Title: State v. Stills
Citation: 310 N.C. 410, 312 S.E.2d 443
Docket Number: 462A83
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 1984

312 S.E.2d 443 (1984) 310 N.C. 410 STATE of North Carolina v. Ronald Lee STILLS. No. 462A83. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 6, 1984. *445 Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Harry H. Harkins, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the state. Adam Stein, Appellate Defender by Ann B. Petersen, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant. MARTIN, Justice. Defendant first claims that certain testimony designated as "corroborative" by the state far exceeded the proper bounds of corroboration and should never have been permitted by the trial court. We agree and remand this case for a new trial. Toby Crandall and Glenda Cook were the only persons to testify as to matters they claimed to have observed firsthand. In addition, the state called six corroborative witnesses: family members Altha Joyce Crandall and Tammy Jones; Officer Marshall Gravley of the Buncombe County Sheriff's Department; Jane Olmsted of the Forsyth County Department of Social Services; Ralph Mason and Evelyn Harless, investigators for the Forsyth County Sheriff's Department. Portions of the secondhand testimony of these six witnesses went to facts and information told to them by one or both of the substantive witnesses, Toby and Glenda. Over defendant's objections, however, the trial court also permitted certain of these corroborative witnesses to testify as to prior out-of-court statements of other corroborative witnesses"to corroborate the corroboration." Here the court was faced with testimony thrice-removed from the original declarant. Furthermore, portions of these so-called "corroborative" statements were in direct conflict with the substantive trial testimony of Glenda Cook or Toby Crandall. Mrs. Altha Joyce Crandall, for example, testifying solely as a corroborative witness at trial, was interviewed by Forsyth County Deputy Sheriff Evelyn Harless on 6 January 1983. The interviewing officer was permitted to read to the jury the entire transcript of the interview. Defense counsel objected "that she has testified and it's hearsay and this is not sufficient value." The trial judge responded: *446 A portion of the transcript read to the jury follows: A review of the record reveals that this "corroborative" testimony is in direct and substantial conflict with the trial testimony of Glenda Cook, Toby Crandall, and Tammy Jones herself, each of whom had testified that Toby had been discovered "fondling" the defendant. Elsewhere the record shows numerous examples of hearsay testimony such as the following: The trial judge, in his charge to the jury, later summarized this portion of the evidence as follows: The evidence against defendant in this case thus consists of (1) confused and inconsistent trial testimony of the state's primary witnesses, Toby and Glenda; (2) testimony of the family and investigating officials as to prior statements of Toby and Glenda, corroborative in varying degrees and accompanied by limiting instructions from the trial court; (3) thirdhand hearsay statements offered by the state to "corroborate" other secondhand testimony which in fact directly conflict with the substantive trial testimony of Toby and Glenda; and (4) other impermissible hearsay statements admitted with no objection and reiterated by the trial court in his charge to the jury. The trial court did not instruct the jury that prior statements of a corroborative witness had been introduced solely for the purpose of corroborating that witness's testimony and were not substantive evidence of the truth of any facts in those prior statements. Defendant argues, and we agree, that it is the third and fourth categories of evidence as summarized above which were improperly heard by the jury and were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. The main task of the jury in most cases is to identify the substantive evidence which is credible. To this end, trial judges in this state generally have wide discretion in admitting evidence which they determine to be helpful to a jury appraisal of credibility. 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 52 (1982). However, as Professor Brandis has noted: Id. at 193. By definition, a prior statement is admitted only as corroboration of the substantive witness and is not itself to be received as substantive evidence. See State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E.2d 800 (1980). Furthermore, "prior consistent statements" are admissible only when they are in fact consistent with the witness's trial testimony. 1 Brandis, supra, § 52; State v. Moore, 300 N.C. 694, 268 S.E.2d 196 (1980); State v. Warren, 289 N.C. 551, 223 S.E.2d 317 (1976); State v. Bagley, 229 N.C. 723, 51 S.E.2d 298 (1949). We hold that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting the challenged "corroborative" testimony. Much of it did not corroborate the other witnesses, and in part it contradicted the substantive testimony. With respect to the primary witness whose testimony is thereby contradicted, the statements are improper as impeachment. As "new" evidence they may not be introduced by the state under a claim of "corroboration." State v. Moore, supra. Moreover, the statements failed to corroborate the witness. The potential of such statements to confuse the jury as to what is substantive evidence in the case far outweighs any probative value. To justify the admission into evidence of hearsay statements three or four times removed from the original declarant under the guise of corroborating the corroborative witnesses is unacceptable. This is not to say, however, that a corroborating witness may not be corroborated. This Court still favors the liberality of the rule as expressed in State v. Henley, 296 N.C. 547, 251 S.E.2d 463 (1979). If there is a question as to whether evidence offered for corroborative purposes is corroborative and admissible, the trial court should conduct a voir dire hearing in the absence of the jury for this determination. The state has argued that any error in admitting this unlawful evidence was harmless, there remaining "plenary competent evidence ... from which the jury could have determined defendant's guilt of the crime charged." Be that as it may, viewing the extent of the incompetent evidence admitted and the likelihood of its effect on the jury, we hold that defendant has carried his burden of showing prejudicial error. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (1983). Defendant has also challenged the validity of the indictment for first degree sexual offense in that it does not specify the sexual act which defendant is alleged to have committed with Toby Crandall. The indictment reads as follows: Defendant argues that his conviction in this case is in violation of his constitutional right to indictment as guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the North Carolina Constitution. In State v. Effler, 309 N.C. 742, 309 S.E.2d 203 (1983), this Court dealt with this precise issue. In that case, as here, defendant was arguing that he "can be convicted of a crime only when the grand jury has charged in the indictment that he committed those acts which are the elements of the offense." Id. at 747, 309 S.E.2d at 206. We do not find the argument persuasive and deem it adequate to repeat the following from Effler: 309 N.C. at 747, 309 S.E.2d at 206. NEW TRIAL.