Title: Topolski v. Topolski
Citation: 2011 WI 59
Docket Number: 2009AP002433-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2011

2011 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2433-FT 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Patrick A. Topolski, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ellen J. Topolski, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 1, 2011   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT COURT   
 
COUNTY: 
WAUKESHA   
 
JUDGE: 
JAMES R. KIEFFER   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Thomas J. Schneck and Law Offices of Andrew 
C. Ladd, LLC, Madison. 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Joseph F. Owens and Law Offices of Joseph F. Owens, 
LLC, New Berlin. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2433-FT 
(L.C. No. 
1994FA492) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
 
 
Patrick A. Topolski, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ellen J. Topolski, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
as modified affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals reversing an order 
of the circuit court for Waukesha County, James R. Kieffer, 
Judge.1  The circuit court interpreted the parties' Marital 
                                                 
1 Topolski v. Topolski, No. 2009AP2433-FT, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 5, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
2 
 
Settlement Agreement, which was incorporated in the judgment of 
divorce, as requiring Patrick Topolski, the husband, to pay 
Ellen Topolski, the wife, $912.88 per month from his disability 
benefits under a pension plan.  The circuit court order awarded 
judgment in the amount of $83,072.08 plus interest to the wife 
and found the husband in contempt for failing to comply with the 
Marital Settlement Agreement.     
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed that part of the circuit 
court order finding the husband in contempt and requiring him to 
pay his wife $912.88 per month with interest from December 2001 
when he began receiving monthly disability payments from the 
pension plan.  The court of appeals concluded that the wife was 
not entitled to receive $912.88 from the monthly disability 
pension benefit but was entitled to receive $912.88 from the 
monthly retirement benefit when the husband reached the age of 
65, the "normal retirement age" under the pension plan, "the age 
at which the parties contemplated that he would have retired had 
he not been injured."2   
¶3 
The issue presented is whether the husband's receipt 
of disability pension benefits paid under the Electrical 
Construction Industry Pension Plan ("Pension Plan"), beginning 
in December 2001 when he was 53 years old, required him to pay 
$912.88 per month to the wife pursuant to their judgment of 
divorce, which provided as follows: "All retirement, pension, 
                                                 
2 Topolski v. Topolski, No. 2009AP2433-FT, unpublished slip 
op., at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. May 5, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
3 
 
and deferred benefit accounts in [the husband's] name, less the 
sum of $912.88 to be paid by [the husband] to [the wife] per 
month, if and when received by him."      
¶4 
To resolve this issue, we must interpret the language 
of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement and apply the 
Marital Settlement Agreement to the husband's disability pension 
under the Pension Plan.   
¶5 
Under the husband's Construction Industry Pension 
Plan, the amounts he received as disability benefits did not 
reduce the amounts payable to him as a retirement benefit when 
he reached early (62 years of age) or normal retirement age (65 
years of age).  The early retirement benefit at age 62 and the 
normal retirement benefit are the same amounts. 
¶6 
We conclude as follows:  
(1) The Marital Settlement Agreement's reference to 
"all retirement, pension, and deferred benefit accounts" 
does not address disability benefits. 
(2) The husband's disability pension under the Pension 
Plan, beginning when he was 53 years old and continuing 
until he attains the age of 62, replaces lost wages and 
therefore does not constitute a retirement, pension, or 
deferred benefit account under the Marital Settlement 
Agreement.  Thus, the Marital Settlement Agreement does not 
require the husband to pay to his wife any portion of the 
disability pension that he receives before age 62.  
(3) When the husband reaches the age of 62 he is 
eligible to receive an unreduced "early pension" under the 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
4 
 
Pension Plan, which is the same amount as his "normal 
pension" would be at age 65, which in turn is the same 
amount as his disability pension has been.  Thus, the 
husband's disability pension under the Pension Plan when he 
reaches the age of 62 constitutes a retirement, pension or 
deferred benefit account under the Marital Settlement 
Agreement. And so, pursuant to the Marital Settlement 
Agreement, when the husband reaches age 62, the husband 
must pay the wife $912.88 per month if and when the husband 
receives the disability pension under the Pension Plan. 
¶7 
This holding places the husband and wife in the same 
position they would have been in had the husband not become 
disabled.  This holding gives both the husband and wife exactly 
what they bargained for in the Marital Settlement Agreement:  
The husband retains, as the parties agreed, full right to 
earnings from his employment (here the disability payments are a 
substitute for earnings from employment); the wife is not 
entitled, under the Marital Settlement Agreement, to any part of 
the husband's earnings.  The husband's retirement benefits under 
the Pension Plan are not reduced or otherwise affected by the 
disability payments made to the husband. "If and when" the 
husband "receives" his retirement benefits under the Pension 
Plan, the wife is to be paid $912.88 per month under the Marital 
Settlement Agreement.  The husband is eligible to receive full 
retirement benefits at age 62 under the Pension Plan and "if and 
when" the husband receives retirement benefits at age 62 the 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
5 
 
husband pays the wife the monthly sum upon which they agreed in 
the Marital Settlement Agreement. 
¶8 
Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court erred 
in holding the husband in contempt and in awarding the wife 
$83,072.08 plus interest.   
¶9 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
reversing that portion of the order of the circuit court holding 
the husband in contempt and ordering him to make payments of 
$912.88 per month with interest to the wife from December 2001.  
We modify the decision of the court of appeals, however, to 
provide that under the Marital Settlement Agreement the wife is 
entitled to $912.88 per month if and when the husband receives 
the disability pension under the Pension Plan beginning the 
first month immediately following his 62nd birthday.  The court 
of appeals erred in holding that the wife's monthly payment 
begins when the husband reaches his 65th birthday, rather than 
his 62nd birthday.  
I 
¶10 The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review.  
Patrick and Ellen Topolski were divorced on January 3, 1995, 
after a marriage of 24 years.  At the time of the divorce the 
husband was able-bodied and employed as an electrician.  The 
judgment of divorce incorporated a Marital Settlement Agreement 
setting forth the division of the parties' property.   
¶11 Maintenance was permanently waived by both the husband 
and wife under the Marital Settlement Agreement. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
6 
 
¶12 Pertinent to this review, under the Marital Settlement 
Agreement 
the 
parties 
divided 
their 
interests 
in 
"all 
retirement, pension, and deferred benefit accounts" in the 
husband's name.  The husband was awarded "all retirement, 
pension, and deferred benefit accounts" "if and when received by 
him" less the sum of $912.88 per month which he was to pay his 
wife as follows: 
All retirement, pension, and deferred benefit accounts 
in [the husband's] name, less the sum of $912.88 to be 
paid by [the husband] to [the wife] per month, if and 
when received by him.  If [the wife] predeceases [the 
husband], her interest lapses and reverts to [the 
husband]. 
Correspondingly, the wife was awarded: "The sum of $912.88 per 
month by direct payment from [the husband] following his receipt 
of pension and retirement benefits, if and when received by him. 
If [the husband] fails to honor this requirement, [the wife] 
will be automatically entitled to obtain a QDRO from the court 
to enforce same."3   
                                                 
3 A generic definition of a QDRO, a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order, is "a court order directed to a retirement plan 
to divide, or pay, all or a portion of the plan participant's 
benefits or account balance to the nonparticipant alternate 
payee spouse or qualified dependant."  Timothy C. Voit, 
Retirement Plan Benefits and QDROs in Divorce 143 (2004).   
The 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Benchbook, 
citing 
29 
U.S.C. 
1056(d)(3)(B)(i), (C), (D), discusses a QDRO as follows:  
2) Qualified Domestic Relations Order.  A "Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order" is a Domestic Relations 
Order which  
a. Creates or recognizes the existence of an Alternate 
Payee's rights to, or assigns to an Alternate Payee 
the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
7 
 
¶13 Nothing in the record explains how the parties valued 
the wife's or husband's interests in retirement, pension, and 
deferred benefit accounts to reach the sum of $912.88 payable to 
the wife each month. 
 
