Title: McQueen v. Williams
Citation: 587 So. 2d 918
Docket Number: 90-CA-0588
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: October 16, 1991

587 So. 2d 918 (1991) Linda Lafferty McQUEEN, INDIVIDUALLY, and as Mother and Next Friend of Brandon Lafferty McQueen v. Jean WILLIAMS, Administratrix of the Estate of David Earl Williams, Deceased. No. 90-CA-0588. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 16, 1991. David H. Linder, Hamilton &amp; Linder, Meridian, for appellant. William E. Ready, Ready &amp; Associates, Meridian, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ. PRATHER, Justice, for the Court: In this case, Brandon Lafferty McQueen, through his mother, filed a complaint in the Clarke County Circuit Court against the estate of the late Clarke County Sheriff David Earl Williams for $1.5 million. McQueen alleged that Sheriff Williams' negligence was responsible for the wrongful death of his father, who was murdered by Robert S. Minnick and James "Monkey" *919 Dyess after they escaped from the Clarke County Jail. On motion for summary judgment, Judge Robert W. Bailey ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded the Sheriff from any liability. McQueen now appeals this ruling. This Court affirms. Due to overcrowded conditions at the State correctional institution at Parchman, Robert Minnick and James Dyess were being confined in the Clarke County Jail in Quitman. They escaped from this jail in April of 1986, and, before being apprehended, they murdered James Lafferty and Donald Thomas during a burglary of Thomas' mobile home. See Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1988), rev'd and remanded, Minnick v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990). On April 18, 1988, Brandon Lafferty McQueen filed a complaint in the Clarke County Circuit Court against the estate of the late Clarke County Sheriff David Williams (hereinafter "Sheriff") for the wrongful death of his father, James Lafferty. In his complaint, McQueen alleged that the Sheriff should be held liable because: (1) the Sheriff "and/or his agents, servants and employees" knew that Minnick and Dyess "were dangerous, prone to escape, and likely to do serious bodily harm to others if allowed to escape;" (2) through the Sheriff's negligence or the negligence of his "his agents, servants and employees," Minnick and Dyess were allowed to escape from an "inadequately secured" jail; and (3) the Sheriff "and/or his agents, servants and employees" failed "to promptly and adequately inform other law enforcement authorities and the general public" of the escape. McQueen later amended the complaint with the following allegation: "Through his negligence, recklessness, and gross negligence," the Sheriff "and/or his agents, servants and employees" breached their ministerial duty to keep Minnick and Dyess confined "by leaving the jail door unlocked and thereby permitting [an] escape."[1] On July 6, 1988, the Sheriff filed his answers to the original complaint and amended complaint. He denied McQueen's allegations, asserted various affirmative defenses including immunity and lack of duty owed to the victim, and moved for summary judgment. On December 14, 1988, after McQueen filed the original complaint, the Sheriff filed a "Motion for a Protective Order" requesting that all discovery be stayed until the legal issue of immunity was decided during summary judgment proceedings. Judge Bailey granted the "Motion for a Protective Order," stayed all discovery, and then ordered the parties to "submit their position and arguments in the matter of Motion for Summary Judgment on briefs and that said positions and arguments shall be limited to the topical areas of the applicable immunities." Upon reviewing the briefs, pleadings, and affidavits, Judge Bailey granted the motion for summary judgment after concluding that the Sheriff was shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. McQueen appealed. In this appeal, McQueen presents three issues for disposition: This Court recognizes that this is an appeal from a summary judgment. The construction and enforcement of Rule 56 regarding summary judgment have been amply addressed in a plethora of cases and, for brevity's sake, will not be repeated in this opinion. See Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1354-55 (Miss. 1990). Issue # 1 was not actually before Judge Bailey on motion for summary judgment.[2] However, Judge Bailey addressed it in his "Opinion on Motion for Summary Judgment" and concluded the Sheriff owed no duty to the public.[3] Upon concluding that the Sheriff owed no duty to the public, Judge Bailey wrote the following: McQueen contends that the judge's decision is erroneous and that the Sheriff should not be protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity since his duties are ministerial in nature. McQueen simply explains: (1) that under statutory law, the Sheriff was duty-bound to "keep his prisoners confined;" (2) that "[t]his duty is ministerial *921 in nature;" and (3) that his failure to keep Minnick and Dyess confined renders him liable for their tortious acts. The Sheriff counters that he owed no duty, or, assuming arguendo he owed a duty, this duty is clearly discretionary in nature not ministerial. He explains: The Sheriff adds that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields from liability governmental officials who, like himself, must use their discretion in the performance of their legal duties. This Court has provided instruction on matters involving the issue of qualified immunity: Davis v. Little, 362 So. 2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1978), quoted in Region VII, Mental Health v. Isaac, 523 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Miss. 1988). In distinguishing between duties which are ministerial in nature and those which are discretionary, this Court has explained: Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 865, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935) (citing and quoting various treatises and cases). And finally, this Court has cautioned that qualified immunity is not impenetrable: Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So. 2d 689, 696 (Miss. 1984) (citing cases). Grantham, 522 So. 2d at 225; see MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(c) (1990 Supp.) ("A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their *922 employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim ... [b]ased upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused."); see also Grantham v. Dep't of Corrections, 522 So. 2d 219, 223 n. 2 (Miss. 1988) (Construing § 11-46-9(c), this Court noted that "the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy relates to suits against officials, not the agencies or departments they serve."). Applying the foregoing law to the case sub judice, the Sheriff's duties are deemed to be discretionary in nature and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. Indeed, McQueen cited no guideline or procedure statutory or otherwise to show that the Sheriff's decision-making in the performance of his duties involves no discretion. The statutes which McQueen did cite merely directed the Sheriff to "safely keep in the jail of his county all persons committed by order of [the] courts." MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-25-35 (1972); see also id. §§ 19-25-69 &amp; 19-25-71 (1972) &amp; 97-9-39 (1990 Supp.). Instead, these statutes relegate to all sheriffs the power of "personal deliberation, decision, and judgment" in the performance of their duties. Davis, 362 So. 2d at 643 (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971)). Such power of discretion entitles a sheriff to qualified immunity so long as he does not substantially exceed his authority or commit an intentional tort. Grantham, 522 So. 2d at 225, citing Hudson, 462 So. 2d at 696. In sum, the Sheriff is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. This Court therefore affirms on this issue. McQueen filed his complaint on April 18, 1988. Approximately six months later, the Sheriff filed his motion for a protective order on December 14, 1988, alleging immunity from suit which potentially would be dispositive of the entire cause of action. Additionally, the Sheriff asserted that the control of discovery was clearly a function of the Court and that the claimed immunities protect from the burden and expense of discovery as well as trial. Allowance of discovery procedures to plaintiff, under these facts, would violate the spirit and content of the Court's rules, create potential waste, subject defendant to undue interference, expense and burden, and be inequitable under the circumstances. McQueen responded reasserting the alleged facts of the complaint, but recognizing that this motion was clearly within the Court's discretion and the authority of the Court pursuant to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986); and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) and their progeny. Those cases specifically state that the official's immunity is an "immunity from judgment, trial and discovery", as same is necessary to protect officials from vexatious lawsuits. On January 10, 1989, the judge granted the Sheriff's motion, issued the protective order, and stayed all discovery until disposition of the immunity issue during summary judgment proceedings. Dissatisfied with this order, McQueen filed an affidavit averring that the facts material to plaintiffs' cause of action concerning the liability of defendant were known only to hostile witnesses and witnesses identified and in close association with the defendant, and that the plaintiffs were therefore unable to procure affidavits to oppose defendant's affidavits. McQueen filed the affidavit pursuant to Miss.R.Civ.P. 56(f).[4] Notwithstanding McQueen's affidavit, the judge granted the Sheriff's motion for *923 summary judgment. In his "Opinion on Motion for Summary Judgment," the judge explained his decision to stay discovery: McQueen now contends that the judge erred; that is, issuance of the protective order was "inappropriate" because he was precluded from discovering any evidence which may have helped him to pierce the Sheriff's immunity and defeat the motion for summary judgment. The Sheriff counters that McQueen was provided ample opportunity to complete discovery; that is, eight months transpired from the time McQueen filed his original complaint to the time the Sheriff filed his motion for a protective order. Moreover, the Sheriff contends that McQueen's Rule 56(f) affidavit was insufficient to overcome his motion for summary judgment: The Sheriff is correct; McQueen did have eight months to complete discovery prior to the judge's issuance of the protective order. This Court holds that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that eight months was a sufficient amount of time for McQueen to complete discovery. A recently-decided case Malone v. Aetna Cas. &amp; Surety Co. provides some guidance on this point: 583 So. 2d 186 at 187 (Miss. 1991). Thus, Malone's "Motion to Compel ... Aetna to Respond" indicated to this Court that Aetna may not have been completely forthright with all of Malone's discovery requests. In view of this fact, this Court concluded that the judge should have provided Malone with more time to complete discovery before considering the motion for summary judgment. In the case sub judice, McQueen waited until December 27, 1988, before attempting to uncover evidence to oppose the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment. On that date, McQueen filed "notices" that he planned to depose Minnick, Dyess, and J.C. Denham (the Sheriff's deputy). McQueen filed these notices eight months after he filed the original complaint and after the Sheriff filed his motion for a protective order. The belatedness of these notices is wholly unexplained. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth stated: 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 425 (1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737-38, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 409-10 (1982)). Under the circumstances, eight months would be a sufficient amount of time for McQueen to uncover any existing evidence of significant and probative value which would show that the Sheriff may have greatly or substantially exceeded his statutory authority. See Palmer, 564 So. 2d at 1355. In Mitchell and Harlow, the United States Supreme Court stated that "discovery should not be allowed" until the "threshold immunity question is resolved" but only if the "plaintiff's allegations *925 [fail to] state a claim of violation of clearly established law." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S. Ct. at 2815, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 425; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 411. In sum, McQueen's allegations, if true, are insufficient to pierce the Sheriff's qualified immunity; therefore, discovery should have been stayed. This Court affirms on all issues. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and McRAE and SULLIVAN, JJ., dissent by separate written opinion. McRAE, Justice, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion affirming the granting of a summary judgment, because the lower court denied the plaintiffs the opportunity for discovery. The lower court's ruling is clearly contrary to the law and violates the plaintiff's right of confrontation of witnesses. Plaintiff had specifically requested to take the deposition of the defendant's witness who gave an affidavit which the court then used as a basis for its ruling on qualified immunity. The amended complaint alleged that the sheriff violated ministerial aspects of his duties "by leaving the jail door unlocked and thereby permitting [an] escape." It was further asserted that the sheriff is charged with duties and responsibilities imposed by statute that are ministerial and not discretionary in nature, and that he was negligent in the administration of those duties. Some of those charges are as follows: The majority has affirmed the lower court's finding that the sheriff is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity because the securing of prisoners is a discretionary function. I disagree. To reiterate the often-repeated rule of Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922 (1935): (emphasis added) The duties of a sheriff with regard to the securing of prisoners is clearly specified by law, as the plaintiff pointed out in the response to the motion for summary judgment. Miss. Code Ann. § 19-25-69 (1972) provides: Finally, Miss. Code Ann. § 19-25-75 (1972) provides: In Marshall v. Chawla, 520 So. 2d 1374 (Miss. 1988), this Court wrote, "[t]he legislature may, by prescribing specific duties of individual state employees, implicitly create tort liability for breaches of them resulting from gross negligence." The laws of this state explicitly provide a penalty for sheriffs who either wilfully or negligently fail to properly secure those prisoners in their custody. This further contradicts the notion that this is a discretionary duty whereby the veil of immunity is pierced only by malice, willfulness or an abuse of discretion. As Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-39 (Supp. 1986) provides: Moreover, in Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss. 575 (1875), this Court stated: 51 Miss. at 580. In less often-quoted language from Poyner v. Gilmore, 158 So. at 923, this Court also stated: The Poyner Court observed that "a sheriff must determine whether process coming into his hands for service, is issued from a court of competent jurisdiction and is regular on its face ... but the execution of the process ... [is a] ministerial act." Id. By the same token, it may be said that while it may have been within the sheriff's discretion to determine whether, based on the information available to him, Minnick and Dyess were dangerous, once that determination was made, the act of keeping them under lock and key was a ministerial duty. The trial court further determined that the sheriff owed no duty to the public. If we are to accept this premise, to whom does he owe a duty? As the plaintiff indicated in the response to the motion for summary judgment, other jurisdictions have found that such a duty does, indeed, exist. In Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1984), the Kansas Court stated: 675 P.2d at 66. Plaintiff further cites Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982), in which a prisoner escaped from incarceration due to negligence of the defendant, robbed a convenience store, and shot the plaintiff, Ryan, with a sawed-off shotgun. The defendants moved for a summary judgment on the basis that the allegations of the complaint failed to give rise to a duty owed the plaintiff individually, rather, the duty was to the public as a whole. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this contention and observed: 656 P.2d at 599. Likewise, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 319, states: Further, on March 8, 1990, prior to the motion for summary judgment being heard, but while the motion for protective order had been granted, plaintiff's counsel urged the court, by filing his MRCP Rule 56(f) affidavit that the facts concerning the liability of the defendant were known only to hostile witnesses and witnesses identified and in close association with the defendant; that the plaintiffs were unable to procure affidavits to oppose defendant's affidavits; and that, although discovery had been sought by the plaintiffs, the court had stayed and held in abeyance pending its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, filed only on the basis of the alleged qualified immunity of the defendants. He therefore urged the court to allow discovery to obtain the evidence and facts to justify the opposition to said motion. The granting of the protective order effectively precluded the plaintiff his right to confront the defendant's witness, who gave an affidavit in support of the defendant's position, which the court considered. This witness happened to be one from whom the plaintiffs attempted to take a discovery deposition but were precluded from so doing. The trial court was in error in not allowing any discovery and rendering the summary judgment on the issues. It should have considered it as a MRCP Rule 12(b) motion and determined first if the complaint stated a cause of action. It is this writer's opinion that the complaint did state a cause of action and, therefore, the court should have allowed discovery or limited discovery to be obtained from the hostile witnesses of the defendant, or witnesses that are closely associated with the defendant. Plaintiff gave notice in December of 1989 to take the depositions of one of the affiants, J.C. Denham, a deputy sheriff, who was readily amenable to give an affidavit in support of the defendant's motion to dismiss. However, the plaintiff could not take his deposition to even confront the general statement made in the affidavit. Plaintiff has followed MRCP Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit and listing areas with the facts that he surmises to be in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; however, because the defendant's motion for protective order was granted and discovery was not allowed by the plaintiff of even those witnesses friendly to the defendant, all being hostile to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was precluded from doing any discovery to oppose said motion. A motion for summary judgment is based on the pleadings and any affidavits, depositions and other forms of evidence relevant to the merits of the challenged claims or defenses *928 available at the time the motion is made. The movant is responsible to see that there are no genuine issues of any material facts and that he is entitled to a judgment on the merits as a matter of law. Brown v. Credit Center, 444 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1984). The allegations in the amended complaint clearly show that these were ministerial acts on the part of the sheriff, that he had charge of the premises, that it was his duty to see that these prisoners were incarcerated, and, further, knowing them to be violent prisoners, it was his duty to notify the public of an escape once one occurred. These were certainly enough material facts to have this matter go forward to the jury, or at least to allow limited discovery by the plaintiffs to obtain said facts. Further, once the affidavits were filed, the plaintiff should have been allowed to take the depositions of those witnesses involved, particularly in view of the fact the defendant called them in support of his motion. I, therefore, respectfully dissent and state that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied, and that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for further discovery and trial. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., join this dissent. [1] None of the plaintiff's affidavits substantiated in any way the charges in the complaint that the sheriff or his employees left the jail door unlocked. The sheriff denied any such acts. Had there been an affidavit supportive of this allegation, there would have been an issue of material fact of the sheriff's commission of willful wrongs, and if so, limited discovery may have been permitted to develop this issue. [2] As noted in Section I(A), the judge limited the parties' briefs to the sole issue of whether the Sheriff is entitled to immunity from any liability. [3] The judge reached his decision by "adopt[ing] the findings of facts and conclusions of law set forth" in Robinson v. Williams, 721 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.Miss. 1989). Robinson was a wrongful-death action instituted against Sheriff Williams by the family of Donald Thomas, who was murdered along with McQueen's father by Minnick and Dyess. The Sheriff moved for summary judgment on the basis that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs in preventing Minnick and Dyess' escape. [4] Miss.R.Civ.P. 56(f) provides: (f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.