Title: Darryl Brian Barwick v. Edwin G. Buss etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-1377
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1831 
____________ 
 
DARRYL BRIAN BARWICK,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1377 
____________ 
 
DARRYL BRIAN BARWICK,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
EDWIN G. BUSS, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 30, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Darryl Barwick appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to vacate his 
conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of 
 
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Criminal Procedure 3.851, and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  As discussed below, we 
affirm the circuit court’s judgment and deny Barwick’s habeas petition. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Barwick was indicted on April 28, 1986, on charges of first-degree murder, 
armed burglary, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery.  A jury found him 
guilty as charged.  The facts underlying the convictions, as summarized by the 
Court on direct appeal, are as follows: 
 
On the morning of March 31, 1986, Michael Ann Wendt left 
her apartment in Panama City to travel to Fort Walton Beach.  
Rebecca Wendt, Michael Ann’s sister and roommate, remained at the 
apartment complex and lay outside sunbathing until approximately 
11:45 a.m.  Another resident of the complex who was also outside 
sunbathing observed a man walking around the complex at about 
12:30 p.m.  The witness indicated that she saw the man walk toward 
the Wendts’ apartment and later walk from the Wendts’ apartment 
into the woods.  She subsequently identified that man as Darryl 
Barwick. 
 
 
On the evening of March 31, Michael Ann returned to the 
apartment and found Rebecca's body in the bathroom wrapped in a 
comforter.  Investigators called to the scene observed bloody 
footprints at various places throughout the apartment and bloody 
fingerprints on the victim’s purse and wallet.  Rebecca’s bathing suit 
had been displaced, and she had been stabbed numerous times.  An 
autopsy revealed that she sustained thirty-seven stab wounds on her 
upper body as well as a number of defensive wounds on her hands.  
The medical examiner concluded that the potentially life-threatening 
wounds were those to the neck, chest, and abdomen and that death 
would have occurred within three to ten minutes of the first stab 
wound.  The examiner found no evidence of sexual contact with the 
victim, but a crime laboratory analyst found a semen stain on the 
 
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comforter wrapped around the victim's body.  After conducting tests 
on the semen and Barwick’s blood, the analyst determined that 
Barwick was within two percent of the population who could have left 
the stain. 
 
 
When initially questioned by investigators, Barwick denied any 
involvement in Rebecca’s murder.  However, following his arrest on 
April 15, 1986, he confessed to committing the crime.  He said that 
after observing Rebecca sunbathing, he returned to his home, parked 
his car, got a knife from his house, and walked back to the apartment 
complex where he had previously observed Rebecca.  After walking 
past her three times, he followed her into her apartment.  Barwick 
claimed he only intended to steal something, but when Rebecca 
resisted, he lost control and stabbed her.  According to Barwick, he 
continued to stab Rebecca as the two struggled and fell to the floor. 
 
Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. 1995) (footnote omitted). 
 
By a vote of nine to three, the jury recommended that Barwick be sentenced 
to death.  The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation in imposing a death 
sentence for the murder conviction.  On direct appeal, the Court reversed 
Barwick’s convictions, vacated his sentences, and remanded for a new trial due to 
an error that occurred during jury selection.  Barwick v. State, 547 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 
1989).1 
                                         
 
1.  The Court found reversible error where the trial court held that Barwick 
lacked standing to challenge, under State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984), the 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove three black venirepersons.  
Barwick, 547 So. 2d at 612.  In Neil, the Court condemned the use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude African Americans from serving on juries solely because of 
their race.  457 So. 2d at 486-87.  Subsequent to Barwick’s trial, but prior to his 
conviction becoming final, the Court decided Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 
1989).  Kibler held that a defendant need not be black to object to a peremptory 
challenge used to remove a black venireperson.  Id. at 712. 
 
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Upon retrial, and represented by a different attorney, Barwick was again 
convicted as charged.2  The jury unanimously recommended that Barwick be 
sentenced to death.  In following the jury’s recommendation, the trial court found 
six aggravating circumstances3 and no mitigating circumstances.  The trial court 
sentenced Barwick on the noncapital offenses to two life terms and one thirty-year 
term. 
 
On direct appeal following retrial, Barwick raised five claims pertaining to 
the guilt phase of his retrial4 and nine claims pertaining to the penalty phase.5  
                                         
 
2.  Barwick’s conviction following remand was while represented by the 
third lawyer appointed to represent him.  His conviction came in a third trial, as a 
mistrial was declared shortly after the second trial commenced. 
  
 
3.  In aggravation, the trial court found the following circumstances: (1) 
previous convictions for the violent felonies of sexual battery with force likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm and burglary of a dwelling with an assault; (2) the 
murder was committed during an attempted sexual battery; (3) the murder was 
committed to avoid arrest; (4) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (5) 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (6) the murder 
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 
pretense of moral justification (CCP).  Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 689-90.   
 
 
4.  The guilt-phase claims were:  (1) the trial court erred in denying his 
motions to disqualify Judge Foster; (2) the prosecutor improperly used his 
peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from the jury; (3) the trial 
court erred in denying Barwick’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
attempted sexual battery charge; (4) the trial court erred in allowing Tim Cherry, 
Michael Ann’s boyfriend at the time of the murder, to testify as to his blood type; 
and (5) the trial court erred in denying Barwick’s motions for mistrial after the 
prosecutor, through comments made during his opening and closing statements, 
improperly commented on Barwick’s silence.  Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 690 n.8. 
    
 
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While agreeing with Barwick that the trial court erred in finding the CCP 
aggravating circumstance, the Court found the error to be harmless and affirmed 
the convictions and sentences on July 20, 1995.  Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 697. 
 
On March 17, 1997, Barwick filed an initial motion for postconviction relief 
in the circuit court; Barwick’s amended motion, filed on August 26, 2002, raised 
twenty-one claims.6  Following a Huff7 hearing, in an order dated December 4, 
                                                                                                                                   
 
5.  The penalty-phase claims included:  (1) the trial court erred in finding 
that the murder was committed during an attempted sexual battery; (2) the trial 
court erred in finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 
(3) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and 
premeditated; (4) the trial court erred in rejecting the nonstatutory mitigator of 
abuse as a child; (5) the death sentence was not proportionate in this case; (6) the 
trial court inadvertently instructed the jury to consider sympathy for the victim and 
erroneously instructed the jurors not to consider sympathy for the defendant in 
evaluating the sentence; (7) the instruction for the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
aggravator was unconstitutional; (8) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the 
mitigating circumstance of extreme duress; and (9) the trial court erred in denying 
Barwick’s motion to preclude the death penalty based on alleged racial bias.  
Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 690 n.9. 
 
 
6.  The twenty-one claims raised in the amended rule 3.851 motion and 
reasserted in the second amended motion were:  (1) ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of trial pertaining to prosecution witness Suzanne 
Caper’s identification of Barwick; (2) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), on the ground that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence 
pertaining to the charge of attempted sexual battery, and violation of Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), on the ground that the State permitted false 
testimony to be given pertaining to that charge and the testimony of Suzanne 
Caper; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to the penalty 
phase of trial, having failed to properly investigate and prepare mitigating 
evidence, failed to properly prepare and utilize mental health experts, and failed to 
adequately challenge the State’s case; (4) cumulative error; (5) Barwick is 
ineligible for the death penalty pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
 
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(2002), and section 921.177, Florida Statutes (2010), because he is mentally 
retarded; (6) Barwick is entitled to a trial by jury on the issue of mental retardation 
pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (7) Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme is unconstitutional under Ring; (8) Barwick’s death sentence is invalid 
because the indictment did not charge the elements of the offense necessary to 
establish capital murder, having failed to specify whether the first-degree murder 
charge was felony murder or premeditated murder; (9) counsel had a conflict of 
interest; (10) the general jury qualification procedure used by Bay County Circuit 
Court violated Barwick’s federal and state constitutional rights and trial counsel 
was ineffective in not litigating that issue; (11) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to argue against the “avoid arrest” aggravating circumstance and not 
objecting to the jury being instructed on the inapplicable aggravator; (12) denial of 
a proper appeal due to omissions in the record, also resulting in a denial of the 
effective assistance of postconviction counsel; (13) jury instructions and comments 
misled and diluted the jury’s sense of responsibility for deciding Barwick’s 
sentence; (14) the State’s arguments introduced impermissible consideration for 
the jury and counsel was ineffective for failing to raise proper objections; (15) the 
finding that the murder occurred during the commission of a felony as an 
aggravating circumstance resulted in an automatic aggravating factor as it was 
duplicative of felony-murder as basis for death sentence; (16) death penalty jury 
instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Barwick to prove that death 
was inappropriate, and counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object 
to the instructions; (17) the Florida Supreme Court erred on direct appeal after 
striking the CCP aggravating circumstance; (18) Florida Rule of Professional 
Conduct 4-3.5(d)(4) violated Barwick’s due process in that counsel was ethically 
prohibited from interviewing jurors who sat on his trial; (19) Florida’s death 
penalty sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it fails to prevent the 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty and for violating the 
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, and trial counsel or appellate 
counsel was ineffective to the extent the claim was not properly litigated; (20) 
Barwick is innocent of committing first-degree murder and of the death penalty; 
and (21) execution by lethal injection and Florida’s laws pertaining to the method 
of execution violate the constitution . 
 
 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring a hearing in 
capital postconviction cases to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is 
required with respect to the postconviction relief claims raised and to permit legal 
argument by the parties on the matter). 
  
 
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2003, the circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on four of Barwick’s claims,8 
reserved ruling on the claim of cumulative error, and summarily denied the 
remainder of his claims.  In a second amended motion for postconviction relief, 
Barwick realleged the original twenty-one claims and raised two additional claims, 
which the circuit court summarily denied on September 8, 2005.9 
 
An evidentiary hearing was held on November 2 and 3, 2006; Barwick and 
the State each presented two witnesses.10  The circuit court issued its final order on 
August 28, 2007, denying Barwick’s rule 3.851 motion.  Barwick raises eleven 
                                         
 
8.  An evidentiary hearing was held on claims 1, 2, 3, and 10. 
  
 
9.  The new claims relied upon Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 
wherein the United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to sentence to 
death an individual who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the murder.  
Id. at 578.  Claim 22 challenged the death sentence on the basis that Barwick, 
while chronologically eighteen when he committed the murder, was brain damaged 
and mentally and emotionally under the age of eighteen at that time; in Claim 23, 
Barwick argued that his death sentence was in violation of Roper because a prior 
violent felony used in aggravation was committed when he was under the age of 
eighteen. 
 
 
10.  Barwick presented Dr. Eisenstein, a psychologist, who addressed 
Barwick’s mental health issues, and Frank McKeithen, the State’s lead investigator 
in the case, who testified about the initial processing of the case.  Barwick’s trial 
attorney, Robert Adams, was unavailable to testify, having been deceased for a 
number of years.  The State called Alton Paulk, lead prosecutor in the case, who 
testified concerning the presentation of evidence at trial, and Don Cioeta, the crime 
scene investigator, who testified concerning details of the crime scene. 
 
 
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claims on appeal from the denial of postconviction relief,11 and has also filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising nine claims.12 
                                         
 
11.  Barwick raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the postconviction 
court erred in denying Barwick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with 
respect to the penalty phase; (2) the postconviction court erred in denying 
Barwick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the guilt phase; 
(3) the postconviction court erred in denying Barwick’s Brady and Giglio and 
prosecutorial misconduct claims; (4) the postconviction court erred in denying 
Barwick’s cumulative error claim; (5) the postconviction court erred in denying 
Barwick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the jury 
qualification procedure in Bay County; (6) the postconviction court erred in 
denying Barwick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the 
“avoid arrest” aggravator; (7) the postconviction court erred in denying Barwick’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to omissions in the record on 
direct appeal; (8) the postconviction court erred in denying Barwick’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim with respect to comments by the prosecutor and court 
that diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility; (9) the postconviction court erred 
in denying Barwick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to 
improper argument by the State; (10) the postconviction court erred in denying 
Barwick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the “during 
commission of a felony” aggravator; and (11) the postconviction court erred in 
denying Barwick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to an 
alleged burden-shifting instruction. 
  
 
12.  Barwick raises the following claims in his habeas petition: (1) whether 
the execution of Barwick, a brain-damaged, mentally retarded person, would be 
unconstitutional; (2) whether the State violated Barwick’s rights when it used 
crimes he had committed as a juvenile as an aggravator; (3) whether appellate 
counsel was ineffective in failing to argue against the “avoid arrest” aggravator; (4) 
whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of omissions 
in the record; (5) whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that 
the sentencing jury was misled by improper comments and instructions that diluted 
its sense of responsibility; (6) whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing 
to argue that the prosecutor presented impermissible considerations to the jury; (7) 
whether the “during commission of a felony” aggravator operates as an 
impermissible automatic aggravator; (8) whether appellate counsel was ineffective 
in failing to argue that the penalty phase instructions improperly shifted the 
 
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II. MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
 
Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, whether directed at the guilt 
or penalty phase of trial, must satisfy two requirements: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
 
Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 969 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).  Review of counsel’s performance “requires that 
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel's perspective at the time.”  Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1027 (Fla. 
2009) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
 
The prejudice prong of the two-part test presents the issue of whether the 
specific deficiency in counsel’s performance rises to the level that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “A reasonable 
                                                                                                                                   
burden; and (9) whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in failing to remand for 
resentencing after striking an aggravator. 
 
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probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  
Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696, 700 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694). 
1.  Failure to Challenge Bay County Circuit Court’s Jury Qualification 
Procedure 
 
 
Barwick contends that his constitutional rights were violated based upon the 
general jury qualification procedure of the Bay County Circuit Court.  Barwick 
identifies the following facts in support of his claim:  (1) the general jury 
qualification is held outside the presence of both the defendant and his attorney; (2) 
the State is allowed to participate in the proceeding; and (3) the proceeding is not 
recorded.  Barwick argues that these facts distinguish his case from the Court’s 
prior decisions holding that the general juror qualification procedure does not 
constitute a critical stage in the proceedings.  See Wright v. State, 688 So. 2d 298, 
301 (Fla. 1996).  Barwick further argues that the lack of a record of the jury 
qualification proceeding in this case, in conjunction with the destruction of all 
records relating to the jury pool before his conviction became final, denied him a 
right to a proper appeal.  According to Barwick, under the circumstances of his 
case, he is entitled to a new trial. 
 
Barwick did not raise this claim on direct appeal; therefore, the claim is 
procedurally barred.  Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 737 (Fla. 2005); Gorby v. 
State, 819 So. 2d 664, 674 & n.8 (Fla. 2002).  Moreover, even if reviewable, 
 
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Barwick’s claim would be denied as a matter of law.  Barwick did not establish the 
facts he relies upon to distinguish his case from the Court’s prior decisions on the 
issue; in fact, testimony from the evidentiary hearing refutes the alleged factual 
distinctions.  See Orme, 896 So. 2d at 737.  Finally, cases cited by Barwick, 
including Delap v. State, 350 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1977), and Blalock v. Rice, 707 So. 
2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), are distinguishable.  Unlike Barwick’s case, a new 
trial was warranted in the cases he relies on because a full transcript of a critical 
stage or stages at trial was unavailable thereby precluding complete appellate 
review.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
2.  Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine State’s Witness Suzanna Capers13 
 
At trial, State’s witness Suzanna Capers identified Barwick as the man she 
saw walking around the apartment complex where both she and Ms. Wendt lived, 
staring at Ms. Capers, and then walking towards Ms. Wendt’s apartment.  Barwick 
argues that trial counsel’s cross-examination of the witness was ineffective, having 
failed to (1) bring out the fact that it was only after extremely prejudicial photo 
lineups and several improper comments by law enforcement officials that Capers 
finally identified Barwick as the man she saw; and (2) impeach Capers’ trial 
testimony with inconsistent testimony she provided at Barwick’s first trial, as well 
                                         
 
13.  Ms. Capers is referred to as Suzanne Capers throughout the trial 
transcript, by the parties, and in the circuit court’s order denying postconviction 
relief.  At trial, however, Ms. Capers expressly answered on the record that her 
name was Suzanna, not Suzanne.  
 
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as in her deposition.  The circuit court rejected Barwick’s claims of ineffective 
assistance, concluding that there was no issue as to the identity of the killer 
because Barwick gave a taped statement admitting he killed Ms. Wendt and 
describing his actions. 
 
On appeal, Barwick does not address his pretrial admission to police, a 
statement properly admitted at trial.  Thus, Barwick has failed to demonstrate how 
he was prejudiced with respect to counsel’s cross-examination of Ms. Capers 
pertaining to her difficulty with identifying him in police photographic lineups. 
 
The Court also rejects Barwick’s claims pertaining to counsel’s handling of 
the alleged inconsistency between testimony at Barwick’s first trial and deposition 
and that given at his second trial.  Barwick takes issue with Ms. Capers’ 
description of her impressions of Barwick’s actions when she observed him outside 
the apartment complex on the day of the murder.  According to Barwick, Ms. 
Capers’ testimony changed from describing her impression that Barwick looked 
“like an innocent man” trying to decide which way to walk, to an impression that 
Barwick was staring at her and gesturing towards Ms. Wendt’s apartment, which 
made her suspicious and feel uneasy.  Barwick’s characterization of Ms. Capers’ 
testimony at his second trial as “significant,” however, fails to identify how 
counsel’s failure to impeach her with the inconsistencies resulted in prejudice.  We 
affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
 
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With respect to the guilt phase of trial, Barwick has not demonstrated 
prejudice in light of his admission to unlawfully entering the victim’s apartment 
while armed with a knife and stabbing her to death, as well as the evidence 
admitted at trial supporting the attempted sexual battery conviction.  That 
conviction did not rely upon the witness’s impressions from her observations of the 
defendant.14  Barwick’s claim as it relates to the penalty phase of trial also is 
without merit; the jury returned a unanimous verdict recommending a death 
sentence, and there exist five valid aggravating circumstances, with minimal 
mitigating evidence, supporting the sentence. 
3.  Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence During Penalty Phase 
 
Barwick contends that he was denied adversarial testing based upon 
counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of trial.  
Barwick alleges that trial counsel relied solely upon the investigation done by the 
attorney who originally represented Barwick.  He further argues that trial counsel 
failed to present the jury with a true picture of Barwick’s extensive mitigation and 
                                         
 
14.  The Court previously affirmed the denial of Barwick’s motion for 
acquittal on the charge of attempted sexual battery.   See Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 
694-5.  The evidence included Barwick’s admission to observing the victim 
sunbathing, returning to the same location after obtaining a knife from his house, 
passing by the victim a number of times, entering her apartment only after she had 
entered, as well as evidence that the victim’s bathing suit bottom in the back had 
been pulled down, and DNA testing results of a semen stain found on the 
comforter wrapped around the victim, revealing that Barwick was within two 
percent of the population that could have left the stain.  Id. at 695. 
 
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tragic home life, including years of sexual, physical, and mental abuse, and failed 
to compile and present to the jury a clear record of Barwick’s mental deficiencies, 
learning disabilities, and psychological problems. 
 
At the penalty phase of trial, defense counsel presented seven mental health 
experts and seven lay witnesses.  They testified as follows. 
 
Dr. Annis, a clinical psychologist, examined Barwick in September 1986.  
Dr. Annis talked with Barwick and reviewed depositions of family members as 
well as the statements they gave to law enforcement officers.  Dr. Annis read 
Barwick’s statements to police and talked to jail personnel familiar with Barwick 
from his prior incarceration.  Psychological testing reflected that Barwick is of 
average intelligence, performs better on motor than verbal skills, and his reading 
ability is very low.  Barwick does not suffer from either bipolar disorder or 
schizophrenia.  Dr. Annis learned that Barwick’s father was an angry, violent man 
who often struck his children.  Dr. Annis told the jury that individuals who were 
victims of violence as children have a stronger tendency than most people to resort 
to aggression as adults when they are frustrated.  Dr. Annis concluded that Barwick 
was not legally insane at the time of the murder and did not suffer from any mental 
defect or disease.  Dr. Annis testified that at the time of the murder, Barwick knew 
the difference between right and wrong, was aware of the consequences of his 
actions, and was not under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional 
 
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disturbance.  Likewise, Barwick’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct at the time of the murder was not impaired.  Dr. Annis also was of the 
opinion that Barwick meets the criteria for antisocial personality disorder. 
 
Dr. Loiry, also a clinical psychologist, examined Barwick in October 1990.  
Dr. Loiry did not detect any attempt on Barwick’s part to deceive.  Barwick was 
very cooperative and they had a normal interaction.  As requested, Dr. Loiry tested 
Barwick and forwarded those results to another mental health provider.   
 
Dr. McClaren, another clinical psychologist, first examined Barwick in 
September 1986.  Dr. McClaren read reports and talked with members of 
Barwick’s family and girlfriend, family friends, police officers, probation officers, 
and jail personnel.  Dr. McClaren opined that Barwick’s overall IQ score was 103, 
placing him in the average range.  However, Barwick has a degree of brain 
dysfunction that may have shown itself in the form of learning disabilities at 
school, and has difficulties in the sexual area.  These difficulties were related to 
what happened in the homicide.  The violence in Barwick’s household, at the 
hands of his father, could have contributed to Barwick’s difficulties.  Dr. McClaren 
diagnosed Barwick as having an antisocial personality disorder, while concluding 
that he meets the criteria for the former classification of a mentally disordered 
sexual offender.  In Dr. McClaren’s opinion, neither statutory mental mitigator 
applied at the time of the murder. 
 
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James Beller, a master’s level clinical psychologist, also testified for the 
defense.  He administered psychological tests and spent between six and seven 
hours with Barwick.  Barwick has an overall average IQ, but exhibited a rather 
serious left temporal lobe deficit that is most likely a learning disability.  Barwick 
has difficulty integrating information and has a significant memory problem.  Mr. 
Beller told the jury that Barwick’s test results could indicate organic brain damage.  
This kind of brain damage is not the type that causes someone to be deranged or 
have behavioral problems.  Mr. Beller testified that Barwick reported he had an 
abusive childhood that had warped his personality and turned him into an abnormal 
person.  In Mr. Beller’s opinion, Barwick could not function in a way that most of 
us would accept as normal behavior.  Mr. Beller believes that Barwick is a 
psychopath and a sexual deviant.  He is also an obsessive compulsive and has a 
dissociative disorder.  Mr. Beller also believes that Barwick is schizoid.  A 
schizoid has difficulty relating to people and experiences a split reality.  Mr. Beller 
believes Barwick knew what he was doing at the time he committed the murder, 
but could not control himself. 
 
Dr. Warriner, a forensic psychologist, testified that he first saw Barwick 
when he was just thirteen years old.  Dr. Warriner evaluated Barwick at the request 
of an attorney who defended Barwick on juvenile charges, and did a considerable 
amount of psychological testing.  Dr. Warriner believed, at that time, that Barwick 
 
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could be rehabilitated.  There was no evidence, however, that Barwick received 
treatment.  Dr. Warriner evaluated Barwick again in 1983 at the request of another 
attorney when Barwick was charged with sexual battery.  Dr. Warriner did not 
recommend treatment for Barwick.  Dr. Warriner evaluated Barwick for a third 
time, when he was accused of committing the murder for which he was 
subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.  Dr. Warriner realized that he had 
been wrong in 1980 when he opined that Barwick could be rehabilitated.  In 1983, 
after Barwick was charged with rape, Dr. Warriner concluded that Barwick was a 
psychopathic sexual deviant.  Dr. Warriner advised Barwick’s lawyer at the time 
that he could not help him.  Dr. Warriner came to the same conclusion in 1986, 
concluding that Barwick was a psychopathic sexual deviant who shows an 
escalating pattern of uncontrollable sexual acts.  For instance, Barwick exposed 
himself and hit a girl after she called him a name.  Another time, when he was 
thirteen, he touched a lady inappropriately.  These events were accumulating since 
Barwick was age thirteen.   There were likely more episodes of escalating violence 
for which Barwick was not caught.  Such behavior is part of the sexual 
psychopathology.  Barwick’s abusive upbringing typically would have an effect on 
his behavior.  Dr. Warriner testified that people like Barwick are rare, and are also 
extraordinarily dangerous because they can pass for a normal person during a 
 
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casual, social contact.  Barwick is at risk for repetition of his behavior, and should 
be confined from the public. 
 
Dr. Hord, a clinical psychologist, testified that he was appointed to conduct a 
competency examination upon Barwick in 1986.  Dr. Hord interviewed Barwick, 
administered psychological tests and examined background information.  
Barwick’s verbal IQ is 90.  In Dr. Hord’s opinion, Barwick is very unstable and 
disturbed.   
 
Dr. Walker, a psychiatrist, testified via deposition.  He evaluated Barwick in 
June 1992.  Barwick was not legally insane at the time of the murder.  However, 
Barwick suffers from intermittent explosive disorder.  This is a condition in which 
people, normally males, have temper tantrums that are beyond the conception of 
the usual temper tantrum.  When they blow up, it is difficult for them to stop what 
they are doing.  Frequently, such people black out during an explosive episode.  
Dr. Walker believed that at some point during the attack, Barwick blacked out and 
became temporarily unaware of what was going on.  Dr. Walker testified that 
Barwick is a sexual deviant, one who enjoys forcing sexual attention on women.  
Barwick’s abusive background could have affected his behavior on the day of the 
murder.  Victims of physical or sexual abuse frequently identify with their abuser.  
In turn, they can get a thrill, and then a sexual thrill, from physically abusing other 
people.  Dr. Walker further opined that Barwick has a great deal of trouble with 
 
- 19 - 
impulse control.  His impulse control focuses on sexual behaviors.  Once he had 
the thought that he wanted to have sex with someone, it would be difficult to deter 
him.  There is no cure for Barwick’s condition.  Barwick should be 
institutionalized and off the streets.  In addition to intermittent explosive disorder, 
Dr. Walker indicated in his written report that Barwick also has antisocial 
personality disorder.  Dr. Walker could not explain, however, why he included 
both diagnoses when a finding of antisocial personality disorder precludes a 
diagnosis of intermittent explosive disorder. 
 
Barwick also called several lay witnesses during the penalty phase. 
 
A sister, Lovey Barwick, testified that there were seven siblings in the 
family and Barwick was the youngest.  Each of the children was physically abused 
by their father.  Depending upon how angry their father was, punishment could 
include being slapped or receiving black eyes.  It did not matter which child was in 
trouble; the siblings were equally abused.  At school, the Barwick children would 
lie if asked about how they had received the bruises that were observed.  As far as 
Lovey Barwick could remember, the defendant did not skip school.  No one 
contacted social services on their behalf.  Their father also beat their mother.  For a 
period of time, how long she did not remember, their father left the family to be 
with another woman.  During cross-examination, Lovey Barwick testified that she 
felt her brother Glen was beaten as much as the defendant, that no other siblings 
 
- 20 - 
had been charged with murder, and that the good times were about equal to the bad 
times. 
 
William Barwick, the defendant’s brother and two years older, similarly 
testified to the abusive childhood environment.  The defendant had been knocked 
unconscious after hitting a rocking chair following a punch from their father.  
William Barwick recalled one time when he and Barwick had been hit with a piece 
of rebar.  The Barwick children were required to attend church regularly.  For a 
month or two their father had run off with the preacher’s wife.  William Barwick 
continues to work with their father.  None of the defendant’s brothers or sisters 
have been arrested for rape or murder.  William Barwick did not think that the bad 
outweighed the good from his childhood. 
 
Janice Santiago, the defendant’s half-sister and ten years older than Barwick, 
also testified about the abuse.  She described the Barwick children as being timid 
around the house, that it was like walking on eggs.  The abuse was so bad that after 
she moved out, she called the state agency responsible for investigating reports of 
child abuse.  She made the report after learning that her step-father had discharged 
a loaded gun into the floor of the family house after wrestling the weapon away 
from one of Barwick’s brothers.  Barwick was seven years old when she moved 
out of the family house. 
 
- 21 - 
 
Barwick’s mother, Ima Jean Barwick, testified that Barwick grew up in a 
violent home, where the violence was directed at both her and the children.  She 
stayed with the defendant’s father because she believed keeping the family 
together was the right thing to do.  She testified that her husband did not drink in 
front of her and she did not believe he drank, but his anger flared up when least 
expected and was instantaneous.  She did not remember any of her sons having to 
be treated by a doctor as the result of the beatings.  She did think, though, that she 
had heard something about a shotgun incident.   
 
 Barwick’s father, Ira Barwick, testified, admitting he beat his children with 
anything within his reach, including two-by-fours and metal rebar.  He also 
admitted that during one of his rages, he hit Barwick’s brother with a shovel.  
During another violent episode, Barwick was knocked unconscious.  Barwick’s 
father testified that he did not think there was anything wrong with how he 
disciplined his children.  He treated his sons the same between them.  He testified 
that he drank occasionally, and he hit his sons whether he was drinking or not.  On 
cross-examination, he testified that Barwick was working for him at least part-time 
in 1986, and that his son William is back working with him. 
 
Sheila Morgan, who lived across the street from the Barwicks, also testified 
on behalf of the defense.  She witnessed Ira Barwick beat his sons in front of the 
 
- 22 - 
Barwick house.  At one time her husband and other male neighbors spoke with 
Barwick’s father, telling him that the abuse had to stop or they would take action.   
 
Barwick’s probation officer, Ernest Langford, testified that he first met with 
Barwick on January 13, 1986, to review conditions of probation and other matters 
pertaining to his probation.  On March 31, 1986, between 2 and 3 p.m., Barwick 
sought his help, stating that he needed counseling.  At the time, Barwick was 
accompanied by his girlfriend, and was very courteous and respectful, as on prior 
occasions.  Ernest Langford was not aware that Barwick had previously been 
subject to psychiatric evaluation and did not recall whether there was any reference 
to or information about that in Barwick’s file. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing held on his rule 3.851 motion, Barwick presented 
the testimony of Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a psychiatrist.  Dr. Eisenstein testified that 
the difference between Barwick’s verbal and performance IQ scores indicated 
possible neurological or neuropsychological impairment of the left hemisphere of 
his brain.  Dr. Eisenstein further testified that Barwick’s mother fell down a flight 
of stairs while pregnant with Barwick, and that he was an unwanted child.  With 
respect to childhood abuse, Dr. Eisenstein reported that Barwick was subject to 
constant beatings by his father and had been knocked unconscious a number of 
times as a child, and that he suffered severe emotional abuse.  Consequently, 
Barwick’s brain deficiencies would affect his ability to interact with people; 
 
- 23 - 
Barwick also would not know how to deal with sexually charged situations.  Dr. 
Eisenstein did not ask Barwick about the details of the murder and had not read 
Barwick’s confession to the murder. 
 
In denying Barwick’s amended motion for postconviction relief, the circuit 
court found Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony to be cumulative to that presented at the 
penalty phase of trial through Barwick’s experts and his family.  Trial counsel does 
not provide ineffective assistance for failing to present cumulative evidence.  
Kilgore v. State, 55 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2010); Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 957 
(Fla. 2000). 
 
The primary differences between Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony and the 
testimony of Barwick’s expert witnesses at trial is Dr. Eisenstein’s opinion that 
both statutory mental mitigators, i.e., the defendant acted under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and defendant’s capacity to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, apply to 
Barwick’s case and his disagreement with the defense experts’ antisocial 
personality disorder diagnosis.  However, the Court has consistently rejected the 
proposition that trial counsel’s performance is deficient simply because a 
defendant finds an expert, in postconviction proceedings, that will testify more 
favorably for him.  Hertz v. State, 941 So. 2d 1031, 1040 (Fla. 2006).  Further, 
Barwick does not address the impact on Dr. Eisenstein’s opinions due to his failure 
 
- 24 - 
to review Barwick’s confession to police and confession to his brothers and father, 
as well as the police and sentencing reports pertaining to Barwick’s prior rape case.  
Similarly, Dr. Eisenstein admitted during cross-examination that Barwick met four 
of the seven criteria of antisocial personality disorder, and three or more are 
required to make the diagnosis.      
 
At trial, counsel presented the testimony of family members as lay witnesses 
to establish the violent childhood experienced by Barwick and expert testimony to 
explain the effect of that environment on Barwick.  The fact that some testimony 
proved to be unfavorable to Barwick does not undermine our confidence in the 
verdict; Barwick’s own expert in this postconviction proceeding testified to many 
of the same prejudicial facts.  Under these circumstances, we affirm the denial of 
relief on this claim. 
4.  Failure to Challenge the “Avoid Arrest” Aggravating Circumstance and to 
Object to the Instruction on the Aggravator 
 
 
Here, Barwick’s claim of ineffective assistance is based upon a possibility 
that counsel did not challenge or otherwise object to the “avoid arrest” aggravating 
circumstance.  Barwick’s claim is limited to his assertion that counsel had a duty to 
know the law with respect to challenging penalty phase instructions.  Our careful 
review of the record establishes, however, that trial counsel did object to the 
aggravator: 
 
- 25 - 
 
MR. ADAMS [defense counsel]:   And I note one other item at 
this time, Judge.  The instruction with regard to aggravation as to the 
crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed for 
the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest or avoiding escape from 
custody.  Did you mean for that to be in there? 
 
MR. PAULK [prosecutor]:  Yes. 
 
MR. ADAMS:  Of course I surely … 
 
THE COURT:  I think there is evidence that when the crime 
was committed, that the crime was committed to escape detection or 
apprehension. 
 
MR. PAULK:  Yes, Your Honor, the two witnesses testified as 
to the fact that she removed the mask, he knew he had to kill her 
because he didn’t want to go back to prison.  That complies with the 
Supreme Court decision that appears at 547 2d 1257. 
 
THE COURT:  Preventing lawful arrest or affecting escape 
from custody.  Your objection is noted.  [Volume XXV, at 904-5.] 
 
 
Moreover, Barwick attempts to incorporate his argument as raised in his 
habeas petition.  We affirm the denial of relief upon this claim, because  
general references to other pleadings are not sufficient to preserve a 
challenge in a collateral proceeding.  See generally Duest v. Dugger, 
555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla.1990) (“Merely making reference to 
arguments below without further elucidation does not suffice to 
preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived.”). 
 
Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 459 (Fla. 2009). 
5.  Failure to Ensure a Complete Appellate Record 
 
With respect to Barwick’s claim of an alleged insufficiency of the record on 
appeal, his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is, in actuality, one of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  The claim is not cognizable in a rule 
 
- 26 - 
3.851 proceeding, and should instead be raised in a habeas petition.  Cook v. State, 
792 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 2001).15  This claim is denied. 
6.  Failure to Object to Instructions and Comments by the State and Trial 
Court that Diminished the Jury’s Sense of Responsibility in Sentencing 
 
 
Barwick argues that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel 
based upon counsel’s references to the jury’s sentence as a “recommendation,” and 
counsel’s failure to object to certain comments made by the State and the trial 
court that diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility.  However, Barwick does 
not provide argument in support of this claim, and fails to identify the statements to 
which he believes counsel should have raised objections.  Accordingly, having 
failed to direct this Court’s attention to the statements which purportedly 
diminished the jury’s responsibility, Barwick has waived this claim.  See Floyd, 18 
So. 3d at 459. 
7.  Failure to Object to Arguments by the State Introducing Impermissible 
Considerations to the Jury or to Seek a Curative Instruction 
 
 
Barwick contends that the State introduced impermissible considerations to 
the jury, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance upon his failure to 
object or seek a curative instruction.  Barwick does not, however, identify the 
prosecutor’s allegedly impermissible arguments; instead, he relies upon the 
                                         
 
15.  Barwick also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective based upon 
an incomplete record on appeal.  We review that claim as raised in his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  
 
- 27 - 
argument as raised in his habeas petition.  Therefore, the claim is waived and relief 
denied.  See Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 459. 
8.  Failure to Challenge the Aggravator “During Commission of a Felony” as 
an Automatic Aggravator 
 
 
Barwick contends trial counsel was ineffective in having failed to object to 
the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during the 
commission of a felony.  Barwick provides no argument, stating that the claim is 
also raised in his habeas petition and is “incorporated as if argued herein.”  We 
deny this claim pursuant to Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 459.  Furthermore, the Court has 
previously rejected the underlying substantive issue as a matter of law.  See, e.g., 
Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 69 (Fla. 2005) (citing cases); Blanco v. State, 706 
So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997); Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637, 647 (Fla. 1995) (citing 
cases).  Accordingly, counsel will not be held to have rendered ineffective 
assistance in not bringing a nonmeritorious claim.  See Lugo v. State, 2 So. 3d 1, 
21 (Fla. 2008). 
9.  Failure to Challenge Penalty Phase Instructions as Shifting Burden of 
Proof 
 
 
Barwick does not set forth any argument in claiming that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the penalty phase jury instructions as shifting 
the burden of proof to the defendant.  Rather, as in other claims, he relies upon the 
 
- 28 - 
argument made in his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  This claim, therefore, is 
waived.  See Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 459. 
B.  Brady, Giglio, and Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
 
Barwick contends that with respect to exculpatory evidence not disclosed to 
the defense and certain testimony pertaining to the attempted sexual assault of 
which he was charged and convicted, the prosecutor violated Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  Barwick 
also argues that the prosecutor violated Giglio when he elicited testimony from Ms. 
Capers describing her impression of Barwick when she saw him walking around 
the apartment complex.   
 
The following rules of law and standards of review govern the Court’s 
consideration of these claims.   
 
To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show “(1) that favorable 
evidence – either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently 
suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant 
was prejudiced.”  Rodriguez v. State, 39 So. 3d 275, 285 (Fla. 2010) (quoting 
Riechmann v. State, 966 So. 2d 298, 307 (Fla. 2007)).  To establish prejudice, the 
defendant must show that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put 
the entire case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.  
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999).  A Brady claim presents a mixed 
 
- 29 - 
question of law and fact.  Therefore, the Court will defer to the lower court’s 
factual findings if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but will 
review that court’s application of law to facts de novo.  Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 
2d 161, 168 (Fla. 2004); Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2000).  The Court also 
reviews the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence de novo.  Mordenti, 894 
So. 2d at 168. 
 
To demonstrate a Giglio violation, a defendant must prove that (1) the 
prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew 
the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material.  Taylor v. State, 
36 Fla. L. Weekly S72 (Fla. Feb. 10, 2011); Guzman v. State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 
1050 (Fla. 2006).  “Once the first two prongs are established, the false evidence is 
deemed material if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the 
jury's verdict.”  Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 532 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, 130 
S.Ct. 3509 (2010).  A Giglio claim also presents a mixed question of law and fact, 
and a reviewing court will defer to the lower court’s factual findings if they are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but will review the court’s 
application of law to facts de novo.  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 785 (Fla. 
2004). 
 
1.  Medical Examiner’s Reports 
 
- 30 - 
 
Barwick argues that two investigative reports from the medical examiner’s 
office, not disclosed by the State, refute evidence of an attempted sexual assault.  
Barwick claims that the reports reflect that the bathing suit was not pulled down in 
the back.  Barwick then contends that, inconsistent with the medical examiner’s 
reports, was trial testimony presented by the State that “the top of the bathing suit 
was pulled down and the rear of the bottoms were pulled down in the back.” 
Barwick claims that, consequently, the State either knew or should have known 
that the testimony adduced was false.  In addressing the materiality of the failure to 
disclose and admission of false testimony, Barwick argues that the only evidence at 
trial that supported the attempted sexual assault conviction was the testimony of 
the lead officer concerning the positioning of the victim’s bathing suit on her body, 
and a semen stain found on a comforter wrapped around the victim. 
 
The circuit court concluded that Barwick failed to establish either a Brady or 
Giglio violation: 
The testimony and photographic evidence at trial showed Ms. 
Wendt’s bathing suit was pulled down in back.  Furthermore, in his 
taped statement played to the jury, the defendant was questioned by 
Captain Frank McKeithan about how Ms. Wendt’s bathing suit was 
pulled down.  In response, the defendant stated her bottom may have 
come down “when they was wrestling around”.  (Trial record Vol. V, 
317)  There was also evidence of the defendant’s semen being found 
on the blanket that was wrapped around the body of Ms. Wendt after 
she was stabbed to death.  Furthermore, at the evidentiary hearing, 
Captain McKeithan testified that the term “intact” meant, to him, that 
the bathing suit was not torn or ripped.  Investigator Don Cioeta 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that when Ms. Wendt’s body was 
 
- 31 - 
unwrapped from the bedspread, the top of her bathing suit was intact 
and the bottoms had been pulled down a bit in the back exposing her 
buttocks. 
 
 
First, contrary to Barwick’s conclusion that the medical examiner’s reports 
“show that the victim’s bathing suit bottom was not pulled down,” one report 
provided that the victim’s bathing suit bottom was “in place,” while the second 
report stated that it was “intact and in place.”  We disagree that these descriptions 
are self-explanatory.  Further, Barwick did not present testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing from the medical examiner’s office or anyone responsible for preparing the 
reports.  Consequently, Barwick has failed to establish the first prong of the Brady 
analysis, that the medical examiner’s reports were favorable. 
 
Secondly, Barwick has not demonstrated that the defense did not receive the 
medical examiner’s reports.  While Barwick’s rule 3.851 motion states that 
postconviction relief counsel received the reports through a chapter 119 records 
request, the defendant did not present evidence establishing that the reports had not 
been made available to the defense.  To the contrary, the assistant state attorney 
who prosecuted the case testified at the evidentiary hearing that the state attorney’s 
office maintained an open discovery policy, furnishing everything to the defense 
initially when a request was made, followed by supplementation.   
 
Third, we also conclude that Barwick has not demonstrated the materiality 
of the reports as required under Brady, even assuming they should have been and 
 
- 32 - 
were not disclosed.  The State called Don Cioeta, the former crime scene 
investigator with the sheriff’s office, to testify at the evidentiary hearing.  Mr. 
Cioeta had photographed the crime scene, including photographs which were 
admitted at trial showing the placement of the bathing suit following the discovery 
of Ms. Wendt’s body.  While Mr. Cioeta testified that he believed he took the 
photographs after the victim had been rolled over, he had no recollection of the 
body being dragged into the bathroom. 
 
Barwick’s related Giglio claim is equally unavailing.  Barwick again 
assumes the meaning of “intact” is that the bathing suit was completely and 
properly positioned on Ms. Wendt’s body, and thus then McKeithan’s testimony 
that the bathing suit bottom was pulled down was false.16  That assumption, 
however, is insufficient for Barwick to meet his burden under Giglio. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Barwick’s Brady and 
Giglio claims pertaining to evidence of the victim’s bathing suit.17 
                                         
 
16.  Testimony at trial was not that the entire bathing suit bottom was pulled 
down, but that the bottom was pulled down in the back. 
 
17.  Alternatively, Barwick argues that to the extent trial counsel should 
have been aware of the investigative reports, he was ineffective in failing to 
discover and use the information therein.  Barwick contends counsel should have 
questioned the crime scene investigator at trial on the possibility that the victim’s 
bathing suit bottom had been pulled down as the result of her being dragged on the 
floor.  This claim is without merit.  In his statement to police, Barwick explained 
that he carried Ms. Wendt to the bathroom after stabbing her to death, i.e., not that 
he dragged her.  In addition, when asked how the victim’s bathing suit bottom had 
 
- 33 - 
2.  Uncorrected Testimony from State’s Witness, Suzanna Capers 
 
Barwick also raises a Giglio claim with respect to the testimony of State’s 
witness Suzanna Capers, based upon the State’s failure to point out to the jury that 
she testified at a prior proceeding that she perceived Barwick’s conduct, on the day 
of the murder, as innocent and unworthy of concern. 
 
The circuit court, in denying Barwick’s postconviction claim, concluded as 
follows: 
 
The defendant has failed to establish that he is entitled to any 
relief under this claim.  First, the defendant has failed to show that 
Ms. Capers’ trial testimony was, in fact, false.  Second, there is no 
showing that the State knew that Ms. Capers’ impressions of the 
defendant’s conduct at the second trial was false or was the result of 
the passage of time and reflection.  Finally, the identity of the 
defendant was never an issue in this case.  As noted previously, the 
defendant had confessed to killing Ms. Wendt.  Therefore, the 
defendant cannot establish that Ms. Capers’ testimony as to his 
behavior could reasonably have affected the outcome of the trial.  See 
Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2003). 
 
 
On appeal, Barwick contends that Ms. Capers’ change in testimony was 
highly prejudicial because the jury did not hear the witness say she had seen an 
innocent man walking around the complex, mumbling to himself, but instead that  
she  saw a suspicious man who was trying to indicate something to Capers or 
frighten her in some way. 
                                                                                                                                   
been pulled down, Barwick answered that it must have happened while he and the 
victim were struggling.  Thus, Barwick’s own admission does not support the 
theory he argues trial counsel was ineffective for not pursuing.   
 
- 34 - 
 
We reject Barwick’s claim.  Barwick does not demonstrate that the witness’s 
testimony as to the facts she observed has changed, only that Ms. Capers’ 
interpretation of those facts differed between her 1986 and 1992 testimony.  Thus, 
Barwick has not established that the witness’s testimony was false.           
3.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Barwick also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, having had 
a conversation with a confidential defense expert appointed to assist the defense, 
without the consent and presence of the defendant.  Barwick alleges this 
unauthorized contact with Dr. Walker hindered the preparation of his mitigation 
evidence by depriving him of a confidential expert.   
 
In denying relief, the circuit court concluded that Barwick made no showing 
that he had been adversely affected in the preparation of his mitigation evidence.  
In addition, the information received by the State was the same that Dr. Walker 
testified to at trial, i.e., that Barwick suffered from an impulsive disorder and that 
he did not fall within the legal definition of insanity.  We affirm the circuit court’s 
denial of relief.  At the evidentiary hearing Barwick neither called his former 
confidential expert to testify concerning the nature of his conversation with the 
State, nor questioned the assistant state attorney who prosecuted the case about the 
issue during cross-examination of the witness.    
C.  Cumulative Error 
 
- 35 - 
 
Barwick argues that in light of the number and types of errors that occurred, 
and taken as a whole, his trial was fundamentally unfair.  Barwick contends that 
the trial court was required to engage in a collective, rather than item-by-item 
review.  However, where allegations of individual error are without merit, a 
cumulative error argument based thereupon must also fail.  See Downs v. State, 
740 So. 2d 506, 509 n. 5 (Fla. 1999).  The circuit court properly denied relief on 
this claim. 
III.  PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Barwick raises nine issues in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming 
the following:  (1) as a brain-damaged, mentally retarded person with a mental and 
emotional age less than eighteen years, Barwick’s execution would be 
unconstitutional; (2) use of a prior conviction involving an offense that occurred 
before Barwick was eighteen years old violates the federal constitution pursuant to 
Roper v. Simmons, 543U.S. 551 (2005); (3) direct appeal counsel’s failure to argue 
against the “avoid arrest” aggravator constituted ineffective assistance; (4) direct 
appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance having failed to raise the issue of 
omissions in the record; (5) counsel’s failure to argue on direct appeal that the jury 
was misled during the penalty phase by improper comments and instructions was 
ineffective assistance; (6) ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel based 
upon counsel’s failure to argue that the prosecutor presented to the jury at 
 
- 36 - 
sentencing impermissible matters for consideration; (7) the “during the 
commission of a felony” aggravating circumstance operates as an impermissible 
automatic aggravator; (8) appellate counsel on direct appeal rendered ineffective 
assistance having failed to argue that the penalty phase jury instructions improperly 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant; and (9) the Court erred in failing to 
remand the case to the trial court for resentencing, having struck an aggravating 
circumstance. 
A.  Roper v. Simmons 
 
 
Barwick makes two claims that his execution would be unconstitutional 
under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  He argues he cannot be executed 
because, first, his mental age is less than eighteen due to brain damage and mental 
capacity, and second, use of a prior violent felony committed before the age of 
eighteen as an aggravating circumstance is improper.  These claims are 
procedurally barred. 
This Court has held that “[h]abeas corpus is not to be used for 
additional appeals of issues that could have been, should have been, or 
were raised on appeal or in other postconviction motions.”  Mills v. 
Dugger, 559 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla.1990).  In Mills, we rejected the 
petitioner’s habeas claims, noting that most had been raised either on 
direct appeal or in the petitioner’s postconviction motion.  See id.  In 
this case, appellant has already raised Roper in his rule 3.851 motion.  
Because every argument raised in this portion of appellant’s habeas 
petition either could have been or in fact was raised in his motion filed 
pursuant to rule 3.851, this claim is rejected as procedurally barred. 
 
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 562 (Fla. 2010). 
 
- 37 - 
 
In addition to the procedural bars, the Court has expressly rejected the 
argument that Roper extends beyond the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the 
execution of an individual who was younger than eighteen at the time of the 
murder violates the eighth amendment.  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 406-07 
(Fla. 2006).  Moreover, the Court has previously denied relief on each of the 
specific claims raised by Barwick.  See Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 
2006) (“Hill’s third claim is that his mental and emotional age places him in the 
category of persons for whom it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty 
under [Roper].  This claim is without merit.  Roper does not apply to Hill.  Hill 
was twenty-three years old when he committed the crimes at issue.  Roper only 
prohibits the execution of those defendants whose chronological age is below 
eighteen.”); Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 46 (Fla. 2008); Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 
994, 1020 (Fla. 2006).  Here, Barwick was nineteen and one-half years old when 
he committed the murder.  Accordingly, we deny relief upon these claims. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Barwick raises a number of claims of ineffective assistance of direct appeal 
counsel.  The Court has previously addressed the applicable standard for such 
claims brought in petitions seeking habeas corpus relief, as follows: 
 
Appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness is properly raised in a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  In order to grant habeas relief on the basis of 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must determine 
 
- 38 - 
 
whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling 
measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable 
performance and, second, whether the deficiency in 
performance compromised the appellate process to such a 
degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the 
result. 
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla.1986).  “The defendant 
has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act 
upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be 
based.”  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069. 
 
Rimmer v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly S745, S752 (Fla. Dec. 16, 2010). 
 
1.  Failure to Argue “Avoid Arrest” Aggravator 
 
Barwick argues that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
argue that the jury should not have been instructed on the “avoid arrest” 
aggravator.  Barwick contends that appellate counsel should have argued that the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the aggravator. 
 
The focus of the avoid arrest aggravator centers on the 
motivation for the crimes.  See Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144, 151 
(Fla.1998).  “[T]o establish the avoid arrest aggravating factor where 
the victim is not a law enforcement officer, the State must show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the 
murder was the elimination of a witness.”  Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 
2d 1128, 1156 (Fla.2006) (quoting Bell v. State, 841 So. 2d 329, 336 
(Fla.2002)). 
 
McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 792 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2100 
(2011).  To determine whether the “avoid arrest” aggravator is supported by the 
evidence, the Court considers whether the victim knew and could identify the 
 
- 39 - 
killer, whether the defendant used gloves or wore a mask, whether the victim 
offered any resistance, or whether the victim was in a position to pose a threat to 
the defendant.  Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 289 (Fla. 2004).   Sufficient 
evidence to support the “avoid arrest” aggravator exists where the defendant has 
made incriminating statements about witness elimination.  Walls v. State, 641 So. 
2d 381, 390 (Fla. 1994) (holding a confession that witness elimination was the 
reason for the murder satisfies this aggravating circumstance).  The Court will 
uphold an aggravator where the trial court applied the right rule of law and where 
competent, substantial evidence supports the finding.  Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 
687, 698 (Fla. 2003). 
 
The evidence at trial, as found by the trial court in its sentencing order, 
established the “avoid arrest” aggravating circumstance: 
In the 1983 sexual battery case of which the defendant was convicted, 
he was identified and arrested because the victim was left alive.  In 
that case the victim convinced him that although she had seen his face 
after his mask had been removed that she would not turn him in.  The 
defendant learned what is obvious, that being, if the victim is dead the 
victim cannot identify the perpetrator.  In this case, the defendant told 
his sister, Lovey Barwick, that when he and the victim where [sic] 
struggling and she saw his face that he knew then that “he had to do 
it.”  Further, the defendant told his brother, William Barwick, that 
during the struggle when the mask came off and the victim saw his 
face he then knew that he had to kill her because he was not going 
back to prison.  Less than 80 days after he was discharged from 
prison, for committing a sexual battery where he left the victim alive, 
he attempted to commit another sexual battery using the same modus 
operandi and this time he did not leave the victim alive to identify 
him. 
 
- 40 - 
 
Accordingly, because the instruction was properly given, appellate counsel will not 
be held ineffective for failing to raise a nonmeritorious issue.  See Lugo, 2 So. 3d 
at 21.  The claim is denied. 
2.  Failure to Ensure a Complete Appellate Record 
 
Barwick argues that direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
having failed to ensure a complete appellate record.  Barwick identifies the 
following portions of the transcript as missing:  (1) the general jury qualification; 
(2) a large portion of the charge conference; and (3) several bench conferences, 
occurring at the time of and pertaining to jury selection, the testimony of the lead 
detective on this case, the instructions to the jury in the guilt phase, and the 
defense’s penalty phase closing argument.  Barwick does not, however, identify 
any errors that occurred as a result of the alleged omissions.  We have previously 
rejected this claim under similar circumstances: 
We deny relief on this claim.  As we previously explained, [the 
defendant] has not sufficiently described how he was prejudiced by 
the lack of a record of the jury hardship excusals by the trial judge.  
This Court has also previously rejected similar ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel claims.  In Thompson v. State, the defendant 
alleged that “this Court was not provided with an adequate record 
during the direct appeal because some pretrial hearings and bench 
conferences were not transcribed and included in the appellate 
record.”  Thompson, 759 So.2d at 660.  Thompson alleged in his 
postconviction motion that his trial and appellate counsel were both 
ineffective for failing to ensure that this record existed.  We rejected 
Thompson’s habeas claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness 
because Thompson had not alleged specific appealable errors in the 
 
- 41 - 
record.  Id.; see also Ferguson v. Singletary, 632 So.2d 53, 58 
(Fla.1993) (“Had appellate counsel asserted error which went 
uncorrected because of the missing record, or had Ferguson pointed to 
errors in this petition, this claim may have had merit.  However, 
Ferguson .  .  . points to no specific error which occurred during these 
time periods.”  (emphasis added)). 
 
While [the defendant] has alleged generally that error occurred, 
as in Thompson, [he] has not pointed to specific error. 
   
Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1107 (Fla. 2009); accord Pardo v. State, 941 So. 2d 
1057, 1973 (Fla. 2006) (citing cases).  Similarly, because Barwick has failed to 
specifically identify any errors that occurred as a result of the alleged omissions in 
the record, we deny this claim. 
3.  Failure to Argue the Jurors’ Sense of Responsibility Was Diluted 
 
Barwick argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 
that during the penalty phase, the jury was misled by comments and instructions 
that diluted its sense of responsibility.  Barwick raised the same underlying 
contention that the jury’s sense of responsibility at sentencing was diminished in 
the context of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Barwick “is not 
permitted to camouflage the underlying argument as an ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel claim.”  Johnston v. State, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S122, S127 (Fla. 
Mar. 24, 2011) (citing Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 562 (Fla. 2010)). 
 
Further, the Court has previously held that the standard jury instructions 
given during the penalty phase, which appear to be the only “comments” made by 
 
- 42 - 
the trial judge concerning sentencing, do not diminish the jury’s sense of 
responsibility.  See Reese v. State, 14 So. 3d 913, 919-20 (Fla. 2009).  Our review 
of the record also reflects that arguments made by the State are the same or similar 
to those the Court has previously upheld.  Foster v. State, 518 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 
1987).  This claim is denied. 
4.  Failure to Argue Prosecutor Injected Improper Considerations at the 
Penalty Phase 
 
 
Barwick argues that certain comments by the State introduced improper 
matters for the jury’s consideration in deciding what sentence to recommend, 
including sympathy for the victim and fear of the defendant.  He maintains this 
inflamed the passions of the jury such that their verdict was an emotional response 
to the crime and the defendant.  Barwick also argues that the prosecutor injected 
fear of the defendant into the guilt phase in order to influence the jury’s verdict.  
Barwick therefore concludes that the cumulative effect of the improper arguments 
was to appeal to the jury’s passions and prejudices, which rendered the guilt and 
penalty phases of trial, and Barwick’s sentence of death, fundamentally unfair. 
 
The arguments identified by Barwick were not objected to at trial; thus, 
challenges to the arguments on appeal would have been limited to review for 
fundamental error.  Absent fundamental error, i.e., error that reaches “down into 
the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have 
been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error,” relief would not be 
 
- 43 - 
warranted on appeal.  Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 74 (Fla. 2003) (quoting 
Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)).  Here, Barwick made no such 
showing.  Accordingly, appellate counsel’s failure to raise a nonmeritorious claim 
cannot constitute ineffective assistance.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 
643 (Fla. 2000) (“If a legal issue would in all probability have been found to be 
without merit had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate 
counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s performance 
ineffective.”).  Reviewed in context, we conclude that the arguments at issue were 
proper. 
 
Addressing the charge of attempted sexual battery during his guilt phase 
closing argument, and in response to Barwick’s defense that he only intended to 
commit a burglary, the prosecutor reviewed Barwick’s admitted conduct of driving 
by the victim’s apartment complex, seeing her sunbathing, returning after 
retrieving a knife, and observing two women sunbathing.  Recalling for the jury 
that Ms. Capers testified at trial that Barwick stared at her and she got an eerie 
feeling, the prosecutor argued that the testimony was evidence Barwick was 
“staring, selecting.”  The State also pointed out that Barwick’s conduct in 
following Ms. Wendt into her apartment was inconsistent with intending only to 
commit a burglary.  According to Barwick, the State’s argument was intended to 
frighten the jury and influence their verdict by appealing to their emotions.  We 
 
- 44 - 
disagree.  Rather, taken in context and based upon evidence adduced at trial, the 
prosecutor’s argument addresses Barwick’s “burglary only” defense to the charge 
of attempted sexual battery.  “The proper exercise of closing argument is to review 
the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence.”  Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 868 (Fla. 2010) (quoting 
Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla.1985)), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1004 
(2011). 
 
In its closing argument in the penalty phase, the State argued that sympathy 
for either the victim or the defendant was not a proper consideration for the jury in 
reaching its decision: 
 
The last thing I wanted to talk to you about, I’ll sit down then.  
I’ve been talking too long and you’re tired of it.  Again, I appreciate 
your patience but I don’t want you to fall into sympathy.  I can’t argue 
sympathy.  It’s improper.  I can’t sit here and show you the 
photograph and say, feel sorry for this young lady right here.  But the 
only reason I can show you this photograph in life and in death is for 
this one right down here, which is particularly heinous, atrocious and 
cruel.  That’s the reason the photographs are there.  That’s the reason 
you can look at them.  It is because of the pain that he inflicted, put 
upon her and the joy that he may have gotten out of it that I can talk 
about or I can even get close to these photographs or even point to 
these photographs or show these photographs to you. 
 
Don’t get me wrong.  I am not arguing sympathy but do not let 
the defense attorney sway you or inflame you with any sort of 
argument for sympathy. 
 
 The reason we’re here, there’s no money.  It sort of falls in the 
category, poor fellow.  He can’t help himself, poor fellow.  
Psychologists and psychiatrists can’t help him.  Poor fellow.  Me, the 
defense lawyer, I can’t help him.  Poor fellow.  All boils down to 
money because that’s why we can’t cure him.  It is lack of ability is 
 
- 45 - 
why we can’t cure him.  Poor fellow.  Everybody has given up on 
him, poor fellow, don’t y’all give up on him. 
 
Don’t fall into that category.  Don’t fall into that sympathy.  
Sympathy has no place in this courtroom.  You are to follow this law.  
Do these aggravating circumstances outweigh these mitigating 
circumstances.  And if you have any sympathy and if sympathy just 
comes in there, tell yourselves, no, Mr. Paulk told me we can’t have 
sympathy for that lady or that, the fact that she endured pain and she 
was being tortured.  We can take that into consideration but don’t fall 
into that category that this man, that just on the basis of sympathy, 
sympathy alone that you are going to vote, to recommend to the judge 
that he be sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole 
after 25 years in prison.  Don’t let sympathy make you vote that way. 
 
We reject Barwick’s characterization of the foregoing argument as encouraging the 
jury to consider sympathy for the victim while ignoring sympathy for the 
defendant in reaching its sentencing recommendation.  The argument is quite to the 
contrary, and is a correct statement of law. 
 
Accordingly, we deny Barwick’s claims of ineffectiveness with respect to 
the State’s closing arguments at issue and counsel’s failure on direct appeal to 
challenge them, since appellate counsel will not be held ineffective for failing to 
raise a nonmeritorious issue.  See Lugo, 2 So. 3d at 21. 
5.  Failure to Challenge the Penalty Phase Jury Instructions as Shifting the 
Burden of Proof to the Defense 
 
 
Barwick challenges the penalty phase jury instructions as shifting to the 
defense the burden of proving that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances and warranted a life sentence.  This claim could and 
should have been raised on direct appeal.  Dufour, 905 So. 2d at 69.  Accordingly, 
 
- 46 - 
Barwick’s attempt to circumvent the procedural bar by recasting his challenge to 
the instructions to one of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel is 
improper.  Further, the Court has previously rejected this precise claim.  See, e.g., 
Bell v. State, 965 So. 2d 48, 79 (Fla. 2007); Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 509 
n.5 (Fla. 1999).  Barwick offers no basis for rejecting this long-standing rule of 
law.  Thus to the extent that Barwick alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise the substantive claim, relief is denied.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d 
at 643 (failing to raise nonmeritorious issue on appeal will not render appellate 
counsel’s performance ineffective).    
C.  The Aggravating Circumstance “During Commission of a Felony” 
Operates as an Impermissible Automatic Aggravator 
 
 
Barwick challenges the constitutionality of the “during commission of a 
felony” aggravating circumstance, which, he argues, was duplicative of the basis 
for the death penalty, i.e., that the killing was a felony murder.  Barwick did not 
raise this claim on direct appeal, and therefore, it is procedurally barred.  In any 
event, the Court has previously rejected this same claim.  See, e.g., Dufour, 905 
So. 2d at 69 (citing cases); Blanco, 706 So. 2d at 11; Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 647 
(citing cases).  
D.  Remand for Resentencing 
 
Barwick argues that the Court should have remanded his case for 
resentencing upon determining on direct appeal that there was insufficient 
 
- 47 - 
evidence to support the CCP aggravating circumstance.  Because this claim should 
have been raised in a proper motion for rehearing on direct appeal, it is 
procedurally barred.  Robinson v. State, 913 So. 2d 514, 523 n.8 (Fla. 2005); 
Cherry v. Moore, 829 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fla. 2002).  Barwick challenged the 
aggravator on direct appeal but did not seek rehearing on the Court’s harmless 
error analysis with respect to the improper aggravating circumstance.18  Moreover, 
the Court has previously rejected this precise claim.  Geralds v. State, 35 Fla. L. 
Weekly S503 (Fla. Sept. 16, 2010); Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100, 106 (Fla. 
1994). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of 
Barwick’s motion for postconviction relief and deny his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
 
18.  On rehearing, Barwick sought relief with respect to his claim that the 
trial court erred in rejecting his childhood abuse as a mitigating circumstance.  
 
- 48 - 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County,  
Don T. Sirmons, Judge – Case No. 86-940 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
D. Todd Doss, Lake City, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent