Title: Matter of: Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN THE MATTER OF:  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 13, 2013 
PEIERLS FAMILY 
 
 
) 
INTER VIVOS TRUSTS  
 
)  Court Below:  Court of Chancery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware  
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Case No. 16812 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  July 10, 2013 
Decided:  October 4, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Peter S. Gordon (argued), Gordon, Fournaris & Mammarella PA, 
Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
Collins J. Seitz (argued), Seitz Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP, Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
2 
 
This Opinion is one of a trilogy of opinions, issued concurrently, addressing 
issues arising out of Petitions, filed by members of the Peierls family, requesting 
the Court of Chancery to accept jurisdiction over, and then modify, thirteen (13) 
trusts created during the period 1953 through 2005.  None of these trusts were 
created or settled under Delaware law, and none were ever administered in 
Delaware.  The Petitioners sought relief under recently-adopted Court of Chancery 
Rules 100-103, inclusive, which were designed to create an orderly procedure for 
entertaining petitions to modify a trust.  No respondent was named in the Petitions, 
which the Court of Chancery denied on various grounds, including lack of 
jurisdiction.  The Petitioners appealed to this Court, which appointed Collins J. 
Seitz, as amicus curiae to brief and argue in opposition to the Petitions.1  
 
This Opinion, in No. 13, 2013, addresses the issues arising out of the five (5) 
Peierls inter vivos trusts.  Our opinions in the companion cases, Nos. 11 and 12, 
2013, respectively, address the seven (7) Peierls family testamentary trusts and the 
charitable trust created by Ethel F. Peierls in 1994.  For the reasons next discussed, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery. 
 
 
 
                                          
 
1 The Court appreciates Mr. Seitz’s service as amicus curiae, and commends him for the quality 
of his presentation, which is in the finest tradition of the Delaware Bar. 
3 
 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellants, Brian E. Peierls and E. Jeffrey Peierls are the current 
beneficiaries of five inter vivos trusts that have been classified into three groups.  
The Vice Chancellor described in ample detail the facts of this case, much of 
which we summarize below. 
 
A. The Five Inter Vivos Trusts 
 
On January 14, 1953, Brian and Jeffrey’s grandmother, Jennie Peierls, 
settled two trusts.  One trust instrument creates and governs each trust 
(collectively, the “1953 Trust Instruments”).  Brian and Jeffrey are each currently 
the sole beneficiary of their respective trust in the pair.2  Importantly, the 1953 
Trust Instruments explicitly state that “all questions pertaining to [their] validity, 
construction, and administration shall be determined in accordance with the laws 
of the State of New York.”3  The Trust Instruments also grant each trustee the 
exclusive right to appoint a successor4 without any geographic limitation.5  The 
                                          
 
2 It appears that the Vice Chancellor in his opinion mistakenly referred to Jeffrey as “the sole 
current beneficiary of the 1953 Trust” after describing a “pair of trusts” settled in 1953.  In re 
Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 473–74 (Del. Ch. 2012) (emphasis added).  The 
1953 Trusts are two separate trusts, with one settled for the benefit of Brian and the other for the 
benefit of Jeffrey. See App. to Answering Br. at B714, B872. 
 
3 App. to Answering Br. at B727, B885. 
 
4 Id. at B724, B882. 
 
4 
 
trustees’ commissions are determined under the laws of New York in accordance 
with the Trust Instruments.6  For each trust, two individuals and one corporate 
institution served as initial trustees in accordance with the requirement that there 
always be three trustees (two individuals and one institution).7  Consistent with the 
description used by the Vice Chancellor, we refer to this pair of trusts as the “1953 
Trusts.” 
 
Ethel F. Peierls settled a third trust on May 24, 1957, and designated two 
individuals and one corporate institution as the initial trustees. 8  One trust 
instrument creates and governs the trust (the “1957 Trust Instrument”).  Brian and 
Jeffrey are currently the sole beneficiaries of that trust.  Although the 1957 Trust 
Instrument declares that its “validity and effect [are] determined by the laws of the 
State of New Jersey,”9 the trust’s situs and administration have been governed by 
New York law ever since the Superior Court of New Jersey exercised jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                        
5 Id. 
 
6 Id. at B726, B884. 
 
7 Id. at B723, B881. 
 
8 In the same vein as mentioned above, the Vice Chancellor in his opinion below mistakenly 
described Jeffrey as being the “sole beneficiary of his 1957 Trust” and Brian as the “sole 
beneficiary of his 1957 Trust.” In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 474 (Del. 
Ch. 2012) (emphasis added).  In fact, only one trust was settled in 1957 which designated both 
Brian and Jeffrey as beneficiaries. See App. to Answering Br. at B121-31. 
 
9 App. to Answering Br. at B32, B128. 
 
5 
 
over the trust in 2001 and appointed a New York trustee.10  Consistent with the 
Vice Chancellor’s opinion below, this trust will be referred to as the “1957 Trust.” 
 
Edgar S. Peierls settled a final pair of trusts on August 14, 1975, again with 
two individuals and one corporate institution serving as the initial trustees.  One 
trust instrument creates and governs both trusts (the “1975 Trust Instrument”).  
Echoing the 1953 Trusts, these trusts are also “governed by, and [their] validity, 
effect and interpretation determined by the laws of the State of New York.”11  
These Trusts similarly reserve to the trustees the right to appoint their successors 
without any geographic limitation.12  The 1975 Trust Instrument also looks to the 
laws of the State of New York to determine the commissions payable to the 
trustees.13  Presently, Brian and Jeffrey are each the sole beneficiary of their 
respective trust. As did the Vice Chancellor, we refer to this pair of trusts as the 
“1975 Trusts.” 
Jeffrey and Malcolm A. Moore serve as the individual trustees of each of the 
1953 Trusts, the 1957 Trust, and the 1975 Trusts (collectively the “Trusts”).  Bank 
of America, N.A. serves as the corporate trustee of those Trusts, as the successor of 
United States Trust Company. 
                                          
 
10 Id. at B32. 
 
11 Id. at B571. 
 
12 Id. at B568–69. 
 
13 Id. at B569. 
6 
 
B. The Trust Petitions 
 
The Petitions regarding the inter vivos Trusts all request that the Court of 
Chancery: (1) approve the resignation of the current trustees; (2) confirm the 
appointment of Northern Trust Company as the sole trustee; (3) determine that 
Delaware law governs the administration of each Trust; (4) confirm Delaware as 
the situs for each Trust; (5) reform the trusts’ administrative scheme; and (6) 
accept jurisdiction over the Trusts.  The Peierls’ Petitions stem from their general 
frustration with Bank of America’s lack of communication and responsiveness 
regarding the handling of Trust assets.  Their decision to swap corporate trustees 
and retitle Trust assets in the name of Northern Trust is largely motivated by their 
desire to “change the situs of the trust[s] to Delaware and establish that Delaware 
law governs the administration of the trusts.”14  Accompanying the Petitions are 
the resignations of the Trusts’ current trustees, all expressly conditioned upon 
approval by the Court of Chancery.  The appointment of Northern Trust as the new 
corporate trustee is also expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of 
Chancery. 
Among the changes to the administrative scheme that the Peierls propose, is 
to extinguish the current three-trustee scheme in favor of one that involves a single 
institutional trustee acting under the direction of an Investment Direction Adviser 
                                          
 
14 In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 474 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
 
7 
 
and a Trust Protector, both of whom would be individuals.  As proposed, Jeffrey 
would serve as the inaugural Investment Direction Adviser and “[would] hold and 
exercise the full power to manage the investments of the Trust.”15  Moore would 
occupy the Trust Protector role, in which he could remove and appoint both the 
trustees and the Investment Direction Adviser.  The creation of these two positions 
would largely eviscerate the authority and responsibilities of the trustees by 
delegating traditional trustee powers to the Investment Decision Advisor and Trust 
Protector.16 
 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Chancery adopted Rules 100 through 103, effective May 1, 
2012, in an effort to clarify the procedures to which a party must adhere when 
filing a consent petition to reform a trust.  The Court of Chancery thereby provided 
a new avenue for petitioners to utilize that court’s equitable powers to reform a 
trust instrument.17  We review cases involving the Court of Chancery’s exercise of 
                                          
 
15 See, e.g., 1953 Trusts Pet. Ex. G at 3. 
 
16 In his opinion, the Vice Chancellor describes in ample detail the roles of each new position in 
the administrative scheme.  See Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d at 474–76.  We, 
therefore, need not address these details. 
 
17 App. to Opening Br. at A42 (citing Consent Petition Committee of the Delaware Bar 
Association, Report to the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on the Matter of Consent 
Petitions (Mar. 8, 2010) (“[Chancery Court’s] equitable power . . . allows it to reform a trust.”). 
 
8 
 
its equitable powers for abuse of discretion.18  However, in doing so, we review the 
Court of Chancery’s legal conclusions de novo.19 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Vice Chancellor correctly found that whether the Court of Chancery 
could exercise jurisdiction and grant the requested relief depended upon whether 
Delaware law applied to the Trusts.20  For this reason we first address the law 
governing the administration of the Trusts and thereafter evaluate the Vice 
Chancellor’s conclusions on the remaining issues. 
A. Which State’s Law Governs the 1953 and 1975 Trusts? 
 
The Appellants’ Petitions assume that once a Delaware trustee is appointed 
and takes custody of Trust assets, Delaware law will govern administration of the 
Trusts.  The Vice Chancellor found, however, that Delaware law could never 
govern the administration of the inter vivos Trusts because that result would be 
“contrary to the choice of law provisions in the trust agreements.”21  For the 
                                          
 
18 Reserves Dev. LLC v. Severn Sav. Bank, FSB, 961 A.2d 521, 523 (Del. 2008); In re Unfunded 
Ins. Trust Agreement of Capaldi, 870 A.2d 493, 497 (Del. 2005). 
 
19 Lawson v. Meconi, 897 A.2d 740, 743 (Del. 2006). See also Scion Breckenridge Managing 
Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance Estate Fund, 68 A.3d 665, 675 (Del. 2013); SV Inv. Partners, 
LLC v. Thoughtworks, Inc., 37 A.3d 205, 209-10 (Del. 2011). 
 
20 Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d at 476 (“The petitions fail primarily because 
Delaware law does not govern the trusts.”). 
 
21 Id. at 478. 
 
9 
 
reasons outlined below, we find that the Trust Instruments do not necessarily 
preclude the future application of Delaware law to the Trusts’ administration. 
1. Choice of Law Principles 
When confronted with a choice-of-law issue, Delaware courts adhere to the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.22  The Restatement directs that initially 
“[a] court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of 
its own state on choice of law.”23  In the absence of a statutory directive, the 
Restatement outlines several factors to consider when deciding the applicable rule 
of law.24 
Delaware has adopted a choice-of-law statute that applies to the 
administration of a trust.25  The Peierls assert that 12 Del C. § 3332(b) governs the 
                                          
 
22 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 7 A.3d 454, 457 (Del. 2010); Liggett Grp., Inc. v. 
Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 134, 137 (Del. 2001); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 
38, 47 (Del. 1991). 
 
23 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971). 
 
24 These factors include: 
 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies 
of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of the other interested states nad the relative 
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the 
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular 
field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in 
the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
 
Id. at § 6. 
 
25 12 Del. C. § 3332. 
 
10 
 
choice of law in this case.26  Section 3332(b) states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise 
expressly provided by the terms of a governing instrument or by court order, the 
laws of this State shall govern the administration of a trust while the trust is 
administered in this State.”27  Notably, the statute imposes a precondition upon its 
application—namely that the trust “[be] administered” in Delaware.  The Petitions 
in part seek orders approving the resignation of the current trustees—resignations 
that are conditioned on judicial approval—and the appointment of a successor 
trustee, whose acceptance is also conditioned on judicial approval.  Because the 
current trustees have not actually resigned and the successor trustee has not yet 
assumed its role, the Trusts are not yet “in Delaware” for purposes of deciding 
whether to permit a transfer of administration and a change in the law of 
administration.  Accordingly, Section 3332(b) is not yet applicable.  We, therefore, 
must look to our conflict-of-laws jurisprudence to determine whether a Delaware 
court can exercise jurisdiction over and approve the Peierls’ Petitions.   
We again turn to the Restatement for further clarification of the principles 
governing a trust instrument’s choice-of-law provision and the settlor’s intent to 
allow a change in the trust’s governing administrative law. 
 
 
                                          
 
26 Opening Br. at 21–22. 
27 12 Del. C. § 3332(b). 
11 
 
i. Which State’s Law Governs The Administration Of A Trust? 
Section 272 of the Restatement specifically addresses which state’s law 
governs the administration of inter vivos trusts.28  Section 272’s Comment a directs 
us to Section 271’s Comment a (which discusses testamentary trusts) to determine 
what matters are administrative in nature.29  Administrative matters are “those 
matters which relate to the management of the trust,” including a trustee’s powers, 
the liabilities a trustee may incur for breach of trust, what constitutes a proper 
investment, a trustee’s compensation and indemnity rights, a trust’s terminability, 
and, importantly, a trustee’s removal and successor trustees’ appointment.30  We 
note that the Peierls’ Petitions seek to change the existing trustees; declare that 
Delaware is the Trusts’ situs and that Delaware law governs administrative 
matters; modify the Trusts’ provisions to allow for particular management changes 
under the Delaware trust statutes; and accept jurisdiction over the Trusts.  All of 
these are administrative matters.  Accordingly, we must determine which state’s 
law governs the Trusts’ administrative provisions to determine whether the Vice 
Chancellor properly denied the Petitions. 
                                          
 
28 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272. 
 
29 Id. at § 272 cmt. a. 
30 Id. 
12 
 
“Generally speaking, a creator of an inter vivos trust has some right of 
choice in the selection of the jurisdiction, the law of which will govern the 
administration of the trust.”31  The Restatement similarly provides that the law 
governing a trust’s administration is either “the local law of the state designated by 
the settlor to govern the administration of the trust,” or, if the settlor does not 
designate a particular state’s law, “the local law of the state to which the 
administration of the trust is most substantially related.”32  Thus, different 
principles apply depending on whether the trustee has designated a particular 
state’s governing law. 
A settlor may designate, either expressly or implicitly within the trust 
instrument, the law governing the trust’s administration.33  Where the settlor does 
not include an express choice-of-law provision, his designation “may otherwise be 
apparent [i.e., implied] from the language of the trust instrument or from other 
circumstances, such as the extent of the contacts with a particular state.”34   
                                          
 
31 Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819, 826 (Del. 1957) (citing Wilm. Trust III, 24 A.2d 309 (Del. 
1942)). 
32 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272. 
33 Id. at cmt. c. 
34 Id.; see also Lewis, 128 A.2d at 826 (inferring choice of law from other circumstances, such as 
where the settlor signs the trust instrument in a particular state and delivers the trust corpus to a 
trustee doing business in that same state). 
13 
 
When, on the other hand, “the settlor does not designate a state whose local 
law is to govern the administration of the trust,” either expressly or implicitly, “the 
local law of the state to which the [trust’s] administration is most substantially 
related” will control.35  Of the several states that potentially may have a substantial 
relationship with a trust’s administration, “most important is the state . . . where the 
settlor manifested an intention that the trust should be administered.”36  Thus, even 
where the settlor does not identify a particular state’s law as the governing 
administrative law, “[i]f the settlor has manifested an intention that the trust should 
be administered in a particular state, the local law of that state will be . . . the law 
governing the administration of the trust, unless it appears that the settlor desired to 
have some other law applied.”37  If no evidence suggests that the settlor intended 
for a particular state’s law to apply, we consider other factors bearing on the 
“substantial relationship” analysis, such as the settlor’s domicile, where the settlor 
executed and delivered the trust instrument, where the trust assets were located at 
the trust’s inception, and the beneficiaries’ domicile.38 
 
 
                                          
 
35 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272 cmt. d. 
36 Id. 
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
14 
 
ii. Changing the Place of Administration of a Trust and its Effect 
on yhe Law Governing Administration of the Trust 
 
The Restatement provides that normally the trustee of an inter vivos trust can 
“enter upon the performance of his duties without authority from any court, and he 
is not under a duty to account to any particular court.”39  At this point, no court has 
exercised jurisdiction over the Trusts.  Only when a beneficiary or trustee brings a 
suit over the trust does a court acquire jurisdiction.40  To be sure, this situation is 
distinguishable from that in which “the trustee has become subject to the 
continuing jurisdiction of a particular court to which the trustee is thereafter 
accountable.”41 
Where the trust is not yet subject to a particular court’s oversight, the 
Restatement’s comments identify issues that arise when parties seek to change the 
place of a trust’s administration.42  The key question is “whether thereafter the 
administration of the trust is governed by the local law of the other state.”43  In 
other words, when the situs of a trust is changed, does the law governing the trust’s 
                                          
 
39 Id. at cmt. e. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
15 
 
administration follow the change of situs?  The answer turns “upon the terms of the 
trust, express or implied.”44 
We take no issue with the Vice Chancellor’s conclusion that, in the absence 
of a choice-of-law provision, the settlor implicitly intends to allow a change in the 
law governing administration by allowing the appointment of a successor trustee.45  
We do not agree, however, that the law governing the administration of a trust can 
be changed only in this limited circumstance.   
A trust instrument may indicate, either expressly or implicitly, the settlor’s 
intention “that the trust is always to be administered under the local law of the 
original state.”46  When discussing testamentary trusts47 and the result of a change 
in the place of administration, the Restatement’s comments indicate that although a 
court may approve a change in the place of administration, it will not order a 
change in the law of administration governing the testamentary trust if it would be 
contrary to the testator’s intent.  Such a circumstance may exist “when [the settlor] 
                                          
 
44 Id. 
45 In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 483 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 
46 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272 cmt. e (emphasis added); see also In re Chase 
Nat’l Bank of City of N.Y. (Stillwell), 102 N.Y.S.2d 124, 127, 129 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (holding 
that the New York courts had exclusive jurisdiction over a trust’s administration because the 
trust indenture stated that the “‘[t]rustee shall not be required to account in any court other than 
one of the courts of [New York]’”). 
47 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272 cmt. e (instructing that the rules regarding 
a change in the place of administration are the same for inter vivos trusts as they are for 
testamentary trusts). 
 
16 
 
has expressly or by implication provided in the will that the administration of the 
trust should be governed by the local law of the state of his domicil[e] at death, 
even though the place of administration should subsequently be changed.”48  In 
that case, “the mere fact that the trustee acquires a domicil[e] in another state or 
that by the exercise of a power of appointment a successor trustee is appointed who 
is domiciled in another state does not result in a change of the law applicable to the 
administration of the trust.”49  Without evidence that the settlor intended for the 
law governing administration of the trust at its inception to always govern the trust, 
a settlor’s initial choice of law is not absolute and unchangeable. 
A trust instrument may expressly authorize a change in the law governing 
administration of the trust.  The trust instrument may also implicitly authorize the 
change, “such as when the trust instrument contains a power to appoint a trustee in 
another named state.”50  As the Restatement notes, even “[a] simple power to 
appoint a successor trustee may be construed to include a power to appoint a trust 
company or individual in another state.”51  Whether the trust instrument expressly 
or implicitly authorizes a change in the trust’s administrative governing law, “the 
                                          
 
48 Id. § 271 cmt. g. 
49 Id. § 272 cmt. e. 
50 Id. (emphasis added). 
51 Id. § 272 cmt. e. 
17 
 
law governing the administration of the trust thereafter is the local law of the other 
state and not the local law of the state of original administration.”52  That rule 
applies even when the trust instrument contains a choice-of-law provision.  
Therefore, when a settlor does not intend his choice of governing law to be 
permanent and the trust instrument includes a power to appoint a successor trustee, 
the law governing the administration of the trust may be changed. 
iii. Distilling Delaware’s Case Law 
After surveying the Delaware case law, the Vice Chancellor concluded that 
validly appointing an out-of-state trustee will effect a change in a trust’s 
administrative law only “if the settlor has not selected a particular law to govern 
the trust.”53  In effect, he reads a choice-of-law provision governing a trust’s 
administration to reflect a settlor’s intent that a particular state’s law chosen will 
always govern a trust’s administration, irrespective of whether the beneficiaries 
validly exercise a power of appointment to select an out-of-state successor trustee.  
The court so concluded by relying on principles derived from Wilmington Trust 
Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co. (Wilmington Trust III),54 Wilmington Trust Co. v. 
                                          
 
52 Id. 
53 In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 483 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
54 24 A.2d 309 (Del. 1942). 
18 
 
Sloane,55 and Annan v. Wilmington Trust Co.56  We do not read these cases to paint 
such broad strokes so as to stand for the proposition that a power to appoint a 
trustee in another state will never reflect an intention to permit a change in the law 
governing a trust’s administration. 
Wilmington Trust III has a confusing history.  In Wilmington Trust Co. v. 
Wilmington Trust Co. (Wilmington Trust I),57 a settlor did not include a choice-of-
law provision in an inter vivos trust instrument.58  The Chancellor concluded that 
the settlor “intended to [create] a trust under the law of New York.”  At the trust’s 
inception the donor and all of the beneficiaries were domiciled in New York, the 
trust’s corpus was located in New York, and the settlor delivered the corpus to the 
trustee in New York.59  Accordingly, the Chancellor ruled that New York law 
would govern the trust.60   
Later, the settlor consented to a Delaware trust company’s appointment as a 
successor trustee.61  The Chancellor then had to determine whether the trust’s 
                                          
 
55 54 A.2d 544 (Del. 1947). 
56 559 A.2d 1289 (Del. 1989). 
57 186 A. 903 (Del. Ch. 1936). 
58 Id. at 908. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 909. 
19 
 
validity would be determined under New York or Delaware law.62  We pause here 
to note that questions concerning a trust’s validity and “the legality of the 
interests”63 purportedly created under the trust are substantive rather than 
administrative questions.64  Therefore, we read the Chancellor’s statement—that 
“[h]ad the original trustee removed to Delaware bringing the trust res with her and 
there continued to administer the trust, it can hardly be denied that the New York 
law would have continued to govern its terms”65—to reflect the common sense 
proposition that the law governing construction of the trust’s substantive terms 
would not change by reason of a change in the trust’s place of administration. 
The Chancellor also concluded that the settlor did not intend the 
beneficiaries to alter the law governing the trust’s validity by the settlor having 
included the power to appoint an out-of-state trustee.  The reason is that the power 
to change the trustee “was designed solely in the interest of administration and was 
in no wise intended as a means of selecting what body of law should govern the 
trust in its substantial and essential terms.”66  He further reasoned that “[t]here is 
no irreconcilable difficulty in having the meaning and validity of a trust judged by 
                                          
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 908. 
 
64 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 268 cmt. e (1971). 
65 Wilm. Trust I, 186 A. at 909. 
66 Id. at 910. 
20 
 
the law of one jurisdiction and its administration governed by the law of another” 
and aptly noted that “[p]ractical considerations render necessary the principle that 
no matter under what jurisdiction the validity of the trust is to be determined, 
problems concerning its management are referable to the jurisdiction where the 
seat of its administration is located.”67  Accordingly, the Chancellor ruled that New 
York law continued to govern the trust’s validity despite its Delaware 
administration.68  After the parties requested reargument, the Chancellor died while 
the request was still pending.69   
In Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co. (Wilmington Trust II), the 
new Chancellor addressed the reargument motion.70  He determined that the trust 
was a New York trust at its inception.71  He also concluded, based on the settlor’s 
deposition and the trust instrument’s provision that any successor trustee would 
“hold the trust estate subject to all of the conditions of the deed ‘to the same effect 
as though now named herein,’” that the exercise of the power to change the 
trustees legally moved the trust’s location to Delaware.72  Accordingly, Delaware 
                                          
 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Wilm. Trust III, 24 A.2d 309, 312 (Del. 1942). 
70 15 A.2d 153 (Del. Ch. 1940). 
71 Id. at 160. 
72 Id. at 163. 
21 
 
law would then control a determination of the validity of any interests created 
under the trust instrument.73 
In Wilmington Trust III, we affirmed the Chancellor’s holding in Wilmington 
Trust II.74  We concluded that based on the “to the same effect as though now 
named herein” language, the trust instrument reflected the settlor’s intention “that 
if the trustee should be changed, the successor trustee should not only be bound by 
the same conditions as were expressed in the trust deed, but also that the successor 
trustee should have the same status, and should be considered in all respects, as an 
original appointee.”75  Because the trust instrument did not expressly indicate 
which state’s law should govern, if a Delaware trust company had been the original 
appointee and if it had received the substantial additions to the trust that occurred 
in this case after the new trustee’s appointment, the late Chancellor would have 
clearly found those circumstances “sufficient evidence of the donor’s intention to 
submit his trust to the law of this jurisdiction.”76  Accordingly, we held that the 
trust language “‘to the same effect as though now named herein’, as applied to the 
power to appoint a successor trustee in another state, must be accepted as 
                                          
 
73 Id. 
74 Wilm. Trust III, 24 A.2d at 314. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
22 
 
authorizing a removal of the seat of the trust from its original location, and its 
reestablishment under the law of another jurisdiction.”77  We continued by 
observing that “[t]here is no substantial reason why a donor, in dealing with that 
which is his own, may not provide for a change in the location of his trust with a 
consequent shifting of the controlling law.”78  Therefore, we concluded the 
Chancellor properly applied Delaware law to determine the “validity and effect of 
[the beneficiary’s] deed of appointment and of the rights and interests of the 
appointees thereunder.”79 
In Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sloane, the Chancellor was required to determine 
the validity of several appointments made by trust beneficiaries.80 In 1925, Thomas 
A. Edison settled a New York inter vivos trust through a New York trust company 
for the benefit of his son, William L. Edison.  The trust permitted the trustee to 
assign the trust fund to whomever William should designate, either through a 
testamentary appointment or based on the intestacy laws.81  In his will, William 
                                          
 
77 Id.   
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Wilm. Trust Co. v. Sloane, 54 A.2d 544, 545 (Del. Ch. 1947). 
81 Id. at 545–46.  The 1925 trust indenture “provided: ‘Upon the death of the Beneficiary 
(William L. Edison) the said trust fund shall be assigned by the trustee to such persons and in 
such shares, interests and proportions, absolutely or in trust as the Beneficiary shall, by his last 
will and testament, designate and appoint.’”  Id. at 549. Thomas also created a testamentary trust 
upon his death in 1931 for his son’s benefit.  Id. at 546. 
23 
 
instructed that the proceeds of the trust, less approximately $227,000, should be 
distributed to his residuary estate and devised the $227,000 to a Delaware trust 
company to be held in trust for that purpose.82  He named his wife, Blanche 
Travers Edison, as the income beneficiary and granted her a testamentary power of 
appointment over the trust’s principal.83  After William’s death, the New York 
trustee delivered the 1925 trust estate to the Delaware trust company as the 
executor of William’s will.84  Blanche exercised her testamentary power of 
appointment, and the parties in Sloane later challenged the validity of those 
bequests.85   
The Chancellor identified the key question to be which state’s law governed 
Blanche’s power of appointment under her husband’s will.86  Addressing the 1925 
inter vivos trust, the Chancellor held that based on the facts and circumstances, 
Thomas settled a New York trust.87  That trust instrument permitted William to not 
only appoint “a successor trustee in another [s]tate, but [it] also contained language 
                                          
 
82 Id. at 546. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 547. 
85 Id. at 547–48. 
86 Id. at 549. 
87 Id.  He also concluded that the testamentary trust Thomas established was a New Jersey trust.  
Id.  
24 
 
which [the Chancellor] construed as an intent to permit the beneficiaries of the 
fund, under certain circumstances, to terminate the original trust and create a new 
trust in [Delaware].”88  Therefore, given the facts and circumstances surrounding 
William’s will, when William exercised his power of appointment in favor of “a 
Delaware trustee on further and different trusts, pursuant to the authority given him 
by the trust deed of October 2, 1925,” he settled “a new trust . . . in [Delaware] by 
his will.”89  Accordingly, the Chancellor concluded, Delaware law would apply to 
the question of whether Blanche validly named the remainder beneficiaries under 
the testamentary power of appointment William granted her.90 That question did 
not fall within the category of “administrative matters.”91 
In Annan v. Wilmington Trust Company, this Court was required to 
determine whether a settlor intended to include illegitimate offspring when the 
settlor used the terms “issue” and “lineal descendants” in several trust 
instruments.92  We addressed choice of law in reference to a 1940 inter vivos trust 
that was created in Montreal, Canada.93  While the trust was initially administered 
                                          
 
88 Id. at 550. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 268 cmt. e (1971). 
92 Annan v. Wilm. Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1289, 1290 (Del. 1989). 
93 Id. at 1290, 1293. 
25 
 
in Quebec, it was at the time of the case being administered in Delaware.94  We 
ruled that the Vice Chancellor correctly upheld the trust instrument’s choice-of-law 
provision requiring that Quebec law would govern the trust’s construction.95  We 
noted that Delaware courts will enforce a choice-of-law provision where the 
selected jurisdiction “bears some material relationship to the transaction.”  The fact 
that the settlor created the trust in Quebec and that the trust was initially 
administered in Quebec met that standard.96  We again note that questions relating 
to a trust instrument’s construction are not questions of administration.97 
The principles we derive from these cases do not go quite as far as the Vice 
Chancellor appears to hold.  We read the Wilmington Trust trilogy to stand for the 
narrow proposition that a trust instrument, through a power to appoint a trustee 
combined with “to the same effect as though now named herein” language can 
reflect the settlor’s intent to allow a beneficiary to reestablish a trust in a different 
state.  Similarly, we read Sloane to hold that a settlor can permit a beneficiary to 
exercise a power of appointment over the trust’s assets to create a new trust in 
another state.  Finally, we read Annan as supporting the proposition that a choice-
                                          
 
94 See id.  
95 Id. at 1293.   
96 Id. (citations omitted).  
97 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 268 cmt. e (1971). 
26 
 
of-law provision concerning the law governing a trust instrument’s construction 
will remain effective even if the trust’s place of administration is changed.  None 
of these cases, however, support the conclusion that “[w]hen a settlor has selected 
a governing law, the power to appoint a successor trustee in and of itself is 
insufficient to override this intent, unless the trust document as construed by the 
Court expressly provides for such a change.”98 
2. Applying These Principles to the 1953 Trusts, the 1957 Trust and 
the 1975 Trusts 
 
Delaware courts apply a “seminal” rule of construction when interpreting 
trust agreements: “the settlor’s intent controls the interpretation of the instrument.  
Such intent must be determined by considering the language of the trust 
instrument, read as an entirety, in light of the circumstances surrounding its 
creation.  If this analysis fails to resolve the conflict, we resort to rules of 
construction.”99  Accordingly, we determine the settlor’s intent based on the 
specific language of the trust instruments.  The Vice Chancellor ruled that New 
York law presently governs the 1953 and 1975 Trusts, and that New Jersey law 
presently governs the 1957 Trust.100 
                                          
 
98 In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 484 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
99 Annan v. Wilm. Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1289, 1292 (Del. 1989) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
100 Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d at 489. 
27 
 
First, we turn to the 1953 Trusts, which state that “all questions pertaining to 
[the Trusts’] validity, construction, and administration shall be determined in 
accordance with the laws of the State of New York.”101  The 1953 Trust 
Instruments also include provisions that permit the trustees to receive the 
commissions that a testamentary trustee may receive under New York law.102  
Additionally, an individual trustee has “the absolute right to appoint his or her 
substitute or successor . . . trustee,”103 without any geographical restrictions on the 
exercise of that power of appointment.   
Turning to the Trust Instruments’ plain language, we agree that at the time 
the settlor executed the 1953 Trusts, the settlor’s intent was that New York law 
would govern the Trusts’ administration.  After having carefully parsed the 
Restatement’s commentary, however, we disagree with the Vice Chancellor’s 
conclusion that a valid appointment of a trustee in another state effects a change in 
a trust’s administrative law only “if the settlor has not selected a particular law to 
govern the trust.”104   
                                          
 
101 App. to Answering Br. at B727, B885. 
102 Id. at B726, B884. 
103 Id. at  B724, B882. 
104 Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d at 483. 
28 
 
That conclusion would require that the 1953 Trusts always be administered 
under New York law, even if the trustees appointed out-of-state successor trustees.  
On that point, we adopt the Restatement’s enlightening commentary concerning 
testamentary trusts, namely, that a change in the place of administration resulting 
from the valid appointment of a successor trustee will result in a change of the law 
of administration, unless the change would be contrary to the testator’s intent.  
Such a circumstance could arise “when [the testator] has expressly or by 
implication provided in the will that the administration of the trust should be 
governed by the local law of the state of his domicil[e] at death, even though the 
place of administration should subsequently be changed.”105   
The 1953 Trust Instruments do not include any language suggesting that the 
Trusts’ law of administration must always remain in New York even if the trustees 
later appoint out-of-state successor trustees.  The reference to trustee commissions 
does not reflect an intent to mandate that administration always occurs under New 
York law; rather, the settlor intended that provision “solely as a yardstick of 
payment.”106  The fact that the settlor knew how to create an absolute, continuing 
                                          
 
105 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 271 cmt. g (1971). 
106 In re Smart’s Trust, 181 N.Y.S.2d 647, 651 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); see also In re Matthiessen, 
87 N.Y.S.2d 787, 790, 791–92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (noting that despite a provision that 
compensated trustees based on what New York’s Surrogate’s Court Act permitted testamentary 
trustees to recover, “the trust agreement does not either expressly or by a necessary implication 
confine the administration of the trust to [New York]”). 
29 
 
requirement bolsters our interpretation that she did not intend New York law 
always to govern the law of administration despite a later change in the place of 
administration.107 
Accordingly, we hold that although the settlor intended that the New York 
trustee initially administer the 1953 Trusts under New York law, the settlor 
implicitly permitted the law of administration to change with a change in the place 
of administration.  The settlor manifested that intent by permitting the existing 
trustees to appoint successor trustees without any geographical limitation and by 
not otherwise indicating that New York law must remain the law of administration 
despite a validly executed change in the place of administration.  We therefore are 
constrained to conclude that the Vice Chancellor erred by ruling that New York 
law would always govern the 1953 Trusts’ administration.  Here, the record 
establishes that, in 1999, the United States Trust Company of Texas, N.A., became 
a valid successor trustee to the 1953 Trusts and that the Trusts’ place of 
administration became Texas.108  Accordingly, the law governing the 1953 Trusts’ 
law of administration also became Texas law.  Under this analysis, the law of 
                                          
 
107 The 1953 Trust Instruments state, for example, that “[t]here shall always be three (3) trustees 
to administer the [Trusts].”  App. to Answering Br. at B723, B881 (emphasis added). 
108 Id. at B733–34; B891–92.  We note that Bank of America has since succeeded United States 
Trust as the institutional trustee, but the record does not indicate that the place of administration 
has moved from Texas.  Opening Br. at 16; App. to Answering Br. at B622, B778. 
30 
 
administration can be changed when accompanied by the appointment of an out-of-
state trustee, even in the face of the Trusts’ choice-of-law provision. 
We next address the 1957 Trust, which states: “This Indenture shall be 
construed and regulated, and its validity and effect determined by the laws of the 
State of New Jersey.”109  The 1957 Trust Instrument also grants the trustees the 
power to appoint their successors without geographic limitation,110 and entitles the 
trustees to “receive, without judicial authorization, the commissions allowed on 
principal and income by the laws of the State of New York.”111 
It is a basic rule of construction that a court will prefer “an interpretation that 
gives effect to each term of an agreement . . . to any interpretation that would result 
in a conclusion that some terms are uselessly repetitive.”112  As such, the term 
“regulated” must refer to something other than the Trust’s “validity and effect.”  
That term must also be distinct from the term “construe,” which we equate with 
“interpret.”  Matters concerning a trust’s validity, effect, and interpretation are not 
                                          
 
109 App. to Answering Br. at B128. 
 
110 Id. at B124. 
 
111 Id. at B127. 
 
112 O’Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287 (Del. 2001) (citation omitted). 
31 
 
generally matters of administration.113  We, therefore, conclude that the 1957 
Trusts Instrument reflects the settlor’s intent that New Jersey law initially govern 
administration. 
Consistent with our analysis of the 1953 Trust, we do not conclude that the 
initial selection of New Jersey law permanently controls the law applicable to 
administration.  Similar to the 1953 Trusts, the 1957 Trust Instrument contains no 
language evincing the settlor’s intent that New Jersey law will always govern the 
administration of the Trust.  The settlor included no restriction on the appointment 
of out-of-state trustees.  In fact, the settlor’s appointment of a New York trustee to 
administer a trust governed by New Jersey law, evidences her intent to ignore 
geographical boundaries.  And, although she denoted New York law as governing 
the trustees’ commissions, we read this measure as merely a yardstick for 
compensation.  Nor is it clear that the New Jersey court order effects any change in 
the Trust’s situs or administrative law, particularly since the judge ordered that a 
New York trustee, United States Trust Co. of New York, succeed what appeared to 
be the then-existing New York trustee, Bankers Trust Co.114  We therefore 
                                          
 
113 Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 268 cmt. d, 271 cmt. a (1971). 
(describing administrative matters), with id. § 268, cmt e. (describing matters not of 
administration).  
114 See App. to Answering Br. B121, B131 (reflecting A.E. Scott’s signature as Trust Officer of 
the Bankers Trust Company before a New York notary and stating that the Trust Officer resides 
in New York). 
32 
 
conclude that the 1957 Trust is currently administered under New Jersey law, but 
find no evidence that the settlor’s initial choice that New Jersey law “regulate” the 
Trust be eternal.   
Turning next to the 1975 Trusts, their Trust Instrument states that the Trusts 
“shall be governed by and its validity, effect and interpretation determined by the 
laws of the State of New York.”115  There is no geographic limitation on 
appointment of a successor trustee.116  The 1975 Trust Instrument also entitles the 
trustees to the “commissions of a sole [t]rustee under the laws of the State of New 
York in effect at the time such commissions become payable.”117 
As described above, we prefer an interpretation that attaches meaning to 
every word used by the drafter and that avoids rendering language superfluous.118  
Accordingly, the word “governed” must refer to something other than a 
determination about the Trusts’ “validity, effect, and interpretation.”  Matters 
concerning a trust’s “validity, effect, and interpretation” are not generally matters 
                                          
 
115 App. to Answering Br. B571. 
116 Id. at B568–69. 
117 Id. at B569. 
118 O’Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287 (Del. 2001) (citation omitted). 
33 
 
of administration.119  Therefore, we conclude the 1975 Trust Instrument reflects the 
settlor’s intent that New York law governs administration. 
Although we conclude that the 1975 Trusts express in designate that New 
York law as the law of administration, it does not follow that the settlor intended 
that New York law would always be the law of administration.  Based on the same 
analysis we applied to the 1953 Trusts, nothing in the 1975 Trust Instrument 
indicates that the settlor intended to limit the law of administration to New York.  
We therefore conclude that the 1975 Trusts’ law of administration would change 
with a change in the place of administration.  Although United States Trust 
Company of New York succeeded Bankers Trust Company as trustee, the 1975 
Trusts have continued to be administered in New York.  We highlight that fact to 
emphasize that this result stems from the Trusts’ current place of administration 
being New York, rather than from the Trust Instrument making the settlor’s initial 
choice of law permanent.  Accordingly, New York law governs the 1975 Trusts’ 
administration at this time. 
To summarize, we affirm the Vice Chancellor’s determination that Delaware 
law does not presently govern the administration of the Trusts.  We disagree, 
however, with the Vice Chancellor’s legal conclusion that New Jersey law governs 
                                          
 
119 Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 268 cmt. d, 271 cmt. a. (1971) 
describing administrative matters), with id. § 268, cmt e. (describing matters not of 
administration).  
34 
 
the administration of the 1957 Trust and that New York law governs the 
administration of the 1953 Trusts.  Lastly, we affirm the court’s conclusion that 
New York law governs the 1975 Trusts, but reach that result because the Trusts’ 
place of administration mandates this outcome, rather than any intent of the settlor 
that New York law always govern. 
B. The Petitions’ Remaining Requests 
Having disposed of the choice-of-law issue, we now turn our attention to the 
remaining relief requested in the Petitions.  Four distinct relief-related issues 
remain: (1) approving the resignation of the current trustees and confirming the 
appointment of a successor trustee; (2) naming Delaware as the situs of the Trusts; 
(3) reforming the Trust Instruments to reflect the proposed new administrative 
scheme; and (4) accepting jurisdiction over the administration of the Trusts. 
1. Approving 
the 
Trustees’ 
Resignations 
and 
Confirming 
Appointment of a Successor Trustee 
 
i. The Vice Chancellor Properly Denied the 1953 Trusts and 
1957 Trust Petitions Because Delaware Law Does Not 
Presently Apply. 
 
 
The Petitions request that the Court of Chancery approve the resignation of 
the current trustees and confirm the appointment of Northern Trust as a successor 
corporate trustee.  In making that request, the Peierls face a hurdle—in that all 
three sets of Trusts require that there be three trustees.  The Vice Chancellor 
correctly noted that the relief sought cannot be granted unless the Court of 
35 
 
Chancery first exercises its equitable powers to reform the Trust Instruments, in 
order to breathe life into the Trusts’ proposed administrative structure which 
requires only one trustee.  The Court of Chancery aptly noted, “[w]hether this 
Court can reform the trusts depends on what law governs the trusts.”120  As we 
have held, Delaware law does not presently govern the administration of either of 
these Trusts.  Thus, as for the 1953 Trusts and the 1957 Trust we affirm the Vice 
Chancellor’s denial of the Petitions’ request that the court bless the resignations 
and appointment of the trustees. 
ii. The Vice Chancellor Properly Denied the 1975 Trusts Petition 
Because No Actual Case or Controversy Exists. 
 
The resignations of the trustees of the 1975 Trusts are “conditioned” upon an 
unnecessary judicial approval.  Moreover, Northern Trust has not actually assumed 
its role of successor trustee because of an equally unnecessary condition of judicial 
confirmation.  The Vice Chancellor declined to approve the resignations and 
appointments under the Delaware Declaratory Judgment Act.121  To obtain a 
declaratory judgment, a case must present an actual controversy: 
                                          
 
120 In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 476 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 
121 In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d at 476–77.  The Delaware Declaratory 
Judgment Act provides the following:  
Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian 
or fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next-of-kin or cestui que trust, in the 
administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, a person with a 
36 
 
(1) It must be a controversy involving the rights or other legal 
relations of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) it must be a 
controversy in which the claim of right or other legal interest is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) 
the controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and 
adverse; (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for 
judicial determination.122 
 
The Vice Chancellor properly concluded that no actual controversy exists 
with respect to the 1975 Trusts’ Petition because the Trust Instrument expressly 
authorizes that which the parties ask the Vice Chancellor to approve.  With respect 
to resignations, the 1975 Trust Instrument provides that the trustees have the power 
“[s]everally to resign, by delivering to any successor or co-[t]rustee written notice 
of such resignation, to take effect at such date as said resigning [t]rustee may 
specify in said notice, without necessity for prior accounting or judicial 
approval.”123  Jeffrey Peierls, as trustee, “is authorized and empowered to 
                                                                                                                                        
mental condition, may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect 
thereto: 
(1) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next-of-
kin or others; or 
(2) To direct the executors, administrators or trustees to do or abstain from 
doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or 
(3) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or 
trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings. 
10 Del. C. § 6504. 
122 Rollins Int’l Inc. v. Int’l Hydronics Corp., 303 A.2d 660, 662–63 (Del. 1973). 
123 App. to Answering Br. at B570 (emphasis added). 
37 
 
designate his own successor.”124 There are similar provisions for how Moore’s 
successor shall be appointed.125  “If there is at any time only one individual 
[t]rustee . . . he is authorized and empowered to designate another individual to 
serve as co-[t]rustee.”126  Furthermore, the individual trustees “are authorized and 
empowered to remove the corporate fiduciary, without being obliged to attribute 
any cause therefor, provided, they thereupon designate another corporate fiduciary 
in its place.”127   
Accordingly, the Vice Chancellor need not approve United States Trust 
Company of New York’s removal, Northern Trust Delaware’s appointment, or 
Jeffrey’s and Moore’s resignations, because the 1975 Trust Instrument provides 
that those changes can be made without judicial approval.  Notably, there is no 
provision in the 1975 Trust Instrument directing how the parties should proceed if 
both individual trustees were to resign without designating their successors, where 
the Trust Instrument requires that there always be three trustees, two individual and 
one institutional.  However, that question is not yet ripe for judicial determination, 
                                          
 
124 Id. at B569. 
125 Id. at B568. 
126 Id. at B569. 
127 Id. 
38 
 
because none of the resignations and appointments, all conditioned on the court’s 
approval, have occurred.   
2. Naming Delaware The Situs of the Trusts 
 
The Petitions next ask the Court of Chancery to declare Delaware as the 
situs of the Trusts.  As explained above, the Restatement highlights the 
circumstances under which a settlor may authorize a change in the place of 
administration of a trust, or of the trust’s situs, in a trust instrument.128  The trust 
instrument may expressly or implicitly permit a change in the place of 
administration.129  An implicit allowance may occur where the trust’s language 
authorizes a trustee to appoint a successor in another named state.  An allowance 
may be evidenced by a “simple power to appoint a successor trustee.”130  We have 
concluded that all inter vivos Trusts in this case authorize a change in the place of 
administration.  The question remains whether that place is Delaware. 
 
At this time, no Delaware trustee administers any of the Trusts.  All of the 
trustees have conditioned their resignations and appointments upon an unnecessary 
judicial rubber stamp.  The 1975 Trusts expressly authorize the appointment of 
Northern Trust without judicial approval.  The 1953 Trusts and the 1957 Trust 
                                          
 
128 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272 cmt. e (1971). 
 
129 Id. 
 
130 Id.  
 
39 
 
require reformation to allow for only one trustee—relief that the Court of Chancery 
properly declined to grant.  Without the appointment of a successor trustee, the 
Trusts continue to be administered in their current places of administration.  For 
these reasons, the Vice Chancellor correctly concluded that Delaware is not 
currently the situs of the Trusts. 
 
We do not, however, agree with the Vice Chancellor’s conclusion that 
“[r]egardless, . . . changing the situs of the trusts would not change the law 
governing administration.”131  As we have previously held, a change in the place of 
administration accomplished by appointing an out-of-state trustee will effect a 
change in the law governing administration, if the settlor has not indicated a 
contrary intent. 
 
We therefore affirm the Vice Chancellor’s determination to refrain from 
declaring Delaware the situs of the Trusts, noting, however, that a change in the 
place of administration, if and when it occurs, may alter the law governing 
administration of the trust. 
3. Reforming The Trust Instruments 
 
All the Trust Petitions requested the Court of Chancery to exercise its 
equitable powers to reform the Trusts in several ways: (1) modifying the 
instruments’ choice-of-law provision; (2) reducing the number of trustees from 
                                          
 
131 In re Peierls Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 489 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
40 
 
three to one; and (3) modifying the administrative structure of the Trusts to create 
an Investment Direction Adviser and Trust Protector, and defining their respective 
duties and liabilities. 
 
Because the Trusts are not currently being administered in Delaware (there 
having been no transfer of situs and no appointment of a Delaware trustee), there is 
no basis to conclude that Delaware law would presently apply to the Trusts’ 
administration.  Therefore, whether the Court of Chancery could properly reform 
the Trust Instruments is a matter governed by the law of administration of the 
Trusts, which we have determined is Texas law for the 1953 Trusts and New York 
law for the 1957 and 1975 Trusts.  The Petitions fail to address the issue of 
reformation under the law that actually governs the administration of the respective 
Trusts, thereby forcing the Vice Chancellor to respond to a request that was 
untethered to any relevant legal basis.  Because the Vice Chancellor properly 
concluded that he was “not in a position to address the requests for reformation,”132 
we affirm the Vice Chancellor’s decision to refrain granting reformation relief. 
 
 
                                          
 
132 Peierls Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d at 489. 
 
41 
 
4. Accepting Jurisdiction 
Generally, we “will not review legal issues on appeal that are not fully and 
fairly briefed” unless the interests of justice require us to do so.133  The Peierls 
failed to address the Vice Chancellor’s determination that Delaware cannot accept 
jurisdiction over the Trusts, except for a fleeting statement regarding the 
testamentary trusts, buried in the Peierls’ discussion of Delaware’s public policy 
that “[t]his is not a jurisdictional requirement under current Delaware trust law.”134  
We are neither required nor inclined to take up the issue of Delaware’s jurisdiction 
over the Trusts in these circumstances.  Accordingly, we affirm the Vice 
Chancellor’s denial of the Petitions insofar as they relate to requests that Delaware 
accept jurisdiction over the Trusts. 
With respect to the 1957 Trust, we can offer some guidance in order to move 
these proceedings forward.  Under the Restatement, the Peierls should have first 
sought the New Jersey Superior Court’s permission to terminate its supervisory 
authority over the 1957 Trust before asking the Court of Chancery to accept 
jurisdiction over the Trusts.  As described earlier, we consult the Restatement to 
                                          
 
133 Smith v. Delaware State Univ., 47 A.3d 472, 479 (Del. 2012); Roca v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours and Co, 842 A.2d 1238, 1242 (Del. 2004) (“The rules of this Court specifically require 
an appellant to set forth the issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support of 
those issues in their opening brief.  If an appellant fails to comply with these requirements on a 
particular issue, the appellant has abandoned that issue on appeal irrespective of how well the 
issue was preserved at trial.”). 
 
134 Opening Br. at 42. 
 
42 
 
resolve choice-of-law issues.135  The Restatement helpfully identifies the 
jurisdictional issues that arise in cases where trusts have significant contacts with 
several states.  Because an inter vivos trust’s trustee is able to perform its duties 
without court supervision, no particular court acquires “jurisdiction over the 
administration of the trust until a suit is brought in a court by the beneficiaries or 
by the trustee.”136 
The Restatement distinguishes between an unsupervised trust and a trust that 
is subject to a court’s continuing jurisdiction.137  A court may acquire jurisdiction 
in the inter vivos trust context, for example, where “the court is asked to appoint or 
has appointed a successor trustee or where by application to the court the 
administration of the trust becomes subject to the continuing control of that 
court.”138  In that case, “it becomes necessary to obtain the permission of that court 
to terminate such accountability.”139  The need to terminate such accountability to 
the court having current jurisdiction over the trusts often arises when that court is 
asked “to appoint a successor trustee” or “when the trustee acquires a place of 
business or domicil[e] in another state, or when by the exercise of a power of 
                                          
 
135 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 46–47 (Del. 1991). 
136 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272 cmt. e (1971). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
43 
 
appointment a trustee is appointed whose place of business or domicil[e] is in 
another state.”140  In these instances, the court having current jurisdiction over the 
trust would apply the same rules applicable to testamentary trusts.141  
As the record indicates, the Superior Court of New Jersey exercised 
jurisdiction over the 1957 Trust in 2001.  The New Jersey judge’s order (i) 
approved Bankers Trust Co.’s third intermediate accounting, (ii) authorized and 
directed Bankers Trust Co. to turn over the Trust’s assets to United States Trust 
Co. of New York as successor corporate trustee, (iii) appointed Malcolm A. Moore 
as a successor co-trustee, and (iv) awarded various commissions and fees.142  The 
1957 Trust Petition declares that the Trust has “been sitused in the State of New 
York and administered in accordance with New York law since” the Superior 
Court of New Jersey’s order.143  However, it is not clear that the New Jersey 
judge’s order reflects any change in the Trust’s situs or administrative law, 
assuming that New Jersey law applies as discussed above.   That judge merely 
ordered that a New York trustee, United States Trust Co. of New York, succeed 
                                          
 
140 Id. 
 
141 Id. 
142 App. to Answering Br. at B97–99. 
143 Id. at B32. 
44 
 
what appears to be the then New York trustee, Bankers Trust Co.144  Nowhere do 
the parties contend that they have sought permission from the New Jersey courts to 
terminate any ongoing accountability over the Trust.  Under the applicable 
Restatement principles, which we herein adopt, they should do so if they intend to 
subject the Trust to Delaware court supervision. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Court of Chancery.  
Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
                                          
 
144 See id. at B121, B131 (reflecting A.E. Scott’s signature as Trust Officer of the Bankers Trust 
Company before a New York notary and stating that the Trust Officer resides in New York).