Title: Smith Mountain Lake Yacht Club v. Ramaker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 000861
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2001

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ. 
 
SMITH MOUNTAIN LAKE YACHT CLUB, INC. 
 
v.  Record No. 000861   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
March 2, 2001 
 
JAMES K. RAMAKER, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 
James W. Updike, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal is from a decree in which the chancellor held 
that a certain landowner has the right to construct a dock over 
partially submerged property that an adjacent landowner claims 
to own. 
 
This dispute arose between James K. Ramaker and Sandra W. 
Ramaker (collectively, the Ramakers), and a neighboring 
landowner, the Smith Mountain Lake Yacht Club, Inc. (the Yacht 
Club).  The properties owned by the Ramakers and the Yacht Club 
respectively are in the vicinity of an inlet of Smith Mountain 
Lake in Bedford County (the Lake).  The Yacht Club property is 
adjacent to the Ramaker property and directly abuts both sides 
of the inlet at all times, regardless of the water level of the 
Lake.  The Ramaker property has about 12 feet of frontage on the 
end of the inlet only when the Lake is flooded to the "full 
pond" level.1
                     
 
1Attached to this opinion is a diagram depicting the inlet 
and the two properties. 
 
When the Ramakers began construction of a dock extending 
into the inlet, the Yacht Club filed a bill of complaint for 
injunctive relief, alleging that the Ramakers' dock extended 
over property owned by the Yacht Club.  The Yacht Club sought to 
enjoin the Ramakers from constructing the dock over the 
property, which was partially submerged (partially submerged 
property).  The Ramakers thereafter filed a separate bill of 
complaint seeking a determination of their riparian rights.  The 
two suits were consolidated for trial. 
 
After conducting evidentiary hearings, the chancellor 
concluded that the Ramakers had sufficient riparian rights to 
allow them to construct a dock extending over the partially 
submerged property into the inlet.  The chancellor's holding was 
based on his determination that the Commonwealth, not the Yacht 
Club, was the owner of the partially submerged property.  The 
chancellor also ordered that the existing dock be removed 
because it extended outside the riparian zone fixed by the 
court. 
 
Central to this dispute is the issue of ownership of land 
that was flooded to create Smith Mountain Lake, an artificial 
lake formed when the Appalachian Power Company (APCO) 
constructed a dam on the Roanoke River as part of a 
hydroelectric project.  Before the land adjacent to the Roanoke 
River and its tributaries was flooded to create the Lake, 
 
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certain parcels of land were condemned and APCO obtained flowage 
easements over other parcels from their respective landowners 
extending to the 800-foot elevation contour of the proposed 
Lake. 
 
Both the Ramakers and the Yacht Club hold their properties 
subject to flowage easements that were conveyed by their 
predecessors in title to APCO.  These flowage easements granted 
APCO 
the right to overflow and/or affect so much of said 
premises as may be overflowed and/or affected, 
continuously or from time to time in any manner 
whatsoever, as the result of the construction, 
existence, operation and/or maintenance of the 
aforesaid dam and/or power station, the impounding of 
the waters of said river and tributaries and/or the 
varying of the level of the so impounded waters by 
reason of the operation of said power station, 
including any pumping as part of such operation. 
 
These flowage easements expressly reserved to the grantors "the 
right to possess and use said premises in any manner not 
inconsistent with the estate, rights and privileges herein 
granted to [APCO] . . . ." 
 
In 1965, after Smith Mountain Lake was created, the Yacht 
Club purchased a 51-acre parcel of land (the Yacht Club 
property) through which Buttery Creek, a tributary of the 
Roanoke River, formerly flowed.  When the Lake was created, 
Buttery Creek was flooded and became part of the Lake.  The 
Yacht Club property was conveyed by a deed that referred to a 
 
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survey plat that showed the location of Smith Mountain Lake as 
well as the centerline of Buttery Creek as it existed before the 
Lake was created. 
 
In 1998, the Ramakers purchased about 101 acres of land 
(the Ramaker property) adjacent to the Yacht Club property.  A 
survey plat of the Ramaker property depicts a small, unnamed 
branch or creek that formerly ran through the Ramaker property 
and emptied into what previously was Buttery Creek. 
 
Although APCO has flowage easements over both the Ramaker 
property and the Yacht Club property extending to the 800-foot 
elevation contour, the Lake is considered to be at "full-pond" 
when it reaches the 795-foot elevation contour.  When the Lake 
is at "full pond," the Ramaker property has about 12 feet of 
water frontage on the inlet.  The record shows that the water 
level of the Lake frequently drops below "full pond" and has at 
times fallen lower than the 790-foot elevation contour.  At the 
793-foot elevation contour and at all lower water levels, the 
Ramaker property has no frontage on the inlet of the Lake.  By 
contrast, the Yacht Club property has frontage on the inlet, 
regardless of the fluctuations in the Lake's water level. 
 
The chancellor held that, under Code § 28.2-1200, the 
general public is permitted to use all land underlying the 
surface of Smith Mountain Lake, absent evidence of a special 
grant or compact.  Based on this authority, the chancellor 
 
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concluded that the Commonwealth owned the partially submerged 
property at issue, and that the Ramakers were entitled to build 
a dock over that property.  The chancellor also noted the 
existence of APCO's flowage easement over the Ramaker property 
to the 800-foot elevation contour and stated: 
To the extent rights are accorded the general public 
and [APCO], the property rights of the Ramakers are 
servient to [APCO's rights], at least at times when 
the lake level is at the 795-foot contour [i.e. at 
"full pond"], or higher.  In my opinion, it would be 
fundamentally unfair for the Ramakers to incur this 
burden, without also incurring some corresponding 
benefit. 
 
 
The chancellor concluded that the Ramakers have riparian 
rights at the 795-foot elevation contour or "full pond" level 
because, at that level, the inlet reaches their property 
boundary.  The chancellor stated that it would be "illogical" to 
rule that the Ramakers cannot have access to the Lake from their 
property unless the Lake "essentially comes to them" by rising 
to the level of "full pond." 
 
The chancellor concluded that the Ramakers' riparian rights 
should be fixed in accordance with the principles set forth in 
Langley v. Meredith, 237 Va. 55, 376 S.E.2d 519 (1989), and 
Groner v. Foster, 94 Va. 650, 27 S.E. 493 (1897).  In applying 
the Groner formula, the chancellor used the 795-foot elevation 
contour as the shoreline or mean low-water mark, even though the 
 
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court made no finding that this line was the location of actual 
mean low water. 
 
After making the calculations under the Groner formula, the 
chancellor concluded that the Ramaker property has a riparian 
zone extending from the 795-foot elevation contour that is 5 
feet wide and about 68 feet long, and that the Ramakers are 
entitled to construct a dock within this zone.  At "full pond," 
the dock approved by the chancellor would extend directly over 
the partially submerged property allegedly owned by the Yacht 
Club.  The chancellor permanently enjoined the Yacht Club from 
interfering with the Ramakers' riparian rights and their 
construction of a dock within this defined riparian zone.  The 
Yacht Club appealed from this decree. 
 
The Yacht Club argues on appeal that the Commonwealth does 
not own the partially submerged property at issue, and that the 
chancellor erred in reaching this conclusion, which was based on 
his incorrect application of Code § 28.2-1200.  The Yacht Club 
asserts that Code § 28.2-1200 applies only to bodies of water 
whose beds have not been conveyed previously to a private owner.  
The Yacht Club notes that the submerged property at issue was 
conveyed to the Club's predecessors in title before Smith 
Mountain Lake was created and the land bordering Buttery Creek 
was flooded.  Thus, the Yacht Club argues that the chancellor 
erred in ruling that the partially submerged property, which was 
 
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not condemned but merely is subject to an APCO easement, is 
owned by the Commonwealth and that the Ramakers may use this 
land to build their dock. 
 
In response, the Ramakers argue that the chancellor 
correctly applied Code § 28.2-1200 in ruling that the partially 
submerged property belongs to the people of the Commonwealth 
because Smith Mountain Lake is a navigable body of water.  The 
Ramakers also assert that the chancellor properly concluded that 
they have riparian rights allowing them to construct a dock 
extending over the partially submerged property at issue.  They 
contend that because the level of the Lake rises and falls 
according to weather, water usage, and power needs, the 
chancellor properly extended their riparian rights to the 795-
foot elevation contour, even though the water sometimes recedes 
to the point where their property does not touch the water.  We 
disagree with the Ramakers' arguments. 
 
The standard of review that we apply on appeal is well 
established.  Under Code § 8.01-680, we will affirm the 
chancellor's decree unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, 
Inc., 258 Va. 140, 149, 515 S.E.2d 277, 283 (1999); W.S. Carnes, 
Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 385, 478 S.E.2d 295, 
301 (1996).  We examine the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Ramakers, the prevailing party in the circuit court.  Id.
 
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We first consider the issue whether the chancellor properly 
applied Code § 28.2-1200 to conclude that the Commonwealth owns 
the partially submerged property at issue.  The statute 
provides, in relevant part: 
All the beds of the bays, rivers, creeks and the 
shores of the sea within the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth, not conveyed by special grant or compact 
according to law, shall remain the property of the 
Commonwealth and may be used as a common by all the 
people of the Commonwealth for the purpose of fishing, 
fowling, hunting, and taking and catching oysters and 
other shellfish. 
 
 
This statute specifically enumerates the categories of 
bodies of water that are subject to its provisions.  The precise 
words of the statute do not include "lakes" within the listed 
categories.  Our construction of the statute is governed by the 
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which provides that 
the mention of a specific item in a statute implies that other 
omitted items were not intended to be included within the scope 
of the statute.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05, 529 
S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000); Board of Supervisors v. Wilson, 250 Va. 
482, 485, 463 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1995); Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 
124, 127, 418 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992).  Thus, we conclude that 
Code § 28.2-1200 does not apply to Smith Mountain Lake because 
the General Assembly chose not to include "lakes" in its 
designation of bodies of water whose beds remain the property of 
the Commonwealth in the absence of a special grant or compact. 
 
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We disagree with the Ramakers' argument that Smith Mountain 
Lake is included within the scope of Code § 28.2-1200 because 
the Lake is navigable.  This argument effectively asks us to add 
words to the statute, since its plain language does not include 
any type of lake and makes no exception for lakes that are 
navigable.  When the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, we construe the statute in accordance with that 
plain meaning.  Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. ___, ___, ___ 
S.E.2d ___, ___ (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 370, 
514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999); Ragan v. Woodcroft Village 
Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 326, 497 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998).  
Therefore, applying the plain language of Code § 28.2-1200, we 
hold that the chancellor erred in concluding that the 
Commonwealth owns the partially submerged property at issue 
based on his determination that Smith Mountain Lake is included 
within the scope of the statutory language. 
 
The Ramakers contend, nevertheless, that Code § 62.1-81 
supports the chancellor's conclusion that the Commonwealth owns 
the partially submerged property.  That section states, in 
relevant part: 
The term "waters of the Commonwealth" as used in this 
chapter shall mean . . . those parts of streams or 
other bodies of water in this Commonwealth which 
either in their natural or improved condition . . . 
are used or suitable for use for the transportation of 
persons or property in interstate or foreign commerce 
. . . . 
 
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The Ramakers assert that since Smith Mountain Lake is part of a 
hydroelectric generation project, the operation of which affects 
interstate commerce, see Vaughan v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 
211 Va. 500, 501-02, 178 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1971), the waters of 
the Lake belong to the Commonwealth. 
 
We find no merit in this argument.  Code § 62.1-81 defines 
the term "waters of the Commonwealth" for use in Chapter 7 of 
Title 62.1 of the Code, and the Ramakers have not cited as 
authority any statute in that Chapter using this term.  
Moreover, the term "waters of the Commonwealth" is not at issue 
in this appeal, which primarily addresses the ownership of a 
portion of the bed of Smith Mountain Lake, and the parties do 
not dispute the public's right to travel over the waters of the 
Lake.  Therefore, we conclude that the above definition is not 
relevant to this appeal. 
 
After the chancellor erroneously concluded that the 
Commonwealth owns the partially submerged property pursuant to 
Code § 28.2-1200, he determined that the Ramakers had riparian 
rights based on Code § 28.2-1202.  That section provides, in 
relevant part, that owners of lands bordering bodies of water 
designated in Code § 28.2-1200 generally have rights and 
privileges of ownership to the mean low-water mark.  After 
observing that the mean low-water mark had not been determined 
 
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in this case, the chancellor substituted in its place the 795-
foot elevation contour for the purpose of fixing the Ramaker's 
riparian rights.  The chancellor concluded that the Ramakers had 
riparian rights over the "land of the Commonwealth" based on 
their 12 feet of water frontage at the 795-foot elevation 
contour. 
 
By its terms, however, Code § 28.2-1202 defines the 
boundaries of privately owned land that is adjacent to a body of 
water whose bed remains the property of the Commonwealth under 
the provisions of Code § 28.2-1200.  Since Code § 28.2-1200 does 
not include lakes within its provisions, Code § 28.2-1202 is not 
relevant to a determination of the Ramakers' property rights.  
Instead, this determination must be made with reference to the 
rights of the owner of the partially submerged property at issue 
separating the Ramakers' land from the navigable part of the 
watercourse.2  Thus, we must examine the record to determine the 
ownership of that partially submerged property before we can 
ascertain what riparian rights, if any, the Ramakers have to 
build a dock across that property. 
 
The Yacht Club's fee simple ownership of the partially 
submerged property is established in the record before us by the 
                     
 
2Based on our conclusion, we need not consider the effect of 
the chancellor's action substituting the 795-foot elevation 
contour for the mean low-water mark in making his determination 
of the Ramakers' riparian rights. 
 
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deeds in their chain of title and the survey plats depicting the 
Yacht Club property boundaries.  In 1960, the Yacht Club's 
predecessors in title conveyed to APCO the above-referenced 
flowage easement over the partially submerged property.  This 
easement did not convey fee simple ownership of that property to 
APCO, nor did it give APCO the right to grant others the 
permission to build any docks below the elevation contour of 800 
feet.  As stated above, the flowage easement expressly reserved 
to the grantors "the right to possess and use said premises in 
any manner not inconsistent with the estate, rights and 
privileges herein granted to [APCO] . . . ." 
 
The chancellor's ruling effectively denies the Yacht Club 
property rights that derive from its fee simple ownership of the 
partially submerged property.  That ruling is contrary to our 
recognition in Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 210, 355 S.E.2d 563 
(1987), of private property rights below the 800-foot elevation 
contour of Smith Mountain Lake in land that has not been 
condemned, but is subject to an APCO flowage easement.  There, 
we held that a landowner established an implied easement to use 
adjacent property retained by his grantors that was subject to 
an APCO flowage easement.  Id. at 221, 355 S.E.2d at 571.  Thus, 
the existence of such a flowage easement did not deprive its 
grantor from exercising the rights of fee simple ownership that 
were unaffected by that flowage easement. 
 
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The chancellor's designation of a riparian zone permitting 
construction of a dock extending from the Ramakers' property is 
contrary to the law because the dock would have to cross the 
Yacht Club's partially submerged property to reach the dock's 
designated terminus point in the water.  Under Code § 62.1-164, 
the right to construct a dock or pier for noncommercial purposes 
on a watercourse is subject to the restriction that the exercise 
of this right shall not obstruct navigation or injure the 
private rights of any person.  See Carr v. Kidd, 261 Va. ___, 
___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2001); Zappulla v. Crown, 239 Va. 566, 
569, 391 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1990); Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 
S.E.2d at 523.  Thus, we hold that a property owner may not 
build a pier or dock extending into a watercourse across the 
property of another without that owner's permission.  See id.  
Since the Yacht Club did not give the Ramakers permission to 
build a dock across the Club's property to reach the navigable 
part of the watercourse, the chancellor's determination allowing 
the construction of such a dock is plainly wrong. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the chancellor's decree 
and remand the case to the circuit court for entry of an 
injunction in favor of the Yacht Club in accordance with the 
principles and holding set forth in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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