Title: In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 6, 2020

In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent Carlia Brady, formerly a Judge of the Superior Court, violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code). The ACJC unanimously recommended the sanction of removal from judicial office. On June 11, 2013, officers of the Woodbridge Township Police Department (WTPD) arrested respondent at her home in Woodbridge. She was charged in a complaint warrant with hindering the apprehension of another, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3, by “knowingly harboring Jason Prontnicki, a known fugitive,” in her residence. Respondent was indicted on three charges: second-degree official misconduct; third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution; and third-degree hindering apprehension. The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the official misconduct charge but denied her motion to dismiss the hindering apprehension or prosecution charges. The State appealed the dismissal of the official misconduct charge, and respondent appealed the denial of her motion to dismiss the other charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determinations and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. The State later moved to dismiss with prejudice the remaining two counts of the indictment. The trial court granted that motion, thus concluding the criminal proceedings against respondent. On March 6, 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court reinstated respondent to her duties as a Superior Court judge. Several months later, the ACJC issued its complaint. After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court modified the sanction of removal recommended by the ACJC and imposed a three-month suspension on respondent. "We view that sanction to be commensurate with the conduct proven by clear and convincing evidence and to further our disciplinary system’s purpose of preserving public confidence in the judiciary." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady (D-10-19) (083462)Argued April 30, 2020 -- Decided August 6, 2020PER CURIAM By Presentment filed with the Court in this judicial disciplinary matter, the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent Carlia M. Brady, formerly a Judge of the Superior Court, violated four provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code). The ACJC unanimously recommended the sanction of removal from judicial office. Respondent was sworn in as a Judge on April 5, 2013. On June 11, 2013, officers of the Woodbridge Township Police Department (WTPD) arrested respondent at her home for “knowingly harboring Jason Prontnicki, a known fugitive,” in her residence. The Court suspended respondent from her judicial duties without pay and referred the matter to the ACJC. The three criminal charges against respondent were eventually dropped, and the Court reinstated respondent to her judicial duties in March 2018. In May 2018, the ACJC issued a Complaint charging respondent with conduct that violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. At the ACJC hearing, the following facts emerged. On June 10, 2013, respondent had been a Superior Court judge for approximately two months. She and Prontnicki had been involved in a romantic relationship for about six months, and Prontnicki was living in respondent’s home. On that morning, respondent appeared at WTPD headquarters to report her car missing. She met with two police sergeants and Officer Robert Bartko. Respondent told the officers that Prontnicki, her boyfriend, had taken one of her cars without permission. The officers explained the procedure to file a criminal complaint against Prontnicki, but respondent declined to do so. While respondent was at the station, officers learned there were two open warrants for Prontnicki’s arrest, one for a violent crime, and that his driver’s license had been suspended. The officers told respondent about Prontnicki’s open warrants and suspended license. The police report reflects that the officers told respondent that as “an officer of the court,” she was required to report to them “if and when” Prontnicki returned with the car, so they could arrest him. 1 Shortly after respondent returned home, Prontnicki called her. Respondent testified that Prontnicki told her he would return her car, that he denied knowing of any warrants or a suspended license, and that she told him that he needed to “go to the police and take care of it right away.” It is undisputed that -- after speaking with Prontnicki -- respondent did not call the police to advise them Prontnicki would be at her home. Respondent testified that, when Prontnicki arrived, he walked past her father into the house. Respondent said she was “a little surprised and shocked and then fearful,” and that she told Prontnicki to leave. Nonetheless, she and Prontnicki talked in her garage for about an hour, joined by her father for the final fifteen minutes of their conversation. Approximately fifteen minutes after Prontnicki left her home, respondent called the WTPD, asked to speak with Bartko, and left a message on Bartko’s voicemail. Respondent notified police that her car had been returned, but other contents of that message are disputed. Respondent contended before the ACJC and the Court that the WTPD tampered with the voicemail to delete part of her message. The next morning, on June 11, 2013, Prontnicki called respondent, and they spoke for more than two and a half hours. Respondent testified that during that call, Prontnicki confirmed he would be staying with his brother and said he needed to retrieve belongings from her home. They made an appointment for that afternoon, and Prontnicki called later to confirm their appointment. Respondent did not notify the police after either call. Respondent left a second message for Officer Bartko later that afternoon, confirming that her car had been returned. Respondent contends that the WTPD also tampered with and intentionally deleted parts of her second voicemail. Bartko did not retrieve either of respondent’s messages until after respondent was arrested. Meanwhile, WTPD officers conducted surveillance of respondent’s residence during the afternoon of June 11, 2013. When Prontnicki left her house, a WTPD officer arrested Prontnicki. Shortly after his arrest, members of the WTPD went to respondent’s home and arrested her for hindering Prontnicki’s apprehension. One testified that when respondent was arrested, she said, “I’ve been vetted, take the cuffs off.” According to the police report, respondent directed officers to take the handcuffs off of her, then asked to be handcuffed with her hands in front of her rather than behind her. The officers refused. Later that evening, officers and an assistant prosecutor presented a Superior Court judge a complaint warrant alleging that respondent had “harbor[ed]” Prontnicki in her residence “for approximately 1 hour and never ma[de] any attempt to contact law enforcement.” Although one officer was aware that respondent had left voicemails for Bartko, he did not disclose those voicemails to the judge. The judge signed the complaint warrant. Before the ACJC, an officer conceded that the statement in the complaint warrant that respondent never tried to contact law enforcement was inaccurate. 2 At the ACJC hearing, both respondent and the Presenter offered expert testimony by psychologists and audio engineering experts. The ACJC found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated the Code. With respect to contested facts and the two issues that the parties’ experts disputed, the ACJC made findings in the Presenter’s favor. The ACJC recommended respondent’s removal from judicial office. Respondent moved before the Court to dismiss the Presentment, or, in the alternative, to modify the ACJC’s recommendation that she be removed from office. After oral argument on that motion, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause denying the motion to dismiss and requiring respondent to show cause “why she should not be publicly disciplined through the imposition of an appropriate sanction that is less than removal, the Court having determined on its review of the matter that the appropriate quantum of discipline shall not include removal.”HELD: The Court concurs in substantial part with the ACJC’s factual findings and holds that clear and convincing evidence supports the ACJC’s determination that respondent committed the Code violations charged. The Court modifies the ACJC’s recommendation that respondent be removed from judicial office, however, and instead imposes on respondent a three-month suspension from judicial duties.1. New Jersey’s system of judicial discipline exists to preserve public confidence in the integrity and the independence of the judiciary. To that end, every judge is duty bound to abide by and enforce the standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge’s acts need not be criminal in order to implicate the Code. Four provisions of the Code govern this disciplinary matter, and the Court reviews each. (pp. 19-21)2. After an independent review of the record presented to the ACJC, the Court finds that the Presenter met her burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence a core allegation. Despite ample opportunity to contact the WTPD in advance of Prontnicki’s visits to her home on June 10 and 11, 2013, respondent declined to do so. When she did call the police after Prontnicki’s departure on each of those two days, she was not forthcoming about her contacts with him and did not reveal her detailed knowledge of his activities. Whether the transcript of the voicemail is accurate or whether it is missing information because of police misconduct, respondent was not fully forthcoming with the WTPD. The Court does not accept respondent’s contention that she acted as she did because the officers allegedly instructed on June 10, 2013 that she should contact police only in specific circumstances, nor does the Court find credible that she refrained from calling the police because she feared that Prontnicki would injure her. The evidence supports the inference that respondent acted in the hope that she could assist Prontnicki and preserve their relationship while maintaining her judicial career. The Court views respondent’s comment that she was “vetted” to be a reference to her judicial status intended to discourage the officers from handcuffing her. (pp. 21-32) 3 3. Relying only on clear and convincing evidence, the Court views respondent’s communications with the WTPD on June 10 and 11, 2013 to fall short of the high standards imposed by the Code. Respondent was undoubtedly in a difficult situation during the two days at issue here, and it is understandable that she was upset as those disturbing events unfolded. As a judge, however, respondent was not at liberty to address her circumstances with only herself and her personal relationships in mind. The public has the right to expect that when police officers are searching for a fugitive accused of a violent crime and a judge has detailed knowledge of the whereabouts, activities and immediate plans of that fugitive, the judge will take prompt and decisive action to ensure that law enforcement is fully informed. There is no exception to that principle when the judge and the fugitive have a personal relationship. Respondent did not meet the high standard imposed on the judiciary, and she did not discharge her responsibility to the public. Although the Court considers respondent’s comment that she had been “vetted” and her direction to the officers about handcuffing improper, that portion of the evidence is far less important to the Court’s determination than the evidence regarding respondent’s communications with the WTPD and her representations about the WTPD’s alleged directive not to call police except under specific conditions, which the Court does not find credible. In sum, based on a de novo review of the record, the Court finds clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. (pp. 32-35)4. In considering the appropriate sanction for respondent’s violation of the Code, the Court weighs the aggravating and mitigating factors collected in In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 153-54 (2006). The aggravating factor of public policy -- in this instance the public policy of ensuring the safety of a community by promptly arresting suspects in violent crimes -- weighs in favor of a significant sanction. Because respondent handled her communications with the WTPD in a manner “unbecoming and inappropriate for one holding the position of a judge,” id. at 153, the Court considers that aggravating factor as well. The Court also considers mitigating factors. This was the first ethics complaint against respondent, who had been on the bench for only two months when these incidents occurred. The Court acknowledges the emotional stress that respondent experienced on June 10 and 11, 2013, and in the nearly five years of criminal proceedings that followed, and the profound impact the events at issue have had on her life and career. The Court sees no evidence, however, that respondent has a “sincere commitment to overcoming the fault” in this case. Id. at 154. Balancing the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court modifies the sanction of removal recommended by the ACJC and imposes a three-month suspension on respondent. (pp. 36-39) Respondent is suspended from judicial duties for a period of three months. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA, concurring, would remove Judge Brady from the bench. But, because the Court’s Order to Show Cause took away removal from the bench as a potential sanction, Justice Fernandez-Vina concurs with the majority’s decision. 4 JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, is of the view that, based on the record, Judge Brady did not harbor a fugitive or obstruct a police investigation. Nor did her conduct demean the judiciary. Justice Albin stresses that Judge Brady’s conduct should not be viewed from the sterile, twenty/twenty perspective of hindsight, but rather from that of a vulnerable human being, fatigued and frightened, in the grip of overwhelming stress, who, in the moment, made decisions that, even if flawed, do not rise to a level that warrants discipline. In Justice Albin’s view, Judge Brady is the victim of a misguided and failed criminal prosecution that has left her career as a judge in ruins and of a disciplinary review that has overlooked police malfeasance, her good-faith efforts, and the human element. Because he does not believe that the charges against Judge Brady have been sustained by clear and convincing evidence, Justice Albin finds that the imposition of discipline is not justified. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting, is not persuaded there is clear and convincing evidence in this record to sustain disciplinary charges.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON join in the Court’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA filed a concurrence. JUSTICES ALBIN and LaVECCHIA each filed a dissent. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate. 5 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY D- 10 September Term 2019 083462 In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady, a Judge of the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey On an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Should Not Be Publicly Disciplined through the Imposition of an Appropriate Sanction that does not include Removal from Judicial Office. Argued Decided April 30, 2020 August 6, 2020 Maureen G. Bauman, Designated Presenter, argued the cause on behalf of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct. Respondent argued the cause on her own behalf. PER CURIAM By Presentment filed with the Court in this judicial disciplinary matter,the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) found by clear andconvincing evidence that respondent Carlia M. Brady, formerly a Judge of theSuperior Court, violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); 1 and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code). The ACJCunanimously recommended the sanction of removal from judicial office. We concur in substantial part with the ACJC’s factual findings and holdthat clear and convincing evidence supports the ACJC’s determination thatrespondent committed the Code violations charged. We modify the ACJC’srecommendation that respondent be removed from judicial office, however,and instead impose on respondent a three-month suspension from judicialduties. I. A. Respondent, who was admitted to the Bar in 1997, was sworn in as aJudge of the Superior Court on April 5, 2013. On June 11, 2013, officers of the Woodbridge Township PoliceDepartment (WTPD) arrested respondent at her home in Woodbridge. She wascharged in a complaint warrant with hindering the apprehension of another, inviolation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3, by “knowingly harboring Jason Prontnicki, aknown fugitive,” in her residence. The following day, this Court suspended respondent from her judicialduties without pay and referred the matter to the ACJC. In accordance with itspolicy regarding disciplinary proceedings against judges charged with criminal 2 offenses, the ACJC took no action on the referral of the disciplinary matterpending completion of the criminal proceedings. After respondent’s criminal matter was transferred from MiddlesexCounty to Somerset County, a grand jury indicted respondent on three charges:second-degree official misconduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(b), third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(1), and third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(2). The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismissthe official misconduct charge but denied her motion to dismiss the hinderingapprehension or prosecution charges. The State appealed the dismissal of theofficial misconduct charge, and respondent appealed the denial of her motionto dismiss the other charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’sdeterminations and remanded the matter to the trial court for furtherproceedings. State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143, 174 (App. Div. 2017). The State moved to dismiss with prejudice the remaining two counts ofthe indictment. On March 2, 2018, the trial court granted that motion, thusconcluding the criminal proceedings against respondent. On March 6, 2018, this Court reinstated respondent to her duties as aSuperior Court judge. 3 B. 1. On May 4, 2018, the ACJC issued a Complaint charging respondent withconduct that violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); andCanon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. In her Answer, respondent denied violatingany provision of the Code. Pursuant to Rule 2:15-3(b), four members of the ACJC conducted aseven-day hearing on the matter. Other participating members of the ACJCreviewed the record and briefs. At the hearing, the Presenter called five factwitnesses and two expert witnesses. Respondent, represented by counsel,testified and called two fact witnesses and two expert witnesses. 2. We summarize the factual evidence presented to the ACJC based on therecord of the hearing. On June 10, 2013, respondent had been a Superior Court judge forapproximately two months. She and Prontnicki had been involved in aromantic relationship for about six months, and Prontnicki was living inrespondent’s home. According to respondent’s testimony before the ACJC,she was undergoing medical treatment in order to have a child with Prontnicki,and was told by her physician that she might be pregnant. 4 On the morning of June 10, 2013, respondent appeared at WTPDheadquarters, and stated that she wanted to report her car missing. At thepolice station, she met with Sergeant James Mullarney, Sergeant WalterBukowski, and Officer Robert Bartko.1 Respondent told the officers that Prontnicki, her boyfriend, had takenone of her cars without permission. According to respondent, after giving afalse account of her vehicle’s location, Prontnicki had admitted loaning it to afriend who lived in Bayonne. Respondent indicated that she and Prontnickihad spent two hours the previous night driving around Bayonne and JerseyCity looking for the missing car. She stated that when she left Prontnicki inJersey City to return to her home, she told him that if she did not hear fromhim by 10:00 a.m. about the status of her car, she would report the vehicle asstolen. Respondent informed the officers that she had not heard fromProntnicki since she had dropped him off in Jersey City. The officers explained to respondent the procedure to file a criminalcomplaint against Prontnicki, but respondent declined to do so. She indicatedthat she preferred to file a complaint against Prontnicki’s friend in Bayonne,1 Officer Bartko testified that when he returned to WTPD headquarters from patrol to process respondent’s complaint, he was told by another officer that respondent was a Superior Court judge. The record does not reveal how the officers learned that information. 5 whom she believed had her car, but officers could not find any record of aperson with the name that respondent provided them. While respondent was still at the police station, officers learned thatthere were two open warrants for Prontnicki’s arrest. One of those warrantsarose from the armed robbery of a pharmacy in Old Bridge on April 29, 2013,in which the perpetrator allegedly threatened a pharmacist with a crowbar,demanding drugs. The officers also learned that Prontnicki’s driver’s licensehad been suspended. The officer told respondent about Prontnicki’s openwarrants and suspended license. The police report reflects that the officerstold respondent that as “an officer of the court,” she was required to report tothem “if and when” Prontnicki returned with the car, so that they could arresthim. Respondent reported to two friends that morning by text that she had justlearned that Prontnicki had threatened a pharmacist with a crowbar on April29, 2013. Respondent sent a text message to one of those friends stating thatwhen the incident at the pharmacy had occurred, Prontnicki “was alreadystaying with me and I was a judge.” She added, “I can’t have him in my housecos I wud now be harboring a criminal . . . I wud have to report him.” At 1:11 p.m., shortly after respondent returned to her home, Prontnickicalled her. Respondent testified that Prontnicki told her that he had her car 6 and would return it, and that she told Prontnicki that police officers hadadvised her that he had outstanding warrants and a suspended license.According to respondent, Prontnicki denied knowing of any warrants or asuspended license, and she told him that he needed to “go to the police andtake care of it right away.” Respondent testified that Prontnicki said he wouldbring back her car first, and she told him “fine, it would be nice if you broughtback [the] car, but you can’t come in my house.” Immediately following that call, respondent texted her friend thatProntnicki “just called to tell me he got the car and will bring it home .” Sheadded that she had told Prontnicki “he can’t stay with me cos he has a warrantout for his arrest and I am required to notify authorities when I know someonehas a warrant[.] So I told him he must leave after he drops the car off as Imust go to the police[.]” It is undisputed that -- after speaking with Prontnicki -- respondent didnot call the police to advise them that Prontnicki would be at her home. Sheexplained that the officers had “told me not to call until if and when he getsback to the house or I know his exact location.” She stated that based on her“interaction” with the police, “it seemed to me the police were not interested ingoing out unless they can just take him and not have to do any kind ofsurveillance or anything.” 7 Respondent then called her parents and asked them to meet her at herhouse, and they did so. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Prontnicki arrived at respondent’s home.According to respondent, Prontnicki rang the doorbell, and when her fatheranswered the door, Prontnicki walked past her father into the house.Respondent said she was “a little surprised and shocked and then fearful,” andthat she told Prontnicki to leave. Nonetheless, after Prontnicki walked throughthe house to the garage, she followed him. Respondent testified thatProntnicki said he was unwilling to leave her home immediately because it wasraining. She and Prontnicki then talked in her garage for about an hour, joinedby her father for the final fifteen minutes of their conversation. Byrespondent’s account, Prontnicki denied having outstanding warrants andsuggested to respondent that the police might be “trying to get you becauseyou’re a judge.” Eventually, Prontnicki used respondent’s cellphone to call his brother,and his brother drove to respondent’s home and picked him up. Shortlythereafter, respondent called Prontnicki and they spoke briefly. At 4:36 p.m. on June 10, 2013, approximately fifteen minutes afterProntnicki left her home, respondent called the WTPD, asked to speak withBartko, and left a message on Bartko’s voicemail. The contents of that 8 message are disputed. According to the audio recordings that the WTPDproduced, respondent’s June 10, 2013 voicemail message stated: Hi, um, Officer Bartko, this is Carlia Brady. I submitted, I sat with you to fill out incident report number 13065290/1 um with regard to the unlawful taking of my car. Um, I just wanted to report to you that, um, Jason Prontnicki, the suspect, um, actually returned it just now. Um, it is in my driveway. I haven’t inspected it yet cause it’s raining and I didn’t bring it into my house because I don’t want it in my house unless I can inspect it. Um, I just wanted to let that be known. Also, to let you know since there’s a warrant out for his arrest, he is not with me, but he is in Woodbridge cause he left, um, my property so please give me a call back. I, we need to know whether an amended report needs to be redone, um, or added, whatever I needed to do. Please give me a call back [telephone number]. Carlia Brady, [telephone number]. Respondent contended before the ACJC, and contends before this Court,that the WTPD tampered with the voicemail to delete part of her June 10, 2013voicemail message. At the ACJC hearing, respondent was asked to describewhat she had said on the portion of the voicemail that she claims was deleted.She testified that she thought she said that Prontnicki was not with her but withhis brother who shares his last name and “lives in Woodbridge about a mileaway. I don’t have his exact address or I don’t know his exact address, but it’sby the ShopRite and ice cream parlor area. Please give me a call back and I’llgive you as much detail as possible.” Respondent’s mother testified that she 9 heard respondent provide that information while leaving her voicemail forBartko. At 10:07 the next morning, June 11, 2013, Prontnicki called respondent,and they spoke for more than two and a half hours. Respondent testified thatduring that call, Prontnicki confirmed he would be staying with his brother inWoodbridge and said he needed to retrieve belongings from her home.Respondent testified that Prontnicki said his brother -- not Prontnicki himself -- would pick up the belongings. According to Prontnicki -- as recorded in astatement to police -- he contacted respondent early in the afternoon of June11, 2013 to confirm that she would be home between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.that day so he could pick up his belongings. Based on telephone records, thatcall occurred at 1:49 p.m. on June 11, 2013. Respondent did not notify thepolice after either call. According to respondent’s texts to her friend that afternoon, Prontnickiattempted to reassure her that he had done nothing unlawful and that theirrelationship could be salvaged. Her texts state that Prontnicki identified twoother men as the actual perpetrators of the robbery, that he denied that therewere any warrants for his arrest or that his license was suspended, that he saidhe would turn himself in and cooperate with police, that he reassured her that 10 he would “fix everything,” and that if he and respondent had a child, he wouldarrange for a relative to pay support for that child. Respondent texted her friend stating that Prontnicki “can’t stay in myhouse cos he has an arrest warrant right now and I have a duty as a judge toreport all crimes and anyone with an arrest warrant. So he is at his brother’shouse.” A short time later, she told the friend that when Prontnicki assured herthat there was no warrant for his arrest, she responded that “without writtenverified proof he and I can’t be seen or stay at my house together.” At 3:31 p.m. on June 11, 2013, respondent left a second voicemailmessage for Bartko. According to the audio recordings that the WTPDproduced, the second voicemail stated: Hi, good afternoon, Officer Bartko, this is Carlia Brady, um, I filled out a police report with you two days ago regarding my, um, car that was, uh, I, you know, I was trying to say it was stolen. Um, I don’t know if you got my message yesterday, but the car has been returned by Jason Prontnicki. I have it, um, I just wanna amend the police report and I need to know whether I should come in and amend that and when, um, you’re available so I can get an amended report, or if you can call me and let me know when I can pick up an amended report to reflect the car has been returned. Obviously um, I have my property back, so, um, please give me a call . . . [two telephone numbers]. It’s Carlia Brady. Thank you. Respondent contends that the WTPD also tampered with her June 11,2013 voicemail, and that officers intentionally deleted a portion of that 11 voicemail. She identifies the deleted content as “something to the effect ofyou didn’t call me back, I left you message yesterday with -- I want to updatethe whereabouts of Jason Prontnicki, the fugitive, and I don’t know who elseto call. You were the person I know of, you’re on the police report, somethingto that effect.” Bartko, who rarely received voicemails on his extension at WTPDheadquarters and checked his voicemail only at the beginning of his four dayson duty in accordance with WTPD procedure, did not retrieve either ofrespondent’s messages until after respondent was arrested. Undetected by respondent, WTPD officers conducted surveillance of herresidence during the afternoon of June 11, 2013. According to the WTPD, at3:48 p.m., driven by his brother, Prontnicki arrived at respondent’s home. Heentered the garage and spoke with respondent. While his brother waited in hiscar, Prontnicki remained in respondent’s home for about an hour. Prontnickithen left with a duffel bag and was driven away by his brother. Shortlythereafter, a WTPD officer stopped the vehicle and arrested Prontnicki. Asthose events transpired, respondent remained at home, texting a friend; sherepeated that she and Prontnicki “can’t be seen together or stay at my housetogether.” 12 Shortly after Prontnicki’s arrest, Sergeant Brian Murphy, DetectiveChris Lyons, and Officer Sean Grogan of the WTPD went to respondent’shome and arrested her for hindering Prontnicki’s apprehension. According torespondent and one of the officers, respondent told the officers that she hadcalled the police department twice. One officer testified that when respondentwas arrested, she said, “I’ve been vetted, take the cuffs off.” According to thepolice report, respondent directed officers to take the handcuffs off of her, thenasked to be handcuffed with her hands in front of her rather than behind her.The officers refused both requests. Respondent was escorted to Bartko’s patrol car, and he drove her to thepolice station. In comments recorded in the patrol car, respondent told Bartkothat she might be pregnant and that Prontnicki was the father. She said that, inlight of Prontnicki’s denial that there was a warrant for his arrest, she did not“know who to believe.” Respondent said, “All I did was help this person. Hewas my boyfriend. There was never any incident before this.” Before theACJC, respondent stated that her comment about “help” for Prontnicki referredto his living at her home, not to any “help” given to him after she learned ofthe warrants for his arrest. After escorting respondent to the processing room at WTPDheadquarters, Bartko retrieved the voicemails and listened to them with other 13 officers. Murphy directed that the voicemails be recorded as potentialevidence, and they were recorded on a digital recorder. Before the ACJC, thetestifying officers denied respondent’s allegation that they tampered with thevoicemail evidence. Later that evening, Murphy, Grogan, and an assistant prosecutor went tothe home of a Superior Court judge. The officers presented to the judge acomplaint warrant alleging that respondent had “harbor[ed]” Prontnicki in herresidence “for approximately 1 hour and never ma[de] any attempt to contactlaw enforcement.” Although Murphy was aware that respondent had leftvoicemails for Bartko the previous day and that afternoon, he did not disclosethose voicemails to the judge. The judge signed the complaint warrant.Before the ACJC, Murphy conceded that the statement in the complaintwarrant that respondent never tried to contact law enforcement was inaccurate . 3. The parties presented expert reports to the ACJC with respect torespondent’s two core defenses to the charges: that her actions following thedisclosure of Prontnicki’s arrest warrants were attributable to a temporarymental health condition that had since been successfully treated, and that theWTPD tampered with the recordings of her June 10, 2013 and June 11, 2013voicemails by deleting portions of those voicemails. 14 With respect to the first defense, respondent presented the testimony ofPeter P. Oropeza, Psy.D. Dr. Oropeza testified that “stressors” -- includingrespondent’s memory of domestic abuse in a prior relationship, sleepdeprivation, a lack of food, and the disclosures about Prontnicki’s behavior --significantly impacted respondent’s decision-making on June 10 and 11, 2013.Dr. Oropeza opined that, due to those stressors, respondent was “at timesthinking irrationally,” that she showed early symptoms of trauma and otherconditions, and that she feared that Prontnicki would harm her. Dr. Oropezaopined, however, that in the years since the events at issue, respondentunderwent mental health treatment. He testified that at the time of the ACJChearing she appeared “able to perform her duties” as a Superior Court judge. In rebuttal, the Presenter offered the testimony of Carla Rodgers, M.D., apsychiatrist. Dr. Rodgers opined that it was impossible for a mental healthprofessional to render a retrospective diagnosis of respondent’s mentalcondition on June 10 and 11, 2013, and that respondent’s conduct on thosedates could not be attributed -- to a reasonable degree of medical probability --to “stressors.” To support her contention that the WTPD deleted portions of thevoicemails that she left for Bartko, respondent offered the report of Arlo West , 15 a forensic audio expert. 2 West opined “to a high degree of audio engineeringcertainty” that the copies of the voicemails obtained from the WTPD’s internalvoicemail system and from the WTPD’s “NICE” Inform System 4.1, acomputer system, were not authentic copies. Citing “gaps” in those copies,West opined that they contained “a re-recording of an edited version” andappeared to be “masking attempt[s].” He also opined that the copies of thevoicemails obtained from the “NICE” computer system were “an inauthenticrendering of the [v]oicemails” and “an edited version.” In rebuttal, the Presenter submitted to the ACJC the report of a forensicaudio expert, Bruce Koenig. Koenig opined that the recordings were authenticclones of the original voicemail recordings and that they “revealed nodiscontinuities, deletions, additions, or other types of events indicative ofediting processes.” He stated that what West viewed as “gaps” in a portion ofthe voicemails recorded on the NICE recording system were a function of thatsystem’s “Activity Detector” system, which allows the recording of only“active audio” and the compression of periods of silence between “active”segments.2 The parties agreed to rely only on the reports of their forensic audio experts, and not to call those experts as witnesses during the hearing before the ACJC. 16 4. The ACJC found by clear and convincing evidence that respondentviolated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule5.1(A) of the Code. With respect to contested facts and the two issues that theparties’ experts disputed, the ACJC made findings in the Presenter’s favor. In its Presentment, the ACJC addressed the key question of respondent’scommunications with the police on June 10 and 11, 2013. It found clear andconvincing evidence that in respondent’s communications with the WTPD, shehad “attempted to evade her ethical obligations . . . by offering the policeintentionally vague and irrelevant information about [Prontnicki’s] knownwhereabouts to appear cooperative while willfully withholding relevantinformation,” thereby placing “a greater emphasis on her personal concernsthan her ethical constraints as a jurist.” Finding the testimony of respondent and her mother as to the contents ofher voicemails and the opinion of her forensic audio expert not to be credible,the ACJC rejected respondent’s contention that the WTPD altered thevoicemails. It also discounted the contention of respondent and her expert, Dr.Oropeza, that she acted out of fear that Prontnicki would harm her. Finally, the ACJC found that respondent’s comment during her arrestthat she had been “vetted” was a “direct reference to her judicial office” and 17 that when she requested that the officers dispense with their practice ofhandcuffing an arrestee, she sought preferential treatment because of heroffice. The ACJC based its ultimate recommendation, however, on the timingand substance of respondent’s communications with the WTPD aboutProntnicki prior to her arrest, not her comments during her arrest. Based on its finding that respondent violated the Code, the ACJCrecommended respondent’s removal from judicial office. C. Pursuant to Rule 2:15-16, respondent moved before this Court to dismissthe Presentment, or, in the alternative, to modify the ACJC’s recommendationthat she be removed from office. After oral argument on that motion, theCourt entered an Order to Show Cause denying the motion to dismiss andrequiring respondent to show cause, in accordance with Rule 2:15-17(b)(2),“why she should not be publicly disciplined through the imposition of anappropriate sanction that is less than removal, the Court having determined onits review of the matter that the appropriate quantum of discipline shall notinclude removal.” Respondent appeared on the return date of the Order toShow Cause and presented argument to the Court. 18 II. A. New Jersey’s system of judicial discipline exists “to preserve 'publicconfidence in the integrity and the independence of the judiciary.’” In reRusso, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 21) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 96 (1993)). To that end, “[e]very judge is duty bound to abide by andenforce the standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct.” In re DiLeo, 216 N.J. 449, 467 (2014). The Code does not enumerate every specific act that canconstitute judicial misconduct; it is instead “a general statement of standardsand goals, admirably serving the purpose of providing guidance to judges in allmatters precisely because of the generality of its provisions.” Id. at 467-68(quoting In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 102 (1985)). As this Court has observed, “because judges are in the public eye,'everything [they] do can reflect on their judicial office’ and has the potentialto erode public confidence.” In re Reddin, 221 N.J. 221, 228 (2015) (alterationin original) (quoting In re Blackman, 124 N.J. 547, 551 (1991)). “No power isgreater, nor its responsibilities more awesome, than that given a judge.” In reSamay, 166 N.J. 25, 43 (2001) (quoting In re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 563(1984)). “That awesome power is bestowed upon a judge on the condition that 19 the judge not abuse or misuse it to further a personal objective such as avendetta or to help a friend.” Id. at 43. A judge’s acts need not be criminal in order to implicate the Code;“[c]onduct that in itself does not constitute a criminal offense may be violativeof standards governing performance, warranting discipline or removal forcause.” In re Yaccarino, 101 N.J. 342, 353 (1985). Four provisions of the Code govern this disciplinary matter. 3 Canon 1, Rule 1.1 provides that “[a] judge shall participate inestablishing, maintaining and enforcing, and shall personally observe, highstandards of conduct so that the integrity, impartiality and independence of thejudiciary is preserved.” Canon 2, Rule 2.1 requires that a judge “act at all times in a manner thatpromotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality ofthe judiciary, and . . . avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”Rule 2.1 applies to a judge’s personal conduct in addition to his or her judicialactivities. As the Comment to that Rule explains, [a] judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety and must expect to be the subject of3 The Rev.sed Code of Judicial Conduct became effective on September 1, 2016, after the events at issue here. With no objection from respondent, the ACJC found that there were no substantive distinctions between the prior Code and the Revised Code that were relevant to this matter, and decided this matter under the Revised Code. We also apply the Revised Code. 20 constant public scrutiny. This principle applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on personal conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. * * * With regard to the personal conduct of a judge, an appearance of impropriety is created when an individual who observes the judge’s personal conduct has a reasonable basis to doubt the judge’s integrity and impartiality. Canon 2, Rule 2.3(A) prohibits judges from “lend[ing] the prestige ofjudicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge orothers,” or allowing others to do so. Finally, Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) requires judges to “conduct theirextrajudicial activities in a manner that would not cast reasonable doubt on thejudge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge, demean the judicial office, orinterfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.” B. 1. Guided by the applicable provisions of the Code, we review de novo therecord presented to the ACJC. In re Williams, 169 N.J. 264, 271 (2001);Seaman, 133 N.J. at 74. In that review, we independently determine “whether 21 the record demonstrates conduct that departed from the strictures delineated inthe Canons of Judicial Conduct.” In re Perskie, 207 N.J. 275, 289 (2011). We apply the clear-and-convincing standard of proof. R. 2:15-15(a); Inre Boggia, 203 N.J. 1, 12 (2010). “Clear-and-convincing evidence is thatwhich produce[s] . . . a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of theallegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty andconvincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, withouthesitancy, of the precise facts at issue.” Williams, 169 N.J. at 271 (alterationsin original) (quoting Seaman, 133 N.J. at 74). That standard is exacting; “theseriousness of [an allegation of judicial misconduct], and the possibleconsequences to the judge, require that we have a clear and accurateunderstanding of facts that may give rise to discipline.” Id. at 272. 2. We do not share the dissent’s view that every factual assertion made byrespondent during her testimony before the ACJC is to be credited, or its rejectionof all testimony that contradicts an assertion made by respondent. See, e.g. post at___ (slip op. at 9-12, 14-20, 28-31). Instead, after an independent review of therecord presented to the ACJC in accordance with the clear-and-convincing burdenof proof, we concur with some of the ACJC’s factual findings, and decline to adoptothers. 22 We find that the Presenter met her burden to prove by clear and convincingevidence a core allegation. Despite ample opportunity to contact the WTPD inadvance of Prontnicki’s visits to her home on June 10 and 11, 2013,respondent declined to do so. When she did call the police after Prontnicki’sdeparture on each of those two days, she was not forthcoming about hercontacts with him and did not reveal her detailed knowledge of his activities. When respondent left WTPD headquarters on June 10, 2013, she knewthat Prontnicki stood accused of a violent robbery and was considered afugitive. As she revealed to a friend, respondent was concerned thatProntnicki committed the alleged offense while he was living at her home andthat the incident occurred after she became a judge. Nonetheless, respondent did not prioritize law enforcement’s urgentneed to locate and arrest Prontnicki over personal considerations. Instead, shestrategized about how to avoid circumstances that, in her view, would trigger aduty to advise the police of his whereabouts. Respondent concluded that ifProntnicki continued to stay at her home, she would have to “report him,” andthus decided that he must move to another residence. Her reasoning providesimportant context for what occurred that afternoon and the following day. It is undisputed that at 1:11 p.m. on June 10, 2013, Prontnicki calledrespondent. Respondent concedes that she learned on that call that Prontnicki 23 would come to her home later that day to return her car. The record revealspart of their conversation. As respondent advised a friend, she told Prontnickiin that telephone call that his continued residence in her home would requireher to contact the police, as she considered herself “required to notifyauthorities” when she knew “someone has a warrant.” She said that she hadtold Prontnicki that he “must leave after he drops the car off as I must go to thepolice.” It is undisputed that respondent did not notify the WTPD about thetelephone call and Prontnicki’s planned visit later that afternoon, thusforfeiting an opportunity for the police to arrest him immediately. She madeno attempt to contact the WTPD prior to Prontnicki’s anticipated arrival. Prontnicki did not leave respondent’s home immediately after returningher missing car, as respondent had said she would insist. He stayed atrespondent’s home with her and her parents for more than an hour, spendingmost of that time in a private conversation with respondent in her garage and,at one point, using her cellphone to call his brother. Respondent called theWTPD about fifteen minutes after Prontnicki’s departure, and left the first ofher two voicemails for Bartko. Respondent and her mother testified that respondent informed the WTPDon that voicemail that Prontnicki was staying with his brother, and that she 24 provided the brother’s name and the approximate location of his home.Respondent claims that the WTPD tampered with the recording to remove thatportion of her voicemail. The WTPD denied that allegation, and the parties’forensic audio experts sharply disputed the technical evidence on the allegedtampering in the reports submitted to the ACJC. We do not premise our conclusion on a determination as to whichforensic audio expert’s report presented to the ACJC is the more persuasive.Whether the transcript of the voicemail is accurate or whether it is missinginformation because of police misconduct, respondent was not fullyforthcoming with the WTPD. Her undisputed comment on the voicemail thatProntnicki “is in Woodbridge cause he left, um, my property” suggests that shehad only a vague notion of his general location based on her car’sreappearance at her Woodbridge home. Even in her version of the voicemail,respondent did not disclose that Prontnicki had been at her home for more thanan hour, that she had an extended conversation with him during that visit, orthat she had spoken with him twice that day by telephone. Viewed inconjunction with respondent’s contemporaneous texts to her friends, eitherversion of the voicemail confirms that respondent’s priority was not publicsafety, but her personal concerns. 25 The record of what occurred the following day, largely undisputed,underscores respondent’s approach to the situation that confronted her. Thatmorning, she and Prontnicki spoke by telephone for two and a half hours.Respondent told her friends that on that protracted telephone call, she andProntnicki discussed respondent’s potential pregnancy, he “[t]old me he issorry 30000 times,” he said he knew who had committed the armed robbery,and he attempted to salvage their relationship. As confirmed by respondent’s texts and comments to Bartko after herarrest, Prontnicki’s assurances left her uncertain as to whether he hadcommitted a crime or had outstanding warrants; as she later told Bartko, shedid not “know who to believe.” Addressing her friend, she defined her duty asa judge to require that she “report all crimes and anyone with an arrestwarrant,” and suggested again that the solution to her quandary was to makesure that Prontnicki did not live at her home. She did not, however, considerherself obligated to report Prontnicki’s call to her, and she did not contact theWTPD in the wake of that call. There is no clear and convincing proof that during respondent’stelephone call with Prontnicki on the morning of June 11, 2013 he madeconcrete plans to visit respondent’s home and retrieve his belongings.Prontnicki, however, told police that he called respondent at 1:49 p.m. and 26 advised her that he would arrive at her home between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. IfProntnicki’s statement is correct, respondent had reason to anticipate thatProntnicki would shortly reappear, yet she made no effort to alert the WTP D.The officers learned about Prontnicki’s visit to respondent’s home thatafternoon only because they conducted surveillance. Just before Prontnicki arrived, respondent left her second message forBartko, this one focused on her expressed intent to “amend the police report”on the theft of her car to reflect the fact that Prontnicki had returned it. Even ifwe assume for purposes of our analysis that the voicemail actually containedthe additional information that respondent contends was deleted from it, itwould be only slightly more informative than the version reflected in thetranscript. Respondent does not contend that she told Bartko of Prontnicki’simpending visit or their hours of conversation that day; instead, she claimsonly that she said she wanted to update Bartko about Prontnicki’s whereaboutsand had the name of no other WTPD officer but Bartko. Even in respondent’sversion of her voicemail, she did not reveal to the police Prontnicki’s calls orvisits to her home. Had the police not initiated surveillance, they would havelost a second opportunity to arrest Prontnicki. Respondent asserts that two factors prompted her decision not to alertthe WTPD of Prontnicki’s contacts with her: the officers’ alleged instructions 27 on June 10, 2013 that she contact police only in specific circumstances, andher fear that Prontnicki would harm her. We consider each in turn. The police report states that at WTPD headquarters, officers remindedrespondent “of her status as an officer of the Court, that it was incumbent uponher to report to the Police if and when [Prontnicki] came back with the car thathe was there, in order for us to arrest him.” According to Mullarney, he andBukowski told respondent that “when you get in touch with him again and hecomes back with this car,” she “ha[d] to call us,” because it was “incumbent”on her as “an officer of the court” to “tell somebody this guy’s wanted for arobbery and he’s got my car.” Respondent testified before the ACJC that one of the officers told her tocall them “if and when [Prontnicki] gets home and we’ll go out there.”According to respondent, she asked the officers whether they wanted her tocall “when this person’s right in front of me in my presence indicating I don’twant to get killed,” and “they said no, just call when you know his exactlocation,” which she interpreted to mean she did not “need to have him in myhouse” when she made the call. Respondent, however, told her psychologist, Dr. Oropeza, that “thepolice had said for her to call if and when [Prontnicki] was at the house, at her 28 house,” and that meant to her that she should call when Prontnicki “literally”was at her home. In oral argument before this Court, respondent initially said that officersdirected her not to contact WTPD before Prontnicki arrived at her house, butalso stated that they instructed her that she should call police only if Prontnickiarrived at her home or she knew his exact location at the time of the call.Respondent speculated that the officers instructed her not to call them otherthan in those circumstances because they wanted to avoid the necessity ofconducting surveillance before arresting Prontnicki. Respondent’s contention that the officers discouraged her frominforming them about the current activities of a fugitive suspect in an armedrobbery unless one of two conditions were met is contrary to the police reportand the officers’ testimony. Moreover, if the WTPD instructed respondent asshe claims they did, she disregarded those instructions. Not only didrespondent fail to alert the WTPD prior to either of Prontnicki’s visits to herhome that he would be there shortly, but she also did not report her extensivein-person and telephone conversations with Prontnicki to police after the fact.We do not accept respondent’s contention that she acted as she did because ofa directive from the WTPD. 29 Nor do we find credible the assertion of respondent, supported by theopinion of her expert psychologist, that she refrained from calling the policebecause she feared that Prontnicki would injure her. We view the clear andconvincing evidence to belie that assertion. Alerted that Prontnicki would be at her house to return her car on theafternoon of June 10, 2013, respondent did not call the police or leave thepremises; instead, she summoned her parents to her home. After Prontnickiarrived, respondent spoke with him for over an hour, all but the last portion ofthat time alone with him in her garage. Respondent spent hours on thetelephone with Prontnicki over the two-day period at issue in this matter. Asrespondent reported those conversations to her friends, a remorseful Prontnickiprofusely apologized for having put respondent in a difficult situation, vowedto resolve his legal problems and repair their relationship, and discussed theprospect that he and respondent would have a child. Most significantly, although respondent had advance warning ofProntnicki’s arrival at her home on the afternoon of June 11, 2013 to collecthis belongings, she took no precaution to protect herself from potential harm.She did not seek the protection of the police. She did not leave Prontnicki’sbelongings outside the house and depart the premises. Instead, she waitedalone in her home for his arrival. 30 The evidence simply does not support respondent’s assertion that heractions on June 10 and 11, 2013 were prompted by fear, and we do not findthat claim credible.4 In short, clear and convincing evidence supports the Presenter’scontention that respondent disclosed very little of what she knew aboutProntnicki’s location, activities, and plans to the police. The evidencesupports the inference that respondent acted not at the direction of the policeor because she feared harm, but in the hope that she could assist Prontnicki andpreserve their relationship while maintaining her judicial career. Finally, we briefly address respondent’s comments during her arrest onJune 11, 2013. There is clear and convincing evidence that respondentasserted at the time of her arrest that she had been “vetted,” and requested thatshe not be handcuffed after her arrest or that she be handcuffed with her handsin front of her, not behind her. It is clear that respondent’s comment that she had been “vetted” was notan attempt to reveal her judicial status to the WTPD officers; the evidence4 We are mindful of respondent’s testimony before the ACJC that she was the victim of domestic violence in a prior relationship. Although we make no factual findings about the allegation, in light of the testimony, we do not assert that respondent was obligated to contact police while Prontnicki was in her home. There was ample time before Prontnicki arrived on both June 10 and June 11, 2013 for respondent to alert police of his impending visits. 31 shows that as of the previous day, the officers already knew that respondentwas a Superior Court judge, and alluded to her judicial status in the policereport. There is, however, a factual dispute as to the import of that comment.The Presenter contended and the ACJC concluded that respondent stated shehad been “vetted” to remind the officers of her judicial status and securefavorable treatment. Respondent insists that her reference to being “vetted”was nothing more than an effort to reassure the officers that she represented nothreat to their safety. Considering respondent’s statement that she had been “vetted” inconjunction with her demands not to be handcuffed or to be handcuffed in acertain manner, we view that comment to be a reference to respondent’sjudicial status, intended to discourage the officers from handcuffing her inaccordance with their normal procedures. 3. Relying only on clear and convincing evidence, we view respondent’scommunications with the WTPD on June 10 and 11, 2013 to fall short of thehigh standards imposed by the Code. Respondent clearly understood that thecharges against Prontnicki were serious and that the police viewed publicsafety to be at risk while he remained at large. Yet she disclosed only minimalinformation about her extensive contacts with Prontnicki. Based on her 32 conversations with Prontnicki, her texts to her friends, and hercommunications with the WTPD, it is apparent that respondent’s prioritieswere her personal concerns -- particularly her relationship with Prontnicki --not her duty to the public. Respondent was undoubtedly in a difficult situation during the two daysat issue here. Alarmed by the disappearance of her car and exhausted fromsearching for it, and believing that she might be pregnant with a child fatheredby Prontnicki, she was shocked by the officers’ revelation of his outstandingwarrants and suspended driver’s license. It is understandable that respondentwas upset as those disturbing events unfolded. As a judge, however, respondent was not at liberty to address hercircumstances with only herself and her personal relationships in mind. TheWTPD was searching for an individual who allegedly robbed a pharmacy bythreatening a pharmacist with a crowbar. A judge had found probable causeand issued a warrant for his arrest, and WTPD officers were charged toexecute that warrant in the interest of public safety. It was incumbent onrespondent to fully cooperate with law enforcement in their search forProntnicki, notwithstanding her distressing personal circumstances. As the evidence makes clear, respondent did not do so. Respondentdeclined to call the police station prior to Prontnicki’s visits to her home, 33 where officers could have arrested him. In her two voicemails to the WTPD,she detailed her intention to amend the complaint she had made the previousday, stressing that Prontnicki had returned her car and suggesting that thesituation was resolved. At best, her communications to law enforcement wereperfunctory and vague. Those communications stand in stark contrast to thecandid and detailed accounts she provided by text to her friends, in real time. Moreover, while leaving a voicemail for a specific officer is animportant first step, it is not the only method of alerting a police departmentabout an important development in the investigation of a violent crime.Respondent could have contacted the officers by using WTPD headquarters’general telephone number, calling 9-1-1, or visiting the headquarters as shehad done only hours before. The public has the right to expect that when police officers are searchingfor a fugitive accused of a violent crime and a judge has detailed knowledge ofthe whereabouts, activities and immediate plans of that fugitive, the judge willtake prompt and decisive action to ensure that law enforcement is fullyinformed. There is no exception to that principle when the judge and thefugitive have a personal relationship. Respondent did not meet the high standard imposed on the judiciary, andshe did not discharge her responsibility to the public. An individual who 34 observed respondent’s personal conduct on the relevant days would have “areasonable basis to doubt the judge’s integrity and impartiality.” Code ofJudicial Conduct, cmt. 3 on Canon 2, Rule 2.1. As noted, we do not find credible respondent’s repeated claim thatWTPD officers prohibited her from contacting them unless Prontnicki was ather house or she knew at the moment of her call exactly where he was. Thatinforms our consideration of this matter. See Russo, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op.at 25) (“Respondent’s explanations under oath about what occurred also reveala lack of candor on multiple occasions, which factors into our judgment in thismatter.”). Although we consider respondent’s comment that she had been “vetted”and her direction to the officers about handcuffing improper, that portion ofthe evidence is far less important to our determination than the evidenceregarding respondent’s communications with the WTPD and herrepresentations before the ACJC and this Court about the WTPD’s allegeddirective to her not to call police except under specific conditions. In sum, based on our de novo review of the record, we find clear andconvincing evidence that respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2,Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. 35 III. We consider the appropriate sanction for respondent’s violation of theCode.5 That inquiry “requires more than establishing some instance orinstances of unethical conduct” and warrants “a more searching and expansiveinquiry . . . carefully scrutiniz[ing] the substantive offenses that constitute thecore of respondent’s misconduct, the underlying facts, and the surroundingcircumstances in determining the nature and extent of discipline.” Seaman, 133 N.J. at 98 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Collester, 126 N.J. 468,472 (1992)). The Court has identified aggravating and mitigating factors that may berelevant to a given case: “Among the surrounding circumstances to which we give heed are . . . considerations of public policy,” including the State’s commitment to ending gender discrimination and, particularly, sexual harassment. Other relevant considerations include “whether the5 Respondent’s judicial service ended on April 4, 2020, when her seven-year term as a Superior Court judge expired without reappointment. See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 3 (providing that Supreme Court justices and Superior Court judges “shall hold their offices for initial terms of 7 years and upon reappointment shall hold their offices during good behavior”). We retain the authority to discipline her for her conduct during her service. See, e.g., In re Breslin, 162 N.J. 190, 191 (2000) (imposing sanction of removal on former Municipal Court judge); In re D’Ambrosio, 157 N.J. 186, 187 (1999) (publicly reprimanding Superior Court judge who had resigned from judicial office); In re Imbriani, 139 N.J. 262, 263-67 (1995) (imposing sanction of removal on retired Superior Court judge). 36 misconduct involves a misuse of judicial authority[,] . . . is unbecoming and inappropriate for one holding the position of a judge, . . . [or] has been harmful to others.” On the other side of the scale we weigh whether “a matter represents the first complaint against a judge, . . . the length and . . . quality of the judge’s tenure in office, [the judge’s] personal and professional reputation, [his or her] sincere commitment to overcoming the fault, [and his or her] remorse and attempts at apology or reparations to the victim.” “We have also found relevant consideration of whether a judge found guilty of misconduct will engage in similar misconduct in the future, or whether the inappropriate behavior is susceptible to modification.” [In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 153-54 (2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Seaman, 133 N.J. at 98-100).] In this matter, the aggravating factor of public policy -- in this instancethe public policy of ensuring the safety of a community by promptly arrestingsuspects in violent crimes -- weighs in favor of a significant sanction. Becauserespondent handled her communications with the WTPD in a manner“unbecoming and inappropriate for one holding the position of a judge,” id. at153, we consider that aggravating factor as well. 66 Like the ACJC, whose recommendation of removal “does not turn on the events related to [r]espondent’s reactions to being handcuffed upon her arrest,” we do not consider those events in assessing the aggravating factors relevant to this matter. 37 We also consider mitigating factors. This was the first ethics complaintagainst respondent, who had been on the bench for only two months whenthese incidents occurred. We acknowledge the emotional stress thatrespondent experienced on June 10 and 11, 2013, and in the nearly five yearsof criminal proceedings that followed, and the profound impact the events atissue have had on her life and career. See Williams, 169 N.J. at 279 (notingthat the respondent in that matter had “already paid a heavy price for herintemperate behavior.”). We see no evidence, however, that respondent has a “sincerecommitment to overcoming the fault” in this case. See Subryan, 187 N.J. at 154. Indeed, during oral argument before this Court, respondent identifiedonly one action that she should have taken and did not take: she said that sheshould have sought the advice of the Assignment Judge of the vicinage inwhich she served. Respondent otherwise expressed no regrets about heractions during the critical two days. Accordingly, we do not consider remorseand a determination to avoid any similar concerns in the future -- factors thathave weighed against serious sanctions in other cases -- to constitutemitigating factors in this matter. Balancing the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, we modifythe sanction of removal recommended by the ACJC and impose a three-month 38 suspension on respondent. We view that sanction to be commensurate with theconduct proven by clear and convincing evidence and to further ourdisciplinary system’s purpose of preserving public confidence in the judiciary. IV. Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that there isclear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1;Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. Wefind that the appropriate discipline is a three-month suspension. So Ordered. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON join in the Court’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA filed a concurrence. JUSTICES ALBIN and LaVECCHIA each filed a dissent. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate. 39 In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady, a Judge of the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA, concurring. I concur with the majority’s thorough de novo factual findings and analysisof Carlia M. Brady’s conduct. I previously dissented from the Court’s March 10, 2020 Order to ShowCause, which took away removal from the bench as a potential sanction. I would dissent from the majority’s determination that Carlia M. Brady’sconduct warrants only a three-month suspension. I agree with the ACJC’s well-reasoned Presentment recommending removal from the bench. I also find that the majority’s analysis today equally supports removal fromthe bench beyond a reasonable doubt. Since removal from the bench is notavailable as a sanction, I concur with the majority’s decision. See Mathews v.United States, 485 U.S. 58 , 67 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Were I judgingon a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt the view that the entrapmentdefense should focus exclusively on the government’s conduct. But I am not 1 writing on a clean slate; the Court has spoken definitively on this point. ThereforeI bow to stare decisis, and today join the judgment and reasoning of the Court.”). 2 In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady, a Judge of the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. Today’s majority decision is a sad epilogue to Judge Carlia Brady’sseven-year nightmare journey through the criminal justice system and thejudicial disciplinary process. Seven years ago, Judge Brady was thequintessential American success story -- a Filipino-American immigrant, whobecame an accomplished lawyer and rose from the ranks of the Bar to becomea Superior Court judge. Just several months after her judicial appointment, hercareer, her reputation, her health -- her life -- would be in ruins, the victim ofoverzealous Woodbridge Township police officers, who filed criminal chargesthat could not be sustained in court. Those dismissed criminal charges and the current judicial disciplinarycharges stem from a tumultuous, thirty-six-hour period in Judge Brady’s life.During that period, while reporting to the police the theft of her car, shelearned that her live-in boyfriend, the father of her unborn child -- the manwith whom she had planned a future -- was a potentially dangerous criminal 1 and wanted for the robbery of a drugstore. In a state of shock -- with herreality shattered and her trust betrayed -- fatigued by twenty-four sleeplesshours, and stressed about her pregnancy, Judge Brady should have been theobject of at least a modicum of police solicitude. Instead, she became thetarget of a hapless police investigation designed to make the case that she washarboring a criminal. Without getting guidance from the prosecutor’s office, and in a recklessrush to judgment, Woodbridge Township police officers arrested Judge Bradyon the unsustainable charge of harboring a fugitive -- and did so withoutreturning her earlier telephone calls or listening to two voicemails she left witha police officer, one notifying him of her boyfriend’s presence in Woodbridge.Officers then withheld their knowledge of the potentially exculpatoryvoicemails from a Superior Court judge, perhaps misleading him into issuing acriminal complaint. The filing of that complaint triggered a misguided criminal prosecutionon evidence so thin and lacking in substance that the Appellate Divisionaffirmed the dismissal of one charge, and the trial court, on motion by theState, dismissed the two remaining charges. During the nearly five-yearprosecution, Judge Brady was suspended from her judicial duties. Judge 2 Brady then exited from the criminal justice system and entered into the judicialdisciplinary process. The Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) held hearings andissued a one-sided Presentment against Judge Brady. In doing so, the ACJCaffirmed the doubtful credibility of the Woodbridge Township police officers,drew every adverse inference against Judge Brady, accepted between duelingexpert reports the ones that disadvantaged Judge Brady, and thenrecommended to this Court that Judge Brady be removed from office -- arecommendation rejected by every Justice but one sitting on this case. From my review of the record, Judge Brady did not harbor a fugitive orobstruct a police investigation. Nor did her conduct demean the judiciary.Judge Brady’s conduct should not be viewed from the sterile, twenty/twentyperspective of hindsight, but rather from that of a vulnerable human being,fatigued and frightened, in the grip of overwhelming stress, who, in themoment, made decisions that, even if flawed, do not rise to a level thatwarrants discipline. Had the police returned Judge Brady’s phone calls, thereis no reason to doubt she would have responded truthfully to any questionspresented to her about the location of her boyfriend. I do not find justified thepost-mortem criticism of Judge Brady -- that she should be disciplined for notleaving more information on a voicemail that the police recklessly failed to 3 retrieve and for not acting as the perfect police informant during thetumultuous hours at issue (ACJC and the majority), and for not calling thepolice in the presence of a potentially violent criminal (ACJC). Although judges must be held to high standards of conduct in theirprivate lives, they too are subject to the harsh vicissitudes of life. Judges canbe deceived in their personal relationships; judges can suffer psychologicalstress and trauma; and even judges are not immune from the abuses of thecriminal justice system. In the end, I view Judge Brady as a victim, moredeserving of an apology than a suspension. During the pendency of thecriminal and judicial disciplinary proceedings, the period for herreappointment came and went, ending Judge Brady’s judicial career. Because I do not believe that the charges against Judge Brady have beensustained by clear and convincing evidence, the imposition of discipline is notjustified. I therefore respectfully dissent. 11 The facts adduced here are derived from the testimony of various witnesses and exhibits presented at the proceedings before the ACJC. Among the witnesses who testified were Judge Brady and her parents, Woodbridge Township police officers, and expert witnesses. 4 I. A. In April 2013, after ten years at the law firm of Stark and Stark, JudgeBrady, then forty-one years old, celebrated the most significantaccomplishment in her career -- her appointment to the Superior Court in theMiddlesex County vicinage.2 Judge Brady began her legal career in that verysame vicinage as a judicial law clerk more than a decade and a half earlier.She testified that her clerkship coincided with a dark period in her personal lifeduring which she was the victim of domestic violence. Her then husband, shealleges, physically and psychologically abused her. 3 Those scarringexperiences, in part, shaped her response to the events of June 2013. Judge Brady began dating Jason Prontnicki at the end of 2012. Therelationship progressed with much promise. Prontnicki told Judge Brady thathe was a chemical engineer. He appeared clean cut, well dressed, andwholesome, and she fell in love with him. By March 2013, Prontnicki hadmoved into Judge Brady’s home in Woodbridge. The two planned a future2 After her appointment, Judge Brady was assigned to the Civil Part. 3 Before the ACJC, Judge Brady described her marriage as “physically, mentally, financially, [and] emotionally abusive.” She recalled an incident during which she demanded that her husband leave the residence. As she attempted to call the police, her husband assaulted her, pulling her hair out and punching her in the mouth. The beating left her bloodied and bruised. 5 together and decided to have a child. Although at some point Prontnickibecame jobless, Judge Brady never saw Prontnicki use drugs and was unawarethat he had a criminal background. In an effort to conceive a child, Judge Brady underwent fertilitytreatments that involved the injection of hormones that, she explained, oftenimpacted her emotional state. B. On Sunday, June 9, 2013, Judge Brady started her day with customaryroutines. She went to the gym in the morning and later to church, and in theafternoon to the Menlo Park Mall to shop. Judge Brady owned two vehicles, a Mercedes and a Honda. Prontnickitold her that morning that he was taking the Honda to visit his father in ahospital in Bayonne. She returned home in the Mercedes around 4:30 p.m.,and shortly afterwards Prontnicki entered the house. Prontnicki told JudgeBrady that he had to go back to the hospital to check on his father. When hedid not return home as planned, Judge Brady decided to join her parents fordinner. As she entered her garage, to her surprise, she discovered that both herMercedes and Honda were missing. Because Prontnicki did not have a cellphone, she had no means of contacting him. 6 At approximately 8:00 p.m., Prontnicki arrived home in the Mercedesand explained to Judge Brady that he had left the Honda with his brother. Shewas disturbed and became more so when she learned that story was a lie.Later in the evening, Prontnicki claimed that he loaned the car to a down-on-his-luck person named Kareem Williams, whose daughter was hospitalized.Judge Brady not only doubted the truth of what Prontnicki told her, but alsodoubted whether their relationship would survive this breach of trust. Judge Brady’s first priority, however, was to retrieve her Honda.Prontnicki used Judge Brady’s cell phone to purportedly call Williams, whosupposedly lived somewhere in Bayonne, to arrange for the return of the car.By 1:00 a.m. on June 10, with the Honda still missing, Judge Brady decided tosearch for it in the Bayonne/Jersey City area where, according to Prontnicki,Williams resided. In her Mercedes, she and Prontnicki circled the streetslooking in vain for the missing car. Around 3:00 a.m., they went back home tosee if the Honda had been returned, but it had not. They then ventured outagain to locate the Honda. In Jersey City, Prontnicki exited the car to searchon foot. As he did so, Judge Brady warned him that if the car was not returnedby 9:00 a.m., she would go to the police. At 9:04 a.m., she texted the following message to the number shebelieved belonged to Kareem Williams: “This is Carlia Brady[.] I will give 7 you and Jason [Prontnicki] until 10 am to return my vehicle or tell me where itis located[.] After that I will report this to the [police].” Seven minutes later,she texted a similar message. Shortly after 10:00 a.m., without sleep for more than twenty-four hoursand exhausted, Judge Brady went to the Woodbridge Township PoliceDepartment to report her car missing. As she explained to the ACJC, “becauseof all the lies and . . . weird, unusual circumstances with the car,” she began tohave doubts about everything Prontnicki told her from the beginning of theirrelationship, and even feared a “reprisal” from him. At 10:28 a.m., she texteda friend, “I feel like my home and my life is being threatened by my boyfriendand this guy.” (emphasis added). Based on her real-time text messages to herfriend, Judge Brady evidently still believed that Williams had her car. Judge Brady recounted the events relating to her missing car toWoodbridge Township Police Officer Robert Bartko and then to other officers,identifying Williams as the suspect. Lieutenant James Mullarney advisedJudge Brady that a record check revealed no information about a KareemWilliams but did reveal that Prontnicki had two warrants for his arrest, one fora second-degree robbery of a pharmacy during which he allegedly threatened apharmacist with a crowbar. She was also told that Prontnicki’s driver’s licensewas suspended. 8 Her contemporaneous text messages at police headquarters reveal herthinking in real time as she absorbed the stunning news about Prontnicki: [Please] call me, I will be signing a complaint against Jason. . . . And that Williams guy. I broke up with my guy last night. I am so exhausted. I just found out that Jason is wanted for Robbery for threatening a pharmacist with a crowbar [in] old bridge on April 29[.] That’s when he was already staying with me and I was a judge. He never took drugs in front of me . . . [.] I can’t have him in my house [because] I [would] now be harboring a criminal . . . . I [would] have to report him[.] According to Lieutenant Mullarney’s report, Judge Brady was remindedthat “it was incumbent upon her to report to the Police if and when[Prontnicki] came back with the car that he was there, in order for us to arresthim.” Judge Brady declined to file a complaint against Prontnicki at that timebecause she wanted first to confer with a lawyer and her family. Woodbridge Township police officers knew that Prontnicki was likely toreturn to Judge Brady’s house. They knew that he was -- as the majoritydescribes him -- “accused of a violent robbery and . . . considered a fugitive.”See ante at ___ (slip op. at 23). If, as the majority rightly states, law 9 enforcement had an “urgent need to locate and arrest Prontnicki,” ante at ___(slip op. at 23), why did the Woodbridge Township police officers not escortJudge Brady home -- if not to await Prontnicki’s return, then at least to provideprotection to a Superior Court judge? One explanation is that the Woodbridge Township police had alreadyjumped to a baseless and speculative assumption that Judge Brady was not avictim but somehow involved in some unspecifiable cover-up. LieutenantMullarney testified that he and Sergeant Bukowski “thought she was hidingsomething” -- “I don’t know what she was covering. I don’t know if it was forhim or herself.” The other explanation is that Judge Brady’s safety evidently was not atop police priority. As Lieutenant Mullarney explained, if Judge Brady wantedan escort home, she should have asked for one. “She’s an adult. . . . I can’t gohome with them and hold their hand every minute of the day either.” Absentfrom his consideration was that Judge Brady was operating in a complete stateof exhaustion, that she had come to headquarters to report the theft of a car,and that instead, to her shock, she had learned that her live-in boyfriend was a“violent” robber. 10 At 1:11 p.m., Prontnicki called Judge Brady and let her know that hewould return the Honda. Her response was contemporaneously memorializedin a text forwarded to a friend: He just called to tell me he got the car and will bring it home[.] I told him he can’t stay with me [because] he has a warrant out for his arrest and I am required to notify authorities when I know someone has a warrant[.] So I told him he must leave after he drops the car off as I must go to the police. [(emphasis added).] Judge Brady explained to the ACJC that, during her conversation withProntnicki, she told him that he had “to go to the police and take care of itright away.” He responded, “I’m going to bring back your car first.” Evidently afraid to be alone and seeking comfort, Judge Brady called herparents, who were out shopping, and asked them to come to her home. Hermother and father arrived there at approximately 3:00 p.m. A short timeafterwards, the doorbell rang. Her father opened the door, and Prontnickipushed him against the wall and walked to the middle of the living room. 4Judge Brady was shocked and fearful, for herself and her parents, and afraid tocall the police in Prontnicki’s presence. Judge Brady told him to get out, buthe refused. He went into the garage, and she followed him. Again, she told4 This account is essentially corroborated by the testimony of Judge Brady’s parents. 11 him to leave. He denied the robbery allegations and stated that he would bestaying at his brother Christopher’s house. He left at approximately 4:30 p.m. Minutes later, Judge Brady called the Woodbridge Township policeheadquarters and asked to speak with Officer Bartko but instead was connectedwith his voicemail. The Woodbridge Township police preserved the followingrecorded message: Hi, um, Officer Bartko, this is Carlia Brady. I submitted, I sat with you to fill out incident report number 13065290/1 um with regard to the unlawful taking of my car. Um, I just wanted to report to you that, um, Jason Prontnicki, the suspect, um, actually returned it just now. Um, it is in my driveway. I haven’t inspected it yet cause it’s raining and I didn’t bring it into my house because I don’t want it in my house unless I can inspect it. Um, I just wanted to let that be known. Also, to let you know since there’s a warrant out for his arrest, he is not with me, but he is in Woodbridge cause he left, um, my property so please give me a call back. I, we need to know whether an amended report needs to be redone, um, or added, whatever I needed to do. Please give me a call back [telephone number]. Carlia Brady, [telephone number]. [(emphases added).] Judge Brady and her mother testified, however, that Judge Bradyprovided in that voicemail more precise information about Prontnicki’swhereabouts. Judge Brady testified that she stated in the voicemail thatProntnicki resided with “his brother Christopher, . . . who lives in Woodbridgeabout a mile away. I don’t have his exact address or I don’t know his exact 12 address, but it’s by the ShopRite and ice cream parlor area. Please give me acall back and I’ll give you as much detail as possible.” Judge Brady’s audioexpert opined that the voicemail preserved by the Woodbridge Townshippolice had gaps, evidencing deletions. The Presenter’s expert at the ACJChearing concluded otherwise. Importantly, the majority finds that Judge Brady “was not fullyforthcoming” even if she left the more detailed message that she claims ismissing from the voicemail. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 24-25, 27). That moredetailed message, however, suggests that Judge Brady would have shown thepolice the location where Portnicki was staying. Judge Brady did not knowthat Officer Bartko did not check his voicemails until the beginning of everyfour-day shift. She had a right to expect a return call, particularly after herreport at headquarters. The lax message-retrieval policies at the WoodbridgeTownship Police Department deprived Judge Brady of the opportunity to giveto the police the more detailed information it presumably wanted. The Presentment faults Judge Brady for not calling the police in thepresence of the person who supposedly was a violent criminal. She testified,however, that she was a domestic violence survivor. Judge Brady knew whatto expect by attempting to call the police in such circumstances. She told theACJC she had been beaten by her ex-husband for doing just that. 13 The majority finds that Judge Brady made some fatal flaw in judgmentby not calling the police before Prontnicki’s arrival -- although she did notknow the precise time he intended to drop off the car and certainly did notenvision he would barge into her home. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 26-27).With the clarity of hindsight, it is easy to find fault with Judge Brady for notmaking perfect decisions in the hurly-burly of the moment while she wasexhausted and in a sleep-deprived state, and perhaps fearful for her safety. Yet, there is no reason to believe that, had Officer Bartko returned thevoicemail message in a timely manner, Judge Brady would not have given himor any other officer as much information as she knew about Prontnicki’swhereabouts. Had she received a timely response, all the events that followedlikely would not have occurred. I do not believe that discipline can bejustified because Judge Brady called the police at 4:30 p.m. instead of 3:00p.m. With no return call from Officer Bartko, Judge Brady left her house withher parents to stay in the safety of their home for that evening. The next morning, June 11, 2013, Judge Brady’s father took her home,and from there she drove to a doctor’s appointment regarding her fertilitytreatments. She learned that she was “likely pregnant” and “should notoverstrain [herself] mentally [or] physically” to avoid the risk of a miscarriage. 14 Around 10:00 a.m., Judge Brady received a call from a number she didnot recognize. She picked it up, thinking that perhaps the police wereresponding to her earlier message, but Prontnicki was on the line. Judge Bradywas angry, berated him about his lies, and asked him “what steps he’d taken toturn himself in [and] whether or not he had contacted or retained a lawyer.”She attempted to confirm that he was staying at his brother’s home so that shecould convey that information to the police. The conversation also turned toher likely pregnancy. Prontnicki told her that he wanted to pick up hisbelongings, and she replied that he could not enter her home. He then said hisbrother would come and hung up. The telephone conversation lastedapproximately two hours and forty minutes. In a contemporaneous text message to a friend that afternoon, JudgeBrady revealed that Prontnicki had told her that “he hired a lawyer and hefound out that the guy who did the robbery was arrested.” C. In the meantime, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Special Investigations Unit ofthe Woodbridge Township Police Department began a surveillance of JudgeBrady’s house without her knowledge. At that point, Sergeant Brian Murphy 15 was in charge of the investigation and the surveillance. 5 He made no effort tocall Judge Brady -- despite having two of her telephone numbers -- to seewhether she had heard from Prontnicki or knew of his whereabouts. Heassumed that if Judge Brady had contacted headquarters, he would have beengiven that information. He also claimed that he told the shift commander tonotify him if any calls came in about Prontnicki. No one, however, checkedOfficer Bartko’s voicemail. Detectives Herbert and Sean Grogan had their eyes on the house fromtheir position, while Murphy sat in his vehicle further away to watch if anycars were entering the street. Murphy had already designated Judge Brady atarget of his investigation. He surmised -- apparently based on a hunch -- thatJudge Brady might be assisting Prontnicki in a criminal enterprise. He sat inhis vehicle, thumbing through his copy of the criminal code and “reading andre-reading the charges that possibly could come of this if there was assistancegiven to Prontnicki throughout this whole thing.” He had decided in his mindthat if Prontnicki appeared at Judge Brady’s home and “if she didn’t make aphone call that she was falling within [the] hindering statute.”5 Murphy was a sergeant on June 11, 2013. At the time of his testimony, he had been promoted to the rank of captain. 16 Although Murphy unsuccessfully attempted to call the “zone” prosecutorfor advice (she was not answering her phone), he made no attempt to call anyof the dozens of assistant prosecutors located in the Middlesex CountyProsecutor’s Office in New Brunswick for assistance. Murphy was priminghimself to charge a Superior Court judge with a crime without first seekingadvice or approval from the appropriate prosecutorial agency. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Judge Brady returned home and “waited forthe police to call [her] back” regarding her message of the previous day. Justfifteen minutes earlier, she texted a friend that “[Prontnicki] can’t stay in myhouse [because] he has an arrest warrant right now and I have a duty as a judgeto report all crimes and anyone with an arrest warrant.” At 3:30 p.m., while her home was under surveillance, Judge Bradycalled Woodbridge Township police headquarters and left a second voicemailwith Officer Bartko. In the audio recording preserved by the WoodbridgeTownship Police Department, the second voicemail stated: Hi, good afternoon, Officer Bartko, this is Carlia Brady, um, I filled out a police report with you two days ago regarding my, um, car that was, uh, I, you know, I was trying to say it was stolen. Um, I don’t know if you got my message yesterday, but the car has been returned by Jason Prontnicki. I have it, um, I just [want to] amend the police report and I need to know whether I should come in and amend that and when, um, you’re available so I can get an amended report, or if you can call me 17 and let me know when I can pick up an amended report to reflect the car has been returned. Obviously um, I have my property back, so, um, please give me a call . . . [two telephone numbers]. It’s Carlia Brady. Thank you. Judge Brady’s audio expert expressed his opinion that that voicemailalso had indicia of deletions. Additionally, Judge Brady testified that thevoicemail was missing part of her message, words “to the effect of you didn’tcall me back, I left you message yesterday with -- I want to update thewhereabouts of Jason Prontnicki, the fugitive, and I don’t know who else tocall. You were the person I know of, you’re on the police report .” Becausethe majority does not premise its conclusion on which of the audio experts ’reports was more persuasive, see ante at ___ (slip op. at 25), based on theclear-and-convincing-evidence standard, see In re Williams, 169 N.J. 264, 271(2001), Judge Brady’s claim about the contents of the message cannot beeasily brushed aside. That second attempt by Judge Brady to speak with Officer Bartko wasnot relayed to the surveillance team sitting outside Judge Brady’s house.Murphy, educating himself on the criminal code and preparing in advancecharges to file against Judge Brady, was completely -- and recklessly-- unaware of her efforts to contact the police. 18 Around 4:00 p.m., a car driven by Prontnicki’s brother, carryingProntnicki, pulled into Judge Brady’s driveway. The garage door openedautomatically (activated apparently by Prontnicki), and to Judge Brady’ssurprise, Prontnicki -- not his brother -- appeared and walked into the garage.She told him, “go get your brother, you’re not supposed to be in the house. . . .You can’t come in this house.” Prontnicki pushed past her, saying “I just wantto get my things and then I’m going to leave.” Meanwhile, the surveillance team, on the lookout for Prontnicki -- apotentially dangerous and violent armed robber -- let him slip into JudgeBrady’s home with apparently little concern for her safety. While Prontnickiremained inside Judge Brady’s home, the surveillance team and Murphy couldnot know whether Judge Brady was being terrorized or physically harmed-- and yet they sat in their vehicles and waited. Murphy, who had JudgeBrady’s telephone number, did not call her to check on her well-being. That isevidently because the plan was not to protect her but to charge her. Prontnicki remained in the house for approximately fifty-five minutes,packing his clothes and pleading his case to Judge Brady -- telling her therewas no warrant for his arrest. After Prontnicki left, Judge Brady readiedherself to go to police headquarters to report Prontnicki’s whereabouts. At the 19 same time, the police stopped the car in which Prontnicki was a passenger andarrested him. Approximately ten to fifteen minutes after Prontnicki’s departure fromthe Brady residence, Murphy, accompanied by Detectives Grogan and Lyons,knocked on the front door. When Judge Brady opened the door, the officersasked her whether Prontnicki had just been in her house, and sheunhesitatingly answered, “yes.” Indeed, she told them, “he just left.” Murphyassumed that Judge Brady had given Prontnicki the bag of clothes he wasfound carrying in the car and that, to his mind, was a “crime.”6 Judge Brady was told that she was under arrest for not contacting thepolice. Detective Grogan recalled that Judge Brady told the assembled officersthat she had called the police twice earlier and left messages. Judge Bradyremembered even more precisely telling them that she had called the daybefore at 4:30 p.m. and again that afternoon. None of the officers stopped tosay, “let’s check with headquarters, let’s see if Judge Brady is telling thetruth.” Was there a need to arrest Judge Brady before making a due diligenceinquiry -- before conducting a full and fair investigation? Was she a flight risk6 At the ACJC hearing, Judge Brady denied ever packing clothes for Prontnicki. 20 or a danger to the community? The same questions would be legitimate ifJudge Brady were Jane Doe. The rush to judgment was on. Murphy had been preparing criminalcharges in his police vehicle, and now he had his catch. Judge Brady, who justhours earlier had been told that she was likely pregnant and to avoid stress,was then handcuffed from behind. Concerned about her pregnancy, she askednot to be handcuffed in that manner -- a request that was denied. Fearing forthe safety of an unborn child, and under great stress and excitement, she statedthat she had been “vetted.” It was a desperate plea to be treated humanely, ifonly for the sake of her pregnancy. All the officers already knew she was ajudge (and did not hesitate to arrest her) -- and if they knew anything about theappointment process, they knew she was vetted. Officer Bartko transported Judge Brady to the police station. During thetransport, the audio system in the patrol car recorded her remarks to theofficer. In a free-flowing, unfiltered monologue, Judge Brady stated, I did call yesterday and I called again this afternoon to find out if I can talk to the officer, also if I need to come in, and once I came in I was [going to] talk to the sergeant to see if it was true that there was no actual arrest warrant . . . out for him.” [(emphasis added).] 21 She went on, “I tried calling . . . yesterday. No one called me back and thenhe’s telling me . . . he doesn’t have an arrest warrant . . . . [N]o offense, Idon’t know who to believe.” She painfully mused aloud, “I can’t believe this.Why would he do this to me if, why would he come to my house when I toldhim you can’t. . . . Why would he do this to me, why is he doing this. Oh myGod.” (emphasis added). Those contemporaneous and spontaneous remarks do not support theconclusion that Judge Brady was attempting to obstruct a police investigationor harbor a criminal. 7 When the officers returned to headquarters with their prisoner, they soonlearned that Judge Brady had called headquarters twice -- just as she had toldthem. The officers, who had so hastily arrested her based on the mistakenassumption that she had not contacted the police, then listened to the messagesthat Officer Bartko retrieved from his voicemail. Murphy recalled that “thevoicemail was played on the speaker phone and was recorded on a digitalrecorder and place[d] into evidence.” The officers denied tampering with oraltering the voicemail messages. With Judge Brady’s arrest, the die was cast.7 Her remark in the patrol car that “[a]ll I did was help this person” was consistent with her repeated assertions that she encouraged Prontnicki to turn himself in to the police. 22 That evening, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Detective Grogan andSergeant Murphy visited the home of Judge Bradley Ferencz, J.S.C.,accompanied by a Middlesex County assistant prosecutor, to secure an arrestwarrant for Judge Brady. The officers did not bring a copy of the voicemails .Why not? And Murphy did not “think [they] had a discussion about avoicemail” at Judge Ferencz’s home. At first, Grogan made the presentationfor the issuance of a warrant to Judge Ferencz, but Judge Ferencz balked.Murphy, unsatisfied with Grogan’s answers to Judge Ferencz’s questions,asked to be sworn in and took over. Murphy admitted that he “led the judge tobelieve that [Judge Brady] made no attempt to alert us to Jason Prontnicki’swhereabouts” and that he succeeded in overcoming Judge Ferencz’s reluctanceto sign the arrest warrant. Murphy conceded at the ACJC hearing that the information on thecomplaint/warrant that he presented for Judge Ferencz’s signature was notaccurate. The complaint/warrant alleged that Judge Brady committed thecrime of hindering Prontnicki’s apprehension by harboring a known armedrobbery fugitive in her residence “for approximately 1 hour and never makingany attempt to contact law enforcement.” (emphasis added). Murphy, whohad recently listened to the voicemails, led Judge Ferencz to believe that JudgeBrady made no “attempt to contact law enforcement.” That was a lie. Surely, 23 Judge Ferencz -- who indicated his hesitance about signing the warrant -- had aright to know about the voicemails, the right to hear the voicemails, and,ultimately, in his role as a neutral and detached judicial officer, the right tomake an informed decision based on accurate, truthful information. 8 With the signing of that complaint, the gears of the criminal justicesystem were set in motion. D. Judge Brady was indicted on one count of second-degree officialmisconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(b); and two counts of third-degree hindering theapprehension or prosecution of Jason Prontnicki, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(1) and(2). The Law Division dismissed the official misconduct charge, finding thatJudge Brady had not acted in “her official capacity” and had no “duty inherentin her office to enforce an arrest warrant” or duty to act within “a specificallyrequired time limit.” State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143, 157 (App. Div.2017). The Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 174.8 At the ACJC hearing, Judge Brady’s attorney referred to a memorandum forwarded by Judge Melvin Gelade, J.S.C., to Assignment Judge Travis Francis. That memorandum indicated that Judge Ferencz believed that he had been deceived at the warrant hearing. The memorandum was not offered into evidence because of its hearsay nature. But, given the information in that memorandum, the ACJC should have called Judge Ferencz to give his account of what occurred at his home. See R. 2:15-6(a). 24 On March 2, 2018, nearly five years after Judge Brady’s arrest, the Statemoved to dismiss the hindering counts because of a lack of evidence to proveguilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted the State’s motion. Basedon the dismissal of the criminal charges, on March 6, 2018, this Courtreinstated Judge Brady to active duty as a Superior Court judge. Thatvindication was short lived. On May 4, 2018, the ACJC filed a formal complaint against Judge Bradybased on alleged violations of canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thecomplaint related to the same basic events covered by the dismissed criminalcharges. The disciplinary complaint alleged that Judge Brady failed to notifythe Woodbridge Township police of “Prontnicki’s known whereabouts, despiteher knowledge of two outstanding warrants for his arrest” and that she abusedher “judicial office during her arrest.” On September 16, 2019, the ACJC returned a Presentment, finding thatJudge Brady had violated various canons of judicial conduct and recommendedher removal from office. While this case was pending review by this Court,Judge Brady’s seven-year judicial term expired, and she was not nominated forreappointment. 25 II. I do not find that the disciplinary charges against Judge Brady aresupported by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67,74 (1993); see also Williams, 169 N.J. at 271 (“[W]e independently determinewhether the record satisfies that demanding burden of proof.”). The ACJC’soverly critical review of Judge Brady’s conduct on June 11 and 12 downplayedher debilitated physical and mental condition brought on by lack of sleep,nourishment, and the shock of events, as well as the officers’ abuse of theirauthority. The excessiveness of the ACJC’s recommended discipline isacknowledged by a majority of the members of this Court. I agree with the majority that “New Jersey’s system of judicial disciplineexists 'to preserve “public confidence in the integrity and the independence ofthe judiciary.”’” See ante at ___ (slip op. at 19) (quoting In re Russo, ___ N.J.___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 21)). But Judge Brady did nothing to underminethe integrity and independence of the judiciary, and the public will understandthat Judge Brady was the target of a run-away criminal investigation andprosecution. I now will generally state my disagreement with the findings of theACJC and the majority. 26 A. First, based on the conduct of the Woodbridge Township policediscussed earlier, unlike the ACJC, I cannot credit the police testimony overJudge Brady. The most obvious evidence of deception occurred duringSergeant Murphy’s appearance before Judge Ferencz. Murphy began with ahalf-baked assumption that Judge Brady was involved in a criminal enterpriseand then set out to justify his inchoate hunch. After the police prematurelyarrested Judge Brady, self-justification became the investigation’s predominantgoal. The Presentment asserts that Judge Brady left “two voicemail messagesfor Officer Bartko that carefully omitted relevant information as to Mr.Prontnicki’s expected presence and known whereabouts.” (emphasis added).Of course, to draw that negative inference, the ACJC inferred that Judge Bradyhad the prescience or telepathic powers to know that Officer Bartko did notcheck his voicemail messages until the beginning of every four-day shift. Inher first voicemail message on June 10, the one preserved by the WoodbridgeTownship police, Judge Brady let Officer Bartko know that Prontnicki was inWoodbridge and asked for Bartko to call her back. But Judge Brady claimsthat she said much more in that voicemail message to pinpoint Prontnicki’s 27 location, and her highly credentialed and experienced audio expert, Arlo West,offered his opinion that there were significant gaps on the tapes. In the Presentment, the ACJC found Judge Brady’s “testimony and thatof her mother accusing the [Woodbridge Township Police Department] ofaltering her voicemails incredible and the testimony of the WTPD officersdenying such conduct credible.” But the possibility that the voicemails weremishandled was not farfetched. On one of the compact discs of the June 11 voicemail recording, Westdetected male voices, presumably officers preparing the recording. One of thevoices says on that recording, “[a]nd as far as this message, whether or not shedid we’ve got to get rid of that.” The meaning of that statement, thoughsuspicious, is difficult to discern. Had the ACJC insisted that the two audioexperts testify -- and not relied solely on their reports -- there would have beena clearer basis on which to credit one expert over the other. The Presenter forwarded the report of Bruce Koenig who, like West, wasa highly credentialed and experienced audio expert. Koenig offered hisopinion that the recording of the voicemails did not have indications ofdeletions or tampering. Koenig faulted West, in part, for relying on “TheSeven Tenets of Audio Authenticity” (Seven Tenets), as “generally acceptedstandards used to determine audio authenticity.” Yet, as recently as 2015, this 28 Court acknowledged the importance of the factors identified in the SevenTenets -- without mentioning the Seven Tenets by name -- in determining thetrustworthiness of a recording. See State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 403(2015). The majority rightly does not rely on the ACJC’s crediting of Koenig asthe superior expert, see ante at ___ (slip op. at 25), particularly in light of theACJC’s failure to require the experts’ oral testimony. That means that JudgeBrady’s and her mother’s recollections of those phone calls, which are moredetailed than the voicemails preserved by the Woodbridge Township police,should not be dismissed out of hand. Judge Brady and her mother rememberedthat Judge Brady gave as precise a location as she knew of the whereabouts ofProntnicki on the June 10 voicemail. Additionally, the message itself revealsthat she gave a call-back number. B. Dr. Peter Oropeza testified before the ACJC about Judge Brady’s stateof mind on June 10 and 11, based on his review of prior psychological reportsand his own evaluation of Judge Brady. Dr. Oropeza related the cascadingstressors that overwhelmed Judge Brady and impacted her judgment -- learningthat her live-in boyfriend was accused of an armed robbery and abusing drugs,fearing the potential for violence against herself and her parents, and concern 29 for her pregnancy compounded by lack of sleep and not eating. Judge Brady’sjudgment, in his view, was also influenced by the physical trauma of thedomestic violence inflicted on her years earlier. Thus, on June 11, when JudgeBrady believed that Prontnicki’s brother would come to her home to retrieveProntnicki’s clothes and “surprisingly[,] [Prontnicki] showed up . . . she wasfearful that . . . if she tried to initiate a phone call in that moment that he . . .would potentially get violent.” The ACJC was dismissive of Dr. Oropeza’s professional and common-sense conclusion and credited the Presenter’s expert psychologist, Dr. CarlaRogers, who, in part, opined that it was not possible to render a diagnosis onthe date of the hearing regarding Judge Brady’s mental state on June 9 to 11,2013. Yet, all psychiatric and psychological opinions rendered in criminal andcivil cases necessarily require the expert to go back in time to determine thesubject’s state of mind. In addition, the ACJC apparently expected Judge Brady -- who testifiedthat she was a domestic violence survivor -- to call the police in the verypresence of the person who was wanted for committing a violent crime andwho she had reason to fear might do harm to her. Ultimately, the ACJC credited the evidence offered against Judge Bradyas well as the negative inferences drawn from that evidence. 30 In many ways, the Presentment was a replay, a seeming revival of thedoomed criminal case. I do not believe that the evidence clearly andconvincingly proves that Judge Brady was involved in a grand deception.Rather, a fair reading of the record reveals that Judge Brady was the victim ofa police investigation run amok -- an investigation that was built on anunfounded assumption and that cast aside inconvenient facts. To the extentthat Judge Brady’s conduct and text messages are susceptible to varyinginterpretations -- the proofs do not meet the exacting clear and convincingevidence standard required for the imposition of discipline. C. Contrary to the majority’s accusation, I do not hold that “every factualassertion made by [Judge Brady] during her testimony before the ACJC is tobe credited.” See ante at ___ (slip op. at 22). I do hold, however, that theevidence must establish “a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of theallegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty andconvincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, withouthesitancy, of the precise facts at issue.” Williams, 169 N.J. at 271 (alterationsin original) (quoting Seaman, 133 N.J. at 74). That is the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to which we must subject the proofs in this case. 31 In light of the questionable police conduct in this case, we should not give thepolice testimony or reports uncritical acceptance. The majority, moreover, selectively credits an unsworn, out-of-courthearsay statement made by Prontnicki -- a known liar with a criminal record-- to support its theory that Judge Brady violated the canons of judicialconduct. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 23, 26-27). No credence should be givento Prontnicki’s unsworn, out-of-court statements to the police that contradictJudge Brady’s testimony that Prontnicki showed up unexpectedly at her homeon June 11 to retrieve his clothes. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 26-27).Prontnicki did not testify and was not subject to cross-examination. Anyexamination of Prontnicki would have revealed that he was a master ofdeception. Prontnicki told Judge Brady that there was no warrant for his arrest andthat he had “confirmed it with an attorney.” He told her he would prove thatthe whole matter was a “mistake.” Even though we know that those utteranceswere just more deceptions from Prontnicki, mistakes about arrest warrants arenot a wholly uncommon occurrence. See generally, e.g., State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 41-43 (2011) (noting that a dispatcher mistakenly informed officersthat there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant’s arrest); State v.Caldwell, 158 N.J. 452, 455 (1999) (noting that a police department’s “active 32 warrant sheet” incorrectly contained a vacated warrant); State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 346, 349 (App. Div. 1999) (noting that police officers identifiedthe wrong person on a warrant). Still, Judge Brady told Prontnicki to turnhimself into the police, lent him no assistance, and made calls to the policeconcerning him that went unreturned. Judge Brady was a judicial officer, not a deputized member of theWoodbridge Township Police Department. She did not harbor a criminal, andshe did not obstruct an investigation. She did not have the reporting duties ofa law enforcement official. That is a line blurred in the majority opinion. D. Additionally, I do not conclude that Judge Brady’s spontaneousstatement that she was “vetted” because she feared for the safety of her unbornchild when handcuffed from behind to be the basis for judicial discipline. Thearresting officers knew she was a judge. Detective Grogan, for example,stated that the word conveyed no information he did not already know aboutJudge Brady. She did not threaten the officers or throw around the weight ofher office. She submitted to their authority. The charge related to the “vetted”statement is so lacking in merit that it should be dismissed. 33 E. Last, the job of the critic is always an easy one. The majority does notconsider the maelstrom of events engulfing Judge Brady from her perspective-- and from her fragile state of mind after more than a day without sleeping oreating. Yes, from hindsight, Judge Brady could have done many thingsdifferently. Instead of calling Officer Bartko and expecting him to return hercall, she could have called 9-1-1. On June 10, she could have called the policeat 3:00 p.m. instead of 4:30 p.m. But had Bartko returned Judge Brady’s 4:30p.m. call and learned Prontnicki’s location, this matter would have ended then.After seven years, the strained arguments now offered do not justify judicialdiscipline. III. In the end, Judge Brady is still shadowed by the false arrest that fueledthe criminal prosecution; it haunts her even in these proceedings, seven yearslater. Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe that Judge Brady engaged inconduct that undermines the confidence of the public or the Bar in the integrityof our judicial system. The public and the Bar will see Judge Brady for whatshe is -- the victim of a misguided and failed criminal prosecution that has lefther career as a judge in ruins and of a disciplinary review that has overlookedpolice malfeasance, her good-faith efforts, and the human element. Carlia 34 Brady was a judge, but she is also a person. Whatever her human failingsduring the highly stressful, emotional, and fearful hours for which she is nowjudged, discipline is not warranted. I therefore respectfully dissent. 35 In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady, a Judge of the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting. Because I am not persuaded that there is clear and convincing evidence inthis record to sustain disciplinary charges and impose discipline on respondent, Irespectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court. 1