Title: State v. Hart
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44698
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 1999

Filed:  July 29, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

KIMBERLY ANN HART,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC95C22922; CA A92712; SC S44698)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted March 8, 1999.

	Ann Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.

	Walter J. Ledesma, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief was David
E. Groom, Public Defender.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,

	 John B. Wilson, Judge.

	 149 Or App 552, 944 P2d 980 (1996).

    **Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.

		GILLETTE, J.

		In this criminal case, defendant pleaded guilty to
aggravated theft for embezzling a large sum of money from her
employer.  The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term
totaling eighteen months for that theft and for two probation
violations and ordered defendant to pay a substantial sum in
restitution within 24 months of the date of her release from
prison.  The Court of Appeals reversed the restitution part of
the sentence, remanded the case to the trial court for findings
concerning defendant's ability to pay the entire amount ordered
during the two-year period, and otherwise affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.  State v. Hart, 149 Or App 552, 944 P2d 980
(1997).  

		We allowed review to consider whether a trial court is
required to make findings of fact before ordering a defendant to
pay restitution and, secondarily, to address limitations that a
defendant's ability to pay might place on a trial court's ability
to impose restitution.  We conclude that the trial court was not
required to make particular findings of fact on the record.  We
further conclude that, on the record before it, the trial court
did not err in choosing to impose the sentence of restitution
that it imposed.  Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in
part the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the
judgment of the trial court.  

		The following facts are undisputed.  Defendant was
employed by Eagle Graphics as an accounts-receivable clerk.  In
1995, defendant's employer discovered that, over the course of
about a year and a half, defendant had been issuing checks in her
husband's name and intercepting incoming payments to the
corporation.  Defendant deposited those funds in her own account
and doctored the corporate books to hide her activities.  By the
time she was caught, defendant had embezzled over $95,000 from
Eagle Graphics.  

		At the time when defendant committed the foregoing
crimes, she was on probation for committing similar offenses
against her previous employer.  In 1992, while defendant was
employed as a bookkeeper for a company called Specialty
Countertops, defendant forged 76 checks and embezzled at least
$30,000 from that company.  She was convicted on one count of
aggravated theft and one count of first-degree forgery in that
case, and sentenced to five years' probation and ordered to pay
$6,150 in restitution.(1)  At the time of the arrest in the present
case, defendant had not paid any significant part of the earlier
restitution amount.  

		As a result of her misconduct at Eagle Graphics,
defendant was charged with one count of aggravated theft and two
counts of first-degree forgery.  She pleaded guilty to the
aggravated theft charge in return for dismissal of the forgery
charges.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed
defendant's criminal history and heard victim-impact testimony
from her employer.  The court revoked defendant's probation on
the two prior felony convictions and imposed concurrent six-month
prison sentences on each, along with two years of post-prison
supervision.  On the new charge, the court found sufficient
aggravating factors to impose a dispositional departure sentence
of one year in prison, to run consecutively to the sentences on
the probation violations, and imposed two years of post-prison
supervision.  Finally, the court sentenced defendant to pay any
restitution remaining unpaid from the 1992 convictions, along
with restitution in the amount of $95,328.76 for the 1995
aggravated theft conviction.  The court directed that defendant
pay those amounts during the two years of post-prison
supervision.  Defendant objected to the restitution part of the
sentence to the extent that it required her to pay back the
entire amount over the two-year period of post-prison
supervision.  The court declined to change that term, noting that
defendant's history showed that she was capable of paying the
amount ordered.

		On appeal, defendant assigned error to the trial
court's imposition of over $95,000 in restitution payable during
the two-year period of post-prison supervision, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that defendant was
capable of paying that amount in that period of time,
particularly in light of the fact that she was earning only $7.50
hourly at the time of sentencing.  The Court of Appeals agreed
and remanded the case to the trial court for additional findings
and resentencing.  Hart, 149 Or App at 555.  In addition, the
Court of Appeals held that the restitution statute "implicitly
requires a determination of the amount of restitution that the
defendant is able to pay within the time period directed for
payment, not merely that the defendant is capable of paying
restitution."  Id. at 555-56 (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, the court directed the trial court on remand to
determine whether defendant would have the ability to pay the
entire amount ordered within the time frame allotted.  Id. at
556.

		We review to determine whether the trial court complied
with the requirements of law in imposing its sentence.  ORS
138.222(4)(a).(2)  The legal requirements for a sentence of
restitution are set out in ORS 137.106.  That section provides:

		"(1) When a person is convicted of criminal
activities * * * which have resulted in pecuniary
damages, unless the presentence investigation report
contains such a presentation, the district attorney
shall investigate and present to the court, prior to or
at the time of sentencing, evidence of the nature and
amount of such damages.  In addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court may order that the
defendant make restitution to the victim.  

		"(2) In determining whether to order restitution
which is complete, partial or nominal, the court shall
take into account:

		"(a) The financial resources of the defendant and
the burden that payment of restitution will impose,
with due regard for the other obligations of the
defendant; 

		"(b) The ability of the defendant to pay
restitution on an instalment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court; and 

		"(c) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of
the payment of restitution and the method of payment.

		"(3) If the defendant objects to the imposition,
amount or distribution of the restitution, the court
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant to
be heard on such issue."

		We first address the trial court's authority under ORS
137.106 to require defendant to pay the entire amount of
restitution ordered within two years following her release from
prison, without first expressly finding that defendant is capable
of paying that amount in that time period.  Whether ORS 137.106
generally requires the trial court to make findings of any kind,
and whether that statute particularly requires the trial court to
find as fact that a defendant is capable of paying the amount
ordered within a particular time period, are questions of
statutory interpretation.  In interpreting a statute, our task is
to discern the intent of the legislature.  We undertake that task
by using the methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), under which
we look first to the text of the statute itself as the best
evidence of the legislature's intent.  Id. at 610-11.  Also at
the first level of our analysis, we look to the context of the
statutory provision at issue, which includes other provisions of
the same statute and other related statutes, id. at 611, as well
as the statutory framework within which the law was enacted. 
Ibid.; accord, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire and
Auto, 322 Or 406, 416-417, 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on
reconsideration, 325 Or 46, 932 P2d 1141 (1997) (applying
principle).  If the legislature's intent is clear after that
analysis, further inquiry is unnecessary.  PGE, 317 Or at 611. 

		We begin our analysis by noting that the text of ORS
137.106 does not require expressly that the trial court make
findings of any kind.  In fact, the word "findings" does not
appear in that section at all.  In addition, the statutory
framework within which ORS 137.106 was enacted provides relevant
context and supports the proposition that the legislature did not
intend to require findings as a prerequisite to imposing
restitution.  

		The legislature enacted ORS 137.106 in 1977.  Or Laws
1977, ch 371, § 2.  At the same time, the legislature added the
following wording to ORS 161.675(1):

	"If a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
an order of payment of a fine, costs or restitution
shall not be enforceable during the period of
imprisonment unless the court expressly finds that the
defendant has assets to pay all or part of the amounts
ordered at the time of sentencing."

Or Laws 1977, ch 371, § 4 (emphasis added).  The legislature's
explicit inclusion of a findings requirement in section 4 of the
same act suggests that the absence of such a requirement in
section 2 of the same act was intentional.  That interpretation
is supported by applying the methodology set out in PGE, which
directs the court, at the first level of analysis, to consider
rules of construction that bear directly on how to read the text. 
PGE, 317 Or at 611.  One of those rules is statutory:  ORS
174.010 enjoins this court "not to insert what has been omitted,
or to omit what has been inserted" from a statute. 

		The Court of Appeals appears to have found an implicit
contextual requirement that a trial court make findings regarding
a defendant's ability to pay before ordering restitution in the
statutory directive to the trial court to "take into account"
various factors in deciding whether to impose restitution that is
complete, partial, or nominal.  ORS 137.106(2).  Those factors
include the defendant's financial resources and the burden that a
restitution payment obligation will impose, the defendant's
ability to pay, on an installment basis or otherwise, and the
rehabilitative effect of payment on the defendant.  Ibid. 
However, that directive does not, in itself, mandate findings of
fact on the record regarding the defendant's ability to pay.  On
the contrary, that wording merely requires the court to take into
account all the relevant factors.  It does not make any one
factor, including the defendant's ability to pay, dispositive. 
State v. Edson, 329 Or __, __, __ P2d __ (decided this date)
(slip op at 7).  

		In Edson, this court held that, having taken into
account the statutory criteria in ORS 137.106(2), "the trial
court is free to impose restitution in an amount and on such
conditions that the court determines best addresses "'the
offender's economic circumstances, the victim's interest in the
recovery and the punitive and reformative goals of these
statutes.'"  329 Or at __ (slip op at 7-8), quoting State v.
Hart, 299 Or 128, 135-36, 699 P2d 1113 (1985).  That amount may
constitute complete, partial, or nominal restitution, as long as
the total amount of restitution ordered is measured by the injury
to the victim and bears a reasonable relationship to the
defendant's criminal conduct.  Edson, 329 Or at ___ (slip op 
at 8).  

		The restitution sentencing statute does not place the
burden on the state to prove a defendant's particular financial
condition.  Under ORS 137.106(1), the state only is required to
present evidence regarding the "nature and amount" of the
pecuniary damages suffered by the victim.  A defendant may object
and, if he or she wishes, present evidence as to why a particular
proposed restitution amount or payment schedule should not be
imposed.  See ORS 137.106(3) (listing grounds for objection.) 
But the restitution statute permits the trial court to order
complete, partial, or nominal restitution as the court finds
appropriate to meet traditional sentencing objectives, payable
within a time frame that the court concludes is best suited to
the circumstances, unless it is evident at the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing that the defendant actually cannot meet the
payment schedule ordered.(3)  Edson, 329 Or at ___ (slip op at 
10-11).

		We hold that the legislature did not intend to require
the trial court to make findings regarding a defendant's ability
to pay in order for the court to be able to impose a sentence of
restitution.(4)  We conclude, therefore, on the basis of our
examination of the statutory text and context, that the meaning
of ORS 137.106 in this respect is clear.  The statute does not
require the trial court to make findings of fact on the record
regarding a defendant's ability to pay before ordering a
defendant to pay restitution.  That is not to say that this court
discourages such findings; on the contrary, this court encourages
trial courts to state their findings on the record.  Findings of
fact always are useful and, on occasion, could even be critical
in a marginal case in which the reasonableness of a trial court's
choice with respect to the amount, duration, or other conditions
surrounding a sentence of restitution are not obvious from the
record.  But no authority requires findings, and the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.   

		It follows that the trial court's restitution sentence
in this case was proper if, in light of the record as a whole, a
trial court reasonably could have imposed it.  We turn to that
question.

		Defendant does not dispute that her criminal conduct
caused the victim pecuniary damages, nor does she challenge the
amount of restitution ordered.  Moreover, it is apparent from a
review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the
presentence investigation report, which the trial court had
before it at that hearing, that the trial court adequately "took
into account" the relevant statutory criteria before ordering
defendant to pay restitution.  First, with respect to the
financial resources available to the defendant and the burden
that payment of restitution will impose (ORS 137.106(2)(a)), the
court had before it evidence that defendant had stolen over
$95,000 in just over a year and a half, is married, and her
husband is employed.  Second, with respect to defendant's ability
to pay restitution on an instalment basis or on other conditions
fixed by the court (ORS 137.106(2)(b)), the court heard testimony
that defendant is both employed and employable and that, at the
time of sentencing, defendant was earning $7.50 per hour.  Third,
with respect to the rehabilitative effect of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment (ORS 137.106(2)(c)), the
court had before it evidence that defendant twice before had
committed similar crimes and that, when she was required in the
past to pay a comparatively small amount of restitution over a
comparatively long period of time, she had failed to pay any
significant part of the restitution ordered.  

		Finally, it was in no way apparent from the record at
the sentencing hearing that defendant would not be able to pay
the amount of restitution ordered in the time set for payment. 
On the contrary, the fact that defendant stole such a large
amount of money over such a short period of time -- and may,
therefore, still own property purchased with the ill-gotten gains
-- combined with the facts that defendant has employment
capabilities and that her husband is employed, at least give rise
to the inference that defendant might have the financial
resources to satisfy the restitution payment obligation.(5)  

		Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial
court complied with the requirements of ORS 137.106 when it
ordered defendant to pay restitution on her release from prison
during the two year period of her post-prison supervision.  The
sentence of restitution was one that, in light of the record as a
whole, a trial court reasonably could have imposed.  The Court of
Appeals' contrary ruling was error.

		One final consideration deserves mention.  The state
reads the Court of Appeals' opinion as implying that restitution,
if ordered at all, must be made payable during the period of
post-prison supervision.  Defendant appears to agree with that
interpretation.  We do not agree that the Court of Appeals'
opinion necessarily so holds.  Nevertheless, to the extent that
the opinion is capable of that inference, that proposition is
incorrect.  Such a limitation is neither expressed nor implied
anywhere in any of the pertinent statutes.  Indeed, the opposite
is implicit throughout the statutory scheme.  Applicable
procedural statutes require that the restitution part of a
judgment and sentence of conviction be set out in a separate
money judgment section and be docketed as a money judgment.  ORS
137.071(9); ORS 137.180(1).  Once the money judgment is so
docketed, it is enforceable as any other civil money judgment. 
ORS 137.180(4) ("[e]ntry and docketing of judgment under this
section has the same effect as a judgment in a civil action); ORS
161.685(6) (failure to make restitution or a default on an
instalment on restitution "may be collected by any means
authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment").  The
judgment then expires at the end of 20 years after entry of
judgment and may not be renewed.  ORS 18.360(2).  It is self-evident that the foregoing statutes contemplate the payment of
restitution beyond the period in which a defendant is subject to
supervision.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.  

1. At the time of the 1992 convictions, defendant was on
probation for a 1990 forgery conviction, resulting from her theft
of a $3,000 check from another previous employer.  At the 1992
sentencing, defendant's previous probation was continued.  That
term of probation had expired before her 1995 arrest.  

2. In her brief before the Court of Appeals, defendant
erroneously stated that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
under ORS 138.040, which allows for review of certain
dispositions to determine if the disposition "[e]xceeds the
maximum allowable by law."  ORS 138.040(1)(b)(A).  The Court of
Appeals apparently agreed with that statement of jurisdiction,
insofar as it issued an order amending its opinion to state that
it reviews the trial court's determination for consideration of
whether it exceeds the maximum allowable by law rather than for
abuse of discretion.  Order Amending Opinion, dated October 22,
1997.  Appellate court review in this case, however, is governed
by ORS 138.222.  See State v. Edson, 329 Or ___, ___ P2d ___
(1999) (decided this date) (holding that sentences of restitution
imposed for felony convictions after November 1, 1989, are
subject to review under ORS 138.222).  

3. In this regard, we note that, in cases where
restitution is ordered to be paid at the conclusion of a lengthy
prison sentence, it likely would not even be possible for the
trial court to make findings regarding the defendant's ability to
pay on release from prison, because any evidence presented by the
parties to that effect at the time of the sentencing hearing
would be speculative, at best.  An example of such a case is
found in State v. Hart, 299 Or 128, 699 P2d 1113 (1985), in which
this court approved a restitution sentence of over $224,000,
payable in monthly instalments of not less than $100, imposed on
a defendant who also was sentenced to a 10-year term of
imprisonment.  The defendant was ordered to begin paying the
restitution 60 days after his release from custody. 

4. The legislature's affirmative choice would not
necessarily end the matter, were this court to deem findings
essential for appellate review.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. Oregon
Freeze Dry, 327 Or 84, 94-96, 957 P2d 1200 (1998) (findings
required to permit appellate review of award of attorney fees). 
Given the nature of a decision to impose restitution, however, we
are satisfied that the statutorily prescribed procedures, see
Edson, 329 Or at ___ (slip op at 10-11), are sufficiently clear
that we do not deem such findings to be essential here.

5. In the event that defendant does find herself unable to
pay the restitution ordered after she is released from prison,
related statutes allow for adjustment of that obligation.  For
example, in a contempt proceeding resulting from defendant's
default on an instalment of restitution, defendant would be
permitted the opportunity to show why her failure to pay should
not be treated as contempt.  ORS 161.685(1).  If she is
successful in that effort, ORS 161.685(5) allows the court to
enter an order granting defendant additional time for payment, or
reducing the amount of the payment or the instalments due on the
payment, or even revoking the order of restitution in whole or in
part.