Title: Vahdat v. Holland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 061960
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2007

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
and Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
TOKTAM VAHDAT 
v.  Record No. 061960  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      September 14, 2007 
ANTHONY WAYNE HOLLAND 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
William D. Hamblen, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we once again address the sudden 
emergency doctrine and decide what, if anything, an 
instruction on that subject must include with regard to a 
defendant’s evidentiary burden.  Because we conclude that 
the circuit court did not err by giving a sudden emergency 
instruction that contained no reference to the defendant’s 
evidentiary burden, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
 
Toktam Vahdat filed an amended complaint in the 
circuit court against Anthony Wayne Holland, seeking 
damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a 
result of an automobile accident.  The case proceeded to a 
jury trial.  Vahdat testified that, while driving her 
vehicle in the left, southbound lane of traffic, she 
noticed the vehicle operated by Holland following too 
                     
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to the effective date of her retirement 
on August 16, 2007. 
 
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closely behind her vehicle.  According to Vahdat’s 
testimony, Holland, while attempting to pass her by driving 
in the center turning lane, accelerated across the two 
northbound lanes of traffic and struck a utility pole.  As 
a result, the utility pole toppled over, and the cables 
attached to the pole fell onto the hood of Vahdat’s 
vehicle, damaging it. 
 
Testifying in his own defense, Holland claimed that, 
while accelerating after a traffic signal changed in favor 
of southbound traffic, he experienced a “blackout” from 
which he did not regain consciousness until after the 
accident.  Holland denied tailgating Vahdat prior to losing 
consciousness.  Holland testified that he was diagnosed 
with Type II diabetes in 1995, but that he had never 
experienced a “blackout” as a result of his condition 
either before or since the day of the motor vehicle 
accident at issue.  Holland stated that, on the day of the 
accident, he followed his routine practice of checking his 
blood sugar level several times throughout the day.  
According to Holland, he noticed nothing unusual about his 
blood sugar level prior to the accident, but medical 
personnel attending to Holland after the collision 
administered glucose gel as a means of correcting his low 
blood sugar level. 
 
3
 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, each party 
tendered jury instructions relating to the sudden emergency 
doctrine.  The instruction submitted by Vahdat stated: 
 
The defendant contends that he was 
confronted with a sudden emergency.  A sudden 
emergency is an event or a combination of 
circumstances that calls for immediate action 
without giving time for the deliberate exercise 
of judgment.  Foreseeable events do not give rise 
to a sudden emergency. 
 
 
The defendant bears the burden of proving 
that, at the time of the accident, he had a 
diabetic blackout, and that he did not foresee 
such a blackout as a possibility.  If you believe 
from the evidence that it is more likely than not 
that the defendant either did not have a diabetic 
blackout or had sufficient notice of an impending 
blackout so that he could have stopped the car 
prior to causing the accident complained of here, 
but did not stop the car, then the defendant was 
negligent. 
 
Holland’s version of the sudden emergency instruction read: 
 
The defendant contends that he was 
confronted with a sudden emergency.  A sudden 
emergency is an event or a combination of 
circumstances that calls for immediate action 
without giving time for the deliberate exercise 
of judgment. 
 
 
If you believe from the evidence that the 
defendant, without negligence on his part, was 
confronted with a sudden emergency and acted as a 
reasonable person would have acted under the 
circumstances of this case, he was not negligent. 
 
Vahdat argued before the circuit court that the 
evidence did not support an instruction on the “sudden 
emergency” doctrine at all, but offered her own 
 
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“precautionary instruction” on sudden emergency in case the 
circuit court decided one was merited.  In support of her 
tendered instruction, Vahdat asserted that Holland, as the 
defendant, has the burden to prove a sudden emergency 
occurred at the time of the accident. 
The circuit court concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to warrant an instruction on the sudden 
emergency doctrine.  The court, however, refused Vahdat’s 
version of the sudden emergency instruction and, over 
Vahdat’s objection, granted the one submitted by Holland.  
The court reasoned that a defendant does not have the 
burden to prove the occurrence of a sudden emergency.  The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Holland, upon which the 
circuit court entered final judgment.  We awarded Vahdat 
this appeal limited to the question whether the circuit 
court erred by granting an instruction on the sudden 
emergency doctrine that did not include language “imposing 
a burden of proof, production, or persuasion” on Holland 
“to substantiate that defense.”2 
                     
2 Whether the circuit court erred by giving any jury 
instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine is not before 
us.  Nonetheless, we reiterate, “the grant of a sudden 
emergency instruction is rarely appropriate.”  Jones v. 
Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. 237, 263, 559 S.E.2d 592, 605 
(2002); accord Herr v. Wheeler, 272 Va. 310, 315, 634 
S.E.2d 317, 320 (2006). 
 
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The sudden emergency doctrine provides that “[w]hen 
the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on 
his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as 
an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same 
or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence.”  
Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60, 63, 116 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1960) 
(citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 
Va. 53, 60, 46 S.E.2d 26, 30 (1948)); accord Velocity 
Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 193, 585 
S.E.2d 557, 560 (2003).  Although Vahdat does not contend 
that the doctrine of sudden emergency is an affirmative 
defense, she asserts that, based on our prior case law, a 
defendant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of a sudden emergency.  Thus, 
according to Vahdat, the circuit court erred by failing to 
properly instruct the jury that Holland, in relying on the 
defense of sudden emergency, had this burden.  We do not 
agree. 
In Daniels v. C.I. Whitten Transfer Co., 196 Va. 537, 
84 S.E.2d 528 (1954), the Court rejected an argument 
virtually identical to the one advanced by Vahdat in this 
appeal.  Id. at 545, 84 S.E.2d at 533.  In doing so, the 
Court held that the sudden emergency doctrine “does not 
constitute an affirmative defense shifting the burden of 
 
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proof in the case.”  Id. (citing Southern Passenger Motor 
Lines, 187 Va. at 59, 46 S.E.2d at 29); but see Monahan v. 
Obici Med. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 271 Va. 621, 632, 628 S.E.2d 
330, 336 (2006) (holding that mitigation of damages is an 
affirmative defense, and “[c]onsequently, the defendant 
bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to 
mitigate his damages”) (citations omitted).  We explained 
that, when a plaintiff presents a prima facie case of 
negligence, a defendant, relying on the defense of sudden 
emergency, must then make “a reasonable explanation, such 
an explanation as the jury could accept, showing that what 
happened was due to something other than the negligence of 
[the defendant].”  Daniels, 196 Va. at 546, 84 S.E.2d at 
533–34.  But, we emphasized, “[n]otwithstanding this burden 
of producing evidence in explanation, the ultimate burden 
remained on the plaintiff to prove her case, that is, to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that her injuries 
were caused by the negligence of the defendants.”  Id., 84 
S.E.2d at 534.  We also noted that, if the plaintiff in 
Daniels had desired, she could have requested the trial 
court to grant an instruction regarding the defendants’ 
duty to make a reasonable explanation for their actions.  
Id. at 547, 84 S.E.2d at 534. 
 
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Vahdat, however, claims that our opinion in Daniels 
was ambiguous as to whether the requirement of producing 
evidence in explanation in order to rebut a plaintiff’s 
prima facie case of negligence imposed on a defendant a 
burden of persuasion or a burden of production as to the 
existence of a claimed sudden emergency.  Conversely, she 
asserts that our decisions in Gaines v. Campbell, 159 Va. 
504, 166 S.E. 704 (1932), Carolina Coach Co. v. Starchia, 
219 Va. 135, 244 S.E.2d 788 (1978), and Pickett demonstrate 
that a defendant who relies on the doctrine of sudden 
emergency has the burden of showing the existence of such 
an emergency by a preponderance of the evidence.  None of 
these cases, however, stands for that proposition. 
In Gaines, the trial court instructed the jury 
“that[,] in order to excuse the defendant, [it] must 
believe from a preponderance of the evidence that [a] 
sudden emergency did, in fact, exist, and that the 
emergency was brought about through no fault of the 
defendant himself.”  159 Va. at 524, 166 S.E. at 711.  This 
Court found no error either in that instruction or in other 
instructions that were challenged on appeal.  It is 
evident, however, from the Court’s opinion that the 
question now before us was not at issue in Gaines.  
Furthermore, the instruction did not actually state that 
 
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the defendant bore the burden of proving the existence of a 
sudden emergency by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
Similarly, in Carolina Coach, the defendant tendered 
an instruction with almost identical language as the 
instruction in Gaines.  In relevant part, the instruction 
stated that the defendant could not be held liable if the 
jury “believe[d] from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant . . . was confronted with a sudden 
emergency.”  219 Va. at 141 n.2, 244 S.E.2d at 792 n.2.  
The only question before the Court relating to the sudden 
emergency doctrine was whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to give any instruction to the jury on that issue.  
Id. at 141, 244 S.E.2d at 792.  Thus, as in Gaines, the 
actual language of the instruction was not at issue.  In 
other words, neither in Gaines nor in Carolina Coach did we 
express any opinion about whether the respective 
instructions were correct statements of law. 
Finally, in Pickett, we held that the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury “that if [it] believed from 
the evidence that ‘it is as likely as not that the left 
rear tire blew out,’ producing without defendant’s fault a 
sudden emergency in which he operated his car as a 
reasonable person would have done under the same or similar 
circumstances, they should find for the defendant.”  202 
 
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Va. at 63, 116 S.E.2d at 51.  We stated that the phrase “as 
likely as not” was “inapt and incorrect in an instruction 
on the burden of proof” because “it placed the burden on 
the wrong party and in effect required the plaintiff to 
prove that the tire did not blow out.”  Id.  We then 
articulated the defendant’s evidentiary burden when relying 
on the sudden emergency defense: 
 
It was the defendant’s burden to explain the 
presence of his automobile on the wrong side of 
the road.  The fact that it was there made a 
prima facie case of negligence for the plaintiff.  
The burden was then on the defendant to produce 
evidence to show why it was there.  His evidence 
was that his tire blew out, creating an emergency 
and causing him to lose control.  If the jury 
could reasonably believe from his evidence that 
the tire did blow out and create the emergency 
claimed by the defendant, the burden then was on 
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the 
whole evidence that there was negligence on the 
part of the defendant which was a proximate cause 
of her injuries. 
 
Id.  This holding, like that in Daniels, requires a 
defendant only to produce evidence of a reasonable 
explanation. 
 
Thus, we conclude that, based on our prior cases, a 
defendant does not have the burden of proving the existence 
of a sudden emergency by a preponderance of the evidence.  
A defendant relying on that doctrine needs only to produce 
evidence explaining that the accident was due to something 
other than the defendant’s negligence.  Daniels, 196 Va. at 
 
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546, 84 S.E.2d at 533–34.  The burden of producing such 
evidence (also referred to as the burden of going forward) 
shifts to a defendant when a plaintiff makes out a prima 
facie case of negligence.  Garnot v. Johnson, 239 Va. 81, 
84, 387 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1990); Watford v. Morse, 202 Va. 
605, 607, 118 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1961).  The burden of 
producing evidence may frequently shift from party to party 
during the course of a trial.  Riggsby v. Tritton, 143 Va. 
903, 918, 129 S.E. 493, 498 (1925).  A plaintiff, however, 
always has the burden of persuasion (also referred to as 
the burden of proof) on the issue of primary negligence; it 
never shifts.  Garnot, 239 Va. at 84, 387 S.E.2d at 475. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err in giving the sudden emergency instruction tendered by 
Holland.  Since Holland did not have the burden of proving 
the existence of a sudden emergency by a preponderance of 
the evidence, Vahdat’s tendered instruction was not a 
correct statement of law.  Furthermore, an instruction on 
the sudden emergency doctrine does not need to include any 
reference to a defendant’s burden to produce evidence of a 
reasonable explanation because the question of sudden 
emergency would not be properly submitted to a jury if a 
defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to support an 
instruction on the subject.  See Pollins v. Jones, 263 Va. 
 
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25, 28, 557 S.E.2d 713, 714 (2002) (“A jury instruction may 
be given only if there is evidence to support the 
instruction.”). 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed.