Title: Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-136-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 2001

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a majority Court. This appeal addresses the contention of the New Jersey State Parole Board that the Appellate Division committed error in reversing its decision to deny parole to Thomas Trantino. The Court upholds the reversal of the Parole Board's decision to deny parole, but modifies the Appellate Division's judgment by ordering that Trantino's parole shall be subject to the pre-release condition of satisfactory completion of a twelve-month halfway house placement. After his conviction, Trantino was originally sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence in 1965. In 1972, this Court concluded that a United States Supreme Court opinion effectively declared our death penalty statute unconstitutional. This Court also determined that pursuant to prevailing law at that time, defendants in those cases where the death penalty was imposed would be sentenced to life imprisonment as of the date of the imposition of their death sentences. The 1979 Parole Act expressly provides that the parole eligibility date for inmates sentenced to life under the law in effect when Trantino's crimes were committed is to be determined in accordance with the former parole act of 1948. Under that statute, defendants sentenced to life imprisonment become eligible for parole after twenty- five years, less deductions for commutation time and work credits. When this Court first had occasion to address Trantino's eligibility for parole in 1982 (Trantino II), it acknowledged that he first became eligible in 1979. The Court also recognized that the standard governing the grant of parole under the 1979 Act is that inmates shall be released on parole unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime if released. Therefore, the critical and controlling question in this appeal is whether a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record supports the Parole Board's determination that there is a substantial likelihood that Trantino will commit a crime if released on parole. A summary of the Parole Board's dispositions of Trantino's prior efforts to achieve parole provides a context for the Court's review of the evidence considered by the Board. Operating under the former parole statute, the Board denied Trantino's applications for parole in 1979 and 1980 on the ground that the punitive aspect of the sentence had not been satisfied. Later in 1980, in a proceeding under the 1979 Parole Act, Trantino was approved for parole subject to conditions, including intensive supervision and restitution to the victims' families in an amount to be fixed by the sentencing court. After the sentencing court declined to fix restitution, that and other issues were appealed. In this Court's opinion in 1982 (Trantino II), the Court held that the Board was obligated to establish specific criteria to guide the sentencing court in determining the amount of restitution. It also authorized the Board to reconsider and redetermine Trantino's fitness for parole. On remand, the Parole Board held a new hearing that resulted in the denial of Trantino's parole application and the imposition of a ten-year future eligibility term (FET). In announcing this determination in October 1982, the Board Chairman explained to Trantino that on completion of the ten-year FET, the punitive aspect of the sentence would be considered fulfilled, and Trantino would be presumptively eligible for parole. In 1988, when the ten-year FET, less credits, had been served, a panel of the Board recommended parole release. However, a majority of the full Parole Board voted to deny parole and imposed a six-year FET, apparently on the basis of Trantino's unwillingness to participate in drug counseling or long-term psychotherapy. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Board denied parole again in October 1991, concluding that Trantino had not yet sufficiently achieved rehabilitation. The Board specifically recommended that the Department of Corrections place Trantino in a halfway house to permit the Board to evaluate his behavior in a less-structured environment. Trantino promptly requested the Superintendent of Riverfront State Prison to authorize transfer to a halfway house. The Superintendent denied that request in 1992. When Trantino's parole application was considered again in 1992, a panel of the Board indicated that they saw no persuasive reasons for Corrections to deny halfway house status. One member recommended that Trantino file suit against Corrections. In December 1993, the full Board concluded that Trantino had reached his rehabilitative potential within his current prison setting. It concluded, however, that Trantino could not be judged to have achieved his full rehabilitative potential and satisfy the punitive aspect of his sentence unless he successfully entered and completed a correctional halfway house program. Consistent with the Board's findings, Trantino again applied to Corrections for transfer to a halfway house. His requests were denied in February 1994. A June 1995 letter from the Administrator of Riverfront Prison explained that the denial was based on threats to kill Trantino if such a transfer occurred, the circumstances of his offense, possible adverse community reaction, and the objection of a member of the Legislature. Trantino again applied for parole in September 1994, which was denied by a panel of the Board in April 1995. The panel explained that although Trantino had made enormous progress in the 30 years of his incarceration, he had not reached his full rehabilitative potential and therefore the punitive aspect of his sentence had not been satisfied. The full Board denied Trantino's appeals from the panel determinations in April 1995. Another adult panel of the Board denied Trantino parole in September 1995. Although acknowledging the great strides made by Trantino toward achieving his rehabilitative potential, the panel primarily based its denial on Trantino's failure to remember certain aspects of the crimes. The panel noted the Board's prior recommendations that Trantino be placed in a halfway house, but the panel determined that Trantino could also achieve his rehabilitative potential through long term psychological counseling. In April 1996, the full Board voted to impose another ten-year FET, primarily based on its conclusion that Trantino's inability to recall details of the crimes evidenced a lack of candor and credibility that suggested a likelihood of future criminal activity. A divided panel of the Appellate Division upheld the Board's denial of parole and imposition of a ten-year FET. (Trantino III.) However, the Appellate Division noted the Board's consistent position that it could not prudently grant parole before Trantino's performance in a halfway house or residential facility could be evaluated, and concluded that Corrections' denial of the request for halfway house placement was not supported by a final determination with an adequate statement of reasons. The Appellate Division therefore remanded to Corrections for consideration of an updated application for transfer to a halfway house. The dissenting judge would have directed Corrections to place Trantino in a pre-parole halfway house or residential facility forthwith. Trantino filed an appeal with this Court based on the dissent. In a unanimous opinion filed in May 1998, (Trantino IV), this Court affirmed that portion of the Appellate Division judgment holding that Corrections' refusal to transfer Trantino to a halfway house was not supported by an adequate statement of reasons. However, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment upholding the Board's denial of parole and fixing a ten-year FET, concluding that that decision was not based on a proper standard and was not supported by sufficient evidence and findings of fact. The Court noted the most recent reports of the two evaluating psychologists concluding there was a likelihood of a successful parole outcome, and held that the record did not provide an adequate evidentiary basis for the Board's rejection of these findings. The Court also held that in light of the evidence and given the length of Trantino's sentence and the successive occasions on which he had been deemed eligible for parole, punishment was no longer a material consideration in the parole determination. The Court directed the Board to reconsider the parole application applying the appropriate standard - whether there was a likelihood Trantino would engage in criminal activity if released on parole. Immediately following this Court's decision, Trantino renewed his request for transfer to a halfway house. Corrections moved Trantino to Talbot Hall in Kearny to screen him for placement in a halfway house assignment. Numerous public officials protested the transfer. A statement by the Office of the Governor expressed surprise over the transfer and requested that the Attorney General review the transfer. The Attorney General requested a new psychological evaluation to consider the propriety of Trantino's assignment to Talbot Hall. In November 1998, Talbot Hall's Community Classification Committee found Trantino ineligible for halfway house treatment, in part because it found that he presented an escape risk and had an unresolved substance abuse problem. Trantino was transferred to an out-of-State medium security prison with a recommendation that he be assigned to a substance abuse program. Trantino's application for enrollment in such a program at the facility was rejected when his score on an addiction severity test was substantially below the minimum required for participation. The Parole Board denied Trantino parole on the remand on June 9, 1999, primarily on five grounds: his psychological profile, as reflected in the testimony of the Board's chief psychologist, of a borderline personality disorder that made him potentially violent; the lack of a suitable parole plan; a failure to address in psychological counseling the issues that led him to engage in domestic violence; a history of being less than candid with the Board and psychologists about his past; and his plans to write another book. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the record did not contain sufficient credible evidence to support the Board's conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood Trantino would commit another crime if released. It ordered Corrections to transfer Trantino to a halfway house immediately, and that Trantino be paroled within 30-days, with whatever post-release conditions the Board deemed appropriate. The Board filed a petition for certification, and Trantino cross-petitioned. This Court granted the petition and cross-petition, and stayed the judgment of the Appellate Division pending disposition of the appeals. HELD: The Parole Board's denial of parole is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record and cannot be sustained. Trantino's release on parole, however, shall be subject to a pre-release condition of satisfactory completion of twelve months placement in a halfway house facility. The Department of Corrections is ordered to transfer Trantino to a halfway house facility within thirty days. 1. Judicial review of the Parole Board's denial of parole requires the Court to examine: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policy (did the agency follow the law?); (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. In this appeal, the focus is on the second prong of that three-part standard. (Pp. 87-92) 2. The Board's heavy reliance on Trantino's inconsistent testimony about the extent of his recollection of the homicides, and its finding that his memory loss is not genuine, reflects the Board's conclusion that Trantino can never be paroled until he sufficiently recalls the details of the Lodi murders. In Trantino IV, this Court expressly held that the Board could not deny parole until psychological treatment resulted in a restoration of Trantino's recollection. In view of this holding, the Board's reliance on Trantino's inadequate recollection of the details of his crimes constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. The Court also concludes that the Board's reliance on evidence relating to remote events that occurred prior to the 1963 murders was arbitrary and capricious. In the view of the Court, the Board's reliance on evidence of such remote events was a makeweight to compensate for the lack of substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusions. Moreover, the Board's insistence on the relevance of such evidence substantially undermined the deference courts ordinarily confer on agency decisions.(Pp. 92-105). 3. The sufficiency of the evidence relating to Trantino's psychological profile is of critical significance to the Court's disposition. The Board relied heavily on the 1999 testimony of Dr. Ferguson, the Board's chief psychologist, that Trantino possesses a borderline personality disorder that makes Mr. Trantino a particularly dangerous individual. In doing so, the Board's decision effectively disregarded the numerous psychological evaluations in the record that supported parole. Of the fifty-plus psychological evaluations of Trantino in the record, Dr. Ferguson was the only one to diagnose Trantino with a borderline personality disorder. The Board accorded no weight to the 1999 evaluations of two other psychologists who submitted reports to the Board -- Dr. Welner, who was retained by the Attorney General, and Dr. Rosenfeld, Trantino's expert. Both concluded that Trantino presented a low risk of recidivism. The Board also disregarded Dr. Ferguson's three prior evaluations (one as recent as 1998) which were strongly supportive of parole, as well as the thirty-five psychological evaluations of Trantino from 1979 to 1997, the vast majority of which supported parole. In addition, the Board relied marginally on the testimony of four other witnesses who testified in November 1999 before the Board concerning Trantino's future eligibility term, five months after the Board issued its decision denying parole. The Court is convinced that the Board should have accorded less weight to such testimony because: the Board had decided to deny parole several months before any of those witnesses testified; three witnesses had never examined or interviewed Trantino; and none expressed an opinion about the substantial likelihood of Trantino committing another crime. The Board's highly selective focus only on the psychological evidence supportive of its denial of parole and its total disregard of evidence favorable to parole, undermines the deference that a court ordinarily would confer on an agency determination. The Court finds that on this record, there exists no doubt that the Board's finding that Trantino was substantially likely to commit a crime was not based, as the Parole Act requires, on a preponderance of the evidence, but rather on the Board's selective and arbitrary reliance on only those portions of the record that could possibly support the Board's conclusion. (Pp. 105-121) 4. The Court is persuaded, however, that Trantino's parole should not occur in thirty days as contemplated by the Appellate Division's judgment. Instead, the Court concludes that Trantino's parole should be subject to a pre-release condition of satisfactory completion of twelve months placement in a halfway house facility. This conclusion is supported by numerous prior decisions of the Parole Board as well as numerous psychological evaluation reports in the record. In addition, the Court notes that the Department of Corrections' regulations subject inmates placed in halfway houses to urine monitoring, breathalyser testing, and disciplinary rules that regulate, among other subjects, unauthorized absences and out- of-State travel. (Pp. 121-125) 5. The Court does not underestimate the pain and anguish its disposition is likely to cause to families and friends of the victims of the Lodi murders. The Court is also aware that the disposition will not be readily understood by members of the public who will find it incomprehensible that the law requires parole release of an inmate who was responsible for the murder of two police officers. Although parole release would be impossible if the murders were committed today, the law in effect when these crimes were committed was different. Under that law, once the punitive aspect of a sentence had been served, Trantino had a right to parole unless the State could prove a substantial likelihood that he would commit another crime. It is the absence of that proof that entitles Trantino to parole, not sympathy or compassion for him. Portions of this record can be read to suggest that under the law, Trantino was eligible for transfer to a halfway house and subsequent release several years ago, but that public pressure prevented that from occurring. No matter how great the pressure, agencies of government cannot ignore the law in special cases. (Pp. 125-128) Judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and AFFIRMED. APPELLATE DIVISION JUDGE BAIME, temporarily assigned, dissents, noting that the decision of the Parole Board is entitled to deference and that the Court's scope of review is limited. He is of the view that applying the appropriate standards, the decision of the Parole Board to deny parole should not be disturbed. JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, and JUDGE HAVEY, temporarily assigned, join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. JUDGE BAIME, temporarily assigned, filed a separate, dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI did not participate. THOMAS TRANTINO, Appellant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. THOMAS TRANTINO, Appellant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Argued September 25, 2000 -- Decided January 18, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 331 N.J. Super. 577 (2000). Howard J. McCoach, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants and cross- respondents (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mary C. Jacobson and Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel). Roger A. Lowenstein argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant. crimes: The brutality of those crimes, whose victims were a Lodi police sergeant and a police trainee, unquestionably is seared not only in the memories of the victims' families and friends but also in the consciousness of society. From the standpoint of retribution, perhaps no prison sentence, whatever its length, is sufficiently severe. [Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 43-33]. Thus, our decision today is mandated not by the belief that Trantino has been punished enough, but rather by the rule of law and the lack of substantial evidence in the record to support the Parole Board's decision. Citizens of New Jersey old enough to recall the circumstances of respondent's brutal murder of Lodi Police Sergeant Peter Voto and Lodi police trainee Gary Tedesco in August 1963 may be astonished to learn that respondent is eligible under the law for parole consideration. Under today's laws, a defendant convicted of the murder of a police officer in the line of duty would face a minimum sentence of life imprisonment without any possibility of parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 3b(2). That law, enacted by our Legislature in 1997, L. 1997, c. 60, reflects our contemporary society's belief that the murderer of a police officer should never be released from prison irrespective of the extent of his rehabilitation during his years of incarceration. If that statute had been in effect in 1963 when those homicides were committed, Trantino never would be eligible to be paroled from prison. Significantly, we note that most of our sister states also have enacted laws, all within the past thirty years, increasing sentences for those who murder police officers.See footnote 11 That such laws did not exist in New Jersey or in other states in 1963 is attributable to the criminal sentencing philosophy that prevailed throughout the nation during the nineteen-fifties and sixties, and reflected the view then expressed by the United States Supreme Court that [r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, 93 L. Ed. 1337, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1084 (1949). The Parole Board, represented by the Attorney General, acknowledges that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, 9, par.3, prohibits the application to respondent of New Jersey's current statute mandating life imprisonment without parole for those convicted of murdering a police officer in the line of duty. Accordingly, the law in effect in 1963 when the murders were committed, supplemented by the Parole Act of 1979, L. 1979, c. 441, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123-45 to -69, is the source of law that governs respondent's eligibility for parole today. Pursuant to the law then in effect, N.J.S.A. 2A:113-4 (repealed), Trantino was sentenced to death based on his conviction for first-degree murder. That statute had provided that the penalty for first-degree murder was death unless the jury recommended life imprisonment. In 1965 this Court unanimously upheld his conviction and death sentence. Trantino I, supra, 44 N.J. at 371. In 1972, on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968), this Court concluded that the United States Supreme Court has declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional under our statute. State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 67 (1972), cert. denied sub. nom. New Jersey v. Presha, 408 U.S. 942, 33 L. Ed. 2d 766, 92 S. Ct. 2849 (1972). Because of the United States Supreme Court's decision that effectively invalidated New Jersey's death penalty statute, this Court determined that the defendant in Funicello, and the defendants in all the other [cases] in which the death sentence was imposed, 60 N.J. at 68, would be sentenced to life imprisonment . . . as of the date the death sentence was initially imposed, and would be entitled to the same credits as if initially sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 67-68See footnote 22. Pursuant to the law prevailing in New Jersey at that time, no more severe sentence could have been imposed after the death penalty was invalidated. The 1979 Parole Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(j), expressly provides that the primary parole eligibility date for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment under the law in effect when Trantino's crimes were committed is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the former parole act, L. 1948, c. 84. Pursuant to that statute, defendants sentenced to life imprisonment became eligible for parole after twenty-five years, less deductions for commutation time and work credits. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.11 (repealed) ( Any prisoner serving a sentence of life shall be eligible for consideration for release on parole after having served twenty-five years of his sentence, less commutation time for good behavior and time credits earned and allowed by reason of diligent application to work assignments ). Accordingly, when this Court first had occasion to address Trantino's eligibility for parole, Trantino II, supra, 89 N.J. 347, we acknowledged that Trantino first became eligible for parole in 1979. Id. at 352. That fact was uncontested. We also recognized in Trantino II, id. at 366, that the standard governing the grant of parole under the 1979 Act is that inmates eligible for parole shall be released on parole at the time of parole eligibility, unless [it is shown] by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime . . . if released on parole at such time. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123-53. Accordingly, the critical and controlling question in this appeal is whether a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record supports the Parole Board's determination that there is a substantial likelihood that Trantino will commit a crime if he is released on parole. A summary of the Parole Board's dispositions of Trantino's prior efforts to achieve parole status will provide a context for our review of the evidence considered by the Parole Board. Trantino first became eligible for parole consideration in 1979. Operating under the former parole statute, the Parole Board denied his first parole application in 1979, and denied a second application in April 1980 on the ground that the punitive aspect of this sentence has not been satisfied. Trantino II, supra, 89 N.J. at 353. In June 1980, in a parole proceeding conducted under the current parole law, L. 1979, c. 441, a single Board member sitting as a hearing officer recommended parole, finding no substantial likelihood [of future criminal conduct]. Id. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55b, the Board's Chairman affirmed the hearing officer's recommendation and approved parole release effective August 12, 1980, subject to conditions, including intensive supervision and restitution to the victims' families in an amount to be fixed by the sentencing court. Trantino II, supra, 89 N.J. at 353-54. After the Law Division declined to fix the amount of restitution, the Parole Board vacated its earlier release order and then established a new release date of December 23, 1980, again subject to restitution as a special condition. Simultaneously, the Board appealed the Law Division's order declining to fix restitution, and Trantino appealed from the Board's December 1980 decision reimposing restitution as a condition of parole. The Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's order declining to fix an amount for restitution and reversed the Board's December 1980 decision reimposing restitution as a condition of parole. In re Parole Application of Thomas Trantino, 177 N.J. Super. 499, 521-23 (App. Div. 1981). This Court granted both the Board's and Trantino's petitions for certification. In re Parole Application of Thomas Trantino, 87 N.J. 385 (1981). We held that although restitution lawfully may be imposed as a condition of parole under the Parole Act of 1979, the Board's perception of the scope of restitution was much too imprecise and broad and that the Board was obligated to establish specific criteria to guide and limit the sentencing court's determination of the amount of restitution to be paid. Trantino II, supra, 89 N.J. at 361-63. We also noted the substantial difference in sentencing philosophies between the Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1- 1 to 104-8, and the provisions of Title 2A under which Trantino was sentenced, observing that although inmates sentenced under the Code presumptively will have satisfied the punitive aspects of their sentences when first becoming eligible for parole, that may not be the case for inmates sentenced under Title 2A. Id. at 370. Accordingly, in remanding the matter to the Parole Board we required the Board to reassess the punitive aspects of Trantino's sentence in considering the extent of his rehabilitation and his fitness for parole. Id. at 373. We also noted that public outrage over an imminent parole determination, such as that which has occurred in this case, has no place in a parole proceeding and is to be given no weight in a parole decision. Id. at 376. Finally, we held that the Parole Board is authorized to reconsider and redetermine Trantino's fitness for parole. . . . If the Board determines that Trantino has not been punished sufficiently and, for that reason, as well as any others, it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood of future criminal activity if he is released, the Parole Board must deny Trantino parole. Id. at 377. On remand, the Parole Board held a new hearing resulting in the denial of Trantino's parole application and the imposition of a ten-year future eligibility term (FET). In announcing its determination in October 1982, the Parole Board Chairman explained to Trantino that upon completion of the ten-year future eligibility term, less commutation and work credits, the punitive aspect of Trantino's sentence would be considered to be fulfilled. According to the Board Chairman, the Board concluded that the punitive aspect of Trantino's life sentence as a Title 2A prisoner should be approximately equal to the twenty-five year parole ineligibility period imposed on a Title 2C life-sentenced prisoner. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(c). Accordingly, the Board Chairman encouraged Trantino to assume that after serving twenty- five years in prison (1963-1988) he would be presumptively eligible for parole unless through [aberrant] behavior you were to do something that gave rise to its reconsideration. See footnote 33 The Adult Panel is of the opinion that if Mr. Trantino can successfully enter and complete a correctional halfway house program as an inmate he can achieve his full rehabilitative potential and therefore will satisfy the punitive aspect of his sentence and meet the substantial likelihood test. [Id. at 453-54 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).] Consistent with the Parole Board's express findings, in November 1993, and again in January 1994, Trantino applied to the Department of Corrections for transfer to a halfway house. Those requests were denied in February 1994. A June 1995 letter from the Administrator of Riverfront prison explained that the denial was based on the receipt of threats to kill Trantino if he were placed in a halfway house, the circumstances of the offense, the risk of possible adverse community reaction, and the objection of a member of the Legislature.See footnote 55 The Adult Panel is aware that a different Board Panel determined at your parole hearing on November 12, 1993 that you had reached your rehabilitative potential within the confines of prison and that your progress toward real and not superficial rehabilitation could only be maintained by placement in a halfway house as an inmate. You have attempted on numerous occasions to be placed in a halfway house as an inmate. The Department of Corrections has continually denied you placement into a halfway house. While this Adult Panel believes placement of you into a halfway house would be beneficial to you in your goal to reach your rehabilitative potential, it is this Panel's determination that certainly this is not the only means by which you can achieve this goal. It is this Panel's position that you can eventually reach this goal through long term psychological counseling in an institutional setting. [Trantino III, supra, 296 N.J. Super. at 458-59 (emphasis added).] In April 1996 the full Parole Board voted to impose a ten- year future eligibility term. In the interim, the Appellate Division reinstated Trantino's appeal from the Board's 1993 and 1994 dispositions, and permitted Trantino also to challenge the Board's most recent denial of parole in 1995. A divided Appellate Division panel upheld the Parole Board's denial of parole and imposition of a ten-year FET primarily on the basis of the Board's conclusion that Trantino's inability to recall details of the crimes evidenced a lack of candor or credibility that suggested a likelihood of future criminal activity if Trantino were released on parole. Id. at 466-71. However, the Appellate Division majority emphasized the consistent position of the Board that it cannot prudently grant parole to a long-term prisoner, convicted of a crime such as murder, before performance in a halfway house or residential facility can be thoroughly evaluated. Id. at 465. Accordingly, after concluding that the Department of Corrections' denial of Trantino's request for halfway house placement was not supported by a final determination with an adequate statement of reasons, the Appellate Division remanded the matter to the DOC for consideration of an updated application for halfway house (or out-of-State transfer) and for findings and a statement of reasons with regard to such application. Id. at 464. Judge Pressler, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the remand to the DOC but would have directed the DOC forthwith to place defendant Thomas Trantino in a pre-parole halfway house or residential facility or to effect his out-of- State placement. Id. at 471 (Pressler, P.J.A.D., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She added: In the absence of such prompt action by the Department, I would remand to the Parole Board for its prompt consideration of parole-release conditions including, if a pre-release halfway house placement is not possible, then a closely monitored post- release placement as well as such other parole conditions as the Board concludes are necessary and appropriate. I would so do because I am persuaded that the record overwhelmingly demonstrates the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of both the Department's denial of halfway house or out-of-state placement and the Parole Board's decision, responsive to that denial, to deny parole and impose a ten-year future eligibility term. [Ibid.] Trantino appealed as of right to this Court, R. 2:2-1(a)(2), based on the dissent below. In a unanimous opinion, we affirmed that portion of the Appellate Division judgment holding that the Department of Corrections' refusal to transfer Trantino to a halfway house was not supported by an adequate statement of reasons. Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 154 N.J. 19, 22 (1998) (Trantino IV). We reversed the Appellate Division judgment upholding the Parole Board's denial of parole and fixing a ten-year FET based on our conclusion that the Board's decision was not based on a proper standard and supported by sufficient evidence and adequate findings of fact. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court clarified the standard governing Trantino's parole eligibility and remanded the matter to the Parole Board to reconsider the evidence and redetermine Trantino's eligibility for parole. Ibid. We specifically noted that although the Parole Board did not ignore recidivism as a criterion of parole fitness, its most recent decisions appeared to focus on whether Trantino had made sufficient progress toward 'reintegration into society,' was 'fully rehabilitated,' had realized 'his real rehabilitative potential,' had reached his 'true and full rehabilitative potential,' and had achieved 'real and not superficial rehabilitation' and 'complete[] and total[] rehabilitat[ion].' Id. at 30. Accordingly, we determined that the record was unclear on whether the Parole Board invoked a test that focuses primarily and essentially on the likelihood of criminal recidivism or whether it followed the more exacting and difficult test of full or complete rehabilitation that assures not only that an inmate will continue to lead a law-abiding life, but also that he or she will assume a responsible role in society consistent with the public welfare. [Id. at 32.] In our opinion we commented extensively on the evidence in the record suggesting that Trantino's rehabilitation in prison was sufficient to indicate a low likelihood of recidivism. We stated: Proceedings on Remand to the Parole Board A. Introduction Immediately following this Court's May 1998 decision reversing the Parole Board's denial of parole and imposition of a ten-year FET, and remanding for a new parole determination consistent with this Court's opinion, Trantino renewed his request for transfer to a halfway house in anticipation of his new parole hearing. Department of Correction regulations require that, prior to transfer to a halfway house, inmates must undergo a risk/needs assessment at one of two residential substance- abuse treatment centers under contract with DOC, and be approved for transfer by the Institutional Classification Committee (I.C.C.). See N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.4, 4.5 and 10A:9-31. After an evaluation by a DOC psychologist in July 1998 found Trantino suitable for halfway-house placement, the Riverfront State Prison I.C.C. recommended that Trantino be transferred to Talbot Hall in Kearny, one of the residential treatment centers that screened inmates prior to halfway-house assignment. The Assistant Commissioner of DOC approved the recommendation and Trantino was transferred to Talbot HallSee footnote 66 on August 18, 1998. At the June 9, 1999 hearing, Board member Gomez criticized Trantino's intention to write a second book. MR. GOMEZ: The problem is basically the victims, once again, are going to suffer. You know what it is, you are going to suffer. You say you suffer about Charlee [Trantino's second wife], you don't want to hear people talk about the[m], but you are willing to write a book - MR. TRANTINO: No. MR. GOMEZ: --And have people suffer again. MR. TRANTINO: No, I am not willing to do that, and that is not my intention. If I try to write a book again, and it certainly wouldn't be about their families, their family members. MR. GOMEZ: You are missing the point. MR. TRANTINO: I am getting the point, but it's not _ MR. GOMEZ: You are profiting, you are profiting. MR. TRANTINO: Yes, profiting from a crime. MR. GOMEZ: You are talking about putting salt in people's wounds. You don't think that is putting salt in people's wounds? MR. TRANTINO: Yes. MR. GOMEZ: It's as simple as that. MR. TRANTINO: I was not thinking about that. MR. GOMEZ: The last question. Board Member Gomez's criticism: MR. TRANTINO: What I was thinking of was Charlee and Charlee's debt that she has and trying to do something about that. MR. CONSOVOY: Now _ MR. TRANTINO: And a book, now the book I'm taking very seriously what Mr. Gomez said and what you are saying here. MR. CONSOVOY: Please do. MR. TRANTINO: I never, it does - I have expressed this to you over many times about the families here, it really does hurt me, I had a mother, that could have been my mother, it could have just been the opposite thing, I know the sorrow that the kind of feelings they have, I wouldn't want to hurt them. What I would be doing would not be to hurt them. MR. CONSOVOY: But that's one point, and as I say that's why you have to in or out of the prison, where ever you may go when we are done with today, you must deal with this narcissistic diagnosis and the features thereof, because that's what that is, Tom. I am not saying you meant to hurt them, you don't mean to hurt them, but the way you look at things that's how you looked at it. You were doing a good thing for Charlee. On the other hand, you were ruining - MR. TRANTINO: I don't know. hearing, he stated: What you just said bothered me a lot, about the families. It just brought up stuff, you know, I work on that, and it hurts. I don't want to hurt them. And now I have to - I am going to rethink about the book. After what you and Mr. Gomez pointed out, that bothered me a lot. I, more than anything, I'm sorry for what I did, I shot and killed two people. And it wasn't only their lives I took, their families, their families as well were affected right to this day, as you are pointing out here. And that is something that I try to live with, I try to deal with, I try to heal, I am ashamed of that. 2. Lack of Candor The Board listed seven examples of when Trantino has been less than candid with authorities or psychologists or [has mitigated] central events [in his] life or aspects of [his] personality. (a) The Talbot Hall Incident In February 1999 the Parole Board conducted an interview by telephone with Joseph Trabucco, the Director of psychological testing at Talbot Hall, whose qualifications include a master's degree in psychology. In September 1998, after numerous public officials had protested Trantino's assignment to Talbot Hall, Trabucco administered to Trantino a 175 question true-false test known as the MCMI-II, the result of which suggested that Trantino possessed a mild to moderate psychological dysfunction and stated that [a]lthough violence is not a major characteristic of this inmate's behavioral repertoire, there may be occasions when violence can be provoked, although not readily. Trabucco described Trantino as a very controlled individual, thinks about what he's saying, thinks about who he's speaking to, calculating if you will. In response to Board Chairman Consovoy's question concerning any specific types of instances that might provoke him to violence, Trabucco related an incident that the Board deemed significant in assessing Trantino's likelihood of recidivism. Trabucco stated that in September 1998 he tested Trantino about substance abuse only on the basis of events during the preceding year, and the test result revealed no substance abuse problem. Trantino was then asked to retake the same test, this time responding on the basis of his entire lifetime. According to Trabucco, Trantino became sort of agitated and definitely perturbed. He said Why are you making me do this? Trabucco stated that Trantino's veneer . . . started to _ to crack a little bit, and described the incident in the following manner: His face was kind of red, he was slightly more animated and agitated. And he said, You know, I know it's not you, Mr. Trabucco, but, you know, those guys at corrections, they're out to get me. And he went into this kind of spiel about how it wasn't me that was making him take this test, but other people, and they were going to take the results and do what they wanted to do anyway. And we got him to sit down again, and then he got up the third time and was then agitated enough, now again, I didn't feel threatened, I didn't feel, you know, that he was going to hit me or anything, but he--it was the only time in this whole experience here when I--when I sensed that that veneer had cracked to some extent. He was highly animated and agitated, took his glasses off, was sort of pacing, was a very different Mr. Trantino then [sic] I think most people get to see. And--and well, he didn't take--the outcome was we didn't--we couldn't get him to sit down and take the other part of the test, and I'm not sure it mattered much in the long run anyway. But as I look back and look at the results of the testing and his experience here, I mean I think what--what it indicated to me was, that when--when you put him in a situation, when you press him, or put him in a situation he doesn't feel in control or totally comfortable with, you begin--you begin to see this other side of--of this person, which, you know, the cool calculated responses tend to vanish, and the agitation sets in. [Trantino V, supra, 331 N.J. Super. at 589.] Cynthia Smarook, an assessment counselor at Talbot Hall, who was interviewed by the Parole Board's executive director, confirmed Trabucco's characterization of the incident. Smarook also reported that during Trantino's stay at Talbot Hall, he was controlled, he was polite, he was cooperative, he was actually rather chatty, and had not exhibited any prior agitation, other than the incident. When told that Trantino later denied the incident, Smarook responded that: [H]e's either lying or it - it happened fairly quickly and he just completely put it out of his mind that - that it occurred. I don't - I can't tell whether or not he is deliberately lying about it. It - it was fairly quick before he was told he didn't have to take it based on the - the same stipulations as the rest of the population who does. At his June 4, 1999 hearing before the Parole Board, Chairman Consovoy, without mentioning Trabucco, referred to an incident at Talbot Hall during which Trantino became agitated and quite perturbed. Trantino denied that any such incident had occurred. Between the June 4 and June 9, 1999 Parole Board hearings Trantino apparently was shown a copy of Dr. Rosenfeld's report that referred to the Trabucco incident. At the June 9 hearing, when Trantino again was asked about the incident by Consovoy, with specific reference by name to Trabucco, Trantino explained his earlier denial and recounted his version of what had occurred: [On June 4] [y]ou didn't mention Mr. Or [sic] Dr., I think he is a psychologist, Tribucco [sic]. I know the incident now, there was a woman psychologist, she went to give me a test, and I am saying this is not appropriate, and it was in this computer room. Other people were there, including Dr. Trabucco was in the back, and I just turned to him, I said, Doctor, could you help out over here. And he said what's the problem? I stated the problem and he told her that this man is in remission, he does not have to take that test, that's what he said, not whatever is said there actually, that's not what happened. Now I might have been perturbed, certainly I was perturbed, but not angry, I was able to talk to him and he straightened it out. He said I didn't have to take it, that I am right. The man is in remission, he took the other test, all these other tests, he is okay, throw that away. That is what he said to that woman. [Id. at 597.] Nevertheless, in its decision denying parole the Parole Board relied on Trantino's inconsistent responses on June 4 and June 9 concerning the Trabucco incident as evidencing a lack of candor that was germane to Trantino's likelihood of recidivism: The record indicates that you became upset when asked to participate in the SASSI Test at Talbot Hall in September, 1998. At your two member Panel hearing on June 4, 1999, you denied that this event ever occurred. At your full Parole [B]oard hearing less than a week later, you admit something did happen, but denied it happened as was reflected in statements Chairman Consovoy read to you (a statement provided by Mr. Trabucco who conducted the testing). This exchange is reflected in Pages 234 through Page 236 of the June 9, 1999 hearing transcript. In the opinion of the Parole Board you have been less than candid about this incident and the Board finds the statements of Mr. Trabucco and Dr. Smarouk [sic], the two individuals who conducted the test, to be more credible than your statement regarding this incident. [Id. at 612.] (b) Trantino's Lack of Candor Concerning the Murders of Voto and Tedesco At the June 9, 1999 Parole Board Hearing, Chairman Consovoy questioned Trantino about his responsibility for the murders. MR. CONSOVOY: [W]hen [Rosenfeld] says regardless of whether or not you actually fired the gun, did you fire the gun? MR. TRANTINO: Yes, I shot and killed both men. MR. CONSOVOY: You're sure? MR. TRANTINO: I am sure. MR. CONSOVOY : Okay. And whether or not there was ever any evidence that you shot Gary Tedesco it is your position that you did? MR. TRANTINO: Yes. In its decision denying parole, the Parole Board referred to prior occasions in 1964, 1967, 1980, 1982, 1995, and 1998 in which Trantino claimed that he did not recall pulling the trigger and committing the murders. The Board concluded that Trantino's inconsistent testimony about whether he recalled committing the murders constituted an additional basis for denying parole: This issue appears now to be a moot issue in light of your statement at your June 9, 1999 hearing that you are now sure that you shot and killed both individuals. The Supreme Court also stated that there was evidence that your memory loss is consistent, long standing, and genuine. With all due respect to the State Supreme Court, the Parole Board, based on a review of your entire record, does not find your claims of past memory loss as consistent or genuine. The issue at this time for the Parole Board is not whether you have made a sincere avowal of responsibility for commission of these offenses. [It is] the [sic] opinion of the Parole Board that you have sincerely claimed responsibility. The issue is rather, in the opinion of the Parole Board, that you have not been candid in the past with psychologists or Board Members regarding your memory of that night and this lack of candidness on a central issue to you is part of an ongoing pattern of deception you have exhibited with authorities. (c) Trantino's Actions on Parole in New York In its June 1999 decision denying parole, the Parole Board quoted from portions of Trantino's May 25, 1961 hearing before the New York State Parole Board that resulted in his parole from prison in New York in June 1961. The Board observed that Trantino would reward the faith the New York paroling authority placed in you by returning to committing burglaries, using and abusing alcohol and narcotics, associating with criminals wanted for murder (including harboring those individuals), and ultimately slaughtering two police officers in the Angel Lounge in Lodi, New Jersey on August 25, 1963. In his testimony before the Board in June 1999, Trantino acknowledged that while on parole in New York he failed to report as required, had quit his job, and was living at an unauthorized address. The Board also noted that during this period Trantino was consorting with known criminals and had on one occasion directed his wife to lie to his parole officer concerning his whereabouts. Based on that record testimony revealing Trantino's breach of his obligations to New York parole authorities from 1961 to 1963, the Parole Board concluded that Trantino's conduct during that period also reflected a lack of candor justifying denial of parole: It is clear based on a review of your New York parole records, you did not follow conditions of parole placed on you by New York paroling authorities. In addition to resorting to criminal behavior with known criminal associates while on parole, records indicate you lied to parole officials in New York when you were hiding Falco and Cassarino, both wanted for murder, prior to the murder in Lodi. The Parole Board also notes your statements to New York paroling authority prior to parole release in 1961 and your subsequent failure to follow through on your commitment to the New York paroling authority, as reflected earlier in this notice of decision. (d) Trantino's Account of the Payroll Robbery on February 16, 1956 The Parole Board also concluded that Trantino's attempt to understate the violent nature of a robbery he committed in New York in 1956 reflected a lack of candor that supported denial of parole. The Board's June 1999 decision denying parole described the circumstances of that robbery: Records indicate on February 16, 1956, you and a co-defendant, George Fernandez, accosted a twenty-one year old dental assistant, Carmella DeVito, and stole $500.00 of payroll money from the dental office Ms. DeVito worked at. Records indicate that when Ms. DeVito approached you and your co- defendant, your co-defendant placed his hands over Ms. DeVito's eyes and mouth. You then pulled Ms. DeVito down and located a payroll envelope in her pocket. Ms. DeVito struggled and was pushed up against a wall. Ms. DeVito and your co-defendant then fell on the tile floor. Ms. DeVito screamed and then you and your co-defendant released her. You and your co-defendant would subsequently be arrested for this offense and your co-defendant would admit to committing twenty-five burglaries prior to this incident and several of the burglaries in your company. As a result of the assault, Ms. DeVito received a black eye, bruises and later suffered from somatic pains, lack of sleep and nightmares as a result of this incident. You would later be indicted for first degree robbery, first degree grand larceny and second degree assault. On June 18, 1956, as the result of a plea bargain, you were given a five to ten year sentence for second degree robbery. [Trantino V, supra, 331 N.J. Super. at 616.] At its June 9, 1999 hearing Chairman Consovoy questioned Trantino about whether the 1956 robbery was a violent crime. MR. CONSOVOY: Now I am going to paraphrase, tell me if I am not right, accurate or fair, that this was a snatching of a payroll? MR. CONSOVOY: Your partner was George Fernandez in this situation? MR. TRANTINO: Yes. MR. CONSOVOY: And you said repeatedly that this was not a violent crime. MR. TRANTINO: That is [sic] a violent crime, but my role in it is [sic] as an accomplice, and I was guilty as the person who did the snatching, but there was [sic] no weapons. MR. CONSOVOY: Right. MR. TRANTINO: Or no one got hurt. MR. CONSOVOY: You are [sic] sure? MR. TRANTINO: Yes, absolutely, no one got hurt. MR. CONSOVOY: No one was injured? MR. TRANTINO: No, it was just a snatching. The woman _ to the best of my recollection, it was dental offices, adjoining dental offices or doctor offices, and this woman picked up the payrolls for all of the offices. And we waited, George _ when she went into the hallway George snatched it and we ran. The Parole Board also would like to make two items clear for the record regarding your parole plan suitability. First, it is not the responsibility of the Parole Board to insure that an inmate has available to him or her, a parole plan that will reduce the likelihood of future criminal behavior. Therefore, it is not the responsibility of the Parole Board to insure that your parole plan is suitable to reduce the likelihood of future criminal behavior. The Parole Board can only evaluate the parole plan submitted by the inmate in the context of the Parole Board's legal standards in assessing parole suitability. In your case your parole plan raises serious concerns in terms of likelihood of future recidivism if you are released on parole. Second, in contrast to your past several parole hearings, you are now divorced from your wife Charlee, who in the past was a central part of your support system if paroled. You attempted to explain your current relationship with Charlee, and in all candor your explanation of your current relationship with Charlee did nothing to assuage the Board's concerns regarding your parole plan. 5. Trantino's Psychological Profile The record before this Court includes numerous psychological evaluations of Trantino since 1979 when he first became eligible for parole and the vast majority of those evaluations reflect a positive assessment of Trantino's suitability for parole. Among those positive psychological evaluations are 1995, 1996, and 1997 evaluations of Trantino by Dr. Glenn Ferguson, the Parole Board staff psychologist whose June 2 and June 9, 1999 testimony before the Board constituted the primary evidence on which the Board relied in denying parole. In its decision, the Parole Board gave no weight to the November 1998 psychological evaluation of Trantino by Dr. Michael Welner who was retained by the Attorney General and on the basis of whose report Trantino was removed from Talbot Hall and transferred to South Woods Prison. Although Dr. Welner expressly found that Trantino's likelihood of criminal recidivism was low, the Board determined that his report was not useful because it did not focus on the central issue of recidivism and because Welner was not provided with reports from New York parole authorities concerning Trantino's background prior to the Lodi murders. In addition, the Board also accorded no weight to the January 1999 psychological evaluation of Trantino by his own expert, Dr. Barry Rosenfeld, who from 1994 to 1999 served as the senior forensic psychologist of the New York Criminal and Supreme Courts in affiliation with Bellevue Hospital. Dr. Rosenfeld concluded that the majority of predictive factors suggest that Mr. Trantino will be capable of successfully adjusting to parole and does not present a high risk of re- offending. Dr. Rosenfeld's report listed eighty-seven separate sources of information on which he relied. The Board determined that Dr. Rosenfeld's report and evaluation should be given no weight in this parole determination because (1) Dr. Rosenfeld was given a very limited amount of material to review, (2) Dr. Rosenfeld did little or nothing to challenge the veracity of statements made by the inmate, and (3) Trantino himself claimed at his hearings . . . that a number of statements Dr. Rosenfeld attributed to him, he did not make. In addition to its primary reliance on the June 2 and June 9, 1999 testimony of Dr. Ferguson, the Board also relied to a limited extent on the testimony of Mark O'Sullivan, a psychology consultant employed by the Board. After issuance of its June 9, 1999 decision denying parole, the Board conducted additional interviews on November 8 and 9, 1999 with O'Sullivan, Dr. Naftali Berrill, Dr. Timothy Brennan and Dr. Mario Papparozzi for the purpose of establishing Trantino's future eligibility term. In its supplemental brief to this Court the Parole Board relies to a limited extent on the post-parole decision testimony of Drs. O'Sullivan and Berrill, and refers briefly to the November 1999 testimony of Drs. Brennan and Papparozzi. In the interest of completeness, we first summarize the testimony of all of the witnesses on whom the Board relied in denying parole based on Trantino's psychological profile. A. Evidence Unfavorable to Parole (i) Dr. Glenn Ferguson - Testimony June 2 and June 9, 1999 Dr. Ferguson, the Parole Board's chief psychologist and a Board employee since 1981, received his Ph.D. in psychology in 1997. Dr. Ferguson had served as a parole hearing officer from 1988 to 1995 and had performed inmate psychological evaluations for the Board beginning in 1995. He began his June 2, 1999 interview by reviewing the history of Trantino's psychological evaluations as an inmate. He stated that of Trantino's fifty-six evaluations, he considered fourteen to be in depth evaluations and forty-two to be relatively brief evaluations. Of the fourteen in-depth evaluations, he determined that four were clearly supportive of parole and the balance were indecisive or not supportive of parole. He acknowledged that thirty-five out of the remaining forty-two shorter evaluations were supportive of parole for Trantino. Ferguson attributed the difference in those results to Trantino's ability to establish a very good rapport very quickly. Dr. Ferguson observed that Trantino's psychological testing at Talbot Hall in 1998 was one of the more thorough in-depth evaluations . . . done in the recent past on Mr. Trantino. Dr. Ferguson was questioned by Board Chairman Consovoy about the results of a Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory - III (MCMI- III) test of Trantino performed at Talbot Hall. Dr. Ferguson acknowledged that although the test results revealed symptoms of three distinct personality disorders (narcissistic, antisocial and borderline), none of the scores could be considered high enough to be clinically significant. Ferguson stated that Trantino frequently had been diagnosed with narcissistic and antisocial personality disorders, but noted that none of the prior psychological evaluations had considered Trantino to possess a borderline personality disorder. Ferguson observed that in his opinion Trantino meets the criteria for all three [disorders]. Ferguson observed that certain aspects of Trantino's personality tend to make him potentially violent, noting that it was unpredictable how Trantino would act in certain situations. Ferguson stated: Because he doesn't have a very clear understanding of who he is, and he hasn't really done a very thorough self-examination, he's not even real clear on what type of situations might present problems for him in the future. And that might set him off. Dr. Ferguson explained to the Board that, in isolation, Trantino's narcissistic personality disorder was not a significant cause for concern. He explained that narcissism is definitely a problem. But again, there's plenty of people out there with narcissistic personality disorders that aren't a threat to anybody else. As long as they get their egos fed and they get everything the way they want, you know, life goes on. However, in Ferguson's view the combination of Trantino's narcissism and a borderline personality disorder could lead to unpredictable and potentially violent situations: Mr. Trantino [is] a particularly dangerous individual. Because of his unpredictability and his unwillingness to clearly examine potential problems in the future. That, you know, makes it almost impossible for him to avoid situations where he is going to be faced with blows to his ego, blows to his narcissism that are going to trigger feelings of, you know, emptiness, and loneliness, and unworthiness, and, you know, wanting to fill those. If he's in a community setting where he doesn't have a lot [of] external controls, you know, strict supervision, you know, serious consequences for behaviors, and there's a liquor store or bar on the corner, you know, it's going to take an awful lot of effort on his part to not to walk into that bar and sit down and start drinking. And once that hurdle's crossed, you know, the next guy that walks in and recognizes him and says, Oh, that's that cop killer. And, you know, What the hell are you doing here? And, you know, gets in his face and starts pointing his finger and pushing his buttons, I don't think it takes that big a leap to say that there is a potential for violence. According to Ferguson, Trantino could not successfully overcome the risks inherent in his personality disorders until he acknowledged their existence and made a commitment to seek the treatment necessary to change those parts of his personality. Dr. Ferguson also disputed the findings of Trantino's expert, Dr. Rosenfeld. Ferguson accused Rosenfeld of bias and inexperience, stating that Rosenfeld had not previously evaluated an inmate for parole purposes. Ferguson and the Board asserted that Rosenfeld's report was based on unsubstantiated and incorrect information provided solely by Trantino and his lawyer, and that Rosenfeld admitted he had not sought out objective data on his own. Ferguson also accused Rosenfeld of scoring the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised test(PCL-R) incorrectly, which Ferguson described as his biggest problem with Dr. Rosenfeld's report. Ferguson testified that the PCL-R test is one of the leading tests being used . . . by forensic psychologists for making predictions for future violence. He explained that the test contains twenty questions about an inmate's personality and behavior, with each question being scored as either 0 (behavioral trait does not apply), 1" (behavioral trait applies to a certain extent), or 2" (behavioral trait applies). According to Ferguson, a score of thirty or above is indicative of psychopathy, which also correlates with a high risk of recidivism. Ferguson testified that when he administered the PCL-R to Trantino in August 1998, Trantino received a nineteen, but that after receiving the New York probation documents Ferguson re- scored Trantino as a 24, which is not in the psychopathic range (30-40), and reflects the average score of most inmates. Ferguson reported that Talbot Hall initially scored Trantino a 22, but after receiving updated information revised that to a 26. Ferguson admitted there are always some judgement calls in scoring psychological tests. Ferguson noted that Dr. Rosenfeld scored Trantino at 14.7 on the PCL-R, a score he characterized as indicative of a very low level of antisocial functioning, let alone psychopathy. Ferguson stated that Rosenfeld erroneously scored Trantino on the basis of his current ability to function rather than on the basis of Trantino's lifetime experience as contemplated by the PCL-R scoring manual. Ferguson also explained to the Board his change in opinion concerning Trantino since his 1995 evaluation, attributing his current views to his enhanced experience as a psychologist, newly-acquired information from the New York parole authorities, and the changes in Trantino's support system. Ferguson explained that in 1995, Trantino had an extensive support system in Camden, that he developed through his contacts at the Riverfront State Prison, including his wife, Charlee, whom Trantino met in prison, and married while on furlough. Ferguson noted that in 1997, after almost twenty years of marriage, Trantino and Charlee divorced. Ferguson concluded that Trantino's support network and parole plan had gone by the wayside. Concerning Trantino's substance abuse problems, Ferguson noted Trantino's extensive and on-going involvement in various programs including Alcoholics Anonymous, but observed that statements by Trantino, such as confidence that he would never relapse, revealed a failure to understand the [Alcoholics Anonymous] model of substance abuse and alcohol treatment. Dr. Ferguson recommended that Trantino receive more intensive treatment to deal with his personality issues, which would require a therapist to see him for a long period of time [and] then to see him in a less restrictive environment. In response to a Board member's question about how long it would take _ three years, five years, to really find out if he can function, Dr. Ferguson replied that it would depend on the level of freedom and . . . supervision in a halfway house noting that within two years you can come across just about all the conceivable options and outcomes that he might see. In concluding the interview with Dr. Ferguson, Chairman Consovoy noted that it would be fair to say that we would never put any pressure on anyone to give us an evaluation we want. After Trantino's June 9, 1999 interview, at which Dr. Ferguson was present, the Board re-interviewed Dr. Ferguson. Dr. Ferguson stated that Trantino's testimony had confirmed his assessment of Trantino's unfitness for parole. He agreed with a Board member that Trantino's desire to write another book about the crime evidenced his narcissism and lack of empathy for the families of the victims. He reemphasized Trantino's lack of self-awareness and the deterioration of his support system. Finally, he agreed with Consovoy's characterization that in judging risk [Trantino] hasn't made much progress in the thirty- five years since the crime. At the conclusion of the June 9, 1999 interview, Chairman Consovoy asked Dr. Ferguson whether it would be fair to say that under the legal standard of substantial likelihood [of recidivism] that this Board has some legitimate concerns. Dr. Ferguson's reply was that [i]t sounds like a legal question more than a psychological question. (ii) Mark O'Sullivan - November 9, 1999 Mr. O'Sullivan is a psychology consultant employed by the Parole Board. His background and qualifications are not revealed by the record except for the statement in the confidential addendum to the Board's decision that Mr. O'Sullivan has been a member of the Parole Board's Psychology Unit for a number of years and has conducted hundreds of pre-parole psychological evaluations in his own right. On November 9, 1999, five months after the Parole Board's decision denying Trantino parole, Chairman Consovoy interviewed O'Sullivan concerning a PCL-R test that he administered to Trantino prior to the Board's parole decision. O'Sullivan testified that prior to administering the test he reviewed some 40-odd years' worth of psychological [reports], court decisions, transcripts of parole hearings, and media presentations. O'Sullivan scored Trantino at 31 on the test, a score substantially higher than that received by Trantino when the same test was administered at Talbot Hall, twice by Dr. Ferguson, and once by Dr. Rosenfeld. Based on his scoring of the test, O'Sullivan expressed the view that Trantino was a prototypical psychopath, and that he considered him a poor risk for parole. (iii) Dr. Naftali Berrill - November 9, 1999 Several months after the Parole Board issued its decision denying Trantino parole, Chairman Consovoy and Mark O'Sullivan interviewed Dr. Berrill on November 9, 1999. Dr. Berrill, a Board-certified forensic psychologist, had never met nor interviewed Trantino but had reviewed materials from his parole file including psychological tests and reports, Parole Board hearings and evaluations. He noted that the prior psychological evaluations tended to characterize Trantino as possessing narcissistic and antisocial personality disorders, but noted that I don't think anyone has gone as far as to say, for example, that there was a form of borderline personality disorder . . . . When asked about the relevance of Trantino's twenty-five years of infraction-free incarceration, Berrill remarked, it's impressive. . . . It's interesting. It is noteworthy. It demonstrates this man's capacity to perform this behavior on some level. . . . He's not a total loose cannon in what he's really doing. Berrill added: I just think it's evident that . . . when drugs and alcohol are not in the picture, he's capable of formidable behavior, which is good, I mean that's fine. However, Berrill continued, it absolutely does not mean that there has been a shift in the way he looks at the world. . . . It speaks in no way, shape or form to the core personality structure. Berrill observed that a realistic assessment of Trantino is only possible in an unsupervised setting. Berrill summarized his findings: There is no reason for you to think that there's any substantive change in the way that that man looks at himself or . . . if left to his own devices, it's entirely possible, that he may well drink and use drugs again. Moreover, he opined there's been no genuine treatment, the real treatment, substantive treatment. (iv) Timothy Brennan On November 8, 1999, subsequent to the Board's parole decision, Chairman Consovoy conducted a telephone interview with Dr. Brennan. Brennan observed that research in the area of risk assessment demonstrates that prior criminal history is probably the most important factor in predicting future risk. Other major factors are the length of criminal history, seriousness of current offense, and substance abuse. [I]nstitutional behavior itself seldom is seen in our literature or even in our clinical work as the main factor. He stated there are about ten major factors that most institutions use, and institutional behavior is not one. Brennan explained that institutional behavior is in a constrained and supervised environment, and thus unreflective of behavior in the community. (v) Dr. Mario Papparozzi _ November 8, 1999 Subsequent to the Board's decision denying parole, Chairman Consovoy on November 8, 1999 conducted a telephone interview with Dr. Mario Papparozzi, who late last year was confirmed by the State Senate as the new Chairman of the Parole Board. Dr. Papparozzi, who served for twenty-six years in the Department of Corrections working in parole and community programs, also served as an assistant professor at the College of New Jersey and as the associate director of the College's Criminal Justice Policy Center. Dr. Papparozzi had not interviewed Trantino nor did he testify that he had reviewed records of Trantino's psychological evaluations. The focus of his interview concerned the relation between long-term infraction-free or trouble-free institutional adjustment and behavior on the street _ once out. Papparozzi stated that from personal experience, just because someone is infraction-free in an institution for a period of time, one should not conclude that that is reason to believe that once released to the streets that they also remain infraction-free or remain in a pro-social mode. He noted that inmates are constantly being watched, thus are less likely to act out, and prison rewards good behavior. Papparozzi then asserted that his personal observations are supported by the academic literature on risk prediction. He stated that, according to the literature, the most important point to understand is that no one factor can be held responsible . . . for predicting the likelihood of an outcome once released to the street. In fact, institutional adjustment is not even in the top three items that are accounting for outcomes, although it does account for a portion of the outcome in terms of an actuarial risk assessment. The witness admitted that it is virtually impossible . . . to predict . . . which particular person is going to do a bad thing. The risk models, which are nowhere [sic] near 80 or 90 percent accurate, only predict the percentage of inmates that will recidivate, not which inmates will do so. observed: As noted in the previous evaluation, Mr. Trantino's fundamental personality is of a narcissistic and antisocial type, and this will likely remain unchanged throughout his life. However, as is usually the case with similar personality structures, there comes a time in the middle to late adulthood when the antisocial personality seems to burn out , leaving a less energetic, less impulsive individual. It would appear that this process has begun to happen for Mr. Trantino. As to what this means for community release, it would appear that critical factors remain similar to the previous evaluation, including an initial period of close supervision to include monitoring for substance abuse, mental health treatment, and vocational and social support as needed. How well Mr. Trantino will ultimately fare in response to specific life stresses in the future is not easily predicted, thus it would appear that the availability of appropriate support systems and monitoring would make the most sense. As to whether release should be though a halfway house placement or direct community release, this frankly seems less important than whether appropriate treatment and parole supports are in place if and when full release is granted. IV Standard of Review The New Jersey Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 5, para. 4, specifically authorizes judicial review of administrative agency determinations. See In re Senior Appeals Examiner, 60 N.J. 356, 363 (1972); Fisher v. Twp. of Bedminster, 5 N.J. 534, 538-40 (1950). In Trantino IV, supra, we set forth the standard that courts should follow in determining the validity of the Parole Board's denial of parole. A reviewing court must examine: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policy, i.e., did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 24.] In this appeal we focus on the second prong of that three- part standard. We noted in Trantino IV, supra, the essentially factual nature of a Parole Board's determination that 'there is a substantial likelihood that an inmate will commit another crime if released,' and that accordingly a reviewing court is obligated to 'determine whether [that] factual finding could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record.' Id. at 24 (quoting State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988). We previously have recognized that Parole Board decisions are highly individualized discretionary appraisals. Beckwith v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973). Accordingly, the Board has broad but not unlimited discretionary powers, and its determinations are always judicially reviewable for arbitrariness. Monks v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 242 (1971); accord In re State In Interest of Steenback, 34 N.J. 89, 101 (1961); In re Smigelski, 30 N.J. 513, 527-28 (1959). Although in Trantino IV, supra, we acknowledged the inherent difficulty in gauging whether a parole determination constitutes an abuse of discretion, 154 N.J. at 25, we emphasized that the judicial review of Parole Board determinations does not engender a more exacting standard of judicial review than that applicable to other administrative agency decisions. Ibid. As this Court observed in In re Hawley Parole Application, 98 N.J. 108 (1984): The Board is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of deciding whether an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole release under the Parole Act of 1979. We find no reason to exempt the Parole Board from the well-established principle that a court may review the actions of an administrative agency to determine if its power is being exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. [Id. at 112 (citations omitted).] See also Cestari, supra, 224 N.J. Super. at 548 n.6 (rejecting the contention that a more restrictive standard of judicial review should apply to parole release than to other administrative decisions). We also take note of the Parole Board's statement in its June 9, 1999 decision denying parole that the actual granting or withholding of parole is a function reposing exclusively in the Parole Board, and there is no such thing as judicial parole. Although the instances are few in which courts have found Parole Board decisions denying parole to be so arbitrary that affirmative judicial intervention to grant parole was necessary, that relief clearly may be encompassed within the province of judicial review. See Williams v. Parole Board, No. A-3102-98T4, 2 000 WL 1839225, at *10-*12 (App. Div. June 6, 2000); Cestari, supra, 224 N.J. Super. at 551; Mallamaci v. Dietz, 146 N.J. Super. 15, 22-23 (App. Div. 1976). In performing our judicial review function in the context of this record, which reflects extraordinary reliance by the Parole Board on the expert testimony and opinion of Dr. Ferguson, we must reiterate concerns that we previously have expressed about the perils of undue reliance by courts and agencies on expert testimony and the impropriety of abdicating decisional responsibility to experts. In State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975), we addressed the nature of civil involuntary commitment and periodic review hearings for criminal defendants acquitted by reason of insanity, and made clear that the court, not the psychiatric expert, was required to decide the issues: It should be emphasized that while courts in determining dangerousness should take full advantage of expert testimony presented by the State and by defendant, the decision is not one that can be left wholly to the technical expertise of the psychiatrists and psychologists. The determination of dangerousness involves a delicate balancing of society's interest in protection from harmful conduct against the individual's interest in personal liberty and autonomy. This decision, while requiring the court to make use of the assistance which medical testimony may provide, is ultimately a legal one, not a medical one. [68 N.J. at 261.] Similarly, in In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31 (1996), which involved the involuntary civil commitment of a paroled convicted sex offender, we cautioned that [t]he final determination of dangerousness lies with the courts, not the expertise of psychiatrists and psychologists. Id. at 59. See also State in the Interest of C.A.H. &amp; B.A.R., 89 N.J. 326, 343, 344 n.5 (1982) ( Obviously, the court was not required to give controlling effect to the testimony of the experts. . . . [W]hile expert opinion on rehabilitative prospects is helpful and important in a waiver hearing . . . such opinion evidence cannot be a substitute for the court's ultimate, highly discretionary decision, reached through an application of all the statutory criteria to all of the relevant evidence, that the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is appropriate. ); Williams, supra, 2 000 WL 1839225, at *11 ( Dr. Gibbons' opinion in his report . . . is entirely without foundation and is contradicted by the empirical evidence. It does not provide sufficient credible evidence to deny parole. ); Cestari, supra, 224 N.J. Super. at 550 ( [Dr.] Rotgers opinion that Cestari has 'the potential to become involved in a violent incident' does not mean that there is a substantial likelihood that he will commit another crime. . . . Thus, the Adult Panel read more into Dr. Rotgers' solitary negative evaluation of Cestari than actually is stated in his report. ) For purposes of this appeal, the principle that we extract from those decisions is that the Parole Board was obligated, in considering Trantino's application for parole, to render its decision not on the basis of the testimony of a single expert, or selected experts, but rather by application of the statutory criteria to all of the relevant evidence. C.A.H. &amp; B.A.R., supra, 89 N.J. at 344 n.5 (emphasis added). V [v]iewing Trantino's comments in their entirety, the Board's finding that Trantino's plans for a second book evince a lack of empathy for the victims' families could not be reasonably reached on this record. [331 N.J. Super. at 616.] Moreover, none of the evidence concerning that issue is at all relevant to the question whether Trantino would be substantially likely to commit another crime if he were released on parole. 2. Lack of Candor (a) The Talbot Hall Incident As noted, supra at ___-___(slip op. at 40-44), the Parole Board concluded that Trantino had not been candid in his June 4, 1999 testimony to the Board in which he denied that any incident occurred at Talbot Hall during which he became agitated and perturbed, noting that Trantino later had recalled the incident during his June 9, 1999 testimony. However, the record reveals that between the two hearings Trantino was shown a copy of Dr. Rosenfeld's report that referred to the incident, and he fully explained his initial failure to recall it by noting that at the June 4 hearing Consovoy did not identify Trabucco by name. We are fully in accord with the Appellate Division's observation that as soon as Consovoy mentioned Trabucco's name at the June 9, 1999 hearing, Trantino remembered the incident and provided a reasonable explanation. Id. at 613. Neither the incident itself, nor Trantino's explanation of his failure to recall the Talbot Hall incident at the June 4 hearing, indicate that Trantino is substantially likely to recidivate nor do they provide any evidentiary support for the Board's decision to deny parole. (b) Trantino's Lack of Candor Concerning the Murder of Voto and Tedesco As noted, supra at ___-___ (slip op. at 45-46), the Parole Board determined that Trantino's inconsistent testimony at trial, at a post-conviction relief hearing, at Board hearings and during psychological evaluations about the extent of his recollection of his role in the murders of Voto and Tedesco reflected a pattern of deception that justified denial of parole. According to the Board, Trantino's claims of past memory loss were neither consistent nor genuine, leading the Board to conclude that Trantino had not been candid regarding his memory of the events on the night of the murders. That finding by the Board is contrary to this Court's unanimous determination in Trantino IV that there is evidence in the record that Trantino's memory loss is consistent, long-standing and genuine, and, beyond the issue of recollection, his acknowledgment of responsibility is sincere and legitimate. 154 N.J. at 35. The Board's heavy reliance on Trantino's inconsistent testimony about the extent of his recollection of the homicides, and its finding that his claimed memory loss is not genuine, reflects the Board's conclusion that Trantino can never be paroled until he sufficiently recalls the details of the Lodi murders. In Trantino IV, we expressly held that the Board could not deny parole until psychological treatment resulted in a restoration of Trantino's recollection: While it may be appropriate in other cases involving pre-Code inmates to insist upon evidence of subjective awareness of guilt before concluding that an inmate's avowal of responsibility is sincere and that he is rehabilitated to the point that he will not commit crimes if released, such an insistence may be unwarranted in this case where, we repeat, the record supports the finding that Trantino cannot and will not ever be able to remember actually pulling the trigger. The record thus does not clearly sustain the conclusion that longterm psychotherapy will eventuate in a breakthrough recollection or that such a recollection is necessary, given Trantino's repeated acceptance of responsibility, in order to ensure that he has achieved a level of rehabilitation that eliminates the likelihood that he will, if released, commit crimes. VI In several important respects we modify the judgment of the Appellate Division. That judgment reversed the Parole Board's denial of parole and remanded the matter to the Parole Board with the direction to grant Trantino parole in thirty days. In addition, although dismissing as moot Trantino's appeal from the decision of the Department of Corrections transferring him from Talbot Hall to South Woods State Prison, the Appellate Division remanded that matter to the Department of Corrections and directed that Trantino be immediately placed in a pre-parole halfway house or residential facility in preparation for his release on parole in thirty days. We are fully persuaded that Trantino's release on parole should not occur in thirty days as contemplated by the Appellate Division's judgment, but should be subject to a pre-release condition of satisfactory completion of twelve months placement in a halfway house facility with parole release to occur on completion of such twelve-month period. Accordingly, our disposition of Trantino's separate appeal from the Department of Corrections' decision to transfer him to South Woods is to remand that matter to the Department of Corrections and to order the Department of Corrections to transfer Trantino within thirty days of the filing of this opinion to a halfway house facility selected by the Department of Corrections that is located within a reasonable proximity to the Camden/Cherry Hill area. As directed, Trantino again applied for halfway house placement, which again was denied by the Department of Corrections in 1994. A letter from the Administration of Riverfront Prison attributed the denial to threats of harm to Trantino, his offense, adverse community reaction, and objections by a member of the Legislature. After an April 1995 decision denying parole was vacated, a two-member Board panel denied parole again in September 1995, noting that [t]he Department of Corrections has continually denied your placement in a halfway house and expressing its belief that placement into a halfway house would be beneficial to you in your goal to reach your rehabilitative potential. . . . Because the record contains only an abbreviated explanation of the Department of Correction's refusal to transfer Trantino to a halfway house, we express no view on whether the Department's refusal, despite strong and consistent statements by the Parole Board favoring the transfer, was based primarily on meritorious considerations. In Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 4, we expressed our emphatic agreement with the Appellate Division's determination in Trantino III, 296 N.J. Super. at 465, that the Department of Corrections' 1994 decision denying Trantino halfway house placement was deficient in that it lacked an adequate statement of reasons demonstrating that the denial was based on sufficient credible evidence. In any event, the recommendation of halfway house placement for Trantino prior to parole release is supported not only by prior Parole Board decisions, by numerous psychological evaluation reports in the record concerning Trantino, and specifically by Dr. Ferguson's 1998 report. In addition, we note that Department of Corrections regulations subject inmates placed in halfway houses to urine monitoring, breathalyser testing, and disciplinary rules that regulate, among other subjects, unauthorized absences, out-of- state travel and possession of alcohol or controlled dangerous substances. See N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.19 and 4.20. We are convinced that a twelve-month halfway house placement prior to Trantino's parole is an appropriate and necessary safeguard to minimize the likelihood that his release from prison will lead to the commission of a criminal offense. In addition, the Parole Board is authorized to impose reasonable and appropriate pre- and post- release conditions of parole consistent with this opinion. VII A The responsibility for resolving this appeal in accordance with law has weighed heavily on the members of this Court, as well as on other judges and Parole Board members who have ruled on prior but related appeals. We do not underestimate the pain and anguish that our disposition is likely to cause to the families and friends of the victims of the Lodi murders. Nor are we unaware that our disposition will not be readily understood by members of the public who will find it incomprehensible that the law requires parole release of an inmate who was responsible for the murder of two police officers. Our opinion explains that parole release would be impossible if the Lodi murders occurred today, because of significant changes in the severity of the sentencing provisions of our Criminal Code. Current law would mandate no less than life imprisonment without parole, if not the death sentence. The law in effect when these crimes were committed was different. Under that law Trantino became eligible for parole release in 1979. The Parole Act of 1979 eliminated the conventional parole discretion to release a prisoner once the punitive aspect of a sentence has been served. That statute provided only that a prisoner shall be released on parole at the time of parole eligibility, unless . . . there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if released on parole at such time. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). The legislation shifts the burden to the State to prove that the prisoner is a recidivist and should not be released. New Jersey Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 92, 205 (1983). We stated that the Legislature recognized that under the Parole Act of 1979 a parole eligibility date creates a legitimate expectation of release . . . absent findings that justification for deferral exists. Based upon this interpretation of our statute, we find that a federally-protected liberty interest exists. Id. at 207. In short, because the punitive aspect of his sentence already has been served, Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 39, Trantino had a constitutionally protected right to parole unless the State could prove that there was a substantial likelihood that he would commit another crime. It is the absence of that proof that entitles Trantino to parole, not sympathy or compassion for him. No matter how much we may abhor the admitted killing of those two officers, the law must apply. Portions of this record can be read to suggest that under the law Trantino was eligible for transfer to a halfway house and subsequent release several years ago, but that public pressure prevented that from occurring. No matter how great the pressure, agencies of government cannot ignore the law in special cases. At its core, this case is more about the rule of law than it is about Thomas Trantino. The great strength of the rule of law in a democratic society is that it applies equally to all persons, the bad as well as the good. Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 228 (1975). Carved into the stone of the facade of the United States Supreme Court building are these words: Equal Justice Under Law. If ever courts permit agencies of government to create exceptions to the rule of law, applying it for the many but exempting the disfavored, we will have irreparably damaged the foundation of our democracy. B We affirm in part and modify in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. The June 1999 decision of the Parole Board denying parole is reversed, and the Board is ordered to grant Trantino parole subject to the pre-release condition of satisfactory completion of a twelve-month halfway house placement, and such other appropriate pre-and post-release conditions that it may impose. Concerning Trantino's appeal from the Department of Corrections' order transferring him to South Woods prison, we remand that matter to the Department and order that Trantino be placed within thirty days of this opinion in a halfway house facility within a reasonable proximity to the Camden/Cherry Hill area. So ordered. JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, and JUDGE HAVEY, temporarily assigned, join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. JUDGE BAIME, temporarily assigned, filed a separate, dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-136/ 37 September Term 2000 THOMAS TRANTINO, Appellant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. _______________________________ THOMAS TRANTINO, Appellant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. BAIME, J., dissenting. This case presents questions of public concern. Following protracted proceedings, the Parole Board concluded that Trantino's release from prison would pose an unjustifiable risk of danger to the public. In vacating this determination, the Appellate Division decided that the evidence did not warrant that conclusion. The issue is now before us. The stakes are high. If the Appellate Division is correct, Trantino deserves his freedom and is entitled to parole. But if the Parole Board is right, the consequences of Trantino's release will be felt, not by some pain-free public entity, nor by some penitent psychologist, social worker or public official, but by tomorrow's next victim for whose protection and welfare we hold office. In my view, the Parole Board's denial of release is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. I would not wager the safety of the public on the odds that Trantino is a changed man. The point to be stressed here is that a jury, having the opportunity to see and hear Trantino testify, rejected the claim that he could not recall the events in question. To put it more bluntly, the jury viewed Trantino's claim of a drug-induced psychotic episode, and saw nothing but the heart of darkness. Trantino's later attempts to accept responsibility for the crimes while denying any recollection of the shootings merely resurrected a claim earlier considered and rejected by a well- informed jury. No amount of historical revisionism can change that basic fact. Beyond this, the Parole Board could reasonably have questioned the accuracy of our statement that "Trantino's memory loss is consistent, long-standing and genuine." Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 154 N.J. at 35. In point of fact, Trantino has wavered in his claim of amnesia. At his post- conviction relief hearing in 1967, for example, Trantino testified unequivocally that he did not kill the victims. At his parole hearing in 1980, Trantino recounted that he was "innocent" of killing the policemen, noting that he had left the tavern before the crimes were committed. Trantino repeated that version when he testified at his parole hearing in 1982. Trantino's failure to come to terms with the brutal crimes he committed is important for several reasons. I do not doubt that a sentence should not be enlarged because a prisoner continues to insist he is innocent. But the greater demand is that the Parole Board take into account the man and his prospect for recidivism. The aims of punishment are several, State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 199-202 (1960), but the hope is that the sentence, mild or severe, will reshape the offender. In assaying the prospects for recidivism, the Parole Board must look to the man as well as to the offense, and it is here that the inmate's attitude toward the truth is highly relevant. In a variety of contexts, we have recognized that a candid acknowledgment of guilt is the first sign of redemption. See State v. Poteet, 61 N.J. 493, 497 (1972); State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 275 (1968), rev'd in part, Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S. Ct. 2278, 29 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1971); State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 260, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830, 88 S. Ct. 96, 19 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1967). Trantino's bland acceptance of responsibility while claiming amnesia is neither candid nor redemptive. It is instead both manipulative and deceptive. I leave the question of moral blameworthiness to the philosophers. I, instead, point to Dr. Berrill's opinion that Trantino's alleged inability to recall the crimes constitutes strong evidence of continued pathology. Trantino was also disingenuous in his testimony regarding his relationship with his first wife, Helene. Trantino admitted that he was less than an ideal husband, having had sexual intercourse with another woman during the couple's honeymoon and thereafter engaging in a series of extramarital affairs. He testified that he struck Helene "three or four times" in the course of the marriage, but he confidently assured the Parole Board that she would not characterize his conduct toward her as "abusive." He was wrong. In her statement to New York parole authorities, Helene maintained that Trantino often beat her. Helene recounted that she submitted to Trantino sexually because of her fear as to what he would do if she were to refuse his demands. Trantino also either minimized or lied about the significance of his 1956 strong-armed robbery of the dentist's payroll and the injuries inflicted upon the victim. This incident again indicates Trantino's penchant to mitigate his involvement in crime. It also suggests his inability to appreciate the impact of his conduct on others. Concededly, these events took place many years ago. They nevertheless are relevant because they contribute to the composite picture of the "whole man," his current mental state, and his prospects for the future. They have resonance not in the fact that they occurred or in the prospect that they will be repeated if Trantino is released. Rather, this evidence confirms Dr. Berrill's opinion that Trantino is dangerous because he cannot appreciate how his conduct affects others. It also confirms the fact that Trantino was less than truthful in his testimony before the Parole Board. Perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the Talbot Hall incident. The simple fact remains, however, that those present at the scene were able to discern a crack in Trantino's veneer, a side of his personality that he otherwise kept hidden. Trantino must have known that he was under a microscope. Yet he refused to complete the psychological testing. Moreover, Trantino either minimized or lied about the incident in his testimony at the Parole Board hearing. Finally, Trantino exhibited a significant lack of empathy in his preliminary decision to write another book pertaining to the killings. The majority's interpretation of this incident as disclosing Trantino's reformation is belied by the record. Obviously Trantino has a First Amendment right to publish another book. However, the concern lies not with the publication itself, but with Trantino's failure to recognize that such action may cause further emotional trauma to the victims' families. As noted by the Parole Board, Trantino's disregard for the feelings of the victims' families tended to corroborate Dr. Berill's findings that Trantino lacks the capacity to understand how his actions affect others. In light of this evidence, I do not believe that the Parole Board went wide of the mark in finding that there is a substantial likelihood of recidivism if Trantino is released. Resolution of these issues by the Parole Board required a reconciliation of competing social values. The interest of public security was at war with the concern for Trantino's personal freedom. Believing that the interest of public safety was paramount, the Parole Board sought to alleviate the tension between these values by denying Trantino's release. I cannot fairly say that the Parole Board was wrong. NO. A-136/137 THOMAS TRANTINO, Appellant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. DECIDED January 18, 2001 Justice Stein Okay. The State Prison cases under the Parole Act, when there is a denial of parole the Board has an obligation to set a future eligibility term. What the Board did was set a future eligibility term that would carry with it a presumptive - in other words we've considered the punitive aspect, we've considered the rehabilitative integration into that, and we've come up with the future eligibility term. When that term has been served and your credit pattern earning that you've established and the fine efforts that you've made, you can then say - it's something for you to hope to. In other words we are saying that in approximately five to five and a half years when perhaps the 25 year mandatory minimum might have been served had that been imposed, you have under the current law the right to presume that there will be. Where that presumption was not available to you because this was a precode case. We've tried to move it to that. So that there is some degree of certainty for you. We felt that you shouldn't leave this hearing today without understanding the hope - light at the tunnel, and understand that it will end, and society has that obligation also to understand. But the Board is not just saying we are denying now and maybe next time we are going to deny and maybe the next time we are going to deny. What we are saying is we dealt with the issue once and for all, of the punitive aspect of the sentence. That issue for us is resolved, unless of course through aborant [sic] behavior you were to do something that gave rise to its reconsideration. But if it weren't, and all those aspects have been done, we are now looking at a day when you will be released. . . . . I think the Board felt very strong in trying to arrive at a certainty. Because we feel strongly that there should be certainty and hope for any individual who is incarcerated, so he can look to the day that he will be released at - provided his behavior is good and all the things are good and he has earned that privilege. And that's what the Board has tried to do. It was a very, very difficult decision to do, but it - we have resolved that for ourselves at this time. [Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 296 N.J. Super. 437, 475 (Pressler, J., dissenting in part) (Trantino III).] If the Court tells us that in your case or any other case we cannot - especially in a 2A case, we cannot demand a halfway house placement as a pre-condition to parole approval, then frankly the board has to deal with it as it is. And in my opinion, in the setting you're in and it's also the opinion of the professionals that have evaluated you the last two times, that you have, in fact, reached your rehabilitative potential. Any inmate who's reached his rehabilitative potential on a gratuity sentence must be paroled whether we want to or not. But in this situation - you see, Tom, there is no legal reason for them to deny halfway house. We've been through that. You meet every criteria. I suggest you follow it. That you take this matter where it belongs, and I believe this matter belongs before the judicial body to referee the tug-of-war between the parole board and the DOC. . . . . But it's come--Tom, it's come to the end. You've done your 30 years. You've done every program you can. You achieved full-minimum status, you've had full-time minimum status. If the Courts come back and tell the parole board that we can't do what we're trying to do, then you basically have my (indiscernible) I would to parole you. I can't speak for anybody else. I voted to parole you last time, and you know, people (indiscernible) I think (indiscernible). This is not what you wanted to hear, and you don't understand this, but this is the best thing that can happen to you. It's got to end. It's got to end before a judge and the judge is going to tell the DOC you're right or they're going to tell the parole board you're right. And then you are on the way to get out. [296 N.J. Super. at 451-52.] On January 28, 1994, inmate Trantino made application for community release with Volunteers of America and Clinton House as his place of preferential assignments. His application was referred to the Institutional Classification Committee, chaired by Donald E. Lewis on February 2, 1994. Mr. Trantino's request for halfway house assignment was discussed, and the committee rejected his request. The denial was is [sic] based upon two (2) factors: 1. Letters of threat, received by my office, warning that Mr. Trantino would be killed if paroled. The three (3) letters were unsigned and very crudely written. One letter was alphabetized, meaning constructed by letters cut out from magazines and newspapers to spell out the threat. The letters did not have a place of origin identifying the area where mailed. Letters were received on or about mid-January, and were shared with the Classification Committee in order to render an informed decision. 2. The committee also took into consideration the circumstances of the offense and the risk of possible adverse community reaction if inmate Trantino was permitted to participate in a residential community release program. In considering all of the above factors, a unanimous decision was rendered by the Institutional Classification Committee, in keeping with the provisions of New Jersey Administrative Code 10A:20-4.12 which provides for Institutional Classification Committee review and disposition. Further be advised, notwithstanding the letters of threat, inmate Trantino would have been denied based on other factors referenced under the above cited provision. As his case has high visibility and notoriety, through the news media and through Senator Kosco who vehemently objected to the parole and community release of inmate Trantino. In concluding this report, the letters of threat have been misplaced, as it is my recollection that they were to be processed to Internal Affairs; however, this is a standard procedure, and it is possible that they were misdirected. For your further review and assistance, I have Mr. Trantino's application, classification blocks and reports to Senator Kosco all addressing the situation of inmate Trantino's parole. [Bantering does not occur constantly, but rather in a cycle. The cycle consists of three phases: the tension building phase, the acute battering incident, and the kindness, contrite, loving behavior (sometimes referred to as the "honeymoon" stage.)