Title: People v. Silveria
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S062417
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DANIEL TODD SILVERIA and JOHN RAYMOND TRAVIS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S062417 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
155731 
 
 
August 13, 2020 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred. 
 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
S062417 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Defendants Daniel Todd Silveria and John Raymond 
Travis were convicted by separate juries1 of the first degree 
murder and second degree robbery of James Madden, and the 
second degree burglary of a LeeWards crafts store.  (Pen. Code,2 
§ 187, subd. (a), former §§ 189, 211, 212.5, subd. (b), 459, 460.2.)  
The juries also found true robbery-murder and burglary-murder 
special-circumstance allegations and an allegation that 
defendants personally used a knife in committing the murder.3  
(Former §§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 12022, subd. (b).)  Silveria was 
also convicted of the second degree robberies of Ben Graber at 
Gavilan Bottle Shop and Ramsis Youssef at Quik Stop Market, 
and stipulated that on May 2, 1995, he had pled guilty to the 
                                        
1  
Defendants were tried jointly before separate juries.   
2 
All further undesignated statutory references are to this 
code. 
3 
Also as to Silveria, a lying-in-wait special-circumstance 
allegation was found not true, and the jury deadlocked on the 
allegation Silveria had used a stun gun and a torture-murder 
special-circumstance allegation.  As to Travis, a torture-murder 
special-circumstance allegation was found not true, and the jury 
deadlocked on the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation.  
After the first penalty trial, the court granted the prosecutor’s 
motion to strike the torture-murder special-circumstance 
allegation as to Silveria and the lying-in-wait special-
circumstance allegation as to Travis.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
 
second degree burglary of Sportsmen’s Supply.  (§§ 211, former 
§§ 212.5, subd. (b), 459, 460, subd. 2.)   
Silveria and Travis also had separate penalty juries.  Each 
jury deadlocked, and the court declared mistrials.  Defendants 
were retried before a single penalty jury, the jury returned 
death verdicts, and the trial court entered judgments of death.  
This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); 
§ 1239, subd. (b).)  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 
judgments.   
I.  FACTS 
On the night of January 28, 1991, Silveria, Travis, 
Christopher Spencer, Matthew Jennings, and Troy Rackley, a 
juvenile, robbed and killed James Madden while he was working 
as the manager of a LeeWards crafts store in Santa Clara 
County.  The indictment charged all four adult perpetrators, but 
the cases of Spencer and Jennings were severed.   
A. Guilt Phase 
During interviews with different law enforcement officers, 
Silveria and Travis waived their Miranda rights, and ultimately 
confessed their involvement in Madden’s murder, including the 
circumstances that both men had stabbed Madden and Silveria 
had used a stun gun on him.  (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
384 U.S. 436, 444–445.)   Silveria also confessed his involvement 
in several other crimes, including the burglary of a gun store in 
which coperpetrator Jennings had obtained a stun gun, the Quik 
Stop robbery, and the robbery of a liquor store on Blossom Hill 
Road in which Silveria had used the stun gun.  Each defendant’s 
statement was played for his jury.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
a. Theft of stun gun and stun gun robberies 
On January 24, 1991, about 1:00 a.m., a PARALI/AZER 
stun gun was taken during a burglary of a Sportsmen’s Supply 
tackle and gun store located in an unincorporated area of Santa 
Clara County.  About an hour later, at 2:20 a.m., Silveria, 
Rackley, and Jennings robbed Ramsis Youssef, a cashier at a 
Quik Stop Market located in San Jose.  Rackley used a stun gun 
on Youssef during the robbery.  A videotape of the crime was 
played for the jury.  About 10:00 p.m. that night, Silveria, 
Rackley, and Jennings robbed Ben Graber, a temporary 
assistant at the Gavilan Bottle Shop, which was located on 
Blossom Hill Road in San Jose.  A stun gun was used on Graber.   
b. Madden’s murder 
Silveria and Travis were hired to work for Madden at the 
LeeWards crafts store on September 3, 1990.  They failed to 
appear for three consecutive scheduled shifts, and were 
permitted to resign rather than be terminated on November 15, 
1990.   
On the night of January 28, 1991, Silveria, Travis, 
Spencer, Jennings, and Rackley drove to LeeWards to rob the 
store.  Madden’s truck was parked in the back lot and Spencer 
slashed the tire in order to prevent Madden from leaving.  
Silveria and Travis watched the front of the store until the last 
customer and the cleaning crew had left and Madden had locked 
the front doors.  Silveria and Spencer then surprised Madden as 
he left the store by the back door.  Madden was led back inside 
and ordered to turn off the store alarm.  He was unsuccessful in 
doing so, and the alarm was triggered at 10:53 p.m.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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Silveria instructed Madden to open the safe and remove 
the money.  The money was placed into a duffel bag.  Silveria 
and Travis bound Madden’s hands and feet respectively 
together with silver duct tape.  At 11:02 p.m., a Honeywell 
Protection Services operator dispatcher called Madden, and he 
gave her the pass card number to clear the alarm.  Madden’s 
mouth was then taped.  Silveria held the duffel bag and 
repeatedly said, “Let’s go.”  Travis said, “[N]o,” and told Spencer 
to kill Madden.   Spencer slit Madden’s throat with a knife, and 
he and Travis repeatedly stabbed Madden.  Silveria then 
stabbed Madden once, and used the stun gun on him.  The five 
perpetrators fled to a Redwood City motel where they divided 
the money from the robbery.   
About 8:00 a.m. the next morning, Madden’s body was 
discovered in the store.  Travis later told law enforcement 
officers that all of the perpetrators knew when they went to 
LeeWards they would have to kill Madden.  The perpetrators 
chose LeeWards because it excited everyone to kill Madden.  If 
one of the female supervisors had been present instead, Travis 
would have simply tied her up because he “got along with all the 
women over there.”   
Later that day Silveria purchased a Honda Civic and he 
and Travis purchased a Datsun 280Z; both vehicle down 
payments were in cash.  On a Tuesday in January 1991, Silveria 
showed his friend Gregg Orlando a wad of cash, and said, “We 
killed somebody last night.”  On the night of January 29, 1991, 
Silveria and Travis were arrested in the Oakridge Mall parking 
lot.  A PARALI/AZER stun gun, silver duct tape, and $694 were 
found in Silveria’s vehicle.   
The cause of Madden’s death was 32 stab wounds to his 
neck, chest, and abdomen.  Forensic pathologist Dr. Parviz 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
 
Pakdaman, who performed Madden’s autopsy, opined Madden 
was alive when some of the wounds to his neck and chest were 
inflicted.  Dr. Robert Stratbucker, a medical doctor and 
biomedical engineer, testified that a stun gun generally causes 
“a very intense kind of . . . sharp pain.”   
2. Defense Evidence 
In Silveria’s statement to police, he told officers that he 
had placed jeans, L.A. Gear shoes, and a T-shirt that he had 
worn during Madden’s murder in an Oakridge Mall garbage can.  
At trial, Silveria called only one witness, Elizabeth Skinner, a 
Santa Clara County crime lab criminalist, apparently to 
attempt to demonstrate that Silveria had a minimal role in the 
murder.  Skinner testified that she had received from the Santa 
Clara Police Department a T-shirt, Levi’s, and a pair of L.A. 
Gear shoes, that she was told were found in an Oakridge Mall 
dumpster, to test for the presence of blood.  No blood was 
detected on the T-shirt or the shoes.  A small spot on the Levi’s 
tested presumptively positive for the presence of blood, but 
Skinner could not ascertain whether the stain was human blood.  
Skinner also tested shoes and jeans that she had been told had 
been collected at some point from Travis.  She found human 
blood on the shoes and inside a front pocket of the jeans.   
Travis presented no defense evidence. 
B. Penalty Retrial 
Many of the individuals discussed in the testimony shared 
the same surname, so for clarity, we use first names to identify 
certain witnesses.  
1. Prosecution Evidence 
Much of the guilt phase evidence regarding Madden’s 
murder, the Sportsmen’s Supply burglary, and the Graber and 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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Youssef stun gun robberies was introduced at the 1997 penalty 
retrial.  Evidence of Travis’s 1990 first degree burglary 
conviction was also admitted.  (Former §§ 459, 460, subd. 1.)  
a. Silveria’s former testimony 
Silveria’s statement to law enforcement was not admitted, 
but portions of Silveria’s first penalty phase testimony were 
read to the jury.   
Silveria had worked at LeeWards from early September 
1990 to Thanksgiving of 1990, and was instrumental in Travis 
being hired there.  At times during this period, Silveria was 
homeless and used marijuana and methamphetamine.   
Silveria described Madden as “just a really nice guy.”  
Madden’s wife and young daughter occasionally visited him at 
the store.  Silveria was terminated by Madden because of his 
work absences, but Madden allowed him to resign so that his 
future employment would not be adversely affected.  Silveria 
then went to work at Toys “R” Us apparently for the Christmas 
holiday season.   
On January 26, 1991, the Saturday before the capital 
crime was committed, Travis was adamant that “Madden 
[would] need[] to be killed because he could identify us.”   
Silveria saw no need for anyone in the store to be harmed, and 
was “taken aback,” and immediately protested.  Silveria and 
Travis debated the point.  Silveria was feeling “horribly sick” 
that night, and left the discussion to lie down.  His illness was 
not related to the discussion of killing Madden.   
On Sunday, January 27, while Silveria was still “very 
sick,” the topic of killing Madden arose again.  Spencer held a 
knife and said he would be willing to stab Madden.  Silveria did 
not intend to kill Madden and did not believe his coperpetrators 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
 
would actually do so because they were not generally violent.  
Although Silveria initially suggested wearing disguises, the 
perpetrators did not do so.  Silveria was ultimately not 
concerned if he was identified during the robbery because he 
planned to immediately flee the area.  On Sunday night, 
Silveria, Travis, and the others drove to LeeWards to commit 
the robbery, but the store had already closed.   
Silveria’s description of the murder was similar to his 
statement to law enforcement introduced at the guilt phase.  In 
addition, Silveria testified that on the night of Monday, January 
28, 1991, Silveria was armed with a stun gun, Travis a hammer, 
Spencer a fillet knife, Rackley a hand device with leather spikes, 
and Jennings a crowbar.  At one point Silveria entered the store 
to see who was working that night.   
When Madden left the store, and Silveria and the others 
confronted him, Madden recognized Silveria, and appeared to 
calm down, saying, “Oh Danny, oh, it’s you, Danny.”  Silveria 
told him to turn off the store alarm.  Madden pleaded with 
Silveria that he not be hurt, and Silveria said:  “We are not here 
to hurt you.  We just want the money.”  Silveria described 
Madden turning off the alarm, obtaining the money from the 
safe, being restrained in a chair by the perpetrators, speaking 
with the alarm company, and the perpetrators taping Madden’s 
mouth.   
Silveria fired the stun gun at Madden’s leg twice, once for 
a long period of time in an effort to render him unconscious.  
Madden made sounds like “somebody . . . trying to scream 
through tape,” and his legs jerked.  Silveria then picked up the 
duffel bag and said several times, “Let’s go.”  Travis told 
Spencer, “Kill him.”  Madden said, “No, no” through the tape.  
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
 
Spencer looked uncertain, and Travis repeated, “Kill him.”  
Spencer repeatedly stabbed Madden in the chest, and then at 
Travis’s direction, cut Madden’s throat.   Silveria was numb with 
disbelief and did nothing to stop the attack except perhaps to 
once more say, “Let’s go.”  Travis then stabbed Madden about 
five times, and handed the knife to Silveria, saying, “[I]t’s your 
turn.”  At that point Madden was slumped over in the chair and 
appeared to be unconscious.  Silveria initially protested, but 
then took the knife and stabbed Madden once, plunging the 
knife in all the way up to its hilt.  Travis then resumed stabbing 
Madden.  Silveria agreed with the prosecutor that Madden had 
been “tortured,” but did not believe he had “tortured 
Mr. Madden by legal definition.”   
After the attack ended, Madden fell over in the chair.  
Silveria felt a slight pulse in Madden’s neck, and they left.  As 
they drove away, Silveria and others described the robbery as a 
success.  Silveria said saying this made him feel “like crap” 
because he had just participated in killing someone.  After 
Silveria’s arrest, he assisted law enforcement in apprehending 
Spencer and Jennings.    
Silveria did not believe causing Madden pain with the 
stun gun was “right,” and felt “horrible” for doing it.  He felt 
“sick” about participating in Madden’s murder, and “horrible” 
about the effect of the murder on Madden’s family.   Silveria did 
not feel that anything that had happened to him in his life was 
an excuse for what he did on the night of Madden’s murder, but 
rather that he “should be held accountable for what [he] did,” 
and “deserve[d] whatever punishment [was] given to” him.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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b. Other prosecution evidence  
Dr.  Pakdaman testified that Madden had suffered 
32 “slash-like superficial cuts” that were skin-deep and “stab-
like wounds” in his neck, chest, and abdomen.   Six stab wounds 
penetrated Madden’s heart.  Other stab wounds penetrated his 
lungs, fracturing two ribs, and his liver and trachea.  He was 
alive after his trachea was cut, although his breathing was 
impaired.  Dr. Stratbucker testified that marks made by the 
stun gun on Madden’s thigh were inflicted while he was alive.   
California Men’s Colony Correctional Lieutenant Jackie 
Graham testified that in September 1991, Charles “Tex” 
Watson, a member of the “Charles Manson Family,” was a 
prisoner at the colony.  On about September 20, 1991, a letter 
from Travis to Watson was intercepted.4   
The prosecution also introduced victim impact testimony.  
Shirley “Sissy” Madden testified that she and Madden were 
married in 1979.  Madden was a kind and loving husband, and 
made Sissy feel cherished and safe.  Their daughter Julie was 
born in 1984, and Madden was a wonderful father.    
Sissy testified regarding seeing Madden for the last time 
several hours before his murder.  On January 28, 1991, about 
6:30 p.m., Sissy and Julie, then seven years old, made an 
unplanned visit to Madden at LeeWards, but declined his dinner 
invitation because Julie had school the next day.    
Susan Thuringer, Sissy’s coworker at the University of 
California at Santa Cruz, testified Sissy arrived late to work the 
following morning, distraught because Madden had not come 
home and she did not know where he was.  Later that morning 
                                        
4 
The letter was further described by Travis in his penalty 
phase retrial defense testimony.  (See post, at pp. 29–30.) 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
 
Thuringer learned from police about Madden’s murder.  
Thuringer told Sissy, and she and her coworkers restrained 
Sissy as she screamed and cried.  Police arrived, and Thuringer 
and her supervisor, Kay House, and an officer accompanied 
Sissy home.  James Douglas Sykes II, Madden’s brother-in-law, 
testified that later that day he and Sissy picked up Julie at 
school.  When they arrived home, Sissy took Julie upstairs to tell 
her about Madden’s death.  Sykes heard an “excruciating[ly] 
painful waning scream” from Julie.   
Testimony regarding the effect of Madden’s death on Sissy 
and Julie was also introduced.  Sissy testified, “I loved my 
husband so much and I feel so lonely and empty without 
him. . . . I miss him terribly.”   Sissy’s brother, Eric Lindstrand, 
testified that Sissy was “devastated,” and “a good part of her life” 
at the time of his testimony was “just a big, sad open wound.”  
Julie was “a blessing” who kept Sissy “going.”  Madden’s mother, 
Joan Madden, said that since Madden’s death, Sissy had gained 
at least 30 pounds, and suffered from depression and psoriasis 
induced by stress.   
Sissy testified that Julie had slept with her every night for 
the first year after Madden’s death, and had been in therapy for 
nearly six years.  She suffered from panic attacks and 
stomachaches so severe “she feels like she is going to die.”  Eric 
testified that Julie was so frightened by her father’s murder that 
for a long time she would not let Sissy out of her sight even to 
use a restroom, and her development regressed five or six years.  
She had also struggled academically.  Joan testified she once 
took Julie shopping for a Mother’s Day gift, and Julie asked, 
“You know, Grandma, what I really, really want?”  Joan said, 
“No,” and Julie said, “I wish[] you only died for one day.”   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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Family members also described their own loss.  Judith 
Sykes, Madden’s older sister, testified that Madden had been 
her only sibling.  They were close, and she described Madden as 
a strong, but kind and gentle person who had cared for his 
family.  When asked if the passage of time had lessened the 
impact of Madden’s death, she said that because Madden had 
been “murdered senselessly and brutally. . . . the closure is not 
the same . . . [a]nd there’s something about it you . . . just can’t 
get past. . . . [I]t’s not like losing someone from a heart attack.”  
Their mother Joan often said that “the joy in her life [was] gone,” 
and she was now overly protective of Judith.   
Eric described Madden as a close friend and “good man” 
who had generously shared his time to help Eric and who had 
enjoyed life.  Eric said living without Madden has “been hell for 
me,” and described it as “learning to live without a heart . . . . 
[or] without your legs.  You learn how to survive.  If you’re lucky, 
you learn how to try and not let your life be ruined.”    
2. Defense Evidence 
a. Silveria 
(1) Background and character witnesses 
Silveria, who was born on December 22, 1969, was 
21 years old at the time of the January 1991 crime.  He 
presented numerous witnesses who testified regarding his 
childhood and his behavior in jail after commission of the capital 
crime.   
Silveria had an older sister Lenae, an older brother S.S., 
and a younger brother Michael.  Silveria’s father, Daniel 
Silveria (Daniel), a long-haul trucker, was often away from 
home.  He brought gifts to Lenae when he returned and was 
affectionate to her.  By contrast, he showed no affection to 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
 
Silveria, S.S., or their mother B.S., and was frequently 
physically abusive to them.  In April 1974, when Silveria was 
four years old, Daniel left the family, and Silveria had little 
contact with him until Silveria was about 19 years old.   
In February 1976, when Silveira was six years old, at 
B.S.’s request he and S.S. were declared dependents of the court.  
B.S. retained custody of Lenae and Michael.  Lenae recalled that 
after Silveria and S.S. were declared court dependents, B.S., an 
alcoholic, began to drink excessively, staying out all night and 
coming home drunk.   
Silveria lived in foster homes for nearly all of his 
remaining childhood.  Two foster families, the Garcias and the 
Gambles, were nurturing and emotionally and financially 
supportive.  In two other families, the Heberts and the Georges, 
however, Silveria was sexually abused and emotionally 
neglected.   
Linda Cortez, a Santa Clara County Department of Social 
Services social worker, supervised the Silveria family, including 
Silveria, S.S., Lenae, and Michael from March 1976 until the 
end of 1981.5  During this time Silveria was a sweet and likeable 
child, who was eager to please.   
Silveria was first placed for about a year in the home of 
Marcus and Lorain Garcia, where he was well-treated and 
thrived.  When Silveria was about seven years old, the Garcias 
moved out of Santa Clara County, and he joined S.S. in the 
Hebert foster family.   
                                        
5 
Many of Cortez’s department of social services reports 
could not be located at the time of her testimony and had 
presumably been destroyed.   
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Mark Hebert, worked as a civilian for the Navy, and his 
wife Evelyn Hebert was a nurse.  Dean Hebert, who was about 
three years older than Silveria, testified that his father 
Mr. Hebert was an alcoholic, who when drunk became verbally 
abusive.  Mr. Hebert would not engage with Dean, his older 
brother Mark, Silveria, or S.S., and would only speak to “put 
somebody down or just to yell at somebody.”  His mother, Mrs. 
Hebert, inflicted physical punishment on Silveria.    
Dean frequently beat Silveria, once burned him with 
matches, and once placed a pillow over Silveria’s face until he 
could no longer breathe or scream.  When Silveria was 11 years 
old, Dean forced him to perform oral and anal sex.   
Robert Ector, Silveria’s fourth grade teacher at the time 
Silveria lived with the Heberts, testified that Silveria was an 
average or below average student who worked hard and wanted 
to please Ector.  Silveria was intelligent, but had “suffered . . . 
academically” apparently because of a lack of parental support 
with his schoolwork.  That was unusual in the “solidly middle-
class community.”  Silveria frequently volunteered to stay after 
school to perform small tasks for Ector, and on field trips he 
“always wanted to be near my side.”   
Between 1976 and 1981, Silveria’s father visited him once.  
B.S. visited Silveria about three times a year, and once cared for 
him for several days after he had wandering eye surgery.   
In late 1980 or early 1981, Cortez told B.S. that if she did 
not become actively involved in returning Silveria home by 
establishing a visitation plan, Cortez would locate a long-term 
placement for him.  The ensuing visits were successful, and 
Silveria was scheduled to return to live with his mother in June 
1981.   
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During a visit home in April 1981, Silveria told his mother, 
and then Cortez, that Dean had molested him.  Cortez 
determined that Silveria should not return to the Heberts, but 
should stay in his mother’s care.  Silveria did not receive therapy 
as a result of the molestation report.  His dependency case was 
later dismissed.   
In the fall of 1981, when Lenae was about 14 years old, she 
moved in with the nearby family of her friend Tasha Guimmond, 
whose father Richard Guimmond was the assistant and resident 
manager of the apartment complex in which the Silverias lived.  
Richard Guimmond described their neighborhood as a “ghetto.”  
When Lenae visited her family, she observed B.S. continued to 
go out drinking, and failed to exercise control over Silveria.  The 
Guimmonds and Lenae moved out of the complex in about 1983, 
and Lenae did not speak to Silveria until late 1990.    
In April 1982 then San Jose Police Officer Michael George 
(George) brought 12-year-old Silveria home to live with him, his 
wife Deborah, and their children.  Silveria lived with the 
Georges for about eight months.   Deborah displayed no affection 
for Silveria.  George was attentive to Silveria, even more so than 
to his biological family.    
Defense investigator Daniel DeSantis testified that in 
about April 1996 he learned that George, who had also served 
as a Clearlake police officer, had in May 1996 been convicted in 
Lake County of 11 counts of child molestation for crimes 
committed against a different child.  (§ 288, subd. (a).) On 
October 3, 1996, DeSantis and Silveria’s defense counsel 
interviewed George in prison.  George expressed concern for his 
life because he was a former police officer and a convicted child 
molester, and said he did not expect to leave prison alive.  
George admitted that when Silveria lived with him, George had 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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on different occasions given Silveria rum and coke and then 
molested him by engaging in “mutual masturbation and oral 
copulation.”   George expressed remorse for what he had done to 
Silveria, and agreed to testify at the penalty retrial.   
On February 13, 1997, DeSantis again met with George.  
George was no longer willing to testify, but did not retract his 
earlier statements made during the first interview.   
In May 1983, when Silveria was 13 years old, he left the 
Georges’ home and went to live with the Gambles.  John Gamble 
testified that he and Silveria, whom Gamble identified as his 
brother, were the same age and had met in the sixth grade while 
Silveria was living with the Georges.  Silveria had been a 
peaceful child and John’s best friend.  John’s mother, Patricia 
Gamble, who worked in the family support division of the Santa 
Clara County District Attorney’s Office, testified that Silveria 
moved into their home with only a bird book, a picture of Jesus, 
and clothing so worn much of it had to be discarded.   
The Gambles were loving and supportive of Silveria, and 
treated him like a member of the family.  Silveria was protective 
of John and his younger sister Lisa, and performed additional 
household chores on his own initiative.  Silveria was respectful 
to Patricia and her husband, and called Patricia “Mom.”  He was 
also was good at sports, especially football.   
To assist with Silveria’s separation from his parents, 
Patricia placed him in therapy.  Silveria asked to be removed 
from therapy after six to eight sessions.   
Patricia and Silveria visited B.S. soon after Silveria moved 
in, and Patricia invited her to call and visit Silveria.  B.S. often 
seemed indifferent to Patricia’s and Silveria’s attempts to 
contact her, and showed Silveria little affection when she saw 
him, once not even getting up to greet him when he visited her.   
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Julie Morrella testified she was Silveria’s girlfriend from 
1984 to 1985 when they were 14 to 15 years old.  Silveria was 
loving and attentive, and demonstrated a need for affection.  He 
never mistreated Morrella, and she never saw him be violent.   
In March 1985, when Silveria and John Gamble were 
15 years old, John’s father moved out of the house.  About this 
time, John and Silveria began to smoke marijuana and drink 
alcohol.  Silveria became angry and violent when drunk, and 
once lay on the kitchen floor kicking and screaming, “I hate this 
shit.”  On a different occasion he cut up the kitchen cabinets 
with a knife.   
When Silveria was 15 and a half years old, Patricia took 
Silveria without protest to juvenile hall for several days because 
of his alcohol abuse.  She again provided Silveria with 
counseling for about a month until Silveria was sent to the boys 
ranch in Morgan Hill for about five months for violating his 
probation by drinking.  Patricia visited him every weekend until 
he was allowed to come home on weekends.  Patricia invited 
B.S., Silveria’s mother, on several occasions to join her on these 
visits to the boys ranch, but B.S. declined.  After Silveria 
returned home from the ranch, and before July 1987, he was 
placed into a group home in Soquel until he was about 18 years 
old because of his alcohol use.   
In February 1988, when Silveria and John were about 
18 years old, Patricia moved to Sacramento.  Silveria lived with 
Patricia intermittently from 1988 to 1989.  John visited Silveria 
numerous times in Sacramento and observed his mother 
continued to love and support Silveria.  In the fall of 1989, while 
living in Sacramento, Silveria slit his wrists, received medical 
attention, and Patricia sent him back to San Jose to live.  She 
did not see him again until after his arrest.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
 
Also at some point in 1988 to 1989, Silveria lived in Gilroy 
for several months with his cousin Geraldine Macias and her 
husband, both postal service workers, and their two young 
children.  During this period, Daniel, Silveria’s biological father 
and Geraldine’s uncle, also lived in Gilroy.   Geraldine trusted 
Silveria — but not Daniel — to babysit her children.   
After Silveria left Geraldine’s home, he lived for at least 
six months with Daniel in Gilroy.  They used “crank” 
(methamphetamine) and marijuana.  Daniel was physically 
abusive to Silveria, and Silveria eventually moved out after 
Daniel broke Silveria’s nose.   
In August 1990, Patricia Gamble was contacted by an 
Army recruiter for Silveria’s diploma because Silveria was 
trying to enlist.  Later that year, Lenae happened to work with 
Silveria at Toys “R” Us for the holiday season.  During that time, 
Lenae observed Silveria lost weight, developed acne and poor 
hygiene, and appeared to be using drugs.   
Patricia visited Silveria frequently after his January 1991 
arrest.  Silveria told her he had stabbed Madden.  On several 
occasions Silveria said that he was sorry, was praying for the 
Madden family, and “knows how it feels to grow up without a 
father and that it hurt him to know that Julie [Madden’s 
daughter] now would not have a father to grow up with.”   
In 1991, Silveria and Patricia both studied the Bible and 
shared with each other what they had learned.  Silveria’s 
biblical knowledge and insight appeared to increase over time.  
He exhibited “an excitement and a real joy about what he was 
learning.”  In late 1993 she stopped visiting Silveria, but 
eventually resumed communicating with him by letter.  Patricia 
loved Silveria because “there was something very good in him, 
something very sad . . . . I see that value.”   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
 
Morrella also visited Silveria in jail frequently for about a 
year from 1991 to 1992, and later resumed visits.  Silveria was 
initially cold to her and his physical appearance was poor.   Over 
time, his demeanor and physical appearance improved.  
Morrella was now a Christian, and at one point during her visits 
she and Silveria began to discuss religion.  Silveria was very 
excited during these discussions, would quote scriptures, and 
would often bring a Bible or Christian book to their meetings.   
Silveria told Morrella he felt “very bad about the fact that 
Julie,” Madden’s young daughter, “was going to grow up without 
a father.”   Silveria said “he had been praying for the family and 
that he . . . felt terrible and that he was just continuously 
praying for them.  He was very remorseful.”   Silveria did not 
tell Morrella he had stabbed and used a stun gun on Madden.  
Morrella believed Silveria was a loving and valuable person who 
had “done a lot of good[] things.”   
John Gamble had visited Silveria about five times in the 
six years since Silveria had been incarcerated, and had never 
spoken to him on the telephone.  John loved Silveria and enjoyed 
his visits with him.  Lenae testified that she loved Silveria, and 
believed that “[f]rom [d]ay one he never had a fair shot.  He’s 
pretty much struggled ever since he came into this world.”   
Several officers testified regarding Silveria’s behavior in 
jail.  Santa Clara County Correctional Officer Victor Bergado 
testified that when Silveria was first incarcerated, he appeared 
to be “emotionless,” a “hard person” who “didn’t really . . . say 
much to anybody.”  Three to four months later, during a random 
check, Officer Bergado observed Silveria kneeling with his arms 
over his bunk.  Officer Bergado asked if Silveria was “Okay.”  
Silveria turned his head toward the officer and appeared 
distraught.  He explained he had been praying, and said, “I’m 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
 
just really . . . sad . . . for the family of the victim.”  He was 
“asking for forgiveness and he’s sorry for what he did and he 
feels sorry for the family of his victim and his family.”  Officer 
Bergado and Silveria discussed their shared Christian beliefs.  
Periodically thereafter for several years, they had discussed 
Christianity and lessons Silveria had learned from the Bible.  
Silveria was well-behaved and shared commissary items with 
other inmates.   
Former Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Deputy Patrick 
Doyle testified that several months after Silveria had been 
incarcerated, he began to ask Deputy Doyle, a former 
missionary who was referred to by inmates and deputies as 
“Father Doyle,” questions about the Bible and started a Bible 
study group.  Deputy Doyle believed Silveria’s Christian faith 
was sincere because of his conduct, joyfulness, and the 
frequency with which Deputy Doyle observed him kneeling by 
his bunk.  Silveria did not engage in physical altercations with 
other inmates, commit assaults on correctional staff, or display 
behavioral problems.  He had not been caught possessing 
weapons, drugs, or alcohol.   
Department of Corrections Officer Lauren Dennehy 
testified that Silveria was intelligent, cooperative, and 
volunteered for additional jobs.  Silveria appeared to go out of 
his way to welcome new inmates, and at Officer Dennehy’s 
request, had provided orientation for inmates new to the 
module.  Santa Clara County Correctional Officer Edwin 
Lausten observed that Silveria was empathetic to other 
inmates, and had appeared to twice successfully intervene with 
inmates who were struggling emotionally.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
 
(2) Expert witnesses 
Reverend Leo Charon testified he had worked in the Santa 
Clara jail for 15 years.  He had not previously testified on behalf 
of any inmates other than Silveria and Travis.  (See post, 
pt. I.B.2.b.2.)   
Reverend Charon had known Silveria, whom he met when 
Silveria started attending his jail Bible study, for about five 
years.  Silveria asked thoughtful questions in Bible study, had 
requested different Bible versions to compare text, and had 
studied Greek to read parts of the Bible in its original tongue.  
Silveria’s spiritual gift was teaching, and he wanted to use that 
gift to help other inmates.  Reverend Charon believed it “would 
be very difficult” to feign the level of study and depth of interest 
Silveria had shown over the years in Christianity.   
About a year after starting Bible study, Silveria began to 
meet individually with Reverend Charon.  Silveria had 
displayed “brokenness,” a process whereby one honestly 
confesses sins and feels true sorrow for them.   Silveria had told 
Reverend Charon he had stabbed Madden, and had used a stun 
gun on him.  They periodically discussed Silveria’s remorse 
about Madden’s murder, and Silveria’s concern for Madden’s 
wife and family.   
Dr. Harry Kormos, a psychiatrist at the University of 
California Hospital in San Francisco and Alta Bates Hospital in 
Berkeley, conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Silveria, and 
testified as an expert on the effects of childhood neglect and 
abuse on the development of adult personality.  Dr. Kormos had 
interviewed Silveria 12 to 15 times in 1993 and 1995, and had 
reviewed Silveria’s former testimony concerning his life until he 
was 21 years old, summaries of other testimony, case 
statements of fact, investigative reports, witness interviews, 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
 
Silveria’s birth medical records, and a report regarding 
Silveria’s psychological tests.  Silveria told Dr. Kormos he did 
not want “anything about his past to be used in a way to excuse 
what he had done because he didn’t feel that there was an 
excuse.”   
Dr. Kormos opined that Silveria did not suffer from manic-
depressive 
illness, 
an 
antisocial 
personality 
disorder, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, conduct disorder, organic brain 
damage, fetal alcohol syndrome, or subnormal intelligence.  He 
did suffer from child neglect, and alcohol and methamphetamine 
addiction.   
Dr. Kormos described child neglect as a long-term 
situation in which the child did not receive the support 
necessary for normal development, and in addition was 
mistreated by “those charged with [the child’s] well-being.”  Low 
self-esteem and decreased ability to delay gratification were 
general issues often seen in those neglected during childhood.  
Depression, drug addiction, and delinquency were negative 
outcomes that “can be traced back to a situation of child neglect.”   
In Dr. Kormos’s view, Silveria had never bonded with his 
parents.   Silveria had only two memories of his father while the 
family was intact.  In one, his father responded to Silveria 
spilling food by violently throwing him down a flight of stairs.  
In the other, Silveria brought home a stray dog, and his father 
killed it by repeatedly hitting it with a shovel.  Dr. Kormos 
concluded Silveria was likely traumatized by his father’s 
violence.  Silveria acknowledged problems with his parents, but 
nevertheless retained “a positive image of both his mother and 
his father.”   
Silveria told Dr. Kormos that he had also been sexually 
abused by Dean Hebert’s older brother Mark.  Dr. Kormos 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
 
compared the constant and severe punishments, sexual abuse, 
and shaming or tormenting inflicted on Silveria at the Hebert 
home to a concentration camp.  He explained, “[T]he person 
subjected to this feels terrorized, feels threatened every day, has 
nowhere to turn and is completely in the power of the persons in 
charge who are not concerned about [his] well-being in any way.”  
Silveria told Dr. Kormos he had no way of knowing his 
experience at the Heberts was abnormal, and also assumed that 
if he complained, worse punishment would occur.  In 
Dr. Kormos’s view, psychological therapy was indicated for 
Silveria when he reported Dean Hebert’s sexual abuse and was 
removed from the Hebert home.   
Dr. Kormos opined that Silveria’s molestation by Police 
Officer George would have made it difficult for him to “correctly 
interpret the nature of authority and of legal behavior.”  Silveria 
told Dr. Kormos that “it had always been useless for him to 
dwell on problems that had occurred in his life . . . because there 
was . . . nothing that he could possibly do about it.  So . . . the 
best thing to do would be to try and push it out of his mind which 
is really a very primitive, a very impaired way of dealing with 
reality.”   
Dr. Kormos was of the view that Silveria, Travis, Spencer, 
and Jennings “were quite close due to the fact that they were all 
very much . . . in need of emotional support.”  They helped each 
other by being together and it was “almost like they were trying 
to make up an artificial, a pseudo-family.”   
Dr. Kormos further opined that the older a child gets, the 
less likely it is that positive intervention will reverse earlier 
damage.  Dr. Kormos was of the view that “there was an unusual 
accumulation of negative factors in this particular case, more 
than you would ordinarily see on the average.”  He agreed with 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
 
defense counsel that a person with Silveria’s background of 
failure to bond with either biological parent, and his experiences 
of neglect, abandonment, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and 
emotional abuse, would be impaired in his ability to make 
rational choices later in life, because “there would likely be such 
distortions in his views of the world that his decisions are likely 
to be skewed.”  He subsequently added, “I think their entire 
world view would be impaired, and that would certainly have an 
effect on all decisions they make.”  He also testified that a “solid 
majority” of persons who had suffered abuse similar to that 
suffered by Mr. Silveria “would indeed suffer from severe 
psychiatric and psychological problems,” including criminality, 
later in life.   
James Park, a former San Quentin associate warden, 
testified as an expert on prison classification and on the security 
for prisoners serving sentences of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  Park described the four security “levels” of 
prisons, with level four being the most secure prisons.   
Park stated that a person serving a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole “will never be 
paroled,” but could earn credits that would allow him or her to 
be considered for incarceration in a level three prison.  Park 
observed that life imprisonment prisoners were required to 
work, and could receive an education, play sports, have a 
television, and purchase books and magazines, but were denied 
conjugal visits.   
In 1995, Park interviewed Silveria, and reviewed capital 
crime fact summaries and Silveria’s jail records up to the 
summer of 1995.  Silveria displayed a “positive and productive” 
outlook, and had spent his jail time constructively by studying.  
Park had seen no evidence that Silveria had been involved with 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
 
drugs or weapons while incarcerated, and his infractions while 
incarcerated had created no danger to jail personnel or other 
inmates.  Park opined that if Silveria were serving a sentence of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, he would 
“make a good adjustment,” and would not be “a threat or a 
danger to other staff or other inmates.”  “[I]n short I think he 
will be a substantially better than average prisoner.”   
b. Travis 
(1) Travis’s background 
Travis, his mother Pamela M., and his younger sister D.S., 
described Travis’s childhood.  Pamela married Travis’s father, 
John Travis, Sr., in about November 1967.  Travis was born in 
December 1969.  Pamela did not drink alcohol or take any 
nonprescription drugs while she was pregnant with Travis.  D.S. 
was born in 1973.   
John, Sr. abused alcohol and was unfaithful to Pamela.  
Once when Pamela was seven months pregnant with D.S., he 
was physically violent with Pamela, punching her in the 
stomach and face, leaving extensive bruising, and causing her 
to bleed.  He never physically abused Travis.   
During the first five years of Travis’s life, John, Sr., was a 
good financial provider, but never told Travis he loved him, or 
hugged or kissed Travis.  In late 1974 or early 1975, when Travis 
was about five years old, Pamela separated from John, Sr.  For 
about two years she, Travis, and D.S. lived with relatives, other 
than a few months in 1975 when they lived with Larry Holly.  In 
1976, Pamela — who was pregnant with Holly’s son Joseph — 
Travis, and D.S. moved to an apartment on Bendorf Drive in 
San Jose that was filled with roaches and had leaks that caused 
the ceiling to disintegrate.  John, Sr., had no relationship with 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
 
his children and provided financial support only when “ordered 
to.”   
Travis and D.S. recalled that Pamela was loving, 
supportive, and a “very good mom” who worked hard to support 
the family.  Pamela testified that she did not use drugs or abuse 
alcohol.  The family was religious and held “family devotions” or 
Bible study.  Travis had been baptized and attended church and 
Sunday school.  He attended religious youth classes at the Los 
Gatos Christian Church until he was about 15 years old.   
During elementary school, Travis was responsible for 
getting himself and D.S. to school because his mother worked at 
night and was asleep in the morning.  When Travis came home 
from school, his mother was at work, so he would make dinner, 
and would occasionally put D.S. and Joseph to bed when their 
mother worked late.   
When Travis was seven years old he began smoking 
marijuana.  He began drinking alcohol before the age of 14, and 
perhaps at 10 or 11.   
In 1979, when Travis was about 10 years old, Pamela 
married Joseph Carvalho, and the family’s financial situation 
improved.  Carvalho often took Travis fishing and treated him 
as his own son, but was physically violent when inflicting 
discipline.  Carvalho disciplined Travis for minor infractions by 
spanking his bare bottom with a belt or cutting board, once 
breaking a one-inch thick cutting board on Travis’s backside.  
Pamela never intervened.   
Carvalho and Pamela frequently fought over finances, and 
their verbal arguments generally escalated into physical fights.  
Travis once saw Carvalho pick up Pamela and slam her body 
onto a table.  Travis felt intimidated and helpless.  When Travis 
was 14, he came home to see Carvalho and Pamela wrestling, 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
 
and Carvalho pin Pamela down and hit her.  Travis intervened, 
and Carvalho and Travis fought until Carvalho pushed Travis’s 
head through a sheetrock wall.   
In about 1981, when D.S. and Carvalho’s daughter S. were 
both about eight years old, and Travis was at least 12 years old, 
Carvalho was arrested for molesting D.S. and S.  Travis was 
devastated when he learned of the molestations.  He and D.S. 
had previously been close, but Travis felt ashamed because he 
had failed her.  When Travis was about 15 years old, Pamela 
divorced Carvalho and obtained a restraining order against him.   
Travis was a poor student in high school, and from the 
ages of 14 to 16, he periodically was truant from school.  He 
started using methamphetamine when he was about 15 years 
old, and continued to use marijuana and alcohol.   
When Travis was about 16 years old, he and his mother, 
who was concerned about his misbehavior, agreed Travis should 
live with his biological father, John, Sr., in North Carolina.  
Travis had not seen John, Sr., since he was five years old, and 
was looking for support and to establish a relationship with his 
father.  Once in North Carolina, Travis and John, Sr., performed 
construction work and drank alcohol and used drugs together, 
but did not develop a closer bond.   
After about a year, Travis returned to California.  He did 
not attend school, and dropped out of high school in his junior 
year when he was about 17 years old.   
Travis committed several burglaries, and went to North 
Carolina to again live with John, Sr., when he was about 18 
years old to avoid an arrest warrant.  Travis ultimately returned 
to California to turn himself in.  He suffered a felony conviction 
for first degree burglary and served about 10 months in county 
jail.  During this time, Travis was a jail “trustee,” performing 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
 
such assignments as delivering the canteen to the women’s 
lockdown.  Travis was released from jail when he was 19 years 
old.   
Pamela was largely unaware of Travis’s activities as an 
adult, and saw him little in 1990.   She did not know what he 
was like or what he doing in January 1991, the month Madden 
was murdered.  Pamela believed she had “disappointed [her] 
children a great deal” and “abandoned them” from their late 
teenage to their adult years.   
Travis obtained the job at LeeWards in 1990, and worked 
there for about two months.  He once saw Madden’s wife and 
daughter in the store.  Travis used drugs while on the job and at 
times did not show up for work.   
At some point after leaving LeeWards, Travis became 
homeless and could not provide himself food or regular hygiene.  
He felt empty inside, and spent his 21st birthday in the back of 
Spencer’s car.  Travis considered committing crimes to get 
“money for [his] drug habit.”  Travis had long stolen items, but 
he had never hurt anyone.   
On about January 24, 1991, Jennings told Travis someone 
had taken his pager.  Travis confronted the man holding the 
pager, and the two fought.  Travis was hit in the face with brass 
knuckles, and received a cut lip and a broken nose.   
D.S. saw Travis on about January 27, 1991.  His “eyes 
looked dead and he looked like he [had] lost his soul.”  He 
appeared to be cold, distant and “mad at the world.”  His nose 
was broken, his lip cut, and his clothes were bloody.  Travis told 
D.S. she did not have to worry about money anymore, or live like 
she was living.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
 
(2) Travis’s testimony regarding the murder 
and jail 
On the night of Sunday January 27, Travis told Silveria, 
Jennings, Spencer, and Rackley that whoever was working as 
the LeeWards manager would have to be killed because Travis 
did not want to be identified and go to prison.  Silveria said, “No, 
no way,” and left the discussion.  Travis recalled no discussion 
of masks or other methods of hiding the perpetrators’ identity.  
They drove to LeeWards that night but the store was already 
closed.   
On Monday, January 28, Travis, Silveria, Spencer, 
Jennings, and Rackley again drove to LeeWards.  Travis 
described confronting Madden, obtaining the store funds, and 
restraining Madden, and the telephone call with the alarm 
company.  Travis turned to Spencer and quietly told him to kill 
Madden so that Madden would not overhear the command.  
Spencer was hesitant, so Travis repeated, “Kill him.”  Madden 
began to fidget.   
Silveria said, “Let’s go.”  Spencer cut Madden’s throat, and 
then began stabbing him.  Travis was excited, but not because 
he “enjoy[ed] it.”  Silveria used the stun gun on Madden while 
Spencer was stabbing Madden.  Spencer then handed the knife 
to Travis and ran out.  Travis repeatedly stabbed Madden.  
When Travis was done stabbing, he felt “empty.”   
Travis was able to kill Madden because “I didn’t care about 
myself or anybody else,” “I just gave up.”  Travis was “mad” and 
“wanted somebody to pay” for “[e]verything that happened in my 
life. . . . I was blaming others for the position I found myself in 
due to my own actions.”  Travis thought the money from 
LeeWards would give him a “new life, a new identity.”  Travis 
was not blaming Madden’s murder on Travis’s rage, poor 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
 
relationship with his father, or drugs and alcohol, but he 
believed “these are major factors that built up to something like 
this.”   
On cross-examination, a recording of Travis’s statement to 
law enforcement was played for the jury.  Travis said he wanted 
Spencer to stab Madden first to prove himself.  When Travis told 
Spencer, “Kill him,” Travis felt powerful.   
During Travis’s first nights in jail after he was arrested, 
he met an inmate who spoke to him about Jesus.  Travis had put 
God “to the side” when he was 14 years old, because he had 
“wanted to live [his] own life, do what [he] wanted to do.”  Travis 
was tremendously affected by the inmate’s words, explaining 
they “showed me just what type of person I had become.”   
Travis began to listen to a radio prison ministry by 
Chaplain Ray from Texas.  He also read a book entitled “Will 
You Die For Me, Tex Watson as told to Chaplain Ray.”  In the 
book, Watson, a convicted murderer, follower of Charles 
Manson, and a drug addict, described his crime, his arrest, and 
his conversion to Christianity.  Travis was impressed that a man 
of Watson’s notoriety had “receiv[ed] Christ Jesus.”  
In September 1991, Travis wrote to Watson.  Travis said 
he was also incarcerated for murder, and that “[t]hey used to 
call me ‘Baby Manson’ because of the power of mind control I 
had on my friends.”  Travis wrote that he had stabbed Madden 
“repeat[e]dly” and “enjoyed every moment of it.”  Travis also 
said, “As we fled, I felt this empt[i]ness inside me,” and that he 
had “re-received Jesus Christ as [his] Lord and Savior” and 
repented of his sins.  Travis felt a peace within, and knew he 
was forgiven for his sins, “even murder.”   
At the penalty retrial, Travis explained he wrote the letter 
because he and Watson were in the same situation, and Christ 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
 
had changed both of their lives.  He said he had told Watson he 
enjoyed stabbing Madden because in Travis’s confession to 
police he had minimized his participation in the murder by 
saying he had only stabbed Madden twice.  Madden had been 
stabbed 32 times, not twice, and Travis was “judging myself, 
condemning myself and putting myself down and thinking I 
must have enjoyed this to do something so heinous like this.”  
Rather, when Travis stabbed Madden, “I was releasing my 
anger . . . . my adrenaline[,] my paranoia, everything.”   
In 1992, about a year after writing Watson, Travis, 
Jennings, and several others planned an escape from jail.  
Travis was angry at God at this time because Travis’s young 
nephew had died.  Travis was shown a cell bar that had been cut 
half-way through, and he tried to cut the bar more using a wire 
from a chair.  Travis also collected sheets to use as a rope.  He 
did not plan to hurt anyone.   
Before the escape plan was executed, one of the inmates 
reported the plan, and Travis was relocated.  He was not 
charged with a crime as a result of his participation, and was 
subsequently made a trustee in his new jail location by Santa 
Clara County Department of Corrections Officer David 
Damewood.  Travis had also been chosen by to be a trustee when 
housed in a different part of the jail, and had worked as a 
“trustee helper” for Officer Limbocker.  He had not had any 
serious rule infractions in the four or five years preceding his 
testimony.   
After the failed escape plan, Travis realized he had been 
“making the wrong decisions,” and “started thinking real hard 
about what I want[ed] to do with my life.”  He began recovery 
and started learning about Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and 
Narcotics Anonymous.  He also began to work with Reverend 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
 
Charon.  No AA meetings were available where Travis was 
housed.   
Travis had also participated in the jail’s Tutor Program, 
which helped inmates learn to read and do math.  He often 
shared his message of recovery with these individuals.  It was 
his “heart’s desire . . . to help those who have been in the same 
situation I have.”   
Travis testified that he accepted the jury’s guilt verdict 
and had admitted his responsibility for Madden’s murder at the 
time of his arrest.  His purpose in testifying was to tell the truth 
and to let the jury know “that I am remorseful for what I have 
done.”  He described what he had done as “heinous,” and was 
“ashamed and humiliated” he had caused others pain.  He had 
unsuccessfully asked his attorney if he could write to the 
Madden family or seek their forgiveness in court.  He asked the 
jury to spare his life, and said the decision whether he went to 
death row was in God’s hands.   
(3) Character witnesses 
Pamela M. testified she did not visit Travis in jail for the 
first two years after his arrest for Madden’s murder because she 
could not face the reality of the charges against Travis.  She was 
now closer than ever to Travis.  D.S. had visited Travis in jail, 
and “he’s got . . . this glow,” and there was hope in his eyes.  She 
loved Travis “[w]ith all [her] heart.”   
Two correctional officers testified regarding Travis’s 
behavior and activities in jail after his arrest for Madden’s 
murder.  Santa Clara County Department of Corrections Officer 
Keith Forster had known Travis about two years and had 
supervised him in jail.  Travis treated staff respectfully and 
followed the rules.  Officer Forster was of the view that although 
“there are individuals [who] absolutely deserve the death 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
 
penalty,” here it would be “improper” because “there is definitely 
an opportunity to be used . . . to change lives,” and to “maybe 
just have one individual change through his testimony and 
experience . . . would be well worth it.”  
Correctional Officer Damewood testified that in late 1992, 
after Travis’s failed escape plan, Travis had been housed in the 
maximum security jail area where Officer Damewood worked.  
Travis was in this area for about three years.  Officer Damewood 
selected Travis as a trustee, a position he held for about two 
years.  His duties included cleaning and delivering paperwork 
and meals to inmates.  Travis was responsible, easy to get along 
with, and did not misbehave or treat Officer Damewood 
disrespectfully.  In his cell Travis was studious and quiet.   
(4) Expert witness testimony 
Reverend Charon, a certified alcohol and drug counselor, 
testified as an expert on the “identification of alcohol and drug-
related problems and the recovery process.”  Reverend Charon 
met Travis in jail in late 1992 or 1993 when Travis attended his 
Bible study.  Travis was diligent in attending, and Reverend 
Charon and Travis eventually began to meet one on one.  
Although Travis initially did not consider himself an addict, he 
eventually began working with Reverend Charon on the “The 
Twelve Steps” AA program.  It was difficult to advance in a 
recovery program in jail because of the limited resources, and 
Reverend Charon had seen few people reach Travis’s level of 
recovery.   
Reverend Charon described Travis as a quiet individual 
who benefitted others by sharing what he had learned in 
recovery.  Reverend Charon believed that Travis was sincere 
when he said he was following in the footsteps of the Lord.  He 
was of the view that Travis had “made peace with God, is trying 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
 
to do it with everyone else, and that he is in genuine recovery.”  
Travis appeared “very remorseful, and was earnestly seeking a 
way, under the circumstances, that he could express . . . his 
regret, and also, if there was anything that was possible [for 
him] to make amends, recognizing that you can never really 
make full amends.”   
Sharon Lutman, a registered nurse and licensed marriage 
and family counselor, testified as an expert regarding the 
assessment of chemically dependent people.  On March 26, 
1997, Lutman interviewed Travis for one and a half hours at the 
Santa Clara County main jail to assess him for the long-term 
effects of drug and alcohol use, and to evaluate whether he was 
in a state of recovery.  The two did not discuss Madden’s murder.   
Travis said he had taken no mood-altering drugs since the 
fall of 1992.  Travis was open and responsive, and did not 
hesitate to share his past use of drugs and alcohol, but had 
difficulty expressing his feelings.   
Lutman concluded Travis was a “Type Two” alcoholic, or a 
man who has an alcoholic father and who begins to use drugs 
and alcohol early in life.  This type of alcoholism was passed 
from father to child, and so her opinion would not change if she 
were aware Travis’s mother did not drink or consume 
nonprescription drugs during her pregnancy with Travis.  
Failure to develop stress management coping skills and impulse 
control are indicative of Type Two alcoholism.   
As to Travis’s recovery from drugs and alcohol, Lutman 
observed that Travis was meeting with Reverend Charon, 
reading 12-step literature, and listening to “recovery oriented 
tapes.”  Travis understood his alcoholism and addiction would 
require treatment for the rest of his life.  He had attempted to 
learn new techniques for resolving conflict and anger with 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
 
others, such as assessing his own responsibility for conflict and 
sharing his concerns with God and Reverend Charon, instead of 
“just act[ing] out” or suppressing his anger with alcohol and 
drugs.  He had appeared sincere and the most emotional when 
discussing his desire to make amends to Madden’s family.   
Travis was interested in counseling other inmates with 
substance abuse problems, and in Lutman’s opinion, had 
learned enough about addiction and recovery to assist others.  
Travis was also interested in studying pharmacology to learn 
more about addiction.   
Dr. Timmen Cermak, a psychiatrist, testified as an expert 
in the field of addiction.  Dr. Cermak had interviewed Travis five 
times between October 30, 1992, and March 15, 1997, including 
one telephone interview.  Dr. Cermak had also interviewed 
Travis’s sister D.S., his mother Pamela, and Reverend Charon.  
He had reviewed various documents including Travis’s 
statement to police, the indictment, investigator reports 
regarding family members, several police reports, and letters to 
and from Travis.   
Dr. Cermak diagnosed Travis as chemically dependent in 
forced remission.  When Travis’s chemical dependence had been 
active, it had “distorted his judgment pervasively.”  Travis was 
also suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of 
his childhood neglect and abuse.  He was not schizophrenic or 
manic-depressive, and did not have an antisocial personality 
disorder.   
Dr. Cermak had hired Dr. James Kurkjian, a clinical 
psychologist, to perform neuropsychological tests on Travis.  
Dr. Kurkjian also administered to Travis the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Index, and intelligence quotient, 
Rorschach, and picture and sentence completion tests.  Based on 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
 
the test results, Dr. Cermak concluded there was no organic 
brain damage, “nothing that would limit [Travis’s] capacity.”  
Travis had average to below average intelligence, and was in the 
normal range.  Nothing in these test results indicated to 
Dr. Cermak that additional psychological testing was necessary.   
Travis initially struck Dr. Cermak as “being immature, 
someone who had been very out of control, [a] chronically 
intoxicated adolescent who really had lost his moral compass . . . 
with very tragic results.”  Travis spoke incessantly about 
religion, and it appeared “religion was playing a very rigid and 
containing role in his life.”  Over the past four and a half years, 
Dr. Cermak had observed Travis begin to recover from his 
chemical dependence, be less rigid in his religious beliefs, and 
become more emotionally available.  There had been “a slow 
increase in his maturity, his ability to contain impulses, his 
ability to talk about his emotional life.”  He had also received his 
General Education Diploma.   
In Dr. Cermak’s view, Travis had held a “highly distorted 
view of the injustices in his life.”  Travis felt shame as a result 
of his January 24, 1991 fight because he lost face before his 
friends, and was left with a facial injury that he believed would 
prevent him from ever again being “attractive to a woman.”  
Travis believed that “someone had to pay.”  The murder was “a 
fatal act of attacking someone else in order to save himself and 
to . . . get away from the sense of inadequacy, failure[,] . . . 
shame, humiliation, . . . that sense of abject embarrassment 
that he . . . harbored within himself.”  By murdering Madden, 
Travis was “defending his honor, defending his sense of 
vulnerability . . . [and] reestablishing the sense of self that is 
less shamed, humiliated, vulnerable and inadequate.”   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
 
Dr. Cermak was of the view that Travis’s personality was 
largely formed in an atmosphere of sufficient parental neglect 
and family member abuse that it affected his development.  
Travis’s chemical dependency allowed him to avoid feelings of 
shame and tension he experienced in his family.  Individuals 
who ignore feelings of shame develop an increased sensitivity to 
that emotion and become less capable of “tolerating even small 
slights.”   
Methamphetamine was “commonly associated with 
violent behavior.”  “Paranoid delusions are almost a routine 
aspect of chronic” methamphetamine use.  Although in general 
paranoia from methamphetamine use could contribute to the 
explosiveness of an event for a person who already felt shame 
and rage, here Dr. Cermak understood Travis and the other 
perpetrators had largely exhausted their methamphetamine 
supply four days before the murder.   
Travis told Dr. Cermak that during the murder, “there 
was a buildup of fear and excitement and a sense of panic.”  
When the murder took longer than expected, and Travis began 
to stab Madden, he felt a “sense of relief from the fear and the 
panic and the excitement.”  Travis said this “wasn’t really 
pleasurable and yet it was a sense of relief.”  Dr. Cermak asked, 
“[I]s that . . . a positive feeling, maybe even a pleasurable 
feeling?”  Travis replied, “Yes, that was a pleasurable feeling.”  
Shortly thereafter, while still at the murder scene, Travis began 
to feel a sense of emptiness.  Dr. Cermak acknowledged that 
Travis may have made these statements to try to lessen the 
damage of Travis’s statement to Tex Watson that he had 
“enjoyed every moment” of the stabbing.  In Dr. Cermak’s view, 
when Travis spoke of enjoyment in the letter, “he was trying to 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
 
explain, make sense of the sense of relief that he felt following 
that murder.”   
3. Prosecution rebuttal 
Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Sergeant David Tomlinson 
testified that before February 1994, Silveria had claimed on a 
jail grievance form that he feared retaliation by an inmate and 
had successfully asked to be moved.  Silveria and Travis were 
both housed in the “Third East Max” tier of the jail between 
September 21, 1993, and August 5, 1994.  In February 1994, 
Silveria stated on a different grievance form that he had lied in 
his previous request to be rehoused and wanted to return to his 
former (less restrictive) housing assignment.  Silveria said he 
had been “dishonest . . . in order [to] get next to my 
codefendant.”   
Sergeant Tomlinson also testified that simply because an 
inmate was a trustee did not mean he was trustworthy because 
the position varied widely in terms of the scope of 
responsibilities and freedom.  
Cynthia Tipton testified that on the morning of January 
28, 1991 (the day of Madden’s murder), Silveria came to her 
home and asked to shower because he had contracted poison 
oak.   He appeared uncomfortable because of the poison oak, but 
not otherwise ill or recovering from a recent illness.  Nor did he 
tell Tipton he had recently been ill.  After his shower, Tipton 
told Silveria she knew “you guys are doing the stun gun 
robberies.”   Silveria replied, “[T]hey don’t know who we are and 
they don’t know what we look like,” and said that Tipton should 
not worry.  He also told Tipton “they had something big that 
they were going to be doing that night.”  Silveria showed no 
reluctance to participate in this event, but appeared to be “in a 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
 
really good mood,” and “looking forward to what was . . . going 
on for the rest of his day.”   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues6 
1. Motion to Suppress  
Travis contends the trial court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress.  In particular he contends the police lacked 
reasonable suspicion to detain him, his arrest lacked probable 
cause, and the warrantless search of his vehicle was improper.  
We disagree. 
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 
evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or 
implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence.  
[Citation.]  We exercise our independent judgment in 
determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or 
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  (People 
v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.)   
a. Factual background 
On January 25, 1991, San Jose Police Detective John 
Boyles caused the Quik Stop Market robbery video to be 
screened at a police briefing.  A fellow officer told Detective 
                                        
6  
“[A]s to many claims defendants allege for the first time 
that the error complained of violated their federal constitutional 
rights.  To the extent that in doing so defendants have raised 
only a new constitutional ‘gloss’ on claims preserved below, that 
new aspect of the claims is not forfeited.  However, ‘[n]o separate 
constitutional discussion is required, or provided, when 
rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily leads to rejection 
of [the] constitutional theory . . . .’ ”  (People v. Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 (Bryant, Smith and 
Wheeler).   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
 
Boyles that he recognized one of the perpetrators on the video 
as Troy Chapple and gave him Chapple’s date of birth. Santa 
Clara County juvenile probation department records indicated 
that Troy Chapple was also known as Troy Rackley.  Detective 
Boyles located a photograph of Rackley in the San Jose Police 
photo base, and observed Rackley appeared to be one of the 
perpetrators on the video.   
On January 28, Detective Boyles contacted a juvenile 
probation officer, who identified Matthew Jennings as a second 
perpetrator on the videotape, and gave Jennings’s home address 
to Detective Boyles.  About 5:00 p.m. that day an unidentified 
female informant spoke to Detective Boyles on the telephone 
and said that “Danny, John, Matt, and Chris” were perpetrators 
of the stun gun robberies, and that “Troy” also associated with 
that group.  Officer Boyles requested San Jose police 
communications dispatch a “Be on the Lookout” notice to all 
police units for Troy Rackley, Matthew Jennings, and “anybody 
associated with them with the names John, Chris, and . . . 
Daniel.”  He also shared the information on the stun gun 
robberies — including photographs of Jennings and Rackley, 
and a still shot photograph from the robbery videotape of a 
person later identified as Silveria — with San Jose Police Officer 
Brian Hyland.  
That evening after Detective Boyles had gone home, San 
Jose Police Sergeant George McCall spoke with a female 
informant who said that the person involved in the stun gun 
robberies known as “Danny” had a last name of “Silveras” or 
“Silveria.”  The informant also said the robbery suspects were 
going to “pull another robbery that night” and would then be 
“leaving town,” and might be driving a red and black Charger.  
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
 
Sergeant McCall passed this information on that evening to 
Officer Hyland and at some point to Detective Boyles.   
About 9:00 p.m. that night, Detective Boyles spoke with a 
woman who sounded like the informant to whom he had 
previously spoken.  Detective Boyles also recalled that he asked 
the woman if she was the same person to whom he had 
previously spoken and she said yes.  She identified herself as 
“Cynthia.”   Cynthia said she now had the last name of “Silveria” 
for “Danny,” and “Jennings” for Matthew, and also gave him a 
home address for Jennings that matched the street and 
apartment number of the address Detective Boyles had received 
for Jennings from the juvenile probation officer.  Detective 
Boyles requested that this additional information also be 
broadcast to the police patrol units.   
On the evening of January 28, after speaking to Sergeant 
McCall, Officer Hyland visited the homes of Jennings, Spencer, 
and Silveria.  Jennings’s older brother told Officer Hyland that 
Jennings had packed a suitcase and left in a black and white 
Dodge Charger with two men named Christopher Spencer and 
John Travis, as well as Silveria and Rackley.  A computer check 
revealed Travis had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant.  
Spencer’s father told Officer Hyland that Silveria, Travis, and 
Rackley were friends of Spencer, and allowed him to search 
Spencer’s room.  There Officer Hyland found a citation with a 
Charger’s license plate number.  Silveria’s brother likewise told 
the officer that Silveria had packed a suitcase, said he was going 
to live in the mountains, and left with Travis, Spencer, Rackley, 
and Jennings.  Officer Hyland spoke with about seven total 
individuals, each of whom said Silveria, Travis, Jennings, and 
Rackley had been together for at least one day and were all 
planning to flee the San Jose area.   Officer Hyland told everyone 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
 
to whom he spoke to call him or 911 if they saw Silveria, Travis, 
Rackley, Jennings, or Spencer.   
On January 29 at 6:46 p.m., San Jose Police Department 
call intaker Joanne Schlachter received a 911 call from a man 
who asked to speak to Officer Hyland.  Schlachter said the 
officer was not available, and asked if she could help.  The caller 
said that the “guys . . . doing the robberies of the mini-marts 
with the taser guns” were at the San Jose Oakridge Mall arcade.  
He also said that one of the men, “Troy,” was 18 or 19 years old, 
and a second man “Matt” was wearing a white shirt and black 
pants.  The informant gave his name and appears to have given 
his phone number and a description of what he, the informant, 
was wearing.  Schlachter sent the information to a police 
channel that routed it to the appropriate officers.  Officer 
Hyland received the dispatch and recognized the informant as 
someone to whom he had spoken the day before.  Oakridge Mall 
security was also alerted, and a security guard began to follow 
the suspects through the mall.  The informant called again at 
6:58 p.m., and told a different intake person that Troy was 
wearing green pants and black tennis shoes, and one of the two 
suspects was now “in Shirtique’s” and was carrying a large sum 
of money.  The other suspect was somewhere in the mall and 
“they [were] getting ready to go to Sacramento.”   
Dana Withers testified that on January 29 he was working 
as an Oakridge Mall security guard.  He received information 
that caused him to follow two White men — who were joined by 
a third White man — through the mall to two silver vehicles, a 
Datsun 280ZX and a Honda Civic.  The men entered the vehicles 
and a second security guard, Michael Graber, who was driving 
outside the mall, continued the surveillance and communicated 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
 
with the San Jose police dispatch.  The suspects drove from the 
west to the north side of the mall where they were stopped.   
On January 29, 1991, about 6:46 p.m., San Jose Police 
Sergeant Jean Edward Sellman received a radio dispatch to go 
to the Oakridge Mall arcade and look for two suspects in the 
stun gun robberies who were described in the dispatch.  
Sergeant Sellman did not see anyone matching the suspects’ 
description in the arcade, but learned that a mall security guard 
was following the suspects through the mall.  He subsequently 
received a dispatch that the suspects were entering a silver 
Honda and a silver either 240 or 280ZX Datsun in the north 
parking lot.  Sergeant Sellman returned to his police car, which 
was also in the north lot, saw two cars matching the dispatched 
description, and noticed that the Honda Civic was closely 
following the Datsun.  A second officer, Sergeant Kurt Brandt, 
blocked the row in front of the suspects’ vehicles with his vehicle, 
and Sergeant Sellman blocked them with his vehicle from 
behind.  Silveria was driving the Honda Civic.  Travis was 
driving the Datsun, and Rackley was his passenger.   
San Jose Police Officer James Werkema arrived at the 
scene, and was told by another officer that Travis was the driver 
of the Datsun.  Officer Werkema had previously been told by 
Officer Hyland that Travis had an outstanding misdemeanor 
warrant and that Rackley had been positively identified as a 
perpetrator by one of the robbery victims.  Officer Hyland 
arrived and observed that while Travis was detained in the 
parking lot, a warrant check was run and his misdemeanor 
warrant was confirmed.  Rackley and Silveria were arrested for 
robbery and Travis was arrested for robbery and on an 
outstanding misdemeanor warrant.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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Officer Werkema searched the Datsun 280ZX incident to 
the arrests of both Travis and Rackley.  In the Datsun’s backseat 
area he found two fanny packs, one that contained rolled coins 
and another that contained $1,313 and a motor vehicle purchase 
order made out to John Travis and Danny Silveria.  In the rear 
of the vehicle he found a duffle bag containing two battery 
packets bearing a LeeWards price sticker.  Sergeant Sellman 
searched Silveria’s car and found a PARALI/AZER stun gun and 
a fanny pack containing $587.  Both cars were impounded.   
b. Analysis 
(1) Reasonable suspicion to detain  
Travis contends that the police lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop his vehicle and detain him.  We reject the 
claim.   
Travis asserts that the record fails to demonstrate how the 
security guard correctly identified robbery suspects “Troy” and 
“Matt” in the mall and followed them to their vehicles.  Travis 
did not challenge the stop of his vehicle in the trial court, and 
the claim is therefore forfeited.   
“[W]hen defendants move to suppress evidence under 
section 1538.5, they must inform the prosecution and the court 
of the specific basis for their motion.”  (People v. Williams (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 119, 129.)  Here, Travis’s suppression motion and his 
argument on that motion challenged the legitimacy of the search 
incident to his arrest on a traffic warrant, his lack of opportunity 
to post bail after his arrest on the warrant, and the sufficiency 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
 
of his Miranda advisement.7  None of these claims informed the 
prosecution of the need to adduce greater detail as to how the 
robbery suspects were identified in the mall and followed to 
their vehicles.8  The suppression hearing, which concerned the 
suppression motions of four then codefendants, spanned nine 
days and consumes much of the first nine volumes of the 
reporter’s transcript.  Had Travis asserted below that his 
detention lacked reasonable suspicion because of the absence of 
evidence of how the security guard initially identified the 
suspects in the mall, the prosecutor would have been on notice 
to adduce additional testimony more fully describing this event.  
(See Williams, at p. 130 [“if defendants detect a critical gap in 
the prosecution’s proof or a flaw in its legal analysis, they must 
object on that basis to admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting 
the issue on appeal”].) 
The claim is also meritless.  “[T]he Fourth Amendment 
permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop 
when he has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting 
the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’  [Citations.]  
‘Although a mere “hunch” does not create reasonable suspicion, 
the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less 
than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.’  
                                        
7  
Travis also contended that the search of his car was 
“beyond the scope of [his] consent, and/or said consent was 
unlawful and/or withdrawn.”  His supporting memorandum 
does not discuss this claim, which appears to arise from events 
after his vehicle was impounded.   
8 
Although Silveria challenged his arrest, his counsel 
expressly stated that he had “no quarrel with anything Officer 
Sellman did” before the arrest including his stop of the vehicles.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
 
[Citations.] [¶] Because it is a ‘less demanding’ standard, 
‘reasonable suspicion can be established with information that 
is different in quantity or content than that required to establish 
probable cause.’  [Citation.]  The standard ‘depends on the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’  
[Citation.]  Courts ‘cannot reasonably demand scientific 
certainty . . . where none exists.’  [Citation.]  Rather, they must 
permit officers to make ‘commonsense judgments and inferences 
about human behavior.’ ”  (Kansas v. Glover (2020) __ U.S. __, 
__ [140 S.Ct. 1183, 1187–1188].)   
 Here, a person to whom Officer Hyland had spoken in 
person the day before called 911, identified himself, and said 
that the stun gun robbery suspects, including “Matt” and “Troy,” 
were at a specific location within the Oakridge Mall.  Critically, 
at the time Officer Hyland received the dispatch about this call, 
he already had probable cause to arrest Jennings and Rackley 
for the Quik Stop Market stun gun robbery because both of these 
men had been positively identified as perpetrators.  Thus, unlike 
cases such as Navarette v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393 
(Navarette), in which the reliability of the informant’s 911 report 
that a crime had occurred was in question, here Officer Hyland 
knew the stun gun robberies had occurred and also knew the 
names of at least two persons who had been identified as 
perpetrators in one of the crimes and implicated in the other.  
He also had the names of three other men who were alleged to 
be involved in the robberies.  (Compare Navarette, at p. 404 
[“Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the indicia of 
reliability in this case sufficient to provide the officer with 
reasonable suspicion that the driver of the reported vehicle had 
run another vehicle off the road,” making it reasonable “for the 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
 
officer to execute a traffic stop”].)  The only question here was 
whether the informant was correctly reporting the location of 
these individuals.   
Moreover, “a caller’s personal knowledge,” shown here by 
the informant’s knowledge of the suspects’ names, current 
location, and apparel, “ ‘lends significant support to the tip’s 
reliability.’ ”  (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 981, 
quoting Navarette, supra, 572 U.S. at p. 399.)  “[T]he caller’s 
report was contemporaneous, a factor that ‘has long been 
treated as especially reliable.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In addition, the caller 
identified himself and appears to have given his phone number 
and described what he was wearing, circumstances that 
enhanced his credibility.  (Id., at p. 982 [“private citizens who 
report criminal activity generally have no bias or motive other 
than good citizenship, and therefore tend to be reliable”].)  His 
“use of the 911 emergency system” is a further “indicator of 
veracity” because the recording and tracing features of that 
system “provide some safeguards against making false reports 
with immunity.”  (Navarette, at p. 400; see Brown, at p. 982.)  
Based on the informant’s report, a security guard was able to 
locate the suspects and follow them to their vehicles, which were 
then described to police and broadcast to responding officers.  
Sergeant Sellman observed two vehicles matching this 
description, and further observed that one vehicle was closely 
following the other, and assisted Officer Brandt in stopping the 
vehicles.  “An officer may arrest or detain a suspect ‘based on 
information received through “official channels.” ’ ”  (Brown, at 
p. 983.)  The totality of these circumstances was sufficient to 
create a reasonable suspicion that the persons in the vehicles 
were stun gun robbery suspects and to detain them.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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(2) Probable cause to arrest 
Travis contends that there was no probable cause to arrest 
him other than on a misdemeanor warrant.  However, the 
outstanding misdemeanor warrant was a sufficient basis for 
Travis’s arrest.  (§ 836, subd. (a) [“A peace officer may arrest a 
person in obedience to a warrant . . . .”]; Utah v. Strieff (2016) __ 
U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2062] [once the officer discovered the 
arrest warrant, he had an obligation to arrest the defendant].)   
Moreover, probable cause existed to arrest Travis for the 
stun gun robberies.  (Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 
370 [“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for 
a felony . . . is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the 
arrest is supported by probable cause”].)  “To determine whether 
an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we 
examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 
‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an 
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.”  
(Id. at p. 371.)  An arrest remains lawful under the Fourth 
Amendment even when the “criminal offense for which there is 
probable cause to arrest” is different from the “offense stated by 
the arresting officer at the time of arrest.”  (Davenpeck v. Alford 
(2004) 543 U.S. 146, 148, 153; see id. at p. 155 [“Those are 
lawfully arrested whom the facts known to the arresting officers 
give probable cause to arrest”].)   
Here, as noted, Officer Hyland had probable cause to 
arrest Troy Rackley for the Quik Stop Market stun gun robbery 
because he had been positively identified as a perpetrator by the 
victim.  Moreover, we have previously concluded based on the 
same evidentiary hearing on which we rely here that informant 
Cynthia’s January 28 report to Detective Boyles — which 
included information that “Danny” Silveria, “John,” “Matt” 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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Jennings, and “Chris” were perpetrators of the stun gun 
robberies, and that “Troy” also associated with that group — 
was reasonably corroborated.  (People v. Spencer (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 642, 664–666 (Spencer).)  This information about the 
four alleged perpetrators was broadcast to all police units on 
January 28.  In addition, on January 29, a different informant, 
whose identity was known to Officer Hyland, told 911 that stun 
gun robbery suspects, including “Troy,” were at the Oakridge 
Mall.  This information, along with (1) the presence of Travis 
driving a car at the Oakridge Mall in which Troy Rackley was a 
passenger, and in which a large amount of cash in one fanny 
pack and rolled coins in a different fanny pack was found, and 
(2) the circumstance that Travis’s car was closely followed by a 
car driven by Silveria that was found to contain a stun gun, the 
weapon used in the January 24, 1991 robberies, would likely 
persuade an objectively reasonable police officer that Travis had 
committed the felony of robbery.  (See Maryland v. Pringle, 
supra, 540 U.S. at pp. 371–372 [given that the defendant was 
one of three men riding in a car in the early morning, $763 of 
rolled-up cash was in the glove compartment directly in front of 
the defendant, and baggies of cocaine were behind the backseat 
armrest and accessible to all three men, and none of the three 
men offered any ownership information with respect to the 
cocaine or money, it was “an entirely reasonable inference from 
these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge 
of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine,” and 
thus “a reasonable officer could conclude that there was 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
49 
 
probable cause to believe [the defendant] committed the crime 
of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly”].)9   
(3) Search of Travis’s vehicle 
Travis asserts that the warrantless search of his vehicle was 
controlled by Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, and was not 
justified under that standard.  We disagree.   
At the time of Travis’s 1991 arrest, prevailing United 
States Supreme Court law held that “when a policeman has 
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, 
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile” and any closed 
containers found within that space.  (New York v. Belton (1981) 
453 U.S. 454, 455, 460–461.)  Travis does not argue that the 
search of his vehicle was invalid under Belton.  Rather, he 
asserts this case is controlled by Arizona v. Gant, supra, 
556 U.S. at pages 343, 351, in which the high court revisited 
Belton, and held that a warrantless search incident to the lawful 
arrest of a recent occupant is justified only (1) “when the 
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search,” or (2) “when 
it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ ”  The 1991 search here 
was after Belton and before Gant.  “[S]earches conducted in 
                                        
9  Because we conclude there was probable cause to arrest 
Travis for robbery, we need not address Travis’s argument that 
because there was no probable cause to arrest him for robbery, 
and he was not provided an opportunity to post bail on his arrest 
for the misdemeanor traffic warrant, his subsequent statements 
to police should have been suppressed.   
 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent 
are not subject to the exclusionary rule.”  (Davis v. United States 
(2011) 564 U.S. 229, 232; see id. at pp. 239–240 [searches 
conducted after Belton and before Gant, and in compliance with 
Belton, are not subject to the exclusionary rule].)  
In sum, the trial court properly denied the motion to 
suppress. 
2. Asserted Denial of Hardship Request  
Travis contends that the trial court erroneously denied 
Alternate Juror No. 1’s hardship request.  We reject the claim.   
After Travis’s jury and alternate jurors were sworn, and 
before opening statements, two jurors, including Juror No. 6, 
were discharged, and Travis and the prosecutor stipulated to 
reopen jury selection to choose two additional alternates.10  
Travis’s remaining jury was called to the courtroom, and the 
court explained these developments.  The court then asked: 
“Everybody’s employer knows that you’re here eight months?  
Nobody is going to have a problem with that?”  Juror No. 12 
asked what would happen if she were laid off during trial and 
described her work situation.  At sidebar, the court gave counsel 
the opportunity to stipulate to her removal, which they declined.  
                                        
10 
We have held that the trial court lacks discretion to reopen 
jury selection after the jury has been sworn.  (People v. Cottle 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 246, 249.)  No challenge is raised on appeal 
to this procedure.  Rather Travis simply challenges the seating 
of Alternate Juror No. 1 for a discharged juror, a procedure 
that was consistent with that described by Penal Code 
section 1089 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 233 and 234.  
 
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The court told Juror No. 12 her situation was too speculative to 
warrant her removal.   
Alternate Juror No. 1, an engineer, informed the court 
that his employer had determined the project on which he was 
working was “expected to take additional time and will require 
that I keep working on it” because there was insufficient time to 
train someone else.  He observed “[e]ngineers usually work 
between 80 to 100 hours a week,” and that “during this time of 
the project . . . that means I will be working 50 hours outside of 
the courtroom, if there’s a concern for attentiveness on the time 
off in the courtroom based on that information.”  In response to 
the court’s inquiry, he identified his company, and explained he 
would be working on Monday through Sunday from 6:00 p.m. to 
1:00 a.m. until the project was done.  He was not asked how long 
the project was expected to last before completion.   
Travis did not request that the court ask Alternate Juror 
No. 1 further questions, or seek his removal.  Shortly thereafter, 
Alternate Juror No. 1 was selected, without objection, to replace 
Juror No. 6.   
This claim is therefore forfeited on appeal.  (People v. 
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212 (Rangel) [the defendant did 
not move for the juror’s discharge and the claim is therefore 
forfeited on appeal].)  Although in response to the court’s inquiry 
Alternate Juror No. 1 described a development in his schedule, 
he did not request that he be discharged.  Nor, although counsel 
had just met at sidebar regarding a different juror and had been 
offered the opportunity to stipulate to her removal, did Travis 
seek to have Alternate Juror No. 1 discharged after his new 
schedule was revealed, or object to the trial court later seating 
him in the place of Juror No. 6.   
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3. Instructional Error  
Silveria contends the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury on first degree murder because the indictment, which 
charged him with murder in violation of section 187, only 
charged him with second degree murder.  We have repeatedly 
rejected substantially similar claims, and Silveria cites no 
persuasive reason to revisit our conclusions.  (People v. Ghobrial 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 284–285; People v. Contreras (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 123, 147–148.)  Nor, as Silveria further contends, was 
greater specificity in pleading required under Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466.  (Ghobrial, at p. 285; Contreras, at 
pp. 148–149.)   
B. Penalty Retrial Issues 
1. Joint Penalty Retrial  
As noted, both penalty juries deadlocked, and defendants 
were retried before a single penalty jury.  Defendants contend 
the trial court erroneously denied their severance motions 
seeking separate penalty retrials.11  We conclude there was no 
abuse of discretion in denying defendants’ severance motions, 
nor did any gross unfairness occur as a result of the joint penalty 
retrial.   
a. Factual background  
In support of their penalty retrial severance motions, 
defendants called two expert witnesses.  Justice Charles 
Campbell, who sat as a visiting judge on the Texas trial and 
                                        
11 
Defendants also sought separate juries, and to the extent 
they raise that claim on appeal, we reject it for the same reasons 
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendants’ motions for separate penalty retrials.   
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intermediate appellate courts, and who had previously served 
as a justice on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and as a 
Texas prosecutor, testified as an expert on capital cases.  Justice 
Campbell stated it was common Texas practice to try each 
defendant in a capital case separately.  In his view severance 
was necessary for each defendant to receive the jury’s individual 
consideration, and either severance or separate juries “avoid[ed] 
the pitfalls” he had “noticed in the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence,” and were preferable to a limiting instruction to 
separately consider the defendants.  Justice Campbell opined 
that if two defendants were equally culpable for a heinous crime, 
but one had heinous post-arrest “activity,” it would be more 
difficult for the jury to draw a distinction between the two 
defendants because the potential “spillover effect . . . is pretty 
great.”   
Charles Gessler, who had worked as a Los Angeles County 
deputy public defender for 31 years, testified as an expert on 
severance and on capital case defense tactics.  He opined it was 
“more difficult for two defendants . . . joined together to get a 
fair and individualized determination by the jury than it is for 
an individual single defendant.”  He was also of the view that “if 
the culpability is about equal in the crime,” and if the jury is 
“going to give death to one [defendant], it is very likely that they 
would then give death to the other [defendant] even if the 
aggravation and mitigation is different because the crime is the 
thing that they are most interested in.”  When the mitigating 
evidence is similar, it “loses all individuality” and is viewed by 
the jury as a “standard defense ploy.”  In his view, if two 
defendants remain friends in jail although one defendant 
misbehaves, jurors will view the continuing friendship as 
evidence that this misbehavior is condoned.  Moreover, if both 
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defendants have a religious conversion, and there is evidence of 
hypocrisy by one defendant, “it would take the other person 
down with him.”  Gessler also believed it was difficult for some 
jurors to distinguish which mitigating and aggravating evidence 
applied to which defendant.  In his view, no two capital 
defendants should be tried jointly before the same penalty jury, 
and the facts in this case “enhance the likelihood” of unfair jury 
verdicts.   
The trial court denied the severance motions, and noted in 
so doing that it had found unpersuasive the expert testimony.  
It stated: “The Court believes that it is capable of properly 
instructing the jury and is capable of ensuring a fair jury, who 
will follow the Court’s instructions, will be chosen. . . .  [T]he 
Court believes that properly instructed jurors will give each 
defendant their individualized attention.”   
b. Analysis 
Section 1098 states in relevant part: “When two or more 
defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, whether 
felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, unless the 
court order separate trials.”  This section illustrates the 
Legislature’s “strong preference for joint trials,” including joint 
penalty phase trials.  (People v. Wimbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 
455; see id.at pp. 457–458; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 
96 [penalty phase severance motion].)  “Joint proceedings are 
not only permissible but are often preferable” when, as here, the 
“defendants’ criminal conduct arises out of a single chain of 
events.  Joint trial may enable a jury ‘to arrive more reliably at 
its conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of a particular 
defendant and to assign fairly the respective responsibilities of 
each defendant in the sentencing,’ ” and conserves judicial 
resources.  (Kansas v. Carr (2016) 577 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 633, 
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645].)  “We review a trial court’s denial of a severance motion for 
abuse of discretion based on the facts as they appeared at the 
time the court ruled on the motion.”  (People v. Avila (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 491, 575.)  “[E]ven if a trial court acted within its 
discretion in denying severance, ‘ “the reviewing court may 
nevertheless reverse a conviction where, because of the 
consolidation, a gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1079 (Thompson).)  
Silveria contends that section 1098 does not apply here 
because defendants were not “jointly charged” within the 
meaning of that section, but rather separate juries adjudicated 
their guilt and then deadlocked on penalty. There was one 
indictment jointly charging both defendants.  The fact that 
separate juries adjudicated their guilt and deadlocked on 
penalty does not alter the fact that they remained jointly 
charged.  “The use of dual juries is a permissible means to avoid 
the necessity for complete severance.  The procedure facilitates 
the Legislature’s statutorily established preference for joint trial 
of defendants and offers an alternative to severance when 
evidence to be offered is not admissible against all defendants.  
(§ 1098; People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1075.)”  (People 
v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1287; see § 190.4, 
subds. (b), (c), (e).)  As the court stated in its pretrial ruling 
severing the trial of defendants from that of Spencer and 
Jennings:  “By this ruling, the Court is not ordering four 
separate trials.  The Court is hereby ordering two trials — two 
defendants in each trial.  Each trial will have two separate juries 
and therefore, each defendant will have a separate jury.”   
Travis contends, based on the expert testimony at the 
severance motion hearing, that the trial court abused its 
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discretion in denying his motion because the jury was unable to 
make an individualized sentencing determination regarding 
Travis and Silveria.  We have recently rejected “similar 
empirical evidence,” concluding it does not “rebut the 
presumption that jurors are presumed to understand and accept 
the court’s instructions.”  (People v. Erskine (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
279, 301 (Erskine).)  Moreover, Travis’s argument has been 
largely foreclosed by the high court’s 2016 conclusion that joint 
penalty trials do not violate the Eighth Amendment right to an 
individualized sentencing determination, and that limiting 
instructions such as those given here “ ‘often will suffice to cure 
any risk of prejudice.’ ”  (Kansas v. Carr, supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ 
[136 S.Ct. at p. 645].)  Nor, in particular, did the circumstance 
that Travis and Silveria both relied on Reverend Charon to 
testify regarding their religious conversion preclude an 
individualized sentencing determination.  The fact that 
defendants were housed in the same county jail, and that jails 
may not employ numerous ministers, is one that would be easily 
understood by the jurors.   
Travis asserts that the trial court acknowledged the jury 
would not be capable of following its admonitions regarding 
severance because it had previously denied his motion to allow 
a former juror and former alternate juror from the first penalty 
phase to testify at the penalty retrial.  He asserts that if the jury 
could not follow instructions regarding the testimony of a former 
juror and alternate juror, then it could not follow instructions to 
individually assess each defendant’s appropriate sentence.  But 
Travis’s comparison of the severance issue to the issue regarding 
testimony by former jurors is inapt:  As we observe below, the 
trial court was reasonably concerned testimony by the former 
juror and alternate risked confusing the penalty retrial jury as 
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to its task, and opened the possibility that “the [prosecutor] 
could then call death voting jurors in rebuttal.”  (Post, at 
pt. II.B.5.a.2.)  Travis does not explain what admonition would 
alleviate these concerns.   
Nor did events at the joint penalty retrial cause such gross 
unfairness to defendants as to deprive them of a fair trial or due 
process of law.  (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1079.)   
Silveria contends “there was a substantial risk that the single 
jury’s penalty determination against Travis could improperly 
influence its penalty decision regarding” Silveria.  Silveria 
contends that such prejudice was demonstrated by evidence that 
Travis, unlike Silveria, stabbed Madden repeatedly, and by 
evidence introduced only against Travis, such as Travis’s plan 
to escape from jail, and his letter to a Manson family member 
describing how Travis “enjoyed every moment” of stabbing 
Madden.12   
“In Kansas v. Carr, supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at 
p. 644], the high court rejected a similar claim.[13]  Carr involved 
two defendants who were brothers.  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at 
p. 637].)  The older brother claimed he was prejudiced at their 
                                        
12 
Silveria also contends that the joint penalty retrial 
allowed the jury to consider evidence of Travis’s willingness to 
kill a jail guard during the planned escape, but we see no such 
testimony in the cited portion of the record.  Rather, Travis 
replied, “No” when asked if there was “ever any plan to harm” 
the correctional guard for the area where the escape had been 
planned to occur, and that Travis only learned long after the 
escape plan had been thwarted that there had been a plan to 
harm the officer.   
13  
This discussion of Kansas v. Carr is drawn from our recent 
discussion of a similar claim in People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 
8 Cal.5th 548, 600 (Beck and Cruz). 
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joint penalty trial ‘by his brother’s portrayal of him as the 
corrupting older brother,’ and by his brother’s cross-
examination of their sister, who equivocated about whether the 
older brother had admitted to her he was the shooter.  (Id. at 
p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].)  The younger brother claimed that 
‘he was prejudiced by evidence associating him with his 
dangerous older brother, which caused the jury to perceive him 
as an incurable sociopath,’ and by the jury’s observation of his 
older brother in handcuffs.  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644; see 
id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644, fn. 4].)  
“The high court held that joint capital sentencing 
proceedings do not violate the Eighth Amendment right to an 
individualized sentencing determination.  (Kansas v. Carr, 
supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].)  Although the due 
process clause protects defendants against unduly prejudicial 
evidence that would render a trial fundamentally unfair, that 
standard was not met by the ‘mere admission of evidence that 
might not otherwise have been admitted in a severed 
proceeding.’  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at pp. 644–645].)  The high 
court observed that the trial court had instructed the jury that 
it must give ‘ “separate consideration to each defendant” ’ and 
that evidence admitted as to one defendant should not be 
considered as to the other defendant.  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at 
p. 645].)  The high court presumed that the jury followed these 
instructions, while observing such limiting instructions ‘ “often 
will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.” ’  (Ibid.)  Moreover, the 
high court concluded that the penalty verdicts were not a result 
of the challenged penalty evidence against one brother or the 
other, but of the guilt phase evidence of ‘acts of almost 
inconceivable cruelty and depravity.’  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at 
p. 646].)” (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 600.)    
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Likewise here, the trial court instructed the jury during 
the prosecutor’s case-in-chief that evidence regarding Travis’s 
letter to Watson “is limited to Mr. Travis only.”  At the end of 
the penalty phase, the court instructed the jury:  “In this penalty 
trial of defendants Travis and Silveria, you must consider the 
penalty verdicts entirely separately for each of the two 
defendants.  While you may consider the parts played by each of 
the two defendants in the murder and compare it to the part 
played by the other defendant, you absolutely may not 
determine a verdict for either of the defendants in terms of the 
verdict rendered to the other defendant.  In other words, you 
may not allow your verdict as to one defendant to [a]ffect your 
verdict as to the other defendant.  You must endeavor to reach 
separate verdicts as to each defendant in accordance with the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable to that 
defendant only, and in accordance with the rest of these 
instructions.”  It further instructed the jury as to evidence of 
Travis’s escape preparations that “[u]nder no circumstances 
may you discuss or consider this evidence in any way as to Mr. 
Silveria.”  We presume it understood and followed these 
instructions.14  (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 
1178 (Hajek and Vo).)   
In sum, defendants fail to demonstrate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying defendants’ severance motions, 
or that gross unfairness occurred as a result of the joint penalty 
retrial.   
                                        
14  Silveria further contends that the denial of his 
severance motion precluded him from introducing mitigating 
evidence in his statement to police.  We address and reject that 
claim in part II.B.5.c.   
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2. Excusals for Cause  
Silveria contends that the trial court wrongfully excused 
for cause Prospective Juror No. J-56 based on his death penalty 
views.  Silveria and Travis contend that the trial court 
wrongfully excused for cause Prospective Juror Nos. E-45 and 
F-77 on this same basis.  We reject the claim.   
A trial court should only dismiss a prospective juror for 
cause if the prospective juror’s views on the death penalty would 
“ ‘prevent or substantially impair’ ” that person from performing 
the duties of a juror.  (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 481.)  
We review the trial court’s sustaining of a challenge to a 
prospective juror based on views about the death penalty for 
substantial evidence.  (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 
p. 607; Caro, at p. 481.) 
We consider each of the challenged excusals under these 
standards. 
a. Prospective Juror No. J-56   
On his questionnaire, when asked if he had any “beliefs 
that would affect in some way [his] ability or willingness to serve 
as a juror in this case,” Prospective Juror No. J-56 answered, 
“Yes,” explaining, “I would have a difficult time saying that 
another human being should be put to death.”  When asked if 
there was “anything about the nature of this case that would 
make it difficult or impossible for [him] to be a fair and impartial 
juror,” he answered, “Yes,” explaining, “I do not think that I 
could assign the death penalty to someone.”  When asked his 
general feelings about the death penalty, he again answered:  “I 
do not think that I could award the death penalty to someone.  
A person should not take another person’s life.”  When asked 
under what circumstances he believed the death penalty was 
appropriate, he answered, “I cannot think of any circumstance 
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that the death penalty is appropriate.”  When asked if he felt 
“the death penalty should never be imposed for murder,” he 
answered, “No,” explaining, “There might be some combination 
that might lead me to believe that the death penalty is 
warranted.  At the moment, I cannot think of one, and hope that 
I never do.”  J-56 answered “Yes” when asked if he could follow 
instructions to consider “all of the circumstances surrounding 
the crime” and “concerning the defendant and his background” 
before deciding on the penalty, but when asked what he would 
“want to know about a defendant before deciding” on penalty, he 
answered, “This is hard to explain since I cannot see myself ever 
awarding the death penalty,” before giving examples of desired 
information.  He answered “No” when asked if he could set aside 
his own personal feelings and follow the law, explaining:  “[I]t 
would be hard to keep my feelings about sentencing another 
person to death from my final analysis (and yet follow[] the law 
as it was explained).”  He answered “Yes” when asked if he had 
any home or work problems “that might interfere with [his] 
ability to concentrate during this trial,” noting in part “the 
expected stress of knowing that I am part of the decision process 
for awarding [the] death penalty.”   
Before voir dire, the trial court explained to the 
prospective jurors, including Prospective Juror No. J-56, that 
the defendants had been found guilty of a murder that was not 
necessarily premeditated and that two special circumstances 
had been found true.  It also identified the two possible penalties 
and the factors that the jury could consider in determining 
which penalty to choose, defined mitigating and aggravating 
evidence, described the weighing process, and explained that “to 
return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that 
the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison 
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with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death 
instead of life without the possibility of parole.”15   
On voir dire, Prospective Juror No. J-56 stated he would 
keep an open mind, listen to all of the evidence, and would not 
automatically vote for either penalty.  When discussing his 
questionnaire, J-56 reiterated that he did not believe “somebody 
should be able to take somebody else’s life.”  He added, “I think 
I also mentioned in there that there might be a situation where 
I think a death penalty would be — or somebody’s life could be 
taken, but I can’t think of any offhand.”  The court explained 
that under California law there was no presumption as to which 
penalty was appropriate and described the circumstances under 
which a juror could vote for the death penalty.  It then asked, “If 
your personal beliefs or feelings were to be in conflict with the 
California law, do you think you’d be able to set aside your 
personal beliefs and feelings for this particular trial for this 
purpose, or do you think that’s something you couldn’t do?”  J-
56 replied, “I think it would be very hard for me to do.”    
In response to questioning by defense counsel, Prospective 
Juror No. J-56 explained that he could follow “the guidelines 
that the judge sets up for aggravated and mitigated . . . and 
come to a conclusion based on those.  But even once I come to 
that conclusion, if it happens to be death, I would still have a 
hard time.”  In response to further questioning he said he would 
be capable of voting for the death penalty, adding, “But, like I 
said, it would be very hard for me to then go through with it and 
to cause another person to die because of the result.”  In 
response to questioning by the prosecutor, J-56 described 
                                        
