Title: Commonwealth v. Andre
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12060
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 2020

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SJC-12060 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEVEN ANDRE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 8, 2019. - April 2, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Hearsay, Business record, Prior 
misconduct, Firearm.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, Argument by 
prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 7, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles 
J. Hely, J., and the cases were tried before Christine M. 
McEvoy, J. 
 
 
 
William S. Smith for the defendant. 
 
Darcy Jordan, Assistant District Attorney (John P. Pappas, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A Suffolk County grand jury indicted the 
defendant, Steven Andre, on two counts of murder in the first 
degree, as well as on counts of possession of a firearm without 
a license, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and armed 
2 
 
 
robbery.  Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
evidence that police discovered upon executing several search 
warrants, which the motion judge denied.  A jury convicted the 
defendant of both counts of murder on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation, as well as the three other charges, and the trial 
judge sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.1 
 
On appeal, the defendant seeks reversal, assigning error to 
(1) the motion judge's denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence; (2) the trial judge's admission in evidence 
of a document that constituted inadmissible hearsay and failure 
to give the requisite jury instruction; (3) the trial judge's 
admission of testimony concerning firearms, which were allegedly 
dissimilar to the murder weapon, that the defendant possessed a 
week prior to the murders; (4) the trial judge's jury 
instruction regarding the firearms testimony, which he argues 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; 
and (5) the prosecutor's improper statements made in his closing 
argument, allegedly prejudicing the defendant and violating his 
constitutional rights.  The defendant also requests that we 
                     
 
1 The judge also sentenced the defendant to a term of life 
imprisonment for armed robbery, and prison terms of from four to 
five years for possession of a firearm without a license and 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon, each to run concurrently 
with the murder sentence. 
3 
 
 
exercise our power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce 
the murder verdicts or to grant a new trial.  Finding neither 
reversible error nor a reason to exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we affirm. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving some details for later discussion. 
 
1.  The murders.  On September 6, 2010, Angel Acevedo and 
Jenret Appleberry were fatally shot in their apartment in 
Chelsea (apartment).  On the evening of September 5, the victims 
had been at the apartment with their roommate, Luis Rodriguez, 
and Rodriguez's five year old son.2  The defendant arrived at the 
apartment after midnight on September 6.  At some point 
thereafter, Rodriguez and his son went to sleep in Rodriguez's 
bedroom with the lights off.  The victims and the defendant 
remained in the living room.  Between 1 and 2 A.M., the sound of 
two gunshots awakened Rodriguez.  The defendant then entered 
Rodriguez's bedroom, turning on the light with one hand, and 
pointing a gun at Rodriguez and Rodriguez's son with his other 
hand.  At gunpoint, the defendant forced Rodriguez, who was 
holding his son and refused to put him down, to search through 
the victims' bedrooms for money.  The defendant told Rodriguez 
that he had heard that there was $50,000 somewhere in the 
                     
 
2 There were two other individuals at the apartment that 
night, but they left before the murders occurred. 
4 
 
 
apartment, that the defendant had been watching the apartment 
for about two weeks, and that someone offered to pay him $25,000 
to kill the victims because they were informants.  Even though 
Rodriguez said he did not know about any money, the defendant 
threatened to kill both Rodriguez and Rodriguez's son if 
Rodriguez's son looked at him or if Rodriguez did not reveal the 
money's location. 
 
The defendant then directed Rodriguez to go into the living 
room to search for shell casings.  Once in the living room, 
Rodriguez saw the victims' bodies.  The defendant took money 
from Acevedo's pocket, ripping it in the process.  The defendant 
told Rodriguez to use a shirt to wipe down anything the 
defendant may have touched, and Rodriguez complied.  From the 
living room, the defendant took a PlayStation 3 gaming console 
(PS3) and put it into a suitcase he took from a closet.3  While 
still at the apartment, the defendant used Rodriguez's cell 
phone, telling the person on the other line, "it's done." 
 
The defendant eventually let Rodriguez and his son leave 
the apartment, at which point they walked to Rodriguez's 
                     
 
3 The defendant also took a gun from under Appleberry's 
mattress and between $300 and $500 in cash and "crack" cocaine 
from Rodriguez.  Rodriguez testified that following the murders, 
an Xbox gaming console that Appleberry kept in his bedroom was 
also missing. 
5 
 
 
father's house.  Approximately six hours later, Rodriguez's 
parents reported the shootings to the police.4 
 
2.  Police investigation.  When the police arrived at the 
apartment on September 6, 2010, the victims' bodies were in the 
living room.  Appleberry had been shot in the head at close 
range, and Acevedo had been shot three times in the head.  There 
were no signs of forced entry.  After Rodriguez identified the 
defendant as the person who committed the murders, the police 
arrested the defendant and executed a search warrant at the 
apartment where he lived with his girlfriend and his cousin.  In 
the defendant's bedroom, the police found a gold, square earring 
and a white watch.  In his cousin's bedroom, the police found a 
PS3 and a different gold earring.  Appleberry's family 
identified the watch and an earring as belonging to Appleberry.5  
The PS3 was also later linked to Appleberry.6 
                     
 
4 At trial, Rodriguez initially testified that he called 
911, but later admitted, after defense counsel refreshed his 
memory using Rodriguez's grand jury testimony, that his parents 
contacted the police. 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth put forth evidence insinuating that the 
gold earring found in the bedroom of the defendant's cousin 
belonged to Acevedo.  The Commonwealth, however, did not seize 
that earring, and the record does not reflect that anyone 
positively identified the photograph of the side of the earring 
as belonging to Acevedo. 
 
 
6 The birthday, security question, and e-mail address 
registered with the account matched that of Appleberry.  In 
addition, when the police turned on the PS3, the screen 
6 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Upon a defendant's 
direct appeal from a capital conviction, we conduct a plenary 
review of the record for error pursuant to statutory mandate.  
See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Where we discern an error to which the 
defendant did not object at trial, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 415-416 (2014).  Where the record 
reflects an error that the defendant preserved below, we apply 
the ordinary standard of review ascribed to errors of that type 
in all appeals.  See Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 160 
(2020). 
 
2.  Motion to suppress.  When reviewing a decision on a 
motion to suppress, "we accept the judge's subsidiary findings 
of fact absent clear error, but conduct an independent review of 
[the] ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 214, 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007).  We recite the facts as the 
motion judge found them, supplemented by certain necessary, 
uncontested facts from the motion hearing record.  See id. 
Rodriguez spoke to the police on three separate occasions 
in the days following the murders:  on September 6, 7, and 11, 
2010.  On September 6, Rodriguez told the police that two masked 
                     
displayed a friend request to "A-Rock_031."  "A-Rock" was one of 
Acevedo's nicknames. 
7 
 
 
men shot his roommates.  Based in part on Rodriguez's 
statements, the police applied for and received search warrants 
for the apartment and for the victims' and Rodriguez's cell 
phones.  On September 7, the police interviewed Rodriguez's 
young son, who said that only one of the men who entered the 
apartment was masked.  Later that day, the police confronted 
Rodriguez with the inconsistencies between his and his son's 
statements, but Rodriguez maintained that there were two masked 
men. 
 
Finally, on September 11, 2010, Rodriguez informed the 
police that the defendant had committed the murders alone.  
Rodriguez also told the police that he lied initially because he 
feared someone would kill him and his son.  Based in part on 
Rodriguez's newest statements, State police Trooper Kevin 
Sweeney applied for and received five additional search 
warrants.7  In the affidavits supporting each of the five 
additional search warrant applications, Sweeney omitted both 
Rodriguez's prior contradictory statements and the statements 
Rodriguez's son made to police. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized pursuant to the latter five search warrants.  
                     
 
7 The search warrants covered the defendant's cell phone 
records, apartment, and purported vehicle, as well as the PS3 
recovered from the defendant's apartment. 
8 
 
 
Citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the defendant 
argued that material omissions in the affidavits supporting the 
search warrants rendered the search warrants invalid.  The 
record is unclear both whether the defendant's motion contained 
a request for a hearing under Franks to determine the veracity 
of the search warrants and whether the hearing that the 
defendant received constituted a Franks hearing.  Id. at 155-
156.  The motion judge, however, denied the defendant's motion, 
concluding that the omission of Rodriguez's and his son's prior 
statements in the warrant affidavits did not "demonstrate that 
the warrant affidavits were knowingly or recklessly false on the 
essential facts that were material to probable cause for the 
warrants."8  On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge 
applied the incorrect standard. 
 
The defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing only if he 
makes two "substantial preliminary showing[s]."  Commonwealth v. 
Long, 454 Mass. 542, 552 (2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 526 (2017), 
quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155.  First, the defendant must 
demonstrate that the affiant included "a false statement 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the 
truth" or intentionally or recklessly omitted material in the 
                     
 
8 The motion judge further concluded that "[t]his is not a 
case of material distortion of a defendant's statement as in 
Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, [448-449] (1984)." 
9 
 
 
search warrant affidavit.  Long, supra, quoting Franks, supra at 
155-156.  Second, the defendant must show that "the allegedly 
false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause," 
Long, supra, quoting Franks, supra at 156, or that the inclusion 
of the omitted information would have negated the magistrate's 
probable cause finding, see Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 
319, 334-335 (1985) (affidavit with omitted material "would not 
have conveyed a significantly different message" regarding 
probable cause from that in submitted affidavit without omitted 
material).  See also United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 
208 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015), quoting 
United States v. Rigaud, 684 F.3d 169, 173 n.5 (1st Cir. 2012) 
("In the case of an omission, this means establishing that the 
inclusion of the omitted information 'would have led to a 
negative finding by the magistrate on probable cause'" [emphasis 
in original]). 
If a Franks hearing is ordered, the defendant must meet the 
same two-prong test by a preponderance of the evidence (as 
opposed to the "substantial preliminary showing" already 
demonstrated).  See Long, 454 Mass. at 552.  As to the second 
prong, "where an omission forms the basis for a Franks 
challenge, the judge considers whether the affidavit, 
supplemented by the omitted information, furnishes probable 
cause."  Id. at 553.  If the judge finds probable cause lacking, 
10 
 
 
the judge must void the warrant and suppress the evidence and 
any "fruits thereof."  Id. 
 
The defendant here would not have succeeded at a Franks 
hearing because, even if he sufficiently demonstrated that the 
affiant had intentionally or recklessly omitted from the latter 
five search warrants the statements that Rodriguez and his son 
made to police prior to Rodriguez's September 11 interview, the 
defendant could not have demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that those omissions negated probable cause.9 
 
Rodriguez reported to the police that his roommates had 
been shot and killed at the apartment.  When the police 
responded to the apartment, they found two identified deceased 
parties with gunshot wounds.  Rodriguez identified the defendant 
as the shooter and knew him by name.  The defendant took 
responsibility for the shootings and ordered Rodriguez to put 
Rodriguez's son down so that the defendant could shoot 
                     
9 The record is unclear whether the defendant's motion to 
suppress contained a request for a Franks hearing or whether the 
hearing the defendant received constituted a Franks hearing.  
Although our conclusion here does not hinge on this issue, the 
same may not be true for every case.  Thus, it is essential that 
judges and parties establish a clear record as to whether a 
Franks hearing is sought and as to whether an adequate showing 
has been made such that such a hearing is warranted.  See Long, 
454 Mass. at 552; Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 522 
(1990) (judge has discretion "to order an in camera hearing 
where the defendant by affidavit asserts facts which cast a 
reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations 
made by the affiant concerning a confidential informant"). 
11 
 
 
Rodriguez.  The defendant threatened to kill Rodriguez and his 
family if Rodriguez told anyone what had happened.  It was not 
unreasonable for Rodriguez to refrain from identifying the 
defendant out of fear of retribution.  The motion judge 
therefore did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion to suppress.10 
3.  PS3 account memorandum.  At trial, Joseph Lamoureux, a 
security supervisor at Sony Computer Entertainment of America 
(Sony), testified for the Commonwealth regarding the account 
information connected to the PS3 seized from the defendant's 
apartment.  After the murders, pursuant to a State police 
request, Lamoureux searched for and found the account 
information in Sony's electronic database.  Lamoureux then 
                     
10 Even when the reasons for a witness's prior inconsistent 
statements concerning the identity of the perpetrator seem 
obvious from the circumstances, the better course is to provide 
the magistrate reviewing a warrant application with such witness 
statements that might detract from the strength of the witness's 
subsequent identification.  The nature of the ex parte 
proceeding prior to any search requires magistrates to rely on 
the police to provide a complete picture as to the credibility 
and veracity of witnesses' statements.  See Franks, 438 U.S. at 
169 ("The magistrate has no acquaintance with the information 
that may contradict the good faith and reasonable basis of the 
affiant's allegations").  It is then the magistrate's 
responsibility to determine whether probable cause exists based 
on the relevant circumstances, and the magistrate will then be 
able to weed through any conflicting information in making his 
or her determination.  See G. L. c. 218, § 33; Commonwealth v. 
Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 813 (2009) (magistrate considers 
affidavit "as a whole and in a commonsense realistic fashion"). 
12 
 
 
copied the account information11 from the database to a new 
document (PS3 memorandum).  The Commonwealth sought to admit the 
PS3 memorandum under the business records exception to the rule 
against hearsay, to which the defendant objected.  Following a 
voir dire of the witness,12 the judge ruled that the memorandum 
was admissible. 
 
a.  Business records exception to the rule against hearsay.  
The business records exception to the rule against hearsay 
requires the judge to find that the record was made (1) in good 
faith, (2) in the regular course of business, and (3) before the 
civil or criminal proceeding in which it was offered began, and 
(4) that it was "the regular course of such business to make 
such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, 
occurrence or event or within a reasonable amount of time 
thereafter."  G. L. c. 233, § 78.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(6)(A) (2019).  Such records are "presumed to be reliable 
and therefore admissible because entries in these records are 
routinely made by those charged with the responsibility of 
making accurate entries and are relied on in the course of doing 
                     
11 As stated, the Sony memorandum contained the following 
information, which was later linked to Acevedo:  account 
creation date, account number, first and last name, date of 
birth, age, security question, and address. 
 
 
12 The judge initially agreed with the defendant and 
sustained the objection, but shortly thereafter she suspended 
her ruling to conduct the voir dire. 
13 
 
 
business."  Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 
406 (1982).  We review the admission of the PS3 memorandum for 
abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Denton, 477 Mass. 248, 
250 (2017). 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in admitting the 
PS3 memorandum under the business records exception because 
Lamoureux made the memorandum after criminal proceedings 
commenced and at the prosecution's request, not in the regular 
course of business, rendering it inadmissible.13  We disagree. 
 
Under the business records exception to the rule against 
hearsay, the act of printing out or copying an electronic record 
verbatim into a separate document does not constitute the 
creation of a new record, even where a party requested the 
printout or copy for litigation.  See United States v. Burgos-
Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 120 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
599 (2015) ("[T]he physical manner in which the exhibit was 
generated simply reflects the fact that the business records 
were electronic, and hence their production required some choice 
and offered some flexibility in printing out only the 
                     
 
13 The defendant also argues that the judge erred in failing 
to make the four preliminary factual determinations required to 
admit in evidence a document under the business records 
exception.  This argument is unavailing, however, because "[a] 
judge's decision to admit the records implies these requisite 
findings under G. L. c. 233, § 78."  Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich, 
444 Mass. 813, 815 (2005). 
14 
 
 
requested information").  Therefore, contrary to the defendant's 
argument, the proper inquiry is whether the underlying 
electronic record, not the printout or copy, satisfies the 
foundation for the business records exception.  We conclude that 
so long as an electronic record satisfies the business records 
exception, a printout or verbatim copy of such an electronic 
record also satisfies the business records exception, even if 
the electronic record was printed out or copied after criminal 
proceedings commenced or in response to the prosecution's 
request.  See United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 n.13 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990) (printouts 
admissible as business records even when prepared specifically 
for trial and not in regular course of business because data 
contained therein was entered into computer at time each call 
was placed and maintained in regular course of business); United 
States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1984) (printouts 
made in preparation of litigation admissible where printout did 
not sort, compile, or summarize data). 
 
The defendant does not contend that Sony's electronic 
records did not satisfy the business records exception, nor is 
there any evidence in the record to even suggest as much.14  At 
                     
 
14 Although the Commonwealth admitted that the actual 
electronic records on which Lamoureux based his memorandum were 
no longer accessible at the time of trial, the defendant does 
not contend that the electronic records were not made in good 
15 
 
 
the time that Lamoureux searched for the relevant PS3 account 
information, Sony kept electronic records of registered user 
account information in the ordinary course of business.  The PS3 
account information was entered on March 4, 2010, before 
litigation commenced, and the defendant does not contend, nor is 
there any indication, that it was not Sony's regular course of 
business to make this type of record on that date.  Therefore, 
the electronic record satisfied the business records exception.  
Because the PS3 memorandum was a verbatim copy of Sony's 
electronic records, the PS3 memorandum also satisfies the 
business records exception to the rule against hearsay.15  The 
judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting it.16 
 
b.  Jury instruction.  Under G. L. c. 233, § 78, when a 
judge admits a record under the business records exception to 
the rule against hearsay, "all other circumstances of the making 
                     
faith.  Accordingly, the records' unavailability does not have 
any impact on our conclusion. 
 
 
15 We note that the defendant does not contest that the 
verbatim copy was made in good faith.  Indeed, during oral 
argument, counsel stated that he was not arguing that there was 
anything "untoward on this record." 
 
 
16 The defendant also makes a passing argument that because 
Lamoureux created the PS3 memorandum at the behest of the police 
and, thus, literally in anticipation of litigation, the 
memorandum was testimonial.  This argument is unavailing.  Given 
our conclusion that the PS3 memorandum was not a newly created 
business record, but instead a copy of a prior business record, 
the PS3 memorandum was not created in anticipation of 
litigation. 
16 
 
 
thereof, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or 
maker, may be shown to affect its weight and . . . in a criminal 
proceeding all questions of fact which must be determined by the 
court as the basis for the admissibility of the evidence 
involved shall be submitted to the jury, if a jury trial is had 
for its final determination" (emphasis added).  We have yet to 
explicitly determine for what purpose the jury consider the 
questions of fact undergirding the admission of the business 
record, and we take the opportunity to do so now.  Judges must 
submit to the jury such questions of fact, not for the jury to 
redetermine admissibility, but to evaluate what amount of weight 
to accord the business record.17  In other words, unlike the 
                     
 
17 We provide an example of an appropriate jury instruction: 
 
"There are records which were admitted in this trial which 
will go to the jury room with you.  When considering what, 
if any, weight to give these records, you may consider the 
following factors: 
 
"(1) That the record was made in good faith; 
 
"(2) That it was made in the regular course of business; 
 
"(3) That it was made before the beginning of this criminal 
proceeding; and 
 
"(4) That it was the regular course of business to make 
such a record at the time of such act, transaction, 
occurrence, or event, or within a reasonable time 
thereafter." 
 
See G. L. c. 233, § 78; Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A) & note 
(2019). 
17 
 
 
situation with the humane practice doctrine, statements of 
coconspirators, or dying declarations, the jury need not engage 
in finding the legal foundation for admitting business records 
as an exception to the rule against hearsay before considering 
the records.  Rather, the jury may consider the evidentiary 
foundations for admission of business records as it affects the 
weight of the evidence.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 
Mass. 22, 36-37 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 
421, 426-427, 432 (2012) (before jury can consider joint 
venturer's statement as bearing on defendant's guilt, jury must 
first make their own independent determination, based on 
preponderance of evidence other than statement itself, that 
joint venture existed and that statement was made during and in 
furtherance thereof); Commonwealth v. Caillot, 454 Mass. 245, 
263-264 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 948 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cryer, 426 Mass. 562, 571 (1998) ("Under the 
Commonwealth's 'humane practice,' if the voluntariness of a 
defendant's statement is a live issue at trial, the judge must 
instruct the jury that the Commonwealth has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made 
voluntarily and that the jurors must disregard the statement 
unless the Commonwealth has met its burden"); Commonwealth v. 
Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 251 n.16 (2008), S.C., 459 Mass. 1005 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 22 (1980) 
18 
 
 
("Under traditional Massachusetts procedure, the judge and then 
the jury are to determine whether the requirements for a dying 
declaration have been established by a preponderance of the 
evidence"). 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred by failing to 
instruct the jury to make the four preliminary findings required 
to admit a document under the business records exception before 
considering the document.  See G. L. c. 233, § 78; Mass. G. 
Evid. § 803(6)(A).  We agree that the judge's failure to provide 
guidance to the jury regarding how they should weigh the 
business records constituted error.  We are confident, however, 
that the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Evans, 438 Mass. 
142, 157 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 966 (2003) (unpreserved 
claim of error in jury instruction reviewed for substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. 
Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n.3 (1998); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 
335 Mass. 555, 563 (1957), S.C., 363 Mass. 171 (1973) (where no 
objection was made, lack of jury instruction on questions of 
fact did not amount to reversible error).  Even if the judge had 
properly submitted the requisite questions to the jury, and the 
jury had determined that the PS3 memorandum should have been 
19 
 
 
accorded less weight, the jury still heard ample other evidence 
that the defendant killed the victims.18 
 
4.  Firearms testimony.  The defendant also argues that the 
judge erred in admitting Krista Najarian's testimony regarding 
her observations of the defendant's prior possession of firearms 
because the description of the guns she observed the defendant 
holding was "wholly different" from Rodriguez's description of 
the murder weapon.  During trial, the Commonwealth introduced 
evidence that the unrecovered murder weapon was a nine 
millimeter firearm.  Rodriguez testified that he believed the 
defendant had a "gray and black" gun, which had a "flat shape" 
and no barrel, on the night of the murders.  Najarian thereafter 
testified that about a week prior to the murders, she observed 
the defendant take two "dark," "regular size guns" out of his 
waistband and put them under the seat of her car.19  Najarian 
further testified that she did not know what kind of guns they 
                     
 
18 Such evidence included the defendant's statement to 
police that he was at the apartment on the night of the murders; 
Rodriguez's testimony identifying the defendant as the murderer 
and his first-hand account of the immediate aftermath of the 
murders, which was corroborated by physical evidence found at 
the murder scene; and the seizure of Appleberry's jewelry and 
Acevedo's PS3 from the defendant's apartment. 
 
 
19 Najarian also testified that the defendant often took her 
car during the summer of 2010 and that after the night on which 
she observed the defendant place the guns under her car seat, 
the defendant kept her car until after the murders.  This car 
was also the subject of one of the search warrants. 
20 
 
 
were, nor did she know anything about guns.  Following 
Najarian's testimony and at the close of the evidence, the judge 
provided limiting instructions to the jury. 
a.  Admission of firearms testimony.  We review a judge's 
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.20  See 
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 237 (2014); Commonwealth v. 
McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156-157 (2014). 
 
We have long held that "[e]vidence of prior bad acts is not 
admissible to show that the defendant has a criminal propensity 
or is of bad character.").  Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 
218, 236 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Robertson, 408 Mass. 
747, 750 (1990).  Such evidence may be admissible, however, so 
long as it is relevant for some other proper purpose and its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of 
prejudice to the defendant.21  See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 
                     
20 The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to permit this 
testimony, which the defendant opposed, but the defendant did 
not renew his objection at trial.  At trial, however, the judge 
recognized defense counsel's previous objection and acknowledged 
that the objection was preserved.  Thus, although the trial took 
place prior to Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016), 
we conclude that the defendant's appellate rights are preserved.  
See id. (prospectively, "[w]e will no longer require a defendant 
to object to the admission of evidence at trial where he or she 
has already sought to preclude the very same evidence at the 
motion in limine stage, and the motion was heard and denied"). 
 
 
21 We need not decide whether the new standard we 
articulated in Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 n.27 
(2014), applies retroactively ,because under either standard, 
the judge here did not abuse her discretion.  See id. 
21 
 
 
Mass. 694, 711 (2019); Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 
306 (2016).  In the context of firearms-related evidence, we 
have often held that such evidence may be admissible to 
demonstrate the defendant's access to or familiarity with 
firearms.  See Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 449-450 
(2017); Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 841 (2015), 
S.C., 482 Mass. 838 (2019); McGee, 467 Mass. at 157; 
Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 322-323 (2009).  While 
this is true, such evidence also "creates a risk that the jury 
will use the evidence impermissibly to infer that the defendant 
has a bad character or a propensity to commit the crime 
charged."  Valentin, supra, quoting McGee, supra at 156. 
 
Before admitting such evidence, the judge should articulate 
the precise manner in which the evidence of the defendant's 
access to and familiarity with firearms is relevant and material 
to the facts of the particular case.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 401; 
P.C. Giannelli, Understanding Evidence 168 (5th ed. 2018).  
However, the fact that the firearms-related evidence may be 
relevant to a specific, nonpropensity purpose does not render 
the evidence admissible.  The judge must then consider and 
articulate "the risk that the jury will ignore the limiting 
                     
(clarifying that "'other bad acts' evidence is inadmissible 
where its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant, even if not substantially outweighed 
by that risk"). 
22 
 
 
instruction and make the prohibited character inference" and use 
the evidence for an inadmissible purpose, such as propensity.  
Giannelli, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 
249 n.27 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 35 Mass. App. 
Ct. 211, 218 (1993), S.C., 43 Mass. App. Ct. 509 (1997) (prior 
bad acts evidence is "inherently prejudicial").  This risk is at 
its zenith in an identification case because the jury may 
incorrectly infer that if the defendant possessed a firearm 
previously (or subsequently), he is probably the person who 
committed the crime charged.  This is especially true when the 
firearms-related evidence is not connected to the firearm used 
in the commission of the crime charged by either forensic 
evidence or eye witness testimony.  Once the judge articulates 
these considerations on the record, it is then within the 
judge's discretion to determine whether the probative value of 
the firearms-related evidence is outweighed by the risk of 
prejudicial effect on the defendant.  See Crayton, supra; Mass. 
G. Evid. § 403. 
 
In this case, the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
admitting Najarian's testimony.  Contrary to the defendant's 
contention, Najarian's and Rodriguez's descriptions of the 
defendant's firearms were not "wholly different."  Najarian 
described the firearms as "dark," while Rodriguez described the 
murder weapon as "gray and black."  In addition, Najarian 
23 
 
 
observed the defendant with the firearms one week prior to the 
murders.  Nevertheless, even if the judge had erred in admitting 
the evidence, that error would not have prejudiced the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 121 
(2012).  Given the amount of properly admitted evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, see note 18, supra, the scant attention 
Najarian's firearms testimony received at trial,22 and the 
judge's limiting instruction,23 any error "had at most a 'very 
slight effect' on the jury."  Barbosa, supra at 124, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
 
b.  Jury instructions.  At the conclusion of the evidence, 
the judge gave another limiting instruction as to Najarian's 
firearms testimony:  "If you credit that testimony, you may 
consider it for limited purposes, which I've explained to you 
before, that is, . . . whether or not the defendant had access 
to guns and familiarity with violence" (emphasis added).  
Because there was no objection, we review any error for a 
                     
 
22 Najarian's testimony regarding the defendant's prior 
possession of firearms only comprised three pages of over sixty 
pages of testimony.  In addition, the prosecutor briefly 
mentioned the acquaintance's testimony during his closing 
argument, but did not argue that the weapons-related evidence 
demonstrated access to or knowledge of firearms. 
 
 
23 Immediately following Najarian's testimony, the judge 
instructed the jury to first determine whether they credited the 
testimony and, if they did, to then only consider the testimony 
for the limited purposes of the defendant's access to guns or 
familiarity with weapons. 
24 
 
 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 106 (2011).  Here, the 
judge clearly misspoke; however, such a misstatement does not 
rise to the level of substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
"We evaluate jury instructions as a whole and interpret 
them as would a reasonable juror."  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 
Mass. 682, 697 (2015).  Immediately following the Commonwealth's 
direct examination of Najarian, the judge gave a lengthy and 
detailed limiting instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 
Mass. 508, 533 n.25 (2017), quoting McGee, 467 Mass. at 158 
(where firearms-related evidence excluded as pertaining to 
possible murder weapon, contemporaneous limiting instruction 
often required); Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 408-409 
(2017) (no abuse of discretion where judge gave "forceful 
limiting instruction[] . . . [i]mmediately following" 
testimony); Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 126, citing Ridge, 455 Mass. 
at 323 (jury presumed to follow limiting instruction).  
Moreover, the judge's misstatement occurred in the middle of her 
otherwise complete and accurate jury instructions on prior bad 
act evidence.  Indeed, immediately prior to and following her 
misstatement, the judge correctly instructed the jury not to 
consider any evidence of the defendant's alleged drug 
distribution activities, gang affiliation, or possession of guns 
25 
 
 
as proof that the defendant "had a criminal propensity or bad 
character."  See Commonwealth v. Kosilek, 423 Mass. 449, 455 
(1996) (jury instruction "misstatement is preceded and followed 
by accurate statements").  See also Vazquez, 478 Mass. at 449-
450 ("judge's instruction forbade the jury from using the 
evidence in ways that were unduly prejudicial to the 
defendant").  Even if the jury had considered Najarian's 
testimony for an improper purpose, her testimony was not so 
pivotal as to create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
 
5.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor made several improper statements during his 
closing argument, which individually and collectively went to 
the heart of the case and prejudiced the defendant.  
Specifically, the defendant argues that the prosecutor 
improperly (1) disparaged the defendant's right to counsel; (2) 
insinuated that the jurors had a duty to convict the defendant 
despite doubts as to someone else's involvement; and (3) 
appealed to the jury's sympathy.24  The defendant objected to the 
                     
24 The defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly 
proclaimed his belief that the defendant received a "fair trial" 
and, thus, he improperly and inferentially referenced the 
defendant's appellate rights.  The prosecutor stated:  "And now 
at this point, at this time you've heard all the evidence in the 
case in what I suggest to you has been a full and fair trial for 
Steven Andre in which he's been represented by an experienced 
attorney."  We are unable to see how this statement referenced, 
26 
 
 
first alleged improper argument; thus, we review for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 480 Mass. 299, 305, S.C., 
480 Mass. 1015 (2018) (no prejudicial error where error did not 
influence jury or had "very slight effect" [citation omitted]).  
Because the defendant did not object to the latter two 
statements, should we find them to be erroneous, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Vazquez, 478 Mass. at 451. 
 
We consider remarks made during closing "in the context of 
the whole argument, the evidence admitted at trial, and the 
judge's instructions to the jury."  Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 
Mass. 359, 368 (2009).  The judge here properly instructed the 
jury that the closing argument was not evidence, and we must 
presume that the jury understood that instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 200 (2017). 
 
a.  Disparagement of defendant's right to counsel.  After 
mentioning defense counsel's alternate theories of the case, and 
over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor stated:  "A 
skilled, experienced, competent attorney will ask those 
questions to get you collectively to start focusing on not 
                     
improperly or otherwise, the defendant's appellate rights.  
Moreover, we discern no way in which this statement would "have 
the inescapable effect of reducing the jurors' appreciation of 
the significance of their deliberations and verdict."  
Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 574, cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 943 (1976). 
27 
 
 
what's before you."  The defendant argues that this statement 
impermissibly disparaged the defendant's right to counsel 
because it insinuated that the defense's theory of the case was 
"merely smoke-blowing by a well spoken, slick defense lawyer." 
 
The prosecutor's comments did not disparage the defendant's 
right to counsel, nor did it disparage defense counsel 
personally or her defense strategy overall.  Instead, the 
prosecutor commented on specific defense tactics, arguing that 
the jury should not believe the defense's version of events and 
permissibly urged the jury to focus solely on the evidence 
actually before them.25  See Felder, 455 Mass. at 369 ("read in 
context, there was no error in the prosecutor's limited 
references to the attempts by defense counsel to create 'smoke 
screen[s]'"); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 463 
(1998), S.C., 468 Mass. 1009 (2014) ("prosecutor may comment on 
defense tactics that the jurors have witnessed themselves").  
See generally Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987) 
("We have never criticized a prosecutor for arguing forcefully 
for a conviction based on the evidence and on inferences that 
may reasonably be drawn from the evidence").  There was no 
error. 
                     
 
25 The judge also instructed the jury not to "decide the 
case based on speculation, surmise or conjecture." 
28 
 
 
 
b.  Insinuation that jury had a duty to convict.  In his 
closing, the prosecutor posed several rhetorical questions 
regarding another person's possible involvement in the murders 
and then stated, "Those are issues for another day, for another 
jury.  Your issue collectively is this man on this case and at 
that moment at that time . . . ."  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor "craftily" intimated that even if the jurors believed 
someone else may have been involved in the murders, and thus 
were hesitant about the defendant's guilt, they should 
nonetheless convict him and leave the issue of multiple 
murderers for "another day." 
 
The prosecutor's statement again permissibly asked the 
jurors not to speculate based on evidence not before them and 
reminded the jurors that their sole job was to determine the 
defendant's culpability.  Moreover, the prosecutor also made the 
challenged statements in response to defense counsel's arguments 
that two people had been involved in the murders, that Rodriguez 
lied about the defendant's involvement, and that the police 
failed to thoroughly investigate anyone other than the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 438 
(2015) (prosecutor "entitled to respond to defense counsel's 
criticism of the police investigation"); Commonwealth v. Smith, 
450 Mass. 395, 408, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 713 (1993) ("A prosecutor 
29 
 
 
is permitted to 'make a fair response to an attack on the 
credibility of a government witness'").  There was no error. 
 
c.  Appeal to the jurors' sympathies.  The defendant also 
contends that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' 
sympathies by highlighting Rodriguez's emotional state at the 
time of the murders to explain why Rodriguez failed to call the 
police immediately.26  While the prosecutor may have overly 
emphasized Rodriguez's plight, we must impute to the jurors "[a] 
certain measure of . . . sophistication in sorting out excessive 
claims" in closing arguments.  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 469 Mass. 
516, 529 (2014), quoting Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517.  A reasonable 
juror would understand that the prosecutor intended his remarks 
to demonstrate that Rodriguez acted reasonably in light of the 
threats to his five year old son.  See Valentin, 474 Mass. at 
310-311.  There was no error.  Even assuming these statements 
constituted error, the judge properly cured it by instructing 
the jury that it was their job alone to determine a witness's 
credibility and that they should not decide the case based on 
any sympathy they might have had towards a particular side.  See 
Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 200-201. 
                     
 
26 Specifically, the prosecutor discussed Rodriguez's 
brother's murder, which occurred less than a month before the 
murders, and Rodriguez's experience witnessing his roommates' 
murders, while his son's life was threatened.  The prosecutor 
argued, "And for the [Rodriguezes] of the world fortunate are 
those who don't walk in his shoes." 
30 
 
 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record of this case pursuant to our responsibilities 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We conclude that there is no basis 
for reducing the defendant's sentence on the murder conviction 
or ordering a new trial. 
So ordered.