Title: Randy William Davis v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR01-678
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2002

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 7, 2002 RANDY WILLIAM DAVIS APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE CR 01-678 AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARK COUNTY, NO. CR-2000-55 HONORABLE JOHN THOMAS, CIRCUIT JUDGE AFFIRMED Appellant, Randy William Davis, pleaded guilty to nine counts of theft of property. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, appellant received a total sentence of sixty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. After a hearing, the circuit court denied appellant's petition. This appeal followed. When a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings are those which allege that the plea was not made voluntarily and intelligently or was entered without effective assistance of counsel. Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show first that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Unless apetitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In order to show prejudice resulting from counsel's performance in the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985). Appellant argues that counsel's advice and lack of preparation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims that trial counsel was in a panic over the prospect of going to trial and that counsel told appellant he would get 180 years if he did not accept the plea. We disagree. The record reveals that appellant signed a statement in advance of his plea of guilty in which he acknowledged that counsel had explained the charges against him, that no threats or promises had been made to persuade him to enter a plea, and that he was satisfied with his attorney who had discussed the case and the plea with appellant. Appellant subsequently entered into a negotiated plea agreement. The circuit court then reviewed the negotiated plea with appellant. At the Rule 37 hearing, trial counsel testified that the plea offer had been communicated to appellant three to four weeks before the trial date. Trial counsel said that appellant did not have any qualms about the plea. Counsel also testified that he was prepared to go to trial if appellant had not wanted to accept the plea. Appellant testified at the Rule 37 hearing that he was told by counsel that there were only two options - take the plea for sixty years or go to trial and get 180 years. Appellant admitted that he signed all of the plea documents but testified that he did not understand everything to the fullest. He claimed that he was not aware of all the options available to him. The circuit court was not required to accept appellant's testimony at the Rule 37 hearing when he is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Sanders v. State, 317 Ark.328, 334, 878 S.W.2d 391, 395 (1994). Based on all of these factors and a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the circuit court's decision that counsel's representation was competent is clearly erroneous. Affirmed.