Title: State v. Pamela L. Peters
Citation: 2003 WI 88
Docket Number: 2001AP003267-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2003

2003 WI 88 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3267-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Pamela L. Peters,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Wayne J. Marik   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH, J., joins Part I of concurrence. 
WALSH BRADLEY, J., joins Part II of concurrence. 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Sandra 
L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Terry W. Rose and Rose & Rose, Kenosha, and 
oral argument by Terry W. Rose. 
 
 
2003 WI 88 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3267-CR  
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 923) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Pamela L. Peters,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Wayne J. Marik, Judge.  Reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings.     
 
1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This case is before the court on 
certification from the court of appeals on a question of first-
impression regarding the scope of Wisconsin's identity theft 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1999-2000).1  Specifically, the 
question is whether a defendant who misappropriates another's 
identity and uses it during an arrest and in subsequent bail 
proceedings to obtain lower bail has done so "to obtain credit, 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version of the statutes. 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
2 
 
money, goods, services or anything else of value" within the 
meaning of the identity theft statute.  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2).  
We answer this question yes. 
¶2  "Bail" is statutorily defined as "monetary conditions 
of release."  Wis. Stat. § 969.001(1).  "Monetary" means "of or 
relating 
to 
money." 
 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 1457-58 (1998).  Bail can consist of cash or an 
unsecured appearance bond or both.  Wis. Stat. §§ 969.02 and 
969.03.  In either case, it operates as a form of credit, 
securing the defendant's return to court.  Accordingly, a 
defendant who misappropriates another's identity and uses it 
during an arrest and in bail proceedings to obtain lower bail 
has stolen that identity to obtain credit or money, or both, 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
identity 
theft 
statute.  
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2).  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 On September 30, 2001, the loss prevention staff at a 
Racine Shopko store attempted to detain Pamela Lynn Peters and 
her son after the two had shoplifted a videogame system.  During 
the confrontation, Peters produced a box-cutter and attempted to 
escape with other stolen goods.  Upon arrest, Peters falsely 
identified herself to police as Patricia A. Panzer, d/o/b 
November 
25, 
1955, 
of 
N898 
Elmore 
Drive, 
Campbellsport, 
Wisconsin.  Patricia Panzer is the ex-wife of Peters' husband.   
¶4 
The State charged Peters, under the falsely assumed 
name of Patricia A. Panzer, with armed robbery and retail theft.  
Peters made her initial appearance in Racine County Circuit 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
3 
 
Court on October 1, 2001.  During the initial appearance, Peters 
continued to falsely represent herself as Patricia Panzer.  The 
State asked for a $20,000 cash bail.  Based on Peters' falsely 
assumed identity, Peters' attorney argued that a $1,000 cash 
bail was appropriate, citing Panzer's stable Campbellsport 
address, lack of a criminal record, lack of any history of 
failed court appearances, and valid driver's license.   
¶5 
The court commissioner set bail as follows: "What I'm 
going to do, it's going to be a combination cash and signature 
bond.  Again, I'm going to knock down the cash portion somewhat, 
but maybe not as much as your client would like. The total bond 
is going to be $20,000.  $10,000 cash, $10,000 signature bond." 
¶6 
The next day, on October 2, 2001, the circuit court, 
the Honorable Wayne J. Marik, held an evidentiary hearing at the 
State's request and made findings of fact concerning Peters' 
actual identity.  The circuit court found that the defendant was 
not Patricia A. Panzer but in fact was Pamela Lynn Peters, d/o/b 
November 15, 1964, of 715 Main Street, Lomira, Wisconsin.  The 
circuit court specifically found that:   
[T]he person who is appearing in court today is the 
wife of the ex-husband of Patricia A. Panzer who was 
born on November 25, 1955.  Further the individual 
present in court on at least two prior occasions has 
identified herself to law enforcement authorities or 
in connection with court proceedings as Patricia A. 
Panzer. 
¶7 
The court amended the case caption to reflect Peters' 
true identity, and then revisited the issue of bail.   The State 
informed the court that, unlike Panzer, Peters had a record of 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
4 
 
criminal arrests including multiple counts of theft, resisting 
arrest, contributing to the delinquency of a child, possession 
of drug paraphernalia, possession of cocaine, and criminal 
damage to property.  Furthermore, unlike Panzer, Peters had 
eight outstanding warrants for her arrest.  After considering 
the new information, the circuit court concluded that there was 
"a very strong inference in the court's mind that the defendant 
was trying to establish an identity that could be verified 
pursuant to which she may be released and then able to flee."  
Having concluded that Peters was a substantial flight risk, in 
part because of the falsely assumed identity and previously 
unknown outstanding warrants, the court increased Peters' bail 
to $30,000 cash. 
¶8 
The State amended the complaint to reflect Peters' 
correct 
identifying 
information 
and 
added 
a 
charge 
of 
obstructing an officer.  The State later filed a second amended 
complaint adding the charge that is at issue on this appeal, 
violation of the identity theft statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.201.  
The identity theft statute makes it a crime to intentionally 
misappropriate another's identity "to obtain credit, money, 
goods, services or anything else of value" without the other's 
consent.  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2). 
¶9 
The second amended complaint alleged that Peters told 
police she had lied about her true identity "because she had 
warrants outstanding in other jurisdictions."  The complaint 
alleged that Peters had misappropriated Panzer's identity to 
obtain something of value, to wit "(1) not being taken into 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
5 
 
custody on warrants from other jurisdictions and (2) to obtain a 
lesser bond at the initial appearance in this matter." 
¶10 Peters moved to dismiss the identity theft charge.  
She claimed that the complaint failed to allege one of the 
elements of the crime required by statute, specifically, that 
she had misappropriated another's identity to obtain "credit, 
money, 
goods, 
services 
or 
anything 
else 
of 
value."  
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2).  Peters argued that the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis as applied to the catch-all statutory phrase 
"anything else of value" required dismissal of the charge 
because bail was not like the other itemized things of value in 
the statute, i.e., credit, money, goods, or services.  The 
doctrine of ejusdem generis is a "canon of construction that 
when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons 
or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to 
include only persons or things of the same type as those 
listed."  State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶33 n.4, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 
626 N.W.2d 712 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 535 (7th ed. 
1999)).    
¶11 The circuit court granted Peters' motion and dismissed 
the charge.  Applying ejusdem generis, the circuit court 
concluded that the phrase "anything else of value" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2) was limited to "something that is in a category of 
credit, money, goods, services, or having those types of 
characteristics 
having 
measurable 
value 
and 
worth 
in 
a 
commercial sense in the marketplace," and that "[o]btaining a 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
6 
 
more favorable bond in a criminal case does not in the court's 
opinion fall within that category." 
¶12 The State appealed the dismissal of the identity theft 
charge.  We accepted the court of appeals' certification of the 
case and now reverse. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 
¶13 This case presents a question regarding the scope and 
interpretation 
of 
the 
identity 
theft 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201.  Questions of statutory interpretation are 
reviewed de novo.  State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 565 
N.W.2d 506 (1997). 
¶14  If the language of a statute is clear on its face, we 
need not look any further than the statutory text to determine 
the statute's meaning.  See Bruno v. Milwaukee Co., 2003 WI 28, 
¶¶18-22, 260 Wis. 2d. 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  "When a statute 
unambiguously expresses the intent of the legislature, we apply 
that 
meaning 
without 
resorting 
to 
extrinsic 
sources" 
of 
legislative intent.  State ex rel. Cramer v. Wis. Ct. App., 2000 
WI 86, ¶18, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591.  Statutory language 
is given its common, ordinary and accepted meaning.  Bruno, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶20; State v. Engler, 80 Wis. 2d 402, 406, 259 
N.W.2d 
97 
(1977). 
 
Rules 
of 
statutory 
construction 
are 
inapplicable if the language of the statute has a plain and 
reasonable meaning on its face.  Id. at 406-09 (holding that 
canons 
of 
construction, 
including 
ejusdem 
generis, 
are 
inapplicable when the statute is clear on its face).  
III. DISCUSSION 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
7 
 
¶15 
Wisconsin's 
identity 
theft 
statute, 
entitled 
"Misappropriation 
of 
personal 
identifying 
information 
or 
personal identification documents," provides as follows:   
Whoever intentionally uses or attempts to use any 
personal 
identifying 
information 
or 
personal 
identification document of an individual to obtain 
credit, money, goods, services or anything else of 
value without the authorization or consent of the 
individual and by representing that he or she is the 
individual or is acting with the authorization or 
consent of the individual is guilty of a Class D 
felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(emphasis added).2 
                                                 
2 In accordance with the truth-in-sentencing follow-up 
legislation, the identity theft statute was reclassified from a 
Class D felony to a Class H felony.  See 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 
733, effective February 1, 2003.  "Personal identification 
document" and "personal identifying information" are defined in 
the statute as follows: "'Personal identification document'" 
means a birth certificate or a financial transaction card, as 
defined in § 943.41(1)(em)."  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(a).  
"Personal identifying information" means any of the 
following information: 
1. An individual's name. 
2. An individual's address.  
3. An individual's telephone number.  
4. The unique identifying driver number assigned to 
the individual by the department of transportation 
under § 343.17(3)(a) 4.  
5. An individual's social security number.  
6. An individual's employer or place of employment.  
7. An identification number assigned to an individual 
by his or her employer.  
8. The maiden name of an individual's mother. 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
8 
 
 
¶16  The circuit court applied the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis to limit the application of the identity theft statute 
to cases in which another's identity is misappropriated for the 
purpose of obtaining something having "measurable value and 
worth in a commercial sense in the market place."  Lower bail, 
in the circuit court's view, did not qualify. 
¶17 We disagree with the circuit court's restrictive 
reading of the identity theft statute.  There is nothing in Wis. 
Stat. § 943.201 that explicitly limits its application to 
identity thefts that are carried out to obtain something that 
has "commercial value" or "market value."  Neither does the 
statute implicitly contain such a limitation. 
¶18  The identity theft statute prohibits misappropriation 
of another's identity "to obtain credit, money, goods, services 
or anything else of value."  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2).  Here, 
Peters is alleged to have misappropriated Panzer's identity to 
obtain a lower bail. 
¶19  "'Bail' means monetary conditions of release."  
Wis. Stat. § 969.001.  "Monetary" means "of or relating to 
money."  Webster's, supra, at 1457-58.  Bail can also include an 
unsecured appearance or "signature" bond, in addition to or in 
lieu of cash.  Wis. Stat. § 969.02(1)(misdemeanor bail) and § 
969.03(1)(felony bail).  The term "bond" as used in this context 
                                                                                                                                                             
9. The identifying number of a depository account, as 
defined in § 815.18(2)(e), of an individual. 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(b). 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
9 
 
means "a writing . . . by which a person binds himself to pay a 
certain sum . . .; also: the amount of money so guaranteed——
often used with give <each must give [bond] for his appearance 
before the court>."  Webster's, supra, at 250.  Bail therefore 
represents either cash or the promise of cash, that is, an 
unsecured grant of credit.  In either case, bail operates as a 
form of credit (secured or unsecured) for the defendant's return 
to court.  As used in this context, bail as a form of "credit" 
is "the balance in a person's favor in an account."  Id. at 532-
33. 
¶20  Accordingly, a misappropriated identity that is used 
to obtain a lower bail obtains: 1) a reduced cash bail; 2) a 
signature bond with a lower money forfeiture; or 3) both.  
Therefore, because bail is statutorily defined as "monetary 
conditions of release," and can be expressed as either cash or a 
bond, or both, one who misappropriates another's identity and 
uses it to obtain lower bail in a criminal case has done so to 
obtain credit or money within the meaning of the identity theft 
statute.  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2). 
¶21  True, bail does not have "commercial value" or "market 
value" in the sense that it is not bought, sold, or traded in 
the marketplace.  But it plainly does have monetary value, is 
expressed in terms of cash or a bond, and operates as a form of 
credit.  The circuit court's imposition of a requirement of 
measurable commercial or market value unduly restricted the 
statute's application contrary to its terms.  See Engler, 80 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
10 
 
