Title: P. v. Murphy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S125572
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: November 28, 2005

1
Filed 11/28/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S125572 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D040040 
MILDRED MURPHY, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCE-217093 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
We consider whether the circumstances in this case afforded sufficient 
exigency to justify a police entry to conduct a search of a residence without 
complying with the usual “knock-notice” rule, to prevent destruction of evidence.  
We conclude the “no-knock” entry was justified by the circumstances, which 
included (1) contemporaneous, ongoing illegal drug sales on the premises, raising 
the reasonable inference that more drugs were inside, (2) the officers’ knowledge 
that defendant was on probation for a drug offense and had consented to a 
warrantless search of her premises, (3) the unplanned noisy confrontation with a 
suspect directly outside defendant’s open doorway, and (4) the officers’ loud 
announcement of their presence and purpose to the suspect.   
The foregoing conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the 
People’s alternative argument that the so-called inevitable discovery doctrine 
applies here to validate the search despite a possible knock-notice violation, an 
 
2
issue now pending before the United States Supreme Court.  (Hudson v. Michigan, 
cert. granted June 27, 2005, No. 04-1360.)   
FACTS 
Defendant Mildred Murphy appeals the denial of her motion to suppress 
evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m)) after having pleaded guilty to 
possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378).  The 
following uncontradicted facts are taken largely from the Court of Appeal opinion 
in this case.  Because the question whether sufficient exigent circumstances 
existed depends on a close examination of the surrounding facts, we recite those 
facts in some detail.   
At approximately 1 p.m. on November 7, 2001, on investigating a citizen’s 
complaint, Detective Santana of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department 
Street Narcotics Team observed a woman leave defendant’s residence, and drive 
away.  Santana, suspecting a drug transaction had taken place, stopped the car.  
The driver admitted she had obtained methamphetamine from defendant.  Santana 
decided to conduct a probation search of defendant’s residence.  (It is undisputed 
that defendant was then on probation and had consented to warrantless searches of 
her residence as a condition of her probation.)   
While Detective Marlow maintained surveillance of defendant’s residence, 
Santana developed an operational plan for the search.  He was familiar with the 
layout of the house, having had previous contact with defendant.  Because Santana 
had observed people coming out of defendant’s converted bedroom in the garage, 
he decided the search team should enter through the garage. 
During the surveillance, Marlow observed defendant greet a man in front of 
her house.  They walked around the side of the house and reappeared a few 
minutes later.  It appeared to Marlow that they were exchanging something.  
Shortly thereafter, Santana and other members of the search team arrived, wearing 
 
3
plain clothes, but with black bulletproof vests with the word “Sheriffs” on them, 
and hats marked with the words “Sheriff’s Narcotics.”  Marlow also observed yet 
another man near defendant’s garage.  Once Santana and the other members of the 
search team arrived, Marlow alerted them to this man’s presence. 
Santana and the other officers approached this man, later identified as 
Thomaselli, who was standing near the corner of the garage clenching something 
in one hand.  Santana pointed a gun at Thomaselli and “[i]n a loud voice . . . 
[a]lmost yelling,” said to him, “Sheriff’s Department.  Probation search.  Get on 
the ground.”  The other members of the team were also yelling, “Sheriff’s 
Department,” and they all had their guns drawn.  Thomaselli was actually 
repairing a fence for defendant and was holding some screws in his hand.  The 
officers at no time observed any interaction between defendant and Thomaselli.   
When the officers confronted Thomaselli, Santana heard a dog barking 
loudly from inside defendant’s house.  At least five to seven seconds later, Santana 
and other members of the team entered the residence, without knocking.  Santana 
said he did not knock because he knew that “anyone in the residence or in the 
bedroom would have heard us” yelling at Thomaselli.  Santana testified that 
“seeing the sliding glass window was opened and a dog was barking, we 
continued in.”  Santana believed the team’s stakeout had been “compromise[d]” 
and feared persons in the residence might arm themselves, destroy evidence, or 
flee.  Santana testified that he and four or five members of his team entered the 
house with their guns drawn. 
Upon searching the residence, the officers found defendant at the opposite 
end of the house from where they had entered, in a bedroom with her bedridden 
ex-husband.  Defendant was read her Miranda rights and waived them.  She 
readily admitted having sold methamphetamine and showed the officers the 
 
4
location of a scale and six baggies that contained the drug.  The officers also found 
several “pay and owe” sheets in defendant’s house. 
Thomaselli testified that when he encountered the officers, they ordered 
him to the ground, at gunpoint.  After he was on the ground, the officers asked him 
whether defendant was inside the house, and he told them she was.  Thomaselli 
did not see them enter the house. 
Defendant testified on her own behalf.  She was in a back bedroom with the 
door shut, caring for her ex-husband, when the officers entered the house.  She 
heard someone calling her name and was disturbed because she did not know who 
it was.  Prior to hearing her name called, she did not believe she had heard anyone 
say anything about police or probation.  After she heard her name called, 
defendant opened the bedroom door and found one of the officers standing in the 
doorway, pointing a gun at her face.  He told defendant to put her hands up. 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378).  She pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to 
suppress evidence, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, claiming that in 
conducting the search, the officers had violated California’s knock-notice 
requirements and the Fourth Amendment.  The preliminary examination hearing 
served also as an evidentiary hearing for the motion to suppress and the probation 
revocation.  
The court initially found there were no exigent circumstances that would 
excuse the officers’ duty to comply with the knock-notice requirements.  The court 
reasoned that when the officers entered defendant’s residence, they had 
insufficient reason to believe drugs were being flushed or otherwise destroyed, or 
that anyone in the house was arming himself or herself.  In addition, they had no 
reason to believe defendant was likely to be armed, and they could see she was not 
attempting to flee. 
 
5
The court also determined, however, that the officers’ shouting at 
Thomaselli, identifying themselves as sheriff’s deputies, and announcing their 
intent to conduct a probation search, sufficiently notified the occupants of the 
impending search, thereby satisfying knock-notice requirements.  The court 
observed that the officers’ entry occurred “at least five to seven seconds [after they 
shouted at Thomaselli], I think it was probably longer, certainly from Mr. 
Thomaselli’s testimony.”  The court opined that this was “plenty of time once that 
notification is made for someone to come to the door and find out what the heck is 
going on.”  The court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers 
had substantially complied with knock-notice requirements.  The court also found 
the evidence was sufficient to hold defendant to answer for the methamphetamine 
charge and revoked her probation. 
Defendant filed a motion to set aside the information, pursuant to Penal 
Code section 995, on the ground that the law enforcement officers had violated 
knock-notice requirements.  The trial court denied the motion.  Defendant then 
pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine for sale.  The trial court placed 
defendant on probation for a period of three years on the condition that she serve 
210 days in custody, and fined her $550.  The court later determined that 
defendant was eligible for electronic surveillance and revised the 210-day 
commitment order accordingly.  Defendant filed a timely appeal. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal filed a divided opinion reversing the 
judgment.  The majority concluded that the evidence seized during the search was 
obtained in violation of  California’s knock-notice requirements and the Fourth 
Amendment, and must therefore be suppressed.  We granted the People’s petition 
for review and directed the Court of Appeal to vacate the opinion and reconsider 
its decision in light of United States v. Banks (2003) 540 U.S. 31 (Banks), which 
was decided after it filed its opinion in this case.   
 
6
On reconsideration, a majority of the Court of Appeal again concluded that 
the search of defendant’s residence violated California’s knock-notice 
requirements and the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence seized during the 
search must be suppressed.  Justice Benke again dissented.  We again granted 
review and will reverse.   
DISCUSSION 
As a general rule, before entering a house to make an arrest or perform a 
search, officers must first identify themselves, explain their purpose, and demand 
admittance.  (People v. Rosales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 299, 302 (Rosales) [failure to 
state purpose invalidated entry]; People v. Maddox (1956) 46 Cal.2d 301, 306 
(Maddox) [knock-notice compliance excused where officer had good faith belief 
his peril would increase or occupants would flee]; see Penal Code, §§ 844, 1531; 
see generally, Annot., Knock-and-Announce Compliance (2001) 85 A.L.R.5th 1 
(Annotation).)  The purpose of this so-called knock-notice rule is (1) to protect the 
privacy of the householder; (2) to safeguard innocent persons on the premises; (3) 
to prevent violent confrontations arising from unannounced entries; and (4) to 
protect the police themselves from injuries caused by a surprised or fearful 
householder.  (People v. King (1971) 5 Cal.3d 458, 464, fn. 3.)  The rule applies to 
entries through unlocked doors as well as “break-in” entries achieved by force.  
(Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 303, and fn. 4.)   
The People no longer contend that the officers’ conduct substantially 
complied with the knock-notice rule, and we do not consider that issue here.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Hoag (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1208-1212 [maj. opn. by Hull, 
J.]; id. at pp. 1219-1229 [dis. opn. by Sims, Acting P.J.].)  The People also do not 
dispute that the knock-notice rule applies to probation searches.  (See People v. 
Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 900; People v. Mays (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 
973, fn. 4.)  The People do contend, however, that exigent circumstances justified 
 
7
the knock-notice violation.  As previously noted, they also argue alternatively that 
the inevitable discovery doctrine validated the search, an issue we decline to reach.   
In the present case, the trial court (magistrate) found no exigent 
circumstances existed to excuse the officers' duty to comply with the knock-notice 
requirements, as the officers did not know that drugs were being flushed or 
otherwise destroyed, or that anyone in the house was arming himself or herself or 
attempting to flee.  Of course, this finding, to the extent it states a legal 
conclusion, is not binding on us.  “In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress 
evidence, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact, whether express or implied, 
if those findings are supported by substantial evidence.  We independently 
determine the relevant legal principles and apply those principles in evaluating the 
reasonableness of the search based on the facts as found by the trial court.”  
(People v. Mays, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 972.)   
We have held that failure to comply with the knock-notice rule may be 
excused when exigent circumstances exist.  For example, in Maddox, supra, 46 
Cal.2d 301, an officer acting with reasonable cause to make a narcotics arrest 
kicked down defendant’s door after knocking and hearing retreating footsteps.  
Although the officer failed to demand admittance or explain his purpose, we 
upheld the seizure of narcotics found within.  We observed that full compliance 
with knock-notice requirements could delay an officer’s entry and thereby “permit 
[the] destruction or secretion of evidence . . . .”  (46 Cal.2d at p. 305.)  Because the 
officer in Maddox clearly had the right to enter and invade defendant’s privacy, 
“there is no compelling need for strict compliance with the requirements of [Penal 
Code] section 844 to protect basic constitutional guarantees.”  (Id. at p. 306.)   
In Maddox, we framed the applicable test for exigent circumstances this 
way:  “[W]hen there is reasonable cause to make an arrest and search and the facts 
known to [the officer] before his entry are not inconsistent with a good faith 
 
8
belief . . . that compliance with [Penal Code] section 844 is excused, his failure to 
comply with the formal requirements of that section does not justify the exclusion 
of the evidence he obtains.”  (Maddox, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 306-307.)  More 
recent cases have slightly rephrased that test so that strict compliance with the 
knock-notice rule is excused “if the specific facts known to the officer before his 
entry are sufficient to support his good faith belief that compliance will increase 
his peril, frustrate the arrest, or permit the destruction of evidence.”  (People v. 
Tribble (1971) 4 Cal.3d 826, 833, italics added; see People v. Dumas (1973) 9 
Cal.3d 871, 877; Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 305; People v. Flores (1982) 128 
Cal.App.3d 512, 521 (Flores); see also Annot., supra, 85 A.L.R.5th at pp. 179-
182, § 50, citing similar out-of-state cases.)   
We have also made clear, however, that no blanket rule exists exempting all 
narcotics cases from the knock-notice rule; instead, a specific showing must be 
made to justify an unannounced entry or break-in.  (Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 
305; People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586, 587-589.)  In other words, the mere 
fact that the officers are aware of contemporaneous drug activity on the premises 
does not provide per se justification for a no-knock entry.   
Nonetheless, we think the People made a sufficient specific showing of 
exigent circumstances here.  Flores, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d 512, is very close on 
point.  There, the officers were aware of recent or contemporaneous drug sales on 
the premises and obtained a search and arrest warrant.  Before entering the 
premises, the officers confronted defendant Flores outside, arrested him, and 
yelled through the open door “ ‘Police officer with a search warrant.  Demand an 
entry.’ ”  (Id. at p. 518.)  Knowing that any drugs on the premises could be quickly 
 
9
destroyed by other persons they knew were inside, the officers entered a few 
seconds later, seizing drugs and various other items.  (Id. at pp. 518-519.) 
The Flores court acknowledged the officers entered without giving the 
occupants a reasonable opportunity to permit or refuse peaceable entry.  (See 
Brown v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 539, 543.)  But the court found 
sufficient exigent circumstances to excuse strict compliance:  “[T]he specific facts 
known to [the police officer] included the immediately preceding large heroin sale 
actively engaged in by [a codefendant] whom he knew was inside the same house 
where heroin sales of increasing amounts were completed in four of the past six 
days and . . . the yelling at [defendant] just outside the open front door which he 
reasonably could consider as having warned those inside of the officers’ presence 
and purpose.”  (Flores, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 521.)  These two factors, 
ongoing drug sales and a loud announcement of the officers’ identify and purpose, 
are similarly present in this case.   
We also find strong support for our holding in Banks, supra, 540 U.S. 31.  
Banks recently clarified the federal constitutional principles governing 
nonconsensual entries made without full compliance with knock-notice 
requirements.  These principles, which seem fully compatible with the California 
cases discussed above, necessarily govern our analysis here.  (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 
28, subd. (d); see In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 884-890.)  In Banks, the 
officers obtained a search warrant based on an informant’s tip that the defendant 
was selling cocaine from his home.  The officers arrived at the premises, called out 
“ ‘police search warrant,’ ” knocked loudly on the door, and after 15 to 20 seconds 
 
10
broke in with a battering ram.  A house search uncovered contraband and other 
incriminating evidence.  (Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at p. 33.)  The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeal reversed a trial court denial of suppression of the foregoing 
evidence, and the high court granted certiorari to consider whether the officers 
waited a reasonable time before breaking in.  The court upheld the entry and 
search.  (Banks, supra, 540 U.S. pp. 34-35.) 
Unlike the present case, the officers in Banks actually knocked and 
formally announced their purpose before breaking in.  Yet the Banks court did not 
treat that fact as legally significant because “there is no reason to treat a post-
knock exigency differently from the no-knock counterpart” because “the same 
criteria” should apply in determining whether the officers could legitimately enter 
after knocking or whether a knock and announcement were required in the first 
place.  (Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at pp. 40, 35.)   
The Banks court repeated the previous test for allowing a “no-knock” entry, 
namely, that the police must “ ‘have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and 
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be 
dangerous or futile, or  . . . would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime 
by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.’ ”  (Banks, supra, 540 U.S. 
at p. 37, quoting Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 U.S. 385, 394.)  Banks noted 
that, under Richards, “if circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency 
when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight in” without knocking.  
(Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at p. 37.)   
With respect to the exigency present whenever drugs are involved, Banks 
agreed that after waiting 15 or 20 seconds without a response to their knock, the 
officers could reasonably suspect that any drug on the premises would be flushed 
 
11
away unless they forcibly broke in.  (Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at p. 38.)  The court 
observed that “when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the 
point of putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to 
the entrance, that governs when the police may reasonably enter . . . .”  (Id.  at p. 
40.)   
As noted, a majority of the Court of Appeal in the present case found no 
exigent circumstances to excuse the officers from complying with the knock-
notice rule.  The majority agreed with the magistrate that the officers provided 
insufficient facts to justify their fear that evidence could be destroyed absent 
immediate entry.  In this regard, the court expressly declined to follow the Flores 
rationale (see Flores, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 521) that contemporaneous sales 
on the premises, coupled with the officers’ yelling at one suspect outside the open 
door, justified immediate entry to prevent destruction of evidence.  As for Banks, 
supra, 540 U.S. 31, the Court of Appeal majority attempted to distinguish that 
case as one in which the officers actually knocked before entering, seemingly 
ignoring Banks’ statement that the same standards it was announcing would apply 
in a “no-knock” situation if the requisite “reasonable suspicion of exigency” 
existed.  (Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at pp. 36-37.)   
The dissenting opinion of Acting Presiding Justice Benke in this case 
argued that exigent circumstances existed based on defendant’s ongoing or 
contemporaneous drug transactions on or near the premises, the officers’ loud 
shouting at Thomaselli identifying themselves as officers conducting a probation 
search, and their reasonable belief that defendant was thereby amply alerted to 
their presence and purpose.  As the Benke dissent observed, “[n]ot only would 
knocking and waiting for a response from occupants have been futile and risk 
destruction of drugs, in this case the officers’ staging plan was in disarray, their 
attention necessarily diverted from appellant and entering her house to the chaos 
 
12
of dealing with events outside. . . .  Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court 
reminds us, we are not at liberty to substitute our views on how the officers should 
have responded, but rather we are obligated to view the reasonableness of their 
actions through their eyes at the time they are confronted with the alleged 
exigency.  Under the chaotic circumstances here, it was reasonable for Santana to 
choose a course of action that preserved the safety of the officers. 
“The majority would have these officers, in the midst of the commotion and 
drug dealing around them, with guns drawn, stand at a partially opened sliding 
glass door they could not see through (but presumably through which they could 
be seen by those inside).  There they would be required to knock and count the 
seconds, somehow reflecting individually or as a group upon preceding events to 
determine how long they should wait.  This is not realistic.  Nor is it a result 
contemplated by existing law.” 
We agree with the Court of Appeal dissent that exigent circumstances 
excused compliance with the knock-notice rule in this case.  The officers 
reasonably could assume, based on their knowledge of defendant’s probationary 
status allowing warrantless searches and the apparent ongoing and 
contemporaneous drug sales on the premises, that some drugs were still present 
inside which could be readily destroyed once defendant became aware of the 
officers’ identity and intent.  The officers could also reasonably suspect that the 
commotion occurring immediately outside defendant’s open door, including the 
officers’ loud identification of themselves as members of the sheriff’s department 
seeking to execute a probation search, and the sound of a barking dog inside the 
premises, together would alert defendant to destroy or conceal any drugs on the 
premise unless the officers entered without further delay.  As the trial court found, 
the loud confrontation with Thomaselli was sufficient to put defendant on notice 
of the officers’ identity and purpose. 
 
13
We stress, of course, that police officers are not permitted to contrive to 
create their own exigency by making loud noises before entering, or even by 
loudly announcing their presence and purpose to serve as a pretext for entering 
without knocking.  But nothing in the record suggest the officers prearranged or 
contrived the confrontation with Thomaselli.   
Defendant observes that in Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at page 33, the officers 
waited 15 to 20 seconds before entering, whereas here the officers entered after a 
mere five to seven seconds after announcing their identity and purpose to 
Thomaselli.  First, the trial court found that “probably” more time had elapsed 
than merely five or seven seconds.  Second, in the present case, the officers 
entered through an unlocked open door.  But in Banks, the officers determined to 
use a battering ram to break down the defendant’s door and obviously needed 
more time to prepare for and execute an entry in such manner.  In any event, in the 
words of the high court in Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at page 40, “when 
circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the point of putting his 
drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance, that 
governs when the police may reasonably enter.”   
Defendant also argues that police officers should not be allowed to dispense 
with the requirement of an actual knock merely because they have previously 
announced their identity and purpose.  We agree that even in drug cases, ordinarily 
officers executing a search must complete the knock-notice procedure and may not 
rely on their announcement as itself creating an exigency justifying immediate 
entry.  As noted above, however, no evidence exists in this case to suggest the 
officers contrived to use their confrontation with Thomaselli as an excuse to avoid 
compliance with the knock notice rule.  
We conclude that, under the facts in this case, the officers’ entry without 
knocking was justified by exigent circumstances.   
 
14
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
The majority concludes that exigent circumstances excused the sheriff’s 
deputies in the present case from complying with the constitutional requirement, 
codified in Penal Code section 1531, that a law enforcement officer may not enter 
a residence to execute a search warrant (or conduct a probation search) unless 
“after notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance.”  (Ibid.)1  I 
disagree.  Although this is a close case, in my view, the commotion that occurred 
as the sheriff’s deputies approached the residence may have alerted the occupants 
to the presence of the police and their purpose, and thus may have obviated the 
need to announce the officers’ authority and purpose, but it did not excuse the 
officers from affording the occupants an opportunity to permit or “refuse[] 
admittance.” 
In People v. Rosales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 299, we recognized that the parallel 
“knock-notice” requirement in section 8442 “is designed to protect fundamental 
rights. ‘Decisions in both the federal and state courts have recognized, as did the 
English courts, that the requirement is of the essence of the substantive protections 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
noted. 
2  
Section 844 states that a peace officer may break open the door of a house 
to make an arrest “after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose 
for which admittance is desired.” 
 
2 
which safeguard individual liberty.’ [Citation.] [¶]  The statute reflects more than 
concern for the rights of those accused of crime. It serves to preclude violent 
resistance to unexplained entries and to protect the security of innocent persons 
who may also be present on premises where an arrest is made. ‘We are duly 
mindful of the reliance that society must place for achieving law and order upon 
the enforcing agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on observance by law 
officers of traditional fair procedural requirements is, from the long point of view, 
best calculated to contribute to that end. However much in a particular case 
insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of 
a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of short-cut 
methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness. The requirement 
of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply 
rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. . . . Every 
householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the 
protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful invasion of the 
house.’ ”  (Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 304-305, fn. omitted.) 
In the present case, Detective Alberto Santana approached defendant’s 
residence with his team of officers to conduct a probation search knowing that 
defendant was actively engaged in selling drugs from the residence.  The officers 
were wearing bulletproof vests with the word “Sheriffs” printed on them, and 
baseball caps that said “Sheriff’s Narcotics.”  The focus of the search was the 
attached garage, which defendant had converted into a bedroom and had a sliding 
glass door on the side. 
Rather than approach the front door of the residence, the officers went 
through a gate to approach the sliding glass door of the converted garage, but as 
they turned the corner, the detective came “face-to-face” with a man “clenching 
something in his hand.”  The detective, with his gun drawn, said “in a loud voice 
 
3 
. . . [a]lmost yelling,” “Sheriff’s Department, probation search, get on the ground.”  
He believed that the other members of his team also had their guns drawn and 
yelled the same thing.  The man, later identified as Michael Thomaselli, had been 
repairing the fence and was holding only screws in his hand. 
A dog began barking inside the converted garage.  Believing their operation 
had been “compromised” because “[a]nyone in the residence or in the bedroom 
would have heard us” and “could possibly arm themselves, could possibly destroy 
evidence or possibly run,” Detective Santana organized his team of officers and, 
within five to seven seconds, entered the sliding glass door, which was open, 
without knocking.  As they entered, the officers yelled “Sheriff’s Department, 
probation search.”  The sole occupant of the converted garage was the barking 
dog.  The officers entered the residence proper and crossed the dining room, the 
living room, and a hallway before finding defendant and her ex-husband, who is 
bedridden, in his bedroom at the rear of the house. 
Defendant testified that just before the police arrived, she had gone into her 
ex-husband’s bedroom and shut the door.  She later heard someone calling her 
name and opened the bedroom door to find a sheriff’s deputy pointing a gun at her 
and ordering her to raise her hands. 
The superior court denied the motion to suppress evidence, erroneously 
concluding that the officers had substantially complied with the knock-notice 
requirement by announcing their presence and their purpose when they 
encountered the worker outside the door of the converted garage, but the court 
further found that no exigent circumstances had excused compliance with the 
knock-notice requirement:  “[T]here are no known exigencies. . . . They don’t 
know if there are drugs being flushed, they don’t know that anybody is being 
armed. . . . They didn’t have any reason to believe she was armed.  They could see 
she wasn’t fleeing.  They have the place surrounded.  There is no exigency.” 
 
4 
The Court of Appeal reversed, correctly recognizing that the officers did 
not substantially comply with the knock-notice requirement, and concluding, as 
did the superior court, that there were no exigent circumstances that excused such 
compliance. 
The People no longer argue that the officers substantially complied with the 
knock-notice requirement, and I agree with the superior court and the Court of 
Appeal that there were no exigent circumstances excusing compliance with the 
knock-notice requirement.  The majority reaches the opposite conclusion that it 
was proper for the officers to enter defendant’s residence without giving “notice of 
[their] authority and purpose” and being “refused admittance” as required by 
section 1531.  My disagreement centers upon a single sentence in the majority 
opinion, which appears in the paragraph summarizing the majority’s reasoning. 
The majority summarizes its reasoning as follows:  “The officers 
reasonably could assume, based on their knowledge of defendant’s probationary 
status allowing warrantless searches and the apparent ongoing and 
contemporaneous drug sales on the premises, that some drugs were still present 
inside which could be readily destroyed once defendant became aware of the 
officers’ identity and intent.  The officers could also reasonably suspect that the 
commotion occurring immediately outside defendant’s open door, including the 
officers’ loud identification of themselves as members of the sheriff’s department 
seeking to execute a probation search, and the sound of a barking dog inside the 
premises, together would alert defendant to destroy or conceal any drugs on the 
premises unless the officers entered without further delay.  As the trial court 
found, the loud confrontation with Thomaselli was sufficient to put defendant on 
notice of the officers’ identity and purpose.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12.) 
I agree with the majority that “the loud confrontation with Thomaselli was 
sufficient to put defendant on notice of the officers’ identity and purpose.”  (Maj. 
 
5 
opn., ante, at p. 12.)  But section 1531 requires more than just notification of the 
officer’s presence and purpose, it further requires that the occupants have “refused 
admittance.”  The loud confrontation with Thomaselli, therefore, might have made 
it unnecessary for the officers to announce their authority and purpose but it did 
not permit the officers to enter the residence until they had either been granted or 
refused admittance.  Such a refusal to admit the officers may be implied, of 
course, if the occupants do not respond within a reasonable time following a 
demand for entry.  (United States v. Banks (2003) 540 U.S. 31, 38; People v. 
Gonzalez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1047.) 
I also agree with the majority that “[t]he officers reasonably could assume, 
based on their knowledge of defendant’s probationary status allowing warrantless 
searches and the apparent ongoing and contemporaneous drug sales on the 
premises, that some drugs were still present inside which could be readily 
destroyed once defendant became aware of the officers’ identity and intent.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  But as the majority acknowledges, “no blanket rule 
exists exempting all narcotics cases from the knock-notice rule . . . . In other 
words, the mere fact that the officers are aware of contemporaneous drug activity 
on the premises does not provide per se justification for a no-knock entry.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 8.)  There always is a risk that the occupants of a residence that 
contains drugs may attempt to destroy those drugs as soon as an officer executing 
a warrant or conducting a probation search announces his or her presence and 
demands admittance.  Nevertheless, the officer cannot lawfully enter until the 
occupants have either granted or refused admittance or have been given a 
reasonable opportunity to do so. 
My disagreement with the majority, therefore, hinges upon the following 
statement:  “The officers could also reasonably suspect that the commotion 
occurring immediately outside defendant’s open door, including the officer’s loud 
 
6 
identification of themselves as members of the sheriff’s department seeking to 
execute a probation search, and the sound of a barking dog inside the premises, 
together would alert defendant to destroy or conceal any drugs on the premises 
unless the officers entered without further delay.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  I 
disagree with half of this statement.  As noted above, I agree that the officers 
reasonably could conclude that the commotion outside the door would alert the 
occupants to the presence and purpose of the officers, but I strongly disagree that 
the officers had a reasonable basis for concluding that such notice of the presence 
and purpose of the officers would lead the occupants “to destroy or conceal any 
drugs on the premises unless the officers entered without further delay.”  (Ibid.) 
The superior court found that the officers had no reason to conclude that 
drugs were being destroyed or that the occupants were fleeing or arming 
themselves:  “They don’t know if there are drugs being flushed, they don’t know 
that anybody is being armed. . . . They didn’t have any reason to believe she was 
armed.  They could see she wasn’t fleeing.  They have the place surrounded.”  As 
the majority acknowledges, we are bound by such findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial evidence.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  Because the officers 
had no basis for believing that drugs actually were being destroyed, the majority is 
forced to rely upon the mere possibility that this could happen.  Such speculation 
is not enough.  “In the absence of some specific and articulable reasons that set the 
present search apart from other narcotics searches, the mere possibility that 
occupants were trying to frustrate the search does not excuse compliance with 
section 1531. . . . If specific indications of arming or destruction of evidence were 
not required, the exigent-circumstances exception would entirely consume the 
notice and refusal requirement.”  (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 
1043, 1050.) 
 
7 
In Gonzalez, the Court of Appeal ruled that an entry to serve a search 
warrant was unlawful when officers in plain clothes knocked on the door of the 
defendant’s residence shortly before 1 a.m.  A woman’s voice asked “ ‘Who is 
it?’ ”  The officer answered, “ ‘Riverbank Police Department. Search warrant.’ ”  
The officer heard nothing further and, after five seconds, kicked in the door, 
hitting the defendant in the shoulder and knocking her to the ground.  (People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1047.)  The defendant testified that when 
the officer identified himself, she answered, “ ‘just a minute’ ” and peered through 
a hole in the door, seeing a man in camouflage pants.  She was about to unlock the 
door when it flew open.  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal, in ruling that the entry was unlawful, recognized “the 
conflicting policies that are at work in this area”:  “On the inside of the door is a 
lone woman with two daughters; she lives in an increasingly violent society and 
she must decide at 12:50 a.m. whether to throw her door open to a band of armed 
men who claim to be police but who are standing on her front porch in scruffy 
street clothes. [Citation.] [¶] On the other side of the door stand officers who have 
no doubts about their authority and purpose – they know they are not rapists or 
killers, and that they are not common thugs despite their dress and the late hour of 
their arrival.  They believe they have a drug dealer cornered inside, and they know 
there is someone behind the door who could let them in but who has not done so.  
They know nothing else about what is happening in the house, but they know that 
almost anything that is happening behind the closed door is likely to result in 
injury to them or destruction of evidence. [¶] The interests at stake on both sides 
of the door are quite important; and as the history of the notice and refusal of entry 
requirement makes clear the interests are not easily reconciled.”  (People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1049.) 
 
8 
Although it certainly is possible that the occupants of the residence in the 
present case, having become aware that the police were there, might attempt to 
escape or destroy evidence, that possibility always arises as soon as the police 
announce their presence and demand entry, as they are required to do.  In People 
v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586, 588, Chief Justice Traynor writing for a 
unanimous court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the police need not 
comply with section 1531 when executing a search warrant for narcotics because 
“narcotics violators normally are on the alert to destroy the easily disposable 
evidence quickly at the first sign of an officer’s presence.”  We stated:  “No such 
basis exists for nullifying the statute in all narcotics cases, and, by logical 
extension, in all other cases involving easily disposable evidence.  The statute 
does not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction.”  (People v. 
Gastelo, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 588.) 
Even when the police have good reason to believe that the premises to be 
searched contain narcotics, and that the occupants are aware that the police are 
present, the police still are required to give the occupants the opportunity to 
respond to their demand for entry, unless the police have reason to believe that the 
occupants actually are attempting to escape or destroy evidence.  This distinction 
may be subtle, but it is important.  In the present case, there is nothing to indicate 
that, even if the occupants had become aware of the presence of the police, they 
were attempting to escape or destroy evidence.  Accordingly, there were no 
exigent circumstances that excused compliance with the requirement that the 
officers give the occupants an opportunity to comply with the demand for 
entrance. 
The majority relies principally upon the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
People v. Flores (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 512, which the majority says is “very 
close on point.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  The circumstances in Flores were 
 
9 
similar to those in the present case but, as explained below, there is a significant 
difference that distinguishes Flores from the present case.  I also disagree with the 
reasoning in Flores.  The reasoning in Flores contains a flaw that, in my view, has 
led astray the majority in the present case. 
In Flores, sheriff’s deputies obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s 
residence after a paid informant made a series of controlled purchases of heroin 
there.  As the officers waited outside, the informant purchased heroin a final time 
from the defendant and his accomplice.  The defendant then escorted the 
informant back to the taxicab in which she had arrived while his accomplice 
remained in the house.  When the driver of the taxicab, who was a sheriff’s 
deputy, revealed that the police were present, the defendant “ran back toward the 
house.”  Another officer yelled at the defendant to stop and placed him under 
arrest and then, as a fellow officer held the defendant, went immediately to the 
front door of the residence, which was open with the screen door ajar.  He yelled 
“ ‘Police officer with a search warrant.  Demand an entry’ ” and entered one or 
two seconds later.  (People v. Flores, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d 512, 518-519.) 
The Court of Appeal in Flores held that the entry was lawful, despite the 
officer’s failure to wait for a response after announcing his presence and purpose, 
reasoning that “[s]trict compliance [with section 1531] is more readily excused 
where the police in good faith believe their presence and purpose to enter is 
already known to the occupants [citations].”  (People v. Flores, supra, 128 
Cal.App.3d 512, 521.)  This echoed an identical statement in Brown v. Superior 
Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 539, 543.  The Courts of Appeal in both Flores and 
Brown cited in support of this proposition our decision in People v. Rosales, 
supra, 68 Cal.2d 299, 302, but we said nothing of the kind in Rosales. 
In Rosales, we invalidated an arrest and resulting search because the 
officers entered the residence without complying with the knock-notice 
 
10 
requirement of section 844.  The officers went to the defendant’s residence to 
arrest him for a parole violation.  As they approached the residence, they looked 
through the screen door and saw the defendant in the living room.  They entered 
and arrested the defendant, telling a girl they passed in the living room that they 
were police officers, but failing to announce their purpose or demand entry.  We 
held that the fact that the officers told the girl that they were police officers was 
not sufficient to comply with section 844 because they did not also explain their 
purpose and demand admittance:  “Such identification alone could constitute 
substantial compliance with section 844 only if the surrounding circumstances 
made the officers’ purpose clear to the occupants or showed that a demand for 
admittance would be futile.  There is nothing in the record to show that any of the 
occupants or even the girl knew that the officers’ purpose was to arrest the 
defendant or understood that they were demanding admittance.”  (People 
v. Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d 299, 302, fn. omitted.)  We did not suggest in Rosales 
that the circumstance that the occupants of a residence are aware of the presence 
and purpose of the police excuses the requirement that the police demand 
admittance and permit the occupants to respond to that demand before entering.  
To the contrary, we held that the entry in Rosales was unlawful, recognizing that 
section 844, like section 1531, “requires that an officer explain his purpose before 
demanding admittance, not merely that he identify himself as an officer.”  (People 
v. Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 302.) 
Although I find the reasoning in Flores to be flawed in this respect, I 
believe the Court of Appeal may have reached the correct result in that case.  
Unlike the present case, the officers in Flores may have had reason to believe that 
an immediate entry into the residence was necessary to forestall the imminent 
destruction of evidence.  As noted above, the defendant in Flores had left his 
residence, leaving his accomplice in the house and, upon learning that the police 
 
11 
were present, “ran back toward the house.”  (People v. Flores, supra, 128 
Cal.App.3d 512, 518.)  The officer could reasonably have concluded that the 
defendant’s purpose in running back to his residence was to destroy evidence or 
escape apprehension.  Because the defendant’s accomplice remained in the house, 
the officer had reason to believe that it was necessary to enter the residence 
immediately to prevent the defendant’s accomplice from accomplishing what the 
defendant had just been prevented from doing. 
The importance of the circumstance in Flores that the defendant ran when 
he learned the police were present is demonstrated by comparing the decision in 
Flores with the decision in People v. Neer (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 991.  Police 
officers approached Neer’s home to execute a search warrant and encountered a 
man working in the front yard.  They detained the man (who the officers later 
learned was Neer), shouting: “ ‘We’re the police department, don’t move . . . we 
have a search warrant.’ ”  (Id. at p. 994.)  One of the officers then went to the front 
door, which was open with the screen door closed.  Seeing people inside, the 
officer identified himself as a police officer, said he had a search warrant, and 
immediately entered “because he believed the occupants had heard both 
announcements and feared they would flee, destroy contraband or arm 
themselves.”  (Id. at p. 995.). 
The Court of Appeal in Neer held that the narcotics found in the ensuing 
search should have been suppressed because no exigent circumstances excused the 
officer’s violation of section 1531.  The court in Neer concluded that “nothing [the 
officer] knew permitted an objectively reasonable belief exigent circumstances 
existed.”  (People v. Neer, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 991, 995.)  The court added: 
“There was no suspicious activity by the occupants . . . . Neer’s detention in the 
front yard cannot suffice to excuse compliance with the statute.  Section 1531 was 
violated.”  (Id. at pp. 996-997.) 
 
12 
The difference between the decisions in Flores and Neer is that the 
defendant in Flores began running when he learned the police were present, while 
no similar facts appear in Neer.  In this respect, there is no meaningful difference 
between Neer and the present case.  As in Neer, the officers in the present case 
detained a suspect outside the entrance to the residence and, in doing so, may have 
alerted the occupants to their presence and purpose.  As in Neer, the officers in the 
present case immediately identified themselves and their purpose and entered the 
residence without giving the occupants an opportunity to respond because they 
feared the occupants might arm themselves, destroy evidence, or run.  As in Neer, 
the officers in the present case violated section 1531. 
The facts in the present case are nearly identical to those in Neer and differ 
from those in Flores in an important respect.  The person the officers encountered 
outside defendant’s residence in the present case did not resist or attempt to enter 
the residence or otherwise give the officers any reason to believe that destruction 
of evidence was imminent.  The encounter with the person outside the residence, 
at most, served only to alert the occupants of defendant’s residence that the police 
were present and intended to conduct a search.  This may have obviated the need 
for the officers to announce their presence and purpose, but it did not excuse the 
officers from complying with the further requirement of section 1531 that they 
demand admittance and permit the occupants an opportunity to respond to that 
demand. 
The decisions in which this court has found that exigent circumstances 
excused compliance with knock-notice requirement have all differed markedly 
from the present case.  In People v. Maddox (1956) 46 Cal.2d 301, police officers 
had watched the defendant’s residence for about a month and had seen known 
narcotics users visit there.  The officers arrested a man soon after he left the 
defendant’s residence who told the officers he had just injected heroin while inside 
 
13 
the residence.  They went to defendant’s door and knocked. A male voice said, 
“ ‘Wait a minute’ ” and the officer heard “the sound of retreating footsteps.  He 
kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where he saw defendant with a 
spoon in his hand running toward the bedroom.”  (Id. at p. 303.) 
This court rejected the defendant’s argument in Maddox that the arrest was 
illegal because the officer did not comply with the knock-notice requirement of 
section 844, stating:  “When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe 
a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his 
peril would be increased or that the felon would escape if he demanded entrance 
and explained his purpose, is not unreasonable.”  (People v. Maddox, supra, 46 
Cal.2d 301, 306, italics added.) 
In People v. Tribble (1971) 4 Cal.3d 826, exigent circumstances excused 
police officers’ failure to comply with the knock-notice requirement where they 
were pursuing violent criminals who reportedly were armed and the officers heard 
the sounds of running footsteps.  The victim in Tribble had been kidnapped and 
raped by two men, one of whom said he had a knife.  After being released, the 
victim reported to the police the license number and description of the vehicle the 
men were driving.  The vehicle was registered to the defendant.  Officer Moen 
went to the defendant’s apartment, saw the vehicle parked in the driveway, and 
found the victim’s photograph album on top of the vehicle.  Two men in a 
Volkswagen that had been parked near the defendant’s vehicle “started to back out 
and then drove rapidly forward and stopped.”  (Id. at p. 833.)  Other officers 
arrested the two men and recovered a gun.  Officer Moen went to the defendant’s 
apartment “where he heard what sounded like running footsteps.”  (Ibid.)  The 
officer forced open the door and arrested the defendant. 
This court concluded that exigent circumstances excused the officer’s 
failure to comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844:  “In the 
 
14 
present case, the violent character of the crimes involved, the victim’s report that 
her assailants had a knife, the recovery of a gun from the Volkswagen, and the 
sound of running footsteps within fully justified Officer Moen’s stated belief that 
‘I felt that there was a possibility of bodily injury to myself or my partner if we 
hesitated.’ Compliance with section 844 was therefore excused.”  (People v. 
Tribble, supra, 4 Cal.3d 826 at p. 833, italics added.) 
In People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 877, compliance with section 
1531 was excused where the police serving a search warrant had been told by an 
informant that the defendant possessed several firearms “and that he invariably 
answered the door with a loaded gun in this hand.”  In People v. Carrillo (1966) 
64 Cal.2d 387, 392, an officer who had gone to the defendant’s residence to arrest 
him for violating his parole on a narcotics offense, entered through a screen door 
without complying with section 844 when he “saw defendant moving quickly 
through the kitchen at about the same time that another officer knocked on the 
front door.”  (Italics added.) 
No similar facts appear in the present case.  Although the officers had 
reason to believe that defendant possessed narcotics and may have become aware 
that the officers were present and intended to search, they did not observe anyone 
moving quickly within the residence, or hear the sound of running footsteps, or 
have information that the occupants were armed.  The superior court so found, and 
we are bound by its finding of fact as it is supported by substantial evidence.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  Even if the commotion that occurred outside the 
entrance to defendant’s residence had obviated the need for the officers to knock 
on the door and announce their intention to enter and conduct a search, they still 
were obligated to wait a short time to permit the occupants to admit them 
peacefully, or to refuse them admittance, before they could enter the residence.  
(See United States v. Banks, supra, 540 U.S. 31, 33 [officers executing a search 
 
15 
warrant “called out ‘police search warrant’ and rapped hard enough on the door to 
be heard by officers at the back door,” then waited 15 to 20 seconds before 
entering].) 
I dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR:  WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
    *BLEASE, J. 
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Murphy 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 118 Cal.App.4th 821 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S125572 
Date Filed: November 28, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Larrie R. Brainard 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Laurel Nelson Smith, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Quisteen S. Shum, Steven T. Oetting and Heather F. Crawford, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Laurel Nelson Smith 
P.O. Box 398 
Cotopaxi, CO  81223-0398 
(719) 942-5267 
 
Heather F. Crawford 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 525-4084