Title: James Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-85-00
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2002

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The Court is called upon in this case to establish the appropriate standard for determining whether the Attorney General or a county prosecutor has properly declined to seek a waiver of forfeiture of public employment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 based on a conviction for a disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense. James Flagg was a twenty-nine year employee of the Department of Sanitation of the City of Newark. His duties included driving a dump truck for the City. On September 5, 1996, at the direction of Norman Dorch, his immediate supervisor, Flagg dumped the contents of a truck on an illegal dumping site. Dorch told Flagg that he would assume responsibility for the dumping. Subsequently, Flagg was charged with illegal dumping, a strict liability disorderly persons offense, N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9.3a and b. On May 13, 1998, the Maplewood Municipal Court found Flagg guilty of the offense. Flagg was fined $5,000, his driver's license was suspended for six months, and he was required to perform five days of community service. A de novo trial yielded the same result, and on July 20, 1999, the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Following a disciplinary hearing on September 20, 1996, Flagg's employment with the Newark Department of Sanitation was terminated. Flagg filed an appeal with the Merit System Board on October 16, 1996, and that matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it now sits pending the outcome of this appeal. On August 16, 1999, Flagg filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ, seeking to compel the Acting Essex County Prosecutor either to request a waiver of the job forfeiture mandate of N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 or to explain his reasons for not seeking a waiver of forfeiture. The prosecutor decided not to seek a waiver, basing his decision on the strict liability nature of the offense and the conclusion that Flagg must have realized that the dumping was illegal. In addition, it was the practice of the prosecutor not to seek waivers of job forfeitures. The trial court held that the prosecutor's decision not to request a waiver of forfeiture was an extraordinary abuse of discretion since Flagg had an unblemished record, had worked for the City for approximately thirty years, and, because the statute under which Flagg was convicted imposes strict liability, Flagg had no criminal intent. The Appellate Division reversed in a published opinion. Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 336 N.J. Super. 506 (2001). The panel held that the trial court should have applied the patent and gross abuse of discretion standard and that, under that standard, the prosecutor's decision was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted certification and allowed the Attorney General to participate as amicus curiae. HELD: Because the decision whether or not to seek a waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2e does not involve law enforcement policy issues, a heightened standard of review is not required. Rather, the appropriate standard is simply abuse of discretion applied pursuant to written guidelines to assist in decision-making. 1. Whereas N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 provides a somewhat draconian measure requiring the forfeiture of employment of a person convicted of an offense involving or touching such . . . employment, subsection e of that statute provides a relief valve. That subsection allows a county prosecutor or the Attorney General to apply for waiver of forfeiture where the employee is convicted of a disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense. (Pp. 7-8) 2. Judicial review of a decision not to seek waiver by a prosecutor or the Attorney General must be conducted in accordance with a state-wide standard that is uniformly applied by all twenty-one county prosecutors and by the Attorney General as well. Since this is a case of first impression, this Court has not yet adopted such a standard. The forfeiture and disqualification requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 are non-penal consequences of certain convictions. N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2e can best be characterized as remedial in nature. Therefore, it should be liberally applied to achieve the legislative intent. That purpose can be achieved more effectively under an ordinary abuse of discretion standard. Ordinarily, an abuse of discretion will be manifest if defendant can show that a prosecutorial veto (a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment. Unlike PTI matters, which rely on the patent and gross abuse of discretion standard, forfeiture of future public employment is not a typical prosecutorial decision but rather a consequence of certain convictions. Therefore, applying the heightened- deferential standard of patent and gross abuse of discretion is unnecessary and inappropriate. (Pp. 9-13) 3. The remedial and beneficent purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2e can be effectuated only if each waiver application, in light of its surrounding facts, is reviewed by the prosecutor on a case-by-case basis. When it is a prosecutor's stated policy not to seek a waiver under any circumstances, as is the case here, then the statute's goal cannot be achieved because the decision has been made before the public employee makes a request for a waiver. In addition, a per se rule precludes a prosecutor from considering relevant factors. The prosecutor's stated reasons for not seeking a waiver in this case are flawed. Moreover, the matter involved here is a disorderly persons offense which the legislature saw fit not to vest a sentencing court with the authority to impose as much as one day of incarceration. Furthermore, if the aggravating and mitigating factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 were applicable, one would not find a single aggravating factor, while ten of thirteen enumerated mitigating factors would be applicable. Under all of the facts and circumstances presented, refusing to seek a waiver was an abuse of discretion. (Pp. 13-22) 4. The Attorney General is to promulgate written guidelines for determining whether to seek a waiver of the forfeiture and disqualification requirements. The guidelines will provide a means for the Attorney General and county prosecutors to avoid arbitrary or abusive exercises of their discretionary power. In addition to the written guidelines, the Attorney General and county prosecutors shall furnish written statements of the reasons for declining to seek waivers. Generally, the public employee should bear the burden of proof to show that his or her request of the Attorney General or a county prosecutor to seek a waiver from the sentencing court is supported by mitigating circumstances warranting a waiver. The guidelines should include certain factors, set forth herewith, although those factors may be modified by the Attorney General from time to time as deemed appropriate. (Pp. 22-25) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the judgment of the trial court precluding forfeiture and disqualification is reinstated. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in Justice COLEMAN's opinion. JAMES FLAGG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 5, 2001 -- Decided February 11, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 336 N.J. Super. 506 (2001). David M. Beckerman argued the cause for appellant (Beckerman &amp; Beckerman, attorneys). Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Donald C. Campolo, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney). Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This appeal involves a municipal worker whose job was forfeited based on illegal disposition of solid waste, a disorderly persons offense under the Solid Waste Management Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9.4. We are called on to establish the appropriate standard for determining whether the Attorney General or a county prosecutor has properly declined to seek a waiver of forfeiture of public employment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 based on a conviction for a disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense. The trial court applied a heightened standard of review and held that the prosecutor's decision not to seek a waiver pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2e was an extraordinary abuse of discretion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the patent and gross abuse of discretion standard used for pretrial intervention matters should be applied and that that standard was not satisfied in this case. We hold that because the decision whether or not to seek a waiver does not involve law enforcement policy issues, that heightened standard is not required. Rather, the appropriate standard is simply abuse of discretion applied pursuant to written guidelines to assist in decision-making. This bill attempts to ameliorate the harshness of 2C:51-2 as it applies to persons convicted of disorderly or petty disorderly persons offenses. The bill provides that while forfeitures and disqualifications would still apply in all cases, the sentencing court, upon application of the municipal or county prosecutor or Attorney General and for good cause, would have the discretion to waive these disabilities in any case where the underlying offense was a disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense. Under the bill, any person convicted of a disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense within the one year preceding this act may have an application made on their behalf to the sentencing court to waive any disqualification which may have resulted from their conviction. Governor Thomas Kean vetoed the bill and returned it to the General Assembly with his comments. Specifically, Governor Kean objected to municipal prosecutors being given the power to seek exceptions to the statute: The legislation, in its original form was carefully drafted to ensure that the waiver provision would be utilized only in the extraordinary case where necessary to remedy an obvious inequity caused by the present requirement of mandatory forfeiture for even the most minor offense. Consequently, only the Attorney General and the 21 county prosecutors__the highest ranking law enforcement officers at the State and county levels, respectively__were given the authority to request these waivers. . . . The power to request a waiver of mandatory forfeiture must be carefully circumscribed if it is to be wielded in a uniform and equitable manner. [Ibid.] It is clear from Governor Kean's letter and the Senate's statement that the intent of the waiver provision was to ameliorate the harshness of the job forfeiture requirement in cases where forfeiture and disqualification, as collateral consequences flowing from convictions for the most minor offenses, would be too severe. Clearly, disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses are minor offenses. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4. The remedial and beneficent purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2e can be effectuated only if each waiver application, in light of its surrounding facts, is reviewed by the prosecutor on a case- by-case basis. When it is a prosecutor's stated policy not to seek a waiver under any circumstances, then the statute's goal cannot be achieved because the decision has been made before the public employee makes a request for a waiver. In addition, a per se rule precludes a prosecutor from considering relevant factors. Even if we accepted the prosecutor's argument that the record supports a finding that two reasons were given for not pursuing a waiver__that Flagg was convicted under a non-intent statute and that he must have known that dumping solid waste on a public street was illegal__the prosecutor still violated the standard that we establish today. With respect to the first reason, Teare testified: [T]hough it appears that Mr. Flagg had no intent in violating this statute, this is a non-intent work -- a non-intent statute. Thus, what his intent was had nothing to do with it. . . . . Since it is a strict liability statute, it is the same as there are individuals in our office that are currently getting prosecuted because their bosses had ordered them to do something illegal. You cannot order someone to do something illegal. 2) he did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm; 3) he acted under a strong provocation in that his supervisor ordered him to dump the debris in the street; 4) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify his conduct, though failing to establish a defense; 5) he will participate in a program of community service; 6) he has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense; 7) his conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; 8) his character and attitude indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense; 9) he is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment; 10) he has cooperated with law enforcement authorities. [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b.] Under the facts and circumstances presented, refusing to seek a waiver because Flagg must have known the dumping was illegal was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that good cause exists in this case to waive the forfeiture and disqualification requirements. Because forfeiture of employment is not warranted based on N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2e, it follows that termination of Flagg's employment in the disciplinary proceedings based on the same matrix of facts would constitute an injustice.See footnote 11 Law should not become an instrument of injustice. LaFage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 431 (2001) (quoting Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 351 (1984). Such draconian discipline all but renders illusory the salutary results intended to be achieved by the waiver statute. 2) the nature of the offense, including its gravity and substantiality, whether it was a single or multiple offense and whether it was continuing or isolated; 3) the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt or culpability, including the employee's motives, reasons and personal gain; 4) the duties of the employee; 5) the relationship between the offense and the duties of the employee, including but not limited to, whether the criminal activity took place during work hours, or involved work facilities or equipment; 6) the employee's public employee history and record; 7) the employee's length of service; 8) whether forfeiture will be an undue hardship upon the employee and his family; 9) the employer's desires; 10) the needs and interests of the victim and society; 11) the extent to which the employee's offense constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior; 13) the threat presented to coworkers or the public if the employee is permitted to retain his or her position; 14) any involvement of the employee with organized crime; 15) whether the employee has been granted waiver on a prior occasion; and 16) the impact of waiver on the employment status of codefendants. NO. A-85 JAMES FLAGG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED February 11, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz