Title: McCarther v. Pacific Telesis
Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 104
Docket Number: S164692
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 18, 2010

1 
Filed 2/18/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
KIMBERLY McCARTHER et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S164692 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/2 A115223 
PACIFIC TELESIS GROUP et al., 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. RG05219163 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In this case we resolve whether Labor Code section 233, which permits an 
employee to use accrued paid sick leave to care for ill relatives, applies to paid 
sick leave policies that provide for an uncapped number of compensated days off.  
We conclude, contrary to the Court of Appeal, that Labor Code section 233 does 
not apply to paid sick leave policies that provide for an uncapped number of 
compensated days off.   
Background 
Plaintiffs Kimberly McCarther and Juan Huerta brought this representative 
action against their respective employers, SBC Services, Inc., and Pacific Bell 
Telephone Company, and against Pacific Telesis Group, Advanced Solutions, Inc., 
Southwestern Bell Video Services, Inc., Pacific Bell Information Services, and 
SBC Telecom, Inc. (collectively, defendants).  In their second amended complaint, 
plaintiffs alleged three causes of action concerning defendants‟ failure to provide 
2 
paid leave to care for employees‟ relatives in accordance with Labor Code1 section 
233.   
According to the parties‟ stipulated statement of undisputed facts, plaintiff 
McCarther had been a service representative for one of defendants‟ companies 
since 1998, and plaintiff Huerta had worked for another of defendants‟ companies 
for over 25 years.  Defendants are affiliated entities and have been signatories to 
various collective bargaining agreements, including the operative April 4, 2004, to 
April 4, 2009, collective bargaining agreement (the CBA) with Communication 
Workers of America, the labor union to which plaintiffs belong.   
A. Defendants’ Sickness Absence and Attendance Management 
Policies 
Section 5.01F of the CBA requires that employees be compensated for any 
day in which they miss work due to their own illness or injury for up to five 
consecutive days of absence in any seven-day period.2  Once an employee returns 
to work following any period of absence, section 5.01F may again be triggered if 
the employee is absent for his or her own illness or injury.  There is no bank of 
paid sick days that employees incrementally accrue over a period of time.  There is 
no cap on the number of days employees may be absent from work under section 
5.01F, nor is there a particular number of days that employees vest, earn, or accrue 
under the sickness absence policy.  As defendants explain, “if an employee 
normally works a five-day schedule from Monday-Friday, is absent for an entire 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
If an employee is disabled for eight or more days, the employee may 
receive short-term disability benefits; if an employee is disabled for more than a 
year, the employee may receive benefits pursuant to defendants‟ long-term 
disability plan. 
3 
workweek due to an illness, returns to work the following Monday morning, and 
becomes ill during the day on Monday, the employee can leave work and be 
absent for five more continuous working days with full pay.”  The parties 
stipulated that defendants never maintained a policy or practice of paying 
employees under section 5.01F of the CBA for absences to care for ill family 
members, nor has plaintiffs‟ union ever asserted that section 5.01F covers 
absences for the illness of an employee‟s family member.   
The CBA also contains an attendance management policy, which sets forth a 
schedule of progressive discipline that can be imposed when an employee is not 
meeting attendance standards.  An employee is not meeting standards if he or she 
has eight or more absences in a 12-month period with no extenuating 
circumstances, or if an employee has more than four full days of absence and three 
or more “occurrences” of absences in a 12-month period with no extenuating 
circumstances.   
The attendance policy sets forth a progressive discipline scheme.  If an 
employee fails to meet attendance standards, the employee is first counseled that 
further instances of absenteeism will result in discipline.  If the employee has 
worked for the company for between five and 20 years, the progressive discipline 
policy mandates the following course for each successive absence: a written 
warning of a one-day unpaid suspension, a one-day unpaid suspension with a 
written warning of a two-day unpaid suspension, a two-day unpaid suspension 
with a written warning of termination, and termination.  Employees with fewer 
than five years of service do not receive a two-day suspension, and are instead 
terminated after a one-day suspension and warning of termination.   
Absences are excluded from this attendance management policy (and exempt 
from discipline) if they constitute protected leave under, among other laws, 
workers‟ compensation laws or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
4 
(29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.).  The CBA provides employees with six “personal” 
days off per year, and absences taken as personal days are also excluded from the 
attendance management policy.  Absences for an employee‟s illness, while 
compensated pursuant to section 5.01F of the CBA, nonetheless constitute an 
absence potentially subject to discipline within the meaning of the attendance 
policy.   
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims 
Plaintiff McCarther was absent for seven consecutive workdays in 2004 to 
care for her ill children.  McCarther was not paid for this absence, and did not 
request to be paid for this absence under the sickness absence or personal day off 
policies.  McCarther instead requested that her leave be approved as Family 
Medical Leave Act protected leave, which her employer denied.  She thereafter 
filed a grievance, which was also denied.  During the pendency of her challenge, 
her absence was not counted as an occurrence of absence, and nearly a year after 
taking her seven-day leave she was counseled that she was meeting attendance 
standards. McCarther was never disciplined in connection with any absence to 
care for an ill family member, and although she received one or two written 
warnings concerning her attendance, she was never suspended or terminated for an 
attendance-related reason.   
Plaintiff Huerta was absent for five consecutive days to care for his ill 
mother.  He requested that one day of his absence be paid pursuant to the personal 
day off policy, which was granted.  He did not request that any other days of his 
absence be paid pursuant to the sickness absence provision of the CBA, and he 
was not paid for those other days of absence.  Huerta‟s absence was considered 
excluded from the attendance management policy, and Huerta was not disciplined 
5 
for his absence.  Huerta was never disciplined for any attendance-related reason 
during his employment.   
C. Proceedings Below 
Before class discovery occurred and class certification issues were litigated, 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a motion for 
summary adjudication seeking a determination of whether defendants‟ sickness 
absence policy constituted sick leave within the meaning of section 233.  The 
parties stipulated, and the court agreed, that this question was purely legal and 
appropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage.     
Relying on paragraphs 15 and 16 of the parties‟ stipulated statement of 
undisputed facts,3 the plain meaning of section 233, and the legislative history of 
section 233, the trial court concluded that defendants‟ sickness absence policy did 
not constitute sick leave pursuant to section 233, and it granted defendants‟ motion 
for summary judgment.  
Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‟s grant of 
summary judgment for defendants.  The Court of Appeal held that defendants‟ 
sickness absence policy constituted sick leave within the meaning of section 233; 
and further concluded that section 234, which provides that employers may not 
discipline employees for taking leave under section 233, did not preclude 
defendants from disciplining employees for taking leave pursuant to section 233 to 
care for ill relatives in the same manner defendants disciplined employees for 
                                              
3 
Paragraph 15 of the parties‟ statement provides that “employees do not 
earn, vest or accrue any particular number of paid sick days in a year under 
Section 5.01F.”  Paragraph 16 states, “Under [defendants‟] system of sickness 
absence payments, employees do not have a „bank‟ of paid sick days that they 
accrue in increments over a period of time.” 
6 
taking leave for their own illnesses or injuries.  We granted defendants‟ petition 
for review. 
Discussion 
Section 233, commonly referred to as the “kin care” statute, provides, in 
pertinent part, that “[a]ny employer who provides sick leave for employees shall 
permit an employee to use in any calendar year the employee‟s accrued and 
available sick leave entitlement, in an amount not less than the sick leave that 
would be accrued during six months at the employee‟s then current rate of 
entitlement, to attend to an illness of a child, parent, spouse, or domestic partner of 
the employee.”  (§ 233, subd. (a).)  The statute defines “sick leave” as “accrued 
increments of compensated leave.”  (§ 233, subd. (b)(4).)  We examine here 
whether defendants‟ sickness absence policy, which provides for an uncapped 
number of paid days off for illness so long as each instance of absence continues 
for no longer than five consecutive days, constitutes sick leave within the meaning 
of section 233. 
Our primary task when faced with a question of statutory construction is to 
determine the intent of the Legislature, and we begin by looking to the statutory 
language.  (Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 
1142, 1147.)  We must give “the language its usual, ordinary import and accord[] 
significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the 
legislative purpose.  A construction making some words surplusage is to be 
avoided.  The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind 
the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject 
must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.”  
(Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 
1386-1387.)  If the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable 
interpretation, we must look to additional canons of statutory construction to 
7 
determine the Legislature‟s purpose.  (Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern 
California, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1147.)  “Both the legislative history of the 
statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered 
in ascertaining the legislative intent.”  (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & 
Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387.) 
The Court of Appeal concluded that “[s]ection 233 plainly applies to the 
„sickness absence‟ policy” at issue here.  We disagree.  The statute requires 
employers that provide sick leave to permit employees to use “accrued and 
available sick leave” in “an amount not less than the sick leave that would be 
accrued during six months at the employee‟s then current rate of entitlement” to 
care for an ill family member.4  (§  233, subd. (a)).  The statute, therefore, does not 
apply to any and all forms of compensated time off for illness, but only to “sick 
leave” as defined by the statute and only in the amount specified.  The facts that 
section 233 defines sick leave as “accrued increments of compensated leave,” and 
that the statute limits the amount of sick leave that can be used to care for an ill 
family member to “an amount not less than the sick leave that would be accrued 
during six months,” indicates that the reach of the statute is limited to employers 
that provide a measurable, banked amount of sick leave. 
The requirement in section 233 that employers that provide sick leave permit 
employees to use at least the “amount . . . that would be accrued during six 
                                              
4 
We note that most California employers are not required to provide sick 
leave to employees (Chin, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The 
Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 12:2345, p. 12-183; Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 2 Cal. 
Labor Law Dig. (2008), ch. 21, p. 548); accordingly, the statute applies only to 
employers that elect to do so.  Employers in San Francisco City and County are 
required to provide sick leave to their employees pursuant to a local ordinance.  
(S.F. Admin. Code, ch. 12W; Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 2 Cal. Labor Law Dig., 
supra, ch. 21, p. 548.) 
8 
months” for kin care cannot sensibly be applied to the sickness absence policy at 
issue here, because it is impossible to determine the amount of compensated time 
off for illness to which an employee might be entitled in a six-month period.  
Defendants‟ sickness absence policy does not provide a bank of sick leave hours 
or days to which the employee is entitled in a six-month or 12-month period, but 
rather provides that an ill employee will be compensated for up to five consecutive 
days for each instance of illness.  But once the employee returns to work, he or she 
is again entitled to compensation for another five-day period of illness.  The only 
limitation is imposed by defendants‟ attendance management policy, which 
provides a schedule of progressive discipline if an employee is absent eight days 
or more in a year absent extenuating circumstances.  It is impossible to determine, 
therefore, the amount of compensated time for sick leave to which an employee 
might be entitled within six months and, thus, impossible to determine the amount 
of time an employee could use for kin care under section 233. 
 Plaintiffs contend, relying on the Court of Appeal‟s conclusion, that section 
233 applies to sickness absence policies like the one at issue here, even if “one 
cannot in advance calculate with mathematical certainty the amount of sick leave 
that employees would actually use in a six-month period.”  Plaintiffs propose “at 
least two ways of calculating” kin care leave under an unlimited sickness absence 
policy like defendants‟.  First, plaintiffs suggest — and the Court of Appeal found 
persuasive — that because defendants‟ sickness absence policy applies to 
employees after one year of employment, “employees earn the use of five-day 
increments of compensated leave in the event of illness or injury . . . .  This is their 
„current rate of entitlement‟ „during‟ any six months of any calendar year 
thereafter.”   
