Title: Com. v. Roberts
Citation: 356 Pa. Super. 309, 514 A.2d 626
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: September 5, 1986

356 Pa. Superior Ct. 309 (1986) 514 A.2d 626 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Douglas Keith ROBERTS. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 29, 1986. Filed September 5, 1986. *310 Donna Jean McClelland, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Com., appellant. Joseph R. Govi, Greensburg, for appellee. Before DEL SOLE, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ. *311 DEL SOLE, Judge: This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order suppressing the results of field sobriety tests, an intoxilyzer examination and statements made by Appellee to the police. The facts as found by the trial court may be briefly summarized as follows. On the evening of June 29th, 1984, a Westmoreland County park police officer observed a vehicle being operated in an erratic manner on Route 356 which is a public highway and not within the confines of the County park system. Believing the operator to be under the influence of alcohol, the park police officer radioed the Allegheny Township Police Department advising the Department that he was following a suspected drunk driver. The Township police advised the officer to pull the driver over and that the Township police would be there at once. The officer stopped the vehicle, directed the driver to turn off his engine and be prepared to provide his card to the Township police who the driver was advised would be arriving shortly. The Township police arrived and had the driver perform a sobriety test and noted a statement made by the driver. Subsequently, the driver was given an intoxilyzer test. Appellee, the driver, was charged with two counts of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol; 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4). Appellee moved to suppress the results of the field sobriety tests, intoxilyzer examination and statement made to the police. Following a hearing on the motion the court made findings of fact as summarized above and thereafter entered conclusions of law. The court concluded that stopping Appellee and advising him to await the arrival of the Township Police constituted an arrest. The arrest was outside the jurisdiction of the park policeman and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(3) does not confer jurisdiction on the park policeman. The court determined that park police do not have jurisdiction to enforce the motor vehicle code on public highways outside of the park system and municipal police officers cannot empower *312 park police to perform arrests they are otherwise without authority to make. Commonwealth v. Pelkey, 349 Pa.Super. 373, 377, 503 A.2d 414, 415-416 (1985). With respect to the appropriate standard of appellate review of a suppression court's ruling: Commonwealth v. Hubble, 509 Pa. 497, 503, 504 A.2d 168, 171 (1986). The Commonwealth does not contest and the record supports the factual findings of the trial court. The Commonwealth however asks: It is the Commonwealth's initial contention that the facts mandate the legal conclusion that Appellee was not placed under arrest by the park police officer. The Commonwealth argues the park police officer's actions were akin to an investigatory stop. *313 Our Supreme Court has "defined an arrest as any act that indicates an intention to take the person into custody and subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest." Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 671, 450 A.2d 975, 978 (1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178, 103 S. Ct. 830, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1025 (1983). Under all of the circumstances, we are convinced that the Appellee was under arrest prior to the arrival of the Township police. "[T]he test is not what the police intended but rather the reasonable impression conveyed to the person subjected to the seizure." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 330 Pa.Super. 295, 307, 479 A.2d 558, 565 (1984). "Officers are not required to make any formal declaration of arrest or use the word `arrest' . . . nor to apply manual force or exercise `such physical restraint as to be visible to the eye' in order to arrest a person" Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 68, 190 A.2d 304, 311 (1963). Here, the park police officer stopped the vehicle, ordered the driver to turn off his engine and be prepared to provide information when additional police arrived. A driver may be found to be under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol prior to a request that the individual submit to various tests. See Neitz v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transp., ___ Pa.Cmwlth. ___, 506 A.2d 961, 963 (1986) (police officer who advised driver injured in automobile accident to stay still and that ambulance was on the way had exercised sufficient custody and control so as to have placed driver under arrest). The Commonwealth next asserts that if it is determined that the park police officer had placed Appellee under arrest, the officer is empowered to do so pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8951 et seq., the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act. (Act). "The authority of a municipal police officer to act beyond the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction is determined by the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953, which became effective August 14, 1982." Commonwealth v. Phillips, 338 Pa.Super. 274, 277, 487 A.2d 962, 963 (1985). This section provides in pertinent part: 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a). We are mindful that "it is clear that one of the goals of the legislature in enacting the statute was to promote a cohesive working relationship among municipal police departments," Commonwealth v. Ebersole, 342 Pa.Super. 151, 155, 492 A.2d 436, 438-439 (1985). "This statute, therefore, must be liberally construed to effect its objects and to promote justice." Id. 342 Pa.Super. at 155, 492 A.2d at 438. However, the power and authority to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth beyond the territorial limits of primary jurisdiction authorized by the Act concerns only duly employed municipal police officers. The question arises as to whether a park police officer is a municipal police officer. The Act defines Municipal police officer as "[a]ny natural person who is properly employed by a municipality, including a home rule municipality, as a regular full-time or part-time police officer." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8951. Primary municipal police jurisdiction is set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8952 which states: 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8952. The duties of park police officers, by contrast, are set forth at 16 P.S. § 2512 which states: 16 P.S. § 2521. Section 8953 of 42 Pa.C.S.A. therefore is inapplicable to park police officers. There is no power under 16 P.S. § 2512 of park police to make an extra-territorial arrest. When police are without authority to arrest outside their jurisdiction, and do so, the evidence seized incident to that arrest must be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Fischer, 348 Pa.Super. 418, 425-426, 502 A.2d 613, 617 (1985).[1] Order affirmed. POPOVICH, J., concurs in the result. [1] In Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 421 (1985), police officers from Montgomery County prepared a search warrant application for the search of an apartment in Berks County. The application was presented to a Berks County Magistrate who issued a warrant. The Montgomery County police conducted the search accompanied by police from Berks County who did not participate. On appeal, this court determined that the search violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 2004. Our Supreme Court: [g]ranted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal to determine the narrow issues of whether the Superior Court erred in holding that the exclusion of evidence was the required remedy for a perceived violation of Rule 2004 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure ("A search warrant shall be served by a law enforcement officer.") and whether the court erred in holding that the execution of the search warrant in the instant case violated said rule. Id., 507 Pa. at 399, 490 A.2d at 422. The Court rejected "the automatic application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search which in some way violates the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the issuance and execution of search warrants." Id., 507 Pa. at 401, 490 A.2d at 423. Unlike the Court in Mason, we are not confronted with a violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning searches and seizures and warrants. Nor are we concerned with a police officer to whom 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953 applies. Suppression of the seized evidence is the appropriate remedy in this instance.