Title: Wynn v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 542, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KEITH W. WYNN, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 542, 2013 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Case. No. 1301002228 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  May 14, 2014 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  May 20, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Francis E. Farren, Esquire, Newark, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Maria T. Knoll, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2 
 
 
The defendant-appellant, Keith Wynn (“Wynn”) appeals from a jury 
conviction in the Superior Court of one count of Burglary in the Second 
Degree and two counts of Felony Theft.   
Wynn raises two claims on 
appeal.  First, he contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
stating that Wynn was not permitted on the second floor of a dwelling.  
Second, he contends that the prosecutor argued for an application of 
Delaware’s burglary statute that was not supported by the record evidence.   
 
We have concluded that both of Wynn’s arguments are without merit.  
Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
Facts 
 
In 2012, Brian and Amanda Sands discovered that money and jewelry 
had been stolen from their upstairs bedrooms at their home in Middletown.  
Brian’s parents, Michael and Patricia, also lived at the Middletown home. 
 
The Sands often entrusted Wynn, a family friend, to care for their 
dogs and get the mail when they were away.  Wynn also had the code to 
their garage door, but was not permitted on the second floor bedrooms 
without permission.  The police interviewed Wynn, who admitted to taking 
the jewelry and money from Michael and Patricia’s bedroom. 
 
Wynn was charged in the Superior Court with Burglary in the Second 
Degree and two counts of Felony Theft.  At trial, Wynn stipulated that he 
3 
 
was guilty of the two counts of Theft, but denied the burglary charge.  
During his closing argument, the prosecutor made references to Wynn’s 
unauthorized presence on the second floor of the Sands’ residence and the 
proper application of Delaware’s burglary statute.  A jury found Wynn 
guilty of all charges.  The trial judge sentenced Wynn to seven years at 
Level V incarceration, suspended after one year for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  This is Wynn’s direct appeal.   
Standard of Review 
 
Wynn contends that the prosecutor made two statements that 
constituted misconduct and that require reversal of his burglary convictions.   
Our review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct depends on whether the 
issue was fairly presented at trial.  If the alleged misconduct was not 
objected to at trial, then we review only for plain error.1  “If defense counsel 
raised a timely and pertinent objection to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, 
or if the trial judge intervened and considered the issue sua sponte, we 
essentially review for ‘harmless error.’”2   
“The first step in the harmless error analysis involves a de novo 
review of the record to determine whether misconduct actually occurred.  If 
                                          
 
1 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006).  
2 Id.   
4 
 
we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends there.”3  If our 
review finds that the prosecutor did engage in misconduct, we then examine 
whether the improper comments or conduct prejudicially affected the 
defendant’s substantial rights necessitating a reversal of his conviction.4   
To make this determination, we apply the three-factor Hughes test, 
which are: “(1) the closeness of the case, (2) the centrality of the issue 
affected by the error, and (3) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the 
error.”5  If we determine after the Hughes test that the errors do not require 
reversal, then the fourth and final step requires that we examine all of the 
statements using the Hunter test.6  Under the Hunter test, we consider 
“whether the prosecutor’s statements or misconduct are repetitive errors that 
require reversal because they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial 
process.”7   
Second Floor Statement Proper 
 
The first statement of misconduct alleged by Wynn relates to the 
prosecutor’s argument about Wynn’s permission to be on the second floor of 
the Sands’ residence.  The prosecutor stated: “. . . [Wynn’s] access was for a 
                                          
 
3 Id. at 148 (footnote omitted) (citing Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Del. 2004)).   
4 Id. at 149 (citing Daniels, 859 A.2d at 1011).  
5 Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981)).  
6 Id. (citing Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 732 (Del. 2002) (per curiam)).  
7 Id.  
5 
 
limited purpose, mail and dogs, and at no point was he allowed onto that 
second floor.”  Wynn contends that this was misconduct because the record 
established that Wynn had been allowed on the second floor to sleep as a 
guest.  
 
Wynn sufficiently raised an objection to this statement at trial.  
Therefore, our review is for harmless error.  It is well-settled law that 
“prosecutors may not misrepresent the evidence presented at trial.”8  In 
Kurzmann v. State, however, this Court held that the prosecutor’s comments 
might be hyperbolic argument, in which the prosecutor made legitimate 
inferences from the evidence at trial, but if they are supported by the record, 
are not misstatements, and, in context, such comments are not improper in 
any way.9   
 
A de novo examination of the complained-of statement shows that it 
was not misconduct.  The record reflects that the statement by the prosecutor 
is a logical inference of the facts presented to the jury.   
 
In this case, the prosecutor’s statements were based on the facts in 
evidence.  Both Michael and Patricia Sands testified that Wynn was not 
allowed in their upstairs bedroom.  Michael further stated that Wynn was 
                                          
 
8 Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 540 (Del. 2006) (citing Hunter, 815 A.2d at 735). 
9 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 713 (Del. 2006); see also Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 
189, 204 (Del. 1980) (“[The prosecutor] is allowed and expected to explain all the 
legitimate inferences of the appellants’ guilt that flow from that evidence.”).  
6 
 
permitted in the dwelling, but he did not have permission to be in the master 
bedroom.  Brian Sands also testified that Wynn only had limited access to 
the Sands’ home, and that he was not allowed upstairs alone.   
 
Although it could be possible to interpret the prosecutor’s statement to 
mean that Wynn was never allowed on the second floor, this assertion is 
made out of context.  Based on the record evidence, the prosecutor’s 
statement can reasonably be construed to mean that Wynn did not have 
access to the second floor at the time of the theft.  Because the prosecutor’s 
statement is a legitimate inference supported by the record, it did not 
constitute misconduct.  Thus, Wynn’s first claim is without merit.   
Burglary Statute Comments Proper 
 
Wynn next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
argued an application of the second degree burglary statute that was not 
supported by the evidence.  Wynn raised the issue of statutory interpretation 
in his Motion for Acquittal, although he did not object to the prosecutor’s 
statements at trial.10   
 
The Delaware Code provides: “A person is guilty of burglary in the 
second degree when the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully . . . 
                                          
 
10 The State reclassified Wynn’s second claim as an appeal on his denied Motion of 
Acquittal.  Although Wynn’s arguments essentially restate those he made in his motion 
below, his appeal clearly focuses on the statements of the prosecutor.  Thus, only his 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct is at issue in Wynn’s second claim on appeal.   
7 
 
[i]n a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein.”11  The definitions 
provision explains that “[a] person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’ in or upon 
premises when the person is not licensed or privileged to do so.”12  “The 
‘intent to commit a crime therein’ may be formed prior to the unlawful 
entry, be concurrent with the unlawful entry or such intent may be formed 
after the entry while the person remains unlawfully.”13 
 
In his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor made the following 
statement: 
 
So he enters unlawfully because he is entering for no 
purpose that he’s supposed to be entering, knowing that the 
family is not there, or there’s a second theory, remains 
unlawfully.  Had he gone inside, even if it was to see if Brian 
was there, even if it was to walk the dog, even if it was to get 
the mail, as soon as that ends and he takes one foot upstairs – 
the dogs are housed on the first floor.  You heard that as part of 
the testimony.  As soon as he takes a step upstairs, is he not 
remaining unlawfully in that premise?  And it is upstairs where 
he ultimately admits to having committed the thefts. 
 
 
At trial, Wynn objected to these comments on the basis that the 
prosecutor was arguing facts not in the record.  The Superior Court, 
however, found that its “memory of the statement by the defendant on the 
tape is consistent with [the prosecutor’s] representation.”  The trial judge 
                                          
 
11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 825(a)(1).   
12 Id. § 829(d).  
13 Id. § 829(e).  
8 
 
added, “I do not agree with you that the record will reflect a misleading 
statement by [the prosecutor].” 
 
After the jury received their final instructions, the Superior Court 
heard further argument on the motion for judgment of acquittal but 
continued to reserve judgment.  After the jury returned its verdict finding 
Wynn guilty of all charges, the Superior Court found that the evidence was 
“more than adequate” for the State to meet its burden of proof with regard to 
the crime of Burglary in the Second Degree.  Specifically, the court found 
that “[t]here was evidence of record that the defendant was not permitted 
and it seemed to me, based on his statement that was recorded and played for 
the jury, that he understood, at least once he entered, that his remaining in 
the bedrooms at the time and place of the theft was improper, unlawful and 
without authority.”   
 
The record shows that although Wynn was allowed in the Sands’ 
residence when someone was home, and to walk the dogs or get the mail, 
when it was unoccupied, he did not have permission to be on the second 
floor of the house at the time he stole the Sands’ belongings.14  By his own 
admission and by his actions, Wynn remained in the residence to steal.  The 
prosecutor’s query to the jury that “as soon as he [took] a step upstairs, is he 
                                          
 
14 See Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d 723, 728 (Del. 2013).   
9 
 
not remaining unlawfully in that premise?” was a legitimate argument to 
make the point that, even if Wynn had been legitimately on the premises to 
get the mail or walk the dog, he did not have permission to access the private 
second floor bedroom areas.  Accordingly, Wynn’s second argument is 
without merit. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.