Title: State v. Sandberg
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100037
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2010

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 100,037 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JASON S. SANDBERG, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
The question of whether Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine applies is a 
question of law. On appeal, questions of law are reviewed de novo.  
 
2. 
Under Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine, if two criminal offenses have 
identical elements but different penalty classifications, a defendant convicted of either 
crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision. 
 
3. 
Legislative intent plays no role in an identical offense sentencing doctrine 
analysis. Rather, regardless of the legislature's intent, if the elements in overlapping 
provisions are identical, the due process considerations involved in the doctrine apply and 
a defendant may only be sentenced to the lesser penalty provided for in the identical, 
overlapping provisions.  
 
 
 
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4. 
Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine does not apply to severity levels of 
the same offense.  
 
5. 
The rule of lenity does not require a prosecutor to charge the least severe level in a 
hierarchy of included offenses.  
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; EVELYN Z. WILSON, judge. Opinion filed July 23, 2010. 
Affirmed.  
 
Shawn E. Minihan, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Jason E. Geier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jamie L. Karasek, assistant 
district attorney, Robert D. Hecht, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.: In enacting K.S.A. 21-3523, the Kansas Legislature defined two 
severity levels for an offense of electronically enticing or soliciting a child to commit or 
submit to an unlawful sex act. The only distinction between the two severity levels is the 
age of the person being enticed or solicited or, more accurately, the age the offender 
believes that person to be. A more severe punishment may be imposed if the offender 
believes the person being enticed or solicited is younger than 14 years of age. K.S.A. 21-
3523(a)(2), (b) (severity level 1 person felony). A less severe punishment is imposed if 
the offender believes the person is younger than 16 years of age. K.S.A. 21-3523(a)(1), 
(b) (severity level 3 person felony). These age groups overlap, meaning that a prosecutor 
has the discretion to charge an offender with either a severity level 1 or a severity level 3 
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person felony if the offender believes the person being enticed or solicited is younger 
than 14 years of age. Pointing to this overlap, Jason S. Sandberg, who was charged with 
the more severe level 1 person felony, argues Kansas' identical offense sentencing 
doctrine and the rule of lenity require that he be sentenced to the lesser severity level 3 
person felony sentence.  
 
We reject his arguments, which would require us to expand the identical offense 
sentencing doctrine beyond past applications. Past cases have applied the doctrine if two 
criminal offenses have identical elements but different penalty provisions; in such a case, 
we have held that a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the 
lesser penalty provision. In this case, Sandberg seeks to apply the doctrine to severity 
levels of the same offense. We decline to expand the doctrine in this manner and also 
conclude the rule of lenity does not require a prosecutor to charge the lowest applicable 
severity level of a given crime.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
The indictment charging Sandberg with electronic solicitation of a child in 
violation of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 did not specify which subsection of the statute 
was charged. However, both the indictment and the written plea agreement identified the 
crime as the most severe, i.e., a severity level 1 person felony pursuant to K.S.A. 2006 
Supp. 21-3523(a)(2), (b). Sandberg pleaded no contest to this charge. During the plea 
hearing, the factual basis offered in support of the plea established that Sandberg 
electronically solicited or enticed a person whom he believed to be 13 years old to 
commit or submit to an unlawful sex act. Sandberg indicated that he understood the crime 
was a severity level 1 person felony carrying a sentencing range of 147 to 653 months, 
depending on his criminal history score.  
 
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After entering the plea and before being sentenced, Sandberg filed a motion for a 
dispositional and durational departure. He argued there were mitigating factors 
warranting a departure, and he raised the argument that Kansas' identical offense 
sentencing doctrine required that he be sentenced under the lesser of the two severity 
levels—i.e., a severity level 3 person felony. The district court heard arguments on the 
motion and directed briefing of the identical offense issue.  
 
In deciding the issue, the district court viewed the issue as one of statutory 
construction. The district court concluded K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 was ambiguous 
and, consequently, a review of the legislative history was warranted. Based on that 
review, the district court determined the legislature intended for offenders to receive a 
harsher punishment when the offender believed the victim to be younger than 14 years of 
age. Accordingly, the court imposed the severity level 1 punishment specified in K.S.A. 
2006 Supp. 21-3523(a)(2), (b) and sentenced Sandberg to a 184-month prison sentence. 
 
Sandberg appealed his sentence, raising only his arguments that the identical 
offense sentencing doctrine and rule of lenity required sentencing him to the penalty 
applicable to a level 3 person felony. Consequently, Sandberg is not attacking the validity 
of his conviction, the facts supporting that conviction, or the failure to depart because of 
mitigating circumstances. This court transferred the case from the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c). 
 
IDENTICAL OFFENSE SENTENCING DOCTRINE 
 
 
The identical offense sentencing doctrine is unique to Kansas and a handful of 
other jurisdictions and, as applied in Kansas, the doctrine is defined in decisions of this 
court. Under the Kansas doctrine, if two criminal offenses have identical elements but 
different penalty classifications, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced 
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only under the lesser penalty provision. State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 253, 258-59, 
200 P.3d 22 (2009). 
 
This doctrine differs from the analytical approach adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 99 S. Ct. 
2198 (1979), when faced with a due process and equal protection challenge brought by a 
defendant who had been sentenced to the more severe penalty allowed by two 
overlapping statutes. However, Sandberg does not raise the due process considerations 
adopted in Batchelder; he relies exclusively on the application of the Kansas doctrine. 
Consequently, if the Kansas doctrine does not apply, there is no need for a further due 
process analysis. 
 
 
On appeal, as before the district court, the parties' arguments assume that the 
identical offense sentencing doctrine applies to the overlapping provisions at issue. 
However, the State does make an argument that implicitly suggests the doctrine does not 
apply when it argues that courts should further the legislative intent of imposing the more 
severe penalty when the victim is believed to be younger than 14 years of age. The reason 
we suggest this is an implicit argument that the doctrine does not apply is because our 
past cases have indicated that legislative intent plays no role in an identical offense 
sentencing doctrine analysis. Rather, regardless of the legislature's intent, "[i]f the 
elements in overlapping provisions are identical, the due process considerations involved 
in Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine apply and a defendant may only be 
sentenced to the lesser punishment provided for in the identical, overlapping provisions." 
Thompson, 287 Kan. at 258.  
 
 
Regardless, at least directly, the parties have skipped the threshold analytical step 
of determining whether the doctrine applies. Only if it does would we reach the level of 
analysis on which the parties focus and determine whether the doctrine required the 
district court to impose a severity level 3 person felony sentence. Even though the parties 
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did not address the threshold question, our analysis would be erroneous if we blindly 
applied the doctrine without determining whether the circumstances warranted our doing 
so. Consequently, we address the question even though it was not directly raised by the 
parties. See State v. Sedillos, 279 Kan. 777, 785, 112 P.3d 854 (2005) (appellate court 
may address question not raised by parties when issues cannot be fully analyzed without 
doing so).  
 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
The question of whether Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine applies is a 
question of law. On appeal, questions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Appleby, 289 
Kan. 1017, 1038, 221 P.3d 525 (2009).  
 
B. 
Application of Kansas' Identical Offense Sentencing Doctrine 
 
 
Several years after the Batchelder decision, this court applied the identical offense 
sentencing doctrine in State v. Clements, 241 Kan. 77, 83, 734 P.2d 1096 (1987). In 
Clements, the defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 
1986 Supp. 21-3506, a class B felony. On appeal, this court vacated the sentence and 
ordered that Clements be sentenced to the term applicable when one takes indecent 
liberties with a child under the age of 14 by performing an act of sodomy, a class C 
felony defined by K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 21-3503(1)(b). In reaching this holding, this court 
explained:  
 
"Where identical offenses are involved, the question is not truly a matter of one being a 
lesser included offense of the other. Each has identical elements and the decision as to 
which penalty to seek cannot be a matter of prosecutorial whimsy in charging. As to 
identical offenses, a defendant can only be sentenced under the lesser penalty." 
(Emphasis added.) Clements, 241 Kan. at 83. 
 
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Through this language this court distinguished the identical offense sentencing doctrine 
from lesser included offense principles. This is significant to our discussion because we 
are dealing with a lesser included offense as defined by the Kansas Legislature in K.S.A. 
21-3107(2)(a) (a lesser included offense is, inter alia, a crime that is a "lesser degree of 
the same crime").  
 
 
Two years later, this court applied the Clements holding to the same statutes—
aggravated sodomy and indecent liberties by committing sodomy—and defined the 
doctrine by clarifying the circumstances in which it applied. We stated: "Where two 
criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of 
imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under 
the lesser penalty provision." (Emphasis added.) State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229, 768 
P.2d 268 (1989). Significantly, as the emphasized language indicates, the Nunn statement 
of the doctrine limited its application to circumstances where two criminal offenses were 
being compared.  
 
 
Subsequently, this court has used the same language in each case where we have 
applied the doctrine, and, in each of these cases, the doctrine was applied to two separate 
offenses. E.g., State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67, 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (applying to 
K.S.A. 65-4152[a][3] and K.S.A. 65-4159[a]); State v. Fanning, 281 Kan. 1176, 1180, 
135 P.3d 1067 (2006) (applying to K.S.A. 65-4152[a][3] and K.S.A. 65-4159); State v. 
Cherry, 279 Kan. 535, 538-41, 112 P.3d 224 (2005) (applying to K.S.A. 65-4152[a][3] 
and K.S.A. 65-7006); State v. Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 4, 10, 106 P.3d 1129 (2005) 
(applying to K.S.A. 65-4152[a][3] and K.S.A. 65-7006[a]); State v. McAdam, 277 Kan. 
136, 145-46, 83 P.3d 161 (2004) (applying to K.S.A. 65-4159[a] and K.S.A. 65-4161[a]). 
 
Hence, the critical language defining the application of the identical offense 
sentencing doctrine in our past cases has two components: (1) two criminal offenses that 
(2) have identical elements. In contrast, Sandberg attempts to apply the doctrine to 
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severity levels of the same offense. This raises the question of whether the doctrine 
should apply in the present circumstance. 
 
C. 
Is Expansion Warranted? 
 
 
 
To answer the question of whether Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine 
should be applied when severity levels of the same offense have overlapping provisions, 
we will examine the purpose of and policy underlying the doctrine. In Clements, this 
court explained the underlying policy as the need to avoid "prosecutorial whimsy." 
Clements, 241 Kan. at 83. This concern was repeated in Nunn, 244 Kan. at 229. 
Subsequently, in Cooper, we noted the Clements-Nunn prosecutorial whimsy concern but 
also observed that subsequent cases had recognized an additional due process concern, 
which we summarized by stating: "[I]t is difficult to discern legislative intent regarding 
the level of punishment when two statutes that proscribe the same conduct have identical 
elements but differing sentencing provisions." (Emphasis added.) Cooper, 285 Kan. at 
968.  
 
 
In Cooper, we noted that both concerns had been discussed in Campbell, 279 Kan. 
at 16. In Campbell, we identified three circumstances where statutory provisions might 
have identical elements and we explained the differing due process implications of each 
situation, stating: 
 
"'[I]t is useful to think about three types of situations in which a defendant's conduct may 
fall within two statutes. They are: (1) where one statute defines a lesser included offense 
of the other and they carry different penalties . . . ; (2) where the statutes overlap and 
carry different penalties . . . ; (3) where the statutes are identical. . . .  
 
"'The first of the three is certainly unobjectionable. Such provisions are quite 
common (robbery-armed robbery; battery-aggravated battery; joyriding-theft; 
housebreaking-burglary), and usually are a consequence of a deliberate attempt by the 
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legislature to identify one or more aggravated characteristics which in the judgment of 
the legislature should ordinarily be viewed as making the lesser crime more serious. They 
afford guidance to the prosecutor, but . . . do not foreclose the prosecutor from deciding 
in a particular case that, notwithstanding the presence of one of the aggravated facts, the 
defendant will still be prosecuted for the lesser offense. 
 
"'By contrast, the third of the three is highly objectionable. It is likely to be a 
consequence of legislative carelessness, and even if it is not such a scheme serves no 
legitimate purpose. There is nothing at all rational about this kind of statutory scheme, as 
it provides for different penalties without any effort whatsoever to explain a basis for the 
difference. It cannot be explained in terms of giving assistance to the prosecutor. "Where 
statutes are identical except for punishment, the prosecutor finds not the slightest shred of 
guidance." It confers discretion which is totally unfettered and which is totally 
unnecessary. . . . 
 
"'As for the second of the three categories, it clearly presents a harder case. . . . 
[I]n the overlap scheme the two statutes will at least sometimes assist the prosecutor in 
deciding how to exercise his charging discretion. "In overlapping statutes, the focus 
frequently is on different types of conduct, thus giving the prosecutor at least some idea 
of which statute he should proceed under."'" Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14-15 (quoting 4 
LaFave, Israel & King, Criminal Procedure § 13.7[a], pp. 95-99 [2d ed. 1999]).  
 
 
This case falls within the first category—lesser included offenses— that is 
"'certainly unobjectionable.' [Citation omitted.]" Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14. As explained 
in Campbell, when the legislature creates a hierarchy of degrees of an offense, it provides 
guidance as to the aggravating factor or factors. Nevertheless, we emphasized that this 
was simply legislative guidance to the prosecutor because nothing "'foreclose[s] the 
prosecutor from deciding in a particular case that, notwithstanding the presence of one of 
the aggravated facts, the defendant will still be prosecuted for the lesser offense.' 
[Citation omitted.]" Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14. In other words, in charging a robbery 
offense, a prosecutor could ignore the use of a weapon and decline to charge armed or 
aggravated robbery and instead prosecute the lesser offense. Or, in a battery case, the 
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prosecutor could ignore a more serious degree of bodily injury and charge battery rather 
than aggravated battery. Similarly, a prosecutor charging a violation of K.S.A. 2006 
Supp. 21-3523 could choose to ignore the fact a victim was believed to be younger than 
14 years of age—the aggravating factor in the electronic solicitation statute—and charge 
the defendant with a lesser offense. On the other hand, where the aggravating factor is 
factually applicable, the prosecutor may charge the more severe crime.  
 
This conclusion is not altered by the fact the legislature could have easily and 
clearly drawn the line between severity levels in K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 so there was 
no overlap in the defined age ranges. See, e.g., L. 2009, ch. 70, sec. 1 (amending K.S.A. 
2006 Supp. 21-3523 to make severity level 3 offense apply only when offender believes 
person being enticed or solicited is "14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of 
age"); K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(1) (unlawful to have sexual intercourse with a child "who is 14 
or more years of age but less than 16 years of age"). The Kansas identical offense 
sentencing doctrine does not require this segregation. For example, again using an 
example cited in Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14, we have not held that an offender could never 
be charged with aggravated robbery because he or she could be charged with a less 
severe degree of robbery. Similarly, a prosecutor should not be precluded from charging 
an offender with the greater offense of electronic solicitation simply because the offender 
could be charged with the lesser offense. This is especially true where, as here, there is a 
strong practical rationale for giving a prosecutor discretion when potentially the only 
difference between one crime and another is one day on the calendar—e.g., where one 
crime occurs the day before the victim's fourteenth birthday and the other occurs on the 
victim's fourteenth birthday.  
 
Moreover, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 clearly gives notice of the potential 
penalty. As the district court observed, where there is ambiguity it arises because of the 
potential for either section to be applied when the offender believes the victim is younger 
than 14 years of age. Once again, however, this ambiguity arises in every case where the 
11 
 
facts fit several severity levels of the same crime. Even though an offender may not know 
how a prosecutor will exercise his or her discretion in charging, the offender knows of the 
potential. As Sandberg admitted at his plea hearing, he had notice that he could be 
sentenced under a severity level 1 person felony.  
 
In other words, there is no more discretion granted to the prosecutor in this case 
and no less notice of possible penalties than in other charging situations where a 
prosecutor must decide which severity level of the same crime should be charged. We, 
therefore, decline to extend Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine to the 
circumstances of this case and conclude it does not apply to severity levels of the same 
offense.  
 
RULE OF LENITY 
 
Sandberg also argues that the rule of lenity requires that he be sentenced under the 
lesser of the two severity levels. He cites no separate authority to support this argument. 
 
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction commonly applied in the 
criminal law context. State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 470, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). It has 
no application in this analysis. As we have noted, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 is clear and 
unambiguous as written. Although the district court perceived an ambiguity when the 
statute is applied to situations where the victim is believed to be younger than 14 years of 
age, the ambiguity does not arise because of ambiguity in the language; the provisions are 
clearly written and clearly overlap. The perceived ambiguity is whether the legislature 
really intended an overlap or wanted a clear segregation that did not leave any 
prosecutorial discretion. Nevertheless, courts need not resolve that question because 
"'[n]o matter what the legislature may have really intended to do, if it did not in fact do it, 
under any reasonable interpretation of the language used, the defect is one which the 
legislature alone can correct.' [Citation omitted.]" Kenyon v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 
12 
 
254 Kan. 287, 293, 864 P.2d 1161 (1993). Here, regardless of whether the legislature 
meant to, it clearly created an overlap, and the only question presented is whether that 
overlap violates Sandberg's right to due process. The rule of lenity is not an appropriate 
tool for that analysis because the rule does not require a prosecutor to charge the least 
severe level in a hierarchy of included offenses. The rule of lenity provides Sandberg no 
relief.  
 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the district court ultimately reached the correct 
conclusion that Sandberg could be sentenced to a severity level 1 person felony sentence, 
even though the district court used different grounds for reaching that conclusion. See 
State v. Hawkins, 285 Kan. 842, 845, 176 P.3d 174 (2008) (judgment of district court 
may be upheld on appeal despite its reliance on the wrong ground). Sandberg was 
appropriately sentenced to a severity level 1 person felony. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
 * * * 
 
JOHNSON, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent. If we are going to continue to 
recognize the court-made identical offense doctrine in this state, it should apply here. 
 
The majority quotes Campbell's recitation of the three circumstances where 
statutory provisions might have identical elements: "'(1) where one statute defines a 
lesser included offense of [another offense] and they carry different penalties . . . ; (2) 
where the statutes overlap and carry different penalties . . . ; (3) where the statutes are 
identical.'" State v. Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 14, 106 P.3d 1129 (2005) (quoting 4 LaFave, 
Israel & King, Criminal Procedure § 13.7(a), p. 95). The majority acknowledges that the 
provisions of K.S.A. 21-3523(a)(1) and (a)(2) fit within the second circumstance of 
overlapping provisions. However, because the legislature labeled K.S.A. 21-3523(a)(1) as 
13 
 
a lesser degree of the crime defined in K.S.A. 21-3523(a)(2), the provisions also fall 
within the first circumstance of a lesser included offense. The majority opines that lesser 
included offenses were never intended to be covered by the identical offense doctrine; 
rather, the doctrine only applies where two separate statutes are involved.  
 
 
If it is true that all lesser included offenses are not subject to the identical offense 
doctrine, regardless of whether they fit into another circumstance, then there would be 
nothing to prohibit a lesser included offense which is identical to the greater degree of the 
crime, i.e., the third circumstance of identical statutory provisions. Accordingly, the 
legislature could have made the age of the victim element in both K.S.A. 21-3523(a)(1) 
and (a)(2) to be a person younger than 16 years of age, so long as it made one of the 
crimes a lesser degree of the other by specifying a lesser penalty. Then, under the 
majority's rationale, the identical offense doctrine could not be utilized to prevent a 
prosecutor from arbitrarily selecting either punishment for a violation of the identical 
statutory provisions, unfettered by the rule of lenity or due process considerations. 
 
As the majority notes, the original rationale for the identical offense doctrine was 
that "the decision as to which penalty to seek cannot be a matter of prosecutorial whimsy 
in charging." State v. Clements, 241 Kan. 77, 83, 734 P.2d 1096 (1987). Ironically, the 
majority justifies excluding from the doctrine those statutory provisions which the 
legislature has labeled as lesser included offenses based upon unfettered prosecutorial 
discretion. The majority notes that prosecutors are always free to ignore the facts and 
choose to prosecute a defendant for a lesser crime, i.e., exercise prosecutorial whimsy in 
charging. While the recognition that prosecutorial discretion permits whimsical decision-
making in the real world might counsel against continuing the identical offense doctrine 
in this state, I do not view it as justifying the disparate treatment of overlapping 
provisions based upon where they are placed in the statute book. 
 
14 
 
Moreover, I would note a distinction in the majority's examples of prosecutorial 
discretion with respect to lesser included offenses. Those examples require the prosecutor 
to ignore a fact, e.g., that the robbery was committed with a deadly weapon or that the 
battery victim sustained great bodily harm. In those instances, the lesser included 
offenses are a subset of the greater crime because an additional fact must be added to the 
lesser included offense to satisfy the elements of the greater offense. Here, if Sandberg 
believed that the person he was enticing or soliciting was age 13, then he believed both 
that the victim was under the age of 14 years and that the victim was under the age of 16 
years. In other words, the greater degree of the crime is a subset of the lesser included 
offense because persons under age 14 years are among those persons who are under age 
16 years. The prosecutor did not have to ignore any fact in order to legitimately charge 
Sandberg under the elements of the lesser crime.  
 
As noted by the majority, the rationale for the doctrine has evolved to include due 
process considerations. See State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 257, 200 P. 3d 22 (2009). 
Nevertheless, the majority contends that the overlapping provisions do not violate those 
due process considerations because they give appropriate notice of the potential penalties 
involved. In that regard, the opinion points out that Sandberg had notice at the plea 
hearing that he was charged with the severity level 1 version of the offense. However, in 
my view, the notice problem arises at the earlier stage, when the crime is being 
committed. "'[A] fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common 
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.'" Wright v. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 451 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States 
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488, 92 S. Ct. 515 [1971]) (discussing the 
principle of lenity).  
 
I would have required the statute to give more explicit warning as to the 
punishment which would be applicable to the proscribed conduct, especially given the 
legislature's demonstrated ability to clearly distinguish crime severity based upon the 
15 
 
victim's age. See, e.g., K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(1) (unlawful to have sexual intercourse with a 
child "who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age"). Accordingly, I 
would reverse and remand for resentencing the offense as a severity level 3 person 
felony.