Title: Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales
Citation: 2014 WI 66
Docket Number: 2012AP000183
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2014

2014 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP183   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Randy L. Betz, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Diamond Jim's Auto Sales, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 344 Wis. 2d 681, 825 N.W.2d 508 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2012 WI App 131  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Maxine A. White 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Lawrence J. Drabot, Sara C. Mills, and Crivello Carlson, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Lawrence J. Drabot. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Timothy 
J. Aiken, Vincent P. Megna, Susan M. Grzeskowiak, and Aiken & 
Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Susan Grzeskowiak 
and Timothy J. Aiken. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP183 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV2883) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Randy L. Betz, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Diamond Jim's Auto Sales, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
decision of the court of appeals, Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto 
Sales, 2012 WI App 131, 344 Wis. 2d 681, 825 N.W.2d 508, 
reversing an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court1 denying 
a motion by the attorneys representing Randy L. Betz ("Betz") to 
recover statutory attorney's fees from Diamond Jim's Auto Sales 
("Diamond Jim's"). 
¶2 
In 
this 
case 
we 
are 
asked 
to 
determine 
the 
circumstances under which plaintiff's counsel may recover 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Maxine A. White presided. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
2 
 
statutory attorney's fees directly from a defendant when, 
without counsel's knowledge or approval, the plaintiff and 
defendant enter into a settlement agreement that does not 
address attorney's fees. 
¶3 
Betz hired Milwaukee attorney Vincent Megna ("Megna") 
to represent him in his dispute with Diamond Jim's.2  Megna filed 
a lawsuit on Betz's behalf under two fee-shifting statutes.  
During the litigation, Betz and Diamond Jim's met and settled 
the case without their attorneys' knowledge or approval.  The 
settlement agreement did not reference payment of Megna's 
statutory attorney's fees.  Subsequently, Megna filed a motion 
with the circuit court seeking to recover his statutory fees 
from Diamond Jim's.  The circuit court denied Megna's motion.  
The court of appeals reversed, citing public policy concerns 
with enforcing settlements made "behind the backs" of the 
attorneys in cases brought under fee-shifting statutes. 
¶4 
Diamond Jim's argues that the right to recover 
statutory attorney's fees belonged to Betz, and that Betz did 
not assign his right to recover those fees to Megna.  As a 
result, Diamond Jim's argues that Megna cannot recover fees 
directly from Diamond Jim's.  Further, Diamond Jim's argues that 
public 
policy 
encourages 
parties 
to 
settle 
disputes 
and 
                                                 
2 Several attorneys with the law firm of Aiken & Scoptur, 
S.C., including Megna, worked on Betz's case.  All these 
attorneys seek to recover statutory attorney's fees from Diamond 
Jim's.  For the sake of simplicity, this opinion will refer only 
to Megna. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
3 
 
requiring counsel's consent to such settlements in fee-shifting 
cases presents a conflict of interest. 
¶5 
Megna argues that Betz did assign his statutory right 
to 
recover 
attorney's 
fees, 
and 
that 
the 
public 
policy 
underlying fee-shifting statutes would be undermined if clients 
were allowed to settle fee-shifting cases without ensuring 
payment of statutory attorney's fees.  Megna further asserts 
that attorney involvement and consent to settlement agreements 
in fee-shifting cases will not serve as a barrier to settlement. 
¶6 
We conclude that the statutory right to recover 
attorney's fees belonged to Betz, and that Betz did not assign 
his right to recover those fees to Megna in their fee agreement.  
Because we conclude that Betz did not assign his right to 
recover statutory attorney's fees to Megna, we must conclude 
that Diamond Jim's could not have had notice of the assignment.  
As a result, we conclude that Megna may not seek statutory 
attorney's fees directly from Diamond Jim's, and that the 
settlement agreement entered into between Diamond Jim's and Betz 
is clear, unambiguous, and enforceable.  We therefore reverse 
the court of appeals. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
On October 19, 2009, Betz purchased a 1999 Cadillac 
Escalade from Diamond Jim's.  Betz paid $8,705.98 for the 
vehicle, including sales tax, title, and license fee.  Over the 
following months, Betz experienced problems with the vehicle, 
which 
Diamond 
Jim's 
was 
unable 
to 
address 
to 
Betz's 
satisfaction. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
4 
 
¶8 
On February 12, 2010, Betz hired Megna to represent 
him in his dispute with Diamond Jim's.  The terms of the fee 
agreement3 between Betz and Megna provided, in relevant part: 
I understand that I do not have to pay any attorney 
fees unless my attorneys recover money for me in this 
case. 
FEE SHIFTING 
I understand that Sec. 100.18, Wis. Stats., __________ 
is a fee[-]shifting statute.  This means if I win at 
trial or settle my case during litigation, the 
defendant 
is 
usually 
responsible 
for 
paying 
my 
attorney fees based on my attorney's hourly rate.  I 
understand that the Law Offices of Vince Megna is 
accepting my case with the agreement that it will look 
to the defendant for payment of attorney fees pursuant 
to the fee[-]shifting provision once a lawsuit has 
been filed. 
. . . . 
SETTLEMENT PRIOR TO LAWSUIT 
If a settlement is reached prior to a lawsuit being 
filed in my case, I understand that the defendant may 
not be responsible for payment of my attorney fees.  
In this event, the Law Offices of Vince Megna agrees 
to charge a flat rate attorney fee in the amount of 
______. 
COSTS AND EXPENSES 
I understand that the Law Offices of Vince Megna will 
need to pay costs and expenses.  In the event my case 
is lost through no fault of my own, I understand that 
the Law Offices [of] Vince Megna will not bring a 
claim against me for these costs and expenses. 
                                                 
3 The fee agreement referenced "The Law Offices of Vince 
Megna" rather than Megna's firm, Aiken & Scoptur.  The parties 
have not addressed the impact, if any, of this distinction, and 
we therefore ignore it for purposes of this opinion. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
5 
 
I understand that if I do not accept a settlement that 
my attorneys deem reasonable and my case continues 
without settlement, I will be required to immediately 
reimburse the Law Offices of Vince Megna for all costs 
and expenses paid up until that point and then be 
responsible to pay all further costs and expenses as 
same become due. 
TERMINATION 
I understand that my attorney has the right to 
"terminate" me as a client.  The Law Offices of Vince 
Megna will be entitled to fees for the work done at 
its hourly rate and its costs, not to exceed 33 1/3% 
of my gross recovery. 
I understand that I have a right to terminate my 
attorneys.  However, if I do so, I will be responsible 
for the Law Offices of Vince Megna fees and costs due 
on the date of termination, not to exceed 33 1/3% of 
my gross recovery. 
(bolding omitted) (all blanks in original). 
¶9 
On March 1, 2010, Betz sued Diamond Jim's in Milwaukee 
County 
Circuit 
Court. 
 
Betz 
asserted 
claims 
for 
false 
advertising, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 100.18 
(2009-10),4 
intentional 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
and 
violations 
of 
automobile dealership regulations, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0116.  In addition to compensatory and punitive damages, 
Betz also claimed "actual attorney's fees" from Diamond Jim's 
under fee-shifting statutes §§ 100.18(11)(b)2.5 and 218.0163(2).6 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2. provides, in relevant 
part: 
Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a 
violation of this section by any other person may sue 
in any court of competent jurisdiction and shall 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
6 
 
¶10 On May 17, 2010, Megna, on behalf of Betz, made a 
settlement 
offer 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 807.01. 
 
The 
settlement offer sought $10,750 in damages and $5,900 in 
attorney's fees.  The offer stated that the check for attorney's 
fees should be made payable to Megna's firm.  Diamond Jim's 
rejected this offer through counsel. 
¶11 On September 28, 2010, counsel for Diamond Jim's made 
a counter-offer to settle the case by repurchasing the vehicle 
and paying $2,000 towards Betz's attorney's fees.  Megna, on 
behalf of Betz, rejected this offer. 
¶12 On April 4, 2011, Betz and Thomas Letizia ("Letizia"), 
the general manager of Diamond Jim's, met without counsel and 
settled the case.  The settlement agreement provided, in 
relevant part: 
The 
purpose 
of 
this 
Agreement 
is 
the 
Amicable 
Resolution of the Action without the need for further 
litigation, the relinquishment by each of the parties 
of any claim or cause of action arising from or 
relating to the issues in the Action, and the mutual 
release of all liability. 
Therefore, in consideration of the following mutual 
promises and releases made by the Parties as well as 
other good and valuable consideration, the Parties to 
                                                                                                                                                             
recover such pecuniary loss, together with costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees, . . . . 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0163(2) provides, in relevant part: 
Any retail buyer, lessee or prospective lessee 
suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation by a 
licensee . . . may recover damages for the loss in any 
court of competent jurisdiction together with costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
7 
 
this Agreement agree that this Agreement is entered 
into as a compromise of disputed claims and does not 
constitute of liability [sic] or obligation whatsoever 
on behalf of any of the parties pursuant to the 
respective claims. 
The parties agree to solve the action [sic] pursuant 
to the following specified terms: 
A) James Letizia and Diamond Jim's Auto Sales 
agree to Pay to Randy L. Betz the sum of 
[$15,000] paid in form of check number 7114; 
B) Randy L. Betz hereby agrees that [his suit 
against Diamond Jim's] [s]hall be dismissed.  
¶13 On April 5, 2011, counsel for Diamond Jim's learned of 
the settlement and drafted a letter advising Megna that the case 
was resolved.  The letter referenced the parties' "confidential 
settlement" agreement and included a draft stipulation to 
dismiss the case. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶14 On April 21, 2011, Megna filed three motions with the 
circuit court.  First, Megna asked the circuit court to compel 
Diamond Jim's to pay statutory attorney's fees pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 100.18(11).7  Megna argued that the right to recover 
attorney's fees under the statute belonged to the lawyer and not 
the client, and that he and his firm were owed $16,808.50 at the 
time of the settlement.  Second, Megna requested leave to amend 
the complaint and intervene as a plaintiff, arguing that he had 
a cause of action against Diamond Jim's for intentional 
                                                 
7 While Betz's suit included claims under two different fee-
shifting statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 100.18 and 218.0163, Megna's 
motion referenced only § 100.18. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
8 
 
interference with a contractual relationship.  Third, Megna 
sought a court order compelling disclosure of the confidential 
settlement between Betz and Diamond Jim's. 
¶15 Diamond Jim's opposed Megna's motions.  Diamond Jim's 
argued that the statutory right to recover attorney's fees 
belonged to Betz, and that the settlement agreement was a clear 
and unambiguous contract between the parties and should be 
enforced.  Diamond Jim's asserted that the parties were entitled 
to settle the case without counsel if they chose, and that while 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11) allows for recovery of attorney's fees, 
it does not mandate such a recovery in the event of a 
settlement.  Diamond Jim's also argued that the settlement 
agreement should remain confidential unless the parties agreed 
to disclose the terms. 
¶16 On July 26, 2011, the court granted Megna's motion to 
require disclosure of the confidential settlement agreement.  
The court held all other motions in abeyance for 30 days to 
allow the parties the opportunity to negotiate a settlement of 
the attorney's fee issue.  On August 31, 2011, the parties 
disclosed to the court that they had failed to resolve the 
dispute.  The court then set a briefing schedule for the pending 
motions. 
¶17 On September 30, 2011, Diamond Jim's filed a motion 
for 
reformation 
of 
the 
contract, 
or 
alternatively, 
for 
rescission.  The filing included an affidavit from Letizia 
wherein he stated that when he signed the settlement agreement, 
he believed it resolved the issue of statutory attorney's fees.  
No. 
2012AP183   
 
9 
 
Diamond Jim's argued that if the settlement agreement did not, 
in fact, resolve the fee issue, the agreement did not represent 
a meeting of the minds and should be reformed or rescinded. 
¶18 On December 8, 2011, the circuit court held a motion 
hearing.  The court determined that the statutory right to 
recover attorney's fees belonged to Betz and not to his 
attorneys.  The court further concluded that the settlement 
agreement was a clear, unambiguous, and binding contract between 
Betz and Diamond Jim's.  As a result, the court denied Megna's 
motions and dismissed the case.8 
¶19 On January 23, 2012, Megna appealed.9 
¶20 On appeal, Megna argued that the fee-shifting statute 
did not permit Betz to settle his claims without Megna's 
knowledge or consent.  Megna asserted that the right to collect 
fees under the statute belonged to the attorney and not the 
client, and that Diamond Jim's had a duty to refrain from 
settling without Megna's knowledge or consent.  Megna further 
argued that the public policy underlying fee-shifting statutes 
would be frustrated if clients were permitted to settle fee-
shifting cases without addressing statutory attorney's fees.  
Finally, Megna argued that it would be inequitable to allow 
                                                 
8 Although the court stated in its December 8 order denying 
Megna's motion that the order was final and appealable, it did 
not enter an order dismissing the suit until January 9, 2012. 
9 Megna's notice of appeal indicated that he was appealing 
from the circuit court's December 8, 2011 order denying his 
motions, rather than the January 9, 2012 order dismissing the 
suit. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
10 
 
Diamond Jim's to avoid paying statutory attorney's fees in this 
case. 
¶21 Diamond Jim's argued that Betz had a right to settle 
his claims and that right was not conditioned on his attorney's 
knowledge or consent.  Diamond Jim's asserted that the trial 
court properly relied on contract principles in resolving the 
issue, and that statutory attorney's fees cannot be awarded 
under equitable principles.  Diamond Jim's further argued that 
Megna should be seeking attorney's fees from his client, Betz, 
and not Diamond Jim's. 
¶22 On October 16, 2012, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court.  Betz, 344 Wis. 2d 681, ¶1.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the settlement agreement, despite being clear and 
unambiguous, was void because it was contrary to the public 
policy behind fee-shifting statutes.  Id., ¶13.  The court of 
appeals therefore ordered Betz to return the settlement payment 
and remanded the case to the circuit court for continued 
litigation.  Id., ¶14. 
¶23 Diamond Jim's petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on May 10, 2013. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 "The 
interpretation 
of 
an 
unambiguous 
contract 
presents a question of law for this court's independent review."  
Town Bank v. City Real Estate Dev., LLC, 2010 WI 134, ¶32, 330 
Wis. 2d 340, 793 N.W.2d 476 (citing Admanco, Inc. v. 700 Stanton 
Drive, LLC, 2010 WI 76, ¶15, 326 Wis. 2d 586, 786 N.W.2d 759). 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
11 
 
