Title: State v. Durbin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48501
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 13, 2003

FILED: February 13, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
	v.
THOMAS EVERETT DURBIN,
Petitioner on Review.
(CR980102; CA A105880; SC S48501)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 1, 2002.
	Beth Corbo, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause
and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her on the
brief was David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
	Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
	BALMER, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Crook County Circuit Court, Gary Thompson,
Judge (Order Denying Motion to Suppress), Carl W. Hopp,
Judge Pro Tempore (Judgment). 172 Or App 515, 23 P3d 363 (2001).
	** Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
		BALMER, J.
		Defendant was charged with driving under the influence
of intoxicants (DUII). (1)  He moved to suppress the results of his
breath test, arguing that the presence within earshot of the
arresting officer when he consulted a lawyer by telephone before
taking the breath test violated his right to counsel under the
Oregon Constitution.  The trial court denied defendant's motion
to suppress the results of the breath test, and he was convicted
after a trial to the court based on stipulated facts.  In an en
banc decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with four judges
dissenting.  State v. Durbin, 172 Or App 515, 23 P3d 363 (2001). 
We allowed defendant's petition for review and now reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
		We take the following facts from the record.  Defendant
was arrested for DUII after a traffic stop.  The arresting
officer took defendant to the county jail and began the process
required to administer a breath test to determine defendant's
blood-alcohol level.  As discussed below, a 15-minute observation
period must precede administration of a breath test.  The officer
began the observation period and also started a tape recorder to
record his conversation with defendant.  When the officer began
to ask questions from an Oregon State Police form, defendant
stated that he wanted to talk to a lawyer.  The officer stopped
questioning defendant and asked defendant if he had a lawyer. 
When defendant replied that he did not, the officer provided him
with a list of lawyers and turned off the tape recorder. 
Defendant then attempted to contact by telephone a lawyer from
among those on the list that the officer had provided.  On the
fifth try, defendant reached a lawyer who was willing to consult
with him by telephone.  The arresting officer remained in the
room and within earshot while defendant conferred with that
lawyer. 
		After defendant finished that telephone conversation,
he agreed to continue.  The officer then read to defendant from
an implied consent form provided by the Department of
Transportation, informing defendant that he was about to be asked
to take a breath test and that he would be subject to criminal
penalties if the test established that he was under the influence
of an intoxicant. (2)  The officer also informed defendant of the
consequences of any refusal to take a breath test and then asked
defendant questions about his activities that evening.  Defendant
answered all the officer's questions.  		
		After the officer finished interviewing defendant, 
defendant agreed to take a breath test.  The results of that test
showed that defendant's blood-alcohol level was .13 percent.  As
noted above, defendant was charged with DUII.  He moved to
suppress the results of his breath test, arguing that his right
to counsel was violated because he was denied private
consultation with counsel. (3)  		
		At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer
testified that he was required by law to observe defendant for 15
minutes before asking him if he wanted to take a breath test. 
The officer explained that, during that 15-minute period, he was
required to watch and listen for any regurgitation, burping, or
other action that might contaminate the breath test results. (4) 
The officer also testified that he did not leave the room when
defendant spoke to his lawyer because he would not have been able
to "watch and listen" as required during the observation period
if he had been outside the room.  The trial court denied the
motion to suppress the results of the breath test, concluding
that the officer's presence was justified under the circumstances
and did not deny defendant the right to counsel.  Defendant
waived his right to a jury trial and, as noted above, was
convicted after a court trial on stipulated facts.  
		Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, en banc,
affirmed, holding that the arresting officer's presence in the
room while defendant conferred with his lawyer did not violate
defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11, because
defendant had not requested privacy.  Durbin, 172 Or App at 521. 
Absent such a request, the Court of Appeals held, the state need
not justify the limitations that it placed on defendant's privacy
in this case.  Accordingly, the majority concluded, the trial
court did not err in failing to suppress evidence from the breath
test.  Four judges dissented.  They would have held that
defendant did not have to make an independent request that he be
allowed to consult with his lawyer privately.  In their view, the
officer violated defendant's right to counsel under Article I,
section 11, by remaining within earshot without sufficient
justification.  Id. at 527 (Haselton, J., dissenting).  We
allowed defendant's petition for review.
