Title: State Ex Rel Kurt M. Hoffman v. Allen Circuit Court
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 02S00-0704-OR-161
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 2007

RELATOR PRO SE  
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
Kurt M. Hoffman 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel J. Borgmann 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Helmke Beams LLP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 02S00-0704-OR-161 
 
STATE OF INDIANA EX REL KURT M. HOFFMAN 
 
 
Relator, 
 
v. 
 
THE ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT, 
THERESE M. BROWN, AS CLERK THEREOF, AND 
THE HON. CRAIG J. BOBAY, AS JUDGE THEREOF, 
 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Original Action 
_________________________________ 
 
June 22, 2007 
 
 
 
Dickson, Justice 
 
 
By a summary order indicating that an explanatory opinion would follow, this Court on 
May 15, 2007, denied the relator's petition for a writ of mandamus.  The relator had challenged 
under Indiana Trial Rule 53.2(A) the failure of the Clerk of the Allen Circuit Court to withdraw a 
cause from the respondent judge for failure to rule within ninety days.   
 
 
Under Rule 53.2, "[w]henever a cause . . . has been tried to the court and taken under ad-
visement by the judge, and the judge fails to determine any issue of law or fact within ninety (90) 
days," upon the request of an interested party, the Clerk of the court must withdraw submission 
of all pending issues from the judge and seek appointment of a special judge by the Indiana Su-
 
preme Court.  T.R. 53.2(A).   There are two exceptions to this time limitation, the first of which 
is applicable where "[t]he parties who have appeared or their counsel stipulate or agree on record 
that the time limitation for decision set forth in this rule shall not apply."  T.R. 53.2(B)(1). 
 
 
In the underlying case, In re Paternity of G.A.D.H., No. 02C01-0410-JP-64, a trial was 
held and concluded on December 14, 2006.  At its conclusion, in an order dated January 2, 2007, 
Magistrate Craig Bobay, who had presided over the trial, stated: 
On the court's order, the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not due 
to be filed until January 26, 2007.  The time within which the Court is to rule on the is-
sues shall not begin to run until said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are filed  
unless either party files an objection to this order within five (5) days.   
 
R. at 21.  On January 25, 2007, and again on February 5, 2007, the parties filed agreed stipula-
tions to extend the time for filing proposed findings and conclusions.  Each stipulation was ac-
cepted by Allen Circuit Judge Thomas Felts.  The alleged father in the paternity action filed his 
proposed findings and conclusions on February 8.  The mother sought and received additional 
time, filing her proposed findings and conclusions on March 8, 2007.  On March 15, 2007, the 
ninety-first day after the trial concluded, counsel for the alleged father filed his praecipe under 
Rule 53.2, seeking removal of the case from the judge and appointment of a special judge.  Four 
days later, the trial court, in a final judgment signed by both Magistrate Bobay and Judge Felts, 
granted sole legal custody to the mother, established parenting time for the father, and ordered 
child support.  In a subsequent entry dated March 26, 2007, the Clerk provided notice of her de-
cision not to withdraw the case, explaining that the father's failure "to object and the multiple re-
quests for extension of time may be deemed to be an agreement as to the Court's delay" and that 
the remedy of removal from the judge would not be equitable.  R. at 33.   
 
 
Responding to the relator's request for a writ, the respondents emphasize Judge Bobay's 
order of January 2, which declared sua sponte that the court's time within which to rule would 
not begin to run until the proposed findings and conclusions were filed "unless either party files 
an objection to this order within five (5) days."  R. at 21.  They argue that both parties accepted 
the benefit of this order and that, by failing to file an objection within the five-day period, the 
relator established his agreement for the record to such extension under the Rule 53.2(B)(1) ex-
ception.   
 
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This court has not previously addressed such an order presuming agreement absent objec-
tion.  In the present case, neither party responded to the order by presenting any objections.  And 
both parties agreed to two extensions of time for the filing of proposed findings and conclusions.  
We have held that, absent the parties' contrary stipulation or agreement on the record, a trial 
court's invitation or directive to file proposed findings and conclusions within a certain time limit 
does not operate to invoke the exception in Rule 53.2(B)(1).  State ex rel. Koppe v. Cass Circuit 
Court, 723 N.E.2d 866, 868 (Ind. 2000).  But the facts in Koppe did not include any counterpart 
to the present order presuming agreement absent objection.  The writ of mandamus is an extraor-
dinary remedy, equitable in nature, and viewed with disfavor.  State ex rel. Woodford v. Marion 
Superior Court, 655 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind. 1995).  Considering the unique circumstances of the pre-
sent case, we declined to grant the requested writ.   
 
 
But we take this opportunity to disapprove future use of devices such as the order pre-
suming agreement absent objection to extend a court's time for ruling.  To provide guidance to 
the bench and bar, we hold that a trial court may not avoid its obligation to make timely deci-
sions by issuing such an order presuming agreement to extend the time absent objection from the 
parties.  The exception provided in the rule means exactly what it says.  It applies only where the 
parties "stipulate or agree on record that the time limitation for decision set forth in this rule shall 
not apply."  T.R. 53.2(B)(1).  The failure of parties to object to a judicial declaration presuming 
their agreement does not satisfy this requirement that they stipulate or agree on the record.  
Henceforth, a fact pattern analogous to that presented today will require withdrawal from the 
trial court and appointment of a special judge by this Court.  The ninety-day requirement for ju-
dicial action operates irrespective of whether proposed findings and conclusions are contem-
plated.  Receiving proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from the respective parties 
may be a judicial convenience, but it is not a necessity to a court's decision-making function.     
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
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