Title: Nunnally v. Artis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961718
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
1 Lacy, 
Hassell, Keenan and Koontz, JJ. 
 
VALERIE F. NUNNALLY 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 961718         September 12, 1997 
 
DR. AVIS ADRIENA ARTIS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 
 
James F. Ingram, Judge 
 
 
I. 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether to overrule our 
decision in Scarpa v. Melzig, 237 Va. 509, 379 S.E.2d 307 
(1989), holding that in an action for wrongful conception, 
the statute of limitations begins to run when the health 
care provider negligently performs the ineffective 
sterilization procedure.   
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
On October 18, 1995, Valerie R. Nunnally filed her 
motion for judgment against Danville Memorial Hospital and 
Dr. Avis A. Artis, and alleged the following.  Nunnally 
decided to have a sterilization because any subsequent 
pregnancies would have been detrimental to her health.  Dr. 
Artis, the Hospital's purported agent, negligently performed 
a tubal ligation upon her on February 6, 1989.  Nunnally 
became pregnant on November 1, 1993, and she gave birth to a 
healthy child.  She "experienced a foreseeable traumatic 
                     
     
1Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on July 1, 1997. 
delivery with consequent adhesions and other related medical 
problems." 
 
The defendants filed special pleas in bar, asserting 
that Nunnally's action is barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations.  The trial court entered a judgment 
sustaining the defendants' pleas, and we awarded Nunnally an 
appeal.   
 
B. 
 
Code § 8.01-243(A) provides, in pertinent part, that 
"every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of 
recovery . . . shall be brought within two years after the 
cause of action accrues."  Code § 8.01-230 provides, in 
relevant part, that "[i]n every action for which a 
limitation period is prescribed, the cause of action shall 
be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period 
shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in 
the case of injury to the person . . . ."   
 
Nunnally argues that the trial court erred in granting 
the defendants' special pleas of the statute of limitations. 
 Nunnally contends that she pled a cause of action for 
wrongful conception, that her cause of action did not accrue 
until she was injured, that her injury occurred at 
conception and, hence, that the statute of limitations did 
not begin to run until November 1, 1993, the date she 
conceived her child.  Thus, Nunnally urges us to overrule 
our decision in Scarpa v. Melzig, supra.  The defendants 
respond that Nunnally's cause of action accrued on February 
6, 1989, the date the sterilization procedure was performed 
and, thus, her action is barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations. 
 
In Scarpa v. Melzig, we considered whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that a plaintiff's medical malpractice 
action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.  
JoAnn C. Scarpa filed an action against her physicians, Eric 
P. Melzig and Wanda L. Radford.  In June 1975, Scarpa was 
hospitalized under the care of Melzig for treatment of a 
pelvic infection.  Melzig removed certain tissue and body 
structures from Scarpa's body during an operation.  Melzig 
erroneously recorded in a written operative report that he 
had removed Scarpa's left fallopian tube when, in fact, the 
left fallopian tube was not among the structures removed.  
Melzig signed a hospital discharge summary which also 
erroneously indicated that Scarpa's left fallopian tube had 
been removed.   
 
In August 1980, Scarpa was hospitalized under the care 
of Dr. Radford because Scarpa desired a permanent 
sterilization.  Radford performed the procedure and noted 
that Scarpa's left fallopian tube was not present when, in 
fact, the left fallopian tube was present.  Thus, Dr. 
Radford did not ligate, cut upon, or alter Scarpa's left 
fallopian tube. 
 
Scarpa conceived and became pregnant in March 1984, and 
a child was born.  During an assessment of her reproductive 
system, the presence of her left fallopian tube was 
confirmed. 
 
Scarpa filed a notice of medical malpractice on 
November 12, 1985 and filed her motion for judgment on July 
11, 1986.  In her motion for judgment, she alleged that Dr. 
Melzig negligently failed to describe accurately the 
surgical procedures he performed on her, thereby preventing 
subsequent health care providers from being fully apprised 
of the status of her reproductive system.  Scarpa also 
alleged that Dr. Radford was negligent in either failing to 
visualize adequately Scarpa's left fallopian tube or in 
failing to ligate or attempt to ligate that tube.  The trial 
court held that Scarpa's cause of action was barred because 
the statute of limitations began to run on August 5, 1980, 
the date that Radford negligently performed the 
sterilization procedure. 
 
On appeal, Scarpa contended that her action was not 
barred by the statute of limitations because her "only hurt" 
occurred when she conceived through her left fallopian tube 
and became pregnant in March 1984.  Rejecting Scarpa's 
contention, we pointed out that the applicable statute of 
limitations required that every action for personal injuries 
shall be brought within two years after the cause of action 
accrued, Code § 8.01-243(A), and that Scarpa's cause of 
action accrued from the date she sustained an injury to the 
person and not when the resulting damage was discovered, 
Code § 8.01-230.  We held that Scarpa's cause of action 
began to run at the time that the negligent 1980 
sterilization procedure was performed because, during that 
procedure she "endured trauma, pain, and inconvenience [and] 
due to defendants' alleged wrongful conduct, she was 
subjected to a wholly inadequate procedure and denied the 
adequate and complete sterilization which she requested."  
Scarpa, 237 Va. at 513, 379 S.E.2d at 310. 
 
Justice Lacy, with whom Chief Justice Carrico joined, 
dissented.  Justice Lacy was of opinion that although a 
legal wrong may have occurred in 1980 when Dr. Radford 
performed the negligent sterilization procedure upon Scarpa, 
no injury occurred because Mrs. Scarpa had suffered no 
"positive, physical or mental hurt" until she became 
pregnant.  Id. at 515, 379 S.E.2d at 311. 
 
C. 
 
In Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 
(1986), we held "that an action for wrongful pregnancy or 
wrongful conception may be maintained in Virginia."  Id. at 
183, 343 S.E.2d at 305.  Explaining our holding, we stated: 
 
"Individuals are . . . free to practice 
contraception to further their constitutionally-
protected choice not to have children.  See 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 
(1965). 
 
 
 
Under traditional tort principles, it is 
clear that a physician who performs . . . [a] 
sterilization procedure owes a legal duty to the 
patient.  Where the patient can establish failure 
to perform the procedure with reasonable care and 
damages proximately resulting from breach of duty, 
she is entitled to recover as in any other medical 
malpractice action." 
 
Id. at 182-83, 343 S.E.2d at 304. 
 
Nunnally's motion for judgment alleges a cause of 
action for wrongful conception.  The gist of an action for 
wrongful conception is that a health care provider 
negligently performed a sterilization procedure and, as a 
proximate result of that negligence, the patient conceives a 
child.   
 
In Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 
S.E.2d 900 (1981), we stated:   
 
"We construe the statutory word [found in Code 
§ 8.01-230] 'injury' to mean positive, physical or 
mental hurt to the claimant, not legal wrong to 
him in the broad sense that his legally protected 
interests have been invaded.  Thus, the running of 
the time is tied to the fact of harm to the 
plaintiff, without which no cause of action would 
come into existence; it is not keyed to the date 
of the wrongful act, another ingredient of a 
personal injury cause of action."   
 
221 Va. at 957-58, 275 S.E.2d at 904.  Here, the injury of 
which Nunnally complains is not "trauma, pain, and 
inconvenience" that may have been associated with the 
negligent sterilization procedure.  Rather, she complains of 
the consequences of the wrongful conception and the 
subsequent pregnancy which, for medical reasons, she sought 
to avoid.  Indeed, we fail to understand how a plaintiff 
could have a cause of action for wrongful conception if 
there has been no conception.   
 
Even though a legal wrong may have occurred in 1989 
when the defendants performed the negligent sterilization 
procedure on Nunnally, we hold that no injury under the 
Locke accrual rule occurred at that time because Nunnally 
had suffered no "positive, physical or mental hurt" related 
to her alleged cause of action, wrongful conception.  Thus, 
we are of opinion that Scarpa was wrongly decided and, 
therefore, it is expressly overruled.   
 
D. 
 
Our decision to overrule Scarpa is made with great 
reluctance.  We recognize the importance of the doctrine of 
stare decisis in our jurisprudence.  Indeed, we have stated: 
 
 
"In Virginia, the doctrine of stare decisis 
is more than a mere cliche.  That doctrine plays a 
significant role in the orderly administration of 
justice by assuring consistent, predictable, and 
balanced application of legal principles.  And 
when a court of last resort has established a 
precedent, after full deliberation upon the issue 
by the court, the precedent will not be treated 
lightly or ignored, in the absence of flagrant 
error or mistake.  Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 
169, 112 S.E. 757, 760 (1922)." 
 
Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 
S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987).   
 
Our strong adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis 
does not, however, compel us to perpetuate what we believe 
to be an incorrect application of the law; neither will we 
be compelled by the doctrine of stare decisis to ignore our 
duty to develop the orderly evolution of the common law of 
this Commonwealth.  Indeed, this Court's obligation to 
reexamine critically its precedent will enhance confidence 
in the judiciary and strengthen the importance of stare 
decisis in our jurisprudence.  Although we have only done so 
on rare occasions, we have not hesitated to reexamine our 
precedent in proper cases and overrule such precedent when 
warranted.  See, Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425, 430, 
317 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1984) (overruling Noell v. 
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S.E. 679 (1923)); Lentz v. 
Morris, 236 Va. 78, 81, 372 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1988) 
(overruling Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53, 255 S.E.2d 479 
(1979) and Crabbe v. School Board, 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 
639 (1968)); Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 100, 340 S.E.2d 
824, 827 (1986) (overruling in part Williams v. Williams, 
192 Va. 787, 792, 66 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1951) and Surber v. 
Bridges, 159 Va. 329, 335, 165 S.E. 508, 510 (1932)); 
Lichtman v. Knouf, 248 Va. 138, 139, 445 S.E.2d 114, 115 
(1994) (overruling in part Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 239 Va. 397, 399, 389 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1990)); 
Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance Co., 247 Va. 150, 154, 439 
S.E.2d 394, 397 (1994) (overruling in part Haddon v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 239 Va. 397, 399, 389 S.E.2d 
712, 714 (1990)). 
 
E. 
 
We find no merit in defendants' argument that our 
holding today constitutes a "discovery rule."  We adhere to 
the holding, expressed in Virginia Military Institute v. 
King, 217 Va. 751, 760, 232 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977), that 
adoption of a discovery rule, which causes the running of 
the statute of limitations only when an injury is discovered 
or should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, must be accomplished by the General Assembly.  As 
we observed in Locke, "in all of our prior decisions that 
reject the discovery rule, the injury or damage existed at 
the time of the wrongful act; it had merely not been 
discovered in a timely manner."  221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d 
906.  Here, however, Nunnally's injury, the wrongful 
conception, did not exist at the time of the defendants' 
alleged wrongful act -- the negligent sterilization 
procedure.  To hold otherwise would result in the inequity 
of barring a plaintiff's claim for wrongful conception 
before she conceived.  Hence, we are of opinion that our 
decision today is entirely consistent with our holding in 
Locke and the cases discussed therein. 
 
F. 
 
Defendants, relying upon Starnes v. Cayouette, 244 Va. 
202, 419 S.E.2d 669 (1992), argue that the statute of 
limitations for Ms. Nunnally's claim expired in 1991 in 
accordance with the law existing at that time and, 
therefore, cannot be revived now.  Defendants' reliance is 
misplaced. 
 
In Starnes, we awarded a plaintiff, an adult survivor 
of childhood sexual abuse, an appeal to consider whether, as 
the trial court ruled, the expiration of the statute of 
limitations on her personal injury cause of action afforded 
the defendant a property right protected by constitutional 
due process guarantees.  Marjorie Starnes, who was born in 
1964, alleged in her motion for judgment that she was 
subjected to multiple acts of sexual abuse by the defendant, 
Robert L. Cayouette, from the age of 5 until she became 14 
years old.  The last such act of abuse occurred in 1978.   
 
Starnes became 18 years of age in 1982 and 20 years of 
age in 1984.  She filed her action against Cayouette in July 
1991.  He filed a plea invoking Code § 8.01-243, which 
imposed a time limitation of two years on personal injury 
actions.  In response, she argued that her action was timely 
filed under Acts 1991, c. 674,
2 which essentially revived a 
victim's cause of action for certain torts related to sexual 
abuse even though the statute of limitations had expired.   
 
In Starnes, we observed that the two-year statute of 
                     
     
2Clauses one and two of that Act provided:  
 
 
 
"In actions for injury to the person, 
whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from 
sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or 
incompetency of the person, [the cause of action 
shall be deemed to accrue] when the fact of the 
injury and its causal connection to the sexual 
abuse is first communicated to the person by a 
licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical 
psychologist.  However, no such action may be 
brought more than ten years after the later of (i) 
the last act by the same perpetrator which was 
part of a common scheme or plan of abuse or (ii) 
removal of the disability of infancy or 
incompetency. 
 
 
 
As used in this subdivision, 'sexual abuse' 
means sexual abuse as defined in subdivision 6 of 
§ 18.2-67.10 and acts constituting rape, sodomy, 
inanimate object sexual penetration or sexual 
battery as defined in Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et 
seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2. 
 
 
 
 
[T]he provisions of subdivision 6 of § 8.01-
249 shall apply to all actions filed on or after 
July 1, 1991, without regard to when the act upon 
which the claim is based occurred provided that no 
such claim which accrued prior to July 1, 1991, 
shall be barred by application of those provisions 
if it is filed within one year of the effective 
date of this act." 
limitations in Code § 8.01-243 was tolled until the 
plaintiff attained her majority in 1982.  We held that the 
statute of limitations expired on her claims in 1984, and 
her action was barred because she did not file suit until 
July 1991.  Additionally, we held that the defendant had a 
vested right to a defense of the statute of limitations once 
the statute of limitations had run and that the General 
Assembly could not, consistent with the due process 
guarantees of the Constitution of Virginia, art. I, § 11, 
divest the defendant of that property right.  Starnes, 244 
Va. at 207, 419 S.E.2d at 672.   
 
Here, however, the defendants, Artis and Danville 
Memorial Hospital, do not have vested property rights in the 
statute of limitations because, as we have already 
demonstrated, Nunnally's cause of action did not accrue 
until her child was conceived.  Unlike the plaintiff in 
Starnes, the statute of limitations governing Nunnally's 
action had not expired.  Thus, the defendants, Artis and 
Danville Memorial Hospital, acquired no vested property 
rights in an expired statute of limitations.  Additionally, 
unlike the facts in Starnes, neither the General Assembly 
nor this Court has revived a plaintiff's action that had 
expired.   
 
III. 
 
In view of the foregoing, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE 
STEPHENSON join, dissenting. 
 
 
The statement this Court made 75 years ago regarding 
Virginia's adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis is 
apropos in the present situation.  "[T]he construction of 
statutes ought not to vary with every change in the 
personnel of the appellate court."  Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 
160, 169, 112 S.E. 757, 760 (1922). 
 
It is obvious that this Court, as presently 
constituted, would not, as an original proposition, have 
construed the applicable statute of limitations as it was 
construed in Scarpa v. Melzig, 237 Va. 509, 379 S.E.2d 307 
(1989).  Nevertheless, the 1989 construction was dictated by 
controlling precedent, was reached "after full deliberation 
upon the issue," was made by a clear majority of the Court, 
and was not the product "of flagrant error or mistake."  
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 
S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987).  The 1989 construction should be 
followed now. 
 
Moreover, Scarpa has been cited with approval by this 
Court in five opinions, which were unanimous on the issue, 
during the period June 1992 to April of this year.  See 
Starnes v. Cayouette, 244 Va. 202, 206, 419 S.E.2d 669, 671 
(1992); Howard v. The Alexandria Hospital, 245 Va. 346, 350, 
429 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1993); Renner v. Stafford, 245 Va. 351, 
355, 429 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1993); Lo v. Burke, 249 Va. 311, 
317, 455 S.E.2d 9, 13 (1995); and St. George v. Pariser, 253 
Va. 329, 332, 484 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1997). 
 
Unfortunately, the present majority, merely 
acknowledging the existence of stare decisis and then 
promptly discarding the doctrine, has chosen to inject 
instability into the law of the Commonwealth.  I believe 
Scarpa should be controlling here, and thus would affirm the 
judgment of the trial court.