Title: BARBARA A ROBINSON V CITY OF LANSING
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 138669
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 2010

FILED APRIL 8, 2010 
 
BARBARA A. ROBINSON, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 138669 
 
CITY OF LANSING, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MARKMAN, J.  
 
At issue here is whether the two-inch rule of MCL 691.1402a(2), which 
provides that a discontinuity defect of less than two inches in a sidewalk creates a 
rebuttable inference that the municipality maintained the sidewalk in reasonable 
repair, applies to sidewalks adjacent to state highways, as with the sidewalk at 
issue here, or only to sidewalks adjacent to county highways.  The trial court 
concluded that the rule only applies to sidewalks adjacent to county highways and, 
thus, granted plaintiff’s motion to strike the rule as an affirmative defense and 
denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition.  However, the Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that the rule is not limited to sidewalks that are adjacent 
to county highways, and remanded for further proceedings.  Because we agree 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
 
 
 
2
with the trial court that the rule only applies to sidewalks adjacent to county 
highways, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the trial 
court’s orders, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 
I. FACTS AND HISTORY 
On December 4, 2005, plaintiff, Barbara Robinson, was walking on the 
brick sidewalk that is adjacent to Michigan Avenue, a state highway in Lansing, in 
front of the Lansing Center.  She stepped into a depressed area of the sidewalk, 
lost her balance, tripped on a raised and uneven area of bricks next to the 
depression, and fell forward.  As a result, she fractured her wrist, necessitating two 
surgeries.  It is undisputed that the raised portion of the sidewalk was less than two 
inches and that defendant, the city of Lansing, maintained this sidewalk. 
Plaintiff sued defendant under the highway exception to governmental 
immunity, alleging that defendant had breached its duty under MCL 691.1402(1) 
to maintain the sidewalk in reasonable repair.  Defendant answered, raising as an 
affirmative defense the two-inch rule of MCL 691.1402a(2).  Before the close of 
discovery, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) 
(governmental immunity), claiming that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because plaintiff had not rebutted the inference created by the rule that 
defendant had maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair.  Plaintiff responded 
and moved to strike the rule as an affirmative defense by arguing that the rule 
applies only to sidewalks adjacent to county highways and, as a result, was 
 
 
3
inapplicable.  The trial court agreed with plaintiff and thus granted plaintiff’s 
motion to strike and denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 
Defendant appealed by right, arguing that nothing in MCL 691.1402a(2) 
limits its application to county highways.  The Court of Appeals reversed and held 
that, in contrast to subsections (1) and (3), subsection (2) of MCL 691.1402a 
contains no language limiting its application to county highways.  Robinson v City 
of Lansing, 282 Mich App 610, 616-618; 765 NW2d 25 (2009).  It then remanded 
the case to the trial court to rule on the remaining issues and noted that defendant 
could refile its summary disposition motion. 
Plaintiff has sought leave to appeal, claiming that the Court of Appeals 
erred in its interpretation of MCL 691.1402a(2).  This Court directed that oral 
argument be heard on the application for leave to appeal, 483 Mich 1134 (2009), 
and argument was heard on December 9, 2009.     
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the two-inch rule of MCL 691.1402a(2) applies to sidewalks 
adjacent to state highways or only to sidewalks adjacent to county highways is a 
question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  Ostroth v Warren Regency, GP, 
LLC, 474 Mich 36, 40; 709 NW2d (2006).  A trial court’s decision to deny a 
motion for summary disposition is also reviewed de novo.  Id.  
 
 
 
 
4
III. ANALYSIS 
A. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND HIGHWAY EXCEPTION 
In Michigan, governmental immunity was originally a common-law 
doctrine that protected all levels of government.  However, in 1961, this Court 
abolished common-law governmental immunity with respect to municipalities.   
Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961); McDowell v State Hwy 
Comm’r, 365 Mich 268; 112 NW2d 491 (1961).  In 1965, the Legislature reacted 
to Williams and McDowell by enacting the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), 
MCL 691.1401 et seq., restoring immunity for municipalities and preserving this 
protection for the state and its agencies.  The GTLA provides: “Except as 
otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency[1] is immune from tort 
liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 
governmental function.”  MCL 691.1407(1).  This grant of immunity is currently 
subject to six statutory exceptions.2   
                                              
1 “Governmental agency” is defined as “the state or a political subdivision.”  
MCL 691.1401(d).  The “state” includes “the state of Michigan and its agencies, 
departments [and] commissions,” MCL 691.1401(c), and a “political subdivision” 
includes “a municipal corporation, county, [and] county road commission,” MCL 
691.1401(b).  Finally, a “municipal corporation” includes a “city, village, [and] 
township . . . .”  MCL 691.1401(a).    
2 The six statutory exceptions are (1) the highway exception, MCL 
691.1402; (2) the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; (3) the public-building 
exception, MCL 691.1406; (4) the proprietary-function exception, MCL 691.1413; 
(5) the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and (6) the sewage-
disposal-system exception, MCL 691.1417. 
 
 
5
At issue in this case is the highway exception, MCL 691.1402(1), which 
provides, in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided in [MCL 691.1402a], each 
governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall 
maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably 
safe and convenient for public travel.[3]  A person who sustains 
bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of 
a governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in 
reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel 
may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the 
governmental agency. . . .  The duty of the state and the county road 
commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for 
that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway 
designed for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, 
trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.   
“Highway” is defined as “a public highway, road, or street that is open for public 
travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the 
highway.”  MCL 691.1401(e) (emphasis added).   
 
