Title: Matthew Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corporation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002549-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 1996

No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-2549-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
MATTHEW VERDOLJAK, 
 
 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-PETITIONER, 
 
 
v. 
 
MOSINEE PAPER CORPORATION, 
 
 
 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAY 10, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  Matthew Verdoljak (Verdoljak) petitioned 
this court for review of a decision of the court of appeals 
affirming the order of the Circuit Court for Douglas County 
dismissing his negligence action against Mosinee Paper Corporation 
(Mosinee).  The order was entered by Judge Joseph A. McDonald upon 
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the claim was barred under the "recreational use" 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52
1 which "limits a property owner's 
                     
     
1  Wis. Stat. § 895.52 provides in relevant part: 
Recreational activities; limitation of property owners' 
liability.  (1) Definitions. In this section: 
. . . . 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
2 
liability for an injury to, or caused by, someone engaging in a 
recreational activity on the owner's property."  Sievert v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 626, 528 N.W.2d 
413 (1995).  We granted the petition for review to resolve the 
issue of whether § 895.52 was properly applied to immunize Mosinee 
from liability for injuries Verdoljak sustained while riding his 
motorbike on a logging road owned by Mosinee.  We conclude that 
the recreational use statute does not require an owner to "open" 
his or her lands in order to be afforded immunity from liability 
to a person injured while engaging in recreational activity on the 
owner's property.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
and hold that the recreational use statute does apply to owners 
(..continued) 
(g) "Recreational activity" means any outdoor activity 
undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or 
pleasure, including practice or instruction in any such 
activity.  "Recreational activity" includes, but is not 
limited 
to, 
hunting, 
fishing, 
trapping, 
camping, 
picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, 
horseback riding, bird-watching, motorcycling . . . . 
. . . . 
(2) No duty; immunity from liability. (a) Except as provided 
in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, employe or 
agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the 
owner's property to engage in recreational activity: 
1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational 
activities. 
. . . . 
3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or 
activity on the property. 
(b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no 
officer, employe or agent of an owner is liable for any 
injury to, or any injury caused by, a person engaging in 
a recreational activity on the owner's property or for 
any injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal. 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
3 
like Mosinee, even when they place some restrictions on the 
public's use of their lands. 
 
FACTS 
 
The material facts are undisputed.  On July 27, 1992, 
Verdoljak transported his Honda 125 "dirt bike" by truck to a 
location where he intended to meet friends to go riding "for fun." 
 Upon arriving and not finding his friends, Verdoljak unloaded his 
motorbike and went riding alone at a nearby sand pit.  After a 
short time, he decided to try to meet up with his friends and 
headed back along a dirt or sandy trail through a forested area.  
 Verdoljak had used the logging trail before and viewed it as a 
"short-cut" to the area where he intended to meet his friends.  He 
was injured when he drove into a gate blocking the road which 
consisted of a one-half-inch steel rod suspended by chains hung 
from posts on either side of the trail.  
 
Mosinee owns the section of forest where the accident 
occurred.  Several trails or logging roads wind through the 
property to provide Mosinee's logging trucks and equipment access 
to the forest land during harvest season.  For the protection of 
the property, the public, loggers and logging equipment, the gate 
is closed during active harvesting operations to block access by 
private vehicles or individuals.  However, when logging is not in 
progress, the property is open to the public for hunting and 
fishing
2 and permits could be obtained to gather firewood.  There 
                     
     
2  Mosinee allows hunting and fishing on its land under the 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
4 
were no "no trespassing" signs posted.  Nor were there signs 
prohibiting motorbike use on the trail or specifically designating 
the trail for such use.  
 
RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY 
 
We review a grant of summary judgment by applying the same 
standards used by the circuit court in making its initial 
determination--those set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Shannon 
v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 441, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 
714, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).  Resolution of this case requires us 
to apply the recreational use statute to the undisputed facts 
which presents a question of law requiring de novo review.  
Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 628. 
(..continued) 
dictates of Wis. Stat. § 77.83(2), which requires that, in order 
to qualify for certain property tax incentives, an owner of 
"managed forest land shall permit public access to the land for 
hunting, fishing, hiking, sight-seeing and cross-country skiing." 
  
 
Mosinee contends that the concept that owners can limit the 
types of recreation allowed on their land and yet still benefit 
both the public and themselves by "opening" the land to public 
access is not only contemplated by the above statute (which 
enumerates only specific activities) but is explicitly permitted 
under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 46.21(3)(b), which provides that: 
Open areas may be posted in conformance with this section and 
s. 943.13, Stats., against uses other than hunting, 
fishing, hiking, sight-seeing and cross-country skiing 
as long as the post signs indicate the land is managed 
forest land and the land is open to the public for 
hunting, fishing, hiking, sight-seeing and cross-country 
skiing. 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
5 
  
Verdoljak argues that Mosinee is not entitled to invoke the 
protection of the recreational use statute in this case because 
Mosinee had not "opened" its property for the particular 
recreational use of motorbiking at the particular time of the 
accident.  He asserts that the legislative history and the 
decisions of Wisconsin courts have made it clear that a private 
landowner is only afforded immunity for lands "opened" to public 
use.  He argues further that Mosinee cannot claim the benefit of 
having "opened" its lands for recreational use because it took 
"affirmative steps to expressly forbid" the use of motorbikes on 
the property.
3  Under Verdoljak's theory, landowners should permit 
the public full access to their land for all recreational uses 
because any restrictions would expose an owner to liability.  In 
short, he contends that landowners must open all of their land, to 
all recreational uses, at all times, in order to benefit from full 
protection of the recreational use statute. 
 
We reject this argument.  Rather, we concur with the position 
taken by the court of appeals which found that the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52 is "straightforward and plain: It limits 'the 
liability of property owners toward others who use the property 
for recreational activities'; it does not purport to condition 
that limit to owners who open their land to those who use it for 
                     
     
3  During oral argument, the only conduct that Verdoljak 
could point to as "expressly forbidding" motorbiking was the 
placement of the gate across the road. 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
6 
recreational activities."  Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 192 
Wis. 2d 235, 246, 531 N.W.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1995).  There are large 
sections of land in Wisconsin on which a member of the public will 
be greeted by neither a "Welcome" nor a "No Trespassing" sign.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) the owner of the property is clearly, 
unambiguously immune from liability for injury suffered or caused 
by a person engaging in recreational activity on the property.  
The focus is on the activity of the person who enters and uses the 
land, not upon any obligation on the part of the owner to 
affirmatively demonstrate that the land is open.
4 
 
As in all instances when our inquiry centers on a statute, 
our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the legislature.  State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 
498 N.W.2d 661 (1993).  Here, the legislature has provided us with 
a clear statement of intent contained in the introductory language 
to 1983 Wisconsin Act 418 which created Wis. Stat. § 895.52: 
 Legislative intent. The legislature intends by this act to 
limit the liability of property owners toward others who 
                     
     
4  This is not to say that there are no circumstances under 
which a landowner may be held liable to a person injured while 
recreating on his or her property.  Wisconsin Statute § 895.52 
expressly provides that liability is not limited if: (a) the 
private property owner collects money, goods or services in excess 
of $2,000 per annum in payment for use of the property for 
recreational activity; or if the injury is: (b) caused by a 
malicious failure of the owner, his or her employe or agent to 
warn of a known, unsafe condition; (c) caused by a malicious act 
by the owner, his or her employe or agent; (d) to a social guest 
expressly and individually invited by the owner for the specific 
occasion; or (e) to an employe acting in the scope of his or her 
duties.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6). 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
7 
use their property for recreational activities under 
circumstances in which the owner does not derive more 
than a minimal pecuniary benefit.  While it is not 
possible to specify in a statute every activity which 
might constitute a recreational activity, this act 
provides examples of the kinds of activities that are 
meant to be included, and the legislature intends that, 
where substantially similar circumstances or activities 
exist, this legislation should be liberally construed in 
favor of property owners to protect them from liability.  
 
 
Neither the statement of legislative intent nor the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 contains the word "open."  This stands in 
contrast with the introductory language of 1963 Wis. Act 89 which 
created the predecessor immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 29.68
5, 
describing it as "relating to the limitations on liability of 
landowners who open private lands for recreational purposes."  
However, this introductory language was altered three times prior 
to the creation of § 895.52 in subsequent amendments, none 
mentioning an obligation to "open" land but rather referring to: 
"a landowner who gives another permission to use his land for a 
recreational purpose" (1965 Wis. Act 190); "landowners who permit 
people to cut or remove wood from their land" (1977 Wis. Act 75); 
                     
     
5  The now repealed statute read, in relevant part: 
29.68  Liability of landowners.  
(2) Permission.  An owner, lessee or occupant of premises who 
gives permission to another to hunt, fish, trap, camp, 
hike, sightsee, berry pick or to proceed with water 
sports or recreational uses upon such premises does not 
thereby extend any assurance that the premises are safe 
for such purpose, or constitute the person to whom 
permission is granted an invitee to whom a duty of care 
is owed, or assume responsibility for or incur liability 
for any injury to person or property caused by any act 
of persons to whom the permission is granted, . . . 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
8 
and finally "landowners who allow their land to be used for 
certain outdoor recreational activities" (1977 Wis. Act 123). 
 
We have found that the nature and language of amendments are 
significant and that the omission of a word or phrase is 
indicative of an intent to alter statutory meaning.  Cardinal v. 
Leader Nat. Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 375, 388, 480 N.W.2d 1 (1992).  
Further, where a statute has been repealed and recreated on the 
same subject, any changes in language are presumed to be the 
result of conscious deliberation on the part of the legislature.  
Kerkvliet v. Kerkvliet, 166 Wis. 2d 930, 945-46, 480 N.W.2d 823 
(Ct. App. 1992).  Here, the newly created statute is essentially a 
complete rewrite, containing none of the previous references to 
"open[ing] land" and giving or granting "permission" to enter.  
Again, the legislature has provided clear guidance in its 
statement of its intent as to the focus of the current statute as 
contrasted with its predecessor: "[1983 Wis. Act 418] is intended 
to overrule any previous Wisconsin supreme court decisions 
interpreting section 29.68 of the statutes if the decision is more 
restrictive than or inconsistent with the provisions of this act." 
 
The unambiguous language of the recreational use statute sets 
the following precondition for immunity--that the injury be to or 
caused by "a person engaging in a recreational activity on the 
owner's property . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b).  There is no 
language that conditions immunity upon affirmative acts on the 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
9 
part of the owner to grant permission or otherwise "open" land.
6  
The legislature has made it clear that previous decisions by 
Wisconsin courts that are more restrictive, implying a requirement 
that lands be "open," are overruled. 
 
We must presume that the legislature intends for a statute to 
be interpreted in a manner that advances the purposes of the 
statute.  GTE North Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 176 Wis. 2d 559, 
566, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993).  This court and the court of appeals 
have recognized that the purpose of the recreational immunity 
statute is to encourage property owners to allow use of their 
lands for recreational activities by removing the potential for 
                     
     
6  Even following the passage of Wis. Stat. § 895.52, both 
this court and the court of appeals have frequently commented that 
the underlying purpose of the statute is to expand opportunities 
for recreation through encouraging landowners to open their lands 
without fear of liability to those who enter to engage in 
recreational activities.  See, e.g., Linville v. City of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 715, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994) ("The 
policy behind the statute is to encourage property owners to open 
their lands for recreational activities by removing a property 
user's potential cause of action against a property owner's 
alleged negligence.").  See also Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp 
Minikani, 184 Wis. 2d 875, 888, 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994); Crowbridge 
v. Village of Egg Harbor, 179 Wis. 2d 565, 572, 508 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. 
App. 1993); Mooney v. Royal Ins. Co., 164 Wis. 2d 516, 522-23, 476 
N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1991); Nelson v. Schreiner, 161 Wis. 2d 798, 
802, 469 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1991); Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 
Wis. 2d 464, 477, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991); Kruschke v. City of New 
Richmond, 157 Wis. 2d 167, 173, 458 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1990); 
Silingo v. Village of Mukwonago, 156 Wis. 2d 536, 544, 458 N.W.2d 
379 (Ct. App. 1990); Bystery v. Village of Sauk City, 146 Wis. 2d 
247, 252, 430 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 
As the courts of Wisconsin have used it, the concept of 
"openness" relates to public policy and legislative purpose--it 
has never been and is not now, as this opinion clarifies, an 
"element" of the statute that a landowner needs to satisfy in 
order to be afforded immunity. 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
10 
liability arising out of negligence actions brought against them 
by persons who use the land for such recreational purposes.  See, 
e.g., Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 715; Silingo v. Village of 
Mukwonago, 156 Wis. 2d 536, 544, 458 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1990); 
Bystery v. Village of Sauk City, 146 Wis. 2d 247, 252, 430 N.W.2d 
611 (Ct. App. 1988).  This purpose would be defeated if 
Verdoljak's interpretation were adopted because property owners 
would lose the certainty that a true immunity statute like § 
895.52 provides.  Owners would be encouraged to close all of their 
lands to all purposes if they feared that a partial restriction 
covering particular activities would actually expose them to 
greater, rather than lesser, liability.
7  Public policy is well-
served by the current statute under which landowners are 
encouraged to allow public access to their property and those who 
take advantage of this access by recreating cannot sue for 
ordinary negligence. 
 
According to Verdoljak, each case is fact-governed and 
immunity should only apply to injuries sustained in recreational 
activities that are specifically permitted on a given property.  
In investigating this line of thought, the following hypothetical 
was posed during oral argument: Farmer A allows public access to a 
lake on his property for public swimming, but posts a sign 
                     
     
7  The inherent irony if such an interpretation were adopted 
is illustrated by Mosinee's situation where the company restricted 
access to that area of the forest during harvesting operations, at 
least in part, due to its concerns for safety. 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
11 
prohibiting skateboarding on a hilly area next to the lake.  
Verdoljak stated that, under his interpretation, the statute would 
immunize the property owner from suit by an injured swimmer but 
not by a skateboarder.   
 
Adherence to the canons of statutory construction as well as 
common sense require us to reject this argument.  We will not 
adopt an interpretation that would lead to an absurd or 
unreasonable result.  Cardinal, 166 Wis. 2d at 390.  The above 
scenario does present just such an absurd result.  This line of 
questioning in oral argument also raised the issue of whether, if 
Verdoljak were determined to have been trespassing at the time and 
point of his accident, Mosinee would be barred from claiming 
statutory immunity.  We take this opportunity to state that the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 does not hinge on the injured 
party's status as a non-trespasser, but rather on his or her use 
of the property for recreational purposes.  We reject the notion 
that the recreational use statute could confer greater protection 
to a trespasser than to one who was lawfully using the premises 
and, conversely, that it could expose a property owner to greater 
liability to one engaging in prohibited activity than to members 
of the public utilizing the property as intended.  Again, we avoid 
constructions of a statute that lead to absurd results.   
 
Although our decision today is based on interpretation of 
Wisconsin's recreational use statute which predates that of many 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
12 
other jurisdictions
8, we note that our holding is in conformance 
with that reached by many other state and federal courts faced 
with similar scenarios.  For example, in Holden v. Schwer, 495 
N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1993), the Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded 
that the state's Recreation Liability Act immunized a farmer, who 
allowed the public to use his property with permission, from suit 
by a plaintiff who was injured when she drove a three-wheeled 
vehicle into a barbed wire fence.  The court commented that "[i]t 
would not encourage landowners to allow others to use their 
property if, to come under the protection of the act, they had to 
allow any person, at any time, under any circumstances, to come 
onto their property and use it in any manner that person saw fit." 
 Holden, 495 N.W.2d at 273.
9 
 
 
Our decision follows the legislative directive contained in 
1983 Wis. Act 418 that the recreational use statute "should be 
                     
     
8  The original Wisconsin recreational use statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 29.68, enacted in 1963 was one of the earliest in the 
country, predating the model act developed by the Council of State 
Governments in 1965 which forms the basis for the statutes 
subsequently adopted in many states.  See LePoidevin v. Wilson, 
111 Wis. 2d 116, 131 n.8, 330 N.W.2d 555 (1983). 
     
9  See also Hubbard v. Brown, 785 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1990) 
(affirming that holder of federal grazing permit immunized from 
suit by motorcyclist who collided with barbed wire gate under 
California code which makes "recreational users responsible for 
their own safety and eliminat[es] the financial risk that had kept 
land closed"); Sega v. State of New York, 456 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 
(N.Y. 1983) (finding operator of all-terrain vehicle who drove 
into cable blocking roadway in no-fee State park barred from suing 
State under statute immunizing landowners who "gratuitously allow 
persons to use their property for certain enumerated recreational 
activities"). 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
13 
liberally construed in favor of the property owners to protect 
them from liability."  See also Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 715.  In 
keeping with that directive, and to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature, we conclude that under Wisconsin's recreational 
use statute, § 895.52(2)(a), Mosinee owed no duty to Verdoljak who 
had entered the property to engage in a recreational activity and, 
therefore, Mosinee is not liable for the injury incurred by 
Verdoljak while engaging in that activity.  Thus, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 94-2549-FT 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2549-FT 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Matthew Verdoljak, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Mosinee Paper Corporation, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  192 Wis. 2d 235, 531 N.W.2d 341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 10, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 1, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas 
 
JUDGE: 
JOSEPH A. MCDONALD 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there was a 
brief by Toby E. Marcovich, George L. Glonek and Marcovich, 
Cochrane & Milliken, Superior, and oral argument by George L. 
Glonek. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Mark A. 
Siefert and Stilp, Cotton and Wells, Eau Claire and oral argument 
by Mark A. Siefert.