Title: Simmons v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 951916
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 1996

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Hassell, and Keenan, 
JJ., Poff, Senior Justice, and Cochran, Retired Justice 
 
JOSEPH M. SIMMONS 
                                         OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 951916 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO   
                                  September 
13, 
1996     
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WAYNESBORO 
 
Rudolph Bumgardner, III, Judge 
 
 
This appeal presents the question whether the trial court 
erred in holding that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel
1 
bars a court from suspending a person's operator's license for one 
year for his refusal to take a blood or breath alcohol test when 
he has already suffered a seven-day administrative suspension for 
the same refusal.
2  Finding that the trial court did not err, we 
will affirm. 
 
The seven-day administrative suspension was made pursuant to 
Code § 46.2-391.2, which provides in pertinent part that if a 
person refuses to submit to a breath test in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-268.3, his license shall be suspended immediately for seven 
days.  Section 18.2-268.3, referred to in § 46.2-391.2, prescribes 
the procedures to be followed if a person, after having been 
arrested for driving under the influence, refuses to permit blood 
or breath samples to be taken for chemical tests to determine the 
                     
     
1The defendant in this case uses the term "estoppel by 
judgment"; however, we prefer the term "collateral estoppel."  
Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671 n.5, 202 S.E.2d 917, 921 n.5 
(1974). 
     
2Because a charge of unreasonably refusing to submit to a 
blood or breath test is not criminal but administrative and civil 
in nature, an appeal lies directly from the trial court to this 
Court.  Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319, 323-24, 402 S.E.2d 
17, 20 (1991). 
alcohol or drug content of his blood.  Section 18.2-268.4 provides 
that if a person is found guilty of violating § 18.2-268.3, the 
court shall suspend his privilege to drive for a period of one 
year, in addition to the administrative suspension imposed under 
§ 46.2-391.2.  
 
The record shows that on February 16, 1995, the defendant, 
Joseph M. Simmons, upon his refusal to submit to a blood or breath 
test, was served with a notice of administrative suspension 
pursuant to § 46.2-391.2, and his license was "taken" for a period 
of seven days.  He was also charged in a warrant with refusing to 
permit the taking of a breath sample to determine the alcohol 
content of his blood.  In general district court, the defendant 
was found guilty as charged in the warrant, and his operator's 
license was suspended for a period of one year.  On a de novo 
appeal to circuit court, he was again found guilty, and his 
license was again suspended for a period of one year. 
 
Citing Wright v. Wright, 164 Va. 245, 252, 178 S.E. 884, 886 
(1935), the defendant correctly points out that for res judicata 
to bar the prosecution of a second action, the judgment in the 
former action must have been rendered on the merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction and the parties and the matters in 
controversy must be the same in the two actions.  The defendant 
also correctly points out that the plea of res judicata and the 
plea of collateral estoppel, while not identical, "are based upon 
similar principles of law, namely the conclusiveness of judgments 
of the Court, and the effect of a judgment as estoppel."  The 
difference between the two pleas, the defendant notes, lies in 
what is concluded by the first judgment.  Under res judicata, the 
first judgment bars the parties and their privies not only from 
relitigating the issues actually determined but also from 
litigating those that might have been determined; under collateral 
estoppel, only those issues actually litigated and determined are 
concluded.  Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 
920-21 (1974).  
 
Here, the defendant argues that "the issue is the same, 
namely that the defendant refused to take the breath or blood 
test."  That issue, the defendant opines, "has already been 
decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction" in the form of the 
administrative 
suspension 
of 
his 
license 
for 
seven 
days.  
Therefore, the defendant concludes, the administrative suspension 
"is res judicata and estoppel and the Commonwealth should be 
estopped from taking a person's Operator's License for twelve 
months for refusing to take a breath or blood test after having 
taken the Operator's License administratively for seven days for 
the same act." 
 
The difficulty with the defendant's argument is that by his 
own statement of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel, the establishment of a prior judgment rendered by a 
court of competent jurisdiction is a condition precedent to the 
allowance of any plea in bar asserting either doctrine.  Yet, by 
no 
stretch 
of 
the 
imagination 
can 
it 
be 
said 
that 
an 
administrative suspension of an operator's license for failure to 
take a blood or breath test is a judgment rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.  What is involved is neither more nor less 
than the term administrative suspension implies, an administrative 
act, not a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the suspension by the trial court 
of the defendant's operator's license for one year was not barred 
by the earlier administrative suspension of the license for seven 
days, and we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.