Title: New Jersey v. Cassidy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 2018

New Jersey v. Cassidy Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on the State’s use of the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C (Alcotest) to obtain breath samples from drivers suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. In 2008, the Supreme Court found Alcotest results admissible in drunk-driving cases to establish a defendant’s guilt or innocence for drunk driving. The Court also required that the devices be recalibrated semi-annually to help ensure accurate measurements. Defendant Eileen Cassidy pleaded guilty in municipal court to driving under the influence based solely on Alcotest results showing her blood alcohol level had exceeded the legal limit. Upon learning that the results of her test were among those called into question from the New Jersey State Police’s Alcohol Drug Testing Unit; the coordinator responsible for administering the calibrations was criminally charged, and the samples taken from some 20,000 people were procured by machines calibrated by that coordinator. Cassidy moved to withdraw her guilty plea. A special master issued a 198-page report concluding the reliability of the Alcotest had been undermined by the coordinator’s faulty calibrations. As such, the State could not carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the Alcotest was scientifically reliable. The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction to vacate Cassidy’s conviction. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Eileen Cassidy (A-58-16) (078390)Argued September 12, 2018 -- Decided November 13, 2018TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers the admissibility of breath test results produced by Alcotest machines not calibrated using a thermometer that produces temperature measurements traceable to the standards set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In 2000, the State began using the Alcotest, a product of Draeger Safety Diagnostics Inc. (Draeger), to conduct breath tests. The Alcotest machine analyzes breath samples, producing blood alcohol concentration readings used to determine whether a driver’s blood alcohol content is above the legal limit. In 2004, Dr. Thomas A. Brettell developed the current calibration protocol while he was director of the State’s Office of Forensic Sciences (OFS). In 2008, the Court found results from Alcotest machines calibrated pursuant to Dr. Brettel’s protocol sufficiently reliable to be admissible in drunk-driving cases to establish a defendant’s guilt or innocence for drunk driving. State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 65 (2008). The Court also required that the devices be recalibrated semi-annually to help ensure accurate measurements. Id. at 153. During the calibration process, simulator solutions are heated to about 34 degrees Celsius, the generally accepted temperature for human breath. It is essential that the temperature of the solution be accurate in order for the Alcotest’s blood alcohol content readings to be correct. The Alcotest’s calibration procedure requires the test coordinator to insert a thermometer that produces NIST-traceable temperature measurements into the simulator solution used to calibrate the Alcotest and confirm that the calibration unit heated the solution to a temperature within 0.2 degrees of 34 degrees Celsius. When a thermometer’s temperature measurements are “traceable” to the standard measurements of the NIST, those measurements are generally accepted as accurate by the scientific community. There are two other temperature probes used during the calibration procedure. Unlike the NIST-traceable thermometer, they are manufactured and calibrated by Draeger. Marc W. Dennis, a coordinator in the New Jersey State Police’s Alcohol Drug Testing Unit, was tasked with performing the semi-annual calibrations on Alcotest instruments used in Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean, Somerset, and Union Counties. He is charged with neglecting to take required measurements and having falsely certified that he followed the calibration procedures. Dennis was indicted in 2016 for failing to use a NIST- traceable thermometer to measure the temperature of simulator solutions used to calibrate 1 Alcotest devices. When Dennis was criminally charged, the Attorney General’s Office notified the Administrative Office of the Courts that evidential breath samples from 20,667 people were procured using Alcotest machines calibrated by Dennis. Defendant Eileen Cassidy, now deceased, pleaded guilty in municipal court to driving under the influence based solely on Alcotest results showing her blood alcohol level had exceeded the legal limit. Upon learning that the results of her test were among those called into question by Dennis’s alleged falsifications, she moved to withdraw her guilty plea. The Attorney General moved for direct certification. The Court granted the motion and remanded the case to retired Appellate Division Presiding Judge Joseph F. Lisa as Special Master to determine whether “the failure to test the simulator solutions with the NIST- traceable digital thermometer before calibrating an Alcotest machine [would] undermine or call into question the scientific reliability of breath tests subsequently performed on the Alcotest machine.” 230 N.J. 232, 232-33 (2017). After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the Special Master issued a 198-page report in which he concluded that failure to use a thermometer that produces NIST-traceable temperature readings in the calibration process undermines the reliability of the Alcotest and that the State failed to carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the Alcotest was scientifically reliable without a NIST-traceable temperature check. The Special Master’s report is appended to the Court’s opinion.HELD: The Special Master’s findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, and the Court adopts them. Breath test results produced by Alcotest machines not calibrated using a NIST-traceable thermometer are inadmissible.1. This case is justiciable despite defendant’s passing. The Court will entertain a case that has become moot when the issue is of significant public importance and is likely to recur. The reliability and admissibility of thousands of breath samples, often used as the sole evidence to support a conviction, is of significant public importance. (pp. 9-10)2. Scientific test results are admissible in a criminal trial only when the technique is shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the relevant scientific community. Chun, 194 N.J. at 91. Although the Court recently adopted the factors identified in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 593-95 (1993), and a methodology-based approach for determining scientific reliability in certain areas of civil law, the Court has not altered its adherence to the general acceptance test for reliability in criminal matters. The proponent of the technique has the burden to clearly establish general acceptance and may do so using (1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and legal writings, and (3) judicial opinions. The party proffering the evidence need not show infallibility of the technique nor unanimity of its acceptance in the scientific community. (pp. 10-11)3. Of the State’s witnesses, the Special Master found only the testimony of Dr. Brettell worthy of substantial weight; he found defendant’s expert credible. The Court defers to and adopts the Special Master’s detailed credibility findings. (p. 12) 2 4. Based on the credible testimony, the Special Master determined that accurate temperature readings of the simulator solutions are “the foundation upon which the entire calibration process is built.” The Special Master found NIST traceability “essential” to confidence in the Alcotest’s results and that the two Draeger-manufactured probes were not NIST-traceable and were insufficient substitutes for the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer. The Special Master also found it particularly significant that the NIST-traceable thermometer was the only temperature measuring device used in the calibration process that was independent from the Alcotest and not manufactured and calibrated by Draeger. The Special Master found it “extremely important and persuasive” that current protocol treats the failure to achieve an in- range temperature reading using the NIST-traceable thermometer as an event of sufficient magnitude to abort a calibration. The Special Master reasoned that such facts clearly cut against the State’s argument that the use of the thermometer is an unnecessary redundancy. Further, the Special Master rejected the State’s theory that ten simultaneous failures would need to occur for the certainty of Alcotest results to be compromised, finding instead that the evidence showed that three relatively minor errors could cause undetected miscalibrations. The Special Master determined that the State had not shown that other states’ practices revealed general acceptance of the reliability of Alcotest results without the use of a NIST- traceable thermometer. Because the Special Master’s findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, the Court adopts them. (pp. 13-17)5. Applying the general acceptance standard to the Special Master’s findings, the Court holds that the State failed to carry its burden and affirms the Special Master’s conclusion. Temperature measurements that are NIST-traceable are generally accepted as reliable by the scientific community. Part of that reliability lies in the fact that the level of uncertainty of each temperature measurement is known. The two Draeger-manufactured probes fail to meet the NIST’s standards and the measure of uncertainty in their temperature readings is unknown. The Court does not accept the State’s contention that the risk of miscalibration is infinitesimal due to the numerous other fail-safes in the calibration procedure. As Dr. Brettell testified, it was that very fear of a laboratory bias that led him to include the NIST- traceable thermometer in the calibration procedure. (pp. 18-19)6. The Court orders the State to notify all affected defendants of its decision that breath test results produced by Alcotest machines not calibrated using a NIST-traceable thermometer are inadmissible and commends to the State that it require the manual recording of the NIST- traceable readings going forward. Further, the Court lifts the stay on all pending cases so that deliberations may commence on whether and how those cases should proceed. For those cases already decided, affected defendants may now seek appropriate relief. Because the State waited approximately a year to notify the affected defendants, the Court relaxes the five-year time bar, R. 7:10-2(b)(2), in the interests of justice. The Court asks the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to monitor these cases and recommend how best to administer them in the event any special measures are needed. Finally, as to defendant Cassidy, the Court exercises its original jurisdiction and vacates her conviction. (pp. 19-20)CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 58 September Term 2016 078390 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eileen Cassidy, Defendant-Respondent. On appeal from the Spring Lake Municipal Court, Monmouth County. Remanded Special Master Report April 7, 2017 May 4, 2018 Argued Decided September 12, 2018 November 13, 2018Robyn B. Mitchell, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt and Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorneys General, of counsel and on the briefs).Michael R. Hobbie argued the cause for respondent (Hobbie, Corrigan & Bertucio, attorneys; Michael R. Hobbie and Elyse S. Schindel, of counsel and on the briefs). 1 Jeffrey E. Gold argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; John E. Keefe, Jr., President, of counsel and on the brief, and Jeffrey E. Gold, Arnold N. Fishman, and Miles S. Winder III, on the briefs). Matthew W. Reisig, participating attorney (Reisig Criminal Defense & DWI Law, attorneys; Matthew W. Reisig, of counsel and on the briefs, and Jeffrey Zajac, on the briefs). John Menzel, participating attorney (John Menzel, J.D., on the briefs). Evan M. Levow, participating attorney, submitted a brief (Levow DWI Law, attorneys). JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. The case before us concerns New Jersey law enforcement’s use of theAlcotest 7110 MKIII-C (Alcotest) to obtain breath samples from driverssuspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. The Alcotest machineanalyzes breath samples, producing blood alcohol concentration readings usedto determine whether a driver’s blood alcohol content is above the legal limit.In 2008, we found Alcotest results admissible in drunk-driving cases toestablish a defendant’s guilt or innocence for drunk driving. State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 65 (2008). We also required that the devices be recalibrated semi-annually to help ensure accurate measurements. Id. at 153. 2 Confidence in the reliability of instruments of technology used asevidence is of paramount importance. Unfortunately, alleged human failingshave cast doubt on the calibration process. Marc W. Dennis, a coordinator inthe New Jersey State Police’s Alcohol Drug Testing Unit, was tasked withperforming the semi-annual calibrations on Alcotest instruments used inMiddlesex, Monmouth, Ocean, Somerset, and Union Counties. He is chargedwith neglecting to take required measurements and having falsely certified thathe followed the calibration procedures. Dennis was indicted in 2016 forfailing to use a thermometer that produces temperature measurements traceableto the standards set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST) to measure the temperature of simulator solutions used to calibrateAlcotest devices. When Dennis was criminally charged, the AttorneyGeneral’s Office notified the Administrative Office of the Courts thatevidential breath samples from 20,667 people were procured using Alcotestmachines calibrated by Dennis. Defendant Eileen Cassidy, now deceased, pleaded guilty in municipalcourt to driving under the influence based solely on Alcotest results showingher blood alcohol level had exceeded the legal limit. Upon learning that theresults of her test were among those called into question by Dennis’s allegedfalsifications, she moved to withdraw her guilty plea. The Attorney General 3 moved for direct certification. We granted the motion because the centralissue of this case is typical to the large number of defendants affected byDennis’s alleged misconduct. We remanded the case to retired AppellateDivision Presiding Judge Joseph F. Lisa as Special Master to determinewhether “the failure to test the simulator solutions with the NIST-traceabledigital thermometer before calibrating an Alcotest machine [would] undermineor call into question the scientific reliability of breath tests subsequentlyperformed on the Alcotest machine.” 230 N.J. 232, 232-33 (2017). On May 4, 2018, after an extensive evidentiary hearing, the SpecialMaster issued a 198-page report in which he concluded that failure to use athermometer that produces NIST-traceable temperature readings in thecalibration process undermines the reliability of the Alcotest. We now adoptthe Special Master’s findings because they are supported by substantialcredible evidence in the record, see Chun, 194 N.J. at 93, and we append hisreport to this opinion. I. We briefly highlight the following facts from the record and commend areview of the Special Master’s comprehensive report for the finer details. Werely heavily on the Special Master’s report. 4 In 2000, the State began using the Alcotest, a product of Draeger SafetyDiagnostics Inc. (Draeger), to conduct breath tests. In 2004, Dr. Thomas A.Brettell developed the current calibration protocol while he was director of theState’s Office of Forensic Sciences (OFS), and we deemed the Alcotestsufficiently reliable as calibrated pursuant to Dr. Brettell’s protocol. Chun, 194 N.J. at 148. As this Court ordered in Chun, N.J.A.C. 13:51-4.3(a) requiresthe semi-annual calibration of approved instruments used to test the alcoholcontent of breath samples. Id. at 153. The regulation, however, does notspecify a calibration procedure. During the calibration process, simulator solutions containing varyingconcentrations of ethanol are used to calibrate the Alcotest and confirm theaccuracy of its blood alcohol content readings. The simulator solutions arepoured into calibration units, which are glass containers that house a heatingcomponent. The calibration units heat the solutions to about 34 degreesCelsius, the generally accepted temperature for human breath, creating avapor. The vapor is a proxy for human breath. It is essential that thetemperature of the solution be accurate in order for the Alcotest’s bloodalcohol content readings to be correct. The Alcotest’s calibration procedurerequires the test coordinator to insert a thermometer that produces NIST-traceable temperature measurements into the simulator solution used to 5 calibrate the Alcotest and confirm that the calibration unit heated the solutionto a temperature within 0.2 degrees of 34 degrees Celsius. The NIST is thefederal agency responsible for maintaining and promoting consistent units ofmeasurement. When a thermometer’s temperature measurements are“traceable” to the standard measurements of the NIST, those measurements aregenerally accepted as accurate by the scientific community. There are two other temperature probes used during the calibrationprocedure. Unlike the NIST-traceable thermometer, both of those probes aremanufactured and calibrated by Draeger. The first is the “black key probe,”which plugs into the Alcotest device and allows the coordinator to access thecalibration function. That probe is used to measure each simulator solution’stemperature during a series of control tests. The second is the “agency’sprobe,” which also plugs into the Alcotest and is used to measure thetemperature of the simulator solution used in the final test to confirm that theAlcotest was calibrated correctly. After the Special Master observed State Trooper David Klimikdemonstrate an Alcotest calibration for him and heard testimony from fiveexpert witnesses, including Dr. Brettell, the Special Master issued his report.In it the Special Master found the State failed to carry its burden of proving byclear and convincing evidence that the Alcotest was scientifically reliable 6 without a NIST-traceable temperature check. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 197-98).The Special Master stated the record “raise[d] substantial doubts about thescientific reliability of breath test results produced by Alcotest devicescalibrated without the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer.” Infra at ___(slip op. at 185). He rejected the State’s contention that the Alcotest itselfcontains so many redundancies and fail-safes that the use of a NIST-traceablethermometer is merely a supplementary check above and beyond the thresholdof sufficient reliability. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 189-90). The Special Masterdetermined that, without the NIST-traceable temperature measurement, the riskof undetected miscalibrations was “reasonably plausible” and would lead to“some number of undetected miscalibrations” among the roughly 1200 testsperformed annually. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 194-96). II. A. The State challenges the Special Master’s findings, asserting that it metits burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the Alcotestis generally accepted as reliable even when a NIST-traceable thermometer isnot used in the calibration process. The State points to the testimony of Dr.Brettell that the black key probe and agency’s probe are so comprehensive thatthe reliability of breath test results will not be reduced without the use of a 7 NIST-traceable thermometer. It also highlights the fact that no other stateusing the Alcotest requires the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer