Title: Commonwealth v. Jewett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11796
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2015

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SJC-11796 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERIC A. JEWETT. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 3, 2015. - June 11, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Arrest.  Search and Seizure, Arrest, Exigent circumstances, 
Probable cause, Pursuit.  Probable Cause.  Constitutional 
Law, Probable cause.  Motor Vehicle, Operating under the 
influence. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Newburyport Division 
of the District Court Department on February 16, 2010.   
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter 
F. Doyle, J.; a motion for reconsideration was heard by him; and 
the case was tried before Michael A. Uhlarik, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Todd C. Pomerleau (Chase A. Marshall with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
John M. Collins, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In this case we consider whether the hot pursuit 
of a suspect who has fled to a private home and who an officer 
has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor for 
which imprisonment is possible, creates a sufficient exigency 
such that a warrantless arrest is lawful.  We conclude that it 
does in the circumstances of this case. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the motion 
judge, and as supplemented by the testimony at the suppression 
hearing which he credited, see Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 
Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008), reserving 
certain details for our analysis of the issues raised on appeal. 
 
On February 14, 2010, at approximately midnight, Officer 
Richard Holcroft1 of the Merrimac police department was on a 
routine patrol in a marked police cruiser.  While traveling west 
on East Main Street he observed a male and female walking to a 
pickup truck in the parking lot of a bar.  There were only a few 
vehicles in the lot and no other vehicles near where the truck 
was parked.  All other businesses in the area were closed. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Holcroft's attention was drawn to a 
different vehicle, traveling at a high rate of speed in the 
opposite direction on East Main Street.  He reversed direction 
to pursue this speeding motor vehicle.  While passing the bar 
                     
 
1 Officer Richard Holcroft was the only witness to testify 
at the motion to suppress hearing, and the motion judge credited 
Holcroft's testimony in his memorandum of decision. 
3 
 
again, Holcroft observed the first vehicle (the truck) make a 
wide left turn onto East Main Street.  The truck pulled out in 
front of Holcroft's vehicle and, in so doing, crossed the fog 
line.  The truck then moved back into its travel lane, but 
subsequently crossed the fog line again, swerved over the double 
yellow lines, and swerved back to the fog line.  After observing 
these three marked lanes violations, Holcroft began to pursue 
the truck, activating his cruiser's full light bar. 
 
The driver of the truck did not stop or pull over, but 
began to travel at a markedly slower rate than the forty miles 
per hour speed limit.  Holcroft then turned on his cruiser's 
siren, in addition to its flashing lights.  The truck began to 
weave within its lane, but the driver neither pulled over nor 
attempted to stop.  In the middle of this pursuit, Holcroft 
observed the truck nearly strike a parked motor vehicle.  
Fearing that the driver of the truck posed a danger to the lives 
of other motorists on the way, Holcroft continued his pursuit of 
the truck with both his lights and siren activated.  The driver 
subsequently took a wide left turn onto another street, but 
still failed to stop. 
 
Holcroft radioed his pursuit of the truck into the police 
station and was informed by the police dispatcher that the truck 
was registered to the defendant.  Holcroft was familiar with the 
defendant, as he had given him a ride on a prior occasion when 
4 
 
the defendant was highly intoxicated and had previously been 
called to the defendant's house, along with multiple other 
officers, to respond to an incident.  Moreover, Holcroft was 
aware that the defendant had been arrested for leaving the scene 
of an accident after causing property damage. 
 
The defendant continued traveling along several streets 
before reaching Mountain Avenue.  After driving erratically and 
very slowly (approximately ten to twenty miles per hour) for 
over one-half mile, the truck turned into an unmarked driveway 
and stopped short of a garage attached to a home at the end of 
the driveway.  Holcroft stopped part way down the driveway with 
both his lights and siren activated, got out of his cruiser, ran 
to the driver's side of the truck, and knocked on the window.  
At this point, he recognized the driver of the truck as the 
defendant, and ordered him out of the vehicle.  The defendant 
ignored Holcroft's order and refused even to make eye contact.  
Holcroft noted that a female passenger was seated in the front 
of the vehicle. 
 
The garage door at the end of the driveway then began to 
rise.  Holcroft ordered the defendant to stop and step out of 
the vehicle, but the defendant did not comply, and proceeded to 
drive the truck into the garage.  Holcroft followed the truck on 
foot.  The defendant drove his vehicle as far into the garage as 
possible, and pressed a button on a remote control inside his 
5 
 
truck, causing the garage door to close slowly.  In response, 
Holcroft wedged a nearby ice pick under the garage door to 
prevent it from closing.  He then entered the defendant's garage 
and approached the driver's side door of the truck.  Holcroft 
again ordered the defendant out of the vehicle.  At this point, 
the female passenger got out of the truck and entered the 
basement of the home through a doorway connecting the garage to 
the house.  The defendant, continuing to disobey Holcroft, slid 
from the driver's seat to the passenger's seat and began to get 
out by the passenger's side door.  Holcroft proceeded around the 
back of the vehicle with his baton drawn, ordered the defendant 
to turn around, and informed him that he was under arrest. 
 
The defendant continued to ignore Holcroft's commands and 
instead made a forward motion towards him.  Holcroft smelled an 
odor of alcohol coming from the defendant, and observed that his 
eyes were glassy and bloodshot, his speech was thick and 
slurred, and he was very unsteady on his feet.  Holcroft 
cautioned the defendant that if he did not comply and desist 
with his forward movements, Holcroft would spray him with pepper 
spray.  The defendant continued toward Holcroft.  After shoving 
the defendant away twice, Holcroft sprayed the defendant once in 
the face with pepper spray.  The defendant then turned and 
stumbled through the doorway into the basement of the home.  
6 
 
After a brief struggle at the basement door, the defendant was 
able to shut the door, leaving Holcroft behind in his garage. 
 
Holcroft drew his service weapon and followed after the 
defendant.  The defendant left his house through a back door in 
an attempt to flee and subsequently was apprehended in the 
backyard when police backup arrived. 
 
Procedural history.  On February 16, 2010, a criminal 
complaint issued in the Newburyport Division of the District 
Court Department, charging the defendant with operating a 
vehicle while under the influence of liquor (OUI), third 
offense, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); 
resisting arrest, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 32B; reckless 
operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 
(2) (a); failure to stop for police, in violation of G. L. 
c. 90, § 25; and a marked lanes violation, in violation of G. L. 
c. 89, § 4A.  Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to 
suppress, contending that Holcroft's entry into his garage 
constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the defendant's 
motion based on the existence of probable cause and several 
exigent circumstances, including hot pursuit, risk of flight, 
and dissipation of evidence.2  The defendant subsequently moved 
                     
 
2 On appeal we do not consider whether the warrantless entry 
was permissible to prevent the dissipation of evidence, as the 
7 
 
for reconsideration, and the judge amended three specific 
findings of fact in an amended decision issued in December, 
2010. 
 
A two-day jury trial commenced on March 21, 2011.  At the 
close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a 
required finding of not guilty, which was denied as to all 
counts except reckless operation of a motor vehicle.  The 
defendant subsequently moved for a required finding of not 
guilty at the close of all the evidence.  This motion was denied 
and the jury found the defendant guilty on all the remaining 
counts. 
 
The following day, after a bench trial, the judge found 
that the defendant had been convicted of OUI on two prior 
occasions, making the instant charge his third offense and 
therefore a felony.  The defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal in April, 2011, and we transferred the defendant's appeal 
to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the 
motion to suppress evidence was wrongly denied, and that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove both that he was under the 
influence of liquor when arrested and that he had two prior OUI 
convictions.  We address each argument in turn. 
                                                                  
Commonwealth concedes that the facts here do not present a 
sufficient basis for such a showing. 
8 
 
 
1.  Suppression motion.  When reviewing a motion to 
suppress, "we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error," but "independently review the judge's 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law."  Commonwealth v. 
Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 682 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Colon, 
449 Mass. 207, 214 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007). 
 
"Warrantless entries into the home are prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights absent either 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, or consent."  
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 236 (2005).  "A variety 
of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to 
justify a warrantless search, including law enforcement's need 
to . . . engage in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect."  
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013), citing United 
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).3  See Commonwealth 
v. Paniaqua, 413 Mass. 796, 797-798 (1992).  It is the 
Commonwealth's "heavy burden" to establish both the requisite 
probable cause and exigent circumstances.  See Tyree, 455 Mass. 
                     
