Title: Ex parte Michael Jerome Lewis. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Michael Jerome Lewis v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070647
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2009

REL: 05/29/09
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070647
_________________________
Ex parte Michael Jerome Lewis
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Michael Jerome Lewis
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-97-1574;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-03-0480)
WOODALL, Justice.
Michael Jerome Lewis was convicted of the capital murder
of Timothy John Kaye.  The murder was made capital because it
1070647
2
was committed "during a kidnapping in the first degree or an
attempt thereof." § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975.  The jury
recommended, by a vote of 10-2, that Lewis be sentenced to
death, and the trial court sentenced him to death.
Initially, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the
case for further action by the trial court regarding Lewis's
claim that the State had violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), by using its peremptory challenges to remove
African-Americans from the jury venire.  Lewis v. State, [Ms.
CR-03-0480, April 28, 2006]    So. 3d    (Ala. Crim. App.
2006).  On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed Lewis's conviction and sentence of death.  Lewis v.
State, [Ms. CR-03-0480, November 2, 2007]    So. 3d    (Ala.
Crim. App. 2006)(opinion on return to remand).  Lewis then
petitioned this Court for certiorari review.
"[P]etitions for writs of certiorari will be considered
... [f]rom decisions where a material question requiring
decision is one of first impression for the Supreme Court of
Alabama."  Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R. App. P.  We granted
Lewis's petition for a writ of certiorari solely to consider
two such questions.  The first question is whether a defendant
who has been found guilty of a capital offense beyond a
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3
reasonable doubt is entitled to have the jury instructed on
"residual doubt" during the penalty phase of the trial.  The
second question is whether, pursuant to § 13A-5-53, Ala. Code
1975, 
the 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
is 
required 
to
independently 
find 
the 
existence 
of 
any 
mitigating
circumstances not found by the trial court and then to weigh
the 
mitigating 
circumstances 
against 
the 
aggravating
circumstances.  We answer both questions in the negative, and,
thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
I. Residual-Doubt Instruction
Lewis requested the trial court to instruct the jury on
"residual doubt" during the penalty phase of his trial.  His
requested instruction defined "residual doubt" as "whimsical
doubt -- the absence of absolute certainty of guilt."  Lewis
requested that the jury be instructed that "the mere whimsy of
one juror or several [would require the jury to] consider the
existence 
of 
such 
a 
residual 
doubt 
as 
a 
mitigating
circumstance that warrants a sentence of life in prison rather
than death."  The trial court refused the requested jury
charge.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court
had correctly denied the requested charge on "residual doubt."
1070647
4
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it "has held on
numerous occasions that 'capital defendants have no right to
demand jury consideration of "residual doubts" in the
sentencing phase.'" Lewis,    So. 3d at   .  The Court of
Criminal 
Appeals' 
holdings 
regarding 
residual-doubt
instructions are correct and have a sound statutory basis.
Lewis concedes that "[c]riminal defendants do not have a
federal constitutional right to present residual doubt as to
guilt as a mitigating factor during the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial."  Lewis's brief, at 22.  Further, he
does not argue that this Court should recognize such a right
under the Alabama Constitution of 1901.  Instead, he argues
that "[r]esidual doubt about the defendant's guilt is a
relevant mitigating factor under Alabama's [statutory] death
penalty scheme."  Lewis's reply brief, at 15.  We disagree.
Section 13A-5-51, Ala. Code 1975, without limiting
possible mitigating circumstances, statutorily defines a
number of mitigating circumstances.  Residual doubt as to the
defendant's guilt is not a statutory mitigating circumstance.
Instead, as the State argues, "all seven statutory mitigating
circumstances [in § 13A-5-51] relate to the defendant or the
circumstances of the crime for which the defendant [has been
1070647
5
found guilty] and merely reduce the defendant's culpability
for committing that crime."  State's brief, at 29.
Section 13A-5-52, Ala. Code 1975, allows a capital
defendant to offer mitigating circumstances in addition to
those enumerated in § 13A-5-51.  Specifically, it provides:
"In addition to the mitigating circumstances
specified 
in 
Section 
13A-5-51, 
mitigating
circumstances 
shall 
include 
any 
aspect 
of 
a
defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant
offers 
as 
a 
basis 
for 
a 
sentence 
of 
life
imprisonment without parole instead of death, and
any other relevant mitigating circumstances which
the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole instead of death."
It is inarguable, as the Court of Criminal Appeals has pointed
out on many occasions, that residual doubt is not a factor
about the "defendant's character or record [or] any of the
circumstances of the offense."  See, e.g., Melson v. State,
775 So. 2d 857, 899 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff'd, 775 So. 2d
904 (Ala. 2000).  Indeed, as the State argues, residual doubt
"is nothing more than a juror's state of mind and bears
directly on the defendant's guilt, [and] is not a fact or
situation relating to the defendant's character or record or
which reduces the defendant's culpability in the commission of
1070647
6
a crime for which guilt is a foregone conclusion."  State's
brief, at 25.
According to Lewis, the language § 13A-5-52 providing
that "mitigating circumstances shall include ... any other
relevant mitigating circumstance which the defendant offers as
a basis for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole
instead of death"  is broad enough to allow the consideration
of residual doubt at the penalty phase of a capital-murder
trial.  It is not, however, because residual doubt is not a
"relevant mitigating circumstance."
A mitigating circumstance is "[a] fact or situation that
does not bear on the question of a defendant's guilt but is
considered ... in imposing punishment and esp. in lessening
the severity of a sentence."  Black's Law Dictionary 260 (8th
ed. 2004).  As previously stated in this opinion, residual
doubt bears directly on the question of a defendant's guilt.
In fact, Lewis admits as much: "Residual doubt arises because
even though the evidence the juror saw was enough to convict,
there is a possibility that ... the defendant is really
innocent."  Lewis's reply brief, at 13.  Also, residual doubt
is not a "fact or situation."  Instead, it is merely "a
lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind that exists
1070647
7
somewhere between 'beyond a reasonable doubt' and 'absolute
certainty.'" Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  Stated simply, Lewis's arguments
find no support in Alabama's statutory provisions addressing
mitigating circumstances.
Residual 
doubt 
is 
not 
a 
mitigating 
circumstance.
Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct in
holding that the trial court did not err in denying Lewis's
requested jury charge on residual doubt during the penalty
phase of Lewis's capital-murder trial.
II. Independent Finding and Weighing of Mitigating
Circumstances by Court of Criminal Appeals
In its sentencing order, the trial court found the
existence of two aggravating circumstances and several
mitigating circumstances.  See § 13A-5-47(d), Ala. Code 1975.
The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Lewis to
death.  See § 13A-5-47(e), Ala. Code 1975.
On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Lewis argued
that that court had a duty under § 13A-5-53 to independently
find mitigating circumstances and then to weigh the mitigating
circumstances against the aggravating circumstances.  The
1070647
8
Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in rejecting this
contention.
Alabama's statutory sentencing and review scheme for
capital offenses clearly supports the Court of Criminal
Appeals' holding.   In pertinent part, § 13A-5-47(e) provides
that, "[i]n deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall
determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to
exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to
exist."  This language clearly contemplates factual findings
"[b]ased upon the evidence presented at trial, the evidence
presented during the sentence hearing, and the pre-sentence
investigation report and any evidence submitted in connection
with it." § 13A-5-47(d).  Factual determinations are the
responsibility of the trial court, and the role of an
appellate court is not to determine what the facts are.  See,
e.g., Ex parte Williford, 931 So. 2d 10, 13 (Ala. 2005).  
Although the factual findings regarding mitigating
circumstances are the responsibility of the trial court, they
are not beyond review.  On appeal, the Court of Criminal
Appeals must determine "whether the trial court's findings
concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
supported by the evidence." § 13A-5-53(a).  "If the court
1070647
9
determines ... that one or more of the trial court's findings
concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances were not
supported by the evidence, it shall remand the case for new
proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or
errors."  Id.  It is only where "the appellate court finds
that no error adversely affecting the rights of the defendant
was made in the sentence proceedings and that the trial
court's 
findings 
concerning 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating
circumstances were supported by the evidence [that] it shall
proceed to review the propriety of the decision that death was
the proper sentence."  Id.  These statutory review provisions
clearly 
recognize 
that the 
responsibility for finding
mitigating circumstances is the trial court's and just as
clearly limit the appellate court's role to determining
whether the  trial court's findings concerning mitigating
circumstances are supported by the evidence.
The scope of the appellate review contemplated by § 13A-
5-53(a) clearly embraces the review of a trial court's failure
to find a mitigating circumstance.  Indeed, as the State
points out, defendants "can, and often do (as Lewis did in
this case), raise on appeal the trial court's failure to find
and consider mitigating circumstances, and the Court of
1070647
10
Criminal Appeals routinely reviews those claims, as it did
below."  State's brief, at 34.  In conducting such a review,
the Court of Criminal Appeals must determine whether the trial
court's failure to find a circumstance to be mitigating is
"supported by the evidence," as required by § 13A-5-53(a).
In Clark v. State, 896 So. 2d 584 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000),
the Court of Criminal Appeals conducted a proper review of a
trial court's failure to find that proffered evidence
constituted a mitigating circumstance, stating, in pertinent
part:
"The sentencing order shows that the trial court
considered all of the mitigating evidence offered by
Clark.  The trial court did not limit or restrict
Clark in any way as to the evidence he presented or
the 
arguments 
he 
made 
regarding 
mitigating
circumstances.  In its sentencing order, the trial
court 
addressed 
each 
statutory 
mitigating
circumstance listed in § 13A-5-51, Ala. Code 1975,
and it determined that none of those circumstances
existed under the evidence presented. Although the
trial court did not list and make findings as to the
existence or nonexistence of each nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance offered by Clark, as noted
above, such a listing is not required, and the trial
court's not making such findings indicates only that
the trial court found the offered evidence not to be
mitigating, not that the trial court did not
consider this evidence.  Clearly, the trial court
considered Clark's proffered evidence of mitigation
but concluded that the evidence did not rise to the
level of a mitigating circumstance.  The trial
court's findings in this regard are supported by the
record.
1070647
11
"Because it is clear from a review of the entire
record that the trial court understood its duty to
consider all the mitigating evidence presented by
Clark, that the trial court did in fact consider all
such evidence, and that the trial court's findings
are supported by the evidence, we find no error,
plain or otherwise, in the trial court's findings
regarding the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances."
896 So. 2d at 652-53 (emphasis added). 
This appropriate review is not the de novo review sought
by Lewis.  Instead, the Court of Criminal Appeals, presuming
that the allegedly mitigating evidence was considered and
rejected by the trial court and not ignored, must determine
only whether the trial court's conclusion that the "evidence
did not rise to the level of a mitigating circumstance" is
"supported by the evidence."  896 So. 2d at 653.  This
assessment requires an evaluation of the allegedly mitigating
evidence in light of all the circumstances of the case.  If
the trial court's explicit or implicit rejection of tendered
evidence as a mitigating circumstance is appropriate when
viewed in this broad perspective, then the trial court's
failure to find a mitigating circumstance is "supported by the
evidence."  On the other hand, if the trial court's rejection
is not supported by the evidence, the Court of Criminal
Appeals is required to "remand the case for new proceedings to
1070647
12
the extent necessary to correct the error or errors." § 13A-5-
53(a).
The Court of Criminal Appeals does not "proceed to review
the propriety of the decision that death was the proper
sentence" until it has found "that no error adversely
affecting the rights of the defendant was made in the sentence
proceedings and that the trial court's findings concerning
aggravating and mitigating circumstances were supported by the
evidence." § 13A-5-53(a).
When it does proceed to review the
propriety of a death sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeals
is charged with making certain determinations, including
"[w]hether an independent weighing of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances at the appellate level indicates that
death was the proper sentence."  § 13A-5-53(b)(2)(emphasis
added). The Court of Criminal Appeals has properly construed
this clause to mean that it "must reweigh the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances as found by the trial court."
Roberts v. State, 735 So. 2d 1244, 1269 (Ala. Crim. App.
1997), aff'd, 735 So. 2d 1270 (Ala. 1999)(emphasis added).
Indeed, any other construction would be contrary to the plain
meaning of § 13A-5-53.
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13
                 III. Conclusion
The Court of Criminal Appeals properly held that a
defendant who has been found guilty of a capital offense is
not entitled to have the jury instructed on residual doubt
during the penalty phase of the trial.  Also, that court
properly construed the scope of its responsibility pursuant to
§ 13A-5-53(b)(2).  Thus, the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED. 
Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Shaw, J.,* recuse themselves.
*Justice Shaw was a member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals when that court considered this case.