Title: Caylor v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC15-1823, SC16-399
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1823 
____________ 
 
MATTHEW LEE CAYLOR,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-399 
____________ 
 
MATTHEW LEE CAYLOR,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 18, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Matthew Lee Caylor appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
 
 
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habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons stated below, we grant Caylor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, vacate 
Caylor’s death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase.  We affirm, 
however, the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Following a jury trial, Matthew Caylor was convicted of first-degree murder, 
sexual battery involving great physical force, and aggravated child abuse for the 
2008 murder of Melinda Hinson.  Caylor v. State, 78 So. 3d 482, 486 (Fla. 2011).  
The jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, which the trial court 
followed in its sentencing order.  Id.  This Court set forth the following facts on 
direct appeal: 
 
In July 2008, Melinda Hinson was living with her mother, her 
mother’s boyfriend, her fifteen-year-old brother, and Daryl Lawton, a 
family friend, in a single room at the Valu-Lodge Motel in Panama 
City.  The family had moved to Florida from Kentucky in December 
2007 and Lawton came to live with the family soon after.  Due to 
strained finances, all five moved to the motel in mid-June.  The room 
was crowded and the children did not have school during the summer, 
so Melinda would spend most of her time by the motel’s pool.  
Melinda would also walk two dogs belonging to Scott Heinze and 
Tyler Nichols, who also lived at the motel, while Heinze and Nichols 
were at work. 
 
According to the motel’s records, Matthew Caylor checked into 
the motel on June 25, 2008.  At trial, Lawton testified that prior to the 
date of Melinda’s disappearance, he had only spoken with Caylor a 
few times and that he had never seen Melinda or her brother speak 
with Caylor.  However, at around noon on July 8, Caylor came to 
Lawton and asked to borrow some duct tape, which Lawton took to 
Caylor’s room.  Later in the day, Caylor called Lawton and asked if 
 
 
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he could also borrow a steak knife.  Again, Lawton went to Caylor’s 
room to take him the item.  Lawton recalled that Melinda and her 
brother accompanied him on one of these occasions, but said that they 
did not speak to Caylor. 
 
Melinda was last seen alive shortly after 5 p.m. on July 8, when 
she returned Heinze and Nichols’ dogs to their room after taking the 
dogs for a walk.  When Melinda did not return to her family’s room, 
the family first asked Heinze and Nichols whether they had seen her.  
Heinze told the family that he had last seen Melinda when she 
returned the dogs to their room.  The family then searched the motel 
and the surrounding area.  When they could not find Melinda, they 
called the police and reported that the girl was missing. 
 
Melinda’s body was discovered on the morning of July 10, 
hidden under a bed in a room two doors down from Heinze and 
Nichols’ room.  The body was found naked and lying face-down.  The 
discovery was made by a housekeeper who was following the motel’s 
requirement of checking under the beds for trash.  Although the room 
had been cleaned the previous day, the first housekeeper to clean the 
room testified that she did not look under the bed that day because her 
back was hurting.  A review of the motel’s records revealed that 
Matthew Caylor had been renting the room on the day of Melinda’s 
disappearance.  Officers of the Panama City Police Department 
subsequently learned that Caylor had been arrested in connection with 
a different criminal matter and that he was already in the custody of 
the Bay County Sheriff’s Department. 
 
Detective Mark Smith of the Panama City Police Department 
testified at trial that he interviewed Caylor after the body was 
discovered.  He was accompanied by Investigator Mike Wesley of the 
Bay County Sheriff’s Department, who had interrogated Caylor 
following the initial arrest.  When Smith and Wesley went to see 
Caylor, Caylor said that he was glad to see the officers because he 
wanted to talk to them.  The officers read Caylor his Miranda [v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] rights, which he waived.  In the 
interrogation that followed, Caylor confessed to the murder of 
Melinda Hinson and described the circumstances leading up to the 
crime.  Based on Caylor’s statements and evidence recovered from the 
crime scene, Caylor was charged with first-degree murder (based on 
both premeditation and felony murder theories of the offense), see  
§ 782.04(1)(a) 1.-2., Fla. Stat. (2008), sexual battery involving great 
 
 
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physical force, see § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (2008), and aggravated 
child abuse, see § 827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). 
 
In statements made initially to the police officers and later to 
the trial court, Caylor gave the following account of the murder and 
the events leading up to it.  In the summer of 2008, Caylor was on 
felony probation in the State of Georgia based on an incident that had 
occurred several years before in which he was accused of molesting 
the fourteen-year-old daughter of a neighbor.  Caylor asserted that he 
was falsely accused, but said that on his attorney’s advice he pled 
guilty to avoid a possible prison sentence.  He was later required to 
register as a sex offender after violating the terms of his probation by 
being convicted of possession of cocaine.  Caylor stated that after 
several years he became frustrated with the restrictions placed on him 
as a sex offender, and said that he told his probation officer that he 
would rather serve time in jail and be done with the sentence.  Caylor 
said that he then went to Panama City to relax because he thought he 
would have to spend approximately a year and a half in jail.  Caylor 
admitted that he had not been given permission by his probation 
officer to leave Georgia, even though he knew he was required to 
receive such permission by Georgia law. 
 
Caylor decided to rent a room at the Valu-Lodge Motel because 
it was close to the beach.  While in Panama City, Caylor began selling 
cocaine and methamphetamine.  He said that he also became friends 
with “two Russian girls,” and that he became romantically involved 
with one of the girls, Marina.  He said that he discovered on July 8 
that the women had stolen some of his drugs.  Caylor said that he 
borrowed a knife and duct tape with the intent of using it to threaten 
them to get his drugs back.  He subsequently went to the women’s 
apartment, taking the knife and duct tape with him.  Caylor said that 
he became violent during that encounter and decided to go back to his 
room at the motel.  He was later arrested for the incident at the 
apartment. 
 
During his interrogation, Caylor told Smith and Wesley that he 
returned to his motel room immediately after the incident at the 
women’s apartment.  He said that he had been back in his room for 
only a few minutes when Melinda Hinson knocked on his door and 
asked him for a cigarette.  He told the officers that at the time Melinda 
came to his room, he felt that he had “been through all of this because 
of something I didn’t do,” and told the officers that he decided he was 
“going to make it worth it.”  When asked during the Spencer hearing 
 
 
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what he meant by these statements, Caylor responded that he meant he 
was angry about his prior conviction for child molestation.  He told 
the trial court he felt that “[i]f I’m going to be in trouble for having 
sex with this girl being in my room, I might as well have sex with this 
girl.” 
 
After Melinda entered the room, Caylor said that she sat down 
on the bed and that they began smoking.  He asked her what she had 
been doing.  Melinda replied that she had just finished walking a dog 
that belonged to the men in the next room.  Caylor asked how old she 
was and she told him that she was thirteen.  He said that he asked her 
why she hung out with the guys next door.  Melinda responded that 
“they think they’re hot stuff” but said that she “[did]n’t really like 
them.”  According to Caylor, Melinda then told him that she thought 
he was “hot,” moved close to him on the bed and put her arm around 
him.  Caylor said that they started kissing, that he took her clothes off, 
and that they started having sex. 
 
Caylor said that at some point he “just started choking her.”  He 
claimed that they had stopped having sex just before he began to 
strangle her.  He said that he “wasn’t into it” and that the intercourse 
lasted for only thirty to forty-five seconds.  However, he said that they 
were still naked when he began to strangle her and that he was still on 
top of her.  Caylor said that when he began to choke Melinda, “she 
was flipping out and I just wanted her to go away.”  He said that she 
began fighting him and saying, “[L]et me ask you a question, let me 
ask you a question,” and that during the struggle they fell from the bed 
to the floor.  Caylor told the officers that he then unplugged the phone 
cord from the wall and wrapped it around her neck.  The officers 
asked whether Melinda was moving when he began to strangle her 
with the cord, and Caylor responded: “Well, yeah, it was like no, no,” 
When he thought Melinda was dead, he released her and plugged the 
phone cord back into the wall.  He then lifted up the mattress and 
placed Melinda and her clothes under the bed.  He said that he 
gathered his things and left the room. 
 
Detective Smith asked Caylor why he decided to kill Melinda: 
 
 
[Detective Smith:]  Well, is your thoughts that now I’ve had sex 
with her she’s going to tell?  Is that what led to that she has to die? 
 
 
[Caylor:]  No, it wasn’t like that, no, it wasn’t like that, it was 
just like, it was like, more or less like you’re the fucking reason why 
 
 
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I’m in this situation I’m in now because I did the right thing.  I think it 
was more of a hate, like a hate, like I was really angry, I think is what 
it was. 
 
 
[Detective Smith:]  A hate for her or a hate the fact [sic] that 
she’s 13 years old. 
 
 
[Caylor:]  That she was 13 coming on to me. 
 
 
Caylor said that when Melinda came into his room, he was “all 
pissed off about everything that has happened, not to mention the fact 
of what just happened at Marina’s house.”  He said that Melinda “just 
kind of walked up at the wrong, with, you know, with that same bull 
shit, man, at the wrong time.” 
 
At trial, the State called several witnesses to describe physical 
evidence recovered from the crime scene.  Brenda Pelfrey, a crime 
scene investigator, identified photographs of the motel room where 
the body was discovered.  She stated that the victim’s clothes, which 
were found underneath the body, were not ripped or torn and that 
there was no blood on the victim’s underwear.  Pelfrey was also 
present during the autopsy, where she collected a sexual assault kit.  
Trevor Seifert, a crime lab analyst, testified that he found Melinda’s 
DNA on portions of the phone cord removed from the motel room, 
and that Caylor was a possible contributor to scrapings taken from 
under Melinda’s fingernails.  Seifert also stated that vaginal swabs 
from the victim tested positive for blood and semen, and that Caylor’s 
DNA profile matched these samples. 
 
The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Michael Hunter, the 
medical examiner who conducted the autopsy.  Dr. Hunter stated that 
during the examination he observed considerable injuries to the 
victim’s neck.  He found that some of these injuries were consistent 
with strangulation by hand, while other straight-line markings showed 
strangulation by ligature.  He agreed that the latter markings could 
have been inflicted through the use of a telephone cord.  Dr. Hunter 
noted that there were multiple straight-line abrasions, which indicated 
application and reapplication of the ligature.  He determined that these 
markings were most likely inflicted while the victim was still alive.  
He also observed bleeding in the victim’s eyes, which provided 
further evidence of strangulation.  Dr. Hunter ultimately concluded 
that the cause of death was strangulation.  He said that the victim 
 
 
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would have been in pain while she was conscious, and noted that there 
was no evidence of any head trauma that might have impaired her 
ability to feel pain or made her unaware of what was happening 
around her. 
 
In addition to evidence of strangulation, Dr. Hunter observed 
other injuries on the body, including a bruise on the victim’s arm, a 
small abrasion on her left ankle, and another large bruise that 
extended over the length of the left side of her clavicle.  He said that 
there was considerable bleeding underneath the clavicle bruise.  
Additionally, Dr. Hunter observed discoloration in the victim’s pubic 
area, although he said that this injury could have occurred during 
consensual sex.  He noted that the victim was menstruating at the time 
of death, but found no indication as to whether she was sexually 
active.  He said that the victim’s blood tested positive for nicotine but 
negative for drugs or alcohol. 
 
After the jury convicted Caylor of all three charged offenses, a 
penalty proceeding was held.  The State’s only witness at this 
proceeding was Thomas Shakitra, who testified that he was employed 
as a probation officer with the State of Georgia.  Shakitra stated that in 
2008, he was supervising Caylor, who was on felony probation.  
Following this testimony, the defense stipulated that Caylor had a 
prior felony conviction in Georgia. 
 
The defense called four witnesses during the penalty phase.  
The appellant’s parents, Kimberly and Kerry Caylor, testified that 
they were both addicted to amphetamines while the appellant was a 
child and that for a time the family had no money and lived in a trailer 
with no power.  Both parents testified that the appellant had an 
abusive relationship with his father, began abusing drugs at a young 
age, and suffered from emotional problems.  A third defense witness 
testified that he worked with the appellant as a mechanic in Jasper, 
Georgia, and described the appellant’s drug problems.  The final 
defense witness was a veterinarian who testified that Matthew Caylor 
had worked in the kennel area of his office for several months.  He 
stated that Caylor was a good employee and treated the animals well.  
At the end of the proceeding, the jury recommended the death penalty 
by a vote of eight to four. 
 
The trial court held a Spencer hearing on November 18, 2009.  
Caylor testified in his own defense and described the events preceding 
the murder.  He said that contrary to his initial statement to the police, 
he had used a large amount of drugs on the day of the homicide.  He 
 
 
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stated that he decided to have sex with Melinda because he was angry 
about the fact that he had been on probation for eight years for an 
offense he did not commit, and that he was angry because he found 
himself in a similar situation with a thirteen-year-old girl.  He said 
that he did not rape Melinda and that he was remorseful for killing 
her. 
 
In its written sentencing order, the trial court found and 
assigned weight to the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the 
capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a 
felony and under a sentence of imprisonment or placed on community 
control or on felony probation (great weight); (2) the capital felony 
was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of 
sexual battery and aggravated child abuse (great weight); and (3) the 
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”) 
(great weight).  The court found the following mitigating 
circumstances: (1) dysfunctional family (little weight); (2) under the 
influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (some 
weight); (3) compassionate to animals and good employee (little 
weight); (4) learning difficulties (very little weight); and (5) remorse 
(little weight). 
 
The trial court concluded that the nature and quality of the 
mitigating factors “pale[d] in comparison” to the enormity of the 
aggravating circumstances.  Furthermore, the court determined that 
the aggravating circumstances clearly and convincingly outweighed 
the mitigating factors.  Based on these determinations, the trial court 
imposed a sentence of death. 
Id. at 486-91 (footnotes omitted).  On appeal, Caylor raised six claims1 and this 
                                          
 
 
1.  Caylor argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the offense of aggravated child abuse; (2) the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the offense of sexual 
battery involving great force; (3) the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating 
circumstance that he committed the murder while on felony probation; (4) the trial 
court erred in assigning “little weight” to the “dysfunctional family” and “remorse” 
mitigating circumstances; (5) death is a disproportionate punishment; (6) Florida’s 
death penalty is unconstitutional under the holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002).  Caylor, 78 So. 3d at 491. 
 
 
 
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Court affirmed the convictions and sentences.  Id. at 502.  The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 14, 2012.  Caylor v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 
2405 (2012). 
 
On May 2, 2013, Caylor filed his original postconviction motion.  The 
motion raised six claims.2  On August 7, 2013 the court conducted a Huff3 hearing 
and summarily denied claim 1 (in part) and claim 3 (in part), with the court 
reserving ruling on whether claim 4 required further evidentiary consideration.  
The court granted an evidentiary hearing on claim 1 (in part), regarding Juror 
Marianne Moore, claim 2, regarding counsel’s failure to investigate and present 
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase and claim 3 (in part), regarding 
counsel’s failure to have a mental health professional testify with respect to 
Caylor’s mental state during the penalty phase.  The remaining claims were to be 
                                          
 
 
2.  Caylor argued: (1) trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire for 
failing to challenge jurors, properly inquire of them, and to move to strike the 
entire panel; (2) trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to 
investigate and present mitigation evidence; (3) trial counsel was ineffective during 
the penalty phase for failing to use a mental health expert to present evidence of 
mental health mitigation; (4) denial of constitutional rights due to Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4-3.5(d)(4) prevented trial counsel from interviewing jurors 
and is unconstitutionally vague; (5) execution by lethal injection violates the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; and (6) 
cumulative error.  
 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
 
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resolved without an evidentiary hearing.  The evidentiary hearing took place on 
June 1–2, 2015.  Following the evidentiary hearing, the court filed a final order 
denying Caylor’s postconviction motion on September 9, 2015.  This appeal 
followed.  
RULE 3.851 MOTION ON APPEAL 
 
Caylor has raised the following five issues on this appeal: (1) trial counsel 
was ineffective for his investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence at the 
penalty phase; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for not ensuring that Caylor receive 
a reasonably competent mental health evaluation for mitigation; (3) the trial court 
erred in summarily denying Caylor’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to challenge Juror Weaver; (4) the trial court erred in summarily denying the claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask any of the jurors about their 
views on mental health, addiction, remorse, rehabilitation, mercy, experts, or any 
other potential mitigation; and (5) cumulative error.  Because we find that Caylor 
is entitled to a new penalty phase, we only address issue three concerning Juror 
Weaver.  As to this issue, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and its denial of 
Caylor’s postconviction motion. 
Juror Weaver 
 
Caylor argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to challenge Juror Weaver.  According to Caylor, Juror 
 
 
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Weaver indicated that she was not sure if she could be impartial, knew one of the 
witnesses, and was once the victim of a crime.  The postconviction court 
summarily denied this claim, finding that Caylor failed to show that an actually 
biased juror sat on the jury panel. 
 
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction motion 
unless: (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the 
movant is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or particular claim is legally 
insufficient.  Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44, 54 (Fla. 2012).  A postconviction 
court’s decision on whether to grant an evidentiary hearing is a pure question of 
law, reviewed de novo.  Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013).  For a 
defendant to show that his trial counsel was ineffective during the jury selection 
process for failing to remove a juror from the panel, that defendant must show that 
an actually biased juror sat on his jury.  Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 324 
(Fla. 2007).   
 
In support of his claim, Caylor relies on the following colloquy with Juror 
Weaver: 
 
THE COURT:  No.  Have you ever been a victim of crime or the party 
in a lawsuit? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  I had a wallet stolen.   
 
THE COURT:  Okay, would that affect your ability to sit on this case? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  This one might. 
 
THE COURT:  Pardon? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  This might. 
 
 
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THE COURT:  Okay.  Do you think because of that, you wouldn’t be 
able to sit on this case or other reasons? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  I can sit. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Let’s see.  Have you had any experiences with 
the State Attorney’s office or law enforcement that would influence 
your decision? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  No, ma’am. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  And do you feel that you could be fair and impartial 
on this case? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  I might. 
 
THE COURT:  Pardon? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  I might. 
 
THE COURT:  You might.  You’re not sure? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  No ma’am. 
Caylor also relies on questioning by the State during voir dire that revealed that 
one of the witnesses, Margaret Davis, was the aunt of Juror Weaver’s two 
daughters: 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  Margaret Davis. 
 
MS. BASFORD:  Margaret Davis, yes, ma’am.  You know Ms. 
Davis? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  Yes. 
 
MR. BASFORD:  How do you know Ms. Davis? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  The lady who worked at the hotel? 
 
MR. BASFORD:  Yes, ma’am. 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  She’s my two daughters’ aunt. 
 
MR. BASFORD:  Excuse me? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  She’s my two daughters’ aunt. 
 
MR. BASFORD:  She’s your two daughters’ aunt? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  Uh huh. 
 
MR. BASFORD:  Oh, okay, okay.  Well, she is going to be a witness 
in this case.  Now, my question is, usually we don’t have people that 
are, you know, that closely related.  Do you see her that often, 
ma’am? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  No. 
 
 
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MR. BASFORD:  Okay.  If she testifies, and well, there’s no if, she is 
going to testify, Good Lord willing she’s going to testify, could you 
weigh and evaluate her testimony as you would that of the other 
witnesses in this case? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  Yes. 
 
MR. BASFORD:  The Judge will give you some criteria to judge the 
witnesses’ testimony.  But you could do that? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  Yes, sir.  
 
 
We agree with the postconviction court’s determination and find that the 
record refutes any claim that an actually biased juror sat on the jury.  In regards to 
Juror Weaver’s comment that she was not sure if she could be impartial, Mr. 
Basford later rehabilitated her through the following exchange: 
 
MR. BASFORD:  All right.  I’ve got a question mark down here 
whether or not you could be impartial.  How do you feel about it after 
sitting here this far in this case? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  I’m in favor of the death penalty. 
 
MR. BASFORD:  Okay. 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  In some cases. 
 
MR. BASFORD:  In some cases you’re in favor of the death penalty.  
Do you think you can be fair and impartial in this case? 
 
JUROR WEAVER:  Yes, sir.  
Additionally, Juror Weaver stated that in regard to Margaret Davis, she would 
weigh and evaluate her testimony as she would the other witnesses.  She also stated 
that she did not see Margaret Davis that often.  As evidenced by the record, trial 
counsel was not ineffective because Juror Weaver clearly indicated that she could 
be fair and impartial, and there is no evidence that she was actually biased.  
Consequently, we deny relief as to this claim. 
 
 
 
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HABEAS PETITION 
 
Caylor raises three claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with 
this Court.  He contends that (1) section 775.082(2) requires that all death-
sentenced capital felons receive life sentences without parole; (2) he is entitled to a 
new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), because the jury 
verdict at the sentencing phase was not unanimous; and (3) appellate counsel 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise an Ake v. Oklahoma, 
470 U.S. 68 (1985), claim on direct appeal.  As mentioned previously, we find 
merit in Caylor’s second claim and grant him a new penalty phase.   
Application of Hurst v. Florida  
 
Caylor argues that he is entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. 
Florida, because the jury verdict at the sentencing phase was not unanimous.  
During the pendency of Caylor’s case, the United States Supreme Court found 
Florida’s death penalty scheme unconstitutional.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 
619.  We have interpreted Hurst v. Florida to require a jury to unanimously find 
each aggravating factor, that the aggravating factors are sufficient to warrant death, 
and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigation.  See Hurst v. State, 202 
So. 3d 40, 57-58, 66-69 (Fla. 2016).  We have also determined that most 
defendants sentenced to death after the Ring decision should receive the benefit of 
 
 
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Hurst.  See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016).  Caylor, whose sentence 
was final in 2012, is one such defendant.   
 
Because Hurst applies to Caylor, we must consider whether it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found all 
the facts necessary for the imposition of death and unanimously recommended 
death, such that any Hurst error is harmless.  See Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1284.  In 
this case, the jury’s recommendations of death were not unanimous and the jury 
made no findings concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The 
jury recommended death for the murder of Melinda Hinson by a vote of eight to 
four.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that the error in Caylor’s penalty phase was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, Caylor is entitled to a new 
penalty phase.4 
Section 775.082(2) 
 
Caylor also argues that section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2016), requires 
that all death sentenced capital felons receive life sentences without parole.  We 
previously rejected this claim in Hurst.  Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 65 (“[W]e conclude 
that the statute does not mandate automatic commutation to life sentences after the 
                                          
 
 
4.  Because we find that Caylor is entitled to a new penalty phase, we do not 
address Caylor’s argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
an Ake claim on direct appeal.   
 
 
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decision in Hurst v. Florida.”).  Therefore, we deny Caylor’s claim that he is 
entitled to a life sentence under section 775.082(2). 
CONCLUSION  
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief.  However, we grant Caylor habeas relief, vacate his death 
sentence as unconstitutional under Hurst, and remand to the trial court for a new 
penalty phase.   
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County,  
James Ball Fensom, Judge - Case No. 032008CF002244XXAXMX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Michael P. Reiter, Ocala, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Marilyn Muir 
Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent