Title: Hunter v. Haun
Citation: 210 Kan. 11, 499 P.2d 1087
Docket Number: 46,361
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 1972

210 Kan. 11 (1972)
499 P.2d 1087
R.W. HUNTER, HUBERT M. MANN and RUBY D. MANN, Appellees,
v.
HAROLD HAUN, Appellant.
No. 46,361

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 19, 1972.
Harold L. Haun, County Attorney, and Lance Burr, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Attorney General, was with them on the brief for the appellant.
No appearance by appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
Plaintiffs-appellees brought this action to enjoin defendant-appellant, the county attorney of Morris County, from proceeding against them under the provisions of the Kansas Buyer Protection Act, K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 50-601, et seq., hereafter referred to as the act. Specifically, plaintiffs prayed that defendant be restrained "from taking any statements, evidence or depositions" pursuant to subpoenas to plaintiffs, which had been issued by defendant under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 50-605.
On May 27, 1970, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order which was attacked by a motion to dismiss and vacate. After a hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court entered a judgment permanently restraining defendant from proceeding further against the plaintiffs under the "Consumer Protection Act" (Buyer Protection Act). Thereafter, the defendant perfected this appeal.
The proceedings stemmed from a verified complaint filed with the county attorney by Arthur Davis, a resident of Morris County.
*12 The gist of the complaint reads as follows:
Following the filing of the complaint the county attorney caused subpoenas to be served on R.W. Hunter and Mr. and Mrs. (Ruby) Hubert M. Mann, directing them to appear before the county attorney to answer questions propounded to them concerning the sale of the Davis real estate and that they bring with them all records and papers relevant to the transaction. At this point plaintiffs filed their action seeking to restrain the county attorney. Plaintiffs claimed the subpoenas were not authorized by 50-604 and 50-605; and further that only the attorney general had authority under the statutes specified to issue the subpoenas.
The trial court found that the county attorney was authorized to issue subpoenas under the act (State v. McPherson, 208 Kan. 511, 493 P.2d 228), but held that a transaction involving the sale of real estate situated in Kansas was not within the purview of the act, and, for that reason, permanently enjoined the county attorney from proceeding pursuant to the subpoenas.
Plaintiffs did not appear or file a brief with this court on appeal.
Defendant presents one narrow issue on appeal. It is stated in his brief in this fashion:
The statute referred to reads as follows:
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court ruled:
We are constrained to agree with the trial court.
Defendant makes several arguments on appeal, including an assertion that Kansas real estate could be included within the definition of the words "objects" or "commodities" as they are used in the statutory definition of "merchandise." If the statute was silent concerning real estate his argument might be persuasive; however, the statute specifically mentions real estate and if the legislature had intended the term "merchandise" to include real estate wherever situated it could have said so rather than specifically referring only to real estate situated outside the state. The specific reference to real estate must control over the general terms "objects" or "commodities."
Defendant says that it seems unreasonable that the legislature intended that the act apply to fraudulent transactions involving real estate located outside Kansas and yet did not intend application to the same fraud in a similar situation involving Kansas real estate. As the trial court pointed out, defendant overlooks the fact that there are other Kansas statutes affording remedies for fraud arising from transactions concerning Kansas real estate.
Defendant further argues that since the purpose of the act is the elimination of fraudulent practices in sales that it should be liberally construed to include sales of Kansas real estate to accomplish the policy of eliminating all fraudulent practices in connection with sales. While this may be the broad policy of the act we are precluded, by well-established rules governing the interpretation of statutes, from searching for another meaning to give a statute when the language used is plain and unambiguous.
In the case of Alter v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 443, 273 Pac. 474, Chief Justice Johnston stated the applicable rule in these terms:
See, also, City of Overland Park v. Nikias, 209 Kan. 643, 498 P.2d 56, Hand v. Board of Education, 198 Kan. 460, 426 P.2d 124.
The language of the statute under consideration is plain and its purpose to reach nonresident sellers or agents who engage in fraudulent practices in attempting to sell out-of-state real estate to Kansas buyers is obvious.
We hold that Kansas real estate does not fall within any of the items specifically enumerated as being included in the term "merchandise" by the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 50-601 (b).
It should be noted that in arriving at the conclusion announced herein, we are not unmindful of the rule announced in State, ex rel., v. Rohleder, 208 Kan. 193, 490 P.2d 374, that the district courts of this state cannot prevent the attorney general or a county attorney from performing the duties required of them by statute. In the instant case the restraint was directed only at subpoena proceedings under 50-605, supra, in connection with a transaction, not within the scope of the "Buyer Protection Act." The restraint here has no bearing on the authority or duty of the county attorney with respect to the enforcement of the laws of the state of Kansas.
The judgment is affirmed.
FROMME, J., concurring:
Under the narrow issue presented to this court I agree that the county attorney was properly restrained from proceeding under the "Consumer Protection Act". The definition in K.S.A. 1969 Supp. 50-601 (b) of "merchandise" does not include real estate located in Kansas, and the complaint lodged with the county attorney did not fall within the purview of those practices declared unlawful by K.S.A. 1969 Supp. 50-602.
The statute 50-602, which defines the practices rendered unlawful, in pertinent part reads:
*15 The definition of "merchandise" contained in 50-601 (b) includes the word "services" without restriction.
The opinion of the court should not be construed to extend beyond the narrow confines of the issue decided. In a future case which encompasses an unlawful practice set forth in 50-602 and which involves the sale of the "services" of a real estate broker I would afford a buyer the protection of the act even though the "services" of the broker may have related to a sale of real estate in Kansas.