Title: Schumaker v. Ivers
Citation: 238 N.W.2d 284
Docket Number: 11449
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: January 27, 1976

238 N.W.2d 284 (1976) Viron F. SCHUMAKER and Virginia B. Schumaker, Plaintiffs and Respondents v. Bob IVERS, d/b/a Burl's Music Shop, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11449. Supreme Court of South Dakota. January 27, 1976. *285 Tidball, Kemnitz, Axtmann &amp; Lovald, Pierre, for defendant and appellant. Charles Poches, Jr., Fort Pierre, for plaintiffs and respondents. WOLLMAN, Justice. Defendant appeals from a judgment ordering him to repay to plaintiffs the purchase price of a certain electric organ. We affirm. On November 30, 1972, plaintiffs went to defendant's music store for the purpose of looking at electric organs. Plaintiffs looked at several models and discussed the matter with defendant, who recommended the organ in question, described in the testimony as a Story Clark Magi model. Defendant suggested that plaintiffs permit him to deliver the organ to their home on a trial basis. Plaintiffs agreed that defendant could do so, and the organ was delivered to plaintiffs' home on December 7, 1972. Mrs. Schumaker played the organ on the day it was delivered and noticed nothing unusual. On December 11, 1972, Mrs. Schumaker went to defendant's store and paid in full the purchase price of the organ in the amount of $1,119.71. According to her testimony, she asked defendant about the warranty and service on the organ and was assured by defendant that it would all be taken care of and that he had a man who serviced organs. Approximately two weeks after the organ was delivered, one of the bass pedals failed to play. Shortly thereafter another bass pedal also failed to play, as did two keys on the keyboard. Mrs. Schumaker called defendant on or about December 27, 1972, and told him about the problems she had been having with the organ. Defendant said that he would send out a serviceman. Nothing was done, however, until March 13, 1973, when defendant and his serviceman came to plaintiffs' home and worked on the organ.[1] Following their visitand here the record is rather vague with regard to datesplaintiffs again experienced difficulty with the organ in that one key in every octave in both keyboards failed to play. Mrs. Schumaker called defendant on May 11, 1973, and told him that she was still having difficulty with the organ and that she was unhappy with it and wanted a refund of the purchase price. Defendant and his serviceman came to plaintiffs' home and after some discussion, during which defendant refused to accede to Mrs. Schumaker's *286 request that he take back the organ and refund the purchase price, plaintiffs agreed to permit defendant to bring out a replacement organ on the condition that if it did not work defendant would take it back and refund the purchase price of the first organ. On or about May 22, 1973, defendant brought out a replacement organ. Shortly thereafter the rhythm system on the second organ began to malfunction. In response to plaintiffs' call, defendant's serviceman attempted to repair the organ on several occasions during the period from May 24 to June 1, 1973, but was unable to remedy the problem. During his last service call the serviceman removed the rhythm system component from the organ. Following this visit the lower keyboard failed to play. Sometime after June 1, 1973, defendant's employees attempted to return the original organ, which defendant claimed had been put into proper operating condition, to plaintiffs' home but were prevented from doing so by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought the advice of an attorney, who wrote to defendant on or about June 15, 1973, regarding the organ.[2] On August 3, 1973, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant in the nature of a rescission action praying for the return of the purchase price of the organ. Although plaintiffs styled their complaint and tried the case on the theory of a rescission action pursuant to SDCL 21-12 and 53-11-2, the trial court correctly elected to treat the action as one based upon revocation of acceptance pursuant to SDCL 57-7-20 (U.C.C. § 2-608(1)). Moeller Manufacturing, Inc. v. Mattis, 33 Colo.App. 300, 519 P.2d 1218; Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161; Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or. 223, 428 P.2d 398. SDCL 57-7-20 (U.C.C. § 2-608(1)) provides that: SDCL 57-7-21 (U.C.C. § 2-608(2)) provides that: A buyer who has rightfully revoked acceptance may recover the purchase price paid. SDCL 57-8-28 (U.C.C. § 2-711(1)). Because we conclude that the trial court correctly treated this action as one based upon revocation of acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code, we need not decide whether the provisions of SDCL 57-7-20 constitute the exclusive remedy available to a buyer who elects to return the goods and seek a refund of the purchase price. See J. White &amp; R. Summers, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform Commercial Code § 8-1 (1972). Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-608 states in part that: The term "rescission" should be carefully delimited in cases involving cases of the Uniform Commercial Code. As Professors White and Summers have pointed out, Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, we believe that the trial court was correct in holding that the defects in the organ substantially impaired its value to plaintiffs. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-608 states that: In their analysis of U.C.C. § 2-608(2) and of Comment 2, Professors White and Summers state in part that: What constitutes substantial impairment is, of course, a factual determination to be made by the trier of fact. Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wash. 2d 343,474 P.2d 270. Although the term "substantial impairment" may not be susceptible of being precisely defined, surely it connotes more than merely minor, easily repairable defects in the goods. As was stated by one court: In holding that the buyer of two valve testing machines had failed to prove that the alleged nonconformity in the machines substantially impaired the value of the machines to him, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that: For cases holding that substantial impairment of value had been proved, see, e. g., Tiger Motor Co., Inc. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638; Stroh v. American Recreation &amp; Mobile Home Corp., Colo.App., 530 P.2d 989; Regents v. Pacific Pump &amp; Supply, Inc., Colo.App., 528 P.2d 941; Irrigation Motor &amp; Pump Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo.App. 343, 483 P.2d 980; Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615; Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, supra. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, § 40. We conclude that plaintiffs satisfied the burden of demonstrating that the defects in the organ substantially impaired its value to them. Although there were conflicts in the testimony concerning the exact nature of the defects in the organ, it was for the trial court to weigh this testimony and determine whether the defects were of such magnitude as to warrant plaintiffs in revoking their acceptance of the organ. Likewise, we conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that plaintiffs had notified defendants within a reasonable time after learning of the defects in the organ that they intended to revoke their acceptance and to ask for a refund of the purchase price. SDCL 57-1-14 (U.C.C. § 1-204) provides in part that: "* * * What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action." Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (SDCL 57-7-21) states in part that: In discussing this section of the Uniform Commercial Code, Professors White and Summers state that: We think that the instant case is similar to the fact situation that existed in the case of Irrigation Motor &amp; Pump Co. v. Belcher, supra. There, the seller installed an irrigation unit in January of 1968. The buyer notified the seller that there were numerous mechanical defects in the machine and the seller made several unsuccessful attempts to repair the machine during the following months. The machine never worked properly, however, with the result that the buyer was unable to use it to irrigate his crop. On July 27, 1968, the buyer notified the seller that he was rescinding the contract and then started an action to recover the money he had paid on the purchase price. The court treated the action as one for revocation of acceptance. In holding that the revocation of acceptance occurred within a reasonable time, the court stated that: Defendant contends that because the record reveals that he at all times stood ready to honor the one-year free parts and service warranty on the organ, plaintiffs should not have been permitted to summarily refuse him the opportunity to do so by revoking their acceptance of the organ. In view of the numerous unsuccessful attempts by defendant to satisfactorily repair the original organ, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that plaintiffs had rightfully revoked their acceptance. Tiger Motor Co., Inc. v. McMurtry, supra. As far as the adequacy of the notice is concerned, defendant acknowledged that Mrs. Schumaker had told him that plaintiffs wanted him to take the organ back and refund the purchase price. If this revocation of acceptance was in any way waived by plaintiffs' accepting delivery of the second organ, such waiver was clearly based upon the condition that the replacement organ would operate satisfactorily, a condition that failed to materialize. Plaintiffs moved promptly to send notice through their legal counsel shortly after the second organ became completely inoperable. Defendant alleges that certain of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are unsupported by the evidence. Defendant is correct that there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that defendant's employees had made certain admissions concerning the condition of the original organ at the time they attempted to redeliver it to plaintiffs' home. Because this particular finding is not material *290 to our disposition of the case, however, its inclusion in the record is not prejudicial to defendant. The judgment is affirmed. All the Justices concur. [1] Defendant testified that the first complaint was received in mid-February of 1973 and that he and his serviceman went to plaintiffs' home "within a couple of days" there after. There were other sharp disputes in the testimony. It was for the trial court, of course, to weigh the testimony and determine the facts. [2] Plaintiffs' original attorney did not represent them at trial or on appeal. The letter does not appear in the settled record, although defendant acknowledged receipt thereof, inasmuch as plaintiffs' present counsel did not offer it.