers' arresting or
attempting 
to 
arrest
persons, or serving as
peace 
officers 
under
circumstances entitling
such 
officers 
to
immunity pursuant to §
6–5–338(a), Ala. Code
1975.'"
"'Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 309.  Additionally:
"'"'This 
Court 
has
established a "burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the
defense of State-agent immunity.' 
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946
So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A
State agent asserting State-agent
immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating 
that 
the
plaintiff's claims arise from a
function that would entitle the
State agent to immunity.'  946
So. 2d at 452.  Should the State
agent make such a showing, the
burden 
then 
shifts 
to 
the
plaintiff to show that one of the
two categories of exceptions to
State-agent immunity recognized
in Cranman is applicable. ..."'
"Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d at 291–94
(quoting Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282–83
(Ala. 2008))."
Thus, 
for 
Officer 
Clifton 
and 
Officer 
Davis 
to
demonstrate that they are entitled to immunity from Mines's
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claims against them in their official and individual
capacities, they must establish (1) that they were peace
officers (2) performing law-enforcement duties at the time of
the accident and (3) exercising judgment and discretion.  If
they can do so, the burden then shifts to Mines to show that
one of the Cranman exceptions applies.  If Mines does not
satisfy this burden, then the officers are entitled to
immunity.   
With regard to the first two factors to determine 
immunity, the materials before us establish that it is
undisputed that Officer Clifton and Officer Davis were
employed as law-enforcement officers by Homewood; therefore,
they are "peace officers" for the purposes of § 6-5-338(a),
Ala.  Code 1975.  Additionally, the parties agree that Officer
Clifton and Officer Davis were performing law-enforcement
duties at the time of the accident.  Therefore, no genuine
issue of fact exists as to the first two factors.
With regard to the third-factor determining immunity –-
whether the officers were exercising proper judgment and
discretion –- in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300,
309 (Ala. 2006), this Court held that arresting or attempting
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to arrest an individual is a discretionary function.  It is
undisputed that Officer Clifton and Officer Davis pursued
Fuller's vehicle in an attempt to arrest Fuller and Mines for
allegedly shoplifting.  Additionally, the video recording
establishes that the officers were engaged in a high-speed
pursuit of Fuller's vehicle, that Fuller was driving
recklessly, that no law-enforcement vehicle made any contact
with Fuller's vehicle during the pursuit, and that no law-
enforcement vehicle was near Fuller's vehicle when Fuller
attempted to turn onto Oxmoor Road and struck a light pole and
another vehicle.  The video recording demonstrates that the
officers were exercising discretion and judgment during the
pursuit of Fuller's vehicle.  See Doran v. City of Madison,
519 So. 2d 1308, 1314 (Ala. 1998)(quoting Madison v. Weldon,
446 So. 2d 21, 28 (Ala. 1984), quoting in turn City of Miami
v. Horne, 198 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1967))("'"The rule governing
the conduct of [a] police [officer] in pursuit of an escaping
offender is that he must operate his vehicle with due care and
in doing so he is not responsible for the acts of the
offender.  Although pursuit may contribute to the reckless
driving of the pursued, the officer is not obliged to allow
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1151310
him to escape."' (Emphasis added.)").   Therefore, Officer
Clifton and Officer Davis satisfied their burden of showing
the third-factor for immunity.
Because 
the 
materials 
submitted 
by 
the 
officers
established that they qualified for immunity, the burden then
shifted to Mines to show that one of the two Cranman
exceptions to immunity applied.    
In her complaint, Mines alleged that Officer Clifton and
Officer Davis 
"acted beyond their authority as police officers
employed by [Homewood], in derogation of and/or
under a mistaken interpretation of the laws enacted
and/or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
boundaries 
of 
permissible 
activities 
of 
law
enforcement personnel in the manner in which they
allowed the police cruisers to pursue the vehicle
driven by [Fuller] and also occupied by [Mines]."
Mines offered nothing to refute the evidence of the officers'
appropriate conduct captured by the dashboard camera of the
police vehicle, nor did Mines proffer any facts in her
complaint to contradict the facts developed in the pleadings.
Instead of addressing the merits of the summary-judgment
motion, that is, refuting the evidence of the officers'
appropriate conduct captured on the dashboard camera, Mines
made the conclusory argument that, because the officers had
16
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not responded to her requests for discovery, she needed time
to gather evidence before addressing the motion.  In effect,
Mines moved, pursuant to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., for a
continuance to permit discovery of evidence to oppose the
motion.  Mines did not support her motion with an affidavit
proffering any facts she expected from the 
requested discovery
that would contradict the facts developed and show that a
genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether
the officers were entitled to immunity.  
In Reeves v. Porter, 521 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 1988), this
Court addressed the propriety of a trial court entering a
summary judgment for the defendants before the defendants had
complied with discovery requests, stating:
"The mere pendency of discovery does not bar
summary judgment.  If the trial court from the
evidence before it, or the appellate court from the
record, can ascertain that the matter subject to
production was crucial to the non-moving party's
case (Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama
State Bar, 533 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1976)) or that the
answers to the interrogatories were crucial to the
non-moving party's case (Noble v. McManus, 504 So.
2d 248 (Ala. 1987)), then it is error for the trial
court to grant summary judgment before the items
have been produced or the answers given.  However,
the burden of showing that these items are crucial
is upon the non-moving party.  He can do so by
complying with Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., Water
View Developments, Inc. v. Eureka, Inc., 512 So. 2d
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916 (Ala. 1987).  Rule 56(f) provides: 'Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as is just.'[3] 
A pending motion to compel production (Parrish,
supra) 
and 
a 
motion 
to 
compel 
answers 
to
interrogatories, which has been granted (Noble,
supra) when the evidence before the court clearly
shows that the evidence sought is crucial to the
non-moving party's case, have been held sufficient
compliance with Rule 56(f).  However, when no such
crucial evidence would be supplied by the production
or by the answers to the interrogatories, it is not
error for the trial court to grant summary judgment
with discovery pending.  Wallace v. Brownell
Pontiac–GMC Co., 703 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1983);
Noble v. McManus, supra.  In Wallace, Judge Kravitch
noted: 'Most, if not all, cases involving a Rule
56(f) issue will be factually dissimilar. For this
very reason, a blanket rule would be inappropriate.' 
703 [F.]2d at 528.  The burden is upon the
non-moving party to comply with Rule 56(f) or to
prove that the matter sought by discovery is or may
be crucial to the non-moving party's case...."
521 So. 2d at 965 (emphasis added).
Here, in light of the caselaw with regard to immunity and
law-enforcement-officer pursuit of a suspect and the evidence
presented in the video recording, Mines's argument that
additional discovery is required before she can address the
3Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., was amended effective August
1, 1992, and no longer reads exactly as quoted here.
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summary-judgment motion is not supported by the record and is
unpersuasive.   Mines did not attach an affidavit to her
opposition to the summary-judgment motion explaining what she
expected the requested discovery to reveal with regard to her
contention that the officers were not entitled to immunity and
why the discovery was crucial to her ability to oppose the
officers' immunity argument.  For example, Mines did not
assert that the requested discovery will demonstrate that
Officer Clifton and Officer Davis did not act as "reasonably
prudent emergency driver[s] exercising [their] discretion
under the prevailing circumstances" Blackwood v. City of
Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495, 507 (Ala. 2006), or that the
discovery would show that the officers were 
acting "willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law," Ex
parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000).  To the extent
that Mines may have asserted that additional discovery will
show that Officer Clifton and Officer Davis "caused" Fuller to
lose control of her vehicle, the video quite clearly
establishes otherwise.  The video recording demonstrates that
the officers were exercising due care in the operation of
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their vehicles and were not responsible for Fuller's actions. 
Doran, supra.  In light of the evidence presented in the video
recording, Mines cannot demonstrate through additional
discovery that a genuine issue of material fact exists with
regard to the immunity of Officer Clifton and Officer Davis. 
The trial court had before it evidence that clearly
showed the accident and the surrounding circumstances. 
Additionally, the evidence clearly showed that the officers
were engaged in conduct that qualifies for immunity and that
the officers were not the proximate cause of Mines's injuries.
Mines did not refute this evidence, nor did she proffer any
evidence indicating that additional discovery would challenge
the officers' immunity defense.  Therefore, the trial court
erred in denying Officer Clifton and Officer Davis's summary-
judgment motion based on immunity.
Likewise, the materials before us demonstrate that
Homewood is entitled to immunity.  Section 6–5–338(b), Ala.
Code 1975, provides that the immunity enjoyed by peace
officers 
extends 
to 
"governmental 
units 
or 
agencies 
authorized
to appoint peace officers."  See also Ex parte City of
Gadsden,  781 So.2d 936 (Ala. 2000)(holding that because the
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officer's decision to pursue the suspect was a discretionary
act entitled to immunity, the plain language of § 6–5–338(b),
Ala. Code 1975, extended that immunity to the municipality
that employed the officer).  Accordingly, because Officer
Clifton and Officer Davis were engaged in a discretionary act
entitling them to immunity from Mines's suit, Homewood, the
municipality that employed them, is also entitled to immunity
from Mines's suit.
Conclusion
Officer Clifton and Officer Davis have established that
they are entitled to immunity as to Mines's claims against
them in both their official and individual capacities. 
Moreover, because Officer Clifton and Officer Davis are
entitled to immunity, Homewood is also entitled to immunity. 
Officer 
Clifton, 
Officer 
Davis, 
and 
Homewood 
have 
demonstrated
a clear, legal right to a summary judgment in their favor. 
Therefore, we grant their petition and issue the writ,
directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment for
Officer Clifton, Officer Davis, and Homewood.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
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