Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Alan D. Eisenberg
Citation: 2004 WI 14
Docket Number: 2002AP000386-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2004

2004 WI 14 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0386-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alan D. Eisenberg,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EISENBERG 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 2, 2004 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 27, 2004 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Richard 
J. Cayo, Christopher T. Kolb and Halling & Cayo, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Richard J. Cayo and Alan D. 
Eisenberg. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe, Krohn, Pope, McCarthy, Haas & Robinson, 
LLP, Edgerton, and oral argument by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
 
 
 
2004 WI 14 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0386-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan D. Eisenberg,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 2, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   We 
review 
the 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendations of Referee Timothy L. 
Vocke for sanctions pursuant to SCR 22.17(1) and (3).1  Attorney 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(1) and (3) provide: 
(1) Within 20 days after the filing of the referee's 
report, the director or the respondent may file with the 
supreme court an appeal from the referee's report.  
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
2 
 
Alan D. Eisenberg was found to have engaged in unprofessional 
conduct in the course of his practice of law in violation of the 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Conduct. 
 
The 
referee 
recommended 
revocation of Attorney Eisenberg's license to practice law and 
the payment of the costs of the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR).2   
¶2 
We approve the findings and conclusions of the referee 
and determine that the seriousness of Attorney Eisenberg's 
misconduct warrants the imposition of a sanction.  However, we 
do not follow the referee's recommendation as to the sanction 
and instead impose a one-year suspension of Attorney Eisenberg's 
license to practice law.  
¶3 
Attorney Eisenberg was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1966.  In 1970 he was suspended from the practice 
of law for one year for vindictive and reckless harassment of a 
judge.  See State v. Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 180 N.W.2d 529 
(1970).  In 1988 he was suspended from the practice of law for 
two years for conflict of interest, offensive personality, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
(3) An appeal from the report of a referee is 
conducted under the rules governing civil appeals to the 
supreme court. The supreme court shall place the appeal on 
its first assignment of cases after the briefs are filed. 
2 Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process was substantially restructured.  The name 
of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases 
involving attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) and the supreme court rules applicable to the 
lawyer regulation system were also revised in part.  However, 
all references to supreme court rules will be to those currently 
in effect unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
3 
 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 
N.W.2d 867 (1988).  In 1996 he received a public reprimand for 
activity occurring during the 1988 suspension consisting of a 
failure to close out a trust account and failing to advise the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility 
upon 
his 
reinstatement that he had not closed the account.  
¶4 
On February 8, 2002, the OLR issued a complaint 
against Attorney Eisenberg alleging eight counts in violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.  These counts involved five 
separate matters.  Attorney Eisenberg answered the complaint and 
proceedings before the referee followed.   
¶5 
The standard of review before this court is that the 
referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless clearly erroneous 
but conclusions of law are reviewed on a de novo basis.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kalal, 2002 WI 45, 252 
Wis. 2d 261, 643 N.W.2d 466.  The referee's credibility 
determinations are intertwined with his findings of fact.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 
844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993).   
DIVORCE RETAINER AND FILE 
¶6 
Count One alleges a violation of SCR 20:1.16(d) (upon 
termination of representation the lawyer must take steps to 
protect the client's interests).3  Count Two alleges a violation 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
4 
 
of former SCR 22.07(2) (an attorney has to disclose all relevant 
information to the OLR),4 and SCR 20:8.4(c) (prohibits conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).5   
¶7 
These two counts involve B.S., a divorce client, who 
elected to have one of Attorney Eisenberg's associates continue 
to represent her after that attorney left his firm.  However, 
there was a dispute between the two attorneys on how much of the 
$5000 retainer should be forwarded on along with the file.  The 
associate claimed $2775.69 of the retainer was unearned whereas 
Attorney Eisenberg claimed that all of the retainer had already 
                                                                                                                                                             
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. 
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law 
4 Former SCR 22.07(2) provided: 
(2) During the course of an investigation, the 
administrator or a committee may notify the respondent 
of the subject being investigated. The respondent 
shall 
fully 
and 
fairly 
disclose 
all 
facts 
and 
circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct or 
medical incapacity within 20 days of being served by 
ordinary mail a request for response to a grievance. 
The administrator in his or her discretion may allow 
additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Failure 
to 
provide 
information or misrepresentation in a disclosure is 
misconduct. The administrator or committee may make a 
further investigation before making a recommendation 
to the board. 
5 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
5 
 
been earned by his office.  Attorney Eisenberg signed an 
affidavit seeking the entire retainer plus additional funds 
which he presented to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
presiding over the divorce.  That court did not take action to 
resolve the fee dispute.  
¶8 
The referee took testimony on these counts from 
Attorney 
Eisenberg, 
his 
legal 
secretary, 
another 
of 
his 
employees, and the former attorney.  Based on this testimony the 
referee 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
had 
his 
staff 
"fabricate . . . bogus billings" which he incorporated into his 
court affidavit and which misrepresented the amount of the 
retainer that was earned.  The referee also found that he failed 
to timely surrender the divorce file and the unearned retainer 
to the former associate.   
¶9 
Accordingly, the referee concluded as a matter of law 
that Attorney Eisenberg had violated the rules specified in the 
two counts. 
¶10 In defense, which the referee rejected, Attorney 
Eisenberg claimed that: (1) the associate's testimony should not 
have been deemed credible; (2) the referee should have given 
greater weight to the testimony of his secretary who testified 
that she made a good faith effort at reconstructing the 
billings; and (3) while it was accurate to characterize the 
recreation of billings as a "guesstimate" this did not rise to 
the level of a fabrication.  
¶11 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the referee with respect to these two counts.  Although 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
6 
 
mindful of Attorney Eisenberg's defense, we cannot conclude that 
the referee's findings, particularly since they rely heavily on 
the credibility of the witnesses, are clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, assuming the findings to be accurate, they clearly 
support the conclusion that there was a violation of the rules 
specified in these two counts.  
PRO HAC VICE APPLICATION 
¶12 Count Three alleges that Attorney Eisenberg again 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  Count Four alleges a violation of SCR 
20:3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false 
statement of fact to a tribunal).6 
¶13 These counts arose out of an incident in which 
Attorney Eisenberg submitted an affidavit in support of an 
application to appear pro hac vice in California which indicated 
he had never been previously suspended from legal practice.  The 
referee took testimony from Attorney Eisenberg, his secretary, 
and the California attorney who had prepared the affidavit and 
faxed it to Attorney Eisenberg's office.   
¶14 The testimony of the three indicated that California 
rules only required an attorney to verify that he was not 
currently 
under 
suspension, 
although 
the 
application 
and 
affidavit prepared by the California attorney did require 
Eisenberg to verify whether he had ever been suspended or 
disbarred by any court.  The secretary testified that she took 
                                                 
6 SCR 
20:3.3(a)(1) 
provides: "(a) A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal." 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
7 
 
the application and affidavit into Attorney Eisenberg's office, 
he was busy with another matter, and only a few minutes were 
spent in the process of having him sign it.  Attorney Eisenberg 
conceded that he should have read the application and affidavit 
before signing it but contended that he was busy and it was 
simply an inadvertent error and he did not intentionally 
misrepresent his disciplinary history. 
¶15 However, 
the 
referee 
found 
that 
since 
Attorney 
Eisenberg regularly has appeared on a pro hac vice basis in 
other states, he should have known the importance of accuracy in 
this application process.  He did not find Attorney Eisenberg's 
testimony 
to 
be credible 
and 
stated 
that 
his 
claim of 
inadvertent error "rings hollow and is absolutely unbelievable" 
and therefore "actual dishonesty and deceit" was involved.  
Accordingly, the referee further concluded as a matter of law 
that there was a violation on both counts.   
¶16 In reviewing the record of this matter, we concede 
that there is no direct evidence of an intent to misrepresent.  
We further concede the possibility that a different trier of 
fact might have reached different findings and conclusions on 
this matter.  However, the law typically recognizes that it is 
unable to look into a person's mind to find intent and it must 
be determined from the person's acts and words and the 
circumstances of the situation.  We also are constrained by the 
clearly 
erroneous 
standard 
and 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
the 
referee's findings and conclusions, based heavily on his 
assessment of Attorney Eisenberg's lack of credibility, meets 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
8 
 
the standard.  Accordingly, we adopt the referee's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law with respect to these counts.  
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HEARING 
¶17 Count Six7 involves a violation of SCR 20:3.5(c) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct intending to disrupt a 
tribunal)8 and SCR 20:3.9 (appearances before administrative 
tribunals are covered under SCR 20:3.5(c)).9  Count Seven alleges 
a violation of SCR 20:8.4(g) (attorney shall not violate the 
attorney's oath),10 and SCR 40:15 (that portion of the attorney's 
oath which requires abstention from all offensive personality).11 
                                                 
7 The OLR had originally alleged a Count Five involving a 
media disclosure matter but voluntarily dismissed it prior to 
the disciplinary hearing.  
8 SCR 20:3.5(c) provides: "A lawyer shall not: (c) engage in 
conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." 
9 SCR 
20:3.9 
provides: 
"Advocate 
in 
nonadjudicative 
proceedings. A lawyer representing a client before a legislative 
or administrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall 
disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and 
shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 
3.4(a) through (c), and 3.5." 
10 SCR 20:8.4(g) provides: "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: (g) violate the attorney's oath." 
11 SCR 40:15 provides, in relevant part:  Attorney's 
oath. 
The oath or affirmation to be taken to qualify 
for admission to the practice of law shall be in 
substantially the following form:  
I will abstain from all offensive personality and 
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation 
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice 
of the cause with which I am charged.  
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
9 
 
¶18 These two counts arise out of Attorney Eisenberg's 
appearance before a Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
hearing examiner in which he is alleged to have essentially 
taken over the hearing, refused to obey the procedural rules of 
the tribunal, and then left with his client before the hearing 
was over, all deemed to be conduct intending to disrupt the 
hearing.   
¶19 The referee took testimony from the hearing examiner 
and Attorney Eisenberg, and also admitted into evidence the tape 
of the hearing.  The referee concluded that Attorney Eisenberg 
was 
"rude, 
abusive, 
controlling, 
disrespectful," 
had 
"essentially 
high-jacked 
the 
hearing 
by 
ignoring 
[the 
examiner's] instructions, telling her to be quiet, and doing 
what he wanted to do," and "act[ed] much like a spoiled child."  
Accordingly, the referee concluded as a matter of law that there 
had been a violation in accord with the two counts.   
¶20 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law with respect to these two counts.  We note in 
particular that Attorney Eisenberg in his arguments to this 
court has not specifically attacked any of the findings or 
conclusions with respect to these counts.  Rather, he has 
conceded that his behavior was "combative" for which he has 
expressed apology. 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
10 
 
BUSINESS TRANSACTION WITH CLIENT 
¶21 Count Eight alleges a violation of SCR 20:1.8(a) (a 
lawyer is not to enter into a business transaction with a client 
except under certain circumstances).12   
¶22 This 
count 
involves 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
attorney/client relationship with a client on a building code 
violation matter which was followed by the client entering into 
a listing contract to sell the property through his alternate 
persona of Alan Eisenberg Real Estate Company.  Attorney 
Eisenberg introduced the client to one of his employees, who was 
serving in a dual role both as a legal assistant for Attorney 
Eisenberg's law firm and also as an employee of the real estate 
company.  The client was not advised of the conflict of 
interest, was not given an opportunity to seek independent 
advice, and did not waive the conflict in writing.  
                                                 
12 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides:  
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless:  
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing to the client in a manner which can be 
reasonably understood by the client;  
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity 
to seek the advice of independent counsel in the 
transaction; and  
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.  
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
11 
 
¶23 The employee testified that he knew the client was one 
of Attorney Eisenberg's law clients but that there was no office 
policy forbidding real estate transactions with law clients.  
However, Attorney Eisenberg testified that the real estate 
listing contract which the client signed was not binding until 
he approved it, which he never did.  
¶24 The referee found that there was no indication that 
the listing contract was invalid until Attorney Eisenberg 
approved it, there was no evidence to support a finding that 
Attorney Eisenberg had no direct knowledge of the listing 
contract under these circumstances, and Attorney Eisenberg's 
defense that he simply failed to properly supervise his support 
staff was not persuasive.  
¶25 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the referee.  Once again, given the duty imposed on the 
referee to assess the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot 
conclude that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, without question, those findings support the legal 
conclusion that there was a violation of these two counts.   
OREGON POLICE DISPATCH COMMUNICATIONS 
¶26 Count Nine alleges the violation of SCR 20:4.4 (a 
lawyer shall not use means which have no substantial purpose 
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person in the 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
12 
 
course of representing a client).13  Count Ten alleges another 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(g) in conjunction with SCR 40.1.  Count 
Eleven involves another violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and also 
20:4.1(a) (in the course of representing a client a lawyer shall 
not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to 
a third person).14   
¶27 These counts arise out of a series of telephone calls 
to a police dispatcher made by Attorney Eisenberg from a 
bar/restaurant in Corvallis, Oregon, where he was appearing pro 
hac vice for a criminal client.  The client had been given a 
message from a police detective to call him on what turned out 
to be an unrelated matter.  Attorney Eisenberg, allegedly 
believing the detective was harassing his client, called the 
number several times eventually reaching the police dispatcher.  
He told the dispatcher that this was a "life or death 
emergency," used vulgar language, and demanded to talk to the 
detective.  He did not cooperate with the dispatcher and claimed 
"I am going to have his [detective's] badge."  He also referred 
to the detective as an "asshole" and a "thug."   
                                                 
13 SCR 20:4.4 provides: "Respect for rights of third 
persons. In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means 
that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, 
or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence 
that violate the legal rights of such a person." 
14 SCR 20:4.1(a) provides: "In the course of representing a 
client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement 
of a material fact or law to a third person." 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
13 
 
¶28 The referee took testimony from Attorney Eisenberg 
with respect to these counts and also listened to the tape of 
the communications.  The referee found as a matter of fact that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
(1) "threatened, 
lied, 
demanded, 
swore, 
insulted . . . acted in a rude and obnoxious manner;" (2) knew 
that there was no emergency of any sort; and (3) had no purpose 
other than to "just embarrass or burden the dispatchers."  The 
referee further concluded as a matter of law that this situation 
"evinced the epitome of an offensive personality" and also 
violated the other two rules. 
¶29 Attorney Eisenberg has conceded that the call was 
"contentious" but basically submits it was simply the result of 
overzealous representation of his client. 
¶30 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law with respect to these counts.  We have 
previously 
rejected 
the 
argument 
that 
the 
"offensive 
personality" 
language 
of 
the 
Attorney's 
Oath 
is 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when applied to an 
attorney's 
professional 
conduct, 
to 
the 
extent 
Attorney 
Eisenberg may so contend.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 12, 510 N.W.2d 129 (1994).  We 
further note that State v. Heilprin, 59 Wis. 2d 312, 207 N.W.2d 
878 (1973) found an offensive personality to have been present 
under circumstances, although different from those in this case, 
which also involved generally rude, discourteous, abusive, 
aggressive, 
and 
hostile 
statements 
like 
the 
case 
here.  
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
14 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the conclusions of law of the referee 
with respect to these three counts are correct.   
SANCTIONS 
¶31 The referee noted as a mitigating factor that Attorney 
Eisenberg has performed work with community and civic groups.  
However, 
as 
aggravating 
factors 
the 
referee 
noted 
his 
substantial 
disciplinary 
history 
and 
what 
the 
referee 
characterized as: (1) a propensity to lie under oath; (2) a 
propensity to minimize culpability by trying to place blame on 
others, portraying himself as the victim, and claiming there was 
no real injury; and (3) no demonstration of remorse.  The 
referee further stated: 
 
Eisenberg is exactly the type of attorney that 
brings 
disrepute 
and 
dishonor 
on 
the 
legal 
profession. . . . [T]he 
fact 
that 
Eisenberg 
has 
continued to conduct himself in a way that violates 
these standards is simply an indication of his distain 
[sic] for the appropriate means of conducting oneself 
as an attorney. . . . [H]e has absolutely no intention 
of changing.  
The 
referee 
analogized 
this 
case 
to 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Heilprin, 168 Wis. 2d 1, 482 N.W.2d 908 
(1992) 
(revocation 
ordered 
where 
attorney, 
previously 
disciplined 
for 
offensive 
personality, 
directed 
sexually 
explicit 
and 
suggestive 
comments 
to 
women 
clients).  
Accordingly, the referee has recommended revocation of Attorney 
Eisenberg's license even though the OLR only asked for a one-
year suspension.  
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
15 
 
¶32 Attorney Eisenberg submits that revocation is wholly 
disproportionate to these violations and, in particular, his 
"ancient" disciplinary history should be largely disregarded.  
He distinguishes this situation from Heilprin which he believes 
involved extremely serious charges of sexual impropriety, unlike 
here.  He further notes that in some instances attorneys have 
repeatedly 
violated 
the 
same 
disciplinary 
rules 
without 
suffering disbarments.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Grapsas, 230 Wis. 2d 751, 602 N.W.2d 526 (1999).  He 
again cited his civic work as a mitigating factor, although that 
does not necessarily warrant a reduction in reduced sanction.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jones, 160 Wis. 2d 
564, 466 N.W.2d 890 (1991).  Accordingly, he has asked this 
court to impose only a public reprimand.  
¶33 We cannot so easily dismiss Attorney Eisenberg's 
disciplinary 
history. 
 
It 
has 
spanned 
four 
decades 
and 
demonstrates a clear pattern of inappropriate behavior.  Indeed, 
two of the matters involved here, concerning the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation hearing and the Oregon police 
dispatch incident, would reflect a pattern even without the 
behavior leading to the discipline imposed in 1970 and 1988.  We 
must express the highest concern over Attorney Eisenberg's 
continued and persistent inability to comport himself with the 
behavior that is expected of attorneys.   
¶34 While these latest violations, particularly coupled 
with the extensive prior disciplinary history, would certainly 
warrant revocation, we will not impose that sanction.  Given 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
16 
 
Attorney Eisenberg's age, revocation might effectively prohibit 
him ever practicing law again.  Age is not necessarily a 
mitigating factor.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Fennig, 
227 
Wis. 2d 
379, 
595 
N.W.2d 
710 
(1999) 
(60-day 
suspension imposed for 70+-year-old attorney rather than public 
reprimand).  But under these circumstances we hope that a 
shorter period of forfeiture will suffice to deter other 
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct and motivate 
Attorney Eisenberg, if he ever returns to the practice of law, 
to conduct himself in an ethical manner, without exception.  
Accordingly, we impose a one-year suspension of Attorney 
Eisenberg's license. 
¶35 In conclusion, we adopt the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the referee.  Attorney Eisenberg's 
misconduct represents a serious failure to comply with the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  However, in lieu of the referee's 
recommendation of revocation, we believe that a one-year 
suspension is appropriate discipline for this conduct and under 
these unique circumstances.  
¶36 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Alan D. 
Eisenberg to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period 
of one year, effective April 6, 2004.  
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Eisenberg shall refund to B.S. the 
unearned retainer of $2775.69. 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
17 
 
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Eisenberg comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an 
attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended.   
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Eisenberg shall pay to the OLR the costs 
of this proceeding.   
 
No. 
02-0386-D   
 
 
 
1