Title: Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP000765-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2020

2020 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP765-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Secretary-Designee Andrea Palm, Julie Willems 
Van Dijk and  
Lisa Olson, In Their Official Capacities As 
Executives of  
Wisconsin Department of Health Services, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 13, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 5, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., 
joined.  ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, 
J. joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.  
DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined with respect to 
¶¶198-258. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners, there was a petition and reply filed by 
Eric M. McLeod, Lane E.B. Ruhland and Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison 
and Ryan J. Walsh, John K. Adams, Amy Miller and Eimer Stahl LLP, 
Madison.  There was an oral argument by Ryan J. Walsh, Madison. 
 
 
2 
 
For the respondents, there was a response filed by Colin A. 
Hector, Thomas C. Bellavia, Colin R. Stroud, Hannah S. Jurss, 
Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorneys general, and Joshua L. 
Kaul, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by Colin Thomas 
Roth, assistant attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Tavern 
League of Wisconsin by James A. Friedman, Zachary P. Bemis, Maxted 
M. Lenz and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin Faith 
Voices for Justice by Stephen E. Kravit, Benjamin J. Glicksman and 
Kravit, Hovel & Krawczyk, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Americans for 
Prosperity – Wisconsin by Matthew M. Fernholz and Cramer, Multhauf 
& Hammes, LLP, Waukesha and Eric R. Bolinder, pro hac vice, 
Arlington, Virginia. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce and Wisconsin Dairy Alliance by Robert 
I. Fassbender and Great Lakes Legal Foundation, Madison and Corydon 
J. Fish, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin Public 
Health Association, Wisconsin Nurses Association, Wisconsin 
Chapter of American Academy of Pediatrics and Other Healthcare 
Amici Curiae by Jeffrey A. Mandell and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, 
Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal Scholars 
as Amici Curiae by Miriam Seifter, Robert Yablon and the University 
 
 
3 
of Wisconsin Law School and Barry J. Blonien and Boardman & Clark 
LLP, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Local Health Departments and Boards and Associated 
Municipalities and Counties by Paul V. Gagliardi, Salem. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of 24 Wisconsin 
Community, Advocacy, Labor and Membership Organizations by Douglas 
M. Poland and Rathje Woodward LLC, Madison and Richard Saks and 
Hawks Quindel, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Hunter Nation, 
Wisconsin Lakeshore Business Association, Sport-Fishing Guides and 
Individual Anglers by Adam M. Jarchow and Jarchow Law, LLC, Clear 
Lake. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal Action of 
Wisconsin, Inc. by Amanda C. Aubrey, Carlos N. Bailey and Robert 
Bebb Held, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Americans for 
Prosperity – Wisconsin by Matthew M. Fernholz and Cramer, Multhauf 
& Hammes, LLP, Waukesha and Eric R. Bolinder, pro hac vice, 
Arlington, Virginia. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Disability 
Rights Wisconsin, The Arc Wisconsin, The Arc and Disability and 
Aging Organizations by Elaine J. Goldenberg, pro hac vice, Brendan 
B. Gants, pro hac vice and Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Washington 
D.C. and Kristin M. Kerschensteiner, Madison and Lauren C. Barnett, 
pro hac vice and Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, 
California and Shira Wakschlag, pro hac vice, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 
4 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Milwaukee 
Teachers’ Education Association, Madison Teachers, Inc., SEIU 
Healthcare Wisconsin, and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 998 by 
Lester A. Pines, Tamara B. Packard, Christa O. Westerberg and Pines 
Bach LLP, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Independent 
Business Association of Wisconsin, Double Decker Automotive, Inc. 
and Shear Xcellence, LLC by Richard M. Esenberg, Luke Berg, Anthony 
LoCoco, Lucas Vebber and Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty, 
Inc., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Washington 
County, Wisconsin by Bradley S. Stern, county attorney, West Bend. 
 
 
 
2020 AP 42 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP765-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Secretary-Designee Andrea Palm, Julie Willems 
Van Dijk and Lisa Olson, In Their Official 
Capacities As Executives of Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 13, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J. joined.  
KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, joined.  HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and 
DALLET, JJ., joined with respect to ¶¶198-258. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION.  Rights declared. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This case is about the 
assertion of power by one unelected official, Andrea Palm, and her 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
2 
 
order to all people within Wisconsin to remain in their homes, not 
to travel and to close all businesses that she declares are not 
"essential" in Emergency Order 28.  Palm says that failure to obey 
Order 28 subjects the transgressor to imprisonment for 30 days, a 
$250 fine or both.  This case is not about Governor Tony Evers' 
Emergency Order or the powers of the Governor.   
¶2 
Accordingly, we review the Wisconsin Legislature's 
Emergency Petition for Original Action that asserts:  (1) Palm as 
Secretary-designee of the Department of Health Services (DHS), 
broke the law when she issued Emergency Order 28 after failing to 
follow emergency rule procedures required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.24 (2017-18),1 and (2) even if rulemaking were not required, 
Palm exceeded her authority by ordering everyone to stay home,2 
closing all "non-essential" businesses,3 prohibiting private 
gatherings of any number of people who are not part of a single 
household,4 and forbidding all "non-essential" travel.5  Palm 
responded that Emergency Order 28 is not a rule.  Rather, it is an 
Order, fully authorized by the powers the Legislature assigned to 
DHS under Wis. Stat. § 252.02.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Order 28, Section 1. 
3 Id., Section 2. 
4 Id., Section 3.  
5 Id., Section 5. 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We conclude that Emergency Order 28 is a rule under the 
controlling precedent of this court, Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 
Inc. v. DNR, 90 Wis. 2d 804, 280 N.W.2d 702 (1979), and therefore 
is 
subject 
to 
statutory 
emergency 
rulemaking 
procedures 
established by the Legislature.  Emergency Order 28 is a general 
order of general application within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13), which defines "Rule."  Accordingly, the rulemaking 
procedures of Wis. Stat. § 227.24 were required to be followed 
during the promulgation of Order 28.  Because they were not, 
Emergency Order 28 is unenforceable.6  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.25 required that Emergency Order 28 be promulgated using the 
procedures established by the Legislature for rulemaking if 
criminal penalties were to follow, as we explain fully below.  
Because Palm did not follow the law in creating Order 28, there 
can be no criminal penalties for violations of her order.  The 
procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. ch. 227 must be followed 
because they safeguard all people.   
¶4 
We do not conclude that Palm was without any power to 
act in the face of this pandemic.  However, Palm must follow the 
law that is applicable to state-wide emergencies.  We further 
conclude that Palm's order confining all people to their homes, 
forbidding travel and closing businesses exceeded the statutory 
authority of Wis. Stat. § 252.02 upon which Palm claims to rely.7     
                                                 
6 This decision does not apply to Section 4. a. of Emergency 
Order 28.   
7 The Legislature's petition included a third issue:  "Even 
if the Department did not violate [Wis. Stat.] § 227.24, whether 
the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Although we do not address the Governor's order, we note 
for purposes of background, that on March 12, 2020, Governor Evers 
issued Executive Order 72 "Declaring a Health Emergency in Response 
to the COVID-19 Coronavirus."  Order 72: 
 proclaimed that a public health emergency existed in 
Wisconsin; 
 designated DHS as the lead agency to respond to the 
emergency; 
 directed DHS to take "all necessary and appropriate 
measures to prevent and respond to incidents of COVID-19 
in the State"; 
 suspended administrative rules that the DHS Secretary 
thought would interfere with the emergency response and 
increase the health threat; 
 authorized the Adjutant General to activate the National 
Guard to assist in responding to the emergency; 
 directed all state agencies to assist in responding to the 
emergency; 
 proclaimed "that a period of abnormal economic disruption" 
existed; and 
 directed the Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection to guard against price gauging during the 
emergency. 
                                                 
Emergency Order 28."  The court declined to take the third issue.  
Therefore, we do not address it. 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
5 
 
¶6 
As further background we note that DHS Secretary-
designee, Andrea Palm, issued Emergency Order 12 on March 24, 2020, 
"under the authority of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3) and (6) and all 
powers vested in [her] through Executive Order #72, and at the 
direction of Governor Tony Evers[.]"  Palm's Emergency Order 12 
ordered 
"[a]ll 
individuals 
present 
within 
the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin . . . to stay at home or at their place of residence" 
with certain delineated exceptions.  It remained in effect until 
April 24, 2020. 
¶7 
On April 16, 2020, Palm issued Emergency Order 28, also 
titled "Safer at Home Order."  This order was not issued by the 
Governor, nor did it rely on the Governor's emergency declaration.  
Rather, it relied solely on "the authority vested in [Andrea Palm, 
Department of Health Services Secretary-designee] by the Laws of 
the State, including but not limited to [Wis. Stat. §] 252.02(3), 
(4), and (6)."  Emergency Order 28 commands all individuals in 
Wisconsin "to stay at home or at their place of residence" with 
certain limited exceptions approved by Palm or risk punishment "by 
up to 30 days imprisonment, or up to $250 fine, or both."8  Order 
28 also: 
 Prohibits "[a]ll forms of travel" except what Palm deems 
essential. 
 Orders "[a]ll for-profit and non-profit businesses" to 
"cease all activities" except for minimum operations that 
Palm deemed basic. 
                                                 
8 Emergency Order 28, Section 18.   
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
6 
 
 Prohibits "[a]ll public and private gatherings of any 
number" "not part of a single household." 
 Declares that all public and private K-12 schools "shall 
remain closed" for the remainder of the year.  
 Declares that libraries shall remain closed for "all in-
person services." 
 Declares all "public amusement and activity" places closed 
regardless of whether "indoors or outdoors" except golf 
courses (with restrictions).  The order says "Driving 
ranges and miniature golf must remain closed." 
 Continues the ordered closure of all salons and spas. 
 Continues the closure of every restaurant and bar except 
for take-out or delivery service. 
 Orders religious groups to limit gatherings to "fewer than 
10 people in a room" including weddings and funerals.   
 Imposes a six-foot social distancing requirement for any 
person not "residing in a single living unit or household." 
Order 28 purports to remain in effect until May 26, 2020. 
¶8 
However, on April 20, 2020, Palm issued Emergency Order 
31.  It is not challenged directly in this action.  In it, Palm 
established "Gating Criteria" that must be met in order to limit 
Emergency Order 28's proscriptions.9  Order 31 has no end date and 
relies solely on Palm's assertion of authority.     
¶9 
It is Order 28 that is being challenged in this original 
action.  The Legislature filed an Emergency Petition for Original 
                                                 
9 Emergency Order 31, Section 2. b.   
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
7 
 
Action on April 21, 2020.  On the same date, we issued an order 
setting a briefing schedule that required a response from Palm by 
April 28, 2020, and a reply from the Legislature by April 30, 2020.  
We also allowed numerous amici motions and briefs to be filed by 
April 29, 2020.10  On May 1, 2020, we granted the Legislature's 
Emergency Petition for Original Action and assumed jurisdiction 
over two issues:  (1) whether Palm violated Wis. Stat. § 227.24, 
governing emergency rules, by issuing Emergency Order 28 without 
complying with § 227.24's procedures, and (2) even if Palm did not 
violate § 227.24, whether Palm's Order 28 exceeds her authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 252.02 by ordering all persons to stay at home, 
forbidding 
all 
"nonessential" 
travel 
and 
closing 
all 
"nonessential" businesses.  The court heard oral argument on May 
5, 2020. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Our Review 
¶10 We 
review 
this 
controversy 
under 
our 
original 
jurisdiction found in the Wisconsin Constitution, Article VII, 
§ 3(2), which provides:  "The supreme court has appellate 
jurisdiction over all courts and may hear original actions and 
proceedings.  The supreme court may issue all writs necessary in 
aid of its jurisdiction."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2).  We 
exercise original jurisdiction when "the matter is one that should 
trigger the institutional responsibilities of the Supreme Court."  
Wis. S. Ct. IOP III (September 12, 2019).  See Petition of Heil, 
                                                 
10 We accepted 14 amici briefs. 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
8 
 
230 Wis. 428, 436, 284 N.W. 42, 45 (1939) ("[T]he purpose of the 
constitution was, 'To make this court indeed a supreme judicial 
tribunal over the whole state; a court of last resort on all 
judicial questions under the constitution and laws of the state; 
a court of first resort on all judicial questions affecting the 
sovereignty of the state, its franchises or prerogatives, or the 
liberties of its people.'" (quoted source omitted)). 
¶11 The dispute in this case involves whether the Secretary-
designee of DHS issued an order in violation of the laws of 
Wisconsin——an order that impacts every person in Wisconsin, as 
well as persons who come into Wisconsin, and every "non-essential" 
business.  Exercising original jurisdiction is appropriate in this 
dispute. 
¶12 Palm has contended that the Legislature does not have 
standing to invoke our original jurisdiction for these claims.  
Whether a party has standing is a question of law.  Schill v. Wis. 
Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶38, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 
177 (Lead opinion).  "Wisconsin courts evaluate standing as a 
matter of judicial policy rather than as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite."  Id. (citing Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee 
Cty., 2001 WI 65, ¶38 n.7, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866).  One 
has standing to seek judicial review when one has a stake in the 
outcome of the controversy and is affected by the issues in 
controversy.  Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶38 (Lead opinion).  
¶13 The crux of the Legislature's claims is that Emergency 
Order 28 was promulgated without following required statutory 
procedures applicable to an emergency, and in so doing, Palm 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
9 
 
impinged upon the Legislature's constitutional core power and its 
functions under Wis. Stat. §§ 227.24 and 227.26.  The Legislature's 
claim is grounded in the concept of separation of powers that is 
inherent in the Wisconsin Constitution.  We previously have 
concluded that petitioners had standing to sue when, as 
legislators, they claimed that a member of the executive branch 
invaded the Legislature's core powers.  Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 
52, ¶42, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666, abrogated on other 
grounds by Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 
¶2, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the Legislature has standing to proceed on the two claims for which 
we granted review.   
B.  Standard of Review 
¶14 Whether Emergency Order 28 fits the statutory definition 
of a "Rule" is critical to deciding the issues presented herein.  
We decide whether an action is a rule by interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13), which defines when an action is a rule and when 
specified actions are not rules.  § 227.01(13)(a)–(zz).  Issues of 
statutory interpretation and application present questions of law.  
Milwaukee Police Ass'n. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 86, ¶17, 383 
Wis. 2d 247, 914 N.W.2d 597. 
C.  Applicable Statutes 
1.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.01(13) 
¶15 The Legislature contends that Palm violated the law by 
issuing Emergency Order 28 because Order 28 is a "Rule" as defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13), and Palm did not follow rulemaking 
procedures that were required by Wis. Stat. § 227.24 when Order 28 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
10 
 
was propagated.  Palm contends that Order 28 is not a rule, but 
rather an order of state-wide application, which did not require 
that rulemaking procedures be followed during propagation.  If 
Order 28 meets the statutory definition of a rule, then Palm 
violated the law because Palm admits that rulemaking procedures 
were not employed. 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.01(13), which defines "Rule" and 
those actions that are not rules is central to this controversy.  
It provides in relevant part: 
"Rule" means a regulation, standard, statement of 
policy, or general order of general application that has 
the force of law and that is issued by an agency to 
implement, interpret, or make specific legislation 
enforced or administered by the agency or to govern the 
organization or procedure of the agency.  "Rule" 
includes a modification of a rule under s. 227.265. 
"Rule" does not include, and s. 227.10 does not apply 
to, any action or inaction of an agency, whether it would 
otherwise meet the definition under this subsection, 
that:  [come within the actions described in (a)–(zz)]. 
¶17 The Legislature argues that Emergency Order 28 is a rule 
because it is a "general order of general application."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13).  The Legislature focuses the relevant inquiry on to 
whom the order applies; not why or how it applies.  It is undisputed 
that Emergency Order 28 is applicable to every person physically 
present in Wisconsin, whether they were present when the order was 
issued or entered Wisconsin subsequently.  Order 28 is not an 
"order in a contested case" nor "an order directed to a 
specifically named person or to a group of specifically named 
persons 
that 
does 
not 
constitute 
a 
general 
class."  
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
11 
 
§ 227.01(13)(b), (c).  If it were either, it would be exempt from 
the definition of a rule set out in § 227.01(13). 
¶18 Palm asserts that Emergency Order 28 is not a general 
order of general application because it responds to a specific 
situation.  She states, "While an order responding to the pandemic 
may be a 'general order' because it applies to the population as 
a whole, it is not of 'general application' because it responds 
only to a specific, limited-in-time scenario."   
¶19 Palm also cites Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4), which states, in 
part, that "[a]ny rule or order" made by DHS "may be made 
applicable to the whole or any specified part of the state."  She 
argues there has to be some way for an order to be applicable to 
the "whole" state without it being a general order of general 
application or the reference to orders in § 252.02(4) is redundant 
because all general orders of general application are rules.  
Therefore, Palm contends, Emergency Order 28 cannot be a general 
order of general application solely because it applies to every 
person physically present in Wisconsin.  She also cites 
§ 252.02(6), which states that DHS can "authorize and implement 
all emergency measures to control communicable diseases." 
¶20 The question of when a general order is of general 
application has been addressed previously by Wisconsin courts.  We 
addressed the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13)'s term, "of 
general application," in Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 90 
Wis. 2d 804.  There, "the DNR issued an order which found that 
Columbia County had not enacted a reasonable and effective flood 
plain zoning ordinance and which adopted a zoning ordinance for 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
12 
 
the delineated flood plain."  Id. at 808.  Over ten months after 
DNR promulgated the ordinance, Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. 
(Citizens) sought declaratory judgment that the ordinance was 
invalid.  Id. at 809.  The DNR moved to dismiss on the ground that 
Citizens' claim was time-barred.  Id.  As we explained, Citizens' 
claim was not time-barred if the ordinance was a rule.  Id. at 
813–14.   
¶21 Our answer to the question of whether the ordinance was 
a rule, was determined by the definition of "Rule" now set out in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).11  We concluded the ordinance was a rule 
because it was a "regulation of general application."  Id. at 816.  
We stated: 
It is not always easy to determine whether an agency 
action is a rule and is of general application or is a 
determination which affects specific parties.  The 
Columbia County flood plain zoning ordinance applies 
only to land within the floodplain in unincorporated 
areas of Columbia County.  The ordinance restricts the 
conduct of only those persons with a legal interest in 
such land.  Nevertheless, to be of general application, 
a rule need not apply to all persons within the state.  
Even though an action applies only to persons within a 
small class, the action is of general application if 
that class is described in general terms and new members 
can be added to the class. 
Id. at 814–16 (emphasis added).   
                                                 
11 At the time that Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. DNR, 
90 Wis. 2d 804, 280 N.W.2d 702 (1979) was decided, Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(3) (1973-74) defined "Rule" as "a regulation, standard, 
statement of policy or general order . . . of general application 
and having the effect of law, issued by an agency to implement, 
interpret or make specific legislation enforced or administered by 
such agency or to govern the organization or procedure of such 
agency."  
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
13 
 
¶22 We explained that "a rule for purposes of ch. 227 is 
(1) a regulation, standard, statement of policy or general order; 
(2) of general application; (3) having the effect of law; 
(4) issued by an agency; (5) to implement, interpret or make 
specific legislation enforced or administered by such agency as to 
govern the interpretation or procedure of such agency."  Id. at 
814.  We concluded that the flood plain ordinance was a rule.  Id.  
In so doing, our focus was on the people who were regulated by the 
order.  Id. (explaining that the ordinance restricts the conduct 
of those persons with a legal interest in property in the flood 
plain).  Our focus was not on the type of factual circumstances 
that led to the DNR order.  We concluded that when the class of 
people regulated by an order "is described in general terms and 
new members can be added to the class," the order is of general 
application and is a rule.  Id. at 816.  There, the class of people 
were described in general terms and new members could be added to 
the class when others secured legal interests in property in the 
flood plain.   
¶23 Citizens for Sensible Zoning has been cited for its 
explanation of the Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13) term, "of general 
application," when a challenge is made to an agency action 
asserting that the action is a "Rule."  In Cholvin v. DHFS, 2008 
WI App 127, 313 Wis. 2d 749, 758 N.W.2d 118, the court of appeals 
applied Citizens for Sensible Zoning.  Id., ¶23.  In Cholvin, the 
plaintiff had been receiving Wisconsin Medicaid program benefits.  
Id., ¶1.  She challenged an instruction given to screeners that 
hindered her ability to continue receiving benefits.  Id.  One of 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
14 
 
the issues was whether the instruction was a policy of general 
application and therefore a rule.  She argued the policy was "of 
general application because it applie[d] to the entire class of 
persons who have their eligibility for a Medicaid waiver program 
determined by the use of the functional screen."  Id., ¶24.  She 
contended "that new members can be added to the class as additional 
people seek to receive Medicaid waiver benefits and as changes in 
their fluctuating abilities occur."  Id.  The court of appeals 
agreed, concluding that the instruction was a policy of general 
application and therefore a rule.  Id., ¶25.  As with Citizens for 
Sensible Zoning, in Cholvin, the focus was on the people regulated, 
not on the factual context in which the regulation arose.  The 
class of people was described in general terms and there was the 
ability to add new members to the class.  Id.   
¶24 We conclude that Order 28 is a "general order of general 
application."  The order regulates all persons in Wisconsin at the 
time it was issued and it regulates all who will come into 
Wisconsin in the future.  If we were to read the definition of 
"Rule" as Palm suggests, one person, Palm, an unelected official, 
could create law applicable to all people during the course of 
COVID-19 and subject people to imprisonment when they disobeyed 
her order.    
¶25 Palm has not addressed either Citizens for Sensible 
Zoning or Cholvin, yet these precedential decisions directly 
address whether Palm's Order 28 is a rule.  In addition, both cases 
stand contrary to her argument that the reason for the order is 
controlling.  Furthermore, both cases noted the openness of the 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
15 
 
groups of people regulated.  Stated otherwise, people not regulated 
by the order one day could have been regulated the next.  Citizens 
for 
Sensible 
Zoning, 
90 
Wis. 2d at 
814–16; 
Cholvin, 
313 
Wis. 2d 749, ¶24.  In the case now before us, persons travelling 
from other states become bound by Order 28 when they cross into 
Wisconsin.  
¶26 We note that the legislative history underlying Wis. 
Stat. § 252.02 confirms our understanding that the drafters of the 
language on which Palm relies did not contemplate expanding DHS's 
authority, nor did DHS understand the amendment to do so.  1981 
Assembly Bill 711 created the "issue orders" language.  In the 
"Explanatory Notes" DHS stated that the bill is "basically 
technical changes designed to bring the statute into concordance 
with the current public health and epidemiologic thought and 
terminology."  In 1979, the predecessor statute of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13) addressed "general orders of general application," 
showing that DHS had the authority to issue orders in 1979, but 
that an "order" was a "Rule" when it met the statutory definition 
of a rule.  Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 90 Wis. 2d at 815.  And 
finally, the Legislative Reference Bureau never described the 
added language as changing DHS's authority. 
¶27 We also are not persuaded by Palm's characterization of 
Emergency Order 28.  Her assertion that "it responds only to a 
specific, limited-in-time scenario" is questionable and not 
relevant to whether Order 28 is a rule.  Furthermore, a "limited-
in-time scenario" is not the power that Palm has seized.  To 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
16 
 
explain further, subsequent to Order 28, Palm has issued Emergency 
Order 31, which states: 
Wisconsin shall adopt a phased approach to re-opening 
its economy and society, with each phase being 
incrementally 
less 
restrictive 
on 
businesses 
and 
individuals while protecting the public from COVID-19.  
The Department of Health Services shall announce the 
transition 
to 
each 
Phase 
with 
an 
order 
fully 
articulating the activities that will resume. 
Emergency Order 31's "Gating Criteria" direct repeated extensions 
of the restrictions in Order 28 until criteria Palm has 
established, 
again 
without 
following 
the 
procedures 
for 
emergencies set out in Wis. Stat. § 227.24, are met.  Stated 
otherwise, Palm's subjective judgment in regard to "Gating 
Criteria" is the only limitation of Order 28's restrictions.   
¶28 Rulemaking exists precisely to ensure that kind of 
controlling, subjective judgment asserted by one unelected 
official, Palm, is not imposed in Wisconsin.  See NLRB v. Wyman-
Gorden Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that "rule-making provisions of that Act [the 
Administrative Procedures Act], which the Board would avoid, were 
designed to assure fairness and a mature consideration of rules of 
general application"). 
¶29 We recognize that emergency rulemaking procedures 
contemplate that rules may have to be promulgated in response to 
extraordinary circumstances.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.24(1)(a) 
explains that: 
An agency may . . . promulgate a rule as an emergency 
rule without complying with the notice, hearing, and 
publication 
requirements 
under 
this 
chapter 
if 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
17 
 
preservation of the public peace, health, safety, or 
welfare necessitates putting the rule into effect prior 
to the time it would take effect if the agency complied 
with the procedures. 
An emergency rule promulgated under § 227.24(1)(a) "remains in 
effect only for 150 days," § 227.24(1)(c), unless extended by the 
Legislature's Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules.  
§ 227.24(2)(a).  As counsel for the Legislature explained during 
oral argument:  "Necessarily under [ch.] 227 you're dealing with 
a rule that's time limited and necessarily you're dealing with a 
rule that's responding to a new set of circumstances and is 
prospective."  Therefore, Emergency Order 28 is a general order of 
general application:  the class is generally defined and new 
members are added to the class when people enter Wisconsin.  
¶30 We also note that Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13)(a)–(zz) 
contains 72 specific exemptions from the definition of "Rule."  
The exemptions are extraordinarily detailed.12  Some exemptions 
apply to DHS.  For example, DHS actions relating "to computing or 
publishing the number of nursing home beds, to be added in each 
                                                 
12 For example, "standards under subch. IX of ch. 254" are 
exempted.  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13)(zu).  Subchapter IX covers the 
"Sale or Gift of Cigarettes or Tobacco Products to Minors."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 254.916(1)(b) states:  "The department, in 
consultation with other governmental regulatory authorities and 
with retailers, shall establish standards for procedures and 
training for conducting investigations under this section."  
Further, a rule does not include agency action that "[e]stablishes 
criteria and standards for certifying instructors for the trapper 
education program." § 227.01(13)(zn).  Furthermore, the definition 
of rule does not cover decisions that "relate[] to the curriculum 
of, admission to or graduation from a public educational 
institution, as determined by each institution."  § 227.01(13)(f).  
The list goes on and on, describing § 227.01(13)'s 72 exemptions 
from the definition of "Rule."   
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
18 
 
health planning area under s. 150.33(1)" are exempt from the 
definition of "Rule."  § 227.01(13)(u).  Some exemptions relate to 
"orders," e.g., § 227.01(13)(b) and (c).  However, despite the 
detailed nature of the list, and the Legislature's consideration 
of acts of DHS and its consideration of "orders," no act or order 
of DHS pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 252.02 is exempted from the 
definition of "Rule."     
¶31 In 
addition, 
we 
employ 
the 
constitutional-doubt 
principle.  That is, we disfavor statutory interpretations that 
unnecessarily raise serious constitutional questions about the 
statute under consideration.  Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 
380-81 (2005).  Palm points to statutes that she asserts give her 
broad authority to impose regulation; but it does not follow she 
can impose regulation without going through a process to give the 
people faith in the justness of the regulation.  However, under 
Palm's theory, she can "implement all emergency measures necessary 
to control communicable diseases," Wis. Stat. § 252.02(6), even at 
the expense of fundamental liberties, without rulemaking.  That 
interpretation is constitutionally suspect.  We do not construe 
§ 252.02(6) as an "open-ended grant" of police powers to an 
unconfirmed cabinet secretary.  Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. 
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality) (explaining 
that statutory construction that affords a "sweeping delegation of 
legislative power" has the potential to cause constitutional 
problems in future cases). 
¶32 To explain further, Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides that "All people are born equally free and 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
19 
 
independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted, deriving their just powers form the 
consent of the governed."  The people consent to the Legislature 
making laws because they have faith that the procedural hurdles 
required to pass legislation limit the ability of the Legislature 
to infringe on their rights.  These limits include bicameralism 
and presentment, Wis. Const. art. V, § 10, quorum requirements, 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 7, and journal and open door requirements, 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 10.  At times, legislation is enacted that 
infringes on a person's rights despite these front-end procedures, 
however, for that we have judicial review. 
¶33 We have allowed the Legislature to delegate its 
authority to make law to administrative agencies.  But as we stated 
in Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 697, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992), 
such a delegation is allowed only if there are "adequate standards 
for conducting the allocated power."  Stated otherwise, "[a] 
delegation of legislative power to a subordinate agency will be 
upheld if the purpose of the delegating statute is ascertainable 
and there are procedural safeguards to insure that the board or 
agency acts within that legislative purpose."  J.F. Ahern Co. v. 
Wis. State Bldg. Comm'n, 114 Wis. 2d 69, 90, 336 N.W.2d 679 
(Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Watchmaking Examining Bd. v. Husar, 49 
Wis. 2d 526, 536, 182 N.W.2d 257 (1971)).   
¶34 When a grant of legislative power is made, there must be 
procedural safeguards to prevent the "arbitrary, unreasonable or 
oppressive conduct of the agency."  J.F. Ahern, 114 Wis. 2d at 90 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
20 
 
(quoting DOA v. DILHR, 77 Wis. 2d 126, 135, 252 N.W.2d 353 (1977)).  
Procedural safeguards, generally, are those requirements imposed 
by the Administrative Procedures Act, codified at ch. 227.  Id. at 
135. 
¶35 Palm cannot point to any procedural safeguards on the 
power she claims.  At oral argument, she continuously referenced 
judicial review; but judicial review takes place after an 
allegation is made that an individual's rights have been violated.  
That is why our case law consistently speaks of "procedural and 
judicial safeguards."  E.g., id. (emphasis added).  Rulemaking 
provides the ascertainable standards that hinder arbitrary or 
oppressive conduct by an agency.  Judicial review does not prevent 
oppressive conduct from initially occurring. 
¶36 Furthermore, Emergency Order 28 purports to criminalize 
conduct pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 252.25 when a factual directive 
of Order 28 is transgressed.13  For example, Order 28 purports to 
impose 30 days in jail when a person leaves home for a purpose 
Palm did not approve.  
¶37 However, in order to constitute criminal conduct 
proscribed by statute, the conduct must be set out with specificity 
in the statute to give fair notice.  State v. Starks, 51 Wis. 2d 
256, 263-64, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971).  The same specificity is 
                                                 
13 Emergency Order 28, Section 18; Wis. Stat. § 252.25 
provides:  "Any person who willfully violates or obstructs the 
execution of any . . . department order under this chapter and 
relating to the public health, for which no other penalty is 
prescribed, shall be imprisoned for not more than 30 days or fined 
not more than $500 or both." 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
21 
 
required in a properly promulgated rule before criminal sanctions 
could follow violations.  Both must "meet the standards of 
definiteness applicable to statutory definitions of criminal 
offenses."  State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 709, 247 N.W.2d 714 
(1976) (violation of rule, Wis. Admin. Code § Ag 29.12(6), was 
charged as a misdemeanor).   
¶38 It has long been the law in Wisconsin that in order for 
the violation of an administrative agency's directive to 
constitute a crime, the directive must have been properly 
promulgated as a rule.  HM Distribs. of Milwaukee v. Dep't of Ag., 
55 Wis. 2d 261, 268-69, 198 N.W.2d 598 (1972) (discussing a 
contention that criminal penalties were not proper because the 
administrative regulation was not properly promulgated as a rule); 
see also State v. Lambert, 68 Wis. 2d 523, 526, 229 N.W.2d 622 
(1975) (explaining that criminal conduct can follow from a properly 
promulgated rule).  
¶39 Palm asserts that Order 28 is not a rule, yet she also 
asserts Wis. Stat. § 252.25 endows her with the power to create 
criminal penalties for violations of Order 28.  Her argument stands 
§ 252.25 on its head.  This is so because criminal penalties can 
arise from a rule violation only when the rule was properly 
promulgated.  HM Distribs., 55 Wis. 2d at 268-69 (explaining that 
HM Distributors' contention that "proper and required rulemaking 
procedures were not followed" was without merit). Without the 
promulgation of a rule, no criminal penalties are possible for 
violations of administrative agency directives.  Id.     
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
22 
 
¶40 Notwithstanding the law, Emergency Order 28 does not 
rely on a statute within ch. 252 defining the elements of the crime 
to which punishment under Wis. Stat. § 252.25 must refer.  Rather, 
the prohibited "criminal conduct" to which Palm refers is factually 
defined solely by Emergency Order 28.  Stated otherwise, Palm 
created the potential for a crime by Order 28.  Counsel for Palm 
admitted as much at oral argument when he said that there was only 
one element that needed to be proved in a criminal prosecution for 
a violation of Emergency Order 28:  that a provision of the order 
was violated.  Such an argument is without legal foundation and 
ignores more than 50 years of Wisconsin law, some of which we cited 
above.   
¶41 As we said at the beginning of this decision, the 
Governor's emergency powers are not challenged by the Legislature, 
and Palm does not rely on the Governor's emergency powers.  
Constitutional law has generally permitted the Governor to respond 
to emergencies without the need for legislative approval.  "With 
no time for ex ante deliberation, and no metric for ex post 
assessments, the executive's capacities for swift, vigorous, and 
secretive action are at a premium."  Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form 
and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 Conn. L. 
Rev. 1549, 1565 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  But the 
Governor's emergency powers are premised on the inability to secure 
legislative approval given the nature of the emergency.  For 
example, if a forest fire breaks out, there is no time for debate.  
Action is needed.  The Governor could declare an emergency and 
respond accordingly.  But in the case of a pandemic, which lasts 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
23 
 
month after month, the Governor cannot rely on emergency powers 
indefinitely.14     
¶42 Emergency Order 28 is a general order of general 
application within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  It is 
a rule; and accordingly, the rulemaking procedures of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.24, which protect people affected by DHS orders, were 
required to be followed during the promulgation of Order 28.  
Furthermore, Palm's reliance on Wis. Stat. § 252.25 for criminal 
penalties for those who violate Order 28 is misplaced.  She chose 
not to follow the law; therefore, there can be no criminal 
penalties for violations of Order 28.  Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d at 
709.   
2.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 252 
¶43 Chapter 252 addresses communicable diseases.  Palm 
relies on Wis. Stat. § 252.02 for the legitimacy of Order 28.  As 
already explained, Palm was in error to assert that she was not 
required to comply with rulemaking procedures.  However, because 
we granted review of the second issue presented by the Legislature, 
we assume, arguendo, that rulemaking was not required, and consider 
                                                 
14 Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 323.10 authorizes the Governor to 
invoke special emergency powers for 60 days when the Governor 
declares an emergency, which Governor Evers did here.  We note 
that 60 days is more than enough time to follow rulemaking 
procedures pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.24.  Therefore, emergency 
circumstances do not justify Palm's failure to follow the 
Administrative Procedures Act.  However, Palm claims that neither 
rulemaking nor time-constraints inherent to emergency powers 
restrict her power.  That assertion is contrary to the law in the 
State of Wisconsin. 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
24 
 
whether Emergency Order 28 exceeded the scope of permissible 
actions under § 252.02.   
¶44 Palm claims that "the meaning of the provisions in [Wis. 
Stat. §] 252.02 are plain."  She argues that "DHS has the power to 
take direct action to control communicable diseases, just as it 
did through Safer-at-Home [Order 28]."  She asserts that 
§ 252.02(6) gives DHS expansive authority to respond to a rare 
public health crisis like COVID-19.  Therefore, she can "authorize 
and implement all emergency measures necessary to control 
communicable diseases."  In addition, Palm asserts that Order 28 
is independently authorized under § 252.02(4), which provides DHS 
with multiple avenues "for the control and suppression of 
communicable diseases."  And finally, many of Order 28's provisions 
also fall under § 252.02(3), which Palm asserts empowers her to 
"close schools and forbid public gatherings in schools, churches, 
and other public places to control outbreaks and epidemics." 
¶45 Palm asserts her broadest grant of authority is Wis. 
Stat. § 252.02(6) because it says she can authorize and implement 
"all" emergency measures "necessary" to control communicable 
diseases.15  She asserts that "'all' [as a modifier] suggests an 
expansive meaning because 'all' is a term of great breadth."  She 
cites Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 336 
(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nat'l Coal. for Students with Disabilities 
Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.02(6) provides:  "The department may 
authorize and implement all emergency measures necessary to 
control communicable diseases." 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
25 
 
1998)).  She argues that she does not have limitless power under 
this subsection because it applies "only in an 'emergency,'" and 
"the statute requires an action be 'necessary.'" 
¶46 Crimes created by the Legislature in statutes must have 
specificity in order to be enforceable.  State v. Popanz, 112 
Wis. 2d 166, 173, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983) (explaining that a 
"criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give a person 
of ordinary intelligence who seeks to avoid its penalties fair 
notice of conduct required or prohibited").  Because Palm fails to 
understand the specificity necessary to a valid criminal statute, 
she also fails to understand that no less specificity is required 
of a rule to which criminal penalties are assigned.  Courtney, 74 
Wis. 2d at 709.     
¶47 If Wis. Stat. § 252.02(6) were the sole factual 
foundation for criminal charges, no criminal prosecution could 
result because § 252.02(6) does not have the specificity required 
for fair notice of the conduct required or prohibited.  Stated 
otherwise, it has no definable standards for required or prohibited 
conduct.  Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d at 173.  If Emergency Order 28 had 
been promulgated as a rule, it has much more specificity; however, 
since no rulemaking occurred, Order 28 cannot save itself.   
¶48 Palm 
next 
cites 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.02(4).16  
Section 252.02(4) addresses four occurrences that permit DHS 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stats. § 252.02(4) provides:   
Except as provided in ss. 93.07 (24) (e) and 97.59, the 
department may promulgate and enforce rules or issue 
orders for guarding against the introduction of any 
communicable disease into the state, for the control and 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
26 
 
action:  First, "for guarding against the introduction of any 
communicable disease into the state;" second, "for control and 
suppression of communicable diseases;" third, "for the quarantine 
and disinfection of persons, localities and things infected or 
suspected of being infected by a communicable disease," and fourth, 
"for the sanitary care of jails, state prisons, mental health 
institutions, schools, and public buildings and connected 
premises." 
¶49 However, Order 28 goes far beyond what is authorized in 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4).  For example, Order 28 exceeds the 
§ 252.02(4) authority to quarantine those infected or suspected of 
being infected.  Instead, Palm quarantines "[a]ll individuals 
present within the State of Wisconsin" by ordering them "to stay 
at home or at their place of residence" with exceptions she deems 
appropriate.17  She also prohibits "All public and private 
gatherings of any number of people that are not part of a single 
                                                 
suppression of communicable diseases, for the quarantine 
and disinfection of persons, localities and things 
infected 
or 
suspected 
of 
being 
infected 
by 
a 
communicable disease and for the sanitary care of jails, 
state prisons, mental health institutions, schools, and 
public buildings and connected premises.  Any rule or 
order may be made applicable to the whole or any 
specified part of the state, or to any vessel or other 
conveyance. The department may issue orders for any 
city, village or county by service upon the local health 
officer.  Rules that are promulgated and orders that are 
issued under this subsection supersede conflicting or 
less stringent local regulations, orders or ordinances. 
17 Emergency Order, Section 1. 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
27 
 
household or living unit."18  Again, this directive is not based 
on persons infected or suspected of being infected.     
¶50 Palm skips over this obvious overreach and contends that 
the first and second provision of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4) permit 
actions taken in Order 28.  However, once again, Order 28 is overly 
broad in its proscriptions.  "Áll forms of travel are prohibited 
except for essential travel as defined in this Order,"19 i.e., by 
Palm.  If this restriction supposedly is connected to the first 
permissible action under § 252.02(4) to "guard against the 
introduction of any communicable disease into the state," Order 28 
goes well beyond entry of communicable disease into the state.  It 
prevents "All forms of travel," not simply interstate travel.  
Furthermore, nothing in § 252.02(4) permits Palm to close "All 
for-profit and non-profit businesses with a facility in Wisconsin, 
except 
[those 
Palm 
defies 
as 
essential 
businesses 
and 
operations]."  She cites no authority for this vast seizure of 
power.    
¶51 In opposition to Palm's claims, the Legislature raised 
legislatively-imposed directives that courts are to follow when 
interpreting the scope of agency authority.  To place this 
contention in context, the reader should note that there is history 
underlying how courts have interpreted administrative agency 
powers. 
 
Formerly, 
court 
decisions 
permitted 
Wisconsin 
administrative agency powers to be implied.  See Wis. Citizens 
                                                 
18 Id., Section 3. 
19 Id., Section 5.   
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
28 
 
Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶14, 270 Wis. 2d 
318, 677 N.W.2d 612.  In theory, "any reasonable doubt pertaining 
to an agency's implied powers" was resolved "against the agency."  
Wis. Builders Ass'n v. DOT, 2005 WI App 160, ¶9, 285 Wis. 2d 472, 
702 N.W.2d 433.  However, the Legislature concluded that this 
theory did not match reality.  Therefore, under 2011 Wis. Act 21, 
the Legislature significantly altered our administrative law 
jurisprudence by imposing an "explicit authority requirement" on 
our interpretations of agency powers.  Kirsten Koschnick, Comment, 
Making "Explicit Authority" Explicit Deciphering Wis. Act 21's 
Prescriptions for Agency Rulemaking Authority, 2019 Wis. L. 
Rev. 993, 997.   
¶52 The explicit authority requirement is codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m), which provides:  "No agency may implement or 
enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold, . . . unless that 
standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly required or 
explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule that has been 
promulgated in accordance with this subchapter[.]"  Furthermore, 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)1.—3., as summarized by a recent comment 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Law 
Review, 
"prevent[s] 
agencies 
from 
circumventing this new 'explicit authority' requirement by simply 
utilizing broad statutes describing the agency's general duties or 
legislative purpose as a blank check for regulatory authority."20  
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)2. provides:  "A statutory 
provision describing the agency's general powers or duties does 
not confer rule-making authority on the agency or augment the 
agency's rule-making authority beyond the rule-making authority 
that is explicitly conferred on the agency by the legislature."   
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
29 
 
Koschnick, Making "Explicit Authority" Explicit, at 996.  The 
explicit authority requirement is, in effect, a legislatively-
imposed canon of construction that requires us to narrowly construe 
imprecise delegations of power to administrative agencies.  See 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation 
of 
Legal 
Texts 
225 
(2012) 
("Interpretive-Direction 
Canon":  "interpretation clauses are to be carefully followed."). 
¶53 In addition, the Legislature cites two more canons of 
construction that it asserts apply here:  first, the Legislature 
does not alter fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague 
terms or in ancillary provisions.  Second, the Legislature cites 
the constitutional-doubt principle.  As the United States 
Department of Justice has recently written in a COVID-19-related 
case raising constitutional issues, "There is no pandemic 
exception . . . to the fundamental liberties the Constitution 
safeguards. 
 
Indeed, 
'individual 
rights 
secured 
by 
the 
Constitution do not disappear during a public health crisis.'  
These individual rights, including the protections in the Bill of 
Rights made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, are always in force and restrain government action."  
Statement of Interest, Temple Baptist Church v. City of Greenville, 
No. 4:20-cv-64-DMB-JMV (N.D. Miss. April 14, 2020), ECF No. 6 
(quoting In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020)). 
¶54 With these canons as guides, the Legislature interprets 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), (4) and (6) much differently than Palm.  
To some extent, Palm and the Legislature are talking past each 
other.  For example, Palm focuses on § 252.02(6) which she asserts 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
30 
 
granted broad powers to DHS.  The Legislature focuses on the 
necessary 
procedural 
foundation 
that 
must 
precede 
DHS's 
implementation or enforcement.  As Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) 
directs, unless a rule has been promulgated pursuant to ch. 227 or 
the DHS action is "explicitly required or explicitly permitted by 
statute" DHS has no power to implement or enforce its directives. 
¶55 We do not define the precise scope of DHS authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), (4) and (6) because clearly Order 28 went 
too far.  We cannot expansively read statutes with imprecise 
terminology that purport to delegate lawmaking authority to an 
administrative agency.  The Legislature appropriately cites the 
statutory explicit authority requirement, Wis. Stat. § 229.10(2m), 
and has provided plausible readings of the text.   
¶56 We have declared rights under the law wherein we have 
concluded that Emergency Order 28 is invalid and therefore, 
unenforceable.  Although a very unusual request, on April 21, 2020, 
the Legislature asked this court to issue a temporary injunction 
of Emergency Order 28 but then requested a stay of that injunction 
for at least six days.  We perceive this request as being grounded 
in a concern for an orderly transition from Order 28 to a lawful 
rule.   
¶57 However, more than two weeks have passed since we began 
our consideration of this case.  Therefore, we trust that the 
Legislature and Palm have placed the interests of the people of 
Wisconsin first and have been working together in good faith to 
establish a lawful rule that addresses COVID-19 and its devastating 
effects on Wisconsin.  People, businesses and other institutions 
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
31 
 
need to know how to proceed and what is expected of them.  
Therefore, we place the responsibility for this future law-making 
with the Legislature and DHS where it belongs. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 We conclude that Emergency Order 28 is a rule under the 
controlling precedent of this court, Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 
Inc. v. DNR, 90 Wis. 2d 804, 280 N.W.2d 702 (1979), and therefore 
is 
subject 
to 
statutory 
emergency 
rulemaking 
procedures 
established by the Legislature.  Emergency Order 28 is a general 
order of general application within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13) which defines "Rule."  Accordingly, the rulemaking 
procedures of Wis. Stat. § 227.24 were required to be followed 
during the promulgation of Order 28.  Because they were not, 
Emergency Order 28 is unenforceable.21  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.25 required that Emergency Order 28 be promulgated using the 
procedures established by the Legislature for rulemaking if 
criminal penalties were to follow. Because Palm did not follow the 
law in creating Order 28, there can be no criminal penalties for 
violations of her order.  The procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 227 must be followed because they safeguard all people. 
¶59 We further conclude that Palm's order confining all 
people to their homes, forbidding travel and closing businesses 
                                                 
21 This decision does not apply to Section 4. a. of Emergency 
Order 28.   
No. 
2020AP765-OA   
 
2 
 
exceeded the statutory authority of Wis. Stat. § 252.02, upon which 
Palm claims to rely.      
By the Court.—Palm's Emergency Order 28 is declared unlawful, 
invalid, and unenforceable.   
 
No.  2020AP765-OA.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶60 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion, but for the reasons set forth below I also 
concur. 
¶61 We have declared that Emergency Order 28 is invalid and 
therefore, unenforceable.  Earlier, the Legislature asked us to 
issue an injunction but to stay such an injunction for six days, 
and at oral argument, the Legislature implied that a longer stay 
may be appropriate if we were to enjoin Order 28.   
¶62 Requesting a stay for a requested injunction is a very 
unusual request, but we understand that it is driven by the 
Legislature's concern that confusion may result if Order 28 is 
declared 
invalid 
and 
actions 
to 
enforce 
our 
declaration 
immediately commence.  People, businesses and other institutions 
may not know how to proceed or what is expected of them. 
¶63 Furthermore, there is authority supporting such a 
request.  Declaratory judgment is a legal remedy; however, it is 
analogous to an injunction, which is an equitable remedy.  Samuels 
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 70–71 (1971).  In Samuels, The United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
Although the declaratory judgment sought by the 
plaintiffs [in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 
319 U.S. 293 (1943)] was a statutory remedy rather than 
a traditional form of equitable relief, the Court made 
clear that a suit for declaratory judgment was 
nevertheless 'essentially an equitable cause of action,' 
and was 'analogous to the equity jurisdiction in suits 
quia timet or for decree quieting title.'  . . .  [T]he 
Court held that in an action for a declaratory judgment, 
'the district court was as free as in any other suit in 
equity to grant or withhold the relief prayed, upon 
equitable grounds. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.pdr 
 
2 
 
Samuels, 401 U.S. at 70-71 (internal citations omitted).  The Court 
emphasized the "continuing validity" of its analogy between 
declaratory judgments and injunctive relief.  Id. at 71.  
¶64 The analogy between declaratory judgment and injunctive 
relief is particularly strong in the context of this case.  As 
then-Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley said, 
"[t]he oft-stated, oft-repeated legal maxim is clear:  declaratory 
judgments are treated functionally as injunctions, when applied to 
governmental parties who are bound by the force and meaning of 
judgments under the law."  Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2013 
WI 91, ¶43, 351 Wis. 2d 237, 869 N.W.2d. 388 (Abrahamson, C.J., & 
A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting).1 
¶65 Therefore, I conclude there is a legal basis upon which 
to consider the Legislature's extraordinary request.  I too am 
appreciative of the concerns raised by COVID-19 and the possibility 
of throwing the state into chaos.  Accordingly, although our 
declaration of rights is effective immediately, I would stay future 
actions to enforce our decision until May 20, 2020.  However, I 
                                                 
1 In Village of Brown Deer, we concluded that the circuit 
court could not stay execution of a declaratory judgment.  Village 
of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 631, 635, 99 
N.W.2d 860 (1959).  However, Village of Brown Deer is factually 
distinct from the case before us because the stay resulted in 
creation of a financial obligation for a city.  Id. at 637.  We 
explained that by staying execution, "the city would be required 
to finance services in an area that had been judiciary [sic] 
determined to belong to the village.  The trial court had no 
authority to impose that duty upon the city."  Id.  In the present 
dispute, there is no burden imposed on DHS as a result of our stay.  
Indeed, it will be helpful to Palm because she and her staff can 
use the period to promulgate an emergency rule pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.24. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.pdr 
 
2 
 
trust that the parties will place the interests of the people of 
Wisconsin first and work together in good faith to quickly 
establish a rule that best addresses COVID-19 and its devastating 
effects on Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶66 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).1  Under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, all governmental power derives "from the 
consent of the governed" and government officials may act only 
within the confines of the authority the people give them.  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 1.  The people of Wisconsin never consented to 
any elected official, much less an unelected cabinet secretary,   
having the power to create law, execute it, and enforce it.  
"[E]ver vigilant in averting the accumulation of power by one body—
—a grave threat to liberty——the people devised a diffusion of 
governmental powers" among three branches of government.  Gabler 
v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶60, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384.  Whenever any branch of government exceeds the 
boundaries of authority conferred by the people, it is the duty of 
the judicial branch to say so. 
¶67 However well-intentioned, the secretary-designee of the 
Department of Health Services exceeded her powers by ordering the 
people of Wisconsin to follow her commands or face imprisonment 
for noncompliance.2  In issuing her order, she arrogated unto 
herself the power to make the law and the power to execute it, 
excluding the people from the lawmaking process altogether.  The 
                                                 
1 I join the majority opinion in full. 
2 I would have promptly granted the Legislature's Emergency 
Motion for Temporary Injunction, enjoining Emergency Order 28, the 
Safer at Home Order, a motion the legislature filed on April 21, 
2020.  An unlawful order should never issue in the first place, 
and it should not remain in effect for any period past the time a 
court ascertains its unlawfulness.  In the context of a request 
for injunctive relief, an unlawful order of this magnitude, 
applicable to every citizen and every person present in the State 
of Wisconsin, should be enjoined as soon as a court determines the 
moving party is likely to succeed on the merits. 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
2 
 
separation of powers embodied in our constitution does not permit 
this.  Statutory law being subordinate to the constitution,3 not 
even the people's representatives in the legislature may 
consolidate such power in one person. 
To the Framers of the United States Constitution, the 
concentration 
of 
governmental 
power 
presented 
an 
extraordinary threat to individual liberty:  "The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or 
many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition 
of tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47, at 298 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
                                                 
3 Spurning 
more 
than 
two 
centuries 
of 
fundamental 
constitutional law as well as the Wisconsin Constitution's 
guarantee of liberty, Justice Brian Hagedorn shockingly proclaims 
"the judiciary must never cast aside our laws or the constitution 
itself in the name of liberty."  Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶259.  
Setting aside the self-contradictory nature of that statement, 
Justice Hagedorn's 53-page opinion contains no constitutional 
analysis whatsoever, affirmatively rejects the constitution, and 
subjugates liberty.  The Wisconsin Constitution IS the law——and it 
reigns supreme over any statute.  "The Constitution's supremacy 
over legislation bears repeating: 'the Constitution is to be 
considered in court as a paramount law' and 'a law repugnant to 
the Constitution is void, and . . . courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by that instrument.'  See Marbury [v. 
Madison], 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) [137] at 178, 180 [1803]."  Mayo v. 
Wis. Injured Patients and Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶91, 
383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
concurring). 
The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is 
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. 
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a 
legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; 
if the latter part be true, then written constitutions 
are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit 
a power, in its own nature illimitable.  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
3 
 
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶4 (ellipsis by Gabler).  Blackstone——
whose conception of the separation of powers "profoundly 
influenced" the Founders——"defined a tyrannical government as one 
in which 'the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is 
vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men,' 
for 'wherever these two powers are united together, there can be 
no public liberty.'"  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶50, 387 
Wis. 2d 552, 
929 
N.W.2d 600 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) (citing DOT v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 
73 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoted source omitted)).  
Thomas Jefferson similarly warned that "concentrating [all the 
powers of government] in the same hands is precisely the definition 
of despotic government."4 
¶68 The people of Wisconsin pronounced liberty to be of 
primary importance, establishing government principally to protect 
their freedom.  "The Wisconsin Constitution begins with a 
Declaration of Rights, echoing language from our nation's 
Declaration of Independence, recognizing that the proper role of 
government——the very reason governments are instituted——is to 
secure our inherent rights, including liberty: 
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
                                                 
4 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia.  Edited 
by William Peden. Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press 
for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, 1954.  The Founders' Constitution, Volume 
1, 
Chapter 
10, 
Document 
9, 
http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch10s9.html            The 
University of Chicago Press. 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
4 
 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.  
Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).  'Too much dignity cannot 
well be given to that declaration.'  An inherent right to liberty 
means all people are born with it; the government does not bestow 
it upon us and it may not infringe it."  Porter v. State, 2018 WI 
79, ¶52, 382 Wis. 2d 697, 913 N.W.2d 842 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J. and Daniel Kelly, J., dissenting) (emphasis added; internal 
citation omitted).  Under the Wisconsin Constitution, government 
officials, whether elected or appointed, are servants of the 
citizens, not their masters. 
¶69 Endowing one person with the sole power to create, 
execute, and enforce the law contravenes the structural separation 
of powers established by the people.  Through the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
the 
people 
confer 
distinct 
powers 
on 
the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.  
"Three clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution embody this 
separation:  Article IV, Section 1 ('[t]he legislative power shall 
be vested in a senate and assembly'); Article V, Section 1 ('[t]he 
executive power shall be vested in a governor'); and Article VII, 
Section 2 ('[t]he judicial power . . . shall be vested in a unified 
court system')."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11.  "[T]he 
Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers depends 
largely upon common understanding of what activities are 
appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts."  Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).  Under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, the legislature makes the laws; an 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
5 
 
unelected cabinet secretary serving in the executive branch cannot 
unilaterally do so. 
¶70 Underlying the separation of powers reflected in our 
governmental structure is an avoidance of concentrations of 
authority:  "it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, 
apt to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of 
making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them."  
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government § 143 (1764), 
reprinted in Two Treatises of Government 119, 194 (Thomas I. Cook 
ed., 1947).  "Montesquieu shared Locke's concern about the threat 
to liberty from accumulated power, expressing apprehension that a 
government with shared legislative and executive power could first 
'enact tyrannical laws' then 'execute them in a tyrannical 
manner.'"  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶5 (citing 1 Montesquieu, The 
Spirit of the Laws 151-52 (Oskar Piest et al. eds., Thomas Nugent 
trans., 1949) (1748) (footnote omitted)).  Preserving the 
perimeters of power constitutionally conferred on each branch of 
government is essential for securing the liberty of the people.  
"The purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in 
general . . . was not merely to assure effective government but to 
preserve individual freedom."  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Although consolidation of 
power in one person may be tempting in times of exigency, for 
purposes of expeditiously producing an efficient and effective 
response to emergencies like a pandemic, history informs of the 
perils of the consolidation of power, and not merely through the 
exhortations of the Founders and philosophers.  Regrettably, we 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
6 
 
have 
tangible 
examples 
of 
judicial 
acquiescence 
to 
unconstitutional governmental actions considered——at the time——to 
inure to the benefit of society, but later acknowledged to be 
vehicles of oppression.  This is particularly true in the context 
of the police power, the source of authority cited by the DHS 
secretary-designee in this case. 
¶71 "Historically, when courts contaminate constitutional 
analysis with then-prevailing notions of what is 'good' for 
society, the rights of the people otherwise guaranteed by the text 
of 
the 
Constitution 
may 
be 
trampled. 
 
Departures 
from 
constitutional text have oppressed people under all manner of 
pernicious pretexts: 
[T]he notion of "social harm" supporting the police 
power was completely untethered from constitutional text 
and ripe for misuse in the hands of a Justice such as 
Holmes, who believed that the Constitution could be 
reduced to ad hoc balancing. Eugenics was built upon the 
notion of harm; indeed, it thrived on a sense of imminent 
doom:  that society was degenerating because of what 
were called its "weaklings" and "discards." The idea 
that society was being swamped by incompetents was a 
common trope for eugenicists:  the unfit were a 
"menace." . . . Like the great popular eugenicists of 
the day, Holmes wrote in Buck that eugenics would prevent 
society from being "swamped" by incompetents, that fewer 
criminals would be executed, and that fewer imbeciles 
would starve. 
Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell:  A Constitutional Tragedy from a 
Lost World, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 101, 114-15 (2011) (emphasis added; 
footnotes omitted)."  State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶84, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, 
935 
N.W.2d 813 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) (some emphasis omitted; some emphasis added). 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶72 In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),5 the 
United States Supreme Court professed to apply "the most rigid 
scrutiny" to the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War 
II but nevertheless found the "assembling together and placing 
under guard all those of Japanese ancestry" in  "assembly centers"  
to be constitutional based on "[p]ressing public necessity" and 
further rationalized this defilement of the Constitution because 
"the need for action was great, and time was short."  Id. at 216, 
221, 223-24.  "Korematsu is one of the Supreme Court's most reviled 
decisions——a relic of the nation's dark past widely regarded as 
unlikely to be repeated."  Stephen Dycus, Requiem for Korematsu, 
10 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 237 (2019).  And thankfully so.  
Nonetheless, the public fear underlying this contemptible case is 
capable of pressuring jurists to misuse the constitution in other 
contexts: 
Judges "are heavily influenced by the perceived 
practical consequences of their decisions rather than 
being straight-jacketed by legal logic. . . . In a 
democracy," 
[Eric 
Yamamoto] 
writes, 
"judicial 
independence serves as the crucial check on the 
political branches' majoritarian impulses."  Careful 
judicial scrutiny is especially important in times of 
stress, when Americans may find themselves "at the mercy 
of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people." 
Id. at 246 (citing Eric K. Yamamoto, In the Shadow of Korematsu:  
Democratic Liberties and National Security (Oxford Univ. Press 
2018) (footnotes omitted)). Although headlines may sensationalize 
the invocation of cases such as Korematsu, the point of citing 
them is not to draw comparisons between the circumstances of people 
                                                 
5 Abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
8 
 
horrifically interned by their government during a war and those 
of people subjected to isolation orders during a pandemic.  We 
mention cases like Korematsu in order to test the limits of 
government authority, to remind the state that urging courts to 
approve the exercise of extraordinary power during times of 
emergency may lead to extraordinary abuses of its citizens.6  "Of 
                                                 
6 During oral arguments in this case, I posed multiple 
questions to the state's attorney representing the DHS secretary-
designee, asking him to identify the limits on her powers.  
Ultimately, he conceded the DHS secretary-designee could "take all 
necessary action" and identified only judicial review and "the 
medical community" as constraints on her power: 
Court:  One of the rationales that we're hearing 
justifying the Secretary's order in this case is that, 
well it's a pandemic, and there isn't enough time to 
promulgate a rule and have the legislature involved with 
determining the details of the scope of the Secretary's 
authority. I'll direct your attention to another time in 
history and the Korematsu decision where the Court said 
the need for action was great and time was short and 
that justified, and I'm quoting, "assembling together 
and placing under guard all those of Japanese ancestry 
in assembly centers during World War II."  Could the 
Secretary under this broad delegation of legislative 
power or legislative-like power order people out of 
their homes into centers where they are properly 
socially distanced in order to combat the pandemic? 
State's counsel:  Your Honor, Korematsu was an equal 
protection challenge to the action that the government 
took to address the crisis.  This is not a substantive 
constitutional challenge to what DHS has done – 
Court:  My question goes to the scope again of the 
Secretary's authority and what the limits are.  What I'm 
hearing is, well the legislature doesn't need to specify 
the limits, it's a time of pandemic, there isn't enough 
time to go through rulemaking, so the Secretary just has 
to do whatever she alone deems necessary to combat the 
pandemic.  So my question to you in invoking Korematsu 
is not the bases for the claims that were brought in 
that case versus this case; the point of my question is, 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
9 
 
                                                 
what are the limits, constitutional or statutory?  There 
have to be some, don't there counsel? 
State's counsel:  Yes.  There absolutely are your Honor.  
Justice Bradley, I think if you read the petition for an 
original action that was filed with your court just last 
evening, there are a variety of fundamental rights based 
claims that target different pieces of Executive [sic 
"Emergency"] Order 28 on the basis of the freedom of 
religion, the freedom to travel, and-and I don't know 
all what's in there, it's a long petition, but there's 
a lot of constitutional rights in it.  That is one of 
the fundamental backstops against an unreasonable and 
unconstitutional exercise of power by DHS. 
Court:  Counsel, that's not answering my question. I 
understand.  We all understand that people have the right 
to come to this court or another court to vindicate their 
constitutional interests. What I'm asking——set aside the 
constitution for a moment, then.  What are the statutory 
limits on the Secretary's power because I'm looking at 
page 45 of your brief and you say that section "252.02 
is not legislation 'enforced or administered by' DHS 
through issuing Safer-at-Home, and DHS's actions did not 
'implement, interpret, or make more specific' standards 
that the legislature designed by statute."  Section 
252.02, according to your brief, "simply empowers DHS to 
act."  What are the limits on the powers of DHS to act?  
What can't DHS do under the statute? 
State's counsel:  Your Honor, I think you take the 
statutory text as it is and the statutory text empowers 
DHS to take all necessary action to combat communicable 
diseases.  I understand your Honor may be uncomfortable 
with that broad grant of authority in the sense that you 
think it may allow DHS to go too far.  I humbly submit 
to you that that concern is best addressed to the 
legislature and asking them to amend the statute that 
they passed and-and-and lobby them to add limitations of 
the kind that your Honor is discussing. 
Court:  Let me just follow-up please.  I have one more 
question.  I think it goes to the heart of what this 
case is all about and as I understand the legislature's 
argument, the legislature is asking us to construe the 
statute so that there isn't a constitutional problem 
because counsel, I think there is a constitutional 
problem with the legislature giving away this much power 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
10 
 
                                                 
to an unelected cabinet secretary. The people never 
consented to a single individual having that kind of 
power. 
State's counsel:  I would respond in two ways.  First, 
the DHS cabinet secretary serves at the pleasure of the 
Governor.  She's clearly accountable to the people in 
the same way the Governor is.  The second thing I'd say 
is the people chose to grant a broad power to the state's 
public health agency to do what's necessary in a pandemic 
to fight it.  Courts for over a century have recognized 
that legislatures – I really encourage you to just think 
about it – think about it. 
Court:  Counsel, I have thought a lot about it.  And my 
concern goes back to what the limits are on the Secretary 
because under your interpretation of the statutes she 
can do whatever she wants and she can order people to 
jail if they don't comply and I don't think the 
legislature can give that kind of power to an unelected 
individual. 
State's counsel:  Your Honor, what I can say is for over 
a century, courts have recognized that in the context of 
infectious diseases, it is practically impossible for 
the legislature to be able to predict exactly what is 
necessary.  You have to keep in mind this is a novel – 
it is literally called the novel coronavirus.  We have 
never seen it before.  We don't know exactly what it can 
do.  And so the legislature realized that it needed to 
give an agency with the ability to respond with expertise 
and alacrity to changing dynamic circumstances on the 
ground. 
Court:  The logical consequence of your argument, 
counsel, is that the government could step in and do 
this, the DHS secretary could step in and do this every 
single flu season, every year, because the flu kills 
tens of thousands of people in America every year and 
that's a communicable disease.  So would you agree with 
me then that the DHS secretary under your interpretation 
could be empowered to do this every single flu season? 
State's counsel:  No your Honor.  I think that the DHS 
secretary if it tried to do that every single flu season 
would have no support in the medical community for 
imposing that kind of restriction. 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
11 
 
course, history may repeat itself – if we ignore the lessons of 
the past, and if the courts fail to do their duty."  Stephen Dycus, 
Requiem for Korematsu, 10 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y at 252.7 
¶73 These cases, among other similarly despicable examples, 
illustrate rather painfully why the judiciary cannot dispense with 
constitutional principles, even in response to a dire emergency.  
Indeed, it is in the midst of emergencies that constraints on 
government power are most important.  It is during such emergencies 
that our historical memory is of vital importance.  Although 
invoking the most odious instances of government-sanctioned 
oppression makes many uncomfortable and tends to trigger outrage, 
it is imperative to do so in order to remind the citizenry of grave 
abuses that have been justified in the name of exigent need.  These 
repugnant cases must be cited to explain the fundamental importance 
of judicial resistance to popular pressures, which in times of 
crisis implore judges to cast aside the law in the name of 
emergency.  "History teaches that grave threats to liberty often 
come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too 
extravagant to endure. . . .  [W]hen we allow fundamental freedoms 
to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we 
                                                 
(Emphasis added.) 
7 Although Korematsu has been disavowed by the United States 
Supreme Court, astonishingly, it has never been overruled.  See 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) ("The dissent's 
reference 
to 
Korematsu, 
however, 
affords 
this 
Court 
the 
opportunity to make express what is already obvious:  Korematsu 
was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in 
the court of history, and——to be clear——'has no place in law under 
the Constitution.' [Korematsu v. United States,] 323 U.S. [214], 
at 248 [1944] (Jackson, J. dissenting)."). 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
12 
 
invariably come to regret it."  Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  Even if a significant portion of the public supports 
the Safer at Home Order, the judiciary must protect the structural 
separation 
of 
powers 
embodied 
in 
our 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions in order to avoid future monumental mistakes from 
which our republic may never recover.  "Experience should teach us 
to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's 
purposes are beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert 
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men 
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."  Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) 
(overruled in part on other grounds by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967)). 
¶74 Thomas 
Jefferson 
counseled 
that 
"the 
powers 
of 
government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies 
of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, 
without being effectually checked and restrained by the others."8  
The judiciary serves as a check not only on the legislative and 
executive branches, but on itself no less.  In the midst of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, I dissented from this court's indefinite 
                                                 
8 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia. Edited by 
William Peden. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for 
the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, 
Virginia, 1954.  The Founders' Constitution, Volume 1, Chapter 10, 
Document 9, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/ v1ch10s9.html           The 
University of Chicago Press. 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
13 
 
suspension of criminal jury trials as a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.9  I also dissented 
from this court's indefinite suspension of non-criminal jury 
trials, which overrode every statutory deadline applicable to such 
proceedings, because "[t]he court lacks any authority to infringe 
the right of Wisconsin citizens to have their cases tried by juries 
within the time frames established by the people's representatives 
in the legislature."10  In its ongoing suspension of the laws 
enacted by the people's representatives in the legislature, I 
cautioned that this court "invades the province of the legislature, 
violates the separation of powers, and 'creates a confrontation of 
constitutional magnitude between the legislature and this 
court.'"11  Notwithstanding COVID-19, "[n]either the constitution 
nor the statutes recognize an exception for public health 
emergencies."12 
¶75 It "is the obligation of the Judiciary not only to 
confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other 
branches do so as well."  City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 
                                                 
9 In Re the Matter of Jury Trials During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
(S. Ct. Order issued March 22, 2020) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) 
("The 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
suspends 
the 
constitutional rights of Wisconsin citizens, citing the exigency 
of a public health emergency.  The Constitution does not 
countenance such an infringement."). 
10 Interim Rule 20-02 In the Matter of an Interim Rule Re: 
Suspension of Deadlines for Non-Criminal Jury Trials Due to the 
COVID-19 Pandemic (March 31, 2020) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
11 Id. (quoted source omitted). 
12 Id. 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
14 
 
U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  In Gabler, this 
court invalidated a legislative conferral of authority on the 
executive branch:  "In creating an executive branch entity with 
authority to pass judgment and impose discipline on a judge's 
exercise of core judicial powers, the Wisconsin legislature 
violates the Wisconsin Constitution's structural separation of 
powers and invades a domain recognized for over two hundred years 
as the exclusive province of the judiciary."  Gabler, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶1.  Declaring the statute unconstitutional was 
necessary to protect the independence of the judiciary:  "By 
statutorily authorizing executive action against the judiciary, 
the legislature unconstitutionally conferred power on an executive 
board 
to 
impair, 
improperly 
influence, 
and 
regulate 
the 
judiciary's exercise of its constitutional duties."  Id., ¶2. 
¶76 These instances illustrate that the judiciary acts as 
the backstop against encroachments by any branch——including the 
judiciary——on the core powers of a coordinate branch.  "Whenever 
any branch of government claims the authority to act beyond the 
boundaries of its powers, the people should be alarmed."13  It is 
"judicial independence that serves as a bulwark protecting the 
people against tyranny."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶2. 
¶77 This court is well aware that many Wisconsin citizens 
support the Safer at Home Order while many oppose it.  This court 
does not base its decisions on popular opinion; it grounds them in 
                                                 
13 Interim Rule 20-02 In the Matter of an Interim Rule Re: 
Suspension of Deadlines for Non-Criminal Jury Trials Due to the 
COVID-19 Pandemic ¶15 n.1 (March 31, 2020) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting). 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
15 
 
the law.  It is for the political branches, not the judiciary, to 
respond to the public's wishes, and for this court to declare 
whether each branch acts within its constitutional grant of power 
and in accord with statutory law.14  "Emergency does not create 
power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or 
diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.  
The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency.  Its 
grants of power to the federal government and its limitations of 
the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency, 
and they are not altered by emergency."  Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934) (emphasis added).  In a 
republic in which the constitution demarcates the powers assigned 
to each branch of government, it is of foundational importance 
which government official presumes the power to control the people.  
Particularly in an emergency, this court may not cast aside the 
constitution nor disregard statutory law. 
                                                 
14 In a thinly-veiled attempt at garnering a sensationalized 
headline, Justice Rebecca Dallet repeatedly employs fear tactics 
in lieu of the law in order to dramatize her perceptions of the 
consequences of the majority's opinion.  See, e.g., Justice 
Dallet's dissent, ¶¶132, 147, 162.  Well-established canons of law 
soundly reject this method of statutory construction, which favors 
an interpretation that will "produce sensible, desirable results, 
since that is surely what the legislature must have intended.  But 
it is precisely because people differ over what is sensible and 
what is desirable that we elect those who will write our laws——
and expect courts to observe what has been written."  Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 22 (2012).  Hyperbolic concerns about the consequences of 
judicial interpretation of the law cannot override our duty to say 
what the law is and not what we may wish it to be.  Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
16 
 
¶78 The DHS secretary-designee bases her authority to enter 
the Safer at Home Order on Wis. Stat. § 252.02, which she 
characterizes as a law that "simply empowers DHS to act"—— 
unilaterally, and with no input from the legislature or the people.  
The statutory language is indeed sweeping, and if interpreted 
expansively, calls into question its constitutionality as an 
impermissible delegation of legislative power never authorized by 
the people.  As a general principle, it is the duty of the 
legislature to create the law, and any delegation of lawmaking 
responsibility to administrative agencies like DHS must be 
carefully circumscribed in order to avoid the people being governed 
by unelected bureaucrats. 
¶79 "The concentration of power within an administrative 
leviathan clashes with the constitutional allocation of power 
among the elected and accountable branches of government at the 
expense of individual liberty."  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶42 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  There is an inherent 
incompatibility between "the system of bureaucratic rule that took 
root in the Progressive era and now reaches into virtually every 
realm of American life" and the constitution's "'deliberate 
calibration of incentives and control between the branches' 
reflected in the structural separation of powers."  Id., ¶43 (first 
quoting Charles J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, 
25 National Affairs 96, 96 (Fall 2015); then quoting Gabler, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶7).  "The philosophical roots of rule by bureaucratic 
overlords are antithetical to the Founders' vision of our 
constitutional Republic, in which supreme power is held by the 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
17 
 
people through their elected representatives."  Koschkee, 387 
Wis. 2d 552, ¶45 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  When 
legislatures expound broad policy goals and leave the details to 
administrative bodies, "[t]he consolidation of power within 
executive branch agencies 'often leaves Americans at the[ir] 
mercy' endowing agencies with 'a nearly freestanding coercive 
power' and '[t]he agencies thereby become rulers of a sort 
unfamiliar in a republic, and the people must jump at their 
commands.'"  Id. (citing Phillip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law 
Unlawful? 335 (2014)). 
¶80 It is insufficient for the DHS secretary-designee to 
point to the legislature's statutory delegation of lawmaking power 
as the source of her authority to dictate how the people must 
conduct their lives, without considering the constitutional 
ramifications of such a broad statutory interpretation——namely, 
the threat to the liberty of the people.  "The Founders recognized 
that maintaining the formal separation of powers was essential to 
preserving individual liberty. 
This devotion to the separation of powers is, in part, 
what supports our enduring conviction that the Vesting 
Clauses are exclusive and that the branch in which a 
power is vested may not give it up or otherwise 
reallocate it. The Framers were concerned not just with 
the 
starting 
allocation, 
but 
with 
the 
'gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same 
department.'  The Federalist No. 51, at 321 (J. Madison). 
Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶51 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
concurring) (citing DOT v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 
73 (Thomas, J., concurring)).  "Under the original understanding 
of the Constitution," devising and imposing "generally applicable 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
18 
 
rules of private conduct" on the people "requires the exercise of 
legislative power," and "the discretion inherent in executive 
power does not comprehend the discretion to formulate generally 
applicable rules of private conduct."  Association of Am. R.Rs., 
575 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Nor does the constitution 
contemplate executive power to penalize noncompliance with 
administratively-drawn rules of conduct through fines and 
imprisonment.  "In facilitating the vast expansion of the 
administrative state, the legislative and executive branches 
transferred power from the people's elected representatives and 
elected executives, bestowing it upon unelected and unaccountable 
bureaucrats, thereby jeopardizing the constitution's safeguards 
against the tyrannical concentration of power."  Koschkee, 387 
Wis. 2d 552, ¶53 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). 
¶81 In a particularly chilling exchange with this court 
during oral arguments, the attorney for the state representing the 
DHS secretary-designee claimed the authoritarian power to 
authorize the arrest and imprisonment of the people of Wisconsin 
for engaging in lawful activities proscribed by the DHS secretary-
designee in her sole discretion: 
Court:  Are there any statutory or constitutional limits 
on the powers of the Secretary? 
. . . .  
State's counsel:  DHS's actions are limited by what is 
necessary to combat the infectious disease that's 
presented at the time. . . . when DHS faces an outbreak 
of a dangerous, communicable disease, it can do what is 
necessary to combat that disease. 
Court:  Whatever DHS and the cabinet secretary solely 
determine is necessary, right? 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
19 
 
State's 
counsel: . . . this 
is 
what 
the 
statute 
says . . . it says that DHS shall implement all 
emergency 
measures 
to 
control 
communicable 
diseases. . . .  [T]hat is what the statute says.  It 
gives that power to DHS.  This is the statute the 
legislature chose to enact. 
Court: . . . [T]he Secretary can identify behavior that 
is not otherwise criminal and . . . she can all by 
herself sit down at her computer keyboard, write up a 
description of behavior and make it criminal, correct? 
. . . . 
State's counsel:  Yes.  The scope of available 
enforcement 
is 
determined 
by 
the 
order.  
Yes. . . .  That's true. 
"If the separation of powers means anything, it must mean that the 
prosecutor isn't allowed to define the crimes he gets to 
enforce."   Neil Gorsuch, A Republic If You Can Keep It 87 (Crown 
Forum ed., 1st ed. 2019).  Justice Gorsuch's admonishment applies 
no less to an unelected cabinet secretary claiming the power to 
unilaterally define the crime and then enforce it. 
¶82 "The people of Wisconsin vest distinct constitutional 
powers of governance in each branch of government, but consistent 
with founding principles of limited government and individual 
freedom, the people also impose constraints on the exercise of 
those powers."  Porter, 382 Wis. 2d 697, ¶52 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J. and Daniel Kelly, J., dissenting).  Among those 
constraints, it is constitutionally impermissible for the 
legislature to authorize the head of an administrative agency to 
unilaterally compel the 5.8 million citizens of Wisconsin to stay 
home, close their businesses, and face imprisonment if they do not 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
20 
 
comply.15  Even in a pandemic, and notwithstanding the good 
intentions of the cabinet secretary.  Thomas Jefferson advised 
against being "deluded by the integrity of" governmental actors' 
"purposes" and cautioned against "conclud[ing] that these 
unlimited powers will never be abused" merely because current 
office holders "are not disposed to abuse them."16  Jefferson 
forewarned that "[t]he time to guard against corruption and 
tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold on us.  It is better 
to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his 
teeth and talons after he shall have entered."17 
¶83 While the rulemaking process the law requires as a 
precondition to an order of this magnitude may seem cumbersome 
during a pandemic, "the difficulties of the legislative process 
were essential to [the constitution's] design, purposefully placed 
there to ensure that laws would be more likely the product of 
deliberation than haste; more likely the product of compromise 
among the many than the will of the few; and more likely to respect 
                                                 
15 The Safer at Home Order actually reaches beyond Wisconsin 
citizens to any individual present within the State:  "All 
individuals present within the State of Wisconsin are ordered to 
stay at home or at their place of residence[.]" 
16 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia.  Edited 
by William Peden. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 
for the Institute 
 of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, 1954.  The Founders' Constitution, Volume 
1, 
Chapter 
10, 
Document 
9, 
http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch10s9.html             The 
University of Chicago Press. 
17 Id. 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
21 
 
minority interests than trample on their rights."  Neil Gorsuch, A 
Republic If You Can Keep It 63 (Crown Forum ed., 1st ed. 2019). 
* * * 
¶84 Informed by the lessons of history, the Constitution was 
established to safeguard the rights of the people even under the 
most exigent circumstances.  The framers "foresaw that troublous 
times would arise, when rulers and people would become restive 
under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to 
accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of 
constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by 
irrepealable law.  The history of the world had taught them that 
what was done in the past might be attempted in the future.  The 
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its 
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
circumstances. 
 
No 
doctrine, 
involving 
more 
pernicious 
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of 
its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies 
of government.  Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or 
despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is 
false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the 
powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its 
existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great 
effort to throw off its just authority."  Ex parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866) (emphasis added).  It is especially in times 
of emergency that we must protect the rights of the people, lest 
we establish a dangerous precedent empowering less benevolent 
No.  2020AP765-0A.rgb 
 
22 
 
government officials in the future to oppress the people in the 
name of exigency. 
¶85 "In America THE LAW IS KING!  For as in absolute 
governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to 
be king; and there ought to be no other."  Thomas Paine, 1776, 
Common Sense (1776).  In Wisconsin, as in the rest of America, the 
Constitution is our king——not the governor, not the legislature, 
not the judiciary, and not a cabinet secretary.  We can never 
"allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real 
or perceived exigency" nor risk subjecting the rights of the people 
to "the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited 
people."  Fear never overrides the Constitution.  Not even in times 
of public emergencies, not even in a pandemic. 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY joins 
this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
1 
 
¶87 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  Secretary-designee 
Andrea Palm, pursuant to authority she says she found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02 (2017-18),1 has taken control of a stunningly broad swath 
of the lives and activities of every single individual and business 
in the State of Wisconsin.  Pursuant to Executive Order 28 (the 
"Order"), she is dictating that, inter alia: 
 all individuals present within the State of 
Wisconsin stay at home or at their place of 
residence, subject only to exceptions allowed by 
the Secretary.  Section 1; 
 
 all for-profit and non-profit businesses with a 
facility in Wisconsin, except essential businesses 
and operations (as defined in the Order) cease all 
activities at facilities located within Wisconsin 
except as allowed by the Secretary.  Section 2; 
 
 all businesses allowed to remain open conform to 
the Secretary's directives on how to conduct their 
activities.  Sections 2, 13, 14; 
 
 there be no private gatherings except as allowed by 
the Secretary.  Section 3; 
 
 no one may travel except as allowed by the 
Secretary.  Section 5; 
 
 all people engaged in activities allowed by the 
Order must comply with DHS guidelines.  Section 6; 
 
 everyone 
must 
comply 
with 
social 
distancing 
requirements, including minimum spacing between 
individuals, how to wash one's hands, how to cough 
or sneeze, when to clean, and a ban on shaking 
hands.  Sections 1, 2(b), 5, 8, 11(c), 13, 14, 15, 
16. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
2 
 
And she asserts that violations of her Order are punishable as 
crimes.  Order, Section 18 ("This Order is enforceable by any local 
law enforcement official, including county sheriffs. Violation or 
obstruction of this Order is punishable by up to 30 days 
imprisonment, or up to $250 fine, or both.").   
¶88 The Secretary says the Legislature delegated to her the 
authority to exercise this nearly total control over our lives via 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02.  As relevant here, that statute empowers the 
Department of Health Services to: 
"[C]lose schools and forbid public gatherings in 
schools, churches, and other places to control outbreaks 
and epidemics."  Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3); 
"[P]romulgate and enforce rules or issue orders for 
guarding against the introduction of any communicable 
disease into the state, for the control and suppression 
of 
communicable 
diseases . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.02(4); and 
"[A]uthorize and implement all emergency measures 
necessary to control communicable diseases."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02(6). 
The court's opinion ably describes why these provisions do not 
confer on her the authority necessary to support the Order, and I 
join it.  My purpose in writing separately is to describe why, 
under our constitutional form of government, the Legislature 
cannot possibly have given the Secretary the authority she believes 
she has. 
¶89 In the Secretary's view, the Legislature gave her 
plenary power to simply "act" without the need of any further 
statutory or regulatory policy.  Her brief candidly asserts there 
are no statutory or regulatory limitations on her authority to 
address communicable diseases: 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02 is not legislation "enforced or 
administered by" DHS through issuing Safer-at-Home 
[Order], and DHS's actions here did not "implement, 
interpret, or make more specific" standards that the 
Legislature designed by statute. Unlike statutes that 
regulate certain conduct or activities, like food safety 
or traffic laws, section 252.02, as relevant here, 
simply empowers DHS to act.  Thus, Safer-at-Home is not 
"enforc[ing]" any legislative requirement . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  That is to say, she expressly disavows any 
suggestion that she is implementing statutory standards.  And she 
not only acknowledges, but affirmatively asserts, that she is not 
enforcing any statutory requirement.  This statute, she says, 
simply empowers her to "act."  When queried during oral arguments, 
her attorney said there are no limits on this power, saving only 
judicial or legislative intervention. 
¶90 But our constitution does not confer on any governmental 
official, bureaucrat, or employee a generalized power to "act."  
There are three powers on loan to our government——legislative, 
executive, and judicial.  To the extent governmental officials may 
act at all, it is only within the context of one of those powers.  
Therefore, we must discern what type of authority the Secretary 
exercised when she issued her Order.  And then, assuming Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02 granted the Secretary all the power necessary to issue 
the Order, we must compare that grant against our basic 
constitutional structure and the non-delegation doctrine to 
determine whether the statute impermissibly delegated part of the 
Legislature's power to the Secretary.  I'll begin with a brief 
rehearsal of the nature of legislative and executive powers. 
I.  THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
4 
 
¶91 The 
executive's 
constitutionally-vested 
authority 
consists of executing the laws, not creating them:  "The executive 
power shall be vested in a governor."  Wis. Const. art. V, § 1.  
The difference between legislative and executive authority has 
been described as the difference between the power to prescribe 
and the power to put something into effect: 
In 1792, Jacques Necker, the famous French 
statesman, 
neatly 
summed 
up 
the 
function 
and 
significance of the executive power.  Of the function:  
"[I]f by a fiction we were for a moment to personify the 
legislative and the executive powers, the latter in 
speaking of the former might . . . say:  All that this 
man has talked of, I will perform."  Of the significance:  
"The laws would in effect be nothing more than counsels, 
than so many maxims more or less sage, without this 
active and vigilant authority, which assures their 
empire and transmits to the administration the motion of 
which it stands in need." 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 819 (2003) (alteration in original; quoted 
source omitted).  This commentator concluded that, "[i]n the late-
eighteenth century, someone vested with the executive power and 
christened as the chief executive enjoyed the power to control the 
execution of law."  Id. 
¶92 On the other hand, we characterize legislative power as:   
"the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them."  
Schuette v. Van De Hey, 205 Wis. 2d 475, 480-81, 556 
N.W.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1996).  Powers constitutionally 
vested in the legislature include the powers:  "'to 
declare whether or not there shall be a law; to determine 
the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; 
[and] to fix the limits within which the law shall 
operate.'"  See, e.g., Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 
Wis. 2d 46, 59, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968) (quoting State ex 
rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 
505, 220 N.W. 929 (1928)). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
5 
 
Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 
N.W.2d 600 (alteration in original).  It includes "the power to 
adopt generally applicable rules of conduct governing future 
actions by private persons——the power to 'prescrib[e] the rules by 
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated,' 
or the power to 'prescribe general rules for the government of 
society.'"  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133, reh'g 
denied, 
140 
S. Ct. 579 
(2019) 
(Gorsuch, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 
Cranch) 87, 136 (1810)).  These powers must be kept forever 
separate because, as Madison once observed, "[t]here can be no 
liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in 
the same person, or body of magistrates."  The Federalist No. 47, 
at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  As I discuss 
below, our duty to ensure the lines do not cross is mandatory and 
non-discretionary. 
II.  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
¶93 Our constitution opens with a frank statement of the 
proper relationship between the people of Wisconsin and their 
government. 
 
It 
declares 
that 
"[w]e, 
the 
people 
of 
Wisconsin . . . do establish this constitution."  Wis. Const. 
pmbl.  This is a declaration of ownership; it establishes that the 
power to create and maintain governments belongs to the people.  
Our constitution also recognizes that the authors merely loan their 
authority to the government, they do not cede it.  The very first 
article and section of the Wisconsin Constitution states that 
"[a]ll people are born equally free and independent, and have 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
6 
 
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).  The 
government's power must come to it as a loan because the freedom 
to consent necessarily encompasses the freedom to withdraw that 
consent. 
¶94 That has serious implications for the work conducted by 
each of the governmental branches.  It means, first and foremost, 
that we must respect the constitutional structure they chose to 
create.  Those selected to wield the government's loaned authority 
have no right to question the handiwork of the constitution's 
progenitors, except to the extent expressly allowed.  See, e.g., 
Wis. Const. art. XII (providing for constitutional amendments and 
conventions).  As relevant here, that means we must respect the 
fact that the constitution——the document adopted by the people of 
Wisconsin to direct and control the government they created——
divides authority amongst three distinct branches.  Goodland v. 
Zimmerman, 
243 
Wis. 459, 
466-67, 
10 
N.W.2d 180 
(1943) 
("[G]overnmental powers are divided among the three departments of 
government, the legislative, the executive, and judicial[.]").2 
                                                 
2 "The executive power shall be vested in a governor."  Wis. 
Const. art. V, § 1.  "The legislative power shall be vested in a 
senate and assembly."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1.  "The judicial 
power of this state shall be vested in a unified court 
system . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
7 
 
A.  Separation of Powers 
¶95 The "separation of powers" doctrine describes our 
understanding of how the constitution allocates each type of power 
to its respective branch.3  This fundamental principle of American 
constitutional government was "established at the founding of our 
nation and enshrined in the structure of the United States 
Constitution," and "inform[s] our understanding of the separation 
of powers under the Wisconsin Constitution."  Gabler v. Crime 
Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384; see also Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 545, 576 
N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("The doctrine of separation of powers is 
implicitly found in the tripartite division of government [among] 
the judicial, legislative and executive branches." (citation 
omitted)); Goodland, 243 Wis. at 466-67 ("It must always be 
remembered that one of the fundamental principles of the American 
constitutional system is that governmental powers are divided 
among the three departments of government, the legislative, the 
executive, and judicial, and that each of these departments is 
separate and independent from the others except as otherwise 
provided by the constitution."); Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 
503, 236 N.W. 717 (1931) ("It is, of course, elementary that we 
are committed by constitution to the doctrine of separation of 
powers."). 
¶96 We must be assiduous in patrolling the borders between 
the branches.  This is not just a practical matter of efficient 
                                                 
3 I addressed this topic at some length in Tetra Tech EC, Inc. 
v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶¶44-46, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21, and 
repeat it here for ease of access. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
8 
 
and effective government.  We maintain this separation because it 
provides structural protection against depredations on our 
liberties.  The Framers of the United States Constitution 
understood that "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, 
executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few 
or many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47, at 298.  Consequently, "[a]s 
Madison explained when advocating for the Constitution's adoption, 
neither the legislature nor the executive nor the judiciary 'ought 
to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over 
the others in the administration of their respective powers.'"  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶4 (quoting The Federalist No. 48, at 
305).  "The purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers 
in general," said Justice Antonin Scalia, "was not merely to assure 
effective government but to preserve individual freedom."4  
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  To this day, "[a]fter more than two hundred years of 
constitutional 
governance, 
th[is] 
tripartite 
separation 
of 
independent governmental power remains the bedrock of the 
structure by which we secure liberty in both Wisconsin and the 
United States."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶3.  As Justice Joseph 
Story said, "the three great powers of government . . . should for 
                                                 
4 See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that "the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty").  
Centuries earlier, the French writer Montesquieu said "there is no 
liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the 
legislative 
and 
executive." 
 
Charles-Louis 
de 
Secondat 
Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws bk. XI, at 152 (Thomas Nugent 
trans., The Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1748). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
9 
 
ever be kept separate and distinct."  Id. (quoting 2 Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 519, at 2-
3 (Boston:  Hilliard, Gray, & Co., 1833)). 
¶97 The constitution does not, however, hermetically seal 
the branches from each other.  The separation of powers doctrine 
"envisions a system of separate branches sharing many powers while 
jealously guarding certain others, a system of 'separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.'"  State ex rel. 
Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 
N.W.2d 32 (1995) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  "The 
constitutional powers of each branch of government fall into two 
categories:  exclusive powers and shared powers."  State v. Horn, 
226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  "Shared powers lie 
at the intersections of these exclusive core constitutional 
powers," and "[t]hese '[g]reat borderlands of power' are not 
exclusive to any one branch."  Id. at 643-44 (quoting Friedrich, 
192 Wis. 2d at 14); see also State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42–
43, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  Although the "branches may exercise 
[shared] power within these borderlands," they "may [not] unduly 
burden or substantially interfere with another branch."  Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d at 644. 
¶98 Core powers, however, are not for sharing.  "Each branch 
has exclusive core constitutional powers, into which the other 
branches may not intrude."  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 545.  These 
"[c]ore zones of authority are to be 'jealously guarded' by each 
branch of government . . . ."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
10 
 
(quoting Barland v. Eau Claire Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 573, 575 
N.W.2d 691 (1998)).  The importance of constitutional limitations, 
Chief Justice Marshall once said, is that they compel restraint 
when restraint is not desired:  "To what purpose are powers 
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to 
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those 
intended to be restrained?"  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).5 
¶99 The separation of powers forbids abdication of core 
power just as much as it protects one branch from encroachment by 
another.  "It is . . . fundamental and undeniable that no one of 
the three branches of government can effectively delegate any of 
the powers which peculiarly and intrinsically belong to that 
branch."  Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. at 503; see also id. 
(stating that "any attempt to abdicate [a core power] in any 
particular field, though valid in form, must, necessarily, be held 
void'" (quoting State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 
491, 137 N.W. 20 (1912))).  Even if one branch truly wished to 
abandon some aspect of its core power, no other branch may take it 
up 
and 
use 
it 
as 
its 
own. 
 
"As 
to 
these 
areas 
of 
authority, . . . any exercise of authority by another branch of 
government is unconstitutional.'"  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31 
(quoting State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wis. Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 
                                                 
5 Chief Justice Marshall could be reaching through the 
intervening centuries to ask that exact question of Justice 
Hagedorn, who deploys a bevy of decision-avoidance doctrines so 
that he can affirm the Secretary's Order without determining 
whether it, or the statute upon which she relies, has exceeded 
constitutional boundaries.  Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶¶245-258. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
11 
 
100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990)); see also Town of Holland v. Vill. of 
Cedar Grove, 230 Wis. 177, 190, 282 N.W. 111 (1938) ("This court 
has repeatedly held that the judicial power vested by the 
constitution in the courts cannot be exercised by administrative 
or executive agencies."). 
¶100 The borders between the branches require constant 
surveillance.  It is not enough that we carefully drew them when 
our state was new.  We need to keep a weather eye on the divide to 
ensure they maintain their separation: 
This devotion to the separation of powers is, in part, 
what supports our enduring conviction that the Vesting 
Clauses are exclusive and that the branch in which a 
power is vested may not give it up or otherwise 
reallocate it.  The Framers were concerned not just with 
the 
starting 
allocation, 
but 
with 
the 
"gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same 
department."  It was this fear that prompted the Framers 
to build checks and balances into our constitutional 
structure, so that the branches could defend their 
powers on an ongoing basis. 
Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 74 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoted source and citations omitted).   
B.  The Non-Delegation Doctrine 
¶101 The border between the legislature and the executive is 
maintained, or at least it once was, under the aegis of the non-
delegation doctrine.  There are some who say this is a dead letter.  
See, e.g., Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation 
Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 619 (2017) ("The 
nondelegation doctrine is dead.  It is difficult to think of a 
more frequently repeated or widely accepted legal conclusion.").  
If that describes the doctrine's vitality in Wisconsin, it is not 
because we never recognized it or outright rejected it, but because 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
12 
 
we allowed it to fall into desuetude.6  To the extent that has 
happened, we have been derelict in our duties. 
¶102 The non-delegation doctrine rests on the premise that 
"[i]t is . . . fundamental and undeniable that no one of the three 
branches of government can effectively delegate any of the powers 
which peculiarly and intrinsically belong to that branch."  Rules 
of Court Case, 204 Wis. at 503.  The operative principle here is 
not that the branches should not delegate their core authority, it 
is that they cannot.   
¶103 This principle is a matter of power, not of prudence:  
the constitution's progenitors did not grant the various branches 
permission to shuffle their distinct powers amongst themselves.  
Justice Neil Gorsuch, commenting on this principle in the federal 
context, consulted John Locke ("one of the thinkers who most 
influenced the framers' understanding of the separation of 
powers") for its animating rationale: 
The legislative cannot transfer the power of making 
laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated 
power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it 
over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of 
the 
commonwealth, 
which 
is 
by 
constituting 
the 
legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall 
be. And when the people have said we will submit to 
rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in 
such forms, nobody else can say other men shall make 
laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws 
but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen 
and authorised to make laws for them. 
                                                 
6 We described this creeping enervation in Gilbert v. State, 
Med. Examining Bd., 119 Wis. 2d 168, 185, 349 N.W.2d 68 (1984):  
"Since 1928, however, the doctrine of the delegation of legislative 
power has shifted the focus away from the nature of the power 
delegated through scrutiny of the delegating standard's language 
and more toward the safeguards surrounding the delegated power." 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
13 
 
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133–34 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting 
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter 
Concerning Toleration § 41, p. 71 (1947)).  It is for that reason 
the legislature cannot alienate even a sliver of its core power, 
even if it consciously intends that end.  Not because it would be 
unwise, or imprudent, but because those who created the legislature 
gave it no power to do so.  Therefore, prohibiting the legislature 
from transferring its authority to the executive "isn't about 
protecting institutional prerogatives or governmental turf."  
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  Instead, 
"[i]t's about respecting the people's sovereign choice to vest the 
legislative power in [the legislature] alone.  And it's about 
safeguarding a structure designed to protect their liberties, 
minority rights, fair notice, and the rule of law."  Id.  In the 
constellation of constitutional doctrines, this serves as one of 
the central organizing principles.  Without it, our constitution 
would be an incomprehensible jumble:  "If [the Legislature] could 
pass off its legislative power to the executive branch, the 
'[v]esting [c]lauses, and indeed the entire structure of the 
Constitution,' would 'make no sense.'"  Id. at 2134-35 (quoted 
source omitted). 
¶104 But just because the legislature cannot pass off its 
powers to the executive doesn't mean it won't sometimes try.  Even 
though the authors of our constitution designed it to maintain 
equilibrium amongst the branches through its internal system of 
checks and balances, and by arraying ambition against ambition, it 
has always been apparent that aberrations might arise.  "The 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
14 
 
framers knew . . . that the job of keeping the legislative power 
confined to the legislative branch couldn't be trusted to self-
policing by Congress; often enough, legislators will face rational 
incentives to pass problems to the executive branch."  Id. at 2135.  
And when an alleged aberration comes before us, we do not have the 
luxury of shrugging off the duty to discern whether a border 
incursion has occurred.  
[T]he Constitution does not permit judges to look the 
other way; we must call foul when the constitutional 
lines are crossed.  Indeed, the framers afforded us 
independence from the political branches in large part 
to encourage exactly this kind of "fortitude . . . to do 
[our] duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution." 
Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 468-469). 
¶105 Adjudicating these constitutional border disputes is not 
easy.  Even when our country was young, government was less 
pervasive, and there were far, far fewer statutes, Madison 
acknowledged that "no skill in the science of government has yet 
been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, 
its three great provinces—the legislative, executive, and 
judiciary."  The Federalist No. 37, at 224.  But as Justice Gorsuch 
observed, there are three principles by which to guide our inquiry. 
¶106 The first is that "as long as Congress makes the policy 
decisions when regulating private conduct, it may authorize 
another branch to 'fill up the details.'"  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 
2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoted source omitted).  But the 
filling 
up 
must 
truly 
comprise 
details. 
 
"The 
framers 
understood . . . that it would frustrate 'the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution' if [the legislature] could merely 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
15 
 
announce 
vague 
aspirations 
and 
then 
assign 
others 
the 
responsibility of adopting legislation to realize its goals."  Id. 
at 2133.  So legislation must "set forth standards 'sufficiently 
definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts, and the public 
to ascertain' whether Congress's guidance has been followed."  Id. 
at 2136 (quoted source omitted).  Second, "once [the legislature] 
prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may make the 
application of that rule depend on executive fact-finding."  Id.  
And third, the legislature "may assign the executive and judicial 
branches certain non-legislative responsibilities."  Id. at 2137.  
That is to say, a statute may require the executive to apply 
authority already resident in the executive branch to the matter 
addressed by the statute. 
¶107 Although there is a great deal more that can be said——
and probably should be——about the non-delegation doctrine, we are 
resolving this case on an extraordinarily expedited basis (barely 
more than a week between arguments and release of our opinion).  
But this is sufficient for the day, and will adequately answer the 
Secretary's claim that the Legislature could give her enough power 
to justify the Order. 
III.  THE ORDER 
¶108 Secretary Palm is the head of the Department of Health 
Services, an executive branch agency.  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 
¶14 ("Agencies are considered part of the executive branch.").  As 
a member of the executive branch, she has no inherent legislative 
authority, and "no inherent constitutional authority to make 
rules . . . ."  Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 698, 478 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
16 
 
N.W.2d 582 (1992).  See also Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2) ("Rule-making 
authority is expressly conferred on an agency").  She says the 
Order is a purely and "quintessentially" executive action 
authorized by Wis. Stat. § 252.02, and so she need not promulgate 
any new rules or refer to any other statute before issuing the 
Order.  So our task is to determine whether the Order incorporates, 
either explicitly or implicitly, policy decisions not already 
encompassed 
by 
current 
statutes 
or 
rules.7 
 
If 
it 
does, 
and 
§ 252.02 
allows her to make those policy decisions, then the statute 
violates the non-delegation doctrine.  As Justice Scalia once said,  
[f]requently an issue of this sort will come before the 
Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing:  the 
potential of the asserted principle to effect important 
change in the equilibrium of power is not immediately 
evident, and must be discerned by a careful and 
perceptive analysis.  But this wolf comes as a wolf."   
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
¶109 Under any rational reading, the Order contains or 
assumes policy decisions that are staggering both in their reach 
and in their effect on what we once thought of as inherent rights—
—rights that, according to our constitution, the government exists 
to secure.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  The Secretary insists 
the Order does not adopt any policies because, by its nature, it 
is time-delimited and directed at a certain set of temporary facts 
that (we all hope) won't recur.  She says "the power to set public 
policy," on the other hand, is accomplished by "establishing 
                                                 
7 I express no opinion on whether the Department could have 
supplied the standards on which the Order is based through the 
rule-making process.  I have no need to do so because the Secretary 
insists her actions be judged without regard to any rule-making 
authority she might have. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
17 
 
prospective, generally applicable requirements to govern future 
conduct."  The Order, she claims, hasn't done that. 
¶110 Although the Secretary's argument seems to accept the 
conceptual distinction between executive and legislative power, it 
does not adequately address the totality of what the Order 
accomplishes.  The Order, it is true, contains an executive 
component.  But much more significantly for our analysis today, it 
also announces some shockingly profound public policy decisions, 
or assumes they have previously been made.  For example, the Order 
could not function without a public policy decision that the 
Secretary of the Department of Health Services has the authority 
to confine people to their homes.  That's a policy decision with 
respect to both the grant of authority itself, as well as the 
choice of person in which to vest it.  So is the public policy 
decision that the Secretary has the power to close private 
businesses, or forbid private gatherings, or ban intra-state 
travel, or dictate personal behavior.  The Order also depends on 
a public policy decision that the Secretary has the authority, all 
by herself, to criminalize whatever conduct she believes is 
anathema to controlling communicable diseases. 
¶111 The heart of the Secretary's error is her failure to 
recognize that her Order contains both executive and legislative 
components.  Executive action does not exist in a vacuum.  It must 
execute on a policy——a policy chosen by the legislature or 
promulgated as a rule.  When such a policy decision has not been 
promulgated by the agency or adopted by the legislature, and the 
executive acts anyway, it is by that very action either announcing 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
18 
 
adoption of the policy or erroneously assuming its existence.  
Consequently, when the Order confines people to their homes to 
manage the spread of COVID-19, it does far more than engage the 
executive power.  It also simultaneously asserts there has been a 
public policy decision to vest this type of power in the Secretary.  
Her exercise of that authority in this situation is executive in 
nature, but the genesis of the authority itself is not——it is 
legislative.  The same is true with respect to the Order's implicit 
assertion that there has been a public policy decision to vest in 
the Secretary the power to close private businesses, or forbid 
private gatherings, or ban intra-state travel, or dictate personal 
behavior.   
¶112 But no such public policy decisions have been taken.  
There are no statutes or rules that confer on the Secretary these 
sweeping powers.  The Secretary not only knows this, she 
affirmatively asserts that Wis. Stat. § 252.02 gave her all the 
power needed to confer this type of authority on herself:  "Under 
the statute's plain language," the Secretary says, "DHS may give 
legal force to suitable actions that it then carries out.  The law 
requires no intermediary that DHS must go through . . . ."  If 
§ 252.02 enables the Department to confer on itself the power to 
confine people to their homes, close businesses, etc., then it has 
quite obviously transferred no small amount of the legislature's 
core authority to the executive branch, thereby enabling the 
Secretary to make up public policy decisions as she goes along.  
Without that understanding of the Secretary's authority, the Order 
could not function.  Justice Hagedorn mirrors this error, and even 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
19 
 
uses it as the organizing principle for his dissent.  The whole of 
his statutory analysis is faulty because he has not discerned that 
the Order implicitly created, or assumed to exist, a host of public 
policy decisions.8  Under Justice Hagedorn's rationale, an 
executive branch agency is free to make ad hoc policy decisions, 
so long as they are temporary and acted upon immediately.  Nothing 
in our legal canon supports such an odd proposition. 
¶113 The Secretary's incursion on legislative authority is 
readily apparent when we compare Wis. Stat. § 252.02 and the Order 
to the three principles that give life to the non-delegation 
doctrine.  As described above, the first inquires into whether the 
legislature decided on the conduct-regulating policy and left the 
executive branch to only "fill up the details."  The power to 
confine law-abiding individuals to their homes, commandeer their 
businesses, forbid private gatherings, ban their intra-state 
travel, and dictate their personal behavior cannot, in any 
imaginable universe, be considered a "detail."  This comprehensive 
claim to control virtually every aspect of a person's life is 
something we normally associate with a prison, not a free society 
governed by the rule of law.   
¶114 Further, if Wis. Stat. § 252.02 actually allows this, as 
the Secretary says, the Framers would recognize the statute as a 
frustration of our system of government because it allows the 
                                                 
8 Justice Hagedorn's statutory analysis might be perfectly 
serviceable if we were considering an executive order implementing 
previously established public policy decisions.  But that is not 
this case.  So, as a functional matter, his analysis is operating 
on a hypothetical set of facts.  
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
20 
 
legislature to "merely announce vague aspirations and then assign 
others the responsibility of adopting legislation to realize its 
goals."  See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
To avoid offending the separation of powers, § 252.02 would have 
to "set forth standards 'sufficiently definite and precise to 
enable [the Legislature], the courts, and the public to ascertain' 
whether [the Legislature's] guidance has been followed."  Id.   The 
Secretary eschews the need for any guidance.  Her power, she says, 
is simply to "act" with all dispatch.  If § 252.02 allows this, 
there is literally no means by which we could ascertain whether 
the Secretary is following any legislatively determined policy at 
all.  The Secretary's view of the statute is, essentially, that 
the Legislature charged her with the vague aspiration of 
controlling communicable diseases, and then left to her the 
responsibility of making the public policy decisions that she would 
then execute.   
¶115 If her authority is that boundless, there is no method 
by which we can determine what power she might assert next.  The 
Secretary understands the scope of her power under Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02 to be so complete, so comprehensive, that she can do 
literally anything she believes is necessary to combat COVID-19.  
Can she also dictate what we do in our own homes?  Can she tell us 
how many hours we can spend outdoors in our own yards?  Can she 
forbid us from buying certain products?  Compel us to buy others?  
Nothing in § 252.02 is "sufficiently definite and precise to enable 
[the Legislature], the courts, and the public to ascertain whether 
[the Legislature's] guidance has been followed" with respect to 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
21 
 
the types of power the Secretary may employ.  Indeed, nothing in 
§ 252.02——the sole and sufficient source of power for everything 
the Secretary is doing——gives us any benchmark or even the vaguest 
of clues about what other types of power she might one day assert.   
¶116 The Order fares no better under the second principle of 
non-delegation:  "[O]nce [the Legislature] prescribes the rule 
governing private conduct, it may make the application of that 
rule depend on executive fact-finding."  Id.  Under this rationale, 
it could conceivably be appropriate for the Legislature to confer 
on the Secretary the power to confine people to their homes if she 
finds that such an action is necessary to control the spread of a 
communicable disease.  But no statute or rule confers on her that 
authority, so the Order cannot be justified as the exercise of 
executive authority under this principle. 
¶117 Nor is the Order salvageable under the third non-
delegation principle, which provides that the legislature "may 
assign the executive and judicial branches certain non-legislative 
responsibilities."  Id. at 2137.  The Secretary, however, insists 
that Wis. Stat. § 252.02 "simply empowers DHS to act," and that 
the Order "embodies the quintessential executive task of deciding 
how to address, for the time being, the exigency caused by COVID-
19," and that her authority to address that exigency is limited 
only by judicial or legislative intervention.  If accepted, this 
would work an intolerable inversion in the nature of executive 
authority, allowing it to swallow almost all of the Legislature's 
power.  Here's why. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
22 
 
¶118 If Wis. Stat. § 252.02 makes the Order's contents 
entirely executive, a few strategically written statutes would 
make the legislature a virtual non-entity.  What if the legislature 
instructed the Department of Justice to "issue orders . . . for 
the control and suppression of [crime]"?   Or it enacted a statute 
that 
"simply 
empower[ed] 
[the 
Department 
of 
Financial 
Institutions] to act" with respect to the subjects within its 
purview?  Or it charged some agency or other with "the 
quintessential executive task of deciding how to address, for the 
time being, the exigency caused by" economic vicissitudes?  If the 
executive's authority under each of these hypothetical delegations 
was as staggeringly broad as the Secretary claims for herself under 
§ 252.02, the whole of our lives could be governed exclusively 
from within the executive branch.   
¶119 But none of those hypotheticals would be consistent with 
the separation of powers for the same reason the Order is not.  An 
agency cannot confer on itself the power to dictate the lives of 
law-abiding individuals as comprehensively as the Order does 
without reaching beyond the executive branch's authority.9 
                                                 
9 Justice Hagedorn suggests my attention to constitutional 
boundaries is merely an effort to "try to get around" his 
observation that "[w]e do not enjoin particular enforcement 
actions under a facially constitutional statute simply because the 
statute could be deployed in ways that violate the constitution."  
Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶¶249, 248.  I have no need to "get 
around" this observation because in this court we don't let the 
tail wag the dog.  Justice Hagedorn is concerned about remedies 
when what we are concerned about is enforcing a structural 
limitation on the branches' powers.  It would be irresponsible of 
us not to consider constitutional limitations when we declare what 
the law is. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
23 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶120 The Order may be a brilliantly conceived and executed 
response to COVID-19.  Or maybe it's not.  Either way, that is not 
the question before the court.  Brilliance does not confer 
authority.  Nor does necessity.  Our only task in this case was to 
determine whether Secretary Palm has the authority to issue the 
Order.  We had an unavoidable, non-discretionary, obligatory 
responsibility to decide that question.  And so we have.10  Because 
I agree with that declaration, I join the court's opinion.  I wrote 
separately because it is important to establish that, if we agreed 
with the Secretary's reading of Wis. Stat. § 252.02, we would have 
to conclude the statute violated the separation of powers by 
                                                 
10 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley is concerned that, without a stay 
on our decision, "chaos and confusion" may ensue.  Although it is 
true that the legislature requested a temporary injunction pending 
our decision, subject to a stay for a period of time, it did not 
ask us to stay our decision.  And even if it had, I'm not entirely 
sure what a stay would mean in this context.  The petition 
requested a declaration of rights.  Our opinion declares those 
rights . . . today.  What would it mean to stay that declaration?  
Would everyone have to act like they hadn't read our decision until 
the end of the stay?  Would there be an embargo on reporting on 
our decision until that date?  I don't think staying a declaration 
of rights that we have just declared would mean anything at all 
because it couldn't un-say what we just said. 
 
No.  2020AP765-OA.dk 
 
2 
 
conferring on the Secretary the power to make laws without going 
through the rule-making process.11 
¶121 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
                                                 
11 Justice Hagedorn suggests that somehow it is ironic that 
we 
should 
pay 
attention 
to 
the 
constitutionally-mandated 
demarcation between the legislative and executive branches.  
Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶252.  Apparently, in his view, there 
is to be no policing of this boundary unless we are prepared to 
dismantle the entire administrative state.  He condescends that 
"[i]f we are going to have a serious discussion about the 
separation of powers and its relationship to the administrative 
state, I welcome that conversation," insinuating that our 
reasoning is a species of "it's good for me but not for thee" 
rationalizing.  Id.  Justice Hagedorn doesn't provide any 
justification for this insult, and there appears to be none.  As 
for 
the 
"serious 
discussion 
about 
the 
separation 
of 
powers" . . . the invitation to that conversation was included in 
our oath of office, wherein we swore to uphold the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  He's free to join in anytime he wishes. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.awb 
 
1 
 
¶122 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
Our 
responsibility as a court is to write clear decisions that provide 
guidance to the litigants, courts and the public at large.  I write 
separately to address the issue of a stay and the confusion arising 
from the majority and concurring opinions of Chief Justice 
Roggensack on the issue. 
¶123 The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice 
Roggensack, does not grant a stay.  Thus, the declaration of rights 
takes immediate effect, leaving no time for a transitional safety 
net that a stay could provide.  Majority op., ¶¶56-57.  That 
opinion garnered four votes (Chief Justice Roggensack and Justices 
Ziegler, Rebecca Grassl Bradley, and Kelly).  However, concurring 
to her own authored majority opinion, Chief Justice Roggensack 
writes that she "would stay future actions to enforce our decision 
until May 20, 2020."  Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶65.  
These positions taken in the majority opinion and the concurrence 
are fundamentally contradictory.  If you are confused, you are not 
alone.  
¶124 Chief Justice Roggensack needs to clarify in an opinion 
whether she is or is not voting for a stay of the majority's 
decision.  If her concurrence is to be interpreted as merely a 
lament that she would stay it, then such a lament rings hollow.  
She can stay the immediate effect of the majority opinion.   
¶125 In a court of seven, it takes four votes to form a 
controlling majority on an issue.  Chief Justice Roggensack 
provides the fourth vote to form a majority denying a stay.  
Without her vote there would be only three votes and the 
No.  2020AP765-OA.awb 
 
2 
 
declaration of rights would not have immediate effect.  However, 
assuming Chief Justice Roggensack is actually voting for a stay, 
as her concurrence seemingly indicates, there appear to be four 
votes for issuing a stay (Chief Justice Roggensack and Justices 
Ann Walsh Bradley, Dallet, and Hagedorn).1  See Justice Dallet's 
Dissent, ¶161; Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶263 n.25.  So, is there 
a stay or isn't there?  It can't be both ways. 
¶126 If the clarified vote is one for no stay, then the 
concurrence cannot stand.  It is illogical to vote to deny a stay, 
while at the same time lamenting that because of the way you voted, 
there is no stay. 
¶127 If there is no stay, I repeat to the petitioner, the 
Wisconsin Legislature, the old adage:  "be careful what you wish 
for."  You have come to this court asking that Emergency Order 28 
be deemed unlawful and unenforceable.  Your wish is granted by 
today's majority.2 
¶128 But, it appears you did not intend that your wish would 
go into effect immediately.  You requested initially in briefing 
                                                 
1 This apparent existence of a majority to issue a stay is 
unaffected by this court's statement in State v. Griep regarding 
"pooling" the votes of separate writings to create a majority 
proposition.  See State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶37 n.16, 361 
Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567.  In Griep, the court set forth that 
under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), "the 
positions of the justices who dissented from the judgment are not 
counted in examining the divided opinions for holdings."  In the 
present case, we are not "examining the divided opinions for 
holdings" on the presented issues, but instead we are deciding 
whether an equitable remedy should be granted. 
2 The majority strikes down Emergency Order 28 in its entirety 
with the exception of section 4(a).  Majority op., ¶3 n.6. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.awb 
 
3 
 
that if you prevail, there should be a six-day stay before the 
decision would go into effect.  Later, at oral argument, presumably 
mindful that any rulemaking would take longer than six days, your 
counsel advanced that approximately 12 days would be necessary for 
a rule replacing Emergency Order 28 to go into effect.  Aware of 
the delicate balance necessary to save both livelihoods and lives, 
counsel likely was concerned with the chaos and confusion that 
would be occasioned by any decision in your favor with no stay. 
¶129 But if there is no stay, your request has fallen on deaf 
ears.  And there appears nothing in place to fill the void rendered 
by such a majority decision.  The lack of a stay would be 
particularly breathtaking given the testimony yesterday before 
Congress by one of our nation's top infectious disease experts, 
Dr. Anthony Fauci.  He warned against lifting too quickly stay-
at-home orders such as embodied in Emergency Order 28.  He 
cautioned that if the country reopens too soon, it will result in 
"some suffering and death that could be avoided [and] could even 
set you back on the road to trying to get economic recovery."3 
¶130 Given the admonition of Dr. Fauci, I fail to see the 
wisdom or the equity in invalidating Emergency Order 28 and, at 
                                                 
3 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "At Senate Hearing, Government Experts 
Paint Bleak Picture of the Pandemic," New York Times (May 12, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/us/politics/fauci-cdc-
coronavirus-senate-testimony.html. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.awb 
 
2 
 
least for the time being, leaving nothing in its stead.4  
Accordingly, I dissent.  
¶131 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Declaratory 
judgments 
are 
treated 
functionally 
as 
injunctions when applied to governmental parties who are bound by 
the force and meaning of judgments.  Chief Justice Roggensack's 
Concurrence, ¶64.  The issuance of a permanent injunction demands 
that equity favors issuing the injunction.  Pure Milk Prods. Co-
op v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 800, 280 N.W.2d 691 
(1979). 
I also observe that, when balancing the equities to determine 
whether injunctive relief is appropriate, courts around the 
country have given the utmost weight to the protection of health 
and human life.  See McLaughlin by McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. 
Supp. 633, 644 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Todd by Todd v. Sorrell, 
841 F.2d 87, 88 (4th Cir. 1988); Rockhill Care Center, Inc. v. 
Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶132 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  Today, a 
majority of this court does the Legislature's bidding by striking 
the entirety of Emergency Order 28, "Safer at Home Order," yet 
confusingly, in a footnote, upholding Section 4. a.  The majority 
reaches its conclusion by torturing the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 252.02 (2017-18)1 and completely disregarding the long-
standing, broad statutory powers the Legislature itself granted to 
the Department of Health Services (DHS) to control COVID-19, a 
novel contagion.2  This decision will undoubtedly go down as one 
of the most blatant examples of judicial activism in this court's 
history.  And it will be Wisconsinites who pay the price. 
¶133 A majority of this court falls hook, line, and sinker 
for the Legislature's tactic to rewrite a duly enacted statute 
through litigation rather than legislation.  But legislating a new 
policy from the bench exceeds the constitutional role of this 
court.  While a majority of this court is clearly uncomfortable 
with the broad grants of authority the Legislature gave to DHS 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 In the United States alone COVID-19 has sickened more than 
1.34 million people and approximately 80,820 people have died.  
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-
in-us.html.  Here in Wisconsin, as of this writing, there are 
10,902 confirmed cases and 421 COVID-19 related deaths, with cases 
confirmed 
in 
almost 
every 
county.  
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/data.htm. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
2 
 
through Wis. Stat. § 252.02 and throughout Wisconsin history,3 the 
court's role is only to examine and apply the plain statutory 
language.  "It is the duty of the courts to enforce the law as 
written."  Baierl v. Riesenecker, 201 Wis. 454, 458, 227 N.W. 9 
(1929), rev'd on reh'g on other grounds, 201 Wis. 454, 230 N.W. 605 
(1930).   
¶134 Rather than examine the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02, the majority engages in analytical gymnastics to arrive 
at a desired conclusion.  One need only examine the clear and plain 
statutory language to uncover what the majority attempts to 
obscure.  Because the Legislature has bestowed on the DHS Secretary 
through § 252.02 the explicit authority to issue orders such as 
Emergency Order 28 without first going through the rulemaking 
process, the majority's exercise ultimately fails.  I dissent. 
I.  EMERGENCY ORDER 28 DID NOT REQUIRE RULEMAKING 
¶135 It is first important to understand Wisconsin's long-
standing history of giving a broad grant of power to its public 
health authority, a history the majority purposefully overlooks.  
The Wisconsin Legislature was among the first state legislatures 
to address public health emergencies when it created the State 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., majority op., ¶31:  "Palm points to statutes that 
she asserts give her broad authority to impose regulation; but it 
does not follow she can impose regulation without going through a 
process to give the people faith in the justness of the 
regulation"; "However, under Palm's theory, she can 'implement all 
emergency measures necessary to control communicable diseases,' 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02(6), even at the expense of fundamental 
liberties . . . ." 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
3 
 
Board of Health in March 1876.4  See ch. 366, Laws of 1876.  This 
was a panel of seven physicians who were responsible for "general 
supervision of the interests of the health and life of the citizens 
of the state."  § 2, ch. 366, Laws of 1876.5  The Legislature 
granted the board unusually broad powers, allowing it to impose 
statewide quarantines unilaterally in times of public health 
emergencies, 
as 
well 
as 
making 
"rules 
and 
regulations . . . necessary for the preservation or improvement of 
public health . . . ."  § 10, ch. 366, Laws of 1876. 
¶136 In 1904 this court recognized that the Legislature may 
"rightfully grant to boards of health authority to employ all 
necessary means to protect the public health" given the need to 
"act immediately and summarily in cases of . . . contagious and 
malignant diseases, which are liable to spread and become epidemic, 
causing destruction of human life."  Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 
155, 97 N.W. 942 (1904) (citing Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 
588, 66 N.W. 805 (1896); City of Salem v. E. Ry. Co., 98 Mass. 431 
(1868); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894)).  Similarly, the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
recognized 
that 
it 
was 
                                                 
4 The impetus for the creation of the State Board of Health 
was "[t]he high death rate from various communicable diseases and 
subsequent efforts of medical societies."  See State of Wisconsin 
Blue Book 465 (1983-84). 
Notably, public health legislation in Wisconsin dates back to 
the territorial days.  Id. 
5 Wisconsin became the tenth state in the nation with such a 
board.  See Steven B. Burg, Wisconsin and the Great Spanish Flu 
Epidemic of 1918, Wisconsin Magazine of History 37, 44 (Autumn 
2000). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
4 
 
"surely . . . appropriate," 
and 
"not 
an 
unusual, 
nor 
an 
unreasonable or arbitrary, requirement," to vest a board of health 
with the authority to respond to "an epidemic of disease" because 
it is composed of persons in the affected locality who presumably 
had "fitness to determine such questions."  Jacobson v. 
Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). 
¶137 The State Board of Health exercised its broad emergency 
powers during the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918.  In October 1918, 
State Health Officer Dr. Cornelius Harper, in consultation with 
the governor, issued an order closing all public institutions in 
Wisconsin, including "schools, theaters, moving picture houses, 
other places of amusement and public gathering for an indefinite 
period of time."  Burg, supra n.5, at 45.  "[N]owhere except in 
Wisconsin was such an order issued statewide or in such a 
comprehensive fashion," as practically every local government in 
Wisconsin cooperated with the order immediately.  Id.  For almost 
three months, isolation rather than socialization was the norm for 
citizens of Wisconsin.  Id. at 52.  Compliance undoubtedly spelled 
the difference between life and death for hundreds, if not 
thousands, of Wisconsin citizens.  Id. at 53. 
¶138 The broad executive power to take swift measures in 
response to an outbreak of communicable disease has existed 
uninterrupted since 1876.  The language of ch. 252 expressly 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
5 
 
confers on DHS, the modern successor to the State Board of Health,6 
broad pandemic-response powers.  Section 252.02, "Powers and 
duties of department," sets forth the powers and duties of DHS, 
the limits of which are not at issue in this case. 
¶139 With this background, I turn to DHS's issuance of 
Emergency Order 28.  DHS asserts that the plain text of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 252.02(3), (4), and (6) authorizes it to issue Emergency Order 
28 without first engaging in rulemaking.  To determine the extent 
of the powers the Legislature has granted DHS to use during a 
pandemic, I start with the plain language of the statute.  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶140 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.02(4) reads: 
The department may promulgate and enforce rules or issue 
orders for guarding against the introduction of any 
communicable disease into the state, for the control and 
suppression of communicable diseases, for the quarantine 
and disinfection of persons, localities and things 
infected 
or 
suspected 
of 
being 
infected 
by 
a 
communicable disease and for the sanitary care of jails, 
state prisons, mental health institutions, schools, and 
public buildings and connected premises.  Any rule or 
order may be made applicable to the whole or any 
specified part of the state, or to any vessel or other 
conveyance. . . . 
                                                 
6 The State Board of Health was abolished in 1939 and its 
functions were subsequently transferred throughout the executive 
branch.  See State of Wisconsin Blue Book 141 (1940-41).  Chapter 
250 of the Wisconsin Statutes designates DHS as "the state lead 
agency for public health," with "all powers necessary to fulfill 
the 
duties 
prescribed 
in 
the 
statutes." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 250.03(1)(b); 250.04(2)(a).  In Chapter 252 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, DHS is charged with controlling communicable disease 
within Wisconsin.   
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
6 
 
(Emphasis added).  Section 252.02(4) plainly grants DHS the power 
to address COVID-19 through rulemaking or by issuing orders.  The 
use of the word "or" distinguishes "orders" from "rules."  See 
Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 357 (2014) (noting the 
use of "or" in a statute is "disjunctive, that is, the words it 
connects are to be given separate meanings").  Whichever 
alternative DHS chooses, order or rule, it can be made "applicable 
to the whole" of Wisconsin.  The Legislature chose these words and 
is presumed to say what it means and mean what it says.  See 
Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 
(Ct. App. 1996) ("When the Legislature uses different terms in a 
statute——particularly in the same section——we presume it intended 
the terms to have distinct meanings."). 
¶141 The statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4), part of 
a plain meaning analysis, confirms the authority of DHS to issue 
orders applicable to the whole of Wisconsin separate and apart 
from rules.  See United States v. Franklin, 2019 WI 64, ¶13, 387 
Wis. 2d 259, 928 N.W.2d 545 (quoted source omitted) ("Evaluation 
of the context of a statute is part of a plain-meaning analysis 
and includes a review of . . . 'previously enacted and repealed 
provisions of a statute.'").  Originally, the predecessor to 
§ 252.02(4) did not allow for the issuance of orders; DHS could 
only "adopt and enforce rules and regulations," with "rule" 
carrying a similar definition as it does today, including "general 
order . . . of general application."  See Wis. Stat. § 143.02(4) 
(1955-56); compare Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3) (1955-56), with Wis. 
Stat. § 227.01(13) (2017-18).   
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
7 
 
¶142 However, in 1982, at the beginning of the AIDS epidemic,7 
the Legislature amended the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4) 
to explicitly include as part of DHS's power the ability "to issue 
orders" of statewide application.  See § 21, ch. 291, Laws of 
1981.8  Even though DHS had existing authority to promulgate a 
"rule" which, again, had always included a "general order . . . of 
general application," the Legislature chose to give DHS the 
                                                 
7 See 
https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/history/hiv-
and-aids-timeline 
8 The majority cites to extrinsic evidence, an "Explanatory 
Note" to Senate Bill 711, for support that the insertion of the 
phrase "issue orders" was "basically technical changes designed to 
bring the statute into concordance with the current public health 
and epidemiologic thought and terminology."  Majority op., ¶26.  
Reliance on this "Explanatory Note" is problematic for several 
reasons.  First, the court has clearly enunciated that it does not 
look to extrinsic sources in a plain language analysis.  See State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
("Where 
statutory language is 
unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation, such as legislative history.").  Second, the cited 
"Explanatory Note" language was not even related to the "issue 
orders" language.  Instead, it refers to inserting words like 
"communicable" before disease and switching the phrase "jails, 
asylums, schoolhouses" to "correctional facilities, mental health 
institutions, schools."  The majority should have realized that 
the "issue orders" language has nothing to do with "public health 
and epidemiologic thought and terminology" and not blindly adopted 
an argument made by Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce in its 
amicus brief. 
Further, the majority asserts that "the Legislative Reference 
Bureau never described the added language as changing DHS's 
authority."  Majority op., ¶26.  There is no support for the 
proposition that the LRB is expected to make such comments or that 
its description of any textual additions is dispositive.  These 
strained inferences from inapplicable extrinsic evidence and the 
LRB's silence illustrate how willing the majority is to circumvent 
the plain text of a statute to reach its desired policy outcome. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
8 
 
separate power to issue orders on a statewide basis to control and 
suppress communicable diseases.   
¶143 Additionally, in the same 1982 amendment giving DHS the 
power to issue orders of statewide application, the Legislature 
added the requirement that "Rules of general application shall be 
adopted under ch. 227."  See § 21, ch. 291, Laws of 1981 (emphasis 
added).9  The amendment did not say that "orders" applicable to 
the entire state shall be adopted pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  
This further supports the Legislature's distinction between 
"orders" permitted under Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4) and "rules" 
subject to ch. 227. 
¶144 According to the majority opinion, any order applicable 
to the whole state would be a rule.  But an "order" "made applicable 
to the whole" state cannot be synonymous with "rule" because, such 
a reading ignores the different words chosen by the Legislature 
and renders the language in the 1982 amendment superfluous.  It is 
a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that we must read 
statutory language "to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage."10  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; see 
also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012) ("Because legal drafters 
                                                 
9 That language was removed from the predecessor to Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02(4) pursuant to 1993 Wis. Act 27, § 284. 
10 Notably, a majority of this court just recently relied on 
this interpretive canon against surplusage in striking down 
Executive Order 74 which had suspended in-person voting in response 
to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.  See Am. Order, Wis. Legislature 
v. Evers, No. 2020AP608-OA, at 3 (Apr. 6, 2020). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
9 
 
should not include words that have no effect, courts avoid a 
reading that renders some words altogether redundant."). 
¶145 Emergency 
Order 
28 
is 
authorized 
by 
two 
other 
subsections of Wis. Stat. § 252.02:  §§ 252.02(3) and (6), neither 
of which require rulemaking under ch. 227.  Section § 252.02(6) is 
the broadest grant of authority given by the Legislature to DHS.  
Subsection 6 reads:  "The department may authorize and implement 
all 
emergency 
measures 
necessary 
to 
control 
communicable 
diseases."  (Emphasis added).  The very broad language of 
§ 252.02(6) to "authorize and implement all emergency measures 
necessary" includes the issuance of emergency orders necessary to 
combat a deadly virus.11  The Legislature asks the court to read 
in language that simply is not there.  Section 252.02(6) does not 
                                                 
11 The concurrences of Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley and 
Justice Kelly attempt to resuscitate the non-delegation doctrine.  
They cite dissenting opinions, evocative precedent, and a 
selective assortment of foreboding historical quotes, but their 
ultimate analyses of Wis. Stat. § 252.02 have been repeatedly 
rejected under modern administrative law.  Broad grants of 
authority are routinely upheld where the statute as a whole, 
including its purpose, factual background, and context, bind the 
agency's authority.  See, e.g.,  Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 
U.S. 90, 104–05, (1946); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. 
Ct. 2116, 2130, reh'g denied, 140 S. Ct. 579 (2019) ("It is wisdom 
and humility alike that this Court has always upheld such 
'necessities of government.'") (citation omitted).  The language 
of § 252.02(6) fits comfortably within the range of broad grants 
historically approved by the United States Supreme Court.  See 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("What legislated standard, one must wonder, can 
possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have 
repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a 'public interest' 
standard?") (citing Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 
190, 216-17 (1943)); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 
U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932)). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
10 
 
contain any limiting language——it does not say that DHS may 
"authorize and implement all emergency measures necessary except 
general orders of general application, for which rulemaking is 
required."  We will not read into a statute "words the legislature 
did not see fit to write."  Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, 
¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316; see also State v. Fitzgerald, 
2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 ("[R]ather, we 
interpret the words the legislature actually enacted into law."). 
¶146 The statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(6) further 
supports a reading of § 252.02(6) which gives DHS a broad grant of 
authority to issue the entirety of Emergency Order 28 without going 
through the rulemaking process.  The Legislature enacted this 
subsection in 1982 contemporaneously with adding the power to issue 
statewide orders and declaring that only rules of general 
application, not orders, be adopted as rules under ch. 227.  See 
§§ 21-22, ch. 291, Laws of 1981.  Section 252.02(6) post-dates 
both §§ 252.02(3) and (4) and demonstrates how, over time, the 
Legislature has continued to expand DHS's ability to act to control 
contagion in emergencies such as this one. 
¶147 Finally, Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3) independently provides 
authority for the issuance of several provisions in Emergency Order 
28 without rulemaking.  Yet, it is significant that the majority 
fails to even mention this subsection despite Emergency Order 28 
explicitly citing § 252.02(3) as authority.  Section 252.02(3) 
allows DHS to "close schools and forbid public gatherings in 
schools, churches and other places to control outbreaks and 
epidemics."  Although § 252.02(3) does not specify the method by 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
11 
 
which DHS can close schools and forbid public gatherings, this 
subsection clearly envisions the issuance of orders.  To suggest 
that in the midst of an outbreak or epidemic of a contagious 
disease DHS must go through the process of rulemaking before 
closing schools is preposterous and at odds with the other 
subsections of § 252.02.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (noting 
that statutory language is examined "not in isolation but as part 
of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes").  The majority opinion seemingly admits the 
absurdity of this outcome when it states that the decision striking 
the entirety of Emergency Order 28 "does not apply to Section 4. 
a. of Emergency Order 28."  Majority op., ¶3 n.6.  
¶148 The majority's attempts to circumvent the statute's 
plain meaning in order to reach its desired outcome are legally 
suspect and, frankly, unpersuasive.  To establish that Emergency 
Order 28 is a rule subject to the emergency rulemaking provisions 
in Wis. Stat. § 227.24, the majority reads "order" "made applicable 
to the whole" in Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4) as a "general order of 
general application."  This reading makes the word "order" 
superfluous and changes the language of § 252.02(4) to read "the 
department 
may 
promulgate 
and 
enforce 
rules 
or 
issue 
rules . . . ."  Courts do not read in redundancies for the sake of 
aligning a statute with a brand new policy preference.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; Scalia & Garner, supra ¶144, at 176.   
¶149 This reading of Wis. Stat. § 252.02 is even more 
illogical because it hamstrings DHS to a time-consuming, lengthy 
rulemaking scheme inconsistent with the authorization for DHS to 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
12 
 
act "immediately and summarily" to guard against the introduction 
of communicable disease as well as to control and suppress it.  
Lowe, 120 Wis. at 155.  A review of the tedious multi-step process 
required to enact an emergency rule illustrates why the Legislature 
authorized DHS to issue statewide orders to control contagion.   
¶150 The emergency rulemaking process set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.24 includes 11-13 steps which the briefing indicates takes 
a minimum of 18 and a maximum of 49 days.12  At oral argument, 
counsel for the Legislature focused only on the first eight steps, 
from the creation of a scope statement until the time a rule is 
published, which he thought "could take 12 days, in this case."  
However, counsel's phrases like "matter of an hour," "approve it 
in one minute," and "about a second" show that the time it takes 
to enact an emergency rule is guess work, at best, and discounts 
the uncertainty tied to this process. 
¶151 Even assuming the Legislature's best-case-scenario 
timeframe of 12 days, DHS still may not be able to act to control 
a contagion using only emergency rulemaking.  While the Legislature 
does not get a seat at the table to draft an emergency rule, a 
                                                 
12 There are eleven mandatory steps contained in Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.24, including drafting a statement of scope for the emergency 
rule, obtaining gubernatorial approval for the statement of scope, 
submitting the statement of scope for publication in the 
Administrative Register, and obtaining approval for the statement 
from the individual or body with the appropriate policy-making 
powers.  See § 227.24(1)(e)1d.  Additionally, the Joint Committee 
for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR), a legislative 
committee, can request a preliminary public hearing, which is a 
potential step that delays the process for several days to several 
weeks. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
13 
 
partisan legislative committee13 has the ability to suspend any 
emergency rule following a public hearing.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.26 
(2)(d).  This, and any other change in circumstances requiring a 
new scope statement, would send DHS right back to the drawing 
board.  These procedures and timelines are wholly inconsistent 
with the prompt and decisive action necessary to control and 
suppress a deadly communicable disease like COVID-19. 
¶152 The majority and the Legislature point the finger at DHS 
and assert that it should have gone through emergency rulemaking 
while Governor Evers' Executive Order 72 was in effect.14  This 
overlooks the Legislature's own inaction.  During the 23 days 
before DHS issued Emergency Order 28, there was already in effect 
a nearly identical emergency order issued under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 252.02(3) and (6), which the Legislature never challenged.  See 
Emergency Order 12, at 2.  During those 23 days, the Legislature 
convened several times, including two special sessions, but chose 
not to address Order 12 or DHS's claimed grant of authority under 
                                                 
13 The Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules is 
currently made up of:  Representative Joan Ballweg (R), Senator 
Stephen Nass (R), Representative Adam Neylon (R), Senator Duey 
Stroebel (R), Senator David Craig (R), Senator Chris Larson (D), 
Senator Robert Wirch (D), Representative Romaine Quinn (R), 
Representative Gary Hebl (D), and Representative Lisa Subeck (D).  
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2019/committees/joint/1965. 
14 In Executive Order 72, Governor Evers declared a public 
health emergency. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
14 
 
§ 252.02.  See Executive Order 73; Executive Order 74.15  Instead, 
the Legislature now comes to this court and asks it to rescind the 
broad powers it granted to DHS.  Whatever policy choices the 
Legislature makes going forward should be effectuated by the 
legislative process, not as a result of a decision made by the 
judiciary. 
¶153 The majority further disregards the nature of Emergency 
Order 28, which is inconsistent with the purpose of emergency 
rulemaking.  An emergency rule does not share the limited nature 
of an order; instead, it is intended to be in place temporarily 
until a permanent rule can be promulgated.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.24(1)(c), (2)(a).  Moreover, a rule applies to future 
circumstances and is enacted with the purpose of guiding future 
conduct.  Emergency Order 28 is an immediate response to current 
circumstances and has an end-date of May 26, 2020.  It does not 
serve as guidance for response to any future unique contagious 
disease, or even to the evolving circumstances surrounding COVID-
19, and is therefore by its very nature not a rule. 
¶154 Finally, the majority conspicuously omits the fact that 
Emergency Order 28 expressly allows this court to sever any 
                                                 
15 The 
majority 
calls 
Secretary 
Palm 
an 
"unelected," 
"unconfirmed" cabinet member.  Majority op., ¶¶24, 28, 31.  It is 
the Legislature who controls her confirmation and has yet to vote 
despite her approval by a bipartisan Senate Committee in August of 
2019.  Secretary Palm does not need confirmation to serve as DHS 
Secretary.  Wisconsin's executive branch is structured such that 
a department secretary, even one awaiting Senate confirmation, 
"serve[s] at the pleasure of the governor."  Wis. Stat. § 15.05. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
15 
 
unconstitutional provision and save the rest.16  Why?  So it could 
feign that it had no choice but to strike the entirety of the 
order.  The majority had another option:  sever the provisions 
besides 
those 
"clos[ing] 
schools 
and 
forbid[ding] 
public 
gatherings in schools, churches, and other places," which the 
Legislature conceded are valid under Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3).17  
While the majority in a footnote says "This decision does not apply 
to Section 4. a. of Emergency Order 28," majority op., ¶3 n.6, it 
does not explicitly sever Section 4. a.  In fact, the broad 
language in the majority opinion suggests otherwise:  "Emergency 
Order 28 is invalid and therefore, unenforceable."  Majority op., 
¶56.  The majority's act of striking the entirety of Emergency 
Order 28 effective immediately is a prime example of judicial 
activism.   
¶155 Relatedly, the majority makes much ado about nothing 
when bemoaning that Emergency Order 28 allows the executive to 
                                                 
16 Section 19 of Emergency Order 28 says:  "To this end, the 
provisions of this Order are severable."   
17 For example, Section 4. a. of Emergency Order 28 indicates 
that "Public and private K-12 schools shall remain closed for pupil 
instruction and extracurricular activities for the remainder of 
the 2019-2020 school year."  Such a provision is clearly within 
DHS's 
explicit 
authority 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
252.02(3).  Similarly, Section 4. c. closes "places of public 
amusement and activity."  Such places include but are not limited 
to "amusement parks, carnivals, water parks, licensed public or 
private swimming pools, splash pads, aquariums, zoos, museums, 
arcades, fairs, children's play centers, playgrounds, funplexes, 
theme parks, bowling alleys, movie and other theaters, concert and 
music halls, country clubs, social clubs, and gyms and fitness 
centers."  Again, the Legislature concedes that DHS may order at 
least some of these places to close under § 252.02(3). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
16 
 
arbitrarily define crimes and impose criminal penalties.18  In 
fact, for shock value, the majority ties much of its reasoning to 
the imposition of criminal penalties.  As detailed in Justice 
Hagedorn's dissent, ¶255 & n.21, criminal penalties for the 
violation of an agency action is nothing new.  Nonetheless, as the 
assistant attorney general conceded at oral argument, this court 
could simply issue a ruling that Emergency Order 28 can only be 
enforced through civil fines and sever the language regarding 
criminal penalties.  The majority fails to even mention this 
possibility because to do so would expose the flaws in their 
reasoning.  Instead, the majority of this court strikes the 
entirety of Emergency Order 28, see majority op., ¶¶3, 56, and 
limits DHS's ability to act quickly while in the midst of its 
efforts to fight COVID-19. 
 
II.  THE MAJORITY'S ADVISORY OPINION ON THE LEGISLATURE'S 
SECOND CLAIM 
¶156 The majority opinion should end after it addresses the 
Legislature's first claim and strikes the entirety of Emergency 
Order 28.  Instead, the majority "assumes arguendo" that rulemaking 
was not required so that it can opine on issues not properly before 
the court.  The reason given by the majority is that the court 
granted review of the second issue.  See majority op., ¶43.  Having 
decided to accept a question on review has never provided a 
justification to engage in an advisory opinion, which this court 
                                                 
18 Section 18 of Emergency Order 28 indicates that violations 
of the order are punishable by up to 30 days imprisonment, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 252.25. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
17 
 
disfavors.  See Am. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 188 N.W.2d 529 (1971) ("Advisory 
opinions should not be given under the guise of a declaration of 
rights."). 
¶157 The majority appropriately defines standing to seek 
judicial review as "when one has a stake in the outcome of the 
controversy and is affected by the issues in controversy."  
Majority op., ¶12 (citing Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 
WI 65, ¶38, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177).  Yet, the majority 
offers a cursory and incomplete analysis on this issue because it 
only addresses standing based on an invasion of the Legislature's 
core powers.  While the Legislature conceivably has standing on 
the first claim regarding rulemaking, this does not confer standing 
to challenge Emergency Order 28 as exceeding DHS's statutory 
authority.  The majority opinion is void of any analysis as to the 
Legislature's standing to bring its second claim.  
¶158 The Legislature has no stake whatsoever in whether the 
mandate in Emergency Order 28 exceeded DHS's authority under Wis. 
Stat. §§ 252.02(3), (4), and (6).  The Legislature itself is 
expressly exempt from the legal directives of Emergency Order 28.  
See Emergency Order 28 at 11 ("This section does not limit the 
ability or authority of the Wisconsin Legislature to meet or 
conduct business.").  No single legislator signed on in an 
individual capacity to this lawsuit.  In order for this court to 
properly reach this claim, it must be brought by one who is harmed 
by the order, a Wisconsin citizen or business entity that falls 
under the scope of Emergency Order 28. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
18 
 
¶159 Recognizing the Legislature's standing to bring a claim 
that enforcement of a statute "exceeded statutory authority" sets 
a dangerous precedent.  This court has deemed it error for a 
legislator to testify regarding legislative intent of a statute 
and likewise the Legislature here cannot testify to its view of 
the scope of a statute.  Cartwright v. Sharpe, 40 Wis. 2d 494, 
508-509, 162 N.W.2d 5 (1968); see also Responsible Use of Rural 
and Agr. Land v. PSC, 2000 WI 129, ¶39 n.20, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 
N.W.2d 888 ("ex post facto explanations from legislators cannot be 
relied upon to determine legislative intent . . . ."); State v. 
Consolidated 
Freightways 
Corp., 
72 
Wis. 2d 727, 
738, 
242 
N.W.2d 192 (1976) ("However, neither a legislator, nor a private 
citizen, is permitted to testify as to what the intent of the 
legislature was in the passage of a particular statute.").  
Moreover, allowing the Legislature to challenge the scope of a 
duly enacted statute without a showing of any particularized harm 
opens the floodgates for future litigation about the application 
of each and every statute.  See also Justice Hagedorn's dissent, 
¶¶233-44 (providing a well reasoned and extensive discussion on 
standing).  
¶160 Even overlooking the clear standing issues, the advisory 
part of the opinion is cursory and misreads the statutory language.  
The majority cuts and pastes portions of Wis. Stat. § 252.02 and 
reaches undeveloped conclusions.  For example, the majority 
opinion appears to say that Emergency Order 28 exceeds the 
authority given to DHS in § 252.02(4) because it goes beyond the 
quarantining of suspected infected persons and guarding against 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
19 
 
the introduction of communicable disease into the state.  Majority 
op., ¶¶49-50.  The majority conveniently fails to mention the rest 
of § 252.02(4), including the authority to issue statewide orders 
"for the control and suppression of communicable diseases."  
Ultimately, by engaging in an advisory opinion about the potential 
limits of § 252.02, the majority of this court did not just jump 
when the Legislature asked it to, it asked "how high?" 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶161 It is important to understand that the Legislature's 
request was not to immediately strike Emergency Order 28.  Even 
the Legislature appreciated the abrupt changes that will be wrought 
by this decision and thus asked this court for a stay.  In its 
initial brief, the Legislature requested that this Court stay 
enforcement of an injunction for a period of six days to allow DHS 
"to promulgate an emergency rule consistent" with state law.  The 
reply brief suggests this court "stay enforcement of its injunction 
in its equitable discretion, to allow DHS sufficient time to 
promulgate a new emergency rule consistent with Wisconsin law."  
In its last act of judicial activism, the majority takes it upon 
itself to immediately overturn Emergency Order 28, a remedy neither 
party asked for. 
¶162 The effective date of this decision should be stayed and 
the majority has the equitable power to do so.  In her concurrence, 
Chief Justice Roggensack claims she would stay "future actions to 
enforce our decision," but since Emergency Order 28 will no longer 
be in effect, there will be no "future actions" of enforcement.  
These words are meaningless.  It is clear that a majority of this 
No.  2020AP765-OA.rfd 
 
20 
 
court has no appreciation of the consequences of doing the 
Legislature's bidding in the midst of a pandemic.  The Legislature 
has always had the power to act, but would rather ask this court 
to do so to avoid political fallout.  Unfortunately for 
Wisconsinites, this court took the bait. 
¶163 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶164 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
1 
 
¶165 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  We are facing a 
unique public health crisis the likes of which few among us has 
ever seen.  And the government response of shutting down 
businesses, travel, and schools, forbidding private gatherings, 
and other such measures is a demonstration of government power the 
likes of which few among us has ever seen.  Understandably, our 
public discourse is full of passionate debate——both over how to 
handle the public health issues facing our world, and over whether 
this exercise of government power is appropriate for this crisis 
and for a nation "conceived in Liberty."  Abraham Lincoln, Address 
at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863). 
¶166 The pressing and consequential nature of these questions 
cannot be overstated, but this particular case has nothing to do 
with them——nothing whatsoever.  The judiciary receives its charge 
from the people through the Wisconsin Constitution.  And the people 
have not empowered this court to step in and impose our wisdom on 
proper governance during this pandemic; they left that to the 
legislative and executive branches.  They have empowered this court 
to decide cases according to the law, and that alone is what we 
must do. 
¶167 Some would like to characterize this case as a battle 
over the constitutional limits on executive power——can an 
executive branch officer really shut down businesses, limit 
travel, and forbid public gatherings?  These are important 
questions for sure, but they are not what this case is about.  No 
party has raised or developed such a claim.  Some would also like 
to frame this as a challenge to the government's potential 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
2 
 
infringement of certain constitutional protections like the 
freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly, and the right to hunt 
and fish.  But these issues are not before us either.  No party 
has raised or developed a claim along these lines. 
¶168 We are a court of law.  We are not here to do freewheeling 
constitutional theory.  We are not here to step in and referee 
every intractable political stalemate.  We are not here to decide 
every interesting legal question.  It is no doubt our duty to say 
what the law is, but we do so by deciding cases brought by specific 
parties raising specific arguments and seeking specific relief.  
In a case of this magnitude, we must be precise, carefully focusing 
on what amounts to the narrow, rather technical, questions before 
us.  If we abandon that charge and push past the power the people 
have vested in their judiciary, we are threatening the very 
constitutional structure and protections we have sworn to uphold. 
¶169 This court granted the legislature's petition for 
original action on two issues.  First, we are asked whether the 
commands in Emergency Order 28 (Order 28) were required to be 
promulgated as an administrative rule under chapter 227 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  I conclude they were not because Order 28 is 
an order applying to a specific factual circumstance, and is 
therefore not an order of "general application" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13) (2017-18).1  Second, the legislature asks us to 
address whether, even if rulemaking was not required, Order 28 
exceeds the Department of Health Services' (DHS) statutory 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
3 
 
authority.  Because this is a challenge to executive branch 
enforcement of clearly on-point statutes, I conclude the 
legislatureas a constitutional body whose interests lie in 
enacting, not enforcing the lawslacks standing to bring this 
claim.  Such claims should be raised by those injured by the 
enforcement action, not by the branch of government who drafted 
the laws on which the executive branch purports to rely.  To the 
extent we countenance an argument that Wis. Stat. § 252.02 grants 
too much power to DHS, we are allowing the legislature to argue 
its own laws are unconstitutional, a legal claim it has no 
authority to make. 
¶170 In striking down most of Order 28, this court has strayed 
from its charge and turned this case into something quite different 
than the case brought to us.  To make matters worse, it has failed 
to provide almost any guidance for what the relevant laws mean, 
and how our state is to govern through this crisis moving forward.  
The legislature may have buyer's remorse for the breadth of 
discretion it gave to DHS in Wis. Stat. § 252.02.  But those are 
the laws it drafted; we must read them faithfully whether we like 
them or not.  To be sure, this leaves much unanswered.  Significant 
legal questions remain regarding the limits, scope, and propriety 
of the powers asserted in Order 28, and in the powers that might 
plausibly be exercised pursuant to the broad authority and 
responsibility given to DHS in § 252.02.  But those are questions 
we must leave for another day; this court has no business raising 
and deciding claims to vindicate the rights of parties not before 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
4 
 
us now.  Based on the legal issues presented in this case, I would 
uphold Order 28.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
I.  Background 
¶171 The factual background to this case is well-known and 
sufficiently stated in the other writings.  But some pertinent 
legal background will be helpful in understanding the issues——
namely, that which pertains to our basic constitutional structure 
and the police power generally. 
¶172 The foundation of our system of government rests in the 
sovereignty of the people.  Government has a morally legitimate 
claim to order and command not because it has the biggest guns or 
because it's always been that way, but because the people have 
given it that power.  The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 
1776); Wis. Const. art. I, § 1. 
¶173 The people have granted power and delineated its limits 
through the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  These constitutions reflect and describe both a 
vertical separation of powers and a horizontal separation of 
powers.  More than even our Bill of Rights, our founders understood 
the separation of powers as the central bulwark of our liberty.  
See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("The Framers of the Federal Constitution . . . viewed 
the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central 
guarantee of a just Government."). 
¶174 The vertical separation of powers is reflected in the 
allocation of powers between the federal government and state 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
5 
 
governments, a concept known as federalism.  Power is diffused 
into two separate sovereigns, each having their own spheres of 
authority within which they can and cannot act.  The federal 
government, as established by the federal constitution, is a 
government of limited and enumerated powers.  This means the 
federal government can only do what the federal constitution itself 
grants it power to do.  Powers not given to the federal government 
are retained by the people and the states.  U.S. Const. amend. X 
("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people."); see also Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state 
whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they 
commercial law or a part of the law of torts.  And no clause in 
the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal 
courts."). 
¶175 The horizontal separation of powers is the idea that 
government power at large is divided and deposited into three 
institutions or officers.  The power to make law, to decide what 
the law should be, is given to the legislative branch.  Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 1.  The power to enforce and execute the law already 
enacted is given to the executive branch.  Id. art. V, § 1.  And 
the power to decide disputes about the law is given to the judicial 
branch.  Id. art. VII, § 2.  This horizontal separation of powers 
is reflected in both the United States Constitution and the 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
6 
 
Wisconsin Constitution.  See Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 
2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384. 
¶176 These two principles——both the vertical and horizontal 
separation of powers——are of key importance to this case in a 
number of ways. 
¶177 First, while the federal government is one of limited 
and enumerated powers, the state government is not.  States have 
what is known as the police power.  This is the state's inherent 
power "to promote the general welfare," which "covers all matters 
having a reasonable relation to the protection of the public 
health, safety or welfare."  State v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 
65 Wis. 2d 482, 490, 222 N.W.2d 912 (1974).  If that sounds 
incredibly broad and far-reaching, that's because it is.  It is 
the police power which allows states to enact general criminal 
laws and punish those who don't comply.  It is the police power 
that allows states to enact permitting requirements on the use of 
private property.  It is the police power that allows the state to 
tax its citizens, prohibit speeding, enact inheritance laws, and 
on and on.2 
                                                 
2 Quoting the United States Supreme Court, this court has 
explained:   
But what are the police powers of a State?  They are 
nothing more or less than the powers of government 
inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its 
dominions.  And whether a State passes a quarantine law, 
or a law to punish offenses, or to establish courts of 
justice, or requiring certain instruments to be 
recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, 
in every case it exercises the same powers; that is to 
say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men 
and things within the limits of its dominion.  It is by 
virtue of this power that it legislates; and its 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
7 
 
¶178 From the British common law through the Industrial 
Revolution and up through today, the power to quarantine and take 
other invasive actions to protect against the spread of infectious 
diseases has been universally recognized as a legitimate exercise 
of state police power.  United States Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Marshall said in the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden that the 
police powers of the state include "every thing within the 
                                                 
authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute 
as its power to pass health laws, except in so far as it 
has been restricted by the constitution of the United 
States. 
Thus has this court from the early days affirmed that 
the power to promote the general welfare is inherent in 
government.  Touching the matters committed to it by the 
Constitution the United States possesses the power, as 
do the states in their sovereign capacity touching all 
subjects jurisdiction of which is not surrendered to the 
federal government. 
Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. La Follette, 43 Wis. 2d 631, 644, 169 
N.W.2d 441 (1969) (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-
25 (1934)). 
Nineteenth century legal luminary Thomas Cooley described the 
police power this way:   
The police power of a State, in a comprehensive sense, 
embraces its system of internal regulation, by which it 
is sought not only to preserve the public order and to 
prevent offenses against the State, but also to 
establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen 
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which 
are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to 
insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, 
so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment 
of rights by others. 
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 
Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American 
Union *572 (1871) (citing Blackstone). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
8 
 
territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government," 
including 
"quarantine 
laws" 
and 
"health 
laws 
of 
every 
description."  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).  In 1902, the 
Court again sounded a similar theme, concluding that preventing a 
ship from docking due to a partial quarantine was a reasonable 
exercise of Louisiana's police power.  Campagnie Francaise de 
Navigation a Vapeur v. Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387-93 (1902).  
And in 1905, the Supreme Court went even further and concluded 
that mandatory vaccination to prevent the spread of infectious 
disease was a valid exercise of the police power.  Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-30, 35 (1905).3 
¶179 The power of state government is not without limits, 
however.  Every exercise of the police power is subject to the 
limits set by the people through our constitutions.  Bushnell v. 
Town of Beloit, 10 Wis. 195, 225 (1860) ("[T]he constitution of 
the state is to be regarded not as a grant of power, but rather as 
a limitation upon the powers of the legislature, and . . . it is 
competent for the legislature to exercise all legislative power 
not forbidden by the constitution or delegated to the general 
government, or prohibited by the constitution of the United 
States.").  The federal constitution imposes certain limits on 
state action——prohibiting slavery, guaranteeing the right to vote 
for men and women eighteen or older of any race, and guaranteeing 
the right to due process and equal protection of the laws, among 
                                                 
3 I cite these cases not to approve or disapprove of their 
holdings, but to establish that strong public health measures have 
long been understood as valid exercises of the police power. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
9 
 
others.4  The state constitution also contains many limits, some 
overlapping with the protections in the federal constitution.  
Among them are the freedom of religion, the right to hunt and fish, 
the right to bear arms, and a variety of protections for crime 
victims and those accused of crimes.5 
¶180 These limits are real and substantive.  Neither 
legislative enactments themselves nor executive enforcement of 
otherwise 
valid 
laws 
may 
transgress 
these 
or 
any 
other 
constitutional boundary.  See State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 ("If a challenger successfully shows 
that such a violation [of his or her constitutional rights] 
occurred, the operation of the law is void as to the party 
asserting the claim." (citation omitted)).  And among these limits, 
now generally understood to be housed in due process guarantees, 
any exercise of police power must be legitimately aimed at 
protecting the public health, safety, and welfare of the people.  
State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 130, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) ("Due 
process requires that the means chosen by the legislature bear a 
reasonable and rational relationship to the purpose or object of 
the enactment; if it does, and the legislative purpose is a proper 
                                                 
4 See U.S. Const. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery); id. 
amend. XV (suffrage for all races); id. amend. XIX (suffrage for 
women); id. amend. XXVI (suffrage for eighteen-year-olds); id. 
amend. XIV (due process and equal protection). 
5 See Wis. Const. art. I, § 18 (freedom of worship); id. art. 
I, § 26 (right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game); id. art. I, 
§ 25 (right to bear arms); id. art. I, §§ 6, 7, 8, 9, 9m & 11 
(protecting rights of crime victims and those accused of crimes). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
10 
 
one, the exercise of the police power is valid." (citation 
omitted)). 
¶181 Of course, recognizing the potential breadth of state 
power is not the same as applauding or affirming use of that power.  
Whether the state can quarantine individuals, forbid public 
gatherings, and take drastic emergency measures during a pandemic 
is quite a different question than whether government has used 
that power wisely or within constitutional limits. 
¶182 Moving beyond the boundaries of potentially permissible 
uses of the police power, its mechanism is also important to this 
case.  The scope of the police power determines the potentially 
legitimate goals of government action——that is, the policies that 
will govern the state.  In our constitutional system, it is the 
legislature that determines policy choices in the first instance.  
Bushnell, 10 Wis. at 225 ("The legislature, subject to a qualified 
veto of the executive, possesses all the legislative power of the 
state.").  It does this pursuant to its constitutional power to 
enact laws.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17.  Following enactment of 
laws, the legislature's constitutional role as originally designed 
is generally complete. 
¶183 The executive then has authority to faithfully execute 
the laws already on the books.  Wis. Const. art. V, § 4.  Executive 
authority is in one sense quite limited; the executive branch must 
enforce the laws the legislature has passed whether it likes them 
or not.  In another sense, however, the authority is quite 
extensive.  The executive branch generally has broad authority to 
execute the laws, and to use judgment and discretion in so doing. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
11 
 
¶184 Where 
the 
legislature 
gives 
broad 
discretionary 
authority to the executive——in the enforcement of the criminal 
law, for example——that power can be immense.  To illustrate, the 
legislature defines crimes, and has created a system for the 
prosecution of those crimes.  But law enforcement has considerable 
discretion in determining whether to arrest those who break the 
law and refer them for punishment.  All of us who have received a 
kindly warning from a merciful officer for driving a bit over the 
speed limit know this firsthand.  Even after referral, prosecutors 
are given vast discretion in choosing whether to file a criminal 
complaint, and which crimes to charge.  In practical effect, some 
crimes are almost never prosecuted in some jurisdictions.6 
¶185 Thus, under our constitutional design, the scope and 
size of the executive branch, the areas in which the executive 
branch is called upon to act, and the discretion with which it is 
entrusted is set by the legislature through the enactment of laws. 
¶186 While more can be said, it is with this foundation that 
we proceed to the two issues before us.  The first question is 
whether Order 28, with all of its various dictates, was required 
to be promulgated as an administrative rule, the failure of which 
renders the order unlawful.  The second issue is whether Order 28 
goes beyond the statutory powers granted to DHS in Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02. 
 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., https://www.wiscontext.org/wisconsins-racial-
chasm-marijuana-enforcement (noting that the Dane County district 
attorney informed law enforcement not to bring him cases based on 
small amounts of marijuana possession). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
12 
 
II.  Order 28 Is Not an Administrative Rule 
¶187 The legislature argues that Order 28 constitutes an 
administrative rule that was not promulgated pursuant to the 
procedural requirements in Wis. Stat. ch. 227 and should therefore 
be struck down in its entirety.  The legislature appears to have 
standing to raise this issue since it has a statutory role in the 
promulgation of rules, in particular, the authority to oversee and 
suspend proposed rules through the Joint Committee for Review of 
Administrative Rules (JCRAR).  See generally Wis. Stat. § 227.19.  
Moreover, nothing in Wis. Stat. § 227.40, the section pertaining 
to judicial review of the validity of a rule, expressly precludes 
the legislature from bringing a claim of this kind.  While an 
argument could be made that JCRAR is the proper party with a 
cognizable harmrather than the legislature as a wholethis is, 
at the very least, a close enough call that I do not see standing 
as a roadblock to consideration of this issue. 
 
A.  Agency Authority and Rulemaking Generally 
¶188 Before examining the precise arguments of the parties 
regarding Order 28, it is helpful to understand the role 
administrative agencies and administrative rules play within our 
government. 
¶189 Administrative agencies are created by the legislature. 
Wis. Stat. § 15.02.  The legislature has the ability to withdraw 
an agency's power, dictate how any agency power is exercised, and 
extinguish the agency's power entirely.  Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. 
Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 57, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968).  Even so, agencies 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
13 
 
are members of the executive branch.  See Wis. Stat. § 15.001(2); 
Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶14, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 
N.W.2d 600. 
¶190 The legislature created DHS as an executive branch 
agency through Wis. Stat. § 15.19 and granted it a variety of 
statutory powers and duties generally found in Wis. Stat. chs. 250 
to 257, including authority relating to communicable diseases 
under chapter 252.7  Some of these powers are triggered when the 
governor declares a public health state of emergency under Wis. 
Stat. § 323.10.  DHS is then treated as the public health authority 
and given certain powers and duties specific to that designation.  
Wis. Stat. § 250.01(6g).  However, chapter 252 contains separate 
authority that is not, at least on its face, dependent on a 
governor's emergency declaration.  Secretary Palm asserts that 
Order 28 is grounded in such separate statutory authority.  Thus, 
an emergency declaration by the governor is not relevant to 
                                                 
7 See also Justice Dallet's dissent, ¶¶135-38 (discussing the 
historical path of Wisconsin's public health law and law 
enforcement, including emergency response measures taken in 
previous instances of communicable disease outbreak). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
14 
 
analysis of whether Order 28 meets the statutory definition of an 
administrative rule.8 
¶191 At 
the 
outset, 
it 
bears 
mentioning 
that 
the 
administrative rulemaking process itself sits a bit uneasily 
within a constitutional structure that vests three different kinds 
of power in three different branches.  See Koschkee, 387 
Wis. 2d 552, ¶¶42-57 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  In 
practice today, administrative rules occupy a form of shared 
governance between the executive and legislative branches. 
¶192 During its rise in the Progressive Era, this court had 
some difficulty squaring the emerging administrative state with 
the structure of the Wisconsin Constitution.  But eventually, like 
the U.S. Supreme Court, it acquiesced.  See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (upholding a 
congressional delegation of authority to the executive to fix 
customs duties).  See generally Gundy v. United States, 139 
S. Ct. 2116, 213342 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the nondelegation doctrine in federal law for its wayward departure 
                                                 
8 If the legislature's rulemaking argument is correct, it 
would appear that Secretary Palm's prior orders, including the 
original "Safer at Home" order issued on March 24, would be 
captured in the same net.  After all, the definition of a rule, as 
explained more fully below, includes something issued by an agency.  
An order from Secretary Palm, even one issued at the direction of 
the governor, would still be issued by the agency.  In other words, 
nothing in the definition of a rule suggests the governor's 
declaration of an emergency gives Secretary Palm the power to issue 
orders without first going through the rulemaking process.  If so, 
the legislature's rulemaking argument was ripe when the first 
COVID-19 orders were issued in March. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
15 
 
from the federal constitution and its historical embrace of a 
separation-of-powers triangle). 
¶193 When the administrative rules process was adopted, early 
cases treated rulemaking as more of an executive power.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 30607, 131 N.W. 832 
(1911) (rejecting the theory that rulemaking and other related 
administrative action was, in this case, a legislative power, and 
explaining that such action falls within the ambit of executing 
the law within legislatively set parameters).  The logic is not 
hard to understand.  If the legislature passes a law requiring 
cigarettes to be taxed, for example, it would be an executive 
function to interpret and enforce the law, including determining 
what constitutes a cigarette and what does not.  Rulemaking over 
the definition of a cigarette is, in one sense, the legislature's 
attempt to add further definition to statutes that the legislature 
did not provide in the first place.  It is a post-enactment effort 
to control and limit how the laws are executed. 
¶194 But over time, this court has come to describe rulemaking 
as closer to a legislative power.  See, e.g., Watchmaking Examining 
Bd. v. Husar, 49 Wis. 2d 526, 53334, 182 N.W.2d 257 (1971) 
(characterizing rulemaking as a "delegation" of legislative power 
to a subordinate administrative agency).  The logic here is not 
hard to understand either.  As government grew into the modern 
behemoth it is today, the legislature began to enact statutes that 
looked more like broad, undefined goals, rather than concrete laws.  
Doing so left specific policy decisions to the executive branch.  
Understandably, the legislature then subjected those choices to a 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
16 
 
check through the rulemaking process.  For example, if the 
legislature passes a law empowering the Department of Revenue to 
"tax products in the public interest," it has, one could argue, 
made no policy judgments at all for the executive to execute.  In 
this view, rulemaking is the legislature's attempt to ensure it 
retains the power to make policy decisions, which is consistent 
with its constitutional role to say what the law should be. 
¶195 Both parties invoke the separation of powers reflected 
in these concepts to support their assertion that rulemaking should 
or should not be required here.  Regardless of how we characterize 
rulemaking generally, the parties accept the constitutional status 
quo, and merely ask us to enforce and apply the statutory 
rulemaking prescriptions. 
 
B.  Defining the Claim 
¶196 The legislature asserts that Order 28 is a rule and that 
DHS's failure to comply with the rulemaking requirements in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 227 leaves an invalid rule that must be enjoined from 
further application.  Not all agency action is rulemaking, of 
course.  The question is a matter of statutory interpretation, 
both of the definition of a rule in Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13), and 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4), one of the statutory bases DHS cited for 
the order's authorization. 
¶197 Relevant for what follows, Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4) states 
in part that DHS "may promulgate and enforce rules or issue 
orders," both of which may "be made applicable to the whole or any 
specified part of the state," for purposes of controlling and 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
17 
 
suppressing any communicable disease.  Secretary Palm argues the 
statutory distinction between "rules" and "orders" indicates that 
DHS has authority to act on a statewide basis outside of the 
rulemaking processthat is, DHS can issue orders based on the 
police power given to the executive through the legislatively set 
parameters in § 252.02.  The legislature rejects this theory, 
arguing that a statewide order issued pursuant to § 252.02(4) that 
has the force of law (as Order 28 does) is, by virtue of its 
statewide application, required to be promulgated as a rule.  With 
this in mind, we must unpack what makes a rule. 
 
C.  Defining a Rule 
¶198 According to Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13), a "rule" is 
defined by five separate criteria.  It must be "(1) a regulation, 
standard, statement of policy or general order; (2) of general 
application; (3) having the [force9] of law; (4) issued by an 
agency; (5) to implement, interpret or make specific legislation 
enforced or administered by such agency [or] to govern the 
interpretation or procedure of such agency."  Citizens for Sensible 
Zoning, Inc. v. DNR, 90 Wis. 2d 804, 814, 280 N.W.2d 702 (1979) 
(citing § 227.01(13)).  Neither party disputes that Order 28 has 
the force of the law and was issued by an agency, the third and 
fourth requirements in the statutory definition.  It was issued by 
DHS, and has the force of law because it is legally enforceable 
rather than just exhortatory.  But the parties dispute whether DHS 
                                                 
9 In 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 32, the legislature changed this 
portion of the definition from "effect of law" to "force of law." 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
18 
 
issued Order 28 "to implement, interpret or make specific" 
legislation that it enforces or administers, as well as the 
requirements that it be "a regulation, standard, statement of 
policy, or general order" and one of "general application." 
¶199 I conclude the textual evidence overwhelmingly shows 
that Order 28 is a "general order" precisely because of its 
statewide application.  Therefore, the legislature's argument that 
its statewide effect also makes it an order of "general 
application" is incorrect.  An order of "general application" is 
one that has prospective application beyond the situation at hand.  
Order 28 does not.  I focus my analysis on the "general order" and 
"general application" requirements because they conclusively 
demonstrate that Order 28 does not meet the definition of a rule.10 
                                                 
10 I am also skeptical that Order 28 was issued by DHS "to 
implement, interpret, or make specific legislation enforced or 
administered by the agency or to govern the organization or 
procedure of the agency."  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  Order 28 was 
obviously not issued to govern DHS's organization or procedure, 
and nothing suggests that Order 28 interprets or makes specific 
any terms or requirements of Wis. Stat. § 252.02.  Whether Order 
28 "implements" legislation is a closer call, however. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
19 
 
¶200 First, a rule must be "a regulation, standard, statement 
of policy, or general order."  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  On its 
face, each of these phrases speaks of a broad and substantive 
policy choice of some sort.  And the chosen policy or standard 
would, by implication, go beyond a one-time situation or decision. 
¶201 Of particular relevance here is the "general order" 
requirement.  Both parties agree Order 28 is a general order, but 
they are not especially precise on why that is.  Note first that 
a simple "order" is not enough to meet the definition.  The statute 
has the modifier "general"——meaning not all orders fit the bill, 
only "general" ones.  And we need to, where possible, "give 
reasonable effect to every word."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
                                                 
In context, "implement," like the rest of the rule definition 
and rulemaking process, seems aimed at covering future enforcement 
and application of the statutory powers and duties vested in a 
respective agency.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(explaining statutory language is to be interpreted "in the context 
in which it is used").  A rule expresses how a statute will be 
enforced going forward, and part of that can involve establishing 
the specifics of a larger procedure or system for all future 
applications of that statute.  Accord Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 
Inc. v. DNR, 90 Wis. 2d 804, 808 & n.1, 816, 280 N.W.2d 702 (1979) 
(explaining that the Department of Natural Resources' adoption of 
a floodplain zoning ordinance constituted implementation of a 
statute pertaining to floodplain zoning that the department 
administered).  This is distinct from actual enforcement and 
application of the law.  Although the parties do not provide much 
help in this analysis, Order 28 seems to be enforcing and applying 
the law, rather than implementing a procedure for future 
applications of Wis. Stat. § 252.02. 
In any event, because Order 28 does not satisfy the "general 
application" requirement in the definition of a rule, a firm 
conclusion on this requirement is unnecessary. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
20 
 
N.W.2d 110.  Yet, Wis. Stat. ch. 227 does not tell us what makes 
an ordinary order, much less a general order.  So we must look for 
clues in chapter 227 and the rest of our laws.  See id., ¶45 
("Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning." (citation omitted)); Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Constr., 
Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462 ("When the 
same term is used throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a 
reasonable deduction that the legislature intended that the term 
possess an identical meaning each time it appears." (citation 
omitted)). 
¶202 In chapter 227, an "order" most commonly describes a 
binding decision applying to a specific person or situation.  For 
instance, in Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3), a "contested case" is defined 
as an agency proceeding that determines a party's rights; this 
proceeding results in "a decision or order."  This type of order 
is also explicitly excluded from the definition of a rule in 
§ 227.01(13)(b).  Elsewhere in the administrative rules statutes, 
Wis. Stat. § 227.03(6) excludes from chapter 227's reach "[o]rders 
of the election commission" issued under Wis. Stat. § 5.06(6).  
That section references the election commission's power to decide 
"by order" certain election-related complaints against election 
officials.  § 5.06(6).  Various other provisions in chapter 227 
refer to court "orders" directed at specific parties.  See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(3)(b); Wis. Stat. § 227.114(6m)(d). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
21 
 
¶203 The most helpful clue in chapter 227 is found in Wis. 
Stat. § 227.40, which governs judicial review of the validity of 
rules.  Section 227.40(2)(e) states, among other things, that the 
validity of a rule may be challenged in proceedings "under chapters 
102, 108, or 949 for review of decisions and orders of 
administrative agencies."  Wisconsin Stat. chs. 108 and 949 cover 
unemployment claims and crime victim compensation, respectively.  
Those chapters discuss person-specific orders, again confirming 
the common usage of "order" as some government decision tied to 
and resulting from a specific factual situation. 
¶204 But Wis. Stat. ch. 102, governing worker compensation 
claims, is different.  Unlike any of the foregoing, that chapter 
defines both an "order" and a "general order."  "'Order' means any 
decision, rule, regulation, direction, requirement, or standard of 
the department or the division, or any other determination arrived 
at or decision made by the department or the division."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.01(2)(dm).  And a "general order" is "such order as applies 
generally throughout the state to all persons, employments, places 
of employment or public buildings, or all persons, employments or 
places of employment or public buildings of a class under the 
jurisdiction of the department.  All other orders of the department 
shall be considered special orders."  § 102.01(2)(bm) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, chapter 102 distinguishes between special orders, 
those applying to a specific person or party, and general orders, 
those applying generally to the entire state. 
¶205 As it happens, this same statutory distinction between 
general and special orders is found all throughout Wisconsin 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
22 
 
statutes governing agency action.  For example, Wis. Stat. ch. 103 
deals with employment regulations as overseen by the Department of 
Workforce Development (DWD).  In the chapter's definitions 
section, which covers Wis. Stat. chs. 103 to 106, nearly identical 
definitions are used, this time adding a complementary definition 
of a local order as well:   
(9) "General order" means such order as applies 
generally 
throughout 
the 
state 
to 
all 
persons, 
employments, places of employment or public buildings, 
or all persons, employments or places of employment or 
public buildings of a class under the jurisdiction of 
the department.  All other orders of the department shall 
be considered special orders. 
(10) "Local order" means any ordinance, order, rule or 
determination 
of 
any 
common 
council, 
board 
of 
alderpersons, board of trustees or the village board, of 
any village or city, a regulation or order of the local 
board of health, as defined in s. 250.01(3), or an order 
or direction of any official of a municipality, upon any 
matter over which the department has jurisdiction. 
(11) "Order" means any decision, rule, regulation, 
direction, requirement or standard of the department, or 
any other determination arrived at or decision made by 
the department. 
Wis. Stat. § 103.001(9), (10), (11).  Again, this understanding is 
replicated throughout Wisconsin law, offering a consistent 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
23 
 
definition of a "general order" as an order having statewide 
effect.11 
¶206 This is not all.  The statutes not only make clear that 
a general order is one applying statewide, but also that such 
statewide general orders may or may not need to be promulgated as 
rules.  This can be seen throughout chapters 103 to 106, where we 
see that DWD has statutory authority to issue statewide orders, 
which may or may not be rules falling under the scope of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 227.  One example is in Wis. Stat. § 106.01(9), which 
authorizes DWD to issue apprenticeship-related "rules and general 
                                                 
11 The same definitions of "Order," "Local order," and "General 
order" are found in Wis. Stat. ch. 101, which governs the 
Department of Safety and Professional Services.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.01(7), (8), (9).  In Wis. Stat. ch. 218, in a section 
governing collection agencies, a "General order" is defined as "an 
order which is not a special order," while a "'Special order' means 
an order against a person."  Wis. Stat. § 218.04(1)(d), (g).  
Elsewhere 
in 
this 
section, 
the 
Department 
of 
Financial 
Institutions (DFI) is authorized "To issue general or special 
orders" and may require reasonable and relevant information "by 
general or special order" that licensees must annually report.  
§ 218.04(7)(a), (10)(a).  Likewise, Wis. Stat. ch. 138 authorizes 
DFI to issue "general orders or special orders" to prevent or 
correct certain actions by insurance premium finance companies.  
Wis. Stat. § 138.12(5m)(b).  In this context, a special order is 
"an order of [DFI] to or affecting a person," and a general order 
is any order "other than a special order."  § 138.12(5m)(a)1. & 2.  
The same definitions and order-issuing authority are found in Wis. 
Stat. § 138.14, which governs payday loans.  See § 138.14(1)(h), 
(L); § 138.14(8).  We also find nearly identical language and usage 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 217, which governs check sellers (Wis. Stat. 
§ 217.02(3), (10); § 217.18(1)), and in Wis. Stat. ch. 93, which 
describes various powers and duties of the Department of 
Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP) (Wis. Stat. 
§ 93.06(3), (5), (6)).  See also Wis. Stat. § 100.19(2) & (3) 
(authorizing DATCP to issue "general orders" and "a special order 
against any person" related to methods of or practices in food 
products and fuel distribution). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
24 
 
or special orders."  Wisconsin Stat. § 106.015(1) similarly 
prohibits DWD from prescribing, enforcing, or authorizing certain 
requirements "whether through the promulgation of a rule [or] the 
issuance of a general or special order." 
¶207 The logic is plain, and of immense importance to this 
case.  General orders are those that apply to everyone.  And some 
general orders may be rules, but not all of them are.  If all 
general orders must be promulgated as rules, these provisions would 
make no sense.  They would instead say, "rules and special orders," 
not "rules and general or special orders."12  The only reasonable 
reading of these statutes is that orders applying statewide are 
general orders, and that these may be rules, but only if they meet 
the other requirements of the rule definition.13 
                                                 
12 Or the statutes could expressly inform that orders issued 
pursuant to these provisions will be considered rules for purposes 
of chapter 227.  The legislature has shown it can do precisely 
that in Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1), where any order issued by the 
Department of Natural Resources that fixes limits of floodplains 
or enacts local floodplain zoning ordinances is subject to the 
rulemaking process under Wis. Stat. § 227.19 (legislative review 
before promulgation) and Wis. Stat. § 227.26 (legislative review 
after promulgation), and "may be suspended by the joint committee 
for review of administrative rules."  § 87.30(1). 
13 This reading is further supported by other chapters in the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  For instance, Wis. Stat. ch. 281 governs water 
and sewage, which is an area generally under the purview of the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR).  See Wis. Stat. § 281.01(3).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 281.19, which is entitled "Orders," states:   
(1) The department may issue general orders, and adopt 
rules 
applicable 
throughout 
the 
state 
for 
the 
construction, 
installation, 
use 
and 
operation 
of 
practicable and available systems, methods and means for 
preventing and abating pollution of the waters of the 
state.  Such general orders and rules shall be issued 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
25 
 
                                                 
only after an opportunity to be heard thereon has been 
afforded to interested parties. 
(2) (a) The department may issue special orders 
directing particular owners to remedy violations of the 
safe drinking water program under s. 281.17 (8) and (9) 
or to secure such operating results toward the control 
of pollution of the waters of the state as the department 
prescribes, within a specified time.  Pending efforts to 
comply with any order, the department may permit 
continuance of operations on such conditions as it 
prescribes.  If any owner cannot comply with an order 
within the time specified, the owner may, before the 
date set in the order, petition the department to modify 
the order.  The department may modify the order, 
specifying in writing the reasons therefor.  If any order 
is not complied with within the time period specified, 
the department shall immediately notify the attorney 
general of this fact.  After receiving the notice, the 
attorney general shall commence an action under s. 
299.95.  
(b) The department may issue temporary emergency orders 
without prior hearing when the department determines 
that the protection of the public health necessitates 
such immediate action.  Such emergency orders shall take 
effect at such time as the department determines. As 
soon as is practicable, the department shall hold a 
public hearing after which it may modify or rescind the 
temporary emergency order or issue a special order under 
par. (a). 
§ 281.19 (emphasis added). 
The next subsection provides that "[t]he department shall 
make investigations and inspections to insure compliance with any 
general or special order or rule which it issues."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.19(3) (emphasis added).  Note that elsewhere in Wis. Stat. 
ch. 281 the department is directed to prescribe various performance 
and certification standards, practices, and prohibitions solely by 
promulgating rules.  § 281.16(2), (3); § 281.165(1); § 281.17(3). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
26 
 
¶208 The legislature does not address this overwhelming 
textual evidence informing what "general order" means for purposes 
of Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  Rather, it looks to one of the 
enumerated exclusions from the rule definition relating to orders, 
and suggests this alone proves that any order applying statewide 
must also be a rule. 
¶209 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.01(13)(c) excludes from the 
definition of "rule" any agency action or inaction that  
[i]s an order directed to a specifically named person or 
to a group of specifically named persons that does not 
constitute a general class, and which is served on the 
person or persons to whom it is directed by the 
appropriate means applicable to the order.  The fact 
that a named person serves a group of unnamed persons 
that will also be affected does not make an order a rule. 
With this, the legislature maintains, by way of converse 
implication, that any order applying statewide is included in the 
definition of a rule.  But this argument does not do the heavy 
analytical 
lifting 
the 
legislature 
wishes 
it 
to 
do.  
Section 227.01(13)(c) does not purport to define any particular 
kind of order, nor does it state or imply that all orders are rules 
but for those fitting this description.  Instead, it clarifies 
that certain person or group-specific orders served on those 
                                                 
The distinctions are clear.  Special orders are issued to 
particular persons.  General orders apply to everyone "throughout 
the state."  And not all general orders, which again, apply to 
all, are rules.  Otherwise, the language in Wis. Stat. § 281.19(1) 
and (3) indicating that DNR may issue general orders and adopt 
rules, and ensure compliance with both, would make no sense. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
27 
 
persons or groups are not rules, making it one of many belt-and-
suspenders exclusions from the definition of a rule.14 
¶210 None of this overcomes or even contradicts the statutory 
meaning of the phrase "general order."  And although chapter 227 
does not tell us what a "general order" is, the story told 
throughout the rest of the Wisconsin Statutes does.  A general 
order is an order that applies to everyone statewide.  Other 
orders, often referred to as special orders, apply to specific 
persons or entities only. 
¶211 This reading also makes sense in the context of the other 
phrases listed in the first criteria of the rule definition.  A 
"regulation," a "standard," and a "statement of policy" all give 
the idea of a general standard applicable to everyone affected by 
its subject.  It would only make sense that a general order does 
the same.  This first requirement, at root, addresses the kind of 
decree and the statewide breadth of its impact (even if only some 
people are personally affected). 
¶212 Importantly, however, our statutes also show that just 
because something is a general order does not make it a rule.  
While many general orders are rules, not all of them are.  They 
still must meet the other criteria to actually qualify as a rule. 
¶213 With that in mind, the second requirement for any rule 
is that it must have "general application."  The legislature's 
                                                 
14 Like Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13)(c), other listed exclusions 
appear quite unlikely to meet the definition of a rule under even 
normal circumstances.  
E.g., § 227.01(13)(r) (excluding 
a 
"pamphlet or other explanatory material that is not intended or 
designed as interpretation of legislation enforced or administered 
by an agency, but which is merely informational in nature"). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
28 
 
main theory in this case is that a "general order of general 
application" is an order applying statewide.  Connecting the dots, 
because Order 28 applies to a broad class of persons or entities 
rather than a specific person or entity, it is an order of "general 
application" in the legislature's telling.  In other words, the 
legislature maintains the temperature gauge for what constitutes 
an order of general application is the breadth of the persons 
subject to the order. 
¶214 But for reasons that are obvious from the previous 
discussion, this is plainly wrong.  If a "general order" is an 
order 
applying 
statewide, 
that 
cannot 
be 
what 
"general 
application" means too.  The legislature never makes any attempt 
to give separate meaning to "general order," nor does it engage in 
any statutory analysis regarding its interpretation.  "General 
application" is a second, separate statutory requirement under the 
rule definition, and it must be given independent meaning.  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible 
to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage.").  The legislature's theory, which depends on 
conflating the two, fails from the outset. 
¶215 Secretary Palm argues, and I agree, that a regulation, 
standard, statement of policy, or general order is one of "general 
application" if it applies generally, as opposed to specifically.  
That is, an application is specific if it applies to a single, 
particular factual situation.  Something with general application 
applies to multiple, prospective factual situations.  A specific 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
29 
 
application is focused on the present; a general application is 
focused on the future. 
¶216 This reading makes sense first and foremost given the 
statutory text's use of the modifier "general."  Just like the 
modifier "general" in "general order" means an order directed to 
everyone (as opposed to a specific someone), the modifier "general" 
in "general application" should have the same effect——that is, an 
order that applies to every situation covered by the subject matter 
(as opposed to a specific situation covered by the subject matter). 
¶217 This reading also makes sense because of what rules are 
meant to be.  Rules are designed to have enduring effect.  They 
are published in official registers.  They require public hearings, 
written input, and a series of complicated bureaucratic checks 
before being implemented.  And while emergency rules are an option, 
they are still relatively slow and cumbersome.  This is all by 
design.  Government orders with limited application to a particular 
situation and individual circumstances warranting temporary action 
are not what rulemaking is designed to address. 
¶218 In some ways, Secretary Palm's interpretation of the 
statutes may even be constitutionally required.  To the extent 
rulemaking has a justification under our state constitution, it is 
because it retains the legislature's constitutional prerogative to 
determine the general policies that will govern the state.  But 
rulemaking itself cannot tread so far as to authorize a legislative 
intrusion into the core power of the executive to enforce the laws.  
Our constitution's commitment to the separation of powers means 
the legislature should not, as a general matter, have a say in the 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
30 
 
executive branch's day-to-day application and execution of the 
laws.  The legislature gets to make the laws, not second guess the 
executive branch's judgment in the execution of those laws.  If 
rulemaking is understood as establishing a check on how a law is 
prospectively understood, that could be justified as retaining the 
legislature's constitutional prerogative to determine the state's 
public policy.  But if rulemaking morphs into subjecting executive 
branch enforcement of enacted laws to a legislative veto, that 
turns our constitutional structure on its very head. 
¶219 The parties do not maintain that any cases directly 
address or control the issues before us, and I agree.  But two 
cases that do address the meaning of "general application" support 
Secretary Palm's reading, not the legislature's. 
¶220 In Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc., this court 
concluded that a Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) floodplain 
zoning ordinance covering Columbia County was a regulation of 
general application.  We reasoned that a rule "need not apply to 
all persons within the state" to have general application.  90 
Wis. 2d at 815-16.  The class size was small, we said, but the 
class was "described in general terms and new members can be added 
to the class."  Id. at 816.  That is consistent with Secretary 
Palm's interpretation of "general application."  The newly enacted 
zoning ordinance was not tailored to a specific circumstance or 
current dispute; rather, it was a regulation applying to the 
general class of all future property owners.  Id. (citing 
Frankenthal v. Wis. Real Estate Brokers' Bd., 3 Wis. 2d 249, 257B, 
89 N.W.2d 825 (1958), which held an instruction covering the 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
31 
 
license renewal procedure for real estate brokers was a policy 
statement of "general application"). 
¶221 Similarly, in Cholvin v. DHFS, the court of appeals 
explained that a written instruction used by screeners to determine 
new applicants' eligibility for a certain Wisconsin Medicaid 
program was of "general application."  2008 WI App 127, ¶¶2425, 
313 Wis. 2d 749, 758 N.W.2d 118.  As the court put it, the 
instruction "does not speak to a specific case, nor is it limited 
to an individual applicant.  It announces the general policy and 
the specific criteria to be employed when entering information on 
fluctuating levels of functional ability for all applicants."  
Id., ¶25.  In other words, the instruction was meant for 
prospective application to everyone covered by the subject matter, 
namely a Medicaid program eligibility screening, not just to a 
current factual situation. 
¶222 Therefore, the best reading of the "general application" 
requirement, 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
text, 
context, 
structure, 
constitutional limitation, and caselaw is that a general order, 
which by definition covers everyone statewide, must apply not just 
to a specific circumstance, but to all circumstances present and 
future that are contemplated by the scope of the order. 
 
D.  Wis. Stat. § 252.02 Does Not Require Rulemaking 
¶223 Collectively, the definition of a rule reflects a 
dictate with statewide effect that takes broad statutory language 
and makes it specific or workable, not just to a particular 
situation, but for future situations of the same kind.  While 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
32 
 
orders certainly can be, and often are, rules, Order 28 does not 
meet this definition.  It is statewide in scope, and therefore it 
constitutes a general order.  But it does not have general 
application.  It is an order with only temporary effect, expiring 
on May 26, 2020, and focused specifically on the control and 
suppression of a particular communicable disease. 
¶224 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.02 confirms this reading.  Section 
252.02(4), on which Order 28 is based in part, states that DHS  
may promulgate and enforce rules or issue orders for 
guarding against the introduction of any communicable 
disease into the state, for the control and suppression 
of communicable diseases, for the quarantine and 
disinfection of persons, localities and things infected 
or suspected of being infected by a communicable disease 
and for the sanitary care of jails, state prisons, mental 
health institutions, schools, and public buildings and 
connected premises.  Any rule or order may be made 
applicable to the whole or any specified part of the 
state, or to any vessel or other conveyance.  The 
department may issue orders for any city, village or 
county by service upon the local health officer.  Rules 
that are promulgated and orders that are issued under 
this subsection supersede conflicting or less stringent 
local regulations, orders or ordinances. 
§ 252.02(4) (emphasis added). 
¶225 The only and unavoidable conclusion from this text is 
that DHS can issue an order that applies statewide and is not a 
rule.  It still must meet the other criteria defining a rule in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13), including the "general application" 
requirement.  Not coincidentally, that is perfectly consistent 
with the distinctions found throughout the Wisconsin Statutes 
between general statewide orders and person-specific orders, and 
the textual distinction in other statutes confirming that a 
statewide order may or may not be a rule. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
33 
 
¶226 This textual reading is also supported by statutory 
history.  In 1982, the statute was amended to explicitly give DHS 
the power to issue orders in addition to promulgating and enforcing 
rules, and to clarify that both could have statewide application.  
§ 21, ch. 291, Laws of 1981.  Nothing in this amendment indicated 
that orders issued by DHS would be treated as rules for purposes 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1) (dictating that 
orders issued by DNR under this subsection will be treated as rules 
for purposes of Wis. Stat. ch. 227). 
¶227 The textual evidence conclusively stands against the 
legislature's position that a statewide order issued under Wis. 
Stat. § 252.02(4) is necessarily a rule.15  But taking a step back 
to look at the reasonableness of its interpretive approach makes 
its error even more plain.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."). 
¶228 The administrative rulemaking process is about as smooth 
sailing as a canoe traversing the Atlantic Ocean.  It's not 
                                                 
15 Elsewhere in its briefing, the legislature seems to turn 
its entire argument inside out by contending that Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02 is nothing more than a general powers and duties statute.  
But if this were true, and § 252.02 was only a general powers and 
duties statute, then DHS would have no authority to promulgate 
rules under that provision because, as the legislature helpfully 
explains, agencies may not rely on general powers and duties 
provisions to promulgate rules.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)2.  
Said differently, the legislature somehow suggests that rulemaking 
cannot happen under the statute, notwithstanding its primary 
theory that rulemaking must happen under the statute. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
34 
 
impossible, but it's not a particularly fun trip.  This is a 
feature, by the way, not a bug.  The rulemaking process is filled 
with checks and double checks and public input and imposed waiting 
periods to discourage some rulemaking, and to ensure a final 
product that is fully vetted, sufficiently clear, statutorily 
grounded, and able to guide agency action moving forward. 
¶229 During oral argument, the legislature effectively 
conceded that the requirements of Order 28 could have been issued 
for Milwaukee County, and that it would not need to be promulgated 
as a rule.  But it continued to argue that the same order applying 
to half the state or the whole state would need to be promulgated 
as a rule.  This makes no sense.  Wisconsin Stat. § 252.02 on its 
face gives broad authority to take statewide action to combat the 
spread of communicable diseases.  Under the legislature's theory, 
DHS can act locally without going through the rulemaking process, 
but not on a statewide basis.  Presumably it could issue 72 
identical orders applying to each of Wisconsin's counties, and 
these would not need to be promulgated as rules.  But it could not 
do the same thing in one order applying statewide.  Such a line is 
wholly impractical and inconsistent with the broad authority and 
discretion granted to DHS by the very words of the statutes the 
legislature enacted.  If we are truly in a public health emergency 
requiring immediate state action, it would make little sense to 
tie the hands of DHS from acting to protect the whole state, but 
give it expansive authority to do the same exact thing through 
multiple actions with a narrower geographic focus.  My point is 
not that we read the statute to give DHS the powers it needs, but 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
35 
 
rather that the legislature's position is an unreasonable way to 
read these broadly worded statutes.16 
¶230 The legislature suggests that the emergency rulemaking 
process ameliorates some of these problems.  During oral argument, 
the legislature indicated that emergency rules——from concept to 
legal effect——could happen in as soon as 12 days under a best-case 
scenario.  That's much quicker than the ordinary rulemaking 
process, but it is wholly unequal to the task Wis. Stat. § 252.02 
seems to ask of DHS.  Twelve days is far too long in a real 
emergency.17  Epidemics don't always give you a two-week heads up 
on their next move.  In addition, emergency rules, just like 
ordinary rules, require a new rule to revoke the earlier one.  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.265.18  If facts on the ground are different next week 
                                                 
16 Moreover, the legislature's line-drawing derives from no 
discernable statutory text.  At some undefined point, according to 
the legislature, the amount of people covered by an order becomes 
too large, and any such order must be promulgated as a rule.  This 
line, we are told, is apparently less than statewide, but larger 
than Milwaukee County.  Why?  Who knows?  This "I know it when I 
see it" argument will no doubt prove to be a complicated line to 
adjudicate moving forward since it has no textual foundation or 
guide. 
17 And as Justice Dallet correctly points out, a 12-day 
turnaround time is hardly guaranteed given the number of 
assumptions that are baked into the legislature's claim.  Justice 
Dallet's dissent, ¶150. 
18 Emergency rules of the kind proposed here are only effective 
for 150 days after publication.  Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(c).  While 
§ 227.24 provides a method to extend the effectiveness of the rule 
for up to an additional 120 days, § 227.24(2)(a), it is silent 
with respect to how such emergency rules would be revoked or 
modified.  As a new rule is required to modify or repeal an existing 
rule, it stands to reason that this process would also be required 
for emergency rules. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
36 
 
than they are this week (and in this pandemic, we seem to be 
learning new things all the time), that makes even changing short-
term policies practically impossible.  The reality is, the 
emergency rules process does not allow for the kind of fits and 
starts and day-in, day-out modifications that would be required in 
any comprehensive, real-time response to a statewide epidemic.  
And again, my point is not that DHS should be granted these powers 
because it needs them, but instead that the legislature's proffered 
interpretation of § 252.02 in conjunction with Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13) is a wholly unreasonable way to read these statutes. 
¶231 Rather than the game of statutory twister offered by the 
legislature, the faithful judicial approach is to read these 
statutes reasonably, and to construe them as they are written.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 252.02(4) contemplates that orders may be issued 
statewide and not be rules.  The meaning of "general order" as 
derived from our statutes as a whole confirms this.  Section 
252.02(4) seems to give DHS extraordinarily broad powers to act 
and respond to public health emergencies not just county by county, 
but statewide.  To the extent any general orders have general, 
prospective application, they may need to be promulgated as rules.  
But situation-specific orders made pursuant to the authority 
already outlined in the statute, whether statewide or local, are 
not subject to the rulemaking requirements of chapter 227. 
¶232 In sum, Order 28 is a statewide order and therefore a 
general order.  But it is temporary and designed to specifically 
and singly address the current COVID-19 pandemic.  This order does 
not have general application to future DHS actions based on Wis. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
37 
 
Stat. § 252.02; it has no application after May 26, 2020.  Rather, 
it is an effort to apply and enforce the statute pursuant to the 
authority DHS has already been granted.  Order 28 therefore does 
not meet the definition of a rule in Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).19 
 
III.  The Legislature Lacks Standing to Challenge DHS's 
Application of the Statutes 
¶233 The legislature has a fallback issue.  If Order 28 is 
not a rule (and it is not), they argue that its terms nonetheless 
exceed the statutory authority on which it is purportedly based.  
To be clear, this is not a constitutional claim; it is an executive 
branch enforcement claim.  That is, the legislature argues the 
executive branch is imposing requirements on the people of 
Wisconsin that go beyond the powers granted to DHS in Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02. 
¶234 While I am not unmindful of the unusual circumstances 
giving rise to this case, claims of this kind are common; they 
happen all the time.  Unemployment compensation claimants argue 
they were illegally denied benefits to which they were statutorily 
entitled.  Agricultural operations claim they were asked to submit 
                                                 
19 The majority reaches a contrary conclusion, but somehow 
excepts section 4.a. from its analysis.  See majority op., ¶3 n.6.  
If rulemaking is required, however, then there is no good reason 
to remove section 4.a. from the result of this reasoning, for it 
is no less a statewide order.  To the extent section 4.a. should 
be treated differently due to the explicit authority granted to 
DHS to close schools in Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), that same logic 
would seem to apply to the other provisions in Order 28 that have 
the same statutory support.  See Justice Dallet's dissent, ¶154 
n.17 (discussing how section 4.c. of Order 28 closes places of 
public amusement and activity, which also seemingly falls within 
DHS's stated authority in § 252.02(3)). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
38 
 
to permit requirements the authorities had no authority to impose.  
Criminal defendants argue their convictions were secured in 
violation of, for example, the expiration of a statute of 
limitations.  As these common claims illustrate, challenges to 
executive branch enforcement are ordinarily brought by the 
specific individuals and entities who are injured or otherwise 
affected by the purportedly overreaching government action. 
¶235 The legislature, on the other hand, is not the state's 
litigator-in-chief or even the representative of the people at 
large.  The legislature is a constitutional creation having a 
significant, but limited, role in governance——the enactment of 
laws.  It is the executive branch that enforces the laws pursuant 
to its own constitutionally vested power.  When the executive 
branch enforces the law in a way that is beyond the statutory terms 
or otherwise violates our constitution, it harms those who are 
directly affected by that enforcement.  And it is those same 
individuals and entities that can challenge that enforcement. 
¶236 The requirement that those challenging government action 
have some cognizable harm is far more flexible in Wisconsin than 
in federal courts, but there are good reasons for not dispensing 
with this requirement altogether.  While federal courts may only 
hear "cases or controversies," "standing in Wisconsin is not a 
matter of jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy."  McConkey 
v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶15, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855.  In 
determining whether a party has standing, the overarching theme is 
"whether 'a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise 
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
39 
 
controversy.'"  State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank of Wis. Rapids v. 
M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 30708, 290 
N.W.2d 321 (1980) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
731 (1972)).  Wisconsin courts apply a two-step analysis for 
standing determinations:  we ask "(1) whether the plaintiff has 
suffered a threatened or actual injury, and (2) whether the 
interest asserted is recognized by law."  Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 
Wis. 2d 241, 24748, 564 N.W.2d 748 (1997) (citations omitted). 
¶237 Generally, in order to demonstrate an injury, "a 
plaintiff must allege 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy,' as to insure that 'the dispute sought to be 
adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a 
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.'"  
First Nat'l Bank, 95 Wis. 2d at 308-09 (quoted sources omitted).  
The extent of the injury is not determinative, a mere trifle will 
suffice to satisfy this requirement.  Id. at 309.  However, the 
injury "must be actual or threatened."  Norquist, 211 Wis. 2d at 
249. 
¶238 To satisfy the second step, courts determine "[w]hether 
the injury is of a type recognized, regulated, or sought to be 
protected by the challenged law."  Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. 
DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 506, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988). 
¶239 The legislature would no doubt like to see the laws it 
has passed enforced within their limits and within constitutional 
boundaries.  But as an institution, the legislature suffers no 
particular cognizable injury when the executive branch enforces 
the law unlawfully.  To accept this principle would grant the 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
40 
 
legislature a seat in every executive branch enforcement action, 
whether public or private, in the state of Wisconsin.  Can the 
legislature sue over unlawful DNR permit requirements?  Overbroad 
criminal prosecutions?  Generally not.  While we have allowed the 
legislature to litigate and sue the governor and other executive 
branch officials in limited situations, that is not a blanket 
invitation to the legislature to litigate every challenge to 
executive action.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. 
Thompson, 
144 
Wis. 2d 429, 
432-33, 
424 
N.W.2d 385 
(1988) 
(permitting the legislative houses, their leaders, and a joint 
legislative committee to bring an original action against the 
governor's use of his partial veto). 
¶240 In its briefing, the only harm the legislature offers is 
its right to suspend administrative rules it finds objectionable.  
That's it; they allege nothing else.  But this harm is wholly 
inapplicable to this issue, which concerns only the execution and 
enforcement of the laws.  Economic harm to individual citizens and 
businesses may be real, but it is not harm to the legislature as 
a constitutional body.  And that is the only kind of harm that can 
establish the standing necessary to raise this claim.  See Powers 
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ("[A] litigant must assert his 
or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to 
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." 
(citation omitted)). 
¶241 A sad feature of our government is that the executive 
branch sometimes acts outside its administrative, statutory, and 
constitutional authority.  This is, of course, not a commendable 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
41 
 
state of affairs.  Sometimes we the people respond by persuading 
lawmakers to change the law.  Sometimes we throw the bums out.  
Sometimes we respond with protest and argument, and sometimes civil 
disobedience.  In extraordinary situations, even revolution may be 
justified.  See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).  But 
the ordinary legal remedy for executive branch overreach is for 
someone personally harmed by that overreach to seek judicial 
relief.  If a business ordered closed wants to challenge the 
authority of the executive branch to close its business, it may do 
so.  If a person wanting to travel wishes to challenge the 
authority of the executive to forbid travel, she may do so.  If a 
church wanting to challenge the authority of the executive branch 
to shut down Sunday services, it may do so.  This is the way our 
system works, and it ensures a careful adjudication of the issues 
based on specific harms, not theoretical broadsides. 
¶242 This also ensures courts enjoin only unlawful executive 
action.  If Order 28 does not need to be promulgated as a rule, 
then presumably some of its commands are lawful.  The legislature 
appears to acknowledge statutory authority to close schools and 
churches and forbid other "public gatherings" to control outbreaks 
and epidemics.  Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3).  But how would this apply 
to large sporting events, small coffee shops, and open-air tree 
farms?  These are hard questions, and having litigants who are 
able to present specific harms and specific burdens ensures we 
remedy only unlawful enforcement efforts and do not sweep more 
broadly than is necessary. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
42 
 
¶243 While interpreting statutes is a question of law, 
application of statutes generally requires facts.  To my mind, the 
legislature's broad arguments do not sufficiently assist this 
court in separating the wheat from the chaff.  The legislature 
cites no law in support of the notion that they are injured by 
poor or even unlawful enforcement of the laws.  We do not let 
anyone bring any case they want, and we certainly don't let the 
legislature bring any case it wants.  Accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) ("[O]nce Congress makes its choice in 
enacting legislation, its participation ends.  Congress can 
thereafter 
control 
the 
execution 
of 
its 
enactment 
only 
indirectlyby passing new legislation." (citation omitted)).  The 
legislature did not even try to assert that it is harmed by the 
alleged 
statutory 
overreach. 
 
Therefore, 
I 
conclude 
the 
legislature lacks standing to raise this issue. 
¶244 Executive overreach, of course, should not be blithely 
dismissed.  But as a court of law, and as an appellate court of 
last resort, it is essential we do not turn ourselves into a panel 
that offers advisory opinions to the legislature on what the laws 
it passed mean.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 
(1973) ("[U]nder our constitutional system courts are not roving 
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the 
Nation's 
laws." 
(citation 
omitted)). 
 
Except 
in 
limited 
situations, only those affected by executive branch enforcement 
can claim injury, not the branch that drafted the law in the first 
place. 
 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
43 
 
IV.  Response to Other Writings 
¶245 While the above analysis addresses many of the 
shortcomings in the various writings of members of the majority, 
several arguments deserve a more direct response. 
¶246 A majority of this court suggests Order 28 should be 
struck down because the statute on which it is based contains 
indiscernible and therefore constitutionally problematic limits.  
But this approach runs completely counter to the way we adjudicate 
these kinds of questions. 
¶247 At the outset, it is a misrepresentation to suggest 
Secretary Palm argues her power knows no bounds.  She made no such 
claim.  Secretary Palm acknowledged that her orders could be 
challenged on the grounds that they violated provisions of the 
constitution, including violation of our fundamental liberties and 
basic due process protections.  No party, of course, raised these 
kinds of claims here.  It is fair game to reject the Secretary's 
proffered legal arguments; it is unfair to ascribe to her and then 
reject arguments she did not make. 
¶248 But suppose Wis. Stat. § 252.02 does offer Secretary 
Palm too much power.  The remedy for this, assuming there are some 
permissible constitutional applications of the statute, would be 
to entertain an as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute 
by someone alleging injury from its enforcement.  We do not enjoin 
particular enforcement actions under a facially constitutional 
statute simply because the statute could be deployed in ways that 
violate the constitution. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
44 
 
¶249 Some members of the majority try to get around this by 
asserting that Order 28 violates the nondelegation doctrine under 
a legal test raised and developed sua sponte without the benefit 
of adversarial briefing.  Even assuming this new legal framework 
is correct and should be adopted, the rationale offered does not 
support the suggested conclusion. 
¶250 Under the nondelegation doctrine as traditionally 
understood, it is usually the statute itself that is the basis for 
any nondelegation problems, not enforcement efforts.  In the recent 
United States Supreme Court decision where Justice Gorsuch in 
dissent called for reinvigoration of a more vigorous nondelegation 
doctrine, the question was whether a law could give the executive 
the discretion to decide to whom it would apply.  See Gundy, 139 
S. Ct. at 2121 (majority opinion) (asking whether Congress 
violated the nondelegation doctrine in enacting 34 U.S.C 
§ 20913(d)); see also id. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(inquiring as to whether Congress "unconstitutionally divested 
itself of its legislative responsibilities").  Similarly, in early 
cases challenging the emerging administrative state, the question 
was whether the law itself provided enough detail.  See J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409 (explaining Congress could 
statutorily delegate if it set forth an "intelligible principle" 
authorizing how the delegated authority was to be exercised). 
¶251 Accordingly, if Wis. Stat. § 252.02 gives too much 
undefined power to Secretary Palm——and that is the argument being 
made by the majority and concurrences——the remedy would be that 
the statute itself should be declared unconstitutional.  The 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
45 
 
problem under a nondelegation theory is not whether an enforcement 
action is consistent with the law, but whether the underlying law 
is constitutionally capable of being enforced in the first place.  
But there's an obvious obstacle with deploying that approach in 
this case with respect to § 252.02.  Namely, it would need to be 
premised on legislative standing to argue that the laws it wrote 
are unconstitutional.  It cannot be that the legislative branch 
has standing to sue the executive branch on the grounds that the 
legislature itself violated the constitution when it passed 
certain laws. 
¶252 Furthermore, a certain irony inheres in calls to breathe 
new life into the nondelegation doctrine in this case.  If we are 
to return to a vision of the separation of powers that does not 
allow delegation from one branch to another,20 how in the world can 
we support that proposition and at the same time hold that 
Secretary Palm is required to submit to rulemaking, a process that 
is premised, lo and behold, on the delegation of legislative power 
to the executive branch?  If we are going to have a serious 
discussion about the separation of powers and its relationship to 
the administrative state, I welcome that conversation.  But a 
decision grounded in "it's good for me but not for thee" does not 
inspire confidence that we are applying the same law to both 
parties before us. 
¶253 Finally, the majority premises much of its argument on 
the notion that an executive branch order may only carry criminal 
                                                 
20 In his separate writing, Justice Kelly argues the 
legislature cannot delegate "even a sliver of its core power."  
Justice Kelly's concurrence, ¶103. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
46 
 
penalties for any violation if the elements of a crime are first 
promulgated as a rule or otherwise defined in the statutes.  
Majority op., ¶¶36-40.  This argument suffers from several glaring 
flaws. 
¶254 First, in what is a recurring theme, this argument was 
not developed by any party.  This is raised sua sponte by this 
court without the benefit of adversarial briefing.  We risk serious 
error when we issue broad rulings based on legal rationales that 
have not been tested through the crucible of adversarial 
litigation.  When accepting an original action, this danger is 
even greater. 
¶255 More to the point, this is a dramatic holding that could 
call into question all kinds of laws.  Our statues include numerous 
instances where violating an agency's order can result in criminal 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
47 
 
penalties.21  In each of these statutes, it is the legislature that 
has defined violation of a lawful order as a criminal offense.  If 
an enactment of this sort is unlawful, then all of these statutes 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 26.985(2) (authorizing criminal 
penalties for violation of any order issued by DNR pursuant to 
protection of forest lands and forest productivity provisions); 
Wis. Stat. § 93.21(3) (authorizing criminal penalties for 
violation of any order issued by the Department of Agriculture, 
Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP)); § 93.21(4) (authorizing 
criminal penalties for violation of any general or special order 
issued by DATCP to avert, relieve, or terminate a scarcity of food 
products or fuel in the state); Wis. Stat. § 94.77(1)-(2) 
(authorizing criminal penalties for violation of any orders issued 
by DATCP or DNR that are not the subject of a specific penalty 
under chapter 94); Wis. Stat. § 95.99 (authorizing criminal 
penalties for violation of any order issued by DATCP pursuant to 
animal health provisions); Wis. Stat. § 126.87(2)(b) (authorizing 
criminal penalties for violations of any order issued by DATCP 
pursuant to agriculture producer security provisions); Wis. Stat. 
§ 250.04(7) (authorizing criminal penalties for violation of any 
orders issued by DHS regarding the duties of local health officers 
and boards); Wis. Stat. § 254.30(2)(b) (authorizing criminal 
penalties for violation of any order issued by DHS pursuant to 
toxic substances provisions); Wis. Stat. § 285.87(2) (authorizing 
criminal penalties for violation of any special order issued by 
DNR 
pursuant 
to 
air 
pollution 
provisions); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 291.97(2)(b)2. (authorizing criminal penalties for violation of 
any special order issued by DNR pursuant to hazardous waste 
management provisions); Wis. Stat. § 463.18 (authorizing criminal 
penalties for violation of any order issued by the Department of 
Safety and Professional Services (DSPS) pursuant to body art laws 
and 
relating 
to 
public 
health); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 551.508(1) 
(authorizing criminal penalties for violation of any order issued 
by the Department of Financial Institutions (DFI) pursuant to 
securities law provisions); Wis. Stat. § 552.19(1) (authorizing 
criminal penalties for violation of any order issued by DFI 
directing any person to file any belated statement required under 
corporate take-over provisions). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
48 
 
would presumably be unconstitutional.  The same may be true for 
analogous statutes authorizing civil penalties.22 
¶256 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.25 does the same thing here.  It 
defines criminal penalties for any person who violates a 
"departmental order under this chapter and relating to the public 
health."  This applies to any DHS order, whether a statewide ban 
on large public gatherings or closing Green Bay West High School 
or quarantining someone in Racine.  No further course of conduct 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 89.079(4)(a) (authorizing penalties 
for violation of any special order issued by DATCP regarding 
unauthorized practice of veterinary medicine); Wis. Stat. 
§ 94.73(13) (authorizing penalties for violation of any order 
issued by DATCP or DNR pursuant to corrective action for discharge 
of agricultural chemicals); Wis. Stat. § 168.26 (authorizing 
penalties for violation of any order issued by DATCP pursuant to 
storage 
of 
dangerous 
substances 
provisions); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 169.45(3) (authorizing penalties for violation of any order 
issued by DNR requiring any captive animal licensee to comply with 
promulgated rules regarding captive animals); Wis. Stat. § 194.17 
(authorizing penalties for violation of any order issued by the 
Department 
of 
Administration 
(DOA) 
or 
the 
Secretary 
of 
Transportation pursuant to motor vehicle provisions); Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.43 (authorizing penalties for violations of any orders 
issued by DOA regarding licensure for selling mopeds); Wis. Stat. 
§ 254.20(11) (authorizing penalties for violation of any order 
issued by DHS regarding asbestos abatement certification); Wis. 
Stat. § 283.91(2) (authorizing penalties for violation of any 
order issued by DNR pursuant to pollution discharge elimination 
provisions); Wis. Stat. § 289.96(3)(a) (authorizing penalties for 
violation of any special order issued by DNR pursuant to solid 
waste facilities provisions); Wis. Stat. § 293.87(3) (authorizing 
penalties for violation of any order issued by DNR pursuant to 
nonferrous metallic mining provisions applicable to person holding 
a prospecting or mining permit); § 293.87(4) (same but for non-
permit holders); Wis. Stat. § 295.19(3)(a)-(b) (authorizing 
penalties for violation of any order issued by DNR pursuant to 
nonmetallic mining reclamation provisions); § 295.37(2) (same but 
oil and gas provisions); § 295.79(4)(a) (same but ferrous metallic 
mining); Wis. Stat. § 440.21(4)(a) (authorizing penalties for 
violation of any special order issued by DSPS regarding 
uncredentialed practice or use of a title). 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
49 
 
needs to be articulated as the legislature has plainly stated that 
violations of DHS orderswhich is exactly what Order 28 isare 
conduct subject to criminal penalties. 
¶257 The majority's logic is premised not on the proposition 
that Order 28 violates Wis. Stat. ch. 252, but rather that the 
statute authorizing criminal penalties for violation of Order 28, 
Wis. Stat. § 252.25, is unconstitutional.  This means all of the 
public health authority granted to DHS in chapter 252 will be left 
with no enforcement mechanism at all, contrary to the law as the 
legislature drafted it.23 
¶258 If we're going to go there, we should be clear-eyed about 
where this logic takes us and what else it applies to.  The 
legislature cannot, as I've already stated, sue the executive 
branch and argue one of its duly-enacted laws is unconstitutional.  
And in fact, they did not do so.  This court should not craft such 
an argument for them, thereby dispensing with scores of contrary 
law,24 without at least a squarely presented issue supported by 
                                                 
23 And even if this conclusion could be reached, the majority 
pays no heed to the possibility of severing the penalty provision 
from Order 28, despite a severability clause being expressly 
included by Secretary Palm.  See also Justice Dallet's dissent, 
¶154. 
24 Beyond the plethora of statutes that do exactly what the 
majority now says cannot be done, our cases have long supported 
the notion that, at least in concept, criminal penalties for 
violating a lawful order are permissible. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
50 
 
adversarial briefing and raised by a party with standing to bring 
such a claim. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
¶259 It is without doubt that the strictures of the 
constitution must be diligently defended during this crisis; the 
judiciary must never cast aside the law in the name of emergency.  
But just as true, the judiciary must never cast aside our laws or 
the constitution itself in the name of liberty.  The rule of law, 
and therefore the true liberty of the people, is threatened no 
less by a tyrannical judiciary than by a tyrannical executive or 
legislature.  Today's decision may or may not be good policy, but 
it is not grounded in the law. 
¶260 The legislature brings two narrow claims to us, none 
involving constitutional questions or a determination of how far 
DHS can go in exercising its powers under Wis. Stat. § 252.02.  I 
would stick to the legal issues before us and go no further. 
¶261 The first question is whether Order 28 was required to 
be promulgated as an administrative rule.  Order 28 is a general 
order by virtue of having statewide effect, but it is not one of 
general application.  It is a temporary order issued to address 
                                                 
One example is Ervin v. State, a case concerning the validity 
of an arrest made for violation a community-wide curfew order 
issued by the Milwaukee mayor.  41 Wis. 2d 194, 163 N.W.2d 207 
(1968).  The mayor, under the relevant Wisconsin statute, had 
authority to declare a state of emergency "and do what is necessary 
in such emergency."  Id. at 198-99.  The court upheld the temporary 
curfew order as "a legitimate and proper exercise of the police 
power."  Id. at 201-02.  The majority's logic would require a 
different result in this and who knows how many other cases. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
51 
 
the outbreak of a particular communicable disease.  Therefore, it 
does not meet the definition of a rule under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13). 
¶262 The legislature asks in the alternative that we address 
whether Order 28 goes beyond the statutory powers DHS has been 
granted in Wis. Stat. § 252.02.  But the legislature has not 
alleged, nor can I identify, any harm to the legislature as a 
constitutional body for which this court can grant relief.  
Executive branch overreach may be challenged by those who are 
harmed by the executive branch action.  Except in unusual cases, 
the lawmaking body is not injured in its lawmaking functions by 
executive 
branch 
enforcement 
gone 
awry. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
legislature lacks standing to bring this claim, and it should be 
dismissed. 
¶263 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.25 
¶264 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join ¶¶198-258 of this dissent. 
 
                                                 
25 In light of my legal conclusions, and in accord with the 
legislature's request, I would have granted a stay of the court's 
decision to give the parties time to consider a replacement for 
Order 28. 
No.  2020AP765-OA.bh 
 
1