Title: In re Julian R.
Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 487
Docket Number: S159282
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 2009

1 
Filed 8/17/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
In re Julian R., a Person Coming  
     ) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law.  
 
     ) 
___________________________________  ) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S159282 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H031292 
JULIAN R.,  
) 
 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. J38483 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
When a minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is committed to 
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile 
Justice, the juvenile court is required to indicate the maximum period of physical 
confinement.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c).)1  In setting that confinement 
period, which may be less than, but not more than, the prison sentence that could 
be imposed on an adult convicted of the same crime, the court must consider the 
“facts and circumstances” of the crime.  (§ 731, subd. (c).) 
This case presents two issues:  First, must the juvenile court orally 
pronounce the juvenile‟s maximum period of confinement, or will a written 
statement of that period suffice?  Our answer:  The latter is sufficient. Second, 
                                              
1  
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.  
 
2 
must the record show that the court complied with section 731, subdivision (c), by 
considering imposition of a confinement period — shorter than the adult 
maximum — that might be justified by the “facts and circumstances” of the crime 
or crimes committed by the juvenile?  Our answer:  On a silent record, as is the 
case here, we will presume that the juvenile court performed its statutory duty.  
I 
 
The probation report describes the incident leading to Julian R.‟s wardship 
as follows:  On June 11, 2006, police officers, responding to a reported carjacking 
in the parking lot of a fast food restaurant in the City of Salinas, in Monterey 
County, found two male victims who said they had been assaulted by the 
occupants of another car.  The victims‟ car had been taken, and was later found 
abandoned nearby. 
 
An hour later, during a routine traffic stop, police officers detained a car 
near the fast food restaurant.  In the car were 17-year-old Julian and five other 
persons, some of whom fit the description of the carjackers.  Radio speakers from, 
and keys to, the victims‟ stolen car were found inside the detained car.  The 
officers brought the six suspects to the restaurant‟s parking lot.  There, the 
suspects were shown to witnesses of the carjacking.  Julian was identified as the 
one who had kicked and punched both victims.   
 
On July 20, 2006, in return for dismissal of the carjacking count, Julian 
admitted committing two counts of assault against separate victims by means of 
force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); each 
count was subject to a criminal street gang sentence enhancement (Pen. Code, 
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). 
 
By a dispositional order of August 7, 2006, the juvenile court declared 
Julian to be a ward of the court under section 602 and, rejecting the probation 
officer‟s recommendation for a commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice 
 
3 
(formerly the California Youth Authority), the court ordered Julian committed to 
the Monterey Youth Center.  On February 5, 2007, after Julian tested positive for 
cocaine use in violation of his probation, he was expelled from the Monterey 
Youth Center.  This led to the filing of a supplemental petition on February 7, 
2007, alleging two probation violations — cocaine use and failure to satisfactorily 
complete the youth center program.  The next day, at a detention hearing on that 
supplemental petition, Julian admitted the probation violations.   
 
On February 26, 2007, at a dispositional hearing on the supplemental 
petition, the juvenile court concluded that Julian was “too far entrenched in gangs 
and the criminal lifestyle to be rehabilitated” through locally available services.  It 
then committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice.  The court did not state the 
maximum confinement that Julian would face, did not mention the maximum term 
that an adult would face for the same offenses, and did not indicate its 
consideration of the crimes‟ facts and circumstances that might justify a shorter 
confinement.  But on a preprinted form (Judicial Council Forms, form JV-665, as 
rev. Jan. 1, 2007) the court checked a box beside this printed text:  “The child is 
committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of 
Juvenile Justice, and form JV-732, Commitment to the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, will be completed 
and transmitted.” 
 
