Title: Ryerse v. Haddock
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50180
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2004

FILED:  August 12, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
RANDALL L. RYERSE
and DIANE K. RYERSE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GEORGE A. HADDOCK
and ROBERT KEECH ASSOCIATES, INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
Defendants.
GEORGE A. HADDOCK
and CATHARINE M. LUCHINI-HADDOCK,
aka Catharine Haddock,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
RANDAL LORIN RYERSE,
Respondent on Review.
(CCV 98-02-401, CCV 98-02-480; CA A107447; SC S50180)
Argued and submitted September 9, 2003.
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Dean Heiling, Heiling Dwyer &amp; Associates, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.
Lisa E. Lear, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief was Peter J. Viteznik, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
RIGGS, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order
of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Don A. Dickey, Judge. 185 Or App 679, 60 P3d 1107 (2003).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
RIGGS, J.
In this case, we decide when a trial court
"determine[s]" a motion to set aside a judgment and for a new
trial pursuant to ORCP 64 F (1997). (1)
  The Court of Appeals
concluded that, in the present case, the trial court did not
"determine[]" the motion until the clerk entered the trial
court's order in the register, and so the motion was deemed
denied. Ryerse v. Haddock, 185 Or App 679, 60 P3d 1107
(2003).  We allowed review and, for the following reasons,
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts relevant to our decision are as follows. 
Ryerse and Haddock were involved in an automobile accident. 
Haddock and his wife sued Ryerse.  At trial, the jury
returned a verdict for Ryerse.  The trial court entered a
judgment for Ryerse on June 3, 1999, and the Haddocks moved
for a new trial.  
We pause at this point to clarify some of the
procedural terminology relevant to the subsequent events in this
case.  After a judge signs a document, it may be "filed" with the
clerk of the court.  This court has defined "filed" as occurring
"when [the] document is given to a clerk with the intention that
it be filed." Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 78, 948 P2d 722
(1997) (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted). 
The document then will be "entered in the register" by the clerk,
which refers to the formal entry of the document in the court's
register as described in ORS 7.020. (2)
 See also
Black's Law Dictionary 554 (7th ed 1999) (defining "entry
of judgment" as "[t]he ministerial recording of a court's final
decision, usu[ally] by noting it in a judgment book or civil
docket").
In the present case, on July 26, 1999, the fifty-third
day after entry of the judgment in the register, the trial judge
signed an order granting a new trial and sent the parties a
letter explaining why.  The trial judge filed the order
with the clerk on July 27, 1999, the fifty-fourth day after entry
of the judgment.  However, the clerk did not enter the
order in the register until August 2, 1999, the sixtieth day
after entry of the judgment. (3)

Ryerse appealed the order granting a new trial. 
He contended (among other things) that the trial court was unable
to grant a new trial because the motion had been deemed denied
pursuant to ORCP 64 F. See Nendel v. Meyers,
162 Or 661, 663, 94 P2d 680 (1939) (interpreting statutory
predecessor to ORCP 64 F; after 55-day period expired, court
order purporting to grant motion for new trial was "null and
void").  Under ORS 3.070 (1997), Ryerse noted, the order did not
become effective until the date of entry in the
register. (4)
  Because the clerk did not enter the order
in the register before the 55-day period ran, Ryerse argued, the
trial court did not "determine[]" the motion, and the motion was
denied by operation of law.
The Haddocks disagreed, contending that a trial court
has "determined" a motion when it signs and files an order with
the clerk.  Because the trial judge signed and filed the
order with the clerk before the 55 days ran, the Haddocks
reasoned, the trial court timely had granted the motion for new
trial.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Ryerse, vacated the
trial court order granting the Haddocks a new trial, and
remanded. Ryerse, 185 Or App at 685. 
As we explain below, at issue here is whether, when the
legislature amended ORS 3.070 in 1991, the legislature intended
the "entry" of the order at issue in the present case to be the
act that makes the order effective and thus determined for
purposes of ORCP 64 F.  When interpreting statutes and the Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure, this court applies the familiar
methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Mulier v. Johnson, 332
Or 344, 349, 29 P3d 1104 (2001).  Accordingly, we begin with
those elements relevant to the text and context of the rule and
statutes at issue. As part of our first level of analysis,
we also consider "[p]rior cases interpreting predecessor
enactments of the same statutes." Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories
Corp., 327 Or 433, 441, 963 P2d 678 (1998). See also
Crocker and Crocker, 332 Or 42, 49, 22 P3d 759 (2001)
(same). 
We turn first to our prior cases and the context within
which the legislature amended ORS 3.070 in 1991.  The predecessor
to ORCP 64 F is former ORS 17.615 (1977), repealed
by Oregon Laws 1979, chapter 284, section 199. (5)
  Other
than the insertion of "the" before "judgment," the final sentence
of that statute is identical to ORCP 64 F.  This court
previously has addressed the meaning of "determine" in that
sentence. In both Clark v. Auto Wholesale Co., Inc.,
237 Or 446, 391 P2d 754 (1964), and Charco, Inc. v. Cohn,
242 Or 566, 411 P2d 264 (1966), this court addressed
whether a trial court timely determined a motion within the 55-day deadline in former ORS 17.615 (1963). (6)
  In both
cases, this court equated the date that a trial court determined
a motion for a new trial with the date that the trial court made
an effective order under ORS 3.070.  Charco,
242 Or at 569-70; Clark, 237 Or at 448-49.  Thus, both
cases necessarily (but implicitly) concluded that a trial court
determines a motion for a new trial when it makes an effective
order. 
Clark and Charco settled the question of that
aspect of the meaning of "determined" for purposes of
former ORS 17.615, the predecessor to ORCP 64 F.  Given the
fact that former ORS 17.615 contained the same wording as
ORCP 64 F, that context is dispositive here:  A trial court
determines a motion for a new trial pursuant to ORCP 64 F when it
makes an effective order.
Still in accordance with Clark and Charco,
we turn to ORS 3.070 to determine when this order became
effective.  From the time that this court decided Clark and
Charco until 1991, ORS 3.070 provided, in part:  
"If signed other than in open court, all such orders,
findings, judgments and decrees issued, granted or
rendered, other than orders not required to be filed
and entered with the clerk before becoming effective,
shall be transmitted by the judge to the clerk of the
court within the county where the matters are pending. 
They shall be filed and entered upon receipt thereof
and shall become effective from the date of
filing."
ORS 3.070 (1989) (emphasis added).  Pursuant to that version of
ORS 3.070, the order ruling on the motion for a new trial in
Clark and Charco was effective from the date of
filing, and that was the date that this court used to calculate
when the trial court had determined the motion for a new trial.   
In 1980, however, the Council on Court Procedures
promulgated ORCP 70 B(2), which governed when judgments would be
effective. (7)
  ORCP 70 B(2) provided that, "[n]otwithstanding
ORS 3.070 or any other rule or statute, for purposes of these
rules, a judgment is effective only when entered in the register
as provided in this rule."  Therefore, although at the time ORS
3.070 included judgments in its list of out-of-court orders that
would be effective from the date of filing, ORCP 70 B(2) created
an exception to that statute.  
The different methods for determining the effective
date of a document in ORS 3.070 and ORCP 70 B(2) created the
possibility for confusion. See Kay v. David Douglas Sch.
Dist. No. 40, 303 Or 574, 579, 738 P2d 1389 (1987) (stating
that out-of-court injunctive order would not result in effective
judgment "until it was signed and entered according to ORCP 70
B").  In 1991, the legislature addressed that possibility by
amending the last sentence of ORS 3.070 to provide that "[the
documents described in the previous sentence] shall be filed and
entered upon receipt thereof and shall become effective from
the date of entry in the register."  Or Laws 1991, ch 111, § 1
(emphasis added).
We presume that the legislature amended ORS 3.070 in
1991 with knowledge of the implications that a change to that
statute would have on the operation of ORCP 64 F. See
Weber and Weber, 337 Or 55, 67-68, 91 P3d 706 (2004)
(stating that court presumes legislature's awareness of existing
law).  As the text of the amendment indicates, the legislature
clearly intended to make "entry in the register," not "filing,"
the effective date for certain documents.  Thus, in light of
Clark and Charco, the legislature's decision to
change the effective date under ORS 3.070 to the date of entry in
the register also altered the date on which an order would be
determined for purposes of ORCP 64 F.  
Here, the trial judge signed the order in question
other than in open court, and the order became effective when
entered in the register, the sixtieth day after entry of the
judgment.  Hence, the order did not determine the motion within
the meaning of ORCP 64 F until after the 55-day period expired,
and, as a result, the motion was deemed denied by operation of
law.  The Court of Appeals was correct in so holding.   
None of the Haddocks' arguments alters that conclusion. 
The Haddocks point to other wording in ORS 3.070 that, they
argue, makes a "clear distinction between 'determining' an issue
and 'entering' an order in the register."  The Haddocks
further argue that interpreting "determined" in ORCP 64 F to mean
"entered" would undermine the trial court's power under ORS 3.070
to "determine" an issue in chambers or in open court, because
entry of the order would happen in a place other than in chambers
or open court.  Those arguments are unavailing because they fail
to acknowledge the import of Clark and Charco -- that
a trial court determines a motion for a new trial when it makes
an effective order -- and the legislature's amendment to ORS
3.070 in 1991.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. ORCP 64 F (1997) provides, in part, that "[t]he motion [for
a new trial] shall be heard and determined by the court
within 55 days from the time of the entry of the judgment, and
not thereafter, and if not so heard and determined within
said time, the motion shall conclusively be deemed denied." 
(Emphasis added.)
ORCP 64 has been amended one time since 1997.  Or
Laws 2003, ch 194, § 12.  That amendment does not affect the
result here.  Unless otherwise specified, all references to ORCP
64 are to the 1997 version.
2. ORS 7.020 (1997) provided:
"The register is a record wherein the clerk or court
administrator shall enter, by its title, every action, suit or
proceeding commenced in, or transferred or appealed to, the
court, according to the date of its commencement, transfer or
appeal.  Thereafter, the clerk or court administrator shall note
therein all the following:
"(1) The date of any filing of any paper or process.
"(2) The date of making, filing and entry of any order,
judgment, ruling or other direction of the court in or concerning
such action, suit or proceeding.
"(3) Any other information required by statute, court
order or rule."
3. On July 27, 1999, the trial court signed an amended order
granting the motion for new trial.  That order was not
filed until August 2, 1999, and not entered until August 5,
1999.  Because each of those events came after the
corresponding events discussed in the text, they do not affect
the result here.
4. ORS 3.070 (1997) provides:
"Any judge of a circuit court in any
judicial district may, in chambers, grant and
sign defaults, judgments, decrees,
interlocutory orders and provisional
remedies, make findings and decide motions,
demurrers and other like matters relating to
any judicial business coming before the judge
from any judicial district in which the judge
has presided in such matters.  The judge may
hear, in chambers, contested motions,
demurrers and other similar matters pending
within the judicial district, at any location
in the district designated under ORS 1.085. 
Upon stipulation of counsel, the judge may
try and determine any issue in equity or in
law where a jury has been waived and hear and
decide motions, demurrers and other like
matters, in chambers, at any location in the
state where the judge may happen to be,
relating to any judicial business coming
before the judge from any judicial district
in which the judge has presided in such
matters.  The judge may exercise these powers
as fully and effectively as though the
motions, demurrers, matters or issues were
granted, ordered, decided, heard and
determined in open court in the county where
they may be pending. If signed other than
in open court, all such orders, findings,
judgments and decrees issued, granted or
rendered, other than orders not required to
be filed and entered with the clerk before
becoming effective, shall be transmitted
by the judge to the clerk of the court within
the county where the matters are pending. 
They shall be filed and entered upon receipt
thereof and shall become effective from the
date of entry in the register."
(Emphasis added.)
The legislature has amended ORS 3.070 one time
since 1997.  Or Laws 2003, ch 576, § 269.  That amendment does
not affect the result here.  Unless otherwise noted, all
references to ORS 3.070 are to the 1997 version.
5. Former ORS 17.615 (1977) provided:
"A motion to set aside a judgment and for a new
trial, with the affidavits, if any, in support thereof,
shall be filed within 10 days after the filing of the
judgment sought to be set aside, or such further time
as the court may allow.  When the adverse party is
entitled to oppose the motion by counteraffidavits, he
shall file the same within 10 days after the filing of
the motion, or such further time as the court may
allow. The motion shall be heard and determined by
the court within 55 days from the time of the entry of
judgment, and not thereafter, and if not so heard and
determined within said time, the motion shall
conclusively be deemed denied." 
(Emphasis added.) 
6. The wording of former ORS 17.615 (1963) was the same
as former ORS 17.615 (1977).
7. The legislature repealed ORCP 70 in 2003, after the
relevant events in this case.  Or Laws 2003, ch 576, § 580. 
Unless otherwise noted, all references to ORCP 70 are to the 1997
version.