Title: People v. Whitfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98136
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2005

Docket No. 98136-Agenda 11-January 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							

RONALD WHITFIELD, Appellant.
	
Defendant, Ronald Whitfield, appeals the dismissal of his
postconviction petition. He contends that his constitutional rights
were substantially violated because he entered a plea of guilty in
exchange for a specific sentence, but, with the addition of a statutorily
required term of mandatory supervised release (MSR), about which
the trial court never admonished him, he was given a more onerous
sentence and, as a result, denied the benefit of his negotiated plea
bargain. As a remedy, he asks that his sentence of imprisonment be
decreased by the length of the statutorily required MSR term.
	For reasons that follow, we now hold that, under the
circumstances of this case, defendant has established that his
constitutional rights were substantially violated. We remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND
	On September 16, 1998, in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant Ronald Whitfield entered a plea of guilty to charges of first
degree murder (No. 95-CR-3219) and armed robbery (No.
95-CR-21921) pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. At the
hearing, the prosecutor set forth the terms of the agreement, stating
that defendant "will receive 25 years IDOC" for his plea of guilty to
felony murder and a concurrent sentence of "six years IDOC" for his
plea of guilty to armed robbery. After hearing a factual basis, the
circuit court accepted defendant's plea, ratified the agreement, and in
accordance with its terms, sentenced defendant to concurrent terms
of imprisonment, 25 years and 6 years, respectively.(1) At no time
during the plea hearing did the prosecutor or the court advise
defendant that, pursuant to section 5-8-1(d)(1) of the Unified Code
of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West 1998)), he
would be subject to a three-year period of mandatory supervised
release (MSR) following his 25-year sentence for murder.(2)
	Defendant did not file a postjudgment motion to withdraw his
plea and never directly appealed his conviction or sentence. However,
sometime while defendant was in prison, he learned that a three-year
MSR term had been added to his 25-year sentence by operation of
law. He then filed a pro se motion, on June 8, 2001, entitled "Motion
for Relief From Judgment." In this motion, defendant contended that
his fourteenth amendment due process rights were violated because an
MSR term, about which he was never advised, had been added to his
negotiated sentence and resulted in a "more onerous" sentence than
the one he had agreed to when he pled guilty. Defendant did not ask
to have his plea withdrawn. Instead, he sought to hold the State to the
terms of the plea agreement. Defendant argued that the appropriate
relief would be to eliminate the MSR term or reduce his 25-year
prison term by the length of the MSR term.
	On October 1, 2001, the circuit court appointed the public
defender to represent defendant on his due process claim. On October
16, 2001, the State moved to dismiss defendant's section 2-1401
motion for relief from judgment, arguing that it was not timely filed.
The State acknowledged that defendant's motion could be treated as
a postconviction petition, but argued that the circuit court was not
obligated to do so. Furthermore, the State argued that, even if the
court treated defendant's motion as a postconviction petition, the
petition should be denied because defendant did not make a substantial
showing that his constitutional rights had been violated.
	Responding to the State's motion, defendant, represented by
counsel, asked the court to treat his motion for relief from judgment
as a postconviction petition. Defendant also supplemented his petition
with references to case law. He cited Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971), in support of his
claim that he was denied the "benefit of the bargain that he made in
pleading guilty." Defendant also cited People v. Moore, 214 Ill. App.
3d 938 (1991), and United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that the court's
failure to admonish him regarding the MSR term constituted a due
process violation which required the court to strike the MSR term.
	After a brief hearing on December 20, 2001, the circuit court
granted the State's motion to dismiss defendant's petition. The circuit
court did not indicate whether or not it found that defendant had
established a due process violation, but simply refused to grant
defendant the relief he requested. Defendant appealed.
	The appellate court, in an unpublished order (No. 1-02-0314
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), upheld the
dismissal of defendant's petition. The appellate court held that the
circuit court had informed defendant he would receive a specific
sentence (25 years), but that defendant was, in fact, sentenced to a
term greater than the agreed term, taking into consideration the period
of MSR, about which defendant had not been admonished.
Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that defendant's due
process claim failed because he had not made a "good-faith argument"
that he would not have pled guilty had he known about the MSR term.
Without any discussion or analysis, the court held that decisions cited
by defendant which held to the contrary, People v. Moore, 214 Ill.
App. 3d 938 (1991), and United States ex rel. Miller v. McGinnis,
774 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1985), were "factually distinguishable."
	Defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal, which we
allowed. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. Here defendant maintains, as he did
below, that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) and the due process
clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions required the
circuit court to admonish him, before accepting his negotiated plea for
the offense of murder, that a three-year MSR term would be added to
his sentence. Defendant further maintains that, because the circuit
court failed to admonish him, adding the MSR term to his sentence
violates due process, fundamental fairness, and principles of contract
law. He asks this court to afford him the benefit of his plea bargain by
modifying his sentence to a term of 25 years, inclusive of the three-year MSR term.

ANALYSIS
	The appeal in the case at bar arises from the dismissal of
defendant's second-stage postconviction petition. The standard by
which second-stage dismissals of postconviction petitions are
reviewed is de novo. People v. Munson, 206 Ill. 2d 104, 115 (2002).
We begin our review by recalling the familiar principles concerning
postconviction proceedings.
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2002)) provides an avenue by which a defendant may challenge
his conviction or sentence for violations of federal or state
constitutional rights. People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 143-44 (2004);
People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 411-12 (2003); People v. Brisbon,
164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995). To be entitled to postconviction relief, a
defendant must demonstrate that he has suffered a substantial
deprivation of his federal or state constitutional rights in the
proceedings that produced the conviction or sentence being
challenged. People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 140 (2000). The scope
of the postconviction proceeding is limited to constitutional matters
that have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated.
Accordingly, any issues which could have been raised on direct
appeal, but were not, are procedurally defaulted and any issues which
have previously been decided by a reviewing court are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 412.
	The State asks us to affirm the appellate court's dismissal of
defendant's petition, arguing that defendant has not demonstrated that
his constitutional rights were substantially violated at the plea hearing
which produced his conviction and sentence.

Nature of Defendant's Claim
	We believe it appropriate, at the outset, to identify the exact
nature of defendant's claim. When seeking relief from a guilty plea,
either directly or collaterally, there are two separate, though closely
related, constitutional challenges that may be made: (1) that the plea
of guilty was not made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
consequences, and (2) that defendant did not receive the benefit of the
bargain he made with the State when he pled guilty. In the case at bar,
the State argues that defendant's appeal is an "improper
amalgamation" of these two constitutional claims and that this court
should clarify that "a claim that a petitioner did not get the benefit of
the People's bargain is fundamentally different from a claim that he did
not understand the People's offer and that, as a result, his plea was not
knowing and voluntary." Defendant, on the other hand, agrees that the
two types of constitutional claims are analytically different, but denies
that he has confused them in his petition. Defendant contends that he
is raising a "benefit of the bargain" claim, i.e., that his constitutional
right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated because the
State breached the plea agreement which induced his plea. In his reply
brief, defendant disavows and waives any challenge to the
voluntariness of his plea.
	In light of the arguments raised, we examine the two types of
constitutional claims. The first constitutional claim derives from
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709
(1969). In Boykin, the defendant entered pleas of guilty to five counts
of robbery and was subsequently sentenced to death. The record of
defendant's plea hearing, however, showed that the trial court asked
defendant no questions concerning his plea and that defendant did not
address the court. On review, the Supreme Court held that, for a
guilty plea to be valid under the due process clause, the record must
affirmatively show that the plea was entered intelligently and with full
knowledge of its consequences. Because, in that case, it could not be
determined from the record of defendant's plea hearing that his plea
had been entered voluntarily or that he was aware of the consequences
of his plea, the Court reversed defendant's convictions and sentence.
	The "benefit of the bargain" claim finds its roots in Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433, 92 S. Ct. 495,
499 (1971). In Santobello, the defendant agreed to plead guilty in
exchange for various concessions by the government, including a
promise by the prosecutor that no sentencing recommendation would
be made by the government. Defendant pled guilty and, after a lengthy
hiatus, was sentenced by the court. At defendant's sentencing hearing,
the government, represented by a different prosecutor, recommended
a sentence to the court over defendant's objection. The court adopted
the recommended sentence. On appeal, the government conceded that
the promise to refrain from making a sentencing recommendation had
been made during plea negotiations. Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings,
holding:
			"This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the
adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty,
must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what
is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances
will vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea rests in
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled." (Emphasis added.) 404 U.S.  at 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d 
at 433, 92 S. Ct.  at 499.
	The cause was remanded to state court to determine whether
specific enforcement of the plea agreement was the appropriate
remedy or whether fundamental fairness required that defendant be
given the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
		Boykin and Santobello deal with two different aspects of a
plea-its acceptance and its implementation. As these decisions make
clear, principles of due process apply to both aspects-to the procedure
of accepting the plea, as well as to the process of implementing the
bargain itself. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 443-44, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1984) (both the validity of a plea
and its enforcement are governed by due process); see also People v.
Walker, 54 Cal. 3d 1013, 1024, 819 P.2d 861, 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 908-09 (1991). There are instances, however, when these two
aspects of a plea will be interconnected. As noted by Justice Douglas
in his specially concurring opinion, a "prosecutor's promise may
deprive a guilty plea of the 'character of a voluntary act.' "
Santobello, 404 U.S.  at 266, 30 L. Ed. 2d  at 435, 92 S. Ct.  at 501
(Douglas, J., concurring), quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473, 478, 82 S. Ct. 510, 513 (1962). Thus,
when a "benefit of the bargain" claim is made, a court may need to
consider the extent to which the plea was validly entered in order to
decide "whether due process requires (a) that there be specific
performance of the plea bargain or (b) that the defendant be given the
option to go to trial on the original charges. One alternative may do
justice in one case, and the other in a different case." Santobello, 404 U.S.  at 267, 30 L. Ed. 2d  at 436, 92 S. Ct.  at 501 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
	In the case at bar, defendant raises a "benefit of the bargain"
claim. We note that he does not assert that the prosecutor or the court
affirmatively promised him that he would not have to serve a period
of MSR. Instead, defendant's premise is that principles of due process,
embodied in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402, made it incumbent
upon the circuit court to admonish him, on the record, regarding the
statutorily required MSR. Further, because no admonishment was
given, his plea agreement, as evinced by the record, was that he would
receive a maximum sentence of 25 years' imprisonment. Based on this
premise, defendant then argues that the State, by adding the MSR
term, has breached the plea agreement, in violation of due process,
and that he is prejudiced because he received a more onerous
sentence-25 years plus 3 years MSR.
	Defendant does not challenge the validity of the plea and,
accordingly, does not seek the withdrawal of his plea of guilty.
Instead, defendant contends that his plea of guilty, given in exchange
for the promise of a 25-year sentence, was voluntarily and knowingly
made. He requests specific enforcement of the negotiated plea
agreement as he understood it. He now concedes, however, that a
term of supervised release is statutorily mandated and, therefore,
cannot be legally struck from his sentence. For this reason, he asks
that his sentence be modified to 22 years' imprisonment plus 3 years
of mandatory supervised release to "approximate" the bargain that
was struck between the parties.

Waiver
	Initially, the State argues that the dismissal of defendant's petition
should be affirmed based on principles of waiver. Noting the well-established rule that "issues that could have been raised on direct
appeal, but were not, are not amenable to post-conviction review"
(see People v. Collins, 153 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (1992)), the State
contends that defendant should be denied collateral review of his claim
because he "was aware from the date of his guilty plea that the judge
had not included an admonition regarding the period of MSR" and
never sought to withdraw his guilty plea or directly appeal his
conviction.
	The State's "waiver" argument is, to be more precise, a claim of
procedural default. "[W]aiver implies a knowing relinquishment of a
right, whereas procedural default refers to the failure to adequately
preserve an issue for later appellate review." People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 457 n.3(2005) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow,
C.J., and Kilbride, J.). See also People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 11
(2000) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by Miller and
McMorrow, JJ.); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 522 (1998)
(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) Here,
the State is arguing that defendant did not preserve his improper-admonishment claim for appellate review because he did not raise the
issue in a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or in a direct appeal. The
State's claim, thus, is one of procedural default.
	We find, however, that there was no procedural default under the
facts of this case. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402, every
defendant who enters a plea of guilty has a due process right to be
properly and fully admonished.(3) Moreover, in People v. Wills, 61 Ill. 2d 105, 109 (1975), this court held that "compliance with Rule
402(a)(2) requires that a defendant be admonished that the mandatory
period of parole [now called mandatory supervised release] pertaining
to the offense is a part of the sentence that will be imposed." See also
People v. McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d 398 (1979). It is undisputed that the
circuit court failed to admonish defendant in accord with the rule.
Under the circumstances, it would be incongruous to hold that
defendant forfeited the right to bring a postconviction claim because
he did not object to the circuit court's failure to admonish him. To so
hold would place the onus on defendant to ensure his own
admonishment in accord with due process. Moreover, defendant
alleges that it was not until he was in prison that he learned that his
sentence had been increased by a three-year period of MSR.
Therefore, he could not have raised the error in a motion to withdraw
his plea or a direct appeal. Accordingly, we address the merits of
defendant's claim.

