Title: Burden v. Copco Refrigeration, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51729
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 2005

FILED:  September 29, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ROSEMAYNE BURDEN,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
COPCO REFRIGERATION, INC.,
Defendant,
and
ANTOINE SABB,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 0006-06290; CA A116663; SC S51729)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 10, 2005.
Maureen Leonard, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.  With her on the brief was Jane
Paulson.
Thomas M. Christ, Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With him on the brief was Thomas W. Brown.
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,
William Snouffer, Judge.
192 Or App 378, 86 P3d 59, modified on recons, 193 Or App
476, 89 P3d 1286 (2004).
KISTLER, J.
The primary question in this case is whether the trial
court could rely on the facts recited in a certificate of service
in ruling on the sufficiency of service of process.  The Court of
Appeals held that it could not because ORCP 21 A (2001) (1)
requires a plaintiff to prove service by either affidavit or
other competent evidence.  Burden v. Copco, 192 Or App 378, 384,
86 P3d 59, modified on recons, 193 Or App 476, 89 P3d 1286
(2004).  We hold that, because a certificate of service is prima
facie evidence of the material facts that it recites, the trial
court properly relied on those facts in ruling on the sufficiency
of service.  We reverse the Court of Appeals decision and remand
for further proceedings.
Plaintiff brought this negligence action against
defendants Sabb and Copco Refrigeration, Inc.  Copco settled, and
the case against Sabb proceeded.  Regarding that defendant,
plaintiff filed two certificates of service with the court.  The
first certificate recited that, after numerous attempts, the
process server could not find defendant and thus could not serve
him personally.  The second certificate recited, in part:
"I hereby certify, that I have made service of the
following upon the individual(s) named below by
delivering a certified/true copy of Summons and
Complaint.
"Upon Antoine Sabb, by delivering such true copy,
at the usual place of abode, 5122 NE Jarret St,
Portland, OR, to Linda Baker, Mother/Co-Occupant who is
a competent person over the age of 14 and a member of
the household of the person served on August 2, 2000,
at 7:45 PM." (2)
Plaintiff perfected substituted service by mailing a copy of the
summons and complaint, along with the requisite statement, to
defendant at the address listed above.  See ORCP 7 D(2)(b)
(requiring mailing to perfect substituted service).  Plaintiff
also served a copy of the summons and complaint on defendant's
insurer.
Defendant answered the complaint and alleged, as an
affirmative defense, insufficiency of service of process.  Three
days before trial, he served two pretrial motions on plaintiff. 
He moved to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and
also for an offset.  In support of the motion to dismiss,
defendant did not introduce any evidence to rebut the facts
recited in the certificate of service, nor did he argue that, if
those facts were true, they were not sufficient to prove
substituted service.  Rather, defendant argued only that, because
the facts recited in the certificate were hearsay, they were not
competent evidence of what the process server did or did not do.
Defendant filed the motion to dismiss and the motion
for an offset on the day of trial, and the trial court held a
hearing on both motions before impaneling the jury.  At the
hearing, defendant repeated orally the arguments that he had made
in his written motion to dismiss.  He argued that plaintiff had
the burden of production and persuasion on the sufficiency of
service, that the facts recited in the certificate were hearsay,
and that plaintiff could not rely on hearsay to meet her burden
of production.  Plaintiff responded that defendant's motion to
dismiss was not timely and that, in any event, she could rely on
the facts recited in the certificate to establish the sufficiency
of service of process.  The trial court denied defendant's motion
to dismiss, as well as his motion for an offset, and the jury
returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor.
On appeal, defendant assigned error to both the ruling
denying his motion to dismiss and the ruling denying his motion
for an offset.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
trial court had erred in denying the motion to dismiss.  Burden,
192 Or at 385.  The court started from the proposition that
plaintiff had the burden to prove service.  Id. at 384.  Relying
on ORCP 21 A, the court reasoned that plaintiff could meet that
burden only through "'affidavits and other evidence.'"  Id.
(quoting ORCP 21 A).  It concluded that, because the certificate
of service on which plaintiff relied was neither in the form of
an affidavit nor competent evidence, it was not sufficient proof
of the facts it recited.  Id. at 384-85.  Because plaintiff had
failed to offer any competent evidence of service, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment.  Id. at 385.
We allowed plaintiff's petition for review to consider
whether plaintiff had the burden of production or persuasion on
the sufficiency of service of process and, if she did, whether
she could rely on the facts recited in the certificate of service
to meet her burden.  After we allowed review, we asked the
parties to address a preliminary issue -- whether defendant's
motion to dismiss was timely under ORCP 21 A.  We begin with that
preliminary issue.
ORCP 21 A provides that "[e]very defense, in law or
fact, to a claim for relief * * * shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion to dismiss[.]" 
The rule lists "insufficiency of service of summons or process"
as one of the defenses that a party may raise either in a
responsive pleading or by way of a motion to dismiss.  The rule
then states: "A motion to dismiss making any of these defenses
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted."
Focusing on the last sentence, plaintiff argues that,
under the plain wording of ORCP 21 A, defendant could not file a
motion to dismiss after he filed his answer.  Literally,
plaintiff is correct.  If defendant wanted to file a motion to
dismiss under ORCP 21 A, the mandatory wording of that rule
required that he file the motion before he filed his answer. 
That is not the end of the matter, however.  ORCP 21 A also
permitted defendant to raise insufficiency of service as an
affirmative defense in his answer.  He did so and did not waive
the defense.  See ORCP 21 G (defining when waiver will occur). 
Having properly pleaded insufficiency of service as an
affirmative defense, defendant either could have waited until
trial to present evidence on that defense or he could have
applied for a preliminary hearing on the defense pursuant to ORCP
21 C.
The latter rule provides that the defenses listed in
ORCP 21 A "shall be heard and determined before trial on
application of any party, unless the court orders that the
hearing and determination should be deferred until trial."  ORCP
21 C.  That rule provides the parties with another procedural
mechanism, in addition to a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A,
for obtaining a pretrial ruling on a potentially dispositive
defense.
In this case, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of service on the day of trial, and the trial court
resolved that motion before impaneling the jury.  ORCP 21 C
authorized the trial court to resolve that motion in advance of
trial rather than requiring defendant to wait until trial to
present evidence on the sufficiency of service.  See Charles Alan
Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 5C Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1361, 95 (3d ed 2004) (explaining interpretation of analogous
rule of federal civil procedure).  Even though defendant
incorrectly captioned the document as a motion to dismiss under
ORCP 21 A rather than an application for a preliminary hearing
under ORCP 21 C, his failure to use the correct caption did not
prevent the trial court from reaching the merits of his defense
and ruling on it before trial. (3)  See State v. Barone, 329 Or
210, 221, 986 P2d 5 (1999) (substance of motion rather than
caption controls).
Having concluded that defendant's "motion to dismiss"
was properly before the trial court, we turn to the question
whether the court could rely on the facts recited in the
certificate of service in determining the sufficiency of service. 
That question entails two issues.  The first is whether
plaintiff, as the party invoking the court's jurisdiction, had
the burden of production.  If she did, the second issue is
whether plaintiff could rely on the facts recited in the
certificate to meet that burden.
On the first issue, we agree with defendant that
plaintiff had the burden of production.  "The burden of coming
forward with the 'jurisdictional facts' lies upon the party
asserting jurisdiction."  State ex rel Sweere v. Crookham, 289 Or
3, 7, 609 P2d 361 (1980).  That burden extends to the facts
relating to the sufficiency of service.  See Mullens v. L.Q.
Development, 312 Or 599, 608-09, 825 P2d 1376 (1992) (holding
that appellant had burden regarding timely service of notice of
appeal).  Although neither Sweere nor Mullens dealt with the
precise question at issue here, we see no reason why their
reasoning does not apply with equal force in this context.
Indeed, for some time, this court has recognized that a
certificate of service that a plaintiff has filed with the court
is "prima facie evidence of the material facts recited therein." 
E.g., Abraham v. Miller, 52 Or 8, 11, 95 P 814 (1908); Huntington
v. Crouter, 33 Or 408, 414, 54 P 208 (1898).  In recognizing that
a certificate of service makes out a prima facie case, the court
implicitly has allocated the burden of production on the
sufficiency of service of process to the plaintiff.  We now
confirm that implicit allocation and hold explicitly that
plaintiff had the burden of production on the sufficiency of
service. (4)
Defendant also argues that plaintiff may not rely on
the certificate of service to meet her burden of production. 
That argument is at odds with well-established precedent.  Since
statehood, Oregon has required plaintiffs to file a proof of
service with the court.  General Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch I,
title V, § 60, p 154 (Deady 1845-1864).  Once filed, a
certificate of service becomes "prima facie evidence of the
material facts recited therein."  Abraham, 52 Or at 11;
Huntington, 33 Or at 414.  If those facts establish that the
plaintiff properly served the defendant, the plaintiff need not
introduce any other evidence to meet his or her burden of
production, although a defendant always may introduce evidence to
rebut the facts recited in the certificate.  Id.
Nothing in the adoption of the Oregon Rules of Civil
Procedure suggests that the legislature intended to depart from
that familiar rule.  ORCP 7 F continues, in all material
respects, the same rules for proof of service that Oregon has
followed since statehood. (5)  Decisions such as Huntington and
Abraham that explain the evidentiary effect of a certificate of
service apply with equal force to certificates of service filed
pursuant to ORCP 7 F.  See Ryerse v. Haddock, 337 Or 273, 279, 95
P3d 1120 (2004) (when statute contains same wording as prior
enactment, cases interpreting prior enactment controlling).
Defendant, however, notes that ORCP 21 A authorizes the
parties to introduce "affidavits and other evidence" to prove the
existence or nonexistence of facts relevant to a motion to
dismiss.  Reasoning that a certificate of service is neither an
affidavit nor admissible evidence, he concludes that the use of
the phrase "affidavits and other evidence" in ORCP 21 A
demonstrates a legislative intent to abrogate the longstanding
judicial rule that a certificate of service is prima facie
evidence of the facts that it recites.
Defendant focuses too narrowly on the phrase
"affidavits and other evidence."  ORCP 21 A provides, in part:
"If, on a motion to dismiss asserting defenses (1)
through (7), the facts constituting such defenses do
not appear on the face of the pleading and matters
outside the pleading, including affidavits and other
evidence, are presented to the court, all parties shall
be given a reasonable opportunity to present affidavits
and other evidence, and the court may determine the
existence or nonexistence of the facts supporting such
defense[.]"
(Emphasis added). (6)  ORCP 21 A recognizes that the facts
relevant to some of the defenses listed in that rule, such as
sufficiency of service, may not appear on the face of the
pleading and that "matters outside the pleading, including
affidavits and other evidence, [may be] presented to the court." 
If that occurs, then all parties may present additional
"affidavits and other evidence" to the court, and the court may
determine the existence or nonexistence of the facts on that
record.
It follows from the legislature's use of the word
"including" that the category of "matters outside the pleading"
that a court may consider in ruling on a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of service is not limited to "affidavits and other
evidence."  And the cases make clear that one of the matters a
court may consider when faced with a challenge to the sufficiency
of service of process is the certificate of service on file with
the court.  See, e.g., Huntington, 33 Or at 414 (stating
proposition).  Put another way, we find nothing in ORCP 21 A that
abrogates the well-established rule that the certificate of
service is prima facie evidence of the facts that it recites. 
Rather, we interpret ORCP 21 A consistently with ORCP 7 and the
cases explaining the evidentiary effect of a certificate of
service.  See ORS 174.010 (providing that "where there are
several provisions or particulars such construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all").
We hold that plaintiff could rely on the facts recited
in the certificate of service to meet her burden of production on
the sufficiency of the service.  Cf. Mullens, 312 Or at 608-09
(party may rely on certificate of mailing to prove timeliness of
mailing).  In this case, defendant did not introduce any evidence
to rebut those facts, and the trial court ruled that plaintiff
properly had served defendant.  In this procedural posture, we
need not decide whether plaintiff also had the burden of
persuasion on this issue.  Rather, once the trial court ruled in
plaintiff's favor, the only question presented by this case is
whether there was an evidentiary basis for the trial court's
factual findings.  See Illingworth v. Bushong, 297 Or 675, 694,
688 P2d 379 (1984) (stating standard of review).  As explained
above, there was. (7)  Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's
ruling denying defendant's motion to dismiss and reverse the
Court of Appeals decision.  Because the Court of Appeals did not
reach defendant's second assignment of error, we remand this case
so that it can consider that issue.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
1. 
Unless otherwise specified, all references to ORCP 21
are to ORCP 21 (2001), the version of the rule in effect when
defendant filed his motion to dismiss.
2. 
ORCP 7 D(1) lists the ways in which a plaintiff can
accomplish service.  It provides, among other things, for
"substituted service by leaving a copy of summons and complaint
at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode."  ORCP
7 D(2)(b) sets out additional requirements for substituted
service.
3. 
In the Court of Appeals, both the parties and the court
assumed that defendant did not file his motion to dismiss before
trial.  Although the trial followed closely on the heels of
defendant's motion, both the motion and the hearing on it
occurred pretrial.
4. 
As explained below, in the procedural posture of this
case, we need not decide whether plaintiff or defendant had the
burden of persuasion on this issue.  We note that, in a different
context, the court has placed the burden of persuasion on the
defendant.  See Abraham, 52 Or at 10-11 (placing burden of
persuasion on defendant seeking to set aside judgment for
insufficient service); Huntington, 33 Or at 414 (same).
5. 
ORCP 7 F permits a larger group of persons to file
certificates of service than the Oregon statutes initially did. 
Compare ORCP 7 F(2)(a)(i) (any person authorized to serve summons
and complaint may file certificate of service), with General Laws
of Oregon, Civ Code, ch I, title V, § 60(1), p 154 (Deady 1845-64) (sheriff or deputy who serves summons may file certificate of
service).  That change is not material, however, to the
evidentiary effect of a certificate of service.
6. 
We note that, literally, defendant was not proceeding
under ORCP 21 A but under ORCP 21 C.  Accordingly, the passage
from ORCP 21 A on which he relies is inapposite.  However, even
if we assume that that passage applies equally to preliminary
hearings under ORCP 21 C, his reliance on the phrase "affidavits
and other evidence" still is misplaced for the reasons explained
below.
7. 
A party also may argue that the trial court's factual
findings do not comply with a legal standard.  In this case,
defendant argues on review that, even if the facts recited in the
certificate were true, they were not sufficient as a matter of
law to prove substituted service.  Because defendant did not
raise that issue in the trial court, we decline to reach it.