Title: Geiser v. Kuhns
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S262032
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
GREGORY GEISER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
PETER KUHNS et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S262032 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Five 
B279738 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BS161018, BS16019, BS161020 
 
 
August 29, 2022 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
S262032 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 
425.16 to combat “a disturbing increase” in Strategic Lawsuits 
Against Public Participation (SLAPPs):  “lawsuits brought 
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights 
of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.”  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a); all undesignated statutory 
references are to this Code.)  In FilmOn.com Inc v. DoubleVerify 
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 143 (FilmOn), we observed that “[i]n 
the paradigmatic SLAPP suit, a well-funded developer limits 
free expression by imposing litigation costs on citizens who 
protest, write letters, and distribute flyers in opposition to a 
local project.”  (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1997, 
pp. 2–3.)  As the Assembly Committee on Judiciary observed, 
approximately 25 percent of SLAPP suits “relate to development 
and zoning . . . .”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill. No. 1296, supra, as amended June 23, 1997, at p. 3.)  The 
committee recognized that “such lawsuits are often pernicious, 
masquerading as standard defamation and interference with 
prospective economic advantage litigation, while really brought 
by well-heeled parties who can afford to misuse the civil justice 
system to chill the exercise of free speech . . . by the threat of 
impoverishing the other party.”  (Ibid.)  To protect against these 
abuses, the Legislature has directed that the anti-SLAPP 
statute “shall be construed broadly.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
As relevant here, the statute’s protection extends to “any 
. . . conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional 
right . . . of free speech in connection with a public issue or an 
issue of public interest.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4) (hereafter 
section 425.16(e)(4)).)  This provision — the so-called catchall 
provision in the statute’s enumeration of “ ‘act[s] in furtherance 
of a person’s right of petition or free speech’ ” (§ 425.16, 
subd. (e)) — was the subject of our recent decision in FilmOn.  
There, we articulated a two-step inquiry for deciding whether 
the activity from which a lawsuit arises falls within section 
425.16(e)(4)’s protection:  first, we ask what public issue or 
issues the challenged activity implicates, and second, we ask 
whether the challenged activity contributes to public discussion 
of any such issue.  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.)  If 
the answer to the second question is yes, then the protections of 
the anti-SLAPP statute are triggered, and the plaintiff in the 
underlying lawsuit must establish “a probability” of prevailing 
before the action may proceed.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) 
The case before us features a sidewalk picket purporting 
to protest a real estate company’s business practices after the 
company evicted two long-term residents from their home.  The 
Court of Appeal held the activity at issue to be beyond the scope 
of anti-SLAPP protection, concluding that the picket did not 
implicate a public issue and concerned only a private dispute 
between the company and the residents it had evicted.  We 
granted review to clarify the proper application of FilmOn’s two-
part test.  Applying both steps of the FilmOn analysis, we hold 
that the sidewalk protest constitutes protected activity within 
the meaning of section 425.16(e)(4).  We remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
I. 
 
Mercedes and Pablo Caamal shared a home in Rialto, 
California for nearly ten years.  They purchased the property for 
$450,000 in 2006 using funds from two mortgages they obtained 
from Wells Fargo without any cash up front.  Both Caamals lost 
their jobs in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008; by 
2012, they had fallen behind on their mortgage payments.  In 
September 2015, the mortgagor held a foreclosure auction, at 
which an affiliate of Wedgewood, LLC — a company “focused on 
the 
purchase, 
rehabilitation, 
and 
resale 
of 
distressed 
properties” — purchased the home for $284,000.  Wedgewood 
filed unlawful detainer actions to evict the Caamals. 
 
The Caamals sought help from the Alliance of Californians 
for Community Empowerment (ACCE), an organization whose 
mission is “to save homes from foreclosures” and to “fight 
against the displacement of long-term residents.”  On December 
17, 
2015, 
several 
ACCE 
supporters — 
including 
the 
organization’s 
Los 
Angeles 
director, 
Peter 
Kuhns — 
accompanied the Caamals to Wedgewood’s headquarters.  The 
group requested a meeting with Gregory Geiser, Wedgewood’s 
chief executive officer, to discuss the possibility of the Caamals 
repurchasing their home.  They set up a tent in the building’s 
lobby and refused to leave until such a meeting transpired.  
Geiser alleges that one of the activists shoved a Wedgewood 
employee when that employee attempted to remove the tent.  
Wedgewood’s chief operating officer and its general counsel 
eventually offered to meet with the Caamals if the ACCE 
activists vacated the premises.  The Caamals agreed, and the 
ACCE activists departed. 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
At the meeting, the Caamals expressed their desire to 
repurchase the property.  Without discussing a specific price, 
Wedgewood employees proposed to stay the eviction proceedings 
for several weeks to enable the Caamals to obtain financing.  In 
January 2016, the parties made this agreement known to the 
court; the eviction proceedings were stayed for 60 days pending 
negotiation of the proposed repurchase.  Although the details of 
those negotiations are disputed, the parties agree that on March 
12, 2016 — shortly before the 60-day period expired — the 
Caamals mailed to Wedgewood, on ACCE letterhead, a letter 
asserting they had secured prequalification for a $300,000 loan.  
Wedgewood found that unacceptable.  The Caamals remained in 
their home as the 60-day period lapsed. 
 
On March 23, 2016, the Caamals and several ACCE 
supporters returned to Wedgewood’s headquarters and sought 
another meeting with Geiser.  Wedgewood’s chief operating 
officer again offered to meet with the Caamals and discuss the 
situation if the ACCE supporters agreed to disperse.  The 
Caamals again accepted, and the protestors again departed.  No 
agreement was reached at the meeting.  Over the next few days, 
articles describing the controversy appeared in the Huffington 
Post and in the Spanish-language newspaper La Opinión. 
 
On March 30, 2016, Wedgewood locked the Caamals out of 
the property.  The Caamals again turned to ACCE.  Together, 
they organized a demonstration that evening on the public 
sidewalk outside of Geiser’s residence in Manhattan Beach.  
About 25 to 30 demonstrators attended.  According to sworn 
testimony from Kuhns and the Caamals, the demonstrators 
“held signs, sang songs, and gave short speeches in protest of 
Wedgewood”; the record does not disclose the precise content of 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
the signs, songs, or speeches.  The only utterance that the record 
discloses verbatim is a chant used by the demonstrators as they 
picketed outside Geiser’s residence:  “Greg Geiser, come outside!  
Greg Geiser, you can’t hide!”  Around 10:00 p.m., Pablo Caamal 
thanked the demonstrators for their support and declared that 
the demonstration was over.  The demonstrators then dispersed. 
 
Multiple Manhattan Beach police officers were present for 
much of the demonstration, as was Gilbert Saucedo, a member 
of the National Lawyers Guild who volunteered to observe.  
According to Saucedo, the demonstration had been organized by 
ACCE “to protest unfair and deceptive practices” used by 
Wedgewood in acquiring the property and in evicting the 
Caamals from their home.  Saucedo relayed this information to 
the commanding officer at the scene.  The officers remained 
present throughout the demonstration and did not intervene.  
According 
to 
Saucedo’s 
declaration, 
“everyone 
behaved 
peacefully and there were no threats of violence at any time.” 
 
Geiser saw things differently.  Two days after the 
demonstration, Geiser filed petitions for civil harassment 
restraining orders against Kuhns and the Caamals.  The 
petitions characterized the picketing as an “assault” on his home 
by a “mob” that he believed threatened his and his wife’s safety.  
The petitions sought to keep Kuhns and the Caamals at least 
100 yards away from Geiser’s home and from the Wedgewood 
headquarters.  The trial court issued a temporary restraining 
order enjoining Kuhns and the Caamals from “picketing or 
otherwise demonstrating in front of [Geiser’s] personal 
residence.”   
 
The litigation attracted more media attention:  Breitbart 
News published an article characterizing the controversy as “a 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
rare case of a senior executive fighting back against radical left-
wing groups like the now-defunct Association of Community 
Organizers For Reform Now (ACORN).”  The article went on to 
argue that ACCE’s policy agenda concerning foreclosures and 
evictions could “put owners of rental properties at real risk.” 
 
Kuhns and the Caamals moved to strike the civil 
harassment petitions under the anti-SLAPP statute.  Their 
motion alleged that the demonstration implicated a public issue 
because the business practices by which Wedgewood evicted the 
Caamals exemplified “one of the many stories of hundreds of 
thousands who lost their homes since 2008 in the Great 
Recession.”  Geiser voluntarily dismissed the petitions before 
the motions could be resolved.  Within days of the dismissals, 
Wedgewood issued a press release alleging that it had 
endeavored to negotiate a settlement with the Caamals and that 
despite “the company’s sincere good-faith efforts,” ACCE 
“unilaterally decided to pursue its own agenda to the detriment 
of the Caamals.”  The press release decried ACCE for 
“portray[ing] the Caamal family as victims, while exploiting a 
very emotional issue . . . to further its own agenda.” 
Motions for attorneys’ fees followed.  In those motions, 
Kuhns and the Caamals asserted that, as prevailing parties on 
an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, they were entitled to full 
recovery of attorneys’ fees — a total of $84,150 — under section 
425.16, subdivision (c)(1). 
 
The trial court rejected the argument that Kuhns and the 
Caamals had prevailed under the anti-SLAPP statute.  In the 
court’s view, the March 30 demonstrations did not implicate a 
public issue because they “did not concern people other than the 
Caamals.”  In so holding, the trial court relied primarily upon 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
the declarations of Kuhns and the Caamals, each of which 
asserted that the March 30 demonstration had been undertaken 
exclusively to facilitate the repurchase of the property.  The trial 
court nonetheless exercised its discretion to award attorneys’ 
fees under a different statutory provision, section 527.6, 
explaining that although Kuhns and the Caamals would not 
have prevailed on their anti-SLAPP motions, they were still 
“prevailing part[ies]” within the meaning of that statute.  The 
trial court accordingly awarded $40,000 in attorneys’ fees, less 
than half the amount that Kuhns and the Caamals sought under 
the anti-SLAPP statute.  The Court of Appeal affirmed. 
 
We granted review and deferred briefing pending our 
decision in FilmOn, where we construed the catchall provision 
of the anti-SLAPP statute.  Section 425.16, subdivision (e) sets 
forth four types of activity that trigger the statute’s protections.  
The fourth — the catchall — covers “any other conduct in 
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition 
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 
public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (§ 425.16(e)(4).)  In 
FilmOn, we articulated a two-step inquiry to determine whether 
the conduct from which the lawsuit arises falls within the 
catchall.  “First, we ask what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public 
interest’ ” is implicated by the challenged activity.  (FilmOn, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.)  Second, we look to the “functional 
relationship” between the challenged activity and the public 
issue it implicates, and ask whether the activity contributed to 
public discussion of that issue.  (Id. at pp. 149–152.)   
 
We transferred this case to the Court of Appeal for 
reconsideration in light of FilmOn.  The Court of Appeal again 
affirmed, maintaining that the demonstration outside Geiser’s 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
home “focused on coercing Wedgewood into selling back the 
property to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price, which was a private 
matter concerning a former homeowner and the corporation that 
purchased her former home and not a public issue.”  Like the 
trial court, the Court of Appeal rested its holding on the 
declarations submitted in support of the anti-SLAPP motion.  It 
emphasized that the Caamals disclosed in their declarations 
that their actions were motivated by a desire to repurchase their 
former residence, and that the declarations neither endeavored 
to detail “Wedgewood’s residential real estate business 
practices” nor to explain how such “large scale fix-and-flip” 
operations were related to the Great Recession and its attendant 
ills.  On this basis, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the true 
“motivation” for the protests “was purely personal to the 
Caamals and did not address any societal issues of residential 
displacement, gentrification, or the root causes of the great 
recession.”  The Court of Appeal also emphasized that “[t]he only 
evidence of the specific content of the speeches during the 
demonstration 
at 
plaintiff’s 
residence 
was 
that 
the 
demonstrators demanded [Geiser] personally come out of his 
home.”  
 
The Court of Appeal went on to address the second step of 
the FilmOn analysis:  “[E]ven if we accepted defendants’ 
contention that the demonstrations concerned the issues of 
displacement of residents due to residential real estate business 
practices, gentrification, and large scale fix-and-flip real estate 
practices leading to the great recession, those demonstrations 
did not qualify for statutory protection because they did not 
further the public discourse on those issues.”  It justified this 
conclusion with the same reasoning that animated its first-step 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
analysis:  that the demonstrations were undertaken only “for 
the purpose of coercing Wedgewood into selling back the 
property” to the Caamals and therefore “did not further the 
public discourse.” 
 
Justice Baker dissented.  He noted our observation in 
FilmOn that “[i]n the paradigmatic SLAPP suit, a well-funded 
developer limits free expression by imposing litigation costs on 
citizens who protest, write letters, and distribute flyers in 
opposition to a local project.”  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 143.)  In his view, that sentence “suffice[d] almost by itself to 
point the way to the correct result here. . . .  Well-funded 
developer?  Check.  Citizen protest of a local (evict-and-flip 
housing) project?  Check.  Limits on free expression by imposing 
litigation costs?  Check. . . .  [T]his case has many of the 
hallmarks of vintage SLAPP conduct.” 
 
Turning to FilmOn’s two-step test, Justice Baker 
emphasized Kuhns’s characterization of ACCE as “an entity 
dedicated to ‘sav[ing] homes from foreclosures and the fight 
against 
displacement 
of 
long[-]term 
residents 
in 
our 
communities.’ ”  “With that mission,” he explained, “ACCE’s 
participation in the protest is enough by itself to infer [that] the 
content of the public protest outside Geiser’s home concerned 
unfair (at least as perceived by ACCE) housing practices that 
displace long-time community residents.”  Rejecting the Court 
of Appeal’s “parsing” of the Caamals’ declarations, he would 
have held that the demonstration outside Geiser’s residence 
implicated public issues concerning “displacement of long-term 
community residents by unfair foreclosure and fix-and-flip 
housing practices.”  Proceeding to FilmOn’s second step, he 
explained that “[t]he identity of defendants, the audience they 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
sought, and the timing and location of the speech all show a 
degree of closeness between the protest and the ongoing public 
conversation about housing displacement.”  “Stated simply,” he 
concluded, “the public protest contributed to the public debate.” 
 
We again granted review. 
II. 
In FilmOn, we observed that “[o]ur courts have ably 
distilled the characteristics of ‘a public issue or an issue of public 
interest.’  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)”  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 149, citing Rivero v. American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 
913, 919–924 (Rivero) and Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 
110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132–1133.)  The court in Rivero, upon 
surveying the case law, said that statements found to implicate 
a public issue generally “concerned a person or entity in the 
public eye[,] . . . conduct that could directly affect a large number 
of people beyond the direct participants[,] . . . or a topic of 
widespread, public interest.”  (Rivero, at p. 924, citations 
omitted.)  The Weinberg court distilled “some attributes of [an] 
issue which make it one of public, rather than merely private, 
interest,” including the fact that the issue is “of concern to a 
substantial number of people” or has “been the subject of 
extensive media coverage.”  (Weinberg, at pp. 1132, 1133.) 
At the same time, our opinion in FilmOn described as “less 
than satisfying” various decisions that had rejected anti-SLAPP 
motions on the ground that the activity from which the litigation 
arose was not in connection with a public issue.  (FilmOn, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 149; see ibid., citing Bikkina v. Mahadevan (2015) 
241 Cal.App.4th 70, 85 (Bikkina); World Financial Group, Inc. 
v. HBW Ins. & Financial Services, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
1561, 1572 (World Financial Group); Mann v. Quality Old Time 
Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 111 (Mann).)  Although 
we expressed no opinion as to the appropriate outcomes in those 
cases, we disapproved their reasoning — in particular, their 
insistence that the challenged conduct implicated only a private 
dispute and not an issue of public interest.  (FilmOn, at p. 149.) 
In Bikkina, an engineering professor accused a student he 
had once advised of having falsified data in two academic papers 
on carbon sequestration.  (Bikkina, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 75–76.)  The professor relayed the accusations to the 
student’s superiors and colleagues, once at an academic 
presentation and another time at the student’s place of 
employment.  (Id. at p. 76.)  The student sued for libel; the 
professor responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that 
his allegedly libelous statements were entitled to anti-SLAPP 
protection because they were made in connection with “public 
discourse on carbon sequestration and its impacts on global 
warming.”  (Id. at p. 77.)  The court disagreed.  In its view, the 
professor’s statements were “about data in papers on carbon 
sequestration” — specifically, allegations “about contaminated 
quartz samples and plagiarism in two [academic] papers” — and 
not about “climate change generally.”  (Id. at p. 83.) 
In World Financial Group, after several former employees 
of an insurance company took jobs with a competitor, the 
insurance company sued, alleging that the competitor had 
unlawfully solicited the former employees and that the former 
employees were using confidential information and trade secrets 
unlawfully to benefit the competitor.  (World Financial Group, 
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1565–1566.)  The competitor 
invoked 
the 
anti-SLAPP 
statute, 
asserting 
that 
its 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
communications were protected because they pertained to 
“ ‘workforce mobility and free competition.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1572.)  
The court rejected this argument, insisting that “defendants’ 
communications were not ‘about’ these broad topics . . . .  They 
were merely solicitations of a competitor’s employees and 
customers undertaken for the sole purpose of furthering a 
business interest.”  (Ibid.) 
In Mann, two independent contractors for a company 
spread false accusations to customers and to government 
agencies that the company “used illegal and carcinogenic 
chemicals” for maintaining industrial water systems.  (Mann, 
supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 100.)  After the company sued, the 
contractors asserted that the alleged statements implicated an 
issue of public interest.  (Id. at p. 111.)  The court acknowledged 
that “pollution can affect large numbers of people and is a 
matter of general public interest,” but held that the statements 
“were not about pollution or potential public health and safety 
issues in general, but about [the company’s] specific business 
practices.”  (Ibid.) 
Was the speech at issue in Bikkina about data in papers 
on carbon sequestration or about climate change?  Were the 
communications at issue in World Financial Group about the 
defendant’s own business interests or about the practice and 
market implications of imposing non-compete clauses?  Were the 
statements at issue in Mann about one company’s specific 
business practices or about pollution and public health and 
safety?  We said in FilmOn that to the extent these decisions 
focused “on discerning a single topic of speech,” their reasoning 
was “less than satisfying” because “speech is rarely ‘about’ any 
single issue.”  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
We articulated the two-part test in FilmOn to steer courts 
away from this mode of analysis.  In order to determine the 
scope of section 425.16(e)(4)’s protection, we first “ask what 
‘public issue or [] issue of public interest’ ” is implicated by the 
challenged activity.  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.)  
Second, we look to the “functional relationship” between the 
challenged activity and the “public conversation” about that 
issue, and ask whether the activity “ ‘contribute[s]’ ” to public 
discussion of the issue.  (Id. at pp. 149–150.)  We explained that 
it is FilmOn’s second step, not its first, that usually plays the 
more prominent role in screening anti-SLAPP motions because 
caselaw “demonstrate[s] that virtually always, defendants 
succeed in drawing a line — however tenuous — connecting 
their speech to an abstract issue of public interest.”  (Id. at 
p. 150.)  We note, however, that “virtually always” does not 
mean “always”; a defendant may fail to meet its first-step 
burden.  And where the first step is satisfied, it performs an 
important function in the inquiry:  It operates as a lens that 
focuses the analysis at the second step.  In other words, to assess 
whether the challenged activity contributes to discussion of a 
public issue, we must identify some public issue that the 
challenged activity purports to address. 
III. 
 
We review de novo whether Kuhns and the Caamals have 
met their burden of demonstrating that the activity from which 
the lawsuit arises falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP 
statute’s protection.  (Park v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ. 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061, 1067.) 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
A. 
The Court of Appeal held that defendants’ demonstration 
outside Geiser’s home “focused on . . . a private matter 
concerning a former homeowner and the corporation that 
purchased her former home,” and not on “any societal issues of 
residential displacement, gentrification, or the root causes of the 
great recession.”  We do not see why defendants’ expressive 
activity fits only one characterization and not both. 
The Court of Appeal, applying FilmOn, emphasized that 
“[t]he only evidence of the specific content of the speeches during 
the demonstration at plaintiff’s residence was that the 
demonstrators demanded plaintiff personally come out of his 
home.”  We find unpersuasive this narrow parsing of the record 
because it ignores inferences that can reasonably be drawn from 
the events described in defendants’ declarations. 
As an initial matter, even a narrow focus on the words of 
the declarations yields a clue that defendants’ protest outside 
Geiser’s home implicated a public issue.  Saucedo, the volunteer 
observer from the National Lawyers Guild, said in his 
declaration that the purpose of the demonstration was “ ‘to 
protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood . . . 
in acquiring the real property of [the Caamals], and evicting 
them from their home.’ ”  As Justice Baker observed, “The 
reference to ‘practices’ suggests conduct that includes — but 
extends beyond — the Caamals’ own situation.”  (Cf. Alch v. 
Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 379 [“ ‘Pattern-or-
practice suits, by their very nature, involve claims of classwide 
discrimination.’ ”].) 
Separate and apart from Saucedo’s declaration, there are 
several indicators that the protest implicated public issues 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
concerning 
unfair 
foreclosure 
practices 
and 
residential 
displacement.  The record shows that the Caamals were long-
term residents who faced foreclosure after they lost their jobs in 
the Great Recession.  After Wedgewood purchased the Caamals’ 
residence at a foreclosure auction and moved to evict them, the 
Caamals 
sought 
assistance 
from 
ACCE, 
an 
advocacy 
organization committed to “fight[ing] against the displacement 
of long[-]term residents” and to “sav[ing] homes from 
foreclosures.”  ACCE evidently viewed the Caamals’ situation as 
an occasion to further this advocacy mission.  It first endeavored 
to assist the Caamals by organizing sit-ins at Wedgewood’s place 
of business.  When that failed, it took its views to a public 
sidewalk, where it staged the demonstration at issue here, in 
which the Caamals and approximately 25 to 30 ACCE members 
picketed. 
In this context, the picketers’ chant — “Greg Geiser, come 
outside!  Greg Geiser, you can’t hide!” — cannot be reduced to a 
bare demand that Geiser emerge from his home.  It can 
reasonably be understood to mean that Geiser should be 
ashamed of, or accountable for, the business practices by which 
the Caamals were displaced from their long-term residence, and 
that Geiser could not hide from that accountability.  Some may 
not find that slogan especially compelling, but as we explained 
in FilmOn, “our inquiry does not turn on a normative evaluation 
of the substance of the speech.”  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 151.) 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the 25 to 30 ACCE 
members who participated in this public demonstration at 9:00 
p.m. on a Wednesday evening had any personal connection with, 
or loyalty to, the Caamals in particular.  It is common knowledge 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
that foreclosures, evictions, and inadequate housing are major 
issues in communities throughout California, and the 
participation of more than two dozen members of an advocacy 
group dedicated to fighting foreclosures and residential 
displacement must be considered against that backdrop.  (See 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm’n  (1937) 301 U.S. 292, 301 [“Courts 
take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge.”]; cf. ibid. 
[“They take judicial notice that there has been a depression, and 
that a decline of market values is one of its concomitants.”].)  As 
Justice Baker explained, “the only apparent shared tie among 
everyone present was the desire to engage in public speech 
consistent with ACCE’s mission and the issue of public interest 
identified here:  combatting unfair housing and foreclosure 
practices that displace long-term community residents.” 
The Court of Appeal overlooked the ways in which these 
contextual considerations inform the expressive meaning of the 
protest outside Geiser’s home.  It is true that FilmOn, in stating 
the two-step test for determining whether expressive activity 
falls within section 425.16(e)(4)’s protection, said that the first 
step poses “a question we answer by looking to the content of the 
speech” and that “[i]t is at the [second] stage that context proves 
useful.”  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.)  Geiser 
argues that this language supports the Court of Appeal’s 
parsing of the picketers’ chant.  But we had no occasion in 
FilmOn to probe the contours of the first-step analysis, and we 
made no ruling on any first-step dispute.  Instead, we assumed 
without deciding that the speech at issue did implicate issues of 
public interest, and we focused our inquiry on the second-step 
question of whether the defendant’s statements — in light of the 
“context” in which they were made, “including audience, 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
speaker, and purpose” — contributed to public debate on those 
issues.  (Id. at p. 152.)  The public issues we assumed to be 
implicated (i.e., copyright violations and children’s exposure to 
adult media) were apparent from the content of the defendant’s 
speech.  (Ibid.)  To the extent that part of our opinion in FilmOn 
suggests the first-step inquiry focuses on “the content of the 
speech” (id. at p. 149) without consideration of its “context” (id. 
at p. 150), it is not controlling because that issue was not 
presented in FilmOn and “ ‘ “cases are not authority for 
propositions not considered” ’ ” (B.B. v. City of Los Angeles 
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11; see People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 
470, 481.) 
Our central theme in FilmOn was that, in analyzing 
whether a statement falls within the ambit of section 
425.16(e)(4), “[i]t would be all but impossible . . . to justify 
ignoring the ordinary contextual cues affecting how people 
generally evaluate speech.”  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 145; 
see id. at p. 146 [“[t]he court below erred” by analyzing speech 
“deracinated of context”]; ibid. [“section 425.16 invites courts to 
consider the context in which statements were made”]; id. at 
p. 148 [“context matters under the catchall provision”].)  
Although we made these observations in elaborating the second-
step inquiry, they also apply at the first step.  “Language, of 
course, cannot be interpreted apart from context” (Smith v. 
United States (1993) 508 U.S. 223, 229), and what a particular 
statement or act is “about” often cannot be discerned from words 
alone. 
The history of the anti-SLAPP statute is instructive on 
this point.  As originally enacted, section 425.16, subdivision (e) 
enumerated three categories of protected activity, each of which 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
required some written or oral statement.  In 1997, the 
Legislature added the catchall provision (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)) 
in order to ensure that “expressive conduct” would be protected.  
(Sen.  Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill. No 1296 (1997–1998 
Reg. Sess.) as amended May 12, 1997, pp. 3–4; see Stats. 1997, 
ch. 271, § 1.)  Drawing upon this legislative history, we have said 
that “[a]t a minimum, [section 425.16(e)(4)] shields expressive 
conduct — the burning of flags, the wearing of armbands, and 
the like — that, although not a ‘written or oral statement or 
writing’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(3)), may similarly communicate 
views regarding ‘matters of public significance.’ ”  (Wilson v. 
Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 893; id. at p. 893, 
fn. 9; see FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 143–144 [section 
425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(3) defines protected conduct “not only by its 
content, but also by its location, its audience, and its timing,” 
and such “contextual information” is not excluded from 
consideration under section 425.16(e)(4)]; id. at p. 148 [“speaker, 
audience, and purpose” are “contextual factors” to be considered 
under section 425.16, including the catchall provision].)   
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District (1969) 393 U.S. 
503, 504, for example, a group of students wore black armbands 
to school in a symbolic protest against the Vietnam War.  The 
armbands do not appear to have included any writing.  If they 
were considered in isolation, it would be difficult to tell that they 
expressed any ideas at all, much less opposition to the Vietnam 
War.  It is in the context of the full controversy — from the 
students’ coordinated plan to wear the armbands to the school’s 
disciplinary response — that the ideas expressed by the 
armbands come into view.  (Id. at pp. 505–506.) 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
Here, the public issue that is reasonably implicated by 
defendants’ demonstration comes into view when the challenged 
conduct is situated within its broader context.  This context 
includes the identity of the speakers or participants (25 to 30 
members of a housing advocacy organization), the picket’s 
location and audience (a public sidewalk outside the residence 
of the CEO of a major real estate development company), and its 
purpose and timing (to protest residential displacement 
practices immediately after a couple had been evicted from their 
long-term home).  Against this backdrop, the declarations 
describing ACCE’s mission and the events leading up to the 
picket, together with Saucedo’s declaration describing the picket 
as a “protest” of the “unfair and deceptive practices used by 
Wedgewood,” give rise to a reasonable inference that the 
demonstration implicates controversial real estate practices 
that many individuals and communities find destabilizing — 
unquestionably an issue of public interest.  (See Rivero, supra, 
105 Cal.App.4th at p. 924 [speech concerning “a topic of 
widespread . . . interest” implicates a public issue].) 
We now make explicit the standard that is implicit in the 
analysis above:  FilmOn’s first step is satisfied so long as the 
challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, 
may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even 
if it also implicates a private dispute.  Only when an expressive 
activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be understood as 
implicating a public issue does an anti-SLAPP motion fail at 
FilmOn’s first step. 
B. 
We also granted review to decide whether courts should 
defer to anti-SLAPP movants in determining whether a public 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
issue is implicated at FilmOn’s first step.  Kuhns and the 
Caamals argue that the Court of Appeal erred because it failed 
to afford sufficient deference to their contentions that the picket 
broadly implicated issues of foreclosure and eviction practices in 
the wake of the Great Recession.  Geiser responds that such 
deference would empower anti-SLAPP movants to “fabricate[]” 
“retroactive” characterizations of their speech or conduct.  We 
hold that FilmOn’s first step calls for an objective inquiry, 
without deference to the movant’s framing or personal 
motivations.  A court evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion should 
take the position of a reasonable, objective observer.  (See 
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
53, 65 [“[O]ur anti-SLAPP statute utilizes a reasonable, 
objective test that lends itself to adjudication on pretrial 
motion”].)   
Kuhns and the Caamals insist that “a speaker is in the 
best position to know the content and purpose of his speech,” 
whereas Geiser worries that anti-SLAPP movants may 
intentionally mischaracterize their activities.  But these 
concerns are misplaced.  FilmOn’s first step asks what issue or 
issues the challenged activity may reasonably be understood to 
implicate.  On that question, the movant’s beliefs, motivations, 
or characterizations may be relevant and, if objectively 
reasonable, will inform the analysis.  But they are not 
themselves dispositive and, if not objectively reasonable, will 
not carry weight.  If a reasonable inference can be drawn that 
the challenged activity implicates a public issue, then the 
analysis proceeds to FilmOn’s second step. 
The Court of Appeal’s parsing of the Caamals’ declarations 
reflects a related confusion.  The court reasoned that because 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
the declarations indicated that the Caamals were moved to 
action by a desire to repurchase their home, the sidewalk 
demonstration implicated only their “purely personal” interest 
in facilitating a repurchase of the property.  But those who speak 
on public issues are often driven to do so by circumstances that 
affect them personally.  A woman who has suffered workplace 
harassment might be moved to speak out about her own 
experiences.  The fact that she foregrounds harms she herself 
has experienced does not mean an objective observer could not 
reasonably understand her story, in context, to implicate 
societal issues of workplace harassment.  Similarly here, 
although the protest in front of Geiser’s home stemmed from the 
Caamals’ personal interest in regaining their property, this does 
not mean that an objective observer could not reasonably 
understand the protest, in context, to implicate public issues of 
unfair foreclosure and residential displacement practices.  
Again, the touchstone is objective reasonableness. 
IV. 
We turn now to FilmOn’s second step.  As with its first-
step analysis, the Court of Appeal’s analysis at the second step 
did not give appropriate weight to the context in which the 
sidewalk demonstration arose.  The Court of Appeal reasoned 
that because the sidewalk protest was “directed at Wedgewood 
and [Geiser] . . . for the purpose of coercing Wedgewood into 
selling back the property,” it “did not further the public 
discourse on the issues of displacement of residents due to 
residential real estate business practices, gentrification, or large 
scale fix-and-flip real estate practices leading to the great 
recession.” 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
But, as explained, the demonstration was not only about 
the dispute over the Caamals’ long-term residence, but also 
about broader issues concerning unfair foreclosures and 
evictions.  While the protest might have served the purpose of 
facilitating a repurchase of the property, as the Court of Appeal 
supposed, it also served to draw attention to the alleged 
unfairness of the business practices by which the Caamals were 
foreclosed upon and evicted.  ACCE’s participation in the protest 
must be understood with the latter purpose in mind.  The 
context makes clear that this sidewalk protest furthered public 
discussion of the public issues it implicated.  It is a paradigmatic 
example of “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the 
constitutional right of . . . free speech in connection with a public 
issue or an issue of public interest.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) 
This conclusion is bolstered by the media coverage arising 
from the controversy and by the press release Wedgewood 
issued in response to it.  That press release accused ACCE, an 
organization that fights foreclosures and displacement of long-
term residents, of “portray[ing] the Caamal family as victims, 
while exploiting a very emotional issue . . . to further its own 
agenda.”  This language suggests that Wedgewood recognized 
not only that the protest implicated public issues, but also that 
the protest bore some connection to the “further[ance]” of 
ACCE’s “agenda.”  This is not to say that a protest must receive 
media attention in order to be protected under the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  As we explained in FilmOn, “[w]e are not concerned 
with the social utility of the speech at issue, or the degree to 
which it propelled the conversation in any particular direction 
. . . .”  (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.)  We simply note that 
when the conduct that gives rise to a lawsuit attracts such 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
media attention, it can be an indicator that such conduct was 
undertaken “in connection with” a public issue. (§ 425.16, 
subd. (e)(4).) 
Finally, we observe that our analysis here at FilmOn’s 
second step overlaps with our analysis at the first step.  Many 
of the same contextual considerations that compel us to conclude 
that the protest implicated public issues also compel us to 
conclude that the protest furthered public discussion of them.  
In cases like this one, it may be more efficient to look to the 
whole context from which the conduct underlying the lawsuit 
arises, rather than attempting to parse which considerations 
fall under which of FilmOn’s two steps.  
CONCLUSION 
 
“Speech 
is 
often 
provocative 
and 
challenging.”  
(Terminiello v. City of Chicago (1949) 337 U.S. 1, 4.)  But our 
legal tradition recognizes the importance of speech and other 
expressive activity even when — perhaps especially when — it 
is uncomfortable or inconvenient.  The Legislature enacted the 
anti-SLAPP statute to safeguard that tradition against those 
who would use the judicial process to chill speech they oppose. 
 
Here, the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the 
demonstration outside Geiser’s home did not constitute speech 
in connection with a public issue under the anti-SLAPP statute’s 
catchall provision.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal and remand this matter to that court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
GEISER v. KUHNS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Geiser v. Kuhns 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 2/28/20 – 2d Dist. 
Div. 5 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S262032 
Date Filed:  August 29, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Armen Tamzarian 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Dinsmore & Sandelmann, Frank Sandelmann, Brett A. Stroud and 
Joshua A. Valene for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Office of Matthew Strugar, Matthew Strugar; Law Office of 
Colleen Flynn and Colleen Flynn for Defendants and Appellants.  
 
David Greene and Shayana Kadidal for Center for Constitutional 
Rights, Electronic Frontier Foundation, American Civil Liberties 
Union of Southern California, Sierra Club, Civil Liberties Defense 
Center, Greenpeace, Inc., Palestine Legal, National Lawyers Guild, 
Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, Mosquito Fleet, Portland Rising 
Tide, Amazon Watch, Center for International Environmental Law, 
the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, the First 
Amendment Project and PILnet as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, Rochelle L. Wilcox, Dan 
Laidman and Abigail Zeitlin for California News Publishers 
Association, the Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc., the First 
Amendment Coalition, First Look Institute, Inc., Hearst Corporation, 
KQED Inc., Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, Motion Picture 
Association, Inc., the New York Times Company, Online News 
Association, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the 
Washington Post as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Frank Sandelmann 
Dinsmore & Sandelmann, LLP 
324 Manhattan Beach Boulevard, Suite 201 
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 
(310) 905-3240 
 
Matthew Strugar 
Law Office of Matthew Strugar 
3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2910 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
(646) 797-1853