Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JOSEPH CARL WEEDER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120107
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant, 
v 
No. 120107 
JOSEPH CARL WEEDER, 
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee. 
PER CURIAM 
This case presents the question whether a driver 
charged with second-degree murder following an auto-related 
death 
must 
receive 
a 
negligent 
homicide 
instruction. 
Following People v McIntosh, 400 Mich 1; 252 NW2d 779 
(1977), the Court of Appeals answered yes. 
We overrule 
McIntosh and remand to the Court of Appeals for further 
review. 
Defendant 
seeks 
to 
appeal 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
affirmance of two convictions for operating a vehicle while 
 
  
 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor and thereby 
causing death, MCL 257.625(4); two convictions for first­
degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 750.479a(5); and one 
conviction for operating a motor vehicle while license 
suspended, subsequent offense, MCL 257.904(3)(b). Defendant 
was 
also 
convicted 
on 
two 
counts 
of 
involuntary 
manslaughter, MCL 750.321, which convictions the Court of 
Appeals reversed. 
The prosecutor seeks to appeal the 
reversal of the involuntary manslaughter convictions. 
The 
significant question presented is whether defendant was 
entitled to an instruction on negligent homicide, MCL 
750.324, as the Court of Appeals concluded. 
Because the 
Court of Appeals relied on People v McIntosh, supra, which 
we believe does not properly construe MCL 750.325, we vacate 
the Court of Appeals reversal of defendant's involuntary 
manslaughter convictions and remand the case to that Court 
for further consideration in light of this opinion. 
We are 
not persuaded that the questions presented by defendant in 
his application merit further review; therefore, except as 
discussed below, defendant's application is denied. 
I 
While intoxicated, defendant fled from a police officer 
who was attempting to effectuate a traffic stop. 
Defendant 
fled at high speeds, at times through residential areas, 
failed to stop at a stop sign and a traffic signal, almost 
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struck two vehicles, and eventually struck another vehicle, 
killing its two occupants. 
Defendant was charged with two 
counts of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; two counts of 
operating under the influence and causing death; two counts 
of first-degree fleeing and eluding; and operating a motor 
vehicle with a suspended license, second or subsequent 
offense. 
In connection with the second-degree murder charge, 
defendant 
requested 
jury 
instructions 
on 
involuntary 
manslaughter and negligent homicide, MCL 750.324. The trial 
court instructed on involuntary manslaughter as defendant 
requested, but refused to instruct on negligent homicide 
because the court did not view the evidence in the case as 
supporting that instruction. 
The jury convicted defendant 
of two counts of involuntary manslaughter rather than 
second-degree murder, and otherwise convicted defendant as 
charged. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant's lead issue 
on appeal that he was denied a fair trial because of the 
trial court's refusal to instruct on negligent homicide. 
The Court found McIntosh, to be dispositive.1
 The Court 
1 The Court of Appeals quoted the following from People
v McIntosh: 
“[I]f the jurors are or should be permitted
to consider manslaughter committed with a motor
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reversed defendant's manslaughter convictions and ordered 
that they be replaced with negligent homicide convictions, 
while giving the prosecutor the option of retrying defendant 
on the manslaughter charges. The Court rejected the rest of 
defendant's claims on appeal. 
II 
In this appeal we are concerned with the construction 
of MCL 750.325, which reads: 
The crime of negligent homicide shall be
deemed to be included within every crime of 
manslaughter charged to have been committed in
the operation of any vehicle, and in any case
where a defendant is charged with manslaughter
committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the
jury shall find the defendant not guilty of the
crime of manslaughter, it may render a verdict of
guilty of negligent homicide. 
The proper construction of a statute is an issue that 
we review de novo. 
People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304; 651 
NW2d 906 (2002). 
Our goal in construing a statute is "to 
ascertain 
and 
give 
effect 
to 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature." 
People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 
275 (2002). 
If the statute's language is clear and 
unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its 
plain meaning and we enforce the statute as written. 
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). In 
vehicle, then, pursuant to MCLA 750.325; MSA 
28.557, they also should be permitted to consider
negligent homicide.” 
[Unpublished opinion per
curiam, issued July 31, 2001 (Docket No. 217454),
quoting McIntosh, at 7]. 
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other words, when statutory language is unambiguous, 
judicial construction is not required or permitted because 
the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it 
plainly expressed. Id. 
III 
We find MCL 750.325 clear and unambiguous. The statute 
plainly deems the crime of negligent homicide (MCL 750.324) 
to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to 
have been committed in the operation of any vehicle. 
Further, the statute clearly and unambiguously allows for 
the conviction of negligent homicide in any case in which a 
defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in the 
operation of any vehicle. 
The Legislature twice uses the 
word "charged." 
Accordingly, for the statute to apply, a 
defendant must be charged with manslaughter committed in 
connection with the operation of a vehicle. 
Here, however, 
defendant was not charged with manslaughter. 
Defendant was 
charged with second-degree murder. 
It follows that MCL 
750.325 does not apply in this case.2 
To the extent our conclusion is inconsistent with 
McIntosh, we overrule that case. 
McIntosh concluded that 
because the jury had been given instructions on manslaughter 
2 We recognize that we reach the same result reached in
People v Jordan, 347 Mich 347; 79 NW2d 873 (1956), which
was overruled in McIntosh, supra. 
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as a lesser offense of murder, the jury should also have 
been instructed on negligent homicide under MCL 750.325. 
The McIntosh Court reached this conclusion by concluding 
that the "better view" of MCL 750.325 "is that manslaughter 
committed with a motor vehicle does not have to be formally 
pled in an information charging murder in order for the jury 
to 
consider 
negligent 
homicide 
as 
a 
possible 
lesser 
offense." 
400 Mich 7. 
In light of the clear and 
unambiguous use of the word “charged” in the statute, it was 
unnecessary for the McIntosh Court to consider what it 
thought was the “better view.” 
However, we agree with 
McIntosh to the extent that it held that a defendant charged 
with the crime of murder is entitled to an instruction on 
manslaughter if there is the necessary evidentiary support 
for the instruction. 
Although not based on McIntosh, our 
decision in People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527; 664 NW2d 685 
(2003), arrived at the same result. 
IV 
This is not the end of the analysis, however. 
The 
result reached in McIntosh will still obtain if negligent 
homicide, MCL 750.324, is an inferior, or necessarily 
included lesser, offense of the charged offense of second­
degree murder, and if there is the necessary evidentiary 
support for an instruction on negligent homicide. 
People v 
Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); MCL 768.32(1). 
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The Court of Appeals did not reach these issues because it 
relied on McIntosh. Accordingly, we vacate the Court of 
Appeals reversal of the manslaughter convictions, and we 
remand this case to that Court for reconsideration of 
defendant's argument in light of this opinion and the 
principles established in Cornell. If, on remand, the Court 
of Appeals concludes that an instruction on negligent 
homicide was warranted in this case, it must additionally 
consider, pursuant to Cornell, whether the trial court 
committed error requiring reversal in failing to give the 
instruction.3 
V 
The foregoing discussion resolves the prosecutor's 
cross-appeal. 
In 
addition 
to 
that 
appeal, 
we 
have 
considered the issues in defendant's appeal. 
Except as 
discussed below, we conclude that defendant's arguments lack 
merit for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals. 
If on remand the Court of Appeals affirms defendant's 
convictions for involuntary manslaughter, it must also 
consider defendant's challenge to his sentences of 15 to 22½ 
3 The circuit court considered defendant's request for
an instruction on negligent homicide, but determined that
the evidence did not support such an instruction. 
We note 
that an appellate court must find substantial evidence in
support of a requested instruction that was not given in
order to reverse. See Cornell, supra at 365-366. 
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years, which the Court did not consider in light of its 
reversal of the manslaughter convictions. 
Further, because 
the Court rejected defendant's supplemental argument for a 
new trial (based on new evidence involving a witness's 
testimony in a subsequent civil proceeding), in part because 
it reversed defendant's manslaughter convictions, this issue 
should be reconsidered on remand if the Court of Appeals 
affirms defendant's manslaughter convictions. 
VI 
The Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant's 
manslaughter convictions is vacated, and this matter is 
remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of 
defendant's manslaughter convictions consistent with this 
opinion. 
Defendant's remaining convictions and sentences 
are affirmed, except as otherwise indicated in this opinion. 
MCR 7.302(G)(1). 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
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_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant, 
v 
No. 120107 
JOSEPH CARL WEEDER, 
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I would not decide this case by an opinion per curiam. 
Because 
this 
case 
offers 
the 
opportunity 
to 
address 
a 
jurisprudentially significant issue, I prefer to grant leave to 
appeal so that we might avail ourselves of full briefing and 
argument by the parties. 
Preferences aside, however, I would limit the Court of 
Appeals reconsideration of defendant’s argument to the issue 
whether there was the necessary evidentiary support for the 
negligent homicide instruction. The majority once again extends 
the obiter dictum from People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 
127 (2002). 
I remain committed to the view that, when 
requested, a jury may be instructed on offenses inferior to the 
charged offense if such an instruction is supported by the 
evidence. 
People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 549; 664 NW2d 685 
(2003) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring). 
Because the trial court 
previously determined that the evidence did not support a 
  
 
 
 
negligent homicide instruction, the only relevant inquiry is 
whether such a determination was erroneous. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly