Title: Kemper Independence Insurance Co. v. Islami
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000488
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2021

2021 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP488 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Kemper Independence Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ismet Islami, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 866,946 N.W.2d 231 
PDC No:2020 WI App 38 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 8, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 22, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
William Domina   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGESNSACK, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Joseph F. Owens and Law Offices of Joseph F. Owens, LLC, 
New Berlin. There was an oral argument by Joseph F. Owens. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by James 
M. Fredricks, Alison E. Kliner, and Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & 
Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by James M. 
Fredricks. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance by James A. Friedman, Daniel C.W. Narvey, and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association for Justice by Michael J. Cerjak and Cannon & Dunphy, 
S.C., Brookfield.  
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 53 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP488 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV2875) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kemper Independence Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ismet Islami, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Ismet Islami seeks review 
of the court of appeals decision1 affirming the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kemper 
Independence Insurance Company (Kemper) denying coverage to Ismet 
                     
1 Kemper Indep. Ins. Co. v. Islami, 2020 WI App 38, 392 
Wis. 2d 866, 946 N.W.2d 231. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
2 
 
for the loss of her home.2  Ydbi Islami, from whom Ismet is legally 
separated, intentionally set fire to the home.  All parties 
stipulated that Ydbi concealed facts from Kemper about his 
involvement in the fire with the intent to deceive, and Kemper 
relied upon Ydbi's concealment and fraud to its detriment.  The 
circuit court ruled the "concealment or fraud" condition in 
Kemper's insurance policy covering the home ("the Policy") barred 
coverage for Ismet's claims.  The court of appeals agreed that the 
Policy did not provide coverage as a result of Ydbi's conduct and 
affirmed the circuit court's decision. 
¶2 
Ismet raises three arguments.  First, Ismet contends 
that, given her legal separation from Ydbi, Ydbi is not her spouse 
and therefore not an "insured" for purposes of the Policy.  Second, 
Ismet argues the Policy's "concealment or fraud" condition is 
ambiguous, conflicts with the Policy's "intentional loss" 
exclusion, and therefore does not bar coverage.  Third, Ismet 
asserts she is an innocent insured and the victim of domestic 
abuse, thereby requiring Kemper to provide coverage under Wis. 
Stat. § 631.95(2)(f)'s domestic abuse exception to a property 
insurer's intentional act exclusion. 
¶3 
We hold:  (1) Ydbi is an insured under the terms of the 
Policy, both under the plain language of the insurance contract 
and because Wisconsin's marriage laws recognize Ydbi as Ismet's 
spouse; (2) the Policy's "concealment or fraud" condition 
                     
2 The Honorable Judge William J. Domina, Waukesha County 
Circuit Court, presided. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
3 
 
precludes coverage for Ismet——a conclusion unaffected by the 
Policy's "intentional loss" exclusion; and (3) Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.95(2)(f) does not apply because the record lacks any evidence 
showing Ydbi's arson constituted "domestic abuse" against Ismet, 
as statutorily defined.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Ismet and Ydbi married in 1978.  In 1988, Ydbi was 
convicted of a number of crimes, including stalking and sexual 
assault of a minor, involving victims other than Ismet.  Following 
these incidents, Ismet initially sought a divorce from Ydbi but, 
for religious reasons, obtained a legal separation instead.  As 
part of the separation, which occurred in 1998, both parties 
entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement, under which Ismet 
received sole ownership of their home in Oconomowoc, although Ismet 
and Ydbi continued to live in the home together.  Neither party 
proceeded with a divorce. 
¶5 
In 2012, Kemper issued a "Package Plus" home and 
automobile insurance policy covering Ismet's Oconomowoc home and 
listed automobiles.  Under the Policy, Ismet is listed as the 
"Named Insured."  However, the introduction to the Policy reads:  
"Throughout the policy, 'you' and 'your' mean the person shown as 
the 'Named Insured' in the Declarations.  It also means the spouse 
if a resident of the same household."  The Policy further states 
that "insured" means "you and residents of your household who 
are . . . [y]our relatives."  Additionally, both Ismet and Ydbi 
are listed in the vehicle coverage section as "Operator 1" and 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
4 
 
"Operator 2," respectively.  Both parties also marked their marital 
status as "Married." 
  
¶6 
The Policy also contains a "concealment or fraud" 
condition.  As relevant to this dispute, the provision bars 
coverage for "all insureds" if "an insured" concealed or 
misrepresented a material fact, with intent to deceive and on which 
Kemper relied.  In full, the provision reads: 
Under Section 1 – Property Coverages, with respect to 
all "insureds" covered under this policy, we provide 
coverage to no "insureds" for loss under Section 1 – 
Property Coverages if, whether before or after a loss, 
an "insured" has: 
1) Concealed or misrepresented any fact upon which 
we 
rely, 
and 
that 
concealment 
or 
misrepresentation is material and made with 
intent to deceive; or 
2) Concealed or misrepresented any fact and the fact 
misrepresented contributes to the loss. 
¶7 
Importantly for purposes of Ismet's argument, the Policy 
also contains an "intentional loss" exclusion.  That provision 
bars recovery for "an insured" who "commits or conspires to commit 
an act with the intent to cause a loss."  As material to Ismet's 
argument, the provision provides as follows: 
1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or 
indirectly by any of the following.  Such loss is 
excluded regardless of any other cause or event 
contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the 
loss. 
. . . .  
1h. Intentional Loss. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
5 
 
Intentional Loss means any loss arising out of 
any act an "insured" commits or conspires to 
commit with the intent to cause a loss. 
This exclusion only applies to an "insured" 
who commits or conspires to commit an act with 
the intent to cause a loss. 
¶8 
In June 2013, a fire occurred at the Oconomowoc home, 
damaging the property and its contents and rendering the home a 
total loss.  Per the Policy, Kemper sent Ismet and Ydbi a "Sworn 
Statement in Proof of Loss."  In the signed statement, both Ismet 
and Ydbi attested that the "the cause and origin" of the fire was 
"unknown."3  They also represented to Kemper in the statement that 
they were each "insureds" under the Policy.  Kemper later conducted 
a formal examination of Ismet and Ydbi with both answering 
questions under oath (hereinafter "Examination Under Oath").  In 
response to questions during that examination, both Ismet and Ydbi 
swore they were not aware the house burned down until after 
receiving notice of the incident.4 
¶9 
Despite 
these 
attestations, 
further 
investigation 
revealed that Ydbi had started the fire.  The fire occurred while 
Ismet was vacationing overseas in North Macedonia——a fact 
indisputably known by Ydbi.  In a separate criminal proceeding, 
                     
3 More specifically, Ismet and Ydbi attested:  "A Fire Loss 
occurred about 10:30 o'clock P.M., on the 10th day of June 2013.  
The cause and origin of said loss was unknown." 
4 According to Ismet, she first learned about the fire during 
a phone call from her niece approximately seven hours after the 
fire.  According to Ydbi, he learned about the fire while at a 
Milwaukee casino from a man he could not remember.  
No. 
2019AP488 
 
6 
 
the State eventually charged Ydbi with arson, for which he was 
convicted. 
¶10 Relying on the Policy's "concealment or fraud" condition 
(among other provisions), Kemper denied coverage for the loss of 
the home.  After its denial of the claim, Kemper commenced a 
declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of 
its rights and obligations under the Policy.  In particular, Kemper 
sought, inter alia, a declaration that the "concealment or fraud" 
condition barred coverage for both Ismet and Ydbi. 
¶11 Both parties eventually filed motions for summary 
judgment on stipulated facts.  Specifically, all parties 
stipulated to the following:  (1) Ydbi committed arson to destroy 
the Oconomowoc home; (2) if Ydbi is found to be an "insured" under 
the 
Policy, 
"Ydbi . . . was 
a 
resident 
of 
Ismet['s] . . . household"; 
(3) 
"Ydbi . . . engaged 
in 
concealment and fraud in his statement[s] to Kemper" about his 
involvement in the fire "with the intent to deceive Kemper, and 
Kemper relied upon Ydbi's concealment and fraud to its detriment"; 
(4) "the fire was not a result of Ismet committing or conspiring 
to 
commit 
any 
act 
with 
the 
intention 
of 
damaging 
the 
property . . . "; and (5) Ismet is an "innocent insured" under the 
Policy. 
¶12 Ultimately, the circuit court granted Kemper's motion 
for summary judgment, finding that Ydbi was an "insured" under the 
Policy, and Ismet's and Ydbi's legal separation in 1998 did not 
alter Ydbi's status.  The circuit court further found that, because 
Ydbi was an "insured," the "concealment or fraud" condition barred 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
7 
 
recovery for Ismet.  Lastly, the circuit court determined that, 
because the record was devoid of any evidence of domestic abuse, 
Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f) did not preclude Kemper from denying 
coverage.  Ismet appealed the decision to the court of appeals, 
which affirmed the circuit court's ruling.  We granted Ismet's 
petition for review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 This case comes before us as a review of a grant of 
summary judgment.  "Summary judgment is appropriate when there is 
no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Talley v. Mustafa 
Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, ¶12, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911 N.W.2d 55 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)).  "We independently review a grant of 
summary judgment using the same methodology of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals."  Id. (citation omitted); see also Romero 
v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, ¶17, 371 Wis. 2d 478, 
885 N.W.2d 591. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Ydbi is an "insured" under the Policy. 
¶14 Ismet contends Ydbi is not her spouse because they are 
legally separated; therefore, according to Ismet, Ydbi is not an 
"insured" under the Policy.  We disagree. 
¶15 Whether Ydbi is Ismet's "spouse" for purposes of 
insurance coverage is governed by the terms of the insurance 
contract. 
 
The 
Policy 
definitions 
answer 
this 
question:  
"Throughout the policy, 'you' and 'your' mean the person shown as 
the 'Named Insured' in the Declarations.  It also means the spouse 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
8 
 
if a resident of the same household."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
Policy defines "insured" as "you and residents of your household 
who are . . . [y]our relatives."  (Emphasis added.)  Ydbi may be 
an "insured" under the policy if he is either Ismet's spouse or 
relative, provided he resides in Ismet's household.  There is no 
dispute Ismet and Ydbi were residents of the same household. 
¶16 We interpret the provisions of an insurance policy using 
the 
same 
principles 
applicable 
to 
contracts 
generally.  
"[I]nsurance policies are contracts to which courts apply the same 
rules of law applicable to other contracts."  Talley, 381 
Wis. 2d 393, ¶35; see also McPhee v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 57 
Wis. 2d 669, 673, 205 N.W.2d 152 (1973) ("Contracts of insurance 
rest upon and are controlled by the same principles of law that 
are applicable to other contracts[.]").  Applying the plain 
language of the Policy, we conclude that Ismet and Ydbi are 
"spouses" for purposes of the contract.  "[T]he language of a 
contract must be understood to mean what it clearly expresses, and 
the courts may not depart from the plain meaning of a contract 
when it is free from ambiguities."  Matter of Watertown Tractor & 
Equip. Co., Inc., 94 Wis. 2d 622, 637, 289 N.W.2d 288 (1980) 
(quoted source omitted).  In the Policy's listed vehicle coverage 
section, Ismet and Ydbi are listed as "Operator 1" and Operator 
2," respectively.  The contract then explicitly indicates the 
marital status of both Ismet and Ydbi as "Married."  Because the 
Policy expressly designates Ismet and Ydbi as spouses, Ydbi meets 
the definition of "you" under the Policy, which makes Ydbi an 
"insured." 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
9 
 
¶17 Additionally, both Ismet and Ydbi represented to Kemper 
that they were each "insureds" under the insurance contract.  In 
determining whether a named insured's spouse is covered under a 
policy, courts may look to the "expectations of the parties," 
considering, among other factors, whether a couple "liv[es] under 
the same roof," whether they have a "close, intimate, and informal 
relationship," and "where the intended duration is likely to be 
substantial, where it is consistent with the informality of the 
relationship, . . . it is reasonable to conclude that the parties 
would consider the relationship . . . in contracting about such 
matters as insurance or in their conduct in reliance thereon."  
Belling v. Harn, 65 Wis. 2d 108, 113, 221 N.W.2d 888 (1974).  All 
of these factors are satisfied here.  Ismet and Ydbi lived under 
the same roof of the Oconomowoc home; they are in a relationship 
recognized as marital under Wisconsin law, albeit legally 
separated; and they each considered their relationship when 
contracting with Kemper, as demonstrated by listing their status 
as "Married."  Critically, both Ismet and Ydbi also stated in their 
"Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss" that they were each "insureds" 
under the contract.  With this understanding, Kemper conducted an 
Examination Under Oath of both Ismet and Ydbi, during which Ismet 
repeatedly stated for the record that Ydbi was her "husband."  
Giving effect to the expectations of the parties, and applying the 
plain language of the contract, Ismet and Ydbi are "spouses" and 
therefore insureds under the Policy. 
¶18 Although Ismet and Ydbi are also "spouses" under 
Wisconsin's marriage laws, Ismet argues that their legal 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
10 
 
separation alters their status as spouses under the law and 
therefore under the Policy.  We disagree.  Wisconsin law plainly 
distinguishes between a divorce and a legal separation.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 767.001(1f),5 "divorce" is defined as "the 
dissolution of the marriage relationship."  Once a judgment of 
divorce is entered, parties are free to remarry another individual, 
so long as it has been six months since the date of judgment.  Wis. 
Stat. § 765.03(2).  In contrast, a judgment of legal separation 
does not terminate a marriage.  As this court has previously noted, 
"there are . . . rights and obligations remaining in the marriage 
after a legal separation."  Herbst v. Hansen, 46 Wis. 2d 697, 706, 
176 N.W.2d 380 (1970) (emphasis added).  For example, legally 
separated couples may reconcile after a judgment for legal 
separation without having to get remarried.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.35(4).  Additionally, because they are still recognized as 
"married" under the law, legally separated couples are also 
precluded from marrying other individuals until six months after 
they obtain a judgment of divorce.  See § 765.03(2).  Indeed, as 
the Wisconsin Court System's own guidance to the public instructs, 
"legal separation does not end a marriage"——only divorce 
proceedings do.6 
                     
5 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-
18 version unless otherwise indicated.  
6 https://www.wicourts.gov/formdisplay/FA-4100V_instructions
.pdf?formNumber=FA-4100V&formType=Instructions&formatId=2&langua
ge=en. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
11 
 
¶19 Given that Ismet and Ydbi never initiated divorce 
proceedings but instead received a judgment of legal separation, 
they remained married under Wisconsin law.  Ydbi is Ismet's 
"spouse" under the Policy as well.  Both parties stipulated that 
Ydbi was "a resident of the same household" as Ismet.  Because 
Ydbi is Ismet's spouse who resided in Ismet's household, Ydbi is 
an "insured" under the Policy.  These conclusions are consistent 
with the expectations of both Ismet and Ydbi, as reflected in their 
representations to Kemper regarding their marital status and their 
status as "insureds" under the contract. 
¶20 Despite the clear language in Wis. Stat. ch. 767, Ismet 
argues Wis. Stat. ch. 766, the Marital Property Act, controls 
Ismet's and Ydbi's status as "spouses" under Wisconsin law.  
Because Chapter 766 contemplates that the "dissolution" of a 
marriage may involve a judgment of legal separation, Ismet argues 
that once she and Ydbi entered into a judgment of legal separation, 
they were no longer spouses.  See Wis. Stat. § 766.01(7).  This 
argument misunderstands the nature and scope of Chapter 766.  The 
Marital Property Act "provides rules which govern the ownership as 
well as management and control of property owned by married persons 
during their marriage . . . [and] at death."  Kuhlman v. Kuhlman, 
146 Wis. 2d 588, 592, 432 N.W.2d 295 (1988) (emphasis added) 
(quoted source omitted).  Chapter 767, on the other hand, contains 
Wisconsin's "divorce rules and policies."  Id. at 593.  That is, 
while Chapter 766 pertains to the control and management of marital 
property, Chapter 767 governs the actual legal status of married 
persons.  The "substantial differences between [Chapter 766 and 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
12 
 
Chapter 767] . . . did not come about by chance; they were 
deliberately drawn by the legislature to achieve different goals."  
Id.  Indeed, Chapter 766 "was not intended to change the law of 
divorce or other forms of dissolution."  Id. (quoted source 
omitted).  Chapter 767 controls the dissolution of marriage and 
under its provisions, Ismet and Ydbi were still "spouses" by law 
as well as under the Policy.  As spouses who resided in the same 
household, both Ismet and Ydbi were "insureds" under the terms of 
the Policy. 
 
B. The "concealment or fraud" condition bars coverage for 
Ismet under the Policy. 
¶21 Ismet next contends the "concealment or fraud" condition 
does not bar coverage for Ismet, because, according to her 
argument, its language is ambiguous and conflicts with the Policy's 
"intentional loss" exclusion.  Ismet relies on Hedtcke v. Sentry 
Insurance Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1992), to support 
her position.  We are not persuaded. 
¶22 Principles of contract interpretation control the 
resolution of this issue as well.  "Contracts of insurance rest 
upon and are controlled by the same principles of law that are 
applicable to other contracts, and parties to an insurance contract 
may provide such provisions as they deem proper so long as the 
contract does not contravene law or public policy."  McPhee, 57 
Wis. 2d at 673.  "[U]nambiguous contract language controls 
contract interpretation."  Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 
62, ¶25, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 833 N.W.2d 586 (quoted source omitted).  
"When the terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, we will 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
13 
 
construe the contract as it stands."  Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 
2003 WI App 140, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 124, 667 N.W.2d 751 (quoted source 
omitted); see also Folkmann v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶13, 264 
Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857 ("If there is no ambiguity in the 
language of an insurance policy, it is enforced as written[.]") 
(citation omitted). 
¶23 In this case, the Policy terms are plain and unambiguous, 
including the "concealment or fraud" condition.  That provision 
states, in relevant part:  "with respect to all 'insureds' covered 
under this policy, [Kemper] provide[s] coverage to no 'insureds' 
for loss" due to concealment or misrepresentation of (1) a material 
fact with the intent to deceive, which is relied upon by Kemper, 
or (2) any fact where the misrepresentation "contribut[ed] to the 
loss."  (Emphasis added.)  This language plainly excludes coverage 
for all insureds if any insured conceals or misrepresents a 
material fact, with the intent to deceive and on which Kemper 
relies. 
¶24 Because both Ismet and Ydbi are insureds under the 
Policy, if either so concealed or misrepresented a material fact 
on which Kemper relied, neither individual can recover.  All 
parties stipulated that "Ydbi . . . engaged in concealment and 
fraud in his statement[s] to Kemper" about his involvement in the 
fire "with the intent to deceive Kemper, and Kemper relied upon 
Ydbi's concealment and fraud to its detriment."  Applying the 
unambiguous language of the "concealment or fraud" condition to 
these agreed-upon facts, we conclude that Ydbi——an insured——
No. 
2019AP488 
 
14 
 
satisfied each element of the Policy's "concealment or fraud" 
condition, thereby precluding coverage for Ismet. 
¶25 Ismet argues that the Policy's "intentional loss" 
exclusion conflicts with the "concealment or fraud" condition, 
rendering the latter ambiguous.  We disagree.  As defined under 
the Policy, "intentional loss" means "any act 'an insured' commits 
or conspires to commit with the intent to cause a loss."  Ydbi's 
act of arson, which caused the loss of the Oconomowoc home, meets 
this definition.  Unlike the "concealment or fraud" condition, 
"this exclusion only applies to 'an insured' who commits or 
conspires to commit an act with the intent to cause a loss."  
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, Ismet does not lose coverage under 
the "intentional loss" exclusion.  In contrast, the "concealment 
or fraud" condition eliminates coverage not only for the insured 
who commits the intentional act causing loss, but for all insureds. 
¶26 There is nothing conflicting about these provisions of 
the Policy.  Each provision simply applies in different 
circumstances.  In the presence of fraud, no insured can recover 
by operation of the "concealment or fraud" condition.  When there 
is only "intentional loss" without any fraud, the Policy allows 
"innocent insureds" to recover by operation of the "intentional 
loss" exclusion.  It is the role of courts to "construe and enforce 
such agreements as made and not make new contracts for the 
parties."  McPhee, 57 Wis. 2d at 673.  "A construction that gives 
meaning to every provision of a contract is preferable to an 
interpretation that leaves part of the policy without meaning."  
Romero, 371 Wis. 2d 478, ¶18; see also 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
15 
 
T-3 Grp., Ltd., 2006 WI 94, ¶56, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d 822.  
In order to give effect to every provision of the Policy, both the 
"intentional loss" exclusion and the "concealment or fraud" 
condition must be read in harmony.  Neither Policy provision 
renders the other superfluous or ambiguous.  The provisions mean 
what they say, and it is the job of this court to apply them.  See 
Folkmann, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶17 ("As a general rule, the language 
in an insurance contract is given its common, ordinary meaning, 
that is, what the reasonable person in the position of the insured 
would have understood the words to mean.") (internal quotations 
and citations omitted).  Ydbi committed arson, lied to Kemper in 
his "Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss" and Examination Under Oath, 
and induced Kemper to rely upon his lies.  Under the "concealment 
or fraud" condition, the Policy provides coverage for "no 
insureds"——including Ismet. 
¶27 Contrary to Ismet's argument, this court's prior 
decision in Hedtcke does not alter this conclusion.  According to 
Hedtcke, when an exclusion is ambiguous and does not state "whether 
the obligations of the insured are joint or several," public policy 
dictates allowing innocent insureds to recover.  Hedtcke, 109 
Wis. 2d at 487-88.  In other words, when a provision is unclear as 
to whether an insured's obligations are "joint" or "several," 
courts should assume they are "several."  Id.  The Hedtcke court 
declared this rule necessary to "effectuate the public policy that 
guilty persons must not profit from their own wrongdoing."  Id. at 
488. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
16 
 
¶28 Hedtcke's rule applies when a coverage exclusion is 
ambiguous.  See id. at 487-88.  In this case, the "concealment or 
fraud" condition, unlike the contractual provision at issue in 
Hedtcke, does specify that the obligations of the insureds are 
"joint":  "with respect to all 'insureds' covered under this 
policy, [Kemper] provide[s] coverage to no 'insureds' for loss" in 
the event of concealment or fraud.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶29 We apply the plain language of the "concealment or fraud" 
condition consistent with Wisconsin precedent.  In Taryn E.F. by 
Grunewald v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis. 2d 719, 505 N.W.2d 418 (Ct. 
App. 1993), the court of appeals gave full effect to the plain 
language 
of 
a 
"joint" 
exclusion, 
which 
provided:  
"insurance . . . shall not apply to any damages . . . attributable 
to . . . any outrageous conduct on the part of any 'insured' 
consisting of any intentional, wanton, [or] malicious acts[.]"   
Id. at 724.  The court held that "[t]his language unambiguously 
denies coverage for all liability incurred by each and any 
insured."  Id.  Likewise, in State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Walker, 157 Wis. 2d 459, 459 N.W.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1990), the court 
of appeals applied the plain meaning of a "concealment or fraud" 
clause, which provided as follows:  "If you or any other insured 
under this policy has intentionally concealed or misrepresented 
any material facts . . . , then this policy is void as to you and 
any other insured."  Id. at 466.  According to the Walker court, 
the policy provision meant what it said:  "the concealment clause 
unambiguously denies recovery to an innocent insured when another 
insured breaches the concealment clause."  Id. at 467.  The Walker 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
17 
 
court determined Hedtcke had no bearing on the case because a 
"court must not modify clear and unambiguous language" when a 
provision plainly expresses a "joint" exclusion.  Id. at 471.  
"When the terms of a policy are plain on their face, the policy 
should not be rewritten by construction to bind the insurer to a 
risk it was unwilling to cover, and for which it was not paid."  
Id. at 471-72 (citations omitted). 
¶30 Just like in Taryn E.F. and Walker, Hedtcke has no 
bearing on the insurance contract before us.  Because the language 
of the "concealment or fraud" condition is plain and unambiguous, 
this court must enforce it and public policy considerations may 
not rewrite the contract.  Ismet lost coverage because "no insured" 
may recover when any insured engages in concealment or fraud under 
the Policy, as Ydbi did in this case.7 
                     
7 Ismet also argues that Ydbi's untruthful statements and 
omissions to Kemper, including during his Examination Under Oath 
and in his "Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss," collectively 
constitute a breach of a promissory warranty.  "Condition G" of 
the Policy reads:  "[N]o breach of a promissory warranty affects 
[Kemper's] obligations under this policy unless . . . the breach 
exists at the time of loss and either:  (a) increases the risk at 
the time of loss; or (b) contribute[s] to the loss."  According to 
Ismet, pursuant to "Condition G," Kemper cannot deny her coverage 
under the "concealment or fraud" condition because Ydbi's 
concealments occurred after the property loss and therefore did 
not increase the risk "at the time of loss" or contribute to the 
loss. (continued) 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
18 
 
 
C. Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f) does not support Ismet's claim. 
¶31 As a final matter, Ismet asserts that Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.95(2)(f), a statute which may allow "innocent insureds" to 
retain coverage that might otherwise be excluded due to intentional 
loss resulting from acts or patterns of domestic abuse, preserves 
coverage for her loss notwithstanding the "concealment or fraud" 
condition.  Based on the record before us, this statute does not 
apply. 
¶32 In relevant part, Wisconsin Stat. § 631.95(2)(f) reads: 
An insurer may not[,]. . . [u]nder property insurance 
coverage that excludes coverage for loss or damage to 
property resulting from intentional acts, deny payment 
to an insured for a claim based on property loss or 
damage resulting from an act, or pattern, of abuse or 
domestic abuse if that insured did not cooperate in or 
contribute to the creation of the loss or damage and if 
the person who committed the act or acts that caused the 
loss or damage is criminally prosecuted for the act or 
acts. 
                     
We disagree.  "Condition G" does not apply.  Under Wisconsin 
law, a promissory warranty is "[a] warranty that facts will 
continue to be as stated throughout the policy period[.]"  Fox v. 
Catholic Knights Ins. Soc., 2003 WI 87, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 207, 665 
N.W.2d 181 (quoted source omitted).  In essence, promissory 
warranties are generally commitments by an insured designed to 
minimize the risk of loss, such as a promise that an insured will 
not store flammables on insured property.  See id., ¶27.  Such 
risk minimization can occur only before the loss.  In this case, 
the "concealment or fraud" by Ydbi occurred after the loss.  Ydbi's 
concealment of his act of arson could not constitute a promissory 
warranty because it was not a representation designed to minimize 
the risk of loss but rather a fraud on Kemper after the arson 
caused the loss. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
19 
 
¶33 Under this statute, "'[d]omestic abuse' has the meaning 
given 
in 
[Wis. 
Stat.] 
§ 968.075(1)(a)." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 631.95(1)(c).  Under § 968.075(1)(a), "domestic abuse" is 
defined as any of four separate actions "engaged in by an adult 
person against his or her spouse or former spouse."  The four 
actions are as follows: 
1. Intentional infliction of physical pain, physical 
injury or illness. 
2. Intentional impairment of physical condition. 
3. A violation of s. 940.225(1), (2), or (3).8 
4. A physical act that may cause the other person 
reasonably to fear imminent engagement in the conduct 
described under subd. 1., 2., or 3. 
§ 968.075(1)(a). 
¶34 Ismet does not claim that Ydbi engaged in any acts 
meeting the first three definitions of domestic abuse.  Instead, 
Ismet contends that Ydbi's act of arson, in and of itself, 
constitutes "a physical act that may cause [her] reasonably to 
fear imminent engagement in the conduct described" in the preceding 
three clauses.  While an act of arson may qualify as a "physical 
act" under the fourth definition of "domestic abuse," Ismet fails 
to identify any evidence in the record establishing that she 
"reasonably . . . fear[ed] imminent engagement" in the sort of 
bodily harm described in this statute.  In particular, there is no 
evidence that Ydbi started the fire to harm Ismet; in fact, Ismet 
                     
8 All three of these subsections of Wis. Stat. § 940.225 
involve sexual assault. 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
20 
 
was overseas in North Macedonia when the arson occurred——a fact 
indisputably known by Ydbi. 
¶35 Ismet does not point to any evidence in the record that 
she reasonably feared for her safety.  Her affidavit contains no 
statements of fact related to any fears regarding Ydbi, or any 
past or ongoing instances of physical or sexual abuse by Ydbi.  
Instead, Ismet mentions only Ydbi's past criminal actions over 25 
years 
ago 
against 
other 
individuals. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 631.95(2)(f) says the property loss must "result" from an act of 
domestic abuse, as it is defined in that statute.  (Emphasis 
added.)  In the absence of evidence sufficient to satisfy that 
definition, the statute cannot apply to restore coverage.  When 
opposing a motion for summary judgment, the party "is obligated to 
submit materials . . . to counter the submissions of the moving 
party.  It is not enough to simply claim that the moving party's 
submission should be disbelieved or discounted."  Dawson v. 
Goldammer, 2006 WI App 158, ¶31, 295 Wis. 2d 728, 722 N.W.2d 106 
(internal quotations omitted).  Pursuant to § 631.95(2)(f) and our 
well-settled standard for summary judgment, Ismet was required to 
present at least some evidence connecting the arson and resulting 
property loss to her fear of imminent bodily harm.  See Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 
673, 289 N.W.2d 801 (1980) ("[T]he party in opposition to the 
motion [of summary  judgment] may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must, by affidavits 
or other statutory means, set forth specific facts showing that 
there exists a genuine issue[.]").  Her failure to do so defeats 
No. 
2019AP488 
 
21 
 
the application of § 631.95(2)(f), and the "concealment or fraud" 
condition precludes coverage. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶36  We conclude the circuit court properly granted Kemper's 
motion for summary judgment.  Ydbi is an insured under the terms 
of the Policy and because he "concealed or misrepresented" a 
material fact, "with intent to deceive" and upon which Kemper 
relied, the Policy's "concealment or fraud" condition precludes 
coverage for Ismet.  Wisconsin Stat. § 631.95(2)(f) does not 
override the operation of that condition because the record lacks 
any evidence to establish that Ydbi's arson constituted "domestic 
abuse" against Ismet, as statutorily defined.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  "If we are to fight 
discrimination and injustice against women we must start from the 
home for if a woman cannot be safe in her own house then she cannot 
be expected to feel safe anywhere."1  First and foremost, this case 
is about domestic abuse.  The majority errs in concluding the 
record in this case "lacks any evidence showing Ydbi's arson 
constituted 'domestic abuse' against Ismet, as statutorily 
defined."  Majority op., ¶3.  This erroneous determination——that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ydbi's 
actions constitute domestic abuse——is based on a misreading of the 
plain statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a)4.  
¶38 In misconstruing Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a)4., the 
majority creates four new hurdles for domestic violence victims 
seeking recovery under their insurance policies, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 631.95, for property destroyed by their abusers.  According 
to the majority's analysis, in order to establish domestic abuse, 
a victim must:  (1) show her fear; (2) disclose past or ongoing 
instances of physical or sexual abuse; (3) prove her abuser's 
motive; and (4) be physically present at the crime scene when the 
crime occurs.  These requirements have no basis in the statutory 
language of § 968.075(1)(a)4., and by failing to follow the 
statutory text, the majority denies Ismet——an "innocent insured"—
—the very insurance coverage § 631.95 was created to protect.  
                     
1 Aysha 
Taryam, 
http://raptreveries.blogspot.com/2015/10/ 
its-time-for-law-against-domestic.html (last visited June 2, 
2021). 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
2 
 
Because the majority misreads the statute and creates new 
requirements in order for victims to receive insurance coverage, 
I must dissent.2   
¶39 I begin this dissent with a succinct discussion of the 
relevant facts.  Next, I analyze the plain and unambiguous language 
of Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f), which prohibits insurance companies 
from discriminating against victims of domestic abuse, and Wis. 
Stat. § 968.075(1)(a), which defines domestic abuse.  I also 
summarize the context in which the legislature drafted these 
statutes.  I conclude by addressing the majority's failed analysis.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶40 Ismet 
and 
Ydbi 
Islami 
were 
married 
in 
1978.  
Approximately ten years later, Ydbi was convicted of stalking and 
second-degree sexual assault of a child, for which a judge 
sentenced him to three years in prison and ordered him to register 
as a sex offender.  Ismet's distress over Ydbi's criminal conduct 
led her to file for a legal separation in 1998.  
¶41 Under the terms of the legal separation, Ismet became 
the sole title owner of the Islamis' Oconomowoc home and the sole 
named insured in a homeowner's policy issued by Kemper Insurance.  
The homeowner's policy contained exclusions if an insured 
intentionally engaged in "fraud or concealment" by conspiring or 
committing the act that caused the loss, or by concealing or 
misrepresenting any fact upon which Kemper could rely to address 
a claim. 
                     
2 This dissent only reaches the domestic abuse issue raised 
by Ismet since that issue is dispositive. 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
3 
 
¶42 On June 10, 2013, while Ismet was in North Macedonia, 
Ydbi burned her house to the ground, destroying all that was 
inside.  Ydbi then lied to Kemper, denying any knowledge about the 
arson.  Ultimately, an investigation revealed that Ydbi was solely 
responsible.  Ydbi was charged and convicted of arson, and 
sentenced to prison.   
¶43 Kemper denied coverage to Ismet for her house and 
belongings damaged in the fire because Ydbi violated the 
"concealment or fraud" provision of the insurance policy when he 
lied about the arson.  The circuit court granted summary judgment 
to Kemper, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f), and the 
court of appeals affirmed.   
II. 
WISCONSIN STAT. §§ 631.95(2)(f) AND 968.075(1)(a) 
¶44 Ismet's situation is not unique.  In 1982, this court 
recognized how the suffering of domestic abuse victims is 
compounded when their property is destroyed through arson and yet 
insurance companies deny their claims.  See Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. 
Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 488, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982) ("An absolute bar 
to recovery by an innocent insured is particularly harsh in a case 
in which the arson appears to be retribution against the innocent 
insured.  Having lost the property, the innocent insured is 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
4 
 
victimized once again by the denial of the proceeds forthcoming 
under the fire insurance policy.").3   
¶45 Insurance companies were engaging in these types of 
practices in increasing numbers by the mid-to-late 1990s.  As a 
result, domestic violence victims were left without homes or any 
means to be financially compensated for their losses.  "The 
immediate impact of this discrimination is to deny battered women 
and their families the life necessities that only insurance can 
provide."  Terry L. Fromson & Nancy Durborow, Insurance 
Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence 4, 5 (National 
Health Resource Center on Domestic Violence, 2019).  To combat 
this discrimination, state legislatures, including Wisconsin's, 
passed laws to protect domestic violence victims.   
                     
3 Strikingly, it is not uncommon for perpetrators of domestic 
violence to commit arson.  See, e.g., Garrison v. State, 409 P.3d 
1209 (Wyo. 2018) (jury convicted defendant on a charge of first-
degree arson for setting fire to his estranged wife's trailer 
home); Icenhour v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 365 F.Supp.2d 743 (S.D. W. Va. 
2004) (woman, who was victim of long-term domestic abuse by her 
husband, was told her by husband that if she took a trip he would 
violate a protection order and burn the family home down——when she 
left town on the trip, he did just that); State v. Goodman, 
30 P.3d 516 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (husband, released on bail, 
returned to his wife's home and burned it down, killing her dog); 
Calhoun v. State, 820 P.2d 819 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (husband, 
who was prohibited by a restraining order from coming near his 
estranged wife, set fire to her dwelling); Moore v. Oklahoma, 736 
P.2d 996 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (man convicted for the arson of 
his estranged wife's residence).  There are also a significant 
number of legal writings discussing this issue.  See, e.g., Brent 
R. Lindahl, Insurance Coverage for an Innocent Co-Insured Spouse, 
23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 433, 455-56 (1997) ("When a spouse burns 
down the marital home, it is often an act of domestic violence or 
part of an ongoing pattern of domestic violence, where the arson 
is simply the abuser's current weapon of choice.  Domestic violence 
largely is motivated by the abusive spouse's desire to control and 
dominate the other spouse.").   
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
5 
 
¶46 Wisconsin's response to the discriminatory practices of 
insurance companies against victims of domestic abuse was 1999 
Wis. Act 95.  Codified as Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f), the statute 
restricts insurers from denying coverage for property damage 
committed as an act of domestic abuse, and is the cornerstone of 
this case.  Specifically, the statute says:  
[A]n insurer may not[,]. . . [u]nder property insurance 
coverage that excludes coverage for loss or damage to 
property resulting from intentional acts, deny payment 
to an insured for a claim based on property loss or 
damage resulting from an act, or pattern, of abuse or 
domestic abuse if that insured did not cooperate in or 
contribute to the creation of the loss or damage and if 
the person who committed the act or acts that caused the 
loss or damage is criminally prosecuted for the act or 
acts. 
§ 631.95(2)(f). 
¶47 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f), insurers must 
grant coverage when:  
 
the claim is for property loss or damage; 
 
the property loss or damage resulted from an act, or 
pattern, of abuse or domestic abuse; 
 
the insured did not cooperate or contribute to creation 
of the loss or damage; and 
 
the person who committed the act that caused loss or 
damage is criminally prosecuted. 
Relevant to this case is the second prong——whether the "property 
loss or damage resulted from an act, or pattern, of abuse or 
domestic abuse."  The statute allows recovery for a loss or damage 
resulting from a single act of domestic abuse, such as an arson, 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
6 
 
or from a pattern of domestic abuse.  For the definition of 
domestic abuse we look to Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a).  
¶48 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.075, Wisconsin's mandatory-arrest 
statute, was enacted in 1987 in response to the "public perception 
of the serious consequences of domestic violence to society and to 
individual victims. . . ."  1987 Wis. Act 346, § 1.  The legislature 
passed this law to ensure that "[t]he official response to cases 
of domestic violence stress the enforcement of the laws, protect 
the victim and communicate the attitude that violent behavior is 
neither excused nor tolerated."  Id.  The stated purpose of this 
law was "to recognize domestic violence as involving serious 
criminal offenses and to provide increased protection for the 
victims of domestic violence."  Id. 
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.075(1)(a) states that "'[d]omestic 
abuse' means any of the following engaged in by an adult person 
against his or her spouse or former spouse[:]" 
1. Intentional infliction of physical pain, physical 
injury or illness. 
2. Intentional impairment of physical condition. 
3. A violation of s. 940.225 (1), (2) or (3). 
4. A physical act that may cause the other person 
reasonably to fear imminent engagement in the conduct 
described under subd. 1., 2. or 3. 
The first three definitions of domestic abuse are not at issue in 
this case.  We are concerned solely with whether Ydbi's arson 
constituted domestic abuse under subd. 4. 
¶50 There is no dispute that the arson was "a physical act."  
This case is focused on whether, at summary judgment, there was a 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
7 
 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ydbi's arson was an 
act that may have caused Ismet to reasonably fear imminent 
engagement of bodily harm.  
¶51 Of import to our analysis, the legislature used the words 
"may" and "reasonably" in Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a)4. to 
establish an objective standard.  "The word 'reasonable' has a 
well-established meaning when used in a legal context.  It 
generally connotes a 'reasonable-person standard,' a standard that 
'has been relied upon in all branches of the law for generations.'"  
State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 
168 (quoting City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 677-78, 
470 N.W.2d 296 (1991)); see Id. (quoting State v. Ruesch, 214 
Wis. 2d 548, 563, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1997))("Significantly, 
'reasonable,' or the 'reasonable person standard,' establishes an 
objective standard for evaluating conduct.").   
¶52 Further establishing an objective standard is the word 
"may" in Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a)4., which is an expression of 
possibility.  "May" is synonymous with "might."  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 1172 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "may" as "[t]o be 
permitted to" and "[t]o be a possibility").4   
¶53 In addition to establishing an objective standard, the 
legislature used the word "imminent" to qualify "engagement of 
                     
4 This objective standard is also an important component of 
domestic abuse statutes because "[i]t can be difficult for someone 
to admit that they've been or are being abused.  They may feel 
that they've done something wrong, that they deserve the abuse, or 
that 
experiencing 
abuse 
is 
a 
sign 
of 
weakness."  
https://www.thehotline.org/support-others/why-people-stay/.  In 
other words, it can be re-traumatizing for victims to explicitly 
say, "I am afraid." 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
8 
 
bodily harm."  Imminent means "impending" or "threatening."  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 898 (defining "imminent" as "threatening to 
occur immediately; dangerously impending").  Importantly, the word 
"imminent" does not means "immediate."  Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "immediate" as "[o]ccurring without delay; instant."  Id. 
at 897.   
¶54 Reviewing Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a)4. in context 
further proves that the two terms are not synonymous.  In the same 
statute, 
the 
legislature 
used 
the 
words 
"immediate" 
and 
"immediately."  See Wis. Stat. § 968.075(2m), (4), (5)(a)1., and 
(6).  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes . . . .").  This context 
shows us that the legislature knew how to use the word "immediate."  
"When the legislature uses different terms in a statute——
particularly in the same section——we presume it intended the terms 
to have distinct meanings."  Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 
Wis. 2d 343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996). 
III. THE MAJORITY'S FAILED ANALYSIS 
¶55 With these statutes, and their purpose of ensuring 
financial recovery for innocent domestic abuse victims, in mind, 
I turn to the majority's analysis.  The majority incorrectly 
concludes that "the record lacks any evidence showing Ydbi's arson 
constituted 'domestic abuse' against Ismet, as statutorily 
defined."  Majority op., ¶3.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
9 
 
majority creates four new hurdles for Ismet and other domestic 
violence victims seeking recovery under their insurance policies 
for property destroyed by their abusers.  According to the 
majority's analysis, in order to establish domestic abuse, a victim 
must:   
1. Show actual fear for his or her safety.  Majority op., 
¶¶34-35; 
2. Disclose past or ongoing instances of physical or 
sexual abuse.  Id., ¶35; 
3. Prove the motive of his or her abuser.  Id., ¶34; 
4. Be present at the scene of the crime when the crime 
occurs.  Id. 
I address each new requirement in turn.  
¶56 The majority creates its first hurdle for victims by 
determining that a domestic violence victim must show actual fear 
in order to establish domestic abuse.  According to the majority, 
Ismet fails to "identify any evidence in the record establishing 
that she 'reasonably . . . fear[ed] imminent engagement' in the 
sort of bodily harm described in [Wis. Stat. § 968.075]."  Majority 
op., ¶34.  The majority asserts that a domestic violence victim 
must present evidence to demonstrate that she actually feared 
imminent engagement of bodily harm.  Section 968.075(1)(a)4. 
plainly does not require a victim to so prove.  It is important to 
repeat, and dispositive here, that in using the language "may cause 
the other person reasonably to fear," the legislature wrote the 
statute with an objective standard.  The use of the word "may" 
indicates that the act must be of a kind that the result of 
reasonable fear is possible; it does not require that fear to be 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
10 
 
realized, much less proven.  In addition, "imminent" means 
forthcoming or threatening.  So the question is, "Might [or may] 
arson cause a person in Ismet's position to reasonably fear harm 
was forthcoming?"  
¶57 What matters here is whether the arson was an act that 
could have caused Ismet to reasonably experience fear.  The focus 
of this statutory text is the nature of the abuser's arson, not 
the victim's actual response subsequent to that act.  To hold 
otherwise is to create two classes of innocent insured domestic-
abuse victims:  those whose abusers were, in fact, successful at 
terrorizing their victims, who may recover; and those whose 
abusers' violent or destructive acts may not have yielded some 
factual indicia of their victims' fear, who are denied recovery.  
Had the legislature wanted to limit recovery solely to innocent 
insureds whose abusers actually caused fear, it certainly could 
have done so.  State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶44, 298 Wis. 2d 
1, 724 N.W.2d 623; see also United America, LLC v. Wisconsin Dept. 
of Transp., 2021 WI 44, ¶31, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___(Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Had the legislature wanted to 
limit 
the 
meaning 
of 
"damages" 
solely 
to 
'structural 
damages,' . . . it certainly could have.").   
¶58 When we apply the correct objective standard to this 
case, it is clear that there is enough in the record for the 
question of whether the arson may have caused a person in Ismet's 
position to reasonably fear imminent harm to go before a jury.  
The record shows that in 1989, Ydbi was convicted of sexual assault 
and stalking.  As a result of these convictions, a judge sentenced 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
11 
 
him to prison and ordered him to register as a sex offender.  These 
facts alone "may cause a person to reasonably fear imminent harm."  
Certainly the State was concerned about Ydbi's conduct; the judge 
sentenced him to prison and ordered him to comply with the sex-
offender registry.  And the record indicates that because of Ydbi's 
violent criminal history, Ismet sought a divorce——but for 
religious reasons, she obtained a legal separation instead——in an 
attempt to begin extricating her life from Ydbi's.  The record 
further establishes that Ydbi continued engaging in criminal 
conduct when he burned down Ismet's house, destroying not only her 
home but all the belongings, keepsakes, and memories inside.  In 
summary, the arson combined with Ydbi's past criminal record is 
more than enough evidence for the question of whether a reasonable 
person in Ismet's position would reasonably fear imminent harm to 
go to a jury.  
¶59 The majority places a second hurdle in front of domestic 
violence victims by requiring an averment about "any past or 
ongoing instances of physical or sexual abuse by [an abuser]."  
Majority op., ¶35.  As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a)4. 
does not require a subjective assessment.  In this instance, Ismet 
does not have to aver instances of physical or sexual abuse because 
the statute is satisfied once she establishes that Ydbi's actions 
may cause a person in her position to reasonably fear imminent 
harm.   
¶60 Additionally, forcing victims to disclose violence only 
perpetuates the isolation, shame, and fear many domestic violence 
victims experience.  Often, victims are reluctant to share their 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
12 
 
experiences of abuse even with those closest to them.  See Sarah 
M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims 
Stay, 28 Colo. Law. 19 (1999) ("Shame and embarrassment about the 
abuse may prevent the victim from disclosing it or may cause her 
to deny that any problem exists when questioned by well-intentioned 
friends, family, co-workers, or professionals.").   
¶61 The majority's third hurdle for domestic violence 
victims is the new requirement that they must prove the motive of 
their abusers.  The majority asserts that Ismet did not establish 
that she was the victim of domestic abuse because she failed to 
show that there was "evidence that Ydbi started the fire to harm 
Ismet."  Majority op., ¶34.  This is an inexplicable requirement 
for two reasons.  First, the majority fails to cite any legal basis 
for the proposition that a victim must prove the motive of her 
abuser.  Second, the majority sets for Ismet the impossible task 
of proving by direct evidence what was in Ydbi's mind. 
¶62 The final hurdle which the majority sets for domestic 
violence victims is the requirement that a domestic violence victim 
must be physically present at the scene of the crime when it occurs 
in order to establish domestic abuse.  The majority concludes that 
Ismet was not a domestic violence victim because she was in North 
Macedonia, rather than Oconomowoc, when Ydbi committed the arson.  
Id.  According to the majority's flawed reasoning, victims cannot 
reasonably fear imminent harm if they are not in close proximity 
to the crime scene at the time the crime occurs.   
¶63 As explained above, Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a)4. does 
not require actual bodily harm or that the victim actually be 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
13 
 
physically present at the crime scene.  Additionally, the majority 
conflates the words "imminent" and "immediate" despite the terms 
having different meanings.  As discussed above, the word "imminent" 
means "threatening to occur immediately; dangerously impending."  
This meaning is consistent with the legislature's use of the word 
"may" in the statute; the requisite act is one that carries with 
it the possibility of future abuse.  The majority fails to explain 
how geographical distance means someone might not reasonably fear 
imminent harm.5   
¶64 In conclusion, the majority creates new hurdles for 
domestic violence victims.  It requires that a victim must:  show 
her fear; disclose past or ongoing instances of physical or sexual 
abuse; prove her abuser's motive; and be physically present when 
the crime against her is committed.  The majority places 
formalistic requirements on the actions and behavior of domestic 
abuse victims in the wake of their abuse that have no basis in the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a).  And in doing so, it 
concludes that because Ismet:  (1) did not say, "I am afraid;" (2) 
did not state, "I am the victim of physical or sexual abuse;" (3) 
                     
5 At what point Ismet learned that Ydbi committed the arson, 
and whether it may have been reasonable for her to fear Ydbi at 
that time, are determinations for a fact-finder.   
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
14 
 
did not prove Ydbi's motive; and (4) was not home when Ydbi set 
fire to her home, she must not be a victim at all.6   
¶65 In erroneously and inexplicably concluding that the 
record lacks any evidence showing Ydbi's act constituted domestic 
abuse, and affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
to Kemper, the majority "implicitly imputes the guilt of the 
arsonist to the innocent insured."  Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 488. 
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, I must dissent. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
 
 
                     
6 What if, instead of viewing people who've been abused as 
weak, we began to celebrate the strength it takes to persevere 
while overcoming the harm that was placed on them by someone who 
was supposed to love and care for them?  What if, instead of 
accepting the myth that there's something wrong with people who 
were abused, we place full responsibility and accountability for 
the abuse on the people who perpetrate it? 
Christine E. Murray, Triumph over Abuse:  Healing, Recovery, 
and Purpose after an Abusive Relationship (2020). 
No.  2019AP488.jjk 
 
 
 
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