Title: Public Service Commission v. City of Williston
Citation: 160 N.W.2d 534
Docket Number: 8479
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 1968

160 N.W.2d 534 (1968) PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION of the State of North Dakota, Appellant, v. CITY OF WILLISTON and Montana Dakota Utilities Company, Respondents. No. 8479. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 9, 1968. *535 John C. Stewart, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Commerce Counsel for the Public Service Commission, Bismarck, for appellant. Walter O. Burk, Williston, for respondent City of Williston. Pearce, Engebretson, Anderson &amp; Schmidt, Bismarck, and William S. Murray, Minneapolis, Minn., for respondent Montana Dakota Utilities Co. Bosard, McCutcheon &amp; Kerian, Minot, for City of Minot, amicus curiae. R. W. Wheeler, Bismarck, and Gene R. Sommers, Minneapolis, Minn., for Northern States Power Co., amicus curiae. ERICKSTAD, Judge (on reassignment). The North Dakota Public Service Commission appeals from a judgment of the District Court of Williams County dated October 13, 1967, which reversed an order of the Commission dated December 7, 1965. The action was initiated when the Public Service Commission ordered Montana Dakota Utilities and the City of Williston to show cause (1) why the Public Service Commission should not find the rate for the furnishing of electrical energy for and to municipal buildings and related facilities within the City of Williston as established by contract between the parties to be unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of N.D.C.C. § 49-02-03; and (2) why the Commission should not by order fix a reasonable rate to be followed by the parties in the future. Throughout the rest of this opinion the parties will be called the Commission, the City, and MDU. Upon the hearing of the order to show cause, the Commission concluded that the 1.2 cents per kilowatt-hour charged the city for electrical energy supplied it for municipal purposes was in violation of N.D.C.C. § 49-02-03; that rate No. 20-N-2, a higher rate previously filed and approved by the Commission, was reasonable; and that as of January 1, 1966, that rate should be charged the City. When the Commission's order was made, both the City and MDU appealed to the district court. The essence of their appeals was that the Commission did not have jurisdiction under the constitution and the statutes of the state to determine the rates to be charged by MDU to the City, a municipal corporation, because of an existing contract between them which established the 1.2 cents per kilowatt-hour rate. It was their contention that part of the consideration of the contract was the granting of a 20-year franchise by the City for the use of its streets, alleys, and other public ways; and that under N.D.Const. § 139 such a contract was exclusively within the authority of the City. Relying on Chrysler Light &amp; Power Co. v. City of Belfield, infra, and holding that the amendments to our statutes contained in H.B. 82 of the Twenty-first Session of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly (N.D.Laws 1929, ch. 173) and S.B. 73 of the Thirty-second Session (N.D.Laws 1951, ch. 260) in no way enlarged the authority of the Commission, the district court held that the Commission had no jurisdiction to determine the rate to be charged the City for the electricity used to light its municipal buildings and other related facilities. On appeal we are asked either to reverse the position this court took in Western Electric Co. v. City of Jamestown, infra, *536 which was followed in Chrysler, or to hold that those decisions were abrogated by the provisions that became law when H.B. 82 of the Twenty-first Session and S.B. 73 of the Thirty-second Session of the Legislative Assembly were adopted. In Western the City of Jamestown had enacted in 1902 an ordinance granting to the Jamestown Electric Light Company for a period of 25 years a franchise to use its streets for "poles, wires, transmission of electricity, etc., in the operation of an electric light and power plant." Western Electric Company was a successor in interest of Jamestown Electric Light Company, and it exercised its privileges as a public service corporation in the city pursuant to the terms of that ordinance. The ordinance provided, among other things, that during its life the company should furnish electrical current to light the city hall, engine house, and city offices without cost to the city. On March 5, 1919, the Public Utilities Act (N.D.Laws 1919, ch. 192) became effective. It was the contention of Western Electric Company that thereafter the provisions of the Public Utilities Act prevailed, and that therefore the company was no longer obligated to provide the free service contemplated by the ordinance and franchise. In holding that the company was obligated to continue free service to the city pursuant to the ordinance and the franchise, notwithstanding the enactment of the Public Utilities Act, this court said: Although the Board of Railroad Commissioners, the predecessor of the Public Service Commission, was not a party to that action and had therefore not made a determination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the free service, the court said: In Chrysler, an opinion written by Judge Christianson, who specially concurred in Western, this court said: It seems to be the contention of Northern States Power Company, which filed an amicus curiae brief in this case, that the Board of Railroad Commissioners made a determination which in effect reversed this court's holding in Western. Only two years after this court's decision in Western was rendered, in considering the free-service aspect of the franchise which the City of Jamestown gave the predecessor of Western Electric Company, the Railroad Commissioners said: It is said that there was no appeal from that decision of the Board, that other similar decisions were rendered by the Board, and that therefore the practical construction of the Public Utilities Act was that the Board (and its successor, the Commission) had jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of rates charged the municipalities, whether or not they were part of a franchise. It is Northern States Power Company's view that when the legislature enacted H. B. 82 in 1929, it was approving the Board of Railroad Commissioners' "reversal" of *538 the Supreme Court's decision in Western Electric Co. v. City of Jamestown, 47 N.D. 157, 181 N.W. 363 (1921), in the Board's ruling in Re Western Electric Co., 1923C P.U.R. 820. The pertinent part of S.B. 82 reads as follows: The question arises, Under what authority could the Commission have reversed a decision of the Supreme Court? There is no such authority. In light of the separation-of-power principle contained in our constitution, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature, in enacting H.B. 82 and in referring to "existing regulatory powers," had in mind the powers that the Board of Railroad Commissioners had as determined by the decision of the Supreme Court. It is our view that had the legislature intended to give the Board authority over this matter, contrary to the Supreme Court's construction of the Public Utilities Act, it would have specifically so provided. Having so decided the effect of H.B. 82 of the Twenty-first Legislative Assembly, it naturally follows that the only effect S. B. 73 of the Thirty-second Legislative Assembly had was to add cities to the provision permitting villages to enter into contracts for the furnishing of electricity or gas to the municipality and its inhabitants. This view is supported by the Report of the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee for the Thirty-second Legislative Assembly, which we think is significant, as the bill was introduced by the Committee. The part of that report which relates to this issue reads: The pertinent part of S.B. 73 reads: *539 N.D. Laws 1951, ch. 260, at 369. What we have said herein is in accord with what we recently said concerning the effect of the legislature's acquiescence in the court's construction of a statute: The amendments which were made indicate no intention on the part of the legislature to depart from this court's construction of the Public Utilities Act. Northern States Power Company also argues: If this argument is sound, we believe it should properly be made to the legislature rather than to the Supreme Court. The Commission's arguments on appeal are summarized in the conclusion of its brief. The pertinent parts follow: What we have thus far said in this opinion and what was said in the previous opinions of this court meet the contentions of the Commission except for the one concerning the state of the industry's art at the time of the earlier decisions of this court. That argument is one which, in light of the previous decisions of this court which have been the law of this state since 1921, should be made to the legislature. We are not convinced of any urgency which would compel or justify us in ignoring the rule of stare decisis in this case. Further, it should be noted that if the Commission were to convince the legislature of the merit of its argument, there would still remain § 139 of the North Dakota Constitution, the effect of which we do not herein attempt to state. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. TEIGEN, C. J., and PAULSON, KNUDSON and STRUTZ, JJ., concur.