Title: Elliott (Larry) v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031610
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2004

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LARRY BILL ELLIOTT 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record Nos. 031610 & 031611  JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
  March 5, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
William D. Hamblen, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction and 
death sentence imposed on Larry Bill Elliott for the murder of 
Dana L. Thrall, Code § 18.2-31(7) (willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing of more than one person as part of the same 
act or transaction), along with his convictions for the first 
degree murder of Robert A. Finch, Code § 18.2-32, and firearm 
offenses related to these two murders, Code § 18.2-53.1. 
BACKGROUND 
In accordance with well-established principles of appellate 
review, we will recount the evidence as reflected in the record 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party below.  Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 198, 576 
S.E.2d 471, 474, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 566 
(2003). 
The Murders 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on the morning of January 2, 
2001, Mary Bracewell, a newspaper delivery person, was traveling 
her route in the Woodbridge community of Prince William County, 
Virginia.  Bracewell was aware that there had been several 
recent vehicle break-ins in the neighborhood and became 
suspicious when she saw a man standing beside a pick-up truck 
parked on Belfry Lane.  Bracewell observed the man, who appeared 
to be carrying a flashlight, walk to the north end of Belfry 
Lane, cross the street, walk onto a grassy area between two 
townhouses, and then disappear from her view.  Bracewell called 
police on her cellular telephone to report her observations. 
At 4:15 a.m., Officer Marshall T. Daniel of the Prince 
William County Police Department received a radio dispatch 
directing him to respond to Bracewell’s call.  He arrived at 
Belfry Lane three minutes later.  Bracewell indicated the parked 
pick-up truck to Daniel and related to him what she had 
observed.  Daniel noted that the pick-up truck, which was 
locked, had a Department of Defense windshield identification 
sticker and that there was a cellular telephone on the passenger 
seat. 
At 4:27 a.m., Officer Daniel received a radio call to 
respond to a report of a domestic disturbance at a townhouse 
located at 3406 Jousters Way.  Jousters Way is located 
approximately 300 yards north of Belfry Lane.  Although the two 
streets do not intersect, one can reach Jousters Way on foot 
 
 
2
from Belfry Lane by walking in the same direction that Bracewell 
had seen the man beside the pick-up truck walking. 
Tina Miller, who lived in an adjoining townhouse, had made 
the report of a domestic disturbance at 3406 Jousters Way.  
Miller telephoned police after being awakened by a crashing 
sound coming from 3406 Jousters Way at approximately 4:20 a.m.  
As she placed the call, Miller heard three or four “hollow” 
sounds followed by “the most horrible scream” she had ever 
heard.  Miller thought that the screaming voice sounded like 
that of Thrall, one of the occupants of 3406 Jousters Way. 
Tommy Young, who lived in a townhouse on the opposite side 
of the street from 3406 Jousters Way, was walking his dog in 
front of his home at about the same time Miller was awakened by 
the crashing sound.  Young heard two loud “banging noises” 
coming from 3406 Jousters Way, followed by the sound of a female 
scream and three more banging noises.  Young went back to his 
house and told his wife to call the police.  A few minutes 
later, Young looked out his front window and saw that the front 
storm door of 3406 Jousters Way, which had earlier been closed, 
was swaying back and forth.  Young also noted that the front 
window shades of the home, which were normally left half-drawn, 
were fully closed. 
 
 
3
Officer Scott Bigger of the Prince William County Police 
Department arrived at 3406 Jousters Way at 4:25 a.m.  Officer 
Bigger knocked on the front door, but got no response.  Officer 
Daniel arrived a few minutes later and walked around to the back 
of the townhouse.  The backyard was enclosed by a privacy fence, 
and Officer Daniel could hear a large dog barking “pretty 
hysterical[ly], angry” inside the yard. 
Returning to the front of the home, Officer Daniel observed 
that Officer Bigger had still received no response to his 
knocking on the front door.  Looking through a gap between the 
shades of a front window, Officer Daniel was able to see the 
legs of a person lying prone and motionless in the foyer of the 
home.  Officer Bigger opened the unlocked front door and he and 
Officer Daniel saw Finch, who lived with Thrall in the home, 
lying on the floor dead.  Finch had suffered three gunshot 
wounds:  one to his head, one to his back, and one to his chest. 
Officer Daniel immediately returned to the back of the home 
to secure that area while Officer Bigger waited at the front of 
the home for additional officers to arrive.  When those officers 
arrived, Officer Daniel immediately returned to the location on 
Belfry Lane where the pick-up truck had been parked.  He arrived 
at that location at 4:38 a.m.  The truck was gone. 
 
 
4
Officer Sheldon R. Creamer, one of the officers who had 
responded to the call by the other officers for assistance, 
arrived at 3406 Jousters Way at approximately 4:45 a.m.  
Entering the home, he heard “a muffled breathing sound” coming 
from the kitchen at the back of the home.  In the kitchen he 
found Thrall, shot and lying in a pool of blood.  Emergency 
medical personal called to the scene took Thrall by ambulance to 
a helicopter, which in turn evacuated her to the Washington 
Hospital Center in the District of Columbia, where she later 
died.  Thrall had suffered multiple gunshot wounds including a 
defensive wound to her right hand, three to her head, and one to 
her chest.  She also suffered a blunt force trauma to the back 
of her head consistent with a pistol-whipping. 
Officer Creamer found that the backdoor was locked by its 
doorknob lock, but that the door’s deadbolt lock was not 
engaged.  He could hear the dog barking in the back yard.  
Entering the yard from the kitchen, Officer Creamer found that 
the dog had calmed down.  He then determined that the gate of 
the privacy fence was secured with a locked padlock. 
Meanwhile, because Officer Daniel had reported seeing a 
child looking out of a second floor back window, Officer Bigger 
reentered the home and went upstairs.  There he found Thrall’s 
 
 
5
two sons, aged six and four, who were crying and upset.  Police 
officers removed the children from the home. 
The Investigation 
Officer Thomas Leo, a crime scene analyst with the Prince 
William County Police Department, collected bloodstain samples 
at various locations inside the townhouse.  Subsequent DNA 
testing of these samples confirmed that the blood was that of 
Thrall and Finch.  Leo also found a bloodstain on the inside of 
the gate of the privacy fence.  Subsequent DNA testing of this 
sample showed that it was consistent with Elliott’s DNA to a 
degree that a match would occur “once in the entire world 
population.” 
Although a murder weapon was never recovered, forensic 
testing of ten bullets recovered from the home and during the 
autopsies of Thrall and Finch confirmed that all had been fired 
by the same weapon.  The bullets were of a type used only in a 
revolver-type handgun.  Gary Arnsten, a firearms expert with 
Virginia’s Division of Forensic Science, testified at trial that 
because no weapon of this type could hold more than five or six 
bullets in its revolving chamber, he was certain that the weapon 
had been reloaded during the commission of the murders. 
Detective Charles Hoffman of the Prince William County 
Police Department spoke with Finch’s sister, Jennifer Finch, the 
 
 
6
day of the murders.  She informed Detective Hoffman that Finch 
had a prior romantic relationship with Rebecca Gragg.  She also 
told him that Finch and Gragg had been involved in a bitter 
custody dispute over their two children.  Detective Hoffman went 
to Gragg’s residence in Dale City, Virginia, located about six 
miles from the crime scene.  Gragg was not at home, but there 
were two vehicles parked in front of the residence.  One of the 
vehicles was registered in Elliott’s name. 
Gragg returned to her home later that day and was 
interviewed by two detectives.  At that time, Gragg maintained 
that Elliott was her “friend and business partner.”  She denied 
knowing anything about the murders, but stated that Finch had 
many enemies. 
The following day, January 3, 2001, Detective Hoffman and 
another detective traveled to Fort Meade in Hanover, Maryland, 
where Elliott worked as a civilian employee for the United 
States Army as a counterintelligence expert.  The detectives had 
learned that Elliott owned a pick-up truck and wanted “to 
determine whether that truck could, in fact, have been the truck 
that was seen nearby the [crime] scene.”  The detectives located 
the truck in a parking lot at Fort Meade, and Detective Hoffman 
observed that there was a flashlight, a cellular telephone, and 
a box of bandages on the seat of the truck. 
 
 
7
As Detective Hoffman was taking photographs of the truck, 
Elliott approached him, identified himself as the owner of the 
truck, and agreed to talk to the detectives.  During that 
conversation, Elliott told the detectives that Gragg was an 
employee at a brewing company he owned in West Virginia.  He 
admitted that he had supplied Gragg with a credit card in the 
name of “Rebecca L. Elliott,” but maintained that this had been 
for business purposes.  He also told the detectives that he had 
been traveling over the New Year’s holiday, as had Gragg, and 
that during that time he had spoken with her several times on 
his cellular telephone in an effort to arrange a business 
meeting with her. 
Elliott told the detectives that he was aware that Gragg 
and Finch were involved in a dispute regarding the custody of 
their two children.  Elliott related that Gragg had traveled to 
Florida over the New Year’s holiday and had taken the children 
with her.  He further related that Gragg had told him that she 
was having car trouble and would not be able to return to 
Virginia with the children in time to return them to Finch at 
2:00 p.m. on New Year’s Day as she was required to do under a 
visitation agreement.  Elliott claimed that he had driven to 
Gragg’s residence in the early afternoon of New Year’s Day “in 
case Robert Finch showed up so that [Elliott] could explain to 
 
 
8
him the problems Rebecca was having with getting back.”  Elliott 
denied he had any relationship with Gragg other than as her 
employer.  He also denied knowing Finch and claimed that he had 
seen him only once. 
Although Detective Hoffman told Elliott that his truck had 
been seen in Finch’s neighborhood in the early morning hours of 
the day of the murders, Elliott denied having been in the area.  
Elliott claimed that he had spent the night of January first to 
second sleeping in his truck at a rest area in Maryland. 
Elliott voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the Anne 
Arundel County, Maryland Police Department.  During the course 
of an interview there, Elliott admitted the true nature of his 
involvement with Gragg.  He told the detectives that he had 
initiated a relationship with Gragg in mid-1999 after viewing 
her photograph on an Internet website called “Adult Friend 
Finders.”  In her advertisement, Gragg had indicated that she 
was looking for a “sugar daddy.”  During their first meeting, 
Gragg told Elliott that she had worked as a stripper and 
“private escort,” a euphemism for a “call-girl” prostitute.  
Gragg told Elliott that she wanted to turn her life around and 
needed financial support to start a business designing and 
selling costumes for strippers.  She told Elliott that she was 
not interested in having a romantic or sexual relationship with 
 
 
9
him.  Elliott agreed to this arrangement, saying that he wanted 
only friendship from Gragg. 
Elliott subsequently provided Gragg with significant 
financial support, including paying private school tuition for 
her children, paying the mortgage on one house Gragg owned in 
West Virginia and rental on others where she lived with her 
husband and children at various times, providing her with cars, 
and permitting her to use his credit cards.  Elliott also paid 
for breast augmentation surgery for Gragg, who had begun 
operating a pay-to-view pornographic website.  Elliott admitted 
that his support of Gragg had placed a significant financial 
burden on him and that he had to sell investments to pay her 
credit card debts. 
Elliott further admitted that he knew where Finch lived and 
that, after he had gone to Gragg’s house on the afternoon of 
January 1, 2001, he had driven to Finch’s house.  He denied 
getting out of his truck, however, and claimed that he had seen 
“a black man with a slinky walk going to the front door of the 
home.”  Elliott maintained that he had then driven to a large 
national retail store and a restaurant before driving to the 
rest stop in Maryland where he had spent the night.  He then 
claimed that he had driven back to Gragg’s residence about 3:00 
a.m. on the morning of January 2, 2001, to retrieve a case of 
 
 
10
motor oil that he had seen there the day before.  He then went 
to a convenience store where he called Gragg’s cellular 
telephone on a pay telephone.  Elliott claimed that he used the 
pay telephone because his own cellular telephone’s battery had 
run down.  Telephone company records showed that a call had been 
placed from the pay telephone to Gragg’s cellular telephone at 
3:28 a.m. on January 2, 2001. 
Elliott admitted that after calling Gragg, he drove to 
Finch’s neighborhood.  He admitted leaving his truck, claiming 
that he did so only because he needed to urinate.  Elliott 
stated that after urinating by a guardrail on the side of the 
road, he walked by Thrall’s and Finch’s townhouse.  He denied 
going onto the property and stated that he had not heard 
gunshots, a scream, or anything unusual.  At the conclusion of 
this interview, Detective Hoffman took a photograph of an 
abrasion he had noticed on one of Elliott’s hands. 
On January 4, 2001, Gragg, accompanied by her lawyer, was 
again interviewed by detectives investigating the murders of 
Thrall and Finch.  During that interview, she admitted receiving 
a telephone call early on the morning of the murders, but 
claimed that the call had come from Finch.  Gragg claimed that 
Finch had threatened to call the police if she did not return 
their children to him that afternoon.  Gragg also told the 
 
 
11
detectives that she did not believe that Elliott had committed 
the murders. 
On January 7, 2001, Detective Hoffman conducted another 
interview with Elliott during which Elliott admitted that he had 
been in Finch’s neighborhood “hundreds of times.”  He further 
admitted walking through the neighborhood, but again denied that 
he had ever been on the property of the townhouse where Thrall 
and Finch lived. 
On January 8, 2001, Officer Leo, the crime scene analyst, 
took possession of Elliott’s pick-up truck pursuant to a search 
warrant.  He determined that the interior of the truck had 
recently been cleaned, noting that the carpet was wet and that 
the seats and interior had been covered with a “silicone type 
base cleaner.”  Nonetheless, testing of samples collected from 
the underside of the truck’s floor mats showed a trace residue 
of blood, though the samples were too small for accurate DNA 
testing.  A further blood sample found in the seat cushion was 
consistent with Elliott’s DNA. 
Detectives investigating the murders interviewed Gragg on 
January 12, 2001 and again on January 19, 2001.  She continued 
to deny any knowledge of the murders.  Based on the results of a 
polygraph examination that Gragg had agreed to take, police 
suspected that Gragg was not being fully forthcoming, but they 
 
 
12
were not certain to what extent she had knowledge of the murders 
or whether she may have been directly involved.  Over the next 
several months, Gragg had continuing contact with the police 
concerning the investigation of the murders, but she did not 
provide any additional information concerning Elliott. 
On May 9, 2001, Elliott was arrested in Maryland and 
charged with capital murder.  At that time, according to 
Maryland State Police, Elliott was “leaving [in his vehicle] at 
a high rate of speed,” and there was some concern that he was 
attempting to flee.  Elliott claimed, however, that he had 
intended to turn himself in. 
On May 10, 2001, Prince William County detectives again 
interviewed Gragg.  During that interview, Gragg agreed to 
submit to a second polygraph examination.  After the polygraph 
examiner and Detective Hoffman told Gragg that her responses to 
questions concerning her knowledge of the murders indicated that 
she was being untruthful, Gragg asked to speak with her 
attorney. 
After consulting with her attorney, Gragg told the police 
that the telephone call she had received early on the morning of 
the murders was not from Finch, although initially she had 
assumed it was because the connection was not good and she could 
not hear the caller clearly.  Gragg then related that when the 
 
 
13
caller realized that she thought she was talking to Finch, the 
caller said he was “tired of this s*** and was going to take 
care of it” and hung up.  Gragg then realized that the call had 
come from Elliott.  She attempted to call his cellular 
telephone, but the call was answered by a voice mail system. 
Gragg told the detectives that she received several more 
calls on her cellular telephone from Elliott later on January 2, 
2001.  During one call, Elliott told her that “all of our 
problems had been taken care of.”  In another call, Elliott 
claimed that “Jerry,” a cryptic figure Elliott supposedly knew 
through his work with military counterintelligence, “had come 
out of nowhere to help him, that he had to go clean up this 
mess.”  Later, Elliott told Gragg that he was looking for a 
place “to dump . . . these bloodied black trash bags from the 
mess that Jerry had made.” 
Gragg told the police that she had not been truthful in her 
prior interviews because she was afraid of Elliott and “Jerry,” 
because Elliott had once told her that “Jerry” was watching her 
and that he would kill her or her family if she went to the 
police.  Once Elliott was in custody and the police had assured 
her that there was no “Jerry,” she stated that she had decided 
to be truthful.  Gragg’s attorney confirmed that she had told 
 
 
14
him on several occasions that she feared Elliott would harm her 
if she told the police what she knew. 
Indictment and Pre-trial Proceedings 
On August 6, 2001, the Prince William County grand jury 
returned indictments charging Elliott with the capital murder of 
Thrall, the first degree murder of Finch, and two counts of the 
use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  Elliott was 
tried on these indictments initially in a jury trial in July 
2002.  After the jury had found Elliott guilty and sentenced him 
to death, the trial court declared a mistrial after it had been 
determined that a juror had improperly discussed the case with a 
third party during the trial. 
Prior to the July 2002 trial, Elliott had filed numerous 
motions, among which were motions to have the Virginia capital 
murder and death penalty statutes declared unconstitutional and 
to have the jury instructed that, if the Commonwealth presented 
evidence of vileness during the penalty determination phase of 
the trial, the jury was to be unanimous in its determination of 
the elements of the act that caused it to be vile.  The trial 
court denied these motions without comment.  After the mistrial 
was declared, Elliott did not renew any of these motions or 
otherwise request that the trial court adopt the pre-trial 
 
 
15
rulings of the first trial and apply them to the conduct of the 
retrial. 
Prior to the retrial, Elliott filed motions seeking 
disclosure of exculpatory and impeaching information within 
Rebecca Gragg’s initial statement to police and related police 
reports.  Elliott maintained that, as a result of Gragg’s 
testimony during the first trial, he now believed that the 
Commonwealth was in possession of statements by Gragg or police 
reports contradicting her testimony.  Elliott also sought an in 
limine ruling from the trial court to permit the introduction at 
trial of a videotape of Gragg’s polygraph examinations.  Elliott 
maintained that the polygraph evidence would show that Gragg had 
a motive to fabricate a story implicating him when she learned 
that police knew that she had been untruthful in her prior 
interviews when she denied any knowledge of or involvement in 
the murders. 
The trial court, by letter to counsel, directed the 
Commonwealth to disclose to Elliott all statements, whether 
exculpatory or not, “authored by Rebecca Gragg and furnished to 
the Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney at some point during 
the pendency of this prosecution.”  The record shows that the 
Commonwealth provided Elliott with additional material not 
previously provided under a Brady order entered in the first 
 
 
16
trial, including a forty-eight-page statement “generated by Ms. 
Gragg.”  The Commonwealth averred in a cover letter to the 
packet containing this material that Elliott had thus been 
“provided . . . with transcripts or summaries of all material 
contacts between Ms. Gragg and the police concerning this . . . 
case.” 
On February 10, 2003, and in anticipation of Elliott’s 
second trial, a hearing was conducted on Elliott’s motion to 
permit the videotape of Gragg’s polygraph examinations into 
evidence.  During that hearing, Elliott’s counsel asserted that 
he should be permitted to establish that Gragg had changed her 
“story” after the police told her that she had “failed” the 
polygraph examinations.  The trial court ruled that during 
cross-examination of Gragg, Elliott could establish that police 
had confronted her on May 10, 2001, with the assertion that she 
had been untruthful in her prior interviews and that is why she 
had made prior inconsistent statements to the police.  The trial 
court reasoned that Elliott’s right to cross-examination could 
be conducted “without getting into this morass of polygraph, no 
polygraph, passing, failing and the like.” 
 
 
17
Guilt Determination Phase 
Elliott’s second trial commenced on March 24, 2003.1  During 
the guilt determination phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence in accord with the above-recited facts 
concerning the murders and the subsequent police investigation.  
During the course of the guilt determination phase, several 
issues arose which principally relate to the polygraph 
examinations of Gragg and are the subject of various assignments 
of error asserted by Elliott in this appeal.  For clarity, we 
will confine our recitation here to the facts relevant to the 
murders and subsequently recite additional facts where 
appropriate to address those assignments of error. 
Brandon T. Jackson, an employee of the United States Army 
Intelligence & Security Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, had 
known Elliott since 1991.  He testified that on December 26, 
2000, Elliott had sent him an e-mail stating that Elliott and 
some co-workers at Fort Meade wanted to establish a gun range 
for practice shooting.  Jackson recounted that Elliott knew that 
Jackson had a federal firearms dealer’s license, and that 
Elliott wanted to know if Jackson could acquire gun silencers 
                     
1 Elliott has not assigned error to any aspect of the jury 
selection process.  Accordingly, we need not recount the 
incidents of that portion of the trial. 
 
 
18
 
because these were needed for use at the gun range to avoid 
complaints from neighbors. 
Jackson testified that he ignored the e-mail because he 
believed Elliott’s request was “ludicrous.”  He explained that 
gun silencers would never be used for practice shooting because 
the repeated use of silencers made them less effective at 
reducing the sound of gunfire.  He also testified that obtaining 
gun silencers legally was a complex process.  Several days after 
sending the e-mail, Elliott telephoned Jackson and asked if he 
had received the e-mail.  He also asked Jackson detailed 
questions about gun silencers and whether Jackson thought 
Elliott could purchase a silencer at a gun show. 
Gragg testified at length concerning her relationship with 
Elliott.  While not denying her willingness to financially 
exploit Elliott’s attraction to her, she maintained that from 
the outset she had made it clear to Elliott that she was not 
seeking a romantic or sexual relationship.  Gragg testified, 
however, that Elliott had once claimed to her that they had 
sexual intercourse while Gragg had been under the effects of a 
pre-operative sedative the night before her breast augmentation 
surgery. 
Following this incident, Elliott was “constantly” 
professing his love to Gragg and provided her with more and more 
 
 
19
financial support and material goods.  Though continuing to 
accept these gifts, Gragg became uncomfortable with the 
relationship and began refusing to see Elliott socially.  
Elliott then began making excuses to see Gragg allegedly on 
business related matters and would arrive unannounced at places 
where he knew Gragg would be. 
Elliott had employed a private investigator to aid Gragg in 
her child custody dispute with Finch.  When the investigator 
failed to provide Elliott with any useful information, Elliott 
told Gragg that “he knew people that could do it better.”  
Gragg, who still had romantic feelings for Finch, told Elliott 
not to interfere. 
Eventually, Gragg revealed to Elliott that she had resumed 
her relationship with Finch and was still in love with him.  
Elliott then told Gragg that “Jerry” was “checking up” on her so 
that Elliott could “keep [Gragg] in line.”  When Gragg made 
light of this claim, Elliott grabbed her by the arm and told her 
that she should take him seriously because “people’s lives were 
in danger.”  Elliott also told her that if she went to the 
police, these people would be killed.  Elliott specifically 
mentioned Finch as one of the people who would be killed. 
In mid-December 2000, Elliott told Gragg that she “had 
gotten him into this mess,” and that she had to help him get out 
 
 
20
of it.  Elliott said that, if Gragg refused, he did not know 
what “Jerry” might do.  Elliott gave Gragg personal information 
about his wife’s financial accounts and had her pose as his wife 
on the telephone to make transfers out of those accounts.  
Elliott threw the paper with the information on it away, but 
Gragg retrieved it and later turned it over to the police. 
On December 26, 2000, the same day that Elliott sent the e-
mail to Jackson inquiring about obtaining gun silencers, Elliott 
sent a rambling e-mail to Gragg to “give [her] a little more 
information concerning a couple of issues that are in the 
works.”  Indicating that he had sent her a carbon copy of his e-
mail to Jackson, Elliott further stated that Jackson was “only 
one of two people that I am working this issue with.”  Elliott 
claimed that the other person, who he identified as “Mac,” was 
“into anything that went bang and he just may have some 
connections.”  Elliott further indicated that he had to meet 
with “Mac” personally because “[h]e is the type of guy that 
would bolt if I mentioned any of this in an email.” 
Throughout the e-mail, as he had in previous communications 
to Gragg, Elliott made references to having “this one issue 
resolved” and the possibility of he and Gragg “hav[ing] a 
relationship when [her] problem [is] taken care of.”  Gragg 
testified that she understood that by the “issue” and the 
 
 
21
“problem” Elliott was referring to the child custody dispute 
with Finch.  Elliott concluded the e-mail with a postscript 
telling Gragg to remember that he loved her even “if everything 
goes south.” 
After the Commonwealth rested, Elliott recalled Detective 
Hoffman for the limited purpose of inquiring into one of the 
issues, previously referenced herein, that had arisen during the 
Commonwealth’s presentation of evidence.  Elliott otherwise did 
not offer any evidence.  After being instructed by the trial 
court and hearing argument from the Commonwealth and the 
defense, the jury retired to consider its verdicts.  During 
deliberations, the jury sent a question to the trial court 
asking to view a videotape of the crime scene that had been 
admitted into evidence.  With the concurrence of the parties, 
the trial court permitted the jury to view the videotape.  The 
record does not reflect that there was any other communication 
from the jury during this phase of the trial. 
After four hours of deliberation, the jury returned its 
verdicts, convicting Elliott of the capital murder of Thrall, 
the first degree murder of Finch, and the two related firearm 
offenses.  At the request of the defense, the jury was polled 
and each juror indicated agreement with the verdicts. 
 
