Title: Ronald W. Coutts, Sr. v. Wisconsin Retirement Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001905
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1905, 95-2228 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Ronald W. Coutts, Sr. 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Retirement Board, 
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner, 
City of Racine, 
 
Respondent. 
------------------------------ 
Byron Des Jarlais, 
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Retirement Board, 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  201 Wis. 2d 178, 547 N.W.2d 821 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 22, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 27, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Angela B. Bartell & Michael N. Nowakowski 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-respondent/appellant-
petitioner the cause was argued by L. Jane Hamblen, assistant 
attorney general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, 
attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by 
Bruce F. Ehlke and Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, 
Hawks & Domer, Madison and oral argument by Bruce F. Ehlke. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief 
by Lester A. Pines, Cheryl Rosen Weston and Cullen, Weston, Pines 
& Bach, Madison and oral argument by Lester Pines. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ronald W. Coutts, Sr., 
 
  
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin Retirement Board, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
City of Racine,  
 
 
Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Byron Des Jarlais, 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin Retirement Board, 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The Wisconsin Retirement Board 
("the Board") seeks review of a published decision of the court 
of appeals,
1 which held that the Board is not statutorily 
                     
1 Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Bd., 201 Wis. 2d 178, 547 
N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1996)(consolidating Coutts' and Des 
Jarlais' cases).  
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
2 
authorized to reduce the duty disability benefits of Ronald W. 
Coutts, Sr. and Byron Des Jarlais with worker's compensation 
benefits previously paid to them.  The Board argues that the 
court of appeals erred because the statute in question requires 
an offset of duty disability benefits with all worker's 
compensation 
payments, 
regardless 
of 
when 
the 
worker's 
compensation payments are made.  We conclude that the statute 
unambiguously mandates an offset of duty disability benefits 
only with worker's compensation payments paid after the duty 
disability benefit payments commence.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.   
¶2 
The parties have stipulated to the relevant facts: 
Ronald W. Coutts, Sr. 
¶3 
Ronald W. Coutts, Sr. was employed as a City of Racine 
firefighter, 
and 
was 
therefore 
a 
"protective 
occupation 
participant" for purposes of the Wisconsin Retirement System 
(WRS).  See Wis. Stat. § 40.02(48)(1995-96).
2  In August 1988, 
Coutts suffered an injury to his right shoulder while fighting a 
fire.  Following surgery on the shoulder and a period of 
physical therapy, Coutts returned to light duty employment at 
the Racine Fire Department in January 1989.  However, the 
permanent physical limitations resulting from the shoulder 
injury eventually forced Coutts to retire.  His last day on the 
Fire Department payroll was September 30, 1989. 
                     
2 
Unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
future 
statutory 
references are to the 1995-96 volume.  
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
3 
¶4 
Following his injury, Coutts filed a claim for 
permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to the Worker's 
Compensation Act, Chapter 102, Wis. Stat.
3  In April 1989, the 
Worker's Compensation Division of the Department of Industry, 
Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) determined that Coutts was 
entitled 
to 
permanent 
partial 
disability 
benefits. 
 
The 
permanent partial disability benefits were paid at a rate of 
$524.33 per month, effective January 7, 1989.  In January 1990, 
Coutts received the last $524.33 full monthly payment of 
permanent partial disability benefits, and in February 1990, he 
received a final payment of $101.88.    
¶5 
Coutts also applied for duty disability benefits under 
Wis. Stat. § 40.65.
4  In May 1989, the Department of Employe 
Trust Funds (DETF) advised Coutts that he was eligible to 
receive duty disability benefits.  When Coutts left the payroll 
of the Fire Department, he began receiving § 40.65 duty 
disability benefits. 
                     
3 Coutts also applied for and received worker's compensation 
temporary total disability benefits. 
4 Section 40.65(4) provides:  
A protective occupation participant is entitled to a 
duty disability benefit as provided in this section 
if: 
(a) The employe is injured while performing his 
or her duty or contracts a disease due to his or her 
occupation; 
(b) The disability is likely to be permanent; and 
(c) 1.  The disability causes the employe to 
retire from his or her job; 
2. The employe's pay or position is reduced or he 
or she is assigned to light duty . . . . 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
4 
¶6 
The DETF reduced Coutts' § 40.65 duty disability 
benefits each month by $524.33, which was the monthly amount of 
worker's compensation permanent partial disability benefits that 
he was receiving at the time.
5  The net result was that Coutts' 
monthly combination of duty disability and worker's compensation 
                     
5 See Wis. Stat. § 40.65(5)(b), providing in part: 
The Wisconsin retirement board shall reduce the amount 
of a participant's monthly benefit under this section 
by the amounts under subds. 1. to 6., . . . .  The 
Wisconsin retirement board may assume that any benefit 
or amount listed under subds. 1. to 6. is payable to a 
participant until it is determined to the board's 
satisfaction that the participant is ineligible to 
receive the benefit or amount . . . . 
1.  Any OASDHI benefit payable to the participant 
or the participant's spouse or a dependent because of 
the participant's work record. 
2.  Any unemployment compensation benefit payable 
to the participant because of his or her work record. 
3.  Any worker's compensation benefit payable to 
the participant, including payments made pursuant to a 
compromise settlement under s. 102.16(1).  A lump sum 
worker's compensation payment or compromise settlement 
shall reduce the participant's benefit under this 
section in monthly amounts equal to 4.3 times the 
maximum benefit which would otherwise be payable under 
ch. 102 for the participant's disability until the 
lump sum amount is exahusted. 
4.  Any disability and retirement benefit payable 
to the participant under this chapter [40], or under 
any other retirement system, that is based upon the 
participant's 
earnings 
record 
and 
years 
of 
service. . . . 
5.  All earnings payable to the participant from 
the employer under whom the duty disability occurred. 
6.  All earnings payable to the participant from 
an employer, other than the employer under whom the 
duty disability occurred, and all income from self-
employment . . . .   
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
5 
benefits were the same as if he received duty disability 
benefits alone.  However, the monthly $524.33 reduction in duty 
disability 
benefits 
continued 
even 
after 
Coutts 
stopped 
receiving worker's compensation benefits in February 1990.  The 
DETF based this continued duty disability reduction on the 
worker's compensation payments that Coutts had received in the 
months prior to the commencement of duty disability benefits.  
As such, after his worker's compensation benefits ceased in 
February 1990, Coutts received $524.33 less per month in 
aggregate benefits than he received in the immediately preceding 
months. 
¶7 
In a letter sent to the DETF in August 1990, Coutts 
objected to the offsets against duty disability benefits 
occurring after his worker's compensation benefits ended.  The 
DETF responded that duty disability benefits are to be reduced 
by all worker's compensation benefits received for the same 
disability 
injury, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
worker's 
compensation payments are made before or after the commencement 
of duty disability benefits.  Coutts appealed the DETF's 
determination to the Board.  See § 40.03(8)(f).         
¶8 
The Board, in a final decision and order dated 
September 15, 1994, concluded that the plain language of 
§ 40.65(5)(b)3 requires an offset of all worker's compensation 
payments against § 40.65 duty disability benefits, regardless of 
the timing of the worker's compensation benefits payments.
6  
Coutts filed a petition for certiorari review in the Circuit 
Court for Dane County, Angela Bartell, Judge. 
                     
6 The Board's final decision and order adopted the proposed 
decision and order of the hearing examiner. 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
6 
¶9 
The circuit court determined that § 40.65(5)(b)3 is 
ambiguous.  However, according to the circuit court, other 
provisions in § 40.65, as well as the legislative history, 
evince a broad legislative intent to offset duty disability 
payments with other sources of income, without regard to the 
time that the duty disability payments commence.  Determining 
that the Board's interpretation of § 40.65 was consistent with 
the legislative intent, the circuit court affirmed the Board's 
decision.  Coutts appealed.  The court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that the statute is unambiguous and does not 
authorize the DETF to reduce § 40.65 duty disability benefits 
with previously paid worker’s compensation benefits.  The Board 
petitioned this court for review.   
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
7 
Byron L. Des Jarlais 
¶10 Byron L. Des Jarlais was employed as a deputy sheriff 
for Vilas County.  In 1988, Des Jarlais suffered a work-related 
back 
injury 
for 
which 
he 
received 
both 
temporary 
total 
disability and permanent partial disability benefits under the 
Worker’s Compensation Act.  Des Jarlais received a total of 
$8,190 in permanent partial disability payments, with the final 
payment being made in December 1988.
7 
¶11 After aggravating his back injury while on the job, 
Des Jarlais applied for § 40.65 duty disability benefits in 
April 1991.  The DETF approved his application, and duty 
disability payments commenced in August 1991.  The DETF reduced 
Des Jarlais’ monthly duty disability payment by $503.10 until 
the amount deducted equaled the $8,190 in permanent partial 
disability payments that Des Jarlais had received through 
December 1988.
8 
¶12 The Board rejected Des Jarlais’ claim that his 
disability benefits should not be reduced by the worker’s 
compensation paid nearly three years prior to the commencement 
of duty disability benefits.  Des Jarlais appealed to the 
Circuit Court for Dane County, Michael Nowakowski, Judge, which 
                     
