Title: Nelson v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47084
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 2000

Filed:  March 13, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MARK W. NELSON,
Petitioner,
v. 
HARDY MYERS,Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
JOHN PORTER,
Intervenor.
(SC S47084)

En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the petition, memoranda of respondent and
intervenor, and on the record, March 9, 2000.
James M. Brown, of Enfield Brown Collins &amp; Knivila, Salem,
filed the petition for petitioner.
Jas. Jeffrey Adams, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the answering memoranda for respondent.  With him on the
memoranda were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Kelly Clark, of O'Donnell &amp; Clark LLP, Portland, filed the
response for intervenor.
GILLETTE, J.
Ballot title certified as modified.  Pursuant to ORAP
1.20(4) and notwithstanding ORAP 11.30(10), the State Court
Administrator shall issue the appellate judgment at 5:00 p.m. on
March 14, 2000, unless a petition for reconsideration is both
filed with and physically received by the Office of the State
Court Administrator by that time.  Any timely petition for
reconsideration will stay issuance of the appellate judgment
until the court acts on such petition.
Van Hoomissen, J., concurred in part and dissented in part,
and filed an opinion.
Riggs, J., concurred and filed an opinion.
This is a ballot title review proceeding with respect
to a referred measure.  See ORS 250.085(2) (permitting challenge
to ballot title for "an initiated or referred measure").  The
measure refers to the voters legislation enacted during the 1999
Legislative Session, House Bill 2082 (1999); Or Laws 1999, ch
1060, which relates, among other things, to motor carrier and
fuel taxes.  Petitioner is an elector who timely submitted
written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content
of the draft ballot title proposed by the Attorney General.  He
therefore is entitled to seek review of the ballot title
certified by the Attorney General.  See ORS 250.085(2) (stating
that requirement).  We review for substantial compliance with the
requirements for ballot titles set out in ORS 250.035 (1997). 
ORS 250.085(5).  For the reasons discussed below, we modify the
Attorney General's ballot title.
Before turning to the merits, we first address a
procedural question arising out of the intervention in this
proceeding by one of the chief petitioners for the measure.  ORAP
11.30(8) provides, in part: 
"Additional persons, including the chief proponent
or proponents of a measure, interested in a ballot
title that is the subject of a petition may file a
motion * * * asking leave of the Supreme Court to
intervene and respond to the petition or the Attorney
General's answering memorandum, or both."
Invoking that rule, the chief petitioner sought and was granted
leave to intervene in this proceeding.  Together with his motion
to intervene, intervenor advanced various arguments concerning
why, in his view, the Attorney General's certified ballot title
fails to comply substantially with statutory standards.  Those
arguments posit different alleged deficiencies in the Attorney
General's certified ballot title than those asserted by
petitioner; they do not attempt to defend the Attorney General's
certified ballot title from the arguments advanced by petitioner. 
Intervenor also proffered a different ballot title, based on
intervenor's criticisms of the Attorney General's certified
ballot title, and urged the court to certify that ballot title in
lieu of the title that had been certified by the Attorney
General.  
The Attorney General objects to intervenor's arguments
on the ground that intervenor neither submitted comments to the
Secretary of State concerning the draft ballot title nor
separately petitioned for review of the Attorney General's
certified ballot title.  The Attorney General asserts that
intervenor may not avoid the statutory restrictions on the right
to file a petition to review a ballot title by seeking a
different ballot title through a motion to intervene.  For the
reasons that follow, we agree that the foregoing argument is well
taken under the particular facts of this case.  
ORS 250.085(2) limits the persons who may challenge a
ballot title to "[any] elector * * * who timely submitted written
comments on the draft ballot title."  In addition to that
restriction, ORS 250.085(3) and (4) contain time-line and notice
requirements that such electors must satisfy before obtaining
Supreme Court review.  And, with respect to that review, ORS
250.085(6) enjoins this court from considering "arguments
concerning the ballot title not presented in writing to the
Secretary of State," unless an exception (inapplicable here)
applies.  Intervenor has not satisfied those prerequisites. 
Thus, although he may offer alternative solutions to any defects
in the Attorney General's certified ballot title that petitioner
may have identified, intervenor may not himself obtain a
different ballot title based on new and different alleged defects
in that ballot title that only intervenor asserts.  
The permissive intervention that ORAP 11.30(8)
authorizes is not inconsistent with the foregoing analysis.  As
noted, that rule permits "additional persons," on being granted
leave to intervene in a ballot title review proceeding, to do one
of three things: "respond to the petition or the Attorney
General's answering memorandum, or both."  Because intervenor's
arguments cannot be read to respond either to the petition or to
the Attorney General's answering memorandum, we decline to
consider them.  And, because intervenor's proffered alternative
ballot title is not responsive to any alleged deficiencies in the
Attorney General's certified ballot title that petitioner raises,
we likewise decline to consider it.
We turn to petitioner's arguments.  The Attorney
General certified the following ballot title for the referred
measure: 
"REPEALS TRUCK WEIGHT-MILE TAX; ESTABLISHES AND  INCREASES FUEL TAXES
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote repeals truck
weight-mile tax; establishes diesel tax; increases gas
tax, registration fees.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote retains weight-mile highway tax on trucks; rejects increasing gas tax,
registration fees.
"SUMMARY:  Currently, motor carriers pay highway
tax based on truck weight, miles driven.  Measure
repeals weight-mile tax.  Establishes diesel fuel tax
(29 cents per gallon).  Increases gasoline tax by five
cents to diesel tax rate.  Raises vehicle registration
fees.  Requires licenses for diesel fuel suppliers,
distributors, certain dyed diesel fuel users, others. 
Requires recordkeeping and monthly tax reports by
licensees.  Authorizes transportation department to
enforce requirements, including inspections, notices,
tax collection, reassessment, credits, refunds. 
Provides remedies for violations, including fines,
penalties, criminal sanctions.  Other provisions."
Petitioner challenges the caption, the result
statements, and the summary.  He raises essentially two
arguments.  First, he asserts that the Attorney General
inaccurately has described the measure as repealing the truck
weight-mile tax.  Petitioner notes that a separate enactment
during the 1999 legislative session amended House Bill 2082 to
provide that the weight-mile tax is to be suspended until January
1, 2006, rather than repealed.  Or Laws 1999, ch 1075, § 2.  As
the Attorney General notes, however, petitioner did not present
that argument to the Secretary of State.  Accordingly, we may not
consider it.  ORS 250.085(6).
Second, petitioner argues that the Attorney General's
ballot title fails to comply substantially with statutory
standards.  This is so, petitioner claims, because nowhere in the
ballot title does the Attorney General describe the uses to which
the revenues that the measure is intended to generate will be
put, viz., road and bridge modernization, maintenance, and
preservation.  The Attorney General responds that describing the
intended uses for the additional revenues that the measure is
expected to generate improperly would discuss the purpose of the
measure.  The Attorney General also believes that such a
description would be, in essence, an abstract interpretation of
the measure.  
We disagree.  Several sections of the measure expressly
prescribe the different uses to which the expected revenues from
the measure are to be put.  Those uses are a major effect of the
proposed measure, tying the alternative taxing scheme that voters
are being asked to adopt with the purposes to which the money
raised by that taxing scheme would be devoted.  We conclude that
the ballot title should have referred, in a general manner, to
those uses.  The Attorney General's failure to do so means that
the Attorney General's ballot title does not comply substantially
with the requirements of ORS 250.035 (1997).  In our view, adding
the following sentence to the summary cures that deficiency: 
"Additional revenue to be used primarily for road and bridge
modernization, maintenance, and preservation."
The remaining question is, where does that sentence
belong?  We disagree with petitioner that such a reference, even
if it could fit within the applicable word limitations of the
caption or result statements, appropriately belongs in either
place.  The caption pertains to the "subject matter" of a
measure, ORS 250.035(2)(a) (1997), and the result statements
pertain to the results if the measure is approved or rejected,
ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c) (1997).  The uses for the expected
revenue are not the subject matter of the measure; neither, we
think, are they a result so substantial that a place for them
must be found in the result statements.  Instead, we conclude
that the reference to revenue uses is a major effect of the
measure that appropriately belongs in the summary.  See ORS
250.035(2)(d) (1997) (requiring "statement of not more than 85
words summarizing the measure and its major effect").  
To include such a reference in the summary and yet
comply with the 85 word limit, we must excise from the existing
summary certain text that we conclude, although permissible in a
summary, is not needed to make the present summary comply
substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(d) (1997).  That text consists
of the phrases "certain dyed diesel fuel users" and "including
inspections, notices, tax collection, reassessment, credits,
refunds." (1)  We also eliminate one of the conjunctions from the
summary.
We certify the following ballot title for the referred
measure to the Secretary of State:
REPEALS TRUCK WEIGHT-MILE TAX; ESTABLISHES AND INCREASES FUEL TAXES
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE:  "Yes" vote repeals truck
weight-mile tax; establishes diesel tax; increases gas
tax, registration fees.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE:  "No" vote retains weight-mile highway tax on trucks; rejects increasing gas tax,
registration fees.
SUMMARY:  Currently, motor carriers pay highway
tax based on truck weight, miles driven.  Measure
repeals weight-mile tax.  Establishes diesel fuel tax
(29 cents per gallon).  Increases gasoline tax by five
cents to diesel tax rate.  Raises vehicle registration
fees.  Additional revenue to be used primarily for road
and bridge modernization, maintenance, and
preservation.  Requires licenses for diesel fuel
suppliers, distributors, others.  Requires
recordkeeping, monthly tax reports by licensees. 
Authorizes transportation department to enforce
requirements.  Provides remedies for violations,
including fines, penalties, criminal sanctions.  Other
provisions.
Ballot title certified as modified.  Pursuant to ORAP
1.20(4) and notwithstanding ORAP 11.30(10), the State Court
Administrator shall issue the appellate judgment at 5:00 p.m. on
March 14, 2000, unless a petition for reconsideration is both
filed with and physically received by the Office of the State
Court Administrator by that time.  Any timely petition for
reconsideration will stay issuance of the appellate judgment
until the court acts on such petition.
VAN HOOMISSEN, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part.
I concur in that part of the majority opinion that
explains the role of an intervenor in a ballot title review
proceeding.  ORAP 11.30(8).
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority
opinion that finds it necessary to modify the Attorney General's
certified ballot title for the referred measure.  I would hold
that the certified ballot title substantially complies with the
statutory requirements for ballot titles set out in ORS 250.035
(1997).  ORS 250.085(5).
I wish to note, however, that the unspoken premise on
which this court's modification decision is based is that it does
not violate the principle of separation of powers for this court
to rewrite an explanatory statement or a certified ballot title. 
See Rooney v. Kulongoski (Elections Division #13), 322 Or 15, 55,
902 P2d 1143 (1995) (Unis, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial
modification of ballot titles offends Article III, section 1, of
the Oregon Constitution); Sizemore v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 229,
237, 905 P2d 1146 (1995) (Durham, J., concurring) (same).  That
premise needs to be revisited and, I trust, will be in an
appropriate case.
RIGGS, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority, but write separately
because I harbor significant concerns about the separation of
powers issues discussed in Rooney v. Kulongoski (Elections
Division #13), 322 Or 15, 55, 902 P2d 1143 (1995) (Unis, J.,
dissenting), and Sizemore v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 229, 238, 905 P2d
1146 (1995) (Durham, J., concurring).  Although I agree with the
concurring opinion of my colleague, Justice Van Hoomissen, as to
the need to revisit those issues, I believe that such a review
should take place sooner rather than later.  Nevertheless, partly
because of the extreme time pressures that resolution of this
particular ballot title case presents, I am content, for the
moment, to wait for a more appropriate case to explore the
parameters of those issues, with the assistance of interested
parties and the Attorney General.

1. To the extent that petitioner can be said to have
raised additional arguments concerning the Attorney General's
ballot title that are separate from those already discussed, we
have considered those arguments and hold that none of them
demonstrates that the Attorney General's ballot title fails to
comply substantially with statutory standards.