¶25 "[T]he application of public policy considerations to 
a contract" also presents a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  Northern States Power Co. v. Nat'l Gas Co., 
2000 WI App 30, ¶7, 232 Wis. 2d 541, 606 N.W.2d 613 (citing 
Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 654, 517 
N.W.2d 432 (1994)). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶26 "[A]n important purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to 
encourage injured parties to enforce their statutory rights when 
the cost of litigation, absent the fee-shifting provision, would 
discourage them from doing so."  Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac 
Cadillac, Inc., 2007 WI 98, ¶55, 303 Wis. 2d 258, 735 N.W.2d 93 
(citing Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 358, 340 
N.W.2d 506 (1983)).  Fee-shifting "encourage[s] attorneys to 
take cases where the pecuniary loss is small in relation to the 
cost of litigation."  Cook v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 2008 WI App 
155, ¶85, 314 Wis. 2d 426, 761 N.W.2d 645.  "For the retail 
buyer with a claim under [a fee-shifting statute], the cost of 
the litigation may be significant, and even . . . exceed the 
total recovery under the statute."  Kolupar, 303 Wis. 2d 258, 
¶37. 
¶27 "The cumulative effect of minor transgressions is 
considerable, yet they would not be deterred if fees were 
unavailable."  Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 162 
F.3d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1998).  "If the cost of litigation 
reduces or even eliminates recovery, retail buyers will be less 
likely to enforce their rights under the statute."  Kolupar, 303 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 258, ¶37.  Fee-shifting thus prevents "defendants from 
inflicting with impunity small losses on the people whom they 
wrong."  Orth v. Wisconsin State Employees Union Council 24, 546 
F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2008). 
¶28 Fee-shifting statutes, and the attorneys who represent 
clients in such cases, are thus vital to ensuring that the 
rights of consumers are vindicated in court.  The importance of 
this public policy is not a matter of debate. 
¶29 Additionally, attorneys who represent clients in fee-
shifting cases already take a significant risk that they will 
not be paid, because they may not "win" a case.  Ordinarily, 
fees are awarded only to a "prevailing party."  See, e.g., 
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 
U.S. 711 (1987).  While we recognize the important right of a 
client to settle, if a client has an unfettered right to settle 
without counsel's involvement when a fee-shifting statute is 
implicated, otherwise qualified attorneys will be discouraged 
from practicing in this vitally important area of law.10 
¶30 Nonetheless, the legislature has determined that an 
award of attorney's fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11) belongs 
to the "person suffering pecuniary loss."  Gorton v. Hostak, 
Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 503, 577 N.W.2d 617 
(1998).  Thus, statutory attorney's fees belong to the client 
and not the attorney.  Given this legislative determination and 
                                                 
10 For example, the record reflects that Megna is one of 
only a handful of attorneys in Wisconsin who takes automobile 
consumer rights cases. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
13 
 
the public policy considerations implicated in these matters, 
both the purpose of fee-shifting statutes and the public 
interest they promote are undermined when a client settles 
without counsel and that settlement does not provide for 
recovery of statutory attorney's fees. 
¶31 In Zeisler v. Neese, the Seventh Circuit was presented 
with a similar conflict involving a settlement that failed to 
address the statutory right to recover attorney's fees. 24 
F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1994).  The Seventh Circuit's analysis in 
Zeisler informs our conclusions in the case at issue and aids us 
in balancing the competing public policy considerations. 
¶32 In Zeisler the plaintiff, Carol Zeisler ("Zeisler"), 
purchased a used car from Neese Motors ("Neese") using dealer 
financing.  Id. at 1001.  Zeisler became unhappy with the 
vehicle and contacted Attorney Barry Barash ("Barash") to 
represent her in her dispute with Neese.  Id.  Barash agreed to 
accept the case on a contingent fee basis, but neglected to 
execute a fee agreement with Zeisler.  Id.  Through Barash, 
Zeisler filed suit against Neese under the Truth in Lending Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq, a fee-shifting statute.11  Id. 
¶33 While the suit was pending, Zeisler defaulted on her 
financing agreement with Neese, and Neese repossessed the car.  
Id.  Neese offered to provide Zeisler with a different, less 
expensive vehicle in exchange for her agreement to dismiss the 
                                                 
11 The Truth In Lending Act provides that a creditor 
violating the statute is liable for "a reasonable attorney's fee 
as determined by the court."  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3). 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
14 
 
lawsuit.  Id.  Without consulting Barash, Zeisler agreed to the 
settlement.  Id.  The settlement made no reference to attorney's 
fees. Id.  The trial court dismissed the suit over Barash's 
objections.  Id. 
¶34 On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial 
court.  Id.  The court concluded that the statutory right to 
recover attorney's fees belonged to the client and not the 
attorney, and that the interests of the client were served by 
encouraging settlement.  Id.  The court, acknowledging the 
policy concerns involved, then addressed how attorneys could 
protect their legitimate interest in receiving payment: 
The lawyer can protect himself, moreover, though 
not perfectly, by entering into a written contract 
with his client in which the client assigns his 
statutory right to attorney's fees to the lawyer.  
Then the lawyer can enforce the right without the 
participation of his client, as in Samuels v. American 
Motors Sales Corp., 969 F.2d 573, 576–77 (7th Cir. 
1992).  If the client makes a settlement with the 
defendant, waiving attorney's fees, and the defendant 
has no notice of the assignment——no notice, that is, 
that the entitlement to attorney's fees is not the 
plaintiff's to waive——the lawyer can go against his 
client for breach of contract.  If the defendant does 
have notice of the assignment, the lawyer can go 
directly against the defendant.  Salem Trust Co. v. 
Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 194 (1924); 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Alamo Ranch Co., 989 F.2d 
413, 417 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Id. at 1002. 
¶35 Thus, practically speaking, under Zeisler so long as 
the written contract between the lawyer and the client so 
provides, counsel can seek payment of attorney's fees from the 
client.  Moreover, when the written contract between the lawyer 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
15 
 
and the client provides for a valid assignment of the right to 
recover statutory attorney's fees, counsel may pursue such fees 
from the defendant so long as the defendant had notice of the 
assignment.  In other words, if the parties enter into a private 
settlement 
without 
the 
involvement 
of 
counsel, 
and 
the 
settlement fails to provide for statutory attorney's fees,12 the 
defendant may be found responsible for plaintiff's attorney's 
fees only when the client assigned his or her right to recover 
statutory attorney's fees to the attorney and the defendant had 
notice of the assignment. 
¶36 We adopt the standard, as posed in Zeisler, as an 
appropriate framework to decide whether Megna can recover his 
statutory attorney's fees directly from Diamond Jim's under 
these circumstances. 
¶37 At the outset, we note that it is undisputed that 
neither Megna nor counsel for Diamond Jim's was involved in the 
April 4, 2011 settlement agreement with Betz.  It is likewise 
undisputed that the settlement agreement between Betz and 
Diamond 
Jim's 
failed 
to 
provide 
for 
payment 
of 
Megna's 
attorney's fees.  Thus, under the facts presented, the crux of 
the matter before the court, as it was in Zeisler, is (1) 
                                                 
12 Although the Zeisler court used the term "waiver," we 
expressly avoid that term in our statement of the standard.  
This is because the term "waiver" under Wisconsin law is the 
"intentional relinquishment of a known right."  See, e.g., 
Brunton 
v. 
Nuvell 
Credit 
Corp., 
2010 
WI 
50, 
¶37, 
325 
Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 302.  The attorney's right to be paid, 
however, 
was 
not 
explicitly 
addressed 
in 
the 
settlement 
agreement in Zeisler, or in the case at issue. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
16 
 
whether Betz assigned his statutory right to recover attorney's 
fees to Megna under the fee agreement, and if so, (2) whether 
Diamond Jim's had notice of the assignment at the time of the 
settlement. 
¶38 Given the fact that Betz and Diamond Jim's settled 
this case without counsel and without providing for Megna's 
attorney's fees, we first address whether the fee agreement 
provided for a valid assignment of the right to recover 
statutory attorney's fees from Betz to Megna. In order to 
determine whether Betz assigned his right to recover statutory 
attorney's fees to Megna under the fee agreement, we look to the 
fee agreement itself.  A fee agreement is a contract.  "When 
construing contracts that were freely entered into, our goal 'is 
to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed by 
the contractual language.'"  Town Bank, 330 Wis. 2d 340, ¶33 
(quoting State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Pleva, 155 
Wis. 2d 704, 711, 456 N.W.2d 359 (1990)). 
¶39 "In ascertaining the intent of the parties, contract 
terms should be given their plain or ordinary meaning."  Huml v. 
Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶52, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807.  "'If 
the contract is unambiguous, our attempt to determine the 
parties' intent ends with the four corners of the contract, 
without consideration of extrinsic evidence.'"  Town Bank, 330 
Wis. 2d 340, ¶33 (quoting Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶52).  "Only 
when the contract is ambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation, may the court look 
beyond the face of the contract and consider extrinsic evidence 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
17 
 
to resolve the parties' intent."  Id. (citing Capital Invs., 
Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., Inc., 91 Wis. 2d 178, 190, 280 
N.W.2d 254 (1979)). 
¶40 Megna argues that Betz assigned his statutory right to 
recover attorney's fees to Megna under the fee agreement.  
Alternatively, Megna argues that Betz's right to recover 
attorney's fees should be equitably subrogated to Megna.  In 
either case, Megna argues that Betz lacked the right to 
relinquish statutory attorney's fees against Diamond Jim's.  
Under the logic of Zeisler, Megna's argument is unpersuasive. 
¶41 "An assignment is the 'manifestation of the assignor's 
intention to transfer' a right so that the assignee acquires the 
right to performance by the obligor."  Stilwell v. Am. Gen. Life 
Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 317 (1981)).  "It is essential to an 
assignment of a right that the obligee manifest an intention to 
transfer the right to another person without further action or 
manifestation of intention by the obligee."  Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 324 (1981).  No such manifestation 
exists in the fee agreement at issue. 
¶42 The terms of the fee agreement indicate that Betz 
understood that "the defendant is usually responsible for 
paying" attorney's fees in suits under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.  The 
agreement further provided that Betz's attorneys would "look to 
the defendant for payment of attorney fees pursuant to the 
fee[-]shifting provision once a lawsuit has been filed."  These 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
18 
 
qualified statements, however, cannot be fairly characterized as 
a written assignment of Betz's statutory right to recover fees. 
¶43 The fee agreement further provides for a number of 
circumstances where Betz might have to pay for Megna's fees or 
costs himself.  For example, if the case had settled prior to 
the filing of the lawsuit, Betz would have had to pay a flat 
rate for Megna's fees.  Similarly, if Betz had declined to 
settle the case on terms his attorneys "deem[ed] reasonable," he 
would have had to immediately pay all of Megna's costs up to 
that point and continue to pay further costs as they became due.  
Finally, the agreement provided that if either Betz or his 
attorneys terminated the attorney-client relationship, Betz 
would be responsible for paying both Megna's fees and costs.  
These provisions provide evidence that Betz did not assign his 
right to statutory attorney's fees to Megna in the fee 
agreement.  As a result, traditional principles of contract law 
militate against finding that Betz assigned his right to 
statutory attorney's fees to Megna. 
¶44 Similarly, 
Megna's 
argument 
that 
Betz 
equitably 
subrogated his right to recover statutory attorney's fees to 
counsel is not compelling. 
¶45 "'Subrogation is an equitable doctrine invoked to 
avoid unjust enrichment, and may properly be applied whenever a 
person other than a mere volunteer pays a debt which in equity 
and good conscience should be satisfied by another.'"  Ocwen 
Loan Servicing, LLC v. Williams, 2007 WI App 229, ¶7, 305 
Wis. 2d 772, 741 N.W.2d 474 (quoting Rock River Lumber Corp. v. 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
19 
 
Universal Mortg. Corp. of Wis., 82 Wis. 2d 235, 240-41, 262 
N.W.2d 114 (1978)).  Courts are permitted "to grant equitable 
remedies to private litigants in situations in which there is no 
explicit statutory authority or in which the available legal 
remedy is inadequate to do complete justice."  Breier v. E.C., 
130 Wis. 2d 376, 388, 387 N.W.2d 72, 77 (1986); see also GMAC 
Mortg. Corp. of Pa. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 479-80, 572 
N.W.2d 466 (1998). 
¶46 In the case at issue, we are presented with specific 
statutory authority which grants the right to recover attorney's 
fees to the plaintiff.  Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2.  If we were 
to conclude that the client's right to recover statutory 
attorney's fees is equitably subrogated to the attorney once 
counsel is retained, despite a fee agreement that does not 
clearly assign that right, we would undermine the legislature's 
explicit directive to the contrary.  The legislature has 
concluded that it is the client's right to recover statutory 
attorney's fees.  The equitable principles espoused by Megna do 
not trump the language of the agreement or the legislative 
directive. 
¶47 Additionally, Megna is not necessarily without a 
remedy if he is unable to recover directly from Diamond Jim's.  
Megna could seek payment from Betz under their fee agreement.  
For these reasons, equitable relief in the form of subrogation 
is not appropriate in this case. 
¶48 Further, to the extent this fee agreement could be 
deemed unclear regarding Megna's right to recover statutory 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
20 
 
attorney's fees from Betz or Diamond Jim's, "the burden is on 
the attorney who possesses legal knowledge and who drafts the 
agreement to state clearly the terms of the fee agreement and to 
address specifically the allocation of court-awarded attorney 
fees."  Gorton, 217 Wis. 2d at 508; see also Ziolkowski Patent 
Solutions Grp., S.C. v. Great Lakes Dart Mfg., Inc., 2011 WI App 
11, ¶13, 331 Wis. 2d 230, 794 N.W.2d 253 (holding that attorneys 
have the burden to clearly draft their legal fee agreements). 
¶49 Given that written fee agreements are required, see 
SCR 20:1.5(c), attorneys are cautioned to clearly draft a fee 
agreement 
so 
that 
it 
unambiguously 
assigns 
the 
client's 
statutory right to recover attorney's fees from the defendant 
under these circumstances.  As discussed, vital public policy 
interests are at stake. 
¶50 A clear fee agreement not only protects the attorney, 
but also protects the client and avoids conflict.  A more 
clearly drafted fee agreement in the case at issue would have 
resolved the problem without the necessity of additional 
litigation. 
¶51 Because Megna's fee agreement failed to clearly secure 
an assignment from Betz in the case at issue, his remedy against 
Diamond Jim's is foreclosed.  
¶52 Finally, because we conclude that the fee agreement 
does not provide for a valid assignment of Betz's right to 
recover statutory attorney's fees to Megna, we conclude that the 
second Zeisler criterion cannot be met.  Because there was no 
assignment between Betz and Megna, Diamond Jim's could not know 
No. 
2012AP183   
 
21 
 
of the assignment.  As a result, the Zeisler test is not met in 
this regard either. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶53 We conclude that the statutory right to recover 
attorney's fees belonged to Betz, and that Betz did not assign 
his right to recover those fees to Megna in their fee agreement.  
Because we conclude that Betz did not assign his right to 
recover statutory attorney's fees to Megna, we must conclude 
that Diamond Jim's could not have had notice of the assignment.  
As a result, we conclude that Megna may not seek statutory 
attorney's fees directly from Diamond Jim's, and that the 
settlement agreement entered into between Diamond Jim's and Betz 
is clear, unambiguous, and enforceable.  We therefore reverse 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶54 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  The issue 
before the court is whether the written fee agreement between 
Randy 
Betz, 
the 
client, 
and 
Vince 
Megna, 
the 
attorney, 
transferred the client's right to statutory attorney fees to the 
attorney.  The majority opinion, ¶43, purports to apply 
"traditional principles of contract law" to decide the issue.  
It does not. 
¶56 The majority opinion interprets the text of the fee 
agreement in a scant three paragraphs, ¶¶41, 42, and 43, without 
any 
analysis, 
proof, 
authority, 
or 
resort 
to 
contract 
principles. 
¶57 At ¶41, without any analysis, proof, authority, or use 
of principles of contract interpretation, the majority opinion 
recites the rule that an assignment depends on the assignor's 
intention and then pronounces in a single sentence that "no such 
manifestation [of the assignor's intention to transfer a right] 
exists in the fee agreement at issue."1  Nothing more to analyze 
here. 
                                                 
1 The full text of the majority opinion, ¶41, reads as 
follows: 
"An assignment is the 'manifestation of the assignor's 
intention to transfer' a right so that the assignee 
acquires the right to performance by the obligor." 
Stilwell v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 572, 577 
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 317 (1981)). "It is essential to an 
assignment of a right that the obligee manifest an 
intention to transfer the right to another person 
without further action or manifestation of intention 
by the obligee."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 324 (1981). No such manifestation exists in the fee 
agreement at issue. 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶58 At ¶42, without any analysis, proof, authority, or use 
of principles of contract interpretation, the majority opinion 
pronounces that because the "FEE SHIFTING" provision has 
"qualified statements" it "cannot be fairly characterized as a 
written assignment of Betz's statutory right to recover fees."   
¶59 At ¶43, without any analysis, proof, authority, or use 
of principles of contract interpretation, the majority opinion 
pronounces that various parts of the fee agreement that 
"provide[] for a number of circumstances in which Betz might 
have to pay for Megna's fees or costs himself" "provide evidence 
that Betz did not assign his right to statutory attorney's fees 
to Megna in the fee agreement."   
¶60 Rather than apply rules of contract interpretation, 
some of which the majority opinion dutifully recites, the 
majority opinion simply decrees, ipse dixit, that the language 
of the fee agreement does not mean what it says.  This 
resolution cannot be correct.2  The fee agreement unambiguously 
assigned Betz's right to attorney's fees to Megna.   
¶61 This court's pronouncements about assignments extend 
beyond the instant case.  Assignments are frequently the subject 
of litigation in this court.  This court has considered 
assignments in other cases and contexts, each with its own 
                                                 
2 At the circuit court, the attorney moved to intervene to 
make a claim against the defendant for tortious interference 
with the fee agreement.  Neither the parties nor I address this 
issue or any potential claim the attorney may have against the 
defendant. 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
3 
 
particularities due to the circumstances of the case.3  Although 
each of these cases involves a slightly different fact scenario, 
a central question is the same——did the parties execute an 
effective assignment?   
I 
¶62 I apply the following principles of contract law to 
the instant case. 
¶63 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, relied upon by 
the majority opinion, ¶41, defines an assignment as follows:  
"An assignment is the 'manifestation of the assignor's intention 
to transfer' a right so that the assignee acquires the right to 
performance by the obligor."4    
¶64 The Restatement does not require any particular 
formalities to be observed to make an effective assignment.5  "No 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Anthony Gagliano & Co. v. Openfirst, 2014 WI 
65, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___  (disputing whether a 
transfer of property rights constituted an assignment or a 
sublease); Dow Family, LLC v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 2014 WI 56, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___ (disputing whether an assignment 
of a mortgage deed was valid as to a later purchaser of 
property); see also Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund v. Town Bank, 
2014 WI 63, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___ (disputing whether 
the proceeds of a legal malpractice claim could be assigned). 
4 Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Contracts 
§ 317 
(quoted 
by 
majority op., ¶41 (emphasis added)).  
5 See 9 Corbin on Contracts § 47.7, at 147-48 (rev. ed. 
2007) ("[I]n the absence of statute or a contract provision to 
the contrary, there are no prescribed formalities that must be 
observed to make an effective assignment.  It is sufficient if 
the assignor has, in some fashion, manifested an intention to 
make a present transfer of his rights to the assignee.").  See 
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 cmt. b. ("A promisor 
manifests an intention if he believes or has reason to believe 
that the promisee will infer that intention from his words or 
conduct."). 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
4 
 
words of art are required to constitute an assignment; any words 
that fairly indicate an intention to make the assignee owner of 
a claim are sufficient."6  The assignment requires only that "the 
obligee manifest an intention to transfer the right to another 
person without further action or manifestation of intention by 
the obligee."7     
¶65 The phrase "manifestation of intention" is a basic 
concept in contract formation in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.  The phrase "adopts an external or objective standard 
for interpreting conduct; it means the external expression of 
intention as distinguished from undisclosed intention."8   
¶66 To 
determine 
the 
parties' 
"manifestation 
of 
intention," the courts apply other well-accepted rules of 
contract interpretation:  "We interpret a contract to give 
'reasonable meaning to each provision and without rendering any 
portion superfluous.'"9  "A writing is interpreted as a whole"10 
and 
words 
"are 
interpreted 
in 
the 
light 
of 
all 
the 
circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is 
ascertainable it is given great weight."11    
                                                 
6 29 Richard Lord, Williston on Contracts § 74:3 (4th ed. 
2003). 
7 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324 (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
8 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2, cmt. b. 
9 Sonday v. Dave Kohel Agency, Inc., 2006 WI 92, ¶21, 293 
Wis. 2d 458, 471, 718 N.W.2d 631 (internal quotation marks & 
citation omitted). 
10 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(2). 
11 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1). 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶67 "Because the scope of retainer agreements varies from 
attorney to attorney and case to case," inquiries about the 
meaning of a retainer and fee allocation agreement between an 
attorney and a client "are necessarily fact intensive."12    
¶68 The meaning given to words "depends to a varying 
extent on the context and on the prior experience of the 
parties."13  In other words, the essence of the meaning of the 
words of a contract is found in how a reasonable person would 
understand the terms, having in mind the context of the 
transaction.  Our courts interpret contracts to give them 
"common sense"14 and "realistic"15 meaning. 
¶69 When there is an ambiguity, the courts look to 
extrinsic evidence to resolve the parties' intent.16  Extrinsic 
evidence 
can 
include 
the 
conduct 
of 
the 
parties, 
their 
negotiations before and after the execution of the documents, 
                                                 
12 Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Pichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 
505, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998). 
13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20, cmt. b. 
14 See D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co., 155 
Wis. 541, 145 N.W. 372 (1914) (interpreting a contract's place 
of performance clause by viewing the acts of the parties "from a 
common sense standpoint"); Mikula v. Miller Brewing Co., 2005 WI 
App 92, ¶22, 281 Wis. 2d 712, 701 N.W.2d 613 (interpreting an 
insurance contract using a "common sense" reading of the text).  
15 See Bradish v. British Am. Assur. Co. of Toronto, Canada, 
9 Wis. 2d 601, 604-05, 101 N.W.2d 814 (1960) (interpreting a 
contract under the more "realistic" connotation of its terms) 
(citing Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Whaley, 272 F.2d 288, 290-91 
(10th Cir. 1959)). 
16 Majority op., ¶39 (quoting Town Bank v. City Real Estate 
Development, LLC, 2010 WI 134, ¶33, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 
N.W.2d 476.   
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
6 
 
the acts and deeds in connection with surrounding circumstances, 
and their words.17   
II 
¶70 I now apply these interpretive aids to the text of the 
fee agreement.   
¶71 I have attached a true and correct copy of the fee 
agreement to give the full text of the agreement.    
¶72 The text of the fee agreement at issue is not derived 
from a legal form book.  It is written in plain English, a 
practice that should be commended.18    
¶73 The text of the fee agreement, giving meaning to each 
provision read separately and to the text read as a whole, 
clearly manifests an intention in plain English that the 
attorney will look to the defendant for attorney fees in some 
circumstances, and to the client in other circumstances.   
¶74 The circuit court interpreted the agreement as I do.  
The circuit court declared: 
                                                 
17 See Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 2003 WI App 140, ¶10, 266 
Wis. 2d 124, 667 N.W.2d 751. 
18 See, 
e.g., 
Yauger 
v. 
Skiing 
Enters., 
Inc., 
206 
Wis. 2d 76, 87 & n.2, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996) (noting that 
negligence waivers in contracts "should be preceded by a clear, 
not misleading, heading and should not be written in legal 
jargon"); Commercial Union Midwest Ins. Co. v. Vorbeck, 2004 WI 
App 11, ¶¶46-49, 269 Wis. 2d 204, 674 N.W.2d 665 (Brown, J., 
concurring) (deploring the use of jargon in insurance contracts 
and citing Wis. Stat. § 631.22, which requires that a consumer 
insurance policy be "written in commonly understood language"); 
Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc., 2004 WI App 142, ¶9, 275 
Wis. 2d 444, 685 N.W.2d 884 (noting that whether a contract term 
or condition is "in plain English" bears on whether it is 
unconscionable). 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
7 
 
The fee-shifting provision addresses with whom the 
right to collect attorney fees vests.  It transfers 
the authority from Betz to Attorney Megna.  It 
provides Attorney Megna with the authority to seek 
attorney fees from the Defendant if Betz succeeds with 
his Wis. Stat. § 100.18 claim at trial or during 
settlement with Diamond Jim's.  Thus, Attorney Megna 
may certainly have the right to seek attorney fees in 
the appropriate situation.  
The circuit court was correct. 
¶75 The words of the agreement itself support this 
interpretation.   
¶76 The agreement is divided into several parts, with a 
bold-faced, capitalized heading preceding each part.  Each part 
of the fee agreement explains the allocation of attorney fees 
under a particular set of circumstances. 
¶77 The 
headings 
are 
descriptive 
of 
four 
various 
circumstances under which fees are to allocated: "FEE SHIFTING," 
"SETTLEMENT PRIOR TO LAWSUIT," "COSTS AND EXPENSES," and 
"TERMINATION."  The purpose of this agreement is to establish 
when the client pays the attorney's fees, and when the defendant 
pays the attorney's fees. 
¶78 The words that manifest an intention to give the 
attorney the right to collect attorney's fees are in the part 
labeled "FEE SHIFTING."  The agreement explicitly uses the words 
"FEE SHIFTING" and explicitly refers to the attorney fee 
shifting statute, Wis. Stat. § 100.18.   
¶79 The agreement states under the heading "FEE SHIFTING" 
the following: 
FEE SHIFTING 
I understand that Sec. 100.18, Wis. Stats., _______ is 
a fee shifting statute.  This means if I win at trial 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
8 
 
or settle my case during litigation, the defendant is 
usually responsible for paying my attorney fees based 
on my attorney's hourly rate.  I understand that the 
Law Offices of Vince Megna is accepting my case with 
the agreement that it will look to the defendant for 
payment of attorney fees pursuant to the fee shifting 
provision once a lawsuit has been filed (emphasis 
added). 
¶80 The "FEE SHIFTING" provision unqualifiedly states the 
circumstances under which the attorney will pursue the attorney 
fees from the defendant:  In exchange for the law firm's 
agreement to take the case, the client and attorney agree that 
the attorney "will look to the defendant for payment of attorney 
fees pursuant to the fee shifting provision once a lawsuit has 
been filed" (emphasis added).   
¶81 The "FEE SHIFTING" provision states that the defendant 
is usually responsible for paying the client's attorney's fees 
and that the attorney "will" pursue fees from the defendant, not 
that the attorney may or could do so.  Obviously, the attorney 
cannot look to the defendant for statutory attorney's fees 
unless the client agrees that the fees belong to the attorney 
and not the client.  By signing the agreement, the client agrees 
to this arrangement.   
¶82 The language in the "FEE SHIFTING" provision states, 
in plain English, the basic terms of the transfer (assignment) 
of a statutory fee award in litigation from the client to the 
lawyer and meets all the requirements of an assignment: 
• Who is entitled to statutory fees?  The client. 
• Who gets the statutory fees?  The attorney. 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
9 
 
• What attorney fees are being transferred?  "[P]ayment 
of attorney fees pursuant to the fee-shifting statute 
once a lawsuit has been filed." 
• Is 
there 
additional 
action 
or 
manifestation 
of 
intention required by the client?  No. 
¶83 The 
majority 
opinion, 
¶42, 
dismisses 
the 
"FEE 
SHIFTING" provision as "qualified statements" that "cannot be 
fairly characterized as an assignment of Betz's statutory right 
to recover fees."  Majority op., ¶42.19  Notably, the majority 
opinion does not offer which words "qualify" the last sentence, 
which states that in exchange for taking the case, the attorney 
will pursue attorney fees from the defendant. 
¶84 Unable to provide a qualifier for the key last 
sentence of the "FEE SHIFTING" provision, the majority opinion, 
¶42, instead focuses on the word "usually" in the second 
sentence, which states that if there is litigation, "the 
defendant is usually responsible for paying my attorney fees 
based on my attorney's hourly rate" (emphasis added). 
¶85 The word "usually" in the second sentence is a correct 
non-legalese statement of the law.  A court usually holds the 
                                                 
19 The majority opinion reads at ¶42 as follows: 
The terms of the fee agreement indicate that Betz 
understood that "the defendant is usually responsible 
for paying" attorney's fees in suits under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18.  The agreement further provided that Betz's 
attorneys would "look to the defendant for payment of 
attorney fees pursuant to the fee[-]shifting provision 
once a lawsuit has been filed."  These qualified 
statements, however, cannot be fairly characterized as 
a written assignment of Betz's statutory right to 
recover fees. 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
10 
 
defendant liable for the plaintiff's attorney fees based on the 
attorney's hourly rate as stated in the fee agreement.  But 
courts do not always do so.  
¶86 The real problem the fee agreement faces in the 
majority opinion is that the text of the "FEE SHIFTING" 
provision is not in the typical formalistic assignment language 
the majority expects.  It does not use the legalese of generic 
boilerplate forms for assignments, nor does it use the legal 
jargon of "assign" or "transfer."   
¶87 "[O]ur profession disdains plain speech."20  Judges 
would probably better understand the agreement in the instant 
case if it were drafted in traditional legalese assignment 
language used in legal form guides that read something like the 
following:  
In exchange for value received, I, ________, of 
_________ [address], as assignor, assign and transfer 
to ___________, of ___________[address], as assignee, 
assignee's legal representatives and assigns, for 
assignee 
and 
their 
use 
and 
benefit, 
any 
and 
all . . . .21 
                                                 
20 United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
21 1 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Legal Forms § 8:24 (updated 
2014) (available on Westlaw). 
In another recent case, Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund v. 
Town Bank, 2014 WI ___, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, similar 
assignment language was used after a detailed listing of various 
legal malpractice claims: 
Now therefore, in order to induce [the assignor] to 
loan [the assignee] $195,000.00, pursuant to the 
provisions of a certain Mortgage Note . . . , [the 
assignor] hereby assigns and transfers his interest 
in . . . the proceeds resulting from each of the above 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶88 In contrast, the client probably better understands 
the plain English version Attorney Megna used, which states that 
Megna, not the client, gets statutory fees from the defendant in 
litigation.   
 
¶89 The 
majority 
opinion 
ignores 
the 
rule 
of 
interpretation that no particular magic words are needed to 
manifest an intention to assign.  Instead, the majority opinion 
sends a message to attorneys who represent clients in cases 
where fee-shifting statutes apply: use legalese, not plain 
English.  The majority opinion seems to endorse attorneys who 
use the legalese version of assignment, in which the client "in 
exchange 
for 
valuable 
consideration, 
hereby 
assigns 
and 
transfers the right to pursue attorney's fees, pursuant to 
[statute], to [attorney] of [address] and all [attorney's] legal 
assigns and heirs" and so forth. 
¶90 The 
majority 
opinion 
ignores 
the 
rule 
of 
interpretation that requires us to give reasonable meaning to 
each word of the contract.  What reasonable meaning does the 
"FEE SHIFTING" provision have if it is not an assignment of 
rights to legal fees in the event of a lawsuit?  The majority 
opinion renders this language meaningless and superfluous. 
 
¶91 Other 
provisions 
of 
the 
fee 
agreement 
support 
interpreting the "FEE SHIFTING" provision as assigning to the 
attorney the right to collect attorney's fees from the defendant 
if there is litigation. The agreement repeatedly treats the 
                                                                                                                                                             
described Claims to [the assignee] together with its 
successors and assigns . . . . 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
12 
 
attorney, not the client, as the owner of the attorneys fees 
paid by the defendant and awarded under the fee shifting statute 
when litigation ensues.  See, for example, the following: 
• I [the client] understand that the Law Offices of 
Vince Megna will charge the other side its 
current rates that are then charged at the time 
of request for payment of its fees. ["HOURLY 
RATE"] (Emphasis added.) 
• In addition to all other fees paid to the Law 
Offices of Vince Megna by the other side, I agree 
to pay the Law Offices of Vince Megna . . . . 
["ADDITIONAL RECOVERY"] (Emphasis added.) 
• In addition to all other fees paid to the Law 
Offices of Vince Megna by the other side, I agree 
to pay the Law Offices of Vince Megna 40% of any 
punitive 
damages 
recovered, 
whether 
through 
settlement 
or 
judgment. 
["PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES"] 
(Emphasis added.) 
• If a settlement is reached prior to a lawsuit 
being 
filed . . . the 
defendant 
may 
not 
be 
responsible for payment of my attorney fees.  In 
this event,  the Law Offices . . . agrees to 
charge a flat rate attorney fee in the amount of 
______________ [left blank] ["SETTLEMENT PRIOR TO 
LAWSUIT"]  
¶92 In each instance, the agreement treats the attorney, 
not the client, as the holder of the right to attorney's fees 
paid by the defendant. 
¶93 The fee agreement sets forth various fee allocations 
under differing circumstances.  The majority opinion asserts 
that these provisions for fee allocation under circumstances 
other than litigation "provide evidence that Betz did not assign 
his right to statutory attorney's fees to Megna in the fee 
agreement."  Majority op., ¶43.22   
                                                 
22 The majority opinion reads at ¶43 as follows: 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶94 The majority does not say, and I cannot figure out, 
why a provision requiring Betz to pay fees or costs under 
certain circumstances (for example, if no lawsuit were filed) 
means that "principles of contract law militate against finding 
that Betz assigned his right to statutory attorney's fees to 
Megna."  Majority op., ¶43.   
¶95 The assignment of attorney fees is thus effective 
under certain circumstances; the assignment does not come into 
play should certain other circumstances come to pass.  There is 
nothing unusual about this arrangement. 
¶96 I conclude, as did the circuit court, that the text of 
the "FEE SHIFTING" provision and the text of the agreement as a 
whole demonstrate a manifest intention to assign the claim to 
legal fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 to the attorney in the 
event of litigation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The fee agreement further provides for a number of 
circumstances where Betz might have to pay for Megna's 
fees or costs himself.  For example, if the case had 
settled prior to the filing of the lawsuit, Betz would 
have had to pay a flat rate for Megna's fees.  
Similarly, if Betz had declined to settle the case on 
terms his attorneys "deem[ed] reasonable," he would 
have had to immediately pay all of Megna's costs up to 
that point and continue to pay further costs as they 
become due.  Finally, the agreement provided that if 
either Betz or his attorneys terminated the attorney-
client relationship, Betz would be responsible for 
paying both Megna's fees and costs.  These provisions 
provide evidence that Betz did not assign his right to 
statutory 
attorney's 
fees 
to 
Megna 
in 
the 
fee 
agreement.  As a result, traditional principles of 
contract law militate against finding that Betz 
assigned his right to statutory attorney's fees to 
Megna. 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
14 
 
III 
¶97 This interpretation is supported not only by the text 
but also by the context in which the fee agreement was executed 
and operates, namely the Wisconsin lemon law allowing claims for 
defective cars and Wis. Stat. § 100.18 governing suits for 
misrepresentation.  Words in a contract "are interpreted in the 
light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of 
the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight."23   
¶98 A car purchase, next to a home purchase, is the 
largest single expenditure of many people.  When a consumer 
purchases a defective car, the lemon law statutes and Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18 are designed to give the consumer a remedy.  Both 
statutes are fee-shifting statutes that modify the American rule 
regarding who pays the attorney.24  Ordinarily in the United 
States the prevailing party does not collect attorney fees from 
the opposing party.25  Thus plaintiffs in relatively small-
dollar-amount consumer cases often cannot afford to seek relief 
if they have to incur and pay attorney fees.  The lemon law and 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18 address this fact of life.26    
¶99 In cases governed by the lemon law and Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18 
(explicitly 
referenced 
in 
the 
"FEE 
SHIFTING" 
                                                 
23 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1). 
24 See Cook v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 2008 WI App 155, ¶85, 314 
Wis. 2d 426, 761 N.W.2d 645.  
25 Winkleman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d 12, 28, 483 
N.W.2d 211 (1992). 
26 See majority op., ¶¶26-29. 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
15 
 
provision), payment for the plaintiff's attorney fees shifts 
from the plaintiff to the defendant.  
¶100 The legislature has expressed this vital public policy 
of 
the 
state 
favoring 
fee 
shifting 
in 
lemon 
law 
and 
misrepresentation cases to ensure the rights of consumers:  
"Fee-shifting statutes, and the attorneys who represent clients 
in such cases, are thus vital to ensuring that the rights of 
consumers are vindicated in court."27 
¶101 Attorney Megna holds himself out as, and is known as, 
one of the few attorneys in Wisconsin who takes lemon law 
cases.28   
¶102 This is the context in which the fee agreement at 
issue was executed.  Indeed, the majority opinion, ¶¶26-29, 
discusses the importance that the legislature has given to the 
fee-shifting statutes in enforcing the consumer-protection laws 
at issue in the instant case.   
¶103 The majority opinion acknowledges, and rightly so, 
that the defendant should not be able to circumvent the fee-
shifting statute's public policy by cutting attorneys out of 
their ability to collect attorney's fees through unfettered out-
of-court settlement: 
While we recognize the important right of a client to 
settle, if a client has an unfettered right to settle 
without counsel's involvement when a fee-shifting 
statute is implicated, otherwise qualified attorneys 
                                                 
27 Majority op., ¶28 (emphasis added). 
28 See majority op., ¶29 n.10 ("For example, the record 
reflects that Megna is one of only a handful of attorneys in 
Wisconsin who takes automobile consumer rights cases."). 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
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will be discouraged from practicing in this vitally 
important area of law. 
Majority op., ¶29.  I agree with the majority opinion's analysis 
of the legislature's mandated public policy.   
¶104 Why 
then 
does 
the 
majority 
opinion 
ignore 
the 
legislative declaration of public policy in deciding the instant 
case?  The majority opinion does not say. 
¶105 In 
sum, 
when 
I 
apply 
the 
rules 
of 
contract 
interpretation, I conclude that the text and context of the 
entire fee agreement demonstrate that the agreement assigned the 
statutory fees 
from the client 
to the attorney in the 
circumstances listed in the "FEE SHIFTING" provision, namely 
litigation. 
IV 
¶106 A few other matters regarding contract interpretation 
emerge in the majority opinion.   
¶107 In the end, the majority opinion never truly decides 
whether there are competing reasonable interpretations of the 
fee agreement requiring a court to look beyond the four corners 
of the contract to interpret its meaning.  Instead, the majority 
opinion waffles. 
¶108 On 
the 
one 
hand, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
can 
be 
interpreted as treating the agreement as unambiguous, looking 
only to the text and never citing any extrinsic evidence to 
determine the intent of the parties.  
¶109 On the other hand, the majority opinion views the fee 
agreement as potentially "unclear" on the subject of the 
assignment of attorney's fees.  Majority op., ¶48.   
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶110 If the fee agreement is "unclear," the intention of 
the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the finder 
of fact after being presented with extrinsic evidence. 
¶111 I would recognize the fee agreement for what it is, an 
unambiguous assignment of the right to attorney's fees from Betz 
to Attorney Megna. 
¶112 Furthermore, the majority opinion apparently assumes, 
without discussion, that the fee agreement is an integrated 
contract. 
¶113 Yet this contract on its face is not complete and 
therefore is not fully integrated.  There is a blank in the fee 
agreement that is not filled in. The amount Attorney Megna will 
charge the client in the "SETTLEMENT PRIOR TO LAWSUIT" provision 
is left blank.   
¶114 A blank in a contract on a material matter indicates 
that the contract is not fully integrated and that extrinsic 
evidence may be used to understand the intention of the parties. 
¶115 Rather than looking to extrinsic evidence, as dictated 
by our rules of contract interpretation for unclear or non-
integrated contracts, the majority opinion asserts that the 
burden is on the attorney "to state clearly the terms of the fee 
agreement and to address specifically the allocation of court-
awarded attorney's fees."  Majority op., ¶48 (quoting Gorton v. 
Hostak, Henzl & Pichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 508, 577 
N.W.2d 617 (1998) and citing Ziolkowski Patent Solutions Grp., 
S.C. v. Great Lakes Dart Mfg., Inc., 2011 WI App 11, ¶13, 331 
Wis. 2d 230, 794 N.W.2d 253).   
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶116 In the Gorton case, the fee agreement was a contingent 
fee agreement.  The fee agreement was silent regarding the 
allocation 
of 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 100.18.  Statutory attorney fees were awarded.  The Gorton 
court held that the distribution of the statutory attorney fee 
award was governed by the contract between the parties.29  The 
contingent 
fee 
agreement 
in 
Gorton 
did 
not 
"address 
specifically" the allocation of statutory attorney's fees, and 
the attorney did not receive statutory fees.  
¶117 In contrast, in the instant case the "FEE SHIFTING" 
provision does exactly what the fee agreement in Gorton did not 
do——the fee agreement at issue addresses specifically the 
allocation of statutory attorney fees. 
¶118 Furthermore, in Gorton the dispute about who was 
entitled to the statutory attorney fees pursuant to the fee 
agreement between the attorney and the client was between the 
attorney and the client.  The attorney and client were 
adversaries.  To the extent that the agreement between the 
attorney and client in Gorton did not specifically address the 
allocation of statutory attorney fees, the attorney, who had 
obviously drafted the agreement and who had legal expertise, 
lost.  
¶119 In the instant case, no dispute exists between the 
attorney (Megna) and the client (Betz) that, pursuant to their 
fee agreement, the attorney, not the client, has the right to 
                                                 
29 Gorton, 217 Wis. 2d at 508. 
No.  2012AP183.ssa 
 
19 
 
any statutory attorney fees.30  The dispute in the instant case 
about who is entitled to statutory attorney fees is between 
Megna, as Betz's attorney, and Diamond Jim's, as the potential 
payor of the statutory attorney fees.  Thus, the rule stated in 
Gorton governing interpretation of a fee agreement in a dispute 
between the attorney and client does not apply in the present 
case.   
¶120 The interpretation of the fee agreement proposed by 
the majority opinion is, unfortunately, troubling on too many 
different fronts. 
¶121 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.  I would remand 
the case to the circuit court to determine whether the defendant 
had notice of the assignment. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Megna continues to represent Betz and has averred that he 
has made no claim and plans to make no claim against his client. 
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