Title: Birmingham Coal & Coke Company, Inc. v. Charlotte Johnson et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070303
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 2008

REL: 12/5/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070303
____________________
Birmingham Coal & Coke Company, Inc.
v.
Charlotte Johnson et al.
Appeal from Winston Circuit Court 
(CV-05-51)
SEE, Justice.
Birmingham Coal & Coke Company, Inc. ("Birmingham Coal"),
appeals 
from 
a judgment awarding monetary damages to Charlotte
Johnson and 18 other plaintiffs ("the plaintiffs") for
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2
property 
damage 
and for emotional 
distress 
and mental anguish.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
Birmingham Coal operated a surface coal mine in Winston
County.  In 2001, Birmingham Coal hired Boren Explosives,
Inc., to perform blasting at the mine; the blasting continued
through 2004.  The plaintiffs, who lived near the blasting
site,  sued Birmingham Coal in the Winston Circuit Court
claiming damage to 10 houses from vibrations created by the
blasting.  The distance to the houses from the point of the
blasting ranges from 2,875 feet to 4,779 feet.  The
plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Birmingham Coal (1)
conducted its mining operation in a negligent and wanton
manner, (2) trespassed by interfering with the plaintiffs'
possession, use, and enjoyment of their properties, (3)
created a nuisance, and (4) engaged in an abnormally dangerous
activity.  
The claims were tried in a bench trial.  The plaintiffs
testified that they could hear and feel the blasting in their
houses and that they noted damage to their houses after
Birmingham 
Coal 
began 
the blasting operation. 
 Birmingham 
Coal
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3
presented 
expert 
testimony that 
it 
had followed State blasting
regulations at all times and that the blasting could not have
caused the damage the plaintiffs claimed it caused to their
houses.  At the close of all the evidence, Birmingham Coal
moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on all the
plaintiffs' claims.  The trial court entered a JML for
Birmingham Coal on the wantonness, trespass, and nuisance
claims.  It entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on
their negligence claim and awarded compensatory damages to
each plaintiff, consisting of the cost to repair the
plaintiff's house and the diminution in the value of the
house.  The trial court also awarded damages for mental
anguish and emotional distress in an amount equal to each
plaintiff's property-damages award.  Birmingham Coal appeals.
Issues
Birmingham Coal raises four issues: first, whether the
plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's damages award for damage to the plaintiffs' houses;
second, whether the trial court 
improperly 
awarded damages for
both the cost to repair and the diminution in value; third,
whether the trial court improperly awarded damages for mental
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4
anguish and emotional distress in the absence of any physical
injury; and, finally, whether the award for mental anguish and
emotional distress was excessive.  
Standard of Review
The trial court entered its judgment after hearing ore
tenus evidence. 
 
"'"'[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus
testimony, its findings on disputed facts are
presumed correct and its judgment based on those
findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is
palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.'"' Water
Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Parks, 977 So. 2d 440,
443 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So.
2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005), quoting in turn Philpot v.
State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002)). '"The
presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable
and may be overcome where there is insufficient
evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its
judgment."'  Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083,
1086 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So.
2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985)).  'Additionally, the ore
tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a
presumption 
of 
correctness 
a 
trial 
judge's
conclusions of law or the incorrect application of
law to the facts.'  Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d at
1086."
Retail Developers of Alabama, LLC v. East Gadsden Golf Club,
Inc., 985 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. 2007). 
Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Damage to the Houses
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5
Liability in blasting cases is governed by the principles
established in Harper v. Regency Development Co., 399 So. 2d
248 (Ala. 1981).  In that case this Court abandoned the
application of traditional negligence principles in blasting
cases and adopted a test based on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 519 - 520 (1977).  The Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 519 provides:
"(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity is subject to liability for harm to the
person, land or chattels of another resulting from
the activity, although he has exercised the utmost
care to prevent the harm.
"(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of
harm, the possibility of which makes the activity
abnormally dangerous."
