Title: State Ex Rel Venn v. Reid
Citation: 207 Or. 617, 298 P.2d 990
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 1956

207 Or. 617 (1956)
298 P.2d 990
STATE OF OREGON EX REL VENN
v.
REID

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued on demurrer May 29, 1956.
Demurrer sustained May 29, 1956.
Written opinion filed June 20, 1956.
*619 E.B. Sahlstrom and Clyde N. Johnston, of Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief were S.M. Calkins, Herbert Lombard, William W. Bartle, Chester N. Anderson, Richard Bryson, William Huey, E.L. Kincaid, E.R. Bryson, Hale G. Thompson, J. Daniel Givan, L.L. Ray, Lewis Hoffman, and Clarence Barrett, Jr., of Eugene, and Marvin O. Sanders and Jack B. Lively, of Springfield.
Eugene C. Venn, District Attorney, and Edward Leavy, Deputy District Attorney, of Eugene, argued the cause for petitioner.
A brief was filed by the following attorneys as amici curiae: Alberta E. Heffron, of Springfield, and Keith D. Skelton, George T. Langford, Richard E. Miller, Charles O. Porter, Gordon A. Ramstead, Thelma Chapman Fowler, W.P. Riddlesbarger, Bert McCoy, D.T. Bayly, James P. Harrang, Frank R. Lacy, L.D. Pederson, David F. Lentz, Cecil Stickney, Stanley R. Darling, and Frank E. Bocci, of Eugene.
WRIT QUASHED.
LATOURETTE, J.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus brought by the state of Oregon on the relation of Eugene C. *620 Venn, District Attorney for Lane county, Oregon, as the petitioner, against Frank B. Reid, presiding judge of the circuit court of the county of Lane, second judicial district, state of Oregon, as the respondent.
Upon the District Attorney's proffer of a petition for a writ of mandamus, we assumed jurisdiction and caused an alternative writ to be issued requiring Judge Reid to discharge the grand jury for the county of Lane, empaneled on the 26th day of April, 1956, or show cause to this court why he had not done so. Judge Reid filed a demurrer to the writ of mandamus on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. The demurrer was set down for hearing, petitioner and his deputy Edward Leavy, appeared in person, and respondent appeared by his attorneys, E.B. Sahlstrom and Clyde N. Johnston. After hearing argument, the court retired, and after conference sustained the demurrer in open court with notice to the parties that a written opinion would be forthcoming.
The writ, inter alia, contains the following language:
ORS 34.110 reads as follows:
ORS 34.150 reads as follows:
1-3. It is well recognized in this state that a petition for mandamus is no part of the pleadings. An alternative writ of mandamus is tantamount to a complaint in other actions. It must contain facts alleging a *623 cause of action and such facts must be legally sufficient so that the mandamus portion of the writ follows as a matter of law. The function of the demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the writ and for this purpose, every fact well pleaded therein is construed as admitted. See Olds v. Kirkpatrick et al., 183 Or 105, 111, 191 P2d 641.
The sole question presented by the allegations of the writ is the alleged duty of Judge Reid personally, as distinguished from some other judge of the district, to discharge the April grand jury for Lane county. Although on demurrer the facts well pleaded in the alternative writ are admitted to be true, as hereinbefore pointed out, yet the allegations of the writ do not show a clear and positive duty on the part of Judge Reid to act as the writ requires him to do. We do not wish to be understood as saying that if the matter as alleged in the alternative writ were properly presented against the right person, and the facts were undisputed, that a writ could not be issued to compel the required action, provided a motion or other proceeding was pending before him requiring action. This is a proceeding in mandamus and the jurisdiction in such a proceeding is circumscribed by well defined rules.
In State ex rel. v. Bradshaw, 59 Or 279, 117 P 284, an original proceeding in mandamus, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice BURNETT, said:
Substantially, the same rule is announced in United States of America v. Cohn, 201 Or 680, 684, 272 P2d 982. In that case, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice BRAND, had the following to say:
In 55 CJS 85, Mandamus § 51, we find the following:
In State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or 413, 422, 255 P2d 1055, we said:
4. It will be noted from the writ that on May 3 and May 9, 1956, the District Attorney moved the circuit court for Lane county to discharge said grand jury for the reason that it was illegally constituted and that on May 9, the Honorable Dal M. King, circuit judge of the second judicial district, overruled said motion. We take judicial notice that Judge King acted within his jurisdictional rights inasmuch as the second judicial district, of which he is judge, embraces Lane county. So far as the writ is concerned, Judge King's ruling on the motion disposed of it and there is not now, nor has there been since entry of such order, any motion or proceeding pending in Lane county requesting Judge Reid to discharge the April grand jury.
This proceeding instituted by the District Attorney is indeed unique and without parallel in the annals of the jurisprudence of this state. Every mandamus proceeding in this court involving a circuit judge, so far as we have been able to ascertain, unlike the instant matter, has sprung from some proceeding theretofore pending before a circuit judge against whom a coercive writ of mandamus is sought. The previous cases of *626 that character have been ones where it has been claimed that the judge has refused to act on a matter pending in his court, where it was his positive duty to act, as in State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, supra, or wherein he has acted in such a proceeding erroneously and without authority of law, as in Pardee v. Latourette, 168 Or 584, 125 P2d 750.
5. It is asserted on behalf of the District Attorney that the circuit court has the inherent power and general constitutional and statutory duty to discharge unlawfully selected grand juries and it is argued in effect that Judge Reid should have, with his knowledge of the illegally constituted grand jury, sua sponte, discharged the same and that, having failed to perform this act which the law requires him to perform, mandamus will lie.
This argument is indeed novel, but, in our opinion, is not tenable for the reason that ORS 34.110, supra, permits a mandamus writ to be issued "to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins." (Italics ours) No law has been called to our attention which specially enjoins Judge Reid to discharge the April grand jury.
We pointed out in the case of United States of America v. Cohn, supra, that there must be a "plain, legal duty on the part of the defendant to perform the act" irrespective of the rule which confines us to a consideration of the allegations of the alternative writ. That there is no legal duty on the part of Judge Reid to perform the act for which he is mandamused, to-wit, a discharge of the April grand jury, is manifest for very cogent reasons now to be stated.
6, 7. By reason of the personal attack that was made upon him as disclosed by the writ of mandamus, Judge Reid was not qualified, nor is he now qualified, *627 as a matter of law, to adjudicate the question of the legality of the formation of the April grand jury. The principle is as old as the law itself that a person cannot judge his own case. We quote from 30 Am Jur 771, Judges § 56, as follows:
We have a statute covering this matter, ORS 14.210, which reads as follows:
In the case of Archerd v. Burk, 148 Or 444, 451, 36 P2d 338, it appears that Judge McMahan in a criminal case in Marion county, disqualified himself to try the case because of his friendship with the defendant. Judge Walker of an adjoining county was called in and heard the case. In regard to the propriety and right of Judge McMahan to disqualify himself, we said:
See Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 208 F2d 842.
The writ discloses that the motion of the District Attorney challenging Judge Reid's action relating to the grand jury and asking for its discharge was, as we have previously noted, heard and ruled upon by Judge King. It is obvious that the hearing was held before Judge King because Judge Reid had voluntarily and necessarily disqualified himself to hear the matter, first, because of his knowledge of and deference to the controlling provisions of ORS 14.210, supra, and secondly, and independently of that statute, because, as a proper sense of his ethical duty in the premises. That Judge Reid had at least acted in obedience to ORS 14.210 is a fair presumption justified by ORS *629 41.360 on disputable presumptions and particularly subsection 15 thereof providing that an "official duty has been regularly performed" and subsection 34 that "the law has been obeyed." (Although not a matter of official record before us, nevertheless, we think it is appropriate here to observe that during the course of the oral argument, the District Attorney, in response to a question from the court, conceded that Judge Reid had actually disqualified himself from a hearing of any matter relating to or emanating from the April grand jury, and that those matters had been assigned to Judge King for hearing and determination.)
8. Judge Reid is prevented by virtue of the law from acting in the matter because Judge King had previously and on the District Attorney's motion adjudicated the question of the validity of the April grand jury. For us to order Judge Reid to take the action suggested in the writ would be to order him to violate the provisions of a specific statute, action, which it is manifest, we are not authorized to take. ORS 16.740 is as follows:
9. We find the following language in 55 CJS 116, Mandamus § 69, to-wit:
*630 See 35 Am Jur 28, Mandamus § 256.
A case somewhat analogous to the present case is Rutkowski v. St. Sure, 143 F2d 715. It appears that Rutkowski filed a mandamus proceeding with the circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, to compel Judge St. Sure, a district judge, to hear a habeas corpus matter. The court over which Judge St. Sure presides consists of four judges. The habeas corpus petition which was originally filed with Judge St. Sure was assigned to Judge Goodman and a hearing on the petition was had before him with Rutkowski's attorney participating. Judge Goodman disallowed the petition. The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Stephens, held that the assignment of the petition for hearing to Judge Goodman was proper and its disposition on the merits rendered the judgment valid. The mandamus proceedings to require Judge St. Sure to again pass on the matter was dismissed.
10. It is universally understood by students of jurisprudence that the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is not a favorite of the law and may only be employed in a clear case where the law specially enjoins a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
We quote from the language of Mr. Justice BURNETT in McCarger v. Moore, 89 Or 597, 599, 175 P 77, as follows:
11. Thus, it is observed that the Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, circumscribed in its powers by constitution and statute. By the constitution we are given original jurisdiction in mandamus, habeas corpus and quo warranto and other than this, by virtue of Article VII, § 6 of the constitution, we "have jurisdiction only to revise the final decisions of the circuit courts." In exercising the power of mandamus, we are controlled by ORS 34.110, which permits us to compel a judge to perform an act which the law "specially enjoins."
12. Mandamus, while classified as a legal remedy in the nature of an action at law, is in fact a special proceeding, the requirements of which differ from the pleading and practice prescribed for ordinary actions. See Buell v. Jefferson County Court, 175 Or 402, 152 P2d 578.
In speaking of the writ, Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, in State ex rel. v. Duncan, 191 Or 475, 491, 230 P2d 773, had the following to say:
13. In any event, the District Attorney does not ask us to compel Judge Reid to merely act in the matter we are concerned with, but to act in a particular manner, that is, to discharge the Lane county April grand jury. If we were permitted to accede to his request, we would be interfering with Judge Reid's judicial discretion, in violation of the statute on mandamus which was so ably construed by Mr. Justice ROSSMAN *633 in the Duncan case, and contrary to our holding in the case of State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, supra, in which we said mandamus will never lie to compel a court to decide a matter within its discretion in any particular way.
14-16. It is evident from the limitations thus imposed, and contrary to popular understanding, that this court can not be looked to as a dispenser of panaceas for all the ills of the commonwealth, nor are we authorized to sabotage well established principles of law and practice for the sake of assumed expediency. No court is authorized to construe law to fit each individual case as it arises. If it attempted such, the orderly administration of justice, according to the well established rules adopted to protect the public, would cease and chaos would reign.
17, 18. Every lawyer should know our ruling on the demurrer is not a ruling on the truth or falsity of the allegations found in the writ respecting the conduct of Judge Reid. Every lawyer should also know that nothing here said is res judicata as to the merits of the controversy and that our action in the premises does not foreclose a proper inquiry when brought in a proper proceeding against the proper parties. Responsibility for any delay in a final disposition of the matters referred to in the writ rests in the authors of the petition and not upon this court.
The District Attorney, in an effort to rid Lane county of the April grand jury, filed a motion with the circuit court of the county to effectuate such purpose. The matter came on regularly for hearing before Judge King, with no objection, so far as the record discloses, on the part of the District Attorney or anyone else. According to the allegations of the writ, Judge King acted adversely to the District Attorney's contentions. *634 We are not advised by the writ as to the reasons given by Judge King for his adverse ruling. We do not know whether his ruling involved a consideration and determination of the facts, or whether it involved only a question of law. If it involved a consideration and determination of the facts, then such determination could not possibly be reached in this court by mandamus. If it involved a consideration and determination of a matter of law only, and it was made to appear that a positive rule of law applied to the undisputed facts and that the court erroneously construed the law, then mandamus would lie. If Judge King made an error in his decision that could be reached by mandamus, the District Attorney had a clear and perfect right to apply to this court for relief, making Judge King a party-defendant. This he did not do but engaged in an expedition wholly without precedent and contrary to law. For the reasons stated, the demurrer is sustained and the writ will be quashed.
LUSK, J., with whom ROSSMAN and BRAND, JJ., concur, dissenting.
The alternative writ, after alleging certain illegal practices on the part of the defendant and others in the selection of the jury list from which the grand jury was drawn, commands that "you, after the receipt of this Writ, do discharge the Grand Jury for the County of Lane empaneled on April 26, 1956 or that you show cause" for not having done so.
Among the charges in the writ is the following:
It is also alleged that the names of approximately 64 persons were submitted to a deputy county clerk by seven individuals to be placed upon the 1956 jury list, that said deputy county clerk arbitrarily placed said names upon the 1956 jury list, and that a member of the grand jury is a person whose name was thus submitted.
Other illegal acts are alleged, but for present purposes they need not be specifically referred to. The charges which we have set forth, if true, show a violation of ORS 10.080, which reads:
The defendant, by his demurrer, admits the truth of all the allegations of the writ which are well pleaded, including the charge that he himself violated the statute which we have quoted. If these things be true, then we are dealing with a packed jury and a circuit judge who is a party to the packing. Were the demurrer to be overruled the defendant would have the right to answer the charges. If he should fail to deny them, *636 or if he should deny them but the evidence should sustain them, in either case we see no reason why this court should not exercise the power conferred upon it by the Constitution to put an end to an intolerable situation by issuing its writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to discharge this illegal grand jury. We can see many reasons why this court should do so, among which may be mentioned the following: First, our duty to defend the integrity of the jury system; second, the great public inconvenience which may result from an illegally constituted grand jury, the validity of whose indictments will be open to question; third, the reasonable apprehension that a packed grand jury might refuse to indict where it should indict.
If these charges be true, then the defendant has a duty which "the law specially enjoins" (ORS 34.110) to discharge this illegal grand jury. Here is no question of controlling judicial discretion. The defendant, as presiding judge of the Lane County Circuit Court, has no discretion to keep this grand jury another day or another hour. The duty resting upon him is one that he cannot disqualify himself to perform, and the fact that there is no statute specifically prescribing the duty is beside the point. No statute required the defendant judge in State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or 413, 255 P2d 1055, 38 ALR2d 720, on which the majority rely, to determine whether the relator, under indictment for a misdemeanor, was entitled to a change of venue. The statute involved withheld that power from the court in a misdemeanor case and was declared unconstitutional  wrongly, as I thought and still think,  by this court. The duty here arises as a consequence of the violation of statutes governing the selection of the jury. It is the duty of a judicial officer to enforce the law which he has sworn to uphold.
*637 The majority opinion betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of this proceeding. It was not instituted for the purpose of compelling the defendant to decide anything, much less to decide something in a particular way. All the learning in the majority opinion employed to demonstrate that a judge may not sit in his own case  about which there can be no dispute  is therefore irrelevant.
This is not a case in which it is sought to compel the circuit judge to try a law suit in which he is personally interested. This is a law suit between the state of Oregon, as plaintiff, and Judge Reid, as defendant, in which the state seeks a writ of mandamus commanding the defendant, in the exercise of one of his administrative functions, to discharge a ministerial duty. It is this court, not the defendant, that is asked to determine the question whether the grand jury for Lane County is an illegal grand jury. Were there an issue of fact here, this court, not the defendant, would have to determine the facts. Since there is only an issue of law arising on a demurrer and the admitted facts disclose the nature of the defendant's duty, the demurrer should be overruled and the defendant permitted to answer the writ.
What has already been said sufficiently shows that the majority's reliance on ORS 16.740 is misplaced. The purpose of that statute is to prevent a litigant, whose motion has been passed on unfavorably by one circuit judge, from applying to another circuit judge for the allowance of the same motion. The section cannot be so construed as to deprive this court of its power to compel action which the law enjoins, even though it be action by a circuit judge and a different circuit judge has refused to take such action.