Title: Harris v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 080437
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2008

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JOSEPH A. MOSES HARRIS, JR. 
 
v.   Record No. 080437                     OPINION BY 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
        October 31, 2008 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether an anonymous tip, 
combined with observations by a police officer, provided the 
officer with the reasonable suspicion required to conduct an 
investigative traffic stop in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Joseph A. Moses Harris, Jr. (“Harris”) was charged with 
feloniously operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in 
violation of Code § 18.2-266.  Harris filed a motion to 
suppress in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, 
claiming that the investigative stop of his car was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The court denied the 
motion to suppress and convicted Harris. 
 
Harris appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. 
Harris v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2320-06-2 (February 5, 
2008).  This Court granted Harris an appeal. 
FACTS 
On December 31, 2005, Officer Claude M. Picard, Jr. 
(“Officer Picard”), of the Richmond Police Department, 
received a call from a dispatcher informing him that “there 
was a[n] intoxicated driver in the 3400 block of Meadowbridge 
Road, [who] was named Joseph Harris, and he was driving [a 
green] Altima, headed south, towards the city, possibly 
towards the south side.”  The dispatcher also gave Officer 
Picard a partial license plate number of “Y8066” for the green 
Altima and stated that the driver was wearing a striped shirt.  
The dispatcher did not include any information concerning the 
identity of the person who had called in the information 
communicated in the dispatch or the time frame in which the 
caller had observed the car or the driver. 
Officer Picard responded to the call, and shortly 
thereafter, saw a green Altima traveling south on Meadowbridge 
Road.  Officer Picard began to follow the car.  While 
following the car that Harris was driving, Officer Picard 
noticed that the license plate number, “YAR-8046”, was similar 
to the one reported by the anonymous caller.  Harris was 
driving within the posted speed limit, and Officer Picard did 
not observe the car swerve at any time. 
While following Harris’ car, Officer Picard observed the 
car’s brake lights flash three times.  The first time Harris 
activated the car’s brake lights was when Harris “slowed down” 
at an intersection although he had the right of way.  The 
second time was approximately 50 feet prior to a red traffic 
 
2
light at the intersection of Meadowbridge Road and Brookland 
Park Boulevard, when Harris “slowed down” as he approached the 
red traffic light.  The third time the brake lights flashed 
was when Harris brought the car to a complete stop for the red 
traffic light at the intersection of Meadowbridge Road and 
Brookland Park Boulevard. 
When the traffic light turned green, Harris proceeded 
through the intersection, drove his car to the side of the 
road and stopped of his own accord.  Officer Picard activated 
his emergency lights to signify the initiation of a traffic 
stop, and positioned his car behind Harris’ already stopped 
car.  During the traffic stop, Officer Picard detected a 
strong odor of alcohol on Harris’ breath and noticed that his 
eyes were watery and his speech was slurred.  Harris was 
charged with feloniously operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated after being previously convicted of two like 
offenses. 
ANALYSIS 
Harris claims that he was stopped by Officer Picard in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s denial of 
Harris’ motion to suppress, which was based on that alleged 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Responding, the 
Commonwealth asserts that the Court of Appeals properly 
 
3
affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Harris’ motion to 
suppress because the anonymous tip, coupled with Officer 
Picard’s observations, provided reasonable suspicion for 
Officer Picard to conduct an investigative stop. 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary searches and seizures by 
governmental officials.  Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 528 (1967); Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 418, 620 
S.E.2d 760, 762 (2005).  Although limited in purpose and 
length of detention, an investigative traffic stop constitutes 
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004).  
An investigative stop must be justified by a reasonable 
suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that 
criminal activity is “afoot.”  United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 7 (1989); McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552, 
659 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008); Jackson, 267 Va. at 672, 594 
S.E.2d at 598; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
Further, pursuant to the “the fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine, evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop is 
inadmissible against the defendant at trial.  Jackson, 267 Va. 
at 672, 594 S.E.2d at 598; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). 
 
4
 
A defendant's claim that he was seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact 
that we review de novo on appeal. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 
Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002); see Bolden v. 
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 470, 561 S.E.2d 701, 704 (2002); 
McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 489, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 
(2001); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 
699 (1996). In making such a determination, we give deference 
to the factual findings of the circuit court, but we 
independently determine whether the manner in which the 
evidence was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Bolden, 263 Va. at 470, 561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 
261 Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 545; Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000). The defendant has 
the burden to show that, considering the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial court's denial 
of his suppression motion was reversible error.  Bolden, 263 
Va. at 470, 561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545 
S.E.2d at 545; Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 
S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980). 
 
Harris contends that the anonymous tip and Officer 
Picard’s observations were not sufficient to create the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop of Harris’ 
car.  Whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated is a 
 
5
question to be determined from all the circumstances.  Samson 
v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); see Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).  
 
Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for a Terry 
stop is based on an assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances, which includes “ ‘the content of information 
possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’ ”  
Jackson, 267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 598-99 (quoting Alabama 
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).  When the factual basis 
for probable cause or reasonable suspicion is provided by an 
anonymous informant, the informant’s veracity or reliability, 
and the basis of his or her knowledge are “highly relevant” 
factors in the overall totality of the circumstances analysis.  
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); see White, 496 
U.S. at 328-31. 
The analysis regarding the use of an anonymous tip to 
provide reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop was 
clarified by this Court in Jackson, in which we relied upon 
the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), and 
White, 496 U.S. at 328-31.  See Jackson, 267 Va. at 674-75, 
594 S.E.2d at 599-600.  An anonymous tip has a relatively low 
degree of reliability, requiring more information to 
sufficiently corroborate the information contained in the tip. 
 
6
See J.L., 529 U.S. at 270; Jackson, 267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d 
at 599.  “Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation 
can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her 
allegations turn out to be fabricated, ‘an anonymous tip alone 
seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or 
veracity.’ ” J.L., 529 U.S. at 270 (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 
329) (citation omitted). 
 
The indicia of reliability of an anonymous tip may be 
bolstered when the tipster provides predictive information, 
which the police can use to test the tipster’s basis of 
knowledge and credibility.  Jackson, 267 Va. at 676, 594 
S.E.2d at 600.  However, for such predictive information to 
bolster the tipster’s basis of knowledge or credibility, the 
information must relate to the alleged criminal activity.  
Providing information observable or available to anyone is not 
predictive information and can only “help the police correctly 
identify the person whom the tipster [meant] to accuse.”  
J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.  An anonymous call that provides no 
predictive information leaves the police without a means to 
test the tipster's knowledge or credibility.  J.L., 529 U.S. 
at 271. 
In this case, the anonymous tip included the following 
information: Joseph Harris, described as wearing a striped 
shirt, was intoxicated and driving a green Altima with a 
 
7
partial license plate number of “Y8066,” southward in the 3400 
block of Meadowbridge Road.  The informant in this case was 
not known to the police nor did he or she personally appear 
before a police officer.  Thus, the informant was not 
subjecting himself or herself to possible arrest if the 
information provided to the dispatcher proved false.  See Code 
§ 18.2-461.  In other words, the informant was not placing his 
or her credibility at risk and could "lie with impunity." 
J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The 
informant provided information available to any observer, 
whether a concerned citizen, prankster, or someone with a 
grudge against Harris.  See Jackson, 267 Va. at 679, 594 
S.E.2d at 602.  The tip received by Officer Picard failed to 
include predictions about Harris' future behavior.  Thus, the 
anonymous tip, in this case, lacked sufficient information to 
demonstrate the informant's credibility and basis of 
knowledge. Such an anonymous tip cannot, of itself, establish 
the requisite quantum of suspicion for an investigative stop. 
 
An anonymous tip need not include predictive information 
when an informant reports readily observable criminal actions.  
See Jackson, 267 Va. at 680, 594 S.E.2d at 603.  However, the 
crime of driving while intoxicated is not readily observable 
unless the suspected driver operates his or her vehicle in 
some fashion objectively indicating that the driver is 
 
8
intoxicated; such conduct must be observed before an 
investigatory stop is justified. 
 
This Court, in Jackson, held that an investigative stop 
violated the Fourth Amendment because the tip lacked indicia 
of reliability and the officer’s observations did not reveal 
any suspicious behavior.  267 Va. at 677-78, 681, 594 S.E.2d 
at 601, 603.  This case is analogous to Jackson in that under 
the totality of the circumstances presented here, the 
anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to 
justify an investigatory stop, absent observations indicating 
criminal conduct.  Thus, the resolution of this case is 
dependent upon whether Officer Picard’s observations, when 
considered together with the anonymous tip, were sufficient to 
establish a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot. 
 
In testifying during the motion to suppress about Harris’ 
driving behavior, Officer Picard did not describe Harris’ 
driving as erratic.  Furthermore, an officer’s subjective 
characterization of observed conduct is not relevant to a 
court’s analysis concerning whether there is a reasonable 
suspicion because the Court’s review of whether there was 
reasonable suspicion involves application of an objective 
rather than a subjective standard.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; 
Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 S.E.2d at 923-24; Ewell v. 
 
9
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997); 
Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611-12, 363 S.E.2d 
708, 709 (1988); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 
S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).  Importantly, Officer Picard’s 
testimony, describing what he actually observed at the time, 
does not indicate that Harris’ driving behavior was erratic.  
 
Officer Picard, while following Harris’ car, observed 
that Harris was driving within the speed limit.  Harris’ car 
did not swerve.  Officer Picard testified that Harris “slowed 
down” at an intersection where Harris had the right of way and 
that Harris “slowed down” 50 feet before he got to a red 
traffic light, at which Harris stopped properly.  After the 
traffic light turned green, Harris proceeded through the 
intersection, drove to the side of the road, and stopped of 
his own accord.  Thereafter, Officer Picard initiated the 
investigative stop. 
An officer may briefly detain an individual for 
questioning if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based 
on particularized and objective facts, that the individual is 
involved in criminal activity.  Zimmerman, 234 Va. at 611, 363 
S.E.2d at 709.  To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer 
is required to articulate more than an unparticularized 
suspicion or “hunch” that criminal activity is afoot.  McCain, 
275 Va. at 552, 659 S.E.2d at 516.  Lawful conduct that the 
 
10
officer may subjectively view as unusual is insufficient to 
generate a reasonable suspicion that the individual is 
involved in criminal activity.  Harris v. Commonwealth, 262 
Va. 407, 416-17, 551 S.E.2d 606, 611 (2001); Ewell, 254 Va. at 
217, 491 S.E.2d at 722-23; Barrett v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 
243, 248, 462 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995); Zimmerman, 234 Va. at 
612, 363 S.E.2d at 709-10. 
When viewed in the context of the anonymous tip, Harris’ 
act of slowing his car at an intersection, or of slowing 
before stopping at a red traffic signal, did not indicate that 
he was involved in the criminal act of operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol.  Driving to the side 
of the road and stopping may be subjectively viewed as 
unusual, but that conduct was insufficient to corroborate the 
criminal activity alleged in the anonymous tip.  See Barrett, 
250 Va. at 248, 462 S.E.2d at 112.  Therefore, we hold that 
Officer Picard’s observations, when considered together with 
the anonymous tip, were not sufficient to create a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, and that, therefore, Harris 
was stopped in violation of his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Thus, the circuit court erred in denying Harris’ 
motion to suppress. 
 
11
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals affirming Harris’ conviction, vacate Harris’ 
conviction, and dismiss the indictment against him. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE MILLETTE 
join, dissenting. 
 
The majority decides today that an investigative traffic 
stop by a police officer acting on an anonymous tip 
corroborated by the officer’s own observation of the 
defendant’s driving behavior violated the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.  In my view, the majority fails to 
understand that the anonymous tip in this case, if reliable, 
provided the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
justify the minimally intrusive traffic stop.  So the question 
is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia 
of reliability.  I answer the question affirmatively and 
therefore conclude the police officer had a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in 
criminal conduct. 
An investigative traffic stop, such as the one at issue, 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment “so long as the officer 
has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 
may be afoot.”  McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552, 659 
 
12
S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).  As this Court has previously explained, 
“[r]easonable suspicion is something ‘more than an “inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” of criminal 
activity.’ ”  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 673, 594 
S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 124 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968))).  “However, it is something less than probable 
cause.”  Id. (citing Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 
525 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000)).  In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 
325, 330 (1990), the Supreme Court of the United States 
explained that 
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 
than probable cause not only in the sense that 
reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity or content 
than that required to establish probable cause, but 
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 
arise from information that is less reliable than 
that required to show probable cause. 
 
“[T]here are situations in which an anonymous tip, 
suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of 
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the 
investigatory stop.’ ”  Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 
(2000) (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327).  The 
constitutionality of the investigative traffic stop at issue 
in this case thus turns on whether the anonymous tip, 
 
13
corroborated by the police officer’s personal observations of 
the defendant’s driving behavior, exhibited sufficient indicia 
of reliability to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
effect the traffic stop.  In making that determination, we 
must consider the “totality of the circumstances – the whole 
picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981), 
which includes “the content of information possessed by police 
and its degree of reliability,” i.e. “quantity and quality.”  
White, 496 U.S. at 330.  “[U]nder the totality of the 
circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, [must 
exhibit] sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the 
investigatory stop.”  Id. at 332. 
There is an inverse relationship between an informant’s 
reliability and the informant’s basis of knowledge.  “[I]f a 
tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more 
information will be required to establish the requisite 
quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were 
more reliable.”  Id. at 330; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 233 (1983) (“a deficiency in one [the informant’s 
‘veracity’ or ‘reliability’ and his or her ‘basis of 
knowledge’] may be compensated for, in determining the overall 
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or 
by some other indicia of reliability”).  Conversely, if a 
police officer’s information contains strong indicia of an 
 
14
informant’s veracity, then less indicia of the informant’s 
basis of knowledge is needed.  Id.; see also State v. 
Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Wis. 2001) (“if there are 
strong indicia of the informant’s veracity, there need not 
necessarily be any indicia of the informant’s basis of 
knowledge”). 
In the case at bar, the informant identified the 
defendant by name and described the shirt he was wearing.  The 
informant further provided specific details about the type and 
color of the vehicle the defendant was driving, a partial 
license plate number, the city block in which the defendant 
was then driving, and the direction he was traveling.  I 
recognize that some of this information only enabled the 
police officer to correctly identify the person whom the 
informant accused of driving while intoxicated.  See J.L., 529 
U.S. at 272 (an accurate description of an “observable 
location and appearance” merely “help[s] the police correctly 
identify the person whom the tipster mean[t] to accuse”). 
The majority, however, overlooks the significance of the 
informant’s statement that the defendant’s vehicle was 
traveling in the 3400 block of Meadowbridge Road and was 
heading south.  Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the 
informant provided no predictions about the defendant’s future 
behavior, this information is predictive.  Also, to know the 
 
15
exact location and direction of the moving green Altima at any 
moment indicates that the informant personally observed the 
vehicle being operated by an intoxicated driver.  See State v. 
Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995) (although anonymous 
informant provided only “innocent” details, they nevertheless 
were sufficient to support the conclusion that the informant 
had personally observed a vehicle being operated by an 
intoxicated driver and thus helped to demonstrate the 
informant’s reliability). 
Furthermore, when the police officer verified the 
accuracy of the “innocent” details provided by the informant, 
he had reason to believe the informant was also accurate as to 
the defendant’s criminal activity.  “[B]ecause an informant is 
shown to be right about some things, he is probably right 
about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim 
that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.”  
White, 496 U.S. at 331; accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 244. 
Because the majority believes (incorrectly, in my view) 
that the informant in this case provided no predictions about 
the defendant’s future behavior, the majority concludes the 
anonymous tip “lacked sufficient information to demonstrate 
the informant’s credibility and basis of knowledge.”  We 
explained in Jackson, however, that every anonymous tip does 
not have to include predictive information in order for the 
 
16
tip to have sufficient indicia of reliability.  267 Va. at 
680, 594 S.E.2d at 603.  This is especially so when an 
informant reports observable criminal activity as opposed to 
concealed criminal conduct.  See United States v. Wheat, 278 
F.3d 722, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (“emphasis on the predictive 
aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable to tips 
purporting to describe contemporaneous, readily observable 
criminal actions, as in the case of erratic driving witnessed 
by another motorist”); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 627 
(Iowa 2001) (distinguishing between concealed criminal 
activity and illegality open to the public while also noting 
that reasonable suspicion does not necessarily require 
prediction of future events). 
Unlike with clandestine crimes such as possessory 
offenses, including those involving drugs or guns, 
where corroboration of the predictive elements of a 
tip may be the only means of ascertaining the 
informant’s basis of knowledge, in erratic driving 
cases the basis of the tipster’s knowledge is likely 
to be apparent.  Almost always, it comes from his 
eyewitness observations, and there is no need to 
verify that he possesses inside information. 
 
Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734. 
In contrast to Jackson and J.L., the police officer in 
this case did not immediately stop the defendant as soon as he 
spotted the vehicle described by the informant.1  Rather, the 
                     
1 In Jackson, the police responded to a dispatch based on 
an anonymous tip reporting “three black males in a white Honda 
 
17
police officer followed the green Altima and observed the 
defendant’s driving, which the officer described at trial as 
“erratic behavior.”2  The defendant’s driving, as observed by 
the police officer, corroborated the informant’s assertion of 
criminal activity and indicated that the defendant was 
operating his vehicle while intoxicated. 
The majority, however, concludes that the defendant’s 
driving was merely “unusual.”  The defendant’s driving 
behavior alone did not need to provide reasonable, articulable 
suspicion.  The appropriate question is whether it 
                                                                
. . . and one of the subjects brandished a firearm.”  267 Va. 
at 670, 594 S.E.2d at 597.  After merely identifying the white 
Honda with the three black males inside, the police initiated 
a traffic stop that led to the discovery of a firearm in 
Jackson’s possession.  Id. at 670-71, 594 S.E.2d at 597. 
In J.L., police officers responded to an anonymous tip 
“that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and 
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”  529 U.S. at 268.  
Apart from the anonymous tip, the officers did not observe any 
suspicious behavior, nor did they see the firearm.  Id.  The 
officers nevertheless frisked the defendant and recovered a 
firearm from the defendant’s pocket.  Id. 
2 The majority states that “during the motion to 
suppress[, the officer] did not describe [the defendant’s] 
driving as erratic.” The officer, however, did use the 
adjective “erratic” to describe the defendant’s driving during 
the Commonwealth’s case in chief.  This testimony can properly 
be considered by this Court on appellate review.  See Murphy 
v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 574, 570 S.E.2d 836, 839 (2002) 
(considering officer’s trial testimony as dispositive in 
reversing trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence); see also Wells v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 541, 
548-49, 371 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1988) (holding that “an appellate 
court may consider trial evidence in ruling on the correctness 
of a denial of a pretrial motion to suppress”). 
 
18
corroborated the informant’s assertion of criminal activity.  
While I disagree with the majority’s view that the defendant’s 
driving was merely “unusual,” even if the majority’s 
characterization is accurate, the defendant’s driving 
behavior, nevertheless, corroborated the informant’s assertion 
that the defendant was driving while intoxicated.  
Furthermore, while the case before us involves the lesser 
legal standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion, 
“ ‘innocent behavior’ when considered in its overall context 
may [actually] ‘provide the basis for a showing of probable 
cause.’ ”  United States v. Thomas, 913 F.2d 1111, 1116 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13).  And, 
“reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less 
reliable than that required to show probable cause.”  White, 
496 U.S. at 330. 
The majority also ignores the principle that, when 
viewing the totality of the circumstances, an officer’s 
training and experience are proper factors for consideration 
in determining not only whether the less stringent test of 
reasonable articulable suspicion is satisfied but also whether 
probable cause exists.  See Cost v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 246, 
251, 657 S.E.2d 505, 507 (2008) (totality of the 
circumstances, in determining whether an officer has 
sufficient probable cause, includes “a consideration of the 
 
19
officer’s knowledge, training and experience”); Brown v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 420, 620 S.E.2d 760, 763 (2005) 
(“We have considered a number of instances in which an 
officer’s expertise and training made his observation of an 
item suspected to contain contraband a significant factor in 
the probable cause analysis.”); Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 146, 149, 400 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1991) (in determining 
whether the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion, 
“‘due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable 
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)); 
Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 
(1976) (In determining whether probable cause exists, we focus 
on “what the totality of the circumstances meant to police 
officers trained in analyzing the observed conduct for 
purposes of crime control.”).  In concluding that the 
defendant’s driving down Meadowbridge Road corroborated the 
informant’s assertion that the defendant was driving while 
intoxicated, the police officer undoubtedly drew on his 
training and experience in identifying intoxicated drivers.  
This Court must give due weight to that reasonable inference, 
which the officer was entitled to draw from the facts in light 
of his experience.  See Harris, 241 Va. at 149, 400 S.E.2d at 
193.  In my view, the police officer’s conclusion reflects 
 
20
what the totality of the circumstances would mean to a 
reasonable police officer trained in analyzing observed 
driving behavior in order to determine whether there is 
reasonable suspicion that the driver is intoxicated.  See 
Hollis, 216 Va. at 877, 223 S.E.2d at 889. 
Finally, we explained in Jackson that “ ‘[i]n contrast to 
the report of an individual in possession of a gun, an 
anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway 
presents a qualitatively different level of danger, and 
concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action.’ ”  267 Va. 
at 681, 594 S.E.2d at 603 (quoting State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 
862, 867 (Vt. 2000)); accord Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d at 526; 
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 629.  We further stated, “ ‘[A] drunk 
driver is not at all unlike a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at 
that.’ ”  Jackson, 267 Va. at 681, 594 S.E.2d at 603 (quoting 
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867).  Although the majority analogizes the 
case before us to Jackson, it ignores this portion of the 
Jackson opinion and never addresses the distinction between an 
intoxicated driver on the highway and a person carrying a 
 
21
 
22
                    
concealed weapon in terms of the need for prompt action by the 
police.3 
For these reasons, I conclude that the anonymous tip, as 
corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability and 
provided reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the 
investigative traffic stop.  I therefore respectfully dissent 
and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia. 
 
3 On brief, the Commonwealth discusses at length the 
decisions from other jurisdictions holding that anonymous tips 
about incidents of drunk driving require less corroboration 
than tips concerning matters presenting less imminent danger 
to the public, see, e.g., People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810 (Cal. 
2006); People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. App. 2007), and 
decisions holding that anonymous tips concerning drunk driving 
may be sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory stop 
without independent corroboration, see, e.g., Cottrell v. 
State, 971 So. 2d 735 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). In light of its 
decision, the majority, in my view, should address the 
Commonwealth’s argument.