Title: Lane v. Brown
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S42992
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 1998

Filed:  December 3, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

CHRISTOPHER LANE,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

ROBERT LARRY BROWN,

	Respondent on Review,

_____________________________

LAURIE JOY INGER,

			Petitioner on Review,

	v.

ROBERT LARRY BROWN,

			Respondent on Review.

(CC 93-73, CC 93-7; A84805 (Control), 

A84806; SC S42992)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted January 14, 1997; reassigned 

February 3, 1998, reassigned July 29, 1998.

	Glen H. Downs, Portland, argued the cause for petitioners on
review.  With him on the briefs was Gerald C. Doblie, of Doblie &amp;
Associates, Portland.

	Denny Z. Zikes, Beaverton, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for respondent on review.

	Lawrence Baron and Daniel L. Keppler, Portland, filed a
brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

	Joel S. DeVore, of Luvaas, Cobb, Richards &amp; Fraser, P.C.,
Eugene, filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Association of
Defense Counsel.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed. 

	*Appeal from Wasco County Circuit Court,

	 Donald W. Hull, Judge.

	 138 Or App 34, 906 P2d 821 (1995).

    **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		GILLETTE, J.

		In this personal injury action arising out of an
automobile accident, the issue involves whether the trial court
properly gave the so-called "emergency" instruction to the jury.
The trial court gave the instruction over plaintiffs' objection,
and the jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor.  Plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence did
not establish an "emergency" that would support giving the
instruction.  The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the
trial court did not err in giving the instruction.  Lane v.
Brown, 138 Or App 34, 906 P2d 821 (1995).  Plaintiffs petition
for review on two principal grounds:  First, they argue that the
emergency instruction was redundant and confusing to the jurors
and, for that reason, giving the instruction was legal error.  In
the same vein, plaintiffs also contend more generally that the
emergency instruction is redundant and confusing to jurors in
every case, and that this court should forbid its use in Oregon. 
Second, they argue that the evidence in the present case did not
justify giving the emergency instruction here.

		We allowed review primarily to consider plaintiffs'
first argument, including the continuing validity of the
instruction.  On close review of the record, however, we have
determined that that issue was not preserved below and,
therefore, it is not properly before this court.(1)  With respect
to the remaining issue -- the sufficiency of the evidence -- we
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  

		The facts of the case were summarized adequately by the
Court of Appeals,(2) and we repeat that summary here. 

		"On November 15, 1991, defendant was driving west
on Highway 26 near Mount Hood.  Defendant had driven
approximately 200 miles before the accident.  The
weather was clear, visibility was good, and the roads
were dry.  The tires on defendant's pickup were almost
new, studded snow tires.  He had the pickup in 2-wheel
drive, because the owner's manual recommended against
driving the pickup in 4-wheel drive on dry pavement.  

		"Defendant's speed did not exceed 50 miles per
hour, in a 55-mile-per-hour zone.  As defendant
approached a place where the road curved to the right,
he slowed to 45 miles per hour.  He explained that, on
a prior occasion, his brother had hit a deer, and he
was especially watchful in wooded areas in case a deer
ran out onto the road.  Suddenly, the rear of
defendant's pickup skidded to the right.  Defendant
tried to correct the skid by letting up on the
accelerator, turning the steering wheel in the
direction of the skid and keeping his foot off the
brake pedal.  Defendant was unable to regain control of
the pickup.  It shot to the left, slid across the
highway and collided with plaintiffs' car.  

		"An eyewitness, who had been driving behind
defendant, stopped his pickup and placed flares in the
road to warn other motorists of the accident.  He
testified that the road was slick and icy in the spot
where defendant's pickup began skidding.  He stated
that the road had been dry and clear up to that point. 
An ambulance driver who drove to the accident testified
that he had approached the scene from the east, the
same direction from which defendant had been driving,
and that he had encountered no adverse road conditions
in the 15 miles that he had driven to the accident."

Lane, 138 Or App at 36-37.

		At trial, defendant requested that the jury be given
the "emergency instruction," Uniform Civil Jury Instruction No.
20.08, which provides: 

		"People who are suddenly placed in a position of
peril through no negligence of their own, and who are
compelled to act without opportunity for reflection,
are not negligent if they make such a choice as a
reasonably careful person placed in such a position
might make, even though they do not make the wisest
choice."

Plaintiff objected to that instruction on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence to submit it to the jury.  The trial
court disagreed and gave the instruction.  The jury found that
defendant was not negligent and returned a verdict in his favor.  

		Plaintiffs appealed, assigning error to the trial
court's decision to give the emergency instruction.  In
particular, plaintiffs argued to the Court of Appeals that an
"emergency" such as to justify giving the emergency instruction
should be an extraordinary circumstance, and a patch of ice on
the road in winter near Mt. Hood is entirely predictable and does
not constitute an "emergency."  In addition, plaintiffs asserted
that the instruction was inappropriate, because defendant did not
make a choice among alternative courses of action when he slid
into their car.  Finally, plaintiffs argued, giving the emergency
instruction in an ordinary negligence case such as the present
one would serve only to confuse the jury and unduly to emphasize
defendant's evidence.  

		The Court of Appeals reviewed only the sufficiency of
the evidence issue.  It concluded that there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find that the patch of ice
that defendant encountered was an aberration on an otherwise dry
road and that, before the accident, defendant was driving
carefully.  Lane, 138 Or App at 37-38.  It also concluded that
there was evidence that defendant made a conscious choice, among
possible alternatives, to react to the skid as he did.  Id. at
38.  Under the circumstances, the court held, it was not error
for the trial court to give the requested instruction.  Ibid.  

		In this court, plaintiffs repeat their argument that
the patch of ice that defendant encountered was not an
"emergency" to justify giving the emergency instruction.  Whether
there is an emergency in a particular case is a question of fact
for the jury.  Swanson v. Hale, 273 Or 138, 139-41, 539 P2d 1073
(1975); Harkins v. Doyle, 271 Or 664, 667, 533 P2d 785 (1975). 
In the present case, there was evidence that road conditions had
been completely dry for more than 200 miles before defendant
encountered the patch of ice that led to the accident and that
defendant had been driving carefully before the accident. 
Therefore, despite the fact that it was winter in a mountainous
region, the jury was entitled to find that, on that particular
day, in the particular circumstances of this case, the ice on the
road constituted an emergency that placed defendant in a position
of peril through no negligence of his own. 

		Plaintiffs also repeat their argument that the
emergency instruction is appropriate only when the evidence
discloses that alternative action is possible and that quick
judgment is required.  In the instant case, according to
plaintiffs, there was no evidence that defendant had alternative
courses of action available to him and, therefore, it was error
for the trial court to give the instruction.  Plaintiffs'
argument is not well taken.  As the Court of Appeals described in
detail in its opinion, defendant testified that he reacted to the
skid as he had been taught to do in driver's education class --
that is, to steer into the skid and take his foot off the brake. 
Lane, 138 Or App at 38.  Defendant clearly had alternatives, as
plaintiffs' own expert conceded at trial.  The fact that
defendant testified that there was nothing that he could have
done to avoid the crash does not alter the fact that the jury was
entitled to infer that defendant made a choice among available
alternative courses of action.  See Durnford v. Worden, 242 Or
536, 539-40, 410 P2d 1020 (1966) (where alternatives actually
were available to plaintiff at time of accident, trial court did
not err in granting new trial to plaintiff for failure to give
plaintiff's requested emergency instruction, even where plaintiff
denied that he made a conscious choice).  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.  

1. A party who disagrees with a proposed jury instruction
must inform the court of the specific grounds for the exception. 
ORCP 59 H; see also Beecher v. Montgomery Ward &amp; Co., 267 Or 496,
503, 517 P2d 667 (1973) (exceptions to jury instructions must be
clear to insure that trial court understands what is intended and
has opportunity to correct mistakes).  An exception on one ground
does not preserve the error on another ground.  See Weitzel v.
Wingard, 274 Or 185, 192-93, 546 P2d 121 (1976) (illustrating
proposition); Transpacific Leas. v. Klineline Sand, 272 Or 133,
147, 535 P2d 1360 (1975) (same).  At trial in this case,
plaintiffs' counsel objected to, and later took an exception to,
the emergency instruction solely on the ground that it was not
supported by the evidence.  That objection and exception did not
preserve the argument plaintiffs now make before this court that
the emergency instruction is redundant and confusing and should
be abolished. 

2. Because the jury found in favor of defendant, the Court
of Appeals recited the facts in the light most favorable to him. 
See Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3 ("no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of this state, unless
the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support
the verdict"); Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 Or 695, 705, 688 P2d
811 (1984) (appellate court does not weigh evidence, but
considers the evidence, including inferences, in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party).