Title: City of Sun Prairie v. William D. Davis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001651
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1651 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
City of Sun Prairie,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
William D. Davis,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  217 Wis. 2d 268, 579 N.W.2d 753 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 18, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Stephen E. Mays, formerly of Kalal & Associates and now 
of Thomas, Kelly, Habermehl & Wood, S.C. Madison and oral 
argument by Stephen E. Mays. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by 
Richard K. Nordeng, Peter T. Julka, Matthew P. Dregne and 
Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison and oral argument 
by Richard K. Nordeng. 
 
No. 
97-1651 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1651 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Sun Prairie,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
William D. Davis,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The City of Sun Prairie 
Municipal Court entered a default judgment against petitioner, 
William D. Davis (Davis), an Illinois resident, for his failure 
to comply with a municipal court order requiring Davis to 
personally appear at trial on a civil forfeiture action.  The 
issue presented is whether the municipal court has inherent 
authority to enter such an order.  Because we hold that a 
municipal court does not have inherent authority to order an 
out-of-state defendant to personally appear at a trial on a 
civil forfeiture action, we reverse the court of appeals’ 
decision and remand the cause to the municipal court for 
proceedings on the merits. 
¶2 
The facts are not in dispute.  In March 1996, Davis 
was arrested and cited by the City of Sun Prairie Police for 
No. 
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Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of an 
Intoxicant (OWI) and for Operating a Motor Vehicle with a 
Prohibited Alcohol Concentration (PAC), both in violation of 
city ordinance 10-1-1 which adopted Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) 
and (b) (1993-94).1  Both citations issued to Davis informed him 
of a date for an initial appearance.  The citations also 
notified Davis that his appearance was mandatory in the City of 
Sun Prairie Municipal Court which had jurisdiction over this 
civil forfeiture action.   
¶3 
On the date scheduled for Davis’ initial appearance, 
March 13, 1996, neither Davis nor his counsel were present.  
However, because Davis’ attorney had sent the court a letter 
stating that Davis refused to enter pleas on the two charges, 
the City of Sun Prairie Municipal Court, the Honorable Frank J. 
Willkom presiding, entered not guilty pleas on behalf of Davis 
on both charges.   
¶4 
About one month after the initial appearance, the 
municipal court held a pretrial conference.  The City of Sun 
Prairie (City) was represented by a city attorney and Davis’ 
counsel appeared on behalf of Davis.  Davis did not appear 
personally.  Following the pretrial conference, the municipal 
court issued a Pretrial Conference Order and Notice of Trial 
which provided that “[t]he defendant must appear at the trial in 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
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person.”  The trial was ultimately scheduled for October 30, 
1996.   
¶5 
On October 22, 1996, Davis’ counsel sent a letter to 
the municipal court objecting to the court’s order that Davis 
appear in person.  Counsel indicated that he did not intend to 
present Davis personally at the trial.  He also indicated that 
if the City wanted the defendant present, it could subpoena him. 
¶6 
On October 28, 1996, the municipal court responded to 
Davis’ counsel by issuing an order indicating that Davis would 
be sanctioned if he failed to personally attend his trial, 
scheduled for two days later.  The municipal court listed the 
possible sanctions including entry of judgment against the 
defendant, contempt, money terms, orders limiting or barring the 
presentation of testimony or introduction of evidence at trial, 
any combination of these sanctions, or other sanctions as the 
court might deem appropriate. 
¶7 
Davis’ counsel immediately responded to the municipal 
court’s order with another letter stating that he would not 
present Davis personally unless the court or the City could 
point to a statute requiring Davis’ personal appearance.  
Neither the City nor municipal court responded to this letter.  
¶8 
On October 30, 1996, the municipal court called Davis’ 
case.  The City was represented by a city attorney, and Davis’ 
counsel appeared on behalf of Davis.  Davis did not appear 
personally.  Upon the City’s motion, the municipal court entered 
judgment against Davis as a sanction for what the court found to 
No. 
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be an intentional and egregious violation of the court’s order. 
  
¶9 
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment issued on December 27, 1996, the municipal court stated 
that having the defendant physically present assisted the court 
in five ways: 
 
a. It promotes prompt justice.  If a defendant’s 
attorney 
appears 
without 
the 
defendant, 
the 
defendant’s attorney is more likely to be unwilling 
to enter into trial stipulations or meaningful 
settlement discussions, either because the attorney 
does not know certain facts known to the defendant 
or because the attorney cannot obtain the necessary 
consent from the defendant.  If the defendant is 
present, the defendant’s attorney always has the 
defendant’s 
knowledge 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
the 
defendant’s authority immediately available.   
 
b. It enhances the search for the truth.  During 
trials, this court often has questions that the 
court puts directly to the defendant.  The court can 
do that only if the defendant is present. 
 
c. It enhances the search for the truth in another 
way.  When the defendant is in court, the court is 
able 
to 
observe 
the 
defendant’s 
demeanor, 
an 
important consideration for the finder of fact. 
 
d. It allows the appropriate disposition of the case. 
 If a defendant is found guilty, it may be 
appropriate for the court to admonish the defendant. 
 The court can admonish the defendant only if the 
defendant is in court. 
 
e. It discourages abuse of the municipal court.  It is 
the court’s experience that sometimes a defendant 
(i) will not attend the defendant’s own municipal 
court trial, but will appear by an attorney, (ii) 
will, 
through 
the 
defendant’s 
attorney, 
cross 
examine 
the 
City’s 
witnesses, 
apparently 
for 
purposes of discovery, (iii) will avoid examination 
by not appearing in court, and then (iv) will appeal 
No. 
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an adverse judgment to the circuit court and request 
a new trial.  Use of the municipal court to engage 
in discovery in preparation for a subsequent trial 
in the circuit court is an abuse of the municipal 
court.  This abuse is discouraged if the defendant 
must attend his or her trial in municipal court. 
Respondent’s App. at C3-C4.  The municipal court determined that 
Davis’ failure to appear made it impossible for the court to 
proceed in a way that it determined to be fundamental and 
essential to the fair and efficient operation of the court.  The 
municipal court further concluded that Davis’ failure to 
personally appear was egregious conduct and done in bad faith.  
Accordingly, the municipal court entered judgment against Davis 
on both charges. 
¶10 Davis appealed this decision to the circuit court, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14.  The Dane County Circuit Court, 
the Honorable Michael N. Nowakowski presiding, affirmed the 
municipal court’s judgment in its entirety.  Davis appealed the 
circuit court order to the court of appeals.   
¶11 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court order.  The court of appeals determined that as 
part of the municipal court’s inherent authority to efficiently 
manage its cases, the municipal court has authority to order the 
defendant to appear personally and to sanction him for failing 
to do so.  City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 217 Wis. 2d 268, 277, 
282-83, 579 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1998).  The dissent stated that 
by ordering the physical presence of the defendant, the 
municipal court shed its cloak of neutrality and gave the 
appearance of favoring the municipality.  Id. at 285.  The 
No. 
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dissent concluded that the municipal court would continue to 
function in an orderly manner if it could not issue orders 
requiring the physical presence of a defendant.  Id. at 286.   
¶12 Davis petitioned this court for review which we 
granted.  The issue is whether a municipal court has inherent 
authority to order an out-of-state defendant to personally 
appear at trial on a civil forfeiture action.  If the municipal 
court has such inherent authority we must also determine whether 
it has inherent authority to enter a default judgment against 
the defendant for his or her failure to personally appear.  The 
question of judicial authority is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  In Interest of E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 381, 387 
N.W.2d 72 (1986) (citing Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board, 117 
Wis. 2d 529, 537, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984)).   
¶13 An order requiring the defendant to personally appear 
is, in essence, a subpoena.  “A subpoena is a command to appear 
at a certain time and place to give testimony upon a certain 
matter.”  Black’s Law Dictionary at 1426 (6th ed. 1990).  The 
power of a municipal court to authorize the subpoena of a 
defendant 
is 
unquestioned 
when 
the 
defendant 
is 
within 
Wisconsin.  See Wis. Stat. § 885.04 (reprinted below).2  However, 
there is no statutory authority for a municipal court to 
subpoena, or order the presence of an out-of-state defendant.  
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.04 provides:  “A subpoena to require 
attendance before a municipal judge may be served anywhere in 
the state if authorized by the municipal judge, and shall 
require the attendance of any witness so served.”  
No. 
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If such authority exists it must be found within the court’s 
inherent authority. 
¶14 Inherent powers have been frequently discussed by this 
court.  See, e.g., Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 
560, 579-83, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998); Flynn v. Department of 
Administration, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 548-551, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998); 
St. ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 
16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995).  In addition to the powers expressly 
granted 
to 
the 
courts 
in 
the 
constitution, 
courts 
have 
“inherent, implied and incidental powers.  These terms ‘are used 
to describe those powers which must necessarily be used’ to 
enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally or 
legislatively mandated functions.”  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 16 
(citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1981) (quoting State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 
(1929)).  Inherent powers are those that “‘have been conceded to 
courts because they are courts.  Such powers have been conceded 
because without them they could neither maintain their dignity, 
transact their business, nor accomplish the purposes of their 
existence.’”  Jacobson v. Avestruz, 81 Wis. 2d 240, 245, 260 
N.W.2d 267 (1977) (quoting State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536-
37, 221 N.W. 603 (1928)).  See also Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 548; 
Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 16-17.   
¶15 A court’s inherent authority may fall within its 
exclusive inherent authority or within inherent authority shared 
with the legislative or executive branches.  If a specific 
function falls within the court’s exclusive inherent authority, 
No. 
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neither 
the 
legislature 
nor 
the 
executive 
branches 
may 
constitutionally exercise authority within that area.  Flynn, 
216 Wis. 2d at 546 (citing In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 
118 Wis. 2d 762, 776, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984)).  Although the 
court may allow another branch to exercise authority in an area 
of exclusive judiciary inherent authority, it does so merely as 
a matter of comity and courtesy rather than as an acknowledgment 
of power.  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 546 (citing Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 15).  The judiciary’s exclusive inherent authority is 
immune from legislative abrogation.  State v. Braunsdorf, 98 
Wis. 2d 569, 580, 297 N.W.2d 808 (1980).   
¶16 In contrast, if a function falls within constitutional 
powers of the judiciary and another branch, it is within the 
judiciary’s shared powers.  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 547.  Another 
branch may exercise power in an area of shared powers but “only 
if it does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the 
judiciary.”  Id. (citing Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 15).   
¶17 There are generally three areas in which courts have 
exercised inherent authority.  See Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 550-51. 
 One area of inherent authority is the internal operations of 
the court.  Courts exercise inherent authority to guard against 
“any action that would unreasonably curtail the powers or 
materially impair the efficacy of the courts or judicial 
system.”  Id. at 550 (referring to Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44; 
Barland, 216 Wis. 2d at 587-88; In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 
134 N.W. 490 (1912)).  For example in Barland, this court 
determined that a circuit court has inherent authority to retain 
No. 
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its judicial assistant.  Barland, 216 Wis. 2d at 587-88.  The 
Barland court relied on a much earlier case, In re Janitor, in 
which this court also held that a court has inherent authority 
to retain its janitor.  Id. at 591-92 (referring to In re 
Janitor, 35 Wis. 410, 421 (1874)).  Another area of internal 
operations under a court’s inherent authority is a court’s 
facilities.  In In re Court Room, we determined that a circuit 
court had inherent authority to refuse facilities proposed by 
the county because such facilities were inadequate for the court 
to carry on its business.  In re Court Room, 148 Wis. at 119-20. 
  
¶18 Courts also have 
inherent 
authority 
to regulate 
members of the bench and bar.  For example, this court can 
require disclosure of judges’ assets.  In re Hon. Charles E. 
Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 518, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).  The court 
also has inherent authority to determine whether attorneys’ fees 
are reasonable and to refuse to enforce those that are not.  
Herro, McAndrews & Porter v. Gerhardt, 62 Wis. 2d 179, 183, 214 
N.W.2d 401 (1974). 
¶19 The final area in which the court exercises inherent 
authority is ensuring that the court functions efficiently and 
effectively to provide the fair administration of justice.  
Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 550 (citing Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44; 
Jacobson, 81 Wis. 2d at 247).  See also Latham v. Casey & King 
Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 311, 314, 127 N.W.2d 225 (1964).  The parties 
cited several cases in which the courts exercised inherent 
authority to dispose of causes on their dockets.  For example, a 
No. 
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municipal 
court 
has 
inherent 
authority 
to 
dispose 
of 
constitutional issues raised before it.  Milwaukee v. Wroten, 
160 Wis. 2d 207, 220-21, 223, 466 N.W.2d 861 (1991).  Courts 
also have inherent authority to do the following: appoint 
counsel for indigent parties, Joni B. v. State, 202 Wis. 2d 1, 
9, 549 N.W.2d 411 (1996); determine compensation for court-
appointed attorneys, Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 19; vacate a void 
judgment because the court had no authority to enter the 
judgment in the first place, City of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184 
Wis. 2d 91, 98, 516 N.W.2d 4 (1994); assess the costs to the 
parties of impaneling a jury, Jacobson, 81 Wis. 2d at 247; order 
dismissal of a complaint if the attorney fails to appear for a 
pretrial conference and the attorney was warned of the possible 
sanction of dismissal, Latham, 23 Wis. 2d at 315-16, 317; and 
order parties to exchange names of lay witnesses, Carlson 
Heating, Inc. v. Onchuck, 104 Wis. 2d 175, 180, 311 N.W.2d 673 
(Ct. App. 1981).  In each of these case, the court determined 
that the function in question related to the existence of the 
court 
and 
the 
orderly 
and 
efficient 
exercise 
of 
its 
jurisdiction.   
¶20 There are, however, notable situations in which this 
court determined that courts do not have inherent authority 
regarding a particular function.  Courts do not have inherent 
authority to expunge juvenile police records which are under the 
authority of a police chief.  In Interest of E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 
at 387.  Courts also do not have inherent authority to dismiss a 
criminal case with prejudice prior to attachment of jeopardy on 
No. 
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nonconstitutional grounds.  Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 585.  In 
both cases, this court determined that the functions were not 
related to the existence of the court nor to the orderly and 
efficient functioning of the court.  In Interest of E.C., 130 
Wis. 2d at 387; Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 585.  Specifically, 
the Braunsdorf court, after reviewing many cases from other 
jurisdictions which recognized a court’s inherent authority to 
dismiss a criminal case with prejudice, determined that in most 
of these cases, the recognition of inherent authority arose from 
a procedural rule or statute, not present in Wisconsin, which 
authorized dismissals.  Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 585.   
¶21 If a municipal court has inherent authority to order 
an out-of-state defendant to personally appear, such authority 
would fall within the third area of inherent authorityensuring 
that the court operates efficiently and effectively to provide 
the fair administration of justice.  See Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 
550.  In other words, for the City of Sun Prairie to prevail, it 
must establish that the order here was necessary for the 
efficient and orderly functioning of the court or to maintain 
the court’s dignity, transact its business or achieve the 
purpose of its existence.  See Jacobson, 81 Wis. 2d at 247.  See 
also Latham, 23 Wis. 2d at 314; State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. at 
536-37.  
¶22 The reasons articulated by the municipal court for 
ordering the defendant’s presence are in essence the arguments 
made by the City to support its conclusion that the municipal 
No. 
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court’s order was related to the existence of the court and to 
the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.  
¶23 In its Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment, in which the municipal court entered judgment in favor 
of the City, the court gave five reasons for ordering the 
defendant to personally appear at trial.  First, the municipal 
court stated that the defendant’s physical presence would 
“promote[] prompt justice” because he knows the facts and can 
enter 
into 
trial 
stipulations 
or 
meaningful 
settlement 
discussions. 
 
Second, 
the 
defendant’s 
physical 
presence 
“enhances the search for the truth” because the court can ask 
questions directly of the defendant.  Third, the defendant’s 
personal appearance also “enhances the search for the truth” in 
that the court can observe the defendant’s demeanor.  Fourth, 
the defendant’s physical 
presence 
“allows 
the 
appropriate 
disposition of the case” because the court can admonish the 
defendant if it finds the defendant guilty.  Finally, the court 
demanded 
the 
defendant’s 
physical 
presence 
because 
it 
“discourages abuse of the municipal court.”  The municipal court 
asserted that requiring the defendant to personally appear 
decreases the chance that the municipal court would be used by 
Davis’ counsel for discovery purposes in preparation for a trial 
in the circuit court.  In its brief, the City explained that 
requiring 
the 
defendant 
to 
personally 
appear 
avoids 
the 
situation in which defendant’s counsel cross-examines the City’s 
witnesses, evades his or her own examination, and then appeals 
No. 
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an adverse judgment to the circuit court as allowed by Wis. 
Stat. § 800.14.   
¶24 While each of the reasons given by the municipal court 
is a legitimate concern, neither the municipal court nor the 
City have persuaded us that these reasons are “related to the 
existence of the court and to the orderly and efficient exercise 
of its jurisdiction . . . .”  Jacobson, 81 Wis. 2d at 247.   
¶25 As counsel for Davis pointed out, he appeared at the 
municipal court on behalf of his client, not only prepared with 
evidence to defend his client, but also with authority to speak 
on his behalf.  In other words, in answer to the municipal 
court’s first reason for ordering defendant’s presence, to 
promote prompt justice, Davis’ counsel had authority to enter 
stipulations or settlement discussions on behalf of his client. 
 He came prepared with knowledge of his client’s wishes and 
limits.  The physical presence of the defendant was not needed 
to promote prompt justice.  His presence was not needed for the 
existence of the court or the orderly and efficient exercise of 
its jurisdiction. 
¶26 Regarding the court’s reason that the defendant’s 
presence would enhance the search for the truth, we agree that 
once a witness is available, a court has authority to question 
that witness.  Schultz v. State, 82 Wis. 2d 737, 741, 264 N.W.2d 
245 (1978) (quoting State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 437, 249 
N.W.2d 529 (1976)).  We do not agree, however, that questioning 
the defendant is necessary for the orderly and efficient 
functioning of the court or to maintain its dignity, transact 
No. 
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its business or achieve the purpose of its existence.  As noted 
above, Davis’ counsel appeared at the municipal court, prepared 
to present evidence and to defend his client.  The case could 
have 
been 
resolved 
without 
the 
municipal 
court 
directly 
questioning the defendant.  Posing questions directly to the 
defendant was not necessary to the orderly and efficient 
functioning of the court.   
¶27 Regarding the municipal court’s third and fourth 
reasons for ordering the presence of the defendant, we agree 
that a court observes a defendant’s demeanor while he or she is 
in the courtroom, and that a court may admonish a defendant who 
is found guilty.  However, neither the municipal court in its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, nor the City 
in its brief and argument before this court, provided any reason 
why observing demeanor or admonishing a defendant found to be 
guilty is related to the existence of the court or to the 
orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.  There is 
simply no case law, statutory authority, or basis in the 
constitution to show that without observing a defendant’s 
demeanor or admonishing a defendant found guilty, a court will 
cease to exist or it will not be able to exercise its 
jurisdiction in an orderly and efficient manner. 
¶28 The fifth and final reason the municipal court and the 
City offer for requiring the defendant’s presence is to 
discourage abuse of municipal courts.  We understand that 
municipal courts are concerned that proceedings before them 
could be misused as discovery proceedings.  To appeal an adverse 
No. 
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decision by a municipal court, the legislature provided that a 
party who loses has the right to a de novo review before a 
circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 800.14.  However, only the 
appellant can request a jury trial.  § 800.14(4).  The City 
alleges that because of the statutory structure regarding 
appeals to the circuit court, defendants have incentive to have 
a hearing in municipal court for discovery purposes but then to 
lose the trial so they can appeal to the circuit court and 
request a jury trial, armed with the discovery made during the 
municipal trial.  The City alleges that that was Davis’ 
counsel’s intent by refusing to present Davis in person at the 
municipal court trial.  The City argues that ordering the 
defendant’s physical presence would alleviate such abuse of the 
municipal court.   
¶29 We recognize that the City raises valid concerns.  
However, 
municipal 
courts, 
although 
authorized 
by 
the 
constitution, are creatures of the legislature.3  And the 
legislature 
has 
made 
certain 
public 
policy 
choices 
and 
established the process to appeal a municipal court decision.  
                     
3 Wisconsin Const. Art. VII, § 2 provides that “[t]he 
judicial power of this state shall be vested in a unified court 
system consisting of one supreme court, a court of appeals, a 
circuit court, such trial courts . . . and a municipal court if 
authorized by the legislature under section 14.”   
Wisconsin Const. Art. VII, § 14 enables the legislature to 
authorize each city, village and town to establish a municipal 
court.  “All municipal courts shall have uniform jurisdiction 
limited to actions and proceedings arising under ordinances of 
the municipality in which established.”  Wis. Const. Art. VII, 
§ 14.    
No. 
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16
It makes no difference whether we agree or disagree with the 
policy choice made by the legislature.  “It is for the 
legislature to make policy choices, ours to judge them based not 
on our preference but on legal principles and constitutional 
authority.”  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 529.     
¶30 As 
allowed 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
the 
legislature created authority for municipalities to adopt an 
ordinance or bylaw providing for the election of municipal court 
judges and the operation of municipal courts.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 755.01(1).  A municipal court so created “has exclusive 
jurisdiction over an action in which a municipality seeks to 
impose forfeitures for violations of municipal ordinances of the 
municipality . . . .”  § 755.045(1).  Along with this exclusive 
jurisdiction 
over 
civil 
forfeiture 
actions 
for 
municipal 
ordinance 
violations, 
the 
legislature 
authorized 
municipal 
courts to issue civil warrants to enforce issues under the 
jurisdiction of the municipal court, § 755.045(2), and to order 
payment of restitution for violations of certain ordinances, 
§ 755.045(3).   
¶31 Because municipal courts exist only as created by the 
legislature, they are creatures of the legislature.  Although a 
court, including a municipal court, has the power to exercise 
all 
of 
its 
constitutional 
powers 
once 
it 
invokes 
its 
jurisdiction, it must exercise those constitutional powers 
within the framework of that conferred jurisdiction.  Wroten, 
160 Wis. 2d at 222.  In the case of municipal courts, the 
“framework of that conferred jurisdiction” has been limited by 
No. 
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17
the legislature.  Municipal courts, as creatures of the 
legislature, are bound by certain policy choices imposed by the 
legislature as long as such policy choices are constitutional.   
¶32 The legislature made the policy choice to establish 
the appeal process in the manner provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.14.  Barring some constitutional infirmity which neither 
the City argued nor that we can discern, the legislature’s 
policy choice must stand.  As stated above, the court’s role is 
not to judge a statutory scheme based on our preferences but 
rather, based on constitutional principles.  We are not 
persuaded by either the municipal court’s reasoning nor the 
City’s argument that the legislative policy choice expressed in 
§ 800.14 for an appeal of a municipal court decision to the 
circuit court is reason to invoke judicial inherent authority to 
order the physical presence of an out-of-state defendant.   
¶33 The City also argues that the municipal court must 
have inherent authority to order a defendant to personally 
appear at trial because subpoenas are ineffective in this case 
because Davis is an Illinois resident.  The City asserts that 
the city attorney does not have authority to issue subpoenas in 
municipal court, and the municipal court has authority to issue 
subpoenas only in Wisconsin.  See Wis. Stat. § 885.04.   
¶34 In addition to the powers conferred upon municipal 
courts in Wis. Stat. ch. 755, the legislature granted municipal 
judges statutory power to authorize the subpoena of a person 
within Wisconsin.  “A subpoena to require attendance before a 
municipal judge may be served anywhere in the state if 
No. 
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18
authorized by the municipal judge, and shall require the 
attendance of any witness so served.”  Wis. Stat. § 885.04.  The 
municipal judge does not, however, have statutory authority to 
authorize the subpoena of an out-of-state witness.   
¶35 As noted above, municipal courts are creatures of the 
legislature and are bound by the policy choices made by the 
legislature as long as they are constitutional.  Our review of 
the statutory scheme regarding municipal courts is that the 
legislature made a policy choice to allow municipal courts to 
authorize the subpoena of persons within Wisconsin, but by 
silence, has not allowed municipal courts to authorize the 
subpoena of persons outside of Wisconsin.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.04.  Because neither the municipal court in its written 
judgment, nor the City in its brief and argument to this court, 
have convinced us that ordering the defendant’s presence in the 
court is necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its 
jurisdiction, we uphold the legislative policy choice expressed 
in § 885.04.  The legislature has effectively expressed its 
policy 
choice 
that 
municipal 
courts, 
authorized 
by 
the 
constitution but creatures of the legislature, may authorize the 
subpoena of a person within the State of Wisconsin but not 
without the state.   
¶36 The City supports its argument that the municipal 
court 
has 
inherent 
authority 
to 
order 
the 
defendant 
to 
personally appear by analogizing this case to cases in which 
this court has recognized an inherent power.  For example, the 
City cited Joni B. for its statement that the court has inherent 
No. 
97-1651 
 
19
authority to appoint counsel “in furtherance of [a] court’s need 
for the orderly and fair presentation of a case.”  Joni B., 202 
Wis. 2d at 11.  The litigants in Joni B. challenged the 
constitutionality of 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 2442v, which amended 
Wis. Stat. § 48.23(3) to prohibit a court from appointing 
counsel in a Children in Need of Protective Services (CHIPS) 
action for anyone other than the child.  Id. at 5.  This court 
relied on the inherent authority of the judiciary to conclude 
that the statute was unconstitutional.  Id. at 11.  “When a 
parent obviously needs assistance of counsel to ensure the 
integrity 
of 
the 
CHIPS 
proceeding, 
the 
court 
cannot 
be 
legislatively denied the right to appoint counsel, thereby 
placing the individual judge in the untenable position of having 
to essentially serve as counsel for that parent.”  Id.   
¶37 In Joni B., the amended statute forbid the court from 
appointing counsel for anyone other than the child.  Under the 
statute, an indigent parent would be forced to represent him- or 
herself.  He or she would have no choice and the court would 
likely not be afforded the orderly and fair presentation of the 
case.  See id.  In contrast, in the present case, defense 
counsel appeared on behalf of his client, prepared to present 
evidence and defend him.  Unlike the situation in Joni B., the 
municipal court in this case did not need the physical presence 
of the defendant to achieve the orderly and fair presentation of 
the case.   
¶38 Another example offered by the City is Latham in which 
this court held that a county court has inherent authority to 
No. 
97-1651 
 
20
dismiss an action on its merits as a sanction for an attorney’s 
failure to obey a court order to attend a pre-trial conference. 
 Latham, 23 Wis. 2d at 316.  The court nonetheless reversed the 
county court’s dismissal of the case because neither the 
attorney nor his client had notice that dismissal was a 
potential sanction for failing to comply with the order 
requiring attendance at the pre-trial conference.  Id.  In the 
present case, Davis and his counsel knew that default judgment 
was a possible sanction for failing to comply with the municipal 
court’s order. 
¶39 We find that Latham is inapplicable.  The county court 
in Latham had issued an order pursuant to a county court rule 
that required attorneys to attend pre-trial conferences.  Id. at 
313 n.1.  The authority of the court to issue such an order was 
not in question.  The court derived its authority from the 
county court rule.  The only issue before the court was the 
power of a court to dismiss an action on its merits as a 
sanction for failure of an attorney to comply with a valid court 
order, an issue we would reach in this case only if we found the 
municipal court has the inherent authority to issue the order.  
Id. at 314.   
¶40 Aside from attempts to analogize this case, the City 
has cited to no case in this state nor any other jurisdiction in 
which a court has recognized the judiciary’s power to order a 
defendant 
to 
personally 
appear 
based 
solely 
on 
inherent 
authority, and we have found none.  Cf. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 
at 580-84 (although this court was not persuaded, the appellant 
No. 
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21
cited cases in several other jurisdictions in which the courts 
recognized inherent authority to dismiss a criminal case with 
prejudice).   
¶41 In fact, this court has previously stated that a 
defendant who failed to personally appear in a civil action 
nonetheless appeared “‘since he was entitled to and did appear 
by his attorney.’”  Sherman v. Heiser, 85 Wis. 2d 246, 255, 270 
N.W.2d 397 (1978) (citations omitted).  The defendant in Sherman 
appeared by the fact that his counsel appeared on his behalf.  
Id. at 254.  “The most generous interpretation that could be 
given to Sherman’s action  [failure to personally appear] is 
that he was willing to let his attorney try the case without 
him.  This he had a right to do.”  Id. at 256.   
¶42 For all of these reasons stated above, we determine 
that the existence of the municipal court and the orderly and 
efficient exercise of its jurisdiction is not dependent upon the 
personal presence of the defendant.  Accordingly, we hold that a 
municipal court does not have inherent authority to order an 
out-of-state defendant to personally appear at trial in a civil 
forfeiture action.   
¶43 Finally, Davis argues that because the municipal court 
erroneously entered default judgment against him, and the City 
failed to prove its case when his counsel was prepared to 
proceed, he is entitled to judgment.  We disagree.  As we have 
done several times upon concluding that a default judgment was 
entered in error, we determine that the default judgment entered 
by the municipal court and affirmed by the circuit court and 
No. 
97-1651 
 
22
court of appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the 
municipal court for proceedings on the merits.  See, e.g., 
Oostburg Bank v. United Savings, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 10, 17, 386 
N.W.2d 53 (1986) (affirming a court of appeals’ decision which 
reversed the circuit court’s judgment and vacated the default 
judgment); Reynolds v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 178, 179, 208 N.W.2d 
305 (1973) (reversing default judgment and remanding cause).   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the municipal court. 
 
  
 
 
 
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