Title: State Of Florida v. Virginia Larzelere
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-611
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-611 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellant/Cross-appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
VIRGINIA LARZELERE, 
Appellee/Cross-appellant. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-148 
____________ 
 
VIRGINIA GAIL LARZELERE, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[February 28, 2008] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The State of Florida appeals an order of the circuit court granting in part 
Virginia Gail Larzelere’s motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which the trial judge vacated Larzelere’s sentence of 
death and ordered a new sentencing proceeding.  Larzelere cross-appeals the trial 
court’s order, asserting that the trial judge erroneously denied her motion to vacate 
her conviction for first-degree murder, and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons expressed below, we affirm the trial court’s order and deny the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Larzelere was convicted of first-degree murder on February 24, 1992.  This 
Court set forth the facts of this case on direct appeal as follows: 
The appellant was married to Norman Larzelere (the victim), a 
dentist, and she worked as the office manager for his dentistry 
practice.  On March 8, 1991, at approximately one o’clock in the 
afternoon, a masked gunman came into the victim’s dental office, 
chased the victim, shot him with a shotgun, and fled.  The victim died 
within a short time after being shot.  At the time of the shooting, a 
dental assistant, a patient, and the appellant were in the office. 
The appellant and her adult son, Jason Larzelere, were charged 
with the victim’s murder.  The State’s theory was that the appellant 
and Jason conspired to kill the victim to obtain approximately $2 
million in life insurance and $1 million in assets.  Jason and the 
appellant were tried separately.  The appellant was tried first. 
The State presented the following evidence at the appellant’s 
trial.  Two men testified that they had affairs with the appellant during 
her marriage to the victim and that the appellant asked them to help 
her have her husband killed.  Two other witnesses, Kristen Palmieri 
and Steven Heidle, were given immunity and testified to a number of 
incriminating actions and statements made by the appellant and Jason 
regarding the murder.  Specifically, their statements reflected that the 
night before the murder the appellant sent Jason to a storage unit to 
 
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pick up documents, which included the victim’s will and life 
insurance policies; that the appellant told Jason after the murder, 
“Don’t worry, you’ll get your $200,000 for taking care of business”; 
that the appellant told both witnesses that Jason was the gunman and 
that he “screwed up . . . he was supposed to be there at 12:30, but he 
was a half hour late, so [the dental assistant] and a patient were there. 
That’s why I had to fake a robbery.”; that the appellant directed the 
two witnesses to dispose of a shotgun and a .45 handgun by having 
them encase the guns in concrete and dump them into a creek; and, 
that, in the days following the murder, Jason and the appellant 
reenacted the murder, with Jason playing the role of the gunman and 
the appellant playing the role of the victim.  With Heidle’s assistance, 
police recovered the guns from the creek but were unable to 
conclusively determine whether the shotgun was the murder weapon. 
Additional testimony reflected that the appellant gave several 
conflicting versions of the murder to police, with differing 
descriptions of the gunman and the vehicle in which he left.  The 
patient who was present at the time of the murder heard the victim call 
out just after he was shot, “Jason, is that you?” 
It was further established that over the six-year period 
preceding the murder, the appellant obtained seven different life 
insurance policies on the victim and that within the six months 
preceding his death, the appellant doubled the total amount payable on 
his life from over $1 million to over $2 million.  Although the victim 
assisted in obtaining these policies, it was shown that the appellant 
was the dominant motivator in securing the policies.  In addition, 
evidence was introduced to show that the appellant gave false 
information and made false statements to obtain the policies (in 
securing the policies she falsely represented to several insurance 
agents that pre-existing policies had been cancelled, did not exist, or 
were being replaced by the new policy).  Further, soon after the 
victim’s death, the appellant filed a fraudulent will, which left the 
victim’s entire estate to the appellant.  The fraudulent will was 
prepared on the same date one of the largest insurance policies on the 
victim’s life became effective. 
In her defense, the appellant presented evidence in an attempt to 
show that her inconsistent versions of the murder were due to her state 
of mind due to the distress of having just lost her husband; that the 
victim assisted in obtaining all of the insurance policies; that the 
appellant’s lovers did not think she was serious about having her 
 
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husband killed; that Heidle and Palmieri were not believable and 
perjured themselves; and that Heidle and Palmieri were unable to 
obtain incriminating statements from the appellant after they had been 
requested to do so by police. 
 
Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 398-99 (Fla. 1996) (footnote omitted).  After 
Larzelere waived the presentation of mitigation evidence, the jury recommended 
the sentence of death by a seven-to-five vote.  The trial judge followed the jury’s 
recommendation and imposed the death penalty, finding two aggravating factors: 
(1) the capital felony was committed for financial gain; and (2) the capital felony 
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP).  The trial judge found no statutory 
mitigating factors, but he did find the following nonstatutory mitigating factors: (1)  
Larzelere had the ability to adjust and conform to imprisonment––assigned 
marginal weight; and (2) Larzelere was not the shooter––assigned insignificant 
weight due to the judge’s finding that Larzelere was the mastermind behind the 
killing.  Larzelere appealed, raising fifteen claims.1  This Court affirmed 
Larzelere’s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 408. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Larzelere’s guilt-phase claims were: (1) the trial court erroneously 
excluded two witnesses that Larzelere proffered to impeach Heidle; (2) the trial 
court erroneously denied Larzelere’s motion for a mistrial based on Palmieri’s 
statement that Jason had used cocaine in her presence; (3) the trial court 
erroneously failed to give the jury a number of special instructions; (4) the trial 
court erroneously admitted only selected portions of taped statements and refused 
Larzelere’s request to introduce the complete statements; (5) the trial court 
erroneously denied Larzelere’s motion to discharge counsel and various other 
 
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On August 31, 2000, Larzelere filed an amended motion for postconviction 
relief, raising fourteen claims, many of which contained numerous subparts.2  
                                                                                                                                        
motions connected to that request; (6) the trial court erroneously denied Larzelere’s 
motion for a new trial based on allegations that the jury had received extrajudicial 
information; (7) the trial court erroneously denied Larzelere’s motion for a new 
trial based upon juror misconduct; (8) the trial court erroneously admitted bullets 
that were found at Larzelere’s residence; (9) the trial court erroneously denied 
Larzelere’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on her claim that the State 
illegally intercepted a holding cell conversation between herself and Jason, and 
that the trial court excluded testimony of an investigator who recorded this 
“illegal” conversation; (10) the trial court erroneously denied Larzelere’s change of 
venue motion; (11) the trial court erroneously denied Larzelere’s motion for 
acquittal based upon insufficient evidence; and (12) the trial court erroneously 
admitted Jason’s hearsay statements.  Larzelere raised three issues regarding the 
penalty phase: (1) the trial court erroneously found duplicative aggravating 
factors––the murder was both CCP and committed for financial gain; (2) 
Larzelere’s death sentence is disproportionate because Jason was acquitted and two 
other participants in the murder were not prosecuted; and (3) Florida’s death 
penalty scheme is unconstitutional. 
 
 
2.  These claims included: (1) the State knowingly presented perjured 
testimony, presented misleading and deceptive jury arguments, intimidated 
witnesses, and violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) newly 
discovered evidence established Larzelere’s innocence; (3) Larzelere was denied a 
fair trial because her counsel had numerous conflicts of interest; (4) Larzelere was 
denied effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase because trial counsel 
failed to adequately investigate and prepare the defense case and challenge the 
State’s case; (5) Larzelere was denied her rights under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68 (1985), at the guilt and penalty phases because counsel failed to obtain an 
adequate mental health evaluation; (6) the trial court committed fundamental error 
by giving an unconstitutionally vague CCP jury instruction; (7) the penalty-phase 
jury instructions improperly shifted the burden to Larzelere to prove that death was 
inappropriate, and counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these 
instructions; (8) the trial court’s comments and instructions diluted the jury’s sense 
of responsibility toward sentencing, and counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to these comments and instructions; (9) Larzelere was denied the effective 
assistance of postconviction counsel because her lawyers were prohibited from 
 
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Later, Larzelere amended her motion, raising two additional claims.3  After a Huff4 
hearing, the trial court summarily denied many of Larzelere’s claims and 
scheduled others for an evidentiary hearing.  State v. Larzelere, No. 91-2561-
CFAES (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. order filed December 14, 2001) (Postconviction Order I).  
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying 
Larzelere’s motion to vacate her conviction but granting her motion to vacate her 
sentence because the trial court found that Larzelere’s counsel had provided 
ineffective assistance during the penalty phase.  State v. Larzelere, No. 91-2561-
CFAES (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. order filed March 24, 2005) (Postconviction Order II). 
The State now appeals the trial court’s award of a new penalty phase.  
Larzelere cross-appeals, raising three claims: (1) the postconviction trial court 
erred when it denied Larzelere’s claim that the trial court’s jury instructions 
constituted a constructive amendment or fatal variance to the indictment; (2) trial 
                                                                                                                                        
interviewing jurors to investigate the jury misconduct that occurred during 
Larzelere’s trial; (10) execution by electrocution is cruel or unusual punishment or 
both; (11) execution by lethal injection is cruel or unusual punishment or both; (12) 
Larzelere may be incompetent at the time of execution; (13) Florida’s capital 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied; and (14) the 
cumulative effect of the procedural and substantive errors in Larzelere’s trial have 
deprived her of a fundamentally fair trial. 
 
 
3.  The supplemental claims were: (15) Florida’s death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to Larzelere on the basis of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000); and (16) Larzelere was embarrassed in her defense due to 
fatal variances and constructive amendments of the indictment at trial. 
 
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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counsel was conflicted and ineffective during the guilt phase; and (3) the 
cumulative effect of procedural and substantive errors deprived Larzelere of a 
fundamentally fair trial. 
 
Larzelere also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court, 
raising two claims: (1) she was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel 
because appellate counsel failed to raise on direct appeal the meritorious issue that 
the trial court’s jury instructions and the State’s closing argument constituted a 
constructive amendment or fatal variance to the indictment; and (2) the cumulative 
effect of procedural and substantive errors deprived Larzelere of a fundamentally 
fair trial. 
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying 
Larzelere’s motion to vacate her conviction but vacating her death sentence and 
ordering a resentencing, and deny Larzelere’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
II.  THE STATE’S APPEAL 
The State asserts that the trial court erred in granting Larzelere a 
resentencing due to her counsel’s ineffectiveness because Larzelere prevented her 
counsel from investigating potential mitigation evidence.  We find no error and 
affirm the trial court’s order. 
In her motion for postconviction relief, Larzelere alleged that her penalty-
phase counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a reasonable background 
 
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investigation and that had counsel investigated, they would have unearthed 
substantial mitigating evidence which could have been presented to the jury or the 
trial court.  She further alleged that her waiver of mitigation was invalid because 
defense counsel failed to conduct an adequate penalty-phase investigation and 
hence could not advise her regarding the ramifications of waiving mitigation. 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (reaffirming Strickland two-prong analysis for claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel).  As to the first prong, the defendant must 
establish that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687; see also Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  For the 
second prong, the reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability that but for the deficiency the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
 
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resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.”  Id. at 687. 
The postconviction trial court received eleven days of testimony.  Regarding 
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness during the penalty phase, Larzelere called her 
trial attorneys, John Wilkins and John Howes, to testify regarding their 
representation of Larzelere.  She called William Lasley, Jason Larzelere’s defense 
attorney, to compare and contrast his representation of Jason to Wilkins’ and 
Howes’ representation of Larzelere, and attorney Donald Robert West, an expert 
witness regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, to further critique her 
counsel’s performance.  Larzelere called Gary McDaniel, the investigator 
originally hired by Wilkins to investigate her case, and Dr. Harry Krop, a 
psychologist consulted by Wilkins after the jury recommendation, to testify about 
counsel’s preparation of mitigation evidence.  Larzelere also called Dr. Bill E. 
Mosman, an expert psychologist, and numerous family members to testify 
regarding what mitigation could have been presented had defense counsel 
investigated thoroughly.  The State called Dr. Harry Albert McClaren, an expert 
forensic psychologist, to rebut Dr. Mosman’s testimony. 
After considering this evidence, the trial court found that Larzelere’s on-the-
record waiver of the presentation of mitigation evidence did not preclude 
consideration of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The trial court found 
 
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that Larzelere’s waiver could not have been made knowingly and intelligently 
because her counsel was unable to adequately advise her regarding potential 
mitigation.  The trial court also found that counsel’s performance during the 
penalty and sentencing phases was deficient because 
counsel did not spend sufficient time preparing for the penalty phase, 
never sought out Defendant’s background, never sufficiently 
followed-up on the investigator’s report outlining the abuse and 
family history, and never interviewed Defendant’s family members.  
Counsel did not obtain informed mental health evaluations of 
Defendant sufficiently in advance of the penalty phase.  Counsel 
presented no mitigation evidence to the jury, and only the testimony 
of two jail guards and limited information regarding former spousal 
abuse to the Court.  Due to this lack of investigation, counsel was 
unable to advise Defendant as to the potential mitigation. 
 
Postconviction Order II at 32-33.  Finally, the trial court found that Larzelere 
satisfied her burden of demonstrating prejudice because, given the seven-to-five 
death recommendation, the trial court could not find that the evidence of 
Larzelere’s childhood sexual abuse and family history “would not have tilted the 
balance in favor of a recommendation of life.”  The trial court further explained 
that a life recommendation likely would have been followed by the sentencing 
judge.5 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
                                          
 
 
5.  The postconviction trial judge was the same judge who presided over 
Larzelere’s trial and sentencing. 
 
 
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court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  We agree with the trial court’s determination in all 
respects.  Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 
Larzelere’s waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently because Wilkins and 
Howes did not investigate possible mitigation sufficiently before Larzelere waived 
her right to present penalty-phase evidence.  The record also supports the 
conclusion that their deficient penalty-phase performance prejudiced Larzelere. 
This Court has held that a defendant may waive the presentation of 
mitigation evidence so long as her waiver is knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently made.  Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1993) (citing Henry v. 
State, 613 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1992)).  In State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 
2002), this Court explained that “[a]lthough a defendant may waive mitigation, he 
cannot do so blindly; counsel must first investigate all avenues and advise the 
defendant so that the defendant reasonably understands what is being waived and 
its ramifications and hence is able to make an informed, intelligent decision.”  In 
Lewis, this Court found that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently made where his counsel had 
never sought out Lewis’s background information and never 
interviewed other members of Lewis’s family; therefore, he was 
unable to advise Lewis as to potential mitigation which these 
witnesses and records could have offered.  The only witness who was 
 
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available and willing to testify in favor of the defendant was a mental 
health expert who had merely talked with Lewis and had not yet 
reached a diagnosis because he did not have sufficient information. 
 
Id. at 1113-14.  This holding that counsel must investigate mitigation before 
concurring with a defendant’s decision to waive mitigation follows the United 
State Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 522-23 (“[O]ur 
principal concern in deciding whether [trial counsel] exercised ‘reasonable 
professional judgmen[t],’ is not whether counsel should have presented a 
mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting 
counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins’ background 
was itself reasonable.” (citation omitted)). 
Like trial counsel in Lewis, Wilkins and Howes did not seek information 
regarding Larzelere’s childhood and background.  Wilkins could not remember any 
specific actions taken to investigate mitigation.  He could only remember that he 
and Howes “were jointly pursuing whatever it was we were pursuing.”  Each of 
Larzelere’s three sisters testified that Wilkins and Howes did not interview them 
on the topic of mitigation.  Yet, all three of the sisters stated that had they been 
asked, they would have testified during the penalty phase that Larzelere was 
sexually abused by her father William “PeeWee” Antley.  Jason and Jessica 
Larzelere, two of Larzelere’s children, testified that counsel did not explain the 
concept of mitigation to them and that they would have testified during the penalty 
 
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phase about Larzelere being physically abused by a prior husband if asked.  Jason 
testified that he tried to contact Wilkins after learning the role of mitigation in a 
first-degree murder case from his attorney William Lasley but that Wilkins would 
not take his call.  Not only did Wilkins and Howes not interview family members 
about Larzelere’s background, they discounted the portions of McDaniel’s 
investigative report that documented Larzelere’s father’s alcoholism, possible child 
abuse, and possible spousal abuse.6  Wilkins could not remember if he asked 
Larzelere about the abuse mentioned in McDaniel’s report, and Howes could not 
                                          
 
 
6.  McDaniel’s report, dated June 7, 1991, stated that Larzelere provided him 
with the following information: 
 
She describes the father as a chronic alcoholic, sitting on the porch, 
drinking at home daily, with no outside hobby or social interest.  She 
was victimized emotionally and physically, as were the other children.  
Without hesitation, client states that she cursed him when he died, an 
obvious emotional response to the victimization as an adolescent. 
. . . She stated that JEANETTE [Larzelere’s sister] could give 
investigator an overview of defendant’s upbringing, except for the 
issues related to child abuse, which is unspoken among family 
members.  Client believes that all the children were subjected to same. 
. . . . 
Client attended and graduated from Lake Wales High School in 
1970, leaving home as a teenager to marry state’s witness HARRY 
MATHIS (2/19/70).  She divorced MATHIS in the city of Lake Wales 
in or around 1977 after seven miserable years of marriage, during 
which she was a victim of frequent assaults inflicted by her husband. . 
. .  A review of the civil records should [indicate] an extensive history 
of domestic assaults and child abuse involving JASON, who was born 
in 1972, and JESSICA in 1976. 
 
 
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remember if he asked Don Carpenter, the investigator who was hired to replace 
McDaniel, to “reinvestigate” potential mitigation. 
Unlike the attorneys in Lewis who consulted a mental health expert before 
allowing Lewis to waive the presentation of mitigation evidence, Wilkins and 
Howes did not retain Dr. Krop to examine Larzelere until after the jury 
recommended death.  Dr. Krop testified that he had done over 1500 first-degree 
murder evaluations in his career and that “this case was the only case that I’ve ever 
been involved in when I was asked to get involved after the jury had already come 
back with its recommendation.”  Donald West testified that there is “probably no 
worse timing” than to hire an expert after the jury recommendation because “at that 
point, all you can do is ask the court to override . . . a jury’s recommendation 
which, by law, the court is required to give great weight.”  Howes testified that he 
did not know why Dr. Krop was not retained early in the representation because he 
did not become Larzelere’s counsel of record until around the time jury selection 
began.  Wilkins first could not remember why he did not contact Dr. Krop before 
the recommendation but later explained that he did not contact Dr. Krop sooner 
because he did not suspect that Larzelere had been abused, and he did not feel that 
it was worth looking for the needle in the haystack until after the death 
recommendation. 
 
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Ordinarily, counsel is not considered deficient where counsel has made a 
strategic decision.  However, “strategic choices made after less than complete 
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91).  Counsel would have seen a reason to 
consult a mental health expert regarding Larzelere had counsel interviewed her 
family members or otherwise pursued the investigator’s report.  As Dr. McClaren 
explained, “When you’re talking to [Larzelere], boy she’s easy to believe, but 
when you’re out of the situation and start looking at all those other conflicting 
things . . . there are many inconsistencies.”  The trial court correctly concluded that 
counsel was deficient for failing to obtain an informed mental health evaluation of 
Larzelere in advance of the penalty phase. 
The record also supports the trial court’s finding that counsel’s performance 
did not improve upon retaining Dr. Krop.  Wilkins and Howes failed to provide Dr. 
Krop with the investigator’s report, Claude Murrah’s trial testimony, or Harry 
Mathis’s deposition, all of which would have alerted Dr. Krop to the possibility of 
sexual and physical abuse.  According to Dr. Krop, Wilkins told him that no family 
members were available to assist in his evaluation.  In State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 
120, 129 (Fla. 2003) (quoting trial court’s order), this Court held that trial 
counsel’s “hurried preparation” for a mental health evaluation was ineffective 
 
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assistance of counsel, where defense counsel “furnished little or no background 
information to the doctors, did not attend the evaluations, and did not believe it 
was his responsibility to explain to the doctors the meaning of statutory mitigation 
factors under the law.”  In the instant case, counsel did not give Dr. Krop the 
investigator’s report, Murrah’s testimony, or Mathis’s deposition, and neither 
Wilkins nor Howes attended when Dr. Krop was deposed by the State.7 
 
Given this evidence, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that 
Larzelere’s waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently and that trial counsel 
was deficient for failing to sufficiently investigate potential mitigation. 
Finally, we agree that Larzelere satisfied her burden of demonstrating 
prejudice.  Dr. Mosman, the defense’s expert, and Dr. McClaren, the State’s 
expert, evaluated Larzelere for purposes of the postconviction hearing, and both 
concluded that she was sexually abused as a child by her father and her uncle, that 
she was physically abused as an adult, and that, while not psychotic, she suffers 
from personality disorders, including narcissistic and histrionic personality 
disorders, which help explain her relationship troubles and cunning, manipulative 
                                          
 
 
7.  Also notable in Coney is that defense counsel was found “plainly 
deficient” in part because counsel failed to remedy the shortcomings of his 
preparation “by seeking additional time and resources from the court in preparation 
for the penalty phase.”  845 So. 2d at 131 (quoting trial court’s order).  Wilkins and 
Howes not only failed to request additional time to prepare for the penalty phase 
but, rather, asked the court to hold the penalty phase one week after the jury’s 
verdict. 
 
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behavior.  Dr. Mosman further diagnosed Larzelere as suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder and features of obsessive compulsive disorder.  Although 
Dr. McClaren disagreed, Dr. Mosman opined that the statutory mitigating factors 
of extreme emotional disturbance and substantially impaired capacity to conform 
conduct were applicable to Larzelere’s crime.  Dr. Mosman also suggested 
numerous nonstatutory mitigating factors were applicable, but again Dr. McClaren 
disputed some of these.8 
Larzelere’s three sisters testified at the evidentiary hearing and confirmed 
that Larzelere had been sexually abused by their father from around age five until 
around age thirteen.  The sisters stated that they did not realize that testimony 
regarding their common childhood could have helped Larzelere’s defense and that 
they would have testified about the sexual abuse during the penalty phase had they 
                                          
 
 
8.  Dr. Mosman proposed the following nonstatutory mitigating factors that 
could have been presented to the jury or trial court: (1) Larzelere had the ability to 
be rehabilitated and function in prison; (2) she had been physically and sexually 
abused and emotionally neglected; (3) she suffered from an emotional disturbance 
and impairment; (4) she did not commit a crime spree around the time of the 
murder; (5) she had a disadvantaged and deprived childhood due to lack of friends 
and social activities caused by her father’s pedophilia; (6) there was a multi-
generational history of dysfunction and sexual abuse in her family; (7) Larzelere 
had a good incarceration record and was a low user of prison resources; (8) 
community and family support systems had failed her; (9) she had a history of 
medical problems such as Legionnaire’s disease and pulmonary issues; (10) she 
had a history of humanitarian and charitable contributions; (11) in her childhood, 
she made efforts to shield her sisters from abuse; (11) she had possible alcohol or 
drug abuse issues; (12) she had a disabled son; and (13) she lost two children, who 
were adopted by Dr. Larzelere’s parents after the murder. 
 
 
- 17 -
been asked to do so by defense counsel.  Larzelere’s older two children, Jason and 
Jessica Larzelere, testified at the evidentiary hearing that Larzelere’s first husband, 
Harry Mathis, physically abused Larzelere and Jason and that as children they were 
sexually abused by their grandfather.  Jessica explained that she would have 
testified on her mother’s behalf and begged the judge and jury to spare her 
mother’s life if given the opportunity.  Likewise, Jason stated that he would have 
been willing to testify on his mother’s behalf after his acquittal on September 22, 
1992, and would have begged the judge and jury to spare his mother. 
 
The State argues that we should not find that Larzelere was prejudiced 
because this “mitigation” evidence would have been more harmful than helpful to 
her case.  The State explains that if the defense had presented a mitigation case, the 
State would have called Harry Mathis to testify that Larzelere attempted to murder 
him and would have presented evidence that Larzelere allowed her children to be 
sexually abused by their grandfather and involved Jason in cocaine trafficking.  
While we agree that the State could have presented rebuttal evidence during the 
penalty phase, this does not change our conclusion that Larzelere was prejudiced 
by her counsel’s penalty-phase performance. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s holding that Larzelere is 
entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because her trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to investigate and prepare for the penalty phase. 
 
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III.  LARZELERE’S CROSS-APPEAL 
 
Larzelere cross-appeals, asserting that she is entitled a new guilt-phase trial 
because: (1) the postconviction trial court erred when it denied Larzelere’s claim 
that the trial court’s jury instructions constituted a constructive amendment or fatal 
variance to the indictment; (2) trial counsel was conflicted and ineffective during 
the guilt phase; and (3) the cumulative effect of procedural and substantive errors 
deprived Larzelere of a fundamentally fair trial. 
A.  Constructive Amendment Claim 
Larzelere’s argument that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial 
court’s jury instructions and the State’s closing arguments constituted a 
constructive amendment or a fatal variance to the indictment is procedurally barred 
because it could have been raised on direct appeal.  See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 
2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995) (“[I]ssues that could have been, but were not, raised on 
direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.”).  In her petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, Larzelere properly raises her appellate counsel’s failure to 
raise this preserved issue on direct appeal.  We consider the issue in that context. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Guilt-Phase Counsel 
1.  Ineffectiveness Due to Conflict of Interest 
Larzelere argues that the trial court erred in denying her claim that Wilkins 
operated under a conflict of interest and was ineffective because he pursued his 
 
- 19 -
own financial and legal interests to the detriment of Larzelere’s defense.  Larzelere 
believes that Wilkins was conflicted because he could not have her declared 
indigent for purposes of costs without drawing attention to his impermissible 
contingency fee contract and because he did not want his eventual payment to be 
impacted by a claim by the county against any insurance proceeds collected by 
Larzelere.  Larzelere asserts that Wilkins performed deficiently in that he failed to 
have her promptly declared indigent for costs, failed to consult and hire needed 
defense experts, and fired his investigator in an effort to minimize costs. 
This Court has explained that Florida follows the legal principles set forth in 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and Strickland, when analyzing an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a purported conflict of interest: 
[I]n order to establish an ineffectiveness claim premised on an alleged 
conflict of interest the defendant must “establish that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”  A lawyer 
suffers from an actual conflict of interest when he or she “actively 
represents conflicting interests.”  To demonstrate an actual conflict, 
the defendant must identify specific evidence in the record that 
suggests that his or her interests were compromised.  A possible, 
speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is “insufficient to impugn 
a criminal conviction.”  “[U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel 
actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the 
constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.” 
 
Sliney v. State, 944 So. 2d 270, 279 (Fla. 2006) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350).  Prejudice is presumed where an actual conflict is shown 
to have adversely affected a client’s representation.  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50.  
 
- 20 -
The question of whether a defendant’s counsel labored under an actual conflict of 
interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance is a mixed question of law 
and fact.  Sliney, 944 So. 2d at 279.  Accordingly, this Court applies a mixed 
standard of review, deferring to the lower court’s factual findings but reviewing its 
ultimate legal conclusions de novo.  Coney, 845 So. 2d at 133. 
In considering whether Wilkins operated under an actual conflict as defined 
by Cuyler, the trial court found that Wilkins’ contract and investigator McDaniel’s 
contract were not contingency fee arrangements and that the insurance proceeds 
would be sufficient to cover fees and costs as outlined in the contracts.  Thus, the 
trial court held that Larzelere “provided nothing but mere speculation” that Wilkins 
failed to hire experts or seek indigency status because he wanted to maximize the 
amount of insurance proceeds he would receive.  Postconviction Order II at 21.  
We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on this claim.  We agree that Larzelere 
did not demonstrate that her counsel had an actual conflict of interest because she 
failed to “identify specific evidence in the record that suggests that . . . her interests 
were impaired or compromised” for the benefit of her attorney.  Herring v. State, 
730 So. 2d 1264, 1267 (Fla. 1998); see also Brown v. State, 894 So. 2d 137, 159 
(Fla. 2004) (finding defendant failed to prove actual conflict where trial court made 
factual finding that counsel did not attempt to gain proprietary interest in 
defendant’s life story, recordings, and poetry until after close of representation and 
 
- 21 -
defendant “did not identify specific evidence in the record that suggested that his 
interests were impaired or compromised for the benefit of the lawyer or another 
party”). 
Wilkins testified that his contract, which was signed by Larzelere and her 
sister, Jeanette Atkinson, provided for a $100,000 retainer, $3000 per day while in 
trial, and costs.  Wilkins believed that he would be able to collect his fee and costs 
against any of Larzelere’s and Atkinson’s assets, but anticipated that he likely 
would be paid from the insurance proceeds.  Wilkins admitted that there was a risk 
of nonpayment.  However, he consulted trusted civil attorneys regarding 
Atkinson’s likelihood of collecting on the insurance policies, and they informed 
him that her chances of collecting a “good portion” of the two to three million 
dollars were “substantial.”  This appraisal alleviated Wilkins’ doubts enough for 
him to take the case under these terms.9  Rodney Lilly, one of the consultants, 
testified at the evidentiary hearing and confirmed that he told Wilkins that the 
insurance case was “worth pursuing, even on a contingency fee basis” because the 
insurer would have to prove fraud in the inducement to avoid paying the policies, a 
difficult claim to prove.  Lilly’s assessment of the insurance case implies that it 
would likewise be worth pursuing the criminal case in hopes of being paid from 
                                          
 
 
9.  Wilkins learned during his representation that all of Larzelere’s property 
and assets were “mortgaged to the hilt,” but he testified that even with that 
knowledge, he remained confident that he would collect from the insurance 
proceeds. 
 
- 22 -
the insurance proceeds.  Moreover, Gladys Jackson, Wilkins’ office manager and 
bookkeeper at the time of Larzelere’s case, testified that she did not recall ever 
telling Wilkins that a requested action, such as taking a deposition, could not be 
done in the Larzelere case due to insufficient funds.  Thus, Larzelere did not prove 
that Wilkins failed to hire experts and have her declared indigent because of a 
financial conflict resulting from the fee arrangement and Wilkins’ personal 
financial problems.  She did not prove that Wilkins had an interest in not hiring 
experts, other than that which any attorney paid by a client or third party would 
have, because he believed his costs would be paid. 
As for investigator McDaniel’s contract, Wilkins testified that he did not ask 
Volusia County to pay the investigative expenses because McDaniel agreed to be 
privately retained and paid from the insurance proceeds.  McDaniel first testified 
that he was to be paid from Wilkins’ retainer, but he later testified, consistent with 
Wilkins’ testimony, that he was hired directly by Larzelere, Jason, and Atkinson, 
and was to be paid from the insurance proceeds.  McDaniel admitted that he agreed 
to be paid “as the money came in” from the insurance policies.  The record also 
refutes Larzelere’s suggestion that Wilkins fired McDaniel in order to minimize 
costs.  McDaniel testified that Wilkins and Howes would not pay for him to go to 
California to interview Norman Karn and Ronald Lee Hayden, state witnesses, as 
he requested to do.  However, McDaniel acknowledged that he and his company 
 
- 23 -
were terminated for not following Wilkins’ and Howes’ instructions, rather than 
due to a dispute over expenses.  This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 
Larzelere failed to prove that McDaniel was fired due to a financial conflict of 
interest.  Further, even if the decision to fire McDaniel was purely financial, 
Larzelere did not demonstrate that this act was adverse to her representation 
because the evidence shows that Wilkins and Howes hired another investigator, 
Don Carpenter, to continue McDaniel’s work. 
Overall, Larzelere failed to show that any interest her attorney may have had 
in minimizing costs was an actual, not merely potential, conflict that adversely 
affected her representation. 
2.  Non-Conflict of Interest Ineffectiveness 
Larzelere also argues that her counsel was simply ineffective.  In order to 
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that 
trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Both prongs of the Strickland test generally present 
mixed questions of law and fact, requiring this Court to employ a mixed standard 
of review, deferring to the circuit court’s factual findings that are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions 
de novo.  See Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 771-72. 
 
- 24 -
Larzelere presented a great deal of evidence regarding Wilkins’ alcohol use.  
She also presented evidence that he was engaging in tax evasion and money 
laundering on behalf of other clients while acting as her counsel.  She presented 
evidence that Wilkins may have been having financial difficulties at that time and 
that he answered a complaint by The Florida Bar just days before giving his 
closing argument in the guilt phase of her trial.  However, to prove that counsel 
acted deficiently, a defendant “must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent 
performance under prevailing professional standards.”  Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 
42, 51 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 
1986)).  The only specific errors alleged are that Wilkins failed to consult or hire 
certain expert witnesses that might have assisted the defense.  Larzelere argues that 
Wilkins was ineffective because, while intoxicated and distracted by financial and 
legal problems, he made the following prejudicial errors: (a) he failed to consult a 
mental health expert regarding both phases of the trial; (b) he failed to consult and 
call a concrete expert and failed to introduce a report of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation regarding the concrete samples; (c) he failed to consult and call an 
insurance expert to testify that Dr. Larzelere’s life insurance coverage was 
reasonable given the family’s circumstances; and (d) he failed to consult and call a 
handwriting expert to examine Dr. Larzelere’s will. 
 
- 25 -
After reviewing the record, we find no error in the trial court’s determination 
that Larzelere failed to demonstrate that Wilkins was ineffective for not calling 
such expert witnesses.  Larzelere did not offer evidence of “what these experts 
would have opined regarding the facts and circumstances” of her case, and given 
the overwhelming evidence of Larzelere’s guilt, even favorable testimony by these 
sorts of experts would not have undermined our confidence in the verdict.  
Postconviction Order II at 21. 
a.  Guilt-Phase Mental Health Expert 
The trial court was correct in finding that Larzelere was not prejudiced by 
not having the assistance of a psychologist or psychiatrist during the guilt phase of 
her trial.  A mental health practitioner’s evaluation of Larzelere’s mental state 
would not have significantly contributed to her defense because there was no 
reasonable basis for arguing that this crime was a second-degree murder.  The 
State presented evidence that Larzelere planned her husband’s murder over a 
period of time.  We agree that there was competent, substantial evidence upon 
which the trial court could conclude that no reasonable person could have found 
this to be a spontaneous rather than a premeditated crime.  Further, none of the 
psychological experts called at the evidentiary hearing testified that Larzelere was 
mentally incompetent. 
b.  Concrete Expert 
 
- 26 -
 
The trial court did not err in holding that Larzelere failed to prove that 
Wilkins was ineffective for not consulting or hiring a concrete expert to testify 
regarding whether the concrete encasing the alleged murder weapon matched the 
concrete found in a cooking pot in Larzelere’s basement.  During the evidentiary 
hearing, Larzelere called John M. Whelan II, a chemistry graduate student at the 
University of South Florida, to testify regarding the FBI’s report about the concrete 
samples.  The trial court ruled that Whelan was not qualified to give an expert 
opinion on concrete but allowed Larzelere to proffer Whelan’s testimony.  
Larzelere did not challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision to not admit 
Whelan’s testimony, and therefore Whelan’s testimony is not before this Court.  
Larzelere has not shown counsel to be ineffective for not calling a concrete expert 
because she had not demonstrated what an individual qualified as a concrete expert 
would have testified to in this case or how such testimony would cast doubt on her 
guilt. 
 
Larzelere’s claim that Wilkins should have called the FBI agent who 
analyzed the concrete samples and introduced into evidence the FBI’s report that 
found that the samples could not be conclusively matched is more fully developed 
in the record.  While Larzelere did not call the FBI agent, she did introduce the 
report into evidence.  The report summarizes the comparison of sample Q1, which 
was a sample of the cement found in Larzelere’s home, and sample K1, which was 
 
- 27 -
a sample of the cement encasing the alleged murder weapon recovered from a 
creek.  The report states:  
The Q1 and K1 cements differ in color, and exhibit some 
difference in particle size distribution and mortar composition.  
However, the K1 cement was exposed to potentially extreme 
weathering conditions which can affect the comparative properties of 
the cement.  Although it is unlikely that weathering is responsible for 
the differences observed between the Q1 and K1 cements in this case, 
it [cannot] be totally eliminated as a possibility. 
 
Neither party introduced this report into evidence during trial, although during his 
closing argument, Wilkins argued that the State failed to prove that the cement 
found in Larzelere’s home matched the cement encasing the alleged murder 
weapon.  Larzelere claims that effective counsel would have supported this 
argument by calling the FBI agent and introducing the report. 
Again, we agree that Larzelere has not demonstrated prejudice.  As William 
Lasley explained, evidence separating Larzelere from the alleged murder weapon 
would have theoretically aided her defense.  However, the trial court correctly 
found that defense counsel’s extensive cross-examination of the State’s informant 
witnesses, Heidle and Palmieri, and his closing argument did challenge the State’s 
theory that the guns were encased in concrete and dumped in a creek at Larzelere’s 
direction.  Given the totality of the evidence, not introducing the indefinite report 
does not undermine this Court’s confidence in the verdict. 
c.  Insurance Expert 
 
- 28 -
The trial court summarily denied Larzelere’s claim that Wilkins was 
ineffective for failing to consult and call an insurance expert to testify that the 
Larzelere family had a reasonable amount of life insurance coverage.  The trial 
court held that such testimony would not likely impact the verdict because the 
reasonableness of the insurance coverage would not discount the State’s theory that 
Larzelere killed her husband to obtain the insurance proceeds and because the State 
conceded during closing argument that Dr. Larzelere participated in the acquisition 
of the insurance policies.  We find no reversible error. 
During his representation of Larzelere, Wilkins consulted two attorneys, Mr. 
Gibson and Mr. Lilly, whom he considered to be experts in insurance.  Lilly, who 
represented Larzelere’s sister, Jeanette Atkinson, in the insurance litigation, 
testified that he prepared a chart explaining the relationships between the different 
insurance policies for Wilkins’ use in the criminal case.  Wilkins used these charts 
during his opening argument and asserted during both his opening and closing 
arguments that the State’s motive theory did not make sense.  He argued that the 
insurance policies were reasonable for the family, that Dr. Larzelere made 
$600,000 a year and let Larzelere buy anything that she wanted, and that Larzelere 
would have made more money by divorcing Dr. Larzelere than by murdering him.  
While Wilkins did not call a defense witness regarding the insurance policies, he 
 
- 29 -
did cross-examine the insurance agents called by the State.  His performance was 
not unreasonable. 
Moreover, the trial court properly denied this claim because Larzelere did 
not demonstrate that she was prejudiced by any failure to discredit the State’s 
financial motive theory.  The State’s first three witnesses, Norman Karn, Ronald 
Lee Hayden, and Philip Langston, all testified that Larzelere approached them 
about killing her husband.  Karn, who dated Larzelere in early 1989, testified that 
Larzelere “[i]n so many words” told him that she wanted Dr. Larzelere dead.  He 
also testified that Larzelere solicited his friend Hayden to kill Dr. Larzelere.  
Hayden testified next and confirmed that Larzelere asked him if he knew anyone 
who would kill her husband because she was unable to divorce Dr. Larzelere and 
wanted to marry Karn.  Next, Langston, who met Larzelere in 1989 or 1990 and 
became romantically involved with her, testified that on one occasion Larzelere 
told him that she “had to get rid of Norm.”  When he said that he was not capable 
of murder, she asked if he knew anyone who would kill Dr. Larzelere for $50,000. 
d.  Handwriting Expert 
The trial court denied Larzelere’s claim that Wilkins was ineffective for 
failing to consult a handwriting expert to examine Dr. Larzelere’s will, which left 
his estate to Larzelere, because there was no reasonable possibility that such 
evidence would have changed the outcome of Larzelere’s trial.  We agree that 
 
- 30 -
Larzelere was not prejudiced by her counsel’s failure to call a handwriting expert.  
Larzelere claims that such an expert could have refuted the State’s accusation that 
the will was forged.  Yet, the probative issue at trial was whether Dr. Larzelere 
knew that he was signing a will when he signed the document, not whether he 
actually signed it.10  A handwriting expert could not offer an opinion on whether 
Dr. Larzelere knew that he was signing a will, and defense counsel did call Leroy 
Mahler, the notary public who claimed to have witnessed Dr. Larzelere’s signature.  
We agree that Wilkins’ failure to call a handwriting expert was not prejudicial. 
3.  Conclusion 
The record does not demonstrate any actual conflict, other than the dual 
representation of Larzelere and Jason, which Larzelere waived and this Court 
affirmed on direct appeal, or any specific prejudicial deficiencies in counsel’s 
performance.  Thus, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
C.  Cumulative Error 
Larzelere argues that she is entitled to a new trial due to her attorneys’ joint 
representation of Larzelere’s codefendant, Wilkins’ alcohol and drug abuse, his 
inexperience in capital cases, his financial misdealings, his contingency fee 
contract that dissuaded him from approaching the court for costs and expenses, his 
                                          
 
 
10.  The State called Randall J. Hagge, an expert forensic document 
examiner, who testified that the signature reading “Norman B. Larzelere” on the 
alleged will was in the same handwriting as that found on documents known to be 
signed “Dr. Norman Larzelere” by Dr. Larzelere. 
 
- 31 -
failure to consult experts prior to trial, the circumstantial nature of the case, and the 
constructive amendments and fatal variances to the indictment.  Larzelere’s claim 
is without merit because each of her arguments is either without merit or 
procedurally barred.  See Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1998) 
(holding that where claims were either meritless or procedurally barred, there was 
no cumulative effect to consider).  This Court found on direct appeal that the trial 
judge “met the burden of assuring that appellant’s [pretrial] waiver was made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,” and that he properly denied Larzelere’s 
post-trial motions to discharge counsel because she failed to show how she would 
be prejudiced by counsel’s continued dual representation of Larzelere and Jason.  
Larzelere, 676 So. 2d at 403.  Also on direct appeal, the Court found the evidence 
sufficient to support Larzelere’s conviction.  Id. at 406.  As for Larzelere’s 
postconviction claims, this Court has affirmed the trial court’s holding that 
Larzelere’s claim that Wilkins was actually conflicted or ineffective due to his 
alcohol and drug abuse, his financial misdealings, his alleged contingency fee 
contract, and his failure to consult defense experts is without merit and that her 
constructive amendment claim is procedurally barred.  Larzelere is not entitled to 
relief on the basis of cumulative error. 
IV.  HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
 
- 32 -
 
Larzelere raises two claims in her habeas petition.  She argues that: (1) she 
was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to raise 
on direct appeal the meritorious issue that the trial court’s jury instructions and the 
State’s closing argument constituted a constructive amendment or fatal variance to 
the indictment; and (2) the cumulative effect of procedural and substantive errors 
deprived Larzelere of a fundamentally fair trial. 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 
2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant 
habeas relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel, this Court must determine, 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In raising such a 
claim, “[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or 
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069.  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
may not be used to camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct 
 
- 33 -
appeal or in a postconviction motion.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 
643 (Fla. 2000).  “If a legal issue ‘would in all probability have been found to be 
without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate 
counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s performance 
ineffective.”  Id. (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). 
 
Larzelere argues that her appellate counsel erred in not raising the claim that 
the trial court’s reading of a conspiracy instruction and the State’s closing 
argument referencing that instruction impermissibly expanded the grounds on 
which she could be convicted from the charges set forth in her indictment.  She 
argues that she was embarrassed in her defense because she prepared to defend 
against the theory that she hired or otherwise induced Jason to shoot Dr. Larzelere, 
not that she aided and abetted unknown others in a conspiracy to murder Dr. 
Larzelere.  She further argues that this issue would have been meritorious if raised 
on direct appeal.  Specifically, Larzelere asserts that the underlined instruction 
defining conspiracy contained in the following excerpt should not have been given: 
 
If the defendant paid or promised to pay another person or 
persons to commit a crime, the defendant must be treated as if she had 
done all of the things the person who received or was promised the 
payment did if, one, the defendant knew what was going to happen, 
two, she made or promised the payment in exchange for the 
commission, or promised to . . . commit the crime or to help commit 
the crime, and three, the crime was committed by a co-conspirator. 
 
To be a principal, the defendant does not have to be present 
when the crime is committed. 
 
- 34 -
 
In considering the application of this above described 
instruction on principals to this case, the elements of the limited 
definition of criminal conspiracy that you must determine have been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt are that, one, the intent of the 
defendant and of the co-conspirator, was that the offense that was the 
object of the conspiracy, to wit, first degree murder, would be 
committed, and two, in order to carry out the intent, the defendant and 
the co-conspirator agreed, conspired, combined, or confederated to 
cause said offense to be committed, either by them or one of them, or 
by some other co-conspirator. 
 
It is not necessary that the agreement, conspiracy, combination, 
or confederation to commit that offense be expressed in any particular 
words, nor that words passed between the defendant and co-
conspirator. 
 
It is not necessary that the defendant do any act in the 
furtherance of the offense conspired. 
 
It is a defense to a charge of criminal conspiracy that a 
defendant, after conspiring with one or more persons to commit the 
offense that was the object of the alleged conspiracy, persuaded the 
alleged co-conspirators not to do so, or otherwise prevented 
commission of the offense that was the object of the conspiracy. 
 
The trial judge gave this disputed conspiracy instruction because the standard 
principal-by-hire instruction uses the term “co-conspirator.”  The judge explained 
that he believed this term should be defined to assist the jury in applying the 
principal-by-hire instruction to the evidence.  The defense objected to the 
instruction and requested that any ambiguity or vagueness in the principal-by-hire 
instruction be solved by editing paragraph three of the instruction to read: “The 
crime was committed by Jason Eric Larzelere.”  The State objected to this 
proposal, arguing that it was not required to prove that Jason was the shooter, but 
instead, the jury could consider “whatever evidence has been presented in the case, 
 
- 35 -
and determine whether or not the shooter was a co-conspirator of Virginia 
Larzelere.”  Later, the State prosecutor referenced the conspiracy instruction in her 
closing argument. 
We find that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this 
issue on direct appeal because the argument is without merit.  Neither the trial 
court’s instructions nor the State’s closing argument impermissibly expanded the 
grounds on which Larzelere could be convicted of first-degree murder. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by rejecting the defense’s 
proposed instruction or by instructing the jury on the definition of conspiracy.  
Both Virginia Larzelere and her son Jason Larzelere were indicted for the murder 
of Norman Larzelere.  The indictment alleged that “Virginia Gail Larzelere and 
Jason Eric Larzelere did, on the 8th day of March, 1991, in Volusia County, 
Florida, in violation of Florida Statute 782.04, form a premeditated design to effect 
the death of NORMAN LARZELERE . . . by shooting him with a firearm.”  This 
indictment properly charges Larzelere as a principal to the murder.  Under Florida 
law, a person who is charged in an indictment or information with commission of a 
crime may be convicted on proof that she aided or abetted in the commission of 
such crime.  State v. Roby, 246 So. 2d 566, 571 (Fla. 1971) (citing Pope v. State, 
94 So. 865 (Fla. 1922); Myers v. State, 31 So. 275 (Fla. 1901)).  To be convicted 
as a principal for a crime physically committed by another, the defendant must 
 
- 36 -
intend that the crime be committed and must do some act to assist the other person 
in actually committing the crime.  Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 964-65 (Fla. 
1996) (citing Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1988)).  The State need not 
prove each codefendant’s guilt in order to convict a codefendant of being a 
principal to a crime.  See Potts v. State, 430 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla. 1982) (“In order 
to convict the aider-abettor it is not necessary to show that the principal perpetrator 
was convicted of the same crime, nor is it even necessary to show that he was 
convicted at all.”)  Thus, the indictment did not limit the State to the theory that 
Jason shot Dr. Larzelere.  Larzelere could be convicted as charged upon the State 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended that Dr. Larzelere be 
murdered and that she did some act to assist the person who actually killed Dr. 
Larzelere.  Accordingly, the trial court’s instructions were consistent with the 
broad scope of the indictment and accurately presented the charges against 
Larzelere to the jury.  The instructions did not permit the jury to convict Larzelere 
upon finding her guilty of conspiracy but only upon finding her guilty of aiding 
and abetting murder.  The instructions were not a constructive amendment or fatal 
variance. 
The State’s closing arguments likewise were not improper.  Larzelere argues 
that the State modified its closing argument to capitalize on the conspiracy 
instruction being read to the jury.  After reviewing the record, it appears that the 
 
- 37 -
State may have revised its closing argument in light of the added jury instruction.11  
However, again, the State was not limited by the indictment to arguing that Jason 
was the shooter. 
 
In conclusion, Larzelere’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
raise the constructive amendment/fatal variance claim on direct appeal because the 
claim is without merit.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643.  This Court would not 
have found any error in the trial court’s instructions or the State’s closing argument 
had the claim been raised on appeal.  Thus, Larzelere has not shown that she is 
entitled to a new trial.  
B.  Cumulative Error 
                                          
 
11.  Any change of theory from opening to closing was slight.  During her 
opening statement, the prosecutor argued that Larzelere hired or otherwise 
procured her son Jason to shoot his adopted father Dr. Larzelere.  At no point 
during the State’s case-in-chief did the State suggest that someone other than Jason 
was the shooter.  The State solicited a great deal of testimony from Steven Heidle, 
a friend of Jason Larzelere, and Kristen Palmieri, an employee of Dr. Larzelere, 
regarding their involvement in covering up the murder but asked comparatively 
few questions regarding their activities before the murder.  During closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued that the evidence showed “complicity between 
Kristen Palmieri, Steven Heidle, Jason, and Virginia through the phone calls.”  The 
prosecutor made two explicit references to the trial court’s conspiracy instruction.  
She briefly argued that Palmieri and Heidle “were co-conspirators with Virginia 
Larzelere” because they knew that the murder was going to happen and that if the 
jury found Heidle and Palmieri to have been “participating with the knowledge of 
Virginia and in cahoots with Virginia,” then the jury should consider their acts, her 
acts.  Ultimately though, the prosecutor still argued during closing that while 
Heidle and Palmieri were participants in their own ways, “[t]he evidence shows 
that Kristen Palmieri, however, was not the shooter.  Steven Heidle was not the 
shooter.  That shooter was Jason Larzelere.” 
 
- 38 -
In her second habeas claim, Larzelere argues that when considered 
cumulatively, the errors revealed in her direct appeal, her postconviction motion, 
her postconviction appeal, and this petition denied her a fundamentally fair trial.  
Larzelere’s cumulative error claim is without merit because each of her arguments 
is either without merit or procedurally barred.  See Melendez, 718 So. 2d at 749.  
While we did find two errors in Larzelere’s trial on direct appeal, both errors were 
harmless.  Larzelere, 676 So. 2d at 401-02, 408.  In this appeal, we have affirmed 
the trial court’s order granting Larzelere a new penalty phase and have found 
Larzelere’s guilt-phase postconviction claims to be without merit.  We have 
likewise rejected her first alleged basis for a writ of habeas corpus.  Thus, there is 
no harmful guilt-phase error to consider cumulatively.  Larzelere is not entitled to a 
new trial on the issue of her guilt. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm the trial court’s order denying 
relief relative to Larzelere’s conviction.  We also affirm the trial court’s order 
insofar as it vacates her death sentence and remands for a new sentencing 
proceeding before a jury.  Larzelere’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,  
John W. Watson, III, Judge - Case No. 91-2561-CF-A-ES 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney 
General, Daytona Beach, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Respondent 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and David Dixon Hendry, 
Assistant CCRC, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant/Petitioner