Title: Harris v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 193, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRYANT HARRIS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 193, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0305005293 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 31, 2005 
  Decided: April 11, 2005 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 11th day of April 2005, upon consideration of the appellant's Supreme 
Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the State's response 
thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Bryant Harris, was convicted of attempted 
robbery, conspiracy, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 
following a Superior Court bench trial.  The Superior Court sentenced Harris to ten 
years in prison followed by three years at decreasing levels of supervision.  This is 
Harris’ direct appeal. 
(2) 
Harris’ counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Harris’ counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and 
 
 
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careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Harris’ attorney informed him of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
Harris with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Harris 
also was informed of his right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Harris has 
raised four issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to Harris’ 
points, as well as the position taken by Harris’ counsel, and has moved to affirm 
the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) 
this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (b) this Court must 
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an 
adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The trial record fairly supports the following version of events:  On 
May 7, 2003, Harris and three codefendants, Marques Comer, Paul Nocho, and 
Dekelvin Townsend, met at Comer’s apartment and formulated a plan to rob 
Pocket’s Liquor Store in New Castle.  The four men took a shotgun and four knit 
                                                 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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caps and drove to the liquor store in Comer’s mother’s car.  They parked the car in 
a private, secluded driveway near the liquor store.  Nocho testified at trial that he 
walked into the store and made a purchase.  When he returned, he told Harris there 
were two clerks in the store.  Harris proceeded toward the store with the shotgun 
hidden in his overalls and the knit cap on his head.  Nocho returned to the car to 
wait as the get-away driver.  Nocho testified that Townend’s role was to act as the 
look-out.  Comer’s job was to collect the money while Harris wielded the shotgun. 
 
(5) 
Unbeknownst to the four men, a concerned citizen telephoned police 
about the unfamiliar vehicle parked in her driveway.  The caller identified four 
men exiting the vehicle pulling stocking caps over their faces and noted that one of 
the men appeared to be carrying a long pipe.  The caller stated that the men were 
walking in the direction of the liquor store.  Several police vehicles arrived on the 
scene within minutes.  As police arrived, they saw Harris walking along Route 13 
in the direction of the liquor store.  With guns drawn, police officers stopped 
Harris and asked him if he had any weapons, to which Harris responded "yes."  
The officers patted him down and discovered the shotgun. 
(6) 
Harris testified at his bench trial.  He admitted to the judge that he had 
conspired with the others to rob the liquor store.  He admitted that he assigned each 
coconspirator a specific role in the robbery plan.  He admitted to driving with the 
 
 
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others to the area near the liquor store in furtherance of their conspiracy.  He also 
admitted to carrying the shotgun.  Harris’ defense, however, was that by the time 
Nocho had returned from casing the liquor store, Harris already had decided to 
abandon the robbery plan and had started walking away from the liquor store.  
Harris asserted that the arresting officer lied when he testified that Harris was 
walking in the direction of the liquor store when police stopped him.  The Superior 
Court judge concluded, however, that the prosecution had proven its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that Harris had failed to prove the affirmative defense of 
renunciation by a preponderance of the evidence.  Harris was convicted of all three 
charges. 
(7) 
Harris raises four issues in this direct appeal.  First, he claims that the 
State failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, he asserts 
that the police lacked reasonable suspicion when they first stopped him.  Third, he 
claims that the officers violated his Miranda rights when, with their weapons 
drawn, they asked him if he had any weapons.  Finally, Harris alleges that his trial 
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  We address these claims 
seriatim. 
 
(8) 
Harris first argues that the State failed to prove all of the elements of 
attempted robbery beyond a reasonable doubt because Harris had renounced the 
 
 
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robbery plan before the police arrived.  The affirmative defense of renunciation 
requires a defendant to establish a complete and voluntary abandonment of the 
criminal purpose.2  The definition of “renunciation” in Section 541(c)(1) of Title 
11 specifically excludes circumstances where a defendant abandons his plans to 
commit a crime because of events that lead the defendant to believe that his 
detection or apprehension is more probable.3  In other words, abandonment of a 
criminal purpose is not voluntary simply because a defendant believes he might be 
caught.  Under the circumstances of this case, we find no error in the Superior 
Court’s conclusion that Harris had failed to establish the affirmative defense of 
renunciation by a preponderance of the evidence.  It was entirely within the judge’s 
discretion to credit the officer’s testimony that Harris was walking toward, not 
away from, the liquor store at the time of his arrest.4  Moreover, Harris still had the 
stocking cap and shotgun in his possession.  We find that the State’s evidence was 
sufficient as a matter of law to prove all three criminal charges beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
(9) 
Harris’ second claim is that the Superior Court erred in denying his 
suppression motion based on the officers’ lack of reasonable suspicion to stop him.  
                                                 
2 11 Del. C. § 541 (2001). 
3 Id. § 541(c)(1). 
4 Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980). 
 
 
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In determining whether police had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct an 
investigatory Terry5 stop, we must examine the totality of the circumstances, 
through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same circumstances 
combining objective facts with a reasonable officer’s subjective interpretation of 
those facts.6   In this case, a concerned citizen called police around 11:30 p.m. to 
report suspicious activity as it was occurring in her driveway.  The caller described 
four strangers exiting an unfamiliar vehicle, pulling stocking masks over their 
heads.  The driveway was located in a high-crime area adjacent to a liquor store 
that had been robbed on prior occasions. The caller stated that one of the men 
appeared to be carrying a large pipe.  When police arrived, they saw Harris 
walking along the poorly-lit highway in the direction of the liquor store.  He was 
wearing coveralls and a knit cap on a May evening.  Under these circumstances, 
we find no error in the Superior Court’s conclusion that police had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to stop Harris. 
 
(10) Furthermore, given the caller’s statement that one of the men 
appeared to have a weapon, it was permissible for the officers to conduct a limited 
                                                 
5 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing brief investigatory stops by law 
enforcement officers based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).  
6 Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1261, 1263 (Del. 2001). 
 
 
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patdown search of Harris for weapons in conjunction with their investigatory stop.7  
In this case, the officers first asked Harris if he was armed before attempting a 
patdown search.  Harris’ contention that this question violated his Miranda8 rights 
is without merit.  Miranda warnings are required during custodial interrogations9 
but are not required before an investigatory stop under Terry, as occurred here.  
Accordingly, we find no merit to Harris’ third argument. 
(11) Harris’ final contention is that his trial attorney provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The Court, however, will not consider this issue for the first 
time on direct appeal.10 
(12) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Harris’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Harris’ counsel has made a conscientious effort to 
examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Harris could not 
raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
7 See Purnell v. State, 832 A.2d 714, 720 (Del. 2003) (holding that, so long as an officer 
is entitled to make a Terry stop and has reason to believe the suspect is armed, the officer may 
conduct a limited patdown search of the suspect’s person for weapons). 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that police officers may not subject 
citizens to custodial interrogations without first advising them of certain rights protecting their 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). 
9 Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1192 (Del. 1992). 
10 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
Justice