Title: Morrow v. Morrow
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 382, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RAYMOND MORROW, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 382, 2005      
 
Petitioner Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Family Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
MARY JO MORROW, now known  § 
as  Mary Jo Krysziak, 
§ 
File No. CN02-09725 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Respondent Below, § 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 1, 2006 
 
 
Decided: 
February 28, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 28th day of February 2006, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. Raymond Morrow (“Husband”) appeals from a Family Court Order 
denying his motion to vacate an order that dismissed its ancillary jurisdiction over 
a property division between Husband and Mary Jo Morrow (now Krysziak) 
(“Wife”). 
 
2. Husband contends that the Family Court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to vacate the order dismissing ancillary jurisdiction because 
Husband demonstrated “excusable neglect” justifying relief under Family Court 
 
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Civil Rule 60(b)(1).  Wife responds that Husband did not demonstrate excusable 
neglect, and that Husband has not shown that the outcome would be different if his 
motion were granted, as required by Rule 60(b)(1). 
 
3. We conclude that Husband satisfied the requirements for relief under 
Rule 60(b)(1), and that the Family Court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion.  We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to Family 
Court. 
 
4. On February 13, 2003, Husband and Wife divorced after about seven 
years of marriage.  Both Husband and Wife are retired.  Husband is in his eighties 
and suffers from physical disabilities.  Before they were married, Husband and 
Wife signed a pre-nuptial agreement in which each disavowed any rights in 
property owned by the other party, unless either made a financial contribution to 
the property.  On that basis, the real estate became marital property and was 
subject to division. 
 
5. At the time of the divorce decree, ancillary jurisdiction was retained for 
the purpose of property division.1  The parties filed pre-trial financial reports and 
conducted a pre-trial conference.  A trial date was set for March 1, 2004, but the 
Family Court set that date aside and raised, sua sponte, the issue of whether Wife’s 
counsel had a conflict of interest because he had represented Wife during the 
                                          
 
1 Pursuant to 13 Del. C. §§ 1507 and 1513 (2005). 
 
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refinancing of certain marital real estate.  A new trial date was set for February 5, 
2005.  The conflict of interest issue was not resolved, but during a teleconference, 
the parties agreed, and the Family Court determined, that the matter could be tried 
on a set of stipulated facts.  Those stipulated facts were to be filed on or before 
April 28, 2005.   
 
6. Husband and Wife, after negotiations, could not agree on a set of 
stipulated facts, and it was apparent to both sides that the April 28, 2005 deadline 
would be missed.  Husband’s counsel drafted a letter advising the Family Court of 
the delay, but the letter was not sent.  No explanation was given for the attorney’s 
omission.  Husband’s counsel was involved in several cases through the week of 
May 23, 2005, and Husband and Wife continued to negotiate on the stipulated facts 
after the April 28 deadline.   
 
7. On May 5, 2005, the Family Court entered an Order vacating its 
retention of ancillary jurisdiction for the division of property.  Husband filed a 
motion to vacate that Order on June 13, 2005.   The Family Court denied 
Husband’s motion on June 23, 2005.     
 
8. A decision to reopen a default judgment under Rule 60(b) rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court.2  Under Rule 60(b)(1), the Family Court may 
                                          
 
2 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 595 A.2d 385, 389 (Del. 1991) (citing Battaglia v. Wilmington Sav. Fund 
Soc’y, 379 A.2d 1132 (Del. 1977)).   
 
 
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relieve a party from a default judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect.”3  To show excusable neglect, the conduct of the party must 
have been that of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.4     
 
9. To further the policy of favoring a hearing on the merits over the entry 
of a default judgment,5 Rule 60(b) is afforded a liberal construction, resolving any 
doubts in favor of the moving party.6  To determine whether the Family Court has 
abused its discretion under Rule 60(b), this Court considers two factors:  (1) 
whether the moving party has shown that the outcome of the action would be 
different if the motion were granted; and (2) whether substantial prejudice would 
be caused to the non-moving party if the motion were granted.7 
 
10. The sole issue on this appeal is whether the Family Court erred in 
denying Husband’s motion to vacate under Rule 60(b)(1).  The claim is that 
Husband demonstrated excusable neglect, by his attorney, in failing to meet the 
deadline for submitting the stipulated facts.  Wife argues that carelessness on the 
part of Husband’s counsel does not constitute excusable neglect. 
                                          
 
3 FAM. CT. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) (2005).   
 
4 Donohue v. Donohue, 2005 WL 1421023, at **1 (Del. Supr. Jun. 16, 2005).   
 
5 Harper v. Harper, 826 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. 2003). 
 
6 Ross v. Ross, 1994 WL 590494, at *2 (Del. Supr. Oct. 11, 1994). 
 
7 Id.   
 
 
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11. Carelessness and negligence do not automatically constitute excusable 
neglect.8  Rather, there must be a valid reason given for the neglect in light of the 
surrounding circumstances.9  The inquiry becomes whether the behavior by 
Husband’s counsel was excusable given the totality of the circumstances.  In other 
words, the test is whether the actions were those of a reasonably prudent person.10   
 
12. We conclude that Husband’s counsel’s behavior was that of a 
reasonably prudent person in the totality of the circumstances, for the following 
reasons.  First, the parties were ready to proceed to trial but were delayed on two 
occasions.  Second, both parties knew that they had not reached an agreement, and 
would miss the deadline to submit the stipulated facts, but there is no evidence that 
Wife informed the Family Court of that fact.  Third, Husband’s counsel was busy 
with several other matters before the Family Court dismissed the ancillary 
jurisdiction.  Upon receiving notice of the Family Court’s Order vacating ancillary 
jurisdiction, Husband’s counsel realized his error and promptly moved under Rule 
60(b) to vacate that order.   
                                          
 
8 See Model Finance Co. v. Barton, 188 A.2d 233, 235 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963). 
 
9 See Cohen v. Brandywine Raceway Assoc., 238 A.2d 320, 325 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968). 
 
10  Donohue, 2005 WL 1421023, at **1. 
 
 
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13. The Family Court cited Donohue v. Donohue11 to support its denial of 
Husband’s motion.  Husband argues that Donohue is distinguishable because here, 
unlike Donohue, Husband had complied with all deadlines set by the Court save 
one, had filed pre-trial reports, had participated in pre-trial conferences, and on two 
occasions was prepared to proceed to trial.   
 
14. In Donohue, the husband delayed filing a financial report for 3 months 
and then argued excusable neglect by blaming the wife’s counsel’s move to a 
different law firm.12  This Court found the husband’s argument unpersuasive, 
because husband’s counsel had wife’s counsel’s new address, and because a 
reasonably prudent person would not have delayed for 3 months to file the 
financial report.13  In this case, Husband and Wife had not agreed on the stipulated 
facts and they both knew that the deadline was going to be missed.  This case is 
distinguishable from Donohue because of the continuing negotiation of the parties, 
the fact that Husband’s counsel had drafted (although not sent) a letter to inform 
the Family Court of the delay, and the compliance by Husband with all other 
previous deadlines.  In these circumstances, the neglect of Husband’s counsel was 
excusable.   
                                          
 
11 2005 WL 1421023 (Del. Supr. June 16, 2005). 
 
12 Id. at **2. 
 
13 Id. 
 
 
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15. Wife also argues that Husband has not shown that the outcome of the 
matter would be different if his motion were granted.  To make such a showing, the 
moving party must establish a meritorious defense to the underlying action.14  Wife 
argues that the dispute involves rights to a Rehoboth property that Wife purchased 
before marriage, not marital property under the prenuptial agreement.  Husband 
responds that he provided consideration for the Rehoboth property and is able to 
produce cancelled checks to support his contention.  Therefore, (Husband claims) 
he has a meritorious claim that the property is marital property and subject to 
division.   
 
16. In our view, Husband has presented a meritorious claim for Rule 60 
purposes.  What is involved is a factual dispute over the intentions and actions of 
the parties that at this procedural stage should be resolved in favor of allowing 
Husband’s claim to be heard.   
 
17. Given the liberal policy of favoring a trial upon the merits and the 
absence of any showing of prejudice to Wife, the Family Court abused its 
discretion in denying Husband’s motion to vacate the order dismissing ancillary 
jurisdiction. 
                                          
 
14 Battaglia, 379 A.2d at 1135. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED. 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
                      
 
 
 
 
       Justice