Title: State v. Rachel W. Kelty
Citation: 2006 WI 101
Docket Number: 2003AP003055-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2006

2006 WI 101 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Rachel W. Kelty,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 873, 690 N.W.2d 884 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood   
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Mason  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Michael J. 
Fairchild and Michael J. Fairchild Law Office, Menomonie, and 
oral argument by Michael J. Fairchild. 
 
 
2006 WI 101
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP3055-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2000CF275) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Rachel W. Kelty, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals that reversed an 
order of the Circuit Court for Wood County, James M. Mason, 
Judge.1  The circuit court denied Rachel Kelty’s postconviction, 
post-sentencing motion to withdraw her plea to two counts of 
first-degree 
reckless 
injury 
in 
violation 
of 
                                                 
1 State v. Kelty, No. 2003AP3055-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 2004).   
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a) (1999-00).2  In her motion, Kelty 
challenged the validity of her conviction to the second reckless 
injury count, claiming that it was multiplicitous.  The circuit 
court concluded that Kelty had waived any double jeopardy defect 
by pleading guilty to both counts.  A divided court of appeals 
reversed, holding that only an express waiver of double jeopardy 
can relinquish a defendant’s double jeopardy rights. 
¶2 
We 
are 
asked 
to 
decide 
whether 
an 
otherwise 
satisfactory guilty plea is sufficient to relinquish a double 
jeopardy/multiplicity challenge upon direct appeal.  We conclude 
that 
a 
guilty plea relinquishes 
the 
right 
to 
assert a 
multiplicity claim when the claim cannot be resolved on the 
record.  When a defendant enters a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary guilty plea, the nature and effect of the plea 
necessarily mean that the defendant gives up the right to a 
fact-finding hearing on the propriety of multiple charges.  
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1989). 
¶3 
Our decision should not be understood to render guilty 
pleas impervious to double jeopardy challenges.  A defendant 
retains the right (1) to challenge whether a plea is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary by pointing to errors in the plea 
colloquy pursuant to State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, __ Wis. 2d __, 
__ N.W.2d __ and State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986); (2) to claim the ineffective assistance of 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-00 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
3 
 
counsel pursuant to State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 
N.W.2d 50 (1996); and (3) to challenge the authority of the 
state to prosecute her and the power of a court to enter the 
conviction or impose the sentence, where the existing record 
allows the court to determine whether the defendant's double 
jeopardy rights have been violated.  See Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 
574-75.3  Because Kelty's attempt to withdraw her guilty plea 
cannot meet any of these grounds for withdrawal,4 we reverse the 
court of appeals. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
On September 14, 2000, Rachel Kelty was a guest in the 
Wisconsin Rapids home of Candice Falkosky, who was babysitting 
her 16-month old nephew.  The child was sleeping on the second 
floor when Kelty came downstairs with "blood all over her."5  
When Falkosky hurried upstairs, she found the baby in his crib 
covered with blood.  There was broken glass in the baby's crib 
                                                 
3 Although the United States Supreme Court concluded a 
defendant can relinquish the right to raise a double jeopardy 
challenge by entering a guilty plea, the Court recognized these 
three possibilities for relief in United States v. Broce, 488 
U.S. 563, 569, 574-75. 
4 Kelty did claim she received the ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel in her postconviction motion.  The circuit court 
rejected this claim and Kelty did not appeal from this portion 
of the decision.  Additionally, at the postconviction hearing, 
Kelty acknowledged 
that 
she 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and 
voluntarily pled guilty.  Her only challenge to her conviction, 
therefore, is that she did not intentionally relinquish her 
double jeopardy rights. 
5 Several persons in addition to Candice Falkosky were 
present when Kelty came downstairs. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
4 
 
and on the floor of his room.  Falkosky at first noticed only 
one laceration on the top of the baby's head.  "I didn't see 
'cause he was laying on his back so I didn't see the one behind 
him yet."  After she brought the baby downstairs, however, 
Falkosky saw a depression at the base of the baby's skull, which 
she described as "deep" and "big."  Eventually, the baby was 
transported 
by 
med 
flight 
to 
St. 
Joseph’s 
Hospital 
in 
Marshfield, where Dr. Hans G. Vanderspek, a neurosurgeon, 
performed emergency surgery. 
¶5 
The Wood County District Attorney subsequently charged 
Kelty with two counts of intentionally causing great bodily harm 
to a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(a).  The 
criminal complaint asserted that Kelty struck the baby in the 
head at least twice with two different objects.  At the 
preliminary examination, Dr. Vanderspek testified that the baby 
suffered two skull fractures, one at the base of his head and 
the other above his left ear.  He noted that the larger, 
depressed skull fracture at the base of the child's head was 
likely caused by a "blunt or sharp object," while the small, 
round depression on the top appeared to have been caused by a 
hammer-like 
object. 
 
Dr. 
Vanderspek 
said 
that 
the 
two 
depressions were "quite a ways" from each other and that "the 
two were not connected."  "In my opinion," he declared, "there 
had to be two separate blows."  "I had never seen anything so 
brutal in a child." 
¶6 
Kelty was the subject of unrelated charges filed both 
before and after the September 14 incident.  All charges against 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
5 
 
her were consolidated at a March 19, 2001, plea hearing, when 
Kelty pled guilty to two counts of first-degree reckless injury 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a), 
in 
an 
amended 
information.  As part of the plea agreement, Kelty also pled 
guilty 
to 
two 
counts 
of 
forgery 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.38(1)(a), one misdemeanor count of intimidating 
a 
victim 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.44, 
and 
one 
misdemeanor 
count 
of 
bail 
jumping 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49.  Numerous other charges were dismissed, 
although some were read in. 
¶7 
At the plea hearing, the circuit court conducted a 
lengthy colloquy to establish that Kelty was making her guilty 
plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The circuit 
court also established a factual basis for the two counts.  
During the plea hearing, the following exchange occurred 
involving the circuit court, Kelty, and Kelty’s attorney, Ina 
Poganis: 
THE COURT: 
There are actually two charges here 
against you . . . arising on September 
14th, 2000.  And one is——because the 
doctor testified——or would testify as 
he did at the preliminary hearing that 
there was a blunt——a blow with a blunt 
object to the child’s head, and another 
with regard to an instrument that would 
have cut the child’s head. 
So you’re charged with two separate 
counts here; do you understand that? 
KELTY: 
 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
Are you willing to stipulate, Attorney 
Poganis, 
that 
there's 
a 
sufficient 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
6 
 
factual basis to support the charges in 
the 
[amended] 
information 
as 
that 
evidence 
is 
found 
in 
the 
original 
criminal 
complaint 
and 
in 
the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing? 
POGANIS:  
Yes. 
¶8 
In the following exchange, the circuit court also 
confirmed that Kelty struck the baby twice: 
THE COURT: 
In both cases, in both blows to the 
child's head——and there were at least 
two blows according to Dr. Vanderspek; 
do you understand that? 
KELTY: 
 
Yes. 
¶9 
The circuit court sentenced Kelty to consecutive 
sentences of ten years in prison and five years of extended 
supervision for the first count of first-degree reckless injury 
and five years in prison and five years of extended supervision 
for the second count of first-degree reckless injury.6   
¶10 Kelty's appellate attorney filed a no-merit report 
with the court of appeals.  The court determined there might be 
an issue of arguable merit and directed Kelty's attorney to 
investigate a multiplicity challenge on whether the two reckless 
injury counts might be identical in fact. 
¶11 Following the lead of the court of appeals, Kelty then 
moved for postconviction relief, asking to withdraw her guilty 
                                                 
6 In effect, Kelty received concurrent sentences on her 
other convictions. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
7 
 
pleas.  She gave two reasons.  First, she claimed that she did 
not intentionally waive her right to challenge her conviction on 
two counts of reckless injury as multiplicitous.  Second, she 
claimed 
that 
her 
attorney 
failed 
to 
discuss 
or 
discuss 
adequately with her a multiplicity challenge to the two counts.  
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel portion of the motion.  The court 
subsequently denied the motion for postconviction relief in a 
lengthy written decision, finding that Kelty’s "acknowledgement 
of the distinct facts in support of each separate charge 
indicates that double jeopardy is not an issue [and] finding 
alternatively that Kelty’s pleas did constitute express waivers 
of double jeopardy . . . ."  It also denied her claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶12 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Kelty 
could waive her double jeopardy rights only through an express 
waiver, as required by State v. Hubbard, 206 Wis. 2d 651, 656, 
558 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1996).  The State petitioned for 
review, arguing that Broce governed the case, not Hubbard. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 The 
parties dispute 
whether 
Kelty's 
guilty 
plea 
relinquished her right to appeal an alleged double jeopardy 
violation.  This issue implicates questions of waiver and what 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
8 
 
effect a guilty plea has upon the right to be free from double 
jeopardy.  These are questions of law we review de novo. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶14 This case appears to present an issue of first 
impression 
in 
Wisconsin 
jurisprudence, 
namely, 
whether 
a 
defendant who seeks to withdraw a guilty plea on double jeopardy 
grounds should be granted a fact-finding hearing, at which 
evidence will be presented, so that the court can determine 
whether the charges to which she pled are multiplicitous. 
A. 
Double Jeopardy 
¶15 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb."  U.S. Const. amend. V.7  In the Wisconsin Constitution, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause is located in Article I, Section 8(1) 
and reads, "no person for the same offense may be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment . . . ."  We view these provisions as 
"identical in scope and purpose" and therefore accept the 
"decisions of the United States Supreme Court as controlling 
interpretations of the double jeopardy provisions of both 
                                                 
7 The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
9 
 
constitutions."  State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶18, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1 (citing cases). 
¶16 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against successive 
prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.  
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).  Protection 
against 
successive 
prosecutions 
precludes 
both 
"a 
second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[]" and "a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction."  
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).  Protection 
against multiple punishments or multiplicity involves three 
strains of analysis: (1) second sentence challenges in which a 
court is alleged to have improperly increased a defendant's 
first sentence for a charged offense; (2) unit-of-prosecution 
challenges in which the state is alleged to have improperly 
subdivided the same offense into multiple counts of violating 
the same statute; and (3) cumulative-punishment challenges in 
which the state is alleged to have improperly prosecuted the 
same offense under more than one statute.  Davison, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, ¶26.8 
                                                 
8 In State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 
N.W.2d 833, 
the 
court 
stated: 
"Multiplicity 
challenges . . . usually arise in two different situations: (1) 
when a single course of conduct is charged in multiple counts of 
the same statutory offense (the 'continuous offense' cases); and 
(2) when a single criminal act encompasses the elements of more 
than one distinct statutory crime."  Id., ¶27. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
10 
 
¶17 This 
case 
presents 
a 
unit-of-prosecution 
(or 
"continuous offense") challenge because Kelty disputes her 
conviction of two counts under one statute in a single 
prosecution.9  Thus, the precise issue presented is whether an 
otherwise satisfactory guilty plea to two counts of violating 
the same statute in a single prosecution is sufficient to waive 
a unit-of-prosecution multiplicity challenge on direct appeal. 
B. 
The Guilty-Plea-Waiver Rule 
¶18 The general rule is that a guilty, no contest, or 
Alford10 plea "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including 
constitutional claims[.]"  State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶54, 
252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437.  Courts refer to this as the 
                                                 
9 The fact that Kelty raises a unit-of-prosecution challenge 
is significant because resolving this type of claim often 
requires close scrutiny of the facts to determine whether the 
defendant's underlying conduct was identical in fact.  Cf. State 
v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 402, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).  
Resolution of a unit-of-prosecution challenge is likely to be 
more fact dependent than other types of double jeopardy 
challenge, and thus, less susceptible to successful attack on 
appeal, since a guilty plea relinquishes a defendant's right to 
fact-finding into disputed or uncertain facts.  
10 An Alford plea is a plea in which the defendant agrees to 
accept a conviction while simultaneously maintaining his or her 
innocence.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
11 
 
guilty-plea-waiver 
rule.11 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Riekkoff, 
112 
Wis. 2d 119, 122-23, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983).  Like the general 
rule of waiver, the guilty-plea-waiver rule is a rule of 
administration and does not involve the court's power to address 
the issues raised.  Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d at 124. 
¶19 Since 1982 Wisconsin has recognized an exception to 
the 
guilty-plea-waiver 
rule 
for 
double 
jeopardy 
defects.  
Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶14; Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶54; 
State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, ¶13, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 562, 638 
N.W.2d 564; State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 404 n.8, 576 
N.W.2d 912 (1998); State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 284 n.2, 
322 N.W.2d 264 (1982) (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 
(1975)); State v. Lasky, 2002 WI App 126, ¶11, 254 Wis. 2d 789, 
797, 646 N.W.2d 53; Hubbard, 206 Wis. 2d at 655; State v. Riley, 
166 Wis. 2d 299, 302 n.3, 479 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1991); State 
                                                 
11 As we have noted previously, the term "waiver" as used 
here does not convey the usual meaning of an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.  State v. Riekkoff, 112 
Wis. 2d 119, 128, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983).  Instead, the effect of 
a guilty plea is to cause the defendant "to forego the right to 
appeal a particular issue."  Id.  If we were writing on a blank 
slate, a more accurate label would be the "guilty-plea-
forfeiture" rule, or something to that effect.  See United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (defining forfeiture 
as "the failure to make the timely assertion of a right"); Peter 
Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of 
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 
1214, 1214 (1975) (explaining that forfeiture "occurs by 
operation of law without regard to the defendant's state of 
mind"). 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
12 
 
v. Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d 188, 192 n.2, 430 N.W.2d 361 (Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Olson, 127 Wis. 2d 412, 423 n.7, 380 N.W.2d 375 
(Ct. App. 1985).  The effect of this exception to the guilty-
plea-waiver rule has been to allow a defendant to plead guilty 
and then challenge her conviction and sentence as violating the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  To avoid this result, however, we have 
allowed an express waiver of double jeopardy rights to foreclose 
a defendant from raising a double jeopardy defect after pleading 
guilty.  Robinson, 249 Wis. 2d 553, ¶13; see also Hubbard, 206 
Wis. 2d at 656 & n.4. 
¶20 The double jeopardy exception to the guilty-plea-
waiver rule entered Wisconsin jurisprudence without fanfare.  
This court simply recognized the exception in a footnote, noting 
that certain defects, including double jeopardy claims, survive 
a guilty plea.  See Morris, 108 Wis. 2d at 284 n.2. 
¶21 In 
retrospect, 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
exception 
recognized in Morris was somewhat unusual in that it overruled, 
sub silentio, a number of Wisconsin cases.  Prior to Morris, 
this court had held that a guilty plea waived a double jeopardy 
challenge, except where the double jeopardy violation was 
evident from the record.  See Smith v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 373, 
379-80, 210 N.W.2d 678 (1973); Nelson v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 769, 
773-75, 193 N.W.2d 704 (1972); Belter v. State, 178 Wis. 57, 63, 
189 N.W. 270 (1922) ("The fact that he interposed no plea as to 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
13 
 
former jeopardy when brought before the upper branch of such 
court . . . cannot deprive him of his right to rely upon it 
here, where it is so clearly a matter of record.") (emphasis 
added).12  Morris made no mention of any of these cases. 
¶22 Despite long-standing precedent to the contrary, the 
Morris footnote had a cascading effect.  Between 1982 and 1998, 
a handful of published decisions from the court of appeals cited 
Morris as authority for the double jeopardy exception to the 
guilty-plea-waiver rule.  E.g., Hubbard, 206 Wis. 2d at 655; 
Riley, 166 Wis. 2d at 302 n.3; Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d at 192 n.2.  
In 1998 this court again observed that double jeopardy claims 
are an exception to the guilty-plea-waiver rule.  Lechner, 217 
Wis. 2d at 404 n.8.  The court invoked the double-jeopardy 
exception to the guilty-plea-waiver rule to reach the merits of 
the defendant's double jeopardy challenges.  Id. at 403-04.  It 
was not until Multaler, however, that the court explicitly 
rejected the State's argument that a plea waived the right to 
                                                 
12 In Hawkins v. State, 30 Wis. 2d 264, 268, 140 N.W.2d 226 
(1966), the court cited with approval the following statement 
from an American Law Reports annotation: 
It seems clear that the constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy may be waived by the accused 
by his own voluntary act, and this principle has been 
successfully invoked in various instances involving 
double jeopardy based on an earlier plea of guilty. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
14 
 
bring a multiplicity challenge.  Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶54.  
In doing so, we simply cited Morris as authority for this 
proposition.  Id. 
¶23 In Morris we derived the double jeopardy exception to 
the guilty-plea-waiver rule in part from Menna.  In Menna the 
State of New York sentenced Steve Menna to 30 days in civil jail 
for contempt of court because he refused to testify before a 
grand jury.  Menna, 423 U.S. at 61.  Two years later, New York 
prosecuted Menna again for the same refusal to testify.  Id.  
Menna pled guilty to this second prosecution and appealed on 
double jeopardy grounds.  Id. at 61-62.  The New York Court of 
Appeals affirmed Menna's conviction, holding that he had waived 
his double jeopardy rights by pleading guilty.  Id. at 62. 
¶24 The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding 
that "[w]here the State is precluded by the United States 
Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, 
federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set 
aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled 
plea of guilty."  Id.  In a footnote to this statement the 
Supreme Court elaborated: "We do not hold that a double jeopardy 
claim may never be waived."  Id. at 63 n.2.  "We simply hold 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hawkins, 30 Wis. 2d at 268 (citing Annotation, Plea of Guilty as 
basis for claim of double jeopardy in attempted subsequent 
prosecution for same offense, 75 A.L.R.2d 683, 700 (1961)). 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
15 
 
that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that——
judged on its face——the charge is one which the State may not 
constitutionally prosecute."  Id. 
¶25 Based on Menna, we, like a number of courts, made the 
sweeping statement that a guilty plea cannot waive a double 
jeopardy claim.  Morris, 108 Wis. 2d at 284 n.2.  Our statement 
in Morris was premised on the belief that Menna set forth an 
interpretation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause that 
required this limitation on guilty pleas. 
¶26 Broce, however, dispelled the notion that the federal 
constitution prevents a guilty plea from waiving a double 
jeopardy claim.  Contrary to our interpretation of Menna in 
Morris, the Supreme Court explained that a guilty plea pursuant 
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure waives a 
double jeopardy claim unless the record reveals "the court had 
no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence[,]" or, 
put differently, the state lacked the power to hale the 
defendant into court and prosecute her.  Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 
573-75.   Under Broce, if a court cannot determine, based on the 
record, whether there is a double jeopardy violation, a guilty 
plea will relinquish a defendant's opportunity to have her 
double jeopardy claim resolved on the merits.  Id. at 576. 
¶27 Because Broce explains the effect of guilty pleas in 
the federal criminal justice system, it is not binding precedent 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
16 
 
on this court.  Cf. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 288, 293 
(1975) (noting that the effect of a guilty plea is a function of 
state law).  Nevertheless, after considering the relationship of 
Broce to Morris and its progeny, especially Hubbard, we conclude 
that the rule in Broce that a guilty plea can waive double 
jeopardy defects, subject to certain exceptions, is consistent 
with Wisconsin case law and properly balances the public's 
interest in efficient judicial administration with a defendant's 
double jeopardy rights. 
C. 
The Relationship Between Broce and Hubbard 
¶28 In Broce, Ray Broce pled guilty to two counts of 
conspiracy.  Broce, 488 U.S. at 566.  Another defendant, 
involved in the same conspiracy but prosecuted separately for 
two counts of conspiracy, successfully argued that there was 
only a single conspiracy and that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
barred the multiplicitous charges.  Id. at 566-67.  Relying on 
results from this other prosecution, Broce collaterally attacked 
his two-count conviction as multiplicitous.  Id. at 567. 
¶29 The Supreme Court held that Broce's guilty plea 
relinquished his right to assert a double jeopardy claim, even 
though he never expressly waived this right.  Id. at 573-74.  
The Court reasoned, "a defendant who pleads guilty to two counts 
with facial allegations of distinct offenses concede[s] that he 
has committed two separate crimes."  Id. at 570.  Thus, a guilty 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
17 
 
plea alone is a sufficient basis to conclude that a defendant 
has relinquished a multiplicity challenge.  Id. at 571 n.*. 
¶30 The holding in Broce followed from the nature and 
effect of a guilty plea.  A guilty plea "is an 'admission that 
[the defendant] committed the crime charged against him.'"  
Broce, 488 U.S. at 570 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 32 (1970)).  It is an admission that "all of the 
factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final 
judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence[]" are true.  Id. at 
569.  These admissions necessarily entail that a defendant 
relinquishes her opportunity to receive a factual hearing on a 
fact-intensive unit-of-prosecution claim after pleading guilty.  
Id. at 573-74. 
¶31 The only published Wisconsin case that discusses Broce 
is Hubbard.  In Hubbard the court of appeals held that a plea 
does not waive a double jeopardy defense and that only an 
express waiver can preclude a defendant from having the merits 
of his double jeopardy claim reviewed on appeal.  Hubbard, 206 
Wis. 2d at 655, 657.  The court distinguished Broce, limiting 
its holding to situations where (1) a defendant seeks to 
collaterally attack a guilty plea, and (2) the double jeopardy 
violation cannot be resolved on the record.  Id. at 655.  The 
Hubbard court found the facts of the case satisfied neither of 
the two prerequisites for invoking Broce, because Hubbard 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
18 
 
challenged his convictions as multiplicitous on direct appeal 
and it was possible to resolve the multiplicity challenge on the 
record.  Id. at 656.  Based solely on the record, therefore, the 
court of appeals reviewed the merits of Hubbard's multiplicity 
claim, concluding his conviction for six counts of issuing 
worthless checks did not violate double jeopardy.  Id. at 662. 
¶32 Kelty relies upon Hubbard for the rule that only an 
express waiver can relinquish a defendant's right to raise a 
double jeopardy challenge after pleading guilty.  Kelty argues 
the court of appeals in the present case correctly invoked 
Hubbard.  She contends she should be allowed to withdraw her 
guilty pleas if the State fails to present evidence that 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the two counts of 
first-degree reckless injury are not multiplicitous.  According 
to Kelty, Broce does not apply because it precludes a double 
jeopardy challenge to a guilty plea only on collateral attack, 
not on direct appeal.  
¶33 The State responds by asking this court to overrule 
Hubbard insofar as it limited the applicability of Broce to 
collateral attacks.  The State asserts that the distinction 
between a collateral attack and a direct appeal was irrelevant 
to the analysis in Broce.  According to the State, the 
fundamental holding of Broce is that a defendant relinquishes 
the right to an evidentiary hearing on a double jeopardy claim 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
19 
 
when she pleads guilty.  Therefore, the State reasons, the court 
of appeals erred, both in Hubbard and in the present case, when 
it elevated the distinction between direct appeal and collateral 
attack to a reason not to apply Broce. 
¶34 We agree with the State.  A guilty plea waives a 
multiplicity claim anytime the claim cannot be resolved on the 
record, regardless whether a case presents on direct appeal or 
collateral attack.  In Broce the distinction between direct 
appeal and collateral attack was not material to the discussion; 
it was just happenstance that the case involved a collateral 
attack.13  Subsequent decisions from the federal circuits confirm 
this conclusion.  See United States v. Kurti, 427 F.3d 159, 162 
                                                 
13 The Supreme Court made several references in Broce to 
collateral attack.  However, the majority opinion cited with 
approval Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), where 
the Court said: 
[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of 
events which has preceded it in the criminal process.  
When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in 
open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense[s] 
with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise 
independent claims relating to the deprivation of 
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 
of his guilty plea.  He may only attack the voluntary 
and intelligent character of the guilty plea. 
The dissenting opinion in Broce also acknowledged that "in 
most instances a guilty plea is conclusive and resolves all 
factual issues necessary to sustain a conviction."  Broce, 488 
U.S. at 581 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  It cited Abney v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977), for the proposition 
that "in a claim of double jeopardy 'the defendant makes no 
challenge whatsoever to the merits of the charge against him.'" 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
20 
 
(2d Cir. 2005) (applying Broce on direct appeal); United States 
v. Leyland, 277 F.3d 628, 631-32 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); United 
States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Quinones, 906 F.2d 924, 925-27 (2d Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(applying Broce on direct appeal to conclude the defendant 
waived the right to an evidentiary hearing on her due process 
challenge). 
¶35 We know of no published decision that has refused to 
apply Broce for the sole reason that a defendant challenged a 
guilty plea on direct appeal rather than collateral attack. 
¶36 In the context of addressing the question whether a 
guilty plea waives the right to an evidentiary hearing on a 
multiplicity challenge, we conclude the distinction between 
direct appeal and collateral attack is irrelevant.  Over and 
over the Broce court stressed the nature and effect of a guilty 
plea and the admissions of guilt that necessarily flow from the 
entry of a voluntary plea.  Broce, 488 U.S. at 570, 573-74.  
Recognizing the effect of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
plea surpasses the state's interest in finality, although that 
interest, particularly when a plea bargain is involved, is also 
substantial. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
21 
 
¶37 Because the distinction between a direct appeal and 
collateral attack is irrelevant, this case is on the same track 
as Broce.  We conclude that neither overbroad precedent from 
Wisconsin courts nor any policy view of our criminal justice 
system warrants our breaking ranks with Broce.14 
1. 
Broce Is Consistent with Wisconsin Case Law 
¶38 The differences that Kelty seeks to draw between Broce 
and the Wisconsin rule of express waiver are not as clear-cut as 
she claims.  The Supreme Court in Broce did not conclude that a 
guilty plea waives the right to raise a double jeopardy 
challenge.  Rather, the Court held that a guilty plea waives the 
right to a fact-finding hearing on a double jeopardy challenge.  
Broce, 488 U.S. at 573.  Thus, "a plea of guilty to a charge 
does not waive a claim that——judged on its face——the charge is 
one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."  Id. at 
                                                 
14 This conclusion is faithful to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975), where 
the Court said: 
[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of 
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and 
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of 
factual guilt from the case.  In most cases, factual 
guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition 
of punishment.  A guilty plea, therefore, simply 
renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not 
logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of 
factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of 
conviction if factual guilt is validly established.  
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
22 
 
575 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2).  What this means is 
that a court will consider the merits of a defendant's double 
jeopardy challenge if it can be resolved on the record as it 
existed at the time the defendant pled.15 
                                                 
15 The federal circuit courts that have applied Broce decide 
a double jeopardy challenge to a guilty plea when it can be 
resolved from the face of the indictment and the record.  E.g., 
United States v. Brown, 155 F.3d 431, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(reversing the district court's decision to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's double jeopardy challenge to his 
guilty plea and remanding "for the district court to determine 
whether, on the face of the record as it existed before the 
evidentiary hearing," a double jeopardy violation was evident); 
see also United States v. Quinones, 906 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 
1990) (noting the defendant's "double jeopardy claim rests on 
facts apparent in the record and thus, under Broce, was arguably 
not waived."); United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 
1992) 
(after 
noting 
that 
a 
defendant 
cannot 
receive 
an 
evidentiary hearing where "an indictment does not raise Double 
Jeopardy concerns on its face," the court examined the record to 
determine whether there was a multiplicity violation); Taylor v. 
Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1991) (first examining the 
face of the indictment to confirm that no double jeopardy 
violation was established, and, second, examining the record to 
confirm that no double jeopardy violation could be definitively 
established); United States v. Makres, 937 F.2d 1282, 1286 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that Broce forecloses an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether a double jeopardy violation exists after 
the defendant has pleaded guilty); Thomas v. Kerby, 44 F.3d 884, 
888 (10 Cir. 1995) ("if a double jeopardy violation is apparent 
on the face of the indictment and/or the record existing at the 
time the plea was entered, it is not waived"); United States v. 
Kaiser, 
893 
F.2d 
1300, 
1303 
& 
n.3 
(11th 
Cir. 
1990) 
(distinguishing Broce because "the record that existed at the 
time [the defendant] made his plea[]" demonstrated a double 
jeopardy violation). 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
23 
 
¶39 Except for some unnecessarily expansive language on 
the need for express waiver, e.g., Robinson, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 
¶13 ("An express waiver of a double jeopardy claim in a plea 
agreement is needed for a waiver of a double jeopardy claim."), 
and Hubbard, 206 Wis. 2d at 656, none of the published Wisconsin 
cases that recognize a double jeopardy exception to the guilty-
plea-waiver rule is inconsistent with Broce on its facts.  In 
all these Wisconsin cases, appellate courts resolved any double 
jeopardy issue based on the record without a fact-finding 
hearing to supplement the record.  See Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 
¶¶59, 66 (based on the record, no multiplicity violation); 
Robinson, 
249 
Wis. 2d 553, 
¶12 
(multiplicity 
violation 
acknowledged by parties); Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 413, 416-17 
(based on the record, no multiplicity violation); Hubbard, 206 
Wis. 2d at 662 (same); Riley, 166 Wis. 2d at 304 (same); 
Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d at 197 (same).  Thus, the analysis in these 
cases is exactly what Broce requires: if a double jeopardy 
challenge can be resolved without any need to venture beyond the 
record, the court should decide the claim on its merits.  Broce, 
488 U.S. at 575-76.  Otherwise, by entering a guilty plea, a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Because pleas may be entered at different stages of a 
criminal proceeding, "the record" as it existed at the time of 
the plea will vary from case to case.  In this case, a plea was 
entered after a preliminary examination, so that the record 
includes a complaint, a preliminary hearing transcript, and an 
information.   
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
24 
 
defendant relinquishes the opportunity to receive a fact-finding 
hearing on a double jeopardy claim.  See Broce, 488 U.S. at 573-
74, 576.  We withdraw the language in Robinson, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 
¶13, Hubbard, 206 Wis. 2d at 656, and other cases that suggests 
that only express waiver can waive a double jeopardy claim. 
2. 
Broce Reflects Sound Guilty Plea Practice 
 
¶40 The rule set forth in Broce balances the conflicting 
interests of a defendant and the state.  On one hand, Broce is a 
check on defendants who may attempt gamesmanship or seek two 
kicks at the cat.  Consider the facts of this case.  Kelty 
reached a plea agreement with the State in which the State 
agreed to drop charges and have other charges read in at 
sentencing.  Significantly, this plea agreement reduced Kelty's 
maximum exposure from 128 years to 61-1/2 years.  Despite these 
concessions, 
Kelty 
still 
challenges 
her 
conviction 
as 
multiplicitous.16  She is demanding an evidentiary hearing, 
                                                 
16 At the hearing on Kelty's motion to withdraw her plea 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Kelty's original 
attorney, Ina Poganis, testified that she met with Kelty on 
numerous occasions to discuss the case. 
[P]hysical evidence and forensic evidence kept coming 
in.  I had several discussions with the then District 
Attorney, Mr. [Gregory] Potter, regarding . . . how he 
wanted to pursue the case.  We had discussions about 
whether or not the charges that were actually issued 
were multiplicitous.  I was trying to get him to drop 
one of them.  He was adamant he would not drop them. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
25 
 
almost six years after the crimes were committed, and more than 
five years after entering her pleas.  If the court of appeals 
decision in the present case supplied the rule of law, Kelty 
would receive her fact-finding hearing even though the case has 
already received exhaustive review by Judge Mason. 
¶41 Functionally, this hearing would likely be comparable 
to a small trial.  Unlike a trial, however, Kelty would have 
nothing to lose since she has already negotiated a plea 
agreement and has already been sentenced.  Under the court of 
appeals analysis, Kelty would receive the benefit of a guilty 
plea and a trial even though a guilty plea necessarily 
established her factual guilt, Broce, 488 U.S. at 569; State v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
In fact, if we contested the multiplicity issue 
or went to trial he was going to add charges, and I 
explained all of this to Rachel on numerous occasions.  
I met with her frequently and explained to her what 
the options were, what the risks were.  My concern was 
that if we contested the multiplicity issue we could 
very well not win because there was evidence then that 
two different objects had been used to injure the 
baby.  Two different objects.  That's what the doctor 
testified to at the preliminary hearing, but even if 
we won and the Court dismissed one count, Mr. Potter 
indicated that he would then charge additional counts 
and he did have evidence regarding a bite mark on the 
baby's thigh, very noticeable bite mark that a 
forensic 
dentist 
indicated 
was 
consistent 
with 
Rachel's teeth.  And there were numerous other cuts to 
the baby's back as if someone had stabbed him and then 
pulled the skin up with some short object.  So, I 
discussed all this with Rachel in considerable detail, 
not just the multiplicity issue at a motion hearing, 
but what we would be facing at a trial if we contested 
the whole situation. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
26 
 
Pohlhammer, 82 Wis. 2d 1, 4, 260 N.W.2d 678 (1978) (on motion 
for re-hearing) (originally reported in 78 Wis. 2d 516, 254 
N.W.2d 478 (1977)), and waived her rights to a trial, to present 
evidence, and to make the State present evidence to establish 
her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Brown, __ Wis. 2d ___, 
¶67. 
¶42 On the other hand, Broce ensures adequate protection 
for the double jeopardy rights of defendants.  Defendants may 
present a double jeopardy challenge if the issue can be resolved 
on the record, as recognized in Broce.  Only the class of double 
jeopardy defects that cannot be resolved on the record will 
escape substantive review.  This result logically follows from 
the nature of a guilty plea.  Where doubts about the presence of 
a double jeopardy violation exist, these doubts should be 
treated 
no 
differently 
than 
other 
factual 
and 
legal 
uncertainties, which are also resolved by a guilty plea.  Just 
as a defendant does not know whether the state will be able to 
prove the factual predicates necessary to establish guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, a defendant does not know whether she will 
succeed on a double jeopardy claim that is heavily enmeshed with 
disputed and uncertain facts.  In both situations, a plea should 
waive the defendant's right to make the state prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the facts necessary to support guilt. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
27 
 
¶43 Although Broce limits the right to substantive review 
of some alleged double jeopardy violations, a defendant may 
obtain a postconviction fact-finding hearing when she seeks to 
withdraw a guilty plea because (1) the plea is not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary; or (2) the defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to enter a plea.  
Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 574.  In both of these situations, if 
the defendant's postconviction motion is sufficient, she is 
entitled to a fact-finding hearing.  A guilty plea waives 
constitutional trial rights, but does not waive Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights or the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, which are the rights implicated in a challenge that a 
guilty plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and a 
challenge that the defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
¶44 A properly conducted plea colloquy assures that the 
defendant understands the nature of the charges and the elements 
the state would be required to prove at trial.  It also 
establishes that there is a factual basis for each of the 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
28 
 
charges 
against 
the 
defendant17 
and 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands the trial rights she is giving up by entering a 
plea.  Brown,  __ Wis. 2d ___, ¶35; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 261-
62.  Notwithstanding a guilty plea, when a defendant files a 
postconviction motion that adequately alleges that the plea was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the plea 
colloquy was defective in discussing the elements of the crime 
or the factual basis for multiple charges, or because the 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard 
to a possible multiplicity claim, she is entitled to a fact-
finding hearing under well-established law. 
¶45 Even though a guilty plea relinquishes a defendant's 
right to a fact-finding hearing on a double jeopardy challenge, 
nothing about our decision prevents a prosecutor or a court from 
securing a defendant's express waiver of his or her double 
jeopardy rights.  See Salters v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 708, 714, 191 
N.W.2d 19 (1971) (recognizing the validity of an express waiver 
                                                 
17 In State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 239, 244, 558 N.W.2d 375 
(1997), the court explained that plea withdrawal is only granted 
when necessary to correct a manifest injustice.  "One type of 
manifest injustice is the failure to establish a sufficient 
factual basis that the defendant committed the offense to which 
he or she pleads."  Id.  The converse proposition is that when 
the state establishes a factual basis for charges and the 
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleads to 
those charges, the defendant should not be permitted to contest 
the 
factual 
basis 
for 
the 
charges 
in 
a 
postsentencing 
evidentiary hearing. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
29 
 
of double jeopardy rights).  We believe this is the better 
practice.  Express waivers not only make for a more complete 
record, but also allow a circuit court and a prosecutor to guard 
against the possibility of reversible error.  They lend greater 
confidence to convictions secured by guilty pleas, by reducing 
concerns that a conviction may have resulted in part from some 
shortcoming or deficiency of defense counsel. 
D. 
Application 
¶46 Absent an express waiver, a guilty plea relinquishes a 
double jeopardy claim if a court is unable to determine from the 
record whether there has been a constitutional violation.  Our 
inquiry, therefore, is whether it is possible to resolve Kelty's 
multiplicity claim on the current record. 
¶47 We begin with the criminal complaint.  The allegations 
in the complaint demonstrate the State could constitutionally 
prosecute Kelty for two counts of the same offense.  The 
complaint states: 
Dr. Vanderspek [the surgeon who treated the baby] 
reported that he observed two skull fractures which 
appeared to have been caused by two different objects.  
One, consistent with a piece of glass and the second, 
consistent with a circular object.  Dr. Vanderspek 
further 
stated 
that 
these 
were 
not 
accidental 
injuries. 
 
¶48 Proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint 
confirm the viability of two separate charges.  For instance, at 
the preliminary hearing Dr. Vanderspek testified that when he 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
30 
 
sliced open the baby's scalp to reveal his skull, he found two 
distinct fractures, "a small round kind of a half moon type 
depression more to the front, quite a ways away from the big one 
that we had seen, and the two were not connected . . . ."  When 
he was asked whether two blows to the baby's head caused two 
skull fractures, Dr. Vanderspek stated "there had to be two 
separate blows, indeed."  In sum, Dr. Vanderspek testified that 
in addition to the multiple lacerations on the baby's body, the 
baby suffered two skull fractures, one of which was a large 
depression and one of which was a small, round depression. 
 
¶49 This evidence provides a basis for the two charges 
against Kelty, even though it is arguably open to two different 
explanations.  One explanation favorable to Kelty's multiplicity 
theory is that she struck the baby in such rapid succession with 
different parts of the same instrument that the acts were 
identical in fact because she did not have "sufficient time for 
reflection between the acts to re-commit [herself] to the 
criminal conduct."  See State v. Schaefer, 2003 WI App 164, ¶46, 
266 Wis. 2d 719, 668 N.W.2d 760. 
¶50 An equally plausible 
explanation 
for 
the 
baby's 
injuries——an explanation that supports the State's position that 
the charges to which Kelty pled were not multiplicitous——is that 
Kelty struck the baby twice with two separate objects, each time 
committing herself to strike the baby, each blow separate, 
distinct, not identical in fact, as separate as the bite marks 
on the baby's thigh. 
No. 
2003AP3055-CR 
 
31 
 
¶51 The record contains evidence to support the charges, 
but we cannot determine with certainty from the record exactly 
how Kelty inflicted the baby's injuries.  In other words, we 
cannot determine with certainty whether Kelty's two convictions 
for first-degree reckless injury were multiplicitous.  All we 
know is that the State had the power to prosecute both counts on 
the evidence available; the defendant pled guilty to both counts 
after hearing the charges and the evidence, and after conferring 
in detail with her attorney; and the court, after a very 
thorough plea colloquy, had the power to convict and sentence 
the defendant on both counts.  Without additional fact-finding, 
we could not learn more than we know now.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Kelty's guilty plea relinquished her opportunity 
to have a court determine the merits of her multiplicity 
challenge.  See Broce, 488 U.S. at 575-76. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶52 When a defendant enters a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary plea, the defendant relinquishes the right to a fact-
finding hearing into the merits of a multiplicity claim.  Broce, 
488 U.S. at 576.  Because the record in this case does not 
permit us to determine whether Kelty's double jeopardy rights 
have been violated, we conclude Kelty relinquished a unit-of-
prosecution multiplicity challenge to her conviction for two 
counts of first-degree reckless injury. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
No.  2003AP3055-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately to emphasize three points.  First, the majority 
opinion does not foreclose all evidentiary hearings regarding a 
double jeopardy claim when an accused pleads guilty.  Second, 
the majority opinion's reliance on the risk of "gamesmanship" as 
a policy justification for the rule it adopts is misplaced.  
Third, the instant case is not a "waiver" case.  
I 
¶54 The majority opinion recognizes that a guilty plea 
does not render a judgment "impervious to double jeopardy 
challenges."1  Even when an accused has pleaded guilty, he may 
make a double jeopardy challenge and get a hearing (1) when the 
challenge is that the plea is not knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent, or (2) when claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel.2  In the instant case, the circuit court held a hearing 
to determine whether defense counsel's performance was deficient 
and 
the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
voluntary, 
and 
intelligent.  The circuit court found that defense counsel and 
the defendant had discussed a possible multiplicity defense.  
Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
held 
that 
there 
was 
no 
ineffective assistance of counsel and that the defendant's plea 
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  After rendering this 
holding, the circuit court rejected the defendant's multiplicity 
challenge, apparently relying on the Broce case. 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶3. 
2 Id., ¶¶3, 43.   
No.  2003AP3055-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶55 I write separately to emphasize this point made in the 
majority opinion:3  Because the majority opinion includes some 
unnecessarily expansive language that, especially if taken out 
of context, might be understood to prohibit a fact-finding 
hearing on double jeopardy in all guilty plea circumstances.4   
¶56 Although a right, such as the right to be free from 
double jeopardy, is subject to forfeiture, a guilty plea does 
not foreclose all opportunities to present evidence in support 
of a double jeopardy claim.5  In particular, if an accused can 
"allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel 
sufficient to show that his plea was not, after all, a knowing 
and intelligent act,"6 he may withdraw a guilty plea.   
¶57 As the majority opinion points out, this conclusion is 
required because a guilty plea waives an accused's right to put 
on evidence at a trial; it does not waive the accused's Sixth 
                                                 
3 Id., ¶¶43-44. 
4 See, e.g., majority op., ¶26 ("Under Broce, if a court 
cannot determine, based on the record, whether there is a double 
jeopardy violation, a guilty plea will relinquish a defendant's 
opportunity to have her double jeopardy claim resolved on the 
merits."); ¶30 ("These admissions necessarily entail that a 
defendant relinquishes her opportunity to receive a factual 
hearing on a fact-intensive unit-of-prosecution claim after 
pleading guilty."); ¶34 ("A guilty plea waives a multiplicity 
claim 
anytime 
the 
claim 
cannot 
be 
resolved 
on 
the 
record . . . ."); ¶39 ("[B]y entering a guilty plea, a defendant 
relinquishes the opportunity to receive a fact-finding hearing 
on a double jeopardy claim."). 
5 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.6(a), 
at 230-32 (2d ed. 1999). 
6 5 LaFave, supra note 5, § 21.6(a), at 230-31 (quoting 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970)).  
No.  2003AP3055-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Amendment right to counsel or Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process.7 
¶58 When an accused makes a motion properly alleging that 
he was denied effective assistance of counsel or the plea was 
not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he was not 
informed of the availability of a double jeopardy claim, he may 
be entitled to an evidentiary hearing even though the record 
supports multiple counts.  Nothing in the majority opinion 
forecloses an evidentiary hearing in all circumstances, nor 
should it.8 
II 
¶59 The 
contention 
in 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
a 
different forfeiture rule would result in gamesmanship by an 
accused is misguided.9  To be sure, gamesmanship is to be 
discouraged.  However, the rule adopted in the instant case does 
                                                 
7 See majority op., ¶43. 
Courts have held that by pleading guilty, an accused does 
not forfeit certain constitutional defenses, including the Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial, the right not to be convicted 
of conduct that cannot constitutionally be made criminal, and 
the right not to be selectively prosecuted in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 5 
LaFave, supra note 5, § 21.6(a), at 228, and cases cited 
therein. 
8 Cf. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (quoting 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984)) ("'It is well 
settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by 
an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, 
may not be collaterally attacked.'  That principle controls 
here.  Respondents have not called into question the voluntary 
and intelligent character of their pleas, and therefore are not 
entitled to the collateral relief they seek."). 
9 See majority op., ¶40. 
No.  2003AP3055-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
not target any game an accused is likely to play.  Certainly, 
the instant case is not an example of such gamesmanship. 
¶60 An accused who pleads guilty and then later moves to 
withdraw the plea on double jeopardy grounds does not "receive 
the benefit of a guilty plea and a trial," as the majority 
opinion contends.10  Even if the defendant wins the "small 
trial"11 on the motion, the best the defendant can hope for is to 
be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea, which terminates the 
plea agreement.12 
¶61 In the instant case, the result would be that, were 
the defendant permitted to withdraw her guilty plea, the State 
would be able to charge her with the crimes for which it 
                                                 
10 Id., ¶41. 
11 Id. 
12 See State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, ¶57, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 
638 
N.W.2d 564 
("[W]e 
conclude 
that 
when 
the 
defendant 
repudiated the negotiated plea agreement on the ground that it 
contained multiplicitous counts, the defendant materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement.  We further conclude 
that when an accused successfully challenges a plea to and a 
conviction on one count of a two-count information on grounds of 
double jeopardy and the information has been amended pursuant to 
a negotiated plea agreement by which the State made charging 
concessions, ordinarily the remedy is to reverse the convictions 
and sentences, to vacate the plea agreement, and to reinstate 
the original information so that the parties are restored to 
their positions prior to the negotiated plea agreement.  We also 
conclude, however, that under some circumstances this remedy 
might not be appropriate."); State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 
290, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982) (defendant convicted of two crimes; 
supreme court held that one of convictions was only an enhancer 
and remanded "to the circuit court with instructions to enter 
judgment against the defendant on the single offense of armed 
robbery 
while 
concealing 
identity 
and 
to 
resentence 
the 
defendant."). 
No.  2003AP3055-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
promised not to charge her under the negotiated plea.  The 
defendant would not get the benefit of the plea bargain.  A 
different rule would create no incentive for gamesmanship. 
III 
¶62 Finally, courts and litigants should be more careful 
in their use of the word "waiver."  As the majority opinion 
explains, "waiver" in the context of the instant case does not 
refer to the intentional relinquishment of a known right.13  It 
would be more precise if courts and litigants would use the word 
"forfeiture."14 
 
Notwithstanding 
its 
recognition 
of 
this 
distinction, the majority opinion unfortunately continues to use 
the language of waiver. 
¶63 Using "forfeiture" to describe situations where a 
right is given up because it is not asserted would help 
delineate between two distinct issues, waiver and forfeiture, 
that may require different analysis. 
¶64 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶18 n.11. 
14 See 5 LaFave, supra note 5, § 21.6(a), at 224-25. 
No.  2003AP3055.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶65 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  We took this 
case to decide whether an otherwise satisfactory guilty plea is 
sufficient 
to 
relinquish 
a 
double 
jeopardy/multiplicity 
challenge upon direct appeal.  The majority concludes that a 
guilty plea relinquishes the right to assert such a claim when 
that claim cannot be ascertained on the record.  Majority 
op., ¶2.  The majority further adopts for direct appeals the 
Broce1 rule on collateral attacks, holding that a defendant who 
enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea gives 
up the right to a fact-finding hearing on the propriety of 
multiple charges.  Id.; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 
576 (1989).  I write separately because I would not apply a rule 
designed for collateral attacks to direct appeals.          
¶66 Of concern is the broad rule that the majority adopts 
that would apparently preclude the defendant from ever having an 
evidentiary hearing as part of a direct appeal in pursuing a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea on double jeopardy grounds.  
The majority concludes that "[w]hen a defendant enters a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, the nature and 
effect of the plea necessarily2 mean that the defendant gives up 
the right to a fact-finding3 hearing on the propriety of multiple 
charges."  Majority op., ¶2 (citing Broce, 488 U.S. at 576).  
Yet, whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
                                                 
1 United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1989). 
2 Emphasis added. 
3 Emphasis in original. 
No.  2003AP3055.lbb 
 
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would necessarily have to be determined by a fact-finding 
hearing.      
¶67 The majority does indicate that a defendant may seek 
to withdraw a guilty plea if (1) the plea is not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, or (2) the defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to enter a plea.  
Id., ¶¶3, 43.  Yet, in application, the majority4 would limit 
plea withdrawals based on double jeopardy violations to record 
reviews, notwithstanding the fact that allegations of double 
jeopardy "will often depend on facts outside the record."  See 
State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶61, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14.     
¶68 I 
also 
submit 
that 
the 
majority 
appears 
to 
misunderstand the underpinnings of the Broce decision, and 
therefore mistakenly and unnecessarily applies a rule for 
collateral attacks to direct appeals.  I start by discussing the 
general rule established in Broce.  The court wrote that:  
[W]hen the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea 
has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the 
proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to 
whether the underlying plea was both counseled and 
voluntary.  If the answer is in the affirmative then 
the conviction and plea, as a general rule, foreclose 
the collateral attack.  There are exceptions where on 
the face of the record the court had no power to enter 
the conviction or impose the sentence. 
Broce, 488 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added). 
¶69 In discussing the source of the rule, the Court noted 
that "[a] defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶¶46-51. 
No.  2003AP3055.lbb 
 
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because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that 
calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the 
likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action."  
Id. at 572. (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 
(1970) (eight year delay between guilty plea and habeas corpus 
action to withdraw guilty plea).  The Court further stated "a 
counseled defendant may not make a collateral attack on a guilty 
plea on the allegation that he misjudged the admissibility of 
his confession."  Id. (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 770 (1970)).  In citing another habeas corpus action in 
support of its reasoning, the Court stated "[t]he collateral 
challenge was foreclosed by the earlier guilty plea."  Id. at 
573 (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973)).  
The Court summarized its understanding of the general rule as 
follows: 
"[I]t is well settled that a voluntary plea of guilty 
made by an accused person, who has been advised by 
competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked."  
That principle controls here.  Respondents have not 
called into question the voluntary and intelligent 
character of their pleas, and therefore are not 
entitled to the collateral relief they seek. 
Id. at 574 (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) 
(emphasis added)).   
¶70 The Court recognized that there were exceptions to the 
general rule barring collateral attack on a guilty plea.  Id. 
(citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and Menna v. 
New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975)).  Those exceptions include where 
"the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings lay in the 
State's power to bring any indictment at all[,]" or where "the 
No.  2003AP3055.lbb 
 
4 
 
indictment was facially duplicative of the earlier offense of 
which the defendant had been convicted and sentenced. . . ."  
Id. at 575-76.  When those exceptions were presented, they were 
resolved without any need to venture beyond the record.  Id. at 
575. 
¶71 I view these exceptions as not taking away from the 
general rule's premise that would allow a defendant to challenge 
whether a plea was knowing and voluntary.  To the extent that 
bringing such a challenge during a direct appeal requires going 
out of the record, I do not view Broce as providing any such 
limitation. 
¶72 Such an interpretation is entirely consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's approach that treats direct 
appeals very differently than collateral attacks to a judgment 
of conviction.  See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-96 
(1976); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 
(1993) ("The principle that collateral review is different from 
direct review resounds throughout our habeas jurisprudence. . .  
(Habeas 
corpus 
'is 
designed 
to 
guard 
against 
extreme 
malfunctions 
in 
the 
state 
criminal 
justice 
systems').  
Accordingly, it hardly bears repeating that 'an error that may 
justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a 
collateral attack on a final judgment.'") id. (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Thus, a record review would appear to be 
perfectly appropriate where one has already exhausted or 
foregone one's appeal rights, as contrasted with one who was 
still developing an appellate record.  In the latter situation, 
No.  2003AP3055.lbb 
 
5 
 
a defendant ought to be able to show that a guilty plea was not 
knowing or voluntary, or that defense counsel was ineffective, 
even if it means going outside the record.    
¶73 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurring opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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