Title: Perullo v. Advisory Committee on Personnel Standards
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12095
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12095 
 
RENEE PERULLO  vs.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL STANDARDS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2017. - April 24, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Public Employment, Removal.  Trial Court.  District Court.  Due 
Process of Law, Employment, Termination of employment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 12, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
John F. Tocci (Cary P. Gianoulis also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Suleyken D. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In 2014, the clerk-magistrate of the Salem 
Division of the District Court Department (Salem District Court) 
                     
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
removed the plaintiff, Renee Perullo, from her position as an 
assistant clerk-magistrate of that court.  Perullo's removal 
followed a lengthy series of disciplinary reprimands and 
suspensions for misconduct that included abuse of leave time and 
other inappropriate behavior.  Perullo brought this action in 
the nature of certiorari in the Superior Court to challenge her 
removal, and contends that the decision to remove her exceeded 
the statutory authority of the clerk-magistrate, in any event 
was arbitrary or capricious, and also violated her 
constitutional guarantee of due process.  In ruling on cross 
motions for judgment on the pleadings, a Superior Court judge 
rejected Perullo's contentions and upheld the removal decision.  
Given Perullo's history of misconduct, we agree that it was 
appropriate for the clerk-magistrate to factor in the whole of 
Perullo's disciplinary record in deciding that removal was the 
appropriate level of discipline.  We affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court. 
 
Background.2  Perullo began her employment with the 
Commonwealth's trial court system in 1989.  At the time of her 
removal in June, 2014, Perullo served as an assistant clerk-
magistrate of the Salem District Court.  According to § 2.000 of 
                     
2 The background facts stated here are taken from the 
administrative record filed by the defendant in the Superior 
Court as its answer to Renee Perullo's complaint in the nature 
of certiorari. 
3 
 
 
 
the Massachusetts Trial Court Personnel Policies and Procedures 
Manual (Jan. 7, 2013) (Manual), an assistant clerk is a 
"managerial employee." 
 
Perullo maintained a clean disciplinary record until 2006.  
Thereafter, she was disciplined numerous times by various 
District Court clerks.  As detailed below, Perullo's 
disciplinary infractions generally fell into two categories -- 
excessive absenteeism and inappropriate behavior. 
 
In February, 2006, Perullo agreed to a ten-day suspension 
without pay due to "inappropriate behavior" with a member of the 
Salem police department.  In November, 2006, after agreeing to 
an indefinite transfer to the Lynn Division of the District 
Court Department (Lynn District Court), Perullo received a 
written warning for her use of profanity during a discussion 
with the clerk-magistrate of that court.  In January, 2007, the 
clerk-magistrate requested that Perullo not return to the Lynn 
District Court based on the profanity incident, along with her 
failure to properly stamp certain criminal files, one of her 
assigned responsibilities. 
 
In May, 2008, while assigned to work in the Chelsea 
Division of the District Court Department, Perullo made 
disparaging remarks about Spanish-speaking persons during a 
recess in court proceedings.  As a result, the presiding judge 
of that court requested that Perullo be reassigned, and Perullo 
4 
 
 
 
ultimately was placed on administrative leave for approximately 
one week. 
 
In November, 2009, after being transferred back to the 
Salem District Court, Perullo was removed from the payroll after 
exhausting all of her accrued leave time.  Perullo's supervisor, 
Clerk-Magistrate Brian Lawlor, advised her not to abuse her sick 
time because it had an adverse impact on the administration of 
the court.  On a day in June, 2010, Perullo did not report to 
work in the morning, but called in sick at some point after 
noon.  Shortly thereafter, she was again removed from the 
payroll, having again exhausted all of her accrued leave time.  
Ultimately, Lawlor issued Perullo a written reprimand, informing 
her that any continued sick time abuse or insubordination could 
result in further disciplinary action, "up to and including 
termination." 
 
The following month, Perullo was suspended without pay for 
five days after an "altercation" with two correction officers in 
the court parking lot.  In June, 2011, Perullo was again 
suspended without pay, this time for one month.  The suspension 
was based on twelve violations of court rules governing persons 
authorized to take bail, nine violations of the standards of 
employee conduct, and other infractions.  In a letter describing 
these violations, Lawlor informed Perullo that, in light of her 
entire disciplinary record, Lawlor at that time believed he had 
5 
 
 
 
the authority to terminate Perullo.  However, Lawlor informed 
Perullo that, instead of termination, he would impose a two-
month suspension without pay.  In a subsequent written agreement 
that reduced the suspension to one month, Perullo, after 
consulting with and being advised by counsel, agreed to "accrue 
and use sick time properly" pursuant to the Manual, and 
"acknowledge[d] that any further disciplinary action [was] 
likely to result in her termination." 
 
In February, 2014, Lawlor issued Perullo another written 
reprimand regarding her "pattern of abuse" of leave time.  This 
memorandum explained that between January, 2012, and February, 
2014, Perullo had only worked one two-week pay period during 
which she did not use any time off, and as a result she had just 
over six days of accumulated time off remaining.  The reprimand 
memorandum also expressed Lawlor's view that Perullo had 
"transformed [her] full-time job into a part-time one" and 
informed her that any further "abuse" of her leave time "[would] 
result in disciplinary action."  Subsequently, in March, 2014, 
Perullo was verbally reprimanded for distracting and 
unprofessional conduct in the court room. 
 
In June, 2014, Lawlor convened a disciplinary hearing, 
after having provided written notice to Perullo in May.  At the 
hearing, Perullo was represented by counsel.  The purpose of the 
hearing was to determine whether cause existed to discipline 
6 
 
 
 
Perullo based on two grounds.  The first was her "continuous 
abuse of sick and vacation time" despite the February, 2014, 
written reprimand.3  The second ground stated was Perullo's 
alleged failure to pay a local business owner for renting a 
parking space near the Salem District Court House.  Following 
the hearing, Lawlor determined that both grounds provided cause 
to impose discipline, and he set forth his findings in a letter 
to Perullo dated June 11, 2014. 
 
In support of the first ground for discipline charged, 
Lawlor found that between February and June, 2014, there were 
only three weeks in which Perullo worked a full work week.  He 
outlined Perullo's prior attendance-based discipline, noting in 
particular how, in February, 2014, he told Perullo that her 
pattern of sick time abuse could result in further discipline, 
as well as "removal from the payroll, which is unacceptable for 
any person, especially one in a senior management position."  
Lawlor also found that Perullo's "pattern of conduct" had not 
changed since the February warning, but rather that she had 
"continue[d] to fail to appear at work."  Lawlor further found 
that Perullo's pattern of conduct "adversely affect[ed] [his] 
ability to manage this office and this court," and that her 
                     
 
3 Unfortunately, the record makes no effort to distinguish 
between Perullo's use of sick time and her use of vacation time.  
However, we do not think that this distinction would alter our 
analysis in this case. 
7 
 
 
 
"continued absences from work [left them] short-handed."  As a 
result of these findings, Lawlor concluded that Perullo had 
violated three personnel rules:  §§ 16.100.B.1 (failure to 
comply with reasonable order), 16.100.B.16 (chronic absences in 
reporting to work), and 16.100.B.22 (conduct that undermines 
administration of court) of the Manual. 
 
With respect to the second ground for discipline, Lawlor 
stated in his letter that he learned of the parking space issue 
in April, 2014, when the business owner contacted Lawlor at the 
Salem District Court House to express dissatisfaction that one 
of Lawlor's employees failed to pay for parking at the business 
owner's establishment.  The business owner informed Lawlor that 
Perullo had agreed to rent the space starting in late 2011 for 
sixty dollars per month.  However, Perullo soon fell behind in 
her payments, and ignored efforts by the business owner to 
collect on three months of unpaid rent.  Lawlor also stated that 
he was "loath[] to delve into someone's personal issues," but 
found that Perullo knowingly and voluntarily entered into the 
parking arrangement in furtherance of her position at the Salem 
District Court, and then intentionally ignored the business 
owner and failed to pay for services rendered.  Lawlor concluded 
that this conduct violated four personnel rules:  §§ 16.100.B.3 
(discourtesy to public), 16.100.B.22 (conduct that undermines 
administration of court), 16.100.B.23 (conduct that tends to 
8 
 
 
 
bring court into disrepute), and 16.100.B.24 (conduct unbecoming 
trial court employee) of the Manual. 
 
Having found that both alleged grounds for discipline were 
proved, Lawlor considered Perullo's entire disciplinary record 
to determine the appropriate discipline.  Ultimately, he decided 
to terminate her employment. 
 
Following the recommendation of the trial court's human 
resources department, the Court Administrator approved Lawlor's 
decision to remove Perullo.4  Pursuant to G. L. c. 211B, § 8 
(§ 8), and § 16.800 of the Manual, Perullo sought review of 
Lawlor's decision by the Advisory Committee on Personnel 
Standards (committee).5  After a hearing, the committee affirmed 
the decision in November, 2014. 
 
Perullo thereafter timely filed her complaint in the nature 
of certiorari in the Superior Court to challenge the removal 
                     
 
4 Pursuant to the Massachusetts Trial Court Personnel 
Policies and Procedures Manual (Jan. 7, 2013) (Manual), the 
decision of Clerk-Magistrate Brian Lawlor, as Perullo's 
appointing authority, to remove Perullo was subject to approval 
by the Court Administrator after a review and recommendation of 
the trial court's human resources department.  See § 16.700.B of 
the Manual. 
 
5 The Advisory Committee on Personnel Standards (committee) 
is established pursuant to G. L. c. 211B, § 8 (§ 8).  Its 
members are the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, the Chief 
Justices of the seven trial court departments, the Court 
Administrator, the Commissioner of Probation, a clerk of the 
Superior Court, a clerk of the District Court, and a register of 
probate.  See G. L. c. 211B, § 8, first par. 
9 
 
 
 
decision.6  Perullo and the committee filed cross motions for 
judgment on the pleadings.  After hearing, the judge allowed the 
committee's motion, and entered judgment for the committee.  
Perullo appealed, and this court allowed Perullo's application 
for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  We review de novo the allowance of a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.  Champa v. Weston Pub. Schs., 473 
Mass. 86, 90 (2015).  Although the record before us does not 
contain the parties' pleadings in the Superior Court action, it 
appears that Perullo advanced essentially the same arguments in 
the Superior Court as she does on appeal.  In particular, 
Perullo's appeal raises three issues:  (1) whether the removal 
of an assistant clerk-magistrate comes within the scope of § 8; 
(2) whether the decision to remove Perullo was arbitrary or 
capricious, and therefore violated § 8; and (3) whether Perullo 
was afforded adequate procedural protections such that the 
constitutional guarantee of due process was satisfied.  We 
address each in turn. 
 
1.  The scope of G. L. c. 211B, § 8.  Section 8, as amended 
through St. 2011, c. 93, § 52, establishes and defines the 
                     
6 Perullo appropriately named the committee as the defendant 
because its affirmance of Lawlor's decision was the final 
decision of the administrative process, but there is no dispute 
that the focus of review in this action in the nature of 
certiorari is Lawlor's decision to remove Perullo. 
10 
 
 
 
duties of the committee (see note 5, supra), but it also 
concerns the duty of the Court Administrator to establish 
employment standards governing certain trial court employees, 
and defines the standard and procedures for the removal of the 
employees covered by that statute.  Thus, § 8 provides in part: 
 
"The committee shall advise the court administrator 
who shall establish and promulgate standards for the 
appointment, performance, promotion, continuing education 
and removal of all personnel within the trial court, except 
judges, clerks and registers of probate . . . . 
 
 
"Subject to the terms of applicable collective 
bargaining agreements, any officer or employee whose 
appointment is subject to the provisions of this section 
may be removed by the appointing authority, in accordance 
with the standards promulgated by the committee; provided, 
however, that any such removal is not for arbitrary or 
capricious reasons and, if the employee so requests, is 
approved by the [c]ommittee.  Every removal of an officer 
or employee whose appointment was subject to the provisions 
of this section shall be reviewed by the committee, and no 
such removal shall be final until approved by the 
committee" (emphases added). 
 
 
Perullo argues that she does not come within the scope of 
§ 8, because "judges, clerks and registers of probate" are 
excepted from the section's coverage and, as an assistant clerk-
magistrate, she qualifies as a "clerk" within the exception.  
The argument fails. 
Section 8 exempts from its scope "clerks."  G. L. c. 211B, 
§ 8.  It never mentions "assistant clerks."  See id.  Clerks and 
assistant clerks are two distinct positions, as related sections 
of c. 211B make clear.  See Commissioners of the Bristol County 
11 
 
 
 
Mosquito Control Dist. v. State Reclamation & Mosquito Control 
Bd., 466 Mass. 523, 528–529 (2013), and cases cited (court 
should interpret section of particular chapter not in isolation, 
but rather "in relation to the over-all framework" of chapter).  
In particular, G. L. c. 211B, § 10B, discusses the standards 
applicable to the "[a]ppointment of assistant clerks."  This 
section vests "clerks" with the "exclusive authority" to appoint 
"assistant clerks" and describes the procedure that "clerks" 
must follow to make such appointments.  It is difficult to 
conceive of a statute that more clearly distinguishes between 
"clerks" and "assistant clerks."7  Yet, Perullo contends that the 
Legislature, just sections earlier in the same chapter of the 
General Laws, used the term "clerks" to denote both "clerks" and 
"assistant clerks."  When statutes relate to the same subject 
matter, we must read them "as a harmonious whole and avoid 
absurd results" (citation omitted).  Connors v. Annino, 460 
Mass. 790, 796 (2011).  We therefore reject Perullo's argument 
because it is clear to us that, in § 8, the Legislature has 
purposefully distinguished between "clerks" and "assistant 
clerks." 
                     
 
7 See G. L. c. 218, §§ 1 (defining "clerks" as distinct from 
"assistant clerks"), 10 (providing that clerk of District Court 
"may . . . appoint one or more assistant clerks"). 
12 
 
 
 
 
2.  Certiorari review.  In an action in the nature of 
certiorari, "the standard of review may vary according to the 
nature of the action for which review is sought."  Forsyth Sch. 
for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in Dentistry, 404 
Mass. 211, 217 (1989).  Under § 8, an assistant clerk-magistrate 
such as Perullo may be removed from her employment by her 
appointing authority -- here, Lawlor as the clerk-magistrate of 
the Salem District Court -– as long as the removal (1) was not 
for "arbitrary or capricious reasons," (2) followed the 
personnel standards promulgated pursuant to that statute, and 
(3) was approved by the committee.  See G. L. c. 211B, § 8, 
fifth par.8  Perullo does not contest the second or third of 
these rationales -– that is, she does not argue that her 
termination violated the governing personnel standards,9 or that 
Lawlor's decision lacked approval by the committee.  At bottom, 
therefore, Perullo's appeal centers on the claim that Lawlor's 
decision was arbitrary or capricious.10  "A decision is arbitrary 
                     
 
8 The relevant language of § 8, fifth par., is quoted in the 
text, supra. 
 
 
9 To the contrary, she argues that the committee's 
standards, although followed, were "clearly deficient" under a 
due process lens.  We discuss this argument, infra. 
 
 
10 To the extent that Perullo suggests that a substantial 
evidence standard should govern, the plain language of the 
statute forecloses that argument.  As the language of § 8 quoted 
previously in the text demonstrates, a covered employee may be 
 
13 
 
 
 
or capricious . . . where it 'lacks any rational explanation 
that reasonable persons might support.'"11  Frawley v. Police 
Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 729 (2016), quoting Doe v. 
Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 5 (2002).  We 
consider Lawlor's decision to remove Perullo under this 
standard. 
 
Lawlor's decision was based on his findings and conclusions 
about Perullo's excessive leave-taking as a management employee, 
as well as her inappropriate conduct in failing to pay for her 
rented parking space near the court house.  Based on these two 
infractions, Lawlor considered the whole of Perullo's 
disciplinary record and terminated her.  Perullo offers 
essentially three reasons why this was arbitrary or capricious:  
(1) her time off was always approved by her supervisors, 
                                                                  
removed so long as the removal comports with the committee's 
standards, is approved by the committee, and is "not for 
arbitrary or capricious reasons."  G. L. c. 211B, § 8, fifth 
par.  Accordingly, the statute, in an action in the nature of 
certiorari such as this one, imposes an arbitrary or capricious 
standard of review, not a substantial evidence standard. 
 
11 Court decisions reflect that the phrases "arbitrary and 
capricious" and "arbitrary or capricious" are used essentially 
interchangeably, and typically denote the same standard.  See, 
e.g., Frawley v. Police Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 728–
729 (2016) (using "and" and "or" formulations interchangeably); 
Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 5–6 
(2002) (same); T.D.J. Dev. Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n of N. 
Andover, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 128 (1994) (same). 
 
14 
 
 
 
including, implicitly, Lawlor,12 and therefore cannot constitute 
"abuse"; (2) the facts surrounding the parking space dispute 
were unverified and, in any event, were an inappropriate basis 
for imposing discipline; and (3) Lawlor imposed a new punishment 
for old disciplinary infractions.  None of these arguments 
succeeds. 
 
As a general matter, Perullo's arguments misapprehend the 
considerable managerial discretion that a District Court clerk-
magistrate possesses.  A clerk has "exclusive authority" to 
appoint assistant clerks.  G. L. c. 211B, § 10B.  As the 
appointing authority, the clerk also is vested with the power to 
remove assistant clerks, within the bounds of § 8, fifth par.  
In this regard, it is important to recognize the Legislature's 
decision, in 2011, to amend § 8 and replace what was a "for 
cause" termination standard with the current one, which allows 
termination for any reason that is not arbitrary or capricious, 
so long as the committee's standards are followed.  Compare St. 
1978, c. 478, § 110, inserting G. L. c. 211B, § 8 ("An officer 
                     
 
12 More specifically, Perullo argues that, following the 
February, 2014, memorandum, she requested permission to take 
time off from her immediate supervisor, the first assistant 
clerk-magistrate, who approved those requests.  Further, she 
argues that Lawlor was responsible for reviewing payroll 
records, including time off, for all court staff on a biweekly 
basis, and that by failing to object to Perullo taking any time 
off based on his regular review of payroll records, Lawlor 
"tacitly approved" her leave time. 
15 
 
 
 
or employee whose appointment is subject to the provisions of 
this section may be removed for cause by the appointment 
authority" [emphasis added]), and St. 1992, c. 379, § 76, 
amending G. L. c. 211B, § 8 (retaining "for cause" standard), 
with St. 2011, c. 93, § 52, amending G. L. c. 211B, § 8 ("[A]ny 
officer or employee whose appointment is subject to the 
provisions of this section may be removed by the appointing 
authority . . . provided, however, that any such removal is not 
for arbitrary or capricious reasons" [emphasis added]). 
 
Considering Lawlor's first ground for removal, Perullo's 
alleged abuse of leave time, we are not persuaded by Perullo's 
contention that a supervisor's approval of her requests to take 
time off forecloses the possibility that she was misusing her 
leave time, at least not in the particular circumstances of this 
case.  We recognize that, when Lawlor reprimanded Perullo in 
February, 2014, for abuse of leave time and when he terminated 
her in June, 2014, she maintained a positive balance of leave 
time; we of course also recognize that trial court employees 
generally are entitled to take the leave time that they accrue.  
However, three interrelated factors influence our analysis in 
this case. 
 
First, a significant consideration here is the fact that 
Perullo was a "managerial" employee.  See § 2.000 of the Manual.  
Managerial employees are "expected to perform their 
16 
 
 
 
responsibilities at a high level of competence."  See § 16.300 
of the Manual.  One of the specific responsibilities of a 
managerial employee is to "work the hours needed or required by 
the operational needs of a particular court . . . providing 
reasonable notice is given."  See § 8.100 of the Manual.  The 
reason for that responsibility is that the work of a managerial 
employee sometimes is defined not "in terms of hours, days or 
weeks," but rather by the demands of "the orderly administration 
of justice."  See id.  To this point, Lawlor specifically 
informed Perullo, in February, 2014, that her pattern of 
absences was "unacceptable for any person, especially one in a 
senior management position," and that any further issues with 
leave time would result in discipline.  Yet, over the next 
fifteen weeks, Perullo worked a full work week only three 
times.13  Regardless of whether these absences were approved by a 
supervisor on a case-by-case basis, Perullo had ample notice 
that engaging in such a pattern of behavior was virtually 
certain to result in further discipline by Lawlor because it 
                     
 
13 The record does not specify precisely when Perullo took 
time off in the other twelve weeks.  However, Lawlor did state 
that, in that span, Perullo took over forty-seven hours of time 
off, in addition to using all five of her personal days.  
Roughly, that averages out to Perullo being out of the office 
for about one working day for twelve out of fifteen weeks 
following Lawlor's February, 2014, warning. 
17 
 
 
 
failed to meet his -- and, importantly, the Manual's -- 
expectations for a "managerial" employee. 
 
Second, it was reasonable for Lawlor to determine that 
Perullo's habitual absences, effectuated by drawing down her 
leave time as soon as it accrued, constituted "chronic 
absences," see § 16.100.B.16 of the Manual, that disrupted the 
court's work,14 see § 16.100.B.22 of the Manual (permitting 
discipline for "conduct that undermines the administration of 
the court").  It is well-documented that a clerk-magistrate like 
Lawlor "performs many roles that are crucial to the fair and 
efficient administration of justice in a District Court."  
Matter of Powers, 465 Mass. 63, 66 (2013).  See id. at 66-68 
(discussing duties of clerk-magistrate).  Most pertinent here, 
the clerk-magistrate is part of the over-all "senior management 
team" in each court house, "working collaboratively to ensure 
the fair, effective, and efficient administration of justice."  
Id. at 68.  That role gives important texture to Lawlor's 
admonition to Perullo, in February, 2014, that he was unable to 
"ensure the efficient administration of this office if 
individuals at all levels did not appear at work as required, 
                     
 
14 Perullo mentions in passing that some of her days off may 
have been related to Ménière's Disease.  To the extent that she 
may believe she was wrongfully terminated on the basis of that 
ailment, such an argument is not developed in the record before 
this court and we do not decide the question. 
18 
 
 
 
and that adversely impacts [his] ability to run [his] office."  
Perullo, in response to this warning, utterly failed to change 
her behavior.  Perullo might stand on different footing if she 
had not already been reprimanded repeatedly for exhausting her 
leave time.  But Perullo's disciplinary history lends further 
credence to Lawlor's position that her "chronic absences" 
represented a managerial problem in terms of his ability to 
staff the court house consistently.  Given that history, Lawlor 
was not obligated to stand idly by as Perullo continued to use 
her leave time as soon as it accrued. 
 
Third, even assuming for the sake of argument that 
Perullo's absences by themselves did not constitute abuse of the 
trial court's leave policies, she had agreed with Lawlor, in 
2011 and again in 2014, to cease her "pattern of abuse" of leave 
time -- in other words, to stop using her leave time as soon as 
it accrued.  It certainly was not unreasonable for Lawlor to 
conclude, based on Perullo's post-February, 2014, conduct, that 
she ignored this agreement, thereby violating the trial court 
policy permitting discipline for "failure or refusal to comply 
with a reasonable order."  See § 16.100.B.1 of the Manual. 
 
It also was not irrational or unreasonable for Lawlor to 
treat the parking space dispute as a basis of his decision.  The 
personnel standards permit discipline for discourtesy to the 
public, see § 16.100.B.3 of the Manual; conduct that tends to 
19 
 
 
 
bring the court into disrepute, see § 16.100.B.23 of the Manual; 
and conduct unbecoming a trial court employee, see § 16.100.B.24 
of the Manual.  Because Lawlor received a telephone call at his 
office regarding Perullo's failure to pay for the parking space, 
it is evident both that the business owner knew that Perullo was 
a court employee and that Perullo's use of the parking space was 
connected to her court job.  Lawlor rationally could conclude 
that this conduct constituted a violation of any of the policies 
mentioned above.  If Perullo were starting from a clean 
disciplinary slate, the parking space dispute, perhaps, might be 
more questionable as a basis for discipline.  But given 
Perullo's history of inappropriate conduct, including very 
public, work-related confrontations with and outbursts about 
others, Lawlor acted well within his discretion to investigate 
the parking space dispute and, after hearing Perullo's response, 
to treat the parking dispute as a cause for discipline. 
 
Finally, after concluding that Perullo's absenteeism and 
the parking space dispute warranted discipline, it was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious for Lawlor to consider Perullo's entire 
disciplinary record when determining the appropriate sanction.  
Perullo's argument would have more force if the "for cause" 
standard for removal of a trial court employee remained in 
place, or if Lawlor were still obligated to use progressive 
discipline for a management employee like Perullo.  But, as 
20 
 
 
 
discussed, the "for cause" regime has been replaced by the 
"arbitrary or capricious" standard currently prescribed by § 8, 
and progressive discipline does not apply to management 
employees like Perullo.  See §§ 16.400 and 16.500 of the Manual.  
In these circumstances, we conclude that Lawlor acted well 
within his broad managerial discretion to factor the history of 
Perullo's prior disciplinary offenses into his sanction and to 
determine that, given Perullo's long disciplinary record, the 
two new infractions constituted the proverbial "last straw" that 
made removal the appropriate level of discipline. 
 
3.  Due process.  Finally, Perullo argues that the process 
by which she was terminated was procedurally defective and 
violated the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.15  
"The threshold issue in a procedural due process action is 
whether the plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property 
interest at stake."  See Mard v. Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 188 (1st 
Cir. 2003), citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 
U.S. 532, 538-541 (1985).  Such a property interest may derive 
from existing rules or independent sources, such as State law.  
                     
 
15 Perullo does not specify whether she relies on the United 
States Constitution or the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
However, "[t]he protection afforded property interests by both 
provisions is subject to the same analysis."  School Comm. of 
Hatfield v. Board of Educ., 372 Mass. 513, 515 n.2 (1977). 
21 
 
 
 
Mard, supra at 189, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972). 
 
As discussed, § 8 permitted Perullo's removal for any 
reason that was not arbitrary or capricious, provided she 
received the protections provided by applicable statutes and 
rules.  Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Perullo had 
a constitutionally protected property interest in continued 
employment, due process was satisfied by compliance with § 8 and 
the personnel standards and policies promulgated by the Court 
Administrator and the committee, which included an opportunity 
for hearing before any discipline was imposed.  See § 16.500 of 
the Manual.  See also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (property interests 
"are created and their dimensions are defined by . . . an 
independent source such as state law"). 
 
Perullo has demonstrated no deviation from the governing 
statute or rules.  Lawlor provided Perullo with written notice 
of the disciplinary hearing that resulted in her termination and 
the grounds that he alleged warranted discipline, along with the 
ability to appear with counsel at that hearing and to respond to 
the allegations orally or in writing.  Perullo took advantage of 
this opportunity and both attended and participated in the 
hearing with her counsel.  After the hearing's conclusion, 
Lawlor set forth in detail, in a written letter of decision, his 
findings and reasons for the discipline he ultimately imposed.  
22 
 
 
 
Consistent with the governing policies, the trial court's human 
resources department reviewed Lawlor's decision, and the court 
administrator approved it.  Finally, as contemplated by § 8, the 
committee held a hearing that Perullo attended and at which her 
counsel presented arguments, before it affirmed the decision.  
These steps fulfilled the procedural protections promised by the 
relevant statute and rules, and in any event satisfied the 
demands of due process by providing Perullo with a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard.  See Matter of Powers, 465 Mass. at 80-
81 (where clerk-magistrate had constitutionally protected 
interest in his position, due process was satisfied when he 
received full and fair hearing before any meaningful deprivation 
occurred). 
 
Perullo also suggests that Lawlor was unfairly biased 
against her based, in part, on his position as investigator and 
adjudicator regarding the parking space dispute.  Both the 
Unites States Supreme Court and this court have rejected the 
notion that it necessarily violates due process to combine 
adjudicatory and investigative functions.  See D'Amour v. Board 
of Registration in Dentistry, 409 Mass. 572, 580 (1991), and 
cases cited.  More to the point, Lawlor, far from being biased 
against Perullo, allowed her several opportunities to correct 
her behavior before deciding to remove her.  Accordingly, 
"[t]here has been no additional showing of actual bias to 
23 
 
 
 
support a claim of lack of impartiality."  Harris v. Board of 
Trustees of State Colleges, 405 Mass. 515, 522 (1989). 
 
Similarly, we reject Perullo's contention that the five-
month delay between Lawlor's decision to terminate her and the 
committee's hearing was so untimely that it created an 
independent due process violation.  We recognize that five 
months is a significant period of time to wait for a 
posttermination hearing.  No explanation for this delay is 
apparent on the record, and the committee does not offer one in 
its brief.  Although it would have been preferable for the 
committee to have held its hearing and made its decision on a 
more expedited basis, longer delays have been found to satisfy 
the demands of due process, and Perullo has not demonstrated any 
specific reason why the passage of time here resulted in a 
constitutional violation.  See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547 
(nine-month delay, without more, not unconstitutional). 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, the Superior Court 
judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.