Title: Ex parte Esther M. Kaufman. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Esther M. Kaufman v. Charles T. Kaufman)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070283
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2009

REL:05/01/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070283
____________________
Ex parte Esther M. Kaufman
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Esther M. Kaufman
v.
Charles T. Kaufman)
(Houston Circuit Court, DR-03-1011.80;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2060245)
PER CURIAM.
WRIT QUASHED.
1070283
2
Lyons, Woodall, Parker, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., dissent.
1070283
The husband died while the case was pending on appeal
1
from the order entered on the Court of Civil Appeals' remand.
Abatement does not occur when the divorce judgment affects
property rights, and matters touching the parties' property
rights under the divorce judgment are amenable to alteration
or modification upon timely motion or upon appeal.  Cox v.
Dodd, 242 Ala. 37, 4 So. 2d 736 (1941); Hill v. Lyons, 550 So.
2d 1004 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).   
3
BOLIN, Justice (dissenting).
I believe the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming
the trial court's judgment entered after that court had
remanded the case for the trial court to fashion an equitable
property division and alimony award.  Accordingly, I must
dissent from quashing the writ of certiorari.
Facts and Procedural History
The wife, Esther M. Kaufman, sued her husband, Charles T.
Kaufman,  for a divorce.  The parties had been married for
1
more than 33 years; no children were born of the marriage.
Both parties had children from previous marriages.  At the
time of the ore tenus hearing in the divorce proceedings in
2004, the husband was 87 years old and the wife was 66 years
old.  After the trial court entered its final judgment of
divorce, the wife appealed.  Kaufman v. Kaufman, 934 So. 2d
1073 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)("Kaufman I").  The Court of Civil
Appeals held:
1070283
Exhibit 1 was submitted by the husband and contained a
2
list of the parties' assets and the husband's valuations of
those assets.   
The trial court awarded the wife approximately 23% of the
3
parties' marital estate and awarded the wife $500 per month in
periodic alimony for five years.
4
"In this case, the parties were married for 33
years. They are both at or nearing retirement age
and are receiving retirement income.  The trial
court's comments made during the course of the
hearing indicate that it considered primarily the
husband's financial contributions to the marriage
and placed little value on the wife's contributions,
both monetary or otherwise, to the marriage.  The
trial court appears to have improperly determined
that the assets listed in Exhibit 1 were not all
marital assets.
  In addition, we note that the
[2]
trial court improperly considered the parties'
settlement negotiations in reaching its division of
the parties' marital property and in its alimony
award. 
 
The 
trial 
court's 
property 
award
disproportionately favors the husband, and, given
the foregoing and the length of the parties'
marriage, we must conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in reaching its property
division and alimony award.
  We reverse and remand
[3]
for the trial court to enter a judgment fashioning
an equitable property division and alimony award.
"As noted earlier in this opinion, the June 3,
2004, divorce judgment contains a provision offering
the husband an election between purchasing from the
wife her interest in the marital residence and its
contents or selling the residence and its contents,
as 
well 
as 
a 
provision 
requiring 
that 
the
furnishings be sold and the proceeds divided between
the parties.  A November 17, 2004, entry on the case
action summary indicates that the trial court, among
other things, purported to delete the provision
requiring the sale of the furnishings. However,
1070283
5
because more than 30 days had passed since the entry
of the divorce judgment and also because the trial
court had already denied the wife's postjudgment
motion, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
that 
part 
of 
its 
November 
17, 
2004, 
order.
Therefore, that order was a nullity and had no
effect. See McGiboney v. McGiboney, 679 So. 2d 1066,
1068 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)(property-division portion
of a divorce judgment is not modifiable after 30
days of the entry of the divorce judgment); and
Reaves v. Reaves, 883 So. 2d 693, 695 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2003)(trial court's purported amendment of a
divorce judgment after it had already denied a
postjudgment motion was a nullity)."
934 So. 2d at 1080-81.  The wife also challenged the trial
court's order finding her in contempt and imposing sanctions
for her purported violation of its order prohibiting the
parties from removing property from their marital residence
during the pendency of this matter.  However, the husband did
not submit a filing fee when he filed his motion to impose
sanctions, and a motion or petition seeking the imposition of
sanctions based on a finding of contempt initiates an
independent proceeding that requires the payment of a filing
fee.  Therefore, the husband did not properly invoke the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and the contempt order was
void for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.  934 So. 2d at
1082.  The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment and remanded the case "for the trial court to enter
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6
a judgment fashioning an equitable property division and
alimony award."  934 So. 2d at 1081.
On remand, the trial judge who had entered the original
divorce judgment recused himself, and another trial judge was
appointed.  It appears that after the trial court had entered
its original divorce judgment as well as after the Court of
Civil Appeals had released its opinion in Kaufman I, the
husband and/or his daughter disposed of certain assets or
transferred amounts from the husband's accounts to certain
members of the husband's family.  
The trial court conducted a hearing on August 21, 2006.
At that hearing, the parties discussed the date that should be
used in valuing the parties' marital assets.  A lunch recess
was taken, and, when the hearing resumed, the record does not
reflect that the valuation-date issue had been resolved.
However, after the hearing resumed, the evidence of the value
of the parties' marital assets was not confined to the value
at the time of the original divorce, which position the wife
was advancing.   On October 26, 2006, the trial court entered
a judgment that divided the parties' property and awarded the
wife periodic alimony and alimony in gross.  Apparently, in
this second order the wife was awarded less than she was in
1070283
7
the original divorce judgment.  The wife filed a postjudgment
motion, which the trial court denied.  The wife timely
appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to comply with
the Court of Civil Appeals' mandate in Kaufman I when it
received additional ore tenus evidence relating to the then
current value of the parties' marital assets at the August 21,
2006, hearing and when it considered that evidence in
fashioning its October 26, 2006, judgment.    
The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the wife, noting:
"[P]recedent has established that once an appellate
court has determined an issue and remanded the cause
to the trial court for the entry of a judgment in
compliance with its decision, the trial court,
unless otherwise directed by the appellate court,
must enter such a judgment based on the evidence as
originally presented to it.
"'It is well settled that, after
remand, the trial court should comply
strictly with the mandate of the appellate
court by entering and implementing the
appropriate judgment.  See Walker v. Humana
Medical Corp., 423 So. 2d 891, 892 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1982).  In Ex parte Alabama Power
Co., 431 So. 2d 151, 155 (Ala. 1983), we
held:
"'"'It is the duty of the
trial court, on remand, to comply
strictly with the mandate of the
appellate court according to its
true 
intent 
and 
meaning, 
as
determined 
by 
the 
directions
given by the reviewing court.  No
1070283
8
judgment other than that directed
or permitted by the reviewing
court may be entered....  The
appellate court's decision is
final as to all matters before
it, becomes the law of the case,
and must be executed according to
the the mandate, without granting
a new trial or taking additional
evidence ....'  5 Am. Jur. 2d,
Appeal & Error § 991 (1962)."'
"Auerbach v. Parker, 558 So. 2d 900, 902 (Ala.
1989)."
Kaufman v. Kaufman, [Ms. 2060245, Nov. 2, 2007] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ("Kaufman II") (emphasis
added).  The Court of Civil Appeals went on to hold, however,
that any error by the trial court on remand in taking and
considering additional evidence relating to the value of the
parties' marital assets as those assets existed at the time of
the August 21, 2006, hearing was invited error by the wife and
could not be grounds for a reversal of the trial court's
judgment when the wife presented much of the additional
evidence considered by the trial court.  The Court of Civil
Appeals also held that the wife failed to present a sufficient
record on appeal to indicate that the trial court erred on
remand in its property division and alimony award where the
only materials before the Court of Civil Appeals were the
1070283
The Court of Civil Appeals, ex mero motu, took judicial
4
notice of the records from the appeal of the original divorce
judgment in Kaufman I.
9
transcripts from the original ore tenus hearing held in 2004
and the August 21, 2006, hearing on remand and the exhibits
from the original divorce hearing.   The Court of Civil
4
Appeals noted that the trial court had before it documentary
exhibits from the August 21, 2006, hearing and that those
exhibits were apparently missing and had not been submitted to
the appellate court as part of the record.  The Court of Civil
Appeals held that it would presume that the missing exhibits
would support the trial court's judgment because the wife had
the duty to ensure that the record contained sufficient
evidence to warrant a reversal of the trial court's judgment.
The wife timely sought certiorari review. 
Discussion
The wife argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in
holding that she invited error in acquiescing to the opposing
party's position that she should receive only a portion of the
assets of the marital estate valued at the time of the August
21, 2006, hearing. It appears that the wife is arguing that
the transcript of the August 21, 2006, hearing does not
1070283
In 1991, Rule 10, Ala. R. App. P., was rewritten; Rule
5
10(f) now applies only to civil cases, and Rule 10(g) was
added to govern the supplementation and correction of the
record in criminal cases. 
10
reflect that she agreed that the issue to be resolved on
remand was the disposition of the marital assets valued as of
August 21, 2006. If, as it appears in the transcript, the
parties had an off-the-record discussion and assuming the
discussion concerned the wife's objection to the using August
21, 2006, as the valuation date, then the wife could have
properly presented the unreported objection, assuming that it
was made and was simply omitted from the transcript.  Rule
10(f), Ala. R. App. P., provides for the supplementation or
correction of the record on appeal to correctly reflect the
proceedings at the trial court level.  
"By its plain wording Rule 10(f) extends broad
coverage and protection to the parties in having
material omissions of 'what occurred' added to the
record. ... [We are] mindful that Rule 10(f)
provides broad leeway in making the record 'conform
to the truth' and mindful that the appellate rules
'shall be construed so as to assure the just ...
determination of every proceeding on its merits.'"
Weaver v. State, 401 So. 2d 344, 348 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).5
The wife made no attempt to correct any omission from the
record; therefore, I believe that the wife waived any alleged
1070283
11
error based upon the omission from the transcript of her
objection to the valuation date.  I disagree with Court of
Civil Appeals' determination that the wife invited error.
The wife next argues that the Court of Civil Appeals
erred in determining that she failed to present a sufficient
record on appeal when the exhibits admitted at trial and
marked to be included in the record on appeal were missing.
Rule 10, Ala. R. App. P., addresses the composition of the
record on appeal.   Rule 10(b), Ala. R. App. P., provides that
the appellant shall designate which parts of the clerk's
records the appellant wants to present on appeal or may
designate all such records.  Rule 10(b) goes on to provide
that "[d]esignated documents incapable of being legibly or
otherwise photocopied, including those of unusual weight or
bulk, and physical exhibits shall be made a part of the
clerk's record by reference but placed in a suitable separate
container for transmittal to the appellate court."    
Rule 11, Ala. R. App. P., addresses the mechanics of
completion and transmission of the record on appeal.  Rule
11(a) requires that the record shall contain an "index of
papers, documents, written charges, exhibits, etc., included
in the clerk's record, an index of those documents and
1070283
An "omitted" exhibits refers to exhibits that have not
6
been designated for inclusion in the record on appeal.
12
exhibits to be filed in the appellate court in a separate
container, and also an index of any documents and exhibits
omitted from the clerk's record with a full description of
each item."    Rule 11(e) addresses the custody of any
6
exhibits and provides:
"The court reporter shall file all exhibits,
including photographs, with the clerk of the trial
court within 14 days (2 weeks) of the notice of
appeal in both civil and criminal cases, assembled
in a flat file. All exhibits incapable of being
assembled in a flat file shall be delivered to the
clerk's office in a suitable separate container. An
index of the exhibits, including those that are
delivered to the clerk of the trial court in a
separate container, shall be included in the flat
file. The index shall also indicate those exhibits
that were offered and not admitted, as well as the
exhibits that were admitted."
There is a document in the present case entitled
"Plaintiff's Exhibit List," which contains a list of 15
exhibits.  I note that the transcript indicates that at least
18 exhibits were discussed during the August 21, 2006,
hearing.  None of those exhibits are photocopied into the
record nor is there an index of the "exhibits to be filed in
the appellate court in a separate container."  The Court of
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13
Civil Appeals' opinion describes telephone calls by personnel
in the Court of Civil Appeals' clerk's office to the clerk of
the trial court and the parties' attorneys regarding the
missing exhibits.  It appears that the clerk of the trial
court indicated that the exhibits were not with the record and
that the court reporter had either lost the exhibits or had
shipped the exhibits to the trial court clerk and the exhibits
were missing from the shipment.     
I recognize that it is the appellant's responsibility to
see that the record is prepared and filed in a timely manner,
and that an appeal may be dismissed if the appellant does not
do so.  However, the exhibits were not transmitted, and, as
Rule 11(e) makes clear, the exhibits were in the custody of
the court reporter who, in turn, was to file the exhibits with
the trial court clerk within 14 days of the notice of appeal.
I cannot fault the wife or the wife's counsel for the
nonfeasance of court personnel.   
I also recognize that Rule 10(f), Ala. R. App. P., as
discussed earlier, provides for the supplementation of the
record when there has been an omission.  Rule 10(f) provides
that if material that has been designated for inclusion in the
1070283
14
record is omitted, the appellant or appellee may file with the
trial court a motion to supplement the record on appeal. Any
party filing such a motion with the trial court shall file a
copy of the motion with the clerk of the appellate court and
shall serve a copy on the court reporter, if the reporter's
transcript is to be supplemented, and on all parties.  The
trial court has 14 days to rule on the motion, and, if no
action is taken, the motion is deemed denied.  After that, any
dissatisfied party may seek relief with the appellate court.
In the present case, I do not believe that the wife would
have been on notice that the exhibits were missing from the
case before the case was submitted to the Court of Civil
Appeals because the wife had designated that the exhibits be
part of the record and the exhibits were in the custody and
control of the court reporter.  When the Court of Civil
Appeals realized that the exhibits had not been sent along
with the record, it attempted an informal supplementation of
the record.  The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion notes
conversations between unnamed members of the clerk's office of
the Court of Civil Appeals and unnamed office members of
1070283
15
counsel for the wife along with a conversation with the clerk
of the circuit court.  
Rule 10(f), Ala. R. App. P., provides that an "appellate
court may, on motion of a party or on its own initiative,
order that a supplemental or corrected record be certified and
transmitted to the appellate court if necessary to correct an
omission ...."  Rule 10(f) further provides that "[e]very
order of the ... appellate court directing that the record on
appeal be supplemented or corrected shall be filed with the
clerk of the court entering the order, who shall forthwith
serve a copy of the order on each party [and] on the clerk of
the other court involved."  The role of the appellate court is
to review and correct errors of the proceedings below, and it
is bound by the record before it.  The Court of Civil Appeals'
clerk's office was either attempting to ask the parties to
supplement the record or was seeking a supplementation on its
own accord.  However, the informal manner in which the clerk's
office handled the matter did not comply with Rule 10(f), as
no written notice was given to the parties.  
Under the peculiar facts of this case, I would reverse
the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the case
1070283
16
for that court to determine if the exhibits can be reproduced
and, if so, to allow the parties to supplement the record with
the reproduced exhibits.  See Rule 2, Ala. R. App. P.,
allowing for a suspension of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
where manifest injustice would otherwise result.  The Court of
Civil Appeals could then review the trial court's disposition
of the marital assets following the August 21, 2006, hearing.
If the exhibits cannot be reproduced, then the wife would be
entitled to a new trial.  See, e.g., Ex parte Steen, 431 So.
2d 1385 (Ala. 1983)(holding that new trial was warranted where
defendants had been attempting without success to obtain
transcripts of their trials and in which the court reporter
who had recorded the proceedings had died and preparation of
succinct statements in lieu of the transcripts would not
afford the defendants a viable remedy in light of the
allegations of error involving most of the testimony).  
I believe that the Court of Civil Appeals correctly held
that the trial court, in its original award, erred in dividing
the marital property and in awarding alimony.  The parties
were married for 33 years, and the wife was awarded
approximately 23% of the parties' marital estate.  It now
1070283
17
appears that the trial court's award following the Court of
Civil Appeals' remand in Kaufman I awarded the wife less than
the original award.  Nevertheless, the wife is essentially
being denied a full review of the award on remand (because
there are no exhibits to support the wife's claims) through no
fault of the wife's.  Therefore, I dissent.
Cobb, C.J., concurs.