		Defendant argues that the right to consult privately
with counsel is inherent in the right to counsel that Article I,
section 11, provides.  It follows, he contends, that the police
must afford an arrested driver the opportunity to consult
privately with counsel, even if the arrested driver does not make
an independent request to consult privately. (5)  He also argues
that, even if the police may limit an arrested driver's right to
consult privately in some circumstances, the only justification
offered here -- that the observation period already had begun --
is insufficient.
		The state responds that the arrested driver enjoys only
a limited right to seek legal advice in such circumstances and
that that right does not include the right to confer with counsel
in private.  Alternatively, the state argues that, if the right
to counsel at that stage of the criminal proceeding includes the
right to confer with counsel in private, then the arrested driver
at least must request privacy before the police will be required
to provide it, and defendant failed to make that request. 
Finally, the state contends that any limitation on defendant's
right to consult with his lawyer privately was justified because
the officer already had begun the 15-minute observation period
that must precede the breath test.
		We agree with the parties that our analysis of this
right-to-counsel question concerning a driver's decision to
submit to a breath test must begin with this court's decision in 
State v. Spencer, 305 Or 59, 750 P2d 147 (1988).  In Spencer, an
arrested driver, upon being advised of the implied consent law
and of the consequences of refusing to take a breath test, asked
the police officer if he could call his lawyer before deciding
whether to submit to the test.  After the officer told him that
he could not call his lawyer, the driver submitted to the breath
test.  The driver later moved to suppress the results of that
test, arguing that his right to counsel under Article I, section
11, had been violated.  
		This court first considered whether an arrested driver
who has not been charged formally with a crime enjoys the right
to counsel under Article I, section 11, which guarantees the
right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions."  This court
noted that "[a] person taken into formal custody by the police on
a potentially criminal charge is confronted with the full legal
power of the state, regardless of whether a formal charge has
been filed."  The court, therefore, concluded that, when that
custody is "complete," the person is "ensnared in a 'criminal
prosecution'" for purposes of Article I, section 11, and enjoys
the right to counsel.  305 Or at 74.
		The Spencer court noted, however, that the right to
counsel at that stage of the criminal prosecution is not as broad
as the right to counsel that an accused enjoys at trial.  The
court explained: 
	"The evanescent nature of the evidence the police seek
to obtain may justify substantially limiting the time
in which the person may exercise his or her  Article I,
section 11, right, but it does not justify doing away
with it.
		"We hold that, under the right to counsel clause
in Article I, section 11, an arrested driver has the
right upon request to a reasonable opportunity to
obtain legal advice before deciding whether to submit
to a breath test."
Id. at 74-75.
		Because, in Spencer, the police had given the arrested
driver no opportunity to speak to his lawyer, that case did not
require that this court discuss whether the police could place
limits -- other than a time limit -- on an arrested driver's
opportunity to obtain legal advice without running afoul of
Article I, section 11.  Defendant argues that, under Spencer, the
only permissible limitation is as to the period of time within
which the arrested driver has the opportunity to consult with
counsel, because it is only such a limitation that is justified
by the "evanescent nature of the evidence."  Therefore, he
argues, once the arrested driver invokes the right to counsel,
the police must provide the opportunity to consult with counsel
in private because such private consultation is inherent in the
right to counsel.  The state counters that other "practical
necessities inherent in" the administration of the breath test
justify limitations on the arrested driver's opportunity to
consult with counsel, including, as in this case, the officer's
need to observe the arrested driver for an uninterrupted period
of 15 minutes before administering the test. 		
		We first consider whether the right to counsel
necessarily includes the right to confer privately with counsel.
When analyzing an original constitutional provision, this court
examines the specific wording of the provision, case law
interpreting the provision, and the historical circumstances that
led to its creation.  Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840
P2d 65 (1992).  The relevant words of Article I, section 11 --
that an accused has the right "to be heard by himself and
counsel" -- do not give specific guidance in determining whether
the right to counsel includes the right to confer privately with
counsel.  Our cases, however, provide some assistance.  As we
held in Spencer, the right to counsel entitles the arrested
driver, upon request, to a "reasonable opportunity to obtain
legal advice before deciding whether to submit to a breath test." 
305 Or at 74.  When one seeks legal advice, the protections of
the lawyer-client privilege are implicated, because appropriate
legal advice requires frank communication between the client and
the lawyer.  As this court has recognized, "The purpose of the * * * privilege 'is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.'"  State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492, 500, 942 P2d
261 (1997) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 389,
101 S Ct 677, 66 L Ed 2d 584 (1981)).  See also State v. Jancsek,
302 Or 270, 274, 730 P2d 14 (1986) ("Lawyers can act effectively
only when fully advised of the facts by the parties whom they
represent[.]"). 	
		The foregoing descriptions show why the purpose of the
lawyer-client privilege cannot be fulfilled unless the
communications between a client and a lawyer are confidential. 
Confidentiality lies at the heart of the privilege, for unless
the communication is "not intended to be disclosed to third
persons," it is not protected by the privilege at all.  See OEC
503(1)(b) (defining "confidential communication" for purposes of
lawyer-client privilege).  For that reason, we agree with
defendant -- and with both the majority and dissenting opinions
in the Court of Appeals, see 172 Or App at 521 (majority); id. at
524 (dissent) -- that confidentiality is "inherent" in the right
to counsel.  Accordingly, we hold that, when an individual has a
constitutional right to consult with counsel, that right includes
the right to confer privately with counsel.
		We next consider the question that divided the Court of
Appeals:  whether defendant was required to make a separate
request that he be allowed to consult privately with his lawyer.  
As to that issue, we agree with defendant that his invocation of
the right to counsel included the invocation of his right to
consult with his lawyer privately.  As previously noted, this
court held in Spencer that, when an arrested driver requests
counsel, Article I, section 11, requires that the police afford
the driver a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice.  305
Or at 74.  The cases cited above demonstrate that the
confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and a client
is critical to the lawyer-client privilege and to the right to
counsel.  Thus, the request for counsel, by itself, indicates
that the arrested driver wants the essential elements that inhere
in that right, including the opportunity for confidential
communication.  A driver arrested for DUII who asks to speak to a
lawyer need not make a further, independent request for
confidentiality.
		Having concluded that defendant's right to counsel
included the right to confer privately with counsel and that his
invocation of the right to counsel was sufficient to request an
opportunity to confer privately, we now consider whether, on this
record, the presence of the police officer violated defendant's
right to counsel.  Defendant argues that the presence of the
officer within earshot while defendant conferred with his lawyer
by telephone violated the confidentiality that is inherent in the
right to counsel and, therefore, violated Article I, section 11.  
		The state's response is two-fold.  First, the state
argues that, although the officer did not allow defendant to
confer privately with his lawyer, the officer did not violate
defendant's right to counsel because there was no evidence that
defendant's ability to consult with his lawyer in this case was
"chilled" or otherwise affected by the officer's presence. 
Second, the state contends that, even if the officer's presence
violated defendant's right to counsel, that violation was
justified, because the officer needed to remain close to
defendant to continue the observation period that was under way
when defendant invoked his right to counsel.  
		In support of its first argument, the state asserts
that defendant made no showing that the officer's presence while
defendant consulted with his lawyer interfered with defendant's
right to counsel.  Even if defendant's right to consult a lawyer
in private was violated, the state suggests, defendant failed to
show that he felt "chilled" by the officer's presence or that he
would have made a different decision about taking the breath test
had the officer not been present.  We conclude, however, that
defendant is not required to make such a showing.  
		As we discussed previously, the right to communicate
confidentially is fundamental to the relationship between a
lawyer and a client.  For those reasons, the presence of the
officer within earshot while defendant consulted with his lawyer
breached the confidentiality of the lawyer-client communication
and violated defendant's right to counsel under Article I,
section 11.  In Spencer, this court suppressed the results of the
defendant's breath test after concluding that his constitutional
right was violated, despite the absence of evidence that the
defendant would have obtained and followed legal advice that he
not take the test.  305 Or at 75.  We stated that "[w]e will not
speculate" as to the advice that the defendant would have been
given or what the defendant's decision based on that advice would
have been, concluding instead that "[t]he violation of
defendant's right to counsel in this case requires exclusion of
the breath test results."  Id. at 76.  Similarly, we will not
speculate here as to the effect of the arresting officer's
presence on defendant's communications with his lawyer or
defendant's decision to take the breath test.  As in Spencer, we
conclude that the violation of defendant's right to counsel in
this case requires exclusion of the breath test results.
		As to the state's second argument, we conclude that the
fact that the officer had begun the observation period before
defendant requested counsel does not justify the officer's
continued presence while defendant consulted with counsel.  As
noted above, the officer testified that applicable administrative
rules require that a valid breath test be preceded by a 15-minute
observation period, that he had begun the observation period
before defendant requested counsel, and that he remained in the
room with defendant so he could "watch and listen" to defendant
as part of his required observation.  However, the fact that an
observation period required by rule or statute would have to be
terminated is insufficient, standing alone, to justify a
violation of defendant's constitutional right to consult with his
lawyer privately.  
		The state asserts that Spencer recognized the limited
nature of the constitutional right to counsel before taking a
breath test and balanced that right against the need to
administer the test quickly.  The state notes that this court
stated in Spencer that, "[b]ecause evidence of an arrested
driver's blood alcohol dissipates over time, the state is not
required to wait for a long period of time before administering
the test."  305 Or at 75.  The state then points to the comment
in Spencer that "a period of 15 minutes after the request to take
the test has been made will doubtless suffice in most cases," id.
at n 5, and argues that, because defendant did not request
counsel until after the 15-minute observation period already had
begun, the officer was not required to interrupt the observation
period.  
		Spencer does not stand for the proposition asserted by
the state.  The reference to a "period of 15 minutes" in Spencer
is to the time that normally will be sufficient for a person to
contact and consult with a lawyer after that person invokes the
right to counsel, not to the 15-minute observation period before
a breath test.  Neither does Spencer hold that a request for
counsel made after the observation period has begun is "too late"
to require that the consultation with counsel be confidential. 
Ordinarily, it will not be, and this is not the extraordinary
case in which the officer testified, for example, that his
presence was necessary because so much time had elapsed since
defendant's arrest that the officer reasonably feared that he
would be unable to obtain a valid breath test by restarting the
observation period after defendant had a reasonable period of
time to speak privately with a lawyer. 
		In summary, we hold that a driver arrested for DUII
has, upon invoking the right to counsel, the right to a
reasonable opportunity to consult privately with counsel before
deciding whether to submit to a breath test.  To obtain evidence
of an arrested driver's blood alcohol level without violating the
driver's right to counsel, police might find it preferable to
inform the driver of their intent to administer the breath test
and then, if the driver requests counsel, to allow the driver a
reasonable time in which to seek legal advice, in private, before
beginning the required observation period.
		Because, in this case, defendant's right to consult
with a lawyer before deciding whether to take the breath test was
violated, the trial court should have suppressed the breath test
evidence.  Spencer, 305 Or at 76.  Defendant's conviction at
trial was based on that evidence and must be reversed.
		For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court and
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.


1. 	Under ORS 813.010:
		"(1) A person commits the offense of driving while
under the influence of intoxicants if the person drives
a vehicle while the person:
		"(a) Has .08 percent or more by weight of alcohol
in the blood of the person as shown by chemical
analysis of the breath or blood * * *; [or]
		"(b) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor
* * *."	 

2. 	The "implied consent" law is set out in ORS 813.100 and 
provides in part:
		"(1) Any person who operates a motor vehicle * * *
shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the
implied consent law, to a chemical test of the person's
breath * * * for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content of the person's blood if the person
is arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 * * *.  Before the test is administered the person
requested to take the test shall be informed of
consequences and rights as described under ORS 813.130.
		"* * * * *.
		"(3) If a person refuses to take a test under this
section or if a breath test under this section
discloses that the person, at the time of the test, had
a level of alcohol in the person's blood that
constitutes being under the influence of intoxicating
liquor under ORS 813.300, the person's driving
privileges are subject to suspension under ORS 813.410 * * *."

3. 	Defendant also moved to suppress the statements that he
made after he invoked his right to counsel.  The trial court
granted that motion as to statements other than defendant's
consent to take the breath test, and the state does not cross-assign error to that ruling.

4. 	The procedure for the pre-test observation period is
set out in OAR 257-030-0070(2), which provides, in part:
		"The operator [must be] certain that the subject
has not taken anything by mouth (drinking, smoking,
eating, taking medication, etc.), vomited, or
regurgitated liquid from the stomach into mouth, for at
least fifteen minutes before taking the test[.]"	

5. 	The parties and the courts below use the terms
"privacy," "right to privacy," "right to consult privately," and
"confidentiality" interchangeably to describe the communications
between a lawyer and a client that are made in the context of
seeking and receiving legal advice and are not intended to be
disclosed to third persons.  Because the terms "privacy" and
"right to privacy" are widely used and have different meanings in
other areas of the law, we use the terms "confidentiality" or
"right to consult privately" to describe the interest that
defendant seeks to protect here.