¶14 In 1998 and in 2000 the husband suffered a series of 
strokes leaving him unable to work as an electrician.  In 
December 2001, the husband, then 53 years old, qualified for and 
began to receive "disability pension" payments under the 
Electrical Construction Industry Pension Plan of $2,348 per 
month.4   The Pension Plan defines "disability" as "a physical or 
mental condition which, in the judgment of the Trustees, will 
totally and presumably permanently prevent an Employee from 
engaging in employment or gainful pursuit in the electrical 
industry or as a craftsman in any building trades industry." 
                                                                                                                                                             
payable with respect to a Participant under a Plan, 
and 
b.  Clearly specifies certain facts, and 
c.  Does not alter the amount or form of benefits 
under a Plan 
d.  Even though signed by the Ct, a Domestic Relations 
Order becomes "Qualified" (i.e. approved) only after 
it is signed by the Plan Administrator. 
3 Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook FA 12-6 (3d ed. 2007). 
When dividing marital interests in a retirement plan at 
divorce, a QDRO can be the most equitable way to divide 
retirement assets and may prevent disputes at a later time.   
4 The 
husband 
also 
began 
receiving 
Social 
Security 
disability benefits.  The Social Security benefits are not at 
issue in this case.  The wife does not claim any right to those 
disability benefits. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
8 
 
 
¶15 In 2008, after determining that the husband had 
received Pension Plan benefits starting in 2001 but had failed 
to pay her the sum of $912.88 monthly, the wife brought a motion 
in the circuit court seeking a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order for $912.88 per month pursuant to the relief provided in 
the Marital Settlement Agreement, as well as payment (with 
accrued interest) from the time the husband commenced receiving 
benefits.   
¶16 The circuit court held a hearing on the wife's motion.  
The wife's testimony centered on why she had waited so long to 
bring the motion seeking payment from the husband.  She did not 
testify regarding her understanding of the terms of the Marital 
Settlement Agreement or the intent of the parties at the time of 
the divorce regarding the Marital Settlement Agreement. 
¶17 The wife presented an expert witness, who testified 
generally about pension valuation and pension division at 
divorce.  The wife's expert also testified that in his opinion, 
upon 
review 
of 
the 
Pension 
Plan 
and 
Marital 
Settlement 
Agreement, the disability pension payments the husband was 
receiving were pension retirement benefits pursuant to the 
Pension Plan.  The expert further opined about whether the 
husband's receipt of these disability pension benefits triggered 
his obligation to pay the wife $912.88 per month pursuant to the 
Marital Settlement Agreement.   
¶18 The wife's counsel asked the expert:  "It's your 
opinion that once Mr. Topolski [the husband] commenced receiving 
benefits, the clause in the Divorce Judgment was triggered and 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
9 
 
he was required to pay $912.88?"5  The expert responded:  "The 
answer is yes."  The expert witness did not testify about the 
intent of the parties about the meaning of the Marital 
Settlement Agreement at the time of the divorce judgment. 
¶19 The husband was the only witness on his behalf at the 
hearing.  He did not testify regarding his understanding of the 
terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement or the intent of the 
parties at the time of the divorce about the Marital Settlement 
Agreement.  The husband was asked what his expected retirement 
date was at the time of divorce.  He responded that his 
expectation was to retire at 62 and that he would have no 
problem with making payments to his wife at that time.  The 
direct examination on this topic proceeded as follows:  
Q. [Husband's counsel] When the language of this 
divorce marital settlement agreement was entered into, 
did you have an intended retirement date in mind that 
this would start? 
A. [Husband] No. 
Q. You were abled [sic] body, did you expect to work 
until you were 65 or 62?  What was your expectation?   
A. Probably 62. 
Q. So you would not have a problem with getting 
payments to her at age 62; is that a fair statement? 
A. No. 
Q. You would have no problem or would you have a 
problem? 
                                                 
5 The husband's counsel objected to this question asserting 
that it called for a legal conclusion.  The objection was 
overruled. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
10 
 
A. No, I wouldn't have a problem.  
¶20 The husband's counsel argued to the circuit court that 
the disability pension was income and that not until the husband 
attained the age of 62 did the disability pension constitute a 
retirement, pension, or deferred benefit account under the 
Marital Settlement Agreement.   
¶21 The circuit court was not persuaded by the argument 
that the disability pension the husband was receiving should be 
characterized as income, as opposed to a retirement, pension, or 
deferred benefit account subject to division under the Marital 
Settlement Agreement.  The circuit court rejected the husband's 
income argument, stating its interpretation of the Marital 
Settlement Agreement and the Pension Plan as follows:   
I recognize the parties did waive their requirements 
or the ability to receive maintenance and I think that 
may have come about for various reasons, all of which 
I really don't know but I know at the time of the 
divorce Patrick [the husband] was healthy and was 
working and he did not envision ever becoming disabled 
such as has happened with him but I disagree this is 
taking income from him as opposed to simply enforcing 
the property division itself. 
¶22 The husband's counsel argued that the disability 
pension should be considered a retirement, pension, or deferred 
benefit account under the Marital Settlement Agreement when the 
husband attained the age of 62: "It would seem appropriate that 
beginning at age 62 the [$]912.88 would start based on his 
testimony and that is the earliest point in time that we should 
start this monthly benefit." 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
11 
 
¶23 In written finding number 7, the circuit court did not 
accept this argument.  The circuit court concluded that the 
disability pension was a retirement, pension, or deferred 
benefit account, commenting as follows:  
That it is clear from the testimony of the experts 
[sic], the parties and the Plan documents, themselves, 
that disability pension benefits received by the 
Petitioner [Mr. Topolski] are retirement benefits 
pursuant to the parties' Judgment of Divorce; That to 
argue that Petitioner has received anything other than 
benefits under his pension plan, is inappropriate[.] 
This finding is not labeled as fact or law, but is an 
interpretation of the language of the Divorce Judgment, the 
Marital Settlement Agreement, and the Pension Plan. 
¶24 Based upon its interpretation of the Divorce Judgment, 
the Marital Settlement Agreement, and the Pension Plan the 
circuit court also found, during the hearing, that the wife was 
not equitably estopped from pursuing monthly payments beginning 
in December 2001: 
I find there is absolutely no basis in this record to 
indicate that [the wife] should be equitably estopped 
from pursuit of what had been awarded to her per the 
parties' own agreement going back to the time of their 
divorce.6 
¶25 The circuit court implemented a qualified domestic 
relations order in favor of the wife pursuant to the Marital 
Settlement Agreement and awarded the wife $912.88 per month 
(plus interest) starting from December 2001. 
                                                 
6 Quoted in part at ¶17 of the dissent. 
The issue of equitable estoppel is not before the court. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
12 
 
II 
¶26 We begin our analysis by determining the proper 
standard of review.  We are called on in the present case to 
determine whether the circuit court erred in its use of the 
contempt power. 
¶27 In reviewing a circuit court's use of its contempt 
power, we determine whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.7  A circuit court erroneously exercises 
its discretion if it makes an error of law.  This court decides 
any questions of law that may arise during its review of a 
circuit court's exercise of discretion independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses.8   
¶28 In the present case, the circuit court exercised its 
discretion on the basis of its interpretation of the Marital 
Settlement Agreement and the Pension Plan.  The interpretation 
of the Divorce Judgment, the Marital Settlement Agreement, and 
the Pension Plan is a question of law, which we decide 
independently of the court of appeals and circuit court but 
benefiting from their analyses.9   
                                                 
7 Krieman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, 165, 571 N.W.2d 425, 
427 (Ct. App. 1997). 
8 State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶37, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 
N.W.2d 777 (2002). 
9 Sulzer v. Diedrich, 2003 WI 90, ¶16, 263 Wis. 2d 496, 664 
N.W.2d 641. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
13 
 
¶29 The principles that govern interpretation of written 
documents are well established.   
¶30 Ordinarily the interpretation of a written document is 
a matter of law.  If, however, a document is ambiguous or the 
parties rely on extrinsic evidence bearing on the intent of the 
parties to the contract regarding the writing when it was made, 
the question is one of fact for the fact-finder.10   
¶31 In the present case, neither party claims the Marital 
Settlement Agreement or the Pension Plan is ambiguous, and 
neither party offered or introduced extrinsic evidence in the 
circuit court bearing on the intent of the parties regarding the 
meaning of the text of either document.  The standard of review 
for circumstances such as these was stated as follows in 
Thurston v. Burnett & Beaver Dam Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 98 
Wis. 476, 478-79, 74 N.W. 131 (1898): 
[W]here 
language 
is 
plain 
and 
unambiguous, 
the 
apparent import of the words must govern, and the rule 
that where there is no uncertainty as to the meaning 
of the words used in the contract, and where such 
uncertainty exists but there is no extrinsic evidence 
or 
circumstance 
bearing 
on 
the 
subject 
to 
be 
considered in determining the meaning attributed to 
them by the parties when the contract was made, the 
proper interpretation of the words and construction of 
the contract are solely for the court.     
                                                 
10 Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 
604, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984); Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fire 
Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979); RTE Corp. v. 
Maryland Cas. Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 620-21, 247 N.W.2d 171 
(1976); Bauman v. Midland Union Ins. Co., 261 Wis. 449, 451-52, 
53 N.W.2d 529 (1952). 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
14 
 
¶32 Accordingly, we determine the meaning of the Marital 
Settlement Agreement and the Pension Plan as questions of law.        
III 
¶33 We turn now to interpreting the Marital Settlement 
Agreement.  The best indication of the parties' intent is the 
language of the document itself.11  Words in a document should be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning unless the word has a 
technical meaning.12  Technical words are to be interpreted as 
usually understood by persons in the profession or business to 
which they relate, unless the context of the document or an 
applicable custom or usage clearly indicates that a different 
meaning was intended.13   
¶34 The Marital Settlement Agreement awards the husband, 
as we have stated previously, "all retirement, pension, and 
deferred benefit accounts in his name . . . ."    
¶35 Nothing in the Marital Settlement Agreement refers to 
the disability of either party or to disability payments.   
¶36 Judge James R. Kieffer presided over the divorce 
proceedings in 1995 and presided over the hearing on the wife's 
motion at issue here.  In the judgment of divorce, the circuit 
court ruled:  "The Marital Settlement Agreement which was 
                                                 
11 Levy v. Levy, 130 Wis. 2d 523, 535, 388 N.W.2d 170 
(1986). 
12 Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶52, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 
N.W.2d 807. 
13 North Gate Corp. v. Nat'l Food Stores, 30 Wis. 2d 317, 
321, 140 N.W.2d 744 (1966).          
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
15 
 
entered by the parties is found to be fair and reasonable, is 
approved in its entirety, and is incorporated within the 
Judgment of this Court as an integral part thereof."  In the 
instant case, the only comment the circuit court made relating 
to the divorce judgment was the following:  "I know at the time 
of divorce Patrick [the husband] was healthy and was working and 
he did not envision ever becoming disabled such as has happened 
with him . . . ."  This appears to be a casual comment, not a 
considered ruling.    
¶37 Nothing 
in 
the 
Marital 
Settlement 
Agreement 
specifically addresses the husband's interest in the Electrical 
Construction Industry Pension Plan.  Indeed no particular 
retirement, pension, or deferred benefit account is referenced 
in the Marital Settlement Agreement; the Marital Settlement 
Agreement addresses the husband's interest globally in any and 
all retirement, pension, and deferred benefit accounts in his 
name.   
¶38 Indeed, the record does not include the Electrical 
Construction Industry Pension Plan that may have been in 
existence at the date of the divorce.  The record does not even 
include the Electrical Construction Industry Pension Plan in 
existence in December 2001 when the husband began collecting the 
disability pension.  The only Pension Plan in the record is 
dated 2007, and the motion was heard as if this 2007 Pension 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
16 
 
Plan were in existence at the time of divorce, in December 2001, 
and throughout this litigation.14 
¶39 The 
context of the Marital Settlement Agreement 
indicates that the words "retirement", "pension," and "deferred 
benefit accounts" are not used in a technical sense.  No one has 
offered an interpretation of these words as usually understood 
by persons in the profession or business to which they relate.  
The wife's expert witness was an expert in the subject of 
pension valuation for purposes of divorce.  He offered no expert 
opinion that the words "retirement," "pension," or "deferred 
benefit account" in the Marital Settlement Agreement had a 
technical meaning.15  
¶40 Thus, we begin by giving the word "retirement" in the 
Marital Settlement Agreement its plain and ordinary meaning.  
Nothing in the record indicates that the parties intended to 
incorporate 
the 
definition 
of 
"retirement" 
used 
in 
the 
Electrical Construction Industry Pension Plan.  Thus, unlike the 
circuit court, we do not interpret the word "retirement" in the 
                                                 
14 The record contains the Summary Plan Description for the 
Electrical Construction Industry Pension Plan dated December, 
2007. 
15 The expert testified about the meaning of the phrase "if, 
as and when" which he viewed as a technical phrase in the 
industry.  The expert testified:  "Shared interest division 
works if, as and when.  It's a very specific term in my 
industry.  If the participant collects, as the participant 
collects it, when the participant collects it.  That's basically 
the term that's in my industry." 
The Marital Settlement Agreement in the present case does 
not use the phrase "if, as and when." 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
17 
 
Marital 
Settlement 
Agreement 
by 
using 
the 
definition 
of 
"retirement" set forth in the Electrical Construction Industry 
Pension Plan.16   
¶41 The plain and ordinary meaning of "retirement" is the 
withdrawal from work, often due to reaching a particular age.17  
Retirement does not ordinarily mean termination of employment 
resulting from an inability to work due to a medical condition.   
¶42 The plain and ordinary usage of the word "pension" is 
to refer to income a person receives when he or she reaches 
retirement 
age 
and 
no 
longer 
earns 
regular 
income 
from 
employment.18 "Pension plan" is often used interchangeably with 
"retirement plan" and in common parlance "pension income" and 
                                                 
16 The Electrical Construction Industry Pension Plan defines 
"Retirement" as "The period after you qualify for a pension 
under 
the 
Plan 
and 
start 
to 
receive 
monthly 
pension 
payments . . . ." 
17 Webster's New World Law Dictionary defines "retirement" 
as "the voluntary termination of employment upon reaching a 
certain age."  Webster's New World Law Dictionary (2010). 
18 "Pension:  money that someone regularly receives after 
they have stopped working because of their age, paid either by 
their company or by the government."  Macmillan Dictionary 
(2009). 
"Pension: a regular payment made by an employer to former 
employees after they retire."  Collins English Dictionary-
Complete and Unabridged (2003). 
"Pension: a fixed sum paid regularly to a person."  
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2011). 
"Pension: A benefit, usually money, paid regularly to 
retired employees or their survivors by private businesses and 
federal, state, and local governments."  West's Encyclopedia of 
American Law (2d ed. 2008). 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
18 
 
"pension 
account" 
or 
"retirement 
income" 
and 
"retirement 
account" are used interchangeably.   
¶43 Nothing in the record defines the phrase "deferred 
benefit accounts."  The plain and ordinary meaning of that 
phrase used in context with the words "pension" and "retirement" 
seems to describe a benefit that will be realized sometime in 
the future.  Reference to deferred benefit accounts seems like a 
reference to deferred compensation received on the attainment of 
a particular age.   
¶44 The value of a spouse's interest in a retirement, 
pension, 
or deferred benefit account, although presenting 
valuation challenges, is generally classified as a divisible 
asset at divorce.19  Therefore, these assets generally must be 
considered in the circuit court's division of property at 
divorce. 
¶45 In contrast, a disability benefit is ordinarily viewed 
as distinct from a retirement, pension, or deferred benefit 
account. 
"Disability 
benefit" 
or 
"disability 
income," 
in 
ordinary parlance, commonly refers to a payment received when a 
person is unable to work, either in a chosen profession or 
totally, due to a physical or mental medical condition.  
                                                 
19 Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, ¶18, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997)(holding that military retirement pay must be considered 
in dividing the property in a divorce proceeding); Steinke v. 
Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 380, 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985), 127 
Wis. 2d 444, 379 N.W.2d 853 (1986) (on reconsideration) ("[W]e 
hold that, as a matter of law, the value of a spouse's interest 
in a pension fund must be included by the trial court in the 
division of the property between the spouses."). 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
19 
 
Disability benefits are not ordinarily referred to as deferred 
compensation.  Disability benefits are generally considered wage 
replacement, that is, compensation for lost future wages because 
a physical or mental condition prevents the person from being 
gainfully employed. 
¶46 Disability 
payments, 
such 
as 
Social 
Security 
disability payments or veteran's disability payments, replace 
the wages lost by the individual due to the disability and are 
generally classified as income at divorce.20  As such, these 
payments are not assets divisible at dissolution of the 
marriage.  Instead, they are considered income for the purpose 
of determining a maintenance award. 
¶47 Courts 
have 
differentiated 
between 
disability 
payments, which are generally not a divisible asset at divorce, 
and retirement benefits, which are generally divisible at 
divorce.  
¶48 For example, in Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 
261 N.W.2d 457 (1978), this court addressed the division of a 
veteran's disability pension.  In that case, this court 
"sharply" distinguished the "disability pension from a present 
interest, vested or unvested, in a retirement plan . . . ."21  
The court concluded that the disability pension was replacement 
                                                 
20 See Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 637, 261 
N.W.2d 457 (1978) ("We view the [Veteran's] disability benefits 
in the case before us as income to the defendant, material only 
to his ability to pay alimony, if alimony were awarded."). 
21 Id. at 636. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
20 
 
for lost earning capacity due to injuries suffered in military 
service.  The court equated the benefit to payment under the 
Social Security Act to disabled workers.22  Thus, the veteran's 
disability benefit in Leighton was treated as income subject to 
a maintenance award determination and not as a divisible asset.23  
¶49 Giving the text of the Marital Settlement Agreement at 
issue its plain and ordinary meaning, we agree with the court of 
appeals that the parties' intent, evident in the language of the 
Marital Settlement Agreement, was to entitle the wife to receive 
a portion of all the husband's retirement, pension, and deferred 
compensation 
accounts, 
and 
that 
nothing 
in 
the 
Marital 
Settlement Agreement addresses disability benefits.         
IV 
¶50 Having interpreted the Marital Settlement Agreement, 
we now look to the Pension Plan.  We interpret the Pension Plan 
to determine whether the disability pension payment to the 
husband is a "retirement," "pension," or "deferred benefit 
account," as those words are used in the Marital Settlement 
Agreement.   
¶51 The husband contends that the disability pension 
payments are a substitute for wages.  The wife contends that the 
disability pension is a form of retirement, pension, or deferred 
benefit account, that is, compensation for past services, and 
                                                 
22 Id. at 636-37. 
23 Id. at 637. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
21 
 
that it must be treated as such under the Marital Settlement 
Agreement. 
¶52 The court need not accept either of these absolutist 
positions.  There is a more nuanced approach to classifying 
disability benefits.  A disabled spouse's disability benefit may 
in effect be an amalgam: a portion may be a replacement for lost 
wages 
and 
a 
portion may be a replacement for deferred 
compensation (that is, retirement or pension benefits).   
¶53 Depending on the terms of a plan, a disability benefit 
may encompass both a wage replacement component and a deferred 
compensation replacement component.  In other words, under a 
plan, 
a 
disability 
benefit may in substance be both a 
replacement for lost future wages and a replacement for deferred 
compensation.  The disability benefit should be viewed in light 
of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether all or 
any part of the disability benefit received by the disabled 
spouse replaces post-divorce lost wages or replaces deferred 
compensation.24   
¶54 When and to the extent that a disability benefit 
replaces the disabled spouse's post-divorce wages, the benefit 
should be characterized as income and will be individual 
property not subject to property division at divorce.   
                                                 
24 For similar analyses, see, e.g., Conner v. Conner, 68 
P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2003); Villasenor v. Villasenor, 657 P.2d 889 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Saslow v. Saslow, 710 P.2d 346 (Cal. 
1985); In re Marriage of Leland, 847 P.2d 518 (Wash Ct. App. 
1993). 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
22 
 
¶55 Alternatively, when and to the extent that the 
disability 
benefit 
replaces 
deferred 
compensation, 
the 
disability 
benefit 
should 
be 
characterized 
as 
deferred 
compensation and will be subject to property division at 
divorce.   
¶56 This approach enables courts to differentiate among a 
multitude of disability benefits under a multitude of different 
circumstances that a court may encounter. 
¶57 There is nothing in the record in the instant case to 
show that in executing the Marital Settlement Agreement or in 
dividing the husband's interest in retirement, pension, or 
deferred benefit accounts, the parties considered the potential 
for or effect of the husband's becoming disabled and qualifying 
for disability benefits.    
¶58 Now that the unfortunate and unforeseen disability has 
occurred, 
the 
task 
of 
the 
court 
is 
to 
understand 
the 
characteristics of the disability pension under the Pension Plan 
and to determine whether the disability pension is a retirement, 
pension, or deferred benefit account, as those words are used in 
the Marital Settlement Agreement, regardless of the label 
"pension" or "retirement" that the Pension Plan has placed on 
the disability benefit.  The characteristics of the disability 
pension under the Pension Plan, not the label used in the 
Pension Plan, determine how the disability pension will be 
treated under the Marital Settlement Agreement.  
¶59 We 
turn 
to 
analyze 
the 
characteristics 
of 
the 
disability pension the husband receives under the Pension Plan. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
23 
 
¶60 The Pension Plan defines the disability benefit as a 
"pension" for purposes of the Pension Plan.  The Pension Plan 
explicitly provides for three kinds of pensions: (1) a "normal 
pension" for an employee who is at least age 65 at termination 
of employment, (2) an "early pension" for an employee who is at 
least age 55 but not yet 65 at termination of employment, and 
(3) a "disability pension" for an employee who terminates 
employment as a result of total and permanent disability.25    
¶61 Thus, the husband's disability is one of three 
conditions giving rise to a "pension" benefit under the Pension 
Plan.  The Pension Plan defines "retirement" as follows: "The 
period after you qualify for a pension under the Plan and start 
to receive monthly pension payments is considered Retirement."  
¶62 The Pension Plan provides that the disabled husband 
collecting a disability pension receives the same monthly 
payment as a disability pension that he would receive as a 
"normal pension"26 or as an "early pension" (that is, if the 
                                                 
25 Under the Pension Plan vesting is required, and the 
disability pension requires that an employee have a minimum 
number of years of Benefit Credit. 
26 Under the terms of the Pension Plan in the record, the 
amount of a disability pension is the greater of $50 or the Plan 
participant's "normal pension" amount.  Thus, the amount that 
the husband has received as a "disability pension" pursuant to 
the Pension Plan is the amount he would receive as a "normal 
pension," that is, the amount he would receive when he retired 
at the age of 65.   
The Pension Plan provides the following calculation of the 
amount of the Normal Pension if certain qualifications are met: 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
24 
 
employee terminates employment when he is at least 62 years of 
age).27  The disability pension the husband receives lasts for 
life.  The husband's receipt of the disability pension does not 
reduce the amount of his "normal" or "early" pension. 
¶63 Under the Pension Plan, in which the monthly amount 
paid to the husband as a disability pension is the same as the 
monthly amount paid as a normal pension and also is the same as 
the monthly amount paid as an early pension at age 62 for life, 
it is understandable that the circuit court concluded that the 
disability pension was a pension under the Marital Settlement 
Agreement.  A more analytical and realistic approach, however, 
                                                                                                                                                             
On or after January 1, 2002, the monthly amount of 
your Normal Pension equals the number of years of 
Benefit 
Credit 
you 
earned 
after 
May 
31, 
1995 
multiplied by $92, plus the total years of Benefit 
Credit you earned prior to June 1, 1995 multiplied by 
$66. 
27 The amount of an "early pension" under the Pension Plan 
is determined "by, first, calculating the amount of the Normal 
Pension to which you would be entitled if you were age 65," and 
then: 
(a) 
You will be eligible for an unreduced pension 
equal to your Normal Pension if payment of your 
Early Pension begins at or after age 62. 
(b) 
If payment of your Early Pension benefit begins 
before age 62 but at or after age 55, your normal 
pension benefit will be reduced by 1/4 of 1% for 
each full month (i.e., 3% for each full year) 
payments 
are 
made 
before 
the 
first 
month 
immediately following your 60th birthday and 1/12 
of 1% for each full month (i.e., 1% for each full 
year) payments are made after you attain age 60 
and before the first month immediately following 
your 62nd birthday. 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
25 
 
is to recognize that under the Pension Plan the disability 
pension has characteristics of both future lost wages and 
deferred compensation.   
¶64 Prior to reaching the age of 62, the husband's 
disability pension is in the nature of compensation for lost 
wages the disabled husband no longer can earn.  In contrast, the 
disability pension paid to the husband after he reaches the age 
of 62 is in the nature of a pension that the husband expected to 
receive had he not become eligible to receive the disability 
pension.  
¶65 Considering these characteristics of the disability 
pension, we conclude that the disability pension that the 
husband received under the Pension Plan at termination of his 
employment prior to age 62 replaced the wages lost because of 
his physical inability to work.  This portion of the husband's 
disability pension under the Pension Plan replaces post-divorce 
income and is not a retirement, pension, or deferred benefit 
account under the Marital Settlement Agreement.  As post-divorce 
income, the disability pension is the husband's individual 
property not subject to the division of property under the 
Marital Settlement Agreement.  
¶66 Regardless of the "disability pension," the husband is 
eligible under the Pension Plan for an unreduced normal pension 
at age 65 or an unreduced early pension at age 62.   
¶67 The question then is whether the wife is entitled 
under the Marital Settlement Agreement to receive a portion of 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
26 
 
the husband's disability pension under the Pension Plan when the 
husband reaches age 62 or age 65.  
¶68 The Marital Settlement Agreement is silent about the 
age at which the husband is required to receive a retirement, 
pension, or deferred benefit account.  The language of the 
Marital Settlement Agreement states that the wife is entitled to 
receive her portion of retirement, pension, and deferred benefit 
accounts in the husband's name, if and when received by him.   
¶69 Under the Pension Plan, when the husband attains the 
age of 62 he is eligible to receive the amount of an unreduced 
"normal pension."  At age 62 the husband receives the disability 
pension that is the equivalent of an unreduced normal pension.   
¶70 Because the husband is disabled, he need not elect an 
early or normal pension benefit; he receives the equivalent of a 
full pension under the Pension Plan at either age 62 or age 65.  
When the husband receives a disability pension under the Pension 
Plan after he reaches the age of 62, the monthly payment is 
precisely the amount he would have received had he terminated 
employment without a disability at age 62 or at age 65.  After 
the husband is 62 years of age, the disability pension 
effectively supplants and is a substitute for the early and the 
normal pension under the Pension Plan.   
¶71 If, after the husband attains the age of 62, the 
husband's disability pension under the Pension Plan is viewed as 
a replacement for an early or normal pension under the Pension 
Plan and therefore as a retirement, pension, or deferred benefit 
account under the Marital Settlement Agreement, the expectations 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
27 
 
of both the husband and the wife are effectively protected under 
the Marital Settlement Agreement.28  Neither party expected the 
husband to become disabled.  The division of the retirement, 
pension, and deferred benefit accounts was calculated on the 
parties' assumption that the husband would receive retirement or 
pension income in the future.   
¶72 Thus, we conclude that at the age of 62 when the 
husband became eligible to begin receiving an unreduced early 
pension equal to the normal pension and equal to the disability 
pension, 
the 
disability pension constitutes a retirement, 
pension or deferred benefit account under the Marital Settlement 
Agreement. 
¶73 This holding places the husband and wife in the same 
position they would have been in had the husband not become 
disabled.  This holding gives both the husband and wife exactly 
what they bargained for in the Marital Settlement Agreement:  
The husband retains, as the parties agreed, full right to 
earnings from his employment (here the disability payments are a 
substitute for earnings from employment); the wife is not 
entitled, under the Marital Settlement Agreement, to any part of 
the husband's earnings.  The husband's retirement benefits under 
the Pension Plan are not reduced or otherwise affected by the 
disability payments made to the husband. "If and when" the 
                                                 
28 At the circuit court and before this court, the husband 
agreed that the wife's claim to payment of $912.88 monthly is 
cognizable under the Marital Settlement Agreement when he 
reaches the age 62.  Petitioner-Appellant-Respondent's Brief at 
6.  
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
28 
 
husband "receives" his retirement benefits under the Pension 
Plan, the wife is to be paid $912.88 per month under the Marital 
Settlement Agreement.  The husband is eligible to receive full 
retirement benefits at age 62 under the Pension Plan and "if and 
when" the husband receives retirement benefits at age 62 the 
husband pays his wife the monthly sum upon which they agreed in 
the Marital Settlement Agreement. 
¶74 In sum, we conclude as follows:  
(1) The Marital Settlement Agreement's reference to "all 
retirement, pension, and deferred benefit accounts" does not 
address disability benefits. 
(2) The husband's disability pension under the Pension 
Plan, beginning when he was 53 years old and continuing until he 
attains the age of 62, replaces lost wages and therefore does 
not constitute a retirement, pension or deferred benefit account 
under the Marital Settlement Agreement.  Thus, the Marital 
Settlement Agreement does not require the husband to pay to his 
wife any portion of the disability pension that he receives 
before he is 62 years old.  
(3) When the husband reaches the age of 62 he is eligible 
to receive an unreduced "early pension" under the Pension Plan, 
which is the same amount as his "normal pension" would be at age 
65, which in turn is the same amount as his disability pension 
has been.  Thus, the husband's disability pension under the 
Pension Plan when he reaches the age of 62 constitutes a 
retirement, pension, or deferred benefit account under the 
Marital Settlement Agreement. And so, pursuant to the Marital 
No. 
2009AP2433-FT   
 
29 
 
Settlement Agreement, when the husband reaches age 62, the 
husband must pay the wife $912.88 per month if and when the 
husband receives the disability pension under the Pension Plan.  
¶75 Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court erred 
in holding the husband in contempt and in awarding the wife 
$83,072.08 plus interest.   
¶76 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
reversing that portion of the order of the circuit court holding 
the husband in contempt and ordering him to make payments of 
$912.88 per month with interest to the wife from December 2001.  
We modify the decision of the court of appeals, however, to 
provide that under the Marital Settlement Agreement the wife is 
entitled to $912.88 per month if and when the husband receives 
the disability pension under the Pension Plan beginning the 
first month immediately following his 62nd birthday.  The court 
of appeals erred in holding that the wife's monthly payment 
begins when the husband reaches his 65th birthday, rather than 
his 62nd birthday. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and as modified affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶77 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   This 
action was commenced on November 24, 2008, by Ellen Topolski's 
motion to hold Patrick Topolski in contempt of court for failing 
to comply with the Judgment of Divorce in two respects:  (1) 
Patrick failed to pay her $912.88 per month from the $2,348 he 
has received every month in disability pension payments since 
December 
2001; 
and 
(2) Patrick failed to pay the full 
equalization payment required by the Judgment of Divorce.  I 
conclude that based upon the findings of the circuit court and 
the obligations created in the Judgment of Divorce, Patrick is 
not in compliance with the Judgment of Divorce as Ellen alleged.   
¶78 I write in dissent because the majority opinion 
erroneously:  (1) ignores the circuit court's finding of fact 
that the parties agreed to divide the future receipt of 
disability pension payments at the time of divorce; and (2) 
mischaracterizes the disability pension payments from the 
Electrical Construction Industry Pension Plan (the Pension Plan) 
in order to avoid the actual issue presented, i.e., whether the 
parties agreed to divide the disability pension payments if and 
when Patrick received them.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent 
from the majority opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶79 Patrick and Ellen were divorced after 24 years of 
marriage and the birth of three children.  At the divorce, the 
parties entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (the 
Settlement Agreement) that the circuit court incorporated into 
the Judgment of Divorce.  In the Settlement Agreement, the 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
2 
 
parties stipulated to waive maintenance and to the division of 
their property.  Patrick received the major assets of the 
parties:  their home and "[a]ll retirement, pension, and 
deferred benefit accounts in his name, less the sum of $912.88 
to be paid by [Patrick] to [Ellen] per month, if and when 
received by him."  Ellen was to receive a $55,000 equalization 
payment as her half of the parties' equity in their home.  
Within 90 days of the divorce, $40,000 was to be paid, and the 
remaining $15,000 was to be paid within three years.  
¶80 Apparently, Patrick paid the initial $40,000 and 
$5,000 of the remaining $15,000 that was due under the judgment 
before this action was commenced.  After Ellen commenced this 
lawsuit, Patrick paid an additional $5,000.  However, on 
July 30, 2009, when the court order now under review was 
entered, $5,000 remained unpaid.  In addition, Patrick has not 
made any payments to Ellen from the $213,688 in disability 
pension payments he received.  
¶81 In response to Ellen's motion, Patrick moved to 
"revise" the judgment, asking the court to excuse him from 
making monthly payments to Ellen from the disability pension.  
He did not deny that he had failed to make the equalization 
payment required by the Judgment of Divorce. 
¶82 At the hearing, the Pension Plan under which Patrick's 
disability pension is paid was received as Exhibit 1.  Neither 
party argued that a different pension plan or a pension plan 
with terms different from Exhibit 1, was relied upon when the 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
3 
 
Settlement Agreement was made.  Both parties testified, as did 
an expert on pensions.  
¶83 Ellen testified that she had heard that Patrick was 
receiving pension payments.  She sought legal assistance to 
determine if this was true and if so, to determine "where my 
portion of it was if he was collecting it."  She said she became 
suspicious that he was receiving pension payments because he was 
not working.  She remarked, "I don't know how you can not work 
and not collect some kind of money."  
¶84 Counsel for Patrick asked Ellen, "Ma'am, have you ever 
sought a qualified domestic relations order from a court to 
enforce your rights to have a piece of Mr. Topolski's pension?"  
Ellen answered, "That's why I hired an attorney." 
¶85 Counsel for Patrick asked him about the disability 
pension payments: 
Q 
Did you have any intent or understanding about 
disability benefits?   
A 
At the time of my divorce? 
Q 
Yes, sir.   
A 
No.   
Q 
You never had a conversation you can recall with 
her when she said when I retire or words to that 
effect? 
A 
No. 
. . .  
Q 
Do you draw a distinction between a retirement 
time in your life or a disability time in your 
life? 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
4 
 
A 
I retired because of a disability, that's all I 
can say.  Normally I wouldn't.  I wouldn't have 
retired when I did.  That's all I can say. 
Patrick did not testify that a disability pension was not among 
the pensions that were provided by the Pension Plan at the date 
of divorce.  
¶86 In response to his counsel's questions, Patrick said 
in addition to the $2,348 in pension payments he receives each 
month, he also receives Social Security disability payments of 
approximately "2,000 bucks" per month.  Patrick also said that 
he has an annuity worth approximately $20,000 that was "paid 
into over the course of the years [he] was working," which he 
can receive payments from when he is 59-1/2 years old.  When 
counsel for Ellen asked, "Did you own the annuity at the time of 
your divorce?"  Patrick responded, "It started right around that 
time.  There was very little in there at that time."1  Patrick 
further testified that his home was assessed at $250,000 to 
$260,000 and that it had a mortgage of approximately $100,000.   
¶87 At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for Ellen 
submitted an exhibit showing the attorney fees that she had 
incurred to enforce the Judgment of Divorce.2   
¶88 The circuit court found that Patrick was not in 
compliance with the Judgment of Divorce in two respects:  (1) he 
                                                 
1 It is not clear whether Patrick's annuity was disclosed at 
the time of divorce. 
2 Paragraph XIII.C. of the Settlement Agreement provided 
that if court enforcement of the Judgment of Divorce was 
required, the party who was not in compliance with the judgment 
would pay the other party's "actual attorney fees incurred in 
bringing the action."   
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
5 
 
has been receiving $2,348 per month in "benefits under his 
pension plan" since December of 2001 without paying Ellen 
$912.88 per month as the judgment required; and (2) Patrick has 
not made the full equalization payment for Ellen's interest in 
the party's home, which home was awarded to Patrick.   
¶89 The circuit court found that the disability pension 
payments that Patrick has been receiving were "what had been 
awarded to [Ellen] per the parties' own agreement going back to 
the time of their divorce."  Patrick had argued that the 
disability pension payments he was receiving were income.  The 
court disagreed, explaining, "I disagree this is taking income 
from him as opposed to simply enforcing the property division 
itself."   
¶90 Patrick appealed and the court of appeals reversed 
that portion of the circuit court order that related to the 
disability pension payments.3  The court of appeals said the 
issue presented was "whether those benefits are retirement or 
disability benefits."4  It concluded that the payments were 
disability benefits and therefore, Patrick was not obligated to 
pay any portion of it to Ellen.5   
¶91 The court of appeals did not address the issue the 
case actually presents, which is whether, at the time of 
divorce, the parties agreed to a division of disability pension 
                                                 
3 Topolski v. Topolski, No. 2009AP2433-FT, unpublished 
order, at 1-2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 5, 2010).  
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Id. 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
6 
 
payments if and when Patrick receives them.  The court of 
appeals did not disturb the circuit court's determination that 
Patrick had failed to make the full equalization payment 
required by the Judgment of Divorce. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶92 This case involves the review of the circuit court's 
findings of fact and the court's interpretation of the Judgment 
of Divorce that incorporates the Settlement Agreement of the 
parties.  We affirm a circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Steinbach v. Green Lake Sanitary 
Dist., 2006 WI 63, ¶10, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715 N.W.2d 195.  
Interpretation of a judgment is a question of law.  Jacobson v. 
Jacobson, 177 Wis. 2d 539, 546-47, 502 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 
1993).  Where we conclude that a judgment is ambiguous, we will 
defer to the circuit court's interpretation of its own ambiguous 
judgment.  Schultz v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 808, 535 N.W.2d 
116 (Ct. App. 1995).  We independently interpret written 
documents, such as the Pension Plan, as a question of law, but 
benefitting from previous court interpretations.  Solowicz v. 
Forward Geneva Nat'l, LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 
N.W.2d 111.  
B.  Finding of Fact 
¶93 The circuit court found that the disability pension 
payments that Patrick has been receiving were "what had been 
awarded to [Ellen] per the parties' own agreement going back to 
the time of their divorce" and that her efforts were "simply 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
7 
 
enforcing the property division itself."  This finding shows the 
circuit court's determination that the parties intended to 
allocate as property in their divorce the division of all 
payments Patrick received when he was no longer working, 
including the disability pension payments.  This finding is not 
clearly erroneous; rather, it is supported by Ellen's testimony 
and uncontradicted by Patrick's testimony.6  Accordingly, I would 
affirm it.  Steinbach, 291 Wis. 2d 11, ¶10.   
C.  Judgment of Divorce 
¶94 The circuit court interpreted the Judgment of Divorce 
that incorporated the Settlement Agreement in light of the 
payments Patrick was receiving under the Pension Plan.  The 
court utilized the testimony of both parties, an expert in 
pension plans, the Settlement Agreement and the Pension Plan.  
The circuit court noted that the relevant provision of the 
Settlement Agreement divided "[a]ll retirement, pension, and 
deferred benefit accounts" in Patrick's name.   
¶95 The circuit court determined that the disability 
pension payments Patrick was receiving fell within that listing.  
It held Patrick in contempt of court for failing to pay the full 
equalization payment and for failing to pay Ellen $912.88 from 
each $2,348 disability pension payment he received.  The court 
                                                 
6 Ellen said that she sought legal assistance to determine 
if Patrick was receiving pension payments and if so "where my 
portion of it was if he was collecting it."  Patrick simply said 
he had no understanding about disability pension payments when 
the divorce was granted and that he retired due to a disability.  
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
8 
 
ordered payment in full of amounts then due and $3,429.50 in 
attorney fees that this enforcement action generated.  
¶96 On review, we must interpret the Settlement Agreement, 
which was incorporated into the Judgment of Divorce.  If it is 
ambiguous because it does not separately describe disability 
pensions from the collective term, "all pensions," or because 
Patrick had no understanding about the disability pension at the 
time of divorce, then I will defer to the circuit court's 
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement because it is part of 
the court's own Judgment of Divorce.  See Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 
at 808.  If the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous, then I will 
review what it requires independently of the decision of the 
circuit court.  Jacobson, 177 Wis. 2d at 547.   
¶97 Whether I defer to the interpretation of the circuit 
court or apply an independent review of the Judgment of Divorce 
as it incorporates the Settlement Agreement, I conclude that the 
circuit court correctly interpreted what was required under the 
Judgment of Divorce.   
¶98 The Pension Plan is relevant to the interpretation of 
the Judgment of Divorce.  Both parties agreed that it was the 
operative document in regard to the pension payments that 
Patrick has been receiving, even though the Pension Plan 
admitted into evidence is dated December 2007. 
¶99 The Pension Plan states, "The period after you qualify 
for a pension under the Plan and start to receive monthly 
pension payments is considered Retirement."7  The Pension Plan 
                                                 
7 Electrical Construction Industry Pension Plan (the Pension 
Plan), at 2. 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
9 
 
also describes "Disability Pension" in the section entitled 
"ABOUT PENSION BENEFITS."8  Therefore, under the Pension Plan 
from which Patrick is paid, an employee achieves "retirement" 
once the employee receives any type of pension payments, 
including payments from a disability pension.  
¶100 The Settlement Agreement covers "[a]ll retirement, 
pension, and deferred benefit accounts" in Patrick's name.  It 
is beyond dispute that the disability pension payments he has 
been receiving are from a pension described in the Pension Plan.  
The parties did not exclude any type of pension payments; 
rather, they agreed to divide "all" pension payments "if and 
when" Patrick received them.  
¶101 When reviewing the majority opinion, it is important 
not to lose track of the issue presented by this review.  That 
issue is whether the parties agreed to divide the disability 
pension payments when they agreed to divide "all" pensions "if 
and when" Patrick receives payments.   
¶102 The majority opinion never addresses this issue.  
Instead, the majority opinion does a clever bait-and-switch 
wherein it sets out an irrelevant conclusion on which its 
decision turns.  
¶103 To explain, the majority opinion concludes that the 
disability pension is not divisible because it "replaces lost 
wages and therefore does not constitute a retirement, pension, 
or deferred benefit account under the Marital Settlement 
                                                 
8 Id. at 12-13.  
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
10 
 
Agreement."9  The majority opinion concludes that "[a]s such, 
these payments are not assets divisible at dissolution of the 
marriage."10  However, whether the disability pension payments 
replace lost wages or are characterized as income has nothing to 
do with the issue presented for our review, which is whether the 
parties agreed to divide the disability pension payments "if and 
when" Patrick received them.   
¶104 Furthermore, the amounts of the pension payments that 
Patrick has received from his disability pension are not 
comparable to the amounts payable as social security disability, 
which amounts are based on statute.  Rather, the uncontroverted 
evidence shows that the amount of Patrick's pension payment was 
determined under the terms of the Pension Plan, based on his 
past years of employment.  For example, the Pension Plan states, 
"Benefit Credit is earned for your work in Covered Employment.  
The amount of your pension benefit will be based on the total 
years of Benefit Credit you have at retirement."11  The Pension 
Plan 
further 
provides, 
"Benefit 
Credit 
is 
used 
in 
the 
calculation of the amount of your pension benefit.  The monthly 
amount of your pension will be based on the number of Benefit 
Credits you have.  Benefit Credit also is counted in determining 
eligibility for Early Retirement and Disability Pensions."12  The 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶6.   
10 Id., ¶46.  
11 Pension Plan, at 2.  
12 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
11 
 
disability pension payments are a property right created by the 
Pension Plan in the same way as a property right to a normal 
pension is created——both are based on past years of service.13   
¶105 Furthermore, both a normal pension and a disability 
pension are income to the recipient.  See Barker v. Kansas, 503 
U.S. 594, 603 (1992); Wis. Stat. § 71.01(13).  Therefore, the 
majority opinion's characterization of the disability pension 
payments as income or lost wages is irrelevant to determining 
whether Patrick owed $912.88 per month from every monthly 
pension payment of $2,348 that he received.  He owed it because 
the parties agreed to divide all pension payments if and when he 
received them.  
¶106 To 
explain 
this 
latter 
point 
further, 
we 
have 
recognized that some disability pensions are separate property 
to compensate for loss of earning capacity and therefore 
division cannot be compelled.14  Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 
620, 636, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978) (remarking that Mr. Leighton was 
not required to divide as marital property his Veterans' 
disability 
pension 
because 
it 
was 
"a 
federally-provided 
replacement for earning capacity lost by reason of injuries 
                                                 
13 I note that the Pension Plan is an ERISA defined benefit plan.  See the Pension Plan, at 
2, 29, 32.  Accordingly, Patrick's right to payments under the Pension Plan is an interest in the 
receipt of payments when the Pension Plan's conditions are met that is protected under federal 
law.  Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 743 (2004); Lockheed Corp. v. 
Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996). 
14 The majority opinion cites Leighton v. Leighton, 81 
Wis. 2d 620, 637, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978), as authority for the 
proposition that a disability pension replaces lost wages.  
Majority op., ¶46 n.20.  However, that is not what Leighton 
holds.  Leighton addresses lost earning capacity, not lost 
wages.  Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d at 636.  
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
12 
 
sustained 
while 
in 
military 
service"). 
 
Other 
Wisconsin 
appellate courts have divided disability pensions against the 
wishes of the primary recipient.  Loveland v. Loveland, 147 
Wis. 2d 605, 612, 433 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1988) (concluding 
that "retirement pay based on disability but which replaces 
'retirement' pension and is partly computed on service longevity 
and rank" is divisible).  However, no Wisconsin appellate 
decision has ever held that the parties cannot agree as part of 
their divorce settlement to divide disability pension payments, 
subject to the approval of the circuit court.   
¶107 The Settlement Agreement now before us, which the 
circuit court approved by incorporating it into the Judgment of 
Divorce, is an agreement to divide all pensions in Patrick's 
name.  The parties were free to divide the disability pension as 
they saw fit, subject to circuit court approval, and they did 
so.   
¶108 Accordingly, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly determined that Patrick failed to comply with the 
Judgment of Divorce when he did not pay Ellen $912.88 each month 
from 
the 
disability 
pension 
payments 
he 
received. 
 
I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion that concludes to 
the contrary.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶109 I conclude that based upon the findings of the circuit 
court and the obligations created in the Judgment of Divorce, 
Patrick is not in compliance with the Judgment of Divorce in two 
respects:  (1) Patrick failed to pay Ellen $912.88 per month 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
13 
 
from the $2,348 he has received every month in disability 
pension payments since December 2001; and (2) Patrick failed to 
pay the full equalization payment required by the Judgment of 
Divorce.   
¶110 I write in dissent because the majority opinion 
erroneously:  (1) ignores the circuit court's finding of fact 
that the parties agreed to divide the future receipt of 
disability pension payments at the time of divorce; and (2) 
mischaracterizes the disability pension payments from the 
Pension Plan in order to avoid the actual issue presented, i.e., 
whether the parties agreed to divide the disability pension 
payments if and when Patrick receives them.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
¶111 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2009AP2433-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
1