Title: Carter v. City of Birmingham
Citation: 444 So. 2d 373
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1983

444 So. 2d 373 (1983)
John CARTER, Administrator, etc.
v.
CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, et al.
82-423.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 16, 1983.
O. William Adams, III, Birmingham, and Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, and Steven L. Winter, New York City, for appellant.
Charles H. Wyatt, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee City of Birmingham.
James T. Collins and John E. Amari, Birmingham, for appellee George M. Sands.
*374 BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal under Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure (A.R.Civ. P.), from the grant of partial summary judgments for the defendants. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
The cause arose from the death of Bonita Beatrice Carter, who was shot and killed by George M. Sands, a Birmingham police officer. Following the filing of a claim with the City of Birmingham, the plaintiff, John Carter, administrator of the decedent's estate, brought this action against the City and Sands. The action was brought under the wrongful death statute, Code of 1975, § 6-5-410 and under § 11-47-190. Motions to dismiss were overruled and the defendants filed answers. Discovery ensued. Plaintiff was allowed to file an amendment to the complaint which added four counts, Counts III, IV, V and VI. Count III stated an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against Sands for the violation of Bonita Carter's right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from excessive use of force. Count IV alleged a violation of Bonita Carter's right to equal protection that Sands would not have used deadly force under the same circumstances had she been white. Count V alleged the City's culpable conduct in failing to provide clear guidelines and adequate training, and in failing to discipline, retrain, and reassign Sands, in violation of §§ 1981 and 1983. Count VI added a state law claim against the City for its own wrongful acts, omissions, and negligence resulting in the death of Ms. Carter. Motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment were filed by the defendants, and, after a hearing, the summary judgments were granted "as to any and all claims asserted by plaintiff in the amendment filed ... and more specifically as to Count III, Count IV, Count V and Count VI in said amendment." Summary judgment as to Count VI was not addressed on appeal.
The first issue to be decided by this Court is whether the survival of Bonita Carter's claim for compensatory damages under § 1983 is governed by federal common law or by reference to the Alabama wrongful death statute, supra. We hold that reference must be made to the Alabama act, and that her claim for compensatory damages under § 1983 does not survive.
The substance of the issue presently before this Court was dealt with in Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.1961), in a factual context similar to the case at bar. In Brazier, an action was brought against Georgia police officers for the death of the deceased resulting from, inter alia, alleged violations of § 1983. The Court in Brazier pointed out that § 1983 does not expressly refer to actions for death or the survival of claims arising from civil rights violations, and, after examining the aims of Congress with specific regard to § 1983, declared:
". . . .
". . . .
The Court in Brazier went on to hold that, by virtue of the Georgia statutes, which provided for both survival of the claim that the decedent had for damages sustained during his lifetime and a right of recovery by his surviving widow and others for homicide, the § 1983 claims survived.
It is important to note that, unlike the Georgia statutes, which permit both the wrongful death and the survival actions to be maintained simultaneously, under Alabama law only a wrongful death action may be maintained, and only punitive damages are recoverable. Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.Ala.1981), Code of 1975, § 6-5-410.
Despite this distinction, the Court in Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304, 306 (N.D.Ala.1974), citing Brazier v. Cherry, supra, as authority, held, inter alia:
Further, in the case of James v. Murphy, 392 F. Supp. 641 (M.D.Ala.1975), the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against state officials for alleged violations of her deceased husband's civil rights, which resulted in his death, and sought compensatory damages. There, the Court said:
Nevertheless, these lower federal court holdings must be examined in light of recent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether state law shall govern the survivability of certain federal claims.
In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 98 S. Ct. 1991, 56 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1978), the Court held that the § 1983 action there would abate in accordance with the Louisiana survivorship statute, thereby reversing *376 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Louisiana statute provided that an action for death would survive only in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings of the deceased. In Robertson, the deceased died without being survived by any of the persons named in the statute.
The survival of claims and damages allowable under the Alabama wrongful death statute was carefully scrutinized and upheld in Brown v. Morgan County, supra, "in light of the proviso posited by the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann, [supra], ... that state law is to be applied `subject to the important proviso that state law may not be applied when it is "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."'" 518 F. Supp. 661, at 663.
Although our analysis here must go further, in view of another recent Supreme Court decision, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981), and its impact on the facts in the present case, discussed ante, we agree with and adopt the reasoning and holding of the District Court in Brown, supra:
With regard to the contention that uniformity is necessary where the survivorship of federal causes of action is at issue, the Court in Robertson further stated, in footnote 11:
The plaintiff contends the Court in Brown erred in its reliance on Robertson because the Court in Robertson expressed no view "about whether abatement based on state law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death," making reference to Brazier v. Cherry, supra, but not overruling that case. 436 U.S.  at 594, 98 S. Ct.  at 1997. Plaintiff further contends the question reserved in Robertson was answered in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1980), and asserts Carlson makes it clear that federal common law allows survival of the action, notwithstanding state law. We do not read the holding in Carlson so broadly, considering the language of the Supreme Court in its opinion, ante. Carlson involved an action brought by a mother on behalf of the estate of her deceased son, alleging that he suffered personal injuries from which he died as a *378 result of the actions by petitioners, federal prison officials, in violation of his due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment rights. These allegations gave rise to a cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). One of the issues decided by the Court in Carlson was whether, in this type of case, survival of the cause of action was governed by federal common law or by state statutes.
It is significant to note, at the outset, that the defendants in Carlson were federal officials, and in the language of its holding in Carlson, the Supreme Court clearly makes this important distinction:
We hasten to point out this distinction made by the Supreme Court in Carlson, which, despite its holding, went on to distinguish and uphold Robertson v. Wegmann, supra:
Thus, we are not persuaded that Carlson v. Green mandates the adoption of a federal rule of survivorship in § 1983 cases, especially where the defendants are not federal officials, but rather state or municipal officials. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's § 1983 claim for compensatory damages as a result of the personal injury and pain and suffering of the deceased prior to her death.
Next, because the plaintiff has asserted a § 1983 claim against the City of Birmingham, we must decide the question reserved in Brown v. Morgan County, supra; namely, whether this Court should permit an action for compensatory damages to survive against a municipality in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., supra, which holds that municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983. Plaintiff contends that the holding in Newport, combined with the holding in Brown, supra, which this Court has adopted today, creates an inconsistency with the Constitution and laws of the United States, calling for resort to the federal common law of survival, Carlson, supra, rather than state law. We disagree. Although, in light of City of Newport, the application of the damages and survival of actions limitations found in the Alabama wrongful death statute will in effect preclude plaintiff's "recovery" from the City of Birmingham on a federal theory, i.e. § 1983, the state law action against the city for wrongful death is still available to the plaintiff. Moreover, the state law affords a remedy beyond that now permitted under federal lawpunitive damages. Thus, the application of state law here does not, in substance, abrogate plaintiff's remedy against the city for violations of § 1983, but rather expands the recovery. Nor do we read City of Newport, supra, as a mandate to allow compensatory damages against municipalities in § 1983 suits, especially where the state law recognizes an analogous cause of action. The language of the Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258-259, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1050, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978), is instructive:
The interests sought to be protected by the Alabama wrongful death statute closely parallel the interests to be protected where death results from violations of § 1983. Thus, the purpose of § 1983 is not defeated, nor are cities insulated from liability under § 1983, because the law of Alabama does recognize an analogous cause of action, affording an appropriate remedy in death cases. Brown v. Morgan County, supra. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment with regard only to plaintiff's § 1983 claim for compensatory and punitive damages against the City of Birmingham.
Nevertheless, we do not ignore the declaration of the Court in Robertson v. Wegmann, supra, at 436 U.S.  at 592, 98 S. Ct.  at 1996, that "[a] state official contemplating illegal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed against him."
Our holding as to the nonallowability of compensatory damages makes it unnecessary to consider the issues of relation back and proper joinder of claims. Accordingly, the partial summary judgment for the defendants is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, SHORES and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
JONES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
ALMON, J., not sitting.
ADAMS, J., recuses himself.
JONES, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the Court's holding and its rationale as to the individual, Officer Sands; I respectfully dissent as to its holding with respect to the City of Birmingham.
I recognize, of course, as pointed out by the majority, that, "in light of City of Newport," strict application of "the Alabama wrongful death statute will in effect preclude plaintiff's `recovery' from the City of Birmingham" under § 1983. But I do not agree that the States are exempt from § 1983's mandate on the ground that state law "recognizes an analogous cause of action."
Under this rationale, we could reject all § 1983 actions. Just as our wrongful death act affords a state remedy where death results from conduct proscribed by § 1983, our statutory law and common law affords certain remedies for personal injury resulting from the same culpable conduct. But this does not serve as a basis for rejection of § 1983 actions. In my opinion, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution precludes our rejection of the § 1983 claim against the City. We should either fashion a remedy allowing recovery of compensatory damages, or we should resort to the federal common law of survival, *381 which allows compensatory damages as the appropriate relief. In any event, I would reverse the trial court's summary judgment as to both the individual defendant and the City of Birmingham.