Title: Wilson v. Wilson
Citation: 199 Or. 263, 260 P.2d 952
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 10, 1953

199 Or. 263 (1953)
260 P.2d 952
WILSON
v.
WILSON

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Submitted on briefs September 9, 1953.
Reversed September 10, 1953.
*264 Morley and Thomas, of Lebanon, for appellant.
No attorney of record for respondent.
REVERSED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for modification of a decree respecting the custody of a minor child.
On September 7, 1951, Louis Eugene Wilson, as plaintiff, commenced suit for divorce in the circuit court for Columbia county against Vivian Irene Wilson, as defendant, upon the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. David Garrett Wilson, born April 4, 1948, is the lawful issue of the marriage between plaintiff and defendant.
*265 Defendant appeared in the suit by filing an answer in which she denied the misconduct alleged against her. Prior to trial and decree, the parties entered into a written stipulation respecting alleged property rights and also concerning the custody of the minor child. In regard to the matter of custody, the stipulation provided as follows:
On September 14, 1951, a decree was entered in said suit in favor of plaintiff and provided in part:
1, 2. The complaint did not charge, nor was any finding made by the court, that the mother of the child, the defendant in said suit, was unfit to have the custody of her child nor that its best interests demanded that custody be awarded to plaintiff. In passing, we also note that the complaint contains no allegation which, even if true, would be sufficient to deprive the mother of the right to custody of her child. This court has repeatedly said that a child of tender years should be *266 awarded to the custody of the mother, notwithstanding the fact that she is the losing party, unless she is morally unfit. As to what constitutes such moral unfitness, we stated in Goldson v. Goldson, 192 Or 611, 621, 236 P2d 314, as follows:
3. From the record before us, it is manifest that the court simply adopted the agreement of the parties as to the custody of the child. In effect, the court accepted the determination of the psychiatrist without further inquiry or finding. What is or may be for the best interests and welfare of a minor child is a matter exclusively for judicial determination in each case where the question arises, and such conclusion should always be based upon competent evidence respecting all matters material to that issue. The court should never abdicate its functions. Before the custody of any child of tender years is taken from a mother, the evidence should clearly disclose, and the court should specifically find, unfitness on her part to have such custody and that the best interests and welfare of the child demand placing its custody elsewhere.
4. However, on this appeal we are not concerned with the original decree. We treat it as final and conclusive as to all matters determined up to the date thereof, inasmuch as no appeal was taken therefrom. A change in custody of the minor child can now be had only if there has been a change in conditions and circumstances *267 following the entry of the decree that affects the welfare of this little boy. The child's best interests and welfare are of primary importance.
On November 17, 1951, defendant filed a motion, supported by her affidavit, for a modification of the decree respecting the custody of the child, asking that such custody be awarded to her. As of January 17, 1952, an order was entered by the court denying defendant's motion but at the same time modifying the decree by adding thereto the following provisions:
After the entry of said modification order, the plaintiff, without leave of the court, took said child to the state of California, thereby depriving defendant of the right of visitation. On or about June 16, 1952, defendant filed another motion, supported by her affidavit, for modification of the decree respecting the custody of the child, again asking that custody be awarded to her. While this motion was pending, the parties entered into a written stipulation (plaintiff executing the same in Riverside county, California, and defendant executing the same in Linn county, Oregon), the significant portion of which reads as follows:
Under date of July 28, 1952, an order was entered by the court modifying the decree as provided in the foregoing stipulation. The order refers to the stipulation.
On February 6, 1953, the instant proceeding was instituted by defendant filing a motion, supported by affidavit, asking for a modification of the decree so as to vest custody of said minor child in her. A hearing was held before the court on March 16, 1953. No counteraffidavit was filed by plaintiff contesting in any way the allegations of defendant's affidavit upon which her motion was based, but plaintiff did testify orally at the trial.
No attempt was made by plaintiff to prove moral or other unfitness on the part of defendant to have the custody of her child, nor that she was not in a position to furnish said child with a good home, loving care and attention. Her own affidavit, which is uncontradicted, shows that she does have a good home in which to take her child and that she is able to give it the motherly care and attention every child deserves. She has remarried and there are no other children in her *269 home. Plaintiff also remarried, but that marriage was annulled by decree of a California court. Plaintiff made no effort to show that he could or would furnish the child with a home other than with the child's grandparents, nor even what kind of home that is. As a witness, his chief complaint was that defendant had not been fair with him respecting the custody of the child; and this complaint was based upon defendant's refusal to surrender custody to him in January 1953, when the six months' period provided in the modified decree expired. Her refusal was based upon the fear that plaintiff would again take the child outside the state, and she immediately commenced this proceeding.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to modify the decree but did modify it by decreeing as follows:
The trial judge made this change in the decree, as he explained, so that there would be no division of legal custody, in conformity to what we said in Raw v. Raw, 195 Or 373, 377, 245 P2d 431.
As was said in Goldson v. Goldson, supra, what constitutes a change in circumstances justifying a modification of a decree of divorce fixing the custody of minor children must be decided in each case as it arises, and there is no fixed standard that will apply *270 to all situations. As repeatedly stated, the primary consideration and determining factor in all cases is the welfare of the child.
5. Defendant's unchallenged affidavit, filed in support of her motion in this proceeding, states facts showing such a change in circumstances and conditions following the modification of decree made in July 1952 that directly affect the welfare of the child, as to warrant a change in its permanent custody. We do not feel it necessary to detail those facts but simply to state our conclusion.
The continual efforts made by defendant to obtain the custody of her little child, the modifications of decree that have been made in her favor, the total absence of any evidence showing her unfitness or any neglect of the child on her part, although the child has been in her actual custody continuously for a long period of time with plaintiff's consent and the approval of the court, demonstrate not only her fitness to have such custody but also that the child's best interests and welfare will be promoted by awarding such custody to her. There is no doubt about her love for her child nor her deep interest in its welfare.
6. In denying defendant's motion, it appears that the trial court was influenced by certain charges of misconduct on defendant's part, contained in an affidavit filed by plaintiff in January 1952 in opposition to defendant's first motion to modify the decree. Also, it is apparent that the trial judge relied to some extent upon some personal knowledge he had gained dehors the record, for during the course of the hearing he said: "* * * The complaint sets forth some very sketchy grounds for divorce. This court is aware however of the facts preceding the divorce which were not *271 stated in the complaint; namely: That this woman was living ilicitly [sic] with a minister of [naming the religous organization] in this town." No such evidence was offered, nor was any such claim made, upon the hearing of the instant proceeding. In Laurance v. Laurance, 198 Or 630, 258 P2d 784, 787, Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, in speaking for the court, pointed out the impropriety of a trial judge basing conclusions upon matters within his own personal knowledge and not of record in the case. What is said in that case is applicable to the situation now before the court.
Under the decisions by this court, defendant is clearly entitled to the custody of her son. Laurance v. Laurance, supra; Pick v. Pick, 197 Or 74, 251 P2d 472; Goldson v. Goldson, supra; Pachkofsky v. Pachkofsky, 192 Or 627, 236 P2d 320; Kellogg v. Kellogg, 187 Or 617, 213 P2d 172; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 184 Or 525, 198 P2d 985.
The decree of the court respecting the custody of David Garrett Wilson, minor child of plaintiff and defendant, shall be, and the same hereby is, modified by substituting therefor the following:
The trial court shall hold a hearing for the purpose of determining the amount of money plaintiff should pay each month toward the support and maintenance of said minor child and enter a decree accordingly.
Inasmuch as the fall term of school is about to open and said child is ready to enter school, we are of the opinion that the mandate in this case should go down immediately upon the filing of this opinion, and it is so ordered.
Reversed. Defendant is entitled to costs.