Title: People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95663
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2004

Docket No. 95663-Agenda 19-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of Illinois, et
al., Petitioners, v. DONALD N. SNYDER, JR., Director of 							
Corrections, et al., Respondents.
Opinion filed January 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case comes before the court as an original action for a writ of
mandamus. 188 Ill. 2d R. 381. The Illinois Attorney General filed the
complaint on behalf of the people of the state of Illinois. The complaint
seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the Director of Corrections and the
wardens of Pontiac and Menard Correctional Centers to prevent the
recording of certain commutation orders entered by former Governor
George H. Ryan or, in the alternative, to expunge the commutation orders
where they have already been entered.

BACKGROUND

	Petitioners' complaint contains the following allegations. On January
10, 2003, then-Governor George H. Ryan announced that he was
granting "blanket clemency" for all inmates who were then, or who had
been, sentenced to death. He issued orders commuting the sentences of
more than 160 inmates to life imprisonment, a maximum of life
imprisonment, or 40 years. Petitioners challenge the validity of the
commutations with respect to two distinct groups of inmates.
	In count I of the complaint, petitioners allege that the Governor
lacked the authority to commute the sentences of inmates who failed to
sign or otherwise consent to their clemency petitions. Article V, section
12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that:
			"The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, after conviction, for all offenses on such terms as he
thinks proper. The manner of applying therefore [sic] may be
regulated by law."
Pursuant to this section, the General Assembly has exercised its authority
to regulate the process of application for clemency in section 3-3-13 of
the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2002)).
That section provides that petitions seeking clemency "shall be in writing
and signed by the person under conviction or by a person on his behalf."
730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(a) (West 2002). A clemency application cannot be
commenced on behalf of a person who has been sentenced to death,
unless that person has consented. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(c) (West 2002).
The complaint listed in an appendix a group of inmates who had not
authorized the filing of clemency petitions on their behalf. The statute
makes an exception for inmates who are mentally or physically incapable
of deciding whether to seek clemency (730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(c) (West
2002)), but none of the inmates listed in the appendix had claimed such an
infirmity.
	Count I alleged that the legislature had regulated the procedure for
applying for executive clemency and that the section imposed a clear legal
duty on the Governor not to grant a commutation to any inmate who fails
to sign or consent to a commutation petition and who is not otherwise
excused from doing so. Accordingly, petitioners allege that the orders
granting commutations to these inmates are void.
	The next three counts of the complaint deal with inmates who were
allegedly not under sentence when then-Governor Ryan issued the
commutations. In count II, petitioners argue that the Governor lacked the
authority to issue commutations to inmates not under sentence. These
inmates had been under a sentence of death at one time, but their
sentences had been reversed in either direct appeals or in postconviction
proceedings and they were awaiting new sentencing hearings. The
complaint alleged that then-Governor Ryan had exceeded his authority in
issuing a preemptive grant of commutation and had encroached on the
judiciary's sentencing powers. Accordingly, petitioner argued that these
commutations were void.
	In count III, petitioners argue that the Governor cannot commute
sentences to unspecified terms. For most of the inmates referenced in
count II of the complaint, the Governor used one of the following two
forms of commutation orders:
			"Sentence Commuted to Natural Life Imprisonment Without
the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic];
or in the alternative, Sentence Commuted to a Sentence Other
Than Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum
Sentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment
Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief
[sic]."
			"Sentence Commuted to a Sentence Other Than Death for
the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that may
be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility
of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic]."
Petitioners argue that these are void orders because the Governor cannot
commute sentences to unspecified terms.
	Count IV alleges that the Governor may not delegate his
commutation power. According to the complaint, then-Governor Ryan
improperly delegated his commutation powers to the judiciary by
commuting sentences of the inmates listed in count II to unspecified terms.

ANALYSIS

	Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally used to compel
a public official to perform a ministerial duty. People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe,
201 Ill. 2d 552, 555 (2002). Generally, a writ of mandamus will be
awarded only if a plaintiff establishes a clear right to relief, a clear duty of
the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to
comply with the writ. People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393,
398 (2001). There must also be no other adequate remedy. Patzner v.
Baise, 133 Ill. 2d 540, 545 (1990). However, even when all of the normal
requirements for the writ's award are not met initially, we may still
consider a petition for a writ of mandamus if it presents a novel issue that
is of crucial importance to the administration of justice. People v. Latona,
184 Ill. 2d 260, 277 (1998). If, in purporting to exercise his pardon or
commutation power, the Governor issues a void order, mandamus may
be used to require the officers charged with execution of the order to
disregard it. People ex rel. Smith v. Jenkins, 325 Ill. 372, 374-75
(1927); People ex rel. Fullenwider v. Jenkins, 322 Ill. 33 (1926).

I. Inmates Who Did Not Sign or Otherwise Consent to Their Petitions
	We first consider petitioners' argument that former Governor Ryan
lacked the authority to commute the sentences of inmates who did not sign
or otherwise consent to the filing of petitions on their behalf. For each of
the inmates listed in the appendix to count I, a petition for executive
clemency was filed with former Governor Ryan. However, these inmates
had not signed consent forms allowing these petitions to be filed on their
behalf.
	Petitioners' argument is straightforward. The Illinois Constitution
gives the Governor the authority to "grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, after conviction, for all offenses on such terms as he thinks
proper." Ill. Const. 1970, art. 5, §12. However, the constitution further
provides that, "[t]he manner of applying therefore [sic] may be regulated
by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, §12. Pursuant to this section, the General
Assembly has exercised its authority to regulate the process of application
for clemency in section 3-3-13 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730
ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2002)). That section provides that petitions
seeking clemency "shall be in writing and signed by the person under
conviction or by a person on his behalf." 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(a) (West
2002). Further, section 3-3-13(c) provides, in part, that:
			"Application for executive clemency under this Section may
not be commenced on behalf of a person who has been
sentenced to death without the written consent of the defendant,
unless the defendant, because of a mental or physical condition,
is incapable of asserting his or her own claim." 730 ILCS
5/3-3-13(c) (West 2002).
According to petitioners, this statute limits the Governor's authority to
grant reprieves, pardons, or commutations to those inmates who follow
the proper application procedures. We disagree.
	By its plain language, article V, section 12, of the constitution merely
allows the legislature to regulate the process for applying for executive
clemency. It does not purport to give the legislature the power to regulate
the Governor's authority to grant clemency. Further, the 1970 Illinois
Constitution does not provide that the Governor's power to grant
clemency is subject to the legislature's regulation of the application
process, as did the 1870 constitution. Article V, section 13, of the
Constitution of 1870 provided that:
			"The Governor shall have power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses,
subject to such regulations as may be provided by law relative
to the manner of applying therefor." (Emphasis added.) Ill.
Const. 1870, art. V, §13.
The notable changes between the two constitutions were the addition of
the phrase "on such terms as he thinks proper" and the deletion of the
"subject to" language. Although petitioners might have had at least a
plausible argument under the 1870 constitution (see People ex rel. Smith,
325 Ill.  at 375 ("The only restriction imposed by the constitution on the
power of the Governor to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons is
that it shall be 'subject to such regulations as may be provided by law of
applying therefor' ")), their contention must fail under the current
constitution, which allows the legislature to regulate the application process
but does not in any way restrict the Governor's power to act. If
petitioners' position were correct, it would mean that the legislature could
nullify the Governor's clemency power through legislation, simply by
enacting regulations sufficiently strict to prevent any clemency petition from
ever reaching the Governor. We do not believe that was the intent of the
framers of the constitution.
	Further, even if we assume, arguendo, that the legislature could
restrict the Governor's commutation powers through its power to regulate
the application process, the legislature did not do so. Indeed, the
legislature went out of its way to ensure that no one would read its
regulation of the application process as limiting the Governor's power to
act. After setting forth the procedures for the filing and consideration of
clemency petitions, the statute expressly provides that:
			"Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the power
of the Governor under the constitution to grant a reprieve,
commutation of sentence, or pardon." 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(e)
(West 2002).
Petitioners contend that the relevant phrase in this section is "under the
constitution." The constitution allows the legislature to regulate the
application process so, according to petitioners, subsection (e) means that
nothing in this section limits the Governor's power to act if this section is
followed. Petitioners argue that the statute would be rendered meaningless
if the Governor could grant clemency even when proper procedures were
not followed. This analysis is problematic for several reasons.
	First, as explained above, the Governor's power under the
constitution is defined by the first sentence of article V, section 12. The
second sentence, allowing the legislature to regulate the application
process, is not a limitation on the Governor's power. Next, subsection (e)
has no meaning except as an explanation that the statute should not be
construed as a limitation on the Governor's power. If petitioners'
argument were correct, section 3-3-13 would indeed be a limitation on
the Governor's power-a limitation petitioners claim the legislature is
entitled to enact-and subsection (e) would then have no purpose. Finally,
it is simply untrue that subsection (e) renders the entire section superfluous.
If an inmate fails to follow the proper procedures, then the Governor does
not have to consider the petition. The Prisoner Review Board does not
have to accept it, does not have to schedule a hearing, and does not have
to make a recommendation to the Governor.
	Thus, in the typical case, an inmate who does not follow proper
procedures will not get his petition before the Governor. The failure of the
inmates listed in count I to consent to their petitions would have given
then-Governor Ryan a basis to refuse to consider the petitions on their
merits. This, however, was not the typical case. We take judicial notice of
then-Governor Ryan's public statements in issuing these commutations
(See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law
School (January 11, 2003)), and it is apparent that he intended to grant
blanket clemency because he believed that Illinois' death penalty system
was broken. Thus, in this instance, the failure of certain inmates to consent
to their petitions was irrelevant to the Governor. That does not mean,
however, that section 3-3-13 does not play an important role in the
clemency process. Petitioners have not shown a clear right to relief on
count I of their complaint, and we deny the request for a writ of
mandamus.

II. Unsentenced Inmates
	We next address the validity of former Governor Ryan's orders
commuting the sentences of inmates not currently under sentence. As
stated above, the inmates listed in this count of the petition had obtained
sentencing relief as part of appellate or collateral proceedings and were
awaiting new sentencing hearings when former Governor Ryan purported
to commute their death sentences.
	Before proceeding with the merits of this discussion, we address a
motion that we ordered taken with the case. Respondents William Bracy
and Roger Collins moved this court to dismiss them from count II. Bracy
and Collins argue that they were not "unsentenced" when then-Governor
Ryan commuted their sentences, and thus they should be dismissed from
count II. Bracy and Collins had obtained relief in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. The Seventh Circuit upheld a district court opinion giving the
Illinois courts 90 days to hold new sentencing hearings. Bracy v.
Schomig, 286 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2002). Bracy and Collins argue that
their death sentences remained intact at this point because federal courts
acting under 28 U.S.C. §2254 do not issue decrees that directly affect the
judgments entered in state courts. Rather, a federal court issuing a writ of
habeas corpus essentially requires the State to retry or resentence the
defendant, on pain of ordering the defendant's release if the State does not
comply.
	We agree with Bracy and Collins that they remained under sentence.
A federal court considering a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus does not have the authority to revise a state court judgment. As
the United States Supreme Court explained in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837, 864, 83 S. Ct. 822, 844 (1963),
overruled in part on other grounds by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977):
		"Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that
right is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the
power to release him. Indeed, it has no other power; it cannot
revise the state court judgment; it can act only on the body of the
petitioner."
See also, e.g., Wilson v. Lawrence County, 154 F.3d 757, 761 (1998)
("[a] federal writ of habeas corpus does not reverse or void the state
judgment of conviction"); Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 168 (3d
Cir. 1998) (federal court in habeas proceeding has no authority to revise
the state court judgment; court may determine only whether there is an
improper detention and, if so, order the release of the prisoner conditioned
on the State's opportunity to correct errors); 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus
§372 (2003).
	Petitioners respond that the federal court did in fact vacate the
sentences, citing to the opinion in United States ex rel. Collins v.
Welborn, 79 F. Supp. 2d 898 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Further, petitioners
contend that, once the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case,
Bracy and Collins could not be said to be under a sentence of death. As
set forth above, however, the federal court had no authority to revise the
judgments of the Illinois courts in these cases. Thus, although the district
court used the term "vacate," its order could not vacate these sentences.
We also deem the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court to be
irrelevant. Because the federal court had no authority to revise the
judgment, that judgment remained intact, even if it could never be
enforced. Thus, we agree with Bracy and Collins that their state court
judgment of conviction and sentence was still intact when then-Governor
Ryan issued his clemency orders. The motion to dismiss is granted.
	We now turn to the merits of petitioners' argument. Petitioners focus
on the phrase "after conviction" in article V, section 12, of the Illinois
Constitution. The constitution gives the Governor the power to grant
"reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses on
such terms as he thinks proper." According to petitioners, the term
"conviction" sometimes refers to an adjudication of guilt and sometimes
refers to both an adjudication of guilt and the imposition of a sentence,
depending on the context in which it is used. People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 487 (2000). Petitioners contend that the use in article V, section 12,
of the term "conviction" means a finding of guilt plus a sentence. In their
reply brief, however, petitioners concede that with respect to the
Governor's pardoning power, article V, section 12, allows the Governor
to act following an adjudication of guilt. Petitioners argue that the single
term "conviction" in this section means two different things:
		"Accordingly, in the context of the Governor's pardon power,
the term 'after conviction' means after a guilty verdict, regardless
of whether there is a sentence. By contrast, in the commutation
power, the term 'conviction' must include an existing sentence."
	We cannot agree with petitioners that "conviction" means two
different things in article V, section 12. Rather, we believe that the framers
intended the word to have its commonly understood meaning, which is an
adjudication of guilt. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary
499 (1993) ("the act of proving, finding, or adjudging a person guilty of
an offense or crime"). Throughout the Illinois Constitution, the term
"conviction" is used separately from "sentence" or other terms relating to
the consequences of an adjudication of guilt. See, e.g., Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §8.1(a)(5) (crime victims shall have the right to "information about
the conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused"); §9
("[a]ll persons shall be bailable *** except for *** offenses for which a
sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed as a consequence of
conviction"); §11 (refers to "Limitation of Penalties after Conviction" and
provides that "no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture
of estate").
	In certain instances, we have construed the term "conviction" to be
a legal term of art meaning a finding of guilt and a sentence. For instance,
in Woods, 193 Ill. 2d  at 488-89, we held that the term "date of
conviction" in section 122-1(c) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725
ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2002) (setting forth time limits in which a post-conviction petition must be filed)) means the date that the final judgment,
including the sentence, was entered. We reached this conclusion by
considering both (1) how the terms "conviction" and "judgment" were
defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) the purposes
underlying the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (to provide a remedy for
constitutional violations that occur at trial or sentencing).
	By contrast, nothing in the language of the constitution leads us to
believe that the framers meant to use a legal term of art rather than the
commonly understood meaning of the term: an adjudication of guilt. We
read article V, section 12, as meaning simply that the Governor may first
exercise his clemency powers after a defendant is found guilty of an
offense. This court stated as much in People ex rel. Smith v. Allen, 155 Ill. 61 (1895), albeit in dicta. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to
conspiracy, but the trial court stayed judgment on the plea, allowed the
defendant to leave, and never imposed sentence. This court held that an
indefinite suspension of sentence in this manner was essentially a quasi
pardon and only the governor had the authority to issue pardons:
		"Our constitution confers the pardoning power upon the
executive branch of the State government, and the Governor
alone can prevent the infliction of punishment after a legal
conviction." (Emphasis added.) Allen, 155 Ill.  at 64.
 The majority of state courts have reached the same conclusion in
interpreting the phrase "after conviction" in the clemency provisions of
their state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Mondragon, 107 N.M. 421,
424, 759 P.2d 1003, 1006 (App. 1988); Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 275, 276-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); In re Anderson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 48, 51-54, 92 P.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1939); People v. Marsh, 125 Mich.
410, 412-15, 84 N.W. 472, 473-74 (1900); Parker v. State, 103 Tenn.
547, 550, 53 S.W. 1092, 1093 (1899); State ex rel. Butler v. Moise,
48 La. Ann. 109, 122-23, 18 So. 943, 949 (1895); State v. Alexander,
76 N.C. 231 (1877); Blair v. Virginia, 66 Va. 850 (1874);
Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, 324-40 (1872); but see
Ex Parte White, 28 Okla. Crim. 180, 187-88, 230 P. 522, 524 (1924);
Ex Parte Campion, 79 Neb. 364, 372, 112 N.W. 585, 588 (1907).
	Nevertheless, holding that the Governor may first exercise his
clemency powers after a defendant is adjudicated guilty does not end our
inquiry. We believe that the relevant inquiry is not so much what the
phrase "after conviction" means as whether it is within the Governor's
clemency powers to do what former Governor Ryan did here. In other
words, does lowering the maximum possible sentence that a defendant can
receive fall within the power given the Governor to "grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons *** for all offenses on such terms as he thinks
proper"? We believe that it does.
	The pardon power given the Governor in article V, section 12, is
extremely broad. The Governor may grant reprieves, pardons, and
commutations "on such terms as he thinks proper." Even before the "on
such terms as he thinks proper" language was added to the constitution,
this court had recognized that the Governor's clemency powers granted
by the constitution "cannot be controlled by either the courts or the
legislature. His acts in the exercise of the power can be controlled only by
his conscience and his sense of public duty." People ex rel. Smith, 325 Ill.  at 374.
	A pardon is "[a]n executive action that mitigates or sets aside
punishment for a crime." Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (6th ed. 1990).
Further, there are several different types of pardons:
			"[A] pardon may be full or partial, absolute or conditional. A
pardon is full when it freely and unconditionally absolves the
person from all the legal consequences of a crime and of the
person's conviction, direct and collateral, including the
punishment, whether of imprisonment, pecuniary penalty, or
whatever else the law has provided; it is partial where it remits
only a portion of the punishment or absolves from only a portion
of the legal consequences of the crime. A pardon is absolute
where it frees the criminal without any condition whatsoever; and
it is conditional where it does not become operative until the
grantee has performed some specified act, or where it becomes
void when some specified event transpires." 67A C.J.S. Pardon
&amp; Parole §2, at 6 (2002).
A commutation is the change of punishment to which a person has been
condemned to a less severe one. People ex rel. Smith, 325 Ill.  at 376. It
removes a judicially imposed sentence and replaces it with a lesser,
executively imposed sentence. People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 463
(2003). Finally, a reprieve is "the postponement of the execution of a
sentence." 67A C.J.S. Pardon &amp; Parole §3 (2002). The power to grant
reprieves and commutations is generally viewed as a subset of the
Governor's pardoning power. See, e.g., State ex rel. Forbes v.
Caperton, 198 W. Va. 474, 478, 481 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1996)
("Although a commutation is not synonymous with a pardon, it is well
established throughout the United States today that the power to pardon
generally encompasses the lesser power to commute"); Ricks v. State,
882 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ("[t]he power to
commute a sentence is a part of the pardoning power and may be
exercised under a general grant of that power"); Whittington v. Stevens,
221 Miss. 598, 604, 73 So. 2d 137, 140 (1954) ("it is generally held that
the general power to pardon necessarily contains in it the lesser power of
remission and commutation"); State v. Hildebrand, 25 N.J. Super. 82,
84, 95 A.2d 488, 489 (1953) ("This constitutional grant of the pardoning
power carried with it the lesser powers of granting remission of part of the
penalty, of granting commutation of sentence, and of granting a limited or
partial pardon, although none of these lesser powers is specifically
mentioned").
	The only restriction this court has heretofore found on the Governor's
clemency power is that he may not change a conviction for one crime into
a conviction for another. Thus, in People ex rel. Fullenwider, 322 Ill.  at
36-40, this court held invalid a commutation order that purported to
commute a life sentence to "manslaughter." The defendant had been
convicted of murder, and the Governor's clemency power did not allow
him to change the nature of defendant's conviction.
	There is a dearth of authority on the issue of whether a Governor can
issue a "commutation" when a defendant is not currently under sentence,
but the two states to address the issue have held this to be a valid exercise
of the Governor's clemency power. See Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 650 (Tenn. 1977); Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972). However, these cases contain little analysis and drew
forceful dissents, arguing that a commutation can only be issued if a
sentence is in place. See Collins, 550 S.W.2d  at 654-57 (Brock, J.,
dissenting, joined by Cooper, C.J.); Whan, 485 S.W.2d  at 277-81
(Onion, J., dissenting). In a somewhat analogous case, the Court of
Appeals of New Mexico held that the governor's pardon power allowed
him to pardon a habitual offender sentence. The power attached after
conviction, but before sentencing. State v. Mondragon, 107 N.M. 421,
424, 759 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1988). The Mondragon court explained that:
			"It is well established that, by exercise of the power to
pardon, the governor can exempt an individual from the
punishment that the law imposes as a result of conviction for
commission of a crime. [Citation.] A sentence enhancement,
though imposed on the basis of a defendant's status as an
habitual offender, is nonetheless punishment for commission of
the crime to which the enhanced sentence attaches. [Citation.]
Thus, the power to pardon an individual from punishment for
commission of a crime includes the power to preclude any
punishment that might be imposed, upon conviction of that crime,
as a result of an individual's status as an habitual offender."
Mondragon, 107 N.M. at 423, 759 P.2d  at 1005.
	This is a difficult question with little to guide us, but we believe that
the grant of authority given the Governor under article V, section 12, is
sufficiently broad to allow former Governor Ryan to do what he did. As
set forth above, the Governor's clemency powers, which attach upon an
adjudication of guilt, allow him to mitigate or set aside the punishment for
the crime by issuing a pardon. Pardons may be full or partial, removing
some or all of the legal consequences of a crime, and may be absolute or
imposed with conditions. Further, the Governor can grant a reprieve for
any sentence imposed and may commute any sentence imposed to a lesser
sentence. In this situation, what former Governor Ryan essentially did was
to grant the inmates listed in count II a partial pardon by pardoning only
the possible capital consequences of the offense. As we noted, a partial
pardon exonerates a defendant from some but not all of the punishment or
legal consequences of a crime. Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (6th ed.
1990); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Ky. 2003)
(construing power of the governor to issue "pardons" under state
constitution as including power to issue partial pardons). The Governor's
pardon power allows him to remove or mitigate the consequences of a
crime, and that is what he did here by removing the maximum sentence for
these defendants in future sentencing hearings. We deem it irrelevant that
the Governor used the term "commutation" in his clemency orders,
because we believe that it is the substance, not the terminology, of the
clemency orders that controls. See Ex parte Black, 123 Tex. Crim. 472,
474, 59 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1933) (construing governor's clemency order
to be a "reprieve" even though governor used the word "furlough"; "it is
the substance of the proclamation of the governor and not the name by
which it is designated, that controls its effect"). We emphasize the limited
nature of our holding. We hold only that the Governor's constitutional
authority to issue pardons after conviction is sufficiently broad to allow him
to reduce the maximum sentence the defendant is facing. In such a
situation, the Governor is exercising his power to prevent or mitigate
punishment by pardoning the defendant from the full extent of the
punishment allowed by law.
	With respect to two of the inmates listed in the exhibit to count II,
Gregory Madej and Renaldo Hudson, former Governor Ryan commuted
their sentences to specific terms of life imprisonment rather than to
maximum terms. However, we believe that these two inmates remained
under a sentence of death and thus a commutation to a specific term was
appropriate. Gregory Madej had been granted relief in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. Thus, for the reasons stated in granting the motion
filed by inmates Bracy and Collins, Madej had an existing sentence of
death that was subject to commutation.
	Renaldo Hudson had his sentence vacated by the circuit court in a
postconviction proceeding. The court denied relief as to Hudson's
conviction, but ordered a new sentencing hearing. The State appealed,
and this court remanded the cause to the circuit court for an evidentiary
hearing on a jury-selection issue. However, we retained jurisdiction of the
cause and ordered the circuit court to file a decision within 90 days.
People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 138 (2001). The circuit court
decided the issue adversely to Hudson, and this court ordered additional
briefing on the issue. After defendant and the State had each filed an
additional brief, and while the cause was still pending before this court,
former Governor Ryan issued the commutation orders. Thus, the issue of
whether Hudson was entitled to a new sentencing hearing had not been
finally decided. We agree with Hudson that at the time the commutation
orders were entered he was not awaiting a new sentencing hearing.
Rather, he was still waiting for a decision from this court as to whether his
sentence should be vacated and if he should receive a new sentencing
hearing. See People v. Brown, 204 Ill. 2d 422, 425 (2002) (commutation
order valid when issued after this court vacated death sentence but while
case was still pending on rehearing and mandate had been stayed pending
a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court). Thus, we
believe that former Governor Ryan had the authority to commute
Hudson's sentence to life imprisonment.
	We next address counts III and IV of the complaint. Petitioners
argue that the clemency orders for most of the defendants listed in the
exhibit to count II were invalid because they commuted to a maximum
term rather than to a specific sentence. Petitioners contend that a
commutation replaces a judicially imposed sentence with an executively
imposed sentence, and therefore the commutation must be to a specific
term. If the sentence is for a maximum term, it leaves resentencing up to
the judiciary, and petitioners claim that this is an improper delegation of the
commutation power. See People ex rel. Brundage v. LaBuy, 285 Ill. 141, 144 (1918) (power to grant reprieves, pardons, and commutations
is vested in the Governor and cannot be vested in another officer or body,
directly or indirectly).
	These arguments fail because, as we explained above, then-Governor
Ryan's clemency orders were more in the nature of limited pardons than
sentencing commutations. The orders pardoned these inmates from the
most severe potential consequences of their crimes-capital punishment.
Thus, there was no problem with orders that set a maximum term, and the
Governor was not delegating any of his clemency powers to the judiciary.
These inmates were already going to receive new sentencing hearings
ordered by the judiciary. The clemency orders merely removed the most
severe possible punishment from consideration at these hearings.
	Finally, petitioners claim that then-Governor Ryan's clemency orders
violated separation of powers principles for two reasons. First, petitioners
argue that the former Governor usurped the authority of the State's
Attorneys to decide what punishment to seek in these cases. Second,
petitioners argue that former Governor Ryan interfered with the judiciary's
sentencing powers.
	We perceive no separation of powers problems. First, when the
State's Attorneys perform their roles as prosecutors, they are members
of the executive branch of government. People ex rel. Daley v. Suria,
112 Ill. 2d 26, 37 (1986). The separation of powers doctrine applies only
to powers assigned to separate branches of government. See Ill. Const.
1970, art. II, §1 ("The legislative, executive and judicial branches are
separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to
another"). Further, petitioners concede that, following an adjudication of
guilt, the Governor can grant a defendant a complete pardon, removing
from the State's Attorneys the ability to seek any punishment against the
individual. Here, the Governor exercised the much lesser power of
preventing them from seeking only the maximum penalty provided by law.
	Similarly, there is no separation of powers problem between the
Governor and the judiciary. As set forth above, following a conviction, the
Governor's constitutional clemency powers allow him to completely or
partially absolve a defendant of the consequences of his crime, and to
suspend or commute any sentence imposed by the judiciary. Former
Governor Ryan did not exercise any powers reserved to the judiciary in
entering these orders, but rather exercised the clemency powers granted
him by the constitution. We deny petitioners' request for a writ of
mandamus on counts II, III, and IV.
	As a final matter, we note that clemency is the historic remedy
employed to prevent a miscarriage of justice where the judicial process
has been exhausted. Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 768
(E.D. Va. 2000). We believe that this is the purpose for which the framers
gave the Governor this power in the Illinois Constitution. The grant of this
essentially unreviewable power carries with it the responsibility to exercise
it in the manner intended. Our hope is that Governors will use the
clemency power in its intended manner-to prevent miscarriages of justice
in individual cases.
	For all of the above reasons, the petition for a writ of mandamus is
denied.

Writ denied.