Title: People v. Fontenot
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S247044
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN REYNOLD FONTENOT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S247044 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Seven 
B271368 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
NA093411 
 
 
August 26, 2019 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin and Corrigan 
concurred. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which 
Justice Groban concurred.  
 
1 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
S247044 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
Defendant John Reynold Fontenot was charged with 
completed kidnapping, but he was convicted of attempted 
kidnapping.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, citing our decision 
in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 (Martinez), which 
treated attempted kidnapping as a lesser included offense of 
completed kidnapping.  Fontenot asks us to overrule Martinez 
and to hold that, despite a statutory provision authorizing 
conviction for attempted crimes even when only completed 
crimes are charged, he could not constitutionally be convicted of 
attempted kidnapping because that offense includes an element 
that completed kidnapping lacks. Accepting the former 
invitation but rejecting the latter, we affirm. 
I.   
One fall evening in 2012, a youth named Destiny was 
babysitting a young child named Madeline.  Madeline and two 
other girls were playing with dolls in the lobby of an apartment 
building, with Destiny looking on.  Fontenot entered the lobby 
and approached the children.  When Fontenot got close enough, 
he grabbed Madeline by the arm and started pulling her towards 
the door.  Destiny intervened.  She latched onto Madeline’s other 
arm, struggling to wrest the child from Fontenot’s grasp.  As 
Destiny kicked Fontenot, the other two girls hit him with their 
dolls –– so he let go.  Destiny swept up Madeline in her arms 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
and told the other girls to run.  Fontenot fled, only to return a 
few hours later.  He was promptly arrested. 
About three months later, the People charged Fontenot 
with kidnapping in violation of Penal Code section 207, 
subdivision (a).1  Tracking the statutory definition of the 
completed offense, the first amended information alleged that, 
“[o]n or about September 15, 2012,” Fontenot “did unlawfully, 
forcibly and by instilling fear steal, take, hold, detain and arrest 
MADELINE C. in LOS ANGELES County, California and did 
take the said MADELINE C. into another country, state, county 
and another part of LOS ANGELES County.”  (See § 207, subd. 
(a).)  The document also alleged that the victim was under the 
age of 14.  (See § 208, subd. (b).)  Fontenot pleaded not guilty 
and waived his right to a jury trial.  
At Fontenot’s subsequent bench trial in March 2016, the 
People argued in closing argument that he was guilty of 
completed kidnapping.  Fontenot’s attorney acknowledged 
during her closing argument that, if not “for the intervening of 
Destiny and the other two little girls hitting [Fontenot] and him 
getting kicked, there might have been a completed crime” — but 
countered that those facts showed only a “classic attempt.”  
Because there was “no substantial movement” of the victim, the 
evidence — though “sufficient to show an attempt” — was 
insufficient to prove the completed crime.  The trial court agreed 
with Fontenot’s attorney.  Sitting as the trier of fact, it found 
“there was definitely a crime,” though only “an attempt,” not 
“a completed kidnapping.”  Noting that attempted kidnapping, 
unlike completed kidnapping, is “a specific intent crime,” the 
                                        
1  
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise noted. 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
trial court expressly found Fontenot had formed the requisite 
specific intent.  The trial court therefore found him “not guilty 
of the kidnapping but guilty of the attempt[ed] kidnapping.”  
Fontenot’s attorney responded, “Thank you.” 
The next day, Fontenot’s attorney filed a letter brief 
challenging the verdict.  She pointed out that the People neither 
charged Fontenot with, nor urged a conviction for, attempted 
kidnapping.  Fontenot’s attorney also argued that, because 
attempted kidnapping is “not a lesser included offense” of 
completed kidnapping, the trial court lacked any power to 
convict him of attempted kidnapping.  Yet she acknowledged 
that “the facts might support such a conviction.”  The trial court 
rejected the challenge to its verdict.  Under the “Three Strikes” 
law, a conviction for attempted kidnapping –– like a conviction 
for completed kidnapping –– exposed Fontenot to a life sentence.  
(See § 667, subd. (e)(2)(A).)  But the trial court nonetheless 
agreed with the People that, at trial, Fontenot’s attorney 
effectively invited a conviction for attempted kidnapping, 
instead of merely arguing that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove completed kidnapping.  Fontenot ultimately received a 
Three Strikes sentence. 
Fontenot appealed.  In its unpublished decision, the Court 
of Appeal treated as controlling our conclusion in Martinez that 
“attempted kidnapping is a lesser included offense of 
kidnapping.”  So despite acknowledging that our subsequent 
decision in People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740 (Bailey) 
“appears to undermine” Martinez by holding that attempted 
escape is not a lesser included offense of escape, the Court of 
Appeal affirmed.  In view of “the apparent confusion in the 
intermediate appellate courts following Bailey,” however, the 
Court of Appeal asked us to “provide further guidance with 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
regard to the issues surrounding attempted kidnapping.”  
Taking the request from our appellate court colleagues to heart, 
we granted review. 
II. 
Fontenot was charged with completed kidnapping under 
section 207, subdivision (a).  That provision establishes that 
“[e]very person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling 
fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in 
this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or 
county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of 
kidnapping.”  (§ 207, subd. (a).)  What Fontenot was convicted of 
is an attempt to commit kidnapping within the meaning of 
section 207, subdivision (a).  But by itself, this discrepancy 
between charge and conviction does not warrant reversal.  Nor 
do any other arguments Fontenot has properly presented in our 
court. 
A. 
Under California law, a defendant may be convicted of an 
attempt even if the People charged only the completed crime.  
The relevant statute is Penal Code section 1159, and what it 
provides is this:  “The jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, 
may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of 
which is necessarily included in that with which he is 
charged, or of an attempt to commit the offense.”  (Italics added.)  
Citing section 1159, we upheld in People v. Oates (1904) 142 
Cal. 12 (Oates) a conviction where the jury was instructed on, 
and found the defendant guilty of, an attempt to commit the 
completed offense charged in the information.  (Id. at pp. 13-14 
[describing as “erroneous” the “assumption that [a] defendant 
[may] not be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
charged”].)  We approved such a procedure both before and after 
deciding Oates.  (See People v. Defoor (1893) 100 Cal. 150, 154 
[before]; People v. Vanderbilt (1926) 199 Cal. 461, 464 [after].)   
California is not alone.  Many jurisdictions have a similar 
statute or rule allowing criminal defendants to be convicted of 
an attempt when they are charged only with the completed 
offense.  In the federal system, for example, Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, rule 31(c) provides (in relevant part) that a 
“defendant may be found guilty” of not just “an offense 
necessarily included in the offense charged,” but also “an 
attempt to commit the offense charged.”  (Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., 
rule 31(c)(1)-(2); see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce (2007) 
549 U.S. 102, 111, fn. 7 (Resendiz-Ponce) [noting that 
“a defendant indicted only for a completed offense can be 
convicted of attempt under Rule 31(c)”]; U.S. v. Castro-Trevino 
(5th Cir. 2006) 464 F.3d 536, 542; U.S. v. Pino (4th Cir. 1979) 
608 F.2d 1001, 1003; U.S. v. Marin (2d Cir. 1975) 513 F.2d 974, 
976; Simpson v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1952) 195 F.2d 721, 723.)  Similar 
provisions are on the books in at least three dozen states, along 
with the District of Columbia and the United States Virgin 
Islands as well.2  (See, e.g., Ga. Code § 16-4-3 [“A person charged 
with commission of a crime may be convicted of the offense of 
criminal attempt as to that crime without being specifically 
charged with the criminal attempt in the accusation, 
indictment, or presentment.”]; Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 916 [“The 
                                        
2  
Some jurisdictions, like California, have a general statute 
proscribing any attempt to commit a codified completed offense.  
(See § 664.)  But federal law, for example, has no such general 
attempt statute and thus punishes only attempts that are 
themselves specifically enumerated in the criminal code.  (See 
U.S. v. Castro-Trevino, supra, 464 F.3d at pp. 541-542.) 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the 
commission of which is necessarily included in that with which 
he is charged, or of an attempt to commit the offense.” (Italics 
added)]; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 505.020(2)(a-b) [“A defendant may 
be convicted of an offense that is included in any offense with 
which he is formally charged.  An offense is so included when:  
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged . . . .” 
(italics added)].)3 
Courts across the country have held that such provisions 
raise no federal constitutional problem.  Several state high 
courts have addressed whether their relevant statute or rule 
gives defendants charged with a completed offense sufficient 
                                        
3  
(See also Alaska Rules Crim. Proc., rule 31(c); Ala. Code 
§ 13A-1-9(a)(2); Ariz. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 21.4(a)(2); Ark. 
Code Ann. § 16-89-126; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-408(5)(b); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 54-60; D.C. Rules Crim. Proc. rule 31(c)(2); Fla. 
Rules Crim. Proc., rule 3.510(a); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2312; 
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168(2); Iowa Rules Crim. Proc., rule 
2.22(3); Kan. Stat. § 21-5109(b)(3); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 
§ 152(3-A); Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.32(1); Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.04(1)-(2); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-5(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 556.046(3); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-607(1); N.M. Rules Crim. 
Proc., rule 5-611(D); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2025; Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 175.501; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-170; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-
8(d)(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.74; Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.465; 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-14; S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-26-8; Tenn. 
Rules Crim. Proc., rule 31(d)(1)(B); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 
art. 37.09(4); V.I. Rules Crim. Proc. rule 31(c)(2); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 13, § 10; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(b); Va. Rules Crim. 
Proc., rule 3A:17(c); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.61.003; W. Va. Code 
§ 62-3-18; Wis. Stat. § 939.66(4); Wyo. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 
31(c).) 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
notice that they may instead face conviction for an attempt.  And 
all those courts have concluded the answer is yes.  (See, e.g., 
State v. Young (Vt. 1981) 433 A.2d 254, 258 [holding that such a 
provision prevented “unfair surprise”]; Patton v. State 
(Miss. 2012) 109 So.3d 66, 81 [similar]; see also Com. v. Sims 
(Pa. 2007) 919 A.2d 931, 941-942 [relying in part on Model Pen. 
Code, § 1.07, subd. (4)(b) to hold that a defendant convicted of, 
but not charged with, an attempt to commit the charged offense 
suffered no constitutional violation — even without a state 
statute on point]; State v. LeFurge (N.J. 1986) 502 A.2d 35, 41 & 
fn. 8 (LeFurge) [holding that a state statute allowing convictions 
for conspiracy to commit a charged offense gave the defendant 
“adequate notice”].)  So has the only federal appellate court to 
confront an analogous constitutional challenge related to 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 31(c).  (See United 
States v. Brozyna (2d Cir. 1978) 571 F.2d 742, 746 (Brozyna).)  
“The courts,” in other words, “are in general agreement that an 
attempt conviction may be had on a charge of the completed 
crime.”  (2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (3d ed. 2018) 
§ 11.5(c) (LaFave).)  Indeed, to our knowledge no federal 
appellate court has concluded the federal Constitution dictates 
that an attempt conviction is necessarily invalid if the defendant 
was charged only with the completed offense.  Neither has any 
state high court. 
True:  courts have offered a range of explanations for why 
a defendant may be convicted of an attempt despite being 
charged only with the completed crime.  Some have cited case 
law in their jurisdictions to argue that an attempt is invariably 
a lesser included offense of the completed crime.  (See, e.g., State 
v. Young, supra, 433 A.2d at pp. 542-543.)  Others have looked 
instead to the notice provided by the terms of their relevant 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
state statute or rule.  (See, e.g., Patton v. State, supra, 109 So.3d 
at p. 81, citing Eakes v. State (Miss. 1995) 665 So.2d 852, 860; 
State v. March (Conn.App. 1995) 664 A.2d 1157, 1161.)  Despite 
such distinctions, not one state high court or federal appellate 
court has reversed an attempt conviction simply because the 
defendant was charged only with the completed crime. 
We decline Fontenot’s invitation to be the first.  The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution accords criminal 
defendants the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation” against them.  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; see 
People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 640 (Seaton).)  Federal 
due process principles likewise “ ‘require[] that an accused be 
advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken 
by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.’ ”  (Seaton, at 
pp. 640-641, quoting People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317.)4  
But as we see it, the whole point of section 1159 — and 
provisions like it — is to serve these constitutional commands.   
Section 1159 informs criminal defendants charged with a 
completed crime that they must prepare to defend against not 
just that crime and “necessarily included” offenses, but also 
against “an attempt to commit” the completed crime.  By 
establishing that background rule for all such charges, the 
statute is meant to provide notice across the board.  
(See Brozyna, supra, 571 F.2d at p. 746 [noting that Fed. Rules 
Crim. Proc., rule 31(c) made clear the defendant needed “to 
                                        
4  
The California Constitution has a similar requirement.  
(Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 640-641.)  But Fontenot 
grounds his claim solely in the federal Constitution, so we focus 
our analysis there. 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
prepare to defend not only against that charge but also against 
whatever necessarily included offenses and attempts she could 
have been convicted of under” the rule (italics added)]; LeFurge, 
supra, 502 A.2d at p. 41 [describing similar provision as 
providing “express notice to defendant[s]”]; State v. March, 
supra, 664 A.2d at p. 1161 [similar].)   
What’s more, any attempt bears an extremely close 
relationship to the completed crime.  Attempts, after all, are 
defined as incomplete efforts to commit a completed crime.  (See, 
e.g., § 21a [“An attempt to commit a crime consists of two 
elements:  a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but 
ineffectual act done toward its commission.”].)  This tight nexus 
might explain why provisions like section 1159 are so common 
across the United States.  So beyond what section 1159 reveals 
as a statutory signpost here, prohibitions on criminal attempts 
are premised on — and in some sense convey — an intuitive 
idea:  someone whose actions and intentions fall just short of 
constituting a completed crime shouldn’t necessarily get off 
scot-free.  With that double-barreled forewarning in place, we 
conclude that a charging document enumerating the elements 
of a completed crime and specifying the time and place of the 
crime’s alleged commission gives defendants — at least in most 
cases — constitutionally sufficient notice that they may be 
convicted of an attempt to commit the crime charged.  (Resendiz-
Ponce, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 108.) 
B. 
What section 1159 does not purport to do — and what it 
constitutionally could not do — is let the People earn a criminal 
conviction without proving every element of the offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
523, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 277-278.)  
Nothing of the sort happened here.  To be sure, an attempt to 
commit kidnapping under section 207, subdivision (a) has an 
intent element that the completed crime lacks.  But in this case 
the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, recognized as much 
and made an express finding on that additional element. 
1. 
The People concede that attempted kidnapping is not a 
lesser included offense of completed kidnapping, given the 
context of section 207, subdivision (a) and our decision in Bailey 
We agree.5   
To determine whether one offense is a lesser included 
offense of another, we have at times looked to the accusatory 
pleading in the case before us, as well as to the statutory 
elements of the two offenses at issue.  (People v. Robinson (2016) 
63 Cal.4th 200, 207.)  But because the first amended information 
charging 
Fontenot 
with 
completed 
kidnapping 
merely 
“incorporate[d] the statutory definition of the charged offense 
without referring to the particular facts” in detail, we “must rely 
                                        
5  
In Justice Kruger’s view, “there is no real reason for us to 
decide the issue here, overruling precedent in the process.”  
(Conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 2.)  But whether attempted 
kidnapping is a lesser included offense of kidnapping is precisely 
the issue on which we granted review and an issue on which 
even the Court of Appeal asked us to provide guidance.  That we 
also hold that section 1159 provides constitutionally sufficient 
notice does not detract from the need for guidance on this issue.  
(See Bank of Italy Nat. etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 
650 [“It is well settled that where two independent reasons are 
given for a decision, neither one is to be considered mere dictum 
. . . .  The ruling on both grounds is the judgment of the court 
and each is of equal validity.”]   
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
on the statutory elements” alone.  (Ibid.)  So here we need only 
apply the so-called “elements test.”  (Ibid.)  What that test 
requires is determining whether a given crime’s elements 
together constitute a mere subset of another crime’s elements.  
(Ibid.)  If the answer is yes, the greater offense “ ‘ “ ‘cannot be 
committed without also necessarily committing [the] lesser 
offense.’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 748.)  
Which means that, so long as some additional evidence is 
required to support a conviction for the former, the latter is a 
lesser included offense.  (Robinson, at p. 207.) 
Our decision in Bailey likewise hinged solely on a 
comparison of the statutory elements of the two offenses at issue 
in that case.  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 751-752.)  There, 
we held that attempted escape is not a lesser included offense of 
completed escape.  (Id. at p. 749.)  To commit completed escape, 
we explained, the mental state required is only what we and 
other courts have often called “general criminal intent”:  if “the 
defendant intentionally d[id] the act which constitutes the 
crime,” the government need not prove his precise purpose for 
doing it.  (Ibid.)  By contrast, “attempt to escape requires a 
specific intent to escape” — that is, a conscious design or purpose 
to avoid confinement.  (Ibid.; see also People v. Pool (1865) 27 
Cal. 572, 585 (opn. on denial of rehearing) [defining “specific 
intent” 
as 
a 
“design 
or 
purpose” 
of 
achieving 
a 
particular — usually harmful — end]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 463, 518-519, fn. 15 [observing that a “crime is 
characterized as a ‘general intent’ crime when the required 
mental state entails only an intent to do the act that causes the 
harm,” but it “is characterized as a ‘specific intent’ crime when 
the required mental state entails an intent to cause the 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
resulting harm”].)  The latter offense therefore calls for a more 
searching inquiry into the defendant’s mental state.   
We ourselves have lamented that the distinction between 
specific and general intent is “notoriously difficult to define and 
apply” — but the distinction between intent of a more specific or 
more general nature nevertheless can be meaningful.  (People v. 
Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456 (Hood).)  Case in point:  evidence 
that the defendant in Bailey “was voluntarily intoxicated or 
intended to return [to prison]” would bear on whether he was 
guilty of attempted escape, but not on whether he was guilty of 
completed escape.  (Bailey, at p. 749; see also Carter v. United 
States (2000) 530 U.S. 255, 268 [distinguishing “ ‘specific 
intent’ ” from “ ‘general intent’ ” on the ground that the former, 
but not the latter, demands inquiry into whether the defendant 
had a purpose or goal to cause a particular harm when 
performing a set of physical acts].)6 
                                        
6  
It may be true in some sense that as a purely “abstract 
proposition, every completed crime necessarily involves an 
attempt to commit it.”  (People v. Vanderbilt, supra, 199 Cal. at 
p. 463; see conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 5.)  But that 
statement risks simply assuming its conclusion by implying that 
a completed crime always includes an attempt to commit that 
crime, because it does (rather than acknowledging that this 
question is part of what’s at issue in the case), or eliding the 
distinction between the colloquial use of the word “attempt” and 
the use of it as a term of art to describe a certain category of 
inchoate criminal offenses.  In any event, even if we embraced 
the abstract proposition, we see no clear practical basis for a 
cross-cutting rule based on this proposition.  As we observed in 
Bailey, such a rule would not apply “where the attempted 
offense includes a particularized intent that goes beyond what 
is required by the completed offense.”  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th 
at p. 753.)   
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
Hood expressly recognized the meaningful “difference in 
mental activity” required for “crimes that have traditionally 
been characterized as crimes of specific intent” as compared to 
those traditionally characterized as crimes of general intent.  
(Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 458.)  That difference, as we’ve 
reiterated today, is the distinction between (i) merely 
committing a physical act intentionally and (ii) engaging in goal-
oriented, purposive thinking.  (See People v. Williams (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 779, 786 [distinguishing “ ‘an intent to commit [an] act’ ” 
from “a specific intent to obtain some further objective” and 
concluding the former falls short of describing “the traditional 
formulation of criminal attempt later codified in section 21a, 
which requires a specific intent”].)  And as we held in Hood, that 
distinction “is sufficient to justify drawing a line between” those 
two types of crimes for, among other things, “considering 
evidence of intoxication in the one case and disregarding it in 
the other.”  (Hood, at p. 458.)  So under our precedents, the kind 
of “specific intent” at issue in attempted kidnapping is indeed a 
“heightened mental state” distinct from a mere intent to commit 
the physical acts constituting the completed crime.7  (Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 751; see also Williams, at p. 786.) 
                                        
7  
Justice Kruger looks to Chief Justice Traynor’s statement 
in Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d 444, that “[t]here is no real difference, 
however, only a linguistic one, between an intent to do an act 
already performed and an intent to do that same act in the 
future.”  (Id. at p. 457.)  Based on this discussion, Justice Kruger 
concludes that general intent and specific intent “will generally 
be indistinguishable” when a crime is defined only in terms of 
committing a particular act.  (Conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at 
p. 5.)  But what’s at issue here is not whether it makes sense to 
draw a distinction between an intent to do an act already 
 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
Attempts require a heightened mental state for good 
reason.  As we explained in Bailey, requiring a heightened 
mental state for attempt liability helps distinguish, for example, 
“the act of an attempt to escape” from the “same act of a violation 
of prison rules” or even purely “ ‘innocuous behavior.’ ”  (Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 751, quoting U.S. v. Bailey (1980) 444 
U.S. 394, 405.)  When someone intentionally commits an act 
constituting a completed felony, for example, that person’s 
culpability is often obvious because “the completed act is itself 
culpable conduct.”  (U.S. v. Gracidas-Ulibarry (9th Cir. 2000) 
231 F.3d 1188, 1193 (en banc).)  But when someone intentionally 
commits an act that merely could be a step towards committing 
a certain completed crime, “uncertainty” about the person’s 
culpability — or at least the contours of that culpability — 
persists.  (Ibid.)   
To ensure that only those whose intentions and actions 
made them a pronounced threat to accomplish what a given 
criminal statute prohibits may be found criminally liable, courts 
impose a “heightened intent requirement” for attempts — even 
when the completed crime requires a less demanding mental 
state.  (U.S. v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, supra, 231 F.3d at p. 1193.)  
In effect, the higher bar serves as a bulwark against convicting 
someone of attempting to accomplish something they never set 
                                        
performed and an intent to do the same act in the future, where 
the individual in question happens to have an intent that fulfills 
the requirement for both the completed offense and the attempt.  
What’s at issue is whether we should presume that the only 
conceivable kind of intent that would make an individual guilty 
of a completed offense is the kind of intent that would also be 
enough to allow for conviction of the inchoate offense of attempt.  
That’s not a question that has an elegant metaphysical answer. 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
out to do.  “Because the act constituting a criminal attempt ‘need 
not be the last proximate or ultimate step toward commission of 
the substantive crime,’ criminal attempt has always required ‘a 
specific intent to commit the crime.’ ”  (People v. Williams, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 786, quoting People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
349, 376.)  And in California, the Legislature codified that 
safeguard:  under section 21a, an attempt conviction requires 
“specific intent to commit the [completed] crime,” even if the 
underlying offense is a general intent crime.  (Italics added.) 
Bailey concerned this same principle.  There, we noted it 
would be difficult to determine whether a prisoner who “stole a 
pair of wire cutters” had at that point attempted to escape.  
(Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 751.)  Yes, the prisoner might 
have intended to use them “to cut through the outer perimeter 
fence of the prison institution.”  (Ibid.)  And had he done that 
and run off, there would be no doubt he committed the 
completed crime of escape.  (Ibid.)  But the prisoner might also 
have intended to use the wire cutters “as a weapon to attack 
another inmate.”  (Ibid.)  So if he were apprehended soon after 
stealing them, one couldn’t know whether he attempted to 
escape –– not without more information about what specifically 
he had planned to do with the wire cutters.  (Ibid.)  Hence the 
“specific intent requirement” for attempted escape.  (Ibid.) 
When it comes to the elements of completed kidnapping 
and attempted kidnapping under section 207, subdivision (a), 
we see a similar distinction.  We’ve described completed 
kidnapping under that provision as a “general intent crime.”  
(People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 257).  Conviction under 
section 207, subdivision (a) requires the defendant to 
intentionally perform the physical acts constituting the crime.  
And because any criminal conviction in California (with a few 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
exceptions not applicable here) requires, as a threshold matter, 
“a union of act and wrongful intent” (People v. Mayberry (1975) 
15 Cal.3d 143, 154 (Mayberry)) under section 20, we have 
further concluded that someone with an honest and reasonable 
belief that the victim “voluntarily consented to accompany him” 
(Mayberry, at p. 155) is not guilty of completed kidnapping.  (See 
also § 26, class Three [providing that someone is not guilty of a 
crime if they “committed the act or made the omission charged 
under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any 
criminal intent”].)  So to satisfy a basic requirement for 
criminality — that a defendant’s mental state be culpable in 
some minimal way — completed kidnapping under section 207, 
subdivision (a) requires not just the intentional commission of 
physical acts, but also –– at least — criminal negligence as to 
consent.  (Mayberry, at p. 154, citing People v. Vogel (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 798, 801, fn. 2.)  Voluntary intoxication, moreover, does 
not bear on whether a defendant formed the intent necessary to 
be guilty of completed kidnapping.  (People v. Hernandez (1988) 
46 Cal.3d 194, 209-211.) 
An attempt to commit kidnapping under section 207, 
subdivision (a), by contrast, is most consistent with what our 
case law tends to describe as a “specific intent” crime.  It 
requires that the defendant act with a conscious design or 
purpose to accomplish what the provision punishing the 
completed crime prohibits (or –– stated otherwise –– to bring 
about the harmful result that statute proscribes):  taking and 
carrying away the victim a substantial distance, by force or fear, 
and without consent.  (§ 207, subd. (a).)  So here, as in Bailey, 
“the attempted offense includes a particularized intent that goes 
beyond what is required by the completed offense.”  (Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 753.)  For example, while voluntary 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
intoxication does not matter for whether someone is guilty of 
completed kidnapping, it does matter for whether someone is 
guilty of attempted kidnapping.  (See People v. Williams (1988) 
44 Cal.3d 883, 908 [noting that “alcohol intoxication” may 
negate “specific intent to commit” kidnapping].)  So it’s possible 
for an intoxicated defendant to commit completed kidnapping 
under section 207, subdivision (a) without necessarily 
committing attempted kidnapping along the way.  And while 
completed kidnapping under that provision requires mere 
criminal negligence as to consent to satisfy the baseline 
requirement for criminality of (almost) any kind (Mayberry, 
supra¸ 15 Cal.3d at p. 154), attempted kidnapping requires the 
defendant to purposefully inflict whatever degree of force or fear 
is required to overcome the victim’s will (see §§ 21a, 207, subd. 
(a); cf. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 509.).  Put another way:  we 
agree with the “prevailing view” that an attempt “cannot be 
committed by recklessness or negligence” — “even if the 
underlying crime can be so committed.”  (LaFave, supra, § 11.3, 
p. 293.) 
Of course, the Legislature may conclude it makes sense to 
punish negligent or reckless conduct in this context, irrespective 
of whether a particular harm is brought about — and subject to 
constitutional constraints, it can criminalize such conduct.  (See 
LaFave, supra, § 11.3(b), p. 298.)  While enactment of such an 
offense would functionally overlap with the kind of attempt 
Justice Kruger envisions –– where the required mens rea is 
merely recklessness or negligence –– there’s no basis in our law 
to presume that attempt offenses require mere negligence or 
recklessness.  To the contrary:  such a conclusion cuts sharply 
against the distinctions we’ve repeatedly drawn between the 
intent that must be shown to establish a defendant’s guilt of a 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
completed offense, and the intent that establishes attempt.  (See 
Bailey, supra, at pp. 750-751; Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 
786.)  Other courts have drawn similar distinctions, too.  (See, 
e.g., United States v. Bailey, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 405 
[explaining that “inchoate offenses such as attempt” require a 
“heightened mental state” as compared to completed offenses]; 
U.S. v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, supra, 231 F.3d at p. 1192 [similar].)   
The additional intent element required both for attempted 
escape and for attempted kidnapping underscores why we 
decided Bailey the way we did.  A reviewing court may not 
reduce a conviction for completed escape to one for attempted 
escape, we explained in Bailey, because doing so would gloss 
over the heightened intent requirement that, for the latter 
offense, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752.)  And that additional element 
suggests we were wrong in Martinez to reduce on appeal a 
conviction for completed kidnapping to one for attempted 
kidnapping. 
In neither Bailey nor Martinez was the attempt a lesser 
included offense of the completed crime under the elements test.  
Moreover, in Bailey, the case was “tried solely as an escape” and 
“the trial court did not instruct on attempt to escape . . . .”  
(Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752.)  The jury, then, “was never 
required to make a finding of specific intent to escape” when it 
returned a guilty verdict of the completed offense.  (Ibid.)  
Martinez is scarcely different.  That case was tried solely as a 
completed kidnapping under section 207, subdivision (a).  (See 
Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 230.)  And a conviction for 
attempted kidnapping was not contemplated until appeal.  (Id. 
at p. 241.)  So the jury was never asked to find that the 
defendant formed the specific intent to kidnap notwithstanding, 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
for example, evidence he was drunk at the time of the alleged 
crime.  (See id. at p. 229.)  And because only the general intent 
crime of completed kidnapping under section 207, subdivision 
(a) was litigated at trial, the defendant had no reason to build a 
defense around voluntary intoxication.  Yet our decision to 
reduce on appeal the defendant’s conviction for completed 
kidnapping to attempted kidnapping did not rest on a reasoned 
consideration of these complexities.  It relied instead on the 
assumption that an attempt was always a “lesser included 
offense” of the completed crime.  (Martinez, at p. 241).  So we 
overrule that portion of Martinez. 
Yet we do not supplant Martinez’s across-the-board 
assumption with an equally sweeping conclusion of our own.  
Our decision does not mean all attempts are created equal, any 
more than all completed offenses are.  Attempts may be lesser 
included offenses of the completed crime — and, at the very 
least, application of the elements test may not always be 
straightforward.  (See Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 753.)  Look 
no further than the very criminal statute at issue here.  Other 
variations of kidnapping set out in different subdivisions of 
section 207 have distinct elements, including as to the mental 
state required for a conviction.  Subdivision (c), for example, 
establishes as a separate offense kidnapping that is:  
(1) achieved by force, fear, or various forms of deception; and 
(2) “for the purpose and with the intent to sell [the victim] into 
slavery or involuntary servitude, or otherwise to employ” the 
victim against his or her will.  (§ 207, subd. (c), italics added.)   
And while subdivision (e) does not itself establish a stand-
alone offense, it provides that — for the various “types of 
kidnapping [offenses] requiring force” established in other 
subdivisions of section 207, including kidnapping under 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
subdivision (a) — “the amount of force required to kidnap an 
unresisting infant or child is the amount of physical force 
required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance 
for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  (§ 207, subd. (e), 
italics added; see also People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 768.)  
That latter wrinkle could affect whether the attempted 
kidnapping of a young child is a lesser included offense of the 
completed crime.  (See conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at pp. 13-
17.)  Indeed, these are precisely the kind of “ ‘intricacies and 
doctrinal divergences’ ” (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 753, 
quoting Moorman v. Thalacker (8th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 970, 974) 
that, as we explained in Bailey, cut against “ ‘generaliz[ing] in 
the law of attempt’ ” (Bailey, at p. 753, quoting U.S. v. Berrigan 
(3d Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 171, 187). 
True:  this case involved a young victim.  But at no point 
have the People relied on subdivision (e) of section 207 — nor 
does the briefing before us address any subdivision of section 
207 other than (a).  So whether subdivision (e) means that 
attempted kidnapping is a lesser included offense of the 
completed crime in cases involving young victims is a question 
not properly presented here.  Accordingly, we needn’t express 
any view on that narrow issue.8  Our decision today concerns 
                                        
8  
Justice Kruger is quite right that the People need not 
expressly plead a violation of subdivision (e) of section 207 when 
they charge a defendant with a kidnapping offense.  (See conc. 
opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 16, citing People v. Westerfield 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 715.)  But that’s somewhat beside the point 
in this case.  What matters for present purposes is that this 
issue is not central to the question on which we granted review, 
and we lack briefing about the effect (if any) of subdivision (e).  
Nor was that issue addressed at oral argument.  Because we 
 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
instead the question addressed in the briefing before us:  
whether, putting aside potential complications caused by the 
application of subdivision (e), attempted kidnapping under 
subdivision (a) is a lesser included offense of completed 
kidnapping.  We conclude the answer to that question is no. 
2. 
Yet this case differs from Bailey and Martinez in one 
crucial respect.  The factfinder in those jury trials (the jury) 
never found the specific intent required for an attempt 
conviction; the jury was not even instructed on it.  (See Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752; Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 
pp. 230, 241.)  So in Bailey we held that the defendant’s 
conviction at trial for the completed offense could not be changed 
on appeal to a conviction for an attempt.  And we erred in 
Martinez by not reaching a similar result.  But the factfinder in 
Fontenot’s bench trial (the judge) recognized that a conviction 
for attempted kidnapping requires specific intent — and he 
expressly made a finding to that effect.  Accordingly, unlike in 
Bailey and Martinez, the factfinder in this case indeed found 
every element necessary to support an attempt conviction.   
That distinction matters.  The constitutional defect 
lurking in the attempt convictions contemplated only on appeal 
in Bailey and Martinez does not apply to the attempt conviction 
                                        
lack input from the parties and need not resolve any question 
about subdivision (e) in order to decide this case, we decline to 
address it.  (See, e.g., Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 
356, fn. 6 [noting that we generally decline to consider 
arguments not raised in the briefs].)  So contrary to Justice 
Kruger’s suggestion, nothing about our decision today calls 
Westerfield into question.   
 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
imposed at Fontenot’s trial.  As a result, our conclusion that 
attempted kidnapping is not a lesser included offense of 
completed 
kidnapping 
in 
the 
context of 
section 
207, 
subdivision (a) does not — standing alone — warrant reversal 
of Fontenot’s conviction for the former crime. 
C. 
We have concluded that section 1159 means what it says, 
and that the statute, so read, is constitutional.  And consistent 
with our decision in Bailey, attempted kidnapping is not a lesser 
included offense of completed kidnapping, at least in the context 
of section 207, subdivision (a).  At trial, moreover, the factfinder 
found every element of attempted kidnapping beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  So contrary to Fontenot’s contentions, we are 
not convinced that his conviction must be reversed. 
To be sure, Fontenot cites language from our precedents 
that might appear in some tension with what we hold today.  
A single sentence in Bailey opined that we have “made the 
qualification that under section 1159, ‘ “[a] defendant may be 
convicted of an uncharged crime if, but only if, the uncharged 
crime is necessarily included in the charged crime.” ’ ”  (Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752, quoting People v. Sloan (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 110, 116.)  And in cases before Bailey we made similar, 
seemingly absolute assertions about the constitutionality of 
convicting a defendant for committing an uncharged crime.  
(See, e.g., Sloan, at p. 116; People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 
1227; People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 973; People v. 
Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 367; People v. West (1970) 3 
Cal.3d 595, 612; In re Hess (1955) 45 Cal.2d 171, 174-175.)   
But because we do not treat cases as “authority for 
propositions not considered,” the sweeping assertions on which 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
Fontenot relies do not dictate our decision in this case about the 
meaning and constitutionality of section 1159.  (In re Tartar 
(1959) 52 Cal.2d 250, 258; see also People v. Ghobrial (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 250, 285.)  Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th 740, addressed 
only the power of an appellate court to reduce a conviction for 
escape to a conviction for attempt, where the trial court did not 
instruct on attempt to escape.  Unlike here, “concerns about 
notice [we]re not at issue . . . .”  (Id. at p. 752.)  Instead, what 
concerned us in Bailey was the fact that the failure to instruct 
the jury regarding the specific intent required for an attempt to 
escape meant that the jury “did not impliedly find all the 
elements of the attempt offense.”  (Ibid.)  Neither Bailey nor any 
of those prior decisions from our court confronted a situation like 
this one:  a case where the defendant was charged with a 
completed offense, but at trial the factfinder nevertheless 
considered, and found every element of, an attempt.  (In fact, 
other than Bailey, none of those decisions concerned attempts at 
all.)  The only time we have confronted circumstances at all like 
those here was in Oates, and there we upheld the defendant’s 
conviction for an attempt.9  (Oates, supra, 142 Cal. at p. 14.)   
The dissent’s view that a person might nonetheless have 
reasonably relied on these statements — not holdings — 
                                        
9  
The dissent faults our citation of Oates on the ground that 
Oates addressed whether section 1159 had been properly 
enacted.  Therefore, the dissent contends, Oates could not have 
given Fontenot notice that he could be convicted of an uncharged 
attempt.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, p. 6.)  But this court 
subsequently cited Oates for the “well-established principle[]” 
that pursuant to section 1159, a person may be convicted of an 
attempt to commit a charged crime even if not charged with an 
attempt of the charged crime.  (People v. Vanderbilt, supra, 199 
Cal. at p. 464.) 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
concerning the propriety of convictions for uncharged crimes in 
our prior cases assumes that a person would reasonably adopt 
an atextual reading of section 1159.  More particularly, taking 
those assertions at face value would strip the statutory language 
“or of an attempt to commit the offense” of any meaning 
whatsoever.  (Ibid.)  But whenever reasonably possible, courts 
avoid reading statutes in a way that renders “meaningless” 
language the Legislature has chosen to enact.  (People v. Hudson 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1010.)  Moreover, as we’ve explained, 
many jurisdictions permit defendants charged only with a 
completed offense to be convicted of an attempt — and no federal 
appellate court or state high court has condemned the practice. 
Even Fontenot himself acknowledges that section 1159 is 
“capable of providing” constitutionally adequate notice to 
defendants that they may be convicted of an attempt even if they 
are charged only with the completed offense.  Yet, in his view, 
that is not the end of the matter.  Fontenot counters that, even 
if the language in our prior decisions was technically dicta, he 
had enough cause for confusion at the time of trial to justify 
reversal of his conviction on constitutional grounds.  And in 
addition to cases from our court, Fontenot cites decisions of the 
Court of Appeal to support that fallback argument, including 
most notably People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239 and 
People v. Hamernik (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 412.   
In Braslaw, which was decided before Fontenot’s trial, the 
Court of Appeal held that trial courts have “no sua sponte duty 
to instruct on attempt unless it is also a lesser included offense.”  
(People v. Braslaw, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247.)  Braslaw 
echoed Bailey’s purported “ ‘qualification’ ” of section 1159 
(Braslaw, at p. 1247), but the case did not involve any issue 
regarding the authority to convict of an uncharged attempt.  In 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
Hamernik, the Court of Appeal reversed an attempt conviction 
solely because the defendant was charged with the completed 
offense but the attempt — though presented to the jury — “was 
not included in the information.”  (People v. Hamernik, supra, 1 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 426-427.)  Hamernik cited Bailey only in 
connection with its analysis of whether the crime of attempt was 
a lesser included offense of the charged crime.  The Hamernik 
court was apparently not aware of, much less confused by, 
Bailey’s dicta on which Fontenot relies.  In fact, Hamernik did 
not even acknowledge section 1159, perhaps because the People 
focused on section 1009, which addresses courts’ authority to 
allow an amendment of charges after the defendant has 
responded to the original pleading.  Moreover, Fontenot could 
not have relied on Hamernik’s erroneous holding because 
Hamernik was decided after the trial in this case.  But Fontenot 
argues that the court’s conclusion nevertheless demonstrates 
that litigants, like the Court of Appeal, wouldn’t have 
understood that a defendant could be convicted of an attempt 
despite being charged only with a completed crime.  So according 
to Fontenot, the state of California case law at the time of his 
trial so muddled the meaning of section 1159 that his conviction 
cannot stand. 
We reject Fontenot’s fallback argument.  Just as our dicta 
in Bailey and other decisions do not control our decision today, 
Fontenot could not reasonably rely on those statements in 
preparing for trial in the face of section 1159’s unambiguous and 
clearly relevant language, and the nearly ubiquitous charging 
practice it establishes.  Indeed, we made clear in Bailey that 
“concerns about notice” were “not at issue” there.  (Bailey, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 752.)  And, as discussed above, not one of our 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
other cases with sweeping, seemingly absolute statements about 
convictions for uncharged crimes involved an attempt.   
These circumstances — a defendant’s reliance on dicta 
that is inconsistent with a clear statute and common practice — 
present a stark contrast to the circumstances in Moss v. 
Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 396 (Moss), on which the 
dissent relies.  (Con. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, pp. 2-3.)  In Moss, 
we 
considered 
whether 
constitutional 
prohibitions 
on 
involuntary servitude and imprisonment for debt precluded a 
judgment of contempt based on a parent’s failure to pay child 
support when the parent’s inability to pay results from the 
parent’s willful failure to seek and accept available employment.  
Our earlier opinion in Ex parte Todd (1897) 119 Cal. 57, which 
held that courts had no power to impose contempt sanctions for 
a failure to pay spousal support when the inability to pay 
resulted from a willful failure to obtain employment, had been 
interpreted to be based on these constitutional prohibitions.  We 
held in Moss that these constitutional prohibitions do not bar 
the imposition of contempt sanctions for the failure to pay child 
support where the failure is based on the parent’s willful failure 
to seek and accept available employment.  We also disapproved 
In re Feiock (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 141, which held that the 
petitioner bore the burden of proof with respect to the issue of 
whether the contemnor had the ability to pay child support.  
(Moss, supra, 17 Cal. 4th at p. 428.)   
But we did not apply our holdings to contemnor Moss, 
because those holdings could “reasonably be seen as both an 
unanticipated expansion of the law of contempt in the child 
support context and a change in the evidentiary burden of which 
[Moss] has no notice at the time of trial.”  (Moss, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 429.)  We acknowledged that Ex parte Todd, supra, 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
119 Cal. 57, on which the contemnor relied, involved spousal 
rather than child support, but observed that “no basis for 
distinguishing child support orders was apparent at the time 
Todd was decided . . . .”  (Moss, at p. 429.)  We also declined to 
assume that the enactment of a statute authorizing a court to 
require a parent to demonstrate efforts to find employment 
would have apprised the contemnor that Todd, which was based 
on substantive constitutional restrictions, no longer applied.  
(Moss, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 429.)  Finally, the contemnor 
“reasonably relied on In re Feiock,” supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 141.  
(Moss, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 429.)  In sum, the contemnor in 
Moss reasonably relied on indistinguishable precedent that was 
based on constitutional principles, whereas Fontenot relied on 
dicta that was inconsistent with a statute that gave him 
constitutionally sufficient notice of the fact that he could be 
convicted of attempt. 
Fontenot had another reason to know he could potentially 
be convicted of attempted kidnapping despite being charged 
only with completed kidnapping.  When he was tried, we had 
not yet overruled Martinez.  Indeed, in Bailey, we cited Martinez 
but took special care not to directly overrule it.  (See Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 753.)  We cautioned that the law of 
attempt is complicated, leaving room for the possibility that we 
might one day reaffirm Martinez’s conclusion that attempted 
kidnapping was a lesser included offense of completed 
kidnapping.  (See ibid.)  Although we decline to take that course 
today, that possibility was very much alive at the time of 
Fontenot’s trial.  So despite overbroad dicta in our prior cases, 
and despite the Court of Appeal’s decisions in Braslaw and 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
Hamernik, Fontenot had ample reason to be ready to defend 
against allegations of attempted kidnapping.10   
III. 
An attempt to commit kidnapping under section 207, 
subdivision (a) has an element that the completed crime does 
not.  To be guilty of completed kidnapping under subdivision (a) 
of section 207, someone need only engage intentionally in the 
action that constitutes the crime — provided there exists a 
union between that act and some minimally wrongful intent, 
and leaving aside the application of subdivision (e) in cases 
involving young victims.  Yet attempted kidnapping in this 
context requires a more demanding mental state:  a conscious 
design or purpose to take and carry away the victim a 
substantial distance, by force or fear, and without consent.  That 
additional intent element serves to distinguish a step towards a 
completed crime from other behavior, and it means courts 
                                        
10  
The dissent contends that our reasoning expects Fontenot 
to have somehow anticipated that we would reject Bailey’s dicta 
regarding section 1159, but not to have anticipated that we 
would overrule Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 225.  (Conc. & dis. 
opn. of Liu, J., post, p. 9.)  Yet our analysis does not depend on 
whether Fontenot might reasonably have questioned our 
holding in Martinez.  The issue instead is whether Fontenot was 
on notice at the time of trial that he could potentially be 
convicted of an uncharged attempted kidnapping.  In light of the 
fact that immediately following Bailey’s dicta, we cited Martinez 
as a case that “stated or applied the general principle that 
attempt is a lesser included offense of any completed crime” 
(Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 753), and we expressly noted that 
the offense in Martinez was kidnapping, the most reasonable 
conclusion at that time was that he could potentially be 
convicted of attempted kidnapping.  The dissent, in contrast, 
would expect a defendant in these circumstances to rely on dicta 
and ignore a holding. 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
cannot assume attempted kidnapping is a lesser included 
offense of completed kidnapping. 
Despite this conclusion, we do not find reversal is 
warranted by the mere fact that Fontenot was charged with 
completed kidnapping but convicted of attempted kidnapping.  
That’s because section 1159 means what it says:  a defendant 
may be convicted of an attempt despite being charged only with 
the completed crime.  And section 1159, so read, comports with 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, as well as with 
federal due process principles. 
Nor does the substance of California’s case law at the time 
of Fontenot’s trial persuade us to disturb the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment.  Contrary to what Fontenot contends, our previous 
decisions and those of the Courts of Appeal gave him sufficient 
reason to know he could potentially be convicted of attempted 
kidnapping despite being charged only with the completed 
offense. 
The foregoing conclusions resolve the challenges to 
Fontenot’s conviction that he has meaningfully advanced in our 
court.  So we affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.  
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.  
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
PEOPLE  v. FONTENOT 
S247044 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
Defendant John Reynold Fontenot was dragging a four-
year-old girl through a building lobby when he was stopped by 
the combined efforts of the girl’s babysitter and her playmates.  
Defendant was charged with kidnapping.  After a bench trial, 
the trial court found that defendant had not managed to 
complete the kidnapping before he was stopped, but that he had 
attempted to kidnap her.  Defendant challenges the resulting 
conviction on the ground that he lacked adequate notice that he 
could be held liable for attempted kidnapping.  He contends that 
attempted kidnapping is not a lesser included offense of 
kidnapping and therefore was not fairly included in the charges 
against him.  He asks us to overrule our precedent holding 
otherwise.  (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 241 
(Martinez).) 
I agree with the majority that the plain language of Penal 
Code section 1159 provided defendant with constitutionally 
sufficient notice that he could be convicted of an attempt to 
commit the charged offense, regardless of whether the attempt 
is considered to be a lesser included offense.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 4–9.)  That is a complete answer to defendant’s challenge, 
and I concur in the majority’s judgment upholding defendant’s 
conviction on that basis. 
The majority, however, does not stop there.  It goes on to 
address the underlying premise of defendant’s argument—that 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
2 
we were wrong in Martinez to call attempted kidnapping a lesser 
included offense of kidnapping—and to agree with it.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, part II.B.1.)  I do not join this portion of the majority’s 
opinion for two reasons. 
First, there is no real reason for us to decide the issue here, 
overruling precedent in the process.  Whether or not attempted 
kidnapping is considered a lesser included offense, as we have 
previously said it is, Penal Code section 1159 informed 
defendant that he could be convicted of attempt.  The majority 
says we still have to assure ourselves that the trial court found 
all the necessary elements to support the conviction.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 9–10.)  But no one doubts that the trial court made 
the necessary findings; that is not defendant’s problem with the 
court’s judgment. 
But second—for reasons I’ll explain in greater detail 
below—I am not persuaded the majority’s answer to the lesser 
included offense question is correct.  Defendant relies on a 
formal distinction between the “general” criminal intent 
required for forcible kidnapping under Penal Code section 207, 
subdivision (a), and the “specific” intent to kidnap required for 
attempted kidnapping.  But the question whether there is a 
substantive difference between these two mental states, beyond 
the difference in labels, is more complex than either defendant 
or the majority acknowledges.  And more to the point, precedent 
establishes that where, as here, the victim is a young child, the 
crime of kidnapping requires the taking and asportation of the 
victim be done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.  
(In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610–612; People v. Oliver 
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 767–768 (Oliver).)  That is a kind of 
specific 
intent 
requirement, 
and 
it 
is 
substantively 
indistinguishable from the specific intent requirement for 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
3 
attempted kidnapping.  Thus, at least where the victim is a 
young child, it would seem that attempted kidnapping is, in fact, 
a lesser included offense of kidnapping.  We should leave other 
questions about other forms of the offense for cases in which 
those questions are squarely presented. 
I. 
The lesser included offense issue is one that has generated 
considerable confusion among both lower courts and the parties 
to this case.  Again, there is no reason for us to decide the issue 
here.  But if we are going to address it anyway, some 
clarification would be helpful. 
Much of the confusion stems from the parties’ reading of 
our decision in People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740 (Bailey).  
In that case, we considered whether, after finding that the 
defendant inmate’s escape from his cell was insufficient to 
support a conviction for escape from state prison, the appellate 
court could reduce the defendant’s conviction to attempted 
escape on the ground that the latter is a lesser included offense 
of the former.  We answered no, explaining that the latter is not 
a lesser included offense of the former:  Escape has been 
described as requiring only general criminal intent while, under 
Penal Code section 21a, an attempt involves the specific intent 
to commit the crime.  We concluded that “[u]nder the elements 
test, attempt to escape is not a lesser included offense of escape 
since it requires additional proof that the prisoner actually 
intended to escape.”  (Bailey, at p. 749.)  The parties here largely 
follow this lead; relying on Bailey, defendant argues, and the 
Attorney General concedes, that attempted kidnapping is not a 
lesser included offense of kidnapping because it requires proof 
that the defendant intended to kidnap. 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
4 
This reliance is misplaced, in my view.  Unlike this case, 
Bailey was not a case about whether the defendant had 
adequate notice of the charges; the question was whether it was 
permissible on appeal to reduce an invalidated conviction for a 
completed crime to a conviction for attempt.  On that question, 
Bailey unquestionably reached the right result:  Based on the 
elements found by the jury, the defendant’s invalidated escape 
conviction could not be reduced to attempted escape on the 
ground that the latter was a lesser included offense of the 
former.  This is because the jury that rendered the escape 
conviction had never found that the defendant had the intent 
that would have been necessary to support a conviction for 
attempted escape (or a valid conviction for completed escape, for 
that matter).1 
But it is not the case, as the parties here have understood 
Bailey to say, that attempt is never a lesser included offense of 
a general intent crime because it always requires an additional 
                                        
1  
The Bailey jury had been given a misleading instruction 
implying that a completed escape could be found so long as the 
defendant merely passed “ ‘beyond some barrier, such as a fence 
or wall, intended to keep the prisoner within a designated 
area.’ ”  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 746; see id. at pp. 755–
757 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  In light of that instruction, the 
jury’s guilty verdict on escape did not necessarily rest on a 
finding that the defendant intentionally escaped from the limits 
of his confinement, the proper measure of a completed escape.  
(Id. at pp. 748–749.)  And absent such a finding, the Court of 
Appeal could not properly reduce the defendant’s conviction to 
attempted escape, as that offense, too, requires the intent to 
escape from the limits of one’s confinement.  (See id. at p. 754 
[reduction improper because under the instructions given, jury 
might have convicted of escape even if it believed the defendant 
that he “merely intended to assault another prisoner and did not 
intend to escape”].) 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
5 
element of proof—namely, proof of “specific” intent to commit 
the crime.  On the contrary, we have long said that attempt to 
commit a crime is, in fact, a lesser included offense of the 
completed crime.  (See, e.g., People v. Vanderbilt (1926) 199 Cal. 
461, 463 (Vanderbilt) [“ ‘It is not disputed, nor could it well be 
disputed, that, as an abstract proposition, every completed 
crime necessarily involves an attempt to commit it.’ ”].)  
Although Bailey rightly noted that this general principle does 
not always apply, our opinion did not purport to repudiate the 
principle altogether.  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 753.) 
In many cases, the general principle only makes sense.  
Many criminal statutes define the actus reus, or prohibited 
conduct, in terms of committing a particular unlawful act (for 
example, striking another person)—as opposed to, for example, 
producing a particular harmful result (for example, causing 
serious injuries to another person).  For such act-based offenses, 
the “general” criminal intent to do the specified act, as required 
for the completed offense, will generally be indistinguishable 
from the “specific” intent to do the specified act, as required for 
an attempt.  In other words, when an offense requires 
commission of act X, the general criminal intent needed is 
simply the intent to do X.  To convict of the attempted crime, the 
jury would also need to find the defendant intended to do X.  We 
call this “specific” intent because it refers to an act the defendant 
has not yet performed.  (See People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 
456–457.)  This requirement of intent to perform some future 
unlawful act is, as the majority says, generally what 
distinguishes the crime of attempt from purely innocent 
conduct.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  But it is not different in 
substance from the intent the prosecution would be required to 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
6 
prove if it were going to establish liability for the completed 
crime.  (See ibid.)2 
To give a concrete example, consider Penal Code section 
288.7, subdivision (a), which punishes sexual intercourse or 
sodomy by a person at least 18 years old with a child 10 years 
old or younger.  The general criminal intent required for the 
completed crime is the intent to engage in sexual intercourse or 
sodomy with the child victim.  If an attempt conviction were 
sought instead, the People would need to prove that the 
defendant took a direct action toward sexual intercourse or 
sodomy with the intent of committing one of those sexual acts.  
We call this mental state a specific intent, because it relates to 
an action beyond the attempt itself.  But if it is proved that the 
defendant intentionally committed one of these unlawful acts, it 
will also necessarily have been proved that the defendant 
                                        
2  
Thus when a crime is defined in terms of committing a 
particular unlawful act, it is perfectly accurate to say (as we 
have long said) that the defendant could not have committed the 
crime without also having attempted to do so.  (See Vanderbilt, 
supra, 199 Cal. at pp. 463–464.)  A person who intentionally 
committed a prohibited act must also have “specifically” 
intended to commit the act before it was completed. 
 
I do not mean to say that attempts are invariably included 
in the completed crime, or that the mental state elements for 
attempts and completed crimes are always identical.  Where, for 
example, the offense is not solely conduct-based, having as an 
element the creation of a particular result but not the intent to 
cause that result, the intent for attempt will differ significantly.  
Murder, for instance, requires an act causing the death of 
another, but not the intent to kill, as implied malice will suffice.  
Attempted murder, which does require intent to kill, is therefore 
not a lesser included offense of murder.  (People v. Bland (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 313, 327–328; People v. Mize (1889) 80 Cal. 41, 42–
43.) 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
7 
intended to commit one of these unlawful acts.  In the attempt 
context, we might label this “specific” intent, but the label does 
not change the substance of the requirement. 
This observation about the relationship between general 
and specific intent is by no means a new one.  Chief Justice 
Traynor made the same point 50 years ago in a slightly different 
context.  After setting out his now-canonical description of 
general criminal intent as the intent to perform a particular 
criminal act (People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 456) and 
specific intent as the “intent to do some further act or achieve 
some additional consequence” (id. at p. 457), he noted:  “There 
is no real difference, however, only a linguistic one, between an 
intent to do an act already performed and an intent to do that 
same act in the future.”  (Ibid.; accord, People v. Hering (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 440, 445.)  From the sometimes “chimerical” nature 
of the specific or general intent distinction in the context of the 
crime of assault, the Hood court took the lesson that the 
question of whether evidence of intoxication may be used to 
defend against an assault charge “must rest on other 
considerations.”  (Hood, at p. 458.)  A similar note of caution is 
in order here.  Whether attempt is a lesser included offense of 
the completed crime does not turn on a mere difference in labels, 
but on the “reality” of the distinction in the context of a 
particular crime.  (Ibid.)  The question we must ask is whether, 
in substance, the attempt offense requires proof of some element 
the completed crime does not. 
II. 
With this background in mind, we can return to the matter 
at hand:  Was attempted kidnapping a lesser included offense of 
the crime charged in this case?  Defendant says no, and the 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
8 
Attorney General concedes the point.  Completed kidnapping 
under Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a), requires proof the 
defendant took the victim and carried him or her away a 
substantial distance by force or fear and without the victim’s 
consent.  Defendant reasons that a conviction for completed 
kidnapping requires only general criminal intent as to the 
criminal act itself, meaning intent to move the victim a 
substantial distance.  (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 
153; People v. Dalerio (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 775, 781.)  By 
contrast, attempted kidnapping requires proof of a specific 
intent to move the victim a substantial distance.  But labels 
aside, defendant does not explain how this intent requirement 
differs substantively from the general intent required for the 
completed offense.   
The majority does suggest one possible answer, but it is not 
clear the answer is correct.  The majority points out that for 
forcible kidnapping, much as for forcible rape, California law 
provides a defense of reasonable and bona fide belief that the 
victim consented to the asportation.  The law thus effectively 
requires that the defendant have been at least negligent as to 
the victim’s consent.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16; Mayberry, at 
pp. 154–155.)  In contrast, the majority reasons, attempted 
kidnapping under Penal Code section 21a must impose a 
heightened mens rea element that “requires the defendant to 
purposefully inflict whatever degree of force or fear is required 
to overcome the victim’s will.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17, italics 
added.)  Elsewhere, the majority describes this requirement as 
a “conscious design or purpose” to “tak[e] and carr[y] away the 
victim a substantial distance, by force or fear, and without 
consent.”  (Id. at pp. 16–17.)  Though the majority does not say 
it precisely this way, this “conscious design” requirement would 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
9 
seem to mean that for attempted kidnapping the People must 
prove both that the defendant intended to carry the victim away 
and that the defendant actually knew the victim did not consent 
to the asportation.  An unreasonable failure to appreciate the 
victim’s unwillingness would not be enough. 
For reasons I’ll explain further below, this explanation does 
not have much to do with this case.  The victim was a  
four-year-old legally incapable of consent; whether the child 
consented to being carried away, or whether defendant believed 
she consented, was not at issue.  But even setting the point aside 
for now, it seems to me we should pause before embracing this 
suggested view of the specific intent requirement for attempted 
kidnapping and other crimes to which the victim’s consent is 
relevant. 
Whether the majority’s suggested view is correct depends 
on what we mean when we say that an attempt involves an 
“intent to commit the crime.”  (Pen. Code, § 21a.)  If that means 
the defendant’s purpose must encompass each of the 
circumstances that make an act criminal, including the 
existence of victim’s lack of consent, then an attempt will often 
require a higher mens rea as to those circumstances than the 
completed crime.  But alternatively, if “intent to commit the 
crime” simply means intent to commit an act that would be 
criminal if completed, then it is not clear why a defendant who 
intended to move a person the defendant should have known to 
be unconsenting, and took a concrete step to put the plan into 
action, should not be held liable for attempted kidnapping.   
If we are choosing between these two interpretations, there 
are some good reasons to prefer the second one.  For one, it fits 
with common understandings of the law of attempt.  If a person 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
10 
tries to take an unconsenting victim, unreasonably failing to see 
the victim’s unwillingness to go, and is stopped before he can 
travel too far, undoubtedly many of us would say that person 
attempted to kidnap the victim.  The law of attempt, as we have 
explained, is designed to protect society from the harm 
threatened by individuals who set out on a course of criminal 
conduct but “ ‘for some collateral reason [are unable to] complete 
the intended crime.’ ”  (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 
230.)  A person who tries and fails to carry away an 
unconsenting victim threatens significant harm, even if he has 
been merely negligent or reckless in ascertaining the victim’s 
consent. 
The second interpretation also fits with the ways we have 
previously described the intent requirement for attempt.  We 
have said a defendant may be convicted of criminal attempt 
when he or she acts “with the intent to engage in the conduct 
and/or bring about the consequences proscribed by the 
attempted crime [citation], and performs an act that . . . ‘show[s] 
that the perpetrator is putting his or her plan into action.’ ”  
(People v. Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 230; see 2 LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law (2018) Solicitation and Attempt, 
§ 11.3, p. 293 (LaFave) [describing mental state for attempt as 
“an intent to do an act or to bring about a certain consequence 
which would in law amount to a crime”].)  We have not further 
required that the defendant act with a purpose of performing 
the prescribed acts under the particular circumstances that 
render them illegal.   
The Model Penal Code makes this point more explicitly:  For 
an attempt, the Model Penal Code requires that the person act 
purposefully as to the criminal conduct itself, with purpose or 
belief as to a particular result that is an element of the 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
11 
completed crime, but in other respects only “with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime.”  
(Model Pen. Code, § 5.01, subd. (1).)  An explanatory note 
reiterates that while purposive action is required as to the 
criminal conduct itself, “with respect to the circumstances under 
which a crime must be committed, the culpability otherwise 
required for commission of the crime is also applicable to the 
attempt . . . .”  (Id., explanatory note to § 5.01, p. 297.)3 
And finally, this interpretation generally fits with the way 
California courts have approached attempts to commit forcible 
sex offenses, to which the victim’s consent is also relevant.  In 
such cases, courts have not required that the defendant act with 
the conscious purpose of overcoming the victim’s will.  They have 
instead required only that the defendant show a willingness to 
use whatever force is necessary to accomplish the intended 
sexual act.  Early California cases held that assault with intent 
to commit rape requires the defendant have the intent “to use 
whatever force was necessary upon the prosecutrix to 
accomplish the consummation of his desires.”  (People v. 
Fleming (1892) 94 Cal. 308, 312; accord, People v. Stewart (1893) 
97 Cal. 238, 240.)  We reaffirmed this formulation more recently, 
                                        
3  
The commentary to this section of the Model Penal Code 
gives some illustrations of its application.  For example, where 
a statute prohibits sexual intercourse with a female under a 
certain age, the required culpability as to the victim’s age would 
be no greater for attempt than for the completed offense.  (Model 
Pen. Code & Commentaries, com. 2 to § 5.01, pp. 301–303.)  
Attempt requires the person act with the purpose of committing 
the criminal conduct defining the completed offense, “but his 
purpose need not encompass all of the circumstances included 
in the formal definition of the substantive offense.”  (Id. at 
p. 301.) 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
12 
equating “ ‘the intent to commit the act against the will of the 
complainant’ ” with the intent “ ‘to use whatever force may be 
required.’ ”  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 509, quoting 
People v. Meichtry (1951) 37 Cal.2d 385, 388–389.)  This 
formulation does not require the prosecution to prove a 
“conscious design or purpose” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16–17) to 
overcome the will of a victim the defendant knows to be 
unconsenting; it requires indifference with regard to the victim’s 
consent.  This understanding may help to explain why we have 
previously described attempted rape as a lesser included offense 
of rape.  (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 88, citing People 
v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 685 and People v. Kelly (1992) 
1 Cal.4th 495, 526, 528.)  It is not clear why we would treat 
attempted kidnapping differently. 
To be clear, this approach is not the same thing as saying 
that a person can negligently or recklessly attempt to commit a 
crime.  As the majority says, an attempt necessarily requires 
that the perpetrator intend to commit the conduct constituting 
the completed crime, and have purpose or at least knowledge as 
to any required consequence.  It is in this sense that “an attempt 
‘cannot be committed by recklessness or negligence’—‘even if the 
underlying crime can be so committed.’  (LaFave, supra, § 11.3, 
p. 293.)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  But it does not follow that 
the prosecution must prove the defendant’s conscious purpose 
with respect to every element of the offense, including the 
existence of victim consent or other circumstances of the crime.  
Indeed, Professor LaFave himself also acknowledges that there 
is nothing obviously unsound about an approach that treats the 
mental state respecting such circumstances as the same for both 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
13 
attempt and for the completed crime, even when the mental 
state in question is one of recklessness or negligence.4 
I express no firm views on these issues here; I raise these 
points only to explain why the matter is more complex than the 
majority opinion suggests.  If we are to answer the lesser 
included offense question by focusing on the role of victim 
consent—overturning our own precedent in the process (maj. 
opn., ante, p. 19)—these are important issues we ought to 
grapple with. 
But ultimately there is no reason for us to resolve these 
issues in this case, because, as I have already noted, the victim’s 
consent was not relevant in this prosecution.  Defendant was not 
charged with kidnapping of an unconsenting victim; he was 
charged with kidnapping a four-year-old child who, because of 
                                        
4 
Professor LaFave finds a lack of authority on this issue but 
notes “a persuasive argument” that if the completed crime 
requires only “ ‘recklessness, or negligence, or even blameless 
inadvertence’ ” as to an attendant circumstance such as victim 
consent, that mental state “ ‘will suffice also for the attempt.’ ”  
(LaFave, supra, § 11.3(c), p. 302, quoting Smith, Two Problems 
in Criminal Attempts (1957) 70 Harv. L.Rev. 422, 434; see 
LaFave, supra, § 11.3(b), p. 298, fn. 32, citing Sergie v. State 
(Alaska Ct.App. 2005) 105 P.3d 1150, 1154 [to be guilty of an 
attempted sexual assault offense, the defendant must exhibit 
reckless disregard for the victim’s lack of consent to the sexual 
contact]; id. at p. 1155 [the government need not prove the 
defendant “intended the circumstance that the penetration be 
without . . . consent”]; see also, e.g., State v. Mayfield (Alaska 
Ct.App., May 3, 2019, No. A-12534) 2019 WL 1970114, p. *7 
[clarifying that an attempted sexual assault requires only that 
the defendant recklessly disregarded a risk the victim did not 
consent to sexual contact and intended to achieve that contact 
by force or threat if necessary].) 
 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
14 
her youth, was legally incapable of giving or withholding 
consent.  Her lack of consent, and defendant’s mental state with 
regard to it, were not legally material to the charge.  Instead, 
the kidnapping charge required proof that defendant took the 
child for an illegal purpose—itself a kind of specific intent 
requirement. 
We interpreted the kidnapping statute this way in Oliver, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d 761, a case in which the defendant had been 
charged with kidnapping a two-year-old child.  He complained 
that under the standard instruction on the intent for 
kidnapping, which stated that no proof of a specific intent or 
purpose was needed, an adult forcibly moving a child without 
any wrongful purpose—for example, to rescue the child from 
danger or simply to walk with the child down the street—could 
be convicted of kidnapping.  (Id. at pp. 764–765.)  The court 
agreed, and noted the same could be true of an adult victim 
mentally incapacitated by illness or intoxication.  Considering 
this result inconsistent with legislative purpose, we formulated 
this general rule:  “Penal Code, section 207, as applied to a 
person forcibly taking and carrying away another, who by 
reason of immaturity or mental condition is unable to give his 
legal consent thereto, should . . . be construed as making the one 
so acting guilty of kidnaping only if the taking and carrying 
away is done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  
(Oliver, at p. 768.)  We have since repeatedly reaffirmed this 
holding.  (People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 856–857; In re 
Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 610–612 (Michele D.); People 
v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 714.)   
In Michele D., we considered a second, corollary question:  
If the victim is too young to withhold consent to movement and 
therefore offers no resistance to the asportation, how is the 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
15 
element of force or fear to be established?  (Michele D., supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 606.)  Although Oliver had expressly addressed 
only consent, we held the logic of that decision required that the 
standard of force or fear (which typically functions as the inverse 
of consent) should also be modified for kidnapping of a small 
child:  “We formulate that standard as follows:  the amount of 
force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply 
the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child 
away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an 
illegal intent.”  (Michele D., at p. 610.)  The Legislature later 
codified this force standard in Penal Code section 207, 
subdivision (e).  Although the holdings of Oliver and Michele D. 
are related, they are distinct, as the Michele D. opinion itself 
makes clear:  the opinion first articulates the standard of force 
applicable to kidnap of an unresisting child (Michele D., at 
p. 610) and then, separately, reaffirms Oliver’s illegal purpose 
holding (Michele D., at p. 612).   
Oliver’s requirement that the asportation be made with an 
illegal purpose or intent makes kidnapping of a small child a 
specific intent crime, not a crime of general intent.  It would 
seem to follow that there was no substantive difference between 
the intent element of the kidnapping charged and the specific 
intent element of the attempt offense.   
The majority acknowledges the point, but sets it aside; it 
asserts this theory of kidnapping is not before us because the 
People have not relied on Penal Code section 207, subdivision 
(e), but only on subdivision (a) of that statute, which defines the 
offense of forcible kidnapping.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20–21.)  It 
is true that at defendant’s bench trial, the parties’ arguments 
paid little or no attention to the “illegal purpose” element—
indeed, they barely addressed any element other than 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
16 
asportation; both attorneys noted that the only serious dispute 
was over whether the victim had been moved a substantial 
distance.  But both court and counsel had before them and 
referred to a standard instruction on kidnapping, CALJIC 
No. 9.50, whose use note plainly states the Oliver rule.5  And 
although the information charged only a violation of Penal Code 
section 207, subdivision (a), without citing subdivision (e) of that 
statute, the element of illegal purpose required under Oliver 
was not thereby eliminated.  Subdivision (e) does not set out a 
variant form of kidnapping; like the Michele D. decision from 
which it was drawn, it merely provides a gloss on how force may 
be established “[f]or purposes of those types of kidnapping 
requiring force.”  (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (e).)  There was no 
need to include it in the information’s allegations.  (People v. 
Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 715 [“Oliver and Michele D. 
. . . did not create a new or different crime of kidnapping that 
needed to be expressly pleaded against the defendant.”].) 
The majority expresses concern that the parties have not 
briefed the special intent requirement that applies in child 
kidnapping cases.  This is true, and unfortunate—as is the fact 
they have not briefed the substantive differences between the 
                                        
5  
The use note to CALJIC No. 9.50 (2012 rev.) states:  “If the 
victim of the alleged kidnapping is incapable of giving consent, 
the People must prove the movement was done for an illegal 
purpose or with an illegal intent.  See CALJIC 9.57.  (People v. 
Oliver, 55 Cal.2d 761, 768, 12 Cal.Rptr. 865, 869, 361 P.2d 593, 
597 (1961).)  (People v. Ojeda-Parra, 7 Cal.App.4th 46, 50, 8 
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 636 (2d Dist. 1992).)”  CALJIC No. 9.57, 
referenced in the use note, states the force standard of 
Michele D. and Penal Code section 207, subdivision (e).  The 
Oliver rule has also been captured in a Judicial Council 
instruction, CALCRIM No. 1201 (2008 rev.).   
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
17 
mental state required for attempted kidnapping and for the 
offense with which defendant was charged.  But if we are going 
to venture beyond the bounds of the parties’ briefing, as the 
majority already does, I see no reason why we shouldn’t also 
acknowledge the direct relevance of the Oliver line of cases—
particularly before undertaking to overrule Martinez.  Martinez, 
after all, was also a case involving the taking of a child; it held 
that the kidnapping charge there at issue encompassed “the 
lesser included offense of attempted kidnapping of a person 
under the age of 14 (§§ 664/207, 208) . . . .”  (Martinez, supra, 20 
Cal.4th at p. 241.)  Because Oliver establishes that kidnapping 
is a specific intent crime when the victim is a small child, it 
seems to me Martinez’s description of the relationship between 
attempted kidnapping and the completed crime likely remains 
correct, at least as to a child the age of the victim here. 
In short, whatever might be said about the offense in 
general, kidnapping is a specific intent crime when the victim is 
a young child, requiring proof defendant took and moved the 
victim for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.  It appears 
there is no difference between this mental state requirement 
and the required mental state for attempted kidnapping.  
Defendant’s challenge to his attempted kidnapping conviction 
falters out of the gate. 
III. 
Ultimately, however, I return to where I began.  The lesser 
included question is largely academic here.  Whatever fine 
distinctions might or might not exist between the mental state 
requirements for attempted kidnapping and the crime charged 
in this case, the Legislature has put all defendants charged with 
crime on notice that they may be convicted of attempt if the 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
18 
evidence supports it.  As the majority opinion holds, Penal Code 
section 1159 affords defendants constitutionally adequate notice 
that they may be convicted of an attempt to commit the charged 
crime.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 4–9.)  On this basis, I concur in 
the judgment of the court. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
S247044 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Today’s opinion correctly holds that attempted kidnapping 
is not a lesser included offense of completed kidnapping and that 
Penal Code section 1159 (section 1159) authorizes conviction for 
an uncharged attempt to commit a charged offense, even if the 
attempt is not necessarily included in the charged offense.  I do 
not agree, however, that the defendant in this case had 
sufficient notice to permit conviction for attempted kidnapping 
on a charge of completed kidnapping.  Notwithstanding the 
plain language of section 1159, our precedent at the time of 
defendant John Fontenot’s 2016 trial did not make clear that a 
conviction for an uncharged attempt was possible if the attempt 
offense included an element that the charged offense lacked.  
Not only did our case law contain no clear holding to that effect, 
but we had made consistent statements to the contrary in 
several cases over the past six decades and, in so doing, 
repeatedly cited section 1159. 
It is one thing to say, as the court does today, that our past 
statements were mistaken.  But it is quite another to say that 
the burden of our mistakes should fall on Fontenot because he 
should have known not to give credence to statements that we 
had affirmed, reaffirmed, and re-reaffirmed over the years.  This 
seems quite unfair.  I would reverse Fontenot’s conviction for 
attempted kidnapping on the ground that he was not adequately 
“informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”  (U.S. 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
Const., 6th Amend.; see People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 
823.) 
“[R]etroactive application of a decision disapproving prior 
authority on which a person may reasonably rely” in preparing 
a defense or in determining whether conduct is criminal violates 
due process of law.  (Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
396, 429–430 (Moss).)  In Moss, we evaluated whether “a parent 
whose inability to pay court-ordered child support results from 
a willful failure to seek and obtain employment [may] be 
adjudged in contempt of court and punished for violation of the 
order.”  (Id. at p. 400.)  We held that such a parent could be 
subject to contempt sanctions, but we declined to apply this rule 
to the litigant before us, Brent Moss.  (Id. at p. 401.)  A prior 
case, Ex parte Todd (1897) 119 Cal. 57, had held that a court 
may not impose contempt sanctions for nonpayment of spousal 
support in such circumstances.  Although Moss involved child 
support, not spousal support, we observed that “no basis for 
distinguishing child support orders was apparent at the time 
Todd was decided . . . .”  (Moss, at p. 429.)  We acknowledged 
that “the Legislature has authorized a court to require 
nonsupporting parents to demonstrate that efforts have been 
made to find employment” (ibid.) and that “the Legislature 
intend[ed] that . . . parental ability to work in order to support 
a child be considered in any enforcement action” (id. at p. 423).  
Nevertheless, we were “unwilling to assume” that “Brent should 
have known in advance of our decision today . . . that Todd was 
inapplicable . . . .”  (Id. at p. 429.)  Thus, even though Todd 
involved spousal support and not child support, and even though 
the Legislature had enacted child support statutes bearing on 
the issue presented, we concluded that “Brent could reasonably 
have relied on Todd” for a contrary rule applicable to child 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
3 
support and that our decision in Moss “may reasonably be seen 
. . . as an unanticipated expansion of the law of contempt in the 
child support context.”  (Moss, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 429.) 
We applied similar reasoning in holding that Brent could 
not be subject to a second rule we newly established in Moss, i.e., 
that an alleged contemnor has the burden of proof as to inability 
to pay.  (Moss, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 430.)  Because this new 
rule partially disapproved In re Feiock (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 
141, retroactive application to Brent violated due process.  
(Moss, at p. 430.)  As we explained, “to state a new rule on appeal 
after trial . . . and to apply the new rule retroactively to a trial 
at which the defendant did not have notice of the change is not 
permissible.”  (Ibid.) 
Similarly here, Fontenot “could reasonably have relied” on 
our prior statements limiting convictions for uncharged crimes 
to those necessarily included in charged crimes, and today’s 
opinion “may reasonably be seen” as “an unanticipated change 
in the law.”  (Moss, supra, 17 Cal. 4th at pp. 429, 401.) 
Considered in isolation, the plain language of section 1159 
would have provided Fontenot with sufficient notice of a possible 
conviction for attempted kidnapping when he was charged with 
completed kidnapping.  But the text of section 1159 did not exist 
in a vacuum at the time of Fontenot’s trial.  Notwithstanding 
the statute’s text, this court had repeatedly stated, with 
citations to section 1159, that a defendant could be convicted of 
an uncharged crime only if that crime is a lesser included offense 
of a charged crime. 
In In re Hess (1955) 45 Cal.2d 171 (Hess), we said:  “A 
person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than a 
necessarily included offense) not charged against him by 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
4 
indictment or information, whether or not there was evidence at 
his trial to show that he had committed that offense.”  (Id. at 
pp. 174–175.)  In support of this conclusion, we cited to a string 
of cases and statutes, including section 1159.  (Hess, at p. 175.) 
In People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 (West), we cited Hess 
in stating that “[w]hen a defendant pleads not guilty, the court 
lacks jurisdiction to convict him of an offense that is neither 
charged nor necessarily included in the alleged crime.”  (West at 
p. 612, citing Hess, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 174–175.)  We quoted 
Hess’s concern that “ ‘[d]ue process of law requires that an 
accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he 
may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his 
defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his 
trial.’ ”  (West, at p. 612, quoting Hess, at p. 175.) 
In People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364 (Lohbauer), we 
said that a defendant cannot “be convicted of an offense which 
is neither specifically charged in the accusatory pleading nor 
‘necessarily included’ within a charged offense.”  (Id. at p. 367.)  
Echoing Hess and West, and citing section 1159, we explained 
that “the requisite notice is nonetheless afforded if the lesser 
offense is ‘necessarily included’ within the statutory definition 
of the charged offense; in such event conviction of the included 
offense is expressly authorized (§ 1159).”  (Lohbauer, at p. 367.) 
In People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224 (Reed), we again 
said:  “A defendant may be convicted of an uncharged crime if, 
but only if, the uncharged crime is necessarily included in the 
charged crime.  (§ 1159; Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 368–
369.)  The reason for this rule is settled.  ‘ “ This reasoning rests 
upon a constitutional basis:  ‘Due process of law requires that 
an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
5 
he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present 
his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at 
his trial.’  [Citation.]” ’  (Lohbauer, supra, at p. 368.)  The 
required notice is provided as to any charged offense and any 
lesser offense that is necessarily committed when the charged 
offense is committed.”  (Id. at p. 1227.) 
This language in Reed could not be clearer.  We did not say 
that a defendant may be convicted of an uncharged crime if, but 
only if, the uncharged crime either is necessarily included in the 
charged crime or is an attempt to complete the charged crime. 
Instead, we said that due process requires notice of charges and 
that such notice is given only for the charged offense and lesser-
included offenses.  In stating this rule, we cited section 1159.  
One year later, in People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, we 
recited with approval the language from Reed quoted above.  
(Sloan, at p. 116, quoting Reed, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1127.) 
Most recently, in People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740 
(Bailey), we expressly recognized that a literal construction of 
section 1159 was inconsistent with our prior cases.  The 
Attorney General argued in Bailey that section 1159’s language 
authorizing conviction of any uncharged offense necessarily 
included in the charged offense “ ‘or of an attempt to commit the 
offense’ ” (Bailey, at p. 752, quoting § 1159, italics added by 
Bailey) meant that “ ‘a conviction of attempt to commit the 
substantive crime is deemed a lesser included offense of the 
charged substantive offense, by operation of section 1159 itself’ ” 
(Bailey, at p. 752).  In rejecting this argument, we said:  “The 
disjunctive language [of section 1159] appears to support the 
claim a trial court may reduce a defendant’s conviction to an 
uncharged attempt if supported by the evidence.  However, we 
made the qualification that under section 1159, ‘[a] defendant 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
6 
may be convicted of an uncharged crime if, but only if, the 
uncharged crime is necessarily included in the charged crime.’  
(Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 116; see Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
at p. 1227; Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 368–369.”  (Ibid.) 
Today’s opinion says “[t]he only time we have confronted 
circumstances at all like those here was in Oates, and there we 
upheld the defendant’s conviction for an attempt.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 23, citing People v. Oates (1904) 142 Cal. 12, 14.)  But 
it is readily apparent that Oates, a brief and somewhat cryptic 
opinion, could not have provided Fontenot with sufficient notice 
that he could be convicted of an uncharged attempt that was not 
necessarily included in the charged crime.  In Oates, we rejected 
the argument that section 1159 had been enacted in violation of 
a state constitutional provision prescribing the format of certain 
statutes.  (Oates, at pp. 13–14.)  The meaning of section 1159 
was not at issue, and we said nothing about it.  The court today 
says People v. Vanderbilt (1926) 199 Cal. 461, 464, cited Oates 
“for the ‘well-established principle’ that pursuant to section 
1159, a person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a 
charged crime even if not [so] charged.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 24, fn. 9.)  But this overreads Vanderbilt, which cited Oates in 
saying that a charged offense of sodomy may result in a 
conviction for attempted sodomy and then, in the very next 
sentence, explained that “an attempt to commit [sodomy] — a 
lesser crime — is necessarily included within the greater and 
completed offense.”  (Vanderbilt, at p. 464.)  In any event, Oates 
and Vanderbilt long predated the line of cases discussed above, 
which repeatedly “made the qualification that under section 
1159, ‘ [a] defendant may be convicted of an uncharged crime if, 
but only if, the uncharged crime is necessarily included in the 
charged crime. ’ ”  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752.) 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
7 
The court says our past statements “do not dictate our 
decision in this case about the meaning and constitutionality of 
section 1159” because none of our prior decisions “confronted a 
situation like this one.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  But the 
above-quoted passage in Bailey construing section 1159 was not 
dicta; it was reasoning essential to the decision.  (See Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1158 
[“ ‘Dicta consists of observations and statements unnecessary to 
the appellate court’s resolution of the case.’ ”].) 
In any event, it is a non sequitur to say that “[j]ust as our 
dicta in Bailey and other decisions do not control our decision 
today, Fontenot could not reasonably rely on those statements 
in preparing for trial in the face of section 1159’s unambiguous 
and clearly relevant language, and the nearly ubiquitous 
charging practice it establishes.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.)  
Even if our past statements “do not control our decision today,” 
it does not follow that “Fontenot could not reasonably rely on 
those statements.”  Indeed, it was “in the face of section 1159’s 
unambiguous and clearly relevant language” (ibid.) that our 
own decisions nevertheless stated, again and again, that a 
defendant may be convicted of an uncharged crime only if it is 
necessarily included in the charged crime. 
In fact, People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239 and 
People v. Hamernik (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 412 adopted exactly 
the position that Fontenot urges here.  Those cases held that a 
defendant may not be convicted of an uncharged attempt unless 
it is necessarily included in the charged crime, and Braslaw, 
which predated Fontenot’s trial, squarely relied on the 
“ ‘qualification’ ” of section 1159 stated in Bailey.  (Braslaw, at 
p. 1247, quoting Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752; see 
Hamernik, at pp. 426–427.)  Braslaw and Hamernik confirm the 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
8 
reasonableness of Fontenot’s understanding of the law at the 
time of his trial. 
There is nothing wrong with acknowledging error in our 
past statements.  But when we do so, we should not fault 
litigants like Fontenot for believing what we write in the Official 
California Reports.  It was not unreasonable for Fontenot to rely 
on a legal proposition that turned out to be incorrect — a 
proposition we repeated in multiple cases over six decades and 
did not disavow until today. 
Finally, today’s opinion alternatively contends that 
Fontenot had sufficient notice because at the time of his trial, 
we had not yet overruled People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
225.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.)  In a single sentence, without 
elaboration, Martinez treated attempted kidnapping as a lesser 
included offense of completed kidnapping.  (Martinez, at p. 241.)  
But, as the Attorney General concedes, and as today’s opinion 
holds, our reasoning in Bailey as to why attempted escape is not 
a lesser included offense of escape fatally undermined that 
portion 
of 
Martinez, 
which 
contained 
no 
“reasoned 
consideration” of the issue before us.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  
Further, the court acknowledges, “Martinez is scarcely 
different” from Bailey in the essential contours of the facts and 
legal question presented.  (Ibid.)  If the nonpaying parent in 
Moss, a case about child support, could reasonably rely on Todd, 
a case about spousal support, notwithstanding contrary statutes 
because Todd’s logic applied equally to child support (see Moss, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 429), then I see no reason why Fontenot, 
whose case involves attempted kidnapping, could not reasonably 
rely on Bailey, a case about attempted escape, notwithstanding 
Martinez in light of the court’s conclusion that Bailey’s logic 
applies equally to attempted kidnapping. 
PEOPLE v. FONTENOT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
9 
Readers of today’s opinion will no doubt detect a dark 
irony here.  On one hand, the court faults Fontenot for failing to 
anticipate a change in the law — namely, today’s rejection of the 
qualification of section 1159 repeatedly stated in Bailey and 
prior cases.  On the other hand, the court faults Fontenot for 
correctly discerning a change in the law — namely, the holding 
and reasoning of Bailey that plainly undermined Martinez’s 
treatment of attempted kidnapping as a lesser included offense 
of kidnapping.  It is problematic enough that each of the court’s 
rationales for finding sufficient notice is unpersuasive on its 
own.  But the damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don’t 
quality of the two rationales together puts an especially fine 
point on the unfairness of today’s decision. 
I would reverse Fontenot’s conviction because at the time 
of his trial the kidnapping charge did not provide him adequate 
notice that he could be convicted of attempted kidnapping.  In 
all other respects, I join the opinion of the court. 
 
      LIU, J. 
 
I Concur: 
GROBAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Fontenot 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 1/9/18 – 2d Dist., Div. 7 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S247044 
Date Filed: August 26, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Gary J. Ferrari 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael Allen and Melissa L. Camacho-Cheung, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Louis W. Karlin and Robert M. Snider, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Melissa L. Camacho-Cheung 
California Appellate Project 
520 South Grand Avenue, Fourth Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 243-0300 
 
Robert M. Snider 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6192