15 
Similar opening instructions were given before the voir 
dire of Prospective Juror Nos. E-45 and F-77.   
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himself as a “person who’s reluctant to award the death penalty 
even though he . . . might decide that the facts and the 
guidelines are met.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror No. J-56 for 
cause and trial court sustained the challenge, stating that “the 
juror could not tell us that . . . he was willing to temporarily set 
aside his own personal views.  It would be difficult, but he didn’t 
say he could do that and that is consistent with his answers in 
the questionnaire. . . [T]he Court finds that he is substantially 
impaired.”   
No error appears in excusing Prospective Juror No. J-56 
for cause.  Although he expressed a willingness to consider all of 
the evidence, keep an open mind, and follow the instructions, he 
also expressed concern he would not be a fair and impartial juror 
because of his views on the death penalty, and observed that he 
would find it difficult to vote for the death penalty even if he 
determined it was the appropriate verdict.  On his 
questionnaire, J-56 answered “No” when asked if he could set 
aside his own personal feelings and follow the law, explaining:  
“[I]t would be hard to keep my feelings about sentencing another 
person to death from my final analysis (and yet follow[] the law 
as it was explained).”  On voir dire he was asked, “If your 
personal beliefs or feelings were to be in conflict with the 
California law, do you think you’d be able to set aside your 
personal beliefs and feelings for this particular trial for this 
purpose, or do you think that’s something you couldn’t do?”  He 
replied, “I think it would be very hard for me to do.”  He 
described himself as a “person who’s reluctant to award the 
death penalty even though he . . . might decide that the facts 
and the guidelines are met.”   Substantial evidence supports the 
trial court’s finding that J-56’s ability to follow the law would be 
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substantially impaired.  (See People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
1048, 1063 [upholding excusal of a prospective juror who 
“repeatedly expressed uncertainty not as to her own views on 
the death penalty or the appropriateness of the death penalty in 
any particular case, but as to her ability to impose a death 
sentence”]; People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 12 [“Comments 
that a prospective juror would have a ‘hard time’ or find it ‘very 
difficult’ to vote for death reflect ‘a degree of equivocation’ that, 
considered ‘with the juror’s . . . demeanor, can justify a trial 
court’s conclusion . . . that the juror’s views would “ ‘prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror . . . .’ ” ’ ”].)   
Moreover, the trial court was in a position, which we are 
not, to observe Prospective Juror No. J-56 as he gave his 
responses.  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [“Deference to 
the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess 
the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose 
it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and 
qualifications of potential jurors”].)  Although Silveria asserts 
no deference should be accorded because the court did not 
expressly state that it had granted the challenge for cause 
because of J-56’s observed demeanor, the court unquestionably 
weighed the prospective juror’s credibility and qualification to 
serve in its thorough voir dire questioning and in relying on that 
voir dire to sustain the challenge.  (See People v. Flores (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 371, 388 (Flores) [“The trial court was in the best 
position to observe [prospective juror] S.M.’s demeanor, vocal 
inflection, and other cues not readily apparent on the record, 
and we reasonably infer that the trial court based its decision 
not only on what S.M. said, but also on how he said it”]; People v. 
Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451 (Stewart) [“a trial judge who 
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observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that 
person’s responses (noting, among other things, the person’s 
tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), 
gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the 
record”]; see also People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 835 
(Wilson) [“In evaluating the testimony of the 12 jurors, the trial 
court necessarily had to assess their credibility”].)   
Substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling.   
b. Prospective Juror No. E-45  
On his questionnaire, in response to the question, “Is there 
anything about the nature of this case that would make it 
difficult or impossible for you to be a fair and impartial juror 
here,” Prospective Juror No. E-45 answered “Yes,” and wrote, 
“[M]y views on the death penalty.”  When responding to a 
question about his “general feelings regarding the death 
penalty,” E-45 wrote, “I do not believe that the death penalty is 
a deterr[e]nt to murder.  I am not sure if we have the right to 
take a life for a life.”  He was “strongly against” the death 
penalty because he did not believe it “does anything to stop a 
crime and that being incarcerated for life is penalty enough.”  
When asked whether his views about the death penalty had 
changed substantially in the last few years, he answered, “Yes,” 
explaining, “I find myself thinking there ‘may’ be special cases 
where it should be considered.”  He answered, “Yes” when asked 
if he adhered to “any religious or philosophical principle that 
would affect [his] ability to vote for the death penalty as a 
judgment in this case,” explaining, “I don’t believe ‘we’ should 
play God.”  E-45 also answered, “Yes” when asked if he would 
always vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole and reject death, “regardless of the evidence presented” 
at the penalty retrial, explaining, “I don’t believe that the death 
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penalty is the appropriate punishment.”  When asked “[u]nder 
what circumstances, if any,” he believed “that the death penalty 
is appropriate,” he answered, “It would have to be for someone 
who is the epitome of evil.”  When asked if he could see himself, 
“in the appropriate case . . . choosing the death penalty,” he 
answered, “No,” explaining, “I cannot at this time but if give[n] 
clear cases where it should be applied, I might be able to 
consider it.”   
On voir dire, the trial court asked Prospective Juror No. E-
45, “[W]hen you initially went back there to deliberate, do you 
think you would be able to go back there with both penalties as 
possibilities?”  E-45 replied, “Yes — well, I guess on the death 
penalty I have some issues with that, but I think I could look at 
what the law requires and — ”  The court asked, “Would you 
automatically be closed off as to one penalty when you initially 
went back there?”  E-45 replied, “It’s hard to say.  Right now, 
yes, but I haven’t seen . . . the evidence, the circumstances.”  The 
court said, “From reading your questionnaire, I gather that you 
do not favor the death penalty, necessarily?”  E-45 answered, 
“Right.”  The court asked:  “You would have more favor toward 
life without parole.  What we want to make sure of is that jurors 
are not closed off to either penalty, that they actually could 
conscientiously consider both penalties as possibilities, again, 
without knowing anything about the facts of the case.”  E-
45 said:  “[P]robably the death penalty would be harder.  I guess 
I would need to see more evidence than for the life in prison.  So 
they’re not equally balanced.”  The court subsequently asked:  
“Assume that the evidence in this case showed that the 
defendants had deliberately participated in the multiple 
stabbing of the victim in this case during the course of a robbery 
and the victim died. . . . [B]ased on that assumption: Do you 
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think that you would always vote for life without parole and 
reject the death penalty despite any aggravating evidence that 
may be presented during the course of the trial?”  E-45 replied, 
“Yes, I think I would vote for life without parole, right.”  The 
court asked, “Do you think you would ever vote for death based 
on that assumption?”  E-45 said, “Probably not at this point, no.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror No. E-45 for 
cause.  The court continued voir dire, asking E-45, “Going back 
to that assumption, the multiple stabbing during a robbery, the 
victim died and so on.  In a situation like that, could you even 
consider the death penalty?”  E-45 replied:  “Personally, no.  But 
I guess if I were instructed as far as what the law should be, 
then I might have to look at . . . changing my beliefs a little bit.  
I guess I could consider the death penalty.”  The court 
subsequently explained that California law “expresses no 
preference for either penalty.  There is no presumption as to 
which penalty is appropriate in this case.”  After further 
colloquy it asked, “[D]o you think that the death penalty could 
be appropriate in a case such as this, without knowing anything 
about the case, other than that one assumption?”  E-45 replied, 
“I guess, just with that one assumption, probably not 
appropriate.”  The court dismissed E-45, finding that he “is in 
fact substantially impaired because of his views on the death 
penalty and it would prevent him from fulfilling his role as a 
juror according to his oath and the instructions.”   
No error appears in excusing Prospective Juror No. E-45 
for cause.  On his juror questionnaire he stated he was “strongly 
against” the death penalty, and that he would always vote for 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and reject 
death, “regardless of the evidence presented” at the penalty 
retrial.  Although he believed the death penalty was appropriate 
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for “someone who is the epitome of evil,” he said on voir dire it 
was “probably not appropriate” for a stabbing death during a 
robbery.  Moreover, “the mere theoretical possibility that a 
prospective juror might be able to reach a verdict of death in 
some case does not necessarily render the dismissal of the juror” 
erroneous.  (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 432 
(Martinez.)   
Travis asserts that Prospective Juror No. E-45 did not 
“indicate he could never vote for” the death penalty.  
Nonetheless, E-45’s “answers provided substantial evidence 
that [he] could not fairly consider both sides.”  (Thompson, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1075.)  On his juror questionnaire, when 
asked, “Is there anything about the nature of this case that 
would make it difficult or impossible for you to be a fair and 
impartial juror here,” E-45 answered “Yes,” and wrote, “[M]y 
views on the death penalty.”  He answered “Yes” when asked if 
he adhered to “any religious or philosophical principle that 
would affect [his] ability to vote for the death penalty as a 
judgment in this case,” explaining, “I don’t believe ‘we’ should 
play God.”  E-45 also answered “Yes” when asked if he would 
always vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole and reject death, “regardless of the evidence presented” 
at the penalty retrial, explaining, “I don’t believe that the death 
penalty is the appropriate punishment.”   
On voir dire, the court asked Prospective Juror No. E-45:  
“Assume that the evidence in this case showed that the 
defendants had deliberately participated in the multiple 
stabbing of the victim in this case during the course of a robbery 
and the victim died. . . . [B]ased on that assumption: Do you 
think that you would always vote for life without parole and 
reject the death penalty despite any aggravating evidence that 
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may be presented during the course of the trial?”  (Italics added.)  
E-45 replied, “Yes, I think I would vote for life without parole, 
right.”  The court asked, “Do you think you would ever vote for 
death based on that assumption?”  E-45 said, “Probably not at 
this point, no.”  The court subsequently asked, “[D]o you think 
that the death penalty could be appropriate in a case such as 
this, without knowing anything about the case, other than that 
one assumption?”  E-45 replied, “I guess, just with that one 
assumption, probably not appropriate.”  This colloquy, 
particularly Juror E-45’s response that he would always vote for 
life without parole “despite any aggravating evidence that may 
be presented,” provides substantial evidence to support the trial 
court’s ruling. 
Moreover, “ ‘ “[t]here is no requirement that a prospective 
juror’s bias against the death penalty be proven with 
unmistakable clarity.” ’ ”  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
472, 497.)  As the high court has observed, many prospective 
jurors “simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the 
point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear’; 
these [prospective jurors] may not know how they will react 
when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable 
to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.  Despite 
this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be 
situations where the trial judge is left with the definite 
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully 
and impartially apply the law.”  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 
469 U.S. 412, 424–426, fn. omitted (Witt).)   
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling.   
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c. Prospective Juror No. F-77 
On his questionnaire, when asked his general feelings 
about the death penalty, Prospective Juror No. F-77 answered, 
“Against it.”  He answered “Yes” when asked if he held any 
“religious or philosophical principle that would affect [his] 
ability to vote for the death penalty as a judgment in this case,” 
explaining, “The involuntary taking of another’s life is wrong.”  
He answered “Yes” when asked if he had any beliefs that would 
affect his ability or willingness to be a juror, explaining:  “I 
believe our [s]ociety might be better off without the Death 
Penalty.  As a moral matter I do not see that the State has a 
right to take a life any more than an individual does.  Some 
States have made mistakes.  I doubt if the Death Penalty deters 
murder.  I believe the existence of the Death Penalty gives a 
sanction to murder in [s]ociety.”  He answered “No” when asked 
if he would always vote for life imprisonment “regardless of the 
evidence presented,” explaining, “I am open to the evidence.”  
When asked under what circumstances he believed the death 
penalty was appropriate, he answered:  “Hard to come up with 
any.  Death Penalty appears to be state-sanctioned murder.”  He 
answered “Yes” when asked if he believed “the death penalty 
should never be imposed for murder.”  He answered “No” when 
asked if he could see himself rejecting life imprisonment and 
choosing the death penalty, explaining, “Sitting here now I 
cannot see it but I would always listen to other people’s points-
of-view.”  He answered “Yes” when asked if he could set aside 
any preconceived notions about each penalty and his personal 
feelings and follow the law.   
On voir dire, in response to the court’s inquiry, Prospective 
Juror No. F-77 said he would try to keep an open mind regarding 
penalty until after he had heard all of the evidence, counsel’s 
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arguments,  and the instructions.  After noting that F-77 had 
said he was against the death penalty, the court asked if he 
would be able to vote for that penalty if after hearing the 
evidence and engaging in deliberation he thought it was 
appropriate.  F-77 replied:  “I would want to keep an open mind 
and I would listen to arguments.  If my opinion on the matter is 
wrong and I’m persuaded that it’s wrong, then I would change 
my opinion.”  When asked if he were “closed off” to the death 
penalty, F-77 observed, “If somebody were to present me with 
an argument that I found overwhelming and persuasive, then 
my opinion would change.” He explained, “If I were persuaded 
by another person’s argument that my position was wrong, then 
I would change my position.”  He identified Charles Manson, 
whom he described as “a monstrous person with no feelings of 
remorse,” as a person for whom the death penalty might be 
appropriate “if one was going to make an exception and say one 
should have the death penalty.”  In response to the prosecutor’s 
inquiry, F-77 affirmed that he considered the death penalty to 
be state sanctioned murder.  The prosecutor subsequently asked 
F-77, “[I]t sounds like you already have a position that you 
would have to be talked out of; is that fair?”  He replied, “I would 
want to listen to all the evidence and I would want to listen to 
how that evidence had impacted other people and I would see 
whether my position was wrong.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror No. F-77 for 
cause, and the trial court sustained the challenge, stating:  
“[T]he Court finds that the juror is substantially impaired.  He 
has a position and his position is that he would have to be 
convinced otherwise.  He is not here with an open mind.  And 
the Court finds that his attitudes and answers and feelings 
would make it impossible or at least substantially impair him 
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from being a juror in this case and properly acting as a juror in 
accordance with the law and his oath.”   
Travis contends that “the trial court erroneously believed 
that an acknowledged aversion to the death penalty 
automatically disqualified” Prospective Juror No. F-77.  As can 
be seen, the record is otherwise and supports the trial court’s 
finding that F-77 would not fairly consider both penalties.  
Although he answered “Yes” when asked on his questionnaire if 
he could set aside any preconceived notions about each penalty 
and his personal feelings and follow the law, and said on voir 
dire he would try to keep an open mind regarding penalty until 
after he had heard all of the evidence, counsels’ arguments,  and 
the instructions, F-77 made other statements that provided 
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.  On F-
77’s questionnaire he answered “Yes” when asked if he believed 
“the death penalty should never be imposed for murder.”  He 
also answered “Yes” when asked if he held any “religious or 
philosophical principle that would affect [his] ability to vote for 
the death penalty as a judgment in this case,” explaining, “The 
involuntary taking of another’s life is wrong.”  He answered “No” 
when asked if he could see himself rejecting life imprisonment 
and choosing the death penalty, explaining, “Sitting here now I 
cannot see it but I would always listen to other people’s points-
of-view.”  On voir dire, F-77 described the death penalty as 
“state-sanctioned murder.”  Although he said he would “keep an 
open mind,” he also indicated he already had an opinion on the 
issue of penalty.  He would require an “overwhelming and 
persuasive” argument during jury deliberations to change his 
view, an attitude that belies the concept of keeping an open 
mind while listening to the evidence and entering deliberations.  
Although he identified Charles Manson as one person for whom 
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the death penalty might be appropriate, again “the mere 
theoretical possibility that a prospective juror might be able to 
reach a verdict of death in some case does not necessarily render 
the dismissal of the juror” erroneous.  (Martinez, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 432.)   
Nor, as Travis further contends, does the circumstance 
that in cases such as People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 
448–449, in which we upheld the trial court’s ruling retaining a 
prospective juror who favored the death penalty, but who “would 
not ‘necessarily be committed from the outset to the imposition 
of the death penalty’ ” (id. at p. 449), and who “assured the court 
multiple times that he would not automatically vote for the 
death penalty and would, instead, reach a decision based upon 
all of the evidence” (id. at p. 448), demonstrate that F-77 was a 
“suitable juror[].”  Although the prospective juror in Ramirez 
initially said that “if the defendant were convicted of first degree 
murder and found to be eligible for the death penalty, he would 
vote to impose the death penalty unless he were convinced 
otherwise” (id. at p. 447), upon further examination the 
prospective juror “acknowledged that he would weigh and 
consider the evidence presented and base his decision on that 
evidence and would not vote ‘automatically’ for anything,” 
“denied that he would always vote to impose the death penalty 
for first degree murder ‘no matter what the circumstances that 
led to that conviction,’ ” and “stated that he would not 
‘necessarily be committed from the outset to the imposition of 
the death penalty.’ ”  (Ibid.)  When asked by the trial court if the 
prospective juror found beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant 
guilty of first degree murder and found true a special 
circumstance allegation, “ ‘would that put you in a position 
where in every case would you always vote for the death 
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penalty,’ ” the prospective juror responded:  “ ‘I don't think I 
could say in every case.  I will have to judge each case by its own 
merits.’ ”  (Ibid.)  While there are some similarities between the 
statements in Ramirez and the statements at issue here, there 
are several crucial differences as well:  Notably, unlike in 
Ramirez, Prospective Juror No. F-77, described the death 
penalty as “state-sanctioned murder,” and stated that he would 
require an “overwhelming and persuasive” argument during 
jury deliberations to change his view.   
d. Standard for assessing substantial impairment  
Silveria contends that the trial court erroneously used a 
different standard to assess whether Prospective Juror Nos. A-
69, B-17, C-47, C-67, and G-68, who supported the death 
penalty, were substantially impaired, than for Prospective Juror 
Nos. J-56, E-45, and F-77, who opposed the death penalty.  He 
claims for that reason the trial court’s rulings are entitled to no 
deference.  We reject the claim.   
As a preliminary matter, we note that Silveria does not 
challenge the trial court’s rulings denying his challenges for 
cause against Prospective Juror Nos. A-69, B-17, C-47, C-67, 
and G-68.  Hence these rulings are not before us.  Although he 
attempts to do so in a footnote in his reply, “ ‘[i]t is axiomatic 
that arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not 
be entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.’ ”  
(Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1218–1219.)  Even assuming 
for the sake of argument that the claim was preserved, none of 
the challenged jurors served on the penalty retrial jury, hence 
Silveria fails to demonstrate prejudice from any erroneous 
denial of his challenges for cause.  (People v. Bell (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 70, 94 (Bell) [“Where no challenged panelist actually 
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served on defendant’s jury, ‘ “there is no basis for us to conclude 
that the jury empaneled was anything but impartial” ’ ”].)   
Silveria does, however, more broadly assert that the trial 
court used a different standard to assess whether five 
prospective jurors who supported the death penalty were 
substantially impaired than it did for three prospective jurors 
who opposed the death penalty.  In making this claim, Silveria 
essentially contends that the trial court was biased in its death-
qualification rulings.  He does not point to any place in the 
record where he objected below on the ground of judicial bias to 
the manner in which the trial court conducted voir dire for these 
prospective jurors.  Indeed, following the voir dire of Prospective 
Juror No. B-17, Silveria’s counsel expressly asserted that the 
trial court had been evenhanded in its application of the 
substantially impaired standard.  Counsel also observed that 
earlier that day the court had excused on its own motion several 
prospective jurors who it had determined would automatically 
vote for the death penalty.   
Assuming the claim is preserved on appeal, it is meritless.  
“Witt has long been the law and it is clear the court was aware 
of the appropriate standard to apply.”  (People v. Thomas (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 336, 361.)  We have concluded, after careful review of 
the respective questionnaires and voir dire of Prospective Juror 
Nos. J-56, E-45, and F-77, that the trial court’s rulings 
sustaining the prosecutor’s challenges are supported by 
substantial evidence.  (See ante, pt. II.B.2.a–c.)  We have also 
reviewed the court’s voir dire of Prospective Juror Nos. A-69, B-
17, C-47, C-67, and G-68, none of whom served on the penalty 
retrial jury, and see no indication that the court showed bias in 
evaluating whether these prospective jurors or Prospective 
Juror Nos. J-56, E-45, and F-77 were substantially impaired.  
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Rather, as to each of these prospective jurors, the court 
conducted thorough voir dire examination to determine whether 
the prospective juror was qualified to serve and permitted 
counsel 
to 
ask 
further 
questions 
regarding 
possible 
disqualifying bias.   
Silveria asserts that Prospective Juror No. A-69 was more 
adamant in his view favoring the death penalty than “some” 
prospective jurors (presumably referring to Prospective Juror 
Nos. J-56, E-45, and F-77) were in their view opposing the death 
penalty, but the court denied the challenge for cause as to A-69 
because he said he could consider a life imprisonment penalty.  
Silveria asserts that the circumstance that the court sustained 
the challenge as to prospective jurors who opposed the death 
penalty, “even though they said they could consider the death 
penalty,” demonstrates the court’s bias against the defense.  
Silveria similarly claims that if Prospective Juror No. B-17 was 
not substantially impaired because he would not automatically 
vote for the death penalty, then Prospective Juror Nos. J-56, E-
45, and F-77 who opposed the death penalty were not 
substantially impaired because they were not “automatically 
pro-life,” and that if Prospective Juror No. “C-47’s responses 
were sufficient to save him from exclusion . . . , then certainly 
the responses of the pro-life” Prospective Juror Nos. J-56, E-45, 
and F-77 “should have saved them as well.”  As to Prospective 
Juror No. G-68, Silveria simply asserts that the trial court 
denied the defense challenge “because, although G-68 was 
biased in favor of the death penalty, he was not so biased in this 
case.”   
These summary assertions fail to consider the prospective 
jurors’ statements in the context of the entire voir dire.  
Prospective Juror No. A-69 said that although his mind was 
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leaning toward being closed off to the possibility of a verdict of 
life imprisonment “knowing that the defendants have been 
convicted of murder in the first degree and two special 
circumstances,” he would want to hear the mitigating evidence 
before reaching a penalty decision, and he could conscientiously 
consider and weigh that evidence.  He also explained that his 
questionnaire opposition to the penalty of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole had been based on a 
misunderstanding that parole was available for such a sentence.    
Having learned otherwise during voir dire, A-69 said a verdict 
of life imprisonment was now “definitely” more possible.  
Prospective Juror No. B-17 said that he would “have to listen 
to . . . the testimony” and “make a judgment based on that,” 
agreed with the prosecutor he was “someone who would want to 
hear all the evidence in a case before rendering” a decision, could 
think of no reason why he could not be fair to both sides in the 
case, and said he had not provided an answer on the 
questionnaire regarding his reasons for supporting or opposing 
the death penalty because he had “no preference one way or the 
other.”  Although he had answered “Yes” when asked on his 
questionnaire whether the death penalty should be mandatory 
for murder, he said on voir dire there could be extenuating 
circumstances that would make the death penalty inappropriate 
and that he would want to hear and could conscientiously 
consider the mitigating evidence before reaching a verdict.  
Prospective Juror No. C-47, who supported the death penalty, 
agreed with the court that he would be able to “keep an open 
mind” and “not make up [his] mind until [he had] heard all the 
evidence in court and the arguments from the attorneys and the 
instructions on the law and had a chance to go back and 
deliberate with [his] fellow jurors.”  He also agreed with the 
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court that he would be able to “listen with an open mind to all 
the evidence that was presented” and “conscientiously consider 
both penalties as possibilities in this case at this point right now 
without knowing anything else.”   
By contrast, as delineated above, although Prospective 
Juror No. J-56 expressed a willingness to consider all of the 
evidence, keep an open mind, and follow the instructions, he also 
expressed concern he would not be a fair and impartial juror 
because of his views on the death penalty, and observed that he 
would find it difficult to vote for the death penalty even if he 
determined it was the appropriate verdict.  Likewise, although 
he acknowledged there could be circumstances in which the 
death penalty would be appropriate, he was unable to articulate 
on his questionnaire or on voir dire what those might be.  He 
also observed that the “stress” from knowing he would be 
participating in the decision whether to impose the death 
penalty would affect his ability to concentrate during the trial.  
Prospective Juror No. E-45 stated on his juror questionnaire 
that he was “strongly against” the death penalty, and that he 
would always vote for life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole and reject death, “regardless of the evidence presented” 
at the penalty retrial.  Although he believed the death penalty 
was appropriate for “someone who is the epitome of evil,” he said 
on voir dire it was “probably not appropriate” for a stabbing 
death during a robbery.  Prospective Juror No. F-77 described 
the death penalty as “state-sanctioned murder,” and said he did 
not believe it should be imposed for murder.  He would require 
an “overwhelming and persuasive” argument during jury 
deliberations to change his view, an attitude that is the 
antithesis of having an open mind while listening to the 
evidence and entering deliberations.  Although he identified 
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Charles Manson as one person for whom the death penalty 
might be appropriate, again “the mere theoretical possibility 
that a prospective juror might be able to reach a verdict of death 
in some case does not necessarily render the dismissal of the 
juror” erroneous.  (Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 432.)  And 
once again, many prospective jurors “simply cannot be asked 
enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been 
made ‘unmistakably clear,’ ” but “[d]espite this lack of clarity in 
the printed record . . . there will be situations where the trial 
judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror 
would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.”  
(Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 424–426.)   
Silveria asserts that the trial court should have recognized 
that Prospective Juror No. A-69’s credibility was suspect “when 
he claimed to have acquired a new understanding of the 
meaning of life without parole during voir dire” because the jury 
questionnaire described the sentence as “Life Without the 
Possibility of Parole.”  “Making such credibility determinations 
fell squarely within the trial court’s province.”  (Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 403; see ibid. [“The trial 
court’s view that Number 80 would not automatically vote in a 
particular way does not establish that the court applied an 
improper or even a different standard than with other 
prospective jurors”].)  
Silveria asserts that Prospective Juror No. C-67 never 
said “he could set aside his preconceived notions about the death 
penalty and follow the law,” yet the defense challenge for cause 
was denied.  By contrast “the judge granted the prosecutor’s 
challenges for cause of three pro-life potential jurors even 
though they said they could put aside their preconceived notions 
about the death penalty.”   
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The United States Constitution “does not dictate a 
catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded 
an impartial jury.”  (Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, 
italics omitted.)  Considering Prospective Juror No. C-67’s voir 
dire in its entirety, although he may not have said the precise 
statement that he could “set aside his preconceived notions 
about the death penalty and follow the law,” he said “Yes” when 
asked by the court if he would “be able to keep an open mind,” 
“not make up your mind until you’ve heard all the evidence from 
all the attorneys here in court, the arguments from the 
attorneys and the instructions on the law from the Court,” and 
go to the jury room for deliberations “with both penalties as 
possibilities.”  Although he “lean[ed] in favor of the death 
penalty,” C-67 answered “Yes” when asked by the court if he 
would be able to listen to the mitigating “evidence with an open 
mind and be able to conscientiously consider and weigh that 
evidence in reaching a penalty phase determination.”  C-67 also 
replied, “Yes,” when asked by the prosecutor, “Would you be 
willing, if you are selected as a member of this jury, to consider 
all of the evidence that comes into this courtroom, listen to it 
with an open mind, listen to the law the Court instructs on, 
listen to the arguments of counsel and then go back into the jury 
room, evaluate that evidence during the process of deliberation 
and arrive at a verdict as to the appropriate penalty even if 
that’s a difficult thing to do; could you do that?”  When asked by 
the prosecutor, “Is there anything that would prevent you from 
being fair and impartial in this case?”  C-67 replied, “I can’t 
think of anything.”  Thus, contrary to Silveria’s assertion, the 
circumstance that C-67 did not expressly state that he could “set 
aside his preconceived notions about the death penalty and 
follow the law” fails to demonstrate that the trial court used a 
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different standard to evaluate substantial impairment for C-67 
than it did for Prospective Juror Nos. J-56, E-45, and F-77.   
By contrast, as delineated above, Prospective Juror No. J-
56 said, “[I]t would be very hard for me” when asked if he would 
be able to set aside “personal beliefs or feelings” that were “in 
conflict with the California law.”  He also observed that he could 
follow “the guidelines that the judge sets up for aggravated and 
mitigated . . . and come to a conclusion based on those.  But even 
once I come to that conclusion, if it happens to be death, I would 
still have a hard time.”  Prospective Juror No. E-45 answered, 
“Probably not at this point, no,” when asked if he would ever 
vote for the death penalty in a case where “the defendants had 
deliberately participated in the multiple stabbing of the 
victim . . . during the course of a robbery and the victim died.”  
When asked if he could “even consider the death penalty” in that 
situation, E-45 replied:  “Personally, no.  But I guess if I were 
instructed as far as what the law should be, then I might have 
to look at . . . changing my beliefs a little bit.  I guess I could 
consider the death penalty.”  Prospective Juror No. F-77 
described the death penalty as “state-sanctioned murder,” said 
he would require an “overwhelming and persuasive” argument 
during jury deliberations to change his view, and identified 
Charles Manson as one person for whom the death penalty 
might be appropriate.   
Silveria asserts the trial court’s rulings sustaining the 
prosecutor’s challenges for cause are not entitled to deference 
because the court did not expressly state that it had granted the 
challenges for cause to Prospective Juror Nos. J-56, E-45, and F-
77 because of their observed demeanor.  As discussed above, the 
court unquestionably weighed the prospective jurors’ credibility 
and qualification to serve in its thorough voir dire questioning 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
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and reliance on that voir dire to both sustain the challenges to 
Prospective Juror Nos. J-56, E-45, and F-77 and to reject 
Silveria’s challenges for cause to Prospective Juror Nos. A-69, B-
17, C-47, C-67, and G-68.  (See Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 388 
[“The trial court was in the best position to observe [prospective 
juror] S.M.’s demeanor, vocal inflection, and other cues not 
readily apparent on the record, and we reasonably infer that the 
trial court based its decision not only on what S.M. said, but also 
on how he said it.”]; Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451 [“a 
trial judge who 
observes 
and 
speaks 
with 
a 
prospective juror and hears that person’s responses (noting, 
among other things, the person’s tone of voice, apparent level of 
confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that 
simply does not appear on the record”]; see also Wilson, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 835 [“In evaluating the testimony of the 
12 jurors, the trial court necessarily had to assess their 
credibility”]; see ante, at pp. 64–65.)    
In sum, no judicial bias in evaluating whether Prospective 
Juror Nos. J-56, E-45, F-77, A-69, B-17, C-47, C-67, and G-68 
were substantially impaired is demonstrated. 
3. Removal of Juror No. 4  
Silveria and Travis contend the trial court erroneously 
removed Juror No. 4.  We reject the claim.   
On her juror questionnaire, Juror No. 4 was asked if she 
knew or had heard of any anticipated witnesses appearing on a 
10−page list, including “Leo Charon.”  She did not circle 
Reverend Charon’s name.  On February 13, 1997, Juror No. 4 
told courtroom personnel during a recess that she now realized 
she knew Reverend Charon.  After the rest of the jury had left 
for the day, and in a hearing with the court and counsel, Juror 
No. 4 explained that her husband had worked at CityTeam 
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83 
 
Ministries in the recovery program with Reverend Charon.  She 
had known Reverend Charon for about 10 years and had 
socialized with him.   She said, “I don’t know him intimately, but 
I just know he’s a good man,” adding “I didn’t know if that would 
have any effect on me.”  Travis’s counsel mentioned that 
Reverend Charon had been gone from CityTeam for about four 
to five years, and Juror No. 4 said, “So has my husband.”  The 
court asked, “Is there anything about your friendship or 
knowledge, your conversations or whatever with [Reverend] 
Charon that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial 
both to the prosecution and the defense in this case?”  Juror 
No. 4 replied, “I don’t think so.”  The court asked, “Would you be 
able to listen to Reverend Charon . . . with an open mind and if 
something he said seemed to ring true with you, fine, and if it 
didn’t, fine the other way?”  Juror No. 4 replied, “Yes.”  After 
consulting with counsel at sidebar, the court asked Juror No. 4, 
“Leo Charon was your husband’s boss you think?”   She replied, 
“I know he works side-by-side. . . . My husband could have been 
his boss.”  The court asked, “Is there anything about . . . your 
husband’s relationship with Leo Charon that would affect you 
in this case; do you think?”  Juror No. 4 replied, “No.”  The court 
thanked the juror and excused her until the next week.   
On February 20, in a hearing held outside the presence of 
the jury, the prosecutor noted that Reverend Charon had stated 
to separate juries at the first penalty phase that each of the 
defendants was the most sincere convert he had encountered.  
Recounting Juror No. 4’s statement that Reverend Charon was 
a good man, the prosecutor expressed concern that the juror had 
already formed an opinion as to his credibility.  The prosecutor 
observed he was in the position of impugning the Reverend’s 
credibility in front of a juror who had known him for 10 years 
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and believed him to be a good person.  “The People . . . find 
themselves with a juror who has a close connection to a critical 
witness [who] the People will have to attack.”  The prosecutor 
also expressed concern that Juror No. 4 would be free to express 
her views regarding Reverend Charon during deliberations.   
On March 12, 1997, a second hearing was held with Juror 
No. 4 after the rest of the jury had left for the day.  In response 
to the court’s question, she said she had seen Reverend Charon 
at a wedding a few months earlier.  When asked if she was 
familiar with his personal life, she said she “thought he was a 
recovering alcoholic.”  When asked what she meant by him being 
a “good man,” she explained the men at CityTeam seemed to be 
able to “talk to him and trust him.”  The court asked Juror No. 4, 
“[A]ssume Mr. Charon testifies . . . favorably for the defense.  
Based on what you know of Mr. Charon, if you were the 
prosecution, would you feel comfortable with a juror such as 
yourself based on what you know?”   Juror No. 4 replied, “Well, 
I would definitely have some concerns.”  She explained:  
“Because I know him.  What I know of him I just wouldn’t believe 
that he would ever lie about any dealings with somebody.  So as 
far as that would go, I would believe that what he was saying he 
would believe to be true.”   She answered, “Right,” when the 
court asked, “[I]f Mr. Charon testified under oath you would not 
believe that he would be capable of telling a lie or misleading 
anybody?”  She later added, “I would tend to believe that what 
he’s saying he believes to be the truth.  That doesn’t mean you 
can’t be wrong about something.”  Juror No. 4 also said she could 
follow the court’s instruction not to disclose what she knew 
about Reverend Charon during deliberations.  The court excused 
her for the day.   
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The court granted the prosecutor’s motion to discharge 
Juror No. 4 for cause, stating:  “The Court is convinced that 
there is absolutely no juror misconduct and Juror No. 4 did not 
realize she knew the witness, Mr. Charon, until February 13 of 
1997 during the opening statements and then she notified the 
Court immediately.  It’s important to note that Mr. Charon’s 
testimony is unlike most witnesses in that it consists not only of 
his observations and conversations but more importantly his 
opinion and the credibility of that opinion. . . . . Juror No. 4 . . . 
would . . . be judging his credibility on facts or factors that are 
not in evidence and that would be improper in and of itself.  Also, 
just as important she would not be able to get involved in the 
deliberative process on the issue of Mr. Charon’s credibility if 
and when that issue came up in deliberations.  Juror No. 4 has 
stated . . . she does not believe that Mr. Charon would lie or even 
mislead anyone . . . . This shows that she has prejudged his 
testimony or opinion and could not look at it with an open mind.”   
“Section 1089 authorizes the trial court to discharge a 
juror at any time before or after the final submission of the case 
to the jury if, upon good cause, the juror is ‘found to be unable to 
perform his or her duty.’ ”  (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
577, 621.)  A trial court’s decision to remove a juror is reviewed 
by “asking whether the grounds for such removal appear in the 
record as a demonstrable reality.”  (People v. Thompson (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 79, 137.)   
Here Juror No. 4 stated that she had already formed a 
positive opinion of Reverend Charon’s credibility based on 
matters outside of the courtroom.  The court asked Juror No. 4 
to assume Reverend Charon testified favorably for the defense, 
and inquired, “[I]f you were the prosecution, would you feel 
comfortable with a juror such as yourself based on what you 
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know?”  She replied, “Well, I would definitely have some 
concerns,” explaining:  “Because I know him.  What I know of 
him I just wouldn’t believe that he would ever lie about any 
dealings with somebody.  So as far as that would go, I would 
believe that what he was saying he would believe to be true.”  
She answered, “Right,” when the court asked, “[I]f Mr. Charon 
testified under oath you would not believe that he would be 
capable of telling a lie or misleading anybody.”  Moreover, as the 
court recognized, she would not be permitted to engage in 
deliberations regarding his credibility or fully function as a juror 
if this issue arose during deliberations.  For these reasons, the 
trial court had good cause to discharge Juror No. 4.   
4. Challenged Admitted Evidence 
a. Silveria’s former testimony  
Travis contends that the trial court erroneously admitted 
Silveria’s first penalty phase testimony regarding the 
circumstances of Madden’s murder at the joint penalty retrial.  
We conclude there was no error.   
As noted, at the first penalty phase, Travis and Silveria 
had separate juries.  As pertinent here, the trial court ruled that 
if Silveria or Travis testified, they would testify before both 
juries when discussing the circumstances of the crime.  Silveria 
testified before both penalty juries regarding the circumstances 
of the capital crime, and was subject to cross-examination by 
Travis.  Neither jury reached a penalty verdict.  At the joint 
penalty phase retrial, Silveria chose not to testify, and the 
prosecutor introduced the portion of Silveria’s prior testimony 
recounting the circumstances of the crime.   
Travis 
contends 
that 
when 
there 
are 
penalty 
codefendants, “testimony given by a defendant at a [penalty] 
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trial that ends in a hung jury should not be available for use by 
the prosecution in its case-in-chief” against the codefendant at 
the penalty retrial.   Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a) 
provides that a person is “ ‘unavailable as a witness’ ” when he 
or she is “(1) Exempted . . . on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement 
is relevant.”  Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a) 
provides in relevant part:  “(a) Evidence of former testimony is 
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness and:  [¶] . . . [¶] (2)  The party against 
whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action 
or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the 
right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an 
interest and motive similar to that which he has at the 
hearing.”16   
These requirements for admission of the former testimony 
were satisfied here.  Silveria, having invoked his Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination, 
was 
unavailable as a witness at the joint penalty retrial within the 
meaning of Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291.  (People v. 
Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 866, fn. 9 [the declarant’s 
“invocation 
of 
his Fifth Amendment privilege 
made 
him unavailable as a witness”].)  Moreover, Travis had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Silveria at the first penalty phase 
                                        
16 
Evidence Code section 1291 further provides in relevant 
part:  
“(b) The admissibility of former testimony under this section . . . 
is not subject to: [¶] . . . [¶]  (2) Objections based on . . . privilege 
which did not exist at the time the former testimony was given.”   
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with a “motive and interest similar” to that which he had at the 
penalty retrial.  (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).)   
Travis further asserts that Silveria’s former testimony 
should not have been admitted at the penalty retrial because 
when there has been a hung jury, “ ‘the status is the same as if 
there had been no trial.’ ”   “Assuming without deciding this rule 
applies to the grant of a penalty phase retrial rather than to an 
unqualified reversal of the entire underlying judgment in a 
capital case” (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1162), it 
does not override specific statutory provisions such as Evidence 
Code section 1291, which allows the admission of former 
testimony when the requirements of section 1291 have, as here, 
been satisfied.  (See Ramos, at pp. 1147, 1164 [prior testimony 
properly admitted at penalty phase retrial under Evid. Code, 
§ 1291].)  Although Travis asserts he had “no control” over 
Silveria’s decision to testify at the first penalty phase, there is 
no such requirement in section 1291 for former testimony to be 
admissible.     
Travis further asserts that even if the first penalty phase 
testimony of a defendant such as Silveria would generally be 
admissible against a codefendant such as Travis at their penalty 
retrial, it was not admissible here because Silveria objected to 
testifying before both first penalty phase juries, rather than to 
only his individual jury, regarding the circumstances of the 
crime, and the trial court erroneously overruled this objection.  
Travis notes that if defendants had been tried separately, each 
defendant could have asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege not 
to testify in each other’s separate penalty trial.  Travis contends 
that under these circumstances, Silveria’s testimony against 
Travis was “obtained in an invalid manner” at the first penalty 
phase, and was therefore improperly introduced against Travis 
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at the penalty retrial.  Travis acknowledges that because 
defendants were granted a penalty retrial when the first penalty 
phase ended with hung juries, Travis could not have been 
prejudiced by any error, and he asserts he does not make this 
claim “as a direct claim of error.”   
Even assuming a claim from the first penalty phase is 
properly before us, it is meritless.  Silveria waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination by testifying at the first penalty 
phase, and Travis is not in a position to challenge the validity of 
Silveria’s waiver.  (See People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 
343 (Badgett) [it is settled that a defendant cannot “object to a 
violation of another’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination”].)   
The People note that we have recognized a defendant may 
seek to exclude a third party’s testimony on the ground “that the 
trial testimony is coerced [citation], and that its admission will 
deprive [the defendant] of a fair trial.”  (Badgett, supra, 
10 Cal.4th at p. 344.)  “[T]he primary purpose of excluding 
coerced testimony of third parties is to assure the reliability of 
the trial proceedings . . . .”  (Id. at p. 347.)  The “exclusion is 
based on the idea that coerced testimony is inherently 
unreliable, and that its admission therefore violates a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  (Ibid., italics omitted; see 
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 559–560; People v. 
Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 966–967.)  We need not decide 
whether these principles apply when a codefendant testifies 
because Travis does not rely on this line of authority or claim 
that Silveria’s former testimony was coerced and therefore 
unreliable.  (See Badgett, at pp. 346–348 [noting that different 
exclusionary principles and burdens of proof apply when courts 
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address a violation of a defendant’s 5th Amendment right than 
when addressing that of a third party witness].)   
Rather, Travis asserts that Silveria was offered an 
“invalid choice” at the first penalty phase by the trial court 
between not testifying at all or testifying before both juries, and 
that absent that erroneous ruling Travis would not have had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Silveria at the first penalty phase, 
and hence none of Silveria’s former testimony would have been 
introduced against Travis at the penalty retrial when Silveria 
chose not to testify because it would not have been admissible 
under Evidence Code section 1291.  We have already rejected 
above defendants’ claim that they were entitled to separate 
penalty retrials, noting that the high court has held joint capital 
sentencing proceedings do not violate the Eighth Amendment 
right to an individualized sentencing determination.  (Kansas v. 
Carr, supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644]; see ante, 
pt. II.B.1.)  Given this precedent, it is difficult to discern any 
basis for deeming erroneous a ruling at the first penalty phase 
requiring either defendant who chose to testify regarding the 
circumstances of the capital crime to do so before both 
defendants’ penalty phase juries. 
Travis contends that if defendants had been tried 
separately each defendant could have asserted a Fifth 
Amendment privilege not to testify in each other’s separate 
penalty trial.  But the “mere admission of evidence that might 
not otherwise have been admitted in a severed proceeding” does 
not render a trial fundamentally unfair.  (Kansas v. Carr, supra, 
577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 645; see id. at p. 644].)  “While 
‘an important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only 
relevant and competent evidence bearing’ ” on the issue of 
penalty, “a fair trial does not include the right to exclude 
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relevant and competent evidence.”  (Zafiro v. United States 
(1993) 506 U.S. 534, 540 [addressing evidence bearing on guilt 
or innocence].)   
Nor, as Travis contends, did the admission of Silveria’s 
former testimony in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief at the penalty 
retrial unduly prejudice Travis by “allow[ing] the prosecutor to 
repeat the most damaging evidence about the circumstances of 
the . . . crime over and over again.”  Although Travis later 
testified in his penalty retrial defense case and described 
Madden’s murder in detail similar to that provided in Silveria’s 
former testimony, that event could not render Silveria’s earlier 
admitted former testimony “cumulative.”   
In sum, the trial court properly admitted Silveria’s former 
testimony regarding Madden’s murder at the joint penalty 
retrial.   
b. Pathologist’s testimony  
Silveria and Travis contend that the trial court 
erroneously permitted Dr.  Pakdaman, the pathologist who had 
performed Madden’s autopsy, to opine that Madden’s murder 
was “one of the most atrocious cases” he had ever seen.  We 
reject the claim.   
Dr.  Pakdaman testified he had performed about 7,000 
autopsies during his career, and did not recall each one.  The 
prosecutor asked, “Is this case one that you will ever be able to 
forget?” 
 
Over 
defendants’ 
unsuccessful 
objection, 
Dr. Pakdaman replied, “I’ve been to court nine times on this case 
and every time you ask this question I get upset.”  He explained, 
“This is one of the most atrocious cases that I’ve ever seen.”   
Even assuming the pathologist’s opinion that the murder 
was “one of the most atrocious cases” he had ever seen was 
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inadmissible, there is no reasonable possibility different penalty 
verdicts would have resulted absent admission of this 
statement.  (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 94 [the 
standard that an “error is reversible if there is a reasonable 
possibility it affected the verdict . . . is essentially the same as 
the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24”]; see People v. 
Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [the reasonable possibility 
standard applies “when assessing the effect of state-law error at 
the penalty phase of a capital trial”].)  His statement was brief 
and isolated.  More compelling was his detailed description of 
Madden’s 32 “slash-like superficial cuts” and “stab-like wounds” 
in his neck, chest, and abdomen, including stab wounds that 
penetrated 
his 
heart 
and 
fractured 
his 
ribs, 
and 
Dr. Stratbucker’s testimony that marks made by the stun gun 
on Madden’s thigh were inflicted while he was alive, and that 
Madden remained conscious “to the bitter end.”  Given this 
graphic evidence of defendants’ attack on Madden, any error in 
admitting Dr. Pakdaman’s opinion regarding atrociousness was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    
c. Evidence of lying in wait and torture  
Silveria and Travis contend that the trial court erred in 
allowing the prosecutor to present evidence of and argument on 
torture and lying in wait at the penalty retrial because Silveria’s 
guilt phase jury had found not true the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance allegation and had deadlocked on the torture-
murder special-circumstance allegation, and Travis’s guilt 
phase jury had found not true the torture-murder special-
circumstance allegation, and had deadlocked on the lying-in-
wait special-circumstance allegation.  We reject the claim.   
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Evidence of lying in wait and torture was part of the 
circumstances of the crime and hence admissible under 
section 190.3, factor (a).  Indeed, the high court has held that 
when a special circumstance the jury has found true is set aside 
on appeal, no constitutional violation occurs if “one of the other 
sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating 
weight to the same facts and circumstances.”  (Brown v. Sanders 
(2006) 546 U.S. 212, 220; see id. at pp. 214–215.)   
In Brown v. Sanders, the high court considered whether 
the circumstance that a California jury had found true four 
special circumstance allegations, including two that were later 
set 
aside 
on 
appeal, 
rendered 
the 
death 
judgment 
“unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element 
to the aggravation scale in the jury’s weighing process.”  (Brown 
v. Sanders, supra, 546 U.S. at p. 214; see id. at p. 215.)  It 
observed that under section 190.3, factor (a), the trial court 
instructed the jury to consider and weigh “ ‘[t]he circumstances 
of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present 
proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found 
to be true.’ ”  (Brown v. Sanders, at p. 214; see id. at p. 215.)  The 
high court reasoned that “because all of the facts and 
circumstances admissible to establish” the two later invalidated 
special circumstance allegations “were also properly adduced as 
aggravating facts bearing upon the ‘circumstances of the crime’ 
sentencing factor, . . . [t]hey were properly considered whether 
or not they bore upon the invalidated eligibility factors.”  (Id. at 
p. 224.)   
Likewise here, all of the aggravating facts and 
circumstances underlying the special circumstance allegations 
on which the jury hung or found not true were also properly 
admitted and considered by the jury as evidence of the 
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circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  
Moreover, because this evidence was properly admitted, the 
prosecutor was free to rely on it in his closing argument.  
(People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 448 (Rhoades) [“The 
fact that the guilt jury did not unanimously find kidnapping 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt did not preclude the 
prosecution from arguing, as a circumstance of the capital crime 
(Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a)), that defendant had in fact 
abducted the victim . . . .”].)   
Travis asserts evidence of torture was precluded by 
section 190.3, which provides in pertinent part:  “In the 
proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be 
presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter 
relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including, but 
not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present 
offense, . . .  the presence or absence of other criminal activity by 
the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force 
or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to 
use force or violence . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  However, in no event shall 
evidence of prior criminal activity be admitted for an offense for 
which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted.”  (Italics 
added.)  The italicized language on which Travis relies concerns 
alleged prior criminal activity, not evidence of the circumstances 
of the capital crime.  Here Travis was found guilty — not 
acquitted —  of the first degree murder of Madden.   
Travis asserts there is no rational basis for treating 
evidence of a special circumstance allegation found not true 
differently than evidence of a prior crime for which the 
defendant has been acquitted.  The electorate could rationally 
conclude that the sentencing jury should consider all of the 
circumstances of the capital offense even if it or a prior jury had 
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previously found these circumstances did not satisfy the 
elements of a special circumstance allegation, but that a prior 
crime for which the defendant had been acquitted lacked similar 
relevance.   
Silveria asserts that the admission of evidence of torture 
and lying in wait “retr[ied]” the torture-murder and lying-in-
wait special-circumstance allegations and placed him in double 
jeopardy with respect to those allegations.  Not so.  The penalty 
retrial jury was not asked to make findings on whether the 
elements of these special circumstance allegations had been 
satisfied.  Nor, for this same reason, and contrary to Silveria’s 
further claim, did the admission of torture evidence at the 
penalty retrial, without first successfully retrying the torture-
murder special-circumstance allegation on which Silveria’s guilt 
jury hung, and which was later struck, violate Silveria’s right to 
a speedy trial on that allegation.  Once again, evidence of torture 
and lying in wait was properly admitted at the penalty retrial 
as a circumstance of the capital crime despite the fact that the 
guilt phase jury was unable to reach a verdict on or found not 
true these allegations.   
Travis contends that the court erred in not instructing the 
penalty retrial jury, or allowing him to inform the jury during 
closing argument, that Travis’s guilt phase jury had found not 
true the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation.  There 
was no error.  We have previously held that the “fact that a first 
jury deadlocked . . . is irrelevant to the issues before the jury on 
a penalty retrial” (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 
178) because such evidence has no bearing on a defendant’s 
character or record, or on the circumstances of the offense 
(People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 968).  For these same 
reasons, and given evidence of torture was properly admitted at 
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the penalty retrial, evidence that Travis’s guilt phase jury found 
that the elements of the torture-murder special-circumstance 
allegation had not been satisfied was irrelevant.   
Travis notes that the first penalty jury had also decided 
Travis’s guilt, and so was aware when hearing evidence of 
torture at the first penalty phase that it had previously found 
the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation not true.  He 
argues that not informing the penalty retrial jury that the guilt 
phase jury made this finding unfairly placed the prosecutor in a 
stronger position and was inconsistent with the general 
principle that after a jury deadlocks the parties are placed in the 
same position at retrial as if there had been no original trial.  
We disagree.  In Brown v. Sanders, the trial court instructed the 
jury to consider as one of the sentencing factors “ ‘the existence 
of any special circumstances . . .  found to be true,’ ” thus giving 
the facts underlying the special circumstances “special 
prominence.”  (Brown v. Sanders, supra, 546 U.S. at p. 224, 
quoting § 190.3, factor (a).)  The high court concluded that even 
assuming this instruction caused the jury to give somewhat 
greater weight to those facts underlying a later invalidated 
special 
circumstance, 
any 
such 
impact 
was 
“ ‘ “inconsequential” ’ ” and could not “ ‘fairly be regarded as a 
constitutional defect in the sentencing process.’ ”  (Brown v. 
Sanders, at p. 225; see id. at p. 224.)  By analogy, the same lack 
of consequence would result when the first penalty jury knew as 
it considered evidence of torture at the first penalty phase that 
it had previously found the torture-murder special-circumstance 
allegation not true, but the penalty retrial jury did not have this 
knowledge when it considered that same evidence.   
In sum, the trial court properly admitted evidence of lying 
in wait and torture.   
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d. School loan money scam evidence  
Silveria contends the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of a loan money scam.  We reject the claim.   
During the prosecutor’s case-in-chief at the penalty 
retrial, he introduced Silveria’s testimony from the first penalty 
phase recounting that Silveria had attended the Technical 
Training Center computer school for several months as a full-
time student.   Silveria explained he had been “attracted” to the 
school because he would be “able to get some type of loan and 
there was some type of . . . scam involved at least from the 
person . . . who brought this up. . . . [Y]ou get this loan and . . . 
you’re supposed to get the balance or something like that.  So . . . 
it sounded good to me.”  On Travis’s cross-examination at the 
penalty retrial, the prosecutor asked whether he and Silveria 
had attended computer training school.  Travis replied that he, 
Silveria, and a friend named Pete Rosa had attended the 
Technical Training Center.  Travis explained Rosa, “had come 
up with a scam to get some type of loan money through this 
school and asked if we were willing to go with him.”  The men 
erroneously assumed they were going to be paid the full amount 
of a school loan up front, and planned to “quit school” and use 
the money to buy drugs.  After defendants learned they would 
not receive full loan checks in advance, they decided to “stay 
anyway,” and attended about two months of classes before 
leaving the school.   
On appeal, Silveria contends the trial court erred in 
permitting Travis’s testimony that Silveria had participated in 
a “scam” to obtain money from a computer school because it was 
not relevant to any of the factors in section 190.3 or as rebuttal 
to Silveria’s penalty defense case.  As noted, Silveria appeared 
to also describe the loan as a “scam” during his first penalty 
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phase testimony that was admitted at the penalty retrial.  Even 
assuming for the sake of argument Travis’s additional detail 
regarding the failed monetary scheme was improperly admitted, 
there is no reasonable possibility the penalty verdict would have 
been different in the absence of this evidence.  The prosecutor 
did not mention the loan scam in his closing argument, and the 
evidence was of marginal probative value when compared with 
the capital crime.    
e. Stun gun evidence  
Silveria contends the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to attempt to elicit evidence of Silveria’s use of a stun 
gun several days before Madden’s murder.  He also presents this 
claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct.  We reject the claim.   
On direct examination, Travis testified that on about 
January 24, 1991, several days before Madden’s January 28 
murder, Travis engaged in a fist fight with a man whom he 
believed had stolen a “beeper” from Jennings.  On cross-
examination, the prosecutor asked Travis whether before the 
fight Silveria, Jennings, or Spencer had “display[ed] the stun 
gun.”  Travis answered, “I don’t recall seeing the stun gun.”  The 
prosecutor subsequently asked whether before the fight Travis, 
Silveria, Spencer, Jennings, or Rackley had displayed a stun 
gun and repeatedly hit the “test button.”  Travis replied, “I don’t 
recall seeing the stun gun there, no.”  Nor did Travis’s review of 
a document shown to him by the prosecutor refresh his 
recollection as to whether before the fight he or one of his friends 
had “displayed a stun gun and kept hitting the test button.”   
Silveria contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
intentionally seeking “to elicit false stun gun evidence” against 
Silveria that was inadmissible under section 190.3, and that was 
misleading because the prosecutor “knew that Rackley was the 
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person who pulled the stun gun during this incident.”  He 
further contends that the trial court erred when it permitted the 
prosecutor to attempt to elicit this testimony.   
There was no misconduct or trial court error.  Contrary to 
Silveria’s characterization, the prosecutor’s questions regarding 
the display of a stun gun were not limited to Silveria, and did 
not imply that Silveria “had committed untoward and possibly 
criminal . . . acts.”  Nor, given that Travis had testified 
regarding the fight on direct examination, did the trial court err 
in allowing the prosecutor to explore on cross-examination the 
circumstances surrounding the fight.  Even if we were to assume 
error for the sake of argument, it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Travis repeatedly testified that he saw no one 
before the fight with a stun gun, and the court instructed the 
jury at the end of the penalty retrial that “[s]tatements made by 
the attorneys during the trial are not evidence.”   
f. Statutory rape evidence  
Silveria contends the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to present evidence that Silveria had impregnated 
Travis’s sister when she was 15-years old.  We reject the claim.  
On cross-examination of D.S., Travis’s younger sister, in 
Travis’s penalty defense case, the prosecutor asked D.S. about 
different events that occurred during a time period when D.S. 
was 14 or 15 years old.  At one point, the prosecutor asked D.S. 
whether she had “a relationship with [Silveria] at that time?”  
She replied, “Yeah, I did.”  The prosecutor asked, “[H]ow was it 
that you and Danny [Silveria] started going together?”  D.S. 
replied, “Well, he was at my house and . . . I was attracted to 
him.”  The prosecutor then asked, “[H]ow old were you at that 
time?”  D.S. replied, “Fifteen is when I got pregnant.”  The 
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prosecutor asked, “By Danny?”  D.S. replied, “Yes.”  Silveria’s 
foundation objection was overruled.   
Silveria contends statutory rape is not admissible as 
aggravating evidence under section 190.3, factor (b) or on 
rebuttal.  Assuming Silveria’s claim is preserved on appeal by 
his foundation objection below, it is meritless.  Nothing in the 
prosecutor’s question asking D.S. how old she was when she 
dated Silveria reasonably elicited D.S.’s response that she had 
been 15 years old when she became pregnant.  The prosecutor’s 
brief follow up question simply clarified D.S.  meant Silveria was 
the father, hence she was 15 years old when she dated Silveria.  
Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that other than 
evidence of the robberies of Youssef at Quik Stop Market and 
Graber at Gavilan Bottle Shop, a “juror may not consider any 
evidence of any other criminal acts or activity as an aggravating 
circumstance” under section 190.3, factor (b).  We presume the 
jury understood and followed this instruction.  (Hajek and Vo, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) 
g. Attempted murder evidence  
Silveria contends the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of a “highly inflammatory and prejudicial attempted 
murder by” the Nuestra Familia, “a notorious prison gang.”  We 
reject the claim.   
At the end of Correctional Officer Lausten’s direct 
examination in Silveria’s defense case, he opined that fellow 
Correctional Officer Jeanine Powell at times lacked an ability to 
get along with and be an effective correctional officer to the 
inmates because she engaged in verbal confrontations with 
inmates and then lost control in the module.  She also 
overreacted to the behavior of mental health patients.   
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On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Correctional 
Officer Lausten if he considered himself an effective correctional 
officer.  Officer Lausten replied, “Yes, sir, I certainly do.”  The 
prosecutor then asked whether Officer Lausten knew “who 
Gabriel Coronado was,” and the officer replied, “Yes.”  When the 
prosecutor asked how Officer Lausten knew Coronado, Travis 
objected.   
At sidebar Travis’s counsel recalled an attack on Coronado 
had been carried out by four Nuestra Familia members.  The 
trial court ruled that Silveria had opened the door to the 
evidence, and overruled the objection.   
In front of the jury, the prosecutor asked Officer Lausten, 
“[D]id Gabriel Coronado have his throat cut in your module 
when you were nearby?”  Officer Lausten agreed, clarifying it 
had been the side of Coronado’s neck and not his throat, and 
that although Officer Lausten had been nearby, he had not seen 
anything until after the incident because the attack happened 
quickly and he had been on the telephone with another officer.  
He further agreed with the prosecutor that events in a jail 
setting can happen quickly and unpredictably, and said it was 
“very possible” that sometimes correctional officers do not 
observe “everything that happens.”   
On cross-examination by Travis, Officer Lausten agreed 
with defense counsel that “there were four gang members who 
hit” Coronado, and that the assault was “very unusual.”  In 
Officer Lausten’s nine years at the jail no similar assault had 
occurred.   
As can be seen, no reference to the Nuestra Familia prison 
gang was made before the jury.  Rather the gang was only 
mentioned by Travis’s counsel during the bench conference.  The 
import of the prosecutor’s line of inquiry on cross-examination 
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was simply to demonstrate that Officer Lausten may have 
similarly been unaware of events legitimately shaping Officer 
Powell’s reaction to inmates.  Although Officer Lausten agreed 
with Travis’s counsel that four gang members had attacked 
Coronado, the gang to which they belonged was never identified.   
In Silveria’s reply brief, he acknowledges that the record 
does not demonstrate that the jury heard the reference to the 
Nuestra Familia gang.  He asserts that “evidence of an 
unrelated attempted murder by means of a sharp instrument 
which resulted in cuts to the victim’s throat are nevertheless 
prejudicial since this attack is very similar to the manner in 
which Mr. Madden was killed.”  But nothing in Officer Lausten’s 
testimony indicated Silveria was present at or in any way 
connected to the attack on Coronado.   
5. Excluded Mitigating Evidence  
Defendants contend the trial court erred in excluding 
certain mitigating evidence.  We reject the claim.   
“ ‘The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that 
the sentencer in a capital case not be precluded from considering 
any relevant mitigating evidence, that is, evidence regarding 
“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘Nonetheless, 
the trial court still “ ‘determines relevancy in the first instance 
and retains discretion to exclude evidence whose probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 
admission will create substantial danger of confusing the issues 
or misleading the jury.’ ” ’  (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 
287, 320 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 268, 148 P.3d 47]; see Romano v. 
Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 12 [129 L.Ed.2d 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004] 
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[‘The Eighth Amendment does not establish a federal code of 
evidence to supersede state evidentiary rules in capital 
sentencing proceedings.’]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 
604, fn. 12 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954] [‘Nothing in this 
opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as 
irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character, 
prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.’].)  ‘The 
meaning of relevance is no different in the context of mitigating 
evidence introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding’ from 
what it is in any other context.  (McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 
494 U.S. 433, 440 [108 L.Ed.2d 369, 110 S.Ct. 1227].)  Thus, 
‘ “[r]elevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends 
logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a 
fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.” ’  
(Ibid.; see Evid. Code, § 210.)”  (People v. Farley (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 1053, 1128.) 
a. Former juror and alternate juror  
Travis contends that the trial court erroneously excluded 
testimony by former Travis Juror No. 8 and former Travis 
Alternate Juror No. A-4 from the guilt and first penalty phase.  
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion.    
(1) Factual background 
Travis’s first penalty phase ended on February 21, 1996.  
On November 25, 1996, during a hearing held before the penalty 
retrial, Travis’s counsel made an offer of proof regarding his 
motion to admit the testimony of former Juror No. 8 and former 
Alternate Juror No. A-4.  He observed that since the mistrial, 
No. A-4 had visited Travis in jail “probably a couple of times a 
month.”  In counsel’s view, A-4 knew “more about John Travis 
than probably anybody else on the face of this earth.”  A-4 was 
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expected to testify on “the issue of rehabilitation,” and opine that 
Travis should not be executed because he “can do some concrete, 
constructive things in his life.”  “[S]ome months” before the 
hearing, former Juror No. 8, who had been the jury foreperson 
and one of two jurors to vote against the death penalty, told 
Travis’s counsel that she also wanted to visit Travis.  She had 
apparently done so, and had “discussed some of the things that 
[were] important” to Travis.  She was expected to testify that 
Travis was “sincere in what he says,” and had “matured beyond” 
his level at the time of Madden’s murder.  Both potential 
witnesses had observed that Travis had “transformed way 
beyond” the person he was when he murdered Madden.  Counsel 
observed that although Travis had “recently reestablished his 
relationship with his mother,” he “has had in almost six years of 
custody virtually no visitation from outside people.”  The trial 
court precluded testimony by the former juror and former 
alternate juror.   
The court stated:  “[T]he Court has gone to great lengths, 
both in reworking the questionnaire and will in its own voir dire, 
to keep from the jury in this penalty phase trial the fact of a 
prior penalty phase, its inability to reach a verdict, the 
numerical split, and which way the voting went.  For the sake of 
convenience the Court will call this ‘prior jury results.’  The 
Court has already ruled that these prior jury results are 
inadmissible and that witnesses must be warned by counsel not 
to let these facts come out.  And counsel have agreed to this.  
[The prosecutor] was correct when he stated that calling prior 
jurors as witnesses is ‘fraught with peril.’  Calling these jurors 
increases the possibility of the prior jury results leaking out at 
least a hundredfold on direct examination alone.  The fact and 
rule of law that cross-examination could rightly go into the basis 
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of any opinion that a juror would give as to character, 
reputation, . . . and how they know the defendant, raises the 
possibility of a leak even more.  Add to that fact that the 
[prosecutor] could then call death voting jurors in rebuttal 
makes the . . . idea intolerable and completely improper.  Once 
this prior jury result is out the biggest danger of all can be seen.  
The current jury would be tempted to and could actually 
abdicate its own duty in favor of a prior jury’s findings, even 
though there was a mistrial.  No one could possibly say that this 
would be proper.  For these reasons alone neither the People nor 
the defense will be allowed to call as witnesses any prior juror, 
including alternates.”   
(2) Analysis 
Travis contends that if former Travis Juror No. 8 and 
former Travis Alternate Juror No. A-4 “had been permitted to 
testify, the [penalty retrial] jury would have learned that these 
two witnesses had received detailed information about John 
Travis’ background and about his crimes, from various 
witnesses who testified at the guilt and penalty phases of the 
first trial [and] . . . then took it upon themselves, with no 
expectation of compensation or other benefit, to visit John 
Travis in the jail on a regular basis, and had continued to do so 
over a long enough period to give them meaningful insight into 
the sincerity of his religious conversion, his recovery from 
addiction, and his desire to help other inmates.”   
As a preliminary matter, Travis’s counsel did not 
represent at the hearing that the former juror and alternate 
juror would testify to the “sincerity of [Travis’s] religious 
conversion, his recovery from addiction, and his desire to help 
other inmates.”  Rather, counsel broadly described the 
anticipated testimony:  A-4 was expected to testify regarding 
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“the issue of rehabilitation,” and opine Travis should not be 
executed because he “can do some concrete, constructive things 
in his life.”  In counsel’s view, A-4 knew “more about John Travis 
than probably anybody else on the face of this earth.”  Former 
Juror No. 8 had “discussed some of the things that [were] 
important” to Travis, and was expected to testify that Travis 
was “sincere in what he says.”  Both potential witnesses had 
observed that Travis had “transformed way beyond” the person 
he was when he murdered Madden.17   
Moreover, Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court 
wide latitude to “exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  When, as here, the potential 
witnesses and penalty retrial jury share the unique role of jurors 
(and alternate jurors), a trial court may be legitimately 
concerned that the proffered character testimony could unduly 
influence the penalty retrial jury or encroach on its own 
deliberative process.  (See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
718, 758–759 (Peoples) [“The trial court could have reasonably 
concluded that the admission of [the four former jurors’] 
testimony would be more prejudicial than probative and would 
confuse jurors for the penalty retrial about the ultimate task”].)   
Although Travis contends the trial court did not rely on 
Evidence Code section 352, it implicitly did so by considering the 
                                        
17 
Travis also cites to a letter dated May 30, 1997, from 
former Travis Alternate Juror No. A-4 to Travis’s probation 
officer.  This information, of course, was not before the trial 
court when it ruled in 1996.   
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possibility that allowing Travis to present a former juror and 
alternate juror could unduly influence the jury and impede the 
performance of its duty, and lead to time-consuming rebuttal 
testimony by former jurors who had voted in favor of the death 
penalty.  Nor is a trial court required to “ ‘expressly weigh 
prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it 
has done so, if the record as a whole shows,’ ” as here, that “ ‘the 
court was aware of and performed its balancing function under 
Evidence Code section 352.’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
1255, 1285.)   
For these same reasons we reject Travis’s oral argument 
assertion that the trial court could not make a ruling under 
Evidence Code section 352 without holding an evidentiary 
hearing.  The primary concern here was not what these 
witnesses would say when testifying, but who they were.  Travis 
makes no effort to explain how testimony at such a hearing by 
the former juror and alternate juror would have mitigated the 
inherent concern that potential witnesses who had previously 
shared the same unique role as the penalty retrial jury (and its 
alternates) could unduly influence the penalty retrial jury or 
encroach on its deliberative process.   
In addition, the possibility that allowing such testimony 
would lead to time-consuming rebuttal testimony by former 
jurors who had voted in favor of the death penalty or who had a 
negative view of Travis’s character further demonstrates that 
the trial court acted well within its discretion.  (Peoples, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 759 [“The trial court also could have reasonably 
concluded that their testimony would have opened the door for 
the prosecution to call other individuals who attended the first 
penalty trial, thus expending an undue amount of the court’s 
time”].)  Although Travis contends that the trial court could 
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have avoided any prejudice by admonishing the penalty retrial 
jury “to give no greater weight to the testimony of the proffered 
witnesses just because they had formerly been a juror and an 
alternate juror,” he did not suggest such an admonition below, 
nor would its availability eliminate the trial court’s discretion to 
weigh other factors and preclude the testimony.   
Nor, as Travis contends, was the preclusion of this 
testimony Skipper error.  (Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 
476 U.S. 1, 3–5.)  In Skipper, the high court found prejudicial 
error in the exclusion of two jailers and one “ ‘regular visitor’ ” 
who would have testified that the defendant had “ ‘made a good 
adjustment’ during his time spent in jail.”  (Id. at p. 3.)  It 
rejected the argument that the testimony was merely 
cumulative to similar testimony by Skipper and his former wife, 
noting that the latter testimony was “the sort of evidence that a 
jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving.  The 
testimony of more disinterested witnesses — and, in particular, 
of jailers who would have had no particular reason to be 
favorably predisposed toward one of their charges — would 
quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury.”  (Id. 
at p. 8; see id. at p. 7.)  Here, Travis presented the testimony of 
two jailers, Correctional Officers Forster and Damewood, 
regarding his respectful and studious jail behavior, his faithful 
work as a trustee, and his potential to change the lives of other 
inmates.  (See ante, pp. 31–32.)  Thus Travis was accorded the 
most crucial testimony Skipper was denied.  (Skipper, at p. 8.)  
For the reasons noted, percipient witness testimony by former 
jurors and alternate jurors is qualitatively different and 
inherently more problematic than the jailer or visitor testimony 
favorably discussed in Skipper.   
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Travis further contends that testimony by a juror is 
contemplated by Evidence Code section 704.18  This section 
provides that when one party calls a sitting juror as a witness, 
and the other party objects, a mistrial is declared.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 704, subds. (b), (c).)  Section 704 does not address the 
circumstances under which the now former juror may testify at 
any retrial, or limit the trial court’s discretion to exclude such 
testimony under Evidence Code section 352.  Here we conclude 
that when those circumstances involve calling a former guilt 
and penalty phase juror and alternate juror to testify as 
character witnesses at the penalty retrial, the trial court acts 
well within its discretion in precluding such testimony.   
                                        
18 
Evidence Code section 704 provides:  “(a) Before a juror 
sworn and impaneled in the trial of an action may be called to 
testify before the jury in that trial as a witness, he shall, in 
proceedings conducted by the court out of the presence and 
hearing of the remaining jurors, inform the parties of the 
information he has concerning any fact or matter about which 
he will be called to testify. 
 
“(b) Against the objection of a party, a juror sworn and 
impaneled in the trial of an action may not testify before the jury 
in that trial as a witness.  Upon such objection, the court shall 
declare a mistrial and order the action assigned for trial before 
another jury. 
 
“(c) The calling of a juror to testify before the jury as a 
witness shall be deemed a consent to the granting of a motion 
for mistrial, and an objection to such calling of a juror shall be 
deemed a motion for mistrial. 
 
“(d) In the absence of objection by a party, a juror sworn 
and impaneled in the trial of an action may be compelled to 
testify in that trial as a witness.” 
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In sum, the trial court acted within its discretion in 
excluding testimony by former Travis Juror No. 8 and former 
Travis Alternate Juror No. A-4.   
b. Defense counsel’s proposed testimony  
Travis contends that the trial court erred in placing 
unreasonable conditions on proffered testimony by his trial 
counsel.  We conclude any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
(1) Factual background 
After the trial court precluded testimony by the first 
penalty phase juror and alternate juror, and before the start of 
the penalty retrial, Travis moved to have his trial counsel, 
James Leininger, either testify on his behalf or withdraw.  
Travis sought to have Leininger testify “to the issue of [Travis’s] 
moral character[,] to wit:  his recovery from alcohol and drug 
addiction, his commitment to the maintenance of this recovery 
through the twelve steps of Alcoholics Anonymous, and the 
practice of these steps in his everyday life, thus reflecting a 
marked departure from the moral and spiritual bankruptcy he 
experienced at the time of the crime to [his] present day status 
of being a child of God in good standing with his Creator.”  He 
asserted that “[i]f such testimony is not allowed, John Travis 
will have no witnesses of his choosing to . . . show[] the change 
in his moral character.”  “The true character of the real John 
Travis who has risen from the grasp of moral depravity to 
become a remorseful, loving person who can and does every day 
seek to implement the will of God will never be known to the 
jury.”   
At the February 5, 1997 motion hearing, Leininger 
asserted that Reverend Charon, not Leininger, would testify as 
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to Travis’s “religious progress.”  Leininger intended to testify 
about “what [Leininger had] observed about Mr. Travis over a 
period of years, what [Travis] was like the first couple of years 
[Leininger] dealt with him, [and] what he was like after that.”  
Leininger asserted that he, Leininger, was the only known 
witness “who has had any consistent contact with Mr. Travis 
over the last six years [and] who has any knowledge of recovery 
or what Mr. Travis is going through.”  The prosecutor objected 
to testimony by defense counsel.   
The court stated no case precluded Leininger from 
testifying, but the court believed “it’s a completely foolish idea.”  
It observed that in a penalty phase, “the argument to the jury is 
almost as important as the evidence itself, and if an attorney 
cannot do that with credibility” because he had previously lost 
credibility while testifying as a witness, “then that goes to the 
defendant’s definite detriment.”  The court took the matter 
under submission, offering the parties guidelines or “pitfalls” to 
consider before it ruled the following week.  Travis would be 
required to completely waive his attorney-client privilege; if 
Leininger qualified as an expert, “he will only be able to testify 
as an expert regarding recovery as a certified alcohol and drug 
counselor,” not regarding religion or “as a character witness”; 
the prosecutor could request to interview Leininger, and if 
Leininger refused, the prosecutor could mention that refusal 
during closing argument; if the prosecutor sought discovery, 
Leininger’s files would “probably” have to be turned over to the 
court for in camera review; it would be improper for Leininger 
to argue his own credibility during closing argument; and no 
continuance would be granted for opening statements scheduled 
to begin about one week later.   
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At the next hearing on February 11, 1997, Leininger said 
he had “sought the advice of others and conveyed this to Mr. 
Travis and we have had a significant opportunity to talk about 
the pros and cons. . . .  Given the restriction of moral and 
character evidence not being testified to,” Leininger would not 
testify, but would get another person to assess Travis, and “do 
the recovery work with [that] professionally-trained person.”   
(2) Analysis 
We have held that “a trial court may not deny the 
defendant the right to present  . . . evidence through the 
testimony of his counsel, notwithstanding the provisions 
relating to testimony by counsel in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”19  (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 574.)  
Here, the trial court recognized it could not prohibit Leininger’s 
testimony, but Travis argues that the court placed conditions on 
that testimony that were so onerous they deprived him of critical 
mitigating evidence.   
Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court 
imposed these conditions should Leininger testify, and that this 
imposition was improper, any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 879 
[any error in barring defense counsel from testifying was 
harmless in light of other evidence].)  Travis asserts that he 
“intended to offer character evidence in two very narrow areas 
— [his] recovery efforts and his remorse for the homicide.”  
                                        
19 
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.7 provides as 
relevant:  “(a) A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in 
which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless:  [¶] . . . [¶] 
(3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the 
client.”   
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Travis also notes that Leininger’s testimony regarding Travis’s 
recovery process “would have added nothing to the similar 
testimony from Dr. Cermak, [Reverend] Charon, and Sharon 
Lutman.”   
We therefore consider whether Leininger would have 
provided critical evidence on the issue of Travis’s remorse.  We 
conclude ample other evidence of remorse was presented.  Travis 
testified at the penalty retrial that he accepted the jury’s guilt 
verdict and had admitted his responsibility for Madden’s 
murder at the time of his arrest.  His purpose in testifying was 
to tell the truth and to let the jury know “that I am remorseful 
for what I have done.”  He described what he had done as 
“heinous,” and was “ashamed and humiliated” he had caused 
others pain.  He had unsuccessfully asked his attorney if he 
could write to the Madden family or seek their forgiveness in 
court.  In addition, Reverend Charon, who had known Travis for 
about four years, testified that Travis appeared “very 
remorseful, and was earnestly seeking a way, under the 
circumstances, that he could express . . . his regret, and also, if 
there was anything that was possible [for him] to make amends, 
recognizing that you can never really make full amends.”  
Defense expert Lutman testified Travis had appeared sincere 
and the most emotional when discussing his desire to make 
amends to Madden’s family.  Although this testimony by Travis, 
Reverend Charon, and Lutman could be viewed by the jury as 
self-serving or biased, Leininger — who had represented Travis 
for six years — would have also reasonably been viewed as 
closely aligned with Travis and not as an objective and 
disinterested witness.   
To the extent Travis asserts Leininger would have 
testified regarding Travis’s transformation in jail, ample 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
114 
 
evidence in this area was also otherwise adduced.  Two jailers, 
Correctional 
Officers 
Forster 
and 
Damewood, 
testified 
regarding Travis’s respectful and studious jail behavior, his 
faithful work as a trustee, and his potential to change the lives 
of other inmates.  (See ante, pp. 31–32.)  In addition, Travis 
testified that after the failed escape plan, he realized he had 
been “making the wrong decisions,” and “started thinking real 
hard about what I want[ed] to do with my life.”  He began 
recovery and started learning about AA and Narcotics 
Anonymous, although no AA meetings were available where 
Travis was housed.  Travis further testified that he also began 
to work with Reverend Charon.  He said he had participated in 
the jail’s Tutor Program that helped inmates learn to read and 
do math.  He often shared his message of recovery with these 
individuals.  It was Travis’s “heart’s desire . . . to help those who 
have been in the same situation I have.”  Travis’s sister D.S. 
testified she saw Travis shortly before Madden’s murder, and 
said his “eyes looked dead and he looked like he [had] lost his 
soul,” and he appeared to be cold, distant and “mad at the 
world.”  By contrast, D.S. had visited Travis in jail, and testified, 
“[H]e’s got . . . this glow,” and there was hope in his eyes.   
In sum, we conclude any assumed error in any conditions 
placed on defense counsel Leininger’s proposed testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    
c. Silveria’s statement to police  
Silveria contends that the trial court erroneously excluded 
his statement to police, and thus mitigating evidence that on the 
night of his arrest he had acknowledged his involvement in and 
expressed remorse for Madden’s murder.  He further claims that 
the exclusion of this evidence is a consequence of the trial court’s 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
115 
 
erroneous denial of his penalty retrial severance motion.  (See 
ante, pt. II.B.1.b.)  We reject the claim.   
At the guilt phase, each defendant’s statement was played 
for his jury.  When the trial court denied Silveria’s penalty 
retrial severance motion, it ruled that the prosecutor could not 
introduce Silveria’s (or Travis’s) statement to police in his case-
in-chief because of confrontation clause concerns,20 but could 
                                        
20 
We have previously assumed without deciding that the 
confrontation clause applies to penalty phase evidence.  (Rangel, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1232; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
622, 720; see Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1165, 1176 
[applying the Aranda/Bruton rule to cross-examination by the 
prosecutor of Hajek’s penalty defense expert, a clinical 
psychologist, who repeatedly testified on cross-examination that 
Hajek had denied killing the victim]; id. at p. 1177 [holding 
Hajek’s statement to his psychologist that he did not kill the 
victim did not facially incriminate Vo because its “incriminatory 
effect depended entirely on its linkage to other evidence”].)  We 
do so again here. 
In Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 127–128, 
137, as later limited by Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 
200, 208–209, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying 
codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant on its face 
violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination guaranteed 
by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is instructed to 
disregard the confession in determining the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant.  We reached a similar conclusion in California 
three years before Bruton in People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 
518.  We have, however, held that “[t]o the extent that our 
decision” in People v. Aranda, regarding redaction or exclusion 
of the out-of-court confession of a defendant that implicates a 
codefendant, “constitutes a rule governing the admissibility of 
evidence, and to the extent this rule of evidence requires the 
exclusion of relevant evidence that need not be excluded under 
federal constitutional law, it was abrogated in 1982 by the 
 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
116 
 
introduce portions of Silveria’s first penalty phase testimony for 
which Travis had been present and had the opportunity to cross-
examine Silveria.  (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a); see ante, p. 87; 
People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 199 [“The Sixth 
Amendment confrontation clause does not bar hearsay 
statements of a witness who testifies at trial and is subject to 
cross-examination”]; see Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 
U.S. 36, 59, fn. 9 (Crawford).)  The court subsequently raised the 
issue that this former testimony might at times refer to 
Silveria’s excluded statement to police.  After hearing argument 
by the parties, the court barred any reference to Silveria’s 
statement to police during the reading of the transcript of 
Silveria’s former testimony.   
In light of the court’s ruling barring any reference to 
Silveria’s 
statement 
to 
police 
during 
the 
prosecutor’s 
presentation of Silveria’s former testimony, and apparently to 
avoid opening the door to other portions of Silveria’s statement 
to police being admitted, Silveria withdrew his own pending 
motion to introduce Silveria’s statement to police.  Silveria’s 
counsel asked that Silveria simply be permitted to ask Santa 
Clara Sergeant Ted Keech, who had interviewed Silveria after 
his arrest and would at that point need to be recalled as a 
witness, whether Silveria had admitted his participation in the 
LeeWards robbery and murder.  The court ruled that Silveria 
would be permitted to ask this question, and also ruled that the 
prosecutor would be permitted to ask Sergeant Keech one 
question regarding whether Silveria had minimized his 
                                        
‘truth-in-evidence’ provision of Proposition 8 (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 28, subd. (d) [now § 28, subd. (f)(2)]).”  (People v. Fletcher 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465.) 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
117 
 
participation in the crime.  Sergeant Keech was not recalled, and 
hence was not asked whether Silveria had admitted his 
participation in the LeeWards robbery and murder.   
There was no error.  The record reveals that once the court 
had barred all reference to Silveria’s statement to police during 
the 
reading 
of 
Silveria’s 
former 
testimony, 
Silveria 
understandably sought to avoid opening the door to evidence of 
the damaging portions of his statement to police, such as 
inconsistencies between his statement and his former penalty 
phase testimony, and withdrew the motion to admit the 
statement.  Moreover, Silveria received the opportunity to 
present the evidence he now claims was precluded.  Thus, the 
trial court ruled that Silveria could ask Sergeant Keech, who 
had interviewed Silveria on the night of his arrest, whether 
Silveria had admitted his participation in the LeeWards robbery 
and murder.  Silveria chose not to ask this question.   
For these same reasons we reject Silveria’s further 
arguments that exclusion of his statement to police was 
“fundamentally unfair under the Fourteenth Amendment,” and 
that denial of his penalty retrial severance motion erroneously 
precluded him from presenting mitigating evidence in his 
statement to police of his “early acknowledgement of guilt” and 
“expressions of remorse for the murder on the night of his 
arrest.”  In his reply, Silveria asserts that during deliberations 
the jury asked to see his confession, demonstrating it “was 
important to the jury’s determination of penalty.”21  As can be 
seen, Silveria withdrew his motion to admit his statement to 
police, and failed to recall Sergeant Keech as a witness to ask 
                                        
21  
In the note, the jury requested “[a]ny police reports from 
his initial arrest — confession?”   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
118 
 
him whether Silveria had admitted his participation in the 
LeeWards robbery and murder. 
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument there 
was error, there was no reasonable possibility Silveria was 
prejudiced. 
 
Silveria’s 
introduction 
of 
his 
early 
acknowledgement of guilt in his statement to police would have 
allowed the prosecutor to introduce the remainder of Silveria’s 
statement, including his initial repeated denials of involvement 
in Madden’s murder and inconsistencies between the statement 
and Silveria’s former testimony regarding his description of the 
murder.  In addition, Silveria presented other evidence of his 
early acknowledgement of guilt.  On direct examination at the 
penalty retrial, Sergeant Keech testified that after meeting 
Silveria (and his coperpetrators), he had received certain 
information that caused him to direct an officer to return to 
LeeWards to seize a gas can.  On cross-examination by Silveria, 
Sergeant Keech testified that he had interviewed Silveria early 
on the morning of January 30, and agreed with defense counsel 
that it was during this interview that Sergeant Keech first 
learned of the significance of the gas can and where it was 
located.22  This indicates that Silveria had acknowledged 
involvement with the murder during the interview.   
Silveria also presented ample evidence of his remorse.  His 
former testimony that was read to the jury at the penalty retrial 
recounted that Silveria did not believe causing Madden pain 
with the stun gun was “right,” and felt “horrible for doing it,” 
                                        
22 
In his first penalty phase testimony that was introduced 
at the penalty retrial, Silveria said the perpetrators brought a 
gas can to burn the store down, but Silveria decided it was not 
needed and the can was left outside near a trailer.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
119 
 
that Silveria felt “sick” about participating in Madden’s murder, 
and “horrible” about the effect of the murder on Madden’s 
family.   Silveria did not feel that anything that had happened 
to him in his life was an excuse for what he did on the night of 
Madden’s murder, but rather that he “should be held 
accountable for what [he] did,” and “deserve[d] whatever 
punishment [was] given to” him.  In addition, Patricia Gamble 
testified that on several occasions Silveria said that he was 
sorry, was praying for the Madden family, and “knows how it 
feels to grow up without a father and that it hurt him to know 
that Julie [Madden’s daughter] now would not have a father to 
grow up with.”  Morrella, Silveria’s former girlfriend, testified 
that Silveria said he felt “very bad about the fact that Julie,” 
Madden’s young daughter, “was going to grow up without a 
father,” that “he had been praying for the family and that he . . . 
felt terrible and that he was just continuously praying for them.  
He was very remorseful.”  Correctional Officer Bergado recalled 
Silveria appearing distraught and explaining to the officer, “I’m 
just really . . . sad . . . for the family of the victim,” he was 
“asking for forgiveness and he’s sorry for what he did and he 
feels sorry for the family of his victim and his family.”  Reverend 
Charon testified that he and Silveria periodically discussed 
Silveria’s remorse about Madden’s murder and Silveria’s 
concern for Madden’s wife and family.  Thus, Silveria fails to 
demonstrate that denial of his severance motion or any assumed 
denial of his motion to introduce his statement to police 
precluded him from presenting “important mitigating evidence.”   
d. Spiritual evidence  
Silveria contends that the trial court erroneously excluded 
mitigating evidence of his interest in Christianity and the Bible.  
We reject the claim.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
120 
 
During the testimony of Julie Morrella, Silveria’s former 
girlfriend who visited him in jail after his arrest, the trial court 
sustained hearsay objections on several occasions when she 
recounted Silveria’s statements to her.  Even assuming for the 
sake of argument that these rulings were erroneous or a 
“mechanistic” application of the hearsay rule, as Silveria 
asserts, he was not thereby precluded from introducing 
mitigating evidence of his interest in Christianity and the Bible.  
Rather, Morrella testified that at some point she and Silveria 
began to discuss Christianity, and these conversations occurred 
at least once a week over a period of time.  Silveria was very 
excited about Christianity and animated during their religious 
discussions.  He quoted scripture and began to bring the Bible 
and other Christian literature to their meetings.  In Morrella’s 
view, Silveria responded “appropriate[ly]” when Morrella told 
him she was a Christian and that she had a “real sense of peace 
with the Lord by [her] side.”  They discussed the relevance of the 
Bible today and the “ways that it could actively work in [their] 
lives,” including its relevance to Silveria’s life in jail.   
This testimony was similar to the excluded testimony that 
Silveria told Morrella “he was really excited because he had 
started reading the Bible, Silveria “mentioned that he was 
starting with the Old Testament,” Silveria said, “ ‘Gosh, I just 
read a really good book,’ ” and Morrella’s testimony, “[S]ince he 
started reading the Bible, he would bring in something” and “He 
would usually discuss with me what he had been reading, what 
he had been learning.”  Thus, even assuming exclusion of these 
statements was erroneous, there is no reasonable possibility the 
penalty verdict would have been different had this testimony 
been admitted.  (See People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 448.)   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
121 
 
e. Limitation on time period of Morrella’s 
testimony  
Silveria summarily contends the trial court erred in 
precluding Morrella from testifying regarding any jail visits to 
him between the end of the first penalty phase in February 1996 
and the time of her testimony at the penalty retrial in March 
1997 under Evidence Code section 1252.23  He does not identify 
when this ruling was made or note whether he objected to it.  He 
simply quotes a sidebar discussion during Morrella’s testimony 
in which the trial court stated without objection:  “I won’t 
tolerate any evidence or accept any evidence of visits between 
this witness and the defendant between February of ’96 and the 
present under 1252.”  No prejudicial error is demonstrated. 
“Although defendant had a constitutional right to have the 
jury hear all mitigating evidence counseling against the death 
penalty, ‘a capital defendant has no federal constitutional right 
to the admission of evidence lacking trustworthiness, 
particularly when the defendant seeks to put his own self-
serving statements before the jury without subjecting himself to 
cross-examination.’ ” (Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 757.)  
Thus, “statements by a defendant to a third party regarding the 
defendant’s state of mind can be admissible, but not when made 
under circumstances that indicate a lack of trustworthiness.  
(Evid. Code §§ 1250, 1252.)”  (Ibid.)   
In Peoples, we held that the trial court could reasonably 
conclude the defendant’s hearsay statements of remorse made 
                                        
23 
Evidence Code section 1252 provides:  “Evidence of a 
statement is inadmissible under this article if the statement was 
made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of 
trustworthiness.”   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
122 
 
to two pastors after the defendant’s attorneys had begun 
working on the case were unreliable.  (Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th 
at pp. 755, 758.)  Similarly here, the trial court could reasonably 
find that statements made by Silveria to Morrella while he 
awaited his penalty retrial were made under untrustworthy 
circumstances.  Moreover, as can be seen, Morrella was 
permitted to testify regarding Silveria’s expressions of remorse 
and religious commitment made during a different period of his 
incarceration, hence any assumed error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
f. Letter to Morrella  
Silveria contends the trial court erroneously excluded 
mitigating evidence of a letter he wrote to Morrella expressing 
remorse about the capital crimes.  We reject the claim.   
The letter does not meaningfully differ from Morrella’s 
testimony about Silveria’s statements of remorse.  In the letter 
Silveria states:  “I wrote the victim[’]s (Jim’s) family a letter 
expressing how [I] feel about the tragedy I’ve caused them.  It 
was written from the heart and is how I feel.  I just hope they 
are receptive when the[y] get it.  Julie it was very hard for me 
to write it[.]  But I wanted them to know that I’m not insensitive 
to their feelings.”   Morrella testified that during their jail visits, 
Silveria told Morrella he felt “very bad about the fact that Julie,” 
Madden’s young daughter, “was going to grow up without a 
father.”  Silveria told Morrella “he had been praying for the 
family and that he . . . felt terrible and that he was just 
continuously praying for them.  He was very remorseful.”  Given 
Morrella’s testimony, any assumed error in precluding 
admission of the letter from Silveria to Morrella was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
123 
 
g. Letters to Munoz and the Madden family 
Silveria contends that the trial court erroneously excluded 
mitigating evidence contained in his letters to Elizabeth Munoz 
(the Heberts’ neighbor) and to the Madden family.  We reject the 
claim. 
Silveria did not testify at the penalty retrial.  Munoz 
identified a letter dated April 10, 1995 as one she had received 
from Silveria, but she was not asked to testify regarding its 
content.  There was no testimony regarding the letter to the 
Madden family.  Silveria attempted to show the Madden family 
letter to Reverend Charon during Travis’s penalty retrial 
defense case, but the trial court ruled he would need to recall 
Reverend Charon as a witness.  Reverend Charon was not 
recalled.  At the end of the penalty retrial, Silveria sought to 
have both letters admitted, and the court excluded them because 
they lacked foundation.   
Silveria contends that the trial court “knew full well” that 
Silveria had written the letters and had laid the foundation for 
their admission during the original penalty phase.  Even if 
correct, Silveria was still required to lay a foundation for the 
letters at the penalty retrial.  (See People v. Mattson (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 826, 849–850 [At a new trial, “[a]bsent a statutory 
provision precluding relitigation, a stipulation by the parties, or 
an order by the court that prior rulings made in the prior trial 
will be binding at the new trial, . . . the court must consider the 
admissibility of . . . evidence at the time it is offered”].)  Silveria 
nonetheless asserts the trial court “relied upon a mechanistic 
application of the rules of evidence to prevent the jury from 
considering mitigating evidence of [Silveria’s] background, his 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
124 
 
shame, remorse, and request for forgiveness from the Madden 
family.”   
As to the Madden family letter, there is no name to whom 
the letter is written in the salutation, nor does Silveria use the 
names of Madden’s wife or daughter in the letter.  Nor was there 
evidence that the letter was ever even mailed.  In the letter, 
Silveria states that “one act of violence does not portray or even 
remotely describe how I’ve [b]een raised or the person I am 
today”; he prays for the family frequently; he’s “not insensitive 
to your family’s feelings and it’s very hard for me to think of a 
certain little girl growing up without a Dad — I do know how 
that feels”; he wants “you, your daughter, and loved ones to 
know that I’m at a loss for words when trying to describe how 
ashamed and saddened I feel now and every time I think of Jim 
and your family”; he would “welcome a life in prison over the 
misery I’ve caused you and both our families”; and he asks for 
their forgiveness.   
In the five-page Munoz letter, Silveria discusses a variety 
of topics.  As to his spiritual life, he stated “the Father Jesus has 
done [immensely] more than make up for any pain and suffering 
that I may [have] gone through growing up”; that despite the 
“pain and suffering” that Silveria had caused others, “the Lord 
has given me the greatest gift of all, eternity with Him and a 
peace and joy now that is [inexpressible]”;  recounted a line from 
a Christian song he liked; and noted two men whose sermons he 
enjoyed.   
There was no error.  The letters lacked foundation and 
were inadmissible hearsay.  Moreover, as noted, “[a]lthough 
defendant had a constitutional right to have the jury hear all 
mitigating evidence counseling against the death penalty, ‘a 
capital defendant has no federal constitutional right to the 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
125 
 
admission of evidence lacking trustworthiness, particularly 
when the defendant seeks to put his own self-serving statements 
before 
the 
jury 
without 
subjecting 
himself 
to 
cross-
examination.’ ” (Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 757.)   
In addition, any assumed error in excluding these letters 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As to the letter to 
Madden’s family, significant evidence of Silveria’s remorse and 
spirituality was presented at the penalty retrial.  Evidence of 
remorse included Silveria’s first penalty phase testimony that 
after his arrest, he assisted Officer Hyland in apprehending 
Spencer and Jennings; that Silveria did not believe causing 
Madden pain with the stun gun was “right,” and felt “horrible 
for doing it”; that Silveria felt “sick” about participating in 
Madden’s murder, and “horrible” about the effect of the murder 
on Madden’s family; and Silveria did not feel that anything that 
had happened to him in his life was an excuse for what he did 
on the night of Madden’s murder, but rather that he “should be 
held accountable for what [he] did,” and “deserve[d] whatever 
punishment [was] given to” him.  In addition, Morrella, 
Silveria’s former girlfriend, testified that Silveria said he felt 
“very bad about the fact that Julie,” Madden’s young daughter, 
“was going to grow up without a father,” that “he had been 
praying for the family and that he . . . felt terrible and that he 
was just continuously praying for them.  He was very 
remorseful.”   
As for Silveria’s spirituality in jail, the evidence included 
Reverend Charon’s testimony that it “would be very difficult” to 
feign the level of study and depth of interest Silveria had shown 
over the years in Christianity.  Patricia Gamble testified that 
she and Silveria both studied the Bible and shared with each 
other what they had learned.  Silveria exhibited “an excitement 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
126 
 
and a real joy about what he was learning.”  Morrella testified 
that Silveria was very excited about Christianity and animated 
during their religious discussions.  Correctional Officer Bergado 
and Silveria had for several years discussed Christianity and 
lessons Silveria had learned from the Bible.   
h. Psychiatric expert 
Silveria contends that the trial court erred in limiting the 
testimony of Dr. Kormos, his psychiatric expert and thereby 
precluding evidence that would have demonstrated “how the 
neglect, deprivation and physical and sexual abuse [Silveria] 
suffered throughout his childhood affected his conduct on the 
day of the crimes,” how Silveria’s “relationship with co-appellant 
Travis, and the other co-defendants, affected [Silveria’s] conduct 
at the time of the crimes,” and how Silveria had positively 
developed in the six years since the crimes.  He also claims that 
the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask 
Dr. Kormos about Madden’s murder.  We reject the claim.   
(1) Factual background 
Dr. Kormos testified at the first penalty phase before only 
Silveria’s jury.  At the joint penalty retrial, Dr. Kormos testified 
that he had relied in part on Silveria’s first penalty phase 
testimony in forming his opinion that Silveria suffered from a 
continuing condition of child neglect.  Dr. Kormos’s testimony 
for that day ended.   
In hearings outside the jury’s presence, the question arose 
whether Dr. Kormos could rely on Silveria’s former testimony as 
a basis for his opinion given portions of this former testimony 
regarding Silveria’s childhood had not been admitted at the 
penalty retrial.   The parties also broadly discussed whether the 
circumstance that Dr. Kormos had reviewed Silveria’s and 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
127 
 
Travis’s statements to police — which had also been excluded at 
the penalty retrial — would give rise to Aranda/Bruton or 
confrontation clause issues for Travis (see ante, p. 115, fn. 20) 
and unduly limit his and the prosecutor’s cross-examination of 
Dr. Kormos because they could not cross-examine Dr. Kormos 
about the excluded statements to police.  Silveria’s counsel, 
Mr. Geoffrey Braun, asserted he did not intend to ask 
Dr. Kormos about defendants’ statements to police and argued 
that there were no confrontation clause issues with the 
unadmitted portion of Silveria’s former testimony because none 
of his statements concerning “what [had] happened in his life” 
implicated Travis.  The prosecutor disagreed, asserting that to 
properly cross-examine Dr. Kormos as to whether Silveria had 
an antisocial personality disorder rather than a condition of 
child neglect, he would need to point out inconsistencies Silveria 
had made in his former testimony and Silveria’s statement to 
police.   
The court expressed concern to Silveria that the 
prosecutor “cannot properly and fully cross-examine your 
witness, because he cannot get into the areas and some of the 
documents that your witness has considered” because of Travis’s 
“constitutional rights.”  The trial court stated Silveria had two 
choices, i.e., to either have the court strike Dr. Kormos’s 
testimony from the previous day or to pause Dr. Kormos’s 
testimony until Silveria decided whether he would testify.24   
                                        
24  
If Silveria testified, Aranda/Bruton would not bar the jury 
from hearing evidence of Silveria’s statement to police that 
inculpated Travis because Travis could cross-examine him 
regarding it.  (See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9 
 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
128 
 
The prosecutor suggested as a compromise that 
Dr. Kormos make no reference to having considered the 
defendants’ statements to police, which again had not been 
admitted at the penalty retrial, and not discuss what Silveria 
had said about Travis, and that the prosecutor and Travis 
inquire “into inconsistencies without specifying that they came 
from a source the jury is not to know about.”  The prosecutor 
acknowledged that “the People’s right of full cross-examination 
would be restricted, but so long as we are allowed the 
opportunity to develop from the witness that . . . there have been 
inconsistencies in what Silveria has related,” and Dr. Kormos 
was subject to recall, he was prepared to proceed.   
Silveria rejected this option.   The trial court stated 
Silveria had three options.  He could (1) strike Dr. Kormos’s 
testimony, (2) give Silveria time to consider whether he would 
testify, or (3) agree to the prosecutor’s proposal.   
After the parties privately negotiated, they agreed to a 
fourth option that included the following terms.  Dr. Kormos 
would not testify regarding Madden’s murder on either direct or 
cross-examination.  Silveria had turned 21 years old on 
December 22, 1990, the month before Madden’s murder.  To 
avoid recounting any statements about the January 1991 crime, 
Silveria’s counsel would limit any diagnosis by Dr. Kormos to 
information up to December 22, 1990 or Silveria’s 21st birthday.  
Silveria’s counsel stated:  “I need not ask the doctor questions 
about his diagnosis of Mr. Silveria subsequent to the time of the 
                                        
[“[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial 
statements”].)   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
129 
 
crime, that is, during the time he was in jail.”  The People would 
“be allowed to cross-examine regarding any possible differential 
diagnosis up to that same point in time based on the same 
information.”  Dr. Kormos would be subject to recall.  The 
parties agreed to this stipulation, and Dr. Kormos’s direct 
testimony resumed.   
The prosecutor reserved his cross-examination.  On 
redirect examination, Silveria asked Dr. Kormos whether he 
believed persons who had suffered about the same “degree of 
abuse that Mr. Silveria suffered according to what you know 
about his life, . . . would indeed suffer from severe psychiatric 
and psychological problems later in life.”  Dr. Kormos replied:  
“Yes.  I would estimate a solid majority.”  Silveria also asked, 
“Would it include criminality?”  Dr. Kormos replied, “It could 
very well include criminal behavior.”  Silveria also asked 
Dr. Kormos whether “that kind of a background would impair 
Mr. Silveria’s, or anyone who has grown up with a similar 
background, ability to make rational choices later in life.”  
Dr. Kormos replied:  “Yes.  I think that there would likely be 
such distortions in his views of the world that his decisions are 
likely to be skewed.”  He subsequently added, “I think their 
entire world view would be impaired, and that would certainly 
have an effect on all decisions they make.”  At sidebar, the court 
indicated it did not “think anybody has gone beyond the 
agreement.”  Silveria rested.  
After Travis testified and rested his defense case, the trial 
court allowed the prosecutor to recall and cross-examine 
Dr. Kormos limited to “what was brought up on direct 
examination” by Silveria and cross-examination by Travis.  The 
prosecutor asked whether Dr. Kormos had spoken with Silveria 
“about the circumstances of the crime.”  Silveria objected.  At 
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sidebar, Silveria’s counsel asserted that “what Mr. Silveria may 
have said about the crime . . . creates insurmountable Sixth 
Amendment problems.”  The court ruled that because Silveria 
had asked “later in life” questions, he had opened the door, and 
the prosecutor could explore, after laying an appropriate 
foundation, whether Silveria had been inconsistent in his 
statements regarding the circumstances of the crime.   
The prosecutor asked, “In formulating the opinions that 
you’ve testified about your assessment and diagnosis of Mr. 
Silveria would it be important to you if he lied to you . . . about 
aspects of how he committed this crime?”   Dr. Kormos replied, 
“[I]t would be important to me to know whether Danny Silveria 
lied to me, but . . . I would also consider it important as to why 
he lied and how he lied.”  The prosecutor subsequently said to 
Dr. Kormos that he would be asking him “in a moment about 
what Mr. Silveria told you that he did in a particular aspect of 
the commission of the crime,” and asked Dr. Kormos if he 
understood.  Dr. Kormos said “Yes.”  The prosecutor said he was 
not asking Dr. Kormos “about anything that [Silveria] said 
anyone else did,” and Dr. Kormos again said he understood.  The 
prosecutor then asked, “What did Mr. Silveria tell you about his 
use of the stun gun on Jim Madden during the commission of 
this crime?”  Dr. Kormos replied, “Danny told me that he had 
used the stun gun . . . on the victim while the crime was being 
committed,” and clarified that he had used the stun gun while 
the stabbing was being carried out.  Dr. Kormos also agreed with 
the prosecutor he was aware of sworn testimony by Silveria in 
which he said he had “used the stun gun in some type of an effort 
to knock Mr. Madden out before any stabbing,” and replied, 
“[Y]es,” when asked if these two statements appeared to be 
inconsistent.  The prosecutor then asked if that inconsistency, 
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131 
 
and the fact that deceit and manipulation are central features 
of an antisocial personality disorder, caused Dr. Kormos to 
change his opinion that the best diagnosis of Silveria was child 
neglect rather than antisocial personality disorder.  Dr. Kormos 
replied:  “No.  It would not change my opinion.”   
(2) Analysis 
As described above, the trial court sought (in light of 
confrontation clause concerns) to preclude statements by 
Silveria to law enforcement or to Dr. Kormos, or made in the 
unadmitted portion of Silveria’s first penalty phase testimony, 
that implicated Travis, and to assure adequate cross-
examination by the prosecutor and Travis.  Silveria asserts that 
the trial court erred in limiting Dr. Kormos’s testimony to the 
period before December 22, 1990, or Silveria’s 21st birthday.  
Silveria contends that this limitation was improper because 
there was no risk that Travis’s confrontation clause rights would 
be violated by testimony (1) explaining how the neglect and 
abuse Silveria suffered as a child, and his relationship with 
Travis and the other perpetrators, affected his conduct on the 
day of Madden’s murder, and (2) delineating Silveria’s positive 
development in the six years since the crime.  He asserts, relying 
on People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), that the 
trial court erred in not specifically considering Dr. Kormos’s 
proposed testimony and excluding “only those portions that 
would have ‘presented, as facts, the contents of the testimonial 
hearsay statements.’ ” 25   
                                        
25 
“Although the court in Crawford ‘did not offer an 
exhaustive definition of “testimonial” statements,’ the court has 
since clarified that ‘a statement cannot fall within the 
 
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As described above, the record demonstrates that the 
parties broadly focused on finding a solution that would keep 
Dr. Kormos as a witness, allow Travis and the prosecutor 
adequate cross-examination, and avoid infringing on Travis’s 
                                        
Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was 
testimonial’ (Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. ___, ___–___ [135 
S.Ct. 2173, 2179–2180 [192 L.Ed.2d 306, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2179–
2180]]) — that is to say, unless the statements are given in the 
course of an interrogation or other conversation whose 
‘ “primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” ’ ”  (Rangel, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1214.)  “Under this test, ‘[s]tatements 
made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering 
and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to 
be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement 
officers.’ ”  (Ibid, quoting Ohio v. Clark, supra, 576 U.S. 237,  
249.)   
In Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 686, this court held 
that an expert cannot “relate as true case-specific facts asserted 
in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by 
competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.”  (See 
People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 175, 177 (Powell) [trial 
court acted within its discretion in precluding the defendant’s 
psychologist from testifying at the penalty phase about the 
defendant’s self-serving statements to him that were offered for 
their truth].)  “If the case is one in which a prosecution expert 
seeks to relate testimonial hearsay, there is a confrontation 
clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of unavailability 
and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination, or forfeited that right by wrongdoing.”  (Sanchez, 
at p. 686.)  In Sanchez, we disapproved People v. Gardeley (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 605, which had been recently decided at the time of 
the March 1997 hearing below, “to the extent it suggested an 
expert may properly testify regarding case-specific out-of-court 
statements without satisfying hearsay rules.”  (Sanchez, at 
p. 686, fn. 13.)   
 
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confrontational rights.  Moreover, the trial in this case preceded 
the high court’s 2004 decision in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 
hence the parties did not use the term “testimonial.”  For these 
reasons the trial court was not asked to rule on whether any 
specific statement by Silveria was testimonial, and therefore 
could not have erred in failing to do so.   
Silveria asserts that the prosecutor and Travis knew when 
Dr. Kormos testified at the first penalty phase that he had 
reviewed defendants’ statements to police, but at that time 
expressed no concern for Travis’s “rights,” or presumably 
Travis’s right not to be implicated by Silveria’s testimonial 
hearsay statements and his right to adequate cross-
examination.  (See ante, p. 131, fn. 25.)  Dr. Kormos testified at 
the first penalty phase only before Silveria’s jury; Travis was not 
present.  Given Travis’s absence, the prosecutor would not have 
had any reason to raise this issue. 
Silveria also asserts that Travis fully cross-examined 
Silveria at the first penalty phase, hence there could be no 
confrontation clause issue for Travis at the penalty retrial.  
Travis was present for and cross-examined Silveria regarding 
his testimony on the circumstances of the crime.26  However, 
                                        
26 
As noted, at the first penalty phase, Travis and Silveria 
had separate juries.  As pertinent here, the trial court ruled that 
if Silveria or Travis testified, they would testify before both 
juries when discussing the circumstances of the crime.  The 
court stated it was in “no position” to tell a defendant how to 
testify, and that if the testimony regarding the circumstances of 
the crime was not made a separate topic, “then both juries will 
have to be present for the entire testimony of the defendant.”  
Silveria structured his testimony so that his testimony about 
the crime was distinct from his testimony about other areas of 
 
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Travis was not present, and did not cross-examine Silveria 
regarding Silveria’s testimony about his childhood.  Moreover, 
although Silveria asserts that Travis testified at the penalty 
retrial, this testimony occurred after the parties entered into the 
agreement regarding Dr. Kormos’s testimony.   
Silveria further asserts that the trial court’s “threats 
to . . . strike all of Dr. Kormos’s testimony” resulted in the 
exclusion of critical mitigating evidence.  But Silveria’s counsel 
asserted below that he would “use Dr. Kormos as I primarily did 
last time . . . simply to establish the effects of the childhood 
traumas that Mr. Silveria suffered and how it affected the 
development of his personality up to a point short of the crime.”  
He also said, “I need not ask the doctor questions about his 
diagnosis of Mr. Silveria subsequent to the time of the crime, 
that is, during the time he was in jail.”  There was no mention 
of counsel curtailing desired examination because of concern 
that the trial court had identified striking the testimony as one 
option.  Although counsel later retreated on these statements 
when the court ruled that Silveria had opened the door to the 
prosecutor’s cross-examination, the parties and the court were 
entitled to rely on counsel’s earlier representations in 
formulating and approving the agreement.   
Nor, contrary to Silveria’s assertion here, were the 
limitations on Dr. Kormos’s testimony proposed by Silveria a 
result of the trial court’s reference to contempt.  The court’s 
reference to contempt occurred 50 transcript pages before the 
parties 
reached 
the 
agreement 
regarding 
Dr. Kormos’s 
                                        
his life such as his childhood.  Neither Travis nor his jury was 
present for this latter testimony, which was, of course, not 
relevant to Travis’s penalty determination.  
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
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testimony.  The record indicates that when the trial court said 
Silveria’s counsel Mr. Braun was “close to contempt,” it was 
expressing frustration regarding counsel’s unwillingness to 
simply address an issue, frustration that may well have been 
compounded by a recently revealed discovery violation by 
counsel that had just been addressed during the same hearing.  
The record is not reasonably read as demonstrating that 
“because Judge Mullin threatened to . . . hold Braun in 
contempt . . . , Braun sought to salvage his defense case by 
proposing to confine his direct examination of Dr. Kormos from 
[Silveria’s] early childhood up to [Silveria’s] 21st birthday.”   
Moreover, any assumed error in accepting the parties’ 
agreement to limit Dr. Kormos’s testimony was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Silveria asserts that the limitation 
precluded evidence that would have demonstrated “how the 
neglect, deprivation and physical and sexual abuse [Silveria] 
suffered throughout his childhood, and his “relationship with co-
appellant Travis, and the other co-defendants,” affected 
Silveria’s “conduct at the time of the crimes,” and how Silveria 
had positively developed in the six years since the crimes.  He 
also asserts that prejudice is demonstrated because the first 
penalty phase jury could not reach a verdict and deliberated for 
a lengthier period of time than the penalty retrial jury.   
At the penalty retrial, Dr. Kormos testified he was of the 
view that “there was an unusual accumulation of negative 
factors in this particular case, more than you would ordinarily 
see on the average.”  He agreed with defense counsel that a 
person with Silveria’s background of failure to bond with either 
biological parent, and his experiences of neglect, abandonment, 
physical abuse, sexual abuse, and emotional abuse, would be 
impaired in his ability to make rational choices later in life, 
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because “there would likely be such distortions in his views of 
the world that his decisions are likely to be skewed.”  He 
subsequently added, “I think their entire world view would be 
impaired, and that would certainly have an effect on all 
decisions they make.”  He also testified that a “solid majority” of 
persons who had suffered abuse similar to that suffered by 
Mr. Silveria “would indeed suffer from severe psychiatric and 
psychological problems,” including criminality, later in life.   
Dr. Kormos also opined that Silveria had “a very primitive, a 
very impaired way of dealing with reality” by trying to push out 
of his mind problems that occurred because he believed “there 
was . . . nothing that he could possibly do about it.”  As to 
Silveria’s relationship with his coperpetrators, Dr. Kormos 
testified that Silveria, Travis, Spencer, and Jennings “were 
quite close,” and “important to each other,” “almost like they 
were trying to make up an artificial, a pseudo-family.”  Thus, 
the jury could reasonably extrapolate from Dr. Kormos’s 
testimony a view of how Silveria’s childhood abuse and 
relationship with his coperpetrators affected his conduct on the 
day of the crime.   
Moreover, Silveria’s counsel asserted below that “I need 
not ask the doctor questions about his diagnosis of Mr. Silveria 
subsequent to the time of the crime, that is, during the time he 
was in jail.”  Indeed, ample evidence was introduced regarding 
Silveria’s positive behavior in jail following the crime.  As noted, 
several correctional officers, Silveria’s former girlfriend, one of 
his foster mothers, and Reverend Charon testified regarding 
Silveria’s spirituality and his remorse for the capital crime.  One 
officer also testified that Silveria did not engage in physical 
altercations with other inmates, commit assaults on correctional 
staff, or display behavioral problems.  He had not been caught 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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possessing weapons, drugs, or alcohol.  Another officer testified 
that Silveria was intelligent, cooperative, and volunteered for 
additional jobs.  He appeared to go out of his way to welcome 
new inmates, and at the officer’s request, had provided 
orientation for inmates new to the module.  James Park, a 
former San Quentin associate warden, testified Silveria 
displayed a “positive and productive” outlook, had spent his jail 
time constructively by studying, and if he were to serve a 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
he would “make a good adjustment,” and would not be “a threat 
or a danger to other staff or other inmates.”  (See ante, pp. 17–
20, 23–24.)   
Thus, Silveria fails to demonstrate what significant 
mitigating evidence was excluded by the limitation on 
Dr. Kormos’s testimony, and hence also fails to demonstrate 
that there is a reasonable possibility that the penalty verdict 
would have been different had Dr. Kormos’s testimony not been 
limited.  Nor, for this same reason, is prejudice demonstrated, 
by itself, because the first penalty phase jury hung, or because 
the penalty retrial jury deliberated for a shorter period of time 
than did Silveria’s first penalty jury.  (See People v. Johnson 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 753 [“The length of jury deliberations in 
this two-homicide case, by itself, supports no conclusion as to 
the closeness of the case or as to any prejudicial effect of 
joinder”].)   
Silveria asserts that the trial court’s ruling that Silveria 
had opened the door to questions regarding a time after 
Silveria’s 21st birthday lacks support in the record and was 
contrary to the court’s earlier statement that it did not “think 
anybody has gone beyond the agreement.”  It is admittedly 
unclear why the court changed its view of the record, but it had 
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discretion to later find, apparently after reviewing the written 
record, that asking “later in life” questions had in fact opened 
the door.  Nor were the parties misled by the court’s earlier 
statement that it did not think the agreement had been violated 
because there was no testimony by Dr. Kormos after the court’s 
statement and before the prosecutor’s cross-examination.   
Silveria asserts that the trial court allowed the prosecutor 
“to cross-examine Dr. Kormos about [Silveria’s] conduct at the 
time of the crimes in a completely illegal and blatantly unfair 
attempt to show [Silveria] committed a torture-murder, after 
preventing [Silveria] from presenting evidence directly relating 
to the same time period to show mitigation.”  The focus of the 
prosecutor’s line of inquiry was not whether Silveria had 
committed a torture murder, but rather whether because of 
Silveria’s inconsistent statements regarding when during the 
murder he used the stun gun, antisocial personality disorder 
was a more appropriate diagnosis than Dr. Kormos’s diagnosis 
of child neglect.  Moreover, although the prosecutor was 
permitted to ask Dr. Kormos whether his opinion that child 
neglect was the most appropriate diagnosis would change in 
light of Silveria’s inconsistent statements as to when he used 
the stun gun against Madden, Dr. Kormos replied that this 
information would not change his opinion.   
Nor, contrary to Silveria’s assertion, did the prosecutor 
assert during closing argument that there “had been no evidence 
explaining how those risk factors could be expected to manifest 
and affect a person as an adult” or “exploit[] the fact that the 
defense had been precluded from presenting the very testimony 
that would have explained such a connection.”   The prosecutor’s 
point in the challenged argument was that no one could know 
for certain why individuals with the same background turned 
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out differently, and that although Silveria had suffered a 
difficult childhood, he had found a reprieve in the Gambles’ 
home, and then made his own choice to rob and kill.  
i. Fifth Amendment invocation 
Silveria contends the trial court erroneously denied his 
right to compulsory process and diluted relevant mitigating 
evidence when it ruled that his former foster parent Michael 
George had validly invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination.  We reject the claim. 
In December 1995, during the original penalty phase, 
Silveria testified that in about 1982, when he was about 
12 years old, he lived for nearly a year with then San Jose Police 
Officer Michael George and his family.  On several occasions, 
George had sexually molested Silveria.   
During the 1997 penalty retrial, at a hearing outside the 
presence of the jury, Silveria sought to call George as a witness 
and asserted that the statute of limitations for the molestations 
had expired.  Stuart Kirchick, George’s counsel, stated he had 
spoken with a San Jose police sergeant, “and he said all he could 
tell me was there was an open investigation” as to George and 
Silveria, and “[w]hether or not that matter is within the statute 
of limitations is still a decision that needs to be made.”  For that 
reason, Kirchick had advised George to invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.   
The prosecutor gave the court and counsel copies of a letter 
he had received that morning from a private attorney in a civil 
action pending against George.  The letter stated that George 
had admitted molesting the attorney’s client when the client 
was 13 years old, and had been “sentenced to a 12 year term at 
San Quentin.”  The attorney wanted to be present in court 
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should George testify in Silveria’s case.  In response to the 
court’s inquiry, Kirchick said that George had suffered these 
convictions in Lake County and had served about 10 months of 
his sentence.  George was called as a witness during the hearing, 
but refused to answer any questions about allegedly sexually 
molesting Silveria, and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The court ruled that George “has a 
legitimate right to claim the Fifth Amendment.”   
We review independently the trial court’s ruling that 
George was entitled to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to 
not incriminate himself.  (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 
304 (Seijas).)  The Fifth Amendment privilege embraces not only 
“answers that would in themselves support a conviction,” but 
also those that “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime.”  (Hoffman v. 
United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 (Hoffman); see People v. 
Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617 (Cudjo).)  The privilege “must 
be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was 
intended to secure.”  (Hoffman, at p. 486.)  This protection is 
“confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause 
to apprehend danger from a direct answer.”  (Ibid.)  “However, 
if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to 
prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually 
required to be established in court, he would be compelled to 
surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to 
guarantee.  To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from 
the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is 
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an 
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous 
because injurious disclosure could result.  The trial [court]  in 
appraising the claim ‘must be governed as much by 
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[its]  personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the 
facts actually in evidence.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 486–487.)  It must be 
“ ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the 
circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and 
that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency’ to 
incriminate.”  (Id. at p. 488.)   
Likewise, Evidence Code section 940 provides that “a 
person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may 
tend to incriminate him” to the extent that such a privilege 
exists under the state or federal Constitution.  Evidence Code 
section 404, which we have stated is consistent with the federal 
Hoffman standard, provides:  “Whenever the proffered evidence 
is claimed to be privileged under Section 940, the person 
claiming the privilege has the burden of showing that the 
proffered evidence might tend to incriminate him; and the 
proffered evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to 
the court that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a 
tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege.”  
(Evid. Code, § 404; see Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 617.) 
At the time of the 1997 hearing in this case, section 803, 
former subdivision (g) (section 803(g)) permitted prosecution of 
child molestation “within one year of the time the victim 
report[ed] an independently corroborated crime to law 
enforcement officials. . . . [T]he new one-year limitations period 
applie[d] whether the crime occurred before or after 
section 803(g) became effective” and “without regard to whether 
the fixed statute of limitations for the crime ha[d] already 
expired, and had already expired, when section 803(g) took 
effect.”  (People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737, 742, see id. at 
pp. 744–747.)  In Frazer, this court held former section 803(g) 
was “not an ex post facto law.”  (Frazer, at p. 765.)  Frazer was 
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abrogated in Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, 609–610 
[§ 803(g) is an ex post facto law because it authorized criminal 
prosecutions that the passage of time had previously barred, 
and was enacted after prior limitations periods for the 
defendant’s alleged offenses had expired].)   
Although 
section 803(g) 
was 
later 
found 
to 
be 
unconstitutional, at the time of the hearing below, George had 
“reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.”  
(Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486; see Seijas, supra, 
36 Cal.4th at p. 307 [“The Court of Appeal’s after-the-fact 
disagreement with the parties, even if ultimately correct as a 
matter of law . . . does not mean [the witness] did not reasonably 
apprehend danger at trial”].)  Apparently based on Silveria’s 
testimony at the first penalty phase, the San Jose Police 
Department was investigating whether George had molested 
Silveria, and no decision had been made as to whether the 
statute of limitations had run.  As the People assert, “George 
could reasonably have feared that existing state law . . . could 
expand the statute of limitations for his offenses or even revive 
them if they had expired.”  Under these circumstances, it does 
not “clearly appear[]” that George’s testimony could not 
“possibly have a tendency to incriminate” him.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 404; see Hoffman, at p. 488.)   
In sum, the trial court did not err in ruling George was 
entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
6. Mistrial Motion  
Silveria contends the trial court erroneously denied his 
mistrial motion.  We disagree.   
During Travis’s questioning of his defense expert witness 
Sharon Lutman, Travis’s counsel said:  “I want to show you a 
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picture here of something and see if we can talk about this for a 
minute.  Do I need these marked for identification?  I’m not 
going to attempt to enter these.”  The trial court replied, “All 
right.”  Counsel continued, “I’m going to show you a picture, 
Ms. Lutman, and maybe — is there a shelf on there?”  The 
prosecutor interjected, “Your Honor, if counsel is going to refer 
to an item in the record and display it to the jury as per 
testimony about it and then it’s not marked and introduced into 
evidence, it does create a problem for the appellate court on 
review.  I think that it’s necessary if he intends to publish them 
and to seek testimony about them to have them marked.”  The 
court replied, “All right.  Let’s mark them then.”   
Silveria then asked to “approach the bench on a 
procedural matter based on what [the prosecutor] just said.”  At 
sidebar, Silveria unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial.  He then 
requested the court admonish the jury ultimately requesting 
that it be told: (1) “the reason the matter [was] being retried has 
nothing to do with any appeal that occurred and, in fact, no 
appeal has ever taken place in this case,” (2) the “reason why 
the matter was tried once in 1995 and why the penalty phase is 
being retried at this time,” (3) the jury was to “disregard” what 
the prosecutor said, and that it was “not to consider whether or 
not this matter will ever be appealed or what the result of any 
such appeal might ever be,” and (4) that the jury is “indeed the 
last word . . . on the subject, that [it was] not to assume that 
there will be any appeal or any subsequent intervention by an 
appellate court and that the decision [it makes] is in fact what 
will happen to Mr. Silveria and Mr. Travis.”   
The court twice admonished the prosecutor at sidebar, 
“You didn’t need to talk about the appellate court.”  It declined 
to admonish the jury, stating:  “Based upon the Court’s view of 
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the jury, the lack of any reaction by the jury and simple common 
sense this Court will not admonish the jury regarding the use of 
the term ‘appellate court’ ” because “[t]o do so would only 
highlight the term.”   
“ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of 
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.  
[Citation.]  Whether a particular incident is incurably 
prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial 
court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial 
motions.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  A motion for a mistrial should 
be granted when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair 
trial have been irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Collins 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198 (Collins).)   
Here, the prosecutor’s statement was not “so incurably 
prejudicial that a new trial was required.”  (People v. Ledesma 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 683 (Ledesma).)  His reference to the 
appellate process was brief and isolated, did not refer to the 
circumstance that Silveria and Travis were being retried, and 
was directed not to the jury, but to the court in the midst of a 
technical discussion about whether an exhibit should be 
marked.   
Nor, contrary to Silveria’s assertion, did the prosecutor’s 
reference constitute Caldwell error.  (Caldwell v. Mississippi 
(1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328–329 (Caldwell) [“it is constitutionally 
impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made 
by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility 
for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death 
rests elsewhere”].)  There is no reasonable likelihood the jury 
understood the brief comment — which again did not occur 
during argument to the jury but during an evidentiary 
discussion with the court as to whether an exhibit should be 
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marked —  as lessening its sentencing responsibility.  (See 
People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 18 [“Certainly the mere 
mention of the appellate process, while ill-advised, does not — 
standing alone — necessarily constitute reversible Caldwell 
error”].)  Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury at the end 
of the penalty retrial:  “Under the law of this state, you must 
now determine which of these penalties shall be imposed on each 
defendant.  In determining what penalty is appropriate in this 
case, you must assume that whichever of the two penalties you 
impose will be carried out.  That is:  If you impose life without 
the possibility of parole, you must assume that the defendant 
will spend the rest of his life in prison and will never be released.  
If you impose death, you must assume that the defendant will 
be executed.”  The brevity and context of the prosecutor’s 
comment, together with the court’s instructions at the end of the 
penalty retrial, “convince[] us the jury could not reasonably have 
understood the [prosecutor] to mean the jury’s verdict was 
advisory only.”  (Moon, at p. 18.)   
The trial court also acted within its discretion in declining 
to admonish the jury when the prosecutor’s comment was made.  
The court was reasonably concerned that an admonition would 
unnecessarily highlight the reference to the appellate process.   
Silveria also challenges the prosecutor’s closing argument 
statement that if the jury decided it was appropriate to impose 
the death penalty, “this is not something that you or we as a 
system are doing to these men.  This is something that each of 
these two defendants has brought upon himself.”  Silveria 
claims this statement exploited both the prosecutor’s error in 
earlier referring to the appellate process, and the trial court’s 
“failure to remedy that error.”  The prosecutor merely reminded 
the jury that the defendants’ own actions had created a situation 
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in which a jury was choosing between penalties of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole and death.  
Nothing in these statements misled the jury “ ‘as to its role in 
the sentencing process in a way that allow[ed] the jury to feel 
less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.’ ”  
(Romano v. Oklahoma, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 9.)   
7. Claims Regarding Sympathy and Mercy 
a. Mercy instruction and argument  
Silveria and Travis contend that the trial court 
prejudicially erred in ordering counsel to tell their witnesses not 
to use the word “mercy,” precluding either side from using the 
word “mercy” during closing argument, and refusing to instruct 
the jury “on mercy or a juror’s use of mercy.”  We conclude there 
was no error.  Based on the trial court’s instructions and 
counsels’ argument, “there is no reasonable likelihood the jury 
was misled as to its ability to grant” defendants leniency based 
on the mitigating evidence by the trial court’s preclusion of the 
word “mercy.”  (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 802 
(Ervine).)   
(1) Factual background 
Before the penalty retrial, Silveria, joined by Travis, 
sought to “argue mercy.”  In a lengthy ruling, the trial court 
denied Silveria’s motion.  It noted that “mercy,” as defined in the 
dictionary, “implies compassion that forebears punishing even 
when justice demands it.”  The court stated:  “The idea of mercy 
falls, if at all, under Factor (k) of Penal Code Section 190.3,” but 
“[m]ercy is not a circumstance which . . . extenuates the gravity 
of the crime.  It is forgiveness and forbearance of warranted 
punishment.  The jury’s job is not to forgive.  The jury’s job is to 
punish with either death or life without parole.”   
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The court stated it would instruct the jury in the language 
of CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), but that “[m]ercy is not a 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or 
record.  There is sympathetic evidence and the jury should 
consider 
that 
evidence. 
 
The 
defendant’s 
upbringing, 
background and life experiences, good and bad, are to be 
considered when . . . evidence of them is presented.”   
The court also noted that the United States Supreme 
Court 
had 
held: 
“ ‘[S]entencers 
may 
not 
be 
given unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those 
charged with capital offenses.  The Constitution instead 
requires that death penalty statutes be structured so as to 
prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and 
unpredictable fashion.’ ”  (California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 
538, 541.)  The trial court observed, “To permit the defense to 
argue mercy would allow the jury to engage in the exact type of 
decision-making that the United States Supreme Court 
condemned.”  “Granting mercy would seem to grant an unduly 
lenient sentence — one not based on the evidence presented.”   
At the end of the penalty retrial, the trial court instructed 
the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), directing 
the jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates 
the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for 
the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 
character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense 
for which he is on trial.”  The court also instructed the jury:  “You 
are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you 
deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are 
permitted to consider. . . . [I]t is not necessary that all twelve 
jurors unanimously agree upon the existence or truth of any . . . 
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particular mitigating circumstance.  Rather, each juror is 
entitled to weigh and consider any . . . mitigating circumstance 
which he or she finds to be true in arriving at a penalty verdict.”  
The court defined a “mitigating circumstance” as “any fact, 
condition or event which as such does not constitute a 
justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be 
considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the 
appropriateness of the death penalty.”   
(2) Analysis 
We have previously held that a trial court does not err in 
directing the parties to refer to “sympathy, pity, or compassion 
instead of mercy” in argument.  (Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 
p. 802.)  When based on the trial evidence, counsel’s use of any 
of these terms — mercy, sympathy pity, or compassion — during 
argument properly requests leniency from the jury.  (Ibid. 
[“ ‘mercy’ and ‘compassion’ are synonymous” in the context of the 
penalty phase jury instructions]; People v. Boyce (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 672, 707 (Boyce) [“the court did not foreclose defense 
counsel from urging the jury to show sympathy and mercy to 
defendant”]; People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 685 
(Seaton) [defense counsel’s argument that the jury could 
consider “ ‘mercy, sentiment, and sympathy for the defendant’ ” 
informed the jury “it could consider sympathy”]; People v. 
Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 228 (Andrews) [relying in part on 
the prosecutor’s argument acknowledging that the jury could 
consider “compassion” to conclude “the jury was not 
misinformed regarding its power to exercise mercy”].)  The trial 
court’s direction in this case permitted the parties to use various 
terms that conveyed the jury’s latitude in considering the 
evidence and making the profoundly personal and normative 
penalty decision.  (See Kansas v. Carr, supra, 577 U.S. at p.  __ 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
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[136 S.Ct. at p. 642] [“In the last analysis, jurors will 
accord mercy if they deem it appropriate, and withhold mercy if 
they do not, which is what our case law is designed to achieve”].)   
We have also observed that the word “mercy,” when not 
based on the trial evidence, may invite a purely subjective 
rather than a reasoned moral response.  (See People v. McPeters 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1195 [the “unadorned use of the word 
‘mercy’ implies an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power 
rather than reasoned discretion based on particular facts and 
circumstances” (italics added)]; Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 707 [same]; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 393 [same]; 
see also Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 452 [“We have held . . . 
that an express reference to ‘mercy’ risks encouraging arbitrary 
decisionmaking”].)  We have also said, relying on McPeters, that 
the word mercy “connote[s] an emotional response to the 
mitigating evidence instead of a reasoned moral response.”  
(Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 802; see People v. Henriquez 
(2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 43–44 [same].)  Nonetheless leniency toward 
the defendant is properly considered at the penalty phase.  
(Kansas v. Carr, supra, 577 U.S. at p.  __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 642]; 
People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 57 [“in the penalty 
phase of a capital trial the jury may properly consider sympathy 
or pity for the defendant in determining whether to show mercy 
and spare the defendant from execution”].)  We clarify here that 
so long as attorneys base their penalty arguments on the trial 
evidence, it is not improper for them to use the word “mercy” or 
its synonyms in argument. 
Here, although all counsel were precluded from using the 
word “mercy,” “there was no suggestion in the arguments of 
either party that the jury could not consider mercy in 
determining penalty.”  (Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 227.)  
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
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The prosecutor argued:  “Now when . . . [Silveria defense 
counsel] Mr. Braun or Ms. Angel ask you for your sympathetic 
consideration, for charity for Mr. Silveria given his life and his 
childhood and his foster homes and the abuse that he suffered, 
physical and sexual, as he will as no doubt will she, when [Travis 
defense counsel] Mr. Leininger asks you to find room in your 
heart to consider the sympathetic aspects under [CALJIC 
No. 8.85,] [f]actor (k) of his client’s background and childhood, 
his substance abuse, his chemical addiction,” look at Madden’s 
bloody shirt and “remember the man who was wearing it.”   
Silveria’s counsel urged the jury that “[W]hat [f]actor (k) 
takes into account is the entire life of a particular defendant, 
and in this case the entire life of my client, Danny Silveria, [is] 
to be measured against what he did on that one terrible night.”  
“[T]he law requires you not to just look at the crime.  It requires 
you to weigh and consider who Danny Silveria was, how Danny 
Silveria became as he is now and who Danny Silveria is now.”  
Counsel asserted that based on the mitigating evidence, “Danny 
is a worthwhile human being, . . . he is a person worth saving,” 
he is “more than the worst thing he ever did.”   Counsel argued, 
“just as there has been sin so too there can be redemption,” 
suggested “[w]e can have compassion enough for everybody in 
this case,” and asked the jury “to spare Danny’s life.”  Travis’s 
counsel asserted:  “What I’m asking you to do is look within 
yourself to discover whether there are any feelings of sympathy 
or compassion for the boy . . . who suffered, the boy whose anger 
was kindled by shame, fanned by countless humiliations, by a 
cruel masochistic sexual predator, the boy who experienced all 
of these things without the protection of family, social agencies 
or even one good friend . . . .”  Counsel told the jury, “I’d like to 
see you live with the peace that comes not from vengeance, not 
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from anger, not from destruction of human life, but from the 
forbearance of imposing death.”  Hence defense counsel were 
accorded broad latitude in marshalling the mitigating evidence 
and attempting to persuade the jury that this evidence 
warranted a sympathetic response, and were not meaningfully 
limited in this effort by preclusion of the word “mercy.”   
In addition, “ ‘a jury told it may sympathetically consider 
all mitigating evidence need not also be expressly instructed it 
may exercise ‘mercy.’ ”  (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 
344; see People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1069–1070 
[“To the extent the proposed instructions told the jurors they 
were free to consider ‘mercy, sympathy and/or sentiment’ . . . or 
‘compassion or sympathy’ . . ., they were essentially duplicative 
of CALJIC No. 8.85, which told jurors that under section 190.3, 
factor (k) they could consider ‘any sympathetic or other aspect 
of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers 
as a basis for a sentence less than death’ ”]; People v. Brown 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 570 [“Because defendant’s jury had been 
instructed in the language of section 190.3, factor (k), we must 
assume the jury already understood it could consider mercy and 
compassion; accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing 
the proposed mercy instruction”].)   
Here, the trial court instructed the jury in the language of 
CALJIC No. 8.85.  “As we have previously explained, CALJIC 
No. 8.85 adequately instructs the jury concerning the 
circumstances that may be considered in mitigation, including 
sympathy and mercy.  [Citation.]  We therefore ‘must assume 
the jury already understood it could consider mercy and 
compassion.’ ”  (Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 801.)  The court’s 
additional instructions also informed the jury of its latitude to 
consider sympathetic and extenuating evidence at trial in 
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determining penalty.  The mere exclusion of the word “mercy” 
did not undercut these instructions.   
In sum, “there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was 
misled as to its ability to grant” defendants leniency based on 
the mitigating evidence by the trial court’s preclusion of the 
word “mercy.”  (Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 802.) 
Silveria and Travis note that the prosecutor violated the 
trial court’s order during opening statements when he said 
Madden had struggled against “the tightly-wrapped duct tape 
that so mercilessly bound him.”  There was no contemporaneous 
objection, but during a recess later that day Travis, joined by 
Silveria, sought a mistrial, or in the alternative, for all counsel 
to be permitted to use the word “mercy.”  The trial court accepted 
defense counsels’ representation that the prosecutor had used 
the word “mercilessly,” denied the motions, and said, “Any 
further violation of the Court’s original order will be dealt with 
severely.”  The prosecutor asked to “speak in regards to that,” 
and the trial court responded:  “No.  We’re done.”   
Defendants do not delineate how the trial court erred in 
denying the motions. As noted, “ ‘[a] mistrial should be granted 
if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by 
admonition or instruction.  [Citation.]  Whether a particular 
incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative 
matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion 
in ruling on mistrial motions.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  A motion 
for a mistrial should be granted when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances 
of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ”  
(Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 198; see ante, pt. II.B.6.)   
Here, the prosecutor’s single use of the word “merciless” 
was not “so incurably prejudicial that a new trial was required.”  
(Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p.  683.)  In his reply brief, 
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Silveria cites the trial court’s ruling as “further demonstrat[ion] 
to the jury the extent to which the judge leaned on the 
prosecution’s side of the scale.”  But neither the objection nor the 
ruling were made before the jury, nor was the prosecutor even 
permitted to defend his asserted violation.  Rather, the trial 
court accepted defense counsels’ representation of what had 
occurred and reprimanded the prosecutor.  These circumstances 
fail to demonstrate judicial bias favoring the prosecution. 
b. CALJIC No. 1.00  
Silveria contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by 
instructing some potential jurors before trial in the language of 
CALJIC No. 1.00.  We reject the claim.   
In December 1996, during jury selection for the penalty 
retrial, the court instructed certain prospective jurors in the 
language of CALJIC No. 1.00:  “You must not be influenced by 
pity for a defendant or by prejudice against him. . . . Both the 
defendants and the People have the right to expect that you will 
conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence, apply the law 
and reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.”  The 
instruction was not repeated in the court’s April 1997 
instructions to the jury at the end of the penalty retrial.   
“We have repeatedly explained that this instruction 
should not be given at the penalty phase because the 
‘ “consequences” ’ at the penalty phase — the choice between 
death and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole — 
‘are precisely the issue that the jury must decide.’ ”  (Erskine, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 302; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 
354 (Ray) [“language instructing the jury to disregard the 
consequences of its verdict is inappropriate and should not be 
given at the penalty phase” (italics omitted)].)  Moreover, it is 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
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erroneous to instruct a penalty phase jury not to be influenced 
by pity or sympathy for the defendant.  (Seaton, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at pp. 684–685.)   
We conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
court’s error misled the jury.  (See People v. Mitchell (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 561, 579 [“In reviewing a claim of instructional error, 
the court must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply 
the law in violation of the Constitution.”].)  Here instruction in 
the language of CALJIC No. 1.00 was given to only some 
potential jurors before the penalty retrial, and was not repeated 
four months later at its conclusion.  Rather, at the end of the 
penalty retrial, the court instructed the jury that it must 
“determine which of these penalties” — death or life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole — “shall be 
imposed on each defendant,” and that in making this 
determination it “must assume that whichever of the two 
penalties you impose will be carried out.”  It further instructed 
the jury:  “Both the People and each defendant have a right to 
expect that you will conscientiously consider all of the evidence, 
follow the law and reach a just verdict.”   
Moreover, as noted, the trial court instructed the jury to 
consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity 
of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime 
and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 
character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense 
for which he is on trial.”  The court also instructed the jury:  “You 
are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you 
deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are 
permitted to consider. . . . [I]t is not necessary that all twelve 
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jurors unanimously agree upon the existence or truth of any . . . 
particular mitigating circumstance.  Rather, each juror is 
entitled to weigh and consider any . . . mitigating circumstance 
which he or she finds to be true in arriving at a penalty verdict.”  
The court defined a “mitigating circumstance” as “any fact, 
condition or event which as such does not constitute a 
justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be 
considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the 
appropriateness of the death penalty.”   
Given these instructions at the end of the penalty retrial, 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors who may have 
heard the challenged language at the outset of trial failed to 
understand that they “bore the ultimate responsibility for 
choosing between death and life imprisonment without parole” 
(Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 355), and that they could consider 
pity and sympathy for the defendants.    
8. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Silveria and Travis assert that the prosecutor committed 
prejudicial misconduct.  We reject the claim.   
“A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her 
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render 
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves 
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the 
trier of fact.”  (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 711.)  “As a 
general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of 
prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion — and on 
the same ground — the defendant made an assignment of 
misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to 
disregard the impropriety.”  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 795, 841 (Samayoa).)  “When attacking the 
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prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, the defendant must show” that 
in the context of the whole argument and the instructions there 
was “ ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the 
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.’ ”  
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667.) 
Travis, joined by Silveria, contends the prosecutor 
committed misconduct during closing argument by referring to 
CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k) evidence as “a kitchen sink.”  During 
closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that Silveria’s 
counsel “will urge you to consider and be swayed by [f]actor (k) 
evidence, which you will see is sort of like a kitchen sink 
category of — ”  Both defendants unsuccessfully objected to the 
term “kitchen sink.”  The prosecutor read the language of the 
instruction on factor (k), and explained that the factor was “an 
all-encompassing category . . . of, in effect, sympathetic evidence 
as to” the defendants.  In the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, he 
stated:  “Factor (k), that’s basically, I submit, all of the penalty 
phase evidence that has been offered on behalf of both 
Mr. Travis and Mr. Silveria by their respective attorneys.  
Factor (k), which I refer[] to as a kitchen sink, meaning by that 
an all-encompassing category.”  He explained:  “Basically it is a 
catch-all category put in by statute for the defendant’s benefit in 
a capital case.  Factor (k) allows you to consider any sympathetic 
aspect of” Mr. Travis’s and Mr. Silveria’s “character or record as 
a basis for a sentence less than death.”   
We conclude any assumed misconduct in using the term 
“kitchen sink” to describe the CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k) 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
language of factor (k), which informs the jury that it may 
consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity 
of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime 
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and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 
character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense 
for which he is on trial,” describes a broad range of evidence.  
The prosecutor also referred to factor (k) as an “all-
encompassing” 
or 
“catch-all” 
category 
of 
defendants’ 
sympathetic evidence.  In light of this, and contrary to Travis’s 
assertion, the prosecutor’s characterization of this evidence did 
not send “a clear message that any factor (k) evidence was not 
to be taken seriously” or constitute prejudicial misconduct.    
Silveria and Travis also contend that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by urging the jury to rely on 
Dr. Pakdaman’s opinion that “[t]his is one of the most atrocious 
cases that I have ever seen,” and thus shifted responsibility for 
the penalty decision to Dr. Pakdaman in violation of Caldwell.27  
(Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 328–329; see ante, pt. II.B.4.b.)  
We have concluded above that even assuming the pathologist’s 
statement was inadmissible, it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because it was brief and isolated, and less 
compelling than Dr. Pakdaman’s detailed description of 
Madden’s 32 “slash-like superficial cuts” and “stab-like wounds” 
in his neck, chest, and abdomen, including stab wounds that 
penetrated 
his 
heart 
and 
fractured 
his 
ribs, 
and 
Dr. Stratbucker’s testimony that marks made by the stun gun 
on Madden’s thigh were inflicted while he was alive, and that 
Madden remained conscious “to the bitter end.”  (See ante, 
pt. II.B.4.b.).   
                                        
27  
Caldwell error claims are not forfeited on appeal for 
failure to object below if the trial, as here, occurred before our 
decision in People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 761–762. 
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Nor did the prosecutor’s recounting of Dr. Pakdaman’s 
statement during closing argument mislead the jury “ ‘as to its 
role in the sentencing process in a way that allow[ed] the jury to 
feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.’ ”  
(Romano v. Oklahoma, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 9.)  The prosecutor 
recounted Dr. Pakdaman’s testimony regarding the number and 
type of stab wounds Madden had suffered.  He showed the jury 
crime scene and autopsy photographs, asked the jury to consider 
Madden’s bloody shirt, and noted Dr. Pakdaman’s testimony 
that it took Madden between 10 and 30 minutes to die, and that 
he was alive at the end of the attack.  The prosecutor asked, 
“What is morally compelling about this case?”  He noted 
Dr. Pakdaman had performed thousands of autopsies, could not 
recall all of them, but remembered this case because, “This is 
one of the most atrocious cases that I have ever seen.”  The 
prosecutor described Dr. Pakdaman as “visibly emotional” 
during this exchange.  After discussing Dr. Pakdaman’s 
testimony, the prosecutor argued that the “callousness and 
horror of this case, of this murder is beyond all human 
comprehension.”  He then argued Travis had enjoyed the 
murder, and discussed the Tex Watson letter and Travis’s 
statements to police.  After a recess, the prosecutor told the jury 
he wanted to “be absolutely clear” that the jury’s moral 
evaluation was not mechanical or a mere counting of factors, but 
an “individual assessment[] as to what is morally compelling 
and your assignment of whatever moral weight you feel you 
should give to each of these various factors that the law allows 
you to consider.”  In this context nothing in the prosecutor’s 
recounting of Dr. Pakdaman’s statement regarding the relative 
atrocity of the case shifted responsibility for the penalty decision 
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from the jury to Dr. Pakdaman in violation of Caldwell.  
(Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 328–329.)  
9. Additional Claims Regarding the Prosecutor’s 
Conduct 
Silveria contends the trial court erred when it permitted 
the prosecutor to elicit certain testimony and Silveria and 
Travis contend the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to 
make certain statements during closing argument.  We reject 
these claims.   
a. Sissy Madden’s testimony  
Silveria contends the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to elicit testimony from Sissy Madden that delays in 
the trial are torture to her, that she has no peace, and that all 
she wants is justice for her husband’s death.  He contends that 
the effect of trial delays on Sissy were “too remote from any act 
of [Silveria] to be relevant to his moral culpability,” that Sissy’s 
testimony was so unduly prejudicial it rendered the penalty 
retrial fundamentally unfair, and that Sissy’s “request for 
justice for her husband’s murder violated the Eighth 
Amendment because it essentially told the jury” she believed 
“death was the appropriate sentence.”   We reject the claim.   
During Sissy’s direct testimony, the prosecutor asked her 
how she had been affected by her testimony being rescheduled 
to that day from the day before.  She replied:  “[I]t was horrible.  
This . . . is so hard for me to do, because I’m in a room full of 
strangers, talking to you about something that’s very intimate 
to me:  My relationship with my husband.  I feel like — every 
time that this gets put off it feels like — I don’t know that you 
can understand, but it feels like a little bit of torture to me. . . .  I 
don’t feel like I have any peace.  I don’t feel like I have any 
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closure.  And all I want is just, you know, to have just a little bit 
of justice for my husband, you know.  That’s all I want.  And this 
has been six years now, and it doesn’t seem like a lot, one 
afternoon or one day doesn’t seem like a lot, but I have been 
going through this now for six years, just waiting and waiting 
for a phone call, having to call . . . the attorney, ‘When is this 
going to happen?’  It’s just . . . not pleasant.”  Silveria did not 
object and his mistrial motion based on this testimony, made 
after the jury had left for the day, was denied.  The court found 
that nothing in the prosecutor’s question or Sissy’s response 
“put blame on the defense for them having to come back to 
court.”   
Even assuming Silveria’s claim is preserved, it is 
meritless.  The prosecutor did not reasonably elicit Sissy’s 
testimony that she felt tortured simply by asking how she had 
been affected by a scheduling change.  Nor, contrary to Silveria’s 
claim, was her testimony unduly prejudicial.  The jury would 
reasonably expect that the anticipation of testifying in a trial 
regarding a loved one’s murder, and delays in the resolution of 
that trial, would be stressful.  Moreover, Sissy’s statement was 
cumulative to other testimony Silveria does not challenge.  
Coworker Thuringer testified that nearly six years after the 
murder, and two days before Thuringer’s testimony, Sissy 
“really went to pieces” because she received a court scheduling 
call.  Thuringer explained, “It just brings it back fresh all over 
again.”  Sissy’s supervisor House testified that Sissy had been 
in tears and told House she had Thuringer speak to the 
prosecutor on the telephone because “I can’t.  I just feel like I’m 
being tortured.  This is just a constant torture to me.”   
To the extent Sissy’s challenged comments could 
reasonably be interpreted to mean she believed the death 
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penalty would be “justice” for Madden, as Silveria contends, the 
trial court instructed the jury:  “Any wishes of the various 
members of the victim’s family concerning which penalty should 
be imposed is not before you and such evidence is inadmissible 
as irrelevant.  You may not speculate about that matter, 
consider it, or take it into account in any way.”  We presume the 
jury understood and followed this instruction.  (Hajek and Vo, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1178.)  
b. Closing argument 
(1) Victim impact  
Silveria and Travis contend that the trial court erred in 
allowing the prosecutor to argue “future victim impact 
evidence.”  We reject the claim.   
At the penalty retrial, the trial court ruled that victim 
impact witnesses would be permitted to testify as to the effect of 
Madden’s murder upon them or a close family member up until 
the time of their testimony, “but nothing in the future as that is 
speculative.”  During Silveria’s closing argument, defense 
counsel Annrae Angel mentioned her 18-month old son Ian.   She 
later argued:  “Life in prison without parole is enough for Danny 
Silveria.  It is a serious punishment. . . . If you sentence 
Danny . . . to life in prison without parole, he will be in state 
prison for the rest of his life.  As Ian grows up and as time 
passes, we can all — and all of the children that you know, we 
can look back and we can say, ‘He’s still in prison for what he 
did.’  And I submit to you that this case is not going to go away 
all that quickly.  We’re going to think about this case for a long 
time.  Maybe forever.  This is not something that we will all 
easily put behind us and easily put in a box, because it is so filled 
with emotion and pain and heartache.”   
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In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said: “Well, it’s 
true that Mr. Travis and Mr. Silveria would be in prison for the 
rest of their lives, the rest of their natural lives, day after day, 
year after year.  So why should you regret [returning a life 
imprisonment verdict]?  Ms. Angel . . . says, ‘As Ian grows up 
and gets older and older  you would know that the defendants 
are still in custody.’  Yes, you would.  Holidays would come and 
go each year and would continue to do so as Ian grows up, as all 
of you get older, as your children grow up, as your children have 
children.  Holidays would come and go for you, for your families, 
for Mr. Travis, for Mr. Silveria and for the Madden family.  I 
submit that with each holiday, Valentine’s Day or Mother’s 
Day — ”  Ms. Angel’s cocounsel, Mr. Braun, objected at sidebar 
that the prosecutor’s argument violated the court’s ruling 
precluding evidence of victim impact in the future.  The trial 
court overruled the objection, finding the argument was “proper 
rebuttal based on what counsel has said in their opening 
arguments.”   
The prosecutor subsequently made the comments Silveria 
challenges here:  “As the holidays come and go in the years to 
come, I submit that with each holiday, Valentine’s Day or 
Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, or Thanksgiving or Christmas, you 
will think about this.  And remember, Ms. Angel pointed out this 
is a case that no doubt will stay with you forever, for a long 
time. . . . [A]s the years pass, you will consider that Julie 
Madden no longer has a father to give Valentine’s Day gifts to 
or Father’s Day gifts to.  You will be wondering who will be 
taking Julie shopping for a Mother’s Day gift this year.  As time 
goes on and the holidays come and go you will remember this 
case, ladies and gentlemen, for the rest of your lives.  Every 
Christmas what will you think of?  Will you think of Julie 
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Madden missing her father?  Will you think of an empty space 
around a holiday table?  Or, on the other hand, will you think of 
John Travis or Daniel Silveria somewhere in a prison facility 
living out the rest of . . . his or their natural lives, receiving 
visitors, sending holiday greetings, receiving cards or gifts?”   
Contrary to Silveria’s claim, the trial court did not permit 
the prosecutor “to violate [its] earlier order restricting victim 
impact to no later than the time of trial.”   Silveria’s argument 
urging the jury to return a verdict of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole relied on the circumstance that as 
defense counsel’s son and other children the jurors knew grew 
older, the defendants would continue to be incarcerated.  The 
prosecutor was entitled to respond to this argument by 
observing that as the victim’s daughter grew older, she would 
continue to be affected by her father’s murder.  Moreover, in 
general it is not improper at the penalty phase of the trial for 
the jury to consider the “residual and lasting impact” of the 
murder (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 398), so long as 
the “evidence is not so inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an 
irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of the 
case.”  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180; see 
People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 762 [“Jurors were simply 
asked to draw reasonable inferences from evidence of the 
family’s close relationship and favorite activities about the long-
term effects of Joseph’s murder on his children”]; People v. 
Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 296–298 (Verdugo) [upholding 
admission of victim impact evidence of the family’s observance 
of the victim’s 19th birthday at the cemetery several months 
after her murder, statements made by the victim’s young niece 
that she had seen the victim after her death, and testimony that 
the victim’s father died seven months after her murder]; Brown, 
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at p. 398 [testimony that the victim’s brother saluted the 
victim’s grave every time he drove by the cemetery and that the 
victim’s father has not gone fishing since his son’s death was 
evidence of “understandable human reactions” to the murder].)    
Nor, as Silveria further contends, did the prosecutor’s 
argument “count[] the jurors among the victims of [the] 
defendant’s crime” by implying that “in order to mitigate the 
impact that the jurors would suffer on their future holidays, 
they should impose the death penalty,” or divert the jury from 
its proper sentencing role.  Rather, Silveria argued that if the 
jury returned a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, it could be reassured as time went by that 
the defendants would remain incarcerated.  The prosecutor 
properly responded to this argument by suggesting the 
continuing effect of the murder on the victim’s family each 
holiday, and noting that the defendants, unlike the murder 
victim, would have the opportunity to continue to celebrate 
holidays should they serve a life imprisonment sentence.   
Travis contends that the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to argue:  “Travis and Silveria took something from 
Jim Madden, something perhaps even more . . . valuable than 
his very life itself.  And that’s a lifetime . . . with his wife, Sissy, 
and the opportunity of watching his little girl, being there for 
her in the audience during those dance performances instead of 
an empty chair, first father-daughter dance and the ones to 
follow, perhaps walking his little girl down the aisle when that 
time comes.”  The trial court sustained defendants’ objections.     
Travis asserts that the prosecutor’s argument was an 
“appeal to pure emotion,” and that although the trial court 
sustained his objection, “the damage was already done.”  The 
trial court instructed the jury before closing arguments that “[i]f 
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an objection was sustained to a question, do not guess what the 
answer might have been.  Do not speculate as to the reason for 
the objection.”  The jury would reasonably apply this principle 
to sustained objections during closing argument.   
(2) Retribution  
Silveria and Travis contend the trial court erred in 
allowing the prosecutor to argue for retribution while precluding 
defendants from arguing for mercy.  There was no error.   
During Silveria’s closing argument, defense counsel 
Mr. Braun said:  “Now, what justification can the state offer you 
for killing Mr. Silveria?  I submit there is only one, and that is 
pure retribution for what might colloquially be termed payback 
or vengeance.  Now, would any such punishment or vengeance 
bring back Jim Madden or somehow make his family whole?  It 
will not.”   
On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued:  “Mr. Braun argues 
that since the victim can’t be brought back nothing can be 
gained by killing a killer so why should society do that.  I submit, 
ladies and gentlemen, that everyone from a civilized society has 
the right to make sure that the law, theoretically and ideally, is 
carried out as it’s supposed to be, because each of us have given 
up our personal right to do that ourselves.  The instinct for just 
retribution is part of the nature of every human being.  
Channeling that instinct to the administration of criminal 
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability 
of a society that is . . . governed by law and order.  Where certain 
crimes are concerned, and this is definitely one of them, 
retribution is not a forbidden consideration or one inconsistent 
with society’s respect for the very dignity of man and humanity.  
The decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate 
action in an extreme case, which I submit this is, is the 
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expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are, and 
those who commit them in and of themselves are, so grievous an 
af[f]ront to humanity that the only appropriate response must 
be the imposition of the penalty of death.”   
Travis did not object to the prosecutor’s reference to 
retribution, but his objection to reference to the “community’s 
feelings about this” was sustained, and the court also struck this 
language.  The prosecutor continued:  “Like it or not, ladies and 
gentlemen, retribution is still a part of being human and of being 
a human being.  I submit that in spite of the fact that both 
defendants are asking you, or their lawyers are, to spare their 
lives, that when they chose to take Jim Madden’s life that night 
they forfeited their own.”  Silveria unsuccessfully objected that 
the argument implied “that the act itself automatically 
warrants the death penalty.”   
Silveria asserts that allowing the prosecutor to argue for 
retribution, but precluding an argument for mercy by defense 
counsel, “blatantly displayed the depth of the unfairness and 
uneven treatment . . . accorded” Silveria.  Assuming this claim 
is preserved, it is meritless.  As discussed above, although 
defense counsel were precluded from using the word “mercy” 
during closing argument, they were accorded great latitude in 
marshalling the mitigating evidence and attempting to 
persuade the jury that this evidence warranted a sympathetic 
response from the jury and the imposition of a lesser 
punishment.  (See ante, pt. II.B.7.a.)  Hence no unfair treatment 
is demonstrated.  Moreover, the prosecutor’s reference to 
retribution was a legitimate response to Silveria’s closing 
argument that retribution would accomplish little because it 
could not “bring back” Madden.   
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(3) Societal demand for the death penalty  
Travis asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to present an argument that “effectively urged the 
jury to return a death verdict” not based on the capital crime or 
the defendants, but “because society demanded such a penalty 
for anyone guilty of murder.”  We reject the claim.   
Travis broadly contends that “the prosecutor was 
permitted to argue that a jury that chose life without parole was 
taking the easy way out, that a death verdict was merely the 
fulfillment of a responsibility resulting from a law passed by the 
jurors’ fellow citizens and affirmed by the courts, and that any 
action beyond the least-aggravated murder possible was 
automatically a factor in aggravation of the penalty.”  As to the 
assertion that the “prosecutor was permitted to argue that a jury 
that chose life without parole was taking the easy way out,” the 
prosecutor argued:  “I come before you . . . to ask you to return a 
verdict of death against these two defendants. . . . This request 
is made on the basis of the evidence showing that these two 
defendants . . . have committed the worst of crimes under the 
law of this state and have under our social contract earned that 
ultimate penalty.  I don’t ask this of you lightly.  I know full well 
that this is a hard, hard thing for me to ask all of you to consider 
and to do. . . . [A]s a direct result of the verdicts in the guilt 
phase of this trial [defendants] . . . will be sentenced to no less 
than life in prison without parole for what they have done.  To 
simply let that happen, to let them go off to prison to live out the 
rest of their natural lives would be the easy way out,” but not 
“what the evidence in this case warrants . . . . You, ladies and 
gentlemen, the few, have been selected as representatives of the 
community in this case to decide the question of which of the 
only two possible penalties here, death or life without parole, 
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should be meted out to these two defendants for what they have 
done.  Your verdict, ladies and gentlemen, will reflect the 
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of penalty 
for what Mr. Travis and Mr. Silveria did here.  It’s a solemn 
responsibility . . . . The responsibility of voting for the 
appropriate penalty in this case, given the evidence, is not one 
to be taken lightly, and that responsibility is not one to take the 
easy way out of by voting for life without parole simply because 
the other alternative is too difficult to contemplate.  That 
wouldn’t be right.”   
In arguing that the jury should not “take the easy way 
out . . . by voting for life without parole,” the prosecutor simply 
urged the jury to consider the death penalty even though that 
consideration was “difficult to contemplate.”  That is proper.  
(Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 685 [the prosecutor did not 
“denigrate the jury’s ‘solemn responsibility’ by insisting that 
anything but a death sentence would be taking the easy way 
out,” but rather “urged jurors not to forgo the punishment for 
the wrong reasons — because it would absolve them of the need 
to weigh the moral blameworthiness of [the defendant’s] 
conduct”]; see People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 259 [in 
arguing that the jury not “ ‘take the easy way out and not make 
a decision based on the evidence’ ” the prosecutor “simply urged 
the jury not to decide defendant’s fate based on untethered 
compassion for him or his mother alone, without following their 
lawful obligation to consider the evidence”].)   
In his reply brief, Travis contends that “jurors in a capital 
case are bound by no ‘social contract’ to return a death verdict.”  
The prosecutor did not argue that the jurors were bound by 
social contract to return a death penalty verdict and there is no 
reasonable likelihood the jury understood the prosecutor’s brief 
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comment in this way.  Rather, the prosecutor repeatedly 
reminded the jury its role was to determine whether defendants 
should receive a penalty of death or life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.  For example, the prosecutor 
subsequently observed:  “You’ve heard a lot of evidence.  No 
doubt you have paid great attention to the evidence that you 
have heard.  Never can it be said that the penalty which you 
finally decide that Mr. Travis and Mr. Silveria should receive for 
what they have done here will be something that wasn’t 
considered and reflected on by a jury of twelve who are 
considering all of the factors that the law says they are to 
consider within the scope of the law. . . . Now, when you do 
decide this case, do not decide it on prejudice or whim, but decide 
it upon an extensive moral evaluation of the evidence.”   
Travis contends that the “prosecutor was permitted to 
argue . . . that a death verdict was merely the fulfillment of a 
responsibility resulting from a law passed by the jurors’ fellow 
citizens and affirmed by the courts.”  The prosecutor simply 
urged the jury that if it found after a consideration of the 
evidence that death was the appropriate punishment, it should 
not hesitate to reach that verdict because of a feeling of guilt.   
Travis also contends that the prosecutor argued “that any 
action beyond the least-aggravated murder possible was 
automatically a factor in aggravation of the penalty.”  The 
prosecutor properly argued that certain circumstances of the 
capital crime, such as  defendants’ planning of the robbery and 
murder of Madden by arming themselves and obtaining duct 
tape and gasoline, and their waiting and watching for Madden 
to close the store, made the crime more egregious than a simple 
store robbery.   
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Nor, as Travis asserts, did the prosecutor “unmistakably 
impl[y] criticism of any juror who did not vote for death — 
implying that such jurors were lacking in strength and courage.”  
The prosecutor argued: “The penalty must fit the crime for 
justice to be satisfied and served.  I’m asking you to find that 
under the circumstances of this case justice requires that 
ultimate penalty for the wrongs done here, the imposition of the 
death penalty for Mr. John Travis and for Mr. Daniel 
Silveria. . . . I submit to you that there’s no question that each 
of these men deserve the death penalty for participating in this 
indescribably brutal murder, this crime that we have here.  And 
I submit when you think about it that’s not really the issue if 
you’re honest with yourselves.  The issue is whether you have 
the courage, the strength to do what the law requires, to weigh 
and evaluate and to impose what is required here by the facts 
and circumstances of . . . this horrible crime of what was done to 
this man, Jim Madden, what was done to his family.   
Remember, we as individual members of society have given up 
our right to take the law into our own hands and have entrusted 
the state and our system of justice to apply.  A free society 
requires of its citizens, of its jurors vigilance, courage and 
strength and resolve in making the decision that you’re going to 
have to make here.  What I’m asking you to do is to follow the 
law, consider the evidence and render a just verdict appropriate 
for these men and their crime.”   
The prosecutor simply argued that in his view death was 
the appropriate punishment based on the evidence, and urged 
the jury to adopt this view.  His reference to courage was in 
regard to the difficulty of considering the evidence and making 
a penalty decision.  His comments were different from those we 
criticized as “unfair and unkind” in People v. Williams (1988) 
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45 Cal.3d 1268, 1326, on which Travis relies.  In Williams, the 
prosecutor compared prospective jurors who had been excused 
because they could not decide the issue of penalty to “ ‘people 
who do not take a position in life between good and evil, they are 
bystanders in every type of war we have,’ ” and speculated they 
would “ ‘stand by and watch an innocent person [be] struck down 
because they don’t want to impose themselves in the battle 
between good and evil.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 1325–1326.)  No such 
aspersions were present here. 
The prosecutor stated: “Thankfully because of this process 
of law, of which you have all now become a part, we’re no longer 
a society that’s made up of vigilante justice or lynch mobs crying 
out for vengeance in the streets.”  Travis asserts that by this 
statement “the prosecutor was able to imply that anything less 
than a death verdict would invite a return to vigilante justice 
and lynch mobs,” and that the prosecutor’s argument pertained 
not to “the present crimes or to the backgrounds of the 
perpetrators,” but “equally to every murder, urging the jurors to 
react with a gut emotional revulsion.”  Travis also erroneously 
asserts that the objections by both counsel to the prosecutor’s 
statement were overruled.  They were, in fact, sustained, and 
the court struck the comment and instructed the jury to 
disregard it.  We presume the jury understood and followed 
these instructions.  (Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1178.)   
Travis further contends that “this strong appeal to 
emotion was punctuated by twenty-seven photographs of the 
bloody victim, prominently displayed throughout the argument, 
generating continuing tears from the victim’s widow and 
mother.”  Travis does not identify the 27 exhibits or challenge 
their admission.  On the record page he cites, during a recess, 
Silveria observed that 17 crime scene photographs and five 
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autopsy photographs unveiled during the argument were still on 
display.  Silveria identified 17 of the exhibits.   He asserted:  “At 
the point where those were unveiled Mr. Madden’s widow, 
Shirley [Sissy] Madden, who has been present in the court 
during all of these arguments and his mother, Joan Madden, 
who has also been present for all of these arguments at that 
point in time began to cry.  And I notice that Mrs. Joan Madden 
essentially was crying continuously thereafter right up until 
the . . . beginning of this recess which I believe exacerbates the 
prejudice that was created when the Court admitted some of 
those photographs which I had objected to.”  The court replied:  
“[T]he Court has ruled that all those photographs are 
admissible . . . .  And the fact that they were exposed to the jury 
is perfectly proper in that they are in evidence.  It’s something 
for the jury to consider.”   
Travis asserts no reason why the court’s ruling is 
incorrect.  Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its 
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)  create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  The trial court’s discretion to 
preclude evidence such as crime scene and autopsy photographs 
under Evidence Code section 352 “ ‘is much narrower at the 
penalty phase than at the guilt phase.  This is so because the 
prosecution has the right to establish the circumstances of the 
crime, including its gruesome consequences ([Pen. Code,] 
§ 190.3, factor (a)), and because the risk of an improper guilt 
finding based on visceral reactions is no longer present.’  
[Citations.]  At the penalty phase, the jury ‘is expected to 
subjectively weigh the evidence, and the prosecution is entitled 
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to place the capital offense and the offender in a morally bad 
light.’ ”  (Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 105–106.) 
We have reviewed the murder and autopsy photographs 
identified during the recess.  Although they are graphic and 
unpleasant, they illustrated for the jury the circumstances of the 
crime.  The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding 
their probative value at the penalty retrial was not substantially 
outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice.  
As to the asserted emotional display by Sissy and Joan 
Madden, Travis does not inform us if the matter was addressed 
by the court or claim to have objected below.  Nor does he raise 
a claim regarding spectator conduct on appeal.  Nor does the 
circumstance — standing alone — that these family members 
may have cried demonstrate that allowing the display of the 
photographs during closing argument was erroneous or unduly 
inflammatory.  Indeed, the jury would reasonably anticipate 
that autopsy and crime scene photographs of the murder victim 
might be emotionally upsetting to the victim’s family.  (See 
Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 298 [“the circumstance that 
[the victim’s] mother cried during her [own] testimony does not 
render that testimony inflammatory.  Her tears reflected a 
normal human response to the loss of a child, a response that 
the jury would reasonably expect a mother to experience”].) 
Travis asserts that “[t]his emotional appeal” was 
exacerbated “by a large graphical depiction of the scales of 
justice with a very long list of assertedly aggravating factors on 
one side, arrayed against a mocking abbreviation of the many 
legitimate mitigating factors on the other side.”  We have 
reviewed both this exhibit and the similar exhibit that was used 
by the prosecutor when discussing the evidence regarding 
Silveria.  We conclude the charts’ recitation of the aggravating 
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and mitigating evidence accurately listed the relevant factors 
and was not misleading simply because it broke down in greater 
detail the aggravating factors.  Travis was free to elaborate on 
the mitigating factors during his closing argument or present 
his own chart.  Although he contends he had no “fair 
opportunity” to create his own chart, he points to no place in the 
record where he requested additional time to do so.  Nor, to the 
extent Travis raises this argument, did the “use of a chart 
impl[y] that scales . . . should be used in determining penalty, 
and that the process is one of numerical computation rather 
than evaluation and judgment.”  (People v. Fauber (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 792, 861.)  Rather, “[t]aking the argument as a whole, 
we find it readily apparent that the prosecutor took care to avoid 
any such mechanistic approaches to the sentencing decision.”  
(Ibid.)   
Travis further asserts that the prosecutor’s “emotional 
appeal was punctuated by the dramatic and completely 
unnecessary act of repeatedly firing the stun gun into the air, 
producing a sound and an electrical spark that was far different 
from what would occur when a stun gun was fired at a person.”  
This assertion is not supported by Silveria’s counsel’s statement 
during a recess, on which Travis relies, that the prosecutor had 
“zapped” the stun gun “in the air for approximately one second.”  
Nor, given there was no evidence Travis used the stun gun on 
Madden, is it clear how Travis claims he was prejudiced by this 
demonstration.   
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10.  Additional Asserted Instructional Error  
a. Deliberate and premeditated murder  
Silveria contends that the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury they were free to determine whether he committed a 
deliberate and premeditated murder.  We reject the claim. 
The court instructed the jury:  “The juries that heard the 
guilt portion of the trial determined that Mr. Travis and 
Mr. Silveria were each guilty of murder in the first degree and 
that the special circumstances of murder in the course of 
burglary and in the course of robbery were true.  Those juries 
were not asked to and did not state in their verdicts upon which 
theory they found the murder to be in the first degree.  There is 
no way to know whether the prior juries found the defendants 
guilty of first degree murder on the same theory or on different 
theories, nor is it possible to know if either or both juries found 
the murder to be premeditated or intentional on the part of 
either or both defendants.  It is not necessary that any or all of 
you make a determination as to which theory the defendants are 
guilty of first degree murder.  However, such a determination 
can be made by any or all of you and considered as a 
circumstance of the crime under [f]actor (a).  You are free to 
make that determination for yourselves.”  The court then 
instructed the jury on the theories of premeditated and felony 
murder.   
Silveria contends that under this “erroneous instruction, 
one or all of the second penalty phase jurors could have 
improperly concluded that [Silveria] committed a deliberate and 
premeditated murder by a lesser standard than” beyond a 
reasonable doubt, “or no standard at all; then sentenced him to 
death since such a murder increased his culpability.”  As the 
People note, Silveria requested this instruction because he was 
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concerned the penalty retrial jury would assume he had been 
found guilty of premeditated murder.  He also agreed to the trial 
court’s modification of his proposed instruction.  Having done so, 
he cannot now complain that the instruction was given.  (Powell, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 170 [the “asserted error was invited by his 
counsel’s own request”]; People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 
157 [“Because any error was invited by the defense, it cannot 
now be asserted as a basis for relief”].)  
Moreover, the instruction did not affect Silveria’s 
substantial rights.  It is well settled that the guilt phase jury is 
not required to agree on a theory of first degree murder.  
(People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1048.)  In addition, “[a] 
defendant’s culpable mental state may be considered a 
circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).” 
(People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 802, fn. 18 (Dykes).)  
Here, it was not known on what theory the guilt phase jury had 
convicted Silveria of first degree murder.  Yet, “[e]ven when the 
verdict is based upon a felony-murder theory, it is appropriate 
to consider any apparent premeditation on the part of the 
defendant as an aggravating circumstance of the crime.”  (Id. at 
pp. 802–803, fn. 18, italics added; see id. at p. 802 [“a jury that 
has convicted a defendant of first degree murder on the basis of 
a felony-murder theory may consider, as part of its evaluation of 
the defendant’s culpability and its moral and normative decision 
concerning the appropriate penalty, the defendant’s state of 
mind with respect to the murder — that is, whether the 
defendant also intended to kill or acted with malice 
aforethought”].) 
 
Contrary 
to 
Silveria’s 
contention, 
in 
considering evidence of Silveria’s state of mind, the penalty 
retrial jury was not determining whether he committed murder, 
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a fact already conclusively found beyond a reasonable doubt by 
the guilt phase jury.   
b. CALJIC No. 8.84.1  
Silveria contends that the trial court erroneously failed to 
instruct the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 to 
“[d]isregard all other instructions given to you in other phases 
of this trial.”  Such an instruction would have been mystifying 
to the jury given it had only served at the penalty retrial and 
was not familiar with the instructions given at the other trial 
phases.   
11. Asserted Judicial Misconduct 
Silveria contends that the trial court’s unjustified abuse 
and unequal treatment of his defense counsel, Geoffrey Braun, 
combined with erroneous legal rulings, violated his rights under 
the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution.  We reject the claim.   
Silveria cites to more than 65 different colloquies in the 
314 volumes of the reporter’s transcript for this case to support 
his claim that the trial court “engaged in a pattern of overt 
judicial hostility toward” Braun, but treated the prosecutor with 
courtesy.  Nineteen of the challenged colloquies are from the 
first penalty phase.  As Silveria acknowledges, he suffered no 
possible prejudice from any assumed misconduct at the first 
penalty phase because the jury hung as to penalty.   
Most of the remaining challenged colloquies were not 
made in the presence of either the guilt phase jury or the penalty 
retrial jury, but at hearings held outside the presence of the 
jury.  Therefore they could not have prejudiced either jury’s view 
of Braun or Silveria.  In addition, for many of the challenged 
colloquies, Silveria simply recites what was said during the 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
178 
 
exchange, and makes no effort to explain how the exchange 
constitutes judicial misconduct.  As Silveria acknowledges, “a 
trial judge has the discretion to rebuke an attorney when that 
attorney askes inappropriate questions, ignores the court’s 
instructions, or otherwise engages in improper conduct.”   
For others, Silveria simply disputes the trial court’s ruling 
on an objection or motion, but does not explain how any assumed 
legal error constituted judicial misconduct.  “[A] judge’s ‘rulings 
against a party — even when erroneous — do not establish a 
charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to 
review.’ ”28   (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 798.)   
For the vast majority of the challenged colloquies Silveria 
did not object on the grounds of judicial misconduct, no 
exception to the general requirement of an objection applies, and 
the claim as to these instances is therefore forfeited.  (People v. 
Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1220.)  We discuss below two 
colloquies in which he did object.  Although “a failure to object 
to judicial misconduct does not preclude appellate review when 
an objection could not have cured the prejudice or would have 
been 
futile” 
(ibid.), 
Silveria 
fails 
to 
demonstrate 
circumstances — such as a trial court’s numerous “sua sponte 
objections” to questions posed by defense counsel and 
                                        
28 
Indeed, we have already addressed and rejected above 
Silveria’s claim that the trial court erroneously allowed the 
prosecutor to introduce “highly prejudicial evidence of an 
attempted murder by a notorious prison gang,” noting no 
reference to the Nuestra Familia prison gang was made before 
the jury, but rather was only mentioned by Travis’s counsel 
during a bench conference.  (See ante, pt. II.B.4.g.)  Given the 
evidence was never introduced or even mentioned in front of the 
jury, it also provides no factual predicate for a claim of judicial 
misconduct or bias.   
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
179 
 
“derogatory comments” to counsel and defense witnesses — that 
would have made his objections futile (People v. Sturm (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237 (Sturm); see id. at p. 1233).  
Moreover, we have reviewed the challenged portions of the 
record and conclude Silveria’s claim as to each instance is 
meritless.  The record indicates the trial judge was engaged, 
thoughtful, and occasionally abrupt with each party’s counsel 
during this lengthy trial when it appeared counsel was 
exceeding 
appropriate 
boundaries. 
 
Silveria 
“fails 
to 
demonstrate any judicial misconduct or bias, let alone 
misconduct or bias that was ‘so prejudicial that it deprived 
defendant of “ ‘a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 533.)   
a. Madden’s shirt 
Before the penalty retrial, Silveria moved to exclude as an 
exhibit the bloody shirt Madden had been wearing at the time 
of the murder.  The court ruled that the shirt was admissible 
and not unduly prejudicial, noting “it can be displayed to the 
jury, but as soon as the witness is through testifying about the 
shirt . . . [it] should be taken down.”   
At 
the 
penalty 
retrial, 
the 
prosecutor 
asked 
Dr. Pakdaman, the pathologist who had performed Madden’s 
autopsy, about Madden’s shirt.  Silveria asked for an offer of 
proof “as to what relevant evidence . . . can be provided by the 
shirt.”  At sidebar, the prosecutor explained the shirt was 
relevant to the pathologist’s stab wound testimony, and after 
hearing argument, the court overruled Silveria’s objection.  The 
pathologist resumed testifying about the shirt, and when he was 
asked by the prosecutor about a wound with a different track 
than the others, Silveria again unsuccessfully objected that the 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
180 
 
shirt testimony was irrelevant and sought to have it struck and 
the shirt covered.   
Soon after, the prosecutor stated he had no further 
questions about the shirt, and said, “If Mr. Braun wishes to 
cover it up, that would be fine.”  Braun replied, “Well, I would 
ask that the person who uncovered it cover it.”  The court said, 
“Cross-examination, Mr. Leininger?”  The prosecutor said, “I 
[still] had a couple of questions regarding the throat.  I had 
nothing about the shirt.  I was just deferring to Mr. Braun if he 
wishes to cover it.”  Braun replied, “Is Mr. Rico suggesting, Your 
Honor, that I go up there and —”  The court said:  “Oh, come on, 
people.  Why don’t we just cover the shirt.  I don’t believe it.  I 
really don’t believe it.”  Braun said, “I don’t either.”  The court 
replied, “Mr. Braun, why don’t you just be quiet.  Thank you.”  
The prosecutor continued his direct examination.   
Later that same day, during Travis’s cross-examination of 
Dr. Pakdaman, Travis’s counsel Leininger responded to an 
objection by the prosecutor by stating:  “Well, the victim wasn’t 
responding to me.  I don’t mean the victim.  The witness.”  The 
prosecutor said, “The victim won’t respond in this case.”  The 
court said, “Let’s get on with it.”   
At the next recess, outside the presence of the jury, 
Silveria moved for a mistrial.  Braun stated:  “I object to the fact 
that the shirt was shown to the jury and move for a mistrial on 
that ground . . . . I also object to the way the Court treated me 
when the subject of covering the shirt up again arose. . . . In the 
course of that colloquy in which I think my behavior was entirely 
appropriate the Court in the presence of the jury told me to be 
quiet which I thought was demeaning to me and harmful to the 
defense generally in how that whole thing appeared to the jury.  
I object to that and join that to the exposure of the shirt itself in 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
181 
 
my motion for a mistrial.”  Braun also moved for a mistrial on 
the basis of the prosecutor’s comment that “ ‘the victim won’t 
respond 
either[,]’ 
or 
words 
to 
that 
effect,” 
when 
“Mr. Leininger . . . accidently referred to Dr. Pakdaman who 
was the witness as ‘the victim.’ ”   
The court denied the mistrial motion, noting:  “As far as 
the Court telling you to sit down, Mr. Braun, it’s not the first 
time the Court has had to do that because you’re a very slow 
learner.  As far as the shirt being re-covered up, it was your 
motion to have it covered up or to cover it up and your 
conversations directly with Mr. Rico w[ere] completely 
improper, as you should know.”   
The court continued:  “Now, apparently we’re dealing with 
a kindergarten class here by the three of you and I’m not at all 
happy with any of you.  So therefore we have to treat you like 
kindergartners.  And if I have to do it in front of the jury, by 
God, I will.  I would expect this from some of the newer attorneys 
in this county, but not from you three.  You’ve been around long 
enough.  Thou shalt not continue to argue a point or objection 
after the Court has ruled.  Thou shalt not address each other 
directly, only through the Court.  Apparently you can’t do it 
civilly.  Thou shalt not interrupt an attorney during the 
attorney’s argument.  Thou shalt not make snide, catty or cheap 
remarks whether under thy breath or not.  Thou shalt not 
interrupt a witness when the witness is answering thy 
questions.  And any violation of these orders will result[] in thou 
paying the coffers of the general fund of this county.  Does 
everybody understand that?”   
Silveria claims the court’s comments demonstrate the 
court’s “persistent[,] uneven treatment of Braun.”  The record is 
otherwise.  It indicates that in front of the jury, the trial court 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
182 
 
reprimanded both parties about their inappropriate comments 
regarding who would cover the shirt.  The court only focused on 
Braun after he said he shared the court’s disbelief at the 
attorneys’ conduct and thus appeared to be minimizing his own 
culpability.   
Likewise, in denying Silveria’s mistrial motion outside the 
jury’s presence, the court largely directed its conduct 
admonition to all counsel.  Although the court observed it had 
previously had to tell Braun to sit down, and that Braun was a 
slow learner, these comments, albeit a bit intemperate, fall well 
short of demonstrating judicial misconduct.  (See Sturm, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 1233 [A “ ‘trial court commits misconduct if it 
persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to 
defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the 
impression that it is allying itself with the prosecution’ ”].)  
Indeed, Braun seemed unwilling to accept the court’s ruling 
with respect to the bloody shirt.  Even though Silveria’s pretrial 
in limine motion to exclude the shirt had been denied, during 
the pathologist’s direct examination about the shirt at the 
penalty retrial Braun unsuccessfully objected at sidebar to 
admission of the shirt and then later moved to strike all 
testimony about the shirt.   
Nor does the court’s denial of Silveria’s mistrial motion on 
the ground that the prosecutor had made an inappropriate 
comment to Travis’s counsel that the victim would not respond 
demonstrate bias toward Braun or constitute judicial 
misconduct.  As noted, the court has broad discretion in ruling 
on a mistrial motion, and though the prosecutor’s statement in 
front of the jury was inappropriate, the court could reasonably 
conclude its comment, “Let’s get on with it,” adequately 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
183 
 
addressed the prosecutor’s gratuitous aside.  (See Collins, supra, 
49 Cal.4th at p. 198; see ante, pt. II.B.6.)   
b. Indirect contempt 
During a recess in the prosecutor’s cross-examination of 
Travis, Travis’s counsel requested leave to interrupt the cross-
examination so that defense expert Dr. Cermak could testify.  
The prosecutor, Mr. Rico, unsuccessfully opposed the motion.   
After the recess, and before the jury was brought in, the 
court stated:  “Mr. Braun, regarding your indirect contempt that 
you weren’t able to accomplish here after the Court took the 
recess this morning in your behavior regarding Mr. Rico, your 
laughing, your taunting him, as far as I’m concerned — you don’t 
need to answer this, Mr. Braun.  Just have a seat because I am 
not going to hear — I am not —”   Braun interjected, “I feel I do.”  
The court replied, “I am not going to hear an answer from you, 
Mr. Braun.  If you don’t sit down[,] I will hold you in direct 
contempt, do you understand that?”  Braun began, “I feel — ”  
The court said:  “And the deputy will sit you down; do you 
understand?  Now do it now.  As far as I’m concerned, you’re all 
acting like children.  Why don’t you all try being professional?  
If there’s any further acting out like this the offending party will 
be banned from the courtroom during any recess.”  Braun 
replied, “Your Honor, there was acting out, but it wasn’t by me.”   
The following day, during a recess that the court had told 
the jury would last “about 15 minutes,” the court reminded 
Braun he had earlier indicated he wanted to put something on 
the record.  Braun stated:  “I’m still very upset over what 
occurred . . . yesterday afternoon when the Court indicated that 
I was in indirect contempt . . . . I think that the Court owes me 
an apology for accusing me of the indirect contempt in the 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
184 
 
manner in which the Court did and I would ask permission now 
to put the matter on the record as to what in fact did happen, 
then there w[ere] other things that I needed to follow through 
with.”   
The court replied:  “Follow-up.  Do the other things then.  
We’re not going to hear this.”  Braun then engaged in a lengthy 
argument asserting that he was treated differently from other 
counsel in the case because the court “almost invariably” did not 
permit him to make a record or complete his arguments, and 
had “demonstrated overt hostility toward” Braun “in open court 
throughout this trial” and “at the bench . . . simply for making 
arguments that ought to be made by any counsel who is 
zealously representing his client. . . .  I thought that the Court 
treated me very badly in the manner of my calling Dr. Kormos 
as a witness.”   
The court replied: “What are you talking about?  Would 
you explain that a little bit more.”  Braun said that he was 
referring to when, during Dr. Kormos’s testimony, the court had 
“essentially castigat[ed] me and blam[ed] me in a very angry and 
what I perceived as a hostile tone of voice for simply calling my 
witness.”  Braun continued, asserting that “the whole 
atmosphere in this court is very intimidating to me,” “the Court 
has been very one-sided against the defense, and me in 
particular,” and citing as the “worst example . . . when only I got 
castigated for indirect contempt” the day before.  He moved for 
a mistrial.   
The court replied:  “That motion is denied.  Anything that 
has come to you, Mr. Braun, you brought upon yourself. . . . 
[T]he Court has a duty to control a proceeding.  Now, the 
problem arises when counsel continue to argue objections and 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
185 
 
argue with the Court after the Court has ruled. . . . Counsel 
continues to argue, and Mr. Braun unfortunately is the biggest 
offender of this in the Court’s eyes.  I think the record will show 
many times where the Court has had to tell Mr. Braun to please 
be quiet, to shut up, or whatever, because the Court has ruled, 
and Mr. Braun insists on going further and further and pushing 
the envelope further and further.”   
No judicial misconduct or bias is demonstrated.  Although 
the court did not fully describe on the record Braun’s 
objectionable recess behavior, it appears Braun had acted 
inappropriately by appearing to visibly taunt the prosecutor 
when the prosecutor unsuccessfully opposed Travis’s motion to 
allow Dr. Cermak to testify out of order.  The court therefore 
reprimanded Braun, and told all counsel they were acting like 
children, and that such visible taunting would not be tolerated.  
The court could reasonably be of the view there was little Braun 
could say to ameliorate his observed conduct, and decline to hear 
argument on the matter.  The court’s language may have been 
intemperate, but it was outside the presence of the jury and an 
effort by the court to control what it perceived to be 
inappropriate conduct by counsel.  The following day, when 
during a recess scheduled to last 15 minutes Braun moved for a 
mistrial based on not only this interaction but on broad 
generalizations regarding the court’s treatment of him 
throughout the trial, the court listened patiently and allowed 
Braun to speak at length.   
Silveria asserts:  “Not every example amounts to 
misconduct independently, nor does each necessarily involve an 
erroneous legal ruling.  But together they tend to illustrate the 
demeaning and hostile attitude [the trial court] displayed 
toward Braun.”  We conclude that Silveria has failed to 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
186 
 
demonstrate any individual instance of judicial bias or 
misconduct, nor are the challenged colloquies cumulatively 
prejudicial.   
12. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute  
Defendants contend California’s death penalty statute 
and implementing instructions are constitutionally invalid in 
numerous respects.  We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, 
and defendants provide no persuasive reason to revisit our 
decisions.   
“[T]he 
California 
death 
penalty 
statute 
is 
not 
impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court.”  (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 813.)  
We further “reject the claim that section 190.3, factor (a), on its 
face or as interpreted and applied, permits arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of a sentence of death.”  (Ibid.; see 
Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975–976, 978.)   
Defendants claim that the failure to require the jury 
unanimously find true the aggravating factors relied on violates 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
federal Constitution.  We have previously rejected this claim.   
(Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1235; People v. Casares (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 808 853–854.)  Nor does the death penalty statute 
“lack safeguards to avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing, 
deprive defendant[s] of the right to a jury trial, or constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment on the ground that it does not 
require . . . findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, 
factor (b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (Rangel, at p. 1235.)  “Nothing in 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
187 
 
Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. ___ [193 L.Ed.2d 504, 136 S.Ct. 
616], Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 
L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856], Blakely v. Washington (2004) 
542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531], Ring v. Arizona[ 
(2002)] 536 U.S. 584, or Apprendi v. New Jersey [, supra,] 
530 U.S. 466 . . . , affects our conclusions in this regard.”  
(Rangel, at p. 1235; see id. at p. 1235, fn. 16.)   
Silveria alternatively claims that the “jury should have 
been instructed that there was no burden of proof.”  In fact, the 
trial court here instructed the jury that “there is no burden of 
proof in a penalty phase” other than for evidence of 
unadjudicated “criminal activity involving force or violence or 
the threat thereof under Factor (b) or any prior felony conviction 
under Factor (c)” which “must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Silveria also claims that the instructions erroneously 
failed to inform the jury that a finding a mitigating 
circumstance was true need not be unanimous.  But again here 
the court instructed the jury it need not be unanimous in finding 
the “existence or truth” of a mitigating factor.   
The trial court need not instruct that there is a 
presumption of life, or that if the mitigating factors outweigh 
the aggravating factors the jury should return a verdict of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  (People v. 
Williams (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1204; People v. Adams (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 541, 581.)  The trial court was not required to delete 
inapplicable factors from CALJIC No. 8.85 (People v. Watson 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 701), or “instruct that the jury can 
consider certain statutory factors only in mitigation”  (People v. 
Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311).  “Written findings by the 
jury during the penalty phase are not constitutionally required, 
and their absence does not deprive [a] defendant of meaningful 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
188 
 
appellate review.”  (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 
1097.)  “A prosecutor’s discretion to select those eligible cases in 
which the death penalty is sought does not offend the federal or 
state Constitution.”  (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 
1098.)  Nor does such discretion “create a constitutionally 
impermissible risk of arbitrary outcomes that differ from county 
to county.”  (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1224.)   
“The language ‘ “so substantial” ’ and ‘warrants’ ” in 
CALJIC No. 8.88 “is not impermissibly vague.”  (People v. 
Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 56.)  “Use of the adjectives 
‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g) is 
constitutional.”  (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 57.)   
“The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and 
equal protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment 
[citations], do not require intercase proportionality review on 
appeal.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1057.)  We do 
perform intracase review, but Travis does not request such 
review here.  (See People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 125.)  
“ ‘[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated 
and therefore may be treated differently without violating’ a 
defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws, due process of 
law, or freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.”  (People v. 
Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 971.)  
Travis’s citation to statistics not based on the record, “even 
if properly before us, do[es] not establish that our review of 
defendant’s appeal specifically, or of all automatic appeals in 
general, has been affected by ‘political considerations,’ resulting 
in a denial of his right to due process.  (SeePeople v. Kipp (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 1100, 1140–1141 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450].)”  
(People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 732.)  “One under 
judgment of death does not suffer cruel and unusual 
PEOPLE v. SILVERIA and TRAVIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
189 
 
punishment by the inherent delays in resolving his appeal.”  
(People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 677.)  “ ‘The death 
penalty as applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional 
through operation of international law and treaties.’ ”  (People v. 
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 373.)   
13. Cumulative Prejudice  
Defendants contend the cumulative effect of penalty phase 
error requires us to reverse the death judgments.  We have 
found error, but no prejudice, in the trial court’s instruction to 
certain penalty retrial prospective jurors in the language of 
CALJIC No. 1.00.  (See ante, pt. II.B.7.b.)  Likewise, we have 
assumed error but found no prejudice in other claims raised by 
defendants.  We further conclude that this error and the 
assumed 
errors 
are 
not 
prejudicial 
when 
considered 
cumulatively.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons above, we affirm the judgments.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Silveria and Travis 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S062417  
Date Filed:  August 13, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior     
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Hugh Mullin III  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointments by the Supreme Court,  
John Fresquez, Timothy Foley, Jessica K. McGuire and Kristin Traicoff, Deputy State Public Defenders, 
for Defendant and Appellant Daniel Todd Silveria.   
 
Mark E. Cutler, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant John Raymond 
Travis.   
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre and Arthur 
P. Beever, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Timothy Foley 
Deputy State Public Defender 
770 L Street, Suite 1000 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Mark E. Cutler 
P.O. Box 172 
Cool, CA 95614-0172 
(530) 885-7718 
 
Arthur P. Beever 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-3664 
(415) 510-3761