Title: State v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP002318-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2021

2021 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Alan M. Johnson, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 393 Wis. 2d 688, 948 N.W.2d 377 
PDC No:2020 WI App 50 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 19, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Kristine E. Drettwan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, 
JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ROGGENSACK, J., joined, and in which KAROFSKY, J., joined ¶¶1-3, 
5-23, and 30-48. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Catherine E. White, Stephen P. Hurley, Jonas B. Bednarek, Marcus 
J. Berghahn and Hurley Burish, S.C., Madison. There was an oral 
argument by Catherine E. White. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Timothy M. Barber, assistant attorney general; with whom 
on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Timothy M. Barber.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 61 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2318-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF422) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan M. Johnson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, 
J., joined, and in which KAROFSKY, J., joined ¶¶1-3, 5-23, and 30-
48. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   In the middle of the night, Alan M. 
Johnson snuck into the home of his brother-in-law (K.M.) seeking 
evidence of child pornography.  Johnson brought a gun.  After 
searching K.M.'s computer for more than two hours, K.M. appeared 
in the doorway and saw Johnson.  K.M. shut the door, as Johnson 
described it, and then burst through the door and attacked.  The 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
2 
 
ensuing altercation left K.M. dead; he was shot five times.  A 
jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree reckless homicide.  
Johnson appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals ruled in 
his favor and ordered a new trial.1   
¶2 
Three issues are presented for our review.  First, did 
the circuit court2 err in failing to instruct the jury on perfect 
self-defense?  Second, did the circuit court err in failing to 
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second-degree 
reckless homicide?  And finally, did the circuit court err in 
precluding Johnson from offering evidence regarding what he found 
on K.M.'s computer the night of K.M.'s death?  The court of appeals 
ruled in Johnson's favor on all three questions. 
¶3 
We agree the circuit court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury on perfect self-defense and second-degree reckless 
homicide.  When determining whether these instructions should be 
provided, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, and the instruction must be provided if evidence is 
presented from which a reasonable jury could find in the 
defendant's favor on the instructed elements.  The evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to satisfy this low evidentiary 
bar.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals on these 
grounds and remand for a new trial. 
                     
1 State v. Johnson, 2020 WI App 50, ¶52, 393 Wis. 2d 688, 948 
N.W.2d 377. 
2 The Honorable Kristine E. Drettwan, Walworth County Circuit 
Court, presiding. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
3 
 
¶4 
However, 
we conclude 
the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in precluding Johnson from testifying 
regarding what he found on K.M.'s computer that night.  The circuit 
court concluded this other-acts evidence was not relevant, and 
even if it was, the probative value of the evidence would be 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  While 
another court might see it differently, this was a permissible and 
reasonable conclusion, particularly since Johnson was permitted to 
testify regarding why he was at K.M.'s house and that he "found" 
what he was looking for.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals on this ground. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Johnson testified in his own defense at trial.  His 
testimony is the only narrative the jury heard of what happened 
the night K.M. died.  Since our review is largely centered on a 
view of the evidence most favorable to Johnson, his testimony forms 
the substantial basis of our analysis.  The following is Johnson's 
side of the story. 
¶6 
Johnson's oldest sister married K.M. when Johnson was a 
child; his relationship with K.M. was strained from the beginning.  
Johnson feared K.M. from the age of ten onward.  Repeatedly, K.M. 
verbally and physically abused Johnson, and on one occasion, 
sexually abused him.  Johnson also witnessed K.M. physically abuse 
his youngest sister and K.M.'s son. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
4 
 
¶7 
Years prior to K.M.'s death, Johnson discovered what he 
believed was child pornography on K.M.'s computer.3  Eventually, 
Johnson reported this to the authorities, but was told that the 
evidence was "stale."  Johnson then told his father, who confronted 
K.M.  K.M. told Johnson's father the pornography was "moved."  
Despite several requests by Johnson's father to attend therapy, 
K.M. never went.  This caused Johnson to fear for the safety of 
his nieces. 
¶8 
Around 11:45 p.m. on the night of October 24, 2016, 
Johnson went to K.M.'s home intending to discover "fresh pictures" 
of child pornography on K.M.'s computer to deliver to the police.  
Johnson believed that K.M. could overpower him if anything 
happened, so he brought a gun to protect himself.  He entered 
through the unlocked back door and proceeded to the computer room.  
Johnson closed the door and searched K.M.'s computer for over two 
hours.  As a result of his search, Johnson intended to turn what 
he discovered over to the police because he "found what they 
needed." 
¶9 
After the calendar flipped to October 25, at around 2:00 
a.m., Johnson heard a "scuff" from somewhere in the house.  Then, 
in Johnson's words:  "I closed the Windows that I had opened on 
the computer . . . and I got up, I grabbed the gun.  I got 
everything that I had with me."  As he was leaving, the door opened 
                     
3 Johnson testified that his sister, KM's wife, asked him to 
find a file she downloaded on KM's computer.  While attempting to 
locate the missing file, Johnson found what he believed was child 
pornography. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
5 
 
and Johnson saw K.M. standing in the doorway without a shirt.  K.M. 
then closed the door, leaving Johnson alone in the room.  Johnson 
was afraid.  When K.M. opened the door, "[h]e looked right at me, 
and he knew why I was there.  I knew that he knew."  Johnson wanted 
to leave, but the only exit was the door K.M. had just shut.  He 
did not believe the windows in the room opened either, leaving him 
no way to escape.  Then, Johnson explained, "the door flew open 
and [K.M.] attacked me.  He just came right at me."  And upon 
further probing, Johnson said, "[K.M.] lunged at me.  I saw him 
come at me."  When all was said and done, K.M. sustained five 
gunshot wounds and died.  Exactly how this transpired was unclear 
even to Johnson.  While he knew he shot K.M., Johnson did not 
remember seeing or hearing his gun fire and does not remember how 
he left the house. 
¶10 Johnson denied knowing how K.M. died when questioned on 
two occasions later that day.  But before the day ended, he 
confessed to killing K.M.  Johnson was charged with first-degree 
intentional homicide, use of a dangerous weapon, and armed 
burglary. 
¶11 During pretrial, Johnson moved to admit other-acts and 
McMorris evidence4 regarding K.M.'s past actions to support his 
                     
4 "Evidence of a victim's violent character and past violent 
acts is often referred to as McMorris evidence."  State v. Head, 
2002 WI 99, ¶24 n.5, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413.  The phrase 
refers to McMorris v. State, where this court noted when "the issue 
of self-defense is sufficiently raised" evidence of the victim's 
"dangerous character or reputation" "is relevant in determining 
whether the victim or the accused was the aggressor."  58 
Wis. 2d 144, 149, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973). 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
6 
 
claim of self-defense.  The circuit court permitted Johnson to 
introduce evidence of K.M.'s past abusive conduct and evidence 
that Johnson previously found what he believed was child 
pornography on K.M.'s computer.  However, the court prohibited 
Johnson from presenting evidence of precisely what he believed he 
found on K.M.'s computer the night K.M. died:  images of naked 
underage girls and over 5,000 images of neighborhood girls.5  The 
court ruled that such evidence, regardless of whether it was child 
pornography, "is not relevant to the homicide, to any claim of 
self-defense or to the burglary charge."  Furthermore, the court 
noted that even if this evidence was relevant, "it would fail under 
[Wis. Stat. §] 904.03" because "[i]t would be completely and 
unfairly prejudicial with little to no probative value other than 
to try and paint the victim in a bad light, and it certainly would 
not . . . substantially outweigh that unfair prejudice." 
¶12 At the close of evidence, the circuit court instructed 
the jury on burglary, first-degree intentional homicide, second-
degree intentional homicide, first-degree reckless homicide, and 
imperfect self-defense.  Johnson also requested, without success, 
instructions on perfect self-defense, second-degree reckless 
homicide, and homicide by negligent use of a firearm.  The circuit 
court refused to instruct on perfect self-defense because it 
                     
5 Johnson made an offer of proof that he would testify to this 
effect, providing more specifics with respect to the images he 
viewed that night.  Johnson made an additional offer of proof that 
a computer analyst would testify to discovering images on the 
computer that to a lay person would appear to be child pornography. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
7 
 
determined no reasonable person could conclude that Johnson 
satisfied either prong of the perfect self-defense standard.  And 
the court did not instruct on second-degree reckless homicide on 
the grounds that Johnson's actions conclusively showed an utter 
disregard for human life.6 
¶13 The jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree reckless 
homicide while armed with a dangerous weapon and not guilty of 
burglary.  Johnson was sentenced to 25 years of confinement and 10 
years of extended supervision. 
¶14 Johnson appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.  State v. Johnson, 2020 WI App 50, ¶52, 
393 Wis. 2d 688, 948 N.W.2d 377.  The court of appeals concluded 
"the circuit court erred in denying Johnson's request to instruct 
the jury on perfect self-defense and second-degree reckless 
homicide and failed to allow into evidence that child pornography 
was found on K.M.'s computer."7  Id.  We granted the State's 
petition for review. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶15 This 
case 
presents 
three 
issues. 
 
Two 
concern 
instructions not provided to the jury, and the third considers the 
                     
6 The circuit court reasoned that Johnson "brought the loaded 
gun there, and that he was aware that his conduct created that 
unreasonable and substantial risk of death or bodily harm." 
7 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision 
not to instruct on homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous 
weapon.  Johnson, 393 Wis. 2d 688, ¶42.  This issue is not before 
us.  
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
8 
 
other-acts evidence Johnson sought to introduce regarding the 
contents of K.M.'s computer on the night of his death.  We begin 
with the jury instructions. 
 
A.  Jury Instructions 
1.  Standard of Review 
¶16 "A circuit court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to give a requested jury instruction."  State v. Coleman, 
206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996).  The circuit court's 
charge is "to fully and fairly inform the jury of the rules of law 
applicable to the case and to assist the jury in making a 
reasonable analysis of the evidence."  State v. Vick, 104 
Wis. 2d 678, 690, 312 N.W.2d 489 (1981) (quoting another source).  
But circuit court discretion is far more limited in some 
circumstances——including 
determining 
whether 
the 
evidence 
presented supports instructing the jury on either perfect self-
defense or a lesser-included offense; these are questions of law 
we review de novo.8  State v. Peters, 2002 WI App 243, ¶12, 258 
Wis. 2d 148, 653 N.W.2d 300; State v. Fitzgerald, 2000 WI App 55, 
¶7, 233 Wis. 2d 584, 608 N.W.2d 391.   
¶17 "A jury must be instructed on self-defense when a 
reasonable jury could find that a prudent person in the position 
of the defendant under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the incident could believe that he was exercising the privilege of 
                     
8 To the extent any statutes are interpreted and applied to 
this end, that review is also de novo.  Quick Charge Kiosk LLC v. 
Kaul, 2020 WI 54, ¶9, 392 Wis. 2d 35, 944 N.W.2d 598. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
9 
 
self-defense."  State v. Stietz, 2017 WI 58, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 
895 N.W.2d 796.  We recently described this benchmark as a low bar 
which only requires the accused to produce some evidence to support 
the proposed instruction.  Id., ¶16.  This standard is met even if 
the evidence is "weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful 
credibility."  Id., ¶17 (quoting another source).  Furthermore, 
circuit courts must not weigh the evidence; rather, the evidence 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.  
Id., ¶¶13, 18.  The instruction should be given based on this low 
modicum of evidence "unless the evidence is rebutted by the 
prosecution to the extent that 'no rational jury could entertain 
a reasonable doubt.'"  State v. Schuman, 226 Wis. 2d 398, 404, 595 
N.W.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting another source). 
¶18 Similarly, a lesser-included offense instruction should 
be provided if "a jury giving the evidence full credence could 
reasonably return a verdict of guilt on the lesser included 
offense."  Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 173, 211 N.W.2d 827 
(1973).  In making this determination, "all relevant and 
appreciable evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
defendant."  State v. Davis, 144 Wis. 2d 852, 855, 425 N.W.2d 411 
(1988).  Failure "to instruct on an issue which is raised by the 
evidence" is error.  State v. Weeks, 165 Wis. 2d 200, 208, 477 
N.W.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting another source). 
 
2.  Perfect Self-Defense 
¶19 The statutes define two types of self-defense:  perfect 
and imperfect.  Imperfect self-defense is an affirmative defense 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
10 
 
to first-degree intentional homicide.  Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) 
(2019-20).9  It is aptly named because, when successful, it reduces 
a charge of first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree 
intentional homicide and therefore does not function as a complete 
(perfect) defense to a homicide charge.  Id.  The circuit court 
gave an imperfect self-defense instruction here. 
¶20 Johnson contends the circuit court should have given a 
perfect self-defense instruction as well.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 939.48(1) provides the requirements: 
A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use 
force against another for the purpose of preventing or 
terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an 
unlawful interference with his or her person by such 
other person.  The actor may intentionally use only such 
force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes 
is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference.  
The actor may not intentionally use force which is 
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm 
unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 
to himself or herself. 
Thus, to receive this instruction, Johnson had to make an objective 
threshold showing that (1) he reasonably believed he was preventing 
                     
9 Under Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b), imperfect self-defense is 
available when, "Death was caused because the actor believed he or 
she or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm and that the force used was necessary to defend the endangered 
person, if either belief was unreasonable."  § 940.01(2)(b).  If 
these conditions are met, the defendant could be convicted of 
second-degree, rather than first-degree, intentional homicide.  
§ 940.01(2); see also Wis. Stat. § 940.05(3) (noting imperfect 
self-defense is not an affirmative defense to second-degree 
intentional homicide). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
11 
 
or terminating an unlawful interference with his person, and (2) 
he intentionally used only the force he reasonably believed was 
necessary to terminate that interference.  State v. Head, 2002 
WI 99, ¶4, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413.  Additionally, because 
he intentionally used force intended or likely to cause great 
bodily harm or death, Johnson needed to also show he reasonably 
believed the force he used was necessary to prevent great bodily 
harm or imminent death to himself.  "Unlawful" in § 939.48 is 
defined as conduct that is "either tortious or expressly prohibited 
by criminal law or both."  § 939.48(6). 
¶21 The question here is whether "a reasonable jury could 
find that a prudent person in the position of [Johnson] under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the incident could believe" 
these conditions were met.  Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶15.  If some 
evidence from which a jury could so find was presented, the 
instruction should have been given.10 
¶22 First, Johnson must show some evidence that he 
reasonably believed he was preventing or terminating an unlawful 
interference with his person.  Stated another way, we must 
determine if some evidence was presented from which a jury could 
find that Johnson reasonably believed he was preventing K.M. from 
                     
10 The dissent states we apply an incorrect standard of law 
by examining the reasonableness of Johnson's beliefs.  Dissent, 
¶59 & n.6.  However, that is exactly what the statute says to do, 
and exactly what our cases confirm——including those cited by the 
dissent.  See State v. Stietz, 2017 WI 58, ¶68, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 
895 N.W.2d 796 (discussing the defendant's reasonable belief); 
Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶¶66-67 (same). 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
12 
 
harming him without lawful authority to do so.  We agree with the 
court of appeals that the evidence could support such a conclusion. 
¶23 Johnson testified that he was not looking for a 
confrontation with K.M.  But when K.M. showed up and closed the 
door to the computer room, Johnson was left alone in the room with 
no means of escape, believing K.M. knew precisely why he was there.  
K.M. then flung the door open and attacked, lunging at Johnson.  
Even granting the unusual circumstance of seeing an unwelcome 
family member in one's home in the middle of the night, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that K.M. engaged in an unprovoked 
physical attack on his brother-in-law to harm and possibly kill 
him.  The jury knew that K.M. had previously been physically 
violent with Johnson, and that past history could lend credibility 
to Johnson's version of events, especially a need to defend himself 
with lethal force.  A reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson 
reasonably believed K.M.'s attack on him was an unlawful 
interference with his person.11 
                     
11 Our 
self-defense 
laws 
also 
establish 
a 
statutory 
presumption that a homeowner may use lethal force against unlawful 
or forcible entry into the home, commonly called the castle 
doctrine.  Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m)(ar).  The dissent concludes the 
castle doctrine should apply to KM's actions, meaning KM lawfully 
attacked Johnson.  Dissent, ¶69.  However, we need not determine 
the scope and meaning of the castle doctrine to rule on the issues 
before us because we are examining Johnson's, not KM's, actions.  
Rather, we conclude there is some evidence from which a jury could 
find that Johnson reasonably believed he was being unlawfully 
interfered with.  The substance and applicability of the castle 
doctrine does not change or alter that conclusion, and therefore 
exploring it is unnecessary to decide this case.  Nothing in this 
opinion interprets, applies, or limits the castle doctrine in any 
way. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
13 
 
¶24 Next, Johnson must also present some evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could conclude he intentionally used only the 
force he reasonably believed was necessary to terminate the 
interference with his person.  Because Johnson used force intended 
or likely to cause death or great bodily harm——he shot K.M. five 
times——he must present some evidence that he reasonably believed 
this force was necessary to prevent great bodily harm or imminent 
death to himself.  "[T]he personal characteristics and histories 
of the parties" are relevant to this determination.  State v. 
Jones, 147 Wis. 2d 806, 816, 434 N.W.2d 380 (1989). 
¶25 As we've discussed, 
Johnson testified that 
K.M. 
physically, verbally, and sexually abused him, and physically 
abused his younger sister, starting when they were both young.  
And Johnson testified that on the night in question, K.M. opened 
the door, recognized him, and knew why he was there.  He then 
closed the door, and then reopened the door to lunge at Johnson 
and attack him.  From this, the jury could conclude K.M. initiated 
a violent altercation with Johnson, possibly because he knew 
Johnson was looking for evidence of child pornography.  These facts 
could be read to provide a motive and historical pattern to 
substantiate a conclusion that Johnson reasonably believed his 
life was in danger from K.M.'s attack.  Even though Johnson did 
not recall the details of the physical altercation that led to 
K.M.'s death, a jury could infer that Johnson intentionally used 
only the force he reasonably believed would prevent an unlawful 
interference with his person and that deadly force was necessary 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
14 
 
to prevent great bodily harm or imminent death.12  Even though 
Johnson was not able to describe what happened in detail and why 
he made the decisions he did when the attack began, a reasonable 
jury could still infer that Johnson responded with the level of 
force necessary to stop the attack.  
¶26 In sum, we conclude the circuit court erred by declining 
to instruct on perfect self-defense.  Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Johnson, there is some evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could conclude he had an objectively reasonable 
belief that he was preventing an unlawful interference with his 
person and that he used only force which was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm.  Because Johnson was entitled 
to receive the perfect self-defense instruction, we affirm the 
court of appeals' decision on this issue.13 
 
3.  Second-Degree Reckless Homicide 
¶27 With respect to the homicide charge against Johnson, the 
circuit court instructed the jury on first-degree intentional 
homicide, second-degree intentional homicide, and first-degree 
reckless homicide.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
                     
12 We reiterate that a jury could also reach the opposite 
result.  Our focus is merely on whether a jury could conclude 
Johnson acted in perfect self-defense, not that it would or should 
reach that conclusion. 
13 The privilege of self-defense may also be limited when the 
person claiming self-defense provoked the initial attack.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 939.48(2)(a).  The circuit court instructed the jury 
on provocation, a decision not challenged before us. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
15 
 
court should also have instructed the jury on second-degree 
reckless homicide, and the State challenges that conclusion before 
us.  If a party requests submission of a lesser included offense, 
as Johnson did here, the court should instruct the jury if "there 
are reasonable grounds in the evidence both for acquittal on the 
greater charge and conviction on the lesser offense."  Fitzgerald, 
233 Wis. 2d 584, ¶7 (quoting another source). 
¶28 A person who "recklessly causes the death of another 
human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for 
human life" is guilty of first-degree reckless homicide.  Wis. 
Stat. § 940.02(1).  Second-degree reckless homicide, meanwhile, 
occurs when someone "recklessly causes the death of another human 
being."  Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1).  The only difference is that 
"utter disregard for human life" is a required element for first-
degree, but not second-degree, reckless homicide.  The parties 
agree that second-degree reckless homicide is a lesser-included 
offense of first-degree reckless homicide.  This means that someone 
who commits first-degree reckless homicide commits the second-
degree offense as well.  See State v. Weso, 60 Wis. 2d 404, 408, 
210 N.W.2d 442 (1973) (noting that an offense is lesser-included 
when the defendant "could be convicted of the lesser crime even 
though he had been charged with and pleaded not guilty to the 
greater crime"). 
¶29 "[U]tter 
disregard 
for 
human 
life 
is 
measured 
objectively, on the basis of what a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would have known."  State v. Jensen, 2000 
WI 84, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 N.W.2d 170.  "A person acting 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
16 
 
with utter disregard must possess 'a state of mind which has no 
regard for the moral or social duties of a human being.'"  State 
v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, ¶33, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 772 N.W.2d 188 
(quoting Wagner v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 30, 45, 250 N.W.2d 331 
(1977)).  Utter disregard for human life is interpreted 
"consistent[ly] with previous interpretations of the 'depraved 
mind' element that it replaced."  Jensen, 236 Wis. 2d 521, ¶18.  
This court has explained: 
To constitute a depraved mind, more than a high degree 
of negligence or recklessness must exist.  The mind must 
not only disregard the safety of another but be devoid 
of regard for the life of another. . . .  A depraved 
mind lacks a moral sense, an appreciation of life, is 
unreasonable and lacks judgment.  A depraved mind has a 
general intent to do the acts and the consciousness of 
the nature of the acts and possible result but lacks the 
specific intent to do the harm. 
Weso, 60 Wis. 2d at 411-12.  In analyzing whether the defendant 
acted with utter disregard for human life, the factfinder examines 
the "totality of the circumstances" including the time before, 
during, and after the crime.14  State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶¶38-
39, 41, 333 Wis. 2d 87, 797 N.W.2d 430. 
                     
14 When examining the totality of the circumstances, factors 
that may be considered include: 
the type of act, its nature, why the perpetrator acted 
as he/she did, the extent of the victim's injuries and 
the degree of force that was required to cause those 
injuries.  We also consider the type of victim, the 
victim's age, vulnerability, fragility, and relationship 
to the perpetrator.  And finally, we consider whether 
the totality of the circumstances showed any regard for 
the victim's life. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
17 
 
¶30 Here, evidence was presented that could lead a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Johnson's actions did not 
constitute utter disregard for human life.  In his telling, Johnson 
brought a gun with him for his protection——not to attack K.M.  And 
Johnson combed through K.M.'s computer for two hours without 
alerting the occupants of the home to his presence.  A jury could 
conclude that Johnson brought the gun intending to use it only if 
necessary for self-defense, and that his intent was to obtain the 
evidence he was looking for and leave without K.M. ever knowing he 
was there.  And again, a jury could conclude it was K.M. that 
instigated a life or death situation by commencing a surprise 
attack.15 
¶31 Reading the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Johnson, there is evidence that he acted in fear for his own life, 
not necessarily with utter disregard for K.M.'s life.16  Based on 
                     
State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84, ¶24, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 N.W.2d 170 
(quoting another source). 
15 Certainly there is evidence that could cause a jury to 
conclude otherwise——Johnson does not recall how he left the 
computer room or bypassed KM, or the details of how he shot KM 
five times. 
16 The court of appeals reached the same conclusion, but 
reasoned that Johnson's conduct searching for child pornography 
for the safety of his nieces demonstrates "a regard for the life, 
safety, and well-being of others."  Johnson, 393 Wis. 2d 688, ¶40.  
In our view, however, the proper inquiry is whether a defendant 
showed regard for human life with respect to those present during 
the events in question.  See, e.g., Balistreri v. State, 83 
Wis. 2d 440, 457-58, 265 N.W.2d 290 (1978) (determining the 
defendant did not have a "depraved mind" where he attempted to 
avoid a collision by swerving his car, honking his horn, and 
braking); State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, ¶42, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
18 
 
this evidence, we conclude that the circuit court should have 
instructed the jury on second-degree reckless homicide as well.  
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals on this issue.17 
 
B.  Other-Acts Evidence 
¶32 Finally, the court of appeals held that the circuit court 
impermissibly excluded other-acts evidence of what Johnson found 
on K.M.'s computer on the night of K.M.'s death.  Under the rules 
of evidence, "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that the person acted in conformity therewith."  Wis. Stat. 
                     
772 N.W.2d 188 (determining there was no utter disregard for human 
life when the defendant did not engage physically after being 
struck, offered help, fired a shot only after the threats became 
imminent, and called 911 to report the shooting and asked if the 
victim would be okay). 
17 The State does not argue that the circuit court's failure 
to instruct on perfect self-defense and second-degree reckless 
homicide was harmless.  We agree that it was not.  The jury 
convicted Johnson of first-degree reckless homicide but acquitted 
him on charges of first-degree intentional homicide, second-degree 
intentional homicide, and burglary.  This suggests the jury 
believed at least some of Johnson's testimony.  Had the perfect 
self-defense and second-degree reckless homicide instructions been 
given, the jury might have concluded either of these standards 
applied and reached a different outcome.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's decision not to provide these instructions was not 
harmless, and Johnson is entitled to a new trial on remand.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) (directing the court to determine if the 
error "affected the substantial rights of the party"); Stietz, 375 
Wis. 2d 572, ¶63 ("A defendant's substantial rights remain 
unaffected (that is, the error is harmless) if it is clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have come to the 
same conclusion absent the error or if it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."). 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
19 
 
§ 904.04(2)(a).  We use a three-step analytical framework to 
ascertain the admissibility of other-acts evidence: 
(1) Is the other acts evidence offered for an acceptable 
purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), such as 
establishing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident? 
(2) Is the other acts evidence relevant, considering the 
two facets of relevance set forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.01?  The first consideration in assessing relevance 
is whether the other acts evidence relates to a fact or 
proposition that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action.  The second consideration in assessing 
relevance is whether the evidence has probative value, 
that is, whether the other acts evidence has a tendency 
to make the consequential fact or proposition more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
(3) Is the probative value of the other acts evidence 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence?  See 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03. 
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998) 
(footnote omitted). 
¶33 Johnson contends this evidentiary decision should be 
reviewed de novo because it implicates his constitutional right to 
present a defense.  We disagree.  Outside of certain constitutional 
commands,18 a circuit court's day-to-day decisions applying the 
rules of evidence will only rarely contain a constitutional 
dimension.  "The rights to confront witnesses and to defend 
                     
18 The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
for example, raises different questions than ordinary decisions 
under the rules of evidence to admit or exclude evidence. 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
20 
 
are . . . not absolute and may bow to accommodate other legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process," including the rules of 
evidence.  State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 793, 456 N.W.2d 600 
(1990).  As the United States Supreme Court has explained:  
State and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under 
the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence 
from criminal trials.  Such rules do not abridge an 
accused's right to present a defense so long as they are 
not "arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purposes 
they are designed to serve." 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting 
another source); see also State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶¶50-
51, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777 (explaining the "accused's 
right to present evidence is subject to reasonable restrictions" 
under the rules of evidence).  Evidentiary questions of the type 
raised here——whether evidence is relevant or prejudicial under an 
other-acts inquiry——are therefore almost always properly reviewed 
for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 
793-94.  We see no reason to depart from this longstanding 
appellate rule in this case. 
¶34 Under this manner of review, we examine whether "the 
circuit court applied the proper legal standard to the relevant 
facts and reached a reasonable discretionary decision."  State v. 
Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, ¶27, 391 Wis. 2d 799, 943 N.W.2d 870.  If 
it did so, its decision is upheld.  Id.  And while the court of 
appeals clearly believed the evidence cut the other way, an 
appellate court "may not substitute its discretion for that of the 
circuit court."  Id. (quoting another source).  Rather, we "look 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
21 
 
for reasons to sustain a trial court's discretionary decision."  
Id. (quoting another source). 
¶35 The circuit court excluded this evidence on the grounds 
that it was not relevant and that its probative value would be 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03.19  Putting aside the circuit court's conclusion 
that what was found that night was not relevant, it was certainly 
within the circuit court's discretion to conclude the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any possible relevance.  
The circuit court expressed its concern that introduction of this 
evidence could mislead the jury or cause them to focus on K.M.'s 
potential criminal behavior related to child pornography rather 
than the circumstances surrounding his death.  Moreover, the court 
was worried about a trial within a trial regarding whether certain 
pictures 
constituted 
child 
pornography 
or 
not, 
possibly 
distracting the jury from the real issues in the case.  And while 
Johnson was not permitted to present direct evidence of what he 
found on K.M.'s computer, Johnson did testify that he went to the 
house to look for child pornography and that he believed he found 
what the police needed. 
¶36 This evidentiary decision was a quintessential judgment 
call of the type we rely on circuit courts to make every day.  And 
whether we would have made the same decision or not, it was a 
                     
19 Wis. Stat. § 904.03 provides:  "Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
No. 
2018AP2318-CR 
 
22 
 
reasonable call within the bounds of the law.  The court of 
appeals' decision on this issue is reversed. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 We conclude the circuit court erred by failing to 
instruct the jury on perfect self-defense and second-degree 
reckless homicide.  We affirm the court of appeals on these issues, 
and agree that Johnson is entitled to a new trial on remand.20  
However, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying the admission of the other-acts evidence; we reverse the 
court of appeals' decision on this issue. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                     
20 The jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree reckless 
homicide, acquitted Johnson of burglary, and did not return a 
verdict on first- and second-degree homicide, greater offenses of 
first-degree reckless homicide, which served as an "implicit 
acquittal" on those charges.  See Green v. United States, 355 
U.S. 184, 190 (1957).  Accordingly, on remand the State is 
precluded from trying Johnson for burglary and first- and second-
degree homicide under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Id. at 190-91; Price 
v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) ("[T]his Court has 
consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an offense continues 
after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is express or implied 
by a conviction on a lesser included offense when the jury was 
given a full opportunity to return a verdict on the greater 
charge."  (footnote omitted)). 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶38 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  It is 
amongst many people's worst fears to be asleep with your family in 
your own home and realize that someone may have broken in and is 
in your house.  Some might go armed to assess the situation.  In 
this case, the homeowner did not go armed, he was not even dressed.  
He went without any clothing or weapons to find an armed and 
dangerous man in his house.  When the homeowner confronted the 
criminal invader, the criminal invader shot the unarmed, naked 
homeowner dead with his family asleep upstairs.  Now the home 
invader claims he was justified in shooting the homeowner, killing 
him because the home invader was afraid.   
¶39 Today, the court endows the person wrongfully in the 
home with a jury instruction for perfect self-defense to homicide.  
I fear that the teaching from the majority's opinion is that 
criminal home invaders should go armed, shoot first, and later 
claim to be afraid so to avoid conviction.  Every home invader 
should be afraid——afraid of detection, afraid of confrontation, 
afraid of being shot by the homeowner, afraid of the police, afraid 
of being convicted for the crime committed.  But being afraid does 
not mean that the home invader can shoot first in "self-defense."  
The majority opinion creates a limitless loophole for those who 
invade another's home so long as they claim to be afraid.  The 
majority opinion unleashes this perfect defense on the innocent 
public at great cost.  This cannot be the law.  
¶40 The majority justifies its reasoning, claiming to cabin 
this perfect defense to this unique group of facts.  However, this 
is unsupported in the law.  In fact, the law prohibits anyone from 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
trespassing into another's home.  It was the defendant who claimed 
to be afraid of the homeowner but chose to put himself in closer 
proximity to the homeowner by breaking into his home.  It was the 
defendant who put himself at risk by wrongfully entering another 
person's home in the middle of the night.  Here, the defendant was 
not randomly confronted with the need to exercise self-defense——
he broke into another's home!  Most typically, self-defense is the 
answer to an unexpected confrontation such that the person is 
permitted to use the amount of force necessary to escape and 
retreat.  To allow the criminal home invader under these facts the 
opportunity to claim perfect self-defense is previously unknown in 
Wisconsin law.  
¶41 And what of the Castle Doctrine?1  The majority dispenses 
with a homeowner's presumptive right to attack a home invader, 
stating that it is irrelevant to the analysis.  But the law rebuts 
this claim.  To receive the perfect self-defense jury instruction, 
Johnson had to believe that K.M.'s lunge was unlawful.  However, 
the Castle Doctrine makes clear that K.M. was legally permitted to 
lunge at——and even possibly kill——Johnson.  But the majority balks 
at the Castle Doctrine, claiming that the Castle Doctrine does not 
impact this case because Johnson presented "some evidence" of 
unlawful interference.  If the Castle Doctrine does not apply when 
a homeowner lunges at a home invader who is carrying a gun, then 
when does it apply?  Such ignorance of the purpose underlying the 
Castle Doctrine is astonishing.   
                     
1 The Castle Doctrine, as codified in Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m), 
provides a presumptive right for a homeowner to use deadly force 
against a home invader. 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
¶42 The majority's conclusions cannot be the law.  It 
unwittingly instructs criminals to go armed and shoot to kill 
during a home invasion, so the invader can claim perfect self-
defense and escape criminal liability.  The majority green lights 
vigilantes to break into suspected criminals' homes and take the 
law into their own hands.  The majority undermines a homeowner's 
presumptive right to defend the home against invaders.  Because 
the law does not permit these unimaginable outcomes, I would hold 
that Johnson is not entitled to jury instructions on either perfect 
self-defense or second-degree reckless homicide.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.2   
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶43 I begin by setting forth relevant facts as established 
by Johnson's testimony.3  As will be shown, this case hinges in 
large part on the testimony presented to the jury.      
¶44 Johnson testified that many years before the home 
invasion and shooting here, Johnson had found child pornography on 
K.M.'s computer.  Johnson stated that he filed a report with the 
authorities 
stating 
that 
K.M.'s 
computer 
contained 
child 
pornography.  The sheriff's office informed Johnson that there was 
"nothing [they] could do" about his report and tip because the 
evidence was "stale."  Disappointed that the police did not take 
                     
2 However, despite its errors and faults, the majority 
correctly determined that the circuit court did not err when it 
excluded certain other-acts evidence.   
3 Johnson's testimony is the only evidence in the record about 
what occurred on the night Johnson shot and killed K.M.   
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
action, Johnson informed his father about the child pornography 
and the report.  Johnson's father confronted K.M. about the child 
pornography, and K.M. stated that he had "moved" the child 
pornography.4   
¶45 Upset that no one had taken any action against K.M., 
Johnson decided to take the law into his own hands.  On the night 
of October 24, 2016, around 11:45 p.m., Johnson decided he would 
break into K.M.'s house and obtain "fresh" pictures of child 
pornography from K.M.'s computer.  He decided to break in so late 
at night "because [he] figured everyone would be asleep."  Johnson 
left to go to K.M.'s house, arming himself with his father's 
handgun and gloves.  Johnson testified that he brought the gloves 
because he "didn't want to fry any of the equipment" because of 
static electricity.  He also testified that he brought the gun 
because "[he] wouldn't be able to go in [K.M.'s house]" without it 
as he needed to feel safe in case K.M. found him after breaking 
in.   
¶46 Johnson arrived at K.M.'s house and parked around the 
corner.  He then proceeded to break into K.M.'s house using the 
back door.  After invading K.M.'s house, Johnson went to K.M.'s 
computer, with his gun and gloves, to search for what he believed 
would be child pornography.   
                     
4 According to the defendant, Johnson and K.M. had a poor 
relationship.  K.M. was married to Johnson's older sister.  Johnson 
testified that for many years K.M. was physically abusive to him, 
his younger sister, and his nephew——K.M.'s son.  Johnson also 
testified that on one occasion K.M. put his hands down Johnson's 
pants.  He claimed to be afraid of K.M. 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
 
¶47 After searching for over two hours, at around 2:00 a.m. 
on October 25, 2016, Johnson heard a "scuff" outside of the 
computer room.  Johnson exited out of the programs on the computer, 
closed it, grabbed the gun, stood up, and walked towards the door.  
As Johnson was walking towards the door, a naked K.M. opened the 
door, peered into the darkened room, and saw Johnson.  K.M. 
immediately shut the door while Johnson stood still, gun in hand.  
Johnson testified that he felt like he had no means to escape the 
room other than through the door that K.M. just shut.  During this 
standstill, Johnson's sister and nephew were asleep upstairs.  
¶48 After a few moments, the door flew open, and K.M. lunged 
at Johnson.  Johnson testified that he did not recall what happened 
after the lunge, but it is clear what happened based on the 
evidence.  Johnson shot the semi-automatic handgun five times, 
thus pulling the trigger five individual times, hitting K.M. with 
each shot.  Johnson testified that he did not feel K.M. touch him 
at any time during this interaction.  K.M. died from these gunshot 
wounds. 
¶49 Although he does not remember how he left the room, it 
is clear that Johnson had to step over K.M.'s body to exit the 
room.  When he exited the room, Johnson was covered in blood.  At 
no time did Johnson call out to his sister or nephew, nor did he 
render aid to the shot K.M.  Instead, Johnson next recalled being 
several blocks away in the truck he came in, soaked in blood.  
¶50 Later the same day, still October 25, 2016, the police 
began investigating K.M.'s death.  The police questioned Johnson 
twice regarding K.M.'s death.  Both times, Johnson lied to the 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
police, stating that he did not know how K.M. died.  However, later 
in the day, Johnson confessed:  "Arrest me, I killed him." 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶51 This case asks the court to determine whether Johnson is 
entitled to jury instructions for both perfect self-defense and 
second-degree reckless homicide.  "A circuit court has broad 
discretion in issuing jury instructions based on the facts and 
circumstances of the case and in deciding whether to give a 
specific jury instruction requested by the parties."  State v. 
Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶89, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560.  
"Whether there are sufficient facts to warrant the circuit court's 
instructing the jury on self-defense is a question of law that the 
court decides independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, but benefiting from their analyses."  State v. Stietz, 
2017 WI 58, ¶14, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 895 N.W.2d 572.  Similarly, the 
court decides independently "whether the evidence adduced at trial 
permits the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction," as 
this is a question of law.  State v. Kramar, 149 Wis. 2d 767, 792, 
440 N.W.2d 317 (1989).   
¶52 This 
case 
also 
requires 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application of statutes, which this court does independent of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  State v. Trammell, 2019 WI 
59, ¶16, 387 Wis. 2d 156, 928 N.W.2d 564. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶53 This analysis centers on the majority's erroneous 
conclusion that the circuit court should have provided a perfect 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
self-defense jury instruction and a second-degree reckless 
homicide jury instruction.  I begin with a discussion of the 
perfect self-defense jury instruction before turning to the 
second-degree reckless homicide jury instruction.   
A.  Perfect Self-Defense 
¶54 Johnson argues that he was entitled to receive the 
perfect self-defense jury instruction.  The circuit court 
correctly concluded that Johnson was not entitled to receive the 
perfect self-defense jury instruction.   
¶55 In Wisconsin, there are two types of self-defense a 
defendant can claim:  imperfect self-defense and perfect self-
defense.  Imperfect self-defense is an affirmative defense to 
first-degree intentional homicide, which is available when 
"[d]eath was caused because the actor believed he or she or another 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the 
force used was necessary to defend the endangered person, if either 
belief was unreasonable."  Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b).  If found by 
a jury, imperfect self-defense mitigates first-degree intentional 
homicide to second-degree intentional homicide.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.01(2), 940.05(3).  The circuit court instructed the jury on 
imperfect self-defense in this case.    
¶56 Unlike imperfect self-defense, which merely mitigates a 
conviction, perfect self-defense is an affirmative defense that 
completely bars conviction for certain crimes.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 939.45, 939.48(1).  Wisconsin codified perfect self-defense in 
§ 939.48(1), which provides: 
A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use 
force against another for the purpose of preventing or 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an 
unlawful interference with his or her person by such 
other person.  The actor may intentionally use only such 
force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes 
is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference.  
The actor may not intentionally use force which is 
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm 
unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 
to himself or herself.[5] 
Distilling this statute down, perfect self-defense has two 
elements when the defendant uses deadly force:  (1) a reasonable 
belief in the existence of an unlawful interference that is likely 
to cause imminent death or great bodily harm; and (2) a reasonable 
belief that the amount of force the person intentionally used was 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to the 
defendant.  See State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶84, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
648 N.W.2d 413.  However, when determining whether a particular 
defendant is entitled to a perfect self-defense jury instruction, 
the "reasonable belief" articulated is from the perspective of a 
prudent person.  Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶15.  Phrased another 
way, to receive the perfect self-defense jury instruction, a 
defendant had to produce "some evidence" that "a reasonable jury 
could find that a prudent person in the position of the defendant 
under the circumstances at the time of the incident could believe 
that he was exercising the privilege of self-defense."  Id., ¶¶15, 
16.   
¶57 Accordingly, to receive the perfect self-defense jury 
instruction, Johnson must present some evidence that a reasonable 
                     
5 "In this section 'unlawful' means either tortious or 
expressly prohibited by criminal law or both."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.48(6). 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
jury could find that (1) a prudent person in Johnson's position 
would reasonably believe that K.M. was unlawfully interfering in 
such a way that would cause imminent death or great bodily harm to 
Johnson, and (2) a prudent person in Johnson's position would 
reasonably believe that shooting K.M. was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm to Johnson.   
¶58 This is no ordinary self-defense case.  This is a case 
where the defendant used "force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm."  Consequently, the interference 
must have been the type that is likely to cause "imminent death or 
great bodily harm" to Johnson.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1).   
¶59 Moreover, the majority erroneously focuses on whether 
Johnson, and not a prudent person in Johnson's position, possessed 
a reasonable belief.  Majority op., ¶20.6  This restatement of the 
test impermissibly injects Johnson's subjective beliefs at the 
time of the incident into an inquiry that focuses on what a 
reasonable jury could find based on what a prudent person in 
Johnson's position would reasonably believe.  See Steitz, 375 
                     
6 Although the majority purports to be applying the objective 
test, it continually restates that it is looking at what Johnson 
believed and not what a prudent person in Johnson's position would 
have believed.  See majority op., ¶22 ("we must determine if some 
evidence was presented from which a jury could find that Johnson 
reasonably believed . . . ."); id., ¶23 ("A reasonable jury could 
conclude that Johnson reasonably believed . . . ."); id., ¶24 
("Johnson must also present some evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude he intentionally used only the force he 
reasonably believed . . . ."); id., ¶25 ("[A] jury could infer 
that Johnson intentionally used only the force he reasonably 
believed . . . .") (Emphases added.)   
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
Wis. 2d 572, ¶15.  This flawed understanding of the objective test 
colors the majority's entire analysis.   
¶60 When we apply the correct, objective standard, it is 
clear that Johnson has presented no evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that a prudent person in Johnson's 
position could reasonably believe that K.M. was unlawfully 
interfering in such a way that would cause imminent death or great 
bodily harm to Johnson.  Similarly, it is clear that Johnson 
presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 
a prudent person in Johnson's position could reasonably believe 
that shooting K.M. was necessary to prevent imminent death or great 
bodily harm to Johnson.   
 
1.  No objective, reasonable belief in the existence 
of unlawful interference 
¶61 For two independently sufficient reasons, Johnson cannot 
show that he provided sufficient evidence of K.M.'s alleged 
unlawful interference that was likely to cause imminent death or 
great bodily harm to Johnson.  First, K.M. was not acting 
unlawfully because his conduct was protected by the Castle 
Doctrine.  Second, Johnson has provided no objective facts that 
demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find that a prudent person 
in Johnson's position would reasonably believe that K.M. was 
unlawfully acting in such a way that would cause imminent death or 
great bodily harm to Johnson.  
a.  Castle Doctrine 
¶62 K.M.'s alleged interference was not unlawful because it 
was protected by the Castle Doctrine.  The Castle Doctrine extends 
the self-defense privilege in the context of the home to include 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
the presumptive right to use deadly force.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.48(1m); see also State v. Christen, 2021 WI 39, ¶44, 396 
Wis. 2d 705, 958 N.W.2d 746.  When a homeowner uses deadly force 
against a person that the homeowner reasonably believed unlawfully 
and forcibly entered the homeowner's dwelling, "the court may not 
consider whether the actor had an opportunity to flee or retreat 
before [the homeowner] used force and shall presume that the 
[homeowner] reasonably believed that the force was necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself."  
Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m)(ar).  This means that when a homeowner 
finds someone in their home and the homeowner reasonably believes 
that person broke into the home, the homeowner has the presumptive 
right to use deadly force against the invader.   
¶63 The Castle Doctrine intersects with this case because 
Johnson was just such an invader in K.M.'s home.  Johnson broke 
into K.M.'s home in the middle of the night, and K.M. found him as 
an invader——satisfying the first aspect of the Castle Doctrine.  
Consequently, the court must presume that any force K.M. was going 
to use was necessary, even if it was deadly force.   
¶64 As 
relevant 
to 
the 
perfect 
self-defense 
jury 
instruction, Johnson had to reasonably believe that K.M. was acting 
under the Castle Doctrine.  "[E]very person is expected to know 
the law."  Neumann, 348 Wis. 2d 455, ¶50 n.29; see also Byrne v. 
State, 12 Wis. 519 (1860) ("[D]efendants are presumed to know the 
law . . . .").  As such, we presume that Johnson knows the Castle 
Doctrine.  Because Johnson is presumed to know of the Castle 
Doctrine, it is clear that an objective, prudent person in 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
Johnson's position would know that the homeowner——here, K.M.——
could legally use deadly force on the person when found after a 
break-in.  Accordingly, Johnson cannot show that K.M.'s lunge was 
an unlawful interference because K.M. was presumptively permitted 
to lunge at and attack Johnson as an invader in his home.   
¶65 Johnson attempts to circumvent this conclusion by 
arguing that K.M. was actively engaged in a criminal activity; 
namely, possession of child pornography.  Johnson is correct that 
a homeowner cannot rely on the Castle Doctrine when the homeowner 
is "engaged in a criminal activity . . . at the time."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.48(1m)(b)1.  However, mere speculation of criminal activity 
cannot form the basis of overriding a homeowner's presumptive right 
to use deadly force against a home invader; the homeowner must 
actually be engaged in a criminal activity at the time.  Id.  There 
is no evidence in the record that, at the time Johnson broke into 
K.M.'s house, K.M. was engaged in any criminal activity.  Johnson 
alleges that he found child pornography on the computer that he 
broke into the house to search; no such child pornography was 
admitted into the record.  Accordingly, K.M. was entitled to the 
Castle Doctrine's presumption of the right to use deadly force.  
Johnson failed to present any evidence that would overcome this 
presumption.   
¶66 The majority ignores the Castle Doctrine's impact on 
this case, opening the door for vigilante justice and providing 
motivation to home invaders to shoot to kill so they can claim 
perfect self-defense.  The law and its procedures not only protect 
the accused, but also the victim.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m.  
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
The majority ignores K.M.'s presumptive right to defend his home 
and his family against a home invader.  Instead, the majority green 
lights a home invader's attempt to escape all liability and dilutes 
a homeowner's presumptive right to protect the home against those 
invaders.  I would not allow such a green light, and I would apply 
the Castle Doctrine to K.M.'s actions, meaning that K.M.'s actions 
were lawful; and therefore, Johnson is not entitled to a perfect 
self-defense jury instruction. 
b.  No evidence 
¶67 The Castle Doctrine notwithstanding, Johnson did not 
proffer any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 
a prudent person in Johnson's position would reasonably believe 
that K.M. was unlawfully acting in such a way that would cause 
imminent death or great bodily harm to Johnson.  Because the 
analysis must be from the perspective of the objective, prudent 
person, I begin by setting forth the facts, not Johnson's feelings 
or characterizations, in the light most favorable to Johnson.7 
¶68 Here, Johnson entered K.M.'s house in the middle of the 
night.  Johnson arrived with gloves, a gun, and a plan:  to 
investigate K.M. and discover what he thought was criminal 
                     
7 Included in these facts are "the personal characteristics 
and histories of the parties" as those characteristics and 
histories are part of the record.  State v. Jones, 147 Wis. 2d 806, 
816, 434 N.W.2d 380 (1989).  In the context of claims of self-
defense, this type of evidence is commonly referred to as McMorris 
evidence; that is, "evidence of violent acts the victim had 
committed which [the defendant] knew about at the time of the 
alleged crime, and which would bear on the reasonableness of the 
claim of self-defense."  State v. McClaren, 2009 WI 69, ¶1, 318 
Wis. 2d 739, 767 N.W.2d 550 (citing McMorris v. State, 58 
Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973)). 
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activity.  After several hours of investigating on K.M.'s computer, 
Johnson heard a noise, closed the computer, grabbed the gun, and 
headed to the door.  A naked K.M. opened the door, peered into a 
darkened room, and saw Johnson.  K.M. then immediately closed the 
door.  Johnson stood there, gun in hand, and did not make a move.  
Johnson knew of K.M.'s history of choking people, pulling hair, 
squeezing heads, and punching people, and that K.M. was much larger 
than himself.  K.M. then opened the door and lunged at Johnson.  
In response, Johnson shot K.M. five times, killing K.M. 
¶69 These are the objective facts, presented in the light 
most favorable to Johnson, from his own testimony.  Johnson had to 
supply evidence that K.M.'s interference was likely to cause 
imminent death or great bodily harm to Johnson.  A mere lunge can 
hardly be characterized as likely to cause imminent death or great 
bodily harm.  Simply put, Johnson presented no evidence that K.M.'s 
alleged unlawful interference was likely to cause imminent death 
or great bodily harm to Johnson.  Accordingly, Johnson is not 
entitled to receive the perfect self-defense jury instruction. 
 
2.  No objective, reasonable belief that killing  
K.M. was necessary to prevent imminent death  
or great bodily harm. 
¶70 For two independently sufficient reasons, Johnson cannot 
show that he provided sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that a prudent person in Johnson's position 
would reasonably believe that killing K.M. was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm to Johnson.  First, Johnson 
was unlawfully in K.M.'s home, creating the danger by his own 
wrongful conduct.  As such, his force was legally not necessary 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
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because he unlawfully sought out the danger that caused him to 
exercise "self-defense."  Second, Johnson has provided no evidence 
that shooting and killing K.M. was necessary to prevent imminent 
death or great bodily harm to Johnson.  
a.  No perfect self-defense when creating the danger 
¶71 Over a century ago, this court stated the rule of self-
defense generally requires a person to have the right to be in the 
location where self-defense is exercised:   
[The common law rule of retreat] has been superseded by 
a doctrine in harmony with the divine right of self-
defense; the doctrine that when one is where he has a 
right to be and does not create the danger by his own 
wrongful conduct, he may stand his ground, if assailed 
by another . . . . 
Miller v. State, 139 Wis. 57, 75, 119 N.W. 850 (1909) (emphasis 
added); see also State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶¶91-94, 255 
Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244 (explaining that the rule from Miller 
must be considered when determining whether the force used was 
necessary).  Thus, a defendant generally cannot claim self-defense 
if he or she was illegally in the place where self-defense was 
used because this conflicts with the principle of retreat.  Here, 
the defendant did the opposite of retreat.  Johnson broke into 
K.M.'s home and placed himself in a situation where the reasonable 
person would suspect that the homeowner may attack a home invader.  
The logic of retreat and self-defense is to avoid possible 
confrontation and use force only when necessary to protect oneself.  
The majority does not address retreat, nor the fact that Johnson 
broke into K.M.'s house while armed with the specific intention of 
protecting himself against attack.  Johnson's "self-defense" can 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
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hardly be called necessary when he sought out the situation where 
he would have to use self-defense.   
 
¶72 Allowing a defendant who seeks out life-threatening 
danger by breaking into a home to claim self-defense also 
fundamentally undermines a homeowner's Second Amendment right to 
"possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."  Christen, 
396 Wis. 2d 705, ¶43 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 592 (2008)).  Under the majority's logic, a domestic 
abuser could know that his or her victim keeps a firearm in a 
bedside drawer for defense, as is constitutionally permitted.  The 
abuser could then bring a gun to "defend themselves" because the 
abuser knows of the victim's firearm.  Then, the abuser could enter 
the victim's home——under the pretenses of investigating alleged 
criminal activity——shoot the domestic abuse victim, and claim that 
he or she feared for his or her life because the victim had a gun.  
Such backward logic transforms a homeowner's lawful right to 
possess a firearm for home defense into the catalyst for a home 
invader to shoot a homeowner and receive perfect self-defense.  
This example of a domestic abuse situation is not alone.  Consider 
rival gang members who have bad blood, breaking and entering into 
another's home with a gun, shooting another, claiming to be afraid 
of another, and asserting perfect self-defense.  And the examples 
could go on and on without limitation.  This is not, and cannot, 
be the law.   
 
¶73 Because Johnson unlawfully sought out the danger, by 
breaking into K.M.'s home, that required him to exercise "self-
defense," Johnson cannot now claim that the amount of force he 
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used was necessary.  Johnson should never have been in K.M.'s home.  
Accordingly, Johnson is not legally entitled to a perfect self-
defense jury instruction.  
b.  No evidence 
¶74 Johnson also presented no evidence that shooting and 
killing K.M. was necessary to prevent imminent death or great 
bodily harm to Johnson.  As I just discussed, there was no threat 
of imminent death or great bodily harm.  Even beyond that simple 
fact, Johnson proffered no testimony that shooting and killing 
K.M. was necessary.  Johnson testified that he has no memory from 
the time K.M. lunged at him until several minutes later when he 
clearly recalls driving home with blood-soaked clothing.  During 
the critical period of when Johnson pulled the trigger, he recalls 
nothing——not pulling the trigger, the sound of the gun, nor 
stepping over K.M.'s body to exit the room.   
¶75 Johnson provided a complete dearth of evidence as to the 
necessity.  Because Johnson presented no evidence as to why or how 
he pulled the trigger, killing K.M., a reasonable jury must look 
at what was known up until the time of the lunge from the 
perspective of an objective, prudent person, not Johnson's 
statement of his own perspective.  Johnson testified that he knew 
that his sister and his nephew were sleeping in a room adjacent to 
where the interaction occurred.  He acknowledged that he could 
have called out to them for assistance or to alert them to any 
impendent threat to life and limb. 
¶76 Johnson argues that K.M. knew he found evidence of 
criminal activity, and so K.M. was attempting to kill him to 
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prevent him from going to the police with the evidence.  
Consequently, his force was necessary to prevent K.M.'s imminent 
threat to life and limb.  Despite Johnson's characterizations, 
there is simply no evidence in the record that K.M. was engaged in 
criminal activity, nor is there any evidence in the record from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that a prudent person in 
Johnson's position would believe this.   
¶77 In sum, there is a complete lack of evidence that K.M.'s 
lunge was going to cause imminent death or great bodily harm and 
that Johnson shooting K.M. was necessary to prevent imminent death 
or great bodily harm.  Consequently, Johnson was not entitled to 
a perfect self-defense jury instruction.   
B.  Second-Degree Reckless Homicide 
¶78 Johnson was not entitled to receive a jury instruction 
on second-degree reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense to 
first-degree reckless homicide.  We have adopted a two-step process 
to determine "whether a lesser included instruction should be 
given."  State v. Muentner, 138 Wis. 2d 374, 387, 406 N.W.2d 415 
(1987).  The first step of this process is to "determine, as a 
matter of law, whether the offense was lesser included."  Id.  
"Wisconsin has adopted the 'elements only' test," which means that 
a lesser included crime is "[a] crime which does not require proof 
of any fact in addition to those which must be proved for the crime 
charged."  State v. Jones, 228 Wis. 2d 593, 598, 598 N.W.2d 259 
(Ct. App. 1999) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  If 
the offense was lesser included, "[t]he second step is to determine 
whether there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for an 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
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acquittal on the greater charge and for a conviction on the lesser 
charge."  Muentner, 138 Wis. 2d at 386.  "[T]he second step 
involves a weighing of evidence which would be presented to the 
jury.  Thus, the court is assessing the likelihood that the jury 
would find all the elements of the particular crime."  Id.   
¶79 Here, Johnson was charged, and convicted of, first-
degree reckless homicide.  To be found guilty of first-degree 
reckless homicide, a person must "recklessly cause the death of 
another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard 
for human life."  Wis. Stat. § 940.02(1).8  Johnson is seeking to 
receive a jury instruction on second-degree reckless homicide.  To 
be found guilty of second-degree reckless homicide, a person must 
"recklessly cause the death of another human being."9   
¶80 Applying the first step to determine whether a lesser-
included offense jury instruction is required, we must compare the 
elements of first- and second-degree reckless homicide.  Jones, 
228 Wis. 2d at 598.  When we compare the elements, every element 
of second-degree reckless homicide must be proven for a person to 
be convicted of first-degree reckless homicide.  Accordingly, 
second-degree reckless homicide is a lesser-included offense of 
first-degree reckless homicide.   
                     
8 There are other circumstances under which an individual may 
be found guilty of first-degree reckless homicide.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.02(1m), (2).  However, these other circumstances are not at 
issue in this case.   
9 A person can also be found guilty of second-degree reckless 
homicide if the person "recklessly causes the death of an unborn 
child."  Wis. Stat. § 940.06(2).  
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
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¶81 Having determined that second-degree reckless homicide 
is a lesser-included offense of first-degree reckless homicide, we 
turn to step two:  "whether there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence for an acquittal on the greater charge and for a 
conviction on the lesser charge."  Muentner, 138 Wis. 2d at 387.  
Because "utter disregard for human life" is the only element that 
is different between first- and second-degree reckless homicide, 
we must weigh the facts of this case and determine whether Johnson 
acted with an utter disregard for human life.  Id.  Accordingly, 
if we weigh the evidence and determine that no reasonable jury 
could determine that Johnson did not act with an utter disregard 
for human life, Johnson would not be entitled to a jury instruction 
on second-degree reckless homicide.   
¶82 "[U]tter 
disregard 
for 
human 
life 
is 
measured 
objectively, on the basis of what a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would have known."  State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 
84, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 N.W.2d 170.10  If utter disregard for 
human life is proven, "the offender is considered more culpable 
because the conduct, according to the standards observed by the 
great mass of mankind, went beyond simple criminal recklessness to 
encompass something that, although falling short of an intentional 
crime, still deserves to be treated more seriously under the law 
and punished more severely."  Id.  "In evaluating the proof of 
                     
10 I agree with the majority that "the proper inquiry is 
whether a defendant showed regard for human life with respect to 
those present during the events in question" and not a general 
regard for the wellbeing and safety of those not present.  Majority 
op., ¶31 n.16.   
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
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utter disregard for human life, the factfinder is to consider all 
the factors relating to the conduct including what the defendant 
was doing; why he was doing it; how dangerous the conduct was; how 
obvious the danger was and whether the conduct showed any regard 
for human life."  Id., ¶24 (cleaned up).11   
¶83 Here, no reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson 
acted without utter disregard for human life.  Johnson carried a 
gun and gloves to break into his brother-in-law's house in the 
middle of the night.  After spending several hours in the house as 
an invader, Johnson heard a noise outside of the computer room.  
Instead of calling out to his brother-in-law, his sister, or his 
nephew, Johnson covered his tracks, closing the computer and 
walking towards the door, gun in hand.  After K.M. lunged into the 
room, Johnson pulled the trigger of his gun five individual times 
with each of the shots hitting K.M., including in his back and 
head.  Instead of alerting his sister or nephew that he just shot 
K.M., Johnson stepped over K.M.'s body and fled the scene.  At no 
time did Johnson render aid to K.M. nor did he attempt to show any 
regard for his callous act of shooting another man.  Based on these 
facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson acted without 
utter disregard for K.M.'s life. 
¶84 The majority ignores several key facts in its analysis 
of the night in question.  Namely, the majority ignores that 
                     
11 The phrasing of these factors has changed over time.  
Compare State v. Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d 67, 77, 598 N.W.2d 290 
(1999), with Wis JI——Criminal 1022 (2015).  But the underlying 
factors have remained unchanged——we must observe the totality of 
the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in 
the defendant's position.    
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Johnson shot K.M. five times, never called for assistance from his 
nearby sister or nephew——either before the murder or after——never 
rendered aid to K.M., then stepped over K.M.'s body, and fled the 
scene.  Instead of observing the "totality of the circumstances," 
the majority focuses on the fact that Johnson said that he brought 
a gun with the intent of using it for self-defense.  Majority op., 
¶30.  The majority's cherry-picking of facts demonstrates that the 
majority is not considering the totality of circumstances.  When 
we observe all of the facts and weigh them, it is clear that no 
reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson acted without utter 
disregard for K.M.'s life.  Accordingly, Johnson is not entitled 
to a second-degree reckless homicide jury instruction.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶85 The majority's conclusions cannot be the law.  It 
unwittingly instructs criminals to go armed and shoot to kill 
during a home invasion, so the invader can claim perfect self-
defense and escape criminal liability.  The majority green lights 
vigilantes to break into suspected criminals homes and take the 
law into their own hands.  The majority undermines a homeowner's 
presumptive right to defend the home against invaders.  Because 
the law does not permit these unimaginable outcomes, I would hold 
that Johnson is not entitled to jury instructions on either perfect 
self-defense or second-degree reckless homicide.   
¶86 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this dissent.  
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
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¶88 I am also authorized to state the Justice JILL J. 
KAROFSKY joins ¶¶1-3, 5-23, and 30-48 of this dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP2318-CR.akz 
 
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