Title: Hall v. Rosteet
Citation: 169 So. 2d 903, 247 La. 45
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 1964

169 So. 2d 903 (1964) 247 La. 45 Thomas W. HALL v. J. W. (Bill) ROSTEET, in his capacity as President of the Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. No. 47524. Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 14, 1964. *904 Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Henry L. Yelverton, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant. John R. Stewart, Lake Charles, amicus curiae. Larry A. Roach, Lloyd E. Hennigan, Jr., Philip J. Shaheen, Jr., Lake Charles, for appellee. McCALEB, Justice. This suit, seeking injunctive relief, was instituted by a property taxpayer of Calcasieu Parish to have J. W. Rosteet, acting in his capacity of President of the Police Jury of said parish, restrained from executing a lease to Louisiana Flyers, Inc., of the airfield located at Lake Charles, Louisiana, formerly known as Chennault Field. After a hearing, the district judge granted a permanent injunction as prayed for and the defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. The judges of that court, being closely divided as to the proper construction to be given to certain claimed conflicting statutory provisions and jurisprudential expressions, certified three questions of law for instructions from this Court to enable them to reach the correct decision in the matter. Since answers to the certified questions (or, perhaps, one of them) will fully dispose of the issue, we think it expedient, instead of remanding the matter to the Court of Appeal for decision, to exercise the privilege accorded this Court by Section 25 of Article 7 of the Constitution to consider and determine the case as though it had been directly appealed here. See Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Ass'n v. Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1, 36 So. 2d 403; Burton v. Lester, 227 La. 347. 79 So. 2d 333 and other cases. The Court of Appeal in its per curiam of certification has set forth the facts and the legal issues of the case with sparkling clarity. Hence, we herewith reinscribe much of that court's statement so that the legal questions presented may be appropriately answered: After a consideration of the statutory provisions in contest in the light of the applicable authorities, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the trial judge was correct in enjoining the defendant from executing the proposed lease without first complying with that part of the general land leasing law of the State, R.S. 41:1214 and 1215, which prescribes for advertisement and competitive bidding as a condition precedent to the leasing of public lands. At the outset, it is apt to point out that, in construing the sections of our Revised Statutes for legislative intent in cases where claims are made of conflict or ambiguities between general and special provisions of legislation therein contained, every reasonable effort should be made to give effect, if possible, to all for "* * * the Revised Statutes constitute a single act of the Legislature, adopted as a whole; different sections should be regarded not as separate acts, but as simultaneous expressions of the legislative will, and all provisions should be construed together and reconciled whenever possible." State ex rel. Fudickar v. Heard, 223 La. 127, 65 So. 2d 112, 114.[2] We are not impressed with defendant's first contention that R.S. 41:1212 is inapplicable to the leasing of an airport because the doctrine of ejusdem generis confines its general provisions to the leasing of lands for purposes similar to the special leasing purposes named therein, i. e., trapping, grazing, hunting and agricultural. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, i. e., that *908 general words, such as "other, etc." following an enumeration of particular classes or things should not be construed to their widest extent but are to be applied only to such classes or things of the same general kind as those specifically mentioned (see Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. 1951, page 609), is not one of universal application and, as we stated in S. A. Harris Transfer &amp; Storage, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 240 La. 1059, 127 So. 2d 148, "Its value as a guide to ascertain legislative intent is limited to cases in which the true intent cannot be discovered from the language employed in the statute." Here, we have no difficulty whatever in reaching the conclusion that the language contained in R.S. 41:1212 manifests a legislative intent to include all public land leases within the scope of its general provisions. For, after stating that public lands may be leased for "trapping, grazing, hunting, agricultural, or any other legitimate purposes whatsoever, * * *" the Legislature has provided a single exception, viz., "other than for oil, gas, or other mineral purposes and development, * * *". This exhibits a clear intent to include within the statutory provisions all leases of public lands for all purposes other than for the special purposes therein excluded.[3] Since we find that the language of R.S. 41:1212 covers the leasing of all public lands other than those leased for purposes specially excepted therefrom, it would seem to follow that the provisions of R.S. 41:1214 and 1215 are also applicable to the leasing of any land and equipment for special purposes under other sections of the Revised Statutes (such as the lease of an airfield under R.S. 2:135(3)), in the absence of an express permissive provision in the special law that such leases could be negotiated without advertisement and competitive bidding. However, counsel for defendant proclaim that an intent to relieve the public body from the necessity of advertisement and competitive bidding for leasing purposes is implicit in the Uniform Airports Law. They say that this is evident in view of the circumstance that R.S. 2:135(3) is silent concerning any competitive bidding requirements and also because R.S. 2:131 et seq. contains no restrictions as to the amount of acreage which may be leased (whereas the public leasing law limits leases to 640 acres) and permits airfields to be leased for a term of 25 years, while the public leasing law limits the term of leases made under its provisions to 10 years. These postulations are not well founded. We cannot see why the absence of provisions concerning competitive bidding for airport leases in the Uniform Airports Law furnishes a valid basis for a conclusion that it was the intent of the lawmaking body to exclude the leasing of airports from the requirements of competitive bidding provided by the general land leasing law, if, as we find, the leasing of airports is included within the provisions of R.S. 41:1212. Nor does the fact that the Uniform Airports Law permits the leasing of an airport for a longer period than that authorized by the general leasing lawand the fact that it contains no restriction as to the acreage to be leased for airport purposesprovide a foundation for deducing that the provisions of the general leasing law respecting advertisement and competitive bidding are inapplicable to the leasing *909 of airportsfor, as we have pointed out above, it is our duty, in construing the Revised Statutes, to give effect to all of its provisions, if possible. In the performance of this task, we find nothing inconsistent in applying the advertising and competitive bidding requirements of the general law to the leasing of airports. On the contrary, this conforms with the legislative intent since we have concluded that airport leasing is covered by R.S. 41:1212 and the Uniform Airports Law is silent on the subject of advertising and competitive bidding. True, the provisions of the Uniform Airports Law as to the duration of an airport lease, and the acreage which may be leased, being inconsistent with those of the general land leasing law, must prevail over the general law to that extent since it deals with a special type of leasing. But, as stated, this affords no ground for not applying the other provisions of the general land leasing law which are not in conflict with the Uniform Airports Law. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. [1] The statute reads "or" and not "and". [2] See also Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 62 So. 2d 92; Babineaux v. Lacobie, 222 La. 45, 62 So. 2d 95; Gandolfo v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 227 La. 45, 78 So. 2d 504; Comegys v. Stanolind Oil &amp; Gas Co., 227 La. 657, 80 So. 2d 110; State ex rel. Le Blanc v. Democratic State Central Committee, 229 La. 556, 86 So. 2d 192; Bartley, Inc. v. Town of Westlake, 237 La. 413, 111 So. 2d 328 and Collector of Revenue v. Olvey, 238 La. 980, 117 So. 2d 563. [3] Defendant has contended that this Court has indicated in Gorham v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 210 La. 462, 27 So. 2d 299, that the maxim "ejusdem generis" was applicable to the language used in R.S. 41:1212. While it is true that there is a statement contained in that decision which might be thus construed as a limitation of the scope of the statute to the specific purposes mentioned therein, it was pure dictum. That case stands only for the proposition that the general leasing statute is not applicable to the leasing of water bottoms of the State by the Commissioner of Conservation for the purposes of extracting sand, shells and gravel because water bottoms are not lands within the intendment of R.S. 41:1212.