Title: Smith v. City of Westfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12243
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12243 
 
VIRGINIA B. SMITH & others1  vs.  CITY OF WESTFIELD & others.2 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 6, 2017. - October 2, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.3 
 
 
Municipal Corporations, Parks, Use of municipal property.  Parks 
and Parkways.  Constitutional Law, Taking of property.  Due 
Process of Law, Taking of property. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 27, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Daniel A. Ford, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Thomas A. Kenefick, III (Mary Patryn also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Seth Schofield, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth, amicus curiae. 
 
Anthony I. Wilson (John T. Liebel also present) for city of 
Westfield. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Twenty four individuals residing in Westfield and Holyoke. 
 
 
2 The city council of Westfield and the mayor of Westfield. 
 
 
3 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
 
 
2 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Luke H. Legere & Gregor I. McGregor for Massachusetts 
Association of Conservation Commissions, Inc. 
 
Edward J. DeWitt for Association to Preserve Cape Cod, Inc. 
 
Sanjoy Mahajan, pro se. 
 
Phelps T. Turner for Conservation Law Foundation. 
 
Jeffrey R. Porter & Colin G. Van Dyke for Trustees of 
Reservations & others. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Article 97 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, approved by the Legislature and 
ratified by the voters in 1972, provides that "[l]ands and 
easements taken or acquired" for conservation purposes "shall 
not be used for other purposes or otherwise disposed of" without 
the approval of a two-thirds roll call vote of each branch of 
the Legislature.  The issue on appeal is whether a proposed 
change in use of municipal parkland may be governed by art. 97 
where the land was not taken by eminent domain and where there 
is no restriction recorded in the registry of deeds that limits 
its use to conservation or recreational purposes.  We conclude 
that there are circumstances where municipal parkland may be 
protected by art. 97 without any such recorded restriction, 
provided the land has been dedicated as a public park.  A city 
or town dedicates land as a public park where there is a clear 
and unequivocal intent to dedicate the land permanently as a 
public park and where the public accepts such use by actually 
using the land as a public park.  Because the municipal land at 
 
 
3 
issue in this case has been dedicated as a public park, we 
conclude that it is protected by art. 97.4 
 
Background.  The subject of this appeal is a parcel of 
property owned by the city of Westfield (city), known as the 
John A. Sullivan Memorial Playground or Cross Street Playground 
(the parcel or Cross Street Playground), on which the city seeks 
to build an elementary school. The parcel contains 5.3 acres of 
land and includes two little league baseball fields and a 
playground.  Because the parcel's history is at the center of 
the parties' dispute in this case, we recount it in some detail. 
 
The parcel has served as a public playground for more than 
sixty years.  The city obtained title to the parcel in 1939 
through an action to foreclose a tax lien for nonpayment of 
taxes.  In 1946, the city planning board recommended that the 
land be used for a "new playground," and referred the matter to 
the mayor.  The city council voted in 1948 to turn over "full 
charge and control" of the property to the playground 
commission, and in 1949 to transfer funds to the commission to 
cover costs of "work to be done on Cross [Street] Playground."  
In November, 1957, the city council passed an ordinance formally 
                                                          
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General on behalf of the Commonwealth; the Association to 
Preserve Cape Cod, Inc.; the Massachusetts Association of 
Conservation Commissions, Inc.; Sanjoy Mahajan; the Conservation 
Law Foundation; and the Trustees of the Reservation, 
Massachusetts Audubon Society and Massachusetts Land Trust 
Coalition. 
 
 
4 
naming the playground the "John A. Sullivan Memorial 
Playground."5  The mayor approved the ordinance early in 1958.  
Despite the name formally given, the parcel eventually came to 
be commonly known as the "Cross Street Playground." 
 
In 1979, working in cooperation with the State government, 
the city applied for and received a grant from the Federal 
government (as well as matching funds from the State) to 
rehabilitate several of its playgrounds, including the Cross 
Street Playground.  The Federal conservation funds that the city 
received were made available by the Land and Water Conservation 
Fund Act of 1965 (act).  See P.L. 88-578, 78 Stat. 900 (1964), 
codified as 16 U.S.C. § 460l-8 (1976).6  The purpose of the act 
is to assure "outdoor recreation resources" for "all American 
people of present and future generations" by enabling "all 
levels of government and private interests to take prompt and 
coordinated action to the extent practicable without diminishing 
or affecting their respective powers and functions to conserve, 
develop, and utilize such resources for the benefit and 
                                                          
 
 
5 The ordinance declared that the "parcel of land heretofore 
designated as a public playground, beginning at a point in the 
Westerly line of Cross Street," would be "hereafter known as the 
JOHN A. SULLIVAN MEMORIAL PLAYGROUND." 
 
 
6 The relevant provision of the Land and Water Conservation 
Fund Act of 1965 is presently codified at 54 U.S.C. § 200305 
(2012 & Supp. II).  However, in this opinion we refer to the 
provision in effect at the time of the grant application in 
question, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-8 (1976). 
 
 
5 
enjoyment of the American people."  16 U.S.C. § 460l (1976).  
Grant money distributed pursuant to the act is known as LWCF 
funding. 
 
The act imposed several key requirements on States seeking 
LWCF funding in support of local park projects.  First, it 
required States to develop a "comprehensive statewide outdoor 
recreation plan" (SCORP) setting forth, among other information, 
the State's evaluation of its need for outdoor recreation 
resources and designating the State agency that would represent 
the State in the LWCF funding process.  Id. at § 460l-8(d).7  The 
act also mandated that "[n]o property acquired or developed with 
assistance under this section shall . . . be converted to other 
than public outdoor recreation uses" without the approval of the 
United States Secretary of the Interior (Secretary).  Id. at 
§ 460l-8(f)(3).  Further, the act stated that "the Secretary 
shall approve such conversion only if he finds it to be in 
accord with the then existing comprehensive statewide outdoor 
recreation plan and only upon such conditions as he deems 
necessary to assure the substitution of other recreation 
properties of at least equal fair market value and of reasonably 
                                                          
 
 
7 In Massachusetts, the Land and Water Conservation Fund 
program is administered through the Executive Office of Energy 
and Environmental Affairs.  See Massachusetts Statewide 
Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan, Executive Office of 
Energy and Energy and Environmental Affairs 1 (2012),  
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/dcs/scorp-2012-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F4D6-W4MS] 
 
 
6 
equivalent usefulness and location."  Id.  The grant agreement 
for rehabilitation of the Cross Street Playground indicates that 
the grant was expressly conditioned on compliance with the act.  
Therefore, by accepting the Federal monies under the act, the 
city forfeited the ability to convert any part of the Cross 
Street Playground to a use other than public outdoor recreation 
unilaterally; such a conversion could only proceed with the 
approval of the Secretary.  The 2006 Massachusetts SCORP states 
explicitly that "[l]and acquired or developed with [LWCF] funds 
become[s] protected under the Massachusetts Constitution 
(Article 97) and [F]ederal regulations -- and cannot be 
converted from intended use without permission" from the 
National Park Service and Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs.  See Massachusetts Outdoors 2006:  
Statewide Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan, Executive 
Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs 4, 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/dcs/massoutdoor2006.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3D7-4EKN].  See also Massachusetts Statewide 
Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan, Executive Office of 
Energy and Energy and Environmental Affairs 2 (2012), 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/dcs/scorp-2012-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F4D6-W4MS] (describing land funded by LWCF as 
protected under art. 97).8  The restrictions imposed by the act 
                                                          
 
 
8 The record does not reflect how the Massachusetts 
 
 
7 
on the management of land acquired or developed with LWCF 
funding remain in full effect over the Cross Street Playground.  
See 54 U.S.C. § 200305(f)(3) (2012 & Supp. II). 
 
In 2009, a report on a survey of the city's parks and open 
space conducted by the Department of Conservation and 
Recreation, the Pioneer Valley planning commission, and the 
Franklin Regional council of governments included a map that 
identifies the Cross Street Playground as "permanently protected 
open space."  A year later, the city's mayor endorsed an open 
space plan which noted that, although not all public land is 
"permanently committed for conservation purposes," Cross Street 
Playground was public land with a "full" degree of protection 
and "active" recreation potential. 
 
On August 18, 2011, the city council voted to transfer the 
entire Cross Street Playground from the city's parks and 
recreation department to its school department for the purpose 
of constructing a new elementary school on the land.  In 2012, 
the city began a demolition process that included taking down 
century-old trees and removing a portion of the playground. 
 
The plaintiffs, a group of city residents, commenced this 
action in April, 2012, naming the city and city council as 
defendants, as well as the mayor and city councillors in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
comprehensive Statewide outdoor recreation plan (SCORP) in 
effect at the time of the 1979 grant application characterized 
the status of the Cross Street Playground. 
 
 
8 
official capacities.  The plaintiffs sought a restraining order 
to halt the construction project under G. L. c. 214, § 7A, and 
G. L. c. 40, § 53.9  In addition, the plaintiffs sought relief  
in the nature of mandamus under G. L. c. 249, § 5, requesting 
that the court order the defendants to comply with art. 97 of 
the Massachusetts Constitution prior to any construction or 
operation of a new school on any part of the Cross Street 
Playground. 
 
A Superior Court judge issued a temporary restraining order 
to halt construction of the school on the Cross Street 
Playground in September, 2012, and later granted the plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  In issuing the injunction, 
the judge agreed with the defendants that "the failure to build 
a new public school would have an adverse impact on the 
residents of the city, specifically the children, who are 
currently learning in outdated and decaying schools."  But the 
judge made clear that she was "not prohibiting the construction 
of a new school"; she was "merely ordering the [c]ity to comply 
with the law before it proceeds." 
                                                          
 
 
9 Under G. L. c. 214, § 7A, the Superior Court may determine 
whether damage to the environment is about to occur and restrain 
the person who is about to cause it, provided that the damage 
about to be caused constitutes a violation of a statute, 
ordinance, by-law or regulation the major purpose of which is to 
prevent or minimize damage to the environment.  "General Laws 
c. 40, § 53, provides a mechanism for taxpayers to enforce laws 
relating to the expenditure of tax money by a local government."  
See LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 332 (1999). 
 
 
9 
 
The parties later submitted cross motions for the entry of 
judgment based on an agreed statement of facts, essentially 
asking the court to decide whether the preliminary injunction 
should be made permanent or vacated.  By this stage of the 
litigation, the parties had stipulated that the only question 
for decision was whether the Cross Street Playground was 
protected by art. 97.  Another Superior Court judge concluded 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Mahajan v. Department of 
Envtl. Protection, 464 Mass. 604, 615 (2013), "decided that a 
parcel of land acquires Article 97 protection only when the land 
is specifically designated for Article 97 purposes by a recorded 
instrument."  Because there was no recorded instrument 
designating that the Cross Street Playground was to be used as a 
playground or for any other recreational purpose, the judge 
concluded that the parcel was not protected by art. 97.  
Consequently, he vacated the preliminary injunction and ordered 
judgment to enter for the defendants. 
 
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the 
judgment.  Smith v. Westfield, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 80, 81 (2016).  
The Appeals Court agreed with the motion judge that land is 
protected by art. 97 only where it was taken or acquired for 
conservation or another purpose set forth in art. 97, or where 
"the land is specifically designated for art. 97 purposes by 
deed or other recorded restriction."  Id. at 82.  Justice 
 
 
10 
Milkey, in a concurrence, agreed that the Supreme Judicial Court 
opinions in Selectmen of Hanson v. Lindsay, 444 Mass. 502, 506-
509 (2005), and Mahajan, 464 Mass. at 615-616, "appear to say" 
that, where land was taken or acquired for non-art. 97 purposes, 
it will only be subject to art. 97 "where the restricted use has 
been recorded on the deed, e.g., through a conservation 
restriction."  Smith, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 86.  But Justice 
Milkey invited this court to "revisit such precedent," id. at 
84, declaring, "Nothing in the language or purpose of art. 97 
suggests that its application should turn on whether the 
underlying deed provides record notice that the land has been 
committed to an art. 97 use."  Id. at 87.  He concluded, "The 
overriding point of art. 97 is to insulate dedicated parkland 
from short-term political pressures.  I fear that the effect of 
Hanson and Mahajan is to rob art. 97 of its intended force with 
regard to a great deal of dedicated parkland across the 
Commonwealth."  Id. at 88. We allowed the plaintiff's 
application for further appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Article 97 provides, among other things, that 
"[t]he people shall have the right to clean air and water . . . 
and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of 
their environment."  It declares a "public purpose" in "the 
protection of the people in their right to the conservation, 
development and utilization of the agricultural, mineral, 
 
 
11 
forest, water, air and other natural resources."  Id.  It grants 
the Legislature the power "to provide for the taking, upon 
payment of just compensation therefor, or for the acquisition by 
purchase or otherwise, of lands and easements or such other 
interests therein as may be deemed necessary to accomplish these 
purposes."  Id.  And, most importantly for purposes of this 
appeal, it provides:  "Lands and easements taken or acquired for 
such purposes shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise 
disposed of except by laws enacted by a two thirds vote, taken 
by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general court."  Id.10 
                                                          
 
 
10 The full text of art. 97 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution annuls art. 49 of the Amendments to 
the Massachusetts Constitution and then provides: 
 
 
"The people shall have the right to clean air and 
water; freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and 
the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of 
their environment; and the protection of the people in 
their right to the conservation, development and 
utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, 
air and other natural resources is hereby declared to be a 
public purpose. 
 
 
"The general court shall have the power to enact 
legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights. 
 
 
"In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the 
general court shall have the power to provide for the 
taking, upon payment of just compensation therefor, or for 
the acquisition by purchase or otherwise, of lands and 
easements or such other interests therein as may be deemed 
necessary to accomplish these purposes. 
 
 
"Lands and easements taken or acquired for such 
purposes shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise 
disposed of except by laws enacted by a two thirds vote, 
 
 
12 
 
The issue on appeal requires us to interpret the meaning of 
art. 97 to determine whether the Cross Street Playground is 
protected land under art. 97 that may be used for another 
purpose -- here, the purpose of building a public school -- only 
by obtaining the approval by a two-thirds vote of each branch of 
the Legislature.  We do not interpret art. 97 on a clean slate.  
We have recognized that the language of art. 97 is "relatively 
imprecise" and that its provisions must be interpreted "in light 
of the practical consequences that would result from . . . an 
expansive application, as well as the ability of a narrower 
interpretation to serve adequately the stated goals of art. 97."  
Mahajan, 464 Mass. at 614-615.  We also have recognized that 
land may be protected by art. 97 where it was neither taken by 
eminent domain nor acquired for any of the purposes set forth in 
art. 97 provided that, after the taking or acquisition, it "was 
designated for those purposes in a manner sufficient to invoke 
the protection of art. 97."  See id. at 615.  Therefore, to 
resolve the issue in this case, we must first determine what it 
means to "designate" land for an art. 97 purpose in a manner 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
taken by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general 
court." 
 
 
13 
sufficient to invoke art. 97 protection, and then determine 
whether the Cross Street Playground was so designated.11 
 
We do not agree with the motion judge and the Appeals Court 
that we have already concluded in our opinions in Selectmen of 
Hanson and Mahajan that the only way to designate land for art. 
97 purposes is through a deed or recorded conservation 
restriction, although we acknowledge that there is language in 
those opinions that invites this inference.12 
 
In Mahajan, 464 Mass. at 608, 612, 615 n.15, the issue on 
appeal was whether a plaza area surrounding an open-air pavilion 
at the eastern end of Long Wharf in Boston that was identified 
as a park "was 'taken' for art. 97 purposes."  The parcel was a 
small part of the land taken by eminent domain in 1970 by the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) as part of the 1964 
Downtown Waterfront-Faneuil Hall urban renewal plan.  Id. at 
                                                          
 
 
11 The city did not challenge the plaintiffs' assertion 
below that the use of Cross Street Playground fell within the 
range of environmental purposes contemplated by art. 97. 
 
 
12 We note that these prior decisions refer to two different 
procedures by which a city might designate a property as 
parkland.  First, we said a city might record a conservation 
restriction pursuant to G. L. c. 184, § 31.  See Selectmen of 
Hanson v. Lindsay, 444 Mass. 502, 506-507 (2005).  Second, we 
suggested that a city might "deed the land to itself for 
conservation purposes."  See Mahajan v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 464 Mass 604, 616 (2013).  This distinction is not 
relevant to this case, where it is undisputed that there is no 
recorded restriction on the use of the Cross Street Playground.  
For the sake of simplicity, we shall characterize both 
procedures as "recorded deed restrictions" on the use of 
property when referring to these decisions. 
 
 
14 
606-607.  We recognized that one of the fifteen "planning 
objectives" under that plan was "[t]o provide public ways, parks 
and plazas which encourage the pedestrian to enjoy the harbor 
and its activities," id. at 608 n.7, but we determined that the 
"overarching purpose" for which the land was taken was to 
eliminate "decadent, substandard or blighted open conditions."  
Id. at 612, quoting G. L. c. 121B, § 45.  We declared that land 
is not taken for art. 97 purposes simply because it 
"incidentally" promotes conservation, or because it "simply 
displays some attributes of art. 97 land generally," or because 
"a comprehensive urban renewal plan may identify, among other 
objectives, some objectives that are consistent with art. 97 
purposes."  Id. at 613-614, 618.  We concluded that, "[g]iven 
the overarching purpose of the 1964 urban renewal plan to 
eliminate urban blight through the comprehensive redevelopment 
of the waterfront area, including its revitalization through the 
development of mixed uses and amenities, it cannot be said that 
the retention of certain open spaces, like the project site, is 
sufficiently indicative of an art. 97 purpose as to trigger a 
two-thirds vote of the Legislature should the BRA wish to 
slightly revise the use of certain spaces in a manner consistent 
with the objectives of the original urban renewal plan."  Id. at 
618. 
 
 
15 
 
Nevertheless, we recognized that land taken by eminent 
domain specifically for art. 97 purposes could fall under the 
provision's protections "where an urban renewal plan 
accompanying a taking clearly demonstrates a specific intent to 
reserve particular, well-defined areas of that taking for art. 
97 purposes."  Id. at 619.  And we recognized that, "[u]nder 
certain circumstances not present here, the ultimate use to 
which the land is put may provide the best evidence of the 
purposes of the taking, notwithstanding the language of the 
original order of taking or accompanying urban renewal plan."  
Id. at 620. 
 
In Selectmen of Hanson, 444 Mass. at 504-505, the issue was 
not whether a parcel of land had been taken for art. 97 purposes 
(it was not), but whether a town meeting vote was sufficient by 
itself to transform a town's general corporate property into 
conservation land protected by art. 97.  The town had acquired 
the property through a tax taking in 1957 and held it as general 
corporate property that could be disposed of in any manner 
authorized by law.  Id. at 504.  In 1971, the town at its annual 
meeting voted "to accept for conservation purposes, a deed, or 
deeds to" the parcel, but the property was never actually placed 
under the custody and control of the conservation commission.  
Id. at 504, 506.  Rather, the property remained under the 
control of the board of selectmen, which was authorized to 
 
 
16 
execute a deed imposing a conservation restriction on the 
property but never did.13  Id. at 506, 508.  In 1998, the town 
sold the property at a public auction to the defendant, but in 
2002 commenced an action seeking a declaration that the sale was 
invalid and void because the land was subject to art. 97 and the 
sale had not been approved by a two-thirds vote of each branch 
of the Legislature.  Id. at 503.  We rejected the town's claim, 
reasoning that the 1971 vote "merely expressed the town's 
interest in dedicating the locus to conservation purposes," and 
that subsequently the town took "no further action" to achieve 
that goal.  Id. at 508.  In these circumstances we declared that 
"an instrument creating such a property restriction had to be 
filed with the registry of deeds in order for the town's 
interest to prevail over that of any subsequent bona fide 
purchaser for value."  Id. at 505. 
 
In the circumstances presented in Selectmen of Hanson, 
where the town intended to designate land for conservation 
purposes by executing a deed with a conservation restriction but 
                                                          
 
 
13 "'A conservation restriction means a right, either in 
perpetuity or for a specified number of years, whether or not 
stated in the form of a restriction, easement, covenant or 
condition, in any deed, will or other instrument executed by or 
on behalf of the owner of the land or in any order of taking, 
appropriate to retaining land or water areas predominantly in 
their natural, scenic or open condition or in agricultural, 
farming or forest use . . .' (emphasis added)."  Selectmen of 
Hanson v. Lindsay, 444 Mass. 502, 507 (2005), quoting G. L. 
c. 184, § 31. 
 
 
17 
never did, it is true, as we said in Mahajan, 464 Mass. at 616, 
that "the town had to deed the land to itself for conservation 
purposes -- or record an equivalent restriction on the deed -- 
in order for art. 97 to apply to subsequent dispositions or use 
for other purposes."  But this should not be understood to mean 
that, in all circumstances, the only way that land not taken or 
acquired for an art. 97 purpose may become protected by art. 97 
is through a recorded deed restriction.  To understand the other 
ways that land may be "designated" for conservation purposes "in 
a manner sufficient to invoke the protection of art. 97," see 
Mahajan, 464 Mass. at 615, we need to examine two related common 
law doctrines:  the dedication of land for public use and prior 
public use.  See id. at 616 ("the spirit of art. 97 is derived 
from the related doctrine of 'prior public use'"). 
 
Under our common law, where developers on private land 
built roads that were dedicated to the use of the public, the 
land on which those roads were built became "subject to the 
easement of a public way" where "the intent to dedicate [is] 
made manifest by the unequivocal declarations or acts of the 
owner" and where the dedication is accepted by the public.  
Hayden v. Stone, 112 Mass. 346, 349 (1873).  "No specific length 
of time is necessary; the acts of the parties to the dedication 
when once established complete it."  Id.  See Longley v. 
Worcester, 304 Mass. 580, 588 (1939) ("The owner's acts and 
 
 
18 
declarations should be deliberate, unequivocal and decisive, 
manifesting a clear intention permanently to abandon his 
property to the specific public use").  Similarly, where a 
developer in Wareham bought a large tract of land to sell 
building lots for residences, and private businesses, and 
reserved open space for "parks, squares, groves and shore 
fronts," the open space was subject to an easement for public 
use upon proof that the owner "had dedicated the use of these 
lands to the public" and that the public had accepted the 
dedication through use of the open space.  Attorney Gen. v. 
Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 221 Mass. 342, 347-348 (1915) (Onset Bay 
Grove Ass'n).  See Attorney Gen. v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 326-
329 (1891).  The dedication "may spring from oral declarations 
or statements by the dedicator, or by those authorized to act in 
his behalf, made to persons with whom he deals and who rely upon 
them; or it may consist of declarations addressed directly to 
the public."  Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 221 Mass. at 348.  "It also 
may be manifested by the owner's acts from which such an 
intention can be inferred."  Id. 
 
A city or town that owns land in its proprietary capacity 
and uses the land for a park may also dedicate the parkland to 
the use of the public.  "A municipality may dedicate land owned 
by it to a particular public purpose provided there is nothing 
in the terms and conditions by which it was acquired or the 
 
 
19 
purposes for which it is held preventing it from doing so, . . . 
and upon completion of the dedication it becomes irrevocable" 
(citation omitted).  Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 730 
(1948).  "The general public for whose benefit a use in the land 
was established by an owner obtains an interest in the land in 
the nature of an easement."  Id.  This court applied the public 
dedication doctrine in holding that, even though title to the 
Boston Common and the Public Garden "vested in fee simple in the 
town free from any trust," the city did not possess title to 
this parkland "free from any restriction, for it is plain that 
the town has dedicated the Common and the Public Garden to the 
use of the public as a public park."  Id. at 729-730.  "The 
title to the Common and the Public Garden is in the city; the 
beneficial use is in the public."  Id. at 735. 
 
The "general public" that has obtained an "interest in the 
land in the nature of an easement," id. at 730, is not simply 
the residents of the particular city or town that owns the 
parkland.  See Higginson v. Treasurer and Sch. House Comm'rs of 
Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 589 (1912).  This court in Higginson 
declared: 
 
"[T]he dominant aim in the establishment of public 
parks appears to be the common good of mankind rather than 
the special gain or private benefit of a particular city or 
town.  The healthful and civilizing influence of parks in 
and near congested areas of population is of more than 
local interest and becomes a concern of the State under 
modern conditions.  It relates not only to public health in 
 
 
20 
its narrow sense, but to broader considerations of 
exercise, refreshment and enjoyment." 
Id. at 590. 
 
Because the general public has an interest in parkland 
owned by a city or town, ultimate authority over a public park 
rests with the Legislature, not with the municipality.  See 
Lowell, 322 Mass. at 730.  "The rights of the public in such an 
easement are subject to the paramount authority of the General 
Court which may limit, suspend or terminate the easement."  Id.  
As stated in Lowell, 322 Mass. at 730, quoting Wright v. 
Walcott, 238 Mass. 432, 435 (1921): 
 
"Land acquired by a city or town by eminent domain or 
through expenditure of public funds, held strictly for 
public uses as a park and not subject to the terms of any 
gift, devise, grant, bequest or other trust or condition, 
is under the control of the General Court . . . The power 
of the General Court in this regard is supreme over that of 
the city or town." 
 
 
Because the Legislature has "paramount authority" over 
public parks, dedicated parkland cannot be sold or devoted to 
another public use without the approval of the Legislature.  
"The rule that public lands devoted to one public use cannot be 
diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and 
explicit legislation authorizing the diversion is now firmly 
established in our law."  Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 
355 Mass. 328, 330 (1969).  See Higginson, 212 Mass. at 591 
("Land appropriated to one public use cannot be diverted to 
another inconsistent public use without plain and explicit 
 
 
21 
legislation to that end").  This "rule," known as the doctrine 
of "prior public use," Mahajan, 464 Mass. at 616, is not limited 
to parkland.  See, e.g., Boston & Albany R.R. v. City Council of 
Cambridge, 166 Mass. 224, 225 (1896); Old Colony R.R. v. 
Framingham Water Co., 153 Mass. 561, 563 (1891); Boston Water 
Power Co. v. Boston & W.R. Corp., 23 Pick. 360, 398 (1839).  But 
it is applied more "stringently" where a public agency or 
municipality seeks to encroach upon a park.  Robbins, supra at 
330 ("In furtherance of the policy of the Commonwealth to keep 
parklands inviolate the rule has been stringently applied to 
legislation which would result in encroachment on them"); Gould 
v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 419 (1966), 
quoting Higginson, 212 Mass. at 591-592 ("The policy of the 
Commonwealth has been to add to the common law inviolability of 
parks express prohibition against encroachment").   Three years 
before the ratification of art. 97, this court declared in 
Robbins, supra at 331: 
 
"We think it is essential to the expression of plain 
and explicit authority to divert parklands, Great Ponds, 
reservations and kindred areas to a new and inconsistent 
public use that the Legislature identify the land and that 
there appear in the legislation not only a statement of the 
new use but a statement or recital showing in some way 
legislative awareness of the existing public use.  In 
short, the legislation should express not merely the public 
will for the new use but its willingness to surrender or 
forgo the existing use." 
 
 
 
22 
 
The meaning of the provision in art. 97 at issue in this 
case -- "Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes 
shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise disposed of 
except by laws enacted by a two thirds vote, taken by yeas and 
nays, of each branch of the general court" -- must be understood 
in this common-law context.  Cf. Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975), quoting Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934) (where meaning of statute is 
not plain from its language, we look to intent of Legislature 
"ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated").  The 
consequence of art. 97's ratification was that "plain and 
explicit legislation authorizing the diversion" of public 
parkland under the prior public use doctrine, which previously 
could be enacted by a bare majority of the Legislature, now 
required a two-thirds vote of each branch.  See Robbins, supra 
at 330.  See also Legislative Research Council, Report Relative 
to the Preservation of the Natural Environment, 1971 House Doc. 
No. 5301.  In Opinion of the Justices, 383 Mass. 895, 918 
(1981), we made clear that art. 97 applied to all property that 
was taken or acquired for art. 97 purposes, including property 
 
 
23 
taken or acquired before its ratification in 1972.  "To claim 
that new Article 97 does not give the same care and protection 
for all these existing public lands as for lands acquired by the 
foresight of future legislators or the generosity of future 
citizens would ignore public purposes deemed important in our 
laws since the beginning of our Commonwealth."  Id., quoting 
Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 139, 141 (1973). 
There is no reason to believe that art. 97 was intended by 
the Legislature or the voters to diminish the scope of parkland 
that had been protected under the common law by the prior public 
use doctrine or the doctrine of public dedication.  Such an 
interpretation would suggest that voters were hoodwinked into 
thinking they were expanding the protection of such lands by 
replacing art. 49 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution with art. 97 when, in fact, they were actually 
reducing the protection already afforded these lands under the 
common law.14  See Bates v. Director of Office of Campaign & 
                                                          
 
 
14 Article 49, which was annulled by art. 97, see note 10, 
supra, provided: 
 
 
"The conservation, development and utilization of the 
agricultural, mineral, forest, water and other natural 
resources of the commonwealth are public uses, and the 
general court shall have power to provide for the taking, 
upon payment of just compensation therefor, of lands and 
easements or interests therein, including water and mineral 
rights, for the purpose of securing and promoting the 
proper conservation, development, utilization and control 
 
 
24 
Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 173-174 (2002), quoting Boston Elevated Ry. 
v. Commonwealth, 310 Mass. 528, 548 (1942) ("We will not impute 
to the voters who enacted the clean elections law an 'intention 
to pass an ineffective statute'").  Therefore, we conclude that 
parkland protected by art. 97 includes land dedicated by 
municipalities as public parks that, under the prior public use 
doctrine, cannot be sold or devoted to another public use 
without plain and explicit legislative authority.  See Mahajan, 
464 Mass. at 615 (art. 97 protects land "designated" for art. 97 
purposes "in a manner sufficient to invoke the protection of 
art. 97"). 
 
Given this conclusion, we turn to the question whether the 
Cross Street Playground was dedicated by the city as a public 
park such that the transfer of its use from a park to a school 
would require legislative approval under the prior public use 
doctrine and, thus, under art. 97.  Under our common law, land 
is dedicated to the public as a public park when the landowner's 
intent to do so is clear and unequivocal, and when the public 
accepts such use by actually using the land as a public park.  
See Longley, 304 Mass. at 587-588; Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 221 
Mass. at 347-348; Hayden, 112 Mass. at 349.  There are various 
ways to manifest a clear and unequivocal intent.  See e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
thereof and to enact legislation necessary or expedient 
therefor." 
 
 
25 
Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 221 Mass. at 348-349 (dedication found 
based on Association’s plan, sales statements, and repeated 
declarations that its open spaces "should never be encroached 
upon").  The recording of a deed or a conservation restriction 
is one way of manifesting such intent but it is not the only 
way.  For instance, it was "plain" to this court that the Boston 
Common and Public Garden had been dedicated as a public park 
without there being any deed or conservation restriction 
declaring the land to be a public park.  See Lowell, 322 Mass. 
at 729-730. 
 
The clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate public land as 
a public park must be more than simply an intent to use public 
land as a park temporarily or until a better use has emerged or 
ripened.  See Longley, 304 Mass. at 588 (requiring "a clear 
intention permanently to abandon his property to the specific 
public use").  Rather, the intent must be to use the land 
permanently as a public park, because the consequence of a 
dedication is that "[t]he general public for whose benefit a use 
in the land was established . . . obtains an interest in the 
land in the nature of an easement," Lowell, 322 Mass. at 730, 
and "upon completion of the dedication it becomes irrevocable." 
Id. 
 
The plaza area on Long Wharf in Mahajan, although 
identified as a park, failed to meet this standard because there 
 
 
26 
was not proof of a clear and unequivocal intent by the BRA to 
make the plaza permanently a public park.  The urban renewal 
plan accompanying the taking did not reflect a specific intent 
to reserve that land forever as a public park but instead left 
open the possibility of revising the use of such open space if 
doing so would better accomplish the objectives of the urban 
renewal plan.  Mahajan, 464 Mass. at 618-619.  The parcel in 
Selectmen of Hanson, although accepted for conservation purposes 
by town meeting, failed to meet this standard both because there 
was no clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the land 
permanently as conservation land where the town never actually 
transferred control of the land to the conservation commission 
and never acted to impose any restriction on the land, and where 
the land was never actually used by the public as conservation 
land.  Selectmen of Hanson, 444 Mass. at 506-508. 
 
The Cross Street Playground, however, was dedicated as a 
public park by the city under this standard, and therefore is 
protected under the prior public use doctrine and art. 97.  We 
need not determine whether it would have been enough to meet the 
clear and unequivocal intent standard that the land had been 
used as a public park for more than sixty years, or that control 
of the land had been turned over to the playground commission, 
or that an ordinance was passed naming the parcel.  Although we 
consider the totality of the circumstances, the determinative 
 
 
27 
factor here was the acceptance by the city of Federal 
conservation funds under the act to rehabilitate the playground 
with the statutory proviso that, by doing so, the city 
surrendered all ability to convert the playground to a use other 
than public outdoor recreation without the approval of the 
Secretary.  See 16 U.S.C. § 460l-8(f)(3).  Regardless of whether 
the parcel had been dedicated earlier as a public park, it 
became so dedicated once the city accepted Federal funds 
pursuant to this condition.  It is significant that this 
understanding was shared by the Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs, whose 2006 SCORP stated that land 
developed with LWCF funds became protected under art. 97. 
 
Conclusion.  Because we conclude that the Cross Street 
Playground is protected by art. 97 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, the judgment in favor of the 
defendants is vacated.  Where the parties have agreed that, if 
the land is so protected, judgment should enter for the 
plaintiffs converting the preliminary injunction into a 
permanent injunction, we remand the case to the Superior Court 
for the issuance of such a judgment consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.