Title: State v. Samuel Nelis
Citation: 2007 WI 58
Docket Number: 2005AP001920-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 2007

2007 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1920-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Samuel Nelis, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 294 Wis. 2d 698, 717 N.W.2d 853 
(Ct. App. 2006—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 22, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 4, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Eaton 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert A. Ferg and Ferg & Sinclair, Ltd., Chippewa Falls, and 
oral argument by Robert A. Ferg. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1920-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF39) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Samuel Nelis, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the Court of Appeals,1 
affirming the decision of the Ashland County Circuit Court, 
Judge Robert E. Eaton presiding, which entered a judgment of 
conviction following a jury trial against Samuel Nelis (Nelis) 
as a repeat offender, on one count each of battery, aggravated 
battery, and second-degree sexual assault by use of force. 
                                                 
1 State v. Nelis, No. 2005AP1920-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 4, 2006). 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In his petition for review, Nelis claims that oral 
statements were erroneously admitted as prior inconsistent 
statements, that the State of Wisconsin (State) did not disclose 
such oral statements in advance, and further, that his right to 
confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) 
was violated.  Nelis claims that all of this occurred because 
Chief Jim Stone of the Bad River Police Department (Police Chief 
Stone) was permitted to testify at his trial, as to alleged oral 
statements of another witness, Steve Stone.  Steve Stone had 
previously testified at Nelis' trial concerning the sexual 
assault incident and his statements to the police on the night 
of the incident. 
¶3 
We hold that the oral statements of Steve Stone were 
properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements of a witness 
in accord with Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a)(2003-04),2 and that the 
State was not required to disclose such oral statements in 
advance.  We further hold that Nelis' right to confrontation, as 
explained in Crawford, was not violated because Steve Stone 
testified at trial about the sexual assault incident and his 
statements to the police, and was subject to cross-examination 
concerning those statements.  The record does not establish that 
he became unavailable for recall to the stand after he 
testified. 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The decision of the court of appeals is therefore 
affirmed. 
I 
¶5 
Nelis was convicted of battery, aggravated battery, 
and second degree sexual assault, following a jury trial that 
was held on August 23 and 24, 2004, in Ashland County Circuit 
Court, Judge Robert E. Eaton presiding.  The three charges for 
which Nelis was convicted arose from incidents involving his 
girlfriend, Diane S.  The first charge of battery arose from an 
incident in February 2004, in which Nelis allegedly threw a full 
beer can and struck Diane S. in the head.  The aggravated 
battery charge arose from an incident a few days later in which 
Nelis allegedly punched Diane S. in the face, resulting in black 
eyes, a swollen face, and blurred vision in her left eye.  The 
sexual assault charge arose from a third incident in February 
2004, in which Nelis allegedly choked Diane S. and forced her to 
have sexual intercourse with him. 
¶6 
At trial, the State's primary witness with regard to 
the sexual assault charge was Diane S.    Diane S. testified 
that, on the day of the sexual assault incident, she and Nelis 
were at Amy Jenson's house in the city of Ashland.  Diane S. 
said that she accused Nelis of shooting up drugs, and then went 
into a bedroom so that she could examine Nelis' arms for needle 
tracks.  According to Diane S.'s testimony, Nelis choked her 
while they were in the bedroom.  Diane S. then walked out of the 
bedroom and encountered David Stone, who suggested that Diane S. 
go into Amy Jenson's room. 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Diane 
S. 
said 
that 
she 
declined 
David 
Stone's 
suggestion and went back into the room where Nelis was.  She 
said that Nelis wanted to have sex with her, but she refused.  
Diane S. testified that Nelis then punched her in the mouth and 
choked her again.  She was bleeding and screamed at Nelis to get 
off her.  Diane S. said that Nelis then ripped off her jeans and 
had intercourse with her.  Diane S. further testified that a man 
heard her screaming and came into the bedroom to see if she was 
alright.  On cross-examination, Diane S. testified that she and 
Nelis had had consensual sexual intercourse in the past, but 
that she did not consent to sexual intercourse during this 
incident. 
¶8 
On the morning of the first day of trial, the State 
informed the court that it had subpoenaed Steve Stone to appear 
as a trial witness, but he had not appeared.  The State asked 
the court to issue a material witness warrant.  In response to 
the court's inquiry regarding the testimony that Steve Stone 
would provide, the prosecutor said that Steve Stone had provided 
a statement that he had walked into the bedroom during the 
alleged sexual assault, that he had seen Nelis on top of Diane 
S., and that Diane S. had been crying and had a bloody face.  
The circuit court granted the State's request and issued a 
material witness warrant for Steve Stone. 
¶9 
In its opening statement, the State told the jury 
about testimony that it would hear: 
You are actually going to hear from a witness who 
heard Diane cry, whimper.  And he got up and he walked 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
5 
 
into the bedroom and he saw Sam on top of Diane as 
Diane was crying and as she was bleeding from her face 
and whimpering.  And at that time Sam got off her and 
that incident was over. 
¶10 Steve Stone was not called as a witness on the first 
day of Nelis' trial, but the court reminded Steve Stone that he 
was still under subpoena and that he was out on bond.  The next 
day, the State called Steve Stone as a witness.  Steve Stone 
testified 
that 
he 
"kind 
of" 
remembered 
talking 
to 
law 
enforcement officers after the alleged sexual assault incident 
involving Nelis and Diane S.  He said he remembered telling law 
enforcement officers that he heard a noise and went to check it 
out.  He said that when he looked in the bedroom, Nelis and 
Diane S. were together, but he denied that Nelis was on top of 
Diane S. 
¶11 Steve Stone testified that he did not remember telling 
law enforcement officers that Diane S. was a bloody mess, but 
said that she was "pretty banged up."  He did not remember 
whether Diane S. was crying or bleeding.  On cross-examination, 
Steve Stone said that he felt pressured to give a statement to 
the police.  He said that someone else wrote out the statement, 
and that he signed it without reading it.  Steve Stone said that 
he did not want to give a statement to the police because Nelis 
is his friend, and he did not want to be involved.  At the 
conclusion of Steve Stone's testimony, the court told him that 
he could "step down." 
¶12 The State then called as a witness Tony Williams 
(Williams), a sheriff's deputy for Ashland County.  Williams 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
6 
 
testified that when he went to Amy Jenson's house to execute a 
search warrant seeking evidence of a sexual assault, he asked 
Steve Stone if he would give a written statement.  Williams 
testified that Steve Stone asked Williams to write the statement 
down for him, because his handwriting was not good. 
¶13 After Williams wrote down the statement, he read it 
back to Steve Stone, who confirmed that the statement was 
correct, and Steve Stone signed it.  Williams then read Steve 
Stone's statement: 
The night Sam [Nelis] and his girlfriend were here I 
heard muffled sounds coming from the back bedroom.  I 
went to check on her.  She was a bloody mess. I heard 
scuffling around.  She was bloody and crying.  When I 
turned on the lights everything stopped.  I was passed 
out but the noise from the back room woke me up.  The 
noise was not right. 
¶14 The State then called Police Chief Stone to testify.  
Police Chief Stone testified that he accompanied Williams to the 
home of Amy Jenson and spoke with Steve Stone about the incident 
involving Nelis and Diane S.  Police Chief Stone said that he 
did not take a written statement or make a record because Steve 
Stone was going to give a statement to Williams. 
¶15 When the State questioned Police Chief Stone about 
what Steve Stone had told him, counsel for Nelis objected on 
hearsay grounds.  The prosecutor responded that Steve Stone's 
statement was an inconsistent statement.  The court then told 
the prosecutor to direct the question to the part of the 
statement that was inconsistent with Steve Stone's testimony.   
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
7 
 
¶16 According to Police Chief Stone, Steve Stone said that 
he heard moaning sounds and then heard Diane S. say "no" and 
"stop, stop."  Steve Stone then went into the bedroom and saw 
Nelis on top of Diane S., and Diane S. was struggling to get 
away from Nelis.  Steve Stone then saw that Diane S.'s face was 
bleeding. 
¶17 Nelis' counsel then objected to Police Chief Stone's 
testimony 
regarding 
Steve 
Stone's 
oral 
statement 
on 
constitutional grounds.  He argued that the admission of the 
statements 
violated 
Nelis' 
right 
to 
confrontation 
under 
Crawford, because Steve Stone was "unavailable," since he 
testified earlier and could not remember some details of his 
statement to the police. 
¶18 The circuit court ruled that there was no violation of 
Nelis' right to confrontation because Steve Stone was available 
for cross-examination, when he had testified earlier in the 
trial.  The court reasoned that Nelis had ample opportunity to 
ask all the questions that he wanted of Steve Stone. 
¶19 David Stone, a witness for the defense, offered 
testimony relevant to the sexual assault charge.  David Stone 
testified that Nelis and Diane S. had been arguing.  David Stone 
said that when the argument ended, Diane S. went to bed, but 
later came out of the bedroom crying and angry.  He testified 
that Diane S. went back into the bedroom with Nelis, and never 
said anything about Nelis assaulting her. 
¶20 Nelis argued at trial that the evidence did not show 
that he and Diane S. had sexual intercourse on the night at 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
8 
 
issue.  He further argued that, even if they did have sexual 
intercourse that night, it was consensual. 
¶21 The jury found Nelis guilty of battery, aggravated 
battery, and second-degree sexual assault.  The circuit court 
sentenced Nelis to concurrent sentences of two years (one year 
of initial confinement and one year of extended supervision), 
six years (four years of initial confinement and two years of 
extended supervision), and twenty-five years (fifteen years of 
initial confinement and ten years of extended supervision), on 
the three counts, respectively. 
¶22 Nelis filed a post-conviction motion pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30, requesting dismissal of the charges 
against him and a new trial.  The circuit court denied Nelis' 
post-conviction motion.  Nelis appealed the circuit court's 
denial of his post-conviction motion, and argued on appeal that 
Steve Stone's oral statements should not have been admitted as 
prior inconsistent statements, and that the admission of those 
statements violated his right to confrontation, since Steve 
Stone was unavailable to testify about the oral statements given 
to Police Chief Stone. 
¶23 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
circuit court and held that the admission of the oral statements 
did not violate Nelis' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
because Steve Stone testified at trial and was fully available 
for cross-examination, and that the statements he gave to the 
police were not presented until after he had given inconsistent 
in-court testimony.  The court of appeals also noted that Nelis' 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
9 
 
attorney was able to cross-examine Police Chief Stone fully in 
regard to Steve Stone's prior statements. 
¶24 Nelis filed a petition for review in this court, and 
we granted the petition for review.  Nelis claims that his right 
to confrontation under Crawford was violated when Police Chief 
Stone was permitted to testify as to undisclosed oral statements 
of 
Steve 
Stone, 
under 
the 
guise 
of 
prior 
inconsistent 
statements, after Steve Stone had been excused as a witness. 
II 
¶25 Since Nelis raises the issue of whether his right to 
confrontation was violated, we must first determine whether the 
oral statements of Steve Stone, as testified to by Police Chief 
Stone, were admissible under the rules of evidence in Wisconsin.  
State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶41, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 
367. 
¶26 The question of whether the circuit court erred when 
it admitted such evidence is subject to an erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard.  State v. James, 2005 WI App 188, ¶8, 285 
Wis. 2d 783, 703 N.W.2d 727; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 
¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698.  The circuit courts have 
"broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence[,] . . . [and] we 
will upset their decisions only where they have erroneously 
exercised 
that 
discretion." 
 
James, 
285 
Wis. 2d 783, 
¶8 
(citations omitted). 
¶27 If Steve Stone's statements were admissible under the 
rules of evidence, then we must resolve whether the admission of 
those statements violated Nelis' right to confrontation.  State 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
10 
 
v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶25, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.  
Whether the admission of hearsay evidence violated a defendant's 
right to confrontation presents a question of law, which we 
review de novo.  Id. (citing State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶10, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485). 
III 
¶28 This case really involves evidentiary issues and does 
not require a detailed analysis of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.  The State argues 
that Steve Stone's oral statements were not hearsay, but were 
admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a) as prior inconsistent 
statements.  
Section 908.01(4)(a)3 provides that a prior 
inconsistent statement is not hearsay and is admissible if the 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.01(4)(a) states in relevant part: 
(4) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement 
is not hearsay if: 
(a) Prior statement by witness. The declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is: 
1. Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, 
or 
2. Consistent with the declarant's testimony and 
is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against 
the 
declarant 
of 
recent 
fabrication 
or 
improper influence or motive, or 
3. One of identification of a person made soon 
after perceiving the person. . . . 
 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
11 
 
declarant "testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement 
is: (1) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony. . . ." 
¶29 Nelis does not argue that Steve Stone's statements 
were consistent with his earlier testimony at trial, but rather 
he contends that Steve Stone's oral statements to Police Chief 
Stone were not admissible as prior inconsistent statements due 
to the lack of cross-examination, and were not admissible under 
any of the hearsay exceptions.  Nelis asserts that Steve Stone 
was not subject to cross-examination concerning his oral 
statements to the police because such statements were not 
disclosed until Police Chief Stone testified.  Nelis argues that 
Steve Stone was not, "subject to cross-examination" concerning 
his oral statements and that his statements were, therefore, 
inadmissible.  Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a). 
¶30 Nelis 
further 
argues 
that 
Steve 
Stone's 
oral 
statements were inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 906.13(2)(a).  
Section 906.13(2)(a) provides: 
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement by a witness is not admissible unless 
any of the following is applicable: 
1. 
The 
witness 
was 
so 
examined 
while 
testifying as to give the witness an opportunity 
to explain or deny the statement. 
2.  The witness has not been excused from 
giving further testimony in the action. 
3.  The interests of justice otherwise 
require. 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
12 
 
¶31 The State argues that Nelis did not object at trial to 
the 
admission 
of 
the 
statements 
on 
the 
ground 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 906.13(2)(a), and therefore waived that issue.  See 
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 
727 ("It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that 
issues must be preserved at the circuit court.").  The State 
contends that Nelis' objection that the oral statements of Steve 
Stone were hearsay was insufficient to preserve Nelis' claim now  
that the statements were inadmissible under § 906.13(2)(a).  We 
agree with the State's argument that Nelis' objection to the 
oral statements was not specific enough to preserve his claim 
that the admission of Steve Stone's oral statement contravened 
§ 906.13(2)(a).  An objection is sufficient to preserve an issue 
for appeal, if it apprises the court of the specific grounds 
upon which it is based.  In Interest of Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 
395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998).  A general objection that does 
not indicate the specific grounds for inadmissibility of 
evidence will not suffice to preserve the objector's right to 
appeal.  State v. Tutlewski, 231 Wis. 2d 379, 384, 605 N.W.2d 
561 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶32 Further, we are satisfied that Police Chief Stone's 
testimony regarding Steve Stone's oral statements to the police 
was not hearsay, since such statements were properly admissible 
as 
prior 
inconsistent 
statements 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a).  During direct examination by the 
State, Steve Stone testified that he did not see Nelis on top of 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
13 
 
Diane S. when he entered the bedroom, and that he did not 
remember whether Diane S. was crying or bleeding. 
¶33 Police Chief Stone later testified that Steve Stone 
told him that he had seen Nelis on top of Diane S., and that 
Diane S. was crying and bleeding.  Steve Stone's oral statements 
given to Police Chief Stone were not hearsay.  Rather, the 
statements 
were 
admissible 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a), 
because Steve Stone was a testifying witness who testified at 
trial concerning his statements to the police on the night in 
question, because he was subject to cross-examination concerning 
those statements, and because the prior oral statements were 
inconsistent with his testimony at trial. 
¶34 During the direct examination of Police Chief Stone, 
Nelis' counsel objected to the oral statements of Steve Stone on 
the grounds that the statements were inadmissible pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1)(c), 
claiming 
that 
Steve 
Stone 
was 
unavailable, thus not "subject to cross-examination," and that 
the 
statement 
violated 
Nelis' 
confrontation 
right 
under 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.  Nelis' counsel did not, however, object 
on the ground of Wis. Stat. § 906.13(2)(a).  We are satisfied 
that, because Nelis did not object to the admissibility of Steve 
Stone's oral statements on the ground of § 906.13(2)(a), such 
argument was waived for failure to state it with sufficient 
specificity before the circuit court.  State v. Givens, 217 Wis. 
2d 180, 195, 580 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶35 Nelis argues that, during pretrial proceedings, he 
demanded that the State provide any statements of witnesses 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
14 
 
which it intended to introduce at trial.  Nelis claims that the 
State never disclosed any oral statements by Steve Stone, nor 
did it summarize any such oral statements in writing. 
¶36 The State argues that it was not required to disclose 
to Nelis the oral statements that Steve Stone gave to Police 
Chief Stone, nor was it required to reduce such oral statements 
to writing.  The State contends that its duty to disclose was 
limited to the duties listed in the discovery and inspection 
statute, in this case specifically Wis. Stat. § 971.23, and that 
Nelis did not expand the State's obligation merely through his 
discovery demand. 
¶37 We are satisfied that the State complied with its 
discovery obligations under Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  We agree with 
the State's argument that it was not required by § 971.23 to 
disclose or to summarize the oral statements of Steve Stone.  
The only oral statements that the prosecutor was required to 
summarize and disclose to the defense were the oral statements 
of the defendant himself, and the names of witnesses to such 
oral statements.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b).  That discovery 
statute also requires that the prosecutor disclose "[a]ny 
relevant written or recorded statements" of a witness it plans 
to call at trial.  Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e).  The oral 
statements of Steve Stone to Police Chief Stone obviously were 
not written, nor were they recorded.   
¶38 Furthermore, Nelis was put on notice of the fact that 
there would be trial testimony about what Steve Stone saw and 
heard in regard to the alleged sexual assault incident.  Steve 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
15 
 
Stone and Police Chief Stone were both on the State's witness 
list, 
which 
was 
disclosed 
to 
Nelis 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(d).   
¶39 Nelis also had notice again of the fact that Steve 
Stone would testify, and notice of the subject matter of his 
expected testimony because on the morning of August 23, 2004, 
the first day of Nelis' trial, the State asked the court for a 
material witness warrant for the apprehension and appearance of 
Steve Stone.  The State argued that the material witness warrant 
was necessary because Steve Stone did not appear in court that 
morning, despite the fact that he had been served with a 
subpoena.  The court inquired about the testimony that Steve 
Stone was expected to provide, and the prosecutor responded that 
Steve Stone had given a statement that he had walked into the 
bedroom during the alleged sexual assault, that he had seen 
Nelis on top of Diane S., and that Diane S. had been crying and 
had a bloody face.  The court then granted the request for a 
material witness warrant. 
¶40 Additionally, 
in 
the 
State’s 
opening 
statement, 
counsel for the State told the jury that it would be hearing 
from a witness who heard Diane S. cry, saw her bleeding, and saw 
Nelis on top of her.  Although the State was not required to 
disclose the oral statement of Steve Stone, the State's witness 
list, the hearing on the material witness warrant request for 
the appearance of Steve Stone, and the State's opening statement 
all put Nelis on notice that there would be testimony at trial 
regarding Steve Stone's observations of the alleged sexual 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
16 
 
assault 
incident. 
 
We 
are 
satisfied 
that, 
under 
such 
circumstances, the State complied with its discovery obligations 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.23. 
¶41 We next address Nelis' argument that the admission of 
his oral statements, through Police Chief Stone's testimony, 
violated his right to confrontation.  Under the Confrontation 
Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, 
criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to confront the 
witnesses against them.  State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶43, 277 Wis. 
2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 7. 
¶42 Nelis argues that the introduction of the oral 
statements of Steve Stone, through the testimony of Police Chief 
Stone, violated his right to confrontation under Crawford, 541 
U.S. 36 because Steve Stone's statements were testimonial in 
nature.  We agree that his statements were testimonial, since 
they were "made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later trial."4     
                                                 
4 In State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶37, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 
N.W.2d 811, we noted that there are three types of testimonial 
statements: 
(1) "[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent——that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial 
examinations, 
prior 
testimony 
that 
the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially[.]"  
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
17 
 
¶43  The United States Supreme Court stated in Crawford 
that "when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, 
the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use 
of his [or her] prior testimonial statements."  Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 59 n.9 (citation omitted).  The United States Supreme 
Court did not explain more fully in Crawford what it meant by 
"the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial."  Id.  
However, the Court previously stated, in United States v. Owens, 
484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988), that a witness is ordinarily regarded 
as "'subject to cross-examination' when he [or she] is placed on 
the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions."  
The Confrontation Clause guarantees only "an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination . . .  not cross-examination that is 
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish."  Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) 
(emphasis in original). 
¶44 Nelis argues that a violation of his right to 
confrontation under Crawford occurred when the State was 
permitted to use, as evidence, the oral statements of Steve 
Stone, as conveyed by Police Chief Stone's trial testimony.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) 
"[E]xtrajudicial 
statements . . . contained 
in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 
(3) "[S]tatements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use 
at a later trial." 
(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)). 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
18 
 
Nelis asserts that he did not have a prior opportunity to cross-
examine Steve Stone concerning his oral statements to Police 
Chief Stone.  He argues that is because the oral statements were 
not disclosed until Police Chief Stone was called as a witness, 
after Steve Stone had already testified and was told by the 
court that he could "step down," and that Steve Stone was not 
required to remain for possible recall to the witness stand. 
¶45 Although Steve Stone testified at trial, Nelis argues 
that Steve Stone did not have the opportunity to explain or deny 
his alleged oral statements because the State did not examine 
him concerning such statements, and the oral statements were not 
made known prior to Police Chief Stone's testimony.  The State 
argues that there 
was no violation of Nelis' right to 
confrontation under Crawford because Steve Stone testified at 
trial and was cross-examined by the defense. 
¶46 Nelis' right to confrontation was not violated because 
"the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all" on the 
use of prior testimonial statements when the declarant appears 
for cross-examination, as did Steve Stone.  Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 59 n.9 (citation omitted).5    It makes no difference, under 
the circumstances here, whether the burden is on the State or on 
Nelis to show that Steve Stone was available for further cross-
examination after the court told him he could "step down."  
                                                 
5 We agree with the concurrence that Nelis' right to 
confrontation under Crawford is not implicated.  Concurrence, 
¶¶53, 
73, 
80. 
 
However, 
because 
Nelis 
raised 
arguments 
concerning Crawford in his briefs and at oral argument, we 
address those arguments here. 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
19 
 
Steve Stone testified at trial and was cross-examined concerning 
his statements to the police; therefore, Nelis' right to 
confrontation was not violated.   
¶47 Although it is not necessary to our holding, we note 
that the record does not establish that Steve Stone was 
unavailable for further cross-examination after his earlier 
testimony at trial.  He was called as a witness and testified on 
August 24, 2004.  After Steve Stone was subjected to direct, 
cross, and redirect examination, the court told him that he 
could "step down."  There is nothing in the record indicating 
the whereabouts of Steve Stone after that.  The record certainly 
demonstrates that Steve Stone had been examined extensively, at 
trial, about his observations concerning the alleged sexual 
assault.  We are satisfied that the record presented fails to 
establish that Steve Stone was unavailable, so that he could not 
have been recalled to testify again about his observations after 
the testimony of Police Chief Stone. 
¶48 We are satisfied that there was no violation of Nelis' 
right to confrontation, since Steve Stone was subject to cross-
examination concerning the statements.  Steve Stone testified at 
trial, and Nelis' counsel had a full and fair opportunity to 
cross-examine him about his observations and his statements to 
the police, as well as the opportunity to cross-examine Police 
Chief Stone regarding Steve Stone's oral statements to the 
police.  On cross-examination, Nelis' attorney asked Steve Stone 
questions about his statements to police on the night of the 
alleged sexual assault incident.  These facts, combined with the 
No. 
2005AP1920-CR   
 
20 
 
fact that the record does not establish that Nelis was 
unavailable for recall to the stand, satisfy us that there was 
no violation of Nelis' right, under the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions, to confront the witnesses against him.  
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
IV 
¶49 This is a review of an unpublished per curiam decision 
of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Ashland 
County Circuit Court, which entered a judgment of conviction 
following a jury trial against Samuel Nelis as a repeat 
offender, on one count each of battery, aggravated battery, and 
second-degree sexual assault by use of force. 
¶50 We hold that the oral statements of Steve Stone were 
properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements of a witness 
in accord with Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a), and that the State was 
not required to disclose such oral statements in advance.  We 
further hold that Nelis' right to confrontation as explained in 
Crawford was not violated because Steve Stone testified at trial 
about the sexual assault incident and his statements to the 
police, and was subject to cross-examination concerning those 
statements.  The record does not establish that he became 
unavailable for recall to the stand after he testified. 
¶51 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.       
   
 
 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶52 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a), Steve Stone's 
oral statements to Chief Stone are admissible because they are 
not hearsay. I part ways with the majority, however, because it 
misapplies that rule of evidence by ignoring an essential part 
of the text. Rather, applying the plain words of the entire 
text, I conclude that the statements are admissible because 
Steve Stone testified at trial and the defendant chose to rest 
on a record that is insufficiently developed to show any 
subsequent unavailability. 
¶53 I 
also 
write 
separately 
because 
the 
majority 
needlessly addresses the constitutional issue of whether Nelis 
had the opportunity to cross-examine Steve Stone for the 
purposes of Nelis' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Because there is no 
showing of unavailability, Crawford is not implicated in this 
case. Nevertheless, in the course of its unwarranted analysis, 
the majority takes an expansive view of when a defendant has had 
the opportunity to cross-examine, thereby having the effect of 
narrowing the constitutional right to confrontation afforded 
under Crawford. This case can be, and should be, decided on the 
rules of evidence alone.  
I 
¶54 Section 
908.01(4) 
excludes 
several 
categories 
of 
statements from the definition of "hearsay." Among those 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
exclusions are some prior statements by witnesses. The rule 
provides in relevant part: 
908.01(4) 
Statements 
which 
are 
not 
hearsay. 
A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(a) Prior statement by witness. The declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is: 
1. 
Inconsistent 
with 
the 
declarant's 
testimony . . . . 
¶55 The 
majority 
maintains 
that 
Steve 
Stone's 
oral 
statements to Chief Stone are not hearsay under § 908.01(4)(a), 
for three reasons:  (1) because Steve Stone "testified at trial 
concerning his statements to police on the night in question"; 
(2) "because he was subject to cross-examination"; and (3) 
"because the prior oral statements were inconsistent with his 
testimony at trial." Majority op., ¶33.  
¶56 It is correct that Steve Stone testified about some of 
his statements to police and was subject to cross-examination.  
It is also true that Steve Stone's statements to Chief Stone 
were inconsistent with his trial testimony. However, the 
requirement under § 908.01(4) is not simply that the witness be 
"subject to cross-examination." Rather, it demands that the 
witness 
be 
"subject 
to 
cross-examination 
concerning 
the 
statement" (emphasis added). 
¶57 The fact that Steve Stone was subject to cross-
examination about some statements he made to police does not 
automatically suffice to show that he was "subject to cross-
examination concerning" his oral statements to Chief Stone. 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Here, Nelis did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him 
regarding his statements to Chief Stone. Nelis had no indication 
that Steve Stone had made oral statements to Chief Stone, and 
that the State would seek to introduce such statements at trial.  
¶58 The majority maintains that Nelis was "on notice of 
the fact that there would be trial testimony about what Steve 
Stone saw and heard in regard to the alleged sexual assault 
incident." Majority op., ¶38. However, the question is whether 
Steve Stone was subject to cross-examination concerning his 
statements to Chief Stone. Knowing that there would be trial 
testimony regarding some of Steve Stone's statements does not 
provide notice of the particular oral statements to Chief Stone 
that are at issue here, and does not thereby create the 
opportunity for cross-examination on those statements.  
¶59 It is important to note that the majority's conclusion 
that Steve Stone was subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statements is not based on Nelis having notice that the 
statements would be introduced. At oral argument, the State 
acknowledged that the notice argument was not of sufficient 
strength that it could not "hang its hat" on that argument. 
Apparently the majority agrees with the State and likewise does 
not ultimately "hang its hat" on any notice argument. 
¶60 Instead, the majority bases its conclusion on the 
facts that (1) Steve Stone "testified at trial concerning his 
statements to police on the night in question"; (2)  Steve Stone 
"was subject to cross-examination"; and (3) his "prior oral 
statements were inconsistent with his testimony at trial." 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
Majority op., ¶33. Such an analysis totally ignores an essential 
part of the text of § 908.04(1) that the declarant must be 
subject to cross-examination "concerning the statement" to Chief 
Stone.  
¶61 Being subject to cross-examination concerning just any 
statements to just any police officer does not comport with the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1). I conclude that when 
Steve Stone was on the witness stand, he was not subject to 
cross-examination concerning his statements to Chief Stone.  
¶62 This conclusion is buttressed by an examination of the 
rules of evidence that address how a witness is to be examined 
concerning a prior statement under Wis. Stat. § 906.13(2)(a). 
That rule provides that a witness must be given the opportunity, 
while testifying, to explain or to deny the statement: 
906.13 Prior statements of witnesses. 
. . . . 
(2) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent 
statement of a witnesses.   
(a) Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement by a witness is not admissible unless any of 
the following is applicable:   
1. 
The witness was so examined while testifying 
as to give the witness an opportunity to explain or 
deny the statement.   
2. 
The witness has not been excused from giving 
further testimony in the action.   
3. 
The interests of justice otherwise require. 
¶63 I am not alone in rejecting the analysis of the 
majority. Contemplating the fact situation before us, a leading 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
treatise on Wisconsin evidence concludes that for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1), a witness is not subject to cross- 
examination "where the prior statement is never mentioned during 
the examination of the witness, the witness is then excused from 
testifying, and the statement is later proffered through 
extrinsic evidence (i.e., another witness or a document)." 7 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence 544 (2d ed. 
2001). 
This 
conclusion 
by 
such 
sound 
authority 
further 
underscores why I cannot embrace the majority's analysis. 
II 
¶64 Nevertheless, I think that the majority is correct 
that Steve Stone's oral statements to Chief Stone are not 
hearsay, and that they are therefore admissible. I conclude that 
the statements are admissible because Steve Stone testified at 
trial and the defendant chose to rest on a record that is 
insufficiently developed to show any subsequent unavailability. 
¶65 In addressing whether Steve Stone was subject to 
cross-examination concerning his statements to Chief Stone after 
Chief Stone's testimony, Nelis now simply asserts that Steve 
Stone was unavailable, and that Nelis had no prior opportunity 
to cross-examine him on those statements. Precluding the 
statements, however, requires more than the mere assertion that 
the declarant is unavailable, as Nelis does here. 
¶66 At trial, the only objection raised by Nelis regarding 
unavailability was based on an assertion that Steve Stone was 
unavailable due to his lack of memory. Apparently he was unable 
to recall some of the details of his statements given to the 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
police. Now, however, Nelis raises the argument that Steve Stone 
was unavailable due to his absence from the trial. 
¶67 Wis. Stat. § 908.04 sets forth what the record must 
reflect in order to show "unavailability" for the purpose of 
admitting out-of-court statements into evidence. It provides in 
relevant part:  
908.04. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable; 
definition of unavailability. 
(1) 
"Unavailability 
as 
a 
witness" 
includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
(a) Is exempted by ruling of the judge on the 
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning 
the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement 
despite an order of the judge to do so; or 
(c) Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject 
matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(d) Is unable to be present or to testify at the 
hearing because of death or then existing physical or 
mental illness or infirmity; or 
(e) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent 
of the declarant's statement has been unable to 
procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
¶68 Typically, 
the 
party 
invoking 
the 
concept 
of 
unavailability will be the proponent of the evidence. This, 
however, is no typical case. Here the proponent of the 
statements did not assert unavailability because the prosecution 
did not believe the witness was unavailable. The statements were 
offered by the prosecution as prior inconsistent statements, a 
category that relies on availability. Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a). 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶69 Under the circumstances of this case, it appears 
illogical 
that 
the 
burden 
of 
developing 
the 
record 
on 
unavailability is on the party that asserts Stone was available. 
Rather, I conclude that it is the burden of the defense to make 
a specific enough objection to allow the record to be developed.   
¶70 Here, there is an evidentiary vacuum. There is no 
indication in the record that Steve Stone was unavailable for 
further cross-examination after finishing his testimony, or that 
any efforts were made to recall him. The record is utterly 
silent as to where Steve Stone was after the circuit court told 
him that he could step down. We note that there is no indication 
that he was excused from testifying. We do not know if he 
remained in the courtroom, if he went home and stayed there such 
that he might have been readily recalled to the stand, or if he 
disappeared from the face of the earth, making him unavailable.  
¶71 Likewise, there is no indication in the record that 
Nelis made any attempt to procure Steve Stone's attendance. 
Nelis makes no argument that Steve Stone is exempted by 
privilege, that he would refuse to testify on the subject matter 
of his statements to Chief Stone, or that he would testify as to 
lack of knowledge of the subject matter of his statements to 
Chief Stone. See Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1).  
¶72 We are left with a record that on its face indicates 
availability. The contention that Steve Stone was not subject to 
cross-examination concerning his statements to Chief Stone after 
Chief Stone testified must rest upon the claim that Steve Stone 
was unavailable. Steve Stone was available prior to Chief 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
Stone's testimony, and there is no indication in the record that 
Steve Stone became unavailable after Chief Stone's testimony or 
that 
Nelis 
attempted 
to 
procure 
Steve 
Stone 
for 
cross-
examination. Thus, Nelis chose to rest on a record that is 
insufficiently 
developed 
to 
demonstrate 
any 
subsequent 
unavailability. I conclude that because Steve Stone testified at 
trial and that the record fails to demonstrate any subsequent 
unavailability, the statements are admissible under § 908.01(4) 
because they are not hearsay. 
III 
¶73 I would end the inquiry there. Since there is no 
showing of unavailability, Crawford is not implicated. Crawford 
applies to the admission of statements from witnesses who are 
"absent from trial" and unavailable to testify. Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 59. Even the majority acknowledges that the case is not 
really about Crawford. Majority op., ¶28. 
¶74 Where a case is not really about a constitutional 
right, then we ought not make determinations about important 
aspects of that right. It is unwise for courts to unnecessarily 
address constitutional issues when the case can be disposed of 
on other grounds. ("Normally this court will not address a 
constitutional issue if the case can be disposed of on other 
grounds." State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶42, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 
N.W.2d 637; see also State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶25 n.4, 281 
Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.) 
¶75 The majority, though, does not end its inquiry. 
Instead, 
it engages in an analysis of Nelis' right to 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
confrontation under Crawford. However, Crawford concerns very 
different circumstances. Moreover, the majority's discussion 
appears to needlessly narrow Crawford. 
¶76 In Crawford, the state introduced a recorded statement 
made to police by the defendant's wife. 541 U.S. at 39-40. 
Because of the marital privilege, the defendant's wife was 
unavailable to testify at the trial.  Id. at 40.  The Supreme 
Court determined that the recorded statement was inadmissible. 
It held that in order for the state to introduce testimonial 
statements by persons who do not appear at trial, the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation demands that the declarant be 
unavailable and that the defendant have had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination. Id. at 68. Thus, the issue in Crawford 
was whether the state could introduce a testimonial statement by 
a declarant who was unavailable and had not appeared at trial. 
In the present case, Steve Stone did appear at trial, and there 
is no indication in the record that he was unavailable after the 
court told him that he could "step down." This is therefore not 
a Crawford case. 
¶77 Rather than simply noting that this is not a Crawford 
case, the majority concludes that for the purposes of Crawford, 
Nelis had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Steve Stone 
regarding his statements to Chief Stone. It cites to a footnote 
in Crawford stating that "when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his [or her] prior testimonial 
statements." Majority op., ¶43 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
n.9). Although the majority recognizes that the meaning of "the 
declarant appears for cross-examination at trial," is unclear, 
it concludes that Steve Stone's appearance suffices. Id., ¶46.  
¶78 This conclusion is unwarranted and unnecessary. As 
earlier noted, Nelis did not cross-examine Steve Stone regarding 
his statements to Chief Stone because Nelis had no notice that 
such oral statements would be introduced. More importantly, 
Crawford did not involve a witness who appeared at trial, and it 
did not contemplate a situation, such as the one here, in which 
a witness is cross-examined concerning some statements, and in 
which the State introduces other statements by the witness after 
the witness steps down. Crawford therefore leaves a gap with 
regard to cases like this one.1 
¶79 Because the majority takes an expansive view of when a 
defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine a declarant 
under Crawford, it has the effect of answering questions that 
are not before us, thereby narrowing Crawford. Specifically, the 
majority's view would allow the State to introduce Steve Stone's 
statements to Chief Stone, even if Nelis could demonstrate that 
                                                 
1 The majority notes that "a witness is ordinarily regarded 
as subject to cross-examination when he [or she] is placed on 
the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions." 
Majority op., ¶43 (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 
561 (1988)(emphasis added)(internal quotations omitted)). It 
fails to acknowledge, however, that this case may not be 
"ordinary."  
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
Steve Stone was subsequently unavailable,2 and even where Nelis 
had no indication that the State would seek to introduce Steve 
Stone's statements to Chief Stone. I am not certain that 
admitting the statements under such circumstances would be 
consistent with Nelis' right to confrontation under Crawford.3 
Because that is not the case before us, I would not reach the 
question. 
¶80 In sum, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
because Steve Stone was cross-examined, it follows that he was 
cross-examined concerning his statements to Chief Stone. Rather, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
statements 
are 
admissible 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1) because Steve Stone testified at trial 
and Nelis chose to rest on a record that is insufficiently 
developed to show any subsequent unavailability. Further, I 
determine that because Crawford is not implicated here, the 
majority undertakes an unwarranted constitutional analysis that 
has the effect of narrowing the constitutional right to 
confrontation 
afforded 
under 
Crawford. 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully concur. 
                                                 
2 The majority indicates that whether "Steve Stove was 
unavailable for further cross-examination after his earlier 
testimony at trial" is "not necessary to our holding." Majority 
op., ¶47. As noted in the text, whether  Steve Stone became 
unavailable after his initial testimony may well impact the 
proper outcome of the case.  
3 At oral argument, the State conceded that the court of 
appeals' analysis——the very analysis now embraced by the 
majority——is inadequate for confrontation purposes. See State v. 
Nelis, No. 2005AP1920-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶27 (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 4, 2006). 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1920-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1