Title: Ex parte E.S.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1140889
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2015

Rel: 10/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
_________________________
1140889
_________________________
Ex parte E.S.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  O.S. and J.A.S.
v.
E.S.)
(Walker Circuit Court, DR-10-900006;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2110621)
MAIN, Justice.
1140889
I. Facts and Procedural History
This is the second time these parties have been before
us.  The underlying facts are as follows. B.O.S. ("the
husband") and E.S. ("the wife") began residing together in
2005.  Their union produced a daughter, B.T.S. ("the child"),
in August 2006.  The couple married in March 2007.  The
husband, the wife, and the child lived in a residence next
door to the residence of the child's paternal grandfather,
O.S. ("the grandfather"), and his wife, J.A.S. ("the
stepgrandmother") (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"the grandparents").  It is undisputed that the grandparents
spent considerable time with the child and that the child
often  visited overnight with the grandparents. 
At some point in 2005 (during the wife's pregnancy) and
again on at least one occasion in 2007, the grandfather
proposed to the wife an action he phrased as being "like an
adoption" of the child by the grandparents but, the
grandfather claimed, was not actually a legally binding
adoption.   The grandfather stated to the wife that "nothing
1
It appears that the stepgrandmother has been only
1
tangentially involved in this case.  The Court of Civil
Appeals noted:
2
1140889
would ever change [and] that [the wife] would always be [the
child's] mother."  O.S. v. E.S., [Ms. 2110621, April 19, 2013]
___ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).    The
grandfather claimed that taking the action he was proposing
would enable the child to attend college with the aid of
additional 
Social 
Security 
benefits 
and 
veteran's 
benefits 
the
grandfather would receive because he had "adopted" the child. 
As far as the husband was concerned, it appears that the
grandfather presented him with contradictory statements; the
grandfather stated at least once that it would be a "legal
adoption" but stated to the husband on another occasion that
it would be a "paper adoption only."  O.S. v. E.S., ___ So. 3d
at ____.
"The stepgrandmother testified that, during a
week when she and the grandfather had been
separated, she had written a letter to her attorney,
requesting that she be removed as a party from the
instant litigation. She acknowledged that she had
arranged for the wife to read the letter and that
she had told the wife that 'it was wrong' for the
grandfather to take the child from the husband and
the wife."
O.S. v. E.S., [Ms. 2110621, April 19, 2013] ___ So. 3d ____, 
_____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).  The grandfather stood to gain
financially from the adoption; specifically, the grandfather
would receive additional Social Security benefits in the
amount of $739 per month and additional veteran's benefits in
the amount of $100 per month after adopting the child. 
3
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In August 2007, the husband and the wife agreed to the
grandfather's proposal for a "paper adoption" of the child. 
The grandfather took the husband and the wife to an attorney's
office, during which time the husband and the wife were
presented with and read two documents –- a "consent for
adoption" and an "affidavit of natural parent."  Both the
husband and the wife signed the documents.  However, the wife
said that she did not sign any other documents; that "nothing
had been explained to her" by the lawyer who drafted the two
documents she did sign, O.S. v. E.S., ___ So. 3d at ____; that
"she had not been given copies of the documents she had
signed," id.; and that "she had not been assisted by her own
attorney," id.  Ultimately, on March 11, 2008, the Probate
Court of Walker County ("the probate court") entered a
judgment granting the grandparents' petition to adopt the
child.
In January 2010, the husband and the wife separated.  The
wife took the child, and the wife and the child began residing
with the wife's parents.  On February 3, 2010, the husband
filed a divorce complaint against the wife in the Walker
Circuit Court ("the trial court").  The husband's complaint
4
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requested that the child be removed from the physical custody
of the wife and returned to "the adoptive parents, i.e., the
grandparents, immediately."  O.S. v. E.S., ___ So. 3d at ____. 
The grandparents moved to intervene in the divorce
action, asserting that they were the child's adoptive parents
and seeking immediate pendente lite physical custody of the
child.  On February 4, 2010, the trial court entered an order
allowing the grandparents to intervene in the 
action, 
granting
their request for pendente lite physical custody of the child,
and directing the wife to return the child to the grandparents
immediately.
The wife answered the husband's divorce complaint and
also filed in the trial court a document styled as a
"counterclaim 
and 
independent 
action" 
against 
the 
grandparents
("the counterclaim"), seeking to set aside the final judgment
of adoption rendered by the probate court on March 11, 2008. 
In her counterclaim, the wife alleged that the grandparents
had fraudulently induced her to consent to the grandparents'
adoption of the child.  Additionally, the wife alleged that
the grandparents had falsely asserted in the 
adoption 
petition
that the child had resided in the grandparents' home since the
5
1140889
child's birth; by making that false assertion, the wife
claimed, the grandparents had perpetrated a fraud on the
probate court. 
The grandparents filed in the trial court an answer to
the 
wife's 
counterclaim, 
asserting 
that 
the 
wife's
counterclaim seeking to set aside the probate 
court's 
judgment
of adoption "could properly be filed only in the [Walker
County] probate court and that the [Walker County] circuit
court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the
matter."  O.S. v. E.S., ___ So. 3d at ____ (emphasis added). 
The trial court entered a judgment purporting to set aside the
judgment of adoption entered by the probate court, finding
that the grandfather had, as the wife had alleged, perpetrated
a fraud on the probate court.  In an opinion authored by Judge
Pittman, a sharply divided Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment.  O.S. v. E.S., supra (Thomas and
Moore, JJ., concurring, and Donaldson, J., dissenting, with
writing, which Thompson, P.J., joined).
The grandparents filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with this Court, which we granted.  This Court
reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the
6
1140889
cause, holding that the probate court, rather than the circuit
court, had subject-matter jurisdiction over the grandparents'
intervention complaint and the wife's counterclaim regarding
the allegedly fraudulent adoption.  Ex parte O.S., [Ms.
1121134, June 20, 2014] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2014) ("As
set forth above, the legislature has given the probate court
original 
jurisdiction 
over 
all 
adoption 
proceedings, 
including
a challenge to a judgment of adoption on the basis of
fraud.").  In remanding the cause, this Court stated, in toto:
"Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Court of Civil
Appeals' judgment and remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion."  ___ So. 3d at
____.  We overruled the wife's application for rehearing
without an opinion. 
On remand from this Court, the Court of Civil Appeals
issued an opinion authored by Judge Pittman on February 27,
2015.  That court's opinion stated, in toto:
"The prior judgment of this court has been
reversed, and the cause remanded by the Supreme
Court of Alabama. See Ex parte O.S., [Ms. 1121134,
June 20, 2014] ___ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2014). On
remand to this Court, and in compliance with the
supreme court's opinion, we hereby reverse the
judgment of [the trial court] and remand the cause
for the entry of a judgment of the [trial court]
7
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dismissing 
[the 
wife's] 
action 
against 
[the
grandparents] 
for 
lack 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction." 
On March 3, 2015 (within the period allowed for the wife
to file an application for rehearing), the wife filed with the
Court of Civil Appeals a motion entitled "Motion to Amend
Order to Transfer to the Probate Court Pursuant to Ala. Code
[1975,] § 12-11-11," which was treated by that court and will
be referred to as the wife's application for rehearing.  In
that filing, the wife argued, in pertinent part, that this
Court's mandate in remanding the cause to the Court of Civil
Appeals did not require or allow for the dismissal of the
adoption contest; instead, the wife argued, the Court of Civil
Appeals was "required" to remand the cause to the trial court
with directions to transfer the adoption contest from the
trial court to the probate court, where, the wife argued,
there exists original subject-matter jurisdiction over the
matter.  The wife's argument relied on Ala. Code 1975, §
12-11-11, which she referred to as "compulsory":
"Whenever it shall appear to the court that any
case filed therein should have been brought in
another court in the same county, the court shall
make an order transferring the case to the proper
court, and the clerk or register shall forthwith
certify the pleadings, process, costs and order to
8
1140889
the court to which the case is transferred, and the
case shall be docketed and proceed in the court to
which it is transferred, and the costs accrued in
the court in which the case was originally filed
shall abide by the result of the case in the court
to which transferred."
 
(Emphasis added.)  The Court of Civil Appeals overruled the
wife's application for rehearing.  This Court granted the
wife's petition for the writ of certiorari.  We now reverse
and remand.
II. Standard of Review
"In reviewing the Court of Civil Appeals'
decision on a petition for the writ of certiorari,
'this Court "accords no presumption of correctness
to the legal conclusions of the intermediate
appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de novo
the standard of review that was applicable in the
Court of Civil Appeals."' Ex parte Exxon Mobil
Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 308 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex
parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala.
1996))."
Ex parte Wade, 957 So. 2d 477, 481 (Ala. 2006).
III. Discussion
The wife's argument is brief and straightforward.  The
wife argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in directing
the trial court to dismiss the adoption contest for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction when, the wife says, the trial 
court was instead "required" to transfer the adoption contest
9
1140889
from the trial court to the probate court pursuant to §
12-11-11.  To use the wife's words: "[T]he order of [the Court
of Civil Appeals on remand] does not comply with [this
Court's] order or with § 12-11-11, Ala. Code 1975."  In
support of her argument, the wife directs our attention to
Kish Land Co. v. Thomas, 42 So. 3d 1235 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010),
which states, in pertinent part:
"The plaintiffs and the defendants own various
adjoining parcels of land in Bullock County, and
they all use their parcels primarily for recreation.
The plaintiffs' parcels are landlocked, having no
access to public roads except through one or more of
the defendants' properties that surround their
parcels or through parcels belonging to entities not
made parties to this case. The plaintiffs filed a
complaint in June 2008 in the Bullock Circuit Court
('the circuit court') seeking an easement by
necessity, condemnation of a right-of-way,  and a
1
preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants'
blocking the road the plaintiffs wanted to use to
access their land during the pendency of the action.
"____________________
" The parties have since agreed that, pursuant
1
to § 18–3–3, Ala. Code 1975, the proper court for
the condemnation action would be the Bullock Probate
Court. In addition to granting the injunction, the
circuit court's order transferred the case to the
probate court, which was proper pursuant to §
12–11–11, Ala. Code 1975."
42 So. 3d at 1236 (emphasis added).
10
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Both Kish and the statute it cites, § 12-11-11, support
the wife's contention that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in
directing the trial court to dismiss the wife's counterclaim
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than directing
that court to transfer the wife's counterclaim to the probate
court.  Furthermore, it is notable that the grandparents do
not dispute that the wife's adoption contest should be
transferred from the circuit court to the probate court.  In
the grandparents' response to the wife's application for
rehearing, they stated:
"Grandparents herein do not dispute that [the
Court of Civil Appeals] has the authority to, if it
judges the same to be mete and appropriate, amend
its Order to the Circuit Court of Walker County,
Alabama, permitting it to transfer (or, perhaps more
appropriately, determine whether it is appropriate
to transfer) the claims of [the wife] concerning the
validity of the Grandparents' 2008 adoption of [the
child] to the Probate Court of Walker County,
Alabama, 
for 
further 
proceedings. 
[The 
wife]
correctly cites § 12-11-11, Code of Alabama (1975),
which states that where, as here, the circuit court
is presented with an action which should have been
filed in another court within the county, it 'shall'
transfer the same."
(Emphasis added.)  
The grandparents also stated:
"Specifically, Grandparents do not dispute that,
when the Circuit Court of Walker County, Alabama,
11
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was originally faced with the challenge to the prior
adoption, of which it had no jurisdiction, §
12-11-11, Code of Alabama (1975), provided for the
case to be transferred to the Probate Court of
Walker County, Alabama."
(Emphasis added.)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of
Civil Appeals erred insofar as it directed the trial court to
dismiss the wife's action against the grandparents for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction; rather, that court should have
directed the trial court to transfer the action to the probate
court pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-11.  Therefore, the
judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is due to be reversed.
IV. Conclusion 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals
insofar as it directed the trial court to dismiss the wife's
action against the grandparents for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.  We remand the cause to the Court of Civil
Appeals for that court to vacate its judgment insofar as it
directed the trial court to dismiss the wife's action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction and to enter a judgment
remanding the case to the trial court and directing the trial
12
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court to transfer the wife's action to the probate court
pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-11.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.  
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., dissent.
13
1140889
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).  
What is now Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-11, was originally
enacted as § 4 of Act No. 725, Ala. Acts 1915.  That entire
act dealt with the transfer of a case erroneously filed in the
law or equity "side" of the circuit court to the proper "side"
of that court.  When codified as part of the Code of Alabama
1940, what is now § 12-11-11 stated: 
"Whenever it shall appear to any court of law or
equity that any cause filed therein should have been
brought in another court of like jurisdiction in the
same county, the court shall make an order
transferring the cause to the proper court ...."
Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 13, § 156.  
Although ostensibly dealing with transfers between the
law and equity "sides" of the circuit courts, the section was
also used as a mechanism to transfer cases, in counties in
which the court sat in divisions, from one division of the
circuit court to another division of that circuit court in
that county.  See, e.g., Ex parte Central of Georgia Ry., 243
Ala. 508, 513, 10 So. 2d 746, 750 (1942).  This prior version
of § 12-11-11 clearly applied only to the transfer of a
circuit court case to another court of equal –- "like" --
jurisdiction.
In the 1975 recodification of the Alabama Code, the Code
section was altered to remove the language referring to "law
14
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or equity" and requiring a transfer to a court of "like
jurisdiction."  It now states: 
"Whenever it shall appear to the court that any case
filed therein should have been brought in another
court in the same county, the court shall make an
order transferring the case to the proper court
...." 
§ 12-11-11. 
It is not immediately clear what court is "the court"
designated in the first clause.  The Code section then refers
to "another court in the same county," which would tend to
indicate that "the court" first mentioned operates in a
county.  The original act, Act No. 725, expressly applied to
circuit courts.  Further, § 12-11-11 is placed in Chapter 11
of Title 12, which governs circuit courts.  I thus read § 12-
11-11 to apply only to circuit courts and to direct only
circuit courts to transfer cases.
As noted above, the language of § 12-11-11 no longer
directs that the transfer be made to a court of "like
jurisdiction."  This omission suggests that the section is no
longer limited to a "horizontal" or "lateral" transfer to a
court of equal or "like" jurisdiction but that a "vertical"
transfer by the circuit court to a lower court is now
15
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possible.   However, § 12-11-11 has not, as far as my research
2
reveals, ever been held to require a "vertical" transfer from
a circuit court to a lower court.   Given the history of the
3
Code section, as recounted above, there is reason to suspect
that it was never "intended" to do so.
Further, when a court lacks jurisdiction, it has no power
to 
transfer 
an 
action. 
 
See 
Bernals, 
Inc. 
v.
Kessler-Greystone, LLC, 70 So. 3d 315, 319 (Ala. 2011) ("When
a circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, all orders
and judgments entered in the case, except an order of
dismissal, are void ab initio." (emphasis added)), and Cadle
Co. v. Shabani, 4 So. 3d 460, 463 (Ala. 2008).  Given the
history of the Code section, nothing suggests that it was
"intended" to expand the jurisdiction of the circuit court to
allow it the ability to transfer an action over which it had
no jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, it is well settled that when "[t]he
language of [a] Code section is clear[,] there is nothing to
There is no county-level court above the circuit court.
2
In Kish Land Co. v. Thomas, 42 So. 3d 1235, 1236 n.1
3
(Ala. Civ. App. 2010), the Court of Civil Appeals noted that
the circuit court in that case transferred a claim to the
probate court, and that the transfer was "proper pursuant to
§ 12–11–11."  However, this comment was gratuitous; there is
no actual holding in Kish Land to that effect. 
16
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construe [and] no need to attempt to divine the 'intent'•of
the legislature ...."  Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 431
(Ala. 2013) (Shaw, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the result).  Section 12-11-11, by its terms, could be read to
permit (and direct) the Walker Circuit Court in this case to
transfer the action challenging the adoption to the Walker
County Probate Court, which would be the "proper court" of
that "same county" where the action "should have been
brought."  
4
This Court's prior decision remanded the case to the
Court of Civil Appeals "for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion."  Ex parte O.S., [Ms. 1121134, June 20,
I have some concerns that the function of this Code
4
section might be redundant. Alabama Code 1975, § 12-11-9,
specifically allows misfiled cases to be transferred from the 
circuit court to the district court; that Code section was
enacted in 1975.  Further, several Code sections deal with the
transfer of cases between the circuit court and the probate
court.  See, e.g., Ala. Code 1975, 12-11-41.1.  It would
appear that, following the merger of law and equity, the
original purpose of Act No. 725, including the prior version
of § 12-11-11, no longer existed.  Because transfers to lower
courts were covered by other Code sections, § 12-11-11 was
probably 
retained and amended to preserve its other 
historical
use as a means to transfer cases between divisions in the 
circuit courts.  On the other hand, perhaps § 12-11-11 is a
"catchall" provision that allows a greater flexibility to
transfer cases.  Such inference, however, is limited by the
facts that only circuit courts would possess this ability and 
that the only transfers that would result under this section
would be certain transfers to probate courts.
17
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2014] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2014).  The Court of Civil
Appeals then reversed the circuit court's decision and
instructed it to enter a judgment dismissing, for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, E.S.'s action.  O.S. v. E.S.,
[Ms. 2110621, Feb. 27, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2015) (opinion after remand).  E.S. filed a motion to amend
that decision, which motion the Court of Civil Appeals treated
as an application for rehearing.  E.S.'s argument as to § 12-
11-11 was as follows:
"[E.S.] requests this Court to amend its Order
of February 27, 2015, and enter an Order consistent
with the direction from the Supreme Court of
Alabama, and consistent with § 12-11-11, Ala. Code
(1975).  At the trial level, [E.S.] sought, as an
alternative remedy, transfer of the case to the
probate court .... § 12-11-11 is compulsory:
'Whenever it shall appear to the court that any case
filed therein should have been brought in another
court in the same county, the court shall make an
order transferring the case to the proper court...'
(emphasis added). The first opportunity for the
circuit court to transfer the case is when this
Court returns to it jurisdiction. The Order of
remand should be modified to direct the circuit
court to make this statutorily required transfer."
Although a transfer by the circuit court under § 12-11-11
would be consistent with this Court's decision, given that §
12-11-11 has never been held to require a circuit court to
make the type of transfer requested, that the decisions
applying the Code section show a completely different
18
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application, and that § 12-11-11 has never been interpreted to
expand the jurisdiction of the circuit court to allow it to
transfer a case when no jurisdiction exists, I do not believe
that E.S.'s application for rehearing contained sufficient
argument or authorities to explain and support the contention
that a transfer under § 12-11-11, and not a dismissal -- the
usual result when a trial court lacks jurisdiction –- was
required.  See Rules 28(a)(10),  40(b),  and 40(g),  Ala. R.
5
6
7
App. P.  Therefore, the issue whether the Court of Civil
Appeals' decision was, in light of § 12-11-11, inconsistent
with this Court's mandate was waived, and that court was
justified in refusing to tread new ground.  Because the issue
forming the basis of the main opinion in the instant appeal
was waived, I believe that the Court of Civil Appeals'
"The brief of the appellant ... shall contain ... [a]n 
5
argument 
containing 
the 
contentions 
of 
the
appellant/petitioner 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
issues 
presented, 
and
the reasons therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes,
other authorities, and parts of the record relied on."  
"The 
application 
for 
rehearing 
must 
state 
with
6
particularity the points of law or the facts the applicant
believes the court overlooked or misapprehended. The brief in
support of the application must contain any arguments in
support 
of 
the application the petitioner desires to present."
"The 
application 
for 
rehearing 
may 
be 
a 
separate 
document
7
or may be included at the beginning of the applicant's brief.
The brief shall be in a form prescribed by Rule[] 28 ...." 
19
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decision is due to be affirmed.  I thus respectfully dissent.
Murdock, J., concurs.  
20