Title: Carter v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 212, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ARTHUR CARTER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 212, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 1306020689 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 3, 2014 
  Decided: November 12, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 12th day of November 2014, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the State's 
response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Arthur Carter, was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury in January 2014 of Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), and Possession of a Firearm by a 
Person Prohibited (PFPP).  The Superior Court declared Carter to be a habitual 
offender and sentenced him to a total period of thirty-five years at Level V 
incarceration to be suspended after serving thirty years for a period of probation.  
This is Carter’s direct appeal. 
 
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(2) 
Carter's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
under Rule 26(c).  Carter's counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and careful 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Carter's attorney informed him of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Carter 
with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Carter also 
was informed of his right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  
(3) 
In response to his counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief, Carter raised three issues 
for the Court’s consideration.  First, he contends that the State violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront a witness against him when it failed to call the victim 
to testify.  Carter next asserts that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish 
his guilt on the charge of PFDCF because there was no gun or shell casing or other 
physical evidence admitted at trial.  Finally, Carter contends that the admission 
into evidence of his taped interview with the police violated his due process rights 
because his statement was not knowing and voluntary because he was intoxicated.  
After the State filed its response to counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief, Carter filed an 
additional argument contending that the State violated Brady v. Maryland when it 
failed to disclose that the victim had written two letters recanting her prior 
statement to the police.  The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court's 
judgment. 
 
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(4) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) 
this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (b) this Court must 
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an 
adversary presentation.1 
 (5) 
The State’s evidence at trial fairly established the following version of 
events.  On June 22, 2013, Carter got into an argument with his pregnant girlfriend, 
Morlicea Capers, at her uncle’s home in Edgemoor Gardens.  Capers’ uncle 
forcibly pushed Carter out of the residence.  Once Carter was outside, he fired a 
gun into the air and then sped off in a silver car.  Both Capers and a child inside the 
home telephoned 911 during the incident.  Tapes of both phone calls were admitted 
into evidence.  The State also admitted a redacted videotaped statement that Carter 
gave to police on June 27, 2013, the day he was arrested.  In the tape, Carter 
initially says that someone fired a gun but that he did not know who.  Later in the 
videotape, Carter admits that he fired a .45 caliber gun in the air before fleeing the 
scene.   
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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(6) 
Two neighborhood residents testified at trial that they heard gunshots 
on the evening of June 22, 2013.  One of those witnesses testified that she heard an 
argument just prior to the sound of a gunshot.  Neither neighbor could identify the 
shooter.  One of the police officers who responded to the scene testified that he 
arrived within minutes after receiving a dispatch reporting a domestic dispute 
involving a gun.  The officer interviewed Capers who stated that she had had a 
physical altercation with Carter, after which Carter left the residence and then 
returned with a handgun and fired a shot in the air outside the residence before he 
fled the scene in a silver car.  Capers did not testify at trial.  Carter also did not 
testify at trial.  At the close of the State’s evidence, counsel moved for acquittal on 
the charges of Aggravated Menacing and PFDCF because there was no evidence 
that Capers had actually been in fear of imminent physical injury.  The Superior 
Court denied the motion. 
(7) 
On appeal, Carter first contends that he was denied his constitutional 
right to confront Capers at trial.  While Carter contends that he was denied his right 
to confront and cross-examine Capers, it appears that Carter’s underlying point is 
that the Superior Court erred in admitting into evidence Capers’ out-of-court 
statements to the police and the tape of the 911 phone calls.  We review this claim 
for abuse of discretion.2   
                                                 
2 Dailey v. State, 956 A.2d 1191, 1194 (Del. 2008). 
 
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(8) 
In Dixon v. State,3 this Court upheld the admission of a recorded 
phone call between a 911 operator and a witness to a shooting.  We concluded in 
that case that the taped phone call fell within the “excited utterance” exception to 
the hearsay rule under Delaware Rule of Evidence 803(2) and that its admission 
did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because it was 
“non-testimonial.”4  We find the same true in Carter’s case.  During the first taped 
phone call, Carter was still in the residence.  During the second taped phone call, 
made two minutes after the first, Carter was outside the residence firing a gun.  
Both phone calls (i) were precipitated by an exciting event, (ii) were made while 
the excitement of the event was continuing, and (iii) related to the exciting event.5  
As the Superior Court found, both phone calls qualified as excited utterances under 
DRE 803(2).   
(9) 
Moreover, the admission of the 911 phone calls and Capers’ 
statements to the police did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the 
statements were non-testimonial.  The statements were admissible because they 
“made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police 
                                                 
3 996 A.2d 1271 (Del. 2010). 
4 Id. at 1276-79. 
5 Id. at 1276. 
 
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assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”6  Accordingly, there was no violation 
of Carter’s Sixth Amendments rights, and the Superior Court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting this evidence at trial. 
(10) Next, Carter contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction for PFDCF because the State did not recover a gun or any physical 
evidence that proved he possessed a firearm.  In reviewing a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, the Court must determine, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have 
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.7  In this case, the evidence 
at trial reflected that Capers reported to police that Carter engaged in a physical 
altercation with her inside a residence and then shot a gun in the air after he left the 
residence.  Carter’s own statement to police confirmed that he possessed and shot a 
gun.  Moreover, neighbors testified to hearing gun shots.  Under the circumstances, 
the evidence was sufficient to support Carter’s conviction for PFDCF.8 
(11) Carter’s third argument is that his videotaped statement was 
inadmissible because he was intoxicated and did not talk to police voluntarily.  
Carter did not object to the admission of his statement below; therefore, we review 
                                                 
6 Id. at 1278 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). 
7 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
8 See Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 950 (Del. 1980). 
 
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for plain error.9  Plain error exists when the error complained of is apparent on the 
face of the record and is so prejudicial to a defendant’s substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the integrity and fairness of the trial.10  The burden of persuasion is on 
the defendant to show prejudice.11  In this case, Carter’s statement to police was 
admissible whether or not he testified at trial.12  Moreover, Carter has offered 
nothing besides his bare assertion to substantiate his contention that he was 
intoxicated at the time he made his statement.  There is nothing in the videotaped 
statement, which reflects that Carter was calm, rational, and articulate when he 
spoke to police, to support this belated contention.  We thus find no plain error. 
(12) Finally, we reject Carter’s supplemental argument that the State 
committed a Brady violation when it failed to disclose that Capers had written two 
letters recanting the statements she made to police following her 911 phone call. In 
Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution 
must disclose to the defense evidence favorable to the defendant.13  There are three 
elements to a Brady violation: “the evidence at issue must be favorable to the 
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence 
                                                 
9 Del. R. Evid. 103(d). 
10 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
11 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 
12 See Del. R. Evid. 801(2)(A) (providing that the out-of-court statement of a party opponent is 
not hearsay). 
13 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 
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must have been suppressed by the State; and prejudice must have ensued.”14 In this 
case, contrary to Carter’s contention, the State did not suppress disclosure of these 
letters.  The record reflects that Capers wrote her letters and sent them to two 
different Superior Court judges.  Both letters were docketed in Carter’s case and 
are part of the public record.  The State committed no Brady violation.   
(13) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Carter’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Carter's counsel has made a conscientious effort to 
examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Carter could not 
raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
14 Norman v. State, 968 A.2d 27, 30 (Del. 2009).