Title: Allen v. State
Citation: 275 So. 2d 238
Docket Number: 43063
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 21, 1973

275 So. 2d 238 (1973)
Freddie Eugene ALLEN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 43063.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 21, 1973.
*239 John W. Watson, III, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
ERVIN, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 267 So. 2d 689. The District Court has certified its decision as one passing on questions of great public interest, to wit:
We have accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
The pertinent facts in this case are accurately and concisely stated in the District Court's opinion as follows:
Petitioner filed a suggestion for writ of prohibition in the District Court of Appeal, seeking to prohibit the trial court from proceeding with the trial. The District Court first addressed itself to the problem of when the 180-day time period provided in Rule 3.191(a)(1), Cr.Pr., 33 F.S.A., commenced. Because the crime involved was a felony, and since the petitioner had made no demand for a speedy trial, the District Court correctly held that the 180-day time period commenced from the date the Petitioner was taken into custody. The language of Rule 3.191(a)(1), Cr.Pr., is specific:
Cf. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971). We are also in agreement with the District Court's holding that Petitioner's bail release did not serve to waive the time requirements of the Rule. The remaining language in that subsection encompasses such a circumstance and any exception under (i) (2) is not applicable to Petitioner's cause, as explained infra.
Unfortunately, the District Court went awry in calculating the effective date of Rule 3.191 Cr.Pr., so as to apply the 180-day time period. Judge Rawls in the dissenting portion of this opinion succinctly and correctly set forth the Petitioner's position:
Judge Rawls has thus answered the second certified question presented for determination, to wit: The November 1, 1971, deadline of Rule 3.191(i)(2), Cr.Pr., applies only to persons taken into custody prior to the effective date (March 1, 1971).
When Petitioner was arrested (June 1, 1971), the grand jury was not in session, having been dismissed on May 25, 1971, and not scheduled to reconvene until November 1, 1971. On November 3, 1971, the Petitioner was indicted. Under the provisions of Rule 3.191(a) and (i), as discussed supra, his trial should have commenced prior to November 29, 1971 (180 days from June 1, 1971). The trial court ordered the trial to be held on January 26, *241 1972. Since the regular grand jury did convene within the 180-day period, the question of great public interest is not the one certified by the District Court, but rather that issue put forth by Judge Rawls:
The Petitioner could have been brought to trial within the twenty-five days following the grand jury indictment. We can only surmise that the delayed trial date was the result of congestion in the court's docket or a lack of preparation and diligent prosecution by the State. These conditions may have been aggravated by the fact that the grand jury did not convene until shortly before the expiration of the 180-day time period. However, the letter of Rule 3.191(f), Cr.Pr., encompasses and excludes the former conditions as constituting "exceptional circumstances," and the spirit of the Rule dictates that a grand jury's untimely convention should not serve to prevent a speedy trial. Such a circumstance is an "avoidable or forseeable delay" within the language of that subsection. The trial court could have recalled the grand jury. See Section 905.09, F.S.A. Perhaps a rescheduling of Jefferson County's Grand Jury terms would serve to alleviate such delay. Petitioner was not responsible for these delays and he should have been afforded a speedy trial. Petitioner's motion for discharge was timely filed and should have been granted. Rule 3.191(a)(1) and (d)(1), Cr.Pr.
Accordingly, the decision of the First District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with instructions to remand the cause to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate order releasing and discharging the Petitioner.
CARLTON, C.J., and BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., dissent.