Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12594
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2019

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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12594 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 496501  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD & others.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 5, 2019. - July 17, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Evidence, Sex offender.  Practice, 
Civil, Sex offender, Standard of proof. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 15, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Jeffrey T. Karp, J., on a motion for 
partial judgment on the pleadings, and entry of final judgment 
was ordered by Timothy Q. Feeley, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kate A. Frame for the plaintiff. 
 
John P. Bossé for the defendant. 
 
Rebecca Rose, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 The general counsel of the Sex Offender Registry Board 
(SORB) and the chair of SORB. 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The plaintiff (Doe) appeals from a Superior 
Court judgment affirming a Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB or 
board) decision to classify him as a level two sex offender 
after he was convicted in 2015 of two counts of open and gross 
lewdness for displaying his genitals to a neighbor through the 
window of his home.  Doe presents three challenges to the level 
two classification.  First, he contends that SORB does not have 
jurisdiction to classify him as a "sex offender," as defined in 
G. L. c. 6, § 178C, because he has not previously been convicted 
of open and gross lewdness and only a "second and subsequent 
. . . conviction for open and gross lewdness" permits 
classification as a sex offender.  Second, he contends that a 
hearing examiner cannot classify an individual as a level two 
sex offender based on a determination that the offender poses a 
moderate risk of reoffending, without also making an express 
determination that the degree of dangerousness posed by this 
individual is such that a public safety interest is served by 
having his or her registration information made publicly 
available on the Internet.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178D, 178K (2) 
(b).  Third, he contends that there was not substantial evidence 
to support his level two classification. 
 
We conclude, first, that SORB has jurisdiction to classify 
Doe as a sex offender because a previous charge of open and 
3 
 
 
gross lewdness against Doe was resolved through a conviction and 
not a continuance without a finding. 
 
Second, we conclude that in order to classify an individual 
as a level two sex offender, the hearing examiner is required to 
make three explicit determinations by clear and convincing 
evidence:  (1) that the risk of reoffense is moderate; (2) that 
the offender's dangerousness, as measured by the severity and 
extent of harm the offender would present to the public in the 
event of reoffense, is moderate; and (3) that a public safety 
interest is served by Internet publication of the offender's 
registry information.  This holding is consistent with the 
relevant statutes and regulations, and avoids due process 
concerns that could arise if an individual's information were 
published online in the absence of these determinations. 
 
Third, having examined the evidence and the hearing 
examiner's findings in light of this three-prong test, we 
conclude that there was not substantial evidence to support her 
decision to classify Doe as a level two sex offender by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Doe's dangerousness could not 
reasonably be characterized as moderate, and it was not 
reasonable to conclude, based on the hearing examiner's 
findings, that Internet publication of Doe's registry 
information would serve a public safety interest.  We therefore 
vacate and set aside the decision of the Superior Court judge 
4 
 
 
affirming SORB's classification of Doe as a level two sex 
offender, and remand this matter to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
 
Background.  1.  Sex offender classification process.  The 
sex offender registry law, as amended in 1999, established a sex 
offender registration system for those in the Commonwealth 
convicted of a "sex offense," as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  
See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q; St. 1999, c. 74.  The purpose of 
the law was "to protect . . . the vulnerable members of our 
communities from sexual offenders," and particularly from 
"sexually violent offenders who commit predatory acts 
characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior."  St. 1999, 
c. 74, emergency preamble & § 1. 
 
Pursuant to the sex offender registry law, the board 
prepares a recommended classification for every sex offender.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  Where a sex offender challenges 
SORB's recommended classification, he or she is entitled to 
request an evidentiary hearing.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1) (a).  
After this hearing, a SORB-designated hearing examiner "shall 
consider the relevant and credible evidence and reasonable 
inferences derived therefrom to determine:  (a) the offender's 
risk of reoffense; (b) the offender's dangerousness as a 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
5 
 
 
function of the severity and extent of harm the offender would 
present to the public in the event of reoffense; and (c) in 
consideration of the foregoing, whether and to what degree 
public access to the offender's personal and sex offender 
information, pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178K, is in the interest 
of public safety."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2) (2016).  
Based on these determinations, the hearing examiner must issue a 
final decision classifying the sex offender into one of three 
"levels of notification."  Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 
Mass. 598, 601 (2014), quoting G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2).  All sex 
offender risk classifications must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 314 & n.27 (2015) 
(Doe No. 380316). 
 
"Where the board determines that the risk of reoffense is 
low and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is not 
such that a public safety interest is served by public 
availability, it shall give a level [one] designation to the sex 
offender."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a).  Level one offenders' 
registry information is not disseminated to the general public 
or published on the Internet.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178D, 178K (2) 
(a).  "Where the board determines that the risk of reoffense is 
moderate and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is 
such that a public safety interest is served by public 
6 
 
 
availability of registration information, it shall give a level 
[two] designation to the sex offender."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) 
(b).  Level two offenders' registry information is "available 
for inspection by the general public in the form of a 
comprehensive database published on the [I]nternet."  G. L. 
c. 6, § 178D.  And "[w]here the board determines that the risk 
of reoffense is high and the degree of dangerousness posed to 
the public is such that a substantial public safety interest is 
served by active dissemination, it shall give a level [three] 
designation to the sex offender."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c).  
Level three offenders' registry information is available for 
public inspection on the Internet and also subject to "active[] 
dissemination" by the police or the board.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 178D, 178K (2) (c).  See also 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.28(1) 
(2016). 
 
Any individual who disagrees with the board's final 
classification is entitled to file a complaint for judicial 
review in the Superior Court.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178M; G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14. 
 
2.  Doe's offenses.  Prior to his 2015 guilty plea, Doe had 
been charged with open and gross lewdness on three occasions:  
once in 1990, once in 1991, and once in 1996.  At the hearing, 
the police report regarding the 1990 charge was not in the 
record; the criminal complaint alleged only that Doe committed 
7 
 
 
the crime of open and gross lewdness in the presence of two 
women.  But Doe testified before the hearing examiner that the 
charge arose out of an incident during which he exposed his 
genitals to two strangers who were walking by while he sat 
inside his motor vehicle.  As described infra, the parties 
disagree as to whether Doe was found guilty of this charge or 
whether the charge was continued without a finding.  The 1991 
charge was dismissed for lack of prosecution and was not 
considered by the hearing examiner.  The 1996 charge arose out 
of a report by the victim that Doe, who was on the opposite side 
of a train platform from her, had his pants and underwear pulled 
down and was playing with his genitals as he walked across the 
tracks toward her.  Doe testified before the hearing examiner 
that he was taking the train home after drinking with friends, 
and was seen by a woman after having pulled his pants and 
underwear down on the platform.  This case was continued without 
a finding in 1997 and subsequently dismissed. 
 
During his classification hearing, Doe admitted that he had 
exposed himself on six or seven other occasions between 1991 and 
1996, none of which resulted in an arrest or a court proceeding.  
There is no evidence that Doe continued to expose himself in the 
time between his 1996 offense and his 2011 offense. 
 
In June 2014, Doe's nineteen year old female neighbor 
reported to the police that, while she was inside her home, Doe 
8 
 
 
had exposed himself to her from inside his home on multiple 
occasions, three of which she described in further detail.  The 
first reported incident took place in 2011, when Doe's neighbor 
was approximately fifteen years old.  At this time, she observed 
Doe standing nude beside a window.  She reported that she was 
able to see Doe's genitals because the window shade "was only 
[three-quarters] of the way down."  Doe denied any recollection 
of this incident.  He was initially charged with open and gross 
lewdness, but pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of 
indecent exposure, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 53.  Indecent 
exposure is not a sex offense under the sex offender registry 
law.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178C (listing all offenses that qualify 
as "[s]ex offense" under sex offender registry law). 
 
The second incident occurred in May 2014.  Again, the 
neighbor observed Doe standing nude beside a partially-covered 
window and exposing his penis.  The third incident took place 
the following month, when the neighbor saw Doe standing nude in 
his kitchen and touching his penis in a manner consistent with 
masturbation.  Doe's neighbor stated that each of these events 
occurred at night, and that she could see the defendant because 
his lights were on. 
 
In response to his neighbor's allegations, Doe voluntarily 
spoke with a Haverhill police detective on June 18, 2014.  
According to the incident report relied upon by the hearing 
9 
 
 
examiner, the officer informed Doe that his neighbor had seen 
him naked inside his home; Doe responded that this was "probably 
true."  When the officer advised Doe that his neighbor believed 
the exposure to be purposeful, Doe responded that he "would 
agree with that."  He likewise agreed that his neighbor had seen 
him masturbating in his kitchen.  Doe stated that the victim -- 
whom he had seen changing her clothing and engaging in sexual 
acts on her living room couch -- was a "trigger" for him, and 
that he was having increasing difficulty controlling his urges.  
He agreed with the officer that the victim's exposure was likely 
accidental, but his exposure had been intentional.  Doe further 
stated that he "had a problem" for which he had sought treatment 
in the past, that he had "been good for a long time," and that 
he now only exposed himself when he was indoors.  He said that 
he was "just an exhibitionist," and that he had never touched or 
hurt anybody.  He further stated that he was building a house on 
several acres of land in New Hampshire to get away from any 
potential "triggers." 
 
In March 2015, Doe pleaded guilty to two counts of open and 
gross lewdness arising out of the two incidents that took place 
in May and June 2014.  He was sentenced to two years of 
supervised probation with conditions that he abstain from using 
drugs and alcohol and that he participate in a sex offender 
10 
 
 
therapy program, which, according to his therapist, he 
successfully completed. 
 
3.  Doe's classification and appeals.  In June 2015, SORB 
recommended that Doe be classified as a level two sex offender.  
Doe challenged the recommended classification, and an 
evidentiary hearing took place on May 3, 2016.  On July 15, the 
hearing examiner concluded that Doe "presents a moderate risk to 
reoffend and that a public safety interest is served by public 
access to his sex offender registry information."  She therefore 
ordered that Doe register as a level two sex offender.  In 
reaching her conclusion, the hearing examiner "acknowledge[d] 
that [Doe's] offenses are not gravely dangerous," but found them 
to be "quite upsetting to his multiple [v]ictims."  She further 
found that in this case, "community availability of [Doe's] sex 
offender information might have prevented the circumstances 
which contributed to his reoffenses," as his neighbors "might 
have been more modest in the rooms facing his home" had they 
"known of his sex offender history."  The hearing examiner 
therefore found that Doe's "other neighbors, present and future, 
deserve this awareness, and that posting his sex offender 
information on the [I]nternet is necessary for public safety." 
 
On the same day that the hearing examiner released her 
decision, Doe commenced this action seeking judicial review in 
the Superior Court.  He also filed a motion for a preliminary 
11 
 
 
injunction to stay the publication of his registry information 
on the Internet, which a Superior Court judge allowed.  In July 
2017, Doe filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, 
which SORB opposed.  A different Superior Court judge denied 
Doe's motion and affirmed SORB's final decision classifying Doe 
as a level two sex offender.  The judge who granted the 
preliminary injunction then ruled that, because Doe's level two 
classification had been affirmed, the preliminary injunction 
that stayed online publication would expire ten days after 
judgment entered. 
 
Doe filed a notice of appeal from the Superior Court 
judge's decision denying his motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, as well as a motion to extend the preliminary 
injunction pending appeal.  A single justice of the Appeals 
Court stayed Internet publication of his information pending 
resolution of this case.  We granted Doe's application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  A reviewing court may 
set aside or modify SORB's classification decision where it 
determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's statutory 
authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, 
is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial 
evidence.  See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (listing these and other 
reasons for vacating decision of agency).  In reviewing SORB's 
12 
 
 
decisions, we "give due weight to the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency."  Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). 
 
2.  SORB jurisdiction over Doe.  A single conviction of 
open and gross lewdness, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 16, is 
not a "sex offense" that permits classification of an individual 
as a sex offender; only a "second and subsequent adjudication or 
conviction" of that offense permits such classification.  G. L. 
c. 6, § 178C.  Doe argues, and SORB concedes, that Doe's two 
2015 convictions of open and gross lewdness would not themselves 
trigger an obligation to register because those convictions 
occurred in the same judicial proceeding.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wimer, 480 Mass. 1, 4 (2018) (where "defendant committed two 
separate incidents on two different occasions" but "resulting 
two convictions occurred in the same judicial proceeding," 
second conviction does not qualify as "subsequent conviction" 
under G. L. c. 6, § 178C).  Therefore, SORB has jurisdiction to 
classify Doe as a sex offender only if his 1990 open and gross 
lewdness charge, which was resolved in 1991, resulted in a 
conviction rather than a continuance without a finding. 
 
We conclude that the hearing examiner and the Superior 
Court judge correctly determined that Doe qualifies as a sex 
offender because he was found guilty of open and gross lewdness 
13 
 
 
in 1991.  The docket sheet for this case shows that on October 
16, 1991, Doe admitted to sufficient facts and, based on the 
letter "G" in the "Finding" column, that a finding of guilt was 
entered.  The box for a continuance without a finding was not 
checked.  The docket further shows that Doe was sentenced to two 
years of probation on this charge.  If his case had been 
continued without a finding, one would expect a check mark in 
the box indicating that the case against Doe was dismissed at 
the request of probation at the conclusion of those two years, 
but there is no such check.  Doe testified at his hearing that 
he was advised that this case had concluded in a continuance 
without a finding, and that he need not report a conviction when 
he applied for employment.  If this advice was given, the docket 
contradicts its accuracy.  Therefore, we conclude that Doe's 
2015 convictions were "second and subsequent" to his 1991 
conviction, and that SORB had jurisdiction to classify Doe as a 
sex offender. 
 
3.  Required determinations for level two classification.  
General Laws c. 6, § 178K (2) (b), provides that, to classify an 
individual as a level two sex offender, the board must determine 
(1) "that the risk of reoffense is moderate" and (2) that "the 
degree of dangerousness posed to the public is such that a 
public safety interest is served by public availability of 
registration information."  SORB's regulations recognize that 
14 
 
 
fulfilling this statutory mandate requires the hearing examiner, 
based on "the relevant and credible evidence and reasonable 
inferences derived therefrom[,] to determine:  (a) the 
offender's risk of reoffense; (b) the offender's dangerousness 
as a function of the severity and extent of harm the offender 
would present to the public in the event of reoffense; and (c) 
in consideration of the foregoing, whether and to what degree 
public access to the offender's personal and sex offender 
information . . . is in the interest of public safety."  803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2).  The SORB regulations therefore 
require a hearing examiner to make three distinct and explicit 
determinations in classifying a sex offender.  We now consider 
each of the three determinations necessary to support a level 
two classification. 
 
a.  Risk of reoffense.  Section 178K (2) (b) explicitly 
provides that a level two offender's risk of reoffense must be 
"moderate."  Although not explicitly stated either in the 
statute or regulations, we understand that this determination of 
risk focuses solely on the risk of sexual recidivism, that is, 
the risk that the offender will commit a new sexual offense, not 
the risk that he or she will commit any criminal offense.  See 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 326573 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 477 Mass. 361, 367 (2017) (SORB reclassification 
decisions made based on information relevant to risk of "sexual 
15 
 
 
recidivism"); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016) (discussing 
"strongest predictors of sexual recidivism"). 
 
b.  Degree of dangerousness.  An offender's dangerousness, 
as described in 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2), is measured by 
"the severity and extent of harm" that would result if the 
offender were to commit a new sex offense.  Determining an 
individual's degree of dangerousness therefore requires a 
hearing examiner to consider what type of sexual crime the 
offender would likely commit if he or she were to reoffend.  
Pragmatically, because past is prologue, a hearing examiner 
would make this determination based on the sexual crime or 
crimes that the offender committed in the past.  Where there is 
a history of different sexual offenses, the primary focus would 
likely be on the crime or crimes recently committed by the 
offender.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475, 482 (2015) (Doe No. 7083) 
("SORB's regulations provide that a sex offender's current . . . 
dangerousness to the community must be considered" [emphasis 
added]).  A hearing examiner, however, may consider an 
offender's older sexual offenses where they are relevant to a 
holistic assessment of the offender's current degree of 
dangerousness, or where the offender has not had recent 
opportunity to commit sexual offenses because he or she has been 
in custody. 
16 
 
 
 
Neither the statute nor the regulations specify the degree 
of dangerousness required for a level two classification.  We 
conclude, based on the statutory and regulatory context, the 
adverse consequences of Internet publication for an offender, 
and our presumption that the Legislature intends its statutes to 
pass constitutional muster, that a moderate degree of 
dangerousness is required for the hearing examiner to classify 
an individual as a level two sex offender. 
 
From the statute, we know that the board can impose a level 
two sex offender classification only where it finds that the 
offender poses a "degree of dangerousness" "such that a public 
safety interest is served by public availability of registration 
information."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).  For a level two 
offender, public availability of registration information means 
that the offender's information will be published on SORB's 
website, where it is viewable by any adult member of the public 
at any time.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178D; Moe, 467 Mass. at 605.  If 
an offender's degree of dangerousness is low, it is difficult to 
see how the public interest would be served by Internet 
publication, especially considering the "dramatic consequences" 
that classification as a level two offender has "for [the 
offender's] liberty and privacy interests."  See Doe No. 380316, 
473 Mass. at 311. 
17 
 
 
 
As this court has previously recognized, Internet 
publication of an individual's sex offender registry information 
"poses a risk of serious adverse consequences to that offender, 
including the risk that the sex offender will suffer 
discrimination in employment and housing, and will otherwise 
suffer from the stigma of being identified as a sex offender, 
which sometimes means the additional risk of being harassed or 
assaulted."  Moe, 467 Mass. at 604.  See Doe No. 380316, 473 
Mass. at 307-308 ("Internet dissemination exposes offenders, 
through aggressive public notification of their crimes, to 
profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism" [quotation, 
citation, and alteration omitted]); Poe v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 456 Mass. 801, 813 (2010), quoting Doe v. Attorney Gen., 
426 Mass. 136, 144 (1997) ("Classification and registration 
entail possible harm to a sex offender's earning capacity, 
damage to his reputation, and, 'most important, . . . the 
statutory branding of him as a public danger'").  Registry 
information posted on the Internet may be obtained anonymously 
from the comforts of one's own home, and republished on public 
websites not subject to SORB's control or to the warnings and 
certifications required by law to be provided on SORB's website.  
Moe, 467 Mass. at 605.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178D.  And even if a 
sex offender's information is later removed from SORB's website 
because the individual is released from the obligation to 
18 
 
 
register or reduced to a level one classification, his or her 
information would likely continue to exist on private websites, 
easily discoverable through a generic online search.  Moe, supra 
at 605-606.  See Note, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 Hastings 
L.J. 257, 259 (2012) ("information posted on the Internet is 
never truly forgotten"). 
 
Due process concerns could be implicated if we were to 
interpret the statute to allow Internet publication of registry 
information for individuals whose degree of dangerousness is 
anything less than moderate.  Cf. Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 
303, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  "An 
individual's ongoing duty to register as a sex offender 
implicates significant liberty and privacy interests for as long 
as the individual is required to register as a sex offender."  
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 76819 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 480 Mass. 212, 219 (2018).  And where registration 
also means Internet publication, the liberty and privacy 
interests take a quantum leap.  "Deprivation of greater 
individual liberty interests requires greater procedures and 
stronger countervailing State interests."  Doe, 426 Mass. at 
140.  By interpreting G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b), to require a 
determination of moderate dangerousness, we avoid such concerns 
and conform to our presumption that the Legislature intended its 
statutes to pass constitutional muster.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
19 
 
 
Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 
764, 771 (2008) ("statute must be construed, if fairly possible, 
so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is 
unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
Our conclusion that a moderate degree of dangerousness is 
required for classification as a level two sex offender does not 
appear to be in tension with SORB's current practices -- hearing 
examiners who conclude that an individual is a level two sex 
offender often already find that the individual poses a moderate 
degree of dangerousness to the public, as well as a moderate 
risk to reoffend.  See, e.g., id. at 767 (hearing examiner found 
offender posed moderate danger to public and moderate risk to 
re-offend); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 376575 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 788 (2016) (same); 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 95318 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (2011) (same).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 706 (2019) ("sex 
offenders designated level two . . . are deemed to pose a 
moderate . . . risk of reoffending and a concomitant degree of 
risk to the public").  Indeed, SORB declares in its appellate 
brief that the hearing examiner here found that Doe "presents 
. . . a moderate degree of dangerousness to the public," which 
20 
 
 
suggests that the board recognizes the need for such a 
determination to support a level two classification. 
 
c.  Efficacy of Internet publication.  A hearing examiner's 
job is not complete upon determining an individual's risk to 
reoffend and degree of dangerousness.  A third and distinct 
determination is required by SORB regulations:  "whether and to 
what degree public access to the offender's personal and sex 
offender information . . . is in the interest of public safety."  
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2).  An offender may not be given a 
level two classification unless "the degree of dangerousness 
posed to the public" by the offender "is such that a public 
safety interest is served by public availability of registration 
information," that is, by the availability of registration 
information on SORB's website.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178D, 
178K (2) (b).  Whether a public safety interest will be "served" 
by Internet publication depends not only on the probability of 
reoffense and the danger posed by that potential reoffense, but 
also on the efficacy of online publication in protecting the 
public from being victimized by the offender.  "The major 
premise underlying the sex offender act," after all, "is that 
disclosure of the presence of a sex offender in a particular 
community will help protect minors and other persons vulnerable 
to becoming victims of sex crimes."  Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 
Mass. at 139. 
21 
 
 
 
Our conclusion that the efficacy of online publication must 
be separately evaluated in light of a particular offender's risk 
of reoffense and degree of dangerousness is supported not only 
by the governing statute and regulations, but also by the 
court's reasoning in Moe, 467 Mass. at 615-616.  In Moe, we held 
that it would be unconstitutional to apply amendments requiring 
level two offenders' information to be published on the Internet 
to offenders who received a level two classification before the 
effective date of those amendments.  We reached this conclusion 
because at the time that those offenders were classified, level 
two offenders' information was explicitly protected from online 
publication.  See id. at 603; G. L. c. 6, § 178D, as amended 
through St. 2003, c. 140, § 5.  We explained that "[i]ncreasing 
the scope of public access to include Internet publication of 
the registry information of level two offenders may affect" 
SORB's determination as to what degree of public access to 
registry information is appropriate, "even if it does not affect 
SORB's evaluation of an offender's degree of dangerousness, 
because SORB may decide that public access with Internet 
publication is not warranted by the public safety risk posed by 
the specific offender's degree of dangerousness."  Moe, 467 
Mass. at 615.  In other words, before the amendments became 
effective, a hearing examiner who made a level two 
classification would have known that public availability would 
22 
 
 
not include Internet publication when he or she determined, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b), "that a public safety 
interest is served by public availability of registration 
information."  We recognized in Moe, supra at 615, that a 
hearing examiner might have reached a different conclusion on 
the same facts if he or she knew that public availability would 
include Internet publication. 
 
The SORB regulations make clear that the determination of 
the degree to which public access to an offender's personal and 
sex offender information is in the interest of public safety 
must be made "in consideration" of the offender's risk of 
reoffense and dangerousness.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2). 
Where a sexually violent offender presents a moderate risk to 
reoffend and a moderate degree of dangerousness, Internet 
publication will almost invariably serve a public safety 
interest by notifying potential victims of the risks presented 
by the offender in their geographic area.  But where a sexually 
nonviolent offender poses a moderate risk of committing 
moderately dangerous sexual offenses, there may be cases where 
Internet publication -- with its attendant consequences -- might 
not be justified because, in light of the particular public 
safety risk posed by the offender, it would not serve a public 
safety interest.  Cf. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. at 146 
("principle of fundamental fairness" requires fact finder to 
23 
 
 
consider whether "disclosure is not needed when balanced against 
the public need to which the sex offender act responded").  The 
efficacy of Internet publication in protecting potential victims 
must be determined based on the facts of each individual case. 
 
We therefore require hearing examiners to ask whether, in 
light of the particular risks posed by the particular offender, 
Internet access to that offender's information might 
realistically serve to protect the public against the risk of 
the offender's sexual reoffense.  If the answer to this question 
is "no," classification as a level two offender is unjustified 
even where the offender poses a moderate risk to reoffend and a 
moderate degree of dangerousness. 
 
d.  Need for explicit determinations supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.  In Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 298, we 
held that "SORB is constitutionally required to prove the 
appropriateness of an offender's risk classification by clear 
and convincing evidence."  In a criminal case, where guilt must 
be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we require 
that each element of the offense be established by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 
641, 652-653 (2019).  In a sex offender classification case, 
where the classification must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence, and where SORB's ultimate determination is 
comprised of three elements that, pursuant to 803 Code Mass. 
24 
 
 
Regs. § 1.20(2), require separate findings, we similarly require 
that each element be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.  That is, to find that an offender warrants a level 
two classification, the board must find by clear and convincing 
evidence that (1) the offender's risk of reoffense is moderate; 
(2) the offender's dangerousness is moderate; and (3) a public 
safety interest is served by Internet publication of the 
offender's registry information. 
 
In determining whether these elements have been established 
by clear and convincing evidence, a hearing examiner may 
consider subsidiary facts that have been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 
85, 91 (2019).  This, too, is consistent with the evidentiary 
rule in criminal cases that, although every element needs to be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, "preliminary questions of fact 
and subsidiary facts need only be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence."  Id. at 91-92, quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
444 Mass. 526, 543 (2005). 
 
Even though the SORB regulation requires a hearing examiner 
to make three determinations before classifying a sex offender, 
see 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2), SORB contends that the third 
of these determinations ("whether and to what degree public 
access to the offender's personal and sex offender information 
25 
 
 
. . . is in the interest of public safety") need not be made 
explicitly because it is implicit in the board's ultimate 
classification.  We agree that, where a hearing examiner 
classifies an individual as a level two sex offender, it should 
be implicit in that decision that the hearing examiner has found 
by clear and convincing evidence that a public safety interest 
is served by Internet publication of the offender's registry 
information.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b); Moe, 467 Mass. at 
615.  But, where such a finding is merely implicit, a reviewing 
court cannot be sure that the appropriate determination in fact 
was made, and was supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
See Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 312 (SORB required to "make 
particularized, detailed findings concerning [offender's] 
classification").  Separate determinations supported by separate 
findings improve the rigor and accuracy of final classifications 
and provide for more effective judicial review.  Where the SORB 
regulation itself calls for three separate determinations and 
where classification decisions affect substantial privacy and 
liberty interests, we conclude that it is appropriate to require 
the hearing examiner to make explicit his or her findings 
regarding each of these three elements, and to make clear that 
each determination is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.  See Doe No. 380316, supra (particularized, detailed 
26 
 
 
findings important features of "the process that offenders are 
due"). 
 
This requirement of explicit findings regarding all three 
elements applies not only to level two classifications, but also 
to level three classifications.3  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.20(2).  And the obligation to rest these determinations on 
clear and convincing evidence likewise applies to all 
classifications.  See Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 314 n.27 
("clear and convincing standard should be applied to all sex 
offender risk classification levels, including level one").  The 
findings necessary to support the classification, of course, 
will differ depending on the level of classification.  See G. L. 
c. 6, 178K (2) (a)-(c). 
 
We apply this requirement prospectively only; it does not 
apply to classifications that have been finally adjudicated.  
Where a prior classification decision fails to meet this 
                                                          
 
 
3 Although determinations regarding three separate elements 
are required for all classifications, including level one, see 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2) (2016), the determination 
regarding the third element is a foregone conclusion once a 
hearing examiner determines that the risk of reoffense or the 
degree of dangerousness is low.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a) 
("Where the board determines that the risk of reoffense is low 
and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is not such 
that a public safety interest is served by public availability, 
it shall give a level [one] designation to the sex offender").  
This is because, to be classified as a level two sex offender, 
an individual must pose a moderate risk to commit new sex 
offenses and at least a moderate degree of dangerousness.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b). 
27 
 
 
requirement, and where an appeal is pending before the Superior 
Court or an appellate court, the court, in its discretion, may 
order that the classification decision be remanded to the 
hearing examiner.4  The hearing examiner will then issue an 
amended classification decision containing his or her express 
findings as to all three elements.  Unless the hearing examiner 
determines that a further hearing is required to evaluate an 
individual's risk of reoffense, an individual's degree of 
dangerousness, or the public safety interest served by Internet 
publication, amended decisions may be issued without holding a 
de novo hearing. 
 
4.  Hearing examiner's findings.  The hearing examiner in 
this case classified Doe as a level two sex offender by clear 
and convincing evidence after concluding (1) that Doe posed a 
moderate risk of reoffense and (2) that online publication of 
his registry information was "necessary for public safety."  We 
now consider whether the hearing examiner's conclusion that 
clear and convincing evidence supports a level two 
                                                          
 
 
4 We grant the court where the appeal is pending the 
discretion to determine whether to remand the case for explicit 
findings for two reasons.  First, whether SORB's existing 
findings are sufficiently explicit to enable proper review is a 
question best left to the reviewing court.  Second, even where 
the findings are not explicit, the underlying facts of the case 
may so clearly dictate the appropriate classification level that 
a reviewing court may determine that a remand for explicit 
findings is not necessary. 
28 
 
 
classification is itself supported by substantial evidence, that 
is, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion."  G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6). 
 
a.  Risk of reoffense.  With regard to the first element, 
we conclude that the hearing examiner's determination that Doe's 
risk of reoffense is moderate was supported by substantial 
evidence.  The hearing examiner found that Doe had "repetitively 
exposed himself to [his neighbor] over the past four years."  
Doe himself admitted that he had had participated in multiple 
instances of exhibitionistic behavior, that he "had a problem," 
and that he was having increasing difficulty controlling his 
urges, which were triggered by seeing his neighbor naked and 
engaged in sexual acts.  These facts are adequate to support the 
hearing examiner's determination that Doe poses a moderate risk 
of reoffense.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33. 
 
b.  Degree of dangerousness.  Although 
SORB claims in its brief that the hearing examiner found Doe to 
present "a moderate degree of dangerousness to the public," we 
discern no such determination.  Rather, as to the issue of 
dangerousness, the hearing examiner found that Doe's offenses 
"are not gravely dangerous," but "are quite upsetting to his 
multiple [v]ictims."  We decline SORB's invitation to 
characterize this as a determination of moderate dangerousness.  
We note that a required element of the crime of open and gross 
29 
 
 
lewdness is that the defendant has engaged in conduct that 
actually alarmed or shocked another person.  See Commonwealth v. 
Maguire, 476 Mass. 156, 158 (2017).  So, in every such case, the 
defendant's conduct will be "quite upsetting" to the victim.  
Yet the Legislature did not consider the harm arising from a 
single offense of open and gross lewdness to be sufficiently 
serious to qualify as a sex offense requiring the offender to 
register; only the second and subsequent conviction of that 
crime is a sex offense under the sex offender registry law.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  The hearing examiner's conclusion that 
Doe's offenses were "quite upsetting," therefore, is 
insufficient to support a determination of moderate 
dangerousness. 
 
We need not remand the matter to the hearing examiner to 
clarify her finding on this issue because, even if she were to 
find Doe's degree of dangerousness to be moderate, as the board 
claims she did, we conclude that such a determination is not 
supported by substantial evidence on this record. 
 
"[O]ur decisions recognize that the registration statute 
requires SORB to base its classification determinations on a sex 
offender's 'current' risk to the community, in order to protect 
the offender's right to due process."  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. 
at 483.  See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 430 Mass. 155, 168 (1999) 
(individualized hearing required to determine whether offender 
30 
 
 
poses "present threat").  In determining whether an individual 
poses a moderate degree of dangerousness at the time of 
evaluation, a hearing examiner must consider "the severity and 
extent of the harm the offender would present to the public in 
the event of reoffense," 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2)(b), 
which requires consideration of the nature and type of offense 
the offender would be likely to commit if he or she reoffended.  
This determination naturally takes place on a continuum -- 
contact offenders are generally more dangerous than noncontact 
offenders, and noncontact offenders whose actions are likely to 
create a fear of bodily harm are generally more dangerous than 
noncontact offenders whose actions are unlikely to generate such 
fear.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Suave, 460 Mass. 582, 587-588 (2011), 
quoting G. L. c. 123A, § 1 (under civil commitment statute for 
sexually dangerous persons, noncontact offender is not "menace 
to the health and safety of other persons" unless offender's 
"conduct will objectively put his [or her] victim in fear of 
bodily harm by reason of . . . a contact sex crime"). 
 
Therefore, while we agree with SORB that under some 
circumstances the danger posed by noncontact offenses such as 
open and gross lewdness might suffice to support a level two 
classification, see G. L. c. 6, § 178C, we conclude that an 
individual is generally unlikely to pose a moderate degree of 
dangerousness -- and thus to qualify as a level two sex offender 
31 
 
 
-- where his or her risk of reoffense relates only to noncontact 
offenses which do not put a victim in fear of bodily harm by 
reason of a contact sex offense.  See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 425 
Mass. 217, 221 & n.7 (1997) ("In a ranking of the sex offenses," 
open and gross lewdness "ranks at or near the bottom in 
seriousness" because it "involves neither physical harm nor the 
threat of physical harm").  Therefore, where a hearing examiner 
concludes (1) that an offender poses a risk only of noncontact 
offenses and (2) that those noncontact offenses are not likely 
to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of a contact 
offense, a hearing examiner will have to articulate why, given 
these circumstances, any classification above level one is 
justified. 
 
Doe has never been accused or convicted of a contact sex 
offense.  Nor has he been accused of committing any offense that 
was sexual in nature between 1996 and 2014, apart from a single 
instance of indecent exposure in 2011.  During this incident, 
Doe's fifteen year old neighbor saw Doe's genitals through his 
bedroom window.  Based on this offense alone, the hearing 
examiner found that Doe was an "Adult Offender with [a] Child 
Victim."  The presence of this "high-risk" factor "is indicative 
of a high risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness" under 
SORB's regulations.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33.  See id. 
32 
 
 
at § 1.33(3) ("Adult offenders who target children pose a 
heightened risk to public safety"). 
 
The hearing examiner erred in relying on the "Adult 
Offender with a Child Victim" high-risk factor when classifying 
Doe as a level two sex offender.  The sex offender registry law 
identifies six "criminal history factors indicative of a high 
risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness posed to the 
public," including "whether the sex offender was an adult who 
committed a sex offense on a child."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (a) 
(iii).  "Sex offense" and "sex offense involving a child" are 
both defined terms under the sex offender registry law, and 
neither definition includes the offense of indecent exposure.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  Where the offense of indecent exposure 
is not a "sex offense," and where there is no evidence that Doe 
committed a crime involving a child at any other time, there is 
no statutory authority to support the hearing examiner's finding 
that this high-risk factor was applicable.  And although the 
SORB regulations refer broadly to "Adult Offender[s] with a 
Child Victim," and not specifically to adult offenders who 
commit sex offenses against children, there is no reason to 
believe that SORB intended its regulatory risk factor to 
encompass more crimes than the statutory factor on which it is 
based.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 27914 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 610, 618-619 (2012) 
33 
 
 
("adult offender with child victim" among "factors that the 
Legislature has specifically highlighted as indicative of a high 
risk to reoffend and a high degree of dangerousness"). 
 
Doe's two convictions of open and gross lewdness in 2015, 
like his conviction of indecent exposure, arose out of conduct 
that occurred when he was alone in his home, viewable to his 
neighbor only through a window.  At the time of these offenses, 
Doe's neighbor was no longer a child; she was eighteen years old 
at the time of the first offense of open and gross lewdness, and 
nineteen years old at the time of the second offense.  See 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(3) ("the Board shall consider any victim 
younger than [sixteen] years old as a 'child victim'").  The 
hearing examiner appeared to credit Doe's testimony that his 
conduct was triggered by seeing, from the windows of his own 
home, his neighbor naked in her home and engaged in sexual acts.  
Therefore, if Doe were to reoffend, the evidence supports a 
finding that the crime of reoffense would again be open and 
gross lewdness, committed in his own home, viewable only by his 
neighbors, which is the only type of sex offense that Doe has 
committed since 1996. 
 
Where Doe's sex offenses were limited to open and gross 
lewdness, where there is no evidence that Doe committed any act 
of open and gross lewdness outside of his home in approximately 
twenty years, where the recent acts of open and gross lewdness 
34 
 
 
that triggered his classification hearing occurred only within 
his own home, and where Doe has never been found to have 
committed or attempted a contact sex offense, there is not 
substantial evidence to support a finding by clear and 
convincing evidence that Doe currently poses a moderate degree 
of dangerousness to the public.5 
 
c.  Internet publication.  The hearing examiner in this 
case made an explicit factual finding regarding the likely 
efficacy of publishing Doe's information on the Internet.  She 
stated that, "in this case, it is reasonable to consider that 
community availability of [Doe's] sex offender information might 
have prevented the circumstances which contributed to his 
reoffenses" -- namely, his neighbor's nudity and sexual behavior 
observable from Doe's home -- because, "[h]ad his neighbors 
known of his sex offender history, they might have been more 
                                                          
 
 
5 We are likewise unconvinced that the other aggravating 
factors considered by the hearing examiner -- namely, the 
repetitive and compulsive nature of Doe's behavior, the fact 
that Doe's early offenses took place in public places, the fact 
that Doe's recent offenses took place in view of his neighbors, 
who were in "the public sphere," the relationship between Doe 
and his victims, the diversity of Doe's victims, and the number 
of victims -- could reasonably be considered adequate to support 
a determination that Doe is moderately dangerous based on the 
discussion supra.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016).  
Because we conclude that a determination of moderate 
dangerousness was unsupported by the evidence, we need not 
consider Doe's specific arguments concerning the hearing 
examiner's "cherry-picking" of the evidence and her failure to 
afford proper weight to the expert evidence presented and to 
Doe's support system and stability in his community. 
35 
 
 
modest in the rooms facing his home."  The hearing examiner 
therefore concluded that Doe's "other neighbors, present and 
future, deserve this awareness, and that posting his sex 
offender information on the [I]nternet is necessary for public 
safety."  Having evaluated this determination, we conclude that 
it was not supported by substantial evidence.6 
 
The hearing examiner's focus on the "modesty" of the 
victims, as opposed to their protection, was misplaced.  
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that Internet 
publication of Doe's registry information would have been 
effective in warning Doe's neighbors to be "more modest in the 
rooms facing [Doe's] home."  Pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178D, 
SORB's website provides the public with only certain 
information:  the offender's name; the offender's home address 
and any secondary addresses; the offender's work address; the 
offender's age, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, and hair 
color; a photograph of the offender, if available; the offense 
for which the offender was convicted or adjudicated; the date of 
the conviction or adjudication; whether the offender has been 
                                                          
 
 
6 We note that we are able to evaluate whether the hearing 
examiner's determination regarding the third element is 
supported by substantial evidence only because she made 
particularized findings as to how a public safety interest might 
be served by Internet publication of Doe's registry information.  
This illustrates the importance of requiring hearing examiners 
to make explicit findings as to each of the three required 
elements. 
36 
 
 
designated a sexually violent predator; and whether the offender 
is in compliance with his or her registration obligations.  
Knowing that Doe had been convicted of open and gross lewdness 
says nothing about Doe's potential "triggers," and therefore 
would not serve to warn Doe's neighbors to avoid conduct that 
potentially may trigger a future act of exhibitionism.  
Therefore, we conclude that there is not substantial evidence to 
support the hearing examiner's determination that "a public 
safety interest is served by public access to [Doe's] 
registration information."  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).7 
 
6.  Conclusion.  Because we conclude that classification as 
a level two sex offender is not supported by substantial 
evidence on this record, we vacate the Superior Court's judgment 
affirming SORB's level two classification and remand the matter 
to the Superior Court for issuance of a judgment declaring that 
there is substantial evidence only to support a level one 
classification.8 
                                                          
 
 
7 Where the hearing examiner's explicit findings regarding 
the efficacy of Internet publication are not supported by 
substantial evidence, we do not consider whether other explicit 
factual findings reasonably could have been made in these 
circumstances that would support a determination by clear and 
convincing evidence that "a public safety interest is served by 
public availability of registration information."  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (b). 
 
 
8 Although we conclude that a level two classification was 
not supported by substantial evidence, the hearing examiner's 
findings, as described supra, do support a level one 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
classification.  Because we conclude that there was substantial 
evidence to support a level one classification by clear and 
convincing evidence, we need not address Doe's argument that 
SORB regulations improperly place the burden of proof on the sex 
offender where the offender seeks relief from the obligation to 
register.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.29(1) (2016).