Title: State v. Mulhern
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001565-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2022

2022 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1565-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Ryan Hugh Mulhern, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS   
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 839, 953 N.W.2d 102 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 9, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Pierce   
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph D. Boles    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Sarah L. Burgundy.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Dennis Schertz and Schertz Lase Office, Hudson. There was an 
oral argument by Dennis Schertz.  
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 42 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP1565-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF255) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Ryan Hugh Mulhern, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review the court of 
appeals' decision1 reversing the circuit court's2 conviction of 
Ryan Mulhern for one count of second-degree sexual assault and 
one count of misdemeanor bail jumping.  On appeal, the State 
                                                 
1 State v. Mulhern, No. 2019AP1565-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2020) (per curiam). 
2 The Honorable Joseph D. Boles of Pierce County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
2 
 
asks us to reverse the court of appeals, arguing that evidence 
of the victim's lack of sexual intercourse is not prior "sexual 
conduct" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(a)-(b) (2017-2018)3 
(collectively referred to as the "rape shield" statute).  
Further, the State argues that, even if the victim's testimony 
was inadmissible, the error was harmless.   
¶2 
We conclude that the broad language used to define 
"sexual conduct" in the rape shield statute's prohibition 
includes evidence concerning the victim's lack of sexual 
intercourse.  Therefore, the victim's testimony in this case 
regarding her lack of sexual intercourse in the week prior to 
the sexual assault was improperly admitted.  However, we also 
conclude that, absent the rape shield evidence, a rational jury 
would have found Ryan Mulhern guilty of second-degree sexual 
assault beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's error in admitting the victim's testimony was harmless.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
This case arises out of a sexual assault committed by 
Ryan Mulhern against his friend, "Lisa."4  The State charged 
Mulhern with one count of second-degree sexual assault, one 
count of strangulation and suffocation, and one count of 
misdemeanor bail jumping.  The case proceeded to trial, during 
which, Lisa testified to the assault and the events that took 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Consistent with the policy underlying Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.86, we refer to the victim using a pseudonym. 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
3 
 
place in its aftermath.  She testified that in the late hours of 
November 21, 2016, Mulhern texted her and asked to come over to 
her house, claiming that he was having personal issues and 
sounded "upset" and "frantic."  Lisa agreed to let Mulhern come 
over for the night, but told him that he would be sleeping on 
the futon and that she "would be there for him as a friend, and 
that would be all it was." 
¶4 
Mulhern arrived around midnight and, rather than speak 
to Lisa about the personal issues going on in his life, he 
continually turned the conversation to Lisa and her life.  After 
a while, Lisa told Mulhern that she needed to go to sleep 
because she had an exam the next morning.  She directed Mulhern 
to the futon in the living room.  Lisa went upstairs to her 
bedroom, but Mulhern persisted.   
¶5 
Lisa got into bed and under the covers.  Mulhern laid 
on top of the covers and put his arm around her.  While Lisa 
tolerated this contact, she continued to try to make it 
"abundantly clear that [she] needed to get to [sleep and that 
she] was not interested in anything else." 
¶6 
Mulhern then began to kiss Lisa, who pushed him away, 
told him to stop, and reminded him that he was in a 
relationship.  Mulhern relented and promised to leave if Lisa 
would give him a single kiss.  Lisa gave him a peck on the lips 
and told him to leave.  Instead, Mulhern became more aggressive.  
He held Lisa's head and shoulders down as he kissed her mouth, 
face, and neck.  Mulhern got out of bed, removed his clothes, 
and got under the covers with Lisa.  
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Mulhern pressed his erect penis against her bottom and 
began trying to put his hands up her shirt and down her pants.  
When Lisa protested and tried to slap his hands away, Mulhern 
grew angrier and more forceful.  He pinned her against the wall 
and removed her pants.  Mulhern maneuvered between her legs and 
Lisa felt his penis enter her.  As he did this, Lisa struggled 
to breathe.  Mulhern pressed his forearm against her throat and 
her head lay over the edge of the bed.  She tried to yell for a 
roommate, who was not home, but she "could barely get her name 
out."  As she tried to scream, Mulhern covered her mouth and 
nose with his hand.  She bit his hand and attempted to scream 
again.   
¶8 
Lisa's next recollection was being curled up on the 
bed and Mulhern standing at the end of the bed and looking 
"apologetic and concerned."  He asked Lisa why she was so upset 
and offered to get her something to drink.  He left only after 
Lisa threatened to call the police.  As soon as Mulhern left, 
Lisa called a friend and told her what had happened with 
Mulhern.   
¶9 
Later that morning, Lisa called a local sexual assault 
resources team ("SART") and was told to meet them at the 
hospital for an examination.  At the hospital, Lisa was examined 
by a SART nurse who testified that she had numerous injuries 
consistent with an assault.  These injuries included tenderness 
and tightness on her neck, a sore throat, a semicircular wound 
on her right shoulder, and tenderness on her right chest wall, 
inner thighs, and inner calves.  Additionally, the nurse 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
5 
 
detailed that Lisa had significant injuries to her genital area, 
including tenderness on her inner and outer labia, a linear tear 
to the left inner labia, an abrasion on her right vaginal wall, 
and redness on the left vaginal wall.   
¶10 Shortly after leaving the hospital, Lisa saw a friend 
and told him about the assault.  The friend later testified that 
Lisa was distraught and cried when she told him about it.  Lisa 
further testified that the next day, she called the River Falls 
Police Department, interviewed with an officer, and told the 
officer what had occurred with Mulhern.  Later that week, Lisa 
went home for Thanksgiving and told her mother about the 
assault. 
¶11 Following Lisa's testimony, a DNA analyst from the 
State Crime Lab testified that he used DNA taken from Lisa's 
hospital visit and tested it for identification purposes.  He 
tested a sample of saliva-based DNA taken from Lisa's neck and 
matched it to Mulhern.  The analyst also tested a vaginal swab 
and found the presence of male DNA, but concluded that there was 
not a large enough sample to determine whose DNA it was.  The 
analyst further testified that a body's natural processes will 
remove foreign DNA deposited into a vagina after a period of 
five days following an assault.   
¶12 Following this testimony, the State, over defense 
counsel's objection, attempted to recall Lisa to the stand.  It 
did so to ask Lisa whether she had sexual intercourse in the 
week prior to November 22, 2016.  The circuit court allowed the 
question because, after reviewing the definition of "sexual 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
6 
 
conduct" under the rape shield statute, it determined that Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(2)(a) was limited to affirmative acts and, 
therefore, the proposed testimony regarding Lisa's lack of 
sexual intercourse fell outside the rape shield statute.  When 
Lisa was asked whether she had sexual intercourse in the prior 
week, she answered that she had not.  Mulhern was not given the 
opportunity to re-cross examine Lisa. 
¶13 Finally, Mulhern took the stand and told his version 
of the events of November 22.  He testified that Lisa invited 
him over that night and he went over to talk and catch up.  
After he was confronted with his text messages to Lisa, he 
acknowledged that his testimony was not accurate and that it was 
he who had asked to come to Lisa's apartment because he was 
"about to have a nervous breakdown."  Next, Mulhern stated that 
Lisa had never limited the interaction to just speaking "as 
friends" or that she told him to sleep on the futon downstairs.  
He was forced to also recant this testimony by his text messages 
to Lisa.   
¶14 Mulhern also testified that, after talking for a 
while, they began to kiss consensually.  He denied that Lisa 
ever voiced any resistance or told him to stop.  Then, they both 
removed their own clothes and Mulhern began to kiss Lisa on her 
breasts, neck, collarbones, and hips.  When Mulhern was about to 
insert his penis into Lisa's vagina, she suddenly yelled at him 
to stop and he left her home.  Mulhern testified that Lisa had 
contacted him twice after the incident.  The first time, she 
asked whether Mulhern had ejaculated inside of her, to which he 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
7 
 
denied penetrating her.  After asking that question, Lisa told 
Mulhern never to contact her again.   
¶15 Following testimony and closing arguments, in which 
the State referenced the analyst's five-day time period as well 
as Lisa's testimony regarding her lack of sexual intercourse in 
the week preceding the assault, the jury convicted Mulhern of 
second-degree assault.  Based on the terms of a plea agreement, 
because Mulhern was found guilty of the sexual assault charge, 
he was also found guilty of the misdemeanor bail jumping charge.  
However, the jury acquitted him of the strangulation charge.  
Mulhern appealed his convictions. 
¶16 The court of appeals reversed.  State v. Mulhern, 
No. 2019AP1565-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶34 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 
6, 2020) (per curiam).  At the court of appeals, the State 
conceded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by admitting the challenged portion of Lisa's 
testimony, but asserted that the error was harmless.  Id., ¶¶23-
24.  The court of appeals disagreed and concluded that the State 
had not met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have convicted Mulhern absent the circuit 
court's error.  Id., ¶¶27, 34.  Specifically, the court of 
appeals noted that the State relied heavily on Lisa's testimony 
and the DNA analyst's five-day window to construct a factual 
timeline that corroborated its theory of guilt in the case.  
Id., ¶33.  This timeline was highlighted in its closing 
argument.  Id.  We granted the State's petition for review, and 
now reverse the court of appeals.  
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
8 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review  
¶17 This 
case 
involves 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation and application.  Statutory interpretation and 
application present questions of law that we independently 
review, while benefitting from decisions of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.   
¶18 We determine whether the circuit court's decision to 
admit evidence was an erroneous exercise of discretion.  State 
v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 780, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).  "A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies 
an improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably 
supported by the facts of record."  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, 
¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191 (quoting Johnson v. Cintas 
Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756).  
A circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion in admitting 
evidence is subject to the harmless error rule.  State v. Hunt, 
2014 WI 102, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434 (citing State 
v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶85, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397).  
Whether the error was harmless presents a question of law that 
we review independently.  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶21 (citing 
State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶44, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 
791). 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
9 
 
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(2) 
¶19 The 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
to 
determine what the words of the statute mean so that they may be 
given effect.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Therefore, 
statutory interpretation must begin with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the words are plain and unambiguous, 
a court's inquiry ends and there is no need to consult extrinsic 
sources of interpretation, such as legislative history.  Id., 
¶¶45, 46.  Statutory language is given its "common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee 
Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).   
¶20 In addition to the plain meaning of statutory words, 
"[c]ontext is important to meaning.  So, too, is the structure 
of the statute in which the operative language appears."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Therefore, "statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results . . . [and] read where 
possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
avoid surplusage."  Id.  When courts interpret a statute, they 
are not at liberty to disregard "plain, clear words of the 
statute."  Id.  Context also can include the factual setting in 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
10 
 
which the statute is interpreted.  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 
76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.   
¶21 Turning then to the statute at issue here, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2) provides:   
(a)  In this subsection, "sexual conduct" means 
any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities 
of the complaining witness, including but not limited 
to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement and 
life-style. 
(b)  If the defendant is accused of a crime under 
s. 940.225, 942.09, 948.02, 948.025, 948.05, 948.051, 
948.06, 948.07, 948.08, 948.085, 948.09, or 948.095, 
or under s. 940.302(2), if the court finds that the 
crime 
was 
sexually 
motivated, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 980.01(5), any evidence concerning the complaining 
witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions of the 
witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation as to 
prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury, except the following, subject to 
s. 971.31(11): 
1.  Evidence of the complaining witness's past 
conduct with the defendant. 
2.  Evidence of specific instances of sexual 
conduct showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered. 
3.  Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault made by the complaining witness. 
§ 972.11(2)(a)-(b).   
¶22 We examine the text of Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(a) and 
(b) to determine whether para. (a)'s definition of "sexual 
conduct" includes a lack of "sexual intercourse."  If a lack of 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
11 
 
"sexual 
intercourse" 
is 
included 
within 
the 
statutory 
definition, does evidence of a victim's lack of "sexual 
intercourse" qualify for admission under one of para. (b)'s 
exceptions.  We address each of these questions in turn.  In 
doing so, it is helpful to begin with a reexamination of our 
past decisions that have involved the question of whether the 
rape shield statute's definition of "sexual conduct" includes a 
lack of sexual conduct.   
1.  Rape shield decisions 
¶23 Wisconsin's rape shield statute was enacted in 1976 
and, apart from updated cross-references, the two relevant 
paragraphs, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(a)-(b), remain unchanged 
today.  Three years after its enactment, in State v. Clark, a 
fifteen-year-old victim of sexual assault was allowed to testify 
"that she never had intercourse with anyone before the incident 
in question."  State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 810, 275 N.W.2d 
715 (1979).  Following a postconviction motion, the circuit 
court reviewed the rape shield statute and concluded it had 
erred by allowing that testimony.  Id. at 813.  On appeal, one 
question presented was whether "it was error to receive evidence 
concerning [a victim's] chastity[.]"5  Id.  However, in briefing, 
the "state concede[d] that the trial court erred in admitting 
[the victim's] testimony that she did not have intercourse 
before the incident in question."  Id. at 817.  We accepted the 
                                                 
5 The appeal in State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 275 N.W.2d 
715 (1979), was filed before the court of appeals was part of 
Wisconsin's appellate procedure.   
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
12 
 
concession and did not interpret § 972.11(2)(a).  Instead, we 
proceeded directly to a harmless error analysis.   
¶24 In Gavigan, we again accepted the State's concession 
that the circuit court erred in admitting testimony of the 
victim's virginity prior to being assaulted.  State v. Gavigan, 
111 Wis. 2d 150, 158, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).  In accepting the 
State's concession, we noted that:  
Sec. 972.11(2)(b), Stats., precludes the admission of 
"any evidence" pertaining to a complainant's prior 
sexual conduct or reputation.  Nothing in the statute 
limits its applicability to prior affirmative acts. 
Rather, the plain meaning of the words "prior sexual 
conduct" includes the lack of sexual activity as well. 
Accordingly, we conclude a statement that a woman is a 
virgin is necessarily a comment on the woman's prior 
sexual conduct.  The two references in question do not 
fall within any of the three exceptions listed in sec. 
972.11(2)(b). 
 
Nor 
do 
they 
establish 
any 
fact 
independent of the complainant's prior sexual conduct 
which is relevant to an issue in the case.  Therefore, 
the virginity testimony was inadmissible under the 
statute. 
Id. at 158–59.  However, despite this pronouncement that "the 
plain meaning of the words 'prior sexual conduct' includes the 
lack of sexual activity as well," id. at 159, we allowed 
evidence of the victim's virginity in regard to proof of lack of 
consent.  Id. at 160.   
¶25 We fashioned a test that would allow evidence to come 
in 
"only 
if" 
the 
evidence 
met 
the 
following 
conditions:  (1) "[T]he evidence [] serve[d] to prove a fact 
independent of the complainant's prior sexual conduct which is 
relevant to an issue in the case."  Id. at 157.  (2) "[T]he 
probative value of the evidence [] outweigh[ed] any prejudice 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
13 
 
caused by its relation to the complainant's prior sexual 
conduct."  Id.  (3) "[T]he jury's consideration of the evidence 
[] [was] limited to the purpose for which it was admitted."  Id. 
at 157-58.   
¶26 Following 
Gavigan's 
court-made 
exception, 
the 
legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) by adding para. (c).  
It provides:   
Notwithstanding 
s. 901.06, 
the 
limitation 
on 
the 
admission of evidence of or reference to the prior 
sexual conduct of the complaining witness in par. (b) 
applies regardless of the purpose of the admission or 
reference unless the admission is expressly permitted 
under par. (b) 1., 2. or 3. 
§ 972.11(2)(c).  This amendment limited the court from expanding 
the exceptions to § 972.11(2)(a) beyond those provided by the 
legislature in § 972.11(2)(b).  
¶27 Following the amendment that added para. (c), the 
State has continued its practice of conceding that, for the 
purposes of an appeal, evidence of a victim's lack of prior 
sexual conduct is inadmissible under the rape shield statute and 
has proceeded to argue for harmless error.  See, e.g., State v. 
Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d 596, 600, 609, 424 N.W.2d 698 (1988) ("The 
defendant and state agree that under our prior cases 'prior 
sexual conduct' includes lack of prior sexual conduct, that is, 
virginity.").   
¶28 However, in the matter now before us, the State has 
changed course and does not concede that Lisa's testimony 
regarding her lack of sexual intercourse during the week before 
the alleged sexual assault was admitted in error.  Therefore, we 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
14 
 
have occasion to interpret the definition of "sexual conduct" in 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(a).  
¶29 We recently held in State v. Bell that "[p]rior sexual 
conduct includes a lack of sexual conduct, meaning that evidence 
that 
a 
complainant 
had 
never 
had 
sexual 
intercourse 
is 
inadmissible."  State v. Bell, 2018 WI 28, ¶63, 380 Wis. 2d 616, 
909 N.W.2d 750.  Seeking to escape from this statement, the 
State asserts that this language should be ignored because its 
"reasoning on that point was a reiteration of an adopted 
concession in a case decided over three decades ago."6 
2.  Rape shield evidence   
¶30 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(a) 
defines 
"sexual 
conduct" as "any conduct or behavior relating to sexual 
activities of the complaining witness, including but not limited 
to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual contact, use 
of 
contraceptives, 
living 
arrangement 
and 
life-style."  
§ 972.11(2)(a).  We interpret and apply its provisions in regard 
to Lisa's testimony that she did not have sexual intercourse in 
the week preceding the assault.   
¶31 First, we note that "sexual conduct" is linked in the 
statutory definition to "any conduct or behavior relating to 
sexual activities of the complaining witness."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(a).  "Sexual activities" are not required to include 
prior sexual intercourse, although they may do so.  Also, 
"conduct" 
is 
an 
alternative 
to 
"behavior" 
("conduct 
or 
                                                 
6 Pet. Br. at 11. 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
15 
 
behavior") so long as it relates to sexual activities of the 
victim.     
¶32 Second, "sexual conduct" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(a) to include "living arrangement" and "life-style" 
if they relate to sexual activities of the victim.  Therefore, 
para. (a) employs very broad terms in its definition of "sexual 
conduct," so long as "living arrangement" and "life-style" have 
a connection to the "sexual activities of the complaining 
witness."  § 972.11(2)(a). 
¶33 Third, the legislature chose to modify "conduct" with 
the word "any."  "Any" is not defined in Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2).  
A dictionary definition provides that "any" is "one, some, or 
all indiscriminately of whatever quantity" or "some without 
reference to quantity or extent."7  Therefore, the plain meaning 
of "sexual conduct" as defined in § 972.11(2)(a) includes a 
broad range of evidence to which para. (b) precludes admission 
except as specifically excepted in para. (b).   
¶34 Furthermore, "relating," the gerund form of "relate," 
which is defined as "to show or establish logical or causal 
connection between,"8 indicates that the statutory definition 
                                                 
7 Any, 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any 
(last 
visited 
Mar. 23, 2022); see also State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 
573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) ("For purposes of statutory interpretation 
or construction, the common and approved usage of words may be 
established by consulting dictionary definitions."). 
8 Relate, 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relate (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2022).  
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
16 
 
does not narrowly limit the prohibition of evidence.  Rather, it 
seeks to identify any evidence that has a causal or logical 
relationship to sexual conduct of a "complaining witness."  The 
complaining witness's lack of sexual intercourse the week before 
the sexual assault at issue here bears a causal and logical 
connection to whether she participated in sexual conduct.  
Stated otherwise, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(a)'s usage of "any" and 
"relating to" sets broad application that extends beyond a 
definition of evidence concerning affirmative acts.  See Burbank 
Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶22, 294 Wis. 2d 
274, 717 N.W.2d 781 ("'Any' is a very broad term."); Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.   
¶35 In addition, the interpretation and application of 
statutory terms such as "life-style" and "living arrangement" 
under the particular facts of a given case, may cause para. (a) 
to be ambiguous.  Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶43 ("Permitting the 
facts of a case to gauge ambiguity simply acknowledges that 
reasonable minds can differ about a statute's application when 
the text is a constant but the circumstances to which the text 
may apply are kaleidoscopic.").  That is, interpretations of 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(a) by reasonably well-informed persons 
may vary.  Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, 
¶18, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (explaining that where a 
statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses, the statute is 
ambiguous).  However, the facts presented herein involve 
testimony concerning only sexual intercourse, not "life-style" 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
17 
 
or "living arrangement."  Accordingly, we do not address life-
style or living arrangement and rely on a plain meaning 
definition 
of 
sexual 
intercourse 
for 
our 
discussion 
and 
decision.   
¶36 As a means of disputing the conclusion that Lisa's 
lack of sexual intercourse in the week prior to the assault is 
sexual conduct to which Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b) prohibits 
admission, the State cites People v. Sharpe, 918 N.W.2d 504 
(Mich. 2018).  Sharpe interprets a similar, but not identical 
rape shield statute, which the State argues is entitled to our 
consideration as interpretive of § 972.11(2).  Under Michigan's 
rape shield statute, "[e]vidence of specific instances of the 
victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual 
conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct 
shall not be admitted . . . ."  Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j 
(2017-18).9 
¶37 In Sharpe, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that 
evidence that the victim "did not engage in other sexual 
intercourse in 2014 does not fall within the plain language of 
the rape-shield statute."  Id at 513.  It concluded that this 
"evidence demonstrate[d] an absence of conduct, not a 'specific 
                                                 
9 As with the Wisconsin rape shield statute, Michigan's rape 
shield statute allows for evidence to be admitted under 
delineated 
exceptions 
if 
"the 
judge 
finds 
that 
the . . . proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in 
the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does 
not outweigh its probative value."  Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j 
(2017-18).  Neither of those exceptions was applicable to the 
analysis at hand.   
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
18 
 
instance' of sexual conduct.  [And that to exclude] evidence of 
a lack of sexual partners under the rape-shield statute would 
render the phrase 'specific instances' meaningless."  Id.   
¶38 Importantly, in coming to this conclusion, the court 
distinguished words of the Michigan rape shield statute, which 
prohibit "specific instances" of a victim's prior sexual conduct 
from Wisconsin's rape shield statute, which prohibits "any 
evidence" of the victim's prior sexual conduct.  Id. at 513 n.9 
(comparing textual differences in state rape shield statutes).   
¶39 The State, in disagreement with the Michigan Supreme 
Court, asserts that these are "distinctions [] without [a] 
difference."10  We agree with the Michigan Supreme Court that 
these are dissimilar statutes, and therefore, whether evidence 
of a victim's lack of sexual intercourse is included in the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(a)'s definition of 
"sexual conduct" is not assisted by Sharpe or the Michigan 
statute.   
¶40 Next, we examine Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b).  It begins 
with 
a 
prohibition 
on 
the 
admittance 
of 
"any 
evidence" 
"concerning the complaining witness's prior sexual conduct or 
opinions of the witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation as 
to prior sexual conduct" that is stated differently than simply 
repeating the definition of "sexual conduct" expressed in 
para. (a).  This case does not involve the opinions of others or 
                                                 
10 Pet. Br. 23.   
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
19 
 
Lisa's reputation as to prior sexual conduct.  Therefore, we do 
not address those provisions.   
¶41 Instead, we move from Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)'s 
initial prohibition of the admission of evidence, to its three 
legislative exceptions, § 972.11(2)(b)1., 2. and 3.  We do so to 
determine whether evidence of a victim's lack of sexual 
intercourse in the week prior to the sexual assault fits within 
a statutory exception to admission of evidence under the rape 
shield statute.  Although para. (b) includes a prohibition of 
evidence of "sexual conduct" as defined in para. (a), the 
following evidence may be admissible:   
1. Evidence of the complaining witness's past 
conduct with the defendant. 
2. Evidence 
of 
specific 
instances 
of 
sexual 
conduct showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered. 
3. Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault made by the complaining witness. 
§ 972.11(2)(b).   
¶42 After examination of testimony at issue in this case, 
we conclude that none of these exceptions is applicable to 
Lisa's testimony regarding her lack of sexual intercourse in the 
week prior to the assault because the State did not use this 
evidence for a statutory purpose:  i.e., to determine "the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury suffered."  
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)2.  Subsection (2) allows the use of 
"sexual conduct" evidence to discern the origin of semen, 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
20 
 
pregnancy, or disease for purposes limited by statute.  However, 
the State did not use the evidence obtained by vaginal swab for 
a listed statutory purpose.  Rather, the State used it as proof 
that Lisa did not have sexual intercourse in the week prior to 
Mulhern's assault.  Therefore, subsec. (2) cannot be a basis for 
the lawful introduction of Lisa's testimony.11  Consequently, we 
conclude that Lisa's testimony, that she did not have sexual 
intercourse with anyone during the week preceding the assault, 
is barred by the broad language of the rape shield statute and, 
therefore, was erroneously admitted by the circuit court. 
C.  Harmless Error 
¶43 Because Lisa's testimony was admitted in error, we 
consider whether the circuit court's admission of that testimony 
was harmless.  The erroneous admission of evidence is subject to 
the harmless error rule.  See State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 
247, 267, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985) (concluding that testimony was 
erroneously admitted but affirming conviction on harmless error 
grounds).  Harmless error requires us to examine the error's 
effect on the jury.  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶26.  For an error 
to be harmless, the party that benefitted from the erroneous 
admission (in this case, the State), must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that "a rational jury would have found the 
                                                 
11 We conclude that neither of the other exceptions in Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(2)(b) is applicable to the facts presented 
herein.  Additionally, we decline to create or recognize any 
other exceptions not already stated in the text according to the 
legislature's most recent amendment to § 972.11(2).  Cf. Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(2)(c). 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
21 
 
defendant guilty absent the error."  Id. (quoting State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189).  We 
previously have articulated several factors to assist in a 
harmless error analysis, including but not limited to:  "the 
importance of the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence; the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting 
the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence; the nature of the 
defense; the nature of the State's case; and the overall 
strength of the State's case."  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶27.  
¶44 Here, the State asserts that, even without the 
erroneous 
admission 
of 
Lisa's 
testimony, 
there 
is 
still 
overwhelming evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a rational jury would have found Mulhern guilty of second-degree 
sexual assault.  Although we acknowledge that Mulhern was denied 
the opportunity to re-cross examine Lisa and that the State 
relied 
on 
Lisa's 
inadmissible 
testimony 
in 
its 
closing 
arguments; we nonetheless recognize the overall strength of the 
State's case and conclude that the circuit court's error was 
harmless.  
¶45 The SART nurse's testimony was crucial evidence 
presented to the jury.  She testified about her physical 
examination of Lisa and the injuries that Lisa's body evidenced.  
She 
testified 
that 
Lisa 
had 
numerous 
physical 
injuries, 
including significant injuries to her genital area.  She said 
that Lisa suffered a linear tear to her left inner labia, 
tenderness on her inner and outer labia, an abrasion on her 
right vaginal wall, and redness on the left vaginal wall.  She 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
22 
 
also testified that Lisa had tenderness and tightness on her 
neck, a sore throat, a semicircular wound on her right shoulder, 
and tenderness on her right chest wall, inner thighs, and inner 
calves. 
 
The 
nurse 
confirmed 
that 
Lisa's 
injuries 
were 
consistent with sexual assault and Lisa's recounting of what had 
happened to her.  In essence, Lisa's injuries provided physical 
evidence that corroborated her description of Mulhern's assault, 
and they also contradicted Mulhern's version of his interaction 
with Lisa.   
¶46 A DNA analyst from the State Crime Laboratory used DNA 
taken 
from 
Lisa's 
hospital 
visit 
and 
tested 
it 
for 
identification purposes.  He tested a sample of saliva-based DNA 
taken from Lisa's neck and matched it to Mulhern.  This placed 
him in physical contact with Lisa.  The analyst also tested a 
vaginal swab and found the presence of male DNA; however, there 
was not a large enough sample to determine whose DNA it was.   
¶47 Lisa also made contemporaneous reports of the sexual 
assault.  Although we recognize that contemporaneous reporting 
may not always be indicative of the veracity of an allegation, 
we observe that immediately after it happened, Lisa called her 
roommate to let her know.  Later that same day, she reported the 
assault to the SART nurse and met her at a hospital for an 
examination.  After leaving the hospital, Lisa told a friend 
about the assault.  The friend testified that Lisa was 
distraught and crying.  The next day, Lisa called the River 
Falls Police Department, interviewed with an officer, and told 
the officer what had occurred with Mulhern.  Later that same 
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
23 
 
week, Lisa told her mother about the assault while home for 
Thanksgiving.   
¶48 Finally, Mulhern's own testimony, and his repeated 
retractions that were forced by his prior text messages, also 
support the jury's concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
was guilty of sexual assault.  For example, Mulhern was required 
to retract his assertions that Lisa had been the one to invite 
him over, that she had never limited the interaction to just 
speaking "as friends," and that she told him to sleep on the 
futon downstairs.  Each of Mulhern's retractions made him less 
credible in the eyes of the jury and supported Lisa's report 
that he sexually assaulted her.   
¶49 Attempting to discount the strength of the State's 
case and witness testimony, Mulhern argues that the jury's 
decision not to convict him of strangulation and suffocation 
casts doubt on Lisa's testimony as a whole.  The court of 
appeals agreed saying that the acquittal "suggests that the jury 
had a reasonable doubt as to whether [Lisa's] testimony fully 
and accurately described Mulhern's actions."12  However, the 
different outcomes on the sexual assault and strangulation 
charges are more reasonably explained by the difference in 
elements needed to prove each crime.   
¶50 To convict Mulhern of strangulation and suffocation, 
the State was required to prove that Mulhern (1) intentionally 
(2) impeded Lisa's normal breathing or circulation of blood; 
                                                 
12 Mulhern, No. 2019AP1565-CR, at ¶31.   
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
24 
 
(3) by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking 
the nose or mouth.  Wis. Stat. § 940.235(1).13  By contrast, to 
convict Mulhern of second-degree sexual assault, the State was 
required to prove that Mulhern (1) had sexual intercourse 
(2) with Lisa (3) without consent (4) by use or threat of force 
or violence.14 
¶51 Based on the required elements for each crime, it is 
reasonable that the jury concluded that there was enough 
evidence to convict Mulhern on the sexual assault charge and not 
on the strangulation charge.  This is so because strangulation 
requires that the State prove that Mulhern acted with the 
"mental purpose to impede normal breathing or circulation of 
blood or was aware that [the] conduct was practically certain to 
cause that result."  State v. Christel, Nos. 2020AP1127-CR & 
2020AP1128-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶45 n.7, (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 8, 2021) (quoting Wis JI——Criminal 1255 (2014)).  The jury 
could have concluded that Mulhern used force to assault Lisa, 
but did not intend to stop her from breathing; rather, his 
covering her mouth was to limit her screams.  The elements of 
                                                 
13 In full, Wis. Stat. § 940.235(1) provides that "[w]hoever 
intentionally impedes the normal breathing or circulation of 
blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking 
the nose or mouth of another person is guilty of a Class H 
felony." 
14 In full, Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) provides that whoever 
"[h]as sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person 
without consent of that person by use or threat of force or 
violence" is guilty of a Class B Felony.   
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
25 
 
the two crimes are distinct; they do not overlap in regard to 
the facts needed to prove each crime.   
¶52 Additionally, if we were to agree with Mulhern and the 
court of appeals that the jury may have doubted Lisa's testimony 
regarding strangulation, it does not follow that it would then 
simultaneously doubt her testimony regarding the sexual assault.  
This case was not simply a straightforward assessment of both 
parties' credibility.  Instead, the inconsistencies inherent in 
Mulhern's testimony, combined with the consistency between 
Lisa's testimony and the physical evidence of bodily injury that 
Lisa suffered, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have found Mulhern guilty of second-degree sexual 
assault without Lisa's testimony that she did not have sexual 
intercourse in the week before the assault.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the circuit court's error in admitting that 
testimony was harmless.   
No. 
2019AP1565-CR   
 
26 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 We conclude that the broad language used to define 
"sexual conduct" in the rape shield statute's prohibition 
includes evidence concerning the victim's lack of sexual 
intercourse.  Therefore, the victim's testimony in this case 
regarding her lack of sexual intercourse in the week prior to 
the sexual assault was improperly admitted.  However, we also 
conclude that, absent the rape shield evidence, a rational jury 
would have found Ryan Mulhern guilty of second-degree sexual 
assault beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's error in admitting the victim's testimony was harmless.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals 
reversed.   
 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
1 
 
¶54 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring).  Ryan 
Mulhern was convicted of second-degree sexual assault.  He now 
appeals claiming that because of the rape shield law, it was 
error for the victim, Lisa, to testify that she did not have 
intercourse with another individual the week prior to the 
assault.  The majority agrees with Mulhern that admission of 
that testimony was in error, but the majority concludes that the 
error was harmless.  I concur because the lack of sexual conduct 
is not sexual conduct, and the rape shield statute does not 
apply to Lisa's testimony.  Lisa's testimony directly related to 
the defense asserted and the DNA expert's testimony.  At a 
minimum, that testimony "opened the door" to the response she 
wished to offer.  It was not error for the circuit court to 
admit Lisa's testimony into evidence.    
¶55 Lisa testified that Mulhern sexually assaulted her on 
November 21, 2016.  She reported the sexual assault shortly 
after it occurred, and physical evidence was collected soon 
thereafter. Mulhern's DNA was found on Lisa's neck.  In 
addition, male DNA was found in her vagina, but the sample was 
not large enough to determine whose DNA it was.   
¶56 At trial, Mulhern defended himself and asserted that 
Lisa was not telling the truth.  He denied having sexual 
intercourse with Lisa.  According to Mulhern, Lisa and he kissed 
and took off their clothes, but before they were about to have 
sex Lisa emotionally and without any warning yelled and demanded 
that he leave.  Mulhern asserted that any male DNA found inside 
her vagina was not his, and therefore the DNA must have come 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
2 
 
from someone else.  Mulhern argued to the jury that "the only 
place they found DNA that they can attribute to [him] is on the 
back of her neck," and the accusations from "the State and 
[Lisa]" 
that 
accuse 
Mulhern 
"of 
having 
sexual 
intercourse . . . did not occur."  In cross-examination of Lisa, 
Mulhern's counsel asked Lisa if she was "always completely 
truthful."  Defense counsel then cross-examined the State's DNA 
expert and pointed out that, other than the DNA on Lisa's neck, 
there was "nothing else that [the DNA report] can attribute to 
Ryan Mulhern."  Mulhern's counsel emphasized during the cross-
examination that the DNA samples do not prove Mulhern's guilt.  
Specifically, Mulhern's counsel stated that "the samples [taken 
from Lisa's vagina] had a male contribute" but the expert "[did 
not] know whether it's Ryan or not."  In other words, Mulhern's 
defense was that while they had certain contact, Lisa must have 
had intercourse with someone else.  
¶57 With Mulhern arguing unambiguously that he did not 
have sex with Lisa and thereby any male DNA must have come from 
a different source, the prosecution called Lisa back to the 
stand.  Lisa testified that she had not had sex with any other 
person in the week prior to the assault.  After receiving this 
testimony, the State called back its DNA expert, who testified 
that the male DNA would generally remain in the vagina only five 
days after sexual contact.  After hearing all the available 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
3 
 
evidence, Mulhern was convicted of second-degree sexual assault.1  
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (stating that it is a Class C felony 
for anyone who has "sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
another person without consent of that person by use or threat 
of force or violence").    
¶58 The majority here errs in concluding that Lisa's 
testimony concerning the lack of sexual activity the week before 
the attack is barred under Wisconsin's rape shield statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11.  See majority op., ¶42.  Specifically, the 
majority errs in concluding that it is Mulhern who is protected 
under the rape shield statute.  According to the majority's 
reading of the rape shield statute, the statute protects the 
perpetrator of the assault from the inculpatory testimony of the 
victim.  The testimony, if believed, would be evidence that 
Mulhern was the source of DNA found on Lisa's body.  The 
majority applies the rape shield statute in a manner that harms 
rather than shields the victim.  At a minimum, the defense that 
was offered "opened the door" to allowing Lisa to testify about 
the lack of an alternative source. 
¶59 Quite often in sexual assault cases, juries have to 
weigh and consider competing versions of events and determine, 
in their search for the truth, which portion of the testimony 
they find more appealing to their good judgment and common 
sense.  In other words, they have to decide who they believe.  
                                                 
1 As part of the same criminal complaint, Mulhern was 
acquitted of a charge of strangulation, Wis. Stat. § 940.235(1), 
and was found guilty to misdemeanor bail jumping, Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(a).   
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
4 
 
Given the intimate nature of these offenses, victims of rape and 
sexual assault often provide very personal evidence to the 
police and assist in the prosecution of their assailants.  Many 
times, sexual assault victims know their assailant and in fact 
may have had prior sexual relations.2  See The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, The National Intimate Partner 
and Sexual Violence Survey 22-23 (2011) (reporting that between 
14% and 15% of rape victims were assaulted by a stranger and 
upward toward 50% of rapes are committed by friends and intimate 
                                                 
2 The vast majority of rapes and sexual assaults are not 
reported. 
 
See 
U.S. 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
Criminal 
Victimization, 2018 8 (Sept. 2019) (stating that in 2017 and 
2018 between 25% to 40% of sexual assaults and rapes were 
reported to police); National Sexual Violence Resource Center, 
Statistics About Sexual Violence 2 (2015) ("Rape is the most 
under-reported crime; 63% of sexual assaults are not reported to 
police.").  Victims often do not want to make known details of 
how they were violated and publicly recount the extraordinarily 
traumatic events in their lives.  Even when sexual assaults and 
rapes are reported, a minority lead to arrests.  E.g., compare 
U.S. Department of Justice, supra 4, 8 (stating that there were 
183,000 reported sexual assaults or rapes in 2018), with Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States: 2018, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2018/tables/table-29 (last visited June 6, 2022) (explaining 
that there were 72,142 arrests for sexual assault and rape in 
the United States in 2018); Rape, Abuse, & Incest National 
Network, 
The 
Criminal 
Justice 
System: 
Statistics, 
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system 
(last 
visited June 6, 2022) (stating that out of 1,000 sexual 
assaults, 310 are reported to police and 50 reports lead to an 
arrest).  Even when a victim reports a sexual assault or rape, 
and even when the State proceeds with prosecution, conviction 
rates are low.  See U.S. Department of Justice, Felony 
Defendants in Large Urban Counties 22 (2013) (finding that 
"[t]he 
probability 
that 
a 
defendant 
would 
eventually 
be 
convicted 
of 
the 
original 
felony 
charge" 
was 
the 
"lowest . . . for charged with rape (35%) and assault (33%)"); 
Rape, Abuse, & Incest National Network, supra (stating that 2.8% 
of sexual assaults or rapes lead to a conviction).   
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
5 
 
partners).  Often times, cases come down to a credibility 
determination between the victim and the defendant.  See State 
v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶81, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174 
(explaining in the context of a child sexual assault that many 
cases "boiled down to a credibility determination" in which the 
prosecution 
relies 
"on 
a 
single 
witness . . . frequently 
unsupported by physical evidence").   
¶60 Before rape shield legislation, defendants in sexual 
assault cases would use a victim's sexual history to attack the 
credibility of the victim and the victim's story.  Rape shield 
legislation was written to stop the practice.  See State v. 
Vonesh, 135 Wis. 2d 477, 484, 401 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(reasoning that the "objective of the [rape shield] reformers 
was to reverse the long-standing common law doctrine that 
permitted a defendant accused of rape to inquire into the 
complainant's 'character for unchastity,'" and was designed to 
"increase . . . the number of rape prosecutions by removing some 
of the potential for embarrassment or humiliation which inhibits 
victims from reporting crimes" (quoting Rape Law Review: A Brief 
Summary 
of 
State 
Action, 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, 
Informational Bulletin 75-1B-1, at 6 (1975)); Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 5372 (2d ed. 2022) (explaining 
that prior to rape shield legislation in the United States, "the 
defense in a rape case operated under few constraints" with 
respect to "evidence concerning the character of a rape victim 
and her prior sexual conduct," which made it "difficult to 
obtain convictions of rapists"); Sandoval v. Acevedo, 996 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
6 
 
F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating the origins of the rape 
shield laws, explaining that many rape and sexual assault 
victims had engaged in sex in the past, and "allowing defense 
counsel to spread the details of a woman's sex life on the 
public record not only causes embarrassment to the woman but by 
doing so makes it less likely that victims of rape will press 
charges").   
¶61 Before the rape shield statute, a common argument was 
that "a woman of previous unchaste character is more likely to 
consent to an act of sexual intercourse than is a woman who is 
strictly virtuous."  Kaczmarzky v. State, 228 Wis. 247, 249, 280 
N.W. 362 (1938).  A classic example of this defense tactic was 
addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court in Williams v. State, 681 
N.E.2d 195 (Ind. 1997).  In that case, the defendant, with the 
help of an accomplice, pulled the victim into a car, pointed a 
gun at the victim, and demanded the victim have sex with the 
defendant.  Id. at 198.  The victim escaped by grabbing the gun 
and opening the car door.  Id.  The defendant was convicted of 
attempted deviate conduct and criminal confinement.  Id.  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court wrongfully 
excluded evidence that "on prior occasions the victim had 
committed acts of prostitution in exchange for money or 
cocaine."  Id. at 200.  The defendant claimed this evidence 
"support[ed] 
his 
defense 
that 
the 
victim 
consented 
and 
accompanied the men because they had promised to obtain drugs 
for her."  Id.  The Indiana Supreme Court correctly concluded 
that this defense was barred by the rape shield law, reasoning 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
7 
 
that "purported incidents with other men at other times [are] 
offered simply to show that the victim had consented in the past 
in the hope the inference will be drawn that she consented 
here."  Id.   
¶62 Here, the evidence produced is not that from a 
defendant who seeks to prove that Lisa's prior sexual acts or 
reputation are a form of propensity evidence.  That would be 
protected by the rape shield law.  In fact, the defendant is not 
introducing the evidence at issue, whether to embarrass or 
intimidate the victim or for any other reason.  Instead, the 
State is introducing the victim's testimony in order to answer 
the defense that the DNA in the victim's vagina was from someone 
other than the defendant.  Lisa reported her assault, assisted 
the police and prosecution, and testified in a public trial 
against her assailant.  No testimony was elicited as to her 
reputation, character, or her predisposition to engage in sexual 
activity; it was offered in answer to the defense.  The evidence 
provided was tailored in time and content, was highly relevant, 
and was fundamentally legitimate.  If the jury instead concluded 
that the State had not proven that Mulhern had sexually 
assaulted Lisa, her responsive testimony was of no consequence.   
¶63 Stated differently, non-conclusive DNA evidence was 
found in Lisa's vagina.  Mulhern contends it is not his and must 
be someone else's because he did not have intercourse with her.  
Lisa answers that defense by stating that there can be no 
alternate sources because she did not have intercourse in the 
prior week.  The DNA expert testified that DNA evidence of this 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
8 
 
type does not last longer than five days.  If the jury believed 
Mulhern's 
defense, 
her 
testimony 
would 
have 
been 
of 
no 
consequence.  The jury believed Lisa, and Mulhern was convicted.   
¶64 The plain text of Wisconsin's rape shield statute does 
not protect criminal defendants from evidence of the victim's 
lack of sexual activity.  In sex crime prosecutions, "any 
evidence concerning the complaining witness's prior sexual 
conduct or opinions of the witness's prior sexual conduct and 
reputation as to prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b).  "Sexual conduct" is 
defined as "conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of 
the complaining witness, including but not limited to prior 
experience of sexual intercourse or sexual contact, use of 
contraceptives, 
living 
arrangement 
and 
life-style."  
§ 972.11(2)(a).  This statute is well in line with rape shield 
statutes throughout the country, which prohibit introduction of 
the 
victim's 
prior 
sexual 
acts 
and 
the 
victim's 
sexual 
reputation and predispositions.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 412(a) 
(prohibiting evidence "that a victim engaged in other sexual 
behavior" and evidence of "a victim's sexual predisposition"); 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2) (allowing criminal defendants to 
introduce character evidence showing "the victim's pertinent 
trait," but subjecting that provision to "the limitations in 
Rule 
412 
[the 
federal 
rape 
shield]"); 
Ohio 
Rev. 
Code 
§ 2907.02(D) ("Evidence of specific instances of the victim's 
sexual activity, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
9 
 
activity, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual 
activity shall not be admitted under this section . . . .").  
¶65 "Conduct" is defined as the "[m]anner of conducting 
oneself or one's life; behaviour; usually with more or less 
reference to its moral quality (good or bad)." Conduct, Oxford 
English Dictionary (2021).  The definition includes how one 
behaves or acts; it does not include behavior or activity not 
attributed to the individual.  Thus, "sexual conduct" cannot 
include conduct that is not sexual.  Under the majority's 
reading, not engaging in sexual conduct is sexual conduct.   
¶66 The statutory explanation of "sexual conduct" further 
supports this conclusion.  Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(2)(a) states 
that sexual conduct includes "conduct or behavior relating to 
sexual activities."  "Sexual activities" makes it even clearer 
that the statute is referring to actions of the victim that are 
sexual in nature.  "Activity" is defined as "[t]he state of 
being active; the quality or condition of being an agent or of 
performing an action or operation; the exertion of energy, 
force, or influence."  Activity, Oxford English Dictionary 
(2021).  Thus, "sexual activity" is the state of a being active 
and engaging in sex or sexual behavior.  The definition and 
plain meaning of sexual activity does not encompass the lack of 
action or behavior.  It is commonly understood that sexual 
"activity" 
and 
sexual 
"acts" 
involve 
engaging 
in 
sexual 
behavior, not abstaining or engaging in non-sexual behavior.  
See, 
e.g., 
Sexual 
Activity 
and 
Satisfaction 
in 
Healthy 
Community-dwelling 
Older 
Women, 
U.S. 
National 
Library 
of 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
10 
 
Medicine, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3246190/ 
(study testing the existence of "sexual activity" by asking 
whether the subjects engaged in sexual acts or intercourse); 
Trends in Frequency of Sexual Activity and Number of Sexual 
Partners Among Adults Aged 18 to 44 Years in the US, 2000-2018, 
JAMA Network, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/ 
fullarticle/2767066 (measuring "sexual activity" in the United 
States by inquiring into "sexual frequency and number of sexual 
partners"); see also Sexually Active, Merriam-Webster (2021) 
("[E]ngaging in sexual relations." (Emphasis added.)).  When a 
doctor asks whether a patient has been sexually active, no 
rational patient would answer "yes" when the patient has 
abstained from sex.  
¶67 The statutory context of Wisconsin's rape shield law 
supports this meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used.").  Wisconsin's rape shield statute includes three 
exceptions.  In conformity with the plain meaning of sexual 
conduct and activities, all three exceptions involve some form 
of sexual behavior or activity.  Evidence of sexual activity can 
be admitted to show "complaining witness's past conduct with the 
defendant"; "specific instances of sexual conduct showing the 
source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in 
determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered"; and "prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault 
made by the complaining witness."  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1.-
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
11 
 
3.  The first exception applies only if there is sexual conduct 
with the defendant to introduce; evidence that the victim never 
met the defendant is not included in the first exception.  The 
second exception involves sexual conduct where there is a 
dispute over the origin of physical evidence.  This exception 
facially would have no relevance if the victim did not engage in 
sexual activities or behaviors.  Finally, the third exception 
includes accusations of sexual conduct the victim made in the 
past.  The exception does not cover victim allegations that no 
sexual activity occurred.  Therefore, the plain text of 
§ 972.11(2) supports the conclusion that Lisa's testimony that 
she did not engage in sexual activities in the week prior to 
Mulhern's assault was admissible and proper. 
¶68 But is it practicable to have a rule whereby the lack 
of sexual conduct is admissible under the rape shield statute?  
Absolutely, in particular when the victim wishes to introduce it 
as an answer to a defense.  While a victim need not so testify, 
it could be offered to complete the facts for the jury. 
¶69 Other states have adopted that position, some for many 
years.  See, e.g., Forrester v. State, 440 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. 
1982) (holding that evidence of the victim's virginity in 
proving the victim's hymen was recently torn was not barred by 
the rape shield statute, reasoning that "[i]t is the victim, not 
the accused, that the statute was designed to shield"); People 
v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Colo. App. 1983) (explaining 
that the rape shield statute "protect[s] rape and sexual assault 
victims from humiliating public fishing expeditions into their 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
12 
 
past sexual conduct," but it does not prohibit "the victim from 
testifying as to the lack of prior sexual activity");  People v. 
Sharpe, 918 N.W.2d 504, 513 (Mich. 2018) (holding that evidence 
that the victim did not engage in sex with a man other than the 
defendant during the relevant period, in conjunction with 
evidence of pregnancy, was not barred by the rape shield 
statute, explaining that the statute did not apply where the 
victim "has voluntarily offered evidence of her pregnancy, 
abortion, and lack of sexual history to bolster her allegations 
of criminal sexual conduct"); see also State v. Boggs, 588 
N.E.2d 813, 816-17 (Ohio 1992) (distinguishing false statements 
of a victim where no sexual activity was involved, thus falling 
outside the rape shield, from those statements where sexual 
conduct did in fact take place, which would be covered by the 
rape shield).   
¶70 The majority states that rape shield statutes from 
other states like Michigan have different meanings because they 
include the words "specific instances."  See majority op., ¶¶37-
39.  The Michigan rape shield statute prohibits evidence of 
"specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct."  Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 750.520j(1).  But the addition of "specific 
instances" 
only 
emphasizes 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
"sexual 
conduct."  If, as the majority holds, "sexual conduct" includes 
the lack of sexual conduct, why would that meaning change if the 
words "specific instances" are included before it?  The 
inclusion of "specific instances" does not materially change the 
meaning of "sexual conduct."  
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
13 
 
¶71 Sexual activity does not include the lack of sexual 
activity.  And the lack of sexual behavior does not become 
sexual behavior simply because the scope of consideration is 
widened from a specific instance to a longer period of time.  
The inclusion of the words "specific instances" brings to the 
fore just how detached non-sexual activity is from sexual 
activity.  This analysis lends weight to the conclusion that the 
lack of sexual activity is not covered by the rape shield law.  
Just as in Michigan, the Wisconsin rape shield law does not 
prohibit a victim from "voluntarily offer[ing] evidence of 
her . . . lack of sexual history to bolster her allegations of 
criminal sexual conduct against defendant."  Sharpe, 918 N.W.2d 
at 513.3   
                                                 
3 Under 
the 
majority's 
reasoning, 
the 
term 
"specific 
instances" supports the conclusion that the lack of sexual 
conduct is excluded from the definition.  See majority op., 
¶¶38-39 (stating, "[w]e agree" that the inclusion of the words 
"specific instances" is a distinguishing feature of the Michigan 
rape shield statute).  If that is true, the second exception to 
the rape shield statute unambiguously does not apply to the lack 
of sexual activity.  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)2. (stating that 
"[e]vidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the 
source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease" may be used to 
determine "the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered" (emphasis added)).  Therefore, if the DNA found in 
Lisa's vagina were derived from semen, under the statute, 
Mulhern would be able to introduce evidence showing that the 
source of the semen was from another man with whom Lisa had sex 
(which in this case did not exist).  Because the majority holds 
that the lack of sexual conduct is covered under the rape shield 
statute 
and 
reasons 
that 
the 
words 
"specific 
instances" 
incorporate conduct alone, Lisa and the prosecution would not be 
able to introduce evidence that she did not engage in sex with 
another man.   
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
14 
 
¶72 Would permitting the victim to present evidence on the 
lack of sexual history unjustifiably prejudice the defendant?  
No.  It provides an answer to the defense presented in this 
case.  The defense here was responded to by Lisa offering to 
testify about her lack of sexual activity in the relevant 
timeframe for this assault.  
¶73 All testimony admitted into evidence must be relevant 
and cannot be unduly prejudicial.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 904.02, 
904.03.  No party contends that Lisa's testimony here was 
irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, or duplicative.  In fact, the 
testimony was immensely relevant to a central issue in the 
case:  whether the DNA evidence was derived from Mulhern or 
another man.  Furthermore, Lisa's testimony only had weight to 
the extent that the jury found her credible.  Lisa's testimony 
merely supplemented expert testimony that male DNA would not 
remain in the vagina longer than five days.  Regardless of 
Lisa's testimony,  the jury could have concluded that the male 
DNA was derived from someone other than Mulhern. 
¶74 No one argues that the admission of this evidence 
prevented Mulhern from presenting a full defense.  Further, the 
rape shield statute has an exception that allows defendants such 
as Mulhern to introduce evidence of prior sexual history to 
prove the "source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease."  
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)2.; see also Sandoval, 996 F.2d at 149 
("[A] rape shield statute cannot constitutionally be employed to 
deny 
the 
defendant 
an 
opportunity 
to 
introduce 
vital 
evidence."); Gagne v. Booker, 680 F.3d 493, 514 (6th Cir. 2012) 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
15 
 
(explaining under established United States 
Supreme Court 
precedent, "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense——such that 
the court may not exclude competent, reliable evidence central 
to the defendant's claim of innocence, in the absence of any 
valid state justification" (cleaned up)); Sharpe, 918 N.W.2d at 
513 n.10 ("[Under the Constitution] [t]he admission of [the lack 
of sexual conduct] may open the door to the introduction of 
evidence whose admission may otherwise have been precluded by 
the rape-shield statute.").   
¶75 Under existing law, Mulhern already had the right to 
introduce evidence proving that physical evidence of the crime 
came from another individual.  The unfortunate result of the 
majority's holding is that sexual assault victims are prohibited 
from fully contesting that defense even if they wish to so 
testify.   
¶76 Wisconsin rape shield caselaw has stated that victims 
are barred from presenting testimony on the lack of their sexual 
history.  See State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 810, 275 
N.W.2d 715 (1979); State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 159, 330 
N.W.2d 571 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d 596, 600, 609, 
424 N.W.2d 698 (1988); State v. Bell, 2018 WI 28, ¶63, 380 
Wis. 2d 616, 909 N.W.2d 750.  However, this conclusion was based 
on the State's concessions.  Instead of precedent based on 
concessions, 
we 
should 
rely 
on 
the 
existence 
of 
strong 
adversarial briefing and litigation.  See State ex rel. First 
Nat'l Bank of Wis. Rapids v. M&I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 303, 309, 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980) (reasoning that the 
whole premise of standing in court is to "insure that the 
dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable 
of judicial resolution").  Because the State conceded these 
points in prior cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not 
provide detailed or thorough analysis.  See Clark, 87 Wis. 2d at 
810; Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 159; Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d at 600, 
609; Bell, 380 Wis. 2d 616, ¶63.  Prosecutors have an obligation 
to fully and zealously represent the interests of the State, 
just as defense attorneys must fully represent their clients.  
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Kraemer, 
200 
Wis. 2d 547, 557, 547 N.W.2d 186 (1996) ("The attorney-client 
relationship is grounded in trust:  the client's justifiable 
expectation that the lawyer retained will act in the client's 
best interests.").  While the State's newly asserted legal 
arguments are correct, for a majority of this court the State's 
positions are too little, too late.  The State's concessions of 
the past should not impact our full analysis of the statutory 
language at issue.  
¶77 We should not be bound by our prior precedents, which 
were the product of party concessions and did not involve 
thorough vetting and analysis.  Compare State v. Roberson, 2019 
WI 102, ¶¶51-57, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (overturning a 
decision from this court when it was not legally supported by 
United States Supreme Court precedent upon which the decision 
was based), with Hennessy v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2022 WI 2, ¶32, 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
17 
 
400 Wis. 2d 50, 968 N.W.2d 684 ("There is no indication that the 
prior decisions were wrongly decided, unsound in principle, or 
subject to change due to newly ascertained facts."); see also 
State v. Jackson, 2011 WI App 63, ¶14, 333 Wis. 2d 665, 799 
N.W.2d 461 (agreeing that "a concession for the sake of 
argument, which is adopted by the supreme court and is not 
thereafter 
the 
subject 
of 
studied 
discussion, 
cannot 
be 
considered as a holding worthy of precedential value").   
¶78 Instead, the majority should apply the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 972.11 and conclude here that the lack of sexual 
conduct is not sexual conduct when the victim wishes to counter 
a defense such as the one here.  The rape shield statute 
protects victims from harassment and intimidation.  Vonesh, 135 
Wis. 2d at 484; Wright & Miller, supra ¶60 § 5372;  Sandoval, 
996 F.2d at 149; see Kaczmarzky 228 Wis. at 249; Williams, 681 
N.E.2d at 200.  It should not protect sexual assailants from 
having their victims provide relevant testimony against them.   
¶79 Of 
course, 
it 
is 
within 
the 
province 
of 
the 
Legislature to consider whether Wis. Stat. § 972.11 should be 
amended so that victims can provide willing and relevant 
evidence at sexual assault trials.  The rape shield statute 
should not hinder victims' ability to assist in the prosecution 
of their assailants.  It is written to be a shield for the 
victim, not a sword used by the defense.   
¶80 I agree with the majority that the evidence in this 
case is overwhelming.  I disagree that there was error.  As the 
majority correctly concludes, the exclusion of Lisa's testimony 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
18 
 
as to the lack of her sexual conduct was in this case harmless.  
Majority op., ¶¶43-52.  That will not always be the case.  And 
under the majority's reading of the rape shield law, the 
prosecution and victim will be prohibited from fully contesting 
the defense.  In the process, truth will be a casualty, and 
justice with it.   
¶81 Because the rape shield statute does not always 
prohibit victims from testifying against their assailants 
regarding the lack of sexual conduct, I respectfully concur.  
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2019AP1565.akz 
 
 
 
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