Title: MARRIAGE OF ISLER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13565
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 1977

No. 13565 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ROBERT ISLER, Petitioner and Respondent, and CHRISTINE M. ISLER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable Alfred B . Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: William J. Miele argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondent : Kenneth R . Wilson argued, Miles City, Montana Submitted: April 18, 1977 Decided: JUN 2 1 1 9 7 z Filed: JUN 22 ]gin M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by ,the mother from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Rosebud County, awarding custody of the p a r t i e s ' two minor children t o t h e i r father. Christine and Robert I s l e r were married i n September 1970, and divorced i n April 1976. Although the d i s t r i c t court found both parents f i t and proper persons, it awarded custody of David, then four years old, and Douglas, then one year old, t o the father. The mother contends the award of custody t o the f a t h e r was an abuse of discretion on the p a r t of the d i s t r i c t court because : 1) Evidence a t t r i a l on the factors l i s t e d i n section 48-332, R.C.M. 1947, of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, favored the mother. 2) The award was erroneously based on the r e l a t i v e earning capacity of the p a r t i e s . 3) The d i s t r i c t court erred i n finding t h a t the presumption i n favor of awarding children of tender years t o t h e i r mother was overcome by the evidence. I n determining t h e issue of custody t h e paramount considera- t i o n i s the welfare of the children and must of necessity be l e f t largely i n the discretion of the d i s t r i c t court. The deci- sion of the d i s t r i c t court w i l l not be overruled on appeal absent a showing of a c l e a r abuse of discretion. Tweeten v. Tweeten, Mont . 9 P.2d , 34 St.Rep. 337,339. Section 48-332, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "Best i n t e r e s t of child. The court s h a l l determine custody i n accordance with the best i n t e r e s t of the child. The court s h a l l consider a l l relevant factors including : "(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as t o h i s custody; "(2) the wishes of the child as t o h i s custodian; 'I (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with h i s parent or parents, h i s siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest; "(4) the child's adjustment t o h i s home, school, and community; and "(5) the mental and physical health of a l l indivi- duals involved ." The f i r s t two factors of section 48-332 are not helpful i n t h i s case. Both parents seek custody and the children were too young a t the time'of t r i a l t o express a preference, The f i f t h factor also provides l i t t l e guidance. The record indicates that.both parties coped well with the s t r a i n of t h i s dispute and none of the persons involved, including the children, were shown t o have a physical or mental problem that would have an effect on the custody issue. The third factor involves the interaction of the children with t h e i r parents and others "who may significantly affect1' their best interests. The d i s t r i c t court found both the mother and father expressed their love for the children and: "That both of the minor children of the parties are healthy, normal children that love each other and both of their parents, and have benefited from a healthy home environment .I1 The record supports these findings. However, the mother t e s t i f i e d she intended t o move t o the San Francisco area i n Cali- fornia and live temporarily with her parents while searching for a permanent home for herself and the children. During t h i s time she planned t o work as an accounting clerk for a stockbroker in San Francisco and commute the 40 miles from her parents' home. She argues i f she were given custody her plan would enable the children to form a close and rewarding relationship with t h e i r maternal grandparents which they would otherwise lose. The fourth factor relates t o the children's adjustment t o home, school, and community. The mother contends she can provide a more stable environment for the children. She notes the father, an engineer for Bechtel Power Corporation, is sub- ject t o many geographical disruptions in h i s career. Although the family had lived in Colstrip, Montana, for over three years a t the time of t r i a l , it was the father's third duty assignment in the s i x and one-half years he had worked for Bechtel, and h i s stay i n Colstrip was not projected t o l a s t beyond 1981. The mother argues i f she were given custody the children would not be subject t o these constant and predictable relocations, but instead would have the benefit of a stable and secure l i f e with her near their maternal grandparents. However, the record shows a stable home i n Colstrip. The family lived i n a modern three-bedroom home. The father spent a l o t of time with the children and they had a close relation- ship. H e shared i n the housekeeping duties and helped discipline the children. H i s place of work was only a few minutes drive from the home and he was available i f an emergency arose. But the mother, a t least temporarily, would be 40 miles away from the children, working i n San Francisco. Considering the factors applicable i n section 48-332, w e find no abuse of discretion i n granting custody t o the father. The mother next argues the d i s t r i c t court erroneously based i t s custody decision on the superior earning power of the father. The father earned approximately $1,800 per month and the mother would earn substantially less i n her position as an accounting clerk. Nothing i n the record expressly s t a t e s the d i s t r i c t court considered t h i s factor i n determining the custody issue, but the mother argues the court must have done so because that was "the only distinction between the parties1' favorable t o the father that was set forth i n the d i s t r i c t court's findings of fact. That i s not enough. Absent any other indication i n the record we w i l l not presume the d i s t r i c t court's custody award t o the father was based on h i s superior earning power. The mother's f i n a l argument is that the d i s t r i c t court erred i n finding the evidence rebutted the presumption i n favor of awarding custody of children of tender years t o t h e i r mother when a l l things are equal. I n Tweeten v. Tweeten, Mont . 9 P. 2d , 34 St.Rep. 337, 341, w e stated t h i s presumption continues under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, but held that it i s not conclusive and each custody case must be decided on i t s own facts "rather than by the use of 'controlling o r con- clusive' presumption. * * *" I n The Matter of the Adoption of Redcrow, Mont . - 3 P.2d , 34 St.Rep. 306, 308, the Court stated that a finding that both competing couples are f i t and suitable adoptive parents i s "not equivalent t o a finding that each would equally promote the best interests of the child." This i s also true i n custody cases. Accordingly, the d i s t r i c t court was correct i n concluding that "* * * t h i s presumption, like any other disputable presumption, may be overcome by contrary evidence." The mother relies on Casale v. Casale, (Ky.1977' No. 76- 273) , S.W.2d , where the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed an a&rd of custody of the parties' infant child t o the father, stating: "* * * W e are not prepared t o define precisely the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the pref- erence that the mother should be the custodian of children of tender years. This i s a value judgment that has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Here the evidence i s so close, we are of the opinion that the natural preference for the mother should prevail." It thus appears that the preference for the mother comes into F . I play i n Kentucky a t the close of the evidence. That is not the case i n Montana. Here, the parties proceed from the presumption and once it i s overcome by a preponderance of the evidence there i s no preference for the mother. I n meeting t h i s burden, the father need not prove the mother t o be unfit. In the instant case the d i s t r i c t court found the presumption i n favor of the mother had been overcome by the evidence and the interests of the children would be best served by granting custody to the father. W e affirm the judgment . W e Concur: . . .---.--- I*'