Two days later, on February 28, 2007, the juvenile court signed the 
required (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.805) preprinted commitment form (Judicial 
Council Forms, form JV-732, as rev. Jan. 1, 2006).  As “sustained petitions” the 
form listed the two felony assault offenses (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) plus 
applicable gang enhancements, resulting in a maximum confinement period of ten 
years.  To that were added two months for a prior offense of fighting in a public 
place (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (1)), a misdemeanor.  Following the form‟s printed 
 
4 
text “maximum period of confinement,” the court inserted “10 years 2 months, 
which the probation officer had indicated was the maximum period of 
confinement for an adult convicted of the same offenses.   
Julian appealed, asserting that the juvenile court erred in its disposition.  He 
contended:  (1) The court should have orally pronounced the maximum period of 
confinement he would face, and (2) the court should have determined whether the 
facts and circumstances of his crimes warranted a maximum confinement period 
shorter than the adult maximum prison term for the same offenses.  The Court of 
Appeal rejected these claims.  It held that the juvenile court was not required to 
orally pronounce the maximum period of confinement that Julian would face.  It 
also held that, although the record did not expressly indicate the juvenile court was 
aware of its discretionary power to impose a maximum confinement period shorter 
than the adult maximum, its awareness of that power must be presumed, thus 
compelling the conclusion that the juvenile court had considered a lesser 
confinement period.  This conclusion was contrary to the one reached by the Court 
of Appeal in In re Jacob J. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 429, which had held that if the 
record was silent as to a juvenile court‟s consideration of a facts and 
circumstances confinement period, the reviewing court would presume that the 
juvenile court had failed to consider such a period. 
In this case, the Attorney General advised the Court of Appeal that Julian‟s 
prior misdemeanor charge of fighting in a public place had been dismissed, 
reducing the maximum adult term for his offenses to 10 years, and that the 
principal and subordinate terms for the current two assault offenses had been 
incorrectly stated on the commitment form.  Although a maximum adult term of 
10 years for the two assaults was correct, the Attorney General noted that Julian‟s 
10-year confinement period had been incorrectly apportioned between the 
principal and the subordinate terms for those assaults, each carrying a gang 
 
5 
enhancement; correctly calculated, the adult maximum term of imprisonment for 
the first assault and gang enhancement was eight years, and the maximum term of 
imprisonment for the second assault and gang enhancement was two years.  Given 
those errors, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the juvenile court so it 
could complete an amended commitment form. 
Recognizing the conflict between this case and In re Jacob. J., supra, 130 
Cal.App.4th 429 concerning the sufficiency of a juvenile court record that is silent 
as to the appropriate confinement period based on the facts and circumstances of 
the crime, we granted review to resolve that conflict.  
II 
 
We begin our analysis with a brief overview of the statutory scheme 
governing commitments to the Division of Juvenile Justice. 
 
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends to persons who are under 18 
years of age when they violate any law defining a crime.  (§ 602, subd. (a).)  After 
conducting an investigation, a probation officer may refer a juvenile matter to the 
prosecuting attorney (§§ 650, 653.5), but no wardship action can commence until 
the prosecutor has filed a petition on the People‟s behalf (§§ 650, subd. (c), 681, 
subd. (a)).  The petition states what penal laws were violated and describes the 
offenses as either felonies or misdemeanors.  (§§ 656, subd. (f), 656.1.) 
 
A bifurcated hearing is then held.  At the first phase — the jurisdictional 
hearing — “the juvenile court decides whether the petition concerns a person 
described in section 602.”  (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 487.)  The 
alleged offense or offenses must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt supported 
by evidence[] legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases . . . .”  (§ 701.) 
 
At the second phase — the dispositional hearing — the juvenile court hears 
“evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor.”  
(§ 706.)  A wardship determination must be made before the minor can be 
 
6 
removed from the physical custody of a parent or guardian.  (In re Eddie M., 
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 488.) 
 
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court must consider the social 
study submitted by the probation officer.  (§ 706.)  Wards may be committed to a 
county home, to a ranch or camp, or to a county juvenile hall.  (§ 730, subd. (a).)  
Wards requiring more secure facilities may be committed to the Division of 
Juvenile Facilities.  (§§ 731, subd. (a)(4), 734.)  In the latter instance, the ward 
“may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the 
maximum term of physical confinement set by the court based upon the facts and 
circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may not exceed the maximum period 
of adult confinement as determined pursuant to this section.”  (§ 731, subd. (c), 
italics added.)2  Succinctly put, the juvenile court must consider the crime‟s 
relevant “facts and circumstances” in determining whether the minor‟s maximum 
commitment period should be equal to or less than the maximum confinement 
term for an adult.  At issue here is whether such a consideration did occur. 
III 
 
A.  Oral Pronouncement of Maximum Confinement 
 
Section 731 does not direct the juvenile court to orally pronounce the 
juvenile‟s maximum period of confinement.  Julian acknowledges this.  He 
contends, however, that because the juvenile offender scheme now favors 
                                              
2  
At the request of the Attorney General, we have judicially noticed official 
documents of the legislative and the executive branches that comprise the 
legislative history of Senate Bill No. 459, which in 2003 amended section 731 by 
adding a “facts and circumstances” confinement period that is now codified in 
subdivision (c).  (Stats. 2003, ch. 4, § 1.) 
 
7 
punishment over rehabilitation, it is now more like the adult criminal justice 
system.  Therefore, Julian argues, the commitment procedure for a juvenile ward 
should parallel the statutory formalities required at an adult felony sentencing 
hearing by, as relevant here, providing for an oral pronouncement of the period of 
confinement, accompanied by a statement of reasons.  (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. 
(b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(a), (b)(2), (b)(4).)  We disagree. 
 
We begin with an examination of section 202.  In that statute, enacted in 
1984, the Legislature has expressed its concern for “the protection and safety of 
the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”  (§ 202, 
subd. (a), added by Stats. 1984, ch. 756, § 2, p. 2726.)  The statute requires, as it 
has since 1984, that juvenile offenders “receive care, treatment and guidance 
consistent with their best interest,” and it states that such “guidance may include 
punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.”  
(§ 202, subd. (b).)  In 1999, although the Legislature deleted from the statute a list 
of punitive sanctions available to the juvenile court (Stats. 1999, ch. 997, § 1.1) it 
retained language, which still appears, that “ „punishment‟ means the imposition 
of sanctions,” and that punishment “does not include retribution” (§ 202, subd. 
(e)).  Contrary to Julian‟s contention, the Legislature has not abandoned the 
traditional purpose of rehabilitation for juvenile offenders and replaced it with 
punishment as a form of retribution.  Juvenile proceedings continue to be 
primarily rehabilitative, disallowing punishment in the form of retribution.  (In re 
Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 507.) 
 
Significant differences between the juvenile and adult offender laws 
underscore their different goals:  The former seeks to rehabilitate, while the latter 
seeks to punish.  The determinate sentencing law, which governs sentencing of 
adult offenders who have committed a crime for which a “statute specifies three 
possible terms,” requires the trial court to choose a set term (Pen. Code, § 1170, 
 
8 
subd. (b)) — a lower, middle, or upper term — from the adult triad sentencing 
scheme.  The determinate sentencing law “provides for fixed terms designed to 
punish.”  (In re Christian G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 708, 715, italics added.)  In 
contrast, juveniles are committed “for indeterminate terms designed to 
rehabilitate.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  And unlike an adult offender who commits a 
felony and serves a set term, a juvenile offender who commits a felony and is 
committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice is ordinarily not held beyond the age 
of 25.  (§ 1771.) 
 