 
3 Other exigencies that may justify a warrantless search are 
law enforcement's need to provide emergency assistance to an 
occupant of a home, see Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 
(2009); restrict the risk of a suspect's flight, see 
Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 807 (1975); and prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence, see Missouri v. McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013).  See Commonwealth v. Skea, 18 
Mass. App. Ct. 685, 693 n.12 (1984) (listing warrant requirement 
exceptions). 
9 
 
at 684.  When asserting an exigency exception, the Commonwealth 
must show that it was impracticable for the police to obtain a 
warrant, "and the standards as to exigency are strict" (citation 
omitted).  Id. 
 
a.  Probable cause.  Probable cause to arrest "exists, 
where, at the moment of arrest, the facts and circumstances 
within the knowledge of the police are enough to warrant a 
prudent person in believing that the individual arrested has 
committed or was committing an offense."  Commonwealth v. 
Franco, 419 Mass. 635, 639 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992).  It "requires more than 
mere suspicion but something less than evidence sufficient to 
warrant a conviction."  Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 
174 (1982), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175-176 (1949).  "In dealing with probable cause . . . we deal 
with probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."  Id., 
quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.  Accordingly, "an objective 
test is used to determine whether probable cause exists."  
Franco, 419 Mass. at 639, citing Hason, 387 Mass. at 175. 
 
Based on the facts and circumstances known to Holcroft at 
the time of the warrantless entry, we conclude that he had 
probable cause to lawfully arrest the defendant for at least two 
10 
 
offenses, one of which was the jailable misdemeanor of reckless 
operation.4  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).  Although this crime 
does not fall within the ambit of G. L. c. 90, § 21, regarding 
arrests in traffic cases, common law permits a police officer to 
arrest an individual without a warrant for a misdemeanor if the 
individual's actions "(1) [constitute] a breach of the peace, 
(2) [are] committed in the presence or view of the officer, 
. . . and (3) [are] still continuing at the time of the arrest 
or are only interrupted so that the offense and the arrest form 
parts of one transaction."  Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332, 
                     
 
4 The motion judge found that, at the time of the 
warrantless entry, there was probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for "failure to stop for a police officer, reckless or 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, and operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol."  Although 
Holcroft arguably had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant 
for an OUI, without having had the opportunity to interact with 
him or conduct a threshold inquiry, it is less certain that at 
the time of the warrantless entry Holcroft's observations 
amounted to probable cause.  Compare Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 
427 Mass. 490, 491-492 (1998) (officer had reasonable suspicion 
to believe defendant was operating vehicle while under influence 
where officer observed vehicle swerve and almost hit parked 
motor vehicles), with Commonwealth v. O'Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 
608, 609-610 (1991) (defendant's erratic driving sufficient to 
provide officer with "some reason to believe" defendant was 
operating vehicle while under influence, but arrest justified 
only after officer made additional observations during stop).  
See Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774, 775-776 (1995), 
overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Blais, 428 Mass. 
294 (1998) (probable cause for OUI where, in addition to seeing 
erratic driving, officer observed obvious signs of intoxication 
including slurred speech, odor of alcohol on breath, and 
bloodshot eyes).  In any event, where there was plainly probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for reckless operation, we need 
not decide this point. 
11 
 
334 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 296-
297 (1934).  "To find a breach of the peace . . . an act must at 
least threaten to have some disturbing effect on the public."  
Commonwealth v. Baez, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 570 (1997). 
 
Each of these requirements was present in the instant case. 
The defendant's erratic operation and near-collision clearly 
occurred in the presence of Holcroft and formed part of the same 
transaction as the defendant's ultimate arrest.  We have little 
doubt that Holcroft had the authority to arrest the defendant on 
the ground that erratic driving through public streets, which 
nearly results in a collision with a parked motor vehicle, 
involves a breach of the peace.  This is especially so given 
that the defendant's refusal to heed the lights and sirens of 
law enforcement, resulting in a chase through a residential 
area, undoubtedly created the potential for a disturbing effect 
on the public.  Compare Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 366 Mass. 
277, 280-281 (1974) (chase through city streets involved breach 
of peace), with Baez, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 566-570 (1997) (civil 
motor vehicle infraction of defective headlight did not 
constitute breach of peace). 
 
In order to establish guilt under the reckless operation 
statute, "the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 
12 
 
operated a motor vehicle negligently (or recklessly)5 so as to 
endanger the lives or safety of the public 'upon any way or in 
any place to which the public has a right of access.'"  
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 34 (2007), 
quoting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).  "The statute only requires 
proof that the defendant's conduct might have endangered the 
safety of the public, not that it in fact did."  Id. at 35.  See 
Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 526-527 (2005) 
("person may operate a vehicle in such a way that would endanger 
the public although no other person is on the street").  
Moreover, "it is not the duration of negligent operation or the 
proximity of the public but 'the operation of the vehicle itself 
that is the crime.'"  Ferreira, supra at 35, quoting 
Constantino, supra at 526. 
 
Here, there was an ample basis for a probable cause 
determination of negligent operation.  Though the defendant was 
not speeding,6 he crossed over the fog line three times and the 
double yellow lines once, made wide turns, weaved within his 
                     
 
5 In Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 392 (1981), we 
recognized "that by custom and usage the element of 
'recklessness' has been of little or no significance in the 
application of the operating to endanger statute" and, 
therefore, "the statutory word 'recklessly' seems to be 
surplusage." 
 
 
6 See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35 
(2007) ("lack of evidence of continuing excessive speed . . . is 
only one factor to be considered when determining whether the 
lives of the public could have been endangered"). 
13 
 
lane, refused to heed Holcroft's persistent demand to pull over, 
and nearly hit a parked automobile while deliberately attempting 
to evade law enforcement.  These facts demonstrate in several 
ways how the defendant's behavior might have endangered the 
lives of the public, thereby establishing probable cause for a 
negligent or reckless operation charge.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 413 Mass. 598, 601 (1992) (probable cause for 
operating to endanger where speeding vehicle attempted to evade 
police and almost hit unmarked vehicle); Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 33-36 (operating to endanger where, despite no 
pedestrians nearby, defendant accelerated in manner that caused 
tires to spin, car to "fishtail," and screeching noise); 
Commonwealth v. Labelle, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 698, 700-701 (2006) 
(operating to endanger where defendant sped through yellow light 
at intersection during busy time of day); Commonwealth v. Daley, 
66 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 255-256 (2006) (operating to endanger 
where defendant erratically crossed lanes, straddled breakdown 
lane, and used wipers on clear night). 
 
b.  Exigent circumstances.  As noted above, hot pursuit of 
a fleeing suspect is a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement.  See Santana, 427 U.S. at 41-43 (warrantless entry 
permissible under doctrine of hot pursuit where defendant fled 
inside home to avoid arrest for heroin possession with intent to 
distribute); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).  
14 
 
This exception effectuates the principle that "a suspect may not 
defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place 
. . . by the expedient of escaping to a private place."  
Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.  Hot pursuit does not require a high 
speed race or a trail of police cruisers in fast pursuit of a 
suspect.  See id. ("it need not be an extended hue and cry in 
and about [the] public streets" [quotations omitted]).  Rather, 
it merely means "some sort of a chase."  Id. 
 
Although it is well settled that a State may develop its 
own law of search and seizure so long as it does not run afoul 
of the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment, see Commonwealth v. 
Matthews, 355 Mass. 378, 380-381 (1969), "[F]ederal and [S]tate 
courts nationwide are sharply divided on the question whether an 
officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a 
misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot 
pursuit of that suspect."  Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 
(2013).  The defendant argues that the hot pursuit exception 
does not apply to "minor crimes," and because the crimes he was 
suspected of committing at the time of the warrantless entry 
were not felonies, he contends that Holcroft's entry into his 
garage was not permissible.  We find this argument unpersuasive. 
 
The hot pursuit exception has never explicitly been limited 
to felonies under either the Fourth Amendment or art. 14.  See 
Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 6 ("though Santana [427 U.S.] involved a 
15 
 
felony suspect," Supreme Court "did not expressly limit [the] 
holding based on that fact").  The defendant grounds much of his 
argument in the subsequent United States Supreme Court case of 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 746 n.6, 754 (1984) (defendant 
arrested for OUI but no incarceration possible for first OUI 
offense under Wisconsin law ), which explained that an "extremely 
minor" offense cannot give rise to a constitutional exigency for 
a warrantless entry.  Welsh is readily distinguishable from the 
instant case for at least two reasons.  First, the Supreme Court 
explicitly noted that the doctrine of hot pursuit did not apply 
as "there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the 
petitioner from the scene of a crime."  Id. at 753.  See 
Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 714 (1995) (hot 
pursuit not implicated).  Second, although undoubtedly "more 
than a minor crime must be involved to justify the warrantless 
intrusion into a private residence," Commonwealth v. Kirschner, 
67 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 842-843 (2006), Welsh did not conclude 
that all misdemeanors are minor offenses, but rather only that 
nonjailable offenses are considered such.  See Welsh, 466 U.S. 
at 754. 
 
Therefore, Welsh is not inconsistent with Santana.7  Taken 
together, these cases stand for the proposition that police may 
                     
 
7 An errant string cite in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
750 (1984) incorrectly characterized the holding of United 
16 
 
not make a hot pursuit warrantless entry into a residence of a 
person who is suspected of committing only a minor offense.  
Felonies, such as the one committed in Santana, 427 U.S. at 41-
43, are not minor offenses, but nonjailable misdemeanors, such 
as the one at issue in Welsh, are properly considered to be 
minor.  See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.  See also Kirschner, 67 
Mass. App. Ct. at 842-843 (hot pursuit not implicated and 
warrantless entry impermissible where crime was possession of 
fireworks punishable only by fine); Commonwealth v. Kiser, 48 
Mass. App. Ct. 647, 649-651 (2000) (same, for nonjailable 
"extremely minor" offense of playing loud music). 
 
Here, however, the defendant was not suspected of 
committing a minor offense, but one which was punishable by 
imprisonment of up to two years.  The defendant incorrectly 
cites Welsh and Kirschner for the proposition that every 
misdemeanor necessarily falls into the category of "minor 
offense," and therefore may never form the basis of a hot 
pursuit exigency.  Neither case so held.  The prohibition in 
Welsh of warrantless entry for a minor offense did not embrace 
all misdemeanors.  See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 761 (White, J., 
dissenting) (noting majority did not draw "a bright-line 
distinction between felonies and other crimes"); Gasset v. 
                                                                  
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976), as permitting "hot 
pursuit of a fleeing felon," rather than a fleeing "suspect" 
(emphases added). 
17 
 
State, 490 So. 2d 97, 98-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).  In 
Joyce v. Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1997), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit emphasized the 
very limited sweep of Welsh in stating that "the fact that 
Massachusetts classifies the alleged violation here as a 
misdemeanor does not reduce it to a 'minor offense.'"  Moreover, 
in Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 6, the Supreme Court clarified that 
Welsh did not hold that a "warrantless entry to arrest a 
misdemeanant is never justified," but rather that such entries 
"should be rare."  We conclude that hot pursuit of an individual 
suspected of committing a jailable misdemeanor such as in this 
case is permissible. 
 
Other States have similarly recognized that jailable 
misdemeanors are not minor offenses under Welsh.  See, e.g., 
People v. Thompson, 38 Cal. 4th 811, 821, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
980 (2006) (jailable misdemeanor "not an 'extremely minor' 
offense within the meaning of Welsh"); Peoples v. Wehmas, 246 
P.3d 642, 648 (Colo. 2011) (jailable misdemeanor "sufficiently 
grave offense such that warrantless home entry may be valid"); 
Dyer v. State, 680 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(jailable misdemeanor is "classified as a much more serious 
offense than [the one] in Welsh"), and that an officer may make 
a warrantless entry to arrest when such crimes are committed in 
their presence and they remain in hot pursuit of the suspect.  
18 
 
See, e.g., Gasset, 490 So. 2d at 98-99 (warrantless entry 
justified where police pursued speeding motorist directly into 
garage, as offense was punishable by imprisonment and 
enforcement of serious traffic violations "is not a game where 
law enforcement officers are 'it' and one is 'safe' if one 
reaches 'home' before being tagged"); State v. Keenan, 325 P.3d 
1192, 1200, 1202 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (officer in hot pursuit of 
person suspected of jailable misdemeanor may make warrantless 
entry into suspect's home); State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 264-
268 (Minn. 1996) (same). 
 
Establishing a bright-line rule prohibiting the warrantless 
entry of a home when the underlying offense is of lesser 
magnitude than a felony would send an unacceptable message to 
the defendant who "drinks and drives that a hot pursuit or an 
arrest set in motion can be thwarted by beating police to one's 
door."  Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 268.  We decline to adopt such a 
rule, which runs directly counter to sound public policy.  "Law 
enforcement is not a child's game of prisoners base, or a 
contest, with apprehension and conviction depending upon whether 
the officer or defendant is the fleetest of foot."  State v. 
Ricci, 144 N.H. 241, 245 (1999), quoting State v. Blake, 468 
N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).  Moreover, such a 
categorical distinction would arbitrarily permit perpetrators of 
serious misdemeanors "to avoid punishment merely because of how 
19 
 
the legislature had labelled an infraction."  Paul, 548 N.W.2d 
at 267.  Rather, limiting the hot pursuit exception to felonies 
and jailable misdemeanors appropriately balances the 
constitutional protections of both the Fourth Amendment and 
art. 14 with society's interest in apprehending individuals 
suspected of serious crimes. 
 
Accordingly, Holcroft's actions in entering the defendant's 
garage to effectuate the arrest were lawful.  At the time of the 
warrantless entry he was clearly in hot pursuit of the defendant 
and the defendant was aware of this.  Although Holcroft 
attempted to effectuate a threshold inquiry and set an arrest in 
motion for a jailable misdemeanor in a public setting multiple 
times, the defendant did not comply with his demands and fled to 
his home in an attempt to frustrate the arrest.8 
                     
 
8 The defendant also attempts to argue that hot pursuit is 
not an exigency unto itself where the underlying crime is not 
felonious, but rather additional factors, such as the crime 
being violent or the suspect being armed, must be satisfied in 
order to justify a warrantless entry.  We disagree with this 
contention.  The Supreme Court in Santana "did not refer to hot 
pursuit as only one factor among others."  People v. Wear, 371 
Ill. App. 3d 517, 537 (2007), aff'd, 229 Ill. 2d 545 (2008).  
Rather, "[m]ost courts appear to take Santana's holding at face 
value, treating hot pursuit as an exception unto itself rather 
than as just another factor."  Id.  See, e.g., People v. Lloyd, 
216 Cal. App. 3d 1425, 1429 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1026 
(1990) ("officer's 'hot pursuit' into the house to prevent the 
suspect from frustrating the arrest which had been set in motion 
in a public place constitutes a proper exception to the warrant 
requirement"); State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1984) ("immediate and continuous pursuit from the scene of 
the crime formed the exigent circumstance"); State v. Bell, 28 
20 
 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant contends 
that the evidence was insufficient to establish both the 
underlying OUI charge as well as his two prior convictions.  
When reviewing a claim as to the sufficiency of the evidence we 
consider "whether the evidence, in its light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence 
presented by the defendant, is sufficient . . . to permit the 
jury to infer the existence of the essential elements of the 
crime charged" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 
378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  "Additionally, the evidence and 
the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be of 
sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and 
sagacity to the persuasion of (guilt) beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 677. 
 
a.  Underlying OUI.  In order to be convicted of an OUI, 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.  G. L. c. 90, 
                                                                  
So. 3d 502, 508-510 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing exigent 
circumstances inherent in hot pursuit); Winter v. State, 902 
S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) ("Court has found that 
exigent circumstances exist when the police are in 'hot pursuit' 
of a suspect").  Essentially, hot pursuit, in and of itself, is 
sufficient to justify a warrantless entry.  Santana, 427 U.S. at 
42-43.  See Commonwealth v. Molina, 439 Mass. 206, 210-211 
(2003) (intimating that no warrant needed if "officers were in 
hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect in the immediate aftermath of a 
crime" without mention of additional exigencies). 
21 
 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1).  The defendant and the Commonwealth stipulated 
that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle and that he was 
operating it on a public way.  To establish that the defendant 
was under the influence, "[t]he Commonwealth need not prove that 
the defendant actually drove in an unsafe or erratic manner, but 
it must prove a diminished capacity to operate safely" (emphasis 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173 (1985). 
 
Here, the defendant bore many of the classic indicia of 
impairment.  He was seen departing from a bar late in the 
evening, and, once in his vehicle, he drove erratically, weaved 
and crossed lane markings, made overly wide turns, nearly struck 
a parked vehicle, and refused to comply with police demands to 
stop.  See Commonwealth v. Sauer, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 299, 303 
(2000) (defendant's visit to bar and erratic driving evidence to 
support OUI conviction).  Additionally, given that Holcroft's 
warrantless entry was lawful, his observations of the defendant 
once inside the garage are admissible and the Commonwealth 
appropriately relied on them at trial.  Holcroft testified that 
the defendant was unsteady on his feet, had bloodshot and glassy 
eyes, smelled of alcohol, and slurred his words.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bryer, 398 Mass. 9, 10-11 (1986) (unsteadiness 
and odor of alcohol are factors that support inference of 
diminished capacity to operate safely due to intoxication);  
Commonwealth v. Lavendier, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 506-507 (2011) 
22 
 
(poor balance and glassy, bloodshot eyes are evidence of 
intoxication); Sauer, supra (unsteadiness is evidence of 
intoxication); Commonwealth v. Shabo, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 924 
(1999) (smell of alcohol and slurred speech support finding of 
intoxication). 
 
Additionally, after the defendant fled his home he 
attempted to hide behind a small tree and fought with 
apprehending officers (and then fell asleep and snored during 
booking).  See Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 
318, 321 (1994) (belligerence is evidence of intoxication).  
This evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for a 
required finding of not guilty and adequately supports a 
determination that the defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol at the time he operated his vehicle. 
 
b.  Third offense.  The defendant contends that the two 
docket sheets introduced in evidence were insufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted of 
two prior OUI offenses.  Thus, the defendant claims that there 
was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of a third 
OUI offense.  For the reasons stated below, we disagree. 
 
The sufficiency of docket sheets as evidence of prior 
convictions is well settled in the Commonwealth, see, e.g., 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (4); Commonwealth v. Dussault, 71 Mass. App. 
Ct. 542, 546 (2008) (certified copies of original court papers 
23 
 
prima facie evidence that defendant previously convicted).  
Although docket sheets that simply identify a name are not 
sufficient to prove that past convictions are those of a 
defendant, see Commonwealth v. Koney, 421 Mass. 295, 302 (1995), 
documents that "include more identifying information than merely 
the offender's name" (citation omitted) can be sufficient to 
satisfy the Commonwealth's burden.  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 
74 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 912 (2009).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 447 Mass. 593, 602 (2006); Dussault, supra at 547 
(records matching defendant's full name, date of birth, town of 
residence, and two addresses associated with defendant's name, 
coupled with judicial notice of unusual surname, sufficient). 
 
The Commonwealth advances an argument only for the 
sufficiency of the docket sheet documenting the second 
conviction, as that is all that is necessary to establish that 
the present conviction was the defendant's third.9  See Bowden, 
447 Mass. at 599 ("judgment of conviction for a third offense 
may appropriately be relied on to establish culpability for the 
first two offenses.").  The defendant claims that the second 
docket sheet only reflects his name, date of birth, and an 
address that is no longer his place of residence, and, relying 
                     
 
9 The defendant points out that the person named on the 
criminal docket for the second offense received a first offense 
disposition.  However, the docket shows the defendant was 
charged with OUI, second offense, and the attached order of 
probation conditions lists a disposition of "OUI 2." 
24 
 
in part on an unpublished opinion of the Appeals Court, argues 
that this information is insufficient.  We disagree. 
 
The docket sheets for the second offense bore the same 
first name, unusual surname, middle initial, and date of birth 
as the defendant's driver's license.  See Dussault, 71 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 547.  Although the address listed on the docket was 
a different local address than the one appearing on the 
defendant's license, the certified copy of the "Order of 
Probation Conditions" for this offense was signed the same day 
as the conviction and identified the defendant by the address 
that appeared on his license (and matched all the other personal 
information from the criminal docket).  Accordingly, the 
complete set of records for the OUI second offense conviction 
matched the defendant's full name, address, and date of birth.  
See Gonsalves, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 912; Dussault, supra at 547.  
Viewing such evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, we are persuaded that it provides a satisfactory 
connection between the defendant and the individual who was 
convicted of OUI, second offense, and is therefore sufficient to 
uphold the defendant's conviction of OUI, third offense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.