7 The permanent partial disability was computed as 70 weeks 
at $117 per week, for a total of $8,190. 
8 In 1993, Des Jarlais received an additional permanent 
partial disability award of $587.33, which the DETF deducted 
from his monthly duty disability check.  Because the additional 
$587.33 of worker’s compensation was paid after the commencement 
of duty disability benefits, Des Jarlais does not dispute that 
the DETF properly reduced his duty disability benefits by that 
amount.  We therefore do not address the offset of the 
additional $587.33.  
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
8 
ruled in his favor.  The circuit court concluded that § 40.65 
unambiguously precluded the DETF from reducing duty disability 
benefits 
with 
previously 
received 
worker’s 
compensation 
benefits.  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
circuit court, and the Board petitioned this court for review. 
II.     
¶13 The sole question before this court is whether the 
phrase 
"any 
worker's 
compensation 
benefit 
payable" 
in 
§ 40.65(5)(b)3 
authorizes 
the 
Board 
to 
reduce 
a 
WRS 
participant's 
duty 
disability 
benefits 
with 
worker's 
compensation benefits paid prior to the commencement of duty 
disability benefits.  Generally, the interpretation of a statute 
is a question of law reviewed by this court under a de novo 
standard, without deference to the decisions of the court of 
appeals, circuit court, or administering agency.  State ex rel. 
Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994). 
 In 
certain 
instances, 
however, 
we 
will 
refrain 
from 
substituting our interpretation of a statute for that of the 
agency charged with administering the statute.  An agency's 
interpretation of a statute is reviewed under one of three 
standards: de novo, "due weight" deference, or "great weight" 
deference.  Sauk County v. WERC, 165 Wis. 2d 406, 413-14, 477 
N.W.2d 267 (1991).   
¶14 An agency's interpretation of a statute will be 
reviewed de novo if any of the following are true: 1) the issue 
before the agency is clearly one of first impression;
9 2) a legal 
                     
9 See Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 244-
45, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992). 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
9 
question is presented and there is no evidence of any special 
agency expertise or experience;
10 or 3) the agency's position on 
an issue has been so inconsistent that it provides no real 
guidance.
11  Under de novo review, the agency's interpretation is 
given no weight.  William Wrigley, Jr. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Revenue, 160 Wis. 2d 53, 71, 465 N.W.2d 800 (1991), rev'd on 
other grounds by Wisconsin Dep't. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, 
Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992).  We conclude that de novo review 
is appropriate in these cases.    
¶15 These cases are analogous to Kelley Co., Inc. v. 
Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  At issue in 
Kelley 
was 
the 
Department 
of 
Industry, 
Labor 
and 
Human 
Relations' (DILHR) interpretation of the phrase "equivalent 
employment position" in the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 
Wis. Stat. § 103.10(8)(a)2.  This court concluded that de novo 
review was appropriate, because the meaning of the statutory 
language was a question of first impression with respect to 
which DILHR had no experience or expertise.  Kelley, 172 Wis. 2d 
at 245.  The Kelley court based its conclusion on the fact that 
DILHR had adopted no administrative rules interpreting the 
meaning of the phrase at issue in that case, and that "the 
hearing examiner relied on no precedent and had no rules to aid 
him in arriving at his conclusion . . . ."  Id.        
                     
10 See William Wrigley, Jr. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Revenue, 160 Wis. 2d 53, 71, 465 N.W.2d 800 (1991), rev'd on 
other grounds by Wisconsin Dep't. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, 
Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992). 
11 See Marten Transport, Ltd. v. DILHR, 176 Wis. 2d 1012, 
1018-19, 501 N.W.2d 391 (1993). 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
10
¶16 For purposes of the instant cases, the Administrative 
Code is devoid of rules interpreting the phrase "any worker's 
compensation benefit payable," and there is no evidence in the 
record that the Board has ever considered whether § 40.65(5)(b)3 
compels an offset of previously paid worker's compensation 
benefits against presently payable duty disability benefits.   
As in Kelley, in neither of the present cases did the hearing 
examiners rely on administrative rules or precedent in reaching 
the conclusion that the phrase "any worker's compensation 
benefit payable" includes worker's compensation benefits paid 
prior to the commencement of duty disability benefits.  We 
therefore conclude that the issue presented in these cases is 
one of first impression in which the Board has no special 
experience or expertise, and that de novo review of the Board's 
interpretation of the phrase "any worker's compensation benefit 
payable" is appropriate. 
¶17 We find unpersuasive the Board's citation to three 
instances in which it has applied § 40.65(5)(b)3 to offset duty 
disability benefits with previously paid worker's compensation 
benefits.  Two of the cases cited by the Board are the very 
cases before this court.  The third is a decision by the Board 
issued on the same day as its decision on Des Jarlais' claim.
12  
As such, all three cases are irrelevant to the issue of whether 
the meaning of § 40.65(5)(b)3 was a question of first impression 
for the Board when it rendered decisions on Coutts’ and Des 
Jarlais’ claims.    
                     
12 Feiereisen v. Wisconsin Retirement Board, No. 95-CV-0022 
(Dane County, Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 22, 1995). 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
11
¶18 Having determined the appropriate standard of review, 
we turn next to interpreting the statutory provision at issue in 
these cases.  When interpreting a statute, this court seeks to 
identify 
and 
effectuate 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature.  
Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 
N.W.2d 96 (1996).  We begin by considering the words of the 
statute.  If the statutory text is clear and unambiguous on its 
face, we need not look further.  Stockbridge, 202 Wis. 2d at 
220.  If the language is ambiguous, we will then construe the 
statute by examining its history, context, subject matter, 
scope, and object.  Id.  
¶19 For purposes of our ambiguity analysis, the relevant 
portion of § 40.65(5) provides: 
 
(b)  The Wisconsin retirement board shall reduce the 
amount of a participant's monthly benefit under this 
section by the amounts under subs. 1. to 6 . . . .  
 
3. Any worker's compensation benefit payable 
to the participant . . . . 
(Emphasis added).  The Board, Coutts, and Des Jarlais agree that 
the language at issue has a clear meaning.  However, Coutts and 
Des Jarlais view the statute as unambiguously supporting their 
position that duty disability benefits cannot be reduced by 
previously paid worker's compensation benefits, whereas the 
Board contends that the statute clearly sustains the opposite 
proposition. 
¶20 Language 
is 
ambiguous 
if 
it 
may 
be 
reasonably 
understood to have more than one meaning.  State ex rel. 
Girouard v. Circuit Court for Jackson County, 155 Wis. 2d 148, 
155, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990).  However, a statute is not rendered 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
12
ambiguous merely by virtue of the parties' disagreement over its 
meaning.  Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 
585, 592, 527 N.W.2d 301 (1995). 
¶21 The word "payable" is the key to interpreting this 
statute.
13  Because the word is not defined in the statute, we 
look first to dictionary definitions of "payable."
14  Payable is 
defined as: 
 
Capable of being paid; suitable to be paid; admitting 
or demanding payment; justly due; legally enforceable. 
 A sum of money is said to be payable when a person is 
under an obligation to pay it.  Payable may therefore 
signify an obligation to pay at a future time, but, 
when used without qualification, term normally means 
that the debt is payable at once, as opposed to 
"owing." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1128 (6th ed. 1990).  See also Random 
House Unabridged Dictionary 1424 (2nd ed. 1993) ("payable" means 
"1. to be paid; due").   
¶22 These definitions demonstrate that the term "payable" 
refers to sums presently owing or to be remitted in the future. 
 The definitions do not support the proposition that the word 
"payable" includes sums that have been remitted in the past.  It 
                     
13 The Board incorrectly focuses on the word "any" in the 
§ 40.65(5)(b)3 phrase "any worker's compensation benefit."  The 
statute's use of the word "payable" modifies and restricts the 
scope of the phrase "any worker's compensation benefit."  This 
fact may be illustrated by the phrase "any automobile," which 
describes a larger universe than the phrase "any automobile that 
is red."     
14 The need to resort to a dictionary for the definition of 
statutory term is not a basis for determining that the term is 
ambiguous.  See Girouard v. Circuit Court for Jackson County, 
155 Wis. 2d 148, 156, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990); State ex rel. Smith 
v. City of Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 798 n.6, 407 N.W.2d 901 
(1987). 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
13
is axiomatic that a sum which is "paid" is no longer "payable." 
 We therefore conclude that § 40.65(5)(b)3 is unambiguous, and 
does not authorize the Board to reduce § 40.65 duty disability 
benefits with worker's compensation benefits paid prior to the 
commencement of duty disability benefits. 
¶23 Our inquiry could end with the determination that 
§ 40.65(5)(b)3 is unambiguous.  Yet, in our quest to identify 
and give effect to the legislature's intent, we may assume 
solely for the sake of the inquiry that the statutory language 
is ambiguous.  Even if the language is ambiguous, which it is 
not, there is strong extrinsic evidence that the legislature did 
not intend that the term "payable" in § 40.65(5)(b)3 include 
worker's compensation paid prior to the commencement of duty 
disability benefits. 
¶24 When construing a statute, we examine the language in 
question in the context of the statute as a whole.  See General 
Castings Corp. v. Winstead, 156 Wis. 2d 752, 758, 457 N.W.2d 557 
(Ct. App. 1990), citing Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 
Wis. 2d 116, 124, 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977).  Examining § 40.65 as a 
whole, we note that the term "payable" is used in each of the 
six § 40.65(5)(b) subsections describing the types of income 
that the Board shall deduct from monthly duty disability 
payments.  When the same term is used repeatedly in a single 
statutory section, it is a reasonable deduction that the 
legislature intended that the term possess an identical meaning 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
14
each time it appears.  See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 
2d 650, 663, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995).
15 
¶25 The Board asserts that the phrase "any worker's 
compensation benefit payable" calls for a reduction in duty 
disability 
benefits 
by 
any 
worker's 
compensation payments 
without regard to the timing of the payments.  Yet, if we 
ascribe 
the 
same 
meaning 
to 
"payable" 
in 
the 
remaining 
§ 40.65(5)(b) subsections dealing with other types of income, 
unreasonable and absurd constructions of the statute arise, a 
result to be avoided.  See Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 
207 Wis. 2d 156, 163, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997) ("It is also a 
fundamental rule of statutory construction that any result that 
is absurd or unreasonable must be avoided").     
¶26 For example, if the Board's definition of "payable" is 
extended 
to 
§ 40.65(5)(b)2, 
the 
phrase 
"any 
unemployment 
compensation benefit payable" would mandate a reduction in duty 
disability benefits by the amount of unemployment compensation 
received prior to the commencement of duty disability benefits. 
 Such an offset would essentially effect a retroactive denial of 
unemployment 
compensation 
benefits, 
an 
anomalous 
result.  
Similarly, under the Board's conception of the word "payable," 
the phrase "all earnings payable" in §§ 40.65(5)(b)5 & 6 would 
authorize 
a 
reduction 
in 
duty 
disability 
benefits 
with 
employment earnings received prior to the commencement of duty 
disability payments.  Such a construction is both unreasonable 
                     
15 See also Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Bill 
Drafting Manual 1997-1998 § 2.01(15)(a) (revised August 1996) 
(legislation "should use identical words for the expression of 
identical ideas to the point of monotony")(citation omitted). 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
15
and unnecessary.  The absurdities vanish under our determination 
that "payable" allows the reduction in duty disability only by 
contemporaneously received income described in § 40.65(5)(b).   
¶27 The Board's belief that the word "paid" is subsumed 
within the statutory term "payable" is also belied by the 
legislature's creation of statutes using both words.
16  If the 
Board is correct that "paid" is a lesser included meaning of 
"payable," then the legislature has repeatedly engaged in the 
hollow gesture of using both terms in the same descriptive 
phrase.  Such a construction of the statute is at odds with the 
rule that effect must be given to each word of a statute if 
possible, so that no portion of the statute becomes superfluous. 
                     
 
16 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 59.64(4)(a)("orders, scrip or 
certificates of indebtedness shall bear no interest if paid or 
payable within one month from date of issuance"); Wis. Stat. 
§ 71.78(2)("the department [of revenue] shall make available upon 
suitable forms prepared by the department information setting 
forth the net Wisconsin income tax, Wisconsin franchise tax or 
Wisconsin gift tax reported as paid or payable in the returns 
filed by any individual or corporation . . . ."); Wis. Stat. 
§ 78.80(4)("The department of revenue shall inform each requester 
of the amount paid or payable under ss. 78.01, 78.40 and 
78.555 . . . ."); Wis. Stat. § 102.835(1)(f)("'property' includes 
all tangible and intangible personal property and rights to that 
property, including compensation paid or payable . . . ."); Wis. 
Stat. § 108.04(2)(f)("A[n unemployment compensation] claimant is 
ineligible to receive benefits for any week for which benefits 
are paid or payable because the claimant knowingly provided the 
department [of industry, labor and job development] with a false 
social 
security 
number"); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 139.02(2)(a)("Each 
eligible producer [of fermented malt beverages] shall receive a 
credit in the amount of 50% of the tax paid or payable . . . on 
the 
first 
50,000 
barrels 
taxed 
. 
. 
. 
.); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 632.32(5)(i)2(authorizing automobile insurance policies that 
reduce uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage by "amounts 
paid or payable under any worker's compensation law"); Wis. Stat. 
§ 812.30(7)("'Earnings' means compensation paid or payable by the 
garnishee for personal services . . . and includes periodic 
payments under a pension or retirement program") (emphasis added 
throughout). 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
16
 See Lake City, 207 Wis. 2d at 163; State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 
337, 355, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996); Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 
673, 680, 500 N.W.2d 649 (1993). Because the two words can and 
should be given distinct meanings, we conclude that "paid" does 
not come within the meaning of "payable."     
¶28 Contrary to the Board's assertions, the legislative 
history of § 40.65 offers little, if any, insight into the 
meaning to be given to the phrase "any worker's compensation 
benefit payable."  The legislature enacted § 2, ch. 278, Laws of 
1981, which created § 40.65, in order to correct perceived 
problems in the then existing system of benefits for protective 
occupation participants in the WRS.  One of these problems was 
the phenomenon of "duplicate benefits" or "double dipping" 
caused by a lack of coordination between duty disability 
benefits and "other income replacement programs such as social 
security, worker's compensation, unemployment compensation, the 
state retirement system, etc."  See Report of Joint Survey 
Committee on Retirement Systems 3, LRB-4909/1. 
¶29 We 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
the 
legislative history is equivocal on the issue of whether duty 
disability benefits are to be reduced by worker's compensation 
benefits received prior to the commencement of duty disability 
payments.  Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Bd., 201 Wis. 2d 178, 
194-95, 547 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1996).  While the legislative 
history may support the Board's position, the legislative 
history is just as supportive of the proposition that the 
legislature intended to address the "double dipping" problem by 
preventing 
the 
simultaneous 
receipt 
of 
income 
listed 
in 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
17
§ 40.65(5)(b) 
and 
full 
duty 
disability 
benefits. 
 
Our 
interpretation of § 40.65(5)(b)3 effectuates that intent.  
¶30 Finally, the Board contends that absurd results follow 
from the conclusion that duty disability payments cannot be 
reduced by worker's compensation benefits paid prior to the 
commencement of duty disability payments: 
 
The disabled participant who applied for and collected 
worker's compensation permanent partial disability 
benefits before applying for the sec. 40.65 duty 
disability benefits would be able to collect unreduced 
monthly duty 
disability 
benefits. 
 An otherwise 
identically situated disabled participant who first 
established sec. 40.65 duty disability eligibility and 
then applied for and collected worker's compensation 
benefits would have those benefits offset against the 
duty disability.  Thus, in the latter case, winning a 
worker's compensation proceeding or agreeing to a 
compromise 
settlement 
would 
not 
increase 
that 
participant's monthly income. 
Petitioner's Brief at 25. 
¶31 While 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
Board 
that 
its 
two 
hypothetical participants will receive different levels of 
monthly income, we cannot say that such a result is absurd.  As 
the court of appeals noted, the participant who waits to apply 
for duty disability benefits gives up the opportunity to receive 
those benefits in the interim.  Coutts, 201 Wis. 2d at 193.  
Thus, it appears that an injured employee has an incentive to 
apply for duty disability benefits without delay.   
¶32 We recognize that in limited instances a participant 
may have an incentive to delay in applying for duty disability 
benefits.  However, it appears to us that the unpredictability 
of workplace injury precludes most of the opportunity to engage 
in such strategizing.  More importantly, to the extent that the 
Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228 
 
18
statute does leave room for strategizing by participants, the 
authority rests with the legislature, rather than this court, to 
change the meaning of the statute. 
¶33 In summary, we conclude that § 40.65(5)(b)3 does not 
authorize the reduction of duty disability benefits with 
worker's compensation benefits paid prior to the commencement of 
duty 
disability 
payments. 
 
Our 
determination 
of 
the 
legislature's intent is based upon the plain meaning of the 
statute, and is supported by the context in which the language 
in question appears.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.