Title: Howard v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 114, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JERMAINE HOWARD,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No.  114, 2007 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. #0604009582 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July 25, 2007 
Decided:  August 14, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 14th day of August 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Appellant-defendant Jermaine Howard appeals his possession of 
cocaine, endangering the welfare of a child, failure to signal1 and disregarding a 
stop sign convictions in the Superior Court.  Howard contends that the trial judge 
erred when he denied his motion to suppress drugs that police found in his 
automobile.  He also contends that police unreasonably detained him for 40 
minutes.  The record shows that police had reasonable suspicion to stop Howard’s 
automobile for traffic violations.  Police also had probable cause to believe that 
                                          
 
1  
The jury convicted Howard on three counts of failure to signal.  
 
 2
Howard was engaged in drug activity before they stopped Howard for traffic 
violations based on information from a reliable informant and their own 
independent investigation.  Therefore, the trial judge acted within his discretion 
when he denied Howard’s motion to suppress.  Furthermore, the 40 minute 
detention was reasonable because it was reasonably related to the scope of the stop 
and did not exceed the two hours authorized by 11 Del. C. § 1902(c).  Accordingly, 
we affirm. 
(2) 
In March 2006, New Castle County Police Officer Ernest Melvin 
received information from a reliable informant2 that a male suspect named “J” was 
“allegedly selling Crack Cocaine from his Maroon Dodge Durango.”  Based on 
other ongoing investigations as well as his independent investigation, Melvin 
determined that “J” was likely Jermaine Howard.3  Melvin also discovered that 
Jermaine Howard owned a maroon Dodge Durango. 
(3) 
Meanwhile, New Castle Police received several complaints of drug 
dealing at 5 Osage Road in Claymont.  On April 12, 2006, while surveilling the 
address, officers witnessed a maroon Dodge Durango pull up and stop in the 
                                          
 
2  
Melvin testified that the “past-proven reliable source” who “has done numerous 
investigations with us and has had numerous convictions among those investigations[.]” 
 
3  
In an unrelated investigation, Melvin discovered that Jermaine Howard went by the name 
of “J.”  
 
 3
middle of the street.  A female walked out of the residence and approached the 
passenger side of the automobile.  The driver and the female engaged in “some 
type of transaction” with the driver and the Durango drove away.  As the Durango 
drove away, the officers determined that the automobile was registered to Jermaine 
Howard.  Based on these observations, the drug dealing complaints, and the 
informant’s tip, Melvin suspected that Howard drove the automobile and that his 
visit to 5 Osage Road was drug related.  
(3) 
While following the Durango, the officers witnessed a similar 
exchange between the driver and an unknown individual on Wistar Avenue.4  After 
the completion of the Wistar Avenue transaction, the officers continued their 
surveillance of the automobile and observed the driver commit several traffic 
violations.5  Melvin then stopped the automobile.6  Melvin asked Howard several 
questions and told him to get out of the automobile.  Melvin asked him “what he 
had been doing in the last hour.”  Howard’s answer indicated that he had not been 
                                          
 
4 (A30).  Melvin testified that “it was dark [and that he] couldn’t see exactly what kinda took 
place, but it was the same type of action as took place in front of 5 Osage Drive.” 
 
5  
According to Melvin, “[the automobile] failed to come to a complete stop at the stop sign 
and failed to utilize his turn signal appropriately as it turned onto Darley Road.” 
 
6  
There were two juveniles in the back seat of Howard’s car approximately ages three and 
six. 
 
 4
to 5 Osage Road.  Howard admitted to being at Wistar Avenue but told the officers 
that he “never made contact with anyone over there.” 
(4) 
Melvin dispatched a K-9 unit to perform an open air sniff of the 
automobile.  Approximately 40 minutes later, the K-9 arrived and signaled that 
drugs were hidden near the steering wheel of the automobile.7  Melvin searched the 
cab of the automobile and found several bags containing cocaine “just above the 
steering wheel, in the lining . . .  [of] the ceiling.”8  Police arrested Howard and a 
New Castle County grand jury indicted him on one count of possession with intent 
to deliver cocaine and other related offenses. 
(5) 
On July 7, 2006, Howard filed a motion to suppress the evidence that 
Melvin seized during the traffic stop.  The trial judge denied Howard’s motion, 
finding that “the police were justified in making the stop, detaining [Howard], and 
searching [his] car.”  A jury trial began on September 14, 2006 and resulted in a 
mistrial.  Before his second trial, Howard attempted to renew his motion to 
suppress, and the trial judge denied his motion.  At the second trial, the jury found 
Howard guilty of possession of cocaine, use of a vehicle for keeping controlled 
                                          
 
7  
Melvin testified that this information was significant “because of the initial information 
[from the informant] that [he] received in reference to the subject, “J”, selling crack out of his 
Dodge Durango an hiding it in the fuse box located underneath the steering wheel.”   
 
8  
Melvin testified that during his search of the interior of Howard’s automobile he noticed 
multiple air fresheners “[likely designed] to mask any type of odor that the drugs may emanate.” 
 
 5
substances, endangering the welfare of a child, three counts of failure to signal and 
one count of disregarding a stop sign.  The trial judge sentenced Howard to three 
years at Level V, suspended after six months, followed by 18 months at Level III. 
(6) 
First, Howard contends that the traffic stop violates the Delaware 
Constitution because it was mere pretext for the officers to engage in a drug 
investigation.  This Court reviews a Superior Court judge’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for an abuse of discretion.9 
 
(7) 
Traffic stops must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.10  Violation of traffic laws constitutes reasonable suspicion.11  Once 
lawfully stopped, “[t]he police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile 
if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of 
criminal activity.”12  Probable cause is measured by the “totality of the 
circumstances.”13  In Caldwell, this Court acknowledged that the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a pretextual traffic stop violated the 
                                          
 
9  
McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1122 (Del. 2002). 
 
10  
Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2001). 
 
11  
Id.  See also State v. Godwin, 2007 WL 2122142, *5 (Super. Ct.). 
 
12  
Id. at 1045 n.11. 
 
13  
Id. (citing Hovington v. State, 616 A.2d 829, 833 (Del. 1992)). 
 
 6
Federal Constitution, but we did not address whether such a stop violated the 
Delaware Constitution.14  
 
(8) 
We need not address here whether a pretextual stop offends Article I, 
Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution because the police in this case had probable 
cause to believe Howard had engaged in illegal drug activity before they stopped 
the automobile.15  Based on the totality of the circumstances, Melvin had a 
reasonable basis to believe that Howard had engaged in illegal drug activity before 
he stopped Howard for the traffic violations.  Melvin received an earlier tip from a 
reliable source that a man named “J” was selling drugs out of a maroon Dodge 
Durango.16  Independently, Melvin discovered that Howard drove a maroon Dodge 
                                          
 
14  
Id. at 1045 n. 9: 
Caldwell's claim on the pretexual stop is necessarily confined to the Delaware 
Constitution because any federal constitutional claim on this issue has been 
foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court. Addressing the permissible 
justification for a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment to the federal 
constitution, the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, held that a traffic stop 
is reasonable so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver 
has violated a traffic law-even if the officer decided to stop the car because the 
officer subjectively intended to use the stop as a means to investigate unrelated 
criminal activity. We do not address the Delaware constitutional claim because of 
our decision on the fourth amendment claim.”  (citation omitted). 
 
See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14(1996). 
 
15  
At least one Superior Court case has found that a pretextual stop violates the Delaware 
Constitution.  See State v. Heath, 2006 WL 3842144 (Del. Super.). 
 
16  
Howard contends that the police improperly relied upon the informant’s tip because the 
tip was “not specific, was stale and was uncorroborated.”  This argument is misplaced because 
the attendant facts and circumstances in this case fully support Melvin’s reliance.  Moreover, 
 7
Durango.  Melvin then saw a maroon Dodge Durango make a quick stop outside a 
residence where neighbors had reported drug dealing.  While outside that address, 
a woman left the residence, approached the passenger side of the automobile, and 
engaged in “some type of transaction [with] the operator . . . [and went] back into 
the residence.”  Officers then witnessed a similar transaction at another location.  
Consistent with the previous tip, the automobile was registered to a man who goes 
by the name of “J.”  Based on these facts, Melvin had a reasonable suspicion to 
stop and search the automobile.  Therefore, the trial judge acted within his 
discretion when he denied Howard’s motion to suppress. 
 
(9) 
Howard also contends that the police detention of Howard for 40 
minutes was unreasonable.  This argument is without merit.  The duration and 
investigation following a stop “must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the 
justification for their initiation.’”17  In Delaware, an investigative detention “shall 
not exceed 2 hours.”18  The stop in the present case lasted only 40 minutes.  The 40 
minute delay was for the purpose of obtaining the assistance of a drug sniffing dog 
– a technique less intrusive than a manually conducted full search of the vehicle.  
                                                                                                                                        
Melvin performed an independent investigation, both before and on the night in question, to 
corroborate his suspicion.   
 
17  
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1046 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-
81 (1975)).  
 
18  
11 Del. C. § 1902 (c). 
 8
Arguably, the process police used to conduct the less intrusive search would have 
benefited a law abiding member of the public simply subject to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  Under the circumstances, the police acted 
circumspectly and reasonably.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice