Title: Karren Hughes, as executrix of the Estate of Thomas Doster v. Noland Hospital Dothan II, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1151315
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 2017

Rel: October 27, 2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
____________________
1151268
____________________
Noland Hospital Dothan II, LLC
v.
Karren Hughes, as executrix of the Estate of Thomas Doster
____________________
1151315
____________________
Karren Hughes, as executrix of the Estate of Thomas Doster
v.
Noland Hospital Dothan II, LLC
Appeals from Houston Circuit Court
(CV-09-900240)
1151268, 1151315
BRYAN, Justice.
1151268 –- AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.
Stuart, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.
Bolin and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
Sellers, J., recuses himself.
1151315 -– APPEAL DISMISSED AS MOOT.
Stuart, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the judgment of dismissal only.
Bolin, J., dissents.
Sellers, J., recuses himself.
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting in case no. 1151268 and
concurring in the judgment of dismissal only in case no.
1151315).
In case no. 1151268, an appeal, this Court affirms
without opinion a judgment for money damages awarded on a
wrongful-death claim against Noland Hospital Dothan II, LLC
("Noland"), in favor of Karren Hughes, as executrix of the
estate of Thomas Doster, who allegedly was injured and
subsequently died from a fall that occurred while Doster was
a patient at one of Noland's hospitals.  Principal among the
issues in the case are whether Doster suffered a fall in his
hospital room sufficient to cause internal head injuries, and
whether he did in fact suffer internal head injuries that
contributed to his death, or whether his death instead
resulted 
from 
the 
progression 
of 
certain 
preexisting
conditions.   
The judgment of the trial court in favor of Hughes was
based upon a verdict entered by a jury that heard testimony as
to a hearsay statement made by Doster himself to the effect
that he fell, which the trial court admitted under the
excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  See Rule
803(2), Ala. R. Evid.  Given Doster's general condition and
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1151268, 1151315
state of mind, as well as the timing of the out-of-court
statement at issue, that statement did not in my opinion have
the necessary attributes of trustworthiness or otherwise
qualify 
for 
admission 
under 
the 
excited-utterance exception 
to
the hearsay rule. 
In addition, the jury heard testimony from Doster's
brother, who relayed an out-of-court statement by an
unidentified "intern or something," which apparently was
admitted into evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), Ala. R.
Evid., as an admission by a party opponent. In my view, the
record contains insufficient information to establish this
declarant to be an agent or servant of the hospital, or to
establish that his statement concerned a matter within the
scope of any such agency, so as to qualify for exclusion from
the hearsay rule under the admission-of-party-opponent
provisions of Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D). 
Based on the foregoing, and because I believe the
aforesaid testimony was material (given what I consider to be
the speculative and inferential nature of much of the other
evidence), I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the
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trial court's judgment based on a verdict rendered by a jury
that heard that evidence.1 
In a cross-appeal, case no. 1151315, Hughes argues that
the trial court's judgment against Noland should be upheld on
the alternative ground that there was evidence proffered, but
improperly excluded from the jury's consideration, that the
trial judge could have considered to justify his denial of
Noland's postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of
law.  Rule 50(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"If the motion for judgment as a matter of law is
denied, the party who prevailed on the motion may,
as appellee, assert grounds entitling the party to
a new trial in the event the appellate court
concludes that the trial court erred in denying the
motion for judgment.  If the appellate court
reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule
precludes it from determining that the appellee is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial
court to determine whether a new trial shall be
granted."
Although Rule 50(d) allows this Court, upon reversing the
denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, to order
a new trial or to direct a trial court to determine whether to
1In addition, I am concerned about the fact that one or
more jurors had discussions about the case with an alternate
juror before the conclusion of the trial.  I find it
unnecessary to further address this as a potential ground for
reversal in light of the concerns addressed in the text.
5
1151268, 1151315
order a new trial, Hughes expressly states that she is not
requesting a new trial.  Instead, she argues that the judgment
in her favor should be upheld as a matter of law on the basis
of the evidence that, although withheld from the jury, was
known to the trial judge.
First, if Hughes's argument were a proper alternative
basis for upholding the judgment in her favor, then a cross-
appeal to assert that alternative ground is neither necessary
nor appropriate.  Such a ground would be properly asserted in
the initial appeal simply as an alternative ground for
affirming the trial court's judgment.  See, e.g., Municipal
Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 190 So. 3d
895, 908 (Ala. 2015).
More fundamentally, the Court cannot sustain a judgment
entered on an otherwise improper jury verdict based on the
trial court's collateral consideration of evidence not
presented to the jury.  As Rule 50 indicates, perhaps a new
trial would be in order if the initial appeal were successful
and it were to be determined in a cross-appeal that there was
evidence that had been improperly excluded from the jury's
consideration that should be considered in the new trial.  But
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the court in a jury trial cannot replace a jury's faulty
verdict with its own verdict based on evidence to which it,
but not the jury, was privy.  
Based on the foregoing, I cannot agree to the dismissal
of the cross-appeal on the ground that it is moot, as stated
in this Court's order dismissing that cross-appeal.  Instead,
for the reasons stated above, I find the cross-appeal, as
framed, to be without merit in its own right.  Accordingly, as
to the cross-appeal, I concur in the judgment of dismissal
only.
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