Title: O'Donnell-Lamont and Lamont
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50551
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2004

FILED:  June 10, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
RAYNE ELIZABETH O'DONNELL-LAMONT (deceased),
Petitioner,
and
MICHAEL DAVID LAMONT, JR.,
Respondent on Review,
and
CHRISTINE AND PATRICK O'DONNELL,
Petitioners on Review,
and
DARRELL MILLER,
Intervenor-Respondent.
(C98 1284 DR; CA A112960; SC S50551)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 12, 2004.
Eli D. Stutsman, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioners on review.  With him on the brief were
David L. Heifetz, Jacqueline Koch, and Koch &amp; Deering. 
Philip F. Schuster II, of Dierking &amp; Schuster, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
F.G. (Jamie) Troy II, of Law Office of Ronnee S. Kliewer,
Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Basic Rights Oregon,
Inc.  With him on the brief was Shaun Wardinsky, of Yates,
Matthews &amp; Marasch, P.C., Portland.
Darcia Krause, Portland, filed the brief for herself as
amicus curiae.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Steven L. Price, Judge. 184 Or App 249, 56 P3d 929 (2002), modified and adhered to
as modified by an equally divided court, 187 Or App 14, 67
P3d 939 (2003).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
We allowed review of this child custody proceeding to
consider the appropriate application of changes that the
legislature made to the third-party custody statute in 2001,
following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 US 57, 120 S Ct 2054, 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000).  The
trial court awarded custody of the two children in this
proceeding to maternal grandparents (grandparents) rather than to
father, and the Court of Appeals reversed.  O'Donnell-Lamont and
Lamont, 184 Or App 249, 56 P3d 929 (2002), modified and adhered
to as modified by an equally divided court, 187 Or App 14, 67 P3d
939 (2003).  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
I.  FACTS
In reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals that is
an appeal from a suit in equity, this court may review de novo or
may limit its review to questions of law.  ORS 19.415(4); see
State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 138, 36 P3d 490
(2001) (reviewing termination of parental rights case de novo). 
In this case, we elect to review the record de novo, because the
Court of Appeals did not address all the issues that we conclude
must be considered (including certain issues that depend on
factual findings), and our reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals on dispositive issues that it did consider otherwise
would require a remand to that court and the delay that
necessarily would attend further proceedings. (1)  In our de
novo review of the record, we give "considerable weight to the
findings of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses and their demeanor in evaluating the credibility of
their testimony."  State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 310 Or 176,
194, 796 P2d 1193 (1990).  We first review the facts leading up
to this custody dispute and then supplement those facts from the
record as needed in our discussion of the applicable legal
standards.  
We find the following facts.  Father and mother were
married in 1991 and had two children -- Taryn, born in 1992, and
Seaira, born in 1996.  Father and mother lived with grandparents
for several months after Taryn was born, then moved to the
Detroit Lake area near the paternal grandfather.  In 1994, mother
and Taryn, and later father, moved to Tualatin and then to
Hillsboro.  In both locations, the family lived within walking
distance of grandparents, and the children had day-to-day contact
with grandparents during much of that time.  The family chose to
live near grandparents in part because mother suffered from a
congenital heart defect, which later caused her death, and
grandparents provided childcare as well as emotional and, at
times, financial support.  Mother was the primary caregiver for
the children, in part because father worked as a long-haul truck
driver, which required him to be away from home several nights a
week.  At other times during the marriage, father worked as a
contractor and as a construction worker at job sites that
required him to be away from home.
Parents' marriage began to deteriorate in 1997, and
father and mother separated and reunited on several occasions. 
In March 1998, mother obtained a Family Abuse Prevention Act
restraining order against father, although mother apparently
enforced the order only when it suited her, and both mother and
father ignored the order at other times.  For example, mother and
father traveled together to Hawaii with the children in July
1998, despite the restraining order and the fact that, in April
1998, mother had petitioned to dissolve the marriage.  The
dissolution of parents' marriage became effective in September
1998.  Father had moved to Eugene, however, and did not take
advantage of all the parenting time provided for in the
dissolution decree.  Twice during father and mother's last
separation, father violated the restraining order in a manner
that was alarming or threatened violence to mother.  On one of
those occasions, father appeared at mother's residence when
mother and children were there.  The police subsequently arrested
him, and he pled guilty to violating the restraining order.
After the dissolution, mother began a relationship with
Darrell Miller.  In March 1999, Miller, mother, and the children
went to Disneyland.  While they were there, mother died of her
preexisting heart condition.  Miller and the children returned to
Oregon, where father and grandparents met them.
At the time of mother's death, father was working in
Eugene and living in a trailer.  Father acknowledged that his
living situation was not appropriate for the children, and father
and grandparents agreed that the children would stay with
grandparents.  Although father and grandparents at one point
anticipated that the children might live with grandparents for as
long as several years, during the summer of 1999 father
reasserted his right to custody of the children, which
grandparents disputed.  The parties attempted unsuccessfully to
mediate their dispute, and the children became the subject of a
tug of war between father and grandparents.  In July 1999, father
refused to return children to grandparents after a visit, without
telling grandparents in advance.  Later that month, grandparents,
while in possession of the children, sought and received a court
order awarding them temporary custody.  The court ordered the
children returned to father, who by that time had acquired a
house in Keizer.  Father assured the court that he would keep the
children in the Salem area.  However, despite that promise,
father moved to Montana with the children and his girlfriend,
Laura Oliver, in September 1999, without notice to the court or
grandparents.  Father refused to disclose his address in Montana
to grandparents and avoided grandparents' efforts to serve him
with legal papers.  The court found father in contempt and
ordered him to return the children to Oregon, which he did. 
After living in Montana for about six weeks, father, Oliver, and
the children moved to the Detroit Lake area, and father and
Oliver later purchased a house in Lyons.  
II.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After a hearing on the merits, the trial court in July
2000 awarded permanent custody to grandparents, with substantial
parenting time to father.  The trial court issued a letter
opinion making extensive findings of fact.  The trial court
relied on the testimony of the parties and numerous other
witnesses, including Dr. Edward Vien, a clinical psychologist
appointed by the court, who spent 27 hours interviewing family
members and conducting psychological tests.  The trial court
found that the children are bonded to father and to grandparents
and that father loves the children, has attempted to provide for
them, and has the potential to be a good custodial parent. 
However, the court also found that father had lied repeatedly
during the hearing, had an unstable job and residence history,
had used illegal substances during the marriage, had abused
mother, and had difficulty controlling his anger.  Although
father claimed to have overcome those problems, the trial court
found that he was "unconvincing."  Based on his testimony in the
trial court, the trial court found that father was "dishonest"
and that he lacked credibility.  For those and other reasons, the
trial court determined that father had serious shortcomings and
deficiencies as a parent.  
In regard to grandparents, the trial court found that
grandparents had provided the children with food, clothing,
shelter, and other physical necessities, as well as care,
education, and discipline.  The court noted that grandparents had
played a "closely supportive role" for many years in helping
mother raise the children.  The court also found that
grandparents had a more constructive interest in, and attitude
toward, the children than did father.  However, the court also
identified several negative factors regarding grandparents,
including grandparents' tendency to dote on the children, their
efforts to "control" father and the children, and their desire to
prevent father from having the children.
The trial court began its legal analysis with ORS
109.119 (1999), which, at the time of the hearing, established
the standards for the court to use in determining whether
grandparents had shown "emotional ties creating a child-parent
relationship" with the children. (2)  Having found that
grandparents had proved such a relationship, the court then
considered father's argument that, as the biological parent, he
had a "supervening right" to custody unless he was shown to be
unfit.  Father had argued that he was a fit legal parent and
that, under Hruby and Hruby, 304 Or 500, 748 P2d 57 (1987), the
court should award him custody in the absence of a "compelling
threat" to the present or future well-being of the children.  The
trial court rejected that argument, stating that this court's
decision in Sleeper and Sleeper, 328 Or 504, 982 P2d 1126 (1999),
had concluded that the applicable version of ORS 109.119 did not
incorporate Hruby's "compelling threat" standard.
Although the trial court rejected the "compelling
threat" standard as inconsistent with ORS 109.119 (1999), it
nevertheless concluded that, to protect a legal parent's
constitutional rights, Hruby required a "compelling reason" to
grant custody to a psychological parent over a legal parent.  The
court further noted that a psychological parent could meet the
"compelling reason" standard when the legal parent's custody
would be "highly detrimental" to the child.  Moreover, in
applying that standard, the trial court ruled that detrimental
conduct by the legal parent did not have to be shown; detrimental
circumstances would suffice.  
Reviewing the facts discussed above, the court found
that "father [was] not so unfit as to justify termination of his
parental rights" but that, given his shortcomings as a parent and
the grandparents' status as psychological parents, it was
appropriate for the court to determine custody based on the best
interests of the children.  Applying the nonexclusive
considerations respecting that standard that are listed in ORS
107.137, (3) the court determined that it was in the children's
best interests for the court to award custody to grandparents,
with substantial parenting time to father.  
The trial court also addressed the impact of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, which had been decided
after the hearing, but before the trial court opinion.  As
discussed in greater detail below, in Troxel, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause "protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children."  530 US at 66. 
The Court concluded that a Washington statute that authorized a
court to award visitation rights to any nonparent if the
"visitation may serve the best interest of the child"
unconstitutionally infringed the parent's right to make decisions
concerning the child.  Id. at 75.  The Court failed to articulate
the scope of the parent's right, holding only that, to meet due
process requirements, "at least some special weight" must be
given to a fit parent's determination of whether such visitation
is in the child's best interest.  Id. at 70.  
The trial court determined that its decision to award
custody to grandparents was consistent with Troxel.  The trial
court noted that the Court in Troxel had considered a "much
broader" state law that would have allowed "any person" to pursue
visitation rights and that the plurality opinion expressly had
rejected a harm standard, i.e., that the psychological parent
must show that the child will be harmed if left with the legal
parent for the psychological parent to prevail in a custody
dispute.  The trial court also pointed out that Oregon's
presumption, developed in the custody caselaw, that a fit parent
acts in the best interest of the child, was consistent with
Troxel's requirement to "accord at least some special weight to
the parent's own determination."  530 US at 70.  In the trial
court's view, because it had applied the presumption to which
father was entitled and nevertheless had determined that it would
be in the best interests of the children to award custody to
grandparents, its decision complied with the Oregon law then in
effect and met the due process requirements as stated in Troxel.  
Father appealed and, as noted, the Court of Appeals
reversed.  In the initial panel decision, that court, like the
trial court, applied ORS 109.119 (1999) in light of its
understanding of Troxel.  Unlike the trial court, however, the
Court of Appeals viewed Troxel as raising the standard previously
applied in Oregon for qualifying nonparents, like grandparents
here, to meet if they are to prevail over fit parents in a
custody dispute.  184 Or App at 254-55.  Specifically, the Court
of Appeals interpreted Troxel to require a showing by the
nonparents that was more similar to the "compelling threat"
standard articulated by this court in Hruby than to this court's
later, but still pre-Troxel, decisions such as Sleeper.  184 Or
App at 253-56.  The Court of Appeals stated:
"[T]o overcome the presumption in favor of father under
ORS 109.119(2)(a) (1997), grandparents must establish
that the evidence as a whole preponderates in their
favor, that is, that father cannot or will not provide
adequate love and care for the children or that
placement of the children in father's custody will
cause them undue physical or psychological harm. * * *
That means that the court must find by a preponderance
of the evidence either that the parent cannot or will
not provide adequate love and care or that the children
will face an undue risk of physical or psychological
harm in the parent's custody."
Id. at 256 (emphasis added).  Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals concluded that grandparents' evidence did
not rise to the level necessary to overcome the presumption that
father would act in the best interests of the children and was
entitled to custody.  Accordingly, that court reversed the
judgment of the trial court and remanded with instructions to
award custody to father.  Id. at 259.
Grandparents petitioned for reconsideration, arguing
that the Court of Appeals should have applied the 2001 amendments
to ORS 109.119 in its de novo review of the trial court decision. 
As noted, the legislature adopted those amendments after Troxel. 
The amendments replaced the existing statute, which allowed a
court to award custody to a nonparent who met certain criteria,
if the court determined that custody was "appropriate in the
case" and was "in the best interest of the child."  ORS
109.119(3)(a) (1999).  As discussed in detail below, the 2001
amendments established a statutory presumption that a legal
parent acts in the best interest of the child and identified the
kinds of factors a court may consider in determining whether a
nonparent seeking custody of a child has rebutted that
presumption.  The 2001 amendments had been adopted after the
trial court's decision, but before the argument in the Court of
Appeals.  
The Court of Appeals, en banc, agreed with grandparents
and modified the panel opinion to state that the 2001 amendments
"are fully retroactive."  187 Or App at 17.  The court was
divided, however, regarding the effect of the 2001 amendments on
its decision and on the appropriate disposition of the case. 
Judge Edmonds, the author of the panel decision, joined by three
other members of the court, concluded that the result under the
2001 amendments would be the same as the panel's decision,
declined to remand for further trial court proceedings under the
2001 amendments, and adhered to the panel opinion as modified. 
Three additional opinions were filed.  In all, five members of
the court adhered to the panel decision, as modified, and five
members dissented in part, arguing that the case should be
remanded for further development of the record.  Because the
court was evenly divided, the court adhered to the panel decision
as modified.
III.  THE 2001 AMENDMENTS TO ORS 109.119
A.  Background
This court has not been required, prior to this case,
to address Troxel or the changes to ORS 109.119 that the
legislature adopted after Troxel.  For that reason, it will be
helpful to review the nature of the dispute before this court and
to examine the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, before turning
to our statutory analysis.
This case involves a third-party custody dispute
between grandparents and father.  In contrast to a proceeding to
terminate parental rights under ORS 419B.498 to 419B.530, the
state is not a party to this case, no one claims that father is
"unfit" to be a parent, and father's status as a legal parent is
not at issue.  The only issue here is custody.  Although any
decision awarding custody to a third party is a serious intrusion
on a parent's right to care for and make decisions for a child,
it is less drastic than the termination of the parent-child
relationship and, as we discuss below, the statutory standard
also is less demanding.  See Stillman, 333 Or at 149-50 (parental
rights may be terminated only if parent is "unfit" and that
conduct or condition is "seriously detrimental" to children).  
A custody dispute also involves a less significant
interference with parental rights than does a juvenile dependency
proceeding in which the court determines that a child is within
the jurisdiction of the court based on a finding that a parent
has, among other things, abandoned the child or failed to provide
"care, guidance and protection necessary for the physical, mental
or emotional well-being" of the child, ORS 419B.100(A), (D).  In
those circumstances, as in a termination proceeding, the state
intervenes to relieve a parent of ordinary parental
responsibilities and to assume control over decisions about such
matters as shelter and health care.  
On the other hand, a custody decision involves a
greater potential intrusion on parental interests than a decision
regarding visitation.  Father here has more at stake than whether
the children are to spend every other weekend with grandparents. 
The decision as to who will have primary custody of the children
will alter in fundamental, unknowable ways the lives of the
children, father, and grandparents.  Courts make these difficult
decisions fully aware of their potential consequences for all the
individuals involved.
Another critical aspect of the background of the 2001
amendments to the third-party custody statute, and therefore of
our decision in this case, is the Supreme Court's decision in
Troxel, to which we now turn.  As noted, the parties agree that
the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 were adopted in response to
Troxel.  We begin with a review of what the Court decided -- and
what it did not decide -- in Troxel, because that discussion
provides important context for construing the amended statute.
In Troxel, the Court reviewed a decision of the
Washington Supreme Court that had considered three consolidated
challenges to a state statute that permitted nonparents to obtain
visitation rights if a court determined that visitation was in
the best interest of the child.  The Washington court had held
that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with the rights of
parents to rear their children.  That court found the statute to
be constitutionally deficient because it permitted the state to
interfere with the rights of parents to rear their children
without any threshold showing of harm to the children and also
because it allowed "any person" to petition for court-ordered
visitation of a child at "any time," contrary to a parent's
wishes, subject only to a best-interests-of-the-child standard. 
In re Smith, 137 Wash 2d 1, 15-20, 969 P2d 21, 28-31 (1998).  The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, although it did not adopt
the analysis of the Washington Court.
The Court held that the statute, as applied to the
facts there, violated the legal parent's fundamental right,
protected by the Due Process Clause, to make decisions concerning
the child.  The Court failed to produce a majority opinion. 
Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion, in which the Chief
Justice and Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined.  The plurality
held that the Due Process Clause "protects the fundamental right
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children."  Troxel, 530 US at 66.  The plurality
emphasized, however, that a parent's right to make decisions
related to a child is not absolute, but rather provides the basis
for a "presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of
their children."  Id. at 68.  The problem in Troxel, according to
the plurality, was "not that the Washington Superior Court
intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at
all to [mother's] determination of her daughters' best
interests."  Id. at 69.  The plurality stated that, when a
decision made by a fit parent is subject to judicial review, due
process requires that the court "accord at least some special
weight to the parent's own determination."  Id. at 70.  
The plurality, however, provided no specificity as to
the extent of the parents' right or the evidence required to
overcome the parental presumption.  Indeed, the plurality
expressly declined to "define * * * the precise scope of the
parental due process right in the visitation context."  Id. at
73.  Instead, the plurality stressed the nuanced, case-specific
nature of the inquiry.  It agreed with Justice Kennedy's
dissenting opinion that the constitutionality of any standard in
this area "turns on the specific manner in which that standard is
applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are
best 'elaborated with care.'"  Id., quoting 530 US at 101
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
Three other members of the Court, although not joining
in the plurality opinion, agreed that the Due Process Clause
protects parental interests in decisions regarding children, but 
that the parental interest is qualified.  Justice Souter wrote a
separate opinion concurring in the judgment.  He pointed out that
the Washington statute authorized "any person" at "any time" to
seek visitation rights "subject only to a free-ranging best-interests-of-the-child standard."  Id. at 76.  Because that
statute failed to give any recognition to the due process rights
of parents to make decisions regarding their children, Justice
Souter stated that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. 
Id. at 76-77.  Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion in which
he agreed that parents have a "fundamental liberty interest in
caring for and guiding their children," that that interest is not
absolute, and that the presumption that parents will act in the
best interests of their children is a rebuttable one.  Id. at 86-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens dissented,
however, because the plurality did not address what he viewed as
the Washington Supreme Court's erroneous holding that the federal
constitution "requires a showing of actual or potential 'harm' to
the child" to overcome the presumption that a fit parent acts in
the best interest of a child.  Id. at 86.  Justice Kennedy
dissented for the same reason, stating that the Washington court
erred in applying a "harm" standard to overcome the parents'
right to make decisions for their children.  Id. at 94, 101-02.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.  He stated
that, because the Due Process Clause protects a "fundamental
right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children," any
infringement of that right is subject to "strict scrutiny."  Id.
at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).  In his view, the State of
Washington lacked "even a legitimate governmental interest -- to
say nothing of a compelling one -- in second-guessing a fit
parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties."  Id.
Finally, Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that
the Due Process Clause provides no protection for "parental
rights," and the Washington legislature therefore was free to
adopt the "best interest" test that was challenged in Troxel. 
530 US at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The absence of a majority opinion in Troxel and the
array of viewpoints expressed in the six different opinions make
it difficult to identify the scope of the parental rights
protected by the Due Process Clause or the showing that the state
or a nonparent must make before a court may interfere with a
parent's custody or control of a child. (4)  However, two
conclusions safely can be drawn from Troxel.  First, with the
exception of Justice Scalia, all the members of the Court agreed
that the Due Process Clause protects, to some degree, a fit
parent's right to make decisions for a child.  Second, of the
eight justices who recognized a constitutional protection for
parental rights, only Justice Thomas concluded that the
constitution requires strict scrutiny of state actions that
intrude upon those rights. (5)  The other opinions articulated
an undefined but less exacting standard.  As noted, the plurality
held that "some special weight" must be given to a parent's
determination of what is in the child's best interest, but did
not elaborate on the nature or extent of that "weight." 
Nevertheless, a majority of the Court strongly indicated that the
presumption in favor of a parent's decisions was not so strong
that it could be overcome only by a showing that the parent poses
a risk of harm to the child.  As previously discussed, Justices
Stevens and Kennedy each expressly rejected the Washington
Supreme Court's conclusion that a finding of harm to the child is
required to overcome the parental presumption.  530 US at 85-86,
89-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 94-96 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).  Moreover, the plurality declined to consider the
lower court's reliance on the "harm" standard, id. at 73, but
cited with approval various statutes that would be inconsistent
with such a standard, id. at 70-71. (6)
The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel led directly to
the 2001 amendments to Oregon's statute regulating third-party
custody and visitation claims.  As previously discussed, ORS
109.119(3)(a) (1999) allowed a court to award custody to a
psychological parent if the court determined that custody "was
appropriate in the case" and was "in the best interest of the
child."  That statute was less "open-ended" than the Washington
statute at issue in Troxel, because it limited the class of third
parties who could seek custody or visitation and also because of
cases interpreting the statute to impose a presumption in favor
of the legal parent.  The statute nevertheless appeared likely to
draw a constitutional challenge under Troxel because it failed to
assign any special weight or deference to the legal parent's
interest in the custody and control of a child.  For that reason,
the legislature undertook to amend the statute.
B.  Retroactivity of the 2001 Amendments
Before we consider the legislature's 2001 amendments to
ORS 109.119, we must decide the threshold issue whether those
amendments are retroactive and therefore applicable to this case. 
Grandparents filed the custody petition in 1999, and the trial
occurred in 2000.  Father argues that the 2001 amendments apply
only to custody proceedings in which the petition seeking custody
was filed after July 31, 2001, the effective date of the 2001
amendments.  As noted, all members of the Court of Appeals
rejected that argument, agreeing that the legislature made the
2001 amendments applicable to all custody proceedings filed
"before, on or after" July 31, 2001.  187 Or App at 17-18.  We
agree with the Court of Appeals' determination of that issue and
do not address it further.
C.  The Text and Structure of ORS 109.119
We now turn to ORS 109.119, which establishes the law
that we must apply in determining custody as between a legal
parent, such as father, and other persons who have established a
child-parent relationship with a child, such as grandparents
here. (7)  That statute provides, in part:
"(1) [A]ny person, including but not limited to a
related or nonrelated foster parent, stepparent,
grandparent or relative by blood or marriage, who has
established emotional ties creating a child-parent
relationship * * * with a child may petition or file a
motion for intervention with the court having
jurisdiction over the custody * * * of that child, or
if no such proceedings are pending, may petition the
court * * * for an order providing for relief under
subsection (3) of this section.
"(2)(a) In any proceeding under this section, there is  
a presumption that the legal parent acts in the best
interest of the child.
" * * * * *
"(3)(a) If the court determines that a child-parent relationship exists and if the court determines
that the presumption described in subsection (2)(a) of
this section has been rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence, the court shall grant custody * * * to
the person having the child-parent relationship, if to
do so is in the best interest of the child. * * *
"* * * * *
"(4)(b) In deciding whether the presumption
described in subsection (2)(a) of this section has been
rebutted and whether to award custody, guardianship or
other rights over the objection of the legal parent,
the court may consider factors including, but not
limited to, the following, which may be shown by the
evidence:
"(A) The legal parent is unwilling or unable
to care adequately for the child;
"(B) The petitioner or intervenor is or
recently has been the child's primary caretaker; 
"(C) Circumstances detrimental to the child
exist if relief is denied;
"(D) The legal parent has fostered,
encouraged or consented to the relationship
between the child and the petitioner or
intervenor; or
"(E) The legal parent has unreasonably denied
or limited contact between the child and the
petitioner or intervenor." 
"* * * * *  
"(8) As used in this section:
"* * * * *
"(b) 'Circumstances detrimental to the child'
includes but is not limited to circumstances that may
cause psychological, emotional or physical harm to a
child."
Although, as this case demonstrates, application of ORS
109.119 to specific circumstances may involve difficult and close
determinations and the exercise of Solomonic judgment by the
finder of fact, the statute establishes a clear roadmap for that
decisionmaking process.  As noted, only persons who have
demonstrated a child-parent relationship with the child have the
right to seek custody under ORS 109.119.  ORS 109.119(1).  In
such a custody proceeding, the legal parent is presumed to act in
the best interest of the child.  ORS 109.119(2)(a).  That
presumption can be rebutted, however, by a preponderance of the
evidence, and the statute identifies five nonexclusive factors
that the court may consider in determining whether the
presumption has been rebutted (rebuttal factors).  ORS
109.119(3), (4)(b).  Finally, the statute provides that, if the
evidence rebuts the presumption in favor of the legal parent, the
court shall award custody to the person having the child-parent
relationship with the child, but only if to do so is in the best
interests of the child.  ORS 109.119(3)(a).
D.  The Parties' Contentions Regarding ORS 109.119
The parties agree that ORS 109.119 (2001) is facially
constitutional. (8)  They disagree, however, over the
interpretation of the statute and its application to this case. 
Grandparents contend that the evidence at trial supported each of
the five nonexclusive factors of ORS 109.119(4)(b) that the court
may consider in determining whether the evidence has rebutted the
presumption.  Grandparents argue first that undisputed evidence
supports the factors set out in ORS 109.119(4)(b)(B) and (D)
because grandparents had been the children's "primary caregivers"
in the months after mother's death, and father had "fostered,
encouraged or consented to" the relationship between grandparents
and the children.  Second, grandparents assert that the evidence
supported a finding under ORS 109.119(4)(b)(E) that father had
"unreasonably denied or limited contact" between the children and
grandparents by moving the children to Montana without notice to
grandparents and in violation of a court order.  Finally,
grandparents argue that father is "unwilling or unable to care
adequately" for the children and that "circumstances detrimental
to the child[ren] [would] exist" if the court awarded custody to
father, ORS 109.119(4)(b)(A) and (C), based on findings by the
trial court as to, among other things, father's job and home
instability, past substance abuse, difficulty in controlling his
anger, and dishonesty.
Father responds that the evidence at trial was not
sufficient to rebut the presumption that he acts in the best
interest of the children.  Father then makes a multifaceted legal
argument, the primary thrust of which is that the court should
interpret ORS 109.119 to permit rebuttal of the parental
presumption only by a showing that "the parent is unable to
adequately care for the child or that custodial placement with
the parent will harm the child."  (Emphasis added.)  If that
interpretation is not required by the words and legislative
history of ORS 109.119, father concludes, Troxel nevertheless
compels such a reading for the statute to be consistent with the
Due Process Clause.  Put another way, father argues that if ORS
109.119, as applied to the facts here, results in the award of
custody to grandparents, then that award would infringe his
rights under the Due Process Clause because grandparents have not
shown that father is unable or unwilling to care for the children
or that awarding custody to father will harm the children.
E.  Construction of ORS 109.119
Before we can evaluate the parties' competing
positions, we first must construe ORS 109.119.  We then can
consider the facts in this proceeding in light of that
construction.  
The 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 were intended to
make that statute consistent with the due process requirements
articulated in Troxel, but not to make broader changes in custody
law. (9) Nothing in the text of the 2001 amendments or in the
legislative history indicates that the legislature intended to
make any change to the custody standard other than the protection
of the parental right recognized in Troxel.  Thus, as we examine
ORS 109.119, we do so in view of the legislature's intent to meet
the constitutional mandate of Troxel which, as we discussed
above, requires a court, in making custody or visitation
decisions, to accord some special weight to a parent's
determination of what is in the child's best interest.  ORS
109.119(2)(a) purports to implement that mandate by establishing
"a presumption that the legal parent acts in the best interest of
the child."  However, as discussed above and as permitted by
Troxel, that presumption can be rebutted.  ORS 109.119(3)(a)
provides that, "if the court determines that the presumption * * * has been rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall grant custody * * * to the person having the child-parent relationship, if to do so is in the best interest of the
child."  
The difficult issue in construing this statute is to
determine how demanding the burden is on the nonparent to rebut
the parental presumption.  As noted, father's argument suggests
that the nonparent's burden is a "heavy" one that can be met only
by showing that a parent is unable to care for the child or will
harm the child.  Grandparents do not articulate any specific
standard, other than to repeat the words of the statute, but
suggest that the parental presumption "easily" can be rebutted by
evidence of any one of the five nonexclusive factors listed in
ORS 109.119(4)(b).
Such characterizations of the evidence to rebut the
parental presumption are of limited utility.  Rather than place
any further adjectival gloss on the burden that an otherwise
qualified nonparent must meet, we offer the following
observations respecting the operation of the statute, in the hope
that they will assist courts in applying the statute in future
cases.  First, the legislature used the basic "preponderance of
the evidence" standard for cases such as this, involving a
custody petition by a nonparent who has a parent-child
relationship with the child, while imposing the more demanding
"clear and convincing evidence" standard when a person with an
"ongoing personal relationship" seeks to overcome the parental
presumption and obtain visitation or other rights regarding a
child.  ORS 109.119(3)(b).  
Second, as previously discussed, the legislature
specifically identified five factors that may be considered in
determining whether the presumption has been rebutted.  ORS
109.119(4)(b).  By stating that those factors are nonexclusive
and by including, as relevant factors, whether the nonparent
recently has been the child's primary caretaker and whether the
legal parent has consented to the relationship between the child
and the nonparent, the legislature demonstrated that the parental
presumption can be rebutted without a showing that the parent
will harm the child or is unable to care for the child.  
Third, the legislature could have imposed a more
rigorous standard than the standard that we have read Troxel to
require.  However, as discussed above, the legislature declined
to do so.  That fact further supports the conclusion that the
presumption can be overcome without showing that a parent is
unable to care for the child or will harm the child.  Troxel
holds only that the Due Process Clause requires that "some
special weight" be given to the interest of the legal parent, and
nothing in the amendments to ORS 109.119 suggests that the
legislature intended its use of the rebuttable parental
presumption to impose a higher standard.  
Finally, as previously discussed, we note that the
consequences of a custody decision are less drastic, and the
statutory requirements for such a decision correspondingly less
exacting, than when the state petitions to terminate a parent's
rights because the parent is "unfit" or to have a child
determined to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
because the parent has failed to provide necessary care.  
Accordingly, although we recognize the significance of
the parental interest protected by the presumption embodied in
ORS 109.119(2)(a), we nevertheless take the legislature at its
word (as we must) when it determined that the presumption could
be overcome by a showing, based on the preponderance of the
evidence, that a parent does not act in the best interest of the
child, and left to the courts as triers of fact the task of
deciding whether the nonparents had made that showing in any
particular case.
We therefore turn to the other critical issue of
statutory construction in this case, namely, what evidence must a
nonparent seeking custody present to show that the legal parent
does not act in the best interest of the child.  We will discuss
each of the five rebuttal factors listed in the statute when we
review the evidence in this case.  But we first must resolve the
issue of whether evidence that supports less than all those
factors -- or other evidence not encompassed within the
enumerated factors -- is sufficient to rebut the statutory
presumption.
Grandparents point out that the statute phrases the
five rebuttal factors in the disjunctive, rather than the
conjunctive.  That phrasing suggests that, in an appropriate
case, a court could conclude that the presumption was rebutted
based on evidence of the existence of only one factor, provided
that the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the nonparent had overcome the presumption that the legal parent
acts in the best interest of the child.  There may be cases in
which the parent is so obviously unwilling or unable to care
adequately for the child that a court could conclude that the
parental presumption was rebutted, despite the absence of
evidence of any of the other four factors.  Conversely, a
nonparent may be able to present some evidence of each of the
five enumerated factors and yet be unable to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the legal parent fails to act
in the best interest of the child.  In specific cases, the weight
to be given to each of the five statutory factors, to the
evidence supporting those factors, and to other relevant
evidence, will vary.  The statutory touchstone is whether the
evidence at trial overcomes the presumption that a legal parent
acts in the best interest of the child, not whether the evidence
supports one, two, or all five of the nonexclusive factors
identified in ORS 109.119(4)(b).
This court has taken the approach set out above in
construing other statutes in which the legislature has provided a
nonexclusive list of factors for a court to consider in making a
determination under the statute.  In Stillman, for example, this
court interpreted and applied ORS 419B.504, which describes the
standard for determining when parental rights may be terminated
because of parental unfitness.  The statutory standard was
whether the parent was "unfit by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child," and the statute provided
that, in making that determination, the court was to consider six
nonexclusive factors, including the parent's "emotional illness,"
"physical neglect of the child," and "criminal conduct that
impairs the parent's ability to provide adequate care of the
child."  333 Or at 144-45 (quoting ORS 419B.504).  In construing
that statute, this court stated:
"[T]he legislature has provided a nonexclusive list of
six examples of conduct and conditions that courts must
consider, both in determining whether a parent is unfit
and in determining whether the parent's disqualifying
circumstances are not likely to change.  But those
statutory examples are just that -- examples.  The
focus of that part of the statute is on the parent's
conduct or condition."
333 Or at 146.  Similarly, the focus of the statute here is not
on whether one or more of the statutory factors are present, but
on whether the evidence as a whole is sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the parent acts in the best interest of the
child. (10)  
Father is probably correct that, ordinarily, a
nonparent seeking to overcome the parental presumption will do so
by proving that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide
adequate care or that the parent is likely to cause harm to the
child.  However, nothing in the text of ORS 109.119 or in Troxel
suggests that such proof is required for the nonparent to rebut
the presumption that the parent acts in the best interest of the
child.
IV.  APPLICATION OF ORS 109.119
We now consider the evidence in this case in light of
our construction of the controlling statute.  As noted, no party
has argued to this court that grandparents have not established a
"child-parent relationship," as defined in ORS 109.119(8)(a)
(2001), with each child.  The trial court found that they had
established such relationships, and the Court of Appeals did not
disagree.  Accordingly, grandparents may seek custody of the
children under ORS 109.119.  Neither does any party argue that
father is not a "legal parent" entitled to the presumption set
out in ORS 109.119(2)(a) that he acts in the best interests of
the children. (11)  The parties disagree, however, as to
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to rebut that
statutory presumption.
A.  Findings as to the Rebuttal Factors
The first rebuttal factor is whether the "legal parent
is unwilling or unable to care adequately for the child."  ORS
109.119(4)(b)(A).  It should be obvious that, if a nonparent
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent is
"unwilling" or "unable" to care for the child, the nonparent will
have rebutted the presumption that the parent acts in the best
interest of the child.  However, consideration of this factor
does not allow the court to substitute its judgment for that of a
parent by determining that the nonparent is better able to care
for the child.  The legislature's use of the word "adequate"
suggests that the parent must have the willingness and ability to
provide something more than a bare subsistence level of care for
the child, but that it would be inappropriate to compare a
parent's "adequate" care with a nonparent's "more than adequate"
care in considering this factor.
Here, grandparents assert that the evidence described
above demonstrates that father is "unwilling or unable to care
adequately" for the children.  ORS 109.119(4)(b)(A).  We
disagree.  Although grandparents claim that father's job and
residential instability and other personal issues show father's
shortcomings as a parent, those facts do not demonstrate that
father is "unwilling" or "unable" to care adequately for the
children as those terms are used in the statute.  On the
contrary, father plainly is willing to care for the children, and
the evidence at trial, including the report and testimony of the
court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Vien, does not support
grandparents' assertion that father is "unable" to provide
"adequate" care.  
Grandparents' argument that the "adequate care" factor
favors their claim for custody boils down to the assertion that
they are better able to care for the children than father is and
that they will provide "better than adequate" care.  Whether or
not that claim is true, as to the rebuttal factor identified in
ORS 109.119(4)(b)(A), only evidence that father is "unwilling or
unable to care adequately" for the child is relevant in the
process of determining whether grandparents have rebutted the
presumption of parental fitness.  See also Troxel, 530 US at 72-73 ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe
on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing
decisions simply because a judge believes a 'better' decision
could be made.").  We find that grandparents have not shown that
father is "unwilling or unable to care adequately" for the
children.  
We next consider whether grandparents have shown that
they "[are] or recently [have] been the child[ren]'s primary
caretaker[s]."  ORS 109.119(4)(b)(B).  This factor focuses on the
interest in continuity of caregiving and the relationship between
the child and the nonparent seeking custody.  As noted,
grandparents had an unusually close and positive relationship
with the children for many years, and mother and children (and,
at times, father) lived with grandparents on occasion.  After
mother's death in March 1999, grandparents were the children's
primary caretakers for more than three months.  We find that
grandparents have shown that they are or recently have been the
children's primary caretakers.
The third factor identified in the statute is whether
"circumstances detrimental to the child exist" if the relief
sought by the nonparent is denied.  ORS 109.119(4)(b)(C).  In
contrast to terms used in the other rebuttal factors,
"circumstances detrimental to the child" is defined in the
statute.  ORS 109.119(8)(b) (2001).  That definition states that
the phrase includes, but is not limited to, "circumstances that
may cause psychological, emotional or physical harm to a child." 
Because the circumstances of living with father may cause such
harm, grandparents assert, the evidence supports that rebuttal
factor.  
Father responds that this factor requires grandparents
to show that the circumstances, if he retains custody of the
children, would be presently detrimental to the children.  He
further argues that, if "detrimental circumstances" is defined in
an open-ended way to include circumstances that may cause
psychological, physical, or emotional harm to a child at some
future time, that interpretation would reduce the showing
required to rebut the parental presumption to a level that would
be inconsistent with Troxel and essentially would reinstate a
"best interest of the child" standard.  
Father is correct that the statutory rebuttal factor of
whether "[c]ircumstances detrimental to the child exist if relief
is denied," ORS 109.119(4)(b)(C), by using the present tense of
the verb "exist," focuses on whether present circumstances cause
present detriment to the child.  In comparison, the definition of
that phrase in ORS 109.119(8)(b) (2001) appears to broaden the
permissible inquiry to include circumstances that "may" in the
future cause harm to the child.  It also is true that, although
the vast majority of parents seek to avoid physical harm to their
children, life in almost any family includes circumstances that
"may cause psychological [or] emotional * * * harm."  ORS
109.119(8)(b) (2001) (emphasis added).  Our task, of course, is
to interpret the statute as the legislature intended, and we look
first to the words that the legislature used.  Examining those
words, we conclude that "circumstances detrimental to the child,"
as used in ORS 109.119(4)(b)(C), refers to circumstances that
pose a serious present risk of psychological, emotional, or
physical harm to a child.  We reach that conclusion because the
purpose of that rebuttal factor, within the context of ORS
109.119, is to aid the finder of fact in determining whether a
nonparent has overcome the presumption that the legal parent acts
in the best interest of the child.  That presumption would be
almost meaningless if it could be overcome by evidence that the
circumstances of living with a legal parent "may cause
psychological, emotional, or physical harm to a child."  Based on
the text and structure of the statute, we conclude that the
legislature intended that, to rebut the statutory presumption
that the legal parent acts in the best interests of the child by
showing that "circumstances detrimental to the child exist if
relief is denied," the nonparent must demonstrate that the
circumstances of living with the legal parent pose a serious
present risk of psychological, emotional, or physical harm to the
child.
In support of this factor, grandparents again point to
evidence of father's substance abuse and anger control problems
and his relationship with Oliver, who also has substance abuse
and anger problems and who lost custody of two of her own three
children.  They emphasize the trial court's finding that father
has limited insight, lies whenever it suits him, is insensitive
to the children's emotional needs, and would end the children's
longstanding child-parent relationship with grandparents.  They
further argue that father leads an unstable life, with frequent
changes of jobs and residences.  They note that, during the
approximately nine months that children lived with father during
1999 and 2000, the family lived at four different addresses and
that, as a result, Taryn attended three different schools during
his first year of elementary school.  For those reasons,
grandparents argue, "circumstances detrimental to the child[ren]"
would exist if grandparents are denied custody.  
Applying the standard that we articulated above, we
find that grandparents have shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that awarding custody to father would pose a serious
present risk of psychological or emotional harm to the children.
Based on the testimony of Dr. Vien and others, we find that
father's lack of understanding of the children's emotional and
developmental needs, his difficulty in controlling his own anger,
and his lack of insight, considered together, pose a serious risk
of psychological or emotional harm to the children.  Father fails
to recognize the emotional attachment that the children have to
grandparents and other relatives of mother or the impact on the
children of the family's changes of residence.  Father was unable
to acknowledge or identify a single possible shortcoming that he
might have as a parent.  Father similarly could identify no
potential weakness that Oliver might have as a caregiver for the
children, despite acknowledging her earlier marijuana and
methamphetamine use, anger control problems, loss of custody of
two of her own children, and failure to complete a drug
rehabilitation program.  Dr. Vien stated that father likely would
be "overwhelmed by the demands of single parenthood" and would
need to rely on Oliver as a significant caregiver for the
children.  We find that Oliver's deficiencies as a caregiver, and
father's complete failure to acknowledge any of them, both
indicate a serious risk to the well-being of the children if
father were granted custody.  
As to grandparents' assertions that father's frequent
changes of jobs and addresses demonstrate "circumstances
detrimental" to the children, our conclusions require some
elaboration.  In our view, the fact that a parent changes jobs or
addresses frequently does not demonstrate "circumstances
detrimental to the child" that are sufficient to rebut the
presumption in favor of the parent.  Although, other things being
equal, frequent changes of school and residence are not ideal for
children, such changes are a fact of life for many families.  A
parent who serves in the military, works for a large corporation,
or labors in the fields may be required to move often.  Such
moves do not necessarily indicate that the parent fails to act in
the best interests of the children. (12)  In this case,
however, the evidence is different.  Although some of father's
testimony was contradictory, it is apparent that most of his
changes of jobs and residences, as reflected in this record, were
not required by financial, employment, or other external
circumstances.  Rather, the evidence shows that father's moves
were choices that he made independent of the necessities of life
as described above but, instead, usually because he wanted to
leave behind problems or conflicts with other people.  The trial
court found, for example, that father's testimony that he moved
to Montana for a "fresh start" showed a "lack of insight into how
to constructively deal with problems."  Moreover, father's moves
during the time that he had custody of the children often were
abrupt and undertaken with minimal planning or consideration of
the interests of the children.  Accordingly, although we
emphasize that a parent's frequent changes of jobs and
residences, by themselves, do not tend to show "circumstances
detrimental to a child," when, as here, the parent chooses to
move often not because of employment or other external
considerations but simply because of a desire to move, and the
parent fails to consider the impact of the moves on the child,
those moves can be relevant to the determination whether the
parent fails to act in the best interest of the child.
Having reviewed the entire record, we find that
circumstances detrimental to the children would exist if custody
is granted to father.
The next rebuttal factor is whether the "legal parent
has fostered, encouraged or consented to the relationship between
the child and the [nonparent]."  ORS 109.119(4)(b)(D).  This
factor recognizes that if a parent encouraged or approved of a
longstanding pattern of contact or informal custody arrangements
involving a grandparent or psychological parent, then the legal
parent, at least at one point, apparently believed that that
relationship was beneficial, or at least not detrimental, to the
child.  
Here, it is undisputed that father consented to the
development over many years of a close relationship between
grandparents and the children and that he agreed that children
should live with grandparents in the immediate aftermath of
mother's death.  Father argues, however, that it would be unfair
to him to permit his consent to allowing the children to live
with grandparents during that time to be used to rebut the
parental presumption.  After all, father points out, he consented
because he understood that he was not prepared on short notice to
take custody of the children, and his consent properly could be
seen as an action taken in the best interests of the children. 
At this point in the statutory analysis, however, we do not
consider father's motives or intentions in consenting to the
relationship between grandparents and the children, but only
whether he, as the legal parent, encouraged or consented to it. 
We find that he did.  As we discuss later, however, we agree with
father that this factor should not be accorded any weight in
rebutting the parental presumption in this case, because the fact
that father consented to grandparents serving as primary
caregivers and otherwise having a close relationship with the
children does not indicate in any way that he does not act in the
best interests of the children.  
The final rebuttal factor listed in the statute is
whether the "legal parent has unreasonably denied or limited
contact between the child and the [nonparent]."  ORS
109.119(4)(b)(E).  Like the factor just discussed, this factor
focuses on the relationship between the child and a nonparent
and, specifically, on the potential harm to a child's interest
when a parent terminates or limits such a relationship. 
Grandparents argue that father "unreasonably denied or limited
contact" between the children and grandparents, ORS
109.119(4)(b)(E), by moving the children with him and Oliver to
Montana, in violation of a court order.  The trial court, based
on that action and the court's assessment of father's credibility
in light of his trial testimony, stated, "Father's conduct
convinces me that he will remove the children from this area if
possible and will do all he can to eliminate contact between the
children and the Grandparents."  We agree.  
Father argues that it is unfair to penalize him for
limiting grandparents' contact with the children when
grandparents also took steps to limit his contact with the
children.  He points out that, after the children spent two weeks
with grandparents in July 1999, with father's consent,
grandparents did not return the children to father.  Instead,
grandparents sought a court order ex parte contending that the
children should remain with them.  As noted previously, they
obtained a court order, but it was vacated soon thereafter and
the children were returned to father.  Although father suggests
that his conduct in taking the children to Montana was no
different than grandparents' conduct in failing to return the
children after the two-week visit and seeking a custody order, he
is mistaken.  Father left for Montana in violation of a court
order, in breach of his promise to the trial judge, and without
notice to grandparents or the court.  Once in Montana, father
refused to disclose his location and did not return the children
until the court found him in contempt of court.  We find that
father unreasonably denied or limited contact between the
children and grandparents.  
B.  Determination Whether Presumption Has Been Rebutted
To summarize the discussion above, grandparents have
shown that some, but not all, of the rebuttal factors are present
in this case.  We now consider whether the evidence here is
sufficient to rebut the presumption that father acts in the best
interests of the children.  As we discussed above, our focus is
not on specific factors but on whether, based on the totality of
the circumstances, grandparents have rebutted the presumption
that father acts in the best interests of the children. 
In this case, we have found facts that support four of
the factors, and we place particular emphasis on three of them: 
grandparents' role as primary caretakers to the children after
mother's death; father's denial of contact between the children
and grandparents by moving the children to Montana; and the risk
to the children that granting custody to father will be
detrimental to them. (13)  ORS 109.119(4)(b)(B), (C), (E). 
First, grandparents were closely involved in the lives of the
children for many years and stepped into the role of primary
caretakers immediately upon mother's death; grandparents did not
simply show up for the first time seeking custody after mother's
death.  Second, father's removal of the children to Montana not
only prevented contact between grandparents and the children, but
also violated a court order and father's in-court promise to a
judge.  Moreover, it significantly disrupted the children's
lives, as discussed above.  Finally, and most importantly, as to
whether awarding custody to father would be "detrimental" to the
children, we conclude that the evidence demonstrates that such an
award would pose a serious present risk of psychological or
emotional harm to the children.  The statute requires us to
examine whether the evidence in support of each identified factor
(and any other evidence relevant to rebutting the presumption),
when taken as a whole, rebuts the presumption.  ORS
109.119(3)(a).  Considering all the evidence, we conclude, on de
novo review, that grandparents have rebutted, by a preponderance
of the evidence, the presumption that father acts in the best
interests of the children.  
C. Consideration of Whether Awarding Custody to Grandparents Is
in Best Interests of the Children
Based on our finding that grandparents have rebutted
the parental presumption, the statute provides that we "shall
grant custody" to grandparents "if to do so is in the best
interest of the child[ren]."  ORS 109.119(3)(a).  Making that
determination is a separate statutory inquiry from whether the
presumption that the parent acts in the best interest of the
child has been rebutted under ORS 109.119(4)(b).  Here, however,
we have explored the evidence in the record thoroughly in our
discussion above, and it would serve no purpose to review that
evidence again.  It is sufficient to state that we conclude,
based on the evidence in the record, that granting custody to
grandparents is in the children's best interests.  
V.  FATHER'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Our conclusion that granting custody to grandparents is
in the children's best interests does not end our inquiry,
however, because father argues that, applied in this manner, ORS
109.119 violates his state and federal constitutional rights.  We
begin with father's state constitutional argument.  
A.  Father's State Constitutional Argument
Although father does not argue that ORS 109.119 is
facially unconstitutional, he does assert that, if the statute is
applied so as to deny him custody here, then that application of
the statute would violate the "remedy clause" of Article I,
section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that
"every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done
him in his person, property, or reputation." (14)  In reaching
that conclusion, father relies upon cases in which this court has
held that the remedy clause prohibits the state from eliminating
a common-law cause of action for injury to a right protected by
Article I, section 10, unless the state provides a
constitutionally adequate substitute.  However, father's advocacy
falls far short of demonstrating how any "remedy," as that term
is used in Article I, section 10, is implicated at all by the
legislative choice embodied in ORS 109.119.  We therefore do not
address the subject further.
B. Father's Federal Constitutional Argument
We now turn to father's federal constitutional
argument.  As we noted at the outset, father does not argue that
ORS 109.199 is unconstitutional on its face.  He does claim,
however, that the statute is unconstitutional in its application
unless the evidence introduced to rebut the statutory presumption
that a parent acts in the best interests of the child
demonstrates that the legal parent is unable to care adequately
for the child or that custodial placement with the legal parent
will harm the child.  That is so, father argues, because Troxel
holds that the Due Process Clause requires that "at least some
special weight" be given to a fit parent's determination of what
is in the child's best interest.  530 US at 70.  Father asserts
that, if the statute allows the constitutional "presumption that
fit parents act in the best interests of their children," id. at
68, to be rebutted by evidence short of demonstrating either
present harm to the child or the parent's inability to care for
the child, then that application of the statute violates the
parent's due process rights.  
Father certainly is correct that ORS 109.119, as we  
have interpreted it above, permits the presumption that the legal
parent acts in the best interest of the child to be rebutted by
evidence that does not rise to the level of showing that the
legal parent is unable to care for the child or that granting
custody to the legal parent will cause harm to the child.  That
is the state of the evidence in this case.  Father is wrong,
however, in arguing that Troxel requires some showing beyond that
made by grandparents in this case.  
As our earlier discussion of Troxel demonstrates, that
case does not sweep as broadly as father asserts.  Troxel
specifically declined to address the so-called "harm" standard,
and it also failed to articulate an "inadequate care"
requirement.  Rather, the due process right that the Supreme
Court affirmed in Troxel is important, but limited:  a court may
not override a parent's decision about the care or custody of a
child simply because the court determines that the decision is
not in the child's best interest, as the trial court did in
Troxel regarding a grandparent's interest in visitation. 
Instead, the court must presume that a fit parent's decision is
in the best interest of the child, and the court may reach a
decision contrary to the wishes of the parent only if there is
evidence sufficient to overcome that presumption.  Troxel goes no
further.
Troxel does require the state to give "some special
weight" to the interest of a parent in decisions regarding a
child.  ORS 109.119, as we have interpreted and applied it here,
responds to that mandate and appropriately protects father's due
process rights.  In our factual findings and legal conclusions,
we have followed the statute and presumed that father acts in the
best interests of the children.  We have considered a petition by
grandparents who have the status, under the statute, of
psychological parents.  We have examined factors reasonably
identified by the legislature as relevant to making a custody
decision, and we have concluded, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the evidence in support of those factors overcomes
the presumption that father will act in the best interests of the
children.  Father received the deference to his due process
rights that Troxel requires.  For the foregoing reasons, we award
custody of the children to grandparents, with parenting time, as
determined by the trial court, to father.
Finally, we pause to recognize the limitations of the
appellate process in dealing with cases of this kind.  As we
noted at the outset, we have reviewed the record de novo and also
have determined (with the parties' agreement) not to remand to
the trial court for additional development of the record.  We
have done so, in large part, because of the need for finality in
this case.  That important consideration, however, carries with
it the consequence that we have reviewed a record that now is
three years old.  The children certainly have changed during that
time, and the lives of father and grandparents also may have
changed in ways that, if part of the record, would cause us to
view some of the issues in this case differently than we have. 
But that unfortunate temporal handicap of appellate
decisionmaking does not diminish the need for a final resolution
to these proceedings, which this disposition provides.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. We also note that the parties agreed at oral argument in this court that the factual record
developed in the trial court was sufficient to resolve the issues in this case and that a remand to
the trial court to take additional evidence is unnecessary.
2. ORS 109.119 (1999) provided in part:
"(1)  Any person, including but not limited to a related or nonrelated foster
parent, stepparent or relative by blood or marriage who has established emotional
ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal relationship with a
child, or any legal grandparent may petition or file a motion for intervention with
the court having jurisdiction over the custody, placement, guardianship or
wardship of that child, or if no such proceedings are pending, may petition the
court for the county in which the minor child resides for an order providing for
relief under subsection (3) of this section.
"* * * * *
"(3)(a) If the court determines that a child-parent relationship exists and if
the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that custody,
guardianship, right of visitation, or other generally recognized right of a parent or
person in loco parentis, is appropriate in the case, the court shall grant such
custody, guardianship, right of visitation or other right to the person, if to do so is
in the best interest of the child.  The court may determine temporary custody of
the child or temporary visitation rights under this paragraph pending a final
order."
The 2001 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 109.119, and we discuss those
amendments in detail below.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 21-32); see Or Laws 2001, ch 873, §§ 1,
1a, 1e.  The 2003 Legislative Assembly also amended the statute, but those amendments do not
affect the decision in the case before us.  See Or Laws 2003, ch 143, §§ 1-2; ch 231, §§ 4-5; ch
576, §§ 138-139.  All subsequent references to ORS 109.119 are to the 2001 version, unless
otherwise noted.
3. 
ORS 107.137 provides a nonexclusive set of factors for courts to consider in determining
the "best interests and welfare" of a minor child when deciding to whom to award custody of the
child in the context of a dissolution proceeding.  Although ORS 107.137 is part of the marital
dissolution statute, this court has approved the use of that standard in determining the "best
interests of the child" under the third-party custody statute, ORS 109.119.  Sleeper and Sleeper,
328 Or at 511.
4. 
See Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle:  Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000
Sup Ct Rev 279, 312 (2001) ("A detailed search [of Troxel] for some concrete criteria produces a
handful of near contentless assertions about what the constitutional protection allows and
requires."); The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -- Leading Cases, 114 Harv L Rev 229, 229 (2000)
("[T]he plurality's failure to elaborate on the mechanics of the constitutional standard will leave
judges, legislators, and individual litigants without adequate guidance.").
5. 
See Buss, 2000 Sup Ct Rev at 283 (Except for the separate opinions of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, "all four [opinions] recognized some constitutional protection for parental rights, but
none suggested that the right is particularly strong.").
6. 
For a discussion of the consideration of the "harm" standard in the various Troxel
opinions, see Buss, 2000 Sup Ct Rev at 283, 303-05.
7. 
Former ORS 109.119(8)(a) (2001), renumbered as ORS 109.119(10)(a) (2003), defines
the term "child-parent relationship."  Here, the trial court found, and father does not dispute, that
grandparents established a "child-parent relationship" within the meaning of the statute. 
Accordingly, we do not discuss further that aspect of ORS 109.119.
8. 
It follows that there is no issue before us respecting the constitutionality of ORS 109.119
(2001), and we express no opinion concerning that issue.
9. 
Representative Lane Shetterly, who sponsored the legislation, stated the drafters'
intentions before the House Judiciary Committee:
"What I would emphasize to the committee is that my charge to the work
group, which I think they maintained very well, was that our focus would be
limited to addressing those issues raised by the Troxel case.  That is, we already
had third-party visitation and custody in the Oregon statutes, uh, the Troxel case
raised issues as to constitutionality under its analysis of the Washington statute. 
And so the charge to the work group which I think they held to very well, and so
did the subcommittee, was that we would only deal with those issues raised by the
Troxel case, and try not to get into re-debating the fundamental issues of third-party visitation, or trying to make changes in those statutes that went beyond the *
* * issues raised by the Troxel case.  I would invite anyone to bring another bill to
raise those broader issues, but this is one of these things we need to do, and so to
get it done, we kept a very narrow focus."
Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary Work Session, Mar 30, 2001, Tape 30, Side A
(emphasis added). 
10. 
See also State ex rel Juv. Dept v. Smith, 316 Or 646, 652-53, 853 P2d 282 (1993) ("We
therefore reject the proposition that any specific condition or circumstance per se does, or does
not, establish the juvenile court's jurisdiction.  We read ORS 419.476(1)(c) to require the juvenile
court to consider the totality of the circumstances presented in the case before it.  If, after
considering all the facts, the juvenile court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood of harm to
the welfare of the child, the court may take jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
11. 
We use the term "legal parent" because that is the term used in ORS 109.119(2)(a).  That
term includes, generally, biological and adoptive parents.  See ORS 109.119(8)(e) (2001) ("legal
parent" means parent as defined in ORS 419 A. 004 whose parental rights have not been
terminated); ORS 419A.004(16) (defining "parent" as biological or adoptive mother of child and
adoptive or "legal" father of child, and identifying circumstances in which biological father is
"legal" father).
12. 
This court made a similar point in refusing to terminate parental rights in State v.
McMaster, 259 Or 291, 486 P2d 567 (1971).  Despite finding that the family situation had some
characteristics that also are present here (although to a lesser degree), including "transiency" and
"instability," this court stated that parental rights could be terminated only by showing "a more
serious and uncommon detriment" than was caused by the parents' conduct there.  Id. at 303.
13. 
Although we have found that father consented to grandparents' role as primary caregivers
after mother's death, for the reasons discussed previously, ___ Or ___ (slip op at 42-43), we
conclude that, in this case, that fact is not evidence that rebuts the presumption that father acts in
the best interests of the children.
14. 
Article I, section 10, provides:
"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without
purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due
course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation."