Title: State v. Eric W. Raye
Citation: 2005 WI 68
Docket Number: 2004AP000770-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2005

2005 WI 68 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP770-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Eric W. Raye,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 572, 687 N.W.2d 549 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 7, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis C. Luebke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Brian C. Hough and Robinson Law Firm, Appleton, and oral 
argument by Brian C. Hough. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sarah 
K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
2005 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP770-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CT1010) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric W. Raye, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 7, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Eric Raye, 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming a circuit court judgment of conviction and order 
denying postconviction relief.1  Raye was convicted of operating 
                                                 
1 State v. Raye, No. 2004AP770-CR, unpublished slip. op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. August 10, 2004) (affirming a judgment and an 
order of the circuit court for Outagamie County, Dennis C. 
Luebke, Judge). 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
2 
 
a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) (2001-02).2 
¶2 
In his quest for a new trial, Raye advances two 
primary arguments.  First, he contends that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when polling of the jury 
revealed that the verdict was not unanimous and the court did 
not grant a mistrial or direct the jury to deliberate further.  
Second, he asserts that the court of appeals erroneously 
concluded that he had waived the issue. 
¶3 
We agree with Raye that he did not waive the issue 
presented.  Furthermore, we determine that a new trial is 
warranted under the facts of the case.  Here, the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by not granting a mistrial 
or directing the jury to deliberate further upon learning of a 
juror's dissent.  The court's continuation of the jury poll and 
individual questioning of the dissenting juror, although well 
meaning, went too far, thereby tainting the deliberation 
process.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand for a new trial.  
I 
¶4 
Raye was charged with operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated (OWI) and operating with a prohibited blood-alcohol 
concentration (PAC), both as third offenses.  Following a two-
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
3 
 
day trial, the jury returned a verdict acquitting him of the OWI 
charge but convicting him of the PAC charge.   
¶5 
After the verdict was read, Raye requested that the 
members of the jury be polled individually.  The court polled 
six jurors before reaching Brian Clark, the jury foreman.  When 
asked by the circuit court, "Is this your verdict?" Clark 
replied, "Can I ask a question?"  The court directed Clark to 
first answer the poll question.  Clark then responded "No."  
After the "no" response, the court continued polling the five 
remaining jurors.  With the exception of Clark, every juror 
assented to the verdict. 
¶6 
Recognizing that the verdict was not unanimous, and 
not knowing the content of Clark's question, the circuit court 
excused the 11 jurors from the courtroom with the following 
statement: 
Okay.  The verdict is not unanimous from the response, 
at least, initially received; therefore, I can't 
accept it. 
Mr. Clark has a question that he wants to make an 
inquiry that he wants to make of the Court.  I don't 
know what the nature of that is; therefore, I don't 
know whether it is appropriate that the question be 
asked in the presence of all the remaining jurors 
given what stumbling block we have. 
What I'm going to do, I'm going to ask that the other 
11 of you, if you would follow the bailiff, please, 
and we'll allow Mr. Clark to ask his question. 
¶7 
After sending the 11 other jurors back to the jury 
room, the circuit court thanked Clark for his "forthrightness" 
in answering the question.  It explained that neither its 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
4 
 
questions nor any questions counsel might ask should be 
considered as pressure to change his verdict.  The court 
repeated this information twice and assured Clark that he was 
free to vote his conscience.  With this caveat, the court 
commenced questioning. 
¶8 
The circuit court asked Clark what his question was, 
and Clark replied that he had concerns about the evidence.  
Listening to Clark, the court attempted to understand his 
position.  It stated: 
You know, if you are just giving an explanation that 
would suggest that you were ultimately convinced to 
vote this way by the facts and the argument of other 
jurors, then that's acceptable and we would accept 
this as your verdict, maybe as a result of compromise 
or some other considerations, but if you are saying 
that it really is not your verdict, I need to know 
that. 
¶9 
Clark 
acknowledged 
that 
his 
verdict 
was 
"on 
a 
compromise."  The circuit court then asked, "You ultimately 
listened to the other jurors, were convinced and persuaded by 
their argument and changed your vote based upon that collective 
analysis of the evidence, is that what you are telling us?"  
Clark replied, "Not really." 
¶10 The circuit court subsequently asked whether either 
the district attorney or Raye's defense counsel wanted to make 
any inquiry.  The following exchange then occurred: 
[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  I guess all we really want to 
know for sure is, when the Judge asks, is this the 
jury's verdict and you answered yes, and that's what 
is agreed on, the Judge wants to know is, do you – in 
your analysis of what happened here today, along with 
what you heard the other jurors say, and what you 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
5 
 
heard them argue in the jury room, do you agree with 
their verdict as being your own? 
JUROR CLARK:  Not 100 percent, no. 
[RAYE'S COUNSEL]:  I think that's enough. 
THE COURT:  Is there anything that – I'm going to – 
[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  Okay. 
[THE COURT3]:  I would rather error in allowing Mr. 
Clark to resolve his concerns and questions than 
simply to compel him to accept a verdict that he 
questions. 
Is there something that the Court can do to assist 
you?  Is the transcript an important issue? 
¶11 When asked by the circuit court whether there was 
something it could do to assist him, and whether the transcript 
was an important issue, Clark answered "Yes."  The court then 
inquired, "Is there an aspect of that testimony that is more 
important than another?"  Again, Clark responded in the 
affirmative, 
explaining 
that 
he 
knew 
which 
part 
of 
the 
transcript it was and that the other jurors agreed.  The court 
instructed Clark to return to the jury room to draft a written 
request for the transcript.  In all, the circuit court's 
comments and questions to Clark lasted approximately five 
minutes. 
¶12 The circuit court declared a recess and handled a 
proceeding in a different case.  During the recess the jury 
requested a portion of the transcript, and it was prepared.  
                                                 
3 The original transcript attributes this statement to 
Raye's counsel; however, the court reporter's errata sheet makes 
clear that this statement actually came from the circuit court.  
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
6 
 
Ultimately, the jury asked for the testimony of one of the 
State's expert witnesses, a chemist.  After approximately 30 
minutes, the court reconvened so that the State and Raye could 
verify that the transcript was acceptable.  At that point, Raye 
moved for a mistrial on the ground that the verdict was not 
unanimous.  The circuit court denied the motion, indicating that 
it had not actually accepted the original verdict and would 
provide the transcript to the jurors. 
¶13 After further deliberations, the jury returned the 
same verdict, this time without dissent.  Raye was found guilty 
and sentenced on the PAC charge but acquitted on the OWI charge.  
He filed a postconviction motion to vacate the conviction or, 
alternatively, for a new trial.  The court denied the motion.  
Raye appealed, asserting that the circuit court had erred by 
individually questioning Clark and then sending the jury back to 
deliberate further after polling revealed that Clark had 
dissented from the verdict. 
¶14 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order 
of the circuit court.  In doing so, it noted that the propriety 
of the interrogation of Clark following polling was waived 
because Raye had failed to make a contemporaneous objection.  
State v. Raye, No. 2004AP770-CR, unpublished slip. op. at ¶7 
(Wis. Ct. App. August 10, 2004).  Even on the merits, however, 
the court of appeals concluded that Raye's arguments failed.  
Id., ¶9.  Raye petitioned this court for review. 
 
 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
7 
 
II 
¶15 In this case we are asked to examine the actions of 
the circuit court in the context of jury polling.  Jury polling 
is a common law procedure whereby "after verdict each juror is 
separately asked whether he or she concurs" in the verdict.  
State v. Coulthard, 171 Wis. 2d 573, 580, 492 N.W.2d 329 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (quoting American Bar Association, Standards For 
Criminal Justice, sec. 15-4.5 commentary at 15-146 (2d ed. 
1980), quoting in turn Commonwealth v. Martin, 109 A.2d 325, 328 
(Pa. 1954)). 
¶16 When we review the actions of the circuit court here, 
we must determine whether the court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  See State v. Cartagena, 140 Wis. 2d 59, 62-63, 409 
N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1987).  An erroneous exercise of discretion 
may arise from an error in law or from the failure of the 
circuit court to base its decisions on the facts in the record.  
Meyer v. Meyer, 2000 WI 132, ¶15, 239 Wis. 2d 731, 620 N.W.2d 
382 (citing King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248, 590 N.W.2d 480 
(1999)). 
III 
¶17 The right to trial by jury protected by the state 
constitution includes the right to a unanimous verdict in 
criminal trials.4  Cartagena, 140 Wis. 2d at 61 (citing Holland 
v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979)).  The jury 
                                                 
4 A third offense OWI or PAC is a criminal offense.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(c) and 939.12. 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
8 
 
must arrive at the unanimous verdict freely and fairly.  Jones 
v. United States, 273 A.2d 842, 844 (D.C. 1971) (citations 
omitted).  As a corollary to the unanimous verdict, a defendant 
has the right to poll jurors individually.  Cartagena, 140 
Wis. 2d at 61-62 (citing State v. Wojtalewicz, 127 Wis. 2d 344, 
350, 379 N.W.2d 338 (Ct. App. 1985)).   
¶18 The purpose of jury polling is to test the uncoerced 
unanimity of the verdict by requiring jurors to take individual 
responsibility and state publicly that they agree with the 
announced result.  State v. Wiese, 162 Wis. 2d 507, 517, 469 
N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Behnke, 155 
Wis. 2d 796, 801, 456 N.W.2d 610 (1990)).  An ancillary purpose 
is to allow jurors to dissent although previously agreeing to 
the verdict.  Id. at 518.   
¶19 Accordingly, it has been recognized that, "the verdict 
of a jury must be arrived at freely and fairly and that the 
validity of a unanimous verdict is not dependent on what the 
jurors agree to in the jury room, but rather upon what is 
unanimously reported in open court."  Jones, 273 A.2d at 844 
(citations omitted). 
¶20 The right to poll the jury is an absolute right, if 
not waived, and its denial requires reversal.  Wojtalewicz, 127 
Wis. 2d at 346.  Nevertheless, defendants may waive their right 
by failing to ask for it in the first instance, or by failing to 
ask for additional polling when given the opportunity to request 
it.  State v. Cydzik, 60 Wis. 2d 683, 695-96, 211 N.W.2d 421 
(1973). 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
9 
 
¶21 As noted above, Raye makes two primary arguments 
related to the jury polling that took place in this case.  
First, he contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion when polling revealed that the verdict was not 
unanimous and the court did not grant a mistrial or direct the 
jury to deliberate further.  Second, he asserts that the court 
of appeals erroneously concluded that he had waived the issue.  
We examine each argument in turn, beginning with the issue of 
waiver. 
A. 
¶22 Raye contends that the court of appeals erroneously 
concluded that he waived any claims of error related to the 
circuit court's polling procedures.  Specifically, he submits 
that there was no opportunity for a contemporaneous objection at 
the circuit court, and even if there was, no corrective measures 
could have taken the place of a mistrial. 
¶23 The State, meanwhile, responds that Raye had several 
opportunities to make contemporaneous objections to the circuit 
court's polling procedures, and Raye's motion for mistrial after 
the continuation of the poll had already ended and after the 
circuit court had concluded its questioning of Clark did not 
adequately preserve Raye's claim for appeal.  The State 
therefore maintains that Raye waived any claims of error related 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
allegedly 
erroneous 
jury 
polling 
procedure. 
¶24 It is an essential principle of appellate review that 
issues must be preserved at the circuit court.  State v. 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
10 
 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. 
Issues that are not preserved at the circuit court, including 
alleged constitutional errors, generally will not be considered 
on appeal.  Id., (citing State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 
563 N.W.2d 501 (1997)).  We have described this rule as the 
"waiver rule" in the sense that issues not preserved are deemed 
waived.  Id., ¶11.   
¶25 As a rule of judicial administration, the waiver rule 
serves important purposes.  Raising issues at the circuit court 
allows the court to correct or avoid the alleged error in the 
first place, eliminating the need for appeal.  Id., ¶12 (citing 
State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999)).  
It also gives both parties and the circuit court notice of the 
issue and a fair opportunity to address the objection.  Id.   
¶26 Appellate courts, however, have authority to ignore 
the waiver rule and have done so in analogous cases involving a 
circuit court's interference with a jury.  For example, in 
Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 449 (1926), the United 
States Supreme Court considered the propriety of a district 
court's inquiry into the numerical division of a stalled jury.  
There, after some hours of deliberation, the district court 
asked the jury how it was split, and was informed by the foreman 
that it stood nine to three, without indicating which number 
favored a conviction.  Id.  Despite the defendant's failure to 
preserve the issue, the Supreme Court reached the merits and 
adopted a per se rule prohibiting such practice.  Id. at 450.  
In a tersely worded opinion, the Court wrote: 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
11 
 
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct 
of the trial, that the inquiry itself should be 
regarded as ground for reversal.  Such procedure 
serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by 
questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature 
or extent of its division.  Its effect upon a divided 
jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot 
properly be known to the trial judge or to the 
appellate courts and may vary widely in different 
situations, 
but 
in 
general 
its 
tendency 
is 
coercive. . . .   
The failure of petitioners' counsel to particularize 
an exception to the court's inquiry does not preclude 
this court from correcting the error.  This is 
especially the case where the error, as here, affects 
the proper relations of the court to the jury, cannot 
be effectively remedied by modification of the judge's 
charge after the harm has been done.    
Id. (citations omitted). 
¶27 Likewise, in State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 89, 519 
N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals addressed the 
same issue of whether the circuit court erred by inquiring into 
the numerical division of the jury during its deliberations.  In 
its decision, the court of appeals acknowledged that there was 
no objection by the defendant at the circuit court.  Id. at 93.  
Nevertheless, it rejected the State's argument for waiver and 
concluded that the circuit court had erred in asking the 
question.  Id.  Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Brasfield, the court explained why the failure to object was not 
an important or useful prerequisite: 
We [reach the issue] in this case for the same reason 
expounded by the United States Supreme Court in 
Brasfield . . . .  The question before us affects the 
proper relations of the jury and could not have been 
effectively remedied by modification of the judge's 
question after it was asked. 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
12 
 
Id. 
¶28 The courts in Brasfield and McMahon declined to apply 
the waiver rule.  We find their rationale persuasive.  The 
question here, like the question before the courts in those 
cases, affects the proper relations between the circuit court 
and the jury and may not have been "effectively remedied by 
modification" after the error was committed. 
¶29 Ultimately, however, we need not determine whether to 
apply the waiver rule because we view the motion as timely made.  
Admittedly, Raye's counsel did not make a formal objection 
during the approximately five-minute period when Clark was alone 
with the court and counsel.  However, after the third time that 
Clark disavowed the verdict, Raye's counsel stated, "I think 
that's enough."  Shortly thereafter a recess was taken.  Upon 
going back on the record after recess, Raye's counsel made a 
motion for a mistrial on the ground that the verdict was not 
unanimous.  Given the circumstances, we conclude that the motion 
was timely and that it was not waived.  Accordingly, we will 
reach the merits of Raye's claim. 
B. 
¶30 The second question we address is whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when polling revealed 
that the verdict was not unanimous and the court did not grant a 
mistrial or direct the jury to deliberate further.  Raye asserts 
that the circuit court had only two options upon Clark's 
dissent:  declare a mistrial or return the jury back for further 
deliberation. 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
13 
 
¶31 The State, on the other hand, contends that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion by continuing 
the jury poll and interrogating Clark after his question.  It 
argues that Clark's inquiry of "Can I ask a question?" created 
ambiguity in his answer to the jury poll and was therefore not a 
clear dissent to the verdict.   
¶32 Under Wisconsin law, a circuit court has two options 
if a juror dissents during jury polling or indicates that the 
assent is merely an accommodation and against the juror's 
conscience.  First, the court can send the jury back for 
continued deliberations.  Wiese, 162 Wis. 2d at 518 n. 2 
(citation omitted).  Second, the court may determine that 
further deliberations would be fruitless and grant a mistrial.  
Id.   
¶33 Wisconsin's approach is consistent with the American 
Bar Association Standards, which provide: 
Standard 15-4.5.  Polling the jury 
When a verdict has been returned and before the jury 
has dispersed, the jury shall be polled at the request 
of any party or upon the court's own motion.  The poll 
shall be conducted by the court or clerk of court 
asking each juror individually whether the verdict 
announced is his or her verdict.  If upon the poll 
there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be 
directed to retire for further deliberations or may be 
discharged. 
See III American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal 
Justice, sec. 15-4.5 at 15.145-46 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis 
added).    
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
14 
 
¶34 Furthermore, 
it 
is 
embraced 
by 
commentators 
as 
representing the "better view" of polling practices.  See 5 
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal 
Procedure § 24.9(e) (2d ed. 1999) ("If the poll reveals that 
there are not a sufficient number of votes for a valid verdict, 
then under the better view the court has the discretion either 
to direct the jury to retire for further deliberations or to 
discharge the jury.") (citations omitted). 
¶35 Wisconsin does recognize a third option, however, for 
situations where a juror gives an ambiguous or ambivalent 
assent:  question the juror.  In Cartagena, 140 Wis. 2d at 62, 
the court of appeals held that circuit courts should interrogate 
jurors who, during the poll, create some doubt as to their vote.  
Doubt may result from the juror's demeanor, tone of voice, or 
language used.  Id.  However, the circuit court should first 
make a determination that the answer was ambiguous or ambivalent 
before it questions the juror further.  Id.   
¶36 As noted above, when initially asked by the circuit 
court, "Is this your verdict?" Clark replied, "Can I ask a 
question?"  This response was clearly ambiguous.  However, when 
pressed by the circuit court to first answer the poll, Clark 
replied with an unambiguous "No."  The record does not reflect 
any equivocation in this answer.  There was no caveat, and there 
was no indication that Clark did not understand the question.5   
                                                 
5 When faced with this situation, the circuit court should 
consider conferring first with counsel in a sidebar before 
proceeding.  Although it is not the only way of handling the 
matter, we believe that the court may benefit from such input.   
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
15 
 
¶37 With Clark's unambiguous "No," the circuit court had 
two options from which to proceed:  grant a mistrial or return 
the jury back for further deliberations.  Ultimately, it chose 
neither. 
 
Instead, 
it 
continued 
polling 
the 
jury 
and 
interrogated Clark individually.  Because these actions were not 
available options upon a juror's dissent, the circuit court's 
decision to pursue them constituted an erroneous exercise of 
discretion. 
¶38 In its defense, the State maintains that the circuit 
court's actions were designed to respond to Clark's hesitancy or 
to 
clarify 
what 
his 
questions 
were 
about 
the 
evidence.  
Accordingly, it asks that we defer to the circuit court's 
implicit finding that the phrase, "Can I ask a question?" 
coupled with Foreman Clark's demeanor and tone of voice, was an 
ambiguous or ambivalent answer to the question:  "Is this your 
verdict?"  
¶39 The problem with the State's argument, of course, is 
the circuit court's explicit acknowledgement that it did not 
have a unanimous jury.  At the conclusion of the polling, the 
circuit court stated, "Okay.  The verdict is not unanimous from 
the response, at least, initially received; therefore, I can't 
accept it."  The court then removed the other 11 jurors and 
thanked 
Clark 
for 
his 
"forthrightness" 
in 
answering 
the 
question.  With these words, the court did not express any doubt 
as to whether Clark dissented.   
¶40 If there were any lingering questions about the nature 
of Clark's response, they were resolved by his subsequent 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
16 
 
interrogation.  The Court asked, "You ultimately listened to the 
other jurors, were convinced and persuaded by their argument and 
changed your vote based upon that collective analysis of the 
evidence, is that what you are telling us?"  Clark replied, "Not 
really."  The district attorney then put the question more 
directly, asking, "do you agree with their verdict as being your 
own?"  Clark responded, "Not 100 percent, no." 
¶41 By the time the district attorney was done with his 
interrogation, Clark had expressed his dissent to the verdict in 
three different ways:  "No," "Not really," and "Not 100 percent, 
no."  Yet, instead of granting a mistrial or returning the jury 
back for further deliberations, the circuit court asked, "Is 
there something that the Court can do to assist you?" 
¶42 We are troubled by the nature and breadth of the 
circuit 
court's 
questions 
after 
Clark's 
initial 
dissent.  
Although its preliminary remarks were commendable,6 and its 
                                                 
6 
Before 
interrogating 
Clark, 
the 
court 
stated 
the 
following: 
First 
of 
all, 
I 
want 
to 
thank 
you 
for 
your 
forthrightness in answering the question, and I want 
to give you this caveat as well.  Please understand 
that the inquiry that I would make or any voir dire 
that I might permit counsel to make of you should not 
be regarded by you as pressure being placed upon you 
by anybody to get you to change the way you have 
answered the questions propounded to you by the clerk. 
You have to decide this verdict in the manner in which 
you as an individual juror perceives the evidence and 
decide individually.  You can vote your conscience.  
Please don't allow us simply by the virtue of the fact 
we're making inquiry on or responding to your inquiry 
putting pressure on you. 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
17 
 
intent well meaning, it simply went too far in this case.  In 
continuing the questioning and polling after Clark dissented to 
the verdict, the circuit court unduly tainted the jury's 
deliberations.  The rationale of Brasfield is applicable here: 
It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear 
in some degree, serious, although not measurable, an 
improper 
influence 
upon 
the 
jury, 
from 
whose 
deliberations every consideration other than that of 
the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper 
charge, should be excluded.  Such a practice, which is 
never useful and is generally harmful, is not to be 
sanctioned. 
Brasfield, 272 U.S. at 450. 
¶43 Some of the court's questions went well beyond 
ascertaining the nature of Clark's response.  To begin, the 
court strayed into dangerous territory by suggesting that it 
would accept Clark's verdict "as a result of a compromise or 
some other considerations."  Clark should not be given the 
option of sentencing Raye on anything other than the application 
of fact to law as stated in Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
¶44 Moreover, the circuit court should not have asked 
Clark whether there was something it could do to "assist" him.  
Such a question is best left to the other jurors in the jury 
room.  It is not a question, however, that a circuit court 
should be asking of a lone juror who dissents from the verdict.  
The potential for undue influence, even by a well-intentioned 
court, is simply too great. 
                                                                                                                                                             
We commend the effort by the circuit court to make the 
atmosphere less intimidating to Clark with these remarks. 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
18 
 
¶45 We are also troubled by the circuit court's decision 
to continue the poll after Clark's dissent.  Not only is this 
action not contemplated by the three available options, but also 
it unnecessarily revealed the numerical division of jurors, a 
practice disavowed by courts as immaterial and potentially 
coercive.  See, e.g., Brasfield, 272 U.S. at 450; McMahon, 186 
Wis. 2d at 91.  If it is problematic to needlessly reveal the 
numerical split without identifying the jurors, then it is also 
problematic to needlessly continue with a poll following a 
dissent to publicly identify the other holdouts. 
¶46 As noted in United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 318, 
339 (D.C.N.J. 1982): 
The purpose of polling a jury is to ensure that there 
is unanimity in the verdict.  United States v. Smith, 
562 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir. 1977).  Once a juror 
registers dissent with the verdict, no purpose is 
accomplished by continuing the poll.  In fact, a 
continuation of the poll will only invite later 
charges that the court had improperly inquired into 
the jury's numerical division and had thereby tainted 
the verdict.  It is therefore wisest to discontinue 
the poll immediately upon learning that the jury's 
verdict is not unanimous.  See United States v. 
Warren, 594 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 
¶47 Circuit courts must be mindful of their actions when 
polling a jury.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, "'The 
influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and 
properly of great weight,' and jurors are ever watchful of the 
words that fall from [the judge.]"  Bollenbach v. United States, 
326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 
U.S. 614, 626 (1894)). 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
19 
 
¶48 In the end, this case is about a circuit court that, 
in an attempt to help resolve a problem, went too far in its 
actions.  The circuit court's continuation of the jury poll and 
individual questioning of the dissenting juror tainted the 
deliberation process.  Given the totality of the circumstances, 
we cannot say with assurance that the jury freely and fairly 
arrived at a unanimous verdict.  
IV 
¶49 In sum, we agree with Raye that he did not waive the 
issue presented.  Furthermore, we determine that a new trial is 
warranted under the facts of the case.  Here, the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by not granting a mistrial 
or directing the jury to deliberate further upon learning of a 
juror's dissent.  The court's continuation of the jury poll and 
individual questioning of the dissenting juror, although well 
meaning, went too far, thereby tainting the deliberation 
process.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for a 
new trial.   
 
No. 
2004AP770-CR   
 
 
 
1