Title: Porter v. Ferguson-Steere Motor Company
Citation: 321 P.2d 1112, 63 N.M. 466
Docket Number: 6324-6327
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 1958

321 P.2d 1112 (1958) 63 N.M. 466 Roma Jewel PORTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERGUSON-STEERE MOTOR COMPANY and Potash Mines Transportation Company, Defendant-Appellant. Charles J. ERKKILA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERGUSON-STEERE MOTOR COMPANY and Potash Mines Transportation Company, Defendant-Appellant. Mary B. McILWEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERGUSON-STEERE MOTOR COMPANY and Potash Mines Transportation Company, Defendant-Appellant. Francis L. GOUGH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERGUSON-STEERE MOTOR COMPANY and Potash Mines Transportation Company, Defendant-Appellant. Nos. 6324-6327. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 11, 1958. *1113 Neal, Neumann &amp; Neal, Carlsbad, Iden &amp; Johnson, Albuquerque, for appellants. Reese, McCormick, Lusk &amp; Paine, Foster Windham, C.N. Morris, M. Rosenberg, Roy H. Blackman, Stagner, Sage &amp; Walker, Carlsbad, for appellees. COMPTON, Justice. The personal representatives of the decedents, George Henry Porter, William Francis McIlwee and K.D. Gough, whose deaths allegedly resulted from a collision between appellant's bus, in which they were riding as fare-paying passengers, and a truck operated by Ferguson-Steere Motor Company, instituted separate actions for damages. The action by appellee Erkkila, also a fare-paying passenger in appellant's bus, is for personal injuries received by him in the same accident. The causes were consolidated for trial, as well as for hearing on appeal. Pending trial, however, Ferguson-Steere Motor Company settled with appellees, and the case was dismissed as to it. The concurring negligence of the drivers of the bus and truck is alleged as the proximate cause of the collision and the resulting injuries and deaths. The jury found in favor of appellees, and from a judgment on the verdict, Potash Mines Transportation Company appeals. The sufficiency of the evidence is not questioned, nor is the amount of the award. The appeal is based solely on claimed erroneous instructions, which read: The claim is made that instruction number 12, in defining negligence, is an invasion of the province of the jury. We do not think the court erred in this regard. The instruction merely says that certain facts constitute negligence, and if such facts are so found by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury will say so by its verdict. The existence of these facts, however, was a matter left squarely to the jury. Moreover, instruction number 18, requested by appellant and given by the court, again tells the jury that it is the fact finder as to negligence. The instructions are substantially the same and are to be considered together. Instruction number 18 reads: The contention is made that instruction number 13 is erroneous because we have no statute specifically requiring drivers to keep a "proper lookout" for vehicles on the highways, or to keep and maintain "proper control" of their vehicles at all times. It must be conceded that we have no specific "lookout" or "control" statute; however, the common law requires as much, and the case is one based on common law negligence. The duty imposed by law upon drivers of motor vehicles is to keep a proper lookout and maintain proper control. Ortega v. Koury, 55 N.M. 142, 227 P.2d 941; Hutchins v. LaBarre, 242 Iowa 515, 47 N.W.2d 269; Bobbitt v. Haynes, 231 N.C. 373, 57 S.E.2d 361. Again, instruction number 18 was specific in regard to the duty imposed upon drivers of motor vehicles. Of course, any erroneous statement of the law, prejudicial to the rights of a litigant, will be held reversible error. Wilder v. People, 86 Colo. 35, 278 P. 594, 65 A.L.R. 1260; Batchelor v. Anglin, 64 Ga. App. 342, 13 S.E.2d 110; Harshaw v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 154 Kan. 481, 119 P.2d 459. Had the court told the jury that the facts enumerated constituted negligence per se, no doubt a different conclusion would be required. But we fail to see any prejudicial error in the record. The error in using the word "statute" instead of the word "law" in the instruction, is technical, harmless, and should be disregarded. Edwards v. Peterson, 61 N.M. 104, 295 P.2d 858; Wiggs v. City of Albuquerque, 57 N.M. 770, 263 P.2d 963. Sections 21-1-1(61), 21-2-1(17) (10), 1953 Compilation. The questions raised by the separate appeals are the same, and for the reasons set forth, the judgments will be affirmed. It is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., and McGHEE and KIKER, JJ., and JOHN R. BRAND, D.J., concur. SADLER, J., not participating.