Title: Phoenix East Association, Inc. v. Perdido Dunes Tower Condominium Association, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2023-0815, SC-2023-0481
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2024

Rel: April 5, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0481 
_________________________ 
 
Phoenix East Association, Inc. 
 
v.  
 
Perdido Dunes Tower Condominium Association, Inc., a Master 
Association 
 
 
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-15-900468) 
 
On Rehearing Ex Mero Motu 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
SC-2023-0481 
 
2 
 
 
This appeal arises from a property dispute between neighboring 
condominium associations on the Gulf Coast.  Perdido Dunes Tower 
Condominium Association, Inc., a Master Association ("Perdido Dunes"), 
sued Phoenix East Association, Inc. ("Phoenix East"), to quiet title to a 
two-and-a-half-foot-wide strip of land between their properties.  Perdido 
Dunes alleged in the complaint that it had acquired title to the disputed 
property through adverse possession.  The Baldwin Circuit Court issued 
a judgment granting Perdido Dunes a prescriptive easement over the 
disputed property.  Phoenix East appealed.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
In 1984, Perdido Dunes' predecessor, Perdido Dunes Association, 
Inc. ("PDAI"), built a two-story condominium complex on beachfront 
property in Baldwin County.  As part of that construction, PDAI also 
installed electrical power poles and sewer lines on part of what it believed 
to be the eastern edge of its property.  In the mid-1990s, Phoenix East 
purchased the plot of land immediately east of PDAI's property and built 
a 14-story condominium complex.  When Phoenix East had its property 
surveyed, the results showed that some of PDAI's power poles and sewer 
lines were actually on Phoenix East's property, about two and a half feet 
SC-2023-0481 
 
3 
 
beyond PDAI's property line.  What transpired between the owners of the 
two properties after that survey was completed is disputed, but Phoenix 
East's developer decided to build a retaining wall approximately two feet 
back from the surveyed property line, which enabled PDAI to continue 
using the power poles and sewer lines.  For the next decade, PDAI 
maintained the power poles and sewer lines, paved the area around the 
utilities, and used the area for parking for its residents, all without any 
objection to or interference from Phoenix East.   
A year after a hurricane destroyed PDAI's condominium building 
in 2004, PDAI dissolved its association and reformed as Perdido Dunes, 
which decided to build a much larger condominium tower on the property.  
Those plans raised the ire of Phoenix East condominium-unit owners, 
who believed the tower would obstruct their view of the shore.  Since 
then, the condominium associations have engaged in extensive 
litigation.1   
One of those disputes revolved around ownership of the strip of land 
that Perdido Dunes and its predecessor had been using for its utilities 
 
1See Phoenix East Ass'n v. Perdido Dunes Tower, LLC, 295 So. 3d 
1016 (Ala. 2019).   
SC-2023-0481 
 
4 
 
and parking.  Perdido Dunes alleged that it had acquired the disputed 
property by adverse possession, but Phoenix East said that Perdido 
Dunes had only used the property with Phoenix East's permission.  To 
resolve that issue, Perdido Dunes filed a quiet-title suit against Phoenix 
East in 2015.   
The Baldwin Circuit Court held a bench trial.  After hearing 
evidence from both sides ore tenus, the trial court entered a judgment 
holding that Perdido Dunes had acquired a prescriptive easement to "the 
entire disputed area."  Phoenix East filed a motion for clarification, 
asking the court to specify whether the prescriptive easement included 
rights to the subterranean portion of the disputed property.  The trial 
court denied that motion.  Phoenix East appealed.       
Standard of Review 
When a trial court hears evidence ore tenus and "'resolves 
conflicting questions of fact in favor of one of the parties, its findings will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless they were clearly erroneous or 
manifestly unjust.'"  Lilly v. Palmer, 495 So. 2d 522, 525 (Ala. 1986) 
(quoting Scarbrough v. Smith, 445 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 1984)).  "The 
presumption of correctness is particularly strong in adverse possession 
SC-2023-0481 
 
