Title: Ex parte Matthew Kennedy, Charles Ward and Marty Griffin. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Burl Thompson, executor of the estate of Joseph James "Pete" Thompson, deceased v. Matthew Kennedy, Charles Ward and Marty Griffin)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061377
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2008

REL:  04/25/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061377
____________________
Ex parte Matthew Kennedy, Charles Ward, and Marty Griffin
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Burl Thompson, executor of the estate of Joseph
James "Pete" Thompson, deceased
v.
Matthew Kennedy, Charles Ward, and Marty Griffin)
(Escambia Circuit Court, CV-04-192)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Matthew Kennedy, Charles Ward, and Marty Griffin, law-
enforcement officers, petition this Court for a writ of
1061377
2
mandamus directing the Escambia Circuit Court to enter a
summary judgment in their favor on a wrongful-death claim
pursued by Burl Thompson, as the executor of the estate of
Joseph James "Pete" Thompson ("Pete Thompson"), based on their
assertion of the defenses of State-agent and statutory
immunity.  For the reasons discussed herein, we grant the
petition and issue the writ.
I.  Factual and Procedural Background
On the afternoon of September 30, 2002, 83-year-old Pete
Thompson, who apparently was suffering from some form of
mental illness and had become angry that automobiles were
speeding on the road next to his house, fired a shotgun at a
passing automobile, striking the windshield.  His brother,
Burl Thompson, who lived with him and who was cutting the
grass at the time, tried to retrieve the gun from Pete.  Pete
refused to turn the gun over to Burl and entered the house.
Shortly thereafter, law-enforcement officers with the
Escambia County Sheriff's Office came to the Thompsons'
property.  They remained about 200 yards from the house.  The
officers contacted Burl by telephone and asked him to try to
convince Pete to speak with them.  When Pete refused, they
1061377
A tactical unit is specially trained in the use of
1
firearms and tactical techniques.
Since the time of the incident that is the basis of this
2
action, Griffin has become a lieutenant with the Department of
Public Safety.
3
asked Burl to come outside and talk to them, which Burl did.
He stayed with the officers until around 9:00 p.m., at which
time he left the scene.
After the officers from the Escambia County Sheriff's
Office were unable to convince Pete to leave his house, they
requested assistance from a tactical unit of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety.   They also obtained a felony
1
warrant for Pete's arrest.
Upon receiving notification that the Escambia County
Sheriff's Office had requested the assistance of a tactical
unit, Sgt. Marty Griffin,  a state trooper and the team leader
2
of the tactical unit, notified the other members of the
tactical unit, and the unit proceeded to the scene of the
incident.  Among those responding were Lt. Charles Ward, who
was Sgt. Griffin's superior officer, and State Trooper Matthew
Kennedy, who was deployed at the scene as a marksman and
observer.
1061377
4
Two members of the Alabama Bureau of Investigation,
Cpl. Doug Darby and Cpl. Stan Stabler, both state troopers,
came to the scene to serve as crisis negotiators.  Cpl. Darby
and Cpl. Stabler attempted to contact Pete by telephone
several times.  Pete, who was watching television in his
living room with his shotgun at his feet, did not answer their
telephone calls and did not in any way communicate with them.
At 9:00 p.m., the decision was made to cut the antenna cable
to the television in the hope that if the television was
disabled Pete would answer his telephone and talk with the
negotiators.  However, after one of the officers cut the
antenna cable, Pete, instead of talking with the negotiators,
turned off the television and turned out the light in the
living room.
Around midnight, the officers determined that Pete might
have gone to bed.  They decided to enter the house from the
front of the house in an attempt to apprehend him.  The
decision was made that if Pete was not in bed as expected, the
team entering the house would exit the house so as to prevent
a confrontation.  The team entered the house through the front
as planned, and, upon seeing that Pete's bed was empty, left
1061377
In an affidavit, Lt. Ward explained why the officers
3
attempted to end the situation before daybreak:  "For the
safety of team members we were attempting to resolve the
situation prior to sunrise.  The house was in the open, near
a well-traveled road and when the sun came up we would lose
the cover of darkness and the team's positions would be
exposed."
5
the house.  As the team left the house, Pete fired on the
officers.  No one was injured.
Following the unsuccessful attempt to apprehend Pete,
Cpl. Stabler, Cpl. Darby, and Sgt. Griffin moved the tactical
unit's van to the front of Pete's house.  They directed the
blue lights and headlights toward the house in an attempt to
ensure that Pete knew it was law-enforcement officers who were
attempting to talk to him.  Cpl. Stabler and Cpl. Darby used
the public-address system in the van to try to communicate
with Pete.  He did not respond.
At approximately 3:30 a.m. on the morning of October 1,
2002, the officers fired two rounds of tear gas into the house
in 
an 
attempt 
to 
coerce 
Pete 
to 
leave 
the 
house.3
Cpl. Stabler and Cpl. Darby continued to attempt to
communicate with Pete, to no avail.  Following the initial
introduction of tear gas into the house, the officers fired
three more rounds of tear gas into the house.
1061377
6
Shortly after the officers fired the last round of tear
gas into the house, Pete walked out of the house and onto the
front porch.  As he was leaving the house, he opened fire on
the officers.  He reloaded his shotgun and continued firing on
the officers, ignoring repeated requests that he drop his gun.
Several of the officers took cover.  In an affidavit, Trooper
Kennedy described what transpired during Pete's attack on the
officers:
"There was a lot of noise from the shotgun blasts
and shouting of the officers who were under attack.
Over all of the noise, I heard Sergeant Griffin say
'if you have a shot, take it.'  I had never shot
anyone before but I knew one of us was likely to be
severely hurt or killed unless something was done.
I did the only thing I could at the time to protect
us.  I made the decision to take the shot.  I fired
the shot and hit [Pete].  That was the only shot
fired by the officers."
Pete died from the gunshot wound.  One of the officers on the
scene received a minor wound to the ankle as a result of
Pete's firing on the officers.
On July 8, 2004, Burl Thompson, as executor of Pete's
estate, sued Trooper Kennedy and numerous fictitiously named
defendants, alleging wrongful death and the tort of outrage.
In his answer, Trooper Kennedy denied the material allegations
1061377
In his answer, Trooper Kennedy asserted the defense of
4
"common 
law 
discretionary 
function 
immunity."
"Discretionary-function immunity is now referred to as
State-agent immunity."  Wilson v. Manning, 880 So. 2d 1101,
1108 (Ala. 2003).
7
of the complaint and asserted, among other defenses, the
affirmative defenses of State-agent  and statutory immunity.
4
In December 2005, Burl moved to amend his complaint to
substitute Lt. Ward and Sgt. Griffin for two of the
fictitiously named defendants.  The fictitiously named
defendants for whom they were substituted were alleged, in the
original complaint, to have been "members of the [tactical
unit] who acted maliciously, willfully, and in bad faith by
failing to follow the department's ... Standard Operating
Procedure" and to have been "department heads and supervisors
who willfully, maliciously and in bad faith failed to train
and supervise properly the members of the [tactical unit]."
The complaint, as amended, asserted the same two counts
against Lt. Ward and Sgt. Griffin, wrongful death and the tort
of outrage, as were asserted in the original complaint against
Trooper Kennedy.  In their answer to the amended complaint,
Lt. Ward and Sgt. Griffin, like Trooper Kennedy, denied the
1061377
8
material allegations of the complaint and asserted the
affirmative defenses of State-agent and statutory immunity.
On November 2, 2006, Trooper Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and
Sgt. Griffin filed a motion for a summary judgment.  They
argued that they were immune from suit under the doctrine of
State-agent immunity and under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a),
which provides that, with certain exceptions, "[e]very peace
officer ... shall at all times be deemed to be officers of
this state, and as such shall have immunity from tort
liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of
any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or
her law enforcement duties."  Burl responded by arguing that
immunity was not available to the defendants because, he
alleged, they had failed to follow established guidelines in
attempting to effect Pete's arrest.
On May 18, 2007, the trial court granted the summary-
judgment motion as to the tort-of-outrage claim, but it denied
the motion as to the wrongful-death claim.
On June 26, 2007, Trooper Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and
Sgt. Griffin filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this
Court, seeking an order directing the trial court to grant
1061377
9
that portion of their summary-judgment motion directed to the
wrongful-death claim.
II.  Standard of Review
We apply the following standard of review to mandamus
proceedings challenging the denial of a motion for a summary
judgment based on a claim of immunity:
"'While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, ...
the denial of a motion for summary judgment grounded
on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for
writ of mandamus.'  Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911,
912 (Ala. 2000).  A writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy available only when there is:
'(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex parte BOC
Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)."
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003).
III.  Analysis
Trooper Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and Sgt. Griffin contend that
the trial court erred when it denied their motion for a
summary judgment as to the wrongful-death claim because, they
argue, they are entitled to immunity in this case based on
State-agent immunity and the immunity provided by Ala. Code
1975, § 6-5-338, for law-enforcement officers.  Burl contends
1061377
10
in response that the officers are not entitled to immunity
from the wrongful-death claim because, he says, several of
their actions during the evening and morning of the incident
resulting in Pete's death violated what he says are binding
rules and regulations set forth in a training manual used by
the Department of Public Safety at its academy for law-
enforcement officers.  For the reasons stated herein, we agree
with the officers that they are immune from Pete's estate's
wrongful-death claim, and we issue the writ.
"State-agent immunity protects state employees, as agents
of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in executing
their work responsibilities."  Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d
117, 122 (Ala. 2002).  In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392
(Ala. 2000), a plurality of this Court articulated the
following test for State-agent immunity:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration 
of 
a 
department 
or 
agency 
of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
1061377
11
"(a) making administrative adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) 
hiring, 
firing, 
transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
1061377
12
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405 (emphasis on "shall" and "shall
not" original; other emphasis added).  The Court adopted the
Cranman test for State-agent immunity in Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d 173, 177-78 (Ala. 2000).
As noted, the officers also rely on § 6-5-338(a), Ala.
Code 1975, which provides immunity for law-enforcement
officers:
"Every peace officer, except constables, who is
employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution
or statutes of this state, whether appointed or
employed as such peace officer by the state or a
county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or
institution, 
corporate 
or 
otherwise, 
created
pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state
and authorized by the Constitution or laws to
appoint or employ police officers or other peace
officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by
the lawful terms of their employment or appointment,
include the enforcement of, or the investigation and
reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of
this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this
state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take
into custody persons who violate, or who are
lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other
lawful process, with violations of, the criminal
laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to
be officers of this state, and as such shall have
immunity from tort liability arising out of his or
her conduct in performance of any discretionary
function within the line and scope of his or her law
enforcement duties."
Although § 6-5-338(a) speaks in terms of immunity for
"discretionary functions," this Court, in Blackwood v. City of
1061377
13
Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 2006), held that the test for
determining whether an officer is entitled to immunity under
§ 6-5-338(a) is the one articulated in Cranman relating to
State officers.  In Blackwood, we stated:
"Before Cranman, the immunity accorded a peace
officer under § 6-5-338(a) was analyzed in terms of
whether at the time of the act complained of the
officer was engaged in the performance of a
discretionary act.
"....
"However, '[w]hether a qualified peace officer
is due § 6-5-338(a) immunity is now judged by the
restatement of State-agent immunity articulated by
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)....'
Hollis [v. City of Brighton] 885 So. 2d [135,] 143
[(Ala. 2004)].
"'By 
enacting 
[§ 
6-5-338], 
the
Legislature intended to afford municipal
law-enforcement 
officials 
the 
immunity
enjoyed by their state counterparts.  Sheth
v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir.
1998). Indeed, "[t]his statute, by its
terms, extends state-agent immunity to
peace officers performing discretionary
functions within the line and scope of
their law-enforcement duties."  Moore v.
Crocker, 852 So. 2d 89, 90 (Ala. 2002)
(emphasis added).
"'In Ex parte Cranman, supra, this
Court "restated the law of state-agent
immunity in Alabama."  Moore, 852 So. 2d at
90.  Since Cranman, we analyze immunity
issues in terms of "State-agent" immunity,
rather 
than 
"under 
the 
dichotomy 
of
1061377
14
ministerial 
versus 
discretionary
functions."  Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d
1115, 1117 (Ala. 2003).  See also Giambrone
v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.
2003); Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 134
n.1 (Ala. 2002).  Thus, we will address the
applicability of peace-officer immunity
under the principles set forth in Cranman.
See Moore, supra; Ex parte Duvall, 782 So.
2d 244 (Ala. 2000).'
"Howard [v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201,] 203
[(Ala. 2003)]."
Blackwood, 936 So. 2d at 504.
 Despite this Court's holding in Blackwood, there
remained the fact that the scope of immunity for law-
enforcement officers as articulated in § 6-5-338(a) was
broader than category (4) of the Cranman test seemed to allow.
In Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala.
2006), this Court eliminated that apparent difference by
expanding the scope of immunity as stated in category (4) of
the Cranman test:
"Given the divergence between the scope of the
immunity 
granted by § 6-5-338(a)–-'conduct in
performance of any discretionary function within the
line and scope of his or her law enforcement
duties'--and summarized in category (4) of the
Cranman restatement–-'exercising judgment in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the State
....'--we conclude that immune category 4 of the
Cranman restatement should be expanded to restate
1061377
15
the 
law 
of 
immunity 
in 
this 
area 
so 
as 
to 
reflect 
§ 
6-5-338(a).
"Because the peace officers' immunity statute
does not limit the availability of immunity to
'enforcement of the criminal laws,' we today modify
category (4) of Cranman to read as follows: 
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's 
"'.... 
"'(4) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement 
officers' 
arresting 
or
attempting to arrest persons, or serving as
peace 
officers 
under 
circumstances
entitling 
such 
officers 
to 
immunity
pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975.'
"(Additional language emphasized.)"
Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 309.
"This Court has established a 'burden-shifting' process
when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
A State agent asserting State-agent immunity "bears the burden
of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a
function that would entitle the State agent to immunity."  946
So. 2d at 452.  Should the State agent make such a showing,
1061377
16
the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of
the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity
recognized in Cranman is applicable.  The exception being
argued here is that "the State agent acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her
authority."  946 So. 2d at 452.  One of the ways in which a
plaintiff can show that a State agent acted beyond his or her
authority is by proffering evidence that the State agent
failed "'to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.'"  Giambrone
v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003) (quoting
Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178).
In the present case, we have no difficulty concluding
that Trooper Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and Sgt. Griffin carried their
burden of demonstrating that, at the times relevant to this
matter, they were engaged in law-enforcement functions for
which statutory and State-agent immunity would be available,
barring the applicability of one of the two categories of
exceptions to immunity recognized in Cranman.  The portions of
the trial court proceedings the parties have placed before
this Court on this mandamus petition demonstrate: (1) that the
1061377
Indeed, before neither the trial court nor this Court did
5
Burl contend that the officers had not carried the initial
burden of demonstrating that they were engaged in activities
for which, in the absence of an applicable exception, immunity
would be available.
In his brief, Burl also states that "the actions of the
6
defendants [were] willful and malicious."  Burl fails to
explain how this was so or to elaborate in any way on this
legal conclusion.  Our own review of those portions of the
17
officers were present at the scene to arrest Pete pursuant to
a warrant; (2) that they were attempting, generally, to
enforce the criminal laws of the State; and (3) that the
actions they took during their standoff with Pete were within
the line and scope of their law-enforcement duties, either, in
the case of Lt. Ward and Sgt. Griffin, as supervisors of the
tactical unit, or, in the case of Trooper Kennedy, as a member
of the tactical unit.   Given this showing, to defeat the
5
officers' summary-judgment motion as to the wrongful-death
claim, Burl had the burden of demonstrating that an exception
to State-agent immunity applied.  See Estate of Reynolds, 946
So. 2d at 452.
Burl contended to the trial court, and contends here,
that the officers acted beyond their authority with regard to
the incident in question because, he alleges, in handling the
situation, they violated binding rules and regulations.   The
6
1061377
trial court's proceedings before us fails to support this bald
assertion.
18
rules and regulations they violated, he argues, are set forth
in a training manual for tactical units used in the Department
of Public Safety's academy for law-enforcement officers; the
manual is known as the "Nighthawk manual."
One passage of the training manual states: "An effective
team requires a minimum of three negotiators."  This "rule"
was violated, Burl argues, because only two negotiators,
Cpl. Darby and Cpl. Stabler, were on the scene during the
standoff.  Another passage states: "Non-hostage situations are
often made worse by a confrontative police profile that
threatens and agitates the subject.  This approach causes a
defensive response that inhibits building trust and rapport,
and may escalate the conflict."  Burl argues that the officers
violated this "rule" when, thinking Pete was asleep, they
attempted to enter the house and later when they fired tear
gas into the house.  A final passage in the training manual to
which Burl refers states: "Non-threatening negotiations can be
undermined by a simultaneous demonstration of force."  He
argues that "[t]hat is exactly what happened in this case
1061377
19
while the negotiators were trying to end the matter
peacefully."
Burl relies on the deposition testimony of State Trooper
Capt. 
Herman 
Wright, 
the 
designated 
deponent 
under
Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., for the Department of Public
Safety, to support his argument that the above-quoted passages
from the Nighthawk manual constitute binding rules and
regulations, the violation of which by an officer results in
his or her loss of immunity.  Specifically, he recites the
following passages from Capt. Wright's deposition:
"Q.  Tell me what the Nighthawk manual is.
"A.  That's a manual that they use for their basic
training trying to give them guidance or guidelines
on what to do about certain situations or how it
would be -- how it would be handled.
"....
"Q.  Captain, how many negotiators are recommended
for each operation?  In what minimum number?
Operation being a barricaded situation like the one
we have in this case.
"A.  You're testing my memory.  I -- I went over the
policy.  I believe it's three.
"....
"Q.  -- they should not aggravate the subject while
they're being -- trying -- the negotiations are
going on.  And if the -- Well, if the Nighthawk
1061377
20
training manual said that, it'd be correct, wouldn't
it?
"A.  That would be their procedure if the -- if the
manual said that.
"Q.  If the manual said that, that's the way it
should be done?
"A.  That would be the guidelines, yes, sir."
(Emphasis added.)
Trooper Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and Sgt. Griffin argue that
the training manual does not constitute binding rules and
regulations.  Rather, they point to two policy orders of the
Department of Public Safety as providing the appropriate rules
and regulations governing the incident in this case.  The
first, 
Policy 
Order 
No. 
411, 
has 
as 
its 
subject
"Crisis/Hostage Situations" and as its purpose "[t]o establish
guidelines for the Department of Public Safety response to
incidents involving hostages, barricaded suspects and other
crisis situations."  The other, Policy Order No. 201, has as
its subject "Use of Force," and as its purpose "[t]o provide
sworn officers of the department with guidelines on the use of
force and establish use of force reporting procedures."  These
policy orders, and not the training manual, argue Trooper
Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and Sgt. Griffin, provided the rules and
1061377
21
regulations they were to follow during the incident resulting
in this litigation.
In Giambrone v. Douglas, supra, and Howard v. City of
Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2003), this Court discussed the
violation-of-rules basis for denying a State agent immunity.
We described those cases in Gowens v. Tys., 948 So. 2d 513,
524-26 (Ala. 2006):
"'The complaint in Giambrone [v. Douglas,
874 So. 2d 1046 (Ala. 2003),] sought
compensation for injuries suffered by
15-year-old Jake Giambrone, a member of the
wrestling team, in an impromptu wrestling
match with Michael Douglas, the head
wrestling coach for Auburn High School.
874 So. 2d at 1049.  Douglas outweighed
Giambrone, 
who 
was 
a 
freshman, 
by
approximately 70 pounds.  Id.  The trial
court entered a summary judgment in favor
of Douglas on the ground of State-agent
immunity.
"'In this Court, the appellant argued
that the summary judgment was improper,
because there was evidence indicating that
"[Douglas] 
violated 
the 
competition
guidelines as promulgated by the National
Federation of Wrestling ('NFW'); and ...
engaged in 'inequitable competition' with
Jake in violation of the code of conduct
contained in the Alabama High School
Athletic Directors and Coaches Association
Directories ('the Athletic Directories')."
874 So. 2d at 1051 (emphasis added).  This
Court 
agreed 
with 
that 
argument 
and
1061377
22
reversed the summary judgment.  874 So. 2d
at 1057.
"'In doing so, the Court noted that,
as a general principle, "Douglas was
permitted to exercise broad judgment in the
education of his students."  874 So. 2d at
1053. 
 
It 
explained, 
however, 
that
Douglas's 
supervisor, 
the 
athletic
director, had "instructed the coaches ...
to follow the guidelines in the Athletic
Directories," and that he had "provided
Douglas with a book containing rules
promulgated by the NFW in order to make
sure that Douglas knew the rules for
conducting wrestling matches."  874 So. 2d
at 1054.  The Court stated:
"'"Although 
[the 
athletic
director] was not directed by the
[Auburn City Board of Education]
to impose on the coaches at
Auburn High School the guidelines
and rules of the ... NFW and the
Athletic 
Directories, 
it 
was
within 
the 
exercise 
of 
his
judgment to 'insist' that the
coaches 
comply 
with 
those
guidelines and rules.
"'"Therefore, 
Douglas's
'broad authority' to exercise
judgment in the safe conduct of
his wrestling team practices was
limited by the guidelines and
rules furnished and imposed by
[the athletic director]."
"'874 So. 2d at 1054.  The Court concluded:
"'"The guidelines and rules
removed Douglas's judgment in
1061377
23
determining whether he should
participate in a 'full speed'
challenge match with a student
who was less experienced, much
younger, 
and 
smaller 
than
Douglas. 
 
Moreover, 
the
guidelines and rules restricted
the 
type 
of 
moves 
that 
are
permissible 
in 
the 
sport 
of
wrestling.  Because a trier of
fact could determine that Douglas
performed an illegal move during
an 'inequitable' challenge match,
thereby failing to discharge his
duties 
pursuant 
to 
'detailed
rules or regulations,' we cannot
determine at this stage in the
proceedings 
that 
Douglas 
is
entitled to State-agent immunity.
Douglas did not meet his burden
of establishing that his actions
and decisions involved functions
that entitled him to immunity."'
"Howard [v. City of Atmore,] 887 So. 2d 201,] 208
[(Ala. 2003)] (emphasis added in Howard).
"More recently, in Howard we considered the
claims 
of 
Gladys 
Howard 
against 
police
officer/dispatcher Frank Bryars for the death of
Howard's sister, Marilyn Bowens, who committed
suicide while she was incarcerated in the City of
Atmore jail.  887 So. 2d at 202.  We agreed with
Howard's theory of the case that Officer Bryars was
not entitled to State-agent immunity, 'because ...
he failed to follow mandatory rules and procedures
prescribed 
by 
the 
... 
police 
department 
for
observing inmates,' which were set forth in the
'"Standard 
Operating 
Procedures 
Manual"' 
('the
SOP').  887 So. 2d at 206.
1061377
24
"The dispositive provision of the SOP stated, in
pertinent part: '"The dispatcher on duty shall make
periodic jail checks on inmates at least twice an
hour and more often if needed or circumstances call
for additional checks.  The monitor camera will
constantly 
be 
operating 
and 
observed 
by
dispatchers."'  887 So. 2d at 207 (emphasis added in
Howard).  There was testimony that Officer Bryars
had 'made a "jail check" on all the inmates when he
arrived at 3:00 p.m. to begin his shift,' and 'that
he saw Bowens on the "monitor camera" [only] once
between 3:00 p.m. and 4:08 p.m.,' when she was
discovered 'hanging from the bars' of her cell.  887
So. 2d at 209.  Thus, summary judgment for Officer
Bryars was inappropriate, in the face of evidence
indicating that he 'failed to comply with [the SOP],
which require[d him] to make "jail checks" of all
inmates at least twice per hour, and "constantly" to
observe the "monitor camera."'  887 So. 2d at 209
(first emphasis added)."
We agree with Trooper Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and Sgt. Griffin
that Burl failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that
they failed "to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."  It is
clear from the materials submitted to us that neither the
Department of Public Safety nor any authorized agent of the
Department adopted the training manual upon which Burl relies
as binding rules and regulations that strictly govern the
tactical unit.  Capt. Wright's testimony that the training
manual set forth "guidelines" and "procedures" and that it
indicated what the tactical-unit team members "should do" in
1061377
It may also be noted in regard to the first of the above-
7
quoted training-manual provisions (requiring a minimum of
three negotiators for an "effective" team), that Policy Order
No. 411 states that "[a] negotiation team will ideally consist
of the following personnel:  1. Primary negotiator;  2.
Secondary 
negotiator/negotiation 
team 
leader; 
3.
Investigation/intelligence officer." 
25
particular circumstances does not mean that the training
manual was adopted as a set of binding rules and regulations
strictly governing the tactical unit.  Indeed, it is in the
nature of a training manual to explain to an employee how to
handle situations and to set forth guidelines for how an
employee "should" conduct himself or herself.  Further, as
highlighted by the words or passages emphasized in our earlier
quotation of the specific provisions in the training manual
upon which Burl seeks to rely, each of those provisions is
either aspirational in nature or leaves the actor with
discretion as to whether the guidance should be followed in a
given situation.   Under these circumstances,  we are
7
unwilling to recognize the Nighthawk manual as a set of
"detailed rules and regulations," the violation of which will
cause a State agent to lose his or her immunity from an action
seeking money damages. 
1061377
26
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, with regard to
the wrongful-death claim asserted against them, Trooper
Kennedy, Lt. Ward, and Sgt. Griffin are entitled to State-
agent immunity and to the immunity provided by Ala. Code 1975,
§ 6-5-338(a).  As a result, we conclude that the trial court
erred when it denied their motion for a summary judgment as to
that claim.  Thus, we issue the writ.  The trial court is
directed to set aside that portion of its order denying the
motion for a summary judgment on the wrongful-death claim and
to enter a summary judgment as to that claim.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Lyons, Stuart, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.