Title: In the Matter of Wolf A. Samay, Judge of the Municipal Court of Passaic
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: d-134-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2001

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Argued November 8, 2000 -- Decided January 12, 2001 PER CURIAM This is a judicial-disciplinary case. The proceedings commenced with the filing of a complaint with the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) against respondent, Wolf A. Samay, a Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Passaic, for cause involving his judicial conduct. The complaint charged that respondent had violated several Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Court's Disciplinary Rules. Following a hearing, the ACJC issued a presentment finding that respondent had violated certain Canons and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The ACJC concluded that respondent was not fit to continue to serve as a judge in the State of New Jersey and recommended that proceedings be instituted to remove him from judicial office. The Supreme Court issued and filed a formal complaint and Order to Show Cause why respondent should not be removed from office. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:2A-7, the Chief Justice appointed a hearing panel, consisting of one Appellate Division judge and two Law Division judges, to conduct a hearing, take evidence, and report findings with respect to the complaint. Following its hearing in the matter, the hearing panel concluded that respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), and 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Rules 2:15-8(a)(1) and (a)(6). It unanimously recommended removal. Respondent was admitted to practice law in New Jersey in 1980. He became a Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Passaic effective December 1, 1993, and has been reappointed to two successive three-year terms. He was a full-time judge by virtue of a local ordinance enacted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-4a. The complaint charged respondent with misconduct in three separate matters. The first matter arose out of a debt respondent owed to a privately owned and operated school his sons attended, the Collegiate School in the City of Passaic. At some point, due to illness and a lack of insurance coverage prior to becoming a municipal judge, respondent became delinquent in his payments of tuition and fees to the Collegiate School. To conclude litigation over that indebtedness, respondent executed a promissory note for the balance owed to the school and agreed to liquidate that balance through installment payments. Subsequently, believing that respondent had become delinquent in those payments, on July 3, 1996, John Lazor, Jr., President of the Board of Trustees of the Collegiate School, wrote to respondent and his wife. In that letter, Lazor requested that the delinquency be addressed immediately and further indicated that he would seek legal counsel if he did not hear from respondent within the next few days. Respondent replied to that letter shortly thereafter, signing his name both as an attorney and as a judge. It was respondent's signature in that manner that formed a basis of the complaint against him. Although respondent acknowledged that his designation of himself as a judge in his signature was both intentional and inappropriate in a non-judicial, personal letter, he maintained that he had done so only to impress on Lazor that respondent had enough intelligence to make his own decisions and to handle his own financial problems. The second matter in which respondent was charged with misconduct involved a domestic violence and other related complaints filed by and between Benjamin Jakubovic (Benni) and his wife, Susan Jakubovic Dauber. The various complaints had been filed by the parties between 1995 and 1997. Benni and respondent had known one another for a number of years prior to these complaints. Specifically, Benni was a Councilman in the City of Passaic between December 1993 and July 1997. In that capacity, he signed a resolution confirming the appointment of respondent as a municipal court judge in 1993 and his reappointment resolution in 1996. Benni also had signed an ordinance that provided a pay increase for respondent in February 1997. Before then, Benni and respondent had served on the City's Board of Adjustment for a number of years. Because of his relationship with Benni, respondent had recused himself from presiding over any court proceeding regarding two of the complaints Benni and his wife had filed against one another. That notwithstanding, on July 14, 1997, respondent authorized a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Benni's wife, a search warrant, and an arrest warrant on the basis of a complaint Benni had filed. Respondent had authorized the warrants and the TRO after receiving a phone call at 11:00 p.m. from Lieutenant Robert Fulleman. No recordation of that conversation was made to reflect the asserted basis for the probable cause requirement, and no papers were ever presented to respondent, including a copy of the TRO or search warrant he authorized. As a result of respondent's authorization of the warrants, Benni's wife was arrested in her home around midnight when her children were sleeping. Respondent reported the incident to the City of Passaic Police Department on November 18, 1997. As a first step in the process of having Grassie arrested, respondent arranged to have an incident report prepared by a police officer, stating that respondent had reported that Patrick had informed him that Grassie had threatened to slap Patrick, made verbal assaults toward Patrick, and had threatened to bash Patrick's head in and kill him after gym class. Respondent's son denied that he had told his father that Grassie had threatened to bash his head in and kill him. That notwithstanding, on the basis of respondent's report, a complaint and warrant charging Grassie with third-degree terroristic threats was prepared. The detective who prepared the complaint did not sign it himself. Instead, he notified respondent that it was ready for his signature. Respondent went to the police department and signed the complaint and warrant, knowing that Grassie would be arrested and brought before the City of Passaic Municipal Court in which respondent was the only judge. After Grassie's arrest, he did ultimately appear before respondent for arraignment. Despite Grassie's objection to respondent's handling of any aspect of the proceedings against Grassie, respondent nevertheless proceeded to accept a waiver of the reading of the charges and advised defendant Grassie to report for a pre-indictment processing hearing in the Law Division. The matter ultimately was remanded to another municipal court where Grassie was acquitted of all charges. HELD: The record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal of Samay based on unfitness for judicial office, and he is thus ordered removed as a Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Passaic. 1. Where removal of a Superior Court or municipal court judge is urged for misconduct in office, willful neglect of duty, or other conduct evidencing unfitness for judicial office, the reason for removal must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, as opposed to by clear and convincing evidence. (pp. 3-4) 2. Respondent's letter to Lazor violated Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Disciplinary Rule 2:15- 8(a)(6) in that his purposeful and intentional use of the initials J.M.C. in the letter constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. (pp. 19-20) 3. The most significant goal of judicial removal statutes is the preservation of the public's confidence in the judicial system. (pp. 20-21) 4. Canon 3C required respondent to disqualify himself from sitting in any phase of the Jakubovic and Grassie matters, as his impartiality might clearly be questioned. The evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent corrupted his judicial office to benefit his personal interest and to punish people for personal reasons. (pp. 21-22) 5. Respondent demonstrated a lack of respect for the law when he gave false and misleading information to the police in the Grassie incident report and when he was less than truthful in his testimony before the ACJC. Respondent's actions in both cases had the clear capacity to undermine the proper administration of justice. (pp. 22-23) 6. Respondent abused his power as a judge and betrayed the public trust and New Jersey's great tradition of judicial honesty and integrity. (p. 23) 7. Respondent's position as a municipal court judge put him in a highly visible position, making him responsible for the popular image of the entire system. His misconduct in the face of such visibility destroyed the trust and confidence in our institutions upon which our entire governmental structure is predicated. (pp. 23-24) 8. Because respondent's transgressions in the Jakubovic and Grassie matters directly subverted and corrupted the administration of justice, he has poisoned the well of justice for which he must be removed. (pp. 25-26) CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and LAVECCHIA join in this PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE ZAZZALI did not participate. IN THE MATTER OF JUDGE WOLF A. SAMAY, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF PASSAIC. Argued November 8, 2000 -- Decided January 12, 2001 On an Order to show cause why respondent should not be removed from judicial office. Jeffrey J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause on behalf of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mark J. Fleming and Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorneys General and Dawn C. O'Connor, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Peter W. Till, argued the cause for respondent. PER CURIAM. This is a judicial-disciplinary case. The proceedings commenced with the filing of a complaint and an amended complaint with the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC or Committee) against respondent, Wolf A. Samay, a Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Passaic, for cause involving his judicial conduct. The gravamen of the complaint was that respondent had violated several Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Court's Disciplinary Rules. The ACJC issued a presentment in which it found the allegations in the amended complaint had been established by clear and convincing evidence and that respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), and 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Rule 2:15-8(a)(1) and Rule 2:15-8(a)(6). The presentment concluded that respondent is not fit to continue to serve as a judge in the State of New Jersey and recommended that proceedings be instituted to remove him from judicial office in accordance with Rule 2:14-1 and N.J.S.A. 2B:2A-1 to -11. This Court issued and filed a formal Complaint and Order to Show Cause why respondent should not be removed from office. The Chief Justice, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:2A-7, appointed a hearing panel, consisting of one Appellate Division judge and two Law Division judges, to conduct a hearing, take evidence, and report findings with respect to the complaint. The hearing panel concluded that respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), and 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Rules 2:15-8(a)(1) and (a)(6). It unanimously recommended removal. July 7, 1996 John Lazor, Jr., President Board of Trustees Collegiate School Kent Court Passaic, New Jersey 07055 Dear Mr. Lazor: This letter is in response to your letter dated July 3, 1996. The substance of your letter attempts to address two separate instances of arrearages in tuition payments. Your letter also suggests the way to correct this situation. Firstly, regarding my previous indebtedness, an agreement was reached in September of 1993 between Mr. Boscia and myself, with the consent of Dean Gibson, to pay off the arrearage no latter than May of 1998. I have paid on account of my indebtedness the approximate amount of $6,000.00, which payments represent approximately three (3) times the amount which I was required to pay under the agreement. The agreement is in full force and legally defensible. As to the impression that you had and as to what you knew or what you now know is of no significance and of little import. The agreement is being honored and legally stands on its own. Furthermore, regarding my recent outstanding balance of $2,625.00, I promised Miss Ellie that I would pay in $1,000.00 increments for June, July, and August which would pay off the indebtedness before September. As promised, I made my payment for June. Consequently, your assertion that I failed to honor my promise is inaccurate. I would like to emphacize [sic] at this point that your suggestion as to how I can resolve my problem is both simplistic and presumptuous. Please do not ever again take the liberty of advising me as to how I can resolve my problems. Neither by your age, by your occupation, by your life experiences or by your education are you qualified to do so. Lastly, and most importantly, I intensely resent the tone of your letter. It is arrogant, overbearing, and totally unwarranted. Given my eighteen (18) year relationship with Collegiate School, as a long-standing member and immediate past president of the Board of Trustees and as an active parent, the format and tone by which you chose to communicate with me is egregiously offensive. Moreover, your threat that unless you hear from me in the next few days this $1,625.00 matter may be subject to legal action is unconscionable and ludicrous. In conclusion, suffice it to say that your letter was highly inappropriate, in bad taste, and blatantly ignorant of the factual matrix of the last eighteen years. Very truly yours, [Signature] Wolf Samay, Esq., JMC Member of the Board of Trustees P.S. To protect the image of Collegiate School, please have any future correspondence edited to correct your blatant sixth grade errors. Respondent sent copies of that letter to Angela Gibson, the Headmaster at Collegiate School, and to other school officials. The aspect of respondent's letter that has disciplinary significance is the fact that respondent signed the letter as an attorney ( Esq. ) and as a judge ( JMC ). Respondent testified that he used the JMC initials only to impress upon Lazor that respondent had enough intelligence to make [his] own decisions and take care of [his] financial problems. Thus, respondent acknowledged using the JMC initials intentionally. Respondent also acknowledged knowing that utilization of the initials in a non-judicial, personal letter was [w]holly inappropriate. We find respondent's alleged motive for using the initials JMC totally lacking in credibility. Cf. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-75 (1999) (discussing appellate review of witness credibility determinations). Pursuant to directions received at police headquarters, [Susan] returned later on the morning of July 15, 1997 for a first appearance or arraignment on the petty disorderly persons complaints, which respondent conducted. After advising [Susan] of the charges against her and accepting pleas of not guilty, respondent indicated I'm fixing your bail at $5,000. I'm releasing you R-O-R, and we'll notify you when to come back for trial. Thereafter [Susan] asked respondent if he intended to hold the trial here or to recuse himself, and respondent indicated that he would recuse himself, and transfer the case to another municipality, in light of his prior recusal in matters involving the parties.See footnote 11 Respondent's position with respect to the Jakubovic matter is that he was aware when he received the telephone call from Lieutenant Fulleman that he should not take any action in a matter involving the councilman; however, he did so in this case because this situation was emergent in the sense that it involved domestic violence, and that there was an allegation of the presence of weapons in [Susan's] residence. He further asserts that he sat on her case on the morning of July 15, 1997 only because he was not aware that she would be in court that morning, that the appearance involved pro forma proceedings, and that the procedures followed in the Jakubovic case were no different than what ordinarily would occur in any other matter in the City of Passaic. We first address the issue of the emergent nature of the telephone call made on July 14, 1997. It is the emergent nature of that telephone call and the situation described therein that prompted respondent to proceed with the matter notwithstanding his knowledge that he should recuse himself. However, while it is alleged that [Susan] used obscenities, neither Lieutenant Fulleman nor respondent asked, or knew at the time, specifically what the obscenities were. Nor was there any indication that any threats had been made by [Susan] against the victim. While there was some dispute in the facts, it seems clear that Benni Jakubovic did not advise Lieutenant Fulleman, nor did Lieutenant Fulleman advise respondent, that Benni was in any fear. In fact, the testimony indicates that Benni was leaving on vacation and Fulleman so advised respondent. Moreover, although there was an allegation of the presence of two specific weapons in [Susan's] home, there was no attempt to have the complainant so swear under oath, incident to issuance of the search warrant or otherwise. In addition, the context of Lieutenant Fulleman's advice to respondent was that these weapons remained in the home after the incident in 1995 when the home was first searched for weapons on Susan's application, and there was no suggestion that Susan ever used or made a threat to use them. In view of the lack of circumstances that could be described as emergent, this panel is unable to conclude that respondent could not have advised Lieutenant Fulleman to call another judge to handle the matter. Furthermore, we question whether respondent perceived the matter as requiring emergent action, so that time could not be taken to call another judge, when he found that the circumstances justified the release of [Susan] R.O.R., irrespective of what the search warrant revealed. . . . . The police have authority to arrest for any criminal or non-indictable conduct they observe and could have arrested [Susan] for such conduct they observed in serving the TRO and executing the search warrant. See R. 3:4-1; R. 7:2. Note that separate Part VII was adopted effective February 1, 1998, after these events, and that R. 3:4-1 essentially governed the proceedings on non-indictables as well as the indictables the prior July. See R. 7:2; 7:3. We are cited to no portion or provision of the Domestic Violence Manuals respondent introduced which supports his contention that an arrest is required for a non-indictable petty disorderly persons harassment complaint when the complaint alleges or relates to a complaint alleging domestic violence. . . . Whether or not respondent authorized [Susan's] arrest on the complaint-warrants signed by Benni Jakubovic, respondent initialed his finding of probable cause the next morning. He so acknowledged before us, and Denise Bradshaw, the Deputy Clerk who signed the warrants on the morning of July 15, without making a finding of probable cause, testified that respondent added those initials during the arraignment. As the determination of probable cause was not made on the record during the arraignment, respondent's recordation of the probable cause determination is evidence which supports a finding that he authorized the arrest the night before. In any event, it appears that respondent knew on the evening of July 14, 1997, that [Susan] would be arrested and that the arrest would take place that night. Fulleman testified that he asked respondent to set the bail during his conversation with respondent in case the police were able to serve this tonight. And the bail-R.O.R. was set at that time. We conclude, based upon all of the evidence, that respondent authorized the arrest of [Susan] on July 14, 1997, and had a strong belief that her arrest would occur that night. Despite respondent's clear awareness that he should have recused himself from the entire Jakubovic July 14-15, 1997 matter, his failure to do so set in motion a set of anticipated events that led to [Susan's] arrest late at night while her children were sleeping. Her house was searched, and she was required to appear before respondent on the morning of July 15, 1997. NO. D-134 JUDGE WOLF A. SAMAY, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF PASSAIC. Decided January 12, 2001 Order returnable November 8, 2000 Opinion by PER CURIAM IN THE MATTER OF : WOLF A. SAMAY, : ORDER Judge of the Municipal Court : of the City of Passaic : JUDGE WOLF A. SAMAY of the Municipal Court of the City of Passaic, having been ordered to show cause why he should not be removed from judicial office or otherwise disciplined, and good cause apearing; It is ORDERED that JUDGE WOLF A. SAMAY is hereby removed from judicial office, effective immediately. WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 12th day of January, 2001. CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT