Title: Barbosa v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12334
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 2018

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SJC-12334 
 
RICARDO BARBOSA  vs.  COMMONWEALTH (NO. 2). 
 
 
December 14, 2018. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Criminal, Appeal.  Habitual Offender.   
 
 
 
The petitioner, Ricardo Barbosa, was convicted by a 
Superior Court jury of rape, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b), 
and, in a separate proceeding, of being a habitual offender 
pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b).  Shortly after he was 
convicted, he filed, in the county court, both a petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and an application for "direct 
appellate review" purportedly under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In 
both the petition and the application, Barbosa raised issues 
related to the habitual offender conviction.  He argues, for 
example and among other things, that he has not been "convicted 
[two] times previously" of any of the crimes enumerated in the 
statute and that, more generally, the statute imposes unfair and 
unconstitutional sentencing requirements.  A single justice 
denied both the petition and the application without a hearing, 
and Barbosa appeals.1       
                                                 
 
1 In September 2016, during the course of the trial court 
proceedings but before the trial itself, Barbosa attempted to 
file in the county court another petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, in which he asked the court to dismiss the 
indictments against him on the basis of pretrial delay.  Because 
Barbosa failed to tender the filing fee or an affidavit of 
indigency, that petition was returned to him without being 
entered (i.e., the petition was not docketed and no case was 
opened).  Although it is not entirely clear from the record 
before us, it appears that when Barbosa filed the G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, petition, and the G. L. c. 278, § 33E, application that are 
2 
 
 
  
 
Neither the petition nor the application is the proper 
means for Barbosa to get the review that he seeks of his 
conviction.  As to the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, the issues 
raised are ones for which Barbosa has an adequate alternative 
remedy -- he can raise them in a direct appeal.  "Relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, is properly denied where there are adequate 
and effective routes other than c. 211, § 3, by which the 
petitioning party may seek relief."  Greco v. Plymouth Sav. 
Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 (1996).     
 
 
As to the G. L. c. 278, § 33E, application, as best we can 
discern from his materials it appears that Barbosa filed the 
application in the county court because he interprets that 
statute, as amended in 2012, see St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 43, 44, to 
require appeals from habitual offender convictions pursuant to 
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), to be entered directly in this court and 
heard by this court in the first instance.  Even if that were 
correct -- and we express no view on whether it is, as further 
explained below -- the process for the direct appeal is not 
through an application with the single justice, but rather 
through the eventual entry of the appeal directly in the full 
court once the record has been assembled in the trial court.  
The single justice, therefore, did not err in denying both the 
petition and the application. 
 
 
Having said this, we recognize that there is an open 
question whether a direct appeal from a conviction pursuant to 
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), should be entered in the Appeals Court 
or in the Supreme Judicial Court in the first instance.  That 
particular question is not before us in this case, but rather is 
a question to be decided in Barbosa's direct appeal.  As to that 
appeal, the trial court docket indicates that he has already 
filed timely notices of appeal in the trial court,2 and the 
record for that appeal is in the process of being assembled by 
the trial court clerk.  In order to avoid any further confusion, 
                                                 
currently before us, he also included the petition that he had 
previously attempted to file in September 2016.  To the extent 
that the issues raised in that petition were meant to be a part 
of the current petition, those issues, which relate to a delay 
in the trial court proceedings, are now moot, Barbosa having 
been tried and convicted. 
 
 
2 In addition to filing a timely notice of appeal from the 
convictions, Barbosa also filed a motion for a new trial, which 
was denied, and a timely notice of appeal from that denial.  
3 
 
 
and without prejudging the answer to the question, we direct the 
clerk of this court to inform the trial court clerk that, once 
the record in Barbosa's direct appeal is assembled, notice of 
the assembly, the docket entries, and the transcript are to be 
transmitted directly to this court, and the case shall be 
entered directly here.  We will therein consider -- in addition 
to the substantive legal issues raised by Barbosa as to his 
convictions -- the procedural question whether, in future cases, 
direct appeals from habitual offender convictions pursuant to 
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), must be entered directly in this court 
or whether, instead, such appeals shall be entered in the 
Appeals Court in the first instance.  See G. L. c. 211A, § 10 
(giving Appeals Court concurrent jurisdiction over all criminal 
appeals except appeals from convictions of murder in the first 
degree).  
 
 
The judgment of the single justice denying Barbosa's G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition, and his G. L. c. 278, § 33E, application 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Ricardo Barbosa, pro se. 
 
Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.