Title: Courtney v. Comonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100776
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Russell, Lacy, and Koontz, S.JJ.∗ 
 
TAVORIS M. COURTNEY 
 
v.  Record No. 100776 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   March 4, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred when it affirmed the conviction of Tavoris M. Courtney 
(“Courtney”) for use or display of a firearm in the commission 
of a felony under Code § 18.2-53.1. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
On January 11, 2008, Laura Nelson (“Nelson”) was driving 
to her home in Chesterfield County around 10:00 p.m.  She 
noticed that a vehicle turned into her subdivision and 
followed her until she pulled into her driveway.  As she 
parked and opened her car door, a masked man approached and 
told her to get back into her vehicle.  She described the man 
as “a black male with a hood over a sweatshirt . . . and a 
bandana over his face,” exposing only his eyes. 
When Nelson did not immediately comply, her assailant, 
later identified as Courtney, told her to “[q]uit looking at 
me and get back in the car.”  When Nelson refused, Courtney 
                     
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
said, “I have a gun, get back in the car.”  Nelson never saw a 
gun or the item that Courtney was holding under his shirt, but 
she believed Courtney had a gun and said that she was “very 
scared.”  Nelson told Courtney that that he would “have to 
kill [her] or shoot [her] because [she was] not getting back 
in the car.”  She remained where she was but also pressed the 
vehicle’s horn.  Courtney took Nelson’s two purses and her 
cellular phone, and he ran away.  At that point, Nelson also 
saw a second man running away, and she chased both men down 
the street.  She pursued both men while screaming for help, 
and her neighbor, Scott Rittenhouse (“Rittenhouse”), heard 
Nelson yelling.  Rittenhouse ran to the street and tackled the 
second man on the ground.  Courtney then kicked Rittenhouse 
and hit him with Nelson’s purse.  Unable to free the second 
man, Courtney got into a waiting vehicle being driven by a 
third person and left the scene. 
Courtney was apprehended in the vehicle by police at a 
gas station approximately five minutes later and three miles 
from Nelson’s home.  Police recovered Nelson’s cellular phone 
in the bathroom trashcan of the gas station, and her purses 
were later recovered down the street in her neighborhood.  
During a search of the vehicle, police recovered hooded 
sweatshirts, two bandanas, and a “small revolver-type handgun 
with an orange tip on the end of it.”  The officer described 
 
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it as a “cap gun” and said that it “looks like, obviously, a 
toy gun.”  
The trial court, without a jury, found Courtney guilty of 
robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery.  
Based on the evidence showing that Nelson “had a bona fide 
belief that [Courtney] had a firearm” and that Courtney 
“threatened [Nelson] and instilled fear in [Nelson] that she 
might be shot if she did not cooperate,” the trial court held 
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain both the robbery 
and firearms convictions under Code §§ 18.2-58 and 18.2-53.1. 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
in an unpublished opinion, affirmed Courtney’s conviction for 
use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery.  Based upon 
the evidence that Courtney stated he had a gun and Nelson’s 
belief that he had one, the Court of Appeals held that the 
evidence was sufficient to support his conviction under Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  Id., slip op. at 5. Courtney timely filed his 
notice of appeal to this Court. 
II.  Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
On appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review when 
addressing a question of statutory construction.  Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 409, 413, 650 S.E.2d 89, 91 (2007); 
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 
 
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104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).  Additionally, when 
considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
conviction, 
this Court reviews “the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party at trial 
and consider[s] all inferences fairly deducible 
from that evidence.”  This Court will only 
reverse the judgment of the trial court if the 
judgment “ ‘is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.’ ”  “If there is 
evidence to support the convictions, the 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute 
its own judgment, even if its opinion might 
differ from the conclusions reached by the 
finder of fact at the trial.” 
 
Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 640-41, 691 S.E.2d 786, 
788 (2010) (citations omitted). 
B. Display or Use of a Firearm 
 in the Commission of a Felony 
 
Courtney contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that the evidence was sufficient to support his 
conviction for use or display of a firearm in the commission 
of a robbery under Code § 18.2-53.1.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we disagree.  
It is important to state what this case is not about. It 
is not about whether a particular toy gun resembles an actual 
gun.  Nelson did not see the object used by Courtney; 
consequently, the question of resemblance is irrelevant. 
In Powell v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 233, 237, 602 S.E.2d 
119, 121 (2004), we affirmed a conviction under Code § 18.2-
 
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53.1 despite the fact that the victims did not see a firearm 
and no firearm was ever recovered.  Powell robbed a clothing 
store and “informed the employees that he had a pistol in his 
pocket,” and he kept his hand in his pocket during the course 
of the robbery.  Id. at 235, 602 S.E.2d at 120.  He was 
apprehended by police only minutes later in a taxicab, but no 
pistol was located.  Id.  Despite the fact that no pistol was 
seen or found, we held that the evidence showing that Powell 
was “fidgety,” kept his hand in his pocket, told the victims 
he had a pistol, and threatened to “hurt” them if they did not 
follow his instructions was sufficient to support his 
conviction.  Id.  We held that  
evidence that no gun was found conflicts with 
Powell’s statements and actions during the 
commission of the offenses.  The trier of fact 
resolved this conflict against Powell, and in 
doing so, necessarily concluded that Powell had 
a gun.  In other words, resolution of the 
factual conflict in this manner established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell had a 
gun. 
Id. 
In her argument to the trial court, the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney stated with regard to the existence of an actual 
firearm: 
We don’t know what the defendant actually had under his 
clothes.  The police did later recover the gun that you 
see photographed there, which is not a real gun.  
However, the victim would have no way of knowing that.  
She didn’t know if he had a gun, a real gun, a play gun, 
 
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what he had under there.  He could have had a real gun 
for all we know.  He certainly had an opportunity to 
discard one. 
 
The Commonwealth’s Attorney additionally stated that: 
 
Your Honor, what I’ll start with is defense counsel 
said that no one believes that this was a real gun. We, 
you, defense counsel and I didn’t believe that this was a 
real gun, but I would submit to you that the victim did.  
She never saw the pistol, she never saw what was 
recovered in this car. She knows that the defendant told 
her that he had a gun and that he had something under his 
shirt. She believed it was a real gun. 
 
 
Courtney argues that the Commonwealth conceded that an 
actual firearm was not used in the commission of the offense.  
Considering the Commonwealth’s argument in context, we do not 
agree.  Clearly, the Commonwealth conceded that an actual 
firearm was not recovered.  Nonetheless, the Commonwealth 
consistently maintained that the evidence was in conflict 
concerning whether Courtney used an actual firearm in the 
commission of the robbery. The Commonwealth argued that 
Courtney’s statement “I have a gun,” and that he would “have 
to kill” or “shoot” the victim if she continued to disregard 
his commands, combined with his opportunity to discard an 
actual firearm, were sufficient to find him guilty of use or 
display of a firearm in the commission of a felony under Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  
 
The conflict in the evidence in this case is precisely 
the situation we considered in Powell.  We review the 
 
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sufficiency of the evidence based upon the statutory standard 
found in Code § 8.01-680: 
When a case, civil or criminal, is tried by a jury and a 
party objects to the judgment or action of the court in 
granting or refusing to grant a new trial on a motion to 
set aside the verdict of a jury on the ground that it is 
contrary to the evidence, or when a case is decided by a 
court without the intervention of a jury and a party 
objects to the decision on the ground that it is contrary 
to the evidence, the judgment of the trial court shall 
not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that 
such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.  
 
As we have said on many occasions, “[I]f there is evidence to 
support the convictions, the reviewing court is not permitted 
to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might 
differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at 
the trial.” Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 
S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998). 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
did not err in affirming Courtney’s conviction for use or 
display of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals.  
Affirmed. 
SENIOR JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
 
 
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I respectfully dissent.  In my view, a “toy gun” is 
neither a “firearm” or “such weapon” contemplated by the plain 
language of Code § 18.2-53.1.  Today, however, the majority of 
this Court judicially broadens the scope of this statute 
beyond the plain meaning of its language to permit a 
conviction pursuant to this statute where the evidence 
establishes that the defendant used a toy gun lacking the 
appearance of an actual gun to commit a robbery.  I am 
unwilling to ascribe to the General Assembly an intent to 
include such toy guns within the sweep of this criminal 
statute. 
 
The principles of appellate review applicable to the 
question of statutory construction in this case are well-
established.  “[W]e determine the General Assembly’s intent 
from the words contained in the statute.”  Alger v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 (2004) 
(quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 
S.E.2d 468, 470 (2003)).  “The plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, 
narrow, or strained construction.”  Commonwealth v. Zamani, 
256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998).  “When the 
language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the 
plain meaning of that language and may not assign a 
construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly 
 
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did not mean what it actually has stated.”  Elliott v. 
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 457, 463, 675 S.E.2d 178, 182 (2009).  
Finally, a court must strictly construe a penal statute 
against the Commonwealth and limit its application to cases 
falling clearly within the statute.  Turner v. Commonwealth, 
226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983). 
 
Code § 18.2-53.1, in pertinent part, provides that:  “It 
shall be unlawful for any person to use or attempt to use any 
pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm or display such 
weapon in a threatening manner while committing or attempting 
to commit . . . robbery . . . .  Violation of this section 
shall constitute a separate and distinct felony.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
This statute is not ambiguous.  Its plain language makes 
no reference to a toy gun.  Moreover, a toy gun is not a 
“firearm” because a toy gun is generally understood and 
accepted to be an object designed, made, and intended for 
amusement and not an object designed, made, and intended to 
have the capability of expelling a projectile by explosion as 
is the case of a “pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm.”  
See, e.g., Code § 18.2-433.1 (defining a “firearm” as “any 
weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted 
to expel single or multiple projectiles by the action of an 
explosion of a combustible material”); Armstrong v. 
 
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Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 584, 562 S.E.2d 139, 145 (2002)(“to 
sustain a conviction for possessing a firearm in violation of 
Code § 18.2-308.2, the evidence need show only that a person 
subject to the provisions of that statute possessed an 
instrument which was designed, made, and intended to expel a 
projectile by means of an explosion”).  Likewise, a toy gun is 
not a “weapon” because a toy gun lacks the capability, common 
to a pistol, shotgun or rifle, to inflict physical harm. 
 
However, in Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 197-
99, 269 S.E.2d 356, 357-58 (1980), a case involving a spring-
operated BB pistol that appeared in size, weight, and shape to 
be a .45 caliber automatic pistol, we held that a firearm 
under Code § 18.2-53.1 includes “an instrument which give[s] 
the appearance of having a firing capability, whether or not 
the object actually had the capacity to propel a bullet by the 
force of gunpowder.”  We explained that “[t]he statute not 
only is aimed at preventing actual physical injury or death 
but also is designed to discourage criminal conduct that 
produces fear of physical harm.”  Id. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 
358.  The defendant had asserted that a “firearm” is a weapon 
that expels a projectile by force of gunpowder and, thus, a 
spring-operated BB gun did not come within the scope of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  Id. at 197, 269 S.E.2d at 357.  While we 
expressly rejected that assertion, our decision in Holloman 
 
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does not purport to sweep all toy guns within the scope of 
Code § 18.2-53.1. 
 
The majority’s analysis in the present case appears to be 
based upon two initial conclusions.  First, the majority 
states that it is “important” that this case is not about 
whether a particular toy gun resembles an actual gun because 
the victim of the robbery did not see the object used by the 
defendant.  Next, the majority concludes that the Commonwealth 
did not concede that the defendant used a toy gun in the 
commission of the robbery and only conceded that an actual 
firearm was not recovered. 
 
In my view, this case is about whether a particular toy 
gun resembles an actual firearm.  It is axiomatic that the 
Commonwealth’s case cannot rise above its own evidence.  In 
support of the alleged violation of Code § 18.2-53.1, the 
Commonwealth introduced a photograph of the gun recovered by 
the police upon arresting the defendant shortly after the 
robbery.  Although the victim had not seen that gun, the 
arresting officer testified on behalf of the Commonwealth that 
the gun “looks like, obviously, a toy gun.”  In short, the 
Commonwealth’s case was premised entirely upon the defendant’s 
use of this particular gun while committing the robbery.  
Indeed, the Commonwealth would have had no other logical 
reason to introduce this evidence. 
 
11
 
In the present case, the Commonwealth both at trial and 
on appeal has relied on our decision in Powell v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 233, 237, 602 S.E.2d 119, 121 (2004).  
In Powell, we affirmed a conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1 
even though the victim of a robbery did not see a firearm and 
no firearm was ever recovered.  Id.  Powell, the defendant, 
had told the victim that he had a pistol in his pocket and he 
kept his hand in his pocket during the course of the robbery.  
Id. at 235, 602 S.E.2d at 120.  He told the victim not to move 
“and won’t nobody get hurt.”  Id.  Powell was arrested a short 
time after the robbery in a taxicab, and no pistol was ever 
recovered by the police.  Id.  Powell confessed to the robbery 
offense, but maintained that he had not had a pistol during 
the robbery.  Id.  A majority of this Court held that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that in fact Powell had a pistol during the course of the 
robbery.  Id. at 237, 602 S.E.2d at 121. 
 
Like in Powell, the defendant in this case stated that he 
had a gun and although the victim did not see a gun, the 
victim was reasonably threatened.  Thus, there is no question 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s 
conviction for robbery of the victim.  That determination, 
however, does not resolve the issue of whether the facts 
support a separate conviction of the defendant for violation 
 
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of Code § 18.2-53.1 because, unlike in Powell, here the 
Commonwealth introduced evidence regarding the particular 
“gun” the defendant used in the commission of the robbery.  
That “gun” was a toy gun; it was not a “firearm.”  
Additionally, the Commonwealth’s evidence established that 
this toy gun “looks like” a toy gun.  A toy gun that looks 
like a toy gun logically does not also have the appearance of 
having the capability of an actual firearm. 
 
Although not addressed by the majority here, in 
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441 S.E.2d 342, 
344 (1994), in construing Code § 18.2-53.1, this Court held 
that “the Commonwealth must prove that the accused actually 
had a firearm in his possession and that he used or attempted 
to use the firearm or displayed the firearm in a threatening 
manner while committing or attempting to commit robbery or one 
of the other specified felonies.”  In that case, the robbery 
victim did not see a gun although she thought that the accused 
possessed a gun.  Id. at 217, 441 S.E.2d at 343.  No gun was 
ever recovered.  Id.  This Court expressly rejected the 
Commonwealth’s assertion that the evidence is sufficient to 
support a conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1 when the victim 
“is made to feel that an assailant has a firearm, and reacts 
in response to that perception.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  
Yarborough clearly does not support the majority’s reasoning 
 
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that the evidence was sufficient in the present case to 
support the defendant’s conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1 on 
the premise essentially that the defendant stated that he had 
a gun, the victim believed that he had a gun, and the victim 
was “very scared.” 
 
In the final analysis, the majority is left to base its 
decision that the Commonwealth’s evidence in this case is 
sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction under Code 
§ 18.2-53.1 on the premise that the defendant had an 
“opportunity to discard an actual firearm” sometime prior to 
his arrest shortly after the robbery.  Significantly, even the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney in that regard could only assert that 
“[the defendant] could have had a real gun for all we know.”  
In light of the Commonwealth’s evidence regarding the toy gun 
recovered by the police when the defendant was arrested, it is 
pure speculation that the defendant also had an actual firearm 
in addition to a toy gun and discarded only the former as he 
fled from the scene of the robbery.  It is well-settled that 
speculation does not amount to the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt which is required for a defendant to be convicted of a 
crime. 
It bears repeating that Code § 18.2-53.1, as pertinent 
here, prohibits the use or attempt to use any pistol, shotgun, 
rifle, or other firearm while committing robbery.  In 
 
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Holloman, which involved the use of a BB pistol, we held that 
an instrument which gives the appearance of having a firing 
capability is a “firearm” contemplated by Code § 18.2-53.1 
because the statute has two purposes; one of which is to 
discourage criminal conduct that produces fear of physical 
harm.  Id. at 198-99, 269 S.E.2d at 358.  And in Yarborough we 
expressly held that the Commonwealth must prove that the 
accused actually had such a firearm, as defined in Holloman, 
in his possession while committing robbery.  247 Va. at 218, 
441 S.E.2d at 343-44.  The plain meaning of the language in 
Code § 18.2-53.1 evinces a legislative intent to include only 
the use or display of a pistol, shotgun, rifle or other 
firearm that gives the appearance of having the capability of 
firing a projectile.  Our prior decisions have been consistent 
with that interpretation of this statute. 
 
In sum, if a particular gun does not have the capability 
of firing a projectile and does not adequately resemble an 
actual gun, then such a gun does not come within our 
interpretation of Code § 18.2-53.1 in either Holloman or 
Yarborough.  In the present case, there is direct evidence 
that the defendant while committing robbery possessed and used 
a toy gun which did not have the appearance of an actual 
firearm.  There is no evidence the defendant possessed and 
used an actual firearm and at some point discarded that 
 
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firearm.  That the defendant stated to the victim of the 
robbery that he had a gun does not alter the fact that the gun 
he possessed was not an actual firearm.  It was a toy.  The 
evidence in this case falls far short of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the toy gun adequately resembled an 
actual firearm and, thus, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the defendant’s conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1. 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals upholding the conviction of Courtney under 
Code § 18.2-53.1 and vacate that conviction. 
 
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