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 lists the following
factors as those that should be considered in determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous: 
"(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land or chattels of others; 
"(b) likelihood that the harm that results will
be great; 
"(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care; 
"(d) extent to which the activity is not a
matter of common usage; 
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"(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the
place where it is carried on; and 
"(f) extent to which its value to the community
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes." 
This Court concluded in Harper that "[t]he use of the
explosives 
under 
abnormally 
dangerous 
conditions 
is
negligence, and thus actionable if such conduct proximately
causes damage to another."  Harper, 399 So. 2d at 252.  This
Court further held: 
"A 
finding, 
guided 
by 
a 
consideration 
of 
factors
outlined in the Restatement, that the blaster was
'one who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity' is a finding of negligence -- the breach
of a legal duty –- and, a further finding that such
conduct proximately damaged another, renders the
blaster liable therefor.  Ordinarily, both of these
determinations will be issues of fact for the jury."
Harper, 399 So. 2d at 253.  This Court further stated that the
law will not "permit the blaster to defend on the ground that
he carefully prepared and detonated the explosive." Id.
In this case, the trial court found that "the plaintiffs
proved by substantial evidence that the use of explosives in
this case [was] under abnormally dangerous conditions and
proximately caused severe damage[] to the plaintiffs'
dwellings."  Birmingham Coal argues in response that the
plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence that its
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blasting 
constituted 
an 
abnormally 
dangerous 
activity 
because,
it argues, the blasting was conducted according to State
regulations.  However, this Court rejected that defense in
Harper.  Therefore, Birmingham Coal did not establish that the
plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence that the
blasting constituted an abnormally dangerous activity.
Birmingham Coal also argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the trial court's damages award for damage
to the plaintiffs' houses because, it says, the plaintiffs did
not present any expert or eyewitness testimony linking the
damage to the plaintiffs' houses to Birmingham Coal's
blasting.  In support of this insufficient-evidence argument,
Birmingham Coal notes the statement in Harper that "[b]oth
prongs of proof [of the traditional negligence standard] set
the stage for a battle of the experts," Harper, 399 So. 2d at
251, 
which, 
it 
argues, 
implicitly 
recognizes 
the 
necessity 
for
the plaintiff to present expert testimony.  However, this
Court also stated in Harper that "[proving that the blasting
caused the claimed damage] pits the plaintiff's evidence of
before and after damage –- in the context of circumstantial
cause and effect –- against the defendant's expert," which
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8
implies that the plaintiff is not required to present expert
testimony.  Harper, 399 So. 2d at 251.  Moreover, the Court of
Civil Appeals has concluded that the defendant in a blasting
case is not entitled to a summary judgment on the issue of
proximate cause when the plaintiff did not present any expert
testimony.  McCuller v. Drummond Co., 714 So. 2d 298, 299 (Ala
Civ. App. 1997) (McCuller testified that Drummond's blasting
could be felt in his house, and he presented evidence
indicating that the extent of the damage to his house went
beyond normal shrinkage of the floor slab or masonry or wear
and tear.  Craig Ledbetter, a construction-management
consultant, said in his deposition that although he was not an
expert in blasting, he could say that the damage to McCuller's
house was consistent with blasting damage.).  
In 
this 
case, 
the 
plaintiffs 
presented 
evidence
indicating that they could hear the blasts and could feel the
vibrations from the blasting in their houses and that they
noticed damage to their houses after Birmingham Coal began
blasting.  It appears that under Harper this evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court's award for damage to
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9
the plaintiffs' property.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court on this issue.   
II. Basis of Property-Damages Award
"The proper measure of compensatory damages in
a tort action based on damage to real property is
the difference between the fair market value of the
property immediately before the damage and the fair
market value immediately after the damage. Nelson
Brothers, Inc. v. Busby, 513 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (Ala.
1987); Dooley v. Ard Oil Co., 444 So. 2d 847, 848
(Ala. 1984).  Although mathematical certainty is not
required, a jury cannot be left to speculate as to
the amount of damages, but '"[t]his does not mean
that the plaintiff must prove damages to a
mathematical certainty or measure them by a money
standard.  Rather, he must produce evidence tending
to show the extent of damages as a matter of just
and reasonable inference." C. Gamble, Alabama Law of
Damages § 7-1 (2d ed. 1988).'" 
IMAC Energy, Inc. v. Tittle, 590 So. 2d 163, 168 (Ala. 1991)
(quoting Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547
So. 2d 812, 820 (Ala. 1988)) (emphasis omitted).
Birmingham Coal argues that the trial court erred in
setting the amount of its award of damages to the plaintiffs
for damage to their houses because six plaintiffs did not
express an opinion on the diminution, if any, in the value of
their houses and because the trial court based its award on
evidence of repair costs and diminution in value.  Birmingham
Coal cites Poffenbarger v. Merit Energy Co., 972 So. 2d 792
1070303
10
(Ala. 2007), in support of its argument.  This case, however,
is inapposite.  In Poffenbarger, the Court addressed the
following question: "Under Alabama law, what is the general
rule for the measurement of direct, compensatory damages for
an injury to real property when the cost to remediate the
property exceeds the diminution in the value of the property
caused by the injury?"  972 So. 2d at 795.  The Court in
Poffenbarger did not answer the question whether repair costs
could be considered in cases where damage to real property
occurred.  Instead, it addressed only those situations in
which the cost to repair the real property exceeds the
diminution in the value of the property.  Birmingham Coal does
not point to any evidence indicating that the trial court
awarded the plaintiffs property damages in excess of the
diminution in value of the property or that the evidence of
repair costs presented by the plaintiffs who did not express
an opinion as to diminution did not present a reasonable
inference of damage.  Nor does Birmingham Coal present to us
any other argument or authority indicating that the trial
court's method of calculating the property damages is in
error.  Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court's
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11
property-damages award is palpably erroneous.  We affirm the
judgment of the trial court on this issue.
III. Damages for Mental Anguish and Emotional Distress
Birmingham Coal argues that the trial court erred in
awarding damages for mental anguish and emotional distress,
because, it argues, blasting damages are negligence based and
this Court "has not recognized emotional distress as a
compensable injury or harm in negligence actions outside the
context of emotional distress resulting from actual physical
injury or, in the absence of physical injury, fear for one's
own physical safety."  AALAR, Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d
1141, 1148 (Ala. 1998).  "'In negligence actions, Alabama
follows the "zone-of-danger" test, which limits recovery of
mental anguish damages to "those plaintiffs who sustain a
physical injury as a result of a defendant's negligent
conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm
by that conduct."'"  Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So. 2d
173, 179 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bowers,
752 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn AALAR, Ltd.
v. Francis, 716 So. 2d at 1147, and citing White Consol.
Indus., Inc. v. Wilkerson, 737 So. 2d 447, 449 (Ala. 1999)).
1070303
12
The plaintiffs argue that liability in blasting cases is
based in strict liability, not negligence.  However, in Harper
this Court stated that "[t]he use of the explosives under
abnormally dangerous conditions is negligence," Harper, 399
So. 2d at 252, and compared an action based on blasting to an
action brought under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's
Liability Doctrine ("the AEMLD").  This Court has held that
"[a] claim under the AEMLD is grounded in tort and is premised
on the notion that 'a [manufacturer's marketing] a product not
reasonably safe, when applied to its intended use in the usual
and customary manner, constitutes negligence as a matter of
law.'"  White Consol. Indus., Inc., 737 So. 2d at 449 (quoting
Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128, 132 (Ala.
1976)).  In White Consolidated Industries, this Court also
stated that under the AEMLD a plaintiff cannot recover damages
for mental anguish and emotional distress if he or she did not
suffer a physical injury or was not in the "zone of danger."
737 So. 2d at 449.  Applying the principles set forth in
Harper and White Consolidated Industries, we hold that the
plaintiffs cannot recover for mental anguish or emotional
1070303
13
distress unless they suffered physical injury or were in the
"zone of danger." 
The plaintiffs argue that although the general rule is
that "the law will not allow recovery of damages for mental
distress where the tort results in mere injury to property,"
Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala.
1994), mental-anguish awards are proper in tort cases when the
property damaged is a person's home.  The plaintiffs cite F.
Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 655, 141 So.
630 (1932); B&M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667 (Ala.
1979); and Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Donavan, 519 So. 2d
1330, 1333 (Ala. 1988), in support of their argument.
However, 
as 
the plaintiffs 
admit, these cases involve 
recovery
for breach of contract, not tort liability, and the plaintiffs
do not cite any caselaw in support of their argument that this
liability should be extended to tort actions.  Thus, the
plaintiffs' argument is not persuasive in light of the well-
established rule that in tort cases damages for mental anguish
have to be linked to actual physical injury or "zone of
danger," and we decline to extend the exception to tort-
liability cases.  
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The plaintiffs next argue that damages for mental anguish
have been routinely awarded in blasting cases.  However, each
of the cases cited by the plaintiffs involved physical injury
to the plaintiff, wantonness or trespass on the part of the
defendant, and/or a plaintiff who was in the "zone of danger."
See Birmingham Realty Co. v. Thomason, 8 Ala. App. 535, 542-
43, 63 So. 65, 67 (1912) (allowing mental-anguish damages
where "the blasting operations, as carried on throughout a
considerable period of time, without due precautions being
taken for the safety of persons or property within the zone of
danger therefrom, amounted to more than an isolated trespass,
and assumed the proportions of a nuisance as regards the
plaintiff's neighboring premises, involving injury to his
property and real or reasonably apprehended peril to himself
and to members of his family"); see also J.B. McCrary Co. v.
Phillips, 222 Ala. 117, 119, 130 So. 805, 807 (1930) (allowing
mental-anguish damages where the defendant "blasted rock and
dirt from the excavation, throwing the rock upon plaintiff's
house, which broke through the roof of the main house and the
porch in such sort as to endanger the lives of the
occupants"); Central of Georgia Ry. v. Kimber, 212 Ala. 102,
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101 So. 827 (1924) (allowing mental-anguish and emotional-
distress damages where the plaintiff showed that the blasting
caused a "physical injury to her nervous system"); IMAC
Energy, Inc. v. Tittle, 590 So. 2d at 168 (allowing mental-
anguish and emotional-distress damages where there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding of wantonness);
Dockins v. Drummond Co., 706 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997) (allowing damages for mental anguish and emotional
distress where the trespass to property was committed "under
circumstances of insult or contumely").  None of those issues
is present in this case.  The cases cited by the plaintiffs in
support of the damages award for mental anguish and emotional
distress 
are 
distinguishable from 
this case and, 
therefore, do
not support the plaintiffs' argument.
Because damages for mental anguish and emotional distress
are proper only in tort cases in which the plaintiff is in the
"zone of danger" or has suffered a physical injury or the
defendant's action constitutes wantonness or trespass under
circumstances of insult or contumely, and because there is no
evidence indicating that such is the case here, we hold that
the trial court erred in awarding damages for mental anguish
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and emotional distress.  We, therefore, reverse the trial
court's judgment on this ground.
IV. Amount of Award for Mental Anguish and Emotional
Distress
Finally, Birmingham Coal argues that the amount of the
trial court's award for mental anguish and emotional distress
is excessive.  Because we hold that the plaintiffs in this
case are not entitled to damages for mental anguish and
emotional distress, we need not address this issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it
awarded damages for damage to the plaintiffs' property and the
amount of that award, but we reverse the trial court's
judgment insofar as it awarded damages for mental anguish and
emotional distress and remand the case for the entry of a
judgment consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.