Title: Hassell v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ.
Citation: 362 N.C. 299
Docket Number: 172A07
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2008

1 By order filed 7 May 2008, this Court allowed Mr. Bryant
to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.
BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INC.), Third-Party Administrator
No. 172A07
FILED: 12 JUNE 2008
1.
Workers’ Compensation--fault--inappropriateness
Fault has no place in the workers’ compensation system, except as expressly
provided by statute.  In a workers’ compensation action involving a teacher who claimed
compensation for generalized anxiety disorder, any language in a finding implying that
plaintiff’s fault or responsibility for her condition plays a role in determining the compensability
of the claim is irrelevant, inappropriate, and disavowed.  
2.
Workers’ Compensation--testimony of psychologist--afforded little weight
The Industrial Commission in a workers’ compensation case did not improperly
ignore a psychologist’s opinion.  The Commission considered the expert’s testimony but decided
to afford it little weight, as it may do.
3.
Workers’ Compensation--finding about  testimony--supported by evidence
The Industrial Commission’s finding in a workers’ compensation case concerning
the testimony of plaintiff’s psychologist was supported by competent evidence.  
4.
Workers’ Compensation--teacher–generalized anxiety disorder--
occupational disease--not proven
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers’ compensation case by
concluding that a teacher did not prove that her mental illness was due to causes and conditions
peculiar to her employment where the Commission had decided not to accept her psychologist’s
opinions.  Without those opinions, plaintiff had no expert evidence to establish that her
generalized anxiety disorder was an occupational disease.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 182 N.C.
App. 1, 641 S.E.2d 324 (2007), affirming an opinion and award
filed on 5 October 2005 by the North Carolina Industrial
Commission.  Heard in the Supreme Court 17 October 2007.
Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., P.A., by Ralph T. Bryant, Jr.,
for plaintiff-appellant.1
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Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by John F. Maddrey,
Assistant Solicitor General, for defendant-appellee
Onslow County Board of Education.
George W. Lennon for the North Carolina Academy of
Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.
HUDSON, Justice.
Plaintiff employee challenges the Industrial
Commission's (“Commission’s”) determination that she is not
entitled to workers' compensation benefits because her
"generalized anxiety disorder" (“GAD”) is not an occupational
disease pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-53(13).  Guided by the well-
established standard of appellate review, we hold that the
Commission properly concluded that plaintiff’s condition is not
an occupational disease because she failed to prove either that
her work increased her risk of GAD or significantly contributed
to it.  Consequently, we affirm the denial of the claim.
From 1987 until February 2002, plaintiff was employed
by the Onslow County Board of Education (“defendant”) as a school
teacher.  Plaintiff worked at the elementary school level until
approximately 1996, when she began teaching at Dixon Middle
School (“Dixon Middle”).  During her time at Dixon Middle,
plaintiff consistently had problems managing the classroom and
maintaining order, which other teachers of the same students did
not have.  Plaintiff dreaded going to work because of student
disciplinary problems and student disrespect for her, which
included verbal and physical harassment.  Parents and students
complained to the administration about plaintiff’s performance as
a teacher.
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Over the course of her employment at Dixon Middle,
plaintiff received numerous negative performance reviews and was
required to enter into four “action plans,” which are mandated by
law when a teacher ranks below the standard in any of the major
teaching functions.  On 25 January 2002, plaintiff began her
fourth action plan with defendant. 
On 25 February 2002, a curriculum specialist observed
plaintiff’s classroom and determined that plaintiff had failed to
show improvement in the quality of her classroom instruction.  In
addition, plaintiff failed to submit timely information to the
administration and missed a meeting with Dixon Middle’s principal
to address these problems.
A few days later, the principal instructed plaintiff to
continue working toward improving her classroom performance and
told her that she was going to share the results of their meeting
with the personnel department.  The principal also asked
plaintiff to sign a warning letter; plaintiff refused, left the
school, and never returned to work.  On 19 April 2002, plaintiff
officially resigned her position with defendant, effective 3 June
2002.
In March 2002 psychologist Dennis Chestnut (“Dr.
Chestnut”) examined plaintiff.  Dr. Chestnut found that plaintiff
was experiencing a severe emotional crisis, and he considered
hospitalizing her.  He diagnosed her with GAD, medically excused
her from work, and stated that she was unable to return to
teaching.  Dr. Chestnut continued to treat plaintiff on an
ongoing basis.  He stated that in his opinion, plaintiff’s “‘job
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was driving her crazy’” and that her work experience was a major
stressor in her life.
Before the Commission, plaintiff contended that her GAD
was an occupational disease caused by a hostile and abusive
classroom environment.  The Commission disagreed, concluding that
“plaintiff did not prove that her [GAD] is due to causes and
conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to her
employment,” and thus, her GAD was not compensable as an
occupational disease.  Plaintiff appealed.  
In the Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued that her GAD
was compensable as an occupational disease and that the evidence
did not support certain of the Commission’s findings of fact. 
She argued further that these findings did not support the
Commission’s conclusion of law that she failed to prove that her
GAD was an occupational disease.  Instead, plaintiff contended
that the Commission should have found that her GAD was an
occupational disease which arose from an abusive and dangerous
work environment.  In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Commission’s opinion and award.  Hassell v. Onslow
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 182 N.C. App. 1, 12, 641 S.E.2d 324, 331
(2007).  The majority upheld all of the Commission's factual
findings and conclusions of law and determined that plaintiff had
failed to prove that her position as a teacher at Dixon Middle
“placed her at an increased risk of developing an occupational
disease” or that her work was a significant contributing factor
in the development of her illness.  Id. at 11-12, 641 S.E.2d at
331. 
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In his dissent, Judge Wynn agreed with plaintiff that
the Commission “erred by finding that her employment at Dixon
Middle School did not place her at an increased risk of
developing an anxiety disorder” and by concluding that
plaintiff’s GAD was not compensable as an occupational disease. 
Id. at 12, 641 S.E.2d at 331-32 (Wynn, J., dissenting).  The
dissent expressed concern that the Commission improperly implied
that the test of compensation involves “apportioning blame,” and
Judge Wynn further concluded that certain findings of fact made
by the Commission were not supported by any competent evidence,
to wit:  (1) that plaintiff’s “anxiety centered around her
principal”; and (2) that the work/classroom environment was
caused by plaintiff’s “inadequate” job performance and thus
resulted from her failings as a teacher.  Id. at 13-14, 641
S.E.2d at 332.  Although specific findings of fact are not
discussed in the dissent, the matters addressed by the dissent
are raised primarily in findings eleven, twelve, and thirteen,
which are quoted below:
11.  Dr. Chestnut explained
that plaintiff’s anxiety focused on
her difficulty with the principal.
[Plaintiff] had gotten a new administrator, 
and she felt that the new administrator was
not supportive of her . . . the new
administrator did not feel that [plaintiff]
was doing a good job, and that regardless of
how hard she worked or regardless of what she
did, that the administrator was going to find
something wrong with it. . . .  [S]he felt
that the administrator was not supportive
when she made decisions in reference to
students.  (Brackets in original.)
Dr. Chestnut testified that the overall
job quality of plaintiff’s work
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experience exacerbated and/or caused her
generalized anxiety.  Yet, Dr. Chestnut
also testified that in mental health,
experts do not necessarily speak of
correlation or causation.  Dr. Chestnut
stated that AXIS evaluations were
designed to be able to make a
deferential diagnosis rather than to get
into causality or correlation.  Dr.
Chestnut did state that plaintiff’s
employment with defendant exposed her to
an increased risk of developing an
anxiety disorder as compared to members
of the general public not so employed. 
Dr. Chestnut stated that plaintiff’s
“job was driving her crazy” and that
plaintiff’s total job experience was a
major stressor in her life.  Dr.
