Title: Yee v. Massachusetts State Police
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12485
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 29, 2019

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SJC-12485 
 
WARREN YEE  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 1, 2018. - January 29, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
State Police.  Anti-Discrimination Law, Employment, Age, Race.  
Employment, Discrimination.  Public Employment, Police, 
Transfer. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 3, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jonathan J. Margolis (Beth R. Myers also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Jesse M. Boodoo, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Simone R. Liebman & Constance M. McGrane for Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination. 
 
Naomi Shatz for Fair Employment Project, Inc., & others. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The plaintiff, a lieutenant in the 
Massachusetts State police, filed suit alleging that he suffered 
discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4, when he was 
unjustifiably denied a transfer to a different troop station on 
the basis of his age, race, or national origin.1  A Superior 
Court judge granted the motion of the State police for summary 
judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had not met his burden 
of showing that the denial of his request for a lateral transfer 
was an "adverse employment action," as required to prove an 
                                                          
 
1 General Laws c. 151B, § 4 (1), provides that it is an 
unlawful practice for an employer to "refuse to hire or employ 
or to bar or to discharge from employment [an] individual or to 
discriminate against such individual," on the basis of a 
protected status such as race or national origin, "in 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment, unless based on a bona fide occupational 
qualification."  The Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions, including the State police, are covered by 
c. 151B.  Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 763 (1997). 
 
The provision of c. 151B governing age discrimination 
distinguishes between private sector employers and the 
government as an employer.  The section specifically covering 
the Commonwealth and its subdivisions is phrased somewhat 
differently from the section covering private employers.  
Compare G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1C), with G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1B).  
Section 4 (1C) provides that it is unlawful "[f]or the 
commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions, by itself or 
its agent, because of the age of any individual, to refuse to 
hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment such 
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment unless pursuant to any other general or special 
law."  Because the State police have not alleged that Yee's 
claim falls outside the scope of this section, we decline to 
address whether the statute's omission of "discriminat[ion]" 
would bar a claim for refusal to grant a request for transfer. 
3 
 
 
employment discrimination claim under c. 151B.  We hold that 
where there are material differences between two positions in 
the opportunity to earn compensation, or in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, the failure to grant a 
lateral transfer to the preferred position may constitute an 
adverse employment action under c. 151B.  Because the plaintiff 
has offered adequate evidence that he would have greater 
opportunities to earn overtime and obtain paid details in the 
troop to which he seeks transfer, we vacate the allowance of 
summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.2 
 
Background.  We set forth the relevant facts in the summary 
judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, which in this case is the plaintiff, reserving some facts 
for our subsequent discussion of the legal issues.3  See Carey v. 
New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 273 (2006).  The 
plaintiff, Warren Yee, was born in Hong Kong in 1954 and later 
immigrated and became a citizen of the United States.  He 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Legal Foundation; the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination; and the Fair Employment Project, Inc., GLBTQ 
Legal Advocates & Defenders, Greater Boston Legal Services, 
Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action, Lawyers' Committee 
for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, Massachusetts Employment 
Lawyers Association, the Union of Minority Neighborhoods, and 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
3 The plaintiff has moved to supplement the summary judgment 
record on appeal.  We deny the motion and decide the appeal on 
the same record available to the motion judge. 
4 
 
 
identifies as a Chinese Asian-American.  Yee began working as a 
police officer for the Massachusetts District Commission (MDC) 
in 1980.  He was promoted to the position of sergeant in 1986, 
and was later transferred to the Massachusetts State police in 
1992, after the State police merged with the MDC.  In 1998, he 
was promoted to the position of lieutenant.  From 2005 until at 
least the time this complaint was filed, he has served as a 
lieutenant shift commander at the headquarters of State police 
Troop H, located in the South Boston section of Boston. 
 
In December 2008, Yee requested a transfer to State police 
Troop F, the unit headquartered at Logan International Airport 
in the East Boston section of Boston.  State police lieutenants 
earn the same base pay and benefits regardless of station, but 
Yee testified that he wanted to transfer to Troop F because he 
"knew that there was better overtime and [paid details] at Troop 
F."4  Yee claims to have "taken steps to keep his interest in 
that transfer known to his superiors continuously since that 
request was first made." 
 
The State police has no written policy governing transfers 
of lieutenants.  When there is an open position for a lieutenant 
in a troop, the troop commander nominates a candidate, but the 
                                                          
 
 
4 Lieutenant Warren Yee speaks Chinese, and he testified 
that he also wanted to transfer to Troop F because he could "be 
useful" at the airport, where there were many travelers of Asian 
descent. 
5 
 
 
decision whether to approve the nomination rests with the 
Superintendent of the State police.  The troop commander has 
broad discretion in nominating a candidate for transfer. 
 
During the time period between his initial 2008 request and 
September 2012, the State police had either transferred or 
promoted seven troopers to Troop F in the position of 
lieutenant; all were white males.  Five out of those seven 
troopers were younger than Yee when they became Troop F 
lieutenants.  Yee was never offered a transfer to Troop F and 
was never interviewed regarding a transfer position. 
 
On September 20, 2012, Yee wrote a letter to the 
Superintendent and others complaining of discrimination on the 
basis of his age or ethnic background.  On September 23, 2012, 
two days after the letter was received, a forty-nine year old 
white male police sergeant in Troop H, Shawn Lydon, was promoted 
to lieutenant and transferred to Troop F even though he had not 
requested a transfer to Troop F.  Lydon served in Troop F for 
approximately two years, during which time he earned over 
$30,000 more per year in overtime and detail pay than he had 
when he served in Troop H.  When Lydon was later transferred 
back to Troop H, his annual overtime and detail earnings dropped 
by about $30,000 per year.  After Yee sent his letter 
complaining of discrimination, at least two other lieutenants 
6 
 
 
apart from Lydon were transferred to or promoted within Troop F; 
both were white males. 
 
On April 3, 2014, Yee filed a complaint in the Superior 
Court, alleging that the State police discriminated against him 
on the basis of race, age, and national origin by failing to 
transfer him to Troop F.  The State police moved for summary 
judgment, contending that no adverse employment action had been 
taken against Yee and that, even if there had been, there was no 
discriminatory animus that motivated the State police's decision 
not to transfer him. 
 
The judge granted the motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that the summary judgment record would not permit a 
jury reasonably to find that Yee "was subjected to an adverse 
employment action when the State police declined to transfer him 
laterally from one troop to another."  Citing MacCormack v. 
Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 663 (1996), the judge declared 
that a plaintiff who brings an employment discrimination claim 
"must show an adverse employment action that materially changes 
objective aspects of the plaintiff's employment."  In the 
context of this case, the judge determined that, for Yee to 
avoid summary judgment, there needed to be sufficient evidence 
in the record to allow a jury reasonably to conclude that Yee 
"lost money when the State [p]olice declined to transfer him to 
Troop F," either by showing that "a lieutenant at Troop F 
7 
 
 
automatically earned more money than a lieutenant at Troop H," 
or by presenting "statistical data showing that lieutenants at 
[Troop F] routinely earn more money than lieutenants at [Troop 
H]."  The judge found that the only evidence of a "potential 
earnings differential between Troop H and Troop F" was the 
additional income that Lydon earned from overtime and details 
when he transferred from Troop H to Troop F, and his 
corresponding drop in these earnings after he returned to Troop 
H.  The judge concluded that this evidence was insufficient to 
defeat summary judgment because it was "entirely anecdotal, 
concerning the experience of only one of the nine potential 
comparators who became lieutenants at Troop F in the relevant 
period," and because Yee had offered no evidence that would 
permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Yee "would have worked 
the same paid details and just as much overtime" as Lydon did. 
 
Yee timely appealed.  We transferred Yee's appeal to this 
court on our own motion to decide whether the denial of his 
request for a lateral transfer may constitute an adverse 
employment action under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, and if so, whether 
the motion judge erred in granting the State police's motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
Discussion.  Our review on summary judgment is de novo.  
LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 318 
(2012).  In determining whether an employee's discrimination 
8 
 
 
claim survives a motion for summary judgment, we apply the 
three-stage, burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973) (McDonnell 
Douglas).  See Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 680-
681 (2016).  We discuss each stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework in turn. 
 
1.  Adverse employment action.  Under the first stage of 
McDonnell Douglas, Yee bears the burden of producing evidence of 
a prima facie case of discrimination that would allow a jury to 
infer that:  (1) he is a member of a class protected by G. L. 
c. 151B; (2) he performed his job at Troop H at an acceptable 
level; (3) his transfer request was treated differently from 
that of another person who was not a member of his protected 
class but otherwise was similarly situated; and (4) the 
continued denial of his request for a lateral transfer to Troop 
F was an adverse employment action.5  See Trustees of Health & 
Hosps. of Boston, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 449 Mass. 675, 681-682 (2007) (Trustees of 
Health & Hosps.); Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, 
Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 396 (2016). The State 
                                                          
 
 
5 The elements of the prima facie case may vary depending on 
the nature of the discrimination claim.  See McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973); Wheelock College 
v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 
135 n.5 (1976). 
9 
 
 
police contends that Yee failed to meet this burden only because 
the denial of a lateral transfer from one troop to another is 
not an adverse employment action. 
 
The phrase "adverse employment action" does not appear in 
G. L. c. 151B, but we use the phrase to determine when an act of 
discrimination against an employee "in compensation or in terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment" may be remedied under 
c. 151B.6  Where an employer discriminates against an employee 
                                                          
 
 
6 We often do not distinguish among "terms," "conditions," 
and "privileges" of employment, or attempt to define them 
separately.  See, e.g., College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162 
(1987) ("Clearly, within the broad sweep of [terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment] falls conduct which creates a 
sexually harassing work environment"); Lopez v. Commonwealth, 
463 Mass. 696, 707 (2012) (right to equal opportunities for 
promotion without discrimination falls within "right to be free 
from discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment").  We attempt to do so here, defining these words as 
they are commonly used in our case law, albeit recognizing that 
the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges" is "general and 
broad, and must be determined on a case by case basis" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  School Comm. of Newton v. 
Newton Sch. Custodians Ass'n, Local 454, SEIU, 438 Mass. 739, 
749 (2003).  See also Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 857, 862 
(1st Cir. 1997) (same language in Title VII is "pretty open-
ended").  We therefore decline to attach any strict limits to 
the definitions we offer. 
 
 
The "terms of employment" govern the employment 
relationship, such as personnel policies, see Weber v. Community 
Teamwork, 434 Mass. 761, 780-781 (2001), or contractual 
provisions that may be either explicit or implied.  See Black's 
Law Dictionary 1698-1699 (10th ed. 2014). 
 
 
The "conditions of employment" may refer to the economic or 
financial conditions of employment, see Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986), such as wages and hours, 
10 
 
 
but the discriminatory act falls short of being an "adverse 
employment action," c. 151B affords the employee no remedy for 
the discrimination.  King v. Boston, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 460, 469 
(2008) ("a successful claim of employment discrimination 
                                                          
 
vacation pay, and sick leave, and therefore some may overlap 
with both the "terms of employment" and "compensation."  See 
G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1).  "Conditions of employment" may also 
encompass the general environment, atmosphere, or quality of the 
work place.  See, e.g., Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 632, 648 
(2004); Gilbert's Case, 253 Mass. 538, 540 (1925); Windross v. 
Village Automotive Group, Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 861, 868-869 
(2008).  For example, the conditions of employment are often 
discussed in sexual harassment cases in the context of the 
creation of an abusive working environment.  See, e.g., Meritor 
Sav. Bank, FSB, supra at 67; McKenzie v. Illinois Dep't of 
Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 
 
A "privilege of employment" is an unmandated benefit that, 
"though not a contractual right of employment," is nonetheless 
customarily provided by an employer to its employees, and is 
therefore "part and parcel of the employment relationship [and] 
may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion."  Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984).  See also Randlett, 
supra at 862 (hardship transfers were commonly granted by 
employer and therefore were "arguably a 'privilege' of 
employment"); Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 726 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 
 
Our definitions of terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment here are limited to the context of enforcement of 
G. L. c. 151B.  We recognize, for example, that pursuant to 
G. L. c. 150E, § 6, municipalities are required to negotiate 
with public employee unions with respect to the "terms and 
conditions" of union member employment.  As to the definitions 
of terms and conditions of employment in that context, we refer 
to our existing case law.  See, e.g., Somerville v. Commonwealth 
Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 570 (2015) (municipal 
contributions to retiree health insurance premiums not "term or 
condition of employment" subject to mandatory collective 
bargaining). 
11 
 
 
requires a showing that the plaintiff has been subjected to some 
adverse action that is material").  Therefore, in defining the 
phrase, we are essentially defining the remedial scope of 
c. 151B.  Because the Legislature has directed that c. 151B 
"shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its 
purposes," G. L. c. 151B, § 9, we must define the phrase with 
the liberality required to meet the statute's broad remedial 
goals.  See Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 
Mass. 607, 620 (2013) ("Employment statutes in particular are to 
be liberally construed, with some imagination of the purposes 
which lie behind them" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
"Cases have employed the phrase 'adverse employment action' 
to refer to the effects on working terms, conditions, or 
privileges that are material, and thus governed by the statute, 
as opposed to those effects that are trivial and so not properly 
the subject of a discrimination claim."  King, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 468, and cases cited.  We have said that an action taken by 
an employer is an "adverse employment action" where it is 
"substantial enough to have materially disadvantaged an 
employee."  Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 707-708 
(2011).  "Material disadvantage for this purpose arises when 
objective aspects of the work environment are affected."  King, 
supra.  The disadvantage must be objectively apparent to a 
reasonable person in the employee's position; "subjective 
12 
 
 
feelings of disappointment and disillusionment" will not 
suffice.  MacCormack, 423 Mass. at 663.  Because we focus on a 
reasonable person in the employee's position, we examine whether 
an employee has suffered an "adverse employment action" on a 
case-by-case basis.  King, supra at 470, quoting Blackie v. 
Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir. 1996).  A lateral transfer 
from an evening to a day shift may be an adverse employment 
action to one employee, but be welcomed by another.  See Bell v. 
Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 97 (D.D.C. 2005) (whether loss of 
overtime constitutes adverse employment action is fact-specific 
inquiry because some employees desire to work overtime and 
others do not). 
 
Here, Yee contends that the failure to grant him the 
transfer was an adverse employment action because Troop F 
offered more opportunities for overtime and paid details than 
Troop H and therefore offered him a greater opportunity to 
increase his over-all compensation, even though his base salary 
and benefits would be unaffected by the transfer.  We have not 
previously reached the question whether a failure to grant a 
lateral transfer may constitute an adverse employment action.  
The failure to grant a lateral transfer is certainly an 
"employment action" by an employer where an employee with 
supervisory authority, whose actions we impute to the employer, 
see College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n 
13 
 
 
Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 165 (1987), makes a 
decision to choose someone else for the lateral position or 
decides not to transfer the employee seeking the transfer to 
that position.  See Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 434 Mass. 
761, 767-769 (2001).  And the denial of a transfer to an 
employee is undoubtedly "adverse" where it would deprive the 
employee of the potential to earn additional "compensation," 
which -- if motivated by discriminatory animus -- G. L. c. 151B, 
§ 4, expressly forbids.  We thus conclude that where an employee 
can show that there are material differences between two 
positions in the opportunity for compensation, or in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, the failure to grant a 
lateral transfer to the preferred position may constitute an 
adverse employment action under c. 151B.  See Harrison v. Boston 
Fin. Data Servs., Inc., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 133, 137-138 (1994) 
(employee made out prima facie case of discrimination by 
asserting, inter alia, that she was not provided with training 
and educational opportunities given to white employees). 
 
We note that a number of Federal courts have confronted 
this question and arrived at the same conclusion.  In 
interpreting G. L. c. 151B, we often look to case law construing 
the analogous Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
14 
 
 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII).7  See, e.g., 
College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc., 400 Mass. at 163; Brown v. 
F.L. Roberts & Co., 452 Mass. 674, 680 (2008).  A number of 
Federal courts have expressly held that the denial of 
opportunities to work overtime may suffice to support an 
unlawful discrimination claim.  See, e.g., Garmon v. National 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 844 F.3d 307, 314 (1st Cir. 2016) 
("decreased overtime opportunities could cause a 'material' 
change in the conditions of a plaintiff's employment"); Lewis v. 
Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (denial to Chicago 
police officer of opportunity to travel to Washington, D.C., to 
work detail assignment involving crowd control was adverse 
action, not only because she would have been paid overtime for 
                                                          
 
 
7 Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) provides, in part: 
 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer -- 
 
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
. . . . " 
 
 
We also may look to employment cases interpreting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, which applies the same legal framework as Title VII.  
Bhatti v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 
2011).  Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and (b) similarly prescribes:  
"All persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and 
enforce contracts . . . [including] the enjoyment of all 
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship." 
15 
 
 
that particular assignment, but also because "she lost her 
ability to move forward in the component of her career of being 
a police officer at recurring large scale public gatherings" 
and, in turn, "lost the potential to earn many hours of 
overtime" in future); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 95, 105-106 (D.D.C. 2017) (potential for lost overtime 
pay may constitute adverse action where it was known to employer 
that employee desired opportunity to work overtime); Bell, 398 
F. Supp. 2d at 97-98 (same).  See also Mazyck v. Metro. Transp. 
Auth., 893 F. Supp. 2d 574, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (lost 
opportunities to earn overtime pay constituted adverse 
employment action).  Cf. Bush v. American Honda Motor Co., 227 
F. Supp. 2d 780, 790 n.8 (S.D. Oh. 2002) (lost opportunity to 
receive potential future bonuses or promotions may amount to 
adverse employment action).8  It would be a curious result for us 
                                                          
 
 
8 In this analysis, our citations to Federal cases concern 
discussions of Title VII discrimination claims, as opposed to 
retaliation claims.  A split in the Federal Courts of Appeals 
existed regarding whether the meaning of an "adverse action" 
differed between discrimination and retaliation claims under 
Title VII until the Supreme Court resolved the dispute in 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. R. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60, 64 
(2006).  The Supreme Court held that adverse actions under the 
antidiscrimination provision are limited to conduct affecting 
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," 
id. at 62, but in the antiretaliation context, the challenged 
action must only have "dissuaded a reasonable worker from making 
or supporting a charge of discrimination" (citation omitted), 
id. at 68.  In deciding this case, we need not reach the 
question whether to apply a different standard to defining 
16 
 
 
to interpret c. 151B to provide less protection against 
employment discrimination than Title VII, given that we at times 
interpret G. L. c. 151B to provide more protection against 
employment discrimination than Title VII, in part because of the 
Legislature's direction that c. 151B is to be applied liberally.  
See G. L. c. 151B, § 9; Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermkt. Co., 
434 Mass. 521, 536 (2001).  There is no such comparable language 
in Title VII. 
 
We reject the argument of the State police that the denial 
of a lateral transfer may be an adverse employment action only 
where the transfer would have constituted a promotion.  To 
satisfy the element of an adverse employment action in the prima 
facie case, it suffices that an employee who is denied a lateral 
                                                          
 
adverse employment actions in the retaliation context under G. 
L. c. 151B. 
 
 
Additionally, in citing to Federal cases that support Yee's 
claim that loss of opportunity to earn overtime and paid detail 
compensation may constitute an adverse employment action, we are 
aware that another provision of Title VII -- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(2) -- provides that it is an unlawful practice for an 
employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin" (emphasis added).  General Laws c. 151B does not contain 
a comparable provision expressly referencing "employment 
opportunities."  However, none of the cases discussed herein 
relies on § 2000e-2(a)(2) or its reference to "employment 
opportunities."  We are therefore satisfied that it is proper to 
consider Federal Title VII cases that have analyzed the 
comparable adverse action requirement. 
17 
 
 
transfer puts forward evidence of any "objective indicator of 
desirability" that would "permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the sought for position is materially more 
advantageous."  Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 165 (2d 
Cir. 2008).  We conclude that Yee's desire to transfer to a 
troop where he had more opportunity to earn additional 
compensation through the greater availability of overtime and 
paid details is an objective indicator of desirability.9 
 
The closer question is whether Yee met his burden of 
producing adequate evidence that Troop F offered greater 
opportunities for overtime and paid details than Troop H.  The 
only evidence before us, other than Yee's own assertions, is 
testimony from a single comparator, Lydon, who earned 
approximately $30,000 more per year in overtime and detail 
compensation during the two years after he left Troop H to work 
                                                          
 
 
9 Because Yee argues that the denial of his requested 
lateral transfer was an adverse employment action primarily 
because it denied him the potential for additional compensation 
through overtime and detail pay, we do not address whether the 
denial of the lateral transfer would have been an adverse 
employment action had he sought the transfer only to use his 
Chinese language skills to assist Chinese visitors who use the 
airport.  Nor do we address whether an employee would have a 
viable discrimination claim -- on the basis of a hostile work 
environment or a denial of a "privilege" of employment, such as 
being considered for a customary benefit, see King v. Boston, 71 
Mass. App. Ct. 460, 471 (2008), citing Hishon, 467 U.S. at 76-77 
-- if the employee could establish that the leadership of a 
particular work station will not accept for transfer persons of 
a particular protected class under c. 151B. 
18 
 
 
in Troop F, and then earned approximately $30,000 less per year 
after he was transferred back to Troop H.  In evaluating whether 
Yee met this threshold showing, we note that the "initial burden 
of establishing a prima facie case is not intended to be 
onerous."  Trustees of Health & Hosps., 449 Mass. at 683, 
quoting Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 45 
(2005).  "It is meant to be a 'small showing' that is 'easily 
made.'"  Trustees of Health & Hosps., supra, quoting Chungchi 
Che v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 38 (1st 
Cir. 2003).  To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff 
bears only the burden of production, which is satisfied by 
furnishing evidence in support of each element; the burden of 
persuasion that an element of the prima facie case has not been 
established rests with the defendant on summary judgment, even 
though it rests with the plaintiff at trial.  Sullivan, supra at 
39.  As to the evidence proffered by the plaintiff, we view it 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all 
reasonable inferences favoring the plaintiff that flow from that 
evidence.  Premier Capital, LLC v. KMZ, Inc., 464 Mass. 467, 
474-475 (2013). 
 
Generally, comparator evidence is intended to prove 
discrimination, such as where an employee who claims she was 
rejected from a job because of discrimination offers evidence 
that the person who obtained the position was less qualified 
19 
 
 
than she.  Trustees of Health & Hosps., 449 Mass. at 682-683.  
Here, Yee offered comparator evidence, to show both that he was 
denied the lateral transfer because of his race, national 
origin, or age, and that the denial of the lateral position was 
an adverse employment action because of the comparator's change 
in earnings at Troop F. 
 
We recognize that the summary judgment record regarding the 
difference in potential earnings from overtime and paid details 
between Troop H and Troop F is rather sparse, where it is 
limited to the change in earnings of a single comparator, but we 
conclude that it suffices to yield a genuine dispute of material 
fact as to this element of the prima facie case of 
discrimination.  Lydon was a close comparator to Yee; he had 
been assigned to Troop H before being promoted to lieutenant, 
was transferred to Troop F, and then returned to Troop H.  It is 
theoretically possible that the opportunities for overtime and 
paid details were the same in Troop H and Troop F, and that 
Lydon simply availed himself of more of those opportunities when 
he transferred to Troop F, and then chose not to when he 
returned to Troop H.  But it is a more reasonable inference -- 
and one to which Yee is entitled at summary judgment -- that 
Lydon's increase in earnings from overtime and paid details 
derived, at least in part, from the greater opportunities 
available in Troop F to work overtime and obtain paid details.  
20 
 
 
And, although the State police was in possession of evidence 
regarding the earnings from overtime and paid details of the 
other potential comparators, it did not offer such evidence to 
satisfy its burden of persuasion that the earnings opportunities 
were the same in Troop F as in Troop H.  Although evidence from 
a single comparator might prove to be insufficient to prevail at 
trial, we require only a modest evidentiary showing from 
plaintiffs to satisfy the prima facie stage of summary judgment.  
Therefore, we conclude that the judge erred in determining that 
Yee had failed to meet his burden of showing a prima facie case 
of discrimination. 
 
2.  Discrimination.  Because the judge granted summary 
judgment to the State police on the ground that Yee had failed 
to show an adverse employment action, he never reached the issue 
whether there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the 
denial of Yee's request for a lateral transfer was motivated by 
discriminatory animus.  We exercise our discretion to remand the 
matter to the motion judge to allow him to decide this issue.  
See Esler v. Sylvia-Reardon, 473 Mass. 775, 781 (2016); Christo 
v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., 402 Mass. 815, 819 (1988). 
 
On remand, the motion judge will need to apply the second 
and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas summary judgment 
framework.  At the second McDonnell Douglas stage, where the 
employee has successfully made out a prima facie case, "the 
21 
 
 
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulat[e] a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its decision to take 
the adverse action (quotation omitted).  Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 
397, quoting Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 
419 Mass. 437, 441 (1995).  The burden of the State police here 
is not meant to be onerous.  Blare, supra at 442.  Even if the 
reasons given are arguably suspect, so long as the State police 
has produced a lawful reason backed by some credible evidence, 
it has satisfied this burden.  Matthews v. Ocean Spray 
Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 128 (1997).  However, its 
explanation must not be wholly unbelievable such that an 
underlying discriminatory motive is obvious.  See Wheelock 
College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 
Mass. 130, 138 (1976). 
 
If the judge concludes that the State police has carried 
its burden of rebutting Yee's prima facie case with a 
nondiscriminatory explanation for denying Yee's request for the 
lateral transfer, the judge will reach the third and final 
McDonnell Douglas stage, where the burden of production shifts 
back to Yee to "produce evidence that the employer's articulated 
justification [for the adverse action] is not true but a 
pretext."  Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 397, quoting Blare, 419 Mass. 
at 443.  Yee may satisfy this burden by offering evidence which, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to Yee, is sufficient to 
22 
 
 
convince a reasonable jury that the reasons the State police 
offered for transferring Lydon instead of him were not the real 
reasons, thereby inviting the inference that discrimination was 
the motivating reason.  See Verdrager, supra. 
 
Finally, although we have denied Yee's motion to supplement 
the summary judgment record on appeal, see note 3, supra, we 
recognize that a developed factual record is particularly 
critical where, as here, wholly subjective procedures are used 
to determine which candidates receive a lateral transfer.  See 
Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 
376 Mass. 221, 231 (1978) ("[T]he opportunity for unlawful bias 
is particularly great in such cases.  A most detailed and 
careful analysis of the facts is required").  On remand, the 
motion judge may decide whether to permit the parties to 
supplement the summary judgment record in determining whether 
there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the denial of 
Yee's request for a lateral transfer was motivated by 
discriminatory animus. 
 
Conclusion.  The order allowing the motion of the State 
police for summary judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded 
to the motion judge to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact whether discrimination was the motivating 
reason for the denial of the plaintiff's request for transfer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.