Title: Doss v. Jamco Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 970703
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and     
  Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
LAURA L. DOSS 
                                             OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 970703 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
                                          October 31, 1997 
JAMCO, INC. 
 
 
UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES 
 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
By a "STIPULATED ORDER OF CERTIFICATION" entered April 9, 
1997, the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Virginia (Lynchburg Division) certified to this Court, 
pursuant to our Rule 42, the following question of law:  
 
Does Va. Code § 2.1-725(D) prohibit a common law cause 
of action based upon the public policies reflected in 
the Virginia Human Rights Act, Va. Code § 2.1-714 et 
seq.? 
 
By order dated April 28, 1997, we accepted the certified question 
of law. 
 
The question arose when, on December 23, 1996, Laura L. Doss 
(Doss) filed in the District Court a two-count complaint alleging 
that her former employer, Jamco, Inc. (Jamco), had unlawfully 
terminated her employment "because of her sex and because she was 
pregnant."  In Count 1, which is not involved in this proceeding, 
 Doss sought to recover damages for Jamco's alleged violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et 
seq.).  In Count 2, which is implicated here, Doss sought to 
recover damages for Jamco's alleged violation of "the statutorily 
expressed public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia as 
embodied in the Virginia Human Rights Act (Va. Code § 2.1-714 et 
seq.) and as expressed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and elsewhere." 
 
The relevant facts are recited in the stipulated order of 
certification, as follows: 
 
[Doss] was hired by [Jamco] and agreed to begin work on 
March 11, 1996. . . .  [P]rior to reporting to work for 
[Jamco] on March 11, 1996, [Doss] learned that she was 
pregnant.  Upon reporting for work, [Doss] told [Jamco's] 
employees who were to be her supervisors about her 
pregnancy. . . .  [O]n March 12, 1996, [Jamco's] supervisors 
informed [Doss] that her employment was being terminated 
because her maternity leave would cause her to be out during 
the Company's busy time which was unacceptable to [Jamco]. 
 
 
We note that Doss grounds her claim for unlawful discharge 
upon the public policy of Virginia as embodied in the Virginia 
Human Rights Act and "as expressed in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and elsewhere."  
However, in answering the certified question, we are limited by 
the terms of the certification order to "the public policies 
reflected in the Virginia Human Rights Act."  Therefore, we 
express no opinion concerning the public policy of Virginia as it 
might be articulated in sources other than the Virginia Human 
Rights Act. 
 
Ever since this Court decided Stonega Coal and Coke Co. v. 
Louisville and Nashville R.R., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906), 
Virginia has adhered to the rule that when an employment contract 
provides for the rendition of services but its intended duration 
cannot be determined from its provisions, "either party is 
ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving 
reasonable notice of his intention to do so."  Id. at 226, 55 
S.E. at 552.  However, the rule is not absolute.  Bowman v. State 
Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 539, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985). 
 
In Bowman, which predated the adoption of the Virginia Human 
Rights Act, we recognized a limited exception to the employment-
at-will rule.  This exception allowed two bank employees who were 
also stockholders of the bank corporation to maintain a common 
law action in tort against their employer.  The employees were 
discharged after failing to heed a threat from the employer that 
their employment would be terminated if they failed to vote their 
stock according to the wishes of corporate management.  Such 
action by the employer, we said, violated the public policy 
established by Va. Code § 13.1-32 (now Va. Code § 13.1-662), 
which contemplated "that the right to vote [shares of stock] 
shall be exercised free of duress and intimidation imposed on 
individual stockholders by corporate management."  Id. at 540, 
331 S.E.2d at 801. 
 
Bowman was followed by Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 
362 S.E.2d 915 (1987), where the events giving rise to the 
litigation predated the adoption of the Virginia Human Rights 
Act.  There, the employee alleged that her termination was in 
retaliation of her appearance as a witness at a co-employee's 
grievance hearing.  The trial court sustained a demurrer to the 
employee's motion for judgment, and we affirmed.  We noted the 
exception recognized in Bowman that allows recovery for 
"discharges which violate public policy, that is, the policy 
underlying existing laws designed to protect the property rights, 
personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare of the people in 
general."  Id. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918.  We held, however, that 
the Bowman exception was not applicable because the "retaliatory 
act [of discharging the employee] would impinge only upon private 
rights established by the employer's internal regulations [and] 
would have no impact upon any public policy established by 
existing laws for the protection of the public generally."  Id., 
362 S.E.2d at 919.  
 
At its 1987 session, the General Assembly adopted the 
Virginia Human Rights Act (the Act).  1987 Va. Acts ch. 581 
(Chapter 43 of Title 2.1 of the Code of Virginia, §§ 2.1-714 
through -725).  In 1996, when Doss's termination occurred, Va. 
Code § 2.1-715 provided that "[i]t is the policy of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia . . . [t]o safeguard all individuals 
within the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of 
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status 
or disability . . . in employment . . . ."
1
 
Following adoption of the Act, this Court considered the 
case of Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 
439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
2  Lockhart involved the claims of two 
female at-will employees who alleged they were wrongfully 
discharged from employment, one because of her race and the other 
because of her sex.  The claims of both employees were dismissed 
on demurrer, and this Court reversed.  After citing Va. Code 
§ 2.1-715 as declarative of the "Commonwealth's strong public 
                     
    
1At its 1997 session, the General Assembly amended 
Va. Code § 2.1-715 by adding "pregnancy, childbirth or 
related medical conditions" to the list of unlawful 
bases for discrimination in employment. 
    
2Wright v. Donnelly & Co., Record No. 930205, was 
decided at the same time as Lockhart and by the same 
opinion. 
policy against employment discrimination based upon race or 
gender," 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331, the Court stated as 
follows: 
 
 
We recognize that the Virginia Human Rights Act 
does not create any new causes of action.  Code § 2.1-
725.  Here, we do not rely upon the Virginia Human 
Rights Act to create new causes of action.  Rather, we 
rely solely on the narrow exception that we recognized 
in 1985 in Bowman, decided two years before the 
enactment of the Virginia Human Rights Act. 
 
Id.  Accordingly, the Court held that the two employees had "pled 
viable causes of action."  Id. at 104, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
3
 
Lockhart was decided in 1994.  At the 1995 session of the 
General Assembly, a bill was introduced that would have had the 
effect of overruling Lockhart.  (S. 1025.)  Two versions 
submitted as amendments in the nature of substitutes expressly 
stated their purpose was the "nullification" of Lockhart.  (S. 
1025, Committee Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute; S. 1025, 
Floor Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute.)  However, in its 
enacted form, the legislation did not employ the "nullification" 
language, but amended Va. Code § 2.1-725 in several respects.  
 
As originally enacted, Va. Code § 2.1-725 provided as 
                     
    
3Subsequent to Lockhart, this Court applied the 
original version of the Virginia Human Rights Act in 
deciding Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 
480 S.E.2d 502 (1997) (maintenance of common law action 
in tort allowed for wrongful discharge based upon 
gender), and Bradick v. Grumman Data Sys. Corp., 254 Va. 
156, 486 S.E.2d 545 (1997) (maintenance of common law 
action in tort allowed for wrongful discharge based upon 
disability).  We decided another wrongful discharge case 
post-Lockhart, but disallowed a common law recovery 
because the employee was unable to identify any Virginia 
statute establishing a public policy that was violated 
by the employer.  Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. 
Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996). 
follows: 
 
Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be 
construed to create, an independent or private cause of 
action to enforce its provisions.  Nor shall the 
policies or provisions of this chapter be construed to 
allow tort actions to be instituted instead of or in 
addition to the current statutory actions for unlawful 
discrimination. 
 
 
The 1995 amendments deleted the second sentence of Va. Code 
§ 2.1-275, made the first sentence subsection A, and changed its 
language.  The subsection reads as follows:  "Nothing in this 
chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create, an 
independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions, 
except as specifically provided in subsections B and C of this 
section." 
 
Subsections B and C are new.  They create a statutory cause 
of action against an employer of more than five but less than 
fifteen persons.  Subsection B provides that no such employer 
shall discharge an employee "on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin or sex, or of age if the employee is 
forty years or older."
4  Subsection C provides that "[t]he 
employee may bring an action in a general district or circuit 
court having jurisdiction over the employer who allegedly 
discharged the employee in violation of this section."  A court 
                     
    
4The stipulated order of certification notes that, 
because Jamco employs more than fifteen persons, it is 
not subject to a claim under Va. Code § 2.1-725(B) and 
(C). 
 
 
At its 1997 session, the General Assembly added 
"pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" to 
the prohibited bases for discharge listed in Va. Code 
§ 2.1-725(B). 
may award up to twelve months back pay, with interest, and the 
award may be increased or decreased if either party engages in 
tactics to delay resolution of the complaint.  A court may also 
award attorney's fees from the amount recovered, not to exceed 
twenty-five percent of the back pay awarded, but the court shall 
not award other damages, compensatory or punitive, nor shall it 
order reinstatement of the employee.   
 
Subsection D, upon which the certified question focuses, is 
also new.  It provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
Causes of action based upon the public policies reflected in 
 
this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those actions, 
 
procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable 
 
federal or state civil rights statutes or local ordinances. 
 
 
Doss maintains, in effect, that nothing has changed.  She 
says that Lockhart remains the controlling law and that all the 
General Assembly accomplished with its 1995 amendments to the Act 
is the creation of a statutory cause of action against employers 
of more than five but less than fifteen persons.  
 
Doss points out that the cause of action recognized in 
Bowman and Lockhart "is a tort action arising solely under common 
law."  She says that although the General Assembly may abrogate 
or alter the common law, its intent to do so must be plainly 
manifested, Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 
92, 412 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1992), and she insists that the 1995 
amendments to the Act do not manifest an intent to alter the 
common law as articulated in Lockhart. 
 
Doss maintains that despite the language in the original 
version of Va. Code § 2.1-725 disavowing the creation of an 
independent or private cause of action, this Court had no trouble 
finding in Lockhart that the Act did not prohibit a Bowman-type 
action in tort for the unlawful termination of employment.  And 
Doss says that nothing in new subsection D supports such a 
prohibition.  Indeed, she opines, with the 1995 deletion of the 
language in the second sentence of Va. Code § 2.1-725 abjuring 
tort actions, "any alleged prohibition against Lockhart-type tort 
claims [is made] even less clear." 
 
Furthermore, Doss submits, if a statute is ambiguous, the 
court may resort to legislative history and the enactment process 
to ascertain legislative intent.  Doss says that the language in 
the Act is ambiguous and that we should examine the enactment 
process involving the 1995 amendments to ascertain their meaning. 
 
Doss says such an examination would reveal that while the 
original 1995 bill and its subsequent substitute amendments all 
contained clear declarations of intent to nullify Lockhart, these 
declarations were not retained in the final enacted version of 
the bill.  Hence, the fair inference to be drawn, Doss concludes, 
is that the General Assembly did not intend to nullify Lockhart. 
 
The issue, then, is whether, in the enactment of the 1995 
amendments, the General Assembly plainly manifested an intent to 
abrogate or alter the common law with respect to causes of action 
for unlawful termination of employment.  Settled principles guide 
our resolution of this issue. 
 
When the legislature has spoken plainly it is not the 
function of courts to change or amend its enactments 
under the guise of construing them.  The province of 
construction lies wholly within the domain of 
ambiguity, and that which is plain needs no 
interpretation. 
 
Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 407-08, 83 S.E.2d 728, 
731 (1954). 
 
 In the absence of ambiguity, a court may look only to the 
words of the statute to determine its meaning, and when the 
meaning is plain, resort to rules of construction, legislative 
history, and extrinsic evidence is impermissible.  Harrison & 
Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assoc., 253 Va. 364, 368, 484 S.E.2d 
883, 885 (1997); Va. Dept. of Labor v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 
Va. 97, 99, 353 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1987); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 
316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 
 
 We disagree with Doss that the Act as amended in 1995 is 
ambiguous.  What we said of the statute involved in Harrison & 
Bates applies with equal force to the enactment involved here: 
 
 
Nothing in the language of this statute is 
inherently difficult to comprehend, of doubtful import, 
or lacking in clarity and definiteness.  Accordingly, 
it is not necessary to look beyond the plain language 
of the statute to ascertain its underlying legislative 
intent. 
 
253 Va. at 369, 484 S.E.2d at 886. 
 
In our opinion, in amending the Act by adding subsection D 
to Va. Code § 2.1-725 in 1995, the General Assembly plainly 
manifested its intention to alter the common law rule with 
respect to "[c]auses of action based upon the public policies 
reflected in [the Act]."  (Emphasis added.)  And, just as 
plainly, the General Assembly altered the common law rule by 
providing that such causes of action "shall be exclusively 
limited to those actions, procedures and remedies, if any, 
afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights statutes or 
local ordinances."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
This is what the Act as amended says, and this is the 
meaning that must be given to the Act to carry out the clear 
intent of the General Assembly.  To say, as Doss would have us 
say, that the 1995 amendments changed nothing would render 
meaningless the General Assembly's use of the words "exclusively 
limited" and reduce to an absurdity its creation of a statutory 
cause of action against employers of more than five but less than 
fifteen persons. 
 
The rules of statutory interpretation argue against 
reading any legislative enactment in a manner that will 
make a portion of it useless, repetitious, or absurd.  
On the contrary, it is well established that every act 
of the legislature should be read so as to give 
reasonable effect to every word . . . .  
 
Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984). 
 
Finally, in her reply brief, Doss cites Va. Code § 2.1-717, 
a part of the Act, which provides in part as follows: 
 
The provisions of this chapter shall be construed 
liberally for the accomplishment of the policies 
herein.  Nothing contained in this chapter shall be 
deemed to repeal, supersede or expand upon any of the 
provisions of any other state or federal law relating 
to discrimination because of race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex, age, marital status or 
disability.[
5] 
 
 
Doss argues that, in this Code section, the Act creates "its 
own rule of statutory construction," and, under the rule, the Act 
"cannot be used as the basis for repealing or superseding the 
common-law expressed in Bowman and Lockhart."  The Act, however, 
                     
    
5A 1997 amendment to Va. Code § 2.1-717 added 
"pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" to 
the list of unlawful bases for discrimination in 
employment. 
is not the basis for the General Assembly's authority to abrogate 
or alter the common law.  The basis for the General Assembly's 
authority is found in Va. Code § 1-10, which provides as follows: 
 
The common law of England, insofar as it is not 
repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and 
Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in 
full force within the same, and be the rule of 
decision, except as altered by the General Assembly. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  To adopt Doss's argument would lead to the 
conclusion that, in enacting Va. Code § 2.1-717, the General 
Assembly effectively repealed or superseded Va. Code § 1-10 
insofar as its authority to alter the common law with respect to 
a substantial class of cases is concerned, and that would be an 
unreasonable conclusion to reach.  So we reject Doss's argument. 
 
Finding that, in enacting the 1995 amendments to Va. Code  
§ 2.1-725, the General Assembly plainly manifested an intent to 
abrogate the common law with respect to causes of action for 
unlawful termination of employment based upon the public policies 
reflected in the Act, we will answer the certified question in 
the affirmative. 
 
Certified question answered in the affirmative.