Title: STATE v CASE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-159
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 1980

i N o . 80-159 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1980 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, vs . CRISS A L L E N CASE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e County of Lewis and Clark. Honorable P e t e r Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hull and Sherlock, Helena, Montana J e f f r e y Sherlock argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Graveley, County Attorney, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: November 18, 1980 Decided: BEG 2 9 5980 Filed: O E C 2 9 1980 Mr. J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant C r i s s A l l e n Case a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n . i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Lewis and Clark County, of one count of robbery. For r e a s o n s h e r e i n - a f t e r set f o r t h , we r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and d i s m i s s t h e charge. Defendant r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s on appeal: 1. Was d e f e n d a n t denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l where 340 days e l a p s e d between t h e f i l i n g of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and t r i a l ? 2. Was s u f f i c i e n t evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l t o s u p p o r t a c o n v i c t i o n ? 3 . Was t h e accomplice testimony of Ron Worden s u f - f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d ? 4 . Was evidence of o t h e r c r i m e s p r o p e r l y admitted? 5. Did j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s allowing p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r - e n c e s s h i f t t h e burden of p r o o f ? Case and h i s t h r e e codefendants Rick Worden, Ron Worden and A u s t i n Metcalf drove t o Montana t o g e t h e r from C a l i f o r n i a i n November 1978. During t h e t r i p , t h e men d i s c u s s e d p l a n s f o r r o b b e r i e s of roadhouse s a l o o n s , purchased a gun and t a p e f o r r e s t r a i n i n g v i c t i m s , and cased a number of b a r s a s p o t e n t i a l robbery s i t e s b e f o r e a r r i v i n g i n Montana. On November 7, 1978, t h e Worden B r o t h e r s robbed Mac's Bar i n Wolf Creek while Case and Metcalf remained o u t s i d e i n t h e c a r . T h e v i c t i m s of t h e robbery, C h a r l e s and Carol Marcus p r e s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g d e f e n d a n t , and n e i t h e r could i d e n t i f y him a s having p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e crime. E m i l Kersey, a p a t r o n who l e f t t h e bar immediately preceding t h e robbery, saw t h e getaway c a r a s he d e p a r t e d and n o t i c e d someone he i d e n t i f i e d a s a blonde woman s i t t i n g i n t h e d r i v e r ' s p o s i t i o n . Other testimony concerning t h e Wolf Creek robbery was p r e s e n t e d p r i m a r i l y by Ron Worden, who had turned S t a t e ' s evidence, and a l s o by Deputy Richard Hammerbacker who had taken s t a t e m e n t s from Rick Worden and Metcalf. On t h e evening of November 8 , 1978, t h e day f o l l o w i n g t h e Mac's Bar robbery, d e f e n d a n t and h i s companions robbed a bar i n Loring, Montana. A l l four men p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h a t robbery, which involved m u l t i p l e kidnappings and homicides a s w e l l a s robbery. Defendant h a s a l r e a d y been t r i e d and c o n v i c t e d f o r h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Loring robbery. He h a s been sentenced t o a t o t a l of 175 y e a r s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h a t i n c i d e n t . That s e n t e n c e is u n r e l a t e d t o and n o t a f f e c t e d by t h i s a p p e a l . On November 30, 1978, Case was charged by i n f o r m a t i o n i n Lewis and Clark County w i t h robbery. He was t r i e d f o r t h a t o f f e n s e u n d e r t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 45-2-302, MCA. T r i a l was e v e n t u a l l y commenced on November 5, 1979, 340 days a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . Defendant a p p e a l s from a v e r d i c t and judgment of g u i l t y . The A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n o r a l argument. The speedy t r i a l i s s u e h e r e is e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d and d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l i n S t a t e v. Worden ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 611 P.2d 185, 37 St.Rep. 869. The only m a t e r i a l d i s t i n c t i o n h e r e from Worden is a d e l a y of an a d d i t i o n a l 19 days b e f o r e commencement of t h i s t r i a l . The r e l a t i v e l y minor a d d i t i o n a l d e l a y h e r e under t h e same f a c t s a s Worden is n o t s o s u b s t a n t i a l a s t o pursuade u s t o abandon t h e p o s i t i o n w e adopted i n Worden. Defendant was n o t denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . Defendant q u e s t i o n s t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence on t h r e e s e p a r a t e bases: (1) t h e e s s e n t i a l element of f e a r was never d i r e c t l y e s t a b l i s h e d ; ( 2 ) t h e testimony of Ron Worden i n d i c a t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s d i d n o t b r i n g him w i t h i n t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y s t a t u t e ; and, ( 3 ) a f a t a l v a r i a n c e e x i s t e d between t h e m a t t e r s a l l e g e d i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e proof adduced a t t r i a l . None of t h e s e arguments a r e p e r s u a s i v e . Defendant u r g e s t h a t under S t a t e v. Merseal ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 412, 538 P.2d 1366, t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o e l i c i t d i r e c t testimony from t h e Marcus' t h a t t h e y were placed i n f e a r l e a v e s t h a t element unproven. The f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h a t i n Merseal, and t h e l a t t e r does n o t c o n t r o l . I n Merseal, d e f e n d a n t was d r i v i n g a c a r i n which a p o l i c e o f f i c e r was a passenger. Defendant slowed t h e c a r , moved t o jump o u t of t h e v e h i c l e and a l s o reached toward t h e f l o o r of t h e a u t o , where it was s u s p e c t e d he had a concealed gun. The o f f i c e r , who was armed, drew h i s weapon and r e s t r a i n e d defendant. The o f f i c e r , a l l e g e d l y t h e v i c t i m of an a s s a u l t , d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t he had experienced f e a r . Here t h e r o b b e r s were i n more complete c o n t r o l of t h e s i t u a t i o n . Rick Worden i n q u i r e d of C h a r l e s Marcus a t g u n p o i n t i f he understood about robbery. C h a r l e s and Carol Marcus were placed f a c e down on t h e f l o o r , and bound w i t h t a p e , while t h e r o b b e r s took t h e money i n t h e till, whiskey and c i g a r e t t e s . The v i c t i m s were then admonished n o t t o move f o r a q u a r t e r hour a f t e r t h e t h i e v e s ' d e p a r t u r e . While t h e only testimony which s e r v e d a s an admission of f e a r was Carol Marcus' s t a t e m e n t : "Well, I understood it t h a t t h e y meant t h e y would k i l l us i f we d i d n ' t (remain on t h e f l o o r ) ," a c t u a l f e a r may be deduced by t h e j u r y when t h e v i c t i m s a r e placed under such t o t a l domination by t h e o f f e n d e r s . I t is w e l l w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y t o determine t h a t f e a r e x i s t s i n such a s i t u a t i o n . R i c k Worden's b r a n d i s h i n g of t h e gun could h a r d l y be anything l e s s t h a n s u f f i c i e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o p l a c e t h e v i c t i m s i n f e a r . The Marcus' compliance w i t h Worden's o r d e r s and t h e i r t o t a l submission i n d i c a t e d a f e a r of t h e consequences of f a i l u r e t o do s o . I t would be c o n t r a r y t o t h e common e x p e r i e n c e of a l l mankind t o conclude t h a t a person would e x p e r i e n c e no f e a r when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a robber w i e l d i n g a gun. Daellenbach v. S t a t e (Wyo. 1 9 7 7 ) , 562 P.2d 679. Defense counsel e l i c i t e d undisputed testimony from Ron Worden t h a t C a s e d i d n o t e n g a g e i n a n y o f t h e a c t s p r o s c r i b e d by s e c t i o n 45-2-302(3), MCA, e i t h e r b e f o r e t h e robbery o r d u r i n g t h e t i m e t h e Wordens were a c t u a l l y i n Mac's Bar. Defendant t h e r e f o r e a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o m p l i c i t y a r o s e , i f a t a l l , o n l y a f t e r t h e robbery had concluded -- t h u s removing Case from any a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e robbery. Ron Worden a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t C r i s s Case drove t h e c a r d u r i n g t h e getaway from Mac's. D e f e n d a n t ' s argument h e r e is dependent on t h e v a l i d i t y of h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e robbery ended t h e moment t h e Worden b r o t h e r s s t e p p e d o u t s i d e t h e b a r . However, i n Montana, t h e ensuing f l i g h t is c o n s i d e r e d p a r t and p a r c e l of a robbery u n t i l such time a s t h e c r i m i n a l purpose, i n c l u d i n g c a r r y i n g away of t h e s p o i l s of t h e crime, is completed. S t a t e v. Jackson ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 71 Mont. 421, 230 P. 370. Here, d e f e n d a n t ' s involvement commenced b e f o r e t h e r o b b e r s had reached a p l a c e of seeming s e c u r i t y and b e f o r e t h e proceeds had been d i v i d e d . By s e r v i n g a s a getaway d r i v e r , d e f e n d a n t a i d e d t h e Wordens i n t h e commission of t h e robbery, and became l i a b l e f o r t h e robbery under s e c t i o n 45-2-302, MCA. Defendant's third assault on the evidence adduced at trial is that it failed to establish the robbery in the mode specified in the information -- purposely or knowingly put the bar owners in fear of immediate bodily injury. Defendant argues that the state's failure specifically to prove fear, where fear was specifically alleged, is fatal. This argument evaporates in light of our above ruling that the fear element was indeed sufficiently established. We turn now to the issue of corroboration of accomplice testimony. The state's major witness was Ron Worden, who testified regarding the events which occurred from the time the four men left California through the commission of the Loring robbery. It was Worden's testimony that placed Case behind the wheel in the getaway vehicle. The only other testimony regarding defendant's possible presence and participation was presented by Kersey, Hammerbacker and Officer Ralph Schmoldt, a jailer who overheard defendant express anger at Ron Worden because, "Ronny had turned State's evidence on some robberies and other things that had gone o n . ' ' The District Court ruled Kersey's testimony sufficient to corroborate Worden. Section 46-16-213, MCA, mandates that accomplice testimony be corroborated by other independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the offense. The quantum and character of this requisite proof has been recently discussed in State v. Kemp (1979), Mont . , 597 P.2d 96, 36 St.Rep. 1215: "To be sufficient, corroborating evidence must show more than that a crime was in fact committed or the circumstances of its com- mission. (Citation.) It must raise more than a suspicion of the defendant's involve- ment in, or opportunity to commit, the crime charged. (Citation.) But corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, by itself, to support a defendant's conviction or even to make out a prima facie case against him. ( C i t a t i o n s . ) C o r r o b o r a t i n g evidence may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ( C i t a t i o n . ) and can come from t h e d e f e n d a n t o r h i s w i t n e s s e s . ( C i t a t i o n . ) " With t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n mind, each c a s e must be examined on its p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s t o determine i f t h e evidence t e n d s , i n and of i t s e l f , t o prove d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n n e c t i o n with t h e crime charged. "One accomplice cannot s u p p l y t h e independent e v i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y t o c o r r o b o r a t e a n o t h e r accomplice. ( C i t a t i o n s . ) " 597 P.2d a t 99, 36 St.Rep. a t 1217-1218. The c o r r o b o r a t i v e evidence must c l e a r l y : (1) B e independent ( 2 ) P o i n t toward d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t , and ( 3 ) Provide a l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t c o n n e c t i o n between d e f e n d a n t and o f f e n s e . See, C i v i l Procedure and Evidence, Montana Supreme Court Survey, 41 Mont.L.Rev. 293, 319 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . Deputy Hammerbacker's testimony concerned s t a t e m e n t s he had taken from Rick Worden and A u s t i n Metcalf i n Las Vegas, Nevada. Coming from accomplices, t h e evidence c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d independent. Kemp, s u p r a . E m i l Kersey provided independent evidence i n s o f a r a s he saw a person, a blonde female, i n t h e d r i v e r ' s p o s i t i o n of t h e getaway v e h i c l e . Kersey could n o t i d e n t i f y t h e husky red-haired d e f e n d a n t a s t h a t p e r s o n , however. The t e s t i m o n y t h u s i m p l i c a t e s d e f e n d a n t only when viewed i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h Ron Worden's and t h e r e f o r e is a l s o n o t independent. O f f i c e r Schmoldt's testimony was f u l l y independent, b u t v a g u e . The Wolf Creek r o b b e r y was n o t m e n t i o n e d by d e f e n d a n t , whose anger a t Worden could j u s t a s e a s i l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e Loring robbery o r some o t h e r i n t e r v e n i n g i n c i d e n t . The e x p r e s s i o n of anger a t Worden is n o t more c o n s i s t e n t with c o m p l i c i t y t h a n noncomplicity i n t h e Wolf Creek r o b b e r y . I t i s t h e r e f o r e i n s u f f i c i e n t a s c o r r o b o r a t i o n . S t a t e v. Keckonen ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 107 Mont. 253, 264, 84 P.2d 341, 346. The S t a t e h a s c l e a r l y f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t any evidence c o r r o b o r a t i v e o f a c c o m p l i c e t e s t i m o n y . T h i s f a i l u r e n e c e s s i t a t e s r e v e r s a l . The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d testimony a t t r i a l , through Ron Worden, o f t h e p l a n n i n g and c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e L o r i n g robbery. The evidence was p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e l i m i t e d purpose o f s h o w i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t , p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n and knowledge. The s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s of t h e Loring robbery, o t h e r than its commission, were n o t r e v e a l e d . Defendant a r g u e s on appeal t h a t a l l evidence r e l a t i n g t o t h e Loring robbery was improperly admitted. W e a g r e e . W e have r e p e a t e d l y expressed our concern over t h e widespread use of o t h e r crimes evidence. Our apprehension h a s l e d us t o a p p l y t h e g e n e r a l r u l e a g a i n s t use of evidence of o t h e r crimes, and t o a l l o w such evidence o n l y under c l o s e l y l i m i t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Toward t h i s end, we have e s t a b l i s h e d s u b s t a n t i v e and p r o c e d u r a l g u i d e l i n e s f o r a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e e x c e p t i o n , which w e have set f o r t h i n S t a t e v. J u s t ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 602 P.2d 957, 36 St.Rep. 1649. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , n e i t h e r t h e s u b s t a n t i v e nor t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s have been f u l f i l l e d . A d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence of o t h e r c r i m e s i s t o be determined by t h e D i s t r i c t Court p u r s u a n t t o a f o u r element test: (1) S i m i l a r i t y of crimes; ( 2 ) Nearness i n time; ( 3 ) Tendency t o e s t a b l i s h a common scheme, p l a n o r system, and; ( 4 ) The p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h e evidence is n o t sub- s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . J u s t , s u p r a , 602 P.2d a t 961, 36 St.Rep. a t 1653. Only t h e time f a c t o r has been m e t h e r e . F i r s t , t h e Wolf Creek and Loring r o b b e r i e s were t o o d i s s i m i l a r t o a l l o w t h e S t a t e t o invoke t h e o t h e r c r i m e s e x c e p t i o n . Where t h e a l l e g e d s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h e crimes r e v e a l l i t t l e i n common o t h e r t h a n a sequence of time from t h e crime charged, t h e a c t s a r e n o t unusual and d i s t i n c t i v e enough t o come w i t h i n t h e p u r v i e w o f t h e s i m i l a r i t y element of t h e e x c e p t i o n . S t a t e v. Hansen ( 1 9 8 o ) t Mont . , 608 P.2d 1083, 1087, 37 St.Rep. 6 5 7 , 661. I n Wolf Creek, t h e Wordens robbed t h e bar u s i n g no f o r c e o t h e r than t h r e a t s , while Case and Metcalf waited i n t h e c a r . I n Loring, a l l four men e n t e r e d t h e b a r , each man assumed a p r e d e s i g n a t e d d u t y s t a t i o n , and t h e e n s u i n g v i o l e n c e r e s u l t e d i n m u l t i p l e homicides. The two i n c i d e n t s a r e s i m i l a r only i n t h a t both involved barroom r o b b e r i e s . T h a t s o l e s i m i l a r i t y between t h e two i s c l e a r l y n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o t r i g g e r t h e e x c e p t i o n . Next, t h e crimes do n o t tend t o e s t a b l i s h a common scheme, p l a n or system. Again, t h e crimes were c a r r i e d o u t i n v a s t l y d i s s i m i l a r f a s h i o n w i t h i n t h e p e r v a s i v e l y common s c e n a r i o of t h e barroom holdup. Absent proof of any f u r t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g e v e n t p e c u l i a r t o t h e commission of b o t h crimes, no common scheme e x i s t s . Hansen, s u p r a . F i n a l l y , t h e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h e evidence must be weighed a g a i n s t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . Evidence of o t h e r crimes i n v a r i a b l y w i l l r e s u l t i n p r e j u d i c e t o a d e f e n d a n t t o a c e r t a i n d e g r e e . The l i k e l i h o o d of such p r e j u d i c e was compounded h e r e , where t h e o t h e r crime had been h i g h l y p u b l i c i z e d . The l a c k of p r o b a t i v e v a l u e o f t h e evidence of t h e o t h e r crime, coupled w i t h t h e p r e j u d i c e i n h e r e n t l y connected w i t h t h e admission of such evidence, c o m p e l s o u r c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t outweighed i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e . T h i s c a s e does n o t on its f a c t s f a l l w i t h i n t h e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e b a r r i n g evidence o f o t h e r c r i m e s . The improper admission o f t h e evidence under t h e e x c e p t i o n is r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Once having determined t h a t e v i d e n c e of o t h e r c r i m e s is a d m i s s i b l e , which we a g a i n emphasize should o n l y occur under l i m i t e d c o n d i t i o n s j u s t i f y i n g a d e p a r t u r e from t h e g e n e r a l r u l e , t h e c o u r t must f o l l o w t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s s e t f o r t h i n J u s t , 602 