Chestnut did not indicate, however, that
another person in the same work
environment or experience would develop
Generalized Anxiety Disorder.  Dr.
Chestnut conceded that Generalized
Anxiety Disorder is the most prevalent
psychiatric disorder reported in the
United States.
12.  The Commission gives little
weight to the opinions of Dr. Chestnut
concerning causation and increased risk
of plaintiff’s mental condition.  Dr.
Chestnut stated that the focus of his
treatment was to be supportive of
plaintiff, that he could not speak to
the validity of plaintiff’s complaints
about the school work, and that he only
dealt with plaintiff’s perceptions. 
There is no testimony in Dr. Chestnut’s
deposition that he reviewed any of
plaintiff’s employment records or that
he considered any concurrent personal
stressors in plaintiff’s life in
formulating his opinions.  
13.  Although plaintiff
developed an anxiety disorder, her
psychological condition was not the
result of anything caused by
defendant or because she was
required to do anything unusual as
a teacher.  Plaintiff was in a
stressful classroom environment
that was caused by her inadequate
job performance and inability to
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perform her job duties as a
teaching professional.  Considering
all the evidence presented, the
Commission finds that there was
nothing unusual about plaintiff’s
job with defendant or what was
expected of her as compared to any
person similarly situated.  The
work plaintiff was asked to perform
by defendant was the same kind of
work any teacher is required to do. 
Plaintiff was merely asked to
perform her job in the manner it
should have been performed. 
Plaintiff was responsible for the
bad environment in her classroom.
Plaintiff gave notice of appeal to this Court on the
basis of the dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority in the
Court of Appeals erred by affirming the Commission’s decision
that her GAD did not entitle her to workers’ compensation
benefits for an occupational disease pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-
53(13).  Relying upon the dissent, she contends that the majority
erred:  (1) by upholding the Commission’s finding of fact that
she was “responsible” for causing the injurious environment and
by thereby relying upon fault to deny her claim; (2) by ignoring
Dr. Chestnut’s testimony and upholding the Commission’s findings
that her GAD centered around and was caused by problems with her
principal and her substandard job performance; and (3) by
concluding that she failed to prove that her employment placed
her at an increased risk of developing GAD.
[1] Plaintiff first asserts that the Court of Appeals
majority “erred when it upheld the Commission’s finding of fact
that plaintiff was at fault in causing the injurious environment
and relied upon that finding of fault as a basis for denial of
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[plaintiff’s] claim.”  In connection with this, she discusses
only finding of fact thirteen, quoted above, which does not use
the word “fault,” but does appear to attribute the cause of her
allegedly disabling condition to her inability to control her
class.  Plaintiff contends that the Commission erred when it
based its denial of workers’ compensation benefits upon its
finding that plaintiff was “responsible” for, or essentially at
fault, in creating the hostile classroom environment and that the
Court of Appeals majority erred by upholding the Commission based
upon the same reasoning.
This Court has stated unequivocally that the Workers’
Compensation Act was “intended to eliminate the fault of the
workman as a basis for denying recovery” and that “[t]he only
ground set out in the statute upon which compensation may be
denied on account of the fault of the employee is when the injury
is occasioned by his intoxication or willful intention to injure
himself or another.”  Hartley v. N.C. Prison Dep’t, 258 N.C. 287,
290, 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also N.C.G.S. § 97-12 (2007).  Thus, except
as expressly provided in the statute (as in section 97-12, which
is not involved here), fault has no place in the workers’
compensation system.  Although finding thirteen does not use the
word “fault,” any language in that finding implying that fault
plays a role in determining the compensability of this claim is
irrelevant and inappropriate.  We expressly disavow any language
from the Commission’s opinion and that of the Court of Appeals
which can be read as indicating that plaintiff’s fault or
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responsibility for her condition -- including specifically the
Court of Appeals’ statement that “plaintiff herself created the
stressful work environment” -- was a valid reason to deny her
claim.  Hassell, 182 N.C. App. at 12, 641 S.E.2d at 331
(majority).  The General Assembly has not specified such as a
basis for denial of a workers’ compensation claim, and we decline
to do so here.
[2] Plaintiff next argues that the Commission did not
give sufficient weight to Dr. Chestnut’s testimony on causation,
specifically contending that the “specious reasons given by the
Commission majority do not indicate that it seriously considered
or weighed Dr. Chestnut’s testimony before rejecting it.”  
Plaintiff also asserts that the testimony of Dr. Chestnut, who
was the only expert to testify, clearly showed that he believed
her GAD was caused by the hostile classroom environment and that
there is no competent evidence in the record to support the
Commission’s finding and conclusion that her anxiety resulted
instead from her difficulty with the principal.  This argument
centers on findings eleven and twelve, quoted above.  We disagree
with plaintiff’s contentions.
The applicable standard of appellate review in workers’
compensation cases is well established.  Appellate review of an
opinion and award from the Industrial Commission is generally
limited to determining:  “(1) whether the findings of fact are
supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the conclusions
of law are justified by the findings of fact.”  Clark v.
Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 43, 619 S.E.2d 491, 492 (2005) (citing
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Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d
374, 379 (1986)).  
The Workers' Compensation Act and the decisions of this
Court clearly state that the Commission is the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
N.C.G.S. §§  97-84 to -86 (2007); Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C.
676, 680-81, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998) (citing Anderson v.
Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274
(1965)).  Section 97-86 states that the award of the Commission
“shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.”  
N.C.G.S. § 97-86.  This Court has explained that the Commission's
findings of fact “are conclusive on appeal when supported by
competent evidence, even though there be evidence that would
support findings to the contrary.”  E.g., Jones v. Myrtle Desk
Co., 264 N.C. 401, 402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965) (per curiam).  
“Thus, on appeal, this Court ‘does not have the right to weigh
the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. 
The court’s duty goes no further than to determine whether the
record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.’” 
Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Anderson, 265
N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at 274 (citation omitted)).  “The
evidence tending to support plaintiff's claim is to be viewed in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff is entitled
to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the
evidence.”  Id. (citation omitted); accord Deese v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000).
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Here, plaintiff’s claim for occupational GAD was filed
under the catch-all disease provision of North Carolina’s
Workers’ Compensation Act, which encompasses, “[a]ny disease . .
. which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are    
 characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation
or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to
which the general public is equally exposed outside of the
employment.”  N.C.G.S. § 97-53(13) (2007).  In 1983 this Court
explained definitively that this provision does not require that
the disease originate exclusively from or be unique to the
particular occupation.  Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308
N.C. 85, 101-02, 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983).  Instead, a
plaintiff worker satisfies the elements of this statute if she
shows that her employment
exposed [her] to a greater risk of
contracting [the] disease than members
of the public generally, and [that] the
. . . exposure . . . significantly
contributed to, or was a significant
causal factor in, the disease’s
development.  This is so even if other
non-work-related factors also make
significant contributions, or were
significant causal factors.  
Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.  Since Rutledge, this two-
pronged proof requirement for an occupational disease, increased
risk and significant contribution, has been approved and applied
repeatedly by this Court and the Court of Appeals.  E.g., Wilkins
v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 333 N.C. 449, 453, 426 S.E.2d 675, 677
(1993); James v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 560, 562-63,
586 S.E.2d 557, 560-61 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 234,
594 S.E.2d 191 (2004).
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Plaintiff has the burden of proving that her claim is
compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act and specifically
here, that her claim qualifies as an occupational disease.  E.g., 
Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d
760, 761 (1950) (citations omitted).  In cases involving
“complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary
experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give
competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.”  Click
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d
389, 391 (1980) (citations omitted).  The Commission “may not
wholly disregard competent evidence”; however, as the sole judge
of witness credibility and the weight to be given to witness
testimony, the Commission “may believe all or a part or none of
any witness’s testimony.”  Harrell v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C.
App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835 (citation omitted), disc. rev.
denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980); see also Anderson v.
N.W. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 376, 64 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1951)
(citing Henry, 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760); accord Deese, 352
N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553.   The Commission is not required
to accept the testimony of a witness, even if the testimony is
uncontradicted.  Morgan v. Thomasville Furn. Indus., 2 N.C. App.
126, 127-28, 162 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1968) (citing Anderson, 233
N.C. at 376, 64 S.E.2d at 268).  Nor is the Commission required
to offer reasons for its credibility determinations.  In Deese,
this Court stated: 
This Court in Adams [v. AVX Corp.]
made it clear that the Commission
does not have to explain its
findings of fact by attempting to
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distinguish which evidence or
witnesses it finds credible. 
Requiring the Commission to explain
its credibility determinations and
allowing the Court of Appeals to
review the Commission’s explanation
of those credibility determinations
would be inconsistent with our
legal system’s tradition of not
requiring the fact finder to
explain why he or she believes one
witness over another or believes
one piece of evidence is more
credible than another.  The
Commission’s credibility
determinations . . . cannot be the
basis for reversing the
Commission’s order absent other
error.
352 N.C. at 116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553.
Here, while the Commission did include reasons for its
credibility determinations in finding of fact twelve, it was not
required to do so.  After examining the record, we conclude that
here, unlike in Harrell, 45 N.C. App. at 204-06, 262 S.E.2d at
835,  the Commission considered the expert’s testimony, but
decided to afford it little weight, as it may do.  Plaintiff’s
argument that the Commission improperly ignored Dr. Chestnut’s
opinion is without merit.  
[3] Plaintiff’s next argument, that the Commission’s
finding that “Dr. Chestnut explained that plaintiff’s anxiety
focused on her difficulty with the principal” is not supported by
any competent evidence, also fails.  Dr. Chestnut testified that
plaintiff “was constantly in fear of not doing something, not
pleasing somebody; you know, that fear was there, and . . . it’s
documented that . . . this is not satisfactory, this is not
satisfactory.”  He further stated that plaintiff’s “difficulties
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with her administrator . . . . increased her anxiety . . . . to
push it to a clinical syndrome.”  While Dr. Chestnut did testify
that what was going to happen with the children was where he “saw
the greatest level of apprehension,” this Court may not re-weigh
the evidence, given that the Commission has already weighed the
evidence, as is its role under statute.  N.C.G.S. § 97-86;
Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at
274; Harrell, 45 N.C. App. at 205, 262 S.E.2d at 835.  This
Court’s duty is merely to determine whether the record contains
any evidence tending to support the Commission’s finding, and
here, this portion of the Commission’s finding is supported by
competent evidence.  Anderson, 265 N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at
274.
In sum, we conclude that the challenged portions of
findings of fact eleven and twelve are supported by competent
evidence and do not demonstrate that the Commission ignored Dr.
Chestnut’s testimony.  Rather, the record shows that the
Commission considered Dr. Chestnut’s testimony and decided to
give “little weight to [his] opinions . . . concerning causation
and increased risk of plaintiff’s mental condition.”
[4] Once the Commission decided on the basis of lack of
credibility and weight not to accept Dr. Chestnut’s opinions, it
determined that plaintiff had failed to carry her burden of
establishing either increased risk or significant contribution as
required by N.C.G.S. §  97-53(13), as explained by Rutledge and
its progeny.  Without Dr. Chestnut’s opinions, plaintiff had no
expert medical evidence to establish that her GAD was an
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occupational disease.  See, e.g., Click, 300 N.C. at 167, 265
S.E.2d at 391.   Consequently, the Commission properly concluded
that “plaintiff did not prove that her mental illness is due to
causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to
her employment,” and that she is “not entitled to compensation
under . . . [section] 97-53(13).”  
For the reasons stated above, the opinion of the Court
of Appeals affirming the Commission's opinion is affirmed as
modified herein. 
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON, dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority has erroneously
upheld the denial of workers’ compensation benefits on the basis
of fault or contributory negligence, I respectfully dissent.
While the majority disavows any language from the
Commission premising compensability on the absence of fault, it
fails to address whether the Commission and Court of Appeals
majority relied on this erroneous premise.  In acknowledging an
error in the proceedings below, yet upholding the result, it
appears that the majority’s treatment of plaintiff’s argument
omits a piece of the puzzle.  
The majority acknowledges that any language in Finding
Thirteen implying that fault plays a role in determining
compensability is “irrelevant and inappropriate.”  However, the
majority fails to evaluate the impact of the application of this
erroneous standard.  In the wider scheme of our Workers’
Compensation Act as well as in the context of this case, the
omitted piece is neither inconsequential nor tangential.
We have previously observed that one of the purposes of
our Workers’ Compensation Act was to abolish the “unholy trinity”
of employer defenses which generally precluded any recovery by
the injured worker at common law: contributory negligence; 
assumption of risk; and the fellow-servant rule.  Pleasant v.
Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 711, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1985) (citation
omitted).  “‘Contributory negligence involves the notion of some
fault or breach of duty on the part of the employee.’”  Hamilton
v. S. Ry. Co., 200 N.C. 543, 561, 158 S.E. 75, 85 (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 636 (1931).
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In this case, the critical finding that plaintiff
argues, but which the majority largely sidesteps in its analysis,
is Finding of Fact 13:
    13.  Although plaintiff
developed an anxiety disorder, her
psychological condition was not the
result of anything caused by
defendant or because she was
required to do anything unusual as
a teacher.  Plaintiff was in a
stressful classroom environment
that was caused by her inadequate
job performance and inability to
perform her job duties as a
teaching professional.  Considering
all the evidence presented, the
Commission finds that there was
nothing unusual about plaintiff's
job with defendant or what was
expected of her as compared to any
person similarly situated.  The
work plaintiff was asked to perform
by defendant was the same kind of
work any teacher is required to do.
Plaintiff was merely asked to
perform her job in the manner it
should have been performed.
Plaintiff was responsible for the
bad environment in her classroom.
(emphasis added).  The above language reflects almost a textbook
definition of contributory negligence, a defense that the
Commission may not consider under our Workers’ Compensation Act. 
The Conclusions of Law similarly reflect language that imputes
fault to plaintiff and denies recovery on that basis:
2.  Mental illness which
results from failing to perform
one’s job duties . . . is not
compensable . . . .
3.  In the present case, plaintiff’s
stress and anxiety disorder developed from
her inability to perform her job in
accordance with defendant’s requirements. 
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Denying compensation on the basis of plaintiff’s own
fault is contrary to the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation
Act.  Hartley v. N.C. Prison Dep’t, 258 N.C. 287, 290, 128 S.E.2d
598, 600 (1962) (“[T]he various compensation acts were intended
to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying
recovery.” (citations omitted)).  The only exceptions to this
rule concern intoxication or intentional injuries.  Id.
Despite the explicit declarations of the majority, I
fear that today’s decision will open the door for future denials
of workers’ compensation benefits on the basis of the injured
employee’s own less than exemplary workmanship.  Furthermore,
such a spectacle will inevitably draw this Court into a morass of 
endless litigation seeking to separate innocent from blameworthy
injuries. 
This is exactly the situation the Workers’ Compensation
Act sought to avert by excluding common law defenses.  Whitaker
v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 556, 597 S.E.2d 665, 667
(2003) (“[T]he North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act was
created to ensure that injured employees receive sure and certain
recovery for their work-related injuries without having to prove
negligence on the part of the employer or defend against charges
of contributory negligence.” (citing Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 712,
325 S.E.2d at 246-47))  Since I fear that today’s ruling departs
from that, I respectfully dissent.