Title: Gunn v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052242
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2006

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
ROBYN GUNN 
 
v.  Record No. 052242  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  November 3, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Robyn Gunn1 was convicted in a bench trial in the 
Circuit Court of Southampton County of knowingly misusing 
or misappropriating funds that came into her custody and 
possession by virtue of her position as an employee of the 
City of Franklin School System in violation of Code § 8.2-
112.2  In Gunn’s subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals, 
a single judge denied her petition for appeal.  Gunn v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 2580-04-1 (June 9, 2005).  For the 
reasons stated in that order, a three-judge panel of the 
Court of Appeals also denied Gunn an appeal.  Gunn v. 
                                                 
1 At trial, Gunn testified that her name was “Robyn 
Gunn Robertson.”  However, she was indicted, convicted, and 
sentenced under the name of “Robyn Gunn.” 
2 Code § 18.2-112 states, “If any officer, agent or 
employee of the Commonwealth or of any city, town, county, 
or any other political subdivision, or the deputy of any 
such officer having custody of public funds, or other funds 
coming into his custody under his official capacity, 
knowingly misuse or misappropriate the same or knowingly 
dispose thereof otherwise than in accordance with law, he 
shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony; and any default of 
such officer, agent, employee or deputy in paying over any 
such funds to the proper authorities when required by law 
to do so shall be deemed prima facie evidence of his 
guilt.” 
 
2
Commonwealth, Record No. 2580-04-1 (Oct. 3, 2005).  Gunn 
now appeals from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
Because we conclude the evidence was sufficient to 
establish Gunn had possession of funds that came into her 
custody by virtue of her official position and that she 
knowingly misused or misappropriated the funds, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
RELEVANT FACTS3 
Gunn was employed as a teacher at Franklin High 
School.  As part of her duties at the school, Gunn coached 
the varsity cheerleading squad and consequently worked “in 
conjunction with” the athletic director and bookkeeper to 
sell advertisements in the school’s football program to 
local businesses and organizations.  Upon collecting 
payment for an advertisement, Gunn was supposed to record 
in a receipt book the name of the purchasing organization 
or business and the amount of the advertisement.  Gunn was 
then required to turn in the money received, along with the 
receipt, to the school’s bookkeeper. 
 
One of the advertisements Gunn sold was to Paul D. 
Camp Community College (the College).  Gunn did not collect 
                                                 
3 In accordance with the well-established principles of 
appellate review, we will recite the evidence presented at 
trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
prevailing party before the circuit court.  Burns v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313, 541 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2001). 
 
3
any money from the College when she sold the $30 
advertisement in the 2002 football program but agreed that 
the College would be billed later.  Before an invoice was 
sent to the College, Gunn received a check in her school 
mailbox from the Commonwealth of Virginia in the amount of 
$30.00, upon which the words, “Paul D[.] Camp Community 
College” were printed in small type.  The check was made 
payable to Franklin High School, and the phrase “C/O Robin 
Gunn” appeared immediately below the school’s name.  Gunn 
indorsed the check using her individual name and deposited 
it in her personal account at a credit union instead of 
turning it over to the school bookkeeper. 
Subsequently, the school athletic director, using a 
list compiled by Gunn, sent invoices to purchasers of 
advertisements who had not paid.  The College received such 
an invoice and informed Franklin High School that it had 
already paid for its advertisement in the football program.  
The College also provided a copy of its cancelled check.  
Gunn’s indorsement appeared on the back of the check.  Upon 
examining Gunn’s receipt book and determining that it 
contained no corresponding entry for the $30 payment from 
the College, the Franklin High School principal reported 
the matter to the school system’s superintendent. 
 
4
In a meeting with school officials, Gunn admitted she 
had cashed the check and offered to repay the $30.  During 
questioning by a City of Franklin police officer, Gunn 
stated she “thought the check was hers” and that it was a 
“reimbursement check” received in connection with classes 
she was taking at the College through Old Dominion 
University.  Gunn also acknowledged to the police officer 
that she had not recorded the sale of the football-program 
advertisement to the College in her receipt book. 
At trial, Gunn testified she had received the check in 
her school mailbox and thereafter deposited it in her 
account at the credit union.  Gunn gave this explanation 
for her actions: 
I didn’t know what it was.  [The check] just came to 
me, it was a Commonwealth of Virginia check.  It . . . 
looked like something you’d get from your tax return.  
And it didn’t say why I was receiving it.  And so I 
just cashed it.  I just assumed – at the time I had 
been taking classes at Paul D. Camp.  I just assumed 
that maybe I had overpaid my tuition. 
 
In her defense, Gunn sought to introduce several 
checks drawn on her personal bank account to establish that 
she had expended her own funds to purchase items for her 
students and cheerleaders.  Gunn claimed such expenditures 
negated any suggestion that she would “steal $30 from the 
school system.”  Finding the evidence not relevant, the 
 
5
circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to the 
admission of the checks. 
On cross-examination, Gunn acknowledged the check in 
question was made payable to Franklin High School and that 
she fully understood the letters “C/O” on the face of the 
check meant “care of.”  Gunn further admitted the check 
came into her possession via her school mailbox and not at 
her home address, and that her signature appeared on the 
indorsement line on the back of the check.  Finally, Gunn 
stated that, when the check was presented to her, she 
“realized that it obviously wasn’t something that was 
supposed to be for me.” 
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief and 
at the close of all the evidence, Gunn moved to strike the 
evidence.  In denying the motions, the circuit court 
reasoned that “[t]he proof required is that the defendant 
used or disposed of the public funds in her charge knowing 
that such use or disposition was a misuse or 
misappropriation of the funds or not in accordance with the 
law.”  The circuit court further found “there was a knowing 
use of these funds for misappropriation when those funds 
were deposited into [Gunn’s] checking account.”  Thus, the 
circuit court found Gunn guilty and sentenced her to 
incarceration for a term of two years, which the court 
 
6
suspended, placing Gunn on supervised probation for a 
period of two years. 
In denying Gunn’s petition for appeal, the Court of 
Appeals concluded Gunn had custody of the funds because she 
actually possessed the check, indorsed it, and kept the $30 
when she cashed the check.  Gunn v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 2580-04-1, slip op. at 2 (June 9, 2005).  The Court of 
Appeals also concluded the circuit court could reasonably 
infer, from the evidence presented, that Gunn knowingly 
misappropriated the funds.  Id. at 3. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Gunn challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain her conviction and the circuit court’s 
refusal to admit the checks drawn on her personal bank 
account.  We will address the issues in that order. 
With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, Gunn 
first argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that she 
had custody of funds belonging to or under the control of 
the City of Franklin School System.  Gunn asserts that, by 
merely having possession of the check payable to Franklin 
High School, she did not have custody of funds belonging to 
Franklin High School.  Citing Code § 8.3A-403(a), Gunn 
further reasons that her indorsement of the check was 
ineffective to cause the drawer’s funds to be paid by the 
 
7
drawee (the payor bank) and that no funds of Franklin High 
School were implicated because there was never a proper 
indorsement of the check.  We do not agree with Gunn’s 
argument. 
As the Commonwealth points out, Gunn’s position 
ignores the plain language of Code § 18.2-112.  The statute 
makes it a Class 4 felony for “any . . . employee of . . . 
any city, town, county, or any other political subdivision, 
. . . having custody of public funds, or other funds coming 
into his custody under his official capacity [to] knowingly 
misuse or misappropriate the same or knowingly dispose 
thereof otherwise than in accordance with law.”  Code §  
18.2-112 (emphasis added).  In light of the emphasized 
language, the Commonwealth was not required to prove that 
Gunn had possession of public funds or funds belonging to 
Franklin High School.  Nor did the indictment in this case 
charge Gunn with knowingly misusing or misappropriating the 
funds of Franklin High School. 
Instead, the provisions of Code § 18.2-112 are in the 
disjunctive and plainly encompass two distinct situations – 
when a public employee has custody of public funds or when 
a public employee comes into custody of “other funds . . . 
under his official capacity.”  The evidence in this case 
established Gunn’s conduct violated the latter portion of 
 
8
the statute.  Gunn was an employee of the City of Franklin 
School System.  The check for payment of the College’s 
advertisement in the football program came into her custody 
in her official capacity as a teacher and cheerleading 
coach at Franklin High School, and she received the check 
in her school mailbox.  Her official duties required her to 
turn the check over to the school bookkeeper.  When she 
failed to do so but instead indorsed the check and 
deposited it into her personal account at the credit union, 
she misappropriated the funds represented by the check.  
Those funds were “other funds” within the meaning of Code 
§ 18.2-112.  Whatever legal effect Gunn’s unauthorized 
indorsement of the check had under the provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code is irrelevant.  While the 
provisions of Code § 18.2-112 clearly apply only to certain 
public officers, agents and employees, the statute just as 
clearly addresses not only custody of public funds but also 
“other funds” that come into the custody of those public 
officials in their official capacity. 
Although penal statutes are to be strictly construed 
against the Commonwealth, Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 
363, 365, 330 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1985), courts are nevertheless 
bound by the plain meaning of unambiguous statutory 
language and “may not assign a construction that amounts to 
 
9
holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it 
actually has stated.”  Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 
268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2003); accord Alger v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 (2004).  
Furthermore, “the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a 
statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or 
strained construction.”  Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 
456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)(citing Tiller v. 
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1952)).  
To adopt Gunn’s position in this case would be tantamount 
to deleting the language in Code § 18.2-112 stating “or 
other funds coming into [the public employee’s] custody 
under his official capacity.” 
Gunn, nevertheless, cites the decision in Ratliff v. 
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 43, 455 S.E.2d 259 (1995), as 
controlling authority for the proposition that the 
Commonwealth had to prove she had possession of funds 
belonging to Franklin High School.  There, the defendant, 
Arvil Ray Ratliff, was convicted of misusing public funds 
in his custody in violation of Code § 18.2-112.  Id. at 45, 
455 S.E.2d at 259.  Acting in his capacity as a member of 
the Buchanan County Board of Supervisors, Ratliff signed 
and submitted a voucher for mileage expenses he allegedly 
incurred over a period of several months.  Id. at 45, 455 
 
10
S.E.2d at 260.  The reimbursement check Ratliff eventually 
received was issued by the county treasurer and was drawn 
on the Buchanan County general fund.  Id.  The evidence 
showed that Ratliff had no authority over that account and 
could not withdraw funds from it.  Id. 
The issue on appeal was whether the evidence was 
sufficient to prove that Ratliff had custody of the funds 
within the meaning of Code § 18.2-112.  Id. at 46, 455 
S.E.2d at 260.  The Court of Appeals concluded “Ratliff did 
not have custody of the county funds.”  Id.  The Court of 
Appeals reasoned that Ratliff “had neither physical 
possession of the funds nor control over the means with 
which to dispose of or [disburse] the funds” because he did 
not have personal control over the county’s general fund 
account upon which his reimbursement check was drawn, he 
could not draw funds from that account, and he could not 
cause a check to be written on the account.  Id. at 48, 455 
S.E.2d at 261.  In reaching its decision, the Court of 
Appeals explained that, if a person charged with violating 
Code § 18.2-112 does not have physical possession of the 
funds at issue, “the term custody requires proof that the 
person had the authority to dispose of or distribute the 
funds.”  Id. at 47, 455 S.E.2d at 261. 
 
11
Ratliff is inapposite to the case at bar.  There is no 
question here that Gunn, unlike Ratliff, had “custody” both 
of the $30 check and the funds represented by it.  The 
issue raised by Gunn is whether the Commonwealth proved the 
funds in her custody were public funds or funds of Franklin 
High School.  As we have already explained, the 
Commonwealth had to prove only that Gunn had custody of 
“other funds” by virtue of her official capacity.4 
In her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
Gunn also argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that 
she knowingly misused or misappropriated the funds at 
issue, i.e., that Gunn disposed of the funds knowing both 
that they belonged to Franklin High School and that her 
disposition of the funds was improper and not in accordance 
with law.  Gunn asserts that the Commonwealth presented no 
evidence inconsistent with her claim of mistake.  Relying 
on Whitlow v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 910, 37 S.E.2d 18 
(1946), Gunn further contends that the circuit court had to 
                                                 
4 Gunn’s reliance on Gardner v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
18, 546 S.E.2d 686 (2001), is also misplaced.  The issue 
there was whether money obtained by false pretenses was the 
property of a bank or property belonging to the defendant’s 
grandfather as alleged in the indictment.  Id. at 19-20, 
546 S.E.2d at 686-87.  As already stated, the indictment in 
the case at bar did not allege that Gunn misappropriated 
funds belonging to Franklin High School. 
 
12
consider “factors other than the check itself” in 
determining whether she had the requisite scienter. 
In Crider v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 574, 145 S.E.2d 222 
(1965), the defendant was convicted of knowingly misusing 
or misappropriating public funds in violation of Code 
§ 18.1-110, the predecessor statute to Code § 18.2-112.  
Id. at 575, 145 S.E.2d at 223.  We discussed the criminal 
intent necessary to sustain the conviction and explained, 
“While the detention of public funds may be done with 
fraudulent intent, the latter is not a necessary element of 
the offense created by § 18.1-110.”  Id. at 580, 145 S.E.2d 
at 226.  A public official need not be “prompted by a 
criminal intent” in order to violate the statute.  Id. at 
580, 145 S.E.2d at 227.  Instead, the proof required to 
establish a “knowing” misuse or misappropriation was “that 
the defendant used or disposed of the public funds in her 
charge knowing that such use or disposition was a misuse or 
misappropriation of the funds or not in accordance with the 
law.”  Id. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom establish that Gunn possessed the requisite 
intent under Code § 18.2-112.  Her own testimony showed 
that she acted knowingly in her misuse or misappropriation 
 
13
of the funds at issue.  Gunn admitted the check was made 
payable to Franklin High School and that she understood the 
meaning of the phrase “C/O Robin Gunn” on the face of the 
check.  Gunn initially stated she thought the check was 
either a tax refund or a tuition reimbursement, but she 
later admitted that she knew it was neither.  As the 
circuit court noted, Gunn’s recognition that the check was 
payable to Franklin High School is inconsistent with her 
initial assertion that she assumed the check was a tax 
refund or tuition overpayment.  Furthermore, she received 
the check in her school mailbox, not at her home address, 
and never recorded the payment from the College for its 
advertisement in her receipt book.  Contrary to Gunn’s 
argument, the circuit court considered several factors in 
addition to the check itself in deciding that she knowingly 
misused or misappropriated the funds.  While “[t]here can 
be no embezzlement where the property is taken ‘under an 
honest belief that . . . the accused had a bona fide claim 
of right to do so,’ ” Whitlow, 184 Va. at 918, 37 S.E.2d at 
21 (citation omitted), no evidence in the case at bar shows 
Gunn had an honest belief that she had a bona fide claim of 
right to the $30 check. 
 
Our conclusion that Gunn knowingly misused or 
misappropriated the funds is not altered by the fact she 
 
14
included the College on the list of businesses that had not 
paid for their advertisements in the football program or 
because the check arrived unexpectedly in her school 
mailbox before an invoice was sent to the College.  This 
evidence created factual and credibility issues the circuit 
court had to resolve as the fact-finder in this case.  See 
Mercer v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 235, 242, 523 S.E.2d 213, 
217 (2000) (within the province of the fact-finder to 
assess credibility of witnesses).  The factual 
determinations of the circuit court, like those of a jury, 
are binding on this Court unless they are plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support them.  Id. at 243, 523 S.E.2d 
at 217.  We cannot say that the circuit court’s conclusion 
that Gunn acted “knowingly” was plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it. 
 
Finally, Gunn assigns error to the circuit court’s 
refusal to admit her personal checks showing expenditures 
on behalf of her students and cheerleaders.  On appeal, 
Gunn asserts the checks were admissible to show that she 
was “in the specific habit of spending her personal funds 
for the benefit of her students and the school system . . . 
thus bearing upon the issue of the credibility of her 
defense of mistake.”  The record, however, shows that at 
trial Gunn did not argue the checks were evidence of her 
 
15
“specific habit.”  Instead, she made the following argument 
in response to the Commonwealth’s objection: 
The relevance . . . is that as a teacher she 
would expend her own funds in excess of what she 
was paid.  It’s contrary to the thought that she 
would also then, at the same time, steal $30 from 
the school system. 
 
 
Since Gunn failed to argue “specific habit” in the 
circuit court, we will not address the argument for the 
first time on appeal.  See Rule 5:25; Buck v. Commonwealth, 
247 Va. 449, 452-53, 443 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1994) 
(defendant’s failure to raise certain arguments before the 
trial court precluded him from raising them for the first 
time on appeal).  Furthermore, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the 
checks.  See Smith v. Irving, 268 Va. 496, 501, 604 S.E.2d 
62, 65 (2004) (“A court’s decision regarding the admission 
or exclusion of evidence is discretionary in nature and, 
thus, will not be overturned on appeal unless the record 
shows an abuse of that discretion.”)  Gunn’s expenditure of 
personal funds on behalf of her students and cheerleaders 
was not relevant to whether she knowingly misused or 
misappropriated “other funds” that came into her custody in 
her official capacity as a public employee.  Code § 18.2-
112. 
CONCLUSION 
 
16
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.