Title: MARTA v. Rouse
Citation: 279 Ga. 311, 612 S.E.2d 308
Docket Number: S04G1389
State: Georgia
Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 2005

612 S.E.2d 308 (2005) 279 Ga. 311 METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. v. ROUSE. No. S04G1389. Supreme Court of Georgia. April 26, 2005. Reconsideration Denied May 23, 2005. Kevin Adrian Doyle, G. Melton Mobley, Lokey, Mobley &amp; Doyle, LLP, Atlanta, for Appellants. Andrew J. Hinton Jr., John Michael Foy, David Morris Sobell, Sobell &amp; Foy, P.C., Atlanta, for Appellee. Stephen L. Cotter, Charles Edgar Hoffecker, Swift, Currie, McGhee &amp; Hiers, Atlanta, for Amici curiae. THOMPSON, Justice. We granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Rouse v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 266 Ga. App. 619, 597 S.E.2d 650 (2004), and posed this question: Does the requirement that common carriers exercise "extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of their passengers" impose a duty upon those carriers to stay informed of safety advances in product design and to buy and incorporate those safety advances into previously-purchased, non-defective products? Leslie Rouse was injured when her foot became entrapped under the comb plate of an escalator in the Five Points MARTA rail station in Atlanta. She filed a negligence action in Fulton County Superior Court, naming as defendants MARTA and Millar Elevator Service Company, which had the contract to maintain the escalator. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants finding no evidence that defendants "knew or should have known of any alleged malfunction of the escalator." Rouse appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, reversed the grant of summary judgment. Rouse, supra. The majority concluded that a question of fact existed as to whether MARTA was obligated to add an optional safety feature (a comb plate impact switch which would automatically stop an escalator if an object becomes caught as it approaches the comb plate), not required by code to be retrofitted to older escalators, in order to fulfill its duty of extraordinary care. This holding required the Court of Appeals to overrule Darlington Corp. v. Finch, 113 Ga. App. 825, 149 S.E.2d 861 (1966), which held that "extraordinary" care did not necessarily impose a duty to add optional safety features. 1. A carrier of passengers, such as MARTA, must use extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of its passengers. OCGA § 46-9-132; Sparks v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 223 Ga. App. 768(1), 478 S.E.2d 923 (1996); Millar Elevator Service Co. v. O'Shields, 222 Ga. App. 456, 458(2), 475 S.E.2d 188 (1996). Extraordinary diligence is defined as "that extreme *309 care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful persons exercise under the same or similar circumstances." OCGA § 51-1-3. See also Southeastern Stages v. Stringer, 263 Ga. 641, 437 S.E.2d 315 (1993); East Tenn., etc. R. Co. v. Green, 95 Ga. 736, 737, 22 S.E. 658 (1895). In Savannah, F. &amp; W.R. Co. v. Boyle, 115 Ga. 836, 838-839, 42 S.E. 242 (1902), this Court expounded upon the duty of extraordinary care owed by a common carrier to its passengers in a case involving an assault on a passenger by third parties: (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Relying on the foregoing language, the Court of Appeals concluded that "because [common carriers] are charged with extraordinary diligence, a question of fact is raised by MARTA and Millar's failure to install such a switch which is specifically designed to avoid the type of injury that Rouse received." Rouse, supra at 623, 597 S.E.2d 650. Boyle, however, is a general statement of the law regarding the duty of extraordinary care as applied to common carriers. Two years following Boyle, this Court decided Alabama Mid. R. Co. v. Guilford, 119 Ga. 523, 46 S.E. 655 (1904). Although technically dicta, particular language in Guilford sheds considerable light on the present case through its discussion regarding the equipment that is required for use by a common carrier. In Guilford, supra at 526, 46 S.E. 655, the plaintiff sued the railway company for personal injuries. The trial court charged the jury as follows: (Punctuation omitted.) The Court concluded that this charge was inaccurate, explaining that (Emphasis supplied.) Id. The Darlington case involved injury to a passenger on an elevator, and the court considered the use of safety devices by the elevator operator as it relates to the operator's *310 duty to exercise extraordinary care. The Darlington court concluded that: (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 827, 149 S.E.2d 861. In order to take a contrary position in Rouse, supra, the Court of Appeals was required to overrule Darlington. It did so on the basis that Darlington relied upon cases involving ordinary care, whereas extraordinary care is the proper standard here. While that may be true, see Emory Univ. v. Porter, 103 Ga.App. 752(2), 120 S.E.2d 668 (1961), the court failed to recognize that the holding in Darlington is entirely consistent with our ruling in Guilford in that a defendant charged with extraordinary care is not necessarily required to utilize the newest and safest equipment to escape liability. To hold otherwise would essentially force all common carriers, in the exercise of extraordinary care, to be "an insurer of his passenger's safety against every possible source of danger," a standard we have consistently declined to impose. Boyle, supra at 839, 42 S.E. 242; Southeastern Stages v. Stringer, supra. Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions with regard to a common carrier's obligation to supply the "latest and best" devices in situations requiring greater than ordinary care. For example, in Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, 198 Md. 585, 596, 84 A.2d 876 (1951), the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to "`predicate negligence upon the mere failure to provide the most modern equipment, in the absence of any evidence that the equipment was defective or inadequate.'" Further, in a case nearly identical to ours, the District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that "[the transit authority] does not have a duty to design and build a subway system that is completely accident-proof, nor is [the transit authority] required to constantly improve its subway system by incorporating every new safety device that may become available." (Citations omitted.) Jones v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 742 F. Supp. 24, 26 (D.D.C.1990) (plaintiff's foot trapped in escalator). While some jurisdictions seem to indicate that a common carrier is required to make use of the "latest and best" devices, a close reading of these cases reveals that this requirement contains a qualification, namely that of being in general practical use. For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Strobel v. Park, 292 Pa. 200, 205, 140 A. 877 (1927). See also Sabiston's Adm'r v. Otis Elevator Co., 251 Ky. 222, 228, 64 S.W.2d 588 (1933) (elevator owner is "bound to provide and use the best and most improved machinery in general, practical use," citing Strobel, supra); Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 600, 22 P. 266 (1889) (elevator owner "must adopt such inventions as ... to combine the greatest safety with practical use; yet ... the law excuses them from seeking and applying every new invention"); Smith v. The Odd Fellows Bldg. Assn., 46 Nev. 48, 55, 205 P. 796 (1922) (upholding jury instructions that elevator operator is "bound to avail himself of ... inventions and improvements ... whenever the ability of such improvements has been thoroughly tested and demonstrated, and ... is within his power, so as to be reasonably practicable"). Based upon the foregoing authority and reasoning, we hold that a common carrier, in *311 exercising extraordinary care, must stay informed of safety advances in product design, but is not held to a per se rule that requires those carriers to buy and incorporate those safety advances into previously-purchased, non-defective products. The carrier need not necessarily utilize "`the most approved pattern in use up to that time.'" Guilford, supra at 526, 46 S.E. 655. The Court of Appeals erred in reaching a contrary conclusion in Rouse, supra, and in overruling Darlington v. Finch, supra, which we hereby reinstate. Accordingly, we remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the case in light of our holding herein. 2. Elevator Specialists, Inc., filed an amicus curiae brief arguing an issue not expressly decided by the Court of Appeals in this case, nor raised by the parties to this action. "[A]micus curiae has no right to except to the rulings of the court or to prosecute a writ of error since he is not a party or privy, or in any way aggrieved by the judgment." (Punctuation omitted.) Douglas v. Trust Co. of Ga., 147 Ga. 724, 95 S.E. 219 (1918) (per curiam). As such, we decline to address the additional "enumeration of error" asserted by amicus curiae. Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur.