Title: Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 022528
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2003

PRESENT:  HASSELL, C.J., KEENAN, KOONTZ, KINSER, LEMONS, and 
AGEE, JJ., and CARRICO, S.J. 
 
UPPER OCCOQUAN SEWAGE AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022528 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 31, 2003 
BLAKE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC./ 
POOLE & KENT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Hon. Jane M. Roush, Judge 
 
 
Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority ("UOSA") appeals rulings of 
the Circuit Court of Fairfax County in proceedings which arose 
out of a construction contract between UOSA and Blake 
Construction Company/Poole & Kent ("the Joint Venture").  On 
appeal, UOSA's multiple assignments of error essentially assert 
the trial court erred by: (1) denying UOSA's application for 
costs under Code § 2.2—4335(A); (2) denying UOSA's motion to 
strike certain Joint Venture claims on the basis of filing 
appeals more than six months after UOSA's final written 
decisions denying the claims; and (3) denying UOSA's motion to 
strike and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the basis that certain Joint Venture notices of claim or time 
impact analyses either were not filed or were filed late. 
 
For the following reasons, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
This litigation involves multiple disputes arising out of a 
contract for construction of a waste water treatment facility 
 
2
located in Fairfax County (the "Project").  UOSA, the owner of 
the facility, is a public authority created pursuant to the 
Virginia Waste and Water Authorities Act, Code § 15.2-5100 
through -5158, to provide waste water reclamation for its member 
jurisdictions, the counties of Fairfax and Prince William and 
the cities of Manassas and Manassas Park.  As a public 
authority, UOSA is subject to the Virginia Public Procurement 
Act, Code § 2.2-4300 through -43771 (the "VPPA"). 
 
Blake Construction Co., Inc. and Poole & Kent Corporation 
formed the Joint Venture in order to submit a bid for the 
Project.  The Joint Venture's bid was successful, and the Joint 
Venture agreed to furnish all labor, materials, and equipment 
for the Project in a contract dated December 10, 1996 (the 
"Contract").  The Contract allows the Joint Venture to obtain an 
increase in the contract price and/or an extension of time to 
complete certain work upon written application to UOSA pursuant 
to procedures set forth in the Contract. 
 
The Joint Venture began work on the Project in January 1997 
which is ongoing at the time of this appeal.  During the course 
of the work, numerous changes were made to the original 
                     
 
1 At the time the claims at issue in this appeal arose in 
the trial court, the VPPA was codified at Code § 11-35 et seq., 
but was recodified at Code § 2.2-4300 et seq. by the General 
Assembly in 2001.  We will refer to the corresponding provisions 
of the current Code of Virginia in this opinion.  
  
 
3
contract, some of which are in dispute and resulted in the 
proceedings now at bar. 
 
Procedures set forth in the Contract allow the Joint 
Venture to obtain an increase in the contract price and/or an 
extension of time to complete certain work upon written 
application to UOSA.  If UOSA issues an adverse final decision 
on the claim (i.e. denies the claim), the VPPA allows the Joint 
Venture to appeal that final decision to the circuit court 
"within six months of the date of the final decision on the 
claim by the public body" for a de novo determination of its 
claim.  See Code § 2.2-4363(D).2  As the Project remains ongoing, 
this has engendered litigation by the parties while their 
contractual relationship continues. 
 
The Joint Venture filed six lawsuits appealing adverse 
claim decisions by UOSA which were eventually consolidated by 
order of the trial court (collectively, the "consolidated 
cases").  UOSA filed a plea in bar to approximately sixty of the 
claims pled by the Joint Venture in the consolidated cases.  The 
plea in bar alleged that the Joint Venture failed to comply in a 
                     
 
2 Code § 2.2-4363(D) provides: 
The decision of the public body shall be 
final and conclusive unless the contractor 
appeals within six months of the date of the 
final decision on the claim by the public 
body by invoking administrative procedures 
meeting the standards of § 2.2-4365, if 
available, or in the alternative by 
instituting legal action as provided in 
§ 2.2-4364. 
 
4
timely manner with various contractual and statutory procedural 
requirements. 
 
On September 28, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in the 
plea in bar proceeding on a special verdict form noting separate 
adjudications for each claim.3  Pursuant to that verdict, the 
trial judge, Judge Roush, entered an order on October 24, 2001 
("the October 24th order"), denying UOSA's plea in bar on 
twenty-nine of the Joint Venture's claims.  The October 24th 
order also included this stipulation: "The parties also 
stipulate that the Amended Motion for Judgment and Declaratory 
Judgment filed in Law 193766 contains no claim for unspecified 
delays or manipulation of schedule other than as may be included 
in any specific claim itemized therein."4
 
Both parties made post-trial motions to set aside portions 
of the verdict, which the trial court denied.  The remaining 
issues in the consolidated cases were set for a trial on the 
merits to begin June 17, 2002. 
 
While the plea in bar trial primarily dealt with the notice 
and timely filing procedural requirements of certain claims, 
separate issues were raised by the Joint Venture through the 
amended motion for judgment and declaratory judgment in Law 
                                                                  
 
 
3 During the trial, the Joint Venture withdrew some claims 
as premature and non-suited others. 
 
 
4 Law #193766 is one of the consolidated cases. 
 
 
5
#193766.  The Joint Venture asserted, in part, a violation of 
the VPPA regarding a bar on damages for unreasonable delay, 
which is the subject of the companion appeal, Blake Construction 
Co., Inc./Poole & Kent v. Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority, 266 
Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2003) (today decided).  The declaratory 
judgment action also requested a declaration that UOSA 
materially breached the Contract and the Joint Venture was thus 
entitled to "[r]ecover the reasonable value of its services 
performed to the date of termination, plus a reasonable 
allowance for overhead and profit." 
 
In supplemental responses to interrogatories prior to the 
scheduled trial date, the Joint Venture calculated its damages 
"[b]ecause UOSA is in material breach of the Contract."  The 
Joint Venture's measure of damages was "its reasonable costs 
incurred in prosecuting the work plus the Joint Venture's 
[General & Administrative] overhead less that which has already 
been paid."  As of February 28, 2002, the Joint Venture 
represented its material breach damages to be $63,258,497. 
 
UOSA filed a motion to strike damages for material breach 
on January 25, 2002.  After a hearing on February 8, 2002, Judge 
Roush denied the motion.  Ruling from the bench, she said the 
Joint Venture's declaratory judgment pleading "is a classic use 
of a declaratory judgment action, I think it's appropriate."  
That same day, Judge Roush entered an order ("the February 8th 
order"), memorializing the bench ruling which provides in 
 
6
pertinent part:  "[i]t appearing that the motion to strike the 
Joint Venture's damages for material breach should be denied, it 
is therefore ORDERED that UOSA's motion to strike the Joint 
Venture's damages for material breach be and hereby is denied." 
 
Judge Finch, substituting for Judge Roush, opined from the 
bench during a May 23, 2002, pretrial hearing that "material 
breach is no longer an issue . . . therefore, the effect is that 
all damages regarding material breach are to be excluded from 
the trial of these consolidated cases."  No order appears in the 
record to implement or explain Judge Finch's remarks from the 
bench.  The Joint Venture non-suited the material breach claim 
and all remaining claims in the consolidated cases on May 29, 
2002. 
 
UOSA subsequently filed an application for costs pursuant 
to Code § 2.2-4335(C) seeking $2,962,715.13.  The trial court 
held an evidentiary hearing on UOSA's application for costs and 
subsequently granted the Joint Venture's motion to strike. 
 
We granted UOSA this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  UOSA's Application for Costs 
 
Code § 2.2-4335(C) provides protection to a public body for 
delay claims made by contractors which are false or without 
factual or legal basis.  The mechanism chosen by the General 
Assembly is the in terrorem effect of recovering litigation 
 
7
costs from the contractor which are attributable to a frivolous 
delay claim.  The statute provides in pertinent part: 
A contractor making a claim against a public body 
for costs or damages due to the alleged delaying 
of the contractor in the performance of its work 
under any public construction contract shall be 
liable to the public body and shall pay it for a 
percentage of all costs incurred by the public 
body in investigating, analyzing, negotiating, 
litigating and arbitrating the claim, which 
percentage shall be equal to the percentage of 
the contractor's total delay claim that is 
determined through litigation or arbitration to 
be false or to have no basis in law or in fact. 
 
Code § 2.2-4335(C) (emphasis added). 
 
 
The trial court denied UOSA's application for costs under 
the statute finding insufficient evidence of "a determination 
within the meaning of the statute or to show that the delay 
claims had no basis in law or fact."  For the following reasons, 
we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
UOSA contends that the Joint Venture's claim for material 
breach damages of $63,000,000 was, in actuality, a claim for 
delay damages.  The Joint Venture responds that its damages lay 
in quantum meruit and thus its claim was not one for delay 
damages. 
 
UOSA argues the material breach claim was really a delay 
damages claim that was effectively stipulated out of the case 
through the October 24th order and verified by Judge Finch's 
later bench ruling.  UOSA reasons that the continued litigation 
of the material breach claim by the Joint Venture thereafter was 
 
8
essentially a de facto "determination" under the statute that 
the material breach claim was a false act not based on law or 
fact.  UOSA thus concludes it is entitled to a percentage of its 
litigation costs incurred in opposing the material breach claim.5  
However, UOSA's argument runs into an immediate roadblock. 
 
Nothing in the October 24th order addresses the material 
breach claim as set out in Law #193766.  More importantly, UOSA 
cannot avoid the unmistakable clarity of the record which 
contains the uncontradicted, succeeding and specific February 
8th order finding material breach damages were in the 
consolidated cases to be tried. 
 
As we noted in Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 578, 318 S.E.2d 
292, 297 (1984), it is fundamental that "a court of record 
speaks only through its written orders."  UOSA has not assigned 
error to the February 8th order which specifically denied UOSA's 
motion to strike material breach damages.  Accordingly, the 
February 8th order is the law of the case.  See Searles v. 
Gordon, 156 Va. 289, 294-96, 157 S.E. 759, 761 (1931). 
                     
 
5 As a tangential matter, we note the voluminous 
documentation regarding UOSA's application for costs is 
difficult to decipher and may well contain costs for non-delay 
items.  We also note UOSA offered no evidence at the hearing on 
its application for costs except to introduce its cost records 
and refer to the existing record in the case as evidence that a 
"determination" within the meaning of the statute had already 
occurred.  Although we have reservations about UOSA's ability to 
carry its initial burden under Code § 2.2-4335(C) with this 
evidence alone, the trial court made no finding in that regard 
so we will assume, for purposes of appeal, that UOSA's claimed 
 
9
 
As in Hill, no order appears in the record to modify or 
vacate the February 8th order.  For whatever purpose Judge Finch 
may have remarked on material breach damages from the bench on 
May 23, 2002, those remarks do not change the law of the case 
and the binding effect of the February 8th order.  Hill, 227 Va. 
at 578, 318 S.E.2d. at 297. 
 
It strains credulity that UOSA would ask the trial court to 
clarify that it had already ruled the material breach claim was 
stipulated out of the case over three months earlier in the 
October 24th order, but not make that argument to the court at 
the February 8th hearing or in its written motion.  That 
invitation, if extended outside the record, was unequivocally 
rejected by the trial judge through the plain and unmistakable 
language of the February 8th order. 
 
The law of the case thus directs the finding that material 
breach damages were very much in the consolidated cases until 
the filing of the May 29, 2002, nonsuit.  Accordingly, UOSA's 
argument that the material breach claim was out of the case 
fails.  There is thus no evidence in the record of a false or 
statutorily baseless delay damages claim upon which UOSA can 
anchor its application for statutory costs.  The trial court's 
judgment denying UOSA's cost application was therefore correct. 
                                                                  
litigation costs were limited to the items it alleged were 
related to delay damages claims. 
 
10
B.  Special Verdicts on the Individual Claims 
 
The trial court conducted a plea in bar hearing from 
September 17-28, 2001, at the conclusion of which forty-six 
claims relating to time extensions were submitted to the jury.  
The jury recorded its verdict on a special verdict form and 
found that the Joint Venture was prohibited from pursuing 
seventeen of its claims because it had either not complied with 
the requirements for submitting claims under the Contract or had 
failed to file suit within six months.  The jury found that 
twenty-nine of the Joint Venture's claims were not procedurally 
or time barred.  UOSA filed motions to strike and a motion 
notwithstanding the verdict challenging the jury's findings.  
The trial court denied those motions and entered an order 
confirming the jury's verdict. 
 
UOSA assigns error to the denial of its motions to strike 
and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  
Specifically, UOSA asserts the trial court erred in: 
 
(1) denying its motion to strike and motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict with respect to Work Orders 12, 
30, 39, 41, 64, 70, 71, 76, 106, 152, Claim 18, and PCO 115 
because the evidence showed the Joint Venture failed to 
file appeals of these claims within six months as required; 
 
(2) denying its motion to strike and motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict with respect to Work Orders 113 
 
11
and 175 because the Joint Venture expressly waived these 
claims by signing a change order; 
 
(3) denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict with respect to Work Orders 88, 106, 127, 193, and 
Claim 252 for lack of evidence that the Joint Venture 
timely submitted a time impact analysis as required; and 
 
(4) denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict with respect to Claims 240 and 280 for lack of 
evidence that the Joint Venture submitted a timely notice 
of claim as required. 
 
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we review 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in 
a light most favorable to the Joint Venture, which prevailed in 
the trial court on the claims UOSA now contests.  WJLA-TV v. 
Levin, 264 Va. 140, 146, 564 S.E.2d 383, 386 (2002) (citing RF&P 
Railroad v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 251 Va. 201, 208, 
468 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996)).  We will uphold the judgment of the 
trial court unless it appears from the evidence that the 
 
12
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.6  
Code § 8.01-680; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. John, 259 Va. 
71, 76, 524 S.E.2d 649, 651 (2000) (citing RF&P Corporation v. 
Little, 247 Va. 309, 319, 440 S.E.2d 908, 915 (1994)). 
 
During the plea in bar trial the jury was asked to decide 
whether the Joint Venture appealed certain claims within six 
months, waived certain claims, submitted time impact analyses 
for certain claims, and timely submitted a notice of claim for 
other claims.  The jury determined the Joint Venture complied 
with the Contract's requirements in each of the claims now 
before us on appeal.  The jury's verdicts, in all but one 
                     
6  
The standard under which a trial court 
should review the evidence adduced at trial before 
granting a motion to strike the case at the end of a 
plaintiff's evidence is well settled under prior 
decisions of this Court.  That standard requires the 
trial court to accept as true all the evidence 
favorable to the plaintiff as well as any reasonable 
inference a jury might draw therefrom which would 
sustain the plaintiff's cause of action. The trial 
court is not to judge the weight and credibility of 
the evidence, and may not reject any inference from 
the evidence favorable to the plaintiff unless it 
would defy logic and common sense. 
 
Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 Va. 134, 138, 486 S.E.2d 285, 287 
(1997). 
 
 
13
instance, find evidentiary support in the record and cannot be 
said to be plainly wrong.7
 
UOSA's proposed verdict form for Work Orders 12, 30, 39, 
41, 64, 70, 71, 76, 106, 152, Claim 18, and PCO 115 asked the 
jury to decide whether the Joint Venture filed suit within six 
months of "UOSA's written decision on this claim challenging 
such decision." (Emphasis added).  The verdict form submitted to 
the jury substituted the word "final" for the word "written" but 
otherwise mirrored UOSA's proposed language.  The record 
reflects that the jury had sufficient evidence before it to 
determine when the Joint Venture's claims began to accrue for 
purposes of calculating the six-month period.  The jury's 
findings on these issues cannot be said to be plainly wrong or 
without evidentiary support.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
trial court's denial of UOSA's motion to strike and motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Work Orders 12, 30, 39, 
41, 64, 70, 71, 76, 106, 152, Claim 18, and PCO 115. 
 
UOSA's proposed verdict form with respect to Work Orders 
113 and 175 was adopted verbatim by the trial court.  In both 
instances the jury found that the Joint Venture did not waive 
                     
 
7 In response to UOSA's assignments of error regarding the 
individual "special verdict" claims the Joint Venture asserts 
that UOSA did not "move to strike Work Orders 12, 41, 64, 70, 
71, 106, Claim 18 or PCO 115."  (BIO at 31).  Because we find 
that the jury's verdict with respect to these claims is not 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, we do not 
address the Joint Venture's contentions in this regard. 
 
 
14
any claim by signing Change Order 79.  Given the evidence in the 
record these findings cannot be said to be plainly wrong.  As 
such, we will affirm the trial court's denial of UOSA's motion 
to strike and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
for Work Orders 113 and 175. 
 
The jury was asked to decide, with respect to Work Orders 
88, 106, 127, 193 and Claim 252, whether the Joint Venture 
timely submitted a time impact analysis as required by the 
Contract.  The trial court adopted wholesale UOSA's proposed 
instructions.  In each instance, the jury found that the Joint 
Venture timely submitted a time impact analysis.  The evidence 
in the record supports the jury's finding as to Work Orders 88, 
106, 193 and Claim 252 which are thus not plainly wrong.  
However, the verdict on Work Order 127 is without support in the 
record. 
 
Work Order 127 was issued on August 16, 1999.  The only 
evidence in the record as to a time impact analysis from the 
Joint Venture is dated October 3, 2001, obviously long past the 
Contract's seven day filing requirement.  During oral argument 
before this Court the Joint Venture referenced a document that 
would support the jury's finding with respect to Work Order 127.  
However, the Joint Venture has since acknowledged this document 
does not appear in the record and cannot be relied upon for 
purposes of appeal.  Accordingly, there was no evidence to 
support the jury's finding that the Joint Venture timely 
 
15
submitted a time impact analysis regarding Work Order 127.  The 
jury's verdict was therefore plainly wrong. 
 
We will affirm the trial court's denial of UOSA's motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Work Orders 88, 
106, 193 and Claim 252, but will reverse the trial court with 
respect to Work Order 127. 
 
Finally, with respect to Claims 240 and 280, the jury found 
that the Joint Venture timely filed a notice of claim.  The 
jury's decision is supported by the evidence in the record and 
cannot be said to be plainly wrong.  We will affirm the trial 
court's denial of UOSA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict for Claims 240 and 280. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment denying UOSA's application for costs pursuant to Code 
§ 2.2-4335(C).  We will affirm the judgment of the trial court 
in denying UOSA's motion to strike and motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict as to Work Orders 12, 30, 39, 41, 
64, 70, 71, 76, 88, 106, 113, 152, 175, 193, Claim 18, Claim 
240, Claim 280, Claim 252, and PCO 115.  We will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court in denying UOSA's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to Work Order 127 and 
enter final judgment. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and final judgment.