Title: Commonwealth v. J.F.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13334
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13334 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  J.F. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     February 8, 2023. - May 5, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sealing.  Criminal Records.  Constitutional Law, Access to 
criminal records.  Practice, Criminal, Nolle prosequi, 
Record. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 28, 2014. 
 
 
A petition to seal the record, filed on August 27, 2021, 
was heard by Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
Arne Hantson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Alyssa Golden, Ann Maurer, Elizabeth Connor, & Leigh 
Woodruff for Community Legal Aid. 
 
Mason A. Kortz, Tamara S. Wolfson, & Paul M. Kominers for 
Upturn, Inc. 
 
Pauline Quirion for Greater Boston Legal Services & 
another. 
2 
 
 
Chinh H. Pham for Boston Bar Association. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On March 10, 2014, the defendant, J.F., was 
arraigned on two counts of rape while armed with a firearm, 
G. L. c. 265, § 22; one count of armed and masked robbery, G. L. 
c. 265, § 17; one count of armed kidnapping with sexual assault, 
G. L. c. 265, § 26; one count of assault with intent to rape, 
G. L. c. 265, § 24; and one count of carrying a firearm without 
a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  In December 2015, after a 
jury trial, he was acquitted on one count of rape while armed, 
assault with intent to rape, and carrying a firearm without a 
license.1  The jury deadlocked on the remaining three counts, 
resulting in the declaration of a mistrial.  Subsequently, in 
March 2018, after determining that the alleged victim was unable 
to testify at a retrial of those counts due to a relapse in her 
substance use disorder, the Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi.  
Consequently, the defendant suffered no convictions resulting 
from the charges. 
On August 27, 2021, the defendant filed a petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 276, § 100C (§ 100C), opposed by the Commonwealth, 
 
1 The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a 
required finding of not guilty as to the assault with intent to 
rape and carrying a firearm charges, and on so much of the rape, 
robbery, and kidnapping counts alleging the involvement of a 
firearm.  The jury found the defendant not guilty on the first 
rape count. 
3 
 
to seal his criminal record as to both the counts on which he 
was acquitted and the counts for which a nolle prosequi was 
filed.  After a hearing, a judge denied the defendant's petition 
in writing.  The defendant appealed.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues that the plain language of § 100C requires the sealing of 
records in cases ending in findings of not guilty, no probable 
cause, or a no bill by a grand jury, unless the defendant 
objects to such sealing.  He asserts that this court's holding 
in Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296 (2014), resolves any 
concern surrounding a right of public access under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  He further argues 
that the judge abused his discretion in denying the petition 
with respect to the counts that were nol prossed because he 
misapplied the "good cause" standard, committing errors of fact 
and judgment in weighing the factors relevant to his decision. 
For the reasons articulated infra, we hold that, consistent 
with Pon, a closed case that ends in an acquittal, a no bill 
from a grand jury, or a finding of no probable cause by the 
court is not a record subject to a First Amendment presumption 
of access.  We further hold that the Legislature clearly 
abrogated the common-law presumption of access with respect to 
these records by its plain language in § 100C, first par.  
Regarding the counts in which the Commonwealth entered a nolle 
prosequi, we conclude that the judge abused his discretion when 
4 
 
weighing the relevant interests and factors.  Therefore, we 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.2 
Background.  On February 28, 2014, a grand jury returned 
six indictments against the defendant, charging him with two 
counts of aggravated rape, one count of armed and masked 
robbery, one count of armed kidnapping with sexual assault, one 
count of assault with intent to rape, and one count of unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  These charges stemmed from allegations 
that the defendant, who knew the alleged victim, entered her car 
while masked, told her that he had a gun, and drove her to 
multiple automated teller machines attempting to have her 
withdraw cash from her bank account.  After the assailant was 
unable to procure cash due to a lack of funds in the victim's 
account, he drove her to a parking lot, raped her, and fled. 
On December 9, 2015, a jury was empanelled, and trial 
began.  On December 16, the trial judge allowed the defendant's 
motion for required findings of not guilty on the charges of 
assault with intent to rape and unlawful possession of a 
 
2 We recognize the amicus briefs submitted by Greater Boston 
Legal Services and the Union of Minority Neighborhoods; Upturn, 
Inc.; and Community Legal Aid; and the amicus letter submitted 
by the Boston Bar Association. 
 
5 
 
firearm.3  On that same day, the jury acquitted the defendant on 
the first count of aggravated rape.  The jury were deadlocked as 
to the remaining three charges. 
The case was continued for the scheduling of a new trial, 
and the defendant's bail was reduced.  In addition to multiple 
continuances by agreement, the Commonwealth advanced and 
continued pretrial conferences and the trial date on several 
occasions.  On April 4, 2017, a judge found the alleged victim 
unavailable for purposes of trial.  The Commonwealth moved to 
present the previous testimony of the unavailable witness, the 
alleged victim, in the second trial.  That motion was denied.  
On July 10, the defendant filed a motion for production of the 
alleged victim's psychiatric treatment records, which was 
allowed.  The case was continued to November 27 for trial.  The 
parties later jointly requested that the trial date be 
rescheduled.  On March 21, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a nolle 
prosequi as to the remaining three counts:  the remaining rape 
count, robbery, and kidnapping with sexual assault. 
 
3 The docket indicates that on April 4, 2017, the parties 
agreed that the trial judge reduced the aggravated portion of 
the remaining rape count and ordered the firearm provision 
removed from the robbery count in accordance with his decision 
on the required findings of not guilty. 
 
6 
 
On August 27, 2021, the defendant filed a petition to seal 
his record in connection with the case.4  The docket indicates 
that the case was continued to October 18 for a "[first] stage 
motion to seal," where the defendant's presence was waived.  On 
October 18, the matter was taken under advisement, and the 
Commonwealth filed its opposition on October 20.  On January 6, 
2022, the judge scheduled a hearing for "[s]tage [two] motion to 
seal," but the hearing was continued due to the absence of an 
interpreter for the defendant. 
After another continuance for COVID-19 reasons, the hearing 
was held on February 9, 2022.  At the hearing, the parties and 
the judge discussed Pon at length.  The judge indicated his 
belief that Pon requires "a higher standard" for cases ending in 
not guilty verdicts:  "the defendant must demonstrate that the 
value of sealing clearly outweighs the constitutionally-based 
value of the record remaining open to society."5 
For the counts in which a nolle prosequi entered, the judge 
stated that the "defendant must establish that good cause exists 
for sealing, but it's a lessened burden on the defendant, and 
 
4 According to the defendant's affidavit in support of his 
petition to seal his criminal record, the only other incident on 
his record is a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a 
suspended license, which was dismissed on the payment of court 
costs in 2012. 
 
5 The judge indicated that this standard appeared in Pon, 
469 Mass. at 313 n.24, discussed infra. 
7 
 
the [judge] must balance the interest at stake."  Defense 
counsel asserted that in Pon, 469 Mass. at 311, this court 
rejected the argument that the records of closed criminal 
proceedings resulting in an entry of nolle prosequi or dismissal 
are subject to a First Amendment presumption of public access.  
The judge responded that the relevant holding only applied to 
the nolle prosequi counts at issue.6  Defense counsel went on to 
argue that the plain language of § 100C requires sealing for the 
counts on which the defendant was acquitted. 
Discussing the factors in favor of sealing, the defendant 
pointed out that it had been about four years since the 
remaining counts had been nol prossed, and approximately six 
years since the defendant's release, with the defendant 
accumulating no new charges since then.  He was aged forty-four 
at the time of the hearing, and he had no criminal record aside 
from the relevant charges and a dismissed charge of operating a 
motor vehicle with a suspended license.  The defendant, although 
he has a job as a truck driver, has been unable to get better 
paying jobs as a result of his record in this case.7  He 
 
6 The judge also noted that this court "defer[ed]" to Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 509-511 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(Pokaski), and that this court "sa[id it is] going to be bound 
by [Pokaski]." 
 
7 The defendant applied for, but was denied employment at, 
among other places, a factory, an international airport as a 
maintenance staff member, and a driver for various rideshare 
8 
 
explained the stigma that he suffers as a result of these 
charges.  The defendant acknowledged that the nature and reason 
of the disposition, particularly the nol prossed counts, may not 
weigh in his favor.8  The judge asked counsel about the publicity 
surrounding the case.  The defendant reported one article had 
appeared in a local newspaper in 2014 about the case.  The 
Commonwealth noted that a news article about the case appeared 
as a top result when searching the defendant's name on the 
Internet. 
The Commonwealth then summarized the facts of the case.  
After testifying in the case, the alleged victim, who suffered 
from substance use issues, relapsed as a result of the trauma 
from her testimony.  The Commonwealth continued the case several 
times to "try[] to get her in a better position to be able to 
 
companies.  The defendant stated that the factory job demanded 
his passport, and his criminal record had to be clean.  From a 
rideshare company, after he filled out an application, he 
received a notice that "there's something that's being presented 
that does not allow [him] to work." 
 
8 The judge stated, with respect to the deadlocked jury on 
the charges of 
 
"rape with a firearm, robbery, armed and masked, and 
kidnapping with sexual assault, armed . . . , wouldn't the 
public want to [k]now, if those charges were . . . nol[] 
pros[s]ed after a jury deadlocked on the charges. 
 
"This is not a conviction; I understand it is not a 
conviction, but it also is -- and there's some indication 
that somebody thought there was some validity to the 
charges, because the jury deadlocked." 
9 
 
testify, and ultimately, she wasn't."  When another judge denied 
the Commonwealth's motion to use her previous trial testimony at 
the second trial, the Commonwealth had "no choice" but to file a 
nolle prosequi as to the remaining charges.  The Commonwealth 
read a letter from the family of the alleged victim, who opposed 
the sealing of the defendant's record, which detailed the severe 
psychological distress and pain that she has suffered and 
continues to suffer as a result of the violent crimes committed 
against her. 
On February 14, 2022, in a written decision, the judge 
denied the defendant's motion to seal his record in its 
entirety.  The defendant appealed, and we allowed his 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Presumption of public access to criminal 
records for cases ending in findings of not guilty, a no bill by 
the grand jury, or a finding of no probable cause by the court.  
The defendant argues that by its terms, § 100C, first par., 
calls for automatic sealing with no court involvement unless the 
defendant requests otherwise as part of a fully integrated 
scheme enacted by the Legislature.  He asserts that the 2010 
reforms to the criminal offender record information (CORI) 
system reaffirmed the Legislature's commitment to the 
preexisting record sealing scheme, and that Pon removed any 
constitutional impediment to the Legislature's directive to 
10 
 
automatically seal closed cases ending in acquittal, as public 
access would not do much to ensure the integrity of criminal 
proceedings where there never was probable cause to bring the 
charges or where a jury acquitted a defendant.  The defendant 
argues that the Legislature, in enacting § 100C, first par., 
unequivocally abrogated the common-law presumption of public 
access to judicial records. 
The Commonwealth argues that the judge did not err in 
requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the value of sealing 
the records of his acquittals at trial clearly outweighs the 
constitutionally based value of the record remaining open to 
society where the Pon decision did not extend to § 100C, first 
par., and where Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 
509-511 (1st Cir. 1989), found a First Amendment presumption of 
access in criminal cases ending with findings of not guilty.  
The Commonwealth asserts that, in fact, the judge did apply the 
Pon analysis to the defendant's petition to seal the not guilty 
charges.  Finally, the Commonwealth argues that because the 
entire criminal case did not result in a finding of not guilty 
(the defendant was only acquitted on three of the six 
indictments against him), the statutory language of § 100C, 
first par., does not apply to the defendant's acquittals. 
Section 100C states, in relevant part: 
11 
 
"In any criminal case wherein the defendant has been found 
not guilty by the court or jury, or a no bill has been 
returned by the grand jury, or a finding of no probable 
cause has been made by the court, the commissioner of 
probation [(commissioner)] shall seal said court appearance 
and disposition recorded in his files and the clerk and the 
probation officers of the courts in which the proceedings 
occurred or were initiated shall likewise seal the records 
of the proceedings in their files.  The provisions of this 
paragraph shall not apply if the defendant makes a written 
request to the commissioner not to seal the records of the 
proceedings. 
 
"In any criminal case wherein a nolle prosequi has been 
entered, or a dismissal has been entered by the court, and 
it appears to the court that substantial justice would best 
be served, the court shall direct the clerk to seal the 
records of the proceedings in his files.  The clerk shall 
forthwith notify the commissioner . . . and the probation 
officer of the courts in which the proceedings occurred or 
were initiated who shall likewise seal the records of the 
proceedings in their files." 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 100C, first and second pars. 
In Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 499, the decision relied on by the 
Commonwealth, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit addressed whether there is a constitutional right of 
access to the records of cases sealed pursuant to § 100C.9  In 
 
9 Before the First Circuit addressed § 100C, this court 
discussed the statute in Commonwealth v. Vickey, 381 Mass. 762, 
767 (1980) (declining to extend availability of sealing beyond 
named dispositions to pardon as no "strong demonstration of a 
legislative purpose not to limit the availability of sealing to 
the named dispositions" where they "are premised on a 
presumption of innocence").  The court focused on the named 
dispositions in § 100C -- not guilty, nolle prosequi, no bill, 
no probable cause, dismissal -- and their connection to a 
presumption of innocence in reasoning that there is a real need 
for the remedy of sealing.  Id. at 769.  In other words, the 
court's perspective was that a criminal defendant should not 
12 
 
discussing § 100C, first par., the First Circuit noted that 
where the defendant was found not guilty, a grand jury failed to 
indict, or the court made a finding of no probable cause, § 100C 
"provides for no court involvement; the sealing occurs 
automatically upon the completion of a criminal case ending in 
one of the above enumerated dispositions."  Id. at 500.  See 
Attorney Gen. v. District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 484 
Mass. 260, 270 (2020) (commissioner "shall" seal court record 
where defendant found not guilty, no bill returned by grand 
jury, or finding of no probable cause made by court); 
Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 437 Mass. 470, 479 (2002) ("Under 
§ 100C, an adult who is acquitted after trial, or as to whom the 
grand jury return a no bill or a court finds no probable cause, 
is entitled to immediate sealing"); Police Comm'r of Boston v. 
Municipal Court of the Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 649 
(1978) (§ 100C, as enacted by St. 1973, c. 322, "provides that 
probation records and court records must be sealed in criminal 
cases on the request of a defendant who has been found not 
guilty, as to whom no bill has been returned by the grand jury, 
or where there has been a finding of no probable cause by the 
court"); Commonwealth v. S.M.F., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 44 (1996) 
(§ 100C, first par., "mandates" sealing).  The second paragraph, 
 
suffer adverse consequences where no finding of guilt was 
entered. 
13 
 
for cases ending with a nolle prosequi or a dismissal, to the 
contrary, does not provide for "automatic" sealing.  Pokaski, 
supra. 
The First Circuit "has established a First Amendment right 
of access to records submitted in connection with criminal 
proceedings."  Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 502.  Underlying the 
determination that there exists a constitutionally secured right 
of access is the premise that the public should have a full 
understanding of the criminal proceeding to serve as a check on 
the judicial system.  Id.  After determining that the blanket 
prohibition on the disclosure of records mentioned by § 100C, 
first par., implicates the First Amendment, the First Circuit 
held that the automatic sealing of records of cases ending in a 
finding of not guilty or no probable cause could not withstand 
strict scrutiny and violated the First Amendment.10  Id. at 505-
509.  Further, the First Circuit noted that cases ending in a 
finding of nolle prosequi or dismissal should be sealed "only 
where it is necessary to achieve a compelling interest."  Id. at 
510. 
 
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Doe, 420 Mass. 142 (1995), 
overruled by Pon, 469 Mass. at 297, § 100C, second par., was at 
 
10 The First Circuit held that there is no First Amendment 
right of access to grand jury records where a grand jury refuses 
to indict.  Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 509. 
 
14 
 
issue.11  The court recognized the First Circuit's conclusion in 
Pokaski that there is a First Amendment right of access to 
records submitted in connection with criminal proceedings, which 
rendered § 100C, first par., unconstitutional.  Doe, supra at 
147.  Under the second paragraph, adopting the constitutional 
analysis set forth in Pokaski, the court held that the 
"substantial justice" requirement in that paragraph would not be 
met "unless it is demonstrated, first at [a] preliminary hearing 
and, if the matter proceeds that far, at [a] final hearing, that 
the value of sealing to the defendant clearly outweighs the 
constitutionally-based value of the record remaining open to 
society."  Id. at 151.  In making this determination, it would 
be appropriate for a judge to consider the reason for the nolle 
prosequi or dismissal and the specific harm the defendant risks 
suffering if the record were to remain open to the public.  Id. 
at 151-152. 
In Pon, the most recent case discussing § 100C, the court 
revisited the "stringent standard for discretionary sealing" set 
out in Doe and articulated a new standard for sealing under 
§ 100C, second par., which the court deemed necessary to achieve 
the legislative intent.  Pon, 469 Mass. at 297, 300.  As a basis 
 
11 Nonetheless, the court indicated that sealing under 
§ 100C, first par., "was to occur automatically on the 
completion of a criminal case ending in one of the enumerated 
dispositions."  Doe, 420 Mass. at 146-147. 
15 
 
for doing so, the court discussed the legislative history of § 
100C and its counterparts, G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A and 100B.  Id. 
at 301. 
Section 100C was "introduced in the 1970s shortly after the 
passage of the initial CORI Act . . . which authorized the 
creation of a comprehensive criminal justice information system 
that would afford limited access to court-based criminal 
records."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 301.  See St. 1973, c. 322, § 1, 
inserting G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  In 1983, the Legislature 
amended the first paragraph to require that the commissioner 
seal the relevant records, rather than sealing only on the 
request of the defendant.  See St. 1983, c. 312.  In 1984, the 
Legislature disposed of the requirement that the commissioner 
notify the clerk and probation officers of the proceedings 
before sealing the records associated with them.  St. 1984, 
c. 123. 
"In 2010, the Legislature enacted extensive reforms to the 
CORI scheme, extending access to official CORI records to more 
employers, housing providers, and other organizations, for 
limited use, and simultaneously broadening the scope of the 
sealing provisions to enable more individuals to shield their 
records from public view."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 297.  As a part of 
these changes, the Legislature deleted the phrase "except in 
cases in which an order of probation has been terminated" from 
16 
 
the second paragraph, permitting the court to seal cases in 
which a defendant had received a continuance without a finding.12  
St. 2010, c. 256, § 131. 
In enacting these statutes, the Legislature intended to 
balance several interests, including the public's interest in 
accessing certain types of records relating to criminal 
proceedings and a defendant's interest in sealing the record of 
his or her criminal history, "recognizing that ready access to a 
defendant's prior criminal record might frustrate a defendant's 
access to employment, housing, and social contacts necessary to 
. . . rehabilitation" (citation omitted).  Pon, 469 Mass. at 
301.  In light of the changes made by the Legislature, the court 
concluded that the test in Doe "serves to frustrate rather than 
further the Legislature's purpose by imposing too high a burden 
of proof on the defendant."  Id. at 308. 
The court analyzed whether there is a First Amendment 
presumption of access to the records of criminal cases that have 
been dismissed or subject to nolle prosequi, and determined that 
 
12 Prior to the 2010 reforms, the second paragraph of § 100C 
began, "[i]n any criminal case wherein a nolle prosequi has been 
entered, or a dismissal has been entered by the court, except in 
cases in which an order of probation has been terminated."  
G. L. c. 276, § 100C, as amended through St. 1984, c. 123. 
 
In 2018, the Legislature made changes to the fourth 
paragraph of the statute, which is not at issue in this opinion.  
See St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 193, 194. 
17 
 
there was not.  Pon, 469 Mass. at 308-309, 311.  Despite its 
overruling of Doe and its rejection of the First Amendment 
analysis in Pokaski with respect to the records mentioned in 
§ 100C, second par., the court concluded in Pon that the records 
are subject to a common-law presumption of public access which 
may be restricted on a showing of "good cause" meriting sealing.  
Id. at 311-312.  In determining whether this standard is met, 
judges should balance a variety of interests, considering 
several factors discussed infra.  Id. at 314-319.  A judge no 
longer needs to go through a two-hearing process, but instead 
may conduct a single hearing on the merits once the judge 
decides that a prima facie showing has been made on the 
pleadings.  Id. at 321-322.  "After hearing the arguments and 
balancing the interests at stake, if the judge is satisfied that 
good cause merits sealing, the judge must make 'specific 
findings on the record setting forth the interests considered by 
the judge and the reasons for the order directing that such 
sealing occur.'"  Id. at 322, quoting Doe, 420 Mass. at 152–153. 
Although Pon confined its holding to § 100C, second par., 
this court's reasoning supporting the conclusion that there is 
no First Amendment presumption of access to records of a 
criminal case ending in a nolle prosequi or a dismissal applies 
with equal force to records of a criminal case wherein the 
defendant has been found not guilty, where a no bill has been 
18 
 
returned by a grand jury, or where a finding of no probable 
cause has been made.  As the United States Supreme Court has not 
yet addressed the First Amendment presumption of access as it 
applies to these records, we are not bound by the First 
Circuit's conclusion in Pokaski.  Pon, 469 Mass. at 308, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 604 (1983) ("we are not 
bound by decisions of Federal courts except the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court on questions of Federal law"). 
Applying the two-step test set out in Press-Enterprise Co. 
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II), 
and examining the analysis conducted in Pon, it is clear that 
the court's reasoning in Pon supports the conclusion that there 
is no First Amendment presumption of access.  The first step 
requires us to "consider[] whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public."  Pon, 
469 Mass. at 309, quoting Press-Enterprise II, supra at 8.  
"[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to 
inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents. . . .  It is uncontested, 
however, that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is 
not absolute" (footnote omitted).  Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-598 (1978). 
Although court records historically have been accessible to 
citizens of the Commonwealth, the court long has recognized that 
19 
 
some classes of court records should not be available for public 
review, may be impounded on a showing of good cause, and may not 
be presumptively open for public view by operation of statute.  
Pon, 469 Mass. at 309.  See New England Internet Café, LLC v. 
Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk 
County, 462 Mass. 76, 90 (2012) (judge may seal documents on 
showing of good cause); Republican Co. v. Appeals Court, 442 
Mass. 218, 222-223 (2004) ("Massachusetts has long recognized a 
common-law right of access to judicial records," but right of 
access may be restricted on showing of "good cause"); Roe v. 
Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 435 (2001) (records of conviction 
are public records constitutionally required to be public); 
Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 546 
(1977) (acknowledging "general principle of publicity" while 
recognizing statutory limits on access to court proceedings and 
official records). 
The sealing of criminal records pursuant to § 100C would 
not affect the public's ability to attend a criminal trial, or 
the media's right to report on court proceedings or publish 
truthful information relating to sealed proceedings.  Pon, 469 
Mass. at 310.  "[Indeed,] the public had a right of access to 
any court record before, during, and for a period of time after 
the criminal trial [until the request for sealing was granted]."  
Id., quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 
20 
 
Ohio St. 3d 382, 385 (2004).  The court in Pon concluded that 
the records of closed cases resulting in a dismissal or nolle 
prosequi have not been open historically to the press and the 
public as have other "constitutionally cognizable elements of 
criminal proceedings."  Pon, supra.  For the same reasons, the 
records of closed cases that resulted in an acquittal after 
trial, a finding of no probable cause, or a no bill from the 
grand jury also have not been open historically to the press and 
public. 
The second step requires the court to "consider 'whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.'"  Pon, 469 
Mass. at 310, quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.  The 
court concluded in Pon that "the availability of records of 
criminal cases that have been closed after nonconviction" does 
little to enhance the fairness and appearance of fairness of a 
criminal trial.  Pon, supra.  Recognizing that criminal justice 
agencies and several licensing commissions and other entities 
with a particular need for the information will retain access to 
sealed records, the court held that the integrity of the 
processes at issue are preserved sufficiently.  Id. at 310-311.  
See G. L. c. 6, §§ 172-178B (discussing CORI access to various 
entities and related sections); G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A, 100B, 
100D (sealing statutes). 
21 
 
Even more than criminal cases ending in a nolle prosequi or 
a dismissal, criminal charges ending in a finding of not guilty, 
no probable cause, or a no bill after grand jury proceedings are 
"premised on a presumption of innocence."  Commonwealth v. 
Vickey, 381 Mass. 762, 767 (1980).  See Police Comm'r of Boston, 
374 Mass. at 657 ("The fact of an arrest without probable cause 
followed by total exoneration would seem to negate any possible 
value to law enforcement of an arrest record because the sum 
total of such an adjudication is that there was no evidence in 
any way connecting the defendant with participation in criminal 
activity").  Particularly where a jury found the defendant not 
guilty on particular charges against him and were deadlocked on 
the remaining charges, sealing the criminal records relating to 
those charges does not "truly impede" the public from ensuring 
that "the operations of government institutions [are] subject to 
effective public scrutiny," as the public and the media were 
free to attend the trial and hear the evidence against the 
defendant13 (citation omitted).  Pon, 469 Mass. at 310.  See 
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 610 ("The requirement of a public trial is 
satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the 
press to attend the trial and to report what they have 
 
13 Indeed, in the present case, the charges against the 
defendant were published by at least one local news service. 
 
22 
 
observed").  See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. 555, 572-573 (1980) ("Instead of acquiring information 
about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from 
those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the 
print and electronic media").  Therefore, the First Amendment 
presumption of access does not apply to nonconvictions mentioned 
in § 100C, first par.14 
Although these records are not entitled to a First 
Amendment presumption of public access, they "are subject to a 
common-law presumption of public access."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 
311.  "In interpreting a statute, we presume that when the 
Legislature enacts a law it is aware of the statutory and common 
law that governed the matter in which it legislates."  Globe 
Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 Mass. 113, 117 (2011).  We review 
the interpretation of a statute de novo.  Commonwealth v. K.W., 
 
14 Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that numerous 
States have statutes commanding the automatic sealing of certain 
nonconvictions.  See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-705(1)(a), (a.5); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(a), (b); Fla. Stat. § 943.0595(2)(a), 
(3)(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 35-3-37(h); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 431.076(1)(a); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.105(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 29-3523(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:5(II-a)(a); N.J. Rev. 
Stat. § 2C:52-6(a)(1); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 160.50(1) 
(McKinney); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9121, 9122.2; R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 12-1-12.1; Utah Code Ann. § 77-40a-201(1)(a).  See also State 
v. Apt, 319 Conn. 494, 510 (2015); Doe v. State, 347 Ga. App. 
246, 247 (2018), quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 35-3-37(a)(6); State v. 
Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 440 (2018); State v. Williams, 173 N.H. 
540, 545 (2020); People v. Anonymous, 34 N.Y.3d 631, 637 (2020); 
State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 550-551 (R.I. 2014). 
23 
 
490 Mass. 619, 624 (2022).  "Where the words [of a statute] are 
'plain and unambiguous' in their meaning, we view them as 
'conclusive as to legislative intent.'"  Id., quoting Dorrian v. 
LVNV Funding, LLC, 479 Mass. 265, 271 (2018).  "Where the words 
of the statute are ambiguous, we strive 'to make it an effectual 
piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound 
reason' and consistent with legislative intent."  Pon, supra at 
302, quoting Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704 (2004). 
 
"'Unless there is a violation of a constitutional guaranty, 
the Legislature may modify or abrogate common law practices' 
regarding public access to judicial records."  Globe Newspaper 
Co., petitioner, 461 Mass. at 118, quoting New Bedford Standard-
Times Publ. Co. v. Clerk of the Third Dist. Court of Bristol, 
377 Mass. 404, 410 (1979).  "[W]e do not interpret a statute to 
modify or abrogate an area traditionally guided by the common 
law, such as public access to judicial records, unless the 
intent to do so is clear."  Globe Newspaper Co., petitioner, 
supra.  See Chelsea Hous. Auth. v. McLaughlin, 482 Mass. 579, 
590 (2019), quoting Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 
438 (1980) ("statute is not to be interpreted as effecting a 
material change in or a repeal of the common law unless the 
intent to do so is clearly expressed").  Where the common-law 
doctrine "'is so repugnant to and inconsistent with' the statute 
that 'both cannot stand,'" the statute preempts the common-law 
24 
 
doctrine by "necessary implication."  Chelsea Hous. Auth., supra 
at 591, quoting George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co., 477 
Mass. 371, 378 (2017). 
 
The plain language of § 100C, first par., evidences the 
Legislature's clear intent to abrogate the common-law 
presumption of access to the nonconvictions explicitly 
referenced where it commands that "the commissioner . . .  shall 
seal said court appearance and disposition recorded in his 
files" and the clerk and probation officers "shall likewise seal 
the records of the proceedings in their files," unless "the 
defendant makes a written request to the commissioner not to 
seal the records of the proceedings" (emphases added).  G. L. 
c. 276, § 100C.  See Johnson v. District Attorney for the N. 
Dist., 342 Mass. 212, 215 (1961) ("The word 'shall' in a statute 
is commonly a word of imperative obligation and is inconsistent 
with the idea of discretion"). 
Although the court need not do so where the language of the 
statute is unambiguous, going beyond the language, the intent of 
the Legislature supports such an interpretation.  The 2010 
reforms to the CORI scheme "strongly indicate that the 
Legislature was concerned with the collateral consequences of 
criminal records and sought to make sealing broadly available to 
individuals whose criminal histories or records no longer 
presented concerns of recidivism."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 306.  
25 
 
"Overall, the legislative history unmistakably suggests that the 
Legislature's intent in enacting the 2010 reforms was to 
recalibrate the balance between protecting public safety and 
facilitating the reintegration of criminal defendants by 
removing barriers to housing and employment."  Id. at 307.  Even 
after Pon's invitation to the Legislature to "revisit[] the 
language of" § 100C, first par., in its 2018 reforms to the 
statute, the Legislature left the language alone.  Id. at 313 
n.24.  See St. 2018, c. 69.  We see this as a "clear" intent to 
abrogate the common-law right to public access to the 
nonconvictions at issue.  Globe Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 
Mass. at 118. 
 
We disagree with the Commonwealth's assertion that § 100C, 
first par., does not apply because the jury did not acquit the 
defendant on all six indictments.  At the outset, the language 
of the statute commands sealing of "said court appearance and 
disposition" in "any criminal case wherein the defendant has 
been found not guilty[,] . . . a no bill has been returned by 
the grand jury, or a finding of no probable cause has been made 
by the court."  G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  This general language 
would seem to include favorable charges in cases where the 
defendant was acquitted on some charges, but not all.  If the 
Legislature intended to limit sealing to cases where a defendant 
26 
 
is acquitted on all charges, it presumably would have said so.15  
See Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass. 589, 593 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012) (we 
"presume, as we must, that the Legislature intended what the 
words of the statute say").  Contrast Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-
705(1)(a)(II) (commanding sealing where "defendant is acquitted 
of all counts in the case"); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1(b) 
(court shall seal records of criminal case where person 
acquitted of all counts in case); Utah Code Ann. § 77-40a-
201(1)(a) (automatic expungement of records in "case that 
resulted in an acquittal on all charges"); State v. Diamante, 83 
A.3d 546, 550-551 (R.I. 2014) (must be acquitted of "all 
counts").  Further, even if the statutory language were 
ambiguous, the legislative history, discussed supra, suggests 
that the intent of the Legislature was to effectuate sealing in 
a wider array of cases.  Interpreting the statute to require 
sealing of the records related to any charge where the defendant 
 
15 Were we to adopt the Commonwealth's interpretation of the 
statute, where a defendant is found not guilty on one charge, 
but guilty on five other charges within the same case, the 
language of the statute requiring sealing in "any criminal case 
wherein the defendant has been found not guilty" would seem to 
result in sealing of the records relating to all the charges, 
including the convictions.  This would be nonsensical.  See 
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, 167 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 409-410 (2013) ("we do 
not adhere blindly to a literal reading of a statute if doing so 
would yield an 'absurd' or 'illogical' result"). 
 
27 
 
was found not guilty, a no bill was returned by the grand jury, 
or a finding of no probable cause was made would facilitate that 
intent.16 
 
2.  Standard of review.  We review a judge's decision on a 
petition to seal a defendant's criminal record for an abuse of 
discretion.  Pon, 469 Mass. at 299.  "Under the abuse of 
discretion standard, the issue is whether the judge's decision 
resulted from 'a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors 
relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives' (quotation and 
citation omitted)."  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 
672 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017), quoting L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  Where the judge's 
decision "is based in part on whether the judge made an error of 
law in interpreting the relevant statutes[,] we review the 
interpretation of [the] statute de novo."  K.W., 490 Mass. at 
624. 
 
3.  Denial of defendant's petition.  a.  Charges of which 
the defendant was found not guilty.  As discussed supra, for 
 
16 We understand the judge's point that "sealing all court 
and probation records concerning the [n]ot [g]uilty [c]ounts in 
isolation would be an extremely difficult task."  Nonetheless, 
this was the Legislature's clear intent in enacting the statute.  
Were there to be a case where some counts are sealed and some 
are not, we presume that redaction of information within the 
records would achieve the intended outcome. 
28 
 
closed criminal cases falling under the first paragraph of 
§ 100C, sealing is mandatory.  With respect to the charges of 
which the defendant was found not guilty, the judge erred in 
failing to seal the records of these counts. 
In his memorandum of decision on the defendant's petition 
to seal, the judge stated:  "Where the petitioner 'has been 
found not guilty by the court or jury, . . .' the petitioner 
must 'prove that the value of sealing . . . clearly outweighs 
the constitutionally-based value of the record remaining open to 
society.'  Pon, 469 Mass. at 312."17  He expressed that this 
court, in Pon, held "that, while the holding of Pokaski may 
apply to petitions to seal filed pursuant to the first paragraph 
of [§] 100C . . . it does not apply to petitions to seal filed 
pursuant to the second paragraph of [§] 100C."  Although he was 
correct to direct "[t]he intellectually inquisitive reader who 
wishes to fully understand the basis for the distinction" to 
Pon, supra at 313 n.24, the judge misinterpreted the court's 
directive. 
In Pon, 469 Mass. at 313 n.24, the first paragraph of 
§ 100C was "not at issue."  The court "decline[d] to extend 
[its] holding and the analysis [it] employ[ed] to [the first 
paragraph] of the statute."  Id.  It discussed the practice of 
 
17 The judge also indicated this confusion at the motion 
hearing. 
29 
 
the District Court Department of the Trial Court to seal records 
of acquittals or where judges made a finding of no probable 
cause under the standard set out in Pokaski and reinforced by 
Doe.  Id.  The court stated: 
"[U]ntil the Legislature revisits the language of [§ 100C], 
first par., or until the issue of its interpretation comes 
before us, we observe that the solution adopted by the 
District Court is a reasonable one, as long as it is 
modified consistent with our holding in this case:  that 
sealing may occur where good cause justifies the overriding 
of the general principle of publicity" (emphases added). 
 
Id.  Therefore, before our clarification in the present case, 
the judge should have applied the good cause standard to both 
the counts that resulted in verdicts of not guilty and the entry 
of a nolle prosequi.  Now, however, it is clear that where a 
defendant stands acquitted on a charge (or a no bill is returned 
by the grand jury or a finding of no probable cause has been 
made by the court), the records pertaining to those charges 
should be sealed, unless the defendant "makes a written request 
to the commissioner" not to seal the records of the proceedings.  
G. L. c. 276, § 100C. 
 
The defendant requests that, if this court "concludes that 
the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the petition 
as to the dismissed counts," we should remand the entire 
petition, including the not guilty counts, to allow him to 
30 
 
decide how he would like to proceed.18  Because we remand the 
case for the judge to illustrate his reasoning underlying his 
findings on the nolle prosequi counts, infra, we remand the 
petition on the not guilty counts as well so that the defendant 
may clarify his intentions.  If he decides that he would like 
the records pertaining to his acquittals to remain open to the 
public, he should make this clear in the Superior Court, and he 
must make a written request to the commissioner not to seal such 
records.  G. L. c. 276, § 100C. 
b.  Charges resulting in nolle prosequis.  As to the counts 
that resulted in nolle prosequis, the defendant argues that the 
judge purported to apply the correct standard, but misapplied it 
by making clear errors of fact and judgment in weighing the 
relevant factors.  More specifically, he argues that the judge 
failed to recognize that he was acquitted not only of carrying a 
firearm, but also of so much of the rape and robbery counts as 
alleged that he possessed a firearm; that the judge erred in his 
factual findings regarding the time elapsed since the trial and 
the nolle prosequis, which weighed heavily in his analysis; that 
the relevant time period to assess the defendant's "likelihood 
 
18 He admits that the judge's question "whether it would 
benefit [the defendant] to seal all court records pertaining to 
the [n]ot [g]uilty [c]ounts, while leaving the records 
pertaining to just the [n]olle [p]rosequi [c]ounts open to the 
public" has some force. 
31 
 
of recidivism or success" is the time elapsed since the 
defendant's release into the community, not the time since the 
charges were nol prossed; and that the judge failed to consider 
several highly pertinent factors, such as the extreme stigma 
attached to the charges, the defendant's age, and his lack of 
criminal history.  Last, the defendant asserts that any 
discussion of "rehabilitation" is improper where he never has 
been convicted of a crime, and the judge gave insufficient 
weight to the interests of the defendant and the Commonwealth in 
keeping the records private. 
The Commonwealth argues that the judge properly considered 
all the factors set out in Pon.  For the reasons discussed 
infra, we remand the matter to the Superior Court for the judge 
to clarify his reasoning. 
The second paragraph of § 100C states, in part:  "In any 
criminal case wherein a nolle prosequi has been entered, . . . 
and it appears to the court that substantial justice would best 
be served, the court shall direct the clerk to seal the records 
of the proceedings in his files."  G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  In 
demonstrating that "substantial justice [will] best be served," 
a "defendant must establish that good cause exists for sealing"; 
in other words, the reason for sealing "justifies the overriding 
of the general principle of publicity."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 312-
313.  "Although a good cause analysis requires consideration of 
32 
 
similar factors as an analysis where the First Amendment is 
implicated, . . . the weight of the scales is more balanced, and 
the burden on the defendant is somewhat lessened."  Id. 
 
When assessing whether a defendant has met the "good cause" 
standard for sealing, a judge must balance the numerous 
interests at stake.  Pon, 469 Mass. at 314.  "If, after 
balancing those interests, the judge determines that the 
defendant has done so, the substantial justice standard will be 
satisfied."  Id.  In conducting this balancing test, a judge 
"should begin by recognizing the public interests at stake."  
Id. at 315. 
Concomitant with the common-law presumption of access, the 
public has an interest in knowing about criminal charges so that 
it may hold the government accountable for the administration of 
justice.  Pon, 469 Mass. at 315.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, judges must acknowledge the interests of the 
Commonwealth and the defendant in keeping the information 
private.  Id.  "These interests include the compelling 
governmental interests in reducing recidivism, facilitating 
reintegration, and ensuring self-sufficiency by promoting 
employment and housing opportunities for former criminal 
defendants."  Id.  In balancing these interests, a judge may 
take judicial notice of the fact that the existence of a 
33 
 
criminal record may "present barriers to housing and employment 
opportunities."  Id. at 316. 
 
Although judges may consider any factors relevant to their 
weighing of the interests at stake, the court in Pon set out 
particularly relevant factors for a judge to consider, which the 
judge noted in his decision here, stating that he "considered" 
all the factors.  The first factor to be considered focuses on 
"the disadvantages the defendant claims to face due to the 
availability of his . . . criminal record."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 
316.  This may include any effect on the defendant's employment, 
housing, ability to participate in community or volunteer 
activities, ability to advance economically or professionally, 
and reliance on public assistance.  Id. at 317. 
 
The defendant, in his petition, identified the 
disadvantages that he suffers from as a result of his criminal 
record, including preclusion of further employment opportunities 
and better paying jobs.19  In his decision, the judge recognized, 
in a sentence, that the defendant "undoubtedly" faces 
disadvantages as a result of the availability of his criminal 
record.  Although it would have been better if the judge 
expanded on this with specific details from the defendant's 
 
19 At the hearing, the defendant expanded on particular 
employment opportunities of which he was deprived, alleging that 
these opportunities were withheld because of his record in this 
case. 
34 
 
case, it is implicit that the judge acknowledged the profound 
effect such serious charges on his record must have.  On remand, 
we urge the judge to elaborate on these disadvantages in order 
to afford them the proper weight and assure the parties that the 
judge has considered the issue adequately. 
 
The second factor to consider, as set out in Pon, is 
"evidence of rehabilitation."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 317. 
"Employment attempts, community or civic engagement, 
successful completion of a probationary period or sobriety 
or mental health treatment, lack of further contact with 
the criminal justice system, or other accomplishments may 
weigh in favor of sealing by demonstrating that the 
defendant bears a low risk of recidivism and a likelihood 
of success in future employment." 
 
Id.  The defendant's argument that where he never has been 
convicted of a crime or admitted to sufficient facts for a 
finding of guilty, he should not be required to show "evidence 
of rehabilitation," is persuasive.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Healy, 
452 Mass. 510, 515 (2008) (in sentencing, "[j]udges may not 
punish the defendant for offenses of which he or she does not 
stand convicted in the particular case"); In re Kollman, 210 
N.J. 557, 576 (2012) ("Facts related to an arrest that did not 
result in conviction, or to a dismissed charge, may . . . offer 
insight into an applicant's character and conduct. . . .  To 
assess the public interest . . . courts [may] consider conduct 
before the time of conviction . . . [only so far as they are] 
established or undisputed facts, not unproven allegations").  
35 
 
Contrast Pon, 469 Mass. at 298 (defendant admitted to sufficient 
facts for guilty finding).  The judge should have recognized 
this in his discussion of the factors. 
Even if we were to assume that evidence of rehabilitation 
is applicable to the defendant, he demonstrated that he has 
taken a number of steps suggesting "rehabilitation," as it is 
defined in Pon.  He had not faced any new criminal charges 
following the case at issue and, as of the date of the hearing, 
had remained free of charges for over five years since his 
release on bail in 2016.20  Further, he had maintained employment 
since his release. 
Aside from mentioning that the defendant "presented some 
'evidence of rehabilitation,'" the judge discussed none of these 
factors.  This was an abuse of discretion, requiring remand for 
the judge to expand on his consideration of all the relevant 
factors.  On remand, we urge the judge to describe in detail his 
weighing of these positive factors in addition to those that he 
found weighed against sealing in order to illustrate the 
"balancing" test that Pon requires judges to conduct. 
 
The third factor for the judge to consider is "other 
evidence on whether sealing [the records] would alleviate the 
 
20 Where we have not been alerted otherwise by the 
Commonwealth, it appears that the defendant now has gone over 
seven years without being charged with any new offenses. 
36 
 
identified disadvantages."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 317.  Some 
examples of such evidence may include the nature of the crimes 
with which the defendant was charged; the stigma associated with 
the charges; whether the defendant would pose an additional 
safety threat to the community were his or her record to be 
sealed; and whether the defendant maintains any sense of 
privacy, i.e., whether his or her charges were newsworthy to the 
extent that sealing would not provide a benefit.  Id. at 317-
318. 
The judge indicated, in his written decision, that 
insufficient time had passed to determine whether the sealing of 
the defendant's record would pose an additional safety threat to 
the community.  Nonetheless, the judge did not mention the 
stigma associated with the particularly abhorrent crimes with 
which the defendant was charged, nor did he discuss the 
publicity that the defendant's case received in the news.  
Although counsel mentioned these factors at the hearing, we 
cannot determine from the record whether the judge considered 
them or, if he did, what weight he gave them.  It is necessary 
that the judge explicitly state for the record the factors he 
considered.  To not do so, where they were relevant to the case 
and discussed at the hearing, was an abuse of discretion.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 394, 414 (2020) (single 
justice abused her discretion in assessment of security factors 
37 
 
when determining whether to grant motion for stay of sentence 
pending appeal, where her assessment was "underinclusive"); 
Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 214-215 (2017), S.C., 
482 Mass. 1017 (2019) ("there must be some mechanism by which an 
appellate court can meaningfully assess whether a judge acted 
appropriately in granting or denying [Mass. R. Crim. P. 
25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995)], relief.  For 
instance, if a judge grants a motion to reduce a verdict, the 
expectation is that the judge will explain his or her reasoning 
in a written ruling or an oral explanation on the record"); 
L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27 ("judge's discretionary decision 
constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge 
made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors 
relevant to the decision such that the decision falls outside 
the range of reasonable alternatives" [citation omitted]). 
 
Fourth, the judge should consider "the defendant's 
circumstances at the time of the offense."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 
318.  This includes the defendant's age, insofar as it speaks to 
his capacity for rehabilitation, and his prior criminal history 
leading up to the offense.  Id.  As the defendant points out, 
the judge made no mention of the defendant's lack of a criminal 
record.  Aside from a dismissal in 2012 on court costs of a 
charge of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, 
the defendant had no criminal record prior to the charges at 
38 
 
issue.  Where the defendant was aged forty-four at the time of 
his petition, his inexperience in the criminal justice system 
has some weight, deserving of mention in the judge's decision.  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 621 (2010) (several scientific and 
statistical studies "conclude that age is an important factor in 
determining the risk of recidivism and that such risk diminishes 
significantly as an offender ages"). 
 
In discussing the fifth factor, "the passage of time since 
the date of the offense and the date of the dismissal or nolle 
prosequi," we note several factual errors.  Pon, 469 Mass. at 
318.  The judge wrote that it had been "three years since the 
dismissal" of the counts in which a nolle prosequi was entered, 
and he indicated that the trial took place in December 2017, 
"less than five years ago."  In fact, at the time of the 
issuance of the judge's decision in February 2022, it had been 
nearly four years since the nolle prosequi issued, and the trial 
was conducted in December 2015, over six years prior.  We do not 
mean to suggest that it was improper for the judge to conclude 
that not enough time had passed from the date of the offense, 
trial, or nolle prosequi to merit sealing, and arguably the 
difference in the calculation of time is insignificant.  But 
where the judge made factual errors crucial to a factor that was 
a primary influence in his decision, we cannot determine whether 
39 
 
his conclusion would be the same were he to have referenced the 
correct time periods.21  On remand, the judge should address 
this. 
 
As to the defendant's assertion that the "relevant 
timeframe [to consider] was the six years during which [he] had 
lived in the community without incident following his release 
from pretrial detention," Pon instructs that both "the passage 
of time since the date of the offense and the date of the 
dismissal or nolle prosequi" are important factors (emphases 
added).  Pon, 469 Mass. at 318.  Admitting that the passage of 
time since the defendant was in the community after he was 
charged with the offenses is relevant to "the risk of 
recidivism," the judge would not have abused his discretion if 
he had considered the correct period of time since his remaining 
charges were nol prossed:  almost four years at the issuance of 
his decision and over five years to date.  See id. ("If sealing 
is sought immediately following the disposition, there may be 
 
21 The judge indicated that the passage of time since 
dismissal of the nolle prosequi counts was insufficient for him 
to assess accurately the defendant's likelihood of recidivism 
and the additional safety threat sealing would pose.  He also 
indicated that a prospective employer might want to know that 
"less than five years ago," a "jury deadlocked over the question 
of whether [the defendant] had kidnapped, robbed, and raped a 
woman at gunpoint."  Further contributing to the error, the 
judge appeared to be incorrect about the "at gunpoint" comment:  
the parties agreed that the trial judge reduced the aggravated 
portion of the remaining rape count and ordered the firearm 
provision removed from the robbery count. 
40 
 
concerns that the public has not had sufficient opportunity for 
access, and that the defendant may be likely to reoffend"). 
 
Finally, the judge heavily relied on the sixth factor, "the 
nature of and reasons for the disposition," in coming to his 
conclusion to deny the defendant's petition to seal.  Pon, 469 
Mass. at 319.  The judge stated: 
"The [c]ourt . . . strongly believes that the 'nature and 
reasons for the disposition' of the [n]olle [p]rosequi 
[c]ounts against [the defendant] constitutes information 
that the public has a 'general right to know.'  Although 
[the defendant] is correct that the jury . . . 'did not 
find the allegations (of the [n]olle [p]rosequi [c]ounts) 
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt' . . . neither did 
the jury exonerate him of those charges.  Indeed, someone 
interested in [the defendant's] past -- including a 
prospective employer thinking of hiring [him] for a 
position that would bring him into frequent contact with 
members of the public -- might very well want to know that, 
less than five years ago, a . . . jury deadlocked over the 
question of whether [the defendant] had kidnapped, robbed, 
and raped a woman at gunpoint." 
 
Aside from the factual error where the defendant was acquitted 
of the aggravating portion of the commission of his crimes at 
gunpoint, this factor undeniably is important.  The particular 
reason for the nolle prosequis, that the victim relapsed and was 
unable to testify, does not speak to the defendant's innocence 
on the charges.  See id. ("Defendants who were subject to 
wrongful accusations present the strongest case for sealing").  
Despite his consideration of this relevant factor, where the 
judge failed to discuss all the factors mentioned supra in favor 
of the defendant and the Commonwealth's interests in keeping the 
41 
 
records private, we cannot be sure that he appropriately 
balanced the interests relevant to a reasoned determination 
whether "substantial justice would best be served" by sealing. 
 
Conclusion.  We take no position on whether the defendant's 
record should be sealed on the counts in which the Commonwealth 
entered a nolle prosequi.  We remand for the purpose of allowing 
the judge to adequately address and illustrate all the relevant 
factors in his balancing of the various interests.  On remand, 
the defendant should clarify his position with respect to 
automatic sealing of the charges of which he was acquitted.  If 
he determines that he would prefer them to remain open to the 
public, he must make a written request to the commissioner not 
to seal those records. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.