P.2d a t 963-964, 36 St.Rep. a t 1657-1658. F a i l u r e t o a d h e r e t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l m a n d a t e s o f J u s t -- c o n s t i t u t e s e r r o r . ~ h i s c a s e was t r i e d two months a f t e r w e handed down J u s t , y e t none of t h e p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e s were met. F i r s t , t h e S t a t e must p r o v i d e w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , b e f o r e t h e c a s e is c a l l e d f o r t r i a l , t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e is t o be produced. The n o t i c e must i n c l u d e a s t a t e m e n t of t h e purposes f o r which t h e evidence is t o be p r e s e n t e d . Here, d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d no w r i t t e n n o t i c e whatsoever; b e f o r e t r i a l t h e S t a t e had v e r b a l l y i n d i c a t e d o n l y t h a t it might p r e s e n t such e v i d e n c e ; and t h e d e f e n d a n t was f i n a l l y a p p r i s e d of t h e S t a t e ' s d e f i n i t e i n t e n t i o n t o p r e s e n t t h e e v i d e n c e , and of t h e purpose f o r t h a t p r e s e n t a - t i o n , o n l y a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e f i r s t day of t r i a l . Next, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must, a t t h e t i m e t h e e v i d e n c e is i n t r o d u c e d , e x p l a i n t o t h e j u r y t h e purpose of t h e e v i d e n c e and admonish t h e j u r y t o weigh t h e e v i d e n c e o n l y f o r t h o s e p u r p o s e s . The Court d i d n o t s o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y . The f i n a l p r o c e d u r a l s t e p r e q u i r e s : " I n i t s f i n a l c h a r g e , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y i n unequivocal terms t h a t s u c h e v i d e n c e was r e c e i v e d o n l y f o r t h e l i m i t e d purposes e a r l i e r s t a t e d and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t is n o t being t r i e d and may n o t be c o n v i c t e d f o r a n y o f f e n s e e x c e p t t h a t charged, warning them t h a t t o c o n v i c t f o r o t h e r o f f e n s e s may r e s u l t i n u n j u s t double punishment." 602 P.2d a t 964, 36 St.Rep. a t 1658. The j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d r e g a r d i n g such evidence a s f o l l o w s : "Evidence of o t h e r crimes, wrongs, o r a c t s is n o t t o be used by you t o prove t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e defendant t o show t h a t he a c t e d i n conformity t h e r e w i t h , nor is such evidence t o be used by you a s evidence t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t committed t h e a c t w i t h which he is charged. However, evidence of o t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs o r a c t s may be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e j u r y f o r o t h e r purposes such a s proof of i n t e n t , opport- u n i t y , m a i n t e n a n c e , p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n o r knowledge. " The s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e d u n e q u i v o c a l w a r n i n g o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r u n j u s t double punishment was n o t i n c l u d e d . Hence, t h e j u r y was i n a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d i n its f i n a l charge. Again, t h e f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e n e c e s s a r y p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s p r e j u d i c e d defendant. T h i s f a i l u r e , of i t s e l f d i c t a t e s r e v e r s a l . F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s c e r t a i n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s improperly s h i f t e d t h e burden of p r o o f . The i n s t r u c t i o n s complained of allowed t h e j u r y t o i n f e r knowledge and i n t e n t on t h e p a r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t . Defendant s u b m i t s t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s v i o l a t e d t h e s p i r i t and i n t e n t of Sandstrom v. Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39. W e d i s a g r e e . W e have p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e v a l i d i t y of s i m i l a r i n s t r u c t i o n s allowing p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e s , S t a t e v. Sunday (1980) I Mont. , 609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561; S t a t e v. Wogamon ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 610 P.2d 1161, 37 St.Rep. 840, and have determined such i n s t r u c t i o n s p l a c e no burden on d e f e n d a n t s . W e s t a t e d i n Sunday: "Since a p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e is involved, S u n d a y m u s t show t h e i n v a l i d i t y o f t h e i n f e r e n c e a s a p p l i e d t o him. Sunday must show t h e r e is no r a t i o n a l way under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a u s e f o r t h e j u r y t o make t h e c o n n e c t i o n p e r m i t t e d by t h e i n f e r e n c e . Only t h e n i s t h e r e a r i s k the p r e s u m p t i v e l y r a t i o n a l j u r y w i l l u s e t h e i n f e r e n c e t o make a n e r r o n e o u s f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . ( C i t a t i o n . ) S u n d a y h a s n o t c a r r i e d h i s burden upon a p p e a l . " 609 P.2d a t 1196, 37 St.Rep. a t 569. The same r e a s o n i n g a p p l i e s h e r e . D e f e n d a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e s . Reversed and d i s m i s s e d . J u s t i c e W e Concur: ....................... C h i e f J u s t i c e ....................... J u s t i c e s M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell, s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t of t h e foregoing o p i n i o n but not w i t h a l l t h e s t a t e m e n t s and d i s c u s s i o n contained t h e r e i n . Chief J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea c o n c u r s and w i l l f i l e a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n a t a later t i m e . THE STATE OF MONTANA vs . C R I S S ALLEN CASE No. 8 0 - 1 5 9 CONCURRING OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DANIEL J. SHEA ....................................................... Dated: January 5, 1 9 8 0 Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring: Generally, I concur in the majority opinion. The evidence was legally insufficient, and therefore a reversal and dis- missal is required. Even if the evidence was sufficient to convict, the failure of the State to comply with the mandate of State v. Just, supra, as the opinion states, would require a reversal and a new trial. I would like to comment on the State's failure to comply with Just. I dissented in Just because the defendant was not given the benefit of the ruling--which would have required a reversal and a new trial. I also stressed the importance of the trial court to first assess the State's need for the similar-crimes evidence, and then determine whether the evidence, if admitted, would be unduly prejudicial. Undoubtedly, the State needed the evidence--with the testimony from the accomplice about the other robbery, it tended to show that defendant and the accomplice were involved in a common scheme or plan. This was an attempt of the State to pull accomplice testimony up by its own boot straps--clearly improper. Assuming the admissibility of the accomplice testimony as to the robbery at Loring, the trial court without question failed to consider the potential harmful effects that the testimony would have as to the Loring robbery. The so-called similar crime, was not only a robbery; it involved multiple brutal murders committed by the accomplice and the defendant. I doubt that any juror could fairly state that he had not heard nor read about the robbery and murders at Loring. Therefore, even if there was no direct reference to the murders committed in the process of the robbery at Loring, there is no doubt that the jury knew it had a person on trial who was involved in the Loring murders. Proper consideration of these factors before admitting the testimony, would have led to a decision -14- that the accomplice testimony as to the Loring robbery was loaded with prejudice that could never be overcome. I stress that just because State v. Just, supra, sets out the procedural requirements for admission of similar crimes, it does not mean that the trial court should always admit such evidence when it is offered. The trial court should carefully scrutinize the attempted use of such evidence and the potential prejudice that will ensue, and where he has any doubt, it should be resolved against use of such evidence. Finally, the conviction of defendant in this case, has, as its underlying cause, a manifest abuse of prosecutorial discretion. We must remember that at the time defendant was tried for the Wolf Creek robbery, he was already under sentence of 175 years in prison for the Loring robbery and murders. It is perhaps understandable that the prosecutor first filed robbery charges against defendant arising from the Wolf Creek robbery, for then the prosecutor was not confronted with the thin evidentiary case and the legal requirements as to corroboration of accomplice testimony. Maybe his initial charge was supported by legally sufficient probable cause, I don't know. But as the case neared the trial stage, the prosecutor knew or should have know that he did not have sufficient legal evidence on which to base a conviction that would withstand the legal requirements. Therefore, he had every reason to believe that a conviction would ultimately lead to a reversal and a dismissal. Also, assuming that the prosecutor was unaware of the rigorous requirements for accomplice testimony, it is sad that he succeeded in getting the Loring robbery evidence admitted when there was not even an attempt to comply with State v. Just. It is not unreasonable to conclude here that the Loring robbery evidence, coupled with the widespread press coverage of the Loring murders,sealed the defendant's fate before the jury. P A & + - -