Title: Matthis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 25, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RANDY MATHIS,  
 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 25, 2006 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court of the 
§ 
State of Delaware in and for 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
§ 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0406015383 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 15, 2006 
Decided:  August 21, 2006 
 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 21st day of August 2006, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Defendant-Appellant Randy Mathis appeals his convictions by a 
Superior Court jury of Murder Second Degree and Possession of a Firearm During 
the Commission of a Felony.  Mathis makes three claims on appeal.  First, he 
claims the Superior Court abused its discretion when it ruled that a police officer 
was not a competent witness to testify about bullet trajectories.  Second, he claims 
the State improperly referred to the bad character of the neighborhood, referred to 
television shows to disparage the reasonable doubt standard, and improperly 
 
2
referred in closing arguments to facts not admitted into evidence.  Third, he claims 
he should have been permitted to cross-examine a witness about prior bad acts of 
the victim after the witness testified that the victim had “a good heart” and “wasn’t 
a bad person.”   We find no merit to his claims and affirm. 
(2) 
On June 10, 2004 the victim in this case, Ronnie Hollingsworth 
(“Hollingsworth”), robbed Mathis at gunpoint.  Two days later, Hollingsworth’s 
younger brother, Ronsheen Hollingsworth (“Ronsheen”), received a call notifying 
him of a fight between Mathis and his brother.  When Ronsheen arrived at the 
scene, he saw Mathis was holding a gun.  Ronsheen stepped between Mathis and 
Hollingsworth to stop the argument, and Mathis put the gun away.  Hollingsworth, 
who was unarmed, swung his fist at Mathis.  Mathis then pulled the gun out, shot 
Hollingsworth twice, and fled.  Hollingsworth died from the gunshots that night.  
Terry Edwards, who was parked in a Honda Civic next to the fight, called 911 and 
later confirmed Ronsheen’s description of what happened.   
(3) 
Officer Gerald Nagowski of the Wilmington Police Department 
responded to the 911 call.  He photographed and videotaped the scene, collected 
evidence, and took fingerprints.  He found a copper projectile underneath the 
Honda Civic.  Another projectile was found later in Hollingsworth’s body.  After 
his arrest, Mathis admitted shooting Hollingsworth but claimed he acted in self-
defense.   
 
3
(4) 
Mathis was indicted on the charges of first degree murder and 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  Officer Nagowski 
testified at trial about his observations which included that he found no evidence 
indicating that a projectile ricocheted off the Civic or a nearby brick wall.  There 
was no evidence of either projectile’s specific point of origin.  During cross-
examination, Mathis’ counsel sought Officer Nagowski’s opinion on the trajectory 
of the bullet found underneath the Civic.  The State objected because Officer 
Nagowski had no special training in ballistics.  The trial judge sustained the 
objection on the grounds that any opinion would be speculative.1  Notwithstanding 
defense counsel’s argument that the shooting was in self-defense, the jury 
                                          
 
1 The relevant exchange developed as follows: 
Q. As an Evidence Detection officer, if you had a situation where an individual is firing 
at another individual towards the wall, and the bullet goes through a portion of the 
alleged victim’s body, you would expect that projectile to either strike the wall or be 
found somewhere back towards the wall; is that correct? 
 
MS. NORRIS:  Objection, Your Honor.  Outside scope of his training and expertise. 
THE COURT:  I think it’s speculative as to what you’re asking him, as to the potential 
flight of the bullet, which once it either hits something does not have a known pattern, 
how it would travel.  I think you would be asking him to speculate as to that traveled 
bullet, which would be impossible to do.  So I’ll sustain the objection as being 
speculative. 
MR. MAUER:  For the record, I thought that I had established that foundation in terms of 
the physical evidence that was not found on the wall. 
 
THE COURT:  You established that he did not find such a marking on the wall. 
 
By MR. MAUER: 
 
Q. Were you the – 
THE COURT:  whether—whether—none was found on the wall, but whether—beyond 
that, we are at trial, I don’t think he’s able to give an opinion because that would be 
speculative as to how it got under the car. 
 
MR. MAUER:  Very well. 
 
4
ultimately convicted Mathis of murder in the second degree and the weapons 
offense.   
(5) 
Mathis first claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion when 
it prohibited him from questioning Officer Nagowski regarding bullet trajectories 
in violation of his rights of confrontation and cross-examination.  We review 
rulings on the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.2  An abuse of 
discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the 
circumstances, or ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce 
injustice.3  To the extent that the evidentiary ruling triggers an alleged 
constitutional violation, we review de novo.4   
(6) 
Defense counsel asked Officer Nagowski to formulate an opinion to 
the bullet trajectory based on his years of experience and his perception of physical 
evidence found at the scene.  Mathis contends the Officer’s testimony was 
admissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence (D.R.E.) 701 as lay opinion, or, 
under D.R.E. 702 as expert testimony, because Officer Nagowski’s opinion was 
based on specific observations he made at the scene.5  We find no indication in the 
                                          
 
2 Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 987 (Del. 2004) (citing Zimmerman v. State, 693 A.2d 311, 313 
(Del. 1997)) (using an abuse of discretion standard to review the Superior Court’s decisions 
regarding expert testimony). 
3 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
4 Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 515 (Del. 2006) (citing Johnson v. State, 878 A.2d 422, 427 
(Del. 2005)). 
5 Ballistics is the study of the flight characteristics of projectiles.  WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY, 86 (2001). 
 
5
record of what that testimony would have been.  On the facts of this case, a 
determination of bullet projectories would be beyond the competence of a 
nonexpert.  Furthermore, the record does not show that Nagowski was qualified to 
render an expert opinion on the trajectory of either bullet, or even if he had such an 
opinion.  We hold that the Superior Court acted within its discretion when it 
sustained the State’s objection.   
(7) 
Mathis further argues that the trial judge’s ruling violated his rights to 
cross examination and confrontation under the federal and state constitutions.  
Under the confrontation clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitution, 
the accused in a criminal proceeding is guaranteed the right to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him.6  This guarantee provides the defendant the opportunity 
to cross-examine such witnesses,7 subject to “reasonable limits where it conflicts 
with other trial considerations.”8  Thus, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective 
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”9   
(8) 
Here, Mathis sought to elicit an opinion that the judge determined to 
be speculative.  The record does not show that any opinion of Officer Nagowski 
                                          
 
6 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986); Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 682 (Del. 
1983). 
7 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1314 (Del. 
1986). 
8 Wright, 513 A.2d at 1314. 
9 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). 
 
6
would have shown bias.10  Still, Mathis argues that the trajectory of the projectile 
in question “would have greatly assisted the jury in determining whether Mathis 
was acting in self-defense” and would have help resolve the “inconsistent” 
testimonies of the State’s two eyewitnesses.  The record does not support Mathis’ 
argument because the point of origin of the projectiles and whether Officer 
Nagowski even had an opinion are both unknown.  We find no basis to conclude 
that Officer Nagowski’s opinion would have been based on anything but 
speculation and conjecture.  The question was not designed to expose a bias or 
otherwise question the credibility of the witness.  We hold that the trial judge did 
not impinge on Mathis’s federal right to confrontation when he sustained the 
objection. 
(9) 
The Delaware Constitution may be interpreted to provide greater 
rights to defendants than the U.S. Constitution.11  However, this Court has held that 
“conclusory assertions that the Delaware Constitution has been violated will be 
considered to be waived on appeal.”12  The proper presentation of an alleged 
violation of the Delaware Constitution should include a discussion and analysis of 
one or more of the following non-exclusive criteria: “textual language, legislative 
                                          
 
10 See Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 7 (Del. 1987) (“Cross-examination on bias is an essential 
element of the right of an accused under the Delaware constitution to meet the witnesses in their 
examination.”). 
11 Goddard v. State, 382 A.2d 238, 240, n. 4 (Del. 1977). 
12 Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291 n.4 (Del. 2005). 
 
7
history, preexisting state law, structural differences, matters of particular state 
interest or local concern, state traditions, and public attitudes.”13  Simply stating 
“the court must always be mindful of a defendant’s right to cross examination and 
confrontation” and citing the Delaware constitutional provision at issue is a 
conclusory assertion.  On the record before us, the alleged violation of the 
Delaware Constitution has been waived.   
(10) Mathis’ second claim on appeal is that the State’s opening and closing 
arguments were improper and therefore denied him a fair trial.  During trial, 
Mathis objected to only one of the three statements he now challenges.  The first 
comment at trial to which Mathis did not object occurred during the State’s 
opening statement.  The prosecutor opened with these remarks:  
On June 12th of 2004, Ronnie Hollingsworth’s life ended at the age of 
23.  He was shot on the street two times by that man, Randi [sic] 
Mathis.  He died a violent and avoidable death.  Ronnie lived a 
lifestyle which put him at risk.  He lived in a neighborhood where 
guns, drugs, violence are all too commonplace.  You’ll hear about 
things that some of you may have only seen or heard on TV.  Ronnie 
lived in a place where people take the law into their own hands. 
 
Mathis argues that this statement was irrelevant and inadmissible in violation of 
D.R.E. 404(a) because it was offered to comment on the character of the 
neighborhood.  Mathis essentially argues that the State’s depreciative commentary 
on the neighborhood unfairly tainted the jury.  Mathis points to the fact that during 
                                          
 
13 Id.; Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 864-65 (Del. 1999).  See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 
A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). 
 
8
the State’s closing statement, the judge sustained an objection to the comment that 
“[g]uns are not uncommon” in that neighborhood.14   
(11) Where there is no objection at trial, we review prosecutorial 
comments only for plain error.15  To be plain error, the comments must be so 
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights that they jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial.16  Where the alleged improper comments do not implicate 
credibility issues, this Court must determine whether the prosecutor, in referencing 
evidence he intends to offer, believed in good faith it would be both available and 
admissible.17  Additionally, the improper comments “must be so clear and defense 
counsel’s failure to object so inexcusable that a trial judge … has no reasonable 
alternative other than to intervene sua sponte and declare a mistrial or issue a 
curative instruction.”18     
(12) Two eyewitnesses stated that Mathis shot the unarmed Hollingsworth 
in response to Hollingsworth’s swing of his fist.  Another witness testified that the 
armed robbery that took place between Mathis and Hollingsworth just two days 
                                          
 
14 In sustaining this objection, however, the court noted, “We had evidence concerning the 
unsafe character of the neighborhood.” 
15 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8; Derose v. State, 840 A.2d 615, 619 (Del. 2003); Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 
342, 355 (Del. 2003).  The comments here do not constitute nor implicate vouching or its 
analysis. 
16 Swan, 802 A.2d at 355 (citing Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 653 (Del. 2001), reversed in 
part on other grounds, 889 A.2d 968 (Del. 2006)). 
17 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 567 (Del. 1981) (quoting ABA Standards, the Prosecution and 
Defense Function (approved Draft, 1971)). 
18 Bruce v. State, 781 A.2d 544, 554-55 (Del. 2001) (quoting Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 965 
(Del. 2000)). 
 
9
earlier occurred in the same general location as the homicide.  Since Mathis 
admitted to shooting Hollingsworth, the central issue was whether Mathis acted in 
self-defense.  While there was no evidence presented on the character of the 
neighborhood beyond the conduct of Hollingsworth and Mathis, the prosecutor’s 
description of the neighborhood would tend to support the necessity for a person to 
act in self-defense in this location.  On the record before us, we conclude that the 
prosecutor’s challenged comments did not amount to plain error. 
(13) The next comment to which Mathis objects for the first time on appeal 
also occurred during the State’s opening statement.  After briefly reviewing the 
evidence the State intended to present, the prosecutor reminded the jury, “Now, 
keep in mind when you’re listening to the testimony from the witness stand this is 
not CSI Miami, it’s not Law and Order.  Nobody involved in this case, no one in 
this room is an actor.  These are real people.”  Mathis claims that reminding the 
jurors of their role sets up a “television expectation” that trivializes the 
constitutional reasonable doubt standard.  We disagree.  This Court has previously 
addressed an argument referring to television shows in Boatswain v. State.19  
Unlike the closing remarks in Boatswain, however, the prosecutor’s statements 
here do not mislead the jury into any confusion over the State’s burden of proof or 
trivialize or disparage the Constitutional standard of reasonable doubt.  The 
                                          
 
19 872 A.2d 959, 2005 WL 1000565 (Del. Supr.) (Table). 
 
10
opening statement only reminded the jury that this case was about real people, not 
actors. 
(14) The final comment that Mathis challenges was made during rebuttal 
summation in closing arguments.  The State responded to Mathis’s self-defense 
argument by encouraging the jury to watch the videotaped statement.  In making 
this request, the prosecutor made the following statement: 
So which is it?  Is he shooting him on purpose to defend himself or is 
he just shooting to get all these crowds of people that are apparently 
around him off of him and in the course of the shooting happened to 
hit Ronnie?  Which is it?  Watch the tape.  You can’t have it both 
ways. 
 
And if he believed that he was justified in his shooting, his actions 
didn’t speak to that when he ran away.  He threw the gun, left it on the 
street, immediately took the braids out of his hair. 
 
Mathis immediately objected to sandbagging.  The trial court overruled the 
objection saying the prosecutor’s statement was “fair rebuttal.”  
(15) “Sandbagging” occurs when “a prosecutor omits from his opening 
summation a salient argument of the State’s case only to bring forth the argument 
in closing after the defense has arguably been induced to avoid the subject in 
closing.”20  Where a prosecutorial remark constitutes sandbagging we review for 
                                          
 
20 De Shields v. State, 534 A.2d 630, 645 (Del. 1987).  Note this is not a case of the State making 
a limited opening and saving the bulk of its argument in chief for rebuttal, such as in Bailey. 
 
11
abuse of discretion.21  This Court reviews sandbagging on a case-by-case basis, and 
the abuse of discretion depends in part on these issues:  
whether a fair statement of the State’s position has been made in some 
manner in its opening argument; whether any waiver has been made 
by the defendant, either by his counsel’s own argument or by the 
failure to object properly and to preserve the point; and, lastly, a 
determination of the question of prejudice in view of all the 
circumstances.22   
 
(16) We review de novo claims of improper prosecutorial remarks.23  At 
trial, a prosecutor may argue “legitimate inferences of the appellant’s guilt that 
flow from the evidence.”24  However, it is “unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the 
inferences it may draw.”25  Such statements, however, do not always merit 
                                          
 
21 Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 1002-03 (Del. 1982) (“[I]t is unfair and often highly prejudicial 
for plaintiff’s or State’s counsel to avoid treatment of certain issues in the opening summation so 
as to deprive defense counsel of the opportunity to reply.”).  Nevertheless, “[t]he general rule has 
evolved to give trial courts a modicum of discretion to allow a more substantial rebuttal which is 
not so narrowly tailored to the scope of defense counsel’s summation.”  Id. at 1003. 
22 Id. 
23 Daniels, 859 A.2d at 1011.  This Court has held that the evaluation of whether improper 
prosecutorial remarks have prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused requires analysis of 
the individual statements and their cumulative effect.  Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 969 (Del. 
2000).  Particularly where credibility is at issue, this Court will review how the improper 
statement affects how the jury might evaluate the witness’ credibility and the affirmative steps 
the trial court took to mitigate the effects of the alleged errors.  Id.  No credibility issues are 
raised by the comments here. 
24 Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204 (Del. 1980). 
25 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 567 (Del. 1981) (quoting ABA Standards, the Prosecution and 
Defense Function (approved Draft, 1971)). 
 
12
reversal.26  “Reversal is warranted where an improper comment ‘prejudicially 
affects substantial rights of the accused.’”27 
(17) Mathis contends that during his closing statement, he focused on his 
own conduct and the facts supporting a conclusion he acted in self-defense.  He 
also argues that the State did not introduce any evidence during its case-in-chief to 
support these statements and therefore, the remarks constitute de facto 
sandbagging.  The proscription of sandbagging, however, “is not to be interpreted 
as requiring a prosecutor to include in his opening summation all or substantially 
all the evidence to be presented to the jury in closing.”28   
(18) The State introduced a video tape of the defendant admitting he fired 
in self-defense and then threw the gun on the street after the homicide.  Its case-in-
chief centered on its theory that Mathis did not act in self-defense.  The State also 
provided evidence from another witness stating that Mathis had braids in his hair at 
the time of the shooting.  In the video of his self-defense statement made the 
evening of the shooting, Mathis did not have braids in his hair.  Although Mathis 
made a timely objection,29 he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the 
prosecutor’s statement or that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his 
                                          
 
26 Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Del. 2004). 
27 Derose v. State, 840 A.2d 615, 619 (Del. 2003) (quoting Hughes, 437 A.2d at 566). 
28 Grayson v. State, 524 A.2d 1, 3 (Del. 1987). 
29 Cf. Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 969-70 (Del. 2000) (admonishing the defense bar to be alert 
to avoid waiver and object rather than make a tactical determination to remain silent). 
 
13
objection.  Even assuming arguendo that the State should have connected the lack 
of self-defense with running away and removing his braids during its opening 
summation and not during rebuttal, any error was harmless.  The statement was a 
fair and logical inference based upon the evidence presented at trial.  The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Mathis’s objection.   
(19) Mathis’s third claim on appeal is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it denied him the opportunity to impeach a witness to challenge 
the assertion that the victim had a good character.  When Ronsheen testified, the 
prosecutor asked him whether he was close to his brother, and if he could state his 
favorite thing about him.  The defense objected to the latter inquiry, and the Court 
allowed for “some leeway here” so long as the State did not “go too far.”  
Ronsheen then testified that he and his brother “were fairly close” and added that 
the best thing he liked about him was “Just being him.  You know, my brother had 
a good heart.  He wasn’t a bad person.”  The prosecution did not ask any further 
questions about Ronsheen’s relationship with his brother.   
(20) Prior to cross-examining Ronsheen, defense counsel argued that 
Ronsheen’s testimony about his brother opened the door to introducing the 
victim’s prior misdemeanor convictions for terroristic threatening and third degree 
assault.  The Superior Court considered the defense request but found that the State 
did not offer Ronsheen’s testimony to rebut evidence that Hollingsworth was the 
 
14
first aggressor.  The trial court did allow Mathis to ask questions about the victim’s 
robbery of him and whether his brother had had any run-ins with the law to test his 
“good heart” testimony.  The defense questioned Ronsheen about the alleged 
robbery in support of Mathis’ self-defense argument and explored what Ronsheen 
meant by a person with a good heart.  For example, the defense asked Ronsheen, 
referring to his brother, “Do you think that holding somebody on the ground with a 
gun to their head and stealing money from them makes a person a good person?”  
Ultimately, Ronsheen conceded “I mean people make mistakes.  I don’t mean that 
he really is a bad, bad, bad person just because he made that mistake.” 
(21) On appeal, Mathis claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion 
when it refused to admit evidence of Hollingsworth’s prior misdemeanor 
convictions for terroristic threatening and third degree assault.  When viewed in 
context, Ronsheen’s testimony about his relationship with his brother did not 
demonstrate that the victim was peaceable or that he was not the type of person 
who would have caused Mathis to act in self-defense.  Even if it could fairly be 
characterized that way, evidence of the misdemeanor convictions would have been 
cumulative because the jury heard other evidence of the victim’s armed robbery of 
Mathis, which showed that the victim was not peaceable.  Finally, evidence of the 
 
15
victim’s character was not an “essential element” of the claim or defense.30  In Tice 
v. State31 this Court explained: 
In a claim for self-defense, the essential element is whether the 
defendant subjectively believed the use of force was necessary for his 
protection, and not whether the victim acted in conformity with a 
character trait of aggressiveness.  The character of the victim is not, 
therefore, an essential element of a self-defense claim.  Accordingly, 
specific instances of past conduct cannot be used as circumstantial 
evidence of a victim’s character for violence or aggression under 
D.R.E. 405(b).32 
 
Mathis offered no evidence to show that the prior misdemeanor convictions 
involved Mathis as a victim or even that he had knowledge of them prior to the 
shooting.  We are satisfied that the Superior Court acted within its discretion when 
it did not admit the proffered misdemeanor convictions.33   
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
30 D.R.E. 405.  Method of proving character.   
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or 
by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct.  
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a 
person is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of 
specific instances of that person's conduct. 
31 624 A.2d 399 (Del. 1993). 
32 Id. at 401-02 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
33 Id.  See D.R.E. 405.   
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice