Title: Land v. Board of Education
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92837
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2002

Docket No. 92837-Agenda 28-September 2002.
MAURICE LAND et al., Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The five plaintiffs are among 138 tenured public school
teachers whose employment by the Board of Education of the City
of Chicago (Board) was "honorably terminated" on January 22,
1999. Defendants are the Board itself, its individual members, and
several officers of the Chicago public schools. After they were laid
off from their teaching positions, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
circuit court of Cook County seeking a writ of mandamus ordering
their reinstatement, a declaration that the Board's layoff policy
was invalid under sections 34-84 and 34-85 of the School Code
(105 ILCS 5/34-84, 34-85 (West 1998)), and a permanent
injunction restraining the Board from terminating their
employment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment and the circuit court granted defendants' motion. The
appellate court reversed and remanded. 325 Ill. App. 3d 294. We
granted leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315)
to determine whether the Board may delegate its authority to lay
off employees. We reverse that portion of the judgment of the
appellate court holding that the Board may not delegate its
authority to make layoffs (325 Ill. App. 3d at 307), but affirm the
order remanding this matter to the circuit court for further fact
finding (325 Ill. App. 3d at 311).

BACKGROUND
	Following the enactment of amendments to the School Code
in 1995, the Board first adopted and later, in 1997, amended a
"Policy Regarding Reassignment and Layoff of Regularly
Certified and Appointed Teachers." Section 1 of the policy permits
reassignment or layoff of teachers, inter alia, "[w]henever an
attendance center is closed, there is a drop in enrollment, [or] the
educational focus of the attendance center is changed." Section 2A
of the amended policy applies when such a change requires the
removal of some but not all teachers, as in the present case:
			"In Attendance Centers/Programs That Are Not Subject
to Reconstitution. If changes in an attendance center or
program require the removal of some but not all teachers,
teachers with appropriate certifications will be selected
for retention based on seniority. Provisionals, Day-to-Day
substitutes, Cadre substitutes, FTBs and Probationary
teachers within the attendance center or program will be
removed before any regularly certified and appointed
teachers with the appropriate certification is [sic]
removed, in that order. Within each group, system-wide
seniority shall be the determining factor."
	According to the affidavit of Xiomara C. Metcalfe, director of
Chicago public schools bureau of recruitment and substitute
services, department of human resources, each of the five plaintiffs
"became subject to reassignment for one of the reasons within the
scope of the applicable Board policy" and was "selected for
reassignment" based on seniority, as required by the policy.
Metcalfe's statements are, for the most part, in the passive
voice-the plaintiffs "were selected," they "were notified," and they
"became" reassigned until, eventually, they "were honorably
discharged." She did not explain on what basis plaintiffs became
subject to reassignment, who determined that layoffs would be
necessary as a result of a change in an attendance center or
program, or who made the selection based on seniority. According
to Metcalfe, plaintiff Land's layoff was in accordance with the
1995 version of the policy, which provided for laying off a
reassigned teacher who did not obtain a permanent position within
20 months of reassignment. The other four plaintiffs were laid off
in accordance with the 1997 amended policy, which provided for
a layoff after 10 months if the teacher had not secured a permanent
position.
	The record contains copies of a form letter sent to all five
plaintiffs on January 6, 1999, informing them that they would be
laid off and honorably terminated as of January 22, 1999, in
accordance with the policy. These letters were signed by one of the
defendants, Carlos Ponce, the director of the department of human
resources for the Chicago public schools. In addition, the affidavit
of plaintiff Land states that he was informed of his impending
termination by the principal of the school at which he taught.
	Plaintiffs' complaint claimed that the layoff policy violates
those sections of the School Code that permit the removal of
tenured teachers only for cause and only after notice and a hearing.
See 105 ILCS 5/34-84, 34-85 (West 1998). In effect, the
plaintiffs' position was that the 1995 amendments to the School
Code did not give the Board the authority to lay off tenured
teachers. Even if the Board is empowered to lay off tenured
teachers, they argued, that power cannot be delegated and, in
particular, the power cannot be delegated to school principals.
Because the Board did not expressly decide to terminate each of
the plaintiffs, they asserted that their terminations were void.
Plaintiffs also acknowledged that their removal was
"accomplished by" the policy quoted above, but claimed that none
of the triggering events or conditions had occurred and that their
layoffs were, therefore, unauthorized.
	After the circuit court denied the Board's motion to dismiss,
plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the basis that each of
these claims could be decided as a matter of law. The Board
responded with its own summary judgment motion in which it
argued that tenured teachers may be laid off; the policy does not
exceed the authority granted to the Board by the legislature; and
the record demonstrated that plaintiffs were laid off in accordance
with the policy. After a hearing, the circuit court denied plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment and granted defendants' motion.
	Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court rejected plaintiffs'
argument that teachers are not subject to layoff, holding that the
layoff provision (105 ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West 1998)), and the
removal provision (105 ILCS 5/34-85 (West 1998)), are "entirely
separate statutory provisions" that can both be given effect without
conflict. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 304. The appellate court further found
that the Board had the statutory authority to promulgate a layoff
policy and that the policy is "clear and unambiguous." 325 Ill.
App. 3d at 305. Because plaintiffs failed to present any competent
evidence to support their assertion that the Board did not follow its
own policy, the appellate court found this claim waived. 325 Ill.
App. 3d at 306.
	The appellate court did address plaintiffs' claim that the
Board improperly delegated its layoff authority to individual
school principals. After concluding that the legislature gave the
Board exclusive authority to determine layoffs, and that the
authority may not be delegated at all (325 Ill. App. 3d at 307), the
appellate court determined that remand was necessary to resolve
a disputed issue of material fact-who made the determination that
these five plaintiffs would be laid off (325 Ill. App. 3d at 308).

ANALYSIS
	In an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, review is
de novo. Crum &amp; Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1993). The purpose of summary
judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine whether
one exists. Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 517 (1993). Summary judgment is proper where pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveal that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2000).
	This case also presents questions of statutory interpretation,
which are reviewed de novo. Michigan Avenue National Bank v.
County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000). In interpreting a
statute, a court's primary goal is to ascertain the intent of the
legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). "The best
evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute
itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Paris,
179 Ill. 2d  at 177. When the plain language of the statute is clear
and unambiguous, the legislative intent that is discernable from
this language must prevail, and no resort to other tools of statutory
construction is necessary. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at 177.
	The appellate court, in its effort to give effect to all of the
relevant sections of the School Code, invoked the doctrine of in
pari materia. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307. Under this doctrine of
construction, two legislative acts that address the same subject are
considered with reference to one another, so that they may be
given harmonious effect. See United Citizens of Chicago &amp;
Illinois v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in 1989, 125 Ill. 2d 332, 339 (1988). This court has previously held that sections of the
same statute should also be considered in pari materia, and that
each section should be construed with every other part or section
of the statute to produce a harmonious whole. Sulser v. Country
Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992). The doctrine
is consistent with our acknowledgment that one of the
fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all of
the provisions of a statute as a whole. Michigan Avenue National
Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. Words and phrases should not be
construed in isolation, but interpreted in light of other relevant
portions of the statute so that, if possible, no term is rendered
superfluous or meaningless. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504; In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001).
Further, we presume that the legislature, when it enacted the
statute, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice.
Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504.
	This dispute is governed by article 34 of the School Code,
which applies to cities of over 500,000 inhabitants. 105 ILCS
5/34-1 et seq. (West 1998). The sections of article 34 that are
relevant to the present case include section 34-8.1, which
describes the powers and duties of school principals (105 ILCS
5/34-8.1 (West 1998)); section 34-18, which describes the powers
of the Board (105 ILCS 5/34-18 (West 1998)); and sections 34-84
and 34-85, which govern the appointment and promotion of
teachers and the removal of teachers for cause, respectively (105
ILCS 5/34-84, 34-85 (West 1998)).
	Section 34-18 is entitled "Powers of the board." Prior to the
1995 amendments, this section contained 29 enumerated powers
as well as a "catch-all" provision authorizing the Board to exercise
all other powers "requisite or proper for the maintenance and the
development of a public school system, not inconsistent with the
other provisions of this Article or provisions of this Code." 105
ILCS 5/34-18 (West 1994). Layoffs were not mentioned in this
section, but were addressed in section 34-84, which concerns the
appointment and promotion of teachers. 105 ILCS 5/34-84 (West
1994). The 1995 amendments deleted the language regarding
layoffs from section 34-84 and added several new enumerated
powers to section 34-18, including the power, "except as
otherwise provided by this Article," to:
			"promulgate rules establishing procedures governing
the layoff or reduction in force of employees and the
recall of such employees, including, but not be limited to,
criteria for such layoffs, reductions in force or recall rights
of such employees and the weight to be given to any
particular criterion. Such criteria shall take into account
factors including, but not be limited to, qualifications,
certifications, experience, performance ratings or
evaluations, and any other factors relating to an
employee's job performance[.]" 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31)
(West 1998).
	The powers and duties of school principals are set out in
section 34-8.1 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West
1998)). The responsibilities of a principal include the duty to
"direct, supervise, evaluate, and suspend *** [or] discipline"
teachers, but the "right to employ, discharge, and layoff shall be
vested solely with the board." The principal, however, "may make
recommendations to the board regarding the employment,
discharge, or layoff of any individual." 105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West
1998).
	Section 34-84 governs the appointment and promotion of
teachers. Following completion of a probationary period,
"appointments of teachers shall become permanent, subject to
removal for cause in the manner provided by Section 34-85." 105
ILCS 5/34-84 (West 1998). Under section 34-85, no permanent
teacher shall be removed "except for cause." Written notice of
charges and specifications and a hearing, with the right of review,
are provided for. 105 ILCS 5/34-85 (West 1998).



A. Board's Authority to Lay Off Tenured Teachers 
	Before the circuit court and the appellate court, the plaintiffs
claimed that because the Board's layoff power is limited by the
"except as otherwise provided" language of section 34-18, and
because section 34-85 provides "otherwise," their layoffs are
entirely unlawful and void. The appellate court formulated the
issue as "whether the legislature intended sections 34-84 and
34-85 to be exceptions to the layoff provision provided in
34-18(31)." 325 Ill. App. 3d at 303.
	We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that these two
separate statutory provisions may both be given effect without
violating the plain language of the statute or ignoring legislative
intent. The Board had the power to lay off tenured teachers prior
to the 1995 amendments. Indeed, it has long been established that
among the unenumerated powers of the Board was the authority
"to lay off employees in good faith for lack of work or purposes of
economy." Perlin v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 86
Ill. App. 3d 108, 112 (1980) (citing Kennedy v. City of Joliet, 380 Ill. 15 (1942), Thomas v. City of Chicago, 273 Ill. 479 (1916),  and
Fitzsimmons v. O'Neill, 214 Ill. 494 (1905)). Prior to 1995, limits
on that power were set out in section 34-84, which permitted the
Board, under certain circumstances, to designate teachers as
"reserve teachers" (see 105 ILCS 5/34-1.1 (West 1994)) and to
honorably terminate such teachers from service after 25 months
(105 ILCS 5/34-84 (West 1994)). The 1995 amendments did not
eliminate or reduce this power. Instead, by deleting the layoff
provision from section 34-84 and adding section 34-18(31), the
legislature gave the Board the authority to formulate and
implement its own rules and procedures regarding layoffs rather
than binding the Board to a legislatively mandated procedure. We,
therefore, affirm that portion of the appellate court judgment
holding that sections 34-84 and 34-85 do not exempt tenured
teachers from layoff.

B. Board's Ability to Delegate the Authority to Make Layoffs
	In the circuit court and the appellate court, plaintiffs also
argued that while section 34-18(31) permits the Board to
promulgate a procedure for determining layoffs, it does not permit
the Board to delegate to others the responsibility for implementing
that procedure. Based primarily on the provision that the "right to
employ, discharge, and layoff shall be vested solely with the
board," found in section 34-8.1 (105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1998)),
the appellate court agreed. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 306-08. Before this
court, the parties now agree that the Board may not only
promulgate a procedure for determining layoffs, but may also
delegate the authority for implementing that procedure.
Nevertheless, we may not reverse this portion of the appellate
court's judgment merely because the parties are in agreement that
the appellate court erred. We must examine the issue ourselves.
	The appellate court based its conclusion that the authority to
make layoffs may not be delegated on "the statute's unequivocal
language." 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307. In an earlier case, however, a
different panel of the same appellate district found this language
ambiguous. See Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v.
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 309 Ill. App. 3d 88,
100 (1999) (finding section 34-8.1 ambiguous and interpreting it
to mean that the Board "may delegate a nonexclusive power, such
as the power to suspend," but may not delegate its "absolute
authority").
	A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two equally
reasonable and conflicting interpretations. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999). Only if the statutory language is ambiguous
may we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative
history, to determine legislative intent. In the absence of
ambiguity, we must rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words chosen by the legislature. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d  at 97-98.
Further, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
a court must give it effect as written, without reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not
express. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181,
184-85 (1999).
	We agree with the appellate court that section 34-8.1 is
unambiguous and that resort to extrinsic aids of construction is not
appropriate. We do, however, conclude that the appellate court
read more into this provision than its plain language justifies. Our
conclusion necessarily overrules the Chicago School Reform
court's finding of ambiguity.
	The Board argues that section 34-18(31), by empowering the
Board to "promulgate rules establishing procedures governing ***
layoff[s]" (105 ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West 1998)), expresses a
legislative intent that such rules are "obviously for the use of [the
board's] administrators." In keeping with this reading of section
34-18(31), the policy states in its introductory sentence: "The
Chief Executive Officer recommends adoption of the following
policy for use by the Board and administrators."
	To "promulgate" is to "declare or announce publicly; to
proclaim," or to "put (a law or decree) into force or effect."
Black's Law Dictionary 1231 (7th ed. 1999). There is nothing
inherent in the act of promulgating rules or procedures that
suggests someone other than the one announcing the rules will
implement them. The Board could promulgate rules and
procedures either as a means of instructing its agents or employees
to whom the task will be delegated, or as a means of giving notice
to affected parties of the procedures and criteria that it intends to
apply. By enacting this provision authorizing the Board to
promulgate rules, the legislature simply did not speak to the matter
of delegating authority for layoffs. We conclude that section
34-18(31), standing alone, does not reveal either a legislative
intent that the Board may delegate responsibility for carrying out
the layoff policy or the opposite intent.
	The appellate court then looked to the language of section
34-8.1: "The right to employ, discharge, and layoff shall be vested
solely with the board." 105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1998). Relying
on dictionary definitions of the words "vested" and "right," the
appellate court concluded that the Board alone is allowed to make
layoffs and, thus, cannot implement a policy delegating this
authority. These words, however, need not be read so narrowly. A
right is a power or privilege to which one is entitled  (325 Ill. App.
3d at 307; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1323 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining "right" as a "power, privilege, or immunity secured to a
person by law")), but such entitlement does not preclude the
delegation of that power or privilege to another. The appellate
court also looked to an earlier edition of Black's Law Dictionary
for the definition of "vested" and found " 'giving the rights of
absolute ownership.' " 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307, quoting Black's
Law Dictionary 1563 (6th ed. 1990). Black's, however, defines a
"vested right" as a "right that so completely and definitely belongs
to a person that it cannot be impaired or taken away without the
person's consent." (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary
1324 (7th ed. 1999). One could not delegate a right or privilege to
another unless one was "vested" with the right in the first place.
For example, a stockholder possesses the exclusive right to vote
his or her shares, but may delegate that right by granting a proxy
to another. A property owner is vested with the right to exclude
others from his property by virtue of ownership in fee simple, but
may delegate that right to another by granting a lease. Giving the
words in this sentence their plain and ordinary meaning, we can
conclude only that the Board has the exclusive power to employ,
discharge, or lay off employees. Section 34-8.1, however, does not
address the ability of the Board to delegate any of this
responsibility, with one exception.
	The language at issue ("The right to employ, discharge, and
layoff shall be vested solely with the board") is contained in
section 34-8.1, which is the provision that defines the powers and
duties of principals. This sentence is immediately followed by:
"The principal shall fill positions by appointment as provided in
this Section and may make recommendations to the board
regarding the employment, discharge, or layoff of any individual."
105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1998). Thus, plaintiffs assert, the
"vested solely" language is intended to describe the role of a
principal vis-a-vis the Board. As between the principal and the
Board, the Board has the sole authority to lay off employees; the
principal's role is entirely advisory.
	Reading section 34-8.1 as whole, it is clear that the Board is
prohibited from delegating the responsibility for making layoffs to
principals. The 17 paragraphs of section 34-8.1 not only define the
powers and duties of principals, but also describe in detail the
relationship between principals and the Board. For example, the
engineer in charge is "[u]nder the direction of and subject to the
authority of" the principal, while the Board "shall" establish a
system of semiannual evaluations by which the principal will
evaluate the performance of the engineer in charge. Similar
provisions apply to the principal's supervision of the food service
manager. Each principal must hold a valid administrative
certificate, but the Board may impose additional qualifications.
With regard to layoffs, the Board has the sole right to make them,
but the principal "may make recommendations to the board." 105
ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1996). This section is clear and
unambiguous-the determinations of whether layoffs are necessary
and who will be laid off may not be made by principals. The role
of principals is purely advisory.
	This reading is consistent with the language of section
34-18(31), which authorizes the Board to establish criteria for
layoffs that include, but are not limited to, "qualifications,
certifications, experience, performance ratings or evaluations, and
any other factors relating to an employee's job performance." 105
ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West 1996). The Board chose to rely entirely
on seniority as the basis for determining who would be laid off. If
it were to adopt a policy under which job performance is a
consideration, the input of the principals would be quite relevant.
Under such a policy, however, the principal could only
recommend, not decide, who should be laid off.
	Our reading of section 34-8.1 is also supported by its title,
"Principals." "When the legislature enacts an official title or
heading to accompany a statutory provision, that title or heading
is considered only as a 'short-hand reference to the general subject
matter involved' in that statutory section, and 'cannot limit the
plain meaning of the text.' " Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 505-06, quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Baltimore &amp; Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, 91 L. Ed. 1646,
1652, 67 S. Ct. 1387, 1391 (1947). Such official headings or titles
are of use " 'only when they shed light on some ambiguous word
or phrase' " within the text; they " 'cannot undo or limit that
which the text makes plain.' " Michigan Avenue National Bank,
191 Ill. 2d  at 506, quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S.  at 529, 91 L. Ed.  at 1652, 67 S. Ct.  at 1392.
	In this case, we do not find the provision ambiguous so our
consideration of the title or heading is not for the purpose of
undoing or limiting the text. Rather, we find section 34-8.1 to be
silent on the question of the Board's ability to delegate layoff
decisionmaking, other than with respect to principals. The title
"Principals" is, however, consistent with our conclusion that
section 34-8.1 deals with the powers and duties of principals, and
the relationship of principals to the Board, but does not otherwise
limit the powers of the Board provided for in section 34-18.
	We conclude that section 34-8.1 is not intended to impose a
limitation on the power of the Board to delegate its layoff
authority. If that had been the intent of the legislature, this
language would have been moved in 1995 when other language
affecting layoffs was deleted from section 34-84 and added to
section 34-18. The continued presence of these words in section
34-8.1 is a clear indication of legislative intent that this language
is a limit only on the role of principals. Although we agree with
plaintiffs that the plain language of section 34-8.1 prohibits
delegation of the authority to make layoffs to principals, we must
still decide whether the Board may delegate this authority to
anyone other than a principal.
	The Board offers five separate arguments in support of its
claim that it may delegate layoff authority. First, when the
legislature intends to prohibit delegation of the Board's authority,
it does so expressly, as in section 34-19 of the School Code. See
105 ILCS 5/34-19 (West 1998). Second, when the legislature
intends for the Board to take action on a given matter, it makes
that requirement explicit. See 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (West 1998)
(various subsections provide that the Board "shall" carry out
certain duties and "may" perform others); 105 ILCS 5/34-85
(West 1998) (providing that, after a hearing, the Board "shall
make a decision as to whether the teacher or principal shall be
dismissed"). Third, the case law has recognized that delegation of
the Board's powers is permissible. Fourth, legislative history
demonstrates intent to permit delegation. And fifth, policy
considerations weigh in favor of permitting delegation. We find
the Board's first argument dispositive and, therefore, need not
address the remaining arguments.
	The Board's first argument is that an entirely separate section
of the School Code authorizes the delegation of layoff authority.
Section 34-19 is entitled "By-laws, rules and regulations; business
transacted at regular meetings; voting; records" and provides, in
pertinent part, that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision in this
Article or in the School Code, the board may delegate to the
general superintendent or to the attorney the authorities granted to
the board in the School Code." 105 ILCS 5/34-19 (West 1998).
The delegation provision also requires that "appropriate oversight
procedures" be established, and lists six nondelegable functions,
none of which are relevant in this case.
	"[C]ourts should not, under the guise of statutory
construction, add requirements or impose limitations that are
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the enactment." Nottage v.
Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). The holding of the appellate
court is in direct conflict with section 34-19, which expressly
authorizes the Board to delegate all but six enumerated functions
to either the general superintendent or the attorney.
	In sum, we find no language in any applicable provision of the
School Code that indicates the legislature's intent to prohibit
delegation of the authority to make layoffs to anyone other than
principals, and we find express authorization of delegation to the
general superintendent and attorney. We reverse that portion of the
appellate court's judgment holding that the Board is entirely
prohibited from delegating its layoff authority. On the record
before us, we need not determine whether the authority may be
delegated to officers or administrators other than the general
superintendent and attorney.

C. Necessity for Remand
	Although summary judgment aids in the expeditious
disposition of a lawsuit, it is a drastic measure and should be
granted only if the moving party's right to judgment is clear and
free from doubt. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing,
Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001). A motion for summary judgment
does not ask the court to try a question of fact, but to determine if
a question of material fact exists that would preclude the entry of
judgment as a matter of law. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d  at 517. Thus,
although the nonmoving party is not required to prove his case in
response to a motion for summary judgment, he must present a
factual basis that would arguably entitle him to judgment. Allegro
Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier &amp; Exposition Authority, 172 Ill. 2d 243, 256 (1996). "If the party moving for summary judgment
supplies facts that, if not contradicted, would warrant judgment in
its favor as a matter of law, the opponent cannot rest on his
pleadings to create a genuine issue of material fact." Harrison v.
Harden County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 470 (2001).
	The appellate court found that summary judgment for the
Board was improper and that remand would be necessary to
determine who laid off the plaintiffs. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 308.
Although the parties now agree that some delegation of layoff
authority is permissible, they disagree on the need for remand. The
Board argues that it promulgated a "self-executing" policy,
properly delegated authority to carry out the policy, and laid off
the plaintiffs in accordance with the policy. Therefore, the Board
claims, no further fact finding is required. We disagree.
	The record before the circuit court when it granted summary
judgment in favor of the Board included the pleadings, the Board's
policy, the layoff notice letters signed by Ponce, the Metcalfe
affidavit, and the Land affidavit in which he stated that his
principal notified him of his impending layoff. We must view the
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 735
ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000).
	Section 34-18(31) authorizes the Board to promulgate "rules
establishing procedures" for layoffs. 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West
1998). A procedure is a "specific method or course of action."
Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (7th ed. 1999). A policy states the
"general principles by which a government is guided in its
management of public affairs." Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (7th
ed. 1999). Both the title and the content of the document
promulgated by the Board reveal it to be a policy, not a procedure.
	The policy specifies events that may trigger layoffs, but does
not reveal who will determine whether a triggering event has
occurred and whether, as a result of that event, layoffs are
necessary. The policy adopts a strict rule of seniority as the basis
for layoffs, thus removing all discretion at this stage, but does not
identify the person or office responsible for making the seniority
determination. The policy also contains a notice provision, but
does not reveal who issues the layoff notice, or who decides when
such notice will issue. In fact, almost the entire policy is written in
the passive voice: a program "is closed"; an educational focus "is
changed"; teachers "are selected" for layoff based on seniority; if
unable to secure a permanent position, the teacher "shall be laid
off" and "shall be notified" of the layoff at least 14 days in
advance.
	In sum, the Board's bare assertion that it followed its own
policy does not resolve the question of whether the layoff authority
was delegated and, if so, to whom. Plaintiffs have produced
evidence that the layoff notices were issued by the director of the
department of human resources and that at least one school
principal was aware of an impending layoff before written notice
was given, but have not produced evidence that the layoff
authority was delegated improperly. Such information, if it exists,
is in the possession of the Board. Viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, summary judgment for the Board
is inappropriate. We remand this matter to the circuit court for
further fact finding to determine whether the Board properly
delegated responsibility for making any or all of the
determinations required by its policy and, if so, whether the party
to whom authority was delegated acted in accordance with the
policy.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.