Title: United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc.
Citation: 303 So. 2d 9
Docket Number: 44402
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 1974

303 So. 2d 9 (1974)
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Petitioner,
v.
SAVE SAND KEY, INC., a Nonprofit Florida Corporation, Respondent.
No. 44402.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 12, 1974.
Rehearing Denied December 4, 1974.
Dennis P. Thompson of Richards, Nodine, Gilkey, Fite, Meyer &amp; Thompson, Clearwater and William F. McGowan, Jr., and Thomas A. Clark, of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith &amp; Cutler, Tampa, for petitioners.
Tom R. Moore, Clearwater, for respondent.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla.App. 1973), which directly conflicts with this Court's decision in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Kirk, 200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967), thus vesting jurisdiction in this Court. Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, 1973, F.S.A.
The Attorney General of this State and respondent, Save Sand Key, a non-profit Florida corporation organized for the specific purpose of securing for the public use as much as possible of Sand Key, a gulffront island in Pinellas County owned by petitioner, United States Steel Corporation, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against petitioner. In its action, Save Sand Key sought to enjoin *10 United States Steel from interfering with certain alleged rights of the public generally, including individual members of the plaintiff corporation, to use a portion of the soft sand beach area of Sand Key. Such rights to the public use of United States Steel's lands were alleged to have been acquired by the public by prescription, implied dedication and/or general and local custom. Inter alia, respondent alleged that petitioner recently commenced construction of rental and high-rise condominium apartment buildings based upon its development plan for Sand Key, that petitioner has fenced portions of Sand Key around its present construction sites which alleged effectively and substantially prohibits and interferes with the rights of the public to the full use and enjoyment of the tract. Respondent by its complaint sought injunctive relief from any future acts which interfere with, impair or impede the exercise of the public's rights and from an alleged public nuisance in the form of a purpresture blocking enjoyment of those rights.
United States Steel moved to dismiss the complaint as filed by Save Sand Key, Inc. alleging, inter alia, that Save Sand Key had no standing to sue because it did not allege a special injury differing in kind from injury to the general public and because the respondent (plaintiff below) corporation was not itself claiming any right or title to the United States Steel's lands and was therefore not a real party in interest.
Upon consideration of the briefs, the arguments, the statutes and the authorities governing the issue, the trial court determined that Save Sand Key, Inc. lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. In his order dismissing the complaint as to Save Sand Key, Inc., the trial judge explained:
As indicated by the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, the court refused to dismiss the Attorney General permitting him to pursue the action insofar as it pertains to the alleged public nuisance; however, the Attorney General has taken a voluntary non-suit.
The District Court of Appeal reversed the order of dismissal and specifically stated:
Sub judice, the District Court explicated:
The District Court also expressly receded from and overruled those portions of Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead  Save Our Bays, 269 So. 2d 696 (Fla.App.2d, 1972) which conflicts with its instant decision.
With all due respect, we comment as we did in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) and Gilliam, et al. v. Stewart, et al., Fla., 291 So. 2d 593 opin. filed Jan. 10, 1974, that it is not the province of the District Court of Appeal to recede from decisions of this Court. A much better solution would be to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court and then certify the cause as being one of great public interest in order to facilitate a re-examination of the decision of this Court in question.
We adhere to our decision in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Kirk, supra, wherein, upon certification by the District Court of Appeal, First District, of their decision in Sarasota County Anglers Club v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla.App. 1967), we adopted their opinion as the decision of this Court, and, therefore, we reverse the instant decision of the District Court and approve the order of dismissal by the trial court for lack of standing to sue on the part of the appellee.
Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla.App. 1967), 200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967), a suit strikingly similar in nature to the instant cause involved a declaratory judgment action by the Anglers Club, a private non-profit corporation identical in type to respondent corporation acting in behalf of its members, and a private citizen against the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, a landowner and the town of Longboat Key, seeking to enjoin fill operations at Longboat Key to the detriment of the club and others interested in fishing, bathing, and boating in the area, seeking that the land in question be impressed with a public easement for boating, bathing, navigation and other public uses, and praying for a decree declaring the dredge-fill permit to be illegal and void. Finding that the plaintiffs were not in a position to maintain this action, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal the District Court of Appeal affirmed the order of dismissal by the trial court and succinctly stated,
Upon certification of the decision to this Court, we held:
Sub judice, as in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, supra, there is no statutory authority for this cause of action wherein respondents, inter alia, seek to assert property rights in real estate owned by petitioner and no special injury differing in kind from that suffered by the public generally was alleged.
Although the District Court in the cause sub judice purports to recede from its earlier but recently decided decision of Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead  Save Our Bays, Inc., supra, we prefer and agree with their earlier decision enunciated therein. Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead  Save Our Bays, Inc. dealt with an attempt of a citizen's group to halt the construction of certain improvements within Oscar Scherer State Park, which park was donated to the State by the will of Elsa Scherer Burrows "for public recreation and as a wild life sanctuary." The trial court dismissed the citizen's group as having no standing, but allowed a private citizen to maintain the action. The District Court affirmed as to the group's lack of standing, but reversed as to the private citizen, holding him to be likewise without standing to sue. In so holding, the District Court stated:
Our decision in Department of Administration v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972), relative to the question of standing arose from facts clearly distinguishable from the instant cause, and cannot serve as *13 precedent for the District Court of Appeal's departure from the special injury rule in the case sub judice. Further, our holding therein affirming the trial court's finding of standing allowed only a very limited exception to the special injury rule. In Horne, supra, taxpayers contested the validity of provisions of the General Appropriations Act on constitutional grounds which related solely to the taxing and spending power. Therein, this Court, speaking through Justice Dekle, in a very narrow holding stated:
The narrowness of this holding is exemplified by the following excerpt from that decision,
Clearly, by its decision in Department of Administration v. Horne, supra, this Court did not intend to abrogate in any way the special injury rule in cases as those sub judice, but, in fact, recognized that it would still obtain in other cases. The District Court erred in finding that the special injury concept as a basis for standing no longer serves a valid purpose and that it should no longer be a viable expedient to the disposition of these cases. The standing test adopted by the Second District Court of Appeal constitutes a significant change in the law with which we cannot agree.
We adhere resolutely to our holding in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Kirk, supra, and other decisions of this Court relative to the concept of special injury in determining standing. See, inter alia, Henry L. Doherty &amp; Co. v. Joachin, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941), Town of Flagler Beach v. Green, 83 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1955).
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court is quashed and this cause is remanded with directions to reinstate the order of the trial court.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., DEKLE, J., and HENDRY, District Court Judge, concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., dissent and concur with ERVIN, J.
ERVIN, Justice (dissenting):
I think the majority decision is flatly contrary to the rights of citizens to corporately organize (legally assemble) in a nonprofit corporation under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution for the purpose of protecting the general *14 public's rights in common to the use and enjoyment of public property. The citizens of this state have long been accorded in common, under the inalienable trust doctrine, the use and enjoyment of navigable waters, tidelands, and sovereignty areas for bathing, boating, fishing and other recreational uses.
When there is neglect or refusal on the part of public officials (in this instance the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund or the Attorney General) to protect those rights in any area of the state, I see no legal reason why aggrieved or affected citizens of the local area cannot corporately organize for the peaceful protection of the public domain which they have so long enjoyed from disturbance from conflicting private interests and, if necessary, have standing to bring appropriate legal action in the process.
It is well recognized now that environmental protection, including protection of marine, animal and bird life and protection from dredging and filling in submerged bottom areas is highly essential to the general public's use and enjoyment of public areas under the inalienable trust doctrine.
Just as the standing of Senators Horne and Karl met with our approval in Department of Administration v. Horne (Fla. 1972), 269 So. 2d 659, to sue as citizen taxpayers to protect the public's monies, I see little reason why the Respondent does not have standing to sue to protect the public's tidelands, including the recreational areas therein which the public has long enjoyed.
I agree with the Second District that
This case repeats the old story which I alluded to in City of Daytona Beach v. Tona Rama, Fla., 294 So. 2d 73, Opinion filed March 25, 1974, of pretexts of one sort or another to favor the private sector, whether of standing to sue or otherwise, over the general public in disputes concerning the general public's traditional rights to enjoy public lands.
Again here, we have an example of this Court's express refusal to honor the District Court's constitutional authority as a final appellate court not to slavishly follow a decision of this Court. As I pointed out in dissent in Stewart v. Gilliam, Opinion filed January 10, 1974, there is no restraint upon a District Court in the area of its final appellate jurisdiction to follow a conflicting decision of this Court. Of course, if the decision involved the final appellate constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, e.g., construction of a controlling provision of the Constitution or passing on the validity of a statute, the decision of this Court is final and binding on the District Courts, but in a case of the instant kind determining legal standing to sue, final appellate jurisdiction in the particular case lies in the District Court. Certiorari jurisdiction of this Court with power to quash the decisions of the District Courts by per-case decisions does not mean that such certiorari decisions must be followed slavishly by the District Courts if the latter find good reasons and modern authority in later cases to hold otherwise. In other words, this Court's power to quash a decision in certiorari only operates as to the particular case. The quashal decision may have stare decisis value in the District Court's decisions, but it is not absolutely binding for the reasons set forth in my dissent in Stewart v. Gilliam, supra.
An illuminating case comment appears in University of Florida Law Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Winter 1974, page 360, et seq., treating upon the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., Fla.App., 281 So. 2d 572. It is especially *15 recommended for reading by those who may be concerned with the problem of standing to sue in situations of the kind presented in the instant case.
BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.