Title: Zulk v. Zulk
Citation: 502 N.W.2d 116
Docket Number: 17919
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 1993

502 N.W.2d 116 (1993) Adolph R. ZULK, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Gladys M. ZULK, Defendant and Appellant. No. 17919. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs on November 19, 1992. Decided June 23, 1993. Gary W. Conklin, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellee. John E. Burke, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant. *117 PER CURIAM. Gladys Zulk (Gladys) appeals a trial court order dissolving a joint tenancy in real property and directing that the property be sold. We affirm. Gladys and Adolph Zulk (Adolph) were married in 1967. The couple eventually acquired some land and built a home which they owned as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Gladys and Adolph divorced in 1979. At that time, the two entered into a property settlement agreement later incorporated by reference in the judgment and decree of divorce. The agreement provides for a distribution of all of the parties' property and sets forth in pertinent part: At the time of the divorce, the parties received an offer to purchase their home in the amount of $67,000 but the offer was not accepted. Thereafter, the property was listed for sale on two separate occasions but was never sold. Gladys continued paying the mortgage and taxes on the home. In May 1988, Adolph granted a second mortgage on the property to a savings and loan association. The second mortgage remains unsatisfied. In June 1988, Adolph married Shirley Zulk (Shirley). Adolph died in March 1990 and Shirley was appointed special administratrix of his estate. In order to pay the estate's liabilities and distribute any remaining property to Adolph's heirs, it became necessary to sell the estate's assets. In May 1990, Shirley filed a motion with the trial court to compel Gladys to deed a one-half tenancy in common interest in the real property at issue to Adolph's estate. Alternatively, Shirley sought Gladys's compliance with the terms of the parties' original property settlement agreement. A hearing on Shirley's motion was held in January 1992. On February 26, 1992, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The trial court found that Gladys and Adolph's execution of their property settlement agreement and Adolph's second mortgage of the property evinced the parties' intent to transform their joint tenancy into an ownership as tenants in common. The trial court went on to conclude: that the joint tenancy ownership of the property was destroyed; that Gladys and Adolph owned the property as tenants in common; and, that each party owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. The trial court subsequently entered its order directing specific performance of the parties' original property settlement agreement. The order further provides that, in the event the property can not be sold for $70,000, the parties may agree to accept a lesser amount or apply to the court for authorization to accept a lesser amount. Gladys appeals. Gladys argues that the trial court erred in its determination that the parties' property settlement agreement and Adolph's second mortgage of the property transformed their joint tenancy into a tenancy in common interest. We disagree. Estate of Dompke v. Dompke, 186 Ill. App.3d 930, 134 Ill.Dec. 715, 717, 542 N.E.2d 1222, 1224 (1989) (citations omitted). Accord, Estate of Asvitt, 92 Cal. App. 3d 348, 154 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1979). In re Marriage of Dowty, 146 Ill.App.3d 675, 100 Ill.Dec. 187, 190, 496 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (1986) (citations omitted). Principles similar to those outlined above were applied by this court in Matter of Estate of Steffen, 467 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1991). In Steffen, the decedent had been married twice. His first marriage ended in divorce. The divorce decree incorporated a property settlement agreement which provided in pertinent part: Steffen, 467 N.W.2d at 491-92. The decedent in Steffen remarried approximately two years after the divorce and died about two years after his remarriage. The funeral chapel subsequently filed suit against his estate and his ex-wife alleging the assets of the estate were insufficient to cover funeral expenses and that the ex-wife, as surviving joint tenant of the marital home, was obliged to pay those debts. Alternatively, the funeral chapel alleged the property settlement agreement had severed the parties' joint tenancy in the marital home and that a tenancy in common resulted. Therefore, the chapel contended an undivided one-half interest in the property was subject to the debts of the estate. The trial court held in Steffen that the property settlement had severed the joint tenancy in the marital residence and created a tenancy in common interest. In reviewing that issue on appeal, we agreed with the trial court reasoning: Steffen, 467 N.W.2d at 493 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although the property settlement in the instant case might not be as explicit on the severance question as was the one in Steffen, we are no less convinced of the parties intention to sever their joint tenancy in the property at issue. In Dowty, supra, divorcing spouses entered into a property settlement agreement requiring the sale of the marital residence and an equal division of the proceeds from the sale. The ex-wife died before consummation of the sale and the ex-husband took the property off the market. The ex-wife's estate brought suit to enforce the provisions of the settlement agreement and the trial court ruled that the property remained in joint tenancy and belonged to the ex-husband as the surviving joint tenant. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed holding: Dowty, 100 Ill.Dec. at 190-91, 496 N.E.2d at 1255-56 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Asvitt, supra, divorcing spouses entered into a property settlement agreement requiring the sale of their jointly held marital home. The home was to be sold on the occurrence of any one of three specifically named events. The proceeds from the sale were to be divided equally. Like the settlement agreement in the instant case, the property settlement also included a provision wherein each spouse waived their interest in the estate of the other. In addressing the issue of whether the settlement agreement severed the joint tenancy regardless of the death of one of the parties before the sale of the property, the California court reasoned: Asvitt, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (citations and footnote omitted). We reach a like conclusion in the instant case. The parties' property settlement agreement recites that its purpose was, "to adjust and settle the matter of property, financial affairs, and other related matters arising out of the action for the divorce between the parties." (emphasis added). Thus, the agreement maintains the same character of finality concerning the adjudication of property rights as the agreement in Steffen, supra, and the settlement agreements under scrutiny in Dowty, supra, and Asvitt, supra. In that regard, the settlement agreement divides all of the parties' marital property, both real and personal, in an equivalent fashion and also divides all of the parties' marital debts. Both parties acknowledged the fairness of the agreement, again giving some indication to the intention of finality with which they entered into it. Like the settlement agreements in both Dowty and Asvitt, the agreement in the instant case calls for a sale of the marital home and an equal division of the proceeds from the sale. Finally, like the agreement in Asvitt, the property settlement at issue here includes a provision wherein each party waives all interest in the estate of the other. Clearly this provision is inconsistent with a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship because, under a joint tenancy, Gladys would become the sole owner of the marital home and thereby deprive Adolph's estate of Adolph's half interest in any proceeds from the sale of the residence. Based upon these provisions of the settlement agreement, we find adequate support for the trial court's determination that Adolph and Gladys' joint tenancy in the marital home was terminated at the time of their divorce. Affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., participating.