Title: In the Matter of: Arthur J. Usher, IV
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S00-1105-DI-298
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2013

ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT 
S. Andrew Burns 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT  
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Secretary 
Seth T. Pruden, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S00-1105-DI-298 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTHUR J. USHER, IV, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
_________________________________ 
 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Mark X. Sullivan 
_________________________________ 
 
 
May 17, 2013 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
We find that Respondent, Arthur J. Usher, IV, committed attorney misconduct by, among 
other things, engaging in a pervasive pattern of conduct involving dishonesty and 
misrepresentation that was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  For this misconduct, we 
conclude that Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law in this state for at least 
three years without automatic reinstatement.   
  
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this 
Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified 
Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties.  
May 17 2013, 1:31 pm
 
2 
Respondent's 1997 admission to this state's bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary 
jurisdiction.  See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4.   
 
Background 
 
Conduct involving "Jane Doe."  During the summer months of 2006, Respondent became 
acquainted with Jane Doe, a law student at the Indiana University McKinney School of Law.  
Respondent was a partner at the law firm of Bose McKinney  & Evans ("Bose"), where Jane Doe 
was working  as a summer  intern.  A social relationship between Respondent and Jane Doe 
developed after she returned to law school for her third year.  By that time, Respondent had 
departed Bose and had become a partner at the law firm of Krieg DeVault LLC ("Krieg 
DeVault"). 
 
Although Respondent expressed an interest in having a romantic relationship with Jane 
Doe, she consistently declined, telling him she wished to remain only friends.  In 2008, their 
relationship began to deteriorate due primarily to Respondent's continued pursuit of a romantic 
relationship. 
 
In July of 2008, Respondent asked the producer of a horror movie in which Jane Doe had 
appeared to help him obtain a clip from another movie in which Jane Doe also appeared.  The 
producer sent Respondent a clip from that movie that appeared to show Jane Doe in a state of 
undress ("the clip").  After Respondent advised Jane Doe of his meeting with the producer, Jane 
Doe decided to end their friendship.  Respondent then began attempting to humiliate Jane Doe 
and to interfere with her employment prospects.  
 
In August of 2008, Respondent sent the clip to an attorney at Bose, where Jane Doe had 
already accepted a job offer.  Respondent attempted to convince the attorney that Jane Doe's 
appearance in a horror film in a state of undress would have an adverse effect on the ability of 
Bose to retain and/or attract clients.  Suspicious of Respondent's motives, the attorney did not 
take Respondent's suggestion to send the clip to the firm's executive committee.  Jane Doe 
commenced her employment with Bose despite Respondent's efforts to interfere.   
 
3 
 
On September 17, 2008, Respondent sent Jane Doe an email accusing her of lying to and 
misleading him regarding her affections.  Jane Doe responded with an email stating: "Leave me 
alone.  Do not contact me.  You have been harassing me for months now.  If you do not stop 
harassing me, I will file for a restraining order." 
 
Respondent then decided to publish the clip to a much wider audience.  To accompany 
the clip, he drafted a fictitious email thread intended to appear to be an exchange of opinions 
among lawyers and other fictitious persons ("the email").  The email included the following 
excerpts: 
 
[Subject line:] Firm slogan becomes "Bose means Snuff Porn Film Business" 
w/addition of [Jane Doe] 
 
This exchange among other women was just too humorous not to share.   Since 
reading such e-mails from the bottom up is a pain I even rearranged everything 
in real time.  
 
All I can say is that I googled [Jane Doe] after seeing the video clip and there 
does not appear to have been any way for Bose McKinney to have known about 
this.    
 
I think you are failing to understand how harmful [Jane Doe]'s behavior was to 
all female professionals, and the incredible stupidity in acting in such a film.  A 
friend happened to wander into a movie theater on the east side of Indianapolis 
and bought a ticket and the DVD for this movie this past summer (some limited 
multi-evening engagement).  The DVD came to me with a note about "When 
can we expect to see you getting naked in court?"    
 
Having now subsequently seen the entire film, what is really troubling from a 
feminist perspective was that a female lawyer played the central role and/or 
otherwise blessed a film project in which the entire plot lines a woman being 
repeatedly brutalized by a man . . . .  This movie was a disgusting misogynistic 
piece of garbage . . . . 
 
Quite frankly, I can not [sic] believe Bose McKinney employs this woman. 
 
There are legions of plain faced big breasted blondes who are such hacks as 
actresses that they are gladly shedding their clothes (or doing anything else) to 
get in front of a camera.  It is troubling that someone you would think would 
know better after making it through law school is such a bundle of insecurities 
 
4 
that they would make such a film.  Who knows, maybe she is not that bright and 
took a similar approach to getting hired?   
 
Free speech rights aside, professional women (now being defined as women with 
a professional degree) do not need the [Jane Does] of the planet eroding their hard 
earned respect in the marketplace.   
 
So, given that you told me that your company does about one to one and a half 
million dollars a year of work with outside counsel, the solution is simple.  Refuse 
to do business with the Bose firms of the world when they employ such people. 
Moreover, encourage other female in-house counsel to adopt a similar approach.  
 
That firm is free to hire idiots who participate in films demeaning to women.  And 
we female in-house counsel are free to never use the Bose firm when they employ 
sexists (or those who denigrate women, or racists, or homophobes,  etc.).  So I am 
forwarding this e-mail chain to you to explain the situation and hope you will 
embrace what is basically my invitation to jot down a note to yourself not to use 
this firm or similar firms. 
 
The email also contained a link to a site where the movie could be purchased on DVD, 
with the suggestion that copies be sent to in-house counsel.   
 
Respondent recruited his paralegal at Krieg DeVault, "KB," to disseminate the email.  
KB had been fired from Bose and was very loyal to Respondent.  Respondent gave KB a flash 
drive containing the email contents and the clip.  Respondent suggested to KB that the recipients 
of the email include attorneys at Bose, that it be sent from a location that would avoid it being 
traced back to them, that the email appear to have originated from somebody with "clout" at 
Bose,1 and that it be sent after Respondent departed for vacation over the upcoming 
Thanksgiving holiday.  In her testimony, KB disclaimed any knowledge of the contents of the 
email or acquaintance with Jane Doe.  She believed the email was simply some sort of prank. 
 
On November 28, 2008, KB took the flash drive to a Kinko's location in Indianapolis, 
created an email account using the name of the managing partner at Bose, and used that account 
to send the email and clip to fifty-one persons, a large number of whom were from Bose.  Other 
                                                 
1 Respondent contends that he suggested that KB use a farcical name based on a Bose attorney's name as 
the purported origin of the fictitious email.  We find, however, that the evidence supports the hearing 
officer rejection's of Respondent's testimony on this point.  
 
 
5 
recipients worked at Barnes & Thornburg, Baker & Daniels, Locke Reynolds, Ice Miller and 
Krieg DeVault.  When Respondent returned to Krieg DeVault from his vacation in December of 
2008, he was confronted with a protective order Jane Doe had obtained against him, to which the 
email was attached.  Respondent complied with Krieg DeVault's demand that he resign.  Since 
2009, Respondent has practiced as a sole practitioner.   
 
Jane Doe takes pride in her acting and does not hide the fact that she has appeared in a 
number of films.  In a scene in the clip, Jane Doe's character undresses, but a body-double was 
used in the part showing nudity.  Respondent was aware of this fact but did not disclose this in 
the email, leaving the impression that Jane Doe appeared topless in the movie.  The hearing 
officer rejected Respondent's assertion that the email was a prank or humorous.  Rather, it was a 
mean-spirited and vindictive attempt to embarrass and harm Jane Doe, both personally and 
professionally.   
 
Conduct in civil action and disciplinary action against Respondent.  On February 27, 
2009, Jane Doe filed a grievance with the Commission against Respondent.  The Commission 
sent a letter to Respondent requesting a written response.  Respondent admits that his response 
was less than required from members of the bar.  In his answer to the Commission's verified 
complaint against him, Respondent stated that he did not draft the subject line of the email.  At 
the hearing in this matter, however, Respondent admitted to having drafted the subject line. 
 
On December 23, 2009, Jane Doe filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent asserting 
claims against him arising out of sending the email.  Jane Doe sent Respondent discovery 
requests, including requests for admissions ("RFAs").  Those RFAs asked Respondent to admit 
whether he composed the email, whether he caused it to be sent, whether he asked or directed 
another individual to send the email, and whether he knew who sent the email.  Respondent's 
response to all was "Deny."  He was asked to admit whether the email was sent at his suggestion.   
 
 
6 
His response was that he did not know "what, if any, 'suggestions' affected the sender" of the 
email.2   
 
The Commission charged Respondent with violating the following Indiana Rules of 
Professional Conduct: 
 
3.3(a)(1):  Knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal. 
 
8.1(a):  Knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the Disciplinary Commission 
in connection with a disciplinary matter. 
 
8.1(b):  Failure to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person 
to have arisen in a disciplinary matter. 
 
8.4(a):  Knowingly assisting another to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, or 
violating the rules through the acts of another. 
 
8.4(b):  Committing a criminal act (identity deception) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. 
 
8.4(c):  Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
 
8.4(d):  Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
 
8.4(g):  Engaging in conduct that was not legitimate advocacy, in a professional capacity, 
manifesting bias or prejudice based upon gender. 
 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer filed his report to this Court 
on November 14, 2012, concluding that Respondent violated all of the above rules except Rule 
8.4(b) and 8.4(g).  Both Respondent and the Commission have filed petitions asking this Court to 
review the hearing officer's report.    
 
                                                 
2 At the time of the final hearing, Jane Doe's civil action was still pending.  Respondent now asserts that 
the case has since been settled "amicably" on the eve of trial with his payment of an undisclosed amount 
to Jane Doe.  Thus, he argues, no harm befell anyone as a result of the fictitious email.  The fact 
Respondent apparently paid to settle Jane Doe's civil action may actually tend to show that she did suffer 
harm for which the payment was meant to compensate.  In any case, however, we decline to consider 
facts that have not been properly presented and admitted into evidence.   
 
7 
Discussion 
 
A.  Reach of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
Actions regarding the email.  Respondent concedes that the email was intended to shame 
Jane Doe but argues that it was protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  
Respondent also argues that his actions regarding the email were not done in a professional 
capacity and thus the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to these actions.    
 
Respondent cites no case in which speech similar to his has been held to be beyond 
disciplinary sanction based on the First Amendment.  This Court has imposed discipline on 
lawyers for speech found to violate their professional duties, as well as for unethical activities 
outside the professional arena.  See, e.g., Matter of Dempsey, ____ N.E.2d ____, 2013 WL 
1907774 (Ind. May 2, 2013) (scurrilous accusations against opponents and others); Matter of 
Holland, 911 N.E.2d 574 (Ind. 2009) (false accusation of bribing a judge); Matter of Cloyd, 794 
N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. 2003) (untruthful statement to police); Matter of Haigh, 894 N.E.2d 550 (Ind. 
2008) (sexual misconduct with minors); Matter of Herthel, 760 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. 2001) 
(untruthful statement to insurer); Matter of Peoples, 646 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. 1995) (conversion of 
rental vehicles).  We conclude that Respondent's actions regarding the email are not beyond this 
Court's disciplinary authority.  
 
Effect of representation by counsel.  Pointing out that he was represented by counsel in 
the civil case, Respondent argues that his actions in that case are beyond the reach of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct because they were not taken as an attorney but as a mere litigant.  This 
Court, however, has suspended attorneys who knowingly made misstatements in discovery in 
civil cases as litigants.  See, e.g., Matter of Richardson, 792 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. 2003) 
(misstatements in interrogatory answers); Matter of Relphorde, 644 N.E.2d 874 (Ind. 1994) 
(same).   Respondent cites no case in which an attorney committing otherwise sanctionable 
misconduct (e.g., providing knowingly false discovery responses) has been relieved from 
 
8 
responsibility just because the attorney took these actions through counsel.3  We agree with the 
hearing officer's conclusion that "the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct apply to an attorney 
who is a party to litigation, particularly when that attorney is not truthful in responding to 
discovery."     
 
B.  Procedural and Evidentiary Issues   
      
Due process. Respondent argues that the Commission failed to comply with procedures 
regarding additional charges of misconduct beyond those in Jane Doe's grievance, particularly 
those related to allegedly false statements in the civil litigation and the disciplinary proceeding, 
citing Admis. Disc. R. 23(10)(d).  Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commission failed to 
follow the letter of this rule, the Commission's verified complaint fully apprised Respondent of 
all the charges on which he was tried.  We find no violation of due process.   
  
Discovery.  Respondent also accuses the Commission of violating its duties to respond to 
his discovery requests.  A review of the documents he cites shows detailed responses by the 
Commission to his discovery requests.  We detect no prejudicial deficiency in the Commission's 
responses.   
 
Alleged concession by Commission.  Respondent argues that the Commission has 
conceded that his responses to the RFAs in the civil case were "literally" true.  In support, he 
cites a statement in correspondence from a Commission staff attorney, which was not introduced 
into evidence.  We have nevertheless examined this document and conclude that it refers only to 
some statements in Respondent's initial response to the Commission.  The Commission has never 
conceded that Respondent's responses to RFAs in the civil case were "literally" true.    
 
Findings of fact.  After a review of the evidence and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we conclude that the hearing officer's findings of fact, as summarized above and 
supplemented by Respondent's own testimony, are supported by the evidence, and we therefore 
                                                 
3 We note that Respondent's counsel was required to abide by Respondent's decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation and to consult with Respondent as to the means by which they were to be 
pursued.  See Prof. Cond. R. 1.2(a).   
 
9 
adopt them as this Court's findings.  Additional details will be supplied as needed in the 
discussion of the charges below. 
 
C.  Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct   
 
Rule 3.3(a)(1).  The hearing officer concluded that Respondent violated this rule, which 
prohibits knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal, by submitting false responses 
to RFAs in Jane Doe's civil action. 
 
Respondent expends much effort in trying to defend his responses to the RFAs.   For 
example, he argues that he was justified in denying a RFA that he "composed" the email because 
he interpreted "composed" to mean preparing the email that was actually transmitted, that he was 
justified in denying that he asked or directed another person to send the email because he did not 
select the recipients or the email account name, and that he was justified in denying that he knew 
who sent the email because KB might have asked someone else to send it.  In defense of his 
disclaimer of any knowledge about whether the email was sent at his "suggestion," he testified 
that he "merely put[ ] the idea out there for" KB, and whether this was a "suggestion" went to 
KB's mental state, which he could not know.  Respondent asserts he was entitled to "exploit the 
infirmities of the discovery requests."   
 
Hyper-technical parsing of ordinary English words and sentences has been rejected in 
prior cases.  See Matter of Fieger, 887 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. 2008) (discipline imposed for calculated 
omissions on application for temporary admission); Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 
(Ind. 1999) (even if literally true, counsel's affidavit created potential for misperception and was 
thus prejudicial to administration of justice); Matter of Fletcher, 694 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Ind. 
1998) (although judge's inquiries were not "perfectly phrased or formulated with pinpoint 
precision," Court found respondent actively concealed facts from judge); Binder v. 
Benchwarmers Sports Lounge, 833 N.E.2d 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (even if technically correct, 
counsel's statements were calculated to mislead opposing counsel).  Respondent's hide-and-seek 
approach to the RFAs reflects a gaming view of the legal system, which this Court has soundly 
rejected.  See Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d at 1264.   
 
10 
 
We concur with the hearing officer's conclusion that Respondent violated Professional 
Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1) by knowingly submitting false responses to RFAs in Jane Doe's civil 
action.4   
 
Rule 8.1(a).  The Commission charged that Respondent violated this rule, which prohibits 
knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the Commission in connection with a 
disciplinary matter, by falsely denying in his answer to the Commission's complaint that he had 
drafted the subject line of the email.  At the hearing in the matter, Respondent testified that he 
had, in fact, drafted the entire email from the subject line down.  Respondent offers no 
explanation for this discrepancy.  We conclude that Respondent violated this rule as charged. 
 
Rule 8.1(b).  This rule requires a respondent "to disclose a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter."  Respondent admits that, in 
his response to the grievance against him, he was less than entirely forthcoming about his 
involvement with the email and thus violated this rule.  Indeed, we find that Respondent's 
response seems crafted to create misapprehensions rather than to dispel them.   
 
Rule 8.4(a).  We agree with the hearing officer's conclusion that Respondent violated this 
rule, which prohibits violating the Rules of Professional Conduct through the acts of another, by 
procuring the aid of KB in disseminating the email. 
 
Rule 8.4(b).  This rule prohibits engaging in a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.  The Commission charged Respondent 
with violating this rule by committing criminal identity deception, Indiana Code section 35-43-5-
3.5, in connection with the email.  The hearing officer concluded that the Commission had failed 
to meet its burden of proof that Respondent's actions rose to the level of being criminal.  We 
defer to the hearing officer's conclusion on this point. 
                                                 
4 We also note that Respondent's responses to the RFAs do not comply with Trial Rule 36(A), which 
states:  "A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires 
that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he 
shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder." 
 
11 
 
Rule 8.4(c). This rule bars a lawyer from engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  We have already concluded that Respondent made 
misrepresentations in his responses to the Commission in this disciplinary action and in his 
responses to the RFAs in the civil suit.   
 
We also conclude that he engaged in misrepresentation and dishonesty in his conduct 
involving the email—by giving it the false appearance of consisting of actual communications 
between female attorneys and other professionals, by including statements and implications he 
knew to be false, and by telling KB that the email was just a prank when it was actually a 
personal and professional attack on Jane Doe.   
 
Respondent says that he crafted the email based on conversations he had with at least one 
female in-house counsel, naming just one.  However, even if the views expressed in the email 
comported with those of an unnamed real person, this does not undermine the conclusion that 
Respondent made misrepresentations in the email, including that real in-house counsel were 
advocating a boycott of Bose based on its employment of Jane Doe.  We reject Respondent's 
attempt to dismiss the email as some sort of prank or parody when it contained deliberate 
misrepresentations of fact intended to embarrass Jane Doe personally and to harm Jane Doe and 
possibly Bose professionally.    
 
Rule 8.4(d).   We conclude that Respondent violated this rule, which prohibits conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, by obstructing the civil action and this disciplinary 
action through knowingly making false statements of fact in those proceedings. 
 
Rule 8.4(g):  The Commission charged Respondent with violating this rule, which  
prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct that is not legitimate advocacy, in a professional 
capacity, manifesting bias or prejudice based upon gender.  The hearing officer concluded that 
the Commission had not met its burden of proof on this charge.  We agree.  The evidence 
supports a finding that the email was motivated by personal anger at Jane Doe in particular rather 
than by bias or prejudice against women in general. 
 
12 
 
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.   After the hearing officer filed his report, 
Respondent filed a "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law."  For the reasons above, we deny 
this motion.   
 
D.  Discipline 
 
 
Our analysis of appropriate discipline entails consideration of the nature of the 
misconduct, the duties violated by the respondent, any resulting or potential harm, the 
respondent's state of mind, our duty to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the 
public should we allow the respondent to continue in practice, and matters in mitigation and 
aggravation.  See Matter of Newman, 958 N.E.2d 792, 800 (Ind. 2011). 
 
 
Respondent's misconduct involves pervasive dishonesty in the email, the civil action, and 
this disciplinary action.  His misconduct involving the email was motivated by personal revenge 
and his intent was to harm Jane Doe personally and professionally.  He continues to advance 
hyper-technical interpretations of various discovery requests as an excuse for his failure to 
provide truthful answers.  His evasive attitude toward his duties in the civil and disciplinary 
actions suggests a danger to the profession and to the public if he continues in practice.   
 
 
The hearing officer found the following facts in mitigation:  (1) Respondent has no 
disciplinary history; (2) he expressed some remorse, but only about involving KB in his plan to 
humiliate Jane Doe; and (3) he was dealing with news that his sister had been diagnosed with 
cancer.5   
 
 
The hearing officer found the following facts in aggravation:  (1) Respondent has not 
clearly shown that he appreciates the harm he has done to Jane Doe, and he still believes that the 
                                                 
5 We note that Respondent cites depression as contributing to deficiencies in his initial response to the 
grievance.  There is some dispute about when Respondent's depression began and whether there is 
sufficient proof to back his assertion.  In any event, depression is more appropriate to consider as a 
mitigator when the misconduct is caused by neglect or oversight.  Here, Respondent's misconduct was 
deliberate and dishonest. 
 
13 
email was, in some way, justified; (2) Respondent's email was the result of a carefully crafted 
plan; and (3) Respondent used a trusting subordinate to distance himself from the email and 
shield himself from the consequences.   
 
 
Respondent has shown no substantial remorse or insight into his misconduct.  It is this 
lack of insight that leads us to believe that a substantial sanction is necessary to ensure that the 
seriousness of his misconduct is impressed upon him and that similar misconduct is not repeated 
in the future.  See Newman, 958 N.E.2d at 800.  We conclude that Respondent should be 
suspended for a period of at least three years and that any possibility of reinstatement thereafter 
be available only upon satisfaction of Indiana's rigorous standards for reinstatement, which 
require clear and convincing evidence of the petitioner's remorse, rehabilitation, and fitness to 
practice law.  See Admis. Disc. R. 23(4)(b). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated the Indiana Professional Conduct Rules 
3.3(a)(1), 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), by, among other things, engaging in a 
pervasive pattern of conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation that was prejudicial to 
the administration of justice. 
 
For Respondent's professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the 
practice of law in this state for a period of not less than three years, without automatic 
reinstatement, beginning June 28, 2013.  Respondent shall not undertake any new legal matters 
between service of this order and the effective date of the suspension, and Respondent shall 
fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26).  At the 
conclusion of the minimum period of suspension, Respondent may petition this Court for 
reinstatement to the practice of law in this state, provided Respondent pays the costs of this 
proceeding, fulfills the duties of a suspended attorney, and satisfies the requirements for 
reinstatement of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4).   
 
 
14 
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent.  The hearing officer 
appointed in this case is discharged. 
 
The Clerk of this Court is directed to give notice of this opinion to the hearing officer, to 
the parties or their respective attorneys, and to all other entities entitled to notice under 
Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d).  The Clerk is further directed to post this opinion to the 
Court's website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this opinion in the bound 
volumes of this Court's decisions. 
 
 
All Justices concur, except David, J., who dissents regarding the sanction imposed, believing 
disbarment is warranted.