Title: Hughes v. Atkinson
Citation: 188 Kan. 413, 362 P.2d 618
Docket Number: 42,300
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 1961

188 Kan. 413 (1961)
362 P.2d 618
DAVID M. HUGHES, MARTHA M. HUGHES, CAROL A. JORY and DEBORAH A. HUGHES, Trustees, Doing Business under the Trade Name and Style of MULVANE RANCH, by its Agent, DAVID M. HUGHES, Appellees,
v.
FRANK W. ATKINSON and HENRY C. HITCH, a Co-partnership, Appellants.
No. 42,300

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 10, 1961.
Wayne Coulson, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Paul R. Kitch, Dale M. Stucky, Donald R. Newkirk, Robert J. Hill, Gerrit H. Wormhoudt, Philip Kassebaum, John E. Rees, Robert T. Cornwell, Willard B. Thompson, and Hugo T. Wedell and Homer V. Gooing, of Counsel, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Emmet A. Blaes, of Wichita, argued the cause, and John E. Wheeler, of Marion, Roetzel Jochems, Robert G. Braden, J. Francis Hesse, James W. Sargent, Stanley E. Wisdom, Vincent L. Bogart, Cecil E. Merkel, John W. Brimer, Harry L. Hobson, Bruce W. Zuercher, and Terrance J. Muth, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This was an action to recover a balance alleged to be due the plaintiffs under the terms of a written agistment agreement, whereby they leased the defendants the 11,000 acre Mulvane Ranch, located in Chase and Morris Counties, Kansas, for pasturage purposes and subsequently pastured 2,003 head of defendants' cattle (steers) in such pasture during the 1958 pasture season.
No issue is raised regarding the pleadings. Therefore reference thereto will be brief and the allegations thereof when mentioned, except for one particular, will be highly summarized.
The amended petition, which includes a copy of the contract, contains all allegations required to state a cause of action against the defendants for recovery of the balance of $3,750.74, alleged to be due and payable under the terms of that agreement, for the number of defendants' steers pastured on the Mulvane Ranch during the 1958 season.
*415 The contract attached to the amended petition is important and pertinent portions thereof should be detailed. Limited as indicated, such agreement reads:
..............
Defendants' amended answer denies all allegations of the amended petition not specifically admitted; admits the allegations contained on page 1 of that pleading and those on page 2, except the last paragraph thereof; asserts Keith W. Gibb was acting within the scope of his authority as agent of the plaintiffs; states the defendants orally instructed the plaintiffs to keep three groups of cattle, therein identified, separated, to maintain the division and "trap" fences and gates in proper repair, and to separate "bullers" from other cattle; and then alleges that in caring for the steers mentioned in the petition plaintiffs were guilty of nine specific acts of negligence which resulted in the loss of several steers *416 and in the loss of an average gain in the remainder, all of these damages resulting in a loss to defendants in an amount of money, which was far in excess of the unpaid balance claimed by plaintiffs in their petition to have been due under the contract.
Defendants also included in their amended answer a cross-petition wherein they made the allegations of the amended answer a part thereof and then, by way of counterclaim, prayed that they recover judgment for the amount of damages therein claimed to have been sustained by reason of plaintiffs' alleged negligence.
For all purposes here pertinent it may be stated the plaintiffs' reply and answer to the amended answer and cross-petition contained a general denial and otherwise joined issues on all questions raised by that pleading.
With issues joined as indicated the case came on for trial in the district court of Morris County, whereupon counsel for the respective parties announced in open court that the only issues to be tried were those issues of set-off and counterclaim as alleged in the amended answer and cross-petition of defendants and in the reply and answer to the amended cross-petition of the plaintiffs. It was further stipulated that, except for such issues, judgment should be entered in favor of plaintiffs in accordance with the prayer of their amended petition.
Thereupon a jury, which we take note was composed of jurors from the Flint hills  blue stem pasture area of Kansas, was duly empaneled and sworn to try the cause. The defendants then introduced their evidence in support of their cross-petition as amended and rested. Whereupon the plaintiffs demurred to such evidence. When this demurrer was overruled the plaintiffs introduced their evidence in defense and rested. Defendants then introduced their rebuttal evidence and rested.
Thereafter the court instructed the jury in writing, counsel for both sides presented oral argument and the jury was permitted to retire to the jury room to commence its deliberations, taking with it special questions which had been submitted by the court. Subsequently the jury returned with a general verdict for the plaintiffs and against the defendants, together with three of the submitted special questions and its answers thereto which read:
"Answer: Yes.
"Answer: Yes.
"Answer: Yes."
Special questions 4 and 5, as submitted by the trial court, were returned by the jury unanswered for the reason that question 4 required no answer unless question 3 had been answered by the jury in the negative and question 5 did not call for any answer unless the jury by its general verdict allowed, which it did not, the defendants damages, as claimed in their amended answer and cross-petition.
Following rendition of judgment in accord with the verdict defendants filed a motion to set aside the answers to the special questions, based on the ground such answers were not supported by the evidence, and a motion for a new trial, based on the first four subsections of our statute (G.S. 1949, 60-3001), prescribing grounds for the granting of such a motion. When these motions were overruled the defendants perfected the instant appeal.
The issues involved will be simplified by stating at the outset that, although numerous specifications of error appear in defendants' abstract, the only errors complained of in their brief are limited to two specifications of error, Nos. 1 and 2, relating to the instructions given by the trial court and to requested instructions refused by that tribunal. In that situation the universal and long established rule of this jurisdiction is that all other specifications of error must be regarded as abandoned (See e.g., Sams v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 157 Kan. 278, 139 P.2d 859; also decisions cited at page 727 of the opinion of Blakeman v. Lofland, 173 Kan. 725, 252 P.2d 852). For our latest expression on the subject see Ferrellgas Corporation v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 187 Kan. 530, 358 P.2d 786, and decisions there cited, where it is said:
*418 What has been heretofore stated makes it appear our decision of this case is limited to alleged instructional errors. Even so the issues with respect to such questions will be further clarified by reference to established rules of this court relating to verdicts and special findings.
One of such rules is that a general verdict resolves all issues of fact, supported by evidence, in favor of the prevailing party, and that such a verdict must stand unless the effect of special findings, when considered as a whole, is such as to overthrow it. (See Epple v. Kress &amp; Co., 187 Kan. 452, 457, 357 P.2d 828; Blakey v. Zirkle, 187 Kan. 562, 564, 358 P.2d 758; Grigsby v. Jenkins, 183 Kan. 594, 596, 331 P.2d 284.)
In connection with the matters just mentioned it must be remembered that the parties stipulated that the only issues to be tried in the cause now before us were those issues raised by the defendants' set-off and counterclaim in their amended answer and cross-petition and in the plaintiffs' reply and answer to that pleading; likewise kept in mind that under the allegations of the amended answer and cross-petition, as previously indicated, the defendants based their right to relief, almost if not entirely, on certain acts of negligence, alleged to have been committed by the plaintiffs, which were specifically charged to have resulted in and were the cause of the death of certain of their steers and the loss of weight to others. Under the rule last above mentioned all these issues were decided adversely to the defendants. Moreover, and conceding the steers pastured under the contract in question were seriously injured and lost weight as the result of "bulling," the same rule compels the conclusion that issues brought into the case as to (1) whether defendants implanting such steers with stilbestrol prior to their delivery caused a subsequent extraordinary and uncontrollable condition in the herd; and (2) whether plaintiffs, under such conditions, exercised the degree of care required of them by the terms of the contract (See, e.g., Cox v. Chase, 95 Kan. 531, 535, 536, 148 Pac. 766), were also questions of fact which were likewise resolved by the jury against the defendants.
We are not disposed to here detail the testimony adduced by the respective parties during the trial of the case, as disclosed by a lengthy record. It suffices to say that, after an extended examination of the record and careful consideration of all contentions made by counsel in support of their respective positions with regard to *419 the status of the evidence, we are convinced, that even though it must be conceded the evidence was highly conflicting, such record discloses substantial competent evidence to sustain both the verdict and the answers to the special questions; and equally convinced the special findings are not inconsistent with the general verdict.
Thus we come to instructional claims of error advanced by defendants as grounds for reversal of the judgment. In approaching these questions it should be pointed out that in reviewing such claims the rule of general construction is that instructions must be construed together and if taken as a whole they properly state the law they are sufficient (Giltner v. Stephens, 166 Kan. 172, 200 P.2d 290; Wing v. Mid-Continent Seeds, 170 Kan. 242, 246, 225 P.2d 78; Casner v. Common School District No. 7, 175 Kan. 551, 556, 265 P.2d 1027; West's Kansas Digest, Trial, § 295; Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.] Trial § 185.)
In this connection it is interesting to note that in instructions, to which no objections were made, the trial court: In Instruction No. 5 advised the jury the burden of proof was on the defendants upon their cross-petition and before they could recover they must prove that at or about the times complained of plaintiffs were guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the damages to defendants' cattle. In Instruction No. 6 defined negligence as the want of ordinary care and stated that the right of a party to recover requires that the injury complained of be the proximate result of some alleged act or acts of negligence. In Instruction No. 7 defined proximate cause and natural and probable consequences. In Instruction No. 8 specifically instructed the jury as follows:
And in Instruction No. 11 advised the jury that:
*420 Another Instruction (No. 12), of which no complaint is made, reads:
Another such Instruction (No. 14) reads:
The first of three instructions complained of by defendants is Instruction No. 9. It reads:
We see nothing wrong with the foregoing instruction. Indeed we believe it is warranted by one of our own decisions (Lips v. Opp, 150 Kan. 745, 96 P.2d 865) where, in dealing with the nature of, and the force and effect to be given, an agistment contract containing provisions remarkably similar to the one here involved, it is said:
Further support for the conclusion just announced is to be found in well-recognized legal treatises.
See 2 Am. Jur., Animals, § 21, which reads:
See, also, 3 C.J.S., Animals, § 17, where it is said:
And see 3 C.J.S., Animals, § 17, which reads:
Next it is urged that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 10, which reads:
There is much to be found in the heretofore quoted statements from 2 Am. Jur. and from 3 C.J.S. to require approval of the instruction just quoted. Even so we do not feel it is necessary to approve it wholly upon that premise. It suffices to say that in our opinion it properly protects the rights of the parties to an agistment contract such as is here involved and contains a fair statement of what should be the law of this state under the conditions and circumstances therein outlined. Therefore such instruction is approved on that basis.
Finally the defendants argue that the trial court erred in submitting Instruction No. 13, which dealt entirely with their obligation to lessen or mitigate the damages they were seeking to recover under the allegations of their amended answer and cross-petition. It is neither necessary nor required that we here decide that question. All that need be said is that by its verdict the jury refused to allow defendants' claim for damages, hence it cannot be successfully argued that defendants were prejudiced by the submission of such instruction. Under our early decisions (e.g., Branner v. Stormont, 9 Kan. [2d] 51; M'Intosh v. County of Crawford, 13 Kan. [2d] 171; Wilkes v. Wolbach, 30 Kan. [2d] 375, 2 Pac. 508), our present statute (G.S. 1949, 60-3317), and later decisions construing the force and effect to be given its terms (See Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.], Appeal &amp; Error, §§ 509, 538, 592, and West's Kansas Digest, Appeal &amp; Error, §§ 1026, 1034, 1068[4]), error complained of which does not prejudice the substantial rights of a party affords no sound basis for the reversal of a judgment and must be disregarded.
We have carefully considered all arguments advanced by defendants in support of their claims of error regarding the instructions (Nos. 9, 10 and 13) complained of, as well as the decisions cited in their support, and find nothing in the arguments or decisions which warrants or permits a conclusion the trial court committed reversible *423 error in submitting them. Moreover, having considered such instructions together with the other instructions given by that tribunal, which we have heretofore referred to at length in order that there may be no possible misunderstanding respecting their force and effect, we are convinced that all the instructions submitted, when considered as a whole, fairly and substantially state the law applicable to the theories of the parties to the case as presented by the evidence adduced by them in the court below. It follows, without laboring contentions advanced with respect thereto, that the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing two instructions requested by the defendants.
The judgment is affirmed.