Title: STATE v LUNDBLADE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 79-050
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 1981

No. 79-50 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS. CARL ROGER LUNDBLADE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Lake. Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: K.M. Bridenstine argued, Polson, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Allan Chronister argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Richard P. Heinz argued, County Attorney, Polson, Montana Submitted: January 13, 1981 Decided : MAR 2 4 19@' Filed: MAR 2 4 1987- M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendant C a r l Roger Lundblade a p p e a l s from a f e l o n y t h e f t c o n v i c t i o n , f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l i n D i s t r i c t Court, Lake County. W e r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and remand t h e cause t o D i s t r i c t Court f o r a new t r i a l . The d e f e n d a n t o p e r a t e d a d i e s e l r e p a i r shop i n P o l s o n , Montana, f o r a t i m e p r i o r to h i s arrest i n December 1978. One of h i s r e g u l a r customers was t h e complaining w i t n e s s i n t h i s case, Warren G. Harding , d/b/a Mission V a l l e y C o n c r e t e I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . I n A p r i l 1978, one of H a r d i n g l s t r u c k s blew an e n g i n e . Defendant i n s t a l l e d a new e n g i n e f o r Harding, using s e v e r a l p a r t s from t h e blown e n g i n e . Harding a p p a r e n t l y wanted to g e t t h e e n g i n e r e p a i r e d , b u t Lundblade determined t h a t t h e blown e n g i n e could n o t be f i x e d and s i m p l y k e p t it a t h i s shop. S h o r t l y af t e r t h i s e n g i n e work was done, d e f e n d a n t posted a n o t i c e i n h i s shop t h a t he was i n c r e a s i n g h i s h o u r l y rate t o $16/hour in-shop and $17.50/hour out-of -shop. M r . Harding , who had been paying $lO/hour, advised Lundblade t h a t he could n o t pay t h e new rates. C o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y was p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l as t o t h e outcome of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . Harding t e s t i f i e d t h a t Lundblade agreed to c o n t i n u e to charge him a t t h e $10 h o u r l y rate; Lundblade t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was agreed t h a t Harding would g e t a "break" and $14 a n hour s t r a i g h t across t h e board was a g r e e d upon. D e s p i t e t h i s d i s p u t e o v e r rates, Lundblade c o n t i n u e d to do m i s c e l l a n e o u s r e p a i r work f o r Harding i n J u n e , J u l y , and August 1978. By e a r l y September, H a r d i n g l s b i l l t o t a l l e d $2,624. Harding p a i d $1,000 b u t r e f u s e d t o pay any more, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t h e w a s " g e t t i n g a runaround on [ t h e ] work." A f t e r s e v e r a l u n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t s to collect t h e b i l l , Lundblade c o n t a c t e d a P o l s o n a t t o r n e y t o assist him i n making t h e c o l l e c t i o n . A f t e r s e v e r a l letters back and f o r t h between Harding 's and Lundblade's a t t o r n e y s , d e f e n d a n t contends t h a t he r e q u e s t e d h i s a t t o r n e y t o f i l e s u i t , b u t no a c t i o n was t a k e n . Lundblade t e s t i f i e d t h a t on a d v i c e of c o u n s e l , he h e l d t h e e n g i n e t o p r o t e c t h i s cause of a c t i o n . H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he understood t h a t i f he s o l d t h e e n g i n e , t h e d e b t would be e x t i n g u i s h e d and he would no l o n g e r have grounds to f i l e s u i t . I n November 1978, Lundblade c o n t a c t e d Wendell J o n e s i n Missoula concerning a s a l e of h i s equipment and t h e e n g i n e because he was f o r c e d to go o u t of b u s i n e s s . A s a l e of t h e equipment and e n g i n e was consumated on November 27, 1978. J o n e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t $750 was a l l o c a t e d to t h e purchase p r i c e of t h e e n g i n e ; Lundblade t e s t i f i e d t h a t $600 r e p r e s e n t e d t h e p r i c e f o r t h e e n g i n e . Both t e s t i f i e d t h a t it would cost more to r e b u i l d t h e e n g i n e t h a n it would t o purchase a used engine. J o n e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e $750 p r i c e was "more t h a n f a i r . " Lundblade t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was s t a n d a r d p r a c t i c e i n t h e r e p a i r b u s i n e s s t o s e l l a customer's p r o p e r t y i f an a c c o u n t could n o t be c o l l e c t e d . H e admitted t h a t he wrote o f f t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e owing, a l t h o u g h he d i d not inform M r . Harding of t h i s u n t i l a f t e r he was a r r e s t e d i n December 1978 f o r f e l o n y t h e f t of t h e disassembled e n g i n e . W e f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n must be r e v e r s e d because improper j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s denied him a f a i r t r i a l . The remaining i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s need not be addressed i n t h i s o p i n i o n a s t h e y w i l l n o t arise on retrial. The j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e error f o r two r e a s o n s : (1) t h e j u r y was not advised of t h e s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s o f t h e crime, and ( 2 ) t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on d e f e n d a n t ' s c i v i l remedy of an a g i s t e r ' s l i e n , p e r m i t t i n g t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t h e was g u i l t y of t h e f t f o r f a i l u r e to pursue t h a t remedy. The S t a t e contends t h a t we should n o t c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n of f a i l u r e to g i v e an "elements of t h e crime" i n s t r u c t i o n , c i t i n g w e l l - s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s of a p p e l l a t e review. The S t a t e c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t f a i l u r e to o b j e c t a t t r i a l t o t h e g i v i n g or r e f u s a l to g i v e a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n normally r e n d e r s t h e i s s u e nonappealable. S t a t e v. Harvey ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. I 603 P.2d 661, 665, 36 St.Rep. 2035, 2038, and t h e record h e r e shows t h a t a p p e l l a n t never o f f e r e d an i n s t r u c t i o n s e t t i n g o u t t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e crime. But t h i s Court h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t i n some s i t u a t i o n s we w i l l n o n e t h e l e s s review j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s " f o r t h e purpose of d e t e r m i n i n g whether or n o t t h e j u r y was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d . " S t a t e v. Watson ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 144 Mont. 576, 582, 398 P.2d 949, 952. I n t h i s case, because we d e t e r m i n e t h a t f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t on t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e crime c o n s t i t u t e s " p l a i n e r r o r " p u r s u a n t to s e c t i o n 46-20-702, MCA, we w i l l t a k e cogni- zance of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n q u e s t i o n . S t a t e v. P o n c e l e t (1980 )I Mont . , 610 P.2d 698, 702, 37 St.Rep. 760, 763. A t a minimum, t h e District Court must e x p l a i n or d e f i n e t h e crime f o r t h e jury. S t a t e v. Campbell ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 111, 114, 500 P.2d 801, 803. I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d t h i s , we are guided by c e r t a i n s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s . F i r s t , we must view t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s as a whole, S t a t e v. C a r y l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 414, 430, 543 P.2d 389, 398, and w e w i l l f i n d no e r r o r i f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s as a whole f u l l y and f a i r l y i n s t r u c t on t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e case. S t a t e v. Higley ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 6 2 1 P.2d 1043, 1054, 37 St.Rep. 1942, 1953; S t a t e v. Campbell, s u p r a , 1 6 0 Mont. a t 116, 500 P.2d a t 804. The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s as a whole ade- q u a t e l y a p p r i s e d t h e j u r y of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e l a w a p p l i c a b l e to t h i s case. W e d i s a g r e e . Even c o n s i d e r i n g I n s t r u c t i o n s N o s . 5, 6 , 8 , and 11, as t h e S t a t e u r g e s us to do, w e are unable to d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e j u r y knew t h a t t h e S t a t e had t o prove e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e crime beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . The p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n s of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s as g i v e n pro- v i d e as f o l l o w s : I' . . . i n o r d e r t o c o n v i c t him of t h e crime c h a r g e d , e v e r y material f a c t or e l e m e n t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime must be proved by t h e S t a t e of Montana by competent e v i d e n c e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt; and, i f t h e j u r y e n t e r t a i n s a r e a s o n a b l e doubt on any f a c t o r e l e m e n t n e c e s s a r y to c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime c h a r g e d , it is your d u t y to g i v e t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e b e n e f i t of such doubt and a c q u i t .I' (No. 5 ) " I n e v e r y crime or p u b l i c o f f e n s e t h e S t a t e must e s t a b l i s h each element d e s c r i b e d & t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e , and t h e S t a t e must f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e Defendant a c t e d w h i l e having t h e mental state r e q u i r e d by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e ." (Emphasis added. ) (No. 6 " I n t h i s case t h e Defendant h a s been charged w i t h committing t h e crime of THEFT, committed as f o l l o w s , to-wit: That on o r a b o u t November 27, 1978, a t t h e County of Lake, i n t h e S t a t e of Montana, t h e Defendant, CARL ROGER LUNDBLADE, p u r p o s e l y or knowingly o b t a i n e d or e x e r t e d u n a u t h o r i z e d c o n t r o l o v e r p r o p e r t y , t o - w i t : one GMC 6V 53 d i e s e l e n g i n e model number 6V 53N, of a v a l u e of more t h a n One Hundred F i f t y Dollars ( $150.00 ) owned by Mission V a l l e y C o n c r e t e I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . , w i t h t h e purpose of d e p r i v i n g t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y . " "The s t a t u t e s under which t h i s I n f o r m a t i o n is f i l e d , and t h e Defendant charged, or as many as are a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, are g i v e n i n t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s . " ( N o . 8 ) [We n o t e t h a t no f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s were g i v e n concerning t h e s t a t u t e s under which t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d , or under which t h e d e f e n d a n t was charged.] "Reasonable doubt is n o t a mere p o s s i b l e doubt, because e v e r y t h i n g r e l a t i n g to human a f f a i r s , and depending on e v i d e n c e , is open to some p o s s i b l e or imaginary doubt. A r e a s o n a b l e doubt e x i s t s when you j u r o r s cannot s a y t h a t you f e e l a n a b i d i n g c o n v i c t i o n to a moral c e r t a i n t y of t h e t r u t h of t h e charge." ( N o . 11) I n t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e j u r y w a s t o l d t h a t each element o f t h e crime as d e f i n e d by s t a t u t e had to be proved ( N o . 6 ) , b u t t h e j u r y w a s n e v e r i n s t r u c t e d as t o t h e s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s of t h e crime. Although t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s charged w i t h t h e f t as d e s c r i b e d i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n (No. 8), nowhere was t h e j u r y a d v i s e d t h a t t h e I n f o r m a t i o n set o u t t h e material e l e m e n t s of t h e crime, each of which t h e S t a t e had to p r o v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. Perhaps some or a l l of t h e j u r o r s i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e I n f o r m a t i o n set f o r t h t h e s t a t u t o r y ele- ments of t h e crime, b u t we have no way of determining t h i s . Without a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e crime being p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y w e cannot s a y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d a f a i r t r i a l . W e f i n d e r r o r a l s o i n t h e District C o u r t ' s g i v i n g of I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 9, t o which d e f e n d a n t d i d o b j e c t a t t r i a l . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n set o u t t h e procedure by which d e f e n d a n t c o u l d have f i l e d an a g i s t e r ' s l i e n a g a i n s t Harding i n o r d e r to collect on h i s b i l l . I t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on d e f e n d a n t ' s c i v i l remedy, a n i n s t r u c t i o n which d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s h a s no p l a c e i n a c r i m i n a l t r i a l . Lundblade was being t r i e d f o r t h e f t , and not f o r f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w h i s c i v i l remedy. The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was n e c e s s a r y t o b r i n g o r d e r to t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l . According t o t h e S t a t e , t h e d e f e n d a n t argued t o t h e j u r y t h a t he had a r i g h t t o r e l y on t h e a g i s t e r ' s l i e n , and a r i g h t t o h o l d on to H a r d i n g ' s p r o p e r t y . While w e a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t may have i n t r o d u c e d i r r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e concerning t h e l i e n , w e do n o t f i n d t h i s to be a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r g i v i n g t h i s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n . The S t a t e had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to o b j e c t to t h i s t e s t i m o n y and t o have it s t r i c k e n from t h e r e c o r d . I n f a i l i n g to d o t h i s , t h e S t a t e cannot t h e n a t t e m p t to respond to t h i s e v i - d e n c e through improper j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e have p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d o u r d i s a p p r o v a l of g i v i n g to a j u r y a b s t r a c t r u l e s of l a w t h a t a r e i n a p p l i c a b l e to t h e case. S t a t e v. R e i n e r ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mon t . , 587 P.2d 950, 955, 35 St.Rep. 1861, 1866; S t a t e v. T r o s p e r ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 4 1 Mont. 442, 446, 109 P. 858, 859. I f , however, we f i n d t h a t t h e j u r y could relate t h e c o n c e p t p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n to t h e f a c t s , and t h e r e is no p r e j u d i c e to t h e d e f e n d a n t i n g i v i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , we w i l l n o t f i n d r e v e r s i b l e error. R e i n e r , s u p r a . I n t h i s case t h e j u r y c o u l d have i n f e r r e d t h a t by f a i l i n g to pursue t h e p r o p e r c i v i l remedy, t h e d e f e n d a n t committed t h e crime of t h e f t . T h i s is c l e a r l y m i s l e a d i n g and n o t a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e l a w of t h e f t . The d i s t r i c t judge e r r e d i n g i v i n g t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . Based on t h e f o r g o i n g , we r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and remand t h e c a u s e f o r a new t r i a l . W e d e c l i n e to r e v e r s e and d i s m i s s , based on o u r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e is e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d to s u p p o r t t h e c o n v i c t i o n . S t a t e v. Johnson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 182, 188, 580 P.2d 1387, 1390; S t a t e v. Langan ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 558, 568, 445 P.2d 565, 570. S e v e r a l o t h e r i s s u e s d e s e r v e comment b e f o r e a r e t r i a l of t h i s case. Although we do n o t f i n d r e v e r s i b l e error i n I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 10, w e n o t e t h a t it h a s no r e l e v a n c e t o t h e case and it should n o t have been g i v e n . I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 1 0 s e t o u t a d e f e n s e which d e f e n d a n t n e v e r r a i s e d . Although d e f e n d a n t may have b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s conduct d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n o f f e n s e , he d i d n o t a t t e m p t to defend t h e charge by t h e means set o u t i n i n s t r u c t i o n 10, t a k e n from s e c t i o n 45-2-103 ( 4 ) , MCA. T h a t i n s t r u c t i o n i n v o l v e s r e l i a n c e on unpublished r u l e s or r e g u l a t i o n s , s t a t u t e s later d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d , c o u r t d e c i s i o n s l a t e r o v e r t u r n e d o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e l a w made by a p u b l i c p e r s o n a u t h o r i z e d to do so. Where, as h e r e , t h e i n s t r u c - t i o n h a s no r e l e v a n c e t o t h e c a s e , it s e r v e s no purpose b u t to c o n f u s e t h e jury. An i n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d n o t be g i v e n i f it is n o t r e l e v a n t n o r material t o t h e e v i d e n c e or i s s u e s i n t h e case. S t a t e v. Brooks ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150 Mont. 399, 411, 436 P.2d 91, 97. L a s t , w e c a u t i o n t h e D i s t r i c t Court a b o u t g i v i n g a n i n s t r u c - t i o n such as No. 6: " . . . The l a w a l s o presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of any volun- t a r y act committed by him. T h i s presumption, however, is termed a d i s p u t a b l e presumption and may be c o n t r o v e r t e d by o t h e r e v i d e n c e . " I n t h e r e c e n t case of P a r k e r v. C r i s t ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 621 P.2d 484, 37 St.Rep. 2048, we approved t h e use of t h e same i n s t r u c t i o n , under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h a t case. T h e r e we found t h a t t h e e r r o r , i f any, i n g i v i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was h a r m l e s s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. P a r k e r , Mon t . , 6 2 1 P.2d a t 487, 37 St.Rep. a t 2050. But w e cannot say t h a t t h e cir- cumstances making t h e i n s t r u c t i o n p e r m i s s i b l e i n P a r k e r o c c u r r e d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , n o r do we know f o r c e r t a i n t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court would f i n d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t o be c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i n t h i s case i n l i g h t of Sandstrom v. Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. Thus we urge t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o avoid t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i n a r e t r i a l of t h i s case. The c o n v i c t i o n is r e v e r s e d and t h i s cause is remanded t o t h e District Court f o r a new t r i a l . Chief J u s t i c e We con k u r : P J u s t i c e s