Title: Commonwealth v. Donald
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13040
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2021

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SJC-13040 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STANLEY DONALD. 
 
 
July 2, 2021. 
 
 
Evidence, Scientific test.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction 
relief. 
 
 
The defendant, Stanley Donald, appeals from a Superior 
Court judge's denial of his eighth motion1 for postconviction 
forensic testing of various evidence from his 1999 trial, at 
which he was convicted of two counts of aggravated rape and 
single counts of unarmed robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (cement 
floor), in connection with his assault of a woman in a parking 
garage.2  The Appeals Court affirmed the denial of his motion.  
Commonwealth v. Donald, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 1105 (2020).  We then 
granted his application for further appellate review, limited to 
the issue whether the Superior Court judge erred in denying 
forensic testing of the bloodstains taken from the cement floor 
of the parking garage, including, more specifically, whether 
Donald has satisfied the threshold requirements of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on his 
motion. 
 
The only live issue with respect to the question presented 
on further appellate review is whether Donald properly raised 
and preserved his claim, based on Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 
 
 
1 We use the term "eighth motion" to refer to the pro se 
motion for access to forensic and scientific analysis filed by 
Stanley Donald on September 17, 2018. 
 
 
2 The facts of the underlying crime are summarized in this 
court's opinion in connection with one of Donald's previous 
motions for postconviction forensic testing.  See Commonwealth 
v. Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 39 (2014). 
2 
 
 
 
Mass. 799 (2019), that the requested testing has the potential 
to result in evidence that is material to his identification as 
the perpetrator of the crime of assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon (cement floor).  Donald argues that, if 
testing of the bloodstains shows that the blood did not belong 
to the victim, then it would support his assertion that that 
particular crime did not occur.  See Williams, supra at 809 ("a 
defendant who asserts that the requested testing has the 
potential to result in evidence that is material to his or her 
identity as the perpetrator of the crime because no crime in 
fact occurred satisfies the § 3 [b] [4] requirement").  At oral 
argument, the Commonwealth conceded that if this court concluded 
that Donald had preserved this argument adequately, the case 
should be sent back for a hearing.  We conclude that the 
argument was preserved adequately, and we therefore remand the 
matter for a hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7. 
 
In his pro se eighth motion, Donald stated: 
 
"Here, a [deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)] test on the crime 
scene blood stains would be the first time a forensic DNA 
test was conducted which would offer evidence that is 
material to whether the blood stains belong to defendant, 
or victim, or the man a witness seen with a limp at the 
time of the crime, and would be relevant to the 
identification of the perpetrator of the crime of assault 
and battery with dangerous weapon cement floor which Donald 
stands convicted. 
 
"Evenmore, if the blood stains do not match the victim 
. . . then the forensic test results would be material 
evidence to establish Donald's innocence since the 
Commonwealth represents that Donald 'body slammed victim on 
to the floor of the garage, and face smashing on the 
concrete and blood was everywhere.'" 
 
These assertions were sufficient to preserve the argument that 
Donald now makes on appeal.3 
 
 
3 Even if Donald had not preserved the issue properly, the 
Commonwealth concedes that he could cure any defect in a renewed 
or subsequent motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A.  In such 
circumstances, where an issue is fully briefed before us, we 
have stated that "requiring the defendant to refile another 
motion making the same arguments . . . , and then to appeal 
therefrom, would be an exercise in needless expenditure of 
judicial resources."  Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 500 
n.7 (2014). 
3 
 
 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order dated March 28, 2019, 
denying Donald's eighth motion for postconviction forensic 
testing of the bloodstains taken from the cement floor of the 
parking garage is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a 
hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7.  We express no opinion 
as to Donald's likelihood of success on the merits of his motion 
after a hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Edward B. Gaffney for the defendant. 
 
Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.