Title: Ho-Chunk Nation v. DOR
Citation: 2009 WI 48
Docket Number: 2007AP001985
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2009

2009 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1985 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ho-Chunk Nation, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 95 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 484, 754 N.W.2d 186 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 5, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O’Brien   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join Part III 
of the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Thomas M. Pyper, Michael P. Murphy, Cynthia L. Buchko, and 
Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Michael P. Murphy. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by F. Thomas Creeron III, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 48
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1985  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV1351) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ho-Chunk Nation, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This review of a published 
court of appeals decision1 involves the Ho-Chunk Nation's appeal 
of a denied claim for a tax refund under Wis. Stat. § 139.323(3) 
(2005-06).2  The statute authorizes partial refunds for cigarette 
taxes provided the tax was collected on sales made on land that 
"was designated a reservation or trust land on or before 
January 1, 1983."  At issue is whether the land on which the 
                                                 
1 Ho-Chunk Nation v. DOR, 2008 WI App 95, 312 Wis. 2d 484, 
754 N.W.2d 186. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
2 
 
relevant sales took place satisfies that portion of the statute.  
The land was approved for purchase in August 1982 and formally 
accepted by the United States government on January 31, 1983.  
The question on which this case turns is at what point a 
particular parcel of land "was designated . . . trust land" for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 139.323. 
¶2 
The court of appeals determined that land cannot be 
held in trust until formal acceptance occurs and that in order 
to satisfy the tax refund statute's requirements, land must be 
held in trust on or before January 1, 1983.  Because formal 
acceptance of the property in question here did not occur until 
after that date, the court of appeals held that the claim for a 
refund was properly denied.  This was the same result that had 
been reached by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR), the 
Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission (the Commission), and the 
circuit court.  The Ho-Chunk Nation sought review. 
¶3 
For 
the 
reasons 
set 
forth 
below, 
we 
affirm.  
"[R]eservations or trust lands" are also referred to in the 
sentence preceding the provision in question; a sensible reading 
of the statute (Wis. Stat. § 139.323) requires that the two 
references 
be 
read 
as identifying the same land.  The 
grammatical construction of the sentence itself lends further 
support to our holding because "was designated" precedes both "a 
reservation" and "trust land" and means the same thing about 
each.  Given that there is no basis in the federal regulations 
for 
recognizing 
a 
preliminary, 
unofficial 
status 
for 
reservations or trust lands, there is likewise no basis for 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
3 
 
reading this statute as intending to apply to land that has 
received only preliminary informal approval. 
¶4 
We therefore hold that in this context the phrase "was 
designated a reservation or trust land" is necessarily read as 
referring to the applicable formal process that must occur in 
order for land to be a reservation or trust land.  Because the 
proper authorities had not completed the necessary steps for the 
property in question to be designated a reservation or trust 
land on or before January 1, 1983, and because that is required 
in order to qualify for the tax refund, the claim was properly 
denied. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The question on which this case turns is at what point 
a particular parcel of land "was designated . . . trust land" 
for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 139.323, and because the parties 
differ as to when that happened, it is necessary to lay out, 
briefly, the process through which the land at issue came to be 
trust land. 
¶6 
In 1982 the Ho-Chunk Nation (the Nation), a federally 
recognized Indian tribe, received permission from the United 
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), to acquire a five-acre parcel of land known as the DeJope 
Property.  A Washington, D.C., BIA official sent a memo dated 
August 20, 1982, to a Minneapolis BIA official, stating in 
relevant part, "You are, therefore, authorized to accept 
conveyance to the United States in trust upon consideration of 
appropriate title evidence in accordance with the requirements 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
4 
 
of 25 CFR 120a.12 [1982]."  On October 29, 1982, the seller of 
the DeJope Property received payment from the Nation and 
conveyed the title by delivery of a warranty deed.  On January 
31, 1983, the Minneapolis BIA Area Director signed the deed, 
accepting the conveyance.  The deed was recorded with the Dane 
County Register of Deeds on March 18, 1983.  
¶7 
When the Nation filed claims with the DOR requesting a 
refund of 70 percent of the taxes paid on cigarette sales at the 
DeJope Property for periods during 2003 and 2004, the claims 
were denied.  The DOR denied the claims because "the [DOR] must 
accept the date of January 31, 1983[,] as the date the DeJope 
land was 'designated' for the purposes of § 139.323, Wis. 
Stats."  As a result, the DOR determined that the DeJope 
Property did not meet the statutory requirements in order to 
receive the requested refund. 
¶8 
The Nation filed an appeal of the decision with the 
Tax Appeals Commission.  In a ruling and order issued on 
February 15, 2006, the Commission granted summary judgment in 
favor of the DOR.  
¶9 
The Nation petitioned the Dane County Circuit Court 
for review.  The circuit court, the Honorable Sarah B. O'Brien 
presiding, affirmed. 
¶10 The Nation then filed an appeal, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  Ho-Chunk Nation v. DOR, 2008 WI App 95, 312 
Wis. 2d 484, 754 N.W.2d 186.  The court of appeals concluded 
that "the United States government does not hold the land in 
trust until formal acceptance under 25 C.F.R. § 151.14 (2007) 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
5 
 
occurs.  Because this did not occur with respect to the DeJope 
property until after January 1, 1983, the Ho-Chunk Nation is not 
entitled to a refund."  Id., ¶¶2, 36.  The Nation petitioned for 
review, and this court granted the petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 This case requires statutory interpretation, and the 
standard of review for statutory interpretation is de novo.  DOR 
v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶44, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 
95. 
¶12 In a case that involves a ruling by the Commission, we 
review the Commission's decision rather than the decision of the 
circuit court.  Id., ¶46.  Like Menasha, this case involves 
review of an agency action so the question arises as to whether 
any deference is due, and if so, what level applies.  In 
Menasha, this court said the agency to which deference is due is 
the 
Commission, 
and 
the 
level 
of 
deference 
as 
to 
the 
Commission's interpretation of statutes is one of three levels: 
great weight, due weight, or no deference.  Id., ¶¶47-49.  
¶13 In its written ruling, the Commission stated, "The 
specific issue before us is one of first impression."  "No 
deference is given to the agency's statutory interpretation when 
the issue is one of first impression, the agency has no 
experience or expertise in deciding the legal issue presented, 
or the agency's position on the issue has been so inconsistent 
as to provide no real guidance."  Menasha, ¶50.  We therefore 
review the ruling of the Commission in this case giving no 
deference to the agency's statutory interpretation. 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
6 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶14 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 139.323 
authorizes 
refunds 
of 
cigarette taxes to Indian tribes "in respect to sales on 
reservations or trust lands" when certain conditions are met.  
The DOR denied the tax refund claim in this case on the grounds 
that the claim was for sales on land that did not meet the third 
condition:  that "[t]he land on which the sale occurred was 
designated a reservation or trust land on or before January 1, 
1983."  As we noted previously, that denial was affirmed by the 
Commission. 
¶15 There is no dispute that the DeJope Property is now 
trust land; the dispute is whether it was so designated prior to 
the January 1, 1983, deadline such that taxes of cigarette sales 
on that property meet the statute's conditions and may be 
refunded to the Nation.  The Commission ruling stated, "Although 
the parties did not stipulate to the facts in this case, they do 
not 
dispute 
any 
material 
facts. . . . 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
Department does not dispute that the Tribe's refund Claim 
satisfies all of the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 139.323 except 
one, which is that the land on which the cigarette sales 
occurred must have been 'designated a reservation or trust land 
on or before January 1, 1983.'"  
¶16 The DOR, in urging us to affirm the decision of the 
Commission, argues that the language "was designated" refers to 
the official process described in the fee-to-trust regulations 
spelled out in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).  This 
process has several steps and is completed, according to the 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
7 
 
C.F.R., when the land is formally accepted into trust.  The DOR 
argues that this occurred with respect to the land in question 
on January 31, 1983, and as a result, there is no entitlement to 
a refund under the statute.  The DOR bases its argument on the 
applicable regulations, 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.12 and 151.13 (1982): 
25 C.F.R. § 151.12  If the Secretary determines that 
he will approve a request for the acquisition of land 
from unrestricted fee status to trust status, he shall 
acquire, or require the applicant to furnish, title 
evidence . . . .  After having the title evidence 
examined, the Secretary shall notify the applicant of 
any liens, encumbrances, or infirmities which may 
exist.  The Secretary may require the elimination of 
any such liens, encumbrances, or infirmities prior to 
taking final approval action on the acquisition and he 
shall require elimination prior to such approval if 
the liens, encumbrances, or infirmities make title to 
the land unmarketable. 
25 C.F.R. § 151.13  Formal acceptance of land in trust 
status shall be accomplished by the issuance or 
approval of an instrument of conveyance by the 
Secretary as is appropriate in the circumstances. 
¶17 The DOR further argues that if this court finds the 
statute ambiguous, we should resolve the question in its favor, 
applying the exemption canon of construction, which generally 
requires a strict reading of statutes having to do with 
exemptions, refunds and other tax privileges.  
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
8 
 
¶18 The Nation argues that the DeJope Property was 
designated trust land in August 1982,3 when the Washington BIA 
official 
authorized 
the 
local 
BIA 
official 
"to 
accept 
conveyance" of the property.  The Nation argues that the word 
"designated," when given its ordinary meaning, should be 
understood to mean "set apart for a purpose or duty," and that 
the land was set apart for the purpose of being trust land at 
the point when the BIA authorized its conveyance. 
¶19 The Nation argues, in the alternative, that if the 
statute is ambiguous, we should apply the "Indian canon of 
construction," which requires that ambiguity be resolved in a 
tribe’s favor when a statute is applied to an Indian tribe. 
¶20 The first question, then, is whether the statute is 
ambiguous. 
                                                 
3 The Nation argues in the alternative that another act 
satisfies the requirement that the land be designated trust land 
on or before January 1, 1983.  The Nation argues that, at the 
latest, the land was designated trust land on December 7, 1982, 
the date on which the Great Lakes BIA office sent a memo and 
forwarded the deed——signed only by the seller at that point——to 
the Minneapolis office.  The memo states that the deed is 
enclosed "for approval."  The argument that this act constitutes 
designating the land as trust land is unpersuasive for the same 
reasons that the first argument is unpersuasive; the December 7, 
1982, memo merely represents a different point in the pre-
approval process. 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
9 
 
¶21 The Commission held that Wis. Stat. § 139.323 is not 
ambiguous, citing to a 1985 opinion of the Attorney General 
concerning the statute.4 
¶22 The circuit court and court of appeals said it is.5  In 
their analysis, both courts cited the fact that there are 
multiple definitions of the word "designate."   
¶23 However, the existence of multiple definitions does 
not mean that in a particular context a word is ambiguous.  As 
we noted in Kalal: 
Many words have multiple dictionary definitions; the 
applicable definition depends upon the context in 
which the word is used.  Accordingly, it cannot be 
                                                 
4 The Commission said, "The specific issue before us is one 
of first impression.  However, in addressing a different 
question under the same statute, the Attorney General of 
Wisconsin 
opined 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 139.323 
is 
not 
ambiguous. . . .  We also find that Wis. Stat. § 139.323 is not 
ambiguous, and therefore must be interpreted according to its 
plain meaning."  However, the Attorney General opinion cited, 74 
Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1985), has to do with another issue and 
reaches 
no 
conclusion 
specifically 
as 
to 
the 
statute's 
requirement that sales occur on land that was designated a 
reservation or trust land on or before January 31, 1983. 
5 The circuit court said, "Both of these meanings are 
reasonable, which is borne out by the definitions of 'designate' 
found in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (4th ed. 2000)."  The court of appeals noted that 
dictionary 
definitions 
of 
the 
word 
led 
to 
opposite 
interpretations:  "The definitions the Nation chooses——'select' 
and 'nominate,' see Black's Law Dictionary 447 (6th ed. 1990)——
have a preliminary sense to them that would support the Nation's 
proposed construction.  However, the definitions 'specify,' 
'give a name or title to,' and 'characterize,' see American 
Heritage College Dictionary 376 (3d ed. 1993), suggest that the 
property would need to actually be held in trust before the 
property could be so specified, named, titled or characterized."  
Ho-Chunk Nation, 312 Wis. 2d 484, ¶16. 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
10 
 
correct to suggest, for example, that an examination 
of a statute's purpose or scope or context is 
completely off-limits unless there is ambiguity.  It 
is certainly not inconsistent with the plain-meaning 
rule to consider the intrinsic context in which 
statutory 
language 
is 
used; 
a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation 
cannot 
contravene 
a 
textually 
or 
contextually manifest statutory purpose.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶24 Other courts have also noted that dictionaries provide 
minimal help in a determination of ambiguity.  As one court 
noted:  
While dictionaries may be helpful to the extent they 
set forth the ordinary, usual meaning of words, they 
provide an inadequate test for ambiguity.  To allow 
the existence of more than one dictionary definition 
to be the sine qua non of ambiguity would eliminate 
contextual analysis of contractual terms; any time a 
definition 
appeared in a dictionary of whatever 
credibility or usage, that definition could be said to 
be "reasonable" and thus render many, if not most, 
words ambiguous.  Dictionaries define words in the 
abstract, while courts must determine the meaning of 
terms in a particular context . . . . 
Gulf Metals Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 993 S.W.2d 800, 
805-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
¶25 This is a point that is easily observed in common 
usage——the fact that the word "tip" has multiple meanings does 
not render the sentence "police received a tip" ambiguous.  For 
that 
matter, 
the 
word 
"reservation" 
itself 
has 
multiple 
meanings, but in context it is unambiguous.  
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
11 
 
¶26 Here, there are two ways the context of the statute 
renders the provision unambiguous notwithstanding the multiple 
dictionary definitions of the verb "to designate."6  
¶27 First, the surrounding text of the statute refers to 
lands that have the status of reservation and trust land, giving 
an indication that the rest of the statute should also be read 
that way.  The language in the statute that precedes the 
enumerated conditions states:  
Refunds to Indian tribes.  The department shall refund 
70% of the taxes collected under s. 139.31(1) in 
respect to sales on reservations or trust lands of an 
Indian tribe to the tribal council of the tribe having 
jurisdiction over the reservation or trust land on 
which the sale is made if all the following conditions 
are fulfilled . . . . 
                                                 
6 We note that no legislative history has been proffered by 
either party to shed further light on the terms at issue here.  
The circuit court said, "Unfortunately, the legislative history 
does not shed any light on this ambiguity."  The court of 
appeals said, "The parties have presented us with no legislative 
history regarding Wis. Stat. § 139.323."  Ho-Chunk Nation, 312 
Wis. 2d 484, ¶18.  The Commission cited no legislative history 
in its ruling that the statute was unambiguous.  It favorably 
cited a 1985 opinion of the Attorney General, 74 Wis. Op. Att'y 
Gen. 134 (1985), which addressed a different question about Wis. 
Stat. § 139.323 and opined on the legislative history relevant 
to that question; however, that opinion does not address the 
question raised here and does not assist in our analysis. 
The dissent carefully examines legislative history but 
stops 
short 
of 
identifying 
anything 
that 
documents 
the 
legislature's intent for the DeJope Property to be subject to 
the tax refund.  The legislature was free (and of course remains 
free) to take a different approach——a simple edit would suffice 
to broaden the scope of this statute in such a way that the 
DeJope Property would not clearly be excluded (e.g., to change 
the January 1, 1983, cut-off date to coincide with the effective 
date of the statute or to set a later cut-off date).     
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 139.323 (emphasis added). 
¶28 In the enumerated conditions, the further condition is 
set forth that the land on which the sale occurred "was 
designated" trust land before a specific date, January 1, 1983.  
We agree with the court of appeals that there is no reason to 
read the two parts of the statute as referring to different 
requirements for the land.  The first part of the statute refers 
to sales on land that has the status of reservation or trust 
land, and the second part of the statute simply limits the 
refund to taxes collected on sales that occurred on land that 
had that status on or before the specified date.   
¶29 Second, in the sentence we construe, the verb (in the 
passive construction, "was designated") connects the subject 
("the land on which the sale occurred") to two subjective 
complements ("a reservation" and "trust land").  Ordinarily, 
"was designated" would be understood to apply in the same way to 
each of those terms.  In other words, whatever "was designated" 
means as to "a reservation," it also means as to "trust land."  
Put the other way, it cannot reasonably be read as meaning "set 
aside for future approval" with regard to trust lands, unless it 
means the same thing for reservations.  However, there is no 
indication that federal law recognizes an official status for 
land having received preliminary approval for reservation lands.7  
                                                 
7 As the court of appeals noted, the relevant federal 
regulations never use the word "designated," so there is no 
helpful guidance to be found there.  Ho-Chunk Nation, 312 Wis. 
2d 484, ¶20. 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
13 
 
¶30 Reservations have been created by statute, agreement, 
executive order, and treaty.  See United States v. Dion, 476 
U.S. 734, 745 n.8 (1986).  Trust land is created in accordance 
with federal regulations.  The choice of the word "designated" 
in this statute is sensible because it encompasses the variety 
of methods by which land attains the distinction of reservation 
or trust land.  Only when the applicable steps are completed 
does the land in question attain the status required by the 
statute. 
¶31 That is also a plausible reason to choose the word 
"designated" in the first place.  The Nation argues that we must 
read the word "designated" as meaning land that has some 
preliminary and non-final approval; otherwise we render the 
words surplusage.8  It is true that the legislature could have 
worded the statute a number of ways to accomplish what it 
intended.  The statute could have been written without the word 
"designated."  We do give effect to every word in a statute.  
Giving effect to every word, however, does not require that we 
generate ambiguity where there is none evident in the context.  
Here we give effect to the word "designated" without reading it 
the way that the Nation asks.  As noted above, sometimes the 
word with broader connotations is the better choice because its 
meaning encompasses the varied procedures that are involved.  
Here, for example, referring to land that has been "designated" 
                                                 
8 "[S]tatutes must be construed, if possible, so that no 
word or clause is rendered surplusage."  Hayne v. Progressive N. 
Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 339 N.W.2d 588 (1983). 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
14 
 
a reservation covers reservations created in a variety of ways.  
To read the word "designated" otherwise, as loaded with great 
meaning and as conferring official status based on a nonfinal 
act, is to import unnecessary uncertainty into a straightforward 
statute.  
¶32 As was noted previously, there is, in fact, a series 
of preliminary and tentative acts that are part of the process 
by which land becomes trust land, as a look at the relevant 
regulations makes clear.  There are also obstacles in the 
process that may in some cases prove fatal to the transaction.  
The regulations discuss the potential effect of liens, for 
example, and give the Secretary of the Interior the authority to 
require that they be eliminated.9  
¶33 These regulations require "approval of an instrument 
of conveyance" before the formal acceptance of the land in trust 
status is accomplished.10  The deed in the record, the instrument 
of conveyance here, shows that it was approved on January 31, 
1983.  
                                                 
9 "After having the title evidence examined, the Secretary 
shall notify the applicant of any liens, encumbrances, or 
infirmities which may exist.  The Secretary may require the 
elimination of any such liens, encumbrances, or infirmities 
prior to taking final approval action on the acquisition and he 
shall require elimination prior to such approval if the liens, 
encumbrances, 
or 
infirmities 
make 
title 
to 
the 
land 
unmarketable."  25 C.F.R. § 151.12 (1982). 
10 "Formal acceptance of land in trust status shall be 
accomplished by the issuance or approval of an instrument of 
conveyance 
by 
the 
Secretary 
as 
is 
appropriate 
in 
the 
circumstances."  25 C.F.R. § 151.13 (1982). 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
15 
 
¶34 We briefly acknowledge additional arguments made by 
the parties concerning the appropriate canons of construction.  
The Nation argues that the statute should be construed liberally 
because it concerns Indian tribes.  Under the "Indian canon of 
construction," statutes "passed for the benefit of dependent 
Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, [with] 
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."  
Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976).  
¶35 However, the DOR argues that courts have declined to 
apply the Indian canon where there was no ambiguity in the 
statute in the first place.  See Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001) (also noting that the Indian 
canon does not necessarily trump other canons of construction 
where they conflict and specifically mentioning the exemption 
canon).  The DOR further argues that that is precisely the case 
here because the statute is the equivalent of an exemption 
statute, and it is well settled that statutes concerning 
exemptions, deductions, and privileges are strictly construed.11 
                                                 
11 "[T]ax exemptions, deductions, and privileges are matters 
purely of legislative grace and tax statutes are to be strictly 
construed against the granting of the same, and one who claims 
an exemption must point to an express provision granting such 
exemption by language which clearly specifies the same, and thus 
bring himself clearly within the terms thereof."  Comet Co. v. 
Dep't of Taxation, 243 Wis. 117, 123, 9 N.W.2d 620 (1943).  "An 
exemption from taxation must be clear and express.  All 
presumptions are against it, and it should not be extended by 
implication."  Soo Line R.R. Co. v. DOR, 89 Wis. 2d 331, 359, 
278 N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 97 Wis. 2d 56, 292 N.W.2d 
869 (1980).  See also Ladish Malting Co. v. DOR, 98 Wis. 2d 496, 
502, 297 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1980). 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
16 
 
¶36 Because we hold that the statute is unambiguous when 
the provisions are read in context, it is not necessary to 
address the arguments concerning which canons of statutory 
interpretation would apply were the statute ambiguous.  However, 
we note that even were we to hold that the statute is ambiguous, 
the bar would be set quite high for the Nation under the 
applicable canon of statutory construction:   
As a general rule courts have held that statutes 
exempting property from taxation should be strictly 
construed in favor of taxation, but should not be 
interpreted unreasonably.  If the standard granting an 
exemption is capable of two interpretations, one 
granting exemption and the other denying it, the 
construction which denies the exemption must be 
adopted. 
 
The 
same 
rule 
has 
been 
applied 
to 
deductions. 
. . . . 
Tax refund statutes must be construed strictly in 
favor of imposing the tax and against allowing the 
refund, and the burden is on the person requesting the 
refund to bring himself within the refund statute.  
Norman J. Singer, 3A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 66:9 
(6th ed. 2003) (citations omitted).  It is clear to us that the 
Nation would have considerable difficulty meeting the burden of 
overcoming 
the 
countervailing 
exemption 
canon, 
especially 
considering the way the United States Supreme Court in Chickasaw 
Nation signaled the Indian canon's loss of strength. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶37 For 
the 
reasons 
set 
forth 
above, 
we 
affirm.  
"[R]eservations or trust lands" are also referred to in the 
sentence immediately preceding the provision in question; a 
No. 
2007AP1985   
 
17 
 
sensible reading of the statute (Wis. Stat. § 139.323) requires 
that the two references be read as identifying the same land.  
The grammatical construction of the sentence itself lends 
further support to our holding because "was designated" precedes 
both "a reservation" and "trust land" and means the same thing 
about each.  Given that there is no basis in the federal 
regulations for recognizing a preliminary, unofficial status for 
reservations or trust lands, there is likewise no basis for 
reading this statute as intending to apply to land that has 
received only preliminary informal approval. 
¶38 We therefore hold that in this context the phrase "was 
designated a reservation or trust land" is necessarily read as 
referring to the applicable formal process that must occur in 
order for land to be a reservation or trust land.  Because the 
proper authorities had not completed the necessary steps for the 
property in question to be designated a reservation or trust 
land on or before January 1, 1983, and because that is required 
in order to qualify for the tax refund, the claim was properly 
denied. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶39 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Wisconsin law 
requires the Wisconsin Department of Revenue to refund 70 
percent of the state excise tax on cigarettes that an Indian 
tribe collects for the state on its reservation or trust lands, 
provided that "[t]he land on which the sale occurred was 
designated a reservation or trust land on or before January 1, 
1983."  Wis. Stat. § 139.323(3) (2007-08).1  If the land on which 
the sale occurred was not designated a reservation or trust land 
on or before January 1, 1983, the state keeps the entire tax. 
¶40 In this case, the Ho-Chunk Nation seeks a refund of 70 
percent of the tax collected on its DeJope trust land on the 
east side of Madison in Dane County.  The issue presented is 
whether this property "was designated . . . trust land on or 
before January 1, 1983."  Id. 
¶41 The answer to this question turns on the meaning of 
the word "designated."  The majority opinion is grounded on the 
premise that the phrase "was designated . . . trust land" means 
exactly the same as the phrase "was trust land"——that is, the 
word "designated" really means nothing in the context of the 
passage in which it appears.  See majority op. ¶¶2-4.  Because I 
disagree, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 139.323 has an interesting history, 
and understanding that history is essential to understanding the 
statute. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶43 In the late 1970s, Wisconsin imposed an occupational 
tax on the sale of cigarettes.  Wis. Stat. § 139.31 (1979-80).  
The nature of the tax was problematic when the tax was applied 
on Indian reservations.  In a May 1979 opinion, Attorney General 
Bronson La Follette advised the Department of Revenue that 
Wisconsin's cigarette tax laws did not apply to Indian persons 
or Indian tribes selling cigarettes on Indian reservations.  68 
Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 151 (1979). 
¶44 The Attorney General's opinion materially advantaged 
Indian smoke shops, where tribes sold cigarettes to both Indians 
and non-Indians without imposition of a state cigarette tax. 
¶45 By 1981 non-Indian merchants began to complain about 
the loss of cigarette sales to tax exempt tribal smoke shops, 
and the state began to notice the loss of cigarette tax revenue.  
"The Legislative Fiscal Bureau said about 11,000 cases of 
untaxed cigarets were sold by 'tribal smokeshops' in 1979 and 
1980."  Eldon Knoche, Revenue Loss in Sale of Cigarets, 
Milwaukee Sent., May 2, 1981 (on file with the Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin).  The newspaper reported 
that non-Indians "apparently are flocking to the tribes to buy 
the cigarets minus the tax of 16 cents a pack, or $1.60 a 
carton."  Id. 
¶46 Legislation was soon introduced to convert Wisconsin's 
cigarette tax from an occupational tax to an excise tax.  See 
1981 A.B. 500 (introduced May 14, 1981).  This legislation was 
based on Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151-160 (1980), where the 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
3 
 
Supreme Court upheld Washington's excise tax on on-reservation 
sales of cigarettes to non-tribal purchasers. 
¶47 In 1982 the Joint Committee on Finance incorporated a 
cigarette excise tax into its revision of 1981 Senate Bill 783, 
the so-called budget adjustment bill.  See Senate Substitute 
Amendment 1 to 1981 S.B. 783.  The Committee's provision 
exempted cigarettes sold to enrolled tribal members.  See id. 
¶48 Governor Lee Sherman Dreyfus vetoed the provision.  
However, in his April 29, 1982 veto message, Dreyfus said the 
following: 
I am vetoing conversion of the current occupational 
tax on cigarettes to an excise tax effective July, 
1983.  Sale of unstamped cigarettes to non-Indians is 
a serious and mounting problem in Wisconsin with an 
estimated revenue loss of more than $4 million 
annually.  There is no question that state government 
and Wisconsin's tribes must have serious discussions 
to resolve this and other tax problems.  However, such 
negotiations are more likely to be conducted in "good 
faith" if a forced mid-1983 solution is not in the 
statutes.  The tribes should understand that the 
intent of the Legislature to end the serious erosion 
of our cigarette tax base is absolutely clear.  A 
comprehensive and fair solution to state-tribe tax 
problems must be found and soon, or the legislature 
will re-enact this law. 
Veto message of Lee Sherman Dreyfus, Governor, 1981 S.B. 783 
(April 29, 1982) (on file with the Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wisconsin). 
 
¶49 During the remainder of 1982, representatives of the 
Department of Revenue met with representatives of Wisconsin's 11 
Indian tribes and bands, attempting to come up with an 
agreement.  These negotiations are summarized in the minutes of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council's Native American Study 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
4 
 
Committee.  See Wisconsin Legislative Council, Summary of 
Proceedings, Native American Study Committee, for May 12, 1982, 
at 4-5; July 19, 1982, at 11-12; and November 15, 1982, at 6-8, 
10. 
¶50 In 1983 Governor Anthony Earl's first budget contained 
language to implement the agreement negotiated by the previous 
administration.  See 1983 S.B. 83, §§ 1496-1506.  A March 24, 
1983 analysis for the Joint Committee on Finance described the 
provision as follows: 
 
Senate Bill 83 (the 1983-85 biennial budget bill) 
contains language to implement a recently-negotiated 
agreement 
between the Department of Revenue and 
representatives of Indian tribes in the state, which 
would require Indian sellers of cigarettes to impose a 
portion of the state cigarette tax on sales to non-
Indians.  This would be accomplished by converting the 
current cigarette occupational tax to an excise tax, 
to be imposed on the first taxable event in the state 
and passed on to the ultimate consumer.  Under the 
negotiated 
agreement . . . cigarettes 
sold 
by 
distributors to Indians or Indian organizations for 
resale would be exempt from 70% of the state excise 
tax (i.e., subject to a tax of 7.5¢ per pack), and 
payment of the non-exempt portion would be evidenced 
by the appropriate tax stamp purchased by distributors 
and affixed to each pack sold to Indian sellers for 
resale.  According to the language of SB 83, this 
special tax rate would only be applicable if a tribe 
imposed an additional 7.5¢ per pack tax of its own; 
otherwise, the full amount of excise tax would be due.  
The use tax imposed by current law on unstamped 
cigarettes brought into the state would not apply to 
cigarettes taxed at the special rate for Indians.  In 
addition, 
the 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
would 
be 
authorized to enter into agreements with Indian tribes 
to provide refunds of cigarette taxes paid through the 
purchase of stamped cigarettes by Indians.  The 
Department would adopt administrative rules regarding 
the 
refund 
provision, 
specifying 
the 
tribal 
alternatives of maintaining separate records of sales 
to Indians, or agreeing to a formula for determining 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
5 
 
the refund amount (for example, Wisconsin per capita 
cigarette consumption multiplied by the reservation 
population). 
Memorandum from Bob Lang, Director, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 
to Members, Joint Committee on Finance, at 2 (March 24, 1983) 
(regarding 1983-85 Biennial Budget: Cigarette Tax——Sale of 
Untaxed Cigarettes by Indians to Non-Indians) (on file with the 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin). 
 
¶51 The fiscal paper noted that the proposal came in 
response to the fact that "the state is not currently collecting 
any significant cigarette tax revenues on sales by Indians to 
non-Indians, and this creates a price differential potentially 
equal to the amount of tax (25¢ per pack) between sales to non-
Indian purchasers by Indians and sales by non-Indian retailers."  
Id. at 3. 
 
¶52 The paper added that, since December 1978, "untaxed 
cigarettes have been sold by Indians currently operating from 
about twenty sites on reservations and two on Tribal trust 
lands."  Id. 
(Tribal trust lands are property purchased by Indians 
or tribes and deeded to the U.S. Department of the 
Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, and treated as 
reservation land for many purposes.  The Attorney 
General has indicated that such lands are treated as 
reservation land for purposes of cigarette taxes.)[2]  
The highest sales have reportedly been in the Green 
Bay area (Oneida tribe), Wisconsin Dells (Winnebago 
tribe) and on the Lac Court Oreilles reservation in 
northwest Wisconsin.  Sales of untaxed cigarettes by 
                                                 
2 Attorney General La Follette issued an opinion on March 
10, 1982, that land purchased and held in trust for Indian 
tribes or tribal members under the superintendence of the 
federal government has the same status as official reservation 
land.  71 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 82 (1982).  
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
6 
 
Indians have grown from approximately 264,000 cartons 
in 1979-80 to over 1,480,000 cartons in 1981-82, and 
are expected to reach 2,280,000 cartons in 1982-83.  
Most of these sales are to non-Indians, and the 
cigarette tax revenue not collected on such taxable 
sales is estimated at nearly $5.2 million in 1982-83, 
increasing between 40% and 50% per fiscal year.  Based 
on current experience with deliveries of unstamped 
cigarettes to Indian sellers, foregone cigarette tax 
collections are estimated to be $7.7 million in 1983-
84 and $11.0 million in 1984-85.  In addition, 
foregone sales tax collections on these purchases 
would be approximately $1.2 million in 1982-83, $1.7 
million in 1983-84, and $2.5 million in 1984-85. 
Id. at 3-4. 
¶53 On April 19, 1983, a subcommittee of the Joint 
Committee on Finance proposed a revision of the Governor's 
budget proposal.  In line with present law, it called for 
imposition of a full excise tax (e.g., 25 cents a pack) on 
Indian cigarette sales but provided a 70 percent refund to the 
tribes.  Plan Would Alter Cigaret Tax Rule, Milwaukee Sent., 
April 20, 1983 (on file with the Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wisconsin). 
¶54 Carrying 
a 
new 
name, 
the 
Legislative 
Council's 
American Indian Study Committee met on April 22, 1983, and 
discussed these developments in the Joint Finance Committee.  It 
voted unanimously to support the Finance subcommittee's proposal 
after learning from Kenneth Funmaker, Sr., a member of the 
Winnebago tribe (now Ho-Chunk Nation) that the tribe had 
acquired "land in the Town of Blooming Grove, Dane County, for 
purposes of establishing a smokeshop."  Wisconsin Legislative 
Council, 
Summary 
of 
Proceedings, 
American 
Indian 
Study 
Committee, for April 22, 1983, at 10-11.  Three members of the 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
7 
 
committee who voted to support the proposal (Jim Schlender, Rita 
Keshena, and Gerald Hill) were members of the Great Lakes Inter-
Tribal Council (GLITC) team that negotiated the original 
cigarette tax agreement with the Department of Revenue.  See 
Letter from Patricia S. Smith, Chairperson, American Indian 
Study Committee, State of Wisconsin Legislative Council, to 
Senator Gerald D. Kleczka and Representative Mary Lou Munts, Co-
Chairpersons of the Joint Committee on Finance (May 4, 1983) (on 
file with the Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin). 
¶55 The Joint Committee on Finance ultimately approved the 
recommendation of its subcommittee.  It introduced a substitute 
amendment to the budget on May 26, 1983.  The budget was enacted 
by the legislature on July 1, 1983, and became law after its 
publication on July 22, 1983.  1983 Act 27; see also Bulletin, 
Wisconsin Legislature, Part 1 Senate, Senate Bill 83, at 35-41 
(1983). 
II 
¶56 The majority opinion sets out several key dates for 
the property in question: 
 
In 
1982, 
the 
Ho-Chunk 
Nation 
(the 
Nation) . . . received 
permission 
from 
the 
United 
States Department on the Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), to acquire a five-acre parcel of land 
known as the DeJope Property.  A Washington, D.C., BIA 
official sent a memo dated August 20, 1982, to a 
Minneapolis BIA official, stating in relevant part, 
"You are, therefore, authorized to accept conveyance 
to the United States in trust upon consideration of 
appropriate title evidence in accordance with the 
requirements of 25 CFR 120a.12 [1982]."  On October 
29, 1982, the seller of the DeJope Property received 
payment from the Nation and conveyed the title by 
delivery of a warranty deed.  On January 31, 1983, the 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
8 
 
Minneapolis 
BIA 
Area 
Director 
signed 
the 
deed, 
accepting the conveyance.  The deed was recorded with 
the Dane County Register of Deeds on March 18, 1983. 
Majority op., ¶6. 
¶57 These dates must be compared to the dates related to 
Wis. Stat. § 139.323: (1) 1983 Senate Bill 83 was introduced on 
February 8, 1983, eight days after the January 31, 1983 date 
that the majority considers controlling; (2) a Joint Finance 
subcommittee proposed the pertinent revision to the budget on 
April 19, 1983, 78 days after the date that the majority 
believes is controlling; and (3) the 1983-85 budget became law 
on July 23, 1983, 173 days after the date the DeJope property 
officially went into trust, although § 139.323 did not take 
effect until October 1, 1983.  By October 1, 1983, the DeJope 
property had been in trust for eight months.   
¶58 From 
the 
perspective 
of 
the 
state, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 139.323 was a generous accommodation to Wisconsin Indian 
tribes because it permitted tribal governments to secure 70 
percent of all excise tax collected on the sale of cigarettes to 
non-tribal purchasers on tribal land.  Under this formula, 
tribal revenues would automatically increase every time the 
state raised the cigarette tax.  Because tribes had the ability 
to acquire additional land, put it into trust, and use it to 
facilitate additional cigarette sales, the Joint Committee on 
Finance must have concluded that it had to cut off new land for 
Indian smoke shops to prevent further erosion of the state's 
cigarette tax base.  This appears to be the reason for the 
January 1, 1983 cutoff date. 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶59 Budget writers knew full well that the budget would 
not be passed overnight.  Hence, they had to devise a statutory 
obstacle to the designation of new trust land before the budget 
became law.  A cutoff of January 1, 1983, served that purpose. 
¶60 The legislature could easily have said the following 
in Wis. Stat. § 139.323: 
(3) The land on which the sale occurred was 
reservation or trust land on or before January 1, 
1983. 
However, that language would have excluded the DeJope property 
that had become trust land before the budget provision was even 
conceived and had been purchased by the Ho-Chunk Nation——with 
explicit prior approval of the BIA——long before January 1, 1983. 
¶61 Inasmuch 
as 
tribal 
legislators 
from 
the 
GLITC 
Cigarette Committee included a Ho-Chunk representative (Harry 
Steindorf), see Memorandum from Wisconsin Judicare——Indian Unit 
to Members of the GLITC Cigarette Committee (October 18, 1982) 
(on file with the Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wisconsin), it is implausible that committee members were 
unaware of the plans of the Ho-Chunk Nation for the DeJope 
Property. 
 
It 
is 
implausible 
that 
key 
leaders 
in 
the 
legislature, 
the 
executive 
branch, 
and 
among 
the 
tribes 
deliberately excluded from cigarette tax refund eligibility five 
acres of property that had been owned by the Ho-Chunk Nation 
since October 29, 1982, and had been officially in trust since 
January 31, 1983, before the legislation was passed. 
¶62 To accept the majority opinion requires us to believe 
that in 1983 all relevant decision makers, except the Ho-Chunk, 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
10 
 
knowingly and deliberately excluded the DeJope Property——even 
though it already had trust status——without any documentation of 
such intentional discrimination.   
¶63 The majority's statutory analysis must be considered 
against this background. 
III 
¶64 The majority opinion rejects the conclusion of both 
the court of appeals and the circuit court that Wis. Stat. 
§ 139.323 is ambiguous in the context of this dispute.  See 
majority op. ¶¶21-22, 26.  It makes this determination even 
though it acknowledges that the word "designate" has multiple 
definitions.  The majority opinion states the following: 
The court of appeals noted that dictionary definitions 
of 
the 
word 
[designate] 
led 
to 
opposite 
interpretations: "The definitions the Nation chooses——
'select' 
and 
'nominate,' 
see 
B[lack's] 
L[aw] 
D[ictionary] 447 (6th ed. 1990)——have a preliminary 
sense to them that would support the Nation's proposed 
construction.  However, the definitions 'specify,' 
'give a name or title to,' and 'characterize,' see 
A[merican] H[eritage] C[ollege] D[ictionary] 376 (3d 
ed. 1993), suggest that the property would need to 
actually be held in trust before the property could be 
so specified, named, titled or characterized." 
Id., ¶22 n.5 (quoting Ho-Chunk Nation v. DOR, 2008 WI App 95, 
¶16, 312 Wis. 2d 484, 754 N.W.2d 186). 
¶65 The American Heritage Dictionary includes among the 
definitions of "designate" the following: "To select and set 
aside for a duty, an office, or a purpose."  American Heritage 
Dictionary 506 (3d ed. 1992).  This definition is illuminated by 
focusing on the adjective "designate"——"Appointed but not yet 
installed in office."  Id. 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶66 To illustrate the use of the word "designate" to 
signal a probability, a possibility, or even a contingency, we 
can look to a statement issued by the White House on January 20, 
2009: 
In order to ensure continuity of government, Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates has been designated by the 
outgoing Administration, with the concurrence of the 
incoming Administration, to serve as the designated 
successor during Inauguration Day, January 20th. 
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 
(January 20, 2009).  In short, Secretary Gates was designated to 
become President of the United States if the higher ranking 
officials slated by statute to succeed the President in the 
event of a disaster were unable to do so.  Of course, Secretary 
Gates was never elected President and never became President, 
but he undoubtedly was designated successor to the President for 
one day.   
¶67 This use of the phrase "was designated" is wholly 
consistent with the Ho-Chunk's position.  On August 20, 1982, 
BIA "designated" the DeJope property as property it would accept 
in trust status.  On October 29, 1982, the Nation received title 
to the property, and thereafter, in documents conveyed to the 
BIA, the Nation again "designated" the property as property set 
aside for trust status.  On December 7, 1982, the Great Lakes 
BIA office sent a memo and forwarded a deed to the Minneapolis 
BIA office for the Area Director's signature, following up BIA's 
earlier designation. 
¶68 The majority rejects this use of the word.  It 
acknowledges that the word "designated" is not part of the 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
12 
 
federal regulations, but it insists upon use of the word as 
though the word identified the critical decision point in a 
formal process.   
¶69 Subchapter II of Chapter 139 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
deals with cigarette taxes.  Section 139.30 sets out a series of 
definitions, 
including 
"Indian 
tribe," 
§ 139.30(5), 
"Reservation," § 139.30(9) and "Trust lands," § 139.30(13m), 
that are employed in the subchapter. 
¶70 "Trust lands" are defined as "any lands in this state 
held in trust by the U.S. government for the benefit of a tribe 
or a member of a tribe."  Wis. Stat. § 139.30(13m). 
¶71 This definition does not help the State in its 
interpretation of the word "designated."  Under the statute, 
"trust lands" are lands "held in trust by the U.S. government."  
Id.  The word "designated" does not appear in the Wisconsin 
definition and the phrase "was designated" does not add anything 
when the phrase is used with respect to an already existing 
status.   
¶72 The 
fact 
is, 
however, 
that 
this 
"trust 
lands" 
definition was not enacted until 1999.  1999 Wis. Act 9.  Hence, 
the meaning of "trust land" in 1983 was not confined by a 
Wisconsin statutory definition.  Turning to federal law would 
make sense if there were evidence that the legislature relied on 
a delineated federal process or if the word "designated" 
appeared in the federal regulations.  There does not appear to 
be such evidence. 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶73 What the legislature was familiar with was a 1982 
opinion from Attorney General La Follette.  See 71 Wis. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 82 (1982).  Among the statements La Follette made in 
his opinion are the following:  
Regardless of how land came to be reserved for Indian 
use by the federal government, the legal status of 
such reserved land is the same. 
Id. at 83 (citation omitted). 
 
It also appears to make no difference whether the 
land in question is held in trust by the United States 
for the use of an Indian tribe or an individual tribe 
member, as with allotments, or whether the tribe holds 
the fee title to the land. 
Id. at 85 (emphasis added). 
¶74 Attorney General La Follette's opinion explains as 
follows: 
In the leading case on cigarette taxes involving sales 
by Indians within reservation boundaries, Moe v. 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), the 
Court made clear that for purposes of taxation 
jurisdiction, all lands located within the exterior 
boundaries of an Indian reservation would be treated 
the same.  The Court did not distinguish between land 
located within the reservation which remained in trust 
status, either for the tribe or individual tribe 
members, and land that had been alienated and is now 
owned in fee by Indians or non-Indians.  The [C]ourt 
refused to distinguish between fee and trust lands 
because 
it 
considered 
"checkerboard 
jurisdiction" 
within reservation boundaries to be unworkable. 
Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
¶75 This latter passage is significant because it shows 
that land within the boundaries of a reservation need not be 
"reservation" or "trust land" to be treated as such.  The 
statutory definition of "reservation" in Wis. Stat. § 139.30(9) 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
14 
 
mirrors this principle.3  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 139.323 authorizes a 
70 percent refund of excise taxes on cigarettes sold on land 
within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, even though the 
land is not "held in trust by the U.S. government for the 
benefit of a tribe or member of a tribe." 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 139.323 begins with the following 
statement: "The department shall refund 70% of the taxes 
collected under s. 139.31(1) in respect to sales on reservations 
or trust lands of an Indian tribe . . . ."  This provision 
employs the definitions in § 139.30 to cover all land within a 
reservation's boundaries and all trust land——that is, all land 
being held in trust at the time of the sale.  The phrase "was 
designated" in subsection (3) looks backward to a different 
time.  In that context, the word "designated" is either 
superfluous or it conveys a different meaning.  There is no 
reason why the legislature would not have used the phrase "was a 
reservation or trust land on or before January 1, 1983," unless 
the 
word 
"designated" 
had 
special 
meaning. 
 
The 
phrase 
"reservation 
or 
trust 
land" 
and 
the 
phrase 
"land . . . designated a reservation or trust land" are not 
likely to mean exactly the same thing. 
¶77 Unlike this dissent, the majority opinion does not 
justify its holding on any historical or policy basis.  It 
                                                 
3 "'Reservation' means all land within the boundaries of the 
Bad River, Forest County Potawatomi, Lac Courte Oreilles, Lac du 
Flambeau, Menominee, Mole Lake, Oneida, Red Cliff, St. Croix, 
and Stockbridge-Munsee reservations and the Winnebago Indian 
communities."  Wis. Stat. § 139.30(9). 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
15 
 
relies instead on unpersuasive interpretive tools.  In my view, 
the only way we would be justified in denying the Ho-Chunk 
Nation the requested refund on its DeJope tax collections would 
be to cite documentary evidence showing that this property was 
considered and intentionally excluded.   
¶78 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY join Section III of 
this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1985.dtp 
 
 
 
1