Title: In re Curtis B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92010
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2003

Docket No. 92010-Agenda 8-March 2002.
In re CURTIS B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 								Appellee, v. Leola B. et al., Appellants).
	Section 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705
ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998)) contains an appeal provision
which states that permanency orders may be immediately appealed
as a matter of right under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1) (155 Ill.
2d R. 304(b)(1)). At issue here is whether this appeal provision
violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1).

BACKGROUND
	Reflecting the concern that a lack of permanency in a child's
life can be harmful to the child's development, section 2-28 of the
Act (705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 1998)) requires that efforts be
made to establish timely, permanent living arrangements for a
child who has been made a ward of the circuit court. To this end,
section 2-28(2) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998))
mandates that "permanency hearings" be held on a regular basis to
review the child's placement status. At the conclusion of a
permanency hearing, pursuant to section 2-28(3) of the Act (705
ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998)), a written order must be entered
that sets forth a permanent placement goal for the child. By statute,
eight permanency goals are available, ranging from the goal of
returning the child home to terminating parental rights and seeking
adoption. See 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2)(A) through (2)(G) (West
1998).
	In July 1999, the circuit court of Cook County conducted a
permanency hearing for the minor in this case, Curtis B. At the
close of the hearing, the circuit court found that medical testimony
presented during the hearing established that Curtis had certain
intellectual and emotional "special needs" which had to be met to
ensure his adequate development. The court further found that
Curtis B.'s mother, Leola B., "would not be able to parent a
special needs child."
	Following the permanency hearing, as required by section
2-28(3) of the Act, the circuit court entered a written order which
established a goal for Curtis' permanent placement. Based on its
findings from the permanency hearing, the court selected a
permanency goal for Curtis of "substitute care pending court
determination on termination of parental rights" (705 ILCS
405/2-28(2)(C) (West 1998)).
	On July 28, 1999, Leola filed a notice of appeal from the
circuit court's permanency order. Leola's appeal was authorized
by the appeal provision of section 2-28(3), which states: "Any
order entered pursuant to [section 2-28(3) of the Act] shall be
immediately appealable as a matter of right under Supreme Court
Rule 304(b)(1)." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998). Rule
304(b)(1), in turn, provides that appeals may be taken from a
"judgment or order entered in the administration of an estate,
guardianship, or similar proceeding which finally determines a
right or status of a party." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(1).
	On April 30, 2001, the State filed a motion in the appellate
court which sought to dismiss Leola's appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction. In its motion, the State argued that a permanency
order could not be appealed under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1)
because such an order does not finally determine a right or status
of a party as required by the rule. The State emphasized in its
motion that the purpose of a permanency order is to set a goal for
the child's permanent placement-not to finally determine the
child's placement status. The State also emphasized that, under the
Act, the permanency goal set forth in the order must be reviewed
at least every six months and may be changed up until the time the
goal is actually attained. Thus, the State argued that a permanency
order "is always interlocutory" and, therefore, could not be
appealed under Rule 304(b)(1).
	In its motion to dismiss, the State also noted that, except as
provided by supreme court rule, "the appellate court is without
jurisdiction to review judgments, orders or decrees which are not
final." Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center,
162 Ill. 2d 205, 210 (1994). The State further noted that legislative
attempts to grant appellate jurisdiction over nonfinal orders are
void because such attempts "encroach upon the exclusive power
of the supreme court to regulate matters of appellate practice and
procedure." People v. Heim, 182 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1081 (1989).
The State maintained that the appeal provision of section 2-28(3)
was an attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal from a nonfinal order. Hence, the State
contended that the appeal provision violated the separation of
powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II,
§1) and had to be stricken from the Act.
	On August 2, 2001, the appellate court issued an opinion
which granted the State's motion to dismiss Leola's appeal. 325
Ill. App. 3d 393. The appellate court agreed with the State that a
permanency order is not a final order and that the legislature had
"unduly encroached upon the inherent powers of the judiciary" by
enacting the appeal provision of section 2-28(3) of the Act. 325
Ill. App. 3d at 398. In so holding, the court followed a line of
unanimous decisions from the Fifth, Fourth and Second Districts
of our appellate court which have held the appeal provision of
section 2-28(3) unconstitutional. See In re D.D.H., 319 Ill. App.
3d 989 (2001); In re C.B., 322 Ill. App. 3d 1011 (2001); In re
A.M., 324 Ill. App. 3d 144, 145-46 (2001) ("Based on the
decisions in C.B. and D.D.H., we conclude that the order changing
the permanency goal in the instant case constitutes a nonfinal order
for which the supreme court has provided no rule for an appeal to
this court and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the
appeal").
	We allowed Leola's petition for leave to appeal from the
judgment of the appellate court dismissing her appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315. On December 11, 2001, we granted leave to Curtis,
represented by the Cook County public guardian, to appear as an
appellant.

ANALYSIS
	Statutes are presumed constitutional. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (2001). The party challenging the validity of a statute has
the burden of clearly establishing that it is unconstitutional. People
v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d 140, 146 (1987). The constitutionality of
statute is a question of law which we review de novo. Brown's
Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 420 (1996).
	Before this court, the State repeats the principal arguments
that it advanced in the appellate court. The State notes that the Act
itself defines a permanency goal as one which establishes "the
future status of the child" (705 ILCS 405/1-3, 2-28(2) (West
1998)), and that, by statute, a permanency order sets forth the
"future status of the minor" (705 ILCS 405/2-28(3)(a) (West
1998)). The State further notes this court's observation that
" '[t]he selection of a permanency goal is not a final determination
on the merits with regard to termination of parental rights but,
rather, an intermediate procedural step taken for the protection of
and best interests of the child.' " In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 329
(2001), quoting In re K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 675, 682 (2000).
According to the State, under the plain language of the Act, "a
permanency goal does not finally determine a right or status of a
party but instead looks at the anticipated future status of the
child."(Emphases in original.) D.D.H. 319 Ill. App. 3d at 991.
Thus, the State argues, a permanency order is not a final order and
the appeal provision of section 2-28(3) violates the separation of
powers doctrine.
	Leola and Curtis do not dispute that the placement status of a
minor is not finally determined in a permanency order. That
question, they concede, is not finally decided until the placement
goal is achieved. Leola and Curtis argue, however, that certain
other important issues, such as the nature of social services
provided to the parent and rights regarding visitation, are finally
decided by a permanency order. Leola and Curtis note, for
example, that section 2-28(2) mandates that all reunification
services provided by the Department of Children and Family
Services cease once a goal other than return home has been set.
See 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). Similarly, Leola and
Curtis maintain that visitation rights may be curtailed once a goal
of termination has been set. Leola and Curtis argue that the
elimination of reunification services and alterations in visitation
rights become effective once the goal of termination is entered. In
light of these significant determinations, Curtis and Leola contend
that a permanency order is final for purposes of Rule 304(b)(1).
	There is no question that, as Curtis and Leola argue, a
permanency order decides important issues for a child in the
juvenile justice system. Nevertheless, the fact that an order
resolves important issues does not necessarily render it final. A
judgment is considered final "if it terminates the litigation between
the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties,
either on the entire controversy or a separate part thereof." R.W.
Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159
(1998). A final order is one which sets or fixes the rights of a
party. See, e.g., In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127 (1982).
	None of the determinations contained in a permanency order
can be considered set or fixed as a matter of law. By statute, the
permanency order must be reviewed and reevaluated at a
minimum of every six months up until the time the permanency
goal is attained. See 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). Under
this requirement, it is not simply the case that the permanency
order, once entered, may at some later time be reexamined. Rather,
by operation of section 2-28, all of the rights and obligations set
forth in the permanency order must remain open for reexamination
and possible revision until the permanency goal is achieved. Given
this fact, there is no reasonable basis upon which we can
determine that a permanency order is a final order for purposes of
Rule 304(b)(1). Like our appellate court, we therefore conclude
that the legislature erred in providing for appeal of permanency
orders under Rule 304(b)(1).
	"[A]ttempts by the legislature to make nonfinal judgments
appealable violate article VI, section 6, of our constitution
[citation]." Almgren, 162 Ill. 2d  at 213. Accordingly, the appeal
provision of section 2-28(3), which attempts to make a nonfinal
order appealable, violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
The appeal provision must therefore be severed from section
2-28(3). Accord In re D.D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 992 (the appeal
provision of section 2-28(3) "can appropriately be stricken while
the remainder of the statute is left intact").
	Our determination that the appeal provision of section
2-28(3) is unconstitutional, and our severance of that provision
from the Act, eliminates the statutory authority for appealing
permanency orders. Our holding therefore raises the question of
whether permanency orders, subsequent to our decision in this
case, may be appealed at all. As we have determined that
permanency orders are interlocutory, the issue of whether such
orders may be appealed is one that rests solely with this court. See
Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 162 Ill. 2d 205, 210 (1994).