Title: Lavitch v. Smith
Citation: 224 Or. 498, 356 P.2d 531
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 1960

Affirmed November 9, 1960.
Thomas E. Cooney, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Maguire, Shields, Morrison, Bailey &amp; Kester, Portland.
Charles Paulson, Portland, argued the cause for *499 respondent. With him on the brief were Peterson &amp; Lent, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY, GOODWIN and KING, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the defendant, the owner of a dress shop in Portland, from a judgment in the amount of $2,650 which the circuit court entered in favor of the plaintiff-respondent after the jury had returned its verdict for him. The complaint averred that the plaintiff was in the defendant's store as an invitee and was injured through the defendant's negligence.
The plaintiff at the time of his injury, July 24, 1958, was a salesman for a dress manufacturer and was taking orders from the defendant for dresses which she was purchasing from him. While he was writing the orders a vase fell from a shelf over his head and inflicted an injury.
The defendant-appellant submits two assignments of error, but the brief of her counsel, for the commendable purpose of facilitating their disposal, makes this statement:
It then explains:
The defendant's store was rectangular in shape. A partition ran parallel to the rear wall about eight feet *500 from it thereby creating a rear room which another partition, at right angles to the rear wall, separated into two rooms. One of these two rear rooms was a fitting room and the other was the defendant's office. A door opened from the main store room into the dressing room and from the latter another door opened into the office. The plaintiff's injury befell him while he was seated in the office engaged, as we have indicated, in writing orders for dresses which the defendant called out to him.
When the plaintiff entered the defendant's shop he was escorted by her to the rear area that we just mentioned. The plaintiff swore that the defendant took him through the fitting room into the office and told him to display his dresses there. The defendant testified that she escorted the plaintiff into the fitting room only and showed him some hangers there upon which he could place his dress samples. Having escorted the plaintiff into the fitting room, according to the defendant, and into the office, according to the plaintiff, the defendant returned to a customer upon whom she was waiting when the plaintiff had entered the establishment. In the meantime the plaintiff went to his automobile and obtained from it his dress samples, re-entered the store and then hung the dress samples upon hangers in the office. Presently the defendant entered the office and before long was joined by her assistant.
As we have indicated, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding the room to which the plaintiff was shown by the defendant. But there is no conflict in the evidence as to what happened from that point on. As just stated, the plaintiff hung his samples upon hangers which were attached to a shelf in the defendant's office, and when the defendant returned to *501 the room he exhibited his samples one by one to her. In so doing he segregated the samples into two lots, one of which was composed of those which she wished to purchase and the other of which held those that she rejected. After the display and segregation had been made the defendant's assistant called out to the plaintiff the numbers that identified the samples which the defendant wished to purchase and he wrote the orders. He was thus engaged when the vase that we have mentioned fell from a shelf and struck him on the head. The plaintiff estimated that he was engaged in his sales efforts for "probably a half-hour."
The defendant-appellant's brief, following its mention that the defendant had taken care of the needs of a customer after she had escorted the plaintiff to the rear room of the store, makes this statement:
It will be noticed that the defendant makes no claim that she asked the plaintiff to withdraw from her office when she discovered that he was in it and was prepared to show his samples there. Nor does she make any intimation that she disapproved of his presence in the office. Having returned to the office and having seen him there she accepted the situation and went ahead for the next half-hour with the transaction of her business with him. As her brief states, "defendant acquiesced in his presence in the private office."
The defendant contends, as is evident from the foregoing, that she had placed at the plaintiff's disposal *502 only the fitting room. She argues that when he entered the office he exceeded the area covered by the invitation she had extended. According to her, the plaintiff was nothing more than a licensee when he was in the office and an issue should have been submitted to the jury as to whether the defendant invited the plaintiff into the office as the place where the business was to be transacted. The plaintiff states that in any event he was permitted to remain in the office without comment from the defendant and without any disapproval from her. He calls attention to the fact that the defendant transacted her business with him in the office after she had noticed that he had hung his samples in that room. He claims that there was nothing to submit to the jury.
1. Hansen v. Cohen, 203 Or 157, 276 P2d 391, 278 P2d 808; Napier v. First Congregational Church, 157 Or 110, 70 P2d 43; and Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., 78, point out that one who exceeds the area of his invitation is at best a licensee in the area into which he ventures. But that simple rule does not settle the issue before us. Hansen v. Cohen, supra, states:
If we assume that the plaintiff was originally invited into the fitting room only but went into the office where the defendant saw him, acquiesced in his presence and then for a half-hour transacted business with him, the question is, was he an invitee in the office. Since the testimony which shows that the defendant acquiesced in the plaintiff's presence in her office is uncontradicted, it presented no issue of fact for submission to a jury. It submits, however, the issue as to whether the plaintiff, while transacting his business with the defendant *503 in her office, was a licensee, as she urges, or an invitee, as he claims. The answer to that question depends upon the definition which should be given to the term "invitee."
Harper and James, the Law of Torts, p 1478 § 27.12, states:
*505 We take the following from Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., page 453:
Briggs v. John Yeon Co., Inc., 168 Or 239, 122 P2d 444, gave effect to the Restatement's definition of a business visitor which is found in § 332, Restatement of Torts, as follows:
In the case before us it is apparent that the plaintiff was a business invitee as defined in the section of the Restatement quoted above. That section found acceptance, as we just indicated, in the Briggs decision. The economic test received mention in Napier v. First Congregational Church, supra. We deem it unnecessary, therefore, to determine whether the invitation test of which we took note by quotation from Prosser and also from Harper and James is also available in this state.
2. Clearly, one in the defendant's position who welcomes an individual into her place of business and then, finding him seated in her office, acquiesces in his presence there and proceeds to do business with him makes him an invitee. We deem it immaterial whether the defendant at the outset envisaged that the business would be transacted in the fitting room. It is always possible to change plans and the state of one's mind.
We have found no error. The challenged judgment is affirmed.