Title: Charles Young v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 27S02-0806-PC-363
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2008

APPELLANT PRO SE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Charles Young 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Bunker Hill, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard C. Webster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 27S02-0806-PC-363 
 
CHARLES YOUNG, 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Grant Circuit Court, No. 27C01-9205-CF-35 
The Honorable Robert L. Barnet, Jr., Special Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 27A02-0703-PC-00263 
_________________________________ 
 
June 26, 2008 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
Charles Young was convicted of Class A felony Conspiracy to Deal Crack Cocaine in 
1992, and sentenced to 40 years in prison.  Young’s 1992 sentencing order stated that he “[wa]s 
entitled to 204 days CREDIT TIME for time spent incarcerated awaiting sentence, and further, 
should be given credit for good time conduct for time spent in confinement.”  (App. at 20 (em-
phasis in original).)  In 2007, after having filed a direct appeal and a petition for post-conviction 
 
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Jun 26 2008, 2:47 pm
relief, Young filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, in which he claimed that he had not 
been credited 204 days of earned Class I credit time in addition to 204 days of time served to-
ward his sentence.1  The trial court denied Young’s motion.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Y-
oung v. State, No. 27A02-0703-PC-263, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2007).  Young petitioned 
for transfer, which we now grant.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58. 
  
Discussion 
 
Young claims that the trial court should have specified in its sentencing order that he was 
to receive 204 days of earned credit time in addition to 204 days of time served toward his sen-
tence, instead of merely stating that he “should be given credit for good time conduct for time 
spent in confinement.”  (App. at 20.)  As the Court of Appeals observed, our opinion in Robin-
son v. State held that where a trial court specifies an amount of credit time already served toward 
a sentence, but does not specify an amount of earned credit time, the presumption shall be that 
the inmate is a Class I offender and has earned an amount of credit time equal to the amount of 
time already served.  805 N.E.2d 783, 792 (Ind. 2004).  Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly 
concluded that Young is presumptively entitled to 204 days of earned credit time in addition to 
his 204 days of time already served, and need not resort to our state court system in order for the 
time to be credited toward his sentence.   
 
It is, of course, possible that a prisoner could accidentally be deprived of earned credit 
time toward his sentence.  The presumption in Robinson has the effect of treating such an acci-
dent as merely an administrative error that can be addressed by the Department of Correction 
(DOC) easily and efficiently through its offender grievance process.  It is for this reason that we 
hold today in Neff v. State, No. 49S02-0806-CR-362, slip op. (Ind. June 26, 2008), that a pris-
oner must show that administrative remedies have been exhausted before pursuing a remedy in 
the state court system. 
 
                                                 
1 Class I offenders earn one day of credit time for every day served.  Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 (2004); see 
Neff v. State, No. 49S02-0806-CR-362, slip op. at 2-3 (Ind. June 26, 2008). 
 
2
 
3
 
Today in Neff, we also address some of the practicalities of making a claim that earned 
credit time has not been applied to a sentence.  Neff focuses on how to properly calculate an in-
mate’s earliest release date.  Young’s claim highlights yet another need for clarification.  Even if 
Young had, as we instruct today in Neff, correctly calculated his earliest release date and ex-
hausted his administrative remedies before appealing to the state courts, he did not provide the 
court any documentation of what the DOC has on record as his earliest release date, nor his own 
calculation of his earliest release date.  More broadly, to present such a claim to a court, a peti-
tioner must show what the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures are, and that they 
have been exhausted at all levels.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The trial court properly denied Young’s motion to correct erroneous sentence because the 
presumption in Robinson—that, in the absence of information to the contrary, he is entitled to 
earned credit time equal to served credit time—applies here.  However, we also note for future 
reference that Young did not supply us with sufficient information to evaluate his claim had that 
been appropriate. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.