Title: Partanen v. Gallagher
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12018
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12018 
 
KAREN PARTANEN  vs.  JULIE GALLAGHER. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 5, 2016. - October 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Parentage.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint in equity filed in the Middlesex Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on October 17, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Jeffrey A. Abber, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Mary Lisa Bonauto (Elizabeth A. Roberts, Teresa Harkins La 
Vita, Patience Crozier, & Joyce Kauffman with her) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Jennifer M. Lamanna for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amicus curiae: 
 
C. Thomas Brown for Greater Boston Legal Services & others. 
 
Emily R. Shulman, Brook Hopkins, & Adam M Cambier for 
American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology Attorneys & 
others. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
Abigail Taylor, Gail Garinger, Brittany Williams, & Andrea 
C. Kramer, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney 
General. 
 
Shannon Minter, of California, Marco J. Quina, & Emma S. 
Winer for forty-two law professors & another. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In 2014, the plaintiff, Karen Partanen, filed a 
complaint in the Probate and Family Court seeking to establish 
legal parentage of two young children.  The complaint alleged 
that she and the defendant, Julie Gallagher, had been in a 
committed, nonmarital relationship between 2001 and 2013.  Using 
in vitro fertilization, and with Partanen's "full 
acknowledgment, participation, and consent," Gallagher gave 
birth to the two children.  Thereafter, Partanen and Gallagher 
represented themselves publicly as the children's parents, and 
jointly raised the children until their 2013 separation.  On the 
basis of these allegations, Partanen's complaint sought a 
declaration of parentage pursuant to, among other things, G. L. 
c. 209C, § 6 (a) (4).  That statute provides that "a man is 
presumed to be the father of a child" born out of wedlock if 
"he, jointly with the mother, received the child into their home 
and openly held out the child as their child."  Concluding that 
Partanen could not be deemed a presumed parent under G. L. 
c. 209C, § 6 (a) (4), because it was undisputed that she was not 
the children's biological parent, a judge of the Probate and 
Family Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a 
3 
 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  See Mass. R. Dom. Rel. 
P. 12(b)(6). 
 
In addressing Partanen's claims on direct appellate review, 
we consider the question whether a person may establish herself 
as a child's presumptive parent under G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 6 (a) (4), in the absence of a biological relationship with 
the child.  We conclude that she may.  We conclude further that, 
here, the assertions in Partanen's complaint are sufficient to 
state a claim of parentage under G. L. c. 209C (statute).  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the 
matter to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings.2 
 
1.  Background.  The facts are largely undisputed.  The 
following facts are drawn from the complaint, which we take as 
true in reviewing a dismissal under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. 
P. 12(b)(6), with certain minor, undisputed details drawn from 
elsewhere in the record.  See Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 
Mass. 474, 477 (2000). 
                                                          
 
 
2 Because we conclude that Karen Partanen's complaint is 
sufficient to establish parentage under G. L. c. 209C, § 6, and 
should not have been dismissed, we do not address her claims 
that she is entitled to a declaration of parentage under G. L. 
c. 46, § 4B (presumptive parentage of child born through 
artificial reproductive technology to married couple), or, 
alternatively, under G. L. c. 215, § 6 (court's equitable power 
to establish parentage).  For the same reason, we do not address 
Partanen's constitutional claims.  See Matter of McKnight, 406 
Mass. 787, 797 (1990) ("this court is not likely to resolve an 
issue on constitutional grounds if the court may dispose of it 
by a consideration of rights created by statute"). 
4 
 
 
In February, 2001, while they were both living in 
Massachusetts, Partanen and Gallagher entered into a committed 
relationship.  They moved to Florida in 2002, and, the following 
year, together purchased a house there.  In 2005, they decided 
to start a family "with the shared intention that they would 
both be parents to the resulting children."  That year, Partanen 
unsuccessfully underwent fertility treatment using a sperm donor 
and in vitro fertilization.  In 2007, Gallagher underwent 
similar treatment "with the full acknowledgment, participation, 
and consent of" Partanen.  This treatment was successful, and, 
with Partanen present, Gallagher gave birth to a daughter, Jo.3  
In 2011, Gallagher again underwent fertility treatment, "with 
the full acknowledgment, participation, and consent of" 
Partanen.4  The treatment was successful, and, in 2012, Gallagher 
gave birth to a son, Ja. 
 
Though Partanen did not formally adopt the children,5 she 
participated in raising them from the time of their birth.  Her 
participation included "waking for night-time feedings, bathing, 
meal preparation, grocery shopping, transportation to/from day 
                                                          
 
 
3 We refer to the children by pseudonyms. 
 
 
4 The plaintiff participated in the insemination procedure,  
injecting the sperm that would lead ultimately to the 
defendant's second pregnancy. 
 
 
5 In 2010, adoption became available to same-sex couples in 
Florida.  See Florida Dep't of Children & Families v. Adoption 
of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
5 
 
care and school, staying home with the children during times of 
illness, clothes shopping, providing appropriate discipline as 
necessary, addressing their developmental needs, [and] 
comforting" them.  Partanen was involved also "in all decision-
making for the children," including in matters related to their 
education and healthcare.  Partanen "provided [the children] 
consistent financial support," and both children referred to 
Partanen as "Mommy."  Partanen and Gallagher represented 
themselves publicly as the children's parents in formal contexts 
such as at the children's schools and for medical appointments, 
as well as in their interactions with friends and family.  They 
vacationed as a family, shared expenses, purchased joint assets, 
and sent family holiday cards. 
 
In May, 2012, after the birth of Ja, Partanen and Gallagher 
returned to Massachusetts with the children.6  In November, 2013, 
the couple separated, and Partanen moved out of the family home.  
Partanen filed an action to establish de facto parentage in 
February, 2014.  She requested visitation with the children and 
shared legal custody.  In September, 2015, a judge of the 
Probate and Family Court ruled that Partanen was a de facto 
                                                          
 
 
6 Although same-sex marriage was then possible in 
Massachusetts, see Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 
309 (2003), Partanen and Gallagher did not marry. 
6 
 
parent of the children, issued orders regarding visitation, and 
required her to pay child support.7 
 
In October, 2014, Partanen filed the present action in the 
Probate and Family Court "to establish [full legal] parentage."8  
In February, 2015, Gallagher's motion to dismiss the complaint 
for "[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted," Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(b)(6), was allowed. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  In reviewing the 
dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. 
P. 12(b)(6), "[w]e accept as true the facts alleged in the . . . 
complaint as well as any favorable inferences that reasonably 
can be drawn from them."  See Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 
382 (2014), quoting Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration 
Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014).9 
 
b.  Statutory language.  General Laws c. 209C, § 1, 
provides "[c]hildren born to parents who are not married to each 
                                                          
 
 
7 That action is the subject of a separate appeal, and is 
not before us. 
 
 
8 See A.H. v. M.P., 447 Mass. 828, 843 (2006) ("a de facto 
parent" is not "afforded all of the privileges of a legal 
parent" [citation omitted]). 
 
 
9 We address Partanen's claim under Massachusetts law.  
Gallagher's contention that Florida law governs was not raised 
in the Probate and Family Court, and therefore is waived.  See 
Adoption of Peggy, 436 Mass. 690, 698, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1020 (2002) (claim regarding choice of law waived).  See also 
Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass. 488 (2012) (applying Massachusetts 
law, including G. L. c. 209C, where child was conceived and born 
out-of-State using artificial reproductive technology).  
7 
 
other" "a means" to obtain an "adjudication of their 
[parentage.]"10  Actions to establish parentage under G. L. 
c. 209C may be brought by, among others, "a person presumed to 
be" the child's parent.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 5 (enumerating 
persons entitled to bring actions to establish "paternity, 
support, visitation or custody of a child" born out of wedlock); 
G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (defining presumed parentage).  Here, 
Partanen contends that she is "presumed to be" the children's 
mother, and therefore may pursue an action for parentage. 
 
To survive a motion to dismiss, Partanen must allege facts 
sufficient to establish that she is a "presumed parent" under 
G. L. c. 209C, two provisions of which are relevant here.  
First, she must allege that Jo and Ja are "children" as that 
term is used in the statute, i.e., people "born to a man and 
woman who are not married to each other."  See G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 1.  Read in gender-neutral terms, see G. L. c.  209C, § 21; 
G. L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth, this requires an allegation that the 
                                                          
 
 
10 While G. L. c. 209C, "Children Born Out of Wedlock," uses 
the gendered phrase "adjudication of paternity," see G. L. 
c. 209C, § 1, we interpret the statute as providing a means for 
establishing parentage regardless of the parent's gender.  See 
Hunter v. Rose, supra at 493 (applying G. L. c. 209C in context 
of relationship between two women); G. L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth (in 
all statutes, "words of one gender may be construed to include 
the other gender and the neuter").  See also G. L. c. 209C, § 21 
(in "an action to determine the existence of a mother and child 
relationship," "the provisions of this chapter applicable to 
establishing paternity shall apply"). 
8 
 
children were "born to [two people] who are not married to each 
other." 
 
Second, Partanen must allege adequately that she satisfied 
the "holding out" provision of G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a), which 
states: 
 
"(a) In all actions under this chapter a man is 
presumed to be the father of a child . . . if: 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he, 
jointly with the mother, received the child into their home 
and openly held out the child as their child." 
 
In gender-neutral terms, Partanen must allege that she, "jointly 
with the mother [i.e., Gallagher], received the child[ren] into 
their home, and openly held out the child[ren] as their 
child[ren]." 
 
Partanen maintains that the facts alleged in her complaint 
satisfy both the "born to" and "holding out" provisions.  With 
respect to the requirement that the children be "born to" two 
people, G. L. c. 209C, § 1, Partanen asserts that the children 
were born both to her and to Gallagher, because Gallagher's 
pregnancies and the children's births took place with Partanen's 
"full acknowledgment, participation, and consent."11  She asserts 
                                                          
 
 
11 It is undisputed that the children were not "born to" 
their genetic fathers, the sperm donors.  See Adoption of a 
Minor, 471 Mass. 373, 378 n.8 (2015) ("sperm donor may assert 
parentage only where he donates . . . 'with the intent to be the 
parent of [the] child'" [citation omitted]). 
9 
 
also, with respect to the "holding out" provision, that she and 
Gallagher jointly received the children into their home and 
openly held out the children as theirs.  See G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 6 (a).  Gallagher contends, however, that Partanen's complaint 
cannot survive a motion to dismiss because the provisions of 
G. L. c. 209C -- and, in particular, those in G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 6, concerning presumed parentage -- were intended only as a 
means of establishing biological parentage, and are inapplicable 
where, as here, it is known that no biological connection 
exists. 
 
The question we must address, then, is whether Partanen may 
establish that she is the children's "presumed parent" under 
G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a), by alleging that the children were born 
to her and to Gallagher, were received jointly into their home, 
and were openly held out as the couple's children, where it is 
known that she has no biological relationship to the children. 
 
c.  Statutory construction.  As with all statutes, G. L. 
c. 209C must be construed "according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
10 
 
effectuated."  Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477 (2008), 
quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). 
 
We turn first to the statutory language.  See Associated 
Subcontractors of Mass., Inc. v. University of Mass. Bldg. 
Auth., 442 Mass. 159, 164 (2004) ("As always, our analysis 
begins with the statutory language . . .").  While the 
provisions at issue speak in gendered terms, they may be read, 
as discussed, in a gender-neutral manner, to apply where a child 
is "born to [two people]," G. L. c. 209C, § 1, is received into 
their joint home, and is held out by both as their own child.  
See G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a).  The plain language of the 
provisions, then, may be construed to apply to children born to 
same-sex couples, even though at least one member of the couple 
may well lack biological ties to the children.12 
                                                          
 
 
12 Gallagher argues that, even under a reading that applies 
these provisions to same-sex couples, a biological link to the 
child still could be required, since two women might each have 
such a link:  one by having provided the ovum and the other by 
having carried the child.  Here, Partanen has no biological link 
to the children, as she was neither the egg donor nor the 
carrier.  Nonetheless, properly read as gender-neutral, G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Fourth, these provisions may apply not only to a 
child born to two women, but also to a child born to two men 
through a surrogacy arrangement.  In such a situation, at least 
one of the men will be unable to form a direct biological 
relationship with the child in the manner that Gallagher 
suggests, since only one can directly contribute his genetic 
material (though the other may do so indirectly, by asking a 
female relative to provide the egg), and neither can carry the 
child. 
11 
 
 
Nothing in the language of G. L. c. 209C expressly limits 
its applicability to parentage claims based on asserted 
biological ties.  See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 (2015) 
("We will not 'read into the statute a provision which the 
Legislature did not see fit to put there'" [citation omitted]).  
This silence is particularly significant because G. L. c. 209C 
is a remedial statute, see Flynn v. Connors, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 
365, 368 n.9 (1995) (G. L. c. 209C should be read to "extend to 
cases within the reason, if not the letter, of the statute"), 
which must "be given a broad interpretation . . . in light of 
its purpose and to 'promote the accomplishment of its beneficent 
design'" (citation omitted).  See Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 
207, 210 (2016).  The statute's purpose, laid out in its first 
sentence, is to provide all "[c]hildren born to parents who are 
not married to each other . . . the same rights and protections 
of the law as all other children."  G. L. c. 209C, § 1. 
 
Here, had Jo and Ja been born to a married couple using 
artificial reproductive technology, they would have had two 
legal parents to provide them with "financial and emotional 
support."  See Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass. 488, 493 (2012), citing 
G. L. c. 46, § 4B (children born to one same-sex spouse are 
legal children of both spouses, even where one not biologically 
related to children).  We decline to "read into the statute a 
provision," see Chin v. Merriot, supra, that leaves children 
12 
 
born to unmarried couples, using the same technology, with only 
one such parent.  Cf. Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 540, 546 
(2010) ("While a statute governing divorced children is not 
applicable directly to nonmarital children, the legal equality 
of nonmarital children pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 1, dictates 
the same rule apply for children in comparable circumstances"). 
 
That the presumption of parentage in G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 6 (a) (4), may be construed to apply even where biological 
ties to the children are absent is consistent with our 
construction of other provisions in the statute.  See Phillips 
v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 443 Mass. 110, 117 (2004) ("we 
look to other provisions of the statute for indicia of 
[legislative] intent, and for the purpose of interpreting the 
statute as a consistent whole").  For example, in Hunter v. 
Rose, supra, we applied another of the parentage presumptions in 
G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a) -- that "a man is presumed to be the 
father" if "the child was born during [the father's] marriage" 
to the mother -- to a child born to two married women, one of 
whom had no biological relationship to the child. 
 
We also have interpreted another provision in the statute, 
G. L. c. 209C, § 11 (a), as recognizing parentage in the absence 
of a biological relationship.  That section provides that 
parentage may be established through a "written voluntary 
acknowledgement of parentage executed jointly by the putative 
13 
 
father . . . and the mother of the child," id., and we have said 
that a father validly may execute such an acknowledgment absent 
a genetic relationship.13  See Paternity of Cheryl, 434 Mass. 23, 
32 (2001) (man could not rescind acknowledgment of paternity 
years after signing it merely because genetic testing showed him 
not to be biologically related to child).  In that case, we 
explained that a "man may acknowledge paternity for a variety of 
reasons," that "we cannot assume that biology is the sole 
impetus in every case," and that, in proceedings under G. L. 
c. 209C, "consideration of what is in a child's best interests 
will often weigh more heavily than the genetic link between 
parent and child."  Paternity of Cheryl, supra at 31-32. 
 
From this, it is apparent that a biological connection is 
not a sine qua non to the establishment of parentage under G. L. 
c. 209C.  Indeed, Gallagher concedes that a voluntary 
acknowledgment of parentage may be executed by a same-sex 
couple, even if one member of the couple is not biologically 
related to the children, and that, had an acknowledgment been 
                                                          
 
 
13 The acknowledgment at issue in Paternity of Cheryl, 434 
Mass. 23 (2001), was executed before the substantial 1998 
amendments to G. L. c. 209C, § 11.  See St. 1998, c. 64, § 205, 
"An Act to improve the Massachusetts child support enforcement 
program."  We recognized that our decision in that case was 
consistent with the Legislature's clear intention in amending 
G. L. c. 209C, § 11, to limit the ability of a voluntary 
signatory to an acknowledgment to challenge its validity at some 
later time.  See Paternity of Cheryl, supra at 29, 39. 
14 
 
executed here, it would have established Partanen as the 
children's legal parent. 
 
Notwithstanding this assertion, however, Gallagher contends 
that, even if Partanen satisfies the "holding out" provision of 
G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a), any presumption created on this basis 
may be rebutted by evidence that she lacks a biological 
connection to the children, i.e., that the children were not 
"born to" her.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 1.  Gallagher's argument 
apparently is rooted in G. L. c. 209C, § 17, which provides that 
in "an action under this chapter to establish [parentage] of a 
child born out of wedlock, the court shall, on motion of a party 
and upon a proper showing . . . order the . . . putative 
[parent] to submit to one or more genetic marker tests."  Thus, 
Gallagher claims that she might seek an order to have Partanen 
undergo such testing, and thereby rebut any presumption of 
parentage created under G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a).14 
                                                          
 
14 Gallagher points also to two other provisions in G. L. 
c. 209C that, she maintains, indicate the Legislature's intent 
to limit the statute's applicability to biological children.  
See G. L. c. 209C, § 8 (default judgment establishing parentage 
may enter against father only if "the mother or putative father 
submits that sexual intercourse between the parties occurred 
during the probable period of conception"); G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 11 (a) (if parent attempts to rescind voluntary 
acknowledgement of parentage, "the court shall order genetic 
marker testing").  To the extent that these provisions focus on 
proving or disproving a biological relationship, they are 
applicable only where the underlying parentage claim is based on 
biology, and not, as here, where the claim is made on another 
basis.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 11 (a) (genetic testing mandatory 
15 
 
 
This claim is unavailing.  The statute's language expressly 
conditions an order of genetic testing on "a proper showing" by 
the moving party.  G. L. c. 209C, § 17.  Where, as here, the 
parentage claim is not based on a genetic relationship, 
Gallagher, as the moving party, cannot show such testing would 
be relevant to the claim at issue, and, therefore, no "proper 
showing" is possible.15  See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
4th 108, 122 (2005) (while statute allows rebuttal of presumed 
parentage by genetic testing in "an appropriate action," case 
where parentage claim is not based on biological connection "is 
not 'an appropriate action' in which to rebut the presumption of 
presumed parenthood with proof that [plaintiff] is not the 
[children's] biological parent").  See also Chatterjee v. King, 
280 P.3d 283, 294-295 (N.M. 2012). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
only where acknowledgement of parentage "constitute[s] the 
proper showing required for an order to submit to such testing," 
i.e., where biological relationship is at issue); Culliton v. 
Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 290 (2001) 
(evidence of occurrence of intercourse under G. L. c. 209C, § 8, 
not relevant to parentage claim where pregnancy is result of 
"reproductive advances[, which] have eliminated the necessity of 
having sexual intercourse in order to procreate"). 
 
 
15 That the parentage presumption may not be rebutted 
through genetic testing, however, does not mean that it cannot 
be rebutted in other ways.  Rebuttal may be accomplished by 
proof that the child, even if held out by the putative parent as 
his or her own, was not actually "born to" that parent.  See 
G. L. c. 209C, § 1.  For example, here, Gallagher might show 
that Partanen's assertions about her having consented to the 
inseminations, and about her involvement in the ensuing 
pregnancies and births, are untrue. 
16 
 
 
Gallagher cites a number of cases to support her contention 
that a biological relationship is necessary to establish 
parentage under G. L. c. 209C.  In one of these, C.M. v. P.R., 
420 Mass. 220 (1995), we held that a man was not a legal parent 
under G. L. c. 209C to a child born to his nonmarital partner, 
where the child was conceived before their relationship began.  
We based this conclusion on an assumption that, "[b]y 
definition," paternity cannot be established under G. L. c. 209C 
by "a person who is not the biological father of a child."  See 
C.M. v. P.R., supra at 223.  We since have made clear, however, 
that this assumption is incorrect.  See Paternity of Cheryl, 434 
Mass. at 34 (judgment of paternity under G. L. c. 209C  may 
be upheld "even though [putative father] may establish 
conclusively that he is not a child's genetic parent"). 
 
Gallagher also cites two decisions that postdate Paternity 
of Cheryl.  One concerns notably different factual circumstances 
from those at issue here.  See T.F. v. B.L., 442 Mass. 522, 527-
531 (2004) (woman not required, under contract law, to pay child 
support to former same-sex partner for child born after their 
separation; child was never received into their joint home or 
held out as child of both women).  In the other, R.D. v. A.H., 
454 Mass. 706, 714 (2009), we held that a de facto parent did 
not have the same right to custody as a full legal parent under 
G. L. c. 209C, § 10, and therefore could not obtain custody 
17 
 
against the wishes of such a parent, because "the term 'parent' 
[as used in that statute] refers to a biological parent" rather 
than to a de facto parent.  In the context of that case, our 
intention was evident:  to distinguish a de facto parent from a 
legal parent.  We did not intend to suggest that G. L. c. 209C 
is limited only to parentage based on biology.  Indeed, the 
result there would have been the same had the de facto parent 
sought custody against the wishes of a nonbiological adoptive 
parent.  See G. L. c. 210, § 6 (adoptive parent has "all rights, 
duties and other legal consequences of" parentage). 
 
Gallagher contends also that allowing Partanen's claim to 
proceed intrudes on Gallagher's "right [as] a single woman to 
give birth to a child into a family framework of her own 
choosing."16  The question in this case, however, is not whether 
courts may impose a second parent onto a single-parent family, 
but whether this was, in fact, a single-parent family in the 
first place.  Partanen's allegation is that, from the beginning, 
the children had two parents, both of whom were jointly involved 
in the children's lives. 
                                                          
 
 
16 Gallagher notes that the Legislature has required 
insurance companies to cover fertility treatments and has not 
limited this requirement to married or partnered women, 
suggesting, in her view, a policy of protecting the rights of 
single women to create a family in the absence of a second 
parent.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 175, § 47H. 
18 
 
 
Moreover, while Gallagher has an acknowledged interest in 
constructing "a family framework of her own choosing," the 
statute at issue was enacted for the benefit of children born 
outside the context of marriage, see G. L. c. 209C, § 1, whose 
"welfare is promoted by ensuring that [they] ha[ve] two parents 
to provide . . . financial and emotional support."17  See Hunter 
v. Rose, 463 Mass. at 493.  As another court has observed, 
"paternity presumptions are driven, not by biological 
paternity, but by the [S]tate's interest in the welfare of 
the child and the integrity of the family. . . .  The 
familial relationship between a nonbiological [parent] and 
[a] child . . . , resulting from years of living together 
in a purported parent/child relationship, is considerably 
more palpable than the biological relationship of actual 
paternity and should not be lightly dissolved" (citations 
omitted). 
 
In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453, 461 (2014). 
 
We note, in this regard, that courts in other jurisdictions 
have read comparable provisions to establish presumed parentage 
in the absence of biological relationships, and have done so, in 
                                                          
 
 
17 Gallagher contends that the purpose of the statute will 
be ensured through the adjudication of Partanen as a de facto 
parent, and that full legal parentage will not provide 
significant additional benefits.  This contention is 
inconsistent with established case law.  See A.H. v. M.P., 447 
Mass. at 843 ("a de facto parent" is not "afforded all of the 
privileges of a legal parent" [citation omitted]).  See also 
R.D. v. A.H., 454 Mass. 706, 711 (2009) (full legal parent may 
obtain primary custody over other parent's objection where in 
best interests of child; de facto parent may obtain such custody 
only if legal parent first found to be unfit); American Law 
Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:  
Analysis and Recommendations § 3.10 & comment c (2002) (limiting 
circumstances in which de facto parent is liable for child 
support). 
19 
 
part, out of concern for the welfare of children born out of 
wedlock.18  See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th at 
120, 122 ("The circumstance that [former member of same-sex 
couple pursuing parentage claim] has no genetic connection to 
the twins does not . . . mean that she did not hold out the 
twins as her . . . children" and that she is not their presumed 
parent; "[r]ebutting the presumption that [she] is [their] 
parent would leave them with only one parent and would deprive 
them of the support of their second parent"); In re Parental 
Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318 P.3d 581, 584, 587 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2013) (female former same-sex partner, not biologically 
related to child, may pursue parentage claim under provision 
that "a man is presumed to be the father of a child if 'he 
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child 
as his natural child'"; "[t]his interpretation is 
supported . . . by the compelling interest children have in the 
love, care, and support of two parents, rather than one, 
whenever possible [citation omitted]); In re Guardianship of 
Madelyn B., 166 N.H. at 460, 462 (former same-sex partner, not 
                                                          
 
 
18 See also Frazier v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730, 747 (2013) 
("female can make a colorable claim to being a presumptive 
mother of a child without claiming to be the biological or 
adoptive mother" under provision that person is presumed parent 
if she "notoriously . . . recognizes [the parentage] of the 
child" [citation omitted]).  The court in that case reached this 
result based on constitutional considerations that we need not 
address here.  See id. at 754. 
20 
 
biologically related to child, may pursue parentage claim 
because she "adequately pleaded that she received [the child] 
into her home and openly held [the child] out as her child"; 
were this not so, "a child in a situation similar . . . could be 
entitled to support from, and be the legitimate child of, only 
her birth mother"); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d at 293, 296 
(former same-sex partner, not biologically related to child, may 
pursue parentage claim because "her allegations satisfy the hold 
out provision of" statute; "the child's best interests are 
served when intending parents physically, emotionally, and 
financially support the child").  See also Uniform Parentage Act 
§ 703 (2002) (person who "consents to . . . assisted 
reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent 
of her child . . . is a parent of the resulting child"); id. at 
§ 703 comment ("This provision reflects the concern for the best 
interests of nonmarital as well as marital children . . ."). 
 
Having determined that a person without a biological 
connection to a child may be that child's presumed parent under 
G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a), we must decide whether, in this case, 
Partanen adequately has alleged that she is such a parent.  We 
conclude that she has.  Partanen was required to allege, first, 
that the children were born both to Gallagher and to her.  See 
G. L. c. 209C, § 1.  In this regard, Partanen claims that both 
of Gallagher's pregnancies were undertaken "with the full 
21 
 
acknowledgment, participation, and consent of" Partanen, and 
"with the shared intention that [the defendant and plaintiff] 
would both be parents to the resulting children."  She states 
also that she was present in the delivery room when the children 
were born.  These allegations suffice to establish, for purposes 
of Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(b)(6), that the children were born 
both to her and to Gallagher.  See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 
37 Cal. 4th at 125 (nonbiological mother "actively participated 
in causing the children to be conceived with the understanding 
that she would raise the children as her own together with the 
birth mother"); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. at 
462 (both parties "planned to have and raise children together," 
"prepar[ing the child's] nursery together in the home they had 
jointly purchased"; nonbiological mother "was in the delivery 
room"). 
 
Partanen was required also to allege that she and Gallagher 
"received the child into their home and openly held out the 
child as their child."  G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a) (4).  In her 
complaint, Partanen asserts that she helped raise the children 
in the home she shared with Gallagher, that she participated 
actively in the care and nurturing of the children from the 
moment of their birth, that she was involved in key decisions, 
that she and Gallagher represented themselves to others -- both 
in formal and informal contexts -- as the children's parents, 
22 
 
and that the children refer to her as "Mommy."  These 
allegations, too, are sufficient.  See Elisa B. v. Superior 
Court, supra (nonbiological mother "voluntarily accepted the 
rights and obligations of parenthood after the children were 
born"); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., supra at 463 
(nonbiological mother was called "Momma," "appeared 'to the 
world' to be [child]'s parent," and was referred to as such in 
child's "school and medical records"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and 
the case is remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.