Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050278
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2007

Rel. 06/15/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1050278
____________________
Serra Chevrolet, Inc.
v.
Theresa Reylander
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-05-2538)
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.
1050278
2
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Parker,
and Murdock, JJ., concur.  
See and Bolin, JJ., dissent.
1050278
3
SEE, Justice (dissenting). 
This Court affirms without an opinion the trial court's
denial of a motion to compel arbitration filed by Serra
Chevrolet, 
Inc., 
the 
defendant 
below. 
 
I respectfully 
dissent.
On May 15, 2003, Theresa Reylander and her boyfriend
visited an automobile dealership operated by Serra Chevrolet
to purchase a used automobile for Reylander.  Aaron Hardy, one
of Serra Chevrolet's salespersons, offered them assistance.
Reylander and her boyfriend returned the next day to buy one
of the cars they had looked at the previous day, on the
condition that 
Serra 
Chevrolet would repair 
the 
radio 
antenna,
touch up some scratches in the paint, and repair the rear
spoiler. 
 
That 
evening, 
Reylander signed a purchase agreement,
which contained an arbitration provision; that provision
stated, in pertinent part:
"The undersigned Purchaser and Seller ... agree as
follows:
"(1) That the motor vehicle described in this
sale document has been heretofore traveling in
interstate 
commerce 
and 
has 
an 
impact 
upon
interstate commerce.
"(2) That in the event of any dispute(s) between
the parties hereto or in the event of any dispute(s)
arising out of or related to this contract,
(including but not limited to the terms of the
1050278
4
agreement, the condition of the motor vehicle sold,
the conformity of the motor vehicle sold to the
contract, 
the 
representations, 
promises,
undertakings or covenants made by Seller, Inc. in
connection with the sale of the motor vehicle, or
otherwise dealing with the motor vehicle ...) that
Seller, and the purchaser agree to submit such
dispute(s) to binding arbitration, pursuant to the
provisions of 9 U.S.C. 1, et seq. and according to
the commercial rules of the American Arbitration
Association then existing in Alabama.
"(3) That in the event any dispute arises
between purchaser and seller, its officers, agents
and employees, the said dispute will be submitted to
binding arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 1, et seq.
and according to the commercial rules of the
American Arbitration Association then existing in
Alabama."
Reylander alleges in her complaint that "[w]hile completing
the paperwork, [Hardy] engaged a coworker in an inappropriate
conversation of a sexual nature in front of [Reylander] and
her boyfriend."
Reylander returned to Serra Chevrolet on May 19 and May
20, 2003, to have the repairs to the automobile she had
purchased completed.  Reylander rode with Hardy to Roebuck
Honda to have the radio fixed and to the body shop to have the
scratches in the paint fixed.  While they were in the car
together, Hardy allegedly made a number of unwanted comments
of a sexual nature to Reylander and repeatedly touched
1050278
5
Reylander in a sexual manner.  Reylander sued Hardy, alleging
assault and battery, invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and false imprisonment.  She also named
Serra Chevrolet as a defendant, alleging the negligent hiring
and supervision of Hardy and vicarious liability for Hardy's
actions.  Serra Chevrolet moved to compel arbitration of the
claims pursuant to the arbitration provision in the purchase
agreement Reylander had signed.  The trial court denied Serra
Chevrolet's motion, stating that "intentional torts of this
nature as a matter of public policy should not be subject to
the arbitration clause in this case." 
This case is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ("the FAA").  Section 2 of the FAA
provides:
"A 
written 
provision 
in 
... 
a 
contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction ...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."
9 U.S.C. § 2.  "The FAA 'provides for "the enforcement of
arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce
1050278
6
Clause."'" Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129, 1132
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S.
52, 56 (2003), and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987)).
In finding a nexus with interstate commerce, we look to the
transaction, not the specific action that is the basis of the
claim.  In Potts v. Baptist Health System, Inc., 853 So. 2d
194, 202 (Ala. 2002), Caroline Potts, a nurse, sued her
employers, Baptist Health System, Inc., and Walker Regional
Medical Center ("Walker"), and others, alleging various
intentional 
torts, 
including 
"defamation, 
intentional
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and
wrongful termination."  853 So. 2d at 195.  Potts had entered
into an arbitration agreement with Walker.  This Court held
that "the FAA applie[d]" to the arbitration agreement between
Potts and Walker, not because the defendants established a
nexus between Potts's intentional-tort claims and interstate
commerce, but because of the relationship between the
underlying transaction -- her continued employment -- and
interstate commerce.  853 So. 2d at 202.  
"It is well established that Congress can regulate
three broad categories of activity pursuant to its
commerce power: (1) the use of the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of
1050278
7
interstate commerce or persons or things in
interstate 
commerce; 
and 
(3) 
those 
general
activities having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."
 
Wolff Motor Co., 869 So. 2d at 1132.  "The automobile, if
anything, is the paradigm of modern interstate commercial
activity in the United States. ... '[C]ars are themselves
instrumentalities of commerce.'" United States v. McCoy, 323
F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1995)).  "[T]he purchase of
a used automobile from an automobile dealer [is] a transaction
that involve[s] interstate commerce." Dan Wachtel Ford,
Lincoln, Mercury, Inc. v. Modas, 891 So. 2d 287, 292 (Ala.
2004).  The arbitration provision in the purchase agreement
between Reylander and Serra Chevrolet covers the sale of a
used automobile.
The question presented to this Court is whether the
arbitration provision encompasses Reylander's claims against
Serra Chevrolet alleging the negligent hiring and negligent
supervision of Hardy and seeking to hold Serra Chevrolet
vicariously 
liable for 
the 
alleged intentional torts of Hardy.
The arbitration provision, by its express terms, covers "any
dispute(s) 
between 
the 
parties 
hereto." 
 More 
specifically, 
it
1050278
8
also covers "any dispute(s) arising out of or related to this
contract."  Even this narrower 
"language of the arbitration provision in this case
is not ambiguous.  Under the plain language of the
provision, [Reylander] agreed to arbitrate all
disputes 'arising from or relating to' the contract.
'This Court has held [that] where a contract signed
by the parties contains a valid arbitration clause
that applies to claims "arising out of or relating
to" the contract, that clause has a broader
application than an arbitration clause that refers
only to claims "arising from" the agreement.'" 
Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Alabama v. Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497,
505 (Ala. 1999).  
The arbitration provision in the agreement between
Reylander and Serra 
Chevrolet 
makes 
no 
exception for negligent
hiring, negligent supervision, or claims asserting vicarious
liability for intentional torts -- this last being the basis
upon which the trial court denied Serra Chevrolet's motion to
compel arbitration of all three claims against it.  Moreover,
"'[t]he federal policy favoring arbitration 
is 
so 
strong that,
as a matter of law, "any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration
...."'" Parkway Dodge, Inc. v. Hawkins, 854 So. 2d 1129, 1132
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Bentley, 851
So. 2d 458, 463 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Moses H. Cone
1050278
9
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983)).  Thus, Reylander's claims fall squarely within the
purview of this "broadly worded agreement."  Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So. 2d 8, 11
(Ala. 1999).  
In  Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Vintson, the Vintsons
asserted intentional-tort claims, and they argued that the
arbitration clause they had signed did not encompass such
claims.  This Court held that 
"[a]ll of the Vintsons' claims -– that Green Tree
fraudulently induced them to purchase a mobile home,
that it violated the Alabama Mini-Code, and that it
breached 
its 
agreement 
to 
pay 
off 
several
preexisting debts -– arise from or relate to the
installment contract.  In fact, the Vintsons concede
as much in their brief, when they state that their
complaint was based on 'fraud relating to this
transaction.'  Accordingly, the plain language of
the arbitration provision encompasses the Vintsons'
claims." 
753 So. 2d at 505.  Similarly, in this case, Reylander's
claims against Serra Chevrolet alleging negligent hiring and
negligent supervision and seeking to hold Serra Chevrolet
vicariously liable for Hardy's actions relate to the purchase
agreement.  In Green Tree Financial the Vintsons conceded that
their action was related to the transaction as to which they
1050278
10
had signed the arbitration clause; similarly, Reylander
asserts in her complaint that Serra Chevrolet "owed a duty to
its employees and customers to ensure that its employees,
agents and servants were adequately trained, educated and
supervised so as not to act in an inappropriate manner with
other employees or customers."  By referring to herself as a
customer, Reylander concedes that her claims against Serra
Chevrolet are related to her purchase of an automobile from
Serra Chevrolet.  See also Potts v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc.,
853 So. 2d at 202  (holding that the arbitration agreement was
enforceable in cases invoking intentional-tort claims brought
by a nurse against her hospital-employer). 
The dispute 
"aris[es] out of or [is] related to [the] contract,
(including but not limited to the terms of the
agreement, the condition of the motor vehicle sold,
the conformity of the motor vehicle sold to the
contract, 
the 
representations, 
promises,
undertakings or covenants made by Seller, Inc. in
connection with the sale of the motor vehicle, or
otherwise dealing with the motor vehicle ...)."
  
Hardy was driving Reylander to have the automobile she had
purchased repaired in accordance with the terms of the
purchase agreement when he allegedly harassed her sexually.
Reylander's claims against Serra Chevrolet thus "arise
1050278
11
directly out of her purchase transaction with [Serra
Chevrolet]." Dan Wachtel Ford, 
Lincoln, 
Mercury, 
Inc., 
891 So.
2d at 293.  Serra Chevrolet's agreement to have the automobile
repaired "was part of the negotiations involved in the
purchase and financing of the [automobile].  Thus the language
used in the arbitration agreement[] is broad enough to
encompass 
[Reylander's] 
claims." 
Ex 
parte 
Bill 
Heard
Chevrolet, Inc., 927 So. 2d 792, 802 (Ala. 2005).  This case
is governed by our analysis in Green Tree Financial, and the
arbitration provision in this case covers Reylander's claims
against Serra Chevrolet alleging negligent hiring and
negligent supervision and asserting vicarious liability.
In the trial court, Reylander cited Fountain Finance,
Inc. v. Hines, 788 So. 2d 155, 158 (Ala. 2000), in which
Lavonne Hines and others sued Fountain Finance, Inc., and Jim
Skinner Ford, Inc., alleging "various intentional torts, all
arising out of an apparently serious altercation on the Hines
property 'in the early morning hours' of July 7, 1999." 788
So. 2d at 158.  Fountain Finance and Jim Skinner Ford moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement Hines
allegedly had signed when she purchased a car from Jim Skinner
1050278
Although Fountain Finance and Jim Skinner Ford stated
1
that the claims arose out of a repossession of the automobile
the purchase of which was the subject of the arbitration
agreement, this Court noted that "'[m]otions and arguments of
counsel are not evidence'" and that the only evidence of
record was an affidavit that "conspicuously fail[ed] to
address the factual basis out of which the plaintiffs' claims
arise."  788 So. 2d at 159.
12
Ford.  The purchase contract was later assigned to Fountain
Finance.  Although the arbitration agreement was a broad one,
it applied only to disputes "resulting from or arising out of
the sale transaction."  788 So. 2d at 160 (See, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).  Fountain Finance and Jim
Skinner Ford did not show that the altercation that occurred
on the Hineses' property had anything to do with the purchase
of the car; thus, "they failed to satisfy their burden of
proof on the question whether the arbitration agreement
covered the plaintiffs' claims."   788 So. 2d at 159.  Where
1
the arbitration agreement requires a nexus, it "cannot be
'enforced to require arbitration of a claim alleging an
intentional tort that in no way relates to the underlying
transaction that gave rise to the arbitration agreement.'
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Shoemaker, 775 So. 2d 149, 151 n. 3
1050278
Note 3 in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Shoemaker says:
2
"At best, this case and Vintson have severely limited the
holding in Ex parte Discount Foods[, Inc., 789 So. 2d 842
(Ala. 2001)].  Ex parte Discount Foods can now stand only for
the proposition that an arbitration clause should not be
enforced to require arbitration of a claim alleging an
intentional tort that is in no way related to the underlying
transaction that gave rise to the arbitration agreement."  In
Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So. 2d 842, 845-46 (Ala.
2001), this Court specifically "disapprove[d]" the principle
"that 
intentional 
torts 
unrelated 
to 
the 
underlying
transaction that gave rise to the arbitration agreement can
never be encompassed in a broad arbitration provision."  We
held that a "broad enough" arbitration provision may encompass
"even 
those 
claims 
based 
on 
allegations 
of 
wrongful
intentional conduct that does not relate to the contract
containing the arbitration provision."  789 So. 2d at 846
(footnote omitted).  
13
(Ala. 2000)."   Fountain Finance, Inc., 788 So. 2d at 158.
2
The case before us, unlike Fountain Finance, expressly
involves claims that clearly fall within the unambiguous
language of the arbitration provision. 
The present case involves an arbitration provision that
is "broad enough" to encompass Reylander's claims against
Serra Chevrolet, including the intentional-tort claims, and
"[w]hether an arbitration provision encompasses a party's
claims is a matter of contract interpretation.  That
interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, which,
absent ambiguity in the 
arbitration 
provision, 
is 
evidenced by
the plain language of the provision." Ex parte Discount Foods,
1050278
As this Court recently stated:
3
"The freedom of parties to contract is an important
public policy written into the state constitution
and adopted by the people of Alabama. It is a
significant liberty interest that is expressly
protected in the constitution.  This Court has
recognized that '"the state constitution protects
contractual obligations from impairment by the
legislature or the judiciary, and the right of
freedom of contract is a cherished one that courts
are bound to protect."'  Ex parte Life Ins. Co. of
Georgia, 810 So. 2d 744, 751 (Ala. 2001) (quoting
Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala.
1993)).  
"'Even under what may seem to be the
most 
compelling 
circumstances, 
[courts] 
may
not "refine away the terms of the contract
that are expressed with sufficient clarity
to convey the intent and meaning of the
parties." Kinnon v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d [887,] 888 [(Ala.
1982)]. "It is not a function of the courts
to make new contracts for the parties, or
raise doubts where none exist." Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Rose's Stores, 411 So. 2d
122, 124 (Ala. 1982).'" 
Title Max of Birmingham, Inc. v. Edwards, [Ms. 1051140, May
18, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ n.1 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Johnson
v. Cervera, 508 So. 2d 257, 259 (Ala. 1987)).
14
Inc., 789 So. 2d 842, 844 (Ala. 2001).  We are compelled when
interpreting arbitration agreements 
to 
apply 
the same 
rules 
of
contract interpretation that we apply to all other contract
provisions.   The Supreme Court of the United States tells us
3
that "Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration
1050278
15
provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such
provisions be placed 'upon the same footing as other
contracts.'" Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).  Moreover, "'"any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration ...."'" Parkway Dodge, 854 So. 2d at 1132.  The
arbitration provision in this case covers "any dispute"
between Reylander and Serra Chevrolet "arising out of or
related to this contract."  
I would reverse the trial court's denial of Serra
Chevrolet's motion to compel arbitration.  Therefore, I
dissent.
Bolin, J., concurs.