Title: Robin Gaertner v. Gertruda Holcka
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002726
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2726 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Robin Gaertner, f/k/a Robin Roth, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Gertruda Holcka, Order of The Franciscan 
Fathers, Northbrook Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company and Catholic Mutual Relief 
Society, Inc., 
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 26, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Geske, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Steinmetz, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Frank L. Steeves, John R. Pendergast, Jr., and Crivello, Carlson, 
Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by John 
R. Pendergast, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Thomas M. Devine, JoAnne Breese-Jaeck and Hostak, Henzl & 
Bichler, S.C., Racine and oral argument by Thomas M. Devine. 
 
No.  96-2726 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2726  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robin Gaertner, f/k/a Robin Roth,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Gertruda Holcka, Order of The Franciscan  
Fathers, Northbrook Property and Casualty  
Insurance Company and Catholic Mutual  
Relief Society, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
 
          Defendant-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, David M. Bastianelli, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on 
certification from the court of appeals following an order of 
the Circuit Court for Kenosha County, David M. Bastianelli, 
Judge, which dismissed the appellants' (collectively referred to 
as Catholic Mutual) motion for summary judgment upon Catholic 
Mutual's cross-claim for contribution against the respondent 
American Family Insurance Company (American Family).  Catholic 
Mutual appealed from the circuit court's final order. 
¶2 
As we interpret this case, there is one issue 
presented for our determination: whether a common law action for 
No.  96-2726 
 
2 
contribution may be brought against persons who violate Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(c) 
(1989-90),1 
as 
controlled 
by 
§ 347.48(2m)(g), by operating a motor vehicle without reasonably 
believing that each passenger between 4 and 15 years of age, and 
seated at a designated seating position in the vehicle, is 
properly restrained with a seat belt.  The court of appeals 
presented the following two issues on certification: (1) whether 
the passive negligence of a non-intentional negligent tortfeasor 
creates a common liability with a causally negligent tortfeasor 
supporting a claim of contribution for enhanced injuries 
attributable to the passive negligence; and (2) whether there 
can be contribution in an enhanced injury case from a party 
whose passive negligence was a substantial cause of the enhanced 
injuries. 
¶3 
We need not address these issues as they are certified 
to this court, since we conclude that the legislature has 
expressed its intent that a claim for contribution may not be 
sustained in cases involving negligence for failure to restrain 
another with 
a seat belt, 
as controlled 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(g).  Accordingly, we affirm the order of the 
circuit court which dismissed Catholic Mutual's motion for 
summary judgment. 
¶4 
In the proceedings below, the parties stipulated to 
the relevant facts in this matter.  On September 11, 1991, the 
                     
1 All future statutory references are to the 1989-90 volume 
unless otherwise noted. 
No.  96-2726 
 
3 
plaintiff Robin Gaertner (Gaertner) picked up 11 year-old Justin 
Koldeway (Koldeway) from school at the request of Koldeway's 
mother and drove him to a doctor's appointment. Following the 
appointment, Gaertner, a friend of Koldeway's mother, began 
driving to her home with Koldeway seated in the rear seat of the 
car.  On the way home, Gaertner was involved in an accident with 
an automobile driven and owned by the defendant Gertruda Holcka 
(Holcka). 
 
The 
accident 
was 
caused 
solely 
by 
Holcka's 
negligence. 
¶5 
At the time of the accident, Koldeway was not wearing 
an available rear shoulder harness seat belt installed for his 
seat.  Gaertner operated her automobile without reasonably 
believing either prior to or at the time of the accident that 
Koldeway was wearing the seat belt. 
¶6 
Koldeway sustained serious and permanent injuries in 
the accident, amounting to $588,235.29 in damages.  As a full 
and final settlement of Koldeway's claims arising out of the 
accident, Catholic Mutual, Holcka's insurer, paid $500,000 to 
Koldeway.  At the same time, Catholic Mutual preserved its right 
to seek contribution from Gaertner's insurer, American Family, 
which had issued a $100,000 insurance policy to Gaertner that 
was in effect on the date of the accident. 
¶7 
The $500,000 settlement appears to represent 85% of 
the total damages suffered by Koldeway, as reduced by the 
parties' apparent interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g). 
 The relevant provisions of this statute provide: 
 
No.  96-2726 
 
4 
Safety belts and child safety restraint systems. . . . 
 
(2m) REQUIRED USE.  (a) In this subsection, 
"properly restrained" means wearing a safety belt 
approved by the department under sub. (2) and fastened 
in a manner prescribed by the manufacturer of the 
safety belt which permits the safety belt to act as a 
body restraint. 
. . . 
 
(c) If a motor vehicle is required to be equipped 
with safety belts in this state, no person may operate 
that motor vehicle unless he or she reasonably 
believes that each passenger who is at least 4 years 
old and not more than 15 years old and who is seated 
at a designated seating position in the front seat 
required under 49 CFR 571 to have a safety belt 
installed or at a designated seating position in the 
seats, other than the front seats, for which a 
shoulder 
harness has 
been installed is 
properly 
restrained. 
 
(d) If a motor vehicle is required to be equipped 
with safety belts in this state, no person who is at 
least 4 years old and who is seated at a designated 
seating position in the front seat required under 49 
CFR 571 to have a safety belt installed or at a 
designated seating position in the seats, other than 
the front seats, for which a shoulder harness has been 
installed may be a passenger in that motor vehicle 
unless the person is properly restrained. 
. . . 
 
(g) Evidence of compliance or failure to comply 
with par. (b), (c) or (d) is admissible in any civil 
action for personal 
injuries or 
property 
damage 
resulting from the use or operation of a motor 
vehicle.  Notwithstanding s. 895.045, with respect to 
injuries or damages determined to have been caused by 
a failure to comply with par. (b), (c) or (d), such a 
failure shall not reduce the recovery for those 
injuries or damages by more than 15%.  This paragraph 
No.  96-2726 
 
5 
does not affect the determination of causal negligence 
in the action.2 
¶8 
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045, as cross-referenced in 
§ 347.48(2m)(g), is Wisconsin's contributory negligence statute. 
 It provided as follows: 
 
Contributory 
negligence. 
 
Contributory 
negligence 
shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or 
his 
legal 
representative 
to 
recover damages for 
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person 
or property, if such negligence was not greater than 
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is 
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in 
the 
proportion 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. 
¶9 
Dr. Joel Myklebust, a qualified biomechanical engineer 
expert witness, opined that Koldeway's damages would have been 
reduced substantially had Koldeway been wearing a seat belt at 
the time of the accident.  According to the expert, 75% of 
                     
2 The record is unclear as to how the parties arrived at the 
$500,000 figure, but it appears that they may have interpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) to require a 15% reduction from 
Koldeway's total damages.  See Record on Appeal at 24:2 (Am. 
Fam. Brief March 15, 1996) (illustrating that $500,000 is 
exactly 85% of the total damages of $588,235.29).  Because this 
issue is not before us on appeal, we need not decide whether 
this reading of § 347.48(2m)(g)if indeed the parties have 
adopted this interpretationis the correct one.  
Although § 347.48 employs the term "safety belt," we use 
the term "seat belt" throughout this opinion for purposes of 
simplicity.  The term is intended to have the same meaning as 
that used in the Wisconsin statutes.  In addition, we note that 
§ 347.48(2m) 
contained 
a 
"sunset" 
provision. 
 
See 
§ 347.48(2m)(h) ("This subsection does not apply after June 30, 
1991.").  Effective July 6, 1991, this sunset provision was 
repealed by 1991 Wisconsin Act 26.  Therefore, the 1989-90 
version of the statutes remained in effect throughout the time 
period that is relevant to this case. 
No.  96-2726 
 
6 
Koldeway's injuries were caused by the failure to wear a seat 
belt and 25% were caused by the accident. 
¶10 Of the 75% of injuries caused by failure to wear a 
seat belt, 70% of Koldeway's incremental injuries were caused by 
Gaertner's 
operation of 
her 
automobile 
without 
reasonably 
believing or ensuring that Koldeway was wearing a seat belt, and 
30% were caused by Koldeway's own failure to wear a seat belt. 
¶11 Gaertner subsequently brought suit against Catholic 
Mutual to recover damages for injuries which she sustained in 
the accident.  In turn, Catholic Mutual filed a cross-claim 
against American Family seeking contribution for a portion of 
the $500,000 which it had paid to Koldeway.  Specifically, 
Catholic Mutual calculated its contribution damages as follows: 
$500,000.00 x 0.75 x 0.70 = $308,823.53.3 
¶12 Stated differently, Catholic Mutual multiplied the 
total insurance settlement paid to Koldeway by the percentage of 
Koldeway's injuries that were caused by the failure to wear a 
seat belt alone.  This product was in turn multiplied by the 
percentage of Koldeway's injuries, enhanced by failure to wear a 
seat belt, that were caused by Gaertner's operation of her 
                     
3 We note that Catholic Mutual used a slightly different 
formula in its brief to this court.  See Appellants' Brief at 
16-17 (using $588,235.29 total damages amount, rather than 
$500,000 settlement amount, as initial figure in formula).  For 
purposes of this opinion, the proper formula to be used is 
irrelevant since both formulas produce dollar amounts that are 
in excess of American Family's potential liability of $100,000, 
and since Catholic Mutual has released Gaertner of any liability 
above American Family's policy limits.  See Catholic Mutual 
Brief at 17, n.4. 
No.  96-2726 
 
7 
automobile 
without 
reasonably 
believing 
that 
Koldeway was 
wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. 
¶13 According 
to 
Catholic 
Mutual, 
the 
net 
amount 
represents the percentage of injuries caused by Gaertner's 
failure to ensure that Koldeway was wearing a seat belt.  
Therefore, Catholic Mutual argues that it was entitled to 
judgment for the entire $100,000 American Family policy. 
¶14 Following a stipulated dismissal of Gaertner's claims 
against the defendants, Catholic Mutual filed a motion for 
summary 
judgment, 
arguing 
that 
the 
three 
elements 
of 
a 
contribution claim were satisfied in this case.  "The three 
prerequisites to a contribution claim are: "1. Both parties must 
be joint negligent wrongdoers; 2. they must have common 
liability because of such negligence to the same person; [and] 
3. one such party must have borne an unequal proportion of the 
common burden."  General Accident Ins. Co. v. Schoendorf & 
Sorgi, 202 Wis. 2d 98, 103, 549 N.W.2d 429 (1996) (quoting 
Farmers Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 
Wis. 2d 512, 515, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959)). 
¶15 Specifically, Catholic Mutual argued that both itself 
and Gaertner were jointly liable for Koldeway's enhanced 
injuries because their independent torts concurred in time.  
Because the joint negligence of the parties caused the enhanced 
injuries, Catholic Mutual asserted that the parties had common 
liability as well.  Finally, Catholic Mutual argued that it had 
borne an unequal proportion of the common liability since it 
paid for all of Koldeway's damages arising out of the accident. 
No.  96-2726 
 
8 
¶16 In response, American Family argued that neither the 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 347.48, nor the common law 
in this state has ever created a right of contribution for 
negligent tortfeasors in seat belt situations.  To the contrary, 
American Family asserted that the legislature's choice to limit 
the reduction of damages recoverable by the injured party to 15% 
evidenced an intent to prevent the tortfeasor responsible for 
the accident from receiving a "windfall" other than the 15% 
provided by statute. 
¶17 The circuit court concluded that since the accident 
was caused solely by Holcka's conduct, there was no common 
liability in this case.  Because there was no common liability 
for 
the 
accident, 
Catholic 
Mutual 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
contribution as a matter of law.  Accordingly, on July 3, 1996, 
the circuit court denied the motion for summary judgment, and 
entered judgment in favor of American Family.  Catholic Mutual 
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to this 
court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96). 
I. 
¶18 The issue presented is whether a common law action for 
contribution may be brought against persons who violate Wis. 
Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c), as controlled by § 347.48(2m)(g), by 
operating a motor vehicle without reasonably believing that each 
passenger between 4 and 15 years of age, and seated at a 
designated seating position, is properly restrained.  Whether 
Catholic Mutual's motion for summary judgment should have been 
granted on this issue is a question of law that the appellate 
No.  96-2726 
 
9 
courts may review without deference to the circuit court's 
analysis.  See Santiago v. Ware, 205 Wis. 2d 295, 323, 556 
N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1996).  Although we follow substantially 
the same methodology employed by the circuit court in analyzing 
a motion for summary judgment, the facts of this case are 
undisputed and, as such, we need not engage in the step-by-step 
analysis which that methodology requires.  See id. 
¶19 Before addressing the issue, we first trace the 
history of common law and legislation involving seat belt 
negligence in Wisconsin.  Since 1967, Wisconsin has recognized 
that the failure to utilize an available seat belt could be a 
possible defense to a personal injury claim.  See Bentzler v. 
Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).  Although the 
seat belt law did not then require use of a seat belt, we 
concluded that "there is a duty, based on the common-law 
standard 
of 
ordinary 
care, 
to 
use 
available 
seat 
belts 
independent of any statutory mandate."  Id. 
¶20 Use of the "seat belt defense" was later discussed and 
clarified in Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 
N.W.2d 824 (1983).  In Foley, we addressed the possible 
ramifications of the successful seat belt defense on liability 
or damages, "since the defense was not proved in Bentzler."  Id. 
at 484.  In characterizing the defense, we stated that: "[s]ince 
failure 
to 
wear 
seat 
belts 
generally 
causes 
incremental 
injuries, damage for these incremental injuries can be treated 
separately for purposes of calculating recoverable damages."  
Id. at 485.  The incremental damages caused by seat belt 
No.  96-2726 
 
10
negligence could be distinguished from those produced by passive 
negligence, where the damages are identical to the injuries 
caused by the active negligence in the same accident and are 
difficult to separate for purposes of calculating recoverable 
damages.  See id. 
¶21 As a result, we determined that seat belt negligence 
was not synonymous with ordinary passive negligence, but rather 
was more akin to an accident involving two incidents: the first 
incident being the actual automobile collision, and the second 
occurring when the occupant of the vehicle hits the vehicle's 
interior.  See id. at 484-85.  These differences led us to 
conclude that "a fair and administrable procedure . . . is to 
calculate a plaintiff's provable damages by the usual rules of 
negligence without regard to the seat belt defense and then take 
into account the seat belt defense by decreasing the recoverable 
damages by the percentage of the plaintiff's causal seat belt 
negligence."  Id. at 486-87. 
¶22 Stated as a mathematical formula, we adopted the 
following method for calculating damages when a successful seat 
belt defense is employed: 
 
(1) Determine the causal negligence of each party as 
to the collision of the two cars (Table 1) ; (2) apply 
comparitive negligence principles to eliminate from 
liability a defendant whose negligence causing the 
collision is less than the contributory negligence of 
a plaintiff causing the collision (Table 1) ; (3) 
using the trier of fact's calculation of the damages, 
reduce the amount of each plaintiff's damages from the 
liable defendant by the percentage of negligence 
attributed to the plaintiff for causing the collision 
(Table 1) ; (4) determine whether the plaintiff's 
No.  96-2726 
 
11
failure to use an available seat belt was negligence 
and a cause of injury, and if so what percentage of 
the total negligence causing the injury was due to the 
failure to wear the seat belt (Tables 2 and 3) ; (5) 
reduce the plaintiff's damages calculated in step (3) 
by the percentage of negligence attributed to the 
plaintiff under step (4) for failure to wear an 
available seat belt for causing the injury. 
Id. at 490. 
¶23 Steps four and five of this test were subsequently 
altered by the legislature in 1987.  See 1987 Wisconsin Act 132; 
see also Wis. Stat. § 347.48.  Legislative history indicates 
that the legislature intended to limit Foley's effect on the 
reduction of a plaintiff's recovery for damages that were caused 
solely by failure to wear a seat belt: 
 
The provision on personal injury actions revises 
Wisconsin common law, as formulated by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 
Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).  Under Foley, if 
negligent failure to wear a safety belt is a cause of 
the injured person's injuries, the injured person's 
recoverable 
damages 
are 
to 
be 
reduced 
by 
the 
percentage of damages caused by failure to wear a 
safety belt.  Under Act 132, recoverable damages may 
not be reduced by more than 15%, regardless of the 
percentage of damages caused by failure to wear a 
safety belt. 
Information Memorandum 87-8 at 8, Wisconsin Legislative Council 
Staff, January 8, 1988.  See also Legislative Reference Bureau 
Memorandum, October 27, 1987. 
¶24 Thus, the legislature eliminated the possibility left 
open by Foley that seat belt negligence causing incremental 
injuries 
could 
disrupt 
the 
distribution 
of 
financial 
responsibility to any great degree.  Prior to the legislature's 
action 
in 
1987, 
a 
plaintiff's 
recoverable 
damages, 
and, 
No.  96-2726 
 
12
conversely, 
a 
defendant 
or 
defendants' 
overall 
financial 
responsibility, 
could 
have 
been 
significantly 
reduced 
in 
situations where the failure to wear a seat belt caused the 
majority of plaintiff's injuries.  Since the amendment of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48, 
the 
reduction 
in 
plaintiff's 
recoverable 
damages, and the corresponding "benefit" received by defendants, 
is statutorily limited to 15% of the injuries caused by failure 
to wear a seat belt. 
II. 
¶25 It is against this background that we make our 
decision regarding actions for contribution by a defendant's 
insurer against a plaintiff who is responsible for failing to 
ensure that an injured minor was properly restrained in a seat 
belt 
at 
the 
time 
of 
an 
automobile 
accident. 
 
Several 
considerations are relevant to our decision. 
A. 
¶26 First, it is important to recognize that we have never 
interpreted the seat belt defense to provide an affirmative 
cause of action for contribution.  As we stated in Foley, seat 
belt negligence is not to be included in the same class as 
active or passive negligence.  See Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 484-86. 
 Instead, the incremental injuries that are caused by the 
failure to wear a seat belt "can be treated separately for 
purposes of calculating recoverable damages."  Id. at 485.  This 
distinction "borrows from the apportionment technique used in 
two traditional tort doctrines: avoidable consequences and 
mitigation of damages."  Id. at 487. 
No.  96-2726 
 
13
¶27 Thus, it is clear that we have previously interpreted 
the seat belt defense to be just that: a defense.  When a party 
fails to wear a seat belt, he or she has presumptively failed to 
mitigate his or her damages.  Defendants may assert plaintiff's 
failure to "buckle up" in defending against a cause of action 
for personal injury and negligence.  As we made clear in Foley, 
the defense may not be used to affect the causal negligence in a 
personal injury action.4  Instead of being viewed as ordinary 
negligence that could be used in an affirmative action to 
recover damages, then, the common law seat belt defense was seen 
as a useful tool to ensure "that the defendant is not held 
liable for incremental injuries the plaintiff could and should 
have prevented by wearing an available seat belt."  Id. at 489. 
B. 
¶28 By amending Wis. Stat. § 347.48, the legislature 
explicitly adopted our interpretation of the seat belt defense. 
 Significantly, the legislature sought to preserve Foley's 
attempt to prevent defendants from attaining a windfall by 
indicating 
that 
"[t]his 
paragraph 
does 
not 
affect 
the 
determination of causal negligence in the action."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g).  As it is relevant to this opinion, the 
                     
4 This approach ensures that defendants are not granted a 
windfall, since plaintiffs might receive no compensation for 
damages that a jury determined they could not have totally 
prevented, and defendants could escape liability for injuries 
that the jury determined their negligence caused.  See Foley v. 
City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 488-89, 335 N.W.2d 824 
(1983).  
No.  96-2726 
 
14
legislature modified the common law in only two ways: (1) to 
limit to 15% the potential reduction in plaintiffs' recoverable 
damages; and (2) to establish a duty on behalf of the driver to 
properly restrain minor passengers.5  We will address these 
changes in turn. 
¶29 The change effected by subsection (2m)(g) (15% maximum 
reduction in plaintiff's recoverable damages) does not, on its 
face, illustrate any intent to create an affirmative cause of 
action for contribution.  To the contrary, as explained below in 
section II.C. of this opinion, we conclude that it evidences the 
legislature's intent to preclude use of the seat belt defense in 
a contribution action. 
¶30 Nor 
does 
the 
change 
effected 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(c) reveal any legislative intent to create a cause 
of action for contribution.  It is important to recognize that a 
violation of subsection (2m)(c), the subsection imposing a duty 
upon drivers to "buckle up" their minor passengers, necessarily 
involves 
a 
violation 
of 
§ 347.48(2m)(d), 
the 
subsection 
mandating use of a seat belt by minor passengers.  If a person 
operates a motor vehicle without reasonably believing "that each 
passenger who is at least 4 years old and not more than 15 years 
old . . . is properly restrained," see § 347.48(2m)(c), it 
logically follows that "a person who is at least 4 years old . . 
                     
5 Catholic Mutual argues that Gaertner had a duty at common 
law to ensure that Koldeway was properly restrained in a seat 
belt.  We need not decide whether Catholic Mutual's assertions 
are accurate since we conclude that the legislature has intended 
to preempt actions for contribution of this sort.  
No.  96-2726 
 
15
. [is] a passenger in that motor vehicle [without being] 
properly restrained."  See § 347.48(2m)(d). 
¶31 "A basic rule of this court in construing statutes is 
to avoid such constructions as would result in any portion of 
the statute being superfluous."  State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 
318, 324, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976).  Read together with Wis. Stat. 
§§ 347.48(2m)(d) 
and 
(2m)(g), 
§ 347.48(2m)(c) 
would 
be 
superfluous unless it had some additional purpose other than to 
reduce the plaintiff's recoverable damages by a maximum of 15%.6 
¶32 In order to avoid a superfluous construction of the 
statute, we can identify two reasons for the inclusion of Wis. 
Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c).  First, we conclude that the legislature 
included subsection (2m)(c) to ensure that defendants received, 
coupled with subsection (2m)(g), a possible 15% reduction in 
plaintiff's recoverable damages, even when the jury determines 
that the minor passenger is less than 15% negligent for failing 
to wear a seat belt.  Accordingly, even if a jury attributes 
little negligence to the minor for failing to "buckle up," the 
                     
6 A plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) illustrates 
that a plaintiff's recoverable damages may not be reduced twice 
by the statutory maximum of 15%: ". . . with respect to injuries 
or damages determined to have been caused by a failure to comply 
with par. (b), (c) or (d), such a failure shall not reduce the 
recovery for those injuries or damages by more than 15%." 
(emphasis added).  In a situation such as this one, involving a 
violation of subsection (c) and its necessary counterpart 
subsection (d), reducing the plaintiff's recoverable damages 
twice would necessarily reduce the recovery for his or her 
incremental seat belt injuries by more than 15%. 
No.  96-2726 
 
16
driver is still negligent, and the passenger's damages may be 
reduced by a maximum of 15%. 
¶33 A second purpose of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) is 
revealed by examining the interrelationship between Wis. Stat. 
§§ 347.48 and 347.50.  The relevant provisions of the latter 
statute provide: 
 
347.50  Penalties. . . . 
 
(2m) (a) Any person who violates s. 347.48(2m)(b) 
or (c) and any person 16 years of age or older who 
violates s. 347.48(2m)(d) may be required to forfeit 
$10. 
 
(b) No forfeiture may be assessed for a violation 
of s. 347.48(2m)(d) if the violator is less than 16 
years of age when the offense occurs. 
. . .7 
This statute clearly illustrates that the legislature did not 
want to impose penalties upon minors less than 16 years old for 
a violation of § 347.48(2m)(d), but would allow penalties to be 
imposed against "any person" who violates § 347.48(2m)(c).  
Therefore, subsection (2m)(c), coupled with §§ 347.50(2m)(a) and 
(b), also provides for the imposition of a $10 forfeiture 
against the driver alone for failing to properly restrain minor 
passengers between 4 and 15 years of age.  By enacting 
subsection (2m)(c), the legislature has again acknowledged that 
the driver of an automobile is more responsible than a minor 
passenger for that minor's failure to "buckle up." 
                     
7 We note that Wis. Stat. § 347.50 also contained a "sunset" 
provision.  See § 347.50(2m)(c).  Subsection (2m)(c) of this 
statute was again repealed by 1991 Wisconsin Act 26. 
No.  96-2726 
 
17
¶34 Most importantly, however, neither statutory change to 
the common law created an affirmative cause of action for 
contribution for that responsibility.  Instead, a $10 penalty 
was 
authorized 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.50(2m)(a), 
and 
a 
§ 347.48(2m)(g) 15% reduction in plaintiffs' recoverable damages 
was allowed even where the minor passenger is determined to be 
relatively faultless for failing to wear a seat belt. 
¶35 Catholic Mutual cites Wis. Stat. § 347.48(4)(d) to 
support the proposition that the seat belt defense may be used 
affirmatively in an action for contribution.  It provides in 
relevant part: 
 
(4)  CHILD SAFETY RESTRAINT SYSTEMS REQUIRED; STANDARDS; 
EXEMPTIONS. (a) 1. No resident, who is the parent or 
legal guardian of a child under the age of 2, may 
transport the child in a motor vehicle unless the 
child is properly restrained in a child safety 
restraint system approved by the department . . . . 
. . . 
 
(d)  Evidence of compliance or failure to comply 
with par. (a) is admissible in any civil action for 
personal injuries or property damage resulting from 
the use or operation of a motor vehicle but failure to 
comply with par. (a) does not by itself constitute 
negligence. 
¶36 Specifically, 
Catholic 
Mutual 
argues 
that 
the 
legislature's omission of the language "failure to comply . . . 
does not by itself constitute negligence" from Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(g) and the inclusion of that language in subsection 
(4)(d) of the same statute "is a clear expression of legislative 
intent that a violation of subsection (2m) is a basis for 
liability."  Catholic Mutual Brief at 8.  We disagree. 
No.  96-2726 
 
18
¶37 As we have stated, since its recognition in 1967, the 
seat belt defense has never been interpreted by this court to 
provide grounds for an affirmative action against a third party. 
 It has always been used to limit damages, not to compel the 
payment of damages.  When the legislature adopted the common law 
seat belt defense in 1987, it did nothing to change that  
consistent and traditional characteristic of the seat belt 
defense. 
C. 
¶38 Having determined that the seat belt defense has never 
before been employed as an affirmative cause of action for 
contribution, we are left to determine whether, as a matter of 
equity, defendants may be excused from liability to a greater 
extent than that allowed by Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) when they 
are at fault for having caused the accident initially.  We 
conclude that they may not. 
¶39 We have previously recognized that the goal of 
ensuring safety through use of available seat belts is a 
laudable one.  See Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 489 ("We hope that 
passengers will also be encouraged to wear seat belts if their 
potential compensation for injuries is reduced.").  However, 
this goal, as with any principle of equity, must be balanced 
against the unquestionably sound goal of ensuring public safety 
through safe and attentive driving on the state's highways and 
streets.  We cannot completely overlook Holcka's negligent 
conduct in assessing Gaertner's negligent failure to restrain 
Koldeway in a seat belt. 
No.  96-2726 
 
19
¶40 The facts of this case illustrate why we are not 
persuaded that the seat belt defense can be used as an 
affirmative action for contribution.  Were we to allow Catholic 
Mutual's claim to proceed in this case using their own formula 
for contribution, Gaertner (0% negligence in causing the 
accident) would be responsible for over $308,000 of Koldeway's 
injuries, leaving Holcka (100% negligence in causing the 
accident) responsible for less than $192,000 of Koldeway's 
approximate $588,000 in total damages.  Although Gaertner had an 
insurance policy worth only $100,000 in this case, we cannot 
presume that this will always be the case; nor can we assume 
that defendants' insurers will, as Catholic Mutual has done 
here, release plaintiffs in Gaertner's position from liability 
above their policy limits. 
¶41 Although the seat belt defense does not, strictly 
speaking, affect the determination of causal negligence in any 
action for personal injury, this case illustrates that use of 
the seat belt defense in an affirmative cause of action for 
contribution can drastically alter the landscape of liability by 
reducing 
defendants' 
overall 
financial 
responsibility, 
regardless of the amount of fault that is attributable to the 
defendant for causing the accident initially.  
¶42 Such a policy determination would require this court 
to declare that seat belt negligence effectively outweighs or 
supersedes the active causal negligence in any automobile 
accident.  Regardless of the defendant's responsibility for 
causing the original accident, the driver's failure to properly 
No.  96-2726 
 
20
restrain a passenger could almost eliminate the defendant's 
financial responsibility altogether.  On the other hand, there 
may be a point when active causal negligence carries more weight 
than seat belt negligencea point at which the driver's 
liability for the passenger's injuries should cease.  Performing 
this balance would thrust this court into a policy-making role 
more appropriately left to the legislature. 
¶43 More 
importantly, 
as 
we 
have 
mentioned, 
the 
legislature has explicitly declared that one's own seat belt 
negligence should not outweigh the determination of active 
causal negligence in an automobile accidenta possibility that 
clearly remained after our decision in Foley.  Instead, the 
legislature has indicated that seat belt negligence may only 
reduce the injured party's incremental injuries by a maximum of 
15%.  See Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g).  We conclude that in doing 
so, the legislature also intended to limit the potential 
windfall to defendants who are determined to be causally 
negligent.  We decline to hinder that stated policy by allowing 
the present cause of action for contribution to proceed. 
III. 
¶44 Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) 
evidences 
the 
legislature's 
intent 
to 
bar 
claims 
for 
contribution involving seat belt negligence, we affirm the order 
of the circuit court which dismissed Catholic Mutual's motion 
for summary judgment against American Family. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
96-2726.awb 
 
1 
¶45 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    (Concurring).   The majority 
incorrectly concludes that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) "evidences 
the legislature's intent to preclude use of the seat belt 
defense in a contribution action."  Majority op. at 14.  No such 
legislative intent can be found in the words of the statute or 
in its history.  To the contrary, both the words and the 
legislative history of the statute evidence its sole true 
purpose: to limit to 15 percent the potential reduction in 
plaintiffs' recoverable damages.  To impute to this statute a 
legislative intent that is not legitimately evidenced invades 
the legislative arena. 
¶46 While I agree with the mandate of the court, I write 
separately to express my agreement with Justice Geske's dissent 
("the dissent") that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) does not bar a 
common law cause of action for contribution against a driver 
that violates Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c).  However, I also write 
to express my disagreement with her dissent that under current 
law the negligent driver in this case can pursue a common law 
cause of action for contribution against the host driver that 
violates Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c). 
¶47 The 
majority 
in 
this 
case 
concludes 
that 
the 
legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) to bar claims 
for contribution made "in cases involving negligence for failure 
to restrain another with a seat belt . . . ."  Majority op. at 
2.  The dissent responds that the limited design of Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(g) "is to cap the reduction of an unrestrained 
plaintiff's recoverable damages," and that the "statute does not 
96-2726.awb 
 
2 
address any limitation or reduction of a party's negligence."  
Dissent at 2.  The dissent then concludes that Gaertner violated 
a safety statute, that the violation enhanced Justin's injuries, 
and that Gaertner is accordingly liable to Holcka for a 
significant portion of Justin's damages under the laws of 
contribution. 
¶48 As indicated, I agree with the analysis of the dissent 
that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) does not bar contribution 
actions under the facts presented here.  I leave discussion of 
that point to the dissent.  However, I do not join the dissent's 
determination that in this case Gaertner is a joint tortfeasor 
with Holcka.  Even if I assume that Gaertner violated a safety 
statute or a coordinate common law duty, under current law and 
the stipulated facts the parties to this action are not joint 
tortfeasors. 
¶49 There are three requirements for a contribution claim 
in Wisconsin.  First, the parties must be joint tortfeasors, 
also known as "joint negligent wrongdoers."  Second, the parties 
must be in common liability to the injured party.  Finally, one 
of the parties must have borne an unequal proportion of the 
common burden.  See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Schoendorf & 
Sorgi, 202 Wis. 2d 98, 103, 549 N.W.2d 429 (1996).  
¶50 Determination of liability in seat belt negligence 
cases is not an easy task.  As the court indicated in Foley v. 
City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983): 
 
[I]t is helpful to think of the automobile accident 
involving seat-belt negligence as involving not one 
96-2726.awb 
 
3 
incident but two.  The first incident is the actual 
collision. . . . The second incident, which is set in 
motion by the first and would not occur without it, 
occurs when the occupant of the vehicle hits the 
vehicle's interior.  Wearing seat belts is relevant 
only to the second collision and . . . may aggravate 
some of the damages caused by the first collision. 
Id. at 485 (citations omitted). 
¶51 To the extent that car accident injuries can be 
characterized only as one injury, the dissent is correct in 
finding joint liability.  However, Foley qualified its initial 
aggravation statements by also indicating that the "[f]ailure to 
wear seat belts may also cause additional injuries."  Id.   
¶52 In 
scenarios 
where 
independent 
torts 
result 
in 
separate injuries, the tortfeasors are successive.  Generally, 
such tortfeasors are liable only for the injuries attributable 
to each of them.  "Since successive torts are involved, no joint 
liability occurs and thus contribution is not allowed."  Wis. 
JI-Civil 1723 cmt.; see Butzow v. Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 
281, 287, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).  Distinguishing separate 
injuries from those injuries which are only aggravated would 
also be consistent with the law of torts that where two 
negligent acts "concur[] in time but result[] in distinguishable 
separate injuries to the same subject, there are separate torts 
rather than joint liability." Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 
302, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976). 
¶53 I note that the very stipulation offered by the 
parties plays into the two-accident, potentially divisible 
injury framework created by Foley and institutionalized by the 
resulting standard jury instruction for enhanced injuries.  See 
96-2726.awb 
 
4 
Wis. JI-Civil 1723.  The stipulation in this case reads in 
pertinent part: 
 
2.  The accident was caused solely by the conduct of 
Gertruda Holcka. 
 
12. 
 
Seventy-five 
percent 
of 
Justin 
Koldeway's 
injuries were caused by the failure to wear a safety 
belt and twenty-five percent were caused by the 
accident. 
 
13.  Robin Gaertner's operation of her automobile 
without reasonably believing or ensuring that Justin 
Koldeway was wearing a safety belt caused 70 percent 
of Justin Koldeway's enhanced injuries due to the 
failure to wear a safety belt and Justin Koldeway's 
failure to wear a safety belt caused 30 percent of his 
enhanced injuries due to the failure to wear a safety 
belt. 
¶54 The stipulation indicates that Holcka's negligence in 
operating her vehicle caused an accident with Gaertner's car.  
At the time of that accident Justin suffered injuries that when 
viewed after the fact constituted 25% of his total injuries.  
The stipulation provides that after the collision between the 
two cars, both Gaertner's failure to restrain Justin and 
Justin's failure to wear a safety belt enhanced Justin's 
injuries. 
¶55 The parties further buttress my view of existing law 
by incorporating the stipulation offered to the court into the 
standard enhanced injury jury instruction.  As special verdict 
question and answer number nine in the defendant's brief 
indicate: 
 
9.  Assuming the combined negligence that caused 
Justin 
Koldeway's 
enhanced 
injuries 
totals 
100 
96-2726.awb 
 
5 
percent, 
what 
percentage 
of 
such 
negligence 
is 
attributable to: 
 
Justin Koldeway 
 
30% 
Robin Gaertner  
 
70% 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
100% 
Once again it is noteworthy that a tortfeasor whose conduct 
caused the initial collision and whose negligent conduct may be 
a substantial causal factor of the victim's enhanced injuries is 
not credited with any responsibility for those injuries. 
 
¶56 The dissent views the injury here as one injury and 
the tortfeasors as having concurring responsibility for that 
injury.  Yet, a tension arises between the dissent's view and 
the apportionment of responsibility for the enhanced injury.   
Neither the special verdict questions nor the stipulation 
apportions any percentage of responsibility to Holcka for this 
separate second injury. 
 
¶57 In referring to Foley, the committee comments to the 
failure to use safety belt jury instruction acknowledge this 
tension.  "It has been suggested that seat belt negligence 
should instead be treated as a concurrent tort . . . . After 
reviewing the Foley decision, the Committee concludes that 
formulating the instruction and special verdict under the 
concurrent tort theory would be inconsistent with the Foley 
decision . . . ."  Wis. JI-Civil 1277 cmt. 
¶58 The dissent resolves the quandary presented by Foley 
by essentially ignoring it.  The dissent instead relies upon 
another line of enhanced injury cases which revolve around 
crashworthiness and products liability claims.  See, e.g., 
96-2726.awb 
 
6 
Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 
359, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984).  While I may agree with the dissent 
that the general principles of such non-seat belt negligence 
cases should control in seat belt cases as well, Foley cannot be 
ignored.  
¶59 The Foley court created its two-crash analysis to 
divorce consideration of the plaintiff's seat belt negligence 
from inclusion in the initial comparative fault calculation then 
existing under Wisconsin law.  See Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 485-86; 
Michael K. McChrystal, Seat Belt Negligence: The Ambivalent 
Wisconsin Rules, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 539, 544 (1985).  However, in 
attempting to partition the seat belt negligence away from the 
primary tortfeasor's negligence, it appears that the Foley court 
may have also partitioned the primary tortfeasor's negligence 
away from the seat belt negligence in determining responsibility 
for enhanced injuries.  The Foley court seems to have immunized 
initial 
tortfeasors 
from 
the 
full 
consequences 
of 
their 
negligence.  See McChrystal, at 544. 
¶60 In response to the Foley decision the legislature 
enacted Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g).  Although the legislature 
limited the reduction of the injured person's damages for 
failure to wear a seat belt and thereby exposed the initial 
tortfeasor to liability for the seat belt injury, it did not 
affect the issue before the court today.  Under the stipulated 
facts of this case only Gaertner and Justin are responsible for 
the seat belt injury.  The 15 percent reduction set forth in 
96-2726.awb 
 
7 
Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) does nothing to alter the successive 
tortfeasor status between Gaertner and Holcka.8 
¶61 I believe this court should revisit that part of the 
two-accident framework of Foley which eliminates concurrent 
responsibility between the primary negligent tortfeasor and 
other tortfeasors responsible for lack of seat belt restraint in 
automobile accident cases, as well as the enhanced injury jury 
instruction.  If after revisiting Foley this court determines 
that the negligent parties are joint tortfeasors with common 
liability, then this court should also address, and not ignore, 
the policy questions inherent in the certified questions from 
the court of appeals.  See, e.g., Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 
2d 409, 425, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995). 
¶62 Accordingly, I agree with the comment to the standard 
jury instruction for enhanced injuries, Wis. JI-Civil 1723, 
"[s]ince successive torts are involved, no joint liability 
occurs and thus contribution is not allowed.  However, the 
accident causing tortfeasor would be entitled to equitable 
subrogation to the extent he or she paid for those damages 
attributable by the jury to the enhancing tortfeasor."  Wis. JI-
Civil 1723 cmt.  Under existing law, because the tortfeasors in 
this case are "successive tortfeasors," not "joint tortfeasors," 
Holcka's claim in contribution must fail. 
                     
8 The dissent of Justice Geske is incorrect in stating our 
position.  The legislature by operation of statute makes 
negligent drivers like Holcka liable without addressing the 
common law concept of joint or successive tortfeasors.  
96-2726.awb 
 
8 
 
No. 96-2726.ssa 
 
 
1 
¶63 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).   I 
do not join the court's opinion or mandate.  I dissent because I 
think the majority opinion, Justice Bradley's concurrence and 
Justice Geske's dissent point out the need to reconsider Foley 
v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983). 
¶64 I agree with the conclusions of both Justice Geske and 
Justice Bradley that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) does not bar a 
common law cause of action for contribution against a driver who 
violates § 347.48(2m). 
¶65 Justice Geske and Justice Bradley both raise important 
considerations about seat belt negligence law in Wisconsin.  
Seat belt negligence is, I am sure, a recurring issue in 
numerous cases.  I am not comfortable discussing and deciding 
the points these opinions raise without giving the parties an 
opportunity to be heard. 
¶66 I conclude that the court should put this case on oral 
argument in September 1998 and request the parties to submit 
additional 
briefs 
discussing 
the 
issues 
raised 
by 
the 
concurrence and dissent and the effect of Sumnicht v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984), 
Farrell v. John Deere Co., 151 Wis. 2d 45, 443 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. 
App. 1989), and Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) (1995-96) on the 
Foley decision. 
¶67 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and write 
separately.  
 
96-2726.jpg 
 
1 
¶68 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Dissenting).  I dissent.  The 
majority focuses on the wrong statute in concluding that 
Gaertner and her insurer, American Family, have no liability to 
her injured minor passenger, Justin, for his safety belt related 
injuries, and therefore that Holcka and her insurer, Catholic 
Mutual, 
have 
no 
right 
of 
contribution 
against 
Gaertner.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g), the statute on which the 
majority relies, is strictly concerned with reducing the 
recoverable damages of an injured passenger who was not 
restrained by a safety belt at the time of the accident.  That 
statute does not answer the real question presented in this 
case: Who between the two drivers is responsible for paying 
those reduced damages? 
¶69 I conclude that Gaertner, the host driver, violated a 
safety statute, Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c),9 and was negligent 
per se.  Because Gaertner was negligent, and her negligence 
caused Justin injuries, she has common liability with Holcka, 
the negligent driver of the other car; I therefore also conclude 
that Catholic Mutual, having paid all of Justin's recoverable 
damages on behalf of Holcka, is entitled to contribution from 
Gaertner and American Family for her portion of Justin's 
injuries. 
I. 
                     
9 Petitioner Holcka asserts that Gaertner also has common 
law liability to Justin for his enhanced injuries.  Resolution 
of that question is not necessary to my analysis that Gaertner 
is statutorily liable for Justin's enhanced injuries. 
96-2726.jpg 
 
2 
¶70 I disagree with the majority's application of Wis. 
Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g), the primary purpose of which is to limit 
the plaintiff's damages.  That provision states: 
 
(g) Evidence of compliance or failure to comply with 
par. (b), (c) or (d) is admissible in any civil action 
for personal injuries or property damage resulting 
from the use or operation of a motor vehicle.  
Notwithstanding s. 895.045, with respect to injuries 
or damages determined to have been caused by a failure 
to comply with par. (b), (c) or (d), such a failure 
shall not reduce the recovery for those injuries or 
damages by more than 15%.  This paragraph does not 
affect the determination of causal negligence in the 
action. (Emphasis added.) 
¶71 The 
recovery 
reduction 
provision 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(g) does not address the question before this 
courtis contribution prohibited between a negligent driver and 
a negligent host driver who had no basis to reasonably believe 
that his or her minor passenger was properly restrained by a 
safety belt?  The thrust of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) is to cap 
the 
reduction 
of 
an 
unrestrained 
plaintiff's 
recoverable 
damages.  The statute does not address any limitation or 
reduction of a party's negligence. 
¶72 Another 
provision, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(c), 
controls the outcome in this case.  That provision states: 
 
(c) If a motor vehicle is required to be equipped with 
safety belts in this state, no person may operate that 
motor vehicle unless he or she reasonably believes 
that each passenger who is at least 4 years old and 
not more than 15 years old and who is seated at a 
designated seating position in the front seat required 
under 49 CFR 571 to have a safety belt installed or at 
a designated seating position in the seats, other than 
96-2726.jpg 
 
3 
the front seats, for which a shoulder harness has been 
installed is properly restrained. 
Based on the terms of this subsection, I conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) is a safety statute. 
II. 
¶73 The 
violation 
of 
a 
safety 
statute 
constitutes 
negligence per se if three elements are present: 1) the harm 
inflicted was the type the statute was designed to prevent; 2) 
the person injured was within the class of persons sought to be 
protected; and 3) there is some expression of legislative intent 
that the statute become a basis for the imposition of civil 
liability.  See Tatur v. Solsrud, 174 Wis. 2d 735, 743, 498 
N.W.2d 232 (1993).  
¶74 The reasons I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) 
is a safety statute, and that Gaertner is  negligent per se, are 
the following.  Taking the class element first, there is no 
dispute that Justin, an 11-year old passenger in a car operated 
by Gaertner and having rear seat shoulder harness restraints, is 
a member of the class of persons meant to be protected by the 
statute, namely, minors between the ages of 4 and 15.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c).10  Taking the harm element next, Justin's 
safety belt related injury following the impact with Holcka's 
                     
10 Other subsections protect children up to the age of 2, 
and children between the ages of 2 and 4.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 347.48 (4)(a)1 and (4)(a)2 (1989-90), respectively.  In the 
1995-96 version of the statute, the requirements of the former 
(4)(a)1 and (4)(a)2 are telescoped into the current (4)(a)1.  
The current (4)(a)2 covers child safety restraint systems for 
children who are at least 4 years old, but less than 8 years 
old.  
96-2726.jpg 
 
4 
car is one of the types of harm this safety statute was enacted 
to prevent.  Finally, I discern a legislative intent, based on 
the language of the statute as a whole and on its legislative 
history, that a host driver's failure to comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(c) is negligence per se and forms the basis for 
civil liability.11  I discuss the latter two elements more fully 
below. 
¶75 The type of harm requirement is met in this case. No 
one contends that safety belts prevent motor vehicle accidents. 
 Instead, the purpose of safety belts is to avoid injury, or at 
least to avoid the enhanced or incremental injuries that can 
occur when, in a vehicle accident, the passenger's body is 
unrestrained and free to contact fixtures and objects within the 
vehicle interior.  See Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 387, 
149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).  These contacts are often referred to as 
                     
11 It is true that this court in Bentzler v. Braun, 34 
Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967), declined to interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 347.48 as a safety statute in the "sense that it is 
negligence per se for an occupant of an automobile to fail to 
use available seat belts," because Wis. Stat. § 347.48 did not, 
by its terms, require the use of seat belts.  Instead, the 
Bentzler court stated that where the evidence showed a causal 
relationship between the person's injuries and his or her 
failure to use the seat belt, the jury could make a finding of 
ordinary negligence. See id. at 387.  At the time Bentzler was 
decided, Wis. Stat. § 347.48 placed no obligation on a vehicle 
operator to ensure that his or her minor passenger was 
restrained by a safety belt.  In 1991, at the time of the 
accident in this case, however, Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) 
imposed just such an obligation.  Thus, Bentzler does not 
preclude my determination that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) is a 
safety statute, the violation of which is negligence per se. 
96-2726.jpg 
 
5 
"second collisions."  See Monte E. Weiss, The Enhanced Injury 
Theory as a Defense, 69 Wis. Lawyer 10 (Nov. 1996). 
¶76 For 
some 
time 
Wisconsin 
has 
recognized 
that 
a 
tortfeasor can be liable for enhanced injuries.  See Farrell v. 
John Deere Co., 151 Wis. 2d 45, 60-61, 443 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 
1989) (listing cases)).  This court recognized the potential for 
incremental or enhanced injuries particularly in the case of a 
failure to wear safety belts in Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 
Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983). 
¶77 According to the testimony of an expert witness, 
Justin sustained enhanced injuries because he was not restrained 
by a shoulder harness safety belt at the time of the accident.  
I conclude that Justin's safety belt related injuries are one of 
the types of injuries this statute was designed to prevent. 
¶78 Finally, I conclude that the third element, the 
"legislative intent" requirement for per se liability, is also 
met in this case. 
¶79 As originally enacted, Wis. Stat. § 347.48 required 
the presence of seat belts in cars manufactured or assembled 
beginning with the 1962 models.  This court first interpreted 
that statute in 1967.  See Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d 362.  The 
Bentzler court concluded that the statute did not require safety 
belt use, but also acknowledged that a failure to use the belt 
may be considered ordinary negligence that contributes to the 
injuries, if proper evidence of cause and effect is introduced. 
¶80 The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 347.48 following 
our decision in Foley, 113 Wis. 2d 475.  In that case, the 
96-2726.jpg 
 
6 
plaintiffs were two adults, one a passenger and one a driver, 
neither of whom  was wearing safety belts.  They sued the driver 
of the other car.  The jury attributed some negligence for the 
collision to both drivers.  The jury also found that the 
unbelted passenger was 70 percent negligent for not having used 
her safety belt.  This court said that causal negligence is 
determined first, and where there are incremental injuries 
caused by a failure to use a safety belt, those injuries are 
treated separately for purposes of calculating recoverable 
damages.  113 Wis. 2d at 490.  Had this court not reached that 
conclusion in Foley, the unbelted passenger plaintiff would have 
recovered nothing from the defendant negligent driver. 
¶81 The legislature decided to modify the effect of the 
Foley decision when, by virtue of 1987 Wis. Act 132, it amended 
Wis. Stat. § 347.48, and placed a ceiling on how much a 
passenger's damages can be reduced for his or her own negligence 
in failing to wear a safety belt.  See App. A-Res-10.12  The 
amended 
statute 
cautioned, 
however, 
after 
limiting 
the 
permissible reduction of the plaintiff's damages to 15 percent, 
"This paragraph does not affect the determination of causal 
negligence in the action."  Id. at 12. 
                     
12 "Under Foley, if negligent failure to wear a safety belt 
is a cause of the injured person's injuries, the injured 
person's recoverable damages are to be reduced by the percentage 
of damages caused by failure to wear a safety belt.  Under Act 
132, recoverable damages may not be reduced by more than 15%, 
regardless of the percentage of damages caused by failure to 
wear a safety belt."  App. A-Res-7.  
96-2726.jpg 
 
7 
¶82 The Legislative Council Staff's description of 1987 
Wis. Act 132 also highlighted a distinction between the facts in 
Foley and the newer provisions of the Act: "The driver of a 
motor vehicle has responsibility under the Act regarding a young 
passenger's compliance with the law."  App. A-Res-4. 
¶83 As the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 347.48 
recognizes, there can be more than one cause of a person's 
injuries, those causes including the failure to wear a safety 
belt.  See App. A-Res-7.  Logically, then, failure to ensure 
that one's minor passenger wears a safety belt can be a cause of 
the passenger's injuries.   
¶84 This court observed in Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. 
Ins., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W.2d 140 (1962), that when assessing 
the negligence of the host driver or another driver, and the 
guest passenger, "the ultimate question relating to their 
respective negligence is whether such negligence caused the 
guest's injuries.  In most cases it is not necessary to 
determine whether the lack of care of the various parties found 
negligent caused the collision as distinguished from the 
injuries . . . the apportionment question likewise should then 
be submitted only in terms of causing the plaintiff's injuries." 
 (Emphasis added).  Thiesen, 18 Wis. 2d at 106-07.  Similarly, 
the person who fails to comply with Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) 
is causally negligent, and should be required to contribute to 
the payment of the injured passenger's recoverable damages. 
¶85 Gaertner and American Family assert that determining a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) to be negligence per se 
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8 
would be absurd, because that interpretation would penalize 
operators who fail to ensure that minors over 4 years old are 
buckled.  The absurdity arises, according to Gaertner and her 
insurer, 
when 
one 
reads 
another 
subsection, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48(4)(a)2, requiring use of a child safety restraint 
system for minor passengers between 2 and 4 years of age.  That 
subsection further states that failure to comply "does not by 
itself constitute negligence."  Holcka and her insurer respond 
by contending that the absence of the language found in Wis. 
Stat. § 347.48(4)(a)2, from Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m) leads to the 
"inescapable conclusion" that a violation of sub. (2m) does 
constitute negligence per se. 
¶86 Holcka's argument is more persuasive.  I agree that 
the absence of the phrase "does not by itself constitute 
negligence"  from Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m), combined with the 
presence of the phrase "[t]his paragraph does not affect the 
determination of causal negligence in the action," in Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(g) demonstrate a legislative intent to recognize a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) as negligence per se.  
Whether this court would also conclude that a violation of the 
duty imposed by Wis. Stat. § 347.48(4)(a)2 constitutes common 
law 
negligence, 
despite 
the 
limiting 
language 
of 
that 
subsection, is a question for another day.  In my view, it would 
be unjust not to impose liability on the host driver when, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c), and in light of "the 
realities of the frequency of automobile accidents and the 
extensive injuries they cause, the general availability of seat 
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9 
belts, and the public knowledge that riders and drivers should 
'buckle up for safety,'"13 Gaertner operated her vehicle without 
reasonably 
believing 
that 
her 
11-year 
old 
passenger 
was 
restrained by a safety belt. 
¶87 In sum, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c) is 
a safety statute.  There is no dispute that Gaertner violated 
the duty imposed by that statute when she operated her vehicle 
without reasonably believing that Justin was restrained by a 
safety belt.  Once Justin received injuries beyond those he 
would have sustained had he been restrained, Gaertner's conduct 
became negligence per se.  She is civilly liable for Justin's 
damages. 
III.   
¶88 The majority failed to engage in an analysis of 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(c) 
is 
a 
safety 
statute, 
apparently out of a fear that a conclusion such as mine would 
unavoidably lead to the question of contribution by the host 
driver, a question not yet reached by this court. 
¶89 A 
claim 
for 
contribution 
is 
separate 
from 
and 
independent of the underlying claim.  See Johnson v. Heintz, 73 
Wis. 2d 286, 295, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976). As the majority 
describes it, there are three prerequisites to a contribution 
claim: "1. Both parties must be joint negligent wrongdoers; 2. 
they must have common liability because of such negligence to 
                     
13 Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 483-84, 335 
N.W.2d 824 (1983).  
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10
the same person; [and] 3. one such party must have borne an 
unequal proportion of the common burden."  Majority op. at 7, 
citing General Accident Ins. Co. v. Schoendorf & Sorgi, 202 
Wis. 2d 98, 103, 549 N.W.2d 429 (1996).  
¶90 "Whether common liability exists is determined at the 
time the damages were sustained."  Teacher Retirement System of 
Texas v. Badger XVI Ltd. Psp., 205 Wis. 2d 532, 545, 556 N.W.2d 
415 (Ct. App. 1996).  In several cases involving complicated 
facts, Wisconsin courts have said that whether there is 
sufficient common liability to support a claim for contribution 
is a question of fact properly resolved at trial.  See Teacher 
Retirement System, 205 Wis. 2d at 546; State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 497, 59 N.W.2d 
425 (1953).  In this case, there was no trial, but the parties' 
stipulation provided that Holcka was negligent for causing the 
accident, 
and 
I conclude 
that the 
facts 
as 
stipulated14 
demonstrate that Gaertner was negligent per se for violating 
Wis. Stat. § 347.48 (2m)(c).  Further, it is undisputed that the 
                     
14 It is somewhat unfortunate that in this case, where the 
court is asked to decide questions of law with far-reaching 
consequences, we do not have a jury determination of negligence 
and damages but have only the limited facts as stipulated by the 
parties.  The parties did agree the accident was caused solely 
by Holcka's conduct.  They also agreed that 75 percent of 
Justin's injuries were caused by the failure to use a safety 
belt and 25 percent were caused by the accident.  Gaertner's 
operation of her vehicle without reasonably believing or 
ensuring that Justin was wearing a safety belt caused 70 percent 
of his enhanced injuries due to the failure to wear a safety 
belt.  Also according to the stipulation, Justin's failure to 
wear a safety belt caused 30 percent of his enhanced injuries 
due to the failure to wear a safety belt.  
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11
conduct of both Holcka and Gaertner resulted in injury to 
Justin. 
¶91 Gaertner and American Family dispute that there can be 
common liability in this case, because Gaertner's failure to 
ensure that Justin was restrained did not cause the accident. 
However, I conclude that common liability can exist when one of 
the negligent tortfeasors caused the accident and some injury, 
and the other negligent tortfeasor negligently caused additional 
injury at the same time. 
¶92 In Schoendorf, we listed a number of examples of joint 
liability, even though there was some separation in time of the 
negligent acts.  For example, we cited the analysis in Butzow v. 
Wausau Memorial Hosp. 51 Wis. 2d 281, 288-289, 187 N.W.2d 349 
(1971)(original tortfeasor and physician jointly and severally 
liable only for aggravation of damages), and Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 879 (1979)(discussing situations where the 
tortfeasors can be jointly liable only for the aggravation of 
initial injuries; in other situations, the tortfeasors can be 
jointly liable for the entire harm).  The Farrell court also 
cited Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 
359, 
360 
N.W.2d 2 (1984) 
(if more 
than 
one 
tortfeasor 
contributed to the injury, the law of joint and several 
liability applies); and Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 557, 
225 N.W.2d 431 (1975) (holding that it was not important that 
the automobile's design defect did not actually cause the 
initial accident, as long as it was a substantial factor in 
causing burn injury after gas tank erupted).  See Farrell, 151 
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12
Wis. 2d at 60 n.3.  In enhancement cases, "the successive tort-
feasor is not jointly liable for all the injuries to the 
claimant, but only for those injuries caused by the tortious 
conduct over and above the damage or injury that would have 
occurred as a result of the accident absent the successor tort-
feasor's conduct."  Farrell, 151 Wis. 2d at 61. 
¶93 Attempting to bolster its denial of a right to 
contribution, the majority observes that, in this case, Gaertner 
would end up liable for the bulk of Justin's recoverable damages 
despite the fact that her conduct caused only safety belt 
related injuries, and not the initial impact.  This result, 
leaving the negligent driver responsible for 40% of Koldeway's 
damages, is apparently sufficient to persuade the majority that 
the seat belt defense cannot "be used as an affirmative action 
for contribution."  Majority op. at 19. 
¶94 I am not so persuaded.  Finding Gaertner liable for 
the injuries she caused is not "wholly out of proportion to her 
culpability," see Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 426, 541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995), when the parties' stipulation already 
demonstrates that Gaertner is responsible for 70 percent of 
Justin's safety belt related injuries. 
¶95 The majority's hesitation to recognize a claim for 
contribution also seems founded on fear that the defendant 
driver will somehow avoid his or her financial responsibility.  
"[U]se of the seat belt defense in an affirmative cause of 
action for contribution can drastically alter the landscape of 
liability 
by 
reducing 
defendants' 
overall 
financial 
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13
responsibility, regardless of the amount of fault that is 
attributable 
to 
the 
defendant 
for 
causing 
the 
accident 
initially."  Majority op. at 20.  The majority continues, 
"Regardless of the defendant's responsibility for causing the 
original accident, the (host's) failure to properly restrain a 
passenger could almost eliminate the defendant's financial 
responsibility altogether."  Id. 
¶96 In my view, recognizing a right to contribution in 
this case does not permit Holcka and her insurer to avoid their 
financial responsibility.  Allowing contribution will not give 
the defendant driver any unwarranted "discount" on his or her 
financial obligation.  When contribution is allowed, the burden 
of paying damages is distributed, not shifted.  See Pachowitz v. 
Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 387, 202 
N.W.2d 268 (1972).  When contribution is allowed, the injured 
minor passenger is still made whole (subject to the maximum 15% 
reduction of recoverable damages under Wis. Stat. § 347.48) and 
the negligent host bears his or her share of the responsibility 
for the safety belt related injuries only.15  Equitable concerns 
                     
15 Presumably under the majority's reasoning, this court 
would not recognize any host liability for damages because of 
the host driver's failure to ensure that his or her minor 
passenger was restrained by a safety belt.  Thus, an effect of 
the majority's reasoning is that if the minor passenger is less 
than 7 but more than 4 years old, and the neighbor transporting 
him or her had failed to ensure that the minor was restrained by 
a safety belt, the minor will never recover more than 85 percent 
of his or her safety belt related damages even though he or she 
could not have been contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
in failing to wear a safety belt.  See Wis. Stat. § 891.44.   
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14
are satisfied.  Moreover, whether the minor passenger's safety 
belt related injuries are substantial or minimal makes no 
difference as to whether the right to contribution exists.  
Appellate courts decide questions of law based on the law, and 
not on palatable outcomes. 
¶97 The majority focuses on the wrong side of the 
proportion.  According to the expert testimony, had the host 
driver complied with the statute and ensured that her minor 
passenger was restrained, the bulk of Justin's injuries would 
not have occurred. Unless the defendant driver is entitled to 
contribution, he or she is disproportionately responsible for 
the plaintiff's recoverable damages.  This disproportion is 
inequitable. 
¶98 Ultimately, the majority concedes that Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.48 does not preclude contribution by the host driver when 
it states, ". . . the seat belt defense does not, strictly 
speaking, affect the determination of causal negligence in any 
action for personal injury . . ."  Majority op. at 20.  The 
majority's reluctance to recognize a right of contribution in 
this case is based in part on the perception that the 
legislature 
should 
decide 
that 
question. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
legislature has already decided.  Despite several amendments to 
the "seat belt law," contribution has not been precluded.  
Causal negligence is determined first.  The defendant driver, 
Holcka, and the negligent host driver, Gaertner, are both 
causally negligent. 
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15
¶99 Justice Bradley's concurrence misinterprets the Foley 
decision.  Foley does not hold that the primary tortfeasor (the 
negligent driver) is immunized "from the full consequences of 
their negligence," see concurring op. at 6, but instead holds 
that a plaintiff's contributory negligence in failing to put on 
a safety belt should act to reduce the amount of recoverable 
damages.  The reduction of damages discussed in Foley, and 
altered and codified in Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g), does not 
affect the negligent driver's liability for both initial and 
safety belt related damages.16  Pursuant to the statute, a 
plaintiff's safety belt negligence does not diminish a negligent 
driver's liability, it diminishes by 15% the amount of safety 
belt related damages the plaintiff can recover.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.48(2m)(g).  The concurrence errs when it advances the 
theory that safety belt negligence extinguishes the liability of 
the negligent driver for the safety belt related injuries to the 
plaintiff. 
¶100 The concurrence states in paragraph 16 that, post-
Foley, the legislature "exposed the initial tortfeasor to 
liability for seat belt injury."  Despite the earlier discussion 
by the concurrence, it now effectively concedes that the 
                     
16 The statute has changed the theory of Foley, as at least 
part of that decision may be read.  See 113 Wis. 2d at 489.  As 
the concurrence reads it, Foley eliminated liability of the 
negligent driver for any of the safety belt related damages. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) effectively puts the negligent 
driver's liability back in, and merely places a ceiling on how 
much the plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt can limit his 
or her recoverable damages for enhanced injuries.  
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16
legislature has made the negligent driver liable for enhanced 
injuries, thereby making the negligent driver and the negligent 
host driver joint tortfeasors.  The concurrence reads the 
stipulation to be one in which the parties have agreed to 
disregard what would be a joint and several liability for the 
seat belt related injuries between Gaertner and Holcka under 
current law, and to artificially create a successive tortfeasor 
status between them.  I disagree.  The stipulation does not say 
that, and the parties did not argue that. 
¶101 In this case, the parties stipulated that Holcka is 
solely responsible for the accident.  Therefore, under Foley she 
is liable for 100% of the recoverable damages.  The parties also 
stipulated that 75% of the total injuries were caused by 
Justin's failure to wear a safety belt.  In most cases, only the 
plaintiff can be found negligent for failing to wear a safety 
belt.  In those cases, a plaintiff is 100% negligent for failing 
to buckle up.  Here, we had a minor passenger so the parties 
then stipulated to divide up the "safety belt negligence" as 
follows: 70% of the safety belt related injuries were caused by 
Gaertner's 
negligence 
and 
30% 
were 
caused 
by 
Justin's 
negligence.  Justin's "safety belt negligence" becomes subject 
to Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g), reducing the total amount of 
recoverable enhanced damages by 15%.  Since Holcka and Gaertner 
remain jointly and severally liable for the safety belt related 
injuries, Holcka and her insurer are entitled to contribution. 
IV. 
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17
¶102 Finally, the majority looks to a forfeiture provision 
as an indication that the legislature, while requiring motorists 
to ensure that their minor passengers are restrained by safety 
belts, intended that the only consequence for violating that 
statute be a $10 forfeiture.17  The majority mistakenly relies on 
the 
existence 
of 
the 
forfeiture 
statute 
to 
manifest 
a 
legislative intent to preempt actions for contribution arising 
out of the negligent failure to ensure that a minor passenger is 
"buckled up."  See majority op. at 14 n.6; 17. 
¶103 By relying on a forfeiture provision and the 15 
percent reduction in total recoverable damages to conclude there 
is no right of contribution here, the majority mixes apples and 
oranges and ignores legislative intent.  Further, by this 
analysis 
the 
majority 
overlooks 
the 
existence 
of 
other 
forfeiture provisions arising from the motor vehicle code, which 
in no way limit the trial of negligence issues.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 347.06, 347.09 
requiring 
lighted headlamps 
before 
operation; Wis. Stat. § 347.14, requiring stop lamps in working 
order before operation of vehicle; Wis. Stat. § 347.245, 
requiring display of slow moving vehicle emblem before operation 
of 
certain 
vehicles; 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.30, 
imposing 
forfeitures of $10 to $200 for violations of lighting provisions 
or display provisions.  
                     
17 The amount of the forfeiture ranges from $10 to $200 
depending on the age of the minor passenger at the time of the 
violation.  In this case, the $10 amount would apply because 
Justin was 11 years old at the time of the accident.  
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18
¶104 Under the reasoning of the majority, an injured minor 
like Justin Koldeway can recover from the negligent driver 100% 
of his or her damages, minus 15% of his or her safety belt 
related damages.  The host driver, who failed to ensure that the 
minor passenger was restrained, pays a $10 forfeiture to the 
State, and is free from all liability for the safety belt 
related injuries that he or she caused.  This result cannot be 
what the legislature intended. 
¶105 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶106 I am authorized to state that Justice Donald W. 
Steinmetz joins in this dissent. 
 
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