Title: In re: Ryan J. McMillin, Respondent.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96223
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2017

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
IN RE: RYAN J. MCMILLIN, 
) 
) 
No. SC96223 
 
Respondent. 
) 
ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING 
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel ("OCDC") filed an information in eight 
counts charging Ryan J. McMillin with numerous violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Following an evidentiary hearing, a disciplinary hearing panel recommended 
McMillin's law license be suspended indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement 
for one year.  The OCDC rejected the panel's recommendation and requested this Court 
suspend McMillin's license indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement for three 
years or, alternatively, disbar McMillin.  After briefing, argument, and de novo review of 
the record, this Court concludes McMillin has committed professional misconduct by 
violating Rules 4-1.3, 4-1.4(a), 4-1.5(a), 4-1.15(a)(5), 4-1.15(b), 4-1.15(c), 4-1.15(f), 
4-1.16(d), 4-8.1(c), 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d).  Considering the egregious nature of
McMillin's misconduct, as well as both mitigating and aggravating factors, this Court 
orders McMillin disbarred. 
I. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
"Professional misconduct must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence before 
discipline will be imposed."  In re Coleman, 295 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Mo. banc 2009) 
Opinion issued June 27, 2017
2 
 
(internal quotations omitted).  "This Court reviews the evidence de novo, independently 
determines all issues pertaining to credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, 
and draws its own conclusions of law."  Id.  "This Court treats the panel's findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and the recommendations as advisory."  Id.  "Moreover, this Court may 
reject any or all of the panel's recommendations."  Id.  The following findings and 
conclusions are based on this Court's review and McMillin's stipulations. 
A.  Trust Account Misuse 
 
McMillin was admitted to the Missouri bar in 1998.  In May 2013, the OCDC 
received notice that McMillin's client trust account was overdrawn.  The OCDC 
commenced an investigation, but McMillin failed to respond to the OCDC's initial request 
for bank records.  After a second request, McMillin provided records.  The OCDC received 
additional overdraft notifications in June 2013, and requested McMillin meet with the 
OCDC.  The OCDC was concerned McMillin had a gambling addiction based on his 
transaction history.  Believing McMillin needed monitoring to correct his trust account 
practices, the OCDC entered into a diversion agreement with him in September 2013.  
However, McMillin soon violated the terms of his agreement, as he failed to provide a 
quarterly report of his financial information and failed to respond to the OCDC's inquiries.  
The OCDC received additional overdraft notices in May and July 2014, and terminated the 
diversion agreement in August 2014.  The OCDC continued to receive overdraft notices in 
September, November, and December 2014.  
The OCDC's investigation discovered McMillin was misusing three different trust 
accounts—essentially using them as personal accounts.  He routinely made personal 
3 
 
deposits to the trust accounts, thereby commingling personal funds with client funds; he 
made hundreds of cash withdrawals from the trust accounts, many of which occurred near 
gambling facilities; and he failed to keep trust account records, making it nearly impossible 
to determine whether he had earned advanced fees paid by clients before withdrawing the 
funds.  Moreover, the further the investigation proceeded, the less McMillin cooperated.  
Despite this hampering of the OCDC's efforts, client complaints revealed that, on several 
occasions, McMillin indeed withdrew client funds he had not yet earned or never earned.  
In February 2014, he even paid his attorney enrollment fees from a trust account, which 
resulted in an overdraft.  McMillin described his trust account practices as "awful" and 
"really horrible." 
McMillin stipulates he has committed professional misconduct1 in that he violated 
Rule 4-1.15 by commingling personal funds and client funds in his trust accounts, by 
making premature withdrawals from the trust accounts for earned fees, by making cash 
withdrawals from his trust accounts, and by failing to keep complete and accurate trust 
account records.2  He also stipulates he violated Rule 4-8.1(c) by failing to respond to the 
OCDC's lawful demands for information.  In addition to his stipulations, this Court 
concludes McMillin violated Rule 4-8.4(c), which prohibits "engag[ing] in conduct 
                                              
1  Rule 4-8.4(a) provides it is professional misconduct to "violate or attempt to violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct."  McMillin's violations of other rules necessarily violates 4-8.4(a).  See 
Coleman, 295 S.W.3d at 868. 
2  Relevant here, Rule 4-1.15(a)(5) prohibits cash withdrawals from client trust accounts, Rule 
4-1.15(b) prohibits depositing personal funds in a client trust account except for paying bank 
service charges, Rule 4-1.15(c) prohibits withdrawal of client funds not yet earned, and Rule 
4-1.15(f) requires complete recordkeeping for client trust accounts. 
4 
 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation," because his misuse of the trust 
accounts included the misappropriation of client funds.  See In re Farris, 472 S.W.3d 549, 
557–58 (Mo. banc 2015).  "When an attorney deposits the client's funds into an account 
used by the attorney for his own purposes, any disbursement from the account for purposes 
other than those of the client's interests has all the characteristics of misappropriation, 
particularly when the disbursement reduces the balance of the account to an amount less 
than the amount of the funds being held by the attorney for the client."  In re Schaeffer, 
824 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 1992).  Misappropriation of "client funds necessarily involves 
deceit and misrepresentation."  In re Ehler, 319 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Mo. banc 2010).   
B.  Neglect of Clients 
 
At the same time McMillin was misusing client trust accounts, he also failed to 
fulfill other substantial duties owed to several of his clients.  Natalie Toney hired McMillin 
in February 2012 for representation in a domestic relations matter and paid him $3,000 in 
advanced fees.  She was then unable to consistently communicate with him as he repeatedly 
either canceled scheduled meetings or refused to come out of his office to meet with her.  
Much of McMillin's limited interaction with Toney consisted of text messages he sent late 
at night containing inappropriate comments referring to Toney as "hot stuff" and "baby."  
McMillin admitted the majority of Toney's complaint "was probably true as far as me 
putting her off and not doing whatever, setting meetings and canceling."  Toney eventually 
terminated McMillin and had to hire another attorney for an additional $3,000 to complete 
the matter.  This Court concludes McMillin violated: (1) Rule 4-1.3 by failing to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Toney; (2) Rule 4-1.4(a) by failing to 
5 
 
keep Toney reasonably informed about the status of her matter and failing to promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information; and (3) Rule 4-1.5(a) by charging a fee 
unreasonable in relation to the work he did for Toney. 
 
Jill Havenhill hired McMillin in December 2013 for representation in a domestic 
relations matter and paid him $1,000 in advanced fees.  Havenhill thereafter attempted to 
contact McMillin.  He responded in January 2014, apologizing for failing to contact her in 
a timely manner and promising to work on her case.  After Havenhill did not hear from 
McMillin over the next several months, she terminated him and requested a refund of her 
fees because he had not done any work for her.  McMillin did not oblige.  This Court 
concludes McMillin violated: (1) Rule 4-1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing Havenhill; (2) Rule 4-1.4(a) by failing to keep Havenhill 
reasonably informed about the status of her matter; (3) Rule 4-1.5(a) by charging a fee 
unreasonable in relation to the work he did for Havenhill; and (4) Rule 4-1.16(d) by failing 
to refund the fee paid by Havenhill upon termination of his representation. 
 
Charles White hired McMillin in February 2013 for representation in a domestic 
relations matter and paid him $3,000 in advanced fees.  White then had little to no 
communication with McMillin, and White eventually discovered via Case.Net that his case 
was dismissed in June 2014.  McMillin told White he would refile the case, but then failed 
to get the case reinstated.  When White filed a complaint with the OCDC, McMillin did 
not respond to the OCDC's request for a response.  McMillin stipulates he violated Rule 
4-1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing White, as 
well as Rule 4-8.1(c) by failing to respond to the OCDC's lawful demand for information.  
6 
 
In addition to McMillin's stipulations, this Court concludes McMillin violated Rule 
4-1.4(a) by failing to keep White reasonably informed about the status of his matter, and 
Rule 4-1.5(a) by charging a fee unreasonable in relation to the work he did for White. 
 
Larry Oliphant hired McMillin in February 2014 for representation in a domestic 
relations matter and paid him $750 in advanced fees.  Following an important development 
in his case, Oliphant attempted to speak with McMillin by calling him "every day for two 
weeks."  McMillin did not respond.  After Oliphant filed a complaint, McMillin called 
Oliphant "screaming and hollering, cussing at [Oliphant], using a lot of profanity, told 
[Oliphant] he made $600 an hour, [and] that he didn't have to talk to [Oliphant]."  McMillin 
then failed to appear at a hearing set for Oliphant's matter, and failed to notify Oliphant he 
was not going to appear.  This Court concludes McMillin violated: (1) Rule 4-1.3 by failing 
to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Oliphant; (2) Rule 4-1.4(a) 
by failing to keep Oliphant reasonably informed about the status of his matter and failing 
to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; (3) Rule 4-1.5(a) by charging 
a fee unreasonable in relation to the work he did for Oliphant; and (4) Rule 4-8.4(d), 
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, by failing to appear at a 
hearing on Oliphant's behalf. 
 
Harold Jordan hired McMillin in June 2013 for representation in a traffic case and 
paid him $350 in advanced fees.  After McMillin failed to appear at a hearing on Jordan's 
behalf, a warrant was issued for Jordan's arrest.  Jordan was later stopped and detained due 
to the warrant and was required to post a $400 bond for his release from custody.  McMillin 
stipulates he violated Rule 4-1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
7 
 
in representing Jordan, as well as Rule 4-1.4(a) by failing to keep Jordan reasonably 
informed about the status of his matter.  In addition to McMillin's stipulations, this Court 
concludes McMillin violated Rule 4-1.5(a) by charging a fee unreasonable in relation to 
the work he did for Jordan, and Rule 4-8.4(d) by failing to appear at a hearing on Jordan's 
behalf. 
II.  Analysis 
 
"The purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and 
maintain the integrity of the legal profession."  Ehler, 319 S.W.3d at 451 (internal 
quotations omitted).  "In imposing discipline, this Court considers the ethical duty violated, 
the attorney's mental state, the extent of actual or potential injury caused by the attorney's 
misconduct, and any aggravating or mitigating factors."  Id.  "When this Court finds an 
attorney has committed multiple acts of misconduct, the ultimate sanction imposed should 
at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among 
the violations."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  "Disbarment is typically reserved for 
clear cases of gross misconduct, those in which the attorney is demonstrably unfit to 
continue the practice of law."  In re Frank, 885 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Mo. banc 1994). 
A.  The Presumptive Discipline 
 
 "The most important ethical duties are those obligations which a lawyer owes to 
clients."  Ehler, 319 S.W.3d at 451 (internal quotations omitted).  As discussed, this Court 
concludes McMillin has violated several ethical duties owed to clients, including the duty 
to act diligently and the duty to communicate.  "The diligent representation of a client is 
particularly important because [a] client's interests often can be adversely affected by the 
8 
 
passage of time or the change of conditions[.]"  Id. at 449 (internal quotations omitted).  
"In some instances, the client's legal position may be destroyed."  Id. (internal quotations 
omitted).  Moreover, "[c]ommunication with a client is essential to maintain a productive 
attorney-client relationship."  Id.  McMillin essentially abandoned his clients.  His lack of 
diligence and communication undoubtedly caused his clients unnecessary delays, stress, 
and expense.  He failed to advance his clients' matters while also routinely ignoring their 
efforts to communicate with him and shirking his duty to keep them apprised.  One client 
was even arrested and taken into custody as a result of McMillin's dereliction.  And when 
McMillin did communicate, he was inappropriate with one client and verbally abusive with 
another.  One client described McMillin's behavior as "very dishonest" and stated she "felt 
very violated . . . nobody else should have to endure that."  McMillin's disturbing pattern 
of client neglect could, alone, perhaps suffice to demonstrate he is unfit to continue the 
practice of law.  See Frank, 885 S.W.2d at 334. 
 
Ultimately, though, McMillin's "most egregious act of misconduct is [his] 
misappropriation of client funds and mishandling of [his] client trust account[s]."  Ehler, 
319 S.W.3d at 451.  On several occasions, McMillin withdrew funds from advanced fees 
deposited in his trust accounts that he had not yet earned or never earned.  "[D]isbarment 
constitutes the 'baseline sanction' for misappropriation."  Farris, 472 S.W.3d at 562.  Put 
another way, "disbarment is the presumptively appropriate discipline for misappropriating 
client funds."  Id. at 563.  As this Court has explained, disbarment is presumptively 
appropriate because "[t]here simply is no room in this profession for attorneys who take 
property held in trust for others and use it as their own."  Id. at 562.  "When a lawyer 
9 
 
misappropriates property belonging to a client or a third party, that lawyer breaches one of 
the fundamental duties of this profession.  Doing so not only injures the property owner, 
but also the Bar as a whole."  Id. at 566.  Although disbarment is presumptively appropriate 
for McMillin's violations, this Court must also consider both mitigating and aggravating 
factors.  Id. at 563. 
B.  Mitigating Factors 
 
"Mitigating factors do not constitute a defense to a finding of misconduct.  But they 
may justify a downward departure from the presumptively proper discipline."  Id. (internal 
citation omitted).  McMillin claims his misconduct stems from a mental disorder, namely 
chemical dependency and abuse pertaining to alcohol and cocaine.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, an independent, licensed psychologist testified McMillin's mental disorders3 were 
"completely responsible" for his misconduct.  McMillin testified he has not used drugs or 
alcohol since August 2015.  Pursuant to Rule 5.285, this Court takes McMillin's mitigation 
claim under consideration.  In addition, this Court notes McMillin's lack of prior 
disciplinary history and his expressed remorse for his misconduct.  See In re Belz, 258 
S.W.3d 38, 46 (Mo. banc 2008). 
 
                                              
3  In addition to chemical dependency and abuse, the psychologist diagnosed McMillin with major 
depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and personality disorder unspecified.  McMillin's answer 
to the OCDC's information, however, identified only chemical dependency and abuse as a mental 
disorder for purposes of his mitigation claim.  "A person claiming a mental disorder as a mitigating 
factor shall identify the mental disorder and how it relates to the alleged professional misconduct 
no later than in the answer or amended answer."  Rule 5.285(b).  Nevertheless, even considering 
the mental disorders not pleaded as mitigation and accepting the expert testimony offered on his 
behalf as true, it does not change the appropriate sanction in this case.  
10 
 
C.  Aggravating Factors 
 
"[A]n aggravating factor need not constitute a separate instance of misconduct.  
Instead, aggravating circumstances may justify a level of discipline greater than the 
presumed discipline or confirm that the presumed discipline is appropriate for the particular 
case."  Farris, 472 S.W.3d at 563.  This Court finds five aggravating factors.  First, "a 
dishonest or selfish motive" is an aggravating factor.  Id. at 565.  As noted, McMillin's 
misappropriation of client funds necessarily involves dishonesty.  Second, this case 
involves multiple patterns of misconduct.  See id.  McMillin's misuse of his client trust 
account was his regular practice, not an isolated misstep, and persisted even after the 
OCDC gave him an opportunity at diversion.  At the same time, he demonstrated a pattern 
of neglecting his duties of communication and diligence in his representation of clients.  
Third, there are "multiple offenses" here.  See id.  As detailed above, this Court concludes 
McMillin has committed a variety of rules violations.  Although the presumptive discipline 
of disbarment is based on McMillin's misappropriation of client funds, this Court must also 
give due weight to the fact McMillin committed many other serious violations by 
essentially abandoning multiple clients.  Fourth, McMillin demonstrated a "bad faith 
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding" as he repeatedly ignored the OCDC's requests 
for information and was uncooperative in the OCDC's investigation.  See id.  Finally, 
"substantial experience in the practice of law" is considered an aggravating factor.  See id. 
at 566.  McMillin has been practicing law in Missouri since 1998.  
 
 
11 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
The presumptive discipline for McMillin's gross misconduct is disbarment.  "[I]n a 
rare but appropriate case a sanction other than disbarment may be appropriate for 
intentional misrepresentation where mental illness is shown to have played a role in the 
misconduct and other substantial mitigating factors are also present."  Id. at 567 (internal 
quotations omitted).  This is no such case.  Even accepting as true McMillin's mitigation 
claim of a mental disorder, there are no other substantial mitigating factors and this Court 
cannot ignore the number of aggravating factors that effectively offset, if not overwhelm, 
any mitigation.  The aggravating factors confirm "there is no reason to depart from the 
presumptive discipline of disbarment in this case."  Id. at 566.  Therefore, this Court orders 
McMillin disbarred.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
                          
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
All concur.