Title: Mary Nell M. DeFriece and Lee M. Durst v. Ernest C. ( 365 ) McCorquodale, Jr. and the estate of Nell M. McCorquodale
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061825
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2008

REL: 04/11/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061825
____________________
Mary Nell M. DeFriece and Lee M. Durst
v.
Ernest C. McCorquodale, Jr., and the estate of Nell M.
McCorquodale
____________________
1070029
____________________
Ernest C. McCorquodale, Jr., and the estate of Nell M.
McCorquodale
v.
Mary Nell M. DeFriece and Lee M. Durst
2
Appeals from Clarke Circuit Court 
(CV-04-63)
STUART, Justice.
Mary Nell M. DeFriece and Lee M. Durst appeal from a
summary judgment entered in favor of Ernest C. McCorquodale,
Jr. ("Ernest Jr."), and the estate of Nell M. McCorquodale
("the estate") on the fraud claims DeFriece and Durst asserted
against Ernest Jr. and the estate.  Ernest Jr. and the estate
cross-appeal.  We affirm.
I.
 DeFriece, Durst, and Ernest Jr. are the children of
Ernest C. McCorquodale, Sr. ("Ernest Sr."), and Nell M.
McCorquodale.  Ernest Sr. predeceased his wife and children,
dying on December 18, 1992.  Before his death, Ernest Sr.
executed a will that devised the family home to Nell and the
rest of his real property, approximately 8,000 acres of
timberland in southwest Alabama, was placed in trusts with
equal one-third shares for the benefit of DeFriece, Durst,
Ernest Jr., and their respective families.  
However, following Ernest Sr.'s death, the family learned
that his will had failed to take advantage of the marital-tax
deduction and would, if effectuated, result in a tax liability
1061825 and 1070029
3
of approximately $4 million on Ernest Sr.'s estate, worth an
estimated $8.3 million.  Seeking to minimize that tax burden,
the 
family 
consulted 
an 
estate-planning 
attorney 
who
recommended, first, that DeFriece, Durst, Ernest Jr., their
respective children, and Nell disclaim their rights to receive
real property under Ernest Sr.'s will, and, second, that
DeFriece, Durst, Ernest Jr., and their children disclaim their
rights to receive any of the estate's real property by
intestate succession.  The result of these disclaimers would
be that Nell would receive outright real property valued at
approximately $7 million, that approximately $1 million of
assets that remained in the estate would pass outright or in
trust for the benefit of the grandchildren, and that the
overall tax liability would be reduced from approximately $4
million to $260,000.
The family ultimately agreed to this plan; however,
DeFriece and Durst allege that they did so only after Nell
told them that she would, either during her life or upon her
death, give the real property she received under the plan to
DeFriece, Durst, and Ernest Jr., in equal shares, and after
Ernest Jr. told them that he would not accept from Nell more
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4
than a one-third share of the real property she received under
the plan.   After the disclaimers were submitted to and
approved by the Probate Court of Clarke County, the individual
family members executed the disclaimers and, on September 24,
1993, Nell took title to the real property in Ernest Sr.'s
estate.  Approximately one week later, on September 30, 1993,
Nell conveyed to DeFriece, Durst, and Ernest Jr. an undivided
22.25% interest in that real property.
Several years later, DeFriece, Durst, Ernest Jr., and
Nell began discussing a possible division of the property in
which they jointly held an undivided interest, and, on March
24, 1997, they executed a series of partition deeds dividing
the property into four separate parcels, and DeFriece, Durst,
Ernest Jr., and Nell were each deeded a parcel.   DeFriece and
Durst again allege that they agreed to the division of the
property only after Nell repeated her representation that she
would later give them each a one-third share of the real
property she held following the division and after Ernest Jr.
again stated that he would not accept from Nell any more than
a one-third share of that property.
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In a number of earlier wills prepared between June 1994
1
and November 1997, Nell had also left the bulk of her real
property to Ernest Jr.
