Title: ANTON PERKOVIQ V DELCOR HOMES-LAKE SHORE POINTE LT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116059
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2002

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 24, 2002  
ANTON PERKOVIQ,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 116059  
DELCOR HOMES—LAKE SHORE  
POINTE, LTD.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiff was injured when he fell from the roof of  
a partially constructed house as he was preparing to paint in  
the course of his employment.  He brought this action against  
defendant, the owner and the general contractor of the  
subdivision development.  The circuit court granted summary  
disposition for the defendant.  The Court of Appeals reversed  
in part, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed  
regarding plaintiff’s claim that defendant, as owner of the  
property, was liable on a premises liability theory.  
We conclude that the evidence before the circuit court on  
the motion for summary disposition did not provide a basis for  
establishing 
premises liability.  We thus reverse the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court’s  
judgment for the defendant.  
I  
Defendant Delcor Homes—Lake Shore Pointe, Ltd., was both  
owner and general contractor of a residential subdivision  
development near Howell in Livingston County. The plaintiff  
was employed by a subcontractor on the project, Kalaj Painting  
and Decorating.  Delcor had hired Kalaj to perform painting  
services at the project, which involved construction of more  
than two hundred homes. On November 22, 1995, the plaintiff  
was working on the roof of a home under construction when he  
slipped on ice or frost that had formed on the roof, falling  
approximately twenty feet to the ground and suffering serious  
injuries.  
The plaintiff and a coworker had been instructed to paint  
the upper level exterior of three homes.  They went to one of  
them. The rough roof of the house consisted only of plywood  
sheeting.  Shingles were not yet in place.  In his deposition,  
the plaintiff testified that several 2 x 4 slats of wood were  
nailed at the lower edge of the roof to provide footing.  This  
was insufficient to allow plaintiff to climb all the way up  
the roof to paint the exterior walls.  He was attempting to  
nail additional slats onto the roof when he slipped on the ice  
or frost on the plywood and fell.  
2  
Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that the defendant  
was liable on the basis of its role as a general contractor on  
the project and its status as owner of the property.  After  
discovery, the defendant moved for summary disposition under  
MCR 
2.116(C)(10), 
contending that no genuine issue of material  
fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter  
of law.  The circuit court granted the motion and entered  
judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.  
II  
The Court of Appeals first dealt with the question of  
defendant’s liability on the basis of its status as the  
general contractor on the project.  The plaintiff’s complaint  
included allegations about the defendant’s failure to provide  
a safe workplace and appropriate safety equipment, as well as  
other claims about its operation of the construction site.  
The Court of Appeals analyzed the principles applicable to  
such claims and concluded that the plaintiff had failed to  
establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding those  
theories.  The plaintiff has not challenged that aspect of the  
Court of Appeals decision in this Court.  
The Court of Appeals then turned to plaintiff’s theory  
that defendant was liable on the basis of its status as owner  
or occupier of the premises. 
It was not disputed that  
plaintiff, as an employee of a subcontractor on the project,  
was an invitee.  The Court stated that an invitor’s legal duty  
is to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from  
3  
unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition of  
the land that the landowner knows or should know that invitees  
will not discover, realize, or protect themselves against.  
Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537 NW2d 185  
(1995).  If the dangerous conditions are hidden or latent, the  
owner has a duty to warn the invitee of the dangers. Knight  
v Gulf & Western Properties, Inc, 196 Mich App 119, 124-125;  
492 NW2d 761 (1992).  The Court of Appeals stated that even  
where conditions are known or obvious to the invitee, the  
owner may still be required to use reasonable care to protect  
the invitee from the danger if the risk of harm is  
unreasonable.  
The Court of Appeals concluded that genuine issues of  
material fact existed regarding premises liability:  
Here, it is undisputed that defendant is both 
owner and developer/general contractor of the  
subdivision under construction, and as possessor of 
the land, defendant has the legal duty to protect 
its invitees.  The danger of slipping off a roof 
appears to be open and obvious, especially where 
there is frost on the roof and plaintiff himself 
and 
his 
co-worker 
testified 
that 
they 
told  
defendant that the roof was icy; thus, the failure 
to warn theory fails to establish liability. 
Further, 
the evidence 
does 
not 
establish 
a  
defective physical structure; instead, it appears 
that there was frost or ice on the roof because of  
the weather conditions.  Such conditions may make 
the situation unreasonably dangerous, but the  
question arises as to whether defendant should  
expect that plaintiff, who paints for a living, 
will fail to protect himself against the danger. 
The evidence presented, including the contract and 
deposition testimony, is conflicting as to who was 
responsible for providing safety equipment and 
ensuring its use; either the general contractor, 
the subcontractor or both.  A question exists as to  
4  
 
 
 
whether defendant should have anticipated that the 
ice/frost on the roof would cause physical harm to 
a painter notwithstanding its known and obvious 
danger.  Based on the evidence presented and giving 
the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmoving 
party, a genuine issue of material fact exists as 
to whether defendant could be liable under the  
theory of premises liability; thus, we reverse the 
trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor 
of defendant with regard to this theory of  
liability.  [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued 
October 1, 1999.][1]  
III  
The defendant has filed an application for leave to  
appeal to this Court.  We held the application in abeyance for  
Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc (Docket No. 112575), which has now  
been decided. 464 Mich 512; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).  
The appeal involves a trial court’s ruling on a motion  
for summary disposition, which we review de novo.  Maiden v  
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).  
IV  
This case presents a classic example of an open and  
obvious danger in the premises liability setting. There was  
nothing hidden about the frost or ice on the roof, and anyone  
encountering 
it 
would become aware of the slippery conditions.  
In Bertrand, supra, we considered the effect of an open  
and obvious danger on the duty of the owner or possessor of  
1 
 The Court of Appeals also rejected plaintiff’s claim 
that the circuit court should have permitted amendment of the 
pleadings to include a negligent selection/retention of 
subcontractor claim.  The plaintiff has not cross-appealed 
that issue.  
5  
 
 
land.  Referring to 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, §§ 3432 and 343A,3  
we explained:  
The invitor’s legal duty is “to exercise 
reasonable care to protect invitees from an  
unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous 
condition of the land” that the landowner knows or  
should know the invitees will not discover, 
realize, or protect themselves against.  [Quoting 
Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 
495, 499; 418 NW2d 381 (1988).]  
* * *  
Where a condition is open and obvious, the 
scope of the possessor’s duty may be limited. 
While there may be no obligation to warn of a fully 
obvious condition, the possessor still may have a 
duty to protect an invitee against foreseeably 
dangerous conditions.  Thus, the open and obvious 
doctrine does not relieve the invitor of his  
general duty of reasonable care.  
When §§ 343 and 343A are read together, the  
2  
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he  
(a)  knows or by the exercise of reasonable 
care would discover the condition, and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of  
harm to such invitees, and  
(b)  should expect that they will not discover  
or realize the danger, or will fail to protect 
themselves against it, and  
(c)  fails to exercise reasonable care to  
protect them against the danger.  
3  
A possessor of land is not liable to his 
invitees for physical harm caused to them by any 
activity or condition on the land whose danger is 
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor 
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge 
or obviousness.  
6  
rule generated is that if the particular activity 
or condition creates a risk of harm only because  
the invitee does not discover the condition or  
realize its danger, then the open and obvious 
doctrine will cut off liability if the invitee 
should have discovered the condition and realized  
its danger.  On the other hand, if the risk of harm 
remains unreasonable, despite its obviousness or 
despite knowledge of it by the invitee, then the 
circumstances may be such that the invitor is  
required to undertake reasonable precautions.  [449 
Mich 609, 610-611 (emphasis in original).]  
Bertrand involved a step in an automobile dealership.  We  
held that the step was an open and obvious condition and that  
liability could be imposed only if something unusual made the  
condition unreasonably dangerous:  
[B]ecause the danger of tripping and falling  
on a step is generally open and obvious, the 
failure to warn theory cannot establish liability. 
However, there may be special aspects of these 
particular steps that make the risk of harm  
unreasonable, and, accordingly, a failure to remedy 
the dangerous condition may be found to have 
breached the duty to keep the premises reasonably 
safe. [449 Mich 614.]  
In summary, because steps are the type of 
everyday occurrence that people encounter, under 
most circumstances, a reasonably prudent person 
will look where he is going, will observe the  
steps, and will take appropriate care for his own 
safety.
 
Under 
ordinary 
circumstances, 
the  
overriding public policy of encouraging people to 
take reasonable care for their own safety precludes 
imposing a duty on the possessor of land to make 
ordinary steps “foolproof.”  Therefore, the risk of  
harm is not unreasonable. However, where there is 
something unusual about the steps, because of their 
“character, location, or surrounding conditions,” 
then the duty of the possessor of land to exercise 
reasonable care remains. [449 Mich 616-617.]  
We reiterated those principles in our recent Lugo  
decision at 516-517:  
7  
“[I]f the particular activity or condition 
creates a risk of harm only because the invitee  
does not discover the condition or realize its  
danger, then the open and obvious doctrine will cut 
off liability if the invitee should have discovered 
the condition and realized its danger. On the other 
hand, if the risk of harm remains unreasonable, 
despite its obviousness or despite knowledge of it 
by the invitee, then the circumstances may be such 
that 
the 
invitor 
is 
required 
to 
undertake  
reasonable precautions.“  
In sum, the general rule is that a premises 
possessor is not required to protect an invitee 
from open and obvious dangers, but, if special 
aspects of a condition make even an open and 
obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises 
possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable  
precautions to protect invitees from that risk. 
[Emphasis in original.]  
Applying those principles to the facts of this case,  
there is no question that the condition of the roof was open  
and obvious.  Thus, the question is whether, despite its  
obviousness and plaintiff’s knowledge of it, a factfinder  
could determine that defendant breached a duty of reasonable  
care in the circumstances.  We conclude that it could not, and  
that summary disposition was properly granted.  In its status  
as owner, defendant had no reason to foresee that the only  
persons who would be on the premises, various contractors and  
their employees, would not take appropriate precautions in  
dealing with the open and obvious conditions of the  
construction site.  There were no special aspects of this  
condition that made the open and obvious risk unreasonably  
dangerous.  
8  
  
The Court of Appeals seems to have confused general  
contractor liability with the liability of a possessor of  
premises. In explaining its conclusion that defendant could  
be liable on a premises liability theory, the Court used  
analysis that was irrelevant to that theory and would be  
applicable only to a claim against a general contractor. It  
stated:  
The evidence presented, including the contract 
and deposition testimony, is conflicting as to who 
was responsible for providing safety equipment and 
ensuring its use; either the general contractor, 
the subcontractor or both.  
The fact that defendant may have additional duties in its  
role as general contractor, however, does not alter the nature  
of the duties owed by virtue of its ownership of the  
premises.4 
As owner, it had no reason to foresee that the  
condition of the premises would be unreasonably dangerous, as  
the roof lacked any special aspects that would make it so.  It  
could not expect that employees of subcontractors working on  
the house would fail to take necessary precautions to guard  
against the obvious danger of the slippery condition of the  
roof.  
4 
 As noted above, plaintiff’s other claim was that 
defendant, as general contractor, did not take appropriate 
measures to insure the safety of the job site. However, the 
lower courts have held that this case does not come within the  
exceptions to the general principle that general contractors 
are not liable for injuries to subcontractors’ employees. 
Plaintiff has not appealed that determination, and it is not 
before us.  
9  
 
 
 
 
 
In short, plaintiff has presented no evidence that the  
condition of the roof was unreasonably dangerous for purposes  
of premises liability.  The mere presence of ice, snow, or  
frost on a sloped rooftop generally does not create an  
unreasonably 
dangerous 
condition. 
Plaintiff 
has not  
articulated any action that could reasonably be expected of  
possessors of land in Michigan to protect against the obvious  
dangers that arise when snow, ice, or frost accumulate on  
sloped rooftops.  To avoid summary disposition on this type of  
claim, a plaintiff must present evidence of “special aspects”  
of the condition that differentiate it from the typical sloped  
rooftop containing ice, snow, or frost. Lugo, supra.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals in part, and reinstate the circuit court’s grant of  
summary disposition in favor of the defendant.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
10  
 
 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ANTON PERKOVIQ, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 116059 
DELCOR HOMES-LAKE SHORE 
POINTE, LTD., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
____________________________________ 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion. 
Plaintiff presented no evidence that the icy roof was  
unreasonably dangerous despite its obviousness.  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred with WEAVER, J.