In light of these significant differences between juvenile offender laws and 
adult offender laws, we reject Julian‟s contention that, as in adult criminal 
sentencing proceedings, in juvenile offender proceedings there needs to be an oral 
pronouncement of the juvenile‟s maximum period of confinement, accompanied 
by a statement of reasons.3 
 
Insisting that the juvenile court must at the dispositional hearing make an 
oral pronouncement of the confinement period, Julian points to certain language in 
section 726‟s  subdivision (c) and in rule 5.795(b) of the California Rules of Court 
as indicative of an intent to require such an oral pronouncement.  The statute 
provides that the court‟s “order shall specify” the maximum length of physical 
                                              
3  
Julian contends that due process requires a statement of reasons.  He notes 
that the determinate sentencing law, which governs adult offenders, requires a trial 
court to “state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1170, subd. (c).)  According to Julian, requiring such a statement of reasons at a 
juvenile court‟s dispositional hearing would ensure that the court used reliable 
sentencing information in exercising its discretion to impose either a physical 
confinement period not exceeding the maximum adult term or a shorter period of 
confinement based on the “facts and circumstances” of the crime.  Because Julian 
did not argue this claim in the Court of Appeal or in his petition for review he is 
precluded from now raising it.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.500(c)(1), 
8.504(b)(1).) 
 
9 
confinement (§726, subd. (c)); the rule directs the juvenile court to “specify and 
note in the minutes the maximum period of confinement under section 726” (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 5.795(b)).  In Julian‟s view, “specify” means to orally 
pronounce.  That is only one of the word‟s meanings, however.  The dictionary 
defines “specify” as “name or state explicitly or in detail.”  (Webster‟s 7th New 
Collegiate Dict. (1970) p. 839.)  That definition would encompass an oral 
pronouncement.  But it is not the only definition.  According to the same 
dictionary, “specify” also means “to include as an item in a specification.”  (Ibid.)  
A “specification,” which is “a plan or proposal for something” (ibid.), is 
frequently a written document.  Under that definition, a juvenile court‟s written 
commitment order would comply with the court‟s statutory duty to “specify” 
(§ 726, subd. (c)) the minor‟s maximum confinement period. 
 
Finally, Julian argues that even though the statutory scheme (§§ 726, subd. 
(c), 731, subd. (c)) does not compel an oral pronouncement of the juvenile‟s 
maximum period of confinement, nonetheless we should impose such a 
requirement “pursuant to our supervisory authority over state [court] procedure.”  
(In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 938; see People v. Galland (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
354, 368.)  He contends that unless the juvenile court is required to make such an 
oral pronouncement, with a statement of reasons, it will be difficult for a 
reviewing court to determine whether the juvenile court has indeed considered a 
period of confinement based on the crime‟s facts and circumstances.  That concern 
is overstated, especially in light of the recent revision of the Judicial Council‟s 
commitment form.  As of January 1, 2009, that form requires the juvenile court 
both to state the duration of the maximum period of confinement and to 
acknowledge that it has “considered the individual facts and circumstances of the 
case in determining the maximum period of confinement.”  (Judicial Council 
Forms, form JV-732, [as rev. Jan. 1, 2009,] Commitment to the California 
 
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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, item 8, 
p. 2.) 
 
B.  Juvenile Court’s Consideration of Crime’s “Facts and  
 
     Circumstances” 
 
Section 731 sets two ceilings on the period of physical confinement to be 
imposed.  The statute permits the juvenile court in its discretion to impose either 
the equivalent of the “maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed 
upon an adult for the offense or offenses” committed by the juvenile (§ 731, subd. 
(c)) or some lesser period based on the “facts and circumstances of the matter or 
matters that brought or continued” the juvenile under the court‟s jurisdiction 
(ibid.). 
 
Here, the juvenile court determined that the maximum adult sentence for 
Julian‟s offenses — two counts of assault — was imprisonment for 10 years.  But 
it did not state on the record that it had considered the crimes‟ “facts and 
circumstances” that might justify a confinement period below the maximum adult 
prison term for the same offenses.  Julian interprets the record‟s silence on this 
point as an indication that the juvenile court never considered imposing a 
confinement period shorter than the maximum adult term.  Therefore, according to 
Julian, a reviewing court must presume from the record‟s silence that the juvenile 
court was either unaware of, or failed to perform, its statutory duty to consider that 
the “facts and circumstances” might warrant a confinement period shorter than the 
adult maximum term. 
 
But such a presumption would, as the Court of Appeal here concluded, 
require the reviewing court “to ignore a cardinal principle of appellate review”:  A 
“ „ “judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct[, and a]ll 
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which 
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ‟  [Citation.]”  As this 
 
11 
court has stated, “we apply the general rule „that a trial court is presumed to have 
been aware of and followed the applicable law.  [Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. Stowell 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.)  “This rule derives in part from the presumption of 
Evidence Code section 664 „that official duty has been regularly performed,‟ ” and 
thus when “a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a 
reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular 
finding or order.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Here, the juvenile court did set a maximum confinement period by 
completing the appropriate Judicial Council commitment form.  In the 
circumstances of this case, we presume, as the Court of Appeal did, that:  (1) the 
court exercised its discretion in setting a maximum period of physical confinement 
that was measured against both the ceiling set by the maximum adult prison term 
and a possibly lower ceiling set by the relevant “facts and circumstances” (§ 731, 
subd. (c)), and (2) the court determined that Julian‟s appropriate confinement 
period was a period equal to the maximum adult term.4   
 
As we noted at the outset, this case presents a conflict with the decision by 
the Court of Appeal in In re Jacob J., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 429.  There, as here, 
the record did not indicate that the juvenile court had considered whether, based 
on the facts and circumstances of the juvenile‟s offense, a confinement period 
shorter than the maximum adult sentence imposed for the same crime was called 
                                              
4  
It would have been better practice if the juvenile court had stated on the 
record that it had considered, based on the “facts and circumstances” of Julian‟s 
offenses, a confinement period less than the prison term for an adult convicted of 
the same offenses (§ 731, subd. (c)), and that in the exercise of its discretion it had 
decided against such a shorter confinement.  In light of newly revised Judicial 
Council form JV-732 requiring the juvenile court to acknowledge its consideration 
of the crime‟s facts and circumstances (p. 9, ante) in the future a court‟s exercise 
of its discretion will be evident. 
 
12 
for.  The court acknowledged that section 731 does not require the juvenile court 
to recite “the facts and circumstances” on which it relies or to discuss “their 
relative weight.”  (In re Jacob J. at p. 438.)  Because the record did not reflect the 
juvenile court‟s consideration of the crimes‟ “facts and circumstances” that might 
justify a confinement period shorter than the adult maximum term, the Court of 
Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the juvenile court.  
(Ibid.)  Unlike the Court of Appeal in this case, the Court of Appeal in In re Jacob 
J. failed to apply the general rule that “ „a trial court is presumed to have been 
aware of and followed the applicable law [Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. Stowell, supra, 
31 Cal.4th at p. 1114.)  That was error.  To the extent that In re Jacob J., supra, 
130 Cal.App.4th 429, 438 is inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove it. 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
 
The Court of Appeal here remanded the matter to the juvenile court so it 
could correct certain errors.  (See pp. 4-5, ante.)  We agree that a remand is 
appropriate.  On remand, the juvenile court is to complete Judicial Council form 
JV-732, as revised January 1, 2009, acknowledging that the court has considered 
the facts and circumstances of the offenses in determining the maximum period of 
Julian‟s physical confinement. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Julian R. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 156 Cal.App.4th 1404 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S159282 
Date Filed: August 17, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Stephen A. Sillman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lori A. Quick, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Martin S. Kaye, Laurence K. Sullivan and Jeffrey M. Bryant, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lori A. Quick 
100 N. Winchester Boulevard, Suite 310 
Santa Clara, CA  95050 
(408) 241-6171 
 
Jeffrey M. Bryant 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5852