Title: JAMES SOUPAL V SHADY VIEW INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123698
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 2003

_______________________________ 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 11, 2003 
JAMES SOUPAL, GERI SOUPAL,
ALAN HAY AND SANDRA HAY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 123698 
SHADY VIEW, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PER CURIAM 
The 
question 
before 
the 
Court 
is 
whether 
an 
association of multiple families may provide a communal 
access to Higgins Lake notwithstanding the local zoning 
ordinance that permits only single-family uses on the 
property owned by the association. 
We conclude that the 
association’s communal use of the property violates the 
zoning ordinance. 
We vacate the judgments of the lower 
courts and remand the matter to the circuit court for 
 
 
 
 
 
further proceedings consistent with the zoning ordinance 
and this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs are the owners of the riparian properties 
that are adjacent to lot 139 of Woodlawn Subdivision on 
Higgins Lake. 
Lot 139 is zoned “Residential District 1” 
(R-1) according to the Gerrish Township Zoning Ordinance. 
Defendant, a nonprofit association of numerous families, 
owns lot 139. 
It was authorized to issue twenty shares of 
stock, 
nineteen 
of 
which 
were 
sold 
to 
individual 
shareholders who are owners of other nonlakefront lots in 
the subdivision. 
Defendant bought lot 139 specifically to 
provide communal access to the lake for use by its 
nonriparian shareholders. 
Among the modifications to the 
property made by the defendant was the construction of a 
dock that was 160 feet long with twenty boat slips. 
A 
cabin on the lot, which had been used by prior titleholders 
as a single-family seasonal cottage, was converted to 
function 
as 
a 
community 
center 
for 
defendant’s 
shareholders. 
In June 1996, plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendant’s 
construction of a dock and operation of a marina on lot 
139. 
Plaintiffs alleged (1) that such use of lot 139 was 
in violation of the zoning ordinance, which designates lot 
139 as R-1, and (2) that such use was a nuisance per se 
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that disturbed the peace and reasonable uses of plaintiffs’ 
property.1
 
Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that 
defendant’s use constituted a “marina” as defined by the 
zoning ordinance,2 that the zoning ordinance did not allow 
that use, and that defendant’s use was unreasonable, and 
constituted a nuisance in fact and a nuisance per se. 
The 
court enjoined defendant from placing a dock longer than 
seventy-five feet, from mooring more than five boats, and 
from having more than two families at any time use the 
facility. 
In a divided, unpublished decision, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court, and 
ruled that the zoning ordinance does not prohibit the 
operation of marinas on property classified as R-1, that 
1 This case has had an extensive procedural history.
The initial trial judge denied plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief based on the zoning ordinance violation
theory, but he retained jurisdiction over the nuisance per
se claim pending completion of related administrative 
proceedings before the Department of Environmental Quality
concerning defendant’s application with that agency for a
formal marina operation permit. 
Eventually, the DEQ
granted defendant’s application for a 160-foot dock and
mooring for twenty pleasure boats, but it acknowledged that
it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims under the 
zoning ordinance. 
The case then returned to the circuit 
court for further proceedings. 
2 The ordinance defines “marina” as “[a] facility which
is owned or operated by a person, extends into or over an
inland lake or stream and offers services to the public or
members of the marina for docking, loading or other 
servicing of recreational watercraft.” Art III, § 3.1.
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defendant’s marina is not a commercial enterprise,3 and that 
the dock is neither a nuisance per se nor a nuisance in 
fact.4  The majority held in part that the circuit court’s 
issuance of the injunction was error requiring reversal 
because “it was based on an erroneous finding that the dock 
was a nuisance.” 
The Court of Appeals dissenter would have held that 
defendant’s combination of uses of the property (“forming a 
corporation, 
soliciting 
funds, 
selling 
stock 
in 
the 
corporation, purchasing land, constructing a twenty-slip 
marina, using the existing structure on the land as a 
community center, and charging yearly dues to use the 
marina and the community center”) violated the zoning 
ordinance, and that the “noise,” “unsightly condition,” and 
“excessive traffic” amounted to a nuisance per se. 
The 
dissenter concluded that “[a]ll marinas are commercial in 
some respect” and that “[c]learly not every resident on 
Higgins Lake would be permitted to turn their property into 
a marina for multiple families and watercraft. 
That is 
precisely the situation zoning laws protect against and the 
very definition of a nuisance.” 
3 The ordinance prohibits “[a]ll enterprises of a
commercial nature, excepting home occupation and rental of
buildings . . . .” Art VI, part A, § 6.7(d). 
4 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 28,
2003 (Docket No. 231443). 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court reviews de novo matters of statutory 
construction, including the interpretation of ordinances. 
Gora v Ferndale, 456 Mich 704, 711; 576 NW2d 141 (1998). 
III. THE ORDINANCE 
Article IV, § 4.1 of the Gerrish Township Zoning 
Ordinance provides in part: 
Except 
as 
is 
hereinafter 
provided, 
no 
buildings shall be erected, altered, or moved and 
no lands or buildings shall be used for any 
purpose other than the types and uses permitted 
in the respective District in which such lands or 
buildings are located. [Emphasis added.] 
Article VI of the ordinance governs “Residential 
Districts,” 
and art VI, part A, § 6.1 governs the R-1 classification, 
which applies to lot 139. 
As is relevant here, the R-1 
classification permits “dwellings,” “[a]ccessory buildings 
or structures,” and “[a]ccessory uses and activity related 
to principal use.” It is apparent from the trial testimony 
that the cabin on lot 139 was designed to be a single­
family dwelling and was so used until purchased by 
defendant. 
The zoning ordinance’s definitions are contained in 
article III, § 3.1. “Dwelling, One-Family,” is defined as 
"[a] detached building designed for or occupied by one (1) 
family and so arranged as to provide living, cooking, and 
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kitchen accommodations for one (1) family only. Also known 
as a single-family dwelling.”5 
Id. “Family” is defined as: 
a. 
One (1) person or two or more persons
living together in one (1) dwelling unit and
related by bonds of marriage, blood, or legal
adoption (may include up to a total of three (3)
additional persons not so related who are either
domestic 
servants 
or 
servants 
or 
gratuitous
guest), comprising a single housekeeping unit,
or; 
b. 
A group of not more than four (4)
persons not related [by] blood, marriage or 
adoption, 
living 
together 
as 
a 
single
housekeeping unit. [Id.] 
Article VI, part A, § 6.1 of the ordinance is entitled 
“Buildings and Uses Permitted.” 
Section 6.1(b) permits 
accessory buildings or structures such as “[g]arage[s], and 
storage buildings,” but only if “used . . . as an accessory 
to the main dwelling." Section 6.1(b) additionally permits 
“[s]tructures 
such 
as 
steel 
towers, 
antenna 
masts, 
antennas, [and] flagpoles,” as well as “[a]ccessory uses 
and activity related to principal use.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
The ordinance defines “Principal Building or Use” as “the 
principal or primary purpose for which a building or parcel 
of land may be designed, arranged, intended, maintained or 
occupied.” 
Art III, § 3.1. 
Article VI, part A, § 6.8, 
“Parking Storage,” provides that “[t]he owner or owners of 
boats may park or store such boats on his or their property 
Multiple-family 
dwellings 
are 
allowed 
in 
R-2 
districts, a classification that does not include lot 139.
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5
 
