Title: Briscoe v. LSREF3/AH Chicago Tenant, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12665
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2019

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SJC-12665 
 
AKKIMA DANNIELLE BRISCOE  vs.  LSREF3/AH CHICAGO TENANT, LLC. 
 
 
February 11, 2019. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari.  Housing Court, 
Jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
The plaintiff, Akkima Dannielle Briscoe, filed several 
petitions in the county court seeking relief from a summary 
process judgment and other orders entered against her in the 
Housing Court.1  The single justice denied relief.  We affirm. 
 
 
The petitions Briscoe filed in the county court center on 
her claim that the Housing Court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction in the summary process matter because the subject 
rental property was held in trust for her.  In denying Briscoe 
relief, the single justice observed, among other things, that 
she failed to demonstrate the absence of an adequate alternative 
remedy.  It is on that basis that we affirm the single justice's 
judgment.   
 
 
The case is now before us on Briscoe's memorandum and 
appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 
1301 (2001), which requires a party challenging an interlocutory 
ruling of the trial court to "set forth the reasons why review 
of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on 
                                                          
 
 
1 The single justice's judgment expressly referred only to 
the "urgent petition for special writ of certiorari" filed by 
Briscoe, although it implicitly denied the other pleadings that 
she had filed as well, namely, her petition for a writ of 
prohibition and a petition seeking reformation of various 
orders, the underlying Housing Court judgment, and the 
execution, on the basis of mistake. 
2 
 
 
appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by 
other available means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).  The rule does 
not apply here, because a final judgment has entered in the 
summary process case in the Housing Court.  See Carrington v. 
Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1015, 1015 (2015).  Regardless, 
Briscoe's filings make it abundantly clear that she had avenues 
available to her to pursue relief from the Housing Court orders 
and judgment other than by means of the petitions that she filed 
in this court.  To the extent she alleged that the underlying 
orders and judgment contain mistakes or were based on a lack of 
jurisdiction, she could have filed a motion pursuant to Rule 
11(b) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980) and Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 60, 365 Mass. 828 (1974), and, if necessary, appealed 
from any adverse ruling on such a motion.  See Brown v. Federal 
Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 481 Mass.     (2019), and cases cited; 
Chavoor v. Lewis, 383 Mass. 801, 805 n.3 (1981).  She also could 
have obtained review of the orders and judgment through the 
ordinary process of a direct appeal.  See Yahya v. Rocktop 
Partners I, LP, 479 Mass. 1035, 1036 (2018); Wallace v. PNC 
Bank, N.A., 478 Mass. 1020, 1021 (2018); Salomon S.A. v. LaFond, 
463 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2012) (jurisdictional claims may be 
reviewed on appeal).  See also Rule 12 of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (2004).2 
 
 
This is the fourth groundless appeal taken by Briscoe from 
a single justice's judgment denying a petition for extraordinary 
relief that we have decided within a month.  See also Briscoe v. 
Middlesex Div. of the Juvenile Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 1027 
                                                          
 
 
2 Additionally, we observe that the common-law writs of 
certiorari, prohibition, error, and review, as well as various 
other writs, were abolished in the Commonwealth by the adoption 
of the rules of civil procedure.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 81 (b), 
365 Mass. 841 (1974); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 
(1974) (last sentence).  See also Chavoor v. Lewis, 383 Mass. 
801, 804-805 nn.2, 3 (1981).  Although "[t]his court retains 
authority to grant relief to correct and prevent errors and 
abuses in the lower courts 'if no other remedy is expressly 
provided,'" id., quoting G. L. c. 211, § 3, the single justice 
in this case correctly concluded that the petitioner failed to 
demonstrate the absence of any other adequate remedy.  See 
Myrick v. Superior Court Dep't, 479 Mass. 1012, 1012 (2018) 
(neither mandamus nor certiorari substitute for ordinary 
appellate process); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Flowers, 282 
Mass. 316, 321 (1933) (writ of error not substitute for appeal); 
Kilty v. Railroad Comm'rs, 184 Mass. 310, 311 (1903) (writ of 
prohibition not substitute for appeal).  
3 
 
 
(2019); Briscoe v. LSREF3/AH Chicago Tenant, LLC, 481 Mass. 1026 
(2019); Briscoe v. District Attorney for the N. Dist., 481 Mass. 
1026 (2019).  She is now on notice that if she files any further 
requests for extraordinary relief that fail to satisfy the basic 
requirements for justifying such relief -- i.e., showing the 
absence of adequate alternative remedies, furnishing record 
support to substantiate her claims, and presenting proper legal 
argument -- the court will consider imposing an appropriate 
sanction against her, including a possible restriction on future 
filings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Akkima Dannielle Briscoe, pro se.