Title: Brown v. Thomas
Citation: 426 S.W.2d 496
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 1968

426 S.W.2d 496 (1968) William Charles BROWN, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. Catherine THOMAS, Defendant-in-Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. March 27, 1968. *497 Flynn &amp; Flynn, Knoxville, for plaintiff in error. Clarence Blackburn, Dist. Atty. Gen., and Zane Daniel, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Knoxville, for defendant in error. CHATTIN, Justice. This controversy arose under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, T.C.A. Sections 36-901 through 36-929. Defendant-in-error, Catherine Thomas, filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas, New London County, Connecticut against plaintiff-in-error, William Charles Brown, to compel support for herself and three young children. We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court: that is, Catherine Thomas as petitioner and William Charles Brown as defendant. At the time the petition was filed, defendant was residing in Knoxville, Tennessee. The record shows the parties had never married but had cohabited for nine years. The children were born to this union. Defendant had refused to provide support for petitioner and their three children. The trial judge found the amount of support necessary was $79.15 per month. A certified copy of the record and judgment was forwarded to Knox County, Tennessee, for enforcement of the judgment pursuant to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and filed in the Circuit Court of that County. Process was issued and served upon defendant. Defendant, through his Attorney, moved to dismiss the petition; which motion was overruled. Defendant then filed a demurrer on the following grounds: The trial judge overruled the demurrer and granted defendant a discretionary appeal. We are of the opinion the judgment of the trial judge in overruling the demurrer must be affirmed. The averments of fact in the petition are admitted to be true by demurrer, and are accepted as true on this appeal. City of Kingsport v. Jones, 196 Tenn. 544, 268 S.W.2d 576 (1954). By the demurrer, defendant has admitted he is the father of the children. *498 T.C.A. Section 36-223 provides, in part: This statute was discussed and construed in the case of Shelley v. Central Woodwork, Inc., 207 Tenn. 411, 340 S.W.2d 896 (1960), as follows: Thus, it is clear a father of illegitimate children is obligated for their support. The second ground of the demurrer is without merit for the reason it was not necessary for petitioner to allege defendant had been adjudicated the putative father of the children. The petition was brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Connecticut General Statutes, Title 17, Chapter 308. The same Act has been adopted in Tennessee, and where applicable, its provisions govern petitioner's cause of action. "Duty of support" is defined by the Uniform Act as including: "* * * any duty of support imposed or imposable by law or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance, or otherwise." T.C.A. Section 36-902(6). Under the statute, the duty of support need not be the result of court action; but may be any duty imposable by law. Such a duty is imposable upon a putative father by the provisions of T.C.A. Section 36-223. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause remanded. Defendant will pay the costs of the appeal. The costs below will await final outcome in that court. BURNETT, C. J., and DYER, CRESON and HUMPHREYS, JJ., concur.