Title: Village of Hobart v. Brown County
Citation: 2005 WI 78
Docket Number: 2003AP001907
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2005

2005 WI 78 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1907 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Village of Hobart,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Brown County and Brown County Solid Waste  
Management Board,  
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 66 
Reported at:  271 Wis. 2d 268, 678 N.W.2d 402 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Peter Naze   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and BUTLER, J.J., join the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by William F. White, Mary C. Turke, Christine Cooney 
Mansour and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, and oral 
argument by Mary C. Turke. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Richard C. 
Yde and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, and oral argument by 
Richard C. Yde. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Joseph P. Guidote, Jr., 
Appleton, on behalf of Outagamie and Winnebago Counties. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman, 
Madison, on behalf of League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
2005 WI 78 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2003AP1907  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 1805) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Village of Hobart,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Brown County and Brown County Solid Waste  
Management Board,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioners Brown County and 
Brown County Solid Waste Management Board (County) appeal a 
decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's 
order to grant summary judgment in its favor and dismiss the 
complaint filed by the Village of Hobart (Village) for a 
permanent injunction.  The Village seeks to enjoin the County 
from operating a transfer station at the Brown County West 
Landfill.  The County attempts to dismiss the Village's claim on 
the theory of equitable estoppel.   
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We conclude that summary judgment was improperly 
granted to the County.  There are still genuine issues of 
material fact, as well as reasonable alternative inferences to 
be drawn from undisputed material facts, sufficient to warrant a 
trial.  This case should be remanded to the circuit court to 
determine if building the transfer station violated a zoning 
ordinance, or any related ordinance, of the Village.  If the 
court finds such a violation, and the Village continues in its 
attempt to enforce that ordinance, the circuit court must weigh 
the equitable considerations, including the County's equitable 
defenses, pursuant to this court's ruling in Forest County v. 
Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998).  We therefore 
affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing the summary 
judgment of the circuit court and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
I 
¶3 
All residential, commercial, and industrial solid 
waste generated by the Oneida Tribe of Indians and the 13 
incorporated municipalities in Brown County is received and 
disposed of by the County.  The majority of the solid waste was 
disposed of at the Brown County East Landfill, until it reached 
capacity in May 2003.  In anticipation of this, the County 
entered into the "Tri-County Solid Waste Agreement" with 
Outagamie and Winnebago Counties.  Pursuant to this agreement, 
the County is allowed to dispose of its solid waste at the 
landfill of one of the participating counties. 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
3 
 
¶4 
In 
order 
to 
address 
concerns 
regarding 
the 
transportation of refuse to such a landfill, the County decided 
to construct a new solid waste transfer station to consolidate 
the waste before hauling it to a landfill in Outagamie or 
Winnebago County.  The County proposed the construction and 
operation of this transfer station at the West Landfill, located 
in the Village.  The County had purchased this property in May 
1976, and operated it as an active landfill until July 1998.  
Before its official closure, the County managed the property as 
an "open area/wildlife refuge."  After July 1998, a portion of 
the former landfill was opened as a pet exercise area.   
¶5 
 On February 18, 2002, the Village and the County met, 
at the Village's request, to discuss the construction of the 
transfer station at the West Landfill.  During this meeting, the 
Village represented to the County that the proposed transfer 
station would comply with the West Landfill's current use and 
zoning.  A second meeting between these parties was held one 
week later, on February 25, 2002, where the County suggested an 
agreement in which it would own the transfer station and pay the 
Village an annual franchise fee of $14,000.            
¶6 
The Village unanimously accepted the County's proposal 
at a public meeting of the Village Board on March 5, 2002.1  
                                                 
1 The motion was transcribed as follows:  
Motion by Dave Dillenburg to accept proposal #3 which 
states Brown County to design, permit and build 
transfer station at the West Landfill, Brown County to 
contract 
for 
operation 
of 
transfer 
station 
and 
transport of refuse to the landfill, Brown County 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
4 
 
During the meeting, the Village Chairman stated to those present 
that the County did not require approval from the Village for 
the construction of the transfer station, because the West 
Landfill was properly zoned and the transfer station would be a 
permitted use in the zoning district.   
¶7 
On May 6, 2002, the Village Board, pursuant to its 
March 5 vote, presented the County with a "Memorandum of 
Understanding" (MOU), which set forth the Village's approval of 
the construction and operation of the transfer station, and 
informed the County of the Village's commitment to negotiate a 
30-year contract with the County.  The MOU provided, in relevant 
part: "It is the Town of Hobart's intention, per the above-
approved motion, to approve the construction and operation of a 
landfill transfer station at the Brown County West Landfill site 
in the Town of Hobart."2  The Village and County signed the MOU 
on May 1, 2002, and May 6, 2002, respectively.    
 
¶8 
After receiving the MOU, the County requested a zoning 
map from the Village.  The Village Clerk provided the County 
                                                                                                                                                             
would provide all maintenance on building & roadways, 
town of Hobart would have no liability for transfer 
station operation and to negotiate a contract for 30 
years at $14,000 annually beginning January 2003 and 
adjusted annually by the CPI-U index. . . .  
2 During the course of these proceedings, the Town of Hobart 
became the Village of Hobart.     
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
5 
 
with a map that was dated May 17, 2002.  The map showed the West 
Landfill area as "Public Property."3  
¶9 
Village officials informed its residents about the 
transfer station in a letter dated August 13, 2002.  The letter, 
titled "Village Of Hobart Concerns Regarding The Solid Waste 
Transfer Station On The Brown County West Landfill Property," 
explained that the County could have constructed the transfer 
station without Village approval or involvement, because it was 
a "permitted use."  The letter also informed residents that the 
Board would be discussing the transfer station further on August 
20, 2002, and encouraged all interested parties to attend.  
¶10 On 
August 
21, 
2002, 
the 
Village's 
Site 
Review 
Committee unanimously approved the County's application.  In 
reliance on this approval, the County hired a general contractor 
to begin construction of the transfer station.  The contract was 
awarded for $1,332,076 and required construction to commence on 
or before October 14, 2002.   
¶11 On September 24, 2002, the Village Board, in response 
to a negative reaction from residents, voted to reject the 
permit and building of the waste transfer site.  The Village 
Board informed the County of its decision, and its rescission of 
the MOU, in a letter dated October 1, 2002.  The Village Clerk 
                                                 
3 It is now claimed that the West Landfill is actually zoned 
as an "A-2 exclusive agricultural district."  If that is 
correct, then pursuant to Village of Hobart Wis. Ordinance 
§ 6.010, the transfer station is neither a permitted use nor a 
conditional use.   
 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
6 
 
then declined to issue the County a sewer permit number to enter 
on its building permit application.  The clerk stated that she 
had been instructed not to issue the County any permits 
regarding the transfer station.   
¶12 The County sought advice from its corporation counsel 
on whether it could proceed with the construction of the 
transfer station without the permits.4  The corporation counsel 
informed the County that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 13.48(13)(a) 
(2001-02),5 it did not need a building permit from the Village 
                                                 
4 As of October 1, 2002, the County had spent approximately 
$130,000 in fees, although construction had not yet begun.   
5 Unless otherwise indicated all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 13.48(13)(a) states in relevant part:  
Except as provided in par. (b) or (c), every building, 
structure or facility that is constructed for the 
benefit of or use of the state, any state agency, 
board, commission or department . . . shall be in 
compliance with all applicable state laws, rules, 
codes and regulations but the construction is not 
subject to the ordinances or regulations of the 
municipality in which the construction takes place 
except zoning, including without limitation because of 
enumeration ordinances or regulations relating to 
materials used, permits, supervision of construction 
or installation, payment of permit fees, or other 
restrictions.  
   
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
7 
 
prior to construction.  After the County received this letter, 
it commenced construction on October 9, 2002.6  
¶13 The Village filed this lawsuit on October 24, 2002, 
seeking a permanent injunction to prohibit the County from 
constructing and operating the transfer station at the West 
Landfill. 
 
In 
its 
complaint, 
the 
Village 
alleged 
that 
construction of the transfer station was in violation of the 
Village's zoning ordinance, that the County had not obtained any 
building permits for construction, that the construction and 
operation of the transfer station was contrary to Village of 
Hobart Solid Waste and Nuisance Ordinance Section 10.1,7 and that 
the County failed to comply with Wis. Stat. § 289.22.   
¶14 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.  On 
May 6, 2003, the Brown County Circuit Court, Peter J. Naze, 
Judge, granted the County's motion for summary judgment, denied 
the Village's motion, and dismissed its complaint.  The court 
                                                 
6  We note that the transfer station's construction has been 
completed and that the County has been operating the facility 
since 
May 
2003. 
 
The 
total 
cost 
of 
construction 
was 
approximately $1.3 million.   
7 Section 10.105 of the Village of Hobart Solid Waste and 
Nuisance Ordinance states:  
CONSTRUCTING, MAINTAINING AND OPERATING A SOLID WASTE 
FACILITY.  No Person shall construct, maintain or 
operate a solid waste facility for disposal, storage 
or treatment of solid waste within the TOWN, unless 
the Person has received a valid license from the TOWN 
Board 
specifically 
authorizing 
construction, 
maintenance and operation of a solid waste facility.  
Upon issuance of the license, the licensee shall fully 
comply with conditions therein. 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
8 
 
concluded, first, that "the Village should be estopped from 
asserting that the County has violated the zoning ordinance."  
Second, the court held that the County, as an "arm of the State, 
is not required to obtain local approval since the statutes 
involved do not apply to Transfer Stations."  The Village 
appealed.   
¶15 The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment 
ordered by the circuit court and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  It held that "a circuit court can apply equitable 
estoppel 
to 
bar 
a 
municipality 
from 
enforcing 
a 
zoning 
ordinance."  Vill. of Hobart v. Brown County, 2004 WI App 66, 
¶2, 271 Wis. 2d 268, 678 N.W.2d 402.  However, the court 
determined that the requirements for equitable estoppel had not 
been established in this case.  Further, the court relied on the 
case Forest County v. Goode for the proposition that a court 
sitting 
in 
equity 
should 
weigh 
"traditional 
equitable 
considerations" before deciding whether or not to issue an 
injunction for a zoning ordinance violation.  See Vill. of 
Hobart, 271 Wis. 2d 268, ¶16.     
¶16 In determining that the County did not establish the 
necessary elements for equitable estoppel, the court of appeals 
held that the County did not show that it reasonably relied upon 
the Village's preconstruction actions when it decided to begin 
construction of the transfer station.  Instead, the court 
determined that the County relied on the advice of its 
corporation counsel before commencing construction.  Finally, 
the court held that the transfer station's construction and 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
9 
 
operation 
could 
not 
be 
justified 
by 
either 
Wis. Stat. § 13.48(13)(a) or on a vested rights theory.8   
¶17 On March 25, 2004, the County filed a petition for 
review with this court.  We accepted review and now affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand the matter to the 
circuit court.     
II 
¶18 We 
first 
address 
whether 
summary 
judgment 
was 
appropriately granted.  Although our review of the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment is de novo, we apply the same 
methodology as used by the circuit court and court of appeals, 
and, of course, benefit from those analyses.  See Atkins v. 
Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶11, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
691 N.W.2d 334.  Summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
¶19 Our first step in this analysis is to determine 
whether the pleadings set forth a sufficient claim for relief.  
Trinity Evangelical v. Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, ¶32, 261 
Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789.  "If such a claim is set forth, and 
                                                 
8 We assume, without deciding, that the County is an "arm of 
the state."  We note, however, that Wis. Stat. § 13.48(13)(a) 
requires compliance with the zoning ordinances and regulations 
of the municipality involved.       
 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
10 
 
the moving party has established a prima facie case for summary 
judgment, 'we examine the record to determine whether there 
"exist[s] disputed material facts, or undisputed material facts 
from which reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn, 
sufficient to entitle the opposing party to a trial."'"  Cent. 
Corp. 
v. 
Research 
Prods. 
Corp., 
2004 
WI 
76, 
¶18, 
272 
Wis. 2d 561, 681 N.W.2d 178 (quoting Trinity, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 
¶32).   
¶20 We conclude, based on our review of the record, that 
there are genuine issues of material fact and reasonable 
alternative inferences that may be drawn from undisputed 
material facts in this case.  Those genuine issues and 
reasonable 
alternative 
inferences 
include 
at 
least 
the 
following: whether the map provided by the Village to the County 
was a Village zoning map, what was the proper zoning and whether 
the County complied with such zoning ordinance and any related 
ordinance, what representations were made by the Village Board 
to the County about the proposed siting for the transfer station 
and whether such representations created any zoning problems, 
and whether the letter from the County's corporation counsel 
advised the County that the zoning for the transfer station was 
proper, and thus affected the County's claimed reliance on the 
Village's representations. 
¶21 While the above list may not be complete, it clearly 
demonstrates that there are genuine issues of material fact and 
reasonable alternative inferences to be drawn from undisputed 
material facts.  Under such circumstances, the circuit court 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
11 
 
should not have granted the County's motion for summary judgment 
when it did.         
III 
¶22 Upon remand, the circuit court must address whether 
the construction and operation of the transfer station violated 
a zoning ordinance, or any related ordinance, of the Village.  
The County argues that the court of appeals erred in assuming 
the transfer station violated Village zoning.  Specifically, the 
County argues that the transfer station is either zoned "Public 
Property" as indicated in the map provided by the Village or the 
ordinance is ambiguous and should be construed as including a 
public use zoning classification.  Conversely, the Village 
argues 
that 
no 
reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
its 
zoning 
ordinances would permit the construction of the transfer 
station.  The Village argues that the map that it furnished to 
the County cannot, by itself, create new zoning districts.     
 
¶23 The circuit court apparently did not address the 
question of whether there was a violation of the Village 
ordinance, but rather held that the Village was estopped from 
asserting such a violation.  The court of appeals, on the other 
hand, assumed, based on its review of the record, that the 
County violated a Village ordinance.  We recognize that if the 
circuit court determines on remand that there was no violation 
of Village ordinances, the Village's claim for injunctive relief 
must, of course, fail.   
 
 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
12 
 
IV 
 
¶24 If the circuit court determines that the County 
violated a Village ordinance, the next issue is whether the 
Village can be estopped from asserting such a violation.  The 
County argues that a municipality can be estopped from asserting 
a violation of its ordinances.  Specifically, the County 
disputes the court of appeals' reliance on City of Milwaukee v. 
Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d 72, 142 N.W.2d 169 (1966).  The County 
contends, instead, that this court should rely on Russell Dairy 
Stores v. Chippewa Falls, 272 Wis. 138, 74 N.W.2d 759 (1956), as 
it stands for the proposition that estoppel can lie against a 
municipality.  In contrast, the Village argues that the court of 
appeals correctly determined that a municipality is free to 
assert a violation of its ordinances, because any other decision 
would amount to a determination that the ordinance can be 
amended without complying with statutory requirements.     
 
¶25 We agree with the court of appeals that a municipality 
cannot be estopped from asserting a violation of its zoning 
ordinance in court.  See Vill. of Hobart, 271 Wis. 2d 268, ¶25 
n.11.  In Leavitt, we stated that "this court is firmly 
committed to the principle that estoppel 'will not lie against a 
municipality so as to bar it from enforcing an ordinance enacted 
pursuant to the police power.'"  Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d at 76 
(footnote omitted).  In that case, the defendant contended that 
the city should have been estopped from revoking his occupancy 
permit and prosecuting the action, because in the past occupancy 
permits had been granted to tenants for uses violative of the 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
13 
 
zoning ordinance, and he had spent a considerable sum of money 
in reliance on the validity of the permit.  We disagreed and 
held that "erroneous acts of municipal officers do not afford a 
basis to estop the municipality from enforcing its ordinances 
enacted pursuant to the police power."  Id. at 76-77.  In other 
words, "citizens have a right to rely upon city officials not 
having acted in violation of the ordinance, and, when such 
officials do so act, their acts should not afford a basis for 
estopping the city from later enforcing the ordinance."  Id. at 
78-79.       
 
¶26 More recently, in Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of 
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693, we 
reaffirmed that the erroneous acts or representations of public 
officials cannot result in the estoppel of a municipality from 
asserting that there has been a violation of its zoning 
ordinance. 
 
There, 
the 
plaintiff 
sought 
to 
estop 
the 
municipality from asserting immunity as a defense and from 
preventing the operation of a game bird farm due to the 
misrepresentations of the Town Chairperson.  Relying on Leavitt, 
we denied the plaintiff's request for equitable estoppel of the 
town and county, where they were attempting to prevent the 
operation of a game bird farm.  We held: "Binding municipalities 
to every representation made by subordinate employees would 
produce 
severe 
results 
for 
the 
municipalities. 
 
Endless 
litigation would ensue over the words of those employees, and 
important 
municipal 
decisions 
would 
be 
delayed 
pending 
resolution of those suits."  Id., ¶50.   
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
14 
 
 
¶27 Moreover, we reject the County's reliance on Russell 
Dairy Stores.  In that case, a City of Chippewa Falls' ordinance 
prevented anyone from constructing a driveway by cutting or 
altering curbs.  The plaintiff was granted a permit by the city 
council to construct a driveway that altered a curb, as he 
agreed to provide a concrete apron to replace it.  The plaintiff 
constructed his driveway upon reliance on the permit.  A few 
months later, the city council revoked the plaintiff's permit.  
This court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent 
the city from revoking a permit that it had already granted.  We 
also recognized that the plaintiff had gained a vested right in 
the permit, which could not later be revoked.  See Russell Dairy 
Stores, 272 Wis. 2d at 145-46.   
 
¶28 Russell Dairy Stores is not controlling for several 
reasons.  First, the County did not have vested rights here like 
the plaintiff had in that case.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that "'in order for a developer's rights to vest, the 
developer must submit an application for a building permit which 
conforms to the zoning or building code requirements in effect 
at the time of the application.'"  Vill. of Hobart, 271 
Wis. 2d 268, ¶30 (quoting Lake Bluff Hous. v. City of S. 
Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 177, 540 N.W.2d 189 (1995)).  Here, 
the 
County 
claimed 
that 
the 
West 
Landfill's 
zoning 
classification was "public use," which apparently did not 
conform with the zoning requirements.  See id.  Next, the 
issuance of the permit in Russell Dairy Stores did not violate 
any law or the city's contract with the state, an issue that was 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
15 
 
involved in Willow Creek Ranch, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶57.  In the 
present case, however, there is an asserted violation of the 
Village zoning ordinance and related ordinances.   
 
¶29 Keeping the above cases in mind, we further recognize 
that we do not apply equitable estoppel "'as freely against 
governmental agencies as [we do] in the case of private 
persons.'"  DOR v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610, 638, 
279 N.W.2d 213 (1979) (quoting Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Dept. 
of Taxation, 260 Wis.  551, 51 N.W.2d 796 (1952)).  "'[I]t is 
not a happy occasion when the Government's hands, performing 
duties on behalf of the public, are tied by the acts and conduct 
of particular officials. . . .'"  Milas v. Labor Ass'n of 
Wisconsin, Inc., 214 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 571 N.W.2d 656 (1997) 
(quoting Schuster v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 312 F.2d 311, 
317 (9th Cir. 1962)).9  If we allow the estoppel doctrine to 
hinder the government's exercise of its police power, we will be 
"expos[ing] a significant number of persons to a risk the 
legislature has determined to be contrary to their safety, 
welfare, health or morals."  Moebius, 89 Wis. 2d at 640.  This 
                                                 
9 We have typically refused to apply estoppel against the 
government when its application would interfere with the police 
power for the protection of the public health, safety, or 
general welfare.  
See 
DOR 
v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 
Wis. 2d 610, 639, 279 N.W.2d 213 (1979) (citing State v. 
Chippewa Cable Co., 21 Wis. 2d 598, 608-09, 124 N.W.2d 616 
(1963); Park Bldg. Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 78, 87-88, 
100 
N.W.2d 571 
(1960); 
Town 
of 
Richmond 
v. 
Murdock, 
70 
Wis. 2d 642, 653-54, 235 N.W.2d 497 (1975); McKenna v. State 
Highway Comm'n, 28 Wis. 2d 179, 186, 135 N.W.2d 827 (1965); 
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc., 22 Wis. 2d 240, 252-53, 
125 N.W.2d 625 (1964)). 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
16 
 
is 
particularly 
true 
in 
the 
context 
of 
zoning. 
 
In 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(a), the legislature expressly states that 
zoning regulations are "for the purpose of promoting health, 
safety, morals or the general welfare of the community. . . ."   
 
¶30 We do not dispute that "zoning may be the most 
essential function performed by local government, since it 
allows a municipality to protect its citizens' quality of life."  
Lake Bluff Hous. v. City of S. Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 150, ¶25, 
246 Wis. 2d 785, 632 N.W.2d 485.  Thus, generally we will not 
allow estoppel to be invoked against the government for the 
erroneous acts or representations of its officials.  To do so 
would elevate the mistake of the official above the needs of the 
citizens and their right to rely on the laws enacted.  When we 
read the cases that we discussed herein, together with Forest 
County v. Goode and Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 17, 
269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470, we conclude that a municipality 
cannot be estopped from asserting a violation and seeking to 
enforce its ordinances, but that a circuit court has authority 
to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to grant 
enforcement.          
V 
 
¶31 The final issue we address is the proper procedure for 
the circuit court to apply if it finds that there was a 
violation of the Village's zoning ordinance, or any related 
ordinance, and the municipality asserts such a violation and 
attempts to enforce it.  In this case, the Village asked for a 
permanent injunction against the operation of the transfer 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
17 
 
station by the County, 
which 
clearly 
is 
a 
request for 
enforcement of its claimed applicable ordinances.   
¶32 This court has established that when a party seeks to 
enforce an ordinance by pursuing an injunction, or other such 
relief, the circuit court can exercise its discretion in 
deciding whether, and in what form, to grant the injunctive 
relief.  See Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 670.  
Specifically, we have determined that "[i]njunctive relief is 
not ordered as a matter of course, but instead rests on the 
sound discretion of the court, to be used in accordance with 
well-settled equitable principles and in light of all the facts 
and circumstances of the case."  Id.; see McKinnon v. Benedict, 
38 Wis. 2d 607, 616, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968).  Thus, in this case, 
the circuit court must determine if its equitable power to deny 
an 
injunction, 
or 
any 
other 
enforcement 
mechanisms, 
is 
appropriate under the totality of the circumstances presented.   
 
¶33 For guidance, we look to our decision in Forest County 
v. Goode.  In Goode, the county brought an action against the 
owner of lakefront property, seeking to enforce its zoning 
ordinance.  The zoning administrator met with Goode and, 
together, they measured and staked a distance of 50 feet from 
the ordinary high water mark to the location of his new house, 
as required under the county zoning ordinance.  Goode then 
obtained a building permit to construct his new house 50 feet 
from the ordinary high water mark.  Upon later determining that 
the distance did not meet the minimum setback requirement, the 
county sought to enforce the zoning ordinance.  Goode responded 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
18 
 
that the violation was unintentional.  In Goode, we determined 
that a circuit court retains its equitable power to deny 
injunctive relief, even if the plaintiff has proven a prima 
facie case of zoning ordinance violation.  See Goode, 219 
Wis. 2d at 669.   
¶34 In doing so, we provided guidance on how to apply 
equitable considerations:   
[T]he circuit court should take evidence and weigh any 
applicable 
equitable 
considerations 
including 
the 
substantial 
interest 
of 
the 
citizens 
of 
Wisconsin . . . the extent of the violation, the good 
faith 
of 
other parties, 
any available 
equitable 
defenses such as laches, estoppel or unclean hands, 
the degree of hardship compliance will create, and the 
role, if any, the government played in contributing to 
the violation.   
Id. at 684.  Ultimately, this court concluded that upon the 
determination of an ordinance violation, the proper procedure 
for a circuit court is to grant the injunction, except when it 
is presented with compelling equitable reasons to deny it.  Id.10 
 
¶35 As a result of this holding, it is argued that the 
zoning violator now has "'two kicks at the cat,' once to defend 
against the claim that there is a violation and, second, to 
defend against enforcement of a sanction for that violation."  
                                                 
10 This holding was reaffirmed recently by our decision in 
Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 17, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 
N.W.2d 470.  The court held that "when a governmental body 
exercises 
its 
authority 
pursuant 
to 
either 
Wis. Stat. §§ 59.69(11) or 62.23(8) and seeks injunctive relief, 
the circuit court retains the power to deny the relief sought 
and the property owners can defend themselves in equity."  Id., 
¶28. 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
19 
 
Vill. of Hobart, 271 Wis. 2d 268, ¶25 n.11 (quoting Town of 
Delafied v. Winkelman, 2003 WI App 92, ¶1, 264 Wis. 2d 264, 663 
N.W.2d 324).  The County now argues, in its second "kick at the 
cat," that if a violation is established the Village should be 
estopped from enforcing any applicable ordinance.  Specifically, 
it contends that it reasonably relied on the Village's zoning 
representation, and that such reliance was not negated by asking 
its corporation counsel for legal advice on the necessity of a 
building permit for the transfer station.  The County argues 
that the court should use its equitable powers and deny the 
Village an injunction against the County. The Village, on the 
other hand, claims that the County did not reasonably rely on 
any of its actions when it decided to commence construction of 
the transfer station.   
¶36 We recognize, as did the court of appeals, that the 
test for equitable estoppel consists of four elements: "'(1) 
action or non-action, (2) on the part of one against whom 
estoppel is asserted, (3) which induces reasonable reliance 
thereon by the other, either in action or non-action, and (4) 
which is to his or her detriment.'"  Vill. of Hobart, 271 
Wis. 2d 268, ¶18; see also Milas, 214 Wis. 2d at 8.  The court 
of appeals, based upon its review of the facts, held as a matter 
of law that the County did not prove all of the elements of 
equitable estoppel.  Vill. of Hobart, 271 Wis. 2d 268, ¶20.  
Specifically, the court determined that the County did not 
commence construction of the transfer station in reliance on the 
Village's representations, but rather on advice from its 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
20 
 
corporation counsel: "Counsel advised the County that, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 13.48(13)(a), the Village's turnabout could not 
stop the County from building the transfer station, even though 
the County did not have the necessary building permits. . . .  
It is undisputed that in reliance upon this advice, the County 
commenced construction."  Id.  
¶37 The issue regarding the meaning of and reliance on the 
corporation counsel's letter remains in dispute.  The court of 
appeals may have misinterpreted, and thus overemphasized, the 
County's reliance on the advice given by its corporation 
counsel.  A fair reading of the letter does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that the corporation counsel asserted that 
there was no zoning problem.11  The circuit court must determine 
                                                 
11 The letter from the corporation counsel is as follows:  
You have requested an opinion regarding two issues, 
both of which involve the proposed transfer station at 
the west landfill site located in the Village of 
Hobart.  The first question concerns a May 19, 1976 
resolution of the Brown County Board of Supervisors 
dealing with the west landfill site, copy attached.  
This resolution is clearly one which gives the Solid 
Waste 
Management Board 
authority 
to utilize the 
landfill site for as long as it deems necessary as 
part of the Solid Waste management system for Brown 
County.  This resolution is of no legal significance 
whatsoever 
in 
prohibiting 
the 
proposed 
transfer 
station on County owned property at the west landfill 
in 
the 
Village 
of 
Hobart. 
 
This 
property 
has 
continuously been used by the Solid Waste Management 
Board for waste management purposes, and a transfer 
station would be consistent with that continued use.  
Nothing in this resolution, and particularly in the 
operative "BE IT RESOLVED" paragraphs, removes any 
authority from the Solid Waste Management Board from 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
21 
 
whether there has been a violation of the Village's ordinances, 
and if the Village continues in its attempt to enforce its 
ordinances by seeking injunctive relief, whether, consistent 
with Forest County v. Goode and the equitable considerations 
outlined therein, the court should enforce any such ordinance 
and grant the Village an injunction.       
VI 
¶38 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
summary 
judgment 
was 
improperly granted to the County.  There are still genuine 
issues of material fact, as well as reasonable alternative 
inferences 
to 
be 
drawn 
from 
undisputed 
material 
facts, 
sufficient to warrant a trial.  We also conclude that this case 
should be remanded to the circuit court to determine if building 
                                                                                                                                                             
utilizing the west landfill site for a transfer 
station. 
The second issue involves the question of whether or 
not local permits are required for construction of the 
transfer station.  Sec. 13.48(13), Stats., provides 
that this type of project is not subject to local 
ordinances 
or 
regulations 
relating 
to 
permits, 
materials 
used, 
supervision 
of 
construction 
or 
installation, 
payment 
of 
permit 
fees, 
or 
other 
restrictions.  This provision was interpreted by the 
Attorney General's office in January, 1997 to the 
effect that County building projects are governed by 
this statute, and as a result, the Solid Waste 
Management Board is not required to obtain any Village 
permits for the construction of this transfer station.   
The relevant portion of the letter relied upon by the court 
of appeals reads as follows: "This property has continuously 
been used by the Solid Waste Management Board for waste 
management purposes, and a transfer station would be consistent 
with that. . . ." 
No. 
2003AP1907   
 
22 
 
the transfer station violated a zoning ordinance, or any related 
ordinances, of the Village.  If the court finds such a 
violation, and the Village continues in its attempt to enforce 
that ordinance, the circuit court must weigh the equitable 
considerations, 
including 
the 
County's 
equitable 
defenses, 
pursuant to this court's ruling in Forest County v. Goode.  For 
the above stated reasons, we affirm the court of appeals' 
decision reversing the summary judgment of the circuit court, 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.     
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 2003AP1907.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶39 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
mandate to remand this case to the circuit court for the 
resolution of disputed facts.  I also applaud the court's 
reaffirmation of Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 579 
N.W.2d 715 (1998).  But I disagree with some of the court's 
analysis and its conclusion that "a municipality cannot be 
estopped from asserting a violation of its zoning ordinance in 
court."  Majority op., ¶25.  As a legal proposition, the quoted 
statement is too broad, and it sends the wrong message to local 
governments.   
¶40 This case involves zoning.  There are many different 
scenarios in which zoning issues may be litigated.  They range 
from a private property owner's suit against a municipality for 
its refusal to issue a needed permit to a municipality's suit to 
raze a building that violates a zoning ordinance.   
¶41 A municipality that wishes to enforce a zoning 
ordinance may become involved in litigation as either a 
plaintiff or a defendant.  But, according to the majority, the 
party status of the municipality makes a big difference in the 
outcome of the dispute. 
¶42 In this case, Brown County and the Village of Hobart 
had extensive dealings over a period of six months.  The Village 
Board was cooperative and reassuring, and the County acted in 
reliance on its representations and official actions.  Then the 
Village changed its position and ordered its clerk to deny the 
County a sewer permit number for a building permit.  By the time 
the Village changed its position, the County had incurred 
No. 2003AP1907.dtp 
2 
 
approximately $130,000 in engineering fees and it had awarded a 
contract to build the transfer station.  The contract provided 
that construction was to commence no later than October 14, 
2002.  The County began construction without receiving building 
permits, 
arguably 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
Village's 
zoning 
ordinance. 
¶43 In theory, the County could have waited and sought a 
declaratory judgment against the Village on the zoning question 
or a writ of mandamus on the building permits.  However, its 
failure on a declaratory judgment would have hurt the County's 
position, and mandamus may not have been a viable remedy.  See 
Beres v. New Berlin, 34 Wis. 2d 229, 231-32, 148 N.W.2d 653 
(1967).  Taking the time to seek a conditional use permit from 
Village officials and then appealing their refusal to a board of 
adjustment, would not have been a fruitful option for the County 
in terms of either timing or result. 
¶44 Fortunately, 
the 
Village 
brought 
an 
enforcement 
action.  In this litigation the County was the defendant and it 
was entitled to raise all defenses that are authorized in Goode 
("Equitable defenses, such as laches, estoppel, or unclean hands 
should . . . be weighed in appropriate cases.").  Goode, 219 
Wis. 2d at 681-82 (emphasis added).   
¶45 In its decision, the court of appeals said: "We 
conclude that when considering whether to issue an injunction 
for a zoning violation, a circuit court can apply equitable 
estoppel 
to 
bar 
a 
municipality 
from 
enforcing 
a 
zoning 
ordinance."  Vill. of Hobart v. Brown County, 2004 WI App 66, 
¶2, 
271 
Wis. 2d 268, 
678 
N.W.2d 402 
(emphasis 
added).  
No. 2003AP1907.dtp 
3 
 
"[E]quitable estoppel can be a basis upon which the trial court 
refuses to grant injunctive relief for a zoning violation."  
Id., ¶16.   
¶46 I agree with this conclusion but am not certain where 
the majority stands.  Even if the majority agrees with the court 
of appeals, it is forcing a landowner like Brown County to 
violate the zoning ordinance before it can obtain equitable 
relief.  This strikes me not only as risky for the landowner but 
also nonsensical as a principle of law.   
¶47 What I do not understand, given the court of appeals' 
conclusion about equitable estoppel as a defense, is why that 
court cited City of Milwaukee v. Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d 72, 76, 142 
N.W.2d 169 (1966), to the effect that "While municipal and other 
government units are not wholly immune from application of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel, this court is firmly committed 
to the principle that estoppel 'will not lie against a 
municipality so as to bar it from enforcing an ordinance enacted 
pursuant 
to 
the 
police 
power." 
 
Vill. 
of 
Hobart, 
271 
Wis. 2d 268, ¶25 (emphasis added).   
¶48 This quote comes from a case in which a city was 
revoking the defendant's occupancy permit.  This quote comes 
from a final enforcement action.  This quote is simply 
No. 2003AP1907.dtp 
4 
 
inconsistent with Goode and with the use of equitable estoppel 
in a zoning enforcement action.12   
¶49 The majority not only affirms the quote but also adds 
that 
"If 
we 
allow the 
estoppel 
doctrine 
to 
hinder the 
government's 
exercise 
of 
its 
police 
power, 
we 
will 
be 
'expos[ing] a significant number of persons to a risk the 
legislature has determined to be contrary to their safety, 
welfare, health or morals.'  This is particularly true in the 
context of zoning."  Majority op., ¶29 (internal citation 
omitted).  This language is not consistent with Goode. 
¶50 On the facts of this case, the County is being 
penalized for consulting with its corporation counsel and 
following his advice.  What was the County supposed to do?  If 
the County had surrendered to the Village on the transfer 
station and sued the Village for money damages, it would not 
have solved the solid waste problem that precipitated this 
situation.   
¶51 If the County had immediately sought a mandamus action 
to secure building permits, it should have been able to invoke 
equitable estoppel so that the Village could not assert its 
                                                 
12 Moreover, the facts in City of Milwaukee v. Leavitt are 
markedly different from the facts in this case.  In Leavitt, the 
court held that "erroneous acts of municipal o
of
ff
fi
ic
ce
er
rs
s do not 
afford a basis to estop the municipality from enforcing its 
ordinances enacted pursuant to the police power."  Leavitt, 31 
Wis. 2d 72, 76-77, 142 N.W.2d 169 (1966) (emphasis added).  In 
this case, the County relied not only on the acts of individual 
officers, but also on the acts of the highest municipal body, 
the Village Board.  See majority op., ¶¶5-7.  Individual 
municipal officers may act roguishly.  The Village Board's 
imprimatur lends an added sense of credence to individual 
officers' representations. 
No. 2003AP1907.dtp 
5 
 
zoning ordinance as a defense.  Of course, the County would have 
had to prove its case.  However, I see nothing in the majority 
opinion that suggests that this option is a possibility.   
¶52 The bottom line is this: If local officials act 
irresponsibly, leading on landowners (including counties) and 
then pulling the rug out from under them, there ought to be a 
way for the landowners to obtain relief without first violating 
the zoning ordinance.  Equitable estoppel, with stringent 
requirements to obtain it, strikes me as a reasonable solution. 
¶53 Because 
the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
internally 
inconsistent and undermines the rule in Goode, I respectfully 
concur.   
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
 
 
No. 2003AP1907.dtp 
 
 
1