Title: BNP Paribas v. Olsen's Mill, Inc.
Citation: 2011 WI 61
Docket Number: 2009AP001007
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2011

2011 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1007 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
BNP Paribas as Agent, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Olsen's Mill, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 
COUNTY: 
Green Lake   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. McMonigal 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J. and GABLEMAN, J. join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Brady C. Williamson, Katherine Stadler, Patricia L. Wheeler and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. and Joseph J. Wielebinski and Munsch Hardt 
Kopf & Harr, P.C, and oral argument by Mr. Williamson. 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Thomas M. 
Olejniczak, Colleen M. Kelly, Patrick M. Blaney and Liebmann, 
Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C. and oral argument by Mr. 
Olejniczak. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 61
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP1007 
 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV25) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
BNP Paribas as Agent, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Olsen's Mill, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  The petitioner, BNP Paribas as 
Agent ("Paribas"), seeks review of an unpublished opinion of the 
court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court.1  
                                                 
1 BNP Paribas v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., No. 2009AP1007, 
unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App., June 30, 2010).  The court 
of appeals entered a summary disposition pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.21 affirming an order of the circuit court for Green Lake 
County, William M. McMonigal, J. 
   
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
2 
 
Paribas and Olsen's Mill entered into a voluntary assignment 
agreement for the benefit of creditors under Wis. Stat. ch. 128.2  
The circuit court ordered the sale of certain assets free and 
clear of all liens to Olsen's Mill's Acquisition Company, LLC 
("OMAC").   
¶2 
As a secured creditor, Paribas argues that the circuit 
court erred by ordering the sale of its collateral free and 
clear of Paribas's security interest without its consent.  
Additionally, 
it 
contends 
that 
the 
sale 
impermissibly 
contravened the order of distribution of the proceeds of a 
debtor's estate set forth in Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1).  
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court erred by ordering 
the sale of Paribas's collateral free and clear of Paribas's 
security interest without its consent.  However, because the 
value of Paribas's security interest in the assets sold is 
unclear on this record, we are unable to discern if Paribas was 
harmed as a result of this error.  We further determine that the 
court contravened the statute by approving an offer that 
circumvented 
the 
order 
of 
distribution 
mandated 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1).  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for a determination of 
what remedy is available under the circumstances. 
I 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
3 
 
¶4 
In 2009, Olsen's Mill, Inc. was one of the largest 
grain elevators in Wisconsin.  Olsen's Mill's largest creditor 
was a French bank, BNP Paribas, which had extended Olsen's Mill 
an $80 million line of credit.  It is undisputed that Paribas 
had a properly perfected security interest in certain assets of 
Olsen's Mill including equipment, real estate, inventory, and 
general intangibles.  It is likewise undisputed that at the time 
Olsen's 
Mill 
defaulted 
on 
its 
obligations 
to 
Paribas, 
approximately $58 million was due and owing on the loan.  It is 
unclear from the record, however, what part of the $58 million 
represented a secured interest.    
¶5 
Olsen's Mill had a number of creditors in addition to 
Paribas.  Baylake Bank had a properly perfected security 
interest in certain assets.  Olsen's Mill also had a number of 
unsecured creditors, including local businesses and farmers.  
¶6 
On February 11, 2009, Paribas and Olsen's Mill entered 
into a written agreement for an assignment for the benefit of 
creditors under Wis. Stat. ch. 128.  The circuit court approved 
the assignment and appointed Michael S. Polsky as interim 
receiver of Olsen's Mill's estate pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 128.08(1)(b).    
¶7 
In a 
document entitled "Agreed Order Appointing 
Interim Receiver and Granting Other Relief," the court ordered 
that the receiver "shall have full management authority for 
Olsen's assets" and shall "hold said property pending this 
action with the usual powers and duties of a receiver under 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
4 
 
Chapter 128."  It provided that the receiver "is hereby 
authorized to sell any and all of Olsen's property free and 
clear of all liens, with all liens attaching to the proceeds of 
sale, through public or private proceedings, in a commercially 
reasonable manner, subject to the prior consent of the creditors 
holding perfected liens of the assets being sold, and the 
approval of the Court."   
¶8 
Shortly thereafter, the receiver requested authority 
to sell certain assets, including inventory and owned equipment.3  
He averred that "[t]he sale of Olsen's assets is subject to the 
consent of BNP Paribas and BNP Paribas has authorized the 
Receiver to represent to this Court that BNP Paribas consents to 
the relief requested in this Sale Motion."  He moved the court 
for authority to sell the assets "in accordance with the 
proposed 
procedures 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
Auction 
Terms 
and 
Procedures to be established by the Receiver with the consent of 
BNP Paribas."    
¶9 
The receiver submitted a document setting forth the 
agreed-upon terms and procedures for the auction (hereinafter, 
"Auction Terms Agreement").  In relevant part, it provided that 
all sales of secured assets "shall be free and clear of all 
liens, claims and encumbrances, with any and all liens, claims 
and encumbrances attaching to the proceeds of sale in the order 
                                                 
3 The receiver did not seek authority to sell other assets.  
Accordingly, after the auction, the unsold assets would remain 
in Olsen's Mill's estate under the receiver's management.      
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
5 
 
of their priority."  It gave the secured creditors the option to 
withhold consent to "the final bid for any particular Lot":  
The sale of the Assets that are subject to properly 
perfected 
liens 
in 
favor 
of 
Debtor's 
lenders . . . shall be subject to the consent of such 
Lenders, as to the specific collateral securing such 
Lender's claims.  The Lenders and the Receiver reserve 
the right to reject the final bid for any particular 
Lot [] and to decline to sell any of the Assets in 
such Lot at the Auction.     
¶10 The Auction Terms Agreement specified that "[a]ll bids 
are subject to approval of the Court."  It further specified 
that the receiver had authority to accept a "Winning Bid" and 
that he would ask the court to approve the "Winning Bid":   
If the Receiver agrees, in consultation with the 
Lenders, to accept a Tentative Winning Bid for the 
purchase of any Lot (a 'Winning Bid'), he shall do so 
at the conclusion of the Auction, and the Receiver 
shall use his best efforts to have the Court enter an 
Order authorizing the Receiver to (a) consummate the 
sale of that Lot pursuant to the terms of the Winning 
Bid, . . . . No Winning Bid is binding on the Receiver 
or the Debtor until the Court enters an Order 
approving the sale of the Assets included in such Lot 
pursuant to such Winning Bid.   
The Receiver will ask the Court to approve the best 
offer for the Lots, with the right of the Receiver to 
accept and close on the sale with the next highest 
bidder, as set forth below, if the party making the 
best offer fails to timely close.    
¶11 The Auction Terms Agreement did not contemplate that 
the court could accept any bids submitted outside the auction 
procedures.  Likewise, it did not provide that the court could 
approve a bid over a secured creditor's objection to the sale of 
its collateral. 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
6 
 
¶12 The auction was held on April 7, 2009, with ten 
registered bidders present.  Two frontrunners emerged.  Olsen's 
Mill Acquisition Corporation (OMAC), which was headed by Phillip 
J. Martini, was affiliated with Olsen's Mill's prior management.  
PRM Wisconsin, LLC (PRM) was affiliated with the secured 
creditor, Paribas.   
¶13 A total of 22 bids were submitted during five rounds 
of bidding.  During the auction, the penultimate bid was 
submitted by OMAC, and PRM submitted the final bid.  The 
receiver concluded that the "highest and best bid" was the final 
bid submitted by PRM, and he designated it as the Winning Bid.   
¶14 The receiver described PRM's Winning Bid as follows: 
$9,000,000 for all owned inventory; $6,500,000 for all owned 
equipment and real estate; and PRM shall cause Paribas "to agree 
to fund certain loans or authorize the use of its cash 
collateral, up to $2,710,000, for outstanding checks due to 
various farmers and producers and other post-petition accounts 
payable."  The receiver also reported that PRM "informed the 
Receiver that Buyer will offer employment to substantially all 
of the current employees of Olsen's."    
¶15 The receiver's report advised that PRM's Winning Bid 
was "in excess of the liquidation value of Olsen's assets" and 
that he believed "that the proposed sale described above is in 
the best interests of Olsen's creditors and all parties-in-
interest."  He reported that Paribas "has consented to the 
Winning Bid described above, and has agreed to release its 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
7 
 
liens . . . on the assets described above upon payment to BNP in 
cash of the net sale proceeds from all such sales."  He 
requested the court's approval of PRM's Winning Bid.     
¶16 At the hearing held the day after the auction, the 
receiver explained his reasons for concluding that the Winning 
Bid was the highest and best.  He noted that the Winning Bid was 
$400,000 higher than the bid submitted by OMAC during the 
auction.  Further, he explained, he could not accept OMAC's 
auction bid because it was contingent upon Paribas's agreement 
to release OMAC from any liability in connection with its 
acquisition of the assets:   
Release of a cause of action in favor of a third 
party, Paribas, is not something that I had the 
ability to deliver, is not something that was in the 
lot offered for sale and, in fact, was in direct 
violation of the bid procedures.  The bid procedures 
clearly provided that all bids must be unconditional.   
¶17 The attorney for Olsen's Mill opined that PRM's 
Winning Bid was not in the best interest of the creditors 
because, he asserted, it would be difficult for Paribas to 
operate the mill as a going concern.  Later in the hearing, he 
asked the court to elicit and accept instead a revised offer 
from OMAC:  
I think we've got a real good competing bidder that's 
a 
real 
bidder 
that 
can 
put 
the 
whole 
thing 
together . . . and indeed is ready, I think, to meet 
the bid here on the table today except he's got all 
the pieces together and it won't require a liquidation 
of all the corn which would severely disrupt the 
business of the ongoing Olsen's Mill, Inc. or its 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
8 
 
successor.4  So for those reasons, Your Honor, we 
believe that [PRM's Winning Bid] should not be 
approved and this Court should order the receiver to 
go back and strong-arm these parties and see if 
something can't be worked out here.  
¶18 The receiver contended that he had no authority to 
make Paribas, a secured creditor, consent to a sale of its 
security interest: "In [a] Chapter 128 proceeding, if a secured 
creditor is to receive less than the full amount due and owing, 
that secured creditor needs to consent to the sale.  That has 
always been the rule.  And the bid procedures and amended bid 
procedures in this case specifically require the consent of the 
secured creditors."   
¶19 He further explained that Paribas "has consented to 
the proposed sale to PRM Wisconsin.  Paribas as agent has not 
consented to the bid submitted by Mr. Martini.  I can't do 
anything as a receiver to make them or to compel them to consent 
to that bid, just like I can't compel them to give a release for 
other claims that they have." 
¶20 Before the court made any decisions, counsel for 
Olsen's Mill announced that he intended to file a petition for 
bankruptcy in federal court.  The court adjourned the hearing.  
After the federal court dismissed Olsen's Mill's bankruptcy 
petition, the hearing before the circuit court was reconvened on 
April 14, 2009.     
                                                 
4 Martini testified that if the court accepted his bid, he 
would merge the assets of Olsen's Mill and Olsen Brothers and 
would operate the business as a combined grain facility.  He 
testified that there would be no liquidation of the stored corn.   
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
9 
 
¶21 From the outset of the April 14 hearing, it was 
apparent that the circuit court was interested in ordering the 
receiver to sell the assets to OMAC.  The court said: "As 
attractive as the PRM bid is, the concern that the Court has is 
whether or not it will, in fact, result in an ongoing business 
or will, in fact, simply result in a liquidation."  "When I 
inject the element of equity," the court explained, there might 
be an obligation to "evaluate on balance which bid may in fact 
be higher and better, all things considered."    
¶22 Throughout the hearing, the parties argued about 
whether the court had authority to approve OMAC's revised offer 
in the place of the Winning Bid selected by the receiver and 
consented to by the secured creditors.  The attorney for Olsen's 
Mill argued that the circuit court could and should approve 
OMAC's revised offer: "Equity needs to be done, all the 
creditors' interests, you have to balance this somehow."  He 
urged the court to consider the interests of the community: 
"This is a terrible position you're in, but there's a big 
balance here, and there's a lot of other creditors in this case 
that I think the Court is cognizant, very cognizant of that.  I 
probably don't even need to point this out."  The court 
responded: "I only have to look over your head."   
¶23 Paribas's attorney objected to the proposed sale to 
OMAC: "Just to make the record clear, I understand crystal clear 
what direction the Court is leaning and which way the Court may 
order.  I just want on the record that Paribas does not consent, 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
10 
 
for whatever that means within the scope of the Court order.  
Just so everybody's clear on that."   
¶24 The attorney for Baylake Bank, a second secured 
creditor, also objected.  He argued: "for [the attorneys] to say 
to you, it's within your power to do equity and to spread these 
competing offers around as far as possible, it ignores a secured 
creditor's rights under Chapter 409."  He concluded: "in sum, 
the Court is bound by statutes nonetheless and cannot simply do 
what is fair and equitable for all parties."   
¶25 The receiver asserted that OMAC's revised offer could 
not be accepted because it would upset the priority order in the 
statutes and also because Paribas would not consent: 
The problem at the end of the day is that BNP Paribas 
as agent has a 58 million dollar claim.  If it 
receives 5 million dollars as a value of this claim, 
it still has a 53 million dollar unsecured claim in 
this case.  And while other unsecured claims, forward 
contracts and prepaid expenses, under Mr. Martini's 
proposal, are being paid one hundred percent, BNP 
Paribas as agent's unsecured claim of over fifty 
million dollars, is receiving nothing.  And that [] 
offer, is not acceptable to BNP Paribas.     
¶26 Additionally, the receiver expressed concern that the 
terms of OMAC's revised offer were nebulous because they had 
emerged piecemeal during the course of the hearing before the 
court.  The court adjourned to allow for further negotiation.     
¶27 When the hearing was reconvened later that day, OMAC 
submitted a three-page handwritten bid that included the 
following terms: $6.5 million for all real estate, rolling 
stock, leased and owned equipment; $9 million for all inventory; 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
11 
 
and other consideration in the form of a commitment to honor all 
checks and obligations to certain producers, a commitment to 
honor all forward contracts of producers, a commitment to honor 
prepaid inventory of producers, and a commitment to honor all 
pre- and post-petition trade accounts payable.  OMAC specified 
that it was not obligated to pay the $9 million for inventory 
upfront, but rather, it would pay as the inventory was sold off 
or within 180 days of closing.   
¶28 In response, the receiver alerted the court to 
additional problems raised by OMAC's revised offer.  First, he 
explained, "Paribas has not consented to finance the sale of its 
collateral over this period of time, which is a separate 
problem."  Second, he explained that the offer would disrupt the 
priority scheme set forth in Wis. Stat. § 128.17 for the 
distribution of assets to various creditors:   
What OMAC has proposed is that . . . certain general 
unsecured claims of the buyer's choice be paid in full 
while others get nothing, and while claims of a higher 
priority, taxes, wages, administrative expenses, may 
or may not get paid in full.     
 . . .  
My concern is if, for example, there are post-petition 
taxes, 
payroll 
taxes——I 
don't 
know 
if 
there 
are. . . . I don't know if there's wage claims.  I 
don't know if there's vacation claims.  I don't know 
what employment claims there may be.  All of which 
have priority over general unsecured claims.  And to 
me the core of the problem is that picking and 
choosing certain general unsecured pre-petition claims 
to pay in full . . . and leaving everybody else at 
zero, I think is a problem.   
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
12 
 
¶29 As the court and parties waded through the specifics 
of OMAC's revised offer in detail, Paribas's attorney again 
objected:  
[W]e don't think the Court can approve this offer 
because of our lack of consent, which is required 
under the statute. . . . And so where I think we end 
up, Your Honor, is we go through a lot of the details 
and specifics, but we get to a situation where you're 
gonna be faced with a much more difficult question on 
whether you can cram this offer into Chapter 128 
without the consent of the lenders. . . . So I wanted 
to at least let you know that now and not let my 
silence somehow constitute consent and to raise it 
with you at this point.  
¶30 The circuit court concluded that the negotiations had 
produced "an enhanced second offer that has met and exceeded the 
original offer that the Court was being asked to approve."  
Without specifically addressing any statutory text, the court 
approved OMAC's revised offer because it "works for the balanced 
interest of those who are entitled to be protected."  "If I 
can't do what I've been attempting to do or I can't do what I've 
been asked to do," the court determined, "then the whole purpose 
of Chapter 128 would seem to be out the window.  And I'm not 
about to buy that."  
¶31 The court ordered the receiver to accept OMAC's 
revised offer.  In its written decision, it found as a fact that 
Paribas had a security interest in certain assets of Olsen's, 
which included equipment, real estate, inventory, and general 
intangibles.  Further, it found that Paribas did not consent to 
the sale of its collateral free and clear of its security 
interest: 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
13 
 
[Paribas] has a properly perfected security interest 
in certain assets of Olsen's (including equipment, 
real estate, inventory and general intangibles), does 
not consent to the OMAC Offer described above, or the 
sale of the Subject Assets in accordance therewith and 
has not agreed to release its liens and security 
interests on the assets described above.  
¶32 The court "overruled" the receiver's recommendation 
and Paribas's objections to OMAC's revised offer, and it 
concluded that "the sale of the Subject Assets by the Receiver 
to OMAC pursuant to the OMAC Offer will constitute a valid, 
legal and enforceable transfer to OMAC of all right, title and 
interest of the Receiver to the Subject Assets, free and clear 
of all liens, claims and encumbrances."  The court determined 
that the payments received by Paribas for inventory would be "in 
partial satisfaction of its secured claim."  
¶33 The court's written decision acknowledged that the 
receivership would continue after the closing, given that 
certain assets of Olsen's Mill had not been included in the 
sale.  It explained: "The Receiver shall continue to administer 
all assets of the receivership estate other than the Subject 
Assets, including, without limitation, accounts receivable, 
contract rights, cash, the tax refund owed to Olsen's, any 
avoidance actions and all other claims or causes of action of 
Olsen's or the receivership estate . . . except any preference 
actions against producers, which will not be pursued by the 
Receiver." 
¶34 From the record and the circuit court's findings of 
fact, it is clear that the sale included equipment, real estate, 
and inventory, and that Paribas held a security interest in 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
14 
 
these assets.  It is unclear, however, whether Paribas held a 
security interest in any of the other assets that were sold.   
¶35 Paribas asked that the judgment be stayed pending 
appeal.  The circuit court denied the motion.  Paribas then 
filed a petition for a supervisory writ and a motion for 
emergency relief in the court of appeals and also in this court.  
These requests were denied.         
¶36 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in an 
unpublished summary disposition.  BNP Paribas v. Olsen's Mill, 
Inc., No. 2009AP1007, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App., June 
30, 2010).  A central premise of the court of appeals' opinion 
was that Wis. Stat. ch. 128 permits a circuit court to value a 
secured creditor's security interest, and that the circuit court 
had valued Paribas's collateral at $9 million.  Id. at 4.  
Because Paribas had been paid $9 million, the court of appeals 
concluded that Paribas's arguments were moot.  Id.      
II 
¶37 We are required to determine whether the circuit court 
erred under Wis. Stat. ch. 128 and other applicable law when it 
ordered the sale of Paribas's collateral without Paribas's 
consent and approved the distribution of proceeds from the sale.  
Resolution of these issues requires statutory interpretation.  
We interpret statutes independently of the interpretations 
rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Martin 
v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 40, ¶11, 252 Wis. 2d 103, 643 
N.W.2d 452. 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
15 
 
III 
¶38 Although Wis. Stat. ch. 128 was created in 1937,5  
there are relatively few appellate cases devoted to its 
interpretation.  We begin with an overview of the laws governing 
proceedings under chapter 128.  Next, we turn to applying those 
laws to evaluate whether the circuit court erred when it ordered 
the sale of Paribas's collateral without its consent and 
approved the distribution of the proceeds from the sale.  
Finally, we discuss issues related to remedy. 
A 
¶39 Chapter 128, which governs assignments for the benefit 
of creditors, provides a state law alternative to federal 
bankruptcy.  It sets forth a statutory scheme under which a 
debtor's assets may be liquidated and the proceeds distributed 
to creditors in an orderly and controlled manner.  See Charles 
G. Center, et al, Wisconsin Business Advisor Series: Collections 
and Bankruptcy § 4.2.16 (2006).  Wisconsin Stat. § 128.01 
provides that "the circuit courts shall have supervision of 
proceedings under this chapter and may make all necessary orders 
and judgments therefor and all assignments for the benefit of 
creditors shall be subject to this chapter."   
¶40 To initiate the assignment, the debtor designates an 
assignee who files the assignment with the clerk of court.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. § 128.02.  Upon the court's approval of an 
assignment, the assignee is "vested with the powers of a 
                                                 
5 See § 2, ch. 431, Laws of 1937. 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
16 
 
receiver" and is ordered to "administer the debtor's estate 
pursuant to" chapter 128.  Wis. Stat. § 128.05(1).   
¶41 To effectively administer the debtor's estate, the 
receiver must determine the debtor's assets and liabilities.  
Therefore, the receiver is required to file a correct inventory 
of any assets and a list of creditors, setting forth the amount 
due each creditor.6  Wis. Stat. § 128.13.  Creditors are given 
notice of the proceedings, and unsecured creditors are required 
to timely file their claims against the debtor's estate.  
Wis. Stat. § 128.14; Wis. Stat. § 128.15(2). 
¶42 With permission of the court, the receiver may sell 
assets and distribute the proceeds of the sale.  Often, the 
proceeds 
will 
be 
insufficient 
to 
satisfy 
all 
debts 
and 
obligations.  Accordingly, Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1) mandates the 
order of distribution of the proceeds.7   
                                                 
6 The receiver's inventory is not included in the record 
before this court.   
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 128.17(1) provides that "[t]he order of 
distribution out of the debtor's estate shall be as follows": 
(a) The actual and necessary costs of preserving the 
estate 
subsequent 
to 
the 
commencement 
of 
the 
proceedings.  
(b) Costs of administration including a reasonable 
attorney's fee for the representation of the debtor. 
(d) Wages . . . which have been earned within 3 months 
before 
the 
date 
of 
the 
commencement 
of 
the 
proceedings . . . . 
(e) Taxes, assessments and debts due the United 
States, 
this 
state 
or 
any 
county, 
district 
or 
municipality. 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
17 
 
¶43 There are significant differences in the treatment of 
secured creditors and general unsecured creditors under chapter 
128.  Unsecured creditors have no property interest in the 
debtor's assets, and they cannot withhold consent to the sale of 
the estate's assets.  Further, unsecured creditors are entitled 
to distribution of any proceeds of a sale only after priority 
claims have been satisfied.  See Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1); 
Collections and Bankruptcy, supra, § 4.2.23.   
¶44 We explained in Wisconsin Brick & Block Corporation v. 
Vogel, 54 Wis. 2d 321, 326, 195 N.W.2d 664 (1972), that "[a] 
secured creditor under ch. 128 cannot have his security taken 
away from him without his consent."  Without the secured 
creditor's consent to the sale of its collateral, "the court 
[does] not have the power in the ch. 128, Stats., proceeding to 
sell the property free of the [secured creditor's] mortgage[.]"  
Id. at 329.   
¶45 This explanation recognizes the assertion advanced by 
Paribas at the outset of its oral argument.  It asserted: "To 
decide this case, this court need not depart from the undisputed 
facts, the statutory commands of ch. 128, and the most basic 
legal principles of secured transactions.  The foremost of those 
principles is that a court cannot compromise, cannot eliminate, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) Other debts entitled to priority. 
(g) Debts due to creditors generally, in proportion to 
the amount of their claims, as allowed. 
(h) After payment of the foregoing, the surplus, if 
any, shall be returned to the debtor. 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
18 
 
cannot depreciate a secured interest without the consent of the 
interest holder."   
¶46 An example of this assertion lies in a security 
interest in inventory governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Wis. Stat. ch. 409.  The general rule under that chapter is that 
a secured creditor must consent before its collateral may be 
sold 
free 
and clear of liens: "A security interest or 
agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, 
lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof unless 
the secured party authorized the disposition free of the 
security 
interest 
or 
agricultural 
lien." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 409.315(1)(a) (emphasis added); see also Cristina M. Choi & 
Margaret E.M. Utterback, Wisconsin Secured Transactions Under 
Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code § 8-1 (rev. ed. 
2010) (explaining that § 419.315(1)(a) sets forth a "general 
rule" with many exceptions).8   
¶47 Wisconsin Stat. § 128.18 governs the validity of liens 
when there has been an assignment for the benefit of creditors.  
Under some circumstances, a receiver may determine that a lien 
on the debtor's property is void or may be dissolved, such as 
when the lien was given in an attempt to circumvent the order of 
                                                 
8 A lien is a "legal right or interest that a creditor has 
in another's property, lasting [usually] until a debt or duty 
that it secures is satisfied."  Black's Law Dictionary 933 (7th 
ed. 1999).     
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
19 
 
distribution set forth in chapter 128.9  By contrast, those liens 
"given or accepted in good faith and for a present consideration 
which have been properly recorded or filed shall, to the extent 
of such present consideration only, not be affected by the 
provisions of [chapter 128]."  Wis. Stat. § 128.18(4) (emphasis 
added).   
¶48 Accordingly, when a lien given and accepted in good 
faith meets the conditions set forth in § 128.18(4), it is "not 
[] affected by" the provisions of chapter 128.  As one 
commentator has explained, "there is no question that a 
receiver's ability to sell collateral depends on the secured 
creditor's consent."  Paul A. Lucey, The Liquidating "Chapter 
11" in State Courts, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Feb. 2001, at 12. 
¶49 Attorney 
Lucey 
compared 
the 
great 
power 
that 
bankruptcy trustees may wield over secured creditors with the 
lesser authority wielded by a receiver appointed under state 
law:  
A bankruptcy trustee can use collateral, even cash 
collateral, over the objection of a secured creditor 
if that creditor's interests are adequately protected 
                                                 
9 For example, Wis. Stat. § 128.18(3)(b)3 provides that 
liens created within four months before the filing of an 
assignment shall be dissolved if the lien "was sought and 
permitted 
in 
fraud 
of 
the 
provisions 
of 
this 
chapter."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 128.18(5) provides that "[a]ll conveyances, 
transfers, assignments or encumbrances of a debtor's property" 
given by the debtor within four months prior to the filing of a 
petition "with the intent and purpose on the debtor's part to 
hinder, delay, or defraud any of the debtor's creditors shall be 
void as against the debtor's creditors except as to purchasers 
in good faith and for a present fair consideration."   
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
20 
 
under [provisions of the bankruptcy code].  There is 
no comparable power under state receivership law.  If 
the secured creditor in a receivership wants to take 
its ball and go home, the game is over. 
Similarly, while there may be a division of authority 
as to whether a bankruptcy court can authorize the 
sale of assets under [federal bankruptcy law] over the 
objection of a secured creditor, there is no question 
that a receiver's ability to sell collateral depends 
on the secured creditor's consent. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
¶50 Wisconsin statutes, case law, and commentary are in 
accord.  A secured creditor may withhold its consent to the sale 
of its collateral in a chapter 128 proceeding.  If it does, the 
court cannot order the sale of the collateral free and clear of 
the secured creditor's lien.   
¶51 In other situations, however, a secured creditor "may 
readily agree to administration and liquidation of collateral in 
a chapter 128 proceeding because this is often an economical 
means of realizing on collateral."  Collections and Bankruptcy, 
supra, § 4.2.20.  If the secured creditor does consent to the 
sale free and clear of its security interest, it is entitled to 
the proceeds of the sale of its collateral in order of priority.   
¶52 When the value of the secured creditor's collateral is 
uncertain or in dispute, Wis. Stat. § 128.25 sets forth a 
procedure by which its value may be determined.10  The secured 
creditor may determine the value through collection (if the 
security is an obligation to pay money) or by creditor's sale 
                                                 
10  Wisconsin Stat. § 128.25 is the Uniform Act Governing 
Secured Creditor's Dividends in Liquidation Proceedings.   
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
21 
 
(if the asset is something other than the payment of money).  
Wis. Stat. § 128.25(5).  Alternatively, it may be determined by 
compromise if a petition is filed and the secured creditor and 
the 
liquidator 
agree 
upon 
value, 
by 
litigation, 
or 
by 
liquidator's sale.  Wis. Stat. § 128.25(6).11   
B 
¶53 Having set forth the chapter 128 procedures, we turn 
to applying them to the facts of this case.  It is undisputed 
that Paribas had a properly perfected security interest in 
certain assets of Olsen's Mill, including equipment, real 
estate, inventory, and general intangibles.12  Therefore, under 
                                                 
11 Additionally, regardless of whether a secured creditor 
consents to liquidation of its collateral, the secured creditor 
may make a claim against the debtor's estate for any deficiency.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 128.15(2) 
provides: 
"Claims 
of 
secured 
creditors may be allowed to enable such creditors to participate 
in the proceedings but shall be allowed for such sums only as 
shall be proved to be due, over and above the value of the 
securities, and dividends shall be paid only upon the excess of 
the claim over the value of the security at the time of the 
commencement of the proceedings." 
Wisconsin Stat. § 128.25(4) provides that the value of the 
debtor's security is credited against the secured creditor's 
total claim: "Dividends paid to secured creditors shall be 
computed only upon the balance due after the value of all 
security not exempt from the claims of unsecured creditors and 
not released or surrendered to the liquidator, is determined and 
credited upon the claim secured by it." 
12 Circuit Court's finding of fact #14.  In its brief to 
this court, OMAC acknowledged that "there is no dispute that 
[Paribas's] liens fall squarely within the criteria established 
by § 128.18(4); its liens were given to secure indebtedness and 
then evidenced and perfected by appropriate UCC financing 
statements." 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
22 
 
Wis. Stat. § 128.18(4), Paribas's lien on these assets was "not 
[] affected by" the provisions of chapter 128.  According to 
Wisconsin Brick & Block, "the court did not have the power in 
the ch. 128 [] proceeding" to sell the collateral free of 
Paribas's security interest without Paribas's consent.  54 
Wis. 2d at 329.   
¶54 Although OMAC initially acknowledges the need for 
consent by a secured creditor, it contends that Paribas's 
participation in the chapter 128 proceedings constituted consent 
under these facts.  It argues that by virtue of Paribas's 
initiation and participation in the receivership proceeding, 
Paribas had already provided consent to the sale of its 
collateral free and clear of all liens.  It contends that no 
further 
consent 
was 
required 
from 
Paribas. 
 
For 
this 
proposition, OMAC quotes a portion of this court's decision in 
Wisconsin Brick & Block.    
¶55 In that case, the debtor made a voluntary assignment 
for the benefit of creditors under chapter 128.  54 Wis. 2d at 
323.  The secured creditor, which held a mortgage on the 
debtor's 
property, 
had 
not 
appeared 
in 
the 
chapter 
128 
proceedings and did not file any claim based on its mortgage.  
Id.  On review, this court determined that because the secured 
creditor had not participated in the proceedings, the circuit 
court had no authority to sell the property free of the 
mortgage.   
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
23 
 
¶56 In making this determination, we stated: "As a general 
rule the court has the power under ch. 128, Stats., to sell the 
assignor's property free of valid liens and encumbrances if the 
lienholder participates in the proceeding."  Id. at 326.  In 
Wisconsin Brick & Block, this court focused on the role of 
participation because the secured creditor had not participated 
in the proceedings.  Without participation, the secured creditor 
could not have consented to the sale.   
¶57 The Wisconsin Brick & Block court held that a secured 
creditor's participation in the receivership proceeding was 
necessary to establish consent.  It should not be read to 
suggest 
that 
the 
secured 
creditor's 
participation 
was 
sufficient, by itself, to establish consent.  Likewise, it 
should not be read to suggest that the creditor's participation 
in the proceedings trumps the secured creditor's express 
objection to the sale of its collateral.  OMAC reads the quoted 
language from Wisconsin Brick & Block out of context. 
¶58 Here, Paribas consented to a sale of the secured 
assets under the procedures outlined in the Auction Terms 
Agreement.  However, the court accepted an offer that was not 
submitted during the auction, was not submitted in accordance 
with the Auction Terms Agreement, and was not selected by the 
receiver.   
¶59 During the hearing, Paribas's attorney raised multiple 
objections to the proposed sale to OMAC.  Early in the hearing, 
he told the court that Paribas did not consent to the sale of 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
24 
 
its collateral: "I just want on the record that Paribas does not 
consent, for whatever that means within the scope of the Court 
order.  Just so everybody's clear on that."  Later in the 
hearing, Paribas's attorney again objected to the sale of the 
collateral: "[W]e don't think the Court can approve this offer 
because of our lack of consent, which is required under the 
statute. . . .  So I wanted to at least let you know that now 
and not let my silence somehow constitute consent and to raise 
it with you at this point."  
¶60 Given Paribas's repeated assertions that it did not 
consent to the sale of its collateral, the circuit court made a 
finding of fact.  It found that Paribas "[did] not consent to 
the OMAC Offer described above, or the sale of the Subject 
Assets in accordance therewith and has not agreed to release its 
liens and security interests on the assets described above."  
Under these circumstances, the circuit court erred by ordering a 
sale of Paribas's collateral free and clear of Paribas's 
security interest without its consent.     
¶61 OMAC advances an alternative argument for why we 
should affirm despite Paribas's lack of consent.  It asserts 
that the circuit court valued Paribas's security interest during 
the proceedings at $9 million, and Paribas received $9 million 
as a result of the sale.  Therefore, OMAC contends, Paribas was 
not injured as a result of the sale. 
¶62 To understand OMAC's argument, we must look to the 
transcript of the circuit court proceedings.  In its revised 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
25 
 
offer, OMAC set the purchase price for Olsen's Mill's inventory 
at $9 million.  This was the same purchase price offered by PRM 
in its Winning Bid.  OMAC points to a portion of the transcript 
where the receiver discussed the effect that OMAC's proposed 
purchase price would have on the largest creditor, Paribas:     
Paribas' claim is approximately sixty million dollars.  
As a result of this proposed sale [to OMAC], that 
amount will be reduced by approximately nine million 
dollars. 
 
That 
leaves 
them 
with 
an 
unsecured 
deficiency claim of over 51 million dollars plus 
costs, plus interest.  They are the unsecured creditor 
pool here, Your Honor.   
¶63 OMAC contends that the receiver's comments in this 
portion of the transcript constitute the receiver's valuation of 
Paribas's collateral.  It argues that Paribas's failure to 
object to this valuation is fatal, and that Paribas was entitled 
to no more than it received, $9 million.   
¶64 There are at least three problems with this argument.  
First, it is doubtful that the receiver's comments analyzing the 
effect of OMAC's proposed purchase price on Paribas's claims 
constitute a "valuation" of the inventory, as that term is used 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 128.  That statute sets forth several distinct 
procedures by which a secured creditor's security interest may 
be valued.13  OMAC makes no attempt to interpret the statutory 
                                                 
13 The relevant sections of Wis. Stat. § 128.25 provide: 
(5) Determination of value by secured creditor.   
(a) By collection.  When the asset constituting the 
security is an obligation for the payment of money, 
the secured creditor may determine the security's 
value by collection . . . . 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
26 
 
requirements or to identify any statutory subsection into which 
the receiver's purported valuation fits.   
¶65 Indeed, it does not appear to fit squarely within any 
of the subsections.  There was no collection or creditor's sale, 
as described in sub. (5).  Further, there was no petition for a 
determination of value, as described in sub. (6).     
¶66 Second, the $9 million reflects the purchase price for 
Olsen's Mill's inventory only.  Yet, Paribas's security interest 
extended beyond inventory, encompassing equipment, real estate, 
general intangibles, and other assets.14  The circuit court's 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) By creditor's sale.  When the asset constituting 
the security is something other than an obligation for 
the payment of money, the secured creditor may 
determine its value by creditor's sale. 
(6) 
Alternative Determinations of Value.  Where 
valuation under sub. (5) is impractical or would cause 
undue delay, the court, upon petition by either the 
secured creditor or the liquidator, may order the 
value of the security determined by any of the 
following methods: 
(a) By compromise, if the secured creditor and the 
liquidator agree upon a value. . . .  
(b) 
By 
litigation, 
through 
proceedings 
in 
the 
liquidation proceeding. . . .  
(c) By liquidator's sale of the assets which, when 
completed and approved by the court, shall pass to the 
purchaser good title, free and clear of all liens of 
the secured creditor, such liens to be transferred to 
the proceeds of the sale. . . .   
14 During oral argument, Paribas's attorney pointed to the 
security agreement in which Olsen's Mill granted Paribas a 
security interest in many assets, including accounts, chattel 
paper, commercial tort claims, documents, general intangibles, 
investment property, inventory, and supporting obligations.     
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
27 
 
order for sale and distribution reflected that the $9 million 
payment for inventory resulted in only "partial satisfaction" of 
Paribas's secured claim.  
¶67 During oral argument, it became apparent that the full 
value of Paribas's security interest was unknown.  Paribas's 
attorney asserted that the value of Paribas's security interest 
must have exceeded $9 million because OMAC was willing to pay 
over $20 million for the business as a going concern.  He 
contended: "[The secured assets] were undoubtedly worth more 
than the $9 million that [Paribas] received, and their value was 
far less than the total amount of the debt." 15   
¶68 Because the value of Paribas's security interest is 
unclear on this record, we are unable to fully address OMAC's 
alternative argument.  We are unable to determine whether its 
security interest in the assets that were sold was fully 
satisfied as a result of the sale, as OMAC contends.  
¶69 The third problem with OMAC's alternative argument is 
even more significant.  Even if the proceedings in the circuit 
court could be considered to have produced a "valuation" of 
Paribas's collateral under Wis. Stat. § 128.25(5) and (6), the 
circuit court's order violated the statutes in other ways.  That 
                                                 
15 Paribas asserts that "there can be no question that the 
nature and extent of [its] security interest was contractual 
and, thus, governed by the Loan Documents and Wisconsin's UCC 
Article 9.  In other words, [its] security interests could not 
be 
properly 
determined . . . without 
regard 
to 
the 
Loan 
Documents, but rather by resorting exclusively to Chapter 128's 
provisions pertaining to valuation of a secured creditor's 
deficiency claim."        
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
28 
 
is, even if Paribas's secured interest had been satisfied, 
Paribas appears to have received nothing on the unsecured 
portion of the debt.   
¶70 As discussed above, Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1) mandates 
the order of distribution of the proceeds of a liquidation sale 
when those proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the estate's 
debts and obligations.  Section 128.17(1) enumerates certain 
unsecured 
priority 
claims 
that 
must 
be 
satisfied 
first, 
including the costs of administering the estate, wages, and 
taxes.  Once those claims are satisfied, any remaining proceeds 
are 
distributed 
pro 
rata. 
 
The 
remaining 
proceeds 
are 
distributed to general unsecured creditors "in proportion to the 
amount of their claims."  Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1); see also 
Linton v. Schmidt, 88 Wis. 2d 183, 198, 277 N.W.2d 136 (1979) 
("The object and purpose of assignment law is to afford an equal 
distribution of the assignor's estate to all [unsecured] 
creditors in proportion to their claims.").      
¶71 Even if the secured portion of Paribas's claim had 
been properly valued at $9 million, then Paribas would have had 
an unsecured deficiency claim of approximately $49 million.  
Under the order of distribution set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 128.17(1), Paribas would have been entitled to a pro rata 
portion of any money that remained in the estate after priority 
payments were made.     
¶72 In this case, however, the revised offer accepted by 
the circuit court had the effect of circumventing the order of 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
29 
 
distribution mandated by Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1).  In addition to 
enumerating a purchase price for inventory and a purchase price 
for real estate, rolling stock, and equipment, OMAC's revised 
offer included a commitment to honor various debts Olsen's Mill 
owed to general unsecured creditors.  Specifically, OMAC agreed 
to pay checks and obligations to certain producers, forward 
contracts of producers, prepaid inventory of producers, and 
trade accounts payable.   
¶73 According to the estimates of the parties, these 
combined obligations totaled somewhere around $10 million. The 
circuit court's order of sale allowed this $10 million to go 
directly to specified unsecured creditors.  The circuit court 
contravened the statute by approving an offer that circumvented 
the order of distribution mandated by Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1).16    
C 
¶74 Having determined that the circuit court erred by 
ordering the sale of Paribas's collateral without its consent 
and approving the distribution of the proceeds from the sale, we 
turn to the issue of remedy.  In its initial brief, Paribas 
asked us to, in effect, unwind the sale.  It requested us to 
order the circuit court to reinstate Paribas's liens on the 
                                                 
16 Paribus makes several additional assertions of error.  It 
contends 
that 
its 
due 
process 
rights 
were 
violated.  
Additionally, it asserts that by permitting OMAC to pay the 
purchase price for inventory over a six-month period, the 
circuit court effectively ordered Paribas to extend OMAC an 
interest-free loan.  Because we resolve this appeal on other 
grounds, we do not address these arguments.   
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
30 
 
collateral that was sold pursuant to the circuit court's order 
and to order a new auction.  In addition, it asked us to order a 
trial to determine any money damages that Paribas has incurred.      
¶75 The sale of Paribas's collateral occurred more than 
two years ago.  At this late date, restoring the parties to the 
actual position they were in prior to the sale may be neither 
practical nor possible.   
¶76 It appears that Paribas recognizes the difficulty of 
fashioning a remedy at this point.  At oral argument, its 
attorney 
explained: 
"Clearly 
the 
bank 
knows 
that 
its 
alternatives, practical alternatives, are limited.  It does not 
expect to recover 58 million less nine, or 51 million dollars.  
But the fact that a remedy may require some creative thinking, 
might require a little bit of unorthodox approach, it should not 
deter this court from correcting an error of law."   
¶77 Paribas has revised its requested remedy.  Rather than 
requesting an order to unwind the sale, it now asks this court 
to remand to the circuit court and order that court to fashion a 
remedy: 
The remedy is a remand, and it would be for the trial 
court to decide . . . .  Granted, this is not a case 
where this court can say reversed, reversed and 
remanded with instructions.  It is going to take a 
little bit of work.  But we can't start at the end and 
work to the beginning.  We can't just say gee, a 
remedy might be a little tough here.  Let's try a 
remedy that corrects the error of law and does a 
better job of restoring the parties to the position 
they should have been in.  In other words, let's not 
let the perfect be the enemy of the good.  And the 
importance of establishing some clear law in this area 
just should not be underestimated.          
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
31 
 
¶78 We agree that under the situation presented here, this 
court is poorly equipped to fashion an appropriate remedy.17  As 
discussed above, we are unable to determine the value of 
Paribas's security interest at the time of the sale.  If that 
determination can be made at this late date, the circuit court 
is in the best position to collect the necessary evidence and 
make the necessary findings of fact.   
¶79 Further, this court does not have the benefit of a 
developed factual record of what has transpired since the sale.  
According to the circuit court's order, the receiver was to 
continue to manage certain assets of the debtor's estate after 
the sale.  At oral argument, the parties explained that the 
receivership continues to this day.  The record before this 
                                                 
17 As 
previously 
mentioned, 
in 
its 
brief, 
Paribas 
specifically requested three remedies: (1) that its liens "on 
all collateral sold and/or transferred" be reinstated; (2) that 
we "order a new auction of Olsen's Mill's (now OMAC) assets to 
be conducted as a going-concern business" and "OMAC could then 
assert a claim against the receivership estate"; and (3) money 
damages. 
Paribas no longer appears to request those remedies.  
Rather, it now argues that this court is poorly equipped to 
determine 
what 
remedies 
may 
be 
appropriate 
under 
the 
circumstances: 
This business is very important to this part of the 
state, it is a very large operation, and from the 
distance of 150 miles or so, I do not think that this 
court is the right entity to be fashioning specific 
remedies.  But the fact is we do not know the value of 
what is left, we do not yet know the value of 
[Paribas's security interest], but we do know there 
was value there.  
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
32 
 
court does not reflect what assets remain in the estate or their 
value.   
¶80 Finally, we note that throughout the proceedings in 
the circuit court, there were references to a New York lawsuit 
filed by Paribas against the Olsen brothers, who had guaranteed 
the loan.  It is unclear what effect, if any, that lawsuit would 
have on the appropriate remedy.       
¶81 We agree with Paribas that the task of fashioning a 
remedy is best left for the circuit court.  Accordingly, we 
remand to the circuit court for a determination of what remedy 
is available under the circumstances.  On remand, the circuit 
court should take all necessary and appropriate actions to 
determine the existence of a remedy that is fair to all parties 
under the circumstances. 
¶82 OMAC argues that "because of the inherent complexity 
of 
insolvency 
proceedings, 
the 
statute, 
if 
little 
else, 
emphasizes the need for the Circuit Court to have broad powers 
to handle the intricate issues that arise so that it may orderly 
administer the assets sequestered before it."  We agree that a 
circuit court has authority under the statutes to withhold 
approval of a bid that had been selected by the receiver.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 128.01.  We also agree that a circuit court should 
take into account equitable considerations when making an order 
in a chapter 128 proceeding.  See id.  Nevertheless, in 
exercising these powers, the circuit court is not free to 
No. 
2009AP1007 
   
 
33 
 
violate the applicable statutes.  A party's express statutory 
rights cannot be ignored or disregarded. 
¶83 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court erred by 
ordering the sale of Paribas's collateral free and clear of 
Paribas's security interest without its consent.  However, 
because the value of Paribas's security interest in the assets 
sold is unclear on this record, we are unable to discern if 
Paribas was harmed as a result of this error.  We further 
determine that the court contravened the statute by approving an 
offer that circumvented the order of distribution mandated by 
Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1).  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for a determination of 
what remedy is available under the circumstances. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
¶84 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶85 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   Although 
I agree with the lead opinion that a reverse and remand is the 
proper disposition, I do not join the opinion.  I write in 
concurrence to clarify that it is BNP Paribas's (Paribas) 
secured interest in the assets that the circuit court sold to 
Olsen's Mill Acquisition Company (OMAC) over Paribas's objection 
and the circuit court's approval of a sale that failed to pay 
Paribas anything on its unsecured claim while other unsecured 
creditors were paid that drive the result that we must reach in 
our review of the ch. 128 (2007-08)1 proceeding now before us.   
¶86 Paribas repeatedly refused to consent to the sale to 
OMAC of assets in which Paribas held perfected security 
interests, alleging that it was not fully compensated for the 
value of its security in those assets.  In addition, Paribas 
received nothing on its unsecured claims, while other unsecured 
claimants were paid.  Accordingly, I conclude that the circuit 
court violated the provisions of ch. 128 and exceeded its 
authority in regard to the sale to OMAC in two major respects:  
(1) it approved the sale of assets in which Paribas held a 
security interest free and clear of all liens, without either 
Paribas's consent or the completion of a statutory determination 
of the value of Paribas's security in the assets sold and 
payment for the value of its security; and (2) it approved the 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
2 
 
sale to OMAC that paid Paribas nothing on its unsecured claims 
while other unsecured claimants were paid.  
¶87 With these conclusions established, I would remand to 
the circuit court to determine an appropriate remedy consistent 
with ch. 128.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶88 Paribas is a secured lender of Olsen's Mill, a major 
grain elevator operation, with sites throughout Wisconsin.  
Paribas loaned Olsen's Mill approximately $58 million for which 
Paribas took a second mortgage on certain real estate and 
secured interests in the following collateral:  
all Accounts; all Bank Accounts; all Chattel Paper; 
all Commercial Tort claims; all Deposit Accounts; all 
Documents; all General Intangibles; all Instruments, 
including 
all 
Commodity 
Accounts 
and 
Commodity 
Contracts; all Inventory; all Investment Property; all 
Payment Intangibles; all Supporting Obligations; all 
books 
and 
records pertaining to the Collateral, 
including, any computer software, hardware and access 
codes[]; and to the extent not otherwise included, all 
Proceeds and products of any and all of the foregoing.   
Security Agreement, at 2.  Paribas timely perfected its security 
interest in its collateral.2   
¶89 Olsen's Mill defaulted on its obligations to Paribas, 
and Paribas then filed the ch. 128 proceeding that is now before 
us. 
 
Olsen's 
Mill agreed to Paribas's request for the 
appointment of a receiver to take control of and to preserve 
                                                 
2 There was no question raised in this proceeding that 
Paribus did not timely perfect its security interests in its 
collateral. 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
3 
 
Olsen's Mill's ch. 128 estate.  Michael S. Polsky was appointed 
receiver.   
¶90 The parties agreed upon the order that appointed 
Polsky, which order provided that the receiver was empowered: 
to sell any and all of Olsen's property free and clear 
of all liens, with all liens attaching to the proceeds 
of sale, through public or private proceedings, in a 
commercially reasonable manner, subject to the prior 
consent of the creditors holding perfected liens on 
the assets being sold, and the approval of the Court.   
(emphasis added).  
¶91 As part of Polsky's duties to Olsen's Mill's ch. 128 
estate, he sent out notice of an April 7, 2009 auction of 
certain of Olsen's Mill's assets.3  The notice was in accord with 
the agreed upon order quoted in ¶6, above.  The Auction 
Procedures noticed certain restrictions on the sale, including 
that Olsen's Mill's assets were subject to perfected security 
interests, including those of Paribas, and that the assets' 
sales were subject to the consent of the secured parties, for 
the assets in which a party held security.   
¶92 The description of Auction Lots was very broad, 
including: 
All owned real estate; All owned equipment; All owned 
inventory (including prepaid inventory); All owned 
grain 
inventory; 
All 
owned 
non-grain 
inventory 
(including 
prepaid 
inventory); 
Belmont 
owned 
equipment; Boscobel owned equipment; Milwaukee owned 
equipment; 
Ripon/Metomen 
owned 
equipment; 
Viroqua 
owned 
equipment; 
Algoma 
owned 
real 
estate 
and 
                                                 
3 Polsky did not seek to auction all of Olsen's Mill's 
assets. 
 
Apparently, 
some 
intangibles 
such 
as 
accounts 
receivable, life insurance policies, licensed software, etc. 
remained in the possession of Polsky and not subject to sale.   
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
4 
 
equipment (Oshkosh operation); Auroraville owned real 
estate and equipment; Berlin owned real estate and 
equipment; Newton/Westfield owned real estate and 
equipment; 
Omro 
owned 
real 
estate 
(4 
lots); 
Stockton/Stevens 
Point 
owned 
real 
estate 
and 
equipment; Warren owned [] and equipment; All other 
owned equipment (not included in lots 7-19); Real 
estate leases 
with Olsen Bros. Enterprises; All 
rolling stock and equipment owned by Olsen Leasing, 
LLC; Intangible assets; Any combination of lots 2 
through 22.  
Paribas held perfected security interests in many of these 
assets and second mortgages on certain real estate.  Baylake 
Bank and Capital Crossing held the first mortgages and primary 
security on the real estate and certain equipment.   
¶93 The highest bid, $18,210,000, was submitted by PRM 
Wisconsin, LLC (PRM), an entity affiliated with Paribas.  The 
second highest bid was submitted by OMAC, an entity affiliated 
with the then current owners of Olsen's Mill.  In the PRM bid, 
$9,000,000 was allocated to inventory, $6,500,000 was allocated 
to all owned equipment and real estate and $2,710,000 was to 
cover outstanding checks due to various farmers and producers.  
Paribas was to receive the $9,000,000 for inventory, "in partial 
satisfaction of its secured claim."  Baylake Bank and Capital 
Crossing 
received 
"full 
satisfaction 
of 
[their] 
secured 
claim[s]."  
¶94 At the hearing to confirm the sale, Polsky informed 
the court that the conditions of the Auction Procedures had been 
followed; that the purchase price was in excess of the 
liquidation value of the assets; that the secured creditors had 
consented; and that PRM was ready to proceed in closing on the 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
5 
 
