Title: Joan La Rock v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue
Citation: 2001 WI 7
Docket Number: 1999AP000951
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 13, 2001

2001 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0951 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Joan La Rock,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 24 
Reported at: 232 Wis. 2d 474, 606 N.W.2d 580 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 13, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 31, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald R. Zuidmulder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating: PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there was 
a brief by Gerald L. Hill, Jennifer L. Nutt Carleton and Oneida 
Law Office, Oneida, and oral argument by Gerald L. Hill and 
Jennifer Nutt Carleton. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent the cause was argued 
by F. Thomas Creeron, III, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief (in the court of appeals) was James E. Doyle, 
attorney general. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brian L. 
Pierson, Donald E. Laverdure and von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and Sheila D. Corbine and Ho-Chunk Nation 
Department of Justice, Black River Falls, on behalf of the Oneida 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin and Ho-Chunk Nation. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gregory B. 
Conway, Jeffrey S. Dunn and Liebman, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, 
S.C., Green Bay, and Sheldon E. Hochberg, John J. Duffy, Hilda A. 
Manuel and Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Washington, D.C., on behalf of 
the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Larry B. 
Leventhal and Leventhal & Associates, Minneapolis, MN, and Glenn 
C. Reynolds and Reynolds & Associates, Madison, on behalf of the 
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of the Lake Superior Chippewa Indians 
and the Sokaogon Chippewa Community. 
 
2001 WI 7 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0951 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joan LaRock,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The question presented in this 
case is whether an enrolled member of the Menominee Tribe, Joan 
LaRock (LaRock), is exempt from Wisconsin's income tax while 
living and working on the Oneida Reservation.  Because LaRock is 
a member of the Menominee Tribe rather than the Oneida Tribe, we 
conclude that principles of tribal sovereignty do not bar the 
State from taxing her income earned on the Oneida Reservation. 
¶2 
The Department of Revenue (DOR) sent notice to LaRock 
in 1996 that she owed $588.00 plus interest for income she 
earned in 1994 and 1995.  LaRock appealed the DOR's finding to 
the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission (Commission) on the ground 
that she is an "Indian" living in "Indian country."  Therefore, 
FILED 
 
FEB 13, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
2 
LaRock contended, she is exempt from state income tax under the 
United States Supreme Court holding in McClanahan v. State Tax 
Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), which exempted an 
enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe living and working on the 
Navajo Reservation from Arizona's income tax.  Id. at 181.  The 
Commission rejected LaRock's argument and ruled that because she 
is not an enrolled member of the Oneida Tribe, she is not exempt 
from Wisconsin's income tax.  The Circuit Court for Brown 
County, Donald R. Zuidmulder, Judge, subsequently affirmed the 
Commission's order.  The court of appeals then affirmed the 
holding of the circuit court. 
I 
¶3 
The facts are undisputed for the purposes of this 
review.  LaRock is an enrolled member of the Menominee Tribe.  
She married an enrolled member of the Oneida Tribe, with whom 
she had four children, all enrolled members of the Oneida Tribe. 
 She subsequently divorced in 1993.  For the taxable years 1994 
and 1995, LaRock resided on the Oneida Reservation and worked 
for Oneida Bingo and Casino, which is also on the Oneida 
Reservation.  The Oneida Bingo and Casino is wholly owned and 
operated by the Oneida Tribe.  In 1994 and 1995, LaRock deducted 
her federal adjusted gross income from the state income tax 
based on her American Indian status.  The DOR disallowed her 
deduction because she was not living and working on Menominee 
tribal lands.  LaRock appealed the DOR's finding to the 
Commission. 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
3 
¶4 
Granting the DOR's motion for summary judgment, the 
Commission found "no Act of Congress, no treaty, no state 
statute 
or 
state 
agreement 
with 
any 
tribe 
that 
impairs 
Wisconsin's right to impose an income tax on enrolled members of 
a federally-recognized Indian tribe who live and work on the 
reservation of another tribe in Wisconsin."  LaRock v. Wisconsin 
Dep't of Revenue, Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission, No. 96-I-
539, 15 (May 11, 1998).  LaRock appealed and the circuit court 
affirmed 
the 
Commission's 
ruling, 
explaining 
that 
"since 
[LaRock] is not a member of the Oneida Nations, she enjoys no 
protected status that would allow her to claim immunity from the 
duty she owes as a citizen of the State of Wisconsin to pay 
income taxes."  LaRock then appealed the circuit court's ruling. 
¶5 
The court of appeals reviewed the treaties and federal 
statutes and asserted that those laws did not preempt state 
income tax jurisdiction in this instance.  LaRock v. Wisconsin 
Dep't of Revenue, 2000 WI App 24, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 474, 606 
N.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1999).  The court then addressed McClanahan 
and the Supreme Court's use of the term "reservation Indian" 
therein.  Id. at 484.  The court reasoned that although the 
Supreme Court never defined that term, its ensuing opinions in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980), and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), distinguished 
between tribal members and nonmembers.  Id. at 484-88.  Thus, 
echoing the Commission, the court of appeals concluded that "no 
act of Congress, treaty, state statute or agreement with any 
tribe impairs Wisconsin's right to impose an income tax on 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
4 
enrolled members of a federally recognized Indian tribe that 
live and work on a reservation of another tribe."  Id. at 494. 
¶6 
LaRock then petitioned this court for review.  On 
April 28, 2000, we granted LaRock's petition. 
II 
¶7 
The 
present 
case 
entails 
applying 
the 
law 
to 
undisputed facts.  See Anderson v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 
169 Wis. 2d 255, 262, 484 N.W.2d 914 (1992).  Because this case 
presents a question of law, we are not bound by the Commission's 
conclusions.  Id.  Although the DOR asserts that the Commission 
has prior experience and has acquired general expertise in the 
area of Indian taxation, de novo review is appropriate because 
there is no evidence that the agency used any special knowledge 
or expertise.  Id. 
¶8 
Before applying the law to the facts of this case, it 
is necessary to consider the Indian sovereignty doctrine, which, 
as the United States Supreme Court has noted, "provides a 
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal 
statutes must be read."  McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.  First set 
forth by Chief Justice Marshall, the underlying principle of 
American Indian law is that Indian tribes are sovereign 
political entities.  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (6 
Pet.) (1832).  The United States Supreme Court has long 
recognized tribal rights and powers that are the accoutrements 
of sovereignty.  See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 
371 (1905) (acknowledging fishing rights of Yakima Indians 
secured in 1859 treaty); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
5 
(1908) (affirming rights of Gros Ventre and Assiniboing tribes 
to water from the Milk River); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 
391 U.S. 404 (1968) (observing that tribal hunting and fishing 
rights from 1854 treaty survived Termination Act of 1954); 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that 
Navajo Tribe has sovereign power to punish tribal member for 
committing a crime on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona); 
Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) (recognizing that 
the Cherokee Nation has the power to determine who is a member). 
 We 
recently 
emphasized 
the 
enduring 
vitality 
of 
tribal 
sovereignty in Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior 
Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 
N.W.2d 709.  Over the years, however, Indian tribes have seen 
their 
sovereignty 
tempered 
because 
"Congress 
has 
to 
a 
substantial degree opened the doors of reservations to state 
laws, in marked contrast to what prevailed in the time of Chief 
Justice Marshall."  Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 
60, 74 (1962).  The source of congressional power to do so 
"derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce 
with Indian tribes and for treaty making."  McClanahan, 411 U.S. 
at 172 n.7 (citations omitted).  Consequently, the notion of the 
"tribe," grounded in our federal constitution, is the essential 
political unit in American Indian law.  See U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Moreover, federal legislation 
over the past century has sought in some instances to encourage 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
6 
tribal coherence.1  Congress can pass legislation based on tribal 
status without running afoul of the equal protection clause 
because 
a 
"tribe" 
is 
a 
political 
rather 
than 
racial 
classification.  See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) 
(holding that a BIA hiring preference is not a "racial 
preference" because it is "granted to Indians not as a discrete 
racial group, but, rather, as member of quasi-sovereign tribal 
entities . . .").  Thus, it is against this backdrop of tribal 
sovereignty that we examine the power of Wisconsin to tax the 
income of LaRock.2 
                     
1 See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-
479 (2000).  Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 476, "[a]ny Indian tribe 
shall have the right to organize for its common welfare . . . ." 
 Therefore, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 fosters self-
government and sets forth a mechanism for federal recognition, 
which establishes the quasi-sovereign status of each tribe under 
federal law.  See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-479.  
2 The term "tribe," as used in this opinion, refers to one 
of the 556 federally recognized Indian tribes, each of which are 
distinct political units.  Indian Entities Recognized and 
Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 65 Fed. Reg. 13298-01 (Mar. 13, 2000).  This 
list indicates that the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin is a 
political unit distinct from the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin, 
which is in turn distinct from the Oneida Nation of New York.  
Id.  It is, of course, undisputed in this case that the 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin is distinct from the Oneida 
Tribe of Wisconsin.  However, at oral arguments, counsel for 
LaRock noted that there are six "bands of Chippewa" in Wisconsin 
and questioned whether the six "bands" would be considered one 
tribe.  The Bureau of Indian Affairs' list indicates that 
several Indian "bands" are distinct political units; therefore, 
they are separate federally recognized Indian tribes.  Id.  For 
example, the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of 
Wisconsin is a federally recognized tribe distinct from the Lac 
du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of the Lac du 
Flambeau Reservation of Wisconsin.  Id. 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
7 
¶9 
Wisconsin requires that "[f]or the purpose of raising 
revenue for the state and the counties, cities, villages and 
towns, there shall be assessed, levied, collected and paid a tax 
on all net incomes of individuals  . . . by every natural person 
residing within the state."  Wis. Stat. § 71.02 (1993-94).3  The 
United States Supreme Court has observed that "[e]njoyment of 
the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant 
right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable from 
the responsibility for sharing the costs of government."  
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932).  Relying 
on the Supreme Court's McClanahan decision, however, LaRock 
contends that she is exempted from the statutory obligation to 
pay state income tax.  Accordingly, we begin our analysis of her 
argument by reviewing the Supreme Court's McClanahan decision. 
¶10 McClanahan is widely regarded as the seminal case in 
the area of American Indian income taxation.4  There, the Court 
was required "to reconcile the plenary power of the States over 
residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status 
of Indians living on tribal reservations."  McClanahan, 411 U.S. 
at 165.  In McClanahan, an enrolled member of the Navajo tribe, 
living and earning her income on the Navajo reservation in 
Arizona, requested a refund for all of the money withheld from 
                     
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1993-94 version unless otherwise indicated.  
4 See, e.g., Sandra Hansen, Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in 
Indian Country 1990, 16 Am. Indian L. Rev. 356, 358 (1991) 
(referring to McClanahan as a "landmark decision"). 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
8 
her wages to cover her state income tax liability.  Id. at 165-
66.  The Court noted that "this case involves the narrow 
question whether the State may tax a reservation Indian for 
income earned exclusively on the reservation."  Id. at 168.  
After surveying the development of American Indian law over the 
last two hundred years, the Court set forth the touchstone of 
recent cases:  "[t]he modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance 
on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to 
the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of 
state power."  Id. at 172.  The Court then observed that in 
light of the 1868 treaty between the Navajo Nation and the 
United States Government, "it cannot be doubted that the 
reservation of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy 
of the Navajos and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the 
prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within the 
exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal 
supervision."  Id. at 174-75.  The Court further noted that 
"since 
the 
signing 
of 
the 
Navajo 
treaty, 
Congress 
has 
consistently acted upon the assumption that the State lacked 
jurisdiction over Navajos living on the reservation."  Id. at 
175.  Based on this two-fold analysis, the Court concluded that 
Arizona did not have jurisdiction to impose a tax on the income 
of a Navajo living on a Navajo reservation.  Id. at 181.  
McClanahan, therefore, stands for the proposition that a state 
may not impose an income tax upon tribal members living and 
working on their own tribal lands. 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
9 
¶11 Since 
McClanahan, 
the Supreme 
Court 
has further 
delineated the fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty and 
the mode of analysis for lower courts to utilize when tribal 
sovereignty 
is 
invoked. 
 
