Title: STATE v CLOSE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13522
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 9, 1981

No. 13522 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, ROBERT DEE CLOSE, a/k/a BOBBY DEE CLOSE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowtone. Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Terence M. Swift argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Sheri Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F . Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Charles Bradley argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana - - Submitted: November 26, 1980 Decided: FEBgn?!#I ~iled: FEB 9 - 1981 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury v e r d i c t i n t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, Montana. O n June 3, 1976, t h e jury found defendant g u i l t y of t h e following crimes, a l l a r i s i n g o u t of one incident: Count I, d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 45-5-102, MCA; Count 11, aggravated kidnapping, s e c t i o n 45-5-303, MCA; and Count 111, robbery, s e c t i o n 45-5-401, MCA. On June 1 0 , 1976, t h e c o u r t sentenced defendant t o one hundred y e a r s pursuant t o t h e v e r d i c t i n Count I; f o r t y years pursuant t o Count 111; and death by hanging pursuant t o Count 11. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e sentences pronounced on Counts I and I11 were ordered t o be served consecutively. I n May 1979 t h i s Court ordered t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o resentence defendant f o r h i s conviction of aggravated kid- napping (Count 11) f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e sentencing pro- v i s i o n under t h a t s t a t u t e was found t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The D i s t r i c t Court complied and resentenced defendant, under Count I1 only, t o t h e t e r m of f i f t y years t o be served concurrently with t h e previous sentences of f o r t y years and one hundred years. O n J u l y 7, 1974, a c a r n i v a l promoter named B i l l y Joe H i l l drove t o B i l l i n g s , Montana, i n a 1968 white-colored, four-door Cadillac sedan. A t t h e t i m e he was carrying between $1200 and $1400 i n cash. H i l l was observed i n t h e Rainbow B a r from 9:30 a.m. u n t i l 7:00 p.m. on J u l y 8, 1974, by Frank P i r t z , t h e owner of t h e bar. That afternoon he was observed with s e v e r a l Indians, a sheepherder and a younger, "cowboy-type" man. H i l l k e p t f l a s h i n g a l a r g e r o l l of money and d i d s o t o such an e x t e n t t h a t P i r t z cautioned him t o stop. H i l l l e f t t h e Rainbow Bar by himself a t approximately 7:00 p.m. The "cowboy-type" young man with him apparently had l e f t t h e saloon about 4:00 p.m. Between 8:00 t o 9:00 p.m. on J u l y 8, two men came i n t o t h e S i l v e r Dollar Bar. The bartender t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e o l d e r of t h e two men had on cranberry-colored t r o u s e r s and a matching s h i r t . She i d e n t i f i e d a p i c t u r e of H i l l a s t h i s man. The younger man's s h i r t was hanging o u t , he looked l i k e a cowboy and wore e i t h e r a black o r dark brown h a t . The bartender i d e n t i f i e d defendant i n t h e courtroom a s t h e younger man. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e two men remained i n t h e b a r f o r about two hours and then l e f t together. The bartender f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e younger man made two telephone c a l l s while i n t h e bar. The bartender l a t e r furnished a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e younger man t o t h e p o l i c e from which a composite drawing of t h e suspected murderer w a s made by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r . H i l l ' s c a r was observed by Deputy S h e r i f f Dean Mahlum a t about 9:45 p.m. near t h e S i l v e r Dollar Bar with two occu- pants. Mahlum described t h e two occupants of t h e white C a d i l l a c a s follows: "The d r i v e r of t h e v e h i c l e was approximately 23 t o 24 y e a r s of age, 5'10" t o 5'11" t a l l , 165 t o 170 pounds. H e was wearing a f e l t type cowboy h a t , e i t h e r dark brown o r black, t h e brim was r o l l e d i n on it. He had a l i g h t colored s h i r t which was unbuttoned down t h e f r o n t and a l s o pulled o u t of h i s pants. I b e l i e v e he had on blue jeans and boots. The o t h e r s u b j e c t was an o l d e r gentleman. I d i d n ' t g e t a s good a look a t t h i s gentleman. H e had on a l i g h t colored s h i r t , maroon pants, boots, and a l s o a white h a t , western type." According t o t h e bartender, H i l l returned t o t h e S i l v e r Dollar Bar alone a t approximately 1:45 a.m. on July 9. He stood a t t h e bar and ordered a can of beer. H e took only about t h r e e d r i n k s of t h e beer and walked o u t . A t about 7:30 a.m. on J u l y 9 , Randall Groom discovered t h e body of a man l y i n g on t h e ground near a white Cadillac. He walked c l o s e t o t h e body, then g o t back i n t o h i s pickup and w e n t home where he c a l l e d the Yellowstone County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e a t about 8:00 a.m. Groom waited a few minutes and then drove back t o t h e scene. When he a r r i v e d , a deputy s h e r i f f had already a r r i v e d . The victim was l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s B i l l y Joe H i l l . N o money was recovered from h i s personal possession. Randall Groom t e s t i f i e d t h a t he discovered t h e body while e x e r c i s i n g h i s dog. H e s t a t e d t h a t he went t o t h i s a r e a q u i t e o f t e n t o e x e r c i s e h i s dog, even though it i s about t h r e e m i l e s from h i s home. Randall Groom i s t h e s t e p f a t h e r of Ed Close, t h e S t a t e ' s main witness. He ada- mantly denied, however, t h a t h i s stepson had c a l l e d him t h a t morning, even though Ed Close l i v e d j u s t down the road from where t h e body was found. Groom s t a t e d t h a t it was months a f t e r t h e murder t h a t he f i r s t learned t h a t h i s stepson knew anything about t h e crime. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s s t e p s o n ' s knowledge of t h e f a c t s surrounding t h i s offense were f i r s t discovered by him about one month before t r i a l . An autopsy was performed by D r . Gordon Cox, a B i l l i n g s p a t h o l o g i s t . D r . Cox t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e victim died from m u l t i p l e severe blows t o t h e head, both f r o n t and back, with r e s u l t i n g b r a i n damage. H e t e s t i f i e d t h e wounds t o t h e deceased's head w e r e i n f l i c t e d , i n h i s opinion, by a long, r e l a t i v e l y narrow, b l u n t o b j e c t . D r . Cox f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t from photographs, two of which w e r e photographs of t h e deceased's c a r taken o u t s i d e h i s presence, he concluded t h a t t h e deceased was s i t t i n g i n t h e passenger s i d e of t h e automobile when t h e i n j u r i e s t o t h e f r o n t of t h e head w e r e i n f l i c t e d . The t h r u s t of t h e S t a t e ' s case was t h a t B i l l y Joe H i l l was robbed of t h e money he was carrying and l a t e r k i l l e d by defendant, Bobby Dee Close. The S t a t e ' s main witnesses were Ed Close and h i s wife, Joyce. Ed Close i s t h e stepson of Randall Groom and a cousin of defendant, The essence of h i s testimony was t h a t he attended a family p i c n i c near Big Timber, Montana, on J u l y 4 , 1974. This p i c n i c was a l s o attended by David Close, t h e second defendant i n t h i s matter and t h e uncle of Ed Close and the defendant, Ed t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h i s p i c n i c , David Close used a pick t o a s s i s t a v e h i c l e a c r o s s a dry creek bed and broke t h e handle near t h e pick head. A f t e r breaking t h e pick handle, David tossed it i n t o t h e back of a pickup owned and driven by Ed. Defendant Bobby Close d i d n o t a t t e n d t h i s picnic. Upon r e t u r n i n g t o B i l l i n g s a f t e r t h e p i c n i c , Ed drove t o David's house and unloaded David's belongings. Ed could n o t remember i f t h e broken pick handle w a s unloaded a t David's house; however, he found t h e metal pick head i n h i s pickup when he g o t home. H e removed it from t h e truck and p u t it i n a box of junk i n h i s garage. The pick head w a s l a t e r delivered t o a u t h o r i t i e s i n February 1976. Ed Close t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had c e r t a i n conversations with defendant regarding t h e death of H i l l . The f i r s t such conversation occurred a t h i s house when defendant t o l d Ed and h i s wife Joyce as follows: "A. Well, he t o l d m e t h a t he run a c r o s s t h i s guy on the south s i d e , he had a l o t of money, throwing it around, buying everybody drinks, and t h a t he had devised some kind of a plan with Uncle Dave t o g e t h i s money. And they, Bobby and t h e man, went t o d i f f e r e n t b a r s around town drinking and they wound up down by the r i v e r and t h a t Uncle Dave was t h e r e and Uncle Dave give him t h i s club and says, 'Here, Bobby, t h i s i s your t r i c k , you do it.' Bobby t o l d m e he h i t the man once and t h e man woke up and wanted t o know what was going on and Bobby g o t scared, Uncle Dave took t h e club and finished it. "Q. Did he, and r e f e r r i n g t o M r . H i l l , d i d he use any name o r job occupation? A. I think he talked about him a s a c a r n i v a l worker. " Ed went on t o t e s t i f y t h a t a t a subsequent conversation defendant s t a t e d , "they would never f i n d i t , " meaning t h e c l u b which w a s used a s a murder weapon. A second conversation took place a t David Close's birthday p a r t y on J u l y 12, 1974. Ed t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t the birthday p a r t y a t David's home the club was mentioned again. According t o Ed Close: "A. W e l l , Bobby had q u i t e a b i t t o drink and he had been outside and he come i n with a, I d o n ' t know, a jug o r a b o t t l e of some kind and broke it over t h e table. Of course g l a s s flew every d i r e c t i o n and t h e wife and Sharon were t r y i n g t o clean it up and Uncle Dave g o t mad and went i n the bedroom and come o u t with t h i s piece of a club and shook it a t Bobby and asked him i f he would l i k e some of t h i s ? "Q. He asked him i f he would l i k e some of t h a t , and what d i d Bobby D e e say o r do? A. I d o n ' t think Bobby s a i d anything." Ed Close t e s t i f i e d t h a t he managed t o g e t the club from David and took it home with him. H e burned it the next morning because he suspected t h a t it w a s t h e club used i n t h e murder. A t t r i a l he compared t h e club he took from David t o two pick handles, introduced f o r demonstrative purposes only, and s t a t e d they w e r e s i m i l a r except t h e one taken from David was o l d e r and weatherbeaten. O n cross-examination, Ed Close admitted t h a t he was f i r s t interrogated by law enforcement o f f i c e r s during t h e summer of 1974 and t o l d Officer S k i l l e n he knew nothing of t h e c r i m e . Later, Ed was p u t under oath and sworn s t a t e - ments w e r e given t o t h e county attorney. Joyce Close, Ed's wife, t e s t i f i e d t h a t she was f i r s t questioned by law enforcement personnel i n February 1976. A t f i r s t , Joyce denied she had any knowledge of the crime and she was questioned separately from her husband. She was l a t e r placed under oath and gave the statement incriminating defendant. Joyce described the picnic on t h e 4th of J u l y and her observation of a pick and pick handle. She a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had attended t h e birthday p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , and t h a t a conversation, p r i o r t o the party, had occurred. She s t a t e d i n d e t a i l what w a s s a i d by defendant during the conversation a t t r i a l : "Q. What d i d t h e defendant, Bobby Dee Close, say t o you a t t h a t time? A. He s a i d he w a s i n the Standard Bar drinking, and he had run across t h i s man t h a t w a s a l s o i n the Standard, and t h i s man had a l o t of money, he was buying t h e bar drinks. I n f a c t he had a r o l l of money t h a t he threw a t a p r o s t i t u t e down t h e r e i n the Standard. She picked it up and threw it back a t him and s a i d t h a t money i s going t o g e t your t h r o a t c u t . And Bobby s a i d t h a t he went t o t h e phone, c a l l e d h i s uncle, David Close, and t h a t he had went with t h i s man t o a couple other bars, t h e Crystal, I believe he mentioned, and t h e S i l v e r Dollar, and then went on o u t t o t h e gravel p i t s . When he w a s o u t t o t h e gravel p i t s , Dave was there. Bobby h i t t h e man over the eye and the man woke up, p u t h i s hands up l i k e , 'What's going on?' and Bobby g o t scared and t h a t was when h i s uncle took over, Dave. W e l l , before t h a t , when he went o u t t o the gravel p i t s and Dave was there, Dave handed him a club and s a i d , 'Bobby, t h i s i s your t r i c k , do your thing. ' And t h a t ' s when Bobby h i t him over t h e eye and t h e man had woke up and t r i e d t o p r o t e c t himself and then Bobby g o t scared and t h a t ' s when Dave took over. "Q. But he d i d say he s t r u c k t h e man, r i g h t ? A. Yes, he h i t him over t h e eye. "Q. Did he t e l l you how many t i m e s he s t r u c k him over t h e eye? A. One time." Joyce f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t an argument developed a t t h e birthday p a r t y between David Close and defendant. During t h e argument David went i n t o t h e bedroom and came back with a club, held it up, shook it a t defendant, and s a i d , "Do you want some of t h i s too?" David's wife t o l d Ed t o g e t t h e c l u b and do something with it. Ed g o t t h e c l u b , took it o u t s i d e and p u t it i n h i s pickup truck. Joyce went on t o t e s t i f y t h a t defendant a t t h e f i r s t conversation t o l d her t h a t David Close had h i t t h e v i c t i m i n t h e back of the head when he "took over." Expert witnesses t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t defendant's f i n g e r p r i n t s were found both i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e v i c t i m ' s c a r . One of them, a p r i n t of defendant's l e f t thumb, was found on t h e i n s i d e r e a r of the l e f t r e a r door window of t h e v i c t i m ' s c a r . One of t h e f i n g e r p r i n t e x p e r t s t e s t i f i e d on r e b u t t a l t h a t t h e p r i n t was of t h e i n s i d e of t h e l e f t thumb, toward t h e f i n g e r s . (Defendant i s l e f t handed.) The door on which t h a t p r i n t appeared was p a r t i a l l y unlatched when the v i c t i m ' s body w a s found. There w a s a l s o testimony concerning defendant's s t a t e - ments t o l a w enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s before he became a suspect i n t h e case. About s i x weeks a f t e r the crime, on August 26, 1974, he spoke with O f f i c e r S k i l l e n , who testi- f i e d : "He s a i d t h a t he had been i n t h e b a r s on t h e south s i d e , he thought t h a t he had seen t h e person described a s t h e victim. H e mentioned seeing t h e victim with a man with a beard and he s a i d t h e l a s t t i m e he saw him he was i n t h e company of some colored people." ~ f t e r h i s a r r e s t on February 27, 1976, defendant t o l d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t he had l e f t H i l l i n h i s c a r on t h e n i g h t of t h e crime. Defendant w a s t h e only defense witness. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had met H i l l f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a t about 3:00 o r 4:00 p.m., on J u l y 8, 1974, i n t h e Rainbow Bar. Defendant remained t h e r e f o r about t h i r t y - f i v e t o f o r t y minutes. Defendant m e t H i l l again some t i m e l a t e r t h a t evening i n a bar near t h e Greyhound Bus Depot. H i l l came i n with two o t h e r men sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. H i l l remained a t t h i s b a r f o r approximately an hour, apparently drinking beer and playing pool. H i l l and defendant l e f t t h i s b a r together and went t o s e v e r a l o t h e r b a r s on t h e south s i d e of B i l l i n g s . They drove t o these b a r s i n t h e deceased's auto- mobile, with defendant d r i v i n g and H i l l s i t t i n g i n t h e f r o n t passenger s e a t . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t H i l l could walk, b u t he was intoxicated. According t o defendant they remained a t t h e Standard Bar f o r two and one-half t o t h r e e hours. Defendant and H i l l l e f t t h e Standard Bar and drove i n t h e deceased's automobile t o t h e S i l v e r Dollar B a r . Defendant again drove with H i l l s t i l l occupying t h e r i g h t f r o n t s e a t . The deceased was a b l e t o g e t i n t o t h e c a r by himself. They parked H i l l ' s c a r near t h e S i l v e r Dollar Bar and drank beer t h e r e f o r one t o two hours. A t t h i s t i m e , defen- d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he (defendant) was " p r e t t y i n t o x i c a t e d . I' When they l e f t t h e S i l v e r Dollar Bar, defendant helped H i l l i n t o h i s c a r by placing him i n t h e passenger s i d e . Defen- d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s w a s the last t i m e he saw H i l l , who apparently had passed o u t i n the f r o n t s e a t of h i s c a r . Defendant s t a t e d he d i d not d r i v e t o the gravel p i t area where H i l l ' s body was found and he d i d n o t rob o r s t r i k e the deceased. Defendant a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he did n o t attend the 4th of J u l y picnic; t h a t he never saw a pick handle such a s t h e one t h a t was demonstrated i n the courtroom. H e denied Ed and Joyce Close's testimony regarding the statements which they alleged he had made t o them regarding t h e homicide. H e d i d admit attending the birthday p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , 1974, and f i g h t i n g with h i s Uncle David. He s t a t e d t h a t David Close had threatened him with a handle from a bathroom plunger. Claim f o r Mistrial The f i r s t i s s u e defendant r a i s e s i s whether the D i s - t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n finding t h a t a m i s t r i a l was not manifestly necessary when a prosecution witness flashed photographs before t h e jury which were later n o t admitted . The S t a t e ' s f i r s t witness was D r . Gordon Cox, a B i l l i n g s pathologist. D r . Cox performed the autopsy on H i l l and t e s t i f i e d about the cause of death. The S t a t e moved t o have c e r t a i n photographs of the body admitted i n t o evidence during D r . Cox's testimony, and defense counsel v o i r dired. O n v o i r d i r e cross-examination, the S t a t e asked D r . Cox t o i d e n t i f y f o r the record those photos which would assist t h e jury i n understanding h i s testimony and findings. The patho- l o g i s t replied, " [ t l h i s one I think, d e f i n i t e l y , " a t which p o i n t defendant's counsel objected, s t a t i n g , ". . . I move f o r m i s t r i a l on behalf of the defendant f o r these p i c t u r e s have been repeatedly flashed before t h e eyes of t h e jury . . ." The c o u r t o v e r r u l e d - t h i s motion and continued the t r i a l . The c o u r t c o r r e c t l y denied t h e motion f o r m i s t r i a l . The t e s t f o r d e c l a r i n g a m i s t r i a l was s t a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n United S t a t e s v. Perez (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580: ". . . the law has invested Courts of j u s t i c e with t h e a u t h o r i t y t o discharge a jury from giving any v e r d i c t , whenever, i n t h e i r opinion, taking a l l t h e circumstances i n t o consideration, t h e r e i s a manifest n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e a c t , o r t h e ends of p u b l i c j u s t i c e would otherwise be defeated. They a r e t o e x e r c i s e a sound d i s c r e - t i o n on t h e subject; and it i s impossible t o d e f i n e a l l t h e circumstances, which would render it proper t o i n t e r f e r e . To be s u r e , t h e power ought t o be used with t h e g r e a t e s t caution, under urgent circumstances, and f o r very p l a i n and obvious causes; . . ." The t r i a l c o u r t judge i s i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o determine with c e r t a i n t y whether t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s handling of t h e e x h i b i t a c t u a l l y exposed it t o t h e jury i n such a manner a s t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l . Our function on appeal i s t o determine whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t granting a m i s t r i a l . United S t a t e s v. Jorn (1971), 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543. The District Court, having observed t h e event and t h e r e a c t i o n of the j u r o r s , and being t h e judge most f a m i l i a r with t h e evidence and t h e background of t h e case ". . . is f a r more 'conversant with t h e f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e t e r - mination' than any reviewing c o u r t can possibly be." Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U.S. 497, 514, 98 S.Ct. P r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r was n o t shown. The photographs involved a r e n o t l a r g e blow-ups; they a r e normal snapshots. I t i s unlikely t h a t such b r i e f exposure t o such small photo- graphs i n t h e hands of a witness on t h e stand could have such an impact as t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l . Also, t h e photo- graphs a t i s s u e are n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from those which w e r e admitted. Furthermore, The judge gave t h e jury appropriate cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n s . See Arizona v. Washington, supra. There was no manifest n e c e s s i t y t o o r d e r a m i s t r i a l , and t h e ends of public j u s t i c e w e r e n o t defeated by carrying t h e t r i a l t o a f i n a l v e r d i c t . W e f i n d no e r r o r . Expert Testimony Next defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n overruling h i s objection t o testimony of t h e p a t h o l o g i s t expressing h i s opinion a s t o how t h e f a t a l blows were applied. Defendant contends t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n n o t s u s t a i n i n g h i s objection because t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s conclu- s i o n was based on photographs taken of t h e automobile out- s i d e t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s presence. "This Court i s n o t o b l i g a t e d t o r e f u t e a l l . . . a l - leged e r r o r s where t h e e r r o r s a r e bald a s s e r t i o n s , a b s e n t any s p e c i f i c argument o r a u t h o r i t y . . ." McGuinn v. S t a t e (1978), 177 Mont. 215, 581 P.2d 417, 420, 35 St.Rep. 871. Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid., s t a t e s : " I f s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l , o r o t h e r s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge w i l l assist t h e trier of f a c t t o understand t h e evidence o r t o determine a f a c t i n i s s u e , a witness q u a l i f i e d a s an e x p e r t by knowledge, s k i l l , experience, t r a i n i n g , o r education may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n t h e form of an opinion o r otherwise." ". . . The competency of a witness t o t e s t i f y a s an e x p e r t i s a question f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . . ." S t a t e v. Paulson (1975), 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339, 342-343. The c o u r t i n t h e i n s t a n t case d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n . A medical doctor has s p e c i a l knowledge regarding anatomy and i n j u r i e s t o t h e human body t h a t q u a l i f i e s him o r h e r t o g i v e an opinion a s t o t h e cause of t h e i n j u r i e s . S t a t e v. Camp- b e l l (1965) , 146 Mont. 251, 405 P . 2d 978. Dr. Cox was exceptionally qualified to give such an opinion. He was a pathologist, a specialist in the study of cause of death. In twelve years as a pathologist, he had performed about 600 autopsies, surgical procedures conducted primarily to determine the cause of death. He had the knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to qualify him to express an opinion as to how the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim from his actual observations, photographs and other tests. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the pathologist to testify and express his opinion. Witness Identification The bartender at the Silver Dollar Bar testified on behalf of the State. She stated that the victim and defen- dant had spent a couple of hours in the bar on the evening of the victim's death. Defendant objects, for the first time on appeal, to the witness's in-court identification of him. Defendant's failure to object at trial precludes him from now predicating error on the admission of this evidence. Rule 103 (a) (1) , Mont.R.Evid. ; State v. Sullivan (1979), Mont. , 595 P.2d 372, 36 St.Rep. 936. Further, upon complete review of the record we find no plain error that substantially affected the rights of defendant. Counsel Misconduct During Trial While cross-examining a prosecution witness, defense counsel pursued the following line of questioning which resulted in a colloquy between counsel: " Q . I don't ask this question in a critical vein, Mr. Close, but you have been drinking before you came here to testify this morning, isn't that correct? A. No. "Q. You haven't had a drink this morning? A. Nothing other than coffee. "Q. Would you care to walk over in front of the Jurors and allow them to smell your breath? A. Yes. "Q. Would you do that please? " (Witness complying. ) "Q. Would you breathe out in the presence of the Jurors? A . Yes, I did. " Q . Would you also go down by this end of the jury box and breathe to the man sitting in the end of the jury box? "MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, I am going to object to this demonstration. "THE COURT: Sustained. "MR. WHALEN: In view of the answer, it goes to the credibility of the witness and should be allowed. "MR. BRADLEY: Have you been drinking this morning, Mr. Whalen? "MR. WHALEN: I haven't, Mr. Bradley. "MR. BRADLEY: Would you mind going up and breathing to the Jury? "MR. WHALEN: I will be glad to do so. "THE COURT: Now, let's desist. "MR. WHALEN: I have no further questions." Defendant raises the issue of whether the District Court properly handled this exchange, and, if there was any irregularity, whether it affected defendant's substantial rights. Defendant contends the court erred in not cautioning the jury with respect to alleged prejudicial comments of the prosecuting attorney. He argues that this exchange of words tended to reflect improperly upon defense counsel, his methods, tact and procedure. This, in turn, inured to the detriment of defendant. We disagree. The prosecutor's questions were totally unrelated to the defendant's guilt. They were merely a reaction to defense counsel's persistent line of questioning and were asked to demonstrate that defense counsel's questions could have been personally humiliating to the witness. " . . . It has generally been held that an appellant may not predicate error upon the prosecuting attorney's actions where such was induced or provoked by the appellant's counsel. . ." State v. Gall (1959), 135 Mont. 131, 134, 337 P.2d 932. Further, defense counsel failed to offer an appropriate cautionary instruction as required by section 46-16-401(4)(a), MCA, and the general instructions given to the jury were sufficient to cure any possible prejudice. The trial court properly handled the situation by simply ending the exchange. Any irregularity in this event did not affect defendant's substantial rights and must be disregarded. Chain - of Evidence Rule Defendant contends the District Court erred in admitting into evidence fingerprints and fingerprint testimony which allegedly was not secure from alteration or tampering prior to and during the trial. Defendant contends his conviction should be reversed because there "could have been" a master key that "could have been" used to obtain access to fingerprint evidence that was locked in the desk of a deputy sheriff. He argues the State failed to establish that the evidence had not been tampered with. The general rule concerning chain of evidence founda- tion is this: "The State must identify the particular exhibit as relevant to the criminal charge and must show prima facie that no alteration or tampering with the exhibit has occurred . . . Once that has been done, the burden - of proving alteration shifts - to appellant. . ." State v. Burtchett (1974), 165 Mont. 280, 28U, 530 P.2d 471, 475. (Emphasis added.) Burtchett is analogous to this case. There, the defen- dant argued on appeal that the fact that several people had access to a forensic laboratory destroyed the custodial chain. This Court rejected that argument, finding the testimony of one of the chemists in the lab, to the effect that the evidence had been kept in the evidence room of the lab, was sufficient to establish the state's prima facie case. Similarly, in the present case, the deputy sheriff's testimony was sufficient to meet the prima facie test, as the record indicates. The burden shifted to defendant, who failed to show in any respect that the evidence was altered or tampered. No error. Exclusion - of Witnesses -- from the Courtroom Defendant argues the District Court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as a rebuttal witness after the same police officer violated a rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom and heard defendant's testimony. Rebuttal witnesses are not within the rule governing exclusion of sworn witnesses from the courtroom during taking of testimony. Sutterfield v. State (Okl. 1971), 489 Demonstrative Evidence Defendant contends the District Court abused its discre- tion in permitting the admission of demonstrative evidence into the trial. -16- The S t a t e introduced s i x items f o r demonstrative pur- poses only: two pieces of a wooden handle and p a r t s of an automobile--a c a r door, a s t e e r i n g wheel on a d r i v e s h a f t , a door knob on t h e c a r door, and a gear s h i f t knob on the s t e e r i n g wheel. Defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d (1) i n allowing these e x h i b i t s t o be admitted; ( 2 ) i n f a i l i n g t o give a cautionary jury i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t t h i s evidence w a s f o r demonstrative purposes only; and ( 3 ) i n f a i l i n g t o f u r t h e r p o i n t o u t i n d e t a i l a l l changes between t h e e x h i b i t s and t h e o r i g i n a l items. "Generally, allowing demonstrative evidence i s within t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge, and is s u b j e c t t o review only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . . ." Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co. (1978), 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711, 722. A n examination of t h e record i n t h i s case shows no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . The testimony of witnesses and com- ments of both attorneys and the t r i a l judge made clear t o t h e jury t h a t t h e items admitted were demonstrative only and w e r e n o t the a c t u a l i t e m s used i n the commission of t h e crime . Further, defendant offered no cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n concerning the demonstrative evidence. H e cannot c l a i m e r r o r on appeal because none was given. See s e c t i o n 46-16- 4 0 1 ( 4 ) (a) , MCA. W e f i n d no e r r o r . Doctrine - of Cumulative Error Defendant a l l e g e s s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s were committed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t with regard t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and proce- dure during the t r i a l . These e r r o r s - i n t o t a l c o n s t i t u t e cumulative e r r o r and have seriously prejudiced defendant, according t o defendant. The "doctrine of cumulative e r r o r " e x i s t s i n Montana. Cumulative e r r o r r e f e r s t o a number of e r r o r s which preju- d i c e defendant's r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . S t a t e v. McKenzie (1978), 177 Mont. 280, 581 P.2d 1205, 35 St.Rep. 759. A f t e r a complete review of t h e record and applying t h e d o c t r i n e , w e f i n d here no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r a f f e c t i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of defendant. Merger - of Felonies Defendant next contends t h a t h i s conviction f o r aggra- vated kidnapping and robbery must be vacated because these offenses w e r e merged f o r purposes of punishment with t h e felony murder offense. This merger, t h e r e f o r e , v i o l a t e s t h e double jeopardy clause. W e f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n defen- d a n t ' s argument. The i s s u e presented here i s merely one of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The double jeopardy c l a u s e p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t both mul- t i p l e prosecutions and multiple punishments imposed a t a s i n g l e prosecution f o r t h e same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656. The test f o r determining what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e same o f f e n s e d i f f e r s depending on whether t h e case involves m u l t i p l e prosecutions o r multiple punishments imposed a t a s i n g l e prosecution. The standard i s broader i n cases involv- i n g m u l t i p l e prosecutions. Two s t a t u t o r y crimes t h a t con- s t i t u t e " t h e same offense" f o r purposes of m u l t i p l e prose- c u t i o n s do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e " t h e same offense" f o r purposes of multiple punishments. See Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2 2 2 1 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, defendant was t r i e d a t a s i n g l e prosecution f o r a l l t h e s t a t u t o r y crimes i n question. The i s s u e , then, is n o t one of m u l t i p l e prosecutions b u t of mul- t i p l e punishments. The i s s u e i s whether, under Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme, a defendant may be punished f o r both felony homicide and the underlying felony. The r e l e v a n t crimes and s t a t u t e s a r e d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 45-5- 102, MCA; robbery, s e c t i o n 45-5-401, MCA; aggravated kid- napping, s e c t i o n 45-5-303, MCA; and s e c t i o n s 46-11-501 and -502, MCA, mul.tiple charges and prosecutions s t a t u t e s . A t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t f o r determining whether two s t a t u - t o r y crimes c o n s t i t u t e " t h e same offense" f o r purposes of m u l t i p l e punishments was s e t f o r t h i n Blockburger v. United S t a t e s (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. ". . . The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e i s t h a t where t h e same a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a - t i o n of two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y provisions, t h e t e s t t o be applied t o determine whether t h e r e a r e two o f f e n s e s o r o n l y one, i s whether each provision r e q u i r e s proof of a f a c t which t h e o t h e r does not. . ." I n Whalen v. United S t a t e s (1980), 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court c l a r i - f i e d t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s r u l e . The r u l e i s n o t always d i s p o s i t i v e on questions of double jeopardy f o r purposes of m u l t i p l e punishments. The d i s p o s i t i v e question i s whether t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o provide f o r m u l t i p l e punishments. The Blockburger test i s merely one r u l e of s t a t u t o r y con- s t r u c t i o n t o a i d i n t h e determination of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . The u l t i m a t e question remains one of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . Whalen, supra. The double jeopardy c l a u s e ". . . serves p r i n c i p a l l y a s a r e s t r a i n t on c o u r t s and prosecutors. The l e g i s l a t u r e remains f r e e under t h e Double Jeopardy Clause t o d e f i n e crimes and f i x punishments; b u t once t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has acted c o u r t s may n o t impose more than one punishment f o r t h e same offense. . ." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. a t 165. Having determined that this case turns on the permissi- bility of multiple punishments imposed at a single criminal proceeding, we find that the dispositive issue is whether the Montana legislature intended to allow a defendant to be punished for both felony homicide under section 45-5- 102 (1) (b) , MCA, for robbery under section 45-5-401 (1) (a) , MCA, and for aggravated kidnapping under section 45-5- 303(l) (b), MCA, where robbery and aggravated kidnapping were the underlying felonies in the felony homicide,. Specifically, the question confronting this Court is whether the Montana legislature intended to authorize cumu- lative punishments for aggravated kidnapping, robbery and felony murder based on one of the other prior statutes. This is a matter of statutory construction and does not concern a constitutional question. Whalen, supra, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). We find that the majority opinion in Whalen does not apply to this case. There are several bases for finding that the legisla- ture did not intend to preclude punishment for both felony homicide and, in this case, the underlying felonies of robbery and aggravated kidnapping in enacting the felony murder statute . First, application of the Blockburger test to the stat- utes involved does not result in the conclusion that the offenses of robbery and aggravated kidnapping are the "same offense" as felony homicide. Blockburger's analysis must stand or fall on the working of the statutes alone, not on the indictment. Whalen, 100 S.Ct. at 1448 (~ehnquist, J., dissenting). Looking at the statutes, then, it is clear that proof of felony homicide will not necessarily require proof of either robbery or aggravated kidnapping. One can commit felony homicide without committing robbery, or commit aggravated kidnapping without committing felony homicide. Thus, Blockburger does not require the conclusion that felony homicide and the underlying felony merge. Section 46-11-502, MCA, is merely a codification of the Blockburger test. See State v . Coleman (1979), Mont. 605 P.2d 1000, 1009-1010, 36 St.Rep. 1134, cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 2952. The second basis for finding no merger is the history and purpose of the felony homicide provision. The history of the common law and the purpose behind laws are both important tools to be used to determine legislative intent. Whalen, 100 S.Ct. at 1449 (~ehnquist, J., dissenting). The analysis of then Chief Judge Bazelon in United States v. Greene (1973), 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 44-45, 489 F.2d 1145, 1168-1169, is persuasive in this regard: ". . . At common law, homicides were divided into two categories, murder and manslaughter, with murder requiring a showing of 'malice.' Any homicide committed in the course of a felony was considered murder because malice could be implied from the commission of the felony. When homicides were further subdivided by statute into first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter, the doctrine of felony murder was preserved, and the under- lying felony was viewed as providing the 'pre- meditation' and 'deliberation' otherwise re- quired for first degree murder, as well as malice, where necessary. "Given this rationale for the felony murder doctrine, it strains credulity to hold that the underlying felony merges into the felony murder. The statute proscribing the underly- ing felony--robbery, for example--is designed to protect a wholly different societal inter- est from the felony murder statute, which is intended to protect against homicide. The underlying felony is an essential element of felony murder only because without it the homicide might be second degree murder or manslaughter. Clearly, neither manslaughter nor second degree murder merges with any other felony like robbery or assisting a prisoner to escape." Third, the legislature found that the homicidal risk is greater when there is a commission of a felony and that the protection of the person from this increased risk warranted additional sentences. The Criminal Law Commission Comment, on which the legislature relied in enacting section 94-5- 102, R.C.M. 1947, now section 45-5-102, MCA, stated: "Section [45-5-102, MCA] relates only to con- duct which is done deliberately; that is, pur- posely or knowingly. The enumerated offenses in subsection (b) broaden the old law dealing with felony-murders, R.C.M. 1947, section 94- 2503, to include any felony which involves force or violence against an individual. Since such offenses are usually coincident with an extremely high homicidal risk, a homi- cide which occurs during their commission can be considered a deliberate homicide. The sec- tion is intended to encompass most homicides traditionally designated as second-degree mur- der. Subsection (2) changes the punishment, providing that a person 'shall be punished by death . . . or by imprisonment . . . for any term not to exceed one hundred (100) years,' thus seeking to expand the sentencing latitude of the judge." Clearly, the legislature properly allowed and broadened the law relating to cumulative sentencing in felony murder cases. The enactment of the felony murder rule is supported by appropriate references to legislative history, the trend to encompass the felony murder rule and the desire of the legislature to prevent the commission of these types of dan- gerous crimes. The legislature allowed it, and the court imposed it. There are no issues other than those. If a defendant wants to commit a felony, he must pay a price. If a defendant wants to commit murder in addition to the felony or in the course of committing another felony, he must pay a higher price. The legislature manifested a clear intention to serve these two different interests in enacting the statutes. Errors Committed With Regard - To Instructions Defendant raises alleged errors committed by the Dis- trict Court with respect to the instructions given and refused. Defendant did not raise any objection to amended In- struction No. 1, nor objected either to the giving of In- struction No. 1 insofar as it relates to the definition of robbery nor to the refusal of State's offered Instruction No. 26, defining "bodily injury." He cannot now object on appeal. See sections 46-16-401(4)(b) and 46-20-701, MCA; McGuinn v. State, supra. Neither did defendant raise the issue of lack of suf- ficient evidence of bodily injury inflicted in the course of the theft. He is likewise precluded from now raising that issue on appeal. See State v . Armstrong (1977), 172 Mont. 552, 562 P.2d 1129. Further, testimony supports the conclusion that the in- fliction of bodily injury was an integral part of carrying out the plan to get the victim's money. It meets the re- quired legal minimum evidence to support the jury's factual finding, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Defendant failed to object to Instructions 2, 16 and 32, and, in the case of No. 16 actually concurred in the request; therefore, these instructions are not reviewable on appeal. Further, review of these instructions fails to demonstrate any error. Defendant contends the court erred in giving Instruc- tion 14 for it does not allow the jury to consider voluntary intoxication in defendant's behalf and irresistible impulse or diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication were effectively removed from the jury's consideration* Instruction 14 does not, as defendant contends, "inform the jury that the intoxication may not be considered if it is voluntarily induced." It stated specifically: "An intoxicated or drugged condition may be taken into consi- deration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense." That sentence was added to the offered instruction to meet defendant's objec- tion that voluntary intoxication could eliminate criminal responsibility if it rendered a defendant incapable of forming a necessary mental state. We find no merit in defendant' s argument. Next, Instruction 18 does not, as defendant contends, "inform the jury that defendant, having voluntarily stopped his efforts toward the commission of any of the charged offenses, was under a duty to stop the uncle from perpe- trating them." It merely states that - if the law does impose a duty which a person is capable of performing, failure to carry out that duty may be a voluntary act. It does not impose any duty. Defendant challenges three instructions regarding proof of knowledge and purpose on the basis of Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed. 2d 39. The challenge, even if it were reviewable, has no merit. The same challenge was made about substantially the same instuction in State v. Sunday (1980), Mont. I 609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561, and was rejected. Furthermore, this challenge was not made in the is- trict Court so the issue is not reviewable on appeal. See sections 46-16-401(4)(b) and 46-20-701, MCA; McGuinn v. State, supra; State v . Armstrong, supra. Defendant claims t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n giving I n s t r u c t i o n 26, defining "knowingly," and I n s t r u c t i o n 27, defining "purposely." The second sentence of I n s t r u c t i o n 26 states: "When Knowledge of t h e existence of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s an element of an offense, such Knowledge i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a person i s aware of a high p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s existence." This Court has r u l e d t h a t t h e reference t o "high proba- b i l i t y " i n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n does n o t v i o l a t e Sandstrom. S t a t e v. Coleman, supra. Defendant's challenge t o I n s t r u c t i o n 27 i s s i m i l a r t o h i s challenge t o No. 26: "A person a c t s purposely with r e s p e c t t o h i s conduct o r t o a r e s u l t which i s an element of t h e offense when he has the conscious o b j e c t t o engage i n t h a t conduct o r t o cause t h a t r e s u l t . " Defendant contends t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n takes t h e S t a t e ' s burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, and reduces it t o something less than proof by a preponderance of t h e evidence. This i s done by a s u b t l e verbal manipulation using t h e words " i n f e r , " "high p r o b a b i l i t y , " and "conscious object." Defendant f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and is precluded from r a i s i n g an objection f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. H i s objection i s meritless i n any event. The same reasoning adopted by Coleman i n approving t h e "knowingly" i n s t r u c t i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e "purposely" i n s t r u c t i o n . The i n s t r u c t i o n merely d e f i n e s t h e element of purposefulness pursuant t o Montana l a w . That d e f i n i t i o n , r e f e r r i n g t o a defendant's "conscious o b j e c t , " i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with modern concepts of i n t e n t . ". . . it i s now generally accepted t h a t a per- son who a c t s ( o r omits t o a c t ) intends a r e s u l t of h i s a c t ( o r omission) . . .: when he con- s c i o u s l y d e s i r e s t h a t r e s u l t , whatever the l i k e l i h o o d of t h a t r e s u l t happening from h i s conduct; . . ." Coleman, 605 P.2d a t 1056. Alleged Errors I n t h e F a i l u r e To Give I n s t r u c t i o n s -- -- Defendant argues t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o g i v e defendant's o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 2 r e l a t i n g t o impeach- ment. ~ e f e n d a n t contends t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given t o t h e jury were inadequate and t h a t a stronger i n s t r u c t i o n should have been given because s e v e r a l witnesses of t h e S t a t e w e r e former f e l o n s , w e r e r e l a t i v e s of t h e defendant, and had admitted l y i n g on previous statements. Refusal t o give i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e same s u b j e c t i s n o t p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . S t a t e v. Sullivan (1979), - Mont. , 595 P.2d 372, 36 St.Rep. 936. There w e r e s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s concerning impeachment of witnesses and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of witnesses. These i n s t r u c t i o n s were s u f f i - c i e n t t o caution t h e jury as t o t h e witnesses' testimony during t h e t r i a l and a s t o t h e law. These i n s t r u c t i o n s , read a s a whole a s they must be, f u l l y and f a i r l y cover t h e s u b j e c t of t h e j u r y ' s determina- t i o n of a w i t n e s s ' s c r e d i b i l i t y . See S t a t e v. Azure (1979), Mont. , 591 P.2d 1125, 36 St.Rep. 514. Defendant contends t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e defendant's o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 17. This i n s t r u c t i o n would have t o l d t h e jury t h a t defendant could n o t be held responsible f o r t h e crimes charged i f someone else performed t h e o f f e n s i v e conduct. The p l a i n language of s e c t i o n 45-2- 302, MCA, i n d i c a t e s t h i s i s i n c o r r e c t . The r u l e was properly presented t o t h e jury i n another i n s t r u c t i o n . Defendant' s contention i s i d e n t i c a l t o one presented i n S t a t e v. Owens (1979), Mont. 597 P.2d 72, 36 St.Rep. 1182. The same holding i s applicable i n t h e p r e s e n t case. Defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was properly refused. The judgment is affirmed. We concur: Justice w - This cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written dissent later.