Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sonja C. Davig Huesmann
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001603-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 28, 2018

2018 WI 114 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1603-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Sonja C. Davig, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
Sonja Davig Huesmann, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HUESMANN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 28, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
September 26, 2018 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, C.J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the complainant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Matthew F. Anich, and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Ashland.  
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sonja C. Davig, Holmen. 
 
 
 
 
2018 WI 114
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1603-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Sonja C. Davig, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Sonja Davig Huesmann, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 28, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
has appealed a report filed by Referee Allan E. Beatty, 
accepting a stipulation filed by the OLR and Attorney Sonja C. 
Davig Huesmann1 in which Attorney Davig Huesmann admitted the 
                                                 
1 Attorney Davig Huesmann is also known as Sonja C. Davig.  
She has not, however, officially changed the name under which 
she is licensed to practice law in this state.  Consequently, 
this order will refer to her as Attorney Davig Huesmann.  See 
SCR 10.03(2) and SCR 40.14(3). 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
2 
 
eight counts of professional misconduct alleged in the OLR's 
complaint.  Referee Beatty recommended that Attorney Davig 
Huesmann be publicly reprimanded for her misconduct.  The OLR 
argues that a public reprimand would unduly depreciate the 
seriousness of Attorney Davig Huesmann's misconduct and that a 
suspension of her license to practice law in Wisconsin is 
appropriate. 
¶2 
Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were 
based on the parties' stipulation.  We agree with the OLR that a 
public reprimand is not a sufficient sanction for the misconduct 
at issue.  Rather, we conclude that a 60-day suspension of 
Attorney Davig Huesmann's license to practice law in Wisconsin 
is appropriate.  In addition, we follow our usual custom of 
imposing the full costs of this proceeding, which are $10,360.04 
as of May 21, 2018, on Attorney Davig Huesmann.  The OLR does 
not seek restitution, and we do not impose a restitution order. 
¶3 
Attorney Davig Huesmann was admitted to practice law 
in Wisconsin in 1994.  She has no prior disciplinary history.  
She was formerly a member of Huesmann Law Office, S.C. in 
Holmen, Wisconsin, where she practiced with her then-husband, 
Mark Huesmann, until August 2013.  Attorney Davig Huesmann 
currently practices law with Johns, Flaherty & Collins, S.C. in 
LaCrosse, Wisconsin. 
¶4 
Huesmann Law Office, S.C. maintained a trust account 
at Seven Bridges Bank in Holmen, Wisconsin.  It also maintained 
a business checking account and business savings account there. 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
On August 15, 2016, the OLR filed a disciplinary 
complaint alleging eight counts of misconduct against Attorney 
Davig Huesmann.  She filed an answer to the complaint on 
November 4, 2016.  The parties filed a stipulation on 
October 16, 2017.  The following facts are taken from the 
stipulation. 
¶6 
On September 13, 2011, Attorney Davig Huesmann entered 
an appearance as attorney for the estate of R.T. in LaCrosse 
county.  She remained attorney of record for the estate until it 
was closed on June 7, 2013. 
¶7 
On June 4, 2013, Attorney Davig Huesmann deposited 
over $98,000 in the firm's trust account, which included over 
$68,000 in proceeds from the R.T. estate.  Between the time the 
money was deposited in the trust account and February of 2014, 
Attorney Davig Huesmann wrote various checks from the trust 
account and electronically transferred various sums from the 
trust account to the firm's business account.  Many of the 
electronic transfers from the trust account were not recorded in 
the transaction register or in any client ledgers.  On multiple 
dates there was less money in the trust account for the R.T. 
estate than should have been there. 
¶8 
On February 6, 2014, the final check relating to the 
R.T. estate was presented for payment, leading to a $13,726.97 
overdraft on the trust account.  The bank honored that check.  
¶9 
On February 7, 2014, Attorney Davig Huesmann deposited 
a $14,000 bank check from a credit union into the trust account.  
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
4 
 
The memo line on the check read "RE:  Christopher Perner."  
Christopher Perner is Attorney Davig Huesmann's current husband.   
¶10 On February 13, 2014, another trust account check was 
presented for payment and resulted in an overdraft in the trust 
account in the amount of $26.97.  That check was also honored by 
the bank.  On February 18, 2014, Attorney Davig Huesmann 
electronically transferred $100 from the business account to the 
trust account to cover that overdraft. 
¶11 On March 11, 2014, Attorney Davig Huesmann deposited 
another $14,000 into the trust account.  The source of that 
money was a cashier's check and the remitter was Attorney Davig 
Huesmann's mother.   
¶12 The OLR's investigative review of Attorney Davig 
Huesmann's trust account records revealed that the transaction 
register, which was broken down month-by-month, was inadequate.  
The register did not include the balance in the account after 
each transaction, nor did it contain a beginning or ending 
balance for any month. The register additionally failed to 
identify the source of each deposit, and occasionally it did not 
indicate the client for whom the funds were being disbursed.  
Attorney Davig Huesmann failed to record over $19,000 in nine 
electronic transfers from the trust account to the business 
account in the trust account transaction register.  Several of 
the dates in Attorney Davig Huesmann's client ledgers were 
incomplete; she failed to maintain monthly reconciliation 
reports as required by supreme court rules; she frequently 
deposited multiple deposit items at one time but the deposit 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
5 
 
slips did not identify the amount or client matter associated 
with each deposit item; and the memo lines of most of the checks 
she disbursed from the trust account did not identify the client 
matter or the purpose for the disbursement.   
¶13 On February 25, 2014, the OLR sent Attorney Davig 
Huesmann a letter informing her of the investigation into the 
overdrafts in her trust account and requiring her to provide a 
written response.  In February of 2015, the OLR filed a notice 
of motion and motion requesting an order to show cause why 
Attorney Davig Huesmann's license should not be suspended for 
her willful failure to cooperate in the OLR's investigation 
concerning her conduct.  After this court issued an order to 
show cause, Attorney Davig Huesmann provided information which 
the OLR deemed sufficient to allow it to continue its 
investigation, and the order to show cause was dismissed at the 
OLR's request.   
¶14 In January of 2016, the OLR filed a second motion 
requesting an order to show cause due to Attorney Davig 
Huesmann's continued willful failure to cooperate in the OLR's 
investigation.  This court issued a second order to show cause.  
Attorney Davig Huesmann provided the OLR with some additional 
information, and the OLR subsequently withdrew its second motion 
to suspend her license. 
¶15 The parties' stipulation set forth the following 
counts of misconduct, which were alleged in the OLR's complaint: 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
6 
 
Count 1:  By converting $13,732.43 belonging to the 
R.T. estate to her own purposes, Attorney Davig 
Huesmann violated SCR 20:8.4(c).2 
Count 2:  By failing to hold in trust $13,732.43 
relating to the R.T. estate, Attorney Davig Huesmann 
violated current SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).3 
Count 3:  By failing to hold $14,677.27 in trust for 
those 
eight 
additional 
clients, 
Attorney 
Davig 
Huesmann violated current SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). 
Count 4:  By depositing $28,000 in personal funds to 
her trust account:  $14,000 on February 7, 2014 and 
$14,000 on March 11, 2014 in order to conceal her 
conversions and failures to hold client funds in 
trust, Attorney Davig Huesmann violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
Count 5:  By depositing $28,000 in personal funds to 
her trust account:  $14,000 on February 7, 2014 and 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
3 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See 
S. Ct. Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 
1, 2016).  Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior 
to July 1, 2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to 
the supreme court rules will be to those in effect prior to 
July 1, 2016. 
Current SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides:   
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts.  
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
7 
 
$14,000 on March 11, 2014, Attorney Davig Huesmann 
violated former SCR 20:1.15(b)(3).4 
Count 6:  By failing to maintain trust account records 
that complied with the requirements of SCR 20:1.15, 
including the transaction register, client ledgers, 
deposit slips, checks, and monthly reconciliations, 
Attorney 
Davig 
Huesmann 
violated 
former 
SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)a., b., d., e.1, and g.5 
                                                 
4 Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) provided: "No funds belonging to 
the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to 
pay monthly account service charges may be deposited or retained 
in a trust account." 
5 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)a., b., d., e.1, and g. provided: 
Complete records of a trust account that is a 
draft account shall include a transaction register; 
individual client ledgers for IOLTA accounts and other 
pooled trust accounts; a ledger for account fees and 
charges, if law firm funds are held in the account 
pursuant to sub. (b)(3); deposit records; disbursement 
records; 
monthly 
statements; 
and 
reconciliation 
reports, subject to all of the following: 
a. The transaction register shall contain a 
chronological record of all account transactions, and 
shall include all of the following:  
1. the date, source, and amount of all deposits; 
2. the date, check or transaction number, payee 
and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, 
wire transfer, or other means; 
3. the date and amount of every other deposit or 
deduction of whatever nature; 
4. the identity of the client for whom funds were 
deposited or disbursed; and 
5. 
the 
balance 
in 
the 
account 
after 
each 
transaction.   
b. A subsidiary ledger shall be maintained for 
each client or 3rd party for whom the lawyer receives 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
trust funds that are deposited in an IOLTA account or 
any other pooled trust account.  The lawyer shall 
record each receipt and disbursement of a client's or 
3rd party's funds and the balance following each 
transaction.  A lawyer shall not disburse funds from 
an IOLTA account or any pooled trust account that 
would create a negative balance with respect to any 
individual client or matter.   
d.  Deposit slips shall identify the name of the 
lawyer or law firm, and the name of the account.  The 
deposit slip shall identify the amount of each deposit 
item, the client or matter associated with each 
deposit item, and the date of the deposit.  The lawyer 
shall maintain a copy or duplicate of each deposit 
slip.  All deposits shall be made intact.  No cash, or 
other form of disbursement, shall be deducted from a 
deposit.  Deposits of wired funds shall be documented 
in the account's monthly statement. 
e.1.  Checks shall be pre-printed and pre-
numbered.  The name and address of the lawyer or law 
firm, and the name of the account shall be printed in 
the upper left corner of the check.  Trust account 
checks shall include the words "Client Account," or 
"Trust Account," or words of similar import in the 
account name.  Each check disbursed from the trust 
account shall identify the client matter and the 
reason for the disbursement on the memo line. 
g.  For each trust account, the lawyer shall 
prepare and retain a printed reconciliation report on 
a regular and periodic basis not less frequently than 
every 30 days.  Each reconciliation report shall show 
all of the following balances and verify that they are 
identical: 
1. the balance that appears in the transaction 
register as of the reporting date; 
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 
for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts, 
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and  
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
9 
 
Count 7:  By making electronic (Internet) deposits to 
and disbursements from her trust account from at least 
January 2, 2013 through February 6, 2014, Attorney 
Davig Huesmann violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)c.6 
Count 8:  By failing to respond to multiple letters 
from 
the 
OLR 
and 
by 
providing 
incomplete 
and 
contradictory responses, necessitating the filing of 
two motions for orders to show cause why her license 
should not be suspended for willfully failing to 
cooperate with the OLR's investigation, Attorney Davig 
Huesmann violated SCR 22.03(2)7 and SCR 22.03(6),8 
                                                                                                                                                             
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 
in the financial institution's monthly statement and 
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 
from the balance in the monthly statement. 
6 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)c. provided:  "A lawyer shall not 
make deposits to or disbursements from a trust account by way of 
an Internet transaction." 
7 SCR 22.03(2) provides:  
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation.   
8 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
10 
 
which are enforced under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct via SCR 20:8.4(h).9 
¶16 The parties stated that the stipulation may be 
admitted into evidence without any supporting testimony.  The 
parties further stated that the referee may file a report 
reciting 
or 
incorporating 
the 
factual 
portions 
of 
the 
stipulation as the referee's findings of fact and the referee 
may recite or incorporate the stated counts of misconduct as the 
referee's conclusions of law.  The parties stated there was no 
stipulation as to what specific discipline the referee should 
recommend. 
¶17 Following the filing of the stipulation, the parties 
submitted briefs regarding the appropriate discipline to impose 
for Attorney Davig Huesmann's misconduct.  The referee issued 
his report on January 12, 2018.  Although the OLR had sought a 
one-year suspension of Attorney Davig Huesmann's Wisconsin law 
license, the referee concluded that a public reprimand was an 
appropriate sanction. 
¶18 The referee identified a number of aggravating factors 
present in this matter: there were multiple offenses; Attorney 
Davig Huesmann initially failed to comply with the OLR's 
investigation; 
Attorney 
Davig 
Huesmann 
had 
substantial 
experience in the practice of law; and client funds were 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
11 
 
involved.  The referee also identified multiple mitigating 
factors:  an absence of a prior disciplinary record; an absence 
of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal problems; a timely 
rectification of the consequences of the misconduct; a full and 
free 
disclosure 
and 
ultimate 
cooperation 
with 
the 
OLR 
proceeding; Attorney Davig Huesmann's character and reputation; 
and her chemical dependency.  The referee said he primarily 
focused on three mitigating factors:  (1) Attorney Davig 
Huesmann had no prior disciplinary history; (2) her personal 
problems and chemical dependency, which the referee found 
contributed 
to 
her 
misconduct, 
have 
been 
addressed 
and 
rectified; and (3) her personal problems led to her professional 
problems, particularly concerning her law practice's financial 
circumstances. 
¶19 The referee praised Attorney Davig Huesmann for 
addressing substance abuse and mental health issues and noted 
that 
she 
submitted 
an 
affidavit 
showing 
that 
she 
had 
successfully completed a two-year contract with the Wisconsin 
Lawyer Assistance Program (WisLAP).  The referee said Attorney 
Davig Huesmann also productively addressed other mental health 
issues with personal counseling, as evidenced by an affidavit 
she presented from a counseling service.   
¶20 The referee found that Attorney Davig Huesmann's 
professional problems arose after the dissolution of her 
marriage 
and 
then 
the 
dissolution 
of 
her 
law 
practice 
partnership with her former husband.  The referee said it was 
not surprising that cash flow problems developed as Attorney 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
12 
 
Davig Huesmann was left alone to keep her law practice afloat.  
The referee commended Attorney Davig Huesmann for finding 
employment in a well-established and professionally managed law 
firm that has the procedures and personnel in place to deal with 
trust account and other financial issues. 
¶21 The referee said there is no question that Attorney 
Davig Huesmann's violations are serious given that the trust of 
clients was violated and large amounts of money were involved.  
In addition, the referee noted that Attorney Davig Huesmann 
failed to respond in a timely manner to the OLR's inquiries, 
necessitating the issuance of two orders to show cause.  The 
referee also pointed out that some of the misconduct alleged in 
the OLR's complaint occurred after Attorney Davig Huesmann had 
found a safer port with her new law firm.  In addition, the 
referee rejected Attorney Davig Huesmann's claim that her trust 
account problems were due to poor record-keeping.  The referee 
said the multiple transfers from the trust account to the 
business account that occurred in 2013 and 2014 were not simply 
mistakes but were intentionally done either by Attorney Davig 
Huesmann or by someone else under her supervision. 
¶22 While the referee said that the OLR made reasonable 
arguments why a suspension of Attorney Davig Huesmann's license 
would be appropriate, the referee ultimately concluded that a 
suspension "would be more punitive than productive."  The 
referee opined that Attorney Davig Huesmann has already taken 
the steps necessary to protect current and future clients from a 
repetition of her mistakes and has already absorbed the lesson 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
13 
 
of the seriousness of her misconduct.  The referee noted that 
there have been many instances in which this court has imposed 
public reprimands for trust account related misconduct, and he 
ultimately concluded that a public reprimand was an appropriate 
sanction for Attorney Davig Huesmann's misconduct. 
¶23 In its appeal, the OLR argues that a public reprimand 
is not a sufficient level of discipline.  The OLR notes that 
Attorney Davig Huesmann, by virtue of the stipulation, admitted 
to five trust account violations, two misconduct counts of 
dishonesty, and one count of willfully failing to cooperate with 
the OLR's investigation into her conduct.  The OLR points out 
that one of the SCR 20:8.4(c) counts, which Attorney Davig 
Huesmann admitted, was converting for her own purposes over 
$13,000 belonging to an estate, and the other SCR 20:8.4(c) 
count, which she admitted, was depositing $28,000 in personal 
funds to her trust account in order to conceal her conversions 
and her failures to hold client funds in trust. 
¶24 The OLR argues that some of the alleged mitigating 
factors identified by the referee to justify the sanction 
recommendation were either erroneous or unsupported in the 
record or by case law.  For example, the OLR asserts that the 
referee's identification of "absence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive" as a mitigating factor is clearly erroneous given the 
fact that Attorney Davig Huesmann stipulated that by converting 
over $13,000 belonging to the R.T. estate to her own purposes 
she violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  In addition, the OLR says the 
referee's conclusion that there was an absence of a dishonest or 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
14 
 
selfish 
motive 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
referee's 
other 
statements that Attorney Davig Huesmann's conduct violated the 
trust of her clients and that the multiple transfers from the 
trust account to the business account were not simply mistakes 
but were intentional.  The OLR argues that to the extent the 
referee recommended a public reprimand based on an absence of 
dishonesty, 
that 
premise 
is 
erroneous 
and 
the 
referee's 
resulting recommendation is overly lenient. 
¶25 The OLR goes on to argue that there is insufficient 
credible evidence in the record for the referee to have made a 
finding regarding Attorney Davig Huesmann's character and 
reputation.  The OLR notes the referee fails to state what he 
believes Attorney Davig Huesmann's character or reputation are, 
or what basis exists for his conclusion.  The OLR says since any 
mention of character and reputation evidence is entirely absent 
in the stipulation, the referee's finding must have been gleaned 
from the affidavits that Attorney Davig Huesmann filed after the 
OLR had already filed its reply brief with respect to 
sanctions.10 
                                                 
10 The OLR notes that the referee's scheduling order 
required Attorney Davig Huesmann to submit to the OLR's counsel 
the affidavits she proposed to file with the referee by October 
27, 2017.  The OLR was then to have seven days to make a request 
to the referee that it be allowed to conduct discovery, an 
investigation, or make its own submissions in response to the 
affidavits.  The OLR points out that Attorney Davig Huesmann did 
not submit her affidavits until after the OLR had already filed 
its sanctions brief, depriving the OLR of the opportunity to 
conduct discovery, investigate, or make its own submissions. 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
15 
 
¶26 The OLR notes that Attorney Davig Huesmann submitted 
an affidavit dated December 1, 2017, attaching a copy of a 
medical 
record 
from 
a 
counseling 
service 
in 
which 
an 
unidentified 
writer 
states, 
referring 
to 
Attorney 
Davig 
Huesmann, "she is very well liked in her work and has a good 
reputation."  The OLR says there is no indication the 
unidentified writer had any information about Attorney Davig 
Huesmann's reputation beyond what Attorney Davig Huesmann 
herself reported.  The OLR says the comments in the exhibit are 
hearsay from an unknown person who has an unknown source and are 
thus not reliable or admissible evidence. 
¶27 The OLR also points out that Attorney Davig Huesmann's 
sanctions brief to the referee stated, "Sonja's practice largely 
consists of strongly advocating for her family law clients.  She 
has a reputation of being a very dependable attorney for her 
clients."  In addition, the OLR notes the sanctions brief says 
that Attorney Davig Huesmann has "an exemplary reputation."  The 
OLR says this is argument, not evidence, and there is no 
testimony or other evidence in the record to support those 
assertions.  Accordingly, the OLR argues there is insufficient 
credible evidence in the record to support the referee's 
reliance on Attorney Davig Huesmann's character and reputation 
as mitigating factors. 
¶28 Next, the OLR argues that Attorney Davig Huesmann's 
claimed personal problems, including chemical dependency, should 
not have been considered as mitigating factors because the 
record does not show those issues caused her misconduct.  The 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
16 
 
OLR notes that Attorney Davig Huesmann's November 17, 2017, 
affidavit stated that in 2010 she had first been prescribed an 
anti-anxiety medication; that she suffered from a situational 
substance 
abuse 
problem 
for 
which 
she 
eventually 
sought 
treatment 
in 
2015 
through 
individual 
counseling 
and 
by 
participation in WisLAP; and that her anxiety and depression 
affected her ability to conquer all facets of everyday affairs 
while managing a law practice.  The OLR says that Attorney Davig 
Huesmann's affidavit, besides being vague as to the pertinent 
dates, never claims that her condition caused her professional 
misconduct, nor did her sanctions brief make that claim. 
¶29 The OLR also says that the paper identified as a 
medical record from a counseling service attached to Attorney 
Davig Huesmann's December 1, 2017 affidavit, does not say 
whether she had a chemical dependency or mental disability that 
caused her misconduct.  In addition, the OLR says the 
December 1, 2017 affidavit attached a letter from WisLAP which 
also did not indicate whether Attorney Davig Huesmann had a 
chemical dependency or mental disability that caused her 
misconduct.   
¶30 The OLR says this court has clearly stated that 
causation must be found in order for a medical condition to 
mitigate the sanction in a disciplinary proceeding.  See, e.g., 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scanlan, 2006 WI 38, ¶62, 
290 Wis. 2d 30, 712 N.W.2d 877; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Mandelman, 2014 WI 100, ¶54, 358 Wis. 2d 179, 851 
N.W.2d 401. 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
17 
 
¶31 The OLR argues that the statements in Attorney Davig 
Huesmann's affidavit and her sanctions brief regarding her 
personal problems are so vague with respect to dates that it is 
impossible to tell what problems, if any, coincided time-wise 
with her misconduct, much less whether her misconduct was 
causally related to her personal problems.  The OLR asserts that 
since there was not sufficient credible evidence in the record 
to establish that one or more of the eight counts of misconduct 
were caused by Attorney Davig Huesmann's chemical dependency, 
anxiety, or depression, those claimed medical issues should not 
have been considered mitigating factors by the referee.   
¶32 The 
OLR 
further 
argues 
that 
when 
the 
referee 
determined the appropriate sanction he failed to distinguish 
conversion of client trust fund cases from other less egregious 
trust account violations and apparently considered trust account 
related misconduct cases as a group.  The OLR says that Attorney 
Davig Huesmann's serious failings with respect to holding client 
funds in trust and her dishonest professional misconduct demand 
a sanction greater than just a public reprimand.   
¶33 The OLR notes that this court has imposed suspensions 
for misconduct far less serious than at issue here.  See, e.g., 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bartz, 2015 WI 61, 362 
Wis. 2d 752, 864 N.W.2d 881 (parties stipulated to a 60-day 
suspension imposed for five counts of misconduct, including one 
SCR 20:8.4(c) violation.  The attorney had a previous private 
reprimand 
and 
several 
administrative 
suspensions); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schuster, 2006 WI 21, 289 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d 23, 710 N.W.2d 458 (parties stipulated to a nine-month 
suspension 
for 
six 
counts 
of 
misconduct, 
including 
one 
SCR 20:8.4(c) violation.  The attorney had one prior 90-day 
suspension and one prior consensual private reprimand). 
¶34 The OLR says while Attorney Davig Huesmann's purported 
addressing of some of her personal issues may lend sympathy to 
imposing a suspension less than the one year originally 
recommended by the OLR, it strenuously argues that imposing only 
a public reprimand would unduly depreciate the seriousness of 
the misconduct at issue, would be inconsistent with past 
precedent, and would fly in the face of this court's need for 
discipline to deter other attorneys from committing similar 
misconduct. 
¶35 Attorney Davig Huesmann argues that the referee 
correctly determined that a public reprimand is an appropriate 
sanction for her misconduct given the circumstances surrounding 
her actions.  Attorney Davig Huesmann argues she suffered from a 
situational substance problem for which she eventually sought 
treatment in 2015.  She says in looking back at her past 
conduct, "it is clear that the anxiety and depression had 
affected Sonja's ability to conquer all facets of everyday 
affairs while managing a law practice, working to the best of 
her ability for her clients as well as adapting to raising two 
young children as a single parent."  She argues she continues to 
excel in her substance abuse recovery and says she has made 
tremendous strides with her anxiety and depression issues.   
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
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¶36 Attorney Davig Huesmann says she has a history of 
being active in her community.  She says the last several years 
have been very difficult for her and that she has extreme 
remorse for violating supreme court rules.  She says the 
misconduct at issue here is not who she is, and she argues her 
mistakes should not define her but rather should refine her and 
make her a better attorney and better person in the future.  She 
says given the totality of the circumstances, the referee's 
recommendation of a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction. 
¶37 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 
14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may impose 
whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶38 We adopt the referee's findings of fact, as they 
appear in the stipulation, and we further agree with the 
referee's conclusions of law, also set forth in the stipulation, 
that Attorney Davig Huesmann violated the supreme court rules 
set forth above. 
¶39 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
after careful review, we agree with the OLR that a public 
reprimand is not an adequate sanction for the misconduct at 
issue here.  Attorney Davig Huesmann admitted to eight counts of 
misconduct, including two counts of violating SCR 20:8.4(c), 
which states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
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engage in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation."  We agree with the OLR that the referee's 
conclusion that there was an absence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive is at odds with his statement that Attorney Davig 
Huesmann violated SCR 20:8.4(c) and is also inconsistent with 
his statement that "the trust of clients was violated.  Large 
amounts of money were involved." 
¶40 As the OLR noted, this court has clearly stated that a 
medical or psychological condition will not be considered in 
mitigation of discipline unless the condition is explicitly 
found to have caused the misconduct.  See Mandelman, 2014 WI 
100, ¶54; Scanlan 2006 WI 38, ¶62.  While Attorney Davig 
Huesmann is to be commended for addressing her personal and 
substance abuse problems, there is no showing in this record 
that 
those 
problems 
were 
the 
cause 
of 
her 
professional 
misconduct, and they should not be considered as mitigating 
factors.  Similarly, there is no showing in this record, beyond 
Attorney Davig Huesmann's own self-serving statements, that her 
character and reputation should be viewed as mitigating factors.  
In addition, although Attorney Davig Huesmann did ultimately 
cooperate with the OLR's investigation, she did not do so until 
she had been served with two separate orders to show cause 
threatening a license suspension if she did not fully respond to 
the OLR's inquiries.   
¶41 To be sure, there are some mitigating factors present 
in this case.  Attorney Davig Huesmann has no prior disciplinary 
history.  It appears that she has taken up practice in a law 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
21 
 
firm where she is not responsible for managing the trust 
account.  As we have noted, she is also to be commended for 
taking steps to address her personal and substance abuse 
problems and it appears that she is genuinely remorseful for her 
misconduct and is determined not to repeat it. 
¶42 The OLR had sought a one-year suspension of Attorney 
Davig Huesmann's license to practice law in Wisconsin.  We 
conclude 
that 
a 
one-year 
suspension 
would 
be 
excessive.  
However, we agree with the OLR that something more than a public 
reprimand is warranted in view of the serious misconduct at 
issue here.  On balance, we conclude that a 60-day suspension of 
Attorney Davig Huesmann's license is an appropriate sanction.  
We find the case of In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Bartz, 2015 WI 61, which was cited by the OLR, to be somewhat 
instructive.   
¶43 In Bartz, the attorney stipulated to five counts of 
misconduct, including one count of violating SCR 20:8.4(c).  
Attorney Bartz had previously been privately reprimanded and 
also had been administratively suspended on three occasions, 
once for nonpayment of state bar dues and failure to file a 
trust 
account 
certificate, 
once 
for 
noncompliance 
with 
continuing 
legal 
education 
requirements, 
and 
once 
for 
noncooperation with an OLR investigation. 
¶44 The amount of the trust account conversions in 
Attorney Davig Huesmann's case were much more significant than 
in the Bartz case.  However, Attorney Davig Huesmann has no 
prior disciplinary history.  Although no two disciplinary 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
22 
 
matters are ever identical, we conclude that, as in Bartz, a 60-
day suspension is an appropriate sanction for Attorney Davig 
Huesmann's misconduct.  In addition, we deem it appropriate, as 
is our normal custom, to impose the full costs of this 
proceeding on Attorney Davig Huesmann. 
¶45 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Sonja Davig 
Huesmann, also known as Sonja C. Davig, to practice law in 
Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, effective 
February 8, 2019. 
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Sonja Davig Huesmann, also known as Sonja C. 
Davig, shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of 
this proceeding, which are $10,360.04 as of May 21, 2018. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sonja Davig Huesmann, also 
known as Sonja C. Davig, shall comply with the provisions of 
SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to 
practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.   
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions with this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
¶49 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2016AP1603-D   
 
 
 
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