Title: STATE v COLLINS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13804
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 1978

No. 13804 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- WILLIAM JOHN COLLINS, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eiqhth Judicial District, Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judqe presidinq. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Smith, Emmons, Baillie & Walsh, Great Falls, Montana Robert J. Emmons arqued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Allen B. Chronister, Assistant Attorey General, argued, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Nick Browning, Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: April 20, 1978 Decided : Filed: AuC 1 , 1978 M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant W i l l i a m John Collins was charged i n t h e D i s - t r i c t Court, Cascade County, with t h e offense of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Upon h i s plea of not g u i l t y , a f t e r t r i a l , t h e jury returned a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Judgment of conviction was entered, and defendant was sentenced t o imprisonment f o r a term of f o r t y years. From judgment and d e n i a l of a new t r i a l , defendant appeals. Without question, on April 2 3 , 1973, defendant s h o t Darrell David Gardipee, who died a s a r e s u l t . The shooting occurred on Wire M i l l Road, north of Great F a l l s . The only witnesses t o t h e events p r i o r t o t h e shooting were t h e defendant and Carla Brave. Two o t h e r s , Robert M. Bretz and h i s wife, drove upon t h e scene very s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e shooting. The only witness t o t h e a c t u a l shooting was defendant. From t h e evidence it appears defendant, a 48 year o l d unemployed p a i n t e r , a t and p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of t h e shooting w a s l i v i n g i n a camper mounted on h i s pickup truck. H e had been i n Great F a l l s 4 o r 5 days, with no d e f i n i t e location, parking h i s pickup and camper u n i t i n various places from time t o time. Before returning t o Great F a l l s , he had been i n Arizona s i n c e t h e previous September doing some pros- pecting there. C a r l a Brave, then i n her twenties, a singer with a band t h a t played i n l o c a l n i g h t spots i n G r e a t F a l l s , met Gardipee, then 21, about s i x months before t h e incident. They became good friends. I n t h e afternoon preceding t h e shooting, Gardipee went t o t h e place where Carla was rehearsing. After t h e p r a c t i c e session, he i n v i t e d Carla t o accompany him t o t h e Brass Rail, a l o c a l bar. There they had some drinks and played pool a t a t a b l e a t t h e r e a r of t h e premises. While Carla and Gardipee were a t t h e Brass Rail, about 6:30 o r so i n t h e evening, defendant entered the bar. He had been drinking before he arrived, and upon entering he ordered a round of drinks f o r t h e house. He noted Gardipee and Carla playing pool and f e l l i n t o conversation with them, although he d i d n o t know them. H e bought a round o r two of drinks. They a l l talked and played some pool and continued t o consume liquor. F i n a l l y they decided t o go t o another place. Defendant had the transportation f a c i l i t i e s s o he drove them t o t h e City Bar, where Gardipee went i n and returned with a b o t t l e of wine. Carla t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l t h r e e inspected t h e i n s i d e of t h e camper while they w e r e stopped a t t h e City Bar; defend- a n t remembers t h e l o c a t i o n a s a t t h e B r a s s Rail. A t any r a t e , t h e camper was inspected and admired by c a r l a and Gardipee. Carla p a r t i c u l a r l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e inspection, she saw no r i f l e lying on a bed i n t h e camper, nor indeed d i d she observe one i n t h e camper other- w i s e . When they l e f t t h e City Bar, Carla wanted t o go t o her place, but Gardipee wanted t o r i d e around. Defendant drove t h e u n i t o u t of t h e c i t y on t h e Havre highway, and then turned off t h a t highway t o t h e Wire M i l l Road, thence t o a place not f a r from t h e Missouri River, where he parked. A l l t h r e e were s i t t i n g i n t h e cab of t h e pickup. When they stopped, Carla and Gardipee g o t o u t and wandered towards t h e r i v e r . The n i g h t was cold, but they talked and kissed about an hour before she returned t o t h e cab, where defendant had remained. H e had continued t o drink, consuming beer they had brought from t h e B r a s s Rail, and some whiskey he had procured from t h e camper. Gardipee w a s drinking from t h e wine b o t t l e . Carla and defendant talked i n t h e cab f o r a t i m e , while Gardipee remained outside. Defendant t o l d Carla t h a t he thought ''everybody should make love t o everybody". The remark "kind of spooked" her. Then he asked her i f she would l i k e t o go t o t h e camper i n back and drink whiskey with him. Carla a l s o t e s t i f i e d about another matter he discussed, t o which w e w i l l a l l u d e more f u l l y l a t e r i n t h i s opinion. Carla l e f t t h e cab, and defendant remained i n s i d e . She rejoined Gardipee, b u t d i d not t e l l him of t h e conversation i n t h e cab. Meanwhile, Gardipee was a c t i n g strangely. He was r a i s i n g t h e wine b o t t l e t o t h e sky, jumping up and down, and he appeared t o defendant t o be " f l i p p i n g out." Finally, near midnight, they decided t o leave. A l l t h r e e g o t i n t h e cab, Carla s i t t i n g i n t h e middle. Defend- a n t drove up t o t h e point of again entering Wire M i l l Road. Here Gardipee grabbed t h e s t e e r i n g wheel and wanted t o t u r n r i g h t . Defendant, however, wanted t o go back t o Great F a l l s , which was t o t h e l e f t . Meanwhile Gardipee was complaining how t h e white man had messed up t h e Indian land, and s a i d "This i s our land." Then he slammed h i s f i s t on t h e dash of t h e cab and s a i d "Even t h i s belongs t o me." ~ e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h a t point, Gardipee s t a r t e d punching him i n t h e head while he was driving. ~ e f e n d a n t stopped t h e truck i n t h e l a n e of t r a f f i c of t h e roadway. Gardipee g o t o u t on h i s s i d e of t h e pickup. Defendant t e s t i f i e d he jumped o u t of t h e truck on t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e and r a n back t o t h e rear of t h e camper. H e opened t h e r e a r door and g o t i n t o t h e camper, and attempted t o lock t h e camper door behind him. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t then t h e door of t h e camper was jerked open by Gardipee, who s a i d " I ' v e g o t you now" o r words t o t h a t e f f e c t . Defendant was i n s i d e t h e camper, possibly i n t h e middle of t h e camper. Gardipee was a t t h e door with one hand on a handle t o help himself i n and de- fendant s a i d he saw something " b r i g h t colored" i n h i s o t h e r hand. Defendant d i d n o t know what it was, nor was it ever f u r t h e r i d e n t i f i e d a t t h e t r i a l . The i n t e r i o r of t h e cab was dark. Defendant had n o t turned on t h e i n t e r i o r camper l i g h t s . The o u t s i d e l i g h t s of t h e camper u n i t w e r e on, including t h e clearance l i g h t s . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was dark enough however t h a t he could n o t have i d e n t i f i e d t h e person a s Gardipee coming i n t o t h e truck, nor could he see Gardipee's eyes. Defendant had i n t h e camper a bolt-action . 2 2 c a l i b e r r i f l e he had purchased i n Great F a l l s , p r i o r t o going t o Arizona f o r prospecting. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r Gardipee jerked t h e camper door open, defendant r a n a s t e p o r two t o t h e f r o n t of t h e camper and picked up t h e r i f l e from t h e bed where it was lying. H e turned without r a i s i n g t h e gun t o h i s shoulder, keeping it i n h i s r i g h t hand, and f i r e d . H e s t a t e d he d i d n o t intend t o shoot Gardipee a t t h e time; t h a t he thought it would s c a r e him o f f ; and, t h a t t h e gun went off a c c i d e n t a l l y . Because of t h e make and type of r i f l e involved, t h e gun must have been ready t o f i r e , with a b u l l e t i n p o s i t i o n i n t h e chamber. Defendant s a i d nothing and gave no warning before he f i r e d t h e shot. The b u l l e t entered t h e body of Gardipee nearly i n t h e middle f r o n t a t t h e l e v e l of t h e seventh r i b and traveled downward a t an approximate forty-five degree angle through h i s diaphragm, t h e p o s t e r i o r of h i s l i v e r , through h i s vena cava and lodged next t o h i s spine i n t h e abdomen. Gardipee f e l l back from t h e camper t o t h e ground. H e was i n a doubled- up p o s i t i o n on t h e ground when Carla came from t h e cab, where she had remained a f t e r the men g o t o u t , u n t i l she heard t h e s h o t which sounded l i k e an "explosion". Defendant was g e t t i n g down from t h e camper when Carla came t o t h e scene. H e s t i l l had t h e r i f l e i n h i s hand. A t t h a t moment another c a r drove up, driven by Robert Bretz, with h i s wife a s a passenger. Defendant placed t h e r i f l e on t h e f l o o r of the camper, went around t o t h e cab of t h e pickup, g o t i n , and drove o f f , leaving Gardipee on t h e roadway, with Carla bending over him. Defendant drove t o t h e Cascade County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , where he turned himself i n . Meanwhile Robert Bretz, h i s wife and Carla p u t t h e bleeding Gardipee i n t o t h e Bretz c a r and went t o t h e h o s p i t a l , where he expired of h i s wounds a t approximately 12:55 a.m. A n autopsy w a s l a t e r performed which established t h e cause of death. The foregoing o u t l i n e of f a c t s i s taken mainly from defendant's testimony. There a r e c e r t a i n discrepancies between h i s testimony and other witnesses i n other matters, but t h e s t o r y of t h e events surrounding t h e a c t u a l shooting came mainly from defendant. The jury l i s t e n e d t o t h e testimony, considered t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s proven, and brought i n its v e r d i c t of g u i l t y of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide a g a i n s t defendant. Defendant's appeal concerns mainly f i v e i s s u e s which a t t a c k t h e v e r d i c t and subsequent judgment: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly admitted testi- mony of an alleged statement of defendant t h a t he had been imprisoned f o r rape. 2 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury . 3 . Whether defendant was denied a speedy t r i a l . 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n admitting c e r t a i n photographs i n evidence. 5. Whether t h e evidence supports t h e jury v e r d i c t . The f i r s t issue, t h e alleged statement of defendant t h a t he had been imprisoned f o r rape, arose during t h e testimony of Carla Brave about her conversation i n t h e cab of t h e pickup with defendant while Gardipee was outside. I n addition t o the s u b j e c t s outlined above, Carla w a s permitted t o t e s t i f y , over objection, t h a t defendant t o l d her during t h e conversation t h a t defendant knew Merle Gardipee, t h e brother of D a r r e U Gardipee; t h a t he had m e t him i n prison. She asked defendant "what were you i n t h e r e for?" and he " s a i d he was i n f o r rape." The s t a t e contended t h e evidence was r e l e v a n t t o t h e events and t o t h e a t t i t u d e and i n t e n t of t h e defendant t h a t evening. Defendant's counsel objected t h a t t h e offered testimony w a s hearsay, and was an attempt by the s t a t e t o g e t i n t o t h e record a statement of a f a c t t h a t was not a f a c t a t a l l . Also, t h a t i n rebutting such testimony, de- fendant would perforce open himself up t o questioning on state's cross-examination a s t o a p r i o r prison record. ( I n argument before t h i s Court, t h e s t a t e argued the evidence is p a r t of t h e " r e s gestae", while defendant argued t h e testi- mony was an improper showing of another unrelated crime.) When she was cross-examined by defendant, Carla ad- mitted she had been t o l d i n t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e t h a t defendant had not been convicted of rape. I n defend- a n t ' s cross-examination by the s t a t e , he admitted he had been convicted of a p r i o r felony, not specified, and t h e matter was not f u r t h e r pursued. The n e t e f f e c t of t h e evidence then was t h a t defendant t o l d Carla he had once been i n prison f o r rape; she admitted t h a t l a t e r she was informed it was not t r u e ; and defendant admitted he had a p r i o r felony conviction on h i s record. The objection on appeal t h a t t h e testimony c o n s t i t u t e d proof of a p r i o r unrelated offense does not bear analysis. The s t a t e d i d not prove t h a t defendant committed an un- r e l a t e d crime; it d i d prove t h a t defendant claimed he com- mitted such an offense. The d i f f e r e n c e could be monumental. It i s t h e same d i f f e r e n c e as an unmarried woman who - i s pregnant and an unmarried woman who claims t o be pregnant. A subsequent marriage founded upon t h e r e a l i t y may be j u s t i - f i e d ; but a marriage founded upon t h e supposition may n o t be. The statement of defendant i s i n t h e same category of evidence, occurring a t t h e same time a s t h e other verbal a c t s t e s t i f i e d t o by Carla, such as defendant's statement about everybody making love t o everybody, and h i s i n v i t a t i o n t o her t o drink whiskey with him i n t h e camper. These remarks went i n without objection. The statement of defendant was r e l e v a n t as a p a r t of t h e whole f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n t o be considered by t h e jury i n weighing t h e g u i l t o r innocence of defendant. Especially i s t h i s t r u e where, a s here, t h e defendant asserted s e l f - defense a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H i s s t a t e of mind leading up t o t h e shooting was a matter bearing on h i s g u i l t o r innocence f o r t h e jury t o consider i n t h e l i g h t of t h a t defense. The statement was t h e r e f o r e a "verbal a c t " r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e s , and thus admissible. A s noted i n Overton v. United S t a t e s , (1968), 403 F.2d 4 4 4 , 447, t h e v e r b a l a c t d o c t r i n e i s t e c h n i c a l l y n o t an exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e . The words of defendant w e r e n o t offered f o r t h e purpose of proving t h e t r u t h of t h e a s s e r t i o n s they contained, b u t merely f o r t h e purpose of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e words had been s a i d by t h e defendant. Ward v. United S t a t e s , (1961), 296 F.2d 898. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e statement was n o t admissible a s p a r t of res g e s t a e , a s t h a t exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e takes i n statements made under such circumstances t h a t r e f l e c t i o n and f a b r i c a t i o n a r e unlikely. S t a t e v. Fairburn, (1959), 135 Mont. 449, 340 P.2d 157. Standing alone t h e statement might n o t be r e l e v a n t o r m a t e r i a l , b u t it formed a p a r t of t h e circumstances, a l i n k which, when connected t o o t h e r evidence, becomes r e l e v a n t and m a t e r i a l i n t h e case. 29 Am J u r 2d, Evidence 8255. A s such t h e statement was c l e a r l y admissible and t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed no e r r o r i n permitting it. W e f i n d no substance i n defendant's f i r s t i s s u e . I n h i s second i s s u e , t h e defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. This i s s u e involves two sub-heads, ( a ) whether a "ladder" i n s t r u c t i o n should have been given t o t h e jury, and (b) whether t h e jury w a s properly i n s t r u c t e d with r e s p e c t t o self-defense. I n considering t h i s i s s u e , we f i r s t analyze t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and t h e i n f e r i o r grades of homicide thereunder, a s w e l l a s t h e a p p l i c a b l e law of j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r exoneration. When Montana adopted its Criminal Code of 1973 (Title 94, Chapters 1-8, Revised Codes of Montana 1947), it wiped out the theretofore existing statutory provisions defining the crimes of murder and of manslaughter. In lieu, the new code provided that criminal homicide includes deliberate homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, and negligent homicide. Section 94-5-101 et seq., R.C.M. 1947. In capsule, the grades of criminal homicide can be defined as: an unlawful death caused by a negligent actor is negligent homicide; an unlawful death purposely or knowingly caused by an actor under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse is mitigated deliberate homicide; and, an unlawful death caused by one acting purposely or knowingly is deliberate homicide. Section 94-5-102; 94-5-103; 94-5-104, R.C.M. 1947. It is to be noted from the definitions that committing the homicide "purposely or knowingly" is an element of deliberate homicide, and also of mitigated deliberate homi- cide. In the case of mitigated deliberate homicide, even though the act may have been committed purposely or knowingly, it is one that is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. In considering the instructions given by the court, we must also look to the law on justification or exoneration, more popularly known, perhaps, as "self-defense". Under the old code, a homicide committed in self-defense was "excusable homicide". Under the Criminal Code of 1973, conduct necessary to defend oneself or another against the imminent use of unlawful force may result in such conduct being a justifiable use of force. Section 94-3-103, R.C.M. 1947. When a person i n an occupied s t r u c t u r e uses such f o r c e as i s necessary t o prevent o r terminate another's unlawful e n t r y i n t o t h e occupied s t r u c t u r e , even t o t h e e x t e n t of causing death by t h e use of t h e force, f o r t h e purpose of preventing an a s s a u l t o r personal violence upon an individual o r t o