Title: American Honda Motor Company, Inc. v. Jennifer Cerasani
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-1907
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1907 
____________ 
 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JENNIFER CERASANI, 
Respondent. 
 
[April 12, 2007] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
In this case we decide whether a long-term lessee of an automobile may sue 
for breach of warranty under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  The 
Second District Court of Appeal answered this question in the affirmative in 
Cerasani v. American Honda Motor Co., 916 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and 
certified conflict to the extent that the First District Court of Appeal held to the 
contrary in Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc., 526 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1988).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
 
The issue presented by the certified conflict requires interpretation of both 
the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Florida’s Motor Vehicle Warranty 
Enforcement Act, more commonly known as the “Lemon Law.”  We hold that a 
long-term lessee who is entitled to enforce a warranty under Florida’s Lemon Law 
also has a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  We approve 
the Second District’s decision in this case to the extent that court reached the same 
conclusion and disapprove Sellers to the extent that the First District held there that 
an automobile warranty is not enforceable under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act unless the automobile has been sold. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Jennifer Cerasani acquired a new Honda Civic through a long-term lease and 
began to have problems with the car.  She took the car to a Honda dealership for 
repairs several times but remained dissatisfied with the results.  Cerasani 
eventually filed suit against the manufacturer, American Honda, under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA” or “the Act”).  She alleged one count 
of breach of written warranty and one count of breach of implied warranty.  The 
trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on grounds that the provisions of 
the MMWA covering a “written warranty” as defined in the Act do not apply to 
persons who lease rather than purchase vehicles, and that Cerasani was not in 
privity of contract with Honda as required under Florida law for an implied 
warranty claim. 
 
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The Second District affirmed the dismissal of the implied warranty claim but 
reversed the dismissal of the claim based on Honda’s express new-car warranty.  
The Second District concluded that the first count of Cerasani’s complaint was 
legally sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.  The Second District 
determined that Cerasani’s assertions that the warranty was part of the basis of the 
bargain in the sale of the car to the lessor, “Honda Leasing,” and that the sale was 
for purposes other than resale were sufficient to allege a “written warranty” as 
defined by the MMWA.  Further, the Second District ruled that Cerasani satisfied 
the second and third of the three alternative definitions of “consumer” under the 
MMWA because she was a person to whom the car was “transferred during the 
duration” of a written warranty and because she was entitled under the terms of the 
warranty to enforce the warranty, as reflected by Honda’s willingness to provide 
repair service.   See Cerasani, 916 So. 2d at 846-47.   
 
The Second District certified conflict with Sellers on the issue of whether 
the MMWA applies to lease transactions.  Id. at 847.  In Sellers, which involved a 
lease of a motor vehicle from a dealership which then assigned its interest in the 
lease to a finance company, the First District held that “there must be an 
identifiable purchase and sale before the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act 
apply.”  526 So. 2d at 156. 
ANALYSIS 
 
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The issue before us—whether a long-term lessee such as Cerasani is entitled 
to bring a cause of action for breach of a written warranty under the MMWA—is a 
matter of pure statutory interpretation.  Our review of a lower court’s ruling on an 
issue of statutory interpretation is de novo.  Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 
So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005).  In construing a statute, this Court endeavors to 
effectuate legislative intent, which is primarily derived from the language used in 
the enactment.  See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 
2006). 
 
Congress enacted the MMWA to enhance the enforceability of warranties on 
consumer products and protect the “ultimate user of the product.”  Cerasani, 916 
So. 2d at 845 (quoting O’Connor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 905 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2005)).  The MMWA authorizes a lawsuit for damages and other 
equitable relief by “a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, 
warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, 
or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.”  15 U.S.C. § 
2310(d)(1) (2000).  The MMWA’s definition of “consumer” is critical in that only 
a person or entity defined as a consumer may bring a cause of action under the Act.  
To qualify as a consumer who may file suit under the Act, a person must come 
within one of the three alternative categories of consumer: 
The term “consumer” means [Category One] a buyer (other than for 
purposes of resale) of any consumer product, [Category Two] any 
 
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person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an 
implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the 
product, and [Category Three] any other person who is entitled by 
the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable 
State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the 
obligations of the warranty (or service contract). 
15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (2000) (bold text supplied).  An individual qualifies as a 
consumer under the MMWA if he or she meets any of these three definitions.  
Ryan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 896 A.2d 454, 456 (N.J. 2006). 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that because the facts as alleged in 
Cerasani’s complaint would create a cause of action under chapter 681, Florida 
Statutes (2006) (the Lemon Law), she is entitled to enforce the obligations of the 
warranty “under applicable State law,” and therefore qualifies as a consumer under 
the second part of Category Three.  Because this conclusion renders unnecessary 
an additional determination of consumer status under Categories One or Two or 
the first part of Category Three, we decline to address whether and under what 
circumstances a lessee can qualify as a consumer under these alternative criteria. 
 
As noted, Category Three of section 2301(3) provides that a person may be a 
consumer if entitled to enforce the warranty either by the terms of the warranty or 
under applicable state law.  The Second District focused on the terms of the 
warranty in concluding that the allegations in her complaint qualified Cerasani as a 
Category Three consumer.  The court stated: 
 
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In the present case, we hold that Cerasani has alleged sufficient 
facts in her amended complaint to qualify as a category three 
consumer under the Act.  Cerasani alleged that she was able to 
enforce the terms of the warranty:  she took the vehicle to authorized 
Honda dealerships for repair on numerous occasions, and Honda 
never asserted that the vehicle was not covered by the written 
warranty. 
Cerasani, 916 So. 2d at 847.  The Third District has similarly concluded, based on 
repair and service records, that a lessee qualified as a Category Three consumer 
entitled to enforce the warranty under the MMWA.  See Mesa v. BMW of N. Am., 
LLC, 904 So. 2d 450, 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“Mesa was entitled to enforce the 
manufacturer’s written warranty, as evidenced by the service and repair records of 
the vehicle.”).   
 
In this case, the Second District did not address whether Cerasani also 
qualified as a Category Three consumer on grounds that she was entitled to enforce 
the warranty under state law.  However, it relied on its previous decision in 
O’Connor v. BMW of North America, LLC, 905 So. 2d 235, 240-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2005), in which it had concluded that a lessee qualified as a Category Three 
consumer both because repair and service records established that she was able to 
enforce the warranty and because the manufacturer admitted that she was entitled 
to enforce the warranty under Florida’s Lemon Law.  Cerasani, 916 So. 2d at 846-
47.  Courts in other jurisdictions have also conferred Category Three consumer 
status on lessees based on their entitlement to enforce warranties under state law.  
 
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See Voelker v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Dekelaita v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA, 799 N.E.2d 367, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); 
Ryan, 896 A.2d at 457-58. 
Florida’s Lemon Law, contained in chapter 681, Florida Statutes (2006), 
entitles lessees to enforce the obligations of automobile warranties.  See, e.g., 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Singh, 664 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (applying 
chapter 681 to claim by automobile lessee).  Section 681.103 imposes a duty on the 
manufacturer (or its authorized service agent) to conform a vehicle to the warranty 
if the nonconformity is reported by the “consumer” within the “Lemon Law rights 
period.”  Section 681.102(4) includes lessees within its definition of “consumer,” 
and section 681.104(2)(b) provides that when a vehicle does not conform to the 
manufacturer’s warranty, “[t]he lessee shall receive the lessee cost and the lessor 
shall receive the lease price less the lessee cost.”  Finally, section 681.112(1) 
authorizes a consumer to file suit to recover damages caused by a violation of the 
Lemon Law, and section 681.112(3) specifies that other rights and remedies are 
not foreclosed by chapter 681.  Thus, the Lemon Law qualifies lessees for 
Category Three consumer status under 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 
 
American Honda asserts that Category Three does not apply to lessees 
because the statutory language requires that the warranty at issue constitute a 
“written warranty” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), which American Honda 
 
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interprets as requiring a sale of the vehicle to the ultimate consumer.1  Cerasani 
claims that her complaint alleged a qualifying sale establishing a “written 
warranty” for purposes of Category Three status under either the terms of the 
warranty or applicable state law.  Precedent is split on whether a “written 
warranty” as defined by section 2301(6) is necessary under Category Three.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court have held that a “written warranty” as defined under the Act is not 
required for Category Three consumer status.  See Voelker, 353 F.3d at 525; Ryan, 
896 A.2d at 457 (deferring to Voelker as “persuasive and directly on point”).  
Neither court explained its conclusion in terms of the principles of statutory 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Act provides: 
The  term “written warranty” means-- 
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in 
connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a 
buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and 
affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free 
or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period 
of time, or 
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a 
supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other 
remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such 
product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, 
 
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of 
the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes 
other than resale of such product. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). 
 
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construction.  Several state supreme courts have reached the contrary conclusion 
and held that Category Three consumer status does require a “written warranty” as 
defined by the MMWA based on a qualifying sale.  See Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 130 P.3d 530, 536 (Ariz. 2006); DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 768 
N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (N.Y. 2002).    
 
Section 2301(3) comprises a single sentence in which the term “written 
warranty” is used in the Category Two definition which immediately precedes the 
language creating Category Three: 
The term “consumer” means . . . any person to whom [a consumer] 
product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written 
warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product, and any other 
person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service 
contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the 
warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or 
service contract).  
15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (emphasis supplied).  It is clear that the use of the term 
“written warranty” in Category Two invokes the definition of “written warranty” 
set forth in section 2301(6).  With the use of the term “written warranty” in 
Category Two in mind, we read the language creating Category Three as follows:   
The term “consumer” means . . . any other person who is entitled  
[a] by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or  
[b] under applicable State law  
to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations 
of the warranty.   
 
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The demonstrative adjective “such,” meaning “of the same type, class, or sort,” 
refers to the antecedent noun “written warranty.”  Cf. Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary 1176 (10th ed. 1999) (defining “such”); Bryan A. Garner, 
Garner’s Modern American Usage 758 (2003) (explaining use of “such” as a 
demonstrative adjective).  Thus, the first alternative in Category Three requires that 
the warranty be a “written warranty” as defined in section 2301(6).  However, 
Congress did not use the term “written warranty” or “such warranty” in setting 
forth the criteria for the second alternative, instead using the generic term “the 
warranty.”  Therefore, we conclude that the type of warranty enforceable under 
state law that will enable a person to qualify as a Category Three consumer is not 
limited to the narrow definition of “written warranty” provided in the MMWA.   
 
The criteria for a warranty enforceable under applicable state law should be 
derived not from the MMWA definition of “written warranty” but rather from 
applicable state law.  Florida’s Lemon Law includes the following definition of a 
warranty enforceable under chapter 681: 
“Warranty” means any written warranty issued by the manufacturer, 
or any affirmation of fact or promise made by the manufacturer, 
excluding statements made by the dealer, in connection with the sale 
of a motor vehicle to a consumer which relates to the nature of the 
material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or 
workmanship is free of defects or will meet a specified level of 
performance. 
 
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§ 681.102(23), Fla. Stat. (2006).  This language defines warranty as either “any 
written warranty,” without further qualification, or “any affirmation of fact or 
promise” made in connection with the sale of a motor vehicle, as follows: 
“Warranty” means 
[1] any written warranty issued by the manufacturer, or 
[2] any affirmation of fact or promise made by the manufacturer, 
excluding statements made by the dealer, in connection with the sale 
of a motor vehicle to a consumer which relates to the nature of the 
material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or 
workmanship is free of defects or will meet a specified level of 
performance. 
 
Under this construction, which is consistent with provisions throughout chapter 
681 specifically bringing motor vehicle lessees within its operation, a sale is 
unnecessary to trigger the protections of the Lemon Law under a written warranty.  
See § 681.102(4), (9), (11)-(13), Fla. Stat. (2006) (including lessee within 
definition of “consumer” and providing definitions of “lease price,” “lessee,” 
“lessee cost,” and “lessor”); § 681.104(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that in 
the case of vehicles that do not conform to the manufacturer’s warranty after a 
reasonable number of repair attempts, “[t]he lessee shall receive the lessee cost and 
the lessor shall receive the lease price less the lessee cost”). 
 
Our construction of the Category Three criterion for warranties enforceable 
under state law, as filtered through the Florida Lemon Law, is also consistent with 
the MMWA’s purpose of preventing warranty deception and protecting consumers.  
We therefore reject American Honda’s assertion that the MMWA is inapplicable to 
 
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leased goods under any circumstances, even where states include lessees within 
consumer protection statutes such as the Florida Lemon Law.  Further, requiring 
that the lease be in connection with a sale, which is not required by chapter 681, 
would lead to inequitable results.  For example, the lessee in a case such as Sellers, 
in which there was an assignment of the lease to a finance company but evidently 
no sale, would be excluded from the MMWA, but the lessees in O’Connor, Mesa, 
and this case, in which sales to finance companies were alleged, would fall within 
the Act’s protection.  We conclude that in authorizing coverage under the MMWA 
for warranties that are enforceable under state law, Congress provided a means by 
which this type of hyper-technical distinction contrary to the Act’s purpose could 
be avoided. 
 
The allegations in Cerasani’s complaint are sufficient to make her a 
Category Three consumer entitled to enforce Honda’s new motor vehicle warranty 
under state law.  She alleged that Honda supplied the warranty to the lessor, who 
then assigned it to Cerasani, and that she submitted the car to the dealer at least 
seven times in an unsuccessful attempt to have defects covered by the warranty 
remedied.  Therefore, she meets the criteria for a consumer entitled to bring suit for 
damages under the MMWA. 
CONCLUSION 
 
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We hold that a motor vehicle lessee who is entitled to enforce the terms of a 
warranty under chapter 681, Florida Statutes, is also entitled to file suit under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  Our rationale is that a lessee with a cause of 
action under chapter 681 qualifies as a Category Three consumer “entitled . . . 
under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor . . . the obligations of 
the warranty” under 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).  Under the complaint filed in the circuit 
court, the respondent in this case, Cerasani, falls within this criterion and thus has a 
cause of action under the MMWA as a Category Three consumer.  The Second 
District also concluded that Cerasani’s complaint was sufficient to make her a 
consumer under the Act, but on different grounds that we need not and do not 
reach.  Thus, we approve its decision that the trial court erred in dismissing 
Cerasani’s complaint, but on the grounds specified herein.  Turning to the conflict 
case, Sellers, we conclude that the First District’s determination that a sale of a 
motor vehicle is necessary to make a warranty on the vehicle enforceable under the 
Act is contrary to our decision today.  We therefore disapprove Sellers’ holding as 
to the MMWA. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D04-2719 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
Wendy F. Lumish, John R. Blue and Matthew J. Conigliaro of Carlton Fields, P.A., 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Theodore F. Greene, III of Krohn and Moss, Ltd., Sunrise, Florida, and Scott M. 
Cohen, Chicago, Illinois, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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