 
22
Penalty Determination Phase 
Elliott has not assigned error to the conduct of the 
evidentiary portion of the penalty determination phase of his 
trial.  Accordingly, we will recount the evidence presented in 
summary fashion.  The Commonwealth called Thrall’s mother, 
brother, and sister-in-law as witnesses to give victim impact 
testimony.  Each recounted the effect of Thrall’s murder on her 
family, including the effect it had on her two sons. 
Elliott called his wife and six of his co-workers as 
character witnesses.  Their testimony consisted principally of 
assertions of Elliott’s good character, mild manner, and strong 
work ethic, including his twenty years enlisted service in the 
United States Army as a counterintelligence specialist and his 
subsequent civilian employment in that same capacity. 
Elliott’s wife testified that they had married in 1976 and 
that they had a daughter.  Elliott also had children from a 
prior marriage.  She admitted that Elliott had not had a close 
relationship with their daughter.  She maintained, however, that 
he was not a violent person and “would not hurt anybody.”  On 
cross-examination, Elliott’s wife maintained that she had been 
unaware of Elliott’s relationship with Gragg.  Mrs. Elliott also 
testified that she was unaware until after the murders that 
 
 
23
Elliott had dissipated about $200,000 of her separate assets 
during the course of his relationship with Gragg. 
The trial court, having ruled that the Commonwealth could 
not argue Elliott’s future dangerousness to society as an 
aggravating factor supporting the imposition of the death 
penalty, ruled that the case would be submitted to the jury only 
on the vileness aggravating factor.  During consideration of the 
jury instructions, Elliott’s counsel stated that he agreed with 
the proposed instruction which, in relevant part, defined the 
vileness aggravating factor as requiring that the murder of 
Thrall “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, 
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated 
battery of the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish 
the act of murder.” 
Elliott did not request an instruction requiring that the 
jury agree unanimously on the basis for finding the murder to 
have been vile, as he had requested in his pre-trial motion 
prior to his first trial.  Rather, Elliott’s sole assertion at 
this point was that, “for the record,” he objected to the jury 
being instructed on capital murder because the evidence would 
not support a finding that the murder of Finch was vile.  While 
conceding that he had no authority other than “a new article [he 
had] read,” Elliott’s counsel contended that where the capital 
 
 
24
murder charge was premised on there having been one or more 
killings as part of the same transaction, the jury was required 
to find that all the killings were vile.  The trial court 
overruled this objection and again asked if Elliott concurred 
with the instructions.  Elliott’s counsel replied, “Yes, other 
than the objection I’ve made.” 
While the jury was deliberating, it sent a question to the 
trial court asking clarification on where the money to pay a 
fine imposed on Elliott would come from and “where would the 
money go.”  With concurrence of the parties, the trial court 
instructed the jury that it was not to concern itself with these 
matters.  The record does not reflect that there was any other 
communication from the jury during this phase of the trial. 
The jury returned its verdicts, sentencing Elliott to death 
for the capital murder of Thrall, to life imprisonment for the 
first degree murder of Finch, and to a total of eight years 
imprisonment for the two firearm offenses.  At the request of 
the defense, the jury was polled and each juror indicated 
agreement with the verdicts. 
Sentencing 
After the jury returned its verdict imposing the death 
sentence, the trial court ordered the preparation of a post-
sentence report in accord with Code § 19.2-264.5.  In that 
 
 
25
report, Elliott claimed for the first time that his relationship 
with Gragg had in fact evolved into a sexual, though not 
necessarily romantic, arrangement.  Elliott maintained that he 
had not disclosed this fact to the police at Gragg’s request.  
Elliott continued to maintain his innocence. 
Following preparation of the post-sentence report, the 
trial court held a sentencing hearing on May 22, 2003.  During 
that proceeding, the trial court overruled several post-verdict 
motions filed by Elliott.  To the extent these motions are 
pertinent to issues raised in this appeal, we will address their 
substance within the discussion of the relevant assignments of 
error.  Addressing the trial court prior to the imposition of 
sentence, Elliott denied any involvement in the murders of 
Thrall and Finch, asserting that he was the victim of “lies that 
were told in [the] courtroom” and “a police department that 
practices Gestapo techniques.”  The trial court imposed sentence 
in accord with the jury’s verdicts. 
We consolidated the automatic review of Elliott’s death 
sentence with his appeal of the capital murder conviction.  Code 
§ 17.1-313(F).  Elliott’s appeal of his non-capital convictions 
was certified from the Court of Appeals, Code § 17.1-409, 
 
 
26
consolidated with his capital murder appeal, and the 
consolidated appeals were given priority on our docket.2 
DISCUSSION 
Elliott raises twenty assignments of error with respect to 
the conduct of his trial and the imposition of the death 
sentence.  The Commonwealth contends that many of Elliott’s 
assignments of error either were not properly preserved in the 
trial court or otherwise have been procedurally defaulted.  We 
will address Elliott’s assignments of error seriatim, 
considering the Commonwealth’s assertions of waiver where 
relevant. 
The “Reasonable Doubt” Jury Question Issue 
In preparing for this appeal, Elliott’s appellate counsel3 
discovered in the trial court’s manuscript record a handwritten 
note, apparently composed by a juror, which reads: 
 
Can you supply a more simplistic definition of 
reasonable Doubt from a guilt or im (sic) innocence 
point of View? 
                     
2 Except to the extent that Elliott asserts that errors in 
the general conduct of his trial would require a reversal of all 
his convictions, Elliott does not directly challenge his 
convictions or sentences for the non-capital crimes. 
 
 
 
27
3 Elliott’s trial counsel had sought to withdraw from 
representation following the mistrial of Elliott’s first trial.  
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, and trial counsel 
represented Elliott pro bono publico during the second trial.  
Subsequently, Elliott’s appellate counsel were substituted and 
served pro bono publico.  
 
In his first assignment of error, Elliott contends that the 
trial court erred in failing to inform his counsel of this jury 
question.  Elliott asks that this Court remand the case to the 
trial court for an evidentiary hearing “to determine whether the 
jury asked the reasonable doubt question appearing in the 
record.” 
Because the existence of the “reasonable doubt” jury 
question was not discovered until after the trial court’s 
jurisdiction had expired, no inquiry was made in the trial court 
as to whether the jury had intended for this question to reach 
the trial judge.  The Commonwealth contends that because the 
alleged failure of the trial court to inform Elliott of the 
question was not the subject of any objection in the trial 
court, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  
Rule 5:25.  Elliott responds that “a party can[not] waive an 
argument before becoming aware of the error.” 
 
 
28
As we previously noted herein, there is no indication in 
the record that the trial court received any inquiry from the 
jury other than the request to view the crime scene videotape 
during the guilt determination phase and the question concerning 
the imposition of a fine during the penalty determination phase.  
Unlike the questions received by the trial court, the 
“reasonable doubt” jury question contains no response from the 
trial court.  Beyond these facts, the matter reduces itself to 
one involving pure speculation, and we decline to speculate 
whether the jury actually intended to send the purported jury 
question at issue to the trial court for a response.  
Accordingly, we will take no further consideration of this issue 
in this appeal.4 
Polygraph Evidence Issues 
In his second assignment of error, Elliott asserts that the 
trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine to have the 
videotape of Gragg’s polygraph examinations admitted into 
evidence.  Elliott acknowledges that evidence of polygraph 
examinations is not admissible to show the correctness of the 
results of such examinations.  Relying on Crumpton v. 
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 131, 384 S.E.2d 339 (1989), he contends 
that evidence of a polygraph examination may be admissible to 
explain “the motive for, or context underlying, testimony or 
statements given by a witness after the witness is told of the 
results of his polygraph examination.”  The Commonwealth 
responds that Elliott’s reliance on Crumpton is misplaced and 
that the trial court’s ruling in this case is in accord with our 
                     
4 Moreover, the relief that Elliott seeks, a remand for an 
evidentiary hearing in the trial court, is not one that may be 
afforded in a direct appeal. 
 
 
29
 
decision in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 155, 341 
S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986), where we held that results of a 
polygraph examination may not be used to impeach a witness.  We 
agree with the Commonwealth. 
In Crumpton, the Court of Appeals held that a criminal 
defendant had a right to give a full explanation of his prior 
inconsistent statements to the police “so long as that 
explanation did not also necessarily invoke the polygraph 
examination results as proof that he had been truthful” when he 
testified.  9 Va. App. at 137, 384 S.E.2d at 343.  The Court in 
Crumpton emphasized that its holding was based upon “the 
particular facts and procedural posture” in which the issue 
arose in that case.  Id., 384 S.E.2d at 342.  Moreover, the 
Court expressly acknowledged our clear precedent, as expressed 
in Robinson, 231 Va. at 156, 341 S.E.2d at 167, that the results 
of polygraph examinations are not admissible whether they favor 
the accused or are agreed to by both the accused and the 
Commonwealth.  Crumpton, 9 Va. App. at 135, 384 S.E.2d at 342. 
Crumpton is inapplicable to the present case.  It is 
evident that Elliott sought to impeach Gragg’s credibility by 
the introduction of evidence of Gragg’s polygraph examinations 
as reflected in the videotape of those examinations.  
Accordingly, our decision in Robinson is controlling, and we 
 
 
30
hold that the trial court did not err in denying Elliott’s 
motion in limine to admit into evidence the videotape of Gragg’s 
polygraph examinations. 
The remaining polygraph issues raised by Elliott in this 
appeal arose at trial in the following context.  During 
Elliott’s counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Hoffman in 
the guilt determination phase of the trial, the following 
exchange occurred: 
Q.  Now there is a gentleman in your police department 
− and I don’t necessarily want you to tell me what he 
does, but I want to ask you the question.  There is a 
Mr. Meyers; you are familiar with that name? 
 
A.  Yes, sir. 
 
Q.  He is a person that interviewed Rebecca [Gragg] as 
well as you; am I right? 
 
A.  I believe you’re referring to the polygrapher? 
Elliott’s counsel immediately requested a bench conference.  
Counsel asserted that he had specifically framed his question so 
that Detective Hoffman would not identify Meyers as a polygraph 
examiner.  The trial court agreed and asked, “[w]hat if anything 
do you want to do?”  Elliott’s counsel asserted that Hoffman had 
“opened the door and I want to go in it.”  The trial court 
reflected that it was “a little dismayed by the answer [Hoffman] 
gave,” excused the jury, and proceeded to question Hoffman. 
 
 
31
The trial court questioned Detective Hoffman on why he had 
referred to Meyers as “the polygrapher.”  Hoffman explained that 
there were two officers in the police department named Meyers.  
He conceded upon further questioning, however, that the other 
officer was a patrolman who had not been involved in the 
investigation of the Thrall/Finch murders. 
Elliott’s counsel maintained that because the jurors were 
now aware that Gragg had taken a polygraph examination, they 
would naturally assume that she had passed the examination and, 
thus, tend to find her testimony more credible.  The trial court 
offered to instruct the jury either that it should disregard 
Detective Hoffman’s last answer and/or to specifically instruct 
the jury that the fact that a witness may have taken a polygraph 
examination should not lend credence to the witness’s testimony.  
Elliott’s counsel indicated that he would prefer that the jury 
only be instructed to disregard the answer, and that he agreed 
to this remedy “under protest.” 
Elliott’s counsel then moved for a mistrial, stating that 
“[i]t was the responsibility on the part of the Commonwealth to 
inform [Detective Hoffman] not” to make reference to Gragg 
having taken polygraph examinations.  Elliott’s counsel further 
stated that while he did not “know why [Hoffman] did it . . . he 
has been a police officer long enough to know that he shouldn’t 
 
 
32
be discussing polygraphs in courtrooms . . . it was intentional 
in that regard.”  The trial court denied the motion for 
mistrial.  The trial court then instructed Detective Hoffman 
that he was not to mention the polygraph examinations again.  
When the jury returned, the trial court instructed the jurors 
that they “will disregard the last answer given by this 
witness.” 
Elliott subsequently filed a post-verdict motion for a new 
trial, asserting that the jury would have been unable to follow 
the trial court’s instruction and disregard Detective Hoffman’s 
answer indicating that Meyers was a polygraph examiner.  During 
the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressly found that 
Hoffman had inadvertently mentioned Meyers’ role as a polygraph 
examiner, and that, without a more definitive assertion that 
Gragg had undergone polygraph examinations, it would require “an 
inference upon inference upon inference” for the jury to have 
concluded that Gragg had passed the examinations.  The trial 
court denied the motion for a new trial, ruling “that one can 
assume to the extent that answer has any effect at all, that 
[the jury] did in fact follow the Court’s instructions to” 
disregard the answer. 
In his third assignment of error, Elliott contends that the 
trial court erred in not permitting him to introduce the results 
 
 
33
of Gragg’s polygraph examinations to rebut the false impression 
that Gragg had been truthful in her statements to the police.  
Elliott contends that the jury would naturally have such an 
impression from Detective Hoffman’s reference to a “polygrapher” 
having interviewed Gragg.  Elliott asserts, as he did at trial, 
that Hoffman’s response “opened the door” to the admission of 
the results of Gragg’s polygraph examinations.  We disagree. 
The term “opening the door” is a catchphrase often used to 
refer to the doctrine of curative admissibility.  Curative 
admissibility, in its broadest form, allows a party to introduce 
otherwise inadmissible evidence when necessary to counter the 
effect of improper evidence previously admitted by the other 
party.  See Clark v. State, 629 A.2d 1239, 1244-45 (Md. Ct. App. 
1993); see also 1 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, § 15 
(Rev. ed. 1983).  The specific facts of this case do not 
implicate the application of this doctrine.  We are of opinion 
that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to give a 
curative instruction to the jury under the circumstances rather 
than to permit Elliott to introduce otherwise inadmissible and 
unreliable evidence. 
In his fourth and fifth assignments of error, Elliott 
contends, respectively, that the trial court erred in not 
granting his motion for mistrial and in not granting his motion 
 
 
34
for a new trial on the ground that the curative instruction 
given by the trial court was not adequate to cure the prejudice 
caused by Detective Hoffman’s testimony. 
A trial court exercises its discretion when it 
determines whether it should grant a motion for 
mistrial.  Whether improper evidence is so prejudicial 
as to require a mistrial is a question of fact to be 
resolved by the trial court in each particular case.  
Unless this Court can say that the trial court’s 
resolution of that question was wrong as a matter of 
law, it will not disturb the trial court’s decision on 
appeal.  A judgment will not be reversed for the 
improper admission of evidence that a court 
subsequently directs a jury to disregard because 
juries are presumed to follow prompt, explicit, and 
curative instructions. 
 
Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280, 427 S.E.2d 411, 420, 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993) (citations omitted). 
As the trial court noted during the sentencing hearing, the 
oblique reference to a “polygrapher” is not so inherently 
prejudicial as to require the trial court to grant a mistrial or 
to set aside the verdict and order a new trial.  See Epperly v. 
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 234, 294 S.E.2d 882, 893-94 
(1982) (holding that a witness’s mention of the word “polygraph” 
did not cause harmful error because the reference was elicited 
“without definition or elaboration”).  We hold that in this case 
the giving of a prompt curative instruction to disregard the 
reference, which the jury is presumed to have obeyed, was 
sufficient to avoid any prejudice to Elliott and, thus, the 
 
 
35
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions 
for a mistrial and for a new trial. 
Gragg’s Alleged False Testimony 
During his cross-examination of Gragg, Elliott’s counsel 
attempted to impeach Gragg by asserting that she had embellished 
her trial testimony with inculpatory details that had not been 
included in the interview she gave to police on May 10, 2001.  
Specifically, Elliott’s counsel contended that, in contrast to 
her trial testimony, she had not told police that Elliott had 
said during one of the telephone calls after the murders that he 
was “covered with blood” and that the police were “swarming” 
around.  Gragg testified that while these details were not in 
the transcript of her interview with the police, she had “told 
[Detective Hoffman] everything when we were outside” taking a 
cigarette break and that “when I came back inside they made me − 
they wrote it down.”  Under further questioning, Gragg was 
uncertain whether the police had written the statement 
containing these additional details for her to sign or whether 
she had written the statement herself. 
Elliott’s counsel, noting that such a statement “has not 
been provided to the Defense,” requested that Elliott be 
provided a copy of this written statement.  The Commonwealth’s 
Attorney advised the trial court that he had no knowledge of the 
 
