Title: MARRIAGE OF TIDBALL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-361
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 1981

No. 80-361 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF EUGENE C. TIDBALL, Petitioner and Appellant, VS . MARCIA TIDBALL, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and for the County of Silver Bow. Honorable James Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Poore, Roth, Robischon and Robinson, Butte, Montana For Respondent: John L. Peterson, Butte, Montana Submitted on briefs: December 23, 1980 Decided: WflF 9 1 1g~f Filed: M A ! ? . 3 1 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . P e t i t i o n e r Eugene T i d b a l l a p p e a l s from a n o r d e r e n t e r e d i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t , S i l v e r Bow County, denying h i s p e t i t i o n to ter- m i n a t e maintenance payments to r e s p o n d e n t Marcia T i d b a l l . W e a f f i r m . I n September 1976, a d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e w a s e n t e r e d i n District C o u r t , S i l v e r Bow County, which r e q u i r e d p e t i t i o n e r t o pay both c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r t h e c a r e of t h e p a r t i e s 1 s o n S t e p h e n , and s p o u s a l maintenance. Based on t h e criteria s e t o u t i n sec- t i o n 40-4-203(1), MCA, t h e c o u r t determined t h a t r e s p o n d e n t was t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t of a c h i l d needing s p e c i a l c a r e and t h a t f o r t h i s r e a s o n r e s p o n d e n t should n o t be r e q u i r e d to seek employment o u t s i d e t h e home. The p a r t i e s agreed a t t h a t t i m e t h a t t h e par- ties could s e e k f u t u r e m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e maintenance award based o n a change i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s set o u t i n s e c t i o n 40-4-203, MCA. They s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t e d r e l i a n c e on t h e criteria f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n i n s e c t i o n 40-4-208, MCA, t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n o f t h e UMDA, which r e q u i r e s a showing of u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y . Eugene T i d b a l l p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n March 1980, a s k i n g t h e c o u r t to d i s c o n t i n u e t h e maintenance award. H e a l l e g e d t h a t Marcia T i d b a l l had sought and o b t a i n e d employment i n Arizona as a t e a c h e r , and no l o n g e r r e q u i r e d maintenance. H e also argued t h a t t h e son who needed h e r care a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n was now performing a d e q u a t e l y i n s c h o o l , l e a v i n g Marcia f r e e t o work o u t s i d e t h e home. The e v i d e n c e a t t h e J u n e 1980 show cause h e a r i n g i n d i c a t e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t worked d u r i n g t h e l a s t p a r t of t h e 1978-79 s c h o o l y e a r and o b t a i n e d a f u l l - t e r m c o n t r a c t f o r t h e 1979-80 s c h o o l y e a r . However, s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e p e t i t i o n seeking m d i f i c a t i o n w a s f i l e d , r e s p o n d e n t l e f t h e r job i n Arizona and moved to C a l i f o r n i a . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t working f u l l t i m e and c a r i n g f o r Stephen was a s e v e r e emotional and p h y s i c a l s t r a i n and l e f t h e r u n a b l e to a d e q u a t e l y care f o r Stephen. Based on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h i s h e a r i n g , t h e d i s t r i c t judge found t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r had n o t shown a suf- f i c i e n t change i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s to r e q u i r e a d i s c h a r g e of t h e maintenance o b l i g a t i o n . H e found t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s a t t e m p t s a t p u r s u i n g a career could n o t be maintained because of t h e p h y s i c a l and emotional stress involved i n working f u l l t i m e and i n c a r i n g f o r h e r son. A d d i t i o n a l l y , he determined t h a t S t e p h e n ' s g r a d e s were s u f f e r i n g because r e s p o n d e n t d i d n o t have t h e t i m e and e n e r g y to h e l p him w h i l e s h e was employed. From t h e s e f i n d i n g s , t h e d i s t r i c t judge concluded t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was n o t e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f from maintenance payments. On a p p e a l , p e t i t i o n e r raises s e v e r a l i s s u e s : (1) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 40-4-203, MCA, i n f i n d i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t m e t t h e s t a t u - t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y f o r s p o u s a l maintenance? ( 2 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n r e f u s i n g to d i s c h a r g e t h e maintenance award? ( 3 ) Was p e t i t i o n e r e f f e c t i v e l y denied h i s r i g h t of review by r e s p o n d e n t ' s act of q u i t t i n g h e r job and reducing h e r income t o a p o i n t of need? ( 4 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n r e f u s i n g e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by p e t i t i o n e r showing improvement i n S t e p h e n ' s g r a d e s ? The p a r t i e s t o a d i s s o l u t i o n can d e c i d e on t h e criteria t o b e c o n s i d e r e d i n a m o d i f i c a t i o n of a maintenance award. S e c t i o n 40-4-201, MCA. Here, p e t i t i o n e r and r e s p o n d e n t agreed t o a l l o w m o d i f i c a t i o n i f t h e r e was a showing of change i n t h o s e f a c t o r s set o u t i n s e c t i o n 40-4-203, MCA, w i t h o u t proof of u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y : "Maintenance. (1) I n a proceeding for d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage o r l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n or a proceeding f o r maintenance f o l l o w i n g d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e m a r r i a g e by a c o u r t which lacked p e r s o n a l j u r i s - d i c t i o n over t h e a b s e n t spouse, t h e c o u r t may g r a n t a maintenance o r d e r f o r e i t h e r spouse o n l y i f it f i n d s t h a t t h e spouse s e e k i n g maintenance: " ( a ) l a c k s s u f f i c i e n t p r o p e r t y to p r o v i d e f o r h i s r e a s o n a b l e needs; and " ( b ) is unable to s u p p o r t himself through a p p r o p r i a t e employment or is t h e c u s t o d i a n of a c h i l d whose c o n d i t i o n o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s make it a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t t h e c u s t o d i a n n o t be r e q u i r e d t o s e e k employment o u t s i d e t h e home." Evidence a t t h e t i m e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e was e n t e r e d and maintenance awarded i n d i c a t e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t , as c u s t o d i a n , s h o u l d n o t work because Stephen needed h e r a t t e n t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l l y , a t t h a t time, Marcia lacked t h e e d u c a t i o n c r e d i t s n e c e s s a r y to pursue a t e a c h i n g c a r e e r . A t t h e t i m e of t h e h e a r i n g on m o d i f i c a t i o n , r e s p o n d e n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t Stephen was still s u f f e r i n g from a h e a r i n g problem and speech d i f f i c u l t y . That c i r c u m s t a n c e had n o t changed from t h e t i m e of t h e o r i g i n a l d e c r e e . Respondent t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l t h o u g h s h e had now completed a master's d e g r e e i n s p e c i a l edu- c a t i o n and had been s u c c e s s f u l l y employed, s h e was unable physi- c a l l y and e m o t i o n a l l y to both work f u l l t i m e and to a d e q u a t e l y a t t e n d to h e r s o n ' s needs. She t e s t i f i e d t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y of t e a c h i n g s p e c i a l e d u c a t i o n a l l day and t h e n working w i t h a hearing-impaired c h i l d a t home. P e t i t i o n e r a r g u e s t h a t respondent is n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e d to maintenance, and t h a t to q u a l i f y , she must meet t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s s e t o u t i n t h e s t a t u t e , c i t i n g Johnsrud v. J o h n s r u d ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 117, 124-125, 572 P.2d 902, 906. P e t i t i o n e r is c o r r e c t b u t he contends t h a t respondent should be g r a n t e d main- t e n a n c e o n l y i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t r e s p o n d e n t is "unable to s u p p o r t [ h e r s e l f ] ." P e t i t i o n e r f a i l s t o r e c o g n i z e t h e o t h e r s e t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which a spouse can q u a l i f y f o r maintenance, and t h e one t h a t is p e r t i n e n t h e r e : t h e spouse " l a c k s s u f f i c i e n t p r o p e r t y to p r o v i d e for [ h e r ] r e a s o n a b l e needs; and . . . is t h e c u s t o d i a n of a c h i l d whose c o n d i t i o n o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s make it a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t t h e c u s t o d i a n not be r e q u i r e d t o seek employment o u t s i d e t h e home." S e c t i o n 40-4-203, MCA. W e f i n d t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s s t a t u t e i n o r d e r i n g c o n t i n u e d maintenance to respondent. Respondent h a s demonstrated t h a t s h e can i n f a c t o b t a i n and h o l d a job. But we n o t e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e does not demand t h a t t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t of a s p e c i a l c h i l d must work i f she is c a p a b l e of doing so. The s t a t u t e d i r e c t s t h e d i s t r i c t judge to d e t e r m i n e o n l y whether it is a p p r o p r i a t e under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t s h e b e r e q u i r e d t o work. The judge determined t h a t it was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e , and we f i n d no e r r o r i n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . P e t i t i o n e r n e x t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n a d o p t i n g r e s p o n d e n t ' s proposed f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . W e f i n d t h a t t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t , though c o n f l i c t i n g , e v i d e n c e i n t h e record to s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s , no matter which p a r t y prepared them f o r t h e c o u r t . Respondent t e s t i f i e d t o h e r h e a l t h problems and to t h e f a c t t h a t Stephen needed h e r a t home. She t e s t i f i e d to h i s s c h o l a s t i c problems and h i s need t o have h e r h e l p him w i t h s c h o o l work. Evidence of S t e p h e n ' s improved g r a d e s was i n t r o d u c e d , b u t t h e judge found r e s p o n d e n t ' s t e s t i m o n y concerning h i s dependence on h e r f o r h e l p w i t h s c h o o l work t o be more p e r s u a s i v e . The d i s t r i c t judge is t h e trier of f a c t i n t h i s case and we w i l l n o t set a s i d e h i s f i n - d i n g s u n l e s s t h e y are c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . J e n s e n v. J e n s e n (1979 1, Mont . , 597 P.2d 733, 735, 36 St.Rep. 1259, 1262; Rome v. Rome ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 6 2 1 P.2d 1090, 1092, 38 St.Rep. 50, 53. W e do f i n d an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , though, i n t h e c o u r t ' s a d o p t i o n of p e t i t i o n e r ' s proposed f i n d i n g N o . 3, s t a t i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had i n c r e a s e d f i n a n c i a l needs which r e q u i r e h e r to s e e k a d d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . The i s s u e of i n c r e a s i n g s p o u s a l maintenance w a s n o t b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s p r o c e e d i n g and no e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d on t h a t i s s u e . Accord- i n g l y , we v a c a t e t h i s f i n d i n g . The t e s t i m o n y of Marcia T i d b a l l i n d i c a t e s t h a t one of t h e r e a s o n s f o r h e r q u i t t i n g h e r job and moving to C a l i f o r n i a was t h e f i l i n g of t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n p e t i t i o n by h e r former husband. T h i s a c t , a c c o r d i n g to p e t i t i o n e r , e f f e c t i v e l y denied p e t i t i o n e r h i s r i g h t of review, because i n v o l u n t a r i l y c u t t i n g h e r income, r e s p o n d e n t f o r c e d him t o c o n t i n u e making maintenance payments. Respondent admitted t h a t h e r d e p a r t u r e from Arizona and from h e r job c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . But h e r t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t o t h e r f a c t o r s prompted h e r to l e a v e , and t h a t t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n was merely t h e f i n a l impetus. She t e s t i f i e d : 'I [I] t ' s v e r y hard t o teach S p e c i a l Ed and t h e n go home and d e a l w i t h a h e a r i n g impaired c h i l d . I t ' s an emotional s t r a i n , a p h y s i c a l s t r a i n , and a s i d e from your f i l i n g of t h e p a p e r s and m y h e a l t h t h i n g s , I was under q u i t e a s t r a i n . . . W e l l I was exhausted from m y job, I was exhausted from S t e v e ' s g r a d e s going down, and t h e n t h i s new t h r e a t i n having to go t o a lawyer, I d i d n ' t have t i m e i n t h e day, along w i t h t h e f i n a n c i a l t h i n g , t o g e t a lawyer i n Tucson and s t a r t t h i s c a s e again." Based on t h i s testimony and o t h e r e v i d e n c e , t h e d i s t r i c t judge denied t h e r e d u c t i o n i n maintenance, f i n d i n g i n s u f f i c i e n t change i n t h e circumstances. W e cannot s a y t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t to a review of t h e p r i o r o r d e r merely because t h e judge found i n r e s p o n d e n t ' s f a v o r . The evidence t h a t respon- d e n t l e f t h e r job v o l u n t a r i l y was i n t r o d u c e d , b u t t h e f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e judge found o t h e r f a c t o r s to be d e t e r m i n a t i v e i n h i s d e c i s i o n to c o n t i n u e t h e maintenance payments. The volun- t a r y d e p a r t u r e a l o n e does n o t r e q u i r e a f i n d i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t is no l o n g e r e n t i t l e d t o maintenance. See Rome, s u p r a , Mont. The l a s t i s s u e r a i s e d by p e t i t i o n e r i n v o l v e s t h e d i s t r i c t judge ' s r e f u s a l to a l l o w cross-examination of respondent con- c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e s p o n d e n t ' s p a s t employment and S t e p h e n ' s g r a d e s . The judge r e f u s e d t o a l l o w t h e i n q u i r y because t h e e v i d e n c e which c o u n s e l attempted t o i n t r o d u c e had been heard i n t h e e a r l i e r d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings. H e d i d a g r e e to t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h a t testimony. W e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e judge's r u l i n g . P e t i t i o n e r was a t t e m p t i n g t o show t h e e f f e c t , i f any, of r e s p o n d e n t ' s working on S t e p h e n ' s g r a d e s . H e was a b l e t o cross-examine h e r as to t h e grades-work r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n c e t h e t i m e of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n , and h e i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e of S t e p h e n ' s g r a d e s i n 1979-80. H e a p p a r e n t l y d i d n o t a t t e m p t to show t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n 1977-78, a t a t i m e when respondent w a s n o t working. The judge r u l e d o n l y t h a t he d i d n o t want to a g a i n h e a r any t e s t i m o n y concerning S t e p h e n ' s g r a d e s which had been heard earlier. The r e c o r d i n d i - cates t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was n o t precluded from p r e s e n t i n g t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g change i n c o n d i t i o n s s i n c e t h e t i m e of t h e d e c r e e . The judge had s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e him to allow him to d e t e r m i n e whether e x i s t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s now r e q u i r e d a d i s c h a r g e of t h e maintenance award. I t was unnecessary to allow i n t e s t i m o n y of e v e n t s p r i o r to t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . The o r d e r of t h e District Court is a f f i r m e d . Chief ~ u s t i c e \