5 
 
cases, because it is difficult for an appellate court to review the evidence 
in such cases."  Rice v. McGinnis, 653 So. 2d 950, 950 (Ala. 1995).  
Analysis 
 Phoenix East argues that the trial court erred for several reasons.  
First, it says that the Alabama Uniform Condominium Act ("the Condo 
Act"), § 35-8A-101, et seq., Ala. Code 1975, prohibited the trial court from 
awarding Perdido Dunes a prescriptive easement on Phoenix East's 
property.  Second, Phoenix East contends that Perdido Dunes did not 
adequately prove adverse use or claim of right, which are two elements 
of a prescriptive easement.  Finally, Phoenix East argues that the trial 
court's judgment is void because, in its complaint, Perdido Dunes did not 
name the Phoenix East unit owners individually, which Phoenix East 
says was required under Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.  We address each 
argument in turn.     
A. The Condo Act Does Not Prohibit a Prescriptive Easement on 
Phoenix East's Property   
Phoenix East first argues that the Condo Act categorically bars 
judicially imposed prescriptive easements.  Phoenix East points to the 
language of § 35-8A-207(e), Ala. Code 1975, which says that "common 
elements" of condominiums "are not subject to partition, and any 
SC-2023-0481 
 
6 
 
purported conveyance, encumbrance, judicial sale, or other voluntary or 
involuntary transfer of an undivided interest in the common elements 
made without the unit to which that interest is allocated, is void."  
According to Phoenix East, the disputed property is part of its "common 
elements" and, because a prescriptive easement is an "encumbrance," the 
trial court's judgment granting that easement "partition[ed]" the Phoenix 
East unit owners' property in violation of the statute.   
Phoenix East misreads the statute.  Subsection (e) does not 
categorically prohibit encumbrances on common elements but instead 
prevents only encumbrances that "partition" common elements by 
untethering a unit owner's interest in the common element from the 
owner's interest in the unit itself.  That prohibition has the effect of 
barring individual unit owners from, for example, selling their interest 
in a communal pool or their space in a condo parking lot unless they 
simultaneously sell "the unit to which that common element interest is 
allocated," Commissioner's Commentary to § 35-8A-207, cmt. 6; but it 
does not bar encumbrances that keep the link between a common element 
and each unit intact.  The easement awarded to Perdido Dunes is 
precisely the sort of encumbrance that does not "partition" common 
SC-2023-0481 
 
7 
 
elements from their units -- because each unit owner's proportional 
interest in the common elements is unaffected by the easement.  The 
easement therefore falls outside the scope of subsection (e).2   
B.  There Was Sufficient Evidence of a Prescriptive Easement  
Next, Phoenix East argues that the trial court erred in awarding a 
prescriptive easement to Perdido Dunes because, it says, Perdido Dunes 
did not adequately prove adverse use and claim of right.  See Bull v. 
Salsman, 435 So. 2d 27, 29 (Ala. 1983) (explaining that, "[t]o establish an 
easement by prescription, the claimant must use the premises over which 
the easement is claimed for a period of twenty years or more, adversely 
to the owner of the premises, under claim of right, exclusive, continuous, 
 
2Dorsett v. Singla, 195 So. 3d 299 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), which 
Phoenix East cites, is distinguishable.  In Dorsett, a condominium-unit 
owner attempted to sever his interests in a parking space and a storage 
space from his interest in the unit and convey them to a third party.  As 
the Court of Civil Appeals held, that attempted conveyance is precisely 
the sort of partitioning of the common elements that § 35-8A-207(e) 
anticipates and proscribes. 
 
Village of Doral Place Ass'n v. RU4 Real, Inc., 22 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), which invalidated a tax sale of a condominium pool, 
is similarly unhelpful to Phoenix East.  Decisions by courts of our sister 
states are not binding on our Court.  Simcala, Inc. v. American Coal 
Trade, Inc., 821 So. 2d 197, 202 (Ala. 2001).  And while they may be 
persuasive, see id., Doral is not because it relies on inapplicable statutes. 
SC-2023-0481 
 
8 
 
and uninterrupted, with actual or presumptive knowledge of the owner").  
Because there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could 
conclude that Perdido Dunes had met its burden, we reject both 
arguments.   
1. Adverse Use 
First, Phoenix East contends that Perdido Dunes failed to overcome 
the presumption that its use of the disputed property was permissive.  
See Ford v. Alabama By-Prods. Corp., 392 So. 2d 217, 219 (Ala. 1980) 
(noting that "[t]here is a presumption that the user is permissive rather 
than adverse unless shown otherwise").  Phoenix East asserts that 
Perdido Dunes "did not present any evidence that it barred Phoenix East" 
from accessing the disputed property and that Perdido Dunes failed to 
repudiate "'permissive use as to afford notice of an adverse claim.'"  
Phoenix East's brief at 20-21 (citation omitted).  
But adverse possession does not require Perdido Dunes to 
demonstrate that it barred access to the disputed property.  Although 
barring the record owner from accessing his property may evince an 
adverse intent, it is not the sole touchstone.  Adverse use simply means 
that a claimant "assert[s] dominion and control over the disputed 
SC-2023-0481 
 
9 
 
property" by using the property without permission from the record 
owner.  Strickland v. Markos, 566 So. 2d 229, 233 (Ala. 1990) (citing 
Reynolds v. Rutland, 365 So. 2d 656 (Ala. 1978)).   
Perdido Dunes presented ample evidence that its use of the 
disputed property was not permissive.  Perdido Dunes installed and 
maintained power poles and sewage lines on the property; it paved the 
property and cleared storm debris from it; and its residents used the 
property for parking.  And while Tommy Robinson, one of Phoenix East's 
developers, testified that he gave permission to Perdido Dunes' 
predecessor to use the disputed property in the 1990s, there was other 
evidence admitted at trial -- including Robinson's own prior 
statements -- that contradicted that testimony.3   
After hearing this evidence, the trial court "resolve[d] conflicting 
questions of fact" in favor of Perdido Dunes, Donaldson v. Jaguar Co., 516 
So. 2d 619, 620 (Ala. 1987), and found that it had rebutted the 
 
3In an earlier deposition, Robinson testified that he did not 
remember ever giving anyone at Perdido Dunes permission when he 
discovered Perdido Dunes was using Phoenix East's property in the 
1990s.  Additionally, several Perdido Dunes condominium unit owners 
testified at trial that Phoenix East had never given them permission to 
use the disputed property.   
SC-2023-0481 
 
10 
 
presumption that its use of the disputed property was permissive.  Fisher 
v. Higgenbotham, 406 So. 2d 888 (Ala. 1981).  Because there was credible 
evidence to support that determination, we will not disturb it on appeal.  
See Mims v. Mims, 368 So. 2d 854, 855 (Ala. 1979) (explaining that 
"[w]here conflicting testimony is taken ore tenus … the findings of the 
court on the facts … will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly and 
palpably wrong").   
2. Claim of Right  
Phoenix East next argues that Perdido Dunes did not meet its 
burden of showing that its use of the disputed property was "under [a] 
claim of right," Bull, 435 So. 2d at 29, for three reasons.  First, Phoenix 
East contends that Perdido Dunes did not "act[] as if it had any rights" 
to the disputed property until 2015, which is too recent to meet the 20-
year minimum requirement for prescriptive easements.  Phoenix East's 
brief at 22.  But "claim of right" does not have the narrow interpretation 
that Phoenix East seems to give it.  Claiming a right in property does not 
require an adverse possessor to explicitly notify the record owner of that 
intent.  Rather, "claim of right" simply means that an adverse possessor 
has "an intention to claim title" to the disputed property.  Hess v. Rudder, 
SC-2023-0481 
 
11 
 
117 Ala. 525, 528, 23 So. 136, 136 (1898); accord Taylor v. Russell, 369 
So. 2d 537, 542 (Ala. 1979) (noting that acts "which unmistakenly convey 
notice" to the record owners are sufficient to establish an adverse claim 
of ownership).   
When we view "claim of right" correctly, Phoenix East's first 
argument -- that Perdido Dunes did not demonstrate any claim of right 
until 2015 -- is legally inaccurate.  Perdido Dunes' predecessor began 
using the disputed property for parking and installed power poles and 
sewer lines sometimes in the 1980s, and Perdido Dunes continued those 
uses from 2005 onward.  Those types of adverse actions sufficiently 
manifested an intent by Perdido Dunes to possess the property "under [a] 
claim of right."  Bull, 435 So. 2d at 29. 
Second, Phoenix East says that Perdido Dunes only offered 
evidence of individuals' claims of right but failed to prove any actions 
demonstrating the requisite "corporate" claim of right to the disputed 
property.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Fincher, 348 So. 2d 466 (Ala. 1977).  
Relying on Robertson, Phoenix East contends that Perdido Dunes only 
proved individual acts of adverse use of the disputed property; Phoenix 
East therefore argues that the trial court could not have "'discern[ed] the 
SC-2023-0481 
 
12 
 
intent of [Perdido Dunes] … as a whole'" to claim a right to the disputed 
property.  Phoenix East's brief at 23 (quoting Robertson, 348 So. 2d at 
468).  But rather than undermine the trial court's finding of a corporate 
claim of right, Robertson supports it.  The Robertson Court held that a 
church had demonstrated a corporate claim of right to the disputed 
property by using it as a parking lot and picnic area for its members.  348 
So. 2d at 468.    Likewise, Perdido Dunes' uses of the disputed property 
benefited the entity "as a whole."  Id.  Perdido Dunes built and 
maintained utilities on the disputed property, paved the property, and 
used it as parking for its unit owners -- acts that evinced a collective claim 
of right to the disputed property.   
Finally, Phoenix East argues that Perdido Dunes' "recognition" of 
Phoenix East's superior title to the disputed property in its 2015 
complaint and in a board meeting in the 1990s defeats its claim of right.  
Phoenix East cites Kittrell v. Scarborough, 287 Ala. 155, 249 So. 2d 814 
(1971), and Kerlin v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., 390 So. 2d 616 (Ala. 
1980), but those cases do not stand for the blanket proposition that any 
recognition of the record owner's title defeats a claim of adverse 
possession.  In Kittrell, the claimants offered to pay the record owner for 
SC-2023-0481 
 
13 
 
the disputed property, which this Court held was "positive evidence that 
the [claimants'] possession was not under a claim of right."  287 Ala. at 
157, 249 So. 2d at 816.  Similarly, the Kerlin Court, citing Kittrell, said 
that "efforts to buy the property from the record owner constitute 
acknowledgement of his superior title, and thus do disprove the 
adverseness, since there is then no claim of right."  390 So. 2d at 619.  But 
Kittrell and Kerlin do not imply that any act of "recognition" undermines 
a claim of right.  By definition, a party seeking to quiet title by adverse 
possession is acknowledging that, at one time, the other party was the 
record owner of the disputed property.  That is all Perdido Dunes did; it 
did not offer to pay Phoenix East for the disputed property or otherwise 
do anything that "disprove[d] the adverseness" of its use.  Id.   
In sum, Perdido Dunes presented sufficient evidence at trial that 
Phoenix East knew about its use of the disputed property and did not 
give it permission to use it.  Consequently, the trial court's finding that 
there was a prescriptive easement is not "'clearly erroneous or manifestly 
unjust.'"  Lilly, 495 So. 2d at 525; accord Ex parte Gilley, 55 So. 3d 242, 
247 (Ala. 2010) (affirming the trial court's judgment because there was 
"some evidence in the record to support the trial court's holding that the 
SC-2023-0481 
 
14 
 
[counterclaim plaintiffs] have a prescriptive easement over the disputed 
property").  
C.  Perdido Dunes Joined All Necessary Parties to the Action  
In the alternative, Phoenix East argues that the trial court's 
judgment is void because Perdido Dunes named only "Phoenix East 
Association" as a party to the action, without also naming each individual 
unit owner.  According to Phoenix East, every unit owner was a necessary 
party required to be joined in the litigation under Rule 19(a)(2)(i), Ala. R. 
Civ. P., because each has "an interest relating to the subject of the action" 
-- the disputed property -- and disposing of the action in their absence 
would "as a practical matter impair or impede [their] ability to protect" 
their interests.  But because Phoenix East adequately represented their 
interests, the unit owners were not necessary parties under Rule 
19(a)(2)(i). 
Rule 19 generally "provides for joinder of persons needed for just 
adjudication," Byrd Cos. v. Smith, 591 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 1991), but 
there is "no prescribed formula for determining whether a party is a 
necessary one or an indispensable one," Holland v. City of Alabaster, 566 
So. 2d 224, 227 (Ala. 1990).  This Court has recognized that when a party 
SC-2023-0481 
 
15 
 
"adequately represent[s] the absent parties' interests," Rule 19 does not 
require those absent parties to be joined in the litigation.  Byrd Cos., 591 
So. 2d at 846.  In Byrd Cos., for example, this Court held that the plaintiff 
was not required to name each condominium-unit owner in its complaint 
because the corporate manager of the condominium association 
adequately represented its unit owners' interests.  591 So. 2d at 847.  The 
Court reasoned that the litigation "related to interests held in common 
by all of the [association's] property owners, not to individualized 
interests."  Id.  Similarly, the disputed property here "relate[s] to 
interests held in common by all of the [Phoenix East] property owners, 
not to individualized interests."  Id. 
In its reply brief, Phoenix East attempts to distinguish Byrd Cos., 
arguing that it is inapplicable because it involved an injunction 
extinguishing an easement, rather than an order granting an easement.  
That is a distinction without a difference.  The holding in Byrd Cos. did 
not rest on the nature of the relief.  Rather, the Court held that the unit 
owners were not necessary parties under Rule 19 because the unit 
SC-2023-0481 
 
16 
 
owners' interest in the easement rights was collective, not individualized.  
The same is true here.  
Further, as Perdido Dunes points out, the Condo Act specifically 
contemplates that condominium associations will represent their 
individual members in litigation.  See § 35-8A-302(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975 
(granting associations the power to "[i]nstitute, defend, or intervene in 
litigation … in its own name on behalf of itself or two or more unit owners 
on matters affecting the condominium" (emphasis added)).  That 
language, especially when combined with this Court's holding in Byrd 
Cos., makes clear that Perdido Dunes was not required to join every unit 
owner to the litigation. 
Conclusion 
There was credible evidence to support the trial court's holding that 
Perdido Dunes acquired a prescriptive easement.  See Pinson v. Veach, 
388 So. 2d 964, 968 (Ala. 1980).  We therefore affirm the judgment.  
 
 
SC-2023-0481 
 
17 
 
ON REHEARING EX MERO MOTU:  OPINION OF MARCH 29, 
2024, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED. 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., 
concur.  
Sellers, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. 
 
SC-2023-0481 
 
18 
 
SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result). 
 
I concur in the result of the main opinion, which affirms the trial 
court's judgment that Perdido Dunes Tower Condominium Association, 
Inc. ("Perdido Dunes"), acquired a prescriptive easement over the strip of 
land at issue in this case.  I concur in the result because I do not read the 
main opinion as clearly recognizing the important distinction between 
obtaining a prescriptive easement and obtaining a fee-simple interest in 
a parcel of land through adverse possession, the latter of which was the 
theory asserted by Perdido Dunes in its complaint.  The difference 
between the two concepts lies in the rights acquired therefrom.  "[O]ne 
who establishes adverse possession of property obtains title to the 
property while one who establishes an easement by prescription 
establishes only a right to use the property."  Jackson v. City of Auburn, 
971 So. 2d 696, 705 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (plurality opinion).  See also 
Aman v. Gilley, 55 So. 3d 248, 249 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (holding that a 
trial court could enter a judgment awarding counterclaim plaintiffs a 
prescriptive easement over a parcel of land, even though they had 
claimed to own the property outright through adverse possession, 
because the parties had impliedly consented to try a claim for a 
SC-2023-0481 
 
19 
 
prescriptive easement).  I also note that "the scope of a prescriptive 
easement is determined by the scope of the use that established the 
prescriptive right, and an easement holder is not entitled to materially 
alter the scope (or character) of its easement."  Jackson, 971 So. 2d at 708 
(plurality opinion).