Title: STATE v DETIENNE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85-155
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 1985

No. 85-155 I N THE SUPREME C0UR.T OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 5 THE STATE OF MONTANA, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , VICTOR and VIBEKE DeTIENNE, husband & w i f e , D e f e n d a n t s a n d A p p e l l a n t s . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i f t e e n t h J u d i c i a l - D i s t r i c t , I n a n d for t h e C o u n t y of S h e r i d a n , T h e H o n o r a b l e R. C. M c D o n o u g h , Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL OF RECORD: For A p p e l l a n t : O ' T o o l e & H u n t , P l e n t y w o o d , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t : B e a t e G a l d a , D e p t . of H i g h w a y s , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a F i l e d : S u b m i t t e d o n briefs: J u l y 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 D e c i d e d : O c t o b e r 1 0 1 1 9 8 5 C l e r k Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, Sheridan County, Montana, in a highway condemnation action. A six-man jury found the defendant-appellants negligent in constructing a building as close to the highway as they did and returned a verdict for the appellants of $5,802.60 for the land taken by the State of Montana. The jury found no depreciation to the remaining property. We affirm. The plaintiff, State of Montana, through the Department of Highways, brought an action to condemn priva te property owned by defendants, Victor and Vibeke DeTienne, for construction of a state highway pursuant to 5 60-4-102, MCA. The property in question is an 8.36 acre tract containing two steel buildings located east of Plentywood. One of the buildings, a 70' x 180' structure, used in part for a garage and sales office for trucks and equipment and in part for storage of lumber and building materials, is affected by the location of a new highway. The highway right-of-way was 95 feet from the building before the construction project , but the new right-of-way is about 4% feet from one corner of the building. When the building was built there was adequate room to back a 60 to 80 foot semi-truck into the building. It is now difficult to drive trucks into the building and impossible to drive them completely around the building because of the location of the new highway. A hearing to determine the value of the property being condemned was held before a three-man value commission who valued the land and improvements taken at $5,800 but found no depreciation to the remainder. The DeTiennes appealed t h a t f i n d i n g t o t h e District Court. The i s s u e s presented t o t h e Court a r e : (1) Whether t h e jury statement t h a t a p p e ? l a n t was n e g l i g e n t i n c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s h u i l d i n g t o o c l o s e t o t h e highway c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . ( 2 ) Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e ' s motion i n limine concerning s a l e s between o t h e r land owners on t h e p r o j e c t and t h e S t a t e a s condemning a u t h o r i t y . (3) Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g c e r t a i n o f t h e S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s . ( 4 ) Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n g i v i n g i t s jury i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e " q u o t i e n t method" f o r determining damages t o be awarded. (5) Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e DeTiennes' proposed jury i n s t r u c t i o n on inconvenience o f use. I n an eminent domain a c t i o n t h e r i g h t o f t h e p r o p e r t y owner t o r e c e i v e compensation a c c r u e s a t t h e d a t e of t h e s e r v i c e o f summons ( t h e t a k i n g ) , i n t h i s c a s e J u l y 30, 1982. The f a i r market v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y on t h a t d a t e i s t h e measure o f compensation f o r t h e p r o p e r t y a c t u a l l y taken. Section 70-30-302(l), MCA. I t i s only t h a t v a l u e which i s r e l e v a n t . The DeTiennes ' b u i l ding was l a w f u l l y c o n s t r u c t e d b e f o r e t h e t a k i n g and t h e reasons f o r i t s l o c a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e new highway a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e v a l u e o f t h e land a t t h e time of t h e taking. The o n l y i s s u e s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e jury a r e t h e f a i r market v a l u e on J u l y 30, 1982, of t h e land taken, and whether, a s a r e s u l t o f t h e t a k i n g , t h e v a l u e o f DeTiennes' remaining p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g t h e b u i l d i n g , was d e p r e c i a t e d . The jury found t h e remaining p r o p e r t y d i d n o t d e p r e c i a t e . DeTiennes a r g u e , however, t h e jury made t h i s f i n d i n g on "negligence" r a t h e r than i n accord w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given and because no i n s t r u c t i o n s on negligence w e r e g i v e n , t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . When t h e jury r e t u r n e d i t s v e r d i c t , t h e foreman, w i t h t h e c o u r t ' s permission, made t h e following statement: W e l l , w e were a l l wondering when we t a l k e d about t h i s a s t o why t h a t b u i l d i n g was b u i l t t h a t c l o s e t o t h e highway, and we f e e l t h e defendant was n e g l i g e n t i n doing what he d i d , b u i l d i n g it t h a t c l o s e t o t h e highway. I t i s d o u b t f u l t h e jury understood negligence a s a l e g a l t e r m of a r t r e q u i r i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a d u t y , b u t a s it i s commonly understood by t h e layman t o mean c a r e l e s s o r showing poor judgment. The c o u r t refused t h e Highway Department's motion i n l i m i n e t o exclude evidence o f i t s d i s c u s s i o n s with DeTiennes i n 1980 about t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e b u i l d i n g . The Highway Department argued t h e testimony could r e s u l t i n a v e r d i c t which was n o t based on f a i r market v a l u e b u t on l o c a t i o n o f t h e b u i l d i n g . DeTiennes argued successfu7 1.y t h e jury should hear t h e reasons f o r t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e b u i l d i n g and decide f o r i t s e l f whether t h e b u i l d i n g should have been placed f a r t h e r back from t h e highway. DeTiennes cannot now argue t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t was e r r o r because it was decided on negligence r a t h e r than i n accord w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given. By i n s i s t i n g t h e evidence o f l o c a t i o n be admitted, DeTiennes cannot now complain t h e jury v e r d i c t was n o t what t h e y had expected, i f i n f a c t t h e v e r d i c t was even a f f e c t e d by t h e evidence. The law i n Montana i s c l e a r : I t has long been t h e r u l e o f t h i s Court t h a t on appeal w e w i l l n o t p u t a D i s t r i c t Court i n e r r o r f o r a r u l i n g o r procedure i n which t h e a p p e l l a n t acquiesced, p a r t i c i p a t e d , o r t o which a p p e l l a n t made no o b j e c t i o n . [ C i t i n g cases.] Green v. Green (1978), 176 Mont. 532, 536, 579 P.2d 1235, 1237. There is no evidence showing t h e jury d i d n o t follow t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n . The jury was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d r e g a r d i n g t h e measure o f damages i n an eminent domain a c t i o n . I t heard v a l u a t i o n testimony from two w i t n e s s e s . It reached a v e r d i c t within t h e evidence. I t a p p a r e n t l y agreed with t h e Highway Department a p p r a i s e r s and t h e t h r e e v a l u e commissioners i n f i n d i n g no d e p r e c i a t i o n . There i s no evidence t h e jury reached i t s d e c i s i o n on t h e l e g a l d o c t r i n e o f negligence, which c l e a r l y i s n o t p a r t o f t h i s case. W e do n o t f i n d any improper conduct on t h e p a r t o f t h e jury o r any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t because of t h e foreman's comments. Although n e i t h e r counsel o b j e c t e d t o allowing t h e j u r y foreman's remarks, prudence s u g g e s t s r e f u s a l o f extraneous comments. The foreman's statement, however, i s n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Nor do we f i n d any i n d i c a t i o n t h e jury intended t o , o r d i d , impeach i t s v e r d i c t . "The r u l e i n Montana i s a jury may n o t impeach i t s own v e r d i c t based on mistake o f t h e evidence o r misapprehension o f t h e law." Johnson v. Green (1969), 153 Mont. 251, 255, 456 P.2d 290, 293. A second motion i n limine o f f e r e d by t h e Highway Department t o prevent testimony from o t h e r land owners along t h e p r o j e c t regarding t h e i r s a l e s t o t h e Department was p r o p e r l y granted. The s a l e s w e r e n o t f a i r market t r a n s a c t i o n s , b u t were made because o f impending condemnation proceedings and t h e r e f o r e w e r e n o t made between a w i l l i n g buyer and a w i l l i n g s e l l e r . See S t a t e v. H o b l i t t (1930), 87 Mont. 403, 413, 288 P. 181, 185. "Current f a i r market v a l u e i s t h e p r i c e t h a t would be agreed t o by a w i l l i n g and informed seller and buyer, . . . " S e c t i o n 70-30-313, MCA. The c a s e s c i t e d by DeTiennes, S t a t e v. Voyich (1963), 142 Mont. 355, 384 P. 2d 765, and S t a t e v. Greenfield (1965), 145 Mont. 164, 399 P.2d 989, a r e n o t on p o i n t . I n Voyich t h e i s s u e is comparability o f t h e neighboring land and n o t t h e f i n a l test o f t h e market v a l u e o f t h e p r o p e r t y being condemned. The i s s u e i n Greenfield i s whether an e x p e r t can t e s t i f y a s t o comparable s a l e s and t h e p r i c e s p a i d i n t r a n s a c t i o n s between p r i v a t e persons b e f o r e t h e r e was any knowledge o f condemnation o f t h e l a n d s f o r highway purposes. The reasons f o r excluding evidence o f such s a l e s t o a condemning a u t h o r i t y a r e w e l l summarized i n 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain through (Rev. 3rd. Ed. 1984) a s follows: Even i n t h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n s where evidence o f comparable s a l e s is admitted, it i s g e n e r a l l y held by t h e weight o f a u t h o r i t y t h a t evidence o f t h e s a l e o f a p a r c e l o f land s u b j e c t t o condemnation t o t h e proposed condemnor o r t o a n o t h e r p o t e n t i a l condemnor may n o t be admitted a s evidence o f t h e v a l u e o f t h e land condemned. Evidence showing what t h e company seeking t o condemn h a s paid f o r o t h e r lands would probably be taken by t h e jury a s i n d i c a t i n g t h e market v a l u e , when, a s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , it does n o t tend t o show t h e market v a l u e o f t h e land. A company condemning land might be w i l l i n g t o g i v e more than it i s worth, and t h e owner o f land might be w i l l i n g t o t a k e less than it is worth, t h a t i s , l e s s than i t s market v a l u e , r a t h e r than have a lawsuit. Moreover, when a company seeks t o g e t land o r condemn it f o r p u b l i c u s e s , having t h e power t o condemn, t h e landowner would probably come t o some agreement w i t h it r a t h e r than have a l a w s u i t , and t h i s agreement would show a compromise r a t h e r than t h e market v a l u e of t h e land. There a r e many reasons which might be advanced i n support o f t h i s almost, i f n o t q u i t e , u n i v e r s a l r u l e . A s h e r e t o f o r e s t a t e d , such s a l e s a r e almost always i n t h e n a t u r e o f a compromise. The landowner, on t h e one s i d e , may f o r c e a s a l e ; and t h e condemnor, on t h e o t h e r , must have t h e l a n d , even though it c o s t s more t h a n its value. Again, t h e circumstances and surroundings a r e n e c e s s a r i l y d i s s i m i l a r , and t h e amount p a i d i s n o t only t h e v a l u e o f t h e land a c t u a l l y t a k e n , b u t a l s o t h e damages done t o t h e e n t i r e t r a c t , depending upon t h e e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e p a r c e l a c q u i r e d , t h e number o f a c r e s i n t h e e s t a t e , and o t h e r f a c t s p e c u l i a r t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r case. A 1 I i n c i d e n t a 1 damages a r e included, and t h e s e , o f course, should n o t be taken i n t o account i n f i x i n g t h e acreage v a l u e i n t h e market. Evidence a s t o damages paid i n one c a s e would c e r t a i n l y n o t be admissible i n o r d e r t o determine t h e damages done i n another. Such testimony does n o t , a f t e r a l l , go t o t h e market v a l u e o f t h e l a n d , except i n c i d e n t a l l y , and it i s n o t a reasonable o r f a i r t e s t of market value. For t h e s e reasons we hold s a l e s t o condemnors a r e n o t admissible t o e s t a b l i s h f a i r market v a l u e when t h e s a l e s a r e p a r t o f t h e same p r o j e c t which r e s u l t e d i n t h e condemnation o f o t h e r p r o p e r t y , however s i m i l a r t h e p r o p e r t y may be t o t h a t i n controversy, and r e g a r d l e s s o f whether t h e payment was t h e r e s u l t o f a s e t t l e m e n t , an award o r a jury v e r d i c t . W e a g r e e w i t h t h e Oregon Court i n C i t y o f Portland v. Holmes ( O r . 1962), 376 P.2d 1 2 0 , 123, t h a t t h e r e i s a v e r y r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between v o l u n t a r y s a l e s and s a l e s made t o a u t h o r i t i e s about t o i n i t i a t e condemnation proceedings. Only i f t h e p r i c e paid i s v o l u n t a r y can it be a reasonable index of value. DeTiennes argue admission o f two o f the Highway Department's e x h i b i t s c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . DeTiennes o b j e c t e d t o t h e i r admission during t r i a l f o r t h e reason t h e y d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h e e x h i b i t s w e r e o f f i c i a l r e c o r d s . DeTiennes f a i l e d t.o o b j e c t on t h e b a s i s of l a c k o f foundation and cannot do s o now. This Court h a s r u l e d p r e v i o u s l y t h a t a p a r t y complaining of e r r o r must s t a n d o r f a l l on t h e ground r e l i e d on by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . T e e s d a l e v. Anschutz D r i l l i n g C o . f1960), 138 Mont. 427, 441, 357 P.2d 4, 11; and B o w e r v. Tebbs ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 132 Mont. 146, 160, 314 P.2d 731, 739. Rule 901, Montana Rules o f Evidence, p e r m i t s a u t h e n t i c a t i o n o f a document by t e s t i m o n y o f a w i t n e s s w i t h knowledge t h a t a m a t t e r i s what it i s claimed t o be. T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what was done h e r e . M r . J a y R a n d a l l , a d i s t r i c t e n g i n e e r f o r t h e Montana Highway Department, t e s t i f i e d t h e documents i n q u e s t i o n were a set o f c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a n s f o r t h e Plentywood South p r o j e c t . Had DeTiennes been concerned w i t h i n a c c u r a c i e s i n t h e p l a n s o r whether t h e p r o j e c t was b e i n g b u i l t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p l a n s , t h e y could have a t t e m p t e d t o show t h i s . They d i d n o t show u s e o f t h e e x h i b i t s a t t r i a l a f f e c t e d any of t h e i r r i g h t s , or t h e y w e r e p r e j u d i c e d by t h e i r admission. For t h e s e r e a s o n s w e f i n d no error by t h e c o u r t i n a d m i t t i n g t h e e x h i b i t s . DeTiennes o b j e c t t o p l a i n t i f f ' s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e " q u o t i e n t method" f o r d e t e r m i n i n g compensation: You a n o t p e r m i t t e d t o a r r i v e a t t h e amount o f compensation t o b e awarded by t h e " q u o t i e n t method," o r any o t h e r method whereby i n advance o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e amount, you a g r e e t o b e bound by t h e determined amount. R a t h e r , f o u r o r more o f your number who have a g r e e d t o award damages must a g r e e upon a s p e c i f i c amount known t o e a c h o f you when you v o t e i n f a v o r o f awarding t h a t amount. T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , i n d e e d , may have a t e c h n i c a l d e f e c t . Mere t e c h n i c a l d e f e c t s i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , i f c o n s i d e r e d a s a whole, d o n o t r e n d e r such errors r e v e r s i b l e error. Lauman v. Lee (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 626 P.2d 830, 834, 38 St.Rep. 499, 503. The opening p h r a s e o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d b e understood t o mean t h e q u o t i e n t method p e r se i s impermissible. Reading t h e e n t i r e s e n t e n c e , however, ma.kes c l e a r a n agreement i n advance t o be bound by an amount y e t t o be determined i.s impermissible. The i n s t r u c t i o n c1earl.y p r o h i b i t s t h i s kind o f agreement. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h e jury was confused by t h e f i r s t p h r a s e , b u t c l e a r l y t h e jury reached a v e r d i c t . There i s no showing t h i s was done by t h e impermissible method o f agreement t o be bound by an undetermined amount. DeTiennes f a i l e d t o show any p r e j u d i c e o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s by reason o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . Unless an e r r o r a f f e c t s t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of a n a p p e l l a n t , judgment w i l l n o t be reversed: On appeal, p r e j u d i c e i s never presumed, and a judgment w i l l n o t be reversed merely because t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d ; i n o r d e r t o work a r e v e r s a l , it must a f f i r m a t i v e l y appear t h a t t h e e r r o r has a f f e c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f defendant on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e case. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. ] It does n o t a f f i r m a t i v e l y appear from t h e record t h a t defendant was prejudiced o r t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s w e r e a f f e c t e d by reason o f t h e e r r o r . Conway v . Fabian (1939), 108 Mont. 287, 323-324, 89 P.2d 1022, 1037, c e r t . denied 308 U.S. 578, 60 S.Ct. 94, 84 L.Ed. F i n a l l y DeTiennes argue e r r o r because t h e c o u r t refused t o give t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n no. 10: You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n determining t h e amount o f d e p r e c i a t i o n t o t h e f a i r market v a l u e o f t h e remainder t o be paid by t h e S t a t e f o r t h e p a r t o f t h e Defendant's land n o t t a k e n , you may c o n s i d e r inconvenience o f use t o t h e landowner r e s u l t i n g from t h e t a k i n g . O r d i n a r i l y damages may be awarded only f o r i n j u r y done t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r l o t o r t r a c t o f land f o r which t h e right-of-way s t r i p i s taken. In a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e award t o be made, t h e v a l u e o f t h e acreage taken and t h e d e p r e c i a t i o n i n v a l u e o f t h e remainder o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r t r a c t i s determined r e g a r d l e s s o f what o t h e r l a n d s t h e owner may possess. Every item of inconvenience need not he considered by the jury. Instruction no. 10 could mislead the jury into believing it could consider any inconvenience to use suffered by DeTiennes whether or not it affected the market value of the property on the day of the taking. This is not the law. The amount of compensation to be awarded, whether the property actually is taken or injuriously affected by the taking, must be based on the market value of the property at the time of the taking. Only when inconvenience results in a diminution of market value of the property is it compensated. Compensation can not be for inconvenience per se. The damage being compensated must be to the [value of the] property itself. Less v. City of Butte (1903) , 28 Mont. 27, 33, 72 P. 140, 141. The jury heard testimony on inconvenience and were properly instructed on the method to determine compensation. It concluded there was no diminution in the value of the property because of the location of the new highway, or because of any inconvenience resulting from its location. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Justices M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr. d i s s e n t s a s follows: I d i s s e n t i n p a r t and concur i n p a r t . I s p e c i f i c a l l y agree w i t h t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e i s s u e on impeaching t h e jury v e r d i c t u t i l i z i n g t h e v o l u n t e e r s t a t e m e n t o f t h e foreman. The statement by t h e foreman i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e jury considered negligence p r e s e n t s an i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n . By analogy, I b e l i e v e t h e i s s u e t o be c o n t r o l l e d by Johnson v. Super Save Markets, Inc. (1984), 686 P.2d 209, 4 1 St.Rep. 1495. In t h a t c a s e t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f o r g e n e r a l damages i n t h e amount o f $17,000. However, t h e j u r o r s v o l u n t a r i l y added a hand w r i t t e n l i s t enumerating f i v e s e p a r a t e elements o f damage accounting f o r t h e t o t a l o f $17,000. The i t e m i z a t i o n showed t h a t t h e j u r y awarded damages f o r t h i n g s which d i d n o t f i n d support i n t h e record. I n r e f u s i n g t o impeach t h e v e r d i c t w i t h t h e handwritten n o t a t i o n s o f t h e j u r o r s , w e s a i d , . . . w e a r e n o t compelled t o impeach a v e r d i c t w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e jury which a r e vo1untariI.y o f f e r e d j u s t a s w e uniformly r e f u s e t o do s o with t h e same information a s e l i c i t e d under o a t h through a f f i d a v i t s . The statement o f t h e foreman was a v o l u n t e e r s t a t e m e n t a s t h e hand w r i t t e n n o t a t i o n s i n Johnson v. Super Save, s u p r a , were. Therefore, I would hold t h a t t h e foreman's s t a t e m e n t s should be disregarded. I d i s s e n t from t h e holding i n t h e m a j o r i t y opinion a f f i r m i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l i n g g r a n t i n g a motion i n limine f o r e c l o s i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f sa I es under t h r e a t o f condemnation. The m a j o r i t y opinion d i s t i n g u i s h e s between comparable s a l e s u t i l i z e d by an e x p e r t w i t n e s s i n a r r i v i n g a t market v a l u e and t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f t h o s e s a l e s t o e s t a b l i s h market value. I b e l i e v e t h i s i s unnecessary " s p l i t t i n g of h a i r s . " However, t h e motion i n limine and t h e r u l i n g thereon, i n t h i s c a s e , f o r e c l o s e t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f such s a l e s f o r any purpose. Such r u l i n g runs c o n t r a r y t o t h e holding o f t h i s Court i n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v. Voyich (1963), 1 4 2 Mont. 355, 384 P.2d 765. J u s t i c e C a s t l e s , i n holding such s a l e s admissible s a i d : W e a r e n o t c a l l e d upon, nor do we r u l e , on t h e question o f a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f s a l e s t o condemners t o e s t a b l i s h market p r i c e . W e have set f o r t h s u f f i c i e n t h e r e , though, t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t upon t h e o b j e c t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e S t a t e , a s h e r e t o f o r e quoted, t h e D i s t r i c t Court was n o t i n e r r o r i n allowing t h e evidence f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e o b j e c t i o n went t o comparability of t h e lands, which comparability was shown.. . . I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e holding o f t h e Court i n Voyich, s u p r a , i s c l e a r l y t h a t s a l e s made under t h r e a t o f condemnation a r e comparable s a l e s . I f such s a l e s c o n s t i t u t e comparable s a l e s t h e y can be used by an a p p r a i s e r i n a r r i v i n g a t market value. I t would a l s o seem t h a t t h e y a r e d i r e c t l y admissible although t h e Court d i d n o t r u l e on t h a t q u e s t i o n . Following t h e a u t h o r i t y found i n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v . Voyich, s u p r a , I would hold t h a t it was e r r o r t o p r o h i b i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e s e "comparable s a l e s " f o r any purpose whatsoever. Such a determination would r e q u i r e a n e w t r i a l . I would r e v e r s e and remand f o r a new t r i a l i n accordance