Title: Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Dissent)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20769
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 2024

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ECKER, J., with whom ROBINSON, C. J., and MUL-
LINS, J., join, dissenting. As a matter of good govern-
ment, I have no quarrel with the majority’s conclusion
that the result it reaches today advances a legitimate
and even praiseworthy public policy. If a residential
landlord who pays the utility bill for a multiunit apart-
ment building desires to recoup those expenses from
its tenants,1 I may agree that enlightened public policy
should require the landlord to do so by imposing ‘‘con-
sistent and predictable payments [on each tenant] each
month’’ rather than charging the tenants variable
monthly amounts that will increase when other tenants
‘‘use more utilities than anticipated each month . . . .’’
After all, a tenant in one unit has no control over the
use of utilities by other tenants in other units, and it
seems sensible to me that tenants with parsimonious
habits in this respect should not suffer financial uncer-
tainty each month due to the unpredictable behavior
of other tenants who may have more extravagant usage
habits. But we are construing a statute, not enacting
one. The most basic principles of statutory construction
prohibit us from substituting our own policy prefer-
ences, however commendable, for the policy choices
made by the legislature. The public policy that the
majority identifies as dispositive in this case is nowhere
to be found in the statute under construction, General
Statutes § 16-262e (c).
The manifest legislative objective of § 16-262e,
reflected in every one of its provisions, is to protect
tenants by preventing utility companies from shutting
off service to a residential building when the landlord
1 For the sake of simplicity, I use the words ‘‘landlord’’ and ‘‘tenant’’
throughout this opinion to refer to the relevant actors. The actual terms
in General Statutes § 16-262e are ‘‘owner, agent, lessor or manager’’ and
‘‘occupant,’’ respectively. The words I use are not perfectly synonymous
with the statutory terms, but any technical differences have no relevance
to the present case.
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fails to pay a utility bill for which it is liable. Nothing in
the statute contains any suggestion, express or implied,
that the legislature intended either to prohibit a landlord
from recovering its utility expenses from its tenants or,
alternatively, to regulate the recoupment methodology
used by the landlord to recover those expenses. The
statute, in short, is aimed at solving the problems that
arise when landlords do not pay their utility bills; it has
nothing to say about the issues that may arise when
landlords fulfill their obligations to pay those bills,
which is the scenario involved in the present case.
As will become apparent, the plain language of § 16-
262e, the structure of the statute, and its relationship
to other statutes all lead to the conclusion that § 16-
262e does not regulate the means by which a landlord
may recoup its utility costs from its tenants. Indeed,
even the majority acknowledges, as it must, that a land-
lord’s recoupment of utility costs from the tenant is
proper under the statute. What the majority fails to
acknowledge is that the line it draws between permissi-
ble and impermissible methods of recoupment is
nowhere to be found in the statute or the public policy
animating its enactment. The public policy that the
majority reads into the statute may be a good one, but
it is not our role to promulgate that policy. I respect-
fully dissent.
I
I agree with the majority that the proper construction
of § 16-262e is a question of law over which our review
is plenary. Analysis of the statute must begin with its
language and relationship to other statutes. See General
Statutes § 1-2z.
The majority focuses its attention on the language in
§ 16-262e (c) providing that a landlord ‘‘shall be liable’’
for the costs of utilities, ‘‘except for any service fur-
nished to any dwelling unit of the building on an individ-
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ually metered or billed basis for the exclusive use of
the occupants of that dwelling unit . . . .’’ The majority
seems to find this language to be ambiguous because
it is unclear whether the landlord’s statutory liability
prohibits the landlord from recouping its utility costs
from tenants utilizing the ‘‘ratio utility billing’’ (RUB)
method, whereby the landlord pays the utility service
provider directly and thereafter bills its tenants individ-
ually for their estimated proportionate share of the total
payment under the terms of the rental agreement. In
light of this perceived ambiguity, the majority deems it
necessary to consult the legislative history and public
policy underlying the statute. Using as its springboard
the premise that § 16-262e is a remedial statute that
must be construed broadly, the majority concludes that
a landlord may not recover its utility expenses from its
tenants under RUB because, in the majority’s words,
the statute prohibits tenants from being ‘‘held liable to
anyone for the cost of a utility that he or she has not
exclusively used.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
The majority’s broad construction of § 16-262e (c) is
inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous language
of the statute, the larger statutory scheme established
by the legislature in § 16-262e, and the relevant provi-
sions of title 47a of the General Statutes governing
landlord-tenant relations. It also is internally inconsis-
tent with the majority’s own conclusion that a landlord
is not prohibited from recovering its utility expenses
from a tenant using the so-called ‘‘building in’’ method
of cost recovery.2 The reality is that, so long as the
landlord pays its utility bills, nothing in our statutes
prevents the landlord from recovering those utility costs
from its tenants under the terms of a rental agreement,
2 ‘‘Building in’’ is a recoupment method under which the landlord estimates
monthly utility costs in advance and then, without separately itemizing or
identifying those costs, incorporates them into the total amount of rent due
under the terms of the rental agreement.
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regardless of whether the charges are calculated using
the RUB method, the ‘‘building in’’ method, or some
other method of recoupment that is not prohibited
by law.
Section 16-262e contains eight subsections, (a)
through (h), and, before more closely examining the
text of subsection (c), the central provision at issue, it
is useful to review the whole statute to better under-
stand its manifest purpose and scope. Subsection (a)
sets forth the most fundamental prohibition in the stat-
ute, which provides that the utility company ‘‘shall not
terminate [utility] service for nonpayment of a delin-
quent account owed to such company’’ by the landlord.
General Statutes § 16-262e (a). This provision applies
to the termination of services for any ‘‘residential dwell-
ing’’ in a building not occupied exclusively by its owner
when the utility company ‘‘has actual or constructive
knowledge that the occupants of such dwelling are not
the individuals to whom the [utility] company . . . usu-
ally sends its bills . . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-262e
(a). In other words, if the utility bill is sent to the
landlord, service to the tenants may not be terminated
as a result of the landlord’s failure to pay the bill.
Subsection (a) contains a single exception, which
permits termination of such services when the utility
company ‘‘(1) . . . makes a good faith effort to notify
the occupants of such building of the proposed termina-
tion by the means most practicable under the circum-
stances and best designed to provide actual notice; and
(2) . . . provides an opportunity, where practicable,
for such occupants to receive service in their own
names without any liability for the amount due while
service was billed directly to the lessor, owner, agent
or manager and without the necessity for a security
deposit; provided, if it is not practicable for such occu-
pants to receive service in their own names, the [utility]
company . . . shall not terminate service to such resi-
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dential dwelling but may pursue the remedy provided
in sections 16-262f and 16-262t.’’3 General Statutes § 16-
262e (a). Upon due notice, service to the building may
be terminated if the tenants are given an opportunity
to receive service in their own names and it is practica-
ble to provide service by that method.
The remainder of the statute fills in the details. Sub-
section (b) specifies that, if service was erroneously
terminated under subsection (a) because of a mistaken
understanding about who gets billed, the utility com-
pany must reinstate service upon learning that the ten-
ants ‘‘are not the individuals to whom it usually sends
its bills . . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-262e (b). Subsec-
tion (c), which I will discuss in more detail in part II
of this opinion, provides the way to determine whether
the landlord or tenant is liable to the utility company for
payment—the landlord is responsible for such payment,
unless the utility ‘‘service [is] furnished to any dwelling
unit of the building on an individually metered or billed
basis for the exclusive use of the occupants of that
dwelling unit . . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-262e (c).
Subsection (c) also provides that, if the landlord ‘‘fails
to pay’’ for utilities when it is required to do so, the
tenants may arrange to receive service in their own
names and ‘‘may deduct, in accordance with the provi-
sions of subsection (d) of this section, a reasonable
estimate of the cost of any portion of such service which
is for the use of occupants of dwelling units other than
such occupant’s dwelling unit.’’ General Statutes § 16-
262e (c).
3 General Statutes § 16-262f (a) (1) permits the utility company to ‘‘petition
the Superior Court or a judge thereof, for appointment of a receiver of the
rents or payments for use and occupancy or common expenses . . . for
any dwelling for which the owner, agent, lessor or manager is in default.’’
Accord General Statutes § 16-262t (a) (1) (water companies). The utility
company can recover its expenses, any arrearages, and reasonable fees and
costs from the money held by the receiver. See General Statutes § 16-262f
(a) (4); see also General Statutes § 12-262t (a) (5).
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Subsection (d) provides that payments made by a
tenant to the utility company pursuant to subsection
(a) or (c) of the statute (i.e., payments made by the
tenant to the utility company for services that are the
landlord’s obligation to pay) may be deducted by the
tenant ‘‘from any sum of rent or payment for use and
occupancy due and owing or to become due and owing
to the’’ landlord. General Statutes § 16-262e (d). Subsec-
tion (e) requires the utility company to provide notice
to each tenant of their right to deduct from rent the
amount of any utility payments made by the tenant to
a utility company in the event that a landlord’s failure
to pay its utility bills requires a tenant to arrange for
service in their own name pursuant to subsection (a).
See General Statutes § 16-262e (e). Subsection (f) pro-
hibits a landlord from increasing rent ‘‘in order to collect
all or part of that amount lawfully deducted by the
occupant pursuant to this section.’’ General Statutes
§ 16-262e (f). Subsection (g) requires a landlord to pro-
vide utility companies access to meters located on the
premises. See General Statutes § 16-262e (g). Finally,
subsection (h) provides that nothing in the statute ‘‘shall
be construed to prevent’’ a utility company or tenant
‘‘from pursuing any other action or remedy at law or
equity that it may have against the’’ landlord. General
Statutes § 16-262e (h).
It is obvious that § 16-262e has nothing to say about
a landlord’s ability to recover its duly paid utility costs
from its tenants. The statute is concerned with land-
lords who do not pay their utility bills, not with land-
lords who do pay their utility bills and thereafter seek
to recoup those expenses from the tenants who receive
the utility service. It is for this reason that the statute
is focused on two things: (1) the landlord’s obligation
to pay the utility company, and (2) the utility company’s
affirmative obligation to facilitate the tenants’ efforts
to avoid termination of services resulting from the land-
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lord’s nonpayment. The statute thus requires landlords
to pay the utility bills (unless separately metered or
billed) and imposes consequences if it fails to do so.4
The obligations of the utility company are also central to
the statutory scheme—the utility company is prohibited
from terminating utility services for nonpayment except
as specified, and it is required in various ways to accom-
modate the needs of tenants whose landlords fail to
pay their utility bills. By contrast, the statute refers not
at all to the rights of a landlord to recover its utility
costs when the landlord does pay its utility bills, which
is the only issue presented in this case.
4 Section 16-262e (c) permits tenants to engage in self-help by arranging
to receive utility service in their own names and deducting the estimated
amount of other tenants’ utility expenses from the rental payments owed
to the landlord. This is an exceptional remedy because landlords and tenants
alike generally are forbidden from engaging in self-help in the event of an
alleged breach of a duty owed by one to the other. See, e.g., General Statutes
§§ 47a-12, 47a-14h, 47a-15, 47a-15a and 47a-43. In particular, a tenant nor-
mally may not unilaterally decide to withhold rent, or any part thereof, on
the basis of an allegation that the landlord has failed to perform legal duties
owed to the tenant. See General Statutes § 47a-14h (a) and (h). Thus, a
tenant who claims a right to rent abatement based on substandard dwelling
conditions generally is limited to the remedies available in § 47a-14h, which
requires the aggrieved tenant to institute an action in the Superior Court
and to pay the full amount of rent with the clerk of the court while that
action is pending. See General Statutes § 47a-14h (a) and (h). I am aware
of only two exceptions in title 47a to the general prohibition against tenants
engaging in self-help, one of which is similar to § 16-262e, in that it permits
the tenant to procure essential services if the landlord breaches its obligation
to do so and allows the tenant to deduct the cost of those services from
the rent. See General Statutes § 47a-13 (a) (1) (‘‘[i]f the landlord is required
to supply heat, running water, hot water, electricity, gas or other essential
service, and if the landlord fails to supply such essential service and the
failure is not caused by conditions beyond the landlord’s control, the tenant
may give notice to the landlord specifying the breach and may elect to . . .
procure reasonable amounts of heat, hot water, running water, electric, gas
or other essential service during the period of the landlord’s noncompliance
and deduct the actual and reasonable cost of such service from the rent’’).
The other exception permits a tenant to cease making rental payments if
the dwelling is ‘‘damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty to an extent
that enjoyment of the dwelling unit is substantially impaired’’ due to no
fault of the tenant. General Statutes § 47a-14 (a).
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II
In light of the foregoing statutory framework, the
meaning of subsection (c) could not be more clear.
Subsection (c) provides that ‘‘[t]he owner, agent, lessor
or manager of a residential dwelling shall be liable for
the costs of all electricity, gas, water or heating fuel
furnished by a public service company, electric sup-
plier, municipal utility or heating fuel dealer to the build-
ing, except for any service furnished to any dwelling
unit of the building on an individually metered or billed
basis for the exclusive use of the occupants of that
dwelling unit, provided an owner, agent, lessor or man-
ager shall be liable for service provided on an individu-
ally metered or billed basis pursuant to subsection (g)
of this section from ten days after the date of written
request by the company, supplier, utility or dealer if
the company, supplier, utility or dealer is denied access
to its individual meters or other facilities located on
the premises of the building. Such owner, agent, lessor
or manager shall only be liable when such owner, agent,
lessor or manager controls access to such individual
meters to which access is denied. If service is not pro-
vided on an individually metered or billed basis and the
owner, agent, lessor or manager fails to pay for such
service, any occupant who receives service in his own
name may deduct, in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (d) of this section, a reasonable estimate
of the cost of any portion of such service which is for
the use of occupants of dwelling units other than such
occupant’s dwelling unit.’’ (Emphasis added.) General
Statutes § 16-262e (c).
The meaning of this language is unmistakable. It pro-
vides that a landlord who does not individually meter
or bill utilities for a tenant’s exclusive use ‘‘shall be
liable’’ for the costs of the building’s utility expenses.
General Statutes § 16-262e (c). The meaning of the term
‘‘liable’’ in this context is plain and unambiguous: the
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landlord is legally responsible to pay for the cost of
utility services provided to residential dwellings that
are billed using a master meter. To whom is the landlord
liable? The answer is equally clear: the landlord is liable
to the utility company. In this regard, I perceive no
ambiguity in the statute whatsoever. Logic dictates that
the liability could not run to anyone else but the utility
company because the service is provided by the utility
company and the debt is owed to the utility company.
The statute contains no suggestion of any other possibil-
ity. Indeed, as I previously discussed, the entire statute
is directed to one end, which is to prevent the utility
company from terminating service to tenants as a result
of the landlord’s failure to pay its bills. The risk of
termination arises only when the utility company is
not paid, and it therefore makes perfect sense that the
liability at issue is the obligation to pay the utility
company.
The majority contends that the term ‘‘liable’’ is ambig-
uous because § 16-262e (c) creates an exception to the
landlord’s liability when a tenant’s utilities are serviced
on an individually metered or billed basis, and the
majority therefore finds it unclear whether the tenant’s
liability is owed to the utility company or the landlord.
From this premise, the majority concludes that the stat-
ute is ambiguous ‘‘[b]ecause the language of the statute
and the dictionary definitions of ’liable’ do not specify
to whom a tenant would have to be liable to violate
the statute . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) I am unable
to make sense of this argument. The fact that the tenant
may be liable to the utility company under specified
circumstances (i.e., when the unit is individually
metered or billed) gives rise to no ambiguity about the
identity of the obligee, that is, the entity to whom the
liability runs. Whether the liable party is the landlord
or the tenant, the payment obligation referred to in § 16-
262e (c) unequivocally is the obligation owed to the
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utility company. This point is obvious not only from
the statutory text, but also upon examination of the
statute as a whole, the manifest purpose of which is
to ensure that the landlord’s failure to pay the utility
company does not result in the termination of service
to the tenants.5
Nor can the majority import ambiguity from the fact
that § 16-262e (c) permits a tenant, in the event a land-
lord fails to meet its utility payment obligations, to pay
the utility company directly and then to deduct from
rent ‘‘a reasonable estimate of the cost of any portion
of such service which is for the use of occupants of
dwelling units other than such occupant’s dwelling
unit.’’ Nothing in this provision creates any ambiguity
about what the statute means when it provides that the
landlord ‘‘shall be liable’’ for utility costs billed on a
master meter, or about whether the statute permits a
landlord to recoup its duly paid utility costs from its
tenants. The provision serves only to support the con-
clusion that the payor may recoup the costs spent on
behalf of others who benefit from the utility service,
which is precisely what landlords do when they recoup
5 Indeed, careful examination reveals that not one word in the statute
imposes liability on the tenant. Section 16-262e (c) provides that a landlord
‘‘shall be liable’’ and, in certain circumstances ‘‘shall only be liable,’’ but it
does not use the term ‘‘liable’’ in connection with tenants. No doubt, the
tenant is liable for his or her own exclusive utility usage when that usage
is individually metered or billed. But, unlike the provisions addressing the
landlord’s obligations, which expressly impose liability on the landlord, the
statute does not expressly impose liability on the tenant. The reason it does
not do so is that the statute is not concerned with the tenant’s failure to
meet his or her payment obligations; the tenant’s nonpayment does not
result in the evil addressed by the statute, which is termination of service
to all tenants as a result of the landlord’s failure to pay its liabilities. Subsec-
tion (h), which refers only to the right of recovery against the landlord,
illustrates this point. See General Statutes § 16-262e (h) (‘‘[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to prevent the company, electric supplier, munici-
pal utility, heating fuel dealer or occupant from pursuing any other action
or remedy at law or equity that it may have against the’’ landlord).
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their utility costs using either the ‘‘building in’’ or
RUB methodology.
There is additional evidence demonstrating that the
statute is unambiguous as it relates to the ability of a
landlord to recover its duly paid utility expenses from
its tenants. Landlord-tenant relations are governed pri-
marily by title 47a of the General Statutes, and it is
unthinkable that the legislature would include in title
16 a provision prohibiting recoupment without simulta-
neously ensuring that such a provision is fully consis-
tent with the bedrock terms of landlord-tenant law set
forth in title 47a. See, e.g., State v. Bemer, 339 Conn.
528, 541, 262 A.3d 1 (2021) (‘‘[t]he legislature is always
presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent
body of law . . . [so that] [i]n determining the meaning
of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at
issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to
ensure the coherency of our construction’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). General Statutes § 47a-3
provides that ‘‘[a] landlord and a tenant may include in
a rental agreement terms and conditions not prohibited
by law, including rent, term of the agreement and other
provisions governing the rights and obligations of the
parties.’’ General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 47a-46 then
lists the terms that are prohibited in any rental agree-
ment. Relevant to the present case is § 47a-4 (a) (10),
which provides that ‘‘[a] rental agreement shall not pro-
vide that the tenant . . . agrees to pay a heat or utilities
surcharge if heat or utilities is included in the rental
agreement.’’ The only plausible construction of this pro-
vision is that a landlord is permitted to include a provi-
sion in the rental agreement that operates to recover
its utility costs from its tenants, so long as the landlord
does not add a surcharge. No one in the present case
6 Hereinafter, all references to § 47a-4 are to the version of that statute
in the 2024 supplement to the General Statutes.
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claims that the RUB recoupment method constitutes a
surcharge under § 47a-4 (a) (10).
In fact, it is undisputed that utility costs can be
included as a part of rent or charged as a separate item
under the rental agreement. General Statutes (Supp.
2024) § 47a-1 (h) defines ‘‘[r]ent’’ as ‘‘all periodic pay-
ments to be made to the landlord under the rental agree-
ment.’’ Consistent with this definition, Connecticut law
permits private parties to include in their rental agree-
ment the tenant’s obligation to pay the cost of utilities,
as well as other costs incidental to the maintenance
and ownership of the property. See Presidential Vil-
lage, LLC v. Perkins, 332 Conn. 45, 59, 209 A.3d 616
(2019) (recognizing that private parties, unlike land-
lords receiving subsidies from federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development, are ‘‘free to define
’rent’ as they see fit’’); Elliott Enterprises, LLC v. Goo-
dale, 166 Conn. App. 461, 463–64, 142 A.3d 335 (2016)
(defining rent to include ‘‘FIXED MINIMUM MONTHLY
RENTAL . . . together with the TENANTS’ pro-rata
share of . . . UTILITIES’’ (emphasis omitted; footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)).
Despite all of this, the majority concludes that peri-
odic payments to the landlord under the rental agree-
ment using the RUB methodology are utility payments
prohibited by statute, rather than payments to cover
the landlord’s utility costs, because the monthly
amounts are not ‘‘consistent and predictable’’ in
advance. But nothing in Connecticut law imposes these
requirements if the rental agreement provides other-
wise. See General Statutes § 47a-3. Landlords and ten-
ants are permitted to include in their rental agreement
any terms and conditions on which they agree, so long
as those terms and conditions are ‘‘not prohibited by law
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 47a-3. The RUB recoupment
method is not prohibited by title 47a or § 16-262e. It is
that simple.
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It is also self-evident that RUB does not require a
tenant to pay the costs attributable to other tenants’
utility consumption any more than does the ‘‘building
in’’ method deemed acceptable by the majority. To the
contrary, the ‘‘building in’’ method likely results in less
accurate cost calculations because it is based on histori-
cal data rather than actual current utility costs. More-
over, the ‘‘building in’’ approach provides landlords with
an incentive to overestimate their monthly utility costs
to safeguard against the possibility that they will be
required to absorb the cost of unexpected increases in
utility prices or usage. Although neither method allo-
cates utility costs among tenants strictly on the basis
of actual, exclusive usage per tenant, that is a feature
common to both methods and plainly cannot be used
to justify deeming one method lawful and the other
legally prohibited.
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear to me that § 16-
262e (c) plainly and unambiguously does not prohibit
a landlord from recouping its utility costs via the RUB
methodology. Although the statute ‘‘is remedial in
nature and must be construed broadly to that end . . .
[w]e are not free . . . to create ambiguity when none
exists; in other words, we cannot accomplish a result
that is contrary to the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the [statute’s] plain language.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, 285
Conn. 778, 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008); see also State v.
Orr, 291 Conn. 642, 654, 969 A.2d 750 (2009) (‘‘our case
law is clear that ambiguity exists only if the statutory
language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausi-
ble interpretation’’). Stated another way, a reviewing
court cannot ‘‘torture words to import ambiguity [when]
the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Honulik v.
Greenwich, 293 Conn. 698, 710, 980 A.2d 880 (2009).
The language of § 16-262e leaves no room for ambiguity,
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and the majority’s expansive construction of the statute
is unwarranted.
Finally, even if I were to conclude that the statute is
ambiguous and therefore agree that it is proper to resort
to extratextual evidence of legislative intent, I would
arrive at the same result. The legislative history reflects
that § 16-262e was intended to impose liability on the
landlord for utility services delivered to a multiunit
apartment building with a master meter and thereby
prevent the utility company from terminating service
due to the landlord’s failure to timely pay the utility
bill. It was contemplated that landlords paying such
utility costs could and would recoup those costs from
their tenants by charging higher or additional rent. For
example, Attorney Raphael L. Podolsky of the Legal
Services Training and Advocacy Project, one of the
drafters of the bill, testified that, ‘‘[i]f, for whatever
reason, the building is so constructed [so as to make
individual metering impracticable], or the [master]
metering system is so arranged, you can’t [individually
meter each unit], then that [utility service payment]
becomes
a
landlord
responsibility.
The
landlord
[builds] the costs to that into the rent, so for example
. . . where there’s a central furnace in a [multifamily]
building, the landlord would pay for the heat, and he
would obviously include heat in the rent. The rent is
going to be higher in that kind of a building.’’ (Empha-
sis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Energy and Public Utilities, Pt. 1, 1984 Sess., p. 387.
Podolosky further explained that the statute ‘‘does not
in any way preclude a property owner from charging
a tenant for heat or other utilities.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Id., 459. Thus, the legislature did not intend to bar land-
lords from recovering their utility costs by billing ten-
ants for a reasonable estimate of their individual utility
usage, regardless of whether that estimate is arrived at
Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority
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, 0
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by using the RUB method, the ‘‘building in’’ method, or
some other recoupment method.
I recognize that there may be sound public policy
reasons to prohibit or limit a landlord’s use of the RUB
recoupment method. As the majority points out, RUB
does not result in ‘‘consistent and predictable payments
each month and places the risk that the tenants may
use more utilities than anticipated each month’’ on a
tenant who ‘‘has no control over the utility usage of
other units within the building . . . .’’ However, it is
up to the legislature, not the courts, to determine
whether to bar the use of the RUB recoupment method
or to impose statutory protections restricting its imple-
mentation. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-1314.01
and 33-2107 (2021); Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 8-212.4
(c) and (d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 504B.215 (2a) (West 2023); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-8-20
(F) (Cum. Supp. 2015); Or. Rev. Stat. § 90.562 (2023);
Va. Code Ann. § 55.1-1212 (D) (2022).7 See generally
Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636,
659, 224 A.3d 147 (2020) (observing that ‘‘the primary
responsibility for formulating public policy must remain
with the legislature’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,
279 Conn. 207, 216, 901 A.2d 673 (2006) (‘‘It is axiomatic
that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accom-
plish a particular result. That is a function of the legisla-
ture.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
7 The majority notes that ‘‘several states have legislation that explicitly
permits the use of RUB’’ and ‘‘provide numerous protections for tenants.’’
It appears, however, that several states, such as California, Georgia, Indiana,
Illinois, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Washington, do not have statutes that
expressly permit or limit the use of RUB, but landlords in those states
employ the RUB methodology to recoup their utility costs from tenants.
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Utility Submetering (last
updated January 15, 2016), available at https://www.ncsl.org/energy/utility-
submetering (last visited April 29, 2024); see also Synergy Utility Billing, Our
Services: RUBS Billing, available at https://www.synergyutilitybilling.com/
services/rubs-billing/ (last visited April 29, 2024).
Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority