Title: James Hitchcock v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2037
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida
_____________
No. SC02-2037
_____________
JAMES HITCHCOCK,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellee.
[January 15, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
James Hitchcock appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for
postconviction DNA testing under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.  We
have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., and affirm the decision below.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hitchcock was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of his brother's
thirteen-year-old stepdaughter.  This Court’s decision on direct appeal summarized
the facts of the crime as follows:
1.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Hitchcock's conviction and first
sentence.  See id.  This Court also affirmed the denial of Hitchcock’s  motion for
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Unemployed, ill, and with no place to live, Hitchcock moved in
with his brother Richard and Richard's family two to three weeks
before the murder.  On the evening of the murder, appellant watched
television with Richard and his family until around 11:00 p.m.  He then
left the house and went into Winter Garden where he spent several
hours drinking beer and smoking marijuana with friends.
According to a statement Hitchcock made after his arrest, he
returned around 2:30 a.m. and entered the house through a dining
room window.  He went into the victim's bedroom and had sexual
intercourse with her.  Afterwards, she said that she was hurt and was
going to tell her mother.  When she started to yell because he would
not let her leave the bedroom, Hitchcock choked her and carried her
outside.  The girl still refused to be quiet so appellant choked and beat
her until she was quiet and pushed her body into some bushes.  He
then returned to the house, showered, and went to bed.
At trial Hitchcock repudiated his prior statement.  He testified
that the victim let him into the house and consented to having
intercourse.  Following this activity, his brother Richard entered the
bedroom, dragged the girl outside, and began choking her.  She was
dead by the time appellant got Richard away from her.  When Richard
told him that he hadn't meant to kill her, Hitchcock told him to go back
inside and that he, the appellant, would cover up for his brother. 
According to Hitchcock, he gave his prior statement only because he
was trying to protect Richard.
Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla. 1982).  The jury convicted
Hitchcock of first-degree murder and recommended a death sentence, which the
trial court imposed.  This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence; however,
postconviction proceedings resulted in a lengthy procedural history and three
resentencing proceedings.1  Hitchcock’s last sentence of death was affirmed by this
postconviction relief.  See Hitchcock v. State, 432 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1983).  In later
federal habeas corpus proceedings, however, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and vacated Hitchcock's death sentence because the jury was
instructed not to, and the sentencing judge refused to, consider evidence of
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393
(1987).  Upon resentencing, Hitchcock was again sentenced to the death penalty,
and this Court affirmed the sentence.  See Hitchcock v. State, 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla.
1990).  But the United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari and remanded
to this Court for reconsideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079
(1992).  See Hitchcock v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).  On remand, this Court
vacated Hitchcock's death sentence and directed the trial court to conduct a new
penalty proceeding.  Hitchcock v. State, 614 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1993).  In
Hitchcock's second resentencing, Hitchcock was again sentenced to the death
penalty.  But, on appeal, this Court remanded for a third sentencing proceeding
because evidence portraying Hitchcock as a pedophile was erroneously made a
feature of his second sentencing proceeding.  Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859
(Fla. 1996).  Upon his third resentencing, Hitchcock was sentenced to the death
penalty for the fourth time, and this Court affirmed the sentence.  Hitchcock v.
State, 755 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1040 (2000). 
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Court in 2000.  See Hitchcock v. State, 755 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2000).  On November
30, 2001, he filed a second amended rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief,
which is now pending in the circuit court.
On December 29, 2001, Hitchcock also filed a motion for postconviction
DNA testing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.  In that motion,
he alleged the following facts:
1.  James Hitchcock was charged with the murder of Cynthia
Driggers.  Cynthia Driggers was James Hitchcock’s step niece.  At the
time of offense James Hitchcock lived in the same house as the victim,
his brother Richard Hitchcock, the victim’s mother and other siblings. 
James Hitchcock was accused of strangling the victim.
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2.  At trial James Hitchcock testified that it was his brother
Richard who killed the victim after finding the victim and James
Hitchcock in a post-sexual situation.
Under the heading of “Statement of Innocence,” Hitchcock asserted his innocence
of the murder charge and death penalty, maintaining that the true murderer was
Richard Hitchcock.  Specifically, he stated in the motion that “[w]hile James
Hitchcock admits to sexual intercourse with Cynthia Driggers, it was Richard
Hitchcock who committed the murder.”  He also asserted that the physical
evidence presented at trial was incompetently analyzed by the Sanford Crime
Laboratory micro-analyst who conducted the hair comparisons in this case and
testified at trial.  Most relevant to this appeal, Hitchcock alleged the following,
under the heading of “Relevance of DNA Testing”:
1.  Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853(b)(3)
and (b)(4) James Hitchcock again states that he is innocent of this
crime and of the death penalty as pled in the above section.  The
identification of the true murderer of the victim is [as] genuinely
disputed now as it was during trial.
2.  Pursuant to this rule, James Hitchcock states that DNA
testing and hair analysis requested in this motion will exonerate James
Hitchcock.  Due to the location of the evidence DNA testing may
show that Richard Hitchcock strangled the victim, that his hair was
present at the crime scene, that his blood was present at the scene, or
that there was other forensic evidence.
3.  The DNA and micro analysis would also tend to exonerate
James Hitchcock and show that the Diana Bass’ hair analysis
improperly excluded Richard Hitchcock and improperly inculpated
James Hitchcock.
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4.  Lastly, the evidence would also show that James Hitchcock
was innocent of the death penalty by showing that even if he was
involved in the death of the victim James Hitchcock was a minor
participant.  See Section 921.141(6)(d), Florida Statutes.  Had James
Hitchcock committed this offense this would mitigate his death
sentence.
Hitchcock concluded his motion with a request for the circuit court to order
“nuclear DNA typing by short tandem repeat STR DNA typing or other method
that can distinguish between brothers” by an independent lab on the following
enumerated items:  (1) a “red, white and blue pullover men’s shirt”; (2) a “pink and
white towel”; (3) a “gold towel”; (4) a “red, white and pink wash cloth”; (5) a
“brown leather belt”; (6) a “small container with dirt sample”; (7) “hairs from
victim’s bed pillow”; (8) “foreign objects from vagina”; (9) “weeds from left leg”;
(10) “foreign objects from left leg”; (11) “vegetation from the abdomen”; (12)
“finger nails from left hand”; (13) “scrapings from buttocks”; (14) a “soil sample
from under body”; (15) a “soil sample from area of struggle”; (16) “one paper
sheet used to wrap the body at the scene and bags from hands”; (17) “clothing
criminal - blue jeans”; (18) “medical criminal - blood”; (19) “medical criminal -
saliva”; (20) “clothing criminal - sweatshirt”; (21) “clothing criminal - shorts”; (22)
“clothing criminal - shirt”; (23) “medical criminal - hair”; and (24) “medical criminal
- foreign matter.”
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In its response, the State argued that Hitchcock’s motion failed to set out the
evidentiary value of the evidence proposed to be tested and how such testing
would exonerate or mitigate the sentence.  The State specifically noted that James
Hitchcock, Richard Hitchcock, and the victim all occupied the same household. 
The State asserted that “[i]t is therefore likely that biological samples such as hair,
sloughed off skin, small amounts of bodily fluids, eyelashes, and finger and toe nail
clippings would constantly be inadvertently deposited by all three persons
throughout the house and curtilage they shared.”  After receiving Hitchcock’s
motion and the State’s response, the circuit court held a hearing, at which the State
further argued that any DNA evidence from the victim’s vaginal area would not be
exonerating because James Hitchcock confessed to having sexual intercourse with
the victim.  Despite the State’s suggestion that the court provide Hitchcock with
additional time to file a more substantive motion, Hitchcock stood by his original
motion, arguing that it met the statutory requirements.
On June 25, 2002, the circuit court denied Hitchcock’s motion, writing:
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to death.  He argues he is innocent of the crime and DNA testing and
hair analysis will exonerate him.  He admits to having sexual
intercourse with the victim, Cynthia Driggers, but asserts that it was his
brother, Richard Hitchcock who strangled her.  He alleges that the
Sanford Crime Laboratory, which analyzed the physical evidence
obtained from the scene, was incompetent, and that Diana Bass, the
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analyst who conducted the hair comparisons, lacked the necessary
training.
However, the motion fails to set forth the evidentiary value of
the evidence to be tested or explain how the results would exonerate
Defendant or mitigate his sentence.  Defendant alleges that DNA
testing “may show that Richard Hitchcock strangled the victim, that
his hair was present at the crime scene, that his blood was present at
the scene, or that there was other forensic evidence.”  (Defendant’s
motion, page 6, emphasis added.)  Such a speculative claim cannot
support the granting of postconviction DNA testing.  Moreover,
Defendant, his brother, and the victim occupied the same house, and
all three would have deposited hair, skin, bodily fluid, eyelashes, and
nail clippings throughout the house.
Defendant next alleges that the testing would tend to exonerate
him and show that the hair analysis improperly excluded Richard
Hitchcock as a suspect, but he does not explain why this is so. 
Finally, he alleges the testing would show that even if he was involved
in the death of the victim, he was a minor participant, which would
mitigate his death sentence.  Again, however, he fails to explain why
this is so.
It is undisputed that Defendant confessed to having sexual
intercourse with the victim, and Defendant fails to establish a
reasonable probability that DNA testing would be able to exonerate
him of the subsequent murder.  The presence of physical evidence
linked to Richard Hitchcock would not establish that Defendant was
not at the scene or that he did not commit the murder.  See Galloway
v. State, 802 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
State v. Hitchcock, No. CR76-1942 at 1-2 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order filed June 24,
2002).  Hitchcock now appeals the denial of his motion.
ANALYSIS
This Court adopted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 in 2001,
tracking the provisions of section 925.11, Florida Statutes (2001).  See Amendment
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to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807
So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2001).  Under rule 3.853, a motion for postconviction DNA
testing must include, among other things, “a statement that the movant is innocent
and how the DNA testing requested by the motion will exonerate the movant of the
crime for which the movant was sentenced, or a statement how the DNA testing will
mitigate the sentence received by the movant for that crime.”  Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.853(b)(3) (emphasis added).  After ordering and receiving the State’s response,
the circuit court “shall . . . enter an order on the merits of the motion.”  Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.853(c)(3).  Further:
The court shall make the following findings when ruling on the
motion:
(A) Whether it has been shown that physical evidence that may
contain DNA still exists.
(B) Whether the results of DNA testing of that physical
evidence likely would be admissible at trial and whether there exists
reliable proof to establish that the evidence containing the tested DNA
is authentic and would be admissible at a future hearing.
(C) Whether there is a reasonable probability that the movant
would have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence if
the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5) (emphasis added).
The clear requirement of these provisions is that a movant, in pleading the
requirements of rule 3.853, must lay out with specificity how the DNA testing of
each item requested to be tested would give rise to a reasonable probability of
2.  For example, Hitchcock has listed a number of items of clothing, but has
not indicated whether those clothes belonged to the victim, the defendant, or
Richard Hitchcock, whether the items were found near the scene of the crime or
worn by someone the night of the crime, or whether there is any indication from
evidence logs, crime lab reports, or trial testimony that any bodily fluids may exist
on these items.
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acquittal or a lesser sentence.  In order for the trial court to make the required
findings, the movant must demonstrate the nexus between the potential results of
DNA testing on each piece of evidence and the issues in the case.  Here, Hitchcock
failed to demonstrate such a nexus.
With respect to the items listed in Hitchcock’s motion, only a general
reference and identification of the type of item was given, without any other relevant
information.2  Rule 3.853 is not intended to be a fishing expedition.  Rather, it is
intended to provide a defendant with an opportunity for DNA testing of material not
previously tested or of previously tested material when the results of previous DNA
testing were inconclusive and subsequent developments in DNA testing techniques
would likely provide a definitive result, and when a motion for such testing provides
a basis upon which a trial court can make the findings expressly set forth in
subdivision (c)(5) of rule 3.853.  It was Hitchcock’s burden to explain, with
reference to specific facts about the crime and the items he wished to have tested,
“how the DNA testing requested by the motion will exonerate the movant of the
3.  
Additionally, Hitchcock raised before this Court a constitutional
argument that the circuit court’s denial of his motion violated his right to habeas
corpus relief.  We conclude, as the State correctly noted, that this argument was
not preserved because Hitchcock did not claim a constitutional right to DNA
testing before the circuit court below. 
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crime for which the movant was sentenced, or . . . will mitigate the sentence
received by the movant for that crime.”  He has not met that burden.  Therefore, we
find no error in the circuit court ruling that “the motion fail[ed] to set forth the
evidentiary value of the evidence to be tested or explain how the results would
exonerate Defendant or mitigate his sentence.”3
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision below denying
Hitchcock’s 3.853 motion for postconviction DNA testing.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and
BELL, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, 
Reginald Karl Whitehead, Judge - Case No. 7601942
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James L. Driscoll, Jr., Assistant CCC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel -
Middle, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee