Title: Hunter v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-246, SC14-88
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2015

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-246 
____________ 
 
JERONE HUNTER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-88 
____________ 
 
JERONE HUNTER,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 30, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Jerone Hunter appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to 
vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
 
 
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habeas corpus.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of his 
postconviction motion and deny his habeas petition.1 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
On direct appeal, this Court described the facts as follows:  
On August 27, 2004, Hunter was charged in a fourteen-count 
superseding indictment relating to the murders of Erin Belanger, 
Roberto Gonzalez, Michelle Nathan, Anthony Vega, Jonathon 
Gleason, and Francisco Ayo-Roman.  Hunter, with codefendants Troy 
Victorino and Michael Salas, went to trial on July 5, 2006.  
Codefendant Anthony Cannon previously pled guilty as charged. 
The evidence at trial established the following.  On the morning 
of August 6, 2004, a coworker of two of the occupants of a residence 
on Telford Lane in Deltona, Florida, discovered the victims’ bodies.  
Belanger lived at the Telford residence with Ayo-Roman, Nathan, and 
Vega.  Gonzalez and Gleason happened to be at the house the night of 
the murders.  The six victims had been beaten to death with baseball 
bats and had sustained cuts to their throats, most of which were 
determined to have been inflicted postmortem.  Belanger also 
sustained lacerations through her vagina up to the abdominal cavity of 
her body; the injuries were consistent with having been inflicted by a 
baseball bat.  The medical examiner determined that some of the 
victims had defensive wounds.  A dead Dachshund was also found in 
the house. 
Following a call to 911, law enforcement officers responded to 
the scene.  The front door had been kicked in, breaking a deadbolt 
lock and leaving a thirteen-inch shoe-print impression on the door.  
The victims were found throughout the house and blood was 
everywhere.  A knife handle and knife blade were recovered at the 
scene, along with two playing cards with bloody shoe imprints, a bed 
sheet with footwear impressions, as well as a pay stub with a footwear 
impression. 
Hunter, who at the time was eighteen years old and in twelfth 
grade, met codefendant Cannon two months before the murders.  He 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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knew codefendant Salas from high school.  Hunter met codefendant 
Victorino during the end of June or beginning of July of 2004, and 
moved in with Victorino a few days later.  Together Hunter and 
Victorino lived in three different residences, including a house that 
belonged to victim Belanger’s grandmother.  No one had permission 
to stay at Belanger’s grandmother’s house, but Victorino testified that 
the owner’s grandson had given him permission to stay there. 
Approximately a week before the murders, Belanger contacted 
police concerning suspicious activity at her grandmother’s residence.  
Victorino also reported to police that he had items stolen from the 
same house.  He became angry when the police told him he would 
have to provide a list of the stolen property.  Victorino told the police 
he would take care of the matter himself.  Victorino also met with 
Belanger at her residence, seeking return of his property. 
Brandon Graham, who was living with codefendants Cannon 
and Salas, met Hunter and Victorino when they went to Belanger’s 
house on Telford Lane a few days before the murders so that 
Victorino could pick up his belongings.  Victorino wanted them to 
fight the people at the residence.  Hunter yelled for the occupants to 
come out and fight. 
On the morning before the murders, Graham, Salas, and 
Cannon drove to the house where Hunter and Victorino were living.  
Victorino discussed a plan to beat everyone to death at the Telford 
residence, asking them if they “were down for it” and saying to 
Hunter, “I know you’re down for it” because he had belongings stolen 
as well.  All agreed.  Victorino verbally described the layout of the 
Telford house and who would go where.  Hunter asked if they should 
wear masks; Victorino said no because they would kill all of the 
occupants. 
A witness testified that around midnight on August 5, 2004, she 
saw Hunter, Salas, Cannon, and Victorino near the murder scene.  
And Graham testified that the morning after the murders, he saw 
Victorino’s belongings in the back of Cannon’s SUV.  On the day 
after the murders, Victorino was arrested on a probation violation. 
In his statement to police, Hunter said that he had gone in 
Cannon’s SUV to the house on Telford on late Saturday or early 
Sunday to get his belongings that had been taken from Belanger’s 
grandmother’s house.  He had an aluminum baseball bat with him.  
Hunter said he entered the house through the front door and found 
Gleason in the recliner in the living room.  Hunter screamed, 
 
 
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“Where’s my stuff,” and when Gleason said, “I don’t know,” he hit 
him with the bat.  Hunter hit Gleason because he thought he was 
lying.  Gleason attempted to get up from the recliner and Hunter hit 
him again.  Hunter said he hit Gleason more than three times but less 
than twelve.  Hunter said he then went to look for his belongings.  
Hunter also indicated that he encountered victim Gonzalez in one of 
the bedrooms.  He claimed he hit Gonzalez because Gonzalez had 
swung at him with a stick.  After Gonzalez dropped his stick, Hunter 
continued to hit him, three to five more times.  Hunter then continued 
looking for his belongings.  Eventually, Hunter and his codefendants 
left in Cannon’s SUV.  Hunter, who wore a black shirt, black shorts, 
and blue and white Nike tennis shoes during the incident, stated that 
he washed his clothes afterwards. 
Cannon’s SUV was seized on August 7, 2004.  Salas admitted 
to being at the Telford residence the night of the murder and stated 
that Cannon had driven them there.  Salas described what he had done 
while in the house and said the bats had been discarded at a retention 
pond.  Based upon that information, law enforcement authorities 
recovered two bats from the pond and two bats from surrounding 
trees. 
Salas testified about Hunter’s involvement in the murders.  
Salas explained that before the men entered the house on Telford, 
Hunter called Salas and Cannon “[b******]” because they did not 
want to take part in the plan.  Hunter ran into the house after 
Victorino.  Salas ran in next and saw Hunter swing his bat.  Hunter 
said to Gleason, “I don’t like you” and started hitting him.  Hunter 
asked Salas if he had killed Gonzalez; Hunter called Salas a “[p****] 
boy” when Salas said he was not killing anyone.  Hunter then ran into 
the bedroom and began hitting Gonzalez in the face and head.  Hunter 
hit Gonzalez between twenty and thirty times, saying he had to kill 
him.  Salas left the house.  When Hunter came out he described how 
he found Nathan hiding in one of the bedrooms and killed her when 
she pled for her life.  Salas described Hunter as having a look of 
“ferule [sic] joy.”  
Pursuant to a search warrant, numerous items were taken from 
the house where Hunter and Victorino lived.  Among the items taken 
was a pair of size thirteen boots, a pair of size ten and one-half Nike 
blue and white tennis shoes without shoe laces, and a pair of shoe 
laces.  These shoes, the laces, and other physical evidence were 
admitted at trial linking Hunter, Salas, and Victorino to the murders. 
 
 
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Hunter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1052, 1057-59 (Fla. 2008) (footnotes omitted).   
Following the penalty phase, “[t]he jury recommended a death sentence for 
the murder of Gleason by a vote of ten to two, a death sentence for the murder of 
Gonzalez by a vote of nine to three, a death sentence for the murder of Nathan by a 
vote of ten to two, a death sentence for the murder of Vega by a vote of nine to 
three, and life sentences for the murders of Belanger and Ayo-Roman.”  Id. at 
1060-61.  The trial court followed the jury’s recommendations, finding that the 
aggravating circumstances2 outweighed the mitigating circumstances,3 and 
                                          
 
 
2.  “[T]he trial court found the following five aggravating circumstances 
with their respective assigned weights:  (1) the defendant has been previously 
convicted of another capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence 
to a person—very substantial weight; (2) the crime for which the defendant is to be 
sentenced was committed while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of 
burglary—moderate weight; (3) the crime for which the defendant is to be 
sentenced was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful 
arrest—moderate weight; (4) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel—very substantial weight; and (5) the capital felony was a homicide and 
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification—great weight.”  Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1061. 
 
3.  “[T]he trial court found three statutory mitigating circumstances and 
assigned weights:  (1) age of the defendant at the time of the crime—some weight; 
(2) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination 
of another person—some weight; (3) the defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity—little weight.  The trial court also found three nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances:  (1) the level of maturity of the defendant at the time of 
the crime—little weight; (2) the defendant exhibited good conduct during 
incarceration—very little weight; and (3) the defendant exhibited good conduct 
during trial—very little weight.”  Id. 
 
 
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sentenced Hunter to death for the murders of Jonathon Gleason, Roberto Gonzalez, 
Michelle Nathan, and Anthony Vega.  Id. at 1061.  
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Hunter’s convictions and sentences.4  
Id. at 1076.  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied Hunter’s petition 
for writ of certiorari.  Hunter v. Florida, 556 U.S. 1191 (2009).  
On April 14, 2010, Hunter filed a motion for postconviction relief.  After 
summarily denying several claims and after holding an evidentiary hearing on 
Hunter’s claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty 
phase and guilt phase, the postconviction court denied relief.  Hunter now appeals 
                                          
 
 
4.  On direct appeal, Hunter argued that:  (1) “the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers;” (2) 
“the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the shoe laces seized from 
his temporary residence;” (3) “the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
mistrial as his rights under the Sixth Amendment to confrontation and cross-
examination were violated when the State’s witness, Cannon, the fourth 
perpetrator, refused to be cross-examined;” (4) “the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for judgment of acquittal;” (5) “the trial court erred in denying his motion 
to sever his trial from that of his two codefendants;” (6) there was “instructional 
error during the guilt phase [because the] use of the conjunction ‘and/or’ between 
the defendants’ names resulted in reversible error;” (7) “the trial court assigned 
improper weights to the mitigating factors and improperly balanced the mitigation 
against the aggravating factors;” (8) “[this Court’s] proportionality review is 
legally insufficient because this Court only considers cases where death has been 
imposed,” and “his death sentence is disproportionate;” (9) “lethal injection, the 
chemicals used to carry out a death sentence, and Florida’s procedures for 
administering the death penalty are unconstitutional under both the Florida and 
United States Constitutions;” and (10) “his death sentence is unconstitutional under 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).”  Id. at 1061-76. 
 
 
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the denial of his postconviction motion.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  
II. POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase 
 
First, Hunter argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
during the penalty phase for:  (1) failing to present further nonstatutory mitigation 
evidence; (2) failing to develop and present evidence of Hunter’s future conduct in 
prison as mitigation; and (3) his statement during closing arguments that a majority 
vote was required to impose a death sentence.  Because Hunter has failed to 
establish the requirements necessary for relief, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
relief.   
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court explained that two requirements must 
be met for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)). 
 
 
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Regarding the deficiency prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption 
that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id.  The defendant carries the burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant “must show that 
but for his counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have 
received a different sentence.  To assess that probability, we consider ‘the totality 
of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence 
adduced in the [postconviction] proceeding’—and ‘reweig[h] it against the 
evidence in aggravation.’ ”  Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (quoting 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)); see also Dennis v. State, 109 
So. 3d 680, 690 (Fla. 2012) (“[T]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, ‘absent the [deficient performance], the factfinder would have 
[had] a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’ ”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).  
 
 
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“A reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.’ ”  Dennis, 109 So. 3d at 690 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual 
findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the 
trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-
72 (Fla. 2004).  
1. Additional Nonstatutory Mitigation 
 
Hunter argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present further 
nonstatutory mitigation evidence at the penalty phase.  Specifically, Hunter asserts 
that trial counsel should have introduced numerous aspects of Hunter’s social 
history, including Hunter’s stressful home environment, his family history of 
mental illness, and his being kicked out of his family’s house prior to the offenses.  
We affirm the denial of this claim.  
First, Hunter has failed to demonstrate deficiency.  At the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that in their case preparation they 
focused on Hunter’s mental health.  Trial counsel explained that they met with 
Hunter’s family members a number of times, but they were uncooperative and not 
willing to admit the family history of mental illness.  Additionally, trial counsel 
testified that they retained an investigator, Odalys Rojas, to interview Hunter’s 
 
 
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family members and others and summarize the findings.  Trial counsel involved 
Ms. Rojas in several meetings in efforts to obtain a comprehensive social history 
on Hunter but did not call her to testify at trial, noting that her testimony may have 
opened the door for negative testimony about Hunter’s aggression.  See Everett v. 
State, 54 So. 3d 464, 474 (Fla. 2010) (“This Court has also consistently held that a 
trial counsel’s decision to not call certain witnesses to testify at trial can be 
reasonable trial strategy.”).  Instead, during the penalty phase, trial counsel called 
three mental health experts, including a psychiatrist, neuropsychologist, and 
psychologist, to testify to Hunter’s mental health and Hunter’s family history of 
mental illness.  And “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s 
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”  Occhicone v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  Therefore, Hunter has failed to 
demonstrate deficiency.  
Additionally, Hunter has not demonstrated prejudice.  During the 
postconviction hearing, Dr. McClaren testified that Hunter was probably exposed 
to domestic violence and other negative influence in his family environment that 
would be traumatic for a child to experience.  Further, in a deposition, Dr. Mings 
discussed his findings of Hunter’s mental illness, including Hunter being in the 
early stages of schizophrenia.  However, this additional mitigation evidence Hunter 
 
 
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presented during the postconviction hearing was largely cumulative of the 
mitigation evidence presented during the penalty phase.  For example, Hunter’s 
social history and mental health issues were presented at the penalty phase through 
the testimonies of Hunter’s family members and doctors.  The trial record reflects 
that the family members testified that Hunter mostly kept to himself, carried on 
conversations with his deceased twin brother, witnessed his father physically 
abusing his mother, and felt abandoned by his older brother moving out.  
Additionally, three mental health experts testified during the penalty phase that 
Hunter suffered from serious mental health issues throughout his life.  Specifically, 
Dr. Berns addressed “Hunter’s family’s history of mental illness, including 
schizophrenia and depression.”  Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1060.  Dr. Mings testified that 
“[Hunter’s] profile was consistent with a person with a psychotic mental illness 
[and] that Hunter was not functioning as a normal adult.”  Id.  Additionally, Dr. 
Gur conducted behavior imaging and concluded that Hunter’s brain damage and 
functioning would tend to make him a follower.  Id.  Therefore, because the 
additional evidence Hunter claims should have been presented was largely 
cumulative of the evidence actually presented during the penalty phase, Hunter has 
not established a reasonable probability of a different result had trial counsel 
presented this additional evidence during the penalty phase.  In other words, our 
confidence in the outcome is not undermined.  See Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d 
 
 
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223, 234 (Fla. 2001) (“There is no reasonable probability that re-presenting 
virtually the same evidence through other witnesses would have altered the 
outcome in any manner.”).   
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.  
2. Evidence of Future Conduct in Prison 
Hunter also argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to develop 
and present evidence of Hunter’s future conduct in prison as mitigation at the 
penalty phase.  Specifically, Hunter claims that trial counsel should have 
introduced evidence that Hunter is not a psychopath and conclusions of 
psychological measures that show Hunter’s risk of future violence is lower than the 
base rate.  We affirm the denial of this claim.  
First, Hunter has failed to demonstrate deficiency.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, trial counsel testified that their strategy regarding mitigation was to focus 
on Hunter’s mental health issues.  And evidence about Hunter’s future conduct in 
prison, including his potential for rehabilitation and nonviolent existence in prison, 
would have been contradictory to trial counsel’s mitigation theory.  For example, 
at the penalty phase, Hunter presented family members and experts who testified to 
Hunter’s mental health issues, including schizophrenia and a profile consistent 
with a person with a psychotic mental illness.  See Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1060.  In 
contrast, during the postconviction proceeding, Dr. Brown and Dr. McClaren 
 
 
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agreed with the conclusion that Hunter is not a psychopath.  Therefore, because it 
appeared to contradict the mental health testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to 
present evidence about Hunter’s future conduct in prison and that his risk of future 
violence was lower than the base rate appears to have been a reasonable strategic 
decision.  See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 (“[S]trategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”). 
Additionally, Hunter has not demonstrated prejudice.  While Hunter 
presented evidence of future conduct in prison in the postconviction proceeding, 
evidence was also presented that the findings were based on speculation.  
Moreover, even considering future conduct in prison with the other mitigation 
evidence presented during the postconviction proceeding, as well as the mitigation 
presented at the penalty phase, the mitigating circumstances would not outweigh 
the five aggravating circumstances presented in this case, namely conviction of a 
capital felony, during the course of a burglary, for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest, HAC, and CCP.  See Tanzi v. State, 94 So. 3d 482, 491 
(Fla. 2012) (“The mitigating evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing combined 
with the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase would not outweigh the 
evidence in aggravation as this case included six aggravating circumstances given 
 
 
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great and utmost weight.”).  Therefore, there is not a reasonable probability that 
investigating and presenting evidence of Hunter’s future conduct in prison would 
have led to a different result.  In other words, our confidence in the outcome is not 
undermined.  
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. 
3. Trial Counsel’s Statement About the Majority Vote  
Further, Hunter argues that trial counsel was ineffective for his statement 
during closing arguments that a majority vote was required to impose a death 
sentence.  However, we affirm the denial of this claim. 
Even assuming that trial counsel was deficient for his statement during 
closing arguments, Hunter has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  In the jury 
instructions, the trial court correctly advised the jury of the vote required for the 
advisory sentence.  Notably, the votes for each of the four victims to impose the 
death penalty were beyond the majority vote stated.  Therefore, there is not a 
reasonable probability that, absent trial counsel’s statement during closing 
arguments, that there would have been a different result.  In other words, 
confidence in the outcome is not undermined. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Hunter’s claim that trial 
counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Guilt Phase 
 
 
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Next, Hunter argues that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase 
for failing to properly preserve his objection and move for a mistrial regarding 
Robert Anthony Cannon’s testimony.  However, Hunter did not demonstrate that 
he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged error.   
Cannon, the fourth perpetrator, negotiated a plea deal in exchange for 
agreeing to testify at the joint trial of the other three defendants, including Hunter.  
On direct appeal, this Court denied Hunter’s claim “that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for mistrial as his rights under the Sixth Amendment to 
confrontation and cross-examination were violated when the State’s witness, 
Cannon, the fourth perpetrator, refused to be cross-examined.”  Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 
1065.   
In a codefendant’s case, Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478, 488 (Fla. 2013), 
where the same issue was raised regarding Cannon’s testimony, this Court found 
that Victorino was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s error in failing to preserve 
alleged error and to move for a mistrial at the time of Cannon’s testimony.  
Similarly, in this case, we affirm the denial of Hunter’s claim. 
Hunter has not demonstrated that Cannon’s testimony was so harmful as to 
merit a mistrial.  In fact, Cannon’s testimony and refusal to answer questions did 
not vitiate Hunter’s trial.  See England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006) 
(“A motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an error is so prejudicial as 
 
 
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to vitiate the entire trial.”).  Cannon’s comments regarding Hunter were brief and 
unelaborated.  Specifically, on direct examination, Cannon’s testimony regarding 
Hunter was the following:  (1) Cannon knew Hunter for a couple days prior to the 
crimes, and (2) Victorino, Hunter, Salas, and Cannon entered the home armed with 
baseball bats.  Therefore, similar to what we concluded in Victorino, Cannon’s 
testimony mentioning Hunter did not vitiate Hunter’s trial.  Victorino, 127 So. 3d 
at 489 (“[O]nly a few lines of testimony were harmful to Victorino . . .  As a result, 
Cannon’s testimony was not essential to the State’s case against Victorino.”).   
Further, the incriminating points made in Cannon’s testimony regarding 
Hunter were established by other evidence.  Specifically, in his statement to police, 
Hunter stated that on the night of the offenses, he went to the Telford home to get 
his belongings, and he had an aluminum baseball bat with him.  Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 
1058.  Hunter further stated that he hit victims Gleason and Gonzalez several times 
with the bat.  Id.  Additionally, “Salas testified about Hunter’s involvement in the 
murders,” that “Hunter ran into the house after Victorino[, and] Salas ran in next 
and saw Hunter swing his bat.”  Id. at 1059.  Cannon’s testimony was cumulative 
and merely “lent further support to . . . fact[s] already known to the jury.”  Cherry 
v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1051 (Fla. 2000).  Therefore, Hunter was not prejudiced 
by trial counsel’s error.  See Victorino, 127 So. 3d at 490 (“[T]he incriminating 
portions of Cannon’s testimony were substantially cumulative to other evidence 
 
 
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presented at trial.  A defendant is not prejudiced by the improper admission of 
evidence if the evidence is merely cumulative.”). 
 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court’s denial of Hunter’s claim that 
trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase. 
C. Other Issues 
 
Hunter also raises four constitutional challenges, all of which do not entitle 
him to relief:  (1) rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar is 
unconstitutional; (2) the trial court unconstitutionally instructed the jury that its 
role was advisory; (3) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates due process and 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment on its face and as applied to him because 
Florida’s death penalty statute does not ensure that defendants are not sentenced to 
death in an arbitrary and capricious manner; and (4) his sentence is 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  These claims are 
procedurally barred because they should have been or were raised on direct 
appeal.5  See Dennis, 109 So. 3d at 698; Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 521-22 
(Fla. 2011); Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 842-44 (Fla. 2011).  Therefore, this Court 
affirms the denial of each of these claims. 
 
                                          
 
 
5.  On direct appeal, Hunter raised the claims that the lethal injection 
protocol and Florida’s procedures for administering the death penalty are 
unconstitutional and that his sentence violated Ring, and this Court found that 
Hunter is not entitled to relief.  Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1075-76.   
 
 
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D. Cumulative Error 
Hunter also argues that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial based on 
cumulative error.  “However, where the individual claims of error alleged are 
either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also 
necessarily fails.”  Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Parker 
v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)).  As discussed in the analysis of the 
individual issues above, the alleged errors are either procedurally barred or without 
merit.  Therefore, the cumulative error claim is similarly without merit, and we 
affirm the denial of this claim. 
III. HABEAS PETITION 
 
In his habeas petition, Hunter contends that Florida’s death penalty statute 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency because most 
states require a unanimous jury verdict to recommend a death sentence.  However, 
this Court recently reviewed and rejected this same argument in Kimbrough v. 
State, 125 So. 3d 752, 753 (Fla. 2013).  As we explained in Kimbrough, Hunter’s 
claim “is subject to our general jurisprudence that non-unanimous jury 
recommendations to impose the sentence of death are not unconstitutional.”  
Kimbrough, 125 So. 3d at 754 (quoting Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 
2013)); see also Parker, 904 So. 2d at 383 (“This Court has repeatedly held that it 
 
 
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is not unconstitutional for a jury to recommend death on a simple majority vote.”).  
Accordingly, we deny relief.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Hunter’s postconviction 
motion and deny his habeas petition. 
It is so ordered.  
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,  
William A. Parsons, Judge - Case No. 642004CF001380XXXAWS 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, 
and Ann Marie Mirialakis, Assistant-Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle 
Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and James Donald 
Riecks, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent