Title: Commonwealth v. Upton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11459
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 2020

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SJC-11459 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT L. UPTON. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     October 2, 2019. - February 19, 2020. 
 
Present (Sitting at Barnstable):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Conflicting statements of witness, 
Credibility of witness, Impeachment of credibility, Prior 
misconduct.  Witness, Credibility, Impeachment.  Practice, 
Criminal, Agreement between prosecutor and witness, New 
trial, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 18, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J., and 
motions for a new trial, filed on December 31, 2014, and 
February 2, 2018, respectively, were considered by him. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Robert L. Upton, 
of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and felony-murder with the predicate felony of 
2 
 
 
attempted armed robbery, for shooting the brother of his 
sister's husband.  The jury also convicted the defendant of 
aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
and of armed assault in a dwelling house.  On appeal, the 
defendant contends that newly discovered evidence comprised of, 
among other components, subsequent contradictory testimony by 
the Commonwealth's key witness indicates that the prosecution 
failed to disclose a plea agreement at the time of trial in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and that 
the Superior Court judge erred in denying his second motion for 
a new trial without an evidentiary hearing on the matter.1  
Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.  We also 
affirm the defendant's convictions and decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or set aside the 
verdict on the murder conviction. 
 
Background.  We recite facts that the jury could have found 
and that are necessary to resolve the defendants' appeal, 
reserving some facts for later discussion.  Commonwealth v. 
Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 390 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 51 
(2019). 
                     
1 The defendant appealed from the denial of his first motion 
for a new trial, yet did not discuss the issues in his brief or 
in any supplemental filings.  Still, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 
33E, we have reviewed the motion and the motion judge's 
reasoning and decision, and we have found no error. 
3 
 
 
 
On the night of September 29, 2009, the defendant and his 
nephew, Christopher Manoloules, went to the Hyannis house of the 
victim, Aris Manoloules.  The next day, the police found the 
victim shot four times, including once in the back of his head. 
 
The murder plot involved a complicated family dynamic 
stemming from the 2007 death of the family matriarch, who had 
had three children:  Treefon Manoloules, Irene Manoloules, and 
the victim.  The matriarch bequeathed her entire $2 million 
estate to the victim, who had been her sole caretaker while she 
suffered from multiple sclerosis.  The defendant's sister joined 
the Manoloules family by marrying Treefon, and Christopher, who 
was seventeen at the time of the murder, was their son.2  
 
Christopher was a troubled youth, and his father 
exacerbated those problems.  Christopher testified that when he 
was fifteen years old, Treefon had him illegally drive a vehicle 
and buy bulk amounts of marijuana.  In addition, after the death 
of Christopher's grandmother, Treefon, who wanted his share of 
the inheritance, involved Christopher in several unsuccessful 
plots to kill the victim, including by a heroin overdose.  
Through these troubles, the defendant remained largely absent 
from Christopher's life until 2009. 
                     
 
2 We refer to Christopher, Treefon, and Irene by their first 
names. 
4 
 
 
 
In May 2009, the defendant moved in with his girlfriend. 
Between then and September 2009, the defendant experienced 
significant financial difficulty, including the loss of his job 
in July.  He owed his girlfriend's father $10,000, and a car 
dealership repossessed, for lack of payment, a $77,000 Mercedes 
vehicle that he had purchased for his girlfriend in July 2009.  
It was during this time that Treefon reached out to the 
defendant to mentor Christopher. 
During the week leading up to the murder, the defendant, in 
short order, fostered a criminal entrepreneurship in his nephew.  
The defendant informed Christopher that an individual was going 
to kill the defendant's older daughter if the defendant did not 
repay a debt of $165,000.  As this alleged threat involved his 
cousin, Christopher wanted to help.  The defendant proposed 
several plans to obtain the money, including theft of 
automobiles.  Christopher asked one of his friends to assist in 
the endeavor.  When, after a couple of days, the threesome 
failed to obtain money illicitly, Christopher spoke to Treefon 
about the defendant's predicament. 
With Christopher and Christopher's friend present, Treefon 
offered to pay the defendant $165,000 to kill the victim by 
shooting him.  On the day of the murder, Treefon insisted that 
the defendant purchase a gun; the defendant complied, buying a 
nine millimeter Ruger pistol and a box of ammunition.  Treefon 
5 
 
 
told Christopher to use a ruse to convince the victim to allow 
Christopher, with the defendant in tow, to visit the victim at 
his Hyannis house.  Despite having offered to pay the defendant 
to kill the victim, Treefon assured Christopher that the real 
plan involved only stealing the matriarch's jewelry. 
Christopher testified that the defendant drove him to the 
victim's house.  They entered through the unlocked front door, 
and then sat with the victim in his family room.  Christopher 
excused himself on the pretense of going to the bathroom, but he 
instead proceeded to search the victim's bedrooms for the 
jewelry.  Finding none, Christopher called the defendant into 
the kitchen, informed him that there was no jewelry, and asked 
to leave.  The defendant pulled out the Ruger, cocked the 
hammer, and walked back into the family room where the victim 
was watching a Red Sox game.  Christopher heard four gunshots. 
 
After the murder, the defendant dropped off Christopher at 
his parent's home and spoke to Treefon.  The defendant returned 
to his girlfriend's home at around 1:30 A.M. on September 30, 
2009.  That afternoon, the defendant's girlfriend arrived home 
from work, saw the defendant cleaning a disassembled gun on a 
table, and asked him to remove it.  Approximately ten to fifteen 
minutes later, she saw that the gun was gone. 
That same day, Treefon requested that the police conduct a 
wellness check on the victim.  Shortly after 5:35 P.M., the 
6 
 
 
police discovered the victim's body on the floor of his family 
room, with four spent shell casings in the area.  At around 
midnight, the police arrested Christopher at his parents' house. 
 
On October 1, 2009, the police interrogated the defendant, 
and he told a story littered with inconsistencies and denials.  
He admitted to buying the Ruger and ammunition on September 29, 
2009, but claimed that he had not seen the gun or ammunition 
since that night after he locked the gun in a case and placed 
the case and the ammunition in the trunk of his car.  The 
defendant also denied being present on Cape Cod on the night of 
the murder, but later acknowledged that he drove there with 
Christopher.  The defendant subsequently admitted to dropping 
Christopher in a Hyannis parking lot between 9 P.M. and 10 P.M. 
so that Christopher could meet with an unidentified individual.  
The defendant stated that he had remained in the vehicle.  He 
justified his earlier misleading statements as an attempt to 
protect Christopher, and he never provided details about being 
at the victim's house. 
On December 11, 2009, the Commonwealth indicted Christopher 
for murder in the first degree, assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon with the intent to murder, aggravated assault and battery 
with a deadly weapon, and armed assault in a dwelling.  On 
December 18, 2009, the Commonwealth indicted the defendant on 
the same charges. 
7 
 
 
 
In July 2010, Christopher decided to cooperate with the 
police investigation and the prosecution.  He told investigators 
about Treefon's orchestration of the murder plot and identified 
the defendant as the shooter.  Christopher then testified for 
the Commonwealth at Treefon's trial for murder,3 but the jury 
acquitted his father on all counts. 
 
At the defendant's trial in January 2013, Christopher 
served as the Commonwealth's key witness.  On the first day of 
trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine for an evidentiary 
hearing regarding undisclosed promises, rewards, and inducements 
to Christopher for his testimony, supported by an attorney's 
affidavit and a letter that Christopher's attorney sent to the 
prosecutors before trial admonishing their disclosure practices.  
However, the defendant then agreed to proceed to trial without a 
ruling on the motion.4  Once on the stand, Christopher testified 
to the defendant's guilt, and denied doing so for any quid pro 
quo with the Commonwealth.  In May 2013, four months after the 
defendant's trial concluded, Christopher nonetheless pleaded 
                     
3 The Commonwealth also charged Treefon with two counts of 
conspiracy under G. L. c. 274, § 7, and an attempt to commit a 
crime under G. L. c. 274, § 6.  The record does not provide 
details about the conspiracy or about the attempted crime. 
 
4 In response to the motion, the Commonwealth disclosed that 
they had only made one promise to Christopher in exchange for 
his testimony:  "his statements would not be used against him at 
any proceeding where he was the defendant on trial." 
8 
 
 
guilty, inter alia, to manslaughter instead of murder, and 
received a sentence of from twelve to fifteen years. 
 
The Commonwealth did not rely solely on Christopher's 
testimony to tie the defendant to the murder.  Christopher's 
friend testified that he had heard Treefon offer to pay the 
defendant to kill the victim.  In addition, forensic evidence 
established that the defendant's Ruger fired the bullets that 
killed the victim.  According to the testimony of the 
defendant's girlfriend, she found the gun in her basement days 
after the defendant's interrogation and believed that the 
defendant had hidden it there after she demanded that he remove 
it from her home.  Moreover, the Commonwealth's ballistics 
expert testified that four bullets were missing from the 
defendant's ammunition case, and that the bullets in the 
ammunition case were the same type of ammunition fired from the 
defendant's Ruger at the victim. 
 
The Commonwealth also established that the defendant 
suffered from substantial financial woes, discussed supra.  
Significantly, on the day of the murder, the defendant sent a 
text message to a salesperson at the Mercedes dealership, in 
which the defendant expressed his belief that he would soon have 
enough money to pay for the Mercedes, and in which the defendant 
also stated that he would be getting the money from his 
"brother-in-law."  The defendant did not testify. 
9 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Because we consider 
the "defendant's direct appeal from a conviction of murder in 
the first degree together with an appeal from the denial of a 
motion for a new trial, we review the whole case [pursuant to] 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 763, 
768 (2018).  We therefore review raised or preserved issues 
according to their constitutional or common-law standard and 
analyze any unraised, unpreserved, or unargued errors, and other 
errors we discover after a comprehensive review of the entire 
record, for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 821 (2017), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  For an error to have 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, it 
must have been "likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion" 
(citation omitted).  Goitia, supra. 
 
2.  Defendant's second motion for a new trial.  "[T]he 
Commonwealth has an obligation to disclose the terms of any 
agreement, promise, or inducement proffered to a testifying 
witness before trial, and . . . a failure to do so may violate 
the defendant's right to due process."  Commonwealth v. Rebello, 
450 Mass. 118, 122 (2007).  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  Despite 
the denials by Christopher and the prosecutor that any deal 
existed, the defendant argues that newly discovered evidence 
demonstrates that such a deal did exist in violation of Brady.  
10 
 
 
He asserts that he deserves a new trial because that evidence 
raises questions about the credibility of Christopher, the 
Commonwealth's key witness at the defendant's trial. 
The circumstances giving rise to the defendant's claim are 
as follows.  Sometime after the victim's death, Treefon and his 
sister, Irene, each inherited one-half of the victim's $2 
million estate.  As executrix of the victim's estate, Irene 
tried to recoup Treefon's share by filing a wrongful death 
action (civil action) against Treefon.5  The trial in this action 
was held in 2016, three years after the defendant's trial.  
Christopher appeared as a witness defending Treefon, testifying 
that he had entered into an undisclosed plea deal with the 
Commonwealth at the time of both Treefon's and the defendant's 
criminal trials, notwithstanding his testimony to the contrary 
before the grand jury and at those trials.  The jury in the 
civil action found Treefon not liable for the victim's death. 
Following Christopher's testimony in the civil action 
(civil action testimony), the defendant filed a second motion 
for a new trial, which is part of this appeal, alleging that 
Christopher's civil action testimony, the jury's subsequent 
finding of no liability for Treefon, and Christopher's plea deal 
constituted "newly discovered evidence" that would have 
                     
5 The suit also named Christopher and the defendant as 
codefendants. 
11 
 
 
substantially affected the jury's deliberations in the 
defendant's criminal trial.6  To support the motion, the 
defendant attached excerpts from Christopher's civil action 
testimony, transcripts from Christopher's plea hearing, excerpts 
from Christopher's testimony in Treefon's criminal trial, and 
citations to arguments made during the defendant's criminal 
trial.  The defendant failed, however, to file any affidavits 
from Christopher's counsel or the prosecutors, or to file an 
affidavit stating that he attempted to obtain such affidavits. 
The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the 
second motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, but issued a detailed memorandum of decision outlining 
                     
 
6 The defendant also alleged that (1) Christopher's guilty 
plea demonstrated his culpability in the murder, undermining his 
trial testimony, and casting real doubt on the defendant's 
conviction; and (2) the civil jury's finding of no liability for 
Treefon proved that Treefon could not have hired the defendant 
to murder the victim, thus undermining the Commonwealth's entire 
theory at the defendant's trial.  Neither claim has any merit.  
First, even assuming the plea deal is newly discovered, 
Christopher's plea would only evidence a Brady violation if 
Christopher had admitted to the murder to the Commonwealth 
before trial and if the Commonwealth did not turn that 
information over to the defendant.  It also does not exculpate 
the defendant; at the very least, the plea shows that 
Christopher was complicit with the defendant.  The plea also 
would constitute cumulative impeachment evidence if admitted at 
trial because defense counsel repeatedly impeached Christopher's 
claims of innocence at trial.  See discussion infra.  Second, 
the civil action verdict cannot be newly discovered because it 
is not evidence.  Moreover, the civil trial involved different 
burdens on the parties and different burdens of proof.  It had a 
different trier of fact, and different testimony upon which the 
jurors reached their conclusion. 
12 
 
 
why the defendant's evidence was not credible and did not 
materially demonstrate that the prosecutor and Christopher had 
entered into an undisclosed plea deal in violation of Brady.  
The judge also explained why Christopher's testimony did not 
comprise impeachment evidence sufficient to grant a new trial.  
This consolidated appeal from the defendant's convictions and 
the orders denying both of the defendant's new trial motions 
followed. 
a.  Decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing.  When 
considering a motion for a new trial, a judge "may rule on the 
motion 'on the basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits 
without further [evidentiary] hearing if no substantial issue is 
raised by the motion or affidavits.'"  Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 
442 Mass. 341, 348 (2004), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c), 378 
Mass. 900 (1979).  In determining whether a substantial issue 
exists, "a judge considers the seriousness of the issues raised 
and the adequacy of the defendant's showing on those issues" 
(citation omitted).  Barry, 481 Mass. at 401.  Clearly, the 
existence of an undisclosed plea agreement in violation of Brady 
would raise a serious issue.  See Goodreau, supra. 
To demonstrate an adequately substantial issue to receive 
an evidentiary hearing, the defendant's submissions "need not 
prove the [motion's] factual premise . . . but they must contain 
sufficient credible information to cast doubt on the issue" 
13 
 
 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 348.  
When examining such evidentiary submissions, motion judges who 
also served as trial judges can use their "knowledge and 
evaluation of the evidence at trial" (citation omitted), 
Commonwealth v. Amaral, 482 Mass. 496, 509 (2019), to "consider 
whether holding a hearing will add anything" to the credibility 
or materiality of the affidavits submitted.  Goodreau, supra. 
We review a judge's decision to deny a motion for a new 
trial without holding an evidentiary hearing "for a significant 
error of law or other abuse of discretion" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 482 Mass. 838, 843-844 (2019).  See 
Barry, 481 Mass. at 401.  This court extends "special [or 
substantial] deference" in situations such as this where the 
motion judge also conducted the trial, Commonwealth v. Grace, 
397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986), and thus was in a "superior position 
to assess the credibility of the defendant's claims" of an 
undisclosed plea deal.  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 
792 n.14 (2004).  Reversal for abuse of discretion in such 
circumstances "is particularly rare" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 302 (2004).  We will 
reverse the judgment only if the judge made "a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
14 
 
 
alternatives" (quotations and citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
The judge here did not err in finding that the defendant's 
evidence of a Brady violation, including the submitted 
affidavits, Christopher's plea, and Christopher's civil action 
testimony, did not create a substantial issue warranting an 
evidentiary hearing because the evidence was not sufficiently 
credible to "cast doubt on the issue" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 348. 
 
i.  Lack of affidavits.  A judge may deny a motion for a 
new trial without an evidentiary hearing where the moving party 
"suspicious[ly] fail[s] to provide pertinent information from an 
expected and available source."  Goodreau, supra at 354.  
Defense counsel aiming to uncover a secret plea agreement 
should, at a minimum, attempt to obtain information from the key 
witness's attorney and the prosecutor who supposedly negotiated 
the deal.  See Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 710-711 & 
n.15 (2000).  Even if those parties refuse to provide 
affidavits, as the defendant here assumed they would, defense 
counsel could provide evidence of a possible Brady violation by 
filing an affidavit presenting the parties' refusal to attest to 
the lack of a negotiation or plea deal.  See Commonwealth v. 
Raymond, 450 Mass. 729, 734 (2008) ("the absence of 
countervailing affidavits from those in a position to know the 
15 
 
 
truth regarding the existence of an agreement supports a 
determination of a lack of credibility").  Here, defendant did 
neither and the silence betrays a "very telling omission" 
confirming the judge's finding that the defendant's motion did 
not raise a substantial issue about the existence of an 
undisclosed plea agreement.  Goodreau, supra.  See Commonwealth 
v. DeCicco, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 159, 163 (2001) (lack of 
affidavits as to plea agreement "handicapped" court). 
ii.  Plea agreement.  Christopher's guilty plea also does 
not raise a substantial issue requiring an evidentiary hearing.  
Even though a favorable disposition for a cooperating witness 
following testimony can, when combined with other strong 
evidence, raise a substantial issue to cast doubt on a jury's 
conclusion, that situation does not present here.  See Hill, 432 
Mass. at 710-711. 
In his second motion for a new trial, the defendant 
attempted to explain how the facts in his case align with those 
in Hill, 432 Mass. at 716, where we held that the key witness's 
later plea provided grounds for a new trial.  As the judge here 
properly determined, the defendant's arguments are unavailing.  
In Hill, we affirmed an order for a new trial because the key 
witness received a plea deal that reduced his possible sentence 
by at least twelve and one-half years from the sentence that he 
would have received under his original indictment, in part 
16 
 
 
because during his testimony at the defendant's trial, the 
witness admitted to conduct that should have carried a 
significantly higher penalty, thus supporting an inference that 
the witness had an expectation of "substantial consideration."  
See id. at 711-712.  Although Christopher also received a more 
favorable sentence than what one would have expected based on 
his original indictment for murder in the first degree, he 
distanced, rather than inculpated, himself from his murder 
charge during his testimony at the defendant's trial. 
Second, the defendant ignores that in Hill, 432 Mass. at 
711, we relied on representations made by the prosecutor and the 
key witness at trial that "reasonably could be interpreted . . . 
as a promise" that later came to fruition.  The judge here found 
the opposite.  He explicitly endorsed the "prosecutor's 
specific, credible, and repeated [on-the-record] denials" of an 
undisclosed plea agreement.  At a sidebar discussing the 
defendant's motion in limine, the judge asked the prosecutor 
whether there were "any promise, reward or inducement," to which 
the prosecutor responded, "No."7  The prosecutor then explained 
that, during Treefon's criminal trial, Christopher testified and 
defense counsel cross-examined him regarding any expectation of 
                     
 
7 The judge asked again whether "anybody said to 
[Christopher], 'Kid, you are getting second [degree murder] for 
[your testimony]'" and the prosecutor responded with "No, not by 
the Commonwealth.  Not by me." 
17 
 
 
a plea deal, and that Christopher also told the grand jury that 
there was no deal or collusion.  Further, the judge noted that 
because he made "[non]cursory or general" inquiries to the 
prosecutor, which the prosecutor denied directly, there was "no 
reason to repeat what would be a nearly identical inquiry of the 
prosecutor in a separate evidentiary hearing on this motion." 
Moreover, defense counsel admitted at trial that his only 
factual evidence was an attorney's affidavit, attesting to 
having overheard a conversation outside of Treefon's criminal 
trial, in which an assistant district attorney unrelated to 
Treefon's or the defendant's criminal trials stated that 
Christopher would receive a plea of murder in the second degree 
for his testimony at Treefon's trial.  Defense counsel then 
confessed that the motion relied in part on his "subjective 
understanding" that prosecutors in Barnstable County often 
violated Brady by withholding evidence of plea deals with 
cooperating witnesses.  Instead of providing concrete evidence 
to bolster his view, defense counsel posited that "[i]t strains 
credulity to think that Christopher . . . , who is charged with 
a first degree murder, testified in the last trial for the 
Commonwealth, is going to testify in this trial for the 
Commonwealth and has nothing -- nothing -- nothing unspoken, 
nothing tacit -- in other words, he's going to walk out of here 
after that trial thinking in his head that he could still get 
18 
 
 
prosecuted for first degree murder. That's rubbish. That's not 
true."  As attractive as his rhetoric may be, it is not legally 
persuasive.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 458-459 
(1998) (discussing defense counsel's persuasive, yet legally 
unsuccessful, arguments about cooperating witness testifying to 
"save his own neck" and to "do anything, absolutely anything to 
please the government and convict [the defendant] because he 
doesn't want the punishment").  Without any statements by the 
prosecutor, by Christopher, or by his plea counsel hinting at 
promises, the judge did not abuse his discretion by trusting the 
prosecutor's unequivocal denials over the defense counsel's 
subjectively based thesis. 
Lastly, the defendant cherry-picked statements at 
Christopher's plea hearing in an endeavor to align the facts in 
his case with those in Hill, 432 Mass. at 708, where the 
prosecutor noted at a hearing on the key witness's plea deal 
that the Commonwealth had offered a lighter sentence as a "quid 
pro quo" for the witness's testimony.  The prosecutor here 
admitted that Christopher received a plea deal in part because 
of his testimony against Treefon and the defendant at their 
criminal trials.  Unlike in Hill though, the comments by the 
prosecutor and Christopher's counsel at the plea hearing weigh 
against the defendant's position, and the defendant's 
selectively quoted words and phrases from the plea hearing, 
19 
 
 
taken out of context and contrary to their intended meaning, are 
not convincing.8 
In sum, the judge made no "clear error of judgment," L.L., 
470 Mass. at 185 n.27, in deciding that none of the evidence 
concerning what Christopher or the prosecutor said at the 
defendant's trial or at Christopher's plea deal "raise[d] a 
substantial issue with respect to" the existence of an 
                     
 
8 First, the defendant points out that the prosecutor noted 
"no discussions concerning a change of plea were ever openly 
discussed" (emphasis added).  As the motion judge noted, that 
statement has to be considered in the context of the 
prosecutor's statement that immediately preceded the "openly 
discussed" comment, that "there was never an offer made to 
[Christopher] or his attorney during the pendency" of Treefon's 
or the defendant's cases.  In this context, the word "openly" 
does not magically connote any hidden agreement, and we agree 
with the judge that it likely demonstrated that the prosecutors 
may have deliberated internally about offering a plea before the 
end of trial or that they never uttered anything concerning it 
until after the trial.  Next, the defendant highlights that 
Christopher's plea counsel called the prosecutor a "man of his 
word" following the Commonwealth's recommendation of the plea.  
But, as determined by the motion judge, Christopher's plea 
counsel used that phrase in the course of explaining to the plea 
judge that the prosecutor had helped instigate Christopher's 
transfer to a new jail because he endured serious threats for 
cooperating with investigations.  Finally, the defendant 
incorrectly alleges that Christopher's plea counsel admitted 
that a "quid pro quo" existed.  Christopher's plea counsel, not 
the prosecutor, mentioned "quid pro quo" while asking the judge 
for a lower sentence than the Commonwealth had recommended based 
on Christopher's "self-advancement and for his cooperation with 
the Commonwealth."  Plea counsel was not explaining the 
underlying reason for the Commonwealth's recommendation for a 
sentence.  As the judge stated, if there was a quid pro quo, the 
Commonwealth would have been bound by the agreement. 
20 
 
 
undisclosed plea deal in violation of Brady.  Goodreau, 442 
Mass. at 354. 
iii.  Credibility of Christopher's testimony at the civil 
trial.  In the context of a motion for a new trial "based on 
recantation by a material witness," the motion judge "grave[ly] 
consider[s] . . . the credibility of the witness's new 
testimony" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Waters, 410 Mass. 
224, 231 (1991), based on the judge's evaluation of the 
submitted evidence "in light of factors pertinent to 
credibility, including bias, self-interest, and delay," 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 469 Mass 398, 403 (2014).  The judge 
examined Christopher's civil action testimony in light of 
Christopher's earlier trial appearances and grand jury 
testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 458 Mass. 405, 416 
(2010).  Even though Christopher was the Commonwealth's key 
witness and therefore his testimony was "particularly vulnerable 
to even slight blows to its credibility," Commonwealth v. 
Collins, 386 Mass. 1, 10 (1982), the judge determined that 
Christopher's civil action testimony alleging the existence of a 
secret plea agreement did not raise a substantial issue 
sufficient for an evidentiary hearing because it was unreliable, 
self-serving, and unworthy of further examination.  See Torres, 
469 Mass. at 403.  The judge concluded that Christopher provided 
his civil action testimony to protect his father, and by 
21 
 
 
extension his mother and sisters, from losing their half of the 
victim's $2 million estate in Irene's wrongful death suit.  
There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
To sufficiently demonstrate that Treefon actually had no 
connection to or responsibility for the victim's death, 
Christopher needed to recant his earlier testimony incriminating 
Treefon.  Christopher asserted that his father "deserve[d] to 
win."  To that end, Christopher outright contradicted his 
earlier testimony regarding the plea deal, and used the alleged 
"secret," unwritten plea agreement to explain his previous 
testimony against Treefon as a strategy encouraged by his 
attorneys to avoid a life sentence.  In addition, throughout his 
civil action testimony, Christopher conveniently forgot facts or 
conversations related to Treefon's involvement, while having 
little difficulty remembering most details about the murder not 
implicating his father, including that the defendant killed the 
victim.  Although not stating that his previous testimony 
painting his father as the mastermind of the victim's death was 
false, Christopher repeatedly claimed not to remember the 
circumstances or facts behind that testimony or even to recall 
giving that testimony only when confronting statements about 
Treefon.  "The judge could [therefore] rationally conclude that 
the factual predicate for [these claims] was not credible."  
Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 351. 
22 
 
 
b.  Denial of the second motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence of a Brady violation.  For the same 
reasons as stated supra, the judge did not abuse his discretion 
in finding that there was no undisclosed plea deal that would 
require granting the defendant's second motion for a new trial 
based on the existence of a Brady violation.  See Grace, 397 
Mass. at 305-306.9 
Even if we were to assume that Christopher's civil action 
testimony were newly discovered and credible evidence, the 
defendant could only prevail on the second motion for a new 
trial if that newly discovered evidence would have been a "real 
factor" in the jury deliberations so as to "cast real doubt on 
the justice of the conviction."10  Grace, 397 Mass. at 305.  See 
                     
 
9 Where the defendant does not meet the requisite burden to 
establish that the motion judge erred in denying his request for 
an evidentiary hearing for an alleged Brady violation, the 
defendant necessarily will not meet the requisite burden, using 
the same evidence, to establish that the motion judge erred (or 
abused his discretion) in denying the defendant's motion for a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence of that alleged 
Brady violation.  See Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 355.  Although 
"[t]he inquiry into whether the defendant has satisfied the new 
trial standard is conceptually distinct from" the inquiry into 
whether the judge correctly decided not to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, the judge relies on "many of the same considerations" 
regarding the "trustworthiness" of the submitted evidence to 
determine if the newly discovered evidence meets the threshold 
for a new trial by "cast[ing] real doubt on the justice of the 
conviction."  Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 39 (2015), 
S.C., 479 Mass. 479 (2018). 
 
 
10 Some of our cases have reviewed an appeal from the denial 
of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence 
23 
 
 
Bonnett, 482 Mass. at 844.  Although Christopher's civil action 
testimony does not raise a substantial issue about the existence 
of a Brady violation, it may constitute impeachment evidence of 
the Commonwealth's key witness at the defendant's trial.  Newly 
discovered evidence that impeaches a key witness's credibility 
usually does not warrant a new trial.  Commonwealth v. Drayton, 
479 Mass. 479, 490 (2018).  However, we will grant a new trial 
where the evidence "seriously undermines the credibility of that 
[key] witness['s]" testimony upon which the Commonwealth's case 
almost solely relied (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Cowels, 
470 Mass. 607, 621 (2015), as measured against the "over-all 
strength or weakness of the prosecution's case," id. at 623.  
Determining "whether such evidence warrants a new trial is left 
to the sound discretion of the motion judge."  See Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 633 (2000). 
First, even if the jury had heard the additional evidence 
from the civil action, the judge did not abuse his discretion by 
                     
consolidated with the direct appeal from a conviction of murder 
in the first degree under the Grace standard.  See Commonwealth 
v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 31 (2015).  Others have determined 
whether the newly discovered evidence created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Chatman, 466 Mass. 327, 333 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 840 (2016).  
Still others have combined the standards.  See Commonwealth v. 
Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 276 (2005).  Although we have applied the 
Grace standard after a thorough review of the record, the 
outcome would be the same if we reviewed for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, or for both standards. 
24 
 
 
concluding that it did not cast real doubt on the jury's 
conviction given the remaining evidence submitted by the 
Commonwealth.  See Amaral, 482 Mass. at 511. 
In addition to the testimony of Christopher's friend 
corroborating the defendant's participation in the murder 
scheme, the defendant admitted during his interrogation to being 
with Christopher on Cape Cod at around the time of the murder, 
without a plausible alternative reason for being there, and to 
purchasing the Ruger and the ammunition that killed the victim.  
As the judge noted, there was a "web of evidence" strongly 
supporting the defendant's guilt, including his hiding the 
murder weapon, the ballistics evidence, and the defendant's text 
message, indicating the defendant's expectation of an influx of 
cash from his brother-in-law on the day of the murder.  The 
judge did not abuse his discretion by concluding that such 
evidence was "strongly persuasive" and therefore that 
Christopher's civil action testimony would not have been a "real 
factor" in the jury's deliberations so as to cast real doubt on 
the jury's verdict (citation omitted).  Bonnett, 482 Mass. at 
844. 
 
The defendant's version of events, which strained 
credulity, bolstered the Commonwealth's affirmative evidence.  
The defendant claimed that Christopher swiped the gun from the 
trunk of the defendant's car and then shot the victim without 
25 
 
 
the defendant's knowledge, all while the defendant waited in his 
car in a random parking lot in Hyannis.  The defendant kept the 
key to the gun case with his keys to the car, which, according 
to his responses during interrogation, he never let out of his 
sight on the night of September 29, 2009.  The girlfriend found 
the case locked in her basement days later.  For Christopher to 
have used the gun without the defendant's knowledge, Christopher 
would have had to open the trunk, pick the lock on the gun case, 
close the trunk, return from the murder, open the trunk, replace 
the gun, and relock the case without a key, all without the 
defendant noticing.  The jury could reasonably have inferred 
that this, or any similar version of the night's events,11 was 
not credible, particularly in the context of the entirety of the 
defendant's interrogation, which was marked by denials and 
contradictions. 
 
Second, the jury also knew that defense counsel's primary 
trial strategy was to impeach Christopher's credibility, 
                     
11 In one of the letters from jail to his ex-girlfriend, all 
entered as exhibits by the prosecution, the defendant told an 
alternative form of this story where the defendant (1) bought 
the gun; (2) drove to Christopher's house; (3) used the bathroom 
and Christopher somehow took the gun; (4) did not notice the gun 
missing while driving Christopher to the Cape to meet with an 
unknown individual; (5) stopped to use the bathroom when 
returning from the Cape, at which point Christopher put the gun 
back into his car's center console; (6) noticed the open gun 
case in his trunk when he returned to his ex-girlfriend's house; 
and (7) brought the gun inside.  The story has flaws similar to 
those in the story he told to police. 
26 
 
 
accomplished by repeated assertions during cross-examination and 
in closing.  Specifically, defense counsel highlighted concerns 
about Christopher testifying due to an undisclosed plea deal and 
about Christopher's truthfulness.  In other words, "to the 
extent that [Christopher] had the sword of Damocles hanging over 
him in the form of a murder charge, and thus had incentive to 
please the prosecution in the hopes of establishing good will 
and securing leniency even absent any explicit agreement, this 
was argued by defense counsel at trial," Jackson, 428 Mass. at 
458, and considered by the jury.12  The judge therefore did not 
err in finding that admitting this testimony at trial would not 
have materially affected the jury's deliberations so as to cast 
real doubt on the conviction. 
                     
12 Defense counsel noted during cross-examination that the 
Commonwealth had charged Christopher with murder in the first 
degree and asked if he would "be surprised" if he found himself 
"in this room three or four months" later.  He also asked 
whether Christopher thought that he was "going to get something 
for testifying here" and insinuated that Christopher did not 
really testify to do the right thing.  In closing, defense 
counsel first impeached Christopher's ability to tell the truth 
by reminding the jury that Christopher initially told one of his 
friends that he was responsible for the murder.  Defense counsel 
later suggested that the jury was "being asked to swallow a 
legal fiction on the question of whether or not Christopher 
. . . is getting anything for testifying."  He also informed the 
jury that promises could be as simple as a "nudge" or a "nod."  
Defense counsel finished by trying to convince the jurors that 
they should not believe Christopher's testimony because he only 
went to the police months after his arrest with "an expectation 
in his head of what he is getting for coming up here." 
27 
 
 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  As part of our 
plenary review, we note that, on direct examination, Christopher 
testified in response to the prosecutor's question, "What 
happened next?" as follows: 
[The defendant] -- he got in the car.  And he said -- he 
said something like -- his hand was shaking; and he said 
something about he's not nervous.  He said, 'I'm not 
nervous.'  He said, 'I've done this before.'" 
 
The defendant did not object to this statement at trial, in 
either of his motions for a new trial, or as a part of his 
direct appeal to us pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
Presumably, this reference to "I've done this before" went 
unnoticed by the parties and the court. 
The prosecution "may not introduce evidence that a 
defendant previously has misbehaved . . . for the purposes of 
showing his bad character or propensity to commit the crime 
charged" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. 
277, 289 (2011).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404 (b) (2019).  However, 
the prosecution may introduce that same evidence for other valid 
reasons, so long as its probative value is not outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 
228, 249 (2014).  Judges "must guard against the risk that such 
evidence will divert the jury's attention from the charged crime 
or otherwise unfairly prejudice the defendant."  Commonwealth v. 
Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 407 (2017).  In the absence of a 
28 
 
 
limiting instruction to the jury regarding the introduction of 
prior bad acts where the defendant did not object, we review the 
error for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 Mass. 799, 809 (2002).  On the 
record before us, where the evidence was not specific as to what 
the defendant had done before, and where the prosecutor did not 
mention the fact in his closing, we find that the error created 
no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
We therefore conclude that the verdict of murder in the 
first degree is consonant with justice, and we decline to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to order a new 
trial or to reduce the verdict. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and the orders of the Superior Court 
denying the defendant's motions for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.