See 
Colville, 
447 
U.S. 
134 
(distinguishing between nonmember Indians on the lands of 
another tribe and tribal members on their own lands in the state 
taxation context); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136 (1980) (setting forth the inquiry to determine whether 
a state can regulate tribal activity on tribal lands); Duro, 495 
U.S. 676 (distinguishing between nonmember Indians on the lands 
of another tribe and tribal members on their own lands in the 
criminal jurisdiction context); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox 
Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993) (characterizing McClanahan as a case 
"in which the Court held that a State could not subject a tribal 
member living on the reservation, and whose income derived from 
reservation sources, to a state income tax absent an express 
authorization from Congress").  We glean two tenets from these 
post-McClanahan cases that are relevant to the present facts:  
(1) there is a distinction between nonmember Indians on the 
lands of another tribe and tribal members living on their own 
tribal lands; and (2) state authority may be asserted over 
American Indians on all tribal lands where the exercise of such 
authority does not conflict with federal law or treaties and it 
does not unlawfully infringe on the right of reservation Indians 
to make their own laws and be ruled by them.5 
                     
5 This second tenet is the analysis set forth in White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980), 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
10
III 
¶12 The first post-McClanahan Supreme Court case that 
explicitly marked the distinction between nonmember Indians 
living on the lands of another tribe and tribal members living 
on their own tribal lands was Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).  There, the Court confronted 
the issue of whether the State of Washington could impose sales 
and use taxes upon American Indians on the reservation of 
another tribe.  The Court, noting that it was apparent after 
"McClanahan that the sales tax could not be applied to similar 
purchases by tribal members," reasoned that "[f]ederal statutes, 
even given the broadest reading to which they are reasonably 
susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt Washington's power to 
impose its taxes on Indians not members of the Tribe."  Id. at 
160.  Further tracing the distinction between nonmember Indians 
                                                                  
which confronted the question of whether Arizona (a Public Law 
280 state for limited purposes) had the power to impose a motor 
carrier license and use taxes on a logging company for its 
logging and hauling operations performed solely on the Fort 
Apache Reservation.  We note that Wisconsin is a Public Law 280 
state and this same analysis might not apply to non-Public Law 
280 states.  Public Law 280 is primarily a grant of state 
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against 
Indians on the reservations to six states, including Wisconsin, 
and other states at their option.  See Bryan v. Itasca County, 
426 U.S. 373, 379-87 (1976).  In Bryan, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the grant of civil jurisdiction in Public Law 280 did not 
grant Minnesota the power to tax "reservation Indians" in 
contrast to McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 
(1973).  Id. at 390.  However, neither the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Bryan nor Public Law 280 prohibit a state from taxing 
non-reservation Indians.  See ¶23. 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
11
on the lands of another tribe and tribal members on their own 
lands, the Court addressed the issue of tribal sovereignty: 
 
Nor would the imposition of Washington's tax on these 
purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-
government, for the simple reason that nonmembers are 
not constituents of the governing Tribe.  For most 
practical purposes those [nonmember resident] Indians 
stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on 
the reservation.  There is no evidence that nonmembers 
have a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in 
tribal disbursements.  We find, therefore, that the 
State's interest in taxing these purchasers outweighs 
any tribal interest that may exist in preventing the 
State from imposing its taxes. 
Id. at 161.  The Court, therefore, in the context of state 
taxation, highlighted the demarcation between nonmember Indians 
who are on the lands of another tribe and tribal members on 
their own tribal lands.   
¶13 LaRock, however, attempts to obscure the line between 
nonmember Indians on the lands of another tribe and tribal 
members on their own tribal lands, arguing that Colville 
involved the taxation of goods and is so confined to its facts. 
 While Colville did involve sales and use taxes rather than an 
income tax, this is a distinction without a difference.  The 
central issue in Colville was whether the state had the power to 
tax a nonmember Indian on another tribe's lands; the nature of 
the tax was immaterial.  Thereby the Supreme Court established a 
bright-line test for determining whether an individual may 
participate in the accoutrements of sovereignty when he or she 
is on tribal lands:  whether the individual is an enrolled 
member of that tribe.   
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
12
¶14 This interpretation of Colville is in accord with 
other jurisdictions.  Prior to Colville, several jurisdictions 
did hold that McClanahan exempted all American Indians on any 
tribal lands from state taxation.  See Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 
531 P.2d 1234, 1234-35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); LaRoque v. Montana, 
583 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Mont. 1978); and Topash v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679, 680-81 (Minn. 1980).  However, after 
the Court handed down Colville, Fox was explicitly overruled by 
New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dep't v. L.R. Greaves, 864 P.2d 
324, 325 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); LaRoque was rendered invalid by 
the passage of Mont. Admin. Reg. § 42.15.121(1); and most 
recently, Topash was abrogated by Minnesota v. R.M.H., 617 
N.W.2d 55, 64 (Minn. 2000).  Thus, New Mexico, Montana, and 
Minnesota have all revisited this same issue in light of 
Colville and recognized the distinction between a nonmember 
Indian on the lands of another tribe and tribal members on their 
own lands.  Moreover, Arizona applied Colville to find the same 
distinction in State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. 
Dillion, 826 P.2d 1186, 1191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).  Indeed, the 
only jurisdictions that provide nonmember Indians on the lands 
of another tribe with the same McClanahan tax-exempt status as 
tribal members on their own tribal lands are those such as 
Oregon and Idaho, which have statutes granting an income tax 
exemption for all American Indians on Indian lands within their 
borders, or North Dakota, which has not confronted the issue 
since Colville.  See Or. Rev. Stat. § 316.777 (1999); Idaho Code 
§ 63-3026A(4)(b)(iv) (2000); White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
13
621 (N.D. 1973).  Consequently, we do not accept the argument 
that Colville is confined to the subject of state sales and use 
taxes; instead, we regard it as a watershed case that further 
clarifies the general principles set forth in McClanahan. 
 
¶15 The fact that the Supreme Court declined to confine 
the distinction between nonmember Indians and tribal members to 
state sales and use tax cases is apparent from the second case 
where the same distinction was raised, albeit in a different 
context.  In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990), the 
Supreme Court considered whether the Salt River Pima-Maricopa 
Indian Community—a recognized Tribe with an enrolled membership—
had criminal jurisdiction over Albert Duro, an enrolled member 
of the Torres-Maricopa Band of the Cahuilla Mission Indians, 
where he allegedly shot and killed a fourteen-year-old boy 
within the Salt River Reservation.  Analyzing the power of the 
Pima-Maricopa Tribe to prosecute Duro, the Court reasoned that 
"the retained sovereignty of the tribes is that needed to 
control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own 
unique customs and social order."  Id. at 685-86.  But this 
retained sovereignty was not implicated in the case of a 
nonmember Indian—who could not participate in the tribal 
government—committing a crime on another tribe's lands.  Id. at 
688.  In so deciding, the Court again addressed the issue at 
hand: 
 