pre- vent the commission of a f o r c i b l e felony i n t h e occupied s t r u c t u r e , such use of f o r c e i s j u s t i f i e d . Section 94-3-103, R.C.M. 1947. A t a l l events, t h e degree of f o r c e used by t h e a c t o r must be reasonable, based upon what a reasonable person would believe under t h e same circumstances. Sections 94-3- 103, 94-3-104, R.C.M. 1947; S t a t e v. Brooks, (1967), 150 Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 91. The foregoing a r e t h e concepts i n a criminal homicide case, such a s t h e one charged here, which must be conveyed t o t h e jury by t h e judge i n t h e body of h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s . He may f l e s h o u t such concepts a s may be necessary b u t i f t h e body of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s contains t h e foregoing elements, f a i r l y and f u l l y conveyed t o t h e jury, then we must consider t h e jury has been properly i n s t r u c t e d both f o r t h e s t a t e and t h e defendant. Against t h a t background, we examine t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given i n t h i s case. The e s s e n t i a l elements a r e there. The t r i a l c o u r t defined t h e grades of criminal homicide (Instruc- t i o n No. 32); it defined d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( ~ n s t r u c t i o n No. 3 1 ) , mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 8 ) , and negligent homicide, ( I n s t r u c t i o n 19) . Moreover, t h e jury was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e j u s t i f i a b l e use of f o r c e t o defend oneself a g a i n s t t h e imminent use of unlawful f o r c e , and t h e j u s t i f i a b l e use of f o r c e a g a i n s t a person breaking i n t o an occupied s t r u c t u r e , s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n the language of t h e s t a t u t e s . Using t h e test applied i n S t a t e v. P o r t e r , (1964), 143 Mont. 528, 539, 391 P.2d 704, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given on j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e gave t h e defendant ample oppor- t u n i t y t o expound t o t h e jury i n argument h i s theory with r e s p e c t t o t h e use of f o r c e a s self-defense a g a i n s t an unlawful a c t . O n o r a l argument, defendant strenuously argued t h a t nowhere i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d t h e c o u r t advise t h e jury, with r e s p e c t t o mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide, i n what circumstances t h e jury should a c q u i t t h e defendant. De- fendant p o i n t s o u t t h a t i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1, t h e c o u r t outlined t h e elements of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and s t a t e d t h a t defendant should be acquitted i f t h e elements were n o t proved. I n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17, it pointed o u t t h e elements of negligent homicide and s t a t e d t h a t i f those elements w e r e not proven beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t defendant should be found not g u i l t y . Contrasting those i n s t r u c t i o n s with t h e lack of a s i m i l a r i n s t r u c t i o n with r e s p e c t t o mitigated t d . L ! X k q f 2 de-abl-e homicide, defendant contends grievous e r r o r on t h e p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. I n essence defendant is complaining t h a t i f t h e jury found a j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e used by defendant t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s did not say t h a t i n such event t h e jury should a c q u i t t h e defendant. Two things m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t t h i s p o s i t i o n of defendant. F i r s t , such an i n s t r u c t i o n w a s not offered by defendant; and second, t h e r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t i f t h e jury i s properly i n s t r u c t e d on t h e law pertaining t o j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e i n a homicide case, t h e c o u r t need not go f u r t h e r and t e l l t h e jury t h a t it must a c q u i t t h e defendant, i f it f i n d s t h a t j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e was used. S t a t e v. Smith, (1975), 168 Mont. 93, 100, 541 P.2d 351; S t a t e v. London, (1957), 131 Mont. 410, 433, 310 P.2d 571. ~ e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n refusing t o give defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 6, which would have t o l d t h e jury t h a t i f it had a reasonable doubt whether t h e homicide was j u s t i f i a b l e , t h s n i t must give t h e defendant t h e b e n e f i t of t h a t doubt and a c q u i t him. That s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n w a s refused i n S t a t e v. Logan, (1970), 156 Mont. 48, 66, 473 P.2d 833, and t h i s Court approved. The Court i n Logan indicated t h a t such instruc- t i o n was unnecessary where t h e jury is otherwise properly i n s t r u c t e d on reasonable doubt. I n t h i s case, I n s t r u c t i o n No. 2 f u l l y covered t h e j u r y ' s duty with r e s p e c t t o rea- sonable doubt. Defendant f u r t h e r argues t h a t h i s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 which would have i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury with r e s p e c t t o j u s t i f i a b l e homicide, t h a t i s the use of j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e , w a s improperly refused. A s s t a t e d however, t h i s s u b j e c t was f u l l y covered by t h e c o u r t i n other i n s t r u c t i o n s , and it appears t h a t i n its I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 23 and 2 4 , t h e c o u r t p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e person using f o r c e , i f a c t i n g a s a reasonable man, i s j u s t i - f i e d i n a c t i n g a s he did. Indeed, i n I n s t r u c t i o n flo. 2 4 , it is s t a t e d t h a t a person may a c t under t h e appearance of p e r i l i f t h a t appearance makes t h e person a c t i n g believe t h a t he i s i n deadly p e r i l of h i s l i f e o r of receiving g r e a t bodily harm, and i f a reasonable man, i n t h e same s i t u a t i o n seeing and knowing what t h e a c t o r knows, would be j u s t i f i e d i n believing himself i n danger. Since counsel w a s not limited under those i n s t r u c t i o n s from f a i r l y presenting h i s defense t o t h e jury, t h e defendant w i l l not be heard t o complain t h a t t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o give t h e many d i f f e r e n t nuances on a theory of defense t h a t might have been devised. F i n a l l y , under t h i s i s s u e , with r e s p e c t t o t h e conten- t i o n made a t o r a l argument t h a t t h e c o u r t should have given a "ladder" i n s t r u c t i o n which would have (1) encompassed t h e various grades of homicide under criminal homicide, ( 2 ) i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e elements, and ( 3 ) advised t h e jury t o convict o r a c q u i t with r e s p e c t t o each such possible offense o r i n f e r i o r grade of offense, the answer remains t h e same: such an i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t offered, and i n any event t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s adequately covered t h e offenses of which t h e defendant could be convicted and h i s defenses thereto. I t is n o t t o be forgotten t h a t i n t h i s case t h e court s e n t four possible v e r d i c t s t o t h e jury, including one f o r each grade of criminal homicide and one f o r a c q u i t t a l , and defendant made no objection a t t h a t time t o t h e forms of v e r d i c t s being submitted t o t h e jury f o r its use. W e conclude therefore t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed no e r r o r with r e s p e c t t o t h e second i s s u e r a i s e d by defendant. Defendant i n h i s t h i r d i s s u e argues t h a t he was denied a speedy t r i a l a s required by t h e Fourteenth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and by A r t i c l e 11, Section 2 4 , 1972 Montana Constitution. Counsel f o r defendant i n o r a l argument conceded t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c i a l delay does not extend beyond t h e f i r s t eleven months. The following timetable of events i s p e r t i n e n t t o a determination of t h i s issue: April 2 3 , 1975 Date of a r r e s t . April 28, 1975 Information f i l e d . ~ p r i l 29, 1975 Defendant arraigned. ~ p r i l 30, 1975 Defendant posted bond. May 2, 1975 May 2 1 , 1975 May 23, 1975 August 23, 1975 October 1975 January 29, 1976 March 3, 1976 March 29, 1976 Defendant f i l e d motion t o produce confession- statement on demand f o r discovery and produc- t i o n of evidence f o r inspection. Defendant d i s q u a l i f i e s Judge Nelson. Judge Bradford c a l l e d i n . Defendant f i l e s n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o r e l y on s e l f - defense and motion f o r order t o take t h e deposi- t i o n of Carla Brave. Defendant leaves Montana f o r Arizona t o seek employment. T r i a l d a t e set f o r March 29, 1976. Defendant r e t u r n s t o Montana from Arizona. T r i a l d a t e vacated a t defendant's request. Under defendant's concession--that only t h e f i r s t eleven months a r e t o be considered under t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e , w e have a period of 336 days elapsing from t h e d a t e t h e Information was f i l e d u n t i l t h e f i r s t t r i a l d a t e . This number of days is g r e a t e r than t h e presumptive period estab- l i s h e d i n S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v. District Court, (1976), Mont. , 551 P.2d 1005, 33 St.Rep. 644, a s a prima f a c i e case of delay. Accordingly, we are c a l l e d on t o balance t h e f a c t o r s set o u t i n Barker v. Wingo, (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2128, 33 L Ed 2d 1 0 1 , t o determine t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e . These f a c t o r s are--length of delay; t h e reason f o r delay; defendant's a s s e r t i o n of h i s r i g h t ; and, prejudice t o t h e defendant. The f i r s t f a c t o r , length of delay, i s e s t a b l i s h e d . The second and t h i r d f a c t o r s we consider together. I t appears t h a t defendant sought and received permission t o leave Montana f o r Arizona while h i s t r i a l was pending. The rea- sons f o r h i s leaving w e r e personal t o defendant. The period of t i m e he was away from t h e s t a t e on personal business cannot be counted a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . That period encom- passes t h e month of October 1975 through t h e f i r s t t r i a l d a t e of March 29, 1976, which d a t e was vacated a t defend- a n t ' s request. The record shows negatively f o r t h a t period t h a t defendant wanted o r was ready f o r a t r i a l , much l e s s t h a t he was a s s e r t i n g h i s r i g h t t o t r i a l . Of s i g n i f i c a n c e a l s o i s t h e f a c t t h a t defendant d i d n o t f i l e h i s i n t e n t t o r e l y on self-defense u n t i l August 23, 1975. I n explaining h i s delay i n s o f i l i n g , defendant s t a t e d he needed t h e intervening t i m e t o complete h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and only on completion d i d he determine t o r e l y on s e l f - defense. Again, defendant i s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o charge t h e s t a t e with t h e time he himself required t o complete t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n necessary f o r h i s defense. It is obvious t h a t i n t h e period from h i s arraignment u n t i l August 23, 1975, he was n o t ready f o r nor d i d he want a t r i a l of t h e charge a g a i n s t him. That leaves t h e only unexplained t i m e , a period from August 23, 1975 u n t i l an unspecified d a t e i n October 1975, t o be accounted f o r . That period of t i n e , even i f it w e r e t o be counted f u l l y a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e , would hardly q u a l i f y a s a p r e j u d i c i a l d e t e r r e n t t o defendant's f a i r and speedy t r i a l , e s p e c i a l l y when i n t h a t period defendant was planning t o leave t h e s t a t e , and no prejudice i s shown t o t h e defend- a n t ' s r i g h t s . The f o u r t h f a c t o r t o be considered, t h e prejudice t o t h e defendant, has no support i n t h e record. ~ o t h i n g has been brought t o our a t t e n t i o n t h a t would show t h e delay hampered defendant i n any way i n presenting h i s defense. ~ e f e n d a n t claims t h e delay caused him concern and anxiety, b u t t h e s e a r e i n h e r e n t i n any criminal case. Barker v. Wingo, supra. Here, t h e s t a t e accommodated defendant t o ease h i s anxiety. I t vacated a t r i a l d a t e because of h i s up-coming surgery. I t allowed him t o l e a v e t h e s t a t e t o seek a job. I f anxiety and concern w e r e p r e s e n t , they were a s much t h e r e s u l t of t h e needs of t h e defendant, as of any delay i n t h e speedy t r i a l process. W e f i n d t h e r e f o r e t h a t defendant f a i l s t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a necessary t o show he had been denied a speedy t r i a l by t h e s t a t e . S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra; Barker v. Wingo, supra; S t a t e v. Steward, (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 388, 543P.2d 178, 181. Defendant's f o u r t h i s s u e d e a l s with t h e question of whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n admitting c e r t a i n photo- graphs i n t o evidence. Defendant argues t h e photographs were s o highly p r e j u d i c i a l a s t o cause r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Defend- a n t relies on S t a t e v. Bischert, (1957), 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969, f o r t h i s contention. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, D r . John Henneford, a p a t h o l o g i s t , t e s t i f i e d a s a prosecution witness t o e s t a b l i s h t h e cause of death. Two black and white photographs of t h e deceased taken during D r . Henneford's autopsy w e r e o f f e r e d and ad- mitted over defendant's objections. The doctor t e s t i f i e d t h a t while it would be p o s s i b l e t o explain t h e autopsy and diagnosis without t h e p i c t u r e s , h i s testimony would be c l e a r , p r e c i s e , and e a s i e r t o understand i f t h e photographs w e r e used. The doctor then used t h e photographs t o d e s c r i b e t h e angle of t h e e n t r y wound and its path through t h e body. The demonstration of t h e angle of t h e e n t r y wound was important in determining the credibility of defendant's testimony that the victim was attempting entry into the camper when the fatal shot was fired. Bischert is distinguishable from the instant case. In Bischert the colored photographs depicted the emaciated body of a child with a ghastly skin disease not related to malnu- trition, from which the child died. In the instant case there is no showing that the black and white autopsy photo- graphs showed any inflammatory or prejudicial conditions unrelated to the crime charged. In State v. Rollins, (1967), 149 Mont. 481, 428 P.2d 462, the Court upheld the admissibility of photographs of a victim's gunshot wounds, distinguishing Bischert upon the grounds the photographs in that case were "particularly distasteful" and did not contribute to the development of the case. In the instant case these photos helped the jury to understand the facts of the case and therefore they were properly admitted into evidence. The final issue raised by defendant is whether the evi- dence supported the jury verdict. One of defendant's claims is that the prosecutor's major witnesses' testimony was in- consistent and unreliable. There is no question that some of the evidence in this case was contradictory; nonetheless the jury viewed the witnesses as they testified and weighed their testimony. The standard of this Court in measuring a jury deter- mination is stated in State v. Merseal, (1975), 167 blont. "This Court remains ever mindful of one fundamental rule--that questions of fact must be determined solely by the jury, and that given a certain legal minimum of evidence, t h i s Court on review w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e its judgment f o r t h a t of t h e jury. * * * "On appeal w e examine t h e evidence t o determine whether t h e v e r d i c t i s supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. I n s o doing, we view t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e S t a t e . * * *" See also: S t a t e v. Farnes, (1976), Mont. , 558 P.2d 472, 33 St.Rep. 1270; S t a t e v. Stoddard, (1966), 147 Mont. 402, 4 1 2 P.2d 827. Therefore, t h i s Court i s limited t o an examination of t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e s t a t e and a determination of whether t h e r e was sub- s t a n t i a l evidence t o support defendant's conviction. The evidence supports t h e v e r d i c t . One other contention under t h i s f i n a l i s s u e i s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t of the jury i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e evidence i n t h a t s i n c e t h e defendant was convicted of mitigated delib- era.te homicide, t h e jury must have found defendant w a s a c t i n g under extreme mental o r emotional stress brought about by t h e apparent intended a t t a c k upon h i s person and h i s property. Defendant contends t h e only possible mental o r emotional stress f o r which t h e r e w a s a reasonable explanation o r excuse suggested by t h e evidence i s t h a t defendant feared f o r himself i n t h e circumstances described. Therefore, defendant argues, i f t h e jury found such stress t o e x i s t , it could only be such stress a s would permit self-defense. Then defendant r e t u r n s t o h i s former argument t h a t s i n c e t h e c o u r t d i d not i n s t r u c t t h e jury t h a t it should a c q u i t t h e defendant when self-defense was established, t h e v e r d i c t is i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e evidence. What t h i s contention of defendant overlooks i s t h a t while under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case t h e jury could have found defendant was a c t i n g under mental o r emotional stress brought about by t h e a t t a c k by Gardipee, t h e jury could a l s o have found t h e counter-force used by t h e defendant w a s s o excessive a s n o t t o be reasonable and j u s t i f i e d . Section 94-3-102, R.C.M. 1947. The jury could have concluded t h a t t h e f o r c e used i n self-defense by defendant, t h e shooting, w a s n o t t h e a c t i o n of a reasonable person under t h e circum- stances. I n t h a t s i t u a t i o n , a v e r d i c t of mitigated d e l i b - e r a t e homicide i s j u s t i f i e d . I t i s n o t given t o u s , however, t o look i n t o t h e minds of t h e jurors t o a s c e r t a i n how they a r r i v e d a t t h e i r v e r d i c t . When, a s here, w e f i n d t h e jury w a s f a i r l y i n s t r u c t e d , w e must leave t h e weighing of t h e evidence and determination of t h e f a c t s t o t h a t jury. I t is n o t w i t h i n our province t o s e t a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t here. The judgment of conviction i s affirmed. W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . J u s t i c e Daly Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: Defendant should be granted a new trial. Testimony of Carla Brave relating to defendant being in prison for rape was not only prejudicial, it was not relevant. Moreover, the court failed to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the offense for which defendant was convicted. Before witness Carla Brave testified to the statement made by defendant that he had been in prison for rape, defense counsel moved that the statement be suppressed. The prosecution then made an offer of proof as to the relevancy of the statement to the following effect: "Your Honor, we offer to prove by the testimony of Carla Brave, in light of the question asked her, that William Collins volunteered that he had been in prison, and that he had been in prison for the - crime of rape. And we, in that regard, suaaest this is relevant, inasmuch as it a a isn't true, that that fact is not true. It shows what was on Mr. Collins' mind at that time, namely sex with Carla Brave. And that certainly bears on the events as they later transpired. Who did what for what purpose. In that regard it is strictly relevant, it is material. And because it is an admission, a statement made by the defendant, and because it is relevant and material, we suggest that the Court hear the testimony." (Emphasis added) The court then let the jury hear the testimony. During cross-examination Carla Brave admitted that in talking to a deputy after the shooting that he had told her that defendant had not been in prison for rape. Defendant asserted self-defense and while testifying in his own behalf stated that he had not made the statement to Carla Brave. However, he was also impeached under the old rule in Montana which was mechanically followed by trial judges which allowed the state to ask the defendant if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Defendant admitted that he had, but the nature of the felony was never stated to the jury. The situation was such that at the end of the prosecution's case the jury did not know whether defendant had been in prison for rape. The situation was not alleviated by the defendant's testimony. He denied that he had been in prison for rape, but also admitted that he had been convicted of a felony, although the jury did not know the nature of that felony. It would certainly be understandable that a jury would conclude that defendant did not tell the truth when he denied making the statement to Carla Brave. For this reason alone, the jury may have decided to distrust defendant in the remainder of his testimony. The majority has concluded that the statement, although known by the prosecution to be false, was relevant to the defendant's state of mind preceding the shooting. Relevant to what? On this point the opinion is silent. If true, what did the statement tend to prove? Even if made, this statement was clearly not relevant to any issue in the case. Moreover, its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value it may have had. At trial, before going any further, the trial court should first have made a determination that the alleged state- ment to Carla Brave was relevant. There is nothing in the record from which we can determine if the trial court concluded that the alleged statement was relevant to any issue in the case. It is true that the prosecution argued that it shows defendant's state of mind as desiring to have sex with Carla Brave. (But even if true, that fact, as will be explained later, had nothing to do with issues at trial.) It is clear here, that the state admitted (at least to the trial judge in chambers) that defendant had not in fact been convicted of rape. This being so, the trial court had the further duty of determining the likelihood of defendant having made the statement to Carla Brave. In the nature of things, a person does not normally go around exclaiming to the world that he has been in prison for rape. Particularly would this be so when such is not the fact. Clearly the probabilities were that defendant did not make this statement to Carla Brave at all. It could be that she was deliberately not telling the truth or that she had misinterpreted what defendant had stated to her. She admitted that she had not revealed this in her statement first given to the prosecution--and the statement extensively covered the events of the evening--including the conversation she had with defendant in his pickup truck. Given this situation, the prejudice to defendant was manifest. There was a strong probability that defendant did not make this statement but if the jury heard the evidence they might get the idea that defendant, in stating he had been in prison for rape, was in fact implying to Carla Brave that if she did not go along with his desire for sex that he would force her. The further implication from this is that the state was implying that defendant was an evil person and would stop at nothing to have his way--including taking of another person's life. But the fact is that the circumstances of the shooting had nothing to do with any alleged statement made to Carla Brave that defendant had been in prison for rape. The events of the evening of the shooting did not transpire at one time. There was a great deal of drinking by all parties concerned throughout the evening and the alleged statement of defendant to Carla Brave took place a considerable time before the shooting. There is not a shred of evidence that the alleged statement had any connection directly or indirectly with the shooting. If defendant had a desire to have sex with Carla Brave, Gardipee was not aware of his desires. There is no evidence that Gardipee knew what defendant and Carla Brave talked about. Indeed, the evidence is that he did not. Under these circumstances, the desire of defendant to have sex with Carla Brave is totally unrelated to his willingness to take Gardipee's life. Moreover, the circumstances of the assault upon defendant leading to the shooting are totally unrelated to any desire of defendant to have sex with Carla Brave. The fight in the pickup truck while defendant was driving Carla Brave and Gardipee back to town, was instigated solely by Gardipee. Gardipee suddenly started getting wild about the loss of his ancestral rights and in the process started pounding on defendant while defendant was driving the truck down the road. It is not at all difficult to understand why defendant stopped his truck, got out, and climbed into the back of the camper. Whatever reasons Gardipee had for pounding on the defendant, they certainly did not relate to any knowledge Gardipee had of the conversations defendant had with Carla Brave. Nor does the alleged statement by defendant to Carla Brave have any connection to defendant's state of mind when he stopped his truck and climbed into the back of his camper in order to avoid Gardipee's assault. It is difficult for me to see how defendant had sex on his mind at that time. to The only purpose for the prosecutor / elic2t the state- ment from Carla Brave was to put defendant in as bad a light as possible in the eyes of the jury. To a degree, this is always the objective of the prosecution, but there must be a sound evidentiary basis for doing so. Here there was none. The testimony was not relevant and was clearly prejudicial. I would also reverse the conviction because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of deliberate homicide and mitigated deliberate homicide. The jury was only given a definition of deliberate homicide and mitigated deliberate homicide; it was not provided with instructions setting forth the elements of deliberate homicide and mitigated deliberate homicide, and telling them that each of the elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Without such instructions the jury did not know what the elements of mitigated deliberate homicide were and the burden of proof required to prove each element. I cannot conceive that a trial court would allow a case to go to a jury without such instruction, nor can I conceive how an appellate court would give its stamp of approval. The duty to instruct the jury on the law, has been stated as follows in McBride, The Art of Instructing the Jury (1969, Anderson Publishing Company) (quoting from California Jury Instructions, Criminal, page 8): "'In recent years we have witnessed a distinct trend of decision away from the rule of earlier days when it was held not to be error for a court to fail to instruct the jury, in the absence of a request, on even such vital rules as those of reasonable doubt and self defense. This later trend has established as a basic principle that the trial judge has the duty, even in the absence of request, to instruct the jury as to all rules of law that necessarily will be involved in a decision of the cause. People v . Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 153 P.2d 21, 24. We do not have sufficient modern precedents to enable us to make a complete list of the instructions that must be given, in the absence of a request therefor, under the modern rule. Generally the trend points to the likelihood of reversal of a conviction if the trial court fails to give any proper and appropriate instruction which, were it given, might result in a different verdict. In instructing jurors, we must assume that they have no knowledge of the rules of law and that, therefore, they must be instructed on all points of law which, under any reason- able theory, might be involved in their deliberations, to the end that their decision will be according to the law and the evidence and untinged by any private and possibly false opinion of the law that they may entertain.'" (Emphasis added) Under any view of a case, the elements of the offenses charged will be involved in a decision of the cause. The failure to instruct the jury on those elements must be reversible error. It appears that this Court is holding that the duty to properly instruct the jury can be delegated to counsel-- and if the trial court does so, he is relieved of any burden either for erroneous instructions submitted to the jury or for failure to instruct the jury on important aspects of the case. While the failure of counsel to submit instructions on the important aspects of the case is surely a sign of ill-prepared- ness, I fail to see how this relieves the trial court of a duty to properly instruct the jury. This is a situation where the jury was not instructed on the essential elements of the offense for which defendant was convicted. The duty is not only that of defense counsel to see that proper instructions are prepared and offered for the court's consideration; there is a correspond- ing duty on the state to see that the jury is instructed on the essential elements of the offenses charged. But regardless of which side provides the instructions, or is derelict in not providing the instructions, the ultimate duty to fairly instruct the jury on the law resides with the trial judge. If he does not receive proper instructions he should refuse to send the case to the jury until he is convinced he has the proper instructions. I cannot believe that the only duty of the trial judge is to accept or reject the instructions which are offered to him by counsel for both sides. If instructions are either improperly worded, or are omitted, he should direct counsel to properly word the instructions or to supply the omitted instructions. Only then can we say that the trial judge has properly discharged his obligations to the law. That was not done in this case.