Title: Ex parte Kevin James Davis.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1150072
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2015

REL: 12/18/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1150072
____________________
Ex parte Kevin James Davis
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: State of Alabama v. Kevin James Davis)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CC-12-1554;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-1860)
STUART, Justice.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1150072
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
"A defendant is constitutionally entitled to be informed
of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ala. Const. art. I, § 6." Ex parte
Washington, 448 So. 2d 404, 407 (Ala. 1984). In this case, I
believe that Kevin James Davis was deprived of his
constitutional rights because his indictment "apprised [him]
of the charge against him but he could not know the
contentions of the state as to how he committed [the charged
offense of manslaughter]." Nelson v. State, 50 Ala. App. 285,
288, 278 So. 2d 734, 737 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973). I therefore
respectfully dissent from this Court's decision to deny
Davis's petition for a writ of certiorari.
In its decision below, the Court of Criminal Appeals
provided the following facts:
"On September 20, 2012, Davis was indicted for
manslaughter, § 13A-6-3(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. The
indictment against Davis stated: 'The Grand Jury of
Baldwin County charges that ... Kevin Davis ...
did[] recklessly cause the death of another person,
to-wit: Randall McKenzie, in violation of § 13A-6-
3(a)(1), of the Code of Alabama.' On September 3,
2014, 
Davis 
filed 
a 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
the
indictment, 
arguing 
that 
the 
indictment 
was
defective because it failed to state the particulars
of the offense. That same day, the State filed a
response to Davis's motion, arguing that the
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indictment was sufficient. On September 8, 2014, the
State filed a notice of a more definite statement in
which it provided details of the offense charged.
The following day, the circuit court struck the
State's notice of a more definite statement and
dismissed the indictment against Davis. The circuit
court reasoned that the indictment was due to be
dismissed because it failed to allege the means by
which Davis caused McKenzie's death. The State filed
a timely notice of appeal."  
State v. Davis, [Ms. CR-13-1860, May 29, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___,
___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). The Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the
cause for further proceedings. The court reasoned 
that Davis's
indictment was sufficient because "it tracked the language of
the statute defining the offense of manslaughter, which
'prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of
[reckless manslaughter].'" ___ So. 3d at ___ 
(quoting 
Tompkins
v. State, 898 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). Davis
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, claiming that
the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicted with prior
decisions of Alabama appellate courts.
Davis claims that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision
conflicts with Nelson v. State, 50 Ala. App. 285, 278 So. 2d
735 (1973). In Nelson, the defendant was charged with first-
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degree murder. The indictment read as follows: "'The Grand
Jury of said County charge that, before the finding of this
indictment, DAVID LARRY NELSON unlawfully, and with malice
aforethought, killed Oliver King against the peace 
and 
dignity
of the State of Alabama.'" Nelson, 50 Ala. App. at 286, 278
So. 2d at 735 (emphasis added in Nelson). The Court of
Criminal Appeals found that this indictment was 
not 
sufficient
to support Nelson's conviction, and it reversed the trial
court's judgment.
The Nelson Court provided the following rationale for its
decision:
"'Indictments must always conform to the
mandates of our organic law. The emphasis
in our cases "that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused has the right ...
to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation"[--]now § 6 of the Constitution
of 1901--is not meaningless tautology, but
one of the cornerstones of our Bill of
Rights.
"'We are further restrained in this case by
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The following utterances by our
Federal 
courts 
are 
pertinent: 
"No 
principle
of procedural due process is more clearly
established than that notice of the
specific charge, and a chance to be heard
in a trial of the issues raised by that
charge, 
if 
desired, 
are 
among 
the
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constitutional rights of every accused in
a criminal proceeding in all courts, state
or federal." Cole v. State of Arkansas, 333
U.S. 196, 201, 68 S.Ct. 514, 517, 92 L.Ed.
644 [(1948)]. "The petitioner charged that
he had been denied any real notice of the
true nature of the charge against him, the
first and most universally recognized
requirement of due process ...." Smith v.
O'Grady, Warden, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61
S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859 [(1941)]. "An
intelligent and full understanding by the
accused of the charge against him is a
first requirement of due process." Bergen
v. United States, 8 Cir., 145 F.2d 181, 187
[(1944)].
"'Regardless of some ill-considered, loose
expressions in some of the cases, the law
is and always has been that it is not
enough to charge against a defendant a mere
legal 
conclusion 
as 
justly 
inferential 
from
facts not set out in the indictment. United
States v. Almeida, 24 Fed. Cas. pages 775,
776, No. 14,433.
"'In order to properly inform the accused
of 
the 
"nature 
and 
cause 
of 
the
accusation", within the meaning of the
constitution and of the rules of the common
law, a little thought will make it plain,
not only to the legal, but to all other
educated, minds, that not only must all the
elements of the offense be stated in the
indictment, but that also they must be
stated with clearness and certainty, and
with a sufficient degree of particularity
to identify the transaction to which the
indictment relates as to place, persons,
things, and other details. The accused must
receive sufficient information to enable
him to reasonably understand, not only the
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nature of the offense, but the particular
act or acts touching which he must be
prepared with his proof; and when his
liberty, and perhaps his life, are at
stake, he is not to be left so scantily
informed as to cause him to rest his
defense upon the hypothesis that he is
charged with a certain act or series of
acts, with the hazard of being surprised by
proofs on the part of the prosecution of an
entirely different act or series of acts,
at least so far as such surprise can be
avoided by reasonable particularity and
fullness of description of the alleged
offense.' 
(Italics 
supplied.) 
United 
States
v. Potter, 1 Cir., 56 F. 83, 89.
"'....
"'... As example, if the indictment had
charged that the defendant "did commit
murder," he would be informed of the crime
charged against him, but no student of the
law with the slightest conception of
constitutional liberty would suggest that
he could be put to trial on such an
indictment against his will....'
"The indictment in this case charges that
appellant 'did commit murder', nothing more, nothing
less. To this extent appellant is apprised of the
charge against him but he could not know the
contentions of the state as to how he committed
murder."
Nelson, 50 Ala. App. at 287-88, 278 So. 2d at 736-37 (quoting
Gayden v. State, 262 Ala. 468, 469-71, 80 So. 2d 501, 502-04
(1955)) (first and second emphases added).
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Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Nelson's
indictment was insufficient because it failed to aver any
facts describing how he committed the crime. Nelson's
indictment stated: "'DAVID LARRY NELSON unlawfully, and with
malice aforethought, killed Oliver King against the peace and
dignity of the State of Alabama.'" 50 Ala. App. at 286, 278
So. 2d at 735. Davis's indictment states: "Kevin Davis ...
did[]  recklessly cause the death of another person, to-wit:
Randall McKenzie, in violation of § 13A-6-3(a)(1) of the Code
of Alabama." Because I believe that Nelson and the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision in the present case are analogous,
I believe that Davis has presented a probability of merit that
the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with Nelson. 
Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on
Tompkins v. State, 898 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004),
for the proposition that "'[a]n indictment that tracks the
language of the statute is sufficient [to inform the accused
of the offense with which he is being charged] if the statute
prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of the
offense.'" ___ So. 3d at ___ (alterations in original)
(quoting Tompkins, 898 So. 2d at 877). However, the Court of
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Criminal Appeals failed to recognize that this is only a
general rule.  As the Gayden Court explained:
"By no means do we intend to detract from the
general rule that it is sufficient to charge the
elements of a statutory offense in the words of the
statute. In passing, however, it is well to note
that the real contention before us is not that the
indictment does not charge an offense, but that the
defendant is not apprised of the thing or things
that he is alleged to have done in such a way as
that they amounted to a crime. Stated another way,
it 
may 
be 
conceded 
that 
the 
defendant 
is
sufficiently informed of the crimes with which he is
charged, but it by no means follows that he has been
sufficiently informed of the acts which allegedly
constituted those crimes. As example, if the
indictment had charged that the defendant 'did
commit murder,' he would be informed of the crime
charged against him, but no student of the law with
the slightest conception of constitutional liberty
would suggest that he could be put to trial on such
an indictment against his will. See 1 Wharton,
Criminal Proceedings, § 270 (10th Ed., 1918), and
authorities supra. So, a parallel to the general
rule that a crime may be charged in the language of
the statute is another contemporary and equally
important principle that it is not sufficient if to
do 
so 
would 
deprive 
the 
defendant 
of 
a
constitutional right."
Gayden, 262 Ala. at 471, 80 So. 2d at 504 (emphasis added).
See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1974)
("'Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used in the
general description of an offence, but it must be accompanied
with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will
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inform the accused of the specific offence, coming under the
general description, with which he is charged.'") (quoting
United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888)); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542, 558 (1875)
("[F]acts are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. A
crime is made up of acts and intent; and these must be set
forth in the indictment, with reasonable particularity of
time, place, and circumstances."); cf. Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions (Criminal) § 6-11 ("To convict, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements
of manslaughter: (1) That (name of the deceased) is dead; and
(2) That the defendant (name of the defendant) recklessly
caused the death of (name of the deceased) by (state the
alleged act, e.g., shooting) him." (emphasis omitted)). 
Davis correctly observes that, before this Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the judgment in Gayden, the Court of
Criminal Appeals had held: "There is a legion of authorities
which declare that an indictment is not sufficient if it
simply follows the language of the statute." Gayden v. State,
38 Ala. App. 39, 43, 80 So. 2d 495, 499 (1954). The court then
cited 11 cases to prove its point. 38 Ala. App at 43-44, 80
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So. 2d at 499-500. Affirming the Court of Appeals' decision,
this Court stated:
"The opinion of the Court of Appeals impresses
us as such an apodictical application of the
fundamental principle of all free governments that
the law secures to every person who is brought to
trial on a charge of crime that the acts which
constitute his alleged guilt shall be set forth with
reasonable certainty in the indictment he is called
upon to plead to, that ... further elaboration would
seem a redundancy." 
Gayden, 262 Ala. at 469, 80 So. 2d at 502. 
Davis observes that the Court of Criminal Appeals
provided an example of a sufficient indictment in Tompkins.
The indictment in that case read:
"'[Ray Tompkins] did, on or about 05/16/2001, with
the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person,
to wit, [A.F.] (18 yrs.), either strike, kick, or
otherwise touch another person, to wit: [A.F.], or
subject him/her to physical contact, to wit; by
trying to get victim to move in with him, rubbed her
on back & butt and asked for "sugar" and really
liked "nipple sugar," also offered her $200.00 to
stay with him. Victim had to leave.'"
Tompkins, 898 So. 2d at 877 (footnote omitted). In contrast,
Davis's indictment said simply: "Kevin Davis ... did[]
recklessly cause the death of another person, to-wit: Randall
McKenzie, in violation of § 13A-6-3(a)(1) of the Code of
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Alabama." Clearly, there is a difference between the two
indictments.
In addition, Davis astutely observes that the legislature
itself has provided two examples of a sufficient indictment
for manslaughter, both of which include a recitation of the
facts constituting the offense. Section 15-8-150, Ala. Code
1975, provides:
"The forms of indictment set forth in this
section in all cases in which they are applicable,
are sufficient, and analogous forms may be used in
other cases.
"....
"(68) MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
 
"A.B. unlawfully and intentionally but without
malice, killed C.D. by stabbing him with a knife (or
by striking him with a stick, etc., as the case may
be).
"(69) MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
"A.B. unlawfully, but without malice or the
intention to kill, killed C.D., by negligently
throwing a brick from the top of a house, (or by
negligently running over him with a horse or by
striking him with a stick, etc., as the case may
be)."
Although § 15-8-150 has not been updated since 1961 to reflect
the change in the law relating to manslaughter (there are no
longer two degrees of manslaughter –- see § 13A-6-3, Ala. Code
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1975), both examples provided by the legislature in § 15-8-150
of a sufficient indictment include a description of the means
by which the offense was allegedly committed. See also § 15-8-
23 (providing that the forms found in § 15-8-150 are
"sufficient in all cases in which the forms there given are
applicable; in other cases, forms may be used as nearly
similar as the nature of the case and the rules prescribed in
this chapter will permit"). In my opinion, the forms found in
§ 15-8-150 are further evidence that when the legislature
mandated 
that 
the 
indictment 
must 
"state 
the 
facts
constituting the offense," § 15-8-25, Ala. Code 1975, it meant
that the indictment must state the facts constituting the
offense. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that Davis could have
moved for a more definite statement under Rule 13.2(e), Ala.
R. Crim. P., ___ So. 3d at ___ n.1, but did not. Although this
is true, it does not necessarily follow that Davis could not
move to dismiss the indictment. See Rule 13.5(c)(1), Ala. R.
Crim. P. ("A motion to dismiss the indictment may be based
upon objections to ... the legal insufficiency of the
indictment ...."); see also Soriano v. State, 527 So. 2d 1367,
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1370 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) ("'"The constitution 
requires 
that
a defendant sufficiently understand the charge against him to
be able to assist in his own defense. Ensuring that the
defendant has that minimum understanding is primarily the 
task
of the trial judge."'") (emphasis added) (quoting Turner v.
State, 429 So. 2d 645, 646 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)). In my
opinion, if we reason that a motion for a more definite
statement under Rule 13.2(e) is the only way an insufficient
indictment may be remedied, then we have nullified the part of
Rule 13.5(c)(1) quoted above and have improperly shifted the
burden to the defendant to ensure that he or she has "a
minimum understanding" of the charges against him. Davis had
the right to move to dismiss the indictment; I do not believe
he should be faulted for exercising that right.
I also fear that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision
has set a dangerous precedent. If Davis's conclusory
indictment is permitted to stand, then other defendants will
be deprived of their constitutional rights in the future in
the same way Davis has been deprived of his. Moreover, if the
indictment does not state how and when Davis killed McKenzie,
then I believe that there is an underlying assumption that the
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notice is adequate because Davis knows what he did. In other
words, there is an assumption that the State does not need to
notify Davis of the allegations against him, because he is
guilty. If this is true, are we not presuming that the
defendant is guilty until proven innocent instead of innocent
until proven guilty? 
I believe that every defendant has the right "to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against
him," a right guaranteed by Art. I, § 6, of the Constitution
of Alabama and by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. Washington, 448 So. 2d at 407. I therefore
respectfully dissent. 
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