Title: State v. Flemmer
Citation: 211 N.W.2d 189
Docket Number: 449
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: October 1, 1973

211 N.W.2d 189 (1973) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Clay FLEMMER, Defendant/Appellant. Cr. No. 449. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 1, 1973. Rehearing Denied October 23, 1973. Benjamin C. Pulkrabek, Bismarck, for defendant/appellant. Allen I. Olson, Atty. Gen., and Thomas F. Kelsch, State's Atty., and Dennis A. Schneider, Asst. State's Atty., Bismarck, for plaintiff/appellee. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. On March 26, 1973, the defendant Clay Flemmer pleaded guilty on the advice of counsel to the crime of possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge sentenced him to imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for one year, with the sentence to commence at the expiration of a two-to-five-year term of imprisonment *190 which he was then serving as a result of a conviction of the crime of delivery of a controlled substance. Clay has appealed to this court, contending that the trial court was in error in imposing a consecutive sentence. He seeks to have the same issue determined through the certification of the following question: "Does North Dakota law, when a defendant has been sentenced to the Penitentiary for a crime, and while he is serving this sentence is convicted of a subsequent crime, other than escape or attempted escape from the Penitentiary, give the Court passing sentence on this second crime the power and jurisdiction to sentence the defendant in such a manner that the second sentence will run consecutively to the sentence now being served?" The pertinent section of our Code relative to certification reads: It is our view that when, as here, the trial court did not halt the proceedings but concluded them by imposing sentence and judgment, the certification procedure does not apply. We shall, however, proceed to a determination of the issue on appeal. Clay refers us to two statutes. They follow: Clay contends and the State agrees that since sentence had been previously pronounced upon him for the crime of delivery of a controlled substance, Section 12-06-24, N.D.C.C., does not apply to him. Clay contends that since Section 12-06-24, N.D.C.C., is not applicable, Section 12-06-09, N.D.C.C., applies and requires that the sentence commence to run at the time of its pronouncement. Section 12-06-09 reads: He further asserts that the only other statute relating to consecutive sentences is Section 12-16-05, N.D.C.C., and since that applies only to an attempted escape or escape *191 that it does not apply in the instant case. The pertinent part of that statute reads: He further asserts that Section 62-01-02, N.D.C.C., relating to the imposition of additional punishment when certain crimes are committed while armed also does not apply. That section reads: The State asserts that Section 12-06-09, N.D.C.C., does not prohibit a consecutive sentence. It agrees that Sections 12-16-05 and 62-01-02, N.D.C.C., do not apply. It is the State's position that there is only one situation in North Dakota when a consecutive sentence is mandatory, and that is in the case of an escape or an attempt to escape, and that it is within the trial court's discretion in all other instances to determine whether a sentence should run consecutively or concurrently. The State points out that the district court is a constitutional office with wide authority. Section 103, Constitution of North Dakota. The State asserts further that if this court were to adopt Clay's reasoning to the effect that a sentence must begin when pronounced, there would be little to deter a person from committing a crime while in the Penitentiary. It contends that this conclusion follows from the fact that the longer the sentence one is serving while in the Penitentiary, the more serious a crime one may commit while there without suffering any additional confinement. The State rejects as preposterous the argument that the solution lies in the warden's power to restrict an inmate's privileges while in the Penitentiary when he commits another crime while there. Notwithstanding that the State has found no case law clearly in point supporting its position, and Clay has cited a number of decisions of other states which have required a sentence in a comparable situation to run concurrently, we conclude that since we have no law which prohibits a district court from imposing a consecutive sentence, it was within the district court's discretion to determine whether the sentence should run concurrently or consecutively in this instance. This view is in accord with the recommendations contained in the Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures. Senate Bill 2045 of the 1973 session of our Legislature completely revises Title 12 of our Code. Section 31 thereof creates Chapter 12.1-32 of the North Dakota Century Code, and Section 12.1-32-11 relates, among other things, to the courts' authority to impose consecutive sentences. As Senate Bill 2045 does not become effective until July 1, 1975, the pertinent section thereof relating to the issue in this case is set forth herein merely to help alert our people to the new features of the law relative to this subject while there is still time to revise the law in the intervening session of the Legislature, should such revision be necessary. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the sentence and judgment of the trial court. TEIGEN, PAULSON, KNUDSON and VOGEL, JJ., concur. VOGEL, J., was not a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, he participated on the briefs filed in this case.