Title: Kolker v. State
Citation: 260 Ga. 240, 391 S.E.2d 391
Docket Number: S90A0137
State: Georgia
Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 1990

260 Ga. 240 (1990) 391 S.E.2d 391 KOLKER v. THE STATE. S90A0137. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided May 11, 1990. Reconsideration Denied June 8, 1990. Lenzer &amp; Lenzer, Thomas P. Lenzer, Robert W. Lenzer, for appellant. Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor, David M. Fuller, George L. Kimbel, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee. Joseph H. Briley, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Neal B. Childers, Assistant Attorney General, Ralph T. Bowden, Jr., N. Jackson Cotney, Jr., Gary D. Bergman, Patrick H. Head, John G. Cicala, Virgil L. Brown, Eric D. Hearn, Bentley C. Adams III, Theresa F. Gilstrap, Walter E. Sumner, amici curiae. FLETCHER, Justice. The Court of Appeals transferred this case, Kolker v. State, 193 Ga. App. 306 (387 SE2d 597) (1989), to us on the ground that it involves a construction of the state constitution and is thus within this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1) of the Ga. Const. of 1983. We agree. Presented for decision are perennial issues of Georgia law concerning the extent to which the General Assembly is authorized to vest municipal courts with jurisdiction preempting enforcement of state criminal laws in state courts. Such a preemption exists in two contexts. The first is where the legislature vests municipalities with the power to enact municipal ordinances on the same subject matters as those covered by state criminal laws. See Burroughs v. State, 246 Ga. 393 (271 SE2d 629) (1980); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (90 SC 1184, 25 LE2d 435) (1970). In the seminal decision of Hood v. Von *241 Glahn, 88 Ga. 405 (14 SE 564) (1891), it was held that in regard to matters of local concern the legislature may, through an express delegation of legislative authority, vest municipalities with such power. Accord Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505 (186 SE2d 719) (1972). In addition, enforcement of state criminal laws in state courts is preempted when the legislature vests municipal courts with jurisdiction over the prosecution of state criminal laws. It has been consistently held at least in the absence of state constitutional authorization, see Hannah v. State, 97 Ga. App. 188, 192 (102 SE2d 624) (1958); Grant v. Camp, 105 Ga. 428 (31 SE 429) (1898) that: In an amendment to the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937, see Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 (33 SE2d 425) (1945), the General Assembly enacted legislation vesting municipal courts with jurisdiction over state misdemeanor traffic violations. Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, §§ 1-3 (codified at OCGA § 40-13-21 (a)). Such jurisdiction would appear to be unconstitutional under Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, supra, and Hannah v. State, 97 Ga. App., supra at 192. See Kolker v. State, 193 Ga. App. at 307. The question for decision in this case is whether Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I of the 1983 Georgia Constitution is properly construed as granting the General Assembly the authority to vest municipal courts with jurisdiction over state criminal laws, thereby breathing constitutional life into OCGA § 40-13-21 (a). Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I provides: As recognized by the Court of Appeals in this case: Notwithstanding the textual ambiguity noted by the Court of Appeals, we conclude that in providing that "[m]unicipal courts shall have jurisdiction over ordinance violations and such other jurisdiction as provided by law," Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I authorizes the General Assembly to vest municipal courts with jurisdiction over state misdemeanor offenses. See Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Ga. Const. of 1983 (vesting superior courts with exclusive jurisdiction over felony offenses, except in the case of juvenile offenders as provided by law). For the following reasons, we hold that this is the only logical interpretation of the constitutional provision under review: Within the meaning of the law of municipal corporations, the term "ordinance" is used to designate those laws, both penal and regulatory, promulgated by a municipality. See McQuillin, 5 Municipal Corporations, § 16 et seq. (3d ed. 1989); Yokley, 1 Municipal Corporations, § 82 et seq. (1956); Antieau, 3 Municipal Corporation Law, § 26.02 (1989). Thus, where Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I provides that municipal courts "shall have jurisdiction over ordinance violations and such other jurisdiction as provided by law," this necessarily means that *243 municipal courts shall have jurisdiction "as provided by law" over laws other than those laws promulgated by a municipality. Of necessity, the only laws that municipal courts could be given jurisdiction over other than municipal laws would be state statutes or county ordinances. Although the present case involves the interpretation of a state constitutional provision, the following canon of statutory construction is apt: "A transposition of words and clauses may be resorted to when a sentence or clause is without meaning as it stands." OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). In addition, the 1983 Constitution was ratified by the people of this State following its adoption by the legislature. See Ga. L. 1981, Ex. Sess., p. 143 et seq. In its adoption of Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I, it can be presumed that the legislature was aware of the body of case law denying municipal courts jurisdiction over state misdemeanor offenses due to a lack of constitutional authorization. It can also be presumed that the legislature was aware of the need to expedite disposition of certain offenses which impose lesser sentences or penalties and which were crowding the dockets of state courts and superior courts in this State. See Clarke v. Johnson, supra. As held in Clarke, 199 Ga. at 166: Following the ratification of the 1983 Constitution, the General Assembly has enacted legislation vesting municipal courts with jurisdiction over various state misdemeanor offenses. See OCGA § 36-32-6 (marijuana possession cases involving one ounce or less); OCGA § 36 32-8 (operating a motor vehicle without a certificate of emission inspection under OCGA § 40-8-161); OCGA § 36-32-9 (a first or second offense of theft by shoplifting under OCGA § 16-8-14, when the property stolen is less than $100); OCGA § 36-32-10 (a first offense violation of OCGA § 3-3-23, relating to furnishing alcoholic beverages to, and purchase and possession of alcoholic beverages by a person under 21 years of age). See also OCGA § 36-32-7 (operating a motor vehicle *244 without insurance under OCGA § 33-34-12). Since jury trials are not generally held in municipal courts, questions arise as to the propriety of granting jurisdiction of state misdemeanor offenses to municipal courts in view of the right to trial by jury contained in Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI of the Ga. Const., as well as the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. See generally McQuillin 6 Municipal Corporations, § 23.01; Yokley, 1 Municipal Corporations, § 376. However, this right has been protected in all of the previously cited Georgia statutory provisions, as each of these provisions grants to any defendant the right on request to have the case against him transferred to the court having general misdemeanor jurisdiction in the county where the alleged offense occurred; and the power of municipal courts to try and dispose of misdemeanor traffic offenses is conditioned upon the defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial. OCGA § 40-13-21 (b); see also State v. Millwood, supra. Separate and distinct issues under Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I and Art. VI, Sec. X, Par. I (5) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution are presented in Duncan v. State, 185 Ga. App. 854 (366 SE2d 154) (1988), and we will not attempt to resolve those issues herein. In 1985, the appellant in this case entered a plea of nolo contendere to a state misdemeanor DUI charge under OCGA § 40-6-391 in a municipal court. In this proceeding, the appellant challenges the validity of the conviction entered on this plea. The trial court rejected this challenge, and under our decision herein, the trial court was correct in so ruling. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.