Title: Kyles v. Pollard
Citation: 2014 WI 38
Docket Number: 2012AP000378-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 2014

2014 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP378-W   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Lorenzo D. Kyles, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
William Pollard, Warden, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A MEMORANDUM DECISION 
 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 17, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 3, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
         
 
COUNTY: 
       
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner, there were briefs by Robert R. Henak, 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and Melinda A. Swartz, Law 
Office of Melinda A. Swartz, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Robert R. Henak.  
 
For the respondent, the cause was argued by Aaron O’Neil, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2012AP378-W 
(L.C. No. 
2002CF2732) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Lorenzo D. Kyles, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
William Pollard, Warden, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 17, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, Lorenzo Kyles, 
seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision that 
denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to 
reinstate the deadline for him to file a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction relief.1  The court of appeals determined 
that Kyles brought his petition in the wrong forum.  Because the 
court viewed the claim as alleging ineffective assistance of 
                                                 
1 State 
ex 
rel. 
Kyles 
v. 
Pollard, 
No. 
2012AP378-W, 
unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. May 9, 2012). 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
2 
 
post-conviction counsel, it concluded that Kyles should have 
filed his petition in the circuit court. 
¶2 
Kyles asserts that a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 
540 (1992), filed in the court of appeals is the proper forum 
and process.  He contends that the petition should be filed with 
the court of appeals because the circuit court does not have 
authority to grant the relief of extending the filing deadline 
which would reinstate his direct appeal rights.  He further 
maintains that his habeas petition set forth sufficient facts to 
entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. 
¶3 
We 
determine 
that 
the 
court 
where 
the 
alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel occurred is the proper forum 
in which to seek relief unless that forum is unable to provide 
the relief necessary to address the ineffectiveness claim.  The 
remedy for an attorney's failure to file a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction relief is an extension of the timeframe to 
file the notice.  Because the circuit court is without authority 
to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief, we conclude that the proper forum here 
lies in the court of appeals.  We also determine that where such 
a claim is made to the court of appeals it should be in the form 
of a habeas petition pursuant to Knight.   
¶4 
We further conclude that Kyles' habeas petition set 
forth sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing 
on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Accordingly, 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
3 
 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to 
the court of appeals to appoint a referee or refer the case to 
the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.39 (2011-12).2 
I 
¶5 
Although some of the facts are uncontested, Kyles' 
assertions set forth below that underlie his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims have not yet been tested in any 
evidentiary hearing.3 
¶6 
Kyles pled guilty to one count of first-degree 
reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon and was sentenced 
in Milwaukee County on November 12, 2002, to 40 years 
imprisonment.  On that day, after he was sentenced, Kyles met 
with his attorney, Thomas Flanagan, to discuss the sentence and 
his appeal rights.   
¶7 
Both Kyles and his attorney signed a "Notice of Right 
to Seek Postconviction Relief" form which explained that if 
Kyles wished to seek postconviction relief, he must file a 
notice of intent with the circuit court within 20 days of 
sentencing.  Kyles checked a box on the form next to the 
statement that "I am undecided about seeking postconviction 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The majority of these facts come from an affidavit by 
Kyles which was attached as an exhibit to the habeas petition he 
filed with the court of appeals in 2012.  
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
4 
 
relief and I know I need to decide and tell my lawyer within 20 
days."  Those 20 days were set to expire on December 2, 2002. 
¶8 
According to Kyles, later that day he called his 
mother and asked her to contact Flanagan and inform him that 
Kyles wished to appeal.  Kyles further asserts that on November 
15, 2002, he sent a letter to Flanagan's office to inform 
Flanagan that he wished to appeal and wanted Flanagan to file 
the notice of intent.  Kyles did not keep a copy of the letter.  
An exhibit attached to Kyles' petition suggests that Flanagan 
disputes receiving the letter. 
¶9 
Kyles also asserts that he tried again to contact 
Flanagan about the notice of intent on November 18, 2002, but 
Flanagan's office refused to accept the call.  When he was 
unable to reach Flanagan, Kyles called his mother to ask if she 
had informed Flanagan of his wish to appeal.  His mother told 
him that she had been unable to reach Flanagan directly, but had 
left a message advising him that Kyles wanted to appeal.  His 
mother called Flanagan "a couple of more times" but was unable 
to reach him.  Kyles also attempted to speak with Flanagan on 
November 27 and December 2, 2002, but Flanagan's office either 
did not accept the collect calls or did not answer the 
telephone.  The rejected calls are reflected in the telephone 
records from Waupun Correctional Institution. 
¶10 Kyles states that he was not able to speak with 
Flanagan until January 24, 2003, after the deadline for filing 
the notice of intent had passed.  When Kyles told Flanagan of 
his desire to appeal, Flanagan informed him that the time limits 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
5 
 
had expired and that because he entered a plea of guilty, there 
were few non-frivolous issues for appeal.  Kyles alleges that 
Flanagan did not inform him that he could seek an extension of 
the deadline to file the notice of intent. 
¶11 Thereafter, citing Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, Kyles 
filed a pro se habeas corpus petition with the court of appeals 
seeking reinstatement of his direct appeal rights.  He contended 
that he was denied his right to appellate counsel because his 
attorney did not file an appeal and appropriate postconviction 
paperwork.  The court of appeals dismissed the petition.  State 
ex rel. Kyles v. McCaughtry, No. 2003AP2760-W, unpublished slip 
op. (Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004).  It noted that a notice of intent 
had never been filed and thus, it construed Kyles' claim as an 
argument that he was denied his right to postconviction counsel.  
Id.  Because the alleged error occurred before the circuit 
court, the court of appeals concluded that Kyles' claim should 
be raised in the circuit court as a petition for habeas corpus 
or a motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  Id. 
¶12 In accordance with those instructions, Kyles filed a 
pro se habeas petition in the circuit court again seeking to 
have his direct appeal rights reinstated.  The petition asserted 
that Kyles was denied effective assistance of counsel because he 
had written a letter to Flanagan about the 20 days for filing 
for postconviction relief and Flanagan never responded.  The 
circuit 
court 
construed 
the 
petition 
as 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  Noting that the petition before it did 
not specifically allege that Kyles informed Flanagan that he 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
6 
 
wished to appeal, the circuit court concluded that Kyles failed 
to state a viable claim for relief and denied the petition.  The 
court indicated, however, that if Kyles produced a copy of the 
letter he sent to Flanagan then it would reconsider its 
decision.   
¶13 Kyles alleges that he did not have a copy of the 
letter and so did not submit it to the court.  Instead, he 
appealed the denial of his motion.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court, State v. Kyles, No. 2004AP885, 
unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2004), and this court 
denied 
Kyles' 
petition 
for 
review, 
State 
v. 
Kyles, 
No. 
2004AP885, unpublished order (Feb. 9, 2005). 
¶14 After attempts at obtaining relief in federal courts4 
were also unfruitful, Kyles filed a pro se motion with the court 
of appeals seeking to extend his deadline for filing notice of 
intent pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2).5  The motion asserted 
that Kyles had been unable to get in touch with Flanagan during 
the 20-day period for filing the notice and Flanagan had not 
                                                 
4 Kyles v. Litscher, No. 05-C-385, unpublished slip op. 
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2008), request for appealability denied, 
unpublished order (7th Cir. June 10, 2008), cert. denied, No. 
08-5882, unpublished order (U.S. Oct. 20, 2008). 
 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.82(2)(a) states: 
Except as provided in this subsection, the court upon 
its own motion or upon good cause shown by motion, may 
enlarge or reduce the time prescribed by these rules 
or court order for doing any act, or waive or permit 
an act to be done after the expiration of the 
prescribed time. 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
7 
 
responded to his letter seeking assistance with filing the 
notice.  The court of appeals denied the motion, concluding that 
Kyles had failed to show good cause for extending the deadline.  
State v. Kyles, No. 2008XX1478-CR, unpublished slip op. (Ct. 
App. Jan. 16, 2009).  It stated that the circuit court is the 
proper forum for developing factual matters and the circuit 
court had already determined that Kyles did not show he had 
instructed his attorney to file a notice of intent. 
¶15 Kyles then filed another pro se habeas petition with 
the court of appeals.  Again he sought an extension of his time 
to file a notice of intent, arguing that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel when Flanagan was unavailable during the 
20 days in which the notice needed to be filed, failed to file 
the notice of intent, and failed to file a motion to extend the 
filing deadline after he became aware Kyles wished to appeal.  
The court of appeals again denied Kyles' requests, concluding 
that claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel 
must be brought in the circuit court.  State ex rel. Kyles v. 
Pollard, No. 2012AP378-W, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. May 9, 
2012).  It later denied Kyles' motion for reconsideration.  
State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, No. 2012AP378-W, unpublished 
order (Ct. App. June 14, 2012). 
II 
¶16 In this case we are asked to determine the appropriate 
forum and vehicle for relief for a defendant who asserts that 
the ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in a notice of intent to 
pursue 
postconviction 
relief 
not 
being 
filed. 
These 
are 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
8 
 
questions of law which we review independently of determinations 
rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals.  State v. 
Badzinski, 2014 WI 6, ¶26, 352 Wis. 2d 329, 843 N.W.2d 29. 
¶17 Additionally, we are asked to determine whether Kyles' 
petition set forth sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary 
hearing.  This also presents a question of law which we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, 
¶18, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334.   
¶18 Our analysis is divided into three parts.  First, we 
consider the appropriate forum for a claim of ineffectiveness 
premised upon counsel's failure to file a notice of intent to 
pursue 
postconviction 
relief. 
 
Second, 
we 
address 
the 
appropriate procedure for such a claim.  Lastly, we address the 
sufficiency of Kyles' habeas petition. 
III 
¶19 The parties agree that there is no precedent directly 
addressing the discrete procedural issue before us.  Absent 
clear guidance, they present different interpretations of our 
related precedent and ultimately disagree on whether Kyles' 
petition alleging ineffectiveness of counsel resulting in the  
failure to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction 
relief should have been filed in the court of appeals or the 
circuit court.6 
                                                 
6 As discussed infra at ¶51, the state agrees that the court 
of appeals is the correct forum for a claim of ineffectiveness 
based on counsel's failure to request an extension of the 
timeline 
for 
filing 
the 
notice 
of 
intent 
to 
pursue 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
9 
 
¶20 A 
brief 
background 
on 
appellate 
procedure 
and 
postconviction proceedings is helpful to provide context for our 
analysis.   
¶21 Upon conviction, a defendant has a statutory right to 
seek postconviction relief through a postconviction motion or an 
appeal.  Wis. Stat. §§ 809.30, 973.18.  The process begins with 
the filing of a notice of intent to seek postconviction relief 
with the circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(b).7   
¶22 It is the duty of defendant's trial counsel to file 
the 
notice 
of 
intent 
if 
the 
defendant 
wants 
to 
seek 
postconviction relief.  Wis. Stat. §§ 809.30(2)(a),8 973.18(5).9  
                                                                                                                                                             
postconviction relief. However, it argues that Kyles' claim is 
procedurally barred because he did not raise it in the petition 
for review. 
 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.30(2)(b) states: 
Within 20 days after the date of sentencing or final 
adjudication, the person shall file in circuit court 
and serve on the prosecutor and any other party a 
notice 
of 
intent 
to 
pursue 
postconviction 
or 
postdisposition relief. If the record discloses that 
sentencing or final adjudication occurred after the 
notice of intent was filed, the notice shall be 
treated 
as 
filed 
after 
sentencing 
or 
final 
adjudication on the day of the sentencing or final 
adjudication. . . .  
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.30(2)(a) provides: 
. . . Counsel representing the person at sentencing or 
at the time of the final adjudication shall continue 
representation by filing a notice under par. (b) if 
the 
person 
desires 
to 
pursue 
postconviction 
or 
postdisposition relief unless counsel is discharged by 
the person or allowed to withdraw by the circuit court 
before the notice must be filed. 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
10 
 
Counsel must file the notice within 20 days of sentencing.  Wis. 
Stat. § 809.30(2)(b).  However, the court of appeals may, upon 
its own motion or a showing of good cause, extend the time for 
filing the notice.  Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2); State v. Harris, 149 
Wis. 2d 943, 947, 440 N.W.2d 364 (1989).  The court of appeals' 
"authority to extend the time periods of Rule 809.30 is to the 
exclusion of the trial court."  State v. Rembert, 99 Wis. 2d 
401, 406 n.4, 299 N.W.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1980). 
¶23 A defendant is entitled to counsel while seeking 
relief through a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.02 
or a direct appeal.  State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶30, 273 Wis. 
2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784; State v. Peterson, 2008 WI App 140, ¶11, 
314 Wis. 2d 192, 757 N.W.2d 834.  The right to counsel includes 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.  State ex rel. 
Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 604, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).  
 
 
¶24 With the above in mind, we turn to address what is the 
proper forum in this case.  Although Wisconsin courts have not 
addressed the situation we face here, i.e. the allegation that 
counsel's ineffectiveness resulted in the failure to file a 
notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, precedent 
suggests 
that 
the 
forum 
for 
seeking 
relief 
for 
such 
ineffectiveness lies in the court of appeals. 
 
¶25 Traditionally, the rule has been that claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel premised on errors occurring 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.18(5) states: "If the defendant 
desires to pursue postconviction relief, the defendant's trial 
counsel shall file the notice required by s. 809.30(2)(b)." 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
11 
 
before the circuit court should be pursued in the circuit court 
and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on 
errors occurring before the appellate court should be pursued in 
the court of appeals.  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶32.  The two 
seminal cases addressing the forum for filing ineffectiveness 
claims are Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, and State ex rel. Rothering 
v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶26 In Knight, the defendant alleged his appellate counsel 
was ineffective for failing to raise certain arguments in the 
court of appeals.  168 Wis. 2d at 513.  At issue was whether the 
appropriate vehicle for relief was a motion to the circuit court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06 or a habeas petition to the 
court of appeals.10  In its analysis the court focused on the 
fact that because the alleged error occurred in appellate 
proceedings, "[t]he appellate court will be familiar with the 
case and the appellate proceedings." Id. at 521.  Thus, it 
concluded that the appellate court that heard the appeal "is a 
                                                 
10 Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1) states: 
 
After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy 
provided in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in 
custody under sentence of a court or a person 
convicted and placed with a volunteers in probation 
program under s. 973.11 claiming the right to be 
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
U.S. 
constitution 
or 
the 
constitution or laws of this state, that the court was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that 
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 
by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, 
may move the court which imposed the sentence to 
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
12 
 
more appropriate and better suited forum than is the circuit 
court to determine whether appellate counsel's performance was 
deficient and prejudiced the defendant's appeal."  Id.  
¶27  Rothering utilized a similar analytical approach.  In 
that case, the court of appeals considered whether a Knight 
petition11 was appropriate to address a claim of ineffective 
assistance premised upon postconviction counsel's failure to 
bring a postconviction motion before the circuit court to 
withdraw a plea and raise the issue of ineffective trial 
counsel.  205 Wis. 2d at 679.  The court noted Knight's 
statement that the appellate court would be familiar with the 
case, and determined that "[t]hose premises do not hold true 
when addressing the conduct of postconviction counsel."  Id.  
"The allegedly deficient conduct is not what occurred before 
[the court of appeals] but rather what should have occurred 
before the trial court."  Id.  The court concluded that "a claim 
of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel should be 
raised in the trial court either by a petition for habeas corpus 
or a motion under § 974.06, Stats."  Id. at 681. 
¶28 The state argues that we should follow the examples of 
Knight and Rothering, and determine that Kyles' petition should 
have been filed in the circuit court because that is where the 
alleged ineffectiveness occurred.  According to the state, the 
circuit court can provide a remedy to Kyles by exercising its 
                                                 
11 Habeas petitions to the court of appeals alleging 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are often referred 
to as "Knight petitions." 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
13 
 
inherent power to vacate and reinstate its prior judgment of 
conviction, effectively restarting the time period for Kyles to 
file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief. 
¶29 The remedy proposed by the state is unpalatable.  
Wisconsin jurisprudence has long disfavored extending time 
limits by vacating one judgment and entering a new one.  For 
example, in Richter v. Standard Mfg. Co., 224 Wis. 121, 128, 271 
N.W. 14 (1937), the court rejected a motion to modify an 
interlocutory judgment so that it would be embodied in a final 
judgment on a later date, thereby extending the time in which to 
appeal. It stated that such an action "is quite unthinkable."  
Id.  Likewise, in Filer & Stowell Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Ry. Co., 161 Wis. 591, 596-97, 155 N.W. 118 (1915), the 
court declined a request to set aside a judgment so that an 
appellate deadline could be reinstated, stating "[t]o set aside 
the award here, as a means of circumventing the statute, would 
be equivalent to abrogating it and giving a new right of appeal 
which would be an exercise of legislative power." 
 
¶30 The court expressed a similar distaste for allowing a 
circuit court to vacate and reinstate a judgment to remedy 
ineffective assistance of counsel in Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509.  
In determining that the circuit court was not the appropriate 
forum, Knight noted that the remedies available to the circuit 
court under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 were limited to vacating, 
setting aside, or correcting a sentence.  Id. at 519.  Although 
the court acknowledged that "a circuit court may indirectly 
remedy the consequences of ineffective assistance of appellate 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
14 
 
counsel through vacating and reinstating a sentence in order to 
allow a fresh appeal," it concluded that "we do not believe that 
the legislature intended the circuit courts to utilize sec. 
974.06 in this oblique manner."  Id.   
¶31 Subsequent cases have stressed the importance of a 
remedy in determining the forum for an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. Rothering acknowledged that "[t]he appropriate 
forum is that one which is able to link the remedy closely to 
the scope of the constitutional violation."  205 Wis. 2d at 680.  
Likewise, Smalley stressed the importance of the ability to 
provide a remedy when it explained that the appropriate forum 
was the court of appeals "because the deadlines contained in 
Rule 809.30 are subject to the control of this court."  State ex 
rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 799, 565 N.W.2d 805 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
¶32 We acknowledge that the remedy for the denial of 
effective assistance of counsel is to restore the defendant to 
the position he or she would have occupied but for counsel's 
ineffectiveness.  State v. Quackenbush, 2005 WI App 2, ¶17, 278 
Wis. 2d 611, 692 N.W.2d 340 (2004) (citing Betts v. Litscher, 
241 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2001); State ex rel. Seibert v. 
Macht, 2001 WI 67, ¶20, 244 Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881).  
Accordingly, where the alleged ineffectiveness was the failure 
to file a notice of intent, the remedy would be to extend the 
time period for a defendant to file a notice of intent.  Id.  As 
discussed above, the court of appeals' "authority to extend the 
time periods of Rule 809.30 is to the exclusion of the trial 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
15 
 
court."  Rembert, 99 Wis. 2d at 406 n.4.  The inability of the 
circuit court to provide a remedy suggests that a claim that 
counsel was ineffective by failing to file a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction relief should be brought in the court of 
appeals.  
¶33 The approach Kyles advocates for is more in line with 
the above cases focusing on the available remedy.  Although 
Kyles agrees that Knight and Rothering generally apply, he 
points to subsequent cases that have developed exceptions to the 
rule regarding selecting the appropriate forum where the error 
allegedly results in the failure to commence an appeal.   
¶34 In Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d 795, the defendant alleged his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an appeal or file 
a no merit report, denying him his direct appeal from his 
conviction.  The court determined that "regardless of whether 
such an appeal had to be preceded by a postconviction motion, 
[counsel's failure to commence an appeal] can be challenged by a 
Knight petition in this court because counsel's inaction in this 
court is at issue."  Id. at 798-99.   
 ¶35 The court reiterated this exception in State ex rel. 
Ford v. Holm, 2004 WI App 22, ¶9 n.4, 269 Wis. 2d 810, 676 
N.W.2d 500 ("Although the allegation of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in this case involves the alleged actions or 
omissions of counsel prior to the filing of an appeal, it is 
nonetheless properly raised by way of a Knight petition in this 
court.") and State ex rel. Santana v. Endicott, 2006 WI App 13, 
¶4, 288 Wis. 2d 707, 709 N.W.2d 515 ("a Knight petition in this 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
16 
 
court provided the proper vehicle for defendants to attack 
appointed counsel's failure to commence an appeal governed by 
Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30 or Wis. Stat. Rule 809.32, whether or not 
the appeal had to be preceded by a postconviction motion."). 
¶36 Kyles asserts that we should follow the Smalley and 
Santana line of cases and determine that the court of appeals is 
the appropriate forum for a claim that counsel's ineffectiveness 
resulted in the failure to file a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief because counsel's alleged ineffectiveness 
amounted to the failure to commence an appeal.  He contends that 
the court of appeals is the correct forum because it can provide 
an extension of the timeline for Kyles to file a notice of 
intent to pursue postconviction relief. 
¶37 We agree with Kyles that the issue here is similar to 
that addressed in Smalley and Santana.   Filing a notice of 
intent to pursue postconviction relief with the circuit court is 
a prerequisite to filing an appeal with the court of appeals.  
Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(b).  Thus, ineffectiveness that results 
in the failure to file that notice is akin to ineffectiveness 
involving the failure to commence an appeal.  It is not a great 
stretch to extend the exception from Smalley and Santana to this 
type of claim. 
¶38 Because the circuit court is unable to provide a 
remedy for the failure to file a notice of intent to seek 
postconviction relief and because our case law permits similar 
claims to be brought in the court of appeals, we determine that 
the court of appeals is the proper forum for claims of 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
17 
 
ineffectiveness premised on counsel's failure to file a notice 
of intent.  Although claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
should generally be brought in the forum where the alleged error 
occurred, if that forum is unable to provide a remedy it is 
proper to petition a forum where relief can be granted. 
¶39 Having determined that the appropriate forum is the 
court of appeals, we turn to address the appropriate procedure 
for a claim of ineffectiveness premised upon the failure to file 
a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief.  Although 
the parties' briefs suggest that there are two options, filing a 
habeas petition and filing a motion to extend time under Wis. 
Stat. § 809.82(2), they ultimately agree that a habeas petition 
is more appropriate.  We agree.  We conclude that Evans, 273 
Wis. 2d 192, dictates that in most circumstances a habeas 
petition is the appropriate procedure to follow. 
¶40 In Evans, the court addressed a defendant's motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2) to extend time to file an appeal or 
postconviction motion. 273 Wis. 2d 192.  Such a motion needs to 
show good cause for the extension.  Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2).  The 
defendant's alleged good cause was ineffectiveness of his 
counsel on direct appeal.  Id., ¶21.  The court concluded that a 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2) was "ill suited" for 
defendant's request.  Id., ¶51.   
¶41 The 
Evans 
analysis 
stressed 
"the 
fundamental 
difference between a § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion and a Knight 
petition."  Id., ¶37.  It noted that a § 809.82(2) motion is a 
procedural mechanism for extending time based on good cause and 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
18 
 
does not resolve the merits of an underlying claim or appeal.  
Id., ¶38.  The court recognized that the court of appeals has a 
lenient policy in granting such extension motions and that the 
motions are decided fairly quickly, possibly without any 
response from an adverse party.  Id.   
¶42 In contrast, Evans stated that Knight petitions are 
more substantive, challenging the lawfulness of an individual's 
imprisonment based on the denial of effective assistance of 
counsel.  Id., ¶39.  Determinations of effectiveness of counsel 
are often fact-intensive inquiries, which can involve several 
important and novel questions of law.  Id., ¶¶43-44, 52.  The 
court noted that unlike § 809.82(2) motions, Knight petitions 
may take a substantial time to resolve due to the issues 
involved and fact-intensive nature of their inquiries.  Id., 
¶53.   
¶43 Additionally, 
the 
court 
observed 
that 
allowing 
defendants to use a § 809.82(2) motion to address ineffective 
assistance of counsel "would eviscerate our decision in Knight."  
Id., ¶56.  Motions under Wis. Stat. § 809.82 are more attractive 
to defendants given the court of appeals' lenient policy towards 
them 
and 
the 
shorter 
timeframes. 
 
Id. 
"However, 
while 
expeditiousness may often be desirous, celerity is no substitute 
for reasoned judicial analysis of significant legal issues."  
Id.  Accordingly, the court determined that "[u]tilizing 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2), a procedural mechanism, as a substitute for 
a Knight petition for habeas corpus, so as to avoid making a 
substantive determination that a defendant was denied the 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
19 
 
effective 
assistance 
of 
appellate 
counsel 
constitutes 
an 
erroneous exercise of discretion."  Id., ¶59. 
¶44 Although in Evans the alleged error by counsel was not 
the failure to file a notice of intent, this is a distinction 
without a difference.   Evans was not limited to the exact fact 
scenario at issue in that case, but expressed general guidelines 
for determining when a Knight petition, as opposed to a motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2), is appropriate.  Accordingly, we 
reaffirm Evans' holding that the complex legal issues involved 
and 
fact-intensive 
inquiry 
required 
by 
most 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in the court of appeals requires 
the more thorough analysis provided by a Knight petition.12 
¶45 In this case, Kyles alleges that the ineffective 
assistance resulted in the failure to file a notice of intent.  
Kyles asserts that his attorney was unavailable during the 20-
day time period for filing a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief and, despite his letter to Flanagan and 
the message his mother left with Flanagan's office communicating 
Kyles' desire to appeal, Flanagan failed to file the notice of 
intent.  He further alleges that his attorney failed to seek an 
extension of the time to file the notice of intent.  The circuit 
                                                 
12 We acknowledge that not all ineffectiveness claims 
involve fact-intensive inquiries and complex legal issues.  For 
example, counsel could miss the deadline for filing a notice of 
intent by a day or two due to office failure or incorrectly 
noting the deadline.  In such circumstances the truncated 
procedure provided by Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2) may be more 
appropriate.   See State v. Quackenbush, 2005 WI App 2, 278 
Wis. 2d 611, 692 N.W.2d 340. 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
20 
 
court is unable to provide the requested relief of extending the 
deadline for Kyles to file his notice of intent.  Accordingly, a 
Knight petition to the court of appeals was the appropriate 
vehicle for Kyles to seek relief. 
¶46 Finally, 
having 
determined 
that 
a 
claim 
of 
ineffectiveness premised upon the failure to file a notice of 
intent should be filed via a Knight petition to the court of 
appeals, we turn to address whether the Knight petition Kyles 
filed was sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on 
his claims. 
¶47 The parties agree that if a Knight petition is the 
correct procedure, a hearing is required if the petition alleges 
sufficient facts which, if true, show that the defendant is 
entitled to relief.  This analysis is consistent with our 
jurisprudence.  See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶18 ("If the 
motion raises sufficient facts that, if true, show that the 
defendant is entitled to relief, the circuit court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing. However, if the motion does not raise such 
facts, 'or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief,' the grant or denial of the motion is a 
matter of discretion entrusted to the circuit court."); State v. 
Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 (same); 
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996) 
(same).  If fact-finding is necessary, the court of appeals has 
the authority "to submit the matter to a referee or to the 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
21 
 
circuit court for inquiry into counsel's conduct."  Knight, 168 
Wis. 2d at 521; Wis. Stat. § 752.39. 
¶48 A defendant is entitled to relief if "counsel's 
actions or inaction constituted deficient performance and [] the 
deficiency caused him prejudice."  State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, 
¶30, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 (quoting State v. Brunette, 
220 Wis. 2d 431, 445, 583 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998)).  Where a 
defendant has been deprived counsel altogether, the defendant is 
relieved of the burden of showing prejudice.  Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 692 (1984).  Counsel's failure to file a notice of 
appeal 
after 
being 
instructed 
to 
do 
so 
constitutes 
the 
deprivation of counsel.  United States v. Nagib, 56 F.3d 798, 
801 (7th Cir. 1995). 
¶49 In 
this 
case, 
Kyles' 
Knight 
petition 
alleges 
sufficient facts which, if true, entitle him to relief.  It sets 
forth three bases for counsel's ineffectiveness: (1) the failure 
to be available during the 20-day period to file the notice of 
intent; (2) the failure to file the notice of intent; and (3) 
the failure to seek an extension of time to file the notice of 
intent.   
¶50 In support of those claims, the Knight petition to the 
court of appeals and attached exhibits detail Kyles' desire to 
appeal, his multiple attempts to contact Flanagan during the 20-
day time period for filing the notice of intent to seek 
postconviction relief, a letter he mailed to Flanagan conveying 
his desire that Flanagan file the notice of intent, and a phone 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
22 
 
message Kyles' mother left with Flanagan's office stating that 
Kyles wished to appeal.  The petition further asserts that when 
Kyles finally met with Flanagan after the time period for filing 
the notice of intent had expired, Flanagan told him that the 
deadline for filing a notice of appeal had expired.  It asserts 
that after Flanagan became aware of Kyles' desire for an appeal, 
he should have filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing 
the notice of intent.  These facts, if true, establish that 
Kyles was denied assistance of counsel during his appeal.  
Accordingly, Kyles is entitled to a hearing on his habeas 
petition. 
¶51 Although the state concedes that the habeas petition 
contains sufficient facts which, if true, entitle Kyles to a 
hearing, it asserts that this court should not consider Kyles' 
claim regarding Flanagan's failure to file a motion for an 
extension because his petition for review included only two 
claims: that Flanagan was unavailable and that Flanagan failed 
to file the notice of intent.  We disagree.  
¶52 Kyles filed his petition for review pro se.  As such, 
we follow our policy of liberally construing the sufficiency of 
pro se petitions.  Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶29; State ex rel. 
L'Minggio v. Gamble, 2003 WI 82, ¶16, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667 N.W.2d 
1.   
¶53 Construing Kyles' petition for review liberally, we 
determine that it was sufficient to raise the issue of 
Flanagan's failure to file a motion to extend the time for 
filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief.  
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
23 
 
Kyles' petition alleges that when he met with Flanagan after the 
time for filing had expired, Kyles informed Flanagan that he 
wanted to appeal.  It further alleges that Flanagan informed 
Kyles that there were few non-frivolous issues for appeal, noted 
that the time limits for filing had expired, and then changed 
the subject.  The petition then states that due to this 
conversation "Kyles believed that the time to appeal his 
conviction was lost based on Flanagan's advi[c]e and Kyles' 
unawareness of a procedural mechanism to restore time limits."   
¶54 The factual allegations concerning Flanagan's failure 
to file a motion to extend the deadline for filing the notice of 
intent are inextricably intertwined with his claims that 
Flanagan was ineffective for failing to file the notice of 
intent.  Flanagan's failure to seek an extension to file the 
notice of intent was just another component of Kyles' claim that 
he was abandoned by counsel, left unrepresented during a 
critical time, and consequently denied his right to appeal.  As 
discussed above, the deprivation of counsel during an appeal is 
per se prejudicial.  Nagib, 56 F.3d at 801.  Thus, Kyles' 
petition for review was sufficient to preserve his claim. 
¶55 The state also contends that the Knight petition is 
procedurally barred.  It asserts that because Kyles already 
pursued remedies in the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
he is unable to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims again.  We are not persuaded by this argument. 
¶56 "[O]ne principal reason why defendants are entitled to 
counsel on direct appeal is so that they will not make the kind 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
24 
 
of procedural errors that unrepresented defendants tend to 
commit."  Betts v. Litscher, 241 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2001).  
It is incongruous to state that a defendant was denied the right 
to counsel and then preclude the defendant from raising a claim 
because of errors made due to the absence of counsel.  Page v. 
Frank, 343 F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) ("if the procedural [error] 
is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth 
Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the [error] be 
imputed to the State").   
¶57 Here, Kyles' various attempts at appealing his case 
pro se after he was allegedly denied counsel were thwarted due 
to his lack of legal knowledge and the lower courts' confusion 
over where and how he should file his claims.  His first 
petition was denied by the court of appeals as inappropriate for 
that forum.  When he sought relief in the circuit court, it 
determined that he did not correctly allege his claims.  In 
response to his subsequent petition, the court of appeals 
misconstrued the circuit court's determination as a finding that 
Kyles did not show that he instructed his attorney to file a 
notice of intent.  The court of appeals has yet to address the 
merits of Kyles' claims.  Accordingly, we reject the state's 
argument that Kyles' prior unsuccessful pro se attempts to seek 
relief barred Kyles from bringing his Knight petition. 
IV 
¶58 In sum, we determine that the court where the alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel occurred is the proper forum 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
25 
 
in which to seek relief unless that forum is unable to provide 
the relief necessary to address the ineffectiveness claim.  The 
remedy for an attorney's failure to file a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction relief is an extension of the timeframe to 
file the notice.  Because the circuit court is without authority 
to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent to pursue post 
conviction relief, we conclude that the proper forum here lies 
in the court of appeals.  We also conclude that where such a 
claim is made to the court of appeals it should be in the form 
of a habeas petition pursuant to Knight.   
¶59 We further conclude that Kyles' habeas petition set 
forth sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing 
on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to 
the court of appeals to appoint a referee or refer the case to 
the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP378-W 
   
 
 
 
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