From these statutory provisions, we know that all governmental agencies, 
including the state, counties, and municipalities, have a duty to maintain highways 
under their jurisdiction in reasonable repair.  However, we also know that the duty 
of state and county road commissions is limited to the “improved portion of the 
highway designed for vehicular travel,” which specifically “does not include 
                                              
3 Const 1963, art 7, § 29 provides that “the right of all counties, townships, 
cities and villages to the reasonable control of their highways, streets, alleys and 
public places is hereby reserved to such local units of government.”  As the Court 
of Appeals noted, “the city does not dispute that it has jurisdiction over the 
sidewalk adjacent to Michigan Avenue.”  Robinson, 282 Mich App at 612-613. 
 
 
6
sidewalks . . . .”  MCL 691.1402(1).  A municipality’s duty, on the other hand, is 
not similarly limited; rather, a municipality has a duty to maintain highways in 
reasonable repair and “highway” is specifically defined to include “sidewalks.”  
MCL 691.1402(1); MCL 691.1401(e).  Thus, while MCL 691.1402(1) exempts 
state and county road commissions from liability for injuries resulting from 
defective sidewalks, municipalities are not exempt; municipalities do have a duty 
to maintain sidewalks in reasonable repair.  Haliw v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 
303; 627 NW2d 581 (2001) (“Pursuant to [MCL 691.1402(1)], the duty to 
maintain public sidewalks in ‘reasonable repair’ falls on local governments, 
including cities, villages, and townships.”); Glancy v City of Roseville, 457 Mich 
580, 584; 577 NW2d 897 (1998) (“[MCL 691.1402(1)] requires municipalities to 
maintain sidewalks in ‘reasonable repair.’”); Listanski v Canton Twp, 452 Mich 
678, 690; 551 NW2d 98 (1996) (“[T]ownships are liable for injuries occurring on 
sidewalks that abut state or county roads as a result of their negligent failure to 
maintain their sidewalks in reasonable repair.”), citing Mason v Wayne Co Bd of 
Comm’rs, 447 Mich 130, 136 n 6; 523 NW2d 791 (1994) (“[T]he purpose of [the 
limiting sentence of MCL 691.1402(1)], which applies only to counties and the 
state, is to allocate responsibility for sidewalks and crosswalks to local 
governments, including townships, cities, and villages.”); Jones v City of Ypsilanti, 
26 Mich App 574, 581; 182 NW2d 795 (1970) (holding that cities are liable for 
injuries occurring on sidewalks that abut state highways as a result of their 
negligent failure to maintain their sidewalks in reasonable repair).  In other words, 
 
 
7
when MCL 691.1402(1) and MCL 691.1401(e) are read together,4 it is clear that 
all governmental agencies except the state and county road commissions have a 
duty to maintain sidewalks in reasonable repair.  Indeed, in the instant case, 
defendant does not argue that it does not have a duty to maintain the sidewalk at 
issue in reasonable repair,5 but only argues that because the sidewalk’s 
discontinuity defect was less than 2 inches, MCL 691.1402a(2) creates a 
rebuttable inference that the municipality maintained the sidewalk in reasonable 
repair and that plaintiff has not rebutted this inference.  Therefore, as the Court of 
Appeals recognized, the “salient question . . . is whether the city is entitled to 
assert as a defense the two-inch rule set forth in MCL 691.1402a(2).”  Robinson, 
282 Mich App at 615. 
 
 
                                              
4 “It is elementary that statutes in pari materia are to be taken together in 
ascertaining the intention of the legislature, and that courts will regard all statutes 
upon the same general subject matter as part of 1 system.”  Dearborn Twp Clerk v 
Jones, 335 Mich 658, 662; 57 NW2d 40 (1953).  In this case, both MCL 691.1401 
and MCL 691.1402 are in the GTLA, MCL 691.1401 immediately precedes MCL 
691.1402, and MCL 691.1401 expressly states, “As used in this act: 
. . . ‘Highway’ . . . includes . . . sidewalks . . . .”  Therefore, “highway” as used in 
MCL 691.1402 clearly includes “sidewalks.”   
5 As noted by the Court of Appeals, “there is no dispute that the city has 
jurisdiction over the sidewalk adjacent to Michigan Avenue and therefore must 
keep it ‘in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public 
travel.’”  Robinson, 282 Mich App at 615, quoting MCL 691.1402(1).  See also 
defendant’s answer to the complaint, ¶ 9, p 2, in which defendant admitted that it 
“had a duty to maintain the sidewalk in reasonable repair so that it was reasonably 
safe and convenient for public travel.”   
 
 
8
B. TWO-INCH RULE 
As with governmental immunity itself, the two-inch rule was originally a 
common-law rule.6  In Harris v Detroit, 367 Mich 526, 528; 117 NW2d 32 (1962), 
                                              
6 Justice BLACK, in his concurring statement in Harris v Detroit, 367 Mich 
526, 537; 117 NW2d 32 (1962) (BLACK, J., concurring), referred to the two-inch 
rule as a culmination of “cases construing an unamended statute; not a case or line 
of cases announcing a rule of the common law.”  However, given that the statute 
referred to by Justice BLACK did not refer to a discontinuity of less than two 
inches, we respectfully disagree.  The statute referred to by Justice BLACK at that 
time stated: 
Any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of 
the public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to 
keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, 
crosswalks and culverts on the same in reasonable repair, and in 
condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, 
city or corporation whose corporate authority extends over such 
public highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, crosswalk or culvert, and 
whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair, such 
township, village, city or corporation shall be liable to and shall pay 
to the person or persons so injured or disabled, and to any person 
suffering damages by reason of such injury, just damages, to be 
recovered in an action of trespass on the case before any court of 
competent jurisdiction.  [MCL 242.1, as amended by 1951 PA 19.] 
Because neither this statute nor any other contemporaneous statute referred to 
anything resembling the two-inch rule, we conclude that the rule at that time could 
only have been a common-law rule.  See Glancy, 457 Mich at 588, which 
explained that “the two-inch rule was . . . a common-law threshold for negligence 
based on the ‘reasonable repair’ standard of care of the statutory highway 
exception.”  See also Rule v Bay City, 387 Mich 281, 282; 195 NW2d 849 (1972), 
in which this Court held that “for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice ADAMS in his 
dissent in Harris v Detroit, 367 Mich 526, 529 (1962), we do not regard it as 
desirable to continue to enforce the ‘two-inch’ rule,’” and Justice ADAM’s dissent 
in Harris, in which he referred to the two-inch rule as a “judge-made rule of law,” 
and opined that “‘“chang[ing] [the common-law] should not be left to the 
legislature.”’”  Harris, 367 Mich at 533-534 (ADAMS, J., dissenting), quoting 
Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 235; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), quoting the William 
 
 
 
9
the two-inch rule was described as meaning that “a depression in a walk which 
does not exceed 2 inches in depth will not render a municipality liable for damages 
incident to an accident caused by such depression.”  “The basis of the two-inch 
rule [was] the concept of ‘reasonable repair.’”  Glancy, 457 Mich at 586.  “The 
two-inch rule was a bright-line rule stating that defects of two inches or less 
constituted ‘reasonable repair’ as a matter of law.”  Id. at 586-587.  In 1972, 
however, this Court abolished the rule, Rule v Bay City, 387 Mich 281; 195 NW2d 
849 (1972),7 and, in 1998, we refused to readopt it, Glancy, 457 Mich at 582.  In 
1999, the Legislature took up the issue, and a statutory two-inch rule was adopted 
in MCL 691.1402a,8 which provides:   
(1) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a municipal 
corporation has no duty to repair or maintain, and is not liable for 
injuries arising from, a portion of a county highway outside of the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, 
including a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation.  This 
                                              
L. Storrs Lectures by Justice Benjamin Cardozo before the Yale University Law 
School in 1921, collected in Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp 151-
152.  
7 In Rule, 387 Mich at 283, this Court announced, “[W]e will no longer 
hold as a matter of law that a depression or obstruction of two inches or less in a 
sidewalk may not be the basis for a municipality’s liability for negligence.”  
(Emphasis in the original.)   
8 The catchline of MCL 691.1402a in the Michigan Complied Laws 
Annotated states, “Duties to repair or maintain county highways; liabilities”; 
however, we recognize that the Legislature did not itself enact this catchline as 
part of the statute, and that such a catchline shall not be used to construe the 
section more broadly or narrowly than the text of the section would otherwise 
indicate.  See MCL 8.4b. 
 
 
10
subsection does not prevent or limit a municipal corporation’s 
liability if both of the following are true: 
(a) At least 30 days before the occurrence of the relevant 
injury, death, or damage, the municipal corporation knew or, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence 
of a defect in a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation 
outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for 
vehicular travel. 
(b) The defect described in subdivision (a) is a proximate 
cause of the injury, death, or damage. 
(2) A discontinuity defect of less than 2 inches creates a 
rebuttable inference that the municipal corporation maintained the 
sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation outside of the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in 
reasonable repair. 
(3) A municipal corporation’s liability under subsection (1) is 
limited by section 81131 of the natural resources and environmental 
protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.81131.[9]   
Although the very first sentence of MCL 691.1402a(1) begins by stating that a 
municipality is not liable for injuries arising from a portion of a county highway 
outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, 
including a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation, this sentence is 
prefaced by the language “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this section,” and the 
very next sentence of this subsection states that a municipality is liable for such 
injuries under certain circumstances.10  That is, a municipality is liable for injuries 
                                              
9 MCL 324.81131(11) provides that municipalities are not liable for injuries 
resulting from the use of off-road vehicles absent gross negligence. 
10 That MCL 691.1402a(1) does not completely abrogate a municipality’s 
liability for injuries resulting from defective sidewalks is further supported not 
 
 
 
11
arising from a defective sidewalk adjacent to a county highway if (a) the 
municipality knew or should have known at least 30 days before the occurrence of 
the injury of the existence of the defect in the sidewalk and (b) that defect was a 
proximate cause of the injury.  MCL 691.1402a(1).  In addition, MCL 
691.1402a(2) provides that a discontinuity defect of less than 2 inches creates a 
rebuttable inference that the municipality maintained the sidewalk in reasonable 
repair, as is required by MCL 691.1402(1); this is the statutory two-inch rule.11 
                                              
only by the fact that the second sentence of subsection (1) states that “[t]his 
subsection does not prevent or limit a municipal corporation’s liability” under 
certain circumstances, but also by the fact that subsection (3) states that “[a] 
municipal corporation’s liability under subsection (1) is limited by . . . MCL 
324.81131.”  (Emphasis added.)  It would have been unnecessary to indicate in 
subsection (3) that a municipality’s liability is limited by MCL 324.81131 if 
subsection (1) had already completely abrogated that liability.  It would have been 
similarly unnecessary to indicate in subsection (2) that a discontinuity defect of 
less than 2 inches creates a rebuttable inference that the municipality maintained 
the sidewalk in reasonable repair if subsection (1) had already abrogated a 
municipality’s duty in this regard.  Therefore, although subsection (1) does limit a 
municipality’s liability for injuries resulting from defective sidewalks, it does not 
completely abrogate this liability.       
11 The statutory two-inch rule’s “rebuttable inference” of reasonable repair 
is distinct from the common-law rule’s irrebutable presumption of reasonable 
repair.  As the Court of Appeals explained in Gadigian v City of Taylor, 282 Mich 
App 179, 183-184; 774 NW2d 352 (2009),  
[i]n crafting [MCL 691.1402a(2)], the Legislature could have 
adopted the former common-law rule, which flatly prohibited claims 
involving discontinuity defects of less than two inches. . . .  
 
But rather than eliminating all sidewalk-injury claims arising 
from defects of less than two inches, . . . the Legislature used the 
term “rebuttable inference.”   
 
 
 
12
 
As discussed earlier, MCL 691.1402(1) imposes liability on municipalities 
for injuries resulting from defective sidewalks, i.e., sidewalks that the municipality 
has failed to maintain in reasonable repair.  Haliw, 464 Mich at 303 (“Pursuant to 
[MCL 691.1402(1)], the duty to maintain public sidewalks in ‘reasonable repair’ 
falls on local governments, including cities, villages, and townships.”).  However, 
MCL 691.1402a limits this liability by providing that municipalities are only liable 
for injuries resulting from defective sidewalks adjacent to county highways under 
the specified circumstances.  Moreover, if this defect constitutes a discontinuity of 
less than 2 inches, a rebuttable inference arises that the municipality maintained 
the sidewalk in reasonable repair, which is all that the municipality is required to 
do under MCL 691.1402(1).  Therefore, when MCL 691.1402(1) and MCL 
691.1402a are read together, it is clear that municipalities are generally liable for 
injuries resulting from defective sidewalks.12   
                                              
This Court has granted leave to appeal in Gadigian to address the meaning of 
“rebuttable inference” in MCL 691.1402a(2).  In the order granting leave, the 
parties have been directed to address “what evidence a plaintiff must present to 
rebut the inference of reasonable repair.”  Gadigian v City of Taylor, 485 Mich 
___ (2009).  Given our conclusion that the two-inch rule does not apply in the 
instant case, there is no need to hold this case in abeyance for Gadigian.     
12 Both MCL 691.1402 and MCL 691.1402a are in the GTLA, MCL 
691.1402 immediately precedes MCL 691.1402a, and MCL 691.1402 expressly 
states, “Except as otherwise provided in section 2a [MCL 691.1402a], each 
governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the 
highway in reasonable repair . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, it is absolutely 
clear that MCL 691.1402 and MCL 691.1402a must be read together.  See n 4 of 
this opinion. 
 
 
13
 
While defendant contends that the rebuttable inference of MCL 
691.1402a(2) applies to all cases in which a plaintiff is seeking to impose liability 
on a municipality for an injury resulting from a defective sidewalk, plaintiff 
contends that this rebuttable inference only applies in cases in which the defective 
sidewalk is adjacent to a county highway.  For several reasons, we agree with 
plaintiff.   
 
First, as discussed above, MCL 691.1402a(1) begins by stating that a 
municipality “is not liable for injuries arising from, a portion of a county 
highway . . . , including a sidewalk,” unless certain conditions are satisfied.  
(Emphasis added.)  These conditions are then set forth in MCL 691.1402a(1)(a) 
and (b).  Then, immediately thereafter, MCL 691.1402a(2) indicates that a 
discontinuity defect of less than 2 inches creates a rebuttal inference that the 
municipality maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair.  Nothing in subsection 
(2) suggests that its scope is any different than that of subsection (1); that is, there 
is no language in subsection (2) that indicates that although subsection (1) only 
applies to county highways, subsection (2) should be construed as additionally 
applying to highways other than county highways, such as state or city highways.   
 
Second, not only do the placement of subsection (2) and the absence of 
language in subsection (2) distinguishing it from subsection (1) suggest that 
subsection (2), as with subsection (1), only applies to county highways, but the 
syntax of subsection (2) also suggests that both these subsections apply only to 
 
 
14
county highways.  Subsection (2) refers to “the highway.”  (Emphasis added.)  As 
this Court has explained: 
 
“The” and “a” have different meanings.  “The” is defined as 
“definite article. 1. (used, [especially] before a noun, with a 
specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or 
generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an). . . .”  Random 
House Webster’s College Dictionary, p 1382.  [Massey v Mandell, 
462 Mich 375, 382 n 5; 614 NW2d 70 (2000).] [13] 
Because subsection (2) refers to “the highway,” we must determine to which 
“specific or particular” highway subsection (2) refers to.  That is, because 
subsection (2) does not refer to “a highway,” we cannot read subsection (2) as 
applying to highways in “general.”14  Given that subsection (2) immediately 
follows subsection (1), which limits its application to “county highway[s],” “the 
highway” referred to in subsection (2) must be the same highway referred to in 
subsection (1) -- the county highway.   
 
Third, subsection (2) cannot be read in isolation, but must be read in 
context.  Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that because the 
Legislature did not expressly use the word “county” in subsection (2), this word 
                                              
13 We must follow these distinctions between “a” and “the” because the 
Legislature has directed that “[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed and 
understood according to the common and approved usage of the language . . . .”  
MCL 8.3a.  See, e.g., Detroit v Tygard, 381 Mich 271, 275; 161 NW2d 1 (1968) 
(“We regard the use of the definite article ‘the’ as significant.”).   
14 Contrary to the Court of Appeals and defendant’s contention, MCL 
691.1402a(2) does not apply to “any” highway.  See Robinson, 282 Mich App at 
618; Defendant’s brief opposing the application for leave to appeal, p 14.  Instead, 
it applies to “the” highway, i.e., “the” highway referred to in MCL 691.1402a(1) -- 
the county highway. 
 
 
15
cannot be read into subsection (2).  If subsection (2) were to be read in isolation, 
defendant and the Court of Appeals might be correct in this analysis because it is 
well established that “we may not read into the statute what is not within the 
Legislature’s intent as derived from the language of the statute.”  AFSCME v 
Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 400; 662 NW2d 695 (2003).  However, it is equally well 
established that to discern the Legislature’s intent, statutory provisions are not to 
be read in isolation; rather, context matters, and thus statutory provisions are to be 
read as a whole.  Apsey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120, 132 n 8; 730 NW2d 695 
(2007) (“To discern the true intent of the Legislature, . . . statutes must be read 
together, and no one section should be taken in isolation.”); Griffith v State Farm 
Mut Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich 521, 533; 697 NW2d 895 (2005) (“‘[T]he 
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.’”) (citation 
omitted); G C Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 421; 662 
NW2d 710 (2003) (“‘[W]ords in a statute should not be construed in the void, but 
should be read together to harmonize the meaning, giving effect to the act as a 
whole.’”) (citation omitted).15  “[A]ny attempt to segregate any portion or exclude 
                                              
15 Defendant’s contention that the subsections comprising MCL 691.1402a 
should be read as “stand[ing] alone” stands in stark contrast to these well-
established rules of construction.  In addition, defendant’s reliance on the equally 
well-established doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the expression 
of one thing is the exclusion of another”), Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 481 Mich 601, 
611; 751 NW2d 463 (2008), is misplaced.  All that doctrine tells us is that which 
everybody agrees -- the express reference in MCL 691.1402a(1) to county 
highways excludes all other highways; that is, MCL 691.1402a(1) only applies to 
county highways.  However, because MCL 691.1402a(2) does not expressly refer 
 
 
 
16
any portion [of a statute] from consideration is almost certain to distort the 
legislative intent.”  2A Singer & Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th 
ed), § 47.2, p 282.  For the reasons discussed throughout this opinion, although 
only subsection (1) expressly refers to “county” highways, we believe that when 
MCL 691.1402a is read as a whole, it is clear that both subsections (1) and (2) 
only apply to such highways.     
 
Fourth, the Legislature is not required to be overly repetitive in its choice of 
language.  In essence, the issue here boils down to whether the Legislature was 
required to repetitively restate “county” throughout the entire statutory provision.  
We do not believe that this is required of the Legislature in order that it 
communicate its intentions.  Instead, we believe that a reasonable person reading 
this statute would understand that all three subsections of this provision apply only 
to county highways.  Indeed, if the Legislature had intended subsections (2) and 
(3) to apply to highways other than county highways, we believe that it would 
have been reasonably incumbent upon the Legislature to so indicate.  Even 
subsection (1) only refers to “county highway” one time and thereafter simply 
refers to “the highway,” and defendant conceded at oral argument that these 
subsequent references to “the highway” in subsection (1) signify “county 
highway.”  The first time that “highway” is used in MCL 691.1402a, it is 
                                              
to a specific highway, other than “the highway,” this doctrine does not aid us in 
our interpretation of MCL 691.1402a(2).        
 
 
17
immediately preceded by the word “county”; however, the next three times that it 
is used, it is not preceded by the word “county.”  Although defendant concedes 
that the second and third such references mean “county highway,” defendant 
argues that the fourth reference to “highway” means any highway.  We 
respectfully disagree.  Instead, we believe that the fourth reference to “highway,” 
just like the previous references in MCL 691.1402a, is a reference only to “county 
highways.”  In short, we do not believe that the Legislature is under an obligation 
to cumbersomely repeat language that is sufficiently incorporated into a statute by 
the use of such terms as “the,” “such,” and “that.”16   
 
Fifth, unless the Legislature indicates otherwise, when it repeatedly uses the 
same phrase in a statute, that phrase should be given the same meaning throughout 
the statute.  Paige v Sterling Hts, 476 Mich 495, 520; 720 NW2d 219 (2006) 
(indicating that “absolutely identical phrases in our statutes” should have identical 
meanings).  In MCL 691.1402a, all the references to “the highway” are 
encompassed within the identical phrase -- “outside of the improved portion of the 
highway designed for vehicular travel.”  Therefore, all the references to “the 
highway” should be interpreted in the same manner.  Given that the first three 
references to “highway” in MCL 691.1402a indisputably refer to county highways 
                                              
16 See, e.g., Townsend v M-R Products, Inc, 436 Mich 496, 502 n 8; 461 
NW2d 696 (1990) (“Rather than repeat the phrases ‘weekly compensation 
benefits,’ and ‘accrued weekly benefits,’ the drafters used the shorter ‘[the] 
compensation’/‘benefits’ to encompass both.”). 
 
 
18
only, we see no reason why the fourth reference to “highway” should be construed 
any differently.             
Finally, the principle that statutory provisions should not be construed in a 
manner that renders language within those provisions meaningless also supports 
our conclusion that the two-inch rule of MCL 691.1402a(2) only applies to 
sidewalks adjacent to county highways.  Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc v Governor, 481 
Mich 56, 70; 748 NW2d 524 (2008) (“[A]n interpretation that renders language 
meaningless must be avoided.”).  As discussed earlier, before MCL 691.1402a 
was enacted in 1999, MCL 691.1402(1) already imposed liability on 
municipalities for injuries resulting from defective sidewalks.  Haliw, 464 Mich at 
303 (“Pursuant to [MCL 691.1402(1)], the duty to maintain public sidewalks in 
‘reasonable repair’ falls on local governments, including cities, villages, and 
townships.”).  Therefore, MCL 691.1402a was plainly not enacted to introduce 
such liability on municipalities.  Instead, it was enacted to limit this liability.17  So 
                                              
17 As the Court of Appeals explained in Carr v City of Lansing, 259 Mich 
App 376, 380-381; 674 NW2d 168 (2003): 
. . . MCL 691.1402a, added by 1999 PA 205, effective 
December 21, 1999, creates no liability for municipalities that would 
not otherwise exist.  The 1999 legislation also amended [MCL 
691.1402(1)] to add “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in section 2a” 
immediately preceding the imposition of the duty of “each 
governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway” to 
maintain it “in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and 
convenient for public travel.”  Section 2a is MCL 691.1402a.  So, 
reading the plain language of the amendment, [MCL 691.1402a] is 
an exception to [MCL 691.1402(1)], the highway exception to the 
 
 
 
19
one must ask how does MCL 691.1402a limit this liability?  At first blush, it 
would appear that MCL 691.1402a(1) limits this liability to instances in which (a) 
the municipality knew or should have known of the defect in the sidewalk at least 
30 days before the injury occurred and (b) this defect was a proximate cause of the 
injury.  However, both of these limitations also existed before the enactment of 
MCL 691.1402a.  Indeed, both of these limitations have existed since the 
Legislature first enacted the GTLA in 1965.   
The first of these limitations, i.e., the one set forth in MCL 691.1402a(1)(a) 
regarding the municipality’s knowledge of the defect, was first set forth in MCL 
691.1403, which provides:          
No governmental agency is liable for injuries or damages 
caused by defective highways unless the governmental agency knew, 
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the 
existence of the defect and had a reasonable time to repair the defect 
before the injury took place.  Knowledge of the defect and time to 
repair the same shall be conclusively presumed when the defect 
                                              
general rule of governmental immunity established in [MCL 
691.1407(1)].  The obvious purpose of [MCL 691.1402a] is to limit 
the liability municipalities would otherwise face to maintain 
sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, or other installations pursuant to 
[MCL 691.1401(e)] and [MCL 691.1402(1)] by virtue of the 
exclusion of municipalities from the fourth sentence of [MCL 
691.1402(1)], which limits state and county liability to “the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel . . . .” 
See Haliw, [464 Mich] at 303, and Weakley [v Dearborn Hts (On 
Remand), 246 Mich App 322, 326; 632 NW2d 177 (2001)].  
Moreover, by its plain terms, [MCL 691.1402a] applies only to “a 
portion of a county highway outside of the improved portion of the 
highway designed for vehicular travel” (emphasis added), but only a 
state highway and a city street are involved in this case. 
 
 
20
existed so as to be readily apparent to an ordinarily observant person 
for a period of 30 days or longer before the injury took place.  
As one can see, MCL 691.1402a(1)(a) and MCL 691.1403 are virtually identical; 
they both limit a municipality’s liability to instances in which the municipality 
knew or should have known of the defect at least 30 days before the injury took 
place.   
 
The second of these limitations, i.e., the one set forth in MCL 
691.1402a(1)(b) requiring that the defect in the sidewalk have been a proximate 
cause of the injury, was first set forth in MCL 691.1402(1), which provides, in 
pertinent part:  
A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her 
property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a 
highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition 
reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered 
by him or her from the governmental agency.  [Emphasis added.]   
This Court has held that this language requires that the defect have been a 
proximate cause of the injury: 
 
[W]here a plaintiff successfully pleads in avoidance of 
governmental immunity, i.e., that the alleged injury occurred in a 
location encompassed by MCL 691.1402(1), the plaintiff must still 
prove, consistent with traditional negligence principles, the 
remaining elements of breach, causation, and damages contained 
within the statute. . . .   
*   *   * 
 
Proof of causation requires both cause in fact and legal, or 
proximate, cause.  [Haliw, 464 Mich at 304, 310.] 
 
 
21
See also Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 434; 751 NW2d 
8 (2008) (“To recover under MCL 691.1402(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that a 
defect in the highway was [a] proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”). 
 
Although it is clear that MCL 691.1402a(1) was enacted to limit the 
liabilities of a municipality with regard to county highways, given that the two 
limitations set forth in MCL 691.1402a(1)(a) and (b) existed before MCL 
691.1402a was enacted and that these limitations already applied to all highways, 
there must be some other reason that the Legislature chose to enact MCL 
691.1402a(1).  We believe that this other reason was to codify the two-inch rule 
with respect to county highways only.  That is, unless MCL 691.1402a(1) is 
interpreted as limiting the two-inch rule to sidewalks adjacent to county highways, 
it is nothing more than a restatement of existing law in Michigan.  In other words, 
MCL 691.1402a(1) is mere surplusage unless “county highway” in that subsection 
is construed to limit the application of the two-inch rule in MCL 691.1402a(2), 
and it is well established that “[i]n interpreting a statute, we [must] avoid a 
construction that would render part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”  People 
v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 126; 771 NW2d 655 (2009).  In light of this historical 
backdrop, we believe it is clear that the significance of MCL 691.1402a(1) is its 
limitation to county highways.18    
                                              
18 The fact that the two-inch rule was placed in MCL 691.1402a, rather than 
MCL 691.1402 further supports our conclusion that the two-inch rule was 
intended to apply to county highways only, rather than all highways.  In other 
 
 
 
22
 
To summarize, MCL 691.1402a(1) limits a municipality’s liability with 
regard to county highways, MCL 691.1402a(2) codifies the two-inch rule with 
regard to county highways, and MCL 691.1402a(3) limits a municipality’s liability 
with regard to county highways and off-road vehicles.19  In other words, 
subsection (1) sets forth in clear terms the general rule regarding a municipality’s 
liability for defective sidewalks adjacent to county highways, subsection (2) 
adopts a statutory two-inch rule for those sidewalks, and subsection (3) provides 
an exception to liability for these same sidewalks.  This establishes a fully rational 
and coherent legislative scheme.  MCL 691.1402a does not apply to sidewalks 
adjacent to highways other than county highways, such as sidewalks adjacent to 
                                              
words, if the Legislature had intended the two-inch rule to apply to all highways, 
why did the Legislature place the two-inch rule in MCL 691.1402a, a statutory 
provision in which two out of its three subsections indisputably apply only to 
county highways, rather than MCL 691.1402, which applies to all highways? 
19 Given that MCL 691.1402a(1) and (2) thoroughly address the liability of 
municipalities with regard to county highways, it makes sense that the Legislature 
would want to clarify in MCL 691.1402a(3) that the limitations of liability 
pertaining to off-road vehicles already found in the Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.81131, and referred to in MCL 
691.1402(4), are still to be applied to municipalities with regard to county 
highways.  That is, the Legislature may well have been concerned that, in the 
absence of subsection (3), the argument might be raised that MCL 324.81131 was 
preempted by MCL 691.1402a with regard to a municipality’s liability for injuries 
resulting from defective county highways. Further, contrary to defendant’s 
contention, the mere fact that MCL 691.1402a(3) expressly refers back to MCL 
691.1402a(1), while MCL 691.1402a(2) does not, does not mean that only 
subsections (1) and (3) are limited to county highways.  Instead, this difference is 
most likely attributable to the simple fact that subsection (3), unlike subsection (2), 
provides that a municipality’s “liability” is limited, and, thus, it is necessary in 
subsection (3) to explain to what “liability” this subsection is referring.    
 
 
23
state highways.  Therefore, the two-inch rule of MCL 691.1402a(2) does not apply 
to the latter.20    
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the two-inch rule of MCL 
691.1402a(2) does not apply to sidewalks adjacent to state highways; it only 
applies to sidewalks adjacent to county highways.  Therefore, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the trial court’s orders granting 
plaintiff’s motion to strike the two-inch rule as an affirmative defense and denying  
 
 
                                              
20 As the Court of Appeals stated in Darity v City of Flat Rock, unpublished 
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided February 21, 2006 (Docket 
No. 256481), at 4-5, lv den 476 Mich 858 (2006): 
Because the sidewalk at issue was adjacent to a state trunkline 
and not a county road, MCL 691.1402a does not govern this 
action. . . . 
[I]n enacting MCL 691.1402a, the Legislature decided to 
limit liability with respect to county roads only.  The Legislature’s 
failure to impose similar limits with respect to state roads does not 
suggest that the Legislature was unaware of that liability or did not 
intend that liability would exist.  Rather, the absence of a provision 
concerning portions of state highways outside the improved portion 
means that a municipal corporation’s liability for those areas 
pursuant to MCL 691.1402 remains unreduced.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
24
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and remand to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
BARBARA A. ROBINSON, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 138669 
 
CITY OF LANSING, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
YOUNG, J. (concurring). 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision in this case to the extent that it offers 
a sensible construction of MCL 691.1402a, the interpretation of which I believe 
reasonable minds can differ.  However, I write separately for two purposes.  First, 
I wish to set forth a plausible alternative interpretation that the Legislature very 
well could have intended when drafting MCL 691.1402a.  And second, to the 
extent that the majority opinion in this case has adopted an incorrect interpretation 
of this statute, I urge the Legislature to clarify its intent with regard to the scope of 
the “two-inch rule” of the highway exception to governmental immunity.   
This case requires that we determine whether the two-inch rule of MCL 
691.1402a(2) is limited in application to county highways like the liability created 
elsewhere in that statute, or whether the rule may apply generally to all sidewalks 
that abut any public roadway.  Generally, MCL 691.1402(1) requires a 
municipality to “maintain” its highways in reasonable repair, and this includes 
 
 
2
sidewalks.1  However, MCL 691.1402a, which is divided into three separate 
subsections, further clarifies this duty.2  There is no dispute that the plain language 
of MCL 691.1402a(1) provides the standard under which a municipal corporation 
will be liable with respect to sidewalks abutting county highways.  There is further 
no dispute that MCL 691.1402a(3) explicitly refers back to MCL 691.1402a(1) to 
                                              
1 MCL 691.1401(e). 
2 MCL 691.1402a provides: 
 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a municipal 
corporation has no duty to repair or maintain, and is not liable for 
injuries arising from, a portion of a county highway outside of the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, 
including a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation. This 
subsection does not prevent or limit a municipal corporation's 
liability if both of the following are true: 
 
 
(a) At least 30 days before the occurrence of the relevant 
injury, death, or damage, the municipal corporation knew or, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence 
of a defect in a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation 
outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for 
vehicular travel. 
 
 
(b) The defect described in subdivision (a) is a proximate 
cause of the injury, death, or damage. 
 
 
(2) A discontinuity defect of less than 2 inches creates a 
rebuttable inference that the municipal corporation maintained the 
sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation outside of the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in 
reasonable repair. 
 
 
(3) A municipal corporation's liability under subsection (1) is 
limited by section 81131 of the natural resources and environmental 
protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.81131. 
 
 
3
provide a particular exception to the liability created in that subsection, and thus 
by direct reference is also limited in application to county highways.  The present 
dispute concerns only whether the rebuttable inference for discontinuity defects of 
less than 2 inches in MCL 691.1402a(2) is limited to county highways like the 
liability created in subsections (1) and (3), or whether MCL 691.1402a(2) applies 
generally to sidewalks abutting any public roadway within a municipal 
corporation’s jurisdiction.  Plaintiff, who was injured on a sidewalk abutting a 
state trunk line highway, has advanced an interpretation adopted by the majority 
whereby the two-inch rule is limited in application to injuries that occur on county 
highways.  Defendant conversely advances an interpretation providing for the 
broadest application of the two-inch rule when defending against this type of 
lawsuit. 
The majority concludes that plaintiff has the stronger position in this case 
and provides a reasonable and text-based analysis in support, utilizing well 
established canons of statutory construction.  I join that decision, yet I am not 
wholly convinced that the Legislature intended to create a distinction between 
county and non-county highways when codifying the two-inch rule of MCL 
691.1402a(2).3  Accordingly, I am setting forth here several considerations that 
support an alternative legislative intent. 
                                              
3 The practical effect of this decision creates a rule whereby municipalities 
have the benefit of a statutory inference that somewhat arbitrarily depends on 
whether a plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred on a sidewalk abutting a county 
 
 
 
4
First and foremost, MCL 691.1402a(2) itself does not expressly contain a 
limitation to county highways.  In this sense, MCL 691.1402a(2) is clear: without 
a reference to county highways, we should be hesitant to impute language to MCL 
691.1402a(2) that the Legislature did not use.  This could represent a specific 
omission by the Legislature, and words excluded from a statute—particularly 
when used elsewhere in the statute—must be presumed to have been excluded for 
a specific purpose.4      
Structurally, MCL 691.1402a contains three separate subsections, all of 
which may stand independently and need not necessarily be read together.  These 
subsections are not joined together by an introductory paragraph that would 
clearly indicate that they all encompass the same limitation—that is, application to 
county highways.  In this way, MCL 691.1402a may logically be read as a 
compendium of highway liability rules.  If that is the case, limitations in one 
subsection should not be read into another subsection absent explicit commands to 
do so.  Unlike MCL 691.1402a(3), in which the Legislature provided an explicit 
                                              
highway or a state trunk line highway.  I recognize that it is certainly within the 
province of the Legislature to create such a rule, and this Court enforces that 
intent, even if an unusual outcome results.  See Lansing Mayor v Pub Service 
Comm, 470 Mich 154, 161; 680 NW2d 840 (2004).  Yet the “arbitrariness” of 
where the rule applies under the majority’s interpretation suggests that the 
Legislature may have intended no such limitation of the rule.  
4 See Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 
(1993).  It is axiomatic that this Court does not read words into a statute that the 
Legislature has excluded.  Byker v Mannes, 465 Mich 637, 646-647; 641 NW2d 
210 (2002). 
 
 
5
command to read that subsection subject to the limitations of MCL 691.1402a(1), 
there is no such command that limits the application of MCL 691.1402a(2) to the 
subject matter of MCL 691.1402a(1).  Recognizing that separate subsections of a 
statute may have independent significance does not offend the canon of 
construction that statutory provisions are to be read in the context of that which 
surrounds them.5   
Additionally, neither the syntax employed by the Legislature nor rules of 
grammar necessarily compels the majority’s interpretation.  As the majority 
correctly notes, the Legislature’s varied use of definite versus indefinite articles in 
a statute requires that those articles be accorded their grammatically correct 
meanings.6  The definite articles in MCL 691.1402a(2) in the phrases “the 
municipal corporation” and “the highway” must refer to a specific antecedent.  
                                              
5 See, e.g., Griffith v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich 521, 
533; 697 NW2d 895 (2005); Lansing Mayor, 470 Mich at 167-168. 
6 A comparison of the definitions for “a” and “the” in Black’s Law 
Dictionary notes: 
[A.]  The word “a” has varying meanings and uses. “A” 
means “one” or “any,” but less emphatically than either. . . .  
*   *   * 
The. An article which particularizes the subject spoken of. 
“Grammatical niceties should not be resorted to without necessity; 
but it would be extending liberality to an unwarrantable length to 
confound the articles ‘a’ and ‘the’.  The most unlettered persons 
understand that ‘a’ is indefinite, but ‘the’ refers to a certain object.”  
[Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed) (emphasis added).] 
 
 
6
The majority quite reasonably believes that these definite articles in MCL 
691.1402a(2) refer back to the indefinite modification of “defect” and “municipal 
corporation” in MCL 691.1402a(1).  However, this is not necessarily so: the 
definite articles used in MCL 691.1402a(2) may logically refer to an earlier noun 
modified indefinitely in MCL 691.1402a(2) itself—“a discontinuity defect.”  
Under this reading, the phrases “the municipal corporation” and “the highway” 
refer back to the specific corporation and highway relating to the indefinite 
“discontinuity defect” at the beginning of MCL 691.1402a(2).  This indefinite 
defect does not necessarily refer back to “the defect” (in county highways) 
discussed in MCL 691.1402a(1).  Thus, the uses of the definite article “the” may 
not have been intended to refer to a defect mentioned in a previous subsection, but 
instead could have been utilized because the use of indefinite articles at this point 
would simply not make grammatical sense.7   
I believe that these considerations, taken together, evidence a legitimate 
contention that MCL 691.1402a(2) neither explicitly subjects itself to the county 
highway limitation nor implicitly relies on this limitation in order to make logical 
                                              
7 For example, it would be nonsensical (or, at least, make less sense) for the 
statute to read: “A discontinuity defect of less than 2 inches creates a rebuttable 
inference that a municipal corporation maintained the sidewalk . . . outside the 
improved portion of a highway . . . in reasonable repair.”  There would be no 
reason for the drafter to use the italicized indefinite articles here.  By this point, 
MCL 691.1402a(2) is not referring to any municipal corporation or any highway; 
rather, it is a definite municipality that has definite control over a particular 
highway with the defect.   
 
 
7
sense.  Yet while this analysis represents a separate plausible understanding of 
MCL 691.1402a(2), ultimately I am fairly convinced by the majority’s 
interpretation that MCL 691.1402a is best understood as a seamless whole that 
applies to county highways, the separate provisions of which work better in 
concert than contrast.  Thus, I concur in the majority opinion, but would call the 
Legislature to action if this Court has reasonably, yet mistakenly, limited the scope 
of the two-inch rule when construing the provisions of MCL 691.1402a.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
BARBARA A. ROBINSON, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No.138669 
 
CITY OF LANSING, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion because I believe that in this 
close case, the plaintiff has a more persuasive position.  I agree with Justice 
YOUNG as he states in his concurrence: “I am fairly convinced . . . that MCL 
691.1402a is best understood as a seamless whole that applies to county highways, 
the separate provisions of which work better in concert than contrast.”   
Further, I also agree with Justice YOUNG that, “to the extent that the 
majority opinion in this case has adopted an incorrect interpretation of this statute, 
I urge the Legislature to clarify its intent with regard to the scope of the ‘two-inch 
rule’ of the highway exception to governmental immunity.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver