Title: Jace C. Schmelzer v. James P. Murphy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001096-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1996

No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  95-1096-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin 
ex rel. Jace C. Schmelzer, 
 
 
Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
James P. Murphy, Warden,  
Green Bay Correctional Institution, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAY 22, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
PETITION for writ of habeas corpus.  Writ granted; rights 
declared. 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.  This case is before the court on review 
of a decision of the court of appeals denying a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Jace C. Schmelzer (Schmelzer) petitioned this court for a 
writ of habeas corpus alleging that his former appellate counsel 
was ineffective in failing to file a timely petition for review of 
an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals affirming his 
conviction for second-degree sexual assault.  This court ordered 
the petition transferred to the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals concluded that it did not have the authority to order this 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
2 
court to consider a petition for review, and thus denied the writ 
of habeas corpus.  See State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 195 
Wis. 2d 1, 535 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1995).  The issue in this case 
is whether there is a statutory right to counsel in the 
preparation of a petition for review to this court.  We conclude 
that there is such a right to counsel, and that Schmelzer's 
counsel performed deficiently in failing to timely file his 
petition for review.  However, we also conclude that the deficient 
performance did not prejudice Schmelzer's defense because his 
petition for review would not have been granted by this court.  We 
therefore do not grant Schmelzer the relief he requested in his 
writ of habeas corpus. 
 
Following a jury trial, Schmelzer was convicted of one count 
of second-degree sexual assault and sentenced to ten years in 
prison.  Schmelzer appealed his conviction, arguing that the 
circuit court erroneously allowed the state to impeach him with 
evidence of an incident occurring five years before the trial in 
which Schmelzer gave a false identity to a police officer and a 
judge following his arrest on a traffic matter.  The court of 
appeals, in an unpublished opinion, rejected Schmelzer's arguments 
and affirmed the conviction.  The court of appeals issued its 
opinion on January 4, 1995.  Schmelzer's attorney agreed to file a 
petition for review.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.10 (1993-94) 
and Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62 (1993-94), Schmelzer's petition for 
review was due 30 days after issuance of the court of appeals 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
3 
opinion, or February 3, 1995.  Schmelzer's attorney miscalculated 
the deadline for filing the petition, believing it was due on 
February 6, 1995.
1  On that date, Schmelzer's attorney filed a 
petition for review along with what he described as a "draft of 
the reasons in support of granting the Petition" and a motion 
asking for an extension of time to file the final draft of the 
reasons supporting the petition.  This court issued an order dated 
February 6, 1995, dismissing the petition as untimely. 
 
Through successor counsel, Schmelzer filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus requesting that his former counsel be found 
ineffective and that this court consider his petition for review. 
 Pursuant to his reading of State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992), Schmelzer's counsel filed the petition in this 
court.  This court, by an order, transferred the case to the court 
of appeals.  The court of appeals, as already noted, concluded it 
could not order the remedy Schmelzer requested and denied 
Schmelzer's writ of habeas corpus.  Schmelzer, 195 Wis. 2d at 4.   
 
Schmelzer claims that his former counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in failing to timely file his petition for review.  
"The guarantee of counsel on appeals as of right includes the 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel."  State ex rel. 
                     
     
1  In the motion Schmelzer's attorney later filed with his 
petition for review, Schmelzer's attorney alleged that he was 
suffering from the flu during the time he was preparing the 
petition and stated that the petition would be filed "on the 
current deadline of February 6."   
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
4 
Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 605, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994) 
(citing, inter alia, Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 511-12).  The State 
argues that because there is no constitutional right to counsel in 
the discretionary review granted by this court, see Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-16 (1974), Schmelzer has no right to 
effective representation on a petition for review.  Schmelzer in 
turn argues that this court recognized a right to effective 
assistance of counsel on petitions for review in State v. Mosley, 
102 Wis. 2d 636, 307 N.W.2d 200 (1981).  We agree. 
 
In Mosley, this court determined that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.32(4) (1977),
2 allowing "no merit" reports in petitions for 
                     
     
2  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(4) (1977) provided: 
 
 
(4)  If a fully briefed appeal is taken to the court of 
appeals and the attorney is of the opinion that a 
petition to appeal in the supreme court under Rule 
809.62 would be frivolous and without any arguable 
merit, the attorney shall advise the defendant of the 
reasons for his opinion and that the defendant has the 
right to file a petition to appeal.  If requested by the 
defendant, the attorney shall file the petition to 
appeal and the defendant shall file a statement of 
reasons in support of the petition. 
 
 
The current version, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(4) (1993-94), 
provides: 
 
 
(4)  If a fully briefed appeal is taken to the court of 
appeals and the attorney is of the opinion that a 
petition for review in the supreme court under s. 809.62 
would be frivolous and without any arguable merit, the 
attorney shall advise the defendant of the reasons for 
this opinion and that the defendant has the right to 
file a petition for review.  If requested by the 
defendant, the attorney shall file a petition satisfying 
the requirements of s. 809.62(2)(d) and (f) and the 
defendant shall file a supplemental petition satisfying 
the requirements of s. 809.62(2)(a), (b), (c) and (e).  
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
5 
review, complied with the right to counsel granted by the federal 
constitution.  The court held that § 809.32(4) did not deprive a 
defendant of his or her right to counsel because, under Moffitt, 
417 U.S. at 610-16, there is no federal constitutional right to 
counsel beyond first appeals of right.  Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d at 
667-68.  The court in Mosley further stated: 
 
Because we find this reasoning [in Moffitt] persuasive 
in light of Wisconsin appellate structure and procedure, 
we decline the defendant's invitation to go beyond the 
federal constitutional holding and reach a contrary 
result 
based 
on 
independent 
state 
constitutional 
grounds.  We emphasize, however, that absent a finding 
of no arguable merit under sec. 809.32(4), Stats., 
subsequent to a decision by the court of appeals, the 
public defender has the duty, which remains undiminished 
by our decision in the present case, to represent an 
indigent 
criminal 
defendant 
through 
the 
appellate 
process.  See, e.g., sec. 977.05(4)(j), Stats.  In 
proceedings before this court, this includes the 
preparation of a petition for review and, if review is 
accepted by this court, briefing and oral argument.   
 
Id. at 667-68.  This court's holding in Mosley is thus comprised 
of two parts: first, that the no merit procedure under § 809.32(4) 
is not in violation of the state and federal constitution; second, 
that the public defender nonetheless has a statutory duty under 
Wis. Stat. § 977.05(4)(j) (1977)
3 to provide counsel in other 
(..continued) 
The petition and supplemental petition shall both be 
filed within 30 days of the date of the decision of the 
court of appeals.  An opposing party may file a response 
to the petition and supplemental petition within 10 days 
of the service of the supplemental petition. 
     
3  Section 977.05(4)(j) provided in pertinent part that the 
public defender shall: 
 
 
(j) At the request of any person determined by the state 
public defender to be indigent or upon referral of any 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
6 
cases, that is, in cases where a no merit report is not filed, 
through the filing of the petition for review and through the 
subsequent proceedings in this court if the petition for review is 
accepted.  We reiterate this holding in the instant case.  Read 
together, Wis. Stat. §§ 809.32(4) and 977.05(4)(j) create a right 
to counsel in petitions for review and cases before any court, 
provided that the counsel does not determine the appeal to be 
without merit.   
 
Where a statutory right to counsel exists, we have held that 
the right includes the right to effective counsel.  A.S. v. State, 
168 Wis. 2d 995, 1002-03, 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992).  We therefore next 
consider the issue Schmelzer raises in his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus: whether he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.   
(..continued) 
court to prosecute a writ of error, appeal, writ of 
habeas 
corpus 
or 
other 
post-conviction 
or 
post-
commitment remedy on behalf of such person before any 
court, if the state public defender is first satisfied 
there is arguable merit to such proceedings. 
 
 
The present wording of the relevant portion of § 977.05(4)(j) 
is: 
 
 
(j) [A]t the request of any person determined by the 
state public defender to be indigent or upon referral of 
any court, prosecute a writ of error, appeal, action or 
proceeding for habeas corpus or other postconviction or 
post-commitment remedy on behalf of the person before 
any court, if the state public defender determines the 
case should be pursued. . . . 
 
See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 7265 (amending Wis. Stat. § 977.05(4)(j) 
(1993-94)). 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
7 
 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must show that his or her counsel performed 
deficiently and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 
Flores, 183 Wis. 2d at 620.  Here, there is no question that the 
performance of counsel was deficient.  Schmelzer's attorney failed 
to submit the petition for review before the 30-day deadline, a 
deadline this court has held to be jurisdictional and non-
extendable.  See First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Nicholaou, 87 Wis. 2d 
360, 364-66, 274 N.W.2d 704 (1979).  There could be no strategic 
reason for missing such a deadline.   
 
We thus turn to the next question: whether the deficient 
performance of Schmelzer's counsel prejudiced his defense.  The 
state argues that a defendant in Schmelzer's position can never 
show prejudice, because he or she would never be able to prove 
that this court would have accepted review.  Schmelzer argues that 
prejudice must be presumed in such an instance, because the 
defendant has lost his or her chance to ask the court for review. 
 We note, however, that the petition for review at issue in the 
present case is available for our review.
4  After reading 
Schmelzer's petition for review, we conclude that the deficient 
performance of Schmelzer's counsel did not prejudice his defense 
                     
     
4  The petition for review was on file with this court in 
case number 94-0582-CR.  Schmelzer's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus and his brief before this court specifically request the 
court to consider this petition. 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
8 
because his petition for review would not have been granted by 
this court.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1) (1993-94).  Because 
Schmelzer suffered no prejudice to his defense from his counsel's 
deficient performance, his claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel must fail and we need not consider his argument that 
prejudice must be presumed in his case.  Our conclusion that 
Schmelzer's petition for review would not have been granted also 
dictates the result of any relief we could grant in this case.  
Even if we were to grant Schmelzer the specific relief he requests 
in his petition for writ of habeas corpus—allowing the late filing 
and consideration of his petition for review—we would not grant 
his petition.  
 
Nonetheless, we note that the situation presented by this 
case may perhaps occur again, and we thus point out several 
factors in this case which favor granting relief.  We make these 
observations in order to clarify the scope of this decision and to 
provide guidance to defendants who may face Schmelzer's situation 
in the future.  Schmelzer, in his brief before this court, 
accurately characterizes the present case as one where an attorney 
agreed to perform an act and then "dropped the ball."  Schmelzer 
was in effect provided with no assistance, because his attorney 
never filed a valid petition for review.  "Actual or constructive 
denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed 
to result in prejudice."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; see also 
Flores, 183 Wis. 2d at 620.  Schmelzer thus raises a strong 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
9 
argument that prejudice must be presumed in such an instance, 
although we do not reach this issue in this case.  Finally, we 
reiterate that this court in a habeas corpus action may grant 
relief suited to the scope of the violation, see Knight, 168 
Wis. 2d at 520-21, and that this court has the power to issue any 
writs necessary to further the administration of justice, see Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 3
5; Wis. Stat. § 751.07 (1993-94).
6  This court 
does have the power to order the relief required in the present 
case: the late filing of a petition for review.  We hold that a 
defendant in Schmelzer's situation may petition this court for a 
writ of habeas corpus, and, should the writ be granted, this court 
has the power to allow the late filing of the petition for review. 
As stated above, we do not grant the defendant in this case the 
relief he requests because allowing a late filing of his petition 
for review would be useless, as we have already considered the 
petition and would not grant it. 
 
This court has previously adopted the rule of Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), that a new rule of criminal 
procedure is applicable to cases in the direct appeal "pipeline," 
that is, cases that are not yet final at the time of the rule's 
                     
     
5  Article VII, § 3(2) provides in part that "[t]he supreme 
court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." 
     
6  Section 751.07 provides in part: "In addition to the writs 
under article VII, section 3, of the constitution the supreme 
court may issue all writs necessary to enforce the administration 
of justice." 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
10 
announcement.  See State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 
152 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 221 (1993).  Relying in part 
on our opinion in Koch, the court of appeals has recently 
concluded that it would also adopt the rule of the plurality
7 
opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that a new rule of 
criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.
8  See State v. Horton, 195 Wis. 2d 280, 287, 
536 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1995).  The Horton court reasoned that 
Teague's rule promotes the interest of finality of criminal 
trials, and has been adopted by other state courts.  See Horton, 
195 Wis. 2d at 287-90, 289 n.6 (citing cases from other 
jurisdictions).  As the plurality opinion in Teague notes:  
 
The "costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive 
application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas 
corpus . . . generally far outweigh the benefits of this 
application."  [Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).]  In many 
ways the application of new rules to cases on collateral 
review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of 
                     
     
7  As the court of appeals in Horton observed, the plurality 
opinion in Teague has subsequently been endorsed by a majority of 
the Supreme Court.  See State v. Horton, 195 Wis. 2d 280, 286-87, 
536 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
461 (1993)). 
     
8  The Teague plurality opinion noted two exceptions to its 
holding.  If a new rule provides constitutional protection to a 
"primary activity" which the court determines to be "beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," or if 
the new rule requires observance of procedures "implicit in the 
conduct of ordered liberty," it should be applied retroactively.  
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 314 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 
U.S. 667, 692, 693 (1971)).  The Court also described the new 
rules subject to the second exception as "watershed rules of 
criminal procedure" that implicate the fundamental fairness and 
accuracy of the criminal trial.  Id. at 311, 312. 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
11 
criminal prosecutions, cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37, 43-54 (1971), for it continually forces the States 
to marshal resources in order to keep in prison 
defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-
existing constitutional standards. 
 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.  We agree with the reasoning of Horton, 
and hereby explicitly endorse the rule of Teague for application 
of new rules to collateral appeals in Wisconsin.   
 
The application of Teague to the present case, however, 
presents a special problem.  First, the Teague plurality also 
holds that "habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create 
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules 
would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral 
review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated."  
Teague, 489 U.S. at 316.  Compliance with this part of Teague's 
holding is impossible in the present case.  The rule we here 
announce, based on a statutory right to counsel and not a 
constitutional right, does not rise to the level of giving 
protection to a "primary activity" or invoking an "absolute 
prerequisite to fundamental fairness," Teague, 489 U.S. at 314, so 
neither exception allowing retroactivity is present.  However, 
according to Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 522, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel may only be heard through a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Applying Teague strictly 
would mean that this court could never announce a new rule of law 
relating to this type of claim unless the new rule fell into one 
of the two exceptions, a result plainly absurd.  We therefore 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
12 
conclude that where, as in the present situation, a type of claim 
may only be made through a form of collateral relief, the creation 
of new rules of law is not forbidden by the Teague rule as adopted 
by this court for use in Wisconsin.  Furthermore, we conclude that 
we may apply the new rule announced in this case to the defendant, 
Schmelzer, although, consistent with Teague, we do not apply it 
retroactively to cases finalized before the issuance of this 
opinion.  This result is somewhat inequitable, in that we have 
afforded relief to one defendant while not allowing relief to 
others similarly situated—the result disfavored in Griffith.  
Nonetheless, we conclude it would be more inequitable, under the 
special situation posed here, to adopt Teague's holding entirely 
and not only deny the benefit of the new rule to this defendant 
but also to foreclose the possibility of any new rules being 
created in this type of case. 
 
Thus, under our present adoption of the rule in Teague and 
our previous adoption of the rule in Griffith, see Koch, 175 
Wis. 2d at 694, the new rule of law we announce in this case is 
applicable to cases in the direct appeal "pipeline," but not to 
cases finalized
9 before the date of issuance of this opinion.   
                     
     
9  As this court noted in Koch, a case is not yet final when 
"prosecution is pending, no judgment of conviction has been 
entered, the right to a state court appeal from a final judgment 
has not been exhausted, and the time for certiorari review in the 
United States Supreme Court has not expired."  Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 
at 694 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n.6).  The peculiar 
nature of the claim in the present matter creates another category 
of unfinalized claims: petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel filed, 
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
13 
 
By the Court.—Writ granted; rights declared. 
(..continued) 
pursuant to State v. Knight, with this court prior to the issuance 
of this opinion but not yet acted upon by this court.   
 
No. 95-1096-W 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-1096-W 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Jace C.  
 
 
 
Schmelzer, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
James P. Murphy, Warden, Green Bay 
 
 
 
Correctional Institution, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  195 Wis. 2d 1, 535 N.W.2d 459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 22, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 28, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
TIMOTHY M. VAN AKKEREN 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the petitioner-petitioner there was a brief and 
oral argument by Keith A. Findley, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by James M. Freimuth, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. 
Doyle, attorney general.