Title: Taylor v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20, 2016
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2016

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARC TAYLOR, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 20, 2016 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID 1008008293 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 5, 2016 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: October 10, 2016 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 10th day of October 2016, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Marc Taylor, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s order, dated December 17, 2015, denying his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  After careful consideration, we find no merit to the 
appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
After a twenty-four day trial, a Superior Court jury convicted 
Taylor in March 2012 of Gang Participation, Possession of Cocaine, Assault 
in the Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony, two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and 
 
2 
Non-Compliance with the Conditions of Bond.  Initially, Taylor had been 
charged along with seven codefendants.  Six of those codefendants pled 
guilty before trial.  Taylor was tried along with his remaining codefendant, 
Kevin Rasin, who was convicted of two counts of Murder in the First 
Degree, Gang Participation, and related charges.  On May 23, 2012, the 
Superior Court sentenced Taylor to fifteen years and six months at Level V 
incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.  This Court 
affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal.1  
(3) 
Taylor filed his first motion for postconviction relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 in November 2013.  Taylor raised four 
issues in his motion, claiming that: (i) his trial counsel was ineffective for 
various reasons; (ii) many of the State’s witnesses perjured themselves at 
trial; (iii) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for Gang 
Participation; and (iv) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony on appeal.  The 
Superior Court appointed counsel to represent Taylor.  Appointed counsel 
ultimately filed a motion to withdraw under Rule 61(e)(6), concluding that 
no substantial ground for relief could ethically be argued on Taylor’s behalf.  
Taylor was permitted to file additional points in response to his counsel’s 
                                                 
1 Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d 791 (Del. 2013). 
 
3 
motion to withdraw.  On December 17, 2015, the Superior Court denied 
Taylor’s Rule 61 motion.2  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Taylor raises five distinct 
arguments.  First, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to sever his trial from Rasin’s.  Second, Taylor 
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay 
testimony admitted through many different witnesses.3  Third, Taylor 
contends that one of the victims was coerced into identifying Taylor at trial 
as the person who shot him.  Fourth, Taylor argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion for new trial based on juror 
misconduct and bias.  Finally, Taylor contends that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate and challenge the chain of custody of the 
gun that was admitted into evidence against him. 
(5) 
We note that only one of the issues which Taylor raises on 
appeal was also raised in the Rule 61 motion he filed in the Superior Court.  
To the extent that Taylor raised other issues in the Superior Court, he has 
waived any right to review of those claims on appeal by failing to argue 
                                                 
2 Taylor v. State, 2015 WL 9592457 (Del. Super. Dec. 17, 2015). 
3 As a corollary to this argument, Taylor restates a claim that this Court rejected in his 
direct appeal, namely that the Superior Court erred in allowing into evidence the hearsay 
statement of a boy named Maleek.  See Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d at 800.  The interests of 
justice do not require us to consider this previously litigated claim simply because Taylor 
has refined and restated it. Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992). 
 
4 
them in his opening brief.4   Moreover, because Taylor failed to raise four 
out of his five appellate claims in the postconviction motion he filed in the 
Superior Court, those claims may only be reviewed on appeal for plain 
error.5   
(6) 
With respect to the one appellate claim that was raised below, 
Taylor argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 
to sever his trial from Rasin’s trial.  We apply the Strickland standard in 
reviewing that claim.  Under Strickland, Taylor must demonstrate that: (a) 
his trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.6  A defendant is required to set forth and substantiate concrete 
allegations of cause and actual prejudice.7 Moreover, there is a “strong 
presumption” that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.8   
(7) 
In analyzing Taylor’s ineffectiveness claim, the Superior Court 
considered the likelihood of whether a motion to sever would have been 
granted, assuming trial counsel had file such a motion on Taylor’s behalf.  
                                                 
4 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  
5 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2012); DeJesus . State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1198 (Del. 1995). 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
5 
The Superior Court noted the four factors a Delaware trial court will weigh 
in deciding whether to sever the trial of codefendants: (i) any problems 
involving a codefendant’s out-of-court statements; (ii) an absence of 
substantial independent competent evidence of one codefendant’s guilt; (iii) 
antagonistic defenses between the codefendants; and (iv) the difficulty in 
segregating the State’s evidence between the codefendants.9   
(8) 
In Taylor’s case, the Superior Court concluded that, if counsel 
had filed a motion to sever Taylor’s trial from Rasin’s, the motion would 
have been denied because: (i) Rasin made no extrajudicial statements that 
were admitted against Taylor at trial; (ii) the State had substantial 
independent evidence to prove Taylor’s guilt; and (iii) Taylor and Rasin did 
not have antagonistic defenses.  The Superior Court noted that, while there 
might have been some difficulty in segregating the State’s evidence of gang 
participation between Taylor and Rasin, the weight of the other three factors 
would have resulted in the denial of a motion to sever.  We agree and adopt 
the Superior Court’s analysis of this claim.  Under the circumstances, 
Taylor’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails because Taylor 
cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s decision not to file a 
motion to sever.  Thus, we reject this claim on appeal. 
                                                 
9 Ayers v. State, 97 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Del. 2014) (quoting Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 
1196, 1210 (Del. 1999)). 
 
6 
(9) 
Taylor’s four remaining claims are that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony, for failing to challenge 
the victim’s coerced identification of Taylor at trial, for failing to file a 
motion for new trial based on juror misconduct and bias, and for failing to 
challenge the chain of custody of the gun.  None of these claims was raised 
in the postconviction motion Taylor filed in the Superior Court.  We will not 
consider any of these claims for the first time on appeal absent a showing of 
plain error.10  Plain error is error that is apparent on the face of the record 
and is so fundamental and serious that it affected the outcome of the trial.11  
Taylor’s contentions, however, are entirely conclusory and lacking any 
factual support or citation to the record.  In short, we find no plain error and 
reject these newly-raised claims. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
10 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2013). 
11 See Roy v. State, 62 A.3d 1182, 1191 (Del. 2012).