Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael D. Mandelman
Citation: 2006 WI 45
Docket Number: 2003AP003348-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2006

2006 WI 45 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael D. Mandelman, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross-
Appellant, 
     v. 
Michael D. Mandelman, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MANDELMAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 6, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs by Daniel W. Hildebrand and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross-appellant, there were 
briefs by Robert G. Krohn and Roethe Krohn Pope LLP, Edgerton, 
and oral argument by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
 
2006 WI 45
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael D. Mandelman, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent- 
          Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael D. Mandelman, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant- 
          Cross-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 17, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   Attorney 
Michael 
D. 
Mandelman 
has 
appealed that portion of a referee's report finding that the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) proved by clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing evidence that Attorney Mandelman engaged in 
misconduct with respect to his representation of five clients.  
The OLR has cross-appealed the referee's findings and conclusion 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
2 
 
with respect to one of the counts as to which the referee found 
the OLR had not met its burden of proof.   
¶2 
We conclude that all of the referee's findings of 
fact, including those challenged by the OLR, are supported by 
satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We also agree with the 
referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Mandelman engaged in 
professional misconduct.  We further agree with the referee that 
a nine-month suspension of Attorney Mandelman's license to 
practice law is appropriate, and we also find it appropriate 
that Attorney Mandelman pay the full costs of the proceeding, 
which total $37,088.08 as of April 19, 2006. 
¶3 
Attorney Mandelman was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1980 and practices in Milwaukee.  In 1990 he 
received a one-year suspension for misconduct consisting of 27 
violations of attorney ethics rules, including repeated neglect 
of client matters, failure to return client funds promptly, 
contacting persons injured in an auto accident to obtain 
professional employment and representing multiple clients with 
adverse 
interests, 
settling 
a 
client's 
claim 
without 
authorization, 
misrepresenting 
to 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility (BAPR) (the predecessor to the OLR) 
work he had performed on a client's behalf, attempting to limit 
his potential malpractice liability to a client, failing to 
communicate with clients, compensating persons to recommend his 
employment or as a reward for employment recommendation, failing 
to responsibly manage his client trust account, and failing to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
BAPR 
in 
its 
investigation 
of 
client 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
3 
 
grievances. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Mandelman, 158 Wis. 2d 1, 460 N.W.2d 749 (1990).   
¶4 
In 1994 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
received 
an 18-month 
suspension, consecutive to the termination of the earlier 
suspension.  When the first suspension period ended, Attorney 
Mandelman petitioned for reinstatement of his license.  This 
court denied the petition on two grounds.  First, it found that 
while the first suspension was pending, additional professional 
misconduct was discovered, including post-suspension violation 
of the rules governing the handling of Attorney Mandelman's 
client trust account.  Second, this court found that during the 
reinstatement 
proceeding 
itself, 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
gave 
incomplete and evasive responses to the district committee and 
to BAPR.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 
182 Wis. 2d 583, 514 N.W.2d 11 (1994).   
¶5 
In 1999 Attorney Mandelman consented to the imposition 
of a private reprimand for misconduct consisting of indicating 
in pleadings that he represented a client when in fact he did 
not represent the client, thereby knowingly making a false 
statement of fact to a tribunal. 
¶6 
On December 12, 2003, the OLR filed a complaint 
alleging 13 counts of misconduct.  As will be discussed in 
further detail herein, the misconduct alleged in the OLR's 
December 2003 complaint is closely related to the misconduct at 
issue in a previous disciplinary proceeding involving Attorney 
Mandelman's partner, Jeffrey A. Reitz, which resulted in this 
court's suspending Attorney Reitz's license to practice law for 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
4 
 
five months.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz, 
2005 WI 39, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 N.W.2d 894.  
¶7 
The 
first 
client 
matter 
detailed 
in 
the 
OLR's 
complaint involved Attorney Mandelman's representation of N.C.  
In March 1998 N.C. met with Attorney Mandelman to discuss a 
potential malpractice case against her former attorney, John 
Dade, who had represented N.C. in a custody dispute in 1995.  
N.C. told Attorney Mandelman she had lost custody of her child 
due to Attorney Dade's negligence.  Attorney Mandelman verbally 
agreed to represent N.C. in a malpractice action against Dade 
for a contingent fee of one-third of any recovery.  N.C. 
testified she did not sign a contingent fee agreement.  Attorney 
Mandelman said while he always had written fee agreements in 
contingency matters and that he never forgot to sign one in any 
case, he could not produce a written fee contract with N.C. 
¶8 
In June 1998 Attorney Mandelman filed a lawsuit 
against Dade in Jefferson County Circuit Court and in Walworth 
County Circuit Court.  The Jefferson County case was ultimately 
dismissed.   
¶9 
Attorney Mandelman also agreed to represent N.C. in 
filing a petition to reopen a custody dispute between N.C. and 
her child's father.  The agreed fee for those services was $275 
per hour.  In September 1998 N.C. gave Attorney Mandelman a 
$3000 check as an advance in the custody matter.  Attorney 
Mandelman deposited this check into his business account.  At 
the time the check was deposited Attorney Mandelman had worked 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
5 
 
6.5 hours in the custody matter, for which N.C. owed him 
$1787.50. 
¶10 In February 1999 N.C. wrote to Attorney Mandelman 
saying she had lost faith in his representation and discharged 
him in the custody case.  Despite having received N.C.'s 
discharge by fax, Attorney Mandelman continued to work on the 
case. 
¶11 On March 1, 1999, Attorney Mandelman became law 
partners with Reitz, forming Reitz & Mandelman, LLC.  Attorney 
Reitz had extensive experience preparing cases for trial, but 
had limited trial experience so his role in the new firm was to 
prepare cases for trial, while Attorney Mandelman's role was to 
handle settlement negotiations, depositions, and trials.  
¶12 On April 5, 1999, N.C. wrote to Attorney Mandelman 
advising him that she had retained new counsel in the custody 
case and requesting that he immediately refund the $3000 she had 
paid him.  Beginning on April 14, 1999, and on several occasions 
thereafter, N.C. sent communications to Attorney Mandelman 
asking for an itemized bill in the custody matter and also 
asking for a refund of her retainer.   
¶13 On April 15, 1999, Reitz sent N.C. a letter advising 
that he would be her attorney in the malpractice case and that 
he would consult with Attorney Mandelman, whose function would 
be to handle court appearances and litigation. 
¶14 On May 11, 1999, Dade's attorney sent Attorney 
Mandelman a first set of interrogatories and a request for 
production of documents, which requested answers within 30 days.  
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
6 
 
Reitz requested various extensions of time to respond.  On July 
2, 1999, Dade's attorney informed Reitz that if a response to 
discovery was not received by July 12, 1999, he would seek 
sanctions, including dismissal of N.C.'s case. 
¶15 By 
July 
16, 
1999, 
Reitz 
mailed 
N.C.'s 
signed 
interrogatories to Dade's attorney.  Although N.C. had signed 
the document it was not notarized as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.08(1)(b)(1999-2000).  In addition, Reitz failed to respond 
to the request for production of documents. 
¶16 On July 23, 1999, Dade's counsel filed a motion for 
dismissal of N.C.'s case based on her failure to respond to the 
discovery request.  That motion was heard on August 19, 1999.  
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, sanctioned N.C. 
for her discovery violations, and ordered that full and fair 
responses to Dade's first discovery be provided by August 30, 
1999. 
¶17 On or about August 30, 1999, Reitz responded to the 
first discovery request and forwarded the documents to Dade's 
counsel.  Throughout the fall of 1999 N.C. wrote to Reitz 
requesting a refund of the fees she had paid in the custody 
matter.  
¶18 On October 27, 1999, N.C. wrote to Reitz confirming an 
October 25 conversation regarding settlement discussions.  N.C. 
said she did not want to settle the malpractice case, and she 
asked about taking depositions.  On November 5, 1999, Dade's 
counsel wrote to Reitz asking that he adequately identify the 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
7 
 
experts he intended to call as witnesses by November 10.  Reitz 
failed to respond to the letter.   
¶19 On November 15, 1999, Reitz filed a motion to withdraw 
as N.C.'s attorney.  On November 24 Dade's counsel filed a 
letter objecting to Reitz's motion to withdraw, citing various 
discovery violations and failure to name experts.   
¶20 Following 
additional 
requests 
from 
N.C., 
Reitz 
ultimately, on December 8, 1999, sent N.C. the balance of the 
$3000 attorney fees she had paid in the custody matter.   
¶21 On December 10, 1999, the trial court denied Reitz's 
motion to withdraw in the malpractice case.  On December 13 
Dade's counsel again requested names of potential experts and 
set a deadline of December 17, 1999, for Reitz to provide them.  
Reitz failed to respond.  On January 4, 2000, Dade's counsel 
filed a motion for dismissal for failure to follow court orders 
and for failure to file the necessary expert opinions.  A 
hearing was scheduled on the motion for January 18, 2000.   
¶22 Reitz scheduled a deposition of Dade to be conducted 
on the afternoon of January 14, 2000, at the Reitz & Mandelman 
law 
office. 
 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
normally 
conducted 
all 
depositions in cases handled by the firm, but he agreed to 
conduct Dade's deposition only if N.C. stated in writing that 
she had been satisfied with Attorney Mandelman's work and that 
she had specifically requested Attorney Mandelman to conduct the 
deposition.  Shortly before the deposition was to begin, Reitz 
met with N.C. and had her sign the following document: 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
8 
 
RELEASE OF MICHAEL MANDELMAN 
I, N.C., understand that Michael Mandelman has not 
recently been working on my case against John Dade and 
has agreed to do the deposition of John Dade January 
14, 2000, only on condition that this release, waiver 
and authorization is executed.  I am providing Mr. 
Mandelman with information regarding my case this date 
and with questions that I wish him to ask of John Dade 
at the deposition.  I hereby authorize Mr. Mandelman 
to conduct this deposition and release Michael D. 
Mandelman from any claims that I may have against him 
for whatever reason relating to any matters that he 
has worked on for me, hereby waiving the same..[sic]  
I have at this time no intention of filing any 
complaint, grievance, lawsuit or any other action with 
anybody against Michael D. Mandelman.  I wish for 
Michael D. Mandelman to conduct this deposition of 
John Dade understand that this statement is necessary 
so that he can can [sic] proceed with my claim with 
the confidence necessary that he has my support in 
this matter. 
¶23 Reitz informed N.C. that if she did not sign the 
document the deposition would not occur and N.C. would lose the 
case.  Neither Attorney Mandelman nor Reitz advised N.C. in 
writing to obtain independent representation before signing the 
release.  After N.C. signed the release, Attorney Mandelman 
conducted Dade's deposition.   
¶24 In January 2000 there were unsuccessful settlement 
negotiations in the malpractice case.  On the date of Dade's 
hearing on the motion to dismiss Reitz filed a brief in 
opposition to the motion, arguing that N.C.'s failure to submit 
summaries 
of 
her 
experts' 
opinions 
did 
not 
violate 
the 
scheduling order because she had no experts to testify on her 
behalf.  The motion asked that N.C. be allowed to proceed 
without an expert witness.   
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
9 
 
¶25 Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order 
dismissing the case.  The court found that N.C. could not 
succeed in proving the case without an expert witness, and she 
had failed to identify any expert who was willing to testify 
that Dade had been negligent.  The court dismissed the case with 
prejudice and awarded costs in favor of Dade.  N.C. subsequently 
agreed to waive the right to appeal the trial court's decision.  
In return Dade agreed to waive his counsel's costs and any 
unpaid legal fees that N.C. still owed to him.  
¶26 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to his representation of N.C.: 
COUNT ONE——By failing to provide N.C. with a written 
fee agreement for the malpractice representation, 
Mandelman charged a contingent fee without a written 
fee agreement, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(c).1 
COUNT TWO——By failing to deposit into his trust 
account the $3,000.00 check from N.C., Mandelman 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.5(c) provides:  Fees. 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the 
matter for which the service is rendered, except in a 
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by 
paragraph (d) or other law.  A contingent fee 
agreement shall be in writing and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including 
the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the 
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, 
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the 
recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted 
before or after the contingent fee is calculated.  
Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer 
shall provide the client with a written statement 
stating the outcome of the matter and if there is a 
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the 
method of its determination. 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
10 
 
failed to hold in trust, separate from his own 
property an advance fee, in violation of former SCR 
20:1.15(a).2 
COUNT THREE——By failing to file a petition to reopen 
N.C.'s custody matter and by failing to pursue N.C.'s 
malpractice action against Dade in a timely manner, 
Mandelman failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3.3 
COUNT FOUR——By continuing work on N.C.'s custody 
matter after she had discharged him, Mandelman failed 
to withdraw from the representation, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.16(a)(3).4 
COUNT FIVE——By failing to respond to N.C.'s requests 
for an accounting of her $3,000.00 payment to him, 
Mandelman failed to render a full accounting regarding 
property in his possession, in violation of former SCR 
20:1.15(b).5 
                                                 
2 Former SCR 20:1.15 applies to misconduct committed prior 
to July 1, 2004.  Former SCR 20:1.15(a) provided in relevant 
part: Safekeeping property. 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity.  Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise.  All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts . . . .  
 
3 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."  
4 SCR 20:1.16(a)(3) provides that ". . . a lawyer shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall 
withdraw from the representation of a client if the lawyer is 
discharged."  
5 Former SCR 20:1.15(b) provided:  Safekeeping property. 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
11 
 
COUNT SIX——By participating in having N.C. sign a 
document entitled "Release of Michael Mandelman" in 
which N.C. agreed to release Mandelman from any claims 
that she had against him, Mandelman made an agreement 
prospectively limiting his liability to a client who 
was not independently represented by counsel, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.8(h).6 
¶27 Another client matter detailed in the OLR's complaint 
involved 
Attorney 
Mandelman's 
representation 
of 
C.K., who 
sustained severe injuries in July 1998 when his motorcycle was 
forced off the road by a pickup truck.  In late January 1999 
C.K. retained Attorney Mandelman to represent him in a claim 
against Germantown Mutual, the insurer of the pickup truck's 
driver. 
¶28 In February and March 1999 Attorney Mandelman sought 
copies of C.K.'s medical records and bills from various 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in 
which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 
person in writing.  Except as stated in this rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 
or third person any funds or other property that the 
client or third person is entitled to receive and, 
upon request by the client or third person, shall 
render a full accounting regarding such property. 
6 SCR 20:1.8(h) provides:  Conflict of interest: prohibited 
transactions. 
(h) 
A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
make 
an 
agreement 
prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a 
client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the 
client is independently represented in making the 
agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with 
an unrepresented client or former client without first 
advising that person in writing that independent 
representation is appropriate in connection therewith. 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
12 
 
treatment providers, along with wage loss verification.  When 
Reitz became partners with Attorney Mandelman the C.K. file was 
assigned to Reitz.  Between March 1999 and July 2000 Reitz 
performed certain legal services on behalf of C.K., including 
obtaining copies of treatment records and billings and engaging 
in settlement negotiations with Germantown Mutual. 
¶29 In late July 2000 C.K. was frustrated about the slow 
pace of negotiations and told Attorney Mandelman in a phone 
conversation that he wanted a lawsuit to be commenced.  On July 
31, 2000, Attorney Mandelman wrote to C.K. and advised him he 
"would do everything possible to expedite this matter."   
¶30 In November 2000 a $12,000 settlement offer was made 
to C.K.  The offer was not accepted.  Over the next six or seven 
weeks, settlement negotiations continued until Germantown Mutual 
reduced its settlement offer to $8000.  That offer was refused 
on February 7, 2001.   
¶31 C.K. was being pursued for payment of medical bills by 
a number of health care providers, including General Clinic, 
which served C.K. with a summons to appear in court on January 
16, 2001.  C.K. faxed the summons to Reitz and was assured that 
Reitz would take care of it.   
¶32 On January 15, 2001, Reitz spoke with an attorney for 
General Clinic in an effort to arrange a delay of a judgment 
being taken.  The attorney advised Reitz he would take judgment, 
but would delay docketing it for 30 days to give C.K. time to 
make arrangements to pay.  Reitz did not relay this conversation 
to C.K.  After hearing nothing from Reitz for 45 days, General 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
13 
 
Clinic commenced a garnishment action against C.K.  Between 
February and May 2001 neither Reitz nor Attorney Mandelman took 
any substantive effort to advance C.K.'s personal injury case 
towards suit.  In early June 2001 Reitz made a final, 
unsuccessful effort to mediate the case. 
¶33 On July 17, 2001, one day before the statute of 
limitations was to run, Reitz filed a summons and complaint in 
Shawano County Circuit Court.  The defendants filed an answer on 
September 7, 2001.  No substantive action was taken by Attorney 
Mandelman or Reitz for the balance of 2001, with the exception 
of receiving and responding to interrogatories filed by the 
defendants. 
¶34 In March 2002 C.K. called the court to check on the 
status of his case.  The clerk informed him that if a status 
conference was not arranged soon the judge would dismiss the 
case.  C.K. contacted Reitz with that information and Reitz 
secured a May 1, 2002, status conference date.  Subsequently, 
C.K. sought other attorneys to take over the case but could find 
no one willing to share the fee with Attorneys Reitz and 
Mandelman.  For that reason C.K. did not terminate Reitz and 
Mandelman's services.  C.K.'s case was settled shortly before a 
February 2003 trial date. 
¶35 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Mandelman's representation 
of C.K.: 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
14 
 
COUNT EIGHT7——By failing to pursue C.K.'s personal 
injury claim in a timely manner, as C.K.'s lawyer and 
as a partner in the firm, Mandelman failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client in violation of SCR 20:1.3. 
COUNT NINE——By failing to respond to C.K.'s requests 
for information, Mandelman failed to ensure that a 
client was kept reasonably informed about the status 
of a matter and further failed to promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information from a client, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).8  Mandelman is responsible 
for a violation of SCR 20:1.4(a) by reason of his own 
conduct and based upon the joint responsibility to 
represent C.K. as partners in a law firm providing 
legal services under SCR 20:5.1(c)(2).9 
¶36 The next client matter detailed in the OLR's complaint 
involved 
Attorney 
Mandelman's 
representation 
of 
T.O., who 
injured his back in October 1999 when, while stopped at a 
traffic signal, he leapt off his motorcycle to avoid being run 
                                                 
7 Count Seven of the complaint involved Attorney Mandelman's 
representation of a client named J.S.  The OLR subsequently 
voluntarily dismissed this count so it will not be discussed in 
further detail.  
 
8 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."  
9 SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) provides:  Responsibilities of a partner 
or supervisory lawyer.   
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another 
lawyer's 
violation of 
the Rules 
of Professional 
Conduct if:  
 
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm 
in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct 
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows 
of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be 
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 
remedial action.  
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
15 
 
over by a truck that was backing up toward him.  T.O. retained 
an attorney to represent him in a personal injury action.  That 
attorney secured a $5000 settlement offer from the truck driver 
and his insurer, but T.O. rejected the offer.  That attorney 
filed suit in Waushara County Circuit Court against the truck 
driver, the truck driver's employer, and Sentry Insurance.  The 
attorney did not serve the defendants in the case because 
shortly after it was filed in October 2000 T.O. met with 
Attorney Mandelman and retained him to take over the case.   
¶37 Reitz prepared, but never filed with the court, a 
formal notice of retainer on behalf of T.O.  No formal 
substitution of attorneys was prepared on behalf of T.O.  
Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz received T.O.'s file from the 
other attorney in early November 2000.  They delayed service of 
the summons and complaint to give them a chance to fully review 
the file.   
¶38 On December 27, 2000, the circuit court sent a 20-day 
dismissal order to the first attorney and to the defendant, 
indicating that the matter would be dismissed without prejudice 
within 20 days if certificates of service were not then on file.  
Reitz filed certificates of service with the court on January 2, 
2001.   
¶39 The defendants' answers to the complaint were due in 
mid-February 2001.  No answers were filed, no appearances were 
made by any attorneys on behalf of the defendants, and no 
extensions of time to answer were filed or documented.  On March 
29, 2001, the circuit court sent a letter to the first attorney 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
16 
 
and to Reitz, indicating that no substitution of attorneys had 
been filed, nor any scheduling initiated.  The court asked for a 
response within 30 days. 
¶40 On April 6, 2001, the first attorney responded, 
copying Reitz, and advised the court it was up to Reitz to 
prepare and file the substitution stipulation and order.  Reitz 
neither responded to the court's letter nor to the first 
attorney's letter.  On May 2, 2001, T.O.'s case was dismissed 
without prejudice for failure to prosecute.  A copy of the 
dismissal order was sent to Reitz.  
¶41 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Mandelman's representation 
of T.O.: 
COUNT TEN——By failing to file in court a notice of 
substitution, which resulted in the dismissal of 
T.O.'s case, Mandelman failed to act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client in 
violation of SCR 20:1.3.  Mandelman is responsible for 
a violation of SCR 20:1.3 by reason of his own conduct 
and based upon the joint responsibility to represent 
T.O. as partners in a law firm providing legal 
services under SCR 20:5.1(c)(2). 
¶42 Another client matter detailed in the OLR's complaint 
involved Attorney Mandelman's representation of J.D.  On 
November 20, 2001, J.D. retained Attorney Mandelman to represent 
her in an employment claim against a former employer, the law 
firm of Daniel Kondos, in connection with a sexual harassment 
matter.  In November and December 2001 Attorney Mandelman 
negotiated with counsel for Kondos's law firm regarding a 
possible settlement of the claim.   
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
17 
 
¶43 On December 20, 2001, J.D. filed a complaint against 
Kondos with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division (ERD) and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sexual 
harassment.  J.D. prepared and typed the complaint under 
Attorney Mandelman's direct supervision.   
¶44 On January 16, 2002, an officer of the ERD advised 
J.D. that he had sent her complaint to Kondos.  He further 
advised that if J.D. was unable to reach a compromise with 
Kondos, he would investigate her complaint.  A copy of the 
letter was sent to Reitz.  On or about January 18, 2002, J.D. 
telephoned Attorney Mandelman requesting some explanation about 
the letter and the materials she had received from ERD.  
Attorney Mandelman's response was vague and of little assistance 
to J.D. 
¶45 On January 25, 2002, counsel for Kondos filed with ERD 
a narrative response to J.D.'s complaint and an answer and 
affirmative defenses.  A copy was sent to Reitz.  The answer 
denied 
J.D.'s 
allegations 
and 
raised 
various 
affirmative 
defenses, including the defense that J.D.'s claim was barred due 
to her failure to file it within the 300-day statute of 
limitations.  On or about January 26, 2002, J.D. asked Attorney 
Mandelman how he intended to respond to the Kondos submissions.  
Attorney Mandelman indicated he did not know how to respond and 
would have to think about it.  Attorney Mandelman neither 
responded to Kondos's narrative response, nor did he respond to 
Kondos's answers and affirmative defenses.   
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
18 
 
¶46 On February 14, 2002, ERD sent a letter addressed to 
Reitz indicating it was proceeding with an investigation of 
J.D.'s claim and enclosing a copy of the Kondos response.  ERD 
informed Reitz it would be necessary for J.D. to provide a 
written rebuttal to Kondos's response by February 25, 2002.  ERD 
also indicated it would assume J.D. agreed with all of the 
Kondos points if she did not dispute them in her rebuttal.  ERD 
requested that J.D. have her witnesses telephone ERD by February 
25.  Attorney Mandelman failed to inform J.D. of ERD's requests.   
¶47 On March 13, 2002, ERD wrote to Reitz and advised him 
they had not received a response to their February 14 letter and 
that an initial determination would be issued based on the facts 
in ERD's file.  Neither Attorney Mandelman nor Reitz responded 
to ERD's letter.   
¶48 On April 8, 2002, ERD issued three orders with respect 
to J.D.'s claim.  The orders were sent to J.D. with a copy to 
Reitz.  Among other things, ERD dismissed the claim against the 
employee of the Kondos law firm whom J.D. accused of sexual 
harassment.  ERD also found that a portion of J.D.'s complaint 
did not meet the timeliness requirements of the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Law, which required a complaint to be filed within 
300 days of the alleged act of discrimination.  In addition, ERD 
found no probable cause with regard to J.D.'s claim and 
dismissed the complaint.  The decision stated that J.D. failed 
to refute Kondos's response and failed to have her witnesses 
telephone the investigator on her behalf.  The decision also 
stated that the investigation of J.D.'s complaint revealed that 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
19 
 
there was no information to support her claim.  J.D. had 30 days 
to appeal this determination. 
¶49 J.D. received the ERD decision.  From discussions with 
Attorney Mandelman she understood that Attorney Mandelman would 
take care of the pending ERD matters, including the appeal.  
J.D. contacted ERD around May 13, 2002, and learned that the 
file had been closed on May 8 because the agency had never 
received a timely appeal.  That same day J.D. contacted Attorney 
Mandelman about the status of the case and Attorney Mandelman 
said he knew nothing about the dismissal and that Reitz was 
working on the case and would keep her informed.   
¶50 J.D. spoke with Reitz on or about May 14, 2002, and he 
agreed to fax her the work done on the case.  After receiving 
nothing from Reitz, J.D. contacted Attorney Mandelman on May 15, 
inquiring about Reitz's work.  She received no response.   
¶51 On May 16, 2002, J.D. wrote to Attorney Mandelman 
expressing concern about her loss of the right to appeal and 
asking how the problem was to be handled.  She received no 
response.  On May 17 Attorney Mandelman acknowledged he had done 
nothing on the case and said he would telephone Kondos's counsel 
to try to reach a settlement.   
¶52 On May 21, 2002, Attorney Mandelman advised J.D. that 
Kondos had agreed to pay $3000 to settle the claim.  J.D. asked 
Attorney Mandelman to make a $10,000 counter-offer.  The offer 
was made and Kondos refused it.  In June 2002 Attorney Mandelman 
advised J.D. to settle the case and told her his fee would be 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
20 
 
$250.  Attorney Mandelman said he would call J.D. back regarding 
the settlement, but he did not do so.   
¶53 By letter dated June 18, 2002, EEOC sent J.D. a 
document entitled "Dismissal and Notice of Rights."  The letter 
informed J.D. that EEOC had upheld ERD's decision but that she 
had the right to sue Kondos in federal court within 90 days.  
Attorney Mandelman never advised J.D. that she had the right to 
sue in federal court.  On June 26, 2002, J.D. wrote to Attorney 
Mandelman and discharged him.   
¶54 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Mandelman's representation 
of J.D.:   
COUNT ELEVEN——By failing to make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that his firm had in effect measures giving 
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct, and by 
the firm's failure to file a response to Kondos' 
Answer and Affirmative Defenses, by failing to submit 
a rebuttal to Kondos' response, and by failing to 
ensure 
that 
J.D.'s 
witnesses 
telephoned 
ERD's 
investigator, Mandelman failed to act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client in 
violation of SCR 20:1.3 and SCR 20:5.1(a).10 
¶55 The 
final 
client 
matter 
detailed 
in 
the 
OLR's 
complaint involved Attorney Mandelman's representation of L.K., 
who was involved in a five-car collision on I-94 in September 
1999.  On September 22 L.K. retained Attorney Mandelman to 
                                                 
10 SCR 20:5.1(a) provides that "[a] partner in a law firm 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in 
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in 
the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct." 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
21 
 
represent her in the personal injury claim resulting from the 
accident. 
 
Following 
the 
accident 
L.K. 
treated 
with 
a 
chiropractor, Dr. Gregory Daniels.  The treatment lasted until 
January 31, 2000, at which time Dr. Daniels released L.K. from 
his care.   
¶56 Between February and May 2000 Reitz collected L.K.'s 
medical records, bills, and wage loss information.  On May 16, 
2000, Reitz submitted the last of the bills and records to 
American Country Insurance Company and made a settlement demand.  
Between May 17 and October 20, 2000, no substantive action was 
taken by either Attorneys Mandelman or Reitz with regard to the 
case.  Between October 21, 2000, and January 4, 2001, Attorney 
Mandelman pursued settlement negotiations with American Country.  
American Country's top offer was $17,000, which was rejected. 
¶57 L.K. discussed her claim with Attorney Mandelman on 
January 3, 2001, and told him she wanted him to file suit 
immediately.  Attorney Mandelman told her he would proceed with 
the lawsuit.  Attorney Mandelman confirmed this conversation in 
a letter dated January 4, 2001, in which he promised to 
"immediately place this matter in suit." 
¶58 Between January 4, 2001, and March 7, 2001, L.K. made 
numerous phone calls to Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz to get a 
status report on her case.  Neither Attorney Mandelman nor Reitz 
returned her calls.  On March 7, 2001, L.K. spoke with Reitz, 
who told her he would file the lawsuit and serve the summons and 
complaint.  The same day Reitz prepared a summons and complaint 
but did not file them with the court.   
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
22 
 
¶59 On March 29, 2001, Reitz sent a copy of the summons 
and complaint to L.K., saying "[p]lease find enclosed a copy of 
the Summons and Complaint for your lawsuit."  There was no 
indication that the documents Reitz sent L.K. were a draft.   
¶60 L.K. believed the complaint had been filed and, after 
waiting 45 days for the defendants to answer the complaint, 
contacted Reitz by phone on May 2, 2001.  Reitz told L.K. he 
would set a date with the judge to arbitrate her claim.  On June 
5, 2001, L.K. telephoned Reitz, who told her no court date had 
yet been scheduled and that she should call him back.  On June 
22, 2001, L.K. again telephoned Reitz, who informed her the 
court would most likely schedule a court date in two to six 
weeks.   
¶61 On June 9, 2001, L.K. met with Reitz and told him she 
would not accept a $17,000 offer from the insurance company.  
She repeated her desire to litigate the claim.  Between May and 
September 2001 Reitz pressed American Country to mediate the 
case without having to actually commence the action.  By 
September 23, 2001, it was apparent that American Country did 
not want to increase its settlement offer or mediate, so on that 
date a new, but substantively identical summons and complaint 
was prepared for filing.  Reitz failed to file the new summons 
and complaint.  On or about December 17, 2001, L.K. retained a 
different law firm to pursue her case when neither Attorney 
Mandelman nor Reitz had filed her lawsuit.  
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
23 
 
¶62 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Mandelman's representation 
of L.K.: 
COUNT THIRTEEN——By failing to pursue L.K.'s personal 
injury claim in a timely manner, Mandelman failed to 
act 
with 
reasonable 
diligence and 
promptness in 
representing a client in violation of SCR 20:1.3.  
Mandelman is responsible for a violation of SCR 20:1.3 
by reason of his own conduct and based upon the joint 
responsibility to represent L.K. as partners in a law 
firm providing legal services under SCR 20:5.1(c)(2). 
¶63 In October 2004 the OLR filed a second complaint 
alleging that by failing to file income tax returns, by filing 
untimely income tax returns, and by failing to pay income taxes 
when due, Attorney Mandelman violated a standard of conduct for 
attorneys, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(f).11 
¶64 John 
A. 
Fiorenza 
was 
appointed 
referee 
in 
the 
consolidated cases.  A hearing was conducted over the course of 
eight days.  The referee filed his report and recommendation on 
August 19, 2005.  The referee found that the OLR had met its 
burden of proof with respect to counts one, three, six, eight, 
nine, ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen of the December 2003 
complaint.  The referee's report also noted that in July 2005 
Attorney Mandelman's attorney had informed the referee that 
Attorney Mandelman admitted the allegations in the October 2004 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
24 
 
complaint dealing with failure to file income tax returns and 
failure to pay income taxes. 
¶65 Of particular significance to Attorney Mandelman's 
appeal is the professional relationship between Attorneys Reitz 
and 
Mandelman 
and 
their 
clients' 
perception 
of 
that 
relationship.  The referee stated: 
There has been testimony given by many of the 
clients of Attorney Mandelman that they retain Mr. 
Mandelman and either at the initial conference with 
Mr. 
Mandelman 
or 
some 
time 
thereafter, 
it 
was 
explained that Attorney Reitz would be assisting 
Mandelman on the case.  At times the clients were told 
that Mr. Reitz would do the "work-up" on the case and 
that Mr. Mandelman would be taking the Depositions and 
appearing in Court and trying the case.  Other clients 
testified that they never met Mr. Reitz in person but 
at times they would talk to him on the phone or see 
some letters that were written by Mr. Reitz. 
There was no testimony that indicated that the 
clients were told or knew that the responsibilities of 
each of these attorneys were separate and distinct 
from the other attorney.  Mr. Mandelman never informed 
any of his clients that he would not be responsible 
for any actions that were taken by Mr. Reitz.   
¶66 The OLR had requested a one-year suspension of 
Attorney Mandelman's license.  The referee concluded that a 
nine-month suspension was appropriate.  The referee also 
recommended that Attorney Mandelman be required to pay the costs 
of the proceeding.   
¶67 Attorney 
Mandelman 
has 
appealed 
the 
referee's 
conclusions of law regarding the allegations in the OLR's 
December 2003 complaint with respect to counts one, six, eight, 
nine, ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen.  Attorney Mandelman 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
25 
 
vigorously disputes that he is responsible for actions taken by 
Reitz.  Attorney Mandelman asserts that SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) states 
a rule of accessorial liability rather than vicarious liability 
and requires that a partner or supervising lawyer know of 
conduct by a partner or subordinate at a time when adverse 
consequences to the client can be avoided and, in the face of 
that knowledge, fails to take remedial action.  Attorney 
Mandelman argues that the referee's analysis of SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) 
in effect applied a respondeat superior theory which does not 
apply in attorney disciplinary proceedings.   
¶68 Attorney Mandelman argues that the record is clear 
that he had no direct supervisory authority over Reitz and that 
the two were equal partners.  He contends that the erroneous 
work performed on behalf of the various clients as detailed in 
the 
OLR's 
complaint 
was 
wholly 
within 
Reitz's 
realm 
of 
professional responsibility.  Attorney Mandelman says, "[u]nder 
the OLR's theory, Mandelman should have done all his own work 
and Reitz's too."  Attorney Mandelman contends the mere fact 
that he spoke to the various clients at different times does not 
obviate the fact that Reitz remained responsible for handling 
their cases. 
¶69 Attorney Mandelman also takes issue with the referee's 
finding of fact that he failed to provide a written contingent 
fee agreement in N.C.'s malpractice case.  He says the facts of 
record establish that he used written fee agreements in 
thousands of cases and in this single lone instance he was 
simply unable to locate the written contingent fee agreement and 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
26 
 
there is nothing to prove that he did not have N.C. sign an 
agreement "other than the recall of a manipulative complainant."   
¶70 With respect to the referee's finding that Attorney 
Mandelman entered into an agreement with N.C. prospectively 
limiting his liability for malpractice, Attorney Mandelman 
claims he did not know what type of document Reitz prepared; all 
Attorney Mandelman wanted was an "acknowledgment" from N.C. that 
she was "happy" with what Attorney Mandelman had done; and 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
never 
looked 
at 
the 
document 
before 
proceeding with the Dade deposition.   
¶71 Attorney Mandelman also contends that the referee's 
recommendation for a nine-month license suspension is excessive.  
He asserts that the five-month license suspension imposed 
against 
Reitz 
"sets 
a 
reasonable 
upper-end 
standard 
for 
discipline in this case." 
¶72 Attorney Mandelman also argues that the costs of the 
proceeding should be prorated based on the OLR's failure to 
prove its entire case.   
¶73 The OLR argues that there is sufficient proof that 
Attorney Mandelman violated SCR 20:5.1(c)(2).  In support of 
this argument the OLR says in each of the subject cases both 
Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz performed services for the same 
client on the same case; Reitz & Mandelman LLC was essentially a 
two-lawyer operation; each client considered Mandelman or both 
Mandelman and Reitz to be their attorneys; while Attorney 
Mandelman claims he did not supervise Reitz, it is clear that 
from time to time Attorney Mandelman did direct Reitz to perform 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
27 
 
certain activities and then failed to follow up on whether Reitz 
had done so; Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz had apparent 
comparable managerial authority in the law firm as to each 
particular file; all files were readily accessible to both 
attorneys; and Attorney Mandelman has acknowledged that there 
was nothing to prevent him from checking on the status of a 
file.  The OLR also contends that Attorney Mandelman had ample 
notice of client complaints and ample time to take measures to 
rectify problems but failed to do so.   
¶74 The OLR also asserts that Attorney Mandelman bears the 
burden of contradicting N.C.'s testimony that there was no 
written contingent fee in the malpractice case, and Attorney 
Mandelman has failed to produce such an agreement.  The OLR says 
the 
agreement 
prospectively 
limiting 
Attorney 
Mandelman's 
liability to N.C. is perhaps the most serious of all the 
misconduct counts, and it says it is the most dramatic example 
of Attorney Mandelman's lack of credibility.  The OLR says the 
suggestion that Reitz mistakenly incorporated release language 
into the document when Attorney Mandelman told Reitz he simply 
wanted an acknowledgment that N.C. was "happy" with his 
representation is simply not credible.  The OLR says Attorney 
Mandelman's claim that he was not aware of the specific content 
of the release is similarly incredible.  The OLR says Attorney 
Mandelman knew that N.C. was a difficult client and that she was 
angry at him.  He asked Reitz to draft the document and assured 
himself that the document had been signed before he took the 
Dade deposition.  The OLR says the document was presumably in 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
28 
 
the file over which Attorney Mandelman had control, and those 
circumstances necessarily lead to the inference that Attorney 
Mandelman did know of the document's content.   
¶75 The OLR has cross-appealed the referee's conclusion 
that Attorney Mandelman's failure to deposit N.C.'s $3000 
retainer check into his trust account did not violate former SCR 
20:1.15(a).  While the OLR acknowledges that the conduct in this 
case predates the July 2004 rule changes which clearly would 
have required placing the retainer check into a trust account, 
it asserts the rule in Wisconsin always was that such payments 
should have been placed in an attorney's client trust account. 
¶76 Attorney Mandelman argues that the referee correctly 
concluded he was not required to deposit N.C.'s $3000 payment of 
advance fees into his trust account.  He notes that Attorney 
Richard Cayo testified as an expert witness on Attorney 
Mandelman's behalf and opined that, during the relevant time 
period, it was a very open question among legal ethics 
professionals what treatment had to be afforded to retainers.  
Attorney Mandelman says if the issue was as clear as the OLR 
contends, there would have been no reason for this court to 
create SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) to specifically provide that advance 
payment of fees and costs must be deposited into a lawyer's 
trust account.   
¶77 The OLR argues that Attorney Mandelman's extensive 
prior disciplinary history warrants a minimum nine-month license 
suspension.  The OLR says "Mandelman has not gotten the message.  
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
29 
 
Prior discipline has not been effective in preventing a repeat 
of the same type of unprofessional conduct."   
¶78 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The 
court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  
After careful review of the record, we conclude that the 
referee's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and we 
adopt them.  We also agree with the conclusions of law that flow 
from the referee's findings of fact, except we do not agree 
that, in his handling of the C.K. matter, Attorney Mandelman 
violated SCR 20:5.1(c)(2).  
¶79 We find that the record supports all of the referee's 
findings and conclusions with respect to Attorney Mandelman's 
handling of the N.C. matter.  We further find that Attorney 
Mandelman failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in his representation of the various clients, as alleged in the 
OLR's complaint.  We also find that he failed to keep C.K. 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and failed to 
promptly 
comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests 
for 
information 
received from C.K.   
¶80 The referee concluded that Attorney Mandelman violated 
SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) with respect to his handling of the C.K., T.O. 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
30 
 
and L.K. matters.  We agree with the referee's analysis as to 
the T.O. and L.K. matters but not as to C.K.'s case.   
¶81 SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) provides that a lawyer shall be 
responsible for another lawyer's violation of the rules of 
professional conduct if the lawyer is a partner in the law firm 
in which the other lawyer practices and knows of the conduct at 
a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but 
fails to take reasonable remedial action.  The preamble to the 
rules 
of 
professional 
conduct 
for 
attorneys 
provides: 
"'Knowingly,' 'Known,' or 'Knows' denotes actual knowledge of 
the fact in question.  A person's knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstances."   
¶82 In addition, the comment to SCR 20:5.1 states: 
Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a lawyer 
having direct supervisory authority over performance 
of specific legal work by another lawyer.  Whether a 
lawyer has such supervisory authority in particular 
circumstances is a question of fact.  Partners of a 
private firm have at least indirect responsibility for 
all work being done by the firm, while a partner in 
charge of a particular matter ordinarily has direct 
authority over other firm lawyers engaged in the 
matter.  Appropriate remedial action by a partner 
would depend on the immediacy of the partner's 
involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct.  
The supervisor is required to intervene to prevent 
avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor 
knows that the misconduct occurred. . . . 
Contrary to Attorney Mandelman's assertion that a finding that 
he violated SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) is tantamount to holding him 
responsible for matters over which Reitz had exclusive control, 
we find that the record demonstrates that Attorney Mandelman had 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
31 
 
direct responsibility for the T.O. and L.K. cases and he had 
actual knowledge that the matters were not being handled with 
reasonable diligence but failed to take appropriate remedial 
action. 
¶83 T.O. retained Attorney Mandelman to take over his 
personal injury case in which a different attorney had already 
filed a lawsuit in circuit court but had not yet served the 
summons and complaint.  After receiving the file from the other 
attorney, Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz delayed service of the 
summons 
and 
complaint. 
 
Although 
service 
was 
eventually 
effectuated, no substitution of attorneys was ever filed, no 
scheduling was initiated, and the case was ultimately dismissed 
for failure to prosecute.  We agree with the referee that the 
evidence supports a finding that Attorney Mandelman knew that 
T.O.'s case was not being handled with reasonable diligence and 
promptness by Reitz and failed to take reasonable remedial 
action.   
¶84 We further agree with the referee's findings and 
conclusion that Attorney Mandelman violated SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) 
with respect to his handling of the L.K. matter.  L.K. retained 
Attorney Mandelman to represent her in her personal injury case.  
Although 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
claims 
Reitz 
then 
took 
over 
responsibility for the file, the record reveals that L.K. told 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
she 
wanted 
him 
to 
file 
her 
lawsuit 
immediately, and Attorney Mandelman promised he would do so.  He 
followed this promise up with a letter.  L.K. subsequently made 
numerous phone calls to both Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
32 
 
trying to get a status report on her case.  There is ample 
evidence to support a finding that Attorney Mandelman knew 
L.K.'s case was not being handled with reasonable diligence and 
promptness and failed to take reasonable remedial action.   
¶85 We 
disagree 
with 
the 
referee's 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney Mandelman violated SCR 20:5.1(c)(2) with respect to the 
handling of the General Clinic collection action filed against 
C.K.  Although C.K. did retain Attorney Mandelman to represent 
him in his personal injury claim, the record indicates that C.K. 
dealt exclusively with Reitz on the collection action, and it 
was Reitz who assured C.K. he would take care of that matter and 
it was Reitz who failed to do so.  Unlike the T.O. and L.K. 
matters, the record does not support a finding that Attorney 
Mandelman knew of Reitz's failure to take care of the C.K. 
collection matter at a time when its consequences could have 
been avoided or mitigated.   
¶86 After careful review of the record, we reject the 
arguments made in the OLR's cross-appeal, and we affirm the 
referee's findings of fact which led to his conclusions of law 
that the OLR failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to 
Attorney Mandelman's failure to deposit N.C.'s $3000 retainer 
check into his trust account.  As Attorney Mandelman's expert 
witness opined, at the time in question it was unclear whether 
such a retainer had to be placed in a client trust account.  
¶87 As to the appropriate sanction to be imposed, we agree 
with the referee that a nine-month suspension of Attorney 
Mandelman's license to practice law is appropriate.  While 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
33 
 
Attorney Mandelman argues that the five-month suspension imposed 
as a result of Reitz's misconduct should be the upper-end 
standard for discipline here, we note that Attorney Mandelman 
has been found to have committed more counts of misconduct than 
Reitz and, unlike Reitz, he has been disciplined on three prior 
occasions.  Under the circumstances we deem a nine-month 
suspension appropriate.   
¶88 We also conclude that Attorney Mandelman should pay 
the full costs of the proceeding totaling $37,088.08.  Although 
Attorney Mandelman argues that because the referee found that 
the OLR failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to some 
of the counts alleged in the December 2003 complaint, this court 
should exercise its discretion to award something less than full 
costs, we decline to depart from the general practice of 
imposing the full costs on a disciplined lawyer. 
¶89 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael D. Mandelman 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for nine months 
commencing June 21, 2006, as discipline for his professional 
misconduct. 
¶90 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney Michael D. Mandelman pay to the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Michael D. Mandelman to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall remain suspended until further order of this court. 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
34 
 
¶91 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael D. Mandelman comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
 
Nos. 2003AP3348-D & 2004AP2633-D   
 
 
 
1