Title: McCormick v. State
Citation: 218 Neb. 338, 354 N.W.2d 160
Docket Number: 100
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 1984

354 N.W.2d 160 (1984) 218 Neb. 338 Richard Freeman McCORMICK and Joan Maxine McCormick, Appellants, v. STATE of Nebraska, Department of Public Welfare, et al., Appellees. No. 84-100. Supreme Court of Nebraska. August 31, 1984. James H. Monahan, Omaha, for appellants. Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and Royce N. Harper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, for appellees. KRIVOSHA, C.J., BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, *161 JJ., and COLWELL, District Judge, Retired. PER CURIAM. Richard and Joan McCormick appeal from the order of the district court dismissing their petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The McCormicks brought the action to cancel their relinquishment and obtain custody of their son, Mark William McCormick. The McCormicks claim that the relinquishment of parental rights which they executed was not signed voluntarily and was therefore invalid. The record shows that in 1981 the State commenced an action in the separate juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of Richard and Joan McCormick to their son Mark. A final hearing in that matter was set for March 23, 1982. Shortly before that hearing was to begin, there was a discussion in the courthouse hallway among the McCormicks; their pastor; their court-appointed counsel, James Pruss; the guardian ad litem, Kenneth Weiner; and Mary Lee Kenworthy, a caseworker from the Department of Welfare. During this discussion, it was explained to the McCormicks that if they signed a relinquishment of their parental rights, there was a possibility that an "open adoption" could be arranged, provided that cooperative adoptive parents could be found. An "open adoption" is described in the record as one where the natural parents continue to have contact with their child. The "open adoption" idea was first brought up in the discussion by the caseworker. It appears that Mrs. McCormick understood "open adoption" meant that she and her husband would be able as a matter of right to see their son following an adoption. Mr. McCormick does not recall any of the events of March 23,1982, apparently due to a combination of medication and the mental condition from which he suffers. Pruss told the McCormicks that it was likely that the juvenile judge would terminate their rights if the March 23, 1982, hearing was held, and he advised the McCormicks that the open adoption may be the "best route to go." The McCormicks then signed a relinquishment. Immediately thereafter, the hearing commenced and the court was informed that a relinquishment had been signed. The court granted the guardian ad litem's motion for a continuance until such time as an adoption was arranged or for 9 months. Pruss testified that the attitude of those representing the State changed as soon as the relinquishment was signed, in that they moved quickly to obtain the child's possessions from the McCormicks. The McCormicks have not been permitted visitation with their son since the relinquishment was signed. The McCormicks brought this action in August 1982 for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus but continued a restraining order preventing the arrangement of an adoption of Mark McCormick pending this appeal. A decision in a habeas corpus case involving the custody of a child is reviewed by this court de novo on the record. Where the evidence is in irreconcilable conflict, we consider the findings of the trial court. Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 293 N.W.2d 90 (1980); Raymond v. Cotner, 175 Neb. 158, 120 N.W.2d 892 (1963). Proceedings in habeas corpus to obtain custody of a child are governed by considerations of expediency and equity, and should not be bound by technical rules. Gray v. Maxwell, supra. "In the absence of threats, coercion, fraud, or duress, a properly executed relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption form signed by a natural parent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is valid." (Syllabus of the court.) Lum v. Mattley, 208 Neb. 789, 305 N.W.2d 878 (1981). The question before us on this appeal is whether the relinquishment was voluntarily executed. The McCormicks contend that they were coerced into signing the relinquishment, as *162 they were led to believe that they could continue to see their son following an adoption if they signed the relinquishment but would not be provided that opportunity if their rights were terminated as a result of the impending judicial proceeding. The State argues that the McCormicks were informed at the time the relinquishment was signed that an "open adoption" was not guaranteed, but was at the option of the adoptive parents. Upon de novo review of the record we conclude that the relinquishment was signed by the McCormicks as the result of coercion. In Duncan v. Harden, 234 Ga. 204, 214 S.E.2d 890 (1975), the parents filed an action for a writ of habeas corpus in September 1974, claiming that they did not voluntarily sign relinquishments shortly following their child's birth in May 1974. The court held that family pressures on the mother and the fact that the mother was taking "mind-dulling" medication at the time the relinquishment was signed rendered her consent to adoption involuntary. The father's consent was also deemed involuntary, as it was given only after he received a "threatening" letter from the caseworker, stating: Id. at 207, 214 S.E.2d at 892. In Matter of Danielson, 104 Misc.2d 33, 427 N.Y.S.2d 572, 574 (1980), the court stated: In Matter of Male M., 76 A.D.2d 839, 428 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1980), the court permitted a mother to revoke her consent to an adoption. The revocation was filed 4 months after the consent was signed. The court said at 839, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 490: In Singer Adoption Case, 457 Pa. 518, 326 A.2d 275 (1974), the court was faced with a situation somewhat similar to that presented in the present case. In that case the court determined that a conditional relinquishment *163 does not amount to the requisite unequivocal consent to adoption. Id. at 523-24, 326 A.2d at 278. In the present case the parents were forced to make a quick decision in the courthouse hallway shortly before the hearing in the action to terminate their parental rights was to commence. The parents were told that the court would most likely terminate their rights. The chance that they would be able to see their son through an "open adoption" was an attractive inducement to sign the relinquishment and abandon their contest of the termination proceedings. Under the circumstances in this case we conclude that the McCormicks were coerced into signing the relinquishment. A relinquishment conditioned upon the retention of some parental rights is invalid. "[T]here remains the question that is present in every habeas corpus case involving child custody: the best interests of the child." Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 394, 293 N.W.2d 90, 96 (1980). The juvenile court has retained jurisdiction to determine the best interests of the child. The plaintiffs' right to custody of their son is subject to further proceedings in the separate juvenile court. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment in conformity with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. HASTINGS, Justice, dissenting. As stated in the majority opinion, although we review a decision in a habeas corpus case involving custody of a child de novo on the record, we will give great *164 weight to the findings of the trial court where the evidence is in irreconcilable conflict. Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 293 N.W.2d 90 (1980). In my view, we have failed to accord that consideration to the district court in this instance. The record fully supports the decision of the trial court. However, by this decision we have permitted the credibility and the integrity of the judicial process to become suspect by the second-thought, self-serving statements of parties to the action. I would affirm the judgment of the district court. I am authorized to state that BOSLAUGH, J., and COLWELL, District Judge, Retired, join in this dissent.