Title: HADFORD v HADFORD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-268
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 1980

No. 80-268 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 W E N D E L L D. HADFORD, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, ELIZABETH M. HADFORD, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e District, I n and f o r t h e County of G a l l a t i n Hon. W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Landoe, Brown, Planalp, Komrners and Lineberger, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Morrow, Sedivy, Olson and Scully, Bozeman, Montana Filed: AUG S Ti 198Q Submitted on b r i e f s : August 7 , 1980 Decided: AUG 2 7 1980 . lisiuwy- Clerk ORDER AND O P I N I O N M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy delivered t h e Order and Opinion of t h e Court. Appellant Wendell D. Hadford a p p l i e s t o t h i s Court f o r r e l i e f from an o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, dated J u l y 23, 1980, r e q u i r i n g a p p e l l a n t t o f i l e i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court within f i v e days of t h e order a supersedeas bond and a l s o providing t h a t i f he f a i l e d t o f i l e t h e supersedeas bond, a motion t o dismiss t h e appeal would be granted. The o r i g i n a l a c t i o n is cause no. 21177, pending i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth D i s t r i c t , f o r G a l l a t i n County. Wendell D. Hadford, as p l a i n t i f f , was ordered i n a judgment entered by t h e D i s t r i c t Court on A p r i l 2 9 , 1980, t o execute a deed t o t h e defendant, Elizabeth M. Hadford, t o c e r t a i n r e a l property i n Bozeman, G a l l a t i n County, and a b i l l of s a l e f o r a laundromat s i t u a t e d i n t h a t c i t y , t o pay Elizabeth M. Hadford $3,554.44 f o r delinquent support payments f o r c h i l d r e n , and t o pay a t t o r n e y fees. Wendell Hadford f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of appeal on May 21, 1980. O n J u l y 9 , 1980, Elizabeth Hadford moved t o dismiss t h e appeal f o r t h e reason t h a t Wendell had f a i l e d t o f i l e an undertaking o r supersedeas bond i n connection with h i s appeal. O n J u l y 17, 1980, an undertaking f o r c o s t s of appeal was f i l e d by Wendell but no supersedeas bond has been furnished by him. Elizabeth f i l e d h e r motion t o dismiss t h e appeal because a supersedeas bond had not been f i l e d nor had t h e deed been executed within t h e t e n days required i n t h e o r i g i n a l D i s t r i c t Court order. Wendell thereupon f i l e d h i s objections t o t h e motion t o dismiss and applied t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r a s t a y of judgment pursuant t o t h e Rule 7 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P. I t was a f t e r t h e s e motions t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court entered its order of July 23, 1980, requiring t h e a p p e l l a n t t o f i l e a supersedeas bond on t h e penalty of having h i s appeal t o t h i s Court dismissed a f t e r f i v e days. -2- he single issue raised is whether the District Court has the power to dismiss the appeal because the appellant has not filed a supersedeas bond. Resolution of the issue requires an examination of the provisions of the Montana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure respecting supersedeas bonds. Under Rule 4(a), M.R.App.Civ.P., an appeal is taken by filing the notice of appeal in the District Court. It is further stated in that rule that the failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. Under the Montana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure, therefore, the only jurisdictional step required of an appellant to vest the Supreme Court with authority in the cause is the filing of the notice of appeal. By virtue of the same rule, the failure to take any other step in connection with the appeal, which would include the filing of a super- sedeas bond, is subject only to such action as the Supreme Court may take. It is exclusively in the province of the Supreme Court under Rule 4(a), M.R.App.Civ.P., as to whether an appeal should be dismissed for failure to take additional steps, once jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is vested by the filing of the notice of the appeal. In this case the District Court was operating under Rule 7, M.R.App.Civ.P. That rule generally relates to the powers of the District Court with respect to undertakings and supersedeas bonds after a judgment has been entered in the District Court. Generally speaking the rule provides that the District Court may grant an ex parte stay of execution after the judgment is entered for such period of time and upon such conditions as the District Court deems proper. Once the service of the notice of appeal has been accomplished, then the District Court may on application of the appellant, order a stay of execution for a longer period, provided the appellant presents to the District Court a supersedeas bond conditioned upon satisfaction of a judgment or order in full, together with costs, interest and damages for delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed, or if the judgment or order of the District Court is affirmed. Two other provisions of Rule 7(a), M.R.App.Civ.P., relate to the case here. Rule 7(a), also states that when the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be fixed by the District Court at such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on appeal, and interest and damages for delay, unless the District Court after hearing determines a different amount is proper. In addition, the rule provides that if the judgment determines the disposition of property, the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be fixed at such sum as will secure for the judgment holder, an amount for the use and detention of the property, costs of action, costs of appeal, interest and damages for delay. Clearly under Rule 7, M.R.App.Civ.P., the ~istrict Court is given the power to stay the execution of a judgment entered in its court and has broad discretion in fixing the amount of supersedeas bond upon which the stay of execution may be conditioned. Just as clearly, however, the ~istrict Court has no authority to order the dismissal of an appeal, which authority is in the exclusive province of the Supreme Court. We held that a District Court could not dismiss an appeal for the failure to file a supersedeas bond in Bryant Development Association v. Dagel (1974), 166 Mont. 8, 531 P.2d 1319. -4- When t h e D i s t r i c t Court provides f o r a supersedeas bond, and t h e supersedeas bond is n o t f i l e d , then of course, t h e r e i s no s t a y o f execution, and t h e r e is a v a i l a b l e t o t h e judgment holder a l l of h i s r i g h t s and remedies of attachment and execution f o r t h e purpose of securing s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e judgment. This is provided i n Rule 6 4 , M.R.Civ.P., which states: "At t h e commencement of and during t h e course of an a c t i o n , a l l remedies providing f o r s e i z u r e of person o r property f o r t h e purpose of securing s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e judgment u l t i m a t e l y t o be entered i n t h e a c t i o n are a v a i l a b l e under t h e circumstances and i n t h e manner provided by law." I n addition, Rule 70, M.R.Civ.P., provides t h a t i f a judgment d i r e c t s a p a r t y t o execute a conveyance of land o r t o perform any o t h e r s p e c i f i c a c t , and t h e p a r t y f a i l s t o comply within t h e t i m e s p e c i f i e d , t h e D i s t r i c t Court may d i r e c t t h e act t o be done a t t h e c o s t of t h e disobedient p a r t y by some o t h e r person appointed by t h e c o u r t , and t h e a c t when s o done has l i k e e f f e c t a s i f done by t h e p a r t i e s . These remedies, of course, a r e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e judgment holder where no supersedeas bond has been provided, and no s t a y of judgment e x i s t s . That p o r t i o n of t h e order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court dated J u l y 23, 1980, which states t h a t , " f a i l u r e t o f i l e t h e supersedeas bond s h a l l r e s u l t i n t h e granting of t h e motion t o dismiss" i s hereby vacated. The remainder of such o r d e r s h a l l be and remain i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t . Neither p a r t y s h a l l recover c o s t s f o r t h i s proceeding u n t i l t h e eventual d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e appeal. The c l e r k of t h i s Court s h a l l cause a copy of t h i s o r d e r and opinion t o be mailed t o t h e c l e r k of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n and f o r t h e County of G a l l a t i n , i n cause no. 21177, pending i n t h a t D i s t r i c t Court. DATED this day of August, 1980. Justice We Concur: i / Chief Justice