Title: Sanders v. Southern Risk Services
Citation: 603 So. 2d 994
Docket Number: 1902005
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 1992

603 So. 2d 994 (1992)
William SANDERS
v.
SOUTHERN RISK SERVICES and Sherman Industries, Inc.
1902005.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 7, 1992.
Bill Thompson of Paden &amp; Thompson, P.C., Bessemer, for appellant.
C. William Gladden of Balch &amp; Bingham, Birmingham, for appellee Southern Risk Services.
Bruce F. Rogers of Bainbridge, Mims &amp; Rogers, Birmingham, for appellee Sherman Industries, Inc.
ADAMS, Justice.
This is a collateral attack on a workman's compensation claim that had been settled by the parties on December 21, 1989. The plaintiff, William Sanders, sued Southern Risk Services and Sherman Industries, Inc., contending that he was discharged from his employment because he filed a workman's compensation claim, that he was denied rehabilitation expenses, and that a fraud was committed on him with regard to the computation of his workman's compensation benefits. The trial court entered a judgment for the defendants. We affirm.
At the outset, we note that the following settlement order was entered on December 21, 1989, with regard to the workman's compensation claim filed by Sanders against Sherman Industries:
*995 "....
The settlement petition was signed by Sanders and approved by the judge. Sanders filed no Rule 60(b), A.R.Civ.P., motion for relief from the order, nor did he follow the guidelines set forth in § 25-5-56, Code of Alabama 1975, for setting aside the order because of fraud. Nevertheless, Sanders filed the present action almost a year later, contending that Sherman had fraudulently misrepresented to him that his average weekly pay was $150 instead of $300, which he now claims was the correct amount. Even if Sherman's present action were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as the appellees claim, we would be compelled to affirm the judgment of the trial court. There is simply nothing in the record supporting Sanders's claim that his average weekly pay was, in fact, $300 and/or that Sherman fraudulently withheld that fact from him.[1]
In addition, we note that Sanders's claim for rehabilitation expenses was addressed in the petition for settlement. In fact, the signed order leaves no doubt that the settlement amount received by Sanders was compensation for future rehabilitation expenses and that Sanders would not be entitled to further expenses in that regard.
Finally, Sanders contends that the summary judgment should not have been entered on his claim that his discharge from Sherman was retaliatory for his having filed a workman's compensation claim against Sherman. Unless there is evidence of fraud, a settlement of an employee's claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act is conclusive of any other claims the worker may have. There was no credible evidence of fraud presented in this case. Nevertheless, Sherman offered the medical reports of Dr. Daniel Michael, which indicated:
"9-6-89
"10-11-89
"11-1-89
Sanders contends that he telephoned Sherman following the report of November 1, 1989, and inquired as to his employment status. He says he was told to contact Southern Risk. He argues that Southern Risk instructed him to contact his attorney. Sherman, on the other hand, contends that it should not be obligated to keep a position open for an employee indefinitely, and Sherman offered the doctor's report to show that Sanders's claim of disability was questionable. In light of the settlement agreement signed by all parties, which on its face releases Sherman of all other obligations to Sanders, except future medical expenses, and considering the doctor's reports, which tend to show that Sanders was suspected of "dragging his feet" with regard to returning to work, we conclude that the summary judgment was proper. At the very least, Sherman offered a legitimate reason for discharging Sanders, and Sanders offered nothing in opposition thereto.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
[1]  We also note that Sanders's claim of fraud falls far short of the "stronger showing than that required by the `substantial evidence rule'" that is required for such a claim. Lowman v. Piedmont Exec. Shirt Mfg. Co., 547 So. 2d 90, 95 (Ala.1989).

"[T]he plaintiff must present evidence that, if accepted and believed by the jury, would qualify as clear and convincing proof of fraud."
Id.