Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Bridget E. Boyle
Citation: 2013 WI 103
Docket Number: 2011AP001767-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 2013

2013 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1767-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  
Bridget E. Boyle, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Bridget E. Boyle, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BOYLE  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 26, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Bridget 
E. Boyle and Boyle, Boyle & Boyle, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief by 
Robert G. Krohn, Edgerton.  
 
 
 
2013 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1767-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Bridget E. Boyle, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Bridget E. Boyle, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 26, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Bridget E. Boyle appeals the 
report of James J. Winiarski, referee, recommending discipline 
of a four-month license suspension, the imposition of costs, and 
restitution to a client in the amount of $2,500.  The referee 
found that Attorney Boyle committed nine of the ten charged 
counts of misconduct that were tried at a hearing before the 
referee.  The ethical violations which the referee determined 
Attorney Boyle committed included failing to keep a client 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
2 
 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter; failing to 
promptly comply with reasonable requests by the client for 
information; failing to communicate the basis for her fees and 
expenses; failing to promptly respond to a client's request for 
information concerning fees and expenses; failing to timely 
return a client's file after the client's request; charging an 
unreasonable fee; failing to hold unearned fees and advanced 
payments of fees in trust until earned; and failing to return 
unearned 
fees 
to 
her 
client 
upon 
termination 
of 
her 
representation. 
¶2 
After our independent review of the record, we approve 
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and adopt 
them.  We agree that Attorney Boyle should pay restitution in 
the amount of $2,500 as described below, and we agree that 
Attorney Boyle should pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding.    
¶3 
We 
do 
not, 
however, 
accept 
the 
referee's 
recommendation that Attorney Boyle's misconduct be sanctioned by 
a four-month suspension.  The serious nature of Attorney Boyle's 
misconduct, combined with her substantial disciplinary history, 
render a four-month suspension an insufficient response.  It is 
imperative that to resume the practice of law in Wisconsin, 
Attorney Boyle must show this court that she has taken steps to 
avoid similar misconduct in the future.  We therefore impose a 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
3 
 
six-month suspension of Attorney Boyle's Wisconsin law license.  
See SCR 22.28(3).1 
¶4 
Attorney Boyle was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1995 and practices in Milwaukee.  In 2008 Attorney 
Boyle was privately reprimanded for failing to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; 
failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status 
of a matter; failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests 
for information; and failing to explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.   
¶5 
In 2012 Attorney Boyle was suspended for 60 days for 
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client; failing to communicate appropriately with 
a client; failing to promptly respond to a client's request for 
information concerning fees and expenses; failing to take steps 
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's 
interest; failing to cooperate with an OLR investigation into 
her conduct; willfully failing to provide relevant information, 
fully answer questions, or furnish documents in the course of an 
OLR investigation; and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Boyle, 2012 WI 54, 341 Wis. 2d 92, 813 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.28(3) states, "The license of an attorney that is 
revoked or suspended for misconduct for six months or more shall 
be reinstated pursuant to the procedure set forth in SCR 22.29 
to 22.33 and only by order of the supreme court." 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
4 
 
N.W.2d 215.  Also in 2012, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
disbarred Attorney Boyle from further practice in that court for 
her abandonment of her client in a criminal case.  In re Bridget 
Boyle-Saxton, 668 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2012). 
¶6 
This disciplinary matter began with 13 counts, three 
of which the referee dismissed during the disciplinary hearing 
at the OLR's request.  The remaining ten counts concern Attorney 
Boyle's work for two clients, C.M. and C.P.  We take the 
following facts from the referee's report. 
CLIENT C.M. 
¶7 
Counts Four through Nine arise out of Attorney Boyle's 
representation of an individual, C.M., who had been convicted of 
one count of possessing firearms after having been previously 
convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l), 
and five counts of violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for possessing 
firearms not registered in the National Firearms Registration 
and Transfer Record.   The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin sentenced C.M. to six concurrent 
terms of 84 months imprisonment, with two years of supervised 
release.   
¶8 
In early 2007 C.M. asked Attorney Boyle, who had not 
previously represented him, to appeal his conviction.  Attorney 
Boyle offered to represent C.M. for a total of $20,000.  C.M. 
agreed and paid Attorney Boyle that amount of money.   
¶9 
No written fee agreement existed between Attorney 
Boyle and C.M.  Attorney Boyle did not communicate to C.M. the 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
5 
 
basis or rate for her fee or the precise legal services covered 
by the fee.   
¶10 C.M. and Attorney Boyle did not reach agreement on 
what services the $20,000 fee would cover.  C.M. believed the 
fee covered a direct appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, including a motion for 
rehearing, a motion for rehearing en banc, a petition for writ 
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, a petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the sentence, a motion 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143 for bail pending appeal, and 
various filings with the department of probation to correct the 
presentence report.  Attorney Boyle maintains she did not 
promise any particular legal services for the agreed upon fee of 
$20,000 other than an appeal to the Seventh Circuit and a 
possible 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, and that the precise nature 
of services she would render for the $20,000 fee was dependent 
upon her review of the file.  However, even after reviewing the 
file, Attorney Boyle never stated the precise nature of the 
legal services that she would provide for C.M.  
¶11 Although C.M. requested that Attorney Boyle seek bail 
pending appeal, Attorney Boyle never filed a motion asking for 
this relief.  On numerous occasions, C.M. wrote and called 
Attorney Boyle concerning his requested motion for bail, but 
Attorney Boyle did not respond to his inquiries. 
¶12 On numerous occasions, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle to 
inquire about issues he wanted Attorney Boyle to raise in his 
Seventh Circuit appeal, and to request that Attorney Boyle 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
6 
 
schedule a telephone conference with him.  Attorney Boyle did 
not respond to these letters.   
¶13 During 
a 
two-month 
period 
surrounding 
the 
oral 
argument of his case in the Seventh Circuit, C.M. called 
Attorney Boyle 84 times from prison.  Attorney Boyle was 
consistently unavailable to speak with C.M. and answer his 
questions concerning the appeal.  C.M.'s friend, C.S., also 
called and e-mailed Attorney Boyle regularly in an attempt to 
assist C.M. in obtaining the status of his case, but was unable 
to reach Attorney Boyle.  
¶14 In an opinion dated January 22, 2008, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed C.M.'s conviction.  Attorney Boyle did not 
advise C.M. of the unsuccessful outcome of his appeal, nor did 
she respond to his telephone calls during the months following 
the Seventh Circuit's decision.  C.M. finally learned of the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in July 2008 from an individual 
within the prison where he resided.   
¶15 On December 30, 2008, Attorney Boyle filed a motion 
with the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin to vacate C.M.'s sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is considered an 
extraordinary remedy, appropriate only for an error of law that 
is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental 
defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.  Harris 
v. 
United 
States, 
366 
F.3d 
593, 
594 
(7th 
Cir. 
2004).  
Notwithstanding this high burden, Attorney Boyle did not attach 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
7 
 
any affidavits to support her position, and her supporting 
arguments were minimal.  
¶16 On January 9, 2009, the district court denied the 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, noting the motion lacked legal or 
evidentiary support.  Attorney Boyle did not advise C.M. of the 
unsuccessful outcome of this motion.  Attorney Boyle claims she 
did not see the decision because the district court sent her the 
decision via e-mail only; she surmises that she must have 
accidently deleted the decision from her computer.  
¶17 On January 29, 2009, Attorney Boyle sent C.M. a copy 
of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, despite the fact that the 
district court had already denied the motion.  
¶18 On February 5, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle and 
asked about the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.  He also asked for a 
copy of his retainer agreement or engagement letter and "a full 
written accounting of the time you have spent on my matter."  
Attorney Boyle did not respond to this letter. 
¶19 On May 13, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle and noted 
she had not responded to his last several letters. 
¶20 On August 8, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle to 
request information on his case.  He stated that he had not been 
able to speak with her despite his numerous requests to do so.  
He further stated that he had heard from a third party that the 
district court had denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.   
¶21 From June 2009 through September 2009, C.M. made many 
unsuccessful attempts to call Attorney Boyle.  C.M.'s friend, 
C.S., also attempted to reach Attorney Boyle by telephone.  
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
8 
 
Attorney Boyle's staff repeatedly told C.M. and C.S. that the 
district court had not ruled on the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.  
¶22 On September 3, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle again 
and asked about the status of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.  
¶23 On September 30, 2009, C.M. wrote the clerk of court 
for the Seventh Circuit, asking the Chief Judge of that court to 
order Attorney Boyle to communicate with him. 
¶24 By early 2010 C.M. learned, from a source other than 
Attorney Boyle, that the district court had denied his 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 motion.  C.M. filed a pro se motion with the district 
court to reopen the time for appealing the denial of the 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, claiming that he did not receive timely 
notice of the denial.  The district court denied C.M.'s motion.   
¶25 On February 12, 2010, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle and 
requested a copy of his file and a refund of fees.  
¶26 On February 24, 2010, C.M. again wrote Attorney Boyle, 
terminating his relationship with her and requesting a copy of 
his file, a return of unearned fees, and an accounting of her 
time.  
¶27 By mid-2010 Attorney Boyle had not returned C.M.'s 
file, returned any unearned fees, or provided an accounting of 
her time.  After C.M. alerted the OLR of these facts, the OLR 
wrote to Attorney Boyle and advised her to provide C.M. with a 
copy of the file.  
¶28 In July 2010 the OLR issued a notice to appear to 
Attorney Boyle for an investigative interview.  Attorney Boyle 
complied with the notice and appeared and answered questions 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
9 
 
posed by the OLR.  Attorney Boyle also gave the OLR a complete 
copy of C.M.'s file, which the OLR copied and forwarded to C.M.  
Attorney Boyle did not furnish any accounting for her fees or 
return any portion of the $20,000 paid by C.M. 
¶29 The OLR's complaint alleges that, by virtue of her 
conduct while representing C.M., Attorney Boyle: 
 failed to keep her client reasonably informed about 
the status of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and his 
Seventh Circuit appeal, and failed to promptly comply 
with her client's reasonable requests for information 
about 
these 
matters, 
in 
violation 
of 
former 
SCR 20:1.4(a)2 and  SCRs 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4)3 (Counts 
Four, Five, and Six);  
 failed to communicate the basis for her fee, in 
violation of former SCR 20:1.5(b)4 (Count Seven);  
                                                 
2 Former SCR 20:1.4(a) (effective prior to July 1, 2007), 
provided, "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information." 
3 SCRs 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4) state that a lawyer shall "(3) 
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter;" and "(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by 
the client for information; . . . ." 
4 Former SCR 20:1.5(b) (effective prior to July 1, 2007) 
provided as follows:  "When the lawyer has not regularly 
represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be 
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or 
within a reasonable time after commencing the representation."  
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
10 
 
 failed to promptly respond to a client's request for 
information concerning fees and expenses, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.5(b)(3)5 (Count Eight); and  
 failed to return a client's file upon termination of 
representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d)6 (Count 
Nine).  
CLIENT C.P. 
¶30 Counts Ten through Thirteen arise out of Attorney 
Boyle's representation of an individual, C.P., who in 2008 was 
convicted after a jury trial of one count of burglary—armed with 
a dangerous weapon, and one count of second-degree endangering 
safety while armed.  The circuit court sentenced C.P. to five 
years of imprisonment and five years of extended supervision on 
each count, with the sentences to run consecutively to each 
other and to any other sentence C.P. might be serving.  
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) states, "A lawyer shall promptly respond 
to a client's request for information concerning fees and 
expenses." 
6 SCR 20:1.16(d) states as follows:   
 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
11 
 
¶31 In August 2010, after his deadline for pursuing a 
direct appeal had expired, C.P. filed multiple pro se motions 
with the circuit court seeking postconviction relief.  On 
August 25, 2010, the circuit court issued an order denying 
C.P.'s postconviction motions.   
¶32 C.P.'s longtime companion, B.T., asked Attorney Boyle 
to file an appeal following the denial of C.P.'s postconviction 
motions.  B.T. mistakenly believed that any such filing was due 
within 20 days of the circuit court's August 25, 2010 denial 
order; i.e., by September 14, 2010.  B.T. paid Attorney Boyle 
$2,500 with the understanding that Attorney Boyle would file an 
appeal by September 14, 2010.  Attorney Boyle deposited the 
$2,500 into the firm's operating account and not the firm's 
trust account.   
¶33 By September 14, 2010, Attorney Boyle had taken 
minimal action on C.P.'s case.  She filed nothing with the court 
of appeals or any other court.  Although Attorney Boyle 
determined that C.P. and B.T. were mistaken in believing that a 
September 14, 2010 filing deadline was in effect, she did not 
inform either C.P. or B.T. that no such deadline applied to 
C.P.'s case.   
¶34 Between September 15, 2010, and September 27, 2010, 
after learning that Attorney Boyle had filed nothing in the 
courts, B.T. called Attorney Boyle multiple times and informed 
her that she wished to terminate the representation and recover 
the $2,500 advanced fee.  Attorney Boyle returned C.P.'s file to 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
12 
 
B.T.  Attorney Boyle did not account for or refund any advanced 
fees.  
¶35 The OLR's complaint alleges that, by virtue of her 
conduct while representing C.P., Attorney Boyle: 
 failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.37 
(Count Ten);   
 charged 
an 
unreasonable 
fee 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:1.5(a)8 (Count Eleven);  
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.3 states, "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
8 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides as follows: 
 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;   
 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
13 
 
 failed to hold unearned fees and advanced payments of 
fees 
in 
trust 
until 
earned, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4)9 (Count Twelve); and  
 failed to refund unearned fees, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.16(d) (Count Thirteen).   
¶36 After a hearing on Counts Four through Thirteen, the 
referee determined that the OLR had proven misconduct in all 
counts except Count Ten, which, as mentioned above, alleged that 
Attorney Boyle failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness during her representation of C.P.10  See SCR 20:1.3.  
The referee recommended that Attorney Boyle receive a four-month 
suspension, as the OLR had requested.  In support of this 
recommendation, 
the 
referee 
noted 
that, 
in 
both 
this 
disciplinary 
matter 
and 
Attorney 
Boyle's 
earlier 
60-day 
suspension, Attorney Boyle displayed a pattern of failing to 
communicate appropriately with her clients.  The referee also 
noted that throughout this disciplinary proceeding, Attorney 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
9 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) state:  Unearned fees and cost advances.  
 
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 
sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred. 
10 The OLR does not challenge the referee's determination on 
Count Ten.   
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
14 
 
Boyle did not express any remorse over her conduct, was quick to 
blame her own clients for communication problems, and offered 
the "greatly exaggerated" defense that it was too dangerous for 
her to engage in meaningful written communications with clients 
in federal prison.  The referee also expressed concern over 
whether Attorney Boyle appreciated the error in her ways, 
writing: 
 
I am not sure this disciplinary case or the prior 
disciplinary cases have impressed upon [Attorney] 
Boyle the need to communicate with her clients from 
the beginning to the end of her representation.  I 
also do not believe she accepts the need to have a 
clear understanding of what legal services she will 
perform for criminal clients, both at the beginning of 
her representation and as the case develops.  I sense 
she remains most reluctant to put anything in writing. 
¶37 As to the appropriate monetary sanctions, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Boyle should be assessed the entire 
costs of the disciplinary proceeding, which total $22,989.06 as 
of March 11, 2013.  The referee further recommended that 
Attorney Boyle be ordered to refund the $2,500 retainer in the 
C.P. matter.  In making this restitution recommendation, the 
referee dismissed as "not credible" Attorney Boyle's insistence 
that she had earned the $2,500 by reading transcripts in C.P.'s 
case.  The referee found that Attorney Boyle performed no 
meaningful legal services for C.P. other than checking the 
state's Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) system to 
determine the status of C.P.'s case.  As to C.M.'s case, the 
referee recommended that no restitution is owed, as Attorney 
Boyle spent significant time on the case, and "[w]hile [C.M.] 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
15 
 
may not be happy with the result . . . , OLR has not requested 
and has not proven . . . that any portion of the [$20,000] fee 
should be returned." 
¶38 Attorney Boyle appeals.  In conducting our review, we 
will affirm the referee's findings of fact unless they are found 
to be clearly erroneous, but we will review the referee's 
conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125.  The court may impose whatever sanction it sees 
fit regardless of the referee's recommendation. See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶39 Although Attorney Boyle identifies only a single issue 
for our review——whether the referee's recommended sanction is 
appropriate——she devotes considerable time in her briefs to 
challenging the factual bases for many of the referee's 
determinations of misconduct.  For example, Attorney Boyle 
argues 
that 
the 
referee 
undercounted 
or 
undervalued 
the 
communications she had with C.M., which, she claims, were 
sufficient to ward off a determination that she failed to 
appropriately communicate with him.  Similarly, Attorney Boyle 
argues that the referee failed to account for all of the legal 
work she performed on C.P.'s case, which, she claims, justified 
the $2,500 she was paid.   
¶40 Tellingly, Attorney Boyle's briefs barely mention——
much less apply——the standard of review relevant to a referee's 
factual findings:  the clearly erroneous standard.  See Inglimo, 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
16 
 
305 Wis. 2d 71, ¶5.  This omission leads Attorney Boyle to 
overlook the fact that our review of the referee's factual 
findings is deferential rather than plenary.  Thus, instead of 
leaving us with a definite and firm conviction that the referee 
has made a factual mistake, Attorney Boyle leaves us with the 
impression that she would rather not confront the damning 
evidence against her.   
¶41 The record overwhelmingly shows that in the matters 
under 
review, 
Attorney 
Boyle 
failed 
to 
carry 
out 
her 
responsibilities to her clients.  She habitually neglected her 
duty to communicate with clients, often leaving her clients 
entirely in the dark.  There is no justifiable reason, for 
example, for a client to have to discover the outcome of an 
important motion or an appeal from someone other than his or her 
lawyer, months after the relevant court issued its decision——as 
C.M. did, twice.  There is no justifiable reason for a client's 
reasonable requests——for progress updates, for information on 
fees, for the case file, for news of the very outcome of their 
case——to be wholly ignored by their lawyer for vast expanses of 
time.   
¶42 Perhaps most troubling is the fact that, throughout 
this disciplinary hearing, Attorney Boyle has strenuously 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
17 
 
avoided taking responsibility for the bulk of the conduct at 
issue,11 instead offering a variety of excuses.  They include: 
 C.M. wrote and called her too frequently. 
 Telephone 
calls 
from 
prisons 
are 
not 
clearly 
identified on telephone systems. 
 She was out of the office or busy when C.M. called.   
 Her failure to respond to C.M.'s communications was 
reasonable given that there was no ongoing activity in 
his case at that time. 
 C.M. could relay messages to her through his family 
and friends. 
 Written communications to a client in the federal 
prison system are risky because other inmates may 
steal them. 
 Keeping memos or notes of her communications with 
clients is dangerous for her clients. 
 Setting up telephone conferences through the prison 
system is difficult. 
 She is too busy to document all communications with 
clients. 
 She could not send C.M. his file because it was too 
large to transmit to the prison. 
                                                 
11 We note that Attorney Boyle admits the facts and 
misconduct alleged by the OLR in Count Eight (failure to 
promptly respond to C.M.'s request for information concerning 
fees and expenses, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(b)(3)), and Count 
Nine (failure to return C.M.'s file upon termination of 
representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d)). 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
18 
 
 The precise nature of services to be rendered in 
criminal matters is difficult to state in writing at 
the commencement of representation. 
 She was unaware and therefore did not inform C.M. of 
the district court's denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 because of the "unique nature" of the federal 
court's electronic filing system. 
¶43 The referee was not persuaded by these and other 
excuses.  We are similarly unpersuaded.  We therefore affirm the 
referee's findings of fact and agree with the referee that those 
factual findings demonstrate that Attorney Boyle committed the 
misconduct alleged in Counts Four through Nine and Eleven 
through Thirteen.   
¶44 With respect to the discipline to be imposed, we 
depart from the referee's recommendation and from the OLR's 
suggestion that a four-month suspension is sufficient.  We are 
particularly concerned by the blame-shifting strategy that 
Attorney Boyle frequently uses to try minimize her ethical 
missteps.  This strategy demonstrates that Attorney Boyle does 
not fully understand her ethical obligations as a lawyer.  The 
purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the public, the 
courts, and the legal profession in Wisconsin from incompetent 
and unfit attorneys.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Hankel, 126 Wis. 2d 390, 394, 376 N.W.2d 848 (1985).  The 
public, the courts, and the Wisconsin legal profession need 
protection from Attorney Boyle until she demonstrates to this 
court, before she resumes practice, that she has made efforts to 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
19 
 
remedy the causes of her repeated failures to serve her clients 
ethically.  A six-month suspension is therefore necessary.  See 
SCR 22.28(3).  It is also consistent with the range of 
discipline this court has imposed for similar misconduct.  See, 
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Joset, 2008 WI 41, 
309 Wis. 2d 5, 748 N.W.2d 778 (six-month suspension for failing 
to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
clients, failing to keep clients reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests 
for information, failing to comply with court orders, and 
failing to cooperate with the investigation into misconduct); In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Glynn, 2000 WI 117, 238 
Wis. 2d 860, 618 N.W.2d 740 (nine-month suspension for failing 
to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
clients, failing to explain matters reasonably necessary to 
permit clients to make informed decisions regarding their 
representation, and failing to cooperate with the investigation 
into misconduct). 
¶45 We further conclude that full costs are to be imposed 
on Attorney Boyle.  Neither the OLR nor Attorney Boyle disputes 
the appropriateness of assessing Attorney Boyle with the full 
costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶46 Finally, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Attorney 
Boyle 
must 
reimburse C.P.'s companion, B.T., for the $2,500 B.T. paid to 
Attorney Boyle.  Attorney Boyle asks this court to send the 
issue of her entitlement to the $2,500 fee payment to 
arbitration.  However, Attorney Boyle surely knew, or should 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
20 
 
have known, that professional discipline may include restitution 
"to the person whose money or property was misappropriated or 
misapplied in the amount or value of such money or property as 
found in the disciplinary proceedings."  See SCRs 21.16(1m)(em) 
and (2m)(a)1.  Attorney Boyle had ample opportunity to verify 
the amounts she earned or expended while working on C.P.'s case.  
She has failed to do so.  The referee found Attorney Boyle's 
justification for the $2,500 fee to be incredible.  This is not 
the forum for reweighing Attorney Boyle's credibility.    
¶47 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Bridget E. Boyle to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, effective January 30, 2014. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bridget E. Boyle shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Bridget E. Boyle shall pay restitution in the 
amount of $2,500 to B.T. 
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Bridget E. Boyle shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶51 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that restitution is to be 
completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation.   
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
21 
 
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this decision is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
No. 
2011AP1767-D   
 
 
 
1