Title: Pam Anita Cook v. Roger Paul Cook
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001963
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1963 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Pam Anita Cook, 
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Roger Paul Cook, 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
Reported at:  201 Wis. 2d 72, 547 N.W.2d 817 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 19, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 9, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Green 
 
JUDGE: 
David G. Deininger 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by Norma Briggs and Briggs Law Office, Madison and 
oral argument by Norma Briggs. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief 
by Richard J. Auerbach and Auerbach & Porter, Madison and oral 
argument by Richard J. Auerbach. 
 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Pam Anita Cook, 
 
  
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Roger Paul Cook, 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals
1 affirming an order of 
the Circuit Court for Green County, David G. Deininger, Judge, 
determining property division and child support in the parties' 
divorce action. Roger Paul Cook, the husband, objects to that 
part of the circuit court's order which awarded a portion of the 
military retired pay to his former wife, Pam Anita Cook, in the 
equitable division of the property and included his portion of 
the military retired pay as income for purposes of calculating 
his obligation for child support. The court of appeals affirmed 
                     
1 Cook v. Cook, 201 Wis. 2d 72, 547 N.W.2d 817 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
2 
the order of the circuit court, rejecting the husband's 
contention that including his portion of the military retired 
pay as income for purposes of calculating his child support 
obligation constitutes impermissible "double-counting." 
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. We 
conclude that military retired pay must be considered as 
property for purposes of property division unless otherwise 
excluded by law and may be considered as income to the recipient 
for purposes of calculating child support. 
¶3 
The facts are not in dispute. The parties were married 
for 12 years; the divorce action was commenced in 1993 and 
judgment entered in 1995, when the parties' children were three 
and five years old. At the time of the judgment the wife, the 
custodial parent, had a gross income of $1,836 per month and 
required more than $800 per month for the children's day care. 
The husband had a gross income of $1,212 per month from the 
military retired pay and expected to earn, soon after the 
divorce, an additional $2,334 to $2,500 per month from his work 
as an over-the-road truck driver. 
¶4 
The circuit court ruled that each party was to receive 
one half of 11/23 of the husband's military retired pay as it 
was paid monthly.
2 The remaining 12/23 of the military retired 
pay was awarded entirely to the husband. The remainder of the 
parties' property was divided equally, consistent with their 
agreement.  
                     
2 The parties do not challenge this division, which is based 
on the number of years of the marriage during which the husband 
was in military service. They dispute whether military retired 
pay is subject at all to property division on divorce.  
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
3 
¶5 
Applying the child support percentage guidelines to 
each party's share of the military retired pay, the circuit 
court determined that the husband, as the non-custodial parent, 
was obliged to pay the wife 25% of his gross income from all 
sources for the support of their children. Monthly payments to 
the husband of military retired pay were determined to be part 
of his gross income. The circuit court denied the wife's request 
for a child support award greater than the guidelines percentage 
to assist in the sizable day care expense necessitated by her 
full-time employment. The circuit court reasoned that the 
percentage standard applied to the husband's gross income 
(including military retired pay) would produce sufficient funds 
for child support once the husband began receiving additional 
income from his new employment.  
¶6 
This case presents us with two related questions. 
First, is military retired pay property for purposes of property 
division upon divorce? The husband contends that his military 
retired pay should be considered as income only and not as 
property subject to division.  
¶7 
Second, if military retired pay is divided in the 
property distribution, may the non-custodial spouse's share of 
the military retired pay be considered part of that spouse's 
gross income for the purpose of calculating his or her child 
support obligation? The husband argues that if the military 
retired pay is subject to property division then any portion 
awarded to him should not be considered as income for purposes 
of calculating the amount of child support he is to pay. 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
4 
¶8 
A third question raised by the court of appeals and 
briefed at this court's request is whether the court of appeals 
may overrule, modify or withdraw language from one of its 
published decisions. For the reasons set forth we conclude that 
the court of appeals does not have this power. 
I. 
¶9 
The division of marital property and the calculation 
of child support are matters generally left to the sound 
discretion of the circuit court. Jasper v. Jasper 107 Wis. 2d 
59, 63, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982); Edwards v. Edwards, 97 Wis. 2d 
111, 116, 293 N.W.2d 160 (1980). That discretion, however, must 
be exercised by applying correct legal standards. Hartung v. 
Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981). An exercise 
of discretion based on a mistaken view of the law is an 
erroneous exercise of discretion. Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 
228, 237, 330 N.W.2d 547 (1983). Because the husband does not 
contend that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion except in regard to the legal standards it applied to 
the husband's military retired pay, we treat this case as 
presenting solely issues of law. We determine the legal issues 
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
benefiting from the analyses of those courts.  
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
5 
 
II. 
¶10 The husband first contends that the circuit court 
erred as a matter of law by considering the military retired pay 
as property subject to property division under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.255 (1991-92).
3 We begin with an evaluation of relevant 
federal and Wisconsin statutes.  
¶11 Persons who serve in the armed forces for a specified 
period, generally 20 years, are entitled to receive military 
retired pay upon leaving the service. 10 U.S.C. § 3911 et seq. 
Military retired pay is not available as a lump sum; it is 
taxable as income and terminates on the death of the retiree. A 
retiree is entitled to military retired pay even if he or she 
takes a post-retirement job, except that military retired pay 
temporarily ceases if the retiree returns to active duty. 
¶12 In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the federal statutory scheme and 
the Supremacy Clause preclude states from dividing military 
retired pay as an asset of a marriage. Congress responded to the 
McCarty decision by enacting the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, which reversed the 
effect of McCarty and allowed a state court to divide military 
retired pay as part of a property division in a divorce. The Act 
provides that "a court may treat disposable retired pay payable 
to a member . . . either as property solely of the member or as 
property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law 
                     
3 All further Wisconsin statutory references are to the 
1991-92 Statutes unless otherwise noted.  
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
6 
of the jurisdiction of such court." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). 
Federal law thus no longer precludes Wisconsin from treating 
military retired pay as property subject to property division on 
divorce.
4 
¶13 We now examine 
Wisconsin 
law governing property 
division on divorce. Under Wisconsin law, upon every judgment of 
divorce a circuit court shall divide the property of the parties 
and divest and transfer the title of such property. Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.255. Certain specified property is not subject to property 
division except in the case of hardship. Id. In regard to all 
other property, a circuit court is to presume that the property 
is to be divided equally between the parties but may alter this 
distribution after considering various factors. Id.  
¶14 With these statutory directives in mind we begin our 
inquiry into whether military retired pay is income or is 
property subject to division on divorce.  
¶15 Military retired pay has characteristics of both 
income and property. A military retiree has a right to a future 
stream of income attributable to past employment; the amount of 
the retiree's benefit is tied to the compensation the retiree 
received while in service. 10 U.S.C. § 3991.  
¶16 Military retired pay is similar to private sector 
retirement plans. Although, as the husband stresses, the 
military retiree is not entitled to exchange retired pay for a 
                     
4 10 U.S.C § 1408 maintains some limitations on state court 
treatment of military retired pay. Because the husband does not 
suggest that the circuit court's treatment of retired pay in 
this case is in conflict with federal law, we need inquire no 
further.  
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
7 
lump sum, the same is true in many private sector retirement 
plans. Similarly, it is of no moment that military retired pay 
terminates at the retiree's death or if the retiree returns to 
active service. These characteristics do not divest the military 
retired pay of its status as a retirement plan, comparable to 
private sector plans.  
¶17 It is settled law in this state that private sector 
retirement plans earned through a spouse's employment during a 
marriage must be considered in the property division at divorce. 
The court has noted that in "many divorce situations, the 
pension rights of one or both employee spouses are the most 
significant marital assets owned by the couple," and that 
Wisconsin "is in the forefront of the common-law-property states 
recognizing the rights of the non-employee spouse [in the 
pension]." Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 129, 267 N.W.2d 
235 (1978).  
¶18 In Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 378-79, 376 
N.W.2d 839 (1985), 127 Wis. 2d 444, 379 N.W.2d 853 (1986) (on 
reconsideration), 
the 
court 
addressed 
"the 
proper 
characterization of Mr. Steinke's pension plan either as 
property (and, therefore, part of the marital estate subject to 
division) or as income." The pension in Steinke, like the 
military retired pay in the present case, was being paid to the 
husband at the time of divorce. The court held that, "as a 
matter of law, the value of a spouse's interest in a pension 
fund must be included by the trial court in the division of the 
property." Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d at 380. In Thorpe v. Thorpe, 123 
Wis. 2d 424, 367 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1985), the court of 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
8 
appeals affirmed a circuit court's property division of military 
retired pay.  
¶19 According to Professor Grace Blumberg, virtually all 
states classify military retired pay as subject to property 
division upon divorce, as they do other pensions. Grace Ganz 
Blumberg, Intangible Assets Recognition and Valuation, in 2 
Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property § 23.02[6] n.225, 
at p. 23-54 (Gary N. Skoloff et al. 2/95) (collecting cases).
5 
¶20 For purposes of the equitable division of property 
upon divorce, we see no distinction between private pension 
plans and military retired pay. We therefore hold that unless 
otherwise excluded by law, military retired pay must be 
considered by the circuit court in dividing the property in a 
divorce proceeding. 
III. 
¶21 We now turn to the principal issue in dispute: whether 
military retired pay which has been divided between the spouses 
in the property division may be considered as income in 
calculating a spouse's obligation for child support. The husband 
contends that to include his portion of the military retired pay 
as income in calculating the amount of child support he is 
obligated to pay would impermissibly "double-count" his portion 
of the military retired pay.  
¶22 We again begin with the relevant statutes. Federal law 
allows states to include military retired pay in calculating 
                     
5 See also Maj. Guilford, Family Law Note: Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act Update, Army Lawyer, 
June 1989, at 43 (collecting cases). 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
9 
child support, just as it allows consideration of military 
retired pay in the determination of a property division. 10 
U.S.C. §§ 1408(a)(2)(B)(i), (c)(1), (d)(1), (d)(5), (e)(6).  
¶23 In Wisconsin, a circuit court is required to order 
either or both parents to pay an amount reasonable or necessary 
to fulfill the duty of child support. Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1)(a) 
(1993-94).
6 Unless unfair to the child or a party, a circuit 
court 
shall 
determine 
child 
support 
payments 
using 
the 
percentage standards established by the Department of Health and 
Social Services. Wis. Stat. §§ 767.25(1j) and 46.25(9)(a) (1993-
94); Wis. Adm. Code ch. HSS 80. A child support award 
established under the percentage standards is based on the 
payor's gross income, Wis. Adm. Code § HSS 80.03(1), which is 
defined 
to 
include 
"[m]ilitary 
allowances 
and 
veterans 
benefits . . . and [a]ll other income, whether taxable or not 
[except public assistance and child support received]." Wis. 
Adm. Code § HSS 80.02(13). Further, the statutes authorize a 
circuit court to consider all relevant financial information in 
determining child support payments. Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1g) 
(1993-94). 
¶24 The husband in the present case concedes, and we 
agree, that his receipt of military retired pay is income under 
the administrative code for purposes of calculating child 
support. But, the husband argues, it is impermissible "double-
                     
6 The legislature amended parts of Wis. Stat. § 767.25 after 
the commencement of the divorce action. The 1993-94 Statutes are 
applicable to the circuit court's child support order, entered 
in 1995.  
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
10
counting" to include as income for purposes of calculating child 
support that portion of the military retired pay which was 
awarded to him in the property division on divorce. 
¶25 The rule against impermissible "double-counting" was 
first set forth in Kronforst v. Kronforst, 21 Wis. 2d 54, 123 
N.W.2d 528 (1963). In Kronforst the trial court awarded as part 
of the property division 49% of the cash value of the husband's 
profit-sharing trust to the wife and 51% to the husband. The 
trial court also directed the husband to pay permanent alimony 
from his income, which was limited to disability payments and 
proceeds of the retirement trust. The supreme court held that 
the trial court properly divided the husband's profit sharing 
trust but erroneously included the husband's share of the trust 
in the calculation of permanent alimony he owed his former wife. 
The supreme court stated: "Such an asset cannot be included as a 
principal asset in making division of the estate and then also 
as an income item to be considered in awarding alimony." Id. at 
64. 
¶26 The 
Kronforst 
"double-counting" 
rule 
has 
been 
interpreted in subsequent cases reviewing a division of property 
and an award of maintenance. The contours and rationale of the 
Kronforst rule are not clear. In Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 
2d 620, 635, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978), the court construed 
Kronforst as establishing that "it is not error to exclude an 
interest in a pension fund from the division of estate if it is 
considered as income in awarding alimony." In Steinke, the court 
concluded that this language in Leighton expanded the holding of 
Kronforst and to that extent was to be treated as dicta having 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
11
no precedential effect. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d at 382. The Steinke 
court stated the Kronforst rule as follows:  
 
Kronforst only established the rule prohibiting the 
double counting of an asset, once in property division 
and once in the maintenance award. It did not create a 
rule that pension rights may be excluded from the 
property 
division 
if 
they 
are 
included 
in 
the 
maintenance award. 
Id. In seeking to limit Leighton, the Steinke court seems to 
have read Kronforst as mandating that pension assets be included 
in property division and excluded from maintenance awards. 
¶27 In Olski v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 237, 247, 540 N.W.2d 
412 (1995), the court acknowledged and affirmed Kronforst's 
"double-counting" rule without extensive discussion. The court, 
however, held that the rule did not bar counting as income for 
determining maintenance that portion of the proceeds from a 
pension received in the property division which was attributable 
to post-divorce employment. Id. at 243.
7 
¶28 The court of appeals also has given uneven treatment 
to the "double-counting" rule. The rule has been applied to bar 
consideration of a divided asset for purposes of calculating 
maintenance.
8 
In 
other 
cases, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
                     
7 See also Hommel v. Hommel, 162 Wis. 2d 782, 793, 471 
N.W.2d 1 (1991) (income from assets awarded to spouse in 
property division can be included as income for maintenance 
determination); LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 34, 406 
N.W.2d 736 (1987) (failure to explain adequately why wife must 
liquidate non-income-producing assets to support herself while 
husband keeps his retirement fund untouched is erroneous 
exercise of circuit court discretion). 
8 See, e.g., Hauge v. Hauge, 145 Wis. 2d 600, 605-06, 427 
N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1988) (accounts receivable); Overson v. 
Overson, 125 Wis. 2d 13, 20, 370 N.W.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(proceeds from sale of real estate). 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
12
"question[ed] whether the Kronforst rule is absolute." Pelot v. 
Pelot, 116 Wis. 2d 339, 344-45, 342 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1983). 
In Pelot, the court of appeals concluded that "if the value of a 
pension fund is included in the property division, the court may 
consider it when making a maintenance award, although it must be 
considered differently from property which can be presently 
enjoyed." Others have also questioned the validity of the 
"double-counting" rule.
9 
¶29 It is unnecessary for purposes of our present inquiry 
to ascertain the precise scope of Kronforst's "double-counting" 
rule. Through our review of the cases we derive two principles 
which are sufficient to demonstrate that the circuit court in 
                     
9 Professor Grace Blumberg has analyzed the issue as 
follows: 
Jurisdictions that have accepted the husband's "double 
dipping" argument have done so in conclusory fashion, 
without any elaboration of the issue or discussion of 
the parity question. [citing Kronforst] . . . Once the 
property 
has 
been 
divided, 
a 
proper 
support 
determination requires that all the parties' income 
producing resources be taken into account. It is as 
immaterial that an income-producing asset was awarded 
to one party in the property distribution as it is 
that an income producing asset was acquired before 
marriage or by inheritance or after divorce. That an 
asset qualifies, for any of those reasons, as a 
spouse's separate, or individual, property does not 
insulate it from the other spouse's support claims. 
[citations omitted] 
 
Grace 
Ganz 
Blumberg, 
The 
Relationship 
Between 
Property 
Distribution and Spousal and Child Support, in 2 Valuation and 
Distribution of Marital Property § 41.07[3], at pp. 41-69 to 41-
71 (Gary N. Skoloff et al. 4/90).  
See also White v. White, 237 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767-68 (Cal. 
App. 1987) (limiting application of "double-counting fallacy"); 
Innes v. Innes, 569 A.2d 770, 789-90 (N.J. 1990) (Stein, J., 
concurring and dissenting) ("double-counting" bar should be 
"presumptive, but not absolute"). 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
13
the present case did not act inconsistently with a "double-
counting" rule.  
¶30 First, because of the infinite range of factual 
situations facing circuit courts in dividing property and 
determining maintenance and child support, some cases have found 
it inappropriate to enforce an absolute bar against counting a 
pension in the property division and in the maintenance or 
support determination. Such an inflexible rule runs counter to 
the equitable nature of these determinations and to purposes 
underlying the broad legislative authorization that the circuit 
court consider relevant financial information in dividing the 
property and setting the level of maintenance and child support. 
Rather, the "double-counting" rule serves to warn parties, 
counsel and the courts to avoid unfairness by carefully 
considering the division of income-producing and non-income-
producing assets and the probable effects of that division on 
the need for maintenance and the availability of income to both 
parents for child support.  
¶31 Second, a review of the cases convinces the court that 
the Kronforst "double-counting" rule does not apply in the 
context of child support. Property division, maintenance and 
child support, although related, differ from each other. A 
property division distributes assets owned by the parties in an 
equitable fashion. Maintenance and child support provide for 
support, usually from current income. Maintenance, however, 
looks to the relative positions of the former spouses, while 
child support is based on the needs of the children and the 
financial abilities of the parents. Nevertheless, there is 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
14
significant overlap in the three. The statutes require a circuit 
court in setting both maintenance and child support to consider 
the property division. Wis. Stat. §§ 767.25(1m)(b), 767.26(3) 
(1993-94).  
¶32 We agree with the circuit court in the present case 
and with Judge Gartzke's concurring opinion in the court of 
appeals distinguishing between child support and maintenance. 
The property division is an allocation of assets between the 
parents; each spouse receives something from the division. In 
the case at bar each spouse got a fair share of the parties' 
assets, including the military retired pay.  
¶33 In contrast, the child of divorced parents receives 
nothing from the property division. A child support order gives 
the child fair support from the non-custodial parent's income 
including pension proceeds such as military retired pay. Thus, 
when a circuit court treats a pension which was subject to 
property division as income for child support purposes, the 
pension is counted for the first time between the parent and the 
child. As between the parent and the child, the pension is not 
being counted twice. Accordingly we conclude that a rule against 
"double-counting" does not bar consideration of the pension both 
as property in the property division 
and 
as 
income in 
calculating child support. 
¶34 The cases applying the Kronforst rule have, with the 
exception of In re Marriage of Maley, 186 Wis. 2d 125, 519 
N.W.2d 717 (Ct. App. 1994), dealt with property division and 
maintenance or family support, not property division and child 
support. In Maley, real property was awarded to the non-
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
15
custodial spouse in the property division and was sold after the 
divorce judgment. The spouse realized a capital gain, although 
the proceeds of the sale were less than the value attributed to 
the property for purposes of the property division. The court of 
appeals held that under these facts the capital gain from the 
sale was not income for purposes of child support.  
¶35 The court of appeals in the present case noted that 
Maley had struck new ground by applying the "double-counting" 
rule to the child support context. But the court of appeals 
distinguished Maley from the present case on factual grounds: 
the property in Maley was awarded to one of the parties and the 
property was sold after judgment. Cook v. Cook, 201 Wis. 2d 72, 
78, 547 N.W.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1996). We, like Judge Gartzke, are 
not persuaded by this distinction.
10  
¶36 We conclude that the court of appeals read its prior 
decision in Maley too broadly. In Maley addressing child 
support, as in Pelot addressing maintenance, the court of 
appeals did not adopt an inflexible rule barring "double-
counting." In Maley the court of appeals refused to adopt an 
inflexible rule that capital gains from sale of an asset awarded 
in property division cannot be counted as income for purposes of 
child support. Rather, the court of appeals urged a flexible, 
case-by-case determination of whether gains from the sale of an 
                     
10 Judge Gartzke concluded 
that the "distinctions the 
majority draws between the facts of this case and those in Maley 
are insubstantial." Cook, 201 Wis. 2d at 79 (Gartzke, J., 
concurring). He would have overruled Maley had he concluded that 
the court of appeals had that power. Id. at 80. 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
16
asset should be considered as income for child support purposes. 
The Maley court of appeals thus concluded: 
 
We do not hold that any gain realized from a sale of 
an asset counted as property in the divorce judgment 
cannot be counted as income. Whether gains from the 
sale of an asset counted as property in the divorce 
judgment can be counted as income for support purposes 
is a fact-sensitive question to be resolved on a case-
by-case basis. Thus, we do not address the issue of 
whether gains from a sale of an asset for greater than 
the value placed on it in the property division may be 
counted as income for support purposes because that 
fact scenario is not before us. 
 
Maley, 186 Wis. 2d at 128.
11 
¶37 We agree with this case-by-case approach. The circuit 
court must carefully exercise its discretion to fashion an 
equitable scheme of property division and child support. It must 
be free to do so in the manner most consistent with the needs of 
the children and the resources of the parents in each case. 
Although they are often analyzed separately, it is critical that 
property division and child support (and maintenance, if any) be 
considered together. As Professor Blumberg explains: "[T]he 
ultimate test of a negotiated settlement or decree is not how 
well any one issue has been resolved, but instead whether all 
                     
11 The Maley court also stated what appears to be an 
inflexible "double-counting" rule: "An asset and its income 
stream may not be counted both as an asset in the property 
division and as part of the payor's income from which support is 
paid." In re Marriage of Maley, 186 Wis. 2d 125, 128, 519 N.W.2d 
717 (Ct. App. 1994). This statement is incompatible with the 
case-by-case approach stated in Maley and affirmed in the case 
at bar.  
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
17
the economic components work together to provide adequately for 
the needs of all members of the now-fragmented family."
12 
¶38 Although 
we 
do 
not 
agree 
with 
its 
effort 
to 
distinguish 
Maley, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
conclusion in the case at bar: 
 
[T]he goal of achieving fairness between the parties, 
which is at the heart of the rule against double-
counting, will not be met by excluding the income 
stream awarded to Roger [the husband] in determining 
his obligation for child support when the law assumes 
Pam [the wife] will be using her share of the marital 
portion of the pension to support the children.  
Cook, 201 Wis. 2d at 78.  
¶39 This focus on fairness and need guided the circuit 
court in this case. The circuit court appropriately presumed 
that the wife, like the husband, would expend on child support a 
portion of her income, including her share of the military 
retired pay.
13 The circuit court crafted a careful scheme of 
property division and child support in which the income-
producing property was fully and equitably considered. Because 
it was important to draw on the income stream from this asset to 
provide adequate support for the children the circuit court 
properly considered the military retired pay in determining 
child support. 
                     
12 Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Relationship Between Property 
Distribution and Spousal and Child Support, in 2 Valuation and 
Distribution of Marital Property § 41.04[1], at p. 41-37 (Gary 
N. Skoloff et al. 4/90).  
13 The circuit court referred to the wife's "25% 'deemed' 
contribution to the support of her children." Findings and 
Decision, March 30, 1995, at 3. The regulations state that the 
percentage standard "expects that the custodial parent shares 
his or her income directly with their children." Wis. Adm. Code 
ch. HSS 80 Preface. 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
18
¶40 We hold that the husband's military retired pay must 
be considered as property for purposes of property division and 
may be considered as his income for purposes of calculating 
child support. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
IV. 
¶41 A recurring issue raised by the court of appeals in 
the 
present 
case 
and 
in 
other 
recent 
decisions 
and 
certifications
14 to this court is whether the court of appeals 
has the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a 
previously 
published 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals. 
Accordingly this court asked the parties to brief this issue.  
¶42 To answer the question posed we must examine the 
constitutional and statutory provisions defining the authority 
of the court of appeals. The court of appeals was created in 
1977 by amendment to the Wisconsin constitution. Article VII, 
section 2 provides that the judicial power of the states is 
vested in a unified system consisting of one supreme court, a 
court of appeals, a circuit court, and trial and municipal 
courts. Article VII, section 5(3) of the Wisconsin constitution 
prescribes the appellate and original jurisdiction of the court 
of appeals.
15  
                     
14 See certification in State v. Johnson, Nos. 95-0266-CR 
and 95-0382 (Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1996). 
15 The 
appeals 
court 
shall 
have 
such 
appellate 
jurisdiction in the district, including jurisdiction 
to 
review 
administrative 
proceedings, 
as 
the 
legislature may provide by law, but shall have no 
original jurisdiction other than by prerogative writ. 
The appeals court may issue all writs necessary in aid 
of its jurisdiction other than by prerogative writ. 
The appeals court may issue all writs necessary in aid 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
19
¶43 The constitution and statutes provide that the judges 
of the court of appeals are elected from districts, Wis. Const. 
art. VII, § 5, and that the districts of the court of appeals 
sit 
in 
different 
parts 
of 
the 
state. 
Nevertheless 
the 
constitution has been interpreted as establishing the court of 
appeals as a unitary court. "The constitutional and statutory 
provisions clearly set forth the mandate that the Court of 
Appeals function as a single court under a chief judge and not 
function as four separate courts." In re Court of Appeals, 82 
Wis. 2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149 (1978). 
¶44 The 
statute 
provides 
that 
officially 
published 
opinions 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
shall 
have 
statewide 
precedential effect. Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2) (1995-96). See also 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.23 (1995-96) (publication of opinions). 
¶45 Thus, the principle of stare decisis is applicable to 
the decisions of the court of appeals. The principle of stare 
decisis does not, however, answer the question before us because 
stare decisis contemplates that under limited circumstances a 
court may overrule outdated or erroneous holdings.
16  
¶46 Judges 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
have 
responded 
differently to the question of the court of appeals' ability to 
                                                                  
of 
its 
jurisdiction 
and 
shall 
have 
supervisory 
authority over all actions and proceedings in the 
courts in the district. 
 
Wis. Const. art. VII, sec. 5(3). 
16 State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 442, 511 N.W.2d 591 
(1993) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (citing Schwanke v. Garlt, 
219 Wis. 367, 371, 263 N.W. 176 (1935); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 
Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 
2d 223, 237-238, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982)). 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
20
overrule, modify or withdraw language from erroneous past 
precedent. Judge Gartzke in his concurring opinion in the 
present case opines that most judges of the court of appeals 
believe, as he does, that the court of appeals may not overrule 
a prior decision of the court of appeals.
17 Judges Moser, 
Sullivan and Fine have concluded that even though the court of 
appeals had previously erred it was required to follow the 
erroneous opinion.
18 
¶47 Judge Brown has written that if a panel "feels that 
the written decision of another panel is wrong, it is probably 
better to write a decision following, although criticizing, that 
panel than to certify the issue."
19  
¶48 Judge Dykman reports "an evolving consensus among 
court of appeals publication committee members that the court of 
                     
17 Cook, 201 Wis. 2d at 80 (Gartzke, J., concurring).  
Judges Dykman and Eich were apparently persuaded in another 
case that a district has the power to withdraw language from or 
to overrule a statement in a previously published opinion but 
should apply the principles of stare decisis. Kimps v. Hill, 187 
Wis. 2d 508, 516, 523 N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1994). For the 
supreme court decision in this case see Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 
2d 1, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996). 
18 Ranft v. Lyons, 163 Wis. 2d 282, 299-300 n.7, 471 N.W.2d 
254 (Ct. App. 1991). 
19 Richard S. Brown, Allocation of Cases in a Two-Tiered 
Appellate Structure: The Wisconsin Experience and Beyond, 68 
Marq. L. Rev. 189, 229 (1985). See also Sommerfield v. 
Sommerfield, 154 Wis. 2d 840, 850, 454 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(Judges Brown, Scott and Nettesheim)("We cannot disregard that 
precedent. The published decisions of any Wisconsin court of 
appeals panel have binding effect on all panels of this 
court.").  
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
21
appeals is powerless to overrule its erroneous decisions."
20 
Judge Dykman, disagreeing with this consensus and supporting the 
view that the court of appeals may overrule its prior published 
opinions,
21 posits two reasons for the conclusion that the court 
of appeals cannot overrule, modify or withdraw language from its 
prior published opinions: First, a published opinion is binding. 
Second, the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from 
a prior published opinion might "be abused, leading to a 
situation where the precedential effect of an opinion would last 
only until the issue arose before another panel."
22 Judge Dykman 
is not persuaded by either reason. According to Judge Dykman, 
the statutory mandate that published opinions are binding does 
not resolve the question of the power to overrule. And, he 
believes, the stabilizing effect of precedent would not be lost 
because overruling erroneous past precedent would not "become 
everyday fare for the court of appeals."
23  
¶49 Judge Dykman argues that undesirable consequences flow 
from failing to recognize the power of the court of appeals to 
overrule, modify or withdraw language from a prior published 
opinion. The court of appeals has, he believes, avoided 
overruling cases by artificially limiting a holding, by drawing 
irrelevant distinctions or by ignoring prior rulings.
24  
                     
20 Linville v. City of Janesville, 174 Wis. 2d 571, 589, 497 
N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993) (Dykman, J., dissenting). 
21 Linville, 174 Wis. 2d at 589-92. 
22 Linville, 174 Wis. 2d at 590. 
23 Linville, 174 Wis. 2d at 591. 
24 Linville, 174 Wis. 2d at 592. 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
22
¶50 Judge Dykman's concerns are valid. Yet, we do not 
resolve this debate on these policy grounds. Rather, we believe 
the proper interpretation of the constitutional and statutory 
authority of the court of appeals lies in an analysis of the 
functions of the court of appeals and the supreme court. The 
court of appeals, a unitary court, has two functions. Its 
primary function is error correcting. Nevertheless under some 
circumstances it necessarily performs a second function, that of 
law defining and law development, as it adapts the common law 
and interprets the statutes and federal and state constitutions 
in the cases it decides.  
¶51 In contrast, the supreme court's primary function is 
that of law defining and law development. The supreme court, 
"unlike the court of appeals, has been designated by the 
constitution and the legislature as a law-declaring court." 
State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 Wis. 2d 
220, 229-30, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983). The purpose of the supreme 
court is "'to oversee and implement the statewide development of 
the law.'" State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 405, 424 N.W.2d 
672 (1988) (quoting State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 665, 307 
N.W.2d 200 (1981)). The supreme court is the only state court 
with the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a 
previous supreme court case. 
¶52 If the court of appeals is to be a unitary court, it 
must speak with a unified voice. If the constitution and statutes 
were interpreted to allow it to overrule, modify or withdraw 
language from its prior published decisions, its unified voice 
would 
become 
fractured, 
threatening 
the 
principles 
of 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
23
predictability, certainty and finality relied upon by litigants, 
counsel and the circuit courts. Further, with the ability to rely 
on the rules set out in precedent thus undermined, aggrieved 
parties would be encouraged to litigate issues multiple times in 
the four districts. 
¶53 Four principles are clear: The court of appeals is a 
unitary court; published opinions of the court of appeals are 
precedential; litigants, lawyers and circuit courts should be 
able to rely on precedent; and law development and law defining 
rest primarily with the supreme court. Adhering to these 
principles we conclude that the constitution and statutes must 
be read to provide that only the supreme court, the highest 
court in the state, has the power to overrule, modify or 
withdraw language from a published opinion of the court of 
appeals. In that way one court, not several, is the unifying law 
defining and law development court. 
¶54 The court of appeals, however, is not powerless if it 
concludes that a prior decision of the court of appeals or the 
supreme court is erroneous. It may signal its disfavor to 
litigants, lawyers and this court by certifying the appeal to 
this court, explaining that it believes a prior case was wrongly 
decided. Alternatively, the court of appeals may decide the 
appeal, adhering to a prior case but stating its belief that the 
prior case was wrongly decided.
25 
                     
25 See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau and Richard R. Malmgren, 
Wisconsin Appellate Practice § 2201 at 135 (1978). 
 
 
No. 95-1963 
 
 
24
¶55 For the reasons set forth we conclude that the court 
of appeals may not overrule, modify or withdraw language from a 
previously published decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.