Title: Fox v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 741, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN FOX, 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 741, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. 0701004097 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  November 3, 2010 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  December 20, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, and  RIDGELY, 
Justices and WITHAM, Judge,1 constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 20th day of December 2010, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, John Fox (“Fox”), a juvenile offender, 
pled guilty to Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, a felony, and 
the State entered a nolle prosequi for one count of Rape in the Third 
Degree.2  Fox was fifteen years old at the time of the offense and his victim, 
a cousin, was four years old.  Fox moved for relief from registration as a sex 
offender after he had already been sentenced and registered.  The Family 
Court denied that request.   
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
2 State v. Fox, No. 0701004097 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 3, 2009). 
 
2
 
2) 
Fox raises three issues on appeal:  first, he is eligible to seek 
relief from registration as a sex offender based on the legislative changes in 
the wording of subsection (6) of title 11, section 4121(d) of the Delaware 
Code; second, the sentencing judge has discretion under title 11, section 
4121(d)(6) to defer a decision on whether to designate a person as a sex 
offender until after treatment and the completion of a risk assessment as to 
the person’s propensity to re-offend; and third, the sentencing judge has 
discretion to consider retroactively a person’s petition for relief from sex 
offender designation under title 11, section 4121(d)(6), if the person’s 
statutory eligibility for relief arose after sentencing but while the person was 
still subject to the Family Court’s jurisdiction. 
 
3) 
Subsection 4121(d)(6) of title 11, currently provides: 
Notwithstanding any provision in this section or in § 4120 of 
this title to the contrary, any person who would otherwise be 
designated as a sex offender pursuant to this section and to § 
4120 of this title may petition the sentencing Court for relief 
from such designation, and from all obligations imposed by this 
section and § 4120 of this title if: 
 
a. 
The Tier II or Tier III offense for which the person 
was convicted was a misdemeanor and the victim was not 
a child under 13 years of age; and 
b. 
The person has not previously been convicted of a 
violent felony, or any other offense set forth in paragraph 
(a)(4) of this section, or of any offense specified in the 
laws of another state, the United States, or any territory 
of the United States, or any offense in a foreign 
 
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jurisdiction which is the same as, or equivalent to, such 
offenses; and 
c. 
The 
sentencing 
court 
determines 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence that such person is not 
likely to pose a threat to public safety if released from the 
obligations imposed by this section, and by § 4120 of this 
title. 
 
Notwithstanding anything in this paragraph to the contrary, no 
person designated as a Tier II or Tier III sex offender shall be 
afforded relief from designation as a sex offender if the victim 
of any of the offenses for which the person was convicted were 
less than 12 years old at the time of the crime, unless the person 
was also less than 18 years old at the time of the crime in which 
case the prohibition set forth in this sentence shall not apply . . .3 
 
 
4) 
In this case, the Family Court determined that the last paragraph 
in section 4121(d)(6) “did not provide broad discretion to the Family Court . 
. . but only exempted juveniles from this specific mandatory prohibition in 
relief.”4  The Family Court interpreted the “notwithstanding” language as 
providing an “exception to the exception” for juvenile sex offenders where 
the victim was under twelve years old at the time of the offense.  The Family 
Court noted that if the addition of “Tier II or Tier III” in paragraph a. gave it 
the discretion to grant an exemption to any juvenile sex offenders, felony or 
misdemeanor, then the “discretion to defer designation would apply to both 
adults and juveniles because the last two sentences of this section 4121(d)(6) 
                                          
 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4121(d)(6).  
4 State v. Fox, No. 0701004097 at 5. 
 
4
pertain to ‘any person seeking relief.’”5  The Family Court held that “the 
Legislature . . . did not provide a separate section of the code to address 
juvenile offenders.  The legislative intent ‘to include juveniles, without 
regard to age, within the scope of the Sex Offender Registration Statute, is 
explicit.’”6 
 
5) 
The Family Court also held that the subsection was not 
retroactively applicable to Fox because the “statute does not provide a 
designated sex offender with the opportunity to seek relief after sentencing 
under 11 Del. C. § 4121(d)(6).”7  The Family Court ruled that subsection 
4121(d)(6) specifically requires that “[a]ny person seeking relief from 
designation as a sex offender under this paragraph shall file a petition with 
the sentencing court prior to sentencing requesting such relief.”8   
6) 
The Family Court decision in this case, rejected the rationale of 
another Family Court decision in Becker,9 thereby creating a conflict of 
opinions within the Family Court.  We resolve that conflict by approving the 
ratio decidendi of the Family Court in this case.  The Family Court’s 
                                          
 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 6 (quoting Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1079 (Del. 2001)). 
7 Id. at 4. 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4121(d)(6). 
9 State v. Becker, 979 A.2d 1149 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2009). 
 
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decision in Becker is overruled, to the extent that it is inconsistent with the 
Family Court’s decision in this case.   
7) 
Having considered this matter after oral argument and on the 
briefs filed by the parties, this Court has determined that the final judgment 
of the Family Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons 
assigned by the Family Court in its well-reasoned decision dated December 
3, 2009. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Family Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
Justice