Title: Sargeant v. State
Citation: 255 Ind. 252, 263 N.E.2d 525
Docket Number: 1069S260
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 1970

255 Ind. 252 (1970)
263 N.E.2d 525
SARGEANT
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 1069S260.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 18, 1970.
Rehearing denied December 30, 1970.
Frank E. Spencer, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, J.
This is an appeal from the Marion Criminal Court, Division I. The appellant was charged by affidavit with the offense of Robbery and was found guilty as charged by a jury.
Evidence introduced at the trial reveals that Frank Babrick, store manager of a Marsh Super Market at 1105 North Arlington, Indianapolis, Indiana, was confronted at work by a man on January 12, 1968, who passed him a note informing him that this was a holdup. Babrick, noticing that the man *253 had a shoulder holster with a revolver in it, proceeded to give the robber the money, which amounted to $1,011.87.
The robbery ocurred at approximately 7:15 p.m. At about 11:30 p.m. Babrick told police he was positive the man who had robbed the grocery was the man they had apprehended.
Appellant objects to certain matters occurring on cross examination. First, Frank Babrick was questioned as follows:
"A. Yes.
Appellant argues his second question, the answer to which the State moved to strike, was not repetitious because it emphasized the time element. However, before asking the second question, it had already been established that the witness was not sure of identifying appellant when he first saw him. The time element was likewise brought out when the witness was asked:
No error occurred when the court sustained the State's objection because of repetition. Appellant had already established through questioning the witness that positive identification was not immediate. As the answer excluded added nothing new, there was no prejudicial harm.
Appellant contends the court committed reversible error by sustaining the State's "objection to what the custom is." Witness for the State, Ronald Young, had been asked on cross examination: "Isn't it the custom to have a lineup in a case of this type, robbery?"
In the case before us, there was testimony prior to the above question to the effect that no lineup was conducted. Furthermore, whether the custom is to have or not to have *255 a lineup has no relevancy on the issue of appellant's guilt or innocence. Thus, there was no abuse of the court's discretion as to this matter.
Frank Babrick testified that the robber of the grocery was wearing a shoulder holster with a pistol in it. Appellant objected when a shoulder holster was entered into evidence on the basis that it was not connected with the appellant. However, the evidence connects appellant with the shoulder holster. Officer Young testified that he followed footprints from a car in a field and at a distance of some 200 or 300 yards from said car he found a money bag, brown felt hat, and an empty shoulder holster. Furthermore, he followed the footprints from that point to about the 1300 or 1400 block of Arlington, where he soon found the appellant. Appellant admitted he had been in the car, and then left the car, walking through the field to Arlington. Anyway, the appellant has not shown how admission of the holster into evidence was prejudicial.
Appellant next asserts that the court erred in refusing to give his tendered Instruction Number 3:
The court ruled that the above instruction was good, but that it had been covered. Appellant alleges that no other instruction *256 pertained to what appellant did not have to prove or show. That is, that appellant did not have to satisfy the jury of his innocence, or that he did not have to establish it was impossible for him to commit the crime charged.
Preliminary Instruction Number 7 stated the burden of proof was on the State. Preliminary Instruction Number 13 instructed the jury as to a presumption of innocence and as to the requirement that the jurors must find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The doctrine of reasonable doubt was defined for the jury in Preliminary Instruction Number 14. Preliminary Instruction 15 further emphasized the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt doctrine.
Court's Instruction Number 26 instructed the jury as to alibi. We find therefore that appellant's tendered Instruction Number 3 was indeed covered by the court's instructions. It is well settled that it is not error to refuse an instruction covered by other proper instructions. Lambert v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 441, 249 N.E.2d 502; Eastin v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 101, 117 N.E.2d 124.
Appellant asserts the failure of the police to hold a lineup and the use of this identification in the trial of the appellant without first holding a lineup violated the appellant's right to due process of law. This question is not properly raised on appeal since no objection was made at the trial to such identification. We stated in Lewis v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 454, 250 N.E.2d 358, 361:
*257 Appellant was sentenced to a term of not less than 10 nor more than 25 years.
In accordance with our decision in McDougall v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 62, 257 N.E.2d 674, the crime of robbery is a lesser included offense of armed robbery, and the legislature may not provide a more severe punishment for a lesser included offense than that for the greater offense.
This cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a corrected judgment and commitment nunc pro tunc, sentencing the appellant to not more than twenty (20) years.
Hunter, C.J., Givan and DeBruler, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 263 N.E.2d 525.