Title: Myers v. Mobile Press-Register
Citation: 97 So. 2d 819
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 1957

97 So. 2d 819 (1957)
George F. MYERS
v.
The MOBILE PRESS-REGISTER, Inc.
1 Div. 648.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 31, 1957.
J. Connor Owens, Jr., Bay Minette, for appellant.
*820 Hand, Arendall &amp; Bedsole, Mobile, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Appellant sued appellee for libel. The complaint contained two counts. Demurrer was sustained to each count. Appellant suffered a nonsuit and appealed. Errors assigned are the rulings sustaining demurrer to each count.
The alleged libel appeared as an editorial in appellee's newspaper on the 14th of October, 1953, as follows:
It was further averred in the complaint that on October 13th, 1953, prior to the time of the alleged libelous publication, appellee published "a front page story in bold type identifying the plaintiff (appellant) by name as a `tavern operator', who met with the group so referred to in said editorial quoted above."
In McGraw v. Thomason, 265 Ala. 635, 639, 93 So. 2d 741, 744, the following was said:
See, also:
When the language used is not actionable per se, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to allege special damages. Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670, 103 So. 842. Appellant alleges no special damage in either count in the instant case; therefore, the publication complained of must be libel per se or the complaint states no cause of action. Trimble v. Anderson, 79 Ala. 514. The appellant in his brief makes the following concession:
*822 Thus, we are presented with the question: Are the words so written libel per se? We answer in the negative.
Appellant argues that the word "saloon keeper" as used in the publication referred to appellant and that the publication is therefore libelous per se because of § 44, Title 29, Code 1940, which provides in part:
This court has stated one definition of "saloon" as follows:
Title 29 does not make unlawful the operation of all places where intoxicating liquors are sold, but does make unlawful the operation of such places in a prohibited manner. In ordinary usage, to say of the plaintiff that he is a saloon keeper is to say that he is the keeper of a place where intoxicating liquors are sold, but unless more is said, such a statement does not on its face say that plaintiff is keeping such a place in an unlawful manner, or that he is otherwise violating the law. We have not been cited to or found any case where to call a person a "saloon keeper" has been held libelous per se. It does not follow that because a person has been falsely called a "saloon keeper" that it is presumed as a matter of law that the reputation of that person has been damaged. Where the publication is libelous per se, damage to reputation is presumed.
In arguing that the publication is libelous per se, appellant points out specifically the following terms used in the publication: "Conspirator," "unholy combination," "Iron Curtain," "rapacious rule," and "dictatorship." In support of this argument, appellant cites Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 692, 13 L.R.A. 864, where on demurrer it was held libelous to falsely publish of a person that he is an "anarchist," since one who advocates anarchy, which is commonly understood as subversive of all government, is liable thereby to be brought into hatred or contempt. The editorial in the instant case certainly does not charge that appellant is opposed to all government.
Appellant cites also Houston Printing Company v. Hunter, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 105 S.W.2d 312, 313, where on appeal it was held that the general demurrer to the petition or complaint, was properly overruled. The publication there complained of stated that plaintiff "`* * * proposes a dictatorship, * * * would not approve the existing form of government, but would remake it after his own pattern. * * *'" and "`* * * is also a visionary and a dreamer who would wreck the very form of government prescribed by the constitution'." Plaintiff further charged that the *823 language used was "* * * `employed * * * in the sense and meaning of one opposed to a Republican form of government, and one who would appropriate unto himself arbitrary, unconstitutional and unlawful and dictatorial powers in violation of the Constitution of the United States of America. * * * That the defendant herein in the use, sense and meaning of the said malicious libels imputed to this plaintiff corrupt, evil, unlawful and reprehensible motives and purposes in seeking to be elected Governor of the State of Texas.'"
In the Hunter case, supra, the opinion does not state that the publication there set out was libelous per se. In pertinent part, the opinion said:
We will observe that the rule with respect to the office of innuendo has been stated differently in Alabama. This court has said:
and also:
See, also, 13 Ala.Dig., Libel &amp; Slander.
In the case at bar, plaintiff charges by innuendo in the second count that the publication shows an intention on part of defendant to create the belief that plaintiff was exerting "corrupting influence upon the City Commission of Mobile" and that plaintiff was a man "who was part of a secret or unlawful combination organized for an unlawful purpose." (Emphasis supplied.) The published words do not support the plaintiff's deduction.
A fair reading of the editorial leads us to conclude that appellant has been charged thereby with planning, in concert with others, to petition or influence the City Commission of Mobile to "unionize" policemen, firemen, and other city employees. The conduct so imputed to plaintiff certainly does not constitute an indictable offense, and we are unable to conclude that the charge of such conduct tends to bring the plaintiff, "into public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or charges an act odious and disgraceful in society."
Plaintiff and his alleged associates had the right to petition the city governing body and thereby attempt to influence it, and the charge that they met in secret does not alter the nature of the conduct charged. This court has held more distasteful language not to be actionable per se. See Trimble v. Anderson, supra, where it was *824 held not libelous per se to publish of the plaintiff that he had obtained certain notes from one whose mental condition incapacitated him for business dealings, and without paying any consideration for the notes.
In Wabash R. Co. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102, 106, 107, 69 N.E. 1003, 1005, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 1091, the defendant published of the plaintiff in a letter the following statement:
The Indiana Court said:
In Chicago, R. I. &amp; P. Ry. Co. v. Medley, 55 Okl. 145, 155 P. 211, 212, L.R.A.1916D, 587, in an action of libel, the publication complained of was a letter stating in pertinent part as follows:
With reference to this letter, the Oklahoma Court said:
In support of its holding, the Oklahoma Court cited, among other authorities, two Alabama cases.
One of these cases, Tennessee Coal, Iron &amp; Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 163 Ala. 348, 351, 50 So. 1008, 1009, involved certain counts for libel based on letters written by agents of defendant, acting within the scope of their authority, charging that certain of defendant's employees were union laborers and that they had:
The plaintiff was named as one of the union men causing the disturbance. This court said:
In the second Alabama case cited by the Oklahoma Court, the publication of a notice that a certain contractor had been placed on the "unfair list" of a carpenters' union, together with a statement that the publication of such notice would be continued until he decided to set himself square with organized labor, was held not to be libelous per se. Labor Review Publishing Company v. Galliher, 153 Ala. 364, 45 So. 188.
In the instant case, while some of the words used are harsh and not calculated to endear the newspaper to the subjects of the editorial, the publication complained of is not libelous per se.
The demurrer was properly sustained.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.