Title: Hawkins v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 393, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONNIE RAY HAWKINS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 393, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0411002216A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 29, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided:  November 3, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 3rd day of November 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Donnie Ray Hawkins, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s May 26, 2010 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
2
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in 2005, a Superior Court jury found 
Hawkins guilty of 2 counts each of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During 
the Commission of a Felony, Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, 
Aggravated Menacing and Offensive Touching and 1 count each of Assault 
in the Third Degree, Disorderly Conduct, Endangering the Welfare of a 
Child, Driving After Judgment Prohibited and Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol.  He was sentenced to a total of 44 years of Level V 
imprisonment.  This Court affirmed Hawkins’s convictions on direct 
appeal.2  Hawkins subsequently filed 2 unsuccessful motions for 
postconviction relief. 
 
(3) 
On September 4, 2009, the Superior Court corrected Hawkins’s 
original sentencing order because it mistakenly referred to 3 years of 
mandatory time for each count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During 
the Commission of a Felony.  The correction of the sentencing order had no 
substantive effect on any of Hawkins’s sentences.  Nevertheless, Hawkins, 
through counsel, requested that he be given an opportunity to appear in open 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Hawkins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 257, 2005, Ridgely, J. (July 11, 2006) (en Banc). 
 
3
court in connection with the correction of the sentencing order and the 
Superior Court granted his request.   
 
(4) 
Hawkins appeared before the Superior Court judge on March 
12, 2010, with counsel present.  The judge explained the correction of the 
sentencing order to Hawkins.  Hawkins’s counsel attempted to argue for a 
reduction of his sentence, but was reminded by the judge of the limited 
purpose of the proceeding.  No new order issued as a result of the 
proceeding.3  Hawkins then filed his third postconviction motion, alleging 
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the March 12, 2010 
proceeding, because she did not argue for leniency on his behalf.   
 
(5) 
The record in this case reflects that the sole purpose for 
bringing Hawkins into court on March 12, 2010 was to provide an 
explanation to Hawkins regarding the basis for correcting the original 
sentencing order and to provide him with an opportunity to ask questions 
regarding that limited issue.  There was no re-sentencing and Hawkins’s 
counsel was not permitted to argue for leniency.    
 
(6) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s 
                                                 
3 Hawkins’s counsel has filed an appeal from that proceeding in No. 146, 2010 pursuant 
to Supreme Court Rule 26(c). 
 
4
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings 
would have been different.4  Hawkins cannot demonstrate that his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance at the March 12, 2010 proceeding because 
she was not permitted to present argument on his behalf. 
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
       
 
                                                 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).