Title: Colby v. Gunson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057691
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2010

FILED: August 26, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CRAIG COLBY,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
KAREN GUNSON,
State Medical Examiner,
Respondent on Review.
(CC
06C15785; CA A133979; SC S057691)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 13, 2010.
Craig P. Colby argued the cause and filed the petition
for review in propria persona.
Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him on the brief
was John R. Kroger, Attorney General.
Thomas M. Christ, Portland, filed a brief
for amici curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association, Oregon Law Center, and Disability Rights Oregon.
Barbara L. Johnston, Brisbee &amp;
Stockton LLC, Hillsboro, filed a brief for amicus curiae Carrell F.
Bradley.  With her on the brief was Larry A. Brisbee.
BALMER, J.
The decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings. 
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,
Albin W. Norblad,
Judge. 229 Or App 167, 210 P3d 917 (2009).
BALMER, J.
This case requires us to determine
whether an attorney, acting pro se, is entitled to attorney fees under
ORS 192.490(3), which grants "reasonable attorney fees" to any person
who prevails in a suit seeking disclosure of a public record.  Plaintiff, an
attorney, filed an action on his own behalf seeking access to reports in the
possession of the state medical examiner.  The trial court dismissed
plaintiff's claims.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 
Plaintiff then sought attorney fees.  The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's
request, reasoning that the phrase "attorney fees" does not include the
value of legal services performed by an attorney acting pro se.  Colby
v. Gunson, 229 Or App 167, 210 P3d 917 (2009).  We allowed plaintiff's
petition for review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff requested that defendant,
the state medical examiner, disclose autopsy and laboratory reports prepared
during the investigation of a police shooting.  Plaintiff made the request
pursuant to ORS 192.420, which provides that, with certain exceptions, "[e]very
person has a right to inspect any public record of a public body in this
state."  Defendant refused to disclose the reports, contending that they
were exempt from disclosure.  Plaintiff petitioned the Attorney General to order
defendant to disclose the reports, and the Attorney General denied plaintiff's
petition.  
Plaintiff then instituted proceedings
in the Marion County Circuit Court to obtain disclosure.  See ORS
192.450(2) (authorizing proceedings).  The trial court determined that the
records were exempt from disclosure under ORS 192.502(9), which exempts from disclosure
records that are confidential or privileged under Oregon law.  Plaintiff
appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.  The court concluded
that the records were not exempt under ORS 192.502(9), but remanded the case
for the trial court to determine whether the records were exempt under another
statute.  Colby v. Gunson, 224 Or App 666, 199 P3d 350 (2008).
After he had successfully appealed,
plaintiff sought attorney fees under ORS 192.490(3).  That statute provides, in
part:
"If a person seeking the right to inspect
or to receive a copy of a public record prevails in the suit, the person
shall be awarded costs and disbursements and reasonable attorney fees
at trial and on appeal.  If the person prevails in part, the court may in its
discretion award the person costs and disbursements and reasonable attorney
fees at trial and on appeal, or an appropriate portion thereof."
(Emphases added.)  The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's
request, concluding that the meaning of "attorney fees," under the
statute, is "the price demanded by an attorney for services rendered to a
separate client entity."  Colby, 229 Or App at 171.  Because
plaintiff had represented himself, the court determined that he was not
entitled to receive attorney fees for his legal services.(1)
 Plaintiff filed a petition for review, which we allowed.
On review, plaintiff argues that the
term "attorney fees," as used in ORS 192.490(3), means "the
value of the services performed by [an] attorney."  In plaintiff's view,
although he did not represent a client separate from himself or send a bill for
his services, he nevertheless performed services as an attorney and is entitled
to recover the value of those services under the statute.  Defendant disagrees
and argues that each word -- "attorney" and "fees" -- has
independent significance.  In particular, defendant argues that the word
"attorney" connotes an agency relationship, rather than a status. 
Thus, according to defendant, "attorney fees" must arise out of
services rendered by one person in the course of representing another. 
Further, defendant argues, the legislature's use of the word "fees"
requires that that separate client actually incur an obligation to pay for
those services rendered.  
For the reasons set out below, we
agree with plaintiff that the term "attorney fees," as used in ORS
192.490(3), means the reasonable value of legal services provided by an
attorney in seeking the disclosure of public records.  Plaintiff is a
practicing attorney who performed legal services in pursuit of disclosure of
public records, and plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover from defendant the
reasonable value of those services, despite the fact that he acted pro se. 