It is true that defendants‟ employees are entitled to compensated time off for 
illness; however, that amount of compensated time is not banked, nor can it be 
9 
calculated in six-month periods.  Defendants‟ sickness absence policy provides 
that employees may be compensated for time off due to illness for up to five 
consecutive days and must seek alternate forms of compensation under short- or 
long-term disability programs if the illness or injury lasts for more than seven 
days.  Thus, an employee‟s “current rate of entitlement” can be measured only in 
seven-day periods (in which an employee would be entitled to up to five days of 
compensated time off for illness), but cannot be measured in six-month periods as 
section 233 requires.  Accordingly, section 233 does not apply to sickness absence 
policies like defendants‟. 
Our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend section 233 to apply to a 
sickness absence policy like defendants‟ is supported by the Legislature‟s addition 
to the Labor Code of section 234, which prohibits employers from using an 
absence control policy to “count[] sick leave taken pursuant to Section 233 as an 
absence that may lead to or result in discipline, discharge, demotion, or suspension 
. . . .”  As noted above, the only limitation on the amount of compensated time off 
an ill employee may claim under defendants‟ sickness absence policy is 
defendants‟ attendance management policy, which provides a schedule of 
progressive discipline if an employee is absent eight days or more in a year.  
Without this limitation, an ill employee could claim an unlimited number of 
compensated sick days, provided the employee returned to work for at least part of 
a day every week. 
If section 233 required defendants to permit an employee to use a portion of 
this compensated time for kin care, section 234, by its terms, would prohibit 
defendants from using its attendance management policy to limit the amount of 
kin care that an employee could claim.  Thus, rather than being entitled to use for 
kin care half of the amount of compensated time the employee could use as sick 
time, sections 233 and 234 together would permit an employee to claim as kin care 
10 
far more compensated time off than the employee would be entitled to claim if 
personally ill.  Such a result would be contrary to the plain intent of section 233, 
which requires only those employers who provide sick leave in accrued 
increments to permit employees to use half of that annually accrued amount for 
kin care. 
In an effort to avoid this obviously problematic conclusion, the Court of 
Appeal reasoned, and plaintiffs suggest in the alternative, that an employee‟s kin 
care leave entitlement could be based on the amount of sick leave that the 
employee actually utilizes in one year.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged the 
flaw with this reasoning, explaining that “one cannot in advance calculate with 
mathematical certainty the amount of sick leave that employees would actually use 
in a six month period because of the uncertainty of their illness or injury.  
However, section 233 does not require any such certainty.”  Not so.   
Section 233 expressly sets forth a minimum amount of kin care leave that 
covered employers must provide to employees — “an amount not less than the 
sick leave that would be accrued during six months at the employee‟s then current 
rate of entitlement.”  (§ 233, subd. (a).)   The Legislature endeavored to provide 
employers with guidelines to ascertain, with precision, an employee‟s kin care 
leave entitlement.  An interpretation of the statute that renders impossible an 
accurate calculation of an employee‟s kin care leave entitlement is illogical and 
contrary to the Legislature‟s clear intent.  Plaintiffs suggest that an employer‟s 
ability to ascertain the amount of kin care leave to which its employees are entitled 
“is not necessary to . . . find that the plan falls within the statutory definition.”  
This reasoning is flawed.  The plain language of the statute requires that the 
amount of accrued and available kin care leave “in any calendar year” be 
ascertainable in relation to the amount of sick leave that is accrued in any six-
month period.  (§ 233, subd. (a).)  Plaintiffs‟ argument — that there are multiple 
11 
ways to calculate an employee‟s kin care leave entitlement under a sickness 
absence policy like defendants‟ — is self-defeating.  Because the Legislature 
intended to put employers and employees on notice of the minimum amount of kin 
care leave to which an employee is entitled, an interpretation of section 233 that 
permits different calculations based upon the same sickness absence policy cannot 
be correct.   
  In addition to requiring that the amount of kin care leave be ascertainable, 
the statute further limits the type of sick leave plans to which it applies, explaining 
that sick leave means “accrued increments of compensated leave,” and employees 
may only use a measurable portion of “accrued and available” sick leave for kin 
care.  (§ 233, subds. (b)(4), (a).)   It is in these two portions of the statute that the 
definition of “accrued” becomes critical. 
Defendants argue that “by far the most common definition of „accrued‟ is „to 
accumulate over time,‟ or words to that effect.”  Our research yields a similar 
conclusion.5  Plaintiffs disagree with defendants‟ proffered definition — that 
accrued means “to accumulate over time” — contending that a temporal element is 
not essential to a plain and commonsense understanding of the phrase.  Once the 
temporal element of the definition is excised, both parties agree that “accrued” 
                                              
5 
(See American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 12 [defining “accrue” as 
“[t]o accumulate over time”]; Black‟s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2005) p. 22 [defining 
“accrue” as “[t]o accumulate periodically”]; Merriam-Webster‟s Collegiate Dict. 
(11th ed. 2004) p. 9 [defining “accrue” as “to accumulate or be added 
periodically”]; 1 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 90 [defining “accrued” as 
“[a]ccumulated by growth”]; Random House Webster‟s Unabridged Dict. (2d ed. 
2001) p. 13 [defining “accrue” as “to happen or result as a natural growth, 
addition, etc.”]; Webster‟s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 13 [defining “accrue” 
as “to be periodically accumulated in the process of time whether as an increase or 
a decrease”]; World Book Dict. (1991) p. 15 [defining “accrue” as “to grow or 
arise as the product of money invested.”].) 
12 
means, in essence, “accumulated.”  Indeed, plaintiffs contend that the definition of 
“accrued” when used in the context of compensated leave “is most closely akin to 
that indicated in Black‟s Law Dictionary, something which is „earned but not yet‟ 
due or paid.”   
Applying this definition of “accrued” here, we conclude that defendants‟ 
sickness absence policy is not governed by section 233.  The parties stipulated that 
“employees do not earn, vest or accrue any particular number of paid sick days in 
a year under Section 5.01F.”  “Under [defendants‟] system of sickness absence 
payments, employees do not have a „bank‟ of paid sick days that they accrue in 
increments over a period of time.”  In other words, defendants‟ policy is not an 
accumulation policy.  Under defendants‟ policy, there are simply no “earned but 
not yet due or paid” sick days.   
Plaintiffs strain to define the terms of section 233 to encompass defendants‟ 
policy, arguing that the definition of the term “accrued” changes based upon how 
it is used in different portions of the statute.  We see no reason to reach this 
unusual conclusion.  “Accrued” means “accumulated” each time it is used in the 
statute.  “Accrued” first appears in section 233 in the statute‟s opening sentence, 
explaining that employers must allow employees to use “accrued and available 
sick leave” to care for an ill relative.  (§ 233, subd. (a).)  Plaintiffs argue that the 
Court of Appeal correctly suggested that the term “accrued” in this portion of the 
statute means to “come into existence as [an] enforceable claim[].”  By so defining 
the term, plaintiffs argue that defendants‟ policy — which provides employees 
with a vested right to use compensated sick leave after a one-year period of 
employment is completed — is governed by section 233.  
The appeal of according the term “accrued” this definition is not lost on the 
court.  Indeed, in some legal contexts, the term “accrued” means to “come into 
existence as an enforceable claim or right; to arise.” (Black‟s Law Dict., supra, at 
13 
p. 22; see also Random House Webster‟s Unabridged Dict., supra, at p. 13 
[defining “accrue” as “to become a present and enforceable right or demand”]; 
American Heritage Dict., supra, at p. 12 [same]; Webster‟s 3d New Internat. Dict., 
supra, at p. 13 [same].)  Black‟s Law Dictionary explains, “ „The term “accrue” in 
the context of a cause of action means to arrive, to commence, to come into 
existence, or to become a present enforceable demand or right.‟ ” (Ibid., citing 
Schwing, Cal. Affirmative Defenses §  25:3, at 17-18 (2d ed. 1996), italics added.)  
Although the term “accrue” can be used to indicate that a cause of action has come 
into existence, section 233 has nothing to do with causes of action.  According the 
term “accrued” another of its ordinary definitions — “accumulated” — makes 
considerably more sense in the context of section 233.6 
Further, plaintiffs‟ proposed definition of “accrued” as a vested or present 
right is improper because it conflates the term “accrued” with the term “available,” 
both of which are used in section 233.  “Available” is defined as “present and 
ready for use.”  (American Heritage Dict., supra, at p. 123; see also 1 Oxford 
English Dict., supra, at p. 812 [“available” defined as “capable of being made use 
of, at one‟s disposal, within one‟s reach”]; Webster‟s 3d New Internat. Dict., 
supra, at p. 150 [“available” defined as “capable of use for the accomplishment of 
a purpose”].)   Because the statute defines the type of sick leave that may be used 
for kin care as both “accrued and available” leave, it is clear that the Legislature 
                                              
6 
Brian Garner‟s A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed. 1995), 
explains that “[a]t least two critics have recommended that this word [„accrue‟] be 
restricted to monetary contexts, quite unaware of its most common meaning in 
legal contexts.  Interest accrues, we may be certain, but so do causes of 
action . . . .”  (Id. at p. 16.)  We do not suggest that the term‟s definition with 
respect to causes of action is in any way altered; instead, in this limited context of 
sick leave, we suggest that the term is better defined in connection with 
measurable or ascertainable amounts.   
14 
intended the terms to have distinct meanings.  Defining “accrued” as a vested or 
present right thwarts that intent, rendering the term “available” redundant.  As we 
have stated, “[a] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.”  
(Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 
1387.)  Accordingly, we cannot agree with the suggestion that “accrued” as used 
in section 233 means a present, vested right, or — put another way — available. 
 The final use of  “accrued” appears in section 233‟s definition of sick leave, 
defined as “accrued increments of compensated leave.”  (§ 233, subd. (b)(4).)  The 
Court of Appeal suggested that the terms “accrued” and “increments” in this 
phrase are nearly synonymous.  We cannot agree; if the terms were to be read 
identically, or nearly so, the word “increments” would be unnecessary, an 
interpretation we do not believe the Legislature intended.  (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair 
Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387.)  Plaintiffs again argue 
that “accrued” means to “come into existence as [an] enforceable claim[],” when 
used in the phrase “accrued increments.”  We reject this argument for the same 
reason mentioned above — although the term “accrued” has a particular meaning 
in the context of a cause of action, there is nothing in section 233 to suggest that 
the term “accrued” takes on that meaning here.  Instead, by according the term 
“accrued” a commonsense meaning of “accumulated,” the conclusion that section 
233 applies only to accrual-based sick leave policies, not uncapped sickness 
absence policies, is plain. 
To avoid this conclusion, plaintiffs urge this court not to focus “on the debate 
over the meaning of „accrue,‟ ” but ask instead that we “analyze the „intent‟ of 
section 233.”  By focusing on the language of section 233, we do both.  Section 
233 applies to employers who  provide sick leave, defined by the statute as 
“accrued increments of compensated leave.”  The fact that the statute includes a 
definition of “sick leave” suggests that the Legislature understood the term is 
15 
susceptible of multiple meanings, and endeavored to clarify precisely which types 
of sick leave policies are covered by the statute.  Some policies, by implication, 
are not within the statute‟s reach.  Had the Legislature intended that every type of 
sickness absence or sick leave policy be governed by section 233, it could have 
stated so expressly, or could have declined to provide a limiting definition of the 
phrase “sick leave” in the statute, arguably broadening the statute‟s reach.   
Although the plain language of the statute is clear, an examination of section 
233‟s legislative history confirms that the statute was not intended to broadly 
apply to all types of sick leave policies.  Instead, the statute applies only to those 
policies in which employers provide “accrued increments of compensated leave.”  
(§ 233, subd. (b)(4).)  The Legislature understood that this was a limiting 
definition; indeed, in describing the bill‟s purpose, the Legislative Counsel 
explained that “[t]his bill would require an employer who provides sick leave, as 
defined, for employees to permit an employee to use . . . accrued sick leave” to 
care for ill relatives.  (Legis. Counsel‟s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 109 (1999-2000 
Reg. Sess.), italics added.)  The legislative history is replete with references to 
limiting the types of sick leave to which the statute is aimed; the phrase “sick 
leave, as defined” is oft repeated in analyses of the bill.  (See, e.g., Legis. 
Counsel‟s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 109 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 21, 
1999; Assem. Com. on Appropriations, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 109 (1999-
2000 Reg. Sess.) for hearing Apr. 28, 1999, p. 4; Assem. Com. on Labor and 
Employment, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 109 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) for hearing 
Apr. 7, 1999, p. 1 [bill “[d]efines „sick leave‟ to mean accrued increments of 
compensated leave”].) 
Assembly Bill No. 109‟s history confirms that the definition of sick leave 
codified in section 233 was intentionally limited.  Prior to the passage of 
Assembly Bill No. 109 in 1999, Assembly Member Knox introduced a similar bill 
16 
in the 1997-1998 Regular Session, Assembly Bill No. 480, which failed to pass 
out of the Senate.  As introduced, Assembly Bill No. 480 defined “sick leave” as 
“payment by an employer of the normal compensation of an employee, out of the 
general assets of the employer, on account of periods of time during which the 
employee is physically or mentally unable to perform his or her duties or is 
otherwise absent for medical reasons.”  (Assem. Bill No. 480 (1997-1998 Reg. 
Sess.), as introduced Feb. 24, 1997.)  The bill was amended four times before it 
failed to pass, and the third amendment altered the original definition of “sick 
leave” to the language currently in section 233.  (Assem. Bill No. 480 (1997-1998 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 5, 1997.)  If the definition of “sick leave” contained 
in Assembly Bill No. 480 had not changed to its current definition, defendants‟ 
sickness absence policy likely would have been covered by section 233.   
While we conclude that the Legislature intended to limit the types of sick 
leave policies to which the statute applies, we conclude that it also intended, as 
plaintiffs suggest, to protect employees.  Interpreting the statute to exclude 
policies like defendants‟ does not run afoul of the legislative intent.  Employers 
are not required to provide sick leave.  Many employers elect to do so, and many 
do so in the form of an accrual-based system.  Employers may choose to refuse 
employees the right to use uncapped sick leave to care for relatives, although 
employers are certainly not precluded from doing so.  Indeed, defendants offer 
compensated personal days off, which may be taken to care for ill relatives — a 
policy of which plaintiff Huerta availed himself to receive one day of compensated 
leave to care for his ill mother.  There are employers, like defendants, that elect to 
provide an uncapped compensated sick leave policy.  We conclude that section 
233 does not apply to those types of policies. 
  
17 
Conclusion 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
O‟ROURKE, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 163 Cal.App.4th176 
Rehearing Granted 
 
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Opinion No. S164692 
Date Filed: February 18, 2010 
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Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Robert B. Freedman 
 
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Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld and David A. Rosenfeld for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
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Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, J. Al Latham, Jr., Thomas E. Geidt, Laura N. Monfredini and Paul W. 
Cane, Jr., for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Erika C. Frank for California Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Seyfarth Shaw, Stacy D. Shartin, John A. Van Hook and Simon L. Yang for California Employment Law 
Council and Employers Group as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David A. Rosenfeld 
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld 
1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200 
Alameda, CA  94501-1091 
(510) 337-1001 
 
Joseph Al Latham, Jr. 
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 
515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-2228 
(213) 683-6000