Title: Davis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1282
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 8, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1282 
____________ 
 
JOSHUA DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
September 8, 2022 
 
COURIEL, J. 
 
We have for review the decision in Davis v. State, 311 So. 3d 
927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), in which the Second District Court of 
Appeal certified the following question of great public importance: 
WHEN A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE ASSERTS 
IN AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED A 
LEGALLY SUFFICIENT MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE 
TRIAL JUDGE FOR ALLEGED BIAS OR PREJUDICE 
UNDER SECTION 38.10, FLORIDA STATUTES (2015), 
AND FLORIDA RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
2.330(D)(1), SHOULD AN APPELLATE COURT REVIEW 
THE ERRONEOUS DENIAL FOR HARMLESS ERROR 
AND, IF SO, WHAT HARMLESS ERROR TEST SHOULD 
THE APPELLATE COURT APPLY? 
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We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  The answer to 
the certified question is yes.  We find that the Second District was 
correct to apply the harmless error standard.  However, the proper 
test is that set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 
1986).  And applying that test here, we find that harmful error 
occurred, so we quash the decision of the Second District to the 
extent that it concludes otherwise, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
I 
 
On April 24, 2012, Joshua Davis shot three coworkers who 
were visiting his home, killing two and severely wounding the third.  
At his trial, the State introduced no evidence regarding a motive for 
the shootings.  Rather, “[t]he State’s theory was that Mr. Davis 
intentionally shot the three men while under the influence of 
marijuana,” which he had smoked with two of them.  Davis, 311 So. 
3d at 931-32.  “[A]ccording to one of the State’s experts, [Davis was] 
in a state of psychosis from having used the drug.”  Id.  Davis’s 
seven-year-old daughter was at home and witnessed the shootings.  
A grand jury indicted Davis on two counts of first-degree murder, 
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one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of child 
abuse on May 10, 2012. 
The case was originally scheduled for trial in May 2015 before 
Judge Donald Jacobsen, who in the intervening years ruled on 
several pretrial matters.  The trial was continued and, eventually, 
Judge Jacobsen announced that he expected to leave the capital 
felony division.  His replacement would be Judge Jalal Harb. 
 
Davis moved for Judge Jacobsen to remain on the case 
because, aside from Judge Jacobsen’s knowledge of the facts and 
his having ruled on many pretrial motions, Judge Harb had been a 
prosecutor in the homicide division of the state attorney’s office 
from August 2012 to March 2014, while Davis’s case was pending.  
The State opposed and moved to strike Davis’s motion, arguing that 
Judge Harb had no involvement in the prosecution of Davis’s case, 
and that his having worked in the same division did not, without 
more, support the inference that he was biased.   
Judge Jacobsen presided at a hearing on these matters.  
Judge Harb attended as an observer.  The prosecutor argued that 
Judge Harb could easily come up to speed on the case and 
- 4 - 
 
explained the following about Judge Harb’s work at the state 
attorney’s office: 
Judge, I would like to put on the record that I did, when I 
received the defense motion, pull this file, as well as any 
homicide committee notes that took place while Judge 
Harb was in our division.  I pulled this file and every 
attorney note that’s in this case.  Judge Harb’s not 
touched this file.  He never attended a homicide 
committee meeting regarding this case.  Other than the 
fact that this was pending in the division when he was an 
attorney in that division, he’s had no contact with this 
file. 
 
Davis, 311 So. 3d at 931.  Judge Jacobsen denied Davis’s motion 
but clarified that this did not prejudice Davis’s right to file a motion 
to disqualify Judge Harb. 
 
And indeed, when Judge Harb took over the capital felony 
division in July 2015, Davis moved to disqualify him under section 
38.10 of the Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.330(e)(1).  In his supporting affidavit, Davis listed 
four reasons he feared he would not receive a fair trial: 
(1) Judge Harb was an assistant state attorney in the 
homicide division while this case was pending and 
worked alongside the prosecutor in that division handling 
his case,  
 
(2) [T]he homicide division functioned as a single unit with 
decisions being made not by individual prosecutors but 
rather by committee as a unified division,  
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(3) [T]he State’s argument in opposition to his motion for 
Judge Jacobsen to remain on the case was both 
strenuous and based on factual research about Judge 
Harb that the judge could not consider in ruling on a 
motion to disqualify, and  
 
(4) Judge Harb was present at the hearing on the motion for 
Judge Jacobsen to remain on the case. 
 
Davis, 311 So. 3d at 931.  Judge Harb denied the motion as legally 
insufficient.  Davis did not file a petition for a writ of prohibition 
seeking relief from that decision.   
The case was tried in October 2016.  The State’s theory was 
that Davis’s use of marijuana left him in a state of psychosis, but 
that he nonetheless intentionally shot the three victims.  Davis did 
not deny that he smoked marijuana, nor did he contest that he shot 
the three men in the presence of his daughter.  Instead, Davis 
argued that the shootings were justified, as his friends were acting 
strangely after reentering his house.  Davis also presented an 
alternative defense of insanity based on expert testimony that he 
suffered from mental infirmity, which manifested itself in paranoid 
beliefs and behavior.  The State countered this theory with expert 
testimony on drug-related paranoia. 
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The jury found Davis guilty of two counts of the lesser 
included offense of second-degree murder—one for each of the two 
victims who were killed—guilty of attempted first-degree murder 
with respect to the victim who survived, and guilty of child abuse.   
Davis moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that 
Judge Harb “showed bias in his rulings toward” the State.  Davis 
also identified a specific ruling of Judge Jacobsen’s that Judge Harb 
reversed: Davis initially sought to conduct individual voir dire with 
jury panelists about the defense of insanity; whereas Judge 
Jacobsen had granted this request in a pretrial ruling, Judge Harb 
ruled that such inquiry would be allowed only if an individual juror 
asked to speak privately about the matter.  Judge Harb denied the 
motion for a new trial.  The court sentenced Davis to three 
concurrent life sentences for the murder counts, each with a 
twenty-five-year minimum mandatory sentence based on the use of 
a firearm, and a concurrent five-year sentence for child abuse. 
 
On appeal, Davis challenged each of his three convictions, 
arguing primarily that “his judgment and sentences should be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial because Judge Harb 
wrongly denied his motion for disqualification.”  Davis, 311 So. 3d 
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at 932.  Davis “abandoned any appellate issue concerning the 
denial of the motion for new trial in which the allegation of actual 
bias was made.”  Id.  The question before the Second District was 
whether “the allegations of the disqualification motion Judge Harb 
denied were legally sufficient to show a reasonable fear that [Davis] 
would not receive a fair trial and thus . . . require that Judge Harb 
step off the case.”  Id. 
The Second District found that Davis’s motion was legally 
sufficient and should have been granted.  Id. at 933.  Relying on our 
decision in Reed v. State, 259 So. 3d 718 (Fla. 2018), which also 
sought disqualification of a trial judge who had previously been a 
prosecutor in a capital case unit,1 the district court explained: 
 
1.  There, as here, the judge had not been the prosecutor 
assigned to the defendant’s case, but members of the capital unit 
“had input in the decision making in each other’s cases.”  Reed, 259 
So. 3d at 721 (quoting defendant’s motion to disqualify).  The record 
here contains something absent from Reed: a prosecutor’s 
representation that her search of the files revealed no evidence that 
the presiding judge did in fact have any input into the defendant’s 
case.  However, to rule on a motion to disqualify, a trial court need 
only determine the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass 
on the truth of the facts alleged.  Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d 705, 
707-08 (Fla. 1995).  The prosecutor’s representation goes to 
whether or not the trial judge in fact influenced the defendant’s 
case, but the defendant need not have put that specific fact into 
issue to state a legally sufficient basis for disqualification. 
- 8 - 
 
First, Mr. Davis’s motion alleges that the State 
strongly argued against Judge Jacobsen’s staying on the 
case and in favor of Judge Harb’s taking it. Second, 
Judge Harb was present at the hearing during which 
these arguments were made. And third, the State, in the 
presence of Judge Harb, disclosed the results of its 
factual investigation into whether Judge Harb had 
contact with the case while at the State Attorney's Office. 
The State’s conduct thus (1) implied that it believed 
Judge Harb was inclined to make rulings that were 
favorable to the State and (2) resulted in Judge Harb 
having learned factual information that the law 
unambiguously forbade him from considering in deciding 
the question of disqualification, when the State knew full 
well that a disqualification motion would be coming if the 
case was assigned to him. 
 
Davis, 311 So. 3d at 934.  In making these findings, the Second 
District stressed that it did not hold that Judge Harb was in fact 
biased.  Id.  But, the district court explained, the State’s eagerness, 
taken together with the allegations of Judge Harb’s employment at 
the state attorney’s office, were sufficient to give Davis a reasonable 
fear that he would not receive a fair trial.  Id. 
Next, the Second District addressed whether Judge Harb’s 
failure to grant Davis’s motion for disqualification required reversal 
of Davis’s judgment and sentences.  The district court noted that 
every defendant “has a constitutional right to a fair trial free of 
harmful error,” and that Florida courts protect that right by 
- 9 - 
 
applying the harmless error test laid out in DiGuilio.  Id. at 937 
(emphasis removed) (quoting Johnson v. State, 53 So. 3d 1003, 
1007 (Fla. 2010)).  The Second District reasoned that DiGuilio’s 
harmless error test—which “requires the State to show ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to 
the verdict’ ”—was an “awkward fit,” and unproductive to use when 
the error was not tied to the jury’s factfinding mission.  Id. at 937-
38 (citing DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1135).  The district court 
concluded that the erroneous denial of a legally sufficient 
disqualification motion should be reviewed for harmless error, “with 
the question being whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
error denied the defendant a fair trial before a neutral judge.”  Id. at 
930. 
 
Applying this standard to Davis, the Second District held that 
there was no reasonable possibility that Davis was denied his right 
to a fair trial by a neutral judge.  Id. at 943.  It listed “[t]hree facets 
of this case” which, when taken together, “convince[d] [it] that there 
[was] no such reasonable possibility”: (1) Davis’s failure to seek a 
writ of prohibition before trial suggested that he did not think he 
would fail to receive a fair trial, (2) the record of Judge Harb’s 
- 10 - 
 
rulings—some of which were favorable to the State, and some 
favorable to Davis—suggested the trial was fair, and (3) the 
circumstances alleged in Davis’s motion for disqualification did not 
in reality pose a substantial risk that Davis would be denied a fair 
trial.  Id.  at 943-45.  The Second District then certified the question 
of great public importance that we now answer. 
II 
 
The Second District determined that Davis’s motion for 
disqualification was legally sufficient.  We agree.  The standard of 
review for a trial judge’s decision on a motion to disqualify is de 
novo.  Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Fla. 2007).   
“A motion to disqualify is governed substantively by section 
38.10, Florida Statutes (2005), and procedurally by Florida Rule of 
Judicial Administration 2.330.”  Id.2  Section 38.10 provides in 
part: 
 
 
2.  In 2021, we renamed the Florida Rules of Judicial 
Administration, which are now the “Florida Rules of General 
Practice and Judicial Administration.”  In re Amends. to Fla. Rules 
of Jud. Admin.—2020 Regular-Cycle Report, 310 So. 3d 374, 375–76 
(Fla. 2021).  We apply rule 2.330 as it existed at the time of the 
events at issue in this case. 
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Whenever a party to any action or proceeding makes 
and files an affidavit stating fear that he or she will not 
receive a fair trial in the court where the suit is pending 
on account of the prejudice of the judge of that court 
against the applicant or in favor of the adverse party, the 
judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall 
be designated in the manner prescribed by the laws of 
this state for the substitution of judges for the trial of 
causes in which the presiding judge is disqualified. Every 
such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the 
belief that any such bias or prejudice exists and shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that 
such affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
 
§ 38.10, Fla. Stat. (2015). 
Rule 2.330 requires that a motion to disqualify “allege 
specifically the facts and reasons upon which the movant relies as 
the grounds for disqualification,” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(c)(2) 
(2008), including, but not limited to, a showing that “the party fears 
that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of 
specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge.”  Fla. R. Jud. 
Admin. 2.330(d)(1) (2008). 
The rule further provides that a judge against whom an initial 
motion to disqualify under subsection (e) is raised “determine only 
the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of 
the facts alleged.”  Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f) (2008); see also 
Cave, 660 So. 2d at 707-08 (explaining that in reviewing a motion 
- 12 - 
 
to disqualify, “the judge shall determine only the legal sufficiency of 
the motion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged”).  If 
a judge determines that a motion is legally sufficient, he or she 
must enter an order granting disqualification and proceed no 
further.  Cave, 660 So. 2d at 708. 
 
When a court rules on the legal sufficiency of a motion for 
disqualification, it must consider “whether the facts alleged would 
place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and 
impartial trial.”  Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 
1983).  Rather than questioning a judge’s perception of his or her 
“ability to act fairly and impartially,” a motion for disqualification 
“focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably 
question a judge’s impartiality.”  Id. at 1086.  Even if a judge, 
therefore, is confident that he or she can preside with no bias, the 
judge must grant a motion to disqualify if a reasonably prudent 
person could question his or her impartiality. 
 
Davis’s motion met this threshold.  It rested on the State’s 
strong preference for Judge Harb’s continued participation in the 
case, notwithstanding his service in the unit responsible for its 
prosecution.  Davis also argued that Judge Harb’s presence at the 
- 13 - 
 
status conference allowed him to learn “factual information that the 
law unambiguously forbade him from considering in deciding the 
question of disqualification, when the State knew full well that a 
disqualification motion would be coming if the case was assigned to 
him.”  Davis, 311 So. 3d at 934.  As the Second District explained, 
the allegations were “sufficient to have given Mr. Davis—who was 
present while all of this unfolded—a reasonable fear that he would 
not receive a fair trial.”  Id. at 934-35.  To deny his motion, 
therefore, was error. 
III 
 
We also agree with the Second District’s conclusion that the 
erroneous denial of a legally sufficient motion for disqualification 
based on alleged bias or prejudice is not reversible error per se. 
A 
When an error is properly preserved for appellate review by a 
timely objection at trial, the reviewing court applies either a 
harmless error test or a per se reversible error rule.  Johnson, 53 
So. 3d at 1007.  To say that certain errors are per se reversible is to 
say that they “are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error.”  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1135 
- 14 - 
 
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).  “In other 
words, [they are] those errors which are always harmful.”  Id.  For 
example, we have held that a bailiff's ex parte communication with 
the jury on a substantive matter, even at the direction of the trial 
court, constitutes per se reversible error.  State v. Merricks, 831 So. 
2d 156, 160-61 (Fla. 2002); see also Ivory v. State, 351 So. 2d 26, 
28 (Fla. 1977) (finding it per se prejudicial error for a trial judge to 
respond to a jury request for additional instructions, after the jury 
has already retired to consider their verdict, without the 
prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and defendant’s counsel being 
present to voice objections).  The classes of error we treat as so 
categorically harmful as to always require reversal, however, are 
few.  That is because section 924.33 of our statutes generally 
prohibits us from “presum[ing] that error injuriously affected the 
substantial rights of the appellant.”  § 924.33, Fla. Stat. (2021); see 
Palmes v. State, 397 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 1981) (“That the trial 
court’s ruling was in error does not necessarily require reversal of 
the judgment.  A judgment will not be reversed unless the error was 
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant.  This long 
standing decisional rule has also been enacted as [section 924.33].” 
- 15 - 
 
(citations omitted)).  Therefore, we default to the harmless error test 
and reserve a per se rule “only for those errors that always vitiate 
the right to a fair trial and therefore are always harmful.”  State v. 
Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995). 
The harmless error test focuses on the effect of the error on 
the trier of fact and “places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, 
alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error contributed to the conviction.”  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1135.  
“If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error did not affect the verdict,” then the error is considered 
harmful.  Id. at 1139. 
Comments on a defendant’s silence are one class of errors 
subject to the harmless error analysis.  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 
1137; see also Marston v. State, 136 So. 3d 563, 570-72 (Fla. 2014) 
(finding harmful error where a prosecutor “commented 
continuously” on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights during 
voir dire, because the “extensive remarks” impermissibly “demeaned 
[the defendant’s] constitutional right to remain silent” and “invited 
- 16 - 
 
the jury to infer guilt from [the defendant’s] decision not to take the 
stand”); but see Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 652 (Fla. 1997) 
(classifying the trial court’s failure to give a cautionary instruction 
on the defendant’s silence at the penalty phase as a harmless error, 
since the defendant was found guilty by a properly instructed guilt-
phase jury, the newly impaneled penalty-phase jury voted 
unanimously for death, the trial court found three aggravating 
circumstances, and the facts of the killing were egregious). 
Improperly admitted evidence is another.  See Czubak v. State, 
570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990) (finding harmful error where 
evidence of collateral crimes committed by the defendant—in the 
form of testimony that defendant was an escaped convict—was 
introduced, since the testimony had no relevance to any material 
fact in issue and the case against the defendant was largely 
circumstantial); but see Castro v. State, 547 So. 2d 111, 115 (Fla. 
1989) (deeming a trial court’s error in allowing a witness to testify 
about the defendant’s previous collateral act harmless, because it 
did not influence the most incriminating evidence against the 
defendant, which was “his own confession”). 
- 17 - 
 
“[B]oth per se reversible error and harmful error analysis apply 
only if,” as was the case here, “the issue is properly preserved for 
appellate review.”  Johnson, 53 So. 3d at 1007. 
B 
 
In light of all this, we consider the properly preserved error 
alleged in this case and conclude that it is subject to harmless error 
analysis.  As we shall explain, this conclusion does not alter the 
error’s seriousness, or indeed the potential seriousness of any error 
subject to such review.  Nonetheless, it is the conclusion 
commanded by the plain language of section 924.33, Florida 
Statutes (2021),3 “which provides that harmless error analysis is 
applicable to all judgments.”  Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1020. 
Per se errors generally fall into two categories.  First, when 
“application of the [harmless error] test to the type of error involved 
will always result in a finding that the error is harmful, then it is 
proper to categorize the error as per se reversible.”  DiGuilio, 491 So. 
 
3.  “No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court 
is of the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal papers, that 
error was committed that injuriously affected the substantial rights 
of the appellant.  It shall not be presumed that error injuriously 
affected the substantial rights of the appellant.” § 924.33, Fla. Stat. 
(2021). 
- 18 - 
 
2d at 1135.  (“The test of whether a given type of error can be 
properly categorized as per se reversible error is the harmless error 
test itself.”).  Second, “[t]his Court has also applied the per se 
reversible error rule to those cases where the appellate court is 
unable to conduct a harmless error analysis because it would have 
to engage in pure speculation in order to attempt to determine the 
potential effect of the error on the jury.”  Johnson, 53 So. 3d at 
1007. 
The erroneous denial of a motion for disqualification does not 
belong in the first category.  That is because our rule for motions 
for disqualification is prophylactic: some motions will inevitably be 
granted where a judge is not in fact biased—and thus the feared 
harm would not have been realized.  See, e.g., Cave, 660 So. 2d at 
708 (holding that the trial court erred by conducting a full 
evidentiary hearing on a motion for disqualification and 
adjudicating the issue on the merits, because the rules provide that 
when presented with a motion for disqualification, a judge “shall 
determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass 
on the truth of the facts alleged,” and “shall immediately disqualify 
himself if the motion is legally sufficient”).  A motion for 
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disqualification may list any number of baseless or untrue 
allegations and nonetheless be legally sufficient.  In that case, 
although a judge must grant the legally sufficient motion, the 
erroneous denial of the motion and the judge’s subsequent 
participation in the case would not always create a “reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.”  DiGuilio, 
491 So. 2d at 1135. 
Regarding the second category of per se errors, we find that 
the alleged error in this case does not require us “to engage in pure 
speculation in order to attempt to determine the potential effect of 
the error on the jury.”  Johnson, 53 So. 3d at 1007.  We have 
previously found per se reversible error to occur when the absence 
of, defect in, or jury’s limited access to a trial record requires us to 
speculate in order to determine the error’s effect. 
In Johnson, id. at 1006, we found that “when a judge 
erroneously instructs a jury that it may not request to have 
testimony read back . . . it is impossible to determine the effect of 
the erroneous instruction on the jury” because we cannot guess 
with any accuracy when the jury would have made such a request.  
Id. at 1009 (“A court attempting to conduct a harmless error 
- 20 - 
 
analysis cannot know what testimony a jury would have requested 
to have read back or even whether a jury would have asked for a 
read-back at all.  Therefore, a reviewing court cannot determine 
whether a jury was confused or needed clarification about the facts 
of the case, and it is impossible to discern whether the defendant 
was prejudiced by the error.”).  And we have recognized that “[a]ny 
communication with the jury outside the presence of the 
prosecutor, the defendant, and defendant’s counsel is so fraught 
with potential prejudice that it cannot be considered harmless.”  
Ivory, 351 So. 2d at 28. 
And we have held that it is per se error “for a trial judge to 
respond to a request from the jury without the prosecuting 
attorney, the defendant, and defendant’s counsel being present and 
having the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the action 
to be taken on the jury’s request,” as the absence of any such party 
would almost certainly affect the record.  Id.  We have likewise 
found unsupervised communications between a bailiff and a jury to 
be per se reversible.  Merricks, 831 So. 2d at 161. 
 
Similarly, when a judge responds to a jury request covered 
under rule 3.410 outside the presence of counsel, the State and 
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defendant are absent, and therefore unable to participate in the 
exchange with the jury.  Without this participation process, “it is 
impossible to determine whether prejudice has occurred” because 
the reviewing court must speculate as to what objections and 
arguments each party might have made.  Bradley v. State, 513 So. 
2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. 1987) (citing Curtis v. State, 480 So. 2d 1277, 
1279 (Fla. 1985)); see also Colbert v. State, 569 So. 2d 433, 435 
(Fla. 1990) (listing cases and examining the history of the per se 
reversible error rule in the rule 3.410 context). 
Finally, when a bailiff engages in unsupervised conversations 
with a jury, harmless error analysis is inappropriate because it 
“would ‘unnecessarily embroil trial counsel, trial judges and 
appellate courts in a search for evanescent “harm,” real or 
fancied.’ ”  Merricks, 831 So. 2d at 161 (quoting Ivory v. State, 351 
So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring)).  There is no 
record to consult. 
Here, however, there is.  Unlike these cases, in this one, the 
result of the alleged error is the trial record as we have it. From this 
record, we may reasonably determine the effect of the alleged 
error—Judge Harb’s erroneous denial of the motion for 
- 22 - 
 
disqualification, and his subsequent participation in the case—on 
Davis’s conviction. 
Since we can indeed conduct a thorough harmless error 
analysis to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that 
the erroneous denial influenced the jury’s decision, a per se rule is 
unwarranted.4  See Colbert, 569 So. 2d at 435 (applying the 
 
 
4.  Some of our prior decisions have assumed, without really 
reasoning to the conclusion, that the erroneous denial of a motion 
to disqualify is per se reversible error.  See Livingston, 441 So. 2d at 
1087 (“We have concluded that Livingston's verified motion and 
supporting documents were sufficient under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.230 to require the trial judge to disqualify 
himself.  We must vacate the judgment and sentence and remand 
with directions to proceed with a new trial.”); Cave, 660 So. 2d at 
708 (“[W]e find that Judge Walsh’s conduct failed to follow the 
procedural process outlined in rule 2.160 and his error requires us 
to vacate Cave's sentence.”);  Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 
2d 1063, 1065-66 (Fla. 2000) (“When a trial court fails to act in 
accord with the statute and procedural rule on a motion to 
disqualify, an appellate court will vacate a trial court judgment that 
flows from that error.”); Thompson v. State, 990 So. 2d 482, 489 
(Fla. 2008) (“When a trial court fails to act in accord with the law 
governing motions to disqualify, an appellate court will vacate a 
trial court judgment that flows from the error.” (citing Fuster–
Escalona, 781 So. 2d at 1065)).  But the decision below is correct 
that these cases do not require us to adhere to a per se rule. In 
Livingston, we did not reject the harmless error rule, but rather, a 
rule that would have put the burden on the defendant to show that 
the trial court was biased in fact.  And in Fuster-Escalona, which we 
cited in Thompson, the language that Davis invokes did not resolve 
 
- 23 - 
 
harmless error analysis where “[t]he prospective jury instructions 
were extensively discussed with counsel,” “[d]efense counsel fully 
argued the position that a mistrial on all counts was warranted and 
objected on the record,” and “defense counsel properly preserved 
the issue by objecting on the record”).5 
We therefore agree with the Second District Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion that harmless error remains the proper analysis for 
erroneous denials of a legally sufficient motion for disqualification. 
 
the dispute before the Court.  See Davis, 311 So. 3d at 942-43 
(addressing these cases and declining to follow them).  
  
5.  Nor, as Davis implies, do “due process concerns” require 
that we employ a per se reversal rule.  Davis cites Steinhorst v. State 
for the proposition that “one of the most important dictates of due 
process” is that “proceedings involving criminal charges, and 
especially the death penalty, must both be and appear to be 
fundamentally fair.”  636 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1994).  That is 
certainly correct.  Yet we have repeatedly found application of the 
DiGuilio harmless error standard to comport with due process, and 
to sufficiently safeguard the appearance and fact of fundamental 
fairness in evaluating the constitutional impact of trial errors, 
including in capital cases.  See, e.g., Burns, 699 So. 2d at 652 
(applying the harmless error standard where a trial court erred in 
refusing to give a requested jury instruction, finding that the trial 
court’s “failure to give the requested instruction was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt,” and affirming the defendant’s sentence 
of death). 
- 24 - 
 
C 
We have repeatedly rejected attempts to depart from the 
harmless error test articulated in DiGuilio.  State v. Lee, 531 So. 2d 
133, 134 (Fla. 1988); Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 546 (Fla. 
1999); Knowles v. State, 848 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2003); Williams v. 
State, 863 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 2003).  We do so again today.  
DiGuilio asks “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
error affected the verdict.”  491 So. 2d at 1139.  Here, we can 
answer that question by looking to a defendant’s motion for 
disqualification, the circumstances surrounding that motion, 
records at pretrial hearings, and records at the trial itself.  Indeed, 
we do so in the next section. 
IV 
 
Applying the test laid out in DiGuilio, we cannot say that “there 
is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
conviction.”  491 So. 2d at 1135.  While presiding over this case, 
Judge Harb made several consequential decisions that could have 
altered the outcome of the trial.  Most notably, Davis’s alternative 
theory of defense at trial was that he suffered a preexisting mental 
disease or infirmity.  As argued by Davis, this preexisting condition 
- 25 - 
 
triggered the psychotic episode that led to the shootings—not, as 
argued by the State, his alleged use of marijuana. 
Prior to Judge Harb’s involvement, the defense moved for 
individual sequestered voir dire on the insanity defense, among 
other topics.  The defense argued that the insanity defense was 
“often viewed negatively by jurors,” therefore an “open discussion of 
a negative view of this topic could taint the entire juror panel.”  
Judge Jacobsen granted the motion in part on May 18, 2015, 
allowing individual sequestered voir dire on “predilections 
concerning the use of a mental health-related defense.” 
However, during jury selection, Judge Harb overrode Judge 
Jacobsen’s order and ruled instead: “I will allow the State to ask 
questions regarding mental health.”  The defense objected, and 
Judge Harb clarified that either the State or defense could request 
to individually voir dire a juror “while the State is asking questions,” 
but the parties “will be allowed to delve into [questions about 
mental health].” 
Sequestered voir dire on the insanity defense, as granted by 
Judge Jacobsen and rescinded by Judge Harb, might very well have 
had a profound effect not only on the composition of Davis’s jury, 
- 26 - 
 
but on the selected jurors’ perception of the insanity defense going 
into trial.  Bearing this in mind, we find that there is a reasonable 
possibility that Judge Harb’s failure to grant the motion to 
disqualify, and in turn his influence on voir dire and the jury 
selection process, contributed to Davis’s conviction.6 
V 
We answer the certified question in the affirmative.  We 
approve in part, finding that the Second District was correct to 
apply the harmless error standard.  However, the proper test for 
harmless error is that set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 
1135 (Fla. 1986).  Under that standard, we conclude harmful error 
occurred.  We quash the decision of the Second District to the 
extent that it concludes that there was no harmful error in this 
case, and remand for a new trial. 
 
6.  We need not and do not find that any of Judge Harb’s trial 
rulings were erroneous.  None of them are before us.  All we must 
consider is whether the error alleged by Davis—the denial of his 
legally sufficient motion for disqualification—had a reasonable 
probability of contributing to his conviction.  Right or wrong, the 
rulings we have discussed here meet that threshold. 
- 27 - 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result and dissents in part with an 
opinion, in which LABARGA, J., concurs. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result and dissents in part with an 
opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
FRANCIS, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree that the motion to disqualify the trial judge should 
have been granted, and I also agree with the majority to the extent 
that it quashes in part the decision below and remands for a new 
trial.  However, I dissent to the majority’s use of the harmless error 
standard because this cannot be reconciled with our established 
precedent treating the erroneous denial of a motion to disqualify the 
trial judge as per se reversible. 
In Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1983), on 
direct appeal from a first-degree murder conviction and death 
sentence, the defendant raised the issue of the erroneous denial of 
his motion to disqualify the trial judge based on alleged bias or 
prejudice.  Id.  The defendant’s motion to disqualify cited specific 
incidents of animosity between defense counsel and the trial judge.  
- 28 - 
 
Id. at 1084-85.  This Court concluded that the defendant’s motion 
was sufficient, and “the trial judge should have disqualified himself 
from presiding in [the defendant]’s trial.”  Id. at 1084, 1087.  As a 
result, we vacated the judgment and sentence and remanded for a 
new trial.  Id. at 1087. 
In Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1995), after conducting 
a “full evidentiary hearing on the factual allegations contained in 
[the defendant]’s motion for disqualification of the judge,” the trial 
judge denied the defendant’s motion as legally insufficient.  Id. at 
707-08.  On direct appeal of resentencing that resulted in a death 
sentence for the conviction of first-degree murder, the defendant 
argued that the erroneous denial of the defendant’s motion for 
disqualification of the trial judge was reversible error.  Id. at 707 
n.2.  This Court agreed, concluding that “[t]he hearing of evidence 
and the subsequent ruling on the evidence demonstrates that the 
judge passed on the truth of the facts alleged and adjudicated the 
question of his disqualification,” and “his error requires us to vacate 
[the defendant]’s sentence” and remand for resentencing.  Id. at 
708. 
- 29 - 
 
Further, in Thompson v. State, 990 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 
2008), in addressing an express and direct conflict issue involving 
“the appropriate standard for determining prejudice with regard to 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure 
to disqualify the presiding judge,” this Court reiterated that “[w]hen 
a trial court fails to act in accord with the law governing motions to 
disqualify, an appellate court will vacate a trial court judgment that 
flows from the error.”  Id. at 489 (emphasis added). 
The majority errs in concluding that the erroneous denial of a 
legally sufficient motion for disqualification is not per se reversible.  
As explained in the cases above, the Court has consistently applied 
a per se reversible standard consistent with the first category of the 
test set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).  
Rather than receding, the majority looks to inapplicable factual 
circumstances and case law to apply the harmless error standard.  
Majority op. at 13-17.  Recusal errors involving a judge who is 
alleged to be biased or prejudiced fit into the class of errors that 
vitiate the right to a fair trial.  See State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 
1020 (Fla. 1995) (“[A] per se rule is appropriate only for those errors 
- 30 - 
 
that always vitiate the right to a fair trial and therefore are always 
harmful.”). 
It is important that a judge have no actual or appearance of 
bias or prejudice.  See Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 2d 
1063, 1065 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he neutrality of judges is a ‘grave 
concern’ even as to perception.”).  Public trust and confidence in 
our judicial system is crucial to the rule of law.  See In re Ford-
Kaus, 730 So. 2d 269, 277 (Fla. 1999) (“The judicial system can 
only function if the public is able to place its trust in judicial 
officers.”).  A judge who appears to be unfair, even if getting legal 
rulings correct, is damaging to the public trust and confidence and 
cannot be tolerated.  See Fuster-Escalona, 781 So. 2d at 1066 
(“Logically, any decision by a judge under a cloud of prejudice 
would be suspect, thus undermining the integrity of the court 
proceeding and any movement toward judgment.”).  Due process 
demands more.  See Steinhorst v. State, 636 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 
1994) (“There is no other conclusion that is consistent with one of 
the most important dictates of due process: that proceedings 
involving criminal charges . . . must both be and appear to be 
fundamentally fair.”). 
- 31 - 
 
Accordingly, consistent with this Court’s precedent, I would 
conclude that the erroneous denial of Davis’ disqualification motion 
is per se reversible, answer the certified question in the negative, 
quash the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision below, and 
remand for a new trial. 
LABARGA, J., concurs. 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that the motion to disqualify the trial 
court judge should have been granted.  Thus, I agree with the 
majority to the extent that it quashes in part the decision below and 
remands for a new trial. 
 
However, because I believe that the erroneous denial of a 
disqualification motion is per se reversible, I dissent to the 
majority’s use of the harmless error standard of review. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Great Public Importance 
 
Second District – Case No. 2D17-517 
 
(Polk County) 
 
- 32 - 
 
Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, Steven L. Bolotin and 
Rachel P. Roebuck, Assistant Public Defenders, Tenth Judicial 
Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and 
David M. Costello, Assistant Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
C. Suzanne Bechard, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Laurie 
Benoit-Knox, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent