Title: Commonwealth v. Alvarez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12414
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2018

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SJC-12414 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARLOS ALVAREZ, JR. 
 
 
August 29, 2018. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Trespass.  Cellular Telephone.  Search 
and Seizure, Expectation of privacy, Search incident to 
lawful arrest.  Evidence, Operative words.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
Following a jury trial in Superior Court, the defendant, 
Carlos Alvarez, Jr., was convicted of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute, as a subsequent offense, and criminal 
trespass.  The defendant was arrested for selling cocaine in a 
grocery store parking lot.  He unsuccessfully moved to suppress 
evidence related to his cellular telephone (cell phone) that had 
been lawfully seized during a search incident to his arrest.  
After trial, the defendant appealed to the Appeals Court, 
challenging the denial of his motion to suppress and his 
convictions, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
 
Evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress.  A police officer observed the defendant conducting a 
hand-to-hand drug transaction in the parking lot behind a 
grocery store.  The officer approached the defendant as he was 
completing the sale.  The defendant fled the scene shortly after 
the officer approached him, but he was apprehended by another 
officer moments later.  After the defendant was arrested, the 
officer who had observed the drug transaction searched the 
defendant's pockets and recovered money and a cell phone.  The 
officer also observed a plastic bag containing a small, rock-
like object -- later determined to be cocaine -- on the ground 
in the area where the defendant had been on the ground. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Upon recovery of the cell phone from the defendant's pocket 
during the arrest, the officer did not attempt to open it, look 
into it, or press any buttons.  At some unspecified point after 
the officer returned to the police station, the cell phone rang; 
the officer glanced at the "ringing" cell phone and saw a text 
message on its outer screen.  A Superior Court judge denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress the cell phone and the text 
message. 
 
 
The defendant contends that by glancing at the ringing cell 
phone and observing a text message on its outer screen, the 
officer conducted a search.  In a motion to suppress, the 
defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that a search 
occurred pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  See Commonwealth v. D'Onofrio, 396 Mass. 711, 
714-715 (1986).  See also Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 
700, 708 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 
697 (2003) ("burden is initially on the defendant[] to 
demonstrate that [he] had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
. . . .  Thus, if the record is unclear . . . it is the 
defendant[] -- not the Commonwealth -- who [has] failed to meet 
[his] burden of proof . . ."). 
 
 
The record before us presents a dearth of evidence 
concerning the cell phone.  It is clear, however, that the 
defendant's cell phone was seized during a valid search incident 
to his lawful arrest.  See Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 
588, 592 (2017).  At some point after the defendant's cell phone 
was lawfully seized and the officer returned to the police 
station, the cell phone rang.  In response, the officer glanced 
at the outer screen of the ringing cell phone, where he observed 
the text message at issue.  There was no evidence that the 
officer opened the cell phone, manipulated it to view the text 
message, or otherwise perused its contents.  Because the record 
is devoid of evidence suggesting that the officer's observation 
of the outside of the defendant's cell phone constituted a 
search, the defendant did not establish that a search occurred.1  
Accordingly, within this factual vacuum, we cannot say that the 
judge erred in denying the motion to suppress. 
 
 
Evidence at trial.  The officer's testimony about the drug 
deal substantially conformed to the evidence presented at the 
                                                 
 
1 There was no evidence concerning the officer's possession 
of the cell phone after the arrest, or anything to suggest that 
his possession of the cell phone was no longer constitutionally 
justified. 
3 
 
 
hearing on the motion to suppress.  The officer observed the 
defendant meeting with another individual and conducting a hand-
to-hand drug transaction in the parking lot behind a grocery 
store.  Several "no trespassing" signs were prominently posted 
around that area of the parking lot.  As the defendant was 
completing the drug deal, the officer approached the defendant.  
The defendant fled the scene but was arrested moments later.  
The officer recovered money and a cell phone from the 
defendant's pockets and observed a plastic bag containing 
cocaine fall from the defendant's pants. 
 
 
The officer testified that the cell phone recovered from 
the defendant was a "flip phone."  As the officer was writing 
his report at the police station, he heard the defendant's cell 
phone ring.  In response, he glanced at its outer screen and saw 
a text message: "N word, I need some shit."2  The officer 
testified that he had not opened the cell phone or otherwise 
manipulated it to view the message appearing on the outer 
screen.  The cell phone was admitted in evidence. 
 
 
Another officer testified that individuals looking to buy 
drugs will often contact a drug dealer through text message, and 
use coded words indicating that the person wants to meet to 
purchase drugs.  That officer testified that a person found in 
possession of one small rock of cocaine, multiple twenty dollar 
bills, and a cell phone with a coded text message is more 
consistent with an individual dealing drugs than a personal 
user. 
 
 
Testimony concerning the text message.  The defendant 
principally claims that the officer's testimony about the 
content of the text message constituted impermissible hearsay 
and should not have been admitted.3  However, "the words used to 
                                                 
2 The trial transcript indicates that this is how the 
officer described the text message that he observed. 
 
 
3 Although he did not raise the issue at trial, the 
defendant now argues that this testimony was not sufficiently 
authenticated.  To authenticate evidence, the proponent of the 
evidence must make a showing sufficient "to support a finding 
that the item is what the proponent claims it is."  Mass. G. 
Evid. § 901(a) (2018).  See Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 
442, 447 (2011).  Here, there was sufficient evidence indicating 
that the evidence presented was what it purported to be:  a 
brief text message on the outer screen of the defendant's cell 
phone. 
4 
 
 
effectuate the commission of a crime, or to make a contractual 
promise or describe its terms, or to form a criminal conspiracy 
or set forth its aims" are legally operative words that do not 
constitute hearsay.  Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 452-
453 (2011).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) (2018).  In the same 
way that statements "compris[ing] a solicitation of a sexual 
act, including any negotiations regarding the price or 
services," are legally operative words, Purdy, supra at 452, a 
statement in a text message asking to buy drugs is composed of 
the words of a crime and does not constitute hearsay.4  
Accordingly, there was no error in admitting the testimony. 
 
 
Criminal trespass.  The defendant contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of criminal 
trespass.  General Laws c. 266, § 120, provides: 
 
 
"Whoever, without right enters or remains in or 
upon the . . . improved or enclosed land . . . of 
another . . . after having been forbidden so to do by 
the person who has lawful control of said premises, 
whether directly or by notice posted thereon, . . . 
shall be punished . . . ." 
 
The phrase "'without right' . . . connote[s] the absence of any 
right, permission, or license recognized by law as permitting an 
entry into an area described by the statute."  Commonwealth v. 
Wolf, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 949, 951 (1993), citing Hurley v. 
Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd sub nom. 
Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277 (1970).  In the circumstances of 
this case, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant had entered onto the grocery store property "without 
right."  Similarly, as it related to the facts before us, there 
is nothing suggesting that once the defendant entered onto the 
premises, he was provided adequate notice that he had been 
forbidden to remain thereon.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
there was insufficient evidence in this case to support the 
defendant's conviction of criminal trespassing. 
                                                 
 
4 The defendant also contends that testimony about the text 
message violated the best evidence rule.  The defendant did not 
raise this objection at trial and, therefore, deprived the 
Commonwealth of the opportunity to produce the original writing, 
Mass. G. Evid. § 1002 (2018), "or show a sufficient excuse for 
its nonproduction."  Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 6 
(2001).  Even if the best evidence rule applied here, we cannot 
say that any potential violation created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
5 
 
 
 
 
The defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute is affirmed.  The defendant's conviction of 
criminal trespass is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Matthew J. Koes for the defendant. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.