Title: Commonwealth v. Colon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12362
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 3, 2019

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SJC–12362 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE COLON. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     October 2, 2018. - May 3, 2019. 
 
Present (Sitting at Worcester):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Jury and Jurors.  Interpreter.  Due Process of Law, 
Presence of defendant in courtroom, Fair trial.  Search and 
Seizure, Consent.  Evidence, Hearsay, Chain of custody.  
Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury, 
Examination of jurors, Voir dire, Interpreter, Presence of 
defendant, Public trial, Hearsay, Assistance of counsel, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 18, 2005. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by C. 
Jeffrey Kinder, J., and the case was tried before Richard T. 
Tucker, J. 
 
 
 
Elaine Pourinski for the defendant. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the summer of 2005, the victim was beaten and 
stabbed to death near a set of railroad tracks in Dudley.  In 
2 
 
2013, the defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of 
murder in the first degree for his role in the killing.  In this 
direct appeal, the defendant maintains that a new trial is 
required because the judge did not declare a mistrial after 
members of the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, and 
that the judge committed reversible error by partially excluding 
the defendant from the subsequent voir dire of the deliberating 
jury.  In addition, the defendant argues that the judge should 
have allowed his request for individual voir dire on questions 
of ethnic bias, and abused his discretion in certain evidentiary 
rulings.  The defendant also asks us to exercise our 
extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
We affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our 
extraordinary powers to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found, reserving additional details for discussion of specific 
issues.  See Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 299 
(2008). 
Late on the evening of July 22, 2005, the victim and Jayser 
Cruz were socializing at the victim's family home; the victim 
and Cruz were family friends.  At some point during the evening, 
the victim's sister heard Cruz express an interest in a knife 
that was lying on a table.  The victim and Cruz then left the 
3 
 
house together.  According to the victim's sister, Cruz took the 
knife when they left. 
 
Later that evening, the defendant was with Cruz and the 
victim at a convenience store.  They ran into two women, the 
defendant's cousin, Maria Colon,0F1 and one of her friends.  Cruz 
and the victim were drunk.  The victim suggested that they all 
smoke marijuana, and the group walked to the nearby railroad 
tracks to do so.  Maria heard Cruz tell the defendant that Cruz 
recently had bought a new knife. 
 
After approximately fifteen minutes, Maria and her friend 
left to go home.  As they were walking away, Maria heard what 
sounded like "skin ripping."  When she looked back, she saw the 
defendant throwing rocks at the victim; she described the rocks 
as thin and estimated them to be approximately one inch in 
width.  Her friend saw the defendant throw four to six rocks, 
which hit the victim in the back.  The victim fell to the 
ground, where he kept asking the defendant to "stop."  Cruz was 
laughing.  When the defendant requested a knife, Cruz handed him 
a backpack.  Maria asked the defendant to stop; he told her to 
leave, or "it would happen to [her] as well."  At that point, 
Maria and her friend left the area.  When they last saw him, the 
victim was on the ground in a fetal position. 
                     
 
1 Because they share a last name, we refer to the 
defendant's cousin, Maria Colon, by her first name. 
4 
 
 
The next morning, when the defendant came to Maria's house, 
she saw "little dots" and "splatter-marks" on his left leg.  
That afternoon, she saw the defendant at a laundromat.  When the 
defendant left the laundromat, the "little dots" on his pants 
were stained yellow, as though he had tried to wash them. 
 
That evening, the defendant's girlfriend and her friend 
picked up the defendant and they all drove around.  The 
defendant told his girlfriend that he had killed the victim, and 
he pointed toward something in the distance that "looked like 
feet."  He said that he had killed the victim "for us," and he 
warned her not to tell anyone or he would harm her siblings. 
Later that evening, the defendant telephoned Maria and told 
her that he had killed the victim.  The defendant explained that 
he had left the railroad tracks and was walking home, but then 
he returned to the railroad tracks, where he saw the victim 
getting up.  The defendant picked up a large rock and hit the 
victim in the head with it several times. 
 
The same day, the victim's body was discovered near the 
railroad tracks.  When a chemist from the State police crime 
laboratory arrived at the scene, he saw the victim lying on his 
back; his heavily-bruised face and clothing were covered with 
"red-brown staining."  A large rock, weighing roughly fourteen 
pounds, with red-brown stains, was next to the victim.  The 
stain later was determined to be the victim's blood.  The 
5 
 
medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a 
combination of blunt force trauma to the head and two stab 
wounds to the body.  Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing 
indicated that the blood found on a pair of jeans recovered from 
the defendant's house was the victim's. 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In November, 2005, a grand jury 
returned indictments, charging the defendant, among other 
things, with murder in the first degree.  Thereafter, the 
defendant moved to suppress his statements to police and the 
items seized during the two searches of his house.  Following an 
evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge, who was not the 
trial judge, allowed the motions to suppress in part and denied 
them in part.  The judge found that the defendant's statements 
were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
479 (1966), because the Spanish interpretation of the Miranda 
warnings provided to the defendant were inadequate to apprise him 
of his rights.  The judge denied the motion to suppress the 
evidence seized from the victim's house, after the judge 
determined that the defendant's consent to the first search had 
been validly obtained, and that police had had probable cause to 
obtain a warrant for the second search. 
 
In March, 2013, the defendant was tried before a Superior 
Court jury.  The jury convicted him of murder in the first 
6 
 
degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
cruelty or atrocity.  The defendant timely appealed. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant maintains that a new trial 
is required because the judge did not declare a mistrial when 
several deliberating jurors expressed concerns about their 
safety, and that the judge erred by partially excluding the 
defendant from the subsequent voir dire of the deliberating 
jury.  The defendant argues also that he was denied a fair trial 
because the judge did not conduct individual voir dire of the 
members of the venire with respect to questions of ethnic bias 
that defense counsel had requested be posed.  The defendant 
further asserts error in the denial of his motion to suppress 
physical evidence, as well as in the admission of out-of-court 
statements, and he contends that his attorney was ineffective in 
failing to make certain arguments at the hearing on the motion 
to suppress.  In addition, the defendant asks us to exercise our 
extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
a.  Dismissal of jurors during deliberations.  The 
defendant argues that he was denied the right to a fair and 
impartial jury when, after substantial evidence of bias was 
brought to the judge's attention during deliberations, the judge 
did not excuse the entire jury.  Specifically, while the jury 
were deliberating, the juror in seat number 15 (juror no. 15) 
7 
 
notified a court officer that she was afraid of the 
repercussions of the potential verdict in the case.  She feared 
that if the jury were to find the defendant guilty, there could 
be possible retribution by gangs; if they were to find him not 
guilty, someone else would be stabbed.  Juror no. 15 was 
fearful, in part, because the defendant had heard her name.  The 
other jurors "were all there" during juror no. 15's conversation 
with the court officer; juror no. 15 reported that other jurors 
also previously expressed similar fears.  The judge found that 
juror no. 15 could not remain impartial and excused her.  
 
Because juror no. 15 reported that others had expressed 
similar "gang-related" fears, the judge conducted an individual 
voir dire of each of the remaining members of the jury.1F2  The 
juror in seat number 1 (juror no. 1) also was excused, after 
stating that he had been "watching to see if anyone is following 
me when I leave here."  The foreperson, who was in seat number 3 
(juror no. 3), reported that she had heard other jurors express 
fears about the proximity of the crime to "the location [in 
which] they lived" and "gang relation."  Juror no. 3 also said 
she had been "concerned," the day before deliberations began, 
that people the defendant might know would "go after us."  On 
                     
 
2 Of the eleven remaining deliberating jurors, all but one 
had heard juror no. 15 express her concerns.  The four alternate 
jurors, however, had not been present to hear her do so. 
8 
 
the first day of deliberations, however, juror no. 3 reported 
that she was no longer concerned.  The judge found that 
juror no. 3 "indicated very clearly that she didn't have any 
concerns now."  Over the defendant's objection, juror no. 3 was 
not excused.  The judge told juror no. 3 not to discuss the 
substance of the voir dire with anyone else. 
 
Juror nos. 1 and 15 were replaced with alternates, and the 
jury were instructed to begin deliberations anew.  The defendant 
objected that the jury were not struck entirely; he argued that 
the "fear running through the deliberations" prevented the jury 
from remaining impartial.  The motion was denied.  Approximately 
one hour later, the jurors returned a verdict finding the 
defendant guilty. 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the extraneous 
influences on the jury resulted in actual bias when the 
suggestion of gang activity was introduced during the process of 
deliberation, where no evidence of gang activity had been 
presented at trial.  The defendant argues that, as a result, he 
was denied the right to a fair and impartial jury when the judge 
declined to dismiss the entire jury.  
 
i.  Extraneous influence.  "Article 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to 
a trial before an impartial jury."  Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 
9 
 
475 Mass. 20, 30 (2016).  "The presence of even one partial 
juror violates this right."  Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 
245, 251 (2001), S.C., 449 Mass. 1018 (2007).  "Prohibiting 
premature jury deliberations, and extraneous influences on 
jurors" is one of the ways in which to safeguard a defendant's 
right to trial before an impartial jury.  Philbrook, supra. 
 
Accordingly, extraneous influences on jurors present a 
"serious question of possible prejudice" (citation omitted). 
Guisti, 434 Mass. at 251.  See Philbrook, 475 Mass. at 30.  "An 
extraneous matter is one that involves information not part of 
the evidence at trial and raises a serious question of possible 
prejudice" (quotations and citation omitted).  Guisti, supra.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cuffie, 414 Mass. 632, 635 (1993) 
(juror made unauthorized visit to crime scene); Commonwealth v. 
Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 194 (1979) (during deliberations, juror 
stated information not presented at trial).  A defendant bears 
the burden of demonstrating an extraneous influence by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 
Mass. 381, 386-387 (2005), discussing Fidler, 377 Mass. at 201. 
 
In this case, the defendant was Hispanic and had "tattoos 
on [his] hands"; the victim was Caucasian.  The case, as it was 
presented to the jury, did not involve allegations of gang 
involvement, and the record does not indicate that any evidence 
of gang affiliation was introduced at trial.  The Commonwealth's 
10 
 
theory was that the defendant killed the victim in order to be 
with the defendant's girlfriend.  Numerous jurors subsequently 
recalled juror no. 15's comments.  The conversation regarding 
gang involvement included discussion of the location of the 
crime and the "tattoos on the [defendant's] hands." 
 
Until jurors began discussing gang-related concerns, juror 
no. 3, for example, had not considered the defendant's tattoos 
to be meaningful; "I never noticed that.  I didn't even think -- 
it never came into my . . . ."  The introduction of the concept 
of gang affiliation by juror no. 15, therefore, constituted 
"information not part of the evidence at trial," and, as 
evidenced by the fear it caused some jurors, "raises a serious 
question of possible prejudice" (citation omitted).  Guisti, 434 
Mass. at 251. 
 
Nonetheless, not all extraneous jury discussion compromises 
a defendant's right to a fair trial, and the presence of an 
extraneous influence does not necessarily require a mistrial.  
See Philbrook, 475 Mass. at 31.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 232 (1989).  If a trial judge learns of 
such an influence, the judge must determine whether the jurors 
remain impartial and, if not, what remedy is required.  See 
Philbrook, supra. 
 
ii.  Impartiality of remaining jurors.  A trial judge has 
"discretion in addressing issues of extraneous influence on 
11 
 
jurors discovered during trial."  Commonwealth v. Trapp, 423 
Mass. 356, 362, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996).  Because the 
"determination of a juror's impartiality is essentially one of 
credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor, [a 
reviewing] court give[s] a trial judge's determination of 
impartiality great deference" (quotations omitted).  Philbrook, 
475 Mass. at 30, quoting Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 
849 (2013).  A reviewing court "will not disturb a judge's 
findings of impartiality," or a judge's finding that a juror is 
unbiased, "absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or 
that the finding was clearly erroneous."  See Commonwealth v. 
Sleeper, 435 Mass. 581, 587 (2002); Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 
Mass. 461, 493-494 (2010). 
 
Where a judge conducts individual voir dire of each juror, 
excuses all influenced jurors, and determines that the remaining 
jurors are impartial, a defendant's right to an impartial jury 
has not been violated.  See Philbrook, 475 Mass. at 31 
(remaining jurors impartial after juror excused for deciding 
case prematurely); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 
506–507 (1999) (remaining jurors impartial after juror excused 
for fear of gang retribution); Commonwealth v. Kamara, 422 Mass. 
614, 616–618 & n.1 (1996) (remaining jurors impartial after 
juror excused for telling other jurors defendant was member of 
gang).  See also Commonwealth v. Stanley, 363 Mass. 102, 104-105 
12 
 
(1973) (jurors impartial despite reading newspaper in 
deliberation room). 
 
In Kamara, 422 Mass. at 616, one juror told the others that 
she knew the defendant, that the defendant was a member of a 
gang, and that she feared for her safety.  The trial judge 
excused the juror and questioned each remaining juror.  Id. at 
617.  The judge found that, although they had heard the 
extraneous information, the remaining jurors were able to be 
fair and impartial.  Id. at 617-618.  We concluded that such a 
determination was not an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 620. 
 
Here, juror no. 15 did not claim to know the defendant, or 
to know that he was a member of a gang.  When she expressed fear 
of the defendant, the judge appropriately dismissed her, 
conducted an extensive voir dire of the remaining jurors, and 
dismissed an additional juror out of an "abundance of caution."  
Both counsel agreed to the dismissals of juror nos. 15 and 1.  
The other jurors stated individually that they had no similar 
concerns.  The judge appropriately instructed the jury that they 
were to disregard "any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, 
[or] prejudices," and were not to base their verdict on 
"speculation, surmise[,] or conjecture."2F3 
                     
 
3 Although these instructions were administered prior to 
deliberations, before juror nos. 1 and 15 were dismissed, there 
is nothing to suggest that the remaining jurors did not continue 
to heed them.  See Commonwealth v. Stanley, 363 Mass. 102, 105 
13 
 
 
Having found that the remaining jurors were unafraid and 
could remain impartial, the judge was not obligated to dismiss 
them, and there was no abuse of discretion in his decision not 
to dismiss the entire jury.  "We are not prepared to substitute 
our judgment for that of the trial judge who heard the evidence, 
carefully interviewed the jurors individually, and made a 
finding that each juror could do his or her job unaffected by 
whatever extraneous information had been injected into the jury 
room."  Kamara, 422 Mass. at 620. 
 
b.  Lack of translators.  The defendant's native language 
was Spanish.  Throughout the trial, the defendant made use of 
two Spanish interpreters, who spoke to him through a headset.  
During the voir dire concerning the extraneous influence created 
by juror no. 15, the defendant was not provided with a 
translator.  The defendant argues that he thereby was denied the 
right to a public trial.3F4 
                     
(1973) (court assumes instructions were followed).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 506–507 813 (1999) (no 
error where judge dismissed one juror, questioned remaining 
jurors, and administered instructions regarding duty of 
impartiality).  It would also have been prudent to instruct the 
newly constituted jury that the reasons for the juror's 
discharge had been personal and not related to the case.  See 
Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 846 (1984) (jury should 
be instructed that reason for discharge is entirely personal).  
See also Commonwealth v. Dosanjos, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 
(2001). 
 
4 In his brief, the defendant refers to this issue as the 
right to a "public trial"; at oral argument, the defendant 
14 
 
After juror no. 15 had been dismissed, and before any of 
the other deliberating jurors had been interviewed by the judge, 
defense counsel requested that the defendant be present during 
the voir dire of the remaining jurors.  The judge, however, was 
concerned that the jurors would not speak candidly about their 
fear of the defendant if they knew he was listening.  Prior to 
the individual voir dire of the deliberating jurors, the 
following exchange occurred: 
Defense counsel:  "I think my client . . . [w]ell, I think 
he needs to be here." 
 
The judge:  "During the voir dire?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "You don't want him here during . . .?" 
 
The judge:  "Yes; he can be here during the voir dire.  I 
don't know that I want him to hear what's said, though." 
 
Defense counsel:  "No -- I have no problem with the court's 
direction that if anybody is excused, it's for personal 
reasons." 
 
The judge:  "I do not . . . want him to learn that one 
juror has left because she's fearful of him, because even 
if it's just a stare or something like that --" 
 
Defense counsel:  "I don't think he's exhibited any 
behavior.  He's basically just been sitting there looking 
                     
claimed "a substantial right of the defendant to be present at 
crucial proceedings."  We understand the defendant to be 
arguing, if obliquely, that the lack of translators implicated 
the right to be present at trial under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The two rights are 
distinct, and we analyze them separately.  See Commonwealth v. 
Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 734-738 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1026 
(2012).  We determine that, although the right to a public trial 
was not implicated here, the right to be present at trial was. 
15 
 
straight ahead . . . . It's a delicate balance, because I 
have to protect his rights, also." 
 
The judge:  "What would you suggest?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Well, if he's at the sidebar, does he 
hear?" 
 
The judge:  "No; if he's sitting there with the headphones 
on, he'll get a translation of what is said." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Yes; but isn't he entitled to know?  I 
mean, he has rights also as a defendant, to know if we're 
dealing with the jury who is going to decide his fate. 
We've got competing interests here." 
 
. . . 
 
The judge:  "The concern I have is that first of all, it 
may be fearful to the jurors to speak candidly if it's 
being interpreted to him." 
 
Defense counsel:  "That's a consideration -- I understand." 
 
The judge:  "So, I think this has to be done outside of his 
hearing, and you can explain that some people -- whatever 
you explain -- had some concerns.  Whatever you think 
you're duty-bound to tell him.  I don't think you're duty-
bound to tell him that people are fearful of him." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Oh, I agree with the court.  I'm not 
duty-bound to tell him that; but my question is, any time 
anything of substance happens in a courtroom with a 
defendant, they have a right to be here.  Now, I don't know 
how we get around that." 
 
The judge:  "I understand . . . .  I'm going to order that 
he can't hear it.  If you wish thereafter whatever you 
think you're duty-bound to reveal, you should do that." 
 
Defense counsel:  "So, your order is that we'll do the voir 
dire outside of the presence of the defendant?" 
 
The judge:  "No; he can be present, but not present with 
ears." 
 
16 
 
 
The judge effectuated the defendant's presence "without 
ears" by prohibiting interpreters at sidebar during the 
individual voir dire, such that the defendant could "watch" but 
would not understand what was being said.  Defense counsel then 
could relay pertinent information to the defendant at a later 
point.  Defense counsel agreed that, if a juror were excused, 
counsel would tell the defendant only that it was for "personal 
reasons," without explaining that any of the jurors had 
expressed fears of him.  Neither defense counsel nor the 
defendant objected to this procedure, and voir dire commenced 
without translation. 
 
i.  Right to a public trial.  The defendant argues for the 
first time on appeal that his right to a public trial, under the 
First and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
was violated during the voir dire of the deliberating jurors.  
Even if this argument were not waived, it is unavailing. 
That individual voir dire took place at sidebar was not 
itself error; "the voir dire examination process itself took 
place, as it should have, in open court."  See Commonwealth v. 
Cohen, 456 Mass. 94, 117 (2010).  See also Wilder v. United 
States, 806 F.3d 653, 660 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2031 (2016) (conducting voir dire at sidebar in open court 
still enables members of public to "observe the individual 
questioning of jurors from their seats and attempt to discern 
17 
 
facial expressions or body language").  "Conducting voir dire 
examinations in open court [also] permits members of the public 
to observe the judge, as well as the jurors."  Cohen, 456 Mass. 
at 117.  Although the public cannot hear what is being said, the 
ability to observe the process "furthers the values that the 
public trial right is designed to protect" (citation omitted).  
See id. 
 
ii.  Right to be present at trial.  Whether the defendant 
can hear what is being said, however, implicates a different 
right:  the right to be present at trial.  "When a judge 
conducts an inquiry about a consequential matter, such as an 
allegation of serious misconduct of a juror or a suggestion of 
juror bias, the defendant is entitled, based on confrontation 
and fair trial rights, to be present."  Commonwealth v. Dyer, 
460 Mass. 728, 738 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1026 (2012).  
See Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 530 & n.26 (1993) 
(reversal required under art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights where names of jurors were withheld and defendant and 
defense counsel were barred from voir dire regarding jurors' 
fear of defendant); Commonwealth v. Robichaud, 358 Mass. 300, 
301–303 (1970) (reversal required under art. 12 where defendant 
was excluded from hearing on juror misconduct). 
 
"While the trial judge may perform minor administrative 
formalities outside the presence of the defendant, . . . the 
18 
 
judge may not bar the defendant from a voir dire during which 
jurors' impartiality may be discussed" (citation omitted).  
Angiulo, 415 Mass. at 530.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dosanjos, 
52 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 535 (2001) ("serious error" for judge to 
exclude defendant from individual questioning of deliberating 
jurors); Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 45 
(1998) (error where deliberating juror was dismissed during 
colloquy held outside defendant's presence). 
 
Counsel's presence at sidebar and intention to relay 
information to a defendant does not substitute for the 
defendant's presence.  See Robichaud, 358 Mass. at 301, 303 
(counsel's presence insufficient in defendant's absence); 
Dosanjos, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 535 (error despite counsel's 
presence); Caldwell, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 45 (error 
notwithstanding counsel's presence).  This is especially so 
where, as here, counsel agrees to restrict the information that 
he would share with the defendant.  Indeed, this does not appear 
to be a case in which a defendant was "fully informed of 
everything that occurred" in his absence.  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 286-287 (1992) (no reversible error 
where, after voir dire, defendant was fully informed of reason 
for juror's discharge and agreed to her dismissal).  Rather, the 
judge cautioned defense counsel not to explain the very thing 
the jurors were discussing -- "that people are fearful of him" -
19 
 
- and requested that the defendant learn nothing more than that 
several jurors had been dismissed for "personal reasons." 
 
Where, without any action on his part, jurors fear a 
defendant, he does not forfeit his right to be present.  See 
Angiulo, 415 Mass. at 520, 522 (right to be present at voir dire 
where jurors felt "intimidated" by defendant, believed he was 
writing down information about them, and saw him giving them 
"[the] whammy" or "[the] evil eye").  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Senati, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 307 (1975) (defendant forfeited 
right to be present by refusing to obey court order to refrain 
from leaving dock and shouting during trial).  Nor may a judge 
seat a defendant far enough away that the defendant is unable to 
hear the proceedings, or conduct questioning, without 
interpretation, in a language the defendant does not understand.4F5 
 
In denying the defendant's request, it appears that the 
judge applied an analysis more appropriate to the consideration 
of the right to a public trial.  The judge stated that it would 
be sufficient for the defendant to "watch" without hearing, 
"[j]ust like we've said the open courtroom is satisfied if 
                     
 
5 Of course, a defendant may waive the right to be present 
at sidebar.  See Dyer, 460 Mass. at 738.  "More particularly, if 
the defendant makes no request to be present, the judge takes no 
steps to exclude him, and counsel never objects to his absence, 
the issue is waived and this court will not address it on 
appeal."  Id.  There is no evidence on this record, however, 
that the defendant made such a waiver.  See Commonwealth v. 
Caldwell, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 46 (1998). 
20 
 
people can watch what's happening.  They don't have to sit at 
sidebar."  While it is true that the right to a public trial is 
satisfied without the public being present at sidebar, the same 
is not true for the defendant's right to be present at trial.  
The right to a public trial is premised on certain 
considerations, including the public perception of fairness in 
the courts; it is satisfied without hearing conversations at 
sidebar.  See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 
(1979).  A defendant's right to be present at his or her own 
trial, by contrast, implicates additional concerns.  It provides 
the accused with information necessary to adjust the trial 
strategy, guarantees that a defendant always has the opportunity 
to object, and, in the event of conviction, ensures that the 
defendant is able fully to assist in an appeal, because the 
defendant understood the prior proceedings.  For a defendant, as 
distinct from the public, the proceedings must not only be seen, 
but also heard.5F6 
                     
 
6 This analysis applies whether a defendant is partially 
excluded due to an inability to understand English, or in any 
other manner.  We are particularly troubled, however, that the 
defendant's inability to understand English was used to exclude 
him from hearing the proceedings.  "A non-English speaker, 
throughout a legal proceeding, shall have a right to the 
assistance of a qualified interpreter."  G. L. c. 221C, § 2.  It 
is a judge's duty to aid, not hamper, a criminal defendant in 
understanding what is occurring at the defendant's own trial. 
21 
 
 
iii.  Prejudice.  Although the defendant's exclusion in 
this case was error, we must consider whether he thereby was 
prejudiced.  "The absence of the defendant from [the voir dire 
of deliberating jurors] does not automatically constitute 
reversible error" (citation omitted).  Sleeper, 435 Mass. at 
588-589.  Although defense counsel initially requested the 
defendant's presence at voir dire, counsel ultimately did not 
object to the judge's decision not to allow that request.  
Therefore, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Dyer, 460 Mass. at 741. 
 
Had the defendant been present during voir dire, little 
would have changed.  Of the twelve jurors questioned, two were 
dismissed after expressing fear related to the defendant.  
Defense counsel then moved to dismiss all of the remaining 
jurors.  The judge denied that request, over counsel's 
objection.  Because his attorney already had moved to dismiss 
each juror, there was nothing more that the defendant could have 
requested in terms of relief.  Nor was the defendant in a 
position to make strategic decisions about cross-examination or 
introduction of evidence, informed by the content of the jurors' 
answers; the trial had concluded, deliberations had begun, and 
no additional evidence could have been presented. 
 
"It is frequently to the defendant's advantage to 
communicate orally with his counsel . . . since he may have 
22 
 
information which may aid his counsel in examining 
[individuals]."  Robichaud, 358 Mass. at 303.  At most, if he 
had been present, the defendant could have suggested additional 
questions for counsel to ask the jurors.  Yet, here, where the 
judge conducted an extensive voir dire of the deliberating 
jurors, the mere possibility that additional questions could 
have been asked is not sufficient to require a new trial.  "The 
defendant's presence at the hearing would not likely have 
yielded anything or altered its outcome."  Sleeper, 435 Mass. at 
589 (harmless error where judge properly excused biased juror 
outside defendant's presence).  See Dosanjos, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 536 (harmless error to conduct voir dire in defendant's 
absence where defendant "offers no suggestion as to how he was 
prejudiced by the procedure" [citation omitted]).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 147 (1986).  We 
are unable to conclude that the defendant's partial exclusion 
resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
c.  Individual voir dire of the venire on racial or ethnic 
bias.  The defendant argues that the judge's decision not to 
conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors' ethnic bias, 
in the form of five questions that defense counsel had requested 
be posed to each member of the venire individually, deprived him 
of his right to a fair and impartial jury, and requires a new 
23 
 
trial.6F7  Stating that the twenty-two question case-specific jury 
questionnaire7F8 was sufficient to accomplish the goal of obtaining 
information on potential bias, the judge denied the request.8F9 
                     
7 It is not clear whether the defendant raised this claim on 
constitutional or statutory grounds.  At least with regard to 
similar questions proposed for the written questionnaire, the 
defendant argued that the questioning was necessary to protect 
his rights under "the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights." 
 
 
8 Voir dire of prospective jurors took place in four stages.  
First, each potential juror was given the "standard jury 
questionnaire."  Second, the judge orally posed questions to the 
venire as a group.  Third, each potential juror was given a 
twenty-two question written questionnaire, prepared specifically 
for this case.  Fourth, each potential juror -- regardless of 
whether the juror had answered any questions affirmatively -- 
came to the sidebar for additional questioning. 
 
 
9 One of the questions on the case-specific, twenty-two 
question juror questionnaire was the first of the five questions 
that defense counsel had requested be posed orally, specifically 
inquiring about the potential juror's beliefs as to a Hispanic 
defendant.  See note 11, infra. 
 
 
The other four questions on potential bias toward a 
Hispanic defendant that were requested to be asked at voir dire 
were: 
 
"2.  Do you believe that Hispanics are more likely to 
commit crimes than whites? 
 
"3.  Would you believe the testimony of a white person over 
that of a Hispanic person simply because of skin color? 
 
"4.  Would you give extra weight to the testimony of a 
white person claiming that a Hispanic person committed a 
crime? 
 
"5.  Are you conscious of any feelings of racial bias or 
prejudice, which might tend to influence your judgement in 
this case, even in the slightest degree?" 
24 
 
 
The defendant is correct that, "in cases of interracial 
murder, a judge, if requested to do so, is required to conduct 
an individual voir dire on the issue of potential bias." 
Commonwealth v. Hunter, 427 Mass. 651, 654 (1998).  See 
Commonwealth v. Young, 401 Mass. 390, 398 (1987), overruled on 
another ground, Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 407 Mass. 553 (1990) 
(establishing rule because of "reasonable possibility" that 
racial prejudice could affect jury's verdict in murder cases 
where defendant and victim are of different races).  We 
similarly have required individual voir dire in cases of 
interracial rape, Commonwealth v. Sanders, 383 Mass. 637, 640-
641 (1981), and interracial sexual offenses against children, 
Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 873 (1982).  A written 
questionnaire does not suffice to fulfill this requirement.  See 
Young, supra at 397-398, citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 
451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) and Sanders, supra.  "As a matter of 
law we held that in such cases a substantial risk exists that 
the extraneous issue of race will affect the impartiality of the 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 218, 227 (1991). 
 
As has the United States Supreme Court with the Federal 
cognate, we established this rule "as a matter of our 
supervisory power," based on the requirements of G. L. c. 234, 
§ 28, the predecessor to G. L. c. 234A, § 67A, and not as a 
result of any constitutional mandate.  See Young, 401 Mass. at 
25 
 
398.  As part of our duty to oversee the courts of the 
Commonwealth, we adopted "the essence of the rule, stated by the 
plurality, in Rosales-Lopez, [451 U.S. at 190], 'that questions 
directed to the discovery of racial prejudice be asked in 
certain circumstances in which such an inquiry is not 
constitutionally mandated.'"  Id., quoting Rosales-Lopez, supra. 
 
Until today, we explicitly "have declined . . . to extend 
this rule to cases where the defendant and the victim are of 
different ethnic backgrounds."  Hunter, 427 Mass. at 654, citing 
Commonwealth v. De La Cruz, 405 Mass. 269, 272 (1989).  See 
Hunter, supra (no individual voir dire for Caucasian defendant 
and Filipino victim).  See also Commonwealth v. Pina, 430 Mass. 
66, 72-73 (1999) (no individual voir dire for Cape Verdean 
defendant and Portuguese victim); De La Cruz, 405 Mass. at 272, 
274 (no individual voir dire for Hispanic defendant and 
Caucasian victim).  Contrast Young, 401 Mass. at 391, 398 
(individual voir dire for African-American defendant and 
Hispanic victim).  Rather, in murder cases involving individuals 
from different ethnic backgrounds, this court has left the 
determination whether individual voir dire on bias is warranted 
"to the sound discretion of the trial judge."  Hunter, supra. 
26 
 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant requested that the judge 
individually ask each prospective juror five questions related 
to racial or ethnic bias.  Among them was the following:9F10 
"The defendant in this case . . . is a Hispanic male, and 
the victim in this case is a white male.  Would those facts 
in any way interfere with your ability to render a fair and 
just verdict?"10F11 
 
 
Although we have not mandated such questioning, where the 
defendant and the victim are of different ethnic backgrounds, we 
nonetheless have "encourage[d]" trial judges to conduct 
individual voir dire to detect prejudice based on ethnic 
considerations.  See De La Cruz, 405 Mass. at 274.  Yet the 
distinction between race and ethnicity, and, correspondingly, 
between that which we "require" and that which we "encourage," 
rests on an increasingly shaky foundation.  Indeed, the Federal 
courts do not attempt to distinguish between race and ethnicity 
for purposes of juror voir dire.  They operate under "a broader 
                     
 
10 The defendant argued that it was necessary to ask this 
question in an individualized setting because "it's not until 
you start doing the individual voir dire that you get behind 
some of these questions, and people really come up and say to 
you, 'Well, I have this bias . . . Well, yeah; I did have this 
experience back in 19- whatever, and so I do have a bit of a 
prejudice against. . . .'" 
 
 
11 Question thirteen of the specifically-drafted juror 
questionnaire asks: 
 
"The defendant in this case is a Hispanic male.  The victim 
is a white male.  Would the fact that the defendant is 
Hispanic in any way interfere with your ability to render a 
fair and just verdict?" 
27 
 
rule" applying to "'ethnic,' as well as racial, groups."1F12  See 
Young, 401 Mass. at 398 n.8.  See also Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. 
                     
 
12 "[I]n our heterogeneous society the [Federal] courts have 
found the boundaries of race and ethnicity increasingly 
difficult to determine," McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 316 
n.39 (1987), and have noted the futility of attempting to define 
"ethnicity."  Rico v. Leftridge–Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 
2003) ("What, though, does 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic origin' 
mean . . . . And how does one define 'race' when the 
understanding of 'race' itself has changed over the 
centuries?").  See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 
194 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("knowing the 
contentiousness of our profession," it is unlikely that "precise 
definition of . . . 'different racial or ethnic groups' will 
ever be arrived at"); Suri v. Foxx, 69 F. Supp. 3d 467, 479 n.9 
(D.N.J. 2014) ("Ethnicity does not have a clear definition in 
the law, and there is variation in how the terms 'race' and 
'ethnicity' are used"). 
 
 
For purposes of discrimination under the Federal Equal 
Rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, for example, Federal courts have 
defined "racial discrimination" as encompassing discrimination 
based on "ancestry or ethnic characteristics" (citation 
omitted).  Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 604-
605 (2nd Cir. 2016).  For purposes of the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury of one's peers, a defendant is entitled to a jury that 
fairly represents "distinctive groups" in the community.  United 
States v. Garcia, 991 F.2d 489, 491 (8th Cir. 1993).  See id., 
quoting United States v. Black Bear, 878 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 
1989) ("A group of people is distinct when they have a shared 
attribute that defines or limits their membership, and when they 
share a community of interest").  In 2016, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that the 
"confusion in unraveling the legal definitions of 'race' and 
"Hispanic'" has occurred since the distinction was first 
recognized by the United States Office of Management and Budget 
in 1977.  See Village of Freeport, supra at 602 & n.13. 
 
 
In light of this, the United States Supreme Court has held, 
under its supervisory power, that a defendant charged with a 
"violent crime" who requests individual voir dire on the 
question of membership in "different racial or ethnic groups" is 
entitled to such questioning.  Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 192.  
Although ethnic distinction, and, for that matter, racial 
28 
 
at 192 ("[F]ederal trial courts must make [an individualized] 
inquiry when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime 
and where the defendant and the victim are members of different 
racial or ethnic groups"). 
 
As the United States Supreme Court observed in 1981, when 
crafting its supervisory rule, "It remains an unfortunate fact 
in our society that violent crimes perpetrated against members 
of other racial or ethnic groups often raise such a possibility 
[that prejudice would influence the jury]."  Rosales-Lopez, 
supra at 192.  Although trial judges may be understandably 
hesitant to introduce notions of racial or ethnic bias into 
their court rooms, "[w]e think that it would be far more 
injurious to permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a 
disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that 
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were 
barred" (citation omitted).  See Rosales-Lopez, supra at 191. 
 
This court previously has declined to follow the Federal 
rule, and has done so using language that causes modern readers 
dismay, and in a manner that is neither prudent nor accurate.  
Thirty years ago, in De La Cruz, 405 Mass. at 273, we concluded 
                     
distinctions, may not be clear in every case, prior to voir 
dire, it is left to "the defendant to resolve this conflict by 
making the determination of whether or not he would prefer to 
have the inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice pursued."  See 
id. at 191. 
29 
 
that individual voir dire was not necessary where a Hispanic 
defendant was charged with sexually assaulting a Caucasian 
victim.  In doing so, we stated that our rule "implies that 
Hispanic persons are not members of the black (Negro) race," 
but, rather, could be viewed as "members of the white race," 
such that there was no racial difference between the Hispanic 
defendant and the Caucasian victim.  Id.  Ten years later, in 
Pina, 430 Mass. at 72-74, we determined that a Cape Verdean 
defendant charged with murdering a Portuguese victim similarly 
was not entitled to individual voir dire concerning prejudice.  
To reach that conclusion, this court relied upon the proposition 
that "the term 'race' reflects the historical division of 
humanity by physical characteristics into three primary 
divisions:  Caucasian, Mongolian, & Negro."  Id. at 73 n.15, 
citing De La Cruz, supra at 272.  We have not addressed the 
issue since. 
 
We recognize that the distinctions described in these cases 
retain little purchase in today's society.  Specifically, over 
the past few decades, the nation's landscape has changed 
dramatically with respect to its Hispanic population.  More than 
half of the country's population growth between 2000 and 2010 
was attributable to an increase in the Hispanic population.12F13  In 
                     
 
13 See Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin:  2010, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, 
30 
 
Massachusetts, an increase in the Hispanic population accounts 
for the entirety of the State's population growth in that same 
period.13F14  Indeed, the Commonwealth now relies on the category of 
"Hispanic," in addition to "African-American," "Caucasian," and 
"Asian," in determining such things as the probabilities of DNA 
matches.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 469 
(2018); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 478 Mass. 481, 486 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. Broom, 474 Mass. 486, 488 & nn.3, 4, 5, 6 
(2016). 
 
The growing Hispanic and Latino population, in turn, has 
encountered varied sources of discrimination.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 878 (2018) (Budd, J., 
concurring) (Hispanic drivers are stopped more often by police 
than Caucasian drivers); Bradley v. Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 
148, 149 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding disparate and adverse impact 
on Hispanic candidates for entry-level fire fighter positions); 
Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 179 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing 
statistics that Latinos are overrepresented in country's prison 
                     
U.S. Census Bureau 3 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod 
/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QQH-Z227] 
(comparing 2000 census to 2010 census). 
 
 
14 See Passel, Cohn, & Lopez, Hispanics Account for More 
than Half of Nation's Growth in Past Decade, Overview, Pew 
Research Center (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org 
/2011/03/24/hispanics-account-for-more-than-half-of-nations-
growth-in-past-decade/ [https://perma.cc/8XL6-DVUA]. 
31 
 
population, and "Latino youths are incarcerated at twice the 
rate of [Caucasian] American youths"). 
 
This type of discrimination poses no less a problem in the 
context of jury trials.  Indeed, research has shown that people 
of Hispanic and Latino descent -- not unlike African Americans -
- are more likely to be treated severely by juries when accused 
of killing a Caucasian victim.  See, e.g., Race, Ethnicity, and 
Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 
269, 272-273 (2015) (jurors more likely to recommend capital 
punishment for African-American or Latino defendants accused of 
killing Caucasian victims).  Concurring in De La Cruz, 405 Mass. 
at 276, Chief Justice Liacos wrote that "[p]eople's prejudices 
do not . . . fit into categories formulated by Webster's 
Dictionary."  Rather, he observed that "[w]e have recognized 
previously, under the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth, the threat that bias toward ethnic groups 
presents to a fair trial."  Id. at 276 (Liacos, C.J., 
concurring). 
 
"Nothing in the statute" on which we based our decision in 
Young, 401 Mass. at 398, "requires us to limit the voir dire 
requirement to racial prejudice" rather than to include ethnic 
32 
 
prejudice.  De La Cruz, 405 Mass. at 276 (Liacos, C.J., 
concurring).  Indeed, G. L. c. 234A, § 67A,14F15 provides: 
"To determine whether a juror stands indifferent in the 
case . . . [with respect to] preconceived opinions toward 
the credibility of certain classes of persons . . . the 
court shall, or the parties or their attorneys may, with 
the permission and under the direction of the court, 
examine the juror specifically with respect to such 
considerations, attitudes, exposure, [and] opinions. . . ." 
 
"The statute includes within its scope prejudices against 
identifiable classes of individuals, including Hispanic 
persons."  De La Cruz, 405 Mass. at 276 (Liacos, C.J., 
concurring).  See art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged 
because of . . . race . . . or national origin").  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Long, 419 Mass. 798, 807 n.9 (1995) ("both 
racial and ethnic groups are discrete groups protected under 
art. 1"); Commonwealth v. Aponte, 391 Mass. 494, 503–504 (1984) 
(addressing underrepresentation of Hispanic people on grand jury 
venires).  There is no principled reason why a Hispanic 
defendant charged with murdering a Caucasian victim should be 
entitled to fewer protections against potential bias than an 
African-American defendant in the same position. 
                     
 
15 Our prior jurisprudence applied G. L. c. 234, § 28, as 
amended by St. 1985, c. 463.  In 2016, that statute was replaced 
with G. L. c. 234A, § 67A, inserted by St. 2016, c. 36, § 4.  
The language as to this provision is virtually identical in both 
statutes. 
33 
 
 
Of course, attorneys seeking to ask questions about ethnic 
bias would now have some leeway to do so during attorney-
directed voir dire, which was not available to defense counsel 
at the time of the defendant's trial.  See, G. L. c. 234A, 
§ 67D, inserted by St. 2016, c. 36, § 4.  Nonetheless, this 
questioning occurs within guidelines and limitations established 
by the judge, and does not provide a clear, consistent, 
authoritative, and reliable means of detecting bias among 
potential jurors in the way that mandatory questioning by the 
trial judge, upon request, would assure. 
 
Indeed, the value of individual voir dire to uncover 
potential ethnic bias was evident in the empanelment proceedings 
in this case.  A least one potential juror identified in her 
written questionnaire that the knowledge that the defendant was 
Hispanic would interfere with her ability to be fair and 
impartial.  After the judge conducted voir dire concerning the 
juror's response, he found that she would not be able to be 
impartial and excused her.  Another juror's ethnic bias, 
however, only came to the fore after answering individual voir 
dire questions, where the potential juror had marked "no" to the 
relevant question on the questionnaire.15F16 
                     
 
16 Juror no. 10 acknowledged having formed an opinion about 
the case.  Called to individual voir dire and asked to specify, 
the juror responded, 
 
34 
 
 
Of course, in many cases, ethnicity remains unlikely to be 
a source of bias in a murder trial, particularly where it is 
difficult for jurors to distinguish between the ethnicities of 
the defendant and the victim.  See generally Commonwealth v. 
Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 28-30 (2015) (discussing difficulties of 
distinguishing ethnic differences in some circumstances).  In 
such cases, a reasonable defense attorney would likely have no 
reason to request individual voir dire on ethnic bias.  In light 
of the changes in our society since this court last addressed 
the issue, however, it is difficult to say now that the question 
of possible ethnic bias toward members of the Hispanic community 
can be set aside as not constituting "racial" bias; for 
instance, descriptions of suspects provided to police often now 
are stated as "light-skinned Hispanic male," Commonwealth v. 
Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 5 (2014), or "dark-skinned Hispanic or 
                     
Juror no. 10:  "What is on his head?  What's that thing on 
his head?" 
 
The judge:  "It's an earphone." 
 
Juror no. 10:  "Does he not understand English?" 
 
The judge:  "Right.  His native language is Spanish." 
 
Juror no. 10:  "Yeah -- that's . . . he's an American 
citizen, and he can't understand and speak English, so 
that's why I've formed an opinion." 
 
The juror was excused. 
35 
 
light-skinned African–American," Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 
Mass. 617, 619 (2011). 
 
Therefore, as a matter of our supervisory power, in cases 
of murder, sexual offenses against children, and rape, decided 
after the issuance of the rescript in this case, we extend the 
principle announced in Young, 401 Mass. at 398; Hobbs, 385 Mass. 
at 873; and Sanders, 383 Mass. at 640, and require that, where a 
defendant facing trial on such a charge requests individual voir 
dire on the issue of racial or ethnic prejudice, and the 
defendant and the victim are of different such backgrounds, that 
request should be granted.16F17 
 
"In prior cases announcing new rules or requirements in the 
exercise of our superintendence power, we have declined to give 
the new rule or requirement retroactive effect."  Commonwealth 
v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 720–721 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
930 (2005).  See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 
366 (1991) ("all previous extensions of the Sanders rule have 
                     
 
17 We do not at this time expand the categories of crimes 
which, as a matter of law, require individual voir dire with 
respect to racial or ethnic bias.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Grice, 410 Mass. 586, 589 (1991) (declining to expand rule to 
include armed robbery).  Where other crimes are at issue, the 
decision to conduct individual voir dire remains within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge.  Nothing in this decision, 
however, should be read to discourage judges from conducting 
individual voir dire on racial or ethnic bias, regardless of the 
crime charged.  Nor do we mean to suggest that individual voir 
dire on the question of racial or ethnic bias should not be 
conducted at sidebar.  See Dyer, 460 Mass. at 738. 
36 
 
been prospectively applied").  Accordingly, the rule we announce 
today shall be applied in cases tried after the issuance of the 
rescript in this case, and not to the defendant's case.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 248 (2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006) (prospectively applying new first 
complaint doctrine). 
 
Under our jurisprudence at the time the defendant's case 
was tried, in the absence of a "substantial risk" of ethnic 
bias, the choice to conduct individual voir dire on the question 
of ethnic bias was left to the discretion of the trial judge.  
See Hunter, 427 Mass. at 654.  The Commonwealth did not argue 
that the defendant's ethnicity was "a possible motive for the 
killing, or otherwise informed the evidence."  See Pina, 430 
Mass. at 74.  The defendant was identified by witnesses who knew 
him; he was not made a suspect on the basis of his ethnic 
characteristics.  See id.  Accordingly, we are confident that 
the judge correctly determined that there was no substantial 
risk of bias related to ethnicity.  Thus, it was within the 
judge's discretion to deny the request for individual voir dire. 
 
d.  Consent to search.  As stated, prior to trial, the 
defendant moved to suppress statements and evidence recovered 
during a police search of his residence.  The motion judge 
allowed the motion to suppress the statements, after he found 
that the Miranda warnings were inadequate, but denied the motion 
37 
 
to suppress evidence.  He concluded that some of the evidence 
had been seized pursuant to a "consent search" and some of the 
evidence was seized during a second search, with a warrant; the 
warrant affidavit did not rely on or even mention any of the 
evidence seized during the warrantless search. 
On the day after the victim's body was discovered, police 
brought the defendant to the police station for questioning.  At 
that time, the defendant was twenty-one years old; he could not 
read English, and he had a limited understanding of spoken 
English.  Accordingly, a police officer was brought in to 
translate from English to Spanish.  The officer read from a 
Miranda rights card, written in English, which he attempted to 
translate into Spanish.  The officer advised the defendant of 
his Miranda rights as follows: 
"These are your Miranda rights.  Before we begin I 
have to read this to you, ok?  They're in English, I'm 
going to read it for you in Spanish, but back here 
where you sign it's going to be in English.  You 
understand?  Ok.  Before they, we ask you any 
question, you can stay quiet.  You have right to 
silence.  Uh, every little thing that you say we can 
use it in court.  You have a right to talk to a lawyer 
before we ask you something.  If you cannot pay for a 
lawyer the court gives you a lawyer without paying 
anything.  If you want to talk to us without a lawyer 
here, you can stop when you want, without a lawyer.  
So if you want to talk to us and you want to stop, 
well that is your right, you want to talk and say 
nothing, to be looking for a lawyer.  You understand?  
Ok." 
 
38 
 
Following this interpretation of his Miranda rights, the 
defendant agreed to speak with the officers.  He denied any 
involvement in the victim's death. 
 
Later in the interview, police requested the defendant's 
consent to search his residence.  They presented him with a 
consent to search form, printed in English, which the officer 
again attempted to explain in Spanish.  The officer did not 
provide a verbatim oral recitation of the language on the form, 
but he did tell the defendant that if he did not want to sign 
the form, "you don't sign it."  The defendant ultimately signed 
the form. 
 
Police searched the house where the defendant had been 
staying.  They seized various items of clothing from an area of 
the living room where he had been sleeping and keeping his 
belongings.17F18  Officers then obtained a search warrant, returned 
to the residence, and seized additional items.  A pair of blue 
jeans with a yellow stain on the ankle was located under the 
couch in the living room.  Due to an error in the evidence log, 
it is unclear whether the jeans were seized during the first 
search or the second search. 
                     
 
18 The defendant had come to Massachusetts from Puerto Rico 
approximately one month earlier and had been staying at his 
uncle's house. 
39 
 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in 
denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized, because the 
Commonwealth did not show that the defendant freely and 
voluntarily consented to the search, and the evidence seized 
pursuant to the later warrant should have been suppressed as the 
fruit of the poisonous tree.  The motion judge found that the 
defendant's affidavit was limited, however, to the contention 
that, had he "understood [his] rights under Miranda, [he] would 
not have signed the consent form."  The defendant's appellate 
counsel concedes that the defendant "did not raise" any other 
issues regarding the consent form in Superior Court. 
 
"The theory on which a motion to suppress is presented in 
the trial court cannot be changed when the motion comes before 
this court for review."  Commonwealth v. Pina, 406 Mass. 540, 
542, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990).  As the motion judge 
noted, quoting Commonwealth v. Costa, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 
231-232 (2005), "[a] Miranda-like warning is not a necessary 
prerequisite to a valid consent [to search] under the Fourth 
Amendment [to the United States Constitution] or under art. 14 
[of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]." 
 
Even if the question of voluntariness were to be 
considered, there was no error.  The Commonwealth bears the 
burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given.  
See Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37, 46 (1995).  
40 
 
Consent is free and voluntary where it is "unfettered by 
coercion, express or implied," and must be more than mere 
"acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority" (citations 
omitted).  Id.  The failure to inform a defendant of the right 
to withhold consent is a relevant consideration, but not 
necessarily dispositive.  See Commonwealth v. Carr, 458 Mass. 
295, 302 (2010).  A voluntariness determination requires a 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.  
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 242 (2005). 
 
While the motion judge found that the officer who presented 
the defendant the consent form was unable to give "a verbatim 
recitation of the language [on that form],"18F19 the judge found 
further that the translation was sufficient to permit free and 
voluntary consent.  He observed that consent to search need only 
be "free and voluntary," not "knowing and intelligent"; that the 
defendant was informed of his "right to refuse consent"; and 
that there was no trickery or coercion in the police conduct. 
 
The motion judge's determination is supported by the 
record.  Although some warnings contained on the printed English 
form were not conveyed, the translation of the form included the 
key information that the police were asking to search the 
                     
 
19 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer 
testified that he was unable "to read that [form] verbatim to 
[the defendant]" in Spanish, in part because some of the words 
"exceed[ed his] comfort level." 
41 
 
defendant's residence and that, by signing the form, the 
defendant was giving them permission to do so.  There was no 
evidence that the defendant's will was overborne.  The judge's 
finding that the defendant's consent was free and voluntary thus 
was not clearly erroneous.19F20 
 
e.  Admission of out-of-court statements.  The defendant 
claims that the judge erred in allowing a police investigator to 
testify to double hearsay evidence in two instances.  Because 
the defendant objected at trial, we review to determine whether 
the introduction of the testimony was error and, if so, whether 
it was prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 
369, 375-376 (2017).  "An error is not prejudicial if it 'did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect'" 
                     
 
20 The officer's inability to convey a precise and complete 
translation nonetheless is concerning.  Although the incomplete 
translation proved sufficient in this instance, the additional 
warnings included on the English version of the form -- which 
the officer did not translate -- doubtless have some value.  
That non-English speaking defendants should receive fewer 
warnings in their interactions with the police runs counter to 
our long-standing principles of equal treatment and access to 
justice.  See generally Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 311-312 (2017) (noting defect in 
Commonwealth's Spanish translation of notice to criminal 
defendants); Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 561 
(2011) (waiver of right against self-incrimination invalid where 
Chinese translation "fell measurably below what would be 
required to impart the substantive meaning of the right"). 
 
 
This could be avoided if care were taken to provide proper 
translation.  Indeed, as the translating officer indicated, "If 
[the form] was given to me in Spanish, I could have gone through 
it with him in Spanish." 
42 
 
(citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 
(2005). 
 
At trial, the defendant employed a Bowden defense, see 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980); he argued 
that Cruz had killed the victim, and that the police had failed 
properly to investigate Cruz's actions.  A Bowden claim refers 
to defendants' "right to base their defense on the failure of 
police adequately to investigate [the crime] in order to raise 
the issue of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the 
minds of the jury" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 753 (2009).  We discern no error in 
permitting the testifying officer to rebut the defendant's 
Bowden defense by testifying to out-of-court statements that 
affected the conduct of the police during the course of the 
investigation. 
 
Through a State trooper, the defendant presented evidence 
that, according to an internal police report, "[A]fter an 
exhaustive investigation, investigators were able to determine 
that Cruz was responsible for the death of [the victim]."  On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the trooper about 
statements made to him during interviews he had conducted with 
several witnesses.  In one statement, the defendant told his 
cousin Maria that he had "smashed" the victim in the head with a 
big rock and stabbed him five times.  Maria thereafter repeated 
43 
 
the defendant's words to one of her friends.  The friend 
ultimately repeated the statements to the officer.  In a second 
statement, the defendant told his girlfriend that he had killed 
someone, and pointed out the location of the body.  His 
girlfriend repeated the defendant's statement to one of her 
friends, who, in turn, relayed the statements to the 
investigator. 
 
The defendant objected to the admission of these statements 
on grounds of hearsay, double hearsay, and prejudice.  Noting 
that, in the context of a Bowden defense, the statements are 
admissible for a purpose other than their truthfulness, the 
judge overruled the objections.  The judge gave detailed 
limiting instructions immediately before and immediately after 
the officer presented this testimony, and explained to the jury 
that the statements were not being offered for their truth but, 
rather, to show that the police had been presented with the 
information at the time they were deciding which suspects to 
investigate. 
 
If a defendant raises a Bowden defense, our "cases make 
clear that . . . the Commonwealth has the right to rebut it."  
Avila, 454 Mass. at 753.  A Bowden defense, therefore, is "a 
two-edged sword for the defendant, because it opens the door for 
the Commonwealth to offer evidence explaining why the police did 
44 
 
not follow the line of investigation suggested by the defense."  
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 803 n.25 (2009). 
 
"[T]he presentation of a Bowden defense can expand the 
usual evidentiary boundaries quite significantly," and can 
permit introduction of evidence that "otherwise [would not] be 
admitted on hearsay or relevance grounds."  Avila, 454 Mass. at 
757.  The permissible scope of rebuttal evidence depends, in 
part, on the issues raised by the defense; "the more wide-
ranging the defendant's attack on the police investigation, the 
broader the Commonwealth's response may be."  Id. at 754–755. 
 
Prior to trial, trial counsel argued that out-of-court 
statements of Cruz that "border[ed] on an admission" should be 
admitted in light of the Bowden defense.  The statements were 
then introduced at trial.  By the same token, the fact that the 
police had been informed of competing admissions, which instead 
implicated the defendant, permissibly could be introduced as 
rebuttal, to help the jury understand why the police focused on 
the defendant rather than on Cruz.  "[T]he Commonwealth was 
entitled to elicit testimony about why the investigators chose 
the particular investigative path they did, including the 
reasons they ultimately accepted and acted on . . . information 
that the defendant was the person who [killed] the victim."  
Avila, 454 Mass. at 755. 
45 
 
Nor do we think that the judge abused his discretion in 
determining that the probative value of the testimony was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 192 (2010) (balancing 
probative value and prejudicial effect "are matters entrusted to 
the trial judge's broad discretion and are not disturbed absent 
palpable error" [citation omitted]).  The quantity of statements 
to which the officer testified was not excessive.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass 461, 467 (2000) ("a general 
expression of the officer's opinion of guilt, followed by a 
recital of all the evidence against the defendant, is not 
permitted").  Moreover, the jury already had heard much of the 
substance of the testimony through Maria and the defendant's 
girlfriend, who had described the defendant's statements in 
detail.20F21 
 
f.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to suppress the jeans seized from the defendant's residence 
on the ground of improper documentation in the chain of custody.  
Police testified that the jeans were recovered during a search 
                     
 
21 The defendant argues also that it was error to permit the 
trooper to opine as to the defendant's guilt.  Had the trooper 
done so, there might have been error.  The trooper testified, 
however, that the evidence led his investigation "to focus on 
[the defendant]," as opposed to other suspects. 
46 
 
of the defendant's residence, and were placed in a bag labeled 
"22."  The evidence log, however, contained only twenty-one 
entries, and did not reflect that jeans had been found and 
bagged at the scene.  The log indicated that other items of 
clothing were seized both during the consent search and, later, 
during the search pursuant to the warrant. 
 
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in a case of murder in the first degree, we apply the 
standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there was 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  In doing so, we determine whether there was 
an error in the course of trial, and, if so, whether it was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  Id.  Where the 
basis of the claim is counsel's failure to file a motion to 
suppress, "the defendant has to demonstrate a likelihood that 
the motion to suppress would have been successful."  See 
Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 91 (2004). 
 
In this case, counsel moved, unsuccessfully, to suppress 
the jeans on other grounds.  Moving to suppress the jeans on the 
additional basis that they were improperly labeled was unlikely 
to have succeeded.  "Defects in the chain of custody of 
otherwise admissible evidence go to the weight of the evidence, 
as opposed to the admissibility of the evidence."  Commonwealth 
47 
 
v. Miller, 475 Mass. 212, 228 (2016).  See Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 380–381 (1997) (counsel not 
ineffective despite failing to object notwithstanding weakness 
in chain of custody). 
 
g.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Pursuant to 
our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have reviewed the entire 
record carefully, and discern no reason to use our extraordinary 
power to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.