Title: Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 97-376 Re: Steven P. Shea (Corrected Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-913
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
   
____________
No. SC92913
____________
INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 97-376
RE:  STEVEN P. SHEA 
[March 23, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the findings and recommendations of a hearing panel of
the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, recommending that Judge Steven P.
Shea be removed from his position of circuit court judge for the Sixteenth Judicial
Circuit.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 12, Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed
below, we affirm the hearing panel’s findings and recommendation.
Judge Shea took office as a circuit court judge in January 1995.  On April 30,
1998, the Judicial Qualification Commission (JQC) filed a "Notice of Formal
Charges" in this Court, alleging various violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
The charges were amended to include six general prefatory charges and thirty-seven
specific charges.  The prefatory charges alleged that Judge Shea abused the power
-2-
of his judicial office by engaging in a pattern of vindictive and retaliatory conduct
towards those who disagreed with him.  This conduct included:  publicly holding the
disagreeing party up to scorn and ridicule; launching unilateral investigations of the
party's conduct and character; issuing self-serving orders that distorted the facts;
airing petty grievances publicly in order to embarrass the parties; being verbally and
physically abusive to others; and showing disrespect for fellow judges in his circuit
and encouraging others to do the same.
At the end of its case-in-chief, the JQC voluntarily dismissed twelve of the
specific charges, stating that no evidence was presented on these charges. 
Subsequently, the hearing panel found that six other charges were not supported by
clear and convincing evidence.  The hearing panel did find Judge Shea guilty of the
conduct charged in the prefatory charges, except that it did not find that Judge Shea
was physically abusive towards others.  The charges found by the hearing panel to
be supported by clear and convincing evidence are summarized as follows:  (1)
Judge Shea improperly contacted two attorneys and intimidated these attorneys into
withdrawing from representation of their client by threatening to recuse himself from
all of their cases; (2) Judge Shea entered an order directing a litigant to show cause
why she should not be held in indirect criminal contempt for writing a letter to the
Governor complaining of Judge Shea's handling of her support case; (3) Judge Shea
-3-
improperly sought to hold a counselor of Upper Keys Guidance Clinic in contempt
and threatened to put the Clinic out of business; (4) Judge Shea limited the rights of
pro se petitioners with domestic violence complaints by requiring employees of the
Domestic Abuse Shelter to submit affidavits that stated that they did not furnish any
assistance to the petitioners, chilling the willingness of victims and staff to come
forward with legitimate claims.  Judge Shea falsely stated in a letter to a newspaper
that the staff of the shelter agreed to the use of these forms; (5) Judge Shea engaged
in a pattern of antagonism with court staff and other judges; (6) Judge Shea
independently investigated a bailiff by interviewing a witness concerning the bailiff
without notice to the bailiff and without counsel on his behalf, intending to release
the information to a newspaper; (7) Judge Shea slammed a door in a bailiff’s face;
(8) Judge Shea inappropriately criticized a bailiff; (9) in a capital case, Judge Shea
entered an order improperly implying that two attorneys were guilty of unethical
conduct without allowing an opportunity to respond and threatening that he would
refer any failure of counsel to comply with his directives to the Chief Justice of this
Court; (10) Judge Shea denied a proper motion for recusal and then entered an order
improperly and inaccurately criticizing defense counsel without affording them an
opportunity to respond; (11) Judge Shea improperly suggested that attorneys in a
domestic violence case were encouraging their client to disobey his orders by filing
-4-
motions for a stay and improperly found the client to be in contempt; (12) Judge
Shea falsely accused an assistant state attorney of attempting to make ex parte
contacts with him and threatened to report him to The Florida Bar; (13) Judge Shea
falsely accused an assistant state attorney of having stated that Judge Shea had
engaged in ex parte communications; (14) Judge Shea improperly sought to involve
third parties in an internal dispute concerning court administrative matters by
publicly disseminating his version of events; (15) Judge Shea verbally attacked
fellow judges in a regular meeting of the judges; (16) Judge Shea violated the
confidence of another judge by disclosing the contents of a confidential
memorandum; and (17) Judge Shea threatened to assess attorney fees against the
Clerk of the Circuit Court.
The hearing panel concluded that Judge Shea had violated canons 1, 2, 3, and
5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and set forth extensive factual findings in support
of its conclusion that Judge Shea is unfit to hold office.  While these findings fully
explain the nature of each particular incident involving Judge Shea’s misconduct, we
find that charge one of the specific charges to be such a substantial offense that it
alone is sufficient to warrant Judge Shea’s removal from the bench.
The hearing panel’s findings as to charge one are as follows:
With regard to Charge 1, the Panel finds that clear and
-5-
convincing evidence demonstrates guilt based upon the following
events:
The Keynoter is an "Upper Keys" newspaper of general
circulation.  On Saturday, October 18, 1997, an article appeared in the
Keynoter discussing Coral Key Village (a well-situated tract on which
trailers are located pursuant to oral individual annual leases) and the
fact that Nicholas W. Mulick, ("Mulick") an Islamorada, Florida,
("Upper Keys") lawyer, was representing the new owners of Coral Key
Village. (T. 2462).
As of that date, Judge Shea, who had been on the bench for
approximately ten months, owned two trailers located on Coral Key
Village lots.  According to Judge Shea, he read the article and noted
that "Mr. Mulick was quoted as representing my landlords, who were
evicting me . . . and it really surprised me . . . ." (T. 2446).  Judge Shea
added that he "was surprised to see that . . . two attorneys who were
very good friends of mine who appeared in my court all the time were
involved in this eviction." (T. 2446).
Immediately after reading the article, Judge Shea called Mulick
at his home at 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. on a Saturday. (T. 85; 2462). 
According to Mulick, Judge Shea told him that he had attempted to
reach Mr. Peterson, a Tallahassee lawyer also representing the new
owners, by telephone, but finding him out of town, left a message for
him and then called Mulick because his name was in the article. (T.
86).  According to Mulick, Judge Shea asked him if he knew that he
(the Judge) owned two mobile homes "because he thought that if I
knew that, I wouldn't be involved in the case." (T. 86; 2463).  Mulick
informed Judge Shea that he was not involved in any eviction
proceedings, that they were being handled by Mr. Peterson, and that he
had only been consulted in connection with land-use matters. (T. 86;
2464).
According to Judge Shea, he "explained to Mulick that they can't
even evict us unless they get the land-use changed under Chapter 723"
and that "if you're working on the land-use . . . that's an essential,
integral part of the eviction." (T. 2464-65).  Judge Shea continued,
saying "It all goes hand in hand basically" and that he thought "we'd be
- to me, we'd be at odds." (T. 2465).
According to Mulick, Judge Shea then indicated that "he thought
-6-
that because I was representing Coral Key Village that I was adverse
to his interests and that if we did not recuse or withdraw from
representing the client, he would have to recuse himself on all cases
where we appeared attorney of record." (T. 87).  Mulick told Judge
Shea that "we shouldn't be talking about this, that he should talk to Mr.
Peterson because he was involved in the eviction matter and not I." (T.
87).
According to Mulick, Judge Shea then stated that if the owners
of Coral Key Village were to buy him out, that would render the issue
moot, and he would not have to withdraw. (T. 89).
Mulick testified that Judge Shea suggested that the buy-out price
on the smaller lot was $50,000.00, with the buy-out price on the more
desirable lot being $100,000.00. (T. 89).  Judge Shea admits to telling
Mulick that "my places are worth up to $150,000.00," but denied
saying "give me $150,000.00 and I'm out of here," stating, instead, that
he suggested that Mulick's client "buy everybody out . . . and then he
can own all the trailers there, and he can leave them there, or he can do
what he wants." (T. 2477; 2479).
A short time later, Judge Shea called Karl Beckmeyer,
("Beckmeyer") Mulick's law partner. (T. 154).  Judge Shea asked him
if he represented Coral Key Village, to which Beckmeyer responded
that he thought Mulick was doing some land-use work for the new
owners. (T. 154).  Judge Shea then reminded Beckmeyer that he (Judge
Shea) owned trailers in Coral Key Village, followed by the statement
that "you're adverse to my economic interest." (T. 155).
Beckmeyer further testified that Judge Shea spoke in a
threatening manner and told him that if his law firm continued to
represent the client, he was going to recuse himself from all of their
cases, forcing them to go to Marathon and Key West for all of their
hearings and trials. (T. 155). According to Beckmeyer, he was
"dumbstruck." (T. 155).
When asked whether upon reading the October 18, 1997,
Keynoter article it was clear to him that Beckmeyer and Mulick were
representing the owners of Coral Key Village, Judge Shea said that it
was, and that such representation created a definite conflict between
him and Beckmeyer and Mulick. (T. 2902-03).  Judge Shea said he
called, however, because he felt that "Nick and Karl must not
-7-
understand that there's a conflict here" . . . "because [he] was under the
impression they were very happy practicing in the Upper Keys; they
weren't dissatisfied with [him]." (T. 2903).  He then decided to
"disclose this conflict to them because it is a conflict, it's a problem."
(T. 2903).
It was then suggested that Judge Shea's call was to "straighten
out a conflict," and did he not see an impropriety in doing so, to which
he responded that he did not remember using the words "straighten out
a conflict." (T. 2904).  However, the record reflects that during the
Rule 6(b) hearing on the charges, Judge Shea had testified that he had
called Beckmeyer's office "and I said, 'Karl,' I said, 'We need to
straighten this out, because there's going to be a conflict of interest for
me to hear your cases if you're suing me or if I'm suing you and you're
representing the other side.'" (T. 2822).
In closing, Judge Shea was asked whether his calls to Mulick
and Beckmeyer "might be viewed as a veiled threat or a show of
muscle by a member of the judiciary, [and] would it not have been the
better practice to wait until the first case came . . . before [him]--and at
that time say, "I'm going to recuse myself" in open court and let them
decide what to do there, rather than a private phone call?" (T. 2906). 
In response, Judge Shea stated that is what he should have done, rather
than what he did. (T. 2906).
Following the contact by Judge Shea, Beckmeyer and Mulick
felt that they had no choice but to terminate their representation of
Coral Key Village. (T. 95).
While the Panel makes no finding as to whether the actual
amounts sought by Judge Shea were "exorbitant," it is noted that Judge
Shea called his judicial assistant, Lee El Koury, as a witness on his
behalf and she testified she overheard a conversation between Judge
Shea and Nick Mulick during which Judge Shea "said a sum of
money." (T. 1432; 1434).  According to Ms. El Koury, Judge Shea
"said $150,000.00." (T. 1435).  Following the telephone conversation,
Judge Shea then told Ms. El Koury that he thought that the waterfront
trailer was worth "about $75,000.00," or $25,000.00 less than what he
had represented to Mulick. (T. 1436).
It is of further interest to the Panel in evaluating witness
credibility that Judge Shea acquired his former wife's interest in the
-8-
waterfront lot in December of 1995, approximately two years before
conveying to Mulick the $100,000.00 price. (T. 2901).  When asked
how much he had paid his former wife for her interest, he stated that
"We had a mortgage on it of $40,000.00 . . . and I paid off that
mortgage, and that's what I paid for that." (T. 2901).  He then conceded
that as one-half of the mortgage was, theoretically, his responsibility,
he effectively paid her $20,000.00 for her interest. (T. 2901).  He did
state that they had an "informal agreement" that if he ever sold the
place, she would get "whatever equity she would be entitled to." (T.
2901).  However, when his attention was called to earlier testimony
where he stated that he wanted to retire on the property (rather than
sell it) he said "I'd like to live there eventually, right." (T. 2902).
All of this testimony raises serious questions surrounding the
actual fair market value of the property, the believability of Judge
Shea's statements in this regard and his underlying thought processes
and intentions.  The testimony shows a representation of a fair buy-out
value on the more expensive lot of $100,000.00 to Mulick, but a
contemporaneous statement to Ms. El Koury that it was worth "about
$75,000.00."  The testimony also reveals the Judge's purchase of his
ex-wife's interest two years earlier by simply satisfying a mortgage of
which only $20,000.00 was attributable to her, coupled with a
questionable statement that when he eventually sold it, she would
receive her share of the equity.  However, the Judge seemed to
contradict that testimony by stating that he intended to retire on it
rather than sell it. (T. 2902).
The Panel also heard evidence from Mr. Rosendale who was
Judge Shea's appraisal expert.  Mr. Rosendale testified to a value of
$141,000.00 and to Judge Shea's involvement in the real estate
appraisal he presented at the trial. (T. 1323 and Ex. 12).
Mr. Rosendale prepared an appraisal of the mobile homes and
arrived at a value of $141,000.00. (T. 1323).  Judge Shea did not own
the lots where the trailers were parked and had only oral leases with
the park owner. (T. 1322).  The effective date of the appraisal was
November 30, 1997, because Judge Shea told Mr. Rosendale that he
received his eviction notice on December 1, 1997. (T. 1338).  In fact,
Judge Shea received his notice of eviction in October, or before the
effective date used in the appraisal. (T. 1335).  The erroneous
-9-
information on which the appraiser relied came directly from the Judge.
(T. 1338).  In addition, Judge Shea had actually prepared the
prospectus for the mobile home park during the time he was a lawyer,
and he failed to inform Mr. Rosendale that he had only an oral one-
year lease for the land. (T. 1342-3).  This information would have
affected the appraisal's outcome. (T. 1340-41).  The Panel has given
Judge Shea the benefit of the doubt as to whether his conduct with
regard to his own appraiser was deliberately misleading and has thus
refrained from finding that Judge Shea was intentionally seeking an
inflated amount.  Notwithstanding, the conflicting evidence
surrounding the value of the property raises serious questions about the
credibility of Judge Shea's testimony and contemporaneous intentions
in response to Charge 1.
Based upon the clear and convincing evidence, as reflected
above, and the reasonable inferences in connection therewith, the Panel
concludes that Judge Shea is guilty in the following respects:
The contact with Mulick and Beckmeyer was improper and
motivated by Judge Shea's own personal financial interests and his
desire to effect the removal of two well-respected attorneys from the
representation of a party that he perceived as an enemy.  In this regard,
he abused his office and intimidated counsel into withdrawing from the
representation of their client, the new owner of Coral Key Village. (T.
92; 155; 158; 159).  The effect of this was to wrongfully, and without
justification, deprive the owners of Coral Key Village of counsel of
their choice.  Judge Shea should not have threatened to recuse himself
from all cases in which these lawyers were engaged in the
representation of other clients.  The telephone calls, regardless of his
perceived friendship, were totally improper, as was the suggestion of a
buy-out, whether made only for his own property or for his and other
owners' properties.  The use and abuse of the power of his office in this
regard is readily apparent and unacceptable.
As already stated, the Panel makes no finding as to whether the
actual amounts sought by Judge Shea were "exorbitant."  The facts,
however, do raise serious questions as to what happened, why it
happened, and the underlying motives.  Similarly, although it is not
found that Judge Shea made threats to sue the owners while he was a
judge or that he used the actual words, "Chicago Mafia," it is found
-10-
that Judge Shea did tell Mulick that the purchasers of Coral Key
Village had a poor reputation, were dishonest businessmen from
Chicago and "had acted in bad faith from the very beginning . . . ." (T.
88; 2492).  These comments are just further evidence of Judge Shea's
attempt to come between Mulick and Beckmeyer and their client. 
These were unsolicited and improper comments.
It is not suggested that Judge Shea could not have recused
himself in particular cases in which Mulick or Beckmeyer might have
appeared if he found the necessity to do so.  However, this should have
occurred in the context of an actual case and without the suggestion of
a trade-off by giving counsel the option of discontinuing their
representation and having Judge Shea remain in all of the firm's cases. 
His direct contacts with these counsel outside the context of any
particular case were influenced by his own financial interests and were
improper.
When Judge Shea made these phone calls to the law firm, it is
absolutely clear from the evidence that he knew there was a pending
eviction action as to the mobile home park and that this lawsuit may
have rendered his trailers worthless because he did not own the land on
which the trailers were parked.  Judge Shea had only an informal oral
lease on the land.
In sum, Judge Shea violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of
Judicial conduct by his actions which were dishonorable and improper
and did not promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. 
Although Judge Shea had every right to protect the value of his
property, the Panel concludes that he wrongly used his judicial office to
promote his own financial interests.
In In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1997), we stated the following in
respect to our review of the JQC’s findings of fact:
Before reporting findings of fact to this Court, the JQC must conclude
that they are established by clear and convincing evidence.  In re
McAllister, 646 So. 2d 173, 177 (Fla. 1994).  This Court must then
review the findings and determine whether they meet this quantum of
proof, a standard which requires more proof than a "preponderance of
-11-
the evidence" but the less than "beyond and to the exclusion of a
reasonable doubt."  In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994).  If
the findings meet this intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive
force and are given great weight by this Court.  See In re LaMotte, 341
So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1977).  This is so because the JQC is in a
position to evaluate the testimony and evidence first-hand.  See In re
Crowell, 379 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1979).  However, the ultimate power
and responsibility in making a determination rests with this Court.  Id.
Id. at 753.
Judge Shea admits that he called the attorneys and stated that if they did not
withdraw from representing their clients or if their clients did not buy out the
trailers, Judge Shea would recuse himself from all of their cases.  In addition, one of
the attorneys testified that Judge Shea discussed his recusal “in a very threatening
manner.”  The record also reflects that, while not admitting that he threatened the
attorneys, Judge Shea did admit that during the discussions it was understood that
his recusal would create an inconvenience for the attorneys because they would
have to try their cases in Marathon or Key West.  The record demonstrates that
Judge Shea used the situation to compel the attorneys to attempt to obtain a buy-out
of his trailers at an inflated price.  The record contains clear and convincing
evidence of Judge Shea’s attempts to improperly use his judicial office for financial
benefit.
The hearing panel concluded that Judge Shea’s conduct as to charge one
-12-
violated canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Canon 1 states that “[a]
judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.”  Canon 2
provides that “[a] judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of the judge’s activities.”  We agree that Judge Shea’s conduct as established
in the record violated these canons.  Our decision is not to be read to indicate that
Judge Shea’s recusal from a case in which these attorneys were involved would
have been improper.  What was plainly a violation of the Code was Judge Shea’s
bargaining in respect to a recusal decision.  Judge Shea made it clear to the
attorneys that they could either withdraw from representing their clients or have
their clients purchase the trailers to avoid his recusal.  Such bargaining was an
improper use of his judicial office to gain a personal financial benefit and was a
breach of the integrity of the judiciary.  We agree with the hearing panel that such a
breach of judicial integrity can in no way be tolerated.
In addition to canons 1 and 2, the hearing panel found that Judge Shea’s
conduct as to the remaining charges also violated canons 3 and 5 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.  Canon 3B.(4) provides that “[a] judge shall be patient, dignified,
and courteous” to those he or she deals with in an official capacity.  Canon 5A.
requires a judge to “conduct all of the judge’s extra-judicial activities so that they do
not . . . demean the judicial office.”  Judge Shea argues that his conduct as to the
-13-
remaining charges are not a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that such
a finding is not supported by the evidence.  We again disagree.
We do not believe it to be necessary to set out in detail the hearing panel’s
exhaustive findings of fact concerning Judge Shea’s conduct in respect to the
specified charges.  We do point out that conduct unbecoming a member of the
judiciary may be shown by evidence of an accumulation of small and ostensibly
innocuous incidents which, when considered together, emerge as a pattern of hostile
conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.  See In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565,
566 (Fla. 1970).  As the hearing panel’s findings and the record demonstrate, Judge
Shea engaged in a pattern of conduct in which he acted with hostility towards
attorneys, court personnel, and fellow judges.  The totality of the proof in the record
supports the conclusion that Judge Shea’s conduct in too many instances was not to
the standard required of a member of the judiciary.  See id.  Judge Shea’s lack of
respect and temperament in dealing with others with whom he had contact while he
served as a judge seriously undermined public trust in the judicial office.  See In re
Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1993).
Judge Shea justifies his conduct as an attempt to improve the administration
of justice in the Upper Keys and to improve access to mental health resources in the
community.  In Graham, this Court removed a judge who abused his judicial power
-14-
but attempted to justify his conduct as an effort to rid the county of what the judge
perceived as political favoritism and corruption.  This Court found that the alleged
misconduct of others did not justify the judge’s departure from the guidelines
established in the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Id. at 1275.  Similarly, Judge Shea’s
allegations of improper conduct on the part of others do not excuse his abuse of his
judicial office.
Judge Shea argues that the hearing panel’s findings should be rejected in their
entirety due to the participation of Judge Frank N. Kaney as chair of the hearing
panel of the JQC.  Judge Shea moved to recuse Judge Kaney because of Judge
Kaney’s participation with Judge Miller and Judge Ptomey (who both had filed
complaints against Judge Shea with the JQC) in the Florida Judicial College.  Judge
Shea alleged that comments made by Judge Kaney to Judge Shea led Judge Shea to
believe that Judge Kaney “may have had conversations” with Judge Miller and
Judge Ptomey concerning Judge Shea’s case.  Such an allegation is insufficient to
support a motion for recusal.  To determine if a motion is sufficient this Court looks
to see whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of
not receiving a fair and impartial trial.  See Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522 (Fla.
1997).  Allegations that Judge Kaney may have communicated with parties involved
in Judge Shea’s case do not meet this threshold.  Judge Shea’s motion for recusal
-15-
was properly denied.
Removal is the ultimate sanction in judicial disciplinary proceedings.  See In
re Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 753.  This Court will approve a recommendation that a
judge be removed from the bench when we conclude that the judge’s conduct is
fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.  Id.  Judge
Shea’s use of his office to promote his financial interests is inconsistent with the
responsibilities of judicial office.  Id.  In addition to using his judicial office for his
own financial purposes, Judge Shea also engaged in a pattern of conduct that further
demonstrates an unfitness to hold office.  While we do not necessarily find that any
one of the other offenses charged would constitute a removable offense individually,
when considered together, these charges are evidence of Judge Shea’s abuse of
power and require removal.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed, Steven P. Shea is hereby removed as
circuit judge for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, effective upon this opinion
becoming final.  We direct that Shea pay the costs of these proceedings, limited to
the court reporter per diem fees, deposition costs and costs associated with the
preparation of the transcript and record.  See In re Hapner, 737 So. 2d 1075, 1077
(Fla. 1999).  We remand this case to the JQC for a determination of the amount of
such costs.
-16-
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission
Honorable Frank N. Kaney, Chair of the Hearing Panel, Thomas C. MacDonald, Jr.,
General Counsel, and John R. Beranek, Counsel to the Hearing Panel, Tallahassee,
Florida; and Lauri Waldman Ross and Eileen L. Tilghman of Ross & Tilghman,
Special Counsel to the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Miami, Florida, 
for Petitioner
Arthur J. England, Jr., Paul R. Lipton, and Benjamin L. Reiss of Greenberg Traurig,
P.A., Miami, Florida; and James Wattigny, Lafayette, Louisiana,
for Respondent, Steven P. Shea