Because the term "attorney
fees" is not defined in the statute, we look to the plain and ordinary
meaning of the term.  See State v. Tate, 347 Or 318, 324, 220 P3d 1176
(2009) (court gives words of common usage their plain, ordinary meaning).  In
determining the plain meaning of "attorney fees," the Court of
Appeals relied, in part, on the definition provided in Black's Law
Dictionary:  "The charge to a client for services performed for the
client, such as an hourly fee, a flat fee, or a contingent fee."  Black's
Law Dictionary 148 (9th ed 2009).  Admittedly, that definition implies some
sort of obligation of one individual (the client) to pay another (the
attorney).  However, the definition in Black's -- although appropriate
in certain contexts -- is not the only reasonable interpretation of the term. 
Instead, when used in the context of an attorney fee award, the ordinary
meaning of the term also includes the reasonable value of an attorney's
services, whether or not the client was required to pay for those services.  See
ORCP 68 A(1) ("'Attorney fees' are the reasonable value of legal
services related to the prosecution or defense of an action.");(2)
see also Chalmers v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 263 Or 449, 455, 502 P2d
1378 (1972) ("For the purpose of determining what is a reasonable attorney
fee in the appeal of a case to this court, * * * we must attempt to ascertain
the reasonable value of such services[.]"). 
Indeed, we previously have held that
a party may collect attorney fees regardless of whether the party incurred an
obligation to pay for the legal services provided.  In Domingo v. Anderson,
325 Or 385, 938 P2d 206 (1997), the plaintiffs brought an action challenging
the notice of sale and the propriety of the sale of collateral that the
defendant had sold after the plaintiffs defaulted on a loan agreement.  The
defendant prevailed on summary judgment and requested attorney fees pursuant to
a contract.  Under the contract, the plaintiffs had agreed to "pay all
costs and expenses" of any action in which the defendant was required to
appear, including "[the defendant's] attorney fees."  Id. at 387. 
The defendant's attorney had been hired by the Professional Liability Fund, a
lawyers' professional liability insurance fund, rather than by the defendant
personally.  The plaintiffs argued that, because the defendant had not
personally paid the attorney for his services, the defendant could not collect
attorney fees under the contract.  This court disagreed, concluding that the
contract, in requiring only that the plaintiffs pay the defendant's
"attorney fees," did not contain any condition requiring that the
defendant first be obligated to pay for the attorney's services.(3)
Similarly, ORS 192.490(3) provides --
without limitation -- that any "person" who prevails in a suit seeking
the right to inspect or to receive a copy of a public record shall be awarded "reasonable
attorney fees."  There is no requirement that the prevailing party, or
anyone else, be obligated to pay for the legal services rendered in the suit.  Nor
is there a requirement that the "person" who prevailed be a different
person from the attorney whose services procured that favorable result.  Instead,
the term "attorney fees," as used in the context of attorney fee
awards, means the reasonable value of services performed by an attorney,
whether or not anyone incurs an obligation to pay for those services. 
Defendant argues that, even if the
term "attorney fees" does not require an obligation to pay for legal
services, the legislature's use of the term "attorney" prevents an
award of attorney fees to pro se litigants.  Defendant argues that the
plain and ordinary meaning of the term "attorney" is one who
"provid[es] legal services or representation for an entity or person other
than oneself."  Thus, defendant argues, an attorney acting pro se is
not an "attorney" for purposes of ORS 192.490(3).  
Defendant relies in part on Black's
Law Dictionary, which defines "attorney" as follows:
"1.  Strictly, one who is designated to transact
business for another; a legal agent. -- Also termed attorney-in-fact; private
attorney.  2. A person who practices law; LAWYER. -- Also
termed (in sense 2) attorney-at-law; public attorney." 
Black's at 147.  Defendant urges us to rely on the
first definition, which focuses on the agency relationship between one who acts
as an "attorney" for another.  However, she points to no reason, and
we can think of none, that the legislature would have intended to use the term
attorney in that "strict" agency sense in the context of a statute
authorizing the award of attorney fees.  Instead, the legislature likely
intended to use the term in its ordinary sense -- "attorney" simply
means an individual who practices law.(4)
Defendant also relies on ORS 9.310,
which provides:
"An attorney is a person authorized to
represent a party in the written proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding,
in any stage thereof.  An attorney, other than the one who represents the party
in the written proceedings, may also represent a party in court, or before a
judicial officer, in which case the attorney is known as counsel, and the
authority of the attorney is limited to the matters that transpire in the court
or before such officer at the time."
Defendant argues that the first sentence of that statute
defines the term "attorney" and indicates that, to be an attorney,
one must have a separate client to represent.  
We are not convinced that ORS 9.310 sheds
any light on the ordinary meaning of the term "attorney"; instead, it
defines the term for the limited purpose of describing the agency relationship
between an attorney and his or her client in a given case.  See also ORS
9.330 (describing authority of "attorney," as described in ORS 9.310,
to act on behalf of a client).  In contrast, ORS 9.005(1) defines
"attorney" more generally as "a member of the bar."  See
also ORS 9.005(7) (defining "bar" as the Oregon State Bar).  ORS
9.005 was adopted in 1975 and provides definitions for purposes of ORS 9.005 to
9.755, which generally describe the responsibilities of attorneys.  That
definition, because it applies in a broader context, is more akin to the
ordinary definition of the term set out in Black's.  It is also more useful
than is ORS 9.310 in determining the plain and ordinary meaning of "attorney."
Plaintiff is an attorney, in the
ordinary sense of the word.  He graduated from law school, is a member of the
Oregon State Bar, and is authorized to practice law in this state.  Throughout
the proceedings below, he was subject to the Oregon Rules of Professional
Conduct, along with other statutory provisions that govern the conduct of
attorneys.  See ORS 9.527 (Supreme Court may discipline members of the
bar for misconduct, including violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct); see
also In re Glass, 308 Or 297, 301-02, 779 P2d 612 (1989) (attorney acting
on his own behalf violated disciplinary rule prohibiting frivolous claims). 
Because plaintiff is an attorney and because he performed legal services in seeking
disclosure of public records, he is entitled to collect attorney fees for those
services.  It is irrelevant that he performed those legal services on his own
behalf. 
The Court of Appeals expressed, in
its opinion denying fees, a concern that permitting pro se attorneys to
collect attorney fees for legal work conducted on their own behalf would raise
the potential for abusive fee generation.  Colby, 229 Or App at 172.  Although
not necessary to our decision here, we note that the legislature has addressed that
concern by permitting attorney fees only to parties who "prevail[] in the
suit" and by requiring that the attorney fee award be "reasonable."
 ORS 192.490(3).  Further, the legislature has provided a list of factors that a
court must consider in determining the amount of any attorney fee award,
several of which protect against the abusive fee generation potential that the
Court of Appeals feared.  See ORS 20.075(1), (2) (listing factors to be
considered in determining amount of any attorney fee award).
We conclude that the Court of Appeals
erred in its interpretation of ORS 192.490(3).  Plaintiff, should he
"prevail[] in [his] suit," ORS 192.490(3), will be entitled to
attorney fees for the reasonable value of the legal services that he performed
on his own behalf.  We therefore remand to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. 
1. The
court allowed plaintiff's petition for costs, to abide the outcome on remand.  See
ORAP 13.05(4) (appellate court may allow costs to prevailing party and
condition award on outcome of case). 
2. ORCP
68 A was not adopted until 1980, after the legislature had passed ORS 192.490. 
It therefore cannot be used, directly, to demonstrate the legislature's intent
in using the phrase "attorney fees."  However, we find it a useful
demonstration that the term has more than one plain and ordinary meaning.
3. Further,
this court cited with approval numerous Court of Appeals cases in which that
court had awarded attorney fees to attorneys who had represented parties free
of charge.  Domingo, 325 Or at 390 n 7.  For example, in State ex rel
Binschus v. Schreiber, 141 Or App 288, 294, 917 P2d 1063 (1996), the Court
of Appeals upheld an award of statutory attorney fees to the mother in a
custody proceeding, despite the fact that the mother had been represented by a
legal aid attorney and therefore was not required to pay for her attorney's
legal services.
4. Defendant
also relies on the definition of "attorney" contained in Webster's,
which is similar to the first definition contained in Black's: 
"one who is legally appointed by another to transact business for him; specif
: a legal agent qualified to act for suitors and defendants in legal
proceedings."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 141 (unabridged
ed 2002).  However, Webster's defines "lawyer" similarly to
the second Black's definition:  "a specialist in or a practitioner
of law : one (as an attorney, counselor, solicitor, barrister, or
advocate) whose profession is to conduct lawsuits for clients or to advise as
to the prosecution or defense of lawsuits or as to legal rights and obligations
in other matters."  Id. at 1280.