Title: Oregon v. Andrews
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S066479
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2020

No. 1	
January 16, 2020	
65
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JOSHUA BRANDON ANDREWS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 15CR1533) (CA A162029) (SC S066479)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 17, 2019.
Erin J. Snyder Severe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of 
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed 
the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was 
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued 
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also 
on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and 
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, 
Flynn, Duncan, and Nelson, Justices, and Landau, Senior 
Justice pro tempore.**
WALTERS, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the 
case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
______________
	
**  On appeal from Malheur County Circuit Court, Patricia A. Sullivan, 
Judge. 295 Or App 194, 433 P3d 757 (2018).
	
**  Garrett, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
66	
State v. Andrews
Case Summary: Defendant, who was convicted of harassment under ORS 
166.065, objected to the state’s request for restitution in the amount of the vic­
tim’s economic damages. Defendant argued that the jury could have found defen­
dant guilty of harassment without finding that he committed the criminal act 
upon which the claim of restitution was based. When the trial court awarded the 
requested restitution, defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: Under the criminal restitution statute, ORS 137.106, a trial court may not 
award restitution unless it can determine, from the record and the defendant’s 
conviction, that the jury necessarily found that the defendant committed the 
criminal act upon which the claim of restitution is based.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part. The judgment of 
the circuit court is reversed in part, and the case is remanded to that court for 
further proceedings.
Cite as 366 Or 65 (2020)	
67
	
WALTERS, C. J.
	
In this criminal case, defendant was convicted of 
one count of harassment, and, during sentencing, the trial 
court awarded restitution under ORS 137.106. The question 
we address is whether the trial court had statutory author­
ity to do so.1
	
The relevant facts are uncontested. The state 
charged defendant with two crimes—one count of fourth-
degree assault, and one count of harassment. To prove 
assault, the state was required to prove that defendant 
caused the victim “physical injury.” ORS 163.160(1)(a). To 
prove harassment, the state was required to prove that 
defendant subjected the victim to “offensive physical con­
tact.” ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A). At trial, the state presented 
evidence that defendant drove to the victim’s place of work, 
began yelling at him, spat on him, and punched him in the 
face, knocking out his tooth bridge. The jury acquitted defen­
dant on the assault charge but convicted him of harassment. 
Post-trial, the state asked the court to impose restitution 
for the cost of replacing the victim’s tooth bridge. Defendant 
objected, arguing that the trial court did not have statutory 
authority to do so. Defendant contended that restitution is 
permitted only when a trial court can conclude, from the 
defendant’s conviction, that the defendant engaged in the 
criminal act that forms the basis for the award of restitu­
tion, and that, in this case, the trial court could not reach 
that conclusion: The act that formed the basis for the vic­
tim’s damages was the punch, and the jury could have con­
victed defendant of harassment without finding that defen­
dant had punched the victim. To support his argument, 
defendant noted that the jury had acquitted defendant of 
assault, which could indicate that the jury did not believe 
that defendant had punched the victim and had reached its 
verdict based on the spitting evidence alone. The trial court 
	
1  Defendant makes a constitutional argument that we do not address. 
Defendant argues that even if the trial court had statutory authority to award 
restitution, its award violated his Article  I, section 11, right to a jury trial. 
Because we resolve the case on statutory grounds, we do not address defendant’s 
constitutional argument. See Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 364 Or 609, 614, 
437 P3d 1107 (2019) (court will avoid reaching constitutional questions unless 
necessary). 
68	
State v. Andrews
reasoned differently and noted that, in acquitting defendant 
on the assault charge, the jury had not necessarily found 
that defendant had not punched the victim; the jury could 
have determined that the victim had not suffered “physi­
cal injury,” as required by ORS 163.160(1)(a). The trial court 
observed that the evidence that defendant had punched the 
victim was strong and that, while urging the jury to find 
defendant guilty of harassment, the state had argued that 
both the punch and the spitting could support a guilty ver­
dict. The trial court awarded the requested restitution.
	
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. State v. Andrews, 295 Or App 194, 433 P3d 757 
(2018). The Court of Appeals noted that, in imposing res­
titution, a trial court “may not engage in fact-finding that 
enlarges the scope of a defendant’s criminal activities 
beyond what the defendant was convicted of or admitted 
to,” and cited State v. Dorsey, 259 Or App 441, 442, 314 P3d 
331 (2013), as an example of that limitation. Andrews, 295 
Or App at 198. In Dorsey, the Court of Appeals held that a 
defendant who had pleaded guilty to stealing money over 
the course of approximately two weeks could not be required 
to pay restitution for money that was reported missing 
over 85 days. 259 Or App at 442. In Andrews, however, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that the restitution award 
did not depend on criminal activities that fell outside the 
scope of the crime for which defendant had been convicted. 

Id. at 198. The court explained that the “scope of defendant’s 
criminal activity * 
* 
* was determined when the jury con­
victed him of engaging in ‘offensive physical contact,’ based 
on evidence that included his spitting at and punching the 
victim” and reasoned that “[t]he trial court did not expand 
on that scope in imposing restitution.” Id. Rather, the trial 
court had considered evidence that it normally could con­
sider at a sentencing hearing and “made findings regard­
ing the victim’s damages and their causal relationship to 
the evidence of defendant’s conduct that was in the record.”2 

	
2  The court noted that the result would be different if the jury’s verdict was 
logically inconsistent with the determination that defendant punched the victim. 
State v. Andrews, 295 Or App 194, 198 n 2, 433 P3d 757 (2019). In this case, it was 
not. The fact that defendant was acquitted on the assault charge did not neces­
sarily mean that the jury had determined that no punch occurred. Id. The jury 
Cite as 366 Or 65 (2020)	
69
Id. at 197-98. We allowed defendant’s petition for review,3 
and, because we conclude that the trial court could not 
award restitution under ORS 137.106, we reverse.
	
ORS 137.106 requires an award of restitution when 
three prerequisites are met: (1) criminal activities;4 (2) eco­
nomic damages; and (3) a causal relationship between the 
two. State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 181, 637 P2d 602 (1981); see 
also State v. Ramos, 358 Or 582, 588, 368 P3d 446 (2016) 
(“The statute requires * 
* 
* that the damages be ‘objectively 
verifiable monetary losses’ that ‘result from’ a defendant’s 
criminal activity.”). In this case, the parties’ dispute focuses 
on the first of those prerequisites—the defendant’s crimi­
nal activities. Specifically, the parties disagree about how 
a trial court is to determine, from a defendant’s conviction, 
whether the defendant committed the criminal act on which 
the state relies for an award of restitution. Defendant argues 
that, to find that a defendant committed a criminal act, a 
trial court must be able to conclude that the jury necessar­
ily found that the defendant committed that act. The state 
argues that the trial court is permitted to conclude that a 
defendant committed a criminal act when there is evidence 
of that act in the record and that evidence is sufficient to 
support the jury’s guilty verdict; in other words, a defen­
dant’s conviction determines the “scope” of a defendant’s 
criminal activity, and the trial court is permitted to find 
that the defendant committed any act within that scope.
could have determined that defendant’s punch broke the victim’s tooth bridge but 
that the victim did not suffer “physical injury.” See ORS 163.160 (defining fourth-
degree assault to require evidence of “physical injury”).
	
3  We note that defendant made an additional assignment of error in the 
Court of Appeals: that the trial court had failed to give a required jury instruc­
tion. Defendant admitted that the issue was not preserved, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed without discussion. State v. Andrews, 295 Or App 194, 195, 433 
P3d 757 (2018). This court denied review of that issue, and accordingly, we do not 
disturb the Court of Appeals’ decision on that matter.
	
4  In 1999, the Oregon legislature amended ORS 137.106 by substituting 
for the phrase, “[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activities,” the current 
phrase, “[w]hen a person is convicted of a crime, or a violation.” Neither party 
contends that that change affects the analysis in this case, and both parties 
agree that our previous cases interpreting the restitution statute are still good 
law. Moreover, for purposes of this case, both parties agree that the question is 
what the proper analysis should be when a trial court is determining whether a 
defendant’s conviction for a crime has resulted in economic damages. As we will 
explain, our previous cases inform our analysis, but do not decide that issue.
70	
State v. Andrews
	
Before we address that narrow dispute, we think it 
helpful to set out the role that the trial court plays in deter­
mining whether the other two prerequisites to restitution, 
which are not at issue in this case, are met. Those two pre­
requisites are a victim’s economic damages and the causal 
link between those damages and the criminal act that the 
defendant committed. As relevant here, the restitution stat­
ute provides:
	
“When a person is convicted of a crime, or a violation as 
described in ORS 153.008, that has resulted in economic 
damages, the district attorney shall investigate and pres­
ent to the court * 
* 
* evidence of the nature and amount of 
the damages. * 
* 
* If the court finds from the evidence pre­
sented that a victim suffered economic damages, in addi­
tion to any other sanction it may impose, the court shall 
* 
* 
* [require] the defendant [to] pay the victim restitution 
in a specific amount that equals the full amount of the vic­
tim’s economic damages as determined by the court.”
ORS 137.106(1)(a).
	
By its terms, the restitution statute grants trial 
courts authority to make its own, independent, factual 
findings as to a victim’s economic damages. When a per­
son is convicted of a crime that has resulted in economic 
damages, ORS 137.106(1)(a) requires the district attorney to 
investigate and present to the court evidence of “the nature 
and amount of the damages.” ORS 137.106(5) provides for a 
hearing if the defendant requests one, and ORS 137.106(1) 
sets forth the procedure for those hearings. See also State 
v. Hart, 299 Or 128, 130, 699 P2d 1113 (1985) (ORS 137.106 
“sets forth the procedure for [restitution] hearings”). If 
the trial court “finds” from the evidence of the nature and 
amount of the damages that the “victim suffered economic 
damages,” then the trial court must order the defendant to 
pay restitution in the full amount of the victim’s damages. 
ORS 137.106(1).
	
The restitution statute also grants trial courts 
authority to engage in independent fact-finding to deter­
mine the cause of the victim’s economic damages; that is, 
the causal relationship between a defendant’s criminal 
activities and the economic damages suffered by the vic­
tim. As we noted in Ramos, “ORS 137.106 requires that 
Cite as 366 Or 65 (2020)	
71
economic damages ‘result from’ a defendant’s crime.” 358 
Or at 593 (quoting the restitution statute). When determin­
ing causation, a trial court must determine whether there 
is a “but-for” connection between the victim’s damages and 
the crime and whether the victim’s economic damages were 
a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s crime. 

Id. at 596. Those questions, like the question of the amount 
of economic damages, pose “a factual question for the court.” 
Id. at 597.5
	
But, as the parties recognize, the restitution stat­
ute does not grant trial courts similar authority to make 
its own independent factual findings about the first prereq­
uisite to an award of restitution—the criminal act that the 
defendant committed. ORS 137.106(1)(a) permits an award 
of restitution when a defendant is “convicted of a crime” that 
permits an award of restitution. In State v. Lefthandbull, 
306 Or 330, 332-33, 758 P2d 343 (1988), this court concluded 
that more than a bald conviction is necessary to meet that 
statutory requirement. In Lefthandbull, the defendant had 
pleaded guilty to an attempt to manufacture a controlled 
substance but had not admitted committing any specific 
acts. Id. at 332. This court held that the defendant could 
not be ordered to pay restitution for damages caused by the 
manufacturing process because the state had not “proved” 
that the defendant had committed the criminal act on which 
the restitution claim was based. Id. at 333. We explained 
that, “[b]ecause defendant pleaded guilty to the attempt, 
* 
* 
* no particular acts were proved at trial. Nor did [the 
defendant] admit any specific acts at the plea proceeding 
or the sentencing hearing.” Id. Thus, under Lefthandbull, 
a trial court must be able to determine from the record at 
trial, not only that the defendant was convicted of a crime, 
but also that the defendant committed a specific criminal 
act—the act on which the restitution claim is based. Put 
differently, ORS 137.106 does not grant trial courts author­
ity to make their own factual findings about whether a 
defendant committed such an act; trial courts must look 
	
5  We have held that Article I, section 11, does not prohibit a trial court from 
making those factual findings, because whether the victim suffered economic 
damages and in what amount is not an element of the crime. State v. Hart, 299 
Or 128, 136-37, 699 P2d 1113 (1985).
72	
State v. Andrews
to the record and the defendant’s conviction to make that 

determination.
	
In this case, the criminal act that allegedly resulted 
in the victim’s economic damages was the punch that 
knocked out the victim’s tooth bridge. The parties accept 
that the trial court was not permitted to make its own fac­
tual finding as to whether the punch occurred. They quarrel 
about what the trial court could determine about the punch 
from the record at trial and defendant’s harassment convic­
tion. Defendant takes the position that the record and con­
viction do not prove that he punched the victim; the jury 
could have convicted defendant of harassment based on the 
spitting alone. The state takes the position that, because 
there was evidence in the record that defendant had deliv­
ered the punch, and the state had urged the jury to consider 
that evidence when it reached its verdict on the harassment 
charge, the record and conviction are sufficient to establish 
that defendant punched the victim.
	
As we understand the state’s argument, it is that, 
because there was evidence at trial from which the jury 
could have found that defendant punched the victim, the 
sentencing court was permitted to conclude that defendant 
had been convicted of doing so. That argument is, however, 
at odds with this court’s decision in State v. Dulfu, 363 Or 
647, 426 P3d 641 (2018). In Dulfu, one of the state’s argu­
ments about the validity of the defendant’s sentence turned 
on the basis for the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 651. The 
state had alleged alternative bases for its charges of first-
degree encouraging child sexual abuse (ESCA I)—the state 
alleged that the defendant had possessed files containing 
visual recordings of sexually explicit conduct involving chil­
dren and that the defendant had duplicated those files. Id. 
The jury convicted the defendant of ESCA I but was not 
asked to specify the basis for its verdict. Id. At sentencing, 
the trial court “[made] its own finding” that the defendant’s 
crime was based on the defendant’s duplication of the files. 
Id. at 653. We reversed, explaining that the trial court could 
not make that finding from the record at trial:
“In sentencing defendant, the trial court could not make 
its own finding regarding the basis for defendant’s guilt; 
Cite as 366 Or 65 (2020)	
73
that finding was within the exclusive province of the jury. 
Although the state may present alternative theories of a 
defendant’s guilt to a jury, a trial court cannot impose a 
sentence that is contingent upon the jury having made a 
particular finding regarding the defendant’s guilt if the 
record does not reflect that the jury actually made that 
finding.”
Id. at 673 (citations omitted). Thus, in Dulfu, we rejected the 
state’s argument that, when a case is tried to a jury and the 
defendant’s sentence depends on the jury having found that 
the defendant committed a particular criminal act, then the 
sentencing court may rely on any criminal act that could 
have been the basis for the jury’s verdict. Instead, we con­
cluded that the sentencing court must be able to ascertain 
from the record that the jury in fact found that the defen­
dant committed that act. Dulfu, 363 Or at 673.
	
We recognize that Dulfu was not a case that 
addressed the restitution statute. And we agree with the 
state that a sentencing court is not always without authority 
to make its own factual findings. Indeed, as discussed, the 
restitution statute grants sentencing courts certain fact-
finding authority—authority to determine the amount of 
a victim’s economic damages and the causal link between 
those damages and the defendant’s criminal activities. 
However, as also discussed, the restitution statute does not 
grant a sentencing court authority to make its own factual 
findings as to the criminal act that the defendant commit­
ted. When a case is tried to a jury, a sentencing court must 
determine the factual findings that the jury made and make 
that determination by considering the record and the defen­
dant’s conviction. In that circumstance, Dulfu is instructive. 
When, as in Dulfu, there is nothing in the record or the con­
viction to indicate that the jury found that the defendant 
committed the particular criminal act that is necessary to 
the decision of the sentencing court, then the sentencing 
court cannot conclude that the jury made that finding.
	
The state’s argument also is at odds with this 
court’s decision in Lefthandbull, a case decided under the 
restitution statute. In Lefthandbull, this court concluded 
that the sentencing court did not have authority to award 
restitution because the court could not determine, from the 
74	
State v. Andrews
defendant’s guilty plea, the particular criminal act that the 
defendant had committed. 306 Or at 333. The state seeks to 
distinguish Lefthandbull by arguing that, in that case, the 
record did not include any evidence about the defendant’s 
conduct. Here, the state notes, there was evidence from 
which the jury could have found that defendant punched 
the victim. But that distinction, although accurate, is not 
what is important about Lefthandbull. What is important 
about Lefthandbull is how this court treated the defendant’s 
conviction. We did not consider whether the particular act 
for which restitution was sought was within the “scope” of 
the crime to which defendant had pleaded guilty, or whether 
the defendant’s guilty plea could have been based on an act 
that would have permitted restitution. Instead, we required 
that the trial court be able to determine that the state had 
“proved” such an act. A state may present evidence of an 
act without proving it. When a case is tried to a jury, it is 
the jury, not the sentencing court, that decides whether a 
criminal act is proved. See Dulfu, 363 Or at 673 (“[A]s in 
any criminal case tried to a jury, it was the jury’s role to 
determine whether the state carried its burden of proving 
the actus reus and the mens rea of each charged crime.”).
	
In addition to attempting to distinguish Dulfu and 
Lefthandbull, the state calls our attention to other law that 
gives a trial court greater latitude in its consideration of a 
defendant’s conviction. The state cites the standard by which 
a court evaluates a motion for judgment of acquittal and 
argues that, when there is sufficient evidence from which 
a jury could find that a defendant committed the charged 
crime, and the jury is not required to concur on the particu­
lar acts that provide the basis for its verdict, then no more is 
required for the jury to reach its verdict. Similarly, the state 
asserts, no more should be required for a court to award res­
titution. The state adds that it is not required to separately 
allege and obtain separate verdicts for all of the various acts 
that a defendant may have committed and contends that it 
would be unduly burdensome to require it to do so for the 
sole purpose of establishing a basis for restitution. The state 
reminds us that, when acts occur in the same criminal epi­
sode, separate guilty verdicts for those acts may merge and, 
if they do, only one judgment of conviction will be entered. 
Cite as 366 Or 65 (2020)	
75
No purpose would be served by requiring more complex 
pleading and proof when such complexity is not required to 
sustain a verdict or enter a judgment of conviction.
	
The state is correct that, when a reviewing court 
considers a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, it 
looks to all the evidence presented to determine whether 
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 
King, 307 Or 332, 339, 768 P2d 391 (1989); see also State 
v. Cervantes, 319 Or 121, 125, 873 P2d 316 (1994) (applying 
that standard). The state need not establish that the jury 
actually found any one or more of the facts presented; the 
state need only establish that the jury could have found the 
essential elements of the crime. King, 307 Or at 339.
	
The state also is correct that a jury may reach a 
verdict without concurring on all the facts adduced by 
the state. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution 
requires that at least 10 members of a jury render a guilty 
verdict, and, as a result, juries are required to concur on all 
material elements of a crime. State v. Pipkin, 354 Or 513, 
529, 316 P3d 255 (2013); see also State v. Ashkins, 357 Or 
642, 649, 357 P3d 490 (2015) (“[A] defendant’s right to jury 
concurrence arises from Article I, section 11.”). But the jury 
is not required to concur on every fact adduced. For exam­
ple, in Pipkin, this court concluded that, to convict a defen­
dant of first-degree burglary, the jury was not required to 
concur as to whether the defendant had entered the home 
unlawfully or had remained unlawfully. Id. at 529-30.6
	
And, again, the state is correct in its articulation 
of merger principles. If, in this case, the state had alleged 
	
6  If jury concurrence is required, then the trial court must instruct the 
jury accordingly. State v. Ashkins, 357 Or 642, 643, 357 P3d 490 (2015) (where 
jury concurrence was required, trial court erred by failing to give concurrence 
instruction). In this case, the parties disagree about whether a jury concurrence 
instruction was required and the role that jury concurrence principles should 
play in this court’s analysis of the restitution statute. But, to determine whether 
the restitution award in this case was permitted, we need not decide whether 
a jury concurrence instruction was required, and we do not believe that jury 
concurrence principles inform our analysis of the restitution statute. Even if the 
jury had been instructed that it must concur on whether defendant was guilty of 
harassment because he punched the victim or whether he was guilty because he 
spit on the victim, the trial court would still have been unable to determine which 
decision the jury had made. 
76	
State v. Andrews
two separate counts of harassment—alleging in one that 
defendant punched the victim, and in the other that defen­
dant spit on the victim—and if the jury had found defen­
dant guilty of both counts, then the two guilty verdicts may 
well have merged and resulted in only one conviction. Under 
ORS 161.067(3), when the state charges a defendant with, 
and the jury finds a defendant guilty of committing, mul­
tiple violations of the same criminal statute based on the 
same conduct, and the trial court determines that there was 
not “sufficient pause” between the defendant’s violations, the 
trial court is required to merge the multiple violations into a 
single conviction.
	
The problem with the state’s argument is not in its 
articulation of the principles that it cites, but in its failure to 
demonstrate that the restitution statute incorporates them. 
As we have explained, ORS 137.106(1)(a) does not permit 
an award of restitution unless a trial court can determine, 
from the record and the defendant’s conviction, that the 
defendant committed the act that resulted in the victim’s 
damages. A conviction may establish that a defendant com­
mitted a crime without establishing that the defendant com­
mitted any particular act. See Lefthandbull, 306 Or at 334 
(upholding the defendant’s conviction for attempt to manu­
facture a controlled substance, but not award of restitution). 
In making other legal determinations, it may be enough for 
a court to determine what a jury could have found from the 
facts adduced. But, under ORS 137.106, that does not suf­
fice. It is not enough that a jury could have found that a 
defendant committed the criminal act that permits restitu­
tion. Instead, a trial court must be able to ascertain from a 
defendant’s conviction that the jury did in fact find that the 
defendant committed the act.
	
We do not consider that interpretation of ORS 
137.106 to be unworkable. As this court said in Dulfu, “in 
most cases, the jury’s finding regarding the actus reus of 
each crime will be apparent from the charging instrument, 
jury instructions, and jury verdict form.” 363 Or at 673 n 10. 
And the state controls how a defendant is charged. For exam­
ple, the state may have the option of alleging alternative 
facts in separate counts. The state also may be able to clar­
ify the basis for a jury’s verdict through jury instructions or 
Cite as 366 Or 65 (2020)	
77
by having the jury indicate the basis for its verdict on the 
verdict form.
	
We conclude that, when a criminal case is submit­
ted to a jury and the jury convicts the defendant of a crime, 
the trial court is not authorized to award restitution under 
ORS 137.106 unless it can determine from the record and 
the defendant’s conviction that the jury necessarily found 
that the defendant committed the criminal act that permits 
restitution. The Court of Appeals is correct in its under­
standing that, in considering whether a person was “con­
victed of a crime * 
* 
* that has resulted in economic dam­
ages,” under ORS 137.106, the trial court has authority to 
make its own factual findings as to both economic damages 
and causation, and, in doing so, may “consider any evidence 
that it ordinarily would at a sentencing hearing.” Andrews, 
295 Or App at 197 (citation and quotation omitted). But a 
trial court does not have the same statutory authority when 
it considers whether the state proved the criminal act on 
which the claim of restitution is based. The trial court must 
be able to determine from the record and the defendant’s 
conviction that the jury necessarily found that the defen­
dant committed that act. Here, the trial court could not 
determine from the record and defendant’s conviction for 
harassment that the jury necessarily found that defendant 
delivered the punch that resulted in damage to the victim’s 
tooth bridge. The jury could have based its decision on the 
spitting evidence alone. Therefore, the trial court did not 
have authority under ORS 137.106 to award restitution for 
damages that were caused solely by the punch.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in 
part. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, 
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.