Title: Kpiele-Poda v. Patterson-UTI Energy, et al.
Citation: 2023 OK 11
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 2023

Kpiele-Poda v. Patterson-UTI Energy, et al. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In 2018, Mwande Serge Kpiele-Poda ("Employee") was injured at a wellsite while repairing a conveyor that activated and crushed his legs. While Employee's Workers' Compensation claim was still pending, he filed a petition asserting negligence and products liability against his employers, two wellsite operators, and the manufacturers and distributors of the conveyor. Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. was named in the body of the petition but omitted from the caption. After the statute of limitations period expired, Employee amended his petition to add Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. as a defendant in the petition's caption. A second amended petition added other parties. Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. moved to dismiss arguing the claim was time-barred because the amended petition did not relate back to the first petition. Employee's employers also moved to dismiss arguing the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act and Oklahoma precedent precluded employees from simultaneously maintaining an action before the Workers' Compensation Commission and in the district court. The district court granted each dismissal motion and certified each order as appealable. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained and consolidated Employee's separate appeals, holding: (1) the district court erred when it dismissed Employee's action against Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. as time-barred; and (2) the district court properly dismissed Employee's intentional tort action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . KPIELE-PODA v. PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY 2023 OK 11 Case Number: 119375 Decided: 02/14/2023 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. MWANDE SERGE KPIELE-PODA, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY, INC., UNIVERSAL PRESSURE PUMPING, INC., SEVENTY SEVEN OPERATING, LLC, PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGIES LLC, CAMBELT INTERNATIONAL CORP., CAMBELT INTERNATIONAL, LLC, CAMBELT INTERNATIONAL, LLC, U.S. SILICA COMPANY, SANDBOX LOGISTICS, LLC, SANDBOX ENTERPRISES, LLC, SANDBOX LEASING, LLC, SANDBOX TRANSPORTATION, LLC, and CASILLAS OPERATING, LLC, Defendants, and OVINTIV MID-CONTINENT, INC., Defendant/Appellee. MWANDE SERGE KPIELE-PODA, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY, INC., UNIVERSAL PRESSURE PUMPING, INC., SEVENTY SEVEN OPERATING, LLC, PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Defendants/Appellees, and CAMBELT INTERNATIONAL CORP., CAMBELT INTERNATIONAL, LLC, CAMBELT INTERNATIONAL, LLC, U.S. SILICA COMPANY, SANDBOX LOGISTICS, LLC, SANDBOX ENTERPRISES, LLC, SANDBOX LEASING, LLC, SANDBOX TRANSPORTATION, LLC, CASILLAS OPERATING, LLC, and OVINTIV MID-CONTINENT, INC. Defendants. ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE CINDY H. TRUONG, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Employee was injured at a wellsite in Kingfisher County while repairing a conveyor that activated and crushed his legs. While Employee's Workers' Compensation claim was still pending, he filed a petition asserting negligence and products liability in the District Court of Oklahoma County against his employers, two wellsite operators, and the manufacturers and distributors of the conveyor. Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. was named in the body of the petition but omitted from the caption. After the statute of limitations period expired, Employee amended his petition to add Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. as a defendant in the petition's caption. A second amended petition added other parties. Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. moved to dismiss arguing the claim was time-barred because the amended petition did not relate back to the first petition. Employee's employers also moved to dismiss arguing the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act and Oklahoma precedent preclude employees from simultaneously maintaining an action before the Workers' Compensation Commission and in the district court. The district court granted each dismissal motion and certified each order as appealable pursuant to 12 O.S.2011, § 994(A). We retained and consolidated Employee's separate appeals. We hold: 1) the district court erred when it dismissed Employee's action against Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. as time-barred; and 2) the district court properly dismissed Employee's intentional tort action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. MATTERS PREVIOUSLY RETAINED FOR DISPOSITION; DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. Daniel Talbot, TALBOT LAW GROUP, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Plaintiff/Appellant, Mwande Serge Kpiele-Poda. J. Todd Woolery, Jodi C. Cole, and Katelyn King, MCAFEE & TAFT, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellee Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. Toby McKinstry, TOMLINSON -- MCKINSTRY, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Defendants/Appellees Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc., Universal Pressure Pumping, Inc., Seventy Seven Operating, LLC, and Performance Technologies, LLC. OPINION ROWE, V.C.J.: ¶1 In this consolidated appeal of separate district court dismissal orders, we are tasked with deciding two questions: 1) whether the district court erred by dismissing Employee's amended petition, finding it was time-barred; and 2) whether the district court erred by dismissing Employee's intentional tort claim while his workers' compensation claim remained pending. I. BACKGROUND ¶2 On June 4, 2018, Mwande Serge Kpiele-Poda ("Employee") was injured at a wellsite while repairing a Sandbox Conveyor ("Conveyor"). During the repair, a part of the Conveyor activated and crushed both of Employee's legs. Employee filed a workers' compensation claim for injury to his legs and lower back, naming Universal Pressure Pumping, Inc. ("UPPI") as his employer. This claim remains pending. ¶3 Following the injury, Employee received medical treatment, and UPPI's workers' compensation insurance carrier voluntarily paid Employee temporary benefits. The Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission") issued orders awarding medical examinations, authorizing medical treatment, and changes in treating physician. ¶4 On June 2, 2020, two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations for Employee's claims relating to his injuries, he filed a petition ("Original Petition") in Oklahoma County District Court against his employer, the manufacturer of the Conveyor, and the owner and operators of the well location. Employee alleged that UPPI and three other alleged employers, Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc., Seventy Seven Operating, LLC, and Performance Technologies, LLC (collectively, "Employers"), "ordered, encouraged, allowed, or otherwise caused Plaintiff to service and/or repair a part of the Sandbox Conveyor while requiring other parts of the Sandbox Conveyor to continue operating with the knowledge that injury and/or death was substantially certain to occur not merely foreseeable or substantially likely."1 Employee also referred to Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. ("Ovintiv") in the general allegations as an owner or operator of the wellsite and alleged Ovintiv contributed to Employee's injuries under a theory of negligence.2 Employee did not list Ovintiv as a defendant in the caption of the lawsuit. ¶5 Before serving the Original Petition on any defendant, but after the limitations period expired, Employee discovered the omission of Ovintiv in the caption. On September 23, 2020, Employee filed an amended petition ("Amended Petition"), which included Ovintiv in the caption.3 All defendants were served with summons and the Amended Petition on October 26, 2020, followed by a second amended petition served almost a month later. ¶6 Ovintiv and Employers filed separate motions for dismissal. Ovintiv's motion to dismiss argued Employee's negligence claim was time-barred because Ovintiv was not sued prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and the Amended Petition did not relate back to the original filing date pursuant to Oklahoma's relation back statute.4 The district court granted Ovintiv's motion to dismiss, concluding "the statute of limitation ran"5 and also granted Employee's oral motion to certify the ruling as immediately appealable. Employee timely appealed the dismissal order and we retained the matter for disposition. ¶7 Employers' motion to dismiss argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Employee's intentional tort claim because Employee's remedy was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission.6 The district court granted Employers' motion to dismiss, finding Employee could not simultaneously maintain an action before the Commission and the district court. Employee appealed, and we retained the matter for disposition. We consolidated Employee's separate appeals for review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 This Court will review the district court's grant of dismissal motions de novo. See, e.g., Woods v. Prestwick House, Inc., 2011 OK 9, ¶ 14, 247 P.3d 1183 , 1187--88 (although limitations issues may involve mixed questions of fact and law, generally, in this Court they are reviewed de novo); Farley v. City of Claremore, 2020 OK 30, ¶ 17, 465 P.3d 1213, 1224 (an order granting a motion to dismiss that raises a jurisdictional issue is reviewed de novo and allegations of a petition are deemed as true similar to a review of a § 2012(B)(6) motion to dismiss). ¶9 The issues before us pose questions of statutory interpretation. A statute's construction and application presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Strickland v. Stephens Prod. Co., 2018 OK 6, ¶ 4, 411 P.3d 369, 372. De novo review "involves a plenary, independent, and non-deferential examination of the trial court's legal rulings." Id. III. ANALYSIS A. Employee's Original Petition Was Timely Filed Against Ovintiv. ¶10 Oklahoma's general rules of pleading require a pleading to contain only "[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief." 12 O.S.Supp.2013, § 2008(A)(1). In addition, a pleading must contain a caption which sets forth the name of the court, title of the action, file number, and "shall include the names of all the parties." 12 O.S.2011, § 2010(A).7 However, "[t]he general philosophy in [Oklahoma's Pleading Code, 12 O.S.2011, § 2001 et seq.] is that pleadings should give fair notice of the claim and be subject to liberal amendment, should be liberally construed so as to do substantial justice, and that decisions should be made on the merits rather than on technical niceties." Wilson v. Webb, 2009 OK 56, ¶ 9, 221 P.3d 730, 734. ¶11 Both parties cite Klopfenstein v. Oklahoma Deptartment of Human Services, 2008 OK CIV APP 16, 177 P.3d 594 in support of their position.8 In Klopfenstein, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held "[a]lthough the Oklahoma and federal rules of pleading require parties to be named in the caption of a petition, the failure to do so is not necessarily fatal." Id. ¶ 14, 177 P.3d at 597.9 Employee contends the omission of Ovintiv is not fatal because the Original Petition clearly states a cause of action against Ovintiv, and Ovintiv received notice within the required time period. Ovintiv argues that while the failure to name a party in the caption of a lawsuit is not always fatal to the action, it did not receive "fair notice"10 and would be prejudiced if forced to defend against the alleged claims. ¶12 Ovintiv's contention that it did not receive notice is misguided. Contrary to Ovintiv's position, the law does not require notice prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.11 12 O.S.Supp.2017, § 2004(I)12 requires service to be made 180 days from the date of filing. Here, Employee was required to serve summons of the petition within 180 days of the date of filing the Original Petition. Before serving the Original Petition on all defendants, Employee discovered Ovintiv's omission from the caption. Employee timely amended his petition to correct the mistake pursuant to 12 O.S.Supp.2018, § 2015(A).13 The Amended Petition was then served on all defendants on September 23, 2020--well within the 180 day service requirement. Thus, Ovintiv received fair notice of the claims against it along with the other defendants. ¶13 Here, the omission of Ovintiv in the lawsuit's caption is not fatal. The caption of a petition is the heading which shows the names of the parties, the name of the court, and number of the case on the docket--the caption is not part of the substance of a petition. Although § 2010(A) requires the name of all parties to be included in the caption, an omission of a party from a caption is not necessarily fatal. The omission of a party from the caption is not fatal where the party is sufficiently named in the body of the petition; § 2010(A) is satisfied by an amended petition filed pursuant to § 2015(A); and the amended petition is served within 180 days from the filing date of the original petition pursuant to § 2004(I). ¶14 Reading § 2010(A) in harmony with § 2015(A) and § 2004(I), we find Employee's Original Petition was timely filed against Ovintiv. The body of the Original Petition identified Ovintiv as an owner of and or operator of the site on which Employee was working and where Ovintiv could be served with process;14 Employee amended the Original Petition to add Ovintiv to the caption; and Ovintiv received fair notice when Ovintiv was served with the Amended Petition within 180 days of the filing of the Original Petition. Our finding comports with the Oklahoma Pleading Code's objective to promote substantial justice and our extant caselaw. Accordingly, the trial court's dismissal of Employee's action against Ovintiv as time-barred is reversed.15 B. Employee May Not Simultaneously Maintain An Action in the Workers' Compensation Court and the District Court. ¶15 Oklahoma's Administrative Workers' Compensation Act ("AWCA") places a duty upon employers to bear the responsibility for compensating employees for accidental personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. 85A O.S.2014, § 3.16 For accidental injuries incurred in the course of employment, the rights and remedies afforded to the injured employee under AWCA are "exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee." 85A O.S.2014, § 5(A).17 The exclusive remedy does not apply, however, if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation or if the injury was caused by an intentional tort committed by the employer. 85A O.S.2014, § 5(B).18 If either exception is present, "the injured employee or his legal representative may maintain an action either before the Commission or in the district court, but not both." 85A O.S.2014, § 5(I).19 ¶16 The question of whether Employee is statutorily entitled to maintain an action for intentional tort in the district court while simultaneously pursuing a workers' compensation claim concerns the application and interpretation of 85A O.S.2014, § 5(I). Section 5(I) provides: If the employer has failed to secure the payment of compensation as provided in this act or in the case of an intentional tort, the injured employee or his legal representative may maintain an action either before the commission or in the district court, but not both. Employers contend Employee's work-related injuries fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission, and that 85A O.S.2014, § 5(I) prohibits Employee from simultaneously pursuing a remedy for the same injuries before the Commission and the district court. Conversely, Employee contends he has a right under AWCA to assert a claim in the district court for intentional tort because he has not elected his remedy with the Commission, or in the alternative, he is not precluded from maintaining an action in the district court because the Commission has not rendered a final adjudication. ¶17 To support their position, Employers rely upon Farley v. City of Claremore, 2020 OK 30, 465 P.3d 1213. In Farley, a spouse's husband was killed due to a work-related injury. She sought and obtained workers' compensation death benefits for the death of her husband. Eleven months after the conclusion of the workers' compensation proceeding, she brought a claim in the district court for damages alleging her husband's death was caused by an intentional tort committed by her husband's employer. Id. ¶ 1, 465 P.3d at 1218. The employer filed a motion to dismiss arguing the "workers' compensation remedy was the sole remedy for the plaintiff and plaintiff has previously and successfully pursued that remedy and was seeking double recovery." Id. ¶ 3, 465 P.3d at 1219. The district court granted the employer's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and plaintiff appealed to this Court. We upheld the dismissal, finding that because her spouse's wrongful death injury was fully adjudicated and compensated, the successful adjudication demonstrated the injury was exclusively before the Commission and not within the jurisdiction of the district court. Id. ¶ 68, 465 P.3d at 1243. ¶18 Employers' reliance on Farley is misguided. In Farley the surviving spouse successfully concluded her workers' compensation claim then asserted a claim in the district court, wherein we applied the doctrine of claim preclusion.20 Claim preclusion was applicable because the surviving spouse sought an intentional tort claim in the district court after her workers' compensation claim reached a final adjudication. We held "an adjudication of the accidental nature of an employee's death precludes a subsequent District Court action collaterally attacking the accidental nature of the injury alleging it arose from an intentional tort outside the jurisdictional scope of an award by the Workers' Compensation Commission." Id. ¶ 30, 465 P.3d at 1230. Farley is not conclusive here because the facts are distinguishable and the doctrine of claim preclusion is not applicable. ¶19 To answer the question before us, we look to the text of § 5(I). "The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and purpose as expressed by statutory language." Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 2018 OK 23, ¶ 17, 415 P.3d 521, 528. "It is presumed that the Legislature has expressed its intent in a statute's language and that it intended what it so expressed." Id. "Only where legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the language of a statute, as in cases of ambiguity, are rules of statutory interpretation employed." Id. ¶ 18, 415 P.3d 521, at 528. (citations omitted). "The test for ambiguity in a statute is whether the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." Id. (citations omitted). ¶20 We find no ambiguity in § 5(I). Section 5(I) permits an employee to maintain an action either before the Commission or in the district court, but not both. The word "either" demonstrates the Legislature intended for an employee to choose one forum to pursue his claim--not two forums. This interpretation is further supported by the statute's language "but not both" at the end of the sentence. Such language reinforces the requirement to choose between two forums--which serves to protect employers from defending against two claims filed simultaneously in different forums--and bolsters the underlying public policy against double recovery. ¶21 Despite the explicit language, Employee contends he may maintain a claim in both forums simultaneously because his workers' compensation claim has not yet reached a point of conclusion. His position is contrary to the text. First, the text does not say that one claim must reach finality to exclude the pursuit of a claim in another forum. Second, the text says an employee may "maintain an action." The plain and ordinary meaning of "maintain an action" means to pursue, continue, or institute.21 Thus, when an employee chooses a forum, invokes its jurisdiction, and pursues that claim, he is effectively maintaining his action. ¶22 When an employee's injury arises out of and in the course of employment, the rights and remedies granted to that employee are exclusive under AWCA, meaning there is not a choice between different forums. However, when allegations of intentional tort are present, the rights and remedies are no longer exclusive under AWCA, and a choice between two forums is available. According to the text of § 5(I), the injured employee is afforded a choice of pursuing and maintaining an action either before the Commission or in the district court, but not both. ¶23 Here, Employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment; thus his rights and remedies fell under AWCA. However, Employee's allegations of intentional tort against Employers provided him a choice between two forums--the Commission or the district court, but not both. Employee gave notice of his claim for compensation by filing a CC-Form 3,22 which invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission.23 Employee chose the Commission as the forum in which to pursue his remedy when he filed the CC-Form 3. While his workers' compensation claim remained pending, he filed his district court action, which is explicitly prohibited by the text of § 5(I). Employee is not entitled to maintain an action simultaneously before the Commission and in the district court. Accordingly, the trial court's dismissal of Employee's tort action against Employers for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is affirmed. IV. CONCLUSION ¶24 We find Employee's Original Petition was timely filed against Ovintiv. Although Ovintiv was not included in the caption of the Original Petition, Ovintiv was sufficiently included in the body of the Original Petition, Employee timely amended the Original Petition to include Ovintiv in the caption, and Ovintiv received fair notice when it was served the Amended Petition within 180 days. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal is reversed. ¶25 We find 85A O.S. § 5(I) of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act unambiguously permits an employee to maintain an action either before the Commission or in the district court, but not both. Employee invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission and has maintained his action in that forum. Accordingly, Employee is statutorily prohibited from maintaining a simultaneous action in the district court and the district court's dismissal is affirmed. MATTERS PREVIOUSLY RETAINED FOR DISPOSITION; DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. Kane, C.J., Rowe, V.C.J., Winchester, Edmondson, Kuehn, JJ., concur. Gurich, J., (by separate writing), with whom Kauger, Combs, and Darby, JJ., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. FOOT