Title: Merriman v. Kraft
Citation: 249 N.E.2d 485, 253 Ind. 58
Docket Number: 769S159
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 1969

253 Ind. 58 (1969)
249 N.E.2d 485
MERRIMAN
v.
KRAFT.
No. 769S159.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed July 15, 1969.
*60 Robert H. Hahn, Evansville and Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald and Hahn, of counsel, Evansville, for appellant.
Jennings and Wilson, Ross E. Myers, all of Evansville, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, J.
This case comes to us on transfer from the Appellate Court of Indiana. (See 242 N.E.2d 526 for opinion of Appellate Court.)
This action was brought by plaintiff-appellee Kraft's complaint in three paragraphs which sought damages for personal injuries from the appellant-Merriman and Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. The trial was by jury which returned a verdict in favor of appellee and against appellant in the sum of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000). Firestone was relieved of any liability by the jury's verdict. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and judgment was entered accordingly.
The complaint alleged that at approximately 10:30 p.m. on July 15, 1964, the appellee was walking easterly on the public sidewalk abutting Covert Avenue in Evansville, Indiana. Appellant was operating an automobile westerly on Covert Avenue when she suddenly and without warning drove the automobile over the curb and onto the sidewalk, injuring the appellee.
Paragraph One of the complaint sought recovery against both defendants on the basis of negligence. Appellant was allegedly negligent in driving at a high and dangerous rate of speed, in failing to keep a lookout, in failing to apply the brakes, in failing to have reasonable control of the steering and in failing to sound her horn. Firestone was alleged to be negligent in that the car driven by appellant was equipped *61 with a tire manufactured and sold by them, which tire had been purchased approximately one week prior to the accident and had been used on the vehicle in normal operation in the manner reasonably intended. The appellee further alleged that when the car operated by the appellant reached a particular point in the street the tire "... blew out, collapsed, and went completely flat.... That the collapse of said tire was a proximate cause of the said automobile traveling up and over the curb and onto the sidewalk, thereby injuring the plaintiff."
Paragraph Two of the complaint asks for recovery against the appellant on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The complaint "further alleges that the automobile which caused the plaintiff's injuries as aforesaid, was at all times herein mentioned under the exclusive and sole control of the defendant, Carita Merriman, and that the plaintiff had nothing whatsoever to do with the control and operation of said automobile and further had absolutely no knowledge regarding the operation and control of said vehicle."
Paragraph Three of the complaint sounded in strict liability and concerned only Firestone Tire and Rubber and does not concern us in deciding the questions raised on appeal.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred when the cause was submitted to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is appellant's position that since the evidence tended to establish that the accident could have resulted from more than one cause, i.e., negligence of appellant and/or a defective tire manufactured and sold by Firestone, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
With appellant's contention we can not agree. To assert the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur it is not necessary to prove that the only cause of the accident was defendant's negligence. To the contrary it is said:
It is therefore not necessary for a plaintiff to exclude every other possibility other than the defendant's negligence as a cause. This principle has been recognized in Indiana.
Other jurisdictions have held that when a car leaves the street and injures a pedestrian on the sidewalk, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
The present case demonstrates the intended use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. A pedestrian who is standing on a public sidewalk and struck by a car is entitled to have the doctrine applied when he shows that the instrumentality that caused his injury was under the exclusive control of the appellant and shows further that the accident was the result of appellant's lack of reasonable care. The only additional requirement placed on the appellee-plaintiff is that he be without information as to the exact cause of the accident. This requirement was satisfied by Paragraph Two of his complaint.
The appellant alleges that even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did apply, such availability was lost when the appellee pled and introduced evidence of a tire blow-out. With this contention we are likewise unable to agree. While jurisdictions have differed on this issue, the rule in Indiana as expressed by the case of New York, Chicago &amp; St. Louis R. Co. v. Henderson, supra, is that the appellee may still avail himself of the doctrine even though he pleads and offers evidence of specific acts of negligence under another paragraph of complaint.
*64 The appellant next cites two cases in support of the proposition that the tire blow-out removes the case from the application of res ipsa loquitur. Both cases can be distinguished from the present case on the facts.
In Klein v. Beeten (1919), 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736, the court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply where the accident coud have occurred due to a blowout of the left front tire. However, the case does contain the following language:
In the case before us there was evidence introduced that the tire not only hit something with a terrific force but that even if the car had suffered a blow-out of a rear tire at the speed appellant stated she was traveling, the blow-out would not have caused her to lose control of her vehicle. This evidence was presented to the trial court through the testimony of John Cox, an engineer employed by Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.
The tests referred to by Cox were controlled experiments duplicating a blowout under similar conditions.
The other case cited by appellant in support of her position, Cox v. Wilson, Ky. 1954, 267 S.W.2d 83, can also be differentiated from the present case. In the Cox case the evidence was undisputed that the accident resulted from a tire blowout.
Foulke v. Meiluta (D.C. Penn. 1958), 164 F. Supp. 384, allowed the plaintiff to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur even though the defendant sought to explain the accident by stating his tire blew out. The court there held that the plaintiff should not lose the benefit of the doctrine merely because the defendant offers some explanation. This same reasoning is found in the New York, Chicago &amp; St. Louis R. Co. case, supra, and is therefore approved by this Court.
This case also presents another question of first impression in this jurisdiction. Can the plaintiff sue co-defendants and still retain the applicability of res ipsa loquitur as against one of the defendants? We agree with other jurisdictions that have faced this issue that the answer is affirmative. See Nichols v. Nold (1953), 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 and Zichler v. St. Louis Public Service (1933), 332 Mo. 90, 59 S.W.2d 654. Where all the circumstances exist which make the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable, its benefits should not be lost merely because another possible tortfeasor is joined as a co-defendant. This woud be a logical *66 extension of the rule embraced by the New York, Chicago &amp; St. Louis R. Co. case that the plaintiff may introduce evidence "as may be available tending to show specifically the items of negligence and still rely upon the inference also permitted under res ipsa loquitur." In the present case, if appellant's story were true, the appellee could have recovered from Firestone under Paragraphs One and Three of the complaint. When the jury's verdict showed their disbelief in appellant's story concerning a tire failure, the appellee was able to recover under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. There is no valid reason for forcing a plaintiff without a full knowledge of all the evidence to be presented at trial to choose which defendant he decides to pursue, or forego his right to have the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in tendering to the jury, Instruction No. 9, which read as follows:
Appellant's objection to the above instruction, reads in part, as follows:
Appellant first objects to the use of the term "presumption of negligence" used in the instruction instead of using the term "inference of negligence". While this Court recognizes that the term "inference of negligence" is desirable in instructing the jury on the application of res ipsa loquitur, we do not believe that the use of the term "presumption of negligence" at one place in an instruction which uses "inference of negligence" three times is such a term of art that it constitutes reversible error. This position is further buttressed by Indiana cases which use the term "presumption of negligence" when speaking of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Instruction No. 9, when read as a whole, correctly instructed the jury as to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The use of the term "presumption of negligence" when used interchangeably *68 and with the same intended meaning as the term "inference of negligence" did not so prejudice the appellant as to constitute reversible error.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, defines presumption as follows:
Webster's Third International Dictionary defines presumption as:
It is evident that the terms "inference" and "presumption" are in common usage practically synonymous, and we believe in the context used in the instruction complained of it conveys a meaning of a permissible deduction which the triers of the fact may or may not accept, as they see fit.
Appellant also alleges error in the use of the words "and shifts to the defendant the burden of proving that it was not caused through any lack of reasonable care on his part." The appellant claims that the instruction has the effect of relieving the plaintiff from the burden of proof. We do not believe the instruction had this effect. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which allows an inference of negligence to be drawn from certain surrounding facts. New York, Chicago, St. Louis R. Co. v. Henderson, supra. As the appellant admits in her brief, where the doctrine is applicable it merely shifts to the defendant the burden of coming forward with evidence of explanation.
In Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Hadley (1907), 170 Ind. 204, 210, 84 N.E. 13, the court gave an instruction in a res ipsa loquitur case which stated:
The appellant objected to the use of the word "burden" and argued that this instruction shifted the burden of proof. This Court rejected appellant's contention. In that case, as in the present case, the plaintiff had, with the aid of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, established a prima facie case. The court stated that when the instruction was read as a whole "... it is plain that the word burden was used in this instance in the sense of duty or obligation, and when so read the instruction is not subject to criticism." Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Hadley, supra, at 211.
The court reasoned in that case that a prima facie case of negligence having been established, "... appellant had the burden of establishing the existence of all separate collateral facts, which might be necessary to explain the cause of the accident and to demonstrate the use of proper diligence and care...." Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Hadley, supra, at 211.
While the fact situations in the present case can be distinguished from the one confronting the court in the Cleveland, etc. R. Co. case, the court's reasoning would be applicable to the present case. The phrase "burden of proving" when the instruction is read as a whole only places upon the appellant the duty or obligation of presenting evidence to show that the accident "was not caused by any lack of reasonable care on his part." Berry v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 494, 242 N.E.2d 355.
It further appears from the transcript that the court's Instruction No. 4 was as follows:
This instruction correctly informed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proof as to the material allegations of his complaint. Any connotations which might have inadvertently arisen from the trial court's use of the phrase "burden of proving" was rendered harmless by this instruction and by looking at the objected to instruction as an entirety.
Appellant next objects to the use of the phrase "does not ordinarily happen" in Instruction No. 9 and urges the following phraseology should have replaced it:
The trial court also gave appellant's Instruction No. 23, which stated:
With these instructions read together, we fail to see any error which the trial court committed in using the phrase "does not ordinarily happen". This same phrase was used by this Court in Union Traction Co. v. Berry, Admr. (1919), 188 Ind. 514, 530, 121 N.E. 655, reh. denied at 124 N.E. 737:
In New York, Chicago &amp; St. Louis R. Co. v. Henderson, supra, at 463, the court said:
The appellant next alleges that the trial court erred in not giving her Instruction No. 10, which stated that no presumption or inference of negligence arose by reason of the accident. This point is controlled by Taylor v. Fitzpatrick, supra:
Once the court affirmatively determines that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, the result is that a fact-finder (jury or judge) may infer negligence to the defendant from the arising of the accident.
The alleged errors, if any, complained of with reference to the instructions reviewed are not of such a substantial character as to mislead a jury, in our opinion. After all, that is the criterion by which we must determine whether or not a party has been prejudiced by an alleged erroneous instruction. It is regrettable to say that far too frequently the courts have been the victim of overly-refining the language of instructions such that they are held bad purely upon semantics or wording which has no substantial effect upon a jury.
In another case we had occasion to say:
It taxes the limits of a legally trained mind to make any real distinction in the phraseology condemned in this case on the one side and approved on the other in the instructions, and we doubt that any legally trained mind would be misled by the instructions attacked. If that be true, then certainly a non-legally trained mind, such as a layman in a jury box, would not be misled by the meaning of the instructions in this case. We must be controlled in determining whether an instruction is erroneous or not, by, whether viewing the instructions as a whole, with all other instructions, a complaining party was actually prejudiced. In this case the distinctions in meaning are so refined with reference to the verbage complained of that we find that no prejudice resulted therefrom. Taking into consideration the fact that no two words in the English language have exactly the same meaning, this Court is compelled from time to time to view the over-all import or sense of the instruction.
Appellant's motion for a new trial contains other specifications of error. However, since the appellant fails to argue them, they are waived under Supreme Court Rule 2-17.
Transfer from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DeBruler, C.J., Hunter and Givan, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 249 N.E.2d 485.