Title: P. v. Foster
Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 1301
Docket Number: S058025
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2010

1 
Filed 11/18/10 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S058025 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
San Bernardino County  
RICHARD DON FOSTER, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. VCR5976 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 
____________________________________) 
A jury convicted Richard Don Foster of the first degree murder of Gail 
Johnson (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 
§ 459), and second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).1  The jury found true the 
special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed while defendant 
was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of burglary and robbery.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G).)  The jury also found true the allegation that 
defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife, in connection 
with the murder and the robbery.  (§ 12022, subd. (b).)  The jury further found that 
defendant previously had been convicted of two serious or violent felonies.  
(§ 667, subd. (a).)  Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict of death.  Defendant moved for a new trial (§ 1181), to strike the special 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 
circumstances, and for modification of the penalty to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole (§ 190.4, subd. (e)).  The trial court denied these motions, 
sentenced defendant to death, imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses, and 
ordered restitution in the amount of $200.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, 
subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
1.  The prosecution case 
a.  Summary 
In the afternoon of August 26, 1991, Gail Johnson‟s body was found on the 
floor of the minister‟s office in the High Desert Church of Religious Science in 
Apple Valley (the church).  She had been stabbed at least eight times.  Her purse 
was found on the floor near her body, and her wallet was missing.  Blood found in 
the minister‟s office matched defendant‟s blood, and the combination of 10 
particular sequences of DNA found in the blood would be expected to occur in 
approximately one in every 24 million individuals.  The victim‟s vehicle was 
found in the parking lot of a business that defendant visited on the day of the 
crimes.  Her wallet was retrieved from a mine shaft in which defendant previously 
had disposed of other items.  A pair of jeans, stained with blood consistent with 
the victim‟s blood, also was found in the mine shaft and were the same brand and 
size as the jeans worn by defendant on the day he was arrested.  A bloodstain on a 
piece of tissue paper found in the mine shaft was consistent with defendant‟s 
blood.  Defendant had visited the church two days prior to the date of the crimes.  
Evidence was received establishing defendant‟s commission of two prior offenses 
in which he found women alone in an office and returned to rob and assault them.  
3 
b.  The day of the crimes 
Loren West testified that on Monday, August 26, 1991, he visited the 
church at approximately 11:20 a.m. to repair the air conditioning, at which time 
the victim, Gail Johnson, was in the church office.  West recalled opening a locked 
box of electrical fuses with a key that he obtained from a box provided by the 
victim.  After replacing a fuse, he returned the key to the victim in the church 
office and departed from the church at approximately 11:45 a.m.  He stated that he 
saw only one vehicle, other than his own, in the church parking lot, and that the 
victim was the only person he saw at the church.  At trial, West was shown a 
photograph of the keys spread out in a wooden tray at the church office, and 
testified he “would not have left the key box open with keys laying everywhere.”   
William Rosenthal testified that when he arrived at the church at 
approximately 1:00 p.m. that day to deliver stationery, he did not observe any 
other vehicles in the parking lot or any other persons in the church office.  When 
he looked into the minister‟s personal office, he saw a person lying on the floor 
next to the desk.  When he called into the minister‟s office, the person did not 
respond.  He reported his discovery to his manager and called 911.  
Mike Malloy, who was working that day as an engineer employed by the 
Apple Valley Fire District, testified that at approximately 1:00 p.m., he was 
assigned to respond to a call regarding “a person down” at the church.  He located 
the victim on the floor in the minister‟s office, on her back, fully clothed, with 
blood on her shirt.  Malloy determined she was not breathing and had no pulse.  
He testified that after an EKG test revealed that “her heart was systole . . . or flat-
lined,” he did not attempt to revive her.   
c.  Crime-scene evidence 
Dr. Frank Sheridan, the Chief Medical Examiner for the County of San 
Bernardino, conducted an autopsy.  He testified the victim was 53 years of age, 
4 
64 inches tall, and weighed 140 pounds.  He described numerous defensive 
wounds on the victim‟s hands and arms, and confirmed that these wounds “could 
occur . . . if someone is slashing at her . . . and she‟s trying to ward off the blows.”  
He stated there were bruises on the right side of her nose and jawline that were 
consistent with being punched, and a bruise on the back of her head that probably 
occurred when the victim fell backward.  All of these wounds were inflicted while 
the victim was alive.   
Sheridan testified that the victim was stabbed once in the neck and at least 
seven times in the chest.  He did not find anything, such as indentations on the 
victim‟s skin, indicating that the knife used in the attack had a handguard that 
would have prevented the perpetrator‟s hand from slipping past the handle.  He 
testified that the neck wound was not as deep as the others, and may have been 
inflicted while the victim was standing and the perpetrator held the knife at her 
neck.  One of the chest wounds was caused by two stabs through the sternum.  
Sheridan agreed that if the perpetrator‟s hand had blood on it when the knife hit 
the sternum, the perpetrator could have lost his grip and been cut.  Sheridan 
concluded the victim was lying on her back when the chest wounds were inflicted, 
because she had a bruise on the back of her head, the chest wounds occurred in 
quick succession, and two of the wounds extended to the back of the ribcage, 
indicating that the force of the thrust did not push her body back.   
Sheridan examined a photograph of defendant‟s right hand taken 
approximately two weeks after the murder.  He testified that an injury on 
defendant‟s palm was consistent with one that would be suffered if a person were 
to stab with a knife and the knife were to slip.  Sheridan also testified that 
defendant‟s wound would have bled and was consistent with the injury having 
occurred two weeks earlier.   
5 
David Stockwell, a criminalist in the San Bernardino County Sheriff‟s 
Department, was assigned to assist in the collection of evidence from the crime 
scene.  He testified that the victim‟s body was found on the floor of the minister‟s 
office, on her back, between the desk and the wall of the office.  Under the desk 
were numerous items that appeared to be from a purse, and a purse was beneath 
shelves that were affixed to the wall.  One of the victim‟s shoes was on the floor 
near her foot, and her other shoe was on the desk.2  A telephone and telephone 
cord also were on the floor, and the office window was broken.  Stockwell was 
aware that a key was found in the trash can in the minister‟s office.  He observed 
blood on numerous items in the minister‟s office. 
Stockwell received blood samples from the victim and defendant, which he 
analyzed to determine 11 genetic markers.  His analysis did not involve DNA 
directly, but focused instead upon particular proteins produced pursuant to the 
donor‟s DNA coding.  He testified that the 11 particular markers in defendant‟s 
blood appear most frequently in the Caucasian population, and those 11 markers 
are found in one in 42,600 Caucasian individuals. 
Stockwell analyzed numerous bloodstains found in the church but was 
unable to test every stain he collected for each of these 11 genetic markers, 
because some of the samples were too small.3  All of the bloodstains for which 
                                              
2  
Malloy, the paramedic, testified that he had moved the victim‟s body one or 
two feet away from a bookcase but could not recall whether shoes were on her 
feet. 
3  
Stockwell also testified that many of the bloodstains in the church had been 
covered with a white liquid or a white powder spray, and these white substances 
rendered the genetic tests on such stains inconclusive.  He did not analyze the 
liquid or the powder but testified that patches of the white liquid on the floor in the 
foyer led to the men‟s restroom, where he noticed a can of Right Guard deodorant 
and an empty bottle that appeared to him to have held hand lotion.  Dr. Sheridan 
(footnote continued on next page) 
6 
Stockwell obtained testing results were (1) consistent with the victim‟s blood, 
(2) consistent with defendant‟s blood, or (3) consistent with a mixture of both 
individuals‟ blood.  He testified that stains on the victim and on her clothing, and a 
blood smear on an ottoman located next to her body, were consistent with the 
victim‟s blood.  Bloodstains, found on the window blinds in the minister‟s office, 
apparently had been deposited as a result of being flung with some force from a 
moving object and were consistent with the victim‟s blood.  Stockwell analyzed 
samples obtained from the purse and concluded two smears were consistent with 
the victim‟s blood, three drops were consistent with defendant‟s blood, and two 
drops were consistent with a mixture of blood from both individuals.  Stockwell 
explained that because the mixtures appeared within single drops of blood, the two 
sources of blood must have mixed before contacting the surface of the purse.  
Bloodstains consistent with a mixture of the victim‟s blood and defendant‟s blood 
also were collected from the desk, the chair, two shelves of the bookcase, one of 
the shelves affixed to the wall, and the carpet in the minister‟s office.  Mixed 
stains also were found on the carpet outside the minister‟s office and on the floor 
of the church foyer.  Finally, bloodstains consistent with only defendant‟s blood 
were found on the carpet in the minister‟s office, the floor at the entrance to the 
church office, the floor of the foyer, and the drinking fountain in the foyer.   
Stockwell testified that samples of the victim‟s blood and defendant‟s 
blood, and a sample of a drop of blood obtained from the purse that was consistent 
with defendant‟s blood, were sent to Cellmark Diagnostics for DNA analysis.  
Dr. Robin Cotton, the laboratory director at Cellmark, explained that her 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
reported noticing a white substance on the victim‟s body and pants, which he 
described as liquid soap.   
7 
laboratory extracts DNA from cells and analyzes certain DNA sequences that vary 
in length among individuals.  At Cellmark‟s laboratory, five locations of the DNA 
from each of these three blood samples were examined.  Each location of the DNA 
generated two distinct lengths or “bands,” representing the DNA received from 
each parent and resulting in 10 bands to compare.  Cotton testified that all 10 of 
the bands from the blood on the purse matched the bands from defendant‟s blood.  
She also testified that the presence of all 10 of these bands would occur in 
approximately one in every 24 million individuals.   
Gilbert Johnson, the husband of the victim, testified that she worked as a 
volunteer at the church.  He identified the purse found in the minister‟s office as 
belonging to his wife, and numerous items found on the floor next to her body as 
normally kept by her in her purse.  He also testified that she had a habit of keeping 
at least $50 in her purse.  According to Johnson, his wife was strong-willed and 
would have resisted an attempt to rob or rape her.  
d.  Evidence obtained from other sites 
On August 26, 1991, at approximately 10:00 p.m., San Bernardino County 
Deputy Sheriff Phil Brown located the victim‟s vehicle in the parking lot of a 
Lucky store in Apple Valley.  Brown testified that the driving distance between 
the church and the parking lot was one and one-half miles.  Jeffrey Smink, a 
forensic specialist with the sheriff‟s department, testified that he did not find any 
fingerprints in the passenger compartment but located a bloodstain on the 
passenger seat.  Stockwell testified that this stain was consistent with a mixture of 
the victim‟s blood and defendant‟s blood.   
On September 10, 1991, Thomas Bradford, a detective with the San 
Bernardino County Sheriff‟s Department, together with defendant‟s parole officer, 
Steven Slaten, visited defendant at his residence.  Bradford testified that he took 
8 
possession of the clothes defendant was wearing, including Rustler brand blue 
jeans with a 33-inch waist and a 30-inch length, and a blue T-shirt. 
On January 11, 1992, Curtis Edwards and his brother found the victim‟s 
wallet in a mine shaft while the two men were prospecting in the Mojave Desert.  
Edwards testified that the wallet did not contain any cash.  He delivered it to the 
sheriff‟s department.  On January 18, the Edwards brothers led Detective Bradford 
to the mine shaft.  Bradford testified that he found a pair of Rustler brand blue 
jeans, with a 33-inch waist and a 30-inch length, and a blue T-shirt in the mine 
shaft, which was located 2.2 miles from defendant‟s residence.   
Stockwell analyzed bloodstains found on the pair of jeans and on a piece of 
tissue paper found in the mine shaft.  He testified that a stain “just above or right 
on the right knee” of the jeans was a “saturating” stain, indicating that the “fabric 
had come in contact with a fair amount of blood that soaked into that knee area.”  
He agreed that such a stain would be formed “if . . . [the victim‟s] blood was on 
the ground and [the person wearing the jeans] put their knee in it.”  He stated that, 
due to the passage of time and the conditions in the mine shaft, the blood had 
degraded, and he obtained results for only two genetic markers, both of which 
were consistent with the victim‟s blood.  With respect to the tissue paper, 
Stockwell testified that it was “crumpled,” with what appeared to be a contact 
blood smear, “as if someone was grasping that particular item and the blood from 
the hand would have bled onto that piece of paper.”  Stockwell obtained results for 
three genetic markers from the tissue paper, each of which matched defendant‟s 
blood.   
e.  Defendant’s visit to the church on Saturday, August 24, 1991 
Irma Plate, the minister of the church, testified that she attended a meeting 
at the church on Saturday, August 24, 1991 (two days prior to the murder).  She 
9 
recalled that, at some point that afternoon, Nina Pittsford, a church member, asked 
her to speak to a man who had come to the church but was not part of the meeting.  
The man identified himself as Martin Jennings and stated that his mother had been 
hospitalized.4  He asked Plate to pray for his mother.  Plate invited him to write a 
prayer request and to place it in the church‟s “prayer request box,” which he did.  
She testified that the man spoke with her for a moment or two, and then departed 
from the church.   
f.  Prior criminal conduct 
Johnnie C. testified that defendant had robbed and raped her on May 23, 
1972, when she was working as a receptionist at the Burns Studio in Boise, Idaho.  
She recalled that defendant entered the studio at approximately 11:15 a.m., when 
she was alone in the office, and told her he wanted a photograph of himself to send 
to his girlfriend.  Johnnie testified that defendant left after she scheduled an 
appointment for him, but he returned five or 10 minutes later and told her she 
should not call his home, because the portrait was to be a surprise for his family.  
She recalled that he left again, but returned again five or 10 minutes later, 
proceeded down the hall toward the studio‟s workrooms before she was able to 
return to the receptionist room, and told her he was “going to rob this place.”  
After confirming she was alone, he asked for her purse, which was in the cabinet 
behind him.  She testified that he took six or seven dollars from her purse.  When a 
bell on the front door rang, indicating someone had entered the studio, defendant 
said, “You better get out there and get rid of them fast or there‟s going to be a lot 
of people hurt.”  As she showed photographic proofs to the customers, she could 
                                              
4  
Defendant confirmed at trial that he was the man who visited the church on 
Saturday and who identified himself as “Martin Jennings.” 
10 
hear the floor squeak and therefore knew he was standing “right around the 
corner” watching her.   
Johnnie testified that when the customers left, defendant ordered her to 
return to the workroom and sit on a stool.  She saw that he had removed the money 
from the cash drawer, which was in the same cabinet as her purse, and had marked 
over his name in the appointment book.  She related that he came toward her and 
placed his hands on her breast and thigh, and she jumped off the stool and told him 
to leave her alone and to get away.  She recalled that he started hitting her in the 
face with his fist, splitting open her lip, and then knocked her down.  She testified 
that every time she tried to get up, he knocked her down with his fist.  He told her, 
“ „If you don‟t stop fighting, I‟m going to hurt you really bad.‟ ” She therefore 
“stopped fighting and just laid there crying and looking off.”  He then raped her.  
When he started to leave, he said, “ „You better not call the police and you better 
forget that you ever saw me or else I‟ll come back and kill you.‟ ”  She recalled 
that he pulled the telephone from the wall and left through the back door.  She 
reported that she suffered bruises on her face and body, and that he “hit me a lot in 
the abdomen.”  She did not see a weapon but thought he told her he had one; 
although she “was convinced that he did,” she could not “swear to it.”   
After pleading guilty to raping Johnnie C., defendant was sentenced to life 
in prison in Idaho.  Upon his release on parole on January 18, 1982, he moved to 
Apple Valley, California.   
Cindy M. testified that defendant robbed and assaulted her on March 29, 
1982, when she was working in the office of a solar energy business in Apple 
Valley.  She testified she was alone in the office when defendant walked in at 
approximately 11:00 a.m. and told her he was waiting for a real estate agent to 
show him an office.  He asked to use the telephone, but when he attempted to 
place a call, the telephone was not operative.  Cindy then walked to another 
11 
business‟s office to contact the telephone company.  She recalled that when she 
returned to her office, defendant inquired whether he could remain there because it 
was cold and windy outside.  She agreed, and he remained in the office until noon, 
when a friend arrived to go to lunch and Cindy asked defendant to leave.   
Soon after Cindy returned to her office at approximately 1:30 p.m., 
defendant again appeared and inquired whether he could wait in her office.  At 
approximately 1:45 p.m., Cindy walked toward the back of her office to obtain 
advertising mailers to address, and when she turned around, defendant was 
standing immediately in front of her.  She testified that he “put [a knife] right to 
my throat” and told her to put down the mailers.  He pointed to her purse and 
asked whether it was hers, and she confirmed it was.  He then turned her around so 
she was facing the door of the bathroom in her office.  She recalled that he handed 
her the purse and told her to give him her money.  After she took her wallet out of 
the purse and gave him the cash, he told her to empty her purse onto the floor, 
which she did.  When asked whether there was any other money, she told him 
there was cash in a box in a desk drawer, but he did not move toward that location.  
Instead, he continued to hold the knife to her throat and moved her into the 
bathroom.  Then he lowered the knife, told her to remove her clothes, and came 
closer to her.  Cindy testified that she “grabbed his hand with the knife in it and I 
just . . . pushed it towards his . . . body.  [¶]  And we fought and struggled and then 
he just started hitting me and he stabbed me, and I went down and he grabbed my 
hair and he kneed me under the chin, and then we struggled a bit more and he said, 
„Try that again, I‟ll kill you.‟ ”  When he came near her again, she “screamed „No‟ 
and pushed and ran out” the bathroom door and through the front door.   
  Richard Nester was at the front door, about to open it, as Cindy ran from 
defendant.  Cindy recalled telling Nester, “He‟s got a knife and he‟s trying to rape 
me.”  Nester told her to run, and she escaped to the office of another business.  
12 
Thereafter, she was treated for a stab wound to the left side of her nose, which 
went through her nasal passages to the roof of her mouth.  She also suffered two 
black eyes, two fractured teeth, and some bruises.  
Richard Nester testified that as he pushed open the front door, Cindy came 
running from the back of the office, with blood streaming down her face, and 
screamed at Nester, “ „He‟s got a knife.  He tried to rape me.‟ ”  Nester recalled 
that as he pulled the door closed after Cindy ran out, the person who was 
following her stuck his right arm out the door and slashed at Nester with a knife as 
Nester tried to hold the door closed.  After five or 10 seconds of struggling to hold 
the door, Nester ran to the parking lot of a nearby office building and yelled to a 
man to call the police, but the man drove away.  Nester testified that he returned to 
his vehicle and pursued a person who, having run to a white Datsun truck, drove 
out of the parking lot ahead of Nester‟s vehicle.  Nester described his pursuit of 
the Datsun, including his attempt to crowd that vehicle into a guardrail.  During 
the chase, Nester attracted the attention of a sheriff‟s deputy, who joined the 
pursuit and subdued the driver of the Datsun.  Nester testified that the man in the 
Datsun was the man whom he encountered in Cindy‟s office.   
Defendant was convicted of robbery and assault with intent to commit rape 
in connection with his attack upon Cindy M.  He was sentenced to 13 years in 
prison, and was paroled from prison on December 12, 1990. 
2.  The defense case 
a.  Expert testimony 
Laurence Mueller, an associate professor in the Department of Ecology and 
Evolutionary Biology at the University of California at Irvine, testified that the 
databases used by Cellmark Diagnostics, which had analyzed the blood samples 
(see ante, p. 7), were inadequate for the methods employed by Cellmark.  He 
13 
stated that Cellmark‟s use of the “product rule” — which involves multiplying the 
frequencies with which each particular DNA band or length appears in the 
population — is flawed if the populations from which data is collected are 
heterogenous rather than homogeneous.  According to Mueller, forensic 
calculations should be based upon the numerous subgroups that make up the major 
population groups, and should not be reached by treating a large group of 
numerous subgroups as if the group were homogeneous.  Mueller advocated use of 
the “counting method,” pursuant to which the entire genetic profile is compared to 
each genetic profile in the database and only complete matches are included in the 
calculations of frequency.  Mueller also criticized Cellmark‟s criteria for 
determining a match, asserted that Cellmark underestimates the frequency of each 
length, and faulted Cellmark for not including in its analysis what Mueller 
described as Cellmark‟s “Oriental” database.  By including the “Oriental” 
database, and by increasing the interval of the lengths that were considered to be 
matches, Mueller‟s application of the product rule arrived at a frequency of 
defendant‟s DNA match of one in 3.6 million.  Taking into account Cellmark‟s 
error rate — which Mueller calculated to be one in 139, based upon a false 
positive result from a proficiency test in 1988 and a second false positive from 
such a test in 1989 — and using the “counting method,” Mueller calculated the 
frequency of defendant‟s DNA to be one in 185 or less.   
b.  Defendant’s testimony 
Defendant testified that in 1991, he and his stepfather, Art Jennings, lived 
in two trailers, north of Apple Valley, supporting themselves by collecting 
recyclable materials.  His mother lived out of state, and her health had been 
deteriorating due to “a peritoneal infection.”  She passed away on October 25, 
1991.   
14 
Defendant related that he learned about the Church of Religious Science 
while imprisoned in Idaho, and had visited the church in Apple Valley in 1982, 
when its minister was John Dennis.  He recalled visiting the church again on 
August 24, 1991, to see Reverend Dennis, when he learned that Reverend Plate 
was the new minister.  He explained that he introduced himself as his half brother, 
Martin Jennings,5 because defendant did not have telephone service and the only 
telephone number he knew was Martin Jennings‟s number.  He confirmed that he 
spoke to Reverend Plate about his mother‟s condition and completed a prayer 
request, but in contrast to Plate‟s testimony and the rebuttal testimony of Nina 
Pittsford, he also testified that he requested, in the presence of Plate and Pittsford, 
to use the telephone, and that he entered the minister‟s office and made a call.6  
Defendant testified that he then walked from the church to the Lucky store in 
Apple Valley, but Art was not there.  Defendant then walked to an area containing 
service stations where he and Art routinely collected recyclable materials, but Art 
was not there, so he walked home, arriving sometime between 3:00 p.m. and 
5:00 p.m.   
Defendant testified that on August 26, the day of the crimes, he and Art 
worked at home until 9:00 or 10:00 a.m., then drove to a bank, a construction 
supply store, and a Smart & Final store, where Art purchased chewing tobacco.  
Defendant initially testified that when he and Art left Smart & Final at 
                                              
5  
See People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616. 
6  
Defendant further testified that he made a single telephone call, to the home 
of his mother and Martin Jennings, reached an answering machine, and terminated 
the call without leaving a message.  He had told an investigator, however, that he 
had used the minister‟s telephone to call a hospital and had spoken with a nurse 
there.  He told another investigator that he had spoken to his brother on the 
minister‟s telephone.   
15 
approximately 1:30 p.m., they went on the first “run,” collecting recyclable 
materials, finishing that run at approximately 3:00 p.m.  When asked whether he 
went “anywhere near” the church on August 26, he provided a revised account of 
his day.  He testified that the closest he came to the church was the CC Market, 
which was approximately one block east of the Lucky store in Apple Valley.  He 
stated that he was at the Lucky store at approximately 11:00 a.m. and walked to 
the CC Market a few minutes later to purchase a carton of cigarettes.  He recalled 
that when he returned to the Lucky store, he could not find Art.  He testified that 
he then walked to the area containing the service stations where he and Art usually 
collected recyclable materials, but upon not finding Art there, he walked seven or 
eight miles back to his residence, remaining there until 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., and then 
walked to visit a nearby family.7   
With respect to the healing injuries on his right hand, which were 
photographed on September 10, 1991, defendant testified that these occurred on 
August 22, 1991, when he was collecting recyclable materials from dumpsters.  
He stated that although he was left-handed, he used both hands when recycling, 
and that he suffered cuts two or three times a week.   
Defendant also testified regarding the mine shaft in which the victim‟s 
wallet was found.  He recalled that on August 16, 1991, he and Art dumped 10 to 
15 loads of nonrecyclable “junk” into the mine shaft in which the victim‟s wallet 
                                              
7  
On cross-examination, defendant testified that the CC Market was 
approximately one mile from the church, and that it would take him 15 to 20 
minutes to walk from the market to the church.  He confirmed that if he was at the 
market at 11:15 a.m. and walked to the church, he would have arrived there at 
approximately 11:35 or 11:40 a.m.  As noted above, Loren West left the church at 
approximately 11:45 a.m., and William Rosenthal arrived there at approximately 
1:00 p.m. 
16 
was found, but he claimed the jeans and the T-shirt found in the mine shaft were 
not his clothes.  He stated that the jeans he was wearing on September 10, 1991, 
which were the same brand and size as the jeans recovered from the mine shaft, 
were Art‟s jeans, which he was wearing because he planned to launder his own 
work pants.   
The prosecutor showed defendant a photograph of the inside of defendant‟s 
trailer, taken on September 10, 1991.  Defendant confirmed that a clean pair of 
jeans and a blue T-shirt visible in the photograph were his clothes.  He also 
confirmed that seven or eight pairs of clean pants were visible on hangers in the 
photograph, and that clothing in a bucket on the floor was the laundry he was 
collecting to wash on September 10.  He explained that he was wearing Art‟s jeans 
that day because all of his work clothes were dirty, and that not all of his jeans 
were work clothes.   
The prosecutor also questioned defendant concerning his prior crimes.  
Defendant admitted he had robbed and raped Johnnie C. but denied taking her 
purse, and claimed he hit her only once, did not hit her hard, and did not knock her 
down.  Defendant denied robbing and assaulting Cindy M.  He admitted visiting 
her office to use the telephone in the morning on the day of her assault, but 
claimed he was in the parking lot in the afternoon when he heard a scream.  He 
testified that he then drove away because he was a parolee, and “the next thing I 
remember I was up on Apple Valley Road and . . . Nester‟s truck hit the tailgate of 
my pick-up.” 
3.  Rebuttal 
Nina Pittsford testified concerning defendant‟s visit to the church on 
August 24, 1991.  She recalled that defendant told her his mother was hospitalized 
due to a heart attack.  Pittsford stated she did not “feel right” about defendant, and 
17 
decided to refer him to Plate, the new minister, and to remain near them.  She 
testified that defendant did not enter the minister‟s office, and she did not hear him 
ask to use the telephone.   
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
Bunny Lynn Miles testified that she received obscene telephone calls from 
defendant in October and December 1989.  When she terminated his calls, he 
placed additional calls and made threatening statements concerning her daughter, 
who was 10 years of age.  After one of his calls was traced to Art Jennings‟s 
telephone, Miles identified defendant‟s voice at a parole revocation hearing.  
Laurel R. testified that on June 13, 1972, when she was 12 years of age, her 
mother, Dinah J., gave defendant permission to use the telephone at the family 
home in Boise, Idaho.  After defendant left, Laurel noticed that he drove by the 
house two or three times.  Thereafter, she heard her mother screaming for help, 
and then observed defendant holding a gun to her mother‟s back.  Defendant told 
Laurel and four other children that if they moved, he would shoot them.  Her 
mother offered to leave the house and cash a check for him in the amount of $100.  
He agreed, and when he left the house with Laurel‟s mother, he told the children 
that the house was being watched and that if they moved, he would shoot them and 
their mother.   
Dinah J. testified that after she allowed defendant to use the telephone, he 
returned and asked to use her telephone again, and as he followed her inside to 
make a call, she saw he had a gun.  She recounted the events as to which Laurel R. 
testified, and also described accompanying defendant to a grocery store, where she 
obtained cash for him.  Dinah testified that defendant then drove her to an isolated 
18 
area, raped her twice, and forced her to orally copulate him.  After resisting, she 
acquiesced when he discharged his firearm in front of her face.   
Monica DiVincenzo, the daughter of Gail Johnson, the homicide victim,  
identified family members who were in photographs found inside the victim‟s 
wallet.  She testified that she had visited her mother every day, and that her own 
daughter usually stayed with Johnson on Saturday nights and accompanied her to 
church on Sundays.   
2.  Defense evidence 
Defendant‟s maternal aunt, Bessie Killebrew, testified that defendant‟s 
mother, Pearl, ran away from home at the approximate age of 15 years, and 
initially was placed in a “girls‟ home” and later in a mental institution.  
Subsequently, Pearl and Ray Foster had 11 children.  Killebrew testified that the 
Foster family lived in poverty, and she described Ray Foster‟s discipline of the 
children, employing a belt, as “a little harsh.”  She stated that Ray Foster left the 
family in 1954, after the eldest daughter, who was then 12 years of age, accused 
him of molesting her.  Killebrew recalled that Pearl and her children left Idaho 
with Art Jennings in 1955, and that the children were made wards of the State of 
Nebraska in 1957.  
Art Jennings confirmed that he drove with Pearl and her children to 
Nebraska, but he exhibited difficulty in recalling the names and the number of her 
children.  He denied ever disciplining defendant or any of the other Foster 
children.  He testified that Pearl told him that her daughter Helen had died when 
her son Larry rolled onto Helen and suffocated her during the night.  He stated that 
the Foster children were removed from Pearl‟s custody while Jennings was in jail, 
and that the Nebraska authorities would not tell him or Pearl where the children 
were being kept.   
19 
Four of defendant‟s siblings testified concerning their childhood.  Larry 
testified that Pearl and Art beat the children, sometimes while the children were 
tied up, and forced them to steal.  He recalled that the family traveled from state to 
state, living in Art‟s vehicle and harvesting crops.  He testified that Art killed 
Larry‟s sister Helen in the vehicle by smothering her.  In 1957, the children were 
taken by the State of Nebraska and placed in Whitehall Home for Children.  Larry 
stated that a housemother at Whitehall taught both defendant and him about sex, 
instructing them that “you got to hit them in the mouth before you do anything or 
they don‟t like it.”  He testified that he and defendant were transferred to a state 
mental institution, where they were beaten and sexually abused and drugs were 
administered, as were electroshock treatments and “hydrotherapy,” which 
involved transferring the subject from hot water to ice water and back again.  
Defendant‟s sister Wilma provided similar testimony concerning their time with 
Art and Pearl and at Whitehall, and also testified that Pearl accused defendant of 
smothering Helen.  Another sibling, Steven, corroborated the foregoing  testimony 
and also recounted that “the first sexual experiences were the girls with Art and 
the boys with mom.”  The eldest daughter, who ran away before Art joined the 
family, testified that her father molested her, with Pearl‟s knowledge, and that 
Pearl blamed the daughter for the molestation.   
Defendant provided similar descriptions of his childhood and additional 
details about his life.  Before being sent to Whitehall, he had attended school for a 
total of five months.  At Whitehall, at 10 years of age, he was placed in first grade, 
remaining at that level for two years.  During his third year at Whitehall, he 
attended eighth grade.  He testified he was beaten at Whitehall and ran away on 
several occasions in an attempt to find his family.  He recalled that, at 12 years of 
age, he was accused of attempting to molest a housemother and was sent to a 
mental hospital for more than a year, where he received psychotropic medication, 
20 
hydrotherapy, and electroshock treatment.  Defendant also described his criminal 
history, which encompassed being kept in custody for all but approximately two 
and one-half years of his adult life.  During his time in prison, he earned a high 
school equivalency degree, was trained as a dental assistant, and was an excellent 
worker. 
Four individuals who resided at Whitehall contemporaneously with the 
Foster children described their experiences.  Samuel Zanderholm testified that 
children were not allowed to visit their siblings on a daily basis but were permitted 
to interact when they encountered each other during free time.  He recalled that 
some children were spanked with a paddle, and confirmed that “a lot of people” 
ran away.  He was unaware of any sexual abuse.  Esther Zanderholm testified that 
life at Whitehall was very regimented, and recalled that lilac branches were used 
to whip children.  Darlene Cummings testified that Whitehall was a very 
controlled environment in which residents had no freedom, making it difficult for 
residents to adjust to life outside of Whitehall.  She stated she was hit in the mouth 
once and her brother was hit with a rubber hose once, but she was unaware of any 
sexual abuse.  She stated that children who returned to Whitehall from the mental 
institution “acted kind of strange and they even looked different,” and she 
confirmed that it “was pretty commonly known . . . that if you went to the mental 
institution, you got the shock treatment.”  Daryld Schlereth confirmed that 
spankings and blows to the face were administered by staff at Whitehall.  He 
testified that most of the teachers and house parents were “pretty decent,” but he 
ran away four times because he grew tired of the rules.  He stated he had heard 
children discuss electroshock treatment when they returned from the mental 
hospital, but he never heard about treatment with ice water.  When asked whether 
he saw defendant get hit, he stated that he thought defendant had been “worked . . . 
over a few times like all of us.”  He testified that defendant bullied other children, 
21 
and that defendant became more violent and rebellious after returning from the 
mental hospital.   
Dr. Edward Fischer, a psychologist, administered various tests to defendant 
and conducted interviews concerning his background.  He testified that defendant 
has an IQ of 112, and no indication of organic brain damage.  He concluded 
defendant has an “antisocial personality” disorder, and testified that individuals 
with this disorder exhibit a low tolerance for frustration and engage in conflict 
with authority.  According to Fischer, such individuals “can‟t change the way they 
behave.  [¶]  Their emotional responses were conditioned by the earlier emotional 
scenarios that were acted out with their family.”  He described defendant‟s family 
as extremely dysfunctional, with “substantial abuse, incest, thievery.”  Documents 
reviewed by Fischer disclose that when defendant was institutionalized in 
Nebraska, questions were raised concerning whether he could adjust to life outside 
an institution.  According to Fischer, defendant could function well in a highly 
structured environment such as a prison.   
James Park, a former associate prison warden at San Quentin State Prison, 
addressed the issue of prison security.  He stated that an individual sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would be placed in the level-
four security classification, which is the highest security level for the general 
prison population.  He added that even if such a prisoner eventually is reclassified 
for level-three confinement, he or she will be guarded by the same level of 
perimeter security and gun coverage as a level-four prisoner.  He stated that 
although level-four prisoners may work, go to the exercise yard, and participate in 
programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous, their schedules are very regimented.  
He testified that defendant was an excellent worker in prison and, in Park‟s 
opinion, would “pay his way” in prison and “contribute to the safe, good operation 
of a prison.” 
22 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Physical restraint of defendant at trial  
At trial, defendant was restrained by a stun belt and leg restraints.  He 
contends these restraints violated his rights of confrontation, due process, a fair 
trial, the assistance of counsel, and a reliable determination of the issues of guilt 
and penalty, as well as the presumption of innocence, under the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
The prosecutor moved for an order permitting the use of physical restraints 
upon defendant, based upon his escape from Idaho State Penitentiary in 1973 and 
his flight from Richard Nester after defendant attacked Cindy M.  At a hearing on 
the motion, defense counsel stated that the defense did not object to an electronic 
security belt, but did oppose leg restraints.  The trial court concluded that 
defendant “has, over the years, exhibited violence and also a firm commitment to 
escape when he decided to do that.”  The court further concluded that “this is a 
case in which we should not just rely upon the belt, because, although the belt is 
handled by extremely competent people, you never know what‟s going to 
happen.”   
“[A] defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the 
courtroom while in the jury‟s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest 
need for such restraints.”  (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291; see 
also Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 629 [“the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial 
court determination, in the exercise of discretion, that they are justified by a state 
interest specific to a particular trial”]; People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 626, 
632-633 [reviewing principles concerning physical restraints]; People v. Mar 
23 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201 [addressing factors to be considered in evaluating whether 
a stun belt should be used].)   
Defendant did not object to being restrained or to the use of a stun belt as a 
restraint.  Therefore, he has forfeited his claim to the extent he contends he should 
not have been restrained at all, or that the stun belt was an inappropriate form of 
restraint.  (See People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 206; People v. Tuilaepa 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583 (Tuilaepa I), affd. sub nom. Tuilaepa v. California 
(1994) 512 U.S. 967 (Tuilaepa II).) 
We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
concluding that defendant also should be constrained by leg restraints, because 
there is no evidence suggesting that any juror observed the use of these restraints.8  
“We have consistently found any unjustified or unadmonished shackling harmless 
where there was no evidence it was seen by the jury.  [Citations.]”  (Tuilaepa I, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 583-584; see also People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
543, 596.)9 
                                              
8  
Defendant asserted at oral argument that the trial court acknowledged the 
jury would see the restraints.  On the contrary, the trial court questioned defense 
counsel‟s assertion that the restraints would be visible to the jury, inquiring:  
“What makes you think that?”  Defense counsel responded:  “[D]uring the course 
of the length of this trial, the jury obviously is going to see that [defendant] is in 
custody.  In fact, our questionnaire addresses that issue.”  The court then stated, 
“They are going to know.”  Defense counsel echoed, “They are going to know,” 
and the trial court added, “Even if it wasn‟t addressed.”  Thus, the trial court‟s 
comment acknowledged that the jury would be aware defendant was in custody, 
not that the jury would observe the restraints.  In any event, as noted, there is no 
evidence suggesting the jury saw the restraints. 
9  
Respondent contends defendant forfeited his constitutional claims by 
failing to assert them in the trial court.  When “new arguments do not invoke facts 
or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but 
merely assert that the trial court‟s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons 
actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating 
(footnote continued on next page) 
24 
2.  Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors 
Defendant claims the trial court‟s examination of the prospective jurors was 
inadequate to reveal bias, and that the jury included jurors who were biased 
against defendant.  He contends the trial court‟s examination violated Code of 
Civil Procedure section 223, and resulted in a denial of his rights to a fair trial, a 
fair and impartial jury, due process of law, and reliable guilt and penalty 
determinations under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. 
In 1996, when defendant‟s case was tried, Code of Civil Procedure former 
section 223 specified that “the court shall conduct the examination of prospective 
jurors,” and also provided that the court had discretion to permit the parties to 
engage in further inquiry.10  In the present case, the examination of prospective 
jurors initially was conducted through a questionnaire.  The trial court rejected 
defendant‟s request that the questionnaire set forth six categories of views 
concerning the death penalty, rather than the five categories identified in the 
prosecution‟s proposed questionnaire, and also rejected defendant‟s objections to 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
the Constitution,” a “defendant‟s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on 
appeal.”  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)  Defendant‟s 
challenge on appeal is merely a constitutional “gloss” upon an objection raised 
below, and therefore is not forfeited. 
10  
Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 provided:  “In a criminal case, 
the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors.  However, the court 
may permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement examination 
by such further inquiry as it deems proper . . . .  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  The trial court‟s 
exercise of its discretion in the manner in which voir dire is conducted shall not 
cause any conviction to be reversed unless the exercise of that discretion has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as specified in Section 13 of Article VI of the 
California Constitution.”   
25 
the manner in which the prosecution had defined these categories.  The court 
informed defendant, however, that “during the Hovey voir dire, you will have 
great latitude in phrasing the questions your way using your chart [of 
classifications] and saying I think this is a better way, let‟s explore it with you.”  
(See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80 [voir dire that addresses 
issues related to the death penalty “should be done individually and in 
sequestration”]; see also People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 973, fn. 5 
[Code Civ. Proc., § 223 abrogates Hovey‟s requirement of individual and 
sequestered voir dire].)  The trial court confirmed with defense counsel that the 
prosecution‟s questionnaire addressed all of the issues that the defense wanted 
addressed and was not phrased in a manner that was argumentative or that would 
require the jurors to prejudge the evidence.11  The court also reiterated that “over 
and above the questionnaire, counsel is going to have extremely wide latitude in 
terms of the Hovey voir dire and in terms of the voir dire of the jurors [once] they 
are seated as a group in the box . . . .”   
Before distributing the questionnaire, the trial court read to the prospective 
jurors the charges and allegations against defendant, informed them that defendant 
had pleaded not guilty, and explained that the People bore the burden of proving 
those charges and allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.  After considering 
claims of hardship, the court explained that if the jury found defendant guilty of 
                                              
11  
The jury questionnaire was 29 pages in length and posed 137 questions, 
some with multiple subparts.  Defendant concedes on appeal that the questionnaire 
addressed most of the areas of inquiry specified in section 8.5 of the California  
Standards of Judicial Administration, and he does not contend the questionnaire 
was inadequate.  (See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661 [directing, 
subsequent to the trial in the present matter, that trial courts “should closely follow 
the language and formulae for voir dire recommended by the Judicial Council in 
the Standards [of Judicial Administration]”].)   
26 
murder in the first degree and found a special circumstance allegation to be true, 
there would be a second phase of the trial during which the jurors would be 
presented with evidence concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances and 
would be asked to decide between the punishments of death and life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  The court read to the prospective jurors the 
description of aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in section 190.3, and 
stated that “we need to select people who can fairly choose one punishment over 
the other” rather than individuals who would be committed in advance to selecting 
one of the two punishments over the other.  The court explained that all of the 
prospective jurors would receive a questionnaire, and that none of them should 
“hold back with regard to any feelings you might have on any issue that is raised.”   
After the prospective jurors returned the questionnaires, counsel were 
afforded time to review the answers and then were allowed to question the jurors.  
The trial court did not pose any oral questions to the prospective jurors, nor did it 
limit the parties‟ questioning of them. 
Defendant did not object to the manner in which voir dire was conducted, 
nor did he indicate he believed the trial court should undertake examination in 
addition to the questions posed by the questionnaire and the unlimited questioning 
afforded defendant and the prosecution.  Defendant therefore has forfeited his 
claim that the voir dire was inadequate.  (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
574, 608 [the defendant forfeited his claim of inadequate voir dire “because his 
counsel failed to suggest followup questions . . . or otherwise complain about the 
adequacy of the trial court‟s voir dire”]; People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 
1149 (Rogers) [“Defendant neither objected to the questionnaire used, nor 
proposed any modifications of additional questionnaire inquiries.  He therefore has 
forfeited any claim that the questionnaire and its contents were inadequate to root 
out any pro-death-penalty bias on the part of the prospective jurors”]; People v. 
27 
Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 620 [“If counsel had believed that further inquiry 
was necessary . . . , he could have submitted additional questionnaire inquires or 
suggested additional oral questions. . . .  [D]efense counsel‟s failure to do so 
forfeits the claim on appeal”].) 
Defendant‟s claim also fails on the merits.  The trial court examined the 
prospective jurors through the comprehensive questionnaire (see Code Civ. Proc., 
former § 223 [“the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors”]) 
and afforded defendant unlimited voir dire.  As in Rogers, “[t]hese procedures 
„provided an adequate basis upon which the parties were able to exercise 
challenges for cause as well as peremptory challenges.‟  (People v. Robinson, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 618 [addressing a similar questionnaire with followup trial 
court questioning]; see People v. Carter [(2005)] 36 Cal.4th [1215], 1251 [voir 
dire found more than adequate when written juror questionnaires were used, and 
each side was given very limited time to voir dire but also given the opportunity to 
request additional court-conducted followup questions].)”  (Rogers, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at pp. 1150-1151.)  In these circumstances, the trial court had no duty to 
compel counsel to explore more thoroughly the views of the prospective jurors, or 
to engage itself in additional questioning.  (See People v. Stewart (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 425, 458 [additional areas of inquiry might have assisted defense counsel 
in exercising challenges, but such inquiry was not constitutionally compelled]; see 
also Ristaino v. Ross (1976) 424 U.S. 589, 594-595 [“Voir dire „is conducted 
under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its 
sound discretion.‟  [Citations.]  This is so because the „determination of 
impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly 
within the province of that trial judge.‟ ”].) 
Finally, although defendant did not challenge any of the seated jurors for 
cause and did not exhaust the peremptory challenges available to him, he contends 
28 
the verdicts must be set aside because six jurors were biased against him.  (See 
Johnson v. Armontrout (8th Cir. 1992) 961 F.2d 748, 754 [“When a defendant 
fails to object to the qualifications of a juror, he is without remedy only if he fails 
to prove actual bias”].)  “Actual bias” is “the existence of a state of mind on the 
part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will 
prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of any party.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C); People 
v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488.) 
Our review of the record reflects that none of the six jurors challenged by 
defendant exhibited actual bias against him.  Although Juror No. 1‟s questionnaire 
stated she was unwilling to weigh and consider all aggravating and mitigating 
factors, further questioning revealed that she was confused by the questionnaire‟s 
inquiry, and that she would weigh and consider such factors.  Although Juror No. 
3 favored the death penalty, indicated that his background in law enforcement 
would make it difficult to be fair and impartial, expressed skepticism concerning 
psychological evidence, and stated he would “have to be really convinced” of the 
mitigating factors, he also responded that he would not always vote for the 
punishment of death, would weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating 
factors, could be a fair and impartial juror in the present case, and would listen to 
both sides.  Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, Juror No. 7 did not state he would 
vote for the punishment of death if defendant “did the crime.”  Rather, he 
answered “yes” in response to the question “if you were convinced . . . that he . . . 
did the crime and deserves the death penalty, you could vote for the death 
penalty?”  Juror No. 10 stated she “would lean towards the death penalty 
probably,” but would not always vote for death and would consider aggravating 
and mitigating factors.  She agreed with defense counsel‟s characterization of her 
position as “very pro death as far as the death penalty.”  When the prosecutor 
29 
inquired whether she “could listen to both sides and be fair and make a proper 
decision,” she responded, “I think so, as much as anybody can.  I‟m not sure.  It 
would be very difficult, but I think that I can.”  Juror No. 11 indicated during voir 
dire that she would not consider “a person‟s life story” or psychological evidence, 
and then stated that she would “have to hear it or see it.”  When defense counsel 
explained that he was referring to “any evidence you hear, [that] we ask you to 
weigh and consider,” she responded, “Oh, yeah, that‟s exactly what I would do.”  
Finally, Juror No. 12 indicated on his questionnaire that he neither favored nor 
opposed the death penalty, and was willing to weigh and consider all of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  Defendant quotes Juror No. 12‟s statement 
that “to kill another person should warrant the death penalty,” but defendant omits 
the last three words of the statement — “based on circumstances.”  Defendant also 
points to Juror No. 12‟s statement, in response to the question whether he had 
discussed the death penalty with his spouse or friends, that “senseless killing 
warrants the death penalty,” and the juror‟s reference to prisoners who have been 
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as “being catered 
to for a crime committed.”  None of these six jurors‟ statements reflect actual bias 
against defendant. 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Admission of evidence of prior crimes  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s admission of evidence of his prior 
crimes violated Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352, depriving him of his rights 
to a fair trial, to present a defense, and to due process of law, and rendered the 
guilt and penalty phase determinations unreliable, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.   
30 
The People moved in limine to admit the testimony of Johnnie C. and 
Cindy M. concerning defendant‟s prior robberies and assaults.  This evidence was 
offered to prove identity, a common plan, and intent.  (Evid. Code, § 1101, 
subd. (b).)  To establish that the prior crimes were admissible, the People 
emphasized the number of similarities between each of them, respectively, and the 
charged offenses that are the subject of the present automatic appeal.  With respect 
to the attack on Cindy M. and the charged offenses involving Gail Johnson, the 
People stated that (1) the two incidents occurred within three-quarters of a mile of 
each other, in a relatively rural town area, Apple Valley, (2) both occurred 
between noon and 1:30 p.m., (3) both occurred in an office, (4) both female 
victims were working alone, (5) defendant had visited each site before the crimes 
occurred, (6) during his earlier visits to both sites, defendant provided a false story 
with respect to the purpose of his visit, (7) the contents of both victims‟ purses 
were emptied onto the floor, (8) the victims‟ purses were placed on the floor, 
(9) the victims were moved to a back area, (10) Cindy M. was told to disrobe, and 
one of Gail Johnson‟s shoes was found on top of the desk, (11) both victims 
resisted and were stabbed, and (12) each attack occurred shortly after defendant 
was released on parole.   
The People also observed that, although no knife was seen or used in the 
attack on Johnnie C. in Boise, Idaho, that attack shared many of the 12 foregoing 
similarities between the attack on Cindy M. and the present offenses.   
Defense counsel argued that the two prior attacks were not sufficiently 
similar to the charged crimes to be relevant.  He challenged the view that the 
Cindy M. incident and the charged offenses occurred in a small area of a rural 
town, stating that the population of “[t]he metropolitan area of Apple Valley, 
Victorville, Hesperia and other adjacent and contiguous communities is 
considerably in excess of 100,000.”  With respect to the time of day, the office 
31 
setting, and the presence of only the female victim, counsel claimed it would be 
necessary to know the number of similar crimes committed in the area in order to 
determine the uniqueness of these characteristics.  He also asserted that defendant 
did not present a false story at the church — his mother was ill, and he was 
concerned about her.  With respect to the presence of a purse and its spilled 
contents on the floor, counsel stated that “[t]here is only one quick method to find 
items contained in a purse.”  He also argued that because the prior crimes involved 
sexual assaults, the evidence was unduly inflammatory, and jurors would be 
tempted to convict him of the charged crimes if they believed he should have 
served more time for the prior crimes.   
The trial court concluded the crimes exhibited common features that were 
sufficiently distinctive to support the inference that the same person committed all 
three crimes pursuant to a common scheme and with the same intent, and that the 
probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice.  The court 
instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50, that “[s]uch evidence, if 
believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to prove that 
defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit 
crimes.  [¶]  Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for 
the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show:  [¶]  A characteristic 
method, plan or scheme in the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, 
plan or scheme used in the commission of the offense in this case which would 
further tend to show the existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the 
crime charged or the identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of 
which the defendant is accused.”   
“Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other than those currently 
charged is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character 
or has a criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to 
32 
prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, 
the existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator 
acted in the commission of the charged crimes.  (Evid. Code, § 1101.)  Evidence 
of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or 
intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support 
a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent.  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.)   
“The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged 
offense) is required in order to prove intent.  [Citation.]  . . .  In order to be 
admissible to prove intent, the uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to 
support the inference that the defendant „ “probably harbor[ed] the same intent in 
each instance.”  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 
402 (Ewoldt).)  “A greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove the 
existence of a common design or plan. . . .  [E]vidence of uncharged misconduct 
must demonstrate „not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of 
common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a 
general plan of which they are individual manifestations.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  “The greatest 
degree of similarity is required for evidence of uncharged misconduct to be 
relevant to prove identity. . . . [T]he uncharged misconduct and the charged 
offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to 
support the inference that the same person committed both acts.  [Citation.]  „The 
pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be 
like a signature.‟  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 403.)  “ „ „The highly unusual and 
distinctive nature of both the charged and [uncharged] offenses virtually 
eliminates the possibility that anyone other than the defendant committed the 
charged offense.”  [Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1003 
(Hovarter).) 
33 
If evidence of prior conduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to 
be relevant to prove the defendant‟s intent, common plan, or identity, the trial 
court then must consider whether the probative value of the evidence “is 
„substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the 
jury.‟  (Evid. Code, § 352.)”  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  “Rulings made 
under [sections 1101 and 352] are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1130.)  “Under the abuse 
of discretion standard, „a trial court‟s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . 
is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.‟  [Citation.]”  (Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1004.) 
As we explain below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the evidence was relevant to prove defendant‟s intent and plan, or 
in concluding that its probative value with respect to these two issues was not 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a 
substantial danger of undue prejudice.  In addition, because evidence of prior 
conduct may be admitted to prove a defendant‟s intent and plan, regardless of 
whether it also is relevant to prove the defendant‟s identity as the perpetrator, we 
need not decide whether the evidence was admissible to prove defendant‟s 
identity.  Assuming, without deciding, that the jury should not have been 
instructed that it could consider the evidence to establish defendant‟s identity as 
the perpetrator, any error in this jury instruction was harmless.  Finally, neither the 
admission of the evidence, nor the instruction that the evidence was relevant to 
establish defendant‟s identity as the perpetrator, violated defendant‟s rights to a 
fair trial, to present a defense, to due process of law, and to reliable determinations 
of the issues of guilt and penalty. 
34 
We begin our analysis by noting the similarity between the prior crimes and 
the charged offenses.  The evidence established defendant‟s pattern of visiting an 
office in the middle of the day, determining that a woman was alone in the office, 
returning in the middle of the day, moving the woman to a more remote area of the 
premises, demanding the woman‟s money and any other cash available on the 
premises, and violently attacking her when she resisted.  If the jury found that 
defendant was the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the pattern of his prior crimes 
strongly suggested that at the time he returned to the church two days after his 
initial visit in the middle of a weekday, when there was only one vehicle in the 
church‟s parking lot and after learning that the minister was a woman, he entered 
the church with the same intent as reflected in his prior crimes — to determine that 
a woman was alone, to move her to a more private area of the premises, and to rob 
and assault her, pummeling her with his fists and stabbing her with his knife if 
necessary to subdue her.  These common features manifest the same general plan, 
and therefore support a finding that defendant acted in accordance with that plan.   
Defendant asserts that any probative value of the prior-crimes evidence was 
minimized by differences between the charged crimes and the prior crimes.  First, 
he contends, the prior crimes were “fundamentally dissimilar to the charged 
crimes in that the former crimes were committed for the purpose of sexual 
gratification whereas the current crimes had no such hallmarks.”  We disagree.  
The three incidents were quite similar, as far as they all progressed.  Each involved 
the robbery of a woman alone in an office, and each involved a violent 
confrontation.  The first confrontation ended when Johnnie C. relented in the face 
of defendant‟s violent attack, and the second ended when Cindy M. escaped after 
defendant assaulted and threatened to kill her.  That the violent confrontation in 
the current case ended in death rather than a sexual assault does not detract 
significantly from the pattern reflected in the three incidents.  For these same 
35 
reasons, we also reject the related contention that it was “purely coincidental” that 
the victims were women.   
Second, defendant, noting he was identified by the victims of the prior 
crimes, asserts that he made no effort before or during the prior crimes to conceal 
his identity from the victims.  In contrast, “[i]n the current case, the perpetrator 
was not personally identified by any witness, and considerable efforts were made 
after the killing to preclude the possibility of identification.”  In connection with 
the crimes committed against Johnnie C., however, defendant marked over his 
name in the studio appointment book.  In addition, defendant‟s violent assault 
upon Cindy M. suggests that he would have killed her in order to avoid detection, 
had she not escaped.  His flight from Nester also reflected the measures he would 
take to avoid apprehension.  Finally, to the extent the evidence reflects increasing 
efforts to avoid apprehension and conviction, such efforts reasonably might be 
expected from a person who repeatedly has been apprehended for his crimes. 
Third, defendant asserts that the passage of time between the incidents 
reduced the probative value of the evidence.  The passage of time is explained, 
however, by defendant‟s incarceration for the major portions of the periods 
between the offenses.  (See People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1287 (Lewis) 
[noting that the defendant had been incarcerated much of the time between the 
prior misconduct and the charged crimes].)   
Our conclusion that defendant‟s prior crimes were relevant to prove that 
defendant had the same intent and plan when he returned to the church does not 
end our inquiry.  “[T]o be admissible such evidence „must not contravene other 
policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.  
[Citations.]‟  [Citation.]  We thus proceed to examine whether the probative value 
of the evidence of defendant‟s uncharged offenses is „substantially outweighed by 
the probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue 
36 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‟  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352.)”  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) 
As reflected in our analysis of the similarity of the three crimes, the 
tendency of the prior offenses to establish defendant‟s intent and the general plan 
of his actions in the church is strong.  If, as established by the evidence, 
defendant — after learning two days earlier that the minister was a woman — 
returned to the church in the middle of a weekday when there was only one 
vehicle in the parking lot, moved the victim from the church office to the 
minister‟s personal office, and robbed and assaulted her, his prior crimes provided 
persuasive proof that when he returned to the church he did so with the intent to 
rob and assault any woman he found alone, demanding money from the victim, 
assaulting her, and killing her when she resisted.  In addition, the evidence is not 
merely cumulative of other evidence concerning defendant‟s intent and the actions 
he took after entering the church, because the balance of the evidence does not 
render his intent and actions beyond dispute.  (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 406 [“if it is beyond dispute that the alleged crime occurred,” evidence of 
uncharged conduct to demonstrate a common design or plan “would be merely 
cumulative and the prejudicial effect of the evidence of uncharged acts would 
outweigh its probative value”].) 
“Evidence is prejudicial within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 
if it „ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual” ‟ 
[citation] or if it would cause the jury to „ “ „prejudg[e]‟ a person or cause on the 
basis of extraneous factors.” ‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
4401, 475.)  With respect to the risk of undue prejudice, defendant observes that 
evidence of other crimes is “inherently prejudicial.”  (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 
at p. 404.)  “As Wigmore notes, admission of this evidence produces an „over-
strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is 
37 
a likely person to do such acts.‟  [Citation.]  It breeds a „tendency to condemn, not 
because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because he has escaped 
unpunished from other offences . . . .‟  [Citation.]  Moreover, „the jury might be 
unable to identify with a defendant of offensive character, and hence tend to 
disbelieve the evidence in his favor.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 
Cal.3d 303, 317, fn. omitted.)  Due to these inherent risks, “uncharged offenses are 
admissible only if they have substantial probative value.”  (Id. at p. 318, italics in 
original; see Ewoldt, supra, at p. 404.)  For the reasons set forth above, the 
evidence of defendant‟s prior crimes has substantial probative value with respect 
to the issues of intent and a common plan.  Therefore, the inherent risks did not 
preclude the admission of this evidence. 
Defendant identifies as an additional risk of undue prejudice the 
circumstance that he had been sentenced to lengthy prison terms for the prior 
crimes, but had been released from prison.  He asserts that no jury would acquit 
him in light of his prior record.  Defendant served significant prison terms for the 
prior offenses, however — almost 10 years in Idaho State Penitentiary, and seven 
years in California.  (See Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1287 [“Because defendant 
was convicted of the prior rape and sentenced to prison, „the jury would not be 
tempted to convict [him] simply to punish him for the other offenses . . . .‟ ”].)  
We perceive minimal if any risk that the jury would conclude he was not the 
perpetrator of the charged crimes, but would convict him based upon the view that 
17 years in prison for his prior crimes was inadequate punishment. 
Finally, defendant characterizes his prior crimes as “highly inflammatory 
and prejudicial.”  Although the prior crimes were violent and sexual, they were 
less inflammatory than the evidence in the present case, in which defendant 
repeatedly stabbed the victim as she lay on the floor.  (See People v. Demetrulias 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 18-19 [in evaluating whether the probative value of an 
38 
uncharged crime was outweighed by its potential for prejudice, the court noted 
that the uncharged incident involved a very serious assault, but the charged 
incident was a homicide].)  In addition, as in Demetrulias, the jury was instructed 
not to consider the evidence to prove that defendant was a person of bad character, 
thereby “minimizing the potential for improper use.”  (Id. at p. 19.) 
In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the evidence reflected similarities between the prior crimes and 
the charged offenses sufficient for the evidence to be relevant to prove defendant‟s 
intent and common plan in committing the current offenses.  We also uphold the 
trial court‟s exercise of discretion in determining that the probative value of this 
evidence was not outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.   
Defendant contends, however, that the evidence could not be admitted for a 
purpose other than identity if the identity of the perpetrator was in dispute.  We 
have rejected this argument.  “As we recently observed in Alcala [v. Superior 
Court (2008)] 43 Cal.4th 1205, a fact finder properly may consider admissible 
„other crimes‟ evidence to prove intent, so long as (1) the evidence is sufficient to 
sustain a finding that the defendant committed both sets of crimes [citations], and 
further (2) the threshold standard articulated in Ewoldt can be satisfied — that is, 
„the factual similarities among the charges tend to demonstrate that in each 
instance the perpetrator harbored‟ the requisite intent.  [Citations.]  There is no 
requirement that it must be conceded, or a court must be able to assume, that the 
defendant was the perpetrator in both sets of offenses.”  (People v. Soper (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 759, 778.) 
As noted above, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence of 
defendant‟s prior crimes also could be considered with respect to the issue of the 
39 
identity of the perpetrator.12  We need not decide whether the prior crimes were 
sufficiently similar to the charged offenses to be relevant to the issue of identity, 
because any error in the court‟s instruction was harmless.  (People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [“a „miscarriage of justice‟ should be declared only 
when the court, „after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,‟ 
is of the „opinion‟ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the 
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error”].)  As noted 
above, the evidence was admissible, regardless of whether it was relevant to the 
issue of identity.  Thus, the jury would have heard this evidence even if the trial 
court had not admitted it to establish defendant‟s identity as the perpetrator.  In 
addition, as summarized below, there is overwhelming evidence establishing that 
defendant was, in fact, the perpetrator of the charged crimes.  Finally, the 
prosecutor, in his arguments to the jury, stated that the evidence of defendant‟s 
prior crimes was insufficient to establish defendant‟s identity as the perpetrator.  
Therefore, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant 
would have been reached in the absence of the reference in the jury instruction to 
proof of identity. 
Blood found at the crime scene was consistent with defendant‟s blood, and 
the DNA profile would occur in only one in every 24 million Caucasian 
                                              
12  
The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50, that the 
evidence of other crimes could be considered “only for the limited purpose of 
determining if it tends to show:  [¶]  A characteristic method, plan or scheme in 
the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan or scheme used in the 
commission of the offense in this case which would further tend to show the 
existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged or the 
identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which the defendant is 
accused.”   
40 
individuals.13  Even when the defense expert expanded the interval of DNA 
lengths considered to be matches and applied the “product rule” to a database that 
included additional ethnic groups, the frequency of defendant‟s DNA was 
determined to be only one in 3.6 million persons.  Also, the defense expert did not 
challenge Stockwell‟s conclusion that the proteins present in defendant‟s blood 
and in blood found at the crime scene would appear in only one in every 42,600 
Caucasians.  Although the defense expert rejected the validity of the product rule, 
he also testified that in the hundred cases in which he had testified, all of the 
approximately 12 laboratories involved had employed the product rule rather than 
his preferred “counting method.” 
In addition to the blood evidence, numerous other facts established 
defendant‟s identity as the perpetrator:  (1) items stolen from the victim were 
found in the same mine shaft in which defendant disposed of “junk,” (2) a pair of 
jeans of the same brand and size as those worn by defendant when he was arrested, 
with the knee area soaked with blood consistent with the victim‟s blood, was 
found in the same mine shaft, (3) the blood on a piece of tissue paper that was 
found in the mine shaft, and appeared to have been held by a bleeding hand, was 
                                              
13  
Defendant asserts that “[t]he blood evidence was suspect by virtue of 
possible contamination during collection and improper procedures.”  Although 
Stockwell testified that much of the blood was covered with white substances that 
rendered the tests on such stains inconclusive, there was no evidence establishing 
that the blood samples for which results were obtained were contaminated.  
Defendant also cites the defense expert‟s opinion that Cellmark Diagnostics 
should have conducted additional independent proficiency testing rather than 
internal proficiency testing.  The record establishes, however, that bloodstains 
were preserved for testing by the defense, and no evidence was presented 
suggesting that Cellmark‟s testing of the stains in the present case was not 
proficient.  On the contrary, the defense expert employed Cellmark‟s test results as 
the basis for his own calculations.   
41 
consistent with defendant‟s blood, (4) the cut on defendant‟s hand was consistent 
with the type of injury a person would sustain if his or her hand slipped while 
stabbing with a knife, (5) defendant had visited the church only two days prior to 
the charged offenses, (6) the church was a 15- to 20-minute walk from the Lucky 
store, where defendant parted company with his stepfather approximately 45 
minutes before the crimes were committed, (7) the victim‟s vehicle was 
abandoned at the same Lucky store, and (8) on the day in question, defendant 
became separated from his stepfather, in contrast to their usual routine of 
collecting recyclable materials together. 
Finally, although defendant denied he was the perpetrator, his testimony 
tended to establish he was not being truthful.  Not only did his testimony conflict 
with the testimony of Reverend Plate and Nina Pittsford regarding his statements 
and activities at the church on Saturday, but he repeatedly was impeached with 
statements he made to interrogating officers following his arrest.14  
                                              
14  
In addition to the conflicting statements made by defendant regarding his 
claimed presence in the minister‟s office two days before the crime was committed 
(see ante, fn. 5 and accompanying text), defendant made inconsistent statements 
concerning his route to the church on Saturday.  He testified at trial that he 
traveled to the church by walking from his residence to the church, but he told 
investigators he had walked there from the Lucky store.  In addition, defendant 
testified he went to the CC Market on Monday to purchase a carton of cigarettes, 
generally purchasing a carton every 10 to 12 days.  He told investigators that he 
had bought a carton of cigarettes on Saturday.  When asked at trial why, if he 
bought a carton of cigarettes on Saturday, he was buying another carton on 
Monday, he responded, “I have no idea.”  Not only did these inconsistencies draw 
into question his veracity, they also suggested that he had contrived his claim of 
using the minister‟s telephone on Saturday in order to explain the presence of any 
of his fingerprints on the telephone found on the floor at the crime scene, and that 
he was conflating the facts of two visits to the church.  
42 
Not only was the evidence of defendant‟s identity overwhelming, but the 
arguments of defense counsel and the prosecutor informed the jurors that they 
should not rely upon defendant‟s prior crimes in determining the identity of the 
perpetrator of the charged offenses.  Defense counsel asserted that the evidence of 
defendant‟s prior crimes was of no probative value with respect to defendant‟s 
identity, and the prosecutor stated to the jury that “just the fact that he commits the 
crime, these kind of crimes in this particular way, well, that of course doesn‟t 
mean he did this one.  If that‟s all the evidence we had, we wouldn‟t be here, 
correct?  But that isn‟t all the evidence that we have.”  The prosecutor then 
reviewed for the jury the extensive evidence of defendant‟s identity as the 
perpetrator.   
Defendant asserts that the admission of the evidence in question violated 
his federal constitutional rights, but he does not specifically address the prejudice, 
if any, resulting from the jury instruction.  First, because the evidence was relevant 
to prove a fact of consequence, its admission did not violate defendant‟s due 
process rights.  (See McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 
[“Because the evidence . . . makes a fact of consequence . . . more probable, its 
admission was not in violation of the historically grounded rule against the use of 
„other acts‟ evidence to prove character”].)  Second, any error in the instruction‟s 
reference to the evidence as relevant to prove defendant‟s identity as the 
perpetrator would not constitute a violation of defendant‟s due process rights, 
because the instruction did not “infect[] the entire trial.”  (Estelle v. McGuire 
(1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [“The only question for [a federal court] is „whether the 
ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 
violates due process‟ ”].)  “It is well established that the instruction „may not be 
judged in artificial isolation,‟ but must be considered in the context of the 
instructions as a whole and the trial record.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  The 
43 
overwhelming evidence of identity, and the arguments of counsel, which focused 
the jury upon this overwhelming evidence and advised jurors not to base a finding 
of identity upon defendant‟s prior crimes, lead us to conclude that the instruction 
did not corrupt the factfinding process.  On this record, the jury instruction‟s 
reference to evidence of defendant‟s identity did not affect defendant‟s federal 
constitutional rights to a fair trial, to present a defense, to due process of law, and 
to reliable determinations of the issues of guilt and penalty. 
In a related contention, defendant asserts that even if Cindy M.‟s testimony 
was admissible, Nester‟s testimony concerning defendant‟s flight from that 
incident was not.  The People‟s motion in limine represented that the prior crimes 
would be proved by the testimony of Johnnie C. and Cindy M., and by certified 
copies of the convictions.  During defendant‟s opening statement, however, 
defense counsel stated that defendant would tell the jury he was not guilty of the 
attack upon Cindy M.  Shortly after Nester began testifying, defense counsel 
objected, asserting that this testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code 
sections 352 and 1101 and was not within the scope of the trial court‟s order 
granting the in limine motion.  The prosecutor responded that Nester‟s testimony 
“is necessary to identify the defendant as Cindy [M.‟s] attacker.  As counsel said, 
if the defendant wasn‟t her attacker, this witness will prove that he was because he 
chased him down and nabbed him.”  The trial queried, “What about that?”  
Defense counsel responded, “His testimony is not relevant until Mrs. [M.] 
testifies.”  The court then asked whether Cindy M. would testify.  The prosecutor 
confirmed she would, and the trial court overruled defendant‟s objection to 
Nester‟s testimony.   
Defendant asserts that the trial court overruled his objection “[w]ithout 
discussing or ruling on the Evidence Code [section] 352 grounds.”  The court was 
not required, however, to discuss section 352 before ruling.  “ „[A] court need not 
44 
expressly weigh prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it 
has done so, if the record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed 
its balancing function under Evidence Code section 352.‟ ”  (Lewis, supra, 46 
Cal.4th 1255, 1285.)  The record reflects that the trial court followed proper 
procedure in ruling upon defendant‟s objection.  In ruling upon the motion in 
limine to admit evidence of defendant‟s prior crimes, the court considered both 
Evidence Code section 1101 and section 352.  When defendant objected that 
Nester‟s testimony did not come within section 1101 or within the trial court‟s 
earlier ruling, and raised a further objection under section 352, the trial court 
elicited an explanation from the prosecutor concerning the purpose for which 
Nester‟s testimony was being offered, and requested a response from defense 
counsel.  In reply, defense counsel stated simply that Nester‟s testimony was not 
relevant until Cindy M. testified; he did not suggest that there existed any other 
obstacle to the admission of Nester‟s testimony.  Thus, it appears the trial court 
considered all of the relevant factors in ruling on the objection. 
Defendant also asserts that the probative value of Nester‟s testimony was 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  He notes that prison and court records 
established that defendant was convicted of the crimes committed against 
Cindy M., and that she would testify that he was the perpetrator.  When the trial 
court requested a response to the prosecutor‟s rationale for admitting this 
evidence, however, defense counsel did not claim that the documentation of the 
convictions rendered the testimony cumulative.  With respect to the prejudicial 
effect of Nester‟s testimony, defendant refers to “the strong likelihood that the jury 
would conflate the 1982 flight with guilt and the issue of penalty.”  Nester‟s 
testimony, however, added minimal additional prejudice to the defense beyond 
that emanating from Cindy M.‟s testimony, and paled in comparison to the 
evidence of defendant‟s prior crimes, rendering it unlikely that Nester‟s testimony 
45 
had any undue impact upon the jurors‟ consideration of the issues of guilt or 
penalty.  Finally, the trial court instructed the jury concerning the limited purposes 
for which evidence related to the prior crimes could be considered, and directed 
that the jurors were “not permitted to consider such evidence for any other 
purpose.”15  (See People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 139 (Yeoman) [the court 
presumes that jurors understand and follow instructions concerning the purposes 
for which particular evidence may be used].)  For all of these reasons, we conclude 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of 
Nester‟s testimony was not outweighed by any undue prejudicial effect of this 
testimony.  
2.  Cross-examination of defendant regarding his prior crimes  
Defendant asserts the trial court misled him and induced him to waive his 
privilege against self-incrimination by the court‟s (1) agreeing that defendant 
could be asked only whether he had been convicted of an offense, and that 
defendant could not be questioned concerning the evidence underlying any such 
prior offense, and (2) subsequently allowing cross-examination concerning the 
facts of the prior similar offenses of which defendant had been convicted.  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s actions denied him his rights to a fair trial, to 
due process, and to reliable determinations of guilt and penalty guaranteed by the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
                                              
15  
Defendant asserts the trial court did not instruct the jury concerning the 
limited purposes for which Nester‟s testimony could be considered.  The relevant 
limiting instruction referred to evidence “introduced for the purpose of showing 
that the defendant committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial, to wit:  
the crimes against Cindy [M.] and Johnnie [C.].”  Nester‟s testimony, all of which 
related to the crimes against Cindy M., clearly was covered by this instruction. 
46 
The record does not support defendant‟s contention.  Before defendant 
testified, the court and the parties discussed the extent to which the prosecutor 
would be permitted to impeach defendant with five prior convictions.  Nothing 
said during the two court hearings at which the issue of impeachment was 
discussed related to the scope of cross-examination of defendant or to the bearing 
of defendant‟s prior crimes on the prosecutor‟s right to cross-examine defendant.  
In this context, the trial court agreed with defense counsel that only the fact of 
convictions, and not their details, would be admissible for impeachment purposes.   
Subsequently, as the direct examination of defendant was nearing 
completion, the prosecutor noted that defendant had not been questioned 
concerning his two prior similar crimes, and offered legal authority concerning 
cross-examination related to those crimes.  Defense counsel objected to cross-
examination on this subject on the grounds that it would (1) exceed the scope of 
the direct examination, and (2) not be sufficiently relevant.  He stated that the 
prosecutor had been allowed to present his “version” of the prior similar acts, and 
that allowing cross-examination would “only prolong the trial and lead to other 
issues.”   
The trial court concluded that when a defendant denies the charges, he or 
she may be cross-examined with respect to every issue related to the defendant‟s 
guilt and credibility, citing People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 760 (by 
denying guilt, the defendant placed the issue of his identity as the perpetrator in 
issue, and the prosecutor therefore could attempt to establish on cross-examination 
the defendant‟s involvement in other offenses that were admitted to prove the 
existence of an offender in common) and People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 611 
(because the defendant on direct examination denied the charged offenses, he 
could be cross-examined concerning collateral offenses).  Defense counsel 
47 
reiterated that the prosecution had proved the prior similar crimes by a 
preponderance of the evidence and that the defense had not refuted this evidence.   
The record establishes that neither the trial court nor the parties assumed 
that the ruling concerning the admission of the evidence of defendant‟s five prior 
convictions for impeachment purposes also related to the scope of cross-
examination concerning the evidence of defendant‟s two prior similar offenses.  
Defendant did not assert that the court already had decided the issue of the 
appropriate scope of cross-examination, or that the court‟s ruling concerning 
impeachment evidence had led him to believe that cross-examination concerning 
the two similar crimes would not be allowed.  Rather, defendant argued that the 
prosecution had established the facts it was entitled to prove, and that cross-
examination of defendant was not sufficiently relevant and was beyond the scope 
of his direct testimony.  In addition, defendant‟s arguments opposing cross-
examination were based upon legal principles different from his earlier arguments 
against admission of the details of his five prior convictions as impeachment 
evidence.  This difference in the two arguments reflects the circumstance that the 
defense understood that two separate issues were involved.  In sum, the trial court 
never ruled that the prosecutor could not cross-examine defendant concerning his 
prior similar offenses, and there is nothing to suggest that defense counsel 
believed the trial court had precluded such cross-examination.16 
                                              
16  
The record also reflects that defendant had decided to testify before there 
was any discussion of the allowable scope of impeachment or cross-examination.  
During his opening statement at the guilt phase, defense counsel stated that 
defendant, “when he takes the stand, will admit that he was guilty in Idaho [of 
attacking Johnnie C.] and . . . will tell you . . . he‟s not guilty of that 1982 offense” 
against Cindy M.  After Dr. Mueller testified for the defense at the guilt phase, the 
court asked defense counsel “[h]ow much longer do you think, in terms of 
(footnote continued on next page) 
48 
3.  Third-party contacts with jurors  
Defendant contends that third-party contacts with jurors during the trial 
tainted the jury, resulting in a presumption of prejudice, thereby violating his 
rights to a fair trial, trial by an impartial jury, due process, and reliable guilt and 
penalty determinations, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.   
On Monday, April 1, 1996, before the cross-examination of defendant 
resumed at the guilt phase, the court informed counsel that Juror No. 9 had 
reported at 5:00 p.m. on Friday that notes had been left on the windshield of his 
vehicle, and that he had been somewhat concerned by the notes.  The court further 
explained that the juror had learned that “it was his friend who was leaving him 
notes, and it turns out to be no big deal, but if you want to examine the juror about 
it, we can.”  Defense counsel inquired concerning the contents of the notes, and 
the bailiff reported that the juror “says he threw them out because they were from 
his buddy.”  Both sides favored further inquiry, and Juror No. 9 was brought into 
the courtroom to be questioned.  He stated that “[i]t happened on Wednesday and 
Thursday and it turned out a friend of mine . . . saw my vehicle in the parking lot.  
He . . . told me at choir practice Thursday he was playing a little joke on me.”  The 
court asked, “Pretty funny?”  The juror responded, “It wasn‟t for me at the time.”  
The court then asked the juror about “the nature of the notes.”  The juror 
responded, “the first one said something about knowing that I had two dogs; I like 
country music — which I do — and then the other one said something like — said 
I looked up; I looked down — and I can‟t remember exactly.  It just didn‟t make 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
witnesses, . . . your case will take?”  Defense counsel responded that defendant 
“will take the stand tomorrow morning.” 
49 
any sense.”  He confirmed that the incidents caused him concern.  The court 
asked, “[W]as there anything in any of these notes about this trial or duties as a 
juror?”  The juror responded, “[N]o, because like I said I went to choir practice 
Thursday night and he says . . . to me:  Did you see the notes on your car?  And he 
explained it to me.”  The court asked, “[W]ould getting those notes in any way 
affect your service as a juror on your decision in this case?”  The juror responded, 
“I don‟t think so.”  The court asked whether counsel wished to inquire, and both 
sides stated they did not.  When asked whether the juror had mentioned the 
incidents to any other jurors, he disclosed that he had mentioned to one juror, 
No. 12, receiving a note, and that this juror had seen him taking a note off of the 
windshield.  The court admonished Juror No. 9 not to discuss the incident with the 
other jurors, and Juror No. 9 left the courtroom.  The court then asked, “Does 
anybody feel we have to do anything with regard to this juror?”  Defense counsel 
and the prosecutor each responded, “No.”   
The court asked that Juror No. 12 be brought into the courtroom, at which 
point the bailiff disclosed that she had asked Juror No. 9 in front of all of the jurors 
whether Juror No. 9 had a note with him.  The prosecutor suggested the court 
bring the entire panel into the courtroom and inform them that the note was from a 
friend.  The court proposed to “bring in the one first and then the whole panel.  
Anybody object to that procedure?”  Both sides stated they did not object.  The 
court then questioned Juror No. 12, who confirmed he had seen Juror No. 9 
receive a note on his vehicle.  The court informed Juror No. 12 that Juror No. 9 
had been concerned about the notes prior to learning that a friend was leaving the 
notes, and that the notes were not related to the trial.  The court inquired:  “Would 
seeing him get notes or knowing that affect you in any way?”  Juror No. 12 
responded, “No.”  The court then asked, “That wouldn‟t affect our decision in this 
case?”  Again the juror responded, “No.”  The court asked, “Does any counsel 
50 
wish to inquire?”  Both sides responded, “No.”  When the court instructed Juror 
No. 12 not to discuss the incident with the other jurors, he agreed not to do so.   
The court stated it intended to make the same inquiry of the panel as a 
whole.  The prosecutor asked that the court also order the jurors “to disregard 
anything about the notes, not to consider it in any way, has nothing to do with the 
case.”  The court agreed, and asked, “Anything else?”  Defense counsel 
responded, “No.”  The entire panel was brought into the courtroom, and the court 
stated that a juror had received notes on his windshield on two successive days, 
and that the juror learned on Thursday that the notes were a joke his friend was 
playing.  The court explained that the incident “had nothing to do with the trial,” 
and inquired:  “Having heard about the note or notes under the circumstances, 
does that cause anybody concern?”  The panel responded in the negative.  The 
court then asked, “Is there anybody who would be affected in any way by that 
circumstance?”  Again the panel responded in the negative.  The court concluded 
by instructing the jury “to disregard that occurrence.  It was a joke arising out of a 
friendship and has nothing to do with the trial.”  
The second incident was brought to the attention of counsel on April 2, 
1996, after both sides rested at the guilt phase.  The court informed counsel that 
Juror No. 7 had overheard persons in the parking lot commenting to each other 
that Juror No. 7 was a juror in this case and that one would not want to be a juror 
in the case.  The court asked, “Does anybody want to inquire?”  Defense counsel 
asked whether Juror No. 7 had revealed the identity of the individuals, and the 
bailiff stated that the juror did not know who they were.  The trial court again 
inquired whether anyone wished to question the juror.  The prosecutor stated, 
“Might be a good idea to bring him in and ask him what happened and ask him to 
put it out of his mind, not let it affect him at all.  It‟s not evidence in this case.”   
51 
Juror No. 7 was brought into the courtroom, and the court questioned him 
concerning the incident.  The juror stated that as he walked from his van to the 
courtroom after returning from the lunch break that day, “two people . . . were 
behind me.  And one of the persons said there is one of the jurors on the trial,” and 
the second person responded to the first person, “I wouldn‟t want to be a juror on 
this trial.”  Juror No. 7 added, “I don‟t know if they are in here or part of what‟s 
happened, but that‟s all that was said.”  The court asked whether he recognized the 
individuals, and the juror indicated he did not.  The court asked the juror to look 
around the courtroom to see whether they were present.  The juror looked, and 
replied “No.”  The court inquired, “[W]hat sort of impression did that make upon 
you?”  The juror responded, “Didn‟t bother me in any way, shape, or form.  It‟s 
just I was identified as one of the jurors.”  The court asked, “Do you think that that 
would bother you at all in terms of performing your functions as a juror?”  Juror 
No. 7 responded, “No, your honor.”  The court asked, “Would it affect the way 
you view this case in any way?”  He responded, “No, your honor.”  The court 
asked whether counsel wished to inquire.  The prosecutor stated he did not, but 
asked that the juror be admonished to disregard the incident.  The court then 
instructed Juror No. 7 “not to mention this to anybody else and any of the other 
jurors, . . . and to disregard whatever you may have heard.”  The juror responded, 
“Yes, your honor.”   
As our review of the trial court‟s investigation reflects, the court questioned 
the jurors, invited counsel to question them, and admonished them.  At no time did 
defense counsel propose additional questions, object to any juror‟s continued 
service, or request a mistrial on the ground of juror misconduct.  Therefore, 
defendant has forfeited his claim.  (Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1308; People v. 
52 
Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 950.)17  As discussed below, the record also 
establishes that the claim fails on the merits. 
“ „In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, 
directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before 
the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial . . . .  The 
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government 
to establish . . . that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.  
[Citations.]‟  (Remmer v. United States (1954) 347 U.S. 227, 229.”  (Lewis, supra, 
46 Cal.4th at p. 1309; see In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294-295 [“A 
sitting juror‟s involuntary exposure to events outside the trial evidence, even if not 
„misconduct‟ in the pejorative sense, may require similar examination for probable 
prejudice”].)  “The presumption of prejudice „ “may be rebutted . . . by a 
reviewing court‟s determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no 
                                              
17  
Defendant asserts he has not forfeited this claim, because defense counsel 
expressed concern about the notes left for Juror No. 9 and requested an inquiry, 
and because the court initiated an inquiry concerning Juror No. 7.  These 
circumstances do not preserve his claim, because defense counsel thereafter 
expressed no dissatisfaction with the inquiry or with the jurors‟ continued service. 
 
Defendant also asserts his challenge is not forfeited to the extent it involves 
the trial court‟s instruction, following its inquiry concerning the notes left for Juror 
No. 9, that the jury should “disregard that occurrence.  It was a joke arising out of 
a friendship and has nothing to do with the trial.”  Defendant does not identify any 
error in this instruction, nor does he explain how the instruction affected his 
substantial rights.  (See § 1259 [“The appellate court may . . . review any 
instruction given, . . . even though no objection was made thereto in the lower 
court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”].) 
 
Finally, defendant asserts it would have been futile to object after the court 
concluded that the jurors were not tainted by the incidents.  This contention 
ignores the trial court‟s repeated invitations to counsel to pose questions or 
identify any concerns, and defense counsel‟s silence in the face of that offer.   
53 
substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual harm.”  
[Citations.]‟  [Citations.]”  (Lewis, at p. 1309.) 
Defendant challenges the adequacy of the trial court‟s questioning of the 
jurors.  He states that Juror No. 9 “was permitted simply to describe the contents 
of one note and make them appear simply as jokes, not threats as he had 
previously stated.”  As our review reflects, Juror No. 9 described the content of 
both notes to the extent he could recall their content, and explained that they 
caused him concern until his friend explained they were a joke.  No further inquiry 
was necessary to evaluate the situation and the propriety of the juror‟s continued 
service.  Defendant also complains that “[t]he court did not inquire whether Juror 
No. 12 had spoken further with Juror No. 9 about the incident or with other jurors 
and, if so, what may have been said.”  Once the court made its inquiry, the 
mystery concerning the notes was solved, and it was determined they were a 
“joke.”  The relevant inquiry at that point related to any impact the incident may 
have had upon the jurors, and it was unnecessary to determine the details of any 
and all conversations concerning the notes.   
Finally, defendant asserts the trial court should have determined whether 
other jurors overheard the comments heard by Juror No. 7, whether this juror had 
overheard other similar comments, and whether other jurors had been involved in 
similar incidents.  The information provided by Juror No. 7 did not give rise to any 
inference that another juror was present when the comments were made, or that 
this juror had overheard other similar comments, or that other jurors had been 
involved in similar incidents.  In these circumstances, the trial court was not 
required to undertake an investigation to determine what had not happened.  (See 
Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1309, fn. 38 [“the trial court was not required to 
confirm in greater detail exactly what [the juror] did not discuss with her 
husband”].) 
54 
Defendant also contends that the information obtained through the court‟s 
questioning of the jurors failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.  We 
disagree.  The content of the notes left for Juror No. 9 was unrelated to the trial, 
and Juror No. 9‟s responses established that, although the notes were not amusing 
“at the time,” he had learned the notes were a joke.  The juror did not believe that 
receiving the notes would affect his service on the jury.  Similarly, Juror No. 12 
was informed the notes were a joke and were unrelated to the trial, and he 
confirmed the incident would not affect him in any way.  Defendant‟s speculation 
that Juror No. 9‟s “concern” — from the time he received the first note on 
Wednesday until his friend revealed the joke on Thursday evening — might have 
caused him to become fearful or resentful of defendant, or that Juror No. 12 would 
be apprehensive or biased, was rebutted by the responses of these jurors to the 
court‟s inquiries.  Nor do we believe it is reasonable to infer that this incident led 
Juror No. 9 and Juror No. 12 to lose their impartiality as a result of concern about 
community expectations.  Finally, any inference that Juror No. 7‟s awareness that 
two persons walking in the court parking lot knew he was a juror, and that one of 
the two would not want to serve as a juror on the case, would lead him to fear 
community reaction to his service as a juror, was dissipated by Juror No. 7‟s 
response that the comments “[d]idn‟t bother me in any way, shape, or form” and 
would not affect his service as a juror.  Our review of the record fails to disclose 
any substantial likelihood that any juror was biased or prejudiced against 
defendant as a result of these incidents.18   
                                              
18  
As in Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1255, “[d]efendant cites no authority 
requiring different or additional analysis in connection with his contention that the 
failure to dismiss [these jurors] violated his right to a reliable verdict under the 
Eighth Amendment.  (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666 [„the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . requires the sentencing jury to be 
(footnote continued on next page) 
55 
4.  Trespass as a lesser included offense  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 
court‟s own motion with respect to trespass as a lesser included offense of 
burglary, in violation of his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable 
determination of guilt and penalty guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
“It is the „court‟s duty to instruct the jury not only on the crime with which 
the defendant is charged, but also on any lesser offense that is both included in the 
offense charged and shown by the evidence to have been committed.‟  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826; see Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 
U.S. 625, 637.)  As we recently reiterated, however, trespass is a lesser related 
offense, not a lesser included offense, of burglary.  (People v. Taylor, supra, 
48 Cal.4th 574, 622; People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136 (Birks).)  “[T]here 
is no federal constitutional right of a defendant to compel the giving of lesser-
related-offense instructions.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 
148 (Rundle).)  Regardless of defendant‟s legal and factual theories concerning 
how his conduct may have constituted trespass, that potential crime nonetheless 
remains at most a lesser offense related to (but not included in) the offense of 
burglary. 
Defendant notes, however, that at the time his crimes were committed and 
his trial was held, this court agreed with various other jurisdictions that it would be 
“fundamentally unfair to deny the defendant the right to have the court or jury 
consider the „third option‟ of convicting the defendant of [a lesser] related 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
impartial to the same extent that the Sixth Amendment requires jury impartiality at 
the guilt phase of the trial.‟].)”  (Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1309, fn. 39.) 
56 
offense.”  (People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 520.)  This circumstance is of 
no assistance to defendant.  In Birks, we overruled Geiger and provided that our 
holding generally should be applied retroactively.  (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 136; see also Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th 76, 147.)  As in Birks, the retroactive 
application of our holding to defendant‟s case “merely withdraws the procedural 
opportunity for conviction of a reduced offense not encompassed by the 
accusatory pleading and selected solely by defendant,” and “neither expands 
criminal liability nor enhances punishment for conduct previously committed.”  
(Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136.)  In any event, Geiger afforded a right to 
instructions on related offenses only if the defendant requested such instructions, 
and defendant did not request an instruction concerning trespass.   
5.  Burden of proof with respect to identity 
Defendant contends that the jury instructions eliminated the prosecution‟s 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the person who 
committed the charged offenses, in violation of his rights to a fair trial by jury, due 
process of law, and reliable determinations of guilt and penalty, as guaranteed by 
the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Defendant notes that the trial court‟s instructions concerning the charged 
offenses and special circumstances did not specify that the identity of the 
perpetrator was an element and that, on the contrary, the trial court instructed that 
identity was not an element of the charged offenses.19  Defendant also notes that 
                                              
19  
The trial court instructed the jury as set forth in CALJIC 2.72:  “No person 
may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some proof of each element 
of the crime independent of any admission made by him outside of this trial.  [¶]  
The identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a crime is not an 
element of the crime nor is the degree of the crime.  Such identity or degree of the 
crime may be established by an admission.”  (Italics added.)   
57 
the court did not instruct, as set forth in CALJIC No. 2.91, that the prosecution 
bore the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the person 
who committed the charged offenses. 
As we explained in People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894 (Frye), the 
instruction that identity is not an element of the crime “is part of the standard 
instruction explaining the principles of the corpus delicti rule . . . .  [¶]  Under this 
instruction, the jury is informed that the defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 
unless there is proof as to each element of the offense independent of his 
extrajudicial confession or admission.”  (Id. at pp. 959-960.)  We also observed 
that, although the jury was not instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.91 concerning 
the prosecution‟s burden to prove the identity of the perpetrator, “the challenged 
instruction did not relieve the prosecution from proving that defendant committed 
the charged crimes.”  (Frye, at p. 960.)  Finally, we concluded in Frye that, “[i]n 
light of the parties‟ steadfast focus on the issue of identity at trial, including the 
consistent position by the defense that defendant did not kill the [victims] and the 
extensive evidence presented by the People connecting him to the crimes, . . . there 
is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the prosecution had no 
obligation to prove defendant was the person who committed the offenses.”  
(Ibid.) 
Defendant urges us to revisit our decision in Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 
for two reasons.  First, he asserts, “CALJIC No. 2.72 clearly and unambiguously 
informed the jury that identity was not an element of any charged crime and did 
not have to be proved.”  CALJIC No. 2.72 did not state, however, that identity 
“did not have to be proved.”  Rather, it instructed that elements of a crime must be 
proved by evidence independent of any admission made by the defendant outside 
of the trial, but that the perpetrator‟s identity, which is not an element, may be 
58 
established by an admission.  Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the instruction‟s 
statement that “[s]uch identity . . . may be established by an admission” reflects a 
recognition that identity must be established. 
Second, defendant asserts, the court in Frye erred in applying the harmless 
error standard.  The court did not find error in that case, however, nor did it 
evaluate whether any error was harmless.  Rather, the court considered whether 
there was any reasonable likelihood the jury would have misunderstood the 
instructions, and concluded there was not.  (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 959-
960; see People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 443 [“In assessing the instruction 
to determine whether the jury was adequately guided under the Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendment, we look to whether it is reasonably likely the jury 
understood the instruction and correctly applied it”].) 
In the present case, as in Frye, the parties presented extensive evidence 
concerning the identity of the perpetrator.  Moreover, the instructions describing 
the possible verdicts repeatedly referred to findings that defendant was or was not 
guilty of the charges, and the instruction explaining the presumption of innocence 
and the prosecution‟s burden stated that “[t]his presumption [of innocence] places 
upon the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(CALJIC No. 2.90.)  We conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
could have understood the instructions to relieve the prosecution of the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the perpetrator. 
6.  Jury instructions concerning prior crimes  
Defendant contends the jury instructions concerning evidence of his prior 
crimes permitted the ultimate facts of his identity and his intent with respect to the 
present charges of murder, burglary, and robbery to be found by a preponderance 
of the evidence, in violation of his rights to due process, a fair trial by jury, and a 
59 
reliable determination of guilt and penalty as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.20 
As explained below, the instructions given in the present case, taken 
together, properly informed the jury that (1) it could not consider the evidence of 
defendant‟s prior crimes unless it found those crimes proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence; (2) it could not find defendant guilty unless the prosecution 
proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) if the evidence of 
prior crimes was necessary to prove an essential fact, the jury could not rely upon 
that evidence unless the prosecution proved the prior crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50, that 
evidence introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed 
crimes against Cindy M. and Johnnie C. could be considered “only for the limited 
purpose of determining if it tends to show:  [¶]  A characteristic method, plan or 
scheme in the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan or scheme 
used in the commission of the offense in this case which would further tend to 
show the existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged 
or the identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which the 
defendant is accused.”  The court also instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 
2.50.1, that “such other crime or crimes purportedly committed by the defendant 
. . . against Cindy [M.] and Johnnie [C.] must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  You must not consider such evidence for any purpose unless you are 
satisfied that the defendant committed such other crime or crimes.  [¶]  The 
                                              
20  
Respondent contends defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to 
the jury instructions.  Because defendant‟s claim of error would affect his 
substantial rights, we address it, despite his failure to object.  (§§ 1259, 1469.)  
60 
prosecution has the burden of proving these facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  Finally, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50.2, the court explained the 
meaning of “preponderance of the evidence.”   
More generally, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC 
No. 2.90, that “a defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until 
the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.  This presumption 
places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  It also instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01, that “a finding of 
guilt as to any crime may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the 
proved circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational 
conclusion.  [¶]  Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of 
circumstances necessary to establish a defendant‟s guilt must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt 
may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or 
circumstance upon which such inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”   
As we noted in People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 (Medina), at the 
guilt phase “facts tending to prove the defendant‟s other crimes for purposes of 
establishing his criminal knowledge or intent are deemed mere „evidentiary facts‟ 
that need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as long as the jury is 
convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the truth of the „ultimate fact‟ of the 
defendant‟s knowledge or intent.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 763.)  The defendant in 
Medina had asserted “that when „other crimes‟ evidence is offered to prove such 
matters as intent or identity, these facts should be proved by the „beyond 
reasonable doubt‟ standard.”  (Id. at p. 764.)  As in Medina, we find no reason to 
61 
reconsider our decisions to the contrary.  (See also People v. Davis (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 539, 615-616 [rejecting a request to reconsider our rulings that CALJIC 
Nos. 2.50, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 do not lower the burden of proof to less than beyond 
a reasonable doubt].)  We also reject defendant‟s contention that “the jury 
reasonably could have believed that its findings as to certain key elemental or 
ultimate facts and issues might be based simply on a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  The trial court‟s instructions concerning the People‟s burden to prove 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and concerning proof by 
circumstantial evidence, made clear that ultimate facts must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 383 
(Carpenter) [the standard instructions on reasonable doubt and circumstantial 
evidence “made clear the reasonable doubt standard applies to intent as well as 
identity”].)21 
7.  Sufficiency of the evidence  
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support convictions for 
robbery, felony murder based upon robbery, burglary, felony murder based upon 
burglary, and deliberate and premeditated murder, or to support special 
circumstance findings of murder committed in the course of a robbery or burglary.  
Therefore, he asserts, these convictions and special circumstance findings violate 
his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
                                              
21  
Defendant asserts that “neither Medina nor Carpenter involved the use of 
prior crimes evidence to prove both basic or evidentiary facts and elemental or 
ultimate facts as in this case.”  In Medina, evidence of uncharged murders was 
admitted to link defendant to the charged murder.  (Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 
p. 723.)  In Carpenter, evidence of uncharged murders was admitted to establish 
the defendant‟s state of mind.  (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 383.)  Thus, in 
each of the two cited cases, the evidence was admitted to prove ultimate facts. 
62 
States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the California Constitution, and his 
right to a reliable determination of his guilt guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
“ „When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence 
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‟  [Citation.]  
„[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‟  [Citations.]  „[I]t is 
the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant‟s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‟  [Citation.]  „In a case, such as the present one, based 
upon circumstantial evidence, we must decide whether the circumstances 
reasonably justify the findings of the trier of fact, but our opinion that the 
circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding would 
not warrant reversal of the judgment.  [Citation.]‟  [Citation.]”  (Lewis, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at pp. 1289-1290, fn. omitted.) 
We first focus our analysis upon defendant‟s conviction for burglary.  Any 
person who enters a building or room with the intent to commit larceny or any 
felony is guilty of burglary.  (§ 459.)  In defendant‟s view, the evidence reflects 
that the larceny was incidental to the killing, and was not intended when defendant 
entered the church.  A rational trier of fact could conclude, however, that 
defendant entered the church with the intent to commit larceny, based upon (1) the 
circumstances of the crime — within a short time after entering the building, 
defendant stole the victim‟s belongings — and (2) defendant‟s pattern of entering 
offices and violently robbing solitary women.  This same evidence supports a 
63 
finding that the killing was committed in the course of a burglary, and thus 
supports a finding of felony murder based upon the commission of a burglary, and 
the special circumstance of murder committed in the course of a burglary.  
(§§ 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G).)22  The fact that the evidence also may support 
other scenarios does not render insufficient the evidence supporting the verdict.  
(People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 553.) 
We next consider defendant‟s conviction for robbery.  “Robbery is the 
felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person 
or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or 
fear.”  (§ 211.)  Defendant contends the evidence reflects only that the perpetrator 
took the victim‟s property after the victim was killed.  For the reasons set forth 
above, however, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant decided, 
before he killed the victim, to steal her belongings, and that, in accordance with 
his plan or pattern in committing his prior crimes, demanded the victim‟s 
belongings before harming her.  Thus, substantial evidence supports the 
conclusion that the victim‟s property was taken against her will, and that the 
killing was committed in the course of the robbery.  Therefore, substantial 
evidence supports a finding of felony murder based upon the commission of a 
robbery, and the special circumstance of murder committed in the course of a 
robbery.  (§§ 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)   
                                              
22  
Defendant notes that at the time of his trial, the felony-murder charge could 
not be premised upon a burglary committed for the sole purpose of assaulting or 
killing the victim.  (People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 440; see People v. 
Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1121 [this court‟s overruling of Wilson does not 
apply retroactively].)  The trial court‟s instruction concerning burglary identified 
larceny as the sole basis of the burglary charge.  Thus, this case presents no issue 
concerning merger of the burglary and the homicide. 
64 
Finally, defendant contends there was no substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion that the murder was deliberate and premeditated.  As explained 
above, there was substantial evidence that the killing was committed in the course 
of a burglary and a robbery.  Therefore, substantial evidence supports a finding of 
first degree felony-murder.  Because the jury unanimously found the felony-
murder special circumstances to be true, it also must have agreed unanimously that 
defendant committed felony murder premised upon his commission of the offenses 
of burglary and robbery.  (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 89-90 
(Hawthorne).)  Therefore, we need not address the question whether substantial 
evidence supports the alternative theory of deliberate and premeditated murder. 
In sum, substantial evidence supports all of the jury‟s findings. 
8.  Asserted prosecutorial misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed acts of misconduct that 
denied defendant his rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, due process, and 
reliable determinations of guilt and penalty, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
“Under the federal Constitution, a prosecutor‟s behavior deprives a 
defendant of his rights „when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that 
it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due 
process.” ‟  [Citations.]  Conduct that falls short of that standard „may still 
constitute misconduct under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the jury.‟  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 370-371 (Gamache).)  “In addition, 
„ “a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a 
timely fashion — and on the same ground — the defendant made an assignment of 
misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the 
65 
impropriety.  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]  Objection may be excused if it would have 
been futile or an admonition would not have cured the harm.  [Citation.]”  (People 
v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 760 (Dykes).)   
a.  Referring to inadmissible evidence and eliciting inadmissible 
testimony 
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by discussing 
Richard Nester‟s testimony during the People‟s opening statement, and by 
introducing Nester‟s testimony concerning defendant‟s flight from the assault 
upon Cindy M.  Defendant did not object to that aspect of the People‟s opening 
statement.  In addition, he objected to the introduction of Nester‟s testimony only 
on the basis that the testimony was not relevant until Cindy M. had testified.  
Therefore, defendant has forfeited his present contentions.  Moreover, in light of 
our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this 
evidence, the prosecutor‟s reference to the evidence during his opening statement 
was not misconduct.  Finally, because the trial court ruled that Nester‟s testimony 
was admissible, the prosecutor‟s introduction of this evidence did not constitute 
misconduct.  (Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th 67, 94.)   
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor‟s cross-examination of defendant with 
respect to his prior crimes violated the trial court‟s ruling concerning the scope of 
cross-examination.  Defendant did not object to the cross-examination on the 
ground of prosecutorial misconduct.  Therefore, he has forfeited this claim.  The 
claim also fails on the merits.  As discussed above (PT, II.B.2.), the trial court did 
not rule that defendant could not be cross-examined concerning his prior crimes.  
In addition, the trial court overruled defendant‟s objections.  Thus, the 
prosecutor‟s cross-examination of defendant was not misconduct. 
66 
Finally, defendant sets forth seven questions to which objections were 
sustained.23  He does not explain why the trial court‟s rulings sustaining the 
                                              
23  
First, after defendant twice noted that there was no trial in the Johnnie C. 
case, and that instead he had pleaded guilty, the prosecutor asked, “Are you trying 
to leave the impression that if you commit a crime, you just admit it?”  The trial 
court sustained defendant‟s unspecified objection.   
 
Second, in the course of questioning defendant about his escape from an 
Idaho prison, the prosecutor asked, “You don‟t like prison[,] would that be fair to 
state?”  The trial court sustained defendant‟s relevancy objection.   
 
Third, after questioning defendant about his activities after he was released 
from prison in 1982, the prosecutor asked, “[H]ad you gotten any insight as to why 
you committed those crimes that landed you in prison back in 1972?”  Defendant 
answered, “No, I did not.”  Defense counsel objected and requested that the court 
strike the question and answer as “improper cross-examination.”  The trial court 
sustained the objection and directed that the answer be stricken.   
 
Fourth, the prosecutor asked whether defendant did “something at your 
1982 trial to try to disguise your appearance.”  Defendant answered, “I did not.”  
The trial court sustained an objection of “no foundation.”  At a sidebar conference, 
the prosecutor explained that the evidence would show that defendant grew a 
beard before his trial in the Cindy M. matter.  The trial court then concluded that 
the questions concerning defendant‟s appearance were appropriate, “since 
[identity] is an issue.”  Thus, the prosecutor‟s questions were not misconduct.  
(See Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 94.) 
 
Fifth, the prosecutor asked, “So when you were released on December 12th, 
1990, you had spent about 18 years in prison for the 1972 crime and the 1982 
crime, is that correct?”  Defendant‟s objection that the question was irrelevant was 
sustained.  
 
Sixth, the prosecutor then asked, “during that period of time, isn‟t it true 
that you spent this time in prison all because victims had come into court and 
identified you as their attacker?”  Defendant answered, “With the exception of the 
escape.”  Defense counsel‟s objection that the question called for a conclusion was 
sustained.   
 
Seventh, the prosecutor asked whether, when defendant was released from 
prison on December 12, 1982, he was “aware of the consequences of the crime of 
murder.”  Defendant answered, “Yes.”  The prosecutor then asked, “You knew if 
you committed the crime of murder, you could get the death penalty.”  Defendant 
answered, “No, not specifically, death penalty.”  Defendant objected that the 
question oversimplified the law and brought the issue of penalty into the guilt 
phase.  The prosecutor responded that the elements of first degree murder require 
(footnote continued on next page) 
67 
objections were inadequate to abate any prejudice.  (See Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th 
at p. 764 [“because the trial court sustained objections to the argumentative 
element of the prosecutor‟s questioning, we assume any prejudice was abated”].)  
He also fails to address why the prosecutor‟s questions constituted misconduct, 
other than to note that the trial court sustained the objections.  Therefore, we 
decline to address these contentions.  (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 
133 (Catlin) [because defendant “fails to offer any authority or argument in 
support of [his] claim, . . . it is not considered here”]; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 1044, 1182 (Barnett) [because defendant “fails . . . to support the claim 
with adequate argument[, we] . . . reject it as not properly raised”].) 
b.  Asserted references at the guilt phase to the issue of penalty 
Defendant asserts that at the guilt phase the prosecutor improperly referred 
to the issue of penalty by (1) describing defendant‟s prior terms of incarceration, 
and (2) examining defendant‟s parole officer concerning defendant‟s Idaho prison 
records.  As explained below, defendant not only has forfeited these contentions, 
but they fail on the merits. 
In his opening statement, the prosecutor, in describing the crimes 
committed by defendant against Johnnie C., noted that defendant “was sentenced 
to life in prison in Idaho” for those crimes, but “in Idaho at that time life in prison 
didn‟t mean life in prison.”  He added that defendant “did remain in prison for 
almost 10 years.”  Similarly, after describing the crimes against Cindy M., the 
prosecutor noted that defendant was sentenced to 13 years in prison, but “in 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
that the defendant have in mind the consequences of killing.  The court sustained 
the objection “on the grounds of 352.”  
68 
California at that time 13 years didn‟t mean 13 years.  A person would serve a 
portion of that time and then they had to be released on parole if they behaved 
themselves in prison.”  
Defendant did not object to these statements, and therefore has forfeited his 
claims.  He contends, however, that he should not be precluded from presenting 
them, because “the prosecutor‟s comments disclose an improper pattern of 
prosecutorial behavior,” citing People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800.  In Hill, 
defense counsel “was subjected to a constant barrage of [the prosecutor‟s] 
unethical conduct, including misstating the evidence, sarcastic and critical 
comments demeaning defense counsel, and propounding outright falsehoods.”  (Id. 
at p. 821.)  In addition, by objecting, defense counsel “risk[ed] repeatedly 
provoking the trial court‟s wrath, which took the form of comments before the jury 
suggesting [defense counsel] was an obstructionist, delaying the trial with 
„meritless‟ objections.”  (Ibid.)  No such circumstances are reflected in the record 
in the present case.  Defendant also asserts that “[a] contemporaneous objection 
would only have highlighted the improper comments and have further inserted 
into the guilt phase improper considerations of penalty.”  An objection always will 
highlight the matter to which the objection is directed.  Allowing this consequence 
to overcome the requirement of an objection would negate the rule that a party 
must object and request an admonition in order to preserve a claim of error and 
enable the trial court to correct the asserted error.   
Defendant‟s claim also fails on the merits.  The prosecutor‟s motion in 
limine to admit evidence of defendant‟s prior crimes stated that the People would 
prove those crimes with testimony from the victims and “by a certified copy of the 
. . . conviction in each case.”  The certified copies of these documents reflected 
that defendant was sentenced to life in prison in Idaho in 1972, and to 13 years in 
prison in California in 1982.  Because the timeline of defendant‟s incarceration 
69 
and the dates of his release were relevant to the jury‟s evaluation of the probative 
value of the evidence of defendant‟s other crimes, an explanation of the actual 
sentences he served was appropriate.  In addition, the prosecutor referred to the 
sentencing schemes “at that time,” and did not suggest that the sentence to be 
imposed in the present case would not be carried out in full.   
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor also introduced the issue of penalty 
during his examination of defendant‟s parole officer, Steven Slaten, by repeatedly 
attempting to establish that records from the State of Idaho indicated defendant 
had been sentenced to life in prison.  Defendant‟s objections to the prosecutor‟s 
questions were based upon the hearsay character of the Idaho records; defendant 
did not object that the contents were irrelevant or that the prosecutor‟s questions 
otherwise were improper.  Therefore, defendant has forfeited his present 
contention.  The claim also fails on the merits.  The trial court already had 
admitted the certified copy of the Idaho records reflecting defendant‟s conviction 
and sentence, and the prosecutor merely attempted to have Slaten explain the 
contents of that document.  As noted above, the terms of defendant‟s prior 
incarcerations were relevant to an evaluation of the probative value of defendant‟s 
prior crimes, and this document was offered to establish relevant facts.  Thus, the 
substance of the prosecutor‟s questions was not inappropriate.   
Because the prosecutor‟s statements and questions were relevant to 
pertinent aspects of defendant‟s prior crimes, we reject defendant‟s assertion that 
the prosecutor‟s conduct was “part of an overall strategy . . . to encourage the jury 
improperly to consider penalty and the propriety of death in this case.”  We further 
note, however, that the jury was instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.42 and 
CALJIC No. 8.83.2, not to discuss or consider the subject of penalty or 
punishment in their deliberations concerning guilt, and that this subject must not in 
70 
any way affect the jury‟s verdict or findings.  We assume the jury followed these 
instructions.  (See Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 139.)   
c.  Accusing defendant of guilt of uncharged crimes 
Defendant contends the prosecutor argued that defendant also was guilty of 
uncharged sex crimes against the victim.  He bases this contention upon the 
prosecutor‟s comparison, in his opening statement, of defendant‟s prior crimes to 
the charged offenses.  After describing the prior crimes, the prosecutor 
characterized the victim as “a strong woman,” and then described how the charged 
crimes unfolded in a manner similar to the prior crimes:  “At around noon on 
August 26th, that Monday, 1991, while Gail was alone there in the church 
[, defendant] walked in.  Just like in 1982 when he walked into Cindy [M.‟s] 
office, [defendant] had a knife.  Just like he had done before, [defendant] 
confronted Gail, made her get her purse and brought her back there into the 
minister‟s office in another room of the church.  Just like he had before with Cindy 
[M.], the contents of Gail‟s purse were dumped on the floor at her feet and her 
purse was put on the floor, and he robbed Gail Johnson.  [¶]  Now, I mentioned 
that Gail was a strong-willed woman, a strong-willed woman, and at some point 
when [defendant] had plans for her, at some point she said no.  At some point, she, 
too resisted just like Johnnie [C.] resisted, just like Cindy [M.] resisted.  At some 
point Gail resisted but, unfortunately, there was no Dick Nester there to walk in 
right in the middle of it and save her. . . .  [¶]  . . . She was fighting for her life. . . .  
Only she didn‟t stop resisting like Johnnie [C.] stopped and was okay.  Cindy [M.] 
didn‟t quite stop but she was saved.”   
Because defendant did not object to these statements, he forfeited his claim.  
He asserts, however, that an objection and admonition would not have cured the 
harm, because they only would have highlighted the insinuation that defendant 
71 
committed uncharged sex crimes.  As noted above, all objections draw attention to 
the assertedly objectionable material, but this consequence does not excuse 
defendant from the requirement that he object.  Defendant does not explain why an 
admonition would not have cured any harm, or why, as he asserts, “the 
prosecutor‟s statements also constituted federal constitutional error, not subject to 
the contemporaneous objection or curative admonition rule.”  (See Catlin, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 133; Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)  Alternatively, 
defendant contends he should not be precluded from raising the issue, because 
“the prosecutor‟s comments disclose a continuing, improper pattern of 
prosecutorial behavior that infected the trial with fundamental unfairness.”  We do 
not perceive such a pattern. 
This claim also fails on the merits.  The evidence of defendant‟s prior 
crimes was admitted because of similarities between those crimes and the charged 
crimes, and the prosecutor‟s statements properly focused the jury‟s attention on 
those similarities.  Contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, the prosecutor did not refer 
to matters outside the record, and the prosecutor‟s statement that the defendant 
“had plans for her” was not baseless, deceptive, or otherwise unwarranted. 
d.  Insinuating guilt based upon defendant’s changed appearance 
During questioning by the prosecutor, Nester confirmed that he had 
identified defendant in court at the preliminary hearing in the Cindy M. matter.  
The prosecutor then asked about changes to defendant‟s appearance between his 
attack on Cindy M. on March 29, 1982, and the preliminary hearing held on 
April 12, 1982.  Nester testified that defendant had grown a beard and mustache, 
and his hair was “slicked back” rather than “big.”  The prosecutor asked, “Did that 
kind of throw you off, you thought, how could this kind of thing be allowed to 
happen, a person can try to disguise their appearance and be allowed to do that?”  
72 
He responded, “Yes, it did.”  Defendant objected, “leading and suggestive.”  The 
trial court sustained the objection.   
Defendant complains that the prosecutor immediately asked another 
question concerning defendant‟s appearance during the proceedings in Cindy M.‟s 
case.  Defendant‟s earlier objection was not to the subject matter of the questions; 
he objected only to the form of a particular question.  Therefore, the prosecutor did 
not act inappropriately merely by continuing to pursue his line of questioning.  For 
the same reason, defendant has forfeited his claim that the substance of the 
questions was improper. 
The claim also fails on the merits.  It is not improper for a prosecutor to 
suggest that a defendant deliberately altered his or her appearance to raise doubt 
concerning the defendant‟s identity as the perpetrator, unless the prosecutor knows 
that the change in appearance was motivated solely by a reason unrelated to the 
reason suggested by the prosecutor.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
p. 1001.)  As in Cunningham, the prosecutor‟s suggestion that defendant had 
changed his appearance in the Cindy M. matter in order to confuse witnesses was 
relevant to the issues of defendant‟s identity and consciousness of guilt.  
Defendant continued to deny that he attacked Cindy M., and Nester‟s testimony 
concerning defendant‟s changes in appearance tended to refute defendant‟s denial.  
Also, defendant‟s changes in appearance tended to explain Nester‟s testimony that 
he recognized defendant in court “[o]nly by virtue of the fact that he‟s sitting at 
the defendant‟s table.”  Defendant‟s speculation on appeal, that “[s]urely, the 
prosecutor was aware that jail grooming requirements alone could have accounted 
for [defendant‟s] changed appearance,” does not establish that the changes in 
appearance were motivated solely by a reason other than raising doubt concerning 
his identity, or that the prosecutor was aware of a separate and exclusive 
motivation for the change in appearance. 
73 
e.  Insinuating that defendant was concealing evidence 
During the examination of Stockwell, the prosecutor noted that the 
criminalist had “preserved portions of each one of these stains so the defense 
would have a portion of the stain to conduct their own independent re-analysis 
with their own criminalist; is that correct?”  Stockwell responded, “It has that 
potential.  By keeping a remaining portion of the stain, they have that ability, yes.”  
The prosecutor then asked, “And did you release portions of many of these stains 
to the defense criminalist for re-analysis?”  Stockwell confirmed he did.  The 
prosecutor then stated:  “I‟d like to go through here and list which stains you 
released portions of to the defense for re-analysis, the defense criminalist — the 
request from this criminalist requested starting with item A-10a.”   
Defendant objected “to this line of questioning on the basis of relevance.”  
Out of the presence of the jury, defendant also objected that the prosecutor was 
“insinuating that this was released to a criminalist hired by the defense.”  The trial 
court asked whether the evidence in fact was released to a criminalist hired by the 
defense, and defense counsel confirmed it was, “but we‟re not using that 
criminalist.  The reports remain confidential.  He‟s drawing an adverse inference.”  
The court noted that “it‟s already in evidence that the samples were available for 
re-analysis,” and defense counsel added, “It‟s also in evidence that our criminalist 
picked up our stuff.  I believe he testified to that.”  The trial court concluded that, 
“under the authority of [People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648], I believe the 
evidence is admissible without mentioning the name of the [defense expert].  And, 
also, I think it‟s already in evidence.  So I think what we are doing here is just 
turning out details of what has been said.  There has been a waiver of any 
objections in any event.  So the objection will be overruled and the evidence will 
be admissible.”  The prosecutor then reviewed with the witness, item by item, 
which stains were released to the defense.  Because the trial court overruled 
74 
defendant‟s objection, the prosecutor‟s questioning did not constitute misconduct.  
(Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 94.)   
Defendant also challenges the propriety of the prosecutor‟s cross-
examination of Dr. Mueller, during which the prosecutor asked a series of 
questions “to try to clarify just what you did do in this case and what you did not 
do in this case.”  He asked whether Mueller (1) conducted a test that proved 
defendant did not kill the victim, (2) conducted a test that proved the blood was 
not defendant‟s blood, (3) “reanalyze[d] any of the blood . . . and show[ed] that 
Cellmark was wrong when they said it matched” defendant, or (4) reanalyzed any 
of the blood in the case.  Mueller answered that he did not perform an analysis of 
any biological samples.  The prosecutor then questioned him concerning the 
possibility of having a blood sample reanalyzed if the first test was not performed 
properly.  Mueller stated there were six or seven private laboratories that perform 
some type of DNA testing.  The prosecutor asked, “You were hired by the defense 
. . . to give them some advice on DNA analysis, is that correct?”  Mueller 
responded, “On the population genetic issues.”  The prosecutor asked, “Did you 
tell them here‟s a lab, send that blood over there and reanalyze it?”  Defense 
counsel interposed that he had an objection that he preferred to express outside of 
the presence of the jury.  The court immediately responded, “The objection is 
sustained,” and no sidebar conference occurred.   
Defendant‟s failure to request that the jury be admonished forfeits his 
claim.  The claim also fails on the merits.  As noted above, the trial court 
permitted the admission of evidence establishing that portions of many of the 
bloodstains were preserved and released to the defense.  Inquiries concerning 
defense testing were relevant in light of Dr. Mueller‟s testimony questioning 
Cellmark‟s proficiency.  The prosecutor‟s questions suggested only what was 
implied by the evidence — that the defense did not possess any contrary 
75 
serological evidence.  Nor did the prosecutor‟s focus upon the absence of contrary 
evidence insinuate that defendant bore the burden of offering evidence of his 
innocence.  In addition, the prosecutor‟s questions were not argumentative; they 
clearly sought to elicit relevant evidence.  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
344, 384.)  
In conclusion, we find no prosecutorial misconduct, much less a pattern of 
prosecutorial misconduct that would excuse defendant‟s failure to object to the 
prosecutor‟s questions and statements.  (See Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 821.) 
9.  Cumulative error  
Defendant contends the various errors claimed to have occurred at the guilt 
phase, considered together, “render[ed] the proceedings fundamentally unfair and 
a denial of due process,” in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 15 of 
the California Constitution.  We have concluded that any presumed error in 
ordering defendant shackled was harmless, because there is no evidence 
suggesting any of the jurors saw the shackles.  We also have concluded that any 
presumed error in the jury instruction that allowed the jury to consider defendant‟s 
prior crimes as evidence of his identity as the perpetrator was harmless, because 
the other evidence of identity is overwhelming.  In combination, these presumed 
errors were harmless and did not deny defendant a fair trial. 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Preinstruction of jurors  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s instructions to prospective jurors 
(1) failed to explain the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment for “life without 
the possibility of parole,” (2) encouraged jurors to speculate that such a sentence 
did not mean defendant never would be paroled, (3) led prospective jurors to 
76 
believe the responsibility for defendant‟s sentence rested with the appellate courts, 
and (4) implied a sentence of death in the present case would not be unexpected.  
Defendant asserts the preinstructions violated his rights to a fair trial, due process, 
equal protection, and a reliable penalty determination, as guaranteed by the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Before distributing copies of the juror questionnaire, the court explained to 
prospective jurors that this case was different from most court cases, because, if 
the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found a special 
circumstance to be true, the jurors would be called upon to select one of two 
sentences — life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death.  The 
court stated that there was some confusion and misinformation among the 
citizenry regarding our system of capital punishment, and that the court would 
“take a few minutes and talk to you about the state of the law today,” to assist 
prospective jurors in answering the questionnaire‟s inquiries concerning the views 
of prospective jurors with respect to capital punishment.  The court explained that 
the death penalty as prescribed in California had been determined by the United 
States Supreme Court to be unconstitutional.  (See Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 
U.S. 153.)  “At that time, there were many people on death row in California, and 
because the law under which they had been sentenced was invalidated, their 
sentences were commuted to life in prison.  [¶]  At that time there was no 
punishment in California known as life without parole so all those people received 
a sentence of life with parole possibility.  And it‟s because of those circumstances 
that men like Charles Manson and Sirhan Sirhan keep coming up for parole 
review.  [¶]  I know that it makes many of our citizens very nervous to think that 
these men might be paroled, but what you need to know is that their cases are 
unique and they are considered for parole only because of that change in the law 
that occurred.”  
77 
The court then explained that California voters adopted a new death penalty 
law in 1978, which “added a new punishment to California law known as life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.  Under that punishment, a Defendant 
would never be released from prison.  [¶]  Now, this new law was tested, which 
took some years, and was found by both the California Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court to be constitutional.  Many people have now been 
convicted under this new law, and as you may be aware, many years passed before 
anyone was actually executed in California.  [¶]  Much of that time was consumed 
in testing the new law and the appellate review of those Defendants‟ cases.  
However, there have been two executions in California in the recent past and I 
anticipate that there will be many more executions in the near future.  What you 
need to know is the following:  [¶]  In 1996, in California, the law means exactly 
what it says.  If the Defendant in this case is found guilty of first degree murder 
and if either of the special circumstances alleged are found to be true, then the jury 
will have the obligation of determining which punishment to choose.  [¶]  There 
will, under those circumstances, be a second phase of the trial, which I‟ll explain 
to you in a few minutes.  [¶]  At the conclusion of that phase, the jury will have 
only two options:  Death or life imprisonment without parole, and again, you are 
instructed that both those punishments mean exactly what they say.  If you vote 
for life without parole, the Defendant will never be released on parole and will 
never be considered for release.  If you vote for death, the Defendant will be 
executed.  I‟m giving you this extremely sobering information because it is 
important that you understand the significance of the questions that we are asking 
on the questionnaire and the decisions you could be required to make.”  The trial 
court then explained the nature and role of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  
78 
We reject defendant‟s contention that the trial court‟s statements 
concerning potential sentences were flawed.24  The court‟s statements made clear 
that the circumstances that led to a sentence of life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole for some death row inmates were unique and transitory, and 
that the death penalty law at the time of trial provided only two options:  life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, in which case “the Defendant will 
never be released on parole and will never be considered for release,” and death, in 
which case “the Defendant will be executed.”  We find no basis whatsoever in the 
record to support defendant‟s view that the court‟s explanation “creat[ed] the 
erroneous illusion that [defendant], as other notorious criminals, might someday 
be eligible for parole,” or his view that the references to notorious criminals would 
have inflamed the jury against defendant.  Nor did the court‟s statements suggest, 
as defendant contends, that jurors would choose between “death and a limited 
period of incarceration.”  Therefore, we reject defendant‟s view that the court‟s 
explanations might have led a juror to believe that “the non-death option offered 
was neither real nor sufficiently severe,” or that defendant would become eligible 
for parole.  Finally, defendant fails to explain how the preinstruction “undermined 
the prosecution‟s burden of proof [and] permitted the jury improperly to speculate 
on penalty during both the guilt and penalty phases.”   
                                              
24  
Defendant reviewed the remarks that the trial court proposed to give to the 
prospective jurors, and informed the court that he had no objection to these 
remarks.  Nonetheless, we review his contentions, because the claimed errors 
might affect his substantial rights.  (§ 1259 [“The appellate court may . . . review 
any instruction given, . . . even though no objection was made thereto in the lower 
court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby”]; People v. 
Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 929.) 
79 
We also reject defendant‟s contention that the instructions led prospective 
jurors to believe that the responsibility for defendant‟s sentence rested with the 
appellate courts.  (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-329 [“it is 
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by 
a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of the defendant‟s death rests elsewhere”].)  The trial court‟s 
comments concerning the role of the appellate courts in testing the validity of the 
death penalty, and the delay in executions caused by appellate review, did not 
suggest that responsibility for the sentence rested with the appellate courts.  
Moreover, the court stated unequivocally that “[i]f you vote for life without parole, 
the Defendant will never be released on parole and will never be considered for 
release.  If you vote for death, the Defendant will be executed.”  (Italics added.)  
Indeed, the court emphasized the jurors‟ responsibility, explaining that “I‟m giving 
you this extremely sobering information because it is important that you 
understand the significance of the questions that we are asking on the 
questionnaire and the decisions you could be required to make.”   
Finally, we reject defendant‟s claim that the trial court‟s statement — “I 
anticipate that there will be many more executions in the near future” — 
“impl[ied] that a sentence of death in [defendant‟s] case would neither be 
unanticipated nor unexpected.  In so stressing its expectations, the court in essence 
both vouched for the propriety of imposing the death penalty generally and at least 
implicitly urged the jury to vote for death in this case.”  Apparently in order to 
counter any impression that the 1978 death penalty legislation did not and would 
not lead to executions, the court explained why there had been only two 
executions in the eight years between the enactment of the law and the trial in the 
present case, and opined that there would be “many more executions in the near 
future.”  These comments clearly did not relate to the present case, and did not 
80 
reflect any expectation concerning what should happen in defendant‟s case.  
Rather, the comments underscored the fact that a sentence of death would lead to 
execution.25 
2.  Instruction concerning victim-impact evidence  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s refusal to give his proposed instruction 
concerning victim-impact evidence violated his right to a decision by a rational 
and properly instructed jury, his due process right to a fair trial, and his right to a 
fair and reliable penalty determination, as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article 1, sections 
7, 15, 16, and 17 of the California Constitution. 
Defendant requested the following instruction:  “Evidence has been 
introduced that may arouse in you a natural sympathy for the victim or the 
victim‟s family.  [¶]  You must not allow such evidence to divert your attention 
from your proper role in deciding the appropriate punishment in this case.  [¶]  
You may not impose the penalty of death as a result of an irrational, purely 
emotional response to this evidence.”   
We rejected the following, similar instruction in People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 398, 455:  “ „Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing the 
                                              
25  
Defendant complains that in preinstructing most of the prospective jurors 
that, in determining the appropriate penalty, they would consider all of the 
evidence received during any part of the trial, the trial court did not add the phrase 
“except as otherwise instructed.”  Defendant does not include any argument 
concerning this omission, and therefore has forfeited any related claim.  (See 
Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 133; Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)  In any 
event, the trial court subsequently instructed the jurors at the penalty phase, 
pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.1, that “[y]ou must accept and follow the law that I 
shall state to you.  Disregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of 
this trial.”   
81 
specific harm caused by the Defendant‟s crimes.  Such evidence was not received 
and may not be considered by you to divert your attention from your proper role of 
deciding whether the Defendant should live or die.  You must face this obligation 
soberly and rationally, and you may not impose the ultimate sanction as a result of 
an irrational, subjective response to emotional evidence and argument.  On the 
other hand, evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subjects may 
provide legitimate reasons for the Jury to show mercy to the Defendant.‟ ”  We 
concluded in Ochoa that “[t]he proposed instruction would not have provided the 
jury with any information it had not otherwise learned from CALJIC No. 8.84.1, 
and the trial court properly refused to read [the proposed] instruction.”  The trial 
court in the present case also instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.1, 
that “[y]ou must neither be influenced by bias nor prejudice against the defendant, 
nor swayed by public opinion or public feelings.  Both the People and the 
Defendant have a right to expect that you will consider all of the evidence, follow 
the law, exercise your discretion conscientiously, and reach a just verdict.”  As in 
Ochoa, defendant‟s proposed instruction would not have provided the jury with 
any information not otherwise furnished by CALJIC No. 8.84.1.  Contrary to the 
views expressed by defendant, we do not believe the jurors would have interpreted 
the words “bias” and “prejudice” in CALJIC No. 8.84.1 to refer exclusively to 
racial or religious discrimination, or that jurors would have interpreted the phrase 
“public opinion or public feelings” to exclude the sentiments expressed by the 
victim‟s family. 
3.  Cumulative error  
Defendant asserts that the errors committed at the guilt phase and the 
penalty phase, considered together, “so infected [defendant‟s] trial with unfairness 
as to make the resulting conviction fundamentally and inherently unfair and a 
82 
denial of due process of law, and the judgment of death constitutionally 
unreliable,” in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  We have concluded that any presumed error in 
ordering defendant shackled was harmless, because there is no evidence 
suggesting any of the jurors saw the shackles.  We also have concluded that any 
presumed error in the instruction that allowed the jury to consider defendant‟s 
prior crimes as evidence of his identity as the perpetrator of the present offenses 
was harmless, because the other evidence of identity is overwhelming.  In 
combination, these presumed errors were harmless and did not deny defendant a 
fair trial. 
D.  General Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Scheme 
1.  Instructions concerning mitigating and aggravating factors  
Defendant contends the jury instructions regarding mitigating and 
aggravating factors, and the jurors‟ application of these factors, rendered 
defendant‟s death sentence arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
a.  The circumstances of the crime 
The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, to 
“consider and take into account and be guided by the [factors set forth in section 
190.3] if applicable.”26  The first factor is “[t]he circumstances of the crime of 
                                              
26  
The court also instructed that “[p]otential aggravating factors are limited to 
those listed in CALJIC No. 8.85 factors A, B, and C only.  You may not consider 
any other evidence as an aggravating factor.  You may not consider the absence of 
mitigating factors as an aggravating factor.  You may not consider the same facts 
more than once in determining the presence of aggravating factors.”  (Italics 
added.)  Defendant complains that “the court did not define what it meant by the 
reference to CALJIC No. 8.85.”  No definition or explanation of this reference was 
required.  This instruction was given immediately after CALJIC No. 8.85‟s 
(footnote continued on next page) 
83 
which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of 
any special circumstances found to be true.”  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)  Defendant 
acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to 
factor (a) based upon the provision‟s asserted vagueness (Tuilaepa II, supra, 512 
U.S. 967, 975-980), but he contends that, as applied over time, factor (a) has 
become arbitrary and capricious.27  He relies upon the variety of circumstances 
that have been invoked by prosecutors in other cases to support imposition of the 
death penalty, such as that the victim was a child, an adolescent, a young adult, in 
the prime of life, or elderly; the victim was killed by a single wound, or by 
multiple wounds; the victim struggled, or the victim did not struggle; or the victim 
had a prior relationship with the defendant, or was a stranger to the defendant.  It 
was apparent in Tuilaepa II that factor (a) would allow wide-ranging and arguably 
contradictory circumstances to be urged as aggravating factors.  In his dissenting 
opinion, Justice Blackmun complained that factor (a) “has been exploited to 
convince jurors that just about anything is aggravating,” including that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
description of the factors that could be considered, and its reference to “factors A, 
B, and C” could only have been to the factors just described.  In addition, the court 
provided the jurors with a copy of the instructions, and the CALJIC No. 8.85 
instruction was labeled with its CALJIC number at the end of that instruction.  
(See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 200-201 (Mills) [the court presumes 
jurors follow the court‟s instructions, including the written instructions].) 
27  
The People assert defendant forfeited this challenge by failing to advance it 
in the trial court.  As the People acknowledge, however, “this court has 
consistently considered „as applied‟ challenges to California‟s death penalty law 
. . . on their merits without discussing whether they were raised at trial.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 863.)  As in 
Hernandez, we need not decide whether an objection was necessary, because 
defendant‟s contention lacks merit in any event. 
84 
defendant killed for a motive or for no motive; killed in cold blood or hot blood; 
attempted to conceal the crime or made no attempt to conceal the crime.  
(Tuilaepa II, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 986-987 [dis. opn. of Blackmun, J.].)  
Similarly, the majority in Tuilaepa II acknowledged in connection with section 
190.3, factor (i) — the age of the defendant at the time of the crime — “that in the 
typical case the prosecution argues in favor of the death penalty based on the 
defendant‟s age, no matter how old or young he was at the time of the crime.”  
(Tuilaepa II, at p. 977.)  This reality did not cause the majority concern; rather, it 
viewed competing advocacy concerning the significance of any particular factor as 
helpful to the jury.  “Competing arguments by adversary parties bring perspective 
to a problem, and thus serve to promote a more reasoned decision, providing 
guidance as to a factor jurors most likely would discuss in any event.”  (Ibid.)  As 
we observed in People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, the range of circumstances 
considered in capital cases “reflects . . . that each case is judged on its facts, each 
defendant on the particulars of his offense.  Contrary to defendant‟s position, a 
statutory scheme would violate constitutional limits if it did not allow such 
individualized assessment of the crimes but instead mandated death in specified 
circumstances.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 401.)  Thus, it is clear that the history of the 
circumstances identified by prosecutors as aggravating under factor (a) does not 
render the sentencing scheme arbitrary or capricious.   
b.  Prior criminal activity 
The second factor in section 190.3 is “[t]he presence or absence of criminal 
activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  (§ 190.3, 
factor (b).)  The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.87, that 
evidence had been introduced for the purpose of showing that defendant had 
85 
engaged in such activity, including the robbery and forcible rape of Johnnie C., the 
kidnapping, robbery, forcible rape, and forcible oral copulation of Dinah J., the 
robbery and assault with intent to commit rape of Cindy M., and the threats to use 
force against Bunny Lynn Miles‟s daughter.  It explained that “[b]efore a juror 
may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this 
case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
. . . did in fact commit such criminal acts. . . .  [¶]  It is not necessary for all jurors 
to agree.  If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such criminal 
activity occurred, that juror may consider that activity as a fact in aggravation.”   
Defendant claims error in the admission of “unreliable” evidence of his 
unadjudicated crimes of oral copulation with respect to Dinah J. and of threats 
with respect to Miles, and the failure to require that the jury unanimously find the 
unadjudicated activity to be true before considering it under section 190.3, 
factor (b).  We repeatedly have rejected claims that evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal activity should not be admitted, as well as claims that the jury must make 
unanimous findings with respect to evidence admitted under factor (b).28  We also 
have rejected the contention that the decisions in Blakely v. Washington (2004) 
542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 (Ring), and Apprendi 
v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi) require otherwise.  (People 
v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 308 (D’Arcy) [the court need not instruct that the 
                                              
28  
Defendant does not address in what way the particular evidence of 
unadjudicated criminal activity was “unreliable.”  Rather, his theory seems to be 
that allowing a single juror to rely upon such evidence, in the absence of a 
unanimous finding that the unadjudicated criminal activity occurred, renders the 
process unreliable.  Thus, his characterization of the evidence as “unreliable” 
presents no issue different from what we have considered in the cases cited above, 
which reject the contention that the jury must be required to reach a unanimous 
conclusion regarding the presence of an aggravating factor.  
86 
jury must unanimously find true an aggravating factor; Blakely, Ring, and 
Apprendi do not alter this conclusion]; Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 214 
[California‟s death penalty law is not invalid for failing to require unanimous 
findings of aggravating factors, nor for permitting consideration of unadjudicated 
criminal activity; Blakely, Ring, and Apprendi do not preclude consideration of 
unadjudicated criminal activity].)  Finally, we have rejected the contention that 
allowing consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity in capital cases, while 
forbidding its consideration in noncapital cases, violates a defendant‟s right to 
equal protection of the laws.  (D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 301.)  Defendant 
provides no reason for us to reconsider these decisions. 
c.  Restrictive adjectives in the description of mitigating factors 
The jury was instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, that it could 
consider “[w]hether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” and “[w]hether 
or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person.”  Defendant asserts that the adjectives “extreme” 
and “substantial” “acted as a barrier to the consideration of mitigation.”  We 
repeatedly have rejected this contention.  (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 406 
[use of the word “extreme” did not prevent the jury from considering relevant 
mitigating evidence]; D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308 [use of “extreme” and 
“substantial” does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments]; Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 210-211 [rejecting challenge to use 
of the word “extreme”].) 
d.  The absence of a requirement of written findings 
Defendant also claims error in the failure to require written findings 
regarding the aggravating factors found and considered by the jury in selecting the 
87 
punishment of death.  We repeatedly have rejected this contention.  (Gamache, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 406 [there is no state or federal requirement of written 
findings]; Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 214 [the death penalty law is not 
unconstitutional for failing to require written findings].) 
2.  Instructions concerning the jury’s consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s instruction, pursuant to CALJIC 
No. 8.88, concerning the meaning and weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, deprived him of his rights to due process, equal protection, a fair 
trial by jury, and a reliable penalty determination of penalty, as guaranteed by the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.29   
First, he challenges the instruction that, “[t]o return a judgment of death, 
each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so 
substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death 
instead of life without parole.”  He asserts that the phrase “so substantial” is 
impermissibly vague, citing Arnold v. State (Ga. 1976) 224 S.E.2d 386, which 
invalidated an instruction that described, as an aggravating circumstance, that the 
defendant “ „has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.‟ ”  
(Id. at p. 391.)  According to the Georgia court, “Whether the defendant‟s prior 
history of convictions meets this legislative criterion is highly subjective.”  (Id. at 
p. 392.)  We previously have rejected this contention.  (People v. Page (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 1, 55-56; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 316.)  As we explained 
                                              
29  
The People contend defendant forfeited these claims by failing to assert 
them in the trial court.  Because his claims of error would affect his substantial 
rights, we address them.  (§§ 1259, 1469.) 
88 
in Page, the difference between the two uses of the phrase arises from the different 
contexts of its usage.  “The jurors in Arnold were called upon to decide, in 
isolation and without further guidance, whether a defendant‟s prior criminal record 
was „substantial,‟ whereas the jurors [instructed pursuant to the CALJIC 
instructions] were instructed extensively with respect to the manner of performing 
their task and were called upon to compare the totality of the aggravating 
circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.  The instructions 
adequately explained that the jurors „could return a death verdict only if 
aggravating circumstances predominated and death is the appropriate verdict.‟  
[Citation.]”  (Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 56.) 
Second, defendant complains that the instruction failed to inform the jurors 
that the central determination entrusted to them is whether the death penalty is the 
appropriate punishment, not merely an authorized punishment.  As we have 
explained, however, “[b]y advising that a death verdict should be returned only if 
aggravation is „so substantial in comparison with‟ mitigation that death is 
„warranted,‟ the instruction clearly admonishes the jury to determine whether the 
balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate penalty.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171; see also People v. Taylor 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 899-900 (Taylor); People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 
593.) 
Third, defendant complains that the instruction failed to inform the jurors 
that if the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances, 
they were required to return a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.  Again, we previously have rejected this contention.  The principle that 
jurors “must return a verdict of life without [the] possibility of parole if mitigation 
outweighs aggravation . . . is clearly implicit in the standard instruction.”  (Taylor, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 900.)   
89 
3.  Burden of proof and other safeguards  
Contrary to defendant‟s contentions, this court consistently has held that the 
trial court is not “required to instruct the penalty jury on any burden of proof; in 
California, at the penalty phase, there is no burden of proof, only a normative 
judgment for the jury.  [Citations.]”30  (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 407.)  Nor 
must the jury unanimously agree with respect to any particular aggravating 
circumstance, find all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, find that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, or find that death 
is the appropriate penalty.  (Id. at pp. 406-407; D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 300; 
People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681.)  The decisions in Blakely, supra, 542 
U.S. 296, Ring, supra, 536 U.S. 584, and Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, do not 
affect these conclusions.  (D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 300-301; Mills, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at p. 214; People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 967.)  Finally, “[t]he 
federal Constitution does not require that the jury be instructed on a presumption in 
favor of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.  [Citations.]”  
(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 301.) 
4.  Intercase proportionality review  
Defendant contends the absence of intercase proportionality review violates 
his rights to a fair trial, due process, and equal protection, and to be free from 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty, as guaranteed by the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  He concedes 
that the United States Supreme Court and this court have rejected this contention.  
                                              
30  
Notwithstanding this principle, defendant asserts the trial court should have 
given his proposed instruction that defendant had no burden to prove the existence 
of a mitigating factor.  As noted above, the trial court was not required to instruct 
on any burden of proof.  In any event, defendant withdrew this proposed 
instruction.   
90 
(Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51; Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 407.)  
“First, intercase proportionality review . . . is not required to render California‟s 
sentencing scheme constitutional.  [Citations.]  Second, the equal protection clause 
does not require California to include in its capital sentencing scheme the same 
disparate sentence review previously provided noncapital convicts under the 
Determinate Sentencing Act.  [Citations.]”  (Gamache, at p. 407.)  Defendant offers 
no persuasive reason for us to reconsider this conclusion. 
5.  International law  
Defendant contends California‟s death penalty scheme violates the 
prohibition against “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” set forth 
in article VII of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  He also 
contends that evolving international norms render a sentence of death “cruel and 
unusual” under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
particularly to the extent this sentence is employed as a regular punishment for a 
substantial number of crimes.  We have concluded, however, that “California‟s use 
of capital punishment as an authorized sentence for certain specified types of first 
degree murder does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment merely because 
most nations have chosen not to employ the death penalty at all.  [Citations.]  Nor 
does our statute violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
[Citations.]”  (Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 900; see also D’Arcy, supra, 48 
Cal.4th at p. 309; Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 215.) 
91 
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Foster 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S058025 
Date Filed: November 18, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Stanley William Hodge 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Supreme, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Susan Elizabeth Miller, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William D. Farber 
P.O. Box 2026 
San Rafael, CA  94912-2026 
(415) 472-7279 
 
Susan Elizabeth Miller 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92186-5266 
(619) 645-2306