Title: People v. Buss
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81911
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 1999

People v. Buss (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Opinion filed April 15, 1999.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
In connection with the August 7, 1995, disappearance and murder of 
Christopher Meyer, defendant, Timothy D. Buss, was indicted on six counts of 
first degree murder, three counts of aggravated kidnaping, and one count of 
aggravated unlawful restraint. Following a trial in the circuit court of Will 
County, a jury found defendant guilty of all of these charges. The same jury 
determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. After hearing 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the jury found that there were no 
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. 
The circuit court sentenced defendant to death for first degree murder and 
imposed sentences of 30 years' imprisonment and 5 years' imprisonment for 
aggravated kidnaping and aggravated unlawful restraint, respectively.
On appeal, defendant argues that this court must grant him a new trial and 
capital sentencing hearing because of errors relating to voir dire, the 
denial of his pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, errors that 
occurred at trial, and errors at both stages of the sentencing hearing. 
Defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court. 
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). We affirm 
defendant's convictions and death sentence.
BACKGROUNDAt defendant's 1996 trial, Mika Moulton, Christopher 
Meyer's mother, testified that, in August 1995, she and her children lived in 
Aroma Park, Illinois. During the afternoon of August 7, 1995, she gave 
10½-year-old Christopher permission to go to the Aroma Park boat launch on the 
Kankakee River. Moulton instructed Christopher to return home at 5 p.m. that 
day. When he left on his bicycle for the boat launch, Christopher was wearing 
blue shorts, a green patterned T-shirt, Chicago Blackhawks high-top tennis 
shoes, and Ninja Turtle underwear. When Christopher did not return home that 
evening, Moulton looked for him without success. She notified police, who began 
a search for Christopher.
In the days following Christopher's disappearance, members of the team 
searching for him found Christopher's clothing and bicycle in areas around the 
Kankakee River. Searchers testified that, while dragging the river on August 8, 
they found one of Christopher's shoes floating near the Aroma Park boat launch. 
That same day, searchers found the bicycle Christopher was last seen riding. The 
bicycle was recovered across the river from the boat launch in a wooded area 
east of the railroad trestle on Birchwood Drive. During the morning of August 9, 
1995, Christopher's other shoe was found floating in the Kankakee River near the 
Kankakee Country Club, which is downstream from the Aroma Park boat launch. On 
August 12, searchers found pieces of Christopher's clothing in the area around 
the gravel parking lot for Hunting Area 10 in the Kankakee State Park. On a path 
leading from the parking lot, there was a piece of Christopher's T-shirt on the 
ground, and a pair of Ninja Turtle underwear was hanging in a nearby bush.
While the search for Christopher proceeded, police learned that several 
individuals had seen Christopher and a man resembling defendant at the boat 
launch during the afternoon of August 7. Jacob Mailloux, who was 14 years old at 
the time of trial, testified that he went to the boat launch with his friend 
Paul Buckner during the afternoon of August 7. As he and Buckner fished at the 
bayou, an area adjacent to the boat launch, Mailloux saw Christopher talking to 
a man. Mailloux knew Christopher because he had seen him at the boat launch 
before. The man with Christopher had dark hair and a mustache and was wearing a 
turquoise tank top and blue jean cut-off shorts. During a conversation Mailloux 
had with this man, the man said that he had been raised in Aroma Park, had 
family in the area, and had just returned from Florida. The man also talked to 
Mailloux about salt water fishing in Florida. Mailloux noticed that the man's 
tackle box contained a filet knife and lures that were too big to be used by 
fishermen in the Aroma Park area. Although Mailloux was unable to make a 
positive identification of defendant in court or at the lineup he viewed, he 
testified that defendant was similar to the man he saw with Christopher.
Fifteen-year-old Edward Meier testified that, around 4 p.m. on August 7, 
1995, he was at the boat launch with his friends Dustin and Darren Posing. Meier 
saw Christopher walk out of the woods on a path leading from the fishing area 
adjacent to the boat launch. Christopher walked to a car, where he spoke to 
someone, after which he jogged to the boat ramp to wash mud from his shoes in 
the river. He then retrieved his bike, which was leaning on a nearby tree. 
Darren suggested that Christopher ride his bike into the river but Christopher 
refused, saying he had to be home by 4:30 p.m. Dustin told him it was only 4:17 
p.m., but Christopher replied that he had to leave. Meanwhile, the car slowly 
circled around the parking lot and then drove out of the lot toward Harry's Bait 
Shop. Christopher quickly rode out of the parking lot after the car. On August 
10, 1995, Meier selected defendant's car from 25 or 30 cars in the parking lot 
of the Kankakee County sheriff's department and identified it as the car he saw 
at the boat launch on August 7.
Darren Posing's testimony was essentially the same as Meier's, except that he 
did not see Christopher talking to anyone at the boat launch. Posing, who was 12 
years old at the time of trial, did, however, see one car in the boat launch 
parking lot, a gray or dark blue car that appeared to be a 1984 Oldsmobile 
Ciera. He told police that defendant's car was similar to the one he saw at the 
boat launch. In addition, he testified that Christopher rode toward Harry's Bait 
Shop when he left the parking lot of the boat launch.
Beth Waselewski testified that she was at the Aroma Park boat launch with her 
boyfriend, Jason Forbes, on August 7, 1995. She saw Christopher pushing his bike 
and following a man in his late thirties or early forties. The man wore a dark 
sleeveless shirt, had a mustache, had dark hair, and was smoking a cigarette. 
Christopher and this man were walking out of the woods on the path leading from 
the bayou. Waselewski saw a dark gray four-door car in the parking lot of the 
boat launch but was unable to tell members of the Kankakee County sheriff's 
department whether the car she saw at the boat launch was among the cars she 
later viewed in the parking lot of the department. She was also unable to tell 
whether the man she saw with Christopher was in a lineup she viewed, but she 
testified that it was "very possible" that defendant was that man, and it was 
"possible" that defendant's car was the one she saw at the boat launch.
Other individuals saw defendant or defendant's car in the Aroma Park area 
around August 7. Charles Henry testified that, in August 1995, he lived east of 
the trestle on Birchwood Drive. Across the road from his house there was a park 
between the road and the river. On August 7, 1995, he was driving home from work 
when he saw a car in the parking area of the park. The car was parked facing 
him, and there was a man standing behind the car by the open trunk. As Henry 
drove past the park, he had a side view of the man. He made eye contact with the 
man when the man turned to look at him.
According to Henry, the man had dark, wavy hair and was wearing blue jeans 
and a gray T-shirt. Henry did not notice any facial hair on the man, but he did 
see a filet knife in a leather case protruding from the man's back pocket. 
Henry, a fisherman, explained that it was common for fishermen to have this type 
of leather case and filet knife, which he described as a thin, single-edged, 
flexible knife. Henry could not remember whether he saw the car and the man when 
he came home for lunch between 12:30 and 1 p.m. or when he returned home from 
work between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m.
Henry reported his observations to police on August 9. On August 10, Henry 
viewed a group of 20 to 25 cars in the parking lot of the Kankakee County 
sheriff's department. From these cars, he selected defendant's car, which he 
stated looked like the car he saw on August 7. On August 11, Henry viewed a 
lineup, from which he identified defendant as the person he saw on August 7. 
Henry also made a courtroom identification of defendant.
Bobbye Fancher testified that, at 12:45 a.m. on August 7, 1995, she was 
driving to work on Route 113 when she saw an older model silver-blue Spectrum 
turn in front of her from a dirt road just west of Hunting Area 7 in the 
Kankakee State Park. At about 9:25 p.m. on August 8, Fancher was driving on the 
same route when she saw the same car turn onto Route 113 at the same location. 
The car did not turn on its headlights for one-half to one mile. The man driving 
the car had a mustache. Fancher contacted police and, after viewing a group of 
23 to 35 cars at the police station, she identified the defendant's car as the 
one she saw on August 7 and 8. She admitted having worked with defendant's 
father at one time but stated that she was unaware that defendant had been 
arrested for Christopher's murder when she contacted police about the car she 
saw. David Buss testified that he and Fancher had had disagreements at work but 
that they had last worked together 15 to 20 years ago.
According to records from the Illinois Secretary of State, defendant owned a 
1986 four-door Chevy Spectrum around the time of Christopher's murder. In June 
1995, defendant obtained Illinois license plates for this car and title was 
transferred from Florida to Illinois.
Other testimony by some of defendant's neighbors linked him to Christopher's 
disappearance. Candace Adkins testified that, in August 1995, she lived in the 
same apartment building as defendant. He had moved there from Florida in May of 
that year. On August 6, her sister returned a hammer that they had borrowed from 
defendant. The hammer was clean when they returned it to him. Around 1 p.m. on 
August 7, she saw defendant's car at the apartment building, but it was gone 
when she looked for it around 4, 5, or 6 p.m. that day. On August 9, defendant 
asked Adkins if she knew where he was on Monday (August 7) and told her that he 
was a suspect in Christopher's disappearance. Adkins noticed that defendant had 
three scratches on his forearm when she saw him on August 9.
Candace's sister, Laura Adkins, testified that she lived with her sister in 
August 1995 and had seen defendant that summer with a filet knife in a case on 
his belt. On August 8, she saw him sitting in his car for long periods of time 
in a daze. He had not acted this way in the past.
Members of the Kankakee police department and Kankakee County sheriff's 
department testified concerning their attempts to speak to defendant about 
Christopher's disappearance. On August 9, police visited the home of David and 
Terry Buss, defendant's father and stepmother. Terry Buss refused to speak to 
police that morning without an attorney. That afternoon, however, David Buss 
told police that defendant was living in Joliet with his brother. When police 
visited defendant's Joliet address that afternoon, no one was home. Defendant 
was also not at his place of employment. Police placed defendant's apartment 
under surveillance and observed him return home that evening. At around 9 p.m., 
police saw defendant's car parked in front of his apartment building but, 
shortly thereafter, police realized that defendant's car had disappeared. Their 
attempts to locate the car that night were unsuccessful.
Wanda Poole, a neighbor of defendant's in August 1995, testified that she is 
familiar with defendant's car. Around 8:40 or 9 p.m. on August 9, she was 
sitting in her garage when she saw defendant's car traveling down the alley 
behind her home at 35 to 40 miles per hour. Although it was dark, the car's 
headlights were off.
Theresa Billingsley testified that she was working as a desk manager at the B 
and P Motel in Braidwood on the night of August 9. A man checked into the motel 
at about 10 p.m. under the name of Jim Benson. The man was driving a blue-gray, 
older model, four-door Spectrum with fishing rods in the back window. He was 
smoking when he registered at the motel and was assigned a smoking room. 
Billingsley contacted police because she believed that this man resembled the 
composite sketch on a flier police had distributed regarding Christopher's 
disappearance. In response to Billingsley's call, police placed defendant under 
surveillance at the motel.
Marsha Pressler testified that she worked as a desk clerk at the B and P 
Motel during the day on August 10. At around 8:25 a.m., defendant checked out of 
the motel. After defendant left the motel office, Pressler saw him place a pair 
of boots in the motel dumpster. Pressler asked another guest at the motel to 
retrieve the boots from the dumpster and place them in a plastic bag. Pressler 
gave this bag to Braidwood police officer Keith Kemp, who testified that the 
boots were "water soaked" but in good condition when he received them.
Kankakee County Deputy Sheriff Brady Bertrand, the police officer assigned to 
watch defendant at the motel, testified that he also observed defendant place a 
pair of boots in the motel dumpster and then drive away from the motel in a 
light blue or gray Chevy Spectrum. Bertrand followed defendant to the Wilmington 
Dam.
William Treadman, testified that he was at the Wilmington Dam around 9 a.m. 
on August 10. Defendant approached Treadman and asked whether Treadman had seen 
him fishing at the Dam before. Treadman responded that he had not.
David Buss explained at trial that, after police came to his house on August 
9, he had contacted defendant and advised him to spend the night at a motel 
around the Wilmington Dam, speak to people at the Dam in the morning to "verify 
his whereabouts" on August 7, and turn himself in to police.
After Bertrand and defendant arrived at the Dam on August 10, four other 
officers joined Bertrand. Three of those officers, Lieutenant Gary Mitchell, 
Detective Rich Sims, and Lieutenant Larry Osenga, approached defendant. Mitchell 
identified himself and told defendant they wanted to speak to him. Defendant 
appeared nervous, walked in circles, and did not make eye contact with the 
officers. In addition, when Sims attempted to take a picture of him, defendant 
turned his face away and put his hands up to shield his face.
At the request of the police officers, defendant then drove his car to the 
sheriff's department. Two officers accompanied defendant to the sheriff's 
department in their own cars. Defendant parked his car in the parking lot of the 
sheriff's department. While he was inside, police had a towing company bring 
other similar cars to the parking lot, after which police asked potential 
witnesses if they recognized any of the cars in the parking lot. That afternoon, 
after consulting with his attorney, defendant consented in writing to the search 
of his car. Defendant was arrested on August 10, 1995.
Christopher's body was found in Will County on August 15, 1995. Will County 
Sheriff's Deputy Scott Swearengen testified that he and another deputy were 
searching the hunting areas of the Kankakee State Park during the early morning 
hours of August 15. In a clearing at the end of a path leading from the parking 
area of Hunting Area 7, they found the body of a small child in a shallow grave 
under a sheet of plywood.
Forensic evidence presented by the State established that the body was that 
of Christopher and that he had died from multiple stab wounds prior to sunset on 
August 7. Dr. Edward Pavlik, an expert in forensic odontology, testified that he 
was asked to assist in identifying the body recovered in Hunting Area 7. Based 
on the development of the teeth in the body and a comparison of these teeth to 
photographs of Christopher's teeth before his death, Pavlik determined that the 
body belonged to Christopher.
Dr. Larry Blum, an expert in forensic pathology, testified that he performed 
the autopsy of Christopher's body. The body was unclothed and showed signs of 
decomposition. Blum found a contusion to Christopher's jaw and 52 stab wounds 
and cuts on the body, primarily to the chest, abdomen, and back. In Blum's 
opinion, the stab and slash wounds were made by a sharp, single-edged knife that 
was relatively long and narrow. This knife could have been a filet knife. There 
was also evidence that this type of knife had been used to cut Christopher's 
genital area; his external genitalia were missing. None of Christopher's wounds, 
including one stab wound to his heart and 12 to his lungs, was sufficient to 
cause immediate death. Blum opined that the cause of death was multiple stab 
wounds.
Neal Haskell, a forensic entomologist, explained that certain insects are 
attracted to human remains, sometimes within seconds of death, and lay their 
eggs in these remains. Based on the stage of development of the insects found in 
a corpse, a precise estimation of the time of death may be obtained. Haskell 
analyzed the insects recovered from Christopher's body, as well as the 
environmental conditions to which the body had been subjected. He concluded that 
the time of death was most likely sometime before sunset on August 7.
Other forensic evidence connected defendant to Christopher's murder. Randy 
Hartman, a Kankakee County police detective and evidence technician, helped 
process defendant's car after defendant consented to the search. He testified 
that he vacuumed the car and placed the collected debris in sealed bags. On the 
floor of the back seat, Hartman found a bucket and hammer with mud caked on the 
claw. There were fishing poles in the back window and a tackle box in the trunk. 
There was no filet knife in this tackle box, but the box did contain various 
lures, sinkers, and a salt water fishing hook. There was blood on the carpet of 
the trunk, as well as on items in the trunk, such as a lug wrench, dent puller, 
and bottle.
The police also searched defendant's apartment, as well as his room at the B 
and P Motel. In the motel dumpster, police found a motel receipt with the name 
of Jim Benson on it. No filet knife was found in the apartment or at the 
motel.
Ralph Meyer, a forensic microscopist for the Illinois State Police Forensic 
Science Lab, testified that he analyzed hairs recovered from defendant's car and 
from the T-shirt fragment found in Hunting Area 10. He obtained hair samples 
from Christopher's body and from defendant. He stated that the characteristics 
of two hairs recovered from the front passenger area of defendant's car matched 
the characteristics of Christopher's hair, which was very unique in terms of 
structure and pigment. Characteristics of a hair found on the T-shirt fragment 
also matched those of Christopher's hair.
Kenneth Knight, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police Crime Lab 
and an expert in forensic microscopy, testified that he analyzed soil recovered 
from the claw of the hammer found in defendant's car and soil from the grave 
site. He found that these soil samples were consistent with each other.
Robert Hunton, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police and an 
expert in foot marks testified that he compared a partial footprint found at the 
grave site to the boots defendant discarded at the B and P Motel. The pattern 
and size of the right boot was the same as the footprint.
Gail Kienast, a forensic scientist at the Illinois State Bureau of Forensic 
Sciences and an expert in serology and blood analysis, testified that she 
analyzed items recovered by police in this case. She determined that there was 
human blood on the dent puller found in the trunk of defendant's car. On carpet 
from the trunk there was a stain of human blood that had soaked through the 
carpet. There was human blood on a box found at the grave site. There was also 
blood on the boots defendant had placed in the motel dumpster, although the test 
to determine whether this blood was human was not positive.
William Frank, the DNA Research Coordinator for the Illinois State Police 
Forensic Sciences Command and an expert in forensic DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) 
analysis, testified that he analyzed DNA extracted from an inhaler prescribed 
for Christopher, from carpet from the trunk of defendant's car, from a piece of 
Christopher's right femur, and from a bloodstained box found at the grave site. 
Frank used two methods of DNA analysis: PCR (polymerase chain reaction) and RFLP 
(restriction fragment length polymorphism). Each of these methods is used to 
identify particular characteristics of a given sample of DNA. Those 
characteristics are referred to as the "profile" of that DNA. Because each 
method of analysis, PCR and RFLP, identifies different characteristics, two 
different profiles are obtained by subjecting a sample of DNA to both types of 
analysis.
Frank used the PCR method to analyze DNA found on the inhaler, carpet, femur, 
and box. The PCR profile of the DNA from each of these items was the same. Frank 
calculated that this particular DNA profile could be found in one out of 19,000 
Caucasian individuals.
Using the RFLP method, which is more discriminating, Frank compared the DNA 
in blood samples from Christopher's parents and defendant to the DNA in blood 
found on the box and carpet. (Because the amount of DNA extracted from 
Christopher's inhaler and femur was insufficient for the RFLP method of 
analysis, Frank used DNA from Christopher's parents to determine whether the 
blood from the box and carpet belonged to Christopher.) By comparing the DNA 
profiles he obtained, Frank determined that the blood on the box and the carpet 
came from a child of Mika Moulton and James Meyer, Sr., Christopher's father. 
Frank calculated that the chance of two Caucasian parents producing a child with 
the same RFLP DNA profile as the DNA found on the carpet and box was one out of 
3.8 million.
Having obtained a PCR and an RFLP profile for the DNA found on the box and 
carpet, Frank then estimated the frequency of DNA with these both of these 
profiles in the population. He determined that a person with such DNA would 
occur in the Caucasian population only 1 out of 419 million times.
The parties stipulated that defendant was 28 years old at the time of 
trial.
The defense presented the testimony of three witness who believed they saw 
defendant around the time of Christopher's disappearance. In an effort to show 
that such eyewitness identifications are unreliable, the defense then called 
witnesses whose testimony indicated that defendant was not the individual these 
three witnesses saw. For example, Kankakee County Deputy Sheriff Marcia Dillon 
testified that, while she was working at the search command center on August 8 
at 6 a.m., she saw a man resembling the composite sketch police had distributed. 
The man drove into the command center parking lot in a blue-gray, early eighties 
model Buick, Chevy, or Oldsmobile. Dillon could not positively identify 
defendant as the driver and testified that defendant's car was not the car she 
saw that morning.
Cindy Berglund testified that, around 1 p.m. on August 8, she was at a pond a 
half hour from Kankakee with her 13-year-old son, David Berglund. A man driving 
a silver-blue Chevy exited his car and began talking to her son. After seeing 
defendant's picture in the newspaper, she believed that the man she saw talking 
to her son was defendant, and she contacted police. David Berglund testified 
that the man talked to him about fishing. Both Berglunds testified that, if the 
man they saw was not defendant, he was defendant's twin. Neither Berglund, 
however, was able to identify the car they saw from the group of cars police 
showed them.
In contradiction to Dillon's and Berglund's testimony, Michelle Cash, one of 
defendant's neighbors, testified that her children did not awaken defendant 
until 10 a.m. on August 8. In addition, Cash testified that, between 10:30 a.m. 
and 2 p.m. on August 8, defendant was with her running errands.
Like Berglund, Francis Wood testified that she was at a lake near Wilmington 
with her grandchildren at about 7:30 or 8:30 p.m. on August 5, 1995, when a man 
approached her grandson and spoke to him about fishing. He was driving an 
eighties model dark-gray automobile with a dent on the driver's side. She 
contacted police about the incident after seeing a picture of defendant on 
television. She testified that she believed the man was defendant. Defendant's 
father and aunt, however, testified that defendant was at his sister's wedding 
and reception on August 5 from 2 to 10:30 p.m.
In addition, to rebut Fancher's testimony that she saw defendant driving near 
Hunting Area 7 on the evening of August 8, defendant's grandmother, Alice Buss, 
testified that defendant was with her in Kankakee that evening from 6 p.m. to 10 
p.m.
Defendant sought to further undermine the identifications of him by the 
State's witnesses by presenting the testimony of witnesses who thought they may 
have seen defendant and Christopher together but who were unable to identify 
defendant at lineups. For example, Thomas Dellibac testified that, on August 7 
at around 5:30 p.m., he saw a boy and a man fishing on the Kankakee River 50 to 
100 yards downriver from the Aroma Park boat launch. The boy resembled 
Christopher and the man looked similar to defendant. Dellibac could not, 
however, positively identify anyone in the lineup police showed him.
Similarly, Steven Jones testified that, around 4:30 p.m. on August 7, 1995, 
he saw a man and a blond-haired boy in a car leaving a playground on the 
Kankakee River in Aroma Park. The car was traveling at a high rate of speed, and 
there was a 20-inch bicycle in the trunk. Although he first tentatively selected 
defendant from a lineup he saw in October 1995, he was unable to positively 
identify the driver of the car.
To show that defendant was not the only man in Aroma Park to have recently 
arrived from Florida around the time of Christopher's murder, defendant also 
presented the testimony of Michael Ingalls, who testified that, around noon on 
August 8, he had a conversation with a man in Harry's Bait Shop in Aroma Park. 
The man said that he had driven to Illinois from Florida. The man was in his 
late thirties to mid-forties, had black hair and a mustache, and was driving a 
white compact car.
After hearing this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of all of the 
charges against him. The same jury found defendant eligible for the death 
penalty based on the following three statutory aggravating factors: (1) 
defendant had been convicted of murdering two or more individuals (720 ILCS 
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994)); (2) the murder occurred in the course of a felony (720 
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); and (3) the murder victim was under the age of 12 
and his death resulted from exceptional brutal or heinous behavior indicative of 
wanton cruelty (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1994)). Following a hearing at which 
extensive testimony concerning aggravation and mitigation was presented, the 
jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the 
imposition of the death penalty. The circuit court entered judgment on counts I 
(intentional first degree murder), VIII (aggravated kidnaping), and X 
(aggravated unlawful restraint) of the indictment. The court sentenced defendant 
to death for the first degree murder conviction and imposed sentences of 30 
years' imprisonment for the aggravated kidnaping conviction and five years' 
imprisonment for the aggravated unlawful restraint conviction.
ANALYSIS
I. Jury Selection
Defendant claims that the voir dire conducted by the court in this 
case was deficient in several respects, as a result of which he was denied his 
right to a fair and impartial jury under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV). Specifically, he 
contends: (1) the court erred in refusing to ask certain questions proposed by 
the defense; (2) the court erred in refusing to grant defense requests that 
certain jurors be excused for cause; and (3) the manner in which the court 
conducted voir dire denied him a fair and impartial jury. According to 
defendant, these errors require that he receive a new trial and sentencing 
hearing.
A. Refusal of Defense Voir Dire Questions
Before voir dire began, the defense made a motion for attorney 
participation in voir dire. The circuit court denied this motion. In 
addition, defendant provided the court with a number of questions for the court 
to include in its questioning of the venire, as well as a written questionnaire 
for the jurors. The court had provided the parties with the 23 questions it 
planned to ask prospective jurors, but the defense argued that the court's 
questions did not address certain subjects. The court refused to use defendant's 
questions in voir dire and refused to require jurors to complete the 
defense questionnaire. The court found that its own questions covered the issues 
raised by defendant, that questions proposed by defendant were an attempt to 
"educate" the jurors concerning defendant's position, and that defendant's 
proposed questions concerned matters more appropriate for instruction or 
argument. During the course of voir dire, defendant asked the circuit 
court to reconsider its rulings on these voir dire issues, but the 
court refused. Defendant now argues that the circuit court's refusal to ask the 
questions he proposed violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury by 
preventing him from identifying unqualified jurors.
Under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant 
in a capital case has a right to an impartial jury for capital sentencing. 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 501, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2228-29 (1992); U.S. Const., amend. XIV. This constitutional guarantee 
includes the right to an adequate voir dire to permit the 
identification of unqualified jurors. Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 729, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 503, 112 S. Ct.  at 2230. Accordingly, voir dire should 
"ascertain sufficient information about prospective jurors' beliefs and opinions 
so as to allow removal of those members of the venire whose minds are so closed 
by bias and prejudice that they cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance 
with their oath." People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 496 (1993).
In Illinois, a defendant's right to an impartial jury does not include the 
right to examine jurors himself. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 
459 (1993). Instead, the circuit court has the primary responsibility for 
examining prospective jurors, and the manner and scope of voir dire is 
within its discretion. People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1994). So 
long as the procedures employed by the circuit court provide a reasonable 
assurance that prejudice, if any, would be discovered, the court's exercise of 
discretion will be upheld. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 459.
1. Questions Concerning Consideration of Mitigation
Defendant contends that it was error for the circuit court to refuse to ask 
prospective jurors questions he submitted concerning their ability to consider 
and weigh mitigating evidence. According to defendant, as a result of the 
court's refusal to ask these questions, he was prevented from intelligently 
exercising his challenges and denied a fair and impartial jury.
We first address the circuit court's refusal to ask the following two 
questions submitted by the defense:
The circuit court refused to ask the venire these questions because it found 
that its own questions covered these concepts. The defendant argues, however, 
that the court's questions were general and did not cover the three stages of a 
death penalty case or the jurors' ability to consider mitigating evidence.
Defendant's argument is belied by the record. Before questioning the 
prospective jurors about their views on the death penalty, the circuit court 
explained to the venire the three phases of a death penalty case and cautioned 
the venire not to infer from its discussion of the death penalty that the 
defendant was guilty or that a particular penalty was appropriate. In addition, 
during voir dire, the circuit court posed the following questions to 
the venire:
Our review of the record convinces us that the concepts contained in 
defendant's proposed questions were more than adequately covered by the circuit 
court's statements to the venire and its own questions. We are unable to 
perceive what incremental value defendant's questions would have had. 
Consequently, we find that the circuit court did not err in refusing to ask 
defendant's proffered questions. See Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 460-62 
(circuit court did not err in refusing voir dire questions proposed by 
the defense when court's general questions were sufficient to expose areas of 
bias) .
Defendant also asserts that the circuit court's failure to ask these other 
questions he proposed caused jury selection to be constitutionally 
inadequate:
The circuit court refused to ask these questions on the basis that they were 
adequately covered by its own questions or involved matters more appropriate for 
instructions or argument. On more than one occasion, the circuit court commented 
to the defense, "I think *** what you are doing here is attempting to educate 
these jurors with regard to the direction you want your case to go in."
As the circuit court observed, these four questions, as well as the other 
questions defendant contends should have been asked of the venire, indicate an 
attempt by the defense to focus the attention of the venire on mitigation 
evidence. Although defendant argues that he was entitled to determine whether 
the venire was biased against psychological evidence or mercy, voir dire 
is not to be used to indoctrinate jurors or to impanel a jury with a 
"particular predisposition." People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 64 
(1986).
Moreover, under Supreme Court Rules 234 and 431, voir dire questions 
"shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions." 134 
Ill. 2d R. 234; see also 134 Ill. 2d R. 431. The Illinois Pattern Jury 
Instructions (IPI) used in this case provide that "[u]nder the law, the 
defendant shall be sentenced to death if you unanimously find that there are no 
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence" and 
that "[m]itigating factors are reasons why the defendant should not be sentenced 
to death." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 7C.05, 7C.06 
(3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d). By seeking to inform the jury how 
to weigh mitigating evidence and how to define the term "mitigate," defendant's 
proposed questions undoubtedly involved "matters of law or instructions" in 
violation of Rules 234 and 431 (134 Ill. 2d Rs. 234, 431). Accordingly, the 
circuit court acted properly in denying defendant's request to ask these 
questions.
Defendant's reliance on this court's decision in People v. Stack, 
112 Ill. 2d 301 (1986), as authority for the proposition that the circuit court 
was required to ask members of the venire whether they would consider 
psychiatric or psychological testimony and mercy is misplaced. In 
Stack, this court held that it was error for the circuit court to 
refuse to ask members of the venire about their feelings concerning the defense 
of insanity. The Stack court reasoned: "Just as the State is allowed to 
probe the venire for jurors who would not follow the law of capital punishment, 
the defendant should be allowed to identify and challenge those prospective 
jurors who would refuse to follow the statutory law of the insanity defense." 
Stack, 112 Ill. 2d  at 313.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the holding in Stack did not 
require the circuit court in the case at bar to ask jurors about bias concerning 
psychological evidence or mercy. While it is appropriate to ask prospective 
jurors whether they will follow the law (see, e.g., People v. 
Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 17-18 (1983)), the purpose of voir dire is 
not to ascertain prospective juror's opinions with respect to evidence to be 
presented at trial (see People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 135-36 
(1991) (circuit court did not err in refusing to ask jurors their attitudes 
about handguns)). Accordingly, while it was error for the circuit court in 
Stack not to ask prospective jurors whether they would refuse 
to apply a statutory defense, it was not error for the circuit court in 
this case to refuse to ascertain prospective jurors' views on defendant's 
theory of defense (see Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 65 (circuit court 
properly refused questions aimed at selecting jury receptive to theory of 
defense).
2. Questions Concerning Imposition of the Death Penalty in 
Particular Circumstances
In addition to requesting questions concerning prospective jurors' views on 
mitigating evidence, defendant requested that the circuit court ask members of 
the venire whether they would automatically impose the death penalty if they 
found that certain statutory aggravating factors were present in the case. 
Defendant now argues that the circuit court's refusal to use these questions 
denied him his right to an impartial jury for sentencing.
Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 785 n.21, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 n.21 (1968), the State is entitled to excuse for cause prospective 
jurors who would refuse to vote for the death penalty under any circumstance. 
See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420-23, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 
849-51, 105 S. Ct. 844, 850-51 (1985). In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), the Court held that a defendant 
has a corresponding constitutional right to "life-qualify" a jury; that is, a 
defendant may exclude for cause prospective jurors who would automatically vote 
for the death penalty in every capital case. The Court explained in 
Morgan:
"A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will 
fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a 
juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of 
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a 
juror. Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge 
for cause any prospective juror who maintains such views." Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 729, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 502-03, 112 S. Ct.  at 2229-30.
To permit a defendant to identify jurors with these views and intelligently 
exercise his challenges for cause, the Morgan Court held that a 
defendant is entitled to have prospective jurors asked whether they would vote 
for the death penalty in every case involving a conviction for a capital 
offense, regardless of the circumstances of the case. Morgan, 504 U.S. 
at 735-36, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 506-07, 112 S. Ct.  at 2233.
As required by Morgan, the circuit court in this case included a 
"reverse-Witherspoon"question in its voir dire inquiry. It 
asked prospective jurors, inter alia, "Are your feelings about the 
death penalty such that you would always vote to impose the death penalty in 
every murder case where there has been a finding of guilt." Finding this 
question sufficient to comply with Morgan, the circuit court rejected 
defendant's request to ask these additional questions:
We find no error in the court's ruling.
Defendant's argument that it was error for the circuit court to omit these 
questions from voir dire is in direct conflict with several recent 
holdings by this court. In People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998), we 
held that Morgan does not require the circuit court to ask prospective 
jurors whether they would automatically impose the death penalty in a case 
involving particular aggravating factors. In Jackson, as in the case 
now before us, the circuit court asked prospective jurors whether they would 
"return a verdict directing the court to impose the death penalty in every case 
where there is a finding of guilty of the offense of murder regardless of what 
the facts were that you heard?" Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 61. The 
defendant in Jackson requested that the circuit court also ask the 
venire, " 'Would you impose the death penalty in all murder cases where 
more than one person was killed?' " and " 'Would you impose the death 
penalty in all murder cases where a child is killed?' " Jackson, 
182 Ill. 2d  at 61. The circuit court refused.
We held that the circuit court properly denied the defendant's request that 
it ask these additional questions of the venire. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  
at 61. We explained that, under our decisions in People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1 (1996), and People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1 (1995), a 
defendant's right under Morgan to "life-qualify" a jury does not 
include the right to have prospective jurors asked whether they would 
automatically impose the death penalty in a case involving certain aggravating 
factors. In Brown and Hope, we interpreted Morgan as 
requiring that jurors be asked only whether they would automatically vote for 
the death penalty based on a finding of guilt in a capital case. 
Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 61-62. The Morgan holding, we stated, 
is intended to permit discovery of jurors to whom the presence of mitigating or 
aggravating factors is " 'entirely irrelevant.' " Jackson, 
182 Ill. 2d  at 59-60, quoting Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 29-30. Asking jurors 
whether they would " 'vote to impose the death penalty, given a particular 
set of circumstances, is thus not required by Morgan.' " (Emphasis 
in original.) Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 59-60, quoting Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 29-30.
Defendant presents us with precisely the same argument we rejected in 
Jackson. The questions he argues were erroneously omitted from voir 
dire in his case are virtually identical to the ones at issue in 
Jackson. Defendant presents us with no compelling reason to overturn 
Jackson, Brown, and Hope, and we decline to do so. 
Indeed, although Jackson was decided prior to the filing of defendant's 
reply brief, he fails to explain why its holding should not be applied to his 
case. Under Jackson, Brown, and Hope, the circuit 
court's refusal to ask the questions submitted by defendant was proper.
3. "Stand Alone" Question
This court has also recently rejected another of defendant's arguments 
regarding voir dire questions. Defendant argues that it was error for 
the circuit court to refuse to ask prospective jurors this question: "In the 
event you are to consider [the death penalty] question, you would have to 
unanimously vote for death. But if any one of you were against death, 
you could so vote alone and stop the entire proceeding. Would you be able to 
stand alone in this way?" (Emphasis in original.) The circuit court refused to 
ask this question on the basis that its substance was covered by the court's 
instructions and the questions the court already planned to ask the venire.
Defendant argues that the circuit court was required to include his "stand 
alone" question in its voir dire inquiry under this court's decision in 
People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984). In Zehr, this court 
held that the circuit court erred when it refused a defendant's request to have 
prospective jurors asked whether they understood that defendant was presumed 
innocent. This court stated:
Based on this reasoning, this court held that a question concerning the 
presumption of innocence was required. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d  at 477.(1)
Under Zehr, defendant contends that it was error for the circuit 
court to refuse to ask prospective jurors whether they could stand alone in 
voting against the death penalty. He asserts that the unanimity requirement 
contained in section 9-1(g) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 
1994)), is as essential to capital sentencing proceedings as the presumption of 
innocence is to trial proceedings. According to defendant, "[a] capital juror 
who could not follow his own conscience when challenged by other jurors and 
after due deliberation is a conscienceless juror who cannot follow the law or 
his oath. Such a juror is not impartial."
We rejected virtually identical arguments in People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1 (1998). We held that the circuit court in that case did not err in 
refusing to ask prospective jurors three questions concerning their ability to 
vote against the death penalty in the event the remaining jurors voted 
otherwise. In Macri, we acknowledged this court's holding in Zehr 
that prospective jurors should be examined to determine, inter 
alia, the existence of prejudice against the presumption of innocence, the 
standard of proof, and the right of a defendant not to testify. We explained, 
however, that the "stand alone" questions proposed by the defendant did not 
involve these basic guarantees and were, therefore, not required by Zehr. 
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 38.
We further concluded in Macri that the defendant's questions 
involved matters more appropriately covered by jury instructions. We found that, 
at both the eligibility and penalty phases of the sentencing hearing, the jury 
was adequately informed about the unanimity requirement. Thus, the circuit 
court's refusal to ask the "stand alone" questions proposed by the defendant did 
not deprive the defendant of his constitutional rights. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 38.
Our holding in Macri requires that we reject defendant's argument 
that the circuit court erred in refusing to ask members of the venire his 
proposed "stand alone" question. The refused questions at issue in Macri 
were essentially the same as the one on which defendant in this case bases 
his claim of error. In this case, as in Macri, the jurors were given 
clear instructions concerning the unanimity requirement. Under Macri, 
we find no error in the circuit court's refusal to ask prospective jurors 
defendant's "stand alone" question.
B. Denial of Defense Challenges for Cause
Next, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by refusing his requests 
to have venirepersons Laurie Morse, Rhonda Raysel, Marsha Marcinkowski, Irene 
Keagle, Jeanette Smeets, and John Roop excused for cause. Defendant asserts 
that, because the circuit court improperly denied his challenges for cause to 
these jurors, he was forced to use his peremptory challenges to remove them. As 
a result, he contends, he exhausted his peremptory challenges and was unable to 
strike venireperson Michael Peterik, whose voir dire responses 
suggested that he would be unfavorable to the defense.
With respect to Raysel, Marcinkowski, Keagle, Smeets, and Roop, defendant 
claims that his challenges for cause should have been granted because these 
venirepersons indicated that, upon a finding of guilt in a capital case, they 
would impose the death penalty without regard to the specific facts of the case. 
After the circuit court denied defendant's challenges for cause, he excused 
these jurors using his peremptory challenges.
The United States and Illinois Constitutions give a defendant the right to be 
tried by a jury that can and will decide his or her case based solely on the 
evidence presented. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 353 (1997). 
Under Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), a defendant has the right to challenge a potential juror for cause 
if that juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction in a 
capital case. See also People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1995). The 
Morgan Court explained: "A juror who will automatically vote for the 
death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do." 
Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 729, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 502-03, 112 S. Ct.  at 
2229-30. Permitting a juror with these views to serve on the jury would violate 
due process. Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 729, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 502-03, 112 S. Ct.  at 2229-30.
The circuit court is in "the best position to observe the potential juror's 
demeanor and ascertain the meaning of his or her remarks." People v. 
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 67 (1996). It is, therefore, within the sound 
discretion of the circuit court to determine whether to permit a challenge for 
cause. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 511 (1996). Based on our 
examination of the record, we cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its 
discretion when it denied defendant's challenges for cause.
1. Rhonda Raysel
One of the prospective jurors defendant argues should have been excluded for 
cause is Rhonda Raysel. When asked about her views on the death penalty, Raysel 
stated: "How I feel is if a person or persons are involved in a crime, that, if 
they are in their right mind, basically, *** knowing right from wrong, and 
doing-did like a senseless crime where it did take a life, I think they should 
give one." In her responses to subsequent questions, she stated, "I just believe 
[t]hat *** if they did something totally senseless, then they should really pay 
for that," and "Basically, if the crime is *** a really *** terrible crime *** 
where they know right from wrong, I believe that they should pay for that."
In making his challenge for cause, defendant argued that these responses 
indicated that Raysel would impose the death penalty without regard to 
mitigating evidence. In reviewing a circuit court's ruling on a challenge for 
cause, however, the juror's voir dire examination must be considered in 
its entirety. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 67. While a prospective juror 
may be removed for cause when that person's "views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror" (People v. 
Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 143 (1998)), an equivocal response does not 
require that a juror be excused for cause (Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 
67).
In addition to the responses described previously, Raysel stated during 
voir dire that she would not vote to impose the death penalty in every 
case. Also, in response to follow-up questions the court asked at defendant's 
request, Raysel said that she would decide the case according to the law and the 
evidence and regardless of her own beliefs concerning the death penalty. In 
light of this clarification of Raysel's views, the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion by concluding that she could be fair and impartial. See 
People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1995) (no abuse of discretion to 
deny challenge for cause to prospective juror who initially indicated that he 
would vote to impose the death penalty based on a finding of guilt; after the 
court more fully explained the sentencing process, he stated that he would only 
vote for the death penalty in an appropriate case).
2. Marsha Marcinkowski
For similar reasons, we reject defendant's arguments that it was error to 
deny his challenges for cause to prospective juror Marcinkowski. Marcinkowski 
stated: "I feel if a person is guilty and the evidence is there, I don't see any 
reason why I wouldn't give a death penalty." The circuit court asked her three 
separate times whether she would impose the death penalty in all murder cases in 
which there was a guilty verdict. After expressing some confusion with respect 
to the question, Marcinkowski answered this question affirmatively once. 
Subsequently, she answered it negatively two times. In addition, the court 
granted defendant's request that it ask her additional questions for purposes of 
clarifying her views. In response to these supplemental questions, Marcinkowski 
stated that her beliefs with respect to the death penalty would not interfere 
with her consideration of evidence in the case.
Defendant suggests that Marcinkowski's equivocal answers required her to be 
excused for cause or required further clarification of her views by the court. 
We disagree. As we have explained, equivocal responses to voir dire 
questions do not require that a prospective juror be excused. See 
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 67. The record indicates that Marcinkowski's 
one affirmative response to the circuit court's 
"reverse-Witherspoon"question was the result of confusion. The 
remainder of her responses indicate that she would consider mitigating and 
aggravating evidence in sentencing a defendant in a capital case. See People 
v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 31-32 (1995) (denial of defense challenge for cause 
was not an abuse of discretion when, in context, prospective juror indicated 
that her views about the death penalty would not impair the performance of her 
duties as a juror). Thus, no further explanation of her views was necessary, and 
it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to excuse her for 
cause.
3. Irene Keagle
Similarly, the circuit court did not err in refusing to excuse venireperson 
Keagle for cause or in refusing defendant's request that the court question her 
further. When asked about her feelings on the death penalty, Keagle stated: 
"[I]f someone did commit murder, then they do deserve the death penalty if 
they're guilty." When asked if she would sentence a defendant to death in every 
capital case involving a guilty verdict for first degree murder, Keagle 
initially said "yes." She later explained, however, that it was her view that 
whether the death penalty was warranted in such a case would depend on the 
circumstances. For example, she stated, "Well, like an adult, like it's an adult 
where maybe it was someone protecting themselves, if something like that 
happened then I would think twice maybe about the death penalty, but an adult 
towards a child I feel the death penalty if the person is guilty would apply." 
She also stated, however, that her attitude would not interfere with her ability 
to be impartial, to follow the court's instructions, and to keep an open mind at 
each phase of the case.
We agree with the circuit court that, although somewhat equivocal, Keagle's 
responses demonstrated that she would not impose the death penalty in every 
case. Her statement that she believed the death penalty would be appropriate in 
cases in which an adult murders a child was only an example of those 
circumstances under which she believed the death penalty was appropriate. 
Furthermore, she expressed her ability and willingness to decide the case 
according to the evidence presented and regardless of her personal views. Given 
these responses, it was unnecessary for the circuit court to further examine 
this prospective juror, and the circuit court properly denied defendant's 
challenge for cause. See Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 31-32.
4. Jeanette Smeets
Defendant also asserts that it was error for the circuit court to refuse his 
request for follow-up questioning of Smeets and to deny his challenge to her for 
cause. When asked about her feelings about the death penalty, Smeets stated that 
she believed in "an eye for an eye." She explained, however, that her attitude 
toward the death penalty would not prevent her from being impartial and that she 
would not impose the death penalty in every case because she would "have to hear 
the facts." The circuit court denied defendant's request for additional 
questioning on these views.
Pursuant to defendant's request, the circuit court did, however, ask Smeets 
additional questions to determine whether, given what she had already learned 
concerning the case, she could presume defendant innocent. Smeets had stated 
that, based on what she had heard and read about the case, she believed 
defendant was probably guilty but that she could judge the case based on the 
facts presented in the courtroom. In addition, in one of her responses, Smeets 
expressed the opinion that it would be "nice" if defendant were required to 
prove his innocence but that she understood he was not required to do this.
We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the circuit court's refusal to 
engage in any further reverse-Witherspoon questioning of Smeets or its 
refusal to excuse Smeets for cause. We agree with the circuit court that Smeets' 
voir dire responses adequately indicated that, although she generally 
believed the death penalty was appropriate in cases of murder, she would not 
impose it in every case. In addition, while Smeets indicated that she had formed 
an opinion as to defendant's guilt based on information she received outside the 
courtroom, she stated that she could set this aside, presume defendant innocent, 
and make her decision based on the evidence presented in the courtroom. See 
People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 547 (1995) (a juror's exposure to 
publicity about a case does not require disqualification so long as the juror 
can set aside opinions about the case and base her decision on the evidence 
presented). The circuit court found that Smeets' views would not substantially 
impair her performance as a juror, and, given the record and the circuit court's 
superior position to evaluate her responses (see People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 296 (1997)), we decline to overturn its determination.
5. John Roop
Defendant also asserts error with respect to the circuit court's refusal to 
excuse venireperson Roop for cause. During voir dire, Roop stated that 
he had "pretty strong" feelings in favor of the death penalty. He also stated, 
however, that his feelings were not such that he would vote to impose the death 
penalty in every case in which there was a conviction for first degree murder. 
In addition, he stated that, despite his personal views on capital punishment, 
he could be fair and impartial in deciding whether to impose the death 
penalty.
Roop also indicated that, based on what he had heard about the case, he 
believed defendant was "probably guilty," and that this information had affected 
his ability to presume defendant innocent. Upon further questioning, however, 
Roop stated that he believed he could set aside what he had heard and presume 
defendant innocent. The circuit court had the opportunity to view Roop's 
demeanor during voir dire and assess his credibility and the meaning of 
his responses. Based on the record, we find that the circuit court's denial of 
the defense challenge for cause was not against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. See Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 546-47.
6. Laura Morse
While defendant's objections to the previous five jurors concerned their 
views on capital punishment, defendant challenged venireperson Morse for cause 
because she was married to a Will County deputy sheriff. According to defendant, 
the circuit court improperly refused to excuse Morse for cause because it 
permitted the State's challenges to jurors with similar relationships. During 
voir dire, Morse stated that her husband was a Will County deputy 
sheriff but that this would not prevent her from being a fair and impartial 
juror and that she had formed no opinions about defendant's guilt. She also 
informed the circuit court that her husband had no involvement in defendant's 
case and that she would not discuss the case with him.
These responses indicate that, despite her relationship to an employee of the 
sheriff's department in the county where Christopher's body was found, Morse 
could serve as a fair and impartial juror. We hold that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's challenge for cause to Morse. 
See People v. Buie, 238 Ill. App. 3d 260, 277 (1992) (the circuit court 
properly denied the defendant's challenge to a juror who stated that, although 
she was a good friend of a police officer in the department investigating the 
case and it would be difficult not to listen to his opinion, she could honor her 
oath as a juror); see also People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 136-38 
(1992) (circuit court did not err by refusing to excuse a prospective juror 
whose brothers-in law were police officers).
Defendant argues, however, that it was unfair for the circuit court to refuse 
his challenge to Morse, yet excuse venirepersons Albert Powell and Sharon 
Michalak. During voir dire, Albert Powell, a salesman at a clothing 
store, stated that he had known one of defendant's attorneys for years because 
the attorney had been a customer of his. The State exercised one of its 
peremptory challenges to exclude Powell from the jury. Subsequently, the defense 
objected to the State's peremptory challenge against Powell on the basis that it 
violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). The State responded that it had challenged Powell because of his 
relationship with defense counsel. The circuit court denied defendant's 
Batson motion.
Michalak stated during jury selection that she worked as an associate 
principal at the school where defendant's stepmother worked as a teacher and 
that this relationship would play a factor in her consideration of the evidence 
in the case. Based on these responses, the court granted the State's motion to 
excuse Michalak for cause.
We disagree with defendant that the circuit court's refusal to excuse Morse 
for cause was unfair in light of the court's decisions to permit the State to 
excuse Powell and Michalak. As a preliminary matter, we believe it is improper 
for defendant to compare the circuit court's ruling on a challenge for cause 
against Morse to its decision that the State's use of a peremptory 
challenge against Powell did not violate Batson. The standards 
involved in these determinations are entirely different. In evaluating a 
challenge for cause by the State, the circuit court must determine whether the 
State has shown that a juror cannot be fair and impartial. See People v. 
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 67 (1996). By contrast, in deciding a Batson 
motion, the circuit court determines only whether the basis for the State's 
peremptory challenge is racially discriminatory. See People v. 
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1994). Thus, the circuit court's denial of 
defendant's Batson motion does not demonstrate that its refusal to 
excuse Morse for cause was unfair.
Defendant's comparison of the circuit court's ruling on the defendant's 
challenge to Morse with its ruling on the State's challenge to Michalak also 
does not persuade us that the court erred by refusing defendant's motion to 
exclude Morse for cause. Michalak worked closely with a family member of 
defendant and stated that this relationship would affect her consideration of 
the evidence in the case. By contrast, Morse's husband had no involvement in the 
case, and Morse affirmatively stated that her husband's employment would have no 
effect on her as a juror.
C. Conduct of Voir Dire
In addition to these arguments concerning voir dire, defendant claims that 
the overall manner in which the circuit court conducted voir dire 
resulted in the denial of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial 
jury. Defendant contends that (1) the circuit court's questions were not 
sufficiently "open-ended," (2) the court's follow-up questions were inadequate, 
and (3) the court favored the State in granting requests for follow-up 
questions. As a result, he contends, the voir dire was inadequate.
We first address defendant's objections to the type of voir dire 
questions asked by the circuit court. He argues that the court asked too 
many "yes" or "no" questions, the result of which was that the court failed to 
elicit sufficient information concerning the juror's attitudes. In addition, he 
contends that the circuit court used leading follow-up questions to induce 
jurors to change their answers. According to defendant, jurors appeared to be 
"reading" the court for the "right" answer.
Defendant asserts that the court should have explored how jurors felt with 
more probing questions. Our review of the record, however, indicates that the 
circuit court's questions were sufficient to elicit relevant information. 
Although it was possible to respond to most of the court's questions by 
providing a "yes" or "no" answer, jurors often provided additional information. 
For example, venireperson Deborah Pevion's responses during the following 
colloquy provided the information necessary for the defense to excuse her for 
cause:
Also, each prospective juror not excused during preliminary questioning was 
required to provide a narrative answer to the court's question, "Can you explain 
to us here in court what your feelings are about the imposition of the death 
penalty?" Their responses generally gave a clear picture of their attitudes 
toward this law. For example, venireperson Karl Strenge stated that, "As a 
Christian, I think I would have an extremely difficult time judging in favor of 
the death penalty." In addition, in response to follow-up questions by the 
circuit court, Strenge stated, "I would say [my feelings against the death 
penalty are] probably ninety percent strong. I can [sic] say that I 
have a hundred percent understanding or consideration of the issue; but for 
strong religious moral reasons, I am quite assured of that, that I would 
oppose." Based on the fact that Strenge indicated that he could follow the law 
despite these beliefs, the circuit court denied the State's motion to excuse him 
for cause.
Similarly, in response to the circuit court's questioning about her feelings 
on the death penalty venireperson Laura Gunn stated: "I believe an eye for an 
eye. I'm sorry but that's the way I believe in it. I believe in the death 
penalty. I'm for the death penalty. I look at it, that person had rights too. 
I'm sorry, that's how I feel." The court then asked Gunn, "Are there 
circumstances under which then that you feel the death penalty wouldn't apply in 
the case of a murder?" She replied, "Well in the case of murder if I felt the 
person was guilty, then I would say yes for the death penalty." Based on these 
responses, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to excuse her for 
cause.
As these examples illustrate, the circuit court's questioning did not prevent 
defendant from obtaining the necessary information concerning jurors' attitudes 
toward the law. Nor do we agree with defendant that the record demonstrates that 
the circuit court improperly "led" prospective jurors to a certain answer.
As evidence of "leading" questioning, defendant cites the circuit court's 
examination of venireperson Joseph Terlep. In relevant part, that examination 
was as follows:
According to defendant, Terlep indicated that he would automatically vote to 
impose the death penalty in every first degree murder case "until he realized 
that he was supposed to say the opposite to satisfy the court." Defendant 
concludes that "[t]he trial court here plowed through the same 23 or so 
questions with every prospective juror, apparently having as its chief priority 
qualifying the venire above all else, at the risk of sacrificing the greater 
goal of uncovering biases and fostering the intelligent exercise of challenges 
based thereon." We disagree.
Our review of the record convinces us that the questioning defendant 
describes as "leading" was merely an appropriate and necessary attempt by the 
circuit court to clarify the views of prospective jurors. Given Terlep's 
statement that he did not have strong feelings for or against the death penalty 
and that he would have to hear the "whole story" before determining whether the 
death penalty was appropriate in a particular case, it was reasonable for the 
court to ask additional questions to determine whether Terlep really intended to 
answer the court's reverse-Witherspoon questions in the affirmative. 
Furthermore, during his examination by the court, Terlep appeared to be confused 
due to the length of the court's questions and due to his failure to pay 
attention to these questions. Indeed, the court asked Terlep at least once 
whether he understood the court's question and also commented, "I don't know if 
you were listening to me here, so I'm going to ask you this question again." 
Under these circumstances, we do not believe it was an abuse of discretion for 
the circuit court to verify the correctness of Terlep's responses to its 
reverse-Witherspoon questions. With respect to other prospective jurors 
whose examination defendant also claims was improperly "leading," we also find 
no error for similar reasons.
Next, we address defendant's argument that the voir dire conducted 
by the circuit court was inadequate because the circuit court did not ask 
sufficient follow-up questions of prospective jurors. Defendant asserts that the 
circuit court should have asked prospective jurors to elaborate on their 
responses to reverse-Witherspoon questions. Specifically, he claims 
that the circuit court erred in refusing defense requests for follow-up 
questions concerning (1) under what circumstances would jurors automatically 
impose the death penalty for first degree murder and (2) whether a juror would 
consider mitigation evidence.
The arguments defendant makes with respect to the circuit court's refusal to 
ask these follow-up questions, however, are essentially the same arguments he 
makes with respect to the court's refusal to include those questions in its 
general voir dire. For the same reasons we rejected defendant's 
contention that it was error for the circuit court to refuse to include these 
questions in its voir dire inquiry, we reject defendant's argument that 
the circuit court should have asked these same questions as a follow-up to the 
questions the court did ask.
Defendant argues also that the circuit court conducted voir dire in 
an unfair manner because it granted the State's requests for follow-up 
questioning, while denying similar requests by the defense. As evidence of this 
practice, defendant compares the court's voir dire of venirepersons 
George Boles, Sr., to that of Laura Gunn, Todd Coleman, Sharon Michalak, and 
Keith Douglas. After reviewing the court's examination of these jurors, we find 
defendant's claim of favoritism to be completely without merit.
During voir dire, Boles stated, "I don't believe in the death 
penalty. I don't think I could-I couldn't vote for the death of anyone." In 
response to further questioning by the circuit court, Boles indicated that his 
feelings were based on his conscience, he could not consider signing a verdict 
to sentence a defendant to death in any circumstances, and his views would 
prevent him from being impartial with respect to whether to impose the death 
penalty. Because of these definitive responses, the circuit court denied 
defendant's request for follow-up questions to determine whether Boles could set 
his views aside and granted the State's motion to excuse Boles for cause.
A prospective juror who unequivocally states that he or she could not follow 
the law and could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances may be 
excused for cause. See People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 296 (1997). 
Here, although Boles was not specifically asked whether he could set aside his 
views and follow the law, he clearly indicated that he could not be impartial 
and would not impose the death penalty under any circumstances. Given these 
statements, the circuit court was not required to question him further and 
properly granted the State's motion for cause. See People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (1996) (additional inquiry not required when prospective juror's 
responses unambiguously indicated that she would never vote for the death 
penalty under any circumstance).
Defendant asserts, however, that the denial of his request for follow-up 
questioning of Boles was unfair in light of the circuit court's decision to 
grant the State's requests for follow-up questioning of venirepersons Gunn, 
Coleman, Michalak, and Douglas. Our review of the record, however, demonstrates 
that defendant's comparisons are ill-chosen. First, the State made no request 
for follow-up questioning of venirepersons Gunn and Coleman. The circuit court's 
examination of these two jurors, therefore, does not support defendant's claim 
that the circuit court unfairly denied defense requests for follow-up questions 
while granting State requests for the same.
Second, although the circuit court did grant the State's request for 
follow-up questioning of Michalak, these questions involved the unique 
circumstance of this venireperson's employment relationship with defendant's 
stepmother. The circuit court's decision to ask additional questions of Michalak 
is not, therefore, comparable to the court's decision not to conduct a further 
inquiry of Boles.
Finally, with respect to venireperson Douglas, defendant agreed with the 
State that he should be questioned further regarding the effect of his 
employment on his jury service. Thus, the circuit court's decision to grant the 
State's request for such questioning does not demonstrate bias against the 
defense.
As support for his argument that the manner in which the court conducted 
voir dire denied him an impartial jury, defendant relies heavily on the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey decision in State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 
393, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988). Contrary to defendant's assertions, this decision 
does not require that we grant defendant a new trial and capital sentencing 
hearing based on deficiencies in the voir dire.
Williams was decided by a court in another state, and, therefore, we 
are not obligated to follow its holding. See Gorham v. Board of Trustees of 
the Teachers' Retirement System, 27 Ill. 2d 593, 599 (1963). Indeed, we 
note that this New Jersey decision is inconsistent with the precedent of this 
state. The Williams court held that it was error for the trial court in 
that case to refuse to ask jurors whether they would automatically impose the 
death penalty for a murder conviction, if particular aggravating factors 
existed. By contrast, this court has held in several cases that the circuit 
court is not required to ask prospective jurors such questions. See 
Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d at 59-60; Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 30-31; 
Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 29-30.
We find that Williams has limited value as persuasive authority, not 
only because it conflicts with these Illinois decisions, but also because of the 
fact-specific nature of the Williams holding. For example, the 
Williams court criticized the voir dire conducted by the trial 
court in that case on several bases, including (1) the court's failure to 
adequately use open-ended questions and (2) the court's use of leading questions 
to suggest "correct" answers to jurors. See Williams, 113 N.J. at 
408-45, 550 A.2d  at 1179-1200. With respect to one juror, the Williams 
court found that the trial court's questioning was so inadequate that 
"[n]othing of substance concerning the juror's death penalty views is 
ascertainable from [the] record." Williams, 113 N.J. at 423, 550 A.2d  
at 1187.
By contrast, as we have explained, the record in defendant's case indicates 
that the voir dire conducted by the circuit court was sufficient to 
discover which venirepersons were "so closed by bias and prejudice that they 
[could not] apply the law as instructed in accordance with their oath." See 
Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 30. Based on these factual distinctions and the 
differences between Illinois and New Jersey law, we disagree with defendant that 
Williams supports a holding that voir dire was inadequate in 
this case.
After reviewing defendant's contentions concerning voir dire and the 
record, we find no abuse of discretion by the circuit court with respect to jury 
selection and no denial of defendant's constitutional right to an impartial 
jury. Accordingly, we refuse to order a new trial or capital sentencing hearing 
on this basis.
II. Pretrial and Trial Issues
In addition to his assertions of error with respect to jury selection, 
defendant contends that the following pretrial and trial errors require that he 
receive a new trial: (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to quash 
arrest and suppress evidence; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions for felony murder, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated unlawful 
restraint; (3) his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain 
testimony by one of the State's witnesses; (4) the fact that defendant wore leg 
shackles denied him a fair trial; and (5) the admission of evidence concerning 
the identity of the body found at Hunting Area 7, as well as evidence of the 
time and cause of Christopher's death, denied him a fair trial.
A. Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress 
evidence resulting from that arrest. After a hearing, the circuit court denied 
defendant's motion. The circuit court found that defendant was not arrested 
until 12:30 p.m. on August 10, 1995, when police told defendant's attorney that 
defendant was not free to leave the sheriff's department, and the police had 
probable cause to arrest defendant at this time. Further, the court found that, 
even assuming his arrest was illegal, the consent defendant gave for the search 
of his car was valid because his opportunity to consult with an attorney prior 
to giving this consent was an intervening cause sufficient to prevent the 
consent from being tainted by any illegal arrest.
Defendant now argues that the circuit court's denial of his motion to quash 
arrest and suppress evidence is reversible error. According to defendant, police 
did not have probable cause to arrest him on August 10 until they searched his 
car following his consent to that search at 1:30 p.m. that day. He asserts, 
therefore, that he was illegally arrested when police told his attorney at 12:30 
p.m. that he was not free to leave the sheriff's department. Alternatively, 
defendant contends that he was arrested when police confronted him at the 
Wilmington Dam and that this arrest was without probable cause.
In addition, defendant argues that certain evidence obtained following his 
arrest should be suppressed because it resulted from the illegal arrest. 
Although he consented to the search of his car, he contends that this consent 
was a product of the illegal arrest and, therefore, involuntary. Thus, he 
asserts that evidence recovered during the search of his car should have been 
suppressed. He also claims that Chuck Henry's identifications of him in court 
and at an August 11 lineup must be suppressed because they also resulted from 
his illegal arrest.
The State responds that defendant was not arrested until 12:30 p.m., at which 
time there was probable cause for his arrest. According to the State, 
defendant's consent to the search of his car was, therefore, valid, and Henry's 
identifications were properly admitted.
Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution protect 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. 
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1994); U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV; Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, §6. In order for a warrantless arrest to be lawful under 
these constitutional provisions, police must have " ' "knowledge of 
facts which would lead a reasonable man to believe that a crime has occurred and 
that it has been committed by the defendant." ' " People v. 
Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 237 (1993), quoting People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 145 (1985), quoting People v. Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d 44, 60 
(1984); People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1996). " ' "In dealing 
with probable cause, *** we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; 
they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act." [Citations.]' " 
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 24, quoting People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 146 (1985). In determining whether police had probable cause to make an 
arrest, courts examine facts known to police at the time the arrest was made. 
People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 405 (1995). "When officers are 
working in concert, probable cause can be established from all the information 
collectively received by the officers even if that information is not 
specifically known to the officer who makes the arrest." People v. 
Bascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d 124, 127 (1997).
A defendant has the burden of demonstrating an illegal search or seizure. 
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 22. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, 
a reviewing court may consider evidence presented at trial as well as evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing. People v. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d 483, 
500 (1995). When the circuit court's ruling on such a motion involves factual 
determinations and credibility assessments, it will be reversed on appeal only 
when manifestly erroneous. People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1998). 
De novo review is appropriate, however, when there are no factual or 
credibility disputes. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d  at 21; see also People v. 
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 309 (1998). In this case, there were no such 
disputes at the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, and 
we, therefore, apply a de novo standard of review to the circuit 
court's ruling.
We begin by addressing the legality of defendant's arrest. The circuit court 
found that defendant was not arrested until 12:30 p.m. on August 10, at which 
time the police had probable cause to arrest him. We may affirm the circuit 
court's ruling on defendant's motion to suppress for any reason in the record, 
regardless of whether the circuit court expressed this reason as a basis for its 
conclusion. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d  at 500-01. While we agree that the police 
had probable cause to arrest defendant, we find that probable cause existed 
before 12:30 p.m. on August 10. Our review of the record convinces us that 
police had probable cause to arrest defendant when they met with him at the 
Wilmington Dam at approximately 9 a.m. on August 10. Consequently, even if, as 
defendant argues, he was arrested at the dam, the circuit court properly refused 
to quash his arrest.
First, the record supports a conclusion that when police spoke to defendant 
at the Wilmington Dam, they had probable cause to believe a crime had been 
committed. Defendant contends that probable cause was lacking because, on August 
10, Christopher's body had not yet been found, and police had not eliminated the 
possibility that Christopher had drowned. When there is a question as to whether 
a crime has been committed, in addition to whether the defendant committed the 
crime, more evidence is required to demonstrate probable cause. In re 
D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 410 (1991). However, although police must have more 
than a mere suspicion to establish probable cause, "probability of criminal 
activity, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is the standard for 
determining whether probable cause is present." People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 370 (1990).
In this case, a reasonable person would have believed that a crime had been 
committed at the time police approached defendant at the Wilmington Dam. 
Christopher, who was only 10 years old, had been missing for almost three days. 
He was last seen riding home from the boat launch on his bicycle. The bicycle he 
was riding was found in a wooded area across the river from the boat launch on 
August 8 and his shoes were found floating in the river on August 8 and 9. 
Charles Henry had told police that, on August 7, he had seen a man with a knife 
standing by the open trunk of his car in the area where Christopher's bicycle 
was found. Although, on August 10, police did not know Christopher had been 
murdered, it was reasonable to conclude that his disappearance was caused by 
criminal means.
We also have no difficulty finding that, when they approached defendant at 
the dam, police had probable cause to believe that defendant was the one 
responsible for Christopher's disappearance. Defendant argues that police had no 
"concrete evidence linking" defendant to Christopher's disappearance. This is 
not the probable cause standard, however. Police needed only reasonable grounds 
to believe that defendant committed a crime. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d  at 500; 
see also 725 ILCS 5/107-2(c) (West 1994). Among the factors relevant to 
establishing probable cause are (1) the proximity of the defendant's residence 
to the scene of the crime (People v. Hendricks, 253 Ill. App. 3d 79, 
88-89 (1993)); (2) the fact that the defendant committed a similar 
crime in the past (Hendricks, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 88-89); (3) 
whether defendant was among the last to see the victim alive (People v. 
Myrick, 274 Ill. App. 3d 983, 990 (1995)); and (4) flight from police 
(People v. Wright, 286 Ill. App. 3d 456, 459-60 (1996)).
Before approaching defendant at the Wilmington Dam, police had information 
that defendant fit the description of the last person seen with Christopher 
before his death. Three individuals, Beth Waselewski, Jason Forbes, and Paul 
Buckner, told police that they had seen Christopher at the boat launch that 
afternoon in the company of a man and gave police a description of this man and 
his car. In addition, Buckner told police that he had talked about fishing with 
the man, and the man had said that he had only salt water bait, that he had 
grown up in the Aroma Park area, and that he had recently returned from Florida. 
Police also had spoken to Charles Henry, who said that, during the afternoon of 
August 7, he had seen a man with a filet knife in his back pocket standing by 
the open trunk of his car in the area where Christopher's bicycle was found. 
Henry also gave police a description of the man and his car.
As of 9 a.m. on August 10, police had reason to believe defendant was the man 
described by these witnesses. Police knew that defendant had previously been 
convicted of a murdering another missing child. In 1981, when defendant was 13 
years old, he murdered five-year-old Tara Sue Huffman, whose body was found 
several hours after she was reported missing. He was in prison for this murder 
until approximately two years prior to Christopher's disappearance.
Police were also aware that defendant was originally from the Aroma Park 
area, that he had recently moved from Florida to Joliet, and that his father 
lived a mile from the boat launch. Police had learned that defendant drove a car 
similar to that described by the witnesses with whom they had spoken. In 
addition, pictures of defendant that police had obtained from the Illinois 
Department of Corrections and information from defendant's parole officer 
indicated that defendant matched the description police had of the man seen at 
the boat launch and on Birchwood Drive on August 7.
Further, while police were conducting surveillance of defendant's apartment 
around 9 p.m. on August 9, defendant eluded them by driving away from his 
apartment building at a high rate of speed through an alley without his 
headlights. Police learned that, later that evening, defendant checked into the 
B and P Motel near the Wilmington Dam using the name of Jim Benson. In the 
morning, police observed defendant as he checked out of the motel, placed a pair 
of boots in the motel dumpster, and drove to the Wilmington Dam. When officers 
approached defendant at the dam, he appeared nervous, did not make eye contact, 
walked in circles, and shielded his face to avoid having his picture taken. 
Based on the knowledge police had of these facts at 9 a.m. on August 10, we find 
that they had probable cause to arrest defendant at the Wilmington Dam.
Defendant asserts, however, that certain discrepancies in the descriptions 
provided to police demonstrate that police had no probable cause to arrest him. 
For example, Waselewski said the man she saw at the boat launch was in his mid- 
to late thirties, while defendant was in his late twenties. In addition, Henry 
did not include a mustache in his description of the man he saw and described 
this man as "dark-complected." Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, we believe 
the descriptions provided by these witnesses, when viewed as a whole, supported 
a finding of probable cause. In general, the physical characteristics described 
by Henry and Waselewski were consistent with those described by other witnesses 
and matched defendant's physical appearance. Also, although Waselewski did not 
describe defendant's age accurately, Buckner did. Moreover, defendant was linked 
to the man at the boat launch and the man Henry saw, not just by physical 
appearance, but also by the appearance of the car he drove and what he told 
Buckner about himself. Based on these facts, we will not overturn the circuit 
court's determination that police had probable cause to arrest defendant for 
Christopher's disappearance. See, e.g., People v. Starks, 190 
Ill. App. 3d 503, 508 (1989) (a general description of a suspect plus proximity 
of time and place can constitute sufficient cause to stop or arrest).
We also reject defendant's suggestion that the State did not establish 
probable cause to arrest him because Sims and Mitchell testified that they 
believed they did not have sufficient evidence to arrest defendant at the 
Wilmington Dam. Probable cause is an objective standard, and an officer's 
subjective belief as to the existence of probable cause is not determinative. 
People v. Moody, 94 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1983). As we have explained, the 
facts demonstrate that police had probable cause to arrest defendant at the 
Wilmington Dam, and their subjective beliefs to the contrary do not alter that 
conclusion.
Having determined that the circuit court properly refused to quash 
defendant's arrest, we now address defendant's arguments that the circuit court 
erred in denying his request to suppress certain evidence. Defendant contends 
that the circuit court should have suppressed Henry's identifications of him 
in-court and at a lineup on August 11 because these identifications resulted 
from his illegal arrest. In addition, defendant argues that evidence recovered 
from his car was improperly admitted because, his consent notwithstanding, the 
search of his car on August 10 was also the product of his illegal arrest. Given 
our holding that defendant's arrest was lawful, we reject these contentions.
Defendant also argues, however, that the search of his car was illegal 
because he suffered from a language-based learning disability which caused his 
consent to the search to be involuntary. Defendant did not, however, raise this 
issue at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Nor did he include it in his 
post-trial motion. In making this argument now, he relies on the sentencing 
testimony of a defense expert concerning this learning disability. Because 
defendant failed to raise this issue at trial, we find it waived. See People 
v. McClellan, 232 Ill. App. 3d 990, 1004 (1992) (finding that a defendant 
waived review of his argument that his statements were coerced by failing to 
raise it in his motion to suppress); People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 404 (1995) (a defendant waives an issue for purposes of appeal when he 
fails to raise it through both an objection and a post-trial motion).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We now turn to defendant's arguments that errors at trial require that we 
reverse his convictions. In his separate pro se brief, defendant 
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for 
felony murder, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated unlawful restraint. In a 
related argument, he asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his motion 
for a directed verdict. As a preliminary matter, we observe that defendant was 
not convicted of the charge of felony murder. The only first degree murder 
charge on which the circuit court entered judgment involved intentional, not 
felony, murder. With respect to his aggravated kidnaping and aggravated unlawful 
restraint convictions, we find that his challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence and the circuit court's ruling on his directed verdict motion are 
without merit.
As defendant argues, secret confinement is an essential element of the 
aggravated kidnaping offense with which he was charged. See 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a) 
(West 1994). Aggravated unlawful restraint occurs when a person "knowingly 
without legal authority detains another while using a deadly weapon." 720 ILCS 
5/10-3.1 (West 1994).
Defendant asserts that the State failed to establish the essential elements 
of aggravated kidnaping and aggravated unlawful restraint because the evidence 
was insufficient to show either secret confinement or detention of Christopher. 
He argues that no one saw Christopher secretly confined by him, the physical 
evidence was insufficient to prove secret confinement, and, although 
Christopher's blood and hair were found in his car, the State failed to show 
that Christopher was alive at the time his body was transported in the car. 
According to defendant, the circuit court should have, therefore, granted his 
motion for a directed verdict and his convictions must be reversed. We 
disagree.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction where it 
satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged. 
People v. Williams, 182 Ill. 2d 171, 192 (1998). In reviewing a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court asks whether, 
after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d 58 (1998). Similarly, a motion for a directed verdict may be granted only if, as 
a matter of law, the evidence is insufficient to support a guilty verdict. 
People v. Robinson, 199 Ill. App. 3d 24, 37-38 (1989).
According to testimony at trial, Christopher was last seen leaving the boat 
launch at approximately the same time as defendant and was traveling in the same 
direction as defendant. Christopher was supposed to be riding home from the boat 
launch, but he never made it home. His body was found a week later in a shallow 
grave in another county. His bicycle was found in a wooded area across the river 
from the boat launch. Two hairs matching Christopher's were found in the front 
seat of defendant's car, and Christopher's blood was found in defendant's 
trunk.
Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that 
defendant secretly confined Christopher by driving him to a secluded location, 
killing him at that location, and then transporting Christopher's body to 
Hunting Area 7 in the trunk of his car. In addition, the evidence that 
Christopher was killed with a knife like the one owned by defendant supports a 
finding that defendant detained Christopher, if only for a short time prior to 
his death, by the use of a deadly weapon. Accordingly, we reject defendant's 
challenge to his convictions for aggravated kidnaping and aggravated unlawful 
restraint and uphold the circuit court's denial of his motion for a directed 
verdict.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also argues, pro se, that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to Gail Kienast's trial testimony that there 
was blood found on the boots he placed in the dumpster of the B and P Motel. 
Because Kienast was unable to identify this blood as human blood or ascertain 
the blood type, defendant asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to 
her testimony on the basis of relevancy.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate 
both that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by 
counsel's error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Counsel's performance is presumed to 
be the product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence (People v. 
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397 (1998)), and no Strickland violation 
will be found unless counsel's professional errors are so serious that 
" 'counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment' " (People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 
223-24 (1998), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 
693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). To satisfy the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate that, but for defense 
counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2068. If a reviewing court finds that the defendant did not suffer prejudice, 
it need not decide whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. 
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 203 (1998).
We hold that defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of the 
Strickland test. Defendant has not overcome the presumption that his 
counsel's performance was the product of sound trial strategy. Defense counsel 
could have reasonably concluded that Kienast's testimony about the blood on the 
boots was helpful to the defense. While the State argued at trial that Kienast's 
inability to identify the type of blood on the boots was consistent with its 
theory that defendant had washed them, the fact that she could not identify the 
blood as human also helped the defense to rebut the State's argument that the 
boots were involved in the murder. If defendant had worn the boots when he 
killed Christopher or disposed of his body, one would expect to find human blood 
on the boots, yet Kienast was unable to identify the blood. In addition, during 
closing argument, the defense reminded the jury that defendant was a fisherman 
and suggested that the source of the blood was the fish he caught. Defense 
counsel may have, therefore, chosen not to object to Kienast's testimony because 
it permitted the defense to suggest an innocent use for the boots and undermined 
the State's argument that the boots were involved in the murder. Thus, defendant 
has established neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
D. Shackling
In addition to the preceding alleged trial errors, defendant asserts that the 
fact he wore leg shackles during voir dire and trial requires that his 
convictions be reversed. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion requesting 
that he not be required to wear leg shackles during jury selection and trial. In 
presenting this motion, defense counsel began by stating that he understood it 
was "past practice" to keep a defendant's legs shackled, to bring him into the 
courtroom before the jury, and to seat him behind a specially constructed table 
so that the jury would not become aware of the shackles. Defense counsel further 
stated, "If that's all acceptable to the State and to the Court, I guess I would 
have no objection if we proceeded that way." The circuit court responded that 
this would be acceptable and that it would require the shackles.
Subsequently, during voir dire, defendant objected because the 
shackles prevented him from being present at certain conversations between the 
circuit court and the attorneys. When it became necessary to consult with the 
attorneys outside the presence of a prospective juror, the circuit court held 
conversations with the attorney in the hallway outside the courtroom. Because of 
the shackles, defendant could not leave the courtroom. Based on his objection to 
this procedure, the circuit court agreed that, from that point on, prospective 
jurors would be excused from the courtroom when necessary so that defendant 
could be present for any conversations between the court and attorneys. Defense 
counsel stated that it was not necessary to repeat the questioning of jurors 
that had already occurred. He said only that "at this point from now on" 
defendant wanted to be present at conversations outside the presence of 
prospective jurors.
Prior to trial, the issue of the effect of the shackles on defendant's 
presence at sidebars during trial arose. After consulting with defendant, 
defense counsel stated, "[J]ust for the record, it is not our intention or Mr. 
Buss's intention to approach the bench during the course of the trial if there 
were sidebars."
The State argues that defendant agreed to the shackling procedures used at 
trial and cannot now complain about those procedures. In addition, the State 
asserts that the shackling did not deny defendant a fair trial. Defendant 
responds that he preserved the shackling issue by filing a pretrial motion to 
preclude shackling and by including the issue in his post-trial motion. 
Alternatively, he argues that we may review the shackling issue under the 
doctrine of plain error or that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
properly preserve the issue for review.
We choose to review the shackling issue on its merits (see People v. 
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 126-27 (1998)) and conclude that no error occurred 
as a result of defendant's wearing shackles during the proceedings in this 
case.
In People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977), this court reversed a 
defendant's conviction on the basis that he was shackled at the hearing to 
determine his competency to stand trial. This court stated in Boose 
that shackling is generally disfavored because "(1) it tends to prejudice 
the jury against the accused; (2) it restricts his ability to assist his counsel 
during trial; and (3) it offends the dignity of the judicial process." 
Boose, 66 Ill. 2d  at 265. Nevertheless, the court explained, a 
defendant may be shackled if there is an indication that he may try to escape, 
pose a threat to the safety of courtroom occupants, or disrupt the order in the 
courtroom. The Boose court listed a number of factors a circuit court 
should consider in determining whether to shackle a defendant, including:
Whether a defendant should be shackled is a determination within the 
discretion of the circuit court. However, this court stated that the circuit 
court should place its reasons for shackling a defendant on the record and 
should provide defense counsel with an opportunity to offer reasons why the 
defendant should not be shackled. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d  at 266.
In Boose, the only reason the circuit court gave for shackling the 
defendant was the nature of his crime (murdering a guard while an inmate at a 
juvenile detention center). Based on the record, this court found this reason 
alone insufficient to justify shackling the defendant and reversed the 
defendant's conviction. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d  at 267-69.
Similarly, in In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 35-36 (1977), this court 
held that " 'poor security' in the courtroom" was, by itself, an inadequate 
basis for shackling a defendant. Although there was no jury in that case, this 
court reversed the defendant's conviction. This court explained that, even 
absent prejudice to a defendant before a jury, shackling may deny a defendant a 
fair trial by negatively impacting on his dignity and hindering his ability to 
consult with counsel. Staley, 67 Ill. 2d  at 37; see also People v. 
Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 814, 825 (1996) (plain error to shackle defendant 
based on courtroom security alone).
On the other hand, Illinois courts have found no abuse of discretion in 
shackling a defendant when the circuit court has expressed more than a single 
reason for shackling a defendant. See, e.g., People v. Starks, 
287 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1037 (1997) (defendant's charge was serious, he was a 
flight risk, a prior conviction indicated violence, there was a potential for 
revenge from the victim's family, and the courthouse presented serious security 
problems); People v. Henderson, 223 Ill. App. 3d 131, 133 (1991) (based 
on the fact that defendant was serving a sentence for murder and had 248 prison 
disciplinary violations, the circuit court determined that defendant was an 
escape and safety risk); People v. McCue, 175 Ill. App. 3d 762, 766-67 
(1988) (defendants were properly shackled at their trial for a prison escape 
where, inter alia, they were strong enough to escape, had a record of 
escape, and the circuit court was familiar with nature of security in 
courtroom).
In the case at bar, the circuit court did not state its reasons for requiring 
shackling at the time it initially denied defendant's motion, presumably because 
defense counsel indicated that defendant did not object to leg shackles so long 
as the jury did not see them. In ruling on defendant's post-trial motion on this 
issue, however, the circuit court explained that the basis for its denial of the 
motion was (1) courtroom security; (2) the extremely serious nature of the 
offense with which defendant was charged; and (3) the large audience in the 
courtroom. In addition, the circuit court observed that the tables in the 
courtroom had been skirted so that the shackling of the defendant was "never 
obvious to the jurors" and that defendant's ability to consult with counsel had 
not been hindered by the shackling.
Based on this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's 
requirement that defendant wear leg shackles during trial. Two of the three 
reasons shackling is disfavored are not issues in this case: there is no 
evidence that the jury was aware of the shackles or that defendant's ability to 
consult with counsel was affected. Although the dignity of the judicial process 
is always a concern, the circuit court provided reasons for shackling which this 
court has held may outweigh this concern. See Boose, 66 Ill. 2d  at 
266-67. Moreover, defense counsel was given an opportunity to present reasons 
why defendant should not be shackled. We, therefore, find that 
defendant was not denied a fair trial by the circuit court's requirement that he 
wear leg shackles. Based on our conclusion that there was no error resulting 
from the shackling of defendant, we need not address his arguments concerning 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel.
E. Identity, Time, and Cause Evidence
As another basis for claiming that he was denied a fair trial, defendant 
challenges the admission of Blum's, Pavlik's, and Haskell's testimony concerning 
the identity of the body found in Hunting Area 7, the time of Christopher's 
death, and the cause of his death. Before trial, defendant offered to stipulate 
to the identity of the body, as well as to the time and cause of Christopher's 
death. He also made a motion in limine, in which he argued that, based 
on his offer to stipulate to these issues, the State should be precluded from 
presenting evidence related to them. The State did not agree to the stipulation, 
and the circuit court denied the motion in limine.
When a defendant pleads not guilty to an offense, the State is entitled to 
prove every element of that offense, even if a defendant does not dispute the 
relevant facts or offers to stipulate to them. People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 46 (1995). Defendant states in his brief that he does not take issue 
with this rule. Instead, he argues that Pavlik's, Blum's, and Haskell's 
testimony should have been excluded because it was unduly prejudicial. According 
to defendant, the circuit court erred by failing to weigh the probative value of 
this evidence against its prejudicial effect. Defendant urges this court to 
require circuit courts to consider the availability of alternative evidence, 
such as the stipulation he offered, as part of the weighing process.
Despite his assertion to the contrary, defendant does indeed appear to be 
challenging the rule that a defendant cannot prevent the State from proving 
relevant facts by offering to stipulate to those facts. Nevertheless, defendant 
is correct that, in determining whether to admit evidence, a circuit court must 
weigh its probative value against its potential prejudicial effect. People 
v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 314 (1998). The circuit court is not required 
to exclude relevant evidence, however, just because it may be prejudicial to the 
defendant or might "arouse feelings of horror or indignation in the jury." 
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 314. It is the function of the circuit court 
to determine the admissibility of evidence, and its rulings will not be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 313 
(1997).
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting 
Blum, Pavlik, and Haskell to testify concerning identity and the time and cause 
of Christopher's death. First, we disagree with defendant's assertion that the 
circuit court failed to weigh the probative value of this evidence against its 
prejudicial effect. In ruling on defendant's motion in limine, the 
circuit court expressly stated that the relevant standard was whether the 
prejudicial effect of particular evidence exceeded its probative value. It 
concluded that the testimony of these experts was not intended merely to inflame 
the passions of the jury. Instead, this testimony was probative of facts the 
State was entitled to prove, such as the time of death, cause of death, 
identity, nature of the injuries, and the type of weapon used. As the circuit 
court's statements indicate, the court did perform the necessary balancing of 
probative value against prejudicial effect.
We also reject defendant's argument that the circuit court erred by failing 
to consider the availability of alternative evidence (i.e., defendant's 
offer to stipulate) when it weighed probative value against prejudicial effect. 
The availability of alternative evidence will normally factor into this weighing 
process because the probative value of the evidence in dispute will necessarily 
be diminished if other evidence may be admitted in its place. In this case, 
however, defendant's offer to stipulate cannot be considered available 
alternative evidence. Without the State's agreement, there was no stipulation 
available to be admitted into evidence, and, as we have explained, the State was 
not required to stipulate to these facts.
Blum's, Pavlik's, and Haskell's testimony was not admitted solely to inflame 
the passions of the jury. It was highly probative with respect to the identity 
of the body found in Hunting Area 7, the precise time of Christopher's death, 
the manner and cause of his death, and the weapon used. In addition, the circuit 
court limited the prejudicial effect of this testimony by preventing Blum from 
testifying concerning the time Christopher may have suffered prior to his death 
and by not publishing photographs of the body to the jury after admitting them 
into evidence.
Defendant argues that the prejudicial effect of this testimony was 
demonstrated by (1) the fact that one juror asked the circuit court whether 
counseling was available for the jurors and (2) the fact that Christopher's 
mother exited the courtroom during Blum's testimony and was heard screaming in 
the hallway outside the courtroom. The record indicates that the juror who asked 
this question did so out of curiosity and stated that the testimony was not 
affecting his ability to serve. In addition, with respect to Christopher's 
mother, the circuit court observed for the record that she left the courtroom 
discreetly and that subsequent noises in the hallway outside could not 
necessarily be attributed to her. Because the probative value of the State's 
expert testimony concerning identity and the time and cause of death outweighed 
its prejudicial effect, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of this 
testimony. See Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d  at 46 (photographs of the victim 
were properly admitted even though identity and cause of death were not 
disputed), citing People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 201-04 
(1968).
III. Sentencing
The remainder of our discussion concerns issues defendant raises with respect 
to the sentencing portion of his trial. He argues that he must receive a new 
sentencing hearing because (1) one of the aggravating factors considered by the 
jury was unconstitutional; (2) the verdict forms used at the eligibility stage 
were defective; (3) the circuit court erred in admitting certain photographs at 
both stages of the hearing; (4) the circuit court erred by refusing certain jury 
instructions submitted by defendant; (5) the State misstated the law regarding 
mercy in its rebuttal argument; (6) a death sentence is inappropriate because 
the State's failed to provide defendant with adequate psychiatric care; and (7) 
the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional.
A. Constitutionality of Section 9-1(b)(7)
We begin our discussion of these sentencing issues by addressing defendant's 
argument that one of the aggravating factors the jury considered was 
unconstitutional. The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty based 
on the following three statutory aggravating factors: (1) "the defendant has 
been convicted of murdering two or more individuals" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 
1994)); (2) "the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony" 
(aggravated kidnaping) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); and (3) "the murdered 
individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally 
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) 
(West 1994)).
Defendant argues that the "brutal or heinous" statutory aggravating factor 
contained in section 9-1(b)(7) of the death penalty statute is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face. Although, pursuant to Illinois Pattern 
Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 7B.07 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 
Criminal, No. 7B.07 (3d ed. Supp. 1996)) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d 7B.07), 
the jury was instructed as to the meanings of "brutal" and "heinous," defendant 
claims that these definitions were insufficient to cure the vagueness of this 
statutory aggravating factor. According to defendant, he must be resentenced 
because the jury found him eligible for the death penalty based on this 
unconstitutional factor and considered this factor at the aggravation-mitigation 
stage.
In other cases involving the same challenge defendant makes to section 
9-1(b)(7), we have repeatedly upheld the validity of this aggravating factor. 
See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 63 (1998); 
People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 272 (1997); People v. 
Odle, 128 Ill. 2d 111, 140-41 (1988); People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 45-46 (1996); People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 460 (1996). We have 
also previously rejected defendant's argument that the definitions of "brutal" 
and "heinous" contained in IPI Criminal 3d 7B.07 do not adequately define these 
terms. See People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 46 (1996). Defendant presents 
us with no persuasive reason to reconsider these holdings and we decline to do 
so. We find no error with respect to the jury's consideration of this 
aggravating factor.
B. Defective Eligibility Verdict Forms
Defendant also argues that he must receive a new sentencing hearing because 
the jury's eligibility verdicts were legally insufficient. He claims that the 
verdict forms used at the eligibility stage omitted the necessary mental state 
with respect to two of the three statutory aggravating factors on which his 
eligibility was based.
To be eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6), a defendant 
must have "acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the 
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily 
harm to the murdered individual or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 
1994). Similarly, to be eligible under section 9-1(b)(3), the defendant must 
have been convicted of murdering two or more individuals with the intent to kill 
or with the knowledge that his acts would "cause death or create a strong 
probability of death or great bodily harm." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 
1994).
In this case, these mental states were omitted from the verdict forms 
relating to defendant's eligibility under section 9-1(b)(3) and section 
9-1(b)(6). The forms stated:
Defendant is correct that these forms are invalid pursuant to our decision in 
People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995). In that case, we held that a 
defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the verdict form, 
pursuant to which he was found eligible for the death penalty, omitted the 
requisite mental state. In Mack, as in this case, the defendant's 
eligibility was based on section 9-1(b)(6). The verdict form in Mack 
provided: " 'We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the following aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder: Larry 
Mack killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery.' " 
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 529-30.
We found that the verdict in Mack was legally insufficient because 
the verdict form had omitted the mental state required for a finding of 
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6)(b). We explained that a verdict need not set 
forth the specific elements of an offense so long as it is a general verdict. 
For example, a verdict that provides only that a defendant is "eligible" for the 
death penalty based on the existence of a "statutory aggravating factor" is a 
general verdict. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538; see also IPI Criminal 3d No. 
7B.10. On the other hand, if the verdict form sets out some of the elements of 
an offense as specific findings, the form must do so completely. Mack, 
167 Ill. 2d  at 537-38.
We held in Mack that the verdict at issue could not be considered a 
general verdict because the verdict form specified certain elements of the 
aggravating factor. Consequently, it was necessary for the verdict form to 
contain all essential elements of that aggravating factor. Because it omitted 
the requisite mental state for eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6), the verdict 
form was legally insufficient, and the verdict could not stand. Given that the 
defendant's eligibility was based solely on section 9-1(b)(6), a new sentencing 
hearing was required. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538.
In the case before us, the State argues that the verdict forms were not 
invalid under Mack because they did not attempt to set forth all of the 
elements of the aggravating factors. In support of this argument, the State 
relies on our decision in People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335 (1997).
Our decision in McNeal does not, however, support the State's 
position. In McNeal, we held that the verdict forms pursuant to which 
the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder were not defective 
just because, in parentheses, they described the nature of the first degree 
murder charges. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at 359-62. For example, one verdict 
form provided, " 'We, the jury, find the defendant, Aldwin McNeal, Guilty 
of the offense of first degree murder (knowing his acts created a strong 
probability of great bodily harm) of Corey Gerlach,' " while another 
provided, " 'We, the jury, find the defendant, Aldwin McNeal, Guilty 
of the offense of first degree murder (intended to kill) of Corey 
Gerlach.' " McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at 359-60. The defendant in that 
case complained that the verdict forms were defective under Mack 
because they contained some but not all of the essential elements of the 
offenses. We found, however, that, unlike the verdict form in Mack, the 
verdict forms in McNeal did not attempt to set forth the essential 
statutory elements. Instead, the parenthetical material in the forms in 
McNeal merely identified by name the first degree murder charge at 
issue on a particular form. Therefore, the jury's verdict in McNeal 
could be considered a general verdict and was not invalid. McNeal, 
175 Ill. 2d  at 362.
Although, in McNeal, we distinguished the language in the verdict 
forms from the language we found legally insufficient in Mack, we are 
unable to make such a distinction in this case. There is no significant 
difference between the language of the verdict form at issue in Mack 
and the two at issue in the case at bar. The form in Mack and the 
forms in this case refer to the aggravating factors in similar terms. Under 
Mack, therefore, the jury's verdicts concerning defendant's eligibility 
under section 9-1(b)(3) and section 9-1(b)(6) are legally insufficient.
Nevertheless, no new sentencing hearing is required. Although the verdict 
forms relating to defendant's eligibility under section 9-1(b)(3) and section 
9-1(b)(6) were defective due to the omission of the requisite mental state, the 
third verdict form, relating to defendant's eligibility under section 9-1(b)(7), 
did not suffer from this flaw. It is well established by our recent case law 
that when a defendant is found eligible for the death penalty under multiple 
statutory aggravating factors, the eligibility finding may stand despite the 
invalidation of one of those factors, so long as there is a separate, valid 
aggravating factor that supports the defendant's eligibility. See People v. 
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 58 (1998); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 69 (1998), citing People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 165 (1996); 
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 321 (1998). In addition 
to finding defendant eligible for the death penalty based on the felony-murder 
and multiple-murder factors, the jury found him eligible under the separate 
"brutal and heinous" aggravating factor. As we have explained, this is a valid 
aggravating factor and supports the defendant's eligibility for the death 
penalty, notwithstanding the invalid verdicts based on the other two aggravating 
factors.
We reject defendant's contention that, even if we were to find him eligible 
under section 9-1(b)(7), we must grant him a new second stage sentencing hearing 
because the jury was improperly influenced at the aggravation-mitigation stage 
by the two improper aggravating factors. We have previously rejected 
this argument by the defendant in People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297 
(1998). In that case, as in this one, the defendant was found eligible for the 
death penalty based on multiple aggravating factors. We determined that his 
eligibility under the felony-murder aggravating factor was invalid because the 
necessary mental state was omitted from the verdict form and the instructions 
involving that factor. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 320. We nevertheless 
held that no new second stage sentencing hearing was required as a result of the 
jury's consideration of this invalid aggravating factor. Even when a statutory 
aggravating factor is eliminated due to a defect in the verdict form and 
instructions, the jury is entitled to consider the defendant's conduct relevant 
to that factor in deciding the appropriate sentence. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 321-22.
In this case, there is no dispute as to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the felony-murder and multiple-murder aggravating factors. Under 
Williams, therefore, evidence relating to these factors was properly 
considered by the jury, and no new sentencing hearing is required.
Defendant was properly found eligible for the death penalty pursuant to 
section 9-1(b)(7), and, although the eligibility verdicts based on section 
9-1(b)(3) and 9-1(b)(6) were invalid, the jury was not precluded from 
considering evidence pertaining to these factors at the aggravation-mitigation 
phase of the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, a new sentencing hearing is not 
required. In addition, given our holding that the verdict finding defendant 
eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3) cannot stand, we need not 
consider defendant's argument that the application of the multiple-murder 
statutory aggravating factor in his case violated the eighth amendment to the 
United States Constitution.
C. Admission of Photographic Evidence
Defendant further contends that resentencing is required because three 
photographs the circuit court admitted into evidence and published to the jury 
during the sentencing proceedings were unduly prejudicial. During the 
eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing, two photographs of Christopher's 
torso, a front view and a rear view, were admitted into evidence and published 
to the jury. As defendant notes, the circuit court described the photographs as 
the "most gruesome things" it had ever seen. The pictures show stab and slash 
wounds to the body, as well as decomposition. The photograph depicting the front 
of Christopher's torso shows the lower part of his face, including his teeth 
which are exposed due to decomposition. His genital area is not visible in the 
photographs.
At the sentence selection phase, the circuit court admitted into evidence 
these two photographs of Christopher, as well as a photograph of the body of 
Tara Sue Huffman, the young girl defendant had killed previously. This picture 
shows her lying in a field naked, except for a shirt pushed up around her chest. 
Her legs are spread, and there is a wooden stick protruding from what appears to 
be her rectum. There are no obvious wounds or other injuries to the body. At the 
jury's request, these photographs were provided to the jury during 
deliberations.
We begin by discussing the admission of the two photographs of Christopher at 
the eligibility phase of sentencing. Defendant contends that he was denied a 
fair sentencing hearing by the admission of these photographs because they were 
cumulative of other evidence presented at the hearing, and their prejudicial 
effect outweighed their probative value.
The first phase of a sentencing hearing is intended to permit the jury to 
determine, without improper influence from potentially inflammatory evidence, 
whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty. People v. 
Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 224 (1993). Consequently, only evidence 
that directly pertains to the statutory aggravating factors is admissible at 
this stage. People v. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1996). Photographs 
that are introduced solely to inflame the jury are not admissible. People v. 
Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 405 (1995). However, if photographs are relevant 
to proving a defendant's eligibility under a statutory aggravating factor, they 
may be admitted, even if they are gruesome, inflammatory, or disgusting. 
Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 405. It is the function of the circuit court to 
determine which evidence should be admitted at this stage, and its decision will 
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  
at 224.
The photographs of Christopher's body demonstrated the nature, location, and 
force of the stab wounds from which Christopher died. They were, therefore, 
highly probative of the "brutal and heinous" aggravating factor contained in 
section 9-1(b)(7). Although, as the circuit court stated, the photographs were 
"gruesome," this is primarily because the crime was gruesome, and the jury was 
entitled to consider the character of the crime in determining defendant's 
eligibility for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(7) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) 
(West 1994)).
Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the prejudicial effect of 
this evidence was minimized. The State had originally proposed that the jury 
view a third photograph of Christopher's body, depicting his groin area. After 
the circuit court expressed concern that this photograph would be unduly 
inflammatory, the State withdrew the photograph. With respect to the other two 
photographs, the circuit court found that their probative value outweighed their 
prejudicial effect. As a result, the jury saw only two photographs of 
Christopher's body, and while some decomposition is visible in these 
photographs, none of the insects with which the body was infested when it was 
discovered were evident.
Furthermore, contrary to defendant's argument, the circuit court was not 
required to exclude the photographs merely because they were cumulative of 
testimony concerning the manner in which Christopher died. This court has 
previously explained that "demonstrative evidence may be clearer and more 
persuasive than oral testimony covering exactly the same points and has allowed 
the jury to view photographs of a crime victim even when the photographs simply 
depict what witnesses have orally described." People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 176-77 (1991). Accordingly, photographs submitted at the eligibility 
phase need not be excluded merely because they are cumulative of other evidence. 
People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 225-26 (1993).
The photographs of Christopher were not admitted at eligibility solely to 
inflame the passions of the jury, and we agree with the circuit court that their 
probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect. Accordingly, it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the circuit court to admit them. See Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at 175-79 (circuit court properly admitted photographs of decedent and 
bloodstains in her apartment at the first stage of the sentencing hearing; their 
prejudicial effect did not outweigh their probative value); Rissley, 
165 Ill. 2d  at 405 (autopsy photographs of victim, even some depicting insect 
infestation of the body, were properly admitted at the eligibility stage of 
sentencing to show eligibility under section 9-1(b)(7); their prejudicial effect 
did not outweigh their probative value and the fact they were cumulative did not 
require them to be excluded).
We also find no error with respect to the admission of these two photographs, 
plus the photograph of Tara Sue Huffman, at the aggravation-mitigation stage of 
the sentencing hearing. These three photographs were admitted into evidence and 
published to the jury. In addition, at the jury's request, they were sent to the 
jury during deliberations. Following the jury's receipt of the photographs, it 
returned the verdict imposing the death penalty.(2)
The rules of evidence applicable to trials do not apply to the 
aggravation-mitigation portion of a capital sentencing hearing because the trier 
of fact at sentencing "must possess the fullest information possible concerning 
the defendant's life, character, criminal record, and the circumstances of the 
particular offense." People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 32 (1998). At 
this phase of sentencing, evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant and 
reliable. People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 152 (1998). The 
determination as to the relevance and reliability of evidence is within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge. People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 
62 (1995).
Evidence of a defendant's prior violent criminal behavior is relevant 
aggravation because it bears on defendant's character and likelihood of 
committing additional crimes. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at 179. Consequently, 
in several different cases, this court has held that the details of previous 
crimes committed by a defendant are admissible at the aggravation-mitigation 
phase of sentencing. See, e.g., People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 
42 (1995) (testimony concerning the autopsy of another of defendant's murder 
victims was properly admitted at the aggravation-mitigation stage of 
sentencing); Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 238 (tape of 911 call by previous 
murder victim of the defendant was properly admitted); Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at 178-79 (testimony by defendant's previous sexual assault victims properly 
admitted).
Defendant does not dispute that the photographs admitted at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage were relevant and reliable. Instead, he again 
argues that they should not have been admitted because they were too prejudicial 
and cumulative of testimony concerning the condition of Christopher's and Tara 
Sue's bodies. As we have explained with respect to the admission of photographic 
evidence at the eligibility stage, the fact that photographs are cumulative of 
other evidence does not require that they be excluded. This principle applies 
with equal force at the aggravation-mitigation stage, especially given the 
relaxed evidentiary standards at this stage. The jury had already seen the two 
photographs of Christopher at the eligibility stage. Only these two photographs 
and the photograph of Tara Sue were admitted at the second stage of the 
sentencing hearing. These photographs were relevant to show the violent nature 
of defendant's criminal acts, and we find that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting them. People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 
110-11 (1990) (murder scene photographs of defendant's previous victim were 
properly admitted). We also find no error in the circuit court's decision to 
grant the jury's request to view the photographs during deliberations. See 
Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d  at 46-47 (no abuse of discretion to send jury 
photographs of victims during trial deliberations); People v. Mitchell, 
152 Ill. 2d 274, 338-39 (1992) (no abuse of discretion to permit jury to view 
life and death photographs during aggravation-mitigation deliberations).
D. Instructions at Aggravation-Mitigation
Defendant claims that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing for the 
additional reason that the circuit court refused to give the jury nonpattern 
instructions he submitted. As a result, he argues that a new sentencing hearing 
is required.
If the IPI instructions contain an applicable instruction on a subject about 
which the circuit court determines the jury should be instructed, the circuit 
court must use that instruction, unless the court determines that the 
instruction does not accurately state the law. 134 Ill. 2d R. 451(a). It is 
within the circuit court's discretion to decide whether to give the jury a 
nonpattern instruction. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 519 (1996). 
If the subject matter of the refused nonpattern instruction is covered by 
pattern instruction or other instructions given by the circuit court, no abuse 
of discretion will be found. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 519.
1. Mercy
According to defendant it was error for the circuit court to refuse his 
request to provide the jury with three nonpattern instructions concerning the 
jury's power to consider mercy in determining the appropriate sentence for him. 
In one of these instructions, defendant proposed the addition of the following 
paragraph to IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.01:
The circuit court also refused defendant's requests to use two other 
nonpattern instructions concerning mercy. One informed the jury that "In 
considering the death penalty, you may, if you wish to do so, consider whether 
or not you wish to extend mercy to the Defendant." The other provided:
The circuit court refused these nonpattern instructions on the basis that the 
IPI instructions tendered by the State sufficiently instructed the jury on the 
subject.
According to defendant, the circuit court failed to recognize its discretion 
to modify the IPI instructions or, to the extent Supreme Court Rule 451(a) 
prevented the circuit court from modifying the pattern instructions in this 
case, it is unconstitutional because, without the modification, defendant was 
denied a fair sentencing hearing. Alternatively, defendant asserts that the 
circuit court abused its discretion in refusing his instructions. He argues that 
the instructions he submitted should have been provided to the jury because the 
IPI instructions failed to inform the jury that it could consider mercy and how 
to do so. He contends that, without his instructions on mercy, the jury was left 
"without adequate guidance as to the proper role of its mercy power." As a 
result, defendant argues, he was denied his right to due process and the 
protections against cruel and unusual punishment under the fourteenth and eighth 
amendments to the United States Constitution. In addition, defendant asserts 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to renew defendant's request for a 
mercy instruction after this request was denied at the instruction 
conference.
As a preliminary matter, we cannot agree with defendant's suggestion that the 
circuit court failed to recognize its discretion to modify the IPI instructions. 
At the instructions conference, defense counsel argued that it was within the 
court's discretion to accept the modifications proposed by defendant. The 
circuit court responded, "I'm going to deny Defendant's one. I will stick with 
the IPI 7C.01. It's consistent with the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions that 
have been set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court. I will follow them." These 
statements indicate that the court recognized its power to modify the pattern 
instructions but chose not to do so because the subject matter of the refused 
instruction was covered by the IPI instructions. This was a proper exercise of 
discretion by the court.
While a jury may properly consider mercy as a factor at a capital sentencing 
hearing, mercy must be considered in the context of all aggravating and 
mitigating factors. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 46-47. Consequently, it is 
well established by the precedent of this court that no specific instruction 
concerning mercy is required when a jury is instructed that it "should consider 
all circumstances that provide reasons for imposing a sentence other than death" 
(Hope, 168 Ill. 2d at 46-47). See, e.g., People v. 
Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 198-99 (1996); People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1992); People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 182-83 (1991); 
People v. Lear, 143 Ill. 2d 138, 151 (1991).
In this case, the jury was instructed:
This instruction permitted the jury to consider mercy, and, therefore, no 
additional specific instructions concerning this nonstatutory mitigating factor 
were required. See People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 50 (1996) (observing 
that this court has repeatedly rejected attempts by defendants to specify 
nonstatutory mitigating factors at the aggravation-mitigation stage).
Defendant asks us to overrule the cases in which we have held that no 
separate mercy instruction is required. We continue to agree with the reasoning 
of those cases, however, and find that defendant's arguments do not support our 
rejection of that line of authority. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing defendant's proposed instructions concerning mercy. In 
addition, given our holding that no specific instructions concerning mercy were 
required, we find no merit to defendant's arguments that Rule 451(a) 
unconstitutionally restricted the circuit court's ability to give such 
instructions and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to renew 
defendant's request for these instructions.
2. Unanimity
Defendant claims that the instructions at the aggravation-mitigation stage 
were also defective because of the circuit court's refusal to give the jury two 
instructions he proposed concerning the unanimity requirement (see 720 ILCS 
9-1(g) (West 1994)). He asked that the jury be instructed as follows: "There is 
no requirement that you reach a unanimous decision at this stage of the 
proceedings. If one or more of you have decided the defendant should not receive 
death, you may sign the verdict form without debate." The second unanimity 
instruction defendant proposed provided: "If the jury or any juror determines 
that there are mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the 
death sentence, then the Court shall not sentence the Defendant, Timothy Buss, 
to death."
The circuit court refused to use these nonpattern instructions. Instead, it 
gave the jury the following IPI instruction:
The jury was also instructed: "[Y]ou may not sign a verdict imposing a death 
sentence unless you unanimously vote for it" (see IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.07), 
and "If you do not unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a 
death sentence, then you should sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a 
sentence other than death" (see IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06).
According to defendant, the circuit court's refusal of the unanimity 
instructions he proposed denied him a fair sentencing hearing because the IPI 
instructions provided to the jury did not give the jury a clear understanding of 
the unanimity rule. Defendant asserts that, because the circuit court refused 
his instructions, the jury was left with the mistaken belief that any verdict 
against the imposition of the death penalty also had to be 
unanimous.
Defendant's challenge to the court's refusal to give his unanimity 
instructions is without merit for several reasons. First, given that there were 
IPI instructions that addressed this subject, it was not an abuse of discretion 
for the court to refuse defendant's nonpattern instructions. See 
Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 519. Indeed, after comparing the IPI 
instructions provided to the jury with defendant's proposed instructions, we are 
unable to discern any clarification of the unanimity rule made by defendant's 
instructions. In addition, this court has rejected the argument that the 
existing IPI instructions concerning the unanimity rule mislead the jury by 
suggesting that a verdict against the death penalty must be unanimous. 
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 70. The refusal of defendant's unanimity 
instructions did not deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing.
3. Standard of Proof
Defendant's third challenge to the instructions provided to the jury at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage is that these instructions failed to correctly 
state the standard under which the jury may choose not to impose the death 
penalty. Although defendant's argument is somewhat difficult to understand, it 
appears that his objection to the instructions provided in his case is that they 
"overstate[d] the mitigation required under state law to acquit of death" and 
failed to inform the jury that it had "unfettered discretion" in determining 
whether to impose the death penalty. He contends that the circuit court should 
have given the following instruction to the jury: "You may spare the defendant's 
life for any reason you deem appropriate and satisfactory."
The circuit court instead instructed the jury that, if it did not find that 
there were "no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death 
sentence," the court would sentence the defendant to a sentence other than 
death. See IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05. In addition, the circuit court instructed 
the jury that a mitigating factor was "[a]ny reason supported by the evidence 
why the defendant should not be sentenced to death" and that "[w]here there is 
evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a 
factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your 
consideration of the evidence." See IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06. As we have held 
in the past, these instructions accurately state the law with respect to the 
quantum of proof at the aggravation-mitigation hearing. See Gilliam, 
172 Ill. 2d  at 520. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's 
refusal of defendant's instruction.
E. Rebuttal Argument
In addition to arguing that he was denied a fair second-stage sentencing 
hearing by the refusal of his instructions concerning mercy, defendant asserts 
that a new sentencing hearing is required because, during its rebuttal argument 
at the aggravation-mitigation stage, the State suggested that the jury could not 
consider mercy as a mitigating factor. Specifically, defendant complains about 
the following portion of the State's rebuttal argument:
According to defendant, the State misstated the law when it said that mercy 
"has nothing to do with the law[ ]" and that, by asking the jury to give 
him mercy, the defendant was asking it to "forget about the law."
The State responds that defendant has waived this issue for review by failing 
to object to these comments at trial and by failing to raise them in his post 
trial motion. We agree with the State that defendant has waived this issue. See 
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998) (an objection at the 
sentencing hearing and reference to the error in a post-sentencing motion is 
necessary to preserve a sentencing issue for review). Defendant replies that we 
may nevertheless review the issue pursuant to the doctrine of plain error. In 
addition, he argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
these comments and that the circuit court should have corrected the 
prosecution's misstatement of the law sua sponte.
Under the doctrine of plain error, a reviewing court may consider issues not 
properly preserved at trial if the evidence is closely balanced or if the error 
is so fundamental that it denies the defendant a fair trial. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 40; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In this case, defendant satisfies neither 
of these requirements.
The evidence at the aggravation-mitigation stage was not closely balanced. 
The evidence presented in aggravation included testimony that, when defendant 
was in eighth grade, he choked a fifth-grader with a wire for no apparent 
reason. Subsequently, in 1981, when defendant was 13 years old, he was involved 
in the disappearance, sexual assault, and murder of five-year-old Tara Sue 
Huffman. Several hours after she was reported missing, her body was found two 
blocks from her home. Objects had been inserted into her vagina and anus. During 
his incarceration as a juvenile for the murder of Tara Sue Huffman, defendant 
was found in possession of a "shank," a hacksaw blade, and a 25-pound weight 
that he was using to punch a hole through the wall of his cell.
After his release from prison for Tara Sue Huffman's murder, defendant moved 
to Florida in the Fall of 1993. A former girlfriend of defendant testified that, 
in 1994, she and defendant lived in a crack house in Sarasota. To support 
themselves, they relied on money gained from shoplifting and checks the 
girlfriend received from the government because of her physical and mental 
disabilities. According to this girlfriend, defendant sexually abused her.
A subsequent girlfriend of defendant testified that she met defendant when 
she was 15 years old and working as a prostitute in Sarasota. She stated that 
defendant could not hold a job and made money selling cocaine and stolen fishing 
poles. Her testimony indicated that defendant also physically abused her. In 
addition to this testimony, a victim impact statement from Christopher's mother 
was read to the jury.
As mitigation, the defense presented testimony by defendant's stepmother, 
father, and grandmother. They explained that defendant's mother left the family 
when defendant was in kindergarten. She did not seek custody and, when visits 
were arranged with the children, she would often fail to come for those visits. 
Defendant was loved by his father and grandmother, but they both had full-time 
jobs, and the children were often left in the care of different 
baby-sitters.
Defendant's childhood baby-sitters and teachers described defendant as quiet, 
not violent, below-average academically, and immature as a child. Defendant also 
lacked social skills, and was teased by other children. They also testified 
concerning the negative effects of defendant's mother's abandonment on him. 
According to defendant's elementary school principal, one month before defendant 
killed Tara Sue Huffman, defendant and his siblings went to a court hearing at 
which their mother said that she did not want the children. One baby-sitter also 
testified that defendant told her that, before she left, his mother had locked 
the children in their rooms and had chased them with a knife. 
Personnel from the Illinois Youth Center in Joliet, where defendant was 
incarcerated for the murder of Tara Sue Huffman, also described defendant as 
quiet and, in general, not a disciplinary problem. Instructors and a guard 
defendant knew after his transfer from the juvenile division to the adult 
division described him as immature but not a disciplinary problem. Although he 
was a slow student, he received his GED while in prison and became trained in 
automotive mechanics and welding.
When defendant moved to Florida, he first lived with a former baby-sitter and 
her husband for six months. She described defendant as immature but caring and 
responsible. He moved out because he ran out of money and could not pay his 
rent.
Defendant's probation officer in Florida stated that defendant participated 
in counseling, but, because he had to pay for this counseling himself and 
provide his own transportation, he dropped out when finances and transportation 
became a problem. He worked only sporadically. She did not know defendant to 
become violent, but, in her opinion, he did not have the "tools" to make the 
right decisions for himself and, as a result, would become frustrated. A social 
worker who provided sex offender counseling for defendant stated that he did not 
seem violent but was immature and had low self-esteem.
Dr. Marvin Ziporyn, a psychiatrist, testified that he evaluated defendant in 
1982, when defendant first entered the juvenile division of the Illinois 
Department of Corrections. Ziporyn diagnosed defendant with depression 
accompanied by tremendous rage, anger, and hostility. According to Ziporyn, 
defendant was emotionally deprived and, when his emotional needs were not met, 
he would likely respond by acting out his anger or turning it inward and 
becoming depressed. During his first few years in the juvenile division, he 
attempted suicide several times. Ziporyn recommended that defendant receive 
medication and six months of therapy with a particular therapist. Defendant 
received only three months of the recommended therapy. By 1984, defendant had 
improved and his medication was stopped. Ziporyn recommended further therapy, 
however, because he believed that defendant's core problems remained. To 
Ziporyn's knowledge, his recommendation was not followed. Ziporyn described 
defendant as a 12 on a scale of 1 to 10 for dangerousness and would not have 
recommended his release. Dr. Ziporyn admitted that he is no longer licensed as a 
doctor in Illinois.
Dr. Randy Zoot, a clinical psychologist who interviewed defendant and members 
of his family after Christopher's murder, testified that defendant suffered from 
parental neglect, a lack of social skills, learning difficulties, and abnormal 
brain functioning because of a head injury as an infant. These problems left him 
with a limited ability to cope and problem solve, especially in emotionally 
charged circumstances. She observed that, although defendant received some 
counseling and medication when he first entered the juvenile division, it was 
not as much as the Department of Corrections' own psychologist had recommended. 
In Zoot's opinion, although defendant was able to function in the structured 
environment of the prison, he left prison with the same problems he had when he 
entered in 1982. Due to these problems, although defendant did not intend to 
harm anyone, he was unable to withhold inappropriate responses.
Dr. Michael Gelbort, a neuropsychologist who also evaluated defendant after 
Christopher's murder, testified that defendant had a language-based learning 
disability, some brain dysfunction, and attention deficit disorder. As a result, 
defendant's reasoning and judgment were distorted, especially under ambiguous or 
confusing circumstances. Although these neuropsychological defects could not be 
changed, defendant would have been "more likely" to lead a normal life if, at an 
early age, he had received treatment and been placed in an environment in which 
his choices were limited.
Based on this record, we do not believe that the evidence at the aggravation 
and mitigation stage of the sentencing hearing was closely balanced. Although 
evidence of defendant's childhood is certainly tragic, it does not begin to 
explain why defendant committed the brutal crimes of which he has been 
convicted. In addition, even the purportedly mitigating evidence presented at 
the hearing indicates that there is little chance that defendant could be 
rehabilitated. Within the first few years following his release from prison for 
Tara Sue Huffman's murder, he became involved in illegal activities, exhibited 
violent behavior toward his girlfriends, and committed a crime almost identical 
to the one for which he had previously been convicted. Also, although defendant 
exhibited little violent behavior while incarcerated, testimony by his own 
experts indicates that the explanation for this apparent improvement is the 
controlled environment of prison. According to even defendant's own experts, he 
is dangerous to himself and others and suffers from neuropsychological problems 
that cannot be remedied.
With respect to the second prong of the plain error doctrine, we find that 
the State's error did not deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Prosecutors 
are permitted wide latitude in their closing arguments, and comments during 
closing argument will not result in reversal unless they cause substantial 
prejudice to a defendant. People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (1995). In 
evaluating claims that remarks in closing arguments were erroneous, reviewing 
courts must consider these comments in the context of the parties' arguments as 
a whole. People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 319 (1997). The propriety 
of closing argument is a matter within the sound discretion of the circuit 
court, and its determination will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion. People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 294-95 (1995).
We agree with defendant that the portion of the State's rebuttal argument he 
cites is improper. In this portion of its argument, the State makes a 
distinction between the jury's weighing of mitigating evidence and its 
consideration of mercy. There is no such distinction in Illinois because, as we 
have held, mercy is a relevant mitigating factor. See, e.g., 
Hope, 168 Ill. 2d at 46-47; People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 
182 (1991). Thus, to the extent that the State's argument suggested that the 
jury could not consider mercy as a mitigating factor, or that mercy differed 
from other mitigating factors, it was error.
Nevertheless, our review of the record convinces us that this error did not 
result in substantial prejudice to defendant. While certain comments by the 
prosecution may have suggested to the jury that it should not consider mercy as 
a mitigating factor, these comments were isolated and the remainder of its 
rebuttal argument made it clear that mercy was a relevant consideration. The 
prosecution stated repeatedly that mercy is a "legitimate" and potentially 
"appropriate" consideration. For example, it stated: "In the end, although mercy 
is an appropriate thing for the Defense to ask in every case, it's appropriate, 
it's your job as jurors to decide whether the object is a legitimate object of 
mercy." Indeed, the fact that the defense argument was focused on mercy and the 
fact that the State devoted a substantial part of its rebuttal argument to 
explaining why defendant did not deserve mercy indicated to the jury that it had 
the power to factor mercy into its sentencing determination.
In addition, the jury was instructed that mitigating factors are "[a]ny 
reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to 
death" and that "any statement or argument by the attorneys which is not based 
on the evidence should be disregarded." See Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 26-27. 
In the context of the parties' arguments as a whole and these instructions, we 
find that the State's improper remarks did not deny defendant a fair sentencing 
hearing. For these reasons, we find no plain error. See People v. 
Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 361 (1988) (the State's rebuttal argument at 
sentencing did not result in plain error where the evidence was not closely 
balanced and substantial justice was not denied).
Alternatively, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the State's argument concerning mercy. Defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is without merit because he has not demonstrated 
prejudice resulting from his counsel's failure to object to the portion of the 
State's rebuttal argument at issue. See Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 203. As we 
have explained, the improper remarks by the State were isolated. Also, in the 
context of the remainder of the State's argument, the defense argument, and the 
circuit court's instructions, these comments did not leave the jury with the 
mistaken belief that it could not consider mercy in determining the appropriate 
sentence for defendant. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.
Finally, defendant asserts that the circuit court should have, sua 
sponte, corrected the State's error in its argument concerning the jury's 
consideration of mercy. As the State observes, however, defendant cites no 
authority for this argument. Accordingly, it is waived. 155 Ill. 2d R. 
341(e)(7); People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 162 (1997).
F. Inadequate Psychiatric Care
Next, defendant contends that the death penalty is inappropriate in his case 
because the State negligently or recklessly failed to provide the psychiatric 
treatment that Dr. Ziporyn had recommended. As a result of the State's failure 
to provide this treatment, defendant argues, he was unable to "work through" his 
anger and murdered Christopher because he could not control his emotions. In 
fact, defendant asserts that "[t]he instant case, in short, could have been 
prevented except for the negligence of the Department of Corrections." On this 
basis, he requests that we vacate his death sentence.
It is the function of a capital sentencing jury to balance factors in 
aggravation and mitigation at the second stage of sentencing, and its decision 
"will not be overturned lightly, particularly where that decision is amply 
supported by the record." People v. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d 64, 77 (1996). 
"Mitigation evidence of a defendant's cognitive abilities and mental health does 
not preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by 
aggravating evidence." People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 286 
(1997).
In this case, before deciding to impose the death penalty, the jury heard the 
evidence that defendant received less than all of the treatment recommended by 
Dr. Ziporyn. Other evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage, 
however, indicated that defendant did receive some counseling and that 
additional treatment may have been of limited value, given that treatment could 
not rectify the brain dysfunction from which defendant suffered. In addition, 
the jury heard evidence concerning the details of defendant's brutal murders of 
two children and his propensity for violence. Based on this record, we will not 
overturn the jury's decision to sentence defendant to death. See, e.g., 
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 139-40 (mitigating evidence of the defendant's 
cognitive difficulties, mental health, and abuse did not outweigh evidence in 
aggravation); Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d  at 286 (the death penalty was 
appropriate for defendant's murder and sexual abuse of a child despite 
mitigating evidence of the defendant's depression, abuse as a child, anti-social 
personality disorder, and low IQ) .
G. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
Lastly, defendant argues that the Illinois death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional. In previous cases, we have repeatedly rejected the arguments 
defendant makes here: (1) that the death penalty statute "requires the sentencer 
to adhere to an impermissibly high standard of acquittal of death" (see, 
e.g., Macri, 185 Ill. 2d at 77-78; People v. Jackson, 
182 Ill. 2d 30, 93-95 (1998)), (2) that the statutory scheme results in the 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty (see, e.g., People v. 
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 333 (1998); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 62-63 (1996)), and (3) that the statute is unconstitutional because it 
permits the jury to consider the "vague" aggravating factor of "any other 
reason" why the defendant should be put to death (see, e.g., People 
v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112-13 (1998); People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 48 (1995)). Defendant fails to present us with any new reason to 
persuade us to overturn our previous decisions on these issues. We, therefore, 
reject his constitutional challenge to the Illinois death penalty 
statute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County 
is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting 
Tuesday, September 14, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death entered 
in the circuit court is to be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the 
manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court 
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of 
Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of 
the institution where defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Timothy Buss' convictions should be 
upheld. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), however, this state's present death penalty law does not 
meet the requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) or article I, section 2, of 
the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Accordingly, we should 
vacate Buss' death sentence and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1994). There 
is, however, no need for the circuit court to conduct another sentencing 
hearing. Under the circumstances of this case, the only authorized disposition 
is a term of natural life imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(1)(b) (West 1994). 

Footnotes:
1. An amendment to Supreme Court Rule 431, effective May 1, 1997, added 
the requirement that the circuit court ask prospective jurors their views on 
these basic guarantees. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 431.
2. Defendant asserts that the jury returned a verdict just 
10 minutes after receiving these pictures. We have been unable to find support 
for this claim in the record.