Title: Ex Parte Moore
Citation: 880 So. 2d 1131
Docket Number: 1020599
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2003

880 So. 2d 1131 (2003)
Ex parte Andrea MOORE.
(In re Montgomery Housing Authority
v.
Andrea Moore).
1020599.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 31, 2003.
*1132 Lawrence F. Gardella of Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Richard G. Moxley III and Karen Materna of Holloway, Elliott &amp; Moxley, LLP, Montgomery, for respondent.
HARWOOD, Justice.
The petitioner, Andrea Moore, a defendant in an action pending in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the circuit court to vacate its order denying her request for a jury trial in an eviction action brought by the Housing Authority for the City of Montgomery ("MHA"), pursuant to the Sanderson Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 35-9-80 et seq. The purpose of the Sanderson Act is to provide a more speedy remedy to a landlord for recovering possession of his or her land after expiration of a lease or when possession is wrongfully withheld by the tenant. See Garrett v. Reid, 244 Ala. 254, 13 So. 2d 97 (1943). See also Riley v. Riley, 257 Ala. 636, 60 So. 2d 432 (1952); Williams v. Prather, 236 Ala. 652, 184 So. 473 (1938); and Hicks v. Longfellow Dev. Co., 362 So. 2d 219 (Ala.1978). The Sanderson Act also vests Alabama district courts with jurisdiction to hear cases brought under that act. Section 35-9-80 states:
Section 35-9-83 provides:
Further, § 35-9-87, states, in pertinent part:
Moore, a tenant at 3704(B) Smiley Circle, in Smiley Court,[1] a housing complex in *1133 Montgomery, was served with a notice of eviction on November 13, 2002, and thereafter failed to deliver possession of the apartment at 3704(B) Smiley Circle. On December 12, 2002, MHA filed an eviction action against Moore under the Sanderson Act in the Montgomery County District Court. The basis of MHA's eviction action was that Moore had held possession of the premises over and beyond the term of her lease. Moore responded by filing an affidavit, contending that her lease had not been terminated and that she had a right to continue as a tenant of the residence. On January 6, 2003, the district court entered an order evicting Moore. The next day, Moore filed a notice of appeal to the Montgomery Circuit Court in which she requested a trial by jury. Thereafter, MHA filed a motion to strike Moore's jury demand, which Moore opposed. After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court entered an order denying Moore's request for a trial by jury and set the case for a nonjury trial. The circuit court's order denying Moore's request for a jury trial states:
Moore contends that the issue presented to this Court is whether the circuit court violated her constitutional right to a trial by jury guaranteed by § 11 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. She argues that she is entitled to a jury trial because, she says, an eviction under the Sanderson Act is within the class of actions for which a right to a jury trial existed when the Alabama Constitution was adopted in 1901. Thus, she asserts that she has a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus from this Court ordering the trial court to grant her request for a jury trial.
Ex parte Empire Fire &amp; Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala.1998). "The rights of the parties secured by those statutory provisions [providing for a right to a trial by jury] are subject to the enforcement by mandamus in view of the fact that as a rule *1134 there would not be an adequate remedy by appeal from the final judgment." Ex parte Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 257 Ala. 663, 664, 60 So. 2d 684, 685 (1952), citing Ex parte Ansley, 107 Ala. 613, 18 So. 242 (1895); Knight v. Farrell &amp; Reynolds, 113 Ala. 258, 20 So. 974 (1896); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus, § 93, p. 151. "Mandamus is the appropriate review where the availability of a jury trial is at issue." Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000).
*1135 Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 269-70, 292 So. 2d 651, 653 (1974) (footnote omitted).
In light of the rule discussed in Gilbreath, we must determine whether the right to a trial by jury existed by statute or at common law for a Sanderson Act eviction at the time of the adoption of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Therefore, we consider whether the action now characterized as a Sanderson Act eviction existed at that time.
Because the courts of this State have yet to address this particular issue, we consider the analogous case of Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 94 S. Ct. 1723, 40 L. Ed. 2d 198 (1974). In that case, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution guaranteed the right to a trial by jury in an action brought by a tenant who sought recovery of possession of real property after having been evicted by the landlord.
Dave Pernell had entered into a lease agreement with Southall Realty for the rental of a house in the District of Columbia. Shortly after the execution of the lease agreement, Southall filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking to evict Pernell from the premises for the alleged nonpayment of rent. The action was brought under District of Columbia Code §§ 16-1501 through 16-1505, which set forth a procedure for the recovery of possession of real property by a landlord from a tenant and is analogous to the Sanderson Act. In his answer denying that he owed rent, Pernell also requested a trial by jury, which the trial judge denied. The case was tried as a bench trial and a judgment was entered in favor of Southall. Pernell appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, claiming, among other things, that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to a trial by jury in all cases brought pursuant to § 16-1501. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that jury trials are not guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment in landlord-tenant cases predicated on the nonpayment of rent or some other breach of the lease agreement where the only relief sought was repossession of the rented premises. Pernell then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review, which it granted.
Addressing the issue whether § 16-1501 of the District of Columbia Code was limited to instances where a landlord sought to evict a tenant, the Court stated:
416 U.S.  at 369-76, 94 S. Ct. 1723 (footnotes omitted).
Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 429, 62 So. 712, 715 (1913), overruled on other grounds, City of Orange Beach v. Benjamin, 821 So. 2d 193 (Ala.2001). "Ejectment was known to the common law, Betz v. Mullin, 62 Ala. 365 [(1878)], and it seems implicit that the right to a trial by jury is preserved in causes known to the common law in Section 11 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901." Kelley v. Mashburn, 286 Ala. 7, 9, 236 So. 2d 326, 327-28 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court's rationale and holding in Pernell is persuasive authority in this case. Specifically, the Sanderson Act serves essentially the same function as an ejectment actionit provides a landlord with a means to evict a tenant wrongfully detaining possessionand ejectment was a part of the common law of this State when the Constitution of 1901 was adopted, with the implicit right to a trial by jury. Thus, the implication of the rationale of Pernell, applicable to the instant facts, is that Moore is entitled to a trial by jury on her appeal to the circuit court challenging the district court's judgment rendered in favor of MHA.
MHA contends, relying on a statement concerning the jurisdiction of the probate courts and the circuit courts to consider appeals from Sanderson Act evictions in Salvadore v. Howard, 247 Ala. 533, 25 So. 2d 412 (1946), that Sanderson Act evictions are purely statutory proceedings. In Salvadore the landlord Hudson filed an affidavit to procure the eviction of the tenant Salvadore, and a writ of eviction was issued. Salvadore filed an opposing affidavit, but he took none of the other steps required by the applicable statutory procedure, no resulting judgment was entered, no transcript of any proceeding was prepared, and Salvadore's attempted appeal to the circuit court omitted critical steps mandated by the statutory procedure. On appeal, this Court, after noting that the proceedings in question "are purely statutory" and that the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court could be invoked only "by following the mode [of appeal] prescribed by the statute," held that the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction, *1139 "there being no appeal nor judgment from which an appeal could be taken to said court." 247 Ala. at 535, 25 So. 2d  at 413-14. The purely "statutory" proceedings in Salvadore were the appellate proceedings; thus, that reference is not pertinent to the issue at hand. MHA also contends, citing Reed v. Hill, 262 Ala. 662, 80 So. 2d 728 (1955), that if there is no legal cause of action, then there can be no right to a jury trial. MHA further asserts that the appropriate basis for determining whether a litigant has a right to a trial by jury was stated in Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 156 (11th Cir.1994). In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated, in pertinent part:
Thus, MHA implicitly argues that because the instant action is equitable in nature, i.e., the Sanderson Act does not provide for money damages, Moore does not have a right to a jury trial. However, our reading of the Sanderson Act reveals that it does not expressly state whether the remedy afforded by the act is legal or equitable in nature.
Notwithstanding the Sanderson Act's failure to state whether it allows for the recovery of money damages, this Court has stated that an action brought pursuant to the Sanderson Act is an action in the nature of unlawful detainer. See Garrett v. Reid, supra; Riley v. Riley, supra; Glenn v. Nixon, 248 Ala. 569, 28 So. 2d 718 (1946); Cranford v. Lawrence, 252 Ala. 445, 41 So. 2d 405 (1949); Williams v. Prather, supra; and Hicks v. Longfellow Dev. Co., supra. Historically, the right to a trial by jury in unlawful-detainer actions has been recognized by the courts of this State. See Riley v. Riley, supra; Johnson v. Christian, 2 Port. 201 (Ala.1835); Powers v. David, 6 Ala. 9 (1844); and Underwood v. Greater Gadsden Housing Auth., 789 So. 2d 867 (Ala.Civ.App.2000). Additionally, in Mobley v. Moore, 350 So. 2d 414, 416 (Ala.1977), this Court stated:
As stated above, we have concluded that a cause of action under the Sanderson Act serves the same function as did an ejectment action at common law, which was "previously recognized as a triable issue," 350 So. 2d  at 416. Moreover, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-12-30, which sets forth the jurisdiction of district courts in Alabama, expressly provides, subject to certain exceptions not applicable to this case, that district courts do not have jurisdiction in actions seeking equitable relief. Specifically, that statute provides, in relevant part:
However, as shown by § 35-9-80 quoted above, district courts do have jurisdiction in Sanderson Act evictions. "`The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature as manifested in the language of the statute.'" Ex parte Weaver, 871 So. 2d 820, 823 (Ala.2003), quoting Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 683 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala.1996); Auburn Univ. v. Advertiser Co., 867 So. 2d 293 (Ala.2003); Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue, 855 So. 2d 513 (Ala.2003). Accordingly, we conclude that Moore had a clear legal right to a jury trial and that the circuit court erred by denying her request for a jury trial on her appeal to that court from the judgment rendered by the district court in favor of MHA. Ex parte Empire Fire &amp; Marine Ins. Co., supra. We therefore grant Moore's petition and issue a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order striking Moore's demand for a jury trial.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  The materials submitted to this Court do not explicitly state whether Smiley Court is governmentally subsidized housing; however, in light of the "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship and Order" filed by Moore, which indicates that she receives financial assistance benefits and also shows her total monthly gross income, we infer that Smiley Court is in fact subsidized housing managed by MHA.