sale.  Polsky asserted that the sale to PRM was in the best 
interests of creditors and all other interested parties. 
¶95 Olsen's Mill objected to the sale, and requested that 
OMAC be permitted to make an alternative offer outside of the 
Auction Procedures.  Ultimately, the circuit court did as 
Olsen's Mill requested; it permitted a new offer and accepted 
that offer.  
¶96 Under OMAC's offer, although Paribas was paid $9 
million for its interest in inventory, the payment was not due 
until six months after the sale.  Paribas was paid nothing on 
its unsecured claim that could approach $50 million, while the 
unsecured claims of grain producers for future purchases 
received $5 million. 
¶97 Paribas refused to consent to the sale, and Polsky 
objected as well.  Polsky informed the court that OMAC's 
proposal violated ch. 128 because it would give the buyer's 
choice of unsecured claims payment in full, while other 
unsecured claimants would get nothing.  Polsky also pointed out 
that claims of a higher priority, such as taxes, wages and 
administrative expenses would not be fully funded under OMAC's 
proposal.  He also brought to the court's attention that Paribas 
had not consented to the sale of assets in which it held a 
perfected security interest and it had not consented to 
financing OMAC's purchase of the inventory during the six-month 
period after closing on the sale.   
¶98 The circuit court heard the objections of Paribas and 
Polsky and noted that Paribas had properly perfected security 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
6 
 
interests in certain assets and that it did not consent to the 
sale to OMAC and did not consent to the release of its liens and 
security interests on the items sold.  However, notwithstanding 
the objections made and noted by the circuit court, the circuit 
court transferred all of the sale assets to OMAC, free and clear 
of all liens.   
¶99 Paribas appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
We granted review and now reverse and remand. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶100 This case requires us to interpret and apply ch. 128 
in regard to the sale of Olsen's Mill's assets to OMAC, under 
undisputed facts.  The interpretation and application of 
statutes in light of undisputed facts present questions of law 
that 
we 
decide 
independently, 
but 
benefitting 
from 
the 
discussions in previous court decisions.  Admanco, Inc. v. 700 
Stanton Drive, LLC, 2010 WI 76, ¶15, 326 Wis. 2d 586, 786 N.W.2d 
759.    
B.  Chapter 128 Principles 
¶101 Under ch. 128, an insolvent debtor makes a voluntary 
assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.  Wis. 
Stat. § 128.01.  A court then may sequestrate the property of 
the debtor and appoint a receiver to administer that property.  
Wis. Stat. § 128.08; Admanco, 326 Wis. 2d 586, ¶32.   
¶102 During 
the 
course 
of 
administration, 
ch. 
128 
proceedings address objections made to claims against the 
debtor's estate, Wis. Stat. § 128.15, and provide for the 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
7 
 
orderly distribution of an insolvent debtor's property.  Wis. 
Stat. § 128.17.    
¶103 A creditor with a perfected security interest in the 
debtor's property is not required to participate in a ch. 128 
proceeding.  Wis. Brick & Block Corp. v. Vogel, 54 Wis. 2d 321, 
325-26, 195 N.W.2d 664 (1972).4  The value of a secured party's 
perfected security in each asset of the debtor's ch. 128 estate 
is protected, and it is only the excess that is above that value 
that is subject to administration, absent a secured party's 
consent.  See Kneeland v. Am. Loan & Trust Co., 136 U.S. 89, 97 
(1890) (explaining vested contract rights in a receivership); 
see also Wis. Stat. § 128.18(4). 
¶104 As we have explained, "[a] secured creditor under ch. 
128 cannot have his security taken away from him without his 
consent," and a secured creditor is not required to participate 
in a ch. 128 proceeding.  Wis. Brick, 54 Wis. 2d at 325-26.  
However, if a secured creditor chooses to participate in a ch. 
128 proceeding, his claim against the debtor's estate is limited 
to the unsecured portion of what the debtor owes because the 
portion of the debt that is secured cannot be defeated by the 
ch. 128 administration.  Id. at 326; see also Kneeland, 136 U.S. 
at 97.5  In addition, a secured party who chooses to participate 
                                                 
4 The 
secured 
creditor 
did 
not 
participate 
in 
the 
receivership proceeding in Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp. v. 
Vogel, 54 Wis. 2d 321, 195 N.W.2d 664 (1972). 
5 Stated otherwise, a creditor who has full or excessive 
security for an outstanding debt will not choose to participate 
in a ch. 128 proceeding because he will be making no claim 
against the general fund of the receivership, which general fund 
pays unsecured claims. 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
8 
 
in a ch. 128 proceeding must give notice of his security 
interest and object to any sale that attempts to diminish the 
value of his security because the court's decision in regard to 
distribution of the debtor's estate cannot be challenged in a 
collateral 
proceeding 
asserting 
the 
secured 
interest.  
Littlejohn v. Turner, 73 Wis. 113, 123, 40 N.W. 621 (1888).6  
¶105 Although a ch. 128 insolvency proceeding is sometimes 
referred to as a "state bankruptcy,"7 a ch. 128 insolvency 
proceeding differs from a federal bankruptcy proceeding in 
significant respects.  For example, a debtor's obligations are 
not discharged in a ch. 128 proceedings.8  Voluntary Assignment 
of 
Tarnowski, 
191 
Wis. 279, 286, 210 N.W. 836 (1926).  
Therefore, when there are insufficient assets to pay all 
creditors, the debtor's obligation to the creditors remains 
after the conclusion of a ch. 128 proceeding.   
                                                 
6 The present ch. 128 is somewhat different from the 
statutes in place when Littlejohn v. Turner, 73 Wis. 113, 40 
N.W. 621 (1888), was decided.  However, the concept that a 
secured creditor who chooses to participate in a ch. 128 
proceeding is to give notice of its perfected security interest 
in property of the estate remains valid.  See Premke v. Pan Am. 
Motel, Inc., 35 Wis. 2d 258, 267, 151 N.W.2d 122 (1967); Wis. 
Stat. § 128.25. 
7 See 
Jeffrey 
L. Murrell, Chapter 128:  Wisconsin's 
Bankruptcy Alternative, Wisconsin Lawyer, May 2008, at 8. 
8 The validity of ch. 128 proceedings ordering a receiver to 
take control of and administer property of a debtor has been 
challenged by a claim that the federal government has preempted 
the field with the federal Bankruptcy Act.  Gelatt v. DeDakis, 
77 Wis. 2d 578, 580, 254 N.W.2d 171 (1977).  That challenge was 
set aside in part by suspending a past provision of ch. 128 that 
discharged the debt of the debtor in a ch. 128 proceeding.  Id. 
at 585 (citing Voluntary Assignment of Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 
210 N.W. 836 (1926)).    
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶106 However, even though a secured creditor with a 
perfected lien cannot have his security taken from him without 
his consent, Wis. Stat. § 128.18(4), when a secured creditor 
chooses to participate in a ch. 128 proceeding, ch. 128 provides 
a procedure somewhat similar to cram down9 under the federal 
Bankruptcy Act.10  In this regard, a ch. 128 proceeding may be 
held to determine the value of a participating secured party's 
                                                 
9 Cram down refers to the power of a federal bankruptcy 
court under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) to compromise the security of 
a secured creditor when the court determines that the holders of 
secured interests receive the "indubitable equivalent of such 
claims."  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii); Dish Network Corp. v. 
DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD), 634 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2011). 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 128.25 is a uniform law:  The Uniform 
Act 
Governing 
Secured Creditors' Dividends in Liquidation 
Proceedings.  Wis. Stat. § 128.25(10).  The history of this 
uniform act relates the act's intended parallels with the 
federal Bankruptcy Act,  
The purpose of taking security is primarily for 
protection 
in 
the 
event 
of 
insolvency. 
 
The 
determination 
of 
the 
adequacy 
of 
security 
is, 
therefore, vitally affected by these rules.  It 
likewise affects the evaluation of all other claims, 
present or prospective, that may depend for payment 
upon the general assets of the debtor.  Uniformity is 
accordingly desirable for the benefit of interstate 
business generally.   
Legislation on this subject in all English 
speaking 
countries 
has 
generally 
followed 
the 
principle of the bankruptcy rule.   
This principle has therefore been adopted in this 
act as being the only one likely to be generally 
accepted by the Legislatures of the several states. 
Unif. Act Governing Secured Creditors' Dividends in Liquidation 
Proceedings, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A. 77, 78 
(1941). 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
10 
 
security in each asset in which such an interest is held and for 
which the secured creditor seeks payment out of the general fund 
for that part of his claim that is unsecured.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 128.25(5) and (6).   
¶107 When an asset in which a perfected security interest 
is held is for the payment of money, a secured party who chooses 
to participate in the ch. 128 proceeding can determine the value 
of his security by executing against the obligation to pay.  
Wis. Stat. § 128.25(5).  All or some portion of his debt may be 
satisfied by execution.   
¶108 Or in the alternative, a secured party or a receiver 
may petition the court to determine the value of a secured 
party's interest in each asset in which a secured party who 
chooses to participate in the ch. 128 proceeding has a perfected 
security interest.  Wis. Stat. § 128.25(6).  Valuation of 
secured interests may be obtained by compromise, § 128.25(6)(a); 
by 
litigation, 
§ 128.25(6)(b); 
or 
by 
a 
receiver's 
sale, 
§ 128.25(6)(c).  All of the actions taken under § 128.25(5) and 
(6) are subject to court approval.  Therefore, although a 
secured creditor who chooses to participate in a ch. 128 
proceeding cannot be forced to accept a sale of estate property 
in which he has a perfected lien if the sale price will not 
fully satisfy the value of his security interest in the property 
sold, how to ascertain the value of that security interest when 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
11 
 
the secured party claims under the general fund is provided by 
statute.11  See Wis. Stat. § 128.25.  
C.  Paribas's Secured Interest 
¶109 Olsen's Mill owed a debt of approximately $58 million 
to Paribas.  Paribas chose to participate in the ch. 128 
proceeding now before us.  It had a perfected security interest 
in many of Olsen's Mill's assets.12  However, from the record 
before us we cannot determine the value of Paribas's security 
interest in the assets that were sold or in the assets that 
remain under the administration of the receiver because no Wis. 
Stat. § 128.25(6) proceedings were held in circuit court.13   
                                                 
11 The lead opinion quotes heavily from Paul A. Lucey's two 
page article, The Liquidating "Chapter 11" in State Court, 20 
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 12 (Feb. 2001), to make broad sweeping 
statements that could be interpreted as contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 128.25.  Lead op., ¶¶48-49.  I do not find Paul Lucey's 
article persuasive.  He cites no authority and provides not one 
footnote to support his assertions.   
This writer could find only one case that cites to the 
Uniform 
Act 
Governing 
Secured 
Creditors' 
Dividends 
in 
Liquidation Proceedings, which is the name the Wisconsin 
legislature adopted from the National Uniform Law Commission and 
gave to Wis. Stat. § 128.25.  Hamberg v. Guaranteed Mortgage Co. 
of New York, 38 N.Y.S.2d 165 (S. Ct. N.Y. 1942), mentions the 
Act, but only to explain that it does not apply to the problem 
under review by the court.  Id. at 174-75. 
12 See ¶4 above. 
13 Furthermore, neither the receiver's inventory (Wis. Stat. 
§ 128.15(1)(a)) nor the debtor's inventory (Wis. Stat. § 128.13) 
is in the record before us.  Therefore, we have not been 
provided a framework from which to determine the total assets of 
Olsen's Mill before the sale, indicating the security interests 
levied against each asset.  Such a framework would have been 
helpful to us in instructing the circuit court on remand.   
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶110 Paribas and the receiver petitioned the circuit court 
to accept the sale to PRM, which action may fall within Wis. 
Stat. § 128.25(6)(a) as a compromise to determine the value of 
Paribas's security interest in some of the assets.  However, the 
circuit court refused their compromise.  Because the court then 
summarily accepted OMAC's offer to purchase, no litigation was 
conducted to determine the value of Paribas's security interest 
in the assets that were sold to OMAC.   
¶111 Accordingly, the record before us does not answer the 
questions of how much of the $58 million owed to Paribas was 
secured by those assets that were sold and how large Paribas's 
unsecured claim against the general fund was.  Without Paribas's 
consent to the sale, or a Wis. Stat. § 128.25(6) determination 
of the value of Paribas's security in the assets sold and that 
payment for the value of its security was accorded to Paribas, 
the circuit court contravened the provisions of ch. 128 when it 
approved the sale to OMAC free and clear of all liens.     
¶112 On remand, the circuit court should determine the 
value of Paribas's security in the assets sold to OMAC, at the 
time of the sale.  The circuit court then can determine whether 
the value of Paribas's security was taken from it without its 
consent or payment for the value of its security due to the 
sale, contrary to Wisconsin Brick and Wis. Stat. § 128.18(4).  
The circuit court then also will be able to determine the value 
of Paribas's unsecured claim against the general fund of the 
receivership.   
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
13 
 
D.  Paribas's Unsecured Claim 
¶113 The sale of Olsen's Mill's assets to OMAC provided 
Paribas with only $9 million against a debt of approximately $58 
million.  In addition, the $9 million that it received for 
inventory was not due to be paid until six months after the 
sale.14   Although it is not possible on the record before us to 
determine the amount of Paribas's unsecured claim, it appears to 
be significant.   
¶114 Distributions of property from the debtor's estate are 
controlled by Wis. Stat. § 128.17, which separates debts into 
classes with varying degrees of priority.  Section 128.17 
provides in relevant part:   
Order 
of 
distribution. 
 
(1) 
The 
order 
of 
distribution out of the debtor's estate shall be as 
follows: 
a. 
The actual and necessary costs of preserving 
the estate subsequent to the commencement of the 
proceedings. 
b. 
Costs 
of 
administration 
including 
a 
reasonable attorney's fee for the representation of 
the debtor. 
c. 
[Omitted from the statute] 
                                                 
14 I can see no lawful basis for requiring Paribas to 
finance OMAC's purchase for six months.  In so doing, the 
circuit court approved a sale that actually paid Paribas less 
than $9 million for its secured interest in inventory.  While it 
is possible under some circumstances to charge the proceeds from 
the sale of an asset with the expenses of a sale that are 
attributable to the asset sold, see Thomsen v. Cullen, 196 Wis. 
581, 588, 219 N.W. 439 (1928), that is not what occurred here.  
There is no basis in the record before us for this charge 
against the payment to Paribas for its perfected security in the 
inventory.   
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
14 
 
d. 
Wages, 
including 
pension, 
welfare 
and 
vacation benefits, due to workmen, clerks, traveling 
or city salespersons or servants, which have been 
earned within 3 months before the date of the 
commencement of the proceedings, not to exceed $600 to 
each claimant. 
e. 
Taxes, assessments and debts due the United 
States, 
this 
state 
or 
any 
county, 
district 
or 
municipality. 
f. 
Other debts entitled to priority. 
g. 
Debts 
due 
to 
creditors 
generally, 
in 
proportion to the amount of their claims, as allowed. 
h. 
After payment of the foregoing, the surplus, 
if any, shall be returned to the debtor. 
¶115 Paragraph 
(1)(g) 
addresses 
the 
distribution 
to 
unsecured creditors.  It requires that the payment of unsecured 
creditors must be a proportionate payment.  Compliance with the 
statute requires an aggregation of the amount of all unsecured 
claims that are allowed and then payment of each claim in an 
amount proportional to the total amount of all unsecured 
outstanding claims from whatever assets are available to satisfy 
these claims.   
¶116 Because the record before us does not permit us to 
know the priority in which Paribas's security attached to assets 
that were sold, we cannot determine the amount of Paribas's 
unsecured claim in the assets that were sold to OMAC.  However, 
with a payment of $9 million, which was not due for six months 
after closing on the sale, against a debt of $58 million and 
Paribas having only a second mortgage on the real estate sold, 
some significant portion of Olsen's Mill's debt to Paribas must 
have been unsecured.   
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶117 The purpose of a ch. 128 proceeding is to provide an 
orderly distribution of the insolvent debtor's property, which 
is not encumbered by liens, to all unsecured creditors.  As we 
explained in Linton v. Schmidt, 88 Wis. 2d 183, 277 N.W.2d 136 
(1979), "The object and purpose of assignment law is to afford 
an equal distribution of the assignor's estate to all creditors 
in proportion to their claims."  Linton, 88 Wis. 2d at 198.   
¶118 The circuit court did not even consider by what amount 
the $58 million that Olsen's Mill owed to Paribas was unsecured.  
The circuit court was not free to order a sale that did not 
treat all creditors equally in proportion to their unsecured 
claims.  Id.  Accordingly, in regard to Paribas's interests, the 
sale to OMAC contravened Wis. Stat. § 128.17(1)(g). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶119 I conclude that the circuit court violated the 
provisions of ch. 128 and exceeded its authority in regard to 
the sale to OMAC in two major respects:  (1) it approved the 
sale of assets in which Paribas held a security interest free 
and clear of all liens, without either Paribas's consent or the 
completion of a statutory determination of the value of 
Paribas's security in the assets sold and payment for the value 
of its security; and (2) it approved the sale to OMAC that paid 
Paribas nothing on its unsecured claims while other unsecured 
claimants were paid.  
¶120 With these conclusions established, I would remand to 
the circuit court to determine an appropriate remedy consistent 
with ch. 128.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
16 
 
¶121 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER 
and 
MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN 
join 
in 
this 
concurrence.   
 
 
 
No.  2009AP1007.pdr 
 
 
 
1