Title: Campbell v. Southern Roof Deck Applicators, Inc.
Citation: 406 So. 2d 910
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 1981

406 So. 2d 910 (1981)
Donald C. CAMPBELL, et al.
v.
SOUTHERN ROOF DECK APPLICATORS, INC.
80-808.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 4, 1981.
*911 Ernest W. Weir, Birmingham, for appellants.
W. Lee Pittman of London, Yancey, Clark &amp; Allen, Birmingham, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
Appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, Southern Roof Deck Applicators, Inc. We affirm.
This action began as a bill for a declaratory judgment brought by the plaintiffs as trustees of the Fultondale First Baptist Church against Southern Roof Deck Applicators, Inc., Neil Bruce d/b/a Neil Bruce Associates (the architect), and two fictitious parties. The bill sought a declaration of the respective rights of the parties under a contract for the construction of a new roof for the church building. The bill was later amended as a demand for damages from the defendants allegedly due because of their negligence. A later amendment to the complaint alleged the following:
*912 In due course the plaintiffs and Southern Roof moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for a reasonable attorney's fee under the contract, based upon the pleadings, interrogatories, answers, request for admissions and answers, affidavits, and the contract referred to. The defendant Neil Bruce d/b/a Neil Bruce Associates, also moved for summary judgment on his cross claim against Southern Roof, on the theory that Southern Roof likewise had indemnified him for attorneys' fees under Article 10.10 of the contract between plaintiffs and Southern Roof. The trial court granted the motion of Southern Roof and denied the motions of plaintiffs and Bruce. The effect of these rulings was that under the contract in question the defendant contractor, as a matter of law, had not agreed to indemnify the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees incurred in the litigation between themselves.
A proper Rule 54(b) certification was entered and the plaintiffs have appealed the ruling adverse to them on that issue.
The contract in question, a standard AIA form contract, contained two sections bearing on the issue of indemnification. Article 10.10 states:
Article 17 pertaining to the protection of persons and property states in part:
The defendant, Southern Roof Deck Applicators, Inc., argues the existence of an ambiguity, caused by these two provisions, with respect to the contractor's obligation, and that therefore, because of this ambiguity, the contract had two separate meanings concerning indemnity, which the trial court resolved. We need not consider Article 10.10 in pari materia with Article 17, however, because it is clear that no such ambiguity existed requiring resolution by the trial court. The language of Article 17 refers to "damage" or "loss to any property" and, standing alone, does not refer to indemnification for attorneys' fees.
Article 10.10, however, does refer to "all ... losses and expenses including attorneys' fees ..." and is the only contractual reference to attorneys' fees. By its express terms the "Contractor shall indemnify... the Owner and the Architect ... against all claims ... and expenses including *913 attorneys' fees arising out of ... performance of the Work...." The claims for which indemnity is made are described in Article 10.10 as "... any and all claims against the Owner or the Architect or any of their agents or employees by any employee of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable...." Clearly, this language does not permit a construction which would indemnify the owner or architect for attorneys' fees incurred by either in a claim which either brought against the contractor. The contractural terms in question refer to the claims of the described third parties against the owner and the architect. Contracting parties have a right to express the limitations under which they will be bound, and such clearly manifested limitations will be recognized by the courts. United States Fid. &amp; Guar. Co. v. Jacksonville State University, Ala., 357 So. 2d 952 (1978).
The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Rule 56, ARCP; Papastefan v. B &amp; L Construction Co. of Mobile, Ala., 356 So. 2d 158 (1978). In other words, on motion for summary judgment the movant must demonstrate that if the case went to trial there would be no competent evidence to support a judgment in favor of the other side and, therefore, that a trial is useless. Logan v. Beuttner, Ala., 342 So. 2d 352 (1977), citing Wright &amp; Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2727. It is clear that such a situation exists here with respect to the defendants' lack of responsibility under the express terms of the contract to pay attorneys' fees, and this question was properly disposed of by summary judgment. Cf. Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 325 So. 2d 137 (1975).
Accordingly, the judgment must be, and is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.