Title: Commonwealth v. Moore
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11582
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2022

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SJC-11582 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DWAYNE MOORE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 7, 2022. - May 31, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Cypher, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Cellular 
Telephone.  Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Relevancy and 
materiality, Exculpatory.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Postconviction relief, 
Assistance of counsel, Disclosure of evidence, Argument by 
prosecutor, Jury and jurors, Challenge to jurors. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 7, 2011. 
 
The cases were tried before Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and 
following review by this court, 474 Mass. 541 (2016), a motion 
for a new trial, filed on December 14, 2016, was heard by him. 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Edmond J. 
Zabin, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Dwayne Moore, was convicted 
on indictments charging murder in the first degree for the 
shooting deaths of Simba Martin, Levaughn Washum-Garrison, 
2 
 
Eyanna Flonory, and Flonory's two year old son, Amanihotep 
Smith.  Another victim, Marcus Hurd, was shot but survived; 
Hurd's injuries left him paralyzed below his shoulders.  The 
events occurred in September 2010 in the Mattapan section of 
Boston.  The defendant was first tried for this so-called 
"Mattapan Massacre" along with a codefendant in early 2012; the 
jury acquitted the codefendant but were deadlocked as to the 
defendant.1  Following a second jury trial, the defendant was 
convicted of four counts of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of felony-murder.  The defendant timely appealed. 
 
Following his convictions, the defendant moved for a new 
trial, arguing that both the prosecutor and defense counsel 
failed to correct allegedly false testimony, that he had been 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and that both newly 
discovered and wrongfully withheld exculpatory evidence 
suggested a key witness committed the shootings with his fellow 
gang members.  The motion judge, who was also the trial judge in 
the second trial, ordered discovery and held a six-day 
evidentiary hearing.  He denied the defendant's motion. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant contends that 
both the prosecutor and his trial counsel failed to use cell 
 
1 The jury acquitted the defendant of a charge of 
trafficking in cocaine but did not reach a verdict as to the 
remaining indictments. 
3 
 
phone records to correct allegedly false testimony, that 
additional details of cell phone records revealed through a new 
analysis constituted newly discovered evidence warranting a new 
trial, that a combination of newly discovered and wrongfully 
withheld exculpatory evidence cast doubt on the Commonwealth's 
theory of the case and would have been a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations, that the prosecutor's closing argument was 
improper and prejudicial, and that the judge erred in declining 
to strike a juror for cause.  The defendant also requests that 
we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce 
the degree of guilt.  We affirm the defendant's convictions and 
the order denying his motion for a new trial, and we discern no 
reason to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving some details 
for later discussion.  Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 57 
(2018). 
 
i.  Premeditated plan.  In September 2010, the defendant 
invited Kimani Washington2 to join him in a robbery involving 
cocaine.  Kimani agreed to participate in the robbery and, upon 
the defendant's request, said he would get a gun for the 
defendant.  The opportunity to consummate their plans presented 
 
2 Because several witnesses share the same surname, we refer 
to each by their first names for clarity. 
4 
 
on the evening of September 27, 2010.  The defendant arrived at 
Kimani's mother's home on Fowler Street, where Kimani was with 
his brother, Charles Washington, and his cousin, Edward 
Washington, in Charles's room.3  The defendant told Kimani that 
"he wanted to do the lick tonight."4  Kimani agreed and told 
Edward that, because he was going to do the robbery, he "needed 
that MAC again" -- referring to a firearm he understood that 
Edward possessed.  Edward left the apartment and inferably 
retrieved the firearm, a MAC-10, which Kimani then gave to the 
defendant.  Kimani armed himself with a Ruger nine millimeter 
firearm.  Edward took Charles's car, a silver BMW, and drove the 
defendant and Kimani to the site of the planned robbery, 
Martin's home. 
 
When they arrived at their destination, the defendant and 
Kimani got out of the car and sat across the street from 
Martin's house.  The defendant "made a couple of phone calls to 
 
3 The defendant called Kimani three times during the evening 
before the killings occurred, at 10:48 P.M., at 11:08 P.M., and 
at 11:09 P.M.  Cell site location information (CSLI) data showed 
that the defendant's first call connected to the cell tower just 
over a mile north of Kimani's mother's home.  The defendant's 
second two calls to Kimani connected to a cell tower near 
Kimani's mother's home on Fowler Street.  Testimony at trial 
established that cell phones typically connect to the cell site 
with the strongest signal at any given time -- that is usually, 
but not always, the closest tower. 
 
4 Kimani testified that the "lick" referred to the robbery 
they had discussed previously. 
5 
 
the house across the street," calling Martin, who was known to 
be a drug dealer, a total of three times (at 12:29 A.M., at 
12:37 A.M., and at 12:52 A.M.).5  The defendant explained to 
Martin that he was "downstairs right now" and that he "wanted 
some weed." 
 
ii.  Hurd's arrival at Martin's home.  Meanwhile, Hurd, who 
had planned to purchase marijuana from Martin, arrived at 
Martin's house in a silver Ford Edge and parked a few houses 
down.  He saw two individuals on the corner near Martin's home.  
Hurd testified that he called Martin "right before [he] got to 
[Martin's] street,"6 asking Martin to come outside.  He testified 
that he saw Martin "[c]oming out of his house on his porch, 
coming down the stairs" and that Martin was waiting on the porch 
when Hurd arrived. 
 
The defendant and Kimani watched Martin leave his house and 
walk to Hurd's car; Martin spoke to Hurd outside the car, but 
"they was talking for so long [Martin] got inside the car on the 
passenger side."  Hurd testified that he and Martin talked 
 
5 The defendant's call records and CSLI confirm that these 
calls to Martin were made.  The first call, at 12:29 A.M., 
connected to a cell tower south of Martin's home on Sutton 
Street.  The second and third calls connected to a tower closer 
to Martin's home. 
 
6 Martin's cell phone records, which were produced to the 
defendant but were not introduced in evidence at trial, confirm 
that Hurd called Martin three times:  at 12:10 A.M., at 12:33 
A.M., and at 12:40 A.M. 
6 
 
"briefly" for "two or three minutes" and completed their 
transaction. 
 
iii.  The robbery.  While this drug sale was occurring in 
Hurd's car, Kimani "[h]ad to try to figure out a way to get in 
that house" to complete the robbery, so he approached the 
running vehicle's passenger's side door, where Martin had 
recently entered.  Hurd testified that Kimani said, "Y'all know 
what time it is," which Hurd understood to mean there was going 
to be a robbery.  Kimani testified that he "pulled [his] gun 
out" and ordered the two men to "get out the car" and "strip."7  
Hurd and Martin got out of the car and removed their clothes.  
The defendant, also armed, joined Kimani.8  Then either the 
defendant or Kimani ordered Hurd and Martin into Martin's house.  
Kimani testified that the defendant held his gun to the back of 
Martin's head as they walked into the house. 
 
There were three other occupants inside Martin's home:  
Washum-Garrison, who was sleeping on the couch downstairs; and 
 
7 Kimani testified that he asked Hurd and Martin to remove 
their clothes because these men were "drug dealers and they were 
subject to have a gun as well." 
 
8 Hurd testified that two other gunmen joined Kimani at this 
point, coming from a nearby yard, and leading him and Martin 
into the house.  Hurd described two of the gunmen:  "One was 
short and kind of stocky.  The other one was a tall, slim young 
man."  He testified that the "tall, slim young man" was holding 
a weapon that looked like the MAC in a photograph that was 
introduced in evidence. 
7 
 
Flonory and her son, who were upstairs.  Kimani testified that 
he stayed downstairs with Hurd, while the defendant took Martin 
upstairs.  Kimani ordered Hurd to face the wall, and awakened 
Washum-Garrison to pat him down; Kimani took drugs and money 
from Washum-Garrison.  Kimani felt that the defendant was 
"taking too long upstairs," so he went up to investigate.  
Kimani found the defendant and Martin going through pockets of 
coats in a closet, and he saw the other two victims, Flonory and 
her son, in a "back room."  The defendant told Kimani to go back 
downstairs, which he did.  Flonory, carrying her son, also went 
downstairs and lay down on the floor.  When Kimani returned 
downstairs, Edward was inside the apartment, pointing his gun at 
Washum-Garrison, who was on the couch.  Shortly after, the 
defendant and Martin came downstairs. 
 
Kimani, the defendant, and Edward took a safe, a flatscreen 
television,9 a bag, and some drugs out of the house.  They loaded 
those items into Hurd's silver Ford Edge, which was still 
running.  Before leaving Martin's home, Kimani said, "[M]y name 
is Point, I'm from the Point.  If they wanted to find me or get 
some get-back on the person that got them, they know where to 
find me."  Kimani left the house; he noticed Hurd's and Martin's 
 
9 Kimani testified that he never saw the television again 
after it was removed from the apartment.  Indeed, it was not 
recovered. 
8 
 
clothes on the ground, "[p]icked them up and threw them" into 
Hurd's Ford Edge, and then drove away in that vehicle. 
 
iv.  The shootings.  Kimani assumed that the defendant and 
Edward had already fled.  Instead, Edward ordered the five 
victims out of Martin's house.  When he left the house, Hurd 
noticed that his car was missing.  The defendant and Edward 
ordered the victims to turn right and to turn right again onto 
Woolson Street.  The defendant held his gun to Hurd's back while 
they walked and told him to "stop turning [his] head around"; 
Hurd had been looking to see "if there was a chance for [him] to 
escape."  The defendant ordered Hurd to "walk ahead and get in 
the bushes," where he shot Hurd in the back of the head.10  Hurd 
testified that he heard multiple gunshots after he was shot but 
could not see anything.11 
 
At 1:11 A.M., 1:12 A.M., and 1:13 A.M., a Shotspotter 
sensor around the area of Woolson Street recorded a total of 
twelve gunshots.  When Boston police officers arrived, they 
found Hurd alive, lying face down in the bushes.  Martin was 
found already deceased, lying face down in the street at the 
 
10 The bullet hit Hurd's spinal cord, paralyzing him. 
 
11 One witness testified that he awoke to the sound of shots 
being fired, looked out his window, and saw someone with the 
same height, body, and facial structure as the defendant lean 
down and shoot one of the victims, who was already lying on the 
ground. 
9 
 
intersection of Woolson and Wildwood Streets.  He had six 
gunshot wounds, one in his hand, three in his torso, and two in 
his head.  Washum-Garrison was found deceased in the bushes by 
the steps of a house on Woolson Street; he had been shot once in 
his chest.  Flonory was also found deceased, on the sidewalk on 
Woolson Street.  Flonory had three gunshot wounds (one in her 
head, one in her right hand, and one in her left hand).  Her son 
had two gunshot wounds, one in his torso and one in his right 
arm; her son was still alive when police arrived, but he died at 
the hospital shortly afterwards.12 
 
v.  The splitting of the proceeds.  The defendant and 
 
12 Police found twelve shell casings (nine were nine 
millimeter, two were .40 caliber, and one was .45 caliber) and 
one nine millimeter spent bullet at the scene.  The .45 shell 
casing matched ballistics from a shooting on Woolson Street that 
had occurred one month prior.  None of the nine millimeter shell 
casings found at the scene was fired from Kimani's nine 
millimeter Ruger handgun, but the casings were all fired from 
the same firearm.  The bullets retrieved from the bodies of the 
victims were also shot from the same nine millimeter firearm, 
and not from the Ruger.  The two .40 caliber shell casings were 
shot from the same gun, and they were consistent with having 
been fired from the .40 caliber Iberia firearm seized from 
Kimani's mother's home a few days after the shooting.  The .40 
caliber bullet retrieved from Martin's body was consistent with 
having been shot from that firearm as well. 
 
Kimani testified that the defendant had been carrying a 
MAC-10, a nine millimeter weapon that was not recovered.  Kimani 
testified that Edward had a gun that was "similar to [his Ruger] 
but all black," a description that matched the Iberia .40 
caliber firearm.  The Commonwealth argued in its closing 
argument that the defendant may have switched guns to get the 
Iberia before shooting Martin in the head with the .40 caliber 
weapon. 
10 
 
Edward returned to Kimani's mother's home, where they met 
Kimani; they planned to "divide the goods that [they] got from 
the robbery."  Kimani asked the defendant, "What took so long?"  
The defendant explained, "We had to go back . . . [t]o kill 
everybody."  The defendant, Kimani, and Edward then brought in 
the safe, which they were unable to open; a bag filled with guns 
and drugs; and $1,800 in cash, which they split three ways.13  
Kimani then left his mother's apartment with the defendant, 
again driving the silver Ford Edge, and dropped the defendant 
off near the Forest Hills neighborhood in the Jamaica Plain 
section of Boston before driving to the Grove Hall neighborhood 
in the Roxbury section of Boston. 
 
vi.  The investigation.  Meanwhile, a police officer who 
responded to the scene of the shootings questioned Hurd as they 
removed him from the bushes, and Hurd told him that the shooters 
had stolen his car.  Officers began to look for a vehicle 
matching the description provided by Hurd:  a rented silver Ford 
sport utility vehicle with out-of-State plates.14  One officer 
 
13 Kimani testified that he awakened his mother, Charlene 
Washington, at that time and tried to introduce her to the 
defendant.  Charlene also testified that Kimani awakened her at 
1:37 A.M and asked her to "meet [his] friend," and she described 
the friend as "about Kimani's complexion," "taller than Kimani," 
and with a "very, very low haircut."  This description matched 
the defendant. 
 
14 A transmission describing the vehicle had also been sent 
out to other officers in the area. 
11 
 
found a vehicle matching the description in Grove Hall, and he 
called other officers to set up a perimeter.  Kimani testified 
that he noticed a Boston police cruiser pull alongside the Ford 
Edge while he was in Grove Hall, so he tried to "appear like 
[he] was nowhere near that truck, that Ford Edge."  The police 
officers saw Kimani walk away from the Ford Edge, and the 
officers moved to secure the car and to stop Kimani. 
 
After additional officers and detectives arrived, they 
began to question Kimani about "a two-year-old [who] just got 
killed."  One detective seized the keys to the Ford Edge from 
Kimani's pocket, although Kimani denied having any connection 
with the vehicle.  Kimani accompanied the officers to an 
interrogation room at Boston police headquarters, where they 
asked him about the robbery and what he had been doing that 
night; Kimani falsely denied any involvement in the robbery and 
shootings. 
 
After Kimani left the police station, he contacted the 
defendant and arranged to meet with the defendant the following 
day.  When they spoke, Kimani said, "Tell me you didn't shoot 
the girl and the baby."  The defendant responded, "I didn't mean 
to kill the baby.  I shot the girl.  Maybe the bullets went 
through her and hit the baby."  Kimani fled to New Hampshire, 
where he was apprehended and arrested a few days later. 
 
At first, Kimani continued to deny his involvement.  After 
12 
 
the detectives told Kimani that a two year old had been killed, 
and that they had found a weapon in his mother's apartment that 
had been fired on the scene,15 Kimani admitted his participation, 
and said, "It was only supposed to be a robbery."  He identified 
the defendant as a coventurer but did not mention the 
involvement of his cousin, Edward, because he "didn't want him 
to get in trouble."  Police officers retrieved the defendant's 
telephone number from Kimani's cell phone.  A month after his 
arrest, Kimani signed a proffer agreement that ultimately became 
a cooperation agreement; thereafter, he named Edward as a 
coventurer. 
 
Police officers interviewed the defendant twice.  In the 
first interview, which occurred several days after Kimani first 
offered the defendant's name, the defendant denied involvement 
in the shootings; instead, he claimed that he was at his home on 
nearby Morton Street.  In the second interview, which occurred 
nearly two months after the killings, the defendant first 
maintained he had learned of the killings on the news the 
morning after the shootings.  During this second interview, 
however, the defendant admitted that he left his apartment and 
 
15 Pursuant to a warrant, police officers had searched 
Kimani's mother's home on the day after the shootings and had 
found a bag of guns and drugs in Charles's bedroom.  Police also 
found a magazine, additional ammunition, and a safe that was 
later determined to have been taken from Martin's home. 
13 
 
went to Martin's home on the night of the shootings.  The 
defendant said that he saw the front door to Martin's home was 
open, and that he heard yelling.  He said he saw people inside 
Martin's apartment "tussling or whatever," so he walked away 
from the apartment; he also said that he heard shots outside 
Martin's apartment. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on four 
counts of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; home 
invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C; armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 17; assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); 
aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i); carrying a firearm without a 
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and trafficking in cocaine, 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b).  Following a jury trial in February and 
March of 2012, he was found not guilty of trafficking in 
cocaine, but the jury were unable to reach a verdict with 
respect to the remaining indictments against him.16 
 
Following a second jury trial, the defendant was found 
guilty of four counts of felony-murder in the first degree, one 
 
16 His codefendant, Edward, was acquitted on all charges, 
including four counts of murder in the first degree, home 
invasion, armed robbery, assault with intent to murder, 
aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
and unlawful possession of a firearm. 
14 
 
count of home invasion, and one count of armed robbery.17  He was 
sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without the 
possibility of parole.  The defendant filed a notice of appeal.18 
 
In December 2016, the defendant filed a motion for 
postconviction relief, seeking a new trial.  The defendant 
argued that the prosecutor and his own trial counsel failed to 
correct false testimony, and that withheld and newly discovered 
evidence suggested that Kimani planned and executed the crimes 
on behalf of a street gang.  The judge ordered postconviction 
discovery.  Following a six-day evidentiary hearing, he denied 
the defendant's motion.  The defendant appealed from the denial 
of his motion for a new trial, and the two appeals were 
consolidated. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant maintains that his 
 
17 The jury found the defendant not guilty of the charges of 
armed assault with intent to murder, aggravated assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and unlawful possession 
of a firearm.  The judge dismissed the convictions of home 
invasion and armed robbery as duplicative. 
 
18 In 2015, the defendant's appellate counsel sent a letter 
to the discharged jurors asking about their jury service, 
pursuant to the revised Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5, as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1428 (2015).  Commonwealth v. Moore, 474 Mass. 541, 
543 (2016).  The Commonwealth filed an emergency motion for 
judicial intervention to prohibit postconviction inquiry of the 
jury.  Id.  The trial judge reported a number of questions of 
law regarding the revised rule 3.5 to the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the matter to this court on our own motion to answer 
the five certified questions.  Id. at 544, 553.  None of those 
issues is relevant to the present appeal. 
15 
 
convictions must be overturned because the prosecutor and 
defense counsel failed to correct allegedly false testimony, the 
failure of defense counsel to use Martin's cell phone records 
constituted ineffective assistance, newly discovered evidence 
from Martin's cell phone records warrants a new trial, the 
prosecution team withheld additional exculpatory evidence that 
would have suggested that Kimani committed the shootings with 
Columbia Point Dawgs (CPD) gang members, the prosecutor's 
closing argument was improper and prejudicial, and the judge 
erred in declining to strike a juror for cause after the juror 
stated during empanelment that he had been exposed to media 
about the shootings.  The defendant also requests that we 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
degree of guilt.  We address each contention in turn. 
 
a.  Purportedly false testimony.  i.  Martin's cell phone 
records.  The defendant contends that the judge erred in denying 
his motion for a new trial because the prosecutor violated his 
due process rights and because the defendant's trial counsel 
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, each by 
failing to correct false testimony.  Specifically, he contends 
that Martin's cell phone records, which were available to 
defense counsel at the time of his trial but were not introduced 
in evidence, showed that it was factually impossible for him to 
have been at Martin's house at the moment that Kimani testified 
16 
 
that Kimani and the defendant approached Hurd's vehicle to 
commence the robbery. 
 
Martin's cell phone records reflect a call from Hurd at 
12:40 A.M.  Hurd testified that he called Martin "right before 
[he] got to [Martin's] street," and that Martin was waiting on 
the porch outside his home when Hurd arrived.  Kimani testified 
that Martin approached Hurd's car, and "they was talking for so 
long [that Martin] got inside the car on the passenger side."  
Kimani also testified that he waited "minutes" before 
approaching Hurd's car.  Based on this testimony, the defendant 
posits that the robbery must have begun precisely between 
12:42 A.M. and 12:43 A.M.  The defendant's cell phone data, 
which was introduced at the trial, showed that the defendant's 
last call to Martin occurred at 12:52 A.M., twelve minutes after 
Hurd called Martin and then arrived at Martin's home, and nine 
minutes after the robbery must have begun if Kimani's timeline 
was to be believed.  Accordingly, he contends that Kimani's 
testimony regarding the defendant's involvement must have been 
false, that his counsel was ineffective in failing to use 
Martin's cell phone records to establish the falsity of Kimani's 
testimony, and that the prosecutor violated due process by 
presenting known false testimony. 
 
Because the motion judge was also the trial judge, we 
extend "'special deference' to the judge's findings of fact and 
17 
 
the ultimate decision on the motion" for a new trial.  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672-673 (2015), S.C., 
478 Mass. 189 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 
591, 597 (2012).  Because the "statutory standard of § 33E is 
more favorable to a defendant than is the constitutional 
standard for determining the ineffectiveness of counsel," 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 316 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014), we analyze this claim "under the rubric of 
§ 33E 'to determine whether there exists a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,'" Commonwealth v. 
Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 409 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 187 (2001).  Under this standard, the 
court considers whether trial counsel erred and, if so, "whether 
that error was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  
Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 472-473 (2018), quoting 
Wright, supra.  A strategic decision constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel if it was "manifestly unreasonable when 
made" (quotation and citation omitted).  Kolenovic, supra at 
674.  "[O]nly 'strategy and tactics which lawyers of ordinary 
training and skill in the criminal law would not consider 
competent' are manifestly unreasonable."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 186-187 (2005).  "The 
manifestly unreasonable test, therefore, is essentially a search 
18 
 
for rationality in counsel's strategic decisions, taking into 
account all the circumstances known or that should have been 
known to counsel in the exercise of his duty to provide 
effective representation to the client and not whether counsel 
could have made alternative choices."  Kolenovic, supra at 674-
675. 
 
Applying these standards, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in denying the motion.  Contrary to the defendant's 
argument, Martin's cell phone records do not establish a 
different timeline from that developed at trial.  As the judge 
concluded, the robbery did not unfold with the precision of a 
military operation suggested by the defendant's assertion that 
the robbery must have started at 12:42 A.M. or 12:43 A.M.  
Instead, testimony was less exact.  Hurd called Martin "right 
before [he] got to [Martin's] street," and spoke with Martin for 
"so long [that Martin] got inside the car."  "[M]inutes" then 
passed before Kimani approached with his firearm.19  Even with 
the additional detail that Hurd called Martin at 12:40 A.M., the 
testimony was consistent with the robbery beginning after 12:52 
 
19 Additionally, when asked whether Martin picked up any 
telephone calls during their conversation in Hurd's car, Hurd 
testified that he did not remember:  "He talked briefly.  He 
answered the phone for a quick second and told somebody he can 
call them back.  I don't recall.  I don't remember none of that 
stuff. . . .  If he did, I do not remember.  If he didn't, I do 
not remember." 
19 
 
A.M., when Martin's cell phone records show a call from the 
defendant's cell phone to Martin's cell phone.20 
 
At best, the cell phone records potentially present 
additional impeachment evidence as to the precise timeline of 
the events on the evening of the shootings.  "In general, 
failure to impeach a witness does not prejudice the defendant or 
constitute ineffective assistance."  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 446 
Mass. 709, 715 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Bart B., 424 
Mass. 911, 916 (1997).  This is true even when reviewing the 
claim under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Hudson, supra.  "[A]bsent 
counsel's failure to pursue some obviously powerful form of 
impeachment available at trial, it is speculative to conclude 
that a different approach to impeachment would likely have 
affected the jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Garvin, 456 
Mass. 778, 792 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 
340, 357 (2001).21  Especially where a witness, like Kimani, "was 
 
20 The defendant's trial counsel was aware of Martin's cell 
phone records and reviewed them before trial.  At the 
evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial, defense 
counsel testified that he had no tactical or strategic reason to 
make use of the records.  Indeed, Martin's cell phone records 
might have corroborated the Commonwealth's case in part by 
showing that the last call Martin received that evening was from 
the defendant. 
 
21 In fact, testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing 
showed the marginal value of Martin's cell phone records even as 
impeachment evidence.  As explained by an expert witness at the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, the record of a call at 
12:52 A.M. from the defendant to Martin, while it was 
20 
 
subjected to extensive impeachment based on his criminal record 
and based on various changes in the different versions of events 
he had given," the fact that "defense counsel did not pursue 
additional avenues of impeachment does not constitute 
ineffective assistance."22  Fisher, supra.23 
 
"connected" for eighteen seconds, could have been an unintended 
"butt dial," making the defendant's 12:37 A.M. call the last 
time he actually spoke with Martin. 
 
22 The defendant also contends that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to marshal arguments using the 
defendant's own cell phone records, which were in evidence, to 
impeach three additional witnesses.  Specifically, Sergeant John 
Brown testified that he found two telephone calls between the 
defendant and Martin in September 2010; however, the defendant's 
cell phone records show dozens of calls between Martin and the 
defendant during that month.  Counsel was not ineffective for 
not highlighting the extensive connection between the two.  
Dedrick Cole testified that the defendant called him, possibly 
the day before the killings occurred, seeking access to a car to 
commit a robbery.  The defendant's cell phone records do not 
show a call between Cole and the defendant in the relevant time 
frame.  Counsel was not ineffective for not highlighting the 
absence of a record of such a call; indeed, Cole had previously 
explained to police that the defendant called from a restricted 
telephone number.  Charlene Washington testified that Kimani 
introduced her to someone, inferably the defendant, at her 
Fowler Street home in the early morning after the shootings; 
however, the defendant's cell phone records showed two calls 
from the defendant to Kimani during the relevant time frame, 
suggesting the two were not together.  Although trial counsel 
could have impeached Charlene with the defendant's cell phone 
records, Charlene was not a key witness, and impeaching her 
likely would not have affected the jury's verdict.  Counsel was 
not ineffective for not highlighting the defendant's cell phone 
records, which were in evidence and available to the jury. 
 
23 The defendant's contention that the prosecutor improperly 
allowed known false testimony in violation of his due process 
also fails.  The Commonwealth may not "allow [false evidence] to 
go uncorrected when it appears."  Commonwealth v. Ware, 482 
21 
 
 
ii.  CSLI data.  The defendant additionally contends that 
his trial counsel failed to use the defendant's CSLI data to 
cast doubt on Kimani's testimony that the defendant was present 
for the killings.  First, the defendant relies on a twenty-one-
minute call starting at 12:07 A.M. on the night of the killings; 
the call began connected to a cell tower near Kimani's mother's 
home on Fowler Street and ended connected to a cell tower near 
Martin's home.  Second, the defendant highlights three calls 
from his cell phone to Martin.  The first call connected to a 
cell tower more than one-half mile south of Martin's home, and 
the second and third calls connected to a cell tower closer to 
but still south of Martin's home.  Lastly, the defendant points 
 
Mass. 717, 721 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Hurst, 364 Mass. 
604, 608 (1974).  However, "[m]inor inconsistencies do not 
constitute falsities."  Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 
491 (2014).  Here, as described supra, the cell phone records 
suggested minor discrepancies in some witness testimony 
(specifically, that the defendant and Martin shared dozens of 
calls in the month prior to the killings) and offered additional 
avenues for possible impeachment (in particular, the timeline of 
the robbery based on Hurd's last call to Martin at 12:40 A.M., 
the reliability of Charlene's purported identification of the 
defendant in the early morning after the shootings, and the 
location of the defendant throughout the night as suggested by 
CSLI data).  However, the cell phone records did not establish 
any "blatantly false" testimony.  See Ware, supra at 725-726.  
"It was not the prosecutor's duty to try the defendant's case 
for him by attempting to impeach the testimony of the 
Commonwealth's own witnesses with cryptic and inconclusive 
documents in the defense counsel's possession."  Commonwealth v. 
Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 363 (2004).  Thus, the prosecutor did not 
violate due process; nor were any inconsistencies likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion.  See Ware, supra at 726. 
 
22 
 
to calls from his cell phone to Kimani after the killings, which 
he contends connected to cell towers disproving his presence:  
first, at 1:32 A.M., his call to Kimani connected to a cell 
tower just south of Martin's home (the same tower as the last 
two calls to Martin);24 and his next call, at 1:50 A.M., 
connected to a cell tower near Kingsdale Street.  The defendant 
contends that, collectively, this data show he was not present 
either at Kimani's mother's home or Martin's home before the 
robbery began, or at Kimani's mother's home afterwards. 
 
The defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective.  To 
begin, before trial, trial counsel filed a motion in limine to 
exclude the CSLI data from the trial, arguing that it was 
unreliable.  The data purportedly showed the cell tower(s) to 
which the defendant's cell phone connected for each call that 
was made, indicating which tower had the strongest signal from 
the cell phone; as multiple witnesses testified at trial, 
however, this is usually but not necessarily the geographically 
closest tower. 
 
The motion was denied; accordingly, the defendant's CSLI 
data were in evidence, and his trial counsel cross-examined 
multiple witnesses concerning the CSLI location data.  Further, 
in his closing argument, trial counsel argued that the CSLI data 
 
24 This cell tower was also the closest one to the 
defendant's home. 
23 
 
did not support the defendant's guilt.  Significantly, the 
defendant's CSLI data generally supported the prosecution's 
theory that the defendant traveled from the vicinity of Kimani's 
mother's house on Fowler Street to the area around Martin's home 
on the evening of the shootings.  Trial counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to highlight further these arguably 
inculpatory records.25 
 
b.  Newly discovered evidence.  The defendant next argues 
that newly discovered evidence, namely additional call record 
details that were revealed by a new analysis in 2018, warrant a 
new trial.  The new records resulted from an analysis of 
Martin's call records using a new software system.  The new 
records show calls received by Martin's cell phone between 1:17 
A.M. and 6:43 A.M., after the shootings, that did not appear in 
Martin's 2010 cell phone records available at trial.  The data 
for these calls included a code, [CFNR:VM], which indicates that 
the calls did not go through but were forwarded to voicemail.  
The defendant contends that the new evidence shows that Martin's 
 
 
25 The defendant's argument that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance because he failed to highlight for the 
jury the text messages that the defendant exchanged with a 
female friend throughout the night is similarly unavailing.  The 
timing of the text messages arguably supported the prosecution's 
theory, because the defendant sent one text message at 12:51 
A.M. (just a minute before his final call to Martin's cell 
phone) and did not respond to his friend's text message until 
over three hours later, long after the robbery and killings. 
24 
 
cell phone went "off network" at around 1:18 A.M. and came back 
"on-line" sometime between 3:27 A.M. and 6:43 A.M., after the 
shootings.  The defendant speculates that Kimani, who admitted 
taking three cell phones from the victims, may have turned 
Martin's cell phone off after the murders, turned it back on, 
found the defendant's name in Martin's call log, and hatched a 
plan to incriminate the defendant. 
 
To be entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence, a defendant must establish that evidence is, in fact, 
newly discovered, and must show that the new evidence is 
"material and credible" and that "there is a substantial risk 
that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the 
evidence been admitted at trial."  Commonwealth v. Santiago, 458 
Mass. 405, 415 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 
303, 305-306 (1986).  Evidence is newly discovered if it "was 
unknown to the defendant or trial counsel and not reasonably 
discoverable at the time of trial."  Commonwealth v. Ellis, 475 
Mass. 459, 472 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 
607, 616 (2015). 
 
A new trial may be awarded where the newly discovered 
evidence "casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction," in 
that "the new evidence would probably have been a real factor in 
the jury's deliberations" (citation omitted).  Ellis, 475 Mass. 
at 476-477.  See Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 640 
25 
 
(2021).  Our review of a denial of a motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence is for abuse of discretion or 
other error of law.  Commonwealth v. Gibson, 489 Mass. 37, 51 
(2022), citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Mass. 595, 602 (2015).  
"In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion for a new 
trial, we accord deference to the views of a motion judge who 
was also the trial judge," as was the case here.  Commonwealth 
v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 176 (1999).  See Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 
at 672-673. 
 
At best, the new records would have provided an alternate 
ground to try to impeach Kimani's testimony.  See Gibson, 489 
Mass. at 52 (concluding that where witness was already 
thoroughly impeached, newly available evidence that would have 
provided additional impeachment grounds would have been 
cumulative and likely would not have had real impact in jury's 
deliberations); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 352 
(2014) (noting that impeachment evidence alone "is usually 
insufficient to warrant a new trial"); Commonwealth v. Sleeper, 
435 Mass. 581, 607 (2002) ("Newly discovered evidence that tends 
merely to impeach the credibility of a witness will not 
ordinarily be the basis of a new trial" [citation omitted]). 
 
Beyond mere speculation, the new details from Martin's cell 
phone records do not suggest that Kimani was in fact able to 
unlock Martin's cell phone, or that he saw anything on Martin's 
26 
 
cell phone, let alone that he specifically saw the defendant's 
cell phone number.26  As the judge found based on testimony at 
the evidentiary hearing, a cell phone can be "off-line" for a 
variety of reasons, including a dead battery, being outside of 
the network, being placed in airplane mode, or an obstructed 
signal. 
 
Thus, the new details available from Martin's cell phone 
records would likely not have been "a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations" (citation omitted).  Ellis, 475 Mass. at 472.  
See Teixeira, 486 Mass. at 640.  The judge did not abuse his 
discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on 
this ground. 
 
c.  Exculpatory evidence.  The defendant argues that a 
combination of withheld evidence, newly discovered evidence, and 
evidence known at the time of the trial supports the exculpatory 
argument that Kimani committed the crimes with members of a 
gang, and not with the defendant.  "To secure a new trial on the 
basis of exculpatory evidence, the defendant must establish 
three elements":  (1) that the evidence was "in the possession, 
custody, or control of the prosecutor or a person subject to the 
prosecutor's control"; (2) that "the evidence is exculpatory"; 
and (3) that the defendant was prejudiced, in that "there is a 
 
26 At trial, Kimani admitted that "he attempted to use . . . 
at least one of them but was unable to bypass the code." 
27 
 
substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion if the evidence had been admitted at trial" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 19-21 (2011). 
 
i.  Evidence of gang affiliation.  During the robbery, 
Kimani announced, "[M]y name is Point, I'm from the Point.  If 
they wanted to find me or get some get-back on the person that 
got them, they know where to find me."  Kimani also testified 
that he went by the nickname "Point" or "Point God."  The 
defendant claims that Boston police officers were aware of the 
existence of the CPD gang and knew that "The Point" was a 
nickname for the group, as well as that the group was known for 
committing armed break-ins.  The defendant argues that the 
failure to disclose this information violated the prosecution's 
obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
The defendant also argues that he could have used this 
information to strengthen his defense under Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980), by showing detectives had 
abandoned prematurely their investigation of Kimani's 
involvement with CPD. 
 
The judge held a six-day evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.  "We accept . . . findings 
that were based on testimony at the evidentiary hearing and do 
not disturb them where they are not clearly erroneous."  
Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 293 (2015), quoting 
28 
 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 539 (2014).  The judge 
found that "despite an exhaustive federal-state investigation 
culminating in numerous indictments aimed at dismantling CPD 
. . . the defendant fail[ed] to identify any source identifying 
Kimani as a member, affiliate, or in any other way connected 
with those involved with CPD."  The judge credited the testimony 
of the Boston police officers who said they investigated 
Kimani's ties to CPD in the days following the shootings but did 
not find any information linking Kimani to CPD.27  Additionally, 
Kimani did not have a bulldog tattoo, an insignia prevalent 
among CPD members. 
 
The judge found that Kimani's statement, "I'm from the 
Point," without more, combined with the fact that Kimani grew up 
in a Columbia Point housing development, made any gang 
affiliation "woefully speculative."  Indeed, Kimani testified 
that his statement meant he was "from the Point," and the 
defendant's trial counsel cross-examined him about this 
declaration at trial.  Even if we assume arguendo that evidence 
concerning the CPD gang supported exculpatory inferences, the 
jury were not likely to have reached a different conclusion had 
 
27 When police asked Kimani if he was "down with Columbia 
Point," Kimani answered, "Well, I'm just from there."  
Similarly, at trial, Kimani testified that he grew up in 
Columbia Point. 
 
29 
 
the evidence been admitted.  See Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 
Mass. 401, 413 (1992).28 
 
Moreover, the judge specifically credited the detectives' 
testimony that they reviewed any potential connection between 
Kimani and CPD in the days following the killings, including 
interviewing a detective assigned to a task force specifically 
investigating CPD.  Thus, any support for the defendant's Bowden 
defense would likely have been minimal at best. 
 
ii.  Other withheld evidence.  The defendant contends that 
a new trial is warranted because the prosecution team withheld 
additional evidence.  Specifically, a 2010 alert issued by the 
Boston regional intelligence center (BRIC), an arm of the Boston 
police department, stated that following the arrest of Kimani, 
"individuals with ties to Rosewood/Thetford may seek retribution 
against Columbia Pt. associates or individuals with ties to that 
area."  The alert was issued after Flonory's brothers, who were 
both incarcerated, were recorded discussing Kimani's arrest and 
speculating about his connection to the shootings on a telephone 
call.  One of the brothers stated, "I don't know who the fuck 
the [shooter] was.  Anybody from the Point, take 'em out."  The 
 
28 For this reason, we also reject the defendant's 
contention that an affidavit filed in connection with a 2015 
Federal indictment against CPD members, which mentioned that CPD 
is known as "the Point," constitutes newly discovered evidence 
warranting a new trial.  See Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 413. 
30 
 
defendant, who accessed this report during postconviction 
discovery, argues that it suggests that Kimani had ties to the 
CPD gang, suggesting further that the gang may have been 
responsible for the shootings. 
 
At best, the BRIC alert and recorded telephone call might 
have provided nominal support for the defendant's Bowden 
defense.  As discussed supra, the judge credited the police 
officers' testimony that they investigated the link between 
Kimani and CPD and found nothing credible.  Thus, the judge did 
not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial 
on this ground. 
 
d.  Prosecutor's closing arguments.  The defendant next 
argues that the prosecutor made multiple errors in his closing 
argument.  Closing arguments must be limited to the facts in 
evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 
them.  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998).  
Referring to facts not in evidence or playing on the jury's 
sympathy or emotions is improper rhetoric.  Commonwealth v. 
Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987).  "In analyzing a claim of 
improper argument, a prosecutor's remarks must be viewed in 
light of the entire argument, as well as in light of the judge's 
instruction to the jury and the evidence at trial" (quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 432 (1984).  
The court considers (i) whether the defendant objected; (ii) 
31 
 
whether the error was limited to collateral issues or went to 
the heart of the case; (iii) what specific or general 
instructions the judge gave to the jury to mitigate the mistake; 
and (iv) whether the error possibly made a difference in the 
jury's conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 
130-131 (2013); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 
(1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1003 (1998). 
 
i.  Order of killings.  The defendant first claims that the 
prosecutor improperly asserted that Flonory saw the other 
victims get shot.29  Hurd testified that he was shot first, and 
 
29 Referring to the jury's visit to the crime scene, the 
prosecutor said: 
 
"You walked to the intersection of Wildwood and Woolson 
Street.  You peered down into those bushes, just as Marcus 
Hurd did before that gunman, that assassin, put a gun to 
the back of his head and pulled the trigger.  You walked 
two at a time up the steps of [the building on] Woolson 
Street and looked down at the grass below, a place where 
Lavaughn [sic] Washum-Garrison's twisted body lay to rest 
after he was shot by the same gunman with that same gun.  
You walked to the middle of Wildwood and Woolson Street, 
and you stood there where Simba Martin, naked and 
defenseless, and staring at a man that he knew, was gunned 
down bullet after bullet after bullet to his face, to his 
chest, to his back and to his arms, an execution so vicious 
that it bespeaks the very personal nature of that murder.  
And you stood [on] Woolson Street by those gray painted 
steps on that sidewalk where Eyanna Flonory in her pajamas 
held her two-year-old baby in her arms, watching what was 
going on in front of her, when that same gunman with that 
same gun opened fire, bullets going through her hand 
striking her child, striking him in the chest, a bullet 
exiting his back, and then that same gunman with that same 
32 
 
he was found in the bushes near the intersection of Wildwood 
Street and Woolson Street.  While there was no direct evidence 
as to the order in which the rest of the victims were shot, the 
other bodies were found in somewhat of a linear progression back 
up the street:  Martin was found in the street at the 
intersection of Woolson and Wildwood Streets; Washum-Garrison 
was found behind the bushes by the steps of a building on 
Woolson Street; and finally, Flonory and her son were found even 
further up Woolson Street on the sidewalk in front of another 
building on Woolson Street.  It was thus an "inference[] that 
may reasonably be drawn from the evidence" that Flonory was shot 
last; at the very least, she would have seen Hurd get shot 
first.  Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 422 (2000), 
quoting Kozec, 399 Mass. at 516.  See Commonwealth v. Semedo, 
456 Mass. 1, 13 (2010) (concluding that prosecutor's reference 
to likelihood of contact between defendant and victim was 
reasonable inference based on evidence adduced at trial, so was 
permissible to suggest to jury).30 
 
gun executed that young mother with a bullet to the back of 
the head." 
 
Later, the prosecutor also said, "Think about what Eyanna 
Flonory must have been thinking when she saw the shootings up in 
front of her and the gun turned on her." 
 
30 The defendant argues that the prosecutor's numerous 
references to Flonory being a mother (eight occasions in the 
opening) and Smith's age (seven occasions in the opening and 
33 
 
 
ii.  Improper invocation of sympathy.  We agree with the 
defendant, however, that the prosecutor improperly invoked the 
sympathy of jurors in this part of his closing argument.31  It is 
improper to ask the jury to "put themselves 'in the shoes'" of 
the victims, or to encourage jurors to speculate about how the 
victims experienced their last moments.  Commonwealth v. 
Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 646 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 420 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. 
Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 608 (2015) (concluding that comments 
such as, "Think about landing face down on that dirty, beer-
stained barroom floor. . . .  Think about the last moments of 
[the victim's] life . . . ," were improper); Bizanowicz, supra 
 
four in the closing) were improper.  Repeated references to a 
characteristic of a victim to elicit sympathy, where the 
characteristic of the victim is not relevant to any material 
issue, is improper.  Santiago, 425 Mass. at 494-495.  However, 
those characteristics, along with argument that the victim was 
conscious of suffering, may be relevant to whether the murder 
was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Commonwealth v. 
Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 390 (1997), S.C., 450 Mass. 729 (2008).  
As the Commonwealth notes, this case was tried prior to 
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-66 (2020) (listing 
three evidentiary factors, replacing seven Cunneen factors, to 
determine extreme atrocity or cruelty).  Accordingly, these 
references were not improper.  See Wilson, 427 Mass. at 351 
(references to gruesome nature of crime were not improper where 
suffering was relevant to issue of atrocity or cruelty, and 
prosecutor "did not gratuitously exploit or dwell on the 
gruesomeness, but made only a few passing references to it"). 
 
31 The prosecutor's statements in full are reproduced in 
note 30, supra. 
 
34 
 
at 420 ("The jury should not be asked to put themselves 'in the 
shoes' of the victim, or otherwise be asked to identify with the 
victim"). 
 
The defendant did not object to this language as an 
improper appeal to sympathy;32 accordingly, our review is limited 
to determining "whether there was a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Kater, 432 Mass. at 423.  See 
Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 201.  See also Commonwealth v. Maynard, 
436 Mass. 558, 570 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Duguay, 430 
Mass. 397, 404 (1999) ("The absence of an objection, '[a]lthough 
not dispositive of the issue . . . is some indication that the 
tone, manner, and substance of the now challenged aspect[] of 
the . . . argument [was] not unfairly prejudicial'").  The judge 
gave a specific instruction that the jury were not to be swayed 
by sympathy.  See Kater, supra at 424 (curative instruction 
"eliminated any prejudice that might have been caused by the 
prosecutor's comment").  Finally, the sympathetic nature of 
these victims was well known to the jury; in this context, it is 
"unlikely that the prosecutor's argument had an inflammatory 
effect on the jury beyond that which naturally would result from 
the evidence presented."  Kolenovic, supra, quoting Commonwealth 
 
32 The defendant did object to the prosecutor's statements 
that Flonory must have been shot last as unsupported by the 
evidence. 
35 
 
v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 35 (2016). 
 
iii.  References to trial counsel.  The prosecutor 
improperly referred to the defendant's trial counsel as the "man 
who is representing the man charged with murder."33  See Lewis, 
465 Mass. at 130 ("it is improper for an attorney in closing 
argument to disparage opposing counsel personally").  Trial 
counsel objected.  Where the defendant seasonably objects to a 
prosecutor's error during closing argument, we determine whether 
the jury were "substantially swayed by the error."  Semedo, 456 
Mass. at 12, quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 
353 (1994).  In this review, "[t]he essential question is 
whether the error had, or might have had, an effect on the jury 
and whether the error contributed or might have contributed to 
the verdicts."  Semedo, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 
412 Mass. 505, 508-509 (1992). 
 
The remark constituted a small part of a lengthy closing 
 
33 The defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly 
stated that the defendant's trial counsel "spun . . . a tale" 
for the jury.  The language was permissible hyperbole, see 
Wilson, 427 Mass. at 352 (jury are "presumed to know that the 
prosecutor is an advocate and to be able to recognize his 
arguments as advocacy and not statements of personal belief" 
[quotation and citation omitted]), and in any event not 
prejudicial, see Commonwealth v. Taylor, 469 Mass. 516, 529 
(2014), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Dirico, 
480 Mass. 491 (2018) (concluding that prosecutor "treads on 
dangerous ground" when "accusing defense counsel of engaging in 
fabrication" through use of phrase "bald-face lie," but remark 
was nevertheless not prejudicial error). 
36 
 
argument and was made in the context of reminding the jury that 
the decision about Kimani's credibility was theirs.  Cf. Lewis, 
465 Mass. at 132 (identifying prejudice where "the tenor of the 
entire closing argument of the prosecutor improperly disparaged 
the defendant and counsel").  Importantly, the judge gave a 
specific curative instruction to the jury in response to these 
statements, instructing them, in part, that "[n]o attorney has 
any greater or lesser claim to the truth or to your respect or 
favor because of the particular side they represent."  Thus, 
there was no prejudice warranting a new trial. 
 
e.  Declining to strike a juror.  The defendant asserts 
that he was forced to use a peremptory challenge on juror no. 
33, who had been exposed to media reporting that Hurd -- who had 
not been able to identify the shooter during the first trial -- 
was in fact able to make a positive identification of the 
defendant as the shooter.  We review the judge's denial of the 
defendant's motion to strike juror no. 33 for cause for an abuse 
of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 639 
(2002). 
 
"[A] juror need not be 'totally ignorant of the facts and 
issues involved,'" as long as he or she will be able to "set 
aside [his or her] own opinion[], weigh the evidence (excluding 
matters not properly before [the jury]), and follow the 
instructions of the judge."  Stroyny, 435 Mass. at 639, quoting 
37 
 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 388 Mass. 98, 108 (1983).  A "juror['s] 
assertions of impartiality should be accepted by the judge 
unless extraordinary circumstances give some reason to question 
such assertions."  Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 494 
(2005).  See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 500 (2006), 
quoting Leahy, supra at 499 ("A judge may accept each juror's 
representation of impartiality unless there is 'solid evidence 
of a distinct bias'"); Stroyny, 435 Mass. at 639 ("Whether to 
accept the declaration of a juror that he or she is 
disinterested lies within the broad discretion of the trial 
judge").  Here, juror no. 33 repeatedly responded that he would 
be able to remain impartial.  Under these circumstances, the 
judge did not abuse his discretion.34 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a review of 
the entire record, we discern no error warranting relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed. 
 
34 The defendant also argues that juror no. 33 made 
statements suggesting a racial bias.  The judge specifically 
asked juror no. 33 whether the defendant's race would affect his 
impartiality, and the juror indicated that he would not be 
affected by the defendant's race and would remain impartial.  
The judge, who was in the best position to determine 
credibility, decided not to strike the juror for cause, which 
was within his discretion.  See Bryant, 447 Mass. at 500.