Title: White v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12233
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2018

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SJC-12233 
 
RAYMOND WHITE  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
April 23, 2018. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Criminal, Appeal, Capital case.  Constitutional 
Law, Appeal. 
 
 
 
In 1972, Raymond White and a codefendant, James Hall, were 
each convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree and 
one count of armed robbery.  This court affirmed Hall's 
convictions after his direct appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Hall, 
369 Mass. 715 (1976).  White's direct appeal was never properly 
perfected, however, although he did at various times make 
efforts toward that end, sometimes pro se and sometimes 
represented by counsel.  Among other things, his counsel filed a 
petition with a single justice of this court for late filing of 
an assignment of errors and late entry of the appeal in October, 
1974, which was allowed.  But it appears that the appeal was 
never actually entered, and that no further action was taken to 
prosecute the appeal for an additional eighteen years when, in 
October, 1992, White, through new counsel, filed a motion in the 
county court seeking an order directing the Superior Court clerk 
to transmit the record to this court so that he could pursue his 
direct appeal.  The Commonwealth opposed the motion, which a 
single justice ultimately denied after a hearing, in 1994. 
 
 
Then, in July, 2014, White filed, again with a single 
justice, a pro se motion for leave to file a late notice of 
appeal, and, in September, 2014, a pro se petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, to reinstate his direct appeal.  Counsel was 
appointed to represent White on these matters, and, after 
further proceedings and a hearing, the single justice eventually 
allowed White's petition to reinstate his direct appeal in 
2 
 
December, 2016.  She also allowed his motions to file a late 
notice of appeal and to appoint appellate counsel for purposes 
of the reinstated direct appeal.  Finally, she ordered the 
Superior Court to assemble the record from the underlying 
prosecution and to make it available to this court for 
determination of the reinstated appeal. 
 
The Commonwealth now appeals from the judgment of the 
single justice reinstating the direct appeal and from her 
related orders.  We reverse. 
 
 
We agree with the basic premise of the single justice's 
decision, i.e., that if the defendant was deprived of his right 
to pursue a direct appeal as a result of the ineffective 
assistance of his trial or appellate counsel in failing to 
preserve and perfect that right, then he is entitled to a 
remedy.  See Commonwealth v. Frank, 425 Mass. 182 (1997); 
Commonwealth v. Cowie, 404 Mass. 119 (1989); Commonwealth v. 
George, 404 Mass. 1002 (1989).  See also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387 (1985).  We disagree with the single justice, however, 
as to her choice of the appropriate remedy in these 
circumstances.  The single justice was of the view that 
reinstating the direct appeal -- such that the issues would be 
considered in the first instance by this court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E -- was the best course.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth that White has a constitutionally adequate 
alternative that better fits these circumstances.  Specifically, 
he can file a motion for a new trial in the Superior Court 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001), have his issues considered on the substantive 
merits in that context, and appeal to this court in the event 
his motion is denied.1 
 
                                                 
1 We also agree with the Commonwealth that the single 
justice's reinstatement of the direct appeal is at odds with the 
earlier order of a different single justice, in 1994, denying 
White's request to have the trial court record assembled and 
transmitted to this court.  The single justice here was of the 
view that the earlier order merely denied a request for the 
transmittal of the record, and did not necessarily deny an 
actual reinstatement of the direct appeal.  We think that is too 
narrow a reading of the earlier order.  We think it was implicit 
at the very least, if not explicit, in the earlier order that 
the single justice at that time was denying reinstatement of a 
direct appeal. 
 
3 
 
 
In Cowie, 404 Mass. at 121, we considered whether a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to rule 30 (b) is a constitutionally 
adequate substitute for the right to a direct appeal that has 
been lost.  We held that it is.  That case involved a defendant 
who had been convicted of armed assault with intent to kill and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  Id. at 120.  
The defendant allegedly lost his right to a direct appeal due to 
the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, who failed to 
file a timely notice of appeal.  Id. at 121.  We held: 
 
"[P]ostconviction attack on [a] judgment through a motion 
under rule 30 (b) fully accords with due process as a 
remedy for the defendant's frustrated right of appeal.  
Rule 30 (b) does not contain a time limitation, but its 
application permits examination of the claimed errors to 
determine whether the defendant was deprived of any 
constitutionally protected rights by his failure to appeal.  
If the judge denies the motion for a new trial, then the 
defendant may appeal that denial and thus obtain appellate 
review of any issue that would have afforded the defendant 
relief had his appeal been timely filed.  Limiting a 
defendant to the postconviction remedy contained in rule 30 
(b), coupled with the right of appellate review of an 
adverse ruling thereon, does not violate the defendant's 
due process rights."  (Footnote omitted.) 
 
Id. at 122-123, and cases cited. 
 
Although the Cowie case did not involve a conviction of 
murder in the first degree, the same general reasoning applies 
here.  The fact that this is a case involving murder in the 
first degree murder and that White, had his right to a direct 
appeal not been lost, would have been entitled to plenary review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, does, however, require us to 
add certain protections to ensure that this procedure affords 
him a truly adequate substitute for a direct appeal.  We 
describe those additional protections in greater detail below. 
 
 
In Frank, 425 Mass. at 184-185, we again considered the 
options for a defendant who lost his right to a direct appeal as 
a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel.  The appeal 
in that case had been timely noticed and entered in the 
appellate court, but it was dismissed for failure to prosecute 
after the defendant's appellate counsel failed to file a brief.  
Id. at 183.  After the appeal had been dismissed, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial in the trial court, pursuant to 
rule 30 (b), as prescribed by the Cowie decision.  He filed the 
4 
 
motion without the benefit of counsel, and specifically 
requested that counsel be appointed for him.  Id. at 182.  The 
trial judge summarily denied the motion without appointing 
counsel.  Id.  The case was before us on the defendant's appeal 
from the denial of his motion for a new trial.  The court was 
thus faced with the question of how to proceed in those 
particular circumstances. 
 
 
The defendant in the Frank case clearly did not receive an 
adequate substitute for his lost direct appeal, as envisioned by 
the Cowie decision, because he was not afforded counsel to 
represent him on his motion for a new trial, whereas, on a 
direct appeal, he would have had an indisputable constitutional 
right to counsel.  We ordered that new counsel be appointed for 
him, and we gave him two choices.  We stated that the defendant 
"may wish to press his claims by prosecuting the appeal . . . or 
by a motion for a new trial if his claims might better be 
developed in such a setting, or both."  Frank, 425 Mass. at 185.  
The Frank case does not stand for the proposition that a 
defendant will always have the option of proceeding with a 
reinstated direct appeal.  It is simply an illustration of one 
circumstance where the reinstatement of a direct appeal would be 
appropriate.  The period of time between the defendant's lost 
appeal and our decision in that case was relatively short -- 
three years; the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
resulting in the loss of his direct appeal was "credible" and 
"unrebutted," the Commonwealth itself having described his 
counsel's neglect as "indefensible"; and the defendant had 
already attempted to pursue a remedial motion for a new trial 
but had been rebuffed.  Id. at 182-183. 
 
Here, by contrast, the length of time that has passed since 
White's trial (and the loss of his right to a direct appeal) is 
much longer -- forty-five years.  Moreover, it has not yet been 
definitively adjudicated that White's loss of his direct appeal 
was in fact due to any ineffective assistance of his counsel.2  
                                                 
2 Compare Commonwealth v. Frank, 425 Mass. 182, 182-183 & 
185 n.2 (1997) (Commonwealth agreed that counsel's neglect was 
"indefensible," and claim of ineffectiveness was "unrebutted"; 
defendant was allowed to proceed with reinstated direct appeal, 
while noting that result would have been different had loss of 
appellate rights been result of defendant's deliberate and 
counseled choice), with Commonwealth v. Cowie, 404 Mass. 119, 
122 n.7 (1989) (Commonwealth did not stipulate that counsel's 
actions constituted ineffective assistance; defendant required 
to proceed with motion for new trial in first instance, which 
5 
 
And finally, White has not yet attempted to rectify the 
situation through a motion for a new trial.  The better course 
in these circumstances is for White to proceed in the first 
instance by a motion for a new trial in the trial court.  This 
approach has several advantages over a reinstated direct appeal 
in the first instance.  First, it will allow for a full 
development of the factual record as to any claims that White 
wishes to pursue, including his claim that the loss of his right 
to an appeal was due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Second, it will permit the trial court judge to make a 
definitive ruling on the ineffectiveness claim.  Third, it will 
permit the parties and the judge to hone legal issues that are 
now more than forty-five years old.  Finally, it will permit the 
parties to litigate in the trial court in the first instance the 
questions that may arise as to what law will apply where the 
relevant law may have changed since the time of White's 
convictions.3 
 
 
Requiring White to proceed in this fashion, rather than 
simply reinstating his direct appeal, will not violate his 
rights or prejudice him in any way provided we impose certain 
protections for his benefit.  First, assuming the trial court 
judge determines that the lost direct appeal was in fact a 
consequence of ineffective assistance of counsel -- and not a 
choice by White -- White must be permitted to raise all claims 
that he could have raised in a direct appeal, and the judge will 
be required to consider each of his claims on the substantive 
merits, just as we would have done in a direct appeal pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Second, if the motion for a new trial 
is denied, White must have an unfettered right to appeal from 
                                                 
would permit that issue, among others, to be fleshed out).  
While there is some suggestion in the record of this case that 
the loss of White's direct appeal was the result of 
ineffectiveness of his counsel, we do not think that point has 
been sufficiently resolved to be definite.  The motion for a new 
trial will permit the issue to be fleshed out. 
 
3 We recognize, as did the single justice, that allowing a 
late appeal many years after a conviction, particularly a 
conviction of murder, is not unprecedented.  See Commonwealth v. 
Beauchamp, 424 Mass. 682, 683 (1997) (defendant convicted of 
murder in 1971 successfully petitioned single justice of this 
court for leave to file late appeal twenty-five years later, in 
1996).  For the reasons we have explained, however, it is not 
the best course in the circumstances we have here. 
 
6 
 
that ruling; he will not be required to obtain leave to appeal 
from a single justice under the gatekeeper provision (i.e., the 
last sentence) of G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  That provision applies 
only to motions that are filed "in the superior court after 
rescript" (emphasis added).4  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Therefore, in 
order to appeal, he will not be required to show that his issues 
are "new and substantial" as the statute requires, or even that 
the issues are meritorious in any way.  See Frank, 425 Mass. at 
184.  See also Commonwealth v. Goewey, 452 Mass. 399, 401-405 
(2008); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 443 
(2007) (defendant who loses right to direct appeal due to 
ineffectiveness not "required to establish any colorable 
appellate issue as a prerequisite to recovering his lost 
appellate rights").  Third, if there is an appeal, it should 
come directly to this court, as a direct appeal following the 
conviction would have, and "the standard of review [will not be] 
the more stringent one that applies 'once the [appellate] 
process has run its course.'"  Frank, supra at 185, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 637 (1997).  See 
Commonwealth v. Beauchamp, 424 Mass. 682, 685-686 (1997).  
Finally, the defendant will at that time receive the benefit of 
our plenary review of the case, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
just as he would have on a direct appeal.  These conditions 
assure that the process we are prescribing will indeed be the 
functional equivalent of, and a constitutionally permissible 
substitute for, his lost right to a direct appeal. 
 
 
We therefore reverse the judgment of the single justice.  A 
judgment shall enter in the county court denying White's G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition and the related motions.  White is then 
free to proceed in the Superior Court with a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) on the terms and 
conditions we have stated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Kathryn E. Leary, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Richard L. Goldman for the petitioner. 
                                                 
4 The "rescript" referred to in the statute is the 
disposition of a capital defendant's direct appeal by this 
court.  See Mass. R. A. P. 1 (c), as amended, 454 Mass. 1601 
(2009) (defining "rescript" as "the order, direction, or mandate 
of the appellate court disposing of the appeal").  Because White 
has not yet had a direct appeal, there has, of course, never 
been any rescript.