Title: Fields v. Fields
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 970112
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1998

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
HENRY M. FIELDS, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 970112 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.  
 
 
 
April 17, 1998 
BONNIE LOU SALMON FIELDS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
Charles H. Smith, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this will contest, we consider whether the trial court 
properly determined that the testator lacked the requisite 
testamentary capacity at the time he executed the later of two 
wills offered for probate. 
 
Robert McKinley Fields (testator) died on May 23, 1994, 
leaving two wills.  The earlier of these two wills, dated August 
28, 1975, was admitted to probate by the order of the clerk of 
the Circuit Court of Washington County on May 25, 1994.  On that 
same day, a will dated November 1, 1988, was also presented to 
the clerk for probate.   
 
The testator was married three times.  Four children, Katie 
L. Fields Harris, Bertia F. Sanders, Mary Lou Fields Wise, and 
Henry M. Fields, were born of the first marriage.  Three 
children, Dale Fields, Carl Fields, and Robert Fields, were born 
of the second marriage.  The testator’s final marriage produced 
one child, David Wayne Fields.  Henry M. Fields, Bertia F. 
Sanders, and Mary Lou Fields Wise (petitioners) are the 
proponents of the 1988 will.  Bonnie Lou Salmon Fields, the 
testator’s widow, and the testator’s remaining children were all 
named as respondents to the petition to have the 1988 will 
admitted to probate. 
 
The 1975 will initially acknowledges Bonnie Lou Salmon 
Fields as the testator’s wife, David Wayne Fields as his child 
of that marriage, and four children from the two prior 
marriages, but fails to make any reference to the three other 
children from those marriages.  The will divides the estate into 
equal shares to be distributed to Bonnie Lou Salmon Fields and 
David Wayne Fields.  In two separate clauses, the will expressly 
excludes the testator’s other children from receiving any share 
of the estate.  The will contains attestation and self-proving 
clauses with three witnesses each and a notary’s certification 
in accordance with Code § 64.1-87.1. 
 
The 1988 will, which expressly revokes all prior wills, 
provides for the distribution of one-third of the estate to the 
testator’s widow and two-thirds equally among all eight of his 
children.  A further provision directs that any debts due from a 
beneficiary are to be deducted from that beneficiary’s share and 
that “heirs that did not contribute to the expense to my 
daughter, Mary Lou, for taking care of me during the week days 
while my wife was at work, equal amount is to be deducted from 
any inheritance that will be due them.”  This will also contains 
 
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attestation and self-proving clauses with two witnesses each and 
a notary’s certification. 
 
The petition challenged the order admitting the 1975 will 
to probate and sought an order declaring the 1988 will valid and 
admitting it to probate.  Code § 64.1-78.  An answer demanding 
strict proof of the claims of the petition was filed on behalf 
of the widow and the testator’s five other children. 
 
In a hearing before the chancellor, the petitioners 
presented testimony from the notary and the two individuals who 
witnessed the execution of the 1988 will.  The notary testified 
that she knew the testator as a customer of the bank where she 
was employed.  She further testified that she spoke with the 
testator and that he acknowledged the writing to be his will.  
She further testified that she would not have notarized the 
execution of the will had she felt there was anything 
“suspicious” or that the testator was not “sane.” 
 
Both of the witnesses to the 1988 will were also employees 
of the bank.  One testified that she recalled being asked by the 
manager of the bank to witness the execution of the will, but 
that she did not remember anything particular about the 
testator.  The other also recalled being asked to witness the 
execution of the will and testified that she believed the 
testator to have been “sane” at that time. 
 
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The respondents presented evidence from numerous lay 
witnesses concerning the general mental and physical capacity of 
the testator between 1975 and 1988.  In sum, that evidence shows 
that the testator was of declining health, that he was 
increasingly confused, and that he occasionally engaged in 
inappropriate behavior.  Several witnesses testified that at 
times the testator would not recognize family members, could not 
discuss current affairs, and could not understand a legal 
document.  On cross-examination, several of the witnesses 
conceded, however, that the testator could recognize family 
members and discuss family matters on occasion.  Although all of 
these witnesses had regular contact with the testator, none 
testified concerning specific events reflecting his testamentary 
incapacity on November 1, 1988. 
 
Mary Lou Fields Wise testified in rebuttal that she 
frequently visited the testator and that he was able to converse 
about politics, read the Bible with her, and sing songs.  She 
further testified that while visiting the testator on November 
1, 1988, she informed him that she had to go to the bank.  The 
testator asked to accompany her because he also needed to go to 
the bank.  In additional rebuttal testimony, Henry M. Fields 
testified that he was also present on November 1, 1988, and that 
the testator stated that he wanted to go to the bank because he 
had a paper he needed to have notarized.  Both of these 
 
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witnesses disputed the testimony of the respondents’ witnesses 
that the testator was confused and could not recognize family 
members. 
 
In the final decree, the chancellor found that the 1988 
will was invalid “due to [the testator’s] physical and mental 
[incapacity].”  The decree further provided that the 1975 will 
was the testator’s last will and that its admission to probate 
was proper.  We awarded the proponents of the 1988 will this 
appeal. 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence 
supports the chancellor’s finding that the testator lacked the 
requisite testamentary capacity when he executed the 1988 will.  
Our resolution of this issue is guided by well established 
principles.   
 
The proponents of the 1988 will had the burden of proving 
the existence of that degree of mental competence required for 
the valid execution of a will by a preponderance of the evidence 
and retained that burden throughout the proceeding.  Gibbs v. 
Gibbs, 239 Va. 197, 199, 387 S.E.2d 499, 500 (1990); Code 
§ 64.1-47.  In clarifying the degree of mental competence 
required for a person to have testamentary capacity, we have 
held that a testator need not “retain all the force of intellect 
which he may have had at a former period,” Wooddy v. Taylor, 114 
Va. 737, 741, 77 S.E. 498, 500 (1913), and under certain 
 
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circumstances may even be legally incompetent to transact other 
business.  See Tate v. Chumbley, 190 Va. 480, 493, 57 S.E.2d 
151, 157 (1950).  Rather, for testamentary capacity to exist, it 
is sufficient that at the time the testator executed his will, 
he was capable of recollecting his property, the natural objects 
of his bounty, and their claims upon him, and knew the business 
about which he was engaged and how he wished to dispose of his 
property.  Tabb v. Willis, 155 Va. 836, 859, 156 S.E. 556, 564 
(1931). 
 
"[T]he time of execution of the will . . . is the critical 
time for determining testamentary capacity.  The testimony of 
witnesses as to the mental capacity of the testat[or] at this 
time carries great weight."  Thomason v. Carlton, 221 Va. 845, 
853, 276 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1981).  Evidence of sickness or 
impaired intellect at other times is insufficient, standing 
alone, to render a will invalid.  Gilmer v. Brown, 186 Va. 630, 
639, 44 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1947); see also Tate, 190 Va. at 495, 57 
S.E.2d at 158 (testatrix on furlough from mental institution was 
not per se incompetent to execute will). 
 
Here, the petitioners presented testimony from the two 
individuals who witnessed the execution of the 1988 will and the 
notary who notarized the signatures of the testator and the 
witnesses.  The notary expressly stated that she spoke with the 
testator, that he acknowledged the writing as his will, and that 
 
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she would not have notarized the execution of the will had she 
believed that he lacked the capacity to execute a will.  One of 
the two witnesses corroborated the notary’s testimony.  The 
other witness did not disavow her attestation in the self-
proving clause. 
 
In addition, Mary Lou Fields Wise and Henry M. Fields 
testified that, on the day the testator executed the 1988 will, 
they were in his presence.  Both of these witnesses related the 
testator’s desire to go to the bank to have a paper notarized, 
indicating no confusion in that desire or the purpose 
contemplated by the testator as reflected by the occurrence at 
the bank. 
 
The respondents’ evidence related to the testator’s mental 
capacity did not directly contradict the testimony of those 
present at the time the testator executed the 1988 will or at 
any time on the day it was executed.  While the respondents’ 
evidence established that at other times the testator might very 
well have lacked the requisite mental capacity to execute a 
will, the respondents offered only lay witness testimony.  As 
such, the observations of these witnesses are valuable only to 
provide “facts which indicate such incapacity” generally, and 
not as evidence of incapacity on the date the will was executed.  
Thornton v. Thornton’s Executors, 141 Va. 232, 237, 126 S.E. 69, 
70 (1925).  In such cases, the testimony of lay witnesses will 
 
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not overthrow the testimony of the witnesses to the execution of 
the will where the latter evidence is clear as to the testator’s 
capacity at the time the will was executed.  See id. at 239, 126 
S.E. at 71. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence of the witnesses to 
the execution of the 1988 will, which must be afforded great 
weight, coupled with the evidence of the other witnesses present 
with the testator on November 1, 1988, establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the testator had the 
requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will on that 
date. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the chancellor’s decree 
that the 1975 will was properly admitted to probate and remand 
with instructions that the 1975 will be withdrawn from probate 
and that the 1988 will be admitted to probate. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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