Title: State v. Panek
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19772
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 2018

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN PANEK
(SC 19772)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Robinson,
D’Auria and Espinosa, Js.*
Argued September 19, 2017—officially released January 31, 2018**
Procedural History
Three informations charging the defendant, in each
case, with the crime of voyeurism, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
geographical area number twenty, where the court,
Wenzel, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss
and rendered judgments thereon, from which the state,
on the granting of permission, appealed to the Appellate
Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Prescott, Js.,
which affirmed the judgments of the trial court, and
the state, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo,
Jr., state’s attorney, and Nichol Peco, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellant (state).
William B. Westcott, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
D’AURIA, J. The defendant, John Panek, was accused
of engaging in sexual activity with a woman in his home
and, while doing so, making a video recording of the
encounter without the woman’s knowledge or consent.
He was accused of doing the same thing on at least
two other occasions with two other women. In three
separate informations, the state charged the defendant
with violating General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-
189a (a) (1).1 This section generally prohibits a person
from, knowingly and with malice, video recording
another person ‘‘(A) without the knowledge and con-
sent of such other person, (B) while such other person
is not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where
such other person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy . . . .’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a
(a) (1). The present appeal concerns the meaning of
the element requiring that the victim be ‘‘not in plain
view’’ when she is recorded. General Statutes (Rev. to
2009) § 53a-189a (a) (1) (B). More specifically, we are
asked to determine to whose plain view the statute
refers.
The defendant moved to dismiss the informations on
the ground that the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element refers
to the plain view of the defendant. He asserted he could
not be charged or convicted under this statute for his
conduct because each of the women he was with was
within his plain view at the time he recorded them. The
state responded that the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of
§ 53a-189a (a) (1) referred instead to the perspective
of the general public and that, because the defendant
and the victim were inside his home at the time, they
were ‘‘not in plain view’’ of the public when the alleged
offenses occurred.2 The trial court concluded that the
statute plainly and unambiguously referred to the plain
view of the defendant and dismissed the informations.
The Appellate Court affirmed the judgments of dis-
missal. State v. Panek, 166 Conn. App. 613, 635, 145
A.3d 924 (2016).
Contrary to the trial court and Appellate Court, we
conclude that the text of § 53a-189a (a) (1) plausibly
could refer to either the plain view of the defendant or
the general public, rendering the statute ambiguous.
Consulting extratextual sources, we are persuaded that
the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element refers to the general
public. We also reject the defendant’s alternative
ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate
Court, namely, that the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element is
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. We therefore
reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment.
For the purposes of this appeal, the parties have
stipulated to the following facts, taken from the affidavit
supporting the warrants issued for the defendant’s
arrest. The defendant and his girlfriend (victim) were
engaged in consensual sexual relations in the bedroom
of her apartment when she discovered he was secretly
recording their encounter using his phone. She had not
previously known about or consented to the recording
and objected to it immediately. The defendant deleted
the recording and claimed it was the first time he had
recorded their sexual encounters.
Suspicious that the defendant had stored other sur-
reptitiously recorded videos on his home computer,
the victim later traveled to the defendant’s home to
confront him and end the relationship. The defendant
admitted to possessing other secret video recordings
of their sexual relations on his computer, and, when
the victim demanded he retrieve and delete all the video
files, he quickly selected a folder on his computer
labeled with her initials and deleted it without showing
her its contents. The defendant told her that he could
not show her where the recordings were stored on his
computer because private images of other women were
stored in the same vicinity. The defendant claimed the
videos he possessed of other women were consensu-
ally recorded.
After the victim reported the incident, the police exe-
cuted a search warrant at the defendant’s home, includ-
ing his computer equipment and electronic file storage
devices. Although he initially told officers he did not
possess any other nonconsensually recorded videos,
the defendant later admitted he had photographed two
other women without their knowledge or consent while
they
were
undressed
in
his
immediate
physical
presence.
The defendant was arrested and charged with voyeur-
ism in violation of § 53a-189a in three separate informa-
tions, each one relating to one of the three women he
recorded. The defendant moved to dismiss all charges
on the ground that recording his own consensual sexual
activity with another person cannot establish the sec-
ond element of the statute, namely, that the recording
took place when the victim was ‘‘not in plain view.’’
General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a (a) (1) (B).
Interpreting ‘‘not in plain view’’ to unambiguously mean
not in plain view of the defendant, the trial court con-
cluded on the basis of the stipulated facts that the state’s
evidence could not establish this element because each
woman was in the defendant’s immediate physical pres-
ence during the recordings and, thus, in his plain view.
The court therefore dismissed all three informations.
The state appealed from the judgments of the trial
court to the Appellate Court pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 54-96, arguing that the phrase ‘‘not in plain view’’
in § 53a-189a (a) (1) (B) is ambiguous and must there-
fore be construed in light of its legislative history, which
establishes that the statute refers to the plain view of
the public. Because the women at issue were not in
plain view of the public when the defendant recorded
them, the state further argued that the second element
of the statute would be satisfied in the present case.
The Appellate Court disagreed and affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of the case, concluding that the statu-
tory language unambiguously referred to the plain view
of the person making the recording, not the public.
State v. Panek, supra, 166 Conn. App. 635.
We granted the state’s petition for certification to
appeal to address the following question: ‘‘Did the
Appellate Court properly construe the ‘not in plain view’
element of . . . § 53a-189a, the video voyeurism stat-
ute, in affirming the dismissal of the charges against
the defendant?’’ State v. Panek, 323 Conn. 911, 149 A.3d
980 (2016). In addition to the certified question, the
defendant claims that the Appellate Court’s judgment
may be affirmed on the alternative ground that the
‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-189a (a) (1) is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face and
as applied to his conduct.
I
We turn first to the certified question concerning the
meaning of the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-
189a (a) (1). Applying plenary review to this question
of law; see, e.g., State v. Fowlkes, 283 Conn. 735, 738,
930 A.2d 644 (2007); we disagree with the Appellate
Court’s interpretation and instead conclude that ‘‘not
in plain view’’ refers to the plain view of the general
public, not the defendant. Specifically, although the
Appellate Court determined that the statute plainly and
unambiguously referred to the plain view of the defen-
dant, we conclude that the statutory language—which
is hardly a model of clarity—is ambiguous about
whether it refers to the plain view of the defendant,
the general public, or anyone else, and, therefore, we
must look beyond the language of the statute. Upon
consulting extratextual sources, especially the statute’s
legislative history, we are persuaded that the legislature
intended for the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-
189a (a) (1) to be viewed from the perspective of the
public generally.
Before turning to our analysis, we set forth the essen-
tial principles that guide our interpretation of statutes.
‘‘[O]ur fundamental objective [in statutory construc-
tion] is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent
intent of the legislature . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Board of Education v. State Board of
Education, 278 Conn. 326, 331, 898 A.2d 170 (2006).
When we construe a statute, General Statutes § 1-2z
directs us to ascertain its meaning ‘‘from the text of
the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.’’
‘‘If, after examining such text and considering such
relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unam-
biguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is
not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpre-
tive guidance to the legislative history and circum-
stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
policy it was designed to implement, and to its relation-
ship to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivers v. New Brit-
ain, 288 Conn. 1, 11, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008). ‘‘[O]ur case
law is clear that ambiguity exists only if the statutory
language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausi-
ble interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Lackman v. McAnulty, 324 Conn. 277, 286, 151 A.3d
1271 (2016).
A
Textual Analysis
Applying these principles, we conclude, contrary to
the Appellate Court and the trial court, that an examina-
tion of the text of the statute and our consideration
of related statutory provisions do not yield a single,
unambiguous meaning of the ‘‘not in plain view’’ ele-
ment in § 53a-189a (a) (1).
1
We begin our search for the legislature’s intended
meaning by examining the statute itself. Section 53a-
189a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty
of voyeurism when, (1) with malice, such person know-
ingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise
records the image of another person (A) without the
knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while
such other person is not in plain view, and (C) under
circumstances where such other person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a (a). The stat-
ute thus generally criminalizes the malicious and non-
consensual recording of another person while ‘‘such
other person is not in plain view,’’ and under circum-
stances where such person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-
189a (a) (1).
The ‘‘not in plain view’’ element presupposes that
‘‘such other person’’ is being viewed from a particular
vantage point, but does not explicitly dictate whose
vantage point must be considered. General Statutes
(Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a (a) (1). The statute itself refers
to two individuals—the person recording and the per-
son being recorded. It is doubtful that the statute refers
to the plain view of the person being recorded because
that would be absurd—the recorded person would
always be in plain view of himself or herself—and nei-
ther party is advocating for this interpretation. The stat-
utory language, on its face, could be interpreted to refer
to the plain view of the person making the recording,
as the defendant asserts. But the statute could also be
read to refer to the view of the public generally, as the
state argues. Also, the statute could refer to the plain
view of any other person, meaning that the person
being recorded must not be in the plain view of anyone
else at the time of the recording to establish this element
of the offense. Nothing in the statutory language
expressly points to or excludes any of these latter three
interpretations.
A closer look at the meaning of ‘‘plain view’’ does
not resolve the ambiguity either. There is no statutory
definition of ‘‘plain view’’ for us to consult. When we
construe undefined statutory terms, General Statutes
§ 1-1 (a) directs us to use the ‘‘commonly approved
usage’’ of the words at issue, or, if they are technical
words that have ‘‘acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in the law,’’ then they should be construed
according to that technical meaning.
The term ‘‘plain view’’ has certainly obtained a techni-
cal meaning within jurisprudence concerning the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution and the law gov-
erning searches and seizures by government agents. An
exception to the fourth amendment’s warrant require-
ment permits police to seize, even in the absence of a
warrant, any evidence or contraband in the ‘‘plain view’’
of a police officer. State v. Jones, 320 Conn. 22, 65–66,
128 A.3d 431 (2015). In the context of the fourth amend-
ment, ‘‘plain view’’ connotes something readily observ-
able and identifiable by the officer, without the aid
of technological equipment not publicly available. See,
e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S. Ct.
2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (use of nonpublic thermal
imaging equipment constitutes search). It also suggests
that the officer must perceive the contraband from a
place he has a lawful right to be without a warrant and
through an activity he has a lawful right to conduct
without a warrant—something is not in plain view if
an officer has trespassed to perceive it. See, e.g., Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d
495 (2013) (officer with police dog approaching and
lingering at front door of residence was search). The
limitations on the plain view doctrine protect those who
have otherwise generally shielded themselves or their
effects from public view from nevertheless being
observed or intruded upon by the government using
equipment not otherwise available to the public or
through an unlawful search or seizure. In short, it helps
ensure that police do not skirt the warrant requirement
by performing searches with technologies or techniques
that the public generally cannot employ.
Considerations at play in the fourth amendment con-
text might help inform the meaning of plain view as
used in § 52a-189a (a) (1). For example, a person might
be ‘‘not in plain view’’ for the purposes of § 53a-189a
(a) (1) if they are observable only through trespass,
peeking over or under a privacy barrier, or the use of
uncommon technological equipment.
Nevertheless, irrespective of whether and how the
fourth amendment plain view doctrine might apply to
§ 53a-189a, we do not believe that it resolves the ambi-
guity we contend with about whose view must be con-
sidered when applying the statute. Although both the
fourth amendment and § 53a-189a may be said to
address privacy concerns, the fourth amendment plain
view doctrine generally governs intrusions by govern-
ment officers, whereas § 53a-189a relates to the conduct
of individuals generally, not government agents. The
fourth amendment plain view doctrine is necessarily
applied from the perspective of a police officer, lawfully
present on the scene, but neither party contends that
the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-189a (a) (1)
was intended to refer to the plain view of a police
officer—an interpretation that would make little sense.
The central considerations relating to the fourth amend-
ment plain view doctrine—that something must be
observed from a lawful location during lawful activity
and without technology unavailable to the general pub-
lic—could still be applied to § 53a-189a (a) (1) regard-
less of whether the relevant viewpoint is that of the
person doing the recording, a member of the public
generally, or anyone else.3
Because this technical fourth amendment meaning
of ‘‘plain view,’’ even if applied to § 53a-189a (a) (1),
does not resolve the ambiguity before us, we also con-
sider the common meaning of that phrase, as expressed
in the dictionary. See, e.g., Middlebury v. Connecticut
Siting Council, 326 Conn. 40, 49, 161 A.3d 537 (2017).
The dictionary definition provides some support for
the state’s position that the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element
of § 53a-189a (a) (1) refers to the view of the public,
but does not entirely resolve the dispute. Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary (1961) defines
‘‘plain,’’ in relevant context, as ‘‘free of obstacles’’ and
‘‘free of impediments to view: unobstructed,’’ and it
defines ‘‘view,’’ in relevant context, as ‘‘the act of seeing
or beholding . . . .’’ Other dictionaries provide similar
definitions, supporting the conclusion that ‘‘in plain
view’’ means something like clearly visible. See, e.g.,
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (2001) (defining
‘‘plain’’ as ‘‘clearly evident,’’ and ‘‘open and without
pretense’’); Webster’s Eleventh New Collegiate Diction-
ary (2011) (defining plain as ‘‘free from duplicity or
subtlety’’). These definitions suggest that ‘‘plain,’’ as an
adjective modifying ‘‘view,’’ describes how the viewing
must occur, but does not tell us who must be doing the
viewing. Put another way, these dictionary definitions
suggest that the person being recorded must not be in
‘‘plain view’’ or not clearly visible, but they do not tell
us to whom the victim must not be visible. Notably,
however, at least one dictionary equates the meaning
of ‘‘plain’’ with ‘‘public’’ in the context of viewing some-
thing. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d Ed. 1991)
defines ‘‘plain’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘open to the elements or
to general view; public.’’ (Emphasis added.) It stands
to reason, based on this definition, that ‘‘not in plain
view’’ might reasonably be interpreted to mean ‘‘not in
public view.’’ Ultimately, we do not believe, however,
that resort to dictionaries alone resolves the question
of how to interpret the phrase ‘‘not in plain view’’ in
§ 53a-189a (a) (1).
2
Apart from the specific statutory provision at issue,
we also must consider the meaning of ‘‘not in plain
view’’ as used in other statutory provisions, but such a
review similarly does not resolve the question of statu-
tory interpretation before us. The defendant in the pre-
sent case is charged with violating subdivision (1) of
§ 53a-189a (a). But § 53a-189a (a) contains three other
subdivisions providing alternative versions of the crime
of voyeurism, each of which uses the phrase ‘‘not in
plain view.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a
(a) (2) through (4).4 Like the subdivision at issue in the
present case, none of the other subdivisions specifies
whose view is at issue.
Applying the defendant’s interpretation to at least
one of the other subdivisions arguably could render it
meaningless, or at least severely limit its scope. Specifi-
cally, General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a (a) (3)
provides that a person may be found guilty of voyeurism
when, ‘‘with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desire of such person, [he] commits simple trespass,
as provided in section 53a-110a, and observes, in other
than a casual or cursory manner, another person (A)
without the knowledge or consent of such other person,
(B) while such other person is inside a dwelling . . .
and not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances
where such other person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
(Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a (a) (3) thus not only requires
that the defendant ‘‘observe’’ the victim, but that he do
so while committing ‘‘simple trespass’’ and while the
victim is ‘‘not in plain view.’’
Problems might arise if we were to apply the defen-
dant’s construction of ‘‘not in plain view’’ to General
Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a (a) (3). If ‘‘not in
plain view’’ means not in plain view of the defendant,
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a (a) (3) might
require that the defendant ‘‘observe’’ the victim, but do
so while she is ‘‘not in [his] plain view,’’ a difficult feat.
Of course, one might avoid this problem by overlaying
fourth amendment principles on the meaning of ‘‘plain
view,’’ but that creates a different problem. General
Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a (a) (3) not only
requires that the defendant ‘‘observe’’ the victim, but
that he do so while committing ‘‘simple trespass.’’
Applying the fourth amendment meaning of ‘‘plain
view’’ to this provision would require the defendant—
like a law enforcement officer—to view the victim from
a position he has no lawful right to occupy. State v.
Brown, 279 Conn. 493, 520, 903 A.2d 169 (2006). This
construction of the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element would
render meaningless the separate requirement that the
defendant must commit a simple trespass as defined
by General Statutes § 53a-110a before his viewing of
another may be considered criminal.5 General Statutes
(Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a (a) (3). If we construed the
terms used in this subdivision to avoid these problems,
that might, in our view, unduly narrow the statute’s
scope in a way the legislature might not have intended.
Lastly, usage of the term ‘‘plain view’’ in other statutes
sheds little additional light on the meaning of the ‘‘not
in plain view’’ element of § 53a-189a (a) (1). The term
‘‘plain view’’ appears in nearly twenty other statutes,6 in
contexts ranging from election protocols and highway
regulations to liquor permitting and human trafficking.
See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 9-257, 12-476b, 30-54 and
54-234a. Examining those specific statutes does not,
however, entirely illuminate from whose perspective
the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element must be considered,
although some statutes indicate that the legislature has,
at times, roughly equated the meaning of ‘‘plain view’’
with ‘‘public view.’’
For example, § 12-476b requires that vehicles trans-
porting fuel must have the name of the ‘‘true owner or
the lessee thereof printed in plain view on both sides
of the vehicle in prominent and legible letters . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) In this context, the usage implies
that ‘‘in plain view’’ means in public view because it
mandates displaying information for general observa-
tion by unspecified onlookers.
Other statutes suggest a similar meaning of ‘‘plain
view’’ in the context of providing a notice to others.
For instance, a permit for the sale of alcohol must be
‘‘framed and hung in plain view in a conspicuous place
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 30-54. Operators of highway
service plazas, hotels, motels, or inns must post notices
offering services to victims of human trafficking ‘‘in
plain view in a conspicuous location . . . .’’ General
Statutes § 54-234a (a). Specialized policemen shall,
when on duty, ‘‘wear in plain view a shield’’ bearing
certain words indicating the type of policemen they are,
such as state park police or railroad police. See, e.g.,
General Statutes §§ 8-44b (b), 23-18, 25-44, 29-19 (b)
and 29-21; see also General Statutes § 7-313a (fire police
officers, when performing their duties, ‘‘shall wear the
badge of office in plain view of any observer’’); General
Statutes § 19a-905 (b) (any health-care provider ‘‘who
provides direct patient care shall wear in plain view
during . . . working hours a photographic identifica-
tion badge’’); General Statutes §§ 22-139 (b) and 22-140
(b) (each licensed milk regulation board tester ‘‘shall
post his license in plain view in the testing room in
which he is employed,’’ and each milk tester ‘‘shall carry
upon his person or post his license in plain view in the
plant in which he is employed’’); General Statutes § 26-
206 (shellfish policemen, when on duty, ‘‘shall wear in
plain view a badge bearing conspicuously the words
‘Shellfish Policeman’ ’’). The context in which these
statutes use the term ‘‘plain view’’ indicates that they
refer to the display of something (permit, notice, shield,
badge, or license) in public view generally and not in
the view of any one person in particular.
These statutes at least suggest that when the legisla-
ture uses the term ‘‘plain view,’’ without specifying
whose view, that term likely refers to a more general
vantage point—the plain view of the public or of any
potential observer—unless it explicitly states other-
wise. That would lead us toward concluding that the
legislature intended a more general viewpoint for the
‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-189a (a) (1), sup-
porting the state’s interpretation.
In other instances, however, the legislature has been
more precise about whether it intends the relevant van-
tage point to be that of the public or of someone specific.
For example, in title 9 of the General Statutes, governing
elections, General Statutes § 9-308 provides that a can-
vass of returns ‘‘shall be made in plain view of the
public.’’ (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, General
Statutes § 9-257 provides that ‘‘[e]very part of the polling
place shall be in plain view of the election officials.’’
(Emphasis added.)
Given the lack of consistency with which the legisla-
ture has specified the proper vantage point for judgment
of whether something is in ‘‘plain view,’’ we draw no
controlling principle from these statutes that may be
applied to resolve the ambiguity in the ‘‘not in plain
view’’ element of § 53a-189a (a) (1).
The results of these textual tools of analysis, consid-
ered together, leave us convinced that, at the very least,
the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element ‘‘is susceptible to more
than one plausible interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lackman v. McAnulty, supra, 324
Conn. 286. That is, we cannot conclude that ‘‘not in
plain view’’ in § 53a-189a (a) (1) unambiguously refers
to the plain view of the defendant, as opposed to the
plain view of the public, or anyone else.
The Appellate Court reached a contrary conclusion,
determining that the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element clearly
and unambiguously referred only to the plain view of the
defendant. It reached this conclusion after considering,
among other things, the dictionary definition of ‘‘plain
view,’’ the fourth amendment meaning of ‘‘plain view,’’
and the use of ‘‘plain view’’ in the statute at issue and
in a related statute. State v. Panek, supra, 166 Conn.
App. 627, 631–32, 634. It concluded that each of these
sources pointed to the defendant’s interpretation.
But, upon our de novo examination of these same
sources, we are persuaded that they at least support
more than one reasonable interpretation, and some
arguably provide greater support for the state’s interpre-
tation. We emphasize that our first purpose in reviewing
these sources is not to select the best interpretation,
but to determine whether, after examining the statute’s
text and related provisions, only one reasonable inter-
pretation remains. See General Statutes § 1-2z. We
therefore disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclu-
sion that these sources lead to one and only one mean-
ing of the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-189a
(a) (1).
Apart from the sources we have already considered,
the defendant relies on other sources of statutory inter-
pretation to advance a number of other arguments in
support of his position that ‘‘not in plain view’’ must
refer to the defendant’s plain view.
First, the defendant claims that interpreting ‘‘not in
plain view’’ to refer to the plain view of the public
would render superfluous the separate element of a
‘‘reasonable expectation of privacy’’ under § 53a-189a
(a) (1) (C). Specifically, he reasons that requiring that
a victim not be in ‘‘public view’’ is no different from
requiring that the victim have a ‘‘reasonable expectation
of privacy.’’ If true, he contends, this interpretation
would run afoul of our presumption that ‘‘the legislature
did not intend to enact meaningless provisions’’ and
that ‘‘[s]tatutes must be construed, if possible, such that
no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void
or insignificant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Drupals, 306 Conn. 149, 159–60, 49 A.3d
962 (2012).
We disagree that the state’s interpretation of the ‘‘not
in plain view’’ element renders the ‘‘reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy’’ element entirely redundant. General
Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a (a) (1). We need not
decide, in this case, the meaning of the ‘‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’’ element. Rather, it suffices to
acknowledge that, although whether a person is in pub-
lic view may affect whether that person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy, the two concepts are not
coterminous. For example, it may be true that a person
in public view generally will not have an expectation
of privacy. But, depending on the circumstances, it does
not follow that a person out of public view necessarily
must hold a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus,
it is possible that, under the state’s interpretation, the
state could prove that the victim was out of the public
view when recorded, but, nevertheless, fail to establish
that the victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy
at the time.7
Second, the defendant also argues, and the trial court
and the Appellate Court agreed, that the ‘‘not in plain
view’’ element must be interpreted consistently with
the ordinary meaning of the term ‘‘voyeurism,’’ the name
of the offense with which the defendant was charged.
See State v. Panek, supra, 166 Conn. App. 632–34.
According to the defendant, ‘‘voyeurism’’ refers to the
secretive or surreptitious viewing of another person,
which suggests that the voyeur must be spying on some-
one who is not in his plain view.
For several reasons, we are not persuaded that the
dictionary definition of ‘‘voyeurism’’ controls our inter-
pretation of ‘‘not in plain view’’ as used in § 53a-189a
(a) (1). First, we hesitate to rely on the dictionary defini-
tion of ‘‘voyeurism’’ to establish the meaning of the
elements of that offense. The legislature, by enumerat-
ing the elements of an offense named ‘‘[v]oyeurism,’’
has provided its own definition for the purpose of our
criminal law. As used in this context, we find the diction-
ary definition of voyeurism less helpful in any attempt
to define the contours of that offense. To be sure, ‘‘[i]t
is well established that, when determining the meaning
of a word, it is appropriate to look to the common
understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Spillane,
255 Conn. 746, 755, 770 A.2d 898 (2001). ‘‘This precept,
however, pertains primarily to the situation where no
statutory definition is available.’’ Id. The legislature is
free to diverge from the dictionary definition when
defining a term for its purposes. See, e.g., State v. Web-
ster, 308 Conn. 43, 54, 60 A.3d 259 (2013) (noting that
statutory definition of ‘‘sale,’’ as used in statute prohib-
iting narcotics sales, ‘‘is substantially broader in scope
than the common dictionary definition’’ [internal quota-
tion marks omitted]). Indeed, even if we assume that
voyeurism historically may have referred to the act of
viewing certain private activities, the legislature has
nevertheless expanded on that meaning in this statute
to address modern technological developments by crim-
inalizing the recording, not just the observation, of cer-
tain private activities. See General Statutes (Rev. to
2009) § 53a-189a (a) (person who ‘‘photographs, films,
videotapes or otherwise records the image of another
person’’ within purview of statute). Thus, even if the
ordinary meaning of ‘‘voyeurism’’ is limited to secretly
viewing someone, that meaning does not control our
interpretation of how the legislature has defined that
word in § 53a-189a.
Second, even if the dictionary definition controlled,
the definition of ‘‘voyeurism’’ does not refer solely to
secretive viewing. For instance, Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (1961) defines ‘‘voyeurism’’ as
‘‘the tendencies, act, or looking of a voyeur,’’ and voyeur
is defined as ‘‘one whose sexual desire is concentrated
upon seeing sex organs and sexual acts,’’ or ‘‘an unduly
prying observer [usually] in search of sordid or scandal-
ous sights.’’ The first definition does not limit voyeurism
to secretive viewing. Also, even if the second definition
implies that the voyeur is viewing something in secret,
neither definition requires that the voyeur must be view-
ing something not in his own plain sight; rather, the
second definition more broadly implies that the voyeur
is peering into something private from others gener-
ally—an understanding that could support the state’s
interpretation.
B
Extratextual Sources
Because we conclude that our consideration of the
text of § 53a-189a and other statutory provisions does
not yield a single, unambiguous interpretation of the
‘‘not in plain view’’ element in § 53a-189a (a) (1), we
turn next to extratextual sources of the legislature’s
intent. This includes looking to the ‘‘legislative history
and circumstances surrounding [the statute’s] enact-
ment, to the legislative policy it was designed to imple-
ment, and to its relationship to existing legislation and
common law principles governing the same general sub-
ject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Rivers v. New Britain, supra, 288 Conn. 11.
We find the legislative history most illuminating. Dur-
ing the Senate debate, the proponent of the bill, Senator
Donald Williams, summarized the elements of the crime
in his own words, clarifying the meaning of ‘‘not in plain
view.’’ As to that element, Senator Williams stated that,
in order for a defendant to violate the statute, the victim
must be ‘‘not in public view . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
42 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1999 Sess., p. 2151. He further rein-
forced this meaning by referring to ‘‘an area’’ not in
plain view, and ‘‘a place’’ not in public view, indicating
that the focus of the statute is on whether the victim
is exposed to the public’s general view—not a specific
person’s view, such as the defendant’s. Id., pp. 2149,
2151, remarks of Senator Donald Williams.
Similarly, during debate in the House of Representa-
tives, the proponent of the bill, Representative Michael
Lawlor, summarized the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of
the statute as meaning ‘‘inside a building or another
structure . . . .’’ 42 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1999 Sess., p.
3493. This suggests that the legislature intended ‘‘not
in plain view’’ to mean not in public view because being
inside a structure implies that a victim is generally
shielded from the public’s view. It is far less likely that
Representative Lawlor intended ‘‘inside a building’’ to
mean out of the defendant’s plain view, who could
potentially also be inside the same building. 42 H.R.
Proc., supra, p. 3493.
Another exchange during the debate in the House of
Representatives also demonstrates that the legislature
did not intend ‘‘not in plain view’’ to mean not in plain
view of the defendant. Representative Hector Diaz
asked Representative Lawlor whether a consensually
recorded video of sexual relations would violate the
statute. Id., p. 3504. Representative Lawlor clarified that
it would not because the ‘‘statute would require that
the original . . . recording would have been recorded
without the person’s consent and where they had a
reasonable expectation of privacy’’ pursuant to §§ 53a-
189a (a) (1) (A) and (C). Id., p. 3505. He continued by
saying that ‘‘if a couple, for example, videotapes their
own sexual relations . . . they wouldn’t be violating
this [statute] because the initial taping, I’m assuming,
was consensual, and it seems like the requirement is
that [the video recording] would have had to have been
without the consent of the party.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Id., p. 3509, remarks of Representative Michael Lawlor.
In other words, Representative Lawlor clarified that
there would be no violation under the hypothetical
posed only because the ‘‘initial taping . . . was consen-
sual’’—not because the sexual relations were consen-
sual.8 Id.
This excerpt of the legislative history undercuts any
suggestion that the legislature intended ‘‘not in plain
view’’ in § 53a-189a (a) (1) to refer to the view of the
defendant. If Representative Lawlor contemplated that
the statute would be violated in the hypothetical exam-
ple where the video recording was nonconsensual, then
a statutory requirement that the victim be ‘‘not in plain
view’’ of the defendant would be nonsensical. It would
be difficult, or well-nigh impossible, for two people to
engage in sexual contact with each other without both
of them being in plain view of one another. Therefore,
if Representative Lawlor, the proponent of the bill, rec-
ognized that this statute can be violated through the
nonconsensual recording of sexual relations, ‘‘not in
plain view’’ cannot refer to the plain view of the defen-
dant. Rather, we agree with the state that the legislative
history of § 53a-189a supports a conclusion that the
legislature intended ‘‘not in plain view’’ to refer to the
plain view of the public generally, meaning that a person
must not be in a position where any member of the
public, lawfully situated, could plainly view the person
being recorded.
The defendant claims, however, that because he and
the state offer ‘‘competing interpretations’’ of the stat-
ute, the issue should ultimately be resolved in his favor
under the rule of lenity. He correctly states that, as a
general rule, ‘‘[c]riminal statutes are not to be read
more broadly than their language plainly requires and
ambiguities are ordinarily to be resolved in favor of the
defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499, 510, 857 A.2d 908 (2004).
We acknowledge that the statute is not perhaps the
paradigm of drafting precision. As we have recognized
in the past, however, ‘‘perfect precision is neither possi-
ble nor required’’ in valid statutory creation. (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Sweetman v. State Elections
Enforcement Commission, 249 Conn. 296, 322, 732 A.2d
144 (1999). We further note that, in many instances,
seemingly imprecise draftsmanship is ‘‘attributable to
a desire not to nullify the purpose of the legislation by
the use of specific terms which would afford loopholes
through which many could escape.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. When interpreting a statute, our
goal remains to divine the legislature’s intent. Any lack
of perfection in the drawing of the statute does not
persuade us that the defendant’s preferred interpreta-
tion of ‘‘not in plain view’’ necessarily accords with
the legislature’s intent. See id. (stating that imprecise
language does not invalidate statute or render it vague
in favor of defendant); see also Foley v. State Elections
Enforcement Commission, 297 Conn. 764, 782–83, 2
A.3d 823 (2010) (court recognized that statute is not
model of clarity, but arrived at most reasonable inter-
pretation of language); In re William D., 284 Conn. 305,
312, 933 A.2d 1147 (2007) (noting that statutory defects,
such as internal inconsistencies, are not dispositive in
favor of respondent—especially if consequences would
clearly contravene broader purposes of statutory
scheme).
In addition, the defendant’s lenity argument fails to
recognize that the rule of lenity applies only if other
tools of statutory construction fail to confirm the mean-
ing of ambiguous language. ‘‘It is well established that
courts do not apply the rule of lenity unless a reasonable
doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even
after resort to the language and structure, legislative
history, and motivating policies of the statute.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Victor O., 320 Conn.
239, 258–59 n.22, 128 A.3d 940 (2016).
Here, for reasons we have explained, after an exami-
nation of the statutory language, its structure, and its
legislative history, we do not conclude that a reasonable
doubt persists about the intended scope of § 53a-189a
(a) (1). Consequently, ‘‘[a]lthough we recognize the fun-
damental principle that criminal statutes are to be con-
strued strictly, it is equally fundamental that the rule
of strict construction does not require an interpretation
which frustrates an evident legislative intent.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re William D., supra, 284
Conn. 320–21.
II
As an alternative ground for affirmance, the defen-
dant makes the claim, related to his lenity argument,
that the voyeurism statute is unconstitutionally vague,
both on its face and as applied to his conduct.9 He
claims that, if the statute does not unambiguously refer
to the plain view of the defendant, his right to fair
notice will be violated because the statute has ‘‘no clear
meaning.’’ We disagree.
‘‘A party attacking the constitutionality of a validly
enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving its
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ State
v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 79, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991). More-
over, we are obligated to ‘‘indulge in every presumption
in favor of the statute’s constitutionality . . . .’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeFrancesco, 235
Conn. 426, 442, 668 A.2d 348 (1995).
‘‘Under the requirements of due process of law man-
dated by our federal and state constitutions, a penal
statute must be sufficiently definite to enable a person
to know what conduct he must avoid.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 443. One of the touchstones
of vagueness is that people ‘‘of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Fields, 302 Conn. 236, 260, 24 A.3d 1243
(2011).Our cases do not hold, however, that a statute
is unconstitutionally vague merely because two parties
have proffered plausible, but opposing, interpretations
of a statute. State v. Mattioli, 210 Conn. 573, 579, 556
A.2d 584 (1989) (‘‘[h]onest disagreement about the inter-
pretation of a statutory provision does not, however,
make the statute ambiguous or vague’’).
If this were true, any statute a court concludes is
ambiguous would be rendered unconstitutional. See
generally State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 726, 998
A.2d 1 (2010) (‘‘a statute is not unconstitutional merely
because it is ambiguous or requires further investiga-
tion’’). Rather, our case law makes clear that ‘‘the stat-
ute at issue need only give fair warning to those who
are potentially subject to it.’’ State v. DeFrancesco,
supra, 235 Conn. 444. To that end, ‘‘[t]he proscription
of the activity . . . need not be definite as to all aspects
of its scope. A statute is not unconstitutional merely
because a person must inquire further as to the precise
reach of its prohibitions.’’ Id., 443. We are satisfied that
§ 53a-189a (a) (1) put the defendant on notice that
recording the victim under these circumstances was
conduct the legislature sought to proscribe.
The defendant’s claim that § 53a-189a (a) (1) is vague
as applied to his conduct warrants little comment. The
defendant asserts, in agreement with the trial court and
the Appellate Court, that the crime of voyeurism, as
used in common parlance, only reaches scenarios in
which victims believe they are alone. State v. Panek,
supra, 166 Conn. App. 624, 632–33. The defendant cites
no legal authority for this contention, and we find no
support for it in the statute’s text or legislative history.
In fact, the legislative history of the voyeurism statute
manifests
a
concern
about
the
nonconsensual
recording of another person, which the statute prohib-
its regardless of whether the victim believes she is
alone. See 42 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 3509, remarks of
Representative Michael Lawlor. Moreover, as we have
previously discussed, common parlance does not dic-
tate our definition of voyeurism; rather, the General
Assembly’s requirements as enacted in § 53a-189a deter-
mines our definition of voyeurism. That definition
includes nonconsensual recordings of an unknowing
victim, even if the defendant makes them while in her
immediate physical presence.
Because we conclude that the state may establish
the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-189a (a) (1)
based on the facts before us, the defendant’s motion
to dismiss should have been denied. The trial court
therefore improperly dismissed the charges against the
defendant on the basis raised in his motion to dismiss,
and the Appellate Court improperly upheld that dis-
missal.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the judgments of the trial court and to remand
the case to that court with direction to deny the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss and for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
** January 31, 2018, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 General Statutes § 53a-189a was the subject of certain amendments since
the events underlying this appeal. See Public Acts 2015, No. 15-213, § 1.
All references to § 53a-189a are to the 2009 revision of the statute unless
otherwise indicated.
2 The state also claimed that the ‘‘not in plain view’’ element of § 53a-189a
(a) (1) referred to the perspective of the recording device and that, because
the victim had no knowledge of the recording device, she was ‘‘not in plain
view.’’ The state does not pursue this argument on appeal to this court.
3 By this observation, we do not mean to hold that these considerations
from the fourth amendment plain view doctrine apply to this statute; that
question is not directly before us. We observe only that, even if § 53a-
189a (a) (1) were interpreted through the lens of this doctrine, such an
interpretation would not resolve the question facing us.
4 We note that, although subdivisions (3) and (4) were added to § 53a-
189a (a) in 2015 after the events at issue in this appeal; see Public Acts
2015, No. 15-213, § 1; they are relevant to our analysis because ‘‘not in plain
view’’ is used in each subdivision. See Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental
Services, 297 Conn. 391, 404, 999 A.2d 682 (2010) (‘‘[w]e are . . . guided
. . . by the presumption that the legislature, in amending or enacting stat-
utes, always [is] presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent
body of law’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
5 The same difficulties arise when the Appellate Court’s construction is
applied to General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (7), otherwise known as the ‘‘Peep-
ing Tom’’ statute, which contains elements similar to those of General Stat-
utes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-189a (a) (3).
6 General Statutes §§ 7-313a, 8-44b, 9-257, 9-308, 12-476b, 19a-905, 22-139,
22-140, 23-18, 25-44, 26-206, 29-19, 29-21, 30-54, 46b-38b, 53a-182 and 54-234a.
7 Any potential overlap between the two elements therefore does not
negatively affect the defendant. If the person being recorded is in plain view
of the public, then the defendant cannot be convicted under the state’s
interpretation. Even if the state proves that the person recorded was out
of public view, the defendant would still have the opportunity to argue that
the victim nevertheless lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy under
the circumstances.
8 The defendant focuses on only one part of this excerpt of the legislative
debate, which could be read to suggest that the statute would not be violated
if the victim was a coparticipant in the sexual relations. In context, however,
the proponent of the bill was clear that it is mutual participation and consent
to the creation of the images that bars application of the statute—not
consent to the sexual relations. 42 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 3505–3509, remarks
of Representative Michael Lawlor.
9 The defendant also makes a passing argument that the voyeurism statute
is unconstitutionally overbroad. Aside from his use of the term in a heading
and quoting of the constitutional standards, the defendant fails to assert
any substantive argument about why or how the statute is overbroad. We
deem the argument abandoned. See, e.g., State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724,
138 A.2d 868 (2016).