Title: Shilling v. Baker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090906
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2010

Present:  Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
KATHRYN SHILLING  
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
v.  Record Number 090906 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APRIL 15, 2010 
BRIAN C. BAKER, ET AL. 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY  
James V. Lane, Judge 
FACTS 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a plot of 
land referred to as the "Baker Cemetery" constitutes a valid 
cemetery under a Rockingham County zoning ordinance. 
Oliver Edwin Baker and Alice Crew Baker, the grandparents 
of Kathryn Shilling and Brian Baker, owned a tract of land in 
Rockingham County that included a scenic hilltop overlook.  
When Oliver died in 1949, his ashes were scattered on the 
hilltop.  The family erected a memorial plaque at the site and 
later surrounded it with a 10-foot by 2-foot, chain-rope fence.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the family scattered the ashes of 
Shilling's grandmother, father, and uncle and placed memorial 
plaques at the same site. 
In 1991, Baker acquired by deed of gift approximately 67 
acres of the Baker property including the site on which the 
family ashes were scattered and memorial plaques placed.  After 
                                                 
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 
12, 2010. 
assuming ownership of the land, Baker did not interfere with 
Shilling and other family members visiting and maintaining the 
site.  Nor did he object in 1999 when Shilling buried an urn 
containing her mother's ashes and placed a memorial plaque at 
the site.  He also allowed Shilling to erect a 40-foot by 40-
foot, wrought-iron ornamental fence in 2006, which encompassed 
an area outside the chain-rope fence where the urn was buried.  
The outer fence holds a sign that reads: "Baker Cemetery." 
In November 2007, Baker contracted to sell the 67-acre 
parcel to David R. Kelly.  The contract was conditioned on 
Baker relocating the "Baker Cemetery," which Baker planned to 
move 500 feet "down the hill."  Shilling filed a complaint in 
the circuit court of Rockingham County asking the court to 
enjoin Baker from selling the land and from disturbing any part 
of the cemetery or removing any remains.  Shilling also asked 
the court to declare the plot of land to be a cemetery and 
grant her and her relatives an easement to access the area.2 
Baker filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim.  
Relying on a letter from the Rockingham County Zoning 
Administrator, Baker denied that the "Baker Cemetery" was a 
lawful cemetery established before the enactment of the 
                                                 
2 The complaint named Baker, Kelly, and Lisa S. Simmons, 
the joint owner of the land one had to cross to access the 
"Baker Cemetery."  The defendants will be collectively referred 
to as "Baker." 
2 
relevant Rockingham County zoning ordinance and asserted that 
the burial of the urn in 1999 was unlawful because it was done 
without a special use permit as required for the operation of a 
cemetery.3 
Shilling, in her answer to the counterclaim, claimed that 
Baker was barred from denying the existence of a cemetery under 
the doctrines of estoppel and laches.  Shilling also asked the 
Zoning Administrator to reconsider her decision, arguing that 
the burial of the urn containing her mother's ashes in 1999 was 
the continuation of a pre-existing, non-conforming use of the 
land as a cemetery because the cemetery use was established in 
1949, before the enactment in 1984 of the zoning ordinance 
requiring a special use permit for a family cemetery.  The 
Zoning Administrator agreed and reversed her opinion in April 
2008, adopting Shilling's position with regard to a 
grandfathered family cemetery.  Baker appealed the Zoning 
Administrator's decision to the Rockingham County Board of 
Zoning Appeals (BZA). 
Before the BZA rendered any decision on the legality of 
the "Baker Cemetery," the trial court proceeded with Shilling's 
original suit.  Following an ore tenus hearing, the court 
indicated that it would issue its ruling after the parties 
                                                 
3 Rockingham County Code § 17-27(a) requires an owner of 
land within a general agricultural district (A-2) to obtain a 
special use permit before using the land for a cemetery. 
3 
submitted briefs on whether the land at issue met the legal 
definition of a cemetery. 
On June 3, 2008, the BZA issued its decision in Baker's 
appeal, stating that a memorial garden or cemetery had been 
created before the enactment of the ordinance requiring a 
special use permit, but the boundary was limited to the 10-foot 
by 2-foot area encompassed by the chain-rope fence.  The BZA 
also held that the burial of the urn beyond that area without a 
special use permit violated the zoning ordinance.  Both Baker 
and Shilling filed petitions for certiorari from the BZA's 
decision.  Baker also filed a demurrer to Shilling's petition 
asserting that the trial court should dismiss the petition 
because Shilling did not name the BZA, a necessary party, as a 
defendant. 
Upon receipt of the petitions for certiorari, the trial 
court consolidated all three cases for argument on December 8, 
2008.  In an opinion letter applying to all the cases, the 
trial court concluded that the BZA erroneously applied 
principles of law in determining that the area within the 
chain-rope fence was a cemetery because "[n]o human remains 
were buried, entombed, or inurned within [the] area prior to 
the enactment of the ordinance."  According to the trial court, 
the scattering of remains in 1949 failed to create a cemetery 
under Code § 54.1-2310, which required the land to be "used or 
4 
intended to be used for the interment of human remains."  The 
court thus found that a "cemetery cannot be established . . . 
without the burial of a dead body."  The smaller enclosure, 
therefore, did not qualify as a prior non-conforming use.  By 
final orders entered February 5, 2009, the trial court affirmed 
in part and reversed in part the decision of the BZA, overruled 
Baker's demurrer to Shilling's petition for certiorari, and 
dismissed Shilling's bill of complaint with prejudice.  We 
awarded Shilling an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Although Shilling appealed the trial court's judgments in 
both her action for injunctive relief and her petition for 
certiorari from the decision of the BZA, her appeal presents a 
single dispositive issue: whether the property referred to as 
the "Baker Cemetery" was a legal cemetery under the zoning 
ordinance of Rockingham County.  The issue is a legal one, 
which we review de novo under the standard applicable to the 
trial court's judgments in Shilling's original action and her 
appeal from the decision of the BZA.  Code § 15.2-2314; Hale v. 
Board of Zoning Appeals, 277 Va. 250, 268, 673 S.E.2d 170, 179 
(2009); Parfitt v. Parfitt, 277 Va. 333, 342, 672 S.E.2d 827, 
830 (2009). 
Shilling presents a number of arguments to support her 
contention that the trial court erred in concluding that the 
5 
"Baker Cemetery" had not been established as a cemetery prior 
to the enactment of the zoning ordinance requiring special use 
permits for cemeteries.  She first argues that the trial court 
erred in failing to give deferential consideration to the 
wishes of her deceased relatives to be buried in the "Baker 
Cemetery."  Citing Grisso v. Nolen, 262 Va. 688, 695, 554 
S.E.2d 91, 95 (2001), Shilling contends that a court should 
carry out the expressed wishes of a decedent with respect to 
their "final resting place . . . so far as it is possible."  
Shilling also suggests that "[i]nterments . . . should not be 
disturbed except for good cause."  Goldman v. Mollen, 168 Va. 
345, 355, 191 S.E.2d 627, 631 (1937).  According to Shilling, 
the trial court erred by placing a burden on her to prove the 
existence of a cemetery instead of requiring the defendants to 
overcome the "expressed wish[es]" of her deceased relatives. 
Shilling's reliance on Grisso and Goldman is misplaced.  
In Grisso, the issue was "limited to whether [the plaintiff] 
had standing to bring the petition seeking the disinterment and 
reburial of his former wife's body."  262 Va. at 693, 554 
S.E.2d at 94.  Similarly, the plaintiffs in Goldman sought to 
disinter and rebury their father at a different location.  168 
Va. at 347, 191 S.E.2d at 628.  Thus, these cases dealt with a 
familial dispute regarding the location of burial and not, as 
in this case, whether certain land qualified as a legal 
6 
cemetery.  Contrary to Shilling's contentions, neither case 
established a standard of review or a presumption that the 
desires of the deceased should trump applicable law.  Indeed, 
the passage Shilling invokes from Grisso includes a qualifier: 
i.e., that the wishes of the deceased should be carried out "so 
far as it is possible."  262 Va. at 695, 554 S.E.2d at 95 
(emphasis added).  The question in this case is whether the 
actions of Shilling and her family established a legal 
cemetery.  The trial court was correct to address that question 
without transforming the desires of Shilling's deceased 
relatives into an overriding presumption. 
Shilling next argues that the trial court erred in relying 
on the definition of a cemetery in Rockingham County Code § 17-
6.  The trial court found that this provision, which states 
that a cemetery is "[l]and used for the burial of the dead," 
requires an actual burial of a dead body.  Because nothing was 
buried in the "Baker Cemetery" prior to the enactment in 1984 
of the County ordinances defining cemetery and requiring a 
special use permit to use land as a cemetery, the trial court 
held that there was no cemetery.  According to Shilling, the 
zoning code's definition of "cemetery" is inapposite because 
the act creating the cemetery in this case occurred when the 
first ashes were scattered in 1949, before the adoption of the 
ordinance in 1984.  In her view, the court thus should have 
7 
used the elements applied by the common law in 1949 for 
establishing a cemetery.  Those elements, Shilling maintains, 
are reflected in the definitions of cemetery currently 
contained in the Code of Virginia and do not include an actual 
burial. 
In identifying the elements necessary to create a cemetery 
at common law, Shilling turns to an Oklahoma case, Heiligman v. 
Chambers, 338 P.2d 144 (Okla. 1959), for the proposition that a 
family cemetery could be created by appropriation by the land 
owner for that use, interments of family members on the 
property, some setting off of the land, and erection of markers 
designating those persons whose remains were present.  Shilling 
maintains that "burial" of remains was not inherent in the 
concept of a cemetery under the common law.  However, the 
cemetery at issue in Heiligman contained three bodies, all of 
which were buried: "[two] in a concrete sepulchre above ground 
and [one] in a grave."  Id. at 147.  Thus whether the property 
at issue in Heiligman would have qualified as a family cemetery 
without these burials is unknown and the case cannot stand for 
such a proposition.  Shilling offers no other support for her 
contention that burial was not an element of a cemetery under 
the common law, and we find none.  
8 
Shilling also maintains that current definitions of 
"cemetery" in the Code of Virginia do not require burial.4  
First Shilling points to the definition of cemetery found in 
Code § 54.1-2310: "[A]ny land or structure used or intended to 
be used for the interment of human remains."  Continuing, 
Shilling notes that "interment," also defined in Code § 54.1-
2310, means "all forms of final disposal of human remains."  
Shilling argues that the scattering of ashes is a "final 
disposal of human remains," and thus qualifies as an 
"interment" under the statute.  Shilling concludes that because 
the deceased relatives clearly intended the "Baker Cemetery" to 
be used for interment, the scattering of ashes established a 
cemetery under Code § 54.1-2310.  Furthermore, Shilling 
suggests that the scattering of ashes is one way of "bur[ying] 
the dead" under Rockingham County Code § 17-6.  
Shilling's interpretation of Code § 54.1-2310 and her 
reliance exclusively on the definitions in that statute are 
also misplaced.  There are a number of Virginia statutes 
addressing cemeteries and interment, a review of which reveals 
that some form of actual burial is required to create a 
cemetery.  Code § 54.1-2310 defines interment as "all forms of 
final disposal of human remains including, but not limited to, 
                                                 
4 The parties recognize that no statute existing in 1949 
contained a definition of cemetery. 
9 
earth burial, mausoleum entombment and niche or columbarium 
inurnment."  By its terms, the statute does not exhaust the 
list of potential "forms of final disposal."  All the examples 
listed, however, share a common feature: a permanent resting 
place either underground or in a confined space or container.  
See Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 319, 585 S.E.2d 780, 784 
(2003) (under the maxim of noscitur a sociis, "[w]hen general 
words and specific words are grouped together, the general 
words . . . will be construed to embrace only objects similar 
in nature to those objects identified by the specific words").  
The mere scattering of human remains above ground is not a 
"final disposal" comparable to a burial underground or in a 
mausoleum, niche or columbarium.  Indeed, the last sentence of 
the statutory definition of interment states that "[t]he 
sprinkling of ashes on church grounds shall not constitute 
interment."  Code § 54.1-2310. 
Several other statutes also support this construction of 
the word interment.  Code § 54.1-2808.1, governing the disposal 
of human remains, or cremains, for funeral directors, allows 
disposal "by interment, entombment, inurnment, or by scattering 
of the cremains."  In enacting this section, the General 
Assembly distinguished "interment" from the "scattering of 
cremains."  See, e.g., Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Marketing 
Cooperative, Inc., 222 Va. 270, 278, 279 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981) 
10 
("When the General Assembly uses two different terms in the 
same act, it is presumed to mean two different things.").  Code 
§§ 57-27.2 and 57-38.1 address the disinterment of interred 
remains, something not possible for scattered cremains. 
Under general usage, interment is "the act or ceremony of 
depositing a dead body in a grave or tomb."  Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 1180 (1993).  The mere scattering 
of cremains does not fit within this definition.  In sum, 
interment is more than the scattering of ashes; it requires a 
permanent and "final disposal" of human remains.  As such, Code 
§ 54.1-2310's definition of cemetery does not encompass land 
used merely to scatter cremains.  In addition to the previous 
sections addressing interment, Code § 15.2-978 also suggests 
that a cemetery must contain some form of burial.  That section 
allows a locality to promulgate "a register of identified 
cemeteries, graveyards, or other places of burial."  Thus, much 
like Rockingham County Code § 17-6, Virginia Code § 15.2-978 
implies that a cemetery is a "place[] of burial." 
In conclusion, neither the common law, current Virginia 
statutes, nor Rockingham County zoning ordinances support 
Shilling's arguments that the scattering of cremains creates a 
cemetery and that a cemetery was created in 1949 by the 
scattering of Oliver Baker's ashes.  Accordingly, the trial 
court did not err in concluding that a cemetery did not exist 
11 
on the property at issue prior to or at the time the urn 
containing the cremated remains of Shilling's mother was buried 
and that the interment of the urn at that location violated 
Section 17-27(a) of the Rockingham County Code requiring a 
special use permit to use the land as a cemetery. 
Shilling also assigned error to the trial court's failure 
to hold that Baker's claims regarding the existence of a 
cemetery were barred under theories of estoppel or laches. 
Shilling's claims of estoppel and laches were raised only in 
response to Baker's counterclaim in the litigation she 
originally filed.  Resolution of this assignment of error, 
therefore, would not have any impact on the trial court's 
judgment regarding the decision of the BZA or the relief 
arising therefrom.  Accordingly, we need not consider this 
assignment of error.  Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 
Va. 37, 42, 353 S.E.2d 727, 731 (1987).  Similarly, because we 
will affirm the trial court's judgment, we need not address 
Baker's assignment of cross-error relating to his demurrer in 
Shilling's appeal from the BZA decision. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and SENIOR JUSTICE 
CARRICO join, dissenting. 
 
12 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the “Baker Cemetery” 
at issue in this case was established prior to the 1984 
enactment of the Rockingham County zoning ordinance requiring 
special use permits for cemeteries.  Based upon the undisputed 
facts in this case, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion 
that the current Virginia statutes do not support Kathryn 
Shilling’s assertion that a private cemetery was created in 
1949. 
 
In 1949, the Baker family scattered the ashes of Oliver 
Edwin Baker upon a scenic hilltop located on his and his wife’s 
farm.  Over the ensuing 60 years, the Baker family has disposed 
of the remains of their dead relatives by conducting funeral 
services, scattering the ashes of the deceased, and placing 
memorial plaques upon this fenced hilltop on the Baker farm.  
Today, this special resting place for the family’s loved ones 
is forever swept away by the majority’s view that “some form of 
actual burial is required to create a cemetery” under Virginia 
law.  Unlike the majority, I am of opinion that the current 
Virginia statutes do not suggest that an actual burial of 
remains is a prerequisite to establishing a valid cemetery. 
 
As the majority notes, no Virginia statute existing in 
1949 contained a definition of cemetery.  It should also be 
noted that the current Virginia statutes pertaining to 
cemeteries generally focus on professional cemetery operators 
13 
and funeral directors, not private landowners.  While this is 
not dispositive, these statutes, however, do provide guidance 
and insight on what constitutes a valid cemetery under common 
law.  
 
Code § 54.1-2310, the definitional section pertaining to 
cemetery operators, defines “[c]emetery” as “any land or 
structure used or intended to be used for the interment of 
human remains.”  Furthermore, “[i]nterment” is broadly defined 
as “all forms of final disposal of human remains including, but 
not limited to, earth burial, mausoleum entombment and niche or 
columbarium inurnment.”  Id. (Emphasis added.)  Beyond 
question, “all forms of final disposal of human remains” would 
include the scattering of cremains upon land dedicated and 
memorialized for such a purpose.  Thus, I would conclude that 
the “Baker Cemetery” is land that has been used since 1949 for 
the interment of human remains. 
 
Additionally, Code § 54.1-2808.1, governing the final 
disposal of cremains by funeral directors, allows disposal by 
“interment, entombment, inurnment, or by scattering of the 
cremains.”  Funeral directors must also keep a permanent record 
of the cremains identifying the “method and site of final 
disposition.”  Id. (Emphasis added.)  The majority concludes 
that in enacting this statute the General Assembly 
distinguished “interment” from the “scattering of cremains.”  
14 
If true, however, this statute would also distinguish 
“entombment” and “inurnment” from “interment,” rendering the 
examples of “interment” in Code § 54.1-2310 meaningless.  In my 
view, this statute simply reflects the commonsense 
understanding that the scattering of cremains is a form of 
“final disposal” of human remains.  
 
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience that 
relatives have the tenderest feelings and emotions for the 
remains of their dead.  Accordingly, “[i]nterments once made 
should not be disturbed except for good cause.” Goldman v. 
Mullen, 168 Va. 345, 355, 191 S.E. 627, 631 (1937).  In this 
case, the holding of funeral ceremonies, the placing of 
memorial plaques, the scattering of cremains in a specific 
area, and the continued upkeep and treatment of the area as the 
family cemetery, including referring to it as such, all support 
the conclusion that the “Baker Cemetery” is and has been since 
1949 a valid cemetery. 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
trial court, hold that a cemetery did exist on the Baker 
property since 1949, and remand this case to the trial court to 
conduct further proceedings to resolve the issues left 
unresolved in light of this holding. 
15