 
36
written statement’s existence.  As it was late in the day, the 
trial court called a recess and directed the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney to make inquiries regarding the existence of the 
written statement. 
After the Commonwealth’s Attorney and Elliott’s counsel 
jointly interviewed Detective Hoffman, the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney advised the trial court that, according to Hoffman, “no 
such document was created by him or by anyone . . . he did not 
have [Gragg] sign anything or read over anything” on May 10, 
2001.  Elliott’s counsel stated that he wanted “a stipulation 
from the government that there is no such statement.”  The trial 
court ruled that either the Commonwealth could agree to such a 
stipulation or Elliott could call Hoffman “to establish that no 
such statement exists . . . absent the stipulation by the 
Commonwealth the statement does not exist, you’re entitled to 
prove that it doesn’t exist.”  The trial court then asked 
Elliott’s counsel, “What else do we need to do?”  Elliott’s 
counsel replied, “Not a thing.” 
Elliott’s counsel then asked the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
whether he would stipulate that the statement did not exist.  
The Commonwealth’s Attorney replied, “We don’t know it doesn’t 
exist, we don’t have any evidence on it.  You’ve just got to 
argue that to the jury that there is no such document.”  The 
 
 
37
trial court again asked, “Well, what else can we do today?”  
Elliott’s counsel replied, “That’s it, your Honor.” 
When the trial resumed the following morning, Elliott’s 
counsel continued his cross-examination of Gragg.  Gragg 
conceded that she did not mention Elliott saying he was “covered 
in blood” or that police were “swarming” in either the May 10, 
2001 interview or in a written statement she later prepared for 
the police.5 
Elliott’s counsel then questioned Gragg about the written 
statement she alleged contained these details, asking her to 
describe the paper it had been written on and to clarify whether 
she or Detective Hoffman had written the statement.  Gragg 
testified that she could not recall whether the statement had 
been written on a pad or on loose paper, but that she believed 
Hoffman had written the statement and she had read it and signed 
it.  Gragg further testified that when she later asked the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney for a copy of this statement, he told 
her to ask Detective Hoffman, who “told me that he could not 
find it.” 
After Elliott’s counsel concluded his cross-examination of 
Gragg, the trial court called a bench conference and asked the 
                     
 
 
38
5 This written statement was the one provided to Elliott 
during the pre-trial proceedings. 
Commonwealth’s Attorney if he had any recollection of having 
been asked by Gragg about the May 10, 2001 written statement or 
referring her to Detective Hoffman.  The Commonwealth’s Attorney 
stated that he had no such recollection. 
Elliott’s counsel stated that while he was “not suggesting 
that [the Commonwealth] did anything improper” concerning 
Gragg’s testimony, his “concern is how do we proceed knowing 
there is no such statement.”  The trial court again opined that 
Elliott could call Detective Hoffman to testify that the 
statement did not exist.  Elliott’s counsel then stated that he 
was concerned the Commonwealth might try to rehabilitate Gragg 
in redirect examination.  The trial court then asked whether 
Elliott’s counsel was asserting that “the Commonwealth knows 
this is . . . perjury.”  Elliott’s counsel responded he was not 
making that assertion.  Although the Commonwealth conducted a 
brief redirect examination of Gragg, it did not return to the 
issue of the alleged May 10, 2001 written statement. 
After the Commonwealth rested, Elliott recalled Detective 
Hoffman and asked him whether he had prepared a written 
statement for Gragg to sign on May 10, 2001.  Hoffman testified 
that neither he nor any other officer prepared a statement for 
Gragg to sign on that day. 
 
 
39
Elliott filed a post-verdict motion for an evidentiary 
hearing “to determine the factual circumstances surrounding the 
existence of a written statement allegedly signed by Rebecca 
Gragg at the behest of the police on May 10, 2001.”  Elliott 
contended that either “Gragg lied on the stand in a deliberate 
attempt to make her story appear more credible and consistent” 
or “the written statement was signed by her off the record, and 
the police and/or the Commonwealth lost it or suppressed it.” 
Elliott stated that an evidentiary hearing was necessary because 
“any possibility of witness perjury or police misconduct must be 
fully explored.” 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ruled that the 
matter had been “explored before this jury to the extent . . . 
that the Defendant saw fit to do so . . . .  [T]o conduct an 
additional hearing at this point on the same issue . . . is not 
warranted.”  The trial court denied the motion for an 
evidentiary hearing in the sentencing order. 
In his sixth assignment of error, Elliott contends that 
“[t]he trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial based 
upon the presentation of false testimony by the Commonwealth’s 
witness Rebecca Gragg that she had signed a written statement 
during an interview with the police on May 10, 2001.”  In his 
seventh assignment of error, Elliott contends that “[t]he trial 
 
 
40
court erred in failing to require the Commonwealth to cure the 
false testimony by its witness Rebecca Gragg that she had signed 
a written statement during an interview with the police on May 
10, 2001.”  In briefing these assignments of error, Elliott 
directs the Court to two points in the trial transcript, 
asserting that at these points “the trial court failed to 
declare a mistrial, to require the Commonwealth to take steps to 
correct the falsehood offered by its star witness, or to 
otherwise remedy the introduction of this testimony.” 
The Commonwealth contends that the record does not show 
that Elliott requested a mistrial or otherwise requested the 
trial court to “remedy the introduction of this testimony.”  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth asserts that Elliott may not raise 
these issues for the first time on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
In his eighth, ninth, and tenth assignments of error, 
Elliott contends, respectively, that the trial court erred “in 
failing to find that the Commonwealth violated its obligation to 
disclose exculpatory evidence,” in failing to grant his post-
trial motion for an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the 
existence of Gragg’s alleged written statement, and “in failing 
to grant a mistrial based upon the Commonwealth’s failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence.”  The Commonwealth contends that 
Elliott, though purporting to relate these assignments of error 
 
 
41
to the question presented in which he argued his sixth and 
seventh assignments of error, failed to adequately brief these 
issues. 
We have reviewed the trial transcript at the two points 
referenced by Elliott with respect to the trial court’s failure 
to grant a mistrial or provide him with some other remedy for 
Gragg’s alleged false testimony.  In addition, we have 
considered the entire record of Gragg’s testimony concerning the 
statement that she alleged she signed on May 10, 2001 and the 
various bench conferences related to that testimony.  At no 
point in the record can we discern where Elliott requested that 
the trial court declare a mistrial, sought a directive from the 
trial court requiring the Commonwealth to “cure” Gragg’s false 
testimony, or asked the trial court for any specific remedy. 
At best, the record shows that Elliott’s counsel asked 
whether the Commonwealth would stipulate that Gragg had not 
signed any statement on May 10, 2001.  In response, the trial 
court opined that in the absence of such a stipulation, 
Elliott’s recourse was to call Detective Hoffman to rebut 
Gragg’s testimony.  In each instance where the trial court 
offered this opinion, Elliott’s counsel did not object or 
otherwise assert that this course of action was not adequate.  
Moreover, Elliott availed himself of that remedy by calling 
 
 
42
Detective Hoffman as his own witness.  Thus, we agree with the 
Commonwealth that Elliott did not preserve for appeal in the 
trial court the issues raised in assignments of error six and 
seven. 
Similarly, we can discern no argument of assignments of 
error eight, nine, and ten within Elliott’s opening appellate 
brief.  The failure to brief an assignment of error constitutes 
a waiver of the argument.  See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 
Va. 307, 318, 541 S.E.2d 872, 880, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 
(2001).  Moreover, as with assignments of error six and seven, 
there does not appear to be any point in the record were Elliott 
requested the trial court to rule that the Commonwealth had 
failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, assuming that Gragg’s 
alleged statement could be considered exculpatory, or sought a 
mistrial on that ground.  Thus, even if argued on brief, these 
assignments of error would be barred in any case by the lack of 
preservation in the trial court. 
In his reply brief, Elliott contends that even if he is 
precluded from raising these issues by his failure to preserve 
them in the trial court, “the ends of justice would demand that 
this Court address [these issues] because the false testimony by 
a government witness strikes at the very heart of the legitimacy 
of the judicial system.”  Even if we were to assume, and indeed 
 
 
43
there is support in the record for making the contention, that 
Gragg fabricated her testimony concerning the May 10, 2001 
written statement, the record is amply clear that the jury was 
aware of this possibility.  Every instance in which it is 
possible, or even probable, that a witness has been untruthful 
with respect to some part of her testimony does not require the 
declaration of a mistrial, the striking of the witness’s 
testimony, or some other intervention on the part of the trial 
court.  To the contrary, one of the principal duties of a jury 
as factfinder is to make judgments on the credibility of the 
witnesses and “[a] factfinder who appreciates a heightened 
possibility of perjury will respond with heightened scrutiny.”  
Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 764 (2000). 
Elliott thoroughly cross-examined Gragg about her claim to 
having signed the May 10, 2001 written statement and called 
Detective Hoffman to rebut that testimony.6  The record reflects 
that in the guilt determination phase of the trial, the question 
of Gragg’s credibility was a central theme of Elliott’s closing 
argument.  Moreover, Elliott consistently maintained at trial 
                     
6 In his post-trial motion for an evidentiary hearing, 
Elliott contended that he wanted to question other police 
detectives who might have knowledge of whether the statement 
existed.  As the trial court indicated in denying that motion, 
Elliott had ample opportunity to call witnesses at trial. 
 
 
44
 
that he did not ascribe any misconduct to the Commonwealth with 
respect to Gragg’s questionable testimony.  Under these 
circumstances, we perceive no reason to invoke the ends of 
justice exception in order to permit Elliott to raise here 
issues that were never presented to or ruled on by the trial 
court. 
For these reasons, we hold that Elliott has waived the 
issues raised in assignments of error six, seven, eight, and ten 
by failing to preserve those issues in the trial court, and that 
he has waived the issue raised in assignment of error nine by 
failing to brief that issue in this appeal. 
Exclusion of Evidence of Third Parties’ 
 Animosity Towards Finch 
 
During the trial, Elliott sought to question Gragg about an 
incident in which Gragg’s husband had brandished a gun at Finch.  
The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection, ruling 
that “unrelated acts of violence would have no bearing on the 
case . . . I don’t see that it’s relevant.”  In his eleventh 
assignment of error, Elliott contends that the trial court erred 
in not permitting him to introduce this evidence.  Elliott 
contends that the evidence was relevant to show that Gragg’s 
husband “had as much motivation as [Elliott] to murder Mr. 
Finch, and the evidence of his prior brandishment of a gun 
 
 
45
against Mr. Finch shows that he was capable of acting on that 
motivation.” 
“Proffered evidence that merely suggests a third party may 
have committed the crime charged is inadmissible; only when the 
proffered evidence tends clearly to point to some other person 
as the guilty party will such proof be admitted.  We have stated 
that a large discretion must and should remain vested in the 
trial court as to the admission of this class of testimony.”  
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 681, 529 S.E.2d 769, 784, 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981 (2000) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  As in Johnson, the evidence proffered 
by Elliott “bore no direct relation to the crimes charged,” but 
tended only to show a prior history of a bad relationship 
between one of the victims and a third party.  Id., 529 S.E.2d 
at 785; cf. Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 766-67, 99 S.E. 
562, 565 (1919) (holding evidence of recent death threats by 
third party admissible).  Accordingly, we hold that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that this evidence 
was irrelevant and inadmissible. 
Elliott also sought to question Detective Hoffman on 
whether he was aware of an allegation by Finch, found in an 
affidavit in the record of Gragg’s and Finch’s custody dispute, 
that Gragg had induced some acquaintances to assault Finch.  The 
 
 
46
trial court ruled that the statement was inadmissible hearsay.  
In his twelfth assignment of error, Elliott contends, citing 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), that the 
trial court should not have “applied [the hearsay rule] 
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.”  Id.  The 
Commonwealth responds that Elliott did not argue for a Chambers 
exception to the hearsay rule in the trial court and, thus, this 
argument is barred by Rule 5:25. 
We need not consider whether Elliott’s generalized 
objection to the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence as 
hearsay was adequate to encompass the argument he now makes on 
appeal.  Even if the due process argument under Chambers were 
cognizable on this appeal, unlike the direct or exculpatory 
proof noted by the United States Supreme Court in that case, 
here the evidence is too tenuous and speculative to have 
relevance to prove that Gragg or some other third party acting 
for her may have committed the murders.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court properly excluded this evidence. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s presentation of 
evidence in the guilt determination phase of the trial, Elliott 
made a motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence “to preserve 
the record.”  However, Elliott did not offer any express 
 
 
47
argument that the Commonwealth had failed to make out a prima 
facie case for capital murder or the other crimes with which he 
was charged.  The trial court denied the motion to strike the 
Commonwealth’s evidence. 
In a post-trial motion for “a new trial,” Elliott contended 
that the evidence was not sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt 
to prove that he committed the murders.7  Elliott contended in 
that motion that the Commonwealth had failed to exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of his innocence.  Elliott further 
contended that even if the evidence were sufficient to prove 
that Elliott committed the murders, the Commonwealth failed to 
prove that Finch’s murder preceded Thrall’s murder.  Though 
citing no authority for the proposition, Elliott contended that 
a capital murder premised upon the “killing of more than one 
person as a part of the same act or transaction” under Code 
§ 18.2-31(7) required proof that the victim of the capital 
murder was killed after some other person had been killed.  
Following argument at the sentencing hearing, the trial court 
denied this motion without comment. 
                     
 
 
48
7 It goes without saying that if the trial court had 
concurred in Elliott’s contention that the evidence had not 
proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law, 
the relief to which he would have been entitled was the setting 
aside of the verdicts and a dismissal of the indictments with 
prejudice, not a new trial. 
In his thirteenth assignment of error, Elliott contends 
that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to 
strike during the guilt determination phase of the trial.  In 
his fourteenth assignment of error, he contends that the trial 
court erred in failing to grant his “motion to set aside the 
verdicts for insufficiency of the evidence (denominated a motion 
for a new trial).”  Elliott failed to expressly relate either of 
these assignments of error to a question presented and in 
reviewing his questions presented, we do not find any that would 
incorporate these issues.  Moreover, we cannot discern any 
argument within his brief that expressly addresses these 
assignments of error.  Accordingly, we hold that Elliott has 
waived these assignments of error.8  See Burns, supra. 
Vileness Aggravating Factor Issues 
In his fifteenth assignment of error, Elliott contends that 
the trial court erred in overruling his motion to have 
Virginia’s capital murder and death penalty statutes declared 
unconstitutional “on the ground that the ‘vileness’ aggravator 
                     
 
 
49
8 In any case, when considering challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal trial, we will not 
disturb the factfinder’s verdict unless it is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 
Va. 124, 146, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 
(1984).  The record of Elliott’s second trial is adequate to 
support the jury’s verdicts convicting him of the murders of 
Thrall and Finch and the related firearm offenses. 
. . . is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied in 
this case and therefore fails to provide meaningful guidance to 
the jury.”  This contention is an amalgam of three arguments 
raised by Elliott in the omnibus motion filed prior to his first 
trial challenging the constitutionality of the capital murder 
and death penalty statutes. 
In his sixteenth assignment of error, Elliott contends that 
“[t]he trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 
narrowing construction of the ‘vileness’ aggravator adopted by 
this Court.”9  Although it is not entirely clear from the 
argument he makes on brief with respect to this assignment of 
error, it would appear that Elliott is asserting the same 
argument as was made in one section of the omnibus motion to 
have the capital murder and death penalty statutes declared 
unconstitutional filed prior to his first trial.  In any event, 
we can find nothing in the record of his second trial to suggest 
                     
 
 
50
9 Elliott does not expressly state how the definition of the 
vileness aggravating factor should have been narrowed or limited 
in jury instructions.  Presumably, Elliott is contending that 
the killing of Thrall lacked one or more of the elements tending 
to show that it involved “torture, depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim.”  Elliott provides no 
authority for his assertion that this Court has “adopted” 
instructions to this effect, although we have permitted trial 
courts the discretion to provide further guidance as to the 
meaning of these terms.  See Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 
446, 323 S.E.2d 554, 564-65 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 
(1985). 
that he sought an instruction giving a “narrowing construction” 
of the vileness aggravator. 
In his seventeenth assignment of error, Elliott contends 
that “[t]he trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to 
instruct the jury to agree unanimously upon a single element of 
‘vileness.’ ”  This argument was also raised in the omnibus 
motion filed prior to Elliott’s first trial and in a separate 
motion filed prior to the first trial seeking a specific jury 
instruction.  Elliott did not proffer an instruction to this 
effect during the penalty determination phase of his second 
trial. 
The Commonwealth asserts that because Elliott did not renew 
the pre-trial motions from his first trial or ask that the trial 
court adopt its prior rulings on those motions in his second 
trial, he failed to preserve these issues for appeal.  The 
Commonwealth further contends that by agreeing to the jury 
instruction defining the vileness aggravating factor in his 
second trial and not proffering any alternative instructions, he 
has waived his claims that the trial court should have given 
“narrowing construction” and “single element of vileness 
unanimity” instructions. 
In his reply brief, Elliott asserts that he was not 
required to reassert his pre-trial motions from his first trial 
 
 
51
because “the rulings in the first trial automatically carry over 
to the second one.”  For the same reason, Elliott contends that 
he was not required to proffer his alternative instructions 
limiting the vileness aggravating factor or requiring a 
unanimous determination of the elements making the crime vile, 
because the trial court had ruled on these issues prior to his 
first trial. 
The cases that Elliott relies upon for his assertion that 
rulings from a mistrial carry over to a subsequent retrial are 
inapposite and distinguishable.  In Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 
1091 (9th Cir. 2002), the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that where a trial court had determined that an 
entrapment instruction was required in a trial that ended in a 
mistrial, the instruction was also required to be given in the 
subsequent retrial where “no additional evidence to the 
contrary” rebutted the prior ruling.  Id. at 1098.  Thus, 
Bradley does not stand for the proposition that all rulings of a 
trial court in a prior mistrial carry over to a subsequent trial 
but, rather, that the rationale underlying a particular ruling 
in the first trial had been correct and should have been applied 
to identical circumstances in the retrial. 
In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating 
Co., 538 F.Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ohio 1981), the trial court did 
 
 
52
observe that “a mistrial does not affect or invalidate any of 
the pre-trial proceedings in the case.”  Id. at 1330.  However, 
that statement is made in an opinion addressing a motion to have 
the pre-trial rulings from a mistrial adopted in the retrial.  
Moreover, the rulings at issue were those in orders disposing of 
discrete claims within a complex litigation, not rulings on 
issues of law related to matters that would arise during the 
retrial.  In commenting on the rationale of the Cleveland 
Electric decision, the federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit has opined that the trial court is not bound in a 
subsequent trial by the rulings of a prior mistrial, so much as 
it has the discretion to “recognize and enforce prior rulings 
. . . but also retains the power to reconsider previously 
decided issues as they arise in the context of a new trial.”  
United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1990). 
We concur in the view expressed by the Commonwealth in the 
present case that when a criminal case ends in a mistrial, the 
rulings made by the trial court prior to or during the aborted 
trial do not automatically carry over to a subsequent retrial.  
Thus, a defendant may not rely upon objections made at an 
aborted trial to preserve issues for appeal following his 
conviction in a subsequent trial.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 1997) (“objections made at 
 
 
53
the aborted trial have no bearing on the retrial, as the two are 
entirely separate affairs”).  Similarly, a defendant may not 
assert that rulings made on pre-trial motions prior to a 
mistrial are binding upon the trial court in a subsequent trial 
unless the trial court adopts those rulings on its own motion or 
in addressing a motion of one or both of the parties.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Oakey, 853 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033 (1989).  In the absence of a ruling 
in the second trial adopting the rulings of the aborted trial, 
the defendant is required to renew his motions with specificity 
in order to preserve the record of the trial court’s rulings and 
the defendant’s objections thereto for any subsequent appeal of 
the retrial. 
Elliott does not assert that the trial court adopted its 
prior rulings for purposes of his second trial, and we have not 
been directed to any place in the record where such was done or 
requested.  Accordingly, we hold that under these circumstances 
Elliott is barred from raising the issues asserted in this 
appeal in assignments of error fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen.  
Additionally, we also agree that Elliott’s failure to proffer in 
his second trial alternative instructions limiting the 
definition of the vileness aggravating factor or requiring 
unanimity on the elements of vileness acts as a waiver of the 
 
 
54
claim that the trial court should have given such instructions 
to the jury.10 
Statutory Review 
Elliott’s eighteenth and nineteenth assignments of error 
merely restate the elements of the statutory review of any death 
sentence mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C).  Accordingly, we will 
combine the mandatory review of Elliott’s death sentence with 
our discussion of the issues raised by Elliott in his 
assignments of error. 
                     
 
 
55
10 We note further that, as framed within the omnibus 
pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of Virginia’s 
capital murder and death penalty statutes, Elliott’s contention 
that the vileness aggravating factor is vague is a reassertion 
of an argument previously rejected by this Court on numerous 
occasions.  See, e.g. Wolfe, 265 Va. at 208, 576 S.E.2d at 480 
and cases cited therein.  Shortly before Elliott’s first trial 
commenced, the United States Supreme Court released its opinion 
in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  In briefing his 
argument in this appeal that the vileness aggravating factor is 
unconstitutionally vague, Elliott for the first time asserts 
that Ring somehow implicates our prior consideration of this 
issue.  Elliott’s failure to argue the application of Ring in 
the trial court, despite the fact that nine months elapsed 
between that opinion’s release and the commencement of his 
second trial, not only constitutes a waiver of that issue on 
appeal, but demonstrates the necessity of prohibiting a 
defendant from attempting to rely upon rulings from a prior 
aborted trial.  In any event, we have already addressed the 
claim that Ring affects our prior consideration of 
constitutional issues in death penalty cases and have determined 
that “nothing . . . in Ring suggests that the Court intended to 
revisit broader issues of due process protections afforded in 
the penalty determination phase of all capital murder trials.”  
Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 137, 590 S.E.2d 537, 555 
(2004). 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) requires that we determine whether 
the jury imposed the sentence of death under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.  Elliott 
makes no particularized argument that the jury’s verdict was not 
the product of a reasoned and dispassionate deliberation.  Nor 
does our review of the record in this case disclose that the 
jury failed to give fair consideration to all the evidence both 
in favor and in mitigation of the death sentence, or was 
otherwise improperly influenced in favor of imposing the death 
penalty.  Accordingly, we hold that the sentence of death was 
not imposed under passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor. 
With respect to the consideration “[w]hether the sentence 
of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed 
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,” 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2), Elliott contends that “[t]he Commonwealth 
has never imposed such a sentence upon a man with as long and 
accomplished a record of service to his country as” Elliott.  He 
further contends that “this case lacks the characteristics that 
normally distinguish the cases in which the death penalty is 
imposed based upon multiple homicides and vileness from those in 
which juries choose to impose life imprisonment.” 
During the penalty determination phase of the trial, the 
jury heard testimony recounting Elliott’s service as a soldier 
 
 
56
and non-commissioned officer in, and later as a civilian 
employee of, the United States Army.  The jury also heard 
evidence throughout the course of the trial that Elliott 
betrayed his wife of twenty-three years, pursuing a former 
prostitute and squandering hundreds of thousands of dollars on 
this illicit relationship.  The evidence showed that Elliott 
murdered two innocent people in a brutal and premeditated 
manner, showing no remorse for and purposefully seeking to 
conceal his crimes.  The murder of Thrall was particularly 
heinous in that it appears she was a victim of opportunity, 
killed while her young children were nearby and simply because 
she was present in the home with Finch or perhaps because she 
saw and could have identified Elliott. 
The jury could reasonably have concluded from Elliott’s 
actions in his secret relationship with Gragg that he had 
renounced the values he purported to support and follow in his 
public life.  Faced with the incongruent reality of Elliott’s 
two lives, the jury was well within its province to determine 
that the mitigating value of Elliott’s years of service in the 
armed forces did not outweigh his culpability for the death of 
Thrall under the circumstances of that murder. 
Because of the statutory directive that we compare this 
case with “similar cases,” we have focused on cases in which an 
 
 
57
individual was murdered as part of the same act or transaction 
as another killing and the death penalty was imposed upon a 
finding of the vileness aggravating factor.  However, our 
proportionality review includes all capital murder cases 
presented to this Court for review and is not limited to 
selected cases.  Even though no two capital murder cases are 
identical, we are confident that, given the heinousness 
associated with the murder of Thrall, the sentence of death 
imposed on Elliott is neither excessive nor disproportionate to 
sentences generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in this 
Commonwealth for crimes of a similar nature considering the 
crime and this defendant.  See, e.g., Hudson v. Commonwealth, 
267 Va. 29, 590 S.E.2d 362 (2004); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 723, 529 S.E.2d 570, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000); Kasi 
v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 508 S.E.2d 57 (1998), cert. 
denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999); Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 
89, 372 S.E.2d 377 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009 (1989). 
In his twentieth assignment of error, Elliott contends that 
“[t]he trial court erred in sentencing appellant to death.”  
Elliott purports to relate this assignment of error to the 
questions presented addressing his challenges to the 
constitutionality of the vileness aggravating factor and the 
mandatory review of his death sentence.  Within the sections of 
 
 
58
 
 
59
his brief addressing those questions presented, we can discern 
no particularized argument that the trial court erred in 
imposing the sentence of death in accord with the jury’s 
verdict.  Thus, we conclude that this assignment of error is 
merely an assertion of general or cumulative error in the 
conduct of the trial.  We do not consider such generalized 
assertions of error. 
CONCLUSION 
Having found no error below and perceiving no other reason 
to commute or set aside the sentence of death, we will affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed.