Title: Aaron D. McDonald v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S03-0706-CR-252
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2007

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Nancy A. McCaslin 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
McCaslin & McCaslin 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Elkhart, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monika Prekopa Talbot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 20S03-0706-CR-252 
 
AARON D. MCDONALD, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court, No. 20C01-0508-MR-151 
The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A03-0605-CR-229 
_________________________________ 
 
 
June 26, 2007 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
 
Background 
 
Along with seventeen-year-old Hanna Stone and her eighteen-year-old boyfriend Spenser 
Krempetz, seventeen-year-old Aaron McDonald concocted a plan to rob and kill Stone’s mother, 
Barbara Keim.  Apparently Stone, who hatched this idea, was irritated that her mother did not 
approve of her relationship with Krempetz.  McDonald was promised $400 for his efforts.  The 
trio executed the plan, which resulted in accosting Keim in her home, binding and gagging her, 
driving Keim to a bank ATM from which she was forced to withdraw $200 – the maximum 
amount the machine allowed – and then driving Keim to a corn field where she was fatally shot 
in the head.  The State charged McDonald with murder, a felony, conspiracy to commit murder, 
a Class A felony, and criminal confinement, as a Class B felony.  The State also filed a request 
for Life Imprisonment Without Parole.  
 
Under terms of a plea agreement McDonald pleaded guilty to all charges and in exchange 
the State dismissed the LWOP request.  The plea agreement also provided that sentencing “shall 
be at the discretion of the Court” and the sentences would run concurrently.  App. at 14-15.  
 
At the sentencing hearing, after listening to testimony of witnesses and entertaining 
arguments of counsel, the trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) McDonald 
committed multiple crimes; (2) the crimes were committed solely for financial gain; (3) 
McDonald has a history of juvenile arrests and delinquency adjudications; (4) McDonald smoked 
marijuana since the age of six or seven, used cocaine and marijuana around the time these 
offenses were committed, and handled a loaded firearm while under the influence of drugs; (5) 
McDonald participated in both the murder and the conspiracy to commit murder; and (6)  
McDonald considered himself a victim in this incident.  App. at 39-40.  The trial court found the 
following mitigating factors: (1) McDonald was a minor at the time of the crimes; (2) McDonald 
cooperated with the State in recovering Keim’s body; (3) McDonald suffered from drug and 
alcohol addictions; and (4) McDonald expressed remorse which was tempered by his claim of 
being a victim.  Id. at 40-41.  Concluding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
factors the trial court sentenced McDonald to a term of sixty-two years for the murder 
conviction, which was seven years above the advisory term.  See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3.  The 
 
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trial court imposed the advisory sentences of thirty years and ten years respectively for the Class 
A felony conspiracy conviction and the Class B felony criminal confinement conviction.  
Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement the trial court ordered the sentences to be served 
concurrently with the sentence for murder for a total executed term of sixty-two years.  
 
McDonald appealed arguing among other things1 that the trial court used “improper 
aggravators” to sentence him.  Appellant’s Br. at 12.  More specifically McDonald argued that 
by referring to multiple crimes and by relying on his participation in the conspiracy to commit 
murder, the trial court improperly used as aggravating factors the material elements of the 
murder offense.  McDonald also complained that the trial court improperly relied upon his 
juvenile history as an aggravating factor.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court.  In doing so the court declined to address McDonald’s argument about alleged trial 
court error in the finding of aggravating factors.  Noting that it is “divided on whether it is 
required to review aggravators and mitigators found or not found by the trial court” the Court of 
Appeals declared, “[w]e await our Supreme Court’s guidance on whether a defendant may 
appeal a trial court’s finding of aggravators and mitigators for a sentence within the statutory 
range, and until then, we will assume it unnecessary to assess the trial court’s findings.”  
McDonald v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  Although we now grant 
transfer, except as otherwise provided below we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
 
Discussion 
 
In an opinion handed down today we noted that in the aftermath of the 2005 amendments 
to Indiana’s criminal sentencing statutes, there has been a lack of consensus on the Court of 
Appeals on whether and to what extent trial judges are now required to make sentencing 
statements and whether any such statements must include findings of aggravating and mitigating 
                                                 
1 As rephrased McDonald raised the following issues: (1) did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
considering improper aggravating factors; (2) did the trial court commit fundamental error by refusing to 
recuse itself at the sentencing hearing because the trial court knew on a professional basis two of the 
State’s witnesses; and (3) was McDonald’s sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 
character of the offender.  
 
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factors.  A closely related issue is the scope of appellate review.  Addressing these concerns we 
declared:  
[C]onstruing what we believe is a legislative intent to retain the traditional 
significance of sentencing statements we conclude that under the new statutory 
regime Indiana trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever 
imposing sentence for a felony offense.  In order to facilitate its underlying goals, 
the statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s 
reasons for imposing a particular sentence.  If the recitation includes a finding of 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all 
significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each 
circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.  
 
Anglemyer v. State, No. 43S05-0606-CR-230, ___N.E.2d___, ___, slip op. at 9 (Ind. June 26, 
2007) (internal citation omitted).  We noted that the standard of appellate review continues to be 
abuse of discretion.  We then suggested a few ways in which a trial court may overstep its 
bounds under the new statutory regime: 
One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing to enter a 
sentencing statement at all.  Other examples include entering a sentencing 
statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence – including a finding of 
aggravating and mitigating factors if any – but the record does not support the 
reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by 
the record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a 
matter of law. 
 
Id. at 10.  
 
  
 
In this case, explaining its reason for the sentence imposed, the trial court entered a five-
page written statement, App. at 39-43, in addition to an oral statement that consumes nine pages 
of transcript.  Tr. at 109-18.  Taken together the statements are meticulously detailed, include the 
finding of aggravating and mitigating factors – all of which are supported by the record – and 
explain why each factor is considered aggravating or mitigating.2  
 
                                                 
2 The trial judge correctly observed, “the Court is free to impose any sentence within the range provided 
by law without regard to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  Tr. at 109.  However the trial judge 
went on to say, “In spite of the fact, Mr. McDonald, that I’m not required to do so, I am going to analyze 
this case involving aggravating and mitigating circumstances for two reasons. One I think it’s an 
appropriate thing to do; and two, is both of your counsel and the counsel for the state have analyzed it in 
that realm, and I think they are correct in doing so . . . .”  Id. at 110.  We commend Judge Shewmaker for 
his thoughtful assessment.   
 
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We make the following observations about McDonald’s claim that the trial court relied 
upon improper aggravating factors.  Under the amended regime a trial court may impose “any 
sentence” the statute authorizes and the Constitution permits, “regardless of the presence or 
absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.”  I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(d).  
Where, as here, the trial court’s reason for imposing sentence includes a finding of aggravating 
and mitigating factors,  they must be supported by the record and consistent with what our courts 
have traditionally deemed as either aggravators or mitigators.  If the factors are not supported by 
the record or have been previously determined to be improper, then “remand for resentencing 
may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have 
imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.”  
Anglemyer, ___ N.E.2d at ___, slip op. at 10. 
 
Among the factors the trial court here found to be aggravating were: McDonald 
committed multiple crimes, McDonald participated in both the murder and the conspiracy to 
commit murder, and McDonald has a history of juvenile arrests and delinquency adjudications.  
According to McDonald each of these factors is improper.  He is wrong.  They are not.  
 
The law is settled that the fact of multiple crimes is a valid aggravating factor.  O’Connell 
v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 952 (Ind. 2001); Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ind. 2000).  
And the fact that a death has occurred as a result of a conspiracy to commit murder is also a valid 
aggravating factor.  See Smith v. State, 655 N.E.2d 532, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).  We have also 
determined that juvenile adjudications may be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence.  Haas v. 
State, 849 N.E.2d 550, 555 (Ind. 2006); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 321-23 (Ind. 2005).  The 
trial court thus committed no error. 
 
In any event, even if the trial court had erred in identifying the foregoing factors as 
aggravators, McDonald would not be entitled to remand for resentencing.  This is so because 
McDonald does not challenge the remaining aggravating factors.  And in imposing sentence the 
trial court declared, “any one of the aggravating circumstances taken alone or in conjunction with 
others substantially outweigh all of the mitigating circumstances considered as a whole.”  App. at 
 
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41.  In essence the record is clear that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence 
without regard to the challenged aggravators.   
 
Under the circumstances the sole ground upon which McDonald can successfully proceed 
in challenging the length of his sentence is that it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 
offense and character of the offender.  App. R. 7(B).  He made this claim before the Court of 
Appeals and was denied relief.  As indicated earlier we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals 
on this point.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
 
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