Title: Glen Edward Rogers v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-732
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-732 
____________ 
 
GLEN EDWARD ROGERS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1730 
____________ 
 
GLEN EDWARD ROGERS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[January 18, 2007] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Glen Edward Rogers appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, and petitions 
this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order 
and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Rogers was convicted of the 1995 murder of Tina Marie Cribbs.  The 
pertinent facts of this case are set forth in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal as 
follows: 
Cribbs was last seen alive leaving the Showtown Bar in Tampa with 
Rogers on Sunday, November 5, 1995. A bartender testified that 
Rogers arrived at the bar around 11 a.m. Cribbs and three female 
friends arrived a few hours later. . . . Rogers asked Cribbs, the only 
single woman of the group, for “a ride” and she agreed. Upon leaving 
the bar with Rogers, Cribbs told one of her friends that she would be 
back in fifteen or twenty minutes to meet her mother. 
. . . . 
A motel clerk testified that Rogers had arrived at the motel by 
cab on Saturday, November 4, 1995. Rogers told the motel clerk that 
he was a truck driver whose truck had broken down. At that time, 
Rogers paid for a two-night stay. A desk clerk testified that Rogers 
returned to the motel office on Sunday evening, November 5, 1995. . . 
. According to the clerk, it appeared as if Rogers was packing a white 
Ford Festiva automobile. Rogers then entered the motel office, paid 
for an additional night’s stay at the motel, informed the clerk that he 
did not want anyone going into his room, and requested a “Do Not 
Disturb” sign. When the clerk informed Rogers that the motel did not 
have such signs, Rogers requested that the clerk leave a note for the 
cleaning crew not to enter and clean his room. The next morning, at 
approximately 9 a.m., the clerk saw Rogers leaving the motel alone in 
the same white automobile. The evidence at trial established that the 
white vehicle belonged to Cribbs. 
On Tuesday, November 7, 1995, a cleaning person at the motel 
went into the room that Rogers had rented. The cleaning person 
noticed a handwritten “Do Not Disturb” sign hanging on the 
 
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doorknob.  She testified that she had observed the same sign hanging 
on the door on Monday morning and thus did not enter the room to 
clean it. Upon entering the room on Tuesday, the cleaning person 
found Cribbs’ body in the bathroom. 
 
Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 2001) (footnote omitted).  One week 
later, Rogers was arrested while driving Cribbs’ car in Kentucky.  The Kentucky 
Police Department inventoried Cribbs’ car and found, among other things, blood-
stained blue jean shorts and a key to the motel room where Cribbs’ body was 
discovered.1   
 
At trial, the State’s pathologist stated that Cribbs died from two stab 
wounds—one to the chest and one to the buttocks.  The State’s forensic serologist 
testified that no evidence of semen was found in Cribbs’ body.  The State’s DNA 
expert acknowledged that neither Cribbs nor Rogers could be excluded as a 
contributor to the blood stains on the blue jean shorts.  Additionally, the State 
introduced evidence that Cribbs’ wallet was found at a highway rest area near 
Tallahassee on November 6, 1995, the same day the motel clerk said Rogers left 
                                          
 
1.  In our decision on direct appeal we stated that the blood-stained blue jean 
shorts were found in the motel bathroom and that a pair of blood-stained blue jeans 
was found in Cribbs’ car.  See Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 986 (Fla. 2001).  
Although the location of the evidence is not material to the issues raised on direct 
appeal or in this postconviction motion, we note that the pair of blood-stained blue 
jean shorts was found in Cribbs’ car and a pair of blood-stained black, as opposed 
to blue, jeans was found in the motel room. 
 
 
 
 
 
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the motel in Tampa.  A crime lab analysis of the wallet identified latent 
fingerprints belonging to Rogers.  Rogers introduced evidence that the area 
surrounding the motel was a high crime area, that many of the residents at the 
motel and within close proximity had criminal records, and that the Tampa Police 
Department failed to investigate any of these potential suspects.  Id. at 986-87.  
 
Rogers was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and grand theft 
of a motor vehicle.  Id. at 985.  The jury unanimously recommended the death 
penalty and the trial court sentenced Rogers to death.  Id. at 987. 2 
 
On direct appeal, Rogers raised ten issues.3  This Court rejected all of 
Rogers’ arguments and concluded that there was “competent substantial evidence 
                                          
 
 
2.  The trial court found two aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murder 
was committed for pecuniary gain; and (2) that the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”).  The trial court also found one statutory mitigating 
circumstance—that Rogers’ capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired 
(some weight)—and the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) 
Rogers had a childhood deprived of love, affection, and moral guidance, and 
lacked a moral upbringing of good family values (slight weight); (2) Rogers’ father 
was an alcoholic who physically abused Rogers’ mother in the presence of Rogers 
and his siblings (slight weight); (3) Rogers was introduced to controlled substances 
at a young age and encouraged by his older brother to participate in burglaries 
(slight weight); (4) Rogers has been lawfully and gainfully employed at various 
times in his adult life (slight weight); (5) Rogers was solely responsible for the care 
of his two children at one time in his adult life (slight weight); and (6) Rogers had 
been drinking alcohol for a few hours on the day he came into contact with the 
victim (little weight).  Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 987. 
 
 
3.  These issues were: (1) whether the trial court should have granted the 
motion for acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
 
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to support a conviction for first-degree murder based on either premeditation or 
felony murder.”  Id. at 990.  The Court affirmed Rogers’ convictions and death 
sentence.  Id.   
Rogers then filed an amended motion for postconviction relief under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.4  Following a Huff 5 hearing, the circuit court 
                                                                                                                                        
support premeditated or felony murder; (2) whether the evidence supported the 
pecuniary gain or HAC aggravators; (3) whether the trial court should have given 
the statutory mental mitigating circumstances at least great or significant weight 
and should have found the mitigating circumstance that the murder was committed 
while “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” § 
921.141, Fla. Stat. (1995); (4) whether the trial court erred when it failed to 
consider and appropriately weigh all mitigating circumstances as required by 
Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990); (5) whether the trial court should 
have allowed Rogers to obtain a Positron Emission Tomography Scan (PET-Scan); 
(6) whether the trial court should have granted the defense’s motion for mistrial 
after testimony concerning a prior criminal misdemeanor conviction in California 
was heard during the penalty phase; (7) whether the trial court should have 
declared a mistrial because the prosecutor made improper comments during the 
State’s penalty-phase closing argument; (8) whether the trial court should have 
granted Rogers’ motion to disqualify the state attorney’s office; (9) whether the 
trial court should have granted Rogers’ motion for a new trial due to newly 
discovered evidence; and (10) whether the death sentence is a disproportionate 
penalty in this case.  Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 987 n.2.   
 
 
4.  Rogers raised the following seven claims in his postconviction motion: 
(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and develop an 
alternative suspect; (2) newly discovered evidence regarding alleged improprieties 
at the lab that performed the DNA analysis; (3) ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for failing to object to improper prosecutorial comments during closing 
argument of the guilt phase; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to 
object to improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument of the penalty 
phase; (5) unconstitutionality of Florida’s death sentencing statute; (6) ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for failing to pursue a claim that Florida’s death 
sentencing statute is facially vague and overbroad, and is premised on fundamental 
 
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granted an evidentiary hearing on two of Rogers’ ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, namely, the failure to develop an alternative suspect and the failure to 
object to improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument of the penalty 
phase, and his cumulative error claim.  The circuit court summarily denied the rest 
of the claims. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Rogers presented the testimony of several 
witnesses, including Robert Fraser, Rogers’ penalty-phase counsel, who testified 
why he did not object to prosecutorial comments made during closing arguments 
of the penalty phase, and Nick Sinardi, Rogers’ guilt-phase counsel, who testified 
regarding his investigation into Joseph Lundin as an alternative suspect, his 
decision not to develop a defense implicating Lundin, and his reasons for not 
calling various witnesses at trial.  Additionally, Mitchell Monteverdi, a co-inmate 
of Rogers and Lundin, testified concerning an alleged statement Lundin made to 
Monteverdi wherein Lundin admitted killing Cribbs and depositions Monteverdi 
gave to prosecutors regarding the alleged jailhouse conspiracy to implicate Lundin 
in Cribbs’ murder.  Rogers testified regarding the alleged conspiracy to frame 
Lundin and why he thought certain witnesses did not testify at trial.  In rebuttal, the 
                                                                                                                                        
error; and (7) cumulative error for the “procedural and substantive errors” and 
appellate counsel’s failure to litigate these errors on appeal.   
 
 
5.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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State presented the testimony of Douglas Vieniek, an investigator for the state 
attorney, and Lyann Goudie, one of the prosecutors assigned to Rogers’ case.   
After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued an order denying relief 
on all remaining claims.  Rogers appeals and raises five issues for this Court’s 
review.6  Rogers also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising four 
issues.7  We address each of these issues below. 
                                          
 
 
6.  These issues are: (1) whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers’ 
claim that counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to develop an 
alternative suspect; (2) whether the circuit court erred in concluding that although 
the impropriety of the FBI lab was newly discovered evidence, the outcome of a 
new trial would not have been different; (3) whether the circuit court erred in 
denying an evidentiary hearing on Rogers’ claim that counsel was ineffective 
during the guilt phase for failing to object to improper prosecutorial comments 
during closing argument; (4) whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers’ 
claim that counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to object to 
improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument; and (5) whether, 
cumulatively, the combination of “procedural and substantive errors,” which 
appellate counsel failed to effectively litigate on appeal, deprived Rogers of a 
fundamentally fair trial. 
 
 
7.  These issues are: (1) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
to argue that the Florida death sentencing statute as applied violates the United 
States Constitution under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (2) whether section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes 
(2005), is facially vague and overbroad in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, whether such unconstitutionality is reversible error because the jury 
did not receive adequate guidance in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, whether Rogers’ death sentence is premised on fundamental error 
which must be corrected, and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
litigate these issues; (3) whether, cumulatively, the combination of procedural and 
substantive errors deprived Rogers of a fundamentally fair trial and whether 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate these issues on appeal; and 
 
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ANALYSIS 
A. 
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
1. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during the Guilt Phase 
 This Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be 
successful, two requirements must be satisfied: “As to the first prong, deficient 
performance, a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is 
outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing professional 
standards.”  Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 467 (Fla. 2003) (citations omitted).  As 
to the second prong, prejudice, a defendant must prove that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 
821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984)). 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  Morris, 931 So. 2d at 828.   
(A) 
Failure to Develop an Alternative Suspect 
                                                                                                                                        
(4) whether Rogers’ Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual 
punishment will be violated as he may be incompetent at the time of execution. 
 
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In his first issue on appeal, Rogers asserts that the lower court erred in 
denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence 
of an alternative suspect, Jonathan Lundin, and failing to present the testimony of 
Robert Thompson.  In the alternative, Rogers argues that prosecutorial misconduct 
deprived him of a reliable adversarial testing.  Each of these sub-claims will be 
addressed in turn. 
(i) 
Failure to Develop Joseph Lundin as an Alternative Suspect 
 
Rogers first contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that 
attorney Sinardi provided ineffective assistance by failing to develop and present 
evidence of an alternative suspect, Jonathan Lundin.  We disagree.   
Strategic decisions are not considered deficient performance when other 
courses have been weighed and the decision is reasonable under the circumstances.  
See, e.g., Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  Attorney Sinardi 
first learned of Lundin through an investigative report that detailed an interview 
with Mitchell Monteverdi, who was incarcerated with Rogers and Lundin during 
the period preceding Rogers’ trial.  He began by deposing Monteverdi to obtain 
sworn testimony of Lundin’s alleged statement against interest—“the bitch had to 
answer to me.”8  Counsel also searched Lundin’s criminal record report, compared 
                                          
 
 
8.  Monteverdi testified that he and Lundin were discussing Rogers’ case in 
prison and Monteverdi believed the statement meant Lundin killed Cribbs. 
 
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the autopsy reports of Cribbs and the victim of a murder by Lundin,9 and 
unsuccessfully attempted to locate witnesses who could identify Lundin as being in 
the vicinity of Rogers’ motel room at the time of the murder.  Attorney Sinardi 
ultimately decided, as a matter of trial strategy, that offering such evidence was not 
worth the risks to Rogers’ case.   
Monteverdi’s testimony would have been extremely risky to the defense.  
Not only would his credibility have been easily attacked,10 but the State could have 
impeached Monteverdi with his prior inconsistent statement acknowledging the 
existence of a jailhouse conspiracy to frame Lundin for Cribbs’ murder.11  
Furthermore, the State could have introduced evidence to prove the existence of 
the jailhouse conspiracy.  Therefore, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to 
develop Lundin as an alternative suspect. 
 
In addition, Rogers has failed to demonstrate prejudice that “so affected the 
fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is 
                                                                                                                                        
 
 
9.  Attorney Sinardi recalled that the depth and location of the wounds were 
similar, but the victim’s body in Lundin’s trial was too decomposed to allege any 
significant similarities.   
 
 
10.  Monteverdi was serving a fifteen-year prison sentence for multiple 
forgeries, burglaries, and grand theft. 
 
 
11.  A confidential informant notified prosecutors of an alleged conspiracy, 
whereby Lundin, Rogers and several others would frame Lundin for the murder 
because Lundin believed he was going to get the death penalty for a different 
murder. 
 
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undermined.”  Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1104-05 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 206 (2006).  First, Lundin was not a viable alternative suspect.  
Prosecutor Goudie testified at the evidentiary hearing that she was confident 
Lundin was not in Florida at the time of Cribbs’ murder because she was the 
prosecutor on Lundin’s murder case and was privy to information regarding his 
location at the time in question.  Had Rogers attempted to offer Lundin as an 
alternative suspect, the prosecutor would have established that Lundin could not 
possibly have committed this murder.  Second, as noted above, the State could 
have impeached Monteverdi on his testimony implicating Lundin by introducing 
his prior inconsistent statement and offered substantive evidence of the conspiracy 
to frame Lundin for Cribbs’ murder.  Third, the evidence against Rogers was 
overwhelming.  The State had introduced a wealth of incriminating evidence 
against Rogers: Cribbs was last seen leaving a bar with Rogers; a motel clerk 
testified that, on the day after the murder, she saw Rogers pack suitcases into 
Cribbs’ automobile, pay for an additional night and repeatedly demand that no one 
go into his room; Rogers made elaborate efforts to keep hotel staff from entering 
his room, including writing a “Do Not Disturb” sign on his door; Cribbs’ wallet 
containing Rogers’ fingerprints was found in a highway rest stop outside 
Tallahassee; and Rogers was arrested in Kentucky while driving Cribbs’ 
automobile, which contained the key to the motel room where Cribbs was found 
 
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murdered.  Even if none of the risks of presenting Lundin as an alternative suspect 
discussed above were present, trial counsel’s rejection of this strategy would not 
undermine our confidence in the outcome. 
(ii)  
Failure to Present Robert Thompson as a Witness 
Rogers next contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel relating to the testimony of Thomas Ambrose by failing to call another 
witness, Robert Thompson.  Ambrose was discovered during the penalty phase of 
the trial and testified that he saw Cribbs with another individual (not Rogers) on 
the evening of the murder.  See Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 1003.  Rogers moved for a 
new trial based on this newly discovered evidence.  The trial court denied the 
motion because the testimony “would not have produced an acquittal on retrial.”  
Id.  On appeal, this Court affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that Ambrose’s 
testimony “was inconsistent, incredible, unbelievable, and [contradicted] the 
physical evidence in the case.”  Id. at 1004.  
In his amended rule 3.851 motion, Rogers argued that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to call Thompson because he would have testified that he 
saw Cribbs walking back toward the hotel with an older white male on the night of 
the murder.  Rogers contended that if Thompson had been called to testify at trial, 
the similar account given by newly discovered witness Ambrose would have 
provided sufficient corroboration to create reasonable doubt and justify a new trial. 
 
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First, this assertion is simply unsupported by the record.  According to trial 
counsel, Thompson would have testified that he saw Cribbs with an “older white 
male” on the night of the murder, whereas Ambrose testified that he saw Cribbs 
with a Mexican or Hispanic male.  Thompson would not have corroborated 
Ambrose’s testimony; rather, he likely would have contradicted it.  Second, 
defense counsel stated that Thompson would have provided extremely damaging 
testimony that Rogers was the last man he saw Cribbs with that night, that Rogers 
told Thompson to call him Kentucky, that Rogers was acting suspicious, that 
Rogers was “fumbling” with Cribbs’ car, and that Thompson was scared of Rogers 
in general.  Counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to call Thompson 
because his testimony could have seriously damaged Rogers’ defense and, in fact, 
could have further implicated Rogers in the crime.  Thus, counsel was not deficient 
for failing to call Thompson.   See Lamarca v. State, 931 So. 2d 838, 849 (Fla. 
2006) (denying ineffective assistance claim for failing to call a witness when 
defense counsel believed that the testimony would have been incriminating to the 
defense); Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417, 428 (Fla. 2002) (denying ineffective 
assistance claim for failing to call witnesses when defense counsel reasonably 
feared the witnesses would implicate the defendant in the crime).  Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court’s denial of relief as to this sub-claim. 
(iii) 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
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Rogers next alleges that two instances of prosecutorial misconduct during 
the guilt phase deprived him of a reliable adversarial testing.  The lower court 
determined that this claim was cognizable as a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and then summarily denied it on the merits.  However, Rogers failed to 
specifically plead any valid ineffective assistance claim in either the amended rule 
3.851 motion or his initial brief on appeal to this Court; rather, he chose to 
substantively argue the issue as one of prosecutorial misconduct.   
First, Rogers asserts that the State’s warrantless search of the jail was 
improper.  We have consistently held that “substantive claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct could and should [be] raised on direct appeal and are thus procedurally 
barred from consideration in a post-conviction motion.”  Spencer v. State, 842 So. 
2d 52, 60 (Fla. 2003); see also Lamarca, 931 So. 2d at 851 n.8 (holding 
postconviction claims of prosecutorial misconduct procedurally barred because 
they could have been raised on direct appeal).  Accordingly, we affirm the denial 
of this claim on grounds that it is procedurally barred.   
Additionally, Rogers asserts that the prosecutor’s actions in taking an 
unnoticed deposition of Monteverdi and threatening him with perjury dissuaded 
Monteverdi from testifying for the defense.  As previously stated, Monteverdi’s 
testimony would have seriously jeopardized the defense’s case and counsel’s 
failure to present him as a witness does not undermine our confidence in the 
 
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outcome.  Thus, any claim alleging that prejudice resulted in the failure of 
Monteverdi to testify because of prosecutorial misconduct is likewise without 
merit. 
(B) 
Failure to Object During Guilt-Phase Closing Argument 
 
In his next issue on appeal, Rogers contends that the trial court erred in 
summarily denying his claim that counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for 
failing to object to improper prosecutorial comments during the State’s closing 
argument.  Specifically, Rogers argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the following comments: (1) repeatedly referring to defense counsel’s 
vivid imagination and how the defense’s closing argument was a product of that 
imagination; (2) bolstering the credibility of Dr. Schultz, the State’s expert who 
performed the autopsy; and (3) bolstering the credibility of the Kentucky Police 
Department, which arrested Rogers and performed serology and fingerprint testing 
on the vehicle and the items founds therein.  The circuit court summarily denied 
this claim, finding the prosecutor’s comments to be proper rebuttal when viewed in 
tandem with defense counsel’s closing argument.12  We agree with this assessment.   
After reviewing the guilt-phase closing arguments, we disagree with Rogers’ 
assertion that the arguments regarding Dr. Schultz and the Kentucky Police 
                                          
 
 
12.  Here, there is no factual dispute as to what each attorney said during 
their respective closing arguments; thus, the trial court did not err when it reviewed 
the record, made a legal determination that the comments were proper, and denied 
the claim without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
 
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Department constituted impermissible bolstering.  Defense counsel directly 
attacked the credibility of Dr. Schultz and the Kentucky police witnesses, and the 
prosecutor’s response to these attacks was within the permissible bounds of 
advocacy.  Similarly, we disagree with Rogers’ assertion that the prosecutor’s 
arguments regarding defense counsel were improper.  The prosecutor’s comments 
rebutted defense counsel’s closing argument, in which he presented theories that 
were not based on facts in evidence.  Because none of the closing arguments were 
improper, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective in failing to object to them.  See 
Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 997 (Fla. 2006) (holding that defense counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to object because none of the comments were 
improper); Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1166 (Fla. 2006) (holding that defense 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to comments that were proper 
responses to the preceding argument by the defense).   
2. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase 
 
Rogers next asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that defense 
counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to object to the prosecutor’s 
comments during the penalty-phase closing argument.13  Specifically, Rogers 
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the following 
                                          
 
 
13.  Unlike the claim related to the State’s guilt-phase closing argument, the 
trial court held an evidentiary hearing on whether trial counsel was ineffective by 
failing to object during the State’s penalty-phase closing argument.   
 
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prosecutorial comments: discussing the victim’s perceptions and thoughts just 
before her death; denigrating the statutory mitigator that Rogers had an impaired 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct by asserting that voluntary 
intoxication and brain damage are no excuse for murder; denigrating the non-
statutory mitigator that Rogers had a childhood deprived of love and affection by 
asserting that Rogers was an adult who should stop blaming his parents for his 
behavior; and making the “Desert Storm” argument by comparing her father’s 
sense of duty to serve in the military, even when faced with brain cancer, to the 
jury’s duty to sentence Rogers to death.  This Court reviewed the prosecutor’s 
comments about voluntary intoxication, a childhood deprived of love, and “Desert 
Storm” on direct appeal; however, we have not previously addressed the comments 
regarding the victim’s perceptions prior to death and Rogers’ alleged brain 
damage.   
We will begin our analysis by examining the propriety of the comments 
because, as stated in connection with the guilt-phase closing argument claim, trial 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to arguments that are 
proper.  First, we address the two prosecutorial comments that were not 
specifically raised on direct appeal.   
Rogers initially alleges that the prosecutor improperly theorized about 
Cribbs’ perceptions at the time of the murder.  The prosecutor stated the following: 
 
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We know that she knew she was going to be killed, . . . we 
know when she was stabbed the first time, she didn’t become 
unconscious; she remained conscious and she could feel the pain of 
the knife going through her body and could feel the pain of the knife 
as it was twisted and pulled out of her body, and then he did it again. 
. . . . 
What weight do you give to the ten, twenty minutes where she 
was there in that bathroom reflecting back on her life, on the things 
that she hadn’t done that she wished she could, the opportunities that 
had never been presented to her, on her children that she would never 
see again, on her mother who loved her so dearly . . . . 
 
These arguments were not improper because they were based upon facts in 
evidence—the victim was stabbed twice, she struggled with her assailant, and she 
remained alive for at least a short period of time after being stabbed.  See Rogers, 
783 So. 2d at 994.  Additionally, this is not a case in which the prosecutor made an 
improper “golden rule” argument by attempting to place the jury in the position of 
the victim.  See Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 358-59 (Fla. 1988) (holding that 
comments such as, “[Y]ou can just imagine the pain of [the victim] . . . . Imagine 
the anguish and the pain [the victim] felt,” improperly placed the jury in the 
position of the victim) (first alteration in original).  Rather, the prosecutor was 
describing the heinousness of the crime for the purpose of establishing the HAC 
aggravator.  This Court has held that for purposes of the HAC aggravator, “a 
common-sense inference as to the victim’s mental state may be inferred from the 
circumstances.”  Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. 1997).  Accordingly, we 
conclude that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object.  
 
 
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Rogers also contends that the prosecutor improperly denigrated the statutory 
mitigator concerning his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct by 
stating: “Mr. Rogers is a violent, aggressive person and brain damage has nothing 
to do with it.”  Although we have held that denigrating a statutory mitigator is 
improper, see Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 904 (Fla. 2000) (holding that 
repeated characterization of mitigating circumstances as “flimsy,” “phantom,” and 
“excuses” was improper denigration), that is not what occurred in this case.  The 
prosecutor was merely responding to defense counsel’s argument that Rogers’ 
aggressive behavior was due to a history of head trauma, a brain contusion, and 
damage to the frontal and temporal lobes of his brain.  Accordingly, counsel is 
likewise not deficient for failing to object to this comment. 
Second, we address the prosecutorial comments raised by Rogers that were 
previously reviewed on direct appeal: the discussion of voluntary intoxication as it 
related to the statutory mitigator of an impaired capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of the conduct, the discussion of the nonstatutory mitigator of a 
childhood deprived of love, and the “Desert Storm” comment.  The only comment 
we found improper was the reference to Desert Storm.  Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 1002.  
Because trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to 
comments that are proper, see Mungin, 932 So. 2d at 997, the failure to object to 
the Desert Storm reference is the sole remaining basis of this ineffective assistance 
 
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claim.  Thus, Rogers must establish that the failure to object to this single comment 
constitutes deficient performance and that, as a result of the deficient performance, 
our confidence in the penalty-phase outcome is undermined.  We do not address 
deficient performance because we conclude that prejudice has not been established.     
During penalty-phase closing argument, prosecutor Cox discussed how her 
father decided to serve in Operation Desert Storm even after being diagnosed with 
brain cancer.  Essentially, Cox equated her father’s “noble sacrifice for his country 
with the jury’s moral duty” to sentence Rogers to death.  Addressing this argument 
on direct appeal, we held that this “single unobjected-to argument [did not] 
constitute fundamental error, nor does it warrant a mistrial.”  Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 
1002 (citation omitted).  This Court has held that counsel’s failure to object to 
improper comments cannot prejudice the outcome if the comments were raised on 
direct appeal and do not rise to the level of fundamental error.  See Chandler v. 
State, 848 So. 2d 1031, 1045-46 (Fla. 2003).14   
Moreover, the existence of strong aggravation and relatively weak 
mitigation further supports our conclusion that prejudice cannot be demonstrated.  
                                          
 
 
13.  Rogers asserts that our holding in Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 
1999), requires reversal of his death sentence.  In Ruiz, we condemned Cox’s use 
of this identical comment during closing argument and reversed Ruiz’s sentence 
based on this argument and the existence of a multitude of other improper 
comments and prosecutorial overreaching.  743 So. 2d at 6-7.  Although we agree 
that the comment was improper, this case is not like Ruiz, in which the prosecutor 
made several improper comments which compromised “the integrity of the judicial 
process” and irreparably tainted the sentence.  Id. at 7.   
 
- 20 -
Because we find that Rogers has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to 
object to any of the prosecutorial comments resulted in ineffective assistance, we 
affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on this claim.  
3.   
Newly Discovered Evidence 
In his next issue on appeal, Rogers asserts that newly discovered evidence 
renders his conviction unreliable and compels a new trial.  Specifically, he alleges 
that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that newly discovered 
evidence of alleged improprieties at the FBI lab would have impeached the 
testimony of the State’s DNA expert, Dr. Baechetel, and vitiated the only piece of 
evidence implicating Rogers in Cribbs’ murder—a pair of Rogers’ blue jean shorts 
that contained a mixed stain of biological materials. 
At trial, Dr. Baechetel testified that he performed the DNA analysis of the 
mixed stain found on Rogers’ blue jean shorts.  He explained that he used the PCR 
method of analysis on the mixed stain, which is less likely than other DNA tests to 
exclude possible contributors to a sample.  Neither Cribbs nor Rogers could be 
excluded as contributors to the DNA in the stain.  Dr. Baechetel also stated that he 
could not exclude Cribbs as a major contributor to the stain, i.e., that Cribbs’ DNA 
constituted more of the total DNA than that of any other contributor, and he 
similarly could not exclude Rogers as a minor contributor.  On cross-examination, 
Dr. Baechetel agreed that the source of DNA can be any number of bodily fluids.  
 
- 21 -
He also admitted that there was no way to determine what fluid other than blood 
was in this mixed stain, when the fluids in the mixed stain were deposited, which 
person’s fluid was deposited first, or how many other potential contributors were 
associated with this stain. 
 
At trial, Dr. Acton, the defense expert, generally concurred with Dr. 
Baechetel, agreeing that the methodology and testing methods were standard 
protocols and the PCR method of testing had less discriminatory power than other 
DNA tests.  He testified that the mixed stain had the DNA of at least two 
contributors and neither Cribbs nor Rogers could be excluded.  Dr. Acton further 
agreed with Dr. Baechetel that it was impossible to determine what biological fluid 
may have contributed to the mixed stain.  However, unlike Dr. Baechetel, Dr. 
Acton did not believe it could be determined who was the major or minor 
contributor to the mixed stain. 
In April 1997, the Office of the Inspector General issued an investigative 
report (OIG report) describing poor laboratory practices in several units at the 
FBI’s crime lab.15  The initial report was limited to three specific units within the 
lab, but additional research later revealed similar improprieties within the DNA 
                                          
 
 
15.  Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The FBI 
Laboratory: An Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in 
Explosives-Related and Other Cases (1997), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9704a/. 
 
 
- 22 -
unit.  These supplementary findings regarding the DNA unit were presented to the 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight in September 1997.16  
In summarily denying this claim, the trial court found:  
The newly discovered evidence does not specifically address 
the work of Frank Samuel Baechetel.  Furthermore, Dr. Baechetel’s 
opinion simply stated that the victim could not be excluded as a 
contributor to a stain found on Defendant’s shorts and that Defendant 
could not be excluded as a contributor to a stain found on Defendant’s 
shorts.  If this opinion was the sole basis for the conviction, then the 
Court would be more inclined to believe the outcome of the trial was 
tainted.  However, the State provided substantial, competent other 
evidence to sustain the conviction.  As such, there is no evidence that 
the outcome of the trial probably would have been different had this 
newly discovered evidence been introduced.  Therefore, Defendant is 
not entitled to any relief on this claim. 
 
(Transcript citation omitted.)  Essentially, the trial court concluded that the newly 
discovered evidence did not specifically call into question the work of the State’s 
expert; that the opinion of the State’s expert did not conclusively establish that 
Rogers murdered Cribbs; and that the State expert’s testimony was not the sole 
basis for the conviction.  Accordingly, the trial court concluded that introduction of 
the new evidence probably would not have changed the outcome.  We agree. 
For a conviction to be set aside based on newly discovered evidence, two 
requirements must be met:  First, the trial court, the party, or counsel must not have 
                                          
 
 
16.  Although the improprieties addressed technician incompetence, 
inaccurate record-keeping, and the fabrication of test results, neither the test results 
in this case nor the expert who testified for the State were specifically identified 
within this newly discovered evidence. 
 
- 23 -
known of the evidence at the time of trial, and it must appear that defense counsel 
could not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the newly discovered 
evidence “must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.”  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II).  Newly 
discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it “weakens 
the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his 
culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)). 
 
In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the trial court must 
“consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible.”  Jones v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I).  This determination includes 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also 
determine whether the evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence.  
Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 521 (citations omitted).   
 
The first requirement under Jones II is that the evidence must be newly 
discovered, i.e., evidence that, at the time of trial, was not known and could not 
have become known by the use of due diligence.  709 So. 2d at 521.  The State 
does not contest this prong and we accept the lower court’s conclusion that the 
evidence is newly discovered. 
 
- 24 -
 
The second requirement under Jones II is that the newly discovered evidence 
must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  Id.  
Because this portion of the test requires the Court to “evaluate the weight of both 
the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial,” 
we must also discuss the remaining evidence of guilt produced at trial.  Jones I, 
591 So. 2d at 916. 
 
In addition to Dr. Baechetel’s testimony concerning the results of the DNA 
testing of the mixed stain, the State presented substantial evidence implicating 
Rogers in the murder.  Witnesses testified that Rogers was seen leaving a bar with 
Cribbs on the afternoon of the murder and that he was seen packing a white Ford 
Festiva, identified as Cribbs’ automobile, at his motel that same evening.  A motel 
clerk testified that after she saw Rogers packing the car, Rogers paid for an 
additional night and told the clerk not to allow housekeeping to enter his room.  
She also stated that she saw Rogers leave the motel in Cribbs’ car the next 
morning.  The cleaning crew found a handwritten “Do Not Disturb” sign hanging 
on the door of Rogers’ motel room and then entered the room, discovering Cribbs’ 
clothed body in the bathtub.  Rogers’ fingerprints were found on Cribbs’ wallet, 
which was left at a highway rest stop near Tallahassee, and Rogers was 
 
- 25 -
apprehended in Cribbs’ automobile in Kentucky.17  Upon arrest, Rogers claimed 
that he met a girl at a bar and brought her to his motel room, and that she loaned 
him the car.  He stated that he left to get cigarettes and beer and never returned.  
He also told police that he could not tell them the truth.  See Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 
985-86. 
 
Rogers contends that when evaluated with the evidence described above, the 
information concerning the alleged improprieties at the FBI lab would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial because this information vitiates the only evidence 
linking Rogers to the murder.  This contention is not borne out by the record in this 
case.   
First, nothing in the OIG report or related documents points to specific 
improprieties with the sample in this case or with Dr. Baechetel’s practices in 
general.  At most, the report calls into question the reliability of the lab overall and 
could have been used to impeach Dr. Baechetel’s testimony as to the validity of the 
results.   
Second, even if this Court were to conclude that the newly discovered 
evidence vitiates the DNA results, this is not the only piece of evidence connecting 
                                          
 
 
17.  Several other pieces of evidence were found in Cribbs automobile, 
including the key to the motel room where Cribbs’ body was found, a bloodstained 
T-shirt, a cooler and duffel bag, and the jean shorts containing the mixed stain 
discussed above. 
 
 
- 26 -
Rogers to the murder.  Nothing presented calls into question the wealth of other 
circumstantial evidence supporting the conviction.  Cf. Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 
2d 941, 951 (Fla. 1998) (holding that although the OIG report was newly 
discovered, it was “not of such a nature that it would probably produce a different 
result on retrial,” because there was “ample evidence to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Buenoano committed the murder”).  Because Rogers has failed to 
demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial, we affirm the denial of relief on this claim.   
4. 
Cumulative Error 
In the final issue of his postconviction appeal, Rogers argues that multiple 
errors, viewed cumulatively, mandate a new trial.18  It is appropriate to evaluate 
claims of error cumulatively to determine if the errors collectively warrant a new 
trial.  See, e.g., Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 441-42 (Fla. 2005).  However, in 
this claim, Rogers attempts to combine claims that were raised on direct appeal 
                                          
 
 
18.  Specifically, Rogers asserts that the following errors justify a reversal: 
(1) trial counsel failed to develop an alternative suspect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence exists establishing improprieties at the FBI lab; (3) the State conducted a 
warrantless search of the cells of Rogers and other inmates in an effort to hinder 
Rogers’ defense; (4) the State took a sworn statement from a defense witness 
without notifying defense counsel; (5) the State threatened a witness with perjury 
unless he changed his testimony; (6) trial counsel failed to object to the State 
denigrating defense witnesses during closing arguments; (7) trial counsel failed to 
object to the State bolstering witnesses during closing arguments; (8) trial counsel 
failed to object to the “Desert Storm” argument; and (9) the State attempted to 
introduce evidence of a nonstatutory aggravator, which necessitated a curative 
instruction. 
 
- 27 -
with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence that 
were raised in his motion for postconviction relief.  
 
First, the alleged prosecutorial misconduct that Rogers raised on direct 
appeal—the warrantless search of the cells of Rogers and other inmates and the 
introduction during the penalty phase of evidence of a prior misdemeanor assault 
committed by Rogers—were rejected by this Court.  Rogers cannot relitigate these 
issues in his postconviction motion.  See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 
1262 n.7 (Fla. 2005) (holding that claims that are raised on direct appeal and 
rejected are procedurally barred from collateral attack in a postconviction motion). 
 
Second, we have already concluded that counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to develop an alternative suspect or failing to object to the State’s guilt and 
penalty-phase closing arguments, and we have analyzed the claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct and newly discovered evidence regarding the FBI’s DNA unit and 
determined that they were likewise without merit.  Because each of Rogers’ 
individual claims is either procedurally barred or without merit, his cumulative 
error claim must fail.  See, e.g., Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005) 
(“[W]here the individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred or 
without merit, the claim of cumulative error also necessarily fails.”). 
B.   
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
1.   
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
 
- 28 -
 
In his first habeas claim, Rogers contends that appellate counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to argue on direct appeal that Florida’s death 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied under the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Of course, Ring was decided after the appeal in this 
case and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to anticipate the Supreme 
Court’s decision in that case.  Further, Rogers’ argument that appellate counsel 
failed to argue the unconstitutionality of the sentence based on the failure of the 
indictment to allege aggravating circumstances is without merit.  This Court has 
consistently held that neither Apprendi nor Ring requires that aggravating 
circumstances be charged in the indictment.  See Parker, 904 So. 2d at 383; 
Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2003).   
 
Additionally, Rogers’ argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to argue that none of the statutory aggravators was individually found by a 
unanimous jury is equally without merit.  The jury recommended that Rogers be 
sentenced to death by a unanimous vote; accordingly, any claim of 
unconstitutionality would have been rejected on direct appeal.  See, e.g., Crain v. 
State, 894 So. 2d 59, 78 (Fla. 2004).  Because neither argument has merit, we deny 
relief.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (holding that 
 
- 29 -
appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless 
argument on direct appeal).  
2.   
Constitutionality of Section 921.141(5) 
In his second habeas claim, Rogers asserts that section 921.141(5), Florida 
Statutes (2005), Florida’s death sentencing statute, is unconstitutional because it 
authorizes the use of an underlying felony as an aggravator supporting the death 
sentence and improperly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that 
the death penalty is not the appropriate penalty.19  His claim is without merit.   
 
First, this Court has consistently rejected claims that “the aggravating 
circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of committing a 
specified felony is unconstitutional because it constitutes an automatic aggravator 
and does not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.”  Arbelaez 
v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 46-47 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 
686 (Fla. 2003)); see also Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997).  Second, 
we have held that the standard penalty-phase jury instructions do not 
“impermissibly shift the burden to the defense to prove that death is not the 
appropriate sentence.”  Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590, 599 (Fla. 2006) (citing 
                                          
 
 
19.  Rogers further contends that defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to object on these grounds at trial.  To the extent that Rogers 
is alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we reject this claim because it is 
not appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Reed v. State, 
875 So. 2d 415, 439-40 (Fla. 2004). 
 
- 30 -
Elledge v. State, 911 So. 2d 57, 79 (Fla. 2005), and Sweet v. Moore, 822 So. 2d 
1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002)).  Third, the United States Supreme Court recently re-
iterated that it is not improper for a statute to require the defendant to offer 
“mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”  Kansas v. 
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 (2006) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 
650 (1990)).  Therefore, Rogers is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
3.   
Cumulative Error 
In his third habeas claim, Rogers contends that the multitude of errors, 
viewed cumulatively, demonstrates that he was deprived of a fundamentally fair 
trial in violation of the United States Constitution.  This claim appears to be a 
reiteration of his postconviction motion cumulative error claim with the addition of 
one ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.  Specifically, Rogers claims 
that the following errors establish that he did not receive a fair trial: (1) the 
introduction of evidence of a prior misdemeanor assault; (2) the trial court’s failure 
to grant a mistrial after improperly allowing the introduction of the prior 
misdemeanor assault in front of the jury; (3) the prosecutor making the “Desert 
Storm” comment during closing argument of the penalty phase; and (4) appellate 
counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to research caselaw and argue on direct appeal 
that the jury should have been instructed on the statutory mitigator of being under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance based upon all the 
 
- 31 -
evidence in the record.  Because each of these alleged errors is either procedurally 
barred, without merit, or insufficient alone to justify a reversal, we deny relief on 
this claim. 
On direct appeal, Justice Anstead, joined by Justice Pariente, dissented from 
the majority’s affirmance of the death sentence, stating: 
I agree with the majority that the prosecutor’s single, unobjected-to 
Desert Storm argument, while error, would ordinarily not amount to 
fundamental error.  However, this case presents a unique situation 
where we have already expressly found this same argument to be a 
flagrant error in another capital case.  Further, when this improper 
argument is considered along with the fact that the defense was denied 
the benefit of a PET scan, and the jury heard improper but 
inflammatory evidence of other crimes Rogers committed, the error 
further demonstrates why these other substantial errors could not 
possibly be harmless.  Indeed, it is impossible for this Court to 
conclude that the jury’s decision to recommend death was not affected 
by these three serious errors.   
Rogers, 783 So.2d at 1009 (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
However, the majority rejected this view and concluded that any error regarding 
the “Desert Storm” comment and the introduction of the prior misdemeanor assault 
testimony did not warrant reversal of Rogers’ conviction or death sentence.  
Because we previously found each of these claims to be without merit on direct 
appeal, they cannot be raised in this habeas petition or combined to create a valid 
cumulative error claim.  See Morris, 931 So. 2d at 837 n.14 (concluding that 
claims that were rejected by the Court on direct appeal are barred from being 
relitigated in a habeas petition); see also Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 749 
 
- 32 -
(Fla. 1998) (concluding that a claim that was rejected in a postconviction motion is 
procedurally barred from being raised in a habeas petition).   
Rogers’ final subclaim of alleged cumulative error is that appellate counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial 
court erred in failing to give an instruction regarding the statutory mitigator of the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  Specifically, Rogers argues 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to research the law and cite cases, 
such as Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1986), to support the contention that 
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance because Rogers had consumed alcohol on the day of the 
murder.  However, appellate counsel raised this issue and cited several cases to 
support Rogers’ assertion that the trial court erred in failing to consider, find, and 
instruct the jury on this statutory mitigator.  Because this issue was adequately 
raised on direct appeal, appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance.  
Therefore, we deny relief on this cumulative error claim. 
4.   
Incompetency at Time of Execution 
In his final habeas claim, Rogers asserts that his Eighth Amendment rights 
will be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution.  As we 
have previously held, this claim is not ripe for review until a death warrant has 
 
- 33 -
been issued, which has not occurred in this case.  See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 
21-22 (Fla. 2003).  Therefore, we deny relief on this claim.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Rogers’ 
motion for postconviction relief and deny Rogers’ petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
Rex M. Barbas, Judge - Case No. 95-15314 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
John W. Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle Region, Richard 
E. Kiley and James V. Viggiano, Jr., Assistant CCR Counsel – Middle Region, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent 
 
 
- 34 -