Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 650, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MALINDA S. KLINE,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 650, 2010 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0904012804 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  May 25, 2011 
Decided:  July 11, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 11th day of July 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Malinda Kline asks us to reverse her jury conviction for falsely 
reporting an incident.  She contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
admitting the testimony of two witnesses and then later striking that testimony 
from the record.  We affirm. 
(2) 
On October 20, 2007, several Delaware State Troopers responded to a 
911 call from an unidentified woman who had become unresponsive to the 
dispatcher.  Corporal Jason Baxley and two other troopers found Kline lying, 
unresponsive, on a sidewalk.  Baxley called an ambulance, which came and took 
Kline to Christiana Hospital.  The next morning, pursuant to his supervisor’s 
2 
 
orders, Baxley interviewed Kline.  He interviewed her inside the hospital, and then 
he returned to his patrol car to prepare a “face copy” summary of the interview.  
After preparing the “face copy,” he returned to Kline’s hospital room and gave her 
a copy of the summary and his business card. 
(3) 
Approximately eight months later, on June 16, 2008, the Delaware 
State Police Internal Affairs Unit received an anonymous complaint accusing 
Baxley of physical assault.  After investigating the complaint, the Internal Affairs 
Unit dismissed the complaint as unfounded.  Kline later admitted that she 
submitted the anonymous complaint against Baxley. 
(4) 
Several months after the Internal Affairs Unit received Kline’s 
anonymous complaint, on October 28, 2008, Kline filed another complaint against 
Baxley.  This complaint alleged that he had raped her.  Detective Tonya Widdoes 
of the Delaware State Police Major Crimes Unit investigated this complaint.  As 
part of her investigation, Widdoes interviewed both Kline and Baxley.  Ultimately, 
Widdoes concluded that Kline had falsely accused Baxley. 
(5) 
A grand jury indicted Kline for falsely reporting an incident.  At 
Kline’s jury trial, several witnesses testified, including Baxley and Widdoes.  The 
State also called New Castle County Police Officer David Hildick and Nurse Lee 
Daniels as witnesses.  Hildick testified, and Daniels was expected to testify, about 
a different allegation of false reporting that Kline directed at Baxley.  This 
3 
 
different allegation of false reporting occurred on May 22, 2010—about nineteen 
months after the rape allegation—and the State did not charge Kline for falsely 
reporting an incident to the NCC police. 
(6) 
Defense counsel made no objections during Hildick’s testimony.  
After Hildick testified and shortly after the prosecutor began her direct 
examination of Daniels, defense counsel asked for a sidebar and objected on 
relevance grounds, explaining that “[t]he indictment is dealing with something that 
happened a year before [the May 2010 incident].”  The judge dismissed the jury 
from the courtroom and then heard argument from the prosecutor and defense 
counsel on the admissibility of testimony about the May 2010 incident.  Defense 
counsel stated at one point, “[T]he indictment is in October of the year before, and 
this is more confusing, and if you weigh it [under Rule of Evidence 403], I think it 
should come out that this should be excluded, rather than giving this jury this new 
incident in May of 2010.” 
(7) 
After hearing argument, the trial judge performed a Rule 403 
weighing of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the potential for 
unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  The record reflects his analysis.  
Afterwards, the judge explained, “When I recall the jury, I will tell the jury that 
they should disregard the testimony of Officer Hildick, because it relates to 
some—I won’t say why, but the reason is, again, it relates to a crime for which she 
4 
 
was not indicted.”  Defense counsel did not object.  After a brief recess, the judge 
instructed the jury: 
I am going to instruct you to disregard the testimony of County Police 
Officer Hildick.  Officer Hildick testified, as I’m sure you recall, 
about events taking place in 2010, but the defendant has been indicted 
for events that allegedly took place in 2008, and I have ruled that the 
events that allegedly took place in 2010 are not relevant to the issue as 
to what happened in 2008, and therefore, I’m going to instruct you to 
disregard Officer Hildick’s testimony. 
 
Once again, defense counsel did not object. 
 
(8) 
The jury found Kline guilty of falsely reporting an incident.  The trial 
judge sentenced Kline to one year at Level V detention, with credit for thirty six 
days previously served but with no possibility of early release.  He also fined Kline 
$1,000 and ordered her to perform 100 hours of community service.  Kline now 
appeals her conviction. 
(9) 
We review a trial judge’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.1  
When a party fails to object to an evidentiary ruling, however, we review any 
claim of error pertaining to that ruling under a plain error standard.2  According to 
the plain error standard of review, we may reverse an evidentiary ruling only if 
                                          
 
1 Harris v. State, 991 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Del. 2010) (citing Zimmerman v. State, 693 A.2d 311, 
313 (Del. 1997)). 
 
2 See Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”); Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) 
(quoting Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995)). 
 
5 
 
“the error complained of [is] so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”3  In fact, plain error “is 
limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are 
basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an 
accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”4 
(10) Kline argues that the Superior Court judge erred by admitting 
Hildick’s testimony and Daniels’s limited testimony and then “sua sponte” striking 
them from the record.  Kline concedes that the trial judge’s analysis was correct 
with respect to both prejudice and confusion, but nevertheless argues that the 
prejudice and confusion had already infected the jury by the time the judge struck 
the testimony from the record.  Accordingly, Kline argues that the prompt curative 
instruction was insufficient—and too late—to overcome the effect of the confusion 
and, therefore, prejudiced her. 
(11) It is well established in Delaware that we presume a trial judge’s 
prompt curative instruction adequately directs the jury to disregard improper 
statements and the jury follows the judge’s instructions, curing any error.5  Here, 
                                          
 
3 Turner, 5 A.3d at 615 (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., McNair v. State, 990 A.2d 398, 403 (Del. 2010); Purnell v. State, 979 A.2d 1102, 
1109 (Del. 2009); Banther v. State, 977 A.2d 870, 891 (Del. 2009); Smith v. State, 963 A.2d 719, 
6 
 
defense counsel neither moved for a mistrial nor objected to the curative 
instruction.  Therefore, we presume that the prompt curative instruction adequately 
directed the jury to disregard Hildick’s and Daniels’s testimony and that the jury 
followed the instruction.  Kline has not shown plain error. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                                        
722–23 (Del. 2008); Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 27 (Del. 2008); Justice v. State, 947 A.2d 1097, 
1100 (Del. 2008); Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994).