Title: New Jersey v. Dickerson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 5, 2018

New Jersey v. Dickerson Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary This appeal raised the question of whether, in cases involving a search warrant, Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) required the State to produce the affidavit underlying the warrant prior to a pretrial detention hearing pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. During defendant Melvin Dickerson’s pretrial detention hearing, the court denied the State’s motion for pretrial detention. Relying on Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B), the court ordered defendant released subject to conditions as a discovery sanction for the State’s failure to produce the search warrant affidavit. On interlocutory appeal, the Appellate Division agreed that the State was obliged to produce the affidavit but held that the trial court erred by releasing defendant as a discovery sanction. Therefore, the Appellate Division directed the State to produce the affidavit and remanded for a full pretrial detention hearing. After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment ordering production of the search warrant affidavit, and also found no evidence or allegation of misconduct on the part of the State justifying discovery sanctions for failure to produce the search warrant affidavit. Thus, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the pretrial release of defendant was in error and that the case should be remanded for a full pretrial detention hearing. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Melvin T. Dickerson (A-1-17) (079769)Argued November 8, 2017 -- Decided February 5, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. This appeal raises the question whether, in cases involving a search warrant, Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) obliges the State to produce the affidavit underlying the warrant prior to a pretrial detention hearing pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. Police officers with the Asbury Park Police Department (APPD) applied for a warrant to search Welcome Back Unisex Hair Cuts, a barbershop/hair salon in Asbury Park (the salon). A Superior Court judge issued the warrant, which did not name any individuals as targets of the search but simply stated that the requesting officer had “probable cause to believe” that within the salon “[t]here has been and now is located certain” contraband. Upon execution of the search warrant, the APPD officers found four men inside the salon, including defendant Melvin Dickerson and co-defendant Julius Franklin (Franklin). Defendant was observed to be at the rear of the salon when the police entered, near where drugs and guns were later found. When questioned, Franklin told the officers he worked at the salon. Defendant, however, was “uncooperative.” One of the two other men present told the officers that he was at the salon waiting for a haircut; the other stated he had just “stopped in . . . briefly and was not employed [at the salon].” The officers then conducted a search of the salon. The search revealed thirty-one pieces of evidence including suspected marijuana, weapons, and several documents addressed to defendant at the salon. After the search, officers arrested Franklin and defendant. That same day, a complaint warrant was issued charging defendant with ten crimes. The complaint warrant was based upon an affidavit of probable cause that stated “pursuant to the execution of a search warrant . . . [defendant] was arrested after being found to be in possession of suspected CDS, weapons, and contraband.” At defendant’s pretrial detention hearing, the State moved to detain defendant and disclosed the Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report (PLEIR), the complaint, the supporting affidavit of probable cause, the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), and the incident and arrest reports. Defendant’s PSA rated both his risk of failure to appear and his risk of new criminal activity as a three out of six. No violence flag was indicated. The PSA recommended that defendant be released pretrial with conditions and monthly reporting. When asked whether the State had the affidavit to support the search warrant in its possession, the State responded that it did not have the affidavit and that it was “not relying upon the affidavit.” The judge found that the affidavit must be produced and, as a sanction, released defendant with conditions. The State moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The Appellate Division granted the State’s request for leave to file an interlocutory appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the State was required to produce the search warrant affidavit. However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision to release defendant and remanded for a pretrial detention hearing—both to determine whether defendant should be detained and to determine the appropriate sanctions, if any, for the State’s failure to provide the search warrant affidavit. The Court granted leave to appeal. 230 N.J. 544 (2017).HELD: The affidavit supporting a search warrant disclosed in discovery need not be disclosed as a matter of course, and no particular circumstances necessitated disclosure of that affidavit here. To the extent that the trial court’s order of release served as a “sanction” for the State’s failure to meet what the court viewed to be the State’s discovery requirements, that release order was improper.1. In State v. Robinson, the Court underscored that the State must carry a twofold burden at pretrial detention hearings—to demonstrate probable cause and to overcome the presumption of pretrial release—and noted that “discovery should likewise be keyed to both areas.” 229 N.J. 44, 69 (2017). The Court accordingly clarified and 1 amplified the meaning of Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B). Rule 3:4-2(c)’s pretrial discovery requirements must “be read in conjunction with Rule 3:13-3, which obligates the State to provide full discovery when it makes a pre-indictment plea offer or when an indictment is returned or unsealed.” Id. at 72. That does not mean that the requirements of the two rules are identical. Rather, the instruction mandates the adoption of “a workable standard.” Id. at 68. (pp. 15-21)2. Together, Rules 3:5-4 and 3:5-6(c) establish strong confidentiality protections for warrants and their supporting materials. Rule 3:5-6(c) provides: “the warrant and accompanying papers shall be provided to the defendant in discovery pursuant to R. 3:13-3,” which provides for “open file” discovery upon indictment or in the event of a plea offer. It is thus not until further along in the process that the confidentiality concerns protected by Rule 3:5–6(c) bow to discovery requirements, whereas the discovery provided for in Rule 3:4-2 is to be turned over pretrial. (pp. 21-23)3. Discovery is limited by the nature of the pretrial detention hearing, at which the State is required only to establish probable cause and to refute the presumption of release. Whether a search warrant affidavit is discoverable at a detention hearing will turn on whether it relates to the affidavit of probable cause or the State’s presentation on the risk factors in the specific case. When charged offenses include an element of possession, trial courts must determine whether the State has established a sufficient nexus between contraband and a defendant to support a finding of probable cause based on the discovery it provides pursuant to Rule 3:4-2(c). If the court concludes that additional related evidence is required to establish the nexus, the court may require production of additional discovery, including the search warrant affidavit. If the State is then unable or unwilling to produce the evidence needed, it will fail to carry its burden of proof, and the trial court must order release. The Court leaves it to the trial courts to apply Rule 3:4–2(c) as clarified to resolve such disclosure issues. That approach is a natural application of existing principles of law. Going far back in time, judges have made probable cause determinations without either the judge or the defendant having the benefit of a search warrant affidavit. Likewise, judges have made bail decisions that affected a defendant’s liberty without a search warrant affidavit. There is no basis under the CJRA or the Rules to require disclosure of search warrant affidavits that do not relate to probable cause or detention—the only issues before the court. (pp. 23-29)4. In the present case, the affidavit of probable cause did not refer to the search warrant affidavit, nor did the State rely on the search warrant affidavit at the detention hearing. The search warrant affidavit did not “relate to” the affidavit of probable cause. It is true that, where a defendant is one of several persons found on premises where contraband is discovered, it may not be inferred that he knew of the presence or had control of the contraband unless there are other circumstances tending to permit such an inference to be drawn. Defendant was in the area of the salon where drugs and guns were found, and officers found mail addressed to defendant at the salon, a State of New Jersey Certificate of Authority addressed to defendant, and an expired City of Asbury Park Barbershop/Salon License addressed to a Barbara Dickerson. It is clear that defendant was not a customer. The State established a nexus sufficient to support probable cause here. The Court reverses the affirmance of the order that compelled production of that document. (pp. 29-31)5. The issue of discovery sanctions must be distinguished from a failure by the State to carry its burden as to probable cause or as to the need for detention. When the State fails to carry its burden in either of those areas, then the presumption of release under the CJRA carries the day. When the State withholds requisite discovery, there are sanctions available under our court rules to penalize gamesmanship. Such sanctions cannot include release of a defendant. As to whether any sanction was warranted, there is no allegation that the State was guilty of any misbehavior here. No sanction was warranted and the pretrial detention hearing should have been allowed to proceed as scheduled while interlocutory review of the legal dispute was pursued. The Court accordingly affirms the Appellate Division’s determination to remand to the trial court for a detention hearing. (pp. 31-33) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, expresses the view the majority decision places Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) at odds with the CJRA and permits the State to disclose the search warrant affidavit only when it is to the State’s advantage. Justice Albin would hold that when contraband is seized pursuant to a search warrant, the search warrant affidavit should be disclosed in discovery pursuant to Rule 3:4-2(c) in the absence of extenuating circumstances. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 1 September Term 2017 079769 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.MELVIN T. DICKERSON, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 8, 2017 – Decided February 5, 2018 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the briefs). Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Cody T. Mason, of counsel and on the briefs). Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Richard T. Burke, President, attorney; Jeffrey L. Weinstein, of counsel and on the brief). Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom, Edward L. Barocas and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief). 1 JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises the question whether, in cases involvinga search warrant, Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) obliges the State toproduce the affidavit underlying the warrant prior to a pretrialdetention hearing pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act(CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. During defendant Melvin Dickerson’s pretrial detentionhearing, the court denied the State’s motion for pretrialdetention. Relying on Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B), the court ordereddefendant released subject to conditions as a discovery sanctionfor the State’s failure to produce the search warrant affidavit. On interlocutory appeal, the Appellate Division agreed thatthe State was obliged to produce the affidavit but held that thetrial court erred by releasing defendant as a discoverysanction. Therefore, the Appellate Division directed the Stateto produce the affidavit and remanded for a full pretrialdetention hearing. We now reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment orderingproduction of the search warrant affidavit. We further find noevidence or allegation of misconduct on the part of the Statejustifying discovery sanctions for failure to produce the searchwarrant affidavit. Thus, we agree with the Appellate Divisionthat the pretrial release of defendant was in error and that thecase should be remanded for a full pretrial detention hearing. 2 I. The following facts are elicited from record documents,including the search warrant, the incident report prepared bypolice, and the complaint-warrant. A. After multiple meetings with a confidential informantdiscussing the sales of controlled dangerous substances (CDS),police officers with the Asbury Park Police Department (APPD)applied for a warrant to search Welcome Back Unisex Hair Cuts, abarbershop/hair salon in Asbury Park (the salon). A SuperiorCourt judge reviewed the application and issued the warrant.The warrant did not name any individuals as targets of thesearch but simply stated that the requesting officer had“probable cause to believe” that within the salon “[t]here hasbeen and now is located certain” contraband. Upon execution of the search warrant, the APPD officersfound four men inside the salon, including defendant and co-defendant Julius Franklin (Franklin). Defendant was observed tobe at the rear of the salon when the police entered, near wheredrugs and guns were later found. When questioned, Franklin toldthe officers he worked at the salon. Defendant, however, was“uncooperative.” One of the two other men present told theofficers that he was at the salon waiting for a haircut; the 3 other stated he had just “stopped in . . . briefly and was notemployed [at the salon].” The officers then conducted a search of the salon. Thesearch revealed thirty-one pieces of evidence including twoplastic bags of suspected marijuana, a 9mm sub-machine gun, a.38 caliber semi-automatic handgun, a stun gun, ammunition, twodigital scales, a heat-seal vacuum, a box of Ziploc vacuumsealer gallon bags, a suspected police scanner, a cell phone, aState of New Jersey Certificate of Authority addressed todefendant, an expired City of Asbury Park Barbershop/SalonLicense addressed to a Barbara Dickerson, and several moredocuments addressed to defendant at the salon. After thesearch, officers arrested Franklin and defendant. That same day, a complaint warrant was issued chargingdefendant with ten crimes: 1) fourth-degree possession of overone-half ounce of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3); 2) third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(11); 3) third-degree possession of marijuanawith intent to distribute in a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a);4) fourth-degree unlawful interception or use of officialcommunications, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-21; 5) two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm while in the course of committinga narcotics offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); 6) fourth-degreepossession of a defaced handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d); 7) second- 4 degree unlawful possession of a machine gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a); 8) second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and 9) fourth-degree unlawful possessionof a stun gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h). The complaint warrant wasbased upon an affidavit of probable cause that stated “pursuantto the execution of a search warrant . . . [defendant] wasarrested after being found to be in possession of suspected CDS,weapons, and contraband.” At defendant’s pretrial detention hearing, the State movedto detain defendant. In connection with the hearing, the Statedisclosed the Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report(PLEIR), 1 the complaint, the supporting affidavit of probablecause, the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), and the incident andarrest reports. Defendant’s PSA rated both his risk of failureto appear and his risk of new criminal activity as a three outof six. No violence flag was indicated. The PSA recommendedthat defendant be released pretrial with conditions and monthlyreporting.1 The PLEIR “is 'an electronic document that succinctly describes the relevant factual circumstances’ relating to a defendant’s arrest.” State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 61 (2017) (quoting Office of the Attorney General, Directive Establishing Interim Policies, Practices and Procedures to Implement Criminal Justice Reform Pursuant to P.L. 2014, c. 31 § 5.2, at 48 (Oct. 11, 2016)). 5 During defendant’s pretrial detention hearing, the judgeexplained to defendant that he had “the right to be providedwith all statements or reports in the prosecutor’s possessionrelating to the pretrial detention application.” At that point,defense counsel claimed that he had received “limiteddiscovery,” because “the affidavit to support the search warrantis absent.” When asked whether the State had the affidavit inits possession, the State responded that it did not have theaffidavit and that it was “not relying upon the affidavit.” Thejudge found that the affidavit must be produced, stating: It doesn’t matter what you’re relying on. If it relates to the motion, it must be produced. The Rule does not speak to what information the State intends to rely upon. That is not the litmus test for what must be produced. It is anything that relates to the application. The defendant is entitled to have all of that information. The State further argued that “[t]he affidavit is notreferenced in the PLEIR” and “has nothing to do with theprobable cause that is related to this offense.” The court,however, found that the affidavit “should be produced . . . .whether the State is intending to rely on it or not” and, as asanction, released defendant with conditions. A day after defendant was released, the Appellate Divisiondecided State v. Robinson, 448 N.J. Super. 501, aff’d andmodified, 229 N.J. 44 (2017), and the State moved for 6 reconsideration based on the holding in that case. At thereconsideration hearing, the State argued that “the only basisfor which the Defense would be able to use the affidavit insupport of the search warrant would be to attack the probablecause” for the search itself -- a question not at issue at thepretrial detention stage. The State also argued that “theappropriate remedy here would not be simply to release thedefendant, but for the Court to issue an order . . . specifyingwhat documents that the State is to produce.” The State’smotion for reconsideration was denied, and the AppellateDivision granted the State’s request for leave to file aninterlocutory appeal. B. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s rulingthat the State was required to produce the search warrantaffidavit. However, the Appellate Division reversed the trialcourt’s decision to release defendant and remanded for apretrial detention hearing -- both to determine whetherdefendant should be detained and to determine the appropriatesanctions, if any, for the State’s failure to provide the searchwarrant affidavit. Specifically, the appellate panel held that, when theState’s evidence in support of pretrial detention is largelydependent on items seized under a search warrant, the affidavits 7 underlying that warrant are relevant evidence relating toprobable cause. The appellate panel relied on the text of Rule3:4-2(c)(1)(B), as well as the sixth, seventh, and tenthprinciples in State v. Robinson that this Court stated “shouldgovern the disclosure of evidence at a detention hearing”: (6)“All statements and reports relating to the affidavit ofprobable cause should be disclosed”; (7) “All statements orreports that relate to any additional evidence the State relieson to establish probable cause at the detention hearing shouldbe disclosed”; and (10) “The phrase 'statements and reports’refers to items that exist at the time of the hearing. Theterms plainly include relevant police reports.” 229 N.J. 44,70–71 (2017). The appellate panel rejected the State’s contention thatwarrant-related materials need only be produced post-indictment,holding that the first exception to Rule 3:5-6(c) applied -- “thewarrant and accompanying papers shall be provided to thedefendant in discovery pursuant to R. 3:13-3” -- and that Rule3:4-2(c) controls the timing of disclosure. The AppellateDivision also held that any confidentiality concerns regardingproduction could be remedied by a protective order, which theState did not seek. The appellate panel affirmed the trial court’s rulingcompelling the State to produce the search warrant affidavit but 8 vacated the portion of the trial court’s order that deniedpretrial detention without a hearing. The appellate panel foundthat the trial court never explained the reasons for imposingthe “sanction” of releasing defendant or why the sanction wasjustified under the circumstances. Hence, the appellate panelremanded for a pretrial detention hearing to evaluate whetherthe State acted in good faith when it did not produce theunderlying affidavit, as well as whether the trial courtconsidered sanctions other than summary denial of the State’spretrial detention application. We granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. 230 N.J. 544 (2017). We also granted the motions of the AmericanCivil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and the CountyProsecutors Association of New Jersey (CPANJ) to participate asamici curiae. II. A. The State asserts that, at the pretrial detention stage,its burden is only to establish probable cause and thedefendant’s risk of danger, flight, and obstruction. Accordingto the State, an expansive discovery obligation at the pretrialdetention stage would strain the judicial system. Further, theState argues that search warrant affidavits are not relevant atthe pretrial detention stage. 9 The State contends that defendant was not charged with anycrimes predicated upon activity that occurred before the searchof the salon -- only upon what police found there. Thus, thesearch warrant and related affidavit do not establish eitherprobable cause for any charged offense or defendant’s risk ofdanger, flight, or obstruction. The State claims that the twelve principles governingdisclosure of evidence at pretrial detention hearings set forthin Robinson all provide that discovery must be “keyed” to theState’s two tasks at the pretrial detention stage --establishing probable cause and risk of danger, flight, orobstruction. Thus, in the State’s view, because defendant’scharges stem only from evidence seized upon execution of thesearch warrant, and not from the search warrant application, thewarrant application materials are not “keyed” to the State’sdual burdens. 2 The State points out that Rule 3:5-6(c), which governs theconfidentiality of warrants and ancillary materials, allows foran exception under Rule 3:13-3 but not pursuant to Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B). Furthermore, the State notes that this Court2 We do not consider the arguments raised by the State or the other parties inferencing an unpublished Appellate Division decision reversing a trial court’s order compelling discovery of a search warrant affidavit. That unpublished decision does not fall within the narrow exceptions set forth in Rule 1:36-3. 10 adopted a version of Rule 3:4-2 that did not include a proposedreference to Rule 3:13-3 in order to mark the difference betweenpretrial detention discovery and post-indictment discovery. The State stresses that search warrants often incorporateinformation gleaned from the undercover work of confidentialinformants. Given the short arrest-to-detention-hearingschedule the CJRA imposes, the State argues that production ofsearch warrant affidavits would often endanger confidentialinformants by making their identity easily discernable. The State acknowledges that the materials it relies on toestablish probable cause may be a subset of the materials thatare relevant to probable cause. The State argues, however, thatif it chooses to rely on less than all the relevant materials,it “runs the risk that the court will deny its pretrialdetention application.” B. Defendant argues for affirmance of the Appellate Division’sdecision. Defendant claims that the State’s productionobligation is “'not limited to documents upon which the Stateclaims to rely’ . . . and instead extends to all materialsrelated to 'the factual assertions contained in the probablecause affidavit’ . . . or that 'can be expected to provide thebasic background facts’ concerning the crime and charges.”(quoting Robinson, 448 N.J. Super. at 517, 520). Defendant also 11 urges that “discovery 'must reflect’ the fact that defendantsface a complete loss of liberty and must be able to challengethe State’s detention application.” (quoting Robinson, 229 N.J.at 68). Hence, in defendant’s view, production of the affidavitin this case was necessary to establish the connection betweenhimself and the contraband he was alleged to possess. Withoutthe affidavit, defendant argues, the State can establish onlythat defendant -- like multiple other individuals -- was presentat the salon where contraband was found. “As a result,” defendant argues, his “only establishedconnection to the contraband is that he, like two unchargedindividuals, was present during the search, and that he may haveworked at [the salon].” “Any additional information concerning[his] connection to the contraband, or lack thereof, wouldtherefore relate to the State’s [pretrial detention] applicationas much as anything previously disclosed in discovery.” Defendant further argues that his approach harmonizes Rule3:5-6 and Rule 3:4-2. According to defendant, the State’sinterpretation “would render Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) moot whenever acase involves a search warrant.” Finally, defendant argues that the State has “made clear”that concerns preventing disclosure, and justifying a protectiveorder, are not present here because the State did not seek aprotective order. 12 C. Amicus ACLU does not argue that the State must producesearch warrant affidavits in every case but claims that suchproduction is required when: 1) the defendant is arrested in aplace other than his home; and 2) there is no evidence of thedefendant’s control over contraband found at the time of arrest.In the ACLU’s view, the Appellate Division’s holding “need onlyapply where the seizure of contraband serves as a basis forpretrial detention and the location of the seizure alone isinsufficient to show a nexus between the defendant and thecontraband.” The ACLU argues that no production is requiredwhere the contraband is found in a room owned or rented by thedefendant, or on the defendant’s person, because the nexusbetween the defendant and the contraband in such situations isalready clear. Lastly, the ACLU argues that the State can avoid otherwise-compulsory production by obtaining a protective order wheremerited -- that is, on a case-by-case basis and on a showing of“legitimate, specific security concerns.” The ACLU points outthat, in this case, the State was aware it could move for aprotective order and explicitly chose not to seek one. D. The CPANJ agrees with the State. The CPANJ argues thatbecause warrant confidentiality is paramount, this Court’s rules 13 permit post-execution disclosure in only two scenarios: 1)post-indictment discovery; and 2) disclosure to any personclaiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.Similarly, the CPANJ notes, this Court has made search warrantsan exception to the general public availability of criminal caserecords. In that vein, the CPANJ asserts a broad public policyinterest in warrant confidentiality, emphasizing that warrantsmay describe ongoing investigations, active wiretaps, identitiesof confidential informants, identities of uncharged butimplicated individuals, and witnesses. Therefore, the CPANJasserts that the rule for which defendant advocates would forcethe State to move for a protective order in an inordinate numberof cases, transforming protective orders from the exception tothe rule and unduly burdening prosecutors. The CPANJ also argues that, given how quickly lawenforcement must act on warrants to forestall a stalenessdefense and how soon detention hearings must follow arrest,requiring warrant affidavit production would increase theprobability that confidential informants would be identified andpotentially subjected to retaliation. In the CPANJ’s view, theAppellate Division did not read Rule 3:5-6(c) “in harmony” withRule 3:4-2(c), but rather read Rule 3:4-2(c) to entirely trumpthe warrant confidentiality rule. 14 The CPANJ notes that law enforcement typically does notrely on information in search warrant affidavits in preparingaffidavits of probable cause and adds that the warrant materialsin this case did not relate to probable cause or pretrialdetention. Thus, the warrant affidavit here did not fall withinthe State’s production obligation, according to the CPANJ. III. This case presents a narrow question regarding the State’sdiscovery obligation at the pretrial detention stage leftunanswered in Robinson -- whether Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) obligesthe State to produce the affidavit underlying a search warrantin a pretrial detention hearing. Appellate review of the meaning of the New Jersey CourtRules is de novo. Robinson, 229 N.J. at 66; State v. Hernandez,225 N.J. 451, 461 (2016). “We apply ordinary principles ofstatutory construction to interpret the court rules and startwith the plain language of the Rule.” Robinson, 229 N.J. at 67. A. The CJRA “allows for pretrial detention of defendants whopresent such a serious risk of danger, flight, or obstructionthat no combination of release conditions would be adequate.”Id. at 54. “After a complaint-warrant is issued, eligibledefendants 'shall be temporarily detained to allow the PretrialServices Program to prepare a risk assessment’ and recommend 15 conditions of release.” Id. at 55 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(a)). “When a prosecutor applies for pretrial detention, thedefendant is held pending a hearing.” Id. at 57. “At thehearing, the defendant has the right to counsel and . . . theright to testify, to call witnesses, to cross-examine witnesseswho appear, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.”Id. at 58 (citation omitted). “In the end, if a court ordersdetention, its decision must be supported by clear andconvincing evidence.” Ibid. “[T]he [CJRA] calls for a determination of probable causeand an assessment of the risk of danger, flight, andobstruction, which may include consideration of the nature andcircumstances of the offense and the weight of theevidence . . . .” Id. at 69; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1);-19(e)(2); -20(a), (b). The statute does not, however, specifywhat discovery must be turned over to defendants as to thoseproofs. We addressed the issue of discovery in crafting rules toguide the implementation of the CJRA. This Court’s CriminalPractice Committee issued a report, which became part of thelegislative history of the rules eventually adopted. SeeRobinson, 229 N.J. at 59; see also Report of the Supreme CourtCommittee on Criminal Practice on Recommended Court Rules to 16 Implement the Bail Reform Law, Part I: Pretrial Release (May 9,2016); Report of the Supreme Court Committee on CriminalPractice on Recommended Court Rules to Implement the Bail ReformLaw, Part II: Pretrial Detention & Speedy Trial (May 12, 2016).The report indicated that “[t]he Committee divided sharply aboutthe amount and type of discovery that should be required forpretrial detention hearings.” Robinson, 229 N.J. at 59.Ultimately, the Court amended Rule 3:4-2 to set parameters forthat discovery. See R. 3:4-2 (as amended Dec. 6, 2016). In Robinson, one of the earliest CJRA cases, this Courtrevisited those parameters in connection with a discoverydispute. We underscored that the State must carry a twofoldburden at pretrial detention hearings -- to demonstrate probablecause and to overcome the presumption of pretrial release -- andnoted that “discovery should likewise be keyed to both areas.”229 N.J. at 69. We accordingly clarified and amplified themeaning of Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B). Id. at 71–72. In so doing, we identified twelve “principles” that“govern” the disclosure of evidence at a detention hearing, id.at 69–71, many of which are relevant here. “All exculpatoryevidence must be disclosed.” Id. at 71. Further, there arespecific documents that the State must turn over: thecomplaint, the PSA, the PLEIR, and the affidavit of probablecause. Id. at 69. We specified that, “[i]f a similar document 17 with a different name is used [instead of an affidavit] toestablish probable cause, that document must be disclosed.”Ibid. We also required the State to provide the defendant with“[a]ll statements and reports relating to the affidavit ofprobable cause. In other words, if an affidavit of probablecause describes what a police officer or witness observed, aninitial police report or witness statement that relates to thosefactual assertions must be disclosed.” Id. at 70. Disclosureis also required for “statements or reports that relate to anyadditional evidence the State relies on to establish probablecause at the detention hearing.” Ibid. “For example, if theState, at the detention hearing, refers to a witness whoseobservations are not discussed in the affidavit of probablecause, all statements and reports relating to the additionalwitness should be disclosed.” Ibid. In addition to those requirements, we offered two importantdefinitions in Robinson. First, we noted “[t]he phrase'statements and reports’ refers to items that exist at the timeof the hearing. The terms plainly include relevant policereports.” Id. at 70–71. Second, we stressed that, although thephrase “relate to” can be construed broadly, see Webster’sSecond New College Dictionary 935 (2d ed. 2001) (defining“relate” as “[t]o have a connection, relation, or reference”),it must be given a workable meaning in New Jersey jurisprudence, 18 see Robinson, 229 N.J. at 72 (“Judges must also be mindful ofpractical concerns . . . there may be dozens of police reportsat the time of arrest that arguably relate to the affidavit ofprobable cause.”). To implement the principles we identified, this Courtexercised its Article VI rulemaking power to bypass thecommittee process and directly revise Rule 3:4-2(c) in the textof Robinson. Id. at 72, 74; see also N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2,¶ 3. Under Rule 3:4-2(c), as modified by Robinson, a prosecutorseeking pretrial detention must now provide defense counsel withfive categories of materials: [1] the discovery listed in subsection (A) above [(i.e., “a copy of any available preliminary law enforcement incident report concerning the offense and the affidavit of probable cause”)], [2] all statements or reports relating to the affidavit of probable cause, [3] all statements or reports relating to additional evidence the State relies on to establish probable cause at the hearing, [4] all statements or reports relating to the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1) that the State advances at the hearing,[ 3] and3 The factors the State may advance are applicable to show that no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary bail and conditions would reasonably assure 1) defendant’s appearance in court when required, 2) the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and 3) that defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1). 19 [5] all exculpatory evidence. [Robinson, 229 N.J. at 71–72; R. 3:4- 2(c)(1)(B).] The revised Rule 3:4-2(c) provides defendants with “farbroader discovery” than they are entitled to at the pretrialdetention stage in the federal system, Robinson, 229 N.J. at 61,and represents this Court’s carefully considered attempt tostrike a balance between the significant competing interests atstake, see id. at 76. We noted in Robinson that making theState’s discovery obligation at the pretrial detention stage any“broader” would “impose a greater administrative burden on theState” and thereby risk “frustrat[ing] the purpose of the[CJRA].” Id. at 76. After all, “in light of the [CJRA’s] verytight time constraints,” under a broader discovery obligation,“the State might be forced to limit detention motions based onthe resources it can devote to discovery in the days after anarrest, and not its assessment of the risk of danger, flight, orobstruction that a defendant poses.” Ibid. We further stressed the need for balance by instructingthat Rule 3:4-2(c)’s pretrial discovery requirements must “beread in conjunction with Rule 3:13-3, which obligates the Stateto provide full discovery when it makes a pre-indictment pleaoffer or when an indictment is returned or unsealed.” Id. at72. That does not mean that the requirements of the two rules 20 are identical; on the contrary, the Court declined to adoptduring the rulemaking process a proposal that would havecollapsed the distinctions between the two. See id. at 60-61. Rather, the instruction mandates the adoption of “aworkable standard,” id. at 68 -- one that does “not imposeimpractical demands on law enforcement” and that balances both“the law’s tight timeframe,” ibid., and the limited purpose ofdetention hearings, which “are not full-scale trials designed toassess guilt,” id. at 73, against “the defendants’ libertyinterests,” id. at 68, and the fact that “[i]n our societyliberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or withouttrial is the carefully limited exception,” ibid. (quoting UnitedStates v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 , 755 (1987)). That mandate is not self-executing, however. And althoughRobinson provides a great deal of guidance as to discoveryrequirements in pretrial detention proceedings, it does notdiscuss search warrant affidavits. Nor did the report by theCriminal Practice Committee refer to the discoverability ofsearch warrant affidavits at the pretrial detention stage. Wetherefore turn to the rules that address search-warrantdiscovery in general for guidance. B. The court rules regarding warrants and supporting documentspredate the CJRA. “A search warrant shall be issued with all 21 practicable secrecy and the affidavit or testimony upon which itis based shall not be . . . made public in any way prior toexecution,” with disclosure punishable by contempt. R. 3:5-4.After the warrant’s execution, the warrant itself “and thepapers accompanying [it], including the affidavits, transcriptor summary of any oral testimony, duplicate original searchwarrant, return and inventory, and any original tape orstenographic recording shall be confidential.” R. 3:5-6(c). Together, Rules 3:5-4 and 3:5-6(c) establish strongconfidentiality protections for warrants and their supportingmaterials. The reason for warrant confidentiality is, in part,that warrants may describe ongoing investigations, activewiretaps, identities of confidential informants, identities ofuncharged but implicated individuals, and witnesses. See Statein Interest of N.H., 226 N.J. 242, 256 (2016) (explaining aprotective order, in the pretrial detention context, is used “toredact, delay, or withhold the disclosure of materials thatwould expose witnesses and others to harm, hinder or jeopardizeongoing investigations or prosecutions, undermine the secrecy ofinformants and confidential information which the lawrecognizes, or compromise some other legitimate interest”); R.3:13–3(a)(1), (e)(1). Despite those concerns for warrant confidentiality, Rule3:5-6(c) provides two exceptions. First, “the warrant and 22 accompanying papers shall be provided to the defendant indiscovery pursuant to R. 3:13-3”; and second, the warrant andaccompanying papers shall be “available for inspection andcopying by any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawfulsearch and seizure upon notice to the county prosecutor for goodcause shown.” R. 3:5–6(c). The first of those exceptions is relevant here. Thatexception is tethered to Rule 3:13-3, which provides for thedefendant’s receipt of “open file” discovery upon indictment orin the event the prosecutor makes a pre-indictment plea offer.It is thus not until further along in the process that theconfidentiality concerns protected by Rule 3:5–6(c) bow todiscovery requirements, whereas the discovery provided for inRule 3:4-2 is to be turned over pretrial. In order to read thepretrial discovery rule “in conjunction with Rule 3:13-3,”therefore, we must determine whether the confidentialityinterests described above militate against imposing the full-disclosure requirements of Rule 3:13-3 at the earlier proceedinggoverned by Rule 3:4-2(c). IV. A. We first determine whether, as a matter of course, theState is required to produce the affidavit of probable causesupporting a search warrant before a pre-detention hearing under 23 the CJRA. Applying the principles set forth in Robinson andconsidering the confidentiality concerns raised by searchwarrants, we decline to establish such a blanket rule. Discovery is limited by the nature of the pretrialdetention hearing, at which the State need not prove guilt, butrather is required only to establish probable cause and to rebutthe presumption of release. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162–19(e)(2).Defendants are entitled, in addition to “all exculpatoryevidence and a copy of the charging document,” to “statements orreports that relate to (1) the affidavit of probable cause and(2) additional evidence the prosecution relies on at thedetention hearing -- both to establish probable cause and toadvance any relevant risk factors.” Robinson, 229 N.J. at 76.Therefore, as to probable cause, the evidence to be produced iscircumscribed by what the State chooses to include in itsaffidavit of probable cause or equivalent document and what itexplicitly relies on during a detention hearing. See ibid. If,through the manner in which it frames its presentation, theState does not meet its burden of showing probable cause, thedefendant must be released. Ibid. Whether a search warrant affidavit is discoverable at adetention hearing, therefore, will turn on whether it relates tothe affidavit of probable cause or the State’s presentation onthe risk factors in the specific case. For example, if an 24 affidavit of probable cause alleged that defendant conducted aseries of drug transactions, and the search warrant affidavitoutlined those transactions, the State would have to disclosethe warrant affidavit in connection with the detention hearing.On the other hand, if the affidavit of probable cause relied onitems found during a search but not a defendant’s prior historyof drug dealing, the warrant affidavit would not have to bedisclosed until the time of indictment. The State may choose to include in its affidavit or discussat the detention hearing only a portion of the evidence in itspossession. In such circumstances, Rule 3:4-2(c) mandates onlythat the State produce discovery related to its presentation.That is true even if production of additional discovery wouldbetter describe the strength of the State’s case. At the pretrial detention hearing, the court will considerthe State’s application to “determine probable cause -- whetheran officer has a 'well grounded suspicion that a crime has been’committed and that defendant committed the offense.” Id. at 68-69 (quoting State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 292 (2014)). As westressed in Robinson, that determination “calls for 'lessevidence than is needed to convict at trial.’” Id. at 69(quoting State v. Brown, 205 N.J. 133, 144 (2011)).Nevertheless, when charged offenses include an element ofpossession, a showing of probable cause that defendant committed 25 the offense requires the State to establish a nexus between thedefendant and the contraband sufficient to support a well-grounded suspicion that the contraband was in defendant’spossession within the meaning of the charged offenses. Thus, at pretrial detention hearings, trial courts mustdetermine whether the State has established a sufficient nexusbetween contraband and a defendant to support a finding ofprobable cause based on the State’s presentation and thediscovery it provides pursuant to Rule 3:4-2(c). Moreover, if“nexus” is rightly an issue, a defendant is free to challengeprobable cause on that basis. The ACLU argues that search warrant affidavits should bedisclosed whenever the nexus between the defendant and thecontraband is the basis “for pretrial detention and the locationof the seizure alone is insufficient to show a nexus between thedefendant and the contraband.” We decline to adopt thatapproach. Rule 3:4-2(c) instead calls for disclosure ofmaterials that relate to the State’s presentation at thedetention hearing. Thus, if the affidavit establishes theparticular nexus between the defendant and the contraband found,the warrant should be disclosed. That will not be the case withall search warrant affidavits, however. Judges, of course, have discretion to require production ofadditional discovery, including the search warrant affidavit, 26 when appropriate. State v. Ingram, 230 N.J. 190, 213 (2017).Thus, if the trial court concludes that additional relatedevidence is required to establish the nexus between a defendantand the contraband, the court may require production ofadditional discovery, including the search warrant affidavit.Cf. ibid. (“We find that the State is not obligated to call alive witness at each detention hearing. To be clear, though, werepeat that the trial court has discretion to require directtestimony if it is dissatisfied with the State’s proffer. Inthose instances, the State must proceed reasonably promptly toavoid unduly prolonging a defendant’s detention while thehearing is pending.” (citation omitted)). In this way the trial court, not the State as is claimed byour dissenting colleague, “control[s] the information that flowsthrough the discovery spigot.” If the State is then unable orunwilling to produce the evidence needed to establish probablecause, it will fail to carry its burden of proof, and the trialcourt must order release. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2);Robinson, 229 N.J. at 58. In sum, we leave it to our trialcourts to apply Rule 3:4–2(c) as clarified by this Court toresolve such disclosure issues. Our approach is a natural application of existingprinciples of law. Going far back in time, judges have madeprobable cause determinations without either the judge or 27 the defendant having the benefit of a search warrant affidavitin hand. Likewise, judges have made bail decisions thataffected a defendant's liberty without a search warrantaffidavit. Today, they are called upon to make both types ofdecisions -- probable cause and detention -- at the same time,with far more discovery than has been available previously atthis early stage under state law, and far more than is availableunder comparable federal law. There is no basis under the CJRAor the Rules to go further and require disclosure of searchwarrant affidavits that do not relate to probable cause ordetention -- the only issues before the court. There will beample later to litigate the merits of the search warrantaffidavit. Our holding also allows courts to maintain theconfidentiality of search warrants in many cases, in keepingwith Rules 3:5-4 and 3:5-6(c), and will promote efficiency inpretrial proceedings. See ibid.; Robinson, 229 N.J. at 68. Atthe same time, that approach respects the evidentiary burdensestablished by the Legislature in the CJRA. See N.J.S.A.2A:162-19(e)(2). We note that, to the extent a search warrantaffidavit contains exculpatory information, its discovery isalready explicitly required by Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B)(v). Westress that, if the circumstances of the case so warrant, theState may seek a protective order if the trial court requires 28 discovery of a search warrant affidavit. See Robinson, 229 N.J.at 72; N.H., 226 N.J. at 256. This approach also recognizes that detention hearingsdiffer from trials and suppression hearings. At the detentionhearing, the court only determines probable cause and assessesthe statutory risk factors. Challenges to the sufficiency ofthe search warrant affidavit and the admissibility of evidencecome later in the judicial process, by which time the State willhave been required to comply with its discovery obligation underRule 3:13 and disclose any search warrant affidavits. B. Having determined that automatic disclosure of searchwarrant affidavits is not mandatory but that trial courts mayrequire such disclosure, we consider whether disclosure wasrequired in the present case. As a part of discovery, the State provided, as required byRobinson, the PLEIR, the complaint, the supporting affidavit ofprobable cause, the PSA, and the incident and arrest reports,which were, in this case, commendably detailed. Further, unlikethe “barebones affidavit” cautioned against in Robinson andcriticized in Ingram, the affidavit of probable cause that theState provided stated in part: “Pursuant to the execution of asearch warrant on 02/01/2017 the accused was arrested afterbeing found to be in possession of suspected CDS, weapons, and 29 contraband.” Also, the State turned over the search warrantreferenced in that portion of the affidavit as required byRobinson. See 229 N.J. at 70. The affidavit of probable cause did not refer to the searchwarrant affidavit, nor did the State rely on the search warrantaffidavit at the detention hearing. The search warrantaffidavit in this case simply did not “relate to” the affidavitof probable cause. It is clear in this case that the evidencerelied upon by the State was obtained when the search warrantwas executed, not before. Amicus ACLU asserts that that such production is requiredwhen the defendant is arrested in a place other than his homeand that, here, there is no evidence of the defendant’s controlover contraband found at the time of arrest. Defendant claimsthat additional information was required to establish a nexusbetween him and the contraband. We disagree. It is true that, “[w]here . . . a defendant is one ofseveral persons found on premises where [contraband is]discovered, it may not be inferred that he knew of the presenceor had control of the [contraband] unless there are othercircumstances . . . tending to permit such an inference to bedrawn.” State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 593 (1979) (first ellipsisin original) (quoting State v. Sapp, 144 N.J. Super. 455, 461(1975), rev’d on other grounds, 71 N.J. 476 (1976)). In this 30 case, such additional circumstances were present. First,defendant was in the area of the salon where drugs and guns werefound. Second, officers found mail addressed to defendant atthe salon, a State of New Jersey Certificate of Authorityaddressed to defendant, and an expired City of Asbury ParkBarbershop/Salon License addressed to a Barbara Dickerson. Itis clear that, unlike others present, defendant was not acustomer. The State established a nexus sufficient to supportprobable cause here. Because we find, first, that the affidavit supporting asearch warrant disclosed in discovery need not be disclosed as amatter of course and, second, that no particular circumstancesnecessitated disclosure of that affidavit here, we reverse theAppellate Division’s affirmance of the trial court order thatcompelled production of that document. V. We turn now to the issue of the appropriate remedy forfailure to comply with the discovery requirements set forth inRule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) and explained in greater detail here and inRobinson. Although there was no such failure here -- inasmuchas it was not necessary to turn over the search warrantaffidavit in this case -- we offer the following guidance. The issue of discovery sanctions must be distinguished,first and foremost, from a failure by the State to carry its 31 burden as to probable cause or as to the need for detention.When the State fails to carry its burden in either of thoseareas, then the presumption of release under the CJRA carriesthe day. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15, -19. When the State withholdsrequisite discovery, there are sanctions available under ourcourt rules to penalize gamesmanship. See R. 3:13–3(f). Such sanctions cannot include release of a defendant. Onlythe failure of the State to establish probable cause or toovercome the presumption of release justifies release. N.J.S.A.2A:162–19(e)(2). Detention is required under the CJRA whennecessary to protect the public, prevent obstruction, or ensurea defendant’s appearance. N.J.S.A. 2A:162–18(a)(1). The courtmust not eschew those interests to punish what it perceives tobe bad conduct. The public cannot be imperiled, nor theintegrity of the judicial system compromised, due to a failureto comply with a discovery order. Thus, to the extent that thetrial court’s order of release served as a “sanction” for theState’s failure to meet what the court viewed to be the State’sdiscovery requirements, that release order was improper. As to whether any sanction was warranted, we note thatthere is no allegation that the State was guilty of anymisbehavior. Indeed, the question of whether the search warrantaffidavit was related to the issues of probable cause ordetention was substantial and genuine. There was no 32 inappropriate conduct here –- only an honest legal dispute as tothe discovery requirements of Rule 3:4–2(c). We therefore findthat no sanction was warranted and that the pretrial detentionhearing should have been allowed to proceed as scheduled whileinterlocutory review of the legal dispute was pursued. Weaccordingly affirm the Appellate Division’s determination toremand to the trial court for a detention hearing. VI. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment ofthe Appellate Division requiring the State to produce theaffidavit in support of the search warrant issued here in pre-detention hearing discovery. We affirm the judgment of theAppellate Division remanding the matter to the trial court toconduct a detention hearing. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. 33 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 1 September Term 2017 079769 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.MELVIN T. DICKERSON, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. The purpose of the discovery rule in a pretrial detentionhearing is to give the defendant a fair opportunity to challengethe State’s assertion that probable cause supports the chargedoffense and that detention is the only means of assuring publicsafety. The majority’s crabbed interpretation of Rule 3:4-2(c)empowers and encourages the State to present the trial courtwith as little evidence as possible to avoid giving thedefendant readily available information to contest the State’spresentation. That approach not only disserves principles offair play, but also ultimately deprives the court of vitalevidence necessary to carry out its statutory obligation ofdetermining whether detention is appropriate under the CriminalJustice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. In this case, the State charged defendant Melvin Dickersonwith unlawful possession of drugs with intent to distribute, 1 unlawful possession of firearms, and related offenses. Thepolice -- armed with a search warrant -- seized drugs, drugparaphernalia, and firearms from a hair salon in Asbury Parkwhere defendant allegedly worked. Defendant requested indiscovery the search warrant affidavit, which presumably wouldshow whether defendant had a true connection to the salon. TheState categorically denied the request. It did not claim thatdisclosure of the search warrant affidavit would place injeopardy a confidential informant or a witness. Nor did it askfor a protective order. The trial court ordered the State to disclose the affidavitto the defense, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding“that Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) required the State to produce todefendant the search warrant information before the detentionhearing.” In reversing both the trial court and AppellateDivision, the majority announces that discovery is limited tothe evidence the State presents at the detention hearing.Because the State relied on the search warrant but did not utterthe words “search warrant affidavit,” the majority finds thatall relevant information in that affidavit is rendered non-discoverable. In effect, the majority provides a guidebook tothe State on how to scrimp on its discovery obligations. The majority decision also places our court rule at oddswith the CJRA, which requires that trial courts consider, in 2 determining whether detention is warranted, the “nature andcircumstances of the offense charged” and the “weight of theevidence against the eligible defendant.” See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) to (b). That statutory obligation cannot be fulfilledwhen the State parcels out only the evidence it wishes topresent to the trial court. For those reasons, and more, I respectfully dissent. I. After passage of the CJRA, this Court received input fromall stakeholders in the criminal justice system -- prosecutors,defense attorneys, and judges -- and then adopted a discoveryrule detailing what the State must produce when it seeks pre-trial detention. See Report of the Supreme Court Committee onCriminal Practice on Recommended Court Rules to Implement BailReform Law, Part I: Pretrial Release (May 9, 2016); Report ofthe Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice on RecommendedCourt Rules to Implement Bail Reform Law, Part II: PretrialDetention & Speedy Trial (May 12, 2016). The court rulerequired the prosecutor to “provide the defendant with allstatements or reports in its possession relating to the pretrialdetention application[,]” including “all exculpatory evidence.”R. 3:4-2(c)(1)(B). The rule corresponded to the trial court’s statutory dutyin making pre-trial detention determinations. N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 3 20(a) to (f) permits the trial court to consider such factorsas: “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged”;“[t]he weight of the evidence against the eligible defendant”;“[t]he history and characteristics of the eligible defendant”;the danger posed to any person or the community if defendantwere released; the risk of obstruction of justice if defendantwere released; and the recommendation of the pretrial servicesprogram. To take account of those factors, the trial courtneeds access to the State’s “discovery.” In State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44 (2017), the majoritydispensed with the rulemaking process and redrafted thediscovery rule in pretrial detention hearings. The rule nowprovides that when the prosecutor seeks pretrial detention, the prosecutor shall provide the defendant with (i) [a copy of any available preliminary law enforcement incident report concerning the offense and the affidavit of probable cause], (ii) all statements or reports relating to the affidavit of probable cause, (iii) all statements or reports relating to additional evidence the State relies on to establish probable cause at the hearing, (iv) all statements or reports relating to the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1) that the State advances at the hearing, and 4 (v) all exculpatory evidence.1 [R. 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) (amended May 10, 2017 to be effective immediately).] Robinson does not alter the trial court’s right to considerthe factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) to (f) pursuantto the CJRA. The trial court, however, will not know the natureand circumstances of an offense or the weight of the evidence ifit is given only a partial account by the State. The question here is whether the State was required todisclose the search warrant affidavit to defendant and the trialcourt. In light of Robinson and the revised discovery rule, theAppellate Division answered in the affirmative. It held “thatwhen the State’s evidence is largely dependent on items seizedunder a search warrant, the affidavits submitted in support ofthe application for the search warrant and related policereports are relevant evidence relating to the issue of probablecause in a pretrial detention hearing.”1 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1) provides that pretrial detention may be ordered if the court finds clear and convincing evidence that no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release or combination of monetary bail and conditions would reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process. 5 The majority, however, has determined otherwise, concludingthat the State can control the information that flows throughthe discovery spigot. In that vein, the majority states, “theevidence to be produced is circumscribed by what the Statechooses to include in its affidavit of probable cause orequivalent document and what it explicitly relies on during adetention hearing.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 24). According tothe majority, “Rule 3:4-2(c) mandates only that the Stateproduce discovery related to its presentation,” and thus theState can limit the scope of discovery by discussing “at thedetention hearing only a portion of the evidence in itspossession.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 25). Because the Statemade the strategic decision not to mention the search warrantaffidavit in its affidavit of probable cause, the search warrantaffidavit remains sealed in the vault, regardless of itsrelevance. But still the majority builds in a fail-safe mechanism incase the State, in doling out the minimum amount of discovery,falls short in its probable-cause presentation. “Thus, if thetrial court concludes that additional related evidence isrequired to establish the nexus between a defendant and thecontraband, the court may require production of additionaldiscovery, including the search warrant affidavit.” Ante at ___(slip op. at 27) (emphasis added). In contrast, the majority 6 does not require disclosure of the search warrant affidavit whenit may instead show that there is no clear nexus between adefendant and the contraband. I do not read Rule 3:4-2(c) to permit such gamesmanship. Afair reading of the rule would let the trial court assess --after reviewing the search warrant affidavit -- whether there isa strong or weak nexus between the defendant and the contraband. II. A. In my view, Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) allows for the disclosureof the search warrant affidavit, in the absence of a claim ofdanger to a witness or a confidential informant. That rulerequires that the State provide “all statements or reportsrelating to”: (1) “the affidavit of probable cause,” Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added), (2) “additional evidence theState relies on to establish probable cause at the hearing,”Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B)(iii), and (3) “the factors listed inN.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1) that the State advances at thehearing,” Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B)(iv). The search warrant affidavitrelates to all three categories because it undoubtedly providesevidence of the connection, if any, between defendant and thecontraband that he is charged with possessing. The searchwarrant affidavit directly relates both to the confiscated drugsand weapons relied on by the State at the detention hearing and 7 to the factors relevant to detention, which include the natureand circumstances of the offense and the weight of the evidence.Last, it relates to the search warrant itself. Discovery rules are intended to illuminate not obscure, toeliminate surprise, and to advance the integrity of the truth-seeking process. The majority’s paradigm permits the State todisclose the search warrant affidavit only when it is to theState’s advantage. Why would we construe our discovery rule toallow the State to hide a search warrant affidavit that weakensits case? That surely will not enhance a court’s ability tomake a just determination at a pretrial detention hearing. I donot believe our rules permit the State to satisfy its discoveryobligations by dispensing morsels of information. B. The State’s legitimate confidentiality concerns can be metwithout eviscerating our discovery rule. I would hold that whencontraband is seized pursuant to a search warrant, the searchwarrant affidavit should be disclosed in discovery pursuant toRule 3:4-2(c) in the absence of extenuating circumstances. Forexample, if disclosure of the search warrant affidavit wouldendanger or place at risk a witness or confidential informant,or jeopardize an ongoing investigation, the State could applyfor a protective order. Because the pretrial detention hearingoccurs shortly after an arrest, when the State may not be in a 8 position to make a sound assessment concerning the risk to itswitnesses or investigation, I would give the State the benefitof the doubt. If the State makes a good-faith representationthat a confidential informant or other witness, or the ongoinginvestigation, would be placed at risk without a redaction ofthe affidavit, then such a redaction should be made. If theState makes a good-faith representation that a disclosure, withor without a redaction, would imperil either the informant orwitness, or the ongoing investigation, then no disclosure wouldbe warranted. At oral argument, we received representations that, in anumber of counties, the State releases search warrant affidavitsas part of the pretrial detention discovery obligations. Thatcommendable practice will likely come to an end with this case. III. For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent. 9