Title: Davis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1207
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 2020

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1207 
____________ 
 
TONEY DERON DAVIS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
August 27, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Toney Deron Davis, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit 
court’s order summarily denying his successive motion for postconviction relief, 
which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have 
jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., and affirm for the reasons that 
follow. 
BACKGROUND 
Davis was “charged with and convicted of first-degree felony murder, 
aggravated child abuse, and sexual battery,” stemming from “the murder of [two-
year-old] Caleasha Cunningham on December 9, 1992.”  Davis v. State (Davis I), 
703 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 930 (1998).  The 
 
- 2 - 
victim’s mother, Gwen Cunningham, testified that “on the day of the murder,” she 
left the victim—then fully clothed, “in good health and without injuries”—alone 
with Davis in their shared apartment.  Id.  At approximately 12:45 p.m., “Thomas 
Moore, an acquaintance of Davis’s,” visited the apartment.  Id.  Moore testified 
that “Davis answered the door with the victim draped over his arm.”  Id.  After 
Davis told Moore that the victim “had choked on a french fry,” Moore called 911.  
Id. 
When rescue personnel arrived, the victim was unconscious, wet, and naked 
from the waist down.  Id. at 1057.  Blood was present in the bedroom and 
bathroom, and “blood which was found to be the victim’s” was located on Davis’s 
underwear and on “the crotch region” of his shorts.  Id.  The victim was taken to 
hospital, where she was “revived but died shortly afterward on December 10, 
1992.”  Id. 
At trial, “Davis testified that he had left [the victim] and his friend Moore 
alone in the apartment at about 12:30 p.m. and went to make some phone calls.”  
Id. at 1056.  “When he returned,” Davis claimed, “Moore was gone and [the 
victim] was having a seizure.”  Id.  Davis stated that “he administered CPR” to the 
victim, “put her in the shower to revive her, and accidentally dropped her in the 
shower.”  Id.  He explained that “Moore asked him not to mention that he had been 
with [the victim] because Moore had marijuana in his possession.”  Id. 
 
- 3 - 
The State presented testimony from “[a] neighbor, Janet Cotton,” who 
claimed to have “heard a child crying” and “a lot of thumping noises coming from” 
Cunningham’s “apartment at approximately noon” on December 9, 1992.  Id.  
Cotton explained that the noises lasted for about thirty minutes.  Davis v. State 
(Davis II), 136 So. 3d 1169, 1189 (Fla. 2014).  She further recalled hearing a “ 
‘[v]ery loud’ and ‘stern’ ‘male voice’ that she recognized as Davis’s, saying ‘[s]it 
down.’ ”  Id. (alterations in original).   
The emergency room physician who treated the victim testified that—in 
addition to bruising—the victim had “swelling of the brain and pools of blood in 
the skull.”  Davis I, 703 So. 2d at 1057.  “[T]here was [also] a large collection of 
blood at the back of the head which was not consistent with being accidentally 
dropped.”  Id.  Another doctor who examined the victim “testified that the injuries 
indicated vaginal penetration by a penis, a finger, or an object.”  Id.  While the 
medical examiner “testified that there was no injury to the vaginal area,” he 
explained that “it could have healed quickly.”  Id.  He “said the victim had suffered 
four separate blows to the head, causing [the] cerebral hemorrhage” that resulted in 
her death.  Id.  The medical examiner further stated that no french fries were found 
in the victim’s stomach.  See id. at 1059. 
A law enforcement officer testified that Davis claimed to have been alone 
with the victim.  Id. at 1056.  Law enforcement agents additionally stated that 
 
- 4 - 
Davis could not explain why blood was found in certain areas of the bedroom and 
bathroom or “specify how the victim actually hit the floor when he supposedly 
dropped her in the shower.”  Id. at 1059. 
Davis was convicted of all charges, id. at 1056, and sentenced to death for 
the first-degree felony murder, id. at 1057.  We upheld his convictions and his 
death sentence on direct appeal.  Id. at 1062.  Thereafter, we denied Davis’s initial 
motion for postconviction relief and his habeas petition.  Davis II, 136 So. 3d at 
1209.  We also affirmed the denial of his successive postconviction motion, Davis 
v. State (Davis III), 42 Fla. L. Weekly S235, S236, 2017 WL 656307, at *2 (Fla. 
Feb. 17, 2017), and denied his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Davis v. 
Jones, 235 So. 3d 301, 301 (Fla. 2018). 
 
In 2019, Davis filed another successive postconviction motion, claiming the 
State committed Giglio1 and Brady2 violations.  The circuit court summarily 
denied the motion.  This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Davis contends that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his claims 
that the State knowingly presented false testimony from trial witness Janet 
 
 
1.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
2.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
- 5 - 
Cotton—in violation of Giglio—and suppressed Cotton’s “true” testimony—in 
violation of Brady.  Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is 
appropriate “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that 
the movant is entitled to no relief.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).  Applying a de 
novo standard of review, we find that test satisfied here. 
Giglio 
We first address Davis’s Giglio claim.  To establish a Giglio violation, Davis 
must show “that: (1) the testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the 
testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material.”  Moore v. State, 132 So. 
3d 718, 724 (Fla. 2013).  False testimony is material “if there is any reasonable 
possibility that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.”  Id. (quoting Tompkins v. 
State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1091 (Fla. 2008)).  “The State . . . bears the burden to 
prove that the presentation of false testimony at trial was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. (quoting Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 506 (Fla. 2003)). 
In support of his claim, Davis relies on an affidavit from Cotton in which she 
states that—contrary to her trial testimony—she “did not hear a baby or child cry 
or scream on December 9, 1992.”  She further claims that she did not hear “a 
thumping noise” or Davis “yell, ‘Sit down.’ ”  Rather, Cotton states, she heard 
“crying and screaming” coming from a nearby apartment “[a]t some point” one or 
two days “before December 9, 1992.”  She claims that she “was put under a great 
 
- 6 - 
deal of pressure and duress by the State of Florida during multiple meetings with 
law enforcement.”  Cotton further recalls that she stayed in touch with a former 
state attorney, who—during their final conversation “several years ago”—offered 
to “take care” of criminal charges filed against her. 
We conclude that the circuit court properly denied this claim.  Even 
assuming Davis could prove that the State knowingly presented false testimony 
from Cotton, the use of this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Regardless of whether Cotton heard noises coming from Davis’s apartment on 
December 9, 1992, the State presented ample evidence that the victim’s injuries 
were not accidental and occurred while she was in Davis’s care.  This includes the 
testimony “that Davis was alone in the apartment with the victim,” “the bloodstain 
evidence,” the medical testimony regarding the nature of the victim’s injuries, “the 
fact that there were no french fries found in the victim’s stomach,” and Davis’s 
inability to explain how the victim fell or why blood was found in certain areas of 
the apartment.  Davis I, 703 So. 2d at 1059.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable 
possibility that Cotton’s testimony affected the jury’s verdict. 
Davis contends, however, that Cotton’s testimony was material because it 
was essential in refuting his defense that Thomas Moore was responsible for the 
victim’s injuries.  At trial, Davis testified that “at about 12:30 p.m.,” he left the 
victim alone in the apartment with Moore while he made phone calls.  Davis I, 703 
 
- 7 - 
So. 2d at 1056.  Without Cotton’s testimony that she heard noises—including 
“thumping” sounds, a child crying, and Davis’s voice saying, “[s]it down”—
coming from the apartment between 12:00 p.m. and 12:30 p.m., Davis claims that 
it would have been more difficult for the jury to rule out the possibility that Moore 
had injured the victim.  Davis II, 136 So. 3d at 1189 (alteration in original). 
This argument lacks merit for three reasons.  First, even if Cotton had not 
testified, “[t]he jury would still be left with the impression . . . that Davis’s defense 
evolved after he had time to contemplate the situation.”  Id. at 1188.  “Davis did 
not begin to assert that someone else harmed the victim until after his 
conversations with the first responders and his interview with the investigating 
detectives.”  Id.  He “spoke to seven people in six separate statements about what 
happened to the victim without ever asserting that Moore—or anyone else—was 
left alone with” her.  Id. 
Further, Davis claimed “that when he returned to the apartment after leaving 
the victim with Moore,” there appeared to be nothing wrong with the victim.  Id.  
He recalled that “[s]he looked normal, except for she wasn’t breathing.”  Id.  Yet 
medical testimony “render[ed] Davis’s claim that the child appeared uninjured 
patently implausible.”  Id. 
Finally, Davis failed to provide a credible “explanation of why he did not 
immediately implicate Moore.”  Id.  At trial, Davis “testified that he promised not 
 
- 8 - 
to inform law enforcement about Moore’s presence—and thus risked implicating 
himself in the murder—because Moore was afraid of being charged with drug 
possession.”  Id. at 1188-89. 
The circuit court correctly determined that there is no reasonable possibility 
that Cotton’s testimony affected the jury’s verdict.3  Accordingly, we affirm the 
summary denial of Davis’s Giglio claim. 
Brady 
Davis next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his 
Brady claim based on Cotton’s testimony.  To establish a Brady violation, the 
defendant has the burden to show “(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory 
or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) 
because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.”  Taylor v. State, 
62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011) (emphasis omitted). 
Davis contends that the State violated Brady by suppressing Cotton’s “true” 
testimony.  But we conclude that Davis’s Brady claim—like his Giglio claim—
fails on the materiality prong.  There is no “reasonable probability that, had” 
Cotton’s “true” testimony “been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
 
 
3.  Davis further asserts that Cotton’s statement should be considered 
cumulatively with evidence presented in prior postconviction claims when 
evaluating the materiality prong.  We conclude, however, that engaging in such a 
cumulative analysis would not change our determination. 
 
- 9 - 
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. (quoting Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506).  
Whether or not Cotton heard noises coming from Davis’s apartment on December 
9, 1992, the State presented ample evidence that Davis intentionally injured the 
victim on that date.4  We therefore conclude that the circuit court properly 
summarily denied this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we affirm the circuit court’s order summarily denying 
Davis’s successive motion for postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and 
COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Linda McCallum, Judge - Case No. 161992CF013193AXXXMA 
 
Rick A. Sichta of The Sichta Firm, LLC., Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
 
4.  The additional evidence Davis has presented in connection with this 
claim does not change our conclusion.  This evidence is either similar to that we 
previously held procedurally barred, see Davis III, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at S236, 
2017 WL 656307, at *1, immaterial even if considered cumulatively with Cotton’s 
statement, or untimely or otherwise improperly presented in the instant appeal. 
 
 
- 10 - 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Janine D. Robinson, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee