Title: Schwartz v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031698
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2004

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
MARC ANDRE SCHWARTZ  
 
OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 031698 
 
April 23, 2004 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
Shortly after midnight on Monday, May 28, 2001, defendant 
Marc Andre Schwartz and three male companions, all teenagers and 
fueled by consumption of alcoholic beverages, embarked on a 
vandalism spree in western Henrico County.  During the next 
several hours, the group broke windows in school busses and an 
automobile with bats and tools, and slashed tires on motor 
vehicles with a knife.  Shortly before 2:45 a.m., in heavy rain, 
the vandals arrived at the residence of Michael Wayne Drye, whom 
they did not know. 
 
Drye's two vehicles, a Ford pickup truck with a camper 
shell on the rear and a Ford Explorer sport utility vehicle, 
were parked in his driveway adjacent to one another.  The truck 
was three to four feet from the dwelling and the Explorer was 
six to eight feet from the home. 
 
The boys first attempted unsuccessfully to overturn the 
truck.  Then, using diesel fuel found in containers within the 
camper shell, the culprits, with difficulty, set fire to the 
 
 
 
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truck, left and, after returning to the scene several times, 
eventually fled the area.  The fire spread from the truck to the 
sport utility vehicle and then to the residence, which became 
engulfed in flames. 
 
The vehicles were destroyed and the home heavily damaged.  
Drye's property loss was estimated to be in the sum of $250,000.  
Drye, who was alone in the house at the time, escaped without 
injury. 
 
Following detention of the defendant on June 1, 2001, 
charges against him were transferred from the juvenile and 
domestic relations district court to the circuit court, where he 
was indicted for three felonies.  In one indictment, defendant 
was charged with malicious burning of an occupied dwelling, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-77.  In two separate indictments, he 
was charged with malicious burning of personal property, the 
pickup truck and the Explorer, in violation of Code § 18.2-81. 
 
Following a bench trial in the circuit court, the defendant 
was found guilty of all three charges of arson and sentenced in 
January 2002 to incarceration, most of which was suspended.  
Upon review, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the 
convictions.  Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 61, 581 
S.E.2d 891 (2003). 
 
We awarded defendant this appeal, limited to consideration 
of one assignment of error, that is, whether:  "The trial court 
 
 
 
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erred in finding Schwartz guilty of three counts of arson when 
the evidence revealed there was only one point of ignition, a 
pick-up truck, which later spread to another vehicle and the 
residence." 
 
In this appeal, the defendant does not contest his 
conviction for arson of the occupied dwelling.  Rather, he seeks 
dismissal of the two convictions for burning the vehicles, 
Drye's personal property. 
 
The defendant argues:  "There was only one act of ignition 
for the residence and the two vehicles.  The three properties 
had one owner. . . . Clearly there was only 'one discrete 
criminal act' committed and Schwartz has been convicted and 
punished for three offenses." 
 
We do not agree with defendant's argument.  The decision of 
this appeal turns upon application to these facts of the 
relevant statutes' clear terms. 
 
Code § 18.2-77(A), as pertinent, provides:  "If any person 
maliciously (i) burns, or by use of any . . . substance 
destroys, in whole or in part, or causes to be burned or 
destroyed, or (ii) aids, counsels or procures the burning or 
destruction of any . . . occupied . . . house . . . , he shall 
be guilty of a felony . . . . Any person who maliciously sets 
fire to anything, or aids, counsels or procures the setting fire 
to anything, by the burning whereof such occupied dwelling house 
 
 
 
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. . . is burned shall be guilty of a violation of this 
subsection." 
 
Code § 18.2-81, as pertinent, provides:  "If any person 
maliciously . . . set fire to or burn or destroy by any . . . 
substance, or cause to be burned, or destroyed by any . . . 
substance, or aid, counsel, or procure the burning or destroying 
by any . . . substance, of any personal property, . . . he 
shall, if the thing burnt or destroyed, be of the value of $200 
or more, be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals' statement that "the 
plain language" of the foregoing statutes demonstrates that the 
General Assembly "intended to allow multiple arson convictions 
under circumstances such as those presented in this case."  
Schwartz, 41 Va. App. at 74, 581 S.E.2d at 897-98. 
 
In contending there was only one criminal act, the 
defendant has argued that the word "anything" in § 18.2-77 means 
the personal property referred to in § 18.2-81.  However, the 
term "anything" in § 18.2-77 refers to the accelerant used to 
start the fire of a dwelling, not the object of the fire.  The 
statutory language proscribes "the setting fire to anything, by 
the burning whereof such occupied dwelling house . . . is 
burned." 
 
In separate statutes, the legislature has criminalized the 
arson of an occupied dwelling, on the one hand, and the arson of 
 
 
 
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personal property, on the other.  The personal property here was 
two distinct, different vehicles that were separately identified 
and parked outside the dwelling.  The dwelling and the two 
vehicles occupied different locations.  Thus, we hold the 
legislature intended that, under these circumstances, there 
should be three units of prosecution, viz., for the burning of 
the dwelling and for the burning of each vehicle. 
 
While we agree with the foregoing statement of the Court of 
Appeals, we disagree with that Court's further observation that 
"Code § 18.2-81, by its plain language, creates a single and 
separate unit of prosecution for each item of personal property 
destroyed as the result of arson."  Id. at 75, 581 S.E.2d at 
898. 
 
As the Court of Appeals' Chief Judge pointed out in her 
concurrence in Schwartz, "[t]his could be construed as 
permitting a separate arson prosecution for every item destroyed 
in a home or car, such as a shoe, a sock, a pillow, etc."  Id. 
at 77, 581 S.E.2d at 899.  As she noted, that literal 
construction of the statute would improperly yield an absurd 
result.  Id.
 
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding 
the defendant guilty of three counts of arson. Therefore, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals confirming these convictions 
will be 
 
 
 
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Affirmed.∗
                     
 
∗ This decision, of course, leaves in place the Court of 
Appeals' order of remand to the circuit court for modification 
of the sentencing order, regarding the defendant's convictions 
for vandalism and possession of alcohol, to reflect they were 
actually juvenile convictions as opposed to adult convictions.  
See 41 Va. App. at 76, 581 S.E.2d at 898-99.