Wis. 2d at 408-09 (Ejusdem generis cannot be applied to alter 
the meaning of statutory language that is clear on its face.). 
¶22  The circuit court arrived at this interpretation of 
the identity theft statute by applying the ejusdem generis canon 
of construction to the catch-all phrase "or anything else of 
value."  We have concluded, however, that bail constitutes 
credit, money, or both, within the meaning of the identity theft 
statute, because bail is statutorily defined as "monetary 
conditions of release," takes the form of cash, a bond or a 
combination of the two, and operates as a form of credit. 
¶23  Accordingly, this case does not require us to 
determine the precise meaning or scope of the phrase "or 
anything else of value" in the identity theft statute.  It is 
enough to note that the addition of the phrase "or anything else 
of value" to the itemized list of "credit, money, goods [or] 
services" does not narrow the meaning of "credit, money, goods 
[or] services."  There is no purpose for the presence of the 
phrase "or anything else of value" except to expand the list of 
potential qualifying "things of value."  But we do not need to 
determine the precise meaning or scope of the phrase "or 
anything else of value" or attempt to delineate the outer limits 
of the identity theft statute in order to decide this case.  
Because bail can be cash, a bond, or both, and operates as a 
form of credit, the misappropriation of another's identity to 
obtain lower bail meets the statute's requirement that the 
perpetrator misappropriate an identity to obtain credit or 
money.  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2). 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
11 
 
¶24 Our decision here is consistent with the court of 
appeals' rejection of a narrow interpretation of the identity 
theft statute in State v. Ramirez, 2001 WI App 158, 246 Wis. 2d 
802, 633 N.W.2d 656.  The defendant in Ramirez misappropriated a 
social security number and used it to obtain a job.  Ramirez, 
246 Wis. 2d 802, ¶2.  This occurred before the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201.  Id., ¶¶2, 4.  The defendant, however, 
continued to hold the job and collect wages using the stolen 
social security number for more than a year after the effective 
date of the statute.  Id., ¶3.  The court of appeals concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 943.201 is "targeted at much more than the 
isolated 
act 
of misappropriating 
the 
personal 
identifying 
information of another or the initial receipt by the defendant 
of a thing of value as a result of the misappropriation."  Id., 
¶16. 
The 
court 
concluded 
that 
because 
"the 
legislature 
envisioned that the theft of a person's identity would, in many 
instances, produce recurring episodes in which the defendant 
would obtain things of value as a result of the original act of 
identity 
theft," 
the 
identity 
theft 
statute 
"creates 
a 
continuing offense."  Id. 
¶25  Similarly here, we reject the narrow reading of the 
identity theft statute adopted by the circuit court.  We 
conclude that the circuit court improperly restricted the scope 
of the identity theft statute to preclude its application to the 
facts present in this case.  Resort to the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis to determine the scope of the statutory phrase "or 
anything else of value" was unnecessary here.  A person who 
No. 
01-3267-CR   
 
12 
 
misappropriates another's identity to obtain a lower bail has 
misappropriated that identity to obtain credit or money within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
identity 
theft 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2).  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit 
court's order dismissing the identity theft charge, and remand 
for 
reinstatement 
of 
the 
charge 
and 
further 
proceedings 
consistent with the opinion. 
By the Court.—The order of the Racine County Circuit Court 
is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶26 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I agree with the majority that a defendant who misappropriates 
another's identity and uses it during an arrest and subsequent 
proceedings to obtain lower bail does so in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201. 
I 
¶27 I write separately to reflect yet again on this 
court's approach to statutory interpretation.3  The majority 
opinion invokes the plain meaning rule in this case, explaining 
that it will not look beyond the statutory text to determine a 
statute's meaning if the language is clear on its face.4  It then 
announces that "canons of construction . . . are inapplicable 
when a statute is clear"5 and uses this "rule" as a bar to 
applying the ejusdem generis canon of construction in the 
present case.6   
                                                 
3 See State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶¶ 45-56, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Fox v. Catholic 
Knights Ins. Co., 2003 WI 87, ¶¶ 43-48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
4 Needless to say, "clarity and ambiguity are in the eyes of 
the beholder."  Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees Local 
1312, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 642 n.8, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998). 
5 Majority op., ¶14.  
6 Majority op., ¶14. 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶28 How strange.7  First, the plain meaning rule is itself 
a canon of construction.8  Second, many of the other interpretive 
techniques 
employed 
by 
the 
majority 
opinion 
to 
construe 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201 are also canons of construction.  For 
example, the maxim that statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary and accepted meaning is a canon of construction.9  So is 
the rule that courts may refer to a recognized dictionary to 
determine the common meaning of terms,10 and the rule that a 
statutory definition declaring what a term means is binding upon 
                                                 
7 See State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶38, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 
N.W.2d 416 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("Rules of statutory 
interpretation are designed to help courts discern the intent of 
the legislature, not to serve as blinders."). 
8 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be 
Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 403 (1950) ("If language is 
plain and unambiguous it must be given effect" is canon of 
construction); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in 
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 927-934 (1992) 
(describing inclusio unius, ejusdem generis, and the plain 
meaning rule as linguistic canons of interpretation);  see also 
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) ("When the 
words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon [of 
interpretation] 
is 
also 
the 
last: 
'judicial 
inquiry 
is 
complete.'"); CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 
1217, 1225 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (the plain meaning rule "is the 
largest caliber canon of them all").   
9 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43 (1979) ("A 
fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."). 
10 JVC Co. of America v. United States, 234 F.3d 1348, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A court may rely upon its own understanding 
of the terms used, lexicographic and scientific authorities, 
dictionaries, and other reliable information" to determine the 
common meaning of a term.) 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the court.11  The majority opinion openly invokes all of these 
canons of construction despite concluding that the language is 
plain on its face.12  It offers no reason why the plain meaning 
rule permits the use of these canons, but not use of the canon 
of ejusdem generis.   
¶29 The majority opinion creates a false division between 
the plain meaning rule and canons of construction.  Proponents 
of the plain meaning rule reject the use of "extrinsic aids" to 
construction such as legislative history, history of the 
enactment process, committee reports, and legislative debates,13 
when the language of a statute is "clear and unambiguous."14  The 
plain meaning rule's advocates do not, however, reject the use 
of "intrinsic aids" that assist in discerning whether the 
                                                 
11 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 47:07, at 227-28 (6th ed. 2000) (citing Nat'l City Lines, Inc. 
v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1133 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
12 See majority op., ¶¶14, 19.  
13 See Courthouse Employees Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d at 642-
43 (giving examples of extrinsic aids). 
14 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev. 621, 623-24 (1989) ("[N]ew textualism posits that once 
the 
Court 
has 
ascertained 
a 
statute's 
plain 
meaning, 
consideration 
of 
legislative 
history 
becomes 
irrelevant.  
Legislative history should not even be consulted to confirm the 
apparent meaning of a statutory text.  Such confirmation comes, 
if any is needed, from examination of the structure of the 
statute, interpretations given similar statutory provisions, and 
canons of statutory construction."); see also R. Randall Kelso & 
C. Kevin Kelso, Use of the Plain Meaning Rule to Provide a 
Structure for Discovering Legislative Intent, 33 Hastings L.J. 
187 (1981) ("[M]odern debate over the [plain meaning] rule 
centers on the permissible use of extrinsic materials to 
determine legislative intent.") (reprinted in Singer, supra note 
11, § 48A:16, at 810). 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
language of a statute is plain on its face, such as other 
statutes, statutory definitions, and dictionaries.  
¶30 "Intrinsic aids" to construction, including rules of 
grammar and generalizations about customary habits in the use of 
language, are essential to any application of the plain meaning 
rule.15  "Even when a judge claims not to be construing a 
statute, he [or she] can not help using what he [or she] has 
learned about customary language usage and common understanding 
associated with the relevant text."16  The rules that words 
should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and that courts 
may resort to a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of words are 
simply generalizations about customary habits in the use of 
                                                 
15 Conn. 
Nat'l 
Bank, 
503 
U.S. 
at 
253 
("Canons 
of 
construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts 
determine the meaning of legislation."); CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 
1225: 
One benefit of applying canons of construction, rather 
than considering legislative history, is that their 
application does not require resort to extrinsic 
material.  Instead, the canons of construction focus 
on the text actually approved by Congress and made a 
part of our country's laws.  As the Supreme Court's 
recent opinion in [Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 
532 U.S. 105 (2001)] confirms, where the meaning of a 
statute 
is 
discernible 
in 
light 
of 
canons 
of 
construction, we should not resort to legislative 
history or other extrinsic evidence.  Canons of 
construction are essentially tools which help us to 
determine whether the meaning of a statutory provision 
is sufficiently plain, in light of the text of the 
statute as a whole, to avoid the need to consider 
extrinsic evidence of Congress' intent. 
See also Singer, supra note 11, § 47:01, at 209-11. 
16 Singer, supra note 11, § 46.02, at 133. 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
language that are part and parcel of the process of interpreting 
the meaning of a statute's text. 
¶31 Similarly, ejusdem generis is simply a generalization 
about the use of words.  Ejusdem generis is Latin for "of the 
same kind," and means that when general words follow specific 
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are 
construed to embrace objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the preceding specific words.17  For example, 
ejusdem generis might suggest that the phrase "any other games" 
in a statute encompassing "baseball, basketball, football, and 
any other games" would be limited to team sports (like soccer) 
and not include "games" like chess or video games.  An 
enumeration followed by a "catch all" phrase is a common 
drafting technique that saves a legislature from having to spell 
out every contingency in advance.18   
¶32 Ejusdem generis is not always an appropriate canon of 
construction, even when a statute includes a list of specific 
words followed by general words in an enumeration.19  The 
applicability of this canon must be resolved as part of a 
court's effort to determine the meaning of a statute's text.  
The canon is an "intrinsic aid" that is germane to a textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation; that is, it is both 
compatible with and necessary to the plain meaning rule, just 
                                                 
17 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15; Singer, supra note 
11, § 47:17, at 273-74. 
18 Singer, supra note 11, § 47:17, at 281-82. 
19 Id. § 47:18, at 287. 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
like the other canons the majority opinion relies on in the 
present case.20   
¶33 The vast majority of cases coming to this court 
involve the interpretation of some writing, be it a statute, a 
constitution, 
a 
contract, 
or 
some 
other 
document. 
 
The 
consistency and coherence of our approach to interpretation is 
therefore vital.  Litigants, lawyers, legislators, judges, and 
the citizens of Wisconsin deserve to know and understand how we 
approach interpretation.   
¶34 As I have stated, proper statutory interpretation 
requires 
that 
a 
court 
take 
a 
comprehensive 
view 
toward 
discerning legislative intent that begins with consideration of 
the language of a statute and then looks to all relevant 
evidence of legislative intent including its scope, history, 
context, subject matter and purpose.21 
II 
                                                 
20 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15 ("The wording of 
[the statute] calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem 
generis"); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting): 
I thought we had adopted a regular method for 
interpreting the meaning of language in a statute: 
first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in 
its textual context; and second, using established 
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear 
indication that some permissible meaning other than 
the ordinary one applies.  If not——and especially if a 
good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain——we 
apply that ordinary meaning. 
21 See Byers, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶ 50, (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶35 Finally, while on the topic of rules, let me turn to 
another rule.  The majority opinion violates a basic rule of 
appellate decision making: courts are not to reach out and 
decide issues unnecessary to the case at hand.  The majority 
opinion correctly concludes that a person is guilty of identity 
theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.201 when he or she misappropriates 
another's identity to obtain lower bail because bail falls 
within the statutory words "to obtain credit or money."22  It is 
thus not necessary to the present case to reach out and further 
state in what amounts to dicta that the phrase "or anything else 
of value" in § 943.201 is unduly restricted if it is interpreted 
to include only items with measurable commercial or market 
value.23  As I have written before, there is a growing tendency 
                                                 
22 Majority op., ¶25. 
23 See, e.g., majority op., ¶17: 
We disagree with the circuit court's restrictive 
reading of the identity theft statute.  There is 
nothing in Wis. Stat. § 943.201 that explicitly limits 
its application to identity thefts that are carried 
out to obtain something that has "commercial value" or 
"market value."  Neither does the statute implicitly 
contain such a limitation. 
See also majority op., ¶21 ("The circuit court's imposition of a 
requirement of measurable commercial or market value unduly 
restricted the statute's application contrary to its terms."); 
majority op., ¶25: 
Similarly here, we reject the narrow reading of the 
identity theft statute adopted by the circuit court.  
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
improperly 
restricted the scope of the identity theft statute to 
preclude its application to the facts present in this 
case.  Resort to the doctrine of ejusdem generis to 
determine the scope of the statutory phrase "or 
anything else of value" was unnecessary here. 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
for this court to reach out and decide issues that are not 
squarely presented.24  This tendency is, I believe, detrimental 
to the development of Wisconsin law.25   
                                                 
24 Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶¶56, 72, 
259 Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
25 The court has treated dicta differently depending on 
whether it likes the dicta.  For an illustration of the 
difficulties the court faces when it must deal with dicta, see 
State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996), and 
State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶31, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 
N.W.2d 195.  
For discussions of Wisconsin's views on dicta, see, e.g., 
State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶¶60-61 n.16, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 
N.W.2d 381 (reviewing two lines of cases on dicta); State v. 
Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶22 n.16, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341 
(same); State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 
(1996) ("[d]icta is a statement . . . in a court's opinion which 
extends beyond the facts in the case and is broader than 
necessary and not essential to the determination of the issues 
before it"; dicta is not controlling); State v. Koput, 142 
Wis. 2d 370, 386 n.12, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988) (it is not 
inappropriate for a court to evaluate statements in Supreme 
Court opinions on the basis of whether they constitute dicta); 
Nicholson 
v. 
Home 
Ins. 
Cos., 
137 
Wis. 2d 581, 
602, 
405 
N.W.2d 327 (1987) (disapproving of discussion of reducing clause 
in Radlein v. Indus. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 
N.W.2d 874 (1984), as dicta); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 356 N.W.2d 175 (1984) (adopting 
the generally accepted doctrine that "a statement not addressed 
to the question before the court or necessary for its decision" 
is dicta, and not binding on the court); Reiter v. Dyken, 95 
Wis. 2d 461, 474, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980) (same).  
But see Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶60, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 
N.W.2d 195 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (the rule in Wisconsin is 
that a discussion of issues not decisive of a controversy is a 
binding judicial act, not dicta) (citing State v. Kruse, 101 
Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981)); Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d at 
392 (quoting Chase v. Am. Cartage, 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 
N.W. 598 (1922)):  
It is deemed the doctrine of the cases is that when a 
court 
of 
last 
resort 
intentionally 
takes 
up, 
discusses, and decides a question germane to, though 
No.  01-3267-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶36 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately.   
¶37 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins part I of this opinion and that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins part II of this opinion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such 
decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the 
court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding 
decision.   
 
No.  01-3267-CR.WAB 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
¶38 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (concurring).  "That depends 
on what the meaning of the word 'is' is."  William Jefferson 
Clinton.   
¶39 I write only to emphasize that canons of statutory 
construction, such as the "plain meaning" rule, are tools, not 
rules.  They are all designed to reach one fundamental goal: 
discerning legislative intent.  Ignoring relevant evidence on 
legislative 
intent 
in 
the 
name 
of 
"plain 
meaning" 
will 
necessarily 
at 
times 
lead 
to 
an 
interpretation 
that 
is 
completely contrary to what the legislature intended.   
¶40 Language 
is 
inherently 
ambiguous——perhaps 
not 
as 
ambiguous as the quotation above would have us believe, but the 
quote makes a point: plain meaning is frequently in the eye of 
the beholder.  What is plain to one may be ambiguous to another.  
If good evidence as to legislative intent is present, why not 
use it?  Accordingly, I join Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
concurrence.    
 
 
 
No.  01-3267-CR.WAB 
 
 
 
1