5
On February 11, 2004, Nell died before transferring any
more real property to her children.  In her final will, dated
November 12, 1997, Nell left the bulk of her real property to
Ernest Jr.   Ernest Jr. petitioned the Probate Court of Clarke
1
County to probate that will on February 27, 2004, and, on
March 23, 2004, DeFriece and Durst filed notice that they were
contesting the will and moved the probate court to transfer
the case to the Clarke Circuit Court.  
After the case was transferred to the Clarke Circuit
Court,  DeFriece and Durst amended their complaint to add four
fraud claims against Ernest Jr. and the estate.  The essence
of those claims was that DeFriece and Durst had agreed to the
family tax-savings plan whereby they would disclaim their
rights to inherit the real property left to them by Ernest
Sr.'s will only after Nell promised that she would later
transfer to them and Ernest Jr. the real property she received
pursuant to that plan in equal one-third shares and after
Ernest Jr. promised them that he would not accept more than a
one-third share of that property.  DeFriece and Durst also
1061825 and 1070029
6
claimed that Nell and Ernest Jr. had repeated those promises
to induce them to agree to the division of the property into
four parcels in March 1997.
On February 9, 2007, Ernest Jr. moved the trial court to
enter a summary judgment in his favor in both the will contest
and on the fraud claims asserted by DeFriece and Durst.  At a
hearing held on that motion on February 26, 2007, DeFriece and
Durst agreed that a summary judgment was due to be granted in
the will contest, and the trial court subsequently entered the
summary judgment.  The trial court also ordered the parties to
file supplemental briefs on the remaining issues.  On April 4,
2007, the estate filed its own motion seeking a summary
judgment on the fraud claims that had been asserted against
it.  Both that motion and Ernest Jr.'s February 9, 2007,
summary-judgment motion argued that Ernest Jr. and the estate
were entitled to a summary judgment on the fraud claims on the
basis of: 1) the statute of limitations; 2) the Statute of
Frauds; 3) the doctrine of judicial estoppel; and 4) the lack
of substantial evidence indicating that DeFriece and Durst had
relied on the alleged misrepresentations by Ernest Jr. and
Nell.  
1061825 and 1070029
7
On August 31, 2007, the trial court issued a final
summary judgment in favor of Ernest Jr. and the estate.  That
order stated, in pertinent part:
"With respect to the Estate's motion for summary
judgment, the court finds that, because both of the
plaintiffs received a greater benefit as a result of
the disclaimers than they would have received had
[Ernest Sr.]'s will been probated as written, the
plaintiffs did not sustain any damage for which they
may obtain relief from the Estate.  Moreover, the
court finds that the doctrine of judicial estoppel
prevents the plaintiffs from presently disavowing or
avoiding the disclaimers that the plaintiffs filed
and affirmed in the Probate Court of Clarke County.
The purpose of judicial estoppel is '"to protect the
integrity of the judicial process" by "prohibiting
parties 
from 
deliberately 
changing 
positions
according to the exigencies of the moment."'  New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001).
"With respect to Ernest [Jr.]'s motion for
summary judgment, the court finds that any alleged
promises made by Ernest [Jr.] were, at best,
illusory and they could not provide a proper basis
for an actionable fraud claim.
"Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."
DeFriece and Durst filed their notice of appeal to this Court
on September 21, 2007, and Ernest Jr. and the estate filed
their cross-appeal on September 28, 2007.
1061825 and 1070029
8
II.
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004).  On appeal, DeFriece and Durst do not challenge
the judgment entered in favor of Ernest Jr. on their claim
contesting Nell's will; rather, they challenge only the
summary judgment entered in favor of Ernest Jr. and the estate
on their fraud claims.  Thus, we review those claims to
determine if, when the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to DeFriece and Durst, a genuine issue of material
fact exists so as to make a judgment as a matter of law for
Ernest Jr. and the estate on those claims inappropriate.
1061825 and 1070029
9
We further note that although the trial court entered an
order articulating its reasoning for entering a summary
judgment in favor of Ernest Jr. and the estate, "our review is
not limited to that reasoning, and we may affirm the summary
judgment[] if [it is] proper for any reason supported by the
record."  Lee L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 851
So. 2d 507, 521 (Ala. 2002) (citing Smith v. Equifax Servs.,
Inc., 537 So. 2d 463 (Ala. 1988)).  
III.
In its August 31, 2007, summary-judgment order, the trial
court listed three bases for its decision: 1) that DeFriece
and Durst were not damaged by the misrepresentations allegedly
made by Ernest Jr. and the estate; 2) that the doctrine of
judicial estoppel barred DeFriece and Durst's claims; and 3)
that the misrepresentations allegedly made by Ernest Jr. were
illusory and therefore could not provide the basis for an
actionable fraud claim.  On appeal, DeFriece and Durst argue
that all three of these conclusions are erroneous.  Ernest Jr.
and the estate predictably argue that the trial court's order
was correct in every respect, and they make the additional
arguments that the summary judgment should be affirmed:  1) on
1061825 and 1070029
10
the basis of the Statute of Frauds because, they say, DeFriece
and Durst have produced no signed writing supporting their
claims; 2) on the basis of the statute of limitations; and 3)
because DeFriece and Durst could not have reasonably relied on
the alleged misrepresentations.  For the reasons that follow,
we agree that DeFriece and Durst's claims are barred by the
Statute of Frauds because there is no writing to support the
claims.  Accordingly, we review only that argument, and we
need not consider the other arguments made by Ernest Jr. and
the estate concerning other potential bases for affirming the
trial court's judgment. 
Alabama's Statute of Frauds, § 8-9-2, Ala. Code 1975,
provides, in pertinent part: 
"In the following cases, every agreement is void
unless such agreement or some note or memorandum
thereof expressing the consideration is in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith
or some other person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized in writing:
"....
"(5) Every contract for the sale of
lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of
any interest therein, except leases for a
term  not longer than one year, unless the
purchase money, or a portion thereof is
paid and the purchaser is put in possession
of the land by the seller ...."
1061825 and 1070029
11
All the fraud claims asserted by DeFriece and Durst are
premised on the contentions that Nell promised that she would
transmit to them and to Ernest Jr., in equal one-third shares,
the real property she received under the tax-saving plan
agreed to following Ernest Sr.'s death and that Ernest Jr.
promised them that he would not accept more than a one-third
share of that same property.  It is undisputed that both of
these promises –– Nell's promise and Ernest Jr.'s promise ––
implicate the conveyance of an interest in land, and this
Court has previously made clear that "'[t]he Statute of Frauds
requires that any agreement to convey an interest in land ...
be in writing.'"  Tonsmeire v. AmSouth Bank, 659 So. 2d 601,
604 (Ala. 1995) (quoting with approval the trial court's
order).  Despite this clear statement of law, DeFriece and
Durst attempt to avoid the application of the Statute of
Frauds in five ways.
First, DeFriece and Durst argue that the trial court did
not enter the summary judgment on the basis of the Statute of
Frauds and that whether the promises violated the Statute of
Frauds is therefore not an issue subject to this Court's
review on appeal.  However, although it is true that the trial
1061825 and 1070029
12
court did not base its judgment on the Statute of Frauds, the
trial court acknowledged that Ernest Jr. and the estate had
raised that defense, and it recognized that the Statute of
Frauds "may provide [a] valid and independent bas[i]s for
granting summary judgment."   In any event, we will affirm a
summary judgment if that judgment is proper for any reason
supported by the record, even if the basis for our affirmance
was not the basis of the decision below and even if the basis
for our affirmance was not argued below.  Smith v. Equifax
Servs., Inc., 537 So. 2d at 465.
DeFriece and Durst argue, second, that the Statute of
Frauds applies only to promises and representations that are
part of contractual agreements.  DeFriece and Durst argue that
the misrepresentations allegedly made by Ernest Jr. and Nell
were not "contractual in nature"; rather, they were simply
fraudulent statements that now support claims of promissory
fraud.  In Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d 47, 58 (Ala. 2003), this
Court considered the relationship between breach-of-contract
claims and promissory-fraud claims insofar as the Statute of
Frauds is concerned and, after overruling a previous line of
cases, held that "an oral promise that is void by operation of
1061825 and 1070029
13
the Statute of Frauds will not support an action against the
promisor for promissory fraud."  Thus, regardless of whether
the misrepresentations allegedly made by Ernest Jr. and the
estate are viewed as contractual in nature or as simply
fraudulent, they are subject to the Statute of Frauds because
they concern the conveyance of an interest in land.
In a related argument, DeFriece and Durst argue, third,
that the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable if fraud occurred
during the inception of an agreement.  In support of this
argument, DeFriece and Durst cite the following passage from
Leisure American Resorts, Inc. v. Knutilla, 547 So. 2d 424,
427 (Ala. 1989):
"It is a well-established principle that equity
will intervene and render the Statute of Frauds
defense inapplicable in a contract action
"'even 
though 
the 
part 
performance
requirement is not met, when fraud operates
from the beginning –– that is, when the
breaching party procured the land ... with
no intent to perform the oral agreement
admitted to have been made.'
"Darby v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 322, 326-27 (Ala.
1985)."
We did not, in Bruce, include Leisure American Resorts or
Darby v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1985), in the list of
1061825 and 1070029
We did in Bruce expressly overrule Hinkle v. Cargill,
2
Inc., 613 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Ala. 1992), in which this Court
had stated:
"[The appellee] argues that a fraud action
cannot be based on the breach of an unwritten
contract that is void under the Statute of Frauds.
As the above-cited authorities show, however, the
Statute of Frauds does not bar proof of a fraud
committed by means of a promise that ordinarily
could not be enforced as a contractual promise
because of the Statute of Frauds.  Furthermore, 'it
is well settled in Alabama that fraud may be
predicated upon a breach of contract which is void,
because not in writing, where the contract was made
for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud.'  Caron
v. Teagle, 408 So. 2d 494, 496 (Ala. 1981)."
Among the "above-cited authorities" referred to in this
passage is Darby v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1985), upon
which Leisure American Resorts relied.
14
cases that were being overruled; however, our holding that an
oral promise that is void by operation of the Statute of
Frauds will not support an action for promissory fraud
ultimately had that effect.   Bruce stands for the proposition
2
that a party may not avoid the effect of the Statute of Frauds
by framing the claim as one alleging promissory fraud or by
invoking the historical fraud-in-the-inception exception to
the Statute of Frauds.  Accordingly, DeFriece and Durst's
argument in this regard is foreclosed by our holding in Bruce.
1061825 and 1070029
15
DeFriece and Durst argue, fourth, that even if this Court
holds that the Statute of Frauds applies to their claims,
multiple writings exist that, when considered together,
satisfy the requirement in § 8-9-2 that the alleged promises
to convey real property be "in writing and subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith or some other person by him
thereunto lawfully authorized in writing."  The documents that
DeFriece and Durst allege jointly constitute a written
memorialization of Ernest Jr. and Nell's alleged promises are:
1) a brief submitted to the Probate Court of Clarke County
following Ernest Sr.'s death; 2) a will Nell purportedly made
in 1990; 3) a letter written to DeFriece, Durst, Ernest Jr.,
and Nell in September 1993 by the attorney helping them with
Ernest Sr.'s estate; and 4) the September 1993 deeds whereby
Nell transmitted to DeFriece, Durst, and Ernest Jr. an
undivided 22.25% interest in the real property she received
after 
Ernest 
Sr.'s 
death, 
and 
the 
March 
1997 
deeds
partitioning that same property.  For the reasons that follow,
these documents are insufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds.
1061825 and 1070029
16
First, we note that the only documents identified that
actually contain the required signatures of Ernest Jr. and
Nell are the deeds.  However, these deeds contain no language
that would indicate that Ernest Jr. and Nell actually made the
misrepresentations they are accused of making; rather, they
are standard deeds conveying and partitioning property.
"Although a writing relied on to satisfy the Statute of Frauds
need not be a complete contract, it must contain the essential
terms of the alleged contract, 'namely, an offer and an
acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential
terms of the agreement.'" Fausak's Tire Ctr., Inc. v.
Blanchard, 959 So. 2d 1132, 1138 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)
(quoting Davis v. Barnfield, 833 So. 2d 58, 62 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002) (citing Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc.,
613 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1993), overruled on another ground, Bruce
v. Cole, supra)).  These deeds contain none of those essential
terms.  
We do not know if the will purportedly made by Nell in
1990 contains her signature because that will is not in the
record.  Indeed, it is apparently no longer in existence;
DeFriece and Durst acknowledge that it was destroyed.  It is
1061825 and 1070029
17
self-evident that a writing that does not exist cannot be used
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
Finally, the letter to the family and the brief submitted
to the probate court are not signed by any of the family
members; rather, they are both signed by the attorney who was
advising the family following Ernest Sr.'s death.  Ernest Jr.
and the estate dispute that these two documents support the
claim that they made the alleged misrepresentations to
DeFriece and Durst; however, even if we were to assume the
contrary, there is no evidence in the record indicating that
Ernest Jr. or Nell gave that attorney written authorization to
make those representations on their behalf; accordingly, these
documents are not sufficient to meet the signed-writing
requirement of the Statute of Frauds.  See Hight v. Byars, 569
So. 2d 387, 388 (Ala. 1990) ("Alabama law is well settled on
the principle that in order for an agent to act on a
principal's behalf regarding a matter controlled by the
Statute of Frauds, the agent's authority must be in writing.
Moreover, any contract made by an agent without written
authority is void if the contract itself is one that has to be
in writing." (citations omitted)).
1061825 and 1070029
18
Finally, DeFriece and Durst argue that their complaint
supports actions alleging unjust enrichment and ordinary
fraud, which claims they allege are undisputedly outside the
ambit of the Statute of Frauds.  However, regardless of
whether the facts in their complaint would support such
actions, they have never asserted those claims.  In their
response to Ernest Jr.'s motion for a summary judgment that
they filed with the trial court, DeFriece and Durst
acknowledged that "besides the will contest itself, the
contestants' action is one in promissory fraud, based upon
their reasonable reliance on the representations made by
[Nell] and Ernest [Jr.]."  DeFriece and Durst cannot now, in
this appellate court, raise for the first time claims that
were never made in the trial court.  Andrews v. Merritt Oil
Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992).
IV.
In its order entering a summary judgment in favor of
Ernest Jr. and the estate on the fraud claims asserted by
DeFriece and Durst, the trial court concluded as a matter of
law that DeFriece and Durst were not damaged by the
misrepresentations allegedly made by Ernest Jr. and Nell, that
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As this Court stated in Smith v. Equifax Services, Inc.,
3
537 So. 2d at 465:  "We do not mean to imply that the reasons
given by the trial court for granting the summary judgment ...
were wrong or insufficient, but merely that we do not need to
address those reasons, because we can uphold the trial court's
judgment on [other grounds] ...."
19
DeFriece and Durst's claims were barred by the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, and that the misrepresentations allegedly
made by Ernest Jr. were illusory and therefore unable to
provide the basis for an actionable fraud claim.  Without
reaching those reasons, we conclude that the trial court's
judgment is due to be affirmed on the basis of the Statute of
Frauds, which requires that an agreement to convey an interest
in land be in writing.   There is no writing memorializing the
3
alleged agreement in this case, and for that reason the
summary judgment in favor of Ernest Jr. and the estate on the
fraud claims is affirmed.
1061825 –– AFFIRMED.
1070029 –– AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.