Title: Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Dr. Condo. Ass'n
Citation: 2013 IL 110505
Docket Number: 110505
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2013

2013 IL 110505
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 110505)
GARY PALM, Appellee, v. 2800 LAKE SHORE DRIVE
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed April 25, 2013.
CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Garman, Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
Justice Thomas specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.
OPINION
¶ 1
The primary issue in this appeal is whether a City of Chicago
ordinance allowing condominium unit owners to inspect
condominium association financial books and records is a valid
exercise of the City’s home rule power. We affirm the appellate
court’s holding that the City’s ordinance is valid and enforceable. We
also affirm the appellate court’s decision that the trial court did not
err in awarding the plaintiff interim attorney fees.
¶ 2
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3
Plaintiff Gary Palm owns a unit in the 2800 Lake Shore Drive
condominium building in Chicago. He served on the board of
directors of the condominium association from 1992 to 1998.
¶ 4
On September 15, 1999, Palm sent a letter to the president of the
Association board of directors asking for production of specific
documents and records related to the building’s management. Palm
explained that he needed the documents to investigate the board’s
actions, including whether: (1) the board awarded contracts
improperly; (2) the board used improper investment and banking
practices; (3) the board held unlawful private meetings; (4) board
president Kay Grossman used Association funds without proper
approval; (5) the 1998 board election was compromised by
“irregularities or improprieties”; and (6) legal action should have
been pursued against the builder.
¶ 5
When his request was denied, Palm filed a complaint seeking to
examine, inspect, and copy the documents. The Association moved
to dismiss the complaint, and the circuit court of Cook County
dismissed it without prejudice.
¶ 6
Palm then filed a four-count first amended complaint. In count IV,
the only claim at issue in this appeal, Palm challenged the denial of
his request for production of documents. Palm sought an order
compelling production of the documents under various laws,
including a provision of the City’s condominium ordinance. The
ordinance allows condominium unit owners to inspect a
condominium association’s financial books and records within three
business days of delivering a written request to examine the records.
Chicago Municipal Code § 13-72-080 (2009).
¶ 7
The Association moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-
615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)).
On December 11, 2000, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss
all four counts of the complaint, ruling that section 107.75 of the
General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986 (805 ILCS
105/107.75 (West 2000)) preempted the City’s ordinance and Palm
was not entitled to the requested documents under that statute. The
trial court allowed Palm 14 days to file a second amended complaint.
¶ 8
On December 19, 2000, Palm filed a motion to reconsider the
dismissal of his first amended complaint. The City petitioned to
intervene to defend the validity of its ordinance and submitted a brief
in support of Palm’s motion to reconsider. The trial court allowed the
City to intervene.
¶ 9
The trial court entered an order on April 3, 2001, stating it had
reconsidered the previous dismissal order. The trial court dismissed
with prejudice counts I, II, and III of the first amended complaint.
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Count IV was dismissed without prejudice and Palm was given until
April 17, 2001, to file a second amended complaint. The trial court
denied the City’s request for a finding under Supreme Court Rule
304(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)) that there was no just
reason to delay an appeal.
¶ 10
On April 17, 2001, Palm filed a motion to reconsider the order
entered on April 3, 2001. A new trial judge was assigned due to the
retirement of the original judge. The trial court granted Palm’s motion
in part, vacating the dismissal of count IV based on its finding that the
City’s ordinance was a valid exercise of its home rule authority and
the ordinance was not preempted by a state statute. The Association’s
motion to dismiss was, therefore, denied.
¶ 11
The trial court later granted in part Palm’s motion for summary
judgment on count IV of his complaint. The Association was ordered
to produce the requested documents as required by the City’s
ordinance.
¶ 12
Palm petitioned for an award of interim attorney fees, alleging
that as the prevailing party he was entitled to fees under the
ordinance. Palm submitted that $300 per hour was reasonable and
appropriate. He acknowledged that he paid his attorney in accordance
with a fee agreement at a rate of $200 per hour, but claimed it was a
reduced rate. He asserted that when attorney fees are recoverable
under a statute, it is typical for a fee agreement to provide for a
reduced hourly rate with reasonable attorney fees determined upon
completion of the case.
¶ 13
Palm’s petition further alleged that the fee award would be
retained by his attorney. According to the petition, Palm would
receive no part of the award other than reimbursement of his actual
payments to his attorney. Palm submitted an affidavit of retired Cook
County Circuit Court Judge Kenneth L. Gillis, asserting that the rate
of $300 per hour was “well within the prevailing market rates charged
in comparable cases by Chicago attorneys of similar qualifications,
skill and experience.”
¶ 14
On August 26, 2008, the trial court granted Palm’s interim fee
petition under the ordinance. Palm was awarded attorney fees at the
rate of $300 per hour. The trial court certified for immediate appeal
under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) the order granting Palm partial
summary judgment on count IV of his complaint and the award of
interim attorney fees.
-3-
¶ 15
The appellate court held that the Chicago ordinance authorizing
inspection of the Association’s records was a valid exercise of the
City’s home rule power and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in entering the award for interim attorney fees. Accordingly, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 401 Ill. App. 3d
868.
¶ 16
We allowed the defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct.
R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
¶ 17
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18
A. Jurisdiction
¶ 19
First, we identified a potential jurisdictional issue in our initial
review of the briefs in this case. The briefs describe a complicated
procedural background suggesting that the trial court may have
entered a final judgment on April 3, 2001. The briefs indicate that the
April 3, 2001, order denied the motion to reconsider the dismissal of
the first amended complaint. According to the briefs, that order was
followed by a second motion to reconsider filed more than 30 days
later on May 8, 2001.
¶ 20
The jurisdictional concerns were raised by this court during oral
argument, and we subsequently entered an order allowing the parties
to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the circuit court lost
jurisdiction before entering the orders subject to this appeal. The
parties filed supplemental briefs clarifying that the April 3, 2001,
order dismissed count IV without prejudice and with leave to refile.
The parties assert that the order was not a final judgment subject to
appeal and the trial court never entered a final order dismissing count
IV of the first amended complaint. The parties, therefore, agree that
the trial court did not lose jurisdiction before entering the orders
subject to appeal in this case.
¶ 21
The jurisdictional concerns that arose in our initial review of this
case centered on whether the April 3, 2001, order constituted a final
judgment. A civil ruling is final if it terminates the litigation and fixes
the parties’ rights leaving only enforcement of the judgment. In re
Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 42-43 (2010). A review of the
record confirms that the April 3, 2001, order dismissed count IV of
the first amended complaint without prejudice and with leave to
refile. An order dismissing a complaint with leave to amend is not a
final judgment. See Smith v. Central Illinois Regional Airport, 207
Ill. 2d 578, 585-87 (2003). The order did not terminate the litigation
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or fix the parties’ rights. Additionally, the order was subject to
reconsideration by the trial court at any time prior to entry of a final
judgment. See Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 119-21
(1978). Thus, after reviewing the record, we agree with the parties
that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction before entering the orders
subject to this appeal.
¶ 22
B. Validity of Ordinance
¶ 23
The central issue in this appeal is whether the Chicago ordinance
allowing condominium unit owners access to association financial
books and records is a valid exercise of the City’s home rule power.1
The defendants contend that the ordinance conflicts with and renders
unenforceable within the City of Chicago portions of the
Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 2000))
and the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986. Those
statutes require condominium unit owners to state a proper purpose
for obtaining association financial books and records, require
production of only 10 years of records, and allow an association 30
days to gather and produce the records. Under the Chicago ordinance,
a unit owner is not required to state a proper purpose for requesting
the records, there is no restriction on the age of the documents, and
the documents must be produced within three business days of the
request. The defendants contend that the ordinance exceeds the City’s
home rule authority because it conflicts with the statutory provisions
and renders them unenforceable. The defendants, therefore, maintain
that the appellate court’s judgment upholding the ordinance should be
reversed.
¶ 24
Palm and the City contend that the General Assembly may limit
home rule authority to regulate in a given field by expressly reserving
that power for itself or prohibiting home rule units from exercising
that power. They contend that in rare cases involving interference
with a vital state interest, this court has intervened to compensate for
legislative inaction or oversight and preempted the exercise of home
rule authority. This court has intervened, however, only in cases
The defendants do not raise any issue on the construction of the
1
ordinance or whether the documents requested by Palm were subject to
production under the terms of the ordinance. The appeal is limited to
whether the ordinance is a valid and enforceable exercise of home rule
power. 
-5-
involving environmental regulations based on specific language in the
Illinois Constitution establishing the state’s supremacy in that field.
The legislature has not specifically limited the authority of home rule
units to regulate condominiums or reserved that power for itself, and
the state does not have a vital interest in regulating condominiums
necessary to justify preemption of the City’s ordinance. Accordingly,
Palm and the City contend that the appellate court’s judgment should
be affirmed.
¶ 25
Palm also asserts that in response to his September 15, 1999,
letter requesting production of documents, the Association’s attorney
provided a copy of a monthly income-expense report with a letter
claiming to comply with the ordinance. Palm contends that the letter
claiming to comply with the City’s ordinance constitutes a waiver of
any challenge to the validity of the ordinance. Palm does not cite any
authority in support of his claim.
¶ 26
Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Phipps,
238 Ill. 2d 54, 62 (2010) (quoting People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444
n.2 (2005), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993)). In contrast, forfeiture applies when an issue is not raised in
a timely manner. Waiver is, therefore, distinct from forfeiture. People
v. Houston, 229 Ill. 2d 1, 9 n.3 (2008).
¶ 27
Palm has not established that the defendants intentionally
relinquished or abandoned their claim that the ordinance exceeds the
City’s home rule power. The letter from the Association’s attorney
purports to comply with the ordinance but does not make any
statement relinquishing or abandoning any challenge to the ordinance.
The letter does not even mention or recognize the availability of a
potential claim under the home rule provisions of the Illinois
Constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants did not
waive their claim in this case.
¶ 28
The appeal in this case is from the trial court’s entry of partial
summary judgment ordering production of the requested documents
under the City’s ordinance. Summary judgment is appropriate when
“the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2008). We review de
novo an order granting summary judgment. Millennium Park Joint
Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 309 (2010).
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¶ 29
Home rule is based on the assumption that municipalities should
be allowed to address problems with solutions tailored to their local
needs. Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d
281, 286 (2001). The home rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution were designed to alter drastically the relationship
between our local and state governments. City of Chicago v. Roman,
184 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (1998). Article VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois
Constitution provides:
“Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its
government and affairs including, but not limited to, the
power to regulate for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur
debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a).
¶ 30
Section 6(a) was written with the intention to give home rule units
the broadest powers possible. Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill.
2d 164, 174 (1992). The Illinois Constitution further provides that the
“[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed
liberally.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m).
¶ 31
The General Assembly may, however, preempt the exercise of a
municipality’s home rule powers by expressly limiting that authority.
Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 287; Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 185-
86. Under article VII, section 6(h), the General Assembly “may
provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of
any power or function of a home rule unit.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII,
§ 6(h). If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home
rule powers, the statute must contain an express statement to that
effect. City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 108 (1981)
(citing Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 528 (1976)). If
the legislature does not expressly limit or deny home rule authority,
a municipal ordinance and a state statute may operate concurrently as
provided in article VII, section 6(i):
“Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with
the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the
extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically
limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State’s
exercise to be exclusive.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i).
¶ 32
Thus, the Illinois Constitution provides home rule units with the
same powers as the sovereign, except when those powers are limited
by the General Assembly. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 513 (citing Triple A
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Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 230 (1989)). Under section 6(i),
home rule units may continue to regulate activities even if the state
has also regulated those activities. Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d
at 287-88. To restrict the concurrent exercise of home rule power, the
General Assembly must enact a law specifically stating home rule
authority is limited. Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 185-86. The General
Assembly has codified that principle in section 7 of the Statute on
Statutes (5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2010)), providing:
“No law enacted after January 12, 1977, denies or limits
any power or function of a home rule unit, pursuant to
paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of section 6 of Article VII of
the Illinois Constitution, unless there is specific language
limiting or denying the power or function and the language
specifically sets forth in what manner and to what extent it is
a limitation on or denial of the power or function of a home
rule unit.”
Section 7 has been formally adopted as part of this court’s home rule
jurisprudence. Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 287.
¶ 33
Additionally, the legislature has enacted the Home Rule Note Act,
providing “[e]very bill that denies or limits any power or function of
a home rule unit shall have prepared for it before second reading in
the house of introduction a brief explanatory note that includes a
reliable estimate of the probable impact of the bill on the powers and
functions of home rule units.” 25 ILCS 75/5 (West 2010).
Accordingly, the legislature has recognized its principal role in
determining whether to preempt or limit home rule power and its
responsibility to use specific language when preempting or limiting
that power.
¶ 34
We have consistently recognized that the home rule provisions of
the Illinois Constitution are intended to “ ‘eliminate or at least reduce
to a bare minimum the circumstances under which local home rule
powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of unexpressed
legislative intention.’ ” Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 186 (quoting David C.
Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part II): Legislative
Control, Transition Problems, and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972
U. Ill. L.F. 559, 571); see also Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at
288; Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 516. “The Illinois approach places almost
exclusive reliance on the legislature rather than the courts to keep
home rule units in line.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Roman,
184 Ill. 2d at 517 (quoting Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 187-88). “ ‘[I]f the
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constitutional design is to be respected, the courts should step in to
compensate for legislative inaction or oversight only in the clearest
cases of oppression, injustice, or interference by local ordinances
with vital state policies.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Scadron, 153 Ill.
2d at 190 (quoting David C. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois
Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 137,
157).
¶ 35
Prior to our recent decision in City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc.,
2011 IL 111127, this court had used a three-part test to review the
constitutionality of the exercise of home rule power. Schillerstrom
Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 289-90. Under that test, we first determined
whether the disputed exercise of local government power pertains to
local government and affairs as required under section 6(a). If so, we
determined whether the General Assembly preempted the exercise of
home rule powers in the area. If not, we determined the “the proper
relationship” between the local legislation and the state statute.
Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 289-90.
¶ 36
The “vital state policy” analysis was treated as the third part of
that test, to be considered after determining whether the local
ordinance pertains to the home rule unit’s government and affairs
under section 6(a) and whether the legislature expressly preempted
the exercise of home rule authority. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 512-19;
Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 174-90. In StubHub, however, this court
recognized that “the concept of a vital state policy trumping
municipal power is analytically appropriate under section 6(a)” rather
than section 6(i). City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 2011 IL 111127,
¶ 22 n.2. Accordingly, “[i]f a subject pertains to local government and
affairs, and the legislature has not expressly preempted home rule,
municipalities may exercise their power.” StubHub, Inc., 2011 IL
111127, ¶ 22 n.2. In those circumstances, the “proper relationship”
between the local legislation and the state statute is established by
section 6(i), providing that home rule units “may exercise and
perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home
rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not
specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the
State’s exercise to be exclusive.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i).
¶ 37
The defendants’ brief specifically states no argument is raised on
whether the City’s ordinance pertains to local affairs or whether the
legislature has expressly preempted home rule authority. In fact, in
their reply brief the defendants criticize the City for addressing those
parts of the home rule analysis because “those factors are not even at
-9-
issue in this appeal.” The defendants assert that “the only issue on
appeal related to the enforceability of the City’s ordinance *** is the
third test ***[,] whether there is ‘a proper relationship between the
local ordinance and the state statute.’ ” The defendants contend that
the City’s ordinance is invalid because it renders unenforceable
within Chicago portions of the Illinois Condominium Property Act
and the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986. The City’s
ordinance states:
“No person shall fail to allow unit owners to inspect the
financial books and records of the condominium association
within three business days of the time written request for
examination of the records is received.” Chicago Municipal
Code §13-72-080 (2009).
Section 19 of the Condominium Property Act and section 107.75 of
the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986 require
condominium unit owners to state a “proper purpose” for inspecting
condominium financial books and records. 765 ILCS 605/19(e) (West
2000); 805 ILCS 105/107.75(a) (West 2000). Additionally, section 19
of the Illinois Condominium Property Act requires production of only
the current and previous 10 years of financial books and records and
allows 30 business days to produce those records. 765 ILCS
605/19(a)(9), (e) (West 2000).
¶ 38
The defendants assert that the City’s ordinance directly conflicts
with the statutory provisions because: (1) it does not require unit
owners to state a proper purpose for inspecting financial books and
records; (2) it does not limit production to a certain number of years;
and (3) it contains a much shorter time period for producing the
records. Relying on Schillerstrom Homes, the defendants argue that
the ordinance exceeds the City’s home rule power given the direct
conflict with the statutory provisions. The defendants contend that in
Schillerstrom Homes this court upheld an ordinance only because it
did not conflict with a state statute. The defendants, therefore,
maintain that an ordinance exceeds home rule power if it conflicts
with a state statute.
¶ 39
The defendants further contend that an ordinance may be a valid
exercise of home rule power only if it is more restrictive than a state
statute addressing the same subject. A more restrictive ordinance
leaves the statute intact and enforceable. The defendants contend that
the ordinance here is less restrictive than the statutes in granting
access to association financial books and records. The ordinance,
-10-
therefore, is invalid because it eliminates the statutory requirement of
stating a “proper purpose” to obtain records, changes the scope of
documents subject to production, and alters the time frame for
producing those documents.
¶ 40
In Schillerstrom Homes, a real estate development company filed
a complaint against the City of Naperville, alleging that the City
willfully failed to approve the company’s final subdivision plat within
the 60-day period required by a state statute. Schillerstrom Homes,
198 Ill. 2d at 282-83. The company sought damages under the
statutory remedy provision. Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 283.
While the City’s ordinance also set forth a 60-day period for plat
approval and was “strikingly similar” to the statute, the ordinance was
silent on a remedy for a violation of its provisions. Schillerstrom
Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 288-89. The dispute centered on whether the
ordinance superseded the statutory remedy provision. Schillerstrom
Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 283.
¶ 41
In analyzing the issue, we considered whether the ordinance
superseded the entire statute, including its remedy provision. See
Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 291-93. We concluded that the
ordinance, by remaining silent on the remedy, did not supersede or
limit the remedy provision of the statute. Schillerstrom Homes, 198
Ill. 2d at 293. The statutory remedy provision simply filled the gap in
the ordinance. Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 293. Importantly,
we did not question whether the ordinance could supersede a
conflicting state statute. Rather, we clearly accepted the basic
principle that an ordinance may supersede or limit a conflicting
statute. Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 291-93. We only held that
the ordinance, by remaining silent, did not supersede the portion of
the statute providing a remedy.
¶ 42
Contrary to the defendants’ argument, the conflict between the
City’s ordinance and the state statutes here does not render the
ordinance invalid or beyond home rule power. “ ‘The fact that the
state has occupied some field of governmental endeavor, or that home
rule ordinances are in some way inconsistent with state statutes, is not
in itself sufficient to invalidate the local ordinances.’ ” Scadron, 153
Ill. 2d at 194 (quoting David C. Baum, Tentative Survey of Illinois
Home Rule (Part II): Legislative Control, Transition Problems, and
Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 559, 572). In holding
that a statutory provision did not preempt an inconsistent home rule
ordinance, this court has relied on Professor Baum’s explanation that:
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“ ‘It may happen that a state statute and a home rule ordinance
are in direct and immediate conflict and cannot reasonably
stand together. ***
 *** Since the state always can vindicate its interests by
legislating in the proper form, it seems unwise to sustain state
legislation at the expense of home rule ordinances except
when a state statute is in the required form or in those few
cases where vital state interests would be sacrificed by
permitting the local legislation to prevail until the next
session of the General Assembly.’ ” Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 519
(quoting 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 572-73).
¶ 43
Further, this court has never held that a home rule unit may only
enact an ordinance more restrictive than statutory provisions. Instead,
we have held that the General Assembly may limit or restrict a home
rule unit’s power by allowing local ordinances, but only within limits
consistent with the statutory scheme. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 519. To
limit or restrict home rule authority, however, the General Assembly
must do so specifically. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 520. Comprehensive
legislation that conflicts with an ordinance is insufficient to limit or
restrict home rule authority. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 519-20.
¶ 44
In sum, the constitutional framework places almost exclusive
reliance on the General Assembly to determine whether home rule
authority should be preempted. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 517; Scadron,
153 Ill. 2d at 187-88. The legislature has not specifically denied the
City’s exercise of home rule power or required its exercise of that
power to be consistent with statutory provisions. If the General
Assembly wishes to deny or restrict the City’s home rule authority, it
may enact a statute expressly providing for that action at its next
session. Accordingly, we conclude that the City’s ordinance is a valid
exercise of its home rule power.
¶ 45
C. Interim Attorney Fees Award
¶ 46
The defendants also contend that the trial court erred in awarding
Palm attorney fees at the rate of $300 per hour when he agreed to pay
and actually paid his attorney $200 per hour. The defendants contend
that the City’s ordinance only allows recovery of attorney fees
actually incurred in an action to enforce the ordinance.
¶ 47
The City’s ordinance provides the basis for awarding attorney fees
in this case. Our review of the interim fee award, therefore, begins
with interpreting the City’s ordinance. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
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886, 892-93 (1984) (determining correct standard for calculating
attorney fees award “begins and ends with an interpretation of the
attorney’s fee statute”); Citizens Organizing Project v. Department
of Natural Resources, 189 Ill. 2d 593, 598-99 (2000) (interpreting
fee-shifting provision in section 10-55(c) of the Illinois
Administrative Procedure Act in accordance with its plain language).
¶ 48
The rules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of
municipal ordinances. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d
296, 306 (2008). The fundamental objective of statutory construction
is to ascertain and give effect to the drafter’s intent. Hubble v. Bi-
State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan
District, 238 Ill. 2d 262, 268 (2010). The statutory language, given its
plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of legislative intent.
In re Andrew B., 237 Ill. 2d 340, 348 (2010). We review questions of
statutory construction de novo. Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d
205, 216 (2011).
¶ 49
The City’s ordinance provides, in pertinent part, that a prevailing
plaintiff in an action brought to enforce an ordinance provision “shall
be entitled to recover, in addition to any other remedy available, his
reasonable attorney fees.” Chicago Municipal Code § 13-72-100
(2009). The ordinance, therefore, allows a prevailing plaintiff to
recover or obtain reasonable attorney fees.
¶ 50
In Blum, the Supreme Court construed a federal statute with
language similar to the City’s ordinance allowing recovery of
“reasonable attorney fees.” The statute applicable in federal civil
rights actions provided that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s
fee as part of the costs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blum,
465 U.S. at 888 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The Court considered
whether the statute required use of the prevailing market rate or a
cost-based standard in calculating attorney fee awards. Blum, 465
U.S. at 892-93. Based on the statute and its legislative history, the
Court concluded that “reasonable fees” were to be calculated in
accordance with the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895.
¶ 51
The phrase “reasonable attorney fees” has generally been
interpreted to require use of the prevailing market rate in calculating
a fee award. See Wisconsin v. Hotline Industries, Inc., 236 F.3d 363,
366 (7th Cir. 2000) (general rule for calculating fee awards under
statutes authorizing a “reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”
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is to use the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community”).
Thus, contrary to the defendants’ argument, the language of the City’s
ordinance does not indicate that recoverable attorney fees are limited
to those actually incurred or paid by the plaintiff in the litigation.
Rather, use of the phrase “reasonable attorney fees” indicates an
intent to allow recovery based on the prevailing market rate for the
attorney’s services.
¶ 52
Here, the trial court awarded interim attorney fees based on the
market value of the attorney’s services. The trial court, therefore, used
the correct standard in calculating the attorney fees award under the
ordinance. The trial court’s award using the correct standard is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lurie v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 93
Ill. 2d 231, 239 (1982).
¶ 53
In this case, Palm provided the only evidence on the prevailing
market rate for the services of his attorney. Palm submitted the
affidavit of retired Cook County Circuit Court Judge Kenneth L.
Gillis, attesting that the rate of $300 per hour was “well within the
prevailing market rates charged in comparable cases by Chicago
attorneys of similar qualifications, skill and experience.”
¶ 54
The defendants did not present any evidence on the prevailing
market rate for the services of Palm’s attorney. Instead, the
defendants contend that the fee award at the prevailing market rate
will result in a windfall to Palm and an award of exemplary damages
against them because Palm will be allowed to keep the amount
exceeding the $200 per hour he paid his attorney. The defendants,
therefore, contend that the fee award allows Palm to profit from his
challenge to the ordinance.
¶ 55
The defendants’ argument is, nevertheless, contradicted by the
allegations in Palm’s petition for interim attorney fees. In his petition,
Palm alleged that the fee agreement provided a reduced hourly rate
that is typical in actions allowing recovery of attorney fees by a
prevailing party. The petition further alleged that the fee award would
be retained by Palm’s attorney and Palm would only receive
reimbursement for his actual payments. Palm’s attorney signed the
petition, averring that she had personal knowledge of the allegations
and could testify to the matters set forth in the petition. According to
the verified petition, therefore, Palm will not receive a windfall from
this action, but will only be reimbursed for his actual payments to his
attorney. Palm’s attorney will receive “reasonable attorney fees”
-14-
based on the prevailing market rate as required by the City’s
ordinance.
¶ 56
Given this record, we cannot find that the trial court abused its
discretion in setting the interim attorney fees award. The award is
based on the only evidence presented on the prevailing market rate for
the attorney’s services. Accordingly, the trial court’s award of interim
attorney fees must be affirmed.
¶ 57
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the City’s ordinance is a
valid exercise of its home rule power and the interim attorney fees
award is not an abuse of discretion. The appellate court’s judgment
is, therefore, affirmed.
¶ 59
Affirmed.
¶ 60
JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:
¶ 61
I join the majority opinion. I write separately to address the
dissent filed by Justices Freeman and Burke, in which the dissenting
justices criticize the majority for not reversing the appellate court on
an unargued and unbriefed basis. The dissent, unfortunately, causes
great confusion about what issues are properly before the court, and
it is off base in its discussion of both home rule and the proper role of
a court of review.
¶ 62
I. What Is at Issue in This Appeal
¶ 63
The argument made by the Association is straightforward and
clear: a municipality may not enact an ordinance that is less restrictive
than a state statute. The Association reads this state’s case law as
establishing a rule that home rule municipalities may enact
ordinances that are more restrictive than state statutes, but not less
restrictive. The argument section of the Association’s brief contains
eight pages of argument on this issue, and another seven pages on the
attorney fees issue. That is it. Apparently unhappy with the way that
the appellants framed their argument, the dissent has decided to make
a different argument for them: that the ordinance does not pertain to
-15-
the City’s government and affairs.  The dissenting justices contend
2
that this court should reverse on this unargued and unbriefed basis.
Although this court unquestionably has the power to do what the
dissenting justices request, our established precedent dictates that we
should not. We recently discussed this very issue in People v. Givens,
237 Ill. 2d 311 (2010). In that case, we explained why a reviewing
court should not search the record for unargued reasons to reverse the
lower court:
“Illinois law is well settled that other than for assessing
subject matter jurisdiction, ‘a reviewing court should not
normally search the record for unargued and unbriefed
reasons to reverse a trial court judgment.’ (Emphasis added.)
Saldana v. Wirtz Cartage Co., 74 Ill. 2d 379, 386 (1978); see
also Parks v. McWhorter, 106 Ill. 2d 181, 184 (1985) (noting
that except for jurisdictional grounds, a search of the record
for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse a lower court’s
decision is improper); People ex rel. Akin v. Southern Gem
Co., 332 Ill. 370, 372 (1928) (‘while this court will examine
the record for the purpose of affirming a judgment it will not
do so for the purpose of reversing it’). Moreover, in Greenlaw
v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243, 171 L. Ed. 2d 399, 408,
128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008), the United States Supreme
Court recently addressed the propriety of a reviewing court
ruling upon issues raised sua sponte. The Court admonished:
The vast majority of the dissent is spent addressing matters not in any
2
way at issue. For instance, the dissent opens by demonstrating that the
ordinance and the statute conflict. Of course they do; both sides concede
this. If there was no conflict, we would not have this case. The dissent
likewise spends a great deal of time tracing the history of condominium law
in the United States. But this is in no way relevant to the Association’s
appeal. The Association raises a simple argument that does not require an
examination of the history of condominiums: a home rule ordinance may
not conflict with a state statute in such a way that it is less restrictive than
the statute. And this argument, the only preemption issue before the court,
is never mentioned or addressed by the dissent. Thus, one wonders what the
dissent means when it opens by stating the majority opinion is an
“unnecessary departure” from settled condominium property law, when the
majority opinion does not address condominium law at all. The majority
opinion is limited to the issues before the court.
-16-
‘In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal
cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the
principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the
parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to
courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present. To the extent courts have approved departures
from the party presentation principle in criminal cases, the
justification has usually been to protect a pro se litigant’s
rights. [Citation.] But as a general rule, “[o]ur adversary
system is designed around the premise that the parties
know what is best for them, and are responsible for
advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to
relief.” [Citation.] As cogently explained:
“[Courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day
looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to
come to us, and when they do we normally decide
only questions presented by the parties. Counsel
almost always know a great deal more about their
cases than we do ***.” [Citation.]’ Greenlaw, 554
U.S. at 243-44, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 408, 128 S. Ct. at
2564.
Our appellate court in People v. Rodriguez, 336 Ill. App. 3d
1, 14 (2002), expressed a similar sentiment as follows:
‘While a reviewing court has the power to raise unbriefed
issues pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), we
must refrain from doing so when it would have the effect
of transforming this court’s role from that of jurist to
advocate. [Citation.] Were we to address these unbriefed
issues, we would be forced to speculate as to the
arguments that the parties might have presented had these
issues been properly raised before this court. To engage in
such speculation would only cause further injustice; thus
we refrain from addressing these issues sua sponte.’ ”
Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 323-24. 
¶ 64
And, here, the problem goes beyond mere forfeiture. Not only did
the appellants not raise this argument, they criticized the City for even
mentioning it. As noted by the dissent, the City did a complete
analysis of every possible preemption argument that the Association
could make, and demonstrated that the Association would lose on
every one. In its reply brief, the Association stated the following:
-17-
“The Schillerstrom court noted that there are three tests for
determining enforceability of a home rule ordinance. The first
two tests are whether the ordinance pertains to local affairs,
and whether a state statute expressly preempts home rule
power. Although the City devotes the vast majority of its brief
to those first two issues, those factors are not even at issue in
this appeal.” (Emphasis added.)
So, according to the dissent, this court should grant relief to the
appellants on the basis of an argument that they criticized the appellee
for even mentioning. 
¶ 65
The dissent offers several reasons why the normal rules of
appellate procedure do not apply to this case, but none are
convincing. First, without citation to authority, the dissent claims that
the issue is “squarely and properly before the court” (infra ¶ 96
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.)) because the City
addressed it in its appellee’s brief. I direct my dissenting colleagues’
attention to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013),
which contains the requirements for an appellant’s brief and provides
that: “Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply
brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.” Thus, the scope
of the Association’s appeal was framed when it filed its opening brief.
¶ 66
Second, the dissent argues that the question of whether a matter
pertains to local government and affairs under section 6(a) is a legal
one, and thus this court is not bound to abide by the parties’
contentions. While I do not disagree with the dissent’s premise, its
conclusion is a non sequitur. Had the Association properly raised a
section 6(a) issue, I agree that this court would not be bound by the
parties’ precise legal contentions on that issue. I do not see, however,
how a section 6(a) question being a legal one excuses the
Association’s complete failure to raise the issue in the first place.
Under the dissent’s reasoning, any legal question not raised by the
parties would always be squarely and properly before a reviewing
court. Again, no citation to authority is offered for this proposition.
¶ 67
Third, the dissent argues that, “under the approach set forth in the
majority decision, our standard for deciding the legal question of
whether a municipality has exceeded the home rule power granted
under section 6(a) will vary, depending on what arguments are raised
in the parties’ briefs.” According to the dissent, this will lead to a
“confusing and inconsistent body of home rule jurisprudence”(infra
¶ 98 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.), and that the court
-18-
should suspend waiver to ensure a uniform body of precedent. The
dissent’s concerns are unfounded. This court has stated that its
opinions are authority only for what is actually decided. Department
of Public Works & Buildings v. Farina, 29 Ill. 2d 474, 479-80 (1963).
Here, the only thing that was “decided” with respect to section 6(a)
and the City’s ordinance is that the Association did not raise a section
6(a) argument. It is the dissent, not the majority, that is creating the
confusion by expounding at length on an issue not raised by the
appellants.
¶ 68
Finally, the dissent argues that the Association did not have the
benefit of this court’s decision in StubHub when it filed its brief. The
dissent points out that, in StubHub, this court recognized that the
concept of a state statute trumping a municipal ordinance when a vital
state policy is involved was not analytically appropriate when
considering an argument under section 6(i) of the constitution.
Although Illinois courts had considered this a section 6(i) question in
the past, StubHub explained that this should instead be considered a
section 6(a) question. While it is certainly true that StubHub did this,
one wonders what possible relevance that is to the Association, as the
Association did not argue that a vital state policy is involved here.
The Association argued only that an ordinance may not be less
restrictive than a conflicting state statute. Why should this court’s
changing the law on a point not argued by the appellants cause this
court to suspend the normal rules of forfeiture? Both before and after
StubHub, the constitution required that home rule ordinances must
pertain to local government and affairs. And, as to the section 6(a)
analysis, the StubHub majority claimed that all it was doing was
applying “settled law” that this court had consistently used as the
“definitive” section 6(a) analysis. StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 25.
The dissenting justices in this case were in the StubHub majority, and
their position in that case necessarily precludes them from arguing
here that StubHub so significantly altered the section 6(a) analysis
that we can excuse the Association’s forfeiture. The Association was
certainly free to argue that this ordinance did not pertain to local
government and affairs, but it chose not to. The problem with the
Association’s argument has nothing to do with StubHub. The problem
is that the argument is simply wrong on its face. It was not the rule
before StubHub, nor is it the rule now, that municipal ordinances may
not conflict with state statutes. 
¶ 69
Clearly, then, the dissent has offered no legitimate reason why
this court should assume the role of advocate for the Condominium
-19-
Association, raise an entirely new argument for it, and then reverse on
that basis.
¶ 70
II. The Ordinance Pertains to the City’s Government and Affairs
¶ 71
Although the question of whether the ordinance pertains to the
City’s government and affairs is not properly before this court, I feel
compelled to point out that, even if it were, the dissent’s analysis of
that issue is wrong for any number of reasons. Moreover, the dissent’s
arguments show that, without a doubt, the dissenting justices are
simply not comfortable with the system of home rule established by
the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 72
First, the dissent looks at the extent of the state’s regulation in the
area of condominium law. This is not, however, how we decide
preemption questions. No one has explained this better than Justice
Freeman, who wrote in City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504
(1998):
“Further, ‘comprehensive’ legislation is insufficient to
declare the state’s exercise of power to be exclusive. To ‘meet
the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain
express language that the area covered by the legislation is to
be exclusively controlled by the State. [Citations.] It is not
enough that the State comprehensively regulates an area
which otherwise would fall into home rule power.’ Village of
Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co., 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138
(1994). After Citizens Utilities, ‘comprehensive scheme’
preemption is ‘no longer the law of this state.’ Board of
Trustees of the Barrington Police Pension Fund v. Village of
Barrington Ethics Board, 287 Ill. App. 3d 614, 619 (1997).
‘The General Assembly cannot express an intent to exercise
exclusive control over a subject through coincidental
comprehensive regulation.’ American Health Care Providers,
Inc. v. County of Cook, 265 Ill. App. 3d 919, 928 (1994).”
Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 517.
See also Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 194 (“ ‘[t]he fact that the state has
occupied some field of governmental endeavor, or that home rule
ordinances are in some way inconsistent with state statutes, is not in
itself sufficient to invalidate the local ordinances’ ” (quoting 1972 U.
Ill. L.F. at 572)); Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev.
1113, 1141, 1158-59 (2007)) (noting that Illinois is unique in that it
is the only state to have no rule of implied preemption).
-20-
¶ 73
Although Roman was not a section 6(a) case, surely the dissent is
not contending that a court can use comprehensive state regulation to
render an area entirely outside of local control under section 6(a). I
would ask my colleagues in the dissent to consider whether it makes
any sense at all that this court’s position should be that, while
comprehensive state regulation cannot preempt home rule authority
in an area, it does render the area entirely outside the authority of
home rule units to act at all. Is it not obvious that this is just
preemption by another name? Indeed, if comprehensive state
regulation means that a particular subject does not pertain to the
government and affairs of home rule units under section 6(a), then we
would rarely get past step one of the analysis, and the powers of home
rule units would be severely restricted. The dissent’s analysis would
render decisions such as Scadron and Roman meaningless. 
¶ 74
Next, the dissent brushes aside the City’s obviously strong and
compelling interest in regulating condominiums. The dissent
disagrees with the majority’s point that the large number of
condominiums in Chicago gives the City a vital interest in
condominium record keeping. But this very same reasoning was used
in City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101 (1981), in which
this court upheld the right of Evanston to enact a landlord-tenant
ordinance. In Create, this court explained:
“The city of Evanston is a densely populated and highly
urbanized municipality with a large number of rental units.
The City, therefore, has a strong interest in protecting both the
landlord and tenant and in providing each with a detailed
description of their respective rights, duties and remedies. In
accordance with the goals attempted to be achieved by the
creation of home rule, the local governing body can create an
ordinance specifically suited for the unique needs of its
residents and is keenly and uniquely aware of the needs of the
community it serves. We therefore believe that the ordinance
in question was one of the types contemplated in the grant of
home rule powers under section 6(a) of article VII.” Create,
85 Ill. 2d at 113-14.
As the largest condominium market in Illinois, and the third largest
in 
the 
United 
States (http://chicagocondosonline.com/
marketoverview.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2013)), Chicago’s interest
in having a condominium ordinance is at least as strong as Evanston’s
interest in having a landlord-tenant ordinance.
-21-
¶ 75
The dissent also argues that:
“Under the City’s logic, every home rule unit that has a large
condominium presence can legislate in this area, with the Act
reduced to providing the law for those condominiums that are
in towns and villages that are not home rule units. The rights
of owners in one town would differ from the rights of owners
in another town. Similarly, the rights of an association would
differ from city to city.” Infra ¶ 123 (Freeman, J., dissenting,
joined by Burke, J.).
Of course other home rule municipalities could enact their own
condominium ordinances with different requirements. That is the
whole point of home rule. In Create, this court did not express any
concern that upholding Evanston’s right to have a landlord-tenant
ordinance would mean that other home rule municipalities could also
enact them.  Again, we can simply turn to the words of Justice
3
Freeman for an explanation:
“[T]he possibility that different home rule units may adopt
similar ordinances with differing mandatory minimum
sentences should be of no concern. ‘The grant of home rule
powers contemplates that different communities which
perceive a problem differently may adopt different measures
to address the problem, provided that the legislature has taken
no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be
taken and that the measures taken are reasonable.” Roman,
The dissent drops a footnote arguing that the City’s large number of
3
condominiums does not “make the problem so unique to Chicago that its
interest its greater than the State’s.” The dissent does not explain where this
standard comes from; the only authority cited in the footnote is a 2006
article from the Chicago Tribune about condominium conversion in
northwest suburban Cook County. The constitutional requirement is that
the ordinance must pertain to local government and affairs. The constitution
does not state that home rule units may enact ordinances only when their
interest in an area is so unique as to render the municipality’s interest
greater than the state’s. As Professor Baum has explained, “home rule units
are supposed to be free to carry on activities that relate to their
communities even if the state also is interested and is active in the area.”
(Emphasis added.) David C. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home
Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 137, 155. That is
the whole purpose of section 6(i).
-22-
184 Ill. 2d at 514-15 (quoting Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 504-05).
And, if this “patchwork” of local regulations is not what the
legislature intended, what should the legislature do? As Justice
Freeman explained in Roman, “ ‘the state always can vindicate its
interests by legislating in the proper form.’ ” Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at
519 (quoting 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 572-73).
¶ 76
The dissent next contends that the ordinance is invalid because
the entire field of real property law is off limits to home rule units.
The dissent relies on the following statement from the record of
proceedings of the Local Government Committee at the Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention:
“It is clear, however, that the powers of home-rule units relate
to their own problems, not to those of the state or nation.
Their powers should not extent to such matters as divorce,
real property law, trusts, contracts, etc., which are generally
recognized as falling within the competence of state rather
than local authorities. Thus the proposed grant of powers to
local governments extends only to matters ‘pertaining to their
government and affairs.’ ” 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention 1621.
Professor Baum warned against taking this language too literally
because it could mean that things such as fair housing ordinances,
which involve both real property and contract law, would be off limits
to home rule units. 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 153. This court has agreed with
Professor Baum and has placed a very narrow construction on the
above language. In Create, the defendant relied on the listing of
contract law in the above passage to argue that Evanston’s landlord-
tenant ordinance was invalid because it interfered with contracts
between private citizens. This court disagreed, explaining that “the
Ordinance does not alter any basic principle of contract law.”
(Emphasis added.) Create, 85 Ill. 2d at 114. Similarly, here, the
dissent has not explained how the section of Chicago’s condominium
ordinance regulating the right of condominium owners to access the
financial books and records of condominium associations alters any
basic principles of real property law.  
4
The dissent also argues that condominium law is a blend of real
4
property law, contract law, and corporate law, but it likewise does not
identify any basic principles of corporate law or contract law that are
altered by the City’s ordinance. Again, all we are talking about is an
-23-
¶ 77
Moreover, this court has consistently recognized the interest that
municipalities have in regulating real property. In Create, we upheld
the right of home rule municipalities to have landlord-tenant
ordinances, and in Schillerstrom Homes, we explained the following:
“Municipal development regulations, including the ordinance
at issue here, undoubtedly pertain to local affairs. See Carlson
v. Briceland, 61 Ill. App. 3d 247, 254 (zoning restrictions
pertain to local affairs); Johnny Bruce Co. v. City of
Champaign, 24 Ill. App. 3d 900, 904 (1974) (the resolution of
zoning problems is left to the local exercise of plenary home
rule power); accord Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d
488, 493-94 (1962) (pre-1970 Constitution) (‘Zoning lies
primarily within the province of the municipality’); La Salle
National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46
(1957) (pre 1970 Constitution) (‘It is well established that it
is primarily the province of the municipal body to determine
the use and purpose to which property may be devoted’); see
also Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d at 116 (city landlord-tenant
ordinance was a proper exercise of home rule power).”
Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 290.
It is simply not possible to argue in 2013 that the entire field of real
property law is off limits to home rule municipalities. 
¶ 78
The dissent contends that Create is distinguishable because the
framers recognized that landlord-tenant relations would fall within
local control. The dissent cites a page of the record from the
constitutional convention showing that the framers believed that
home rule units could act to prevent slums and could enact rent
control ordinances. Infra at ¶ 127. There are two problems with the
dissent’s argument. First, you cannot simultaneously argue that: (1)
the entire field of real property law is off-limits to home rule units;
and (2) that home rule units may act to prevent slums and may enact
rent control ordinances and landlord-tenant ordinances. Either the
entire field of real property law is off-limits to them or it is not; the
dissent cannot have it both ways. Second, this page of the report of
proceedings from the constitutional convention was not why Create
upheld the right of home rule units to enact landlord-tenant
ordinances. Rather, Create recognized this as a matter pertaining to
ordinance that gives condominium owners greater access to the financial
books and records of condominium associations.
-24-
local government and affairs because “[t]he city of Evanston is a
densely populated and highly urbanized municipality with a large
number of rental units.” Create, 85 Ill. 2d at 113. And this reasoning
applies equally to Chicago’s interest in enacting a condominium
ordinance. Thus, Create can be distinguished only if one is willing to
ignore the actual basis for the court’s holding.
¶ 79
Continuing to exhibit its complete discomfort with Illinois’s
system of home rule, the dissent complains that the majority is
requiring the legislature to include “magic words” whenever it wants
to preempt home rule authority. The dissent also finds it unsurprising
that the legislature would not include those “magic words” here,
because it never could have imagined that including those words was
necessary with regard to anything having to do with real property.
There are so many problems with these points that one barely knows
where to begin. 
¶ 80
As for the dissent’s complaint of a “magic words” requirement,
that requirement has three sources. First, the constitution clearly
imposes that requirement. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(h), (i).
Second, this court has interpreted the constitution as imposing that
requirement. I again point the reader to Justice Freeman’s opinion in
Roman, where he discusses the magic words requirement in detail,
explains that this is the only way that the legislature can preempt
home rule authority, and notes that the legislature has included the
magic words in many different statutes. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 515-18.
Third, the legislature has imposed this requirement on itself. As the
majority notes, but the dissent ignores, section 7 of the Statute on
Statutes specifically provides that no legislative act after January 12,
1977, may be read as preempting home rule authority unless it
contains specific preemption language. 5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2010).
There is no hint given by the dissenting justices why they believe this
court is free to ignore constitutional text, controlling authority from
this court, and an express statutory directive from the legislature.
¶ 81
As for the dissent’s claim that the legislature could not possibly
have imagined the need to include the magic words in the section of
the Condominium Property Act at issue, the dissent must know that
this is not true. As the City explains in its brief, the legislature
requested a home rule note from the Illinois Department of
Commerce and Economic Opportunity before the second reading of
Senate Bill 408 in the House, and the legislature was advised by the
Department that the amended bill did “not preempt home rule
authority.” So, even after being advised by the Department that the
-25-
legislation did not preempt home rule authority, the legislature still
chose not to include preemption language in the bill. And, we must
not ignore the facts that: (1) the same session of the General
Assembly included express preemption language in other bills (see,
e.g., 215 ILCS 155/3.1 (added by Pub. Act 90-317, § 5, eff. Aug. 1,
1997); 225 ILCS 51/170 (added by Pub. Act 90-532, § 170, eff. Nov.
14, 1997); and (2) the legislation in question was enacted over 15
years after this court had already upheld the right of home rule units
to enact landlord-tenant ordinances. In other words, the legislature
knew exactly what it was doing, and the dissent’s claim that this court
should now usurp the legislature’s preemption authority is simply
untenable.
¶ 82
III. Conclusion
¶ 83
In sum, the dissent filed by Justices Freeman and Burke is
fundamentally flawed for two independent reasons: (1) they
improperly assume the role of appellate advocate for the
Condominium Association, raising an unargued and unbriefed issue
on its behalf and then criticizing the court for not reversing on this
unargued and unbriefed basis; (2) the view of home rule expressed
therein is diametrically opposed to our state’s constitution, case law,
and statutes, and seems to advocate a return to the very system that
the framers of the 1970 Constitution intended to replace. As for the
parade of terrible consequences of this decision that the dissent
envisions, there is a simple answer. If the legislature wants this to be
an area of exclusive state control, then the legislature can make it
such with a single sentence. As this court stated in Village of
Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 142-
43 (1994), “It is not for us to usurp a function accorded to the General
Assembly by the Constitution.”
¶ 84
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
¶ 85
Today’s decision marks an unnecessary departure from settled law
in two important areas—home rule jurisprudence and condominium
property law. Ultimately, the court subjects real property owners who
happen to live in condominiums to home rule ordinances that deny
them important protections intended by the General Assembly to
operate statewide. While the decision affects only production of
condominium records, there is nothing in the court’s approach to
-26-
home rule that would limit further local intrusions on real property
condominium ownership. I therefore respectfully dissent.
¶ 86
BACKGROUND
¶ 87
On September 15, 1999, plaintiff, a condominium owner at 2800
Lake Shore Drive Condominium Association  sent a letter to the
5
Association’s board of directors requesting production of what the
majority characterizes as “specific documents and records related to
the building’s management.” Supra ¶ 4. Plaintiff sought (1) all
contracts in effect since 1977 between the Association and some 18
different entities; (2) minutes from all board meetings from 1980
through 1990; (3) all building expenditures for fiscal year 1988 to the
present; (4) ballots from the 1998 election of the board of directors;
and (5) bank statements for 1998, plus itemized financial records
from 1988.
¶ 88
On September 28, 1999, the Association’s attorney sent plaintiff
a letter which acknowledged that some of the records and documents
sought had been previously turned over to plaintiff and noted that
plaintiff’s request sought documents which dated back over 20 years
to a time before the condominium association was even created. The
letter also stated that plaintiff’s current request, as well as his
previous requests, required management to divert time from serving
the Association to fulfilling document demands that seemed designed
only to vex and harass.
¶ 89
The board did not turn over the documents, and plaintiff
commenced this lawsuit in January 2000. Plaintiff’s initial complaint
was dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff thereafter filed a four-
count amended complaint, which alleged that defendants committed
a variety of violations of both the Association’s declaration and of the
Condominium Property Act (Condominium Act or Act) (765 ILCS
605/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Although the Condominium Act was
referenced throughout the complaint, with respect to count IV, which
is the only count at issue in this appeal, plaintiff challenged the failure
to produce all of the documents requested in his September 15 letter,
and cited to a Chicago municipal ordinance requiring that “financial
The Association recorded its condominium instruments, including its
5
declaration, on June 8, 1979. See 765 ILCS 605/6 (West 2000) (upon
recording, the property “shall become subject to the provisions of [the
Condominium Property] Act”). 
-27-
books and records” be turned over upon request within three days.
The amended complaint was subsequently dismissed in its entirety.
In dismissing count IV without prejudice, the court found that the
document-access requests were nothing more than a “fishing
expedition” because plaintiff did not allege a proper purpose for those
requests.
¶ 90
Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal, which was
denied. He then filed a second motion to reconsider. In the interim,
due to the resignation of the original judge who heard the matter, a
new judge was assigned to the case and ruled on the second motion
to reconsider. The court declined to reconsider the previous dismissal
of the first three counts of the amended complaint. The court,
however, vacated the dismissal of count IV, and plaintiff thereafter
filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to that count,
which was the only count that remained pending. The circuit court
granted the motion in part and denied it in part, with the court
specifically ruling that the Chicago ordinance mandated the
production of the following documents:
• Itemized and detailed records of all building
expenditures during 1988, 1989, 1994, and 1999 to the
present.
• Itemized and detailed financial records for the period of
1988 to the present of the Association’s reserve fund.
• Bank statements for 1998 from three different banks.
• Minutes of the board for the period of 1980 through
1990.
• All documents relating to exterior concrete facade; any
and all documents between the Association and the CPA firm
of Altschuler, Melvoin, and Glasser; any and all documents
between the Association and Reserve Advisors; any and all
documents relating to defects in pipes, including those
documents from the original engineering firm for the
building; any and all documents relating to the condition of
the exterior concrete facade between the Association and the
original architectural firm for the condominium building. 
The circuit court also included Rule 304(a) language in its order,
which allowed the issue to be immediately appealed. The court
-28-
further awarded plaintiff interim attorney fees pursuant to the Chicago
ordinance.6
¶ 91
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the Chicago ordinance
mandated the production of the documents. 401 Ill. App. 3d 868.
¶ 92
ANALYSIS
¶ 93
I. Home Rule 
¶ 94
As the majority acknowledges, this court traditionally has
employed a three-part test in reviewing the constitutionality of an
exercise of home rule power. Supra ¶ 35 (citing Schillerstrom Homes,
Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 289-90 (2001)). The first
element of that inquiry requires that we determine whether the
challenged exercise of local government power pertains to local
government and affairs, as mandated by section 6(a). Id. If so, we
then must consider whether the General Assembly has preempted the
use of home rule powers in the relevant area. Id. If the legislature has
not preempted the area, we then determine “the proper relationship”
between the local ordinance and the state statute. Id. In examining
“the proper relationship” between an ordinance and a statute, this
court has held that “ ‘[w]hether a particular problem is of statewide
rather than local dimension must be decided *** with regard for the
nature and extent of the problem, the units of government which have
the most vital interest in its solution, and the role traditionally played
by local and statewide authorities in dealing with it.’ ” City of
Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 24 (quoting Kalodimos
v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 501 (1984)); see also
Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 176 (1992).
¶ 95
Here, the majority entirely omits the first element of our
traditional analysis because defendants have not specifically
challenged whether the City’s ordinance pertains to its local
government and affairs. The omission of that analysis is improper for
several reasons.
¶ 96
First, the City’s brief does contain an argument regarding whether
its ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of home rule power under
While the interlocutory appeal from the grant of summary judgment
6
on count IV was proceeding in the appellate court as well as this court, the
parties continued their litigation in the trial court. Plaintiff ultimately filed
a third-amended complaint in the case, which apparently went to trial.
Those allegations are not at issue in this appeal.
-29-
section 6(a). Thus, although it was not raised by defendants, that issue
is squarely and properly before the court. Moreover, this court has
recognized that a reviewing court may, in furtherance of its
responsibility to provide a just result and to maintain a sound and
uniform body of precedent, override considerations of waiver that
stem from the adversarial nature of our system. Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.
2d 223, 224-25 (1967); see also People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 325
(2010); Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). I believe that
responsibility outweighs defendants’ procedural default in this case.
See, e.g., Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05 (2002)
(and cases cited therein). In my view, it is inappropriate to sidestep a
significant, and I believe dispositive, element of our traditional
analysis simply because it was not argued by some of the parties to
the litigation.
¶ 97
Second, the question of whether a matter falls within the scope of
the home rule power granted in section 6(a) is a legal one. See
Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537, 540 (1975) (holding that the
“qualifying phrase ‘pertaining to its government and affairs’ *** will
ultimately depend upon an interpretation by this court as to whether
or not the power exercised is within the grant of section 6(a)”); see
also StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 19 (noting that the determination of
this question lies in judicial interpretation of this qualifying phrase).
As such, this court is not bound to abide by the parties’ contentions.
See Hux, 38 Ill. 2d at 225.
¶ 98
Third, under the approach set forth in the majority decision, our
standard for deciding the legal question of whether a municipality has
exceeded the home rule power granted under section 6(a) will vary,
depending on what arguments are raised in the parties’ briefs. This
variable approach will lead to a confusing and inconsistent body of
home rule jurisprudence that fails to provide necessary guidance to
municipalities throughout the state.
¶ 99
Finally, ignoring the first element of the traditional three-part test
is manifestly unfair under the circumstances presented here. As the
majority has recognized, defendants do not dispute that the City’s
ordinance pertained to its local government and affairs. Instead,
defendants focus their arguments on the third element of the test,
addressing “the proper relationship” between the ordinance and the
relevant state statutes. That argument necessarily requires
consideration of “ ‘the nature and extent of the problem, the units of
government which have the most vital interest in its solution, and the
role traditionally played by local and statewide authorities in dealing
-30-
with it.’ ” Stubhub, Inc., 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 24 (quoting Kalodimos,
103 Ill. 2d at 501 (1984)); see also Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 176.
Defendants claim that the City’s ordinance is invalid because it
effectively nullifies several important provisions of the Condominium
Act and the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986, which
govern the duty of condominium associations in Chicago to maintain
and disclose certain books and records. In refusing to address
defendants’ claims, the court relies on a footnote in StubHub, which
“recognized that ‘the concept of a vital state policy trumping
municipal power is analytically appropriate under section 6(a)’ rather
than section 6(i).” Supra ¶ 36 (quoting City of Chicago v. StubHub,
Inc., 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 22 n.2). 
¶ 100
However, the court’s approach is fundamentally flawed because
defendants did not have the benefit of our decision in StubHub, which
was argued during the same term as this case and was not finally
decided until November 2012, 18 months after both cases were
submitted. Consequently, when the instant case was briefed and
argued, the traditional three-part test that had governed our analysis
of home rule power for more than 30 years included consideration of
whether a vital state policy should take precedence over home rule
authority, even if the problem pertained to local government and
affairs. See Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill.
2d 281, 291 (2001). Under that test, a party could challenge the
constitutional validity of an exercise of home rule power without
contesting that the problem addressed by the municipality pertained
to its government and affairs. It was only in StubHub, that this court
explicitly held, albeit in a footnote, that the existence of a vital state
policy was not “analytically appropriate” in cases involving
concurrent authority under section 6(i). At the time defendants
formulated and presented their arguments, they did not know that we
were about to dispense with the third element of our long-standing
inquiry in such cases. We can only assume that, had defendants
known that our decision in StubHub, would render the third element
of the traditional test a nullity in cases analyzed under section 6(i),
they would not have limited their argument to that element alone.
¶ 101
More importantly, any analysis regarding the validity of home
rule power must begin with a determination of the legal question of
whether the problem pertains to local government and affairs, as
required by section 6(a). After our decision in StubHub, section 6(i)
cases are governed by the following standard: “If a subject pertains to
local government and affairs, and the legislature has not expressly
-31-
preempted home rule, municipalities may exercise their power.”
StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 22 n.2. Accordingly, the first step in our
analysis under section 6(i) requires consideration of the “pertaining
to [local] government and affairs” language under section 6(a), which
is the first element of our traditional test. Therefore, though it was not
argued by defendants, this court should undertake that analysis with
regard to the ordinance at issue in this case or, at the very least, order
supplemental briefing on the question, in light of our intervening
decision in StubHub. Alternatively, the court should consider
defendants’ arguments as to the “proper relationship” between the
City’s ordinance and the relevant state statutes, in accordance with the
traditional three-part inquiry that has guided our home rule
jurisprudence for more than three decades. As set forth below, I
believe that analysis compels a finding that the City’s ordinance
exceeds the home rule power granted in section 6(a).
¶ 102
Defendants first contend that the Chicago ordinance, if valid,
eviscerates section 19 of the Condominium Act, which sets forth both
the rights and obligations of the Association and individual unit
owners with respect to record keeping and access. They contend that
the City does not have the authority under the Illinois Constitution to
act in this manner.
¶ 103
Before addressing defendants’ constitutional arguments, it is
necessary to compare the two competing provisions. The state statute
is found in section 19 of the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS
605/19 (West 2000)). The Act, as I will explain in detail later, is an
enabling statute which not only recognizes the condominium as a
form of property ownership in Illinois, but also sets forth the manner
in which condominium associations must be managed as well as the
rights and duties of the association and individual owners to each
other. Section 19 imposes on a condominium association’s board of
directors the duty to keep and maintain (1) the association’s
declaration, bylaws, rules and regulations; (2) minutes of all meetings
of the association and its board for seven years; and (3) all current
policies of insurance of the Association. 765 ILCS 605/19(a) (West
2000). Section 19 also requires the board to produce, within 30 days,
these documents to any owner who makes a written request stating
with particularity the documents sought to be examined. 765 ILCS
605/19(b) (West 2000). Nothing in the Act otherwise obligates an
association to keep and maintain minutes that are older than seven
years.
-32-
¶ 104
Further, section 19 requires the board to keep “all contracts,
leases, and other agreements then in effect to which the association
is a party.” 765 ILCS 605/19(a)(6) (West 2000). In other words, the
board is not required to keep expired contracts and is under no
obligation to produce such a document even upon request. Section 19
requires the board to keep and maintain the “books and records of
account” for an association’s current and 10 preceding fiscal years,
including itemized and detailed records of all receipts and
expenditures. 765 ILCS 605/19(a)(9) (West 2000). An association
member has a right to request these types of materials only if the
request is made in writing and states a proper purpose. 765 ILCS
605/19(b) (West 2000). Section 19 imposes on the requesting
association member the burden of proving, in an action to compel,
that the request is based on a proper purpose. 765 ILCS 605/19(e)
(West 2000). Moreover, no attorney fees can be assessed against the
board unless a court first specifically finds that the board acted in
“bad faith” in denying the member’s request. 765 ILCS 605/19(e)
(West 2000). Finally, section 19 specifically exempts certain
documents from disclosure, “unless otherwise directed by court
order.” These include documents relating to association employees’
discipline or dismissal; documents relating to actions pending against
or on behalf of the association or its board in a court or administrative
tribunal; and documents relating to the common expenses or other
charges owed by an association member other than the requesting
member. 765 ILCS 605/19(g) (West 2000).
¶ 105
In contrast to section 19’s specific and comprehensive provisions,
the City of Chicago ordinance states generally as follows:
“No person shall fail to allow unit owners to inspect the
financial books and records of the condominium association
within three business days of the time written request for
examination of the records is received.” Chicago Municipal
Code § 13-72-080 (2009).
The ordinance contains no time limits for the keeping of financial
books and records. In contrast, the Act imposes a statutory duty on
boards to keep such records for 10 years. In addition, the requirement
of a proper purpose for a record request is not included in the
ordinance. The ordinance therefore imposes a less stringent burden on
association members in Chicago in requesting such records than does
section 19. Also, section 19 gives the association 30 days to produce;
the ordinance allows only 3 days. Therefore, the ordinance and
section 19 are in direct conflict.
-33-
¶ 106
Home Rule: General Principles
¶ 107
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 gave home rule municipalities
broad power to deal with problems that were local in nature.
Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 286
(2001). The notion of home rule, in fact, was predicated on the
assumption that problems affecting municipalities and their residents
should be met with solutions tailored to local needs and concerns. Id.
As a result, our constitution provides that home rule units “may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its
government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VII, § 6(a).
¶ 108
As this court recently iterated in City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc.,
2011 IL 111127, ¶¶ 18, 19, while this “intentionally imprecise
language” grants local governmental units “the broadest powers
possible,” that home rule authority nevertheless must relate only to
local problems. This court, while mindful of the constitutional
mandate of liberal construction, has not hesitated to strike down home
rule ordinances where they did not pertain to the government or
affairs of the local unit (see Ampersand, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d at 542
(collecting cases)), and StubHub stands as the most recent example
of this principle. As noted above, the meaning of the “qualifying
phrase ‘pertaining to its government and affairs’ *** will ultimately
depend upon an interpretation by this court as to whether or not the
power exercised is within the grant of section 6(a).” Ampersand, Inc.,
61 Ill. 2d at 540; StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 19.  Thus: 
7
“If a home rule unit attempts to exercise a power or to
perform a function which is not within the scope of the grant
contained in [ ]section 6(a)—i.e., if the action does not pertain
to the government and affairs of the home rule unit—*** the
exercise or performance would be void unless authorized by
Significantly, the drafters’ intent regarding this inquiry contrasts
7
sharply with their intent with respect to the separate question of whether
the General Assembly has preempted home rule in a given area. As to that
question, our case law is clear that once a home rule unit falls within the
grant of power of section 6(a), the drafters intended to “eliminate or at least
reduce to a bare minimum the circumstances under which local home rule
powers are preempted by judicial interpretation.” Scadron v. City of Des
Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 186 (1992).
-34-
statute or by another provision of the 1970 Constitution.”
ILCS Ann., 1970 Const., art. VII, § 6, Constitutional
Commentary, at 265 (Smith-Hurd 2006). 
¶ 109
The Chicago Ordinance Does Not Pertain to the City’s
Government and Affairs
¶ 110
This court has recognized that an ordinance pertains to local
government and affairs where it addresses local, rather than state or
national, problems. Schillerstrom, 198 Ill. 2d at 290. That
determination requires the court to consider the “ ‘nature and extent
of the problem, the units of government which have the most vital
interest in its solution, and the role traditionally played by local and
statewide authorities in dealing with it.’ ” StubHub, 2011 IL 111127,
¶ 24 (quoting Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483,
501 (1984)).
¶ 111
The majority decision states that “[t]he primary issue in this
appeal is whether a City of Chicago ordinance allowing condominium
unit owners to inspect condominium association financial books and
records is a valid exercise of the City’s home rule power.” Supra ¶ 1.
Yet, characterizing the issue in this manner overlooks critical aspects
of condominium property ownership. Indeed, to describe the problem
as relating only to unit owners’ access to association documents is to
look at the issue only from the perspective of the individual unit
owner. That is too narrow and does not comport with condominium
law, which was created to address ownership rights from the
perspective of both the individual unit owner and the perspective of
the joint holders of the common property of the association.  What
8
may be in the best interest of an individual unit owner may not be in
the best interest of the association. Therefore, condominium laws
have been historically designed to balance the needs of both. As
section 19 demonstrates, the unit owners’ right of access to certain
records must be balanced against the association’s duty to keep and
maintain those records in the first instance. This balancing of
competing interests reflects the need to protect associations and unit
owners alike from potential abuses. These issues, which are addressed
in section 19, are not covered in the ordinance. As we just made clear
Individual unit owners enjoy collective ownership in common areas
8
of the property with other unit owners as tenants in common. 1 Gary A.
Poliakoff, The Law of Condominium Operations § 1.1 (1988). 
-35-
in StubHub, this court “can declare a subject off-limits to local
government control only where the state has a vital interest and a
traditionally exclusive role.” StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 25. As I
explain below, the General Assembly appears to have seen the matter
from defendants’ perspective, as shown by the extent and history of
the state’s activity as well as by the legislative record.
¶ 112
A condominium is a form of joint ownership of real property
which has been defined as “a system of separate ownership of
individual units in multi-unit projects.” 1 Patrick J. Rohan & Melvin
A. Reskin, Real Estate Transactions: Condominium Law & Practice
§ 1.01(1) (1974). Each unit owner holds title to his or her unit in fee
simple, and owns the underlying common elements as a tenant in
common with other unit owners. Id. Ownership of the units in fee
simple permits financing tailored to individual needs and minimizes
the economic dependence of neighbors. Id. § 9.01. As a result, for a
condominium arrangement to be feasible, the rights and duties of unit
owners with respect to the common elements must be clearly defined.
Generally, an association consisting of unit owners is organized to
tend to administrative matters, maintenance, and allocation of
common expenses. Id. § 5.04.
¶ 113
The condominium form of ownership of real property was
recognized in the United States as early as 1947 in New York.  Allan
9
Goldberg, The Illinois Act and Condominium Titles, in Illinois
Condominium Law § 1.3 (Ill. Inst. for Cont. Legal Educ. 2010). In
1951, the legislature of Puerto Rico became the first to enact specific
legislation acknowledging the right to own real property in this
manner. Id. § 1.4. In 1960, the United States Congress recognized
condominiums as a form of property ownership that was to be
included within the purview of federally guaranteed housing
legislation. Id. As a result, Congress amended the National Housing
Act to require each state to recognize the condominium as a form of
real property ownership before a Federal Housing Authority mortgage
Commentators disagree somewhat as to whether this form of property
9
ownership existed historically at common-law. See Carol Jane Brown,
Note, Special Declarant Rights and Obligations Following Mortgage
Foreclosure on Condominium Developments, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 463,
465 (1984) (collecting sources). There is authority for common interest
property ownership in England and Scotland without benefit of statute.
Curtis J. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63
Colum. L. Rev. 987, 1001-02 (1963).
-36-
guarantee could issue. Id. § 1.5; see also Charles E. Ramsey,
Condominiums: The New Look in Co-ops, Practical and Legal
Problems 22 (1961) (noting that section 234 of National Housing Act
included a condition requiring “that the concept of condominium
homeownership must be established under the laws of the state where
the property is located”). At the time of Congress’ action, it was
generally recognized that state legislation must do three things: (1)
“provide a procedure for the establishment and dissolution of a
condominium,” (2) “accommodate existing legislation dealing with
taxation, recording procedures, liens, land-use control, and security
regulatory techniques to the special needs of condominiums, and (3)
anticipate possible judicial antagonism involving matters such as bars
on partition and covenants real.” Curtis J. Berger, Condominium:
Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 987, 1003
(1963) (Berger).
¶ 114
The original Puerto Rican statute served as the model of
condominium legislation, and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws subsequently promulgated a
model act designed to bring uniformity to the statutes governing this
unique form of property. Jonathan D. Ross-Harrington, Property
Forms in Tension: Preference Inefficiency, Rent-Seeking, and the
Problem of Notice in the Modern Condominium, 28 Yale L. & Pol’y
Rev. 187, 198 (2009). While it was generally accepted that a
condominium could exist under common law principles, most legal
commentators at the time argued that this particular form of property
ownership would not grow in the way Congress intended without
statutory provision. Berger, supra, at 1002. Enabling statutes, it was
argued, provided the necessary assurances that the legal system would
fully recognize unit ownership as an interest in real property that
would, in turn, stimulate the interest and elicit the confidence of
lenders, consumers, and suppliers of labor and services. Id. at 1003.
In other words, state legislation would not only provide certainty in
real property law, but would also provide increased marketability and
insurability
¶ 115
By 1968, every state had enacted a condominium statute. Carol
Jane Brown, Special Declarant Rights and Obligations Following
Mortgage Foreclosure on Condominium Developments, 25 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 463, 466 (1984). All state statutes have several things
in common. First, they “provide for recognition of divided ownership
and the utilization of conveying instruments that adequately and
clearly demonstrate ownership and transferabilty.” David Clurman,
-37-
F. Scott Jackson & Edna Hebard, Condominiums and Cooperatives
13 (2d ed. 1984). Further, they “regulate procedures, delineate the
duties of the individual unit owners, as well as of the condominium
association, provide for the distribution of responsibilities in the event
of damage, destruction or condemnation, and determine the legal
rights of condominium unit owners and associations in the event of
defaulting individual unit owners.” 4 David A. Thomas, Thompson
on Real Property 237-38 (2d ed. 2004). As a result, it is said that
condominium law is a “blend” of both property and contract law,
along with aspects of corporate law. Ross-Harrington, supra, at 198-
99. 
¶ 116
It was in response to this nationwide effort to facilitate
condominium real estate law that our General Assembly enacted the
Condominium Property Act in 1963, which addresses both
condominium creation and management. The Act governs the rights
of the owners to the use and enjoyment of their property and also
provides for the areas in which common expenses are to be allocated.
The Act further regulates procedures and delineates the duties of
individual unit owners as well as those of the association, as section
19 demonstrates. Almost immediately, the concern of legal scholars
that state condominium law had to “accommodate existing legislation
dealing with taxation, recording procedures, liens, land-use control,
and security regulatory techniques to the special needs of the
condominiums” (Berger, supra, at 1003) was illuminated. Provisions
had to be added to address the method by which real estate taxes
could be imposed on condominium property and the manner by which
tax relief could be sought. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, ¶ 310,
Historical & Practice Notes, at 203-04 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
Other changes included, inter alia, (1) recognizing condominium
associations as non-for-profit corporations. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30,
¶ 250, Historical & Practice Notes—Introduction, at 146 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992)); (2) coordinating language to synchronize condominium
law with the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Ill. Ann Stat., ch. 30,
¶ 309, Historical & Practice Notes, at 185 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992));
(3) authorizing condominiums to enter into master metering
agreements with respect to telephone, gas, and electric public utility
services (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, ¶ 250, Historical & Practice
Notes—Introduction, at 149 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)); (4) providing
for the procurement of insurance and insurance trust funds (this was
done so that condominium associations could benefit from the
General Assembly’s comprehensive insurance reform package and
-38-
the Charitable Trust Pool Act) (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, ¶ 312.1,
Historical & Practice Notes, at 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)); and
(5) requiring officers and directors to have a fiduciary bond and
fidelity insurance coverage in certain amounts so as to lessen the
difficulty in obtaining such insurance. I cite these provisions only to
show examples of the variety of ways Illinois condominium law
touches upon other areas of general law.
¶ 117
With respect to the powers and duties of a condominium board of
directors (including the duty of record keeping), it is clear that from
its beginnings the Act was designed to put condominium associations
on as equal a footing as possible with other corporate associations
doing business in the state. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, ¶ 250,
Historical & Practice Notes—Introduction, at 146 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992). The Act permits for condominium associations to file papers
of incorporation with the Secretary of State and further grants all
associations all of the powers specified in the General Not For Profit
Corporation Act, even if the association is not incorporated. See St.
Francis Courts Condominium Ass’n v. Investors Real Estate, 104 Ill.
App. 3d 663, 667 (1982). The record-keeping provisions of the Act
originally corresponded to those in the General Not For Profit
Corporation Act. Public Act 85-1386 was the first in which the
legislature moved away from the strictures of the Not For Profit Act
to ensure that freedom of information provisions were made
applicable to condominium units. 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, July 1, 1988, at 52 (statements of Senator Karpiel). This
was done for a number of reasons, including having uniform sources
of information for owners seeking federal mortgages. According to
the House sponsor, Representative Levin, Senate Bill 1719, which
addressed comprehensive changes to the Condominium Act, included
provisions that “strengthen[ed] the books and records provisions of
the Condo Act for unit owners.” 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, July 1, 1988, at 88 (statements of Representative Levin).
The comprehensive legislation was the product of an agreement with
the Chicago Bar Association, mortgage lenders, and the State’s
Attorney’s office of Cook County. Id.
¶ 118
By 1991, the General Assembly again addressed comprehensive
condominium issues that related to record keeping, proxy voting, and
reserve funding, this time in Public Act 87-746. The legislative
debates reveal that the Illinois State Bar Association objected to some
of the proposed record-keeping provisions because it “is more ***
micro-management of boards of directors.” 87th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
-39-
Senate Proceedings, July 2, 1991, at 47 (statements of Senator Geo-
Karis). Eventually, the bill received bipartisan support, and approval
from both the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations. 87th Ill.
Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 3, 1991, at 11 (statements of
Senator Cullerton).
¶ 119
Shortly thereafter, the legislature had to revisit the issue again in
Public Act 88-135. The problem sought to be avoided was the impact
that the new laws had on secret ballot voting in association elections.
88th Ill. Gen Assem., House Proceedings, May 12, 1993, at 125
(statements of Representative Ervin). Finally, in 1998, the General
Assembly again addressed the record-keeping duties of an
association’s directors, this time in response to problems with
burdensome requests for older documents. During the debate of
Public Act 90-0496, the bill’s House sponsor, Representative
Feigenholtz of Chicago, was asked what exactly the problem was that
was being solved by the bill. She responded:
“Actually, some people have been going to their
condominium associations and asking for records that are
very, very old. And it’s actually been very burdensome. So,
what we’re trying to do here is set up a better, more expedited
system.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 13,
1997, at 20 (statements of Representative Feigenholtz). 
In fact, Representative Feigenholtz characterized the legislation as a
“most compelling condominium matter.” Id. at 23. During the Senate
debate, the bill’s sponsor, Senator Cullerton of Chicago, noted that
the bill dealt with “the examination of condominium records” and
“allows for obtaining records of condominium board of managers,
certain guidelines and rules that you have to follow to gain access to
those records.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 31,
1997, at 16-17 (statements of Senator Cullerton). 
¶ 120
Thus, the floor debates reveal that unfettered record access had
become yet another problem relating to condominium record keeping
because it allowed for burdensome requests that were difficult to
meet. The General Assembly sought to solve this problem by
amending the Act to delineate between the various different types of
records that can be requested. As a result, section 19 now establishes
nine different classes of records that a board must maintain and keep.
765 ILCS 605/19(a) (West 2000). The General Assembly further
imposed time limits for the keeping of such documents (7 years for
meeting minutes, 10 years for financial records). Id. Importantly, in
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balancing the interests of an individual owner and the rest of the
Association’s members with respect to “record access,” the General
Assembly chose to obligate the unit owner who is requesting financial
records to articulate a “proper purpose.” 765 ILCS 605/19(e) (West
2000); see also Taghert v. Wesley, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 1146 (2003)
(noting that the Act vests condominium association members with
inspection rights established in the statutory law of corporations). The
requesting unit owner likewise has the burden of proof in any court
action to compel requests. 765 ILCS 605/19(e) (West 2000). The
statute does not allow for the recovery of attorney fees without a
court’s specific finding of “bad faith.” Id. Finally, the statute
explicitly states that it pertains to all condominiums incorporated in
this state and is an expression of public policy. 765 ILCS 605/19(h)
(West 2000).
¶ 121
It is therefore clear from the outset of condominium regulation in
Illinois that condominium record keeping cannot be considered in a
vacuum, as the majority’s view indicates. It is part and parcel of a
larger statutory scheme and has purposes beyond protection of a unit
owner’s right of access. Rather, record access is needed for a
multitude of reasons, including financing and insurance. To address
this, the General Assembly borrowed from areas of corporate law.
Thus, the General Assembly chose to view the matter of
condominium creation, management, and regulation as a problem
which was twofold in nature: creating a new form of real property
interest and ensuring that the new law matched up with other areas of
substantive law in order to properly delineate both owners’ and
associations’ rights and obligations. To do this, the General Assembly
created a comprehensive statute which borrowed heavily from areas
of contract and property law, as well as corporate law.
¶ 122
Our recent StubHub decision underscores that the “problem” in
this case is not local. There, we reviewed the historical and legislative
record with respect to the Ticket Sale and Resale Act to conclude that
the City of Chicago did not have the authority under section 6(a) to
require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement
taxes on resold tickets. StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶¶ 26-36.
Similarly, here the history and legislative record of this enabling
statute indicates that its subject matter is not local and, therefore, falls
outside of section 6(a).
¶ 123
In addition, examination of the third element of our traditional
three-part inquiry reflects that the state has a vital interest in the
regulation of condominium ownership such that the statute must take
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precedence over the City’s ordinance. The City asserts that the
abundance of condominiums in Chicago renders its interest in solving
the “problem” of record keeping and access greater than the state’s.
This assertion misses the point.  Under the City’s logic, every home
10
rule unit that has a large condominium presence can legislate in this
area, with the Act reduced to providing the law for those
condominiums that are in towns and villages that are not home rule
units. The rights of owners in one town would differ from the rights
of owners in another town. Similarly, the rights of an association
would differ from city to city. It is for this reason that the state has the
greater obligation to Illinois property owners so as to ensure the
proper balance between individual unit owners’ rights and those of
the collective association. The Act, as I have noted, works to ensure
that condominium regulations are uniform so as to facilitate
Congress’ desire to enhance this form of property ownership.  In
11
order to preserve this national uniformity and to safeguard the rights
of associations and unit owners alike, the legislature has acted in
areas beyond record keeping and has allowed for fiduciary bonds,
increased protections against individual owners’ failure to pay
assessments and mortgage foreclosures, and mandatory
insurance—not just on property but also for directors and officers,
again borrowing from principles of corporate law.
¶ 124
The City’s ordinance directly impedes the purposes of the
Condominium Act, which include protecting unit owners’ right of
access to association records, while imposing reasonable limitations
To the extent that the City is arguing that because it has many
10
condominiums within its city limits, that does not make the problem so
unique to Chicago that its interest is greater than the state’s. Chicago
suburbs have experienced greater condominium development as land
becomes scarce. For example, in 2005, 2,139 units were converted to
condominiums in northwest suburban Cook County alone. Annemarie
Mannion, Conversion Country: Suburban Complexes Offer Condo Buyers
Space, Location and Affordabilty; Investors Like Them, Too, Chi. Trib.,
Apr. 22, 2007, § 16, at 1.
The reason Congress encouraged condominium growth was because
11
it was deemed to be in the national interest to provide more affordable
housing for people. Carol Jane Brown, Note, Special Declarant Rights and
Obligations Following Mortgage Foreclosure on Condominium
Developments, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 463, 466-67 (1984). In short, it
allowed many Americans to pursue the dream of owning one’s own home.
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on the record-keeping and disclosure obligations of the association.
Defendants note that in order to comply with the City’s ordinance,
they would have to keep books and records, including minutes, for an
indefinite period of time and would have to turnover documents to
any owner who so requests even though the owner does not state a
proper purpose. They would, in fact, have to break state law (and
violate a statutorily imposed duty) in order to comply with the City’s
ordinance. Obviously, if other municipalities followed the City’s lead
and deviated from state law in such a way, there would be a
“patchwork” of local regulations. This, of course, frustrates the very
reason for the uniform state laws that were envisioned when the
condominium form of ownership was first recognized. Almost all
legal commentators recognized that a comprehensive and consistent
approach to condominium regulation should be instilled among the
states. It is clear from the history of our Act, the General Assembly
shared this view and chose to impose uniform rules for the creation
and management of condominiums across our state. I am therefore
compelled to conclude that the state has a greater interest than any
municipality in regulating this relatively new form of property
ownership.
¶ 125
Again, StubHub underscores this conclusion. There, we
specifically acknowledged that the phrase “pertaining to [local]
government and affairs” in section 6(a) does not relate to matters such
as divorce, real property, trusts, and contracts. StubHub, 2011 IL
111127, ¶ 19 (citing 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention 1621). We also held that the General
Assembly’s choice of imposing “a more comprehensive and uniform
approach,” as opposed to a “patchwork” of local regulations, was
evidence that the state had a greater interest in solving the problem of
tax collection on resold tickets. See StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 34.12
In this case, the conclusion that the state has the greater interest in
regulating condominium ownership, an aspect of property law, is
even clearer. This conclusion is not undermined by the fact that we
have recognized the authority of home rule units to regulate landlord-
tenant relationships. See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d
101, 113-14 (1981). The landlord-tenant relationship is not the
equivalent of an individual’s ownership rights in real property. Also,
We held this despite the fact that section 6(a) contains language that
12
expressly grants to home rule units the power “to tax.” Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VII, § 6(a).
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the constitutional debates make clear that it was the intent of the
drafters, that like the power to tax, landlord-tenant relations were
intended to fall within the purview of section 6(a). See 7 Record of
Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1605 (noting
that the prevention of “slums” was one of the reasons for the
broadened local powers), 1652 (allowing for rent control ordinances
under home rule). Neither the provisions of the home rule article nor
the constitutional debates indicate an intent to include the regulation
of condominium ownership among the matters embraced by home
rule power.
¶ 126
Finally, in terms of whether the state or the municipality has a
traditional role in solving the problem, the history of condominium
law reveals that the state has, by virtue of congressional mandate, had
the traditional role in condominium creation, management, and
regulation. The power to form a condominium association flowed
from the state, not the local municipality. This conclusion is not only
supported by the history of condominium law that I set forth above,
but is also supported by the constitutional debates on home rule.
¶ 127
As noted earlier, this court has repeatedly stressed that whether a
matter of local or statewide concern is a question of law, left by the
constitution to judicial interpretation. Fortunately, Illinois judges have
extensive commentary from the constitutional debates to guide us in
this area. For example, the Report from the Local Government
Committee, which drafted article VII, states that the section 6(a)’s
phrase “any function pertaining to its government and affairs” was
derived from Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home
Rule prepared by Dean Jefferson Fordham of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School for the American Municipal Association in
1953. See 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention 1620. The language of section 6(a) does not track the
Model language exactly because the drafters also borrowed from
provisions of the Alaska Constitution—language that they believed
was “designed to be the broadest possible description” of the powers
that the receiving units of local government may exercise. Id. at 1621.
The drafters, however, expressly noted that such powers, broad and
liberally construed as they may be, ultimately must relate to local
concerns: 
“It is clear, however, that the powers of home-rule units relate
to their own problems, not to those of the state or the nation.
Their powers should not extend to such matters as divorce,
real property law, trusts, contracts, etc. which are generally
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recognized as falling within the competence of state rather
than local authorities. Thus the proposed grant of powers to
local governments extends only to matters ‘pertaining to their
government and affairs.’ ” (Emphases added.) Id. at 1621-22.
See also StubHub, 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 19; Ampersand, 61 Ill. 2d at
540.
¶ 128
These very comments have been echoed by Dean Fordham, who,
as noted previously, was the author of the Model Constitutional
Provisions for Municipal Home Rule that was utilized by the drafters
of our constitution: “It is perfectly plain that we do not want to
devolve upon local government independent authority to enact private
law. To have contract law or property law vary from city to city
would be horrendous.” Kenneth Vanlandingham, Constitutional
Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1, 17 (1975). As stated earlier, condominium law is a blend
of real property law and contract law, with aspects of corporate law
added as well. It is clear that this is the very type of law that was
intended by the drafters of the home rule article to fall outside the
purview of section 6(a). For this reason, I conclude that the state has
the traditional role in regulating this area. Just as the state has a
traditional interest in regulating corporate record keeping and access,
so it does with respect to condominiums, which are corporations
under Illinois law.
¶ 129
Thus, the underlying basis and goals of the Act and the debates
that particularly address record keeping evince an intent by the
legislature to impose uniform standards on condominium associations
that are based on areas of property, contract, and corporate law. The
City’s ordinance does not pertain to its own government and affairs.
The City, therefore, has overstepped its home rule authority. 
¶ 130
Today’s decision has far-reaching implications for home rule
jurisprudence. Under the majority’s approach, all matters can be
characterized as pertaining to a municipality’s government and
affairs, unless the legislature has taken affirmative action to deny or
limit home rule power. Virtually any action by a home rule unit can
be said to fall within section 6(a). The General Assembly would have
to include express preemptive language to insulate against the reach
of home rule, even in legislation relating to areas of law that the
drafters of the home rule article never envisioned would fall within
its domain. Given the drafters’ intent, it is not surprising that the Act
does not contain any “magic words” of express limitation since real
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property law, of which condominium law is a part, was never
intended to fall within section 6(a). 
¶ 131
For all of the above reasons, I would conclude that the City’s
ordinance is unenforceable. Under section 19, plaintiff’s request in
1999 for all of the board meeting minutes dating from 1980 through
1990 is invalid since an association is required to only keep minutes
for seven years. State law requires financial books and records of
account for the current year and the 10 immediately preceding fiscal
years be produced, but “only for a proper purpose.” I therefore would
reverse the order of the circuit court and remand with directions that
plaintiff’s 1999 request be reviewed according to the provisions of
section 19 and that all further proceedings be conducted in
accordance with that statute.
¶ 132
II. Attorney Fees
¶ 133
While my position in section I of this dissent does not require that
I address the attorney fees issue, I feel it necessary to do so given the
result reached by the majority.
¶ 134
The ordinance allows for those like plaintiff here to recover “his
reasonable attorney fees.” Chicago Municipal Code § 13-72-100
(2009). The import of this language is clear—a plaintiff can only
recover the fees “he” incurred by hiring a lawyer. Reasonable fees are
those that fall within the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community. 
¶ 135
Plaintiff’s attorney agreed to charge plaintiff $200 per hour for his
services. Evidence revealed that the prevailing market rate in Chicago
was $300. The $200 fee therefore was within the market range. There
was no reason for the circuit court to increase the agreed-upon rate by
$100, thereby awarding a windfall to plaintiff or his counsel. 
¶ 136
First National Bank of Decatur v. Barclay, 111 Ill. App. 3d 162
(1982), is directly on point. There, the plaintiff’s attorney agreed to
represent him in an action on a promissory note at a rate of $70 per
hour. The evidence revealed that the attorney billed plaintiff for 17½
hours. The circuit court awarded the attorney $5,000. The appellate
court reversed the award, holding as follows:
“The record supports an award for 17½ hours of the lawyer’s
time, billed at the rate of $70 per hour. To allow any greater
award in this case, where the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel
had agreed upon this fee, would be to sanction an
unjustifiable windfall for the plaintiff. The terms of the
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promissory note obligated the defendant to pay the reasonable
attorney fees incurred during collection efforts. Here, it was
error for the trial court to find that a reasonable fee exceeded
the rate which the plaintiff agreed to pay its counsel in the
case.” Barclay, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 164.
The court remanded with directions for the circuit to enter a fee of
$1,225 (17½ x 70). The same result should obtain here. The fee
award should have been calculated using the agreed-upon rate of
$200 per hour. It is wrong for the court to affirm the improper
calculation.
¶ 137
Accordingly, not only have the collective members of the
association here been denied the protections of section 19 in this case,
they now have to pay plaintiff more money than he incurred in
attorney fees. Given the importance of balancing the rights of
individual condominium owners against the right of the association
members as a whole, I urge the General Assembly to take action in
this area.
¶ 138
JUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.
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