Title: Commonwealth v. Diaz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11812
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11812 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FAUSTINO DIAZ, JR. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 8, 2017. - December 8, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, Capital 
case.  Evidence, Chain of custody. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 15, 2013. 
 
 
The case was tried before Constance M. Sweeney, J. 
 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In January, 1991, the victim was found lying 
across her bed, with her face covered in blood, at a housing 
complex for the elderly in Springfield.  She had been sexually 
assaulted and severely beaten.  An autopsy determined that she 
had suffered numerous broken bones in her face, sternum, and 
ribs, and that she died as a result of blunt force trauma.  
2 
 
 
Police interviewed individuals who knew the victim and also 
employees who worked at the complex, including maintenance, 
nursing, and cleaning staff.  The defendant, who was a part-time 
maintenance worker there, was one of those interviewed.  No 
arrests were made, and no suspect was identified. 
 
In 2012, Springfield police reopened the investigation.  
They sought to interview men, including the defendant, who had 
had access to the housing complex and to collect 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples from them.  Investigators 
visited the defendant at his place of employment, and he 
consented to the taking of a DNA sample.  Approximately one 
month later, test results indicated that the defendant's DNA 
matched the DNA profile from sperm found in the victim's body.  
The defendant was arrested and indicted on charges of murder in 
the first degree and aggravated rape.1  At trial, the 
Commonwealth proceeded on theories of deliberate premeditation, 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with aggravated 
rape as the predicate felony.  A Superior Court jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on all three 
theories. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the prosecutor 
                     
 
1 Approximately one week before trial, the trial judge 
dismissed the indictment charging aggravated rape as time 
barred.  See Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass.415, 430-431 
(2017). 
3 
 
 
presented arguments and asked the jury to draw inferences from 
facts that had been excluded from their consideration; made 
multiple misstatements of fact in her closing argument; 
suggested that she had personal knowledge of the case beyond the 
evidence that had been presented to the jury; argued in a manner 
designed to appeal to the jury's emotions and inflame the jury; 
and propounded medical theories based on facts that were not in 
evidence and were, at best, entirely speculative.  The defendant 
contends that, as a result, a new trial is required.  In 
addition, the defendant maintains that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the improper statements in 
the prosecutor's closing.  The defendant also asks us to use our 
extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
verdict.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction 
and decline to exercise our authority to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving some facts for later discussion of particular issues. 
 
a.  Discovery of the victim's body.  On Sunday, 
January 20, 1991, the victim's daughter-in-law went to the 
victim's apartment because the victim unexpectedly had not 
attended church services.  The daughter-in-law entered the 
apartment and called for the victim, but received no reply.  
When she inserted her key in the front door lock, she noticed 
4 
 
 
that the door felt unlocked.  After looking through the living 
room, dining room, and kitchen, she also noticed that the back 
door was ajar, being held open by the deadbolt that was touching 
the doorjamb. 
 
In the bathroom, she found the victim's purse, wet, in the 
sink, and a towel in the toilet.  Finally, she found the victim 
dead in the bedroom.  The victim was lying face up with her head 
at the foot of the bed; her face was covered in blood, and her 
head was in a pool of blood on a pillow.  The victim's nightgown 
had been pushed up above her waist; her lower body was naked and 
her blood-stained underwear was on the floor near the bed. 
 
Crime scene investigators later found blood on the bathroom 
wall, and blood spatters on the wall, dresser, and curtains in 
the bedroom.  They also found evidence of blood in the drains in 
the kitchen and bathroom sinks, and copious amounts of blood on 
the victim's face and hands and on the bedding. 
 
An autopsy showed that the victim died of blunt trauma from 
multiple injuries to her head and chest.  Her nose was 
dislocated and broken, and seven other bones in her face were 
broken.  There was bleeding from a head injury under her scalp, 
as well as injuries to her neck muscles that were not evident 
externally; part of her larynx had been crushed, and there was 
blood in her mouth and lungs.  She also had four broken ribs and 
a broken sternum.  Her ribs had been broken by blunt force 
5 
 
 
trauma.  There were hemorrhages in her eyes that were consistent 
with strangulation. 
 
In addition, there was a tear in her vaginal wall caused by 
blunt force and bleeding in her anal cavity.  The medical 
examiner2 took samples from a vaginal swab, an anorectal swab, 
and a perianal swab for an evidence collection kit. 
 
b.  Initial investigation.  Police found no sign of forced 
entry into the apartment, and officers conducted the 
investigation on the theory that either the victim knew her 
assailant or the assailant had had a key.  They interviewed 
people who had known the victim and employees at the apartment 
complex and assisted living center.3  The defendant was on the 
list of employees to be interviewed because he was a part-time 
maintenance worker at the complex and had specific duties in the 
victim's building. 
 
On January 21, 1991, officers went to the defendant's house 
                     
 
2 Due to his medical condition, the medical examiner who 
conducted the autopsy did not testify at trial.  An officer who 
attended the autopsy testified as to his observations, and the 
Commonwealth's chief medical examiner testified based on an 
examination of the autopsy report and photographs taken during 
the autopsy. 
 
 
3 The four separate apartment buildings in the complex were 
connected by a shared common basement.  The kitchen door of the 
victim's apartment opened into a hallway, which led to another 
apartment, the basement, and the back door of the building.  
Some members of the security staff, as well as the maintenance 
supervisor, had been issued master keys to the building and the 
apartments.  The nursing staff had access to keys that were kept 
in a locked box in their offices. 
6 
 
 
and asked him if he would come with them to the police station 
to assist with their investigation of a death of one of the 
residents at the apartment complex for the elderly.  The 
defendant agreed to accompany them to the police station and 
speak with the officers; he was driven there in a police 
cruiser.  When the officers informed the defendant of the 
victim's death, without having told him the circumstances of 
that death, the defendant broke down and cried for five minutes.  
The defendant said that he did not have a master key to the 
apartment units.  The defendant was not a suspect at the time he 
gave his statement. 
 
A chemist from the State police crime laboratory (crime 
lab) examined the items from the evidence collection kit and 
found sperm cells on the vaginal swab, the vaginal smear, the 
anorectal swab, and the anorectal smear.  He did not conduct DNA 
testing on any of this evidence.  In 1991, the crime lab did not 
conduct any form of DNA testing; at that time, such testing was 
not commonly conducted in State police laboratories nationwide.4 
 
The crime lab began DNA testing in 2001.  In 2002, a State 
police analyst performed DNA testing on the anorectal swab and 
                     
 
4 In 1991, restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) 
testing, an early method of DNA testing, was performed by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations and some private laboratories.  
This method of DNA testing required a large sample to create a 
genetic profile, and required a lengthy period of testing in 
order to obtain the test results. 
7 
 
 
developed a DNA profile for the sperm fraction of the sample 
found on that swab.5 
 
c.  Reopened investigation.  In 2012, the office of the 
Hampden County district attorney reopened a number of unsolved 
homicides, including the victim's case.  Detectives reviewed the 
case file and began the renewed investigation by interviewing 
men who had worked at the victim's apartment complex or who 
otherwise had been acquainted with her.  During the summer and 
fall of that year, detectives interviewed between eight to 
twelve men, and obtained DNA samples from them.  Because there 
was no probable cause to seek a warrant to obtain the samples, 
the officers relied on the men's voluntary agreement to provide 
a sample. 
 
On November 27, 2012, police spoke with the defendant at 
his workplace.  The interview was conducted in an employee break 
room where the defendant suggested that they talk.  The 
defendant and the officers sat at one of the tables.  The 
defendant said that he remembered the victim, he remembered that 
she had been killed, and he had worked at the housing complex 
for the elderly at that time. 
                     
 
5 At trial, the analyst described how a swab could contain 
two DNA profiles: a sperm fraction and a nonsperm fraction.  A 
nonsperm fraction is present where a swab picks up the victim's 
skin cells, which contain DNA.  The analyst used differential 
extraction, a process that relies on the different chemical 
properties of sperm cells and skin cells, to isolate the DNA 
from the sperm fraction. 
8 
 
 
 
The officers requested that the defendant provide a DNA 
sample, and presented him with a consent form stating that he 
agreed voluntarily to provide a sample through a buccal swab, 
notwithstanding the absence of a court order requiring a sample.  
Officers told him that they were collecting samples from former 
employees for comparison purposes.  The officers placed the form 
on the table where the defendant could see it, and then read it 
aloud to him.6  Because the defendant was not then a suspect and 
the interview was voluntary, the defendant was not provided 
Miranda warnings and the officers did not discuss a right to 
consult with counsel.  After listening to one of the detectives 
read the form, the defendant consented to providing the DNA 
sample and signed the waiver form.  Detectives obtained a buccal 
swab and left the defendant's workplace shortly thereafter.7  The 
sample was delivered to the crime lab for analysis. 
 
Analysts at the crime lab conducted DNA testing on samples 
obtained from the defendant and five other men.  The defendant's 
                     
 
6 An officer testified that the defendant had a heavy 
accent, but that he was able to understand what the defendant 
said.  The defendant also appeared to understand the officers. 
 
 
7 The defendant moved to suppress the DNA evidence obtained 
from the buccal swab taken at his workplace.  After a hearing, 
the judge denied the motion, finding that the employee break 
room was not a coercive setting, in that the door to the room 
had been open and employees were coming into the room and 
leaving it during the interview.  See Commonwealth v. Groome, 
435 Mass. 201, 212 (2001).  The judge found that the defendant 
voluntarily provided the police with a DNA sample. 
9 
 
 
DNA matched the DNA profile of sperm found on both the perianal 
swab and the anorectal swab.  Statistical analysis, introduced 
at trial by a different State police chemist, established that 
the likelihood a DNA profile would match a randomly selected 
individual was 1 in 2.064 quadrillion in the Hispanic 
population, 1 in 1.531 quadrillion in the Caucasian population, 
1 in 87.11 quadrillion in the African American population, and 
1 in 61.58 quadrillion in the Asian population.  Police arrested 
the defendant on January 21, 2013. 
 
The investigating officers interviewed the assistant 
administrator for the complex, and also reinterviewed the man 
who had been the complex's maintenance supervisor at the time of 
the victim's death.  Each of them told police, for the first 
time, that when the defendant returned to work, as scheduled, a 
few days after the victim's death, he was not wearing the green 
army fatigue jacket and work boots that he usually wore to work.  
Instead, he wore a sport coat and shoes.  The defendant worked 
for approximately a month after the victim's death, and then did 
not return.  During that month, he did not wear the green army 
jacket or the work boots. 
 
The complex's maintenance supervisor also told police 
during this later interview that, approximately one month before 
the victim's death, the supervisor told the defendant to stop 
asking residents for money, and offered to lend the defendant 
10 
 
 
money for the Christmas holiday.  When the supervisor confronted 
the defendant, he agreed that he had been asking residents for 
money, said that he would stop doing so, and accepted the 
supervisor's offer of a loan. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In this appeal, the defendant challenges 
several statements by the prosecutor during her closing 
argument.  He contends that the statements misstated the facts; 
made improper inferences based on facts not in evidence; 
suggested that the prosecutor had personal knowledge of the case 
beyond the evidence that had been presented to the jury; 
improperly sought to inflame the jury's emotions and distract 
them from making a reasoned determination based on the evidence; 
and urged the jury to draw speculative inferences about the 
defendant's background, in an effort to prejudice the jury 
against him, without any basis in the evidence.  The defendant 
maintains that these statements, and his trial counsel's failure 
to object to them, require that he be granted a new trial. 
 
"When a defendant raises a claim of error regarding a 
prosecutor's closing argument, we consider (1) whether the 
defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error was limited 
to collateral issues or went to the heart of the case; (3) what 
specific or general instructions the judge gave the jury which 
may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in 
the circumstances, possibly made a difference in the jury's 
11 
 
 
conclusions."  Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 422–423 
(2000), citing Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518 (1987). 
 
While prosecutors are entitled to argue "forcefully for the 
defendant’s conviction," closing arguments must be limited to 
the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom.  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 
(1998).  Within this framework, however, a prosecutor may 
attempt to "fit all the pieces of evidence together" by 
suggesting "what conclusions the jury should draw from the 
evidence" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 
Mass. 422, 437 (2008).  Because the defendant did not object to 
any of the challenged statements at trial, we consider his 
arguments to determine whether there was error and, if so, 
whether it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 379-380 (1995).8 
 
a.  Defendant's reaction to news of victim's death.  The 
defendant argues that the prosecutor relied on facts not in 
evidence in describing the defendant's reaction in 1991 when the 
investigating officers informed him of the victim's death: 
                     
 
8 The defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to portions of the prosecutor's closing 
argument.  This claim is reviewed under the substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard, which is more 
favorable to the defendant than the standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel in other types of cases.  See Commonwealth 
v. Painten, 429 Mass. 536, 549-550 (1999), and cases cited; 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 & n.1 (1992). 
12 
 
 
 
"Is it a coincidence that in this case when the police 
talked to him in 1991 about this case, the defendant cries 
uncontrollably?  [A detective] described it extremely 
emotional, over the top.  Was this a coincidence?  [The 
detective] hadn't even told him how [the victim] had died.  
No other witnesses cried like this.  He hadn't even told 
him how [the victim] had died. 
 
 
"He hadn't told him that she had been beaten to death 
and that she had been raped, that [the ninety]-year-old 
[victim], [four] feet [ten] inches and 110 pounds, that she 
had beaten to death and raped.  But yet, yet, the defendant 
cries uncontrollably.  Ask yourself why and what 
conclusions you can draw from that evidence. 
 
 
"I would suggest it's because the defendant didn't 
need to be told what had happened to [the victim], he knew.  
He knew what he had done on January 19th of 1991.  He knew.  
He knew that he had beaten her to death and he knew that he 
had killed her, and he was scared that he was going to get 
caught." 
 
 
As the defendant points out, the trial judge sustained an 
objection to part of the detective's testimony: 
The prosecutor:  "And you indicated, and it's written in 
the statement, that the defendant became upset and began to 
cry?" 
 
The detective:  "That's correct." 
 
The prosecutor:  "Could you describe what this was like?" 
 
The detective:  "It was -- he -- to me, he was over the top 
on the way he started crying.  It was -- he was extremely 
emotional.  Something I had not experienced before from 
similar witnesses in a case." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Objection, Your Honor." 
 
The judge:  "Sustained as to that observation." 
 
The defendant's objection was sustained only as to the 
detective's comparison of the defendant's reaction to that of 
13 
 
 
similar witnesses.  Had the judge sustained the objection as to 
the entire answer, she would not have limited her decision "to 
that observation."  The detective's statements that the 
defendant "was extremely emotional" and "was over the top on the 
way he started crying" were not excluded.  The detective's 
testimony thus supports the prosecutor's statement in closing 
that the defendant's reaction to the news of the victim's death 
was "extremely emotional, over the top." 
 
Further, on redirect, the prosecutor asked the detective, 
"[I]n regards to the defendant breaking down and crying when you 
were interviewing him, how many other witnesses did that that 
you interviewed?"  The detective responded, "None."  The 
defendant did not object.  This testimony supports the 
prosecutor's statement that "[n]o other witnesses cried like 
[the defendant]." 
 
The defendant also argues that the prosecutor's statement 
that the detective "hadn't even told him how [the victim] had 
died" before the defendant's emotional reaction is inaccurate; 
at that point, the officer indeed had told the defendant that 
the victim had been killed.  The officer did testify that he 
informed the defendant that the victim had been killed.  He 
testified also, in response to a question from the prosecutor 
about whether the officer had mentioned "the manner in which 
[the victim] had been murdered" or "the manner in which she was 
14 
 
 
found," that he provided the defendant with "[n]o details" about 
the victim's death.  Thus, the prosecutor's statement that the 
officers had not told the defendant "how" the victim died before 
the defendant began crying was a reasonable interpretation of 
the detective's testimony. 
 
b.  Speculation about defendant's motive.  The defendant 
contends also that a new trial is required as a result of the 
prosecutor's speculation about his motive for the killing: 
 
"You can ask yourself why, why would someone do 
something like this?  I don't know why. . . .  Did he have 
a drug problem?  I don't know.  The medicine cabinet was 
open and left open in her bathroom." 
 
 
There was evidence that, when the victim was found, the 
door of the medicine cabinet in the bathroom had been partially 
open, and her purse had been upended in the bathroom sink.  As 
the defendant points out, however, no evidence was introduced 
that suggested the defendant used drugs or had any issues with 
substance abuse.  This speculation on the defendant's possible 
motive for the offense was thus improper, and should not have 
been made.  Moreover, the speculative suggestion, without 
evidentiary support, went to an issue that, while not an element 
of the offense, might have been a significant question in the 
minds of the jury:  what would have motivated such a brutal 
attack on a ninety year old woman who stood less than five feet 
tall. 
15 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, the prosecutor did clarify that she was 
speculating in making this statement, commenting at the 
beginning of these musings, "I don't know why [the defendant 
would have done this]" and ending by repeating, "I don't know."  
The prosecutor also explained, accurately, that motive "[is] not 
an element that the Commonwealth has to prove.  The Commonwealth 
doesn't have to prove why."  See Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 
15, 33 (2016).  In the circumstances here, given the strength of 
the Commonwealth's evidence, and the brief and passing nature of 
these statements, the improper speculative remarks would have 
had but little, if any, effect on the jury's thinking. 
 
c.  Inferences to be drawn from victim's injuries.  The 
defendant contends that the prosecutor also misstated the 
evidence in presenting her argument in support of the 
Commonwealth's theory that the manner of the victim's death was 
extremely atrocious or cruel.  The prosecutor told the jury that 
the victim "didn't die from the first blow . . . .  [H]ow else 
would you explain blood on the palms of her hands and bruising 
on the back of her hands, on her fingers. . . .  [The victim] 
was alive.  She suffered.  She was trying to protect herself, 
covering her bleeding head as the defendant struck her 
repeatedly, bruising her hands as she covered her head." 
 
While the jury could have found, based on the medical 
evidence, that the victim had been killed by the first blow to 
16 
 
 
her head, as the defendant argues, the medical evidence amply 
supports the prosecutor's assertions that the victim was alive 
after repeated blows, and would have suffered from her numerous 
injuries.  On cross-examination, the medical examiner testified 
that one blow to the head of a ninety year old woman could 
result in immediate death.  The medical examiner also testified, 
however, that in his opinion, the cause of the victim's death 
was "multiple blunt trauma" to the "head and chest."  He further 
testified that there was physical evidence consistent with 
"aspirating the blood that was in the pharynx," which meant that 
the victim would have been alive and struggling to breathe after 
the attempt at strangulation or after the multiple blows to her 
face.  The medical examiner also testified that the victim's 
broken bones, displaced nose, and other injuries would have been 
painful. 
 
"Remarks made during closing arguments are considered in 
the context of the whole argument, the evidence admitted at 
trial, and the judge's instructions to the jury."  Commonwealth 
v. Whitman, 453 Mass. 331, 343 (2009).  The defendant is correct 
that the evidence here did not establish definitively at what 
point during the attack the victim died.  One of the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, however, was that the 
victim was not killed by a single blow, and suffered during the 
brutal attack.  Indeed, the medical examiner was inclined to 
17 
 
 
that belief.  Therefore, this portion of the prosecutor's 
statement was not improper.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 
Mass. 543, 552 (2014) ("[T]he prosecutor did not misstate the 
medical examiner's testimony.  Rather, he . . . asked the jury 
to draw an inference [based on all of the evidence]"). 
 
The defendant also challenges the prosecutor's statement in 
closing that the victim fought to defend herself and had been 
trying to protect her head with her hands when her hands were 
bruised.  The defendant argues that the Commonwealth presented 
no evidence from which the jury could determine that the bruises 
on the back of the victim's hands were defensive wounds.  As the 
defendant asserts, the Commonwealth did not introduce any expert 
testimony to support this theory.  See Commonwealth v. Cyr, 425 
Mass. 89, 96-97 (1997) (medical expert may testify that injuries 
were defensive wounds).  The defendant notes that there were no 
other injuries to the victim's hands and arms, such as 
scratches, cuts, or abrasions, and no biological material was 
found under her fingernails.  Nonetheless, the nature of the 
assault and the number of blows inflicted on the victim could 
have supported an inference that she bruised her hands in some 
manner attempting to ward off her attacker.  To the extent that 
the evidence did not allow the prosecutor to argue that the 
victim sustained these wounds "as she covered her head," the 
brief comments did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
18 
 
 
miscarriage of justice, given the overwhelming evidence of the 
brutality of the attack against a particularly vulnerable 
victim. 
 
d.  Suggestion that the defendant disposed of blood 
evidence.  The defendant claims also that the prosecutor's 
suggestion that the defendant needed to remove blood from his 
person before leaving the apartment, or that he had gotten blood 
on his clothes, was improper.  The prosecutor's suggestions to 
this effect, however, were inferences the jury properly could 
have drawn from the blood spatter on the walls, the curtains, 
and the furniture in the bedroom; the blood on the wall in the 
bathroom; the victim's wet purse in the sink; the towel found in 
the toilet; the evidence of blood in the drains in the bathroom 
and kitchen sinks; and the testimony that, after the victim's 
death, the defendant never wore the jacket and work boots to 
work that he previously had worn routinely. 
 
e.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  At trial, the 
defendant argued that certain items of physical evidence had 
been mishandled and some pieces of evidence had been lost, thus 
giving rise to reasonable doubt about his guilt.  Although the 
defendant did not raise any arguments on appeal concerning the 
handling of the evidence, because the record does indicate 
issues with respect to specific items, we consider these issues 
as part of our duty pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
19 
 
 
 
The crime lab analyst who tested the anorectal swab in 2002 
testified that, in February, 2003, she wrote a note that "[t]he 
original case file cannot be located at this time."  The 
"original file" referred to the forms presented when the sample 
was submitted to the crime lab in 1991.  The anorectal swab 
itself was not lost; the crime lab returned the sample to the 
Springfield police in 1995, and the Springfield police 
resubmitted the sample to the crime lab in 2001.9  "Alleged 
defects in the chain of custody usually go to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility."  Commonwealth v. 
Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 230 (1992).  Where the judge 
allowed the defendant to argue that "the Commonwealth has not 
proven this case, has not connected the dots" because of the 
assertedly defective chain of custody, there was no error.  See 
id. at 230-231. 
 
We have carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to 
our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no reason to set 
                     
 
9 Similarly, the defendant argued in his closing that other 
physical evidence was "lost" because it had been found in the 
Springfield police department evidence room the week before 
trial.  An officer testified that Springfield police believed 
they had produced all of the evidence, only to discover an 
additional box that had the case label on a side that had not 
initially been visible to them.  At trial, the defendant made 
use of this situation to argue to the jury that the evidence had 
been lost, notwithstanding that the defendant had received 
information about the evidence a week prior to trial, and, on 
appeal, does not make any claim of prejudice from the late 
disclosure.  Accordingly, there is no error.  See Commonwealth 
v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 230-31 (1992). 
20 
 
 
aside the verdict or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.