Title: Commonwealth v. Tejeda
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11858
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2015

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SJC-11858 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBINSON TEJEDA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 10, 2015. - December 2, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Joint Enterprise.  Robbery.  
Home Invasion.  Practice, Criminal, Required finding, 
Motion for a required finding. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 27, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and a 
motion for a required finding of not guilty was heard by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan (Robert S. Sinsheimer with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The primary issue in this appeal is whether a 
defendant who joins with others to commit an armed robbery may 
2 
 
be found guilty of murder on the theory of felony-murder for the 
killing of his accomplice by someone resisting the armed 
robbery.  We conclude that he may not. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our 
analysis of the issues raised on appeal.  On January 14, 2012, 
the defendant and two friends, Christopher Pichardo and Stephane 
Etienne, met with Frederick Reynoso, who was to sell them one-
half pound of marijuana for $2,200.  Together, they traveled in 
a vehicle the defendant had borrowed from his girl friend to a 
residence in the Dorchester section of Boston, where the 
transaction was to take place.  Pichardo, Etienne, and Reynoso 
entered the home through a basement door; the defendant remained 
outside in the parked vehicle.  Reynoso's cousin, Jonathan 
Santiago, was waiting for them in the basement.  Once inside, 
Santiago weighed the marijuana, placed it into eight one-ounce 
bags, and handed the bags to Pichardo.  Pichardo told Santiago 
that Etienne would pay him for the marijuana.  Etienne dropped 
his cellular telephone to distract Santiago, and Pichardo then 
pulled out a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun from his 
waistband and told Santiago, "You know what time it is."  
Reynoso responded by pulling out his own .32 caliber revolver, 
and a gun battle between Pichardo and Reynoso followed in which 
3 
 
shots were fired from both weapons.  A bullet struck Pichardo on 
the right side of his chest. 
 
Etienne and Pichardo attempted to leave the basement, but 
Pichardo collapsed while still inside.  Etienne took Pichardo's 
firearm and cellular telephone, as well as the marijuana, and 
ran to the defendant's vehicle, which was parked around the 
corner.  Etienne and the defendant then returned to the basement 
and attempted to carry Pichardo back to the vehicle, but they 
were unable to lift his body.  They ran back to the vehicle and 
left the scene.  The defendant telephoned 911 from Pichardo's 
cellular telephone shortly thereafter to inform the police that 
Pichardo had been shot.  Pichardo was taken from the scene by 
ambulance and was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at 
Boston Medical Center. 
 
The police executed a search warrant on the Dorchester 
residence and recovered a home surveillance system that had 
captured a video recording of the exterior of the house, which 
showed the arrival of the defendant, Pichardo, Etienne, and 
Reynoso, and the aftermath of the shooting.  The police later 
also executed a search warrant on the defendant's girl friend's 
vehicle and found approximately thirty bags of marijuana in the 
trunk. 
 
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in 
the second degree on the theory of felony-murder, with armed 
4 
 
robbery as the underlying felony.1  The jury also convicted the 
defendant of the armed robbery of Santiago, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 17; home invasion, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18C; and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a).2 
 
The defendant, having earlier moved for a required finding 
of not guilty at the close of the evidence, moved after trial 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on all his convictions.  
The judge allowed the motion for a required finding of not 
guilty on the felony-murder conviction, but denied the motion as 
to the remaining convictions, and later issued a carefully 
researched and reasoned memorandum of decision and order 
explaining her ruling.  The Commonwealth appealed the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict as to the felony-murder conviction; 
the defendant cross-appealed as to the surviving convictions.3  
                                                          
 
 
1 The indictment alleged murder in the second degree, even 
though armed robbery is punishable by life in prison, G. L. 
c. 265, § 17, and, as the underlying felony, would support a 
conviction of felony-murder in the first degree.  The judge 
ruled that the Commonwealth's decision to charge the defendant 
with murder in the second degree did not preclude armed robbery 
as the underlying felony.  The defendant does not challenge this 
ruling on appeal. 
 
 
2 The defendant was found not guilty of the armed robbery of 
Frederick Reynoso, and of carrying a firearm without a license. 
 
 
3 Although the defendant's cross appeal encompasses all 
three of the surviving convictions, the defendant does not 
challenge in his brief his conviction of possession of marijuana 
5 
 
We allowed the parties' joint application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Felony-murder.  Under our common law of 
joint venture, a defendant is guilty of armed robbery if he or 
she knowingly participated in the commission of the crime with 
the required intent, and either was armed himself or herself or 
knew that an accomplice was armed.  See Commonwealth v. Benitez, 
464 Mass. 686, 689 & n.4 (2013).  See generally Commonwealth v. 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466-468 (2009).  If, during the course 
of that robbery, for instance, an accomplice were to shoot at a 
police officer who arrived on the scene but not kill the 
officer, the defendant could not be found guilty of the crime of 
assault with intent to murder a police officer unless the 
defendant knowingly participated with the accomplice in the 
shooting with the intent to kill, even if the assault were the 
natural and probable consequence of the armed robbery.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 308-309 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 306 (1973) ("We 'firmly 
rejected' the argument that a joint venturer should be liable 
for 'any crime committed by any of his partners which follows 
naturally and probably from the carrying out of the 
enterprise'").  However, if that same accomplice had shot and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
with intent to distribute.  Therefore, we do not address that 
conviction. 
6 
 
killed the police officer during the course of the robbery, our 
common law recognizes an exception to the ordinary rule of joint 
venture criminal liability:  the defendant could be found guilty 
of the police officer's murder on the theory of felony-murder, 
even if the defendant did not knowingly participate in the 
shooting or intend to harm the police officer.4  See Hanright, 
supra at 308-309; Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 
(1978), quoting Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 256 Mass. 387, 392 
(1926) ("it is no defence for the associates engaged with others 
in the commission of a robbery, that they did not intend to take 
life in its perpetration, or that they forbade their companions 
to kill"). 
 
The felony-murder exception to the ordinary rule of joint 
venture liability incorporates two implicit premises.  The first 
is constructive malice:  the substitution of "the intent to 
commit the underlying felony for the malice aforethought 
required for murder."  See Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
4 Felony-murder liability also extends to accidental deaths 
occurring during the course of an underlying felony so long as 
the death was a natural and probable consequence of the unlawful 
activity.  For example, if the police officer in the 
hypothetical scenario above were to suffer a fatal heart attack 
from the stress of being confronted by armed robbers, the joint 
venturers could be found guilty of felony-murder.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 668 (2004) ("If [the 
victim] had died of fright while the defendant was robbing him, 
the defendant would be responsible for murder"); Commonwealth v. 
Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151-52 (1983) (felony-murder applies where 
victim was killed by accidental discharge of gun). 
7 
 
259, 271 (1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010) and 459 Mass. 480 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 
(1982).  The second is vicarious criminal liability for every 
act resulting in death committed by a joint venturer in 
furtherance of the joint venture, that is, the act of one is 
treated as the act of all.  See Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 
Mass. 658, 668 (2004); Commonwealth v. Lussier, 333 Mass. 83, 
93-94 (1955).  These two legal constructions have defined 
felony-murder since it was first articulated in English common 
law in the Eighteenth Century.  See Rex v. Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 
1103, 1105 (K.B. 1701) ("if divers persons be engaged in an 
unlawful act, and one of them kills another, it shall be murder 
in all the rest" provided that "[t]he killing must be in 
pursuance of that unlawful act, and not collateral to it"); 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *200 (" if two or more come together to 
do an unlawful act against the king's peace, of which the 
probable consequence might be bloodshed; . . . and one of them 
kills a man; it is murder in them all, because of the unlawful 
act, . . . or evil intended beforehand").  See generally Binder, 
The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 
59, 88-98 (2004). 
 
In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 541, 543 (1863), the 
Commonwealth sought to expand the scope of felony-murder by 
claiming that a defendant should be vicariously responsible for 
8 
 
the act of someone who was not a joint venturer during the 
commission of the underlying felony.  In Campbell, the defendant 
had participated in a draft riot during the Civil War where a 
person was shot and killed, but the evidence was unclear whether 
the fatal shot had been fired by one of the rioters "with whom 
the prisoner was acting in concert," or by a soldier inside the 
armory who was resisting the attack by the rioters.  Id.  The 
Commonwealth sought a jury instruction that the defendant may be 
found guilty of homicide regardless of who fired the shot.  Id.  
We rejected the Commonwealth's argument, declaring, "[n]o person 
can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually 
or constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either sense 
unless committed by his own hand or by some one acting in 
concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or 
purpose."  Id. at 544.  We explained: 
"The real distinction is between acts which a man does 
either actually or constructively, by himself or his agents 
or confederates, and those which were done by others acting 
not in concert with him or to effect a common object, but 
without his knowledge or assent, either express or implied.  
For the former the law holds him strictly responsible, and 
for all their necessary and natural consequences, which he 
is rightfully deemed to have contemplated and intended.  
For the latter he is not liable, because they are not done 
by himself or by those with whom he is associated, and no 
design to commit them or intent to bring about the results 
which flow from them can be reasonably imputed to him." 
 
9 
 
Id. at 546.5 
 
A century later, this court reaffirmed the principle that 
vicarious liability in felony-murder is limited to the acts 
resulting in death committed by a joint venturer.  Commonwealth 
v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 515 (1965), S.C., 370 Mass. 585 
(1976).  In Balliro, the defendants broke and entered a home in 
the night with the intent to commit an assault with a dangerous 
weapon, but the police were waiting for them inside, and a 
gunfight resulted in which a mother and her son were killed.  
Id. at 508-510.  Over the defendants' objection, the judge 
instructed the jury that, if the defendants "entered and shot 
first," the death of the two victims was "imputable to these 
defendants and they are guilty of murder."  Id. at 511.  The 
judge denied the defendants' request for an instruction that 
they could not be found guilty unless it were proved that the 
                                                          
 
 
5 The principle that a defendant is responsible for the acts 
of a joint venturer that are committed in furtherance of the 
joint venture has an evidentiary counterpart in our law of 
vicarious admissions, which admits in evidence the statements of 
a joint venturer that are made during the course of and in 
furtherance of the joint venture, and treats them as if they 
were statements made or adopted by the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 426 (2012).  See 
generally Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2015).  The 
justification for admitting what would otherwise be hearsay is 
that each joint venturer is an agent of the others in seeking to 
accomplish the goals of the joint venture, see Bright, supra, 
and there is a "community of activities and interests" within 
the agency relationship that "justifies exposing one coventurer 
to the risk of being incriminated by the utterances of another."  
Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 712 (1976). 
10 
 
bullets that caused the deaths of the victims were fired by one 
of the defendants, and not by the police.  Id. at 511-512.  We 
noted that our Campbell opinion "appear[ed] to have become the 
leading case on the subject and has generally been followed in 
other jurisdictions."  Id. at 513, citing People v. Washington, 
62 Cal. 2d 777 (1965); Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641 (1888); 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97 (1905); People v. Wood, 8 
N.Y.2d 48 (1960); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658 (1924).  After 
carefully examining the relevant case law, we reaffirmed the 
rule in Campbell, "which has been the law of this Commonwealth 
for more than one hundred years," and declared that a defendant 
cannot be found guilty of felony-murder "for the death of any 
person killed by someone resisting the commission of the 
felony."  Id. at 515.  We therefore concluded that the judge 
erred in his instructions to the jury and in declining to give 
the defendants' requested instructions.  Id. 
 
Now, more than fifty years after our Balliro opinion, the 
Commonwealth again asks us to expand the scope of felony-murder 
by expanding the scope of vicarious liability to make every 
joint venturer criminally responsible for every act that results 
in death that is proximately caused by the underlying felony.  
Under the Commonwealth's "proximate cause theory," a joint 
venturer would be vicariously liable for an act resulting in 
death even if it were committed by a person who was resisting 
11 
 
the underlying felony or attempting to apprehend the persons 
committing it, provided that resistance or an attempt to 
apprehend would be reasonably foreseeable by a person initiating 
the underlying felony, which it always would be.  The 
Commonwealth concedes, correctly, that the majority of other 
States follow what has become known as the "agency theory" of 
felony-murder under which the act causing death must be 
committed in furtherance of the joint venture by the defendant 
or someone acting in concert with him or her.6  See W.R. LaFave, 
Criminal Law § 14.5(d), at 793-794 (5th ed. 2010) (citing cases 
and noting that "it is now generally accepted that there is no 
felony-murder liability when one of the felons is shot and 
killed by the victim, a police officer, or a bystander" 
[footnotes omitted]).  The Commonwealth asks that we join the 
minority of jurisdictions that impose felony-murder according to 
the "proximate cause theory."  See, e.g., State v. Wright, 379 
So. 2d 96, 96 (Fla. 1979); People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 
465 (1997); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 434-436 (1994).7 
                                                          
 
 
6 We note that, in contrast to Massachusetts, many States 
set out the substantive definition of felony-murder by statute, 
requiring, at least in part, a statutory analysis not applicable 
in Massachusetts.  See, e.g., Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 337-
342 (Del. 2009); People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309, 315-317 
(1993); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 435, 436 (1994). 
 
 
7 The Commonwealth also notes that, in Santiago v. 
Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 39, 43-44 & n.5 (1998) (Santiago II), we 
expressed "grave doubt as to the continuing validity of the 
12 
 
 
As noted earlier, the common law of felony-murder is 
already an exception to our law of joint venture in that it 
deems the intent to commit the underlying felony as a substitute 
for the intent generally required for murder, and makes every 
joint venturer vicariously liable for the acts of his or her 
accomplices that result in death and that are committed in 
furtherance of the joint venture.  Indeed, for these reasons the 
common law of felony-murder is an exception to two basic 
principles of our criminal jurisprudence.  See Hanright, 466 
Mass. at 309 ("the felony-murder rule operates according to a 
unique set of principles").  First, generally we require proof 
of a defendant's intent to commit the crime charged, and do not 
conclusively presume such intent from the intent to commit 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
principle set forth in [Commonwealth v.] Campbell," 7 Allen 541 
(1863), that a defendant may not be found guilty of murder 
unless the defendant or a joint venturer committed the killing.  
In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 503 (1997), S.C., 
427 Mass. 298 (1998) and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1003 (1998) (Santiago I), we held that "where the defendant 
chooses to engage in a gun battle with another with the intent 
to kill or do grievous bodily harm and a third party is killed, 
the defendant may be held liable for the homicide even if it was 
the defendant's opponent who fired the fatal shot."  In Santiago 
I, however, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of murder in 
the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation, not 
on the theory of felony-murder.  See id. at 502, 505.  The court 
in Santiago II specifically emphasized that "Santiago I does not 
contemplate holding the juvenile liable for his opponent's acts 
on a joint venture theory," but rather states that "the juvenile 
may be found delinquent for his own act, namely, engaging in the 
shootout that caused the victim's death" (emphasis in original).  
Santiago II, supra, at 44 n.4.  The "grave doubt" expressed by 
the Court in Santiago II must be considered in this context. 
13 
 
another crime.  See, e.g., id. at 308-309 ("The intent to commit 
armed robbery, although sufficient to support liability for 
felony-murder on a theory of joint venture, is insufficient to 
support liability for" additional offenses against other 
surviving police officers who attempted to apprehend 
accomplice); Richards, 363 Mass. at 302, 307-308 (defendant who 
was waiting near getaway car in armed robbery may be found 
guilty of assault with intent to murder police officer committed 
by accomplice only if defendant had specific intent to kill 
police officer). 
 
Second, generally "[o]ne is punished for his own 
blameworthy conduct, not that of others."  Richards, supra at 
306, quoting Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 48 (1965).  
Only where a dangerous felony results in death do we adopt a 
principle that we otherwise have "firmly rejected" -- that a 
person who knowingly participates in one crime as part of a 
joint venture is "ipso facto also guilty" of all other crimes 
committed by an accomplice in furtherance of the joint venture.  
Richards, supra.  See Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307-310, quoting 2 
W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.3(b), at 362-363 (2d 
ed. 2003) ("we remain committed to the view that . . . A's guilt 
as an accomplice to one crime should not per se be a basis for 
holding A accountable for a related crime merely because the 
latter offense was carried out by A's principal").  Contrast 
14 
 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-647 (1946) 
(conspirator is criminally responsible for all substantive 
offenses committed by coconspirators in furtherance of 
conspiracy). 
 
Adoption of the Commonwealth's proximate cause theory would 
essentially cause our law of felony-murder to depart even 
further from the second basic principle:  it would extend 
vicarious accomplice liability to acts that were not committed 
by accomplices, and that were committed not to further the joint 
venture but to thwart it.  We need not decide here whether our 
common law of felony-murder should continue to be an exception 
to our basic principles of criminal jurisprudence, or whether we 
should join those who have abolished or redefined felony-
murder.8,9  But we would need persuasive reasons to justify an 
                                                          
 
 
8 We have criticized the felony-murder rule in the past for 
divorcing moral culpability from criminal liability and for the 
harsh consequences it imposes for unintended or accidental 
killings.  Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 
506-507 (1982) (noting that common-law felony-murder rule is of 
"questionable origin" and detailing limitations placed on 
doctrine by other jurisdictions). 
 
 
9 Great Britain, the nation where the common law of felony-
murder was born, has abolished felony-murder by statute, 
providing that "[w]here a person kills another in the course or 
furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount 
to murder unless done with . . . malice aforethought . . . ."  
Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1.  So have Hawaii 
and Kentucky.  See 7A Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 707-701 commentary; 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 1974 commentary.  Michigan has 
abolished felony-murder under its common law. People v. Aaron, 
409 Mich. 672, 727-729 (1980).  Other States have not abolished 
15 
 
expansion of what is already an unusual doctrine.  The reasons 
offered by the Commonwealth are not persuasive. 
 
First, the Commonwealth contends that the proximate cause 
theory should be applied to the common law of felony-murder 
because it comports with the scope of liability in civil cases 
and reflects the causation standard that would apply in a civil 
case brought by the decedent against the joint venturers.10  The 
purpose of civil liability, however, is to fairly compensate a 
plaintiff for injuries caused by the wrongful or negligent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the doctrine but have significantly departed from the 
traditional formulation.  See, e.g., State v. Doucette, 143 Vt. 
573, 582 (1983) (holding that felony-murder requires proof of 
malice, but that malice can be inferred "from evidence presented 
that the defendant intentionally set in motion a chain of events 
likely to cause death or great bodily injury, or acted with 
extreme indifference to the value of human life"); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, §§ 635, 636 (2007) (requiring defendant to act 
with recklessness, for murder in the first degree, or criminal 
negligence, for murder in the second degree); N.Y. Penal Law 
§§ 125.25(3), 125.27 (McKinney 2009) (setting forth affirmative 
defense where joint venturer rather than defendant commits act 
causing death).  The Model Penal Code also has abandoned the 
traditional doctrine of felony-murder, requiring the homicide to 
be purposeful, knowing, or reckless in order to constitute 
murder, but providing for a rebuttable presumption of 
recklessness where the homicide occurred during the commission 
of certain felonies.  Model Penal Code §§ 1.12(5), 210.2(1)(b) 
(1985).  See also Matchett, 386 Mass. at 503 n.12. 
 
 
10 We note that causation may also be an issue under the 
agency theory of felony-murder.  To return to an earlier 
hypothetical scenario, if a police officer suffered a heart 
attack attributable to the stress of confronting armed robbers 
and died after receiving negligent medical care, the question 
whether there was a sufficient causal relationship between the 
joint venturers' act and the resulting death would arise under 
both the agency and proximate cause theories. 
16 
 
conduct of another.  In light of that purpose, it is reasonable 
that, where a person is killed during the course of an armed 
robbery by someone seeking to resist it, the burden of loss 
should be imposed on those who committed the armed robbery and 
thereby set in motion the chain of events that proximately 
caused the death.  In contrast, the purpose of criminal 
liability is to punish persons found culpable for their wrongful 
conduct, and that punishment is most severe when a person is 
found guilty of murder.  Given the "fundamentally different 
purposes of criminal law and tort law," Commonwealth v. Godin, 
374 Mass. 120, 127 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978), 
and the extreme penalties and infamy associated with a 
conviction of murder, it is not reasonable to expand the scope 
of felony-murder to punish a defendant for conduct that neither 
the defendant nor an accomplice committed or intended.  See 
Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 450-451 (1982) ("Tort law is 
primarily concerned with who shall bear the burden of loss, 
while criminal law is concerned with the imposition of 
punishment"); State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 226 (1977) ("Tort 
concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause have shallow 
relevance to culpability for murder in the first degree"). 
 
Second, the Commonwealth argues that, "[b]y holding 
defendants responsible for deaths caused when they engage in 
activities which are 'inherently dangerous to human life,' 
17 
 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 651 (1982), we deter 
individuals from creating scenarios which may result in death."    
We doubt that persons contemplating a dangerous felony would be 
significantly deterred by the possibility that, if a person were 
to be killed by someone seeking to thwart or apprehend them, 
they might be found guilty of felony-murder.  If they thought 
that they likely faced the risk of death from someone seeking to 
resist or arrest them, that risk would be the more potent 
deterrent.  See Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 781 ("An additional 
penalty for a homicide committed by the victim would deter 
robbery haphazardly at best"). 
 
Third, the Commonwealth contends that someone should be 
found guilty of murder for a violent death and, without the 
proximate cause theory of felony-murder, there is the risk that 
no one will be punished for the death of a bystander mistakenly 
shot by an armed robbery victim or by a police officer, because 
the victim and the police officer may have been justified in 
their use of force against the robbers.  It is true that, in 
these circumstances, it is likely that no one will be found 
guilty of murder.11  But that does not mean that the joint 
                                                          
 
 
11 We acknowledge the possibility that, in circumstances 
where a defendant committing an underlying felony engages in 
conduct so dangerous that "a reasonably prudent person would 
have known that, according to common experience, there was a 
plain and strong likelihood that death would follow," the 
Commonwealth might obtain a murder conviction based on the third 
18 
 
venturers will escape punishment.  Armed robbery is a life 
felony under Massachusetts law, see G. L. c. 265, § 17, and the 
death is likely to be treated as an aggravating factor by a 
judge imposing sentence on the armed robbery conviction.  
Moreover, a tragic death does not always justify a murder 
conviction; the law recognizes that a person is guilty of 
manslaughter, not murder, punishable by up to twenty years in 
prison rather than a life sentence, where the killing is 
committed intentionally under mitigating circumstances or 
unintentionally but recklessly.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13.  See 
also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 64-79 (2013).  In 
circumstances where a defendant committing an underlying felony 
engaged in reckless conduct that "created a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person," 
the Commonwealth might obtain an involuntary manslaughter 
conviction.  Id. at 74. 
 
More than fifty years ago, in Balliro, 349 Mass. at 515, we 
were presented with the same question that we are presented with 
today: 
"The basic question is whether a felon can be held 
criminally liable for the death of any person killed by 
someone resisting the commission of the felony." 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prong of malice.  See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 
669 n.14 (1998). 
19 
 
For the reasons stated, our answer is the same as it was in 
Balliro:  "We hold that he cannot be."  Id.  We therefore affirm 
the judge's allowance of a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding 
the verdict regarding the conviction of felony-murder in the 
second degree.12 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence of armed robbery and home 
invasion.  The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his convictions of armed robbery and home 
invasion, claiming that no reasonable jury could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he knew that Pichardo and Etienne intended 
to rob the sellers of the marijuana or that either was armed.  
See Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 100 (2013) (where 
                                                          
 
 
12 We recognize that the current model jury instructions 
regarding felony-murder promulgated by this court do not provide 
adequate guidance to a jury in the circumstances presented in 
this case.  The trial judge in this case appropriately provided 
the jury with, in essence, the current model jury instruction on 
felony-murder, which instructs the jury that the Commonwealth 
must prove the defendant committed a felony, that the felony was 
inherently dangerous or committed with conscious disregard to 
human life, and that "the killing occurred during the commission 
or attempted commission of the underlying felony . . . [and] in 
connection with the felony and at substantially the same time 
and place."  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 54-56 (2013).  
Such an instruction would allow a jury to convict a defendant 
where, as here, a joint venturer is killed during the commission 
of a felony by a victim or other person resisting the felony, 
and therefore does not accurately state the law of felony-murder 
in the Commonwealth where there is an issue whether the victim 
was killed by a joint venturer or by a person seeking to resist 
or arrest.  We shall revise the model jury instructions to 
address this issue.  Until the revised instructions are 
published, we direct judges to depart from the model jury 
instruction regarding felony-murder to reflect the law as stated 
in this opinion. 
20 
 
element of offense is that perpetrator is armed, Commonwealth 
must prove that defendant knew that at least one joint venturer 
was armed); Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 466-467 (2009) (Commonwealth 
required to prove that defendant knowingly participated in crime 
charged with intent required for that offense).  Rather, the 
defendant argues, the evidence was sufficient only to show that 
the defendant knew that he was driving Pichardo and Etienne to 
purchase marijuana. 
 
When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required 
finding of not guilty, we must determine "whether the evidence 
offered by the Commonwealth, together with reasonable inferences 
therefrom, when viewed in its light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, was sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the 
crime charged."  Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005) 
S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007), and 460 Mass. 12 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 686 (1979), S.C., 
Commonwealth v. Doherty, 411 Mass. 95 (1991), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 1094 (1992).  Here, Alvin Bernardez, who described himself 
as Pichardo's "best friend" and "at one point" a friend of the 
defendant, testified that the defendant informed Bernardez of 
the circumstances surrounding Pichardo's death during a 
telephone call initiated by the defendant on the day after the 
killing and a subsequent in-person conversation.  Bernardez 
21 
 
testified that the defendant said that the defendant, Pichardo, 
and "another kid named Stephan" went to Dorchester "to catch a 
lick," and "it went wrong and [Pichardo] was shot."  Bernardez 
explained that "catch a lick" was a slang term for a robbery.  
See Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719, 721, 729 (2002) 
(witness allowed to testify that he understood defendant's use 
of term "wet them up" to describe desire to kill).  Bernardez 
testified that the defendant told him that "[t]hey went to rob 
someone for a couple of O's," which Bernardez later explained 
meant ounces of "weed."  The defendant told Bernardez that 
"Stephan" set up the robbery, Pichardo was the "robber," and the 
defendant was the driver.  Further, the defendant, in a 
videotaped interview with police, stated that he knew that 
Pichardo "ripped people off" to supplement his income from work, 
and that he had seen Pichardo with a few guns, although he 
denied seeing Pichardo with a gun on the day of the shooting. 
 
From this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that the 
defendant knew that the plan to purchase marijuana from Reynoso 
was, in fact, a ruse to steal the marijuana and that he would be 
driving Pichardo and Etienne to and from the robbery.  A 
reasonable jury could also infer that the defendant knew that 
Pichardo was armed, because he had earlier seen him with guns 
and knew that Pichardo's role was to be the "robber" who might 
need to use force to overcome any resistance by the drug 
22 
 
sellers.  This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in 
the armed robbery and home invasion with the intent required for 
these offenses, and knew that Pichardo would be armed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Chay Giang, 402 Mass. 604, 608-610 (1988) 
(knowing participation could be inferred from surrounding 
circumstances where defendant served as getaway driver).  The 
defendant claims that his conversations with Bernardez only 
reflected what he knew after the shooting, not what he 
understood at the time of the offenses, but a jury reasonably 
could have rejected this interpretation based on Bernardez's 
description of the conversation, including Bernardez's assertion 
that the defendant "knew what the ride was for." 
 
Conclusion.  The judge's order allowing the defendant's 
motion for a required finding of not guilty on the indictment 
charging felony-murder in the second degree is affirmed, as is 
the judge's order denying the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty on the remaining convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.