 
 
 
 
providing that said property is zoned for residential use 
and occupied by residential dwellings.” 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In considering the alleged violation of the zoning 
ordinance, the threshold issue is whether defendant’s use 
is consistent with the uses permitted in an R-1 district. 
Those uses are limited under art III, § 3.1, and art VI, 
part A, § 6.1 to activities and buildings related to 
single-family use. 
The Court of Appeals failed to address 
this threshold issue, focusing instead on the alleged 
“commercial” aspect of plaintiff’s marina. If the proposed 
use 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
single-family 
use, 
it 
is 
immaterial whether the property is being used for a 
“commercial” purpose. Because we conclude that defendant’s 
use of the property is inconsistent with its single-family 
designation, we hold that the circuit court correctly ruled 
that the use constituted a nuisance per se. 
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly 
ruled that defendant’s marina is not commercial, the marina 
nevertheless is in violation of the zoning ordinance 
because of the prohibition in art IV, § 4.1 of the use of 
land “for any purpose other than the types and uses 
permitted in the respective Districts . . . ." 
The 
occupation of the lot by a multiple-family association and 
the operation of an oversized marina containing twenty boat 
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slips are not permitted uses in an R-1 district. 
The use 
of the former cottage as a community building is not a 
permitted use under the ordinance. 
The ordinance provides 
that a “Dwelling Unit” must be “occupied exclusively as the 
home, residence or sleeping place of one (1) family 
. . . .”  Art 
III, § 3.1. 
It is clear that neither 
defendant nor its nineteen shareholders qualify as a 
“family” as defined by the ordinance. 
Furthermore, operation of a twenty-boat-slip marina 
and a community house is not an “[a]ccessory use” that is 
“related to [the] principal use” of the R-1 lot under 
§ 6.1(b)3.  The ordinance defines “Principal Building or 
Use” as “the principal or primary purpose for which a 
building or parcel of land may be designed, arranged, 
intended, maintained, or occupied.” 
Art 
III, § 3.1. 
It 
is clear from the testimony that the cabin on lot 139 was 
designed to be a single-family dwelling. The lot, with its 
seventy-seven feet of lake frontage, was intended to 
support that use. 
Operating the marina, irrespective of 
its commercial or noncommercial nature, is not “related” to 
the property’s permitted use as a single-family dwelling. 
MCL 125.587 provides in relevant part that a “building 
. . . converted, or a use carried on in violation of a 
local ordinance . . . is a nuisance per se. 
The court 
shall order the nuisance abated . . . .” 
Because the 
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circuit court correctly ruled that defendant’s use violated 
the zoning ordinance, it was also correct in ruling that 
such use was a nuisance per se. 
The Court of Appeals 
majority erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. 
However, the circuit court’s ruling, which allowed the 
families of two of defendant’s shareholders at any time to 
use a seventy-five-foot dock on which up to five boats 
could be moored, is inconsistent with the township’s 
ordinance provisions concerning single-family dwellings. 
We therefore vacate that portion of the circuit court’s 
judgment and remand for further action consistent with this 
opinion. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
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_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
JAMES SOUPAL, GERI SOUPAL,
ALAN HAY AND SANDRA HAY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 123698 
SHADY VIEW, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the opinion per curiam 
because defendant’s use of the property is not consistent 
with the buildings and uses permitted in R-1 districts 
under the Gerrish Township zoning ordinance. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly