Title: New Jersey v. Prall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2018

New Jersey v. Prall Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The Appellate Division reversed defendant Tormu Prall’s conviction, finding that: (1) his prior threat to kill his girlfriend, Jessie Harley, was admitted in error and without a limiting instruction; (2) the State improperly utilized prior bad act evidence in closing; and (3) statements by defendant’s brother John Prall to John’s girlfriend Kimberly Meadows were inadmissible hearsay and did not qualify as dying declarations or excited utterances. Defendant was convicted for the arson murder of his brother. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certification and reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate panel’s legal conclusions that the trial court erred by allowing evidence that defendant threatened to burn down Jessie’s homes and by admitting John’s hearsay statements to Kimberly that defendant was responsible for the arson. However, the Court found the errors were not capable of producing an unjust result because of the overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence against defendant. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Tormu E. Prall (A-28-16) (078169)Argued October 23, 2017 -- Decided January 31, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers evidentiary rulings from the trial of defendant Tormu Prall for the arson murder of his brother, John Prall (John), and the attempted murder of John’s girlfriend, Kimberly Meadows (Kimberly). John moved into his late mother’s house in Trenton (the Trenton home), where defendant also lived. John and defendant argued several times about bills. Having left the Trenton home after an argument, defendant asked his girlfriend, Jessie Hartley (Jessie), to return him to the Trenton home. Jessie did so and, while waiting in the car, heard yelling from inside. Defendant then returned to the car “with a gas can in his hand” and said, “I’m going to set the mo**erfu**er on fire. Would you take me to the gas station so I can get some gas?” Jessie declined and, while driving defendant to her house, defendant yelled, “f**k him, I’m going to kill him.” At Jessie’s house, defendant stated that “Cain killed Abel and [I’m] going to kill [my] brother.” Two days later, defendant returned to Jessie’s house in the afternoon and told her that he had just come from town, where he had argued again with his brother and, in front of many people, said he was going to kill him. Defendant was wearing a yellow T-shirt. Kimberly testified that she and John fell asleep that night. An unknown amount of time went by before she “started feeling something . . . hot on [her] right side.” She asked John, “[W]hy do you feel so hot?” She then rolled over to find John on fire from his waist up. Kimberly noticed that her own legs were also on fire. When Kimberly awakened John, he began “hollering and screaming saying oh, my God. My Brother, my brother.” Kimberly and John were able to exit the Trenton home. An ambulance transported them to a hospital. John died four days later. During the search of the Trenton home, a red gas can was located. At trial, Jessie identified the red gas can as the one defendant had retrieved from the Trenton home two days before the fatal fire. Paul Bethea, a City of Trenton sanitation worker, testified that he personally witnessed the argument between John and defendant downtown on the Saturday before the fire. Bethea also testified that he saw defendant standing “staring at the fire.” Almost a year later, defendant was located in Connecticut. After returning defendant to New Jersey, a detective noticed and photographed “severe burns to [defendant’s] hands.” Detectives also learned from Jessie and others that approximately one month before the fire, defendant threatened to burn down both of Jessie’s houses when she attempted to end their relationship. As a result, Jessie obtained a restraining order against defendant. Jessie also admitted the following: after the fire, she found the yellow T-shirt defendant wore on the night of the fire; the T- shirt had dried blood and skin on it; and she discarded the T-shirt out of fear of defendant. Before trial, the court determined that Jessie’s testimony that defendant threatened to burn down her houses was inadmissible. At trial, during direct examination by the State, Jessie testified that, two days after the fire, she found the yellow T-shirt defendant wore the night of the fire with “dry blood and skin on it.” She further testified that she “threw it in the trash” because officers had not found defendant and “[she] was scared.” Defense counsel objected to Jessie’s further testimony regarding her fear of defendant, but the court allowed it. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Jessie’s delay in reporting the yellow, blood-stained T- shirt she had found, and challenged whether she was truly afraid of defendant. At the conclusion of Jessie’s cross- examination, the prosecutor argued at sidebar that he should be permitted to question Jessie on re-direct examination regarding the specific threats defendant made to her because defense counsel “opened the door.” The court ruled that the prosecutor could explore the nature of the threats. On re-direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Jessie about defendant’s threats to kill Jessie. During the State’s summation, the prosecutor repeated defendant’s threats against Jessie: “I’m going to set your house on fire. . . . That’s how he thinks. That’s how he gets revenge on people. That’s how he does it. He sets houses on fire.” Those statements did not elicit an objection. 1 During the trial, Kimberly testified—without objection—that when John awoke in flames he shouted repeatedly, “my brother, my brother.” During a break, the court expressed concern that those statements were impermissible hearsay. The prosecutor argued that two hearsay exceptions applied—excited utterance under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), and dying declaration under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(2). The court found it was error to admit the testimony but concluded that an appropriate instruction would cure the error. The curative instruction was given twelve days later, immediately before summations and after the defense presented its only witness. The court instructed the jury to disregard Kimberly’s testimony about John’s references to defendant and said the following: “The reason I am instructing you to disregard the testimony is that it is hearsay. I wrestled with that and did research and so forth. I heard it as did you, but it has no probative value in this case, and it has the potential really to incite, to inflame, things of that nature, and it should not be used.” The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions, concluding that evidence of “the dangerously prejudicial fact that defendant had threatened to use the same means for [Jessie’s] demise a month earlier” should not have been admitted. The panel also noted that the State’s improper use of the evidence in summation compounded the trial court’s failure to promptly instruct the jurors on how to use the information. The appellate panel also found that John’s cries blaming defendant for the fire should have been excluded because John would not have been competent to testify to an opinion not rationally based on his perception. Therefore, Kimberly was not permitted to do so, either. The State petitioned for certification, which the Court granted. 228 N.J. 501 (2017).HELD: The court erred by allowing evidence that defendant threatened to burn down his girlfriend’s homes and by admitting John’s hearsay statements that defendant was responsible for the arson. However, the errors were not capable of producing an unjust result because of the overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence against defendant.1. N.J.R.E. 404(b) excludes “evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that such person acted in conformity therewith.” To be admissible, such evidence must be relevant to a material issue, and its probative value must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. The “opening the door” doctrine is a rule of expanded relevancy and authorizes admitting evidence which otherwise would have been irrelevant or inadmissible in order to respond to (1) admissible evidence that generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible evidence admitted by the court over objection. Here, defense counsel challenged Jessie’s representation that she feared defendant. On re-direct examination, however, the prosecutor impermissibly expanded that subject by eliciting testimony about the specific nature of defendant’s threat and its similarity to what occurred in this case. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit Jessie’s testimony that defendant threatened to kill her by burning down her houses. The error was magnified by the failure to instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence. (pp. 16-21)2. The State contends that John’s statements to Kimberly—“my brother, my brother”—made while John was engulfed in flames, are excited utterances and dying declarations. Nevertheless, they are not allowable as hearsay exceptions unless they would be admissible if testified to at trial by the declarant. The fire started while John and Kimberly were asleep, and John did not awaken until he was engulfed in flames. Thus, John’s statements were inadmissible hearsay because they were not based on actual knowledge. Although the trial court allowed Kimberly to testify about John’s statements, the court ultimately disallowed the testimony and gave a curative instruction. Here, the curative instruction was given before summations, twelve days after the improper testimony; it was not given immediately. In giving the instruction, the trial judge discussed, among other things, the excited utterance hearsay exception and the fact that he had “wrestled with” the statements’ admissibility and barred them after conducting “research and so forth.” Therefore, although the judge properly informed the jury of the specific evidence they were to disregard, he did so neither soon enough nor sufficiently firmly, clearly, and effectively to remedy the improper testimony. (pp. 21-25)3. To warrant reversal of defendant’s conviction, those errors, singly or collectively, must “raise a reasonable doubt” as to whether they affected the result reached by the jury. Here, there was overwhelming fact and expert evidence properly offered against defendant. This is a rare case in which significant errors by the trial court are harmless because, when evaluated in light of the vast evidence against defendant, those errors were not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether they led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. (pp. 25-27) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and defendant’s convictions are REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 28 September Term 2016 078169 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TORMU E. PRALL, a/k/a JUDDS EMMANUEL, BUTLER JAMES and PRALL MANUEL, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 23, 2017 – Decided January 31, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Jennifer E. Kmieciak, of counsel and on the briefs). Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch, of counsel and on the briefs). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Tormu Prall was charged with and convicted of thearson murder of his brother, John Prall (John), and theattempted murder of John’s girlfriend, Kimberly Meadows(Kimberly). 1 The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictionfinding that: his prior threat to kill his girlfriend, JessieHarley (Jessie), was admitted in error and without a limitinginstruction; the State improperly utilized prior bad actevidence in closing; and statements by John to Kimberly wereinadmissible hearsay and did not qualify as dying declarationsor excited utterances. We granted the State’s petition for certification and nowreverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstatedefendant’s convictions. We agree with the appellate panel’slegal conclusions that the trial court erred by allowingevidence that defendant threatened to burn down Jessie’s homesand by admitting John’s hearsay statements to Kimberly thatdefendant was responsible for the arson. However, we find theerrors were not capable of producing an unjust result because ofthe overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence againstdefendant. I. We rely upon the trial transcript and the appellate recordfor the following facts and procedural history. A. John moved into his late mother’s house in Trenton (theTrenton home), where defendant also lived and where defendant’sgirlfriend, Jessie, stayed four to five times per week. At that 2 time, the utilities were turned off at the Trenton home fornonpayment; they were restored when John satisfied theoutstanding utility bills. About two weeks after John moved in with defendant and oneweek before the fire, John and defendant argued aboutdefendant’s failure to contribute to the bills and engaged in aphysical altercation.1 The Friday before the fire, Johnprevented Jessie and defendant from entering the Trenton home,and defendant and John argued again about the bills. Jessiepersuaded defendant to leave with her and stay at her house thatnight. The following morning, Jessie drove defendant back to theTrenton home. Kimberly was there visiting John. Kimberlytestified that she heard the two argue again about the bills,and heard defendant tell John, “you food, you food,” before aphysical altercation2 broke out between the brothers.3 Duringthe argument, Jessie was waiting in the car in front of theTrenton home. She testified that as defendant exited the home1 Jessie testified at trial that John “grabbed him and they began to tussle” and “they was fighting a little bit.”2 Kimberly testified that she was downstairs when the altercation began, but stated she heard “a lot of scuffling like bumping around and stuff like that.”3 According to Kimberly’s testimony at trial, “food” means “dead” in street slang. 3 he yelled to John, “you’re going to die, you’re going to die,you’re going to die.” Jessie then took defendant back to herhouse. That night, at around 7:30 p.m., defendant asked Jessie toreturn him to the Trenton home. Jessie did so and, whilewaiting in the car, heard yelling from inside. Defendant thenreturned to the car “with a gas can in his hand” and said, “I’mgoing to set the mo**erfu**er on fire. Would you take me to thegas station so I can get some gas?” Jessie declined and, whiledriving defendant to her house, defendant yelled, “f**k him, I’mgoing to kill him.” At Jessie’s house, defendant continued totalk about John, stating that “Cain killed Abel and [I’m] goingto kill [my] brother.” Two days later, in the morning, defendant was at Jessie’shouse when she left for work as a school bus driver; defendantwas not there when Jessie completed her route and returned home.Jessie testified that defendant returned to her house around oneo’clock in the afternoon and told her that he had just come fromtown, where he had argued again with his brother and, in frontof many people, said he was going to kill him. That incident was corroborated by Kimberly, who testifiedthat John had taken her to a bank in downtown Trenton thatmorning and “h[ad] words” there with his brother. Kimberlyheard defendant tell John, “you’s a dead man, you dead, you 4 food, you food” and “you are going to die tonight.” As John andKimberly walked away, defendant followed, still trying to argueand calling John a “dead man.” Later that same day, Jessie took defendant into town againand returned to work to complete her afternoon bus route. Aftercompleting her afternoon route, Jessie located defendant inNorth Trenton. When she found him, defendant was “still kind ofupset.” Shortly after returning to Jessie’s house, defendantfell asleep. Jessie then left to pick up her children from amovie and took them to another house she owned, where she stayedthat evening. When Jessie left defendant, he was wearing ayellow T-shirt. Kimberly testified that she and John fell asleep thatnight. An unknown amount of time went by before she “startedfeeling something . . . hot on [her] right side.” Laying on herside she asked John, “[W]hy do you feel so hot?” She thenrolled over to find John on fire from his waist up. Kimberlynoticed that her own legs were also on fire. When Kimberlyawakened John, he began “hollering and screaming saying oh, myGod. My Brother, my brother.” Kimberly and John were able toexit the Trenton home. An ambulance arrived shortly thereafterand transported them to a hospital. Both were later transferredto the burn unit at Temple University Hospital. John died fourdays later. 5 B. The investigation of the fire by the Trenton PoliceDepartment and Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office revealed thefollowing evidence, which was admitted at trial. During the search of the Trenton home, a trained dogalerted officers to the presence of ignitable liquids in thesecond-floor front bedroom, where John and Kimberly had beensleeping. A red gas can, a BIC lighter, matches, and a can ofWD-40 oil were located in the second-floor rear bedroom. Attrial, Jessie identified the red gas can as the one defendanthad retrieved from the Trenton home two days before the fatalfire. A qualified expert in K-9 handling, fire investigation,and accelerant detection testified at trial that the fire wasincendiary, intentionally set, and fueled by an accelerant. Hefurther determined that the fire had two points of origin: thesecond-floor doorway leading into the front bedroom and themattress in the same bedroom. Paul Bethea, a City of Trenton sanitation worker, testifiedthat he personally witnessed the argument between John anddefendant in front of the downtown bank on the Saturday beforethe fire. Bethea also testified that, on the morning of thefire, he drove by the scene on his way to work and saw defendantstanding on a nearby corner “staring at the fire.” Betheastated that he then went into the work-yard to prepare his truck 6 for the day, which took approximately twenty minutes; after heleft the work-yard, defendant was still “staring at the fire.” Based on the information gathered during the investigation,detectives filed charges against defendant and issued a warrantfor his arrest. Almost a year later, defendant was located inConnecticut. After returning defendant to New Jersey, adetective noticed and photographed “severe burns to[defendant’s] hands.” Detectives also learned from Jessie andothers that approximately one month before the fire, defendantthreatened to burn down both of Jessie’s houses when sheattempted to end their relationship. As a result, Jessieobtained a restraining order against defendant. Jessie alsoadmitted the following: after the fire, she found the yellow T-shirt defendant wore on the night of the fire; the T-shirt haddried blood and skin on it; and she discarded the T-shirt out offear of defendant. An indictment was returned by a Mercer County grand jurycharging defendant with first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A.2C:11-3(a)(3) (count one); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2) (count two); second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A.2C:17-1(a)(1) (count three); and first-degree attempted murder,N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 (count four). Before trial, the State sought a preliminary determinationof the admissibility of Jessie’s testimony that defendant 7 threatened to burn down her houses. In response, the courtscheduled a Cofield4 hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b) toaddress the admissibility of that evidence of prior bad acts.After the hearing, the court determined that the evidence wasinadmissible because the “apparent prejudice” outweighed anyprobative value. The court concluded that “[t]his is exactlythe type of [propensity] evidence that N.J.R.E. 404(b) seeks toexclude.” C. 1. At trial, during direct examination by the State, Jessietestified that, two days after the fire, she found the yellow T-shirt defendant wore the night of the fire with “dry blood andskin on it.” She further testified that she “threw it in thetrash” because officers had not found defendant and “[she] wasscared.” Defense counsel objected to Jessie’s further testimonyregarding her fear of defendant, but the court allowed it,instructing the prosecutor to ask “[l]eading questions . . . sowe don’t get too far off the chart.” The prosecutor askedJessie, “and specifically he threatened to kill you,” drawinganother objection. The court sustained the objection andinstructed the jury to disregard the question.4 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992). 8 On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Jessie’sdelay in reporting the yellow, blood-stained T-shirt she hadfound, and challenged whether she was truly afraid of defendant: Q: Have you reported -- you ever reported to anyone that you were scared of Mr. Prall? A: Just when we was in a relationship, yes. When he threatened me, I reported it to the police, yes. Q: But you never filed charges in that case, correct? A: No. Q: You filed a restraining order? A: Yes, just a restraining order. Q: That you later dismissed, right? A: Yes. Q: But for that one instance, you never reported to anyone that you were scared of him, correct? A: No, I haven’t. At the conclusion of Jessie’s cross-examination, theprosecutor argued at sidebar that he should be permitted toquestion Jessie on re-direct examination regarding the specificthreats defendant made to her because defense counsel “openedthe door.” Finding a distinction between direct evidence andrebuttal evidence, the court ruled that the prosecutor couldexplore the nature of the threats. On re-direct examination, 9 the prosecutor questioned Jessie about defendant’s threats tokill Jessie: Q: He threatened to kill you over the next few days, did he not? A: Yes, he did. Q: He threatened to burn your house down, both houses in Burlington and the one in Trenton; did he not? A: Yes, he did. Q: He told you all I need is a gallon of gas to do it? Didn’t he tell you that? A: Yes. Q: And didn’t he also call your employer and told your supervisor he was going to kidnap you and your school bus and then kill you? A: Yes.On re-cross-examination, Jessie testified that she did notreport to law enforcement that she found and discarded theyellow T-shirt because she was afraid of defendant. During the State’s summation, the prosecutor repeateddefendant’s threats against Jessie: Jessie says promise me -- talking to the defendant -- you won’t do anything to your brother. Defendant says, “I can’t promise you that.” Why did Jessie ask him that? Well, there’s only one explanation. Jessie must have really thought he was going to do it because why would she ask him to promise me you won’t kill your brother? Why would she say that if she didn’t think -- and she was there with him -- that he was going to kill his brother? Now, think about what she’s 10 thinking in her mind. He’s already -- defendant’s already threatened to kill Jessie a month earlier. He tells her a month earlier I’m going to -- not just anything, not going to kill you. But what does he use? What does he say? I’m going to set your house on fire, your house in Burlington and your house here. That’s how he thinks. That’s how he gets revenge on people. That’s how he does it. He sets houses on fire. And all I need is a gallon of gasoline. [(emphasis added).]Those statements did not elicit an objection from defensecounsel. 2. During the trial, Kimberly testified -- without objection -- that when John awoke in flames he shouted repeatedly, “mybrother, my brother” as he attempted to extinguish the fire andflee from the Trenton home. During a break, the court expressedconcern that those statements were impermissible hearsay. Theprosecutor argued that two hearsay exceptions applied -- excitedutterance under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), and dying declaration underN.J.R.E. 804(b)(2). Defense counsel did not respond, and thecourt reserved its ruling until after both parties had theopportunity to research the issue. Ultimately, the court found that it was error to admit thetestimony but concluded that an appropriate instruction wouldcure the error. The curative instruction was given to the jurytwelve days later, immediately before summations and after the 11 defense presented its only witness, Dr. Mark Taff, a forensicpathologist who disputed the origin of scars on defendant’shands. The court instructed the jury to disregard Kimberly’stestimony about John’s references to defendant and said thefollowing: The reason I am instructing you to disregard the testimony is that it is hearsay. I wrestled with that and did research and so forth. I heard it as did you, but it has no probative value in this case, and it has the potential really to incite, to inflame, things of that nature, and it should not be used. . . . . One has to, therefore, evaluate what is the basis for the statement, and there are many exceptions in the law. Excited utterance, somebody sees something happening and screams. I see a face in the window and it’s so and so. And it may have happened under extreme circumstances. In this case if John Prall had said, “My brother’s at the window” or something like that or John Jones is at the window, that might be acceptable under certain rules, but that’s not the case . . . . Before charging the jury, the trial judge placed on therecord a request from defense counsel that he specifically not“mention again in the charge to the jury to disregard thetestimony of [Kimberly] concerning the alleged statements byJohn Prall.” No other jury instructions regarding defendant’sthreats to Jessie or John’s “my brother, my brother” statementswere requested or given. 3. 12 The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts, and thecourt sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of life plustwenty years in prison -- life for John’s murder, plus twentyyears for defendant’s attempted murder of Kimberly -- with aneighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant tothe No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendantappealed. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions,concluding that evidence of “the dangerously prejudicial factthat defendant had threatened to use the same means for[Jessie’s] demise a month earlier” should not have beenadmitted. The panel also noted that the State’s improper use ofthe evidence in summation compounded the trial court’s failureto promptly instruct the jurors on how to use the information. The appellate panel also found, relying on N.J.R.E. 701,that John’s cries blaming defendant for the fire should havebeen excluded because John would not have been competent totestify to an opinion not rationally based on his perception.Therefore, Kimberly was not permitted to do so, either. The State petitioned for certification, which this Courtgranted. 228 N.J. 501 (2017). II. A. 13 First, the State argues that the trial court “properlyexercised its discretion in concluding that defense counsel’scross examination of . . . Jessie . . . opened the door for theprosecution to elicit testimony regarding defendant’s specificthreats to kill her.” According to the State, the threatsagainst Jessie were of special significance because she believeddefendant had carried out the same threats against John. The State also claims that the victim’s statements “mybrother, my brother,” as testified to by Kimberly, wereadmissible dying declarations or excited utterances. Finally, the State contends that, even if the challengedtestimony was admitted in error, it was not reversible errorbecause “the jury’s verdict is amply supported by overwhelmingevidence in the record.” B. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor used evidence ofprior bad acts to show propensity, which is “exactly the type ofevidence that N.J.R.E. 404(b) seeks to exclude.” Defendantconcedes that defense counsel went too far in cross-examiningJessie on her fear of defendant, but claims that counsel’stransgression opened the door for re-direct examination only onthe purported death threat, not on its precise nature. Defendant agrees with the Appellate Division that John’shearsay statements -- “my brother, my brother” -- constituted 14 improper lay-witness testimony under N.J.R.E. 701 and claims thecourt compounded this error by its delay in issuing a curativeinstruction. Defendant also avers that, even if the instructionwas timely, it was tainted by the court’s acknowledgment to thejury that the question of admissibility was one that the courthad “wrestled with.” III. This appeal requires our review of the trial court’sevidentiary rulings regarding prior bad acts and hearsay. Thetrial court’s evidentiary rulings “are reviewed under the abuseof discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decisionto admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to thetrial court’s discretion.” Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. &Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010). As the appellatepanel recognized here, we do not set such rulings aside unlessit appears that “there has been a clear error of judgment.”State v. J.A.C., 210 N.J. 281, 295 (2012) (quoting State v.Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)). Said differently, we must beconvinced that “the trial court’s ruling is so wide of the markthat a manifest denial of justice resulted.” Ibid. (quotingBrown, 170 N.J. at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our review of the evidentiary determinations cannot end ouranalysis when we find an abuse of discretion; rather, we mustthen determine whether any error found is harmless or requires 15 reversal. The State offered evidence of prior bad acts on anumber of occasions -- by pretrial motion, during Jessie’sdirect and redirect examination, and in summation. On someoccasions the evidence elicited an objection; on others it didnot. Issues regarding the repetition of John’s hearsaystatements “my brother, my brother” were raised sua sponte bythe trial judge. Under those circumstances, we will disregardany error or omission “unless it is of such a nature as to havebeen clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2;see also State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 337-38 (1971).Accordingly, we must determine whether either claimed “error[was] 'sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it]led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.’”State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004) (second alteration inoriginal) (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 336). To apply those principles, we review both disputedevidentiary rulings and then consider their potential impact ondefendant’s convictions. IV. A. We first consider the determination that prior bad actsevidence was admissible here because defense counsel challengedJessie’s purported fear of defendant. We review theadmissibility of defendant’s threats in the context of N.J.R.E. 16 404(b), which excludes “evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. . . to prove the disposition of a person in order to show thatsuch person acted in conformity therewith.” Because of the “underlying danger” that a “jury may convictthe defendant because he is a 'bad’ person in general,” State v.Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 514 (2014) (quoting State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992)), “to be admissible, such evidence must be'relevant to a material issue,’ and its probative value 'mustnot be outweighed by its apparent prejudice,’” State v. Sanchez-Medina, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op. at 17) (quotingCofield, 127 N.J. at 338 (factors one and four of multi-factortest)).5 The mere bolstering of a witness’s credibility does notsatisfy the relevancy element of the Cofield test. Skinner, 218 N.J. at 520; State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 520-21 (2002). Also,if the evidence withstands a Cofield analysis, before itsadmission the trial “court must instruct the jury on the limiteduse of the evidence” and “explain precisely the permitted andprohibited purposes of the evidence.” Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341.5 There is no dispute that the second element of the Cofield analysis, requiring that the prior act be “similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged,” Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338, is satisfied. Likewise, the clear-and-convincing element of the Cofield test is not in dispute because the testimony concerning the threat came directly from the victim of the threat, whom the trial judge found to be credible. 17 After a Cofield hearing, the trial court here determinedthat evidence about defendant’s threats against Jessie wasinadmissible because the “apparent prejudice” outweighed anyprobative value. The court concluded that “[t]his is exactlythe type of [propensity] evidence that N.J.R.E. 404(b) seeks toexclude.” Later, however, the judge found that defense counsel“opened the door” to evidence of defendant’s threats to burndown Jessie’s houses. The “opening the door” doctrine is “a rule of expandedrelevancy and authorizes admitting evidence which otherwisewould have been irrelevant or inadmissible in order to respondto (1) admissible evidence that generates an issue, or (2)inadmissible evidence admitted by the court over objection.”State v. James, 144 N.J. 538, 554 (1996) (emphases omitted). Inother words, it permits “a party to elicit otherwiseinadmissible evidence when the opposing party has made unfairprejudicial use of related evidence.” Ibid. (citation omitted).The “doctrine operates to prevent a defendant from successfullyexcluding from the prosecution’s case-in-chief inadmissibleevidence and then selectively introducing pieces of thisevidence for the defendant’s own advantage, without allowing theprosecution to place the evidence in its proper context.” Ibid.The doctrine is limited, however, by weighing the probative 18 value against the prejudicial nature of the evidence underN.J.R.E. 403. Ibid. To the extent that evidence of the threats was intended tobolster Jessie’s credibility as a witness, we emphasize thatsuch use of prior bad acts evidence does not satisfy therelevancy element of the Cofield test. Skinner, 218 N.J. at 520. Furthermore, even if defense counsel did “open the door”to testimony about defendant’s threat, rendering it relevant,the probative value of that testimony would nevertheless need tooutweigh its apparent prejudice to be admissible. See James,144 N.J. at 554 (subjecting “opening the door” argument toprobative/prejudice balancing test). Here, defense counsel challenged Jessie’s representationthat she feared defendant, which did -- as defendant concedes --render potential rebuttal evidence relevant. On re-directexamination, however, the prosecution did not limit itself tothe subject of Jessie’s fear. Rather, the prosecutorimpermissibly expanded that subject by eliciting testimony aboutthe specific nature of defendant’s threat and its similarity towhat occurred in this case. The prosecutor then fatallyundermined any claim by the State that it was seeking merely torebut defense counsel’s cross-examination by improperly arguingpropensity in closing: 19 But what does he use? What does he say? I’m going to set your house on fire, your house in Burlington and your house here. That’s how he thinks. That’s how he gets revenge on people. That’s how he does it. He sets houses on fire. And all I need is a gallon of gasoline. [(emphases added).] Defendant correctly argues that the State could havedirected the jury’s attention to defendant’s death threatswithout relaying the specific nature of the threats; suchtestimony would be admissible to rebut any implication thatJessie and defendant “were involved in minor domestic squabbles”only and that she was overstating her fear of him. The specificnature of the threats, however, is highly prejudicial propensityevidence without justifying relevance, which N.J.R.E. 404(b)explicitly prohibits. See, e.g., State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232,259 (2010) (holding evidence of unrelated sex crime tending toshow propensity inadmissible because “unmoored from theprinciples informing N.J.R.E. 404(b)”). Essentially, even ifdefense counsel “opened the door,” counsel did not open it sowide as to allow in inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts. We hold, therefore, that it was a “clear error of judgment”and an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permitJessie’s testimony on redirect examination that defendantthreatened to kill her by burning down her houses. Thatevidence was not “relevant to a material issue,” and its 20 probative value was “outweighed by its apparent prejudice.”Sanchez-Medina, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 17) (quotingCofield, 127 N.J. at 338). The error was magnified by the trialcourt’s failure to “instruct the jury on the limited use of theevidence” before its admission. Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341. B. We next consider whether the admission of Kimberly’shearsay testimony that, after waking up engulfed in flames, Johnhollered “my brother, my brother,” was also error and, if so,whether the error was remedied by the court’s curativeinstruction. In deciding the admissibility of the hearsaystatements, we must review the applicable exceptions to the ruleagainst hearsay. 1. To begin, N.J.R.E. 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement,other than one made by the declarant while testifying at thetrial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of thematter asserted.” Hearsay is generally inadmissible “except asprovided by [the Rules of Evidence] or by other law.” N.J.R.E.802. In the present appeal, the State relies on two exceptionsto the hearsay rule to support admissibility -- the excited-utterance exception and the dying-declaration exception. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) defines an excited utterance as “[a]statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 21 the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by theevent or condition and without opportunity to deliberate orfabricate.” A dying declaration, which is a “[s]tatement underbelief of imminent death,” is also “admissible if it was madevoluntarily and in good faith and while the declarant believedin the imminence of declarant’s impending death.” N.J.R.E.804(b)(2). Although there is no controlling New Jerseyauthority explaining “belief of imminent death,” the UnitedStates Supreme Court has held that “[d]espair of recovery mayindeed be gathered from the circumstances if the facts supportthe inference.” Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 , 100(1933). The State contends that John’s statements to Kimberly – “mybrother, my brother” – made while John was engulfed in flames,are excited utterances and dying declarations. Nevertheless,they are not allowable as hearsay exceptions unless they wouldbe admissible if testified to at trial by the declarant. 6McCormick on Evidence § 18 (2006); see also N.J.R.E. 701;McCormick at § 272, 313. An excited utterance or dyingdeclaration may be excluded if the declarant did not have directpersonal knowledge of the statement’s basis. Ibid. Thus, to beadmissible, John’s statements to Kimberly must have been basedupon John’s “firsthand” observations. Ibid. 22 The fire started while John and Kimberly were asleep, andJohn did not awaken until he was engulfed in flames. The recorddoes not contain evidence that John made any observations or haddirect knowledge that defendant started the fire. Thus, whetheroffered as dying declarations or excited utterances, John’sstatements, “my brother, my brother,” were inadmissible hearsaybecause they were not based on actual knowledge. The statementsshould not have been admitted. 2. Although the trial court allowed Kimberly to testify aboutJohn’s statements blaming his brother for the arson, the courtultimately disallowed the testimony and gave a curativeinstruction. Therefore, we consider whether the trial court’scurative jury instruction sufficiently mitigated any prejudicecaused by the admission of the hearsay. When inadmissible evidence is admitted in error by thetrial court, a curative instruction may sometimes be asufficient remedy. See State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 646(1984). An effective curative instruction needs to be “firm,clear, and accomplished without delay.” State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 134 (2009); see also State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397,452 (2007) (noting trial court issued “immediate curativeinstruction” to deal with issues raised by State’s comments“promptly and effectively”); State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 23 614 (2000) (explaining that State expert’s testimony regardingdefendant’s guilt was improper but that “trial court’s curativeinstructions given immediately after [the] statements . . . weresufficient to remedy [the] improper testimony”); State v.Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 203-05 (1997) (concluding that trialcourt’s curative instruction was sufficient to mitigateprejudice to defendant caused by reference to unindictedsuspect’s polygraph results where instruction to disregardevidence was immediate); Winter, 96 N.J. at 649 (holdingcurative instruction sufficient because, “[b]efore defensecounsel even objected, the court struck the offending remark”and, after brief recess, gave “sharp and complete curativeinstruction”); State v. La Porte, 62 N.J. 312, 318 (1973) (“Thetrial judge immediately instructed the jury in the strongestterms to disregard the offending remark.”). Moreover, in curing potentially prejudicial testimony, ajudge must not confuse a jury by disclosing the court’s ownreasons for denying or admitting evidence, which are extraneousand potentially suggestive. Cf. State v. Ridout, 299 N.J.Super. 233, 240-41 (App. Div. 1997) (finding reversible error intrial judge’s potentially influential statements to jury which“effectively took that issue out of its hands” and collectingcases from other jurisdictions finding that trial courts’references to reasoning behind their evidentiary decisions can 24 be so suggestive as to taint jurors’ consideration of admittedevidence). Here, the curative instruction was given before summations,twelve days after the improper testimony; it was not givenimmediately. In giving the instruction, the trial judgediscussed, among other things, the excited utterance hearsayexception and the fact that he had “wrestled with” thestatements’ admissibility and barred them after conducting“research and so forth.” Therefore, although the judge properly informed the jury ofthe specific evidence they were to disregard, he did so neithersoon enough nor sufficiently firmly, clearly, and effectively to“remedy [the] improper testimony.” See Papasavvas, 163 N.J. at 614. We thus find an abuse of discretion in the admission ofthe hearsay evidence and a failure to sufficiently remedy thaterror via curative instruction. We take this opportunity to remind our trial courts thatwhen delivering curative instructions, judges should limit theircomments to the ruling itself and not add commentary that couldcause confusion or dilute the instruction’s effect. Ridout, 299 N.J. Super. at 240. V. Having found that the trial court abused its discretionthrough the improper admission of both hearsay and prior bad 25 acts evidence and the failure to properly instruct the jury asto either, we now consider whether those errors were “clearlycapable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. We repeatthat, to warrant reversal of defendant’s conviction, thoseerrors, singly or collectively, must “raise a reasonable doubt”as to whether they affected the result reached by the jury.Macon, 57 N.J. at 336. Also, “[t]he error[s] must be evaluated'in light of the overall strength of the State’s case.’”Sanchez-Medina, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 21) (quoting Statev. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 388 (2012)). Here, there was overwhelming fact and expert evidenceproperly offered against defendant. On numerous occasions andbefore many witnesses, defendant threatened to kill his brother.On at least one occasion, two days before the fire, defendanttold Jessie he would burn his brother to death. Indeed, on thatoccasion, defendant retrieved a gas can from his home and askedJessie to take him to fill it. That same gas can was laterrecovered from the scene of the fire by investigators andidentified at trial by Jessie. Investigators determined thatthe fire originated in the bedroom where John and Kimberlyslept. Jessie also provided testimony that she last sawdefendant in a yellow T-shirt and then found the same shirtafter the arson with dried blood and skin on it. Paul Bethea,the City of Trenton sanitation worker, testified that he 26 witnessed defendant and John arguing in front of a Trenton bankand that he saw defendant at the scene of the fire, standing onthe corner “staring at the fire” for a period of at least twentyminutes. Defendant fled the state after the fire. Nearly ayear later, detectives located defendant and observed burn scarson his hands. This is a rare case in which we find significant errors bythe trial court to be harmless because, when evaluated in lightof the vast evidence against defendant, those errors were not“sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [they] ledthe jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.”Daniels, 182 N.J. at 95 (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 336); seealso State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 497 (1997) (findinginsufficient instruction as to other crimes evidence harmlessbecause, in “consideration of the “near overwhelming evidence ofguilt,” instruction “did not tip the scales”). Here, there wasoverwhelming admissible evidence on which to convict defendant,and his convictions should therefore not have been disturbed. VI. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment ofthe Appellate Division and reinstate defendant’s convictions. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 27