Title: BUDDY D MILLER II V CHAPMAN CONTRACTING
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130808
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2007

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 25, 2007 
BUDDY MILLER, II, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 130808 
CHAPMAN CONTRACTING, RAMZY 
KIZY, JR., KEVIN R. PAPERD, and 
SWEEPMASTER, INC., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
__________________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
PER CURIAM. 
In this case, plaintiff’s attorney erroneously named plaintiff, instead of his 
bankruptcy trustee, as the plaintiff in this lawsuit.  After the period of limitations 
expired, defendants moved to dismiss the case, pointing out the failure to name 
plaintiff’s bankruptcy trustee in the lawsuit.  Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the 
complaint to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff, but the trial court 
dismissed the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed.  We likewise affirm.  MCR 
7.302(G)(1). In doing so, we adopt as our own the following unpublished opinion 
per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 16, 2006 (Docket No. 
256676). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order denying 
his motion to amend his complaint and granting defendants’ motion 
for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5) based on lack 
of standing. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral 
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). 
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that on December 28, 2000, 
defendant Kevin Paperd was operating an automobile that was 
owned by one or more of the remaining defendants when he 
negligently struck plaintiff’s vehicle, causing plaintiff to suffer a 
serious impairment of an important body function and/or serious 
permanent disfigurement.  Defendants sought summary disposition 
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), contending that plaintiff was not the 
real party in interest and lacked standing to sue.  Defendants alleged 
that plaintiff had filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code [11 USC 701 et seq.] on March 
6, 2002, and that all of plaintiff’s rights regarding the December 28, 
2000, accident were therefore transferred to the bankruptcy trustee, 
who was the sole party who could pursue the lawsuit. 
In response, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint in order to correct the “misidentification” of the 
named plaintiff.  Plaintiff stated that Wendy Turner Lewis, the 
trustee for his bankruptcy estate, had authorized plaintiff’s counsel to 
file a complaint on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, and that counsel, 
through no fault of plaintiff or Lewis, had misidentified the plaintiff. 
The trial court entered an order denying as futile plaintiff’s 
motion to amend and granting defendants’ motion for summary 
disposition, stating: 
“There is no dispute the real party in interest is the bankruptcy 
trustee, not Plaintiff. Thus, the issue is whether Plaintiff should be 
granted leave to amend to add the bankruptcy trustee.    
“Under MCR 2.118(A)(2), leave to amend pleadings should 
be freely given when justice so requires.  Leave to amend should be 
denied only for particularized reasons, such as undue delay, bad 
faith or dilatory motive on the movant’s part, repeated failure to 
cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue 
prejudice to the opposing party, or where amendment would be 
futile. Ben [P]Fyke & Sons v Gunter [Co], 390 Mich 649; 213 
NW2d 134 (1973). 
In [Employers Mut Cas Co v Petroleum 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment, Inc, 190 Mich App 57, 63; 475 NW2d 418 (1991)], the 
court held that ‘Although an amendment generally relates back to 
the date of the original filing if the new claim asserted arises out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original 
pleading, MCR 2.118(D), the relation-back doctrine does not extend 
to the addition of new parties.’ 
“The court is satisfied that because the bankruptcy trustee was 
the real party in interest prior to the filing of the Complaint, this is a 
motion to add a party and is not merely a request to correct a 
misnomer. Thus, the court finds that based on the binding precedent 
in Employers, the amendment would be futile as the addition of the 
new party cannot relate back to the original Complaint.”  
MCR 2.201(B) provides that, generally, “[a]n action must be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest . . . .”  “A real 
party in interest is one who is vested with the right of action on a 
given claim, although the beneficial interest may be in another.” 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v Eaton Rapids Comm Hosp, 
221 Mich App 301, 311; 561 NW2d 488 (1997).  “This standing 
doctrine recognizes that litigation should be begun only by a party 
having an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” 
[City of] Kalamazoo v Richland Twp, 221 Mich App 531, 534; 562 
NW2d 237 (1997). It is undisputed that the bankruptcy trustee is 
the real party in interest and that she should have been named as the 
plaintiff.1 
MCR 2.118(A)(2) provides that leave to amend a pleading 
“shall be freely given when justice so requires.”  But “leave to 
amend a complaint may be denied for particularized reasons, such as 
. . . where amendment would be futile.” Hakari v Ski Brule, Inc, 230 
Mich App 352, 355; 584 NW2d 345 (1998).   
MCR 2.118(D) provides: 
“An amendment that adds a claim or a defense relates back to 
the date of the original pleading if the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the original 
pleading.” 
However, “[t]he relation-back doctrine does not apply to the addition 
of new parties.”  Cowles v Bank West, 263 Mich App 213, 229; 687 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
NW2d 603 (2004)[ aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded 476 
Mich 1 (2006)]; see also Employers Mutual, supra at 63. 
Plaintiff 
contends, 
nevertheless, 
that 
the 
requested 
amendment would do no more than correct a misnomer and that the 
Employers Mutual rule therefore does not bar the amendment and its 
relation back. “‘As a general rule, . . . a misnomer of a plaintiff or 
defendant is amendable unless the amendment is such as to effect an 
entire change of parties.’” Parke, Davis & Co v Grand Trunk Ry 
System, 207 Mich 388, 391; 174 NW 145 (1919) (citation omitted). 
The misnomer doctrine applies only to correct inconsequential 
deficiencies or technicalities in the naming of parties, for example, 
“‘[w]here the right corporation has been sued by the wrong name, 
and service has been made upon the right party, although by a wrong 
name . . . .’” Wells v Detroit News, Inc, 360 Mich 634, 641; 104 
NW2d 767 (1960), quoting Daly v Blair, 183 Mich 351, 353; 150 
NW 134 (1914); see also Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co v 
Plywood Products Corp, 311 Mich 226, 232; 18 NW2d 387 (1945) 
(allowing an amendment to correct the designation of the named 
plaintiff from “corporation” to “partnership”)[,] and Stever v Brown, 
119 Mich 196; 77 NW 704 (1899) (holding that an amendment to 
substitute the plaintiffs’ full names where their first and middle 
names had been reduced to initials in the original complaint would 
have been permissible). 
Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to 
substitute or add a wholly new and different party to the 
proceedings, the misnomer doctrine is inapplicable.  See Voigt 
Brewery Co v Pacifico, 139 Mich 284, 286; 102 NW 739 (1905); 
Rheaume v Vandenberg, 232 Mich App 417, 423 n 2; 591 NW2d 
331 (1998). 
1 See 11 USC 541; 11 USC 323;[In re Cottrell], 876 F2d 540 (CA 6, 
1989). 
Moreover, this Court adds that MCR 2.118(D) specifies that an amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading only if it “adds a claim or a 
defense”; it does not specify that an amendment to add a new party also relates 
4  
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
 
back to the date of the original pleading.1  Consequently, the Court of Appeals 
correctly affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the amendment to substitute 
plaintiff’s bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff after the expiration of the period of 
limitations would be futile. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
1 Justice Kelly contends that, because MCR 2.118(D) does not specifically 
forbid an amendment to add a new party to relate back, this Court may rely on the 
“purpose” and “basic policy” of the relation-back rule and the statute of 
limitations. This overlooks, however, that the “purpose” and “basic policy” of a 
court rule, as with other expressions of the law, are normally communicated by 
their language. In particular, it has been long understood that the expression of 
specific exceptions to the application of a law, as here, implies that there are no 
other exceptions. See Hoerstman General Contracting, Inc v Hahn, 474 Mich 66, 
74 n 8; 711 NW2d 340 (2006) (stating the interpretative rule expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, i.e., “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another”).   
Moreover, Justice Kelly’s assertion that this Court is “allow[ing] 
gamesmanship to take precedence over the orderly disposition of an injured 
party’s cause of action,” post at 1, simply ignores that defendants in their answer 
to plaintiff’s complaint provided plaintiff with notice of the defect that the wrong 
plaintiff had been named 12 days before the period of limitations expired.  Justice 
Kelly’s appeal to FR Civ P 15(c) is also inapposite, because the language of the 
federal rule is altogether different from MCR 2.118(D).  The current federal rule 
allows for the relation back of amendments to add a party “against whom a claim 
is asserted,” whereas MCR 2.118(D) does not.  Although Justice Kelly also cites 
the 1937 version of FR Civ P 15(c), that version allowed an amendment to relate 
back “[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence” in the original pleading.  In contrast, 
MCR 2.118(D) only allows an amendment to relate back if the amendment “adds 
a claim or a defense.” (Emphasis added.)  Justice Kelly ignores this dispositive 
difference. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
BUDDY MILLER, II, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 130808 
CHAPMAN CONTRACTING, RAMZY 
KIZY, JR., KEVIN R. PAPERD, and 
SWEEPMASTER, INC., 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I would deny leave to appeal in this case because to do otherwise would 
create an injustice. 
I believe that the bankruptcy trustee in this case is not a “new party” in the 
sense of “another party” being added by amendment of the complaint.  Rather, the 
amendment in this case simply involves replacing the wrongly named plaintiff, 
“Buddy Miller,” with the correct name of Buddy Miller’s bankruptcy trustee, 
“Wendy Turner Lewis.” As a result, any caselaw discussing whether the relation­
back doctrine applies to adding plaintiffs to a suit is immaterial because a new 
plaintiff is not being added. 
The Michigan Court Rules do not address the protocol for addition of 
parties to a suit. This Court has opened an administrative file to consider whether  
 
 
we should adopt, or not adopt, a rule amending the Michigan Court Rules to 
govern the addition of a party to a suit.       
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
BUDDY MILLER, II, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 130808 
CHAPMAN CONTRACTING, RAMZY 
KIZY, JR., KEVIN R. PAPERD, and 
SWEEPMASTER, INC., 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
A majority of the Court has affirmed the dismissal of this suit on the basis 
of a contrived legal technicality. It has misread MCR 2.118.  In extinguishing the 
valid claim, it has allowed gamesmanship to take precedence over the orderly 
disposition of an injured party’s cause of action.  The result is sad.  I respectfully 
dissent and would reverse the lower courts’ judgments, allow trustee Wendy 
Turner Lewis to be substituted as the party plaintiff, and enable the case to 
proceed to trial. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff Buddy Miller, II, was injured when the automobile in which he 
was traveling was struck by another driven by defendant Kevin R. Paperd.  The 
vehicle that Paperd was operating was owned by one or more of the other 
defendants. On March 6, 2002, plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for personal 
 
 
 
 
 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  11 USC 701 et seq. Lewis 
was appointed trustee of plaintiff’s estate and all of plaintiff’s rights regarding the 
accident were transferred to her. Lewis retained an attorney to bring suit to 
recover the damages that plaintiff sustained from the accident.  On October 22, 
2003, a lawsuit was filed. 
Service of the lawsuit on defendants was timely.  However, the complaint 
identified Miller as the party plaintiff.  Trustee Lewis should have been the named 
plaintiff. In an affidavit, Lewis’s attorney has taken full responsibility for the 
error. 
On December 16, 2003, fewer than two weeks before the statutory period 
of limitations expired, defendants answered the complaint.  They specifically 
raised as an affirmative defense that plaintiff Miller lacked standing to bring suit 
against defendants because trustee Lewis was the real party in interest.  After the 
limitations period expired, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition.  In 
response, plaintiff Miller sought to amend the complaint to substitute trustee 
Lewis as the party plaintiff. 
The circuit court denied the motion to amend and granted defendants’ 
motion for summary disposition.  The court found that it would be futile to allow 
the complaint to be amended, because the limitations period had run.  It ruled that 
the needed amendment would not relate back to the date of the filing of the 
complaint. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unpublished 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
opinion per curiam, issued February 16, 2006 (Docket No. 256676).  The majority 
has adopted the opinion as its own.     
ANALYSIS 
It is undisputed that it would be futile to allow the substitution of Lewis for 
Miller unless the amendment related back to the date of the filing of the complaint.  
Thus, the issue that controls the resolution of this case is whether relation back 
applies to an amendment that substitutes a party plaintiff.  A majority of this Court 
has decided that it does not. 
This is an erroneous decision, one that allows a 
miscarriage of justice to go uncorrected.1  As Justice Hugo Black of the United 
States Supreme Court has observed, the “‘principal function of procedural rules 
should be to serve as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal 
right to bring their problems before the courts.’”  Schiavone v Fortune, 477 US 21, 
27; 106 S Ct 2379; 91 L Ed 2d 18 (1986), quoting order adopting revised rules of 
the Supreme Court, 346 US 945, 946 (1954). 
1 The Michigan Court Rules provide at MCR 1.105 that the “rules are to be 
construed to secure the just . . . determination of every action and to avoid the 
consequences of error that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 
The result reached in this case is anything but just. In their answer, defendants 
stated that the trustee, not Miller, was the real party in interest.  This is proof that 
they had full notice of the proper party plaintiff before the limitations period ran. 
Yet, defendants waited until after the period of limitations had expired to bring 
their motion for summary disposition.  Although this proved an effective strategy, 
it illuminates what is wrong with the majority’s decision. By allowing defendants 
to prevail with a statute of limitations defense, this Court has elevated the skill 
level of defendant’s counsel over the pursuit of justice. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCR 2.118 
MCR 2.118 is the court rule that deals with amendments of pleadings.  In 
relevant part, it provides: 
(A) Amendments.  
* * *  
(2) Except as provided in subrule (A)(1), a party may amend 
a pleading only by leave of the court or by written consent of the 
adverse party. Leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
The court rules make no mention of whether a substitution of parties relates 
back to the date the original complaint was filed.  The majority’s chief reliance for 
its finding that the court rules do not permit a substitution of parties to relate back 
is MCR 2.118(D).  It reads: 
Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment that adds a 
claim or a defense relates back to the date of the original pleading if 
the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth, or attempted to be 
set forth, in the original pleading. 
But MCR 2.118(D) applies only to amendments that add a claim or defense.  The 
amendment in this case does neither. The original complaint asserted a claim 
arising from Buddy Miller’s automobile accident.  Had the substitution that 
plaintiff requested been allowed, the complaint would have continued to assert the 
same claim, no other. Not only would no claim or defense have been added, no 
party would have been added.  Before the amendment, there was one party 
plaintiff. 
After the substitution, there still would have been only one party 
plaintiff. Simply, Lewis would have been substituted for Miller.   
4  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
_________________________ 
 
Contrary to the majority’s statement, MCR 2.118(D) does not limit relation 
back only to new claims or defenses. Rather, it is silent with respect to whether 
relation back can apply to added or substituted parties. 
Although admittedly in a different context, this Court has previously 
allowed relation back where the amendment changed the named party.  In the case 
of Wells v Detroit News, Inc,2 the Court remarked, “‘While due diligence is 
required in pleadings of the plaintiff in the description of the parties, and pleadings 
still serve a necessary purpose, nevertheless, where no one has been misled in any 
manner by a misnomer, the amendment should be permitted.’”3 
Id., quoting 
Fildew v Stockard, 256 Mich 494, 498; 239 NW 868 (1932).  Accordingly, the 
majority’s claim that relation back is not allowed because the rules do not 
specifically allow it is unpersuasive and inconsistent with precedent. 
Because the court rules are silent with respect to whether a substitution of 
parties relates back, it is appropriate to identify what best effectuates the principle 
underlying the relation-back doctrine.  The purpose of relation back is to deprive 
defendants of the opportunity to defeat a valid claim by using a legal technicality 
when the rationale for the statute of limitations has been met.  6 Michigan Law & 
2 360 Mich 634, 641; 104 NW2d 767 (1960). 
3 The majority finds that relation back is proper when the amendment 
corrects a misnomer, as in Wells, but not when the amendment substitutes a party, 
as it does here. However, when no one has been misled and the opposing party 
has full notice, the distinction is indefensible. 
5  
 
 
 
   
  
_________________________ 
 
 
 
Practice, Civil Procedure, § 37, pp 69-70; Smith v Henry Ford Hosp, 219 Mich 
App 555, 558; 557 NW2d 154 (1996). 
Relation back “‘satisfies the basic policy of the statute of limitations, 
because the transactional base of the claim must still be pleaded before the statute 
runs, thereby giving defendant notice within the statutory period that he must be 
prepared to defend against all claims for relief arising out of that transaction.’” 
LaBar v Cooper, 376 Mich 401, 406; 137 NW2d 136 (1965), quoting Honigman 
& Hawkins, 1 Michigan Court Rules Annotated, p 416. 
In this case, allowing the amendment to relate back to the date of the filing 
of the complaint is consistent with the general principle underlying the relation­
back doctrine. Moreover, it does not transcend the purpose of the statute of 
limitations, which is to “‘prevent[] surprises through the revival of claims that 
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, 
and witnesses have disappeared.’”4 Cowles v Bank West, 476 Mich 1, 21; 719 
NW2d 94 (2006),5 quoting American Pipe & Constr Co v Utah, 414 US 538, 554; 
94 S Ct 756; 38 L Ed 2d 713 (1974) (further citation omitted).   
4 The majority offers no reason other than its reading of MCR 2.118(D) for 
its decision that relation back does not apply to amendments that substitute parties.  
5 The majority cites the Court of Appeals decision in Cowles for the 
proposition that relation back does not apply to the addition of new parties.  The 
holding in Cowles is inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, the statement 
was dictum since the Court of Appeals majority found that the amendment did not 
add new parties.  Second, this case involves substituting one party for another, not 
adding new parties.     
6  
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
It is uncontested that defendants had notice of the claim and knew that 
trustee Lewis was the real party in interest.  None of the facts concerning the 
accident and no part of the legal basis of the claim would change as a result of the 
amendment. Because defendants had notice and were not misled, it is illogical to 
conclude that the Legislature wrote the limitations statute intending that it be used 
as it has been here. 
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15 
When MCR 2.118 was first adopted, it was modeled after Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15.6  As this Court noted, “‘Sub-rule 118.4 is intended to 
introduce a more liberal and workable test, borrowed from the Federal Rules.’” 
LaBar, supra at 405, quoting 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules 
Annotated, p 416. The current version of MCR 2.118(D) closely resembles 
Federal Rule 15(c).7  Significantly, neither the current version of MCR 2.118(D) 
nor the 1937 version of Federal Rule 15(c) specifically addresses relation back of 
amendments that substitute parties. Despite this omission, federal courts have 
interpreted the 1937 version of Federal Rule 15(c) as allowing relation back of 
6 The predecessor of MCR 2.118 was adopted in 1963 as GCR 1963, 118. 
7 Federal Rule 15(c), promulgated in 1937, stated: 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
7  
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
amendments changing parties.8  In 1966, Federal Rule 15(c) was amended to 
address amendments of pleadings that change or rename party defendants.9  The 
advisory committee notes to the 1966 amendments indicate that the new 
provision formally recognized the validity of permitting amendments to change 
parties to relate back. 
Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more clearly when an 
amendment of a pleading changing the party against whom a claim 
is asserted (including an amendment to correct a misnomer or 
misdescription of a defendant) shall “relate back” to the date of the 
original pleading. [Advisory Committee Notes to FR Civ P 15(c).] 
8 See Russell v New Amsterdam Cas Co, 303 F2d 674, 680-681 (CA 8, 
1962); Jackson v Duke, 259 F2d 3, 6-7 (CA 5, 1958); American Fidelity & Cas Co 
v All American Bus Lines, Inc, 190 F2d 234, 236-237 (CA 10, 1951). 
9 Federal Rule 15(c), as amended in 1966, provided in relevant part: 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.  An 
amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted 
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the 
period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the 
party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of 
the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against him.  [Emphasis 
added.] 
8  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
The amendment did not mention relation back when the change involves a party 
plaintiff. However, the advisory committee notes reveal that the omission of 
plaintiffs from 15(c) does not preclude relation back in such circumstances. 
The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not 
expressly treated in revised Rule 15(c) since the problem is generally 
easier. Again the chief consideration of policy is that of the statute of 
limitations, and the attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward 
change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing 
plaintiffs. [Id.] 
While committee notes do not bind this Court, they do serve as an instructive aid 
to interpretation. Shields v Reddo, 432 Mich 761, 778; 443 NW2d 145 (1989). 
The foregoing committee notes and federal caselaw support construing MCR 
2.118(D) to allow relation back of amendments involving plaintiffs. 
In its current form, Federal Rule 15(c) continues to support the use of the 
relation back rule for amendments substituting plaintiffs.  Unlike MCR 2.118(D), 
Federal Rule 15(c)10 specifically addresses and allows relation back when a party 
defendant is substituted. It provides, in part: 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a 
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when 
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the 
statute of limitations applicable to the action, or 
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or 
10 The federal rule was amended to its current form in 1991.   
9  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the 
party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) 
is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service 
of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by 
amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the 
action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense 
on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would 
have been brought against the party. 
In 1992, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
California applied Rule 15(c) to allow the complaint to be amended to change the 
named party plaintiff in Arthur v Schurek, 139 BR 512 (1992). There, a trustee 
had filed a fraudulent conveyance claim only days before the statutory period of 
limitations was to expire. Id. at 513-514.  In his haste to file, counsel denominated 
the plaintiff as “James D. Arthur on behalf of Ralph O. Boldt, Trustee.”  Id. at 514. 
The trustee later filed an amended complaint, which changed the name of the 
plaintiff to “Ralph O. Boldt, Trustee.”  Id.  The defendants moved to dismiss the 
amended complaint, asserting that it instituted a new and separate claim belonging 
to the trustee, which was filed after the expiration of the limitations period.  Id. 
The Arthur court denied the motion, noting that “[t]he relation back of 
amendments changing plaintiffs is not expressly treated in revised Rule 
15(c) . . . .” Id. at 515 n 5. However, by analogy, the court found the test to be 
“whether ‘the [defendant] has received such notice of the institution of the action 
that the [defendant] will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
merits.’” Id. at 515. The original complaint in Arthur notified the defendants of 
10  
 
 
 
   
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
the institution of the fraudulent conveyance action.  Also, the defendants alleged 
no prejudice. 
Hence, the bankruptcy court found, by analogizing with rule 15(c), that the 
amendment substituting the trustee relates back to the date of the filing of the 
original complaint. Arthur, 139 BR at 515-516. In Arthur, the defendant was not 
misled and had full notice of the identity of the real party in interest.  The decision 
illustrates that, under those circumstances, no reason exists to refuse to apply 
relation back to an amendment that substitutes the named party plaintiff.11 
CONCLUSION 
I would reverse the lower courts’ judgments, allow the substitution of 
trustee Lewis as the party plaintiff, and remand the case for trial.  The majority’s 
reliance on MCR 2.118(D) is ill-founded because that rule does not address the 
substitution of a party. 
Relation back should be allowed in this case because it is consistent with 
the general principle underlying the relation-back doctrine:  defendants had full 
notice of the proper party plaintiff within the statutory period of limitations and 
were not misled by counsel’s error in naming Miller.  As Justice Black, speaking 
for the United States Supreme Court, stated “[t]here is no reason to apply a statute 
11 Other federal cases applying relation back to an amendment that changes 
the named plaintiff are Advanced Magnetics, Inc v Bayfront Partners, Inc, 106 
F3d 11, 18-21 (CA 2, 1997); SMS Fin, Ltd Liability Co v ABCO Homes, Inc, 167 
F3d 235, 244-245 (CA 5, 1999); and Plubell v Merck & Co, 434 F3d 1070, 1071­
74 (CA 8, 2006). 
11  
 
 
 
 
of limitations when, as here, [defendants have] had notice from the beginning that 
[plaintiff] was trying to enforce a claim against [them].”  Tiller v Atlantic Coast L 
R Co, 323 US 574, 581; 65 S Ct 421; 89 L Ed 465 (1945).    
Trustee Lewis has a valid claim. The majority should not read words into 
MCR 2.118 in such a manner as to deny Lewis her day in court. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
12