Title: Commonwealth v. Wilkerson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12124
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12124 
 
COMMONWEALTH  v.  WILLIE WILKERSON. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     January 10, 2020. - November 4, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Subornation of Perjury.  Perjury.  Cellular 
Telephone.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Witness, Expert.  
Evidence, Expert opinion, Joint venturer.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Warrant, 
Affidavit, Trial of indictments together, Instructions to 
jury, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 27, 2012, and August 2, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth 
J. Fishman, J.; the cases were tried before Douglas H. Wilkins, 
J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on October 14, 2016, was 
considered by him. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Stephanie Martin Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree in the shooting death of twenty-three year old 
Kristopher Rosa, a long-time rival of one of the defendant's 
high school friends.2  The defendant's participation in the 
shooting came to light almost two years after the event, when 
his then girlfriend contacted police.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction.  He also claims error in the denial of a motion to 
suppress cell site location data (CSLI) and the admission of 
that data at trial,3 error in the introduction of hearsay 
statements by his alleged coventurer and in the exclusion of 
other evidence concerning that coventurer, misjoinder of 
charges, abuse of discretion in the judge's decision not to 
provide certain jury instructions, and improprieties in the 
prosecutor's closing argument.  In addition, the defendant asks 
us to use our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a 
new trial.  We affirm the convictions and decline to exercise 
                     
 
2 The defendant also was convicted of attempting to suborn 
perjury. 
 
 
3 "Cell[] site location information (CSLI) refers to a 
cellular telephone service record or records that contain 
information identifying the base station towers and sectors that 
receive transmissions from a [cellular] telephone." (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 
852, 853 n.2 (2015). 
3 
 
 
our authority to reduce the verdict or order a new trial 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
viewing them in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. 
 
1.  Coconspirator's dispute with victim.  The victim's 
death arose from a long-running antagonism between him and 
Rhandisyn Lawrence, a high school friend of the defendant and 
his brother, Keith.  This conflict began in high school and 
appears to have centered on Lawrence's and the victim's 
relationships with Davina Mendes.  At different times while they 
were high school students, Mendes dated both Lawrence and the 
victim; she later settled into a relationship with the victim 
and they had a child together. 
 
Conflict between the victim and Lawrence devolved into 
physical violence on at least three occasions during and after 
their high school years.  The last of these incidents took place 
in April of 2011, five months before the shooting, when the 
victim was twenty-three years old.  Mendes recounted how she, 
the victim, and a friend drove to Lawrence's home.  The victim 
and the friend went into the house while she waited in the 
vehicle.  Approximately thirty minutes later, Lawrence came 
outside with a bloody face and a broken jaw.  He apologized to 
her through the window of the vehicle; Mendes did not know the 
reason for the apology. 
4 
 
 
 
Later that summer, Mendes had unpleasant exchanges with 
Lawrence through an Internet messaging application and in an in-
person encounter at the store where he worked.  The first time 
she told the victim about the encounter, he did not appear to 
react; the second time she told the victim about the encounter, 
he threw a rock through the rear window of Lawrence's gray 
Volvo.  The police were called, but Lawrence refused to speak 
with them when they arrived to see the smashed window and other 
damage to the body of the vehicle.  This incident took place 
approximately six days before the shooting. 
 
2.  The shooting.  On September 19, 2011, at approximately 
9:15 P.M., two Avon firefighters saw a gray Volvo parked on the 
side of the road with its lights off, not far from the victim's 
home.  In the driver's seat, they saw a man speaking on his 
cellular telephone; they could see the side of his face from the 
light of the telephone on his cheek. 
 
At around the same time, the victim and Mendes left the 
victim's house.  They were on their way to the victim's mother's 
house for dinner.  They left their infant son with the victim's 
father.  In the driveway, the victim saw something that made him 
demand the keys to the vehicle from Mendes; he told her to hurry 
into the vehicle and he went to the driver's side. 
 
Mendes then noticed Lawrence's gray Volvo, which she 
recognized from the time when she had dated him, drive by and 
5 
 
 
then make a U-turn.  The victim made a U-turn in order to follow 
the Volvo.  The victim and Mendes came upon the Volvo backed 
into a driveway with its lights off.  Having just passed it, 
they made another U-turn and parked diagonally, facing 
Lawrence's vehicle.  Mendes saw Lawrence smirk as he pulled into 
the road in front of them. 
 
As the victim again began to follow the Volvo, shots from 
behind shattered the back window.  Mendes ducked her head, as 
the victim urged her to do, but saw the victim look in the 
rearview mirror and curse.  She heard a second volley of shots, 
this time from the driver's side of the vehicle, and saw the 
victim bleeding from his mouth.  Because his foot was still on 
the accelerator, she had to seize the wheel to maneuver the 
vehicle around the gray Volvo, which appeared to be braking.  
Climbing onto the victim's lap, she drove to the local hospital.  
That night, the victim was pronounced dead from a gunshot wound 
to his chest. 
 
3.  The investigation.  At the scene, police recovered six 
shell casings from the road, spread over a distance of 
approximately seventy yards.  The next morning, police 
interviewed Lawrence, seized the Volvo, and obtained his 
permission to view information from his cellular telephone.  
That evening, they interviewed the defendant at the home he 
shared with his girlfriend, Amanda Burgess.  He told them that 
6 
 
 
he had been at his apartment the previous evening taking care of 
her two year old son.  He said that he had been using a 
telephone registered to Burgess, and that Lawrence had been to 
his apartment for approximately fifteen minutes that evening at 
around 8:30 P.M.  He agreed that he also spoke by telephone with 
Lawrence at least twice that evening, once at approximately 
8 P.M. and again shortly after 9 P.M. 
 
4.  Burgess's statements and testimony.  Initially, Burgess 
told police she and the defendant had been together the entire 
evening of the shooting.  In the weeks after the shooting, she 
received a subpoena to testify before the grand jury.  The 
defendant told her to repeat what she had told the police.  
Prior to her testimony, police confronted Burgess with records 
from her cellular telephone service provider tending to show the 
defendant had left their apartment on the evening of the 
shooting, and Burgess conceded to the police, and to the grand 
jury, that she and the defendant had not been together 
throughout the evening. 
 
In early 2013, Burgess was charged with misleading the 
police.  She was incarcerated prior to trial for approximately 
seventy days, while she was pregnant with her second child, 
because she was unable to pay the bail.  Her bail was posted one 
week before she gave birth.  At that point, she had ended her 
romantic relationship with the defendant because she believed he 
7 
 
 
had cheated on her with another woman.  After entering into an 
immunity agreement, she testified at the defendant's trial to 
the following. 
 
Lawrence began visiting the defendant's and her apartment 
more frequently shortly before the shooting.  On September 19, 
2011, the night of the shooting, the defendant told her that he 
could not pick her up from work as planned, because but had to 
go with Lawrence "to take care of something."  Her coworker, 
Heather Farris, drove her to the defendant's mother's house, 
where the defendant had left her son.  She was driving home with 
Farris, while talking on the telephone with the defendant, when 
Burgess saw him drive by in the front passenger seat of a gray 
Volvo going the opposite direction.  Lawrence was driving.  She 
believed that they "beeped" at them as the Volvo continued in 
the opposite direction, towards Avon. 
 
After she picked up her son, Burgess repeatedly tried to 
call the defendant; sometimes she spoke with him, and some of 
her calls went unanswered.  When she reached the defendant at 
some point after 9:30 P.M., he told her that "he took care of 
what he had to take care of" and "did what he had to do."  The 
defendant's sister drove Burgess home; as Burgess arrived at her 
apartment, she saw the defendant sitting on the front stairs and 
Lawrence's Volvo driving away.  After the defendant's sister 
left, she saw the defendant take a black gun from his waistband 
8 
 
 
and put it under the mattress.  He said again that he "did what 
[he] had to do."  Sometime later, he told her that he "wasn't 
sure if he killed [the victim] or not because the car was still 
rolling" after he approached it and shot through the rear and 
side windows. 
 
The next morning, Burgess noticed the defendant searching 
the Internet for news about a shooting in Avon.  Forensic 
analysis of the laptop computer later revealed searches for 
"Avon shooting," and "Avon man dead."  Burgess called her aunt, 
who brought a vehicle and dropped off the defendant at his 
father's home in the Dorchester section of Boston.  Before the 
defendant left, Burgess saw him retrieve the gun from under the 
mattress and place it in a backpack, which he took with him.  
Burgess never saw the gun again.  When the defendant returned 
from his father's home later that night, he had changed clothes.  
He explained that he had changed because he got gasoline on his 
shirt, which "gets rid of the gunpowder."  He told Burgess to 
tell anyone who asked that they had been together all evening on 
the evening the victim was killed. 
 
5.  CSLI evidence.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), the 
Commonwealth requested forty-eight hours of CSLI for the 
cellular telephone that the defendant was using; the prosecutor 
received data for a thirty-four hour period.  Before trial, the 
defendant moved to suppress the CSLI evidence; the trial judge 
9 
 
 
ordered suppressed all of the CSLI evidence from the defendant's 
telephone except for a three-hour period between 8 P.M. and 
11 P.M on September 19, 2011, covering the period approximately 
ninety minutes before and ninety minutes after the shooting.  
The Commonwealth also introduced CSLI evidence from Lawrence's 
cellular telephone. 
 
a.  CSLI data.  Between 8:23 P.M. and 8:30 P.M. on 
September 19, 2011, the defendant's cellular telephone4 connected 
four times to a cellular tower in Taunton, the city where the 
defendant and Burgess lived.  At 8:43 P.M., the CLSI records 
showed a thirty-nine second call that began by connecting to a 
cellular tower in Taunton, and ended while connected to a tower 
in Raynham.  Raynham is north of Taunton, in the general 
direction that the defendant would have been traveling if he had 
been driving from Taunton toward Avon. 
 
Between 9:18 P.M. and 9:39 P.M., the defendant's cellular 
telephone connected eight times to a cellular tower near Avon.  
The Commonwealth's expert introduced maps showing that this 
tower was near the scene of the shooting, and that the specific 
antenna that connected to the defendant's telephone generally 
                     
 
4 As mentioned, this cellular telephone was registered to 
Burgess, but it is not disputed that the defendant used it often 
and was in possession of it on the evening of the shooting. 
10 
 
 
pointed from the tower toward the scene.5  Among the calls that 
connected to the Avon tower was a twelve-minute call to 
Lawrence, beginning at 9:19 P.M.  That call was twice 
interrupted by incoming but unanswered calls from Burgess, 
consistent with her testimony that she had been unable to reach 
the defendant for a period of time while she was driving with 
the defendant's sister. 
 
The CLSI records show a 9:47 P.M. call that connected to a 
tower in Bridgewater, and a 9:56 P.M. call that connected to a 
tower in Raynham.  As both Bridgewater and Raynham lie between 
Avon and Taunton, these calls are consistent with the 
Commonwealth's theory that the defendant was returning from Avon 
to his home in Taunton.  After 10:08 P.M., the CSLI records 
indicate that the defendant's telephone connected three times to 
the same cellular tower in Taunton as did the first calls in the 
record introduced at trial. 
 
In sum, the CSLI data is consistent with a round trip drive 
from the defendant's apartment in Taunton to the scene of the 
shooting in Avon -- at the time of the shooting -- and back to 
Taunton. 
                     
 
5 Within this same period, the defendant's telephone also 
connected once with a different tower in Avon.  While it was 
further away, that tower connection nonetheless essentially was 
consistent with the defendant being at or near the scene of the 
shooting in Avon. 
11 
 
 
 
b.  CSLI from Lawrence's telephone.  The Commonwealth also 
introduced CSLI call records from Lawrence's cellular telephone.  
Between 4:30 P.M. and 7 P.M. on September 19, 2011, Lawrence 
called the defendant four times; each of these calls connected 
to a cellular tower in Taunton.  At 9:18 P.M. and 9:19 P.M., 
Lawrence's telephone records show a nineteen-second call and a 
twelve-minute call from the defendant.  Both connected to towers 
just south of the scene of the shooting, and to antennae that 
pointed from the respective towers toward the scene.  A 
9:53 P.M. call connected between Lawrence's telephone and a 
tower in Raynham, and a 10:08 P.M. call connected between 
Lawrence's telephone and a tower in Taunton.  Thus, CSLI data 
from Lawrence's cellular telephone, as with information from the 
defendant's telephone, is consistent with a round trip drive 
from Taunton to Avon and back. 
 
6.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation and an attempt to suborn perjury.6  He timely filed 
a notice of appeal.  While his appeal was pending before this 
court, he was allowed a stay so that he could pursue a motion 
                     
 
6 At a separate trial, Lawrence had been acquitted of 
charges of murder in the first degree on a theory of joint 
venture. 
12 
 
 
for a new trial in the Superior Court.  The denial of that 
motion has been consolidated with his direct appeal. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Admission of CSLI.  Collecting more than 
six hours of CSLI data invades a defendant's reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and, therefore, under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, requires a warrant 
supported by a showing of probable cause.  See Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018); Commonwealth v. 
Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 858 (2015). 
 
When we first imposed the warrant requirement for CSLI 
data, we determined that the imposition constituted a new rule 
under the Teague-Bray framework.  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 
Mass. 230, 257 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015) 
and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 
296, 301 (1990) (adopting retroactivity analysis announced in 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 [1989]).  Thus, the warrant 
requirement applied both to new cases and also to those cases, 
like this one, that were pending on direct appeal when 
Augustine I, supra, was decided.  For cases on direct review, 
the Commonwealth already had been required, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d), to make a lesser showing to obtain CSLI data.7  
                     
7 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), "A court order for 
disclosure . . . may be issued by any court that is a court of 
13 
 
 
Therefore, we retroactively have examined the supporting 
affidavit to determine whether it also might support a 
determination of probable cause.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 543–544 (2019); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 
472 Mass. 448, 453 (2015) (Augustine II), citing Augustine I, 
467 Mass. at 256. 
 
The defendant claims that the judge's decision to permit 
the admission of CSLI data was erroneous for three reasons.  
First, he argues that if unreliable hearsay is excised properly 
from the underlying affidavit, no period of CSLI data was 
supported by probable cause.  Second, he argues that if there 
was not probable cause to search the entire thirty-four hours of 
CSLI data, it was error for the judge to allow introduction of 
the three-hour period surrounding the shooting, because the 
proper measure of the constitutional intrusion is the entirety 
of the data collected by the government.  Finally, the defendant 
contends that the CSLI should not have been admitted absent a 
Daubert-Lanigan hearing in order to test the reliability of the 
CSLI data and to qualify the testifying witness as an expert.  
                     
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental 
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . .records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation" (emphasis omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 236 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015) 
and 472 Mass. 448 (2015) (standard under 18 U.S.C. § 2703[d] is 
less than probable cause). 
14 
 
 
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-
595(1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994).  
Examining these arguments, we conclude that there was no error 
in the introduction of the CSLI evidence in this case. 
 
a.  Severance.  We first address the defendant's argument 
against severance of the three-hour period.  The defendant 
argues that because a search, and hence a potential 
constitutional violation, occurs when the government receives 
the data, if there was not probable cause for the whole period, 
the entirety of the CSLI should have been suppressed. 
 
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we "accept the judge's 
subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an 
independent review of his [or her] ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law."  Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 543, quoting 
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 587 (2016).  We make an 
"independent determination of the correctness of the judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."  
Hobbs, supra, quoting White, supra. 
 
The collection of extended CSLI data raises significant 
constitutional concerns.  Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 549, citing 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, and Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 
248-249.  We have recognized that determining the precise time 
period for which CSLI data is supported by probable cause is a 
difficult and fact-intensive inquiry.  Hobbs, supra.  Under the 
15 
 
 
warrant requirement imposed by Augustine I, judges should permit 
introduction of only that period of time for which there is 
probable cause to believe "that a particularly described offense 
has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and that the 
[CSLI being sought] will produce evidence of such offense or 
will aid in the apprehension of a person who the applicant has 
probable cause to believe has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit such offense."  Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 256, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 825 (2009).  
Where there is little question that an offense has been 
committed and the whereabouts of the suspect are known, the 
critical question often will be whether "there is a sufficient 
nexus between the criminal activity for which probable cause has 
been established and the physical location of the cell phone 
recorded by the CSLI . . . at least for the time and place of 
the criminal activity."  See Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 547. 
 
In Hobbs, supra at 549-550, we addressed the question 
raised by the defendant here:  where only a portion of the 
period of the data received by the government is supported by 
probable cause, should the entirety of the CSLI data obtained 
through an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) be suppressed?  
On the facts of that case, we answered that complete suppression 
was not necessary.  "[W]here the requisite nexus for probable 
cause clearly exists for a reasonable period of time 
16 
 
 
encompassing the commission of and flight from the crime, as 
well as the defendant's immediate apprehension, the CSLI for 
this period of time need not be suppressed so long as the CSLI 
for which there is not the requisite nexus to the crime is not 
relied on or otherwise exploited by the Commonwealth at trial" 
[footnote omitted].  Id. at 550. 
 
In reaching this decision, we relied on Commonwealth v. 
Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 524-525 (2017), a case in which we 
sanctioned the admission of certain relevant text messages, 
notwithstanding an insufficiently particular warrant.  Both 
Hobbs and Holley are consistent with analogs from the physical 
world, which allow severance of the valid portion of a search 
warrant where a part of the warrant is insufficiently particular 
or not supported by probable cause.  See Commonwealth v. Lett, 
393 Mass. 141, 144–145 (1984), quoting United States v. 
Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 
U.S. 950 (1984) ("the infirmity of part of a warrant requires 
the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part of the 
warrant . . . but does not require the suppression of anything 
described in the valid portions of the warrant"); Lett, supra at 
145 ("The partial suppression remedy for a partially invalid 
warrant, we believe, effects a pragmatic balance between the 
deterrent effect of suppression and the cost to society of 
excluding probative evidence").  See also Aday v. Superior Court 
17 
 
 
of Alameda County, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 797 (1961) (seminal case on 
severance); 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(f), at 814-
815 (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2019) (endorsing Aday rule). 
 
Importantly, this severance doctrine is not without limits.  
"It is beyond doubt that all evidence seized pursuant to a 
general warrant must be suppressed.  The cost to society of 
sanctioning the use of general warrants -- abhorrence for which 
gave birth to the Fourth Amendment -- is intolerable by any 
measure."  Lett, 393 Mass. at 145-146, quoting United States v. 
Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir. 1982).  This is equally 
true in the context of digital location tracking.  "Just as 
police are not permitted to rummage unrestrained through one's 
home, so too constitutional safeguards prevent warrantless 
rummaging through the complex digital trails and location 
records created by merely participating in modern society." 
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493, 499 (2020).  Thus, 
where a warrant so lacks particularity or is so overbroad that 
it begins to resemble a general warrant, total suppression is 
required.  See Lett, supra; LaFave, supra at § 4.6(f), at 816. 
 
We need not decide here how overbroad a request for CSLI 
must be in order for total suppression to be appropriate.  The 
forty-eight hours requested, and the thirty-four hours obtained 
here, are not so overbroad on the facts of this case so as to be 
akin to a general warrant.  In addition, nothing in the record 
18 
 
 
suggests that the Commonwealth relied upon or exploited the CSLI 
data that was not admitted.  See Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 550.  
Indeed, the round-trip journey between Taunton and Avon revealed 
by the CSLI fits squarely within the language used in Hobbs; it 
represents "a reasonable period of time encompassing the 
commission of and flight from the crime."  Id.  Because those 
three hours were severable, we discern no abuse of discretion in 
their admission. 
 
The defendant is correct that, when determining whether a 
search has occurred, the relevant inquiry is the amount of data 
that the government receives, not that which it ultimately seeks 
to introduce at trial.  McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 499; Estabrook, 
472 Mass. at 858-859 ("in terms of reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the salient consideration is the length of time for 
which a person's CSLI is requested, not the time covered by the 
person's CSLI that the Commonwealth ultimately seeks to use as 
evidence at trial").  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 
(evaluating 127 days of CSLI data, not four days that were 
admitted at trial, in determining that government access to CSLI 
data constituted search in constitutional sense). 
 
Here, however, the proper inquiry is not whether a search 
occurred; our holding in Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 858, makes 
clear that one did.  Rather, the proper question is whether that 
search was supported by probable cause and was reasonable under 
19 
 
 
the circumstances.  Where the Commonwealth followed the 
applicable law at the time of this pre-Augustine search, if the 
three-hour period admitted at trial was supported by probable 
clause, there was no error. 
 
b.  Probable cause.  Having determined that the three-hour 
period admitted against the defendant is severable, we still 
must ensure that a search of those three hours was supported by 
probable cause.  Our inquiry is confined to the four corners of 
the affidavit submitted in support of the motion for an order 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  See Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 544; 
Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 386 (2018).  Review of such an 
affidavit is de novo, and we consider it "as a whole and in a 
commonsense and realistic fashion; inferences drawn from the 
affidavit need only be reasonable, not required."  Augustine II, 
472 Mass. at 455, quoting Connolly, 454 Mass. at 813. 
 
The defendant contends that the judge did not excise 
unreliable hearsay from the affidavit.  Individuals supplying 
information to the affiant for a search warrant must meet the 
strictures of the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test; the affidavit 
must demonstrate both that his or her information is grounded in 
a basis of knowledge, and also that it is reliable.  See 
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 374-375 (1985).  See also 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); J.A. Grasso, Jr., & C.M. 
20 
 
 
McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 10-3 
(2017).  When a witness, victim, or officer is identified by 
name in an affidavit, that fact weighs towards the witness's 
reliability.  See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 657 
(2019); Commonwealth v. Beliard, 443 Mass. 79, 85 (2004); 
Commonwealth, v. Alvarez, 422 Mass. 198, 203 (1996).  See also 
Grasso & McEvoy, supra at § 10-5[a][1], collecting cases ("Named 
informants or concerned citizens are presumed to be reliable and 
the information they provide credible"). 
 
The affidavit here supplied the following facts.  Mendes 
gave an account of the shooting essentially consistent with her 
trial testimony, described supra.  She was an eyewitness to 
these events, thus satisfying the basis-of-knowledge 
requirement.  She is named and the narrative is sufficiently 
detailed so as to support her veracity.  Her account included 
seeing Lawrence drive by the victim's home, the victim's 
decision to follow him in their vehicle, Lawrence "laugh[ing] at 
them" as he pulled his vehicle out of the driveway in front of 
the victim's house, and the subsequent shooting.  This sequence 
of events gives rise to the reasonable inference that the attack 
was coordinated between Lawrence and the shooter. 
 
Mendes also told officers that, prior to the shooting, the 
victim had been receiving threatening calls from the defendant 
and his brother, including a statement that they were not "just 
21 
 
 
going to beat him up like he did to [Lawrence]."  Mendes's 
dating relationship with the victim is, by reasonable inference, 
the basis of this knowledge.  It is reasonable to assume either 
that he relayed these conversations to her or that she was 
present for them.8  Again, the fact that she is named and the 
specificity of the information she supplied supports her 
credibility.  The threatening telephone calls are properly 
considered in the probable cause analysis.9 
 
The affiant interviewed two named firefighters, who 
described seeing a Hispanic male sitting in a Volvo near the 
victim's residence fifteen minutes before the shooting.  The 
vehicle's lights were off, and the man was talking on his 
cellular telephone.  These observations also properly are 
considered. 
                     
8 Part of the defendant's argument is that these statements 
were relayed in a chain of hearsay.  In such circumstances, 
"each link must be tested and found reliable under Aguilar-
Spinelli."  Commonwealth v. Zorn, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 228, 233 
(2006).  The victim had an adequate basis for the content of the 
calls, as they were directed to him, and his identity is known, 
making him presumptively reliable. 
 
9 These specific statements, made by a specific named 
witness, with an inferable basis of knowledge, are readily 
distinguishable from the vague statement in the affidavit that 
"witnesses have told investigators that they do not believe 
that . . . Lawrence knows anyone who would be willing to 
threaten or harm anyone on his behalf other than [the defendant] 
and Keith Wilkerson."  This later statement does not meet the 
threshold for either basis of knowledge or reliability, and we 
do not consider it. 
22 
 
 
 
Finally, Lawrence gave an interview to police in which he 
confirmed that a twelve-minute call in the call log of his 
cellar telephone, at 9:19 P.M., was to the defendant.10  The 
affidavit submitted in support of the motion for a 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d) order states that the police had received a call for 
"shots fired" at approximately 9:40 P.M.  Thus, Lawrence was on 
the telephone with the defendant between ten and twenty minutes 
prior to the shooting. 
 
Limited to these facts, we examine the search warrant 
application to determine whether it was supported by probable 
cause for the relevant three-hour period.  Doing so involves a 
two-part inquiry.  We ask whether "(1) the magistrate had a 
substantial basis to conclude that a particularly described 
offense has been, is being, or is about to be committed; and 
(2) the CSLI being sought will produce evidence of such offense 
or will aid in the apprehension of a person who the applicant 
has probable cause to believe has committed . . . such offense."  
Robertson, 480 Mass. at 387, citing Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 870. 
 
Here, there is no question that an offense was committed; 
the affidavit describes the shooting in detail.  The more 
difficult question is whether the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that the defendant's CSLI would produce 
                     
10 The affidavit says the call log referenced 9:19 P.M., but 
does not say whether the call started or ended at that time. 
23 
 
 
evidence of that offense.  "[T]he location of a suspect's cell 
phone at the time of the criminal activity provides evidence 
directly related to his or her participation, or lack thereof, 
in the criminal activity, and the location of the cell phone at 
that time can reasonably be expected to be found in the CSLI 
records requested."  Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 547.  Therefore, for 
the CSLI to produce evidence of the offense, the affidavit must 
show probable cause that the defendant was directly involved in 
the shooting, either as the shooter or as some type of 
accomplice. 
 
Taken together, we conclude that the element of 
coordination inherent in the shooting as described, the 
defendant's previous threats to the victim, and the telephone 
call to the defendant from Lawrence minutes before the 
coordinated attack -- made while Lawrence was stopped on the 
side of the road near the victim's home -- establishes probable 
cause to believe that the defendant was the shooter or otherwise 
involved in the commission of the crime.  Therefore, there was 
no error in the introduction of the three hours of CSLI at 
trial, because the three-hour period of CSLI data admitted was 
supported by probable cause. 
 
c.  Expert testimony.  The defendant argues that the judge 
erred in not conducting, sua sponte, a Daubert-Lanigan hearing 
to test the scientific validity and reliability of the CSLI 
24 
 
 
evidence before it was introduced.  While the defendant did move 
to exclude the CSLI and testimony about it through motions in 
limine that raised the issue of its scientific reliability, he 
did not request an evidentiary hearing on the matter.  Where a 
defendant does not request a Daubert-Lanigan hearing to 
challenge the general scientific reliability of the methodology 
prior to trial, the issue is waived on appeal.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 328 (2015), overruled on other grounds 
by Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454 (2019) ("Because 
the defendant failed to request a Daubert–Lanigan hearing to 
establish the reliability of the methodology underlying [the 
expert's] testimony, we do not consider the matter further").  
See also Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 349 (2015). 
 
Nonetheless, regardless of whether such a hearing is held, 
a trial judge has an important responsibility as the gatekeeper 
of the evidence; before a witness may testify as an expert, the 
judge must make "the threshold determination that the expert 
opinion is sufficiently reliable to go before the jury."  
Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 417 (2014), citing 
Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761–762 (2010).  
"Reliability may be established either by demonstrating that the 
principles and methods generally are accepted in the relevant 
scientific community or by applying the factors set forth in the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert," 509 U.S. at 
25 
 
 
592–594.  Hoose, supra at 416-417, citing Commonwealth v. 
Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640–641 (2005). 
 
On appeal, the defendant also challenges the qualifications 
of the Commonwealth's CSLI experts, Raymond MacDonald and 
Trooper Brian Tully.  A judge need not explicitly qualify an 
expert as such in open court, and the better practice is not to 
do so.  See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 184 
(1996).  Wherever the hearing is conducted, "[t]he crucial issue 
in determining whether a witness is qualified to give an expert 
opinion, is whether the witness has sufficient education, 
training, experience and familiarity with the subject matter of 
the testimony" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 298 (2004). 
 
Ruling on the defendant's motion in limine, the judge 
likely allowed testimony, as set forth in the affidavit, that 
CSLI data "could identify which tower(s) were used during a 
call, the location of those towers, and the fact that a phone 
must be within the coverage area of a tower in order to connect 
with that tower."11  He allowed defense counsel on cross-
                     
11 The defendant's motion to exclude CSLI testimony was 
endorsed with the statement "Denied, except as stated in open 
court."  Unfortunately, the hearing was not recorded.  The 
approximate contours of the judge's evidentiary ruling are based 
on a reconstruction of the record.  We emphasize that, 
particularly in cases of serious crimes, a contemporaneous 
record of the proceedings must be made. 
26 
 
 
examination to elicit scientific evidence tending to cast doubt 
on the precision of any locational inference to be drawn from a 
particular tower connection.  This delineation essentially is 
consistent with the way in which the judge ruled on objections 
at trial. 
 
We discern no abuse of discretion in the expert opinion 
testimony given in this case.  Tully testified to his extensive 
training in applying CSLI records to criminal investigations.  
Raymond similarly testified to fourteen years of experience and 
technical training in wireless cellular telephone technology.  
This training was adequate to support the limited scope of the 
experts' opinion testimony.  It was not an abuse of discretion 
to allow them to testify to the well-established facts that 
cellular telephones connect to towers via radio signals, that 
CSLI records indicate the tower to which a particular cellular 
telephone connected for a particular call, and that the device 
must be within the coverage area of the tower in order to 
connect.  See Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 237-239 (describing this 
basic functionality). 
 
2.  Lawrence's statements as coventurer.  The defendant 
also challenges part of Burgess's testimony in which she relayed 
statements made by Lawrence a few days prior to the shooting.  
On the first day that the prosecutor attempted to introduce the 
statements, the judge sustained the defendant's objection 
27 
 
 
because there was insufficient evidence of a joint venture.  
After a sidebar discussion the following day, the judge 
determined that a sufficient foundation had been established, 
and allowed these statements to be admitted under the hearsay 
exception for statements by joint venturers.  Before they were 
introduced, the judge properly instructed the jury, as the 
defendant requested, regarding the findings that they would be 
required to make before they could consider the statements 
against the defendant; the judge gave a more detailed 
instruction on statements by joint venturers in his final 
charge. 
 
According to Burgess, Lawrence came to the house she shared 
with the defendant and told the defendant that the victim had 
beaten him and had smashed the window of his vehicle, and that 
he and the defendant "needed to take care of what they needed to 
take care of and handle it."  Sometime later (prior to the 
shooting), Burgess was present for a telephone call between 
Lawrence and the defendant.  While she could hear only the 
defendant's side of the conversation, she gathered that Lawrence 
was going to pick him up and that they were going to "take care 
of what they needed to do."  After a second call between the 
defendant and Lawrence, the defendant told Burgess that "he 
shouldn't do it.  And he didn't want to do it."  She thought 
28 
 
 
that "[h]e didn't seem like he wanted to do it," and told him 
that he "shouldn't do it" and "should stay out of it." 
 
Generally, "[o]ut-of-court statements by joint venturers 
are admissible against the others if the statements are made 
during the pendency of the criminal enterprise and in 
furtherance of it."  Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 
520–521 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 8 
(2014).  In order for such statements to be admissible, "the 
judge must make a preliminary determination, based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, other than the out-of-court 
statement itself, that a joint venture existed between the 
declarant and the defendant and that the statement was made in 
furtherance of that venture."  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 
22, 37 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 426 
(2012). 
 
If the judge determines that it is admissible, and after 
the evidence is introduced, before they may consider the 
statement, the jury "first [must] make their own independent 
determination, again based on a preponderance of the evidence 
other than the statement itself, that a joint venture existed 
and that the statement was made in furtherance thereof."  Rakes, 
supra.  "We view the evidence presented to support the existence 
of a joint venture in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, recognizing also that the venture may be proved by 
29 
 
 
circumstantial evidence" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Winquist, 474 Mass. at 521.  We review the judge's decision for 
an abuse of discretion.  Rakes, supra at 37; Winquist, supra. 
 
While, ordinarily, a coventurer's statements must be made 
during an existing conspiracy or joint venture, "[s]tatements 
made prior to the formation of a joint venture may be admissible 
if they were made in furtherance of a joint venture that formed 
thereafter."  Carriere, 470 Mass. at 10–11.  See Rakes, 478 
Mass. at 38–39 ("statements probative of the declarant's intent 
to enter into a joint venture with the defendant to commit a 
crime may be admitted under the joint venture exception"); 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 248 (2000) ("Matters 
surrounding the history of the conspiracy, including statements 
of coconspirators, may be admissible even if they predate the 
conspiracy"); Commonwealth v. Rankins, 429 Mass. 470, 474 (1999) 
("The date on which a conspiracy allegedly began is not an 
absolute bar to looking at earlier events that have a bearing on 
the existence of the conspiracy"). 
 
Lawrence's statements, although vague, tended to show that 
he was trying to recruit the defendant, and therefore were made 
"in furtherance of a joint venture that formed thereafter."  
Carriere, 470 Mass. at 11.  The defendant's hesitance, which 
tends to indicate a lack of agreement at the time of the 
telephone calls, is not dispositive as to whether the statements 
30 
 
 
were admissible.  Rather, we conclude that they fall within the 
exception, delineated supra, for the admission of relevant 
statements that predate the formation of a joint venture.  See 
Carriere, 470 Mass. at 10–11; McLaughlin, 431 Mass. at 248.  
Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing 
these statements to be presented to the jury. 
 
3.  Joinder of suborning perjury charge.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred by allowing the charges against 
him -- murder and suborning perjury -- to be joined for trial 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (3), 378 Mass. 859 (1979).  
By rule, joinder "is appropriate where offenses are related, 
unless joinder 'is not in the best interests of justice.'"  
Commonwealth v. Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 519 (2017), quoting Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (3).  For the purposes of joinder, offenses 
are related "if they are based on the same criminal conduct or 
series of criminal episodes connected together or constituting 
parts of a single scheme or plan."  Mendez, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 393 (2015).  In making 
a determination whether offenses are related, we consider 
"factual similarities, closeness of time and space, and 'whether 
evidence of the other offenses would be admissible in separate 
trials on each offense.'"  Hernandez, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 180 (2005). 
31 
 
 
 
On appeal, "[t]he defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the offenses were unrelated, and that 
prejudice from joinder was so compelling that it prevented him 
from obtaining a fair trial."  Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 
245, 260 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 
346 (1998).  We review for an abuse of discretion.  Hernandez, 
473 Mass. at 393. 
 
Here, the charges were adequately connected such that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing them to be 
joined.  There is an inherent connection between an offense 
committed and statements made in an effort to cover up the 
commission of the crime.  A significant portion of the evidence 
introduced, which would have been needed to convict the 
defendant in separate trials, would have been admissible at both 
trials.  See Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 680 (2001) 
(joinder was proper where evidence of perjury would be 
admissible in murder trial to show consciousness of guilt, and 
evidence of involvement in murder was admissible on perjury 
charge to show materiality).  Because we cannot say that any 
prejudice from the joinder was so great that the defendant was 
prevented from obtaining a fair trial, he has not met his burden 
to establish an abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to 
allow the joinder. 
32 
 
 
 
4.  "Missing witness" and Bowden instructions.  The 
defendant argues prejudicial error in the judge's decisions not 
to give "missing witness" and Bowden instructions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). 
 
a.  "Missing witness" instruction.  The defense maintains 
that the Commonwealth's failure to call Heather Farris, who 
drove Burgess home from work on the day of the shooting, 
warranted a "missing witness" instruction.  Farris's testimony, 
presumably, either would have corroborated or undercut Burgess's 
testimony that she saw the defendant and Lawrence together in 
the gray Volvo, driving toward the scene of the shooting. 
 
A missing witness instruction permits the jury, if they 
think it reasonable under the circumstances, to infer that the 
uncalled witness would have given testimony unfavorable to the 
party that could have, but did not, call that witness.  
Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 720 (2016).  This 
instruction is appropriately given "when a party 'has knowledge 
of a person who can be located and brought forward, who is 
friendly to, or at least not hostilely disposed toward, the 
party, and who can be expected to give testimony of distinct 
importance to the case,' and the party without explanation, 
fails to call the person as a witness."  Id. at 720-721, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Saletino, 449 Mass. 657, 667 (2007).  Because 
such an instruction can be a powerful influence on the jury, a 
33 
 
 
missing witness instruction should be provided "only in clear 
cases, and with caution."  Williams, supra at 721, quoting 
Salentino, supra at 668. 
 
The decision whether to give a missing witness instruction 
is committed to the "discretion of the trial judge, and will not 
be reversed unless the decision was manifestly unreasonable."  
Saletino, 449 Mass. at 667, citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 
Mass. 146, 151 (1999). 
 
There is a critical distinction between instances where a 
judge gives a proper missing witness instruction and then allows 
counsel to argue for an adverse inference due to a missing 
witness -- that the uncalled witness would testify in a way 
harmful to the party that did not call them -- and those cases 
where defense counsel merely questions the adequacy of the 
Commonwealth's case as it was presented at trial.  See Saletino, 
449 Mass. at 672 ("Nothing we say today prohibits a defense 
attorney from arguing to the jury, in a case where there is no 
missing witness instruction, that the Commonwealth has not 
produced sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt. . . . A defendant has wide latitude in every 
case to argue that the Commonwealth has failed to present 
sufficient evidence and, in this sense, that there is an 
'absence' of proof or that evidence is 'missing'"). 
34 
 
 
 
We conclude that it was certainly not manifestly 
unreasonable for the judge to decline to give a missing witness 
instruction in this case.  Farris's testimony, while it could 
have corroborated a portion of Burgess's account, was not "of 
distinct importance to the case" (citation omitted).  Williams, 
475 Mass. at 720.  Rather, the judge properly allowed defense 
counsel to argue a general lack of corroboration at closing, 
which counsel did forcefully: 
"Second, what about all of the people that she talked 
about?  She talked about Heather Farris, who drove her 
home from work that night.  Where is Heather Farris? 
To corroborate what she says? . . . What about the 
next morning when she says that her aunt . . . drove 
them into Boston to get rid of the gun.  Where is the 
aunt . . . to tell us, yes, I remember that morning? 
We drove into Boston.  You don't have it.  There is no 
corroboration." 
 
 
b.  Bowden instruction.  The defendant contends that the 
judge erred in failing to give an instruction for his Bowden 
defense.  See Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486 (permitting defense on 
grounds of inadequate scientific testing and investigation).  
This argument is unavailing.  As we have explained repeatedly, 
"a judge is not required to instruct on the claimed inadequacy 
of a police investigation.  'Bowden simply holds that a judge 
may not remove the issue from the jury's consideration.'"  
Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 674 (2016), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 259 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 
12, 23 (2011).  Here, the defendant was allowed to argue the 
35 
 
 
inadequacies of the police investigation, and did so.  There was 
no error. 
 
5.  Evidence of Lawrence's acquittal.  The defendant also 
contends that it was error for the judge to exclude evidence of 
Lawrence's prior acquittal.  The defendant maintains that 
exclusion of this evidence abridged his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to present a complete 
defense.  Because the issue was not preserved,12 we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 210 (2014). 
 
The defendant concedes in his brief that "it would be 
improper to allow introduction of a coconspirator's acquittal to 
show that the defendant himself should be acquitted."  Here, 
however, it is unclear what relevance Lawrence's acquittal would 
                     
12 The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude a 
theory of joint venture, or, in the alternative, to present 
evidence of Lawrence's acquittal.  By agreement of the parties, 
the judge precluded a theory of joint venture and did not reach 
the defendant's alternative request.  Subsequently, the 
Commonwealth moved to exclude evidence of Lawrence's acquittal.  
That motion was allowed, without objection, and the defendant 
did not seek to revisit the question at trial. 
 
Nonetheless, throughout his opening statement, the 
prosecutor explained that the jury would learn of a conspiracy 
between the defendant and Lawrence, the prosecutor introduced 
significant evidence of joint venture at trial, and the judge 
instructed on statements by joint venturers in his final charge, 
as well as when the statements were introduced. 
36 
 
 
have had aside from this impermissible inference.  The defendant 
argues that, because Lawrence's statements were admitted against 
the defendant as a coventurer, Lawrence is akin to a witness at 
the trial.  If the jury knew that Lawrence had been acquitted, 
they might have viewed his efforts to recruit the defendant in a 
different "context."  This argument is unavailing.  The fact of 
Lawrence's acquittal would not necessarily serve to impeach his 
reported statements.  Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 472 Mass. 535, 
545 (2015) ("A finding of not guilty at a criminal trial can 
result from any number of factors having nothing to do with the 
defendant's actual guilt" [citation omitted]).  The judge did 
not abuse his discretion in excluding evidence of Lawrence's 
acquittal. 
 
6.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  It is impermissible for 
a prosecutor to "'misstate the evidence or refer to facts not in 
evidence' or 'play . . . on the jury's sympathy or emotions, or 
comment on the consequences of a verdict."  Carriere, 470 Mass. 
at 19, quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516–517 
(1987).  A prosecutor may, however, argue "forcefully for a 
conviction based on the evidence and on inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence."  Carriere, supra, 
quoting Kozec, supra at 516.  Similarly, "[w]hile a prosecutor 
may not vouch for the truthfulness of a witness's testimony, 
. . . where the credibility of a witness is an issue, counsel 
37 
 
 
may 'argue from the evidence why a witness should be believed'" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brewer, 472 Mass. 307, 315 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 684, 694–695 
(2004). 
 
Where, as here, the defendant did not object at trial, we 
review the prosecutor's closing argument to determine "whether 
any of the challenged statements was improper and, if so, 
whether it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice."  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 198 (2017).  
We examine the challenged statements "in the context of the 
entire closing, the jury instructions, and the evidence 
introduced at trial."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. Costa, 414 
Mass. 618, 628 (1993). 
 
The defendant argues that the prosecutor misstated facts in 
evidence, drew impermissible inferences, wrongly vouched for 
Burgess's testimony, and made inflammatory statements.  
Reviewing the prosecutor's closing argument as a whole, we 
discern one impropriety, but conclude that it did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
The prosecutor argued a theory of the case, consistent with 
the defendant's statement to Burgess, that the defendant chased 
the victim's vehicle on foot before firing the fatal shot from 
the side.  At trial, and on appeal, the defendant contends that 
this was a physical impossibility, because the distance between 
38 
 
 
shell casings and the period of time between shots would have 
required him to cover some seventy yards in a little over two 
seconds, or, otherwise put, run at over 150 miles per hour.  We 
conclude that the prosecutor's argument did not rely on such 
unreasonable inferences, because it was consistent with the 
defendant's statement, and Mendes's testimony, which left open 
an interpretation of the events that would have allowed for a 
longer period of time between the shots being fired.  While a 
prosecutor may not infer a physical impossibility from the 
evidence, see Lao, 460 Mass. at 21-22 (inferences must be 
possible), where an alleged impossibility rests on competing 
testimony,13 the prosecutor is free to argue that one witness 
should be believed over another.14 
                     
13 A nearby officer heard the shots and testified that the 
time between volleys was "a second or two."  A resident who 
heard the shots stated that they were "a few seconds" apart, but 
also that the second set of shots sounded further away.  On the 
other hand, while Mendes was clear that she was not able to 
estimate the time with any certainty, when pressed she said 
"maybe a minute" and gave an account consistent with a larger 
period of time in which the victim began to stop the car, asked 
her if she was okay, adjusted his mirror, and recognized 
something that made him curse, and then tried to accelerate. 
 
14 The defendant also contends that the prosecutor misstated 
the evidence when she said that Burgess saw Lawrence drop the 
defendant off.  Technically, this was a misstatement of 
Burgess's testimony (she testified to seeing Lawrence driving 
off while the defendant sat on the steps outside their 
apartment, but did not see him get out of Lawrence's vehicle).  
However, the statement was a reasonable inference from the 
evidence at trial:  Burgess stated that both she and the 
defendant were planning to get dropped off because the 
39 
 
 
 
The defendant contends as well that the prosecutor exceeded 
the bounds of permissible argument by arguing that particular 
features of Burgess's testimony –- details that easily could 
have been refuted and self-incriminating statements -- provided 
reasons why she should be believed.  We observe no error.  "It 
is not improper vouching for the prosecutor to point to reasons 
why a witness's testimony, or portions of a witness's testimony, 
should logically be believed."  Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 
808, 816 (2003), citing Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 
713–714 (1993). 
 
Finally, the defendant argues that the prosecutor used 
impermissibly inflammatory language in her closing when 
addressing the defendant's motive:  "He did it for his friend, 
[Lawrence].  He did in a context of being a hired killer, or a 
hired assassin, except he didn't get paid.  He did it, because 
he didn't mind killing someone; and he did it to help [Lawrence] 
get revenge for what [the victim] had done."  These statements 
were inappropriate and should not have been made.  "[I]t is 
improper to refer to a defendant with epithets that suggest he 
has a criminal record where the evidence does not support such a 
                     
defendant's vehicle was broken down, and Burgess saw him in the 
passenger seat of the gray Volvo earlier that night.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 21–22 (2011), citing 
Commonwealth v. Marquetty, 416 Mass. 445, 452 (1993) 
("Inferences need not be inescapable, just reasonable and 
possible").  There was no error. 
40 
 
 
finding, or invite the jury to decide the case on general 
considerations."  Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 
(2013). 
 
Nonetheless, taking the passage as a whole, the 
prosecutor's general meaning is clear:  that the defendant 
lacked any personal motivation for the killing.  "[W]e ascribe a 
certain level of sophistication" to the jury, and, here, have 
little doubt that they would not have been swayed by this 
unnecessarily hyperbolic language.  Id. at 131.  While this 
statement was improper and should not have been made, given the 
totality of the evidence against the defendant, it did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
7.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have carefully 
reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and we discern no reason to order a new trial or 
to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions and the order 
denying his motion for a new trial are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.