The distinction between members and nonmembers and its 
relation to self-governance is recognized in other 
areas of Indian law.  Exemption from state taxation 
for residents of a reservation, for example, is 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
14
determined by tribal membership, not by reference to 
Indians as a general class.  We have held that States 
may not impose certain taxes on transactions of tribal 
members 
on 
the 
reservation 
because 
this 
would 
interfere 
with 
internal 
governance 
and 
self-
determination.  But this rational does not apply to 
taxation of nonmembers, even where they are Indians. 
Id. at 686-87 (citation omitted).  Therefore, the Court 
reasserted the holding of Colville in determining that the 
sovereignty retained by Indian tribes does not include criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, although it does include, 
of course, criminal jurisdiction over tribal members on their 
own tribal lands.  Id. at 694.   
¶16 However, the Pima-Maricopa Tribe raised the concern 
that if the Court did not grant it criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians on its tribal lands, "the tribes will lack 
important power to preserve order on the reservation, and 
nonmember Indians will be able to violate the law with 
impunity."  Id. at 696.  The Court responded to the Pima-
Maricopa's 
concern 
by 
asserting 
that 
"[i]f 
the 
present 
jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical 
needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to 
address the problem is Congress, which has the ultimate 
authority over Indian affairs."  Id. at 698.  Congress responded 
to the Court's invitation by passing the "Duro fix," which 
granted tribes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on 
tribal lands.  25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000).   
¶17 LaRock, 
by 
looking 
to 
committee 
reports 
and 
legislative history, argues that the "Duro fix" not only 
overturned the United States Supreme Court's decision in Duro, 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
15
but mandated that a state has no inherent jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians within Indian country.  LaRock's argument 
fails for three reasons.  First, Congress did precisely what the 
Supreme Court invited it to do in Duro; there was no question 
that 
Congress 
was 
within 
its 
authority 
in 
passing 
such 
legislation. 
 
Although 
Congress 
granted 
"Indian 
tribes" 
jurisdiction over Indians committing a crime on their tribal 
lands, 
it 
does 
not 
follow 
that 
Congress 
eliminated 
the 
distinction between Indian tribes.  25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).  To the 
contrary, if Congress intended to erase this distinction, it 
could have done so explicitly in the legislation.  Second, 
Congress has not acted to overturn Colville, which unlike Duro, 
is within the context of the present case—state taxation.  Of 
course, the Wisconsin Legislature could act to grant such an 
exemption, but so far has refrained from doing so, in contrast 
to the state legislatures in Oregon and Idaho.  Finally, the 
Supreme Court, while indicating that it was cognizant of the 
"Duro fix," repeated the rule of its "pathmaking case" of 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981), which 
defined the limits of tribal sovereignty: 
 
'Indian tribes retain their inherent power [to punish 
tribal offenders,] to determine tribal membership, to 
regulate domestic relations among members, and to 
prescribe rules of inheritance for members . . . but 
[a tribe's inherent power does not reach] beyond what 
is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations.'   
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 n.5, 459 (1997) 
(bracketed material in the original).  The Court, as evidenced 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
16
by this recent reiteration of the Montana rule in a case 
fourteen years after the "Duro fix," has held since McClanahan 
that membership in a tribe, not ethnic status as an American 
Indian, is the integral fact that brings inherent tribal 
sovereignty into play.  Thus, the distinction between nonmember 
Indians on the lands of another tribe and tribal members on 
their own landsas stressed in Colville and reasserted in 
Duroremains valid. 
IV 
¶18 The fact that neither Congress nor the Wisconsin 
Legislature has acted to grant the exemption indicates that the 
State is not preempted from taxing LaRock.  The applicable 
analysis was set forth in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), which followed Colville and 
confronted the issue present here:  whether the state has 
jurisdiction to regulate and tax activity occurring on tribal 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
17
lands.6  The threshold question is whether the exercise of state 
authority is pre-empted by federal law.  Id. at 142.  The second 
question is whether state authority "infringe[s] 'on the right 
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.'"  Id.   
A 
¶19 As for the first inquiry, LaRock asserts that "the 
Treaties that established the Oneida Reservation preclude the 
extension of State income tax law to Indians on the Oneida 
Reservation."  An examination of the treaties between the Oneida 
Tribe and the United States does not support her conclusion.  
LaRock has referred us to an 1831 treaty between the United 
                     
6 LaRock urges this court to employ the "categorical 
approach" outlined in the United States Supreme Court decision 
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima 
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992).  This approach is that 
"'absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes 
permitting it,' we have held, a State is without power to tax 
reservation lands and reservation Indians."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  However, this "categorical approach" is only utilized 
"when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe 
or its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-
Indians . . . ."  Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 
U.S. 450, 458 (1995) (emphasis added).  LaRock is not a member 
of the Oneida tribe; therefore, the categorical analysis would 
be inappropriate.  This is in accord with the Supreme Court's 
conclusion that nonmember Indians resident on another tribe's 
lands have the same status as non-Indians resident on tribal 
lands in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 
134, 161 (1980).  As noted above, there the Court discussed 
whether the imposition of a tax on a nonmember Indian on another 
tribe's lands "contravene[s] the principle of tribal self-
government."  Id.  The Court concluded that the tax would not do 
so because "non-members are not constituents of the governing 
Tribe.  For most practical purposes those Indians stand on the 
same footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation."  Id. 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
18
States and the Menominee Tribe, an 1838 treaty between the 
United States and the Oneida Tribe, as well as an 1822 treaty 
between the United States, the Menominee Tribe, and the Oneida 
Tribe.  See Treaty of February 8, 1831, between the Menominee 
Tribe and the United States; Treaty of February 3, 1838, between 
the Onieda Tribe and the United States; Treaty of September 23, 
1822, between 
Oneida, 
Stockbridge, 
Tuscaroara, 
St. 
Regis, 
Munusee and Menominee Tribes of Indians.  In none of the 
treaties to which LaRock has referred us is taxation mentioned. 
 Nor do they imply that a nonmember is exempt from state 
taxation while on another tribe's lands.  Therefore, they do not 
provide a basis to preempt Wis. Stat. § 71.02.   
¶20 LaRock 
further 
suggests 
that 
a 
"sister-Tribe 
relationship" exists between the Menominee Tribe and the Oneida 
Tribe as evidenced by "Treaties in 1821 and 1822" between the 
two tribes.  According to the 1822 Treaty, which is the only 
treaty between the Menominee Tribe and the Oneida Tribe that 
LaRock has cited, the Menominee Tribe ceded some tribal lands to 
the Oneida Tribe and retained some limited rights to enjoy the 
ceded lands, but the treaty does not create dual-sovereignty 
over their respective lands.  See Treaty of September 23, 1822, 
between Oneida, Stockbridge, Tuscaroara, St. Regis, Munusee and 
Menominee Tribes of Indians.  It is undisputed that LaRock is an 
enrolled member of the Menominee Tribe, living and working on 
Oneida lands.  LaRock does not assert that she has any more 
voice in Oneida tribal affairs than a non-Indian or that this 
"sister-relationship" between the two tribes gives her any voice 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
19
in Oneida tribal affairs.  Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for 
LaRock admitted that the cessation of Menominee land to the 
Oneida Tribe only indicates that the Menominee Tribe has a 
relationship with the Oneida Tribe.  The tribes do not grant 
dual-memberships. 
¶21 LaRock next contends that the definition of "Indian 
country" in 18 U.S.C. § 1151—when read in conjunction with 
McClanahan—supports the proposition that Wis. Stat. § 71.02 has 
been preempted by federal law, thereby preventing the State from 
taxing her income.  LaRock maintains that "[i]t is the creation 
and oversight of Indian country that the Federal government 
preempts 
the 
State's 
ability 
to 
tax 
Indian 
tribes 
and 
individuals."  We reject her argument.  The language of 18 
U.S.C. § 1151, within the Indian Crimes Act, defines "Indian 
country" as:   
 
[T]he term 'Indian country' as used in this chapter, 
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through  
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within 
 the 
original 
or 
subsequently 
acquired 
territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a 
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian 
titles to which have not been extinguished, including 
rights-of-way running through the same. 
Drafted in 1948, the nomenclature "Indian country," although it 
has been used in a civil context,7 refers to the various types of 
                     
7 See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 
114, 123 (1993). 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
20
Indian lands for the purposes of the Indian Crimes Act.  The 
need for such a nomenclature is apparent when the various forms 
of Indian lands, created by the dramatic reversals in federal 
Indian policy over the years, are considered.  See Egan, 369 
U.S. at 72-74 (tracing the history of the discombobulated 
federal Indian policy, which includes the establishment of 
allotments, dependent communities and other forms of Indian 
lands).  Therefore, when Congress decided to pass criminal 
legislation for all Indian lands, it chose the term "Indian 
country" and included within the definition the various forms of 
Indian lands in the United States.  Such a definition, however, 
does not preempt the State either explicitly or implicitly from 
taxing the income of a nonmember American Indian residing on the 
lands of another tribe.  When read with the aforementioned 
Supreme Court caselaw, it is clear that the Supreme Court—in 
Colville and again in Duro—drew a distinction between nonmembers 
on the lands of another tribe and tribal members on their own 
tribal lands.  LaRock has not cited any other federal law as 
having preempted the State from imposing income tax in such a 
situation.  And we find no federal law—including treaties, 
statutory provisions, and caselaw—that preempts the State from 
imposing an income tax on a nonmember Indian living on another 
tribe's lands.   
B 
¶22 The second area of inquiry is whether State authority 
will infringe upon the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them.  Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142. 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
21
 This inquiry is targeted at whether the tribe's sovereignty is 
restricted by the imposition of the tax.  Therefore, we must 
begin by ascertaining the meaning of the term "reservation 
Indian."  In McClanahan, the Supreme Court employed the term 
"reservation Indian" in order to distinguish those facts from 
its holding in Egan, 369 U.S. 60, which "came in the context of 
a decision concerning the fishing rights of nonreservation 
Indians."  McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176 n.15.  LaRock, however, 
turns to this court's definition of a "reservation Indian" in 
Anderson, where we said that "the term 'reservation Indian' 
refers to an Indian living on the reservation."  169 Wis. 2d at 
276.  This definition, LaRock argues, encompasses her because 
she "is an Indian that lives on a Reservation, the Oneida 
Reservation."  In Anderson, however, we were referring to the 
specific reservation of the particular tribe in which Anderson 
was enrolled:  the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of the Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians.  Id. at 276, 260.  LaRock attempts to stretch 
this 
definition 
to 
include 
all 
Indian 
reservations, 
a 
proposition for which she provides no authority.  Inasmuch as 
LaRock is not an enrolled member of the Oneida Tribe living on 
the Oneida Reservation, she is not a "reservation Indian" as 
that term is used in United States Supreme Court precedent or in 
our Anderson decision. 
¶23 It is because LaRock is not an enrolled member of the 
Oneida Tribe that the tribal sovereignty of the Oneidas is not 
implicated.  The fact is that LaRock—who is an enrolled member 
of the Menonminee Tribe—has no voice in the affairs of the 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
22
Oneida Tribe as she may in the affairs of the Menominee Tribe.  
Nor does she have an expectation of having a voice in Onieda 
Tribal affairs as her children, who are enrolled members of the 
Oneida Tribe, may have.  She merely asserts that she is an 
"Indian" residing in "Indian country" and therefore is exempt 
from the State's income tax.  While it is undisputed that she is 
an American Indian, her ethnicity does not confer upon her any 
more rights or privileges within the Oneida Tribe than a non-
Indian has within the Oneida Tribe.  Therefore, we do not find 
that the State is preempted from imposing an income tax on 
LaRock.   
V 
¶24 In conclusion, we hold that the State is not barred by 
principles of tribal sovereignty from taxing LaRock's income 
because, although she is an enrolled member of the Menominee 
Tribe, she is not an enrolled member of the Oneida Tribe.  We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶25 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
99-0951 
 
 
1