Title: State v. Taylor
Citation: 2013 WI 34
Docket Number: 2011AP001030-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2013

2013 WI 34 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1030-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gerald D. Taylor, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 23, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Dee R. Dyer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Prosser, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant state public 
defender.   
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2013 WI 34
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1030-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF330) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gerald D. Taylor, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 23, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Outagamie County, Dee R. Dyer, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This appeal is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2009-10).1  The defendant, Gerald Taylor 
(Taylor), pled no contest to charges of uttering a forgery as a 
repeater.  The penalty Taylor faced for uttering a forgery was 
"a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 
years, or both."  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(h).  Additionally, 
because Taylor was a repeat offender, his maximum term of 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
2 
 
imprisonment could "be increased by not more than 2 years if the 
prior 
convictions 
were 
for 
misdemeanors."2 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.62(1)(b).  Therefore, Taylor faced a maximum term of 
imprisonment of eight years. 
¶2 
Specifically, at the plea hearing, the circuit court 
informed Taylor that it "could impose the maximum penalty here 
of a $10,000 fine or six years in prison or both."  Though the 
court mentioned the repeater allegation several times, it did 
not explicitly inform Taylor during the plea colloquy that he 
faced an additional two-year penalty because of the repeater 
allegation for a maximum term of imprisonment of eight years. 
¶3 
Thereafter, the circuit court sentenced Taylor to a 
six-year term of imprisonment for uttering a forgery as a 
repeater. 
 
Subsequently, 
Taylor 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h).  
Taylor moved to withdraw his no contest plea, arguing that it 
was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.   
¶4 
The circuit court denied Taylor's motion without 
requiring the State to prove, at a Bangert hearing, that Taylor 
entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.3  The 
                                                 
2 The complaint charges Taylor as a repeater, as he had been 
convicted of at least three prior misdemeanors. 
3 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) 
outlines the procedure for withdrawal of a plea based on an 
error in the plea colloquy: 
Where the defendant has shown a prima facie violation 
of sec. 971.08(1)(a) or other mandatory duties, and 
alleges that he in fact did not know or understand the 
information which should have been provided at the 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
3 
 
court stated that since Taylor was informed that he faced a six-
year term of imprisonment and he received a six-year term of 
imprisonment, any error was "harmless."   
¶5 
Taylor appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
motion to withdraw his no contest plea.  Taylor argued that it 
was improper for the circuit court to find that its error was 
"harmless," and that a plea that is not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily is harmful under State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
¶6 
The court of appeals certified Taylor's appeal to this 
court.  It noted that "it is unclear whether understating the 
potential penalty during a plea colloquy can properly be deemed 
harmless error, and if so, where in the analytical framework of 
Bangert such a determination should be made."   
¶7 
We granted the court of appeals' certification and now 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.   
¶8 
We 
hold 
that 
the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily when the record makes 
clear that the defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be 
imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the 
penalty that he received.  Therefore, the circuit court did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
plea hearing, the burden will then shift to the state 
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently entered, despite the inadequacy of the 
record at the time of the plea's acceptance. 
Id. at 274. 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
4 
 
err by denying Taylor's postconviction motion to withdraw his no 
contest plea.   
¶9 
Further, plea withdrawal "remains in the discretion of 
the circuit court and will not be disturbed unless the defendant 
shows that it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice."  
State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶4, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64; 
State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶20, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177.  
Taylor has not demonstrated that withdrawal of his plea is 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.  Accordingly, the 
judgment and order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
¶10 On January 2, 2009, at an M&I Bank in Appleton, 
Wisconsin, Taylor attempted to cash check number 4627, which was 
drawn on the account of Finished Touch Inc. and was made payable 
to Gerald Dwayne Taylor.  The teller at the bank had previously 
been alerted that someone named Gerald Taylor had passed 
counterfeit checks at an M&I Bank in Green Bay, Wisconsin.  The 
teller delayed Taylor, giving Sgt. Michael Daul of the Appleton 
Police Department time to arrive.  Taylor acknowledged that he 
had been the one attempting to cash the check and claimed that 
he had done subcontracting work for Finished Touch Inc.  Officer 
Daul contacted James Smith of Finished Touch Inc.  Smith 
indicated that he was the person in charge of writing all the 
checks for Finished Touch Inc., that he did not recall writing a 
check to Taylor, that he did not have any employees or 
subcontractors named Taylor, and that he still had check number 
4627 in his book.   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
5 
 
¶11 On May 8, 2009, the State filed a criminal complaint 
charging Taylor with uttering a forgery as a repeater, in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.38(2),4 
939.50(3)(h),5 
and 
939.62(1)(b).6  The complaint stated that upon conviction, Taylor 
"may be fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000), or 
imprisoned not more than six (6) years, or both."  The complaint 
also alleged that "because the defendant is a repeater, having 
been 
convicted 
of 
at 
least 
three 
misdemeanors, 
which 
conviction(s) remain of record and unreversed, the maximum term 
of imprisonment . . . may be increased by not more than 2 
years."  The complaint listed Taylor's prior convictions, 
including two disorderly conducts, resisting or obstructing an 
officer, and criminal damage to property.  At Taylor's bail 
hearing on August 20, 2009, the court asked Taylor's attorney, 
Michael Dally, if he wanted the complaint read.  Attorney Dally 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.38(2), "Forgery," provides, in 
relevant part: 
Whoever utters as genuine or possesses with 
intent to utter as false or as genuine any forged 
writing or object mentioned in sub. (1), knowing it to 
have been thus falsely made or altered, is guilty of a 
Class H felony. 
5 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 939.50(3)(h), 
"Classification 
of 
felonies," provides that the penalty for a Class H felony is "a 
fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 
years, or both." 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(1)(b), "Increased penalty for 
habitual criminality," provides that "[a] maximum term of 
imprisonment of more than one year but not more than 10 years 
may be increased by not more than 2 years if the prior 
convictions were for misdemeanors." 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
6 
 
responded that the "Court does not have to read the complaint.  
It does charge uttering a forged instrument as a repeat 
offender.  Priors appear to be for misdemeanors."  Taylor 
appeared in person at the bail hearing. 
¶12 Taylor waived his right to a preliminary hearing on 
November 24, 2009.  At the waiver hearing, the court asked 
Taylor: "Were you able to read over the criminal complaint in 
this case to see what they say you did?"  Taylor responded 
"Yeah."  The court confirmed "So you could understand that?"  
Taylor responded "Yeah." 
¶13 On December 1, 2009, the State filed an information 
which stated that upon conviction for uttering a forgery, Taylor 
may be "imprisoned not more than six (6) years."  Further, 
because Taylor is a repeat offender, the term of imprisonment 
"may be increased by not more than 2 years if the prior 
convictions were for misdemeanors." 
¶14 At Taylor's arraignment on January 25, 2010, the court 
asked Taylor's attorney, "Mr. Dally, have you received a copy of 
the information?"  Taylor's attorney responded, "We have Judge.  
It's a charge of uttering with the repeater enhanced and alleged 
as well."   
¶15 Pursuant to plea negotiations, Taylor agreed to plead 
no contest to the charge of uttering a forgery as a repeater, 
and in return, the State would recommend, inter alia, three 
years of probation.  On August 23, 2010, Taylor completed a Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form.  In the "understandings" 
section, Taylor acknowledged that he understood the judge was 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
7 
 
"not bound by any plea agreement or recommendations and may 
impose the maximum penalty."  Taylor's maximum penalty was 
handwritten on the form: "8 yrs prison/$10,000 fine or both."  
Taylor signed the form, acknowledging that he "reviewed and 
understand[s] this entire document and any attachments.  I have 
reviewed it with my attorney (if represented).  I have answered 
all questions truthfully and either I or my attorney have 
checked the boxes.  I am asking the court to accept my plea and 
find me guilty."  Taylor's attorney also signed the form and 
acknowledged that he had "discussed this document and any 
attachments with the defendant.  I believe the defendant 
understands it and the plea agreement.  The defendant is making 
this plea freely, voluntarily, and intelligently." 
¶16  At the plea hearing held on August 23, 2010, the same 
day Taylor filled out the plea questionnaire form, the court 
mentioned the repeater several times and confirmed that Taylor 
had read and understood the complaint and plea questionnaire 
form: 
THE COURT:  
Then how does your client wish to 
plead to this one count of felony 
uttering a forgery? 
ATTORNEY DALLY: No contest, Judge. 
THE COURT:  
And that is with the repeater still, 
is it? 
ATTORNEY DALLY: It is.  There were several prior 
misdemeanor convictions.   
 . . . . 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
8 
 
THE COURT: 
How do you wish to plead to this 
forgery, a felony as a repeater? 
THE DEFENDANT: Plead no contest, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
You did go over a plea questionnaire 
form with Mr. Dally, did you?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.   
THE COURT: 
When you did that, did you understand 
all 
the 
information 
in 
these 
documents?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.   
 . . . . 
THE COURT: 
Were 
you 
able 
to 
read 
over 
the 
criminal complaint in this case and 
understand what it says? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: 
And how about the plea questionnaire, 
when you went over that, were you able 
to understand all that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  
 . . . . 
THE COURT: 
And when you went over the plea 
questionnaire form with him, did you 
believe 
he 
understood 
that 
information? 
ATTORNEY DALLY: He seemed to.  I believe he did.  
THE COURT: 
Therefore, do you believe that he's 
freely, 
voluntarily, 
and 
understandingly 
entering 
his 
plea 
today? 
ATTORNEY DALLY: Yes.   
The court asked Taylor if he understood that it was not bound by 
any agreements or recommendations.  Taylor acknowledged that he 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
9 
 
understood.  The court then stated: "I could impose the maximum 
penalty here of a $10,000 fine or six years in prison or both if 
I thought that's what was necessary.  Do you understand that?"  
Taylor said "Yes, I do."  At the plea hearing, however, the 
circuit court did not expressly inform Taylor that because of 
the 
repeater 
allegation, 
the 
potential 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment was eight years. 
¶17 On October 11, 2010, the circuit court sentenced 
Taylor to a term of imprisonment of six years, consisting of 
three years of initial confinement and three years of extended 
supervision.   
¶18 Approximately four months later, on February 8, 2011, 
Taylor filed a motion for postconviction relief, seeking to 
withdraw his no contest plea.  Taylor alleged that the plea 
colloquy was deficient because it did not inform him of the 
maximum penalty under Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert.  In the 
motion, Taylor also affirmatively alleged that he did not know 
the correct maximum penalty.   
¶19 The State moved the court to deny Taylor's motion, 
arguing that the "defendant has failed to make a prima facie 
showing that anything other than a harmless error occurred."  
The State argued that under Brown, even if Taylor did not 
understand that the maximum penalty was greater than six years, 
it would be "harmless" because Taylor's sentence did not exceed 
the maximum discussed during the plea colloquy.  State v. Brown, 
2006 WI 100, ¶78, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
10 
 
¶20 The circuit court denied Taylor's motion without 
requiring the State to prove that Taylor entered his plea 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The circuit court 
believed that this case was similar to Brown.  It noted that in 
Brown, the defendant was not informed that his sentences for 
separate crimes could be served consecutively, but it was a 
harmless error because the sentence he received did not exceed 
the sentence he was told he could receive.  The circuit court 
here believed its error was "harmless," similar to Brown, 
because the court informed Taylor he could be sentenced to six 
years and Taylor was sentenced to six years. 
¶21 Taylor appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
motion to withdraw his no contest plea.  Taylor argued that it 
was improper for the circuit court to find that its error was 
"harmless," and argued that a plea that is not entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is harmful under 
Bangert.  Taylor argued that because the circuit court did not 
inform him of the correct maximum penalty during the plea 
colloquy and because he alleged that he did not know the true 
maximum penalty, he should have been entitled to a Bangert 
hearing at which the State must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that his plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily.7 
¶22 The court of appeals certified Taylor's appeal to this 
court.  It noted that "it is unclear whether understating the 
                                                 
7 See supra note 3.   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
11 
 
potential penalty during a plea colloquy can properly be deemed 
harmless error, and if so, where in the analytical framework of 
Bangert such a determination should be made."  The court of 
appeals noted that following either Brown or Cross in the 
instant case could arguably lead to different results: 
As in Brown, the defendant here was told that he faced 
a lesser punishment than the law actually provided, 
but the sentence actually imposed did not exceed the 
amount of time the court had erroneously informed the 
defendant he faced.  The court's emphasis in Brown on 
the fact that the defendant was not sentenced to more 
time than he was told he faced suggests that the 
harmless error doctrine might be applicable in these 
circumstances——regardless of whether the defendant was 
or was not aware of the actual penalty.  That would 
negate the necessity for a hearing.  In contrast, the 
court's discussion in Cross seems to suggest that the 
due process concerns implicated whenever a defendant 
has erroneously been informed that the penalty is less 
than the actual maximum might, in fact, require a 
hearing to determine whether the defendant was aware 
of the actual penalty he faced. 
¶23 We granted the court of appeals' certification by an 
order dated March 15, 2012.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 "When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea 
after sentencing, he must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in 'manifest injustice.'"  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18 
(citing State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 
N.W.2d 836).  One way the defendant can show manifest injustice 
is 
to 
prove 
that 
his 
plea 
was 
not 
entered 
knowingly, 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
12 
 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily. 
 
Id. 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891).  
¶25 A plea not entered knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily violates fundamental due process, and a defendant 
therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right.  Cross, 
326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14 (citing Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19).  
Whether a plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact that is 
reviewed independently.  Id.  "In making this determination, 
this court accepts the circuit court's findings of historical or 
evidentiary facts unless they are clearly erroneous."  Id.   
¶26 Whether 
Taylor 
has 
pointed 
to 
a 
plea 
colloquy 
deficiency that establishes a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
or other mandatory duty at a plea hearing is a question of law 
we review de novo.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶21.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶27 When a defendant moves to withdraw his or her plea 
based on an error in the plea colloquy, the proper analysis is 
first to determine if the defendant should be allowed to 
withdraw the plea because the circuit court violated its duty 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-mandated duty, and 
second to determine, if necessary, whether the failure to 
withdraw 
the 
plea 
would 
otherwise 
result 
in 
a 
manifest 
injustice. 
¶28 In this case, Taylor was told at the plea colloquy 
that he faced a maximum term of imprisonment of six years when 
in fact he faced a maximum of eight years because of the 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
13 
 
repeater allegation.  However, the record is replete with 
evidence that Taylor was nonetheless aware of the potential 
eight-year term of imprisonment.  Moreover, at the plea hearing, 
the circuit court verbally informed Taylor of the six-year term 
of imprisonment to which he was ultimately sentenced.  As a 
result, Taylor's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily, and it was not a violation of Taylor's due process 
rights to deny his motion to withdraw his no contest plea.  
Further, Taylor has not otherwise established that failure to 
withdraw his no contest plea would result in a manifest 
injustice.   
A. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary 
¶29 Recent Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent requires us 
to affirm the order of the circuit court that denied Taylor's 
motion for plea withdrawal.  Under the analysis set forth in 
Cross and Brown, we conclude that Taylor's plea was entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.   
¶30 "The duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08, in 
Bangert, and in subsequent cases are designed to ensure that a 
defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶23.  Due process requires that "a 
defendant's guilty plea must be affirmatively shown" to be 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶16; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶25.  Before the court accepts a 
plea of guilty or no contest, it must "[a]ddress the defendant 
personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
14 
 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).   
¶31 In 
order 
to 
ensure 
that 
a 
plea 
is 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, the court is required, at the plea 
hearing and on the record, to do the following: 
(1) Determine the extent of the defendant's 
education and general comprehension so as to assess 
the defendant's capacity to understand the issues at 
the hearing; 
(2) Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, 
or 
threats 
were 
made 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
defendant's anticipated plea, his appearance at the 
hearing, or any decision to forgo an attorney; 
(3) Alert the defendant to the possibility that 
an attorney may discover defenses or mitigating 
circumstances that would not be apparent to a layman 
such as the defendant; 
(4) Ensure the defendant understands that if he 
is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney 
will be provided at no expense to him; 
(5) Establish the defendant's understanding of 
the nature of the crime with which he is charged and 
the range of punishments to which he is subjecting 
himself by entering a plea; 
(6) Ascertain personally whether a factual basis 
exists to support the plea; 
(7) Inform the defendant of the constitutional 
rights he waives by entering a plea and verify that 
the defendant understands he is giving up these 
rights; 
(8) 
Establish 
personally 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands that the court is not bound by the terms 
of any plea agreement, including recommendations from 
the district attorney, in every case where there has 
been a plea agreement; 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
15 
 
(9) 
Notify 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
direct 
consequences of his plea; and 
(10) Advise the defendant that 'If you are not a 
citizen of the United States of America, you are 
advised that a plea of guilty or no contest for the 
offense [or offenses] with which you are charged may 
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to 
this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal 
law,' 
as 
provided 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c). 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35 (footnotes omitted). 
¶32 If the court fails to fulfill one of the duties 
mandated in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or under the Bangert line of 
cases (a "Bangert violation"), the defendant may move to 
withdraw his plea.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  In the motion 
("Bangert motion"), the defendant must (1) make a prima facie 
showing of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-
mandated duty, and (2) allege that the defendant did not, in 
fact, know or understand the information that should have been 
provided during the plea colloquy.  Id.  "A defendant attempting 
to make this prima facie showing must point to deficiencies in 
the plea hearing transcript; conclusory allegations are not 
sufficient."  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶19.  Assuming the 
defendant makes a proper Bangert motion, the defendant is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing ("Bangert hearing"), where 
the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant's plea, despite the inadequacy of 
the plea colloquy, was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  One reason to shift the burden of 
persuasion to the State is to encourage the State "to assist the 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
16 
 
trial court in meeting its sec. 971.08" and other mandated 
duties.  Id. at 275.  The State may use "any evidence" to prove 
that 
the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary, including any documents in the record and testimony 
of the defendant or defendant's counsel.  Id. at 274-75.  
¶33 In this case, we are concerned with the court's duty 
to "[e]stablish the defendant's understanding of . . . the range 
of punishments to which he is subjecting himself by entering a 
plea."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35 (citing Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 262).  A recent decision of this court provides 
extensive authority on this issue: 
[W]here the sentence communicated to the defendant is 
higher, but not substantially higher, than that 
authorized 
by 
law, 
the 
incorrectly 
communicated 
sentence does not constitute a Bangert violation and 
will not, as a matter of law, be sufficient to show 
that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional 
right to due process of law. 
Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶40.  In that case, the circuit court 
informed Cross that his maximum term of imprisonment was 40 
years, when in fact it was only 30 years, and Cross brought a 
motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Id., ¶¶1, 11.  
Though the circuit court granted his motion for resentencing, it 
denied Cross's motion for plea withdrawal.  Id., ¶2.  This court 
concluded that the circuit court was correct to deny Cross's 
plea withdrawal motion.  Id., ¶4.  According to Cross, "a 
defendant who has been told a maximum punishment higher, but not 
substantially higher, than that authorized by law, has not 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
17 
 
necessarily made a prima facie case that the requirements of 
§ 971.08 and our case law have been violated."  Id., ¶30.  Cross 
looked to the underlying purpose of the Bangert framework, to 
ensure 
that 
the 
defendant's 
plea 
is 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily: 
[R]equiring an evidentiary hearing for every small 
deviation from the circuit court's duties during a 
plea 
colloquy 
is 
simply 
not 
necessary 
for 
the 
protection of a defendant's constitutional rights.  
The Bangert requirements exist as a framework to 
ensure that a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently enters his plea.  We do not embrace a 
formalistic application of the Bangert requirements 
that would result in the abjuring of a defendant's 
representations 
in 
open 
court 
for 
insubstantial 
defects. 
Id., ¶32.  Additionally, Cross noted that "the great weight of 
authorities from other state and federal courts reject the 
notion that the failure to understand the precise maximum 
punishment is a per se due process violation."8  Id., ¶33.  Thus, 
                                                 
8 See also State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶33 n.7, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64; Williams v. Smith, 591 F.2d 169, 172 
(2d Cir. 1979)("[T]he test in this circuit for determining the 
constitutional validity of a state court guilty plea where the 
defendant has been given sentencing misinformation is whether 
the 
defendant 
was 
aware 
of 
actual 
sentencing 
possibilities . . . .").  Cf. Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 
1183 (10th Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. 
Thomson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); overruling recognized by Mendoza 
v. Hatch, 620 F.3d 1261 (2010)).  In Worthen, the defendant 
argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he 
was not advised on the record of acts sufficient to constitute 
the offense: 
[I]n order for a guilty plea to be 'voluntary in a 
constitutional sense,' a defendant must . . . have a 
competent understanding of the charge against him.  
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated, however, that 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
18 
 
"a defendant's due process rights are not necessarily violated 
when he is incorrectly informed of the maximum potential 
imprisonment," and in some cases, "small deviations" from the 
Bangert line of cases do not amount to a Bangert violation.  
Id., ¶¶37-38.  Further, Cross surmised that when a defendant is 
given a sentence in excess of that authorized by law, which 
"presumably would also involve an error in the understanding of 
the possible maximum penalty," the proper remedy is to commute 
the sentence under Wis. Stat. § 973.13,9 not plea withdrawal.  
Id., ¶34. 
¶34 We recognize that the Cross court noted that "when the 
defendant is told the sentence is lower than the amount allowed 
by law, a defendant's due process rights are at greater risk and 
a Bangert violation may be established."  Id., ¶39.  Under these 
facts, however, we conclude that Taylor's due process rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
a defendant of sufficient 'intelligence and experience 
in 
the 
criminal 
justice 
system' 
may, 
in 
some 
circumstances, be presumed to have understood the 
nature 
of 
the 
charge 
even 
though 
a 
specific 
explanation is not shown on the plea record.  
Id. (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1983)).  
Thus, in some circumstances, a guilty plea will still be 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the defendant's due 
process rights will not be violated, when the defendant is 
informed of the incorrect maximum sentence.  See Cross, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶37.   
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.13 provides: "In any case where the 
court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that authorized by 
law, such excess shall be void and the sentence shall be valid 
only to the extent of the maximum term authorized by statute and 
shall stand commuted without further proceedings." 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
19 
 
were not violated when the circuit court denied his motion to 
withdraw his no contest plea.  At the plea colloquy, the court 
verbally informed Taylor that he faced a potential six-year term 
of imprisonment for the underlying offense and that he also was 
pleading to being a repeat offender.  Ultimately, he was 
sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment.  Thus, on this 
record, a failure to discuss the additional two-year repeater 
penalty enhancer at the plea hearing is an insubstantial defect. 
¶35 The record in this case is replete with evidence that 
Taylor 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
potential 
eight-year 
term 
of 
imprisonment, comprised of a six-year term of imprisonment for 
the underlying charge and an additional two-year term of 
imprisonment from the alleged repeater.  For example, the 
complaint, filed on May 8, 2009, stated that Taylor faced a term 
of imprisonment of "not more than six (6) years," which "may be 
increased by not more than 2 years if the prior convictions were 
for 
misdemeanors." 
 
The 
complaint 
listed 
Taylor's 
prior 
convictions, including two disorderly conducts, resisting or 
obstructing an officer, and criminal damage to property.   
¶36 At Taylor's bail hearing on August 20, 2009, the court 
asked Taylor's attorney if he wanted the complaint read.  
Attorney Dally responded that the "Court does not have to read 
the complaint.  It does charge uttering a forged instrument as a 
repeat offender.  Priors appear to be for misdemeanors."  Taylor 
appeared personally at the bail hearing.  At the preliminary 
hearing, on November 24, 2009, the court asked Taylor if he had 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
20 
 
read the complaint, and Taylor responded that he had read the 
complaint.   
¶37 Further, the information, filed on December 1, 2009, 
stated that upon conviction, Taylor could be sentenced to "not 
more than six (6) years" and that the maximum term "may be 
increased by not more than 2 years if the prior convictions were 
for misdemeanors."  At the arraignment on January 25, 2010, the 
court asked Taylor's attorney if he had received a copy of the 
information.  The attorney responded "We have, Judge.  It's a 
charge of uttering with the repeater enhanced and alleged as 
well." 
¶38 Additionally, 
Taylor 
completed 
a 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver 
of 
Rights 
form 
on 
August 
23, 
2010.  
Handwritten on the form is Taylor's acknowledgement that the 
judge is not bound by any agreement or recommendation, and that 
the judge may impose the maximum penalty: "8 yrs prison/$10,000 
fine or both."  Taylor signed the form, acknowledging that he 
had read and understood the form.  Taylor's attorney also signed 
the form, acknowledging that he had discussed the document with 
Taylor, and that he believed Taylor understood the form.  At the 
plea hearing, held on the same day that Taylor completed the 
plea questionnaire form, the court asked Taylor if he had read 
the complaint and understood it, and Taylor answered "Yes."  The 
court also asked Taylor if he had gone over the plea 
questionnaire form with his attorney and if he understood all of 
the information.  Taylor answered "Yes" to both questions.  
Later in the hearing, the court once again asked Taylor if he 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
21 
 
had gone over the plea questionnaire form and if he understood 
it.  Taylor answered "Yes."  The court then asked Taylor's 
attorney if he had gone over the plea questionnaire form with 
Taylor and if the attorney believed Taylor understood the form.  
The attorney answered that he had gone over the form with 
Taylor, and he believed that Taylor understood the form.  The 
attorney acknowledged on the plea questionnaire form that he 
believed Taylor was entering his plea "freely, voluntarily, and 
intelligently."   
¶39 To conclude that Taylor was not aware of the maximum 
eight-year term of imprisonment, we would have to assume that 
Taylor's trial counsel misrepresented, on the plea questionnaire 
form itself and to the court, that he had read the form with 
Taylor and that Taylor understood it.  We would also have to 
assume that Taylor misrepresented to the court that he had 
received, 
read, 
and 
understood 
the 
complaint 
and 
plea 
questionnaire form.  "[I]f a defendant does understand the 
charge and the effects of his plea, he should not be permitted 
to game the system by taking advantage of judicial mistakes."  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶37.  "We do not embrace a formalistic 
application of the Bangert requirements that would result in the 
abjuring of a defendant's representations in open court for 
insubstantial defects."  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶32.  The 
failure to specifically reference the two-year repeater penalty 
enhancer at the plea hearing is, on review of this record, an 
"insubstantial defect" such that an evidentiary hearing is not 
required to determine if Taylor entered his plea knowingly, 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
22 
 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  A Bangert violation occurs, and 
a hearing is required, when the plea is not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  No such hearing is required 
here because this record reflects that Taylor indeed pled 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  He knew of the 
eight-year maximum term of imprisonment, and in any event, he 
was verbally informed by the court at the plea hearing of the 
sentence that he actually received. 
¶40 The certification from the court of appeals points out 
that it is unclear, after Cross and Brown, whether understanding 
the potential penalty during the plea colloquy can properly be 
deemed harmless error, and if so, where in the analytical 
framework of Bangert such a determination should be made.  
Taylor and the State agree, but for different reasons, that the 
harmless error doctrine should not apply to this case.  We also 
agree that here the harmless error does not apply.10  Taylor 
argues that this error was not "harmless" because "the unknowing 
plea is itself the harm caused by the court's error."  The State 
argues that no case has ever applied the harmless error doctrine 
                                                 
10 Taylor argues that in addition to Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 
another Wisconsin case lends support to the proposition that 
erroneous information about the possible sentence is not 
"harmless" simply because the defendant received a sentence 
within the erroneous range given.  See State v. Mohr, 201 
Wis. 2d 693, 549 N.W.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1996).  We need not 
address Taylor's argument, since we determine that neither Cross 
nor 
State 
v. 
Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906, adopted the harmless error analysis when analyzing a 
defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea based 
on an alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-
mandated duty during the plea colloquy.   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
23 
 
to the Bangert framework, and that the proper focus is whether 
failure to withdraw Taylor's plea would result in a manifest 
injustice.  In this case, the circuit court determined that, 
under Brown, since Taylor was informed of and actually received 
a six-year term of imprisonment, any error was "harmless." 
¶41 Brown, however, was not a harmless error case.  The 
court did not undertake the harmless error analysis.  Instead, 
in Brown, the court considered whether the defendant entered his 
plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.   Brown alleged 
that the circuit court failed to enumerate the elements of the 
charges to which he pled guilty, failed to inform him of the 
constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty, and failed 
to adequately explain the potential punishment he faced.  Brown, 
293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶3.  The court concluded that Brown was 
entitled to a Bangert hearing based on the circuit court's 
failure to inform him of the elements of the crime and the 
circuit court's failure to inform him that when he pled, he was 
waiving certain constitutional rights.  Id., ¶¶66, 77.  While 
Brown did make two short references to harmlessness, it clearly 
did not engage in a harmless error analysis.11  For example, 
                                                 
11 See 
State 
v. 
Martin, 
2012 
WI 
96, 
¶¶45-46, 
343 
Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270. 
Nor did Cross undertake the harmless error analysis.  The 
only time Cross mentioned harmless error was in the context of 
discussing federal rules that support the proposition that not 
every plea colloquy error should result in withdrawal: "Rule 
11(h) states that any 'variance from the requirements of this 
rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial 
rights.'"  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶36 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(h)).   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
24 
 
Brown noted that if a defendant's Bangert motion does not 
properly allege that the defendant lacked understanding with 
regard to the plea, "any shortcoming in the plea colloquy is 
harmless."  Id., ¶63.  Brown instructs that before the defendant 
is entitled to a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty or no 
contest plea, the defendant's Bangert motion must satisfy two 
requirements: (1) it must make a prima facie showing of a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated 
duty, and (2) it must allege that the defendant did not know or 
understand the information that should have been provided at the 
plea hearing.  Id., ¶39.  Brown also used the phrase "harmless" 
when it concluded that even if the court had erred by not 
telling Brown that his sentences could run consecutively, it 
would be "harmless" because Brown's total sentence was not 
greater than the sentence he was informed he could receive.  
Id., ¶78.  Much like the case we have before us today, the Brown 
                                                                                                                                                             
In a court of appeals case, State v. Johnson, the court 
focused mainly on whether failure to allow the defendant to 
withdraw his plea would result in manifest injustice where the 
circuit court failed to inform the defendant that it was not 
bound by the plea agreement.  2012 WI App 21, 339 Wis. 2d 421, 
811 N.W.2d 441.  The court also noted that under Cross, this was 
a harmless error.  Id., ¶¶14-15.  We note that the "harmless 
error" doctrine is a distinct legal analysis.  See Martin, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶¶45-46.  We repeat, however, that neither Brown 
nor Cross undertook the harmless error analysis; nor does this 
court today undertake the harmless error analysis to determine 
whether the defendant may withdraw his plea after alleging a 
violation of the court's Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other mandated 
duties.  Rather, the focus is on whether the defendant's plea 
was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and 
whether the defendant is otherwise able to prove that failure to 
withdraw the plea would result in a manifest injustice.   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
25 
 
court determined that this "error" did not prevent Brown's plea 
from being knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because it is a 
"reasonable conclusion when a defendant is confronted with 
multiple charges [] that the defendant could face multiple 
punishments."  Id.   
¶42 As in Brown, it is a "reasonable conclusion" that 
Taylor understood that he faced an enhanced penalty since he was 
charged with a repeater penalty enhancer.  The court informed 
Taylor of the repeater allegation several times at the plea 
colloquy, and the record provides clear evidence that Taylor was 
aware of the additional two-year term of imprisonment he faced 
because of the repeater allegation.  Also, Taylor's actual 
sentence, like Brown's, did not exceed the six-year term of 
imprisonment that the court, at the plea hearing, specifically 
informed him that he could receive.  Thus, under the precedent 
of Cross and Brown, we conclude that the circuit court's failure 
at the plea hearing to inform Taylor of the additional two-year 
term of imprisonment does not render Taylor's plea not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, and the circuit court did not err by 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
26 
 
denying Taylor's plea withdrawal motion without holding a 
Bangert hearing.12   
B. Manifest Injustice 
¶43 Taylor's request for plea withdrawal is properly 
analyzed under the manifest injustice framework.  Taylor has not 
proven that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest 
injustice. 
1. Following the Precedent of Cain, Taylor's Motion is Properly 
Analyzed under the Manifest Injustice Framework 
                                                 
12 In this opinion, we afford due respect to longstanding 
precedent which requires that before the court accepts a guilty 
or no contest plea, it must "determine that the plea is made 
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and 
the 
potential 
punishment 
if 
convicted." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a); Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35 (requiring the court 
at 
the 
plea 
colloquy 
to 
"[e]stablish 
the 
defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the crime with which he is 
charged and the range of punishments to which he is subjecting 
himself by entering a plea.").  The dissent incorrectly implies 
that 
the 
defendant 
cannot 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily enter a plea without being specifically advised of 
the potential maximum term of confinement and also the potential 
maximum term of extended supervision.  Dissent, ¶116.  We have 
never held, and we do not hold today, that the court must parse 
out and specifically advise the defendant of the potential term 
of 
confinement 
and 
also 
the 
potential 
term 
of 
extended 
supervision at the plea colloquy.  In fact, to so advise a 
defendant could be misleading since a defendant's initial term 
of confinement may be increased during the confinement phase or 
the extended supervision phase.  See Wis. Stat. § 302.113(3)(a) 
("If an inmate subject to this section violates any regulation 
of the prison or refuses or neglects to perform required or 
assigned 
duties, 
the 
department 
may 
extend 
the 
term 
of 
confinement in prison portion of the inmate's bifurcated 
sentence."); § 302.113(9)(am) (stating that if person violates a 
condition of extended supervision, supervision can be revoked 
and the person ordered to return to confinement for a time not 
exceeding remaining time on the bifurcated sentence).   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
27 
 
¶44 Taylor is arguing that because the circuit court did 
not verbally inform him at the plea hearing of the potential, 
additional two-year term of imprisonment from the repeater 
allegation, his entire plea is not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  Taylor argues that he is entitled to a Bangert 
hearing and that he should be able to withdraw his entire plea 
based on his alleged lack of knowledge of the additional two-
year 
term 
of 
imprisonment 
from 
the 
repeater 
allegation.  
However, the fact that the circuit court did not verbally 
discuss the additional two-year term of imprisonment at the plea 
hearing, while not ideal, does not automatically trigger a 
hearing under Bangert and its progeny.   
¶45 We reject Taylor's argument——that because he was not 
specifically, verbally advised by the circuit court at the plea 
hearing 
of 
the 
potential, 
additional 
two-year 
term 
of 
imprisonment from the alleged repeater, his entire plea is not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary——because he did in fact 
plead 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
to 
the 
underlying crime of uttering a forgery.  At the plea hearing, 
the court did verbally inform Taylor that he faced a maximum 
term of imprisonment of six years for the underlying charge of 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
28 
 
uttering a forgery.13  See supra, ¶16.  Taylor does not argue 
that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead 
to the underlying charge of uttering a forgery, which he knew 
carried a six-year term of imprisonment.  Moreover, Taylor never 
argued that the repeater allegation should be dismissed because 
of the plea hearing deficiency.14  Instead, Taylor argues that 
the entire plea should be withdrawn because he did not know of 
the additional two-year term of imprisonment from the repeater 
allegation.15  The record reflects that Taylor in fact received a 
                                                 
13 As we noted in Part III.A. above, if a defendant is given 
a sentence greater than that authorized by law, presumably 
including "an error in the understanding of the possible maximum 
penalty," the proper remedy for that error is to commute the 
sentence, not plea withdrawal.  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶34.  
Thus, had Taylor actually been sentenced to the full eight 
years, Wis. Stat. § 973.13 would have applied to commute his 
sentence to six years, which would be the amount authorized by 
law. 
14 Clearly, the circuit court could consider his prior 
criminal convictions at sentencing regardless of whether the 
State charged Taylor as a repeater.   
15 Unlike in Bangert, where the error was a failure to 
advise 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
potential 
sentence 
for 
the 
underlying crime, Taylor's argument relates only to the two-year 
repeater, not the penalty for the underlying crime.   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
29 
 
six-year term of imprisonment.  As previously discussed, Taylor 
knew that the charges carried a maximum eight-year term of 
imprisonment. 
¶46 In addition, recent precedent and the record in this 
case do not support Taylor's argument.  We are bound by the 
precedent of Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1.  Taylor's argument for plea 
withdrawal is remarkably similar to the unsuccessful argument 
presented by Cain.  Cain pled no contest to manufacturing 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in an amount of more than four but 
less than twenty marijuana plants.  Id., ¶¶5-6.  Cain argued 
that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he 
admitted to manufacturing only four plants, not more than four 
plants.  Id., ¶27.  Like Taylor, Cain faced an enhanced penalty 
                                                                                                                                                             
Further, under State v. Harris, the court can apply a 
repeater enhancement only if it seeks to sentence the defendant 
to a greater amount than the maximum allowed for the underlying 
offense.  119 Wis. 2d 612, 619, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984).  In this 
case, since the circuit court sentenced Taylor to only six 
years, the sentence enhancement from the repeater allegation 
never applied.  Therefore, this case is distinguishable from 
Bangert; Taylor cannot argue that his plea to the underlying 
forgery was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the 
court did not violate any mandated duty with regard to that 
charge.  The proper remedy for failure to inform the defendant 
of an additional two-year penalty from the repeater allegation 
would be to commute that part of the sentence under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.13, not withdrawal of the entire plea.  That remedy is not 
necessary here, since Taylor was given a six-year term of 
imprisonment. 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
30 
 
if he pled to manufacturing more than four plants.16  The court 
analyzed Cain's argument under the manifest injustice framework, 
not under the Bangert framework.  Id., ¶¶33-37.  Looking at the 
entire record 
of 
the proceedings——including documents and 
statements from Cain and his attorney that indicated a number of 
plants greater than four——the court determined that Cain had not 
met his burden to show that plea withdrawal was necessary to 
correct a manifest injustice.  Id., ¶37.   
¶47 In this case, the crux of Taylor's argument is that he 
did not know or understand the potential, additional two-year 
term of imprisonment from the repeater allegation at the time he 
entered his plea.  Under the logic of Cain, Taylor's claim is 
properly analyzed under the manifest injustice framework. 
2. Taylor has not Proven that Plea Withdrawal is Necessary to 
Correct a Manifest Injustice 
¶48 The circuit court has discretion to determine whether 
a plea should be withdrawn, and a plea will not be disturbed 
unless the defendant establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that failure to withdraw the guilty or no contest plea 
will result in a manifest injustice.  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶20 (citing Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶15; Thomas, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, ¶16).  The clear and convincing standard for plea 
                                                 
16 Under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h), manufacturing four or 
less marijuana plants is a Class I felony, and manufacturing 
more than four but less than twenty plants is a Class H felony.  
The maximum term of imprisonment for a Class I felony is three 
years and six months, and the maximum term of imprisonment for a 
Class H felony is six years.  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(h)——(i).   
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
31 
 
withdrawal after sentencing, which is higher than the "fair and 
just" standard before sentencing, "reflects the State's interest 
in the finality of convictions, and reflects the fact that the 
presumption of innocence no longer exists."  Id., ¶42.  The 
higher burden "is a deterrent to defendants testing the waters 
for possible punishments."  State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 
379-80, 534 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Booth, 
142 Wis. 2d 232, 237, 418 N.W.2d 20 (Ct. App. 1987)).   
¶49 Showing that a plea was not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily is one way to prove a manifest 
injustice.  The defendant can otherwise establish a manifest 
injustice by showing that there has been a "serious flaw in the 
fundamental integrity of the plea."  Id. at 379.  Disappointment 
in the eventual punishment does not rise to the level of a 
manifest 
injustice. 
 
Id. 
 
Prior 
cases 
have 
recognized 
nonexhaustive examples of manifest injustice: 
(1) 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel; 
(2) 
the 
defendant did not personally enter or ratify the plea; 
(3) the plea was involuntary; (4) the prosecutor 
failed 
to 
fulfill 
the 
plea 
agreement; 
(5) 
the 
defendant did not receive the concessions tentatively 
or fully concurred in by the court, and the defendant 
did not reaffirm the plea after being told that the 
court no longer concurred in the agreement; and, (6) 
the court had agreed that the defendant could withdraw 
the 
plea 
if 
the 
court 
deviated 
from 
the 
plea 
agreement. 
State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 251 n.6, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice sec. 14-
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
32 
 
2.1(b)(ii)(A)——(F) (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986)).17  "The reviewing 
court looks at the entirety of the record to determine whether, 
considered as a whole, the record supports the assertion that 
manifest injustice will occur if the plea is not withdrawn."  
Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1, ¶31.   
¶50 In this case, the State argues that the manifest 
injustice test under Reppin governs whether Taylor should be 
allowed to withdraw his plea.18  State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 
381, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).  The State argues that in Reppin, this 
                                                 
17 See also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶26, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 
816 N.W.2d 177.  In addition to adopting the ABA's examples of 
manifest injustice, Wisconsin courts have found that there may 
be manifest injustice in other situations.  Id., ¶26 n.6.  For 
example, defendants have previously attempted to overturn a 
conviction or withdraw a guilty or no contest plea where new 
evidence was discovered.  See State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 
471 
N.W.2d 599 
(Ct. 
App. 
1991); 
State 
v. 
Nawrocke, 
193 
Wis. 2d 373, 534 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995).  Manifest injustice 
also occurs if the circuit court fails to establish a factual 
basis that, as admitted by the defendant, constitutes the 
offense pleaded to.  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶17, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836 (citation omitted).  See also 9 
Christine M. Wiseman & Michael Tobin, Wisconsin Practice Series: 
Criminal Practice & Procedure § 23:32 (2d ed. 2008 & Supp. 
2012).   
18 The State's argument goes further, arguing that State v. 
Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967) is the only standard 
that should govern the withdrawal of Taylor's plea and that the 
Reppin standard survives after Bangert, Brown, and Cross.  The 
State argues that Bangert and its progeny have shifted the 
burden, but that in this case, the manifest injustice standard 
is the only test necessary to determine if Taylor may withdraw 
his plea.  However, when a defendant seeks to withdraw his plea 
based on an alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other 
court-mandated duty, the court should analyze the alleged error 
under Bangert and, if necessitated by the defendant's motion, 
under the manifest injustice standard. 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
33 
 
court adopted the ABA's examples of what constitutes manifest 
injustice, see id. at 385-86 & n.2, and that the ABA commentary 
expressly stated that "[f]or example, if the judge misstates the 
maximum penalty as being lower than that provided by law but the 
defendant's sentence does not exceed that stated as possible by 
the judge, there is no manifest injustice."  ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Commentary to Standard 14-2.1(b)(ii).   
¶51 Taylor argues that the Reppin manifest injustice test 
has been supplanted by the Bangert line of cases.  Taylor also 
argues that even if there were still a Reppin standard, the 
Reppin case stated that the four examples of manifest injustice 
it adopted were not exhaustive, and that the Reppin case did not 
adopt the ABA commentary upon which the State relies.   
¶52 In this case, Taylor has not established by clear and 
convincing evidence that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to 
correct a manifest injustice.  Taylor has not demonstrated that 
there was a "serious flaw in the fundamental integrity of the 
plea."  Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d at 379.  First, the circuit court 
informed Taylor that he could receive a maximum term of 
imprisonment of six years.  Taylor received a six-year term of 
imprisonment.19  In other words, Taylor received a sentence that 
he was verbally informed he could receive.   
                                                 
19 The sentencing transcript evinces the judge's belief that 
Taylor is a habitual criminal who deserves the maximum possible 
punishment: 
You've been given every opportunity in the 
community, Mr. Taylor, and I wish that it was a 
situation that I could impose probation, but it's not.  
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
34 
 
¶53 As 
previously 
discussed, 
this 
record 
makes 
it 
abundantly clear that Taylor was informed of the potential 
eight-year term of imprisonment.  There were several court 
hearings that preceded his plea where the charges and penalties 
were discussed.  To conclude now that he did not know of the 
penalty enhancer, we would have to assume that both Taylor and 
his attorney repeatedly misrepresented to the court that they 
had received, read, and understood the criminal complaint, 
information, and plea questionnaire.  Based on the record, we 
conclude that Taylor was aware of the potential eight-year term 
of imprisonment.   
¶54 Therefore, it was not manifestly unjust to deny 
Taylor's motion to withdraw his no contest plea where (1) the 
circuit court informed Taylor at the plea colloquy that he could 
receive a six-year term of imprisonment; (2) Taylor actually 
received a six-year term of imprisonment; and (3) the record is 
                                                                                                                                                             
The time has come, Mr. Taylor, for you to feel the 
significant consequences of a prison term because 
you've earned that.  You've earned that by just simply 
continuing on your own selfish road in life. 
You've 
had 
your 
probations 
revoked 
five 
times. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
You've lived a criminal lifestyle, Mr. Taylor, 
and it's not going to stop until you decide to make it 
stop, and I can't let you free in the community to 
make more victims.  Our community is tired of that.  
Everything that could be done for you in this 
community and others has been done. 
No. 
2011AP1030-CR   
 
35 
 
abundantly clear that Taylor was nonetheless aware of the two-
year penalty enhancer from the alleged repeater. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶55 We 
hold 
that 
the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily when the record makes 
clear that the defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be 
imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the 
penalty that he received.  Therefore, the circuit court did not 
err by denying Taylor's postconviction motion to withdraw his no 
contest plea.   
¶56 Further, plea withdrawal "remains in the discretion of 
the circuit court and will not be disturbed unless the defendant 
shows that it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice."  
Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶4; Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20.  Taylor 
has not demonstrated that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to 
correct a manifest injustice.   
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶57 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This case 
requires the court to address an alleged Bangert violation; that 
is, an alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08, or other 
mandatory requirements for a plea colloquy, set out in State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and subsequent 
cases such as State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906, and State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 
N.W.2d 64. 
¶58 The defendant entered a plea of no contest to a charge 
of uttering a forgery.  After he was sentenced, he moved to 
withdraw his plea on grounds that the plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  His motion relied upon Bangert 
principles, 
alleging, 
first, 
that 
his 
plea 
colloquy 
was 
deficient because the court did not inform him of the correct 
maximum 
penalty 
for 
a 
conviction 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.50(3)(h), with a repeater enhancement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(1)(b) and (2); and, second, that he did not know or 
understand the correct maximum penalty when he entered his plea. 
¶59 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.  
Had such an evidentiary hearing been held, the State would have 
been required to prove that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, notwithstanding a deficiency in the 
plea colloquy. 
¶60 Most members of the court are satisfied that the 
defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea because his plea 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Most members of the 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
court are willing to reach this conclusion without affording the 
defendant a Bangert hearing. 
¶61 The real issue in this case is why the defendant does 
not get a Bangert hearing.  My principal purpose in writing 
separately is to address this issue. 
I 
¶62 This court has set standards that a defendant must 
meet if he seeks to withdraw his plea.  See State v. Cain, 2012 
WI 68, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177.  When a defendant 
moves to withdraw his plea before sentencing, the circuit court 
should freely allow the withdrawal if the defendant supplies any 
"fair and just reason" unless withdrawal would substantially 
prejudice the prosecution.  Id. (quoting State v. Jenkins, 2007 
WI 96 ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 240).  After sentencing, 
however, the defendant must show that withdrawal is necessary to 
correct a "manifest injustice."  Id. (quoting Jenkins, 303 
Wis. 2d 157, ¶2 n.2). 
¶63 This court adopted "the manifest injustice test" in 
State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).  The 
test was based on the tentative draft on Standards Relating to 
Pleas of Guilty issued by the American Bar Association Project 
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice in February 1967.  Id. 
at 385.1  The Reppin court said: 
                                                 
1 The ABA House of Delegates subsequently approved the 
tentative draft, as amended, in March 1968.  Am. Bar Ass'n 
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards 
Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft, 1968). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
These standards adopt the "manifest injustice" test of 
Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and implement[ ] it with four factual situations which 
the 
advisory 
committee 
believes 
independently 
establish 
manifest injustice when proved by the 
defendant.  We agree and adopt this standard.  We 
think too the four fact situations are not exhaustive 
of 
situations 
which 
might 
constitute 
manifest 
injustice.  And, a court would abuse its discretion if 
it denied a request to withdraw a plea of guilty when 
any one of these four grounds was proved. 
Id. at 386 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
¶64 The four fact situations identified by the advisory 
committee were as follows: 
 
2.1 Plea[] withdrawal. 
 
 
(a)  . . . . 
(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct 
a 
manifest 
injustice 
whenever 
the 
defendant 
proves that: 
(1) he was denied the effective 
assistance 
of counsel guaranteed to him by 
constitution, statute, or rule; 
(2) the plea was not entered or 
ratified by the defendant or a person authorized 
to so act in his behalf; 
(3) the plea was involuntary, or 
was entered without knowledge of the charge or 
that the sentence actually imposed could be 
imposed; or 
(4) he did not receive the charge 
or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea 
agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to 
seek or not to oppose these concessions as 
promised in the plea agreement. 
Id. at 385 n.2. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶65 In the years following the Reppin decision, the court 
repeatedly quoted (in whole or in part), or alluded to, the four 
fact situations adopted in Reppin.2 
¶66 Over time, however, the court began to shift its focus 
from the "manifest injustice" test to the development of rules 
for particular fact situations.  For instance, our rules for 
plea withdrawal because of a defective plea colloquy were 
established in Bangert and restated in Brown.  Our rules for 
plea withdrawal on account of ineffective assistance of counsel 
are found in State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996), and State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 
N.W.2d 433.  In recent years, our attention has often been 
directed more toward the application of these rules than to the 
broader mantra of "manifest injustice." 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., State v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 558–59, 285 
N.W.2d 739 (1979); State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 248–49, 276 
N.W.2d 268 (1979); Spinella v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 494, 498, 271 
N.W.2d 91 (1978); Hatcher v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 559, 564, 266 
N.W.2d 320 (1978); State v. Jackson, 69 Wis. 2d 266, 270–72, 230 
N.W.2d 832 (1975); Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 124–25, 208 
N.W.2d 331 (1973); Young v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 361, 366, 182 
N.W.2d 262 (1971); Kruse v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 460, 464–65, 177 
N.W.2d 322 (1970); State v. Weidner, 47 Wis. 2d 321, 328–29, 177 
N.W.2d 69 (1970); State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 484, 175 
N.W.2d 216 (1970); Meunier v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 174 
N.W.2d 277 (1970); Brisk v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 584, 587, 172 
N.W.2d 199 (1969); Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 666, 170 
N.W.2d 713 (1969); State v. Biastock, 42 Wis. 2d 525, 529, 167 
N.W.2d 231 (1969); Reiff v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 369, 372, 164 
N.W.2d 249 (1969); Galvin v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 679, 682 n.1, 162 
N.W.2d 622 (1968); LeFebre v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 666, 669–70, 162 
N.W.2d 544 (1968); State v. Harrell, 40 Wis. 2d 187, 192–93, 161 
N.W.2d 223 (1968); Cresci v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 287, 293, 152 
N.W.2d 893 (1967).  See also Wiseman & Tobin, 9 Wis. Practice: 
Criminal Practice and Procedure § 23:32 (2d ed. Supp. 2012). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶67 In 1991 the court of appeals rewrote the four fact 
situations adopted in Reppin and added two more, without much 
notice or explanation of what it was doing.  See State v. 
Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 251 n.6, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 
1991).  The Krieger court's new formulation has been followed 
uncritically3 
even 
though 
the 
two 
additional 
"factual 
situations," id. at 251 n.6, relate to judicial participation in 
plea bargaining, which is not approved under Wisconsin law.  See 
State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶27, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14. 
¶68 The majority opinion states that "Taylor's request for 
plea 
withdrawal 
is 
properly 
analyzed 
under 
the 
manifest 
injustice framework.  Taylor has not proven that withdrawal is 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice."  Majority op., ¶43.  
These statements follow an extensive discussion of Taylor's 
claim of a Bangert violation (because the circuit court did not 
correctly state the maximum penalty during the plea colloquy) 
and this court's conclusion that Taylor's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary nonetheless. 
¶69 "When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea 
after sentencing, he must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in 'manifest injustice.'"  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18 
(citing State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 
                                                 
3 State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶26, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 
N.W.2d 177; State v. Daley, 2006 WI App 81, ¶20 n.3, 292 
Wis. 2d 517, 
716 
N.W.2d 146; 
State 
v. 
Washington, 
176 
Wis. 2d 205, 213-14 n.2, 500 N.W.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 836).  "One way for a defendant to meet this burden is to 
show that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
enter" his plea.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18 (citing State v. 
Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891).  
Here, 
the 
court 
has 
determined 
that 
Taylor 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea.  Majority op., 
¶8.  In making this determination, the court has rejected the 
defendant's specific complaint about the plea colloquy.  Thus, I 
do not understand the need for a separate section on manifest 
injustice. 
¶70 A defendant could expound multiple theories for plea 
withdrawal and if he did, the court would have to address each 
of the theories.  Here, however, Taylor has advanced only one 
theory——a Bangert violation leading to a plea that was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Once that single claim has 
been rejected, the case is over. 
¶71 The manifest injustice test was adopted more than 40 
years ago.  Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d at 386.  The court should find a 
way to carefully update the "manifest injustice" test, with a 
comprehensive catalog of fact situations requiring withdrawal, 
when a defendant satisfies his burden of proof, along with 
citations supporting these situations. 
II 
¶72 Once again, the real question in this case is why 
Taylor did not get a Bangert hearing. 
¶73 Taylor filed a postconviction motion stating that he 
was "misinformed by the court of the maximum penalty that he 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
faced upon conviction, and [he] did not understand the true 
maximum."  Taylor affirmatively alleged that he did not know the 
correct maximum penalty that he faced at the time he entered his 
no contest plea and moved the court to withdraw his plea "on the 
ground that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently entered." 
¶74 In Brown, the court said: 
 
A circuit court's failure to fulfill a duty at 
the plea hearing will necessitate an evidentiary 
hearing if a defendant's postconviction motion alleges 
he did not understand an aspect of the plea because of 
the omission [or misstatement]. 
 
. . . .  
 
After 
sentencing, in cases that involve an 
alleged deficiency in the plea colloquy, an attempt to 
withdraw a guilty plea proceeds as follows.  The 
defendant must file a postconviction motion under Wis. 
Stat. § 809.30 or other appropriate statute.  The 
motion must (1) make a prima facie showing of a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-
mandated duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the 
plea hearing transcript; and (2) allege that the 
defendant did not know or understand the information 
that should have been provided at the plea hearing. 
 
When a Bangert motion is filed, it is reviewed by 
the court.  If the motion establishes a prima facie 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-
mandated duties and makes the requisite allegations, 
the court must hold a postconviction evidentiary 
hearing at which the state is given an opportunity to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary despite the identified inadequacy of the 
plea colloquy.  When the defendant has met his two 
burdens, the burden of producing persuasive evidence 
at the evidentiary hearing shifts to the state. 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶36, 39-40 (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶75 Against this background, I find it difficult to 
contend that Taylor's motion does not satisfy the requisite 
criteria for a Bangert hearing.  Why, then, did he not get an 
evidentiary hearing? 
¶76 Taylor did get a postconviction hearing.  He was 
brought to Outagamie County from the Racine Correctional 
Institution and appeared in court on April 21, 2011. 
¶77 In my view, Taylor did not receive an evidentiary 
hearing because there would have been no point in taking 
testimonial evidence. 
¶78 The court already understood that Taylor had come to 
court on August 23, 2010, for the purpose of entering a plea.  
There was evidence in the record that the defendant had read the 
complaint, which correctly stated the maximum sentence, and had 
met with his attorney to discuss a negotiated plea agreement and 
go over the plea questionnaire.  The plea questionnaire included 
information about the maximum penalty.  Defense counsel made a 
notation: "8 yrs prison/$10,000 fine or both."  "Yrs" is 
shorthand for "years."  "8 yrs prison" is likely shorthand for 
"8 years of imprisonment." 
¶79 The record also showed that the court had made a 
conscientious effort to discharge its duties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08, Bangert, and Brown, and had succeeded except for an 
inadvertent misstatement of the maximum penalty.  The court 
knew, in considering the postconviction motion, that it had 
informed Taylor of more than the penalty he actually received, 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
so that the court's misstatement had no adverse impact on Taylor 
under the circumstances. 
¶80 Taylor's claim that he lacked understanding of the 
maximum sentence was objectively incredible given the ample 
evidence in the record of the correct information he had 
received.  The record also revealed that Taylor had a lengthy 
criminal history so that he had familiarity with the courts.  
Multiple charges of uttering a forgery were pending in Brown 
County on the date of the plea.   
¶81 If we look back to the foundational case of Reppin, we 
are reminded that the defendant had the burden of proof in all 
four fact situations.  Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d at 386.  This burden 
of proof has been relaxed in defective plea colloquy situations 
because evidence of a deficient plea colloquy should be obvious 
in the plea hearing record, and a defendant's allegation that he 
did not understand something because of the deficiency, while 
"admittedly, conclusory," would be "difficult to expand on," 
except through sworn testimony.  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶¶57-
59. 
¶82 This court is firmly committed to the principle that 
when a defendant files a motion showing a prima facie Bangert 
violation and the requisite claim that he lacked understanding 
because of a deficiency in the plea colloquy, he is entitled to 
a burden-shifting Bangert hearing.  Adherence to this principle 
tends to encourage careful, conscientious plea colloquies.  
Nonetheless, there are often limits to even the most salutary 
principle.  Courts must not be rendered powerless to reject a 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
conclusory allegation——"I didn't know"——that is disproven by the 
existing record.4 
¶83 In Birts v. State, the court said: "We have held that 
in determining whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea, 
'the trial 
court is not obligated to accept the 
defendant's statements as verities.'"  Birts, 68 Wis. 2d 389, 
394, 
228 
N.W.2d 351 
(1975) 
(quoting 
Ernst 
v. 
State, 
43 
Wis. 2d 661, 668, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969)).  A court is not 
obligated to accept a defendant's statement if the record 
demonstrates that the statement is not credible.5 
                                                 
4 State v. Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 594 N.W.2d 799 (1999), is 
a classic example of an appellate court's common sense review of 
the record:  
We affirm the judgment of conviction . . . even 
though the defendant did not expressly and personally 
articulate a plea of no contest on the record in open 
court, because the only inference possible from the 
totality of the facts and circumstances in the record 
is that the defendant intended to plead no contest. 
Burns, 226 Wis. 2d at 764 (emphasis added).   
5 In his postconviction motion, the defendant asserted that 
"[d]uring the plea colloquy, the court erroneously informed Mr. 
Taylor that the maximum penalty he faced was six years of 
imprisonment——that is, the penalty without the enhancer.  (Plea 
hearing transcript at 7)."  At the hearing on the motion, the 
defendant's postconviction counsel discussed State v. Cross, 
2010 WI 70, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64, and asserted that 
"the court . . . did go on to say that in a case where the 
defendant was informed that a penalty was lower than it is[,] 
that remains a potential Bangert violation."   
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶84 In this case, requiring the State to establish through 
testimonial evidence the notice about the sentence that the 
defendant could receive——in light of the lesser sentence the 
defendant actually did receive, and in light of the information 
in the record——was simply unnecessary. 
¶85 Having read this court's decision in Brown, the 
circuit court understood that there are times when a defendant 
"should not be permitted to game the system by taking advantage 
of judicial mistakes."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶37.  This was 
one of those times. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent has reformulated the defendant's argument.  
Instead of arguing that the circuit court understated the 
maximum penalty at the plea hearing, the dissent asserts that 
the defendant "was not told in straight, simple English that the 
punishment for the crime was eight years' imprisonment."  
Dissent, ¶91.  "The circuit court . . . advised the defendant 
(incorrectly) of the term of confinement without advising him 
correctly of the term of imprisonment."  Id., ¶102 n.19.   
The dissent acknowledges that the circuit court will 
satisfy Bangert, Brown, and Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) by stating 
the maximum term of imprisonment, "without explicitly stating 
the 
component 
parts 
of 
the 
bifurcated 
sentence," 
i.e., 
confinement and supervision.  Id., ¶101.  Yet this concession 
undermines 
Taylor's 
position 
because 
the 
complaint 
and 
information 
both 
correctly 
stated 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment and Taylor admitted that he had read and understood 
the complaint.  In fact, the complaint states that Taylor 
supplied the information on his prior convictions to Sergeant 
Michael Daul of the Appleton Police Department.   
There is a very high likelihood that Taylor's attorney, 
Michael 
Dally, 
explained 
the 
meaning 
of 
eight 
years 
of 
imprisonment to Taylor.  But if Dally actually spoke of eight 
years "in prison," instead of "imprisonment," just as the 
circuit court spoke of six years "in prison," then the case is 
covered by this court's decision in Cross.   
No.  2011AP1030-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
¶86 Requiring the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
to receive what was already evident throughout the record would 
have served no legitimate purpose in this case. 
¶87 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶88 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  The case 
before us presents a clear example of a flawed plea colloquy 
under 
Bangert,1 
Brown,2 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a).3  
According to the case law and the statute, in taking a guilty 
plea or no-contest plea the circuit court must establish the 
accused's understanding of the range of punishments which the 
crime carries.         
¶89 The concurrence has it right:  The defendant has met 
his two burdens under Bangert, which entitles him to an 
evidentiary hearing:  (1) The defendant has made a prima facie 
showing of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a); and (2) The 
defendant has alleged that he did not know or understand the 
information (the range of punishments) that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing.4   
                                                 
1 Prior to accepting a guilty plea, it is the circuit 
court's 
duty 
"[t]o 
establish 
the 
accused's 
understanding 
of . . . the 
range 
of 
punishments 
which 
[the 
crime] 
carries . . . ."  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 262, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
2 "During the course of the plea hearing, the court must 
address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and . . . establish 
the 
defendant's understanding of the . . . range of punishments to 
which he is subjecting himself by entering a plea . . . ."  
State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) provides in relevant part 
as follows:  "Before the [circuit] court accepts a plea of 
guilty or no contest, it shall . . . [a]ddress the defendant 
personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of . . . the potential punishment if convicted."   
4 Concurrence, ¶¶73-75. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶90 Thus, the question posed for this court, as the 
concurrence correctly and simply explains, is "[w]hy, then, did 
he not get an evidentiary hearing?"5 
¶91 This is an easy case:  According to the record of the 
initial appearance,6 the bail hearing,7 the waiver of a 
preliminary hearing,8 the arraignment,9 the plea hearing,10 and 
the sentencing hearing,11 the defendant either was not told of 
the punishment or was not told in straight, simple English that 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Brown, the court concluded that the failure to advise 
the defendant that the punishment for each charge could run 
consecutively did not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary 
hearing "in the absence of any allegation that the defendant did 
not understand the effect of multiple charges on his sentence."  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶78.   
I also agree with the concurrence, Part I, ¶¶62-71, that 
the majority errs in undertaking a manifest injustice analysis.  
The manifest injustice analysis is unnecessary under the facts 
of this case.  The Bangert analysis suffices, as explained by 
the concurrence.  This conclusion is apparent in the majority 
opinion itself.  The majority opinion's manifest injustice 
analysis simply repeats its own Bangert analysis.  See also 
State v. Lichty, 2012 WI App 126, ¶¶8, 9, 344 Wis. 2d 733, 823 
N.W.2d 830 (explaining the relationship of a Bangert violation 
and the manifest injustice approach).      
5 Concurrence, ¶¶61, 72, 75. 
6 May 26, 2009 (defendant did not appear). 
7 August 20, 2009 (nothing said of the penalty). 
8 November 24, 2009 (nothing said of the penalty). 
9 January 25, 2010 (Attorney states that he received a copy 
of the information.  Formal reading of information was waived). 
10 August 23, 2010.   
11 October 11, 2010. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the punishment for the crime was eight years' imprisonment.12  
Because the defendant was never told the correct punishment, no 
one can reach the conclusion on the basis of the record that the 
defendant knew or understood the penalty.  I therefore conclude 
that the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  
¶92 The majority and concurring opinions offer different 
explanations for not affording the defendant an evidentiary 
hearing, but both rely on the record to conclude that the 
defendant must have known (should have known, would have known, 
or is presumed to have known) the penalty for the crime.       
¶93 At their core, the majority and concurring opinions 
are changing the law.  The present law requires that a court 
determine whether the individual defendant (to use the Bangert 
terminology) "in fact" knows or understands the information that 
should have been provided at the plea hearing——a subjective 
test.13   
¶94 The refusal of the majority and concurring opinions to 
afford the defendant an evidentiary hearing can be read as 
declaring that a court may determine from the paper record that 
a reasonable person must have known (should have known, would 
have known, or is presumed to have known) the information the 
                                                 
12 The defendant's brief states the issue before the court 
as follows:  Is a defendant's no contest plea knowing, voluntary 
and intelligent when the defendant is mistakenly informed by the 
trial court that the maximum sentence was six years rather than 
the correct eight years imprisonment and believes that the 
maximum sentence is lower than it actually is? 
13 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 257, 274-75 (citing Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969)). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
court was required to provide at the plea hearing——an objective 
test.  The majority and concurring opinions seem to be 
substituting an objective test for the subjective test set forth 
in Bangert, Brown, and Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).  Neither the 
majority opinion nor the concurring opinion considers the 
constitutional implications of their respective approaches. 
¶95 Because 
the 
majority 
and 
concurring 
opinions 
drastically break with precedent, I dissent. 
¶96 Although the majority and concurring opinions offer 
various and different rationales for their ultimate decision in 
the present case,14 they essentially reason that no evidentiary 
                                                 
14 The majority opinion states and restates its rationale 
and holding in several different ways so that it is difficult to 
determine what test the majority adopts or uses to determine 
that the defendant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made.   
The majority opinion can be read in a number of ways: 
The defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because the complaint and information stated the correct maximum 
penalty.  Majority opinion, passim.   
The defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because the record makes clear that the defendant knew the 
maximum penalty that could be imposed and the defendant was 
orally informed at the plea hearing of the penalty he received.  
Majority op., ¶¶8, 28.  
The defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because the defendant was orally informed by the circuit court 
at the plea hearing of the sentence that he actually received.  
Majority op., ¶¶8, 28, 39, 42, 52, 54.   
The defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because the circuit court's misstatement of the penalty is an 
insubstantial defect.  Majority op., ¶¶34, 39.   
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
hearing is needed because "the record makes clear that the 
defendant knew the maximum penalty . . . . The record in this 
case is replete with evidence that [the defendant] was aware of 
the potential eight-year term of imprisonment, comprised of a 
six-year term of imprisonment for the underlying charge and an 
additional two-year term of imprisonment from the alleged 
repeater [charge]."  Majority op., ¶¶8, 35 (emphasis added).   
¶97 In contrast, I conclude that the record clearly and 
unambiguously demonstrates that the defendant was never told 
that he was subject to an eight-year term of imprisonment.  
Indeed the record is replete with inconsistencies and confusion 
by the circuit court and the defense counsel (with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
•  The majority opinion does not attempt to define 
"insubstantial defect."  By applying an insubstantial 
defect test, is the majority opinion really applying a 
harmless error test by a different name? 
•  Is the majority opinion abrogating the Cross 
decision with regard to the doctrine of insubstantial 
error?     
The 
Cross 
opinion 
states 
that 
when 
"the 
sentence 
communicated to the defendant is higher, but not substantially 
higher, 
than 
that 
authorized 
by 
law, 
the 
incorrectly 
communicated sentence does not constitute a Bangert violation 
and will not, as a matter of law, be sufficient to show that the 
defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to due 
process of law. . . . We conclude that Cross has not made a 
prima facie showing that the circuit court failed to comply with 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or the requirements outlined in Brown and 
Bangert . . . ."  State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶¶40-41, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64.  In contrast with Cross, the 
majority opinion treats the instant case as one with a flawed 
plea colloquy; treats the error in the plea colloquy as an 
insubstantial defect; and requires the circuit court to review 
the record to determine whether the plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
prosecuting attorney remaining silent) regarding the maximum 
penalty the defendant faced.15        
¶98 Because the defendant was never apprised of the 
maximum penalty, this court cannot determine that the defendant 
knew or understood the maximum penalty——information that should 
have been provided at the plea hearing.  This court should order 
an evidentiary hearing in the present case to determine whether 
the defendant did know and understand the maximum penalty he 
faced.16   
¶99 Before I turn to the record, I must state the actual 
maximum penalty.  Knowing the actual maximum penalty helps put 
in 
perspective 
the 
inaccurate 
information 
the 
defendant 
received.   
                                                 
15 Indeed it is often difficult to follow the majority 
opinion's discussion of what the defendant knew as the opinion 
continually shifts, not always precisely or correctly, between 
referring to "imprisonment" (which encompasses confinement and 
extended supervision) and "prison" (which encompasses only 
confinement). 
For a discussion of the statutory use of the term 
"imprisonment," see Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1) and State v. Cole, 
2003 WI 59, ¶16, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700 (under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01, the word "imprisonment" refers to a "bifurcated 
sentence" consisting of a "term of confinement in prison 
followed by a term of extended supervision.").  See also State 
v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, ¶5 n.4, 270 Wis. 2d 113, 676 N.W.2d 872 
("Under Truth-in-Sentencing legislation, the term 'imprisonment' 
does not mean time in prison.  Rather, 'imprisonment' consists 
of both the time of confinement (in prison) and the time 
following the confinement spent on extended supervision."). 
16 "If 
a 
defendant 
does 
not 
understand . . . the 
implications of the plea, he should not be entering the plea, 
and the court should not be accepting the plea."  Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594,  ¶37. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶100 According 
to 
the 
defendant's 
brief 
and 
my 
calculations, the maximum penalty was imprisonment not to exceed 
eight years, which could consist of not more than five years of 
initial confinement (prison) and not more than three years of 
extended supervision.17   
¶101 A circuit court's telling the defendant at the plea 
hearing the maximum term of imprisonment, without explicitly 
                                                 
17 It takes some time and effort to understand how the 
penalty statutes work together in the instant case. 
Here is how I calculated the maximum penalty when the 
defendant is charged with Uttering a Forgery, Repeater, a Class 
H Felony.   
The potential penalty for a Class H felony is "a fine not 
to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 years, or 
both."  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(h).   
"For a Class H felony, the term of confinement in prison 
may not exceed 3 years."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)8.   
"The term of extended supervision may not be less than 25% 
of the length of the term of confinement in prison imposed under 
par. (b) and, for a classified felony, is subject to whichever 
of the following limits is applicable: . . . For a Class H 
felony, the term of extended supervision may not exceed 3 
years."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d)5. 
Because 
the 
defendant 
was 
a 
repeater 
due 
to 
prior 
convictions for misdemeanors, "[a] maximum term of imprisonment 
of more than one year but not more than 10 years may be 
increased by not more than 2 years if the prior convictions were 
for misdemeanors . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(b). 
"Subject to the minimum period of extended supervision 
required under par. (d), the maximum term of confinement in 
prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by any applicable 
penalty enhancement statute.  If the maximum term of confinement 
in prison specified in par. (b) is increased under this 
paragraph, the total length of the bifurcated sentence that may 
be imposed is increased by the same amount."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(c). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
stating 
the 
component 
parts 
of 
the 
bifurcated 
sentence, 
satisfies Bangert, Brown, and Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).18  
¶102 The majority opinion gratuitously and cavalierly warns 
that a circuit court's advising a defendant of the possible term 
of confinement and extended supervision at the plea hearing 
"could be misleading."  Majority op., ¶42 n.12.19       
¶103 
The 
majority 
opinion 
thus 
opens 
the 
door 
for 
additional 
post-conviction 
motions. 
 
I 
have 
read 
many 
transcripts of plea colloquies; circuit courts often state the 
component parts of the imprisonment during the plea colloquy, 
although they are not required to do so.  The majority opinion 
should not be read to mean that the circuit court commits a 
"Bangert" error if it provides a defendant with information 
about the components of the bifurcated sentence, as long as the 
circuit court gives the defendant the correct information about 
the maximum term of imprisonment. 
¶104 And now to the record.    
¶105 The complaint and information——documents available to 
the circuit court, defense counsel, prosecuting attorney and the 
defendant——stated that the defendant could be "imprisoned not 
more than six (6) years" with an additional penalty enhancer of 
"not more than 2 years."   
                                                 
18 Lichty, 344 Wis. 2d 733, ¶14 (citing State v. Sutton, 
2006 WI App 118, ¶15, 294 Wis. 2d 330, 718 N.W.2d 146). 
19 The circuit court in the present case advised the 
defendant (incorrectly) of the term of confinement without 
advising him correctly of the term of imprisonment. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶106 These 
are 
correct 
statements 
of 
the 
statutory 
language, although it takes some calculation and legal knowledge 
to translate the legalese found in the complaint and information 
into knowing and understanding that the maximum penalty is 
"imprisoned not more than eight (8) years."  Thus it is not 
clear from the complaint and information that the defendant was 
apprised of the maximum penalty of eight years of imprisonment, 
as the majority repeatedly and inaccurately states. 
¶107 Moreover, it would take a proverbial Philadelphia 
lawyer to figure out what "imprisoned" means in the complaint 
and information in the present case.  The word "imprisoned" 
takes on special significance in the present case because of the 
enhanced penalty, and the record shows that the defendant was 
told about "prison," not about being "imprisoned."   
¶108 Although the defendant stated he was familiar with the 
complaint and information, neither document stated the maximum 
penalty as eight years' imprisonment.  Nevertheless, the 
majority opinion can be read to state that when the complaint 
and information in the record state the penalty in the exact 
terms of the statute, as they do in the present case——a 
circumstance that will likely occur frequently——the defendant 
has been adequately told of the maximum penalty and is held to 
know and understand the maximum penalty.  Such a holding 
completely undercuts Bangert.   
¶109 I therefore examine the rest of the record to 
determine whether the defendant was apprised of the maximum 
penalty and understood the maximum penalty of eight years' 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
imprisonment.  I look at the plea colloquy and the plea 
questionnaire.  Then I look at the sentencing hearing. 
¶110 Neither the circuit court nor the defense attorney 
correctly translated the statutory penalty provisions in the 
complaint and information into plain English to advise the 
defendant of the correct maximum penalty in the plea colloquy or 
plea questionnaire, imprisonment for a maximum of eight years.  
¶111 During the plea colloquy, the circuit court changed 
the description of the penalty, telling the defendant that he 
faced the possibility of "six years in prison."  Majority op., 
¶2.20  The circuit court erred.  The defendant was not subject to 
six years in prison.  (Remember, six years in prison is not the 
same penalty as six years of imprisonment; his maximum prison 
(confinement) time, as I have stated previously and which never 
appears correctly in the record, is five years).       
¶112 The plea questionnaire (obviously completed by the 
defense counsel and signed by the defendant) also errs in 
telling the defendant of the maximum penalty.  The plea 
questionnaire states that the defendant could face a maximum 
penalty of "8 yrs prison."  The defendant was not subject to an 
eight-year prison term.  (Remember, eight years in prison 
(confinement) is not the same penalty as eight years of 
imprisonment; the defendant's maximum time in prison, which 
never appears correctly in the record, is five years).  Once 
                                                 
20 The transcript reads:  "The Court: I could impose the 
maximum penalty here of a $10,000 fine or six years in prison or 
both if I thought that's what was necessary.  Do you understand 
that?" 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
again, the defendant was told of a different and incorrect 
penalty.   
¶113 Nevertheless, 
the 
concurrence 
inexplicably, 
inaccurately, 
and 
incorrectly 
states 
that 
the 
complaint, 
information, 
and 
plea 
questionnaire 
correctly 
stated 
the 
defendant's maximum penalty and that the defendant's knowledge 
was "already evident throughout the record."  Concurrence, ¶¶78, 
86.  
¶114 Neither the defense counsel nor the prosecuting 
attorney offered assistance to the circuit court during the plea 
colloquy to state the maximum penalty correctly.  Our prior 
cases impose a burden on the prosecutor to ensure that the plea 
colloquy is sufficient.  "As we explained in Bangert, part of 
the reason the burden shifts from the defendant to the state is 
that this burden-shifting 'will encourage the prosecution to 
assist the trial court in meeting its § 971.08 and other 
expressed obligations.'"21 
¶115 At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court again 
incorrectly stated the maximum punishment under the statute.  
The circuit court advised the defendant that the felony (with 
the penalty enhancer) was "punishable by a $10,000 fine or six 
years in prison or both, but then there is the two additional 
years of possible prison because of the repeater."  So once 
again the defendant was advised he faced eight years in prison 
(confinement), not eight years' imprisonment.  
                                                 
21 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 n.24 (citation omitted) 
(quoting Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶116 To summarize the record:  The defendant was never 
explicitly told in plain English that the maximum penalty was 
eight years' imprisonment.  The complaint and information were 
worded in terms of imprisonment——not more than six years for the 
offense, which may be increased by not more than two years for 
the repeater charge.  But these documents did not translate the 
legalese into plain English or calculate the effect of the 
penalty enhancer on the potential term of imprisonment.  The 
plea colloquy set forth the maximum penalty in terms of prison——
six years.  The plea questionnaire set forth the maximum penalty 
in terms of prison——eight years.  The defect in the plea hearing 
was not remedied at sentencing.  Even at sentencing, the 
defendant was told incorrectly of a maximum prison term but was 
never 
told 
that 
the 
maximum 
penalty 
was 
eight 
years' 
imprisonment.       
¶117 According to the record, the defendant was repeatedly 
given inconsistent and conflicting information about the maximum 
punishment he faced.  When he was not told the maximum 
punishment, how can anyone conclude that the defendant knew and 
understood the maximum punishment?  Nevertheless, the majority 
opinion concludes that on the basis of the complaint and 
information, the plea colloquy, and the plea questionnaire that 
the defendant was nonetheless aware of the "maximum eight-year 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
term of imprisonment."22  Majority op., ¶¶8, 35, 39.  The 
majority seems to reach its conclusion by substituting the word 
"imprisonment" for the word "prison" in the plea questionnaire.23  
The only point in the record that the number eight appears is in 
the plea questionnaire, which incorrectly refers to eight years 
in prison.  The number five, the correct prison term, never 
appears in the record.  
                                                 
22 The majority asserts: "To conclude that Taylor was not 
aware of the maximum eight-year term of imprisonment, we would 
have to assume that Taylor's trial counsel misrepresented, on 
the plea questionnaire form itself and to the court, that he had 
read the form with Taylor and that Taylor understood it.  We 
would also have to assume that Taylor misrepresented to the 
court that he had received, read, and understood the complaint 
and plea questionnaire form."  Majority op., ¶39 (emphasis 
added). 
The irony, of course, is that defense counsel and the 
majority 
opinion 
confuse 
prison 
and 
imprisonment. 
 
The 
concurrence 
rewrites 
defense 
counsel's 
notation 
of 
"8 
yrs/prison" on the plea questionnaire, interpreting it as 
"likely shorthand for '8 years of imprisonment.'"  Concurrence, 
¶22.  The concurrence also assumes that "[t]here is a very high 
likelihood that Taylor's attorney, Michael Dally, explained the 
meaning of eight years of imprisonment to Taylor."  Concurrence, 
¶27 n.5. 
Were we to grant the evidentiary hearing required by 
Bangert, we would not have to make any assumptions about the 
defendant's understanding and defense counsel's advice.  Whether 
a defendant is entitled to a Bangert hearing does not turn on 
this court's retrospective speculation of what defense counsel 
likely meant on the plea questionnaire or whether "there is a 
very high likelihood" that defense counsel properly explained 
the meaning of "eight years of imprisonment." 
23 Majority op., ¶39 (quoted at note 22, supra).  In Brown, 
293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶12-13, 52-53, the plea colloquy was flawed but 
the defendant had stated on the record during the plea colloquy 
that he understood the charges, that he had had the complaint 
read to him, and that he had gone over the elements of the 
charges with his attorney.  This record was still not sufficient 
to refuse the defendant an evidentiary hearing.   
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶118 As 
I 
explained 
previously, 
according 
to 
the 
defendant's brief and my calculations, the defendant was subject 
to a maximum penalty of imprisonment not to exceed eight years, 
which could consist of not more than five years of initial 
confinement (prison) and not more than three years of extended 
supervision. As I have shown, the defendant was never so 
advised, and nothing in the record demonstrates that the circuit 
court, prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, or the defendant 
knew the correct maximum penalty.  The record is anything but 
clear and consistent in establishing that the defendant "in 
fact" knew the true and correct maximum penalty he faced.  From 
this record the majority concludes not only that the defendant 
was told of the maximum penalty but that he knew and understood 
it. 
¶119 I have, until now, focused on the majority opinion.  
The concurring opinion strikes out in a somewhat different 
direction, focusing more on the defendant's understanding of the 
maximum penalty.  The concurring opinion concludes that the 
defendant does not "receive an evidentiary hearing because there 
would 
have 
been 
no 
point 
in 
taking 
testimonial 
evidence. . . . [The 
defendant's] 
claim 
that 
he 
lacked 
understanding of the maximum sentence was objectively incredible 
given 
the 
ample evidence in the record of the correct 
information he had received. . . . [A] defendant 'should not be 
permitted to game the system by taking advantage of judicial 
mistakes. . . .'" 
 
"Requiring 
the 
court 
to 
conduct 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
receive 
what 
was 
already 
evident 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
throughout the record would have served no legitimate purpose in 
this case."  Concurrence, ¶¶21, 24, 29, 30. 
¶120 The concurrence worries about the defendant gaming the 
system.  Concurrence, ¶29; see also majority op., ¶39.  I do not 
favor allowing the defendant (or anyone else) to game the 
system.  Here the defendant satisfied the Bangert requirements, 
requirements established by this court that entitle him to an 
evidentiary hearing.  How is the defendant gaming the system?24  
¶121 According to the concurring opinion, a circuit court 
should decide whether to hold a Bangert evidentiary hearing 
based on what it surmises the evidence will be at the 
evidentiary hearing and what it predicts the outcome of the 
evidentiary hearing will be about the defendant's knowledge and 
understanding.  What legal principle or theory allows courts to 
decide whether to hold an evidentiary hearing based on court 
conjecture? 
¶122 When the circuit court, prosecuting attorney, and 
defense counsel all failed to recognize that the defendant was 
being told different and inconsistent maximum penalties and 
failed to explain the correct maximum punishment, how can the 
majority and concurring opinions indifferently conclude that the 
defendant knew and understood that his charges carried a maximum 
sentence of eight years of imprisonment and not six or eight 
                                                 
24 Justice 
Prosser, 
writing 
for 
the 
court 
in 
Brown, 
explained how to prevent a defendant from gaming the system:  
"Thus, only the [circuit] court, with the assistance of the 
district attorney, can prevent potential sandbagging by a 
defendant by engaging the defendant at the plea colloquy and 
making a complete record."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶38. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
years in prison, numbers the defendant was given by the court 
and defense counsel?  The majority and concurring opinions are 
telling us (with straight faces) that although all the legally 
trained, courtroom-experienced participants in the plea colloquy 
and sentencing (namely the judge, the defense counsel, and the 
prosecuting attorney) displayed their ignorance of the correct 
maximum penalty, the defendant, the only participant in the plea 
hearing who did not have the benefit of a legal education, is 
the only participant who actually knew and understood the 
correct maximum penalty.  This cannot be right.  
* * * * 
¶123 Plea colloquies, indeed many, many plea colloquies, 
are being conducted every day in courtrooms across this state.  
Plea colloquies upon a plea of guilty or no contest are the 
"bread and butter" of criminal practice.  Plea colloquies are 
frequent 
and 
recurrent 
court 
events 
with 
constitutional 
overtones and ramifications.   
¶124 More than 25 years ago, the court decided the Bangert 
case.  The court has clearly and decisively adhered to Bangert 
declaring that "[c]omplying with the requisite standards [of 
Bangert] is not optional."25  
¶125 The Bangert line of cases sets down relatively simple, 
relatively "bright-line" rules instructing the circuit courts, 
the court of appeals, this court, defendants, and counsel about 
the goals of a plea colloquy, how a plea colloquy should be 
conducted, and the route to be taken when the plea colloquy is 
                                                 
25 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶52. 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
defective.  There is no indication the framework is not working.  
Once again, I ask, "Why disturb it now?"26 
¶126 The 
majority 
opinion 
and 
concurrence 
have 
unnecessarily muddied waters often plied, to the detriment of us 
all.  We now have an inconsistent "jurisprudence of flawed plea 
colloquies" apparently governing an overstatement of a penalty, 
an understatement of a penalty, a substantial misstatement of a 
penalty, and an insubstantial misstatement of a penalty.  This 
court is supposed to clarify the law.  It has not.  
¶127 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶128 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
26 Cross, 
326 
Wis. 2d 492, 
¶47 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  2011AP1030-CR.ssa 
 
1