Title: State v. Glenn E. Davis
Citation: 2002 WI 75
Docket Number: 2000AP002916-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2002

2002 WI 75 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2916-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Glenn E. Davis,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 210 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 917, 634 N.W.2d 922 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Wolfgram   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by James M. Shellow and Shellow & Shellow S.C., Milwaukee, and 
Angela Kachelski and The Shellow Group, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by James M. Shellow. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 75 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2916-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 115) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Glenn E. Davis,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   Glenn 
Davis 
(Davis) 
petitioned this court to review a court of appeals' decision, 
which held that, because he intended to introduce expert 
psychological testimony at trial pursuant to State v. Richard 
A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998), he 
effectively waived his right against self-incrimination and 
could be ordered to submit to a psychological examination by a 
state-selected expert.  Richard A.P. evidence is evidence 
introduced by the defendant to show that he lacked the 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
2 
 
psychological characteristics of a sex offender and therefore 
was unlikely to have committed the charged crime. 
¶2 
We address two issues on review.  The first issue is 
whether Richard A.P. evidence is admissible at trial.  We 
conclude that such evidence may be admissible pursuant to the 
statutes governing both character evidence and expert testimony.  
The circuit court must closely scrutinize such evidence, 
however, for its relevancy, its probative value, and its 
potential for danger of unfair prejudice or confusion to the 
jury.  In this case, because the circuit court never made a 
determination as to the admissibility of the evidence, we remand 
for such a determination on this issue.   
¶3 
The second issue we address is whether, when a 
defendant notifies the state that it intends to introduce 
Richard A.P. evidence at trial, the court may compel the 
defendant to undergo a psychological examination by a state-
selected expert.  We conclude that a defendant may be compelled 
to submit to such an examination if the defendant's expert 
testifies, either implicitly or explicitly, to facts surrounding 
the crime.  In such instances, the defendant uses the expert as 
a surrogate to assert his or her own statements about facts on 
the 
crime 
and 
thereby 
waives 
the 
right 
against 
self-
incrimination.  Thus, waiver of the right in this case depends 
on the testimony of the expert; it is not waived simply by 
introducing the expert's testimony.  We therefore reverse the 
court of appeals' decision and remand for further proceedings on 
the issue of waiver as well.   
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Davis was charged in Ozaukee County Circuit Court with 
repeated 
sexual 
assault 
of 
a 
child, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025 
(1999-2000),1 
and 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  These 
charges stemmed from alleged sexual contact that he had with his 
daughter.  His daughter alleged that Davis had sexually abused 
her from the time she was four years old until she was about ten 
years old.  Following a preliminary hearing and the filing of 
the information, Davis entered not guilty pleas to these 
charges. 
¶5 
During pre-trial proceedings, Davis filed a notice 
with the court that he intended to call Dr. Bronson Levin to 
testify at trial.  Levin had interviewed Davis and conducted a 
series of psychological tests on Davis.  Davis stated that Levin 
would testify, consistent with Richard A.P., that Davis does not 
exhibit character traits consistent with a sexual disorder such 
as pedophilia and that, because Davis does not possess such 
character traits, he would have been unlikely to have committed 
any sexual assault on his daughter.  Levin would also testify on 
the data upon which his opinion is based.   
¶6 
In response, citing State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 
507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993), the State of Wisconsin (State) 
filed a motion to compel Davis to submit to a reciprocal 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
4 
 
psychological examination by an expert selected by the State.  
Davis objected, arguing that the holding in Maday did not 
require him to submit to any examination by the State and that 
such a compelled examination implicated his right against self-
incrimination. 
¶7 
The circuit court, the Honorable Thomas R. Wolfgram 
presiding, denied the State's request for a psychological 
examination of Davis by its own expert.  The court concluded 
that such an examination would violate Davis's right against 
self-incrimination.  The court reserved for future consideration 
whether Levin's expert testimony would be admissible at trial.  
The State filed a petition for leave to appeal the circuit 
court's nonfinal order.  The court of appeals granted this 
petition.   
¶8 
The court of appeals, in a published opinion, reversed 
the circuit court's order, holding that the State could compel 
Davis to submit to an examination by a psychologist selected by 
the State based on his intent to introduce Richard A.P. expert 
testimony.  State v. Davis, 2001 WI App 210, ¶1, 247 
Wis. 2d 917, 634, N.W.2d 922.  The court held that a defendant 
who presents such expert testimony places his or her mental 
status at issue and therefore waives his or her right against 
self-incrimination.  Id.  As a result, based on concerns of 
fundamental fairness to provide the State with equal access to 
the same quality of psychological evidence, the court concluded 
that the defendant could be ordered to submit to a psychological 
evaluation by an expert chosen by the State.  Id. (citing Maday, 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
5 
 
179 Wis. 2d at 357).  The court remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.  Id.  Davis requested review. 
II.  RICHARD A.P./ADMISSIBILITY OF PROFILE EVIDENCE 
¶9 
We begin by examining an issue presented in Richard 
A.P., that is, whether a defendant may present expert testimony 
to show that the defendant lacks the characteristics of a sexual 
offender and is therefore unlikely to have committed the alleged 
sexual assault.  Whether this evidence is generally admissible 
under our state's rules of evidence is a question of law that we 
decide de novo.  See State v. Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d 282, 305-06, 
361 N.W.2d 705 (1985). 
¶10 In Richard A.P., Richard was charged and convicted for 
sexual contact with a child and for intimidation of a victim.  
Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d at 779.  Before trial, Richard filed a 
motion in limine requesting permission to introduce expert 
testimony from a psychologist who had evaluated Richard.  Id. at 
790-91.  The motion alleged that the psychologist would testify 
that "'[Richard's] sexual history and his responses to specific 
testing about his sexual behavior did not show any evidence of 
any 
diagnosable 
sexual 
disorder.'" 
 
Id. 
at 
791. 
 
The 
psychologist would then testify that, absent such a diagnosable 
disorder, it is unlikely that Richard would have molested the 
child.  Id.  The circuit court denied admission of the 
psychologist's testimony because the psychologist could not say 
that the absence of any sexual disorder made it impossible for 
Richard to have committed the crime.  Id. at 791-92.  Richard 
appealed this evidentiary determination.  Id. at 779-80.  
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 On appeal, the State conceded that the circuit court's 
reason for denying admissibility was incorrect.  Id. at 792.  
Still, the State argued that the circuit court did not err in 
denying admission of this evidence because such testimony was 
not admissible character evidence.  Id.  The court of appeals 
concluded otherwise, holding that such evidence was relevant and 
admissible under the rule governing expert testimony "operating 
in tandem" with the rule governing character evidence.  Id. at 
795.   
¶12 In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked to 
the law governing expert testimony.  It noted that expert 
testimony is admissible "'if it is relevant' and if it will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue."  Id. at 791 (citation omitted).  The 
court concluded that the expert's testimony in its case was 
admissible 
because 
it 
would 
have 
assisted 
the 
jury 
in 
determining whether Richard committed the charged offense by 
providing 
expert 
opinion 
on 
the 
likelihood 
that 
Richard 
committed the crime in light of his psychological profile.  Id. 
at 792.  
¶13 The court also examined the law governing character 
evidence, which allows the defendant to present evidence of any 
pertinent trait of his or her character.  Id. at 792-93.  Such 
evidence, it noted, could be presented through testimony as to 
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.  Id. at 
793.  Richard sought to introduce his expert testimony in order 
to show that he did not exhibit character traits consistent with 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
7 
 
a sexual disorder.  The court noted that such expert testimony 
had been used in other cases to inform jurors of the behavior 
profiles of the victims of crimes.  Id. at 793-94 (citing State 
v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 657-58, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990) 
(the court suggested that profile evidence pertaining to 
battered woman's syndrome may be admissible if supported by 
expert testimony); King v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 26, 38-39, 248 
N.W.2d 458 (1977) (the court ruled that expert opinion testimony 
concerning 
the 
defendant's 
general 
character 
trait 
of 
nonhostility and nonaggressiveness was admissible)).  The court 
upheld the admissibility and relevancy of the evidence. 
¶14 The State contends that Richard A.P. should be 
overturned because this type of evidence has low probative value 
and is substantially outweighed by dangers presented by this 
evidence.  It argues that only two other states have allowed 
such evidence, see People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989), 
and Nolte v. State, 854 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), and 
that a majority of other states have excluded such evidence, in 
some instances because of its low probative value, see, e.g., 
State v. Floray, 715 A.2d 855 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997).  Based on 
this low probative value and the inherent dangers involved, the 
State urges us to follow cases in which the court has excluded 
evidence on public policy grounds.  See State v. Peters, 192 
Wis. 2d 674, 689 n.8, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing two 
examples of such public policy determinations:  State v. Dean, 
103 
Wis. 2d 228, 
307 
N.W.2d 628 
(1981) 
(prohibiting 
the 
admission of polygraph test results in criminal cases) and 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
8 
 
Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980) (expert 
psychiatric testimony regarding a defendant's capacity to form 
intent held inadmissible when based on the defendant's mental 
health history)).  The State argues that a case-by-case 
determination on admissibility should be avoided because it 
would be too burdensome and would outweigh any probative value 
of the evidence.   
¶15 We conclude that a blanket restriction on Richard A.P. 
evidence is unwarranted.  Discretion to admit or exclude such 
evidence remains with the circuit court.  We agree with the 
conclusions reached by the court of appeals in Richard A.P. and 
specifically adopt its reasoning.   
¶16 The rules on character evidence and expert testimony 
allow for the admissibility of Richard A.P. evidence.  Under our 
rules 
of 
evidence, 
a 
defendant 
may 
introduce 
"pertinent 
trait[s]" 
of 
his 
or 
her 
character 
as 
evidence.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(a).  "Pertinent" refers to the relevance 
of the traits.  7 Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Wisconsin 
Evidence § 404.4, at 133 (2d ed. 2001).  Thus, like all 
admissible evidence, character evidence must be relevant to the 
facts at issue.  Relevancy has two facets:  (1) the evidence 
must relate to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action and (2) the evidence must have 
probative value, that is, a tendency to establish those 
consequential propositions.  Id. at § 401.1 at 82.  A defendant 
may introduce such relevant character evidence through opinion 
testimony.  Wis. Stat. § 904.05(1).   
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
9 
 
¶17 Expert 
testimony 
is 
permitted 
when 
specialized 
knowledge 
will 
assist 
the 
trier 
of 
fact. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  Again, relevancy of the testimony is an 
essential requirement for the admissibility of such expert 
testimony.  Blinka, supra, § 702.2, at 473.  In addition, 
admissibility 
of 
the 
expert 
testimony 
depends 
on 
the 
qualifications of the expert and the usefulness of the testimony 
to the trier of fact.  Id.  The testimony is useful if it will 
assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  
¶18 Davis's expert will allegedly testify to the general 
character traits of sexual offenders, the tests used to 
determine whether an individual possesses such character traits, 
his findings on whether Davis possesses such character traits, 
and, based on these results, the likelihood that Davis committed 
the sexual assault.  Such traits regarding the defendant's 
propensity to commit sexual assault are pertinent traits of his 
character.  This evidence relates to a consequential fact, that 
is, whether the defendant committed sexual misconduct with a 
child.  Further, this evidence has probative value in sexual 
assault cases, where there is often no neutral witness to the 
assault and there is seldom any physical evidence implicating 
the defendant.  Such profile evidence may be extremely important 
to the defense.  Such testimony may also be useful to the trier 
of fact, helping it to determine a fact in issue, that is, 
whether 
the 
defendant 
committed 
the 
crime, 
by 
showing 
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's innocence.   
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
10 
 
¶19 Indeed, as the State contends, such evidence is not 
typical character evidence.  This evidence must be presented 
through expert testimony due to the specialized nature of the 
character profiles.  Typically, character witnesses will consist 
of lay witnesses who testify to the defendant's character in the 
community based on their knowledge of the defendant prior to the 
commission of the crime.  However, the statutory language 
contains broad language to include all "pertinent trait[s]" of 
the defendant's character, regardless of whether this character 
evidence is founded on knowledge prior to the alleged assault or 
based on tests conducted after criminal charges have been filed.  
Further, 
Wisconsin 
has 
traditionally 
provided 
broad 
admissibility to expert testimony.  State v. St. George, 2002 WI 
50, ¶39, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 643 N.W.2d 777.   
¶20 The State warns that allowing such evidence leads to a 
"battle of experts" on an issue that is not central to the case. 
However, a battle between experts is a frequent occurrence in 
criminal cases where specialized knowledge on a relevant issue 
is required.  In such cases, Richard A.P. evidence may be highly 
relevant.  We therefore find this argument unpersuasive.   
¶21 The State also asserts that such expert testimony 
wastes the jury's time and may mislead the jury into thinking 
that reasonable doubt is present because the defendant lacks the 
character traits of a sexual offender.  However, the fact that 
the defendant may not possess the relevant character traits of a 
sexual offender will not necessarily lead to an impermissible 
inference of reasonable doubt.  We entrust the circuit court to 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
11 
 
act as gatekeepers to unduly prejudicial evidence in this 
respect, and when admitted, we conclude that juries, in light of 
an instruction from the court, will afford the proper weight to 
such evidence on character traits which is admitted to show 
circumstantial evidence that the defendant is not guilty.  We 
recognize that impermissible inferences may be more likely to 
occur in instances where the expert testifies that, based on his 
or her lack of character traits of a sexual offender, the 
defendant is unlikely to have committed the crime.  It therefore 
must be emphasized that the circuit court retains discretion in 
admitting such evidence and must carefully scrutinize such 
Richard 
A.P. 
expert 
testimony 
in 
each 
case 
for 
its 
admissibility.   
¶22 Finally, the State warns that such evidence should be 
inadmissible because it lacks reliability.  Sexual offenders, 
the State asserts, are such a heterogeneous group and share so 
few characteristics that such evidence will not help the jury.  
Further, they contend that there are no psychological tests that 
can accurately determine whether a person will or will not 
sexually abuse a child.  As Davis points out however, in 
Wisconsin, the reliability of expert testimony is an issue for 
the trier of fact, not the circuit court as a predicate for 
admissibility.  Peters, 192 Wis. 2d at 690.  Reliability of 
expert testimony is something that is subject to challenge on 
cross-examination in Wisconsin.  Id.  The trier of fact must 
then determine the reliability of such evidence in light of 
differing opinions by experts.  See Dean, 103 Wis. 2d at 262.  
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
12 
 
For this reason, we leave any determination on reliability of 
such evidence to the trier of fact.   
¶23 Other jurisdictions limit Richard A.P.-type evidence 
based most often on its reliability.  See, e.g., State v. 
Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026-29 (N.J. 1982); but see, Floray, 
715 A.2d at 859-60 (courts also often limit such evidence based 
on its own state rules governing character evidence).  The test 
in Wisconsin, however, is one of relevance, and under our state 
rules, we find that such evidence may be admissible.  Our 
decision is supported by California decisions, which also 
similarly find such evidence may be admissible as character 
evidence.  See Stoll, 783 P.2d at 707.   
¶24 In 
closing, 
we 
note 
that 
the 
legal 
support 
underpinning Richard A.P.——in particular King—— provides support 
for the conclusion that Richard A.P. evidence may be admissible.  
In King, the defendant, charged with first-degree murder, 
introduced expert psychological testimony to show that the 
defendant was not suffering from any mental disorder and that 
the criminal act was inconsistent with his nonaggressive 
personality.  King, 75 Wis. 2d at 34-35.  The court concluded 
that this expert opinion testimony, relating to the defendant's 
character, 
was 
admissible 
under 
the 
rules 
for 
character 
evidence.  Id. at 38-39.   
¶25 The State argues that the King decision is difficult 
to reconcile with this court's holding in Steele.  Steele, 
however, was a narrow holding.  See Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d at 302.  
In Steele, this court concluded that a defendant may not present 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
13 
 
expert testimony on the defendant's mental capacity to form 
criminal intent when based on the defendant's mental health 
history.  Steele, 97 Wis. 2d at 97-98.  The evidence presented 
in this case is distinguishable.  Here, the evidence is not 
introduced to show that the defendant lacked the mental capacity 
to form the criminal intent required.  See United States v. 
Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 710-11 (5th Cir. 1980).  The character 
evidence introduced in this case is used as circumstantial 
evidence to show the unlikelihood that he committed the crime.  
As a result, we conclude that Steele does not limit our decision 
in this case. 
¶26 On the whole, we conclude that Richard A.P. evidence 
may be introduced by a defendant in some cases consistent with 
Wisconsin rules of evidence as discussed above.  In this case, 
however, no ruling has been made as to the admissibility of 
Levin's testimony.  For this reason, even though such evidence 
may be admissible, the matter must be remanded for the circuit 
court's determination.   
III.  COMPULSORY EXAMINATION/RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
¶27 Having determined that Richard A.P. evidence may be 
admissible in some cases, the next issue is whether a defendant 
who intends to introduce Richard A.P. evidence may be compelled 
to undergo an examination from a state-selected expert without 
violating the defendant's right against self-incrimination.   
¶28 The State argues that a defendant who intends to 
introduce Richard A.P. expert testimony waives his or her right 
against self-incrimination by placing his or her mental status 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
14 
 
at issue.  The State argues that this waiver derives from the 
fact that the expert's testimony is based on statements that the 
defendant has made to the expert and that the expert's testimony 
essentially amounts to the defendant's introduction of his or 
her own statements of the crime charged——thereby waiving the 
right against self-incrimination.  As a result, the State 
asserts that a reciprocal compelled examination by an expert 
selected by the State is appropriate and the only fair and 
effective way for it to counter the defendant's introduction of 
Richard A.P. evidence.  The State acknowledges that its use of 
this evidence is limited——it may only use the evidence obtained 
from its own expert's psychological examination of the defendant 
to rebut the testimony of the defendant's psychological expert.  
It cannot introduce this evidence in its case-in-chief. 
¶29 The State admits that there is no case law directly on 
point for the proposition that it advances——that is, that a 
defendant 
waives 
his 
right 
against 
self-incrimination 
by 
introducing Richard A.P. profile evidence at trial, thereby 
allowing the court to order a compelled examination by the 
state.  However, it argues that there is analogous support in 
cases where courts have found a waiver of the privilege against 
self-incrimination based on the defendant's introduction of 
expert psychological testimony in support of an insanity 
defense, see State v. Hutchinson, 766 P.2d 447 (Wash. 1989); in 
support of a diminished capacity defense, Commonwealth v. 
Morley, 681 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1996); during the penalty phase of a 
trial or at sentencing, Savino v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
15 
 
(Va. 1990); and to show battered wife syndrome in support of 
self-defense claim, State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1988).  
The State admits that, unlike these cases, Davis is not claiming 
that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to commit the 
crime.  However, the State contends that the rationale from 
these 
cases 
supports 
its 
proposition——that 
is, 
that 
the 
defendant's introduction of expert psychiatric testimony on his 
or her mental status constitutes a waiver of the right against 
self-incrimination.   
¶30 Davis argues that his introduction of Richard A.P. 
expert testimony does not constitute a waiver of his right 
against self-incrimination.  He distinguishes the State's cases 
from his case.  He argues that the cases cited by the State 
mostly involve defendants who admitted to committing the crime 
charged and who introduced expert psychological testimony to 
show that they lacked the mental capacity to form the requisite 
intent to commit the crime.  In such cases, an examination can 
be compelled, Davis argues, because it is the defendant who 
injects this new issue into the case, on which the defendant 
bears the burden of proof.  In contrast, in his case, he has not 
admitted to committing the crime and is not introducing his 
expert psychological testimony to show that he lacked the 
requisite intent.  Instead, he is offering evidence to support 
his innocence on the elements of the crime, on which the State 
carries the burden of proof.  A compelled examination, he 
contends, will now allow the State to gather incriminating 
testimony from him on an element of the crime.   
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
16 
 
¶31 The court of appeals rejected Davis's distinction, 
concluding that his introduction of Richard A.P. evidence was 
essentially the same as the introduction of expert testimony to 
show lack of mental capacity to form intent.  The court stated: 
We 
are 
convinced 
that 
Davis's 
affirmative 
defense/burden of proof approach elevates form over 
substance.  See United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 
388, 390 (9th Cir. 1983).  While Davis is not 
technically asserting an affirmative defense, he is 
certainly offering a theory of defense.  We see no 
reason to distinguish the ability of the State to 
compel 
psychiatric 
testimony 
in 
response 
to 
an 
affirmative defense from the use of such testimony to 
rebut the defendant's theory of defense based on 
expert character evidence.  Both instances place the 
defendant's mental status in issue and "hinge on the 
workings of a defendant's mind at the time of the 
offense."  United States v. White, 21 F. Supp.2d 1197, 
1200 (E.D. Cal. 1998).   
Davis, 2001 WI App 210, ¶¶11, 13.2  As a result, the court of 
appeals concluded that Davis's introduction of Richard A.P. 
expert testimony, like the introduction of expert psychiatric 
testimony to prove insanity or diminished capacity, constituted 
a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination.  We do not 
reach this same conclusion.  We disagree that the mere 
introduction 
of 
such 
Richard 
A.P. 
evidence 
necessarily 
constitutes a waiver of the right against self-incrimination in 
all instances. 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals' reasoning very closely followed the 
reasoning from U.S. v. White, 21 F. Supp.2d 1197, 1200 (E.D. 
Cal. 1998), where the court held that a defense based on 
diminished capacity would be treated the same as a defense based 
on insanity for purposes of a compulsory psychiatric examination 
by the state.   
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
17 
 
 
¶32 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.  The Wisconsin Constitution provides for 
approximately the same protection.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1).   
¶33 Whether a compulsory examination is constitutionally 
permissible is a question of constitutional law that we 
ultimately decide de novo.  Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 353.  The 
circuit court's factual findings underlying any such decision 
are to be upheld unless they are contrary to the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence.  Id.   
 
¶34 In 
cases 
where 
the 
defendant 
introduces 
expert 
testimony in support of a defense related to his or her mental 
capacity, not all courts have specifically required a waiver of 
the right against self-incrimination to occur before ordering a 
compulsory examination.  See Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1988) 
(identifying two general approaches that courts have taken in 
such cases).  Some courts conclude that a compulsory examination 
is constitutionally permissible——that is, not in violation of 
the right against self-incrimination——based on the reasoning 
that the state must be afforded the same opportunity to obtain 
the same type and quality of psychological evaluation as the 
defendant when the defendant raises the issue of his or her 
mental capacity.  Id. at 238; see also U.S. v. White, 21 F. 
Supp.2d 1197, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Hutchinson, 766 P.2d at 
452-53.  The overriding concern in such cases is that the finder 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
18 
 
of fact must be given a fair and full assessment of the 
defendant's culpability when the defendant raises this issue.  
Id.   
¶35 In contrast, other courts have held that a compulsory 
examination by the state is constitutionally permissible because 
the defendant waives the privilege against self-incrimination by 
showing his or her intent to introduce expert psychiatric 
testimony in support of a defense related to his or her mental 
capacity.  Briand, 547 A.2d at 238; see also, State v. Fair, 496 
A.2d 461 (Conn. 1985); Morley, 681 A.2d 1254, Savino, 391 S.E.2d 
276.  In turn, based on this waiver and fairness considerations 
to 
the 
state, 
courts 
have 
justified 
ordering 
compulsory 
examinations. 
 
The 
Briand 
decision 
shows 
some 
courts' 
justification for finding that a waiver occurs in such cases.   
¶36 In Briand, the defendant was charged with first-degree 
murder for shooting her husband.  Briand, 547 A.2d at 236.  
Before trial, the defendant informed the state that she had 
undergone a psychological examination from her own expert and 
that she intended to present the psychologist's testimony to 
show either that she suffered from battered woman's syndrome (in 
support of a potential self-defense plea) or that she was 
provoked 
(in 
support 
of 
the 
lesser-included 
offense 
of 
manslaughter).  Id.  The court concluded that the defendant's 
mere notice of this expert testimony constituted a waiver of her 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. at 239.  The court 
explained:  
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
19 
 
Because the expert's testimony is thus predicated on 
the defendant's statements, the latter are explicitly 
or implicitly placed in evidence through the testimony 
of the expert during his direct and cross-examination.  
Since a defendant would waive his privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination if he took the stand and 
made those same statements himself, his decision to 
introduce his account of relevant facts indirectly 
through an expert witness should likewise be treated 
as a waiver obligating him to provide the same access 
to the State's expert that he has given to his own, 
and opening the door to the introduction of resulting 
State's evidence, as the State requests here, to the 
extent that he introduces comparable evidence on his 
own behalf.   
Id.  We find this reasoning persuasive.  We conclude that such 
waiver must occur in this case before the State is entitled to 
an examination of the defendant by its own expert. 
¶37 Based on the type of evidence presented in this case, 
however, we are not prepared to conclude that the defendant 
automatically waives his or her privilege simply by introducing 
Richard A.P. character profile evidence.  As Davis contends, 
Richard A.P. evidence is distinguishable from expert testimony 
related to a defendant's mental capacity to form criminal 
intent.  In particular, Richard A.P. evidence is introduced as 
character evidence, used as circumstantial evidence to show that 
the defendant did not commit the crime.  The defendant has not 
introduced this evidence to support a particular defense related 
to his mental capacity.  Therefore, we conclude that the mere 
introduction 
of 
Richard 
A.P. 
profile 
evidence 
does 
not 
constitute waiver of the right against self-incrimination.  
¶38 We are also not convinced that the state needs a 
reciprocal psychological examination in order to adequately 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
20 
 
counter such Richard A.P. character evidence.  When the expert 
testimony is introduced in support of a defense related to the  
defendant's mental capacity to form the requisite intent, the 
need for the state to counter this evidence with a reciprocal 
examination is greater because the defendant has clearly placed 
his mental capacity at issue to directly address an element of 
the crime.  Richard A.P. evidence, however, is not introduced to 
support a defense based on his mental capacity.  It is 
circumstantial evidence of his innocence.  Further, allowing a 
compelled examination to counter character evidence presents a 
great danger to the defendant that this compelled examination 
will result in incriminating testimony that the state may use in 
its case-in-chief or in rebutting this character evidence.  This 
danger outweighs any fairness considerations in favor of the 
state in such cases involving character evidence.   
¶39 Nevertheless, the State is justifiably concerned in 
this case that the introduction of Richard A.P. expert testimony 
may amount to nothing more than the defendant's own denial of 
the crime through a surrogate.  For this reason, we conclude 
that a waiver of the right against self-incrimination may result 
in some cases.   
¶40 A defendant who seeks to introduce Richard A.P. 
evidence must notify the court and the state that he or she 
intends to introduce this evidence at trial and precisely 
identify the exact testimony that the expert will provide at 
trial and the bases for the expert's opinion.  Upon this 
disclosure, the state may then bring a motion requesting the 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
21 
 
court to compel the defendant to undergo an examination by an 
expert from the state.  On this motion, the circuit court must 
then carefully examine the defendant's disclosure regarding his 
or her expert's testimony and the expert's basis for his or her 
opinion.  If this disclosure statement shows that the expert 
will either explicitly or implicitly provide testimony regarding 
relevant facts surrounding the alleged crime that amounts to the 
defendant's own denial of the crime, the court may then order 
the defendant to undergo a reciprocal examination from the state 
based on the fact that the defendant has waived his or her right 
against self-incrimination.  In this way, the defendant is 
permitted to introduce expert opinion testimony pursuant to 
Richard A.P., but restricted from introducing statements that 
amount to nothing more than the defendant's own statements on 
the crime.   
¶41 In his reply brief, Davis asserted that he did not 
intend on using the opinions of Levin as a mechanism to present 
his version of the facts of the alleged offense before the jury.  
Levin, Davis contends, would only testify to the results of 
psychological tests and to his opinions based on the results of 
these tests; Levin would not be used as a conduit.  To the 
extent that Levin will testify that he used only standardized 
tests that did not require Levin to inquire into the relevant 
facts surrounding the case, we conclude that no waiver of the 
right against self-incrimination would have occurred and the 
State is not entitled to a reciprocal examination of the 
defendant.  However, as he concedes, Davis must disclose all 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
22 
 
results of Levin's tests to the State if he introduces testimony 
from Levin.  The State may then have its own expert examine 
these tests and testify to rebut any testimony from Levin.  The 
State, we conclude, is not unfairly prejudiced by this result.  
The State is afforded sufficient means to question this evidence 
through cross-examination and through rebuttal expert testimony.   
¶42 The State contends that its need for a compulsory 
examination is based in part on the fact that the jury will give 
more weight to an expert from the defendant because his or her 
expert will have personally conducted the tests on the defendant 
and interviewed the defendant.  We do not agree with this 
assertion as it pertains to Richard A.P. expert testimony.  
Cross-examination and rebuttal expert witnesses will provide the 
State with adequate tools to counter such evidence without 
subjecting the defendant to a potentially prejudicial compelled 
examination 
by 
the 
State's 
expert. 
 
With 
appropriate 
instructions from the court, we have confidence that the finder 
of fact will give fair weight to this evidence, even though the 
State has not conducted personal interviews with the defendant. 
¶43 At oral argument, Davis proposed a different solution 
to this case:  a jury instruction.  He argued that, instead of 
allowing the State to conduct its own examination of the 
defendant, we should instead implement a rule where, if the 
defendant's 
expert 
testifies 
to 
facts 
learned 
from 
the 
defendant, the circuit court should instruct the jury not to 
accept as true the facts that the expert testified to pertaining 
to the defendant, unless they were supported by the testimony of 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
23 
 
others with personal knowledge of those facts.  An analogous 
solution was implemented in California; however, there the 
state's expert is allowed to examine the defendant and, when the 
state's expert testifies, the court instructs the jury not to 
regard as true any of the state's expert's statement of the 
facts on which the expert's opinion is based.  See People v. 
Danis, 107 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).  We have 
given full consideration to all potential options and conclude 
that the solution adopted above best serves all interests in 
cases 
where 
Richard 
A.P. 
evidence 
is 
presented, 
without 
compromising 
fairness 
to 
the 
state 
and 
constitutional 
protections of the defendant, but still allowing a full inquiry 
into the facts by the jury.   
¶44 Finally, we address State ex rel. LaFollette v. 
Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967), upon which Davis 
relies.  Raskin established a bifurcated trial system for 
defendants pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.  In that 
case, the defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty 
by reason of insanity to charges of armed robbery and burglary.  
Id. at 612.  In light of his insanity plea, he was required to 
undergo a statutorily-mandated psychiatric examination from a 
court-appointed expert.  Id. at 613, 618-19.  The Raskin court 
concluded that the defendant's submission to the statutorily-
mandated psychiatric examination did not constitute a waiver of 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. at 622.  Accordingly, 
the state was prohibited from introducing the results from this 
examination during the guilt phase of the trial.   
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
24 
 
¶45 Following Raskin, Davis argues that he cannot be 
forced to undergo a compulsory examination by the State simply 
by introducing expert testimony on his lack of any sexual 
disorder.  He argues that, in such instances, following Raskin, 
he still retains his right against self-incrimination.  Raskin, 
however, does not restrict the state's ability to obtain 
compulsory examinations.  Instead, its holding restricts the 
prosecution, in light of a defendant's right against self-
incrimination, from using incriminating statements obtained 
during a compulsory examination during the guilt phase of trial.  
Nothing in Raskin restricts the court from ordering a compulsory 
examination when the defendant effectively waives his right 
against self-incrimination by introducing his or her own 
statements through a surrogate at the guilt phase of trial.  We 
therefore conclude that Raskin is distinguishable.  We conclude, 
however, that the State is restricted to using any evidence 
obtained from a compulsory examination only in rebutting 
defendant's expert testimony.  See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 
U.S. 402, 422-23 (1987).   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶46 In sum, we conclude that a defendant may introduce 
expert testimony to show that he or she lacks the character 
traits of a sexual offender and that therefore he or she is 
unlikely to have committed the assault in question.  Such 
evidence is admissible, however, subject to the discretion of 
the circuit court.  We also conclude that the court may compel 
the defendant to undergo a compulsory examination conducted by 
No. 
00-2916-CR   
 
25 
 
an expert selected by the state in certain instances when such 
evidence is introduced.  The court may only order such 
examinations, however, when the expert will testify, either 
explicitly or implicitly, on facts surrounding the crime 
charged.  In this case, we remand to the circuit court to (1) 
determine the admissibility of the defendant's expert testimony 
in this case and (2) determine whether this testimony will 
constitute a waiver of the right against self-incrimination, 
allowing the court to order the defendant to submit to an 
examination from an expert selected by the State.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded.  
 
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶47 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent in order to address two issues.  First, although I agree 
with the majority opinion that Richard A.P. evidence is 
admissible, it should be noted that its admissibility is 
premised on the unique nature of many sexual assault trials, and 
we should caution Wisconsin courts that the use of character 
profile evidence should not be extended to other situations.  
Second, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the mere 
introduction of Richard A.P. evidence does not constitute a 
waiver of the right against self-incrimination.  I respectfully 
dissent because I would affirm the court of appeals’ conclusion 
that “a defendant who offers expert testimony to show he or she 
lacks the psychological profile of a sex offender puts his or 
her mental status at issue and thereby waives the right against 
self-incrimination.”  State v. Davis, 2001 WI App 210, ¶20, 247 
Wis. 2d 917, 634 N.W.2d 922.   
¶48 I reluctantly agree with the majority’s conclusion 
that Richard A.P. evidence is admissible at a trial on sexual 
assault 
charges. 
 
The 
majority’s 
strongest 
argument 
for 
admission of the defendant’s character profile evidence is that 
such evidence “may be extremely important to the defense.”  
Majority op. at ¶18.  As the majority recognizes, at a trial on 
sexual assault charges there is often no neutral witness and 
seldom any physical evidence; thus, the focus becomes a 
credibility battle.  Id.  Due to this unique nature of many 
sexual assault cases, Richard A.P. evidence may become extremely 
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
2 
 
important for the defense, because it will help to bolster the 
defendant’s credibility.  Using Richard A.P. evidence outside 
the scope of a sexual assault case, however, potentially 
emasculates the evidence code’s rule that character evidence is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted 
in 
conformity 
therewith 
on 
a 
particular 
occasion. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1).  New situations should be dealt with and 
examined on a case-by-case basis.3  Consistent with this 
reasoning, therefore, we should caution Wisconsin courts that 
the holding here does not amount to an endorsement of the use of 
character profile evidence outside of sexual assault cases.  
Accordingly, I agree with the majority’s holding regarding the 
admissibility of Richard A.P. evidence in sexual assault cases, 
but I would caution that Richard A.P. evidence is not admissible 
generally in all situations. 
¶49 In Part III of the majority opinion, I respectfully 
disagree with the majority’s characterization of Richard A.P. 
evidence, and the test created to determine whether such 
evidence constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right against 
                                                 
3  I acknowledge that in King v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 26, 248 
N.W.2d 458 (1977), which the majority relies on, the defendant 
introduced expert psychological testimony, in the form of 
character evidence, to show that the alleged criminal act, 
murder, was inconsistent with his nonaggressive personality.  I 
note, however, that at issue in that case was not the 
admissibility 
of 
the 
expert 
testimony, 
but 
the 
rebuttal 
testimony of the State concerning specific prior violent acts of 
the defendant.  Accordingly, I emphasize that new situations 
should be examined on a case-by-case basis because our holding 
here does not amount to an endorsement of the use of character 
profile evidence in all situations. 
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
3 
 
self-incrimination. 
 
The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
the 
introduction of Richard A.P. evidence——expert testimony that the 
defendant lacks the characteristics of a sexual offender and is 
therefore unlikely to have committed the alleged sexual assault—
—does not amount to waiver of the defendant’s right against self 
incrimination, because it is not introduced to support a 
particular defense related to the defendant’s mental capacity.  
Majority op. at ¶37.  Heeding the State’s concern that the 
expert testimony may amount to surrogate testimony of the 
defendant’s denial of the assault, however, the majority crafts 
a test to determine if proposed Richard A.P. evidence waives the 
defendant’s right against self-incrimination: 
If this disclosure statement [describing the proposed 
Richard A.P. testimony] shows that the expert will 
either explicitly or implicitly provide testimony 
regarding relevant facts surrounding the alleged crime 
that amounts to the defendant’s own denial of the 
crime, the court may then order the defendant to 
undergo a reciprocal examination from the [S]tate 
based on the fact that the defendant has waived his or 
her right against self-incrimination. 
Id. at ¶40. 
¶50 I disagree with the majority’s test because it is 
unnecessary and premised on a narrow, and in my view, incorrect, 
characterization of Richard A.P. evidence.  Furthermore, the 
test addresses only whether the expert’s testimony amounts to 
surrogate statements on behalf of the defendant, and ignores the 
impact on the defendant’s right against self incrimination of 
what I conclude is the core of Richard A.P. evidence, the 
character profile.   
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
4 
 
¶51 Narrowly interpreted, the majority correctly states 
that Richard A.P. evidence does not support a defense related to 
mental capacity.  However, it is evidence that, at least 
implicitly, goes to the defendant’s lack of mental infirmity and 
that it is unlikely that without such mental infirmity the 
defendant would have committed the alleged assault.  Richard 
A.P. evidence, by definition, is expert testimony based on an 
examination of the defendant, concluding that the defendant 
lacks the personality characteristics of a sexual offender and 
is, therefore, unlikely to have committed the alleged sexual 
assault.  This personality profile testimony goes directly to 
the defendant’s sexual experiences, preferences, and attitudes, 
which puts a defendant’s mental status at issue.  While I agree 
with the majority that this character evidence is circumstantial 
evidence of the defendant’s innocence, unlike the majority, I do 
not draw such a fine, and often difficult, line between mental 
capacity and mental infirmity.  By its nature, therefore, I 
conclude that Richard A.P. evidence puts the defendant’s mental 
status at issue, and use of such evidence thereby waives the 
defendant’s right against self-incrimination. 
¶52 I find further support for this conclusion in two 
cases the court of appeals relied on in drawing the same 
conclusion, United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 
1989), and United States v. White, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. 
Cal. 1998).  In Kessi, the court concluded that the government 
was properly allowed to introduce rebuttal expert witness 
psychiatric testimony to counter the defendant’s psychiatric 
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
5 
 
testimony, because the defendant had opened the door by raising 
the issue of mental status.  868 F.2d at 1108.  Similarly, in 
White, the court concluded that it was proper to compel 
examination of the defendant by the government’s expert witness, 
because the defendant injected the diminished capacity defense.  
21 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.  The court stated:  “The Fifth Amendment 
does not bar the government’s ability to access the same type of 
evidence, and a fair and effective criminal process requires 
that the government ‘be able to follow where [the defendant] has 
led.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1114 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).  I agree with the court of appeals’ analogy 
to Kessi and White that when a defendant is asserting his or her 
innocence on the basis of a lack of mental infirmity, “he opens 
the door to [S]tate compelled evaluation by injecting evidence 
of a character trait for sexual deviancy into the trial.”  
Davis, 2001 WI App 210, ¶13.  “It simply does not matter for 
Fifth Amendment purposes whether [the defendant] is using this 
evidence as part of an affirmative defense or attempting to 
persuade the jury as to an element of the offense upon which the 
government has the burden of proof.”  Id.   
¶53 Furthermore, I agree with the court of appeals’ 
application of State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 
(Ct. App. 1993), to this situation.  Rather than allow the State 
to have its own examination, the majority opinion simply 
provides the results of the defense expert’s tests to the 
State’s expert.  I respectfully disagree that cross-examination 
and rebuttal expert witness testimony based only on examination 
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
6 
 
of test results is sufficient to counter the defendant’s Richard 
A.P. evidence.  Based on fundamental fairness, the State is 
entitled to reciprocal discovery, and applying Maday, I conclude 
that the only effective rebuttal of psychiatric or psychological 
opinion testimony is contradictory psychiatric or psychological 
opinion testimony.  I agree with the majority and the court of 
appeals, however, that the State’s use of its expert testimony 
regarding the defendant’s mental status must be for the sole 
purpose of rebutting the Richard A.P. evidence.  It should not 
be allowed in the State’s case-in-chief. 
¶54 Applied here, Davis has waived his right against self-
incrimination by clearly stating the intent to introduce Dr. 
Levin’s expert testimony.  The proposed testimony is that Davis 
does not exhibit character traits consistent with a sexual 
disorder such as pedophilia, and because of his character 
profile, it would have been unlikely that he committed any 
sexual assault on his daughter.  Davis is using Dr. Levin’s 
testimony to claim innocence by lack of mental infirmity; thus, 
he puts his mental state at issue, and has, therefore, waived 
his right against self-incrimination.  Consequently, the court, 
upon the State’s motion, can compel Davis to submit to an 
examination by an expert for the State.  As the court of appeals 
recognized, however, if Davis changes his mind and foregoes the 
Richard A.P. testimony by Dr. Levin, then the prosecution is 
barred from introducing any evidence from the compelled exam. 
¶55 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
7 
 
¶56 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  00-2916.npc 
 
 
 
1