Title: State v. John Martini, Sr
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-222-97
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PORITZ, C.J., writing for a majority of the Court. This appeal involves the Public Defender's petition for post-conviction relief over the objection of defendant, John Martini, Sr., whose murder conviction and death sentence were affirmed previously by this Court. In 1990, a jury convicted Martini of the kidnapping murder of Irving Flax, a Fair Lawn business executive. During the trial, Martini did not dispute the kidnapping or that he had shot the victim three times in the back of the head. Instead, he asserted that his cocaine addiction diminished his capacity such that the murder was not committed purposely or knowingly. During the penalty phase, the jury found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and sentenced Martini to death. This Court affirmed Martini's conviction and death sentence in 1993 (Martini I) and on proportionality review in 1994 (Martini II). After the United States Supreme Court denied Martini's petition for certiorari in 1995, the Public Defender sought post-conviction relief (PCR) on Martini's behalf, even though Martini stated he did not wish to file any further appeals. The trial court granted a stay and appointed independent counsel to represent Martini and a psychiatrist to determine whether Martini was competent to waive PCR proceedings. Following a hearing, the court concluded that Martini was competent and that the Public Defender could not pursue PCR on Martini's behalf without his consent. In Martini III, this Court held that Martini's personal choice could not take precedence over the State's paramount concern for the reliability and integrity of a death sentencing decision. It remanded for a PCR hearing focusing on the limited issues that were not capable of review in Martini's initial appeal. On remand, the Public Defender attempted to present materials considered confidential by Martini, claiming the information contained mitigating evidence erroneously omitted at the penalty-phase trial. Martini expressed his continuing desire that the evidence remain confidential. After examining the evidence in camera, the trial court ruled that Martini's interest in maintaining its confidentiality prevented its use in the PCR proceeding. This Court granted the Public Defender's motion for leave to appeal that decision. In Martini IV, this Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for the trial court to reconsider, in an in camera proceeding, the issue of the omission of the evidence from Martini's penalty-phase trial. The trial court heard testimony from Martini's original counsel (who withdrew before trial), his actual trial counsel, a member of the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, and others. The court found that there was a substantial downside to the presentation of the omitted evidence that outweighed any mitigating factors. The trial court concluded that defendant's trial counsel would not have used the evidence in the penalty-phase proceeding, and therefore that counsel's failure to obtain it was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the trial judge found that Martini's trial attorneys were not ineffective, he went on to address the question whether Martini has an interest in preserving the confidentiality of the evidence. The judge concluded that even if the evidence had some minimal mitigating value, it was outweighed by Martini's substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information. The judge explained that if the information were presented in a new penalty-phase trial, criminal defendants will believe that they cannot share confidences with their attorneys without risking exposure at some later date. Further, the trial judge expressed the opinion that Martini's confidentiality interest could not be adequately preserved in a new penalty-phase trial. The trial judge also rejected the other points raised in the PCR petition. These included an allegation that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the confidential information; a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and present to the jury additional evidence of Martini's cocaine use; and a claim that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that Martini would be subject to a 45 year term (consecutive terms of 30 years on the murder and 15 years on the kidnapping) deprived Martini of due process. The Public Defender appeals the trial court's determinations on all the claims raised in the PCR petition. Martini's special counsel requests that the Court affirm the decision below. HELD: The failure of Martini's trial counsel to discover and introduce the allegedly mitigating evidence during the penalty phase does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel or otherwise constitute a violation of Martini's constitutional rights; the denial of the Public Defender's other claims for post-conviction relief is affirmed. 1. The usefulness of the evidence that the Public Defender argues should have been used in mitigation is seriously undermined by its unfavorable aspects. Introduction of the evidence posed the clear risk of an adverse jury reaction, and also would have opened the door to damaging rebuttal evidence by the State. (pp. 12-16) 2. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires proof that counsel's representation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness (deficiency prong). In addition, it must be shown that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (prejudice prong). In the context of a penalty-phase proceeding, the prejudice prong is established if, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the jury's deliberations would have been affected substantially. (pp. 16-19) 3. The Public Defender argues that Martini's counsel was ineffective because of the failure to uncover the omitted evidence and then, to use it in the penalty-phase trial. However, counsel's failure was significantly affected by Martini's conduct. Martini purposely hid the information because he considered it confidential. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for his attorneys to conclude that further investigation would not yield anything useful. And, to the extent that Martini's lawyers had some idea that there was additional evidence, it was reasonable for them to believe its discovery would result in more harm than good. (pp. 19-22) 4. Although there is some marginal mitigation value to the omitted material, its potentially harmful nature and the damaging rebuttal opportunity it provides weigh heavily against presenting it to a jury. Therefore, the absence of the evidence at Martini's penalty-phase trial was not prejudicial. (pp. 22-23) 5. Under the Brady rule, the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused is a violation of due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Public Defender alleges that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose to Martini's defense the information that Martini considers confidential. For the reasons already expressed, it is not reasonably probable that disclosure of that omitted evidence would have resulted in a different outcome. (pp. 23-26) 6. The Court rejects the other claims raised by the Public Defender in its petition. (pp. 26-34) The denial of the petition for post-conviction relief is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE COLEMAN, concurring, is of the view that the Public Defender should not have been permitted to file a PCR petition over Martini's objection, as he expressed in his dissent in Martini III. However, now that the Court has permitted the PCR proceedings to be conducted, he agrees with the conclusion that the petition was properly denied. JUSTICE O'HERN, concurring, is of the view that it would be impossible to conduct a closed penalty-phase hearing. Although he believes that the newly-discovered evidence is mitigating, he also believes that Martini's reasons for excluding it are not irrational. He concludes that a jury verdict is not irrational when a defendant's reasons for excluding mitigating evidence are not irrational. JSUTICE HANDLER, dissenting, is of the view that, given the confidential nature of the newly-discovered evidence and the public's entitlement to an open proceeding, the State cannot, in any principled way consistent with constitutional standards, prosecute Martini for capital murder and exact the death penalty. JUSTICES POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate concurring opinion in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate concurring opinion in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate dissenting opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN MARTINI, SR., Defendant-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER, Petitioner-Appellant. Submitted October 14, 1998 -- Decided July 27, 1999 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Bergen County. Mark H. Friedman and Theresa Yvette Kyles, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, submitted briefs on behalf of appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Susan W. Sciacca, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, submitted a brief on behalf of respondent State of New Jersey (William H. Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Sciacca, Fred L. Schwanwede, First Assistant Prosecutor, and Marilyn Goceliak Zdobinski, Special Deputy Attorney General, of counsel). Alan L. Zegas submitted a brief on behalf of respondent John Martini, Sr. The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J. (1) a defense based on certain undisclosed information that has been imparted to the Public Defender and presumably was not disclosed to the jury below; (2) a new constitutional principle announced by the Supreme Court after Martini's trial in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994); and (3) evidence disclosed after Martini's conviction that suggests that New Jersey's death penalty system may be constitutionally flawed because of systematic discrimination against blacks and other minorities. On remand, the Public Defender attempted to present materials Martini considered confidential, claiming that the information contained therein constituted mitigating evidence erroneously omitted at the penalty-phase trial. As Martini expressed his continuing desire that this evidence remain confidential, the court conducted an in camera inspection of the Public Defender's submission and ruled that Martini's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the submitted materials prevented their use in the PCR proceeding. The Public Defender sought leave to appeal the court's decision, which we granted. On reviewing the record and written arguments of counsel, this Court vacated the trial court's order and again remanded the matter to permit the judge to "reconsider the issue of the omission of mitigating evidence from defendant's penalty-phase trial." Martini IV, supra, 148 N.J. at 453. We directed the lower court to determine: 1. Whether the evidence was mitigating; 2. If the evidence was mitigating, whether defense counsel's failure to obtain the evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or whether the omission of the evidence constituted a manifest injustice and a violation of defendant's constitutional rights, entitling defendant to post conviction relief; 3. If defendant is entitled to post conviction relief because of the failure to obtain or the omission of the evidence, whether defendant has an interest in preserving the confidentiality of the evidence; 4. If defendant has such a confidentiality interest, whether that interest can be protected in a penalty-phase proceeding by imposing conditions on the admission of the evidence, such as in camera proceedings, redaction of information, or the presentation of the evidence through summarization or paraphrasing in a form that will eliminate the concerns for confidentiality; and 5. If the evidence can be used subject to such conditions, whether the failure to use the evidence at the penalty-phase proceeding of defendant constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel or a manifest injustice and a violation of defendant's constitutional rights, entitling defendant to post conviction relief . . . . Lastly, we ordered the "hearing on remand [to] be conducted in camera, with the State and defendant being provided with all of the evidence at issue . . . subject to its absolute confidentiality and strict non-disclosure." Ibid. Over the course of one year and one week, the trial judge heard testimony from Martini's original trial counsel (who had withdrawn from the case prior to trial), Martini's actual trial counsel, a member of the Bergen County Prosecutor's Homicide Squad (who initially investigated the Flax murder), and other witnesses. After hearing the testimony, reviewing all of the confidential evidence and listening to argument, the court determined that the evidence was not mitigating. The court found that the testimony of Martini's trial counsel and the Public Defender first assigned to his case established that none of those attorneys would have used the alleged mitigating evidence in Martini's penalty-phase trial. To the contrary, trial counsel believed there was a substantial downside to the presentation of this evidence that outweighed any mitigating factors, and the Public Defender at that time saw the evidence as both "possibly good" and "not so hot." From this, the court concluded that the evidence "would [not] have had a significant impact on [the jury's] deliberations in that it [would not] have changed any one of [the juror's] minds[.]" Because the trial judge found that the Public Defender's evidence was not mitigating, counsel's failure to obtain it was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Similarly, the potentially damaging effect of the evidence eliminated the possibility that its omission constituted a manifest injustice to Martini. In reaching this conclusion, the judge refused to allow two experts to testify on the mitigation value of the evidence. The Public Defender sought to introduce the testimony of mitigation specialists who would have described how the evidence could have provided a construct for a favorable social history of Martini. The judge determined that he did not need the aid of expert opinion because, as the trial judge in the murder and penalty phase trials, he had acquired an understanding of the case that he was able to use in his evaluation of the evidence now proffered by the Public Defender. He further declined to admit the experts' reports, specifically holding that one of the reports was inadmissible because it was based in part on privileged communications between the expert and Martini. Although the judge found that defendant's trial attorneys were not ineffective, he nonetheless answered the question "whether defendant has an interest in preserving the confidentiality of the evidence." The judge concluded that even if the evidence had some mitigating value, that minimal value was outweighed by Martini's substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information. He explained that if the information is presented at a new penalty-phase trial, criminal defendants will learn that they cannot share confidences with their attorneys without risking exposure at some later date. In the court's view, even though the evidence sought to be admitted was not revealed by the client, the effects of using it could be devastating to the attorney-client relationship. Because the judge concluded that the jury decision to impose the death penalty was reliable, defendant's interest in confidentiality tipped the scale against a new penalty trial. Moreover, in the judge's opinion Martini's confidentiality interest could not be adequately preserved in a new trial, even through "in camera proceedings, redaction of information, or the presentation of the evidence through summarization or paraphrasing . . . ." Martini IV, supra, 148 N.J. at 454. After discussing the specific questions posed in Martini IV, the judge considered the additional points raised in the PCR petition not related to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Public Defender alleged that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the confidential information to the defense prior to Martini's murder trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963) ("[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . ."). The judge found this claim to be without merit. He concluded that the State did not have knowledge of the evidence at the time and, therefore, could not be obligated to release it to defendant. Further, even if the prosecutors had imputed knowledge, there was no Brady violation because the defendant himself possessed the information and chose not to share it with his attorneys. The court dismissed the claim that Martini's trial counsel were ineffective in failing to discover and present to the jury "burned screens" found in defendant's hotel room after he was arrested. The screens were overlooked by Martini's attorneys among the other evidence they reviewed before trial. Because the screens could have been used as additional evidence of defendant's cocaine use, the Public Defender argued that they would have strengthened Martini's diminished capacity defense. The court found that the evidence was cumulative and that it would not have altered the jury's decision to reject this defense. The court also ruled that the failure to instruct the jury that Martini would be subject to a consecutive fifteen-year parole ineligibility period for the kidnapping offense did not deprive the defendant of his due process right to a reliable sentencing proceeding. On this point, the judge pointed out "that this jury knew, based on all the testimony . . . as to Mr. Martini's age, his health[,] that certainly he would not be eligible for parole until he was 90 years old." The judge held that if there was error in these circumstances it was not harmful. Finally, the court briefly considered the Public Defender's allegations that the death penalty is administered in a racially discriminatory manner; that imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by international law; and that the cumulative effect of the errors at Martini's trial required a new penalty-phase proceeding. These claims were either dismissed or reserved to this Court (i.e., the racial bias claim). Accordingly, the Public Defender's PCR petition was denied. The Public Defender appeals the court's determinations on all of the claims raised in the PCR petition. Martini's special counsel requests that we affirm the decision below. 1. The Strickland/Marshall Test Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984), an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is made out upon proof that the representation is both deficient and prejudicial to the defendant. Counsel's representation is deficient if it falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693; it is prejudicial if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. The Strickland two-prong standard was adopted by this Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), as the appropriate measure of counsel's performance under Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. Subsequently, in State v. Davis, we determined that the Strickland/Fritz standard would "adequately fulfill the constitutional guarantee" in capital cases. 116 N.J. 341, 357 (1989). In Marshall III, for the first time we had occasion to consider the Strickland/Fritz standard in the context of a penalty-phase proceeding. "Our recognition of the profound distinction between our circumscribed appellate-review function and the capital jury's significantly less-restricted role in deciding between life and death," led us to modify the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz standard to reflect this dichotomy. Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 250. Under the reformulation, prejudice is established if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the jury's penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially." Ibid. As we noted in Marshall III, supra, that modification was "a necessary adaption of the literal Strickland standard to the realistic limitations on appellate review of jury penalty-phase deliberations." Ibid. We acknowledged that the reformulated standard essentially "equates with" the Strickland Court's understanding of "reasonable probability . . . [as] 'a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,'" ibid. (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698), and that it captures the "core meaning" of Strickland, id. at 251. 2. Deficiency Prong The Public Defender argues that Martini's representation was rendered ineffective by trial counsel's failure to conduct a timely and effective investigation that would have uncovered the omitted evidence, and, then, to use it at Martini's penalty-phase trial. We reject both claims. "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695. Whether this duty has been satisfied is measured by "reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Ibid. Put differently, when counsel's decision to limit an investigation is supported by "reasonable professional judgments," we will not find deficient performance. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3125, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638, 657; accord State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 624 (1990). In some cases, whether counsel's conduct is reasonable "may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2061, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695. Thus, when the "defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable." Ibid., 104 S. Ct. at 2061, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 696; see also Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 890 91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863, 108 S. Ct. 182, 98 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1987) ("A trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims as to which his client has neglected to supply the essential underlying facts when those facts are within the client's possession . . . ."). Here, counsel's failure to discover the omitted evidence was significantly affected by Martini's conduct. Martini purposely hid information from his attorney and deflected questions put to him because he considered the information to be confidential. Martini's trial counsel testified at the PCR hearing that he had asked defendant about the possibility that additional evidence existed and that defendant had responded: "it had no bearing on the case." When the information was discovered later Martini expressed his desire to keep it from being used in either the PCR hearing or in a new penalty-phase trial. Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 619-20 (Coleman, J., dissenting). That he did not want his attorneys to know about or use the information at his first penalty-phase trial is clear. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for his attorneys to conclude that further investigation would not yield anything useful. To the extent that Martini's lawyers had some idea that there was additional evidence, it also was reasonable for them to believe its discovery would result in more harm than good. On being informed about the nature of the evidence, trial counsel testified that, had he discovered it, he would "most likely" have kept it out because of its potentially damaging effect. Even Martini's original attorney, who had some limited knowledge of the evidence at the time, understood that it was both "possibly good" and "not so hot." Because the evidence, "although possibly beneficial to the defendant, posed the clear risk of an adverse jury reaction," Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 256, the decision to forego further investigation is supported by reasonable professional judgment and does not constitute deficient performance. See Boyd v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1999) (declaring capital defendant's attorney "did not perform deficiently in failing to investigate the issue further" because the evidence "may have influenced the jury negatively"), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (June 11, 1999) (No. 98-9745). 3. Prejudice Prong We begin our analysis of the prejudice prong with the Marshall III reformulation. The Public Defender claims that there is a reasonable probability that the jury's deliberations would have been affected substantially if the omitted evidence had been presented during Martini's penalty-phase trial. In Marshall III, we reviewed a similar claim in connection with certain mitigating evidence not adduced at Marshall's penalty phase trial, and concluded that the evidence was either flawed or not likely to have affected the jury. Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 252. Marshall complained that his sister and son would have testified "that his family loved him, and that his execution would harm the family." Ibid. Recognizing that Marshall had "already inflicted grievous harm on [his] family by" contracting for his wife's murder, and that the jurors would likely "have been offended" by such testimony, we rejected Marshall's claim. Ibid. Although State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998), was a direct appeal, it also is instructive. In Morton, we rejected another ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel's failure to call defendant's mother and daughter or to bring in a social worker to present a social history of defendant. Id. at 432. There, we reasoned that the testimony could have portrayed defendant in a negative light or undermined counsel's attempts to portray defendant's mother as an inadequate parent. Id. at 431 32. The evidence on which the Public Defender has based her ineffective assistance claim in this case is no different. Here, although there is some marginal mitigation value to the omitted material, its potentially harmful nature and the damaging rebuttal opportunity it provides, weigh heavily against presenting it to a jury. We hold that the absence of the evidence at Martini's penalty-phase trial was not prejudicial. C. Brady Claim In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963). The Brady rule was later held to apply even where, as here, the defendant makes no formal request for Brady material. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 351-52 (1976); State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 245 (1996). In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706, 713 (1972). Our discussion of the Strickland/Marshall test is directly pertinent to the question whether the proffered evidence in this case is "material." In United States v. Bagley, the United States Supreme Court adopted a unitary materiality standard applicable in all Brady violation cases. 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 505 (1995). Under the unitary standard, as adopted by this Court in State v. Knight,See footnote 44 supra, evidence is "material" if there is a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494; accord Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S. Ct. at 1565, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 505; Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 246. A "reasonable probability" is one that is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494. As we discussed supra at __ (slip. op. at 12-16), we cannot say that it is reasonably probable that disclosure of the omitted evidence would have resulted in a different outcome because, although the evidence has some mitigating value, it poses a "clear risk of an adverse jury reaction." Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 258. We reach this conclusion for the reasons previously expressed. First, the evidence itself has the potential to negatively influence the jury. See supra at __ (slip op. at 13). Second, presentation of the evidence would afford the State the opportunity to present damaging rebuttal evidence, albeit subject to a limiting instruction. Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 610; McDougald, supra, 120 N.J. at 574; Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 503-08. We conclude that it is not reasonably probable the result would have been different such that our confidence in the outcome is undermined.See footnote 55 E. Trial Counsel's Failure to Discover and Present the Burned Screens at the Penalty-Phase The Public Defender argues that Martini's trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to find and use at both the guilt and penalty-phase trials five burned cocaine screens that were found in Martini's and Afdahl's shared apartment and then placed in the State's physical evidence file. Although Martini's trial attorneys presented other drug paraphernalia at trial, they missed the five screens among the various items in the State's file. The Public Defender claims the screens would have provided additional critical support for the defense theory that Martini's drug addition had diminished his capacity and, more specifically, that he had used cocaine around the time of the murder. Trial counsel's failure to find the burned cocaine screens was inadvertent. Presumably, Martini knew the screens existed although he never mentioned them. The question remains, however, "whether the production of additional mitigating evidence would have been likely to have a substantial effect on the jury's deliberations." Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 250-51; see also Morton, supra, 155 N.J. at 431. Given counsel's presentation of other drug paraphernalia, including a glass cocaine pipe and a glass vial, and a certified laboratory report indicating that both the pipe and the vial contained trace elements of cocaine, the burned screens would have added only cumulative weight to the argument that Martini had used cocaine around the time of the murder. We do not believe that this additional evidence would have substantially affected the jury's deliberations and, therefore, also reject the Public Defender's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue. F. Trial Court's Failure to Inform the Jury that the Alternative to a Death Sentence Might Include a Period of Parole Ineligibility Beyond Thirty Years The Public Defender contends that the failure of the trial court to inform the jury about Martini's aggregate parole ineligibility, which could exceed thirty years, denied Martini his right to due process of law and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. On direct appeal, we rejected this argument. Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 308. Because defense counsel had not asked the trial court to so inform the jurors, and because the jury knew "of the practical consequences of defendant's life sentence," we held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the aggregate period of parole ineligibility was not error. Id. at 313. After our decision, the United States Supreme Court decided Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994). The Public Defender now argues that under Simmons, the Court must reverse on the lack of an instruction concerning sentencing alternatives. We disagree. In Simmons, the State presented "future dangerousness [as] a factor for the jury to consider when fixing the appropriate punishment." Id. at 157, 114 S. Ct. at 2190, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 139. In response, the defendant sought an instruction that would explain to the jury "that 'life imprisonment' did not carry with it the possibility of parole in [defendant's] case." Id. at 158, 114 S. Ct. at 2191, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 139. The trial court refused; moreover, when the jury asked about the possibility of parole, the court instructed the jurors "'not to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching [a] verdict.'" Id. at 160, 114 S. Ct. at 2192, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 140. The Supreme Court vacated Simmons's death sentence. The Court explained: [I]f the State rests its case for imposing the death penalty at least in part on the premise that the defendant will be dangerous in the future, the fact that the alternative sentence to death is life without parole will necessarily undercut the State's argument regarding the threat the defendant poses to society. Because truthful information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant to "deny or explain" the showing of future dangerousness, due process plainly requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention by way of argument by defense counsel or an instruction from the court. [Id. at 168-69, 114 S. Ct. at 2196, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 145-46.] First, in the instant case the State has not offered "defendant's 'future dangerousness' as an aggravating factor," nor could it do so. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 371 (1996) (Loftin I). As we pointed out in Loftin I, "[f]uture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors."See footnote 77 Ibid. Although we determined in Loftin I that "the holding of Simmons [was] therefore inapplicable. . . .," ibid., we required that in future cases, if the court, based on the evidence presented believes that there is a realistic likelihood that it will impose a sentence to be served consecutively to any of defendant's prior sentences, in the event the jury does not return a death sentence, the jury should be so informed. [Id. at 372.] G. International Law In State v. Nelson, we rejected the Public Defender's argument that New Jersey's death penalty violates international customary law, concluding that "[t]he United States of America has not subscribed to any international human rights accord that has invalidated the death penalty." 155 N.J. 487, 512 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999) (citations omitted). We reject the Public Defender's claim once again in this case. H. Systemic Racial Discrimination In State v. Loftin, we reaffirmed our commitment to "'the prevention of any impermissible discrimination in imposing the death penalty.'" 157 N.J. 253, 298 (1999) (Loftin II) (quoting State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 135 (1992) ). We found, however, that the results of the statistical models developed as part of the Court's frequency review have not "'relentlessly documented the risk' of racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty." Id. at 315; see also State v. Chew, ___ N.J. ___ (1999) (slip op. at 53); State v. Cooper, ___ N.J. ___ (1999) (slip op. at 83-84); State v. Harvey, ___ N.J. ___ (1999) (slip op. at 54-55). We therefore also reject the Public Defender's claim of systemic racial discrimination for the reasons stated in Loftin II. I. Cumulative Effect of the Errors The Public Defender's final claim is that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case warrants reversal of Martini's death sentence. The errors complained of are not independent of the claims we have already addressed. We conclude that the errors in the aggregate were not clearly capable of affecting the jury's determination that death is the appropriate sentence. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 170 (1991). STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN MARTINI, SR., Defendant-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER, Petitioner-Appellant. _____________________ COLEMAN J., concurring. The trial court found that defendant is competent and that he has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to pursue post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3:22. I continue to agree with the trial court, and would have declined to consider the post-conviction relief application by the Public Defender, over defendant's objections, for the reasons expressed in Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 618-27 (Coleman, J., dissenting). I agree with the trial court's determinations in both Martini III and Martini IV, supra, 148 N.J. at 455. Now that the Court has permitted the post-conviction relief proceedings to be conducted, I agree with the conclusion reached in Chief Justice Poritz's opinion that the trial court properly denied the post-conviction relief application. That conclusion and the reasoning advanced to support it are consistent with my views expressed in Martini III and Martini IV. I therefore concur in Chief Justice Poritz's opinion and the Court's judgment affirming the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. Justice Garibaldi joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 222 September Term 1997 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN MARTINI, SR., Defendant-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER, Petitioner-Appellant. O'HERN, J., concurring. I concur in the judgment of the Court. I write separately to set forth my reasoning. This is an application for post-conviction relief in a capital case based in part on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The claim relates to counsel's failure to obtain and present at trial certain confidential information concerning Martini's character. I am satisfied that reasonably competent capital counsel would have obtained the information. The question is whether the jury's penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially if the information had been obtained and presented at trial. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 250 (1997) (Marshall III). Under a constitution that guarantees public trials it would be impossible to conduct a partially-closed penalty-phase hearing. Even if such a closed hearing were not illegal, it would be unwise. In Marshall III, supra, the Court adopted a different test than the Strickland/FritzSee footnote 88 test for application in penalty trials to measure ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We departed from United States Supreme Court precedent: In contrast, the Marshall III Court held: Our recognition of the profound distinction between our circumscribed appellate-review function and the capital jury's significantly less restricted role in deciding between life and death informs our application of the prejudice prong of Strickland/Fritz to penalty-phase proceedings. That distinction demonstrates that a reviewing court strays from its traditional function if it attempts to predict the probability that a penalty-phase jury would have changed its verdict if counsel had not been deficient. In our view, an adaptation of the Strickland/Fritz prejudice test to capital-case penalty-phase proceedings that more faithfully reflects our appellate function would require courts to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the jury's penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially. That standard is, in our view, more consistent with the Strickland Court's admonition that a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. The reasonable probability that ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of a capital case substantially affected the jury's penalty-phase deliberation equates with a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Id. at 250.] I am satisfied that some of the undisclosed information would have affected substantially the jury's deliberations. To explain my reasoning is difficult when the reader does not know the contents of the undisclosed information. The reader will have to take my word for it that much of the information contained in the undisclosed files might have been considered mitigating by a jury. I certainly learned things about defendant that I did not know from his original appeal. Hence, for me, the question comes down to whether Martini's interest in preserving the confidentiality of the undisclosed information outweighs society's interest in seeing that the death penalty is imposed fairly and rationally. See State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225 (1988) (Koedatich II), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 108 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1989), and appeal after remand, 118 N.J. 513 (1990). In Koedatich, the Court explained that our procedures for trial and appeal are established not only to protect the interests of the accused, but also to enable a state to enact a constitutional death penalty statute. . . . A defendant who prevents the presentation of mitigating evidence withholds from the trier of fact potentially crucial information bearing on the penalty decision no less than if the defendant was himself prevented from introducing such evidence. . . ." A jury verdict is not irrational when the defendant's reasons for excluding the evidence are not irrational. That is plainly the case here. In addition, as the Court explains, the information might cut both ways, lending further rationality to a decision to withhold the evidence. Justice Stein joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 222 September Term 1997 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN MARTINI, SR., Defendant-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER, Petitioner-Appellant. The Office of the New Jersey Public Defender appeals the denial of its petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) from the conviction of murder and sentence of death imposed on John Martini, Sr. Although the Office of the Public Defender seeks vacation of defendant's death sentence, it filed its petition without Martini's approval. Martini, through personal counsel, contests the Public Defender's appeal, as does the Bergen County Prosecutor. This Court has twice affirmed the Public Defender's right to pursue post-conviction proceedings on Martini's behalf despite defendant's desire not to. The present case, however, marks the Court's first opportunity to assess the merits of the Public Defender's PCR petition. The foundation of the Public Defender's appeal is that newfound mitigating evidence is sufficient to warrant a reversal of Martini's death sentence and a new penalty phase trial. The PCR court concluded that the evidence was not mitigating and denied relief. In my opinion, that decision lacks critical support and was in error. This Court's affirmance of that judgment, I respectfully urge, is similarly unsupportable. The evidence crucial to this proceeding, although double edged, is mitigating nonetheless. It amply supports the Public Defender's claim that defendant's counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to uncover and present the contested evidence in the penalty phase of defendant's trial, as well as the claim that the State's failure to disclose the evidence violated due process. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court's order on post-conviction review and vacate defendant's death sentence. A deeper problem looms. The Court does not acknowledge a fundamental dilemma and consequently fails to recognize that the State cannot, in any principled way consistent with constitutional standards, prosecute defendant for capital murder and exact the death penalty. Both defendant and the State, pursuant to its responsibility for the fair administration of the death penalty, have a confidentiality interest in the newly discovered evidence. The evidence may not, therefore, be introduced in a public proceeding; nor may that evidence be used in an in camera proceeding, in observance of defendant's constitutional right and the public's entitlement to a fair and open trial. Yet, to seek the death penalty in a trial that denies defendant this newly discovered mitigating evidence would deprive defendant of full constitutional protections that require the use of mitigating evidence in an open trial. The just resolution is inescapable: the petition for post conviction relief must be granted; defendant's death sentence must be vacated; and the matter remanded for the imposition of a life sentence. See Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 311 (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 644 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 544-45 (1991) (Handler, J., concurring). Martini's defense counsel failed to exhibit this heightened level of competence in two respects: trial counsel failed to adequately investigate mitigating evidence; and, consequently, trial counsel failed to present the jury with the information necessary to make an individualized sentencing determination. "The failure to investigate, assemble, and present mitigating evidence is the most basic form of ineffectiveness of capital counsel." Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 322 (Handler, J., dissenting). This Court has recognized that the "critical element" of representation in the penalty phase of capital trials is investigation. See Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 625. Defense counsel has a duty to conduct "reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 618 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695). Where "counsel thoroughly investigates law and facts, considering all possible options, his or her trial strategy is 'virtually unchallengeable.'" Id. at 617 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695); see Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 791, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3124, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638, 655 (1987) (holding that after conducting interviews and consulting psychiatric reports regarding defendant's history, attorney's choice not to present such evidence as mitigation was a "reasonable decision"). Although "clairvoyance is not required," Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863, 108 S. Ct. 182, 98 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1987), a strategic choice by an attorney not to inquire into critical, mitigating facts is not reasonable, see Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 625. The PCR court responded that the entire penalty phase would have to be closed. The Court does not reach this issue. See ante at __ n.6 (slip op. at 29 n.6). Because I believe that defendant's death sentence should be vacated, I must consider whether closed proceedings would be an adequate solution to the intricate and importunate constitutional demands presented by this case. I conclude that the in camera presentation of mitigating evidence would be constitutionally inadequate, in this or any capital penalty-phase trial. Closing the courtroom of a criminal proceeding infringes upon a defendant's right to a fair and public trial. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47-48, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 39-40 (1984); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1979); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968) (extending Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury to all state criminal proceedings through Fourteenth Amendment); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961) (holding fair and impartial jury in state criminal proceedings required by due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment). "[O]ne of the most important means of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 7, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2739, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II). "The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned . . . ." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25, 68 S. Ct. 499, 506 n.25, 92 L. Ed. 682, 692-93 n.25 (1947); see Waller, supra, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S. Ct. at 2215, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 38; Gannett, supra, 443 U.S. at 380, 99 S. Ct. at 2905, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 622. With regard to the presentation of mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing proceeding, the right of a criminal defendant to a fair and public trial, rooted in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, harmonizes with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment bar to cruel and unusual punishment. Like the right to a public trial, the ban on cruel and unusual punishment demands public scrutiny. That would be absent from a penalty-phase trial closed for the presentation of mitigating evidence. To authorize such veiled proceedings, and respect a death sentence derived therefrom, would bring us precariously close to a practice of off-the-record convictions and secret executions, which the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment were intended to prevent. Given the high level of public accountability and responsiveness required for the implementation of a valid death sentence, the presentation of mitigating evidence in a capital penalty trial cannot, consistently with constitutional imperatives, be conducted in camera.See footnote 1212 NO. A-222 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN MARTINI, SR., Defendant-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER, Petitioner-Appellant. DECIDED July 27, 1999 Chief Justice Poritz We do not address the Public Defender's contention that the prosecution "knew or should have known" that the evidence existed. Eighth Amendment concerns regarding accurate sentencing determinations in capital cases outweigh concerns with finality and the general policy against retrial. Our concern that all mitigating evidence be before the final arbiter of death imbues mitigating evidence with perpetual relevance. Continuing consideration of mitigating evidence is necessary to insure that a death sentence is imposed consistently. Evidence relevant to a death-sentencing proceeding uncovered after a death sentence has been imposed must not, therefore, be dismissed simply because it is belated. It would have taken them less time to make a decision. I have no doubt. I selected this jury. I sat with this jury . . . I believe attached to the certification of the moving papers was an article where two of the jurors were interviewed, one being the foreperson. I remember the other juror was quoted as saying, "Yes, I had tears in my eyes." I remember the foreperson as being quoted as saying something to the effect, "We knew in our hearts if there was a case for the death penalty this was it," and so they voted. Would this have had a significant impact on their deliberations in that it may have changed any one of their minds? I don't think so at all. I do not think so at all.