Due Process and Benefit of the Bargain
	In the case at bar, defendant contends that his constitutional right
to due process and fundamental fairness was violated because he pled
guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, but received a different,
more onerous sentence than the one he agreed to. We agree.
	As discussed earlier, the Court held in Santobello that, "when a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such a promise must be fulfilled." Santobello, 404 U.S. 
at 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d  at 433, 92 S. Ct.  at 499. By this holding, the
Court recognized that plea agreements may be enforceable on
constitutional grounds. In other words, if a defendant shows that his
plea of guilty was entered in reliance on a plea agreement, he may
have a due process right to enforce the terms of the agreement. See
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 443-44, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1984); People v. Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d 516, 522
(1988) ("defendant who enters a guilty plea in reliance upon the
promise of the prosecutor is entitled to a remedy when the prosecutor
breaches that promise"). This is because a plea bargain, once
embodied in the judgment of a court, deprives a defendant of liberty
and other constitutionally protected interests. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.  at 507-08, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 442, 104 S. Ct.  at 2546.
	This court recognized the constitutional underpinnings of plea
agreements in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326-27 (1996), when
we held:
		"Courts must keep in mind that the defendant's 'underlying
"contract" right is constitutionally based and therefore
reflects concerns that differ fundamentally from and run
wider than those of commercial contract law.' [Citation.] As
a result, the application of contract law principles to plea
agreements may require tempering in some instances."
	In Evans, we consolidated the appeals of two defendants who
had entered negotiated pleas of guilty in exchange for specific
sentences and, subsequently, brought motions to reduce their
sentences. Applying the principles first espoused in Santobello, we
held in Evans that when a defendant enters a negotiated plea of guilty
in exchange for specified benefits, such as the dismissal of certain
counts or the promise of a certain sentence or sentencing
recommendation, both the State and the defendant must be bound by
the terms of the agreement. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 327. Although, in
Evans, we were concerned with the constitutionality of holding
defendants to the terms of their negotiated plea agreements, we
quoted with favor United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th
Cir. 1986), for the proposition that "[n]either side should be able, any
more than would private contracting parties, unilaterally to renege or
seek modification simply because of uninduced mistake or change of
mind." We concluded that, "[i]n effect, the defendants are seeking to
hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying
the sentences to which they had earlier agreed" and that it would be
"inconsistent with constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness" to
allow defendants to attempt to unilaterally reduce their sentences.
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 328.
	In the case at bar, defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement. The terms of the plea agreement, as set forth by the
prosecutor at the plea hearing, included a specific sentence of 25
years. The trial court ratified this agreement and failed to admonish
defendant, as required by Supreme Court Rule 402, that a mandatory
supervised release term would be added to the sentence defendant had
agreed to. Under these circumstances, we conclude that adding the
statutorily required three-year MSR term to defendant's negotiated
25-year sentence amounts to a unilateral modification and breach of
the plea agreement by the State, inconsistent with constitutional
concerns of fundamental fairness. We believe this conclusion is in
conformity with earlier decisions of this court and with decisions
reached by other jurisdictions.
	In People v. McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d 398 (1979), the defendant filed a
postconviction petition alleging that the court's "failure to admonish
him at the time of his plea of guilty that the mandatory parole term
was a part of the sentence was per se a constitutional violation
entitling him to post-conviction relief." McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d  at 401. We
rejected this claim, holding that "the quid pro quo for the plea of
guilty was the [prosecutor's] recommendation that there be
concurrent sentences of 1 to 3 years [and] defendant knew that the
court was not bound to accept the recommendation and could
sentence defendant to a term of not less than 1 nor more than 20
years." (Emphasis added.) McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d  at 403. We concluded
that, although it was error for the court to have omitted the
admonishment, the error was not of constitutional dimension because
defendant was not prejudiced-the "indeterminate sentence imposed,
together with the mandatory parole period, [was] substantially less
than the maximum of 20 years to which defendant knew he could be
sentenced." Under the facts of that case, then, there were no grounds
for granting the defendant relief on his postconviction petition.
Defendant received a sentence that was less than the maximum
sentence he was told he could receive and, as a result, the omitted
admonition did not affect the voluntariness of the plea. McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d  at 403. Moreover, because the State promised only to recommend
a sentence, defendant received the benefit of the bargain he made with
the State.
	Significantly, in McCoy, we considered decisions issued by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States
ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1977), and United
States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1977), but
found them to be "factually distinguishable." McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d  at 403-04. In Baker and Ferris, the defendants, like the defendant in the case
at bar, entered pleas of guilty in exchange for the promise of a specific
sentence and were not informed by the court, prior to the court's
acceptance of their plea, that a statutorily required mandatory period
of parole would be attached to the prison sentence.(4) Having been
denied relief in state court, the defendants sought writs of habeas
corpus.
	The Baker court ruled that the defendant's due process rights had
been violated, holding:
			"The correct test to be used in determining whether the
circumstances surrounding Baker's negotiated guilty plea
violated the Due Process Clause is that the plea must
withstand collateral attack unless the sentence actually
imposed upon Baker significantly differed from the sentence
which the prosecutor and the trial court promised him."
Baker, 551 F.2d  at 183.
	Citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 161-63, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 432-33, 92 S. Ct. 495, 498-99 (1971), the Baker court held
that the addition of the mandatory parole term made defendant's
sentence "more onerous" than what he had been promised and, as a
result, he did not receive the benefit of the bargain he had made with
the State. The Baker court concluded that, because the defendant had
entered his plea in exchange for a specific sentence, the failure of the
prosecutor and the trial court to advise Baker of the mandatory parole
term "created a defect of constitutional dimension in his guilty plea"
in that the guilty plea was "unfairly induced in violation of the Due
Process Clause." Baker, 551 F.2d  at 181, 184.
	In Ferris, the court relied on its decision in Baker and concluded
that Ferris, too, had been "substantially prejudiced by the additional
parole term, and that due process notions of fundamental fairness
required that he receive the benefit of the bargain he had struck."
	Distinguishing Baker and Ferris from the situation in McCoy, we
held that Baker and Ferris differed in that the defendants' negotiated
plea agreements in those cases had been, not just for a sentencing
recommendation, but for the promise of a particular prison sentence.
Thus, in McCoy, we suggested that the result might have been
different had McCoy's negotiated plea been for the promise of a
specific sentence.
	Since McCoy, our appellate court has had several opportunities
to consider, both in the context of direct appeals and postconviction
proceedings, whether a defendant's due process rights are violated by
a trial court's failure to admonish the defendant that a mandatory
supervised release term will be added to the term of incarceration.
Generally, our appellate court has drawn a distinction, as suggested
in McCoy, between "open" guilty pleas and negotiated pleas for a
specific sentence.(5) In situations where a defendant has entered an open
plea and the trial court has admonished the defendant regarding the
maximum sentence to which he would be exposed by his plea, the
failure to admonish a defendant concerning the MSR is not a
constitutional violation, as long as the sentence plus the term of MSR
is less than the maximum sentence which defendant was told he could
receive. See People v. Fish, 316 Ill. App. 3d 795 (2000) (in a
stipulated bench trial, defendant was advised that the maximum
penalty was 14 years, but he was sentenced to 14 years plus two years
MSR and fines; thus stipulation was not a knowing and intelligent act
done with sufficient awareness of the consequences); People v.
Brown, 296 Ill. App. 3d 1041 (1998) (although defendant entered an
open plea, he was admonished as to a maximum sentence, but was
sentenced to the maximum plus an MSR term; thus failure to
admonish regarding MSR was not harmless error); People v. Coultas,
75 Ill. App. 3d 137 (1979) (no constitutional error occurred because
sentence of three years plus mandatory supervised release was less
than the maximum five-year sentence defendant was advised could be
imposed).
	On the other hand, if the defendant negotiated a plea agreement
for a specified sentence, the court's failure to advise the defendant, on
the record, concerning the MSR term has been held to be reversible
error and a violation of due process. As explained in People v. Didley,
213 Ill. App. 3d 910, 915 (1991):
		"When a defendant has pled guilty in contemplation of
receiving a specific sentence, imposing additional and
unbargained-for terms or conditions is not permissible."
	See also People v. Smith, 285 Ill. App. 3d 666 (1996) (where
defendant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for an 11-year sentence,
the failure to advise defendant that a 3-year MSR term would be
added to his sentence made his plea unknowing); People v. Moore,
214 Ill. App. 3d 938, 944 (1991) (because defendant negotiated for a
predetermined sentence, the failure to admonish him regarding the
MSR was error); People v. O'Toole, 174 Ill. App. 3d 800, 801 (1988)
(defendant entitled to postconviction relief because due process was
violated when the court advised defendant that he would be sentenced
to "a flat ten years" and did not tell him that a term of mandatory
supervised release would be added); People v. Kull, 171 Ill. App. 3d
496 (1988) (plain error occurred because defendant pled guilty in
exchange for an agreed 22-year sentence, but was given 22 years plus
3 years' mandatory supervised release).
	Having reviewed the above cases, we conclude that, although
substantial compliance with Rule 402 is sufficient to establish due
process (People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 323 (2002); People v. Burt,
168 Ill. 2d 49, 64 (1995)), and an imperfect admonishment is not
reversible error unless real justice has been denied or the defendant
has been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment (People v.
Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 250 (1991)), there is no substantial compliance
with Rule 402 and due process is violated when a defendant pleads
guilty in exchange for a specific sentence and the trial court fails to
advise the defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a mandatory
supervised release term will be added to that sentence. In these
circumstances, addition of the MSR term to the agreed-upon sentence
violates due process because the sentence imposed is more onerous
than the one defendant agreed to at the time of the plea hearing.
Under these circumstances, the addition of the MSR constitutes an
unfair breach of the plea agreement.
	In reaching this conclusion, we reject the appellate court's
holding that a due process violation was not established in the case at
bar because defendant "never raised a good-faith argument" that he
would not have pled guilty had he been made aware of the MSR term.
The appellate court relied on People v. Smith, 285 Ill. App. 3d 666
(1996), wherein the court held that a due process violation is shown
only if (1) the record discloses the court informed the petitioner he
would receive a specific sentence of incarceration upon a guilty plea;
(2) the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term greater than the
agreed term, taking into account and including any period of MSR;
and (3) petitioner raises a good-faith argument that he would not have
pled guilty if he had been fully and correctly informed by the court of
his potential sentence. The Smith court purported to rely on United
States ex rel. Williams v. Morris, 633 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1980),
vacated as moot, 455 U.S. 624, 71 L. Ed. 2d 508, 102 S. Ct. 1322
(1982), and United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180
(7th Cir. 1977), as legal support for the three-prong test it
promulgated.
	Upon examination, the Baker decision reveals that the court
explicitly rejected the argument that "Baker cannot now attack the
validity of his guilty plea unless he can affirmatively demonstrate that
he would not have entered the pleas if he had known of the mandatory
parole term." Baker, 551 F.2d  at 183. The Baker court reasoned that,
when a defendant enters a plea in exchange for a specific sentence,
rather than an open plea as in Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d 589
(7th Cir. 1975), no additional showing is necessary because prejudice
has already been shown. The court stated:
			"In contrast [to Bachner], Baker did suffer a detriment. He
agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the promise of a
specific sentence by the prosecutor, which was then ratified
by the trial judge. Yet he was given a more onerous sentence
than he had been promised." Baker, 551 F.2d  at 183.
	In United States ex rel. Williams the habeas petitions of three
defendants were consolidated for consideration. Analyzing the facts
of each defendant's plea in comparison to Baker (negotiated plea) and
Bachner (open plea), the court found that, in all cases but one, relief
should be granted because the plea of guilty had been entered, as in
Baker, in exchange for a specified sentence and the total sentence,
with the addition of the parole term, exceeded the sentence that was
promised.
	Clearly, neither Baker nor Williams supports the holding in Smith
that, where a defendant enters a negotiated plea for a specific
sentence, a finding that due process has been violated is contingent on
the defendant's ability to demonstrate that he would not have pled
guilty had he known about the MSR.(6) Accordingly, we reject it.
	Moreover, contrary to the State's argument, we find that the
recent Supreme Court decision United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 159 L. Ed. 2d 157, 124 S. Ct. 2333 (2004), does not
support a finding that a defendant, such as the one in the case at bar,
must plead and prove that he would not have pled guilty had he
known about the MSR. In Dominguez Benitez, the defendant (who
spoke only Spanish) was arrested after he sold drugs to a confidential
informant. He was charged with conspiracy to possess more than 500
grams of methamphetamine and possession of 1,391 grams of
methamphetamine, both with the intent to distribute. As a result of
plea negotiations, the government agreed, in writing, to drop the
possession charge and to stipulate to a "safety-valve" reduction of two
levels if defendant pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, which carried
a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. The "safety-valve"
reduction would have allowed the district court to give defendant a
sentence below the 10-year minimum. Eligibility for the safety-valve
reduction was contingent on satisfying five conditions, one going to
defendant's criminal history. The contingencies, however, were not
listed in the written agreement.
	At the plea hearing, defendant was admonished in accord with
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in all respects but
one-defendant was warned that the agreement reached with the
government was not binding on the court, but he was not advised that
he would be unable to withdraw his guilty plea if the government's
recommendations were not followed. The written agreement,
however, which had been read to the defendant in Spanish, provided
the defendant with this specific warning. Defendant pled guilty but
was not immediately sentenced.
	At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the district court imposed
a sentence of 10 years, the mandatory minimum without the safety-valve reduction. Defendant was told that at this time that he was
ineligible for the safety-valve reduction because the probation report
revealed that he had a more extensive criminal history than was
previously known. Defendant did not object to the sentence at the
time of the hearing, but later appealed, claiming that the court's failure
to advise him properly at the plea hearing pursuant to Rule 11 was
plain error and grounds for allowing him to withdraw his plea. On
review, the court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction, finding
that the district court's error affected defendant's substantial rights.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question:
			" '[w]hether, in order to show that a violation of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 constitutes reversible plain
error, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have
pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred.' "
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at ___, 159 L. Ed. 2d  at 166,
124 S. Ct.  at 2338.
	In deciding the issue before it, the Court noted that Rule 11,
itself, provides that "[a] variance *** is harmless error if it does not
affect substantial rights." Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 11(h); Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U.S. at ___, 159 L. Ed. 2d  at 166, 124 S. Ct.  at 2338.
The Court concluded that the omission of a single Rule 11 warning,
without a showing of prejudice, was not a "structural" error, i.e., an
error which " 'affects substantial rights' " or has " 'substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the ... verdict.' "
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at ___, 159 L. Ed. 2d  at 167, 124 S. Ct. 
at 2339, quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 90 L. Ed. 1557, 1572, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1946).(7) The Court then held
that, to show prejudice, "a defendant who seeks reversal of his
conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court
committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the
plea." Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at ___, 159 L. Ed. 2d  at 168, 124 S. Ct.  at 2340. The Court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals, finding that it had applied the wrong standard and remanded
for further proceedings.
		Dominguez Benitez is inapposite to the case at bar. Similar to
Bachner and Timmereck, the defendant in Dominguez Benitez entered
an open plea and was advised by the court, prior to the time that he
entered his plea, that the court was free to impose any sentence
available under the law and that the court was not obligated to follow
the sentencing recommendations proffered by the government. Thus,
the district court's failure to advise defendant that he could not
withdraw his plea if the government's recommendation was not
followed had no direct effect on the validity of the plea or the sentence
imposed. Simply stated, Dominguez Benitez could not establish that
he suffered any prejudice as a result of the faulty admonishment.
Unlike the defendant in the case at bar, Dominguez Benitez was never
promised by the government and the court that he would receive a
particular sentence, only to learn later that the actual sentence
imposed was more lengthy. The Court's decision in Dominguez
Benitez is not inconsistent with our holding in the case at bar.
	Finally, we reject the State's argument that we must remand
defendant's postconviction petition for a third-stage evidentiary
hearing. The State argues that, although defendant alleged that he did
not know that a mandatory supervised release term would be added
to his sentence and although "it is uncontested that MSR was not
mentioned" at defendant's plea hearing, defendant should be required
to prove, at an evidentiary hearing, that he was not actually aware that
a period of MSR would be added to his sentence. We disagree.
	First, it is unclear what sort of additional showing defendant
could provide which would establish his lack of knowledge. Secondly,
even if, as the State speculates, defendant had some level of general
knowledge about MSR terms as a result of his criminal history or
evidence could be mustered which would show that MSR was
discussed during plea negotiations, it would not establish what
defendant reasonably understood the terms of his plea agreement to
be at the time he pled guilty. Finally, and most importantly, due
process requires that it be evident from the record that a defendant's
plea of guilty is entered with full knowledge of the consequences. See
People v. Day, 311 Ill. App. 3d 271, 274 (2000) ("Due process is
violated where a court admonishes a defendant that he will receive a
shorter sentence than he actually receives; this includes the failure to
advise a defendant of the three-year MSR attached to his sentence").
Where, as here, the record contains no evidence which affirmatively
shows that defendant knew that he would be subject to an MSR term,
defendant's alleged unawareness must be taken as true.
	We recognize that MSR terms are statutorily required and that
"the State has no right to offer the withholding of such a period as a
part of the plea negotiations and *** the court has no power to
withhold such period in imposing sentence." People v. Brown, 296 Ill.
App. 3d 1041, 1043 (1998). We have little doubt that, in the case at
bar, neither the prosecutor nor the court intended to impose a
sentence without the statutorily required MSR. However, as noted by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Anderson, 970 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1992), a present inability to fulfill
a promise does not mean a breach of the plea agreement has not
occurred. See also United States v. Cook, 668 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir.
1982) ("[a] plea induced by an unfulfillable promise is no less subject
to challenge than one induced by a valid promise which the
Government simply fails to fulfill"). Here, the court was required to
admonish defendant regarding the MSR term. Failing to do so was an
uninduced error by the State.
	In sum, we find that, in the case at bar, defendant has established
a substantial violation of his constitutional rights. The record shows,
and the appellate court found, that defendant pled guilty to murder in
exchange for the promise of a 25-year sentence. It is "uncontested"
that the circuit court failed to admonish defendant, as required by
Supreme Court Rule 402 and due process, that a three-year MSR
term would be added, by operation of law, to the negotiated 25-year
sentence defendant agreed to when he pled guilty. As a result of the
circuit court's error, defendant was never advised that the sentence he
was told he would receive in exchange for his plea of guilty was not
the sentence which he would ultimately receive. Defendant was
prejudiced by the omitted admonition because he received a more
onerous sentence than the one he was told he would receive. Under
these circumstances, it is not necessary for defendant to demonstrate
a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have
pleaded guilty. Based on the record, defendant's guilty plea was
induced by the promise of a specific sentence, which he did not
receive. Thus, defendant has established that this constitutional right
to due process and fundamental fairness was violated.

Remedy
	Having established that his constitutional rights were substantially
violated, defendant is entitled to postconviction relief. The Supreme
Court, in Santobello, provided for two possible remedies when a
defendant does not receive the "benefit of the bargain": either the
"promise must be fulfilled" or defendant must be given the
opportunity to withdraw his plea. Santobello, 404 U.S.  at 262-63, 30 L. Ed. 2d  at 433, 92 S. Ct.  at 499. In Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624,
71 L. Ed. 2d 508, 102 S. Ct. 1322 (1982), the Court agreed that,
under circumstances nearly identical to the those in the case at bar,
two forms of relief were available, stating:
		"[R]espondents could seek to remedy this error in two quite
different ways. They might ask the District Court to set aside
their convictions and give them an opportunity to plead
anew; in that event, they might either plead not guilty and
stand trial or they might try to negotiate a different plea
bargain properly armed with the information that any
sentence they received would include a special parole term.
Alternatively, they could seek relief in the nature of 'specific
enforcement' of the plea agreement as they understood it; in
that event, the elimination of the mandatory parole term from
their sentences would remove any possible harmful
consequence from the trial court's incomplete advice." Lane,
455 U.S.  at 630, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 514, 102 S. Ct.  at 1326.
	The remedy defendant requests in the case at bar is enforcement
of the negotiated plea agreement as he understood it. At the same
time, however, defendant concedes that a term of supervised release
is mandated by statute and legally cannot be struck from his sentence.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West 1998) (every sentence shall
include as though written therein a term in addition to the term of
imprisonment). Having conceded that the promise which induced his
plea is unfulfillable under state law, defendant asks that his sentence
be modified to 22 years' imprisonment plus 3 years of mandatory
supervised release to approximate the bargain that was struck between
the parties.
	After reviewing decisions by courts in other jurisdictions, we find
the remedy sought by defendant to be appropriate. In James v. State,
699 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 2005), the Minnesota Supreme Court
considered a postconviction petition brought on grounds similar to
those of the case at bar. In James, the petitioner entered a guilty plea
and was not admonished that he would be subject to a statutorily
mandated conditional release term. The court found that the addition
of the 10-year conditional release term "resulted in a sentence that was
in excess of the upper limit contemplated at the time [defendant]
entered into the plea agreement." The court concluded that
defendant's plea was induced by an unfulfillable promise and that he
was entitled to withdraw his plea or have his sentence "modified in a
way that does not violate the agreement." See also State v. Jumping
Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42 (Minn 2000). We note that, in James, the
court did not grant either remedy, but remanded for further
proceedings, stating that, due to the petitioner's substantial delay in
bringing his claim, the court should determine whether allowing
petitioner to withdraw his plea would be unduly prejudicial to the
State, in which case, defendant would be limited to the alternative
remedy.
	In Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453, 353 A.2d 441 (1976),
the defendant pled guilty in exchange for various promises from the
Commonwealth, including a promise that certain sentences would run
concurrently-a promise which was unfulfillable because it was
contrary to law. In a postconviction appeal, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the defendant's plea had been induced by the
illegal promise and granted defendant's request to have his sentence
reduced, stating:
			"By so doing, appellant will then have received 'the benefit
of the bargain' made with the Commonwealth and still serve
a prison sentence commensurate with the term contemplated
by all of the parties to the plea proceedings." Zuber, 466 Pa.
at 462, 353 A.2d  at 446.
	In United States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185, 187
(7th Cir. 1977), cited earlier, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held:
			"Since Ferris has substantially begun performing his side
of the bargain, it would not be fair to vacate the plea and
require him to go through the procedure anew. Fundamental
fairness can be had by limiting his term of custody to that
portion of the sentence which comports with the bargain
made."
	Similarly, in United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir.
1978), the court held that "the fashioning of an appropriate remedy is
largely a matter of the exercise of the sound discretion of the court
according to the circumstances of each case." The Bowler court
proffered three choices: "Appropriate relief can include allowing a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, United States v. Hammerman,
528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975); directing the Government to provide
specific performance of a promise, Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1975); or ordering the imposition of a specific sentence
where withdrawal of a guilty plea or specific performance by the
Government would be either meaningless or infeasible. Correale v.
United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973)."
	Recently, in People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552, 557
(2002), this court exercised its discretion and fashioned an appropriate
remedy in a situation where a guilty plea had been induced by a legally
unfulfillable promise. The circumstances were procedurally different
from those in the case at bar. In Roe, the State brought a mandamus
complaint, seeking to have a sentencing order amended on the
grounds that the sentence was illegal. After finding that the sentence,
which had been imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, violated the
law and, therefore, was void, we held that an "equitable solution"
would be to modify the sentence to one which defendant proposed
and which would approximate the penal consequences contemplated
by the original plea agreement.
	In light of Roe and Justice Douglas' admonition that "a court
ought to accord a defendant's preference considerable, if not
controlling, weight inasmuch as the fundamental rights flouted by a
prosecutor's breach of a plea bargain are those of the defendant, not
of the State" (Santobello, 404 U.S.  at 267, 30 L. Ed. 2d  at 436, 92 S. Ct.  at 501 (Douglas, J., concurring)), we conclude that, in the case at
bar, the appropriate remedy is to modify defendant's sentence to a
term of 22 years of imprisonment, to be followed by the mandatory 3-year term of supervised release.

CONCLUSION
	We reverse the judgment of the appellate court, vacate the
sentence imposed by the Cook County circuit court and remand to the
circuit court with directions that it impose a sentence of 22 years'
imprisonment, to be followed by a term of 3 years' mandatory
supervised release.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
cause remanded with directions.
	CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority that defendant made a substantial
showing that his constitutional rights were violated because he did not
receive the benefit of his bargain and further that the appropriate
remedy for such a claim, under the circumstances, would be to modify
the defendant's sentence. I also agree with the majority's conclusion
that the cause need not be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to test
defendant's claim that he failed to receive the benefit of his bargain.
I write separately because I reach the conclusion that an evidentiary
hearing is not required for different reasons than the majority.
	The purpose of a postconviction proceeding is to allow inquiry
into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and
sentence that have not been, and could not have been adjudicated
previously on direct appeal. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528
(1999). The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides the mechanism by
which those under a criminal sentence can assert that their convictions
were the result of a substantial denial of their constitutional rights.
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). The Act provides
for various, distinct stages to conduct this inquiry. First, a defendant
commences proceedings under the Act by the filing of a petition,
which must clearly set forth the respects in which the defendant's
rights were violated. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2002). The Act
requires that a defendant attach affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting the petition's allegations. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2002).
Thereafter, if the defendant is under a sentence of imprisonment, the
circuit court is to examine the petition to determine if it is frivolous or
patently without merit; if it is determined to be frivolous or patently
without merit, the court is authorized to dismiss the petition. 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2002). If the petition is not dismissed at this
stage, it is docketed for further proceedings in accordance with
sections 122-4 through 122-6 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b)
(West 2002). Under section 122-5 of the Act, the State then has an
opportunity to file a motion to dismiss or an answer. 725 ILCS
5/122-5 (West 2002). If a motion to dismiss is filed and then denied,
the State must then file an answer within 20 days after such denial.
725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2002). The court may then receive proof by
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. 725 ILCS
5/122-6 (West 2002). In its discretion, the court may order the
defendant to be brought before the court for the hearing. 725 ILCS
5/122-6 (West 2002). If the court finds in favor of the defendant, it
is required to enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment
or sentence in the former proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West
2002).
	In the present case, the State's motion to dismiss was granted
without comment, so it never actually had an opportunity to file an
answer denying the factual allegations of defendant's petition. While
it is true that all well-pleaded facts in a defendant's petition and in the
accompanying affidavits are taken as true, this is only for the purpose
of making a substantial showing that constitutional rights have been
violated so that a defendant can proceed to an evidentiary hearing on
his allegations. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528. This court has repeatedly
stressed that an evidentiary hearing is required whenever a defendant
makes a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381. Thus, if the court finds a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation, the inquiry is normally advanced
to the third stage of the postconviction procedure where the trial court
conducts an evidentiary hearing. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239,
246 (2001). When the petitioner's claims are based on matters outside
the record, it is not the intent of the Act that such claims be
adjudicated on the pleadings. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 360
(2000); People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (1999); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382.
	In support of its ruling that no hearing is required, the majority
asserts that "it is unclear what sort of additional showing defendant
could provide which would establish his lack of knowledge." Slip op.
at 18. The State's counter to this seems to be that, at an evidentiary
hearing on a defendant's claims, the burden is on the defendant to
prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence (People v.
Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2002)), and that contract principles
govern this case, requiring the party seeking to enforce a contract to
prove its terms (see, e.g., Mannion v. Stallings &amp; Co., 204 Ill. App.
3d 179, 186 (1990)). According to the State, the exact terms of the
offer agreed upon are matters outside the record. Therefore, it
contends, defendant would have to prove his claim either by testifying
orally that the State did not tell him during plea negotiations that MSR
would be included in his sentence or by submitting an affidavit
indicating the same. The State also maintains that it would be free to
submit evidence to show that defendant was told that MSR would be
a part of his sentence. According to the State, these scenarios would
raise conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility for the court
to resolve at the hearing.
	The State's analysis would be sound if not for the requirement of
Supreme Court Rule 402(b), which requires that the terms of a plea
agreement be "stated in open court." 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(b).
Specifically, the rule provides in relevant part as follows:
			"The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first
determining that the plea is voluntary. If the tendered plea is
the result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall be stated
in open court. The court, by questioning the defendant
personally in open court, shall confirm the terms of the plea
agreement ***." (Emphases added.) 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(b).
One of the purposes of an open-court statement and a personal
confirmation of the terms of the plea agreement is to prevent a
defendant from swearing falsely at a later collateral attack upon the
proceedings that the terms of the agreement were other than the actual
sentence imposed. See People v. Salvaggio, 38 Ill. App. 3d 482, 486
(1976). Additionally, this court has emphasized that the requirement
"prevents misunderstandings as to the terms of an agreement. It is an
efficient means of reducing what is typically an oral understanding
to a matter of record. It also insures that the agreement will be visible
for examination. *** Announcing the agreement in open court will
deter *** future unfounded claims by a defendant that an agreement
entered into was not honored." (Emphasis added.) People v. Dudley,
58 Ill. 2d 57, 60 (1974).  
	It would be incongruous to hold that the State is free to argue
that the terms of the agreement differed from those stated in open
court, while at the same time, preclude a defendant from challenging
a plea stated in open court on the basis that it differed from an earlier
oral understanding. Rule 402(b) takes the guessing game out of
discerning the parties' oral understandings by reducing those
understandings to a matter of record. This is analogous to a contract
setting where the parties' oral negotiations are reduced to a written
contract, with all previous understandings merging into the written
contract. Because I find that the plea agreement is a matter of record
that can be easily discerned from a review of that record, I agree that
no evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the benefit-of-the-bargain issue in this case.
	 
	1.  The order of sentence and 
commitment found in the record also shows
that defendant was sentenced on the murder count to "(25) Twenty Five
Years IDOC." The sentencing order makes no reference to the three-year
mandatory supervised release term required by law.
	2.  ï»¿ Section 581(d)(1) of the 
Code provides:
"Except where a term of natural life is imposed, every sentence
shall include as though written therein a term in addition to the term
of imprisonment. For those sentenced under the law in effect prior
to February 1, 1978, such term shall be identified as a parole term.
For those sentenced on or after February 1, 1978, such term shall
be identified as a mandatory supervised release term. Subject to
earlier termination under Section 338 [730 ILCS 5/338], the
parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be as follows:
(1) for first degree murder or a Class X felony, 3 years."
3.  ï»¿ Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
402 was adopted in response to Boykin. It
is noted in the committee comments that one of the major objectives of the
rule is to "insure compliance with the Boykin requirements."

4.  ï»¿ Additionally, in Ferris, the 
defendant was misinformed by the court that,
if he served his 10-year sentence, "that would be the end of it" and he would
not be required to serve a period of probation.    
         

5.                
             
               
          
             
              
    
 ï»¿ This same distinction has been drawn in other federal court decisions.
See, for example, United States ex rel. Williams v. Morris, 633 F.2d 71 (7th
Cir. 1980), vacated as moot, 455 U.S. 624, 71 L. Ed. 2d 508, 102 S. Ct.
1322 (1982), distinguishing the negotiated plea for a specific sentence in
Baker from the open pleas in United States v. Timmereck, 441 U.S. 780, 60
L. Ed. 2d 634, 99 S. Ct. 2085 (1979), and Bachner v. United States, 517
F.2d 589 (7th Cir 1975).
6.  ï»¿ 
As indicated above, the Williams decision was later vacated as moot by
the Supreme Court in Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 71 L. Ed. 2d 508,
102 S. Ct. 1322 (1982). In Lane, the Court explicitly declined to consider
whether, to establish a constitutional violation, a defendant would have to
show that he "in fact did not know of the parole requirement at the time [he]
pleaded guilty or that [he] would not have pleaded guilty had [he] known of
this consequence." Lane, 455 U.S.  at 630 n.9, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 514 n.9, 102
S. Ct. at 1326 n.9.
7.  ï»¿ It 
appears that the Court's "structural error" standard for assessing
faulty admonitions under Rule 11 is identical to our "substantial compliance"
standard for assessing faulty admonitions under Supreme Court Rule 402.