Title: City Council of Springfield v. Mayor of Springfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13154
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2022

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SJC-13154 
 
CITY COUNCIL OF SPRINGFIELD  vs.  MAYOR OF SPRINGFIELD. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 6, 2021. – February 22, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Municipal Corporations, City council, Mayor, Police, By-laws and 
ordinances, Contracts.  Police, Hiring.  Power of 
Appointment.  Contract, Municipality.  Constitutional Law, 
Police hiring, Separation of powers, Municipalities. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 2, 2020. 
 
The case was heard by Francis E. Flannery, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Michael P. Angelini for the defendant. 
Thomas Lesser (Michael Aleo also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  As cities across the country consider changes 
to their police departments to ensure greater accountability, 
control over these decisions can be hotly contested, as it is in 
 
 
 
2 
the instant case.  This appeal requires us to determine whether 
the city council of Springfield (city council) can reorganize 
the Springfield police department to be headed by a five-person 
board of police commissioners rather than a single commissioner 
under the provisions of the Springfield city charter passed in 
accordance with G. L. c. 43, §§ 46-55.  The city council 
contends it can do so pursuant to its legislative powers, and 
the mayor of Springfield (mayor) disagrees, claiming it 
infringes on his executive appointment authority.  We conclude 
that the city council may so reorganize the police department, 
based on the plain language of the relevant statutes and city 
ordinances, and therefore affirm the Superior Court's entry of 
declaratory judgment in favor of the city council. 
Background.  1.  Springfield's city government.  The 
parties agree to the material facts. 
In 1962, the city of Springfield adopted a "Plan A" model 
city charter based on G. L. c. 43, §§ 46-55, codified in the 
city charter at sections 46-55.  See Kaczmarski v. Mayor of 
Springfield, 346 Mass. 432, 432-433 (1963).  In a Plan A model, 
the division of executive and legislative powers is as follows.  
The mayor is the "chief executive officer" of the city.  G. L. 
c. 43, § 48.  The mayor can appoint "all heads of departments 
and members of municipal boards" without approval from the city 
council.  G. L. c. 43, § 52.  The appointment becomes effective 
 
 
 
3 
when the mayor files a certificate with the city clerk providing 
that the appointment is made "solely in the interest of the 
city" and that the appointee either "is a recognized expert in 
the work which will devolve upon [him or her]" or "is a person 
specially fitted by education, training or experience to perform 
the duties of said office."  G. L. c. 43, § 53.  The mayor can 
also remove a head of department or board member without city 
council approval by filing a statement with the city clerk.  
G. L. c. 43, § 54.  Due in part to these unilateral appointment 
and removal powers, Plan A is also referred to as a "responsible 
executive," Kaczmarski, supra at 432, or "strong mayor" 
government, City Council of Boston v. Mayor of Boston, 383 Mass. 
716, 719 (1981). 
The city council is vested with the legislative powers of 
the city.  G. L. c. 43, § 50.  Another section of G. L. c. 43, 
not connected to any particular model charter plan, provides: 
"[T]he city council or other legislative body may at any 
time by ordinance, consistent with general laws, 
reorganize, consolidate or abolish departments, in whole or 
in part; transfer the duties, powers and appropriations of 
one department to another, in whole or in part; establish 
new departments; and increase, reduce, establish or abolish 
salaries of heads of departments or members of boards." 
G. L. c. 43, § 5.  Springfield adopted this section in its city 
charter as section five. 
2.  The Springfield police department.  In 1902, pursuant 
to a grant of authority by the Legislature, the city council 
 
 
 
4 
established a police commission to manage and control the 
Springfield police department.  The commission had five unpaid 
members, who were required to be residents of Springfield and 
could not be employees of the city.  The mayor had appointment 
and removal powers over the commissioners, subject to approval 
of the city council.  The commission had the power to appoint a 
chief of police and other officials.  St. 1909, c. 244.  This 
remained the case even after Springfield adopted the Plan A city 
charter in 1962.1 
In 2004, the Legislature responded to Springfield's acute 
fiscal distress by creating a finance control board that assumed 
all powers of the city government, both of the mayor and city 
council.  See St. 2004 c. 169.  In 2005, the finance control 
board abolished the five-member commission and restructured the 
Springfield police department to be headed by a single, 
professional police commissioner.  The commissioner was 
appointed solely by the mayor, but had a three-year term, which 
was not to be coterminous with the mayor's term; and the 
commissioner could only be removed for cause.  The commissioner 
was to have at least seven years of experience as a captain or 
its equivalent and a master's degree or its equivalent.  The 
 
1 The record does not show whether the city council 
continued to exercise these powers after the adoption of the 
charter. 
 
 
 
5 
2005 ordinance authorized the police commissioner to appoint, 
establish, and organize the police department and provided that 
the police commissioner would hold office until a successor was 
appointed and qualified.  The new commissioner position 
integrated the duties of the "chief of police," which were laid 
out in separate ordinances.  The finance control board was 
dissolved in 2009, when the fiscal health of the city had 
recovered. 
In 2018, the city council attempted to restore the pre-2005 
structure of the police commission, passing an ordinance that 
replaced the professional commissioner with a board of police 
commissioners (board) comprised of five unpaid civilians, and 
reimposed the requirements that the members of the board be 
residents of Springfield who were not city employees,2 as 
provided in sections 67-84 to 67-96 of the municipal code.  The 
mayor vetoed the ordinance, and the city council voted to 
override the veto. 
The mayor refused to implement the ordinance, and entered 
into a contract with a new, full-time professional police 
 
2 The city council had passed a similar ordinance in 2016 
over the mayor's veto, but it was never implemented.  Unlike the 
2018 ordinance, the 2016 version required city council 
confirmation of the mayor's appointees to the board, which the 
council later acknowledged was invalid because it conflicted 
with the mayor's unilateral appointment authority under the city 
charter. 
 
 
 
6 
commissioner in 2019.  The council responded by commencing the 
present action in October 2020 seeking declaratory relief, an 
injunction, and mandamus to require the mayor to comply with the 
ordinance.  The parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment. 
The motion judge held that all provisions of the ordinance 
were valid except for the eligibility criteria for board 
members, which he held violated the mayor's appointment 
authority under the charter.  The court entered a judgment 
declaring that the mayor must "without further delay and in good 
faith endeavor to identify and appoint qualified individuals to 
serve on the [b]oard."  However, the motion judge refused to 
grant an injunction or mandamus relief.  The mayor appealed and 
filed an unopposed motion to stay enforcement of the judgment, 
which a Superior Court judge granted.3  We granted the parties' 
joint application for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review a grant of 
summary judgment de novo.  Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 
633, 636 (2021), citing Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 
463 Mass. 635, 637 (2012).  There are no factual disputes, and 
the only issue is one of statutory interpretation. 
 
3 The city council did not appeal from the motion judge's 
adverse rulings abrogating the qualifications provision and 
declining to grant injunctive or mandamus relief, so we do not 
review them. 
 
 
 
7 
2.  The city council's powers under G. L. c. 43, § 5.  As 
explained above, G. L. c. 43, § 5, gives the city council the 
power to "reorganize, consolidate or abolish departments, in 
whole or in part" and to "establish new departments."  The city 
council claims, and the motion judge held, that the 2018 
ordinance was clearly within the scope of its power to 
"reorganize" municipal departments.  We agree. 
"Ordinarily, where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent" 
(citation omitted).  Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 
483 Mass. 612, 620 (2019).  "If the words used are not otherwise 
defined in the statute, we afford them their plain and ordinary 
meaning."  Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018).  
"Reorganize," unsurprisingly, means to "organize again or anew."  
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/reorganize [https://perma.cc/9LTV-RTXN].  
"Organize" means, inter alia, "to set up an administrative 
structure for."  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/organize [https: 
//perma.cc/FT2T-XLXJ]. 
The plain meaning of "reorganize . . . departments," in 
§ 5, clearly encompasses changing the structure of the 
department, including how it shall be overseen.  See Duggan v. 
Third Dist. Court of E. Middlesex, 298 Mass. 274, 280-282 (1937) 
 
 
 
8 
(city council used § 5 to abolish department of public safety 
headed by public safety commissioner and replace it with police 
department and fire department with heads appointed by mayor); 
Reynolds v. McDermott, 264 Mass. 158, 165 (1928) (city council 
has authority under § 5 to abolish administrative offices and 
create new department heads appointed by mayor); Gabriel v. 
Mayor of Fitchburg, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 984, 984 (1982) (ordinance 
allowing police chief to designate officer to assist city 
solicitor valid exercise of city council's authority under § 5 
to "define by ordinance the powers and duties of the officers 
and employees of the city"). 
3.  The mayor's appointment and removal powers.  The mayor 
contends that even if the 2018 ordinance was within the scope of 
G. L. c. 43, § 5, it violates G. L. c. 43, §§ 52-54, which give 
him the unilateral right to appoint and remove "all heads of 
departments and members of municipal boards."  G. L. c. 43, 
§ 52.  In challenging the validity of the ordinance, the mayor 
"bear[s] a heavy burden."  Springfield Preservation Trust, Inc. 
v. Springfield Library & Museums Ass'n, 447 Mass. 408, 418 
(2006), citing Grace v. Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 49–50 (1979).  
For the ordinance to be invalid, "[t]here must be a 'sharp 
conflict' between the ordinance or bylaw and the statute" 
(citation omitted).  Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 470 
Mass. 284, 289 (2014). 
 
 
 
9 
Again, we look to the plain meaning of the words of the 
statute.  "Appoint" means, inter alia, "[t]o choose or designate 
(someone) for a position or job, esp[ecially] in government."  
Black's Law Dictionary 124 (11th ed. 2019).  Section 52 of G. L. 
c. 43 does not give the mayor the power to determine the 
structure or number of the heads of departments or boards 
(properly the province of the city council under § 5), but 
rather the identity of the people who will fill them. 
We detect no conflict between the mayor's rights under 
G. L. c. 43, §§ 52-54, and the 2018 ordinance, much less one 
"sharp" enough to invalidate an otherwise valid ordinance.  The 
city council concedes that the board members are subject to the 
mayor's unilateral appointment and removal powers.  Indeed, the 
ordinance itself provides that the board members are appointed 
by the mayor, pursuant to section 67-84 of the municipal code.4 
4.  The contracting power under G. L. c. 41, § 108O.  The 
mayor next argues that the 2018 ordinance is invalid because it 
interferes with what he claims to be his authority under G. L. 
c. 41, § 108O, to enter into an employment contract with a 
police chief. 
 
4 The mayor certainly cannot protest the infringement of his 
removal powers under G. L. c. 43, § 54, because the 2018 
ordinance allows him to remove the board members at will, unlike 
the 2005 ordinance imposed by the finance control board, which 
provided the police commissioner with for-cause protection. 
 
 
 
10 
The statute provides: 
"Any city or town acting through its appointing authority, 
may establish an employment contract for the salary, fringe 
benefits, and other conditions of employment, including but 
not limited to, severance pay, relocation expenses, 
reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance of 
his [or her] duties or office, liability insurance, 
conditions of discipline, termination, dismissal, and 
reappointment, performance standards and leave for its 
police chief and fire chief, or a person performing such 
duties having a different title." 
G. L. c. 41, § 108O, first par. 
We discern no "sharp conflict" between the appointing 
authority's contracting power regarding a police chief provided 
by G. L. c. 41, § 108O, and the city council's power to 
reorganize the police department as provided by section five of 
the city charter and G. L. c. 43, § 5. 
The city council has the right to define the organizational 
and oversight structure of the police department.  That 
organizational structure is most likely, if not certainly, going 
to include a police chief or a person performing the duties of a 
police chief but with a different title.  That person would also 
be expected to have an employment contract.  The appointing 
authority for the police chief would also be expected to 
"establish" such a contract. 
There is nothing in this statute that precludes the city 
council from reorganizing the police department to have either a 
single commissioner or a multiperson police commission.  It is 
 
 
 
11 
possible for the city council to consolidate the police chief 
and police commission functions into one person, as was done 
under the finance control board, but there is no legal 
requirement to do so.  The city council is also free to replace 
a single police commissioner with an unpaid, five-member board.  
Under this structure, the board performs an oversight function 
for the department but not a daily managerial function as would 
be performed by a police chief.  These duties are already 
defined elsewhere in the Springfield municipal code, and are 
separate from those of the board, although they happened to be 
 
 
 
12 
exercised by the same person between 2005 and 2018.5,6  Someone 
will have to perform that daily managerial function, but it is 
not, and does not have to be, the commission. 
 
5 For example, section 27-26 of the Springfield municipal 
code provides that the chief of police "shall, subject to the 
rules and regulations of the Board of Police Commissioners, from 
time to time issue orders . . . as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of proper discipline in the Department, for the 
detail and duties of its members and employees, and for the use 
and disposition of its equipment."  Other duties concern the 
day-to-day operation of the police department, including 
approving payroll and overtime, "command and control" of all 
other department members, and, along with other department 
members, "see[ing] that the provisions of all ordinances are 
enforced," as provided in sections 27-25 to 27-36 of the 
municipal code.  The chief of police also has duties outside of 
the department itself, including collecting contact information 
from security alarm system owners, issuing permits to hold 
auctions, and issuing emergency parking bans, pursuant to 
sections 100-14, 115-1, and 385-9 of the municipal code. 
 
In contrast, as provided in sections 67-90 to 67-92 of the 
municipal code, the duties of the board concern "the 
appointment, management and control of the members and employees 
of the Police Department," including the power to "make such 
lawful rules for the maintenance of the Police Department, . . . 
including the regulation, government and discipline of such 
members and employees" and "the power to examine into absences 
of members and employees of the Department." 
 
6 The motion judge ordered the parties to submit all 
ordinances relevant to the police commission from at least 1962 
to 2005.  However, despite this specific order, the record still 
contains gaps.  Some of the ordinances cited above were not 
included in the record appendix and were not cited by the 
parties in their briefs, although they do appear on the Attorney 
General's website:  https://www.mass.gov/guides/massachusetts-
city-and-town-ordinances-and-bylaws [https://perma.cc/SE3W-
QJP7].  Although not necessary to our decision, these ordinances 
were informative and readily accessible.  If they were statutes 
or a municipal charter, we could have easily taken judicial 
notice of them.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 202(a), (b) (2021).  As 
 
 
 
 
13 
The real conflict here is not between the statutory 
provisions but who will have control over the department, and 
the selection of the police chief.  The city council and mayor 
disagree over who is the appointing authority for a police chief 
under G. L. c. 41, § 108O, when the police chief and the 
department head are not one and the same.  When the police 
commissioner is the police chief, as he or she was before 2018, 
the mayor is clearly the appointing authority under G. L. c. 43, 
§ 52.  When the board of police commissioners is a five-person 
board, an argument can be made that the board itself is the 
appointing authority for the police chief, as was the case under 
St. 1909, c. 244, as discussed above. 
 
municipal ordinances, however, they are treated differently, as 
a "peculiar species of fact, requiring formal proof."  
Commonwealth v. Bones, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 681, 685 (2018), 
quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 335, at 334 (K.S. Broun ed., 
7th ed. 2013).  See Mass G. Evid. § 202(c).  See also Halbach v. 
Normandy Real Estate Partners, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 669, 675 n.5 
(2016) (Milkey, J., concurring).  The Appeals Court has also 
thoughtfully invited us to reconsider this rule stating, "We 
have noted that 'reliable versions of municipal ordinances and 
by-laws now may be as generally accessible as statutes.' . . .  
The time may have come for the rule prohibiting judicial notice 
of municipal ordinance and bylaws to be revisited by the Supreme 
Judicial Court."  (Citation and footnote omitted.)  Bones, supra 
at 685-686.  We agree that the time has come to reconsider this 
rule, which appears, as the Appeals Court recognizes, to be a 
relic of another era.  See id.  As the ordinances have been 
provided to the Attorney General for widespread public 
dissemination and are thus readily available, we take judicial 
notice of them in the instant case.  We also refer the matter to 
the Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts 
Evidence Law for further consideration of the issue. 
 
 
 
14 
As this issue has not been properly briefed, and is not 
necessary to decide whether the city council has the power to 
restructure the police commission from a single police 
commissioner to a five-person board, we decline to do so.  We 
further note, however, that the mayor appoints all five members 
of the board, so his power to influence, if not control, the 
selection of any police chief is significant, even when the city 
council has created a five-person board of police commissioners. 
5.  Separation of powers.  The mayor urges us to look 
beyond the language of the relevant statutes and charter 
provisions and to limit the city council's power so that it does 
not interfere with what he claims is the general intention 
behind the "strong mayor" Plan A form of government.  The mayor 
claims that, by interposing the civilian board of police 
commissioners, the city council is usurping his right as the 
chief executive officer to decide that the police force would be 
better administered with a single, professional commissioner who 
answers directly to him.  This, we conclude, is an important 
policy question, but not a separation of powers problem given 
the structure of the city charter.  The statutes and ordinances 
permissibly divide legislative and executive responsibilities 
over the police department between the mayor and the city 
council, recognizing their mutual responsibility and 
accountability for the performance of the department. 
 
 
 
15 
We begin by acknowledging that the present dispute is 
rooted in both parties' understandable concerns for how one of 
the most, if not the most, important and powerful departments of 
a modern city government should be run.  Both the 2016 and 2018 
ordinances and the present action arose from a Commonwealth- and 
nationwide reevaluation of policing, which extends beyond the 
behavior of individual officers to how police leadership and 
city governments supervise and discipline them.  See, e.g., 
St. 2020, c. 253 (creating, inter alia, Massachusetts Peace 
Officer Standards and Training Commission, empowered to 
investigate police misconduct and decertify police officers).  
These concerns are especially acute in Springfield where, since 
at least 2004, allegations of abuse and discrimination against 
the department have led the community to call for greater 
civilian control over the police.7  In addition, shortly before 
the city council commenced this action, the United States 
Department of Justice released a report concluding: 
"[T]here is reasonable cause to believe that [the 
Springfield police department's] Narcotics Bureau officers 
engage in a pattern or practice of excessive force in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. . . .   This pattern or practice of excessive 
force is directly attributable to systemic deficiencies in 
policies, accountability systems, and training." 
 
7 The prior mayor, by executive order, created the community 
complaint review board in 2007, now referred to as the community 
police hearing board. 
 
 
 
16 
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, & 
United States Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts, 
Investigation of the Springfield, Massachusetts Police 
Department's Narcotics Bureau, at 2 (July 8, 2020).8 
Here, the Legislature (and the citizens of Springfield in 
adopting the city charter) vested the mayor with executive 
authority and the city council with legislative authority.  This 
traditional separation of powers has been applied to the 
oversight of the police department as well as other municipal 
functions.  Although constitutional separation of powers 
principles applicable to Federal and State governments do "not 
generally apply to municipal governments," 4 E. McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations § 13:1, at 1278 (3d rev. ed. 2019), where 
a statutory scheme "delineate[s] clear spheres of activities to 
be exercised by the separate branches of municipal authority," 
that division of authority should be respected.  Tierney v. 
Mayor of Boston, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 406 (1980), S.C., 383 
Mass. 716 (1981).  Casamasino v. Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 343 
(1999) ("Principles of separation of powers are applicable where 
the Legislature has specifically delegated to the mayor and to 
the council separate functions").  As in the constitutional 
separation of powers analysis, however, there are often 
 
8 Available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1292901/download [https://perma.cc/AY33-WDL4]. 
 
 
 
17 
overlapping and intersecting powers.  The "separation of powers 
does not require three watertight compartments within the 
government" (quotation and citation omitted).  Opinion of the 
Justices, 372 Mass. 883, 892 (1977).  Rather, "there is a need 
for some flexibility in the allocation of functions among the 
three departments" (quotation omitted).  Desrosiers v. Governor, 
486 Mass. 369, 383, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 83 (2020), quoting 
Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 387 Mass. 531, 541 
(1982). 
The division of powers here reflects the mutual 
responsibility and ultimate accountability of the executive and 
legislative branches of municipal government over policing in 
their city.  Rather than give the mayor essentially complete 
authority over the police department as he claims here, the 
statutes provide the city council with the legislative power to 
reorganize the department to determine its oversight structure 
while the mayor retains the executive power of appointment over 
the commission the council establishes.  The result provides 
some checks and balances regarding control over the police 
department.  It also recognizes that both the mayor and the city 
council are answerable to the voters of Springfield for the 
performance of the police department.  We have not found a 
separation of powers problem in other contexts where municipal 
authority and control have been so shared and divided.  Cf. City 
 
 
 
18 
Council of Boston, 383 Mass. at 720 (city council possessed "a 
check on the mayor's executive function through the power of 
appropriation"); Sherriff v. Mayor of Revere, 355 Mass. 133, 137 
(1969) (although mayor could not fire city clerk's employee, he 
could limit staffing budget to provide for fewer positions); 
Mayor of New Bedford v. City Council of New Bedford, 13 Mass. 
App. Ct. 251, 256 (1982) (city council's employees were not 
subject to mayor's appointment power, but their hiring was 
"subject, however, to such appropriation and other powers as may 
be held by the mayor").  We likewise fail to discern a 
separation of powers problem here. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the motion judge's grant of summary 
judgment to the city council and denial of the mayor's cross 
motion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.