Title: P. v. Wright
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S119067
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 2005

1
 
Filed 5/26/05 (Publish this opinion before People v. Randle, also filed 5/26/05) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S119067 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C039031 
DONALD THOMAS WRIGHT, 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super.Ct.No. 99F09290 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 (Christian S.), we reaffirmed that 
an actual, though unreasonable, belief in the need to defend oneself from an 
imminent threat of death or great bodily injury negates the malice element of 
murder, reducing the offense to manslaughter.  (See also People v. Flannel (1979) 
25 Cal.3d 668, 674.)  We granted review in this case to consider whether to extend 
this “doctrine of imperfect self-defense” (Christian S., at p. 771) to a case in which 
the defendant’s actual, though unreasonable, belief in the need to defend himself 
was based on delusions and/or hallucinations resulting from mental illness or 
voluntary intoxication, without any objective circumstances suggestive of a threat.  
After studying the record, we conclude that we do not need to reach that issue 
here, because defendant was able to claim imperfect self-defense, the jury heard 
evidence supporting that defense, and the trial court’s exclusion of additional 
evidence supporting that defense was not prejudicial to defendant.  Accordingly, 
 
 
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because defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of this additional evidence, 
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Prosecution Case 
Eddie and Laura Sanchez and their children moved next door to defendant 
in April 1996.  In the early morning hours of November 15, 1999, defendant 
visited the Sanchez home, shot and killed Eddie, and then wounded Clarence 
Redoble, a friend of defendant’s who had accompanied him.  Eddie had been 
urging defendant out the door, when defendant pulled out a Kimber .45 pistol, 
loaded with Black Talon hollow-point bullets, and fired, while members of the 
Sanchez family sat in the living room watching a movie.  According to witness 
accounts, no argument or threatening conduct preceded the shooting. 
The previous day, the Sanchez family had hosted a barbecue.  They dug a 
fire pit in the backyard.  Two of Eddie’s brothers, John and Anthony, their 
families, and Laura’s younger sister, Tracey, were at the house.  This was not 
unusual.  The families were close-knit.  Family members visited often and 
frequently stayed overnight.  About a month before the shooting, Anthony was 
sleeping on the couch at Eddie’s house, when he was awakened by defendant 
knocking on the door.  Defendant told Anthony someone was trying to burglarize 
Eddie’s car, and then he said, “Don’t worry, I got something for them,” showing 
Anthony a gun he had tucked in his waistband.  Anthony’s impression was that 
defendant “was a little off” and “kind of odd.” 
Clarence Redoble, defendant’s friend, lived five minutes away from 
defendant, and as he often did, he saw defendant several times on November 14, 
the day before the shooting.  That morning, at defendant’s insistence, he brought 
his pit bulls over to defendant’s house and released them in the crawlspace under 
 
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the house as a security precaution.  Defendant thought people were trying to gain 
access to his house by tunneling their way into the crawlspace.  Redoble went 
back later to feed the dogs and turned them loose in the backyard. 
By nightfall on November 14, the weather had turned cold and rainy.  The 
Sanchez family rented three videos and went inside for a dinner of hot soup and a 
movie marathon.  Some family members watched the movies; others fell asleep.  
Most of the children were put to bed. 
Sometime after 11:00 p.m., defendant called the Sanchez house; Laura’s 
sister Tracey answered the phone.  Defendant said he needed to talk to a friend and 
wanted Tracey to come over.  She refused.  Defendant asked to speak to Eddie, but 
Tracey told him Eddie was asleep and then hung up the phone. 
Around midnight, Clarence Redoble returned to defendant’s house and 
found him standing outside in the rain.  Defendant said he had locked himself out 
of the house.  It was cold, and Redoble had tucked his hands into his jacket 
pockets, but defendant asked Redoble to take his hands out of his pockets, which 
made Redoble think defendant was “tripping.”  Redoble checked the doors and 
windows to see if there was any way to get into the locked house.  Finally, he 
suggested breaking a small window in the side door, which he could easily repair 
the next day.  Defendant rejected that idea.  He wanted to go to Eddie’s house to 
call a locksmith.  Redoble thought it was too late to disturb the neighbors, so he 
offered to go to his own house to call a locksmith.  Defendant was adamant.  As an 
alternative, Redoble offered to go next door alone and ask the Sanchezes to call a 
locksmith so that defendant, who used crutches, would not have to negotiate the 
path on his crutches in the rain.  Defendant stubbornly followed Redoble to 
Sanchez’s door. 
Eddie answered Clarence Redoble’s knock and invited him and defendant 
inside.  Defendant refused to sit down and remained standing just inside the door, 
 
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resting on his crutches, while Eddie looked up locksmiths in the phonebook and 
made a couple of calls. 
Defendant’s behavior was unusual.  According to witnesses, he was 
mumbling to himself, pointing to different people, saying, “Oh, there’s one . . . by 
the window.  Oh, [that]’s her.”  Clarence Redoble wanted to leave, but defendant 
resisted.  He asked to go to the backyard to see Eddie’s dogs.  Eddie refused, 
explaining it was cold and raining outside and defendant was on crutches.  
Defendant then started to get aggressive, demanding to see the backyard.  Eddie 
sought to soothe defendant’s agitation, telling him, “No one’s gonna hurt you 
here.” 
At some point during this exchange, Eddie went into the kitchen and put a 
barbecue fork in his back pocket.  Eddie’s brother John saw him do so and 
expressed concern.  Eddie said:  “Everything’s okay.  Don’t worry about it.”  
Defendant was wearing a jacket, and he kept putting his hand in the jacket pocket, 
which had a noticeable bulge. 
The front door had been opened and cold air was seeping into the house.  
Eddie asked defendant to leave, telling him the baby would get sick because of the 
cold air coming in through the open door.  Defendant refused, saying, “No, I don’t 
wanna go.”  He seemed to get upset, and he asked Eddie, “Are you packing?”  
Eddie answered, “No, what do I need a gun for?” and then asked, “Why?  Does he 
have a gun?”  Eddie was standing next to defendant.  He patted or frisked 
defendant’s jacket and then stepped back a little.  Eddie had nothing in his hands.  
He never touched the fork in his back pocket.  Defendant pulled the pistol from his 
jacket and fired several shots at Eddie.  Clarence Redoble was holding defendant’s 
arm, and when he tried to pull defendant away, defendant turned the gun toward 
Redoble and fired a shot that grazed Redoble’s hip. 
 
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Eddie was flung backward by the blast.  His body was sprawled on the 
dining room floor.  One of the Black Talon hollow-point bullets, with which 
defendant had loaded the gun, had lacerated two major blood vessels in Eddie’s 
lower abdomen.  After the shooting, Eddie’s brother Anthony was the first person 
to reach defendant, who was standing right outside the door, the gun still in his 
hand.  Defendant turned the gun toward Anthony, but Anthony launched himself 
at defendant, grabbed his gun hand, and bashed him in the face.  Defendant 
dropped his crutch, and Anthony picked it up and beat defendant until the crutch 
broke.  Anthony thought defendant was trying to get the gun, which had fallen to 
the ground during the struggle, but John got to it first.  John picked the gun up, 
placed the barrel against defendant’s head, but he did not pull the trigger.  He took 
the gun inside the house and placed it on the dining room table. 
A patrol officer heard the gunshots and arrived at the scene within two 
minutes.  He found defendant sitting in the middle of the lawn, bloodied but 
conscious.  The paramedics arrived and transported Eddie to the hospital, where he 
died. 
Officers who searched defendant’s house after the shooting found more 
guns and ammunition.  They also found a note, written on an old parking ticket, 
that said, “It might not be Ed, but Jay.” 
B. The Defense Case 
As a result of the struggle that followed the shooting, defendant suffered a 
possible concussion, a fractured right wrist, an abraded and crushed little finger, 
and metacarpal fractures of his left hand.  His toxicological screen was positive for 
amphetamines, benzodiazepines, and opiates.  Defendant also had a number of 
serious preexisting medical problems.  He suffered from osteoarthritis and high 
blood pressure.  A broken leg had healed improperly and had required corrective 
 
6
surgery in September 1999.  Defendant had to use crutches until his leg healed and 
had prescriptions for his various ailments, including painkillers.  He supplemented 
his Social Security disability income by selling drugs. 
The jury learned more background information about defendant through the 
testimony of Dr. Charles Schaffer, a psychiatrist who testified concerning 
defendant’s mental condition.  In 1998, defendant was the victim of an aggressive 
home invasion robbery.  Evidence suggested that a family member—perhaps 
defendant’s niece, Corina Fajardo—and other people with whom defendant was 
acquainted were involved in the robbery.  The intruders tied defendant up, gagged 
him, and beat him, taking money, drugs, and jewelry. 
After the robbery, defendant’s friends, neighbors, and relatives noticed that 
his behavior became increasingly bizarre.  He seemed more paranoid, nervous, and 
vulnerable.  Cindy Fajardo, defendant’s half sister, lived with him for a time, but 
moved out when defendant accused her of being part of a conspiracy against him.  
Defendant’s leg injury also seemed to increase his paranoia.  Defendant went 
through a complete personality change; he was “tripping . . . thinking the wrong 
thoughts.”  Defendant said his cat was acting strangely because it could hear 
people tunneling under the house.  Defendant also believed people were trying to 
break into his house through the attic and were planting microphones.  Defendant 
inquired from a salesperson named Pete Cabanyon about installing a home 
security system.  One neighbor, Joaquin Miranda, saw defendant wearing a 
headset that defendant claimed could detect people in the backyard and the attic.  
The day before the shooting, Miranda heard defendant calling for help.  Defendant 
said that he had been shot, but when Miranda examined him, he found no injuries. 
Defendant made repeated 911 calls.  He told officers that “someone was 
trying to put a satellite dish on top of his house so they could beam rays down 
 
7
from space and take over his body.”  The day before the shooting, he claimed he 
heard gunshots in the attic, but responding officers found nothing. 
Defendant’s paranoia often focused on Eddie Sanchez and sometimes on 
one of Eddie’s coworkers, Jay Moffit.  He accused Jay and Eddie of stealing from 
him.  He thought there was a “Hispanic conspiracy against him” and that Eddie 
was “running it.”  He told people the harassment from Eddie was getting out of 
hand. 
Prior to the shooting, defendant reported he had been “snorting a couple of 
lines” of methamphetamine every day for at least six months. 
Dr. Charles Schaffer personally interviewed defendant, and reviewed 
statements of friends, relatives, and neighbors, as well as records from the county 
jail and reports of other mental health professionals, and concluded that at the time 
of the shooting defendant was suffering from an “amphetamine induced psychotic 
disorder, with delusions.”  Dr. Schaffer noted that psychotic symptoms “can 
include delusions [or] thoughts that are out of touch with reality . . . perceiving 
things that don’t exist . . . seeing things that are not based on any real object . . . .”  
Defendant denied experiencing any psychotic symptoms at the time of the 
interview with Dr. Schaffer.  He claimed he could remember only bits and pieces 
of the confrontation with Eddie.  He recalled clearly why he went to the Sanchez 
house.  He needed a locksmith, and his auto club card was locked inside the house.  
He remembered asking Eddie about a weapon and recalled nothing else until he 
woke up in the University of California hospital. 
Although Dr. Schaffer discounted defendant’s claim of amnesia, he 
believed that his diagnosis of psychotic disorder with delusions was sound, based 
in part on the stories related to him by defendant’s relatives and neighbors.  He 
rejected—as highly improbable—the possibility that defendant was malingering.  
He also opined, in support of defendant’s claim of imperfect self-defense, that a 
 
8
person suffering from defendant’s symptoms would have a heightened sensitivity 
to threat, especially when crowded by other people. 
Defense counsel sought to have all of the witnesses on whose statements 
Dr. Schaffer relied, including Joaquin Miranda, Pete Cabanyon, and Cindy 
Fajardo, testify during the trial.  The court sustained the prosecution’s objection 
that this evidence would be cumulative, but left open the possibility the defense 
could present these witnesses if Dr. Schaffer failed to recall what they said. 
The jury found defendant guilty of the second degree murder of Eddie 
Sanchez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and the assault of Clarence Redoble (§ 245, 
subd. (a)(2)).  As to the murder charge, the jury found true an allegation that 
defendant personally used a firearm in violation of section 12022.53, subdivision 
(d).  As to the assault charge, the jury found true an allegation that defendant used 
a firearm within the meaning of section 1203.06, subdivisions (a)(1), and section 
12022.5, former subdivision (a)(1) (now subd. (a)).  In a separate sanity phase of 
the trial, the jury found defendant was legally sane during the commission of the 
crimes. 
On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred 
when it excluded testimony from the witnesses on whose statements Dr. Schaffer 
had relied in reaching his conclusions.  The Court of Appeal found trial court error 
and reversed the judgment.  The court reasoned that this testimony was crucial to 
substantiating defendant’s assertion of imperfect self-defense, and its exclusion 
prejudicially violated defendant’s state and federal due process rights.  We granted 
review. 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
9
II. 
DISCUSSION 
The People assert that a claim of imperfect self-defense must be based on 
objective circumstances indicating a threat, not on mere delusions or 
hallucinations arising from voluntary intoxication.  The People argue that the 
evidence in this case does not support imperfect self-defense because the only 
arguably threatening objective circumstances that preceded defendant’s violent 
outburst were the barbeque fork in Eddie Sanchez’s back pocket and the fact that 
Eddie patted or frisked defendant’s jacket.  According to the People, these 
circumstances were not sufficient to support the claim of imperfect self-defense.  
We need not reach that issue, however.  Assuming without deciding that imperfect 
self-defense applies here, we see no prejudice to defendant in the trial court’s 
ruling that excluded the testimony of his witnesses. 
The jury was instructed on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, and 
defense counsel was permitted to argue this theory.  Moreover, evidentiary support 
for defendant’s imperfect self-defense claim was provided by the testimony of 
prosecution witnesses Clarence Redoble and Anthony Sanchez, as well as defense 
expert Dr. Schaffer.  Redoble, for example, described in detail defendant’s 
paranoid behavior prior to the shooting, including his belief that he was the target 
of a possible attack and that people were trying to enter his house.  The Court of 
Appeal reversed solely because the trial court excluded as cumulative the 
testimony of other witnesses who would have recounted additional incidents 
reflecting defendant’s precarious mental state in the days, weeks, and months 
preceding the shooting.  According to the defense offer of proof, these witnesses 
would have testified to the circumstances of the home-invasion robbery, how 
defendant’s behavior deteriorated after the robbery, what defendant told police 
officers who responded to his 911 calls, and how defendant was acting on the day 
before the shooting. 
 
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The substance of this excluded testimony was, however, admitted through 
Dr. Schaffer, the defense expert who relied on statements from these various 
witnesses in forming his opinion about defendant’s mental state and who 
described these statements to the jury.  The trial court admitted his descriptions 
without a limiting instruction, and defense counsel elicited details from 
Dr. Schaffer without a single objection from the prosecution.  In addition, the trial 
court, as already noted, permitted the defense to renew its request to present these 
witnesses if Dr. Schaffer’s testimony was inadequate, and defense counsel chose 
not to do so, suggesting satisfaction with Dr. Schaffer’s testimony. 
Thus, the jury heard Dr. Schaffer recount the statement of defendant’s uncle 
that after the home-invasion robbery defendant “became very vulnerable” and was 
concerned that someone was trying to burglarize his house, that defendant also 
believed someone was surveilling the house and monitoring his conversations with 
hidden microphones, and that, on the day before the shooting, defendant was 
“really strange,” “agitated and disturbed,” “shaking,” and “looking bad,” and made 
his uncle afraid.  Dr. Schaffer also recounted the statement of the uncle’s grandson 
that, on the day before the shooting, defendant was “acting weird” and “talking 
about strange things,” such as people entering his home and planting microphones, 
hearing voices in the attic, seeing people crawling underneath the house, and cars 
chasing him.  Dr. Schaffer further recounted the statement of defendant’s half 
sister who lived with defendant for several months.  She reported that defendant 
became “very afraid right after his home invasion robbery,” that he repeatedly 
woke her up in the middle of the night because he believed someone was in the 
house, that he believed someone had “bugged” the house and was out to “get” 
him, that he had accused her of being part of a conspiracy against him, and that 
she believed his leg injury had exacerbated his paranoia.  In addition, Dr. Schaffer 
recounted the statement of the home security system salesperson who visited 
 
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defendant in September or October 1999 and reported that defendant was terrified 
and shaking and believed people had “bugged” his house, were trying to enter the 
house, and were “out to get him.”  Dr. Schaffer also recounted the statement of the 
neighbor who reported that defendant became increasingly paranoid about six 
months before the shooting, claimed people were stealing from him and trying to 
kill him, asserted that his headset could detect intruders, and falsely declared on 
the day before the shooting that he had been shot in the back.  Finally, Dr. 
Schaffer described the 911 call on the day before the shooting, in which defendant 
claimed that there were intruders in the house, that he had heard gunshots in the 
attic and the crawlspace under the house, and that someone was trying to install a 
satellite dish on his roof.  Dr. Schaffer described the conclusion of the police 
officer who responded to the call and found no basis for defendant’s concerns.  In 
short, through Dr. Schaffer’s testimony, the jury heard the substance of what all 
these witnesses had to say.  We certainly do not condone the use of hearsay to 
present a case to the jury, but the primary consequence of the trial court’s ruling 
excluding the testimony of these several witnesses was that the jury did not see the 
witnesses testify live. 
The Court of Appeal found the trial court’s ruling prejudicial error.  In the 
court’s words, “this is the rare case in which the trial court abused its discretion,” 
because defendant’s mental state “was the lynchpin of his defense,” and the 
excluded testimony “was crucial to the defense’s position that defendant’s 
delusional mental state was not falsely fabricated after he committed the crime.”  
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal reasoned, defendant was deprived 
of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law. 
The Court of Appeal’s analysis cannot withstand scrutiny.  Not only did the 
jury learn the substance of the excluded testimony, but the People never 
challenged the accuracy of the witnesses’ statements or Dr. Schaffer’s description 
 
12
of those statements, and therefore the credibility of these witnesses was simply not 
a central issue.  In fact, after the defense made its offer of proof regarding these 
witnesses, the district attorney explained to the court:  “I am not contesting that the 
statements he read are true.  I mean, if the witnesses come in, I wouldn’t intend on 
suggesting in any way that they are making this stuff up.”  Moreover, in closing 
argument to the jury, the district attorney referred to Dr. Schaffer’s testimony and 
said:  “[I]f the psychotic disorder is true that the psychiatrist was telling you about, 
that he actually has some real delusions, and it sounds like that’s true.  [¶]  He’s 
having some real delusions the week before and up to this very day.  These real 
delusions probably have an impact on him, right?  That’s no problem with that.  
Everybody can buy that.  I think we can all be on the same page that this is going 
on . . . .”  (Italics added.)  The district attorney’s strategy, in other words, was to 
concede the existence of defendant’s mental problems but argue there was no 
evidence that defendant actually believed an imminent peril necessitated the use of 
deadly force at the moment the shooting occurred.  (See Christian S., supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 783.)  As the district attorney put it:  “These are issues that show that 
he has moments certainly of lucidity and clarity.  [¶]  And when he’s over there at 
the house we don’t know what happened for sure.  We don’t know what’s in his 
head.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Where’s the evidence?  Where’s the evidence in his head that at 
that moment he said, oh, my gosh, I know I have an [actual] unreasonable belief in 
the need to defend myself against this imminent peril right now.  I’ve got to do it, 
boom.  [¶]  You know what, there’s no evidence of that.”  Thus, defendant’s actual 
belief at the time of the shooting was the critical issue in the case, not the general 
existence of his abnormal mental condition, and testimony of live witnesses who 
would have described defendant’s general state of mind at various times prior to 
the shooting would not have affected the jury’s assessment of that critical issue in 
any way, because (1) the jury learned the substance of this testimony through Dr. 
 
13
Schaffer, and (2) the prosecution conceded the truth of the statements recounted 
by Dr. Schaffer, as well as Dr. Schaffer’s diagnosis of psychotic delusions. 
The Court of Appeal, relying in part on Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 
683, concluded that exclusion of this testimony was so serious an error that it 
violated defendant’s right to a fair trial under the federal Constitution, and 
defendant, also relying on Crane, argues that the trial court’s ruling prevented the 
jury from assessing the credibility of his defense.  In Crane, the credibility of the 
defendant’s confession was the central issue in the case, and the high court held 
that the trial court in that case erred in excluding evidence related to the 
circumstances of the confession, because that evidence bore on the question of 
credibility.  (Id. at pp. 690-691.)  Here, on the other hand, the People did not 
contest the accuracy of Dr. Schaffer’s hearsay account of defendant’s delusional 
behavior, and in fact the People conceded that defendant was having the delusions 
that the excluded witnesses would have described.  Therefore, contrary to 
defendant’s assertion, the exclusion of their testimony did not impact the 
credibility of his defense as directly as the exclusion of evidence that was at issue 
in Crane. 
Because the circumstances at the time of the shooting only weakly support 
the conclusion that defendant was acting at that time under a delusional belief that 
he was under attack (cf. People v. Viramontes (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263), 
the evidence of other paranoid delusions prior to the shooting was of some 
importance—but the jury heard about this paranoid and delusional behavior from 
defendant’s friend Clarence Redoble.  The trial court’s decision to bar additional 
testimony to the same effect (but to allow Dr. Schaffer to describe the substance of 
this excluded evidence) arguably did not violate Evidence Code section 352, but 
we need not decide the question.  Even if we assume the trial court erred, and if 
we assume the error was so grave as to implicate defendant’s federal due process 
 
14
rights, the exclusion of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming that the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling, we find that 
error to be harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
A series of flawed decisions and patchwork legislative solutions has left the 
law governing homicide in California confusing and in some cases anomalous.  
For the reasons stated in my majority opinion, ante, we cannot decide the issue we 
had intended to decide in this case, but considering the impenetrable labyrinth that 
California’s homicide law has become, perhaps the Legislature is better situated to 
provide the answer than we are.  I write this concurrence to describe how we got 
ourselves into this labyrinth and to suggest the way out. 
Much of the confusion is traceable to our efforts to define malice 
aforethought.  “California statutes have long separated criminal homicide into two 
classes, the greater offense of murder and the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter.  The distinguishing feature is that murder includes, but 
manslaughter lacks, the element of malice.”  (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
450, 460 (Rios).)  But what exactly is malice in this context?  The plain text of 
Penal Code section 1881 seems to suggest that intent unlawfully to kill by itself 
establishes malice:  Malice “is express when there is manifested a deliberate 
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature.”  Voluntary 
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), however, requires proof of “purpose and design,” 
as opposed to mere “accident,” and therefore the element of malice that 
differentiates murder from manslaughter must be something more than simple 
intent.  (See People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 321 (Conley), quoting People 
v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 730, fn. 11 (Gorshen), italics omitted.)  What is 
that “something more”? 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2
I. 
We have construed the statutory definition of malice in a series of cases 
considering the relevance of a defendant’s abnormal mental condition in the 
context of a homicide prosecution.  Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d 716, for example, 
involved what appeared on its face to be a deliberate and premeditated murder.  
The defendant, a longshoreman, drank enough gin during the course of his work 
shift to become intoxicated.  His foreman confronted him, told him to go home, 
and the two began to fight.  In the course of this brawl, the defendant suffered a 
cut below his eye, requiring several stitches.  (Id. at p. 720.)  When the defendant 
returned to work the same night, he was told to go home.  He asserted that he 
would do so, but that he would return with his gun and kill the foreman.  (Ibid.)  
He then went home, fired his gun once, returned, and shot the foreman in the 
stomach.  (Id. at pp. 720-721.)  At his trial, the defendant presented evidence that 
he suffered from a form of schizophrenia that caused him to have sexual 
hallucinations.  (Id. at p. 722.)  Recent anxiety over sexual dysfunction had 
exacerbated these hallucinations, and his self-esteem was, as a result, tied closely 
to “his ability in his work.”  The defense expert, a psychiatrist, testified that, on 
the night of the shooting, the defendant’s mental condition caused him to perceive 
the foreman’s instruction to go home as the equivalent of:  “ ‘You’re not a man, 
you’re impotent, . . . you’re a sexual pervert.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The psychiatrist explained 
that the defendant was at that moment on the verge of complete loss of sanity, and 
his mind compensated for the crisis by clinging obsessively to the thought of 
killing the foreman.  The shooting then resolved that mental crisis.  (Ibid.) 
The trial court found the defendant guilty of second degree murder.  
(Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 719.)  In affirming the conviction, we held that 
the psychiatrist’s testimony was proper evidence because it was relevant to 
whether the defendant had acted with the requisite specific intent.  (Id. at pp. 726-
727.)  We also considered whether an “abnormal mental . . . condition (whether 
caused by intoxication, by trauma, or by disease, but not amounting to legal 
 
3
insanity or unconsciousness)” could negate malice, reducing murder to 
manslaughter.  (Id. at p. 731.)  We concluded that it could, disapproving a long 
line of cases that suggested otherwise.  We reasoned that malice was, in this 
regard, a mental state like any other, and a defendant’s abnormal mental condition 
was relevant to determining the presence of that mental state.  (Id. at pp. 731-733.) 
In Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, we again considered the relevance of 
intoxication evidence in a homicide prosecution.  The defendant in Conley had 
been romantically involved with Elaine McCool until she reconciled with her 
husband, Clifton McCool.  (Id. at pp. 314-315.)  After a multiday drinking binge, 
the defendant purchased a rifle and tested it.  (Id. at p. 315.)  He told friends he 
wanted to kill the McCools, but his friends dismissed the threat because he was 
intoxicated.  (Ibid.)  He continued to drink.  He next went to the group of cabins 
where the McCools lived and visited other friends.  (Ibid.)  He repeated that he 
wanted to kill the McCools and then left his friends’ cabin.  A few minutes later, 
four shots rang out.  Witnesses saw the defendant shoot Elaine McCool as she was 
running from him.  (Ibid.)  A jury convicted the defendant of the first degree 
murders of both Elaine and Clifton McCool (id. at p. 314), but we reversed the 
convictions because the trial court had failed to give the jury instructions on 
manslaughter, and also failed to define malice and explain that malice is an 
essential element of murder.  (Id. at pp. 319-320.) 
In our opinion, we reaffirmed the principle stated in Gorshen that a 
defendant’s mental condition (including intoxication) at the time of a homicide is 
relevant to the issue of malice aforethought (Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 317-
318), but then we went a step further.  The Attorney General argued that the first 
degree murder convictions necessarily included a finding of deliberation and 
premeditation and that the jury had therefore found malice.  (Id. at p. 320.)  We 
disagreed, and in so doing we had to define malice in a way that distinguished it 
from intent.  In other words, we had to carve out a class of murders that might 
somehow be deliberate and premeditated but not malicious.  (Id. at pp. 320-323.)  
 
4
In that context, we divined an awareness-of-civic-duty component of malice 
aforethought, stating:  “An awareness of the obligation to act within the general 
body of laws regulating society . . . is included in the statutory definition of . . . 
malice . . . .”  (Id. at p. 322.)  By adding that gloss to the definition, malice 
aforethought became something clearly distinct from intent, and under this new 
definition, a defendant’s “diminished capacity” (id. at p. 318) due to intoxication 
or other mental condition might leave him unaware of his duty to act lawfully but 
still able to act with intent, deliberation, and premeditation.  (Id. at p. 323.)  We 
specifically cited Gorshen as an example of a fact scenario in which one might act 
with deliberation and premeditation—declaring an intent to kill, going home, test-
firing a gun, returning, and killing—but not with malice, because one was not able 
to appreciate one’s duty to act within the law.  (Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 
322-323.) 
Moreover, this same revised definition of malice justified the need for 
manslaughter instructions.  If malice aforethought were closely tied to intent, then 
any factual defense that might disprove malice would also tend to disprove intent, 
making a voluntary manslaughter conviction inappropriate and voluntary 
manslaughter instructions unnecessary.  But, by defining malice in a way that 
sharply distinguished it from intent, we created the possibility that the evidence 
might disprove malice but nevertheless establish an intentional unlawful killing, 
making a voluntary manslaughter conviction appropriate.  In short, by an accretion 
upon the statutory definition of malice, we were able to create an element of 
murder that could be disproved by diminished capacity evidence without 
simultaneously disproving intent to kill.  This accretion, therefore, provided the 
logical basis by which diminished capacity might reduce murder to voluntary 
manslaughter. 
II. 
Various 1981 amendments to the Penal Code were expressly intended to 
eliminate the diminished capacity defense.  (See In re Christian S. (1994) 7 
 
5
Cal.4th 768, 774-775, 781-782 (Christian S.).)  Thus, the Legislature announced:  
“As a matter of public policy there shall be no defense of diminished capacity . . . 
in a criminal action . . . .”  (§ 28, subd. (b).)  The electorate passed a 
complementary initiative in 1982 that provided in part:  “The defense of 
diminished capacity is hereby abolished.”  (§ 25, subd. (a).)  Nevertheless, as long 
as a specific state of mind is a necessary element of an offense, a defendant cannot 
be prohibited from presenting relevant evidence raising a doubt about whether that 
state of mind was present.  Therefore, the 1981 amendments did not preclude the 
defense of “diminished actuality”—that nonsensical phrase being judicial 
shorthand for the actual lack of a requisite mental state, due to an abnormal mental 
condition.  (See, e.g., People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253, italics 
omitted (Steele).)  Hence, even after the 1981 amendments, intoxication evidence 
could still produce an acquittal in a murder prosecution.  A key component, 
however, of the diminished capacity defense had been that it offered jurors the 
middle option of a voluntary manslaughter conviction rather than the stark choice 
between a murder conviction and a complete acquittal.  To eliminate that middle 
option, the 1981 amendments rejected the awareness-of-civic-duty gloss we had 
put on the definition of malice aforethought.  As amended, section 188 now 
provides:  “Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body 
of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the 
definition of malice.” 
As a result of this statutory change, a defendant who announced his intent 
to kill, and then took methodical steps to do so, could not pursue the compromise 
verdict of voluntary manslaughter on the theory that intoxication or other mental 
condition had clouded his awareness of his duty to act within the law.  That, in any 
case, was our holding in People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103.  In Saille, the 
defendant argued that, because the 1981 amendments did not eliminate diminished 
actuality, intoxication evidence could still negate malice and reduce murder to 
voluntary manslaughter.  (Id. at pp. 1112-1113.)  We rejected the argument, citing 
 
6
the change to section 188 and concluding that the elimination of the diminished 
capacity defense effectively eliminated the middle option of voluntary 
manslaughter in a diminished actuality case.  (Id. at pp. 1113-1117.)  In the course 
of our opinion, we repeatedly linked malice to intent.  We said:  “[O]nce the trier 
of fact finds a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill, no other mental state need be 
shown to establish malice aforethought.”  (Id. at p. 1113, italics added.)  We added 
that “express malice and an intent unlawfully to kill are one and the same” (id. at 
p. 1114), and we twice said that, “when an intentional killing is shown, malice 
aforethought is established” (ibid.).  Finally, we concluded that, “[i]n amending 
section 188 in 1981, the Legislature equated express malice with an intent 
unlawfully to kill.”  (Id. at p. 1116.)  By closely linking malice to intent, our 
holding in Saille tended to blur the distinction between voluntary manslaughter 
and second degree murder, seemingly limiting voluntary manslaughter to the 
statutorily defined instance of “a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”  (§ 192, subd. 
(a).)  For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to this statutorily defined category of 
voluntary manslaughter as “heat-of-passion manslaughter.” 
III. 
Imperfect self-defense was originally a subcategory of heat-of-passion 
manslaughter, not a distinct doctrine.  In fact, at one time we felt the need to 
clarify that heat-of-passion manslaughter could encompass factual scenarios other 
than imperfect self-defense.  (People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49-50 
(Logan).)  Similarly, in People v. Best (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 606 (Best), the Court 
of Appeal treated imperfect self-defense as a specific type of heat-of-passion 
manslaughter.  Discussing imperfect self-defense, the court stated:  “ ‘The 
dividing line between self-defense and this character of manslaughter seems to be 
the existence, as the moving force, of a reasonable founded belief of imminent 
peril to life or great bodily harm[, leading to an acquittal based on self-defense], as 
distinguished from the influence of an uncontrollable fear or terror, conceivable as 
existing, but not reasonably justified by the immediate circumstances[, leading to a 
 
7
manslaughter conviction].’ ”  (Id. at p. 610, quoting Commonwealth v. Colandro 
(Pa. 1911) 80 A. 571, 574.)  Thus, according to the traditional view, imperfect 
self-defense, like other forms of heat-of-passion manslaughter, involved a killing 
committed in a state of passion, but the passion at issue was not rage or intense 
jealousy; rather, the killer believed (in the passion of the moment) that he had to 
use deadly force to repel an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.  The 
Best court noted, however, the long-standing rule that “adequate provocation” 
must underlie the defendant’s heat of passion for it to support a reduction of 
murder to manslaughter.  (Best, at p. 610, citing People v. Freel (1874) 48 Cal. 
436, 437.)  In a case where there was “no considerable provocation,” and the 
elements of murder were otherwise satisfied, malice was implied, and a murder 
conviction was appropriate.  (§ 188.)  In addition, the Best court made clear that, 
in the case of imperfect self-defense, the fear of death or great bodily injury, 
though unreasonable, must nevertheless be “caused by the circumstances.”  (Best, 
at p. 610.)  This language tends to ground imperfect self-defense in some objective 
circumstance that the defendant could conceivably interpret as threatening.  Thus, 
it was not the absence of objective circumstances, but the unreasonable response 
to those circumstances—a miscalibration—that characterized imperfect self-
defense. 
In short, the Court of Appeal, in Best, supra, 13 Cal.App.2d 606, expressly 
endorsed a reasonably unreasonable standard for imperfect self-defense.  (But see 
People v. Uriarte (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 197 (Uriarte).)  The “provocation” 
or threatening “circumstances” must be adequate, but at the same time, the deadly 
force exerted in response must be “ ‘not reasonably justified.’ ”  (Id. at p. 610.)  As 
awkward as this reasonably unreasonable standard might seem on its face, it is 
quite consistent with manslaughter as that crime has been historically understood.  
Manslaughter is, of course, a class of criminal behavior, and therefore it 
necessarily implies unreasonable conduct—that is, conduct falling short of the 
minimum standards society imposes on its members—but we have nevertheless 
 
8
always held that the heat of passion that justifies reducing murder to voluntary 
manslaughter must be based on “circumstances . . . sufficient to arouse the 
passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.”  (Logan, supra, 175 Cal. at p. 49, 
italics added.)  Therefore, the intermediate, reasonably unreasonable standard has 
always been an aspect of voluntary manslaughter—for manslaughter is, after all, a 
middle option between murder and complete exculpation. 
In People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 (Flannel), we approved the 
reasoning of Best, expressly adopting imperfect self-defense as a category of 
voluntary manslaughter (Flannel, at pp. 675-676), but we disconnected it from 
heat-of-passion manslaughter (id. at pp. 677-678).  We separated these doctrines 
because imperfect self-defense by definition involves an unreasonable response to 
the circumstances (for otherwise it would be true self-defense), whereas heat-of-
passion manslaughter requires a provocation that would arouse the passions of a 
“ ‘reasonable person.’ ”  (Id. at p. 678, italics added.)  We believed these 
standards to be mutually inconsistent.  (Ibid.)  We did not, however, recognize that 
even in the case of heat-of-passion manslaughter (where the defendant’s passion 
must, by definition, be reasonable), the defendant’s conduct is certainly 
unreasonable in the sense that manslaughter constitutes a serious crime, not an 
exculpation.  Therefore, the reasonableness component of heat-of-passion 
manslaughter has always managed to coexist with the recognition that we are 
talking about a defendant who has acted unreasonably. 
In short, unreasonable conduct has always been a component of heat-of-
passion manslaughter, as well as imperfect self-defense, and that element of 
unreasonableness is perfectly consistent with a countervailing requirement of 
some minimum objective measure of reasonableness.  Therefore, in deciding 
Flannel, we could have left imperfect self-defense linked to heat-of-passion 
manslaughter but simply defined reasonableness in a way that was appropriate to 
the specific facts under consideration.  As we shall see, our decision instead to 
conjure a nonstatutory category of voluntary manslaughter (see Flannel, supra, 
 
9
25 Cal.3d at p. 677, fn. 3; Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 465) has led to several 
problems. 
IV. 
 
The Flannel decision rested in part on the same awareness-of-civic-duty 
definition of malice that we had adopted in Conley.  Specifically, we decided that 
the state of mind associated with imperfect self-defense—that is, an actual belief 
in “the need to repel imminent peril or bodily injury”—would necessarily render 
one unaware “that society expects conformity to a different standard” and 
therefore incapable “of comprehending [one’s] societal duty to act within the law.”  
(Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 679.)  Therefore, the 1981 amendments to the 
Penal Code, eliminating the awareness-of-civic-duty component of malice, called 
into question our holding in Flannel.  Nevertheless, we concluded in Christian S. 
that the history of the 1981 amendments did not suggest any intent to eliminate 
imperfect self-defense as a basis for a manslaughter conviction, and we were loath 
to assume that the Legislature had eliminated this legal theory by legislative 
accident.  Accordingly, we held that imperfect self-defense remained a viable 
theory for negating malice and that, by negating malice, it did not also negate 
intent, and therefore a voluntary manslaughter conviction remained possible.  
(Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 771.)  In reaching this conclusion, we 
implicitly retreated from our repeated statements in Saille that equated malice 
aforethought with intent unlawfully to kill, and that implicit retreat became 
explicit in Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th 450. 
In Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th 450, we held that voluntary manslaughter is a 
lesser included offense of second degree murder.  We reasoned that imperfect self-
defense and heat of passion are not elements of voluntary manslaughter, but rather 
they are alternative means of raising a doubt about the element of malice in a 
murder prosecution.  Therefore, though “malice” and “intent to unlawfully kill” 
are “[g]enerally” one and the same (id. at p. 460, italics added), malice is 
 
10
narrower, implying intent combined with an absence of the factors that would 
reduce the killing to manslaughter.  (Id. at pp. 460-462, 469.) 
V. 
 
As this history of our law makes clear, our cases construing heat-of-passion 
manslaughter have always emphasized the necessity of reasonableness as regards 
the defendant’s passionate reaction, because “no defendant may set up his own 
standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself [simply] because in fact his 
passions were aroused.”  (Logan, supra, 175 Cal. at p. 49; see People v. Cole 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1215-1216; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 
1143; Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1252; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 
307, 326; People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515; People v. Danielly (1949) 33 
Cal.2d 362, 377; People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 137.)  But, in Flannel, 
by disconnecting imperfect self-defense from heat-of-passion manslaughter, we 
arguably disconnected it also from this long-standing reasonableness 
requirement—and, if so, allowed defendants to set up their own standards of 
conduct.  In all imperfect self-defense cases, like all heat-of-passion manslaughter 
cases, the defendant certainly acts unreasonably, but the defendant’s conduct 
should still be measured against some minimum objective standard.  Otherwise, a 
hyperparanoid and delusional defendant would be a law unto himself, 
hallucinating violent attacks and then killing innocent people with impunity as 
regards a murder conviction.  That result would fly in the face of 90 years of 
precedent requiring that actions of a defendant seeking to negate malice exhibit 
some objective reasonableness.  It would also stand in sharp contrast to the rule 
adopted in other jurisdictions as regards imperfect self-defense.  (See, e.g., State v. 
Ordway (Kan. 1997) 934 P.2d 94, 104 [“the ‘unreasonable but honest belief’ 
necessary to support the ‘imperfect right to self-defense manslaughter’ cannot be 
based upon a psychotic delusion”]; Peterson v. State (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1994) 643 
A.2d 520, 522 [“we conclude that the imperfect self-defense instruction should not 
be given unless the evidence generates the issue of whether, under the 
 
11
circumstances, the defendant was entitled to take some action against the victim”]; 
State v. Powell (N.J. 1980) 419 A.2d 406, 410 [approving a claim of imperfect 
self-defense “where the exercise of ‘self-defense’ was provoked by an act that 
clouded the defendant’s perceptions as to the imminence of danger, the extent of 
the danger, or the amount of force called for to eliminate the danger” (italics 
added)]; Com. v. Bracey (Pa. 2001) 795 A.2d 935, 947 [although defendant 
claimed that abuse as a child left him with an “ ‘exaggerated startle response,’ ” 
“there was absolutely no evidence that [defendant] acted in self-defense—
imperfect or otherwise”]; Com. v. Sheppard (Pa.Super.Ct. 1994) 648 A.2d 563, 
569 [imperfect self-defense “is more in the nature of perception based upon faulty 
analysis of the circumstances, or state of mind arising from a pattern or history of 
interaction, which would lead to a reaction based on fear of one’s safety arising 
out of previous abuse”]; id. at p. 570 [“[t]he appellant’s alleged subjective 
cognitive process under case law is not a factor for consideration unless and until 
the objective determination has been made . . . that a basis exists for such a 
perception”]; State v. Seifert (Wis. 1990) 454 N.W.2d 346, 352 [“The doctrine of 
imperfect self-defense manslaughter was simply never intended to cover situations 
such as this one where it is entirely the defendant’s mental disease or defect, not 
an error in judgment or perception or a negligently-formed perspective of the 
situation, that motivates the defendant’s actions”]; cf. State v. Head (Wis. 2002) 
648 N.W.2d 413, 436-437.) 
Of course, imperfect self-defense is a “judicially developed theory” (Rios, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 465), and therefore, as the creators of this theory, we could 
judicially ensure a requirement of reasonable objective circumstances, thereby 
making this category of manslaughter consistent with our long-standing rule that a 
defendant should not be able to set up his own standard of conduct.  In fact, the 
requirement announced in Best, supra, 13 Cal.App.2d at page 610, and reiterated 
in our cases (see Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 776; Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 
at p. 676), that the defendant’s fear must be “caused by the circumstances” 
 
12
indicates that, since its inception, imperfect self-defense has required a showing of 
some objective circumstances that the defendant could conceivably interpret as a 
threat.  The problem, however, is that we are not dealing with the common law, 
but rather construing a criminal statute, and we cannot simply make new law, 
though that is precisely what we did in Flannel by creating a category of 
manslaughter that “is not expressed in the statutory scheme at all.”  (Rios, at 
p. 465.)  In short, we are confined by the statutory scheme, though by 
disconnecting imperfect self-defense from heat-of-passion manslaughter, we broke 
out of the statutory scheme into uncharted territory. 
For example, one can argue that, because the element of malice refers to a 
subjective state of mind, the defendant’s actual belief—reasonable or wholly 
delusional—is the only relevant consideration as regards proof of malice in a 
murder prosecution.  In other words, the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief in 
the need for self-defense is of no consequence; so long as the unreasonable 
defendant actually, in fact, had that belief, he had the same subjective mental state 
as one whose belief was reasonable, and he did not act with malice or commit 
murder.  (See, e.g., People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 344-345; Uriarte, 
supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 197.)  The anomaly in this reasoning is that, in the 
case of heat-of-passion manslaughter, we have always required some objective 
reasonableness, though the act of manslaughter is inherently unreasonable.  A 
person who unreasonably and delusionally reacts to a minor provocation may 
have the same subjective mental state as a person who reasonably and accurately 
reacts to a major provocation, but in the case of heat-of-passion manslaughter, the 
law imputes malice (regardless of the defendant’s actual mental state) “when no 
considerable provocation appears.”  (§ 188; cf. People v. Padilla (2002) 103 
Cal.App.4th 675, 678-679.)  Thus, the defendant’s actual subjective mental state 
is, at least to that extent, deemed to be irrelevant, and a murder conviction is 
appropriate.  With respect to imperfect self-defense, however, we are dealing with 
a judicially created gloss on the voluntary manslaughter statute, and therefore the 
 
13
statutory basis for imputing malice to a defendant who acts in response to a very 
minor or wholly nonexistent threat is uncertain.  We can cite as a limitation on 
imperfect self-defense the long-standing objective requirement that it be “caused 
by the circumstances” (Best, supra, 13 Cal.App.2d at p. 610; see Christian S., 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 776; Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 676), but doing so does 
not necessarily solve the problem of how, without a statutory provision, we can 
fictionally impute malice where there is no actual malice in the defendant’s 
delusional inner world.2 
A further complication arises when voluntary intoxication is the source of 
the defendant’s unreasonable response to a very minor or wholly nonexistent 
threat.  If the defendant in such a case were to claim heat-of-passion manslaughter, 
malice would be implied on account of the insufficiency of the provocation 
(§ 188), and of course evidence of voluntary intoxication is, by statute, 
inadmissible on the question of implied malice (§ 22, subd (b)).  Therefore, the 
intoxication evidence would be excluded, and the defendant would be guilty of 
murder.  If, on the other hand, the defendant claimed imperfect self-defense, the 
same intoxication-produced delusions would arguably negate malice and reduce 
murder to manslaughter.  This anomaly is illogical in itself, and it has the further 
mischief of frustrating the Legislature’s clear intent to eliminate the diminished 
capacity defense.  If imperfect self-defense may be based on intoxication-
produced delusions, then a defendant can still use diminished capacity evidence to 
obtain a compromise verdict of manslaughter, simply by asserting that his 
intoxication (or other abnormal mental condition) caused him to believe he was 
facing an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. 
                                              
2  
If we were to hold that imperfect self-defense is unavailable to a delusional 
defendant who cannot identify sufficient provocation, that defendant would not be 
without a remedy.  The defendant would be able to invoke the defense of 
unconsciousness (§ 26) or insanity (§ 25, subd. (b)), if applicable. 
 
14
Finally, our law should recognize that intoxication can affect a person in 
two opposing ways.  It can cause a person not to perceive a risk that is real, as is 
common in the case of alcohol abuse (see, e.g., People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 
Cal.4th 437, 442-444), and it can cause a person to perceive a risk that is not real, 
as is common in the case of cocaine or methamphetamine abuse.  The Legislature 
has made clear that, in the former situation, a defendant may be convicted of 
second degree murder on an implied malice theory, and the evidence of voluntary 
intoxication is not admissible.  (§ 22, subd. (b).)3  Logic suggests that a similar 
rule should apply when voluntary intoxication causes the opposite effect.  One 
who voluntarily takes a drug that causes hallucinations of an imminent peril 
should not be able to kill innocent people and then claim intoxication as a defense 
to a murder charge.  The point we made long ago in a different context remains 
pertinent here:  “ ‘In the forum of conscience, there is no doubt considerable 
difference between a murder deliberately planned and executed by a person of 
unclouded intellect, and the reckless taking of life by one infuriated by 
intoxication; but human laws are based upon considerations of policy, and look 
rather to the maintenance of personal security and social order, than to an accurate 
discrimination as to the moral qualities of individual conduct.’ ”  (People v. Blake 
(1884) 65 Cal. 275, 277, quoting The People v. Rogers (1858) 18 N.Y. 9, 18.) 
VI. 
 
As must be apparent, all these various problems and anomalies arise from 
our misstep in 1979 in Flannel, when we waved our judicial magic wand and 
                                              
3 
Voluntary intoxication is, however, admissible on the question of express 
malice.  (§ 22, subd. (b).)  Under current law, then, an intoxicated defendant who 
kills while driving with a conscious disregard for human life may not rely on 
evidence of intoxication to rebut implied malice, but the same defendant who 
intends to kill unlawfully may rely on such evidence to rebut express malice.  I 
note that nothing in the Constitution compels this anomaly.  (Montana v. Egelhoff 
(1996) 518 U.S. 37, 56 (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.); id. at pp. 58-59 (conc. opn. of 
Ginsburg, J.).) 
 
15
created a new nonstatutory category of manslaughter rather than keeping imperfect 
self-defense linked to heat-of-passion manslaughter.  Having created it from thin 
air, we are now stuck with the unpleasant reality that what we created does not fit 
the statutory scheme the Legislature crafted.  The only sensible solution, then, 
would be to correct the error we made over a quarter century ago and once again 
locate imperfect self-defense within the statutory category of heat-of-passion 
manslaughter.  The Legislature could easily correct our 1979 misstep by providing 
clear definitions of malice and imperfect self-defense, and I urge the Legislature to 
do so, thereby restoring coherence and common sense to California’s homicide 
law.  Of course, if no legislative fix is forthcoming, we will continue to do our best 
to see our way through this forest of anomalies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Wright 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 110 Cal.App.4th 1594 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S119067 
Date Filed: May 26, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Jack Sapunor 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Madeline McDowell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Janet E. 
Neeley, Brian R. Means, Janis Shank McLean, John G. McLean and Aaron R. Maguire, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
David La Bahn; Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Patrick D. Moran, Acting Head Deputy 
District Attorney, and Brent Riggs, Deputy District Attorney, for Appellate Committee of the California 
District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Madeline McDowell 
1305 North H Street, Suite A 
PMB 306 
Lompoc, CA  93436 
(805) 733-4933 
 
Aaron Maguire 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 327-6733