Title: Murray v. Town of Hudson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11816
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 3, 2015

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SJC-11816 
 
JOHN W. MURRAY  vs.  TOWN OF HUDSON & others.1 
 
 
 
Worcester.     April 9, 2015. - August 3, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Municipal Corporations, Liability for tort, Parks, Notice to 
municipality, Governmental immunity.  Negligence, 
Municipality, One owning or controlling real estate, 
Athletics.  Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.  Parks and 
Parkways.  Governmental Immunity.  Notice, Claim under 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.  Practice, Civil, 
Presentment of claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 24, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by John S. McCann, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Brian W. Murray for the plaintiff. 
 
John J. Davis for town of Hudson. 
                                                 
 
1 Alteris Insurance Services, Inc. (Alteris), and Argonaut 
Insurance Company (Argonaut).  In June, 2014, a stipulation of 
dismissal with prejudice was entered relative to the plaintiff's 
claims against Alteris and Argonaut. 
2 
 
 
Charlotte E. Glinka, Thomas R. Murphy, Elizabeth S. Dillon, 
& John A. Finbury, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  During a varsity baseball game between two 
high school teams at a public park in the town of Hudson (town), 
the plaintiff, a ballplayer with the visiting team, seriously 
injured his knee while warming up in the bullpen.  The plaintiff 
filed suit in the Superior Court against the town under the 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258 (act), alleging that 
his injury was caused by the town's negligence and its wanton 
and reckless conduct in allowing the visiting team to use a 
dangerous bullpen.  The judge allowed the town's motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that the evidence did not support a 
finding of wanton or reckless conduct, and that the plaintiff's 
negligence claim was barred by the recreational use statute, 
G. L. c. 21, § 17C, where the injury occurred on a baseball 
field owned by the town that it allowed the public to use 
without a fee, and where the town had no "special relationship" 
with the plaintiff because he was a student from a visiting high 
school rather than the town's own high school.  We conclude that 
the town could be found liable for negligence despite the 
recreational use statute because, where a town's school invites 
another town's school to play an athletic match on a town field, 
the town owes the visiting student-athletes the same duty to 
3 
 
provide a reasonably safe playing field that it owes to its own 
students.  We also conclude that there was no failure of 
presentment under § 4 of the act, and that it cannot be 
determined until trial whether liability is barred by the 
discretionary function exemption in § 10(b) of the act.  We 
therefore reverse the allowance of the motion for summary 
judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for trial.2 
 
Background.  We recite the undisputed facts in the summary 
judgment record.  Hudson High School (Hudson) hosted a varsity 
baseball game against Milford High School (Milford) on the night 
of May 15, 2010.3  The game was played at Riverside Park, a 
public park in the town maintained by the town's department of 
public works.4  The plaintiff, a member of the visiting Milford 
team, alleges as follows: 
"During the game, [the plaintiff] was asked by his coach to 
warm up as a pitcher and he went to a designated 'bullpen' 
area located behind the third base dugout.  The 'bullpen' 
area consisted of a[n] . . . area with wooden landscape 
timbers or berms enclosing the pitching rubber 
approximately [eighty-four] inches apart.  During the 
                                                 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
 
 
3 Hudson High School and Milford High School are both 
members of the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic 
Association (MIAA).  The baseball game on May 15, 2010, was an 
interscholastic event governed by the rules of the MIAA. 
 
 
4 The town of Hudson (town) does not charge a fee for the 
use of Riverside Park, and does not receive any portion of any 
annual athletic fee that the plaintiff pays Milford High School. 
 
4 
 
course of his warm-ups, [the plaintiff]'s left foot on the 
follow through of a pitch struck the wooden landscape 
timber or berm located to his right.  The uneven landing 
resulted in a twisting of [the plaintiff]'s left knee and 
caused him to fall to the ground and experience immediate 
pain.  [The plaintiff] was caused to suffer a badly torn 
meniscus in his left knee which required two (2) surgical 
procedures as well as other medical and physical therapy 
treatments to repair and heal."5 
 
The bullpen was designed and constructed by a former town 
employee, and was maintained by the town and by student 
athletes. 
 
As required under § 4 of the act, the plaintiff sent a 
letter to the town board of selectmen on December 10, 2010, 
reciting the above-quoted allegations, notifying them that he 
was asserting a claim against the town, and making demand of 
$100,000 for his "injuries, pain and suffering and medical 
expenses."  The letter alleged that the town had "engaged in 
willful, wanton or reckless conduct," and had committed a breach 
of its "duty of reasonable care to visiting high school baseball 
players and was negligent in allowing them to utilize the . . . 
bullpen area."  The letter further alleged that the "bullpen 
area" was "inherently dangerous" in three ways: 
 
"First, the width of approximately [eighty-four] 
inches between the wooden timbers that enclose the pitching 
                                                 
 
5 During his deposition testimony, the plaintiff stated that 
the poor grading of the dirt forced him to start his pitching 
motion on the far right side of the rubber.  He also stated that 
he had never warmed up in a bullpen with exposed wooden timbers 
before. 
 
5 
 
mound is much too narrow an area, particularly when 
compared to the field's actual pitching mound which is 
approximately 140 inches across in the landing area and 203 
inches in diameter at the pitching rubber. 
 
 
"Secondly, the use of wooden timbers at all in this 
type of athletic setting, i.e. a pitching mound, is 
extremely dangerous.  It invites exactly the kind of injury 
which occurred in this instance by creating an uneven 
landing spot for pitchers. 
 
 
"Third, the area itself is poorly lit.  As stated, 
[the plaintiff] was injured during a night game.  The poor 
lighting prevented him from viewing clearly, competently 
and thoroughly the condition of the warm up mound, 
particularly the type, size and locations of the wooden 
berms." 
 
 
After the town's insurer denied the plaintiff's claim, the 
plaintiff brought this action, claiming that the town had 
committed a breach of its "duty of reasonable care" and "engaged 
in willful, wanton and reckless conduct" by "allowing a 
'bullpen' area to be accessed by [the plaintiff] that was poorly 
constructed, maintained and illuminated, all without any posted 
warnings."  After the town's motion for summary judgment was 
allowed by the judge, the plaintiff appealed, and we transferred 
the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Recreational use statute.  Murray 
challenges the judge's ruling that the recreational use statute 
bars his negligence claim against the town.  The recreational 
use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C, was enacted in 1972 "to 
encourage landowners to permit broad, public, free use of land 
for recreational purposes by limiting their obligations to 
6 
 
lawful visitors under the common law."  Ali v. Boston, 441 Mass. 
233, 238 (2004).  General Laws c. 21, § 17C (a), provides, in 
relevant part: 
"Any person having an interest in land including the 
structures, buildings, and equipment attached to the land 
. . . who lawfully permits the public to use such land for 
recreational . . . purposes without imposing a charge or 
fee therefor . . . shall not be liable for personal 
injuries . . . sustained by such members of the public, 
including without limitation a minor, while on said land in 
the absence of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct by such 
person." 
 
The statute makes recreational users a "discrete subgroup of 
lawful visitors owed only the standard of care applicable to 
trespassers:  that is, landowners must refrain from wilful, 
wanton, or reckless conduct as to their safety."  Ali, supra at 
237.  Because landowners do not owe recreational users the 
reasonable duty of care owed to other lawful visitors, they may 
not be found liable to them for ordinary negligence.  See id. 
Government landowners that provide free access to their land for 
public use are protected from liability by G. L. c. 21, § 17C, 
to the same extent as private landowners.  See G. L. c. 21, 
§ 17C (b) (including "any governmental body, agency or 
instrumentality" within meaning of term "person").6  The town is 
thus a proper party to invoke the recreational use statute. 
                                                 
 
6 The definition of "person" under the recreational use 
statute was added in 1998 to G. L. c. 21, § 17C.  St. 1998, 
c. 268.  But even before the statute made clear that "any person 
having an interest in land" included a governmental body, we had 
7 
 
 
The original legislative purpose of the recreational use 
statute was to encourage landowners to give the public free 
access to their land for recreational purposes by protecting 
them from negligence claims if a member of the public were to be 
injured on the land.7  It was not intended to diminish the duty 
of care that a school owes its students to provide reasonably 
safe school premises for school-related activities, including 
interscholastic sports.  "Personal injury from defective 
premises . . . is not a risk that schoolchildren should, as 
matter of public policy, be required to run in return for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
held that government landowners were protected from negligence 
liability by the recreational use statute, relying on the 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, § 2, which 
expressly provides that government entities "shall be liable 
. . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances."  See Anderson v. 
Springfield, 406 Mass. 632, 634 (1990). 
 
 
7 The recreational use statute, which also is called the 
public use statute, was enacted following the commission of a 
report by the Legislature, published in 1967, which found that 
"the general public was increasingly pursuing 'participant 
forms' of outdoor recreation (e.g., boating, camping, and 
hiking), creating a need for more land than was then available 
for public recreational use," and which also found that "the 
need for additional space would not be met unless private 
landowners were persuaded to open their land to the recreating 
public" despite their "fear[s] that they would incur liability 
for injured recreationalists."  Ali v. Boston, 441 Mass. 233, 
235-236 (2004), citing 1967 Senate Doc. No. 1136, at 15-16.  As 
originally enacted, the recreational use statute only extended 
immunity to landowners who open their land to the public for 
recreational purposes.  See St. 1972, c. 575.  It has been 
amended to encompass landowners who open their land to the 
public for other enumerated public purposes, including 
educational purposes.  See St. 1998, c. 268. 
 
8 
 
benefit of a public education."  Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 
208, 223 (1977).  See Alter v. Newton, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 142, 
145 (1993) ("Because of the relationship between a school and 
its students, the city had a duty of care to the plaintiff to 
provide her with reasonably safe school premises").8  Therefore, 
the recreational use statute does not alter the standard of care 
that a school owes its own students arising from its special 
relationship with its students, and would not protect the town 
from liability for negligence claims brought against it by 
students enrolled in its own public schools for injuries 
sustained while the students were engaged in school-related 
activities.  See id. at 149, quoting Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. 
Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 588-589 (1989) ("'if the 
recreational use statute were applied to injuries children 
suffered while on school premises as students,' the special 
relationship of the school to its students would be 
substantially impaired").9  Cf. Wilkins v. Haverhill, 468 Mass. 
                                                 
 
8 See also Driscoll v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 70 Mass. 
App. Ct. 285, 304 (2007) (Mills, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("The existence of a duty that secondary 
schools owe to minor children is further supported by the 
special protections that both the courts and the Legislature 
have long accorded to minors, and by the doctrine of in loco 
parentis" [footnote omitted]). 
 
 
9 See also McIntosh v. Omaha Pub. Sch., 249 Neb. 529, 538 
(1996), appeal after remand, 254 Neb. 641 (1998), overruled on 
other grounds by Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320 (2006) 
("Clearly, a student participating in a clinic sponsored by his 
9 
 
86, 91 n.9 (2014), quoting Ali, 441 Mass. at 236  (because 
municipalities need no "encouragement to open their schools for 
parent-teacher conferences," applying recreational use statute 
to parent's slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-
teacher night "would upend the balance that the Legislature 
intended to strike 'between encouraging public access to private 
land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries'"). 
 
If the baseball game between the Hudson and Milford teams 
had been played on a field on the Hudson grounds, it would be 
plain that the town owed a duty to its students to maintain the 
field in a reasonably safe condition.  That duty remains where, 
as here, Hudson chooses to play its home interscholastic 
baseball games in a town park off the high school grounds. 
                                                                                                                                                             
school's athletic program does not fall under the category of 
recreational use of land open to members of the public without 
charge"); M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 783 N.W.2d 806, 
815 (N.D. 2010), appeal after remand, 815 N.W.2d 273 (N.D. 2012) 
("we do not believe the Legislature intended to relieve school 
districts of duties of care owed their students, who are 
mandated by law to attend their schools, based on a statutory 
scheme designed to encourage landowners to make available to the 
public land and water areas for recreational purposes"); Auman 
v. School Dist. of Stanley-Boyd, 248 Wis. 2d 548, 554, 563-564 
(2001) (where plaintiff was injured sliding down snow pile on 
school playground during recess, "[h]er participation in what is 
a 'recreational activity' in common parlance . . . does not 
convert the educational purpose of school attendance into a 
recreational activity under the [recreational immunity] 
statute," and "[n]o reason exists to immunize school districts 
from liability for not exercising reasonable care in the 
maintenance of school facilities or supervision of 
schoolchildren during regular school hours"). 
10 
 
 
The town does not dispute that, if a Hudson pitcher had 
been injured warming up in the home team bullpen, the 
recreational use statute would not shield the town from 
liability for negligence because of the special relationship the 
town has with its own students.  But the town argues, and the 
judge concluded, that because the plaintiff was a pitcher on the 
visiting team and not a student at Hudson, there was no "special 
relationship" between the plaintiff and the town "that stands in 
the way of the normal operation of the recreational use 
statute."  The consequence of such a ruling would be that the 
town owes a duty of care to maintain a reasonably safe bullpen 
for the home team, but need only avoid wilful, wanton, or 
reckless conduct in maintaining the visiting team's bullpen.  
This not only would be poor sportsmanship; it would be bad law. 
Hudson has chosen to offer interscholastic baseball as a 
school-related activity for its students, but it can do so only 
if other schools agree to compete against it; otherwise, Hudson 
high school could offer only intramural baseball.  Where the 
town, as it did here, invites a school like Milford to play a 
baseball game on the town's home field, thereby enabling Hudson 
students to play interscholastic baseball, the town owes the 
students on the visiting team the same duty of care to provide a 
reasonably safe playing field that it owes its own students.  
Where the recreational use statute does not shield the town from 
11 
 
liability for negligence resulting in injuries to its own public 
school students, the statute also does not shield the town from 
liability for negligence resulting in injuries to visiting 
student-athletes.  See Morales v. Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 724, 
731 (R.I. 2006) (despite recreational use statute, town owed 
visiting student-athlete "a special duty of care to protect her 
from a dangerous condition on the athletic field").  Cf. Avila 
v. Citrus Community College Dist., 38 Cal. 4th 148, 161-162 
(2006) (despite doctrine of assumption of risk, "the host school 
and its agents owe a duty to home and visiting players alike to 
. . . not increase the risks inherent in the sport"). 
 
The judge rested his ruling in part on Kavanagh v. Trustees 
of Boston Univ., 440 Mass. 195, 196 (2003), where a Boston 
University basketball player during an intercollegiate 
basketball game punched and broke the nose of an opposing 
player.  In that case, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Boston University, noting that the university owed 
no duty to protect the plaintiff from third-party conduct absent 
a "special relationship" between the plaintiff and Boston 
University, and concluding that a college's "special 
relationship" with its own students does not extend to student-
athletes from a different college.  Id. at 201-203.  We need not 
consider here whether to revisit that precedent, which did not 
involve the recreational use statute, because the issue in that 
12 
 
case was whether the university was negligent in failing to 
protect the plaintiff from third-party conduct, not whether the 
university was negligent in failing reasonably to provide a safe 
basketball court.  Had the plaintiff in that case been injured 
by falling on an unreasonably unsafe basketball floor, our 
analysis might have been quite different. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that, despite the 
recreational use statute, the town may be found liable for 
negligence in providing the pitchers from the opposing team with 
a bullpen that was not reasonably safe.10 
 
2.  Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.  The town also argues 
that the plaintiff did not comply with the act's presentment 
requirement, G. L. c. 258, § 4, because the plaintiff's 
presentment letter to the town raised only a "negligent design" 
theory, and did not also raise the "negligent maintenance" 
                                                 
10 The plaintiff also argues that the recreational use 
statute does not bar his claim because, when the game was being 
played, the ballfield was open only to the two high school 
baseball teams and not to the general public.  We reject this 
argument.  Where a landowner makes available its land for use by 
the general public, the recreational use statute will not cease 
to protect the landowner simply because the landowner, without 
charging a fee, allows members of the public to reserve a 
particular field at a particular date and time to avoid 
conflicts over who may use that field.  Contrast Marcus v. 
Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 156-157 (2012) (recreational use statute 
did not apply where softball league paid fee to town to reserve 
field, and where there was no evidence in summary judgment 
record that fee was used to reimburse town for marginal costs 
directly attributable to league's use of field). 
 
13 
 
theory alleged in his complaint.  Further, the town argues that 
it is not liable for "negligent design," because the design of 
the bullpen was a "discretionary function" falling within the 
act's discretionary function exception, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b).  
The motion judge did not reach either of these arguments.  
Because our review of a motion for summary judgment is de novo, 
see Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 711 
(2012), and because we may affirm an allowance of summary 
judgment on grounds other than those reached by the judge, see 
id., we address these arguments here. 
 
Under the act, G. L. c. 258, § 4, "[a] civil action shall 
not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for 
damages [under the act] unless the claimant shall have first 
presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such 
public employer . . . ."  "This strict presentment requirement 
is a statutory prerequisite for recovery under the [a]ct."  
Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 267 (2013).  Its purpose is 
to "ensure[] that the responsible public official receives 
notice of the claim so that the official can investigate to 
determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of 
inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims 
expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will 
not be brought in the future."  Richardson v. Dailey, 424 Mass. 
258, 261 (1997), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the 
14 
 
Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 (1985).  See Shapiro, 
supra at 268.  See also Estate of Gavin v. Tewksbury State 
Hosp., 468 Mass. 123, 131-135 (2014). 
 
A presentment letter should be precise in identifying the 
legal basis of a plaintiff's claim, but it is adequate if it 
sets forth sufficient facts from which public officials 
reasonably can discern the legal basis of the claim, and 
determine whether it states a claim for which damages may be 
recovered under the act.  See Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 
718, 723 (1994) ("While a presentment letter should be precise 
in identifying the legal basis of a plaintiff's claim, [the 
plaintiff's] letters . . . were not so obscure that educated 
public officials should find themselves baffled or misled with 
respect to" claim being asserted).  Here, the presentment letter 
identified the legal basis of the plaintiff's claims as 
negligence and wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct; it did not 
characterize the specific theory of negligence, and did not use 
the terms "negligent design" or "negligent maintenance."  The 
letter claimed that the town was negligent in allowing the 
visiting players to use a bullpen that was "inherently 
dangerous," and described what made the bullpen dangerous, 
noting specifically the width of the pitching mound in the 
visiting team's bullpen, the use of wooden "timbers" to enclose 
15 
 
the pitching mound, and the poor quality of lighting.11  It is 
not apparent from these allegations in the presentment letter 
that liability in this case would rest solely on the "design" of 
the bullpen.  We conclude that the presentment letter provided 
the town with adequate notice of the circumstances of the 
plaintiff's negligence claim -- without limitation to any 
specific theory of negligence -- and that the town reasonably 
could investigate those circumstances and determine whether the 
town might be liable on the claim under the act.  See McAllister 
v. Boston Hous. Auth., 429 Mass. 300, 305 n.7 (1999), overruled 
on other grounds by Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734 (2014) 
(where presentment letter only explicitly raised one of 
plaintiff's theories of liability, presentment requirement was 
satisfied with respect to all theories because "executive 
officer had the opportunity to investigate the circumstances of 
each claim, as all theories of liability argued by the plaintiff 
were based on the same facts"). 
 
Having concluded that the plaintiff's presentment letter 
does not limit the plaintiff to a "negligent design" theory, we 
also conclude that the town is not entitled to summary judgment 
based on its claim that the town is immune from liability on a 
"negligent design" theory under the act's discretionary function 
                                                 
 
11 The letter noted that there were "perhaps more" reasons 
why the bullpen was dangerous. 
16 
 
exception.12  It is not apparent from the summary judgment record 
that the plaintiff intends to rest solely on that theory.  Nor 
is it apparent from the summary judgment record that the width 
of the mound and the enclosure of the mound by wooden "timbers" 
are the type of design decisions that fall within the 
discretionary function exception.  See Barnett v. Lynn, 433 
Mass. 662, 664 (2001), quoting Patrazza v. Commonwealth, 398 
Mass. 464, 467 (1986) ("Generally, such discretionary conduct is 
'characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment 
involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with 
respect to public policy and planning'").  The issue whether 
some or all of the plaintiff's claims come within the 
discretionary function exception cannot be resolved until the 
judge can determine whether the plaintiff rests liability on a 
negligent design theory and, if so, whether the decisions 
concerning the design of the bullpen constitute the type of 
discretionary policy-making and planning by government officials 
that is protected by sovereign immunity.  See Greenwood v. 
Easton, 444 Mass. 467, 470 (2005) ("Deciding whether particular 
discretionary acts involve policy making or planning depends on 
                                                 
 
12 The discretionary function exception, G. L. c. 258, § 10 
(b), provides that a public employer shall not be liable for 
"any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a public employer or public employee, acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion 
involved is abused." 
17 
 
the specific facts of each case"); Alter, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 
148 ("the application of the discretionary function exception is 
a question of law for the court"). 
 
Conclusion.  We reverse the order granting summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants, and remand the case to the Superior 
Court for trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.