Title: State v. Partain
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057581
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 10, 2010

FILED: September 10, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
RICHARD DALE PARTAIN,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 03P3038; CA A132336; SC S057581)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
March 2, 2010.
Susan G. Howe, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review.  With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney
General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.
Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Deputy Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent on review.  With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part on different grounds.  The judgment of the
circuit court is vacated, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
Walters, J., dissented
and filed an opinion.
*On appeal from the
Polk County Circuit Court, William M. Horner, Judge. 228 Or App 329, 208 P3d
526 (2009).
GILLETTE, J.
This case concerns the propriety of a
600-month prison sentence imposed on a defendant in a sex abuse case, after the
Court of Appeals had vacated the 420-month sentence that the trial court
originally had imposed.  On defendant's appeal from the second sentence, the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had violated the rule
announced by this court in State v. Turner, 247 Or 301, 313, 429 P2d 197
(1967) -- that, when a defendant is retried after a successful appeal of his or
her conviction, the court in the second proceeding may not impose a harsher
sentence than had been imposed in the original proceeding.  State v. Partain,
228 Or App 329, 208 P3d 526 (2009).   Before this court, the state argues that
the rule from Turner either does not apply to the circumstances of this
case or, in any event, should be abandoned in favor of a rule that permits
imposition of a longer sentence on remand if the trial court is able to justify
that sentence on nonvindictive grounds.  We agree with the state that Turner
should be abandoned.  We also accept a version of the test that the state
proposes, but we conclude that the question whether that test has been met
requires further development of the record.  We therefore affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court.
In 2003, defendant was convicted of
multiple sex crimes --12 in all -- in a single proceeding.  At sentencing, the
trial court imposed various sentences and ordered that certain of the sentences
be served consecutively to others.  Altogether, the sentences required
defendant to serve 420 months in prison.  The judgment stated, with respect to
each sentence, that defendant would not be eligible for any sentence reduction
program.
Defendant appealed, arguing (1) that the
trial court had erred in requiring that defendant serve the sentences imposed
on four of the convictions consecutively to certain other sentences, and (2) that,
with respect to the same four sentences, the trial court had erred in denying
defendant eligibility for sentence reduction programs without making certain
findings in open court that, under ORS 137.750, are required when sentences are
so limited.  At some point in the appeal, the state conceded error with respect
to defendant's second argument, and joined with defendant in a motion to vacate
the erroneous sentences and to remand the entire case for resentencing.  The
Court of Appeals granted the motion.
On remand, no new evidence or
information was placed on the record.  In entering its sentence on remand, the
trial court discharged the four sentences that had been the focus of
defendant's appeal, but structured the remaining sentences in a way that
resulted in an overall term of 600 months in prison.  The court did not state
any reasons for imposing the lengthier overall sentence.  
Defendant appealed again, this time
arguing that, because the total sentence imposed on remand was longer than the
total sentence imposed in the original proceeding, the sentence violated the "no
harsher sentence" rule of Turner (described more fully below, ___ Or
at ___ (slip op at 5-6)).  Because Turner was a case involving a retrial
rather than a resentencing, defendant also relied on a Court of Appeals
decision -- State v. Stockman, 43 Or App 235, 603 P2d 363 (1979) -- that
held that the Turner rule applied when a case was remanded after a
successful appellate challenge to a sentence on grounds other than
excessiveness.  The state responded that the rules of Turner and Stockman
have been legislatively superseded by a 1993 amendment to ORS 138.222(5)(a), which
provides that, when a case is remanded because of a sentencing error, the
sentencing court "may impose a new sentence for any conviction in the
remanded case."  Or Laws 1993, ch 692, § 2(5).  The state also suggested
that Turner was directed only at sentences that are imposed by a court
to punish a defendant for seeking appellate review and that, in this case, the
new sentences were based solely on the abhorrent nature of the crimes. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the
state's contention that the legislature impliedly repealed Turner and Stockman
when it later amended ORS 138.222(5)(a).  Partain, 228 Or App at 335. 
The court also rejected the state's suggestion that Turner prohibits harsher
sentences on remand only when the sentencing court's motivation was to punish
the defendant for appealing:  It observed that, in Turner, this court
explicitly described the rule as a prophylactic one, adopted to avoid the
difficult task of determining a trial court's motives.  Id. at 335-36
(quoting Turner, 247 Or at 314).  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals
concluded that, under this court's decision in Turner and its own
decision in Stockman, the trial court had erred in imposing a greater
total sentence on remand.  Id. at 336.  We allowed the state's petition
for review.
The state argues that the Court of
Appeals erred on two grounds:  (1) the court failed to recognize that the Turner
"no harsher sentence" rule is limited to cases in which the defendant
has been retried after successfully challenging his or her conviction,
and does not apply when a defendant is before a trial court solely for resentencing
after successfully challenging the lawfulness of the original sentence; and
(2) the court also failed to recognize that, in light of certain changes in
Oregon's sentencing laws, the Turner rule is no longer viable.  Both of
those arguments call for a close examination of the Turner case, a task
to which we now turn. 
The defendant in Turner was
convicted of assault and initially received a five-year sentence.  He
successfully appealed his conviction and the case was remanded for a new
trial.  In the second trial, defendant was convicted again, but this time the
trial judge sentenced him to seven years in prison -- two years more than the
original trial court had imposed.  The defendant appealed, arguing that the
trial court could not constitutionally impose a longer prison sentence than the
one imposed in the original trial.
In its opinion in Turner, the
court described its overall methodology for analyzing the issue in terms of
"weigh[ing] the public interest in being protected from persons found
guilty of crimes and the individual's interest in exercising rights guaranteed
him by constitution, statute or judicial decision."  247 Or at 312.  The
court identified the individual defendant's interest in terms of the statutory
right of appeal, and it concluded that permitting a trial court to impose a
more severe sentence after a successful appeal would have a "chilling
effect" on a defendant's exercise of that right.  Id. at 313.  The
court did not, however, explain its reasoning or identify any source of law for
the balancing approach that it adopted.  
The court in Turner then
considered the public interest at issue, i.e., an interest in allowing
trial courts to impose whatever lawful sentences they deemed to be appropriate,
including a harsher sentence, when defendants are retried after successfully
appealing from some aspect of their previous conviction.  The court suggested
that the public interest in such a scheme was relatively weak, rejecting, as
contrary to logic and its own prior case law, most of the reasons that had been
offered for upholding a harsher sentence imposed after retrial.(1) 
It then announced the results of its balancing analysis, holding that
"the interest of the public and the individual can best
be served by the following rule:  After an appeal or post-conviction proceeding
has resulted in the ordering of a retrial for errors other than an erroneous
sentence, such as in [State v. Froembling, 237 Or 616, 391 P2d 390
(1964) and Froembling v. Gladden, 244 Or 314, 417 P2d 1020 (1966)], and
the defendant has again been convicted, no harsher sentence can be given than
that initially imposed."
Id.
After stating that rule, the court
acknowledged that there might be some circumstances in which a harsher sentence
on remand might be rational and justified -- for example, when the first
sentence was too lenient or when evidence relevant to sentencing that was not
available to the judge in the first trial is available to the judge in
the second trial.  The court concluded, however, that requiring reviewing
courts to distinguish between those legitimate harsher sentences and sentences
that were merely vindictive would cause difficulties in judicial
administration.  It further concluded that the possible advantages associated
with permitting trial courts to impose harsher sentences when there were
nonvindictive reasons to do so were outweighed by the judicial efficiency that
would result from following the simple prophylactic rule that it was announcing. 
Turner, 247 Or at 314-15.  
The court concluded by discussing the
legal source of its new rule:
"There also remains the issue of whether
the rule proposed should be grounded upon the due process or double jeopardy
provisions of the state or federal constitutions or whether it should be
grounded upon the statutes or the common law.  
"We do not find it necessary to decide the
constitutional issues as we conclude that, when the state grants a criminal
appeal as a matter of right to one convicted of a crime, as it has, our
procedural policy should be not to limit that right by requiring the defendant to
risk a more severe sentence in order to exercise that right of appeal.  ORS
138.020."
Id. at 315.  Although the court in Turner thus
proclaimed the rule to be a prudential one, the reference to the state
"grant[ing] a criminal appeal as a matter of right" and the citation
to ORS 138.020 indicate that the rule in some sense derived from the court's
particular understanding of the legislative intent behind that statute.(2)
Since Turner was decided in
1967, the rule it announced has been assiduously followed -- and sometimes
extended(3)
-- by the Court of Appeals, and it has been cited by this court as established
law on at least three occasions.  See State ex rel Dillavou v. Foster,
273 Or 319, 324 n 8, 541 P2d 811 (1975) (to deny defendant who appeals credit for
time spent in jail pending appeal effectively penalizes the defendant for
appealing and, thus, violates rule of Turner); State v. Holmes,
287 Or 613, 617-19, 601 P2d 1213 (1979) (Turner rule precluding
imposition of more lengthy sentence after successful appeal and retrial does
not apply in the context of a probation revocation proceeding); State v.
Martin, 288 Or 643, 645-47, 607 P2d 171 (1980) (consistent with principle
announced in Turner, defendant whose conviction is set aside on his
motion for a new trial cannot, on remand, be prosecuted for additional charges
arising from the same criminal episode).  Of those three cases, only Dillavou
truly embodies a Turner-like approach.  Still, Turner's status as
a precedent of long standing is undeniable. 
That brings us to the more ambitious
of the state's two arguments(4)
-- that we should abandon the Turner rule altogether in favor of a
sentencing rule that is more specifically focused on the one legitimate concern
that such resentencing raises -- the possibility that trial courts may employ
their sentencing authority to punish defendants for having the temerity to
appeal earlier convictions and sentences.  The state acknowledges that
defendants and courts have relied on the Turner rule for a long time,
but it argues that the Turner rule is neither constitutionally nor
legislatively compelled and that, for a variety of reasons, this court can and
should set it aside.
In so arguing, the state does not
directly acknowledge this court's general policy of adhering to precedent or
the kind of showing that we generally have required before we will consider
overturning a decision of such long standing.  But, acknowledged or not, the
reality of the state's burden is clear:  Although this court arguably is more kindly
disposed to requests to reconsider precedent when, as here, the precedent does
not rest directly on the court's interpretation of a particular statute or
constitutional provision, that does not mean that we will lightly set aside a decision
of this sort.  In fact, we have stated that there are three grounds on which we
will reconsider an established nonstatutory rule: 
"(1) that an earlier case was inadequately considered
or wrong when it was decided; (2) that surrounding statutory law or regulations
have altered some essential legal element assumed in the earlier case; or (3)
that the earlier rule was grounded in and tailored to specific factual
conditions, and that some essential factual assumptions of the rule have
changed.  Without some such premise, the court has no grounds to reverse a
well-established rule beside judicial fashion or personal policy preference,
which are not sufficient grounds for such a change."
G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54,
59, 757 P2d 1347 (1988) (citations omitted).(5)
The state has not expressly directed
its analysis to any of those three "premises."  Instead, the state's
primary objections to the Turner rule are that it is "too
restrictive," "too unwieldy," and that it is not required
by this state's constitutional or statutory law.  The state also argues that
the rule is inconsistent with this court's expressed reluctance to interfere
with a trial court's sentencing discretion and with its expressed view that
judicial review of criminal sentences must be limited because the setting of
criminal penalties is a purely legislative function.  See, e.g., State v.
Smith, 128 Or 515, 524, 273 P 323 (1929) (it is the province of the
legislature to establish penalties for crimes); State v. Montgomery, 237
Or 593, 595, 392 P2d 642 (1964) (court should not disturb discretion of the
trial court in fixing term of imprisonment).  Finally, the state argues that,
since Turner was decided, the legislature has amended the statutes
pertaining to criminal appeals in ways that implicitly conflict with the Turner
rule.  Unlike the state's other arguments, its last argument is relevant to one
of the accepted grounds for reconsidering established precedent -- that
"surrounding statutory law or regulations have altered some essential
legal element assumed in the earlier case."  Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or at 59.
We note, in that regard, that,
although the court in Turner purported to erect a prudential rule, its
justification for that rule largely derived from an unspoken "gloss"
on ORS 138.020 -- that the right of appeal that that statute guarantees also
includes a right to be shielded from outcomes that might "chill" a
defendant's desire to exercise the right, including the risk of a longer
sentence.  It would seem, in fact, that that gloss on ORS 138.020 was, in Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, Inc. terms, an "essential legal element"
assumed in Turner.  If so, then the question for this court, with
respect to the state's bid for reconsideration of Turner, is whether the
1993 amendment to ORS 138.222(5)(a) (on which the state relies), or any other
alterations in the surrounding law, has undermined that assumption about the
right of appeal that the court in Turner thought that ORS 138.020 conveyed. 
If that assumption has been substantially undermined by more recent enactments,
then the Turner rule itself is an appropriate candidate for
reconsideration.
The 1993 amendment to ORS
138.222(5)(a), which the state has invoked, is germane to that inquiry. 
Enacted some 25 years after Turner was decided, the relevant portion of
ORS 138.222(5)(a) provides:
"If[, in a criminal appeal,] the appellate court
determines that the sentencing court, in imposing a sentence in the case,
committed an error that requires resentencing, the appellate court shall remand
the entire case for resentencing.  The sentencing court may impose a new
sentence for any conviction in the remanded case." 
(Emphasis added.)  As noted, the Court of Appeals rejected
the state's suggestion that, by enacting that provision, the legislature
implicitly overruled Turner.  We agree with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion as far as it goes:  There is nothing in the text, context, or
legislative history of ORS 138.222(5)(a) that suggests that the statute was
specifically directed at the holding in Turner.
On the other hand, it appears
that enactment of the quoted amendment did alter the legal landscape for
criminal appeals in a way that undermines the assumptions in Turner about
the dimensions of the right of appeal guaranteed by ORS 138.020.  The amendment
unambiguously provides that, when a case is remanded because of a particular
sentencing error, the sentencing court may impose different sentences on any
and all counts -- even those not affected by the identified error.  Although
the amendment does not explicitly state that that authority extends to increasing
a defendant's overall sentence, the scope of the statutory wording allows
sentencing courts to replace terms in a prior sentencing decision respecting certain
counts that were favorable to the defendant with less favorable ones respecting
those counts, with one reasonable consequence of such action by the sentencing
court being a collection of lawful sentences whose total exceeds defendant's
earlier sentence.  The amendment thus strikes a different balance than did Turner
with respect to the discretion of trial courts to impose the lawful sentences that
they find to be appropriate.
The history of the amendment confirms
that general sense of the legislature's intentions.  As defendant notes, the
amendment was adopted in response to a Court of Appeals case, State v. Smith,
116 Or App 558, 842 P2d 805 (1992), adh'd to on recons, 120 Or App 438,
852 P2d 935 (1993), which held that, upon remand for a sentencing error with
respect to one charge, a trial court could not resentence on certain other
offenses whose sentences were unchallenged, thereby restructuring the collective
sentences in the case so that the defendant was subject to the same total
sentence as previously had been imposed.  Proponents of the amendment offered
it as a mechanism for "overruling" Smith, which they viewed as
"unjustly favor[ing] convicted felons."  Exhibits, House
Appropriations Committee, SB 1043 (1993) (letter from Fred Avera, Polk County
District Attorney, and Dale Penn, Marion County District Attorney, proposing
amendment to SB 1043).  Although there is nothing in the history that
establishes a legislative intent to affirmatively authorize the imposition of
sentences after a remand that are longer overall, the fact that
the legislature appears to have been motivated by a disagreement with the Smith
analysis does not comport with Turner's notion that the right of appeal
guaranteed by ORS 138.020 must be provided free of any risk of unfavorable
alterations in sentences.
Other post-Turner statutes also
are at odds with the special weight that Turner assigned to the right of
criminal defendants to appeal free of the risk of a more severe sentence on
remand.  For example, ORS 138.222(5)(b), adopted in 2005 (Or Laws 2005, ch 563,
§ 1), extends the general approach of  ORS 138.222(5)(a), allowing trial courts
to resentence a defendant on any judgments of convictions that are affirmed on
appeal, if any other judgment of conviction in the same case is reversed on
appeal.(6) 
Again, the amendment indicates that the legislature did not share the view of a
criminal defendant's right to a risk- and barrier-free appeal that the court
espoused in Turner.  The legislature's philosophical distance from the Turner
approach is still further illustrated by the 1989 legislature's grant of
authority to the state to appeal from sentences in felony cases on grounds that
the law required a different sentence.  See ORS 138.222(4), (7)
(collectively providing that state may appeal defendant's sentences on such grounds).
One final illustration helps make our
point.  For a number of years, the court relied on what it called a "rule
of lenity."  That rule, which also was prudential, was used by the court
in doubtful cases as a basis for giving criminal statutes a limited reading -- i.e.,
for limiting the sweep of legislative enactments.  See State v. Linthwaite,
295 Or 162, 179, 665 P2d 863 (1983) (describing and applying doctrine as basis
for holding that defendant's attack on four victims with a knife permitted only
one punishment); State v. Welch, 264 Or 388, 393-94, 505 P2d 910 (1973)
(applying rule in holding that person uttering two forged instruments committed
only one crime).  The "rule" was abrogated by the legislature when it
adopted ORS 161.025(2), which directs courts to construe penal statutes
"according to the fair import of their terms."  See Bailey v.
Lampert, 342 Or 321, 327, 153 P3d 95 (2007) (so holding).  This history
further illustrates the legislature's systematic rejection of the policy and
value judgments underlying Turner.
We have suggested that the Turner
decision rested on an unexamined elaboration on the right of appeal guaranteed
by ORS 138.020 -- i.e., that the right of appeal necessarily includes
the right to have the length of any resentence limited to the length of the sentence
originally imposed.  We have assumed, without actually deciding, that that reading
of ORS 138.020 had some basis in the law when Turner was decided.  But,
based on changes in the law pertaining to criminal sentencing and criminal
appeals since Turner was decided, as well as the legislature's rejection
of the "rule of lenity," it now is clear that the Turner
court's expansive reading of the right to appeal in ORS 138.020 no longer is
viable, if it ever was.  Put differently:  The legal landscape surrounding the
right of criminal defendants to appeal has changed in a way that undermines the
essential premise for the holding in Turner.  We therefore are free to
reconsider that holding in the light of current law.(7)
On reconsideration, we conclude that
the Turner rationale has been overtaken by the passage of time and by legislation. 
As noted, Turner itself did not rest on any constitutional basis and no
persuasive argument has been advanced that the Oregon Constitution requires that
criminal defendants be shielded from the possibility that, on remand after a
successful appeal, a sentencing court will impose a lengthier sentence than that
which it originally imposed.  In that regard, we note that the prohibition on
double jeopardy of Article I, section 12, which has been put forward as a basis
for such a rule, pertains to successive prosecutions and not to
resentencing, while the alternative proffered basis -- due process -- is a
federal, not an Oregon, constitutional guarantee.  Furthermore, the suggestion
in Turner that such a blanket rule is somehow justified by ORS 138.020,
to ensure a full realization of the right of appeal that that statute was
enacted to guarantee, is wrong in the context of the present legal landscape
(and was both not fully considered and wrong in 1965):  The statute was
concerned with who could appeal and what could be appealed.  In our view, it
did not -- even by implication -- deal with what might be a permissible outcome
if a case were reversed and remanded.  Finally, we cannot justify such a
blanket rule, as the court did in Turner, as a purely prudential safeguard.
 Whatever the possibility of vindictive sentencing, the legislature remains
competent to deal with it explicitly and, if it does not do so, both the state
and federal constitutions provide the appropriate legal backstop.  This court's
policy-driven intervention in that statutory/constitutional arrangement, while
doubtless well-meaning, inappropriately assumed on the part of the court
policy-making responsibility that belongs elsewhere.  Turner is
overruled.
While we reject Turner's absolutist
approach to the longer-sentence-on-remand issue, that does not mean that we are
turning a blind eye to the problem that such sentences can pose.  When, on
remand of a criminal defendant's case after a successful appeal, a trial court
imposes a longer sentence, it is natural to be concerned that the enhanced
penalty may be intended to punish the defendant for his or her success on
appeal.  And, to the extent that that sort of vindictive sentencing occurs, it
undoubtedly is unlawful:  The statutory right of appeal provided at ORS 138.020
may carry with it risks, as we today hold, but no conceivable construction of
the statute's wording supports the idea that the legislature intended to grant
to trial judges the authority to use their sentencing power to impose more
lengthy sentences on remand for the purpose of punishing defendants for
bringing appeals.
On the other hand, we can posit a
number of legitimate reasons for a trial court to impose a longer sentence on
remand or after retrial -- including the fact that the trial court in the
second sentencing proceeding has information about the defendant and his or her
actions that was not available at the first or the fact that the trial court
simply erred in applying sentencing statutes or guidelines.  There is no basis
for saying that the legislature intends that such exercises of a trial court's
sentencing discretion must be barred, in order to ensure against the imposition
of vindictive (and unlawful) sentences.  There also is no basis for saying that
either the Oregon or federal constitutions bars all such choices.
But the problem remains:  How are
Oregon courts to deal with claims of vindictive sentencing?  As we have noted,
it is not clear that any Oregon constitutional provision answers the question
directly.  And, as we also have noted, we think that it is inappropriate to
create or announce a rule in this area of the law without real constitutional
or statutory support.  (To do otherwise would be simply to substitute our
policy-making assessments for those of the court in Turner.  If it was
inappropriate for that court to do what it did, it would be just as
inappropriate for this court to act in like manner.)
As it happens, there is a source of
law.  The Supreme Court of the United States, acting under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, has addressed the problem and laid out a
method of dealing with it.
In North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 US 711, 726, 89 S Ct 2072, 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969), the Court was faced with
two cases in which a defendant's sentence on retrial exceeded the sentence that
each defendant had received at that defendant's initial sentencing.  The
defendants urged that longer sentences on retrial offended the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy provision, as well as the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court held that neither constitutional
provision prohibited such sentences.  395 US at 723.
The Court then turned to an analysis
of the issue under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For
reasons that soon will be apparent, we set out the Court's analysis at some
length:
"It is hardly to be doubted that it would
be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to
follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every
reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for
his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside.  * * * And
the very threat inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would, with
respect to those still in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic
constitutional rights.'  * * * [Moreover, and] even if the first conviction has
been set aside for nonconstitutional error, the imposition of a penalty upon
the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or
collateral remedy would be no less a violation of due process of law."
Id. at 723-25 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Court then went on to deliver the
following pronouncement:
"Due process of law, then, requires that
vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first
conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. 
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a
defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first
conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension
of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
"In order to assure the absence of such a
motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe
sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must
affirmatively appear.  Those reasons must be based upon objective information
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after
the time of the original sentencing procedure.[(8)]
 And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made
part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased
sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal."
Pearce, 395 US at 725-26 (footnotes and citations
omitted).
The foregoing federal constitutional
rule is one that Oregon courts must follow with respect to resentencing
offenders to longer sentences.  This court could, of course, announce
additional requirements under our own constitution or pursuant to statute.  As
noted, however, we find no obvious basis in either source of law for doing so. 
We therefore decline to posit anything other than the Pearce standard, as
modified by the Court in the manner noted, as the applicable standard in cases
of resentencing in Oregon:  If an Oregon trial judge believes that an offender
whom the judge is about to resentence should receive a more severe sentence
than the one originally imposed, the judge's reasons must affirmatively appear
on the record.  Those reasons must be based on identified facts of which the
first sentencing judge was unaware, and must be such as to satisfy a reviewing
court that the length of the sentence imposed is not a product of
vindictiveness toward the offender.  Absent such facts and reasons, an unexplained
or inadequately explained increased sentence will be presumed to be based on
vindictive motives, and will be reversed.
Turning to this case, the Court of
Appeals, based on Turner, reversed the 600-month sentence that the trial
court imposed on remand.  In light of our decision to overrule Turner
(an outcome the Court of Appeals could not have anticipated), the Court of
Appeals' rationale was incorrect:  We now recognize that a trial court
lawfully may impose a harsher sentence on a defendant after retrial or remand,
as long as the court's grounds for doing so are not directed at punishing the
defendant for appealing his or her original convictions or sentences.  However,
in light of the trial court's failure to explain on the record in this case its
reasons for imposing the longer sentence on remand, we cannot say that the
Court of Appeals was incorrect in reversing the trial court's judgment. 
That court needed more information than is available in the present record in
order to assure itself that the sentencing court's choice of sentence on remand
was not a vindictive one.  The trial court in this case should have an
opportunity to clarify the record in that respect; we therefore remand the case
to the trial court for that purpose.  On remand, the trial court may choose to
impose a sentence that does not exceed the original total sentence of 420
months, which would not require a statement of the court's reasons for imposing
the sentence.  If the court choose, instead, to impose a longer or otherwise
more severe total sentence, it must place on the record one or more nonvindictive
reasons for doing so.(9)
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part on different grounds.  The judgment of the circuit court is
vacated, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing in
accordance with this opinion.
WALTERS, J., dissenting.
In 1967, a defendant had a right,
under Oregon statute, to appeal a wrongful conviction.  In 1967, a trial court
had discretion, under Oregon statutes, to decide the sentence that a defendant
should receive if convicted for a second time after a successful appeal.  In
1967, in State v. Turner, 247 Or 301, 429 P2d 565 (1967), this
court decided a question at the confluence of those statutes:  whether a
defendant who successfully exercised the right to appeal a wrongful conviction
and had it overturned could be subjected to a harsher sentence than that
originally imposed.  The court decided, in a unanimous opinion, that he could
not.
The majority overrules Turner as
a "well-meaning" but "inappropriate[]" assumption of
policy-making responsibility "that belongs elsewhere."  ___Or at ___ (slip
op at 15).  I agree with the majority that, in 1967, the legislature had
authority to decide the question presented in Turner.  However, the
legislature had not exercised that authority and Oregon statutes neither
explicitly permitted nor explicitly precluded a sentencing judge from imposing
a harsher sentence in the circumstance presented.  Therefore, I cannot agree
that the court in Turner inappropriately assumed a legislative role when
it decided the question before it.  
In the absence of express statutory
guidance, the court in Turner considered the competing public interests
reflected in the statutes that the legislature had enacted --the public
interest in "permit[ting] a court to assess its sentence upon the most
complete and current information" and the public interest in
"correction of an erroneously conducted trial."  247 Or 313-14.  The
court decided that because the legislature had granted a right of criminal
appeal and because the "public has no interest in foreclosing the
correction of an erroneously conducted trial," the appropriate procedural
policy should be "not to limit that right by requiring the defendant to
risk a more severe sentence in order to exercise that right of appeal."  Id.
at 313, 315.  A different rule, the court decided, "would 'chill' a
defendant's desire to correct an erroneously conducted initial trial," id.
at 313, and require a reviewing court to "make a subjective
determination whether the new information justified and was in fact the motive
for the more severe sentence," raising "difficulties in judicial
administration," id. at 314.  
The court in Turner was not
required to reach that particular result and could have ruled, as the majority
in this case apparently would have, that the fact that the legislature had not
expressly precluded a harsher sentence on remand permitted just that.  But the
court did not do so.  During the 43 years that have intervened between Turner
and Partain, the Oregon legislature had authority to overrule
or alter the court's decision in Turner.  But the legislature did not do
so.  Given the authority of those entities, it is, in my view, the majority in Partain
that assumes policy-making authority that belongs elsewhere.  
First, the majority extends its
authority beyond that necessary to decide the case before it.  In this case,
the trial court imposed a harsher sentence on defendant after defendant
successfully appealed an error in sentencing, not an error in the underlying
conviction.  The rule that the court announced in Turner explicitly
did not address that circumstance.  The court stated:  
"After an appeal or post-conviction proceeding has
resulted in the ordering of a retrial for errors other than an erroneous
sentence * * * and the defendant has again been convicted, no
harsher sentence can be given than that initially imposed."
247 Or at 313 (emphasis added).  Instead of overruling Turner,
the majority could have refused to extend its rule to successful appeals of
sentencing errors.   
Second, the majority reaches a
different result than did the court in Turner without an argument from
the state that the grounds for overturning longstanding precedent as stated in G.L.
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54, 59, 757 P2d 1347
(1988), are satisfied, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 9), and without itself
reaching that conclusion.(1) 
The majority relies, for reconsideration, on statutes enacted by the Oregon
legislature since Turner but does not conclude, and cannot conclude, in
the words of Foundation Hospitals, Inc., that those statutes
"altered some essential legal element assumed in the earlier case."  Foundation
Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or at 59.
The statutes on which the majority
relies neither limit a defendant's right to appeal a wrongful conviction nor
indicate a legislative intent to expose a defendant to a risk that he or she
will receive a harsher sentence if successful in appealing a wrongful
conviction.  ORS 138.222(5)(a) overrules a Court of Appeals case, State v.
Smith, 116 Or App 558, 842 P2d 805 (1992), adh'd to on recons, 120
Or App 438, 852 P2d 934 (1993), and ensures that a trial court may, on remand
from a successful appeal of a sentencing error, reconstruct a collective
sentence to impose the same total sentence previously imposed.  ORS
138.222(5)(a) does not address remand from a wrongful conviction, much less
grant trial courts authority to impose harsher sentences after a successful
appeal from a wrongful conviction.  ORS 138.222(5)(b) does address remand from
a successful appeal of a conviction, but only permits trial courts to
resentence the defendant on affirmed convictions.  It does not address
sentencing on remand from reversed convictions, nor does it grant trial
courts authority to impose harsher sentences after a successful appeal or
indicate a philosophical interest in permitting such sentences.  
ORS 138.222(4)(7) permits the state
to appeal from sentences in felony cases on the ground that the law required a
different sentence.  Granting the state a right to insist that a lawful
sentence is imposed does not indicate a legislative intent to permit a trial
court to impose a harsher sentence on a defendant who exercises the same
right.  To me, it indicates a legislative interest to ensure that any sentence
that is imposed be legally sound.  Turner is consistent with that
intent.  If a defendant knows that appeal of an invalid sentence will expose
him or her to the risk of a harsher sentence, the defendant will be less likely
to seek correction of that sentence -- a correction that the legislature deems
to be in the public interest.(2)
The majority does not contend that
the statutes on which it relies alter the right to appeal a wrongful conviction
or any other essential element of Turner but instead asserts that those
statutes are "at odds" with the "right of criminal defendants to
appeal free of the risk of a more severe sentence on remand."  ___ Or at
___ (slip op at 12).  I do not perceive the conflict that the majority
observes, but, more importantly, the majority itself recognizes that Oregon law
continues to grant criminal defendants the right to appeal free from the very
risk of a more severe sentence that Turner addresses -- the risk of
vindictive sentencing:  
"[T]o the extent that that sort of vindictive
sentencing occurs, it undoubtedly is unlawful:  The statutory right of appeal
provided at ORS 138.020 may carry with it risks, as we today hold, but no
conceivable construction of the statute's wording supports the idea that the
legislature intended to grant to trial judges the authority to use their
sentencing power to impose more lengthy sentences on remand for the purpose of
punishing defendants for bringing appeals."
___Or at ___ (slip op at 15).
After construing
Oregon law to preclude vindictive sentencing, the majority notes that the Due
Process Clause of the federal constitution includes the same prohibition.  The
majority then decides that the rule devised by the Supreme Court in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US 711, 89 S Ct 2072, 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969), is
sufficient to address that concern.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 18).  In so
doing, the majority calls attention to the essential role of the judiciary and
makes my point. 
The Due Process Clause does not state
explicitly the procedure that a reviewing court should use to protect against
vindictive sentencing.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined, in Pearce,
that, whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence after a new trial, the
reasons for doing so must affirmatively appear.  Id. at 725-26.  The
Supreme Court did not exceed its authority in imposing that requirement; it
fulfilled its constitutional role.  The court in Turner did the same. 
The difference is not in the authority exercised, but in the rule crafted.   
In the years since Pearce, the
Supreme Court has made clear that Pearce does not state a bright-line
test or even impose a presumption of vindictiveness for harsher sentences:   
"While the Pearce opinion appeared on its face
to announce a rule of sweeping dimension, our subsequent cases have made clear
that its presumption of vindictiveness 'do[es] not apply in every case where a
convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.'" 
Alabama v. Smith, 490 US 794, 799, 109 S Ct 2201, 104
L Ed 2d 865 (1989) (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 US 134, 138, 106 S
Ct 976, 89 L Ed 2d 104 (1986)).  As a result, by adopting the Pearce rule
as the only test of the validity of a sentence on remand after a successful
appeal, the majority requires reviewing courts to do just what the court in Turner
sought to avoid; viz., deciding whether the case before them is one
"in which there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the increase in sentence
is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing
authority."  Nulph v. Cook, 333 F3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir 2003)
(quoting Alabama v. Smith, 490 US at 799).  
Oh, the endless questions and appeals
and consumption of judicial time we have purchased.
Is there a presumption of vindictiveness?  See
Texas v. McCullough, 475 US at 138-40 (no presumption of vindictiveness
when defendant resentenced by trial judge after originally sentenced by a
jury); United States v. Goodwin, 457 US 368, 384, 102 S Ct 2485, 73 L Ed
2d 74 (1982) (presumption of vindictiveness not warranted in the pretrial plea
negotiation context, even though "[t]here is an opportunity for
vindictiveness"); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 US 17, 26-27, 93 S Ct
1977, 36 L Ed 2d 714 (1973) (no presumption of vindictiveness when defendant is
resentenced by a jury); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 US 104, 116-17, 92 S Ct
1953, 32 L Ed 2d 584 (1972) (no presumption of vindictiveness when defendant
convicted of misdemeanor in an inferior court was later convicted of a felony
after trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction).  
If there is a presumption of vindictiveness, has
it been overcome?  See Nulph, 333 F3d at 1059-60 (insufficient
evidence in the record that petitioner elected to apply an unfavorable rule at
parole board hearing; therefore state did not rebut presumption of
vindictiveness); Bono v. Benov, 197 F3d 409, 421 (9th Cir 1999) (victim
letter contained in "contemporaneous notes and memoranda," but not in
written notice of decision, insufficient to rebut the presumption of
vindictiveness); Hurlburt v. Cunningham, 996 F2d 1273, 1276 (1st Cir
1993) (presumption rebutted by judge's reference to presentence report, the
defendant's record, and what he observed during trial); United States v.
Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir 1982) (burden shifts to
prosecution to show that increase in the severity of the charges did not stem
from vindictive motive or was justified by independent reasons or intervening
circumstances).  
 If the Oregon legislature had
decided that the bright line rule adopted by the court in Turner to
protect the right of appeal and guard against vindictive sentencing was too
restrictive, that times have changed, and that reviewing courts of this state
should determine, instead, whether sentencing judges, in truth, were
vindictive, I would, of course, apply that rule.  But absent clear legislative
direction to do so, I would not subject Oregon judges to that inquiry.  I would
not disturb the basic premise upon which Turner rested, and rested for
43 years -- that a defendant should not be required "'to barter with his
life for the opportunity of exercising'" the right to a criminal appeal.  Turner,
247 Or at 316 (quoting State v. Wolf, 46 NJ 301, 309, 216 A2d 586, 590
(1966)).  I respectfully dissent.
1. In
particular, the court rejected each of the reasons courts in other
jurisdictions had offered in defense of harsher sentences after remand -- that,
once reversed, an initial conviction and sentence are a "nullity,"
leaving the trial court on remand complete freedom to pass sentence as if the
initial sentence had never existed; that the traditional discretion granted to
trial judges in sentencing matters demanded that an otherwise lawful second
sentence be upheld; and that, by appealing, a criminal defendant essentially consents
to any lawful sentence that the trial court might impose on remand.  247 Or at
312-13.
2. The
referenced statute, ORS 138.020, has not been changed in any significant
respect since Turner.  It provides:  "Either the state or the defendant
may as a matter of right appeal from a judgment in a criminal action in the
cases prescribed in ORS 138.010 to 138.310, and not otherwise."
3. See,
e.g., Stockman, 43 Or App at 235-43, applying Turner's prohibition
on harsher sentences after remand and retrial to case in which the remand was
for resentencing only. 
4. Because
we ultimately agree with the state that the Turner rule must be
overruled, there is no need to consider its alternative argument -- that,
assuming the rule is good law, it is inapplicable to the present case.
5. Although
we focus on a framework that was designed for reconsideration of common-law
holdings, we acknowledge that Turner is not, strictly speaking, a
common-law rule:  As we have observed, the Turner court purported to be
resting its decision on purely prudential grounds but, at the same time, also
appeared to derive support for its rule in the terms of ORS 138.020, i.e.,
the statutory right of appeal.  In the end, we would say that the Turner
decision is neither a case of statutory construction nor a common-law rule, but
simply turns on an unexamined assumption about the legislative intent
behind ORS 138.020.  As such, it is not clear that resort to Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, Inc. is necessary -- but, for the sake of completeness,
we proceed as if it were.
6. ORS
138.222(5)(b) provides:
"If the appellate court, in a case involving multiple
counts of which at least one is a felony, reverses the judgment of conviction
on any count and affirms other counts, the appellate court shall remand the
case to the trial court for resentencing on the affirmed count or counts."
7. Our
decision to reconsider the Turner rule on this basis is not meant to
suggest that the rule is not also susceptible to reconsideration under another
of the Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. criteria, viz.,
that Turner was "inadequately considered or wrong when it was
decided."  306 Or at 59.
8. This
specific requirement that any conduct on the part of the defendant that a court
relies on to justify a longer sentence must have occurred "after the time
of the original sentencing proceeding" is no longer applicable.  See,
e.g., Texas v. McCullough, 475 US 134, 141-42, 106 S Ct 976, 89 L Ed 2d 104
(1986) (allowing judge to consider newly learned information about defendant
that involved acts committed by defendant before first sentencing proceeding;
stating that to do otherwise could lead to "bizarre conclusion").
9. The
requirement of a statement of nonvindictive reasons is essentially the outcome
for which the state advocates, although we impose it for reasons of judicial administration,
rather than -- as the state would have it -- as a substitute prudential rule
that somehow is "more fair."  Defendant, for his part, never
advocated either for rejection of the Turner rule or for a remand for
resentencing; he preferred Turner as it was.  However, we cannot be
satisfied that the root concern of defendant's second trip through the
appellate process -- vindictive resentencing -- is not present on this record. 
The remand to the sentencing court addresses that problem.
1. The
majority does state, mirroring the words of Foundation Hospitals, Inc.,
that the court's decision in Turner "was both not fully considered
and wrong in 1965."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 14-15).  However, the
majority does so only after already deciding that reconsideration is
appropriate for the statutory reasons that it discusses.  ___ Or at ___ (slip
op at 14). 
2. See
State v. Thompson, 231 Or App 193, 217 P3d 697 (2009) (more severe sentence
permitted on resentencing when statutorily mandated).