Title: State v. Sahs
Citation: 2013 WI 51
Docket Number: 2009AP002916-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2013

2013 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2916-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gregory M. Sahs, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 330 Wis. 2d 498, 792 N.W.2d 240 
(Ct. App. 2010 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 25, 2013 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs.  (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, LTD., 
Waukesha. 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sarah 
K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.    
 
 
 
2013 WI 51
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2916-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF3217) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gregory M. Sahs, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the 
judgment of conviction entered by the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. Conen, Judge.1    
                                                 
1 State v. Sahs, No. 2009AP2916-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Gregory M. Sahs, the defendant, was convicted of 
possession of child pornography in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.12(1m) (2007-08).2   
¶3 
The charge of possessing child pornography arose from 
incriminating admissions the defendant made to his probation 
agent.  The defendant was on probation as a result of a prior 
conviction for possession of child pornography.  After the 
defendant made incriminating statements to his probation agent, 
the police were alerted and found the computer the defendant 
used to access and possess child pornography, leading to a 
revocation of his probation and these additional criminal 
charges. 
¶4 
After being criminally charged, the defendant moved 
the circuit court to suppress the admissions to his probation 
agent, claiming that they were compelled, testimonial, and 
incriminating 
in 
violation 
of 
his 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  The Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution3 and Article I, 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part:  "No person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."   
The privilege against self-incrimination is applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.  
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
3 
 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution4 provide that no person 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.   
¶5 
The defendant's admissions are clearly testimonial and 
incriminating.  The issue is whether the admissions were 
compelled.      
¶6 
The legal issue before this court is the same as the 
legal issue before the circuit court and court of appeals:  
Should the incriminating statements made by the defendant to his 
probation agent admitting possession of child pornography be 
suppressed on the ground that the statements were compelled in 
violation of the defendant's federal constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination?5     
¶7 
The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
properly denied the motions to suppress: "[T]he evidence that 
Sahs relies upon [namely a Department of Corrections document] 
does not appear in the record" and "the facts in the record are 
insufficient to show compulsion."6   
                                                 
4 Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:  
"No person . . . may be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself or herself." 
5 The defendant filed a second motion to exclude the 
evidence discovered after a search of his computer, as well as 
statements made to police, on the ground that the evidence and 
statements were a direct consequence of the compelled statements 
to the probation agent.  We need not and do not address this 
second motion because we conclude that the defendant has not 
carried his burden of proving that his statements to the 
probation agent were compelled.   
6 State v. Sahs, No. 2009AP2916-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶1, 9 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
¶9 
The defendant has failed to meet his burden to prove 
that his initial, oral statements were compelled.7  Neither the 
circuit court nor this court can consider the Department of 
Corrections form that the defendant claims advised him that his 
incriminating statements cannot be used against him in criminal 
proceedings.  The form is not in the record.  The parties did 
not agree about its existence, the details of its use, or the 
defendant's knowledge of its contents before the defendant made 
his oral admissions.     
¶10 The defendant has failed to put sufficient evidence 
into the record to show that the rules of his probation rendered 
his incriminating statements compelled.  No documents, no 
testimony, and no undisputed, agreed-upon facts by the parties 
are in the record to evidence any compulsion of the defendant to 
admit possession of child pornography to his probation agent.  
¶11 Because there is not sufficient evidence in the record 
to show compulsion, we affirm the decision of the court of 
                                                 
7 When a defendant seeks to exclude prior statements based 
upon his Fifth Amendment privilege, the burden is on the 
defendant to establish that the statements at issue are 
compelled, testimonial, and incriminating.  In re Commitment of 
Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶16, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90.  After a 
defendant 
proves 
that 
his 
statements 
were 
compelled, 
testimonial, and incriminating, the burden shifts to the State 
to demonstrate that the evidence it wishes to use in a criminal 
prosecution 
is 
"derived 
from 
a 
legitimate 
source 
wholly 
independent of the compelled testimony."  State v. Spaeth, 2012 
WI 95, ¶¶38, 74, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 819 N.W.2d 769 (quoting 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)). 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
5 
 
appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's order denying 
suppression of the statements and the judgment of conviction.8 
I 
¶12 We first turn to the facts.  The Complaint charging 
the defendant with two counts of possession of child pornography 
was filed on July 2, 2008.  The defendant waived a preliminary 
hearing.  The State filed the information based on the 
complaint.  The defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the 
two counts charged.           
¶13 The defendant then filed his motion seeking to 
suppress the statements he made to his probation agent.  The 
State opposed the motion.  The circuit court requested that the 
parties participate in an evidentiary hearing regarding the 
suppression motion.  Instead, both parties proffered facts in 
written briefs to the circuit court and stipulated that the 
circuit court could decide the case based on the factual 
representations set forth in the briefs.    
¶14 The facts set forth here are therefore predominantly 
taken from the parties' briefs filed in the circuit court.  The 
                                                 
8 The defendant's motion to suppress his statements was 
orally denied in open court by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, John Franke, Judge.  Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
Judge Jeffrey A. Conen signed the written order of denial and 
later entered the judgment of conviction. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
6 
 
circuit 
court 
explained 
that 
it 
was 
"dealing 
with 
representations here and not a factual record by affidavit."9 
¶15 As one might suspect from the proceedings we have 
described thus far, the record in this case relating to the 
suppression motion is extremely thin.  What follows are the 
parties' undisputed, agreed-upon facts we have culled from the 
parties' briefs and the findings of fact the circuit court made. 
¶16 The parties agree that the defendant was sentenced to 
probation in 2005 arising from a conviction for possession of 
child pornography.   
¶17 The parties agree that Department of Corrections 
Probation/Parole Agent Michael Krause was assigned to supervise 
the defendant's probation and that the defendant was required to 
participate in sex offender group therapy as a condition of his 
probation.10  The other conditions of the defendant's probation 
are not in the record.   
¶18 The parties finally agree that the defendant was on 
probation when, in January 2007, he made statements to Agent 
Krause indicating that he again possessed child pornography.  
From there, the parties' factual assertions diverge. 
                                                 
9 A circuit court may predicate its factual findings on 
undisputed facts.  State v. Thierfelder, 174 Wis. 2d 213, 217 
n.4, 495 N.W.2d 669 (1993); State v. Schulpius, 2006 WI App 263, 
¶¶11-12, 298 Wis. 2d 155, 726 N.W.2d 706. 
10 These facts are taken from the defendant's motion to 
exclude evidence and the State's response to the defendant's 
motion to exclude evidence, which were filed with the circuit 
court. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
7 
 
¶19 The defendant asserts that he was required to take a 
polygraph test as a condition of sex offender treatment and that 
he failed this polygraph test on December 15, 2006,11 when he 
untruthfully answered that he had not broken any of his 
probation rules.   
¶20 The State, in contrast, contends that the polygraph 
test was administered because the defendant had "refused to 
participate in a meaningful way in his group therapy sessions."  
The focus of the polygraph test was on the defendant's prior 
sexual history.  In his pre-polygraph examination interview, the 
defendant admitted that he had not been truthful about this 
history previously; the polygraph test then focused on whether 
the defendant had been truthful in the pre-polygraph exam 
interview.  The result of the polygraph test was that the 
defendant was truthful.   
¶21 The parties agree that the defendant was terminated 
from his group therapy sessions.  But, the parties dispute the 
reason 
for 
termination. 
 
The 
defendant 
believes 
he 
was 
terminated because he failed the polygraph test.  The State 
asserts 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
terminated 
because 
the 
information that he provided about his prior sexual history to 
                                                 
11 There is some confusion in the circuit court briefs and 
in the briefs before this court whether the date of the 
polygraph test was December 2006 or December 2005.  The 
defendant's material in the record refers to December 2005.  The 
polygraph report is in the record as an attachment to the 
documents the State filed in response to the defendant's motion.  
The report is dated December 2006 and states that the polygraph 
test was administered in December 2006.   
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
8 
 
the polygraph examiner in a pre-test interview should have been 
disclosed during his previous group therapy sessions. 
¶22 The parties agree that the defendant was given an 
opportunity to regain admittance to group therapy.  They do not 
agree on the conditions he had to meet for re-admittance or 
whether he was re-admitted.   
¶23 The defendant asserts that he was required to take 
another polygraph test, which was scheduled for January 13, 
2007.12  The State asserts that the defendant was required only 
to write a letter of full disclosure regarding his prior sexual 
history and that when he completed the letter, he was allowed 
back into therapy.  The State asserts that the defendant had 
already been allowed back into his group therapy when he and 
Agent Krause met on January 12, 2007, and that Agent Krause had 
no intention of initiating revocation proceedings against the 
defendant, at that time, for his probation violations. 
¶24 The 
State's 
brief 
sets 
forth 
Agent 
Krause's 
recollection about the events of January 2007.  The State 
asserts that in January 2007, Agent Krause received a phone call 
from the defendant, who wanted to come in to talk "about some 
things."  According to Agent Krause, he and the defendant agreed 
upon a mutually acceptable date, which was January 12, 2007.       
                                                 
12 The circuit court commented that "the parties represent 
that another polygraph was set for January 13."  The State's 
response to the defendant's motion, however, makes no mention of 
a January 13 polygraph test. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
9 
 
¶25 The date of the meeting (Jan. 12) was the day before 
the date the defendant claims that he was required to take a 
polygraph examination (Jan. 13) in order to get back into 
therapy.  The State makes no mention of this second polygraph 
test. 
¶26 The parties agree that at the January 12, 2007 
meeting, the defendant orally told Agent Krause that he had 
violated the rules of his probation by using a computer he kept 
at a friend's house to access child pornography.  According to 
Agent Krause, the defendant volunteered that he had been 
violating the rules of his probation. 
¶27 According to the defendant and Agent Krause, Agent 
Krause wrote down the defendant's statements on a Department of 
Corrections form, which the defendant signed.  The defendant 
asserts that this Department form included a notification and a 
box checked off next to the following statement: 
I have been advised that I must account in a true and 
accurate manner for my whereabouts and activities, and 
that failure to do so is a violation for which I could 
be revoked.  I have also been advised that none of 
this information can be used against me in criminal 
proceedings.13 
¶28 The defendant does not state, either in the brief he 
filed in this court or in the motion he filed in the circuit 
court, when he was first advised that his statements could not 
be used against him in a criminal proceeding or whether he saw 
the form before he gave the oral statements.  
                                                 
13 The DOC form is not in the record. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
10 
 
¶29 The State agrees that Agent Krause wrote down the 
defendant's statement on a Department form but neither denies 
nor concedes the existence of the Department form or the 
notification that the defendant described.  The State's brief in 
this court asserts that it never conceded or stipulated that the 
defendant was aware of the written notification when he gave his 
earlier, oral statements.  The State's position here is that the 
defendant did not proffer any evidence to support his assertion 
that he was aware of the written notification of immunity when 
he gave his earlier, oral statements.14    
¶30 The parties agree that after the defendant made the 
incriminating statements, Agent Krause took the defendant into 
custody and initiated revocation proceedings. 
¶31 There is no dispute about what happened thereafter.  
¶32 Agent Krause notified the West Allis Police Department 
of the defendant's statements.  The police arranged to retrieve 
the computer the defendant admitted to using.   
¶33 Detective Jacque Chevremont of the West Allis Police 
Department met with the defendant twice while he was in custody 
at 
the 
Milwaukee 
Secure 
Detention 
Facility. 
 
Detective 
Chevremont read the defendant his Miranda warnings both times; 
the defendant stated he understood the warnings and that he was 
willing to speak with the Detective.  The defendant admitted 
                                                 
14 The circuit court explicitly stated that it "won't make 
findings of fact as to what happened after [the defendant's oral 
admission of possessing child pornography] because I do not find 
that those [oral] statements to the probation officer on these 
undisputed facts must be suppressed . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
11 
 
that while on probation, he downloaded child pornography on a 
computer that he kept at a friend's house. 
¶34 In ruling on the suppression motions, the circuit 
court assumed that the defendant was advised of the standard 
conditions of probation, which include providing true and 
correct information when asked.  Neither the conditions of 
probation imposed on the defendant nor any "standard conditions 
of probation" are in the record before this court.   
¶35 The circuit court's findings of fact to be upheld as 
not clearly erroneous had to be based in the present case on the 
parties' agreed-upon, undisputed facts.  The circuit court made 
the following factual findings: 
• The defendant initiated the January 12, 2007 meeting 
with his probation agent. 
• The defendant volunteered the information that he 
had been violating the probation rules by using a 
friend's computer to download images of child 
pornography.   
¶36 With regard to the circuit court's first finding, the 
parties agreed that the defendant initiated the January 12, 2007 
meeting with his probation agent.   
¶37 With regard to the circuit court's second finding, the 
circuit court, relying on common sense, assumed that the 
probation agent would have asked the defendant some questions.  
Nevertheless, the circuit court found that the defendant 
volunteered that he had violated the rules of probation.  The 
State asserted that the defendant volunteered that he had been 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
12 
 
violating 
the 
probation 
rules. 
 
The 
defendant 
did 
not 
characterize his statements as volunteered.  Neither party made 
any representation to the circuit court about whether the 
defendant made any statement in response to questions.      
¶38 The circuit court denied the defendant's motions to 
suppress, concluding that the facts were insufficient to show 
compulsion and that simply because an agent might revoke 
probation is not enough to establish compulsion.   
¶39 After the circuit court denied the defendant's motions 
to suppress, the defendant changed his plea to guilty of one 
count of possession of child pornography pursuant to plea 
negotiations. 
II 
¶40 Whether the defendant's statements to his probation 
agent were compelled in violation of his constitutional right 
against self-incrimination presents a question of constitutional 
fact. In reviewing issues of constitutional fact, first, we 
review the circuit court's findings of historical fact; we will 
uphold them unless they are clearly erroneous.  Second, we 
determine 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, 
benefitting from their analyses.15  
                                                 
15 Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶30;  State v. Felix, 2012 WI 
36, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775 (citing State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625). 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
13 
 
¶41 A probationer has a Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination.16  A critical issue is whether the 
probationer must claim the privilege or whether the situation 
gives rise to a self-executing privilege. 
¶42 The United States Supreme Court has declared that an 
ordinary witness who is "merely required to appear and give 
testimony" must affirmatively claim the privilege.17  "[I]n the 
ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes 
disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government 
has not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself."18   
¶43 However, the United States Supreme Court has also 
recognized exceptions to the general rule requiring a person to 
affirmatively assert his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.  In 
some situations, the privilege is self-executing and thus need 
not be affirmatively invoked before the statement is deemed 
compelled.19  One of these "self-executing situations" occurs 
when a probationer must answer questions that require him to 
choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing 
his conditional liberty by remaining silent.20 
                                                 
16 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984).  
17 Id. at 435 (quoted in State v. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, ¶47, 
343 Wis. 2d 220, 619 N.W.2d 769). 
18 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427 (quoting Garner v. United States, 
424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976)). 
19 Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶¶43, 47 (quoting Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 434-35 (1984)). 
20 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435-36; Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 
¶¶46-49. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
14 
 
¶44 The United States Supreme Court has explained the 
difference between the ordinary witness who must claim the 
privilege when he is "merely required to appear and give 
testimony" and certain situations relating to a probationer 
whose privilege may be self-executing when he is required to 
answer 
incriminating 
questions. 
 
The 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
differentiated between the two as follows:    
The threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege 
distinguishes 
cases 
of 
this 
sort 
[namely 
those 
involving a probationer] from the ordinary case in 
which a witness is merely required to appear and give 
testimony.  A state may require a probationer to 
appear 
and 
discuss 
matters 
that 
affect 
his 
probationary status; such a requirement, without more, 
does not give rise to a self-executing privilege.  The 
result may be different if questions put to the 
probationer, however relevant to his probationary 
status, call for answers that would incriminate him in 
a pending or later criminal prosecution.  There is 
thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding 
that if the state, either expressly or by implication, 
asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to 
revocation of probation, it would have created the 
classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the 
privilege would be excused, and the probationer's 
answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in 
a criminal prosecution.21 
III 
¶45 The defendant asserts that his statements to his 
probation agent were compelled in violation of his federal 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination for two 
reasons.  First, he claims that he signed a Department of 
                                                 
21 Murphy, 
465 
U.S. 
at 
435 
(quoted 
in 
Spaeth, 
343 
Wis. 2d 220, ¶47). 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
15 
 
Corrections document that notified him that his failure to 
account truthfully about his activities is a violation for which 
his probation could be revoked and that "none of the information 
can be used against [him] in criminal proceedings."  Second, he 
claims that his statements were compelled because he allegedly 
was required to report his activities truthfully to his 
probation agent and was required to take a mandatory polygraph 
test and knew that if he failed the polygraph test, his 
probation could be revoked. 
¶46 We discuss each claim in turn. 
A 
¶47 We turn first to the defendant's claim of compulsion 
relying on the Department of Corrections form described above.  
This form, according to the defendant, advised the defendant 
that the statements he made to the probation agent were not to 
be used against him in a criminal proceeding. 
¶48 The burden was on the defendant in the circuit court 
to prove that his statement to the probation agent was compelled 
and that use of the statement in this criminal proceeding 
violates the federal constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.   
¶49 The circuit court and court of appeals ruled that the 
defendant did not meet his burden. 
¶50 The Department of Corrections form upon which the 
defendant relies is not part of the circuit court record or part 
of the record before this court.  The well-established rule is 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
16 
 
that appellate review is limited to the record presented.22  The 
burden is on the appellant, here the defendant, to ensure that 
the record is sufficient to address issues raised on appeal.23 
¶51 No undisputed, agreed-upon facts by the parties or 
other evidence appears in the record to prove that the defendant 
signed the form or that the defendant was informed or knew of 
the contents of the form before he gave oral incriminating 
statements to his probation agent.     
¶52 The circuit court made no findings of fact regarding 
the existence of the Department form or the conversation that 
occurred between the defendant and Agent Krause when the form 
was allegedly completed and signed.   
¶53 Because the Department form is not in the record and 
nothing about the execution of the form is in the parties' 
undisputed, agreed-upon facts, the defendant's argument that the 
form immunized his statements fails.     
B 
¶54 We turn now to the defendant's claim that the 
statements to the probation agent were compelled by the threat 
of revocation of his conditional liberty.  The defendant makes 
two arguments.  He argues that the mere fact that he was 
required to appear and report truthfully to his probation agent 
                                                 
22 Schimke v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 34 
Wis. 2d 317, 320-21, 149 N.W.2d 659 (1967). 
23 State v. Marks, 2010 WI App 172, ¶20, 330 Wis. 2d 693, 
794 
N.W.2d 547; 
State 
Bank 
of 
Hartland 
v. 
Arndt, 
129 
Wis. 2d 411, 423, 385 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1986). 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
17 
 
is sufficient to establish compulsion.  He also argues that the 
fact that he was required to take a polygraph test establishes 
compulsion. 
1 
¶55 The case law establishes that the mere requirement on 
a probationer to appear and speak "truthfully to his or her 
probation (or parole) officer is insufficient to establish 
compulsion."24  
¶56 The seminal case regarding probationers and self-
incrimination is Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).  The 
United States Supreme Court recognized that requiring Murphy, a 
probationer, to appear and answer questions truthfully was 
insufficient to establish compulsion.25  The Court declared that 
if Murphy was in a situation that gave rise to a self-executing 
privilege against self-incrimination——such that "the State, 
either expressly or by implication, assert[ed] that invocation 
of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation"——then 
"the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the 
probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible 
in a criminal prosecution,"26 even though the privilege was not 
affirmatively invoked.  See ¶¶41-44, supra. 
                                                 
24 Commitment of Mark, 292 Wis. 2d 1, ¶25. 
25 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427.  See also Commitment of Mark, 
292 Wis. 2d 1, ¶25. 
26 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
18 
 
¶57 As to Murphy, the Court concluded that the State of 
Minnesota did not go further than requiring Murphy to appear and 
give testimony.  It did not "require[ ] him to choose between 
making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional 
liberty by remaining silent."27  The Court in Murphy concluded 
that there was no evidence in the record showing that the State 
would have revoked the probation or that the probationer 
(Murphy) believed his probation would have been revoked if he 
chose to remain silent.28  Accordingly, Murphy did not prove his 
statement was compelled.        
¶58 In the present case, there is no evidence that the 
State, either expressly or by implication, told the defendant 
that his refusal to speak to his probation agent or his 
invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination would 
lead to the revocation of his probation.  The defendant claims 
                                                 
27 Id. at 436 (quoted in Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶48). 
28 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436.  
The Court explained further in Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437, as 
follows: 
Murphy's probation condition proscribed only false 
statements; it said nothing about his freedom to 
decline to answer particular questions and certainly 
contained 
no 
suggestion 
that 
his 
probation 
was 
conditional on 
his waiving his [privilege] with 
respect to further criminal prosecution. . . . Without 
the 
benefit 
of 
an 
authoritative 
state-court 
construction of the condition, we are hesitant to read 
into 
the 
truthfulness 
requirement 
an 
additional 
obligation that Murphy refrain from [invoking his 
privilege]. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
19 
 
that he believed his probation would be revoked if he failed to 
tell his probation agent the truth, but there is no evidence in 
the record indicating that the defendant was informed of such 
potential revocation.  The parties did not agree that revocation 
was a consequence or that the defendant believed his probation 
would have been revoked if he chose to remain silent.   
¶59 Nothing in the record supports the defendant's claim 
that there was an explicit consequence of revocation for failing 
to tell the truth or that the defendant believed that probation 
would be revoked if he did not tell the truth.  Thus, the 
probationer in the present case, like the probationer in 
Minnesota v. Murphy, has not proved his claim of compulsion.    
2 
¶60 The defendant appears to rest his claim of compulsion 
not only on the fact that the rules of probation required him to 
tell the truth, but also on the fact that he was required to 
take a polygraph test and that he knew that if he did not admit 
to his behavior it would be discovered the next day during his 
scheduled polygraph test.  The defendant argues that on the 
basis of his past experiences, he made the incriminating 
statement knowing that if he did not give an accurate and 
truthful 
accounting 
of 
his 
behavior 
before 
the 
mandated 
polygraph test, he would be in violation of his probation rules 
and he would face revocation of his probation. 
¶61 Again, the defendant has not carried his burden of 
proving compulsion.  Nothing in the record supports the 
defendant's claim of compulsion regarding the polygraph test.  
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
20 
 
¶62 The defendant's original rules of supervision, which 
the defendant asserts require a polygraph test, are not in the 
record.  The requirement of a polygraph test is not an 
undisputed fact.29  Nothing appears in the record to support the 
defendant's assertion that he was required to take a polygraph 
test the day after he made his statements.   
¶63 The circuit court could not and did not determine 
whether the defendant was required to take a mandatory polygraph 
test as a condition of his probation or that he had a mandatory 
polygraph test scheduled for January 13, 2007, which he knew he 
would fail.  Nothing in the record describes the rules governing 
the polygraph test.   
¶64 Without any evidence in the record, the defendant 
fails to demonstrate that his admission to the probation agent 
was compelled by his being required to take a polygraph test. 
¶65 The fact that a probationer was required to take a 
polygraph test as a condition of probation played an important 
part in both State v. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156, 330 Wis. 2d 243, 
792 
N.W.2d 212, 
and 
State 
v. 
Spaeth, 
2012 
WI 
95, 
343 
Wis. 2d 220, 819 N.W.2d 769, in the court's determining whether 
the probationers' statements were compelled. 
                                                 
29 The defendant asserts that he was required to take a 
polygraph test as a condition of his mandatory sex offender 
treatment.  The State contends that the polygraph test was 
administered because the defendant had "refused to participate 
in a meaningful way in his group therapy sessions."  
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
21 
 
¶66 The Peebles and Spaeth cases were decided after the 
circuit court's and court of appeals' decisions in the present 
case and did not guide these decisions.  
¶67 In Peebles, the court of appeals was faced with 
determining whether a probationer's incriminating statements 
were compelled.30  Peebles was placed on probation after pleading 
no 
contest to sexual assault.  The court ordered "Sex 
Counseling/register/be compliant with Sex Offender Program."31   
¶68 Peebles subsequently met with his probation agent and 
signed the Rules of Community Supervision and the Standard Sex 
Offender Rules, which were entered into the record.  The rules 
warned him that his probation could be revoked if he violated 
the rules.32   
¶69 One requirement of Peebles' probation was that he take 
a polygraph test.33  Peebles testified that he understood that if 
he 
did 
not 
follow 
the 
rules 
of 
supervision, 
including 
participating in sex offender treatment and cooperating with his 
treatment counselor, which required talking in treatment about 
his sexual behavior, he could face revocation from supervision 
or incarceration.34  
                                                 
30 State v. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156, 330 Wis. 2d 243, 792 
N.W.2d 212. 
31 Id., ¶2. 
32 Id., ¶3. 
33 Id., ¶5. 
34 Id., ¶4. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
22 
 
¶70 Peebles' probation was ultimately revoked based on 
comments he made in sex offender counseling and to the polygraph 
examiner immediately before a polygraph examination.35 
¶71 The court of appeals explained in Peebles that "a 
probationer's statements are compelled if he or she must choose 
between providing them or jeopardizing his or her conditional 
liberty by remaining silent."36 
¶72 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
Peebles' 
statements were compelled because the rules of his supervision, 
which were in the record, required that he be truthful, that he 
submit to polygraph tests, and that he fully cooperate with and 
successfully complete sex offender counseling.  Peebles "then 
gave his statements, at least in part, because he was required 
to take lie detector tests."37 
¶73 In Spaeth, this court explained that the Peebles 
decision demonstrates how statements made to probation agents 
may be "compelled by way of probation rules."  This court 
explained that based on Peebles' testimony about his subjective 
view of the consequences of failure to take a polygraph test, 
the court of appeals held that Peebles' statements were 
compelled.38     
                                                 
35 Id., ¶¶6-7. 
36 Id., ¶22 (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436). 
37 Peebles, 330 Wis. 2d 243, ¶20. 
38 Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶57. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
23 
 
¶74 The record before the court in the present case does 
not support the same conclusion as did the record in Peebles.  
In the present case, the defendant's probation rules are not in 
the record.  The parties did not reach undisputed, agreed-upon 
facts regarding the defendant's knowledge or belief that his 
probation would be revoked unless he told the truth.   
¶75 In the present case, the court is unable to determine 
what the probation rules required and what the defendant 
believed would be the consequences of his failing to tell the 
truth.  Thus, the court is unable to conclude, from the record, 
that the defendant's probation rules required him to be 
truthful, required him to submit to polygraph tests, or required 
revocation of probation if he violated the rules.   
¶76 In Spaeth, the State and Spaeth stipulated that 
Spaeth's participation in a polygraph test while on probation 
was compelled.39  A condition of Spaeth's probation was a 
                                                 
39 Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶¶49, 58. 
The Spaeth court concluded: 
[The probation agent's] own testimony revealed that 
Spaeth was required to take the polygraph examination 
or face a sanction, including possible revocation.  
This compulsion is authorized by statute and rule, 
demonstrated in the cases, and testified to by the 
[Department of Corrections] agent involved.  All 
parties agree that this case involves compulsion.  As 
a result, we have no difficulty determining that 
Spaeth 
was 
compelled, 
under 
the 
rules 
of 
his 
probation, to answer truthfully during the polygraph 
examination.   
Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶58.  
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
24 
 
mandatory polygraph test at least once per year.40  Spaeth was 
"required to take this examination, required to cooperate with 
the examiner, and required to answer questions truthfully.  His 
failure to take the polygraph examination could have resulted in 
revocation of his probation.  His failure to answer questions 
truthfully also could have resulted in a serious sanction."41 
¶77 Before taking the polygraph test, Spaeth signed a 
"consent form" provided by the test administrator, but the form 
he signed was not, according to the court, an accurate statement 
of the law for this probationer because the form stated that his 
statement may be used against him at trial.42  The court 
determined that his "failure to take the polygraph examination 
could have resulted in his revocation, and his refusal to sign 
the 'consent form' could have been deemed a refusal to take the 
polygraph examination.  In addition, any statements that Spaeth 
made during the polygraph examination were subject to use and 
derivative use immunity and could not be used against him at a 
criminal trial."43  The probation agent "later testified that 
Spaeth was aware that the polygraph results and the statements 
he made in the examination could not be used in a criminal 
prosecution."44 
                                                 
40 Id., ¶4. 
41 Id. 
42 Id., ¶¶5-6. 
43 Id., ¶6. 
44 Id. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
25 
 
¶78 The results of the Spaeth polygraph test showed that 
he was being deceptive and his probation agent was so informed.45  
The probation agent discussed the results of the polygraph test 
with Spaeth, and Spaeth then admitted probation violations.46  
The probation agent informed police, who arrested Spaeth for 
both a probation violation and in connection with a possible 
additional criminal offense.47 
¶79 This court re-examined the fundamental principles of 
the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment.48  The court recognized that in some situations, the 
privilege is self-executing and need not be affirmatively 
invoked before the statement is deemed compelled.49  When a 
probationer must answer questions that require him to choose 
between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his 
conditional liberty by remaining silent, the privilege is self-
executing and the statements are compelled.50   
¶80 The Spaeth court concluded, based on the evidence in 
the record, the testimony of the defendant and the defendant's 
probation agent, and stipulations by the parties that the 
                                                 
45 Id., ¶8. 
46 Id., ¶9. 
47 Id., ¶¶10-11. 
48 Id., ¶¶31-49. 
49 Id., ¶¶43, 47. 
50 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435-36; Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 
¶¶46-49. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
26 
 
defendant's participation in the polygraph test was compelled 
and that any incriminating statements arising from it could not 
be used against him.51 
¶81 The present case does not provide the extensive record 
available in Spaeth.  The record in the instant case does not 
include the probation rules, the polygraph requirements, or a 
finding about what the defendant knew or believed regarding the 
possible consequences of his incriminating statements.     
¶82 The 
defendant 
has 
failed 
to 
provide 
sufficient 
evidence to support his legal argument of compulsion on the 
basis of the polygraph test.  On this record, the court cannot 
reach the legal conclusion that the defendant's statements were 
compelled.  
* * * * 
¶83 In sum, the defendant has failed to meet his burden to 
prove that his initial, oral statements were compelled.  Neither 
the circuit court nor this court can consider the Department of 
Corrections probation form that the defendant claims advised him 
that his incriminating statements cannot be used against him in 
criminal proceedings.  The form is not in the record.  The 
parties did not agree about its existence, the details of its 
use, or the defendant's knowledge of its contents before the 
defendant made his oral admissions.     
¶84 The defendant has failed to put sufficient evidence 
into the record to show that the rules of his probation rendered 
                                                 
51 Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶49, 58. 
No. 
2009AP2916-CR   
 
27 
 
his incriminating statements compelled.  No documents, no 
testimony, and no undisputed, agreed-upon facts by the parties 
are in the record to evidence any compulsion of the defendant to 
admit possession of child pornography to his probation agent.   
¶85 Because there is not sufficient evidence in the record 
to show compulsion, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  The defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
¶86 By the Court——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶87 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   Gregory 
Sahs' incriminating, oral statement to his probation agent, made 
when he was not in custody, was voluntarily made without the 
threat that he would be revoked if he did not speak.  
Accordingly, his statement was not compelled and his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for the crime he 
disclosed was not self-executing.  See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 
U.S. 420, 436 (1984).   
¶88 I write to confirm for the reader that the majority 
opinion does not rest on the Wisconsin Constitution, but rather, 
that the majority opinion is based solely on the Fifth Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, 
which 
is 
the 
only 
constitutional provision that the parties argued before us.1  I 
also write to draw together foundational principles that control 
when the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
becomes self-executing for probationers and to draw attention to 
unduly broad statements in some opinions that could cause 
confusion if the statements were applied without a thorough 
consideration of all underlying legal principles.  Because my 
analysis differs from the majority opinion's analysis but also 
results in the conclusion that Sahs' oral statement was not 
compelled, I do not join the majority opinion, but respectfully 
concur.  
                                                 
1 Even 
though 
Sahs 
argued 
both 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutional provisions in his motion to the circuit court, 
majority op., ¶4, he has not done so before us.  
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶89 In 2007, Sahs was convicted of possession of child 
pornography, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m).  This was 
Sahs' second conviction for possession of child pornography, the 
first one occurring in 2005.  When the incriminating statements 
giving rise to the second conviction were made, Sahs was on 
probation for the 2005 conviction.  He made the incriminating 
statements to his probation agent, Michael Krause.   
¶90 Prior to making incriminating statements, Sahs called 
Krause and asked to come in and "talk about some things."  Sahs 
set up an appointment to meet with Krause on a mutually 
convenient date, January 12, 2007.   
¶91 When Sahs appeared for his appointment, he told Krause 
that he had accessed child pornography through a computer he 
kept at a friend's house.  Sahs does not allege that he made 
this oral statement in response to a question from Krause about 
either a pending charge or particular criminal activities, nor 
does he allege that Krause, or the conditions of his probation, 
threatened revocation of probation if Sahs refused to answer 
such questions.  After Sahs orally incriminated himself of 
violating Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m), Krause asked Sahs to provide 
a written statement on a standard Department of Corrections 
(DOC) form.  Sahs did so; however, the DOC form is not in the 
record.2  
                                                 
2 Because the record does not contain the DOC form, and 
because there is no contention that the written statement 
somehow 
modified 
Sahs' 
earlier 
statement, 
I 
confine 
my 
subsequent discussion to Sahs' oral statement to his probation 
agent. 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶92 At the time of Sahs' incriminating oral statement to 
Krause, he alleged he was scheduled to take a polygraph test 
within a few days as part of his probation requirements for his 
2005 conviction.  Sahs alleges that this upcoming obligation 
generated his need to speak with Krause.  
¶93 After Sahs made his oral and written incriminating 
statements, Krause initiated revocation proceedings.  Krause 
also notified the West Allis Police Department, who took Sahs 
into custody.  Detective Chevremont gave Sahs Miranda3 warnings.  
Sahs said that he understood the warnings and was willing to 
speak with the detective.  Sahs then admitted that while he was 
on probation, he downloaded child pornography on the computer he 
kept at his friend's house.  Based on his admissions, Sahs was 
charged with possessing child pornography, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.12(1m). 
¶94 As the matter proceeded before the circuit court, Sahs 
moved to suppress both the oral and written statements he made 
to Krause and his statements to Chevremont.  The circuit court 
found that Sahs initiated the January 12, 2007 meeting with 
Krause, and that he volunteered that he had downloaded child 
pornography onto a computer he kept at a friend's home.  The 
circuit court concluded that no Fifth Amendment violation 
occurred and denied Sahs' motion to suppress. 
                                                 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), concludes that a 
suspect has the right to remain silent and to have an attorney 
present for any questioning.  The warnings arising from Miranda 
also caution that any statements the suspect makes can be used 
against him or her. 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶95 On appeal, as well as on this review, Sahs contends 
that his statements to Krause were compelled by the rules of 
probation to which he was subject because he was required to 
appear and give truthful answers to questions; and therefore, 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was 
self-executing, 
requiring 
suppression 
of 
his 
incriminating 
statements.  He also contends that the DOC form on which he 
provided 
a 
written 
admission 
of 
violating 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.12(1m) notified him that his statement thereon would not 
be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding, thereby providing 
another 
ground 
upon 
which 
to 
suppress 
his 
incriminating 
statements.  However, as I noted, that form is not in the record 
before us.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶96 Whether a statement was testimonial, incriminating and 
compelled, are questions of law for our independent review.  
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426.  Whether testimony was voluntary, 
thereby 
waiving 
the 
defendant's 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination, 
involves 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles to the facts found by the circuit court.  This also 
presents a question of law for our independent review.  State v. 
Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.  And 
finally, we uphold the factual findings of the circuit court 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, 
¶22, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 N.W.2d 610.   
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
B.  General Fifth Amendment Principles4 
¶97 The privilege, or right, to remain silent afforded by 
the Fifth Amendment comes into play when a defendant is 
compelled to give testimony that is incriminating.  Murphy, 465 
U.S. at 426.  A defendant does not lose the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination when he is convicted of a 
crime.  Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976).   
¶98 Cases parsing a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination arise in two broad categories.  
Either the defendant remained silent, thereby maintaining his 
Fifth Amendment privilege and objected to the sanction imposed 
for his silence, or the defendant made a statement and then 
moved to suppress his statement.   
1.  Defendant is silent 
¶99 Generally, a witness must remain silent rather than 
answer questions in order assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429.  However, 
a witness may be compelled to testify, notwithstanding the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, if he is granted use-immunity for his 
                                                 
4 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provided in relevant part:  "No person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."   
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
answers to questions that may incriminate him.  Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).5 
¶100 Only certain types of questions, for example, those 
that are related to pending charges or relevant to particular 
criminal activity, will implicate the Fifth Amendment if the 
probationer is required to answer rather than to remain silent.  
State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 227-28, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977).  
Stated otherwise, it is those types of questions that generate 
testimony that is incriminating.  Id.  Therefore, requiring 
answers to questions such as whether the probationer has been 
following the curfew requirements of his probation, generally 
are not sufficient to draw in the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment, even though they could lead to revocation of 
probation.  See id. at 230 (explaining that a probationer enjoys 
a conditional liberty that is made possible by the legislature 
and the probationer's adhering to the rules of the probation).    
¶101 A probationer may be forced to relinquish his right to 
silence and be compelled to answer questions that were "prompted 
by pending charges or accusations of particular criminal 
activity" if he is advised that his responses "could not be used 
against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding arising out of 
                                                 
5 Kastigar 
v. 
United 
States, 
406 
U.S. 
441 
(1972), 
established the scope of Fifth Amendment immunity as "use-
immunity," which is immunity for the use and derivative use of 
compelled testimony that is incriminating.  Id. at 453.  Use-
immunity contrasts with "transactional immunity," which is 
absolute immunity from prosecution for the crime to which the 
compelled, incriminating testimony relates.  Id.  However, 
Kastigar did not address the criteria to be applied when 
determining whether testimony was compelled.  
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
the same fact situation."  Id. at 235-236.  If the probationer 
nevertheless refuses to answer and if his probation was revoked 
because of his silence, no Fifth Amendment violation occurred.  
Id. at 236 (explaining that a remand was necessary to advise 
Evans that if he responded to questions that were incriminating, 
his answers would not be used against him in violation of his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).  
¶102 However, not all penalties levied when a defendant 
refuses to speak are significant enough to implicate the Fifth 
Amendment.  See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) 
(explaining 
that 
a 
prison 
inmate's 
silence 
resulting 
in 
dismissal from sex-offender treatment program and the subsequent 
transfer to a less desirable penal institution were not adverse 
consequences significant enough to affect a defendant's Fifth 
Amendment privilege). 
¶103 State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 419 N.W.2d 564 
(Ct. App. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), provides a helpful discussion, 
but it requires careful reading and an understanding of the 
cases on which Thompson relies.  Thompson, while in custody and 
without being given Miranda warnings, initially refused to 
answer questions posed by his probation agent about his 
whereabouts on the day of a robbery and shooting.  Id. at 826.  
While still in custody and after being served with notice of a 
revocation hearing, Thompson was again questioned and made 
incriminating statements.  Id. at 826-27.  Thompson's answers 
were later used at trial.  Id. at 827.  
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶104 Although there are some sweeping statements in the 
Thompson decision that could be read to expand the principles 
established in Murphy, Thompson's holding is proscribed by three 
requirements:  First, Thompson is based on the Fifth Amendment 
and therefore, it must follow United States Supreme Court 
precedent; second, the questions inquired about pending charges 
or particular criminal activity, id. at 830-31; and third, the 
questioning occurred while Thompson was in custody and without 
the benefit of Miranda warnings, id. at 826-27.  The failure to 
give Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation is 
sufficient, standing alone, to suppress Thompson's incriminating 
statements as compelled self-incrimination, according to Murphy.  
See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-30.  
¶105 Our decision in Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, 257 
Wis. 2d 40, 654 N.W.2d 438, presents another facet of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  "Tate was 
convicted of repeated sexual assault of a child after a jury 
trial in which he testified and denied the offense."  Id., ¶2.  
The procedural posture of the case was critical to the 
conclusions we reached.  To explain, Tate was placed on 
probation and ordered to attend a sex-offender treatment 
program, which required him to admit the sexual assaults at a 
time when his conviction was up on appeal.  Id.  He refused, 
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id.  He was terminated 
from the program and his probation was revoked.  Id.   
¶106 Tate objected to the termination of probation.  He 
asserted that he had not been offered use-immunity, and he had 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
not been told that statements made in treatment would not be 
used against him in the event that his appeal resulted in a new 
trial.  Id. ¶11.  He also was concerned that the requested 
admission could result in a perjury charge.  Id.  We agreed that 
because of the potential for new criminal consequences for the 
same crime for which he was on probation, Tate's Fifth Amendment 
privilege had been contravened by the probation revocation that 
resulted from his silence when use-immunity was not offered.  
Id., ¶4.  We crafted a very narrow decision in which we 
explained that there would be no Fifth Amendment violation in 
requiring admissions in therapy sessions for the crime of 
conviction if no threat of new criminal consequences pertained.  
Id., ¶19 n.6 (citing State v. Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d 85, 92, 
528 N.W.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1995)).   
2.  Defendant speaks 
¶107  As set out above, it is the general rule that a 
witness must remain silent rather than answer questions if he 
chooses to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429.  However, Murphy 
established certain situations where the application of this 
general rule does not pertain, e.g., when the witness is in 
custody and has not received Miranda warnings.  Id.; see also 
Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d at 827.  This exception for custodial 
questioning from the general rule that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege must be asserted, is driven by the inherently coercive 
nature of police custody.  Murphy, 465 U.S. at 29-30.   
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶108 It was argued in Murphy that the five factors set out 
below could result in a custody-like coercive setting for 
probationers 
that 
should 
result 
in 
exceptions 
from 
the 
obligation to remain silent when asserting the Fifth Amendment 
privilege:  (1) that the probation officer "could compel [] 
attendance and truthful answers;" (2) that "the probation 
officer consciously sought incriminating evidence;" (3) that 
probationer "did not expect questions about prior criminal 
conduct and could not seek counsel before attending the 
meeting;" (4) that "there were no observers to guard against 
abuse or trickery;" and (5) "interrogator's insinuations that 
the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained."  
Id. at 431-33.  However, the Supreme Court concluded that those 
factors, 
either 
individually 
or 
taken 
all 
together, 
are 
insufficient to excuse the failure to "claim the privilege in a 
timely manner" by remaining silent.  Id. at 431.  
¶109 An exception to the obligation to remain silent in 
order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, in addition to that set out in Murphy, occurs 
when a probationer is required to appear and respond to 
questions and the state seeks "to induce the [probationer] to 
forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose 
economic or other sanctions 'capable of forcing the self-
incrimination which the Amendment forbids.'"  Id. at 434 
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)). 
¶110 To explain further, Cunningham arose in the context of 
attempted enforcement of a New York statute that automatically 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
removed political office-holders from office for refusing to 
sign a document waiving the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination prior to being questioned before a grand 
jury.  Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 802-03.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that because of the statutory, automatic removal from 
office that resulted from refusing to waive the Fifth Amendment 
privilege 
to 
remain 
silent, 
the 
questioning 
involved 
an 
unconstitutional threat unless use-immunity was provided in 
exchange for the waiver prior to questioning.  Id. at 809.   
¶111 When a state's parole revocation statute does not 
automatically afford revocation, even when the probation agent 
seeks revocation, the presence of such a statute, without more, 
is not sufficient to constitute a threat of the type that 
results in compelled testimony violative of the Fifth Amendment.  
See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437 (explaining that "[o]n its face, 
Murphy's probation condition proscribed only false statements; 
it said nothing about his freedom to decline to answer 
particular questions and certainly contained no suggestion that 
his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment 
privilege").  Therefore, in regard to an obligation to appear 
and to give truthful testimony,6 the Supreme Court has explained 
that a probationer is in no different position from that of an 
                                                 
6 It is the ability of the probation agent to require 
attendance at meetings and to require truthful answers to 
questions the agent asks that is most often cited in Fifth 
Amendment cases where the defendant is on probation.  It is 
important to note that the United States Supreme Court has held 
that those facts are insufficient to cause the Fifth Amendment 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination 
to 
be 
self-executing.  
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984). 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
ordinary witness subpoenaed to trial or to appear before a grand 
jury.  Id. at 427.  He must appear and if he chooses to speak, 
he must answer truthfully.  Id. (noting that "the general 
obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in 
itself convert Murphy's otherwise voluntary statements into 
compelled ones"). 
¶112 We have recently reaffirmed that generally, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not self-
executing and must be invoked.  State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶2, 
292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90.  "The answers of [a probationer] 
to questions put to him are not compelled within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required to answer 
over his valid claim of the privilege."  Id., ¶26.  If a 
probationer speaks, we examine whether the statements were 
incriminating 
and 
compelled because the Fifth Amendment's 
protection against self-incrimination will not lie unless there 
is testimony that is incriminating and compelled.  Id., ¶16 
(further citations omitted).   
¶113 In Mark, use-immunity was granted for prosecution of 
future crimes so the statements that resulted in revocation were 
not incriminating, i.e., Mark's statement did not incriminate 
him in a crime that could be prosecuted.  Therefore, the Fifth 
Amendment did not come into play.  In addition, the statements 
were used in a ch. 980 commitment, which is not a criminal 
proceeding.   
¶114 In addition, according to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Murphy, being revoked for a voluntary statement does not 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 440.  All choices that a defendant makes are 
not choices that result in compelled, rather than voluntary, 
testimony.   
¶115 An interesting example of such a choice is found in N. 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  There, Alford pled to 
second-degree murder, rather than standing trial for the charged 
offense, first-degree murder, in order to avoid the possibility 
of being subjected to the death penalty if convicted of first-
degree murder.  Id. at 26-27.  The Supreme Court concluded that 
the availability of such a choice and Alford's plea to second-
degree murder did not equate with a compelled plea that would 
violate the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 39. 
¶116 A recent court of appeals case, State v. Peebles, 2010 
WI App 156, 330 Wis. 2d 243, 792 N.W.2d 212, greatly expanded 
Fifth Amendment protections for probationers, above the Fifth 
Amendment protections accorded to one who has never been 
convicted of a crime.  In Peebles, the court concluded that 
Peebles was compelled7 to give incriminating statements in the 
course of sex-offender treatment, even though he did not raise 
his Fifth Amendment privilege, none of the exceptions to the 
obligation to assert the privilege set out in Murphy or 
                                                 
7 Peebles was subject to "Rules of Community Supervision" 
that provided his probation "may be revoked," but did not 
require revocation if Peebles did not comply with the rules 
stated therein.  State v. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156, ¶3, 330 
Wis. 2d 243, 792 N.W.2d 212. 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
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Cunningham were present and use-immunity was not granted prior 
to Peebles' statements.8  Id., ¶¶1, 9.   
¶117 Peebles is wrongly decided because it grants blanket, 
self-executing use-immunity to probationers simply because they 
could be revoked if they did not answer an agent's questions, 
thereby omitting the obligation to raise the Fifth Amendment 
privilege as Murphy has required.  See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431 
(explaining that a probationer's obligation to appear and to 
answer truthfully does not remove a probationer's obligation to 
raise his Fifth Amendment privilege).  Peebles cites Evans, 77 
Wis. 2d at 235-36, for its holding.  Peebles, 330 Wis. 2d 243, 
¶13.  However, in so doing, Peebles incorrectly states the legal 
conclusions of Evans, and it is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's holdings in Murphy.9   
¶118 To explain, Evans arose out of a probationer's 
silence, not a probationer's statement.  Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 
236.  In contrast with Evans, Peebles spoke and then sought to 
suppress his statement.  While Evans is based on the Fifth 
Amendment, it preceded Murphy, which explained Fifth Amendment 
principles more fully than Evans.  Therefore, unless the 
probationer falls within one of Murphy's or Cunningham's 
                                                 
8 No petition for review was filed in Peebles.  
9 The court did correctly explain that there would have been 
no Fifth Amendment violation if the sole potential consequence 
of admissions in regard to criminal conduct were the revocation 
of probation.  Id., ¶26 (citing State v. Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d 
85, 97, 528 N.W.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1995).  Stated otherwise, 
Carrizales explains that the use of a probationer's silence in 
noncriminal probation proceedings raised no Fifth Amendment 
issues.  Id. 
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exceptions, a probationer must raise the privilege to remain 
silent and be given use-immunity before he can be held to have 
been compelled to speak.  Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427;10 Cunningham, 
431 U.S. at 806.11   
¶119 Peebles' omission of a defendant's requirement to 
raise the Fifth Amendment privilege before he can speak without 
fear of prosecution is also inconsistent with our decision in 
Mark where we said that, "while an individual has a prepetition 
or prearrest right against self-incrimination, that right is 
ordinarily not self-executing and must be invoked."  Mark, 292 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶2 (emphasis added).  See also, id., ¶24 (explaining 
that "Murphy reaffirms the general rule that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege must be asserted in all but 'certain well-defined 
situations.'") (citation omitted).  Peebles completely ignores 
our decision in Mark.   
¶120 The problems created by Peebles' omission of a 
probationer's obligation to raise the Fifth Amendment privilege 
                                                 
10 The United States Supreme Court explained,  
Murphy was in no better position than the ordinary 
witness at a trial or before a grand jury who is 
subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated to 
answer on the pain of contempt, unless he invokes the 
privilege and shows that he faces a realistic threat 
of self-incrimination. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added). 
11 In Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977), removal 
from office was absolute if the Fifth Amendment privilege was 
not waived.  Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 809.  By contrast, 
revocation of probation was only a possibility for Peebles.  
Peebles, 330 Wis. 2d 243, ¶3.   
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have been compounded by State v. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, 343 Wis. 2d 
220, 819 N.W.2d 769, which relied in part on Peebles, even 
though the State conceded that Spaeth's statements had been 
compelled and never briefed the issue of compulsion for us.  See 
id., ¶¶57-58.  The mistaken reasoning in Peebles is further 
compounded by the majority opinion herein, which repeatedly 
mentions Peebles' overly broad statements.12  
C.  Fifth Amendment Application 
¶121 This case turns on Sahs' statements.  Therefore, he 
falls into the second broad category of Fifth Amendment 
privilege cases, i.e., those defendants who speak and then seek 
to have their statements suppressed.   
¶122 If Sahs' statement was voluntarily made, no self-
executing Fifth Amendment privilege arises that precludes the 
statement's use in a subsequent criminal case, unless the 
circumstances under which the statement was made meet one of 
Murphy's 
or 
Cunningham's 
well-defined 
exceptions 
to 
the 
obligation to raise the privilege.  See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427.  
The Murphy/Cunningham exceptions are:  (1) a probationer is in 
custody while questioned without Miranda warnings; (2) a 
probationer is threatened with significant sanctions if he 
remains silent.   
¶123 I conclude that Sahs' oral statement to Krause was 
voluntarily made.  There is nothing in the record that supports 
the 
conclusion 
that 
Sahs' 
oral 
statement 
to 
Krause 
was 
compelled.  First, Sahs contacted Krause and asked to meet with 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶¶67-72. 
No.  2009AP2916-CR.pdr 
 
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him.  Second, their meeting was scheduled on a mutually 
convenient date.  Third, they met in Krause's office and Sahs 
was not in custody.  Fourth, there is nothing in the record to 
show that Sahs' statements were made in response to Krause's 
questions about pending charges or accusations of particular 
criminal activity.  Fifth, there is nothing in the record to 
show that Sahs raised his privilege and that Krause threatened 
to impose economic or other sanctions capable of forcing self-
incrimination.  Sixth, there is nothing in the record to show 
that Sahs' probation was conditioned on his waiving his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.   
¶124 That Sahs was required by the conditions of probation 
to give truthful answers, if he chose to speak, is no different 
from the obligations one has when subpoenaed to appear before a 
grand jury.  If one chooses to speak before a grand jury to 
which he has been subpoenaed, one must speak truthfully.  
Accordingly, I conclude that Sahs' oral statement to his 
probation agent was voluntarily made and may be used against him 
in a subsequent criminal case.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶125 Sahs' incriminating, oral statement to his probation 
agent, made when he was not in custody, was voluntarily made 
without a threat by his probation agent.  Accordingly, his 
statement was not compelled and his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination for the crime he disclosed was not 
self-executing.  See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436.   
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¶126 In conclusion, I write to confirm for the reader that 
the 
majority 
opinion 
does 
not 
rest 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, but rather, that it is based solely on the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is the only 
constitutional provision that the parties argued before us. I 
also write to draw together foundational principles that control 
when the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
becomes self-executing for probationers and to draw attention to 
unduly broad statements in some opinions that could cause 
confusion if the statements were applied without a thorough 
consideration of all underlying legal principles.  Because my 
analysis differs from the majority opinion's analysis but also 
results in the conclusion that Sahs' oral statement was not 
compelled, I do not join the majority opinion, but respectfully 
concur.     
 
 
 
 
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