Title: People v. Wilson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98111
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2005

Docket No. 98111-Agenda 9-January 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
HOWARD W. WILSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed March 24, 2005.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The State charged defendant, Howard W. Wilson, with two
counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West
2002)). Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the
domestic battery statute is unconstitutionally vague. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court of Douglas County found the
statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant and granted
the motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the State's motion to
reconsider, and the State appealed directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R.
603. We now reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand the
cause for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	The State charged defendant with two counts of domestic
battery, arising out of an incident on September 19, 2003. Defendant
moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that the domestic battery
statute was unconstitutionally vague. In his motion, defendant pointed
out that the victim, Kimberly Meeks, was not related to defendant by
blood or marriage. At the time of the incident, the two did not have a
dating or living relationship, although they had previously lived
together and dated. Defendant's complaint was that the statute
allowed a domestic battery charge to be based on a former
relationship.
	The difference between simple battery and domestic battery is
that the latter is committed against a "family or household member as
defined in subsection (3) of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, as amended." Compare 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)
(West 2002) with 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a) (West 2002). Both battery
and domestic battery are Class A misdemeanors, but domestic battery
can be enhanced to a Class 4 felony if the defendant has a previous
conviction for domestic battery. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(b) (West 2002).
The State charged defendant with a felony because he had a
conviction for domestic battery in 1995.
	Defendant's specific complaint is with the definition of "family or
household members":
			" 'Family or household members' include spouses, former
spouses, parents, children, stepchildren and other persons
related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who
share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who
have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share
or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child,
persons who have or have had a dating or engagement
relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal
assistants, and caregivers as defined in paragraph (3) of
subsection (b) of Section 12-21 of the Criminal Code of
1961. For purposes of this paragraph, neither a casual
acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2
individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to
constitute a dating relationship." 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3)
(West 2002).
Defendant argued that this definition was unconstitutionally vague
because it did not place any time limits on the former relationship of
the parties.
	At an evidentiary hearing on the motion, defendant testified about
the nature of his relationship with Meeks. Defendant and Meeks dated
for 10 months. For four of those months, from February to May 2003,
Meeks and defendant lived together in Arcola. Meeks ended the
relationship in May 2003. Although the relationship was intimate and
sexual, it was never exclusive, even during the period in which they
lived together. In September 2003, when the incident occurred,
defendant and Meeks were just friends.
	The trial court entered an order dismissing the charges against
defendant on the basis that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
The trial court began by noting that defendant could challenge the
statute only as applied to the facts of this case. The court then found
that the problem with the statute was that it applied to those people
who have previously had a dating relationship, but did not specify how
recent the dating relationship must have been. The court was
concerned that even a relationship that occurred 50 years ago would
be covered by the statute. The court acknowledged that, in People v.
Johnson, 341 Ill. App. 3d 583 (2003), the appellate court held that the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague. However, the court
distinguished that case on the basis that the parties in that case had a
current dating relationship at the time of the alleged battery.
According to the trial court, it was "apparent from the Statute in
question that the legislative intent was to prohibit difficulties and acts
of domestic violence between persons who have a continuing
relationship." Thus, the statutory definitions "persons who ***
formerly shared a common dwelling" and "persons who *** have had
a dating relationship" were vague as applied to defendant because the
statute offered no guidance to law enforcement officers or prosecutors
as to how recently the relationship must have ended. Because
defendant's relationship with Meeks had ended several months prior
to the incident in question, no guidance was offered as to whether
their relationship fell within the statutory prohibition.
	The State filed a petition for rehearing. The State argued that,
pursuant to People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 113-14 (2001), when a
court considers an "as applied" challenge, it must determine the
validity of the law in light of the particular facts at hand, and that a
statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a hypothetical
situation could be imagined in which some terms might be called into
question. The State pointed out that defendant's relationship with
Meeks had ended only four months prior to the incident, and argued
that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that such a
relationship would fall within the statute's reference to "persons who
... have had a dating or engagement relationship." The court denied
the petition for rehearing.

ANALYSIS
	All statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of
rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the validity of
the statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation. People v.
Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406 (2003). If reasonably possible, a statute
must be construed so as to affirm its constitutionality and validity.
Greco, 204 Ill. 2d  at 406. When a statute is declared unconstitutional,
our review is de novo. People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 450 (2004).
	Defendant concedes that he may challenge the statute only as
applied to the facts of this case. Where, as here, a statute does not
affect first amendment rights, it will not be declared unconstitutionally
vague on its face unless it is capable of no valid application. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d  at 112. Defendant does not dispute that the statute is capable
of some valid applications. In cases that do not involve first
amendment freedoms, due process is satisfied if: (1) the statute's
prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by common
understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2) the statute
provides sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers
and triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on their
private conceptions. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 639-40 (2000).
A defendant cannot escape a statute's reach by arguing that it might
be vague as applied to someone else. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d  at 113. If the
defendant's conduct clearly falls within the statute's proscriptions,
prosecuting him does not offend due process even though the statute
might be vague as to other conduct in other circumstances. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d  at 113.
	The State argues, and we agree, that the trial court clearly erred
in holding the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant.
The evidence showed that defendant had dated the victim for 10
months, living with her for 4 of them, and that the relationship had
ended only 4 months before the incident in question. Thus, defendant
fell within the statute's definition of a "[f]amily or household member"
under two separate bases: (1) he and the victim had "had a dating ***
relationship"; and (2) he and the victim had "formerly shared a
common dwelling" (725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2002)).
	As applied to defendant, the statute meets Falbe's two-part test.
First, the statute's prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when
measured by common understanding and practices, to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited.
As previously stated, domestic battery is battery committed against a
family or household member. Both the simple battery statute and the
domestic battery statute prohibit causing bodily harm to someone or
making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with
someone. 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a), 12-3.2(a) (West 2002). Defendant
conceded at oral argument that he understood that he was not entitled
to commit a battery against the victim whether or not she was a family
or household member. If defendant's argument is that he was not
given fair warning whether committing a battery against Meeks would
be a simple battery or a domestic battery, that argument is also
unavailing. Because defendant and Meeks formerly shared a common
dwelling and formerly had a dating relationship, defendant was clearly
informed that committing a battery against Meeks would be a
domestic battery. Defendant's argument before this court shows that
he understood what was prohibited. Defendant complains about the
lack of a time limit in the statute and notes that it applies to anyone
who has ever had a dating relationship with the victim or who has ever
shared a common dwelling with the victim, no matter how long ago.
Defendant's interpretation is correct: the statute has no time limit. But
that does not make the statute vague. Defendant's own argument
shows that he understood what the statute meant.
	Second, as applied to the facts of this case, the statute provides
sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and triers
of fact that its application does not depend merely on their private
conceptions. At the time defendant committed the alleged battery, he
and Meeks had ended an intimate and sexual 10-month relationship
only 4 months previously. For 4 of those months, they had shared a
common dwelling. Thus, any law enforcement officer or trier of fact
would understand that this statute applied to defendant's situation,
and they would not have to rely on private conceptions as to what
constituted formerly sharing a dwelling or having a dating relationship.
	Although the trial court stated that it understood that it could
consider the statute only as it applied to defendant, the court did not
limit its inquiry accordingly. At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the
court expressed concern that defendant could still be charged with
domestic battery against Meeks if a similar incident occurred in 40
years. The court then asked the State if that provided much guidance
to law enforcement officers, prosecutors, or triers of fact. The State
responded that it did because the question is always whether the
parties have had a dating relationship. Moreover, the lack of a time
limit did not make the statute vague. The court responded that it was
concerned that if a man bumped into a woman on the street, and he
had dated that woman 45 years earlier in high school, he could be
charged with domestic battery. The State explained that such a
hypothetical was not relevant and again reiterated that a lack of a time
limit made the statute definite rather than vague. When the trial court
issued its written ruling, it stated that "if a person had had a dating
relationship with another individual 50 years ago, and then a battery
occurred between those two individuals, that person committing the
battery could be charged with and convicted of the offense of
domestic battery." The trial court erred in taking all of these
hypotheticals into account. As we stated in Izzo, a defendant "cannot
escape the law's reach by arguing that the statute might be vague as
applied to someone else." Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d  at 113. Moreover, even in
these hypothetical situations, the statute would not be vague. The
statute is very clear that there is no time limit, and both defendant and
the trial court have demonstrated their understanding of this.
	From the above quotations, it appears that the State is correct
that the trial court's true concern was not vagueness, but whether the
statute was enacted under a valid exercise of the legislature's police
power. However, due process principles prohibit only the arbitrary or
unreasonable use of the police power. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d  at 640. "To
constitute a legitimate exercise of the police power, a legislative
enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest
intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable
method of accomplishing the desired result." Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d  at 640.
We are concerned not with whether the legislature has chosen the best
or most effective means of resolving the problems addressed by the
statute, but only with whether the statute is reasonably designed to
remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to
the public health, safety, and general welfare. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d  at
640.
	The trial court, however, could consider a police power argument
only on an as-applied basis. See Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d  at 644-45. Thus, it
was not relevant whether it was a valid exercise of the police power
to make the statute applicable to relationships that ended 50 years
before the alleged battery. The legislature's obvious concern in
enacting the domestic battery statute was in curbing the serious
problem of domestic violence. Defendant conceded at oral argument
that the threat of domestic violence does not end when a relationship
ends. Clearly, it was not unreasonable for the legislature to include
within the domestic battery statute relationships that had been over for
only a few months. Whether it was reasonable to include relationships
that had ended 50 years ago is not before this court.
	In sum, section 112A-3, as applied to defendant, is neither vague
nor an unreasonable exercise of the police power. We therefore
reverse the trial court's order holding the statute unconstitutional and
remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.