Title: Lambrix v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-1845, SC11-1845, SC12-6
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2013

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1845 
____________ 
 
CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1845 
____________ 
 
CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-6 
____________ 
 
CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
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STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 27, 2013] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have consolidated all of Cary Michael Lambrix’s pending cases before 
this Court for the purposes of this opinion.  The current proceedings involve the 
summary denial of Lambrix’s fourth successive motion for postconviction relief 
(SC10-1845) and the summary denial of his fifth successive motion for 
postconviction relief (SC12-6), both filed on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence.  In addition, Lambrix filed a separate petition for a writ of prohibition, 
challenging the postconviction court’s denial of his motion to disqualify the judge 
(SC11-1845).   
We conclude that both Lambrix’s fourth and fifth successive motions for 
postconviction relief are completely devoid of merit, as is his separate petition for 
a writ of prohibition.  Further, as to Lambrix’s specific claim that the 
postconviction court abused its discretion in not allowing him to proceed without a 
lawyer, Lambrix’s pattern of conduct in postconviction proceedings alone 
demonstrates why Lambrix’s request for self-representation was properly denied.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
 
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As we recognized when reviewing the denial of relief as to Lambrix’s third 
successive postconviction motion, “[t]his death case, which has been in the judicial 
system for a substantial period of time, has a lengthy procedural history.”  Lambrix 
v. State, 39 So. 3d 260, 262 (Fla. 2010).  With these most recent filings, we 
observe that the lengthy procedural history is in part due to the continued attempts 
by Lambrix to file pleadings both with the postconviction court and with this Court 
that do not establish any viable claim pertaining to his guilt or the validity of the 
death penalty imposed, and his failure to provide any facts that would undermine 
confidence in the outcome of either the guilt or penalty phase of his trial.  
Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder 
and was sentenced to death for the 1983 murders of Clarence Moore and Aleisha 
Bryant, and we affirmed Lambrix’s convictions and sentences of death in 1986.  
Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143, 1148 (Fla. 1986).  In our latest opinion denying 
Lambrix postconviction relief, we detailed Lambrix’s extensive history of 
successive postconviction motions, all of which have been rejected as lacking in 
merit.  See Lambrix, 39 So. 3d at 264-65.  In addition, up to the present, Lambrix 
has filed numerous extraordinary writ petitions, both through counsel and pro se, 
which this Court has either denied or dismissed.  See, e.g., Lambrix v. State, No. 
SC10-1517 (Fla. June 16, 2011) (unpublished order denying petition for writ of 
mandamus or prohibition); Lambrix v. State, 944 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2006) 
 
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(dismissing petition for writ of mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 900 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 
2005) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 766 So. 2d 
221 (Fla. 2000) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus as moot); Lambrix v. 
State, 727 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1998) (denying petition for writ of prohibition); 
Lambrix v. Reese, 705 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1998) (denying petition for writ of 
mandamus). 
Not only has Lambrix initiated numerous successive postconviction 
proceedings and petitions for extraordinary relief in this Court, but he has also filed 
successive petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts.  In 2010, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Lambrix failed to make a prima facie 
showing for filing his second federal habeas petition because he failed to show that 
the underlying factual predicate for any of the twelve claims presented in that 
proceeding could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence.  In re 
Lambrix, 624 F.3d 1355, 1368 (11th Cir. 2010). 
Turning to the current proceedings, Lambrix has three cases currently 
pending before this Court.  In case number SC10-1845, Lambrix’s appeal from the 
denial of his fourth successive motion for postconviction relief asserts that he is 
entitled to relief because two hairs on the murder weapon, which was wrapped in a 
shirt, are consistent with a key State witness, who helped him dispose of the bodies 
and the weapon.  In case number SC12-6, the appeal of the denial of his fifth 
 
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successive motion for postconviction relief that was also filed on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence, Lambrix contends that he recently discovered the 
whereabouts of his ex-wife, who could testify in greater detail regarding an injury 
that Lambrix suffered while he was in the army’s basic training, and that the effect 
of this injury should have been discussed in greater detail during his penalty phase.  
Finally, in case number SC11-1845, Lambrix filed a separate petition for a writ of 
prohibition, challenging the postconviction court’s denial of his motion to 
disqualify the judge—a claim that is also raised on appeal from the denial of his 
fourth and fifth successive motions for postconviction relief in both case number 
SC10-1845 and case number SC12-6.  We address each proceeding separately 
below, concluding that all of these proceedings are utterly without merit.  
ANALYSIS 
SC10-1845: Fourth Successive Postconviction Proceeding 
In the appeal of the postconviction court’s denial of his fourth successive 
motion for postconviction relief, case number SC10-1845, Lambrix asserts that his 
private investigator discovered new records belonging to the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement (FDLE) and that information within these records appears to 
demonstrate that there were two hairs found on the murder weapon that may match 
Frances Smith—a key State witness who was at the general location when the 
murders occurred and who helped to bury the bodies and hide the murder weapon 
 
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(a tire iron).  According to Lambrix, if the only biological materials found on the 
tire iron belong to Smith, this supports his theory raised in prior postconviction 
proceedings that Smith was involved in a sexual affair with State Attorney 
Investigator Bob Daniels and helped to fabricate the murder weapon.  Specifically, 
Lambrix raises the following claims: (1) he should be entitled to DNA testing of 
these hairs; (2) he is entitled to relief based on the newly discovered lab notes from 
the FDLE and evidence pertaining to the hairs and the shirt that were found with 
the murder weapon; and (3) the State committed a Brady/Giglio1 violation when it 
failed to provide a complete set of FDLE lab notes and records to Lambrix.  
Lambrix also asserts that he was denied the opportunity to proceed pro se during 
the postconviction proceedings before the postconviction court, despite the fact 
that the court found him to be competent; that the judge erred in denying his 
motion to disqualify; and that section 119.19, Florida Statutes (2012), and Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional.2
                                         
 
1.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150 (1972). 
 
2.  As this Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of section 
119.19 and rule 3.852, we deny Lambrix’s constitutional challenge to section 
119.19 and rule 3.852 without further discussion.  See, e.g., Wyatt v. State, 71 
So. 3d 86, 111 (Fla. 2011) (denying claim that these provisions unconstitutionally 
restrict a defendant’s right to public-records access because they impermissibly 
mandate that his demand for public records not be “overly broad or unduly 
burdensome” and that he make his own search for records).  
 
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As to the substance of the allegations, Lambrix attempts to resurrect his 
allegations from prior postconviction proceedings that there was a conspiracy 
against him because the State’s main witness, Frances Smith, allegedly had a one-
time sexual encounter with the State’s investigator at some point.  Lambrix now 
claims that the two conspired to fabricate evidence for trial.  However, he fails to 
recognize that this Court already rejected his allegation that an affair occurred and 
concluded that, even if it had occurred, no prejudice was established because, 
based on the testimony presented at prior postconviction proceedings, the alleged 
incident occurred during Lambrix’s second trial and Smith’s testimony at the 
second trial was substantially similar to testimony that she had previously given.  
Lambrix, 39 So. 3d at 269-70.  In addition, this Court further detailed the 
significant evidence against Lambrix, including his own testimony during an 
evidentiary hearing where even Lambrix acknowledged that he was present and 
had “struck one of the victims using a tire iron, although he denied that he intended 
to kill either victim.”  Id.
 
In the first claim we address on appeal, Lambrix seeks DNA testing on the 
hairs pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.  The postconviction 
court denied this request, finding that Lambrix’s allegations were facially or 
legally insufficient because “he has failed to demonstrate how testing the hair[s] 
would exonerate him or mitigate his sentence,” particularly since Lambrix asserted 
 at 273.     
 
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he acted in self-defense and his theory of the hairs did not disprove any theory in 
this case.  We review this ruling de novo.  See Van Poyck v. State, 961 So. 2d 220, 
224 (Fla. 2007). 
 
In reviewing the postconviction court’s denial of the request in light of 
Lambrix’s allegations, we affirm the denial of relief.  As this Court has recognized, 
“[i]t is the defendant’s burden to explain, with reference to specific facts about the 
crime and the items requested to be tested, how the DNA testing will exonerate the 
defendant of the crime or will mitigate the defendant’s sentence.”  Scott v. State, 
46 So. 3d 529, 533 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 1259, 1265 
(Fla. 2004)).  Lambrix has completely failed to explain how finding Smith’s hair 
on the murder weapon would help exonerate him or even cast Smith’s testimony 
into doubt.  Smith was at the murder scene after the murders occurred.  According 
to her trial testimony, Lambrix was carrying the tire iron when he returned to the 
trailer alone and admitted to Smith that he killed both Bryant and Moore.  Smith 
then helped to dispose of the bodies and the weapon.  Thus, it would not be 
unexpected that her hairs could also be on the weapon, as she was present at the 
scene and helped to hide the weapon.  As this Court has previously held, a trial 
court does not err in denying a motion for DNA testing where the defendant cannot 
show that there is a reasonable probability that the absence or presence of DNA at 
 
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a crime scene would exonerate him or lessen his sentence.  Scott, 46 So. 3d at 533.  
Accordingly, we deny this claim.  
In his second claim, Lambrix asserts that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his newly discovered evidence claim regarding the FDLE notes and 
evidence pertaining to the hairs and the shirt that were found with the murder 
weapon.  We disagree because this evidence does not meet the test for newly 
discovered evidence.   
To set aside a conviction based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant 
must show the following: (1) the asserted facts “must have been unknown by the 
trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that 
defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence”; and 
(2) the newly discovered evidence “must be of such nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Wyatt v. State, 78 So. 3d 512, 523 (Fla. 2011) 
(quoting Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998)).  In reviewing the record 
and Lambrix’s allegations, we conclude that Lambrix has failed to show that this 
evidence would probably produce an acquittal or would mitigate his sentence.  
Lambrix’s identity was never genuinely disputed in this case since Lambrix 
admitted that he was present at the murder scene and asserted that he merely acted 
in self-defense.  As the postconviction court aptly recognized, establishing that the 
hairs came from someone else does not disprove any theory in this case “because it 
 
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is impossible to establish when or how the hairs may have become attached to the 
murder weapon or the t-shirt it was wrapped in.”  Lambrix is therefore not entitled 
to relief on this claim. 
In his third claim, Lambrix contends that the State violated Brady and Giglio 
by failing to disclose certain FDLE documents pertaining to these hairs.  The 
postconviction court denied relief.  We affirm the denial because Lambrix has 
completely failed to allege how any of the three Brady prongs have been met, 
including how the documents could constitute favorable evidence in any manner.  
Likewise, he has also failed to allege how the facts he points to would constitute a 
Giglio violation.  Because Lambrix’s claims as to both a Brady violation and a 
Giglio violation rely entirely on speculation and conjecture, we deny relief.    
We now address in turn the two other issues raised in Lambrix’s appeal of 
the denial of his fourth successive motion for postconviction relief.  Initially, 
Lambrix challenges the denial of his motion to disqualify the postconviction judge, 
alleging that a staff attorney who worked for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court 
represented Lambrix at some time in the past.  Because of the nature of these 
allegations, we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, which was held.3
                                         
 
3.  Upon initial review of these allegations, this Court relinquished 
jurisdiction, stating as follows: 
 
 
In his motion, among other claims, [Lambrix] alleged that on May 27, 
2010, Lambrix learned that the staff attorney who was personally 
 
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We reject Lambrix’s argument that the postconviction court was obligated to 
accept the truth of the allegations, as we already determined that the trial judge in 
this case was a successor judge.  In reviewing an order denying a successive 
motion to disqualify, this Court evaluates “whether the record clearly refutes the 
successor judge’s decision to deny the motion.”  Kokal v. State, 901 So. 2d 766, 
774 (Fla. 2005) (quoting  Pinfield v. State, 710 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1998)).   
The allegations against the postconviction judge arose out of the claim that 
one of the staff attorneys working for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court had 
                                                                                                                                   
participating in the case had previously been hired by Lambrix to 
conduct certain investigations in Lambrix’s case and that she had 
received monetary payment in exchange for information and legal 
advice that she gave to him.  CCRC subsequently adopted the motion.  
The judge denied this motion as being untimely, and that even if the 
court had treated it as a new motion to disqualify, it would be legally 
insufficient. 
 
The allegations in the motion, if true, raise significant concerns.  
Therefore, upon review of the assertions contained in the motion to 
disqualify, the Court has determined that it should relinquish 
jurisdiction in this case for further consideration.  Pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(g), “a successor judge may rule 
on the truth of the facts alleged in support of the motion.”   
Accordingly, we hereby temporarily relinquish jurisdiction to 
the lower tribunal for thirty days for the narrow purpose of addressing 
the motion to disqualify.   
 
Lambrix v. State, No. SC10-1845, Order at 1 (Fla. Sup. Ct. order filed Jan. 4, 
2012).  Justice Canady dissented from this order and would have denied the motion 
as untimely. 
 
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previously assisted Lambrix on his case.  At the evidentiary hearing, however, 
Lambrix failed to present any evidence that the staff attorney in question ever 
assisted Lambrix in challenging his criminal convictions.  At the most, the 
evidence established that the staff attorney may have attempted to solicit general 
legal work outside of her employment with the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court 
and may have answered a general inquiry about how an inmate could obtain 
cholesterol medication in the prison system.   
After listening to the testimony and evaluating the credibility of the 
witnesses, the postconviction court stated as follows: 
The significant concerns raised by the Defendant’s allegations 
regarding the Staff Attorney are refuted or unsupported by the 
evidence and testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing.  
Although third parties alleged to have been indirectly working on the 
Defendant’s behalf, namely Hickey and Pavelchak, suggest that the 
Staff Attorney provided legal advice for which she was paid, these 
allegations were refuted by the testimony of the Staff Attorney. 
 
A persistent theme throughout the Defendant’s motion is the 
allegation that the Staff Attorney identified during the May 2010 case 
management conference previously worked for or served as an 
Assistant State Attorney.  The only evidence offered on this issue was 
the uncontroverted testimony of the Staff Attorney unequivocally 
stating that she never worked for the State Attorney’s Office.  
Accordingly, this alleged definitive fact extensively relied upon by 
Defendant in support of his motion is unfounded. 
 
. . . .  
Even though the Defendant alleges in his motion that the Staff 
Attorney had conducted certain investigations into his case, the 
testimony of Pavelchak suggests, at most, only an inquiry into a 
limited issue unrelated to the Defendant’s criminal case, namely an 
issue that the Defendant was having with the DOC regarding the 
administration of his cholesterol medication.  Notably, Defense 
 
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Exhibit 2 reflects only that which appears to be a cursory response to 
a procedural question as to how to compel the DOC to provide an 
unidentified inmate with medication.  Pavelchak testified that she sent 
a $20.00 money order to the Staff Attorney, but, even though the 
Defendant represents in his motion that he can produce copies of 
money receipts, no such money receipts were presented nor offered 
into evidence. 
 
The Staff Attorney testified that she did not recognize the e-
mails reflected in Defense Exhibits 1 or 2 and never received a money 
order from Pavelchak.  The Staff Attorney further affirmatively 
testified that she had never worked for the Defendant, had never taken 
any legal work on behalf of the Defendant, and had never been 
contacted by anyone asking her to work on the Defendant’s case. 
 
 
The court then found that the claim regarding the staff attorney for the Twentieth 
Judicial Circuit Court was unsupported.   
We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of the motion, as the record does 
not clearly refute the successor judge’s decision to deny the motion.  See Kokal, 
901 So. 2d at 774.  Moreover, even if the e-mails are taken as accurate, the e-mails 
themselves do not establish that the staff attorney was working on or had ever 
worked on Lambrix’s criminal case.  Therefore, these e-mails would not mandate 
that a judge working at the same circuit court would need to disqualify herself 
from the case.  Thus, Lambrix is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
In the last issue on appeal pertaining to the fourth successive postconviction 
motion, Lambrix claims that the postconviction court erred in denying his request 
to represent himself.  We disagree and affirm that denial as well.  Lambrix initially 
filed a pro se motion to have his counsel discharged in 2009, well over a decade 
 
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after his initial postconviction motion was denied.  A hearing was held on July 31, 
2009, where Lambrix presented detailed complaints to Judge Thomas Corbin, 
alleging that his CCRC-appointed counsel was ineffective during the investigation 
relating to the newly discovered FDLE lab documents and failed to file certain 
claims in a timely manner after discovering them.  At the time, Lambrix asserted 
that he was seeking the appointment of alternative counsel and had “no intention of 
waiving the statutory right to postconviction counsel before the proceedings in the 
lower court.”  Judge Corbin denied the motion in open court, finding that CCRC 
was rendering competent representation and that there was no basis to discharge 
counsel.  On September 1, 2009, Lambrix filed a pro se motion to disqualify Judge 
Corbin, which was denied, and on October 7, 2009, the Chief Judge of the 
Twentieth Judicial Circuit removed Judge Corbin and reassigned the case to Judge 
Christine Greider, who is the current postconviction judge presiding. 
In September 2009, Lambrix filed a civil complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against numerous individuals, including CCRC, the Clerk of the Florida Supreme 
Court, and then-Chief Justice Quince.  In this pleading, he alleged in part that his 
counsel was involved in a conspiracy against him in an effort to obstruct his 
constitutional rights.  Defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw from 
representing Lambrix in ongoing postconviction proceedings, stating that based on 
Lambrix’s pro se civil complaint, he had a conflict of interest.  Lambrix filed a pro 
 
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se motion, seeking the right to waive postconviction counsel and represent himself.  
The court held a hearing, with Lambrix appearing telephonically.  During the 
hearing, Lambrix stated that he wanted to represent himself, that he understood the 
consequences, and that he had no mental or physical disabilities that would hinder 
him from representing himself.  When he was asked whether he understood that if 
he waived postconviction counsel, it was not guaranteed that postconviction 
counsel would be reappointed later, Lambrix asserted that he understood this and 
discussed opinions from this Court in detail regarding his right to represent 
himself.  He stated as follows: 
I just want, I think that needs to be clear, because in the event 
that a death warrant is signed in the future on me, or in the event that 
circumstances that I’m not aware of today develop to the point that I 
can no longer adequately pursue these postconviction claims, then 
they [sic] will be my intent to assert my right to post-conviction 
representation
 
. 
(Emphasis added.)  At the time of that hearing, Lambrix did not appear to have 
competency issues.4
                                         
 
4.  Although Lambrix did not appear to have any competency issues at the 
time of the hearing, he appears to have since been consumed by thoughts of wide-
reaching conspiracy and has filed many more pro se pleadings to this effect.  In 
case number SC10-1845 alone, Lambrix has filed the following pro se pleadings: 
(1) pro se motion to stay proceedings pending this Court’s disposition of pending 
petition for writ of mandamus/prohibition; (2) pro se renewed motion to 
unequivocally waive postconviction representation as a means of discharging 
incompetent collateral counsel acting under substantial conflict of interest; and (3) 
pro se motion to compel court to monitor performance of counsel in capital case in 
which appellant previously asserted and unequivocally waived collateral 
   
 
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The postconviction court subsequently denied Lambrix’s request to 
discharge counsel and proceed without legal representation.  We conclude that the 
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lambrix’s right to 
represent himself.   
Lambrix possesses no constitutional right to proceed unrepresented at this 
stage of the postconviction proceedings.  While a defendant has a constitutional 
right to self-representation and self-determination at trial, these rights do not 
continue to the same degree after the conviction.  As the United States Supreme 
Court clarified in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 154 
(2000), a convicted defendant does not have a federal constitutional right of self-
representation on an initial appeal of right.  In other words, a defendant’s federal 
constitutional right to self-representation ends when he or she has been convicted.  
Likewise, after the conviction is affirmed on direct appeal, a defendant’s right to 
self-determination must be balanced with this Court’s obligations to ensure 
reliability, fairness, and uniformity in the imposition of the death penalty.  See 
generally Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 364 (Fla. 2001).   
We emphasize that a defendant continues to have a right to self-
determination during postconviction proceedings, and this Court will not force 
                                                                                                                                   
representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).  His counsel now 
alleges that competency may be an issue in this case and requested the Court to 
remand for competency proceedings, if Lambrix is permitted to waive counsel.  
 
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counsel on a defendant who does not seek to challenge his or her convictions after 
the convictions have been affirmed, so long as the defendant is competent to make 
that decision and the waiver is knowing and voluntary.  James v. State, 974 So. 2d 
365, 367 (Fla. 2008); Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482, 484-85 (Fla. 1993).  
Any right of self-determination and self-representation during postconviction 
proceedings, however, does not outweigh this Court’s solemn duty to ensure that 
the death penalty is imposed in a fair, consistent, and reliable manner, and to 
guarantee this Court’s administrative responsibility to minimize delays in the 
postconviction process.  See Gordon v. State, 75 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 2011) 
(holding that based on these policy considerations, death-sentenced appellants may 
not appear pro se when appealing the denial of relief in postconviction 
proceedings).  In addition, a defendant does not have the right to disrupt the 
judicial system, frustrate the administration of justice, or prevent his or her case 
from being litigated.  See, e.g., McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 868 (Fla. 2011) 
(“[T]he trial court has the power to terminate a defendant’s self-representation if he 
continues to abuse the court system.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).   
At this point, Lambrix appears to have exhausted all permissible legal 
remedies in his case.  Specifically, counsel has filed (or adopted) five successive 
motions for postconviction relief, as well as numerous motions for habeas relief—
both at the state and federal level—and numerous original writs.  Permitting 
 
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Lambrix to waive counsel now, especially when he specifically stated that he 
would like the opportunity for counsel if a death warrant is signed in the future, 
would only create delays at the point when a death warrant is signed, as counsel 
would then need to be appointed and to have an opportunity to become familiar 
with the case.  Further, the only purpose in allowing Lambrix to proceed pro se at 
this time would be to give him further ability to continue to file pleadings that to 
date have consistently lacked merit.  At least with counsel to represent him, there 
will be the requirement that counsel has a good faith belief that the allegations are 
not completely devoid of merit.  See generally R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.1 (“A lawyer 
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, 
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which 
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law.”).  Thus, any right to self-representation Lambrix may have does not 
outweigh the risk of substantial interference with the administration of the death 
penalty presented in this case.  
Accordingly, for all these reasons, we affirm the denial of Lambrix’s motion 
to proceed pro se and conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying 
Lambrix’s fourth successive motion for postconviction relief in full. 
SC12-6: Fifth Successive Postconviction Proceeding 
 
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As to Lambrix’s fifth successive motion for postconviction relief, which the 
postconviction court summarily denied, we likewise affirm this denial of relief.  
This successive motion addresses additional mitigation that Lambrix asserts he was 
unable to present during the penalty phase of his trial.5
  Lambrix argues that this “newly discovered evidence” establishes that he is 
“an honorably discharged military veteran who has suffered a substantial physical 
injury and resulting disability while serving his country in the United States 
Army.”  He believes that if the jury had heard the information about his injury and 
how the effects of the chronic pain from that injury led him to substance abuse, it 
would have compelled the jury to recommend a life sentence, thereby rendering his 
  Specifically, Lambrix 
argues that he is entitled to relief because he recently was able to locate his ex-
wife, who allegedly made herself deliberately unavailable until now, and she has 
prepared an affidavit discussing the injury that Lambrix suffered during the army’s 
basic training, which caused him debilitating pain and led him to self-medicate by 
turning to alcohol and illicit drugs.  In addition, Lambrix presented a decision by 
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals and a report by privately retained defense expert 
Dr. Thomas M. Hyde. 
                                         
 
5.  Lambrix also contends that the postconviction court erred in denying his 
motion to disqualify the judge, asserting the same issue pertaining to the staff 
attorney, which we already addressed above.  As this claim is meritless, we hold 
that Lambrix is not entitled to relief for the reasons we have already detailed. 
 
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death sentence disproportionate.  In support, Lambrix relies on Porter v. 
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009), contending that this case stands for the premise 
that the failure to allow a jury to hear evidence of a physical disability sustained 
during military service renders the sentence constitutionally unreliable.  
We conclude that Lambrix is not entitled to relief.  As this is a successive 
postconviction motion filed more than one year after the convictions and sentences 
became final, in order for this newly discovered evidence claim to be reviewed on 
the merits, Lambrix must show that the new evidence was not known to himself or 
his attorney and “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 
diligence.”  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).  “To be considered timely filed as 
newly discovered evidence, the successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have 
been filed within one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable 
through due diligence.”  Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008). 
 
In this case, in both his fifth successive postconviction motion before the 
postconviction court and in his briefing before this Court, Lambrix acknowledges 
that he and his trial counsel knew of Lambrix’s injury.  Yet, he asserts that he was 
unable to raise the claim until now because his “trial counsel simply did not have 
available the evidence that would have established this substantial mitigation.”  
Lambrix recognizes in this successive motion that he knew about the underlying 
facts of this claim all along and that “Lambrix himself could have provided 
 
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testimony concerning the extent of his military injury and the resulting disability, 
including a description of how the chronic physical pain from the injury resulted in 
a substantial escalation in self-medication and chronic substance abuse.”   
However, he contends that “he was prevented from [testifying] by actions of the 
trial court and trial counsel.”  Lambrix acknowledges that he actually raised this 
issue previously, both in state and federal postconviction challenges, but that his 
claim has been denied.   
 
Specifically, in prior litigation, Lambrix asserted that during the guilt phase 
of his first trial, his counsel told the trial judge to inform Lambrix that if Lambrix 
chose to testify in his own defense during the guilt phase, his counsel would 
withdraw and the court would not appoint new counsel for Lambrix.  Thus, 
Lambrix contends that he was denied his fundamental right to testify.  The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim, stating as follows: 
Lambrix argues that he was denied the fundamental right to testify on 
his own behalf because his counsel and the judge coerced him into 
choosing between his right to testify and his right to counsel.  The 
evidence which Lambrix presents on this issue relates only to events 
which occurred during his first trial.  Even if we concluded that 
Lambrix was denied his right to testify during his first trial, the 
appropriate remedy would be to grant a new trial.  Therefore, because 
Lambrix has already received a second trial, this issue is moot. 
Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500, 1508 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).  
The Eleventh Circuit noted that there was no evidence at all regarding any person 
who prevented Lambrix from testifying during the second trial, which occurred 
 
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two months after his first trial ended in a hung jury.  Id.  Moreover, to the extent 
that Lambrix’s counsel advised Lambrix against testifying in the first trial, this 
advice pertained only to Lambrix’s testimony concerning the guilt phase (at the 
first trial only), where Lambrix sought to tell the jury his version of how the 
victims died.   
In other words, the claim that Lambrix was prevented from testifying at trial 
has been litigated and denied.  Even if Lambrix believed that he could not testify 
during the penalty phase at his second trial, this does not explain why he failed to 
present this claim in his initial postconviction motion.  Lambrix clearly had the 
necessary knowledge pertaining to this claim, but failed to raise it at all, until his 
current attempt to resurrect this procedurally barred claim by pointing to a new 
witness he contends that he did not discover until now.  In addition, he presents a 
decision by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals and an expert who could testify 
regarding his injury.  Since Lambrix and his counsel knew of the injury at trial, 
they could have at any time hired the expert now retained to support Lambrix’s 
assertion. 
In sum, this claim is clearly time-barred.  Lambrix is attempting to raise the 
claim now, asserting that he has just found a new witness who would have helped 
present additional testimony on this claim.  In addition, he attempts to argue it in 
conjunction with other claims that he previously argued, including that he was 
 
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prohibited from testifying at trial and his prior claim that his counsel was 
ineffective in not presenting evidence pertaining to his addiction and alcoholism.  
As this Court has repeatedly held, a defendant may not raise claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by filing successive motions.  See, e.g., 
Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 1991).  
Further, the claim is completely lacking in merit as a newly discovered 
evidence claim because there is no probability that if this evidence had been 
introduced, it would have resulted in a life sentence.  As the postconviction court 
observed:  
Of the specific evidence Defendant mentions, none would result in 
acquittal or a lesser sentence.  Even had the additional details relating 
to Defendant’s injury been presented at trial, and even had Ms. Martin 
testified, such information would have no reasonable likelihood of 
changing the outcome of the trial.  That Defendant suffered a back 
injury during basic training and chose to abuse drugs and alcohol in 
self medication for his pain would not change the outcome, as there 
was sufficient evidence that Defendant committed the two murders for 
the jury to find Defendant guilty and to recommend the death penalty, 
and such additional mitigating evidence would not have outweighed 
the aggravating factors.  The Florida Supreme Court found that “We 
do not believe the introduction of the proffered testimony concerning 
Lambrix’s alcoholism would probably have resulted in life 
imprisonment rather than a sentence of death.”  Lambrix v. State, 534 
So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 1998).  The Eleventh Circuit also found trial 
counsel’s strategy of downplaying Defendant’s substance abuse in 
order to focus on good character was reasonable.  Lambrix v. 
Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1996).  Defendant presented 
evidence regarding his substance abuse during trial and during 
postconviction proceedings, and was not found to be sufficiently 
mitigating so as to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  Evidence 
regarding the background of Defendant’s drug and alcohol abuse, that 
 
- 24 - 
they resulted from, or were exacerbated by, the back injury during his 
uncompleted basic training, would not . . . increase the weight of that 
mitigation so as to outweigh the aggravating factors.  Such 
information, if introduced at a new trial, would not be likely to result 
in a lesser sentence.  Defendant has failed to meet either requirement 
for a claim that his conviction and sentence should be set aside 
because of newly discovered evidence.  As the information is not 
newly discovered evidence, the current motion is untimely.  Further, 
since this information was already presented, although not with the 
thoroughness Defendant now wishes, this motion is successive and 
procedurally barred.  Aldridge v. State, 503 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 
1987); Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 951 n.8 (Fla. 1998); 
Grossman v. State, 29 So. 3d 1034, 1042 (Fla. 2010); Jennings v. 
State
 
, 782 So. 2d 853, 860 (Fla. 2001). 
While Lambrix attempts to rely on Porter, 558 U.S. at 33-36, this case is not 
remotely similar to that case, in which Porter’s counsel failed to discover or 
present evidence that Porter endured significant child abuse on a weekly basis, 
enlisted in the army to escape the abuse, and was involved in two major 
“horrifying” engagements during the Korean War, where he was both wounded 
and decorated for his active participation.  Porter’s combat service unfortunately 
left him a traumatized, changed man.  Id.  In contrast, in this case, during basic 
training, Lambrix fell down a flight of stairs and was honorably discharged.  
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief.  
SC11-1845: Petition for Writ of Prohibition 
 
As to the petition for a writ of prohibition, case number SC11-1845, 
challenging the denial of his motion to disqualify, Lambrix’s motion was based on 
the same allegations we previously discussed regarding the Twentieth Judicial 
 
- 25 - 
Circuit Court’s staff attorney, as well as on rulings that Judge Greider made in the 
course of presiding over this case and on the fact that Judge Greider was a long-
time assistant state attorney.  To the extent that Lambrix asserts that Judge Greider 
erred in denying the motion to disqualify based on the claim that the staff attorney 
was involved with Lambrix’s prior legal cases, this claim has already been 
addressed and rejected in our discussion of case number SC10-1845 and, for the 
reasons addressed in that part of our analysis, this claim is without merit.  
In addition, Lambrix asserts that Judge Greider ruled in an adverse manner 
with regard to his motion to discharge counsel and represent himself and that she 
improperly denied his motion for DNA testing.  As this Court has repeatedly held, 
“[t]he fact that a judge has previously made adverse rulings is not an adequate 
ground for recusal.”  Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1171 (Fla. 2005) 
(quoting Jackson v. State, 599 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. 1992)).  Finally, Lambrix 
asserts as a basis for disqualification that Judge Greider previously worked as an 
assistant state attorney.  This Court has expressly rejected the claim, however, that 
a judge’s “former employment as a prosecutor [i]s legally sufficient for 
disqualification.”  Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 916 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, we 
deny the petition for a writ of prohibition. 
CONCLUSION 
 
- 26 - 
 
Based on the above analysis, we affirm the summary denial of Lambrix’s 
fourth successive motion for postconviction relief (SC10-1845), affirm the 
summary denial of his fifth successive motion for postconviction relief (SC12-6), 
and deny the petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the postconviction 
court’s denial of his motion to disqualify (SC11-1845).   
 
It is so ordered. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., is recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Three Cases 
Two Appeals from the Circuit Court in and for Glades County, 
Christine Hissam Greider, Judge - Case No. 83-12 CF 
And an Original Proceeding – Prohibition 
 
William M. Hennis III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-
South, and Craig J. Trocino and Neal Andre Dupree, Assistant Capital Collateral 
Regional Counsels, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent