Title: ZOOK BROTHERS CONSTR CO v STATE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12983
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 1976

No. 12983 IN THE SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 19 7 6 ZOOK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION C O M P A N Y , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable P e t e r Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Ronald Waterman argued, Helena, Montana Patrick Sullivan argued, Spokane, Washington For Respondent : Donald Douglas appeared, Helena, Montana Cannon and Garrity, Helena, Montgna Donald Garrity argued, Helena, Montana - fl\J G 2 k, **',-'? F i l e d : Submitted : June 3, 1976 Decided : 2 5 p 7 r M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. P l a i n t i f f appeals from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court, Lewis and Clark County. Zook Brothers Construction Company (Zook) and the Montana Department of Highways (State) entered i n t o a contract i n June 1967, whereby Zook agreed t o construct a segment of highway referred t o a s the "Montana City Project1', a 6.083 segment of i n t e r s t a t e and secondary highway i n Jefferson County, south of Helena, Montana. The contract allowed 300 days f o r completion of the project and involved a $3,000,000 contract between the p a r t i e s . The i n s t a n t case involves Zook's claim f o r damages allegedly caused by the S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o inform Zook the S t a t e lacked r i g h t - of-way access t o portions of the project, which i s claimed t o have caused a delay i n scheduled operations and escalated costs of com- pletion. Zook contends 1) it i s e n t i t l e d t o damages f o r costs incurred i n completion of the project, 2) f o r the cost of "standby" on equipment it was unable t o u t i l i z e due t o unforeseen delays, and 3) f o r p r o f i t s allegedly l o s t on t h i s project and subsequent projects due t o the delays and tieup of assets. The delays r e l i e d upon by Zook a s a basis f o r i t s claim were occasioned (a) by Montana Power Company's problem i n obtaining a right-of-way f o r relocation of a u t i l i t y l i n e , and (b) by the i n a b i l i t y of the S t a t e t o obtain right-of-way across various mining claims through the project. (a) The u t i l i t y delay. The S t a t e , a f t e r planning the general location of the highway t o be constructed, took steps t o secure a right-of-way and t o remove existing u t i l i t i e s from the area. The Montana Power Company was contacted regarding the relocation of an e l e c t r i c a l transmission l i n e . A relocation contract with Montana Power was approved by the S t a t e on June 27, 1967 and contained a provision t h a t a l l u t i l i t y moves were expected t o be completed by August 31, 1967. Relocation of the power l i n e was c r i t i c a l t o Zook's schedule f o r construction, i n t h a t the l i n e had t o be removed prior t o construction of a frontage road upon which Zook had planned t o d i v e r t t r a f f i c t o complete the main highway construc- tion. The power l i n e was not relocated u n t i l April 1968. (b) The mining claim delay. The S t a t e encountered problems i n obtaining the right-of-way through various mining claims within the work area. Zook was ad- vised t o begin construction on July 17, 1967, although the S t a t e was aware there were various problems obtaining right-of-way through the mining claims. A t a preconstruction conference held be- tween the S t a t e representatives and Zook personnel on July 19, 1967, Zook advised the S t a t e of i t s schedule f o r completion of the various phases of the project. The S t a t e discussed such diverse problems as s a f e t y and the protection of w i l d l i f e h a b i t a t . The S t a t e did not advise Zook personnel of the right-of-way d i f f i c u l t i e s it was encountering. Upon r e c e i p t of the S t a t e ' s order t o proceed on July 17, 1967, Zook began t o mobilize a l l of the necessary equipment f o r completion of the project according t o the agreed schedule. However, on July 27, 1967, the S t a t e issued a suspension order t o Zook which prevented Zook from proceeding with construction i n the area of the mining claims during negotiation f o r and t e s t i n g of these claims. Zook's schedule called f o r completion of "Frontage Road No.4" by September 15, 1967, and diversion of t r a f f i c from the existing route t o u t i l i z e sophisticated blasting techniques, which were intended t o reduce great quantities of rock t o a s i z e t h a t would allow excavation with self-loading "scrapers" of large rock cuts. Zook a l s o planned t o use large q u a n t i t i e s of the excavated rock and material a s f i l l i n the area involved i n the mining claim stop order. However, because of the S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o obtain the necessary right-of-way, Zook was forced t o abandon i t s plan of t r a f f i c diversion and various f i l l and excavation require- ments were delayed several weeks. Restrictions on work i n the v i c i n i t y of the mining claims were l i f t e d on September 22, 1967; the power poles were removed by October 1 7 , 1967; Frontage Road No. 4 was then available f o r construction work. O n September 6, 1967, Zook personnel informed the S t a t e by l e t t e r t h a t the u t i l i t y pole problem and theI1mining claims delay has r e a l l y fouled up our schedule f o r completion of t h i s project and f e e l we should be given f u l l consideration for these delays." O n November 12, 1968, Zook submitted a claim f o r damages resulting from the delays which it claimed caused the 116 day over-run on the scheduled completion date. This claim was rejected by the State. O n March 24, 1972 Zook f i l e d a "complete Documentation" [ ~ o o k ' s description] of i t s claim f o r an amount f a r i n excess of i t s o r i g i n a l claim. Following the submission of t h i s claim, the S t a t e undertook an audit of the Zook records f o r the purpose of evaluation of t h a t portion of the claim r e l a t i n g t o equipment standby costs. Zook's claim was o r a l l y denied by the Director of the S t a t e Highway Commission a f t e r several meetings between the p a r t i e s t o discuss t h a t claim. - 4 - Zook brought s u i t i n the d i s t r i c t court t o recover the amount claimed, based on the s t a t e ' s alleged breach i n f a i l i n g t o secure the right-of-way. After a lengthy t r i a l the d i s t r i c t court determined: "The S t a t e of Montana materially breached its contract with Zook and the damages which Zook suffered thereby were a d i r e c t and proximate r e s u l t of such breach." Zook was awarded a t o t a l of $140,917 i n damages, consisting of $125,000 f o r maintenance of equipment i n standby s t a t u s , and $15,917 as additional expense f o r t r a f f i c control costs incurred due t o i t s i n a b i l i t y t o complete Frontage Road No. 4. Zook appeals claiming it i s e n t i t l e d t o damages fa.r i n excess of those granted by the d i s t r i c t court. The S t a t e cross- appeals on the basis Zook's claim i s barred by the special s t a t u t e of limitations prescribed by section 83-602, R.C.M. 1947, and by the terms of the contract and the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court t h a t a breach had occurred i s not supported by the evidence. Hearing was had on March 5, 1976 before t h i s Court, and on March 25, 1976, the Court ordered additional b r i e f s and argument limited to: 1. Causal connection between breach and damages. 2. Equipment standby costs. 3. T r a f f i c control costs. 4. Administrative costs. Arguments heard on June 3, 1976 were r e s t r i c t e d t o a discussion of the four items enumerated. The S t a t e contends the claim of Zook is barred by the provisions of section 83-602, R.C.M. 1947, which provides i n per- tinent part: "Whenever any contracting agency of the s t a t e of Montana provides a procedure f o r the settlement of any question o r dispute a r i s i n g between the con- t r a c t o r and said agency, the contractor, before proceeding t o bring an action i n court under provision of t h i s a c t , must r e s o r t t o such procedure within the time specified i n h i s contract o r , i f no time i s specified, within ninety (90) days a f t e r the question o r dispute has arisen * * *.I' The contract between the p a r t i e s contains a provision requiring: "In case any claim o r dispute a r i s e s between the p a r t i e s hereto, respecting any matter pertaining t o t h i s agreement * * * said claim o r dispute s h a l l be referred t o the Commission by the contractor i n writing, and a request f o r a hearing within a period of s i x t y (60) days a f t e r the claim o r dispute has arisen * * *.If The S t a t e argues Zook's cause of action, i f any, arose as of the July 27, 1967 order from the Director t o stop work i n the area of the mining claims. The S t a t e urges the contract l i m i t s the time f o r f i l i n g of a claim t o within the 60 day period following the date of the delay. It claims the September 6, 1967 l e t t e r from Zook's general manager f a i l s t o s t a t e a claim i n t h a t it does not contain demand f o r additional compensation, nor does express an intention t o submit such a claim a t any 1a.ter date. It also notes the l e t t e r does not d i r e c t i t s e l f t o the Commission. These alleged f a c t s a r e urged as grounds f o r finding t h a t Zook time f a i l e d t o present a claim within the/provided, i . e . 60 days. This Court i s i n agreement with the d i s t r i c t court ' s conclu- sion t h a t these contentions a r e t o t a l l y without merit. The claim i s neither barred on statutory nor contractual grounds. The l e t t e r from Zook was addressed t o a M r . Richard B. Dundas, D i s t r i c t En- gineer, S t a t e Highway Commission, and was sent approximately 40 days a f t e r the work stoppage order was promulgated. Zook's l e t t e r c l e a r l y expressed the contractor's concern regarding t h e e f f e c t of the delays on the over-all project. 'i. A Thereafter the S t a t e considered the matter, audited Zook's records regarding i t s claim f o r standby expenses and held several hearings, a t Zook's request, regarding the varied claims of Zook. To date, Zook has received only an o r a l denial of i t s claims on February 26, 1973, by the Director of the S t a t e Highway Department. Litigation was commenced April 20, 1973 and i s c l e a r l y not barred by the contractual limitations nor the s t a t u t o r y limitations. The logical r u l e , and the r u l e adopted i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , i s t h a t a claim o r dispute ARISES a t the time the S t a t e submits a f i n a l estimate t o the contractor f o r h i s approval o r rejection. Terry Contracting, Inc. v. S t a t e of N e w York, 280 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1967); Waterman v. S t a t e of N e w York, 241 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1963). To date, no such f i n a l estimate has ever been submitted t o Zook by the State. The S t a t e ' s reliance on s t a t u t o r y o r contractual limitations is a l s o without merit f o r the reason the S t a t e , through i t s own actions, led Zook t o believe t h a t i t s claim would receive timely a t t e n t i o n and would be reviewed by the S t a t e pending an adminis- t r a t i v e decision on i t s merits. Zook r e l i e d upon the assurances i n the S t a t e ' s l e t t e r dated September 12, 1967, t h a t the S t a t e would give f u l l consideration t o a l l factors r e l a t i v e t o the S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o obtain right-of-way. Clearly, the S t a t e i s foreclosed from raising a s t a t u t e of limitations defense given the above f a c t s . The S t a t e a l s o urges there was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence i n the record of the d i s t r i c t court t o support a finding there was a breach of contract upon which t o base an award of damages t o the contractor, Zook. This Court, i n detemining a similar dispute, held the f a i l u r e t o obtain highway right-of-way i s a material breach of contract which, i f it delays a contractor, w i l l sustain an award of damages. Laas v. Montana Highway Comm'n, 157 Mont. 121, 125, 132,483 P.2d 699 (1971). The Standard Specifications portion of the contract entered i n t o here provides i n part: "07.17 FURNISHING RIGHT-OF-WAY. A l l right-of-way f o r the roadway s h a l l be provided by the Commission without cost t o the contractor. A l l right-of-way may not have been obtained a t the time when the bids a r e opened and the proposal considered, and i n t h a t case the award w i l l not be made u n t i l the e n t i r e right-of-way has been obtained. The 'submission of a bid w i l l be construed as an acceptance of t h i s condition by the bidder, and no claim f o r damage o r loss of unavoidable delay i n securing right-of-way w i l l be considered by the Commission. I f the contract i s materially delayed because of right-of-way d i f f i c u l t i e s , due consideration w i l l be given by the Commission i n extending the contract time t o make proper allowances therefor." (Emphasis supplied.) The contract between Zook and the S t a t e was signed nearly four months prior t o the S t a t e ' s obtaining of the right-of-way i n the area of the mining claims. Considering similar evidence a s establish- ing a breach of contract, t h i s Court noted i n - Laas: "There is l i t t l e question but t h a t there was a breach of contract by the S t a t e i n f a i l i n g t o secure t h e right-of-way across the Emery property. * * * The standard specifications, one of the contracting docu- ments, s p e c i f i c a l l y provided t h a t the S t a t e would provide a l l of the right-of-way f o r the roadway without cost t o the contractor. The same document further provided t h a t i f the right-of-way had not been obtained a t the time when the bids were opened, the award would not be made u n t i l the e n t i r e right-of-way had been obtained. Clearly, the p l a i n t i f f had a r i g h t t o assume, when he received the award and the order t o proceed, t h a t the right-of-way had been obtained, or would be obtained without detriment t o him. "The standard specifications take i n t o account t h a t there may be delay between the time the bids a r e opened and the award i s .made because of unavoidable d i f f i c u l t i e s i n securing the right-of-way, and further provide t h a t no claim f o r damages o r loss of anticipated p r o f i t s on t h a t account may be made. But, no provision i s made f o r delay i n securing right-of-way a f t e r the award has been made and the order t o proceed given. The standard specifications further provide t h a t i f the contract i s materially delayed because of right-of-way d i f f i c u l t i e s , due consideration w i l l be given by the S t a t e i n extending the contract t i m e t o make proper allowance therefor. This may a s s i s t t h e contractor i n avoiding the penalty clause, but it i s a f a r cry from compensating him f o r idled men and equipment because of delay brought about by the f a i l u r e of the S t a t e t o secure the right-of-way before awarding the contract, o r i n reasonable time thereafter ." The d i s t r i c t court determined i n i t s conclusions of law t h a t "The S t a t e of Montana materially breached i t s contract with Zook and the damages which Zook suffered thereby were a d i r e c t and proximate r e s u l t of such breach." It i s c l e a r the record supports such a conclusion and it w i l l not be s e t aside by t h i s Court. Zook acted i n reliance upon the S t a t e ' s implicit repre- sentation the right-of-way had been obtained and suffered g r e a t I expense a s a r e s u l t . The record indicates t h a t Zook assembled ample equipment t o complete t h i s project i n the time intended. Testimony from Zook's and the S t a t e ' s witnesses was presented t o the e f f e c t t h a t Zook was a competent and e f f i c i e n t highway contractor and t h i s project was performed as e f f i c i e n t l y as possible, under the c i r - cumstances. Zook proceeded with grading a c t i v i t i e s even though foreclosed from operation i n two c r i t i c a l areas, Frontage Road No. 4 and the railroad overpass. Zook also worked as much a s possible during the winter shutdown as allowed by the contract, and thereby made some use of the equipment held on the project f o r completion i n the spring. Thus, Zook made every reasonable attempt t o mitigate i t s damages under the S t a t e ' s breach. Having determined the S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o timely relocate the u t i l i t y l i n e s and obtain right-of-way through the mining claims was a breach of contract t h a t materially damaged Zook, the question now becomes the proper measure of those damages. Section 17-301, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "For the breach of an obligation a r i s i n g from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by t h i s code, i s the amount which w i l l compensate the party aggrieved f o r a l l detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, i n the ordinary course of things, would be l i k e l y t o r e s u l t therefrom." For damages t o be recoverable under section 17-301, they must "have been within the contemplation of the p a r t i e s when they entered i n t o the contract, and such as might naturally be expected t o r e s u l t from i t s violation." Myers v. Bender, 46 Mont. 497, 508, 129 P. 330. O n appeal, Zook seeks compensation f o r three separate areas of damage: 1) increased costs of performing the contract; 2) standby costs f o r idled equipment; and 3) l o s t p r o f i t s . These c o n s t i t u t e the proper measure of damages under the f a c t s . The contract was l e t f o r almost $3,000,000. It involved complete construc- t i o n of over s i x miles of i n t e r s t a t e highway. A t one time o r another, Zook had approximately $3,000,000 worth of equipment on the job. It i s c l e a r the losses claimed by Zook were foreseeable and would naturally flow from a substantial delay i n performance of the contract. The delay t h a t did occur was caused by the S t a t e , therefore these losses are properly compensable under section 17-301, R.C.M. 1947. 1) To e s t a b l i s h i t s claim f o r increased performance c o s t s , Zook u t i l i z e d the a c t u a l business records maintained during i t s work on the Montana City Project. These records were introduced and admitted without objection during t r i a l . Zook's records con- tained actual costs consistent with the pay items within the S t a t e ' s contract. Zook limited i t s cla.im t o nine c r i t i c a l items of highway construction costs t h a t were influenced by the Sta.tel s breach. Zook's records show it cost Zook $1,440,483 i n s t r a i g h t f i e l d costs t o perform the work. It a l s o incurred i n d i r e c t job costs of $166,088 and a general administrative expense of $158,408. Payments by the S t a t e f o r these several items totaled $1,146,293.42, resulting i n Zook's loss of $618,685.58 on i t s performance of the contract. Zook introduced several a l t e r n a t i v e methods of determining i t s loss. One method consisted of an audit of costs and revenues f o r the e n t i r e job including equipment ownership expense. Under t h i s method, Zook suffered a loss of $652,542,85. Another method calculated the reasonable cost of performing the contract and compared it t o the S t a t e payments. Escalated costs i n eight areas of job performance were compared against S t a t e revenues. The r e s u l t showed a l o s s t o Zook of $663,026.66. Methods of computing the amount of damages may vary from case t o case. Under the f a c t s of t h i s case, the Court believes the r e s u l t derived from Zook's actual cost records i s the best evidence of Zook's actual loss. W e mention the other methods and the losses they show only t o reinforce the determination t h a t the loss shown by Zook's actual cost records i s reasonably c e r t a i n and accurate. 2) Zook claims damages of $613,387 f o r equipment standby. The claim i s based on a l i s t of approximately 100 pieces of equip- ment idled because of the S t a t e ' s breach. Standby time was computed by examining Zook's business records t o determine the a c t u a l oper- ating and r e p a i r hours f o r each piece of equipment i n each week of a 10 month period running from August 1967 t o May 1968. These hours were subtracted from a base of 40 hours per week. The difference was standby. This method of computing standby time was necessary since neither Zook nor the S t a t e maintained standby records during the Montana City Project. I n the absence of such records, the use of a 40 hour week a s the measure of standby time was reasonable under the circumstances. Zook planned t o schedule 2 10-hour work s h i f t s 6 days a week o r a t l e a s t 2 8-hour s h i f t s 5 days a week. This, the evidence shows, i s common practice i n the construction industry. Compared t o the anticipated operating hours of 80 t o 120 hours per week, 40 hours is not an a r b i t r a r y guideline. To e s t a b l i s h the c o s t of the standby time, Zook used 50 per cent of the hourly r e n t a l r a t e s promulgated by the Montana Highway Department and approved by the S t a t e Highway Commission. There was testimony i n the record s t a t i n g these r a t e s were reasonable and below prevalent r e n t a l r a t e s a t tha.t time. During t r i a l , counsel f o r the S t a t e represented t h a t it could not find c e r t a i n pieces of equipment shown on Zook's records as working on the Montana City Proj e c t . Zook deleted and eliminated standby claims f o r several items, reducing the damages claimed by some $66,000. Zook's claim f o r equipment standby costs of $613,387 is reasonable and amply supported by the record. 3) Zook,finally, asks f o r an award of l o s t p r o f i t s on the contract i n the amount of $88,249. This amount i s equivalent t o the 5 per cent p r o f i t Zook anticipated when it bid on the job. The r u l e i n Montana as s t a t e d by t h i s Court i n Cruse v. Clawson, 137 Mont. 439, 448, 352 P.2d 989, and c i t e d i n - 9 Laas i s t h a t a party: "* * J ; may recover f o r loss of p r o f i t s where it i s shown t h a t such l o s s is the n a t u r a l and d i r e c t r e s u l t of the a c t of t h e defendant complained of and t h a t such amount i s c e r t a i n and not speculative." The record is r e p l e t e with testimony t h a t Zook w a s a competent and e f f i c i e n t highway contractor and t h a t it performed the project as e f f i c i e n t l y a s possible under the circumstances. Highway construction i s a hazardous pursuit with no guarantee t h a t a p r o f i t w i l l be realized on any p a r t i c u l a r job. Under the f a c t s of t h i s case, however, we a r e convinced Zook should recover i t s anticipated p r o f i t . The delays, caused by the S t a t e , g r e a t l y increased operating costs. They seriously disrupted Zook's schedule and moved the project into higher wage periods and bad weather. The evidence showed Zook had the necessary equipment and expertise t o perform the contract i n a workmanlike manner were it not f o r the S t a t e ' s breach. Under these f a c t s , Zook should receive the benefit of its bargain. Zook also alleges t h a t its losses on the Montana City Project forced it t o s e l l much of its equipment, thus decreasing i t s p r o f i t s f o r several subsequent years. W e concur with the d i s t r i c t court t h a t the evidence a s t o these alleged losses i s vague and speculative. W e find no basis i n the record f o r an award of damages f o r l o s s of future p r o f i t s . This Court i n Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons, Co., 147 Mont. 500, 509, 414 P. 2d 918 (1966), s a i d the verdict of the t r i a l court w i l l be s e t aside i f : * * it can be shown with reasonable conviction t h a t the [finder of f a c t ] * * * (3) made a mistake of law or f a c t ; (4) based i t s findings on a m i s - understanding of law o r f a c t J C * Jc." Where a verdict does n o t appear t o have resulted from passion and prejudice, and any e r r o r may be ascerta.ined by mathematical calculation, t h i s Court may properly modify t h e judgment without reversing it. See: Nesbitt v. City of Butte, 118 Mont. 84,94, 163 P.2d 251; Miller v. Emerson, 120 Mont. 380, 381, 186 P.2d 220; A.T. Klemens & Son v. Reber Plumbing and Heating Co., 139 Mont. 115, 126, 360 P.2d 1005. This Court, a f t e r a review of the d i s t r i c t court's findings of f a c t and conclusions of law, is unable t o determine a b a s i s f o r the judgment rendered. From the record we cannot discern a basis t h a t supports the damages award given, e i t h e r i n the f i r s t judgment o r i n the amended judgment which added an additional amount i n compensation f o r t r a f f i c control expenses incurred. The d i s t r i c t court was faced with an enormous volume of highly complex accounting evidence and detailed technical testimony presented on behalf of Zook and the State. A thorough review of the evidence and the record of the d i s t r i c t court t r i a l of t h i s matter, leads t h i s Court t o the conclusion t h a t Zook i s r i g h t f u l l y e n t i t l e d t o the damages s e t f o r t h i n t h i s Opinion, l e s s the $140,917 awarded i n the d i s t r i c t court. W e Concur: J u s t i c e s --.".*---- /-*"'- 7, 4.. & & & C CLL- V - Hon. Edward T. Dussault, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l , concurring i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t : I concur i n t h e holding of t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e S t a t e breached t h e construction c o n t r a c t and t h a t Zook's claim i s n o t barred by t h e s p e c i a l s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . I d i s s e n t from t h e amount of damages awarded by t h e majority -- $1,320,321.58, o r almost 10 t i m e s t h e damages awarded by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . This award is based on Zook's contention t h a t t h e delays r e s u l t i n g from r e l o c a t i o n of u t i l i t y poles and a c q u i s i t i o n of right-of-way over mining claims i n one segment of t h e p r o j e c t caused a " r i p p l e e f f e c t " on o t h e r segments of t h e p r o j e c t with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e e n t i r e construction p r o j e c t as conceived and bid had t o be changed m a t e r i a l l y which caused l o s s e s h a l f again a s g r e a t a s t h e amount of t h e o r i g i n a l bid and award. I n m y view, t h e focus of t h e i s s u e i s whether t h e S t a t e ' s breach caused t h e damages claimed by Zook. O n appeal, t h e function of t h i s Court i s simply t o d e t e r - mine t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s finding and judgment. Holenstein v. Andrews, 166 Mont. 60, 530 P.2d 476; Kirby v. Kelly, 161 Mont. 66, 504 P.2d 683, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . H e r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t only $140,917 of t h e claimed damages w e r e caused by t h e S t a t e ' s breach. The g i s t of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s reasoning is found i n t h e follow- ing excerpt from i t s opinion: " I t is t h e opinion of t h i s Court t h a t both t h e S t a t e and t h e c o n t r a c t o r miscalculated t h e t o t a l time allowed f o r t h e completion of t h e c o n t r a c t . There was an overrun of 116 days due, i n p a r t , t o t h e delays occasioned by t h e S t a t e i n not having t h e e n t i r e right-of-way a v a i l a b l e . Work s t a r t e d on J u l y 25, 1967, and t h e complete right-of-way was a v a i l a b l e i n mid-October, 1967. However, during t h i s t i m e t h e c o n t r a c t o r w a s a v a i l a b l e t o work on and d i d work on a major p o r t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t . " I n m y view, t h e evidence, though c o n f l i c t i n g , is s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h i s finding and judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . I would a f f i r m t h e judgment. J u s t i c e - 15 -