Title: Foster v. Commissioner of Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13125
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13125 
 
STEPHEN FOSTER1 & others2  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION 
& others.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 10, 2021. - November 18, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Commissioner of Correction.  Commissioner of Public Safety.  
Imprisonment, Safe environment.  Constitutional Law, 
Imprisonment, Cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 17, 2020. 
 
Following review by this court, 484 Mass. 698 and 484 Mass. 
1059 (2020), and transfer to the Superior Court Department, a 
motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Robert L. 
Ullmann, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
1 On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 
 
 
2 Michael Gomes, Peter Kyriakides, Richard O'Rourke, Steven 
Palladino, Mark Santos, David Sibinich, Michelle Tourigny, 
Michael White, Frederick Yeomans, and Hendrick Davis, on behalf 
of themselves and all others similarly situated. 
 
 
3 Chair of the parole board and Secretary of the Executive 
Office of Public Safety and Security. 
 
2 
 
 
Bonita P. Tenneriello (David Milton also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
Stephen G. Dietrick for Commissioner of Correction & 
another. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The plaintiffs, a class of inmates in 
Department of Correction (DOC) facilities, have brought suit 
contending that the conditions of their confinement during the 
COVID-19 pandemic constitute cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In 
Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 1), 484 Mass. 698, 
730, 733 (2020), S.C., 484 Mass. 1059 (2020) (Foster I), this 
court denied the plaintiffs' first motion for a preliminary 
injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success of proving deliberate 
indifference to inmates' health.  Here, we reach the same 
conclusion regarding the plaintiffs' second motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  We emphasize, as did the Superior Court 
judge who heard the second motion (motion judge), that because 
the DOC has continued to implement the measures that were 
discussed in Foster I, and has undertaken additional measures, 
including in particular the offer of vaccination to all 
medically eligible prisoners, the plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated a likelihood of success of proving deliberate 
indifference necessary to constitute a constitutional violation.  
 
3 
We therefore affirm the motion judge's denial of the plaintiffs' 
second request for a preliminary injunction. 
 
Background.  1.  Procedural history.  In April 2020, the 
plaintiffs filed a class action complaint and an emergency 
motion for a preliminary injunction in the county court.  In 
seeking preliminary relief from the single justice, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the risk to DOC inmates of contracting 
COVID-19 created unconstitutional conditions of confinement and 
sought to enjoin the DOC to use various measures to reduce the 
incarcerated population, thus allowing for physical distancing 
to be maintained in DOC facilities.4  The single justice reserved 
and reported the case to the full court while remanding to the 
Superior Court for expedited fact finding.  On the basis of the 
factual findings that the motion judge submitted to us in May 
2020, we denied the plaintiffs' first motion for a preliminary 
injunction and transferred the case to the Superior Court for a 
final adjudication on the merits.  See Foster I, 484 Mass. at 
733-734.  The judge subsequently certified a class of all 
prisoners housed in DOC facilities. 
 
4 The plaintiffs also moved the court to require the parole 
board to expedite the release of certain categories of 
prisoners, to consider the dangers posed by COVID-19 to 
incarcerated persons in making parole decisions, and to adopt a 
presumption in favor of release on parole for all parole-
eligible inmates. 
 
4 
On December 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed their second 
emergency motion for a preliminary injunction in the Superior 
Court, alleging that their ongoing conditions of confinement, 
and the DOC's limited efforts to decrease the prison population 
after Foster I, were violative of the Eighth Amendment because 
they were unreasonably dangerous to prisoners' health.  The 
plaintiffs' motion sought an order requiring the defendants to 
adopt specific measures that would achieve an immediate 
reduction in the incarcerated population.  The measures urged 
included the immediate implementation of a home confinement 
program, the release of prisoners on furloughs, the maximization 
of the award of good conduct deductions, and the expeditious 
granting of medical parole to all eligible inmates.5 
 
5 The plaintiffs' second motion also sought to enjoin the 
defendant chair of the parole board to adopt rules in her 
decision-making that would expand the availability of parole, 
such as considering a potential parolee's risk of contracting 
COVID-19 while incarcerated in assessing the impact of his or 
her release on the welfare of society, establishing a 
presumption in favor of granting parole to all parole-eligible 
inmates, and ignoring technical violations that would otherwise 
lead to parole revocation.  The motion judge ruled in favor of 
the parole board, concluding that it had "made numerous 
adjustments in its operations during the pandemic, including but 
not limited to remote parole hearings, expediting certain types 
of hearings, and expanding living arrangements for prospective 
parolees through contractual arrangements."  Because the 
plaintiffs presented no arguments specifically addressing their 
claims against the parole board in their brief filed with this 
court, we decline to consider their claims against the chair of 
the parole board.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing 
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (requiring that appellant's brief 
contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to the 
 
5 
On December 29, 2020, after the plaintiffs had filed their 
second motion, the Legislature enacted a budget line item 
addressing the threat of COVID-19 in DOC facilities.  The line 
item directed the DOC to use or consider using various measures 
to reduce the prison population, consistent with public safety.  
St. 2020, c. 227, § 2, line item 8900-0001.  In light of the 
passage of this line item, the plaintiffs submitted a reply 
brief on January 27, 2021, the same day as the scheduled hearing 
on the plaintiffs' second motion, advancing for the first time 
arguments based on the line item.  The motion judge set an 
expedited briefing schedule for the defendants to respond to the 
plaintiffs' reply brief and for all parties to address 
additional issues raised by the judge, including, in particular, 
the current status of the DOC's vaccination program.  Final 
submissions by the parties were made on February 10, 2021, and 
the judge heard oral arguments on that day. 
The motion judge subsequently denied the plaintiffs' second 
motion for preliminary relief in a memorandum and order dated 
February 17, 2021.  He ruled that a preliminary injunction 
should not issue because the plaintiffs had not shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their underlying Eighth 
 
issues presented, and the reasons therefor," and providing that 
"[t]he appellate court need not pass upon questions or issues 
not argued in the brief"). 
 
6 
Amendment claim.  The judge did not rule on whether, under the 
objective element of the test for unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement, the plaintiffs faced a substantial risk of serious 
harm, professing himself unable to predict plaintiffs' ultimate 
likelihood of success on that issue, given the DOC's vaccination 
program.  The judge's decision was instead based on his finding 
that the DOC's response to the threat of COVID-19 to inmates did 
not demonstrate the deliberate indifference required under the 
subjective element of the test for unconstitutional prison 
conditions.  Because he concluded that the plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, the judge 
denied their motion without ruling on the other elements 
required for a preliminary injunction. 
Following the motion judge's denial of preliminary relief, 
the plaintiffs filed a petition for review in the Appeals Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, and a single justice of that 
court referred the plaintiffs' petition to a full panel of the 
court.  While the  case was pending before the Appeals Court, 
the plaintiffs filed a petition for direct appellate review by 
this court, which we granted. 
2.  The DOC's response to the threat of COVID-19 to 
inmates.  a.  Nonpharmaceutical interventions.  As we noted in 
our Foster I decision, the DOC began implementing a suite of 
measures to control COVID-19 in March 2020, informed by 
 
7 
recommendations issued by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
regarding the control of COVID-19 in correctional facilities.6  
Foster I, 484 Mass. at 704-709.  Given that vaccines against 
COVID-19 had yet to be developed then, the measures recommended 
by the CDC and adopted by the DOC were nonpharmaceutical 
interventions (NPIs) designed to disrupt the transmission of 
COVID-19 among those who worked at and were housed in DOC 
facilities. 
Crediting representations made by the Commissioner of 
Correction (commissioner) in two affidavits submitted to the 
Superior Court, the motion judge determined that the DOC 
maintained or updated almost all of these NPIs since we issued 
our decision in Foster I. 
Thus, the DOC retained mask-wearing policies and reiterated 
to inmates the importance of wearing masks in protecting against 
COVID-19 transmission.7  Heightened cleaning and disinfection 
protocols were also continued.  To reduce the risk of COVID-19 
being introduced into DOC facilities from the outside, 
 
6 See Centers for Disease Control, Interim Guidance on 
Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in 
Correctional and Detention Facilities (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-
detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html [https://perma 
.cc/MXY3-ETDL]. 
 
7 All DOC employees are required to wear masks when not in 
their own workspaces and alone, and every prisoner has been 
issued cloth masks. 
 
8 
nonattorney in-person visits were suspended and replaced with a 
virtual visitation program using video conferencing technology.8  
To timely detect new infections, the DOC conducted regular 
asymptomatic testing of inmates and staff, as well as contact 
tracing by testing the close contacts of inmates who tested 
positive.9  Inmates with a positive COVID-19 test or presenting 
with COVID-19 symptoms were moved into medical isolation.  The 
DOC also continued with policies to promote social distancing, 
including advising inmates of the importance of physical 
distancing in infection prevention, and having inmates take 
their meals in their cells or units.  Nevertheless, it is 
undisputed that because roughly one-half of the inmate 
population is not housed in single cells, many prisoners are not 
in fact able to keep a six-foot distance from others at all 
times. 
 
8 Since June 1, 2021, in-person visits have resumed on a 
restricted basis, with each inmate limited to one visit per 
week.  See Department of Correction, Press Release, DOC to 
Resume In-Person Visits Next Week with Continued Health & Safety 
Protocols (May 28, 2021), https://www.mass.gov/news/doc-to-
resume-in-person-visits-next-week-with-continued-health-safety-
protocols [https://perma.cc/79Q2-CQHJ]. 
 
9 The DOC's testing efforts are aided by the use of 
wastewater surveillance, in which samples of wastewater from 
various facilities are analyzed for special concentrations of 
the virus, which provides an early indicator of outbreaks.  
Where wastewater surveillance points to an outbreak at a 
particular facility, the DOC intensifies asymptomatic testing 
there. 
 
9 
While acknowledging the DOC's conscientious efforts in 
implementing measures to mitigate the COVID-19 risk within its 
facilities, the motion judge concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to establish that the DOC did not achieve perfect 
compliance with its COVID-19 policies.  The judge also concluded 
that the lapses were sporadic rather than systematic. 
b.  The end of full lockdown.  We noted in Foster I that, 
beginning in April 2020, the commissioner had instituted a 
"system-wide lockdown," which left inmates housed in cells 
confined there for twenty-three hours per day, and inmates 
living in dormitory settings confined in their units at all 
times.  Foster I, 484 Mass. at 705.  Since then, the motion 
judge determined, the DOC has ended the full lockdown.  While 
some restrictions remain to allow for physical distancing among 
inmates during activities that involve social interaction, 
prisoners' outdoor yard time has been restored, and educational 
and vocational programs, through which inmates can earn 
sentence-reduction credits, have resumed.  Some industrial 
programs have also been restored. 
c.  Vaccination of inmates and DOC staff.  A key 
development since our ruling in Foster I has been the 
availability of vaccines against COVID-19.  The motion judge 
found that the DOC had offered the vaccine to all medically 
eligible inmates, and had undertaken a campaign to educate 
 
10 
inmates about the benefits of vaccination.  By February 2, 2021, 
of the ninety-four percent of inmates deemed medically eligible 
for vaccination, seventy-one percent had receive their first 
dose of the two-dose Moderna COVID-19 vaccine.10 
d.  COVID-19 outcomes in the inmate population.  
Unfortunately, the DOC's efforts to mitigate the risk of COVID-
19 to the incarcerated population did not succeed in fully 
sparing DOC inmates from the effects of the pandemic.  Between 
May 4, 2020, and February 10, 2021, which roughly corresponds to 
the period between when the factual findings that supported our 
Foster I were made and the motion judge's decision denying the 
plaintiffs' second motion for preliminary relief, there were 
more than 2,700 confirmed new COVID-19 cases among DOC inmates, 
and at least nineteen inmates died because of the virus.11 
 
10 Since the time that the motion judge ruled on the 
plaintiffs' second motion for preliminary relief, the 
vaccination campaign within DOC facilities has continued.  The 
defendants represent in their brief that as of July 7, 2021, 
seventy-eight percent of DOC inmates are fully vaccinated.  At 
oral argument, the defendants also called our attention to the 
Governor's executive order mandating that all executive branch 
employees, including all DOC employees, receive COVID-19 
vaccination no later than October 17, 2021.  See Executive Order 
No. 595 (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.mass.gov/doc/august-19 
-2021-executive-department-employee-vaccination-order/download 
[https://perma.cc/VYQ4-4E3V]. 
 
11 See the Special Master's Weekly Report (Feb. 11, 2021) in 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020), at 
62-64, https://www.mass.gov/doc/sjc-12926-special-masters-
weekly-report-2112021/download [https://perma.cc/P25S-4YHF]. 
 
11 
As the motion judge observed, however, the COVID-19 
emergency within DOC facilities has not occurred in isolation.  
The waves of COVID-19 infection within the population of DOC 
inmates have largely tracked background changes in the spread 
and containment of COVID-19 in Massachusetts at large.  When 
infections waned in Massachusetts during the summer and early 
fall months of 2020, COVID-19 transmission inside DOC facilities 
was low.12  It was only as COVID-19 infections began to surge 
again in Massachusetts in the late fall of 2020, reaching a peak 
in December 2020 and January 2021, that DOC facilities 
experienced a parallel wave of infections. 
e.  The budget line item.  The Legislature enacted a budget 
line item in December 2020 that directed the commissioner and 
the DOC to use various measures, consistent with public safety, 
to reduce the prison population in light of the "continued 
prevalence and threat of COVID-19 within [DOC] facilities."  St. 
2020, c. 227, § 2, line item 8900-0001.  The line item provided 
that the commissioner "shall release, transition to home 
confinement or furlough individuals in the care and custody of 
the [DOC] who can be safely released, transitioned to home 
confinement or furloughed."  Id. 
 
12 Between June 1, 2020, and September 23, 2020, there were 
never more than three new infections per week among prisoners 
across all DOC facilities.  See Special Master's Weekly Report 
(Feb. 11, 2021), supra at 62-63. 
 
12 
To that end, the law further provides that the DOC "shall 
consider" at least the following policies:  (1) home 
confinement; (2) expedited review of medical parole petitions by 
superintendents and the commissioner; (3) furloughs; (4) 
maximization of good time by eliminating, for prisoners close to 
their release dates, the requirement to participate in 
programming to earn good time; and (5) awarding credits to 
provide further sentence remissions for time served during 
periods of declared public health emergencies where prison 
operations are disrupted.  Id. 
 
The parties disagree sharply about the line item's effect 
on the statutory duties and authority of the commissioner and 
the DOC.  In denying the plaintiffs' second motion, the motion 
judge did not rule on the issue of the disputed interpretation 
of the line item and its effect on the Massachusetts statutory 
scheme governing prison administration.  The judge simply 
allowed the plaintiffs to move on an expedited basis for leave 
to amend their complaint to assert new statutory claims and to 
establish that they have a private right of action under the 
law. 
f.  The DOC's limited use of programs to reduce the inmate 
population.  While the motion judge declined to rule on how, if 
at all, the budget line item changed the DOC's statutory 
authority and duties, he did find -- as an "essentially 
 
13 
undisputed" fact -- that the DOC made only limited use of home 
confinement, "good time credit," and medical parole to bring 
down the prison population level, and has not used furloughs at 
all for that purpose, as the judge found that the DOC does not 
consider furloughs to be good policy. 
For example, although the commissioner initiated a home 
confinement program, only a small number of prisoners were 
released on electronic monitoring under the program, because the 
commissioner determined that State law and DOC regulations 
severely limit the types of inmates who are eligible for home 
confinement.  The commissioner also declined to deviate from the 
DOC's policy of requiring participation in programming, such as 
educational, journaling, vocational, and employment programs, as 
a condition for earning good time, even for prisoners nearing 
release. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  A party moving for a 
preliminary injunction must show the following:  first, that 
success is likely on the merits; second, that if the injunction 
is denied, the moving party faces a substantial risk of 
irreparable harm; and third, that this risk of irreparable harm, 
considered in light of the moving party's chances of prevailing 
on the merits, outweighs the nonmoving party's probable harm.  
See Massachusetts Port Auth. v. Turo Inc., 487 Mass. 235, 239 
(2021) (Turo Inc.); Doe v. Worcester Pub. Sch., 484 Mass. 598, 
 
14 
601 (2020); John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Malden, 430 Mass. 
124, 130-131 (1999); Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 
Mass. 609, 616-617 (1980).  "Where a party seeks to enjoin 
government action, the judge also must determine that the 
requested order promotes the public interest, or, alternatively, 
that the equitable relief will not adversely affect the public" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Garcia v. Department of Hous. 
& Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 747 (2018). 
Among the factors the motion judge must consider to 
determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue, 
likelihood of success on the merits is especially important.  As 
we have previously emphasized:  "[T]he movant's likelihood of 
success is the touchstone of the preliminary injunction inquiry.  
[I]f the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to 
succeed in his quest, the remaining factors become matters of 
idle curiosity."  Foster I, 484 Mass. at 712, quoting Maine 
Educ. Ass'n Benefits Trust v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 152 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
Where, as here, we review a denial of a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, we inquire into whether the judge abused 
his or her discretion.  John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc., 430 Mass. 
at 130.  To test for an abuse of discretion, we ask "whether the 
judge applied proper legal standards and whether there was 
reasonable support for his [or her] evaluation of factual 
 
15 
questions."  Turo Inc., 487 Mass. at 239.  Where the judge's 
findings were "predicated solely on documentary evidence," we 
"may draw our own conclusions from the record."  John T. 
Callahan & Sons, Inc., supra, quoting Packaging Indus. Group, 
Inc., 380 Mass. at 616.  As for the motion judge's conclusions 
of law, we subject them to de novo review.  See Doe, 484 Mass. 
at 601; Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 256 (2010), quoting 
Packaging Indus. Group, Inc., supra ("On review, the motion 
judge's 'conclusions of law are subject to broad review and will 
be reversed if incorrect'"). 
2.  The plaintiffs' likelihood of success on their Eighth 
Amendment claim.  The plaintiffs seek preliminary relief on the 
claim that their Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by 
their conditions of confinement in DOC facilities, because of 
the unacceptable COVID-19 threat they face there.  As we 
explained in Foster I, a prisoner's claim that his or her 
conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, as 
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, includes both objective and 
subjective elements.  Foster I, 484 Mass. at 717, citing Wilson 
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).  The objective element 
requires a plaintiff inmate to show that his or her conditions 
of confinement pose a "substantial risk of serious harm."  
Foster I, supra, quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 
 
16 
(1994).  The subjective element requires the plaintiff to show 
that "prison officials acted or failed to act with deliberate 
indifference."  Foster I, supra, citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  Accord Wilson, supra at 302-303. 
Because the motion judge declined to rule on the objective 
element of the plaintiffs' claim,13 focusing instead on the 
 
13 In our review of the plaintiffs' first motion for a 
preliminary injunction, we concluded that the heightened risk of 
COVID-19 transmission in congregate settings like prisons made 
it "almost certain[]" that persons incarcerated in DOC 
facilities would succeed in showing that their conditions of 
confinement posed a "substantial risk of serious harm" as 
required to prevail on the objective element of their Eighth 
Amendment claim.  Foster I, 484 Mass. at 717, 718.  We further 
suggested that the lockdown measures instituted by the DOC to 
combat COVID-19 transmission were themselves potential sources 
of serious harm to inmates' health, particularly their mental 
health.  Id. at 731-732. 
 
Nonetheless, because of two developments since Foster I, 
the motion judge adjudicating the plaintiffs' second motion 
determined that he could not "predict plaintiffs' ultimate 
likelihood of success on the objective element of their Eighth 
Amendment claim at a future trial."  First, the DOC had launched 
a vaccination campaign, with seventy-one percent of eligible 
inmates receiving a first dose by February 2, 2021.  The arrival 
of a mass vaccination scheme changed the calculus of the risk 
that COVID-19 posed to inmate health.  Second, the full, system-
wide lockdown had been replaced with a regime of less onerous 
restrictions, which provided inmates with expanded opportunities 
for recreation, education, and work, and allowed inmates to 
renew contact with loved ones, even if only via video 
conferencing. 
 
We agree that these two developments may have significantly 
altered the risk calculus, such that confident predictions of 
the plaintiffs' ultimate success in demonstrating a substantial 
risk of serious harm are now much more difficult.  Moreover, at 
the time of the motion judge's decision on the plaintiffs' 
second motion, it was too early to reliably assess the full 
 
17 
subjective element, which he considered dispositive, in 
reviewing the ruling we proceed directly to analyze this key 
issue:  whether the plaintiffs can demonstrate a likelihood of 
success on the subjective element of their Eighth Amendment 
claim. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the 
showing of deliberate indifference necessary to satisfy the 
subjective element of a claim of unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement involves a demonstration that prison officials had a 
"culpable state of mind" in the form of "'deliberate 
indifference' to inmate health or safety."  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
834, quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 303.  The level of 
culpability involved in deliberate indifference tracks the 
criminal-law standard of recklessness, which requires the 
"'conscious[] disregar[d]' [of] a substantial risk of serious 
harm."  Farmer, supra at 839, quoting Model Penal Code 
§ 2.02(2)(c).  We have similarly described deliberate 
 
impact of the DOC's vaccination campaign on the inmate 
population's vulnerability to disease and death from COVID-19.  
In their brief, the defendants represent that from April 15, 
2021, to July 12, 2021, there have not been more than four 
confirmed COVID-19 cases among inmates at any one time, and that 
as of July 12, 2021, there were no active confirmed cases at all 
among DOC inmates. 
 
As we need not decide the difficult issue of the objective 
element of the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim to assess the 
plaintiffs' over-all likelihood of success on the merits, we, 
like the motion judge, decline to do so. 
 
18 
indifference as "'recklessly disregarding' a substantial risk of 
harm," which is the standard of "'subjective recklessness' 
[that] would apply in the criminal context."  Foster I, 484 
Mass. at 719, quoting Farmer, supra at 836, 839-840. 
Under this standard, a prison official shows deliberate 
indifference only if he or she "knows of . . . an excessive risk 
to inmate health or safety," yet "disregards" that risk.  
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  In establishing an "excessive" risk 
standard, the Court recognizes that some risk is inevitable in 
the prison context.  Id. at 844-845 (prison officials have 
"unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under 
humane conditions" [citation omitted]).  Prison officials are 
not expected or required to make the prison risk free but to 
respond reasonably to "excessive" risk. 
The Court has also carefully explained what constitutes 
disregard of an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.  
Crucially, prison officials do not disregard such a risk if they 
"respond[] reasonably" to that risk.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.  
Indeed, the Court has made clear that "prison officials who 
actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety 
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to 
the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted."  Id.  
Accord Foster I, 484 Mass. at 720 ("Where the risk of serious 
harm is substantial, but prison officials have undertaken 
 
19 
significant steps to try to reduce the harm and protect inmates, 
courts have concluded that there was no Eighth Amendment 
liability"). 
In sum, prison officials' constitutional duty under the 
Eighth Amendment is to "to ensure reasonable safety" by taking 
"reasonable measures" to mitigate excessive risk (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 847.  Ultimately, 
"prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause."  Id. at 845. 
We conclude, as did the motion judge, that the plaintiffs 
did not demonstrate that they are likely to succeed in proving 
deliberate indifference.  As the motion judge found, the DOC 
continued to implement most of the NPIs that we characterized in 
Foster I as "significant steps" toward reducing the COVID-19 
risk to inmates, probative of a reasonable response to that 
risk.  See Foster I, 484 Mass. at 720, 721-724.  These continued 
measures included restrictions on in-person visits, mask 
wearing, heightened cleaning and disinfectant, program 
limitations to improve social distancing, regular asymptomatic 
testing, and the medical isolation of confirmed COVID-19 
patients. 
Significantly, in addition to these NPIs, the DOC took full 
advantage of the availability of COVID-19 vaccines by launching 
an effort to vaccinate all prisoners in its custody.  The DOC's 
 
20 
vaccination campaign involved outreach to educate inmates about 
the benefits of vaccination as well as the offer of the COVID-19 
vaccine to all medically eligible inmates -- the overwhelming 
majority of the prison population -- with the result that at 
least seventy-one percent of the eligible inmate population had 
received a first dose by the time of the motion judge's 
decision.14  The scientific community has recognized that 
vaccination is highly effective in protecting against COVID-19 
infection, and especially against serious outcomes like severe 
illness, hospitalization, and death.15  In implementing a 
comprehensive inmate vaccination program, then, the DOC was 
adopting the state-of-the-art medical response in combatting 
COVID-19.  See Foster I, 484 Mass. at 722 (emphasizing 
importance of compliance with professional guidance).  This was 
eminently reasonable. 
Additionally, the DOC changed its previous full lockdown 
policy to alleviate the burdens that its harsh restrictions had 
 
14 In fact, first doses of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine were 
made available to DOC inmates as early as January 2021, before 
the general public in Massachusetts had access to the vaccine.  
See Department of Public Health, Massachusetts' COVID-19 
Vaccination Phases, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/ 
massachusetts-covid-19-vaccination-phases [https://perma.cc/ 
KJM3-VHDV]. 
 
15 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 
Vaccines Work, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/ 
vaccines/effectiveness/work.html [https://perma.cc/5D8P-XLHZ]. 
 
21 
placed on inmates' mental health, while still retaining 
guardrails to control COVID-19 transmission by, for example, 
scaling down programs and scheduling activities to maintain 
social distancing.  Again, this approach was reasonable as a 
strategy to manage two interlocking health risks to prisoners. 
We recognize, as did the motion judge, that there were 
lapses in the implementation of DOC policies and procedures to 
contain the COVID-19 threat.  However, these lapses were, as he 
found, inadvertent and sporadic.  They thus fall far short of 
the standard needed to establish deliberate indifference, which 
tracks that of criminal recklessness, not civil negligence.  See 
Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008), citing Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 836-837 (explaining that to establish deliberate 
indifference, "negligence or even gross negligence is not 
enough; the conduct must be reckless in the criminal sense").  
Hence, unless "lapses in enforcement" of prison policies to 
combat COVID-19 were "ignor[ed] or approv[ed]" by prison 
officials, the mere fact that lapses unfortunately occurred does 
not establish deliberate indifference.  Swain v. Junior, 958 
F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020).  See Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 
1276, 1287-1288 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that deliberate 
indifference inquiry focuses on "the defendants' entire course 
of conduct" rather than on "isolated failures"). 
 
22 
The plaintiffs contend nonetheless that the package of 
measures undertaken by the DOC still constituted deliberate 
indifference because it did not include prison depopulation 
efforts.  In addressing this argument, the motion judge pointed 
out that there had been a seventeen percent decline in the 
prison population.  He also, however, acknowledged that even 
with such a reduction, prisoners could not keep a six-foot 
distance from each other at all times, and that roughly one-half 
of all inmates were not housed in single cells.  Additionally, 
he recognized that the DOC chose not to use, or at least use to 
its maximum advantage, various programs that could have achieved 
further prison depopulation and even greater risk reduction.  
His findings are well supported, and we adopt them in our own 
analysis. 
We conclude that the plaintiffs have not established a 
likelihood of success in demonstrating deliberate indifference, 
even absent greater prison depopulation efforts.  The deliberate 
indifference inquiry, as explained above, centers on whether the 
DOC has responded reasonably to the risks presented by COVID-19.  
The DOC's approach of combining existing NPI measures with a 
comprehensive vaccination program appears, on this record, to 
have been a reasonable response resulting in reasonably safe 
conditions of confinement.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.  The 
scientific community has clearly established that vaccination is 
 
23 
a powerful tool in protecting against the risk of COVID-19 
infection and especially against severe outcomes from the virus.  
The NPI measures implemented by the DOC, such as mask wearing, 
testing, and social distancing, also have a well-supported 
scientific basis.16 
In choosing between reasonable alternatives to combat 
COVID-19, the DOC could have relied on increased prison 
depopulation as one of its tools of risk reduction.  That being 
said, the DOC was not required to employ or exhaust every 
measure that would offer a risk-reduction benefit for its COVID-
19 response to be "reasonable" under Farmer.  See Wilson v. 
Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 844 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting 
contention that prison officials respond unreasonably to risk to 
inmate health if they do not make "full use of the tools 
available" or "take every possible step to address a serious 
risk of harm").  A reasonable response is one that takes steps 
to mitigate excessive risk, not one that adopts every available 
measure to eliminate risk.  The DOC may, consistent with 
mounting a reasonable response to the COVID-19 threat, choose 
one risk-reduction strategy over another, particularly when the 
choice implicates other penological considerations. 
 
16 As we noted in Foster I, the DOC's package of NPI 
measures is aligned with the guidance issued by the CDC for the 
containment of COVID-19 in correctional facilities.  Foster I, 
484 Mass. at 721-723. 
 
24 
The reasonableness inquiry thus takes into account 
officials' over-all responsibilities, recognizing and giving due 
deference to officials' consideration of the full range of "the 
legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution."  Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).  See O'Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (urging judicial deference in 
reviewing Eighth Amendment claims to "considered judgment of 
prison administrators" on matters regarding "evaluation of 
penological objectives").17 
Absent vaccination, prison officials may have had no other 
reasonable choice but to rely on greater prison depopulation 
measures.  In Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 445, S.C., 484 Mass. 
1029 (2020), prior to the development of vaccines, we described 
the conditions inside jails and prisons to be "urgent and 
unprecedented," such that "a reduction in the number of people 
who are held in custody [was] necessary."  The evaluation of 
deliberate indifference is not, however, "a static 
determination."  Foster I, 484 Mass. at 719.  With the DOC 
implementing a comprehensive vaccination scheme in addition to 
 
17 We note that among the DOC's most important 
responsibilities is public safety.  The early release of 
prisoners to achieve prison depopulation would appear to require 
a careful, individualized, and time-consuming determination 
whether the release of a given prisoner poses a danger to the 
community in which he or she would be released. 
 
25 
the suite of NPIs it already had in place, we cannot conclude 
that the plaintiffs would likely be able to establish that 
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to inmate health 
without the prison depopulation measures that the plaintiffs 
advocate.  The DOC's over-all choice of measures to combat 
COVID-19 reflected a reasonable risk-reduction response. 
Finally, we address briefly the passage of the budget line 
item in the midst of the injunction proceedings in the Superior 
Court.  We conclude that the motion judge properly allowed the 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint.  As the briefing here 
demonstrates, it is not clear on its face what changes in 
existing law the line item permitted or required.  Although its 
recent passage precludes a finding of deliberate indifference at 
the time of the preliminary injunction hearing in early February 
2021, as the DOC had little to no time to comply with whatever 
changes in the law the line item had brought about, allowing the 
complaint to be amended ensures that the budget provision, and 
the DOC's response, be given appropriate consideration as the 
case proceeds. 
Conclusion.  Based on the record before us, which 
demonstrates that the DOC added a comprehensive vaccination 
program to the NPI measures previously adopted, the plaintiffs 
have not established that they are likely to succeed in proving 
that the defendants showed deliberate indifference to inmate 
 
26 
health.  Because the plaintiffs are thus unlikely to prevail on 
their Eighth Amendment claim, we affirm the Superior Court's 
denial of their second motion for preliminary relief.  The 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court, where the case shall 
continue to proceed as an emergency matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.