Title: Spade v. Select Comfort Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 2018

Spade v. Select Comfort Corp. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified two questions of New Jersey law to the New Jersey Supreme Court arising from two putative class actions brought under the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Plaintiffs David and Katina Spade claimed that on or about April 25, 2013, they purchased furniture from a retail store owned and operated by defendant Select Comfort Corporation. They alleged that Select Comfort’s sales contract included the language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c). The Spades also alleged the sales contract that Select Comfort provided to them did not include language mandated by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a). The Third Circuit asked: (1) whether a violation of the Furniture Delivery Regulations alone constituted a violation of a clearly established right or responsibility of the seller under the TCCWNA and thus provided a basis for relief under the TCCWNA; and (2) whether a consumer who receives a contract that does not comply with the Furniture Delivery Regulations, but has not suffered any adverse consequences from the noncompliance, an “aggrieved consumer” under the TCCWNA? The New Jersey Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second certified question in the negative. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) David Spade v. Select Comfort Corp. (A-57-16) (078611)Argued November 8, 2017 -- Decided April 16, 2018PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court addresses two questions of law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit’s certified questions arise from two putative class actions brought under the Truth-in- Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18. The plaintiffs in both actions premise their TCCWNA claims on defendants’ alleged violations of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 and -5.3. Those regulations, promulgated by the Attorney General under the authority of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210, address the content of contracts of sale or sale orders for the delivery of household furniture. The certified questions are: 1. Does a violation of the Furniture Delivery Regulations alone constitute a violation of a clearly established right or responsibility of the seller under the TCCWNA and thus provides a basis for relief under the TCCWNA? 2. Is a consumer who receives a contract that does not comply with the Furniture Delivery Regulations, but has not suffered any adverse consequences from the noncompliance, an “aggrieved consumer” under the TCCWNA? In 1995, the Division of Consumer Affairs proposed and adopted regulations governing the delivery of household furniture and furnishings, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1 to -5.4. The regulations impose a series of delivery and notice requirements on “[a]ny person who is engaged in the sale of household furniture for which contracts of sale or sale orders are used for merchandise ordered for future delivery.” N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(a). Plaintiffs David Spade and Katina Spade (Spade plaintiffs) assert that they purchased furniture from a retail store owned and operated by defendant Select Comfort Corporation (Select Comfort). They allege that Select Comfort’s sales contract included language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c): a statement that the sale of certain products “are final,” and a statement that as to certain categories of products, “[n]o returns will be accepted” or “[n]o returns or exchanges will be authorized or accepted.” The Spade plaintiffs also allege that the sales contract provided to them did not include language mandated by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a). Plaintiffs Christopher D. Wenger and Eileen Muller (Wenger plaintiffs) allege that they ordered furniture from a store owned by defendant Bob’s Discount Furniture, LLC (Bob’s Discount Furniture). They allege that the “sales document” provided by Bob’s Discount Furniture included language that violates N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), which mandates a full refund in the event of a late delivery of the furniture ordered. The Wenger plaintiffs also contend that the sales document did not entirely conform with N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a) because language required by those provisions appeared in a font different from the “ten-point bold face type” that the regulations prescribe.HELD: (1) The inclusion of language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) in contracts of sale or sale orders for the delivery of household furniture may alone give rise to a violation of a “clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller” for purposes of the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. (2) A consumer who receives a contract that includes language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), but who suffers no monetary or other harm as a result of that noncompliance, is not an “aggrieved consumer” entitled to a remedy under the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. 1 1. The TCCWNA is intended “to prevent deceptive practices in consumer contracts.” Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 67 (2017). When it enacted the TCCWNA, the Legislature sought to require sellers to acknowledge clearly established consumer rights, and to provide remedies for posting or inserting provisions contrary to law. A plaintiff pursuing a TCCWNA cause of action must prove: that the defendant was a “seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid”; that the defendant offered or entered into a “written consumer contract or [gave] or display[ed] any written consumer warranty, notice or sign”; that at the time that the written consumer contract is signed or the written consumer warranty, notice or sign is displayed, that writing contains a provision that “violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee” as established by State or Federal law; and that the plaintiff is an “aggrieved consumer.” N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, -17. (pp. 13-15)2. The Third Circuit’s first certified question asks whether a violation of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 or -5.3 alone constitutes a violation of a clearly established legal right of a consumer or a responsibility of a seller under the TCCWNA, and therefore provides a basis for relief under the TCCWNA. In these appeals, all plaintiffs allege that defendants included in their sales documents language constituting an affirmative misrepresentation, contrary to N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c). Because those allegations are present in both appeals, the Court does not reach the question of whether a seller’s omission of a provision required by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 or -5.3 would give rise to a TCCWNA claim. Nothing in either the TCCWNA’s plain language or its legislative history suggests that the inclusion of language in a contract or other writing that violates a regulation cannot be the basis for a claim under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. Moreover, accepting regulations as a source of law in the application of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15’s “clearly established” standard furthers the TCCWNA’s consumer-protection objectives. Although the CFA generally describes unlawful commercial practices that give rise to a cause of action, the Legislature envisioned that the Attorney General would specifically identify unlawful practices in particular commercial markets, and that such regulations would constitute law. New Jersey decisions also acknowledge that a TCCWNA violation may be premised on the violation of a regulation. N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) is plainly the source of a “clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller” within the meaning of N.J.S.A 56:12-15. The regulation carries the force of law; indeed, a violation “shall be subject to the sanctions contained in” the CFA. N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.4. Moreover, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c)’s prohibition on misleading refund terms in furniture-sales contracts provides unambiguous direction to furniture sellers. Accordingly, a furniture seller’s inclusion in a consumer sales contract or agreement of language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) may alone constitute a violation of a “clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller” underN.J.S.A. 56:12-15, and thus may provide a basis for relief under the TCCWNA. (pp. 16-20)3. The Third Circuit’s second certified question asks whether a consumer who receives a contract containing provisions that violate one of the regulations at issue, but who has suffered no adverse consequences as a result of the contract’s noncompliance with the regulation, constitutes an “aggrieved consumer,” as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. “The TCCWNA does not specifically define what makes a 'consumer’ an 'aggrieved consumer’ for purposes of N.J.S.A. 56:12-17,” Dugan, 231 N.J. at 69, and the Third Circuit’s request to define an “aggrieved consumer” raises a question of first impression for the Court. In the provision of the TCCWNA that defines a statutory violation, the word “consumer”—unmodified by the term “aggrieved”—broadly denotes “any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any money, property or service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” N.J.S.A. 56:12- 15. In the TCCWNA’s remedial provision, however, the Legislature chose a more precise term: “aggrieved consumer.” N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. The Legislature clearly intended to differentiate between “consumers and prospective consumers”—the broad category of people whom the Legislature seeks to shield from offending provisions—and “aggrieved consumers” entitled to a remedy under the TCCWNA. If “aggrieved consumer” were construed to mean nothing more than a “consumer” to whom a contract or other writing is offered, given or displayed, the term “aggrieved” would be superfluous. That word distinguishes consumers who have suffered harm because of a violation of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 from those who have merely been exposed to unlawful language in a contract or writing, to no effect. That harm is not limited to injury compensable by monetary damages. Proof of harm resulting from contract language prohibited by N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 may warrant a civil penalty under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17, even if the harm is not compensable by damages. In the setting of these appeals, if a consumer has entered into a sales contract containing a provision that violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3, but his or her furniture was delivered conforming and on schedule, and he or she has incurred no monetary damages or adverse consequences, that consumer has suffered no harm. Such a consumer is not an “aggrieved consumer” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. (pp. 20-27) CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 57 September Term 2016 078611DAVID SPADE and KATINA SPADE, H/W, individually and as a class representative on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.SELECT COMFORT CORP., d/b/a SLEEP NUMBER, LEGGETT & PLATT INC., Defendants-Respondents.CHRISTOPHER D. WENGER and EILEEN MULLER, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.BOB’S DISCOUNT FURNITURE, LLC, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 8, 2017 – Decided April 16, 2018 On certification of questions of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Lewis G. Adler argued the cause for appellants David Spade and Katina Spade (Lewis G. Adler and Law Office of Paul DePetris, attorneys; Lewis G. Adler and Paul DePetris, on the briefs). 1 Andrew R. Wolf argued the cause for appellants Christopher D. Wenger and Eileen Muller (The Wolf Law Firm, attorneys; Andrew R. Wolf and Henry P. Wolfe, on the briefs).Andrew S. Hansen of the Minnesota bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondent Select Comfort Corp. (Fox Rothschild, attorneys; Karen A. Confoy, on the brief, and Heidi A.O. Fisher, of the Minnesota bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Andrew S. Hansen, of the Minnesota bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on the briefs).Brett D. Carroll of the Florida and Massachusetts bars, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondent Bob’s Discount Furniture, LLC (Holland & Knight, attorneys; Brett D. Carroll, Sean C. Sheely and Duvol M. Thompson, on the briefs).James A. Barry argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Locks Law Firm and Law Offices of Charles N. Riley, attorneys; James A. Barry, Michael A. Galpern, Andrew P. Bell, and Charles N. Riley, on the brief).David R. Kott argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Business & Industry Association (McCarter & English, attorneys; David R. Kott, Edward J. Fanning, and Zane C. Riester, of counsel and on the brief).Gavin J. Rooney submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (Lowenstein Sandler, attorneys; Gavin J. Rooney and Naomi D. Barrowclough, of counsel and on the brief).Bruce D. Greenberg submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Consumers League of New Jersey (Lite DePalma Greenberg, attorneys; Bruce D. Greenberg, of counsel and on the brief, and Susana Cruz Hodge, on the brief). 2 Christopher J. Michie and Christopher J. Dalton submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey (Clark Michie and Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, attorneys; Christopher J. Michie, Bruce W. Clark, Christopher J. Dalton, and Jinkal Pujara, on the brief). Drew Cleary Jordan submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Retail Merchants Association (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, attorneys; Drew Cleary Jordan and Kristin M. Hadgis on the brief, and Gregory T. Parks, of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). Michael P. Daly and Matthew J. Fedor submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The Retail Litigation Center, Inc. (Drinker Biddle & Reath, attorneys; Michael P. Daly, Matthew J. Fedor, Meredith C. Slawe, Kathryn E. Deal, Jenna M. Poligo, and Andrew B. Joseph, of counsel and on the brief). Benjamin D. Morgan submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Tailored Brands, Inc. (Archer & Greiner and Armstrong Teasdale, attorneys; Benjamin D. Morgan, on the brief, Charles W. Steese, of the Colorado, Arizona and Iowa bars, admitted pro hac vice, and Douglas N. Marsh, of the Colorado and Illinois bars, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we address two questions of law certifiedby the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit tothis Court. The Third Circuit’s certified questions arise fromtwo putative class actions brought under the Truth-in-ConsumerContract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to 3 -18. The plaintiffs in both actions premise their TCCWNA claimson defendants’ alleged violations of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 and -5.3. Those regulations, promulgated by the Attorney Generalunder the authority of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A.56:8-1 to -210, address the content of contracts of sale or saleorders for the delivery of household furniture. The certified questions are: 1. Does a violation of the Furniture Delivery Regulations alone constitute a violation of a clearly established right or responsibility of the seller under the TCCWNA and thus provides a basis for relief under the TCCWNA? 2. Is a consumer who receives a contract that does not comply with the Furniture Delivery Regulations, but has not suffered any adverse consequences from the noncompliance, an “aggrieved consumer” under the TCCWNA? We answer the first certified question in the affirmativeand the second certified question in the negative. We hold thatthe inclusion of language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c)in contracts of sale or sale orders for the delivery ofhousehold furniture may alone give rise to a violation of a“clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibilityof a seller” for purposes of the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. Wefurther hold that a consumer who receives a contract thatincludes language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), but whosuffers no monetary or other harm as a result of that 4 noncompliance, is not an “aggrieved consumer” entitled to aremedy under the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. I. A. In 1995, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-4, the Division ofConsumer Affairs proposed and adopted regulations governing thedelivery of household furniture and furnishings, N.J.A.C.13:45A-5.1 to -5.4. See 17 N.J.R. 3575 (Sept. 18, 1995). Theregulations impose a series of delivery and notice requirementson “[a]ny person who is engaged in the sale of householdfurniture for which contracts of sale or sale orders are usedfor merchandise ordered for future delivery.” N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(a). N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(a) requires the seller to either“[d]eliver all of the ordered merchandise by or on the promiseddelivery date,” or “[p]rovide written notice to the consumer ofthe impossibility of meeting the promised delivery date.” Thatwritten notice, which must be provided to the consumer prior tothe delivery date in the event that the seller does not meet theagreed-upon delivery schedule, “shall offer the consumer theoption to cancel said order with a prompt, full refund of anypayments already made or to accept delivery at a specified latertime.” Ibid. 5 Two of the regulations prescribe specific language thatmust appear in contract forms or sales documents in “ten-pointbold face type” with information specific to the transaction tobe added by the seller. N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2, -5.3. First,contract forms or sales documents for furniture sales mustinclude the following statement: The merchandise you have ordered is promised for delivery to you on or before (insert date or length of time agreed upon). [N.J.A.C. 13:45a-5.2(a) (boldface in original).] Second, such forms or documents “shall conspicuouslydisclose the seller’s obligations in the case of delayeddelivery in compliance with N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1” and “shallcontain, on the first page of the contract form or salesdocument the following notice”: If the merchandise ordered by you is not delivered by the promised delivery date, (insert name of seller) must offer you the choice of (1) canceling your order with a prompt, full refund of any payments you have made, or (2) accepting delivery at a specific later date. [N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a) (boldface in original).] Another provision prohibits a seller from including certainlanguage in a furniture contract or sales agreement: It shall be unlawful for any person to use any contract or sales agreement that contains any terms, such as “all sales final,” “no 6 cancellations” or “no refunds,” which violate or are contrary to the rights and responsibilities provided for by this rule. Any contract or sales agreement which contains such a provision shall be null and void and unenforceable. [N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c).] Finally, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.4 declares that “any violationof the provisions of this subchapter shall be subject to thesanctions” set forth in the CFA. B. 1. Plaintiffs David Spade and Katina Spade (Spade plaintiffs)assert that on or about April 25, 2013, they purchased furniturefrom a retail store owned and operated by defendant SelectComfort Corporation (Select Comfort).1 They allege that SelectComfort’s sales contract included the following languageprohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c): a statement that the saleof certain products “are final,” and a statement that as tocertain categories of products, “[n]o returns will be accepted”or “[n]o returns or exchanges will be authorized or accepted.”The Spade plaintiffs also allege that the sales contract thatSelect Comfort provided to them did not include languagemandated by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a).1 We derive our summary of the Spade plaintiffs’ allegations from the complaint and its exhibits in the record. 7 It is undisputed that the furniture ordered by the Spadeplaintiffs was timely delivered to them on or about May 29,2013. As the Third Circuit noted, “[t]he Spade plaintiffsexperienced problems with their furniture, but it was initiallydelivered in a conforming manner.”2 2. Plaintiffs Christopher D. Wenger and Eileen Muller (Wengerplaintiffs) allege that on November 28, 2013, they orderedfurniture from a store owned by defendant Bob’s DiscountFurniture, LLC (Bob’s Discount Furniture).3 They allege that the“sales document” provided by Bob’s Discount Furniture includedthe following language:2 The Spade plaintiffs allege that on two unspecified dates following delivery, they found defects in the furniture sold by Select Comfort. They assert that after unsuccessful attempts to repair the defects, they retained counsel to revoke their acceptance of the delivery pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:2-608, and that Select Comfort has not resolved the parties’ dispute over the alleged defects. Select Comfort represents that the Spade plaintiffs did not contact it to complain about the furniture until several months after the furniture was delivered and accepted. It asserts that two components of the furniture were replaced in accordance with the applicable warranty, and that plaintiffs’ warranty claim was resolved. In light of the Third Circuit’s statement that the Spade plaintiffs’ furniture was timely delivered in a conforming condition, the parties’ dispute is irrelevant to our consideration of the certified questions. See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 18, 35 (2006) (“The purpose of the certification process is to answer the question of law submitted pursuant to Rule 2:12A, not to resolve [the parties’] factual differences.”).3 We derive our summary of the Wenger plaintiffs’ allegations from the complaint and its exhibits in the record. 8 You may cancel special orders within three (3) days after the order date (11/28/2013) and we will refund your Special Order deposit in full. If you cancel your special order later than three (3) days after the order date (11/28/2013), we will refund your Special Order Deposit less the Special Order fee. The Wenger plaintiffs assert that this language violatesN.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), because that regulation mandates a fullrefund in the event of a late delivery of the furniture ordered.The Wenger plaintiffs also contend that the sales document didnot entirely conform with N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2(a) and N.J.A.C.13:45A-5.3(a) because language required by those provisionsappeared in a font different from the “ten-point bold face type”that the regulations prescribe.4 Although the record does not reveal the date on which Bob’sDiscount Furniture delivered the furniture ordered by the Wengerplaintiffs, it is undisputed that the furniture was timelydelivered. C. The Spade plaintiffs filed a putative class action in theLaw Division, naming Select Comfort and the manufacturer of the4 The Wenger plaintiffs also allege that a “brochure/folder” provided by Bob’s Discount Furniture violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A- 5.2(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a), because it advised the consumer that when the store’s delivery team “is ready to leave your home, we will ask you to confirm that your delivery was totally satisfactory, or, if there was a problem, to immediately speak with a Customer Care representative.” 9 furniture that they ordered, Leggett & Platt, as defendants.The Spade plaintiffs asserted a claim under the TCCWNA, based onalleged violations of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 and -5.3 on behalf of“all other persons similarly situated to plaintiffs who wereissued/received contracts of the same kind and in the same wayas plaintiffs.”5 The action was removed to the United StatesDistrict Court for the District of New Jersey, based on 28U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and (d). The Wenger plaintiffs also filed a putative class action inthe Law Division. They asserted TCCWNA claims against Bob’sDiscount Furniture based on alleged violations of N.J.A.C.13:45A-5.1, -5.2 and -5.3, and sought certification of thefollowing class: All New Jersey consumers who purchased household furniture or furnishings for future delivery from Defendant at any time on or after the day six years prior to the day this Complaint was filed, using a sales document the same as or similar to the sales document used in the transaction with Plaintiffs that contains the following sentence: ”The Merchandise that you have ordered is promised for delivery to you on or before _____” and where the delivery date in the blank space at the end of the sentence was not filled in.5 The district court dismissed the Spade plaintiffs’ claims against Select Comfort based on the CFA and the Magnuson Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 to 2312. It also dismissed the Spade plaintiffs’ claims against Leggett & Platt. None of those claims are relevant to the Third Circuit’s certified questions. 10 Bob’s Discount Furniture removed the action to the UnitedStates District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and (d). The district court denied theWenger plaintiffs’ motion to remand. In Spade, Select Comfort filed a motion for judgment on thepleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In Wenger, Bob’s DiscountFurniture filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure tostate a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6). After consolidating the cases, the district court grantedboth motions in accordance with the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6). Citing the plain language of N.J.S.A. 56:12-17, thedistrict court held that in order to be an “aggrieved consumer”entitled to relief under the TCCWNA, a plaintiff would berequired to demonstrate that he or she “suffer[ed] the effectsof a violation” of the regulation at issue. It concluded thatbecause N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 and -5.3 exist to “foster timelydelivery of conforming furniture” -- an objective achieved bythe defendant sellers in both cases -- none of the plaintiffsconstituted an “aggrieved consumer” for purposes of the TCCWNA.The district court accordingly dismissed both complaints. The Spade plaintiffs and the Wenger plaintiffs appealed thedistrict court’s judgment. After briefing, the Third Circuitpanel determined that the appeals raised important and 11 unresolved questions of New Jersey law. Pursuant to Rule 2:12A-3, the Third Circuit certified the questions to this Court. We accepted the questions as posed by the Third Circuit.6We also granted the applications of the New Jersey Associationfor Justice, the Consumers League of New Jersey, the RetailLitigation Center, Inc., the New Jersey Retail MerchantsAssociation, the New Jersey Business and Industry Association,the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute, the Commerce andIndustry Association of New Jersey, and Tailored Brands, Inc.,to appear as amici curiae. II. A. To answer the Third Circuit’s certified questions, we applyfamiliar principles of statutory construction. The Legislatureinstructs that in its statutes, “words and phrases shall be readand construed with their context,” and that such words andphrases “shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent ofthe legislature or unless another or different meaning isexpressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning,6 The Third Circuit designated its question regarding the definition of an “aggrieved consumer” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17 as its first question, and its question concerning a “clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 as its second question. BecauseN.J.S.A. 56:12-15 defines a TCCWNA violation and N.J.S.A. 56:12- 17 prescribes the remedy for such a violation, we answer the questions in reverse order. 12 according to the approved usage of the language.” N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. Accordingly, “[t]he starting point of all statutoryinterpretation must be the language used in the enactment.”DCPP v. Y.N., 220 N.J. 165, 178 (2014); accord Acoli v. StateParole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 227 (2016). We construe the words ofa statute “in context with related provisions so as to givesense to the legislation as a whole.” N. Jersey Media Grp.,Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 570 (2017) (quotingDiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). “If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguousresult, then our interpretative process is over.” Johnson v.Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016) (quotingRichardson v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)). Werely on extrinsic evidence of legislative intent “only when thestatute is ambiguous, the plain language leads to a resultinconsistent with any legitimate public policy objective, or itis at odds with a general statutory scheme.” Shelton v.Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 429 (2013). B. The TCCWNA is intended “to prevent deceptive practices inconsumer contracts.” Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24,67 (2017) (quoting Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds & ReynoldsCo., 207 N.J. 428, 457 (2011)). When it enacted the TCCWNA in 13 1981, the Legislature acknowledged the presence of legallyinvalid provisions in “[f]ar too many consumer contracts,warranties, notices and signs,” which acted to “deceive[] aconsumer into thinking [the provisions] are enforceable,” anddeterred consumers from enforcing their legal rights. Sponsor’sStatement to A. 1660 2 (1980). In the TCCWNA, the Legislaturesought not to confer new legal rights, but to require sellers“to acknowledge clearly established consumer rights,” and to“provide[] remedies for posting or inserting provisions contraryto law.” Shelton, 214 N.J. at 432; see also Governor’sStatement on Signing A. 1660 (Jan. 11, 1982) (noting that TCCWNAwould “strengthen[] provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act”). To that end, the TCCWNA provides that [n]o seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee shall in the course of his business offer to any consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written consumer contract or give or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign after the effective date of this act which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or the warranty, notice or sign is given or displayed. [N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.] The TCCWNA authorizes the award of a civil penalty,damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs to an “aggrieved consumer”: 14 Any person who violates the provisions of this act shall be liable to the aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 or for actual damages, or both at the election of the consumer, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs. This may be recoverable by the consumer in a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction or as part of a counterclaim by the consumer against the seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid, who aggrieved him. A consumer also shall have the right to petition a court to terminate a contract which violates the provisions of [N.J.S.A. 56:12-15] and the court in its discretion may void the contract. [N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.] A plaintiff pursuing a TCCWNA cause of action must provefour elements: first, that the defendant was a “seller, lessor,creditor, lender or bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid”;second, that the defendant offered or entered into a “writtenconsumer contract or [gave] or display[ed] any written consumerwarranty, notice or sign”; third, that at the time that thewritten consumer contract is signed or the written consumerwarranty, notice or sign is displayed, that writing contains aprovision that “violates any clearly established legal right ofa consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor,lender or bailee” as established by State or Federal law; andfinally, that the plaintiff is an “aggrieved consumer.”N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, -17. 15 C. 1. Against that backdrop, we consider the Third Circuit’sfirst certified question: whether a violation of N.J.A.C.13:45A-5.2 or -5.3 alone constitutes a violation of a clearlyestablished legal right of a consumer or a responsibility of aseller under the TCCWNA, and therefore provides a basis forrelief under the TCCWNA. The Spade plaintiffs, the Wenger plaintiffs, and amicicuriae the New Jersey Association for Justice and the ConsumersLeague of New Jersey, argue that any violation of N.J.A.C.13:45A-5.2 or -5.3 violates a “clearly established legal rightof a consumer or responsibility of a seller” under N.J.S.A.56:12-15. Defendants contend that, in general, administrativeregulations cannot give rise to a “clearly established” legalright or responsibility for purposes of the TCCWNA. Amicuscuriae the Retail Litigation Center, Inc., argues that aconsumer asserting that a seller violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 or-5.3 must also show ascertainable loss under the CFA todemonstrate a violation of a “clearly established” legal rightor responsibility. Amicus curiae the New Jersey Civil JusticeInstitute urges the Court not to deem an omission of requiredlanguage, or the appearance of such language in an incorrectfont, to give rise to a cause of action under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. 16 Amici curiae the Commerce and Industry Association of New Jerseyand Tailored Brands, Inc., assert that only the contravention ofwell-recognized requirements should constitute a violation of a“clearly established” legal right or responsibility underN.J.S.A. 56:12-15. The remaining amici curiae take no positionon this issue. In these appeals, all plaintiffs allege that defendantsincluded in their sales documents language constituting anaffirmative misrepresentation, contrary to N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), a regulation that prohibits potentially misleadinglanguage concerning the availability of a refund. Because thoseallegations are present in both appeals, we need not reach thequestion of whether a seller’s omission of a provision requiredby N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 or -5.3 would give rise to a TCCWNAclaim. We address only those allegations of an affirmativeviolation of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c). Nothing in either the TCCWNA’s plain language or itslegislative history suggests that the inclusion of language in acontract or other writing that violates a regulation cannot bethe basis for a claim under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. In the TCCWNA,the Legislature did not limit the term “State or Federal law” tostatutes, as it could have done with a minor revision of theTCCWNA’s text. 17 Moreover, accepting regulations as a source of law in theapplication of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15’s “clearly established”standard furthers the TCCWNA’s consumer-protection objectives.The Legislature not only included affirmative acts and knowingomissions in the category of consumer fraud violations, but also“impose[d] strict liability” for regulatory violations,regardless of the defendant’s intent. Cox v. Sears Roebuck &Co., 138 N.J. 2, 18 (1994). It did so because “parties subjectto the regulations are assumed to be familiar with them, so thatany violation of the regulations, regardless of intent or moralculpability, constitutes a violation of the [CFA].” Id. at 18-19. Although the CFA generally describes unlawful commercialpractices that give rise to a cause of action, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2,the Legislature envisioned that the Attorney General wouldspecifically identify unlawful practices in particularcommercial markets, and that such regulations would constitutelaw. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-4 (“To accomplish the objectives and tocarry out the duties prescribed by [the CFA], the AttorneyGeneral . . . may . . . promulgate such rules and regulations .. . as may be necessary, which shall have the force of law.”). Accordingly, the content of contracts and other writingsused in commercial transactions is typically addressed inregulations, rather than statutes. See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(12)(ii) (requiring all home improvement contracts for 18 purchase price in excess of $500.00 to include “[a] descriptionof the work to be done and the products and materials to be usedor installed in performance of the contract”); N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26B.2(a)(2) (requiring motor vehicle sellers to itemize chargesfor pre-delivery services “in at least 10-point type, on thesales document”). Our decisions also acknowledge that a TCCWNA violation maybe premised on the violation of a regulation. In Bosland v.Warnock Dodge, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 267, 278-79 (App. Div.2007), aff’d on other grounds, 197 N.J. 543 (2009), theAppellate Division recognized a TCCWNA claim based on allegedviolations of automotive sales practices regulations promulgatedpursuant to the CFA. We noted in Dugan that courts applyingN.J.S.A. 56:12-15 “assess whether the CFA or another consumerprotection statute or regulation clearly prohibited thecontractual provision or other practice that is the basis forthe TCCWNA claim.” 231 N.J. at 69; see also Kent Motor Cars,207 N.J. at 457-58 (affirming dismissal of defendant’s claimsagainst insurer in TCCWNA action based on violation ofautomotive sales regulations governing font size in salescontract). There is, in short, no support in the TCCWNA or incase law for the proposition that regulations cannot serve asthe source of a consumer’s “clearly established legal right” ora “responsibility of a seller” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. 19 N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) is plainly the source of a “clearlyestablished legal right of a consumer or responsibility of aseller” within the meaning of N.J.S.A 56:12-15. The regulationcarries the force of law; indeed, a violation “shall be subjectto the sanctions contained in” the CFA. N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.4.Moreover, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c)’s prohibition on misleadingrefund terms in furniture-sales contracts provides unambiguousdirection to furniture sellers. The regulation generally barsterms in furniture sales contracts or sales agreements “whichviolate or are contrary to the rights and responsibilities” setforth in the regulations, and provides specific examples ofprohibited language: “'all sales final,’ 'no cancellations’ or'no refunds.’” N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c). The regulation issimple and clear. Accordingly, we conclude that a furniture seller’sinclusion in a consumer sales contract or agreement of languageprohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) may alone constitute aviolation of a “clearly established legal right of a consumer orresponsibility of a seller” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, and thusmay provide a basis for relief under the TCCWNA. 2. The Third Circuit’s second certified question requires thatwe determine whether a consumer who receives a contractcontaining provisions that violate one of the regulations at 20 issue, but who has suffered no adverse consequences as a resultof the contract’s noncompliance with the regulation, constitutesan “aggrieved consumer,” as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. “The TCCWNA does not specifically define what makes a'consumer’ an 'aggrieved consumer’ for purposes of N.J.S.A.56:12-17.” Dugan, 231 N.J. at 69. In several decisions, wehave evaluated TCCWNA claims without squarely addressing thequestion posed by the Third Circuit in this case. See id. at71-72 (reversing certification of TCCWNA class because “aclaimant who does not, at a minimum, prove that he or shereceived a menu cannot satisfy the elements of the TCCWNA and isnot an 'aggrieved consumer’”); Manahawkin Convalescent v.O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 125-26 (2014) (affirming dismissal ofTCCWNA claim predicated on alleged violation of prohibition onMedicaid or Medicare-certified nursing homes requiring third-party guarantees of payment as condition of resident admissionor retention); Shelton, 214 N.J. at 435 (“[T]he phrase'primarily for personal, family or household purposes’ inN.J.S.A. 56:12-15 cannot be interpreted to exclude intangibleproperty from the scope of the TCCWNA.”). The Third Circuit’srequest that we define an “aggrieved consumer” thus raises aquestion of first impression for this Court. 21 The Spade plaintiffs, the Wenger plaintiffs, amicus curiaethe New Jersey Association for Justice, and amicus curiae theConsumers League of New Jersey urge an expansive definition of“aggrieved consumer.” They argue that any consumer who isoffered or enters into a contract or other writing that violatesN.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 or -5.3, either by inclusion of an offendingprovision or omission of a required provision, is an “aggrievedconsumer” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17, whether or not he or she hasconsequently suffered harm. Defendants in both appeals andamici curiae the Retail Litigation Center, Inc., the New JerseyRetail Merchants Association, the New Jersey Business andIndustry Association, the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute,the Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey, andTailored Brands, Inc., maintain that in order to be an“aggrieved consumer,” a plaintiff must demonstrate an adverseconsequence caused by an unlawful provision in a contract orother writing. We find ample evidence of the Legislature’s intent in theTCCWNA’s plain language to resolve this question of statutoryinterpretation. In the provision of the TCCWNA that defines astatutory violation, the word “consumer” -- unmodified by theterm “aggrieved” -- broadly denotes “any individual who buys,leases, borrows, or bails any money, property or service whichis primarily for personal, family or household purposes.”22 N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. The Legislature prohibited any “seller,lessor, creditor, lender or bailee” from including an unlawfulprovision in any “written consumer contract” offered to “anyconsumer or prospective consumer,” or entered into with such a“consumer or prospective consumer,” or in “any written consumerwarranty, notice or sign.” Ibid. Thus, when it defined theconduct barred by the TCCWNA, the Legislature chose expansivelanguage to describe the consumers and potential consumers whomthe statute was enacted to protect. In the TCCWNA’s remedial provision, however, theLegislature chose a more precise term: “aggrieved consumer.”N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. The Legislature clearly intended todifferentiate between “consumers and prospective consumers” --the broad category of people whom the Legislature seeks toshield from offending provisions -- and “aggrieved consumers”entitled to a remedy under the TCCWNA. “[L]egislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable,be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless.” Carterv. Doe (In re N.J. Fireman’s Ass’n Obligation), 230 N.J. 258,274 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011)). If “aggrieved consumer” were construedto mean nothing more than a “consumer” to whom a contract orother writing is offered, given or displayed, the term“aggrieved” would indeed be superfluous. We interpret that word 23 so as to give it significance; it distinguishes consumers whohave suffered harm because of a violation of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15from those who have merely been exposed to unlawful language ina contract or writing, to no effect. As reference sources contemporaneous to the TCCWNA’senactment reflect,7 the term “aggrieved consumer” denotes aconsumer who has suffered some form of harm as a result of thedefendant’s conduct. See Black’s Law Dictionary 60 (5th ed.1979) (defining “aggrieved party” as “[o]ne whose legal right isinvaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest isdirectly affected by a degree or judgment,” and “aggrieved” todenote “[h]aving suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured”);Oxford English Dictionary 255 (2d ed. 1989) (observing that“aggrieve” was “rarely used” except “[i]n the passive to beaggrieved: to be injuriously affected, to have a grievance orcause of grief[;] 2. [t]o afflict oneself, to grieve, to feel7 In construing legislative language, we may consider the usage of that language at the time of a statute’s enactment. See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S.___, 134 S. Ct. 870, 877-79 (2014) (relying on dictionary definitions in use at time of statute’s enactment to define “clothes” and “changing” in order to determine whether “the donning and doffing of protective gear” qualifies as “changing clothes” within the meaning of Fair Labor Standards Act); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 , 42 (1979) (“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. Therefore, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term 'bribery’ [in the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952,] at the time Congress enacted the statute in 1961.” (citation omitted)). 24 grief, 3. [t]o make more grave or serious; to aggravate,exaggerate”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 41(3d ed. 1981) (defining “aggrieved” to mean “1. troubled ordistressed in spirit[;] 2. showing grief, injury, offense,having a grievance, specifically suffering from an infringementor denial of legal rights”). Thus, an “aggrieved consumer” is aconsumer who has been harmed by a violation of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. We do not, however, view that harm to be limited to injurycompensable by monetary damages. The Legislature clearlyenvisioned that an “aggrieved consumer” is not necessarily aconsumer entitled to an award of damages; it provided for “acivil penalty of not less than $100.00 or . . . actual damages,or both at the election of the consumer.” N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.The TCCWNA thus contemplates that a consumer may be entitled toa remedy notwithstanding the absence of proof of monetarydamages. Ibid.; see also Bohus v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 784 F.3d 918, 930 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We cannot disregard theLegislature’s choice to award statutory damages in the absenceof actual damages.”); Shelton, 214 N.J. at 432-43 (describingAssembly Commerce, Industry and Professions Committee’s decisionto change language providing for statutory remedy “from civil'damages’ of not less than $100 to a civil 'penalty’ of not lessthan $100”). 25 Thus, a consumer may be “aggrieved” for purposes ofN.J.S.A. 56:12-17 if he or she has suffered harm as a result ofthe defendant’s inclusion of prohibited language in a contractor other writing even if that harm is not a basis for a damagesaward. If, for example, a furniture seller fails to timelydeliver a consumer’s furniture, and the consumer would havesought a refund had he or she not been deterred by the “norefunds” language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3, thatconsumer may be an “aggrieved consumer” entitled to a civilpenalty under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. If an untimely delivery andmisleading “no refunds” language leave a consumer withoutfurniture needed for a family gathering, the consumer may be an“aggrieved consumer” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. Proofof harm resulting from contract language prohibited by N.J.S.A.56:12-15 may warrant a civil penalty under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17,even if the harm is not compensable by damages. In the absence of evidence that the consumer sufferedadverse consequences as a result of the defendant’s regulatoryviolation, a consumer is not an “aggrieved consumer” forpurposes of the TCCWNA. In the setting of these appeals, if aconsumer has entered into a sales contract containing aprovision that violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3, but his or herfurniture was delivered conforming and on schedule, and he orshe has incurred no monetary damages or adverse consequences, 26 that consumer has suffered no harm. Such a consumer is not an“aggrieved consumer” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. III. In sum, we construe the TCCWNA to recognize an affirmativeviolation of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), by virtue of the inclusionof language prohibited by that regulation in a contract of saleor sale order for the delivery of household furniture, toconstitute a violation of a “clearly established legal right ofa consumer or responsibility of a seller.” N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.We interpret N.J.S.A. 56:12-17 to require a consumer to showthat he or she has suffered harm, even if that harm does notwarrant an award of damages, as a result of a violation ofN.J.S.A. 56:12-15, in order for that consumer to constitute an“aggrieved consumer” for purposes of the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A.56:12-17. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 27