Title: State v. Schell
Citation: 224 Or. 321, 356 P.2d 155
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 1960

Affirmed October 19, 1960.
*322 C.S. Emmons, Albany, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Willis, Kyle &amp; Emmons, Albany.
Courtney R. Johns, District Attorney for Linn County, Albany, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY, GOODWIN and KING, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the circuit court, based upon a verdict, which found the defendant guilty of the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (ORS 167.210). The indictment named as the victim of the crime the defendant's daughter, who was 13 years of age at the time of the trial, and charged that the defendant did "lewdly and lasciviously handle and manipulate the private parts" of the girl.
1. Evidence presented by the state showed that the defendant on the day charged in the indictment, August 28, 1959, committed acts with his daughter as specified in the indictment. It also showed that on three previous occasions he committed similar acts. The defendant objected when the testimony showing the similar acts was presented. The ruling which admitted this evidence is the subject of attack by the first assignment of error.
The defendant's brief says:
The defendant argues that evidence showing similar acts by the defendant is admissible only in cases involving sexual intercourse.
In State v. Risen, 192 Or 557, 235 P2d 764, this court declared:
Statements similar to the one just quoted concerning the admissibility of evidence showing the accused's commission of other similar acts where he is charged "with any form of illicit sexual intercourse" were made in State v. Ewing, 174 Or 487, 149 P2d 765; State v. Gillis, 154 Or 232, 59 P2d 679; and State v. O'Donnell, 36 Or 222, 61 P 892. Undoubtedly the broad sweep of the language "any form of illicit sexual intercourse" was chosen to embrace cases other than rape.
Virtually the same issue as that presented by this defendant-appellant was decided adversely to a similar defendant-appellant in State v. Du Bois, 175 Or 341, 153 P2d 521. In that case, as in this one, the charge was contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In that case this court said:
In State v. Pierce, 59 Ariz 411, 129 P2d 916, where the charge was contributing to the delinquency of a minor, the trial court received evidence showing that the defendant had committed a similar offense upon the alleged victim. In holding that the receipt of this testimony was not error the court, upon appeal, ruled:
People v. Oliver, 29 Cal App 576, 156 P 1005, in which the charge was contributing to the delinquency of a minor, held to the same effect as the foregoing decisions.
The following is taken from People v. Richardson, 17 Ill 2d 253, 161 NE2d 268, in which the charge was taking indecent liberties with his seven-year-old daughter and contributing to her delinquency:
See, to similar effect, People v. Anderson, 375 Ill 163, 30 NE2d 648.
In State v. Berube, 139 Me 11, 26 A2d 654, where the charge was taking indecent liberties with a female minor the trial judge permitted the minor, over the defendant's objections, to testify to acts of earlier happenings between the parties similar to the offense charged. In holding that no error was committed and in sustaining the judgment of guilt the court said, *326 "the testimony was admitted only for the purpose of showing the relationship between the parties."
Grabowski v. State, 126 Wis 447, 105 NW 805, arose out of the defendant's conviction of having taken improper and indecent liberties with a ten-year-old girl. We now quote from the decision:
The following is taken from People v. Place, 226 Mich 212, 197 NW 513, in which the charge was taking indecent liberties with a female minor:
An extensive annotation in 167 ALR 565 includes at page 622 this statement:
At page 627 the annotation declares:
We are fully satisfied that the challenged testimony was admissible to establish lust, intent and the girl's attraction for the defendant. This assignment of error possesses no merit.
2. The defendant-appellant's final assignment of error is based upon an instruction, given to the jury, which the defendant says authorized a verdict of guilt even though the jury did not believe that the crime charged in the indictment was established but thought that he was guilty of one of the similar acts which the girl had described. Before the trial judge permitted the girl to describe the three similar episodes he told the jury:
*328 The defendant made no objection to that charge. Still later, after both sides had rested and the oral arguments had been made, the trial judge, in instructing the jury, included the part which the defendant challenges in this assignment of error. After the defendant had taken his exception to that part of the charge the trial judge at once returned the jury to the jury box and then gave them an additional instruction that it could not find the defendant guilty upon evidence of any of the similar acts but would have to find him guilty, if it so did at all, upon the charge delineated in the indictment. The defendant took no exception to that charge. We believe that the jury could not have misunderstood. The second assignment of error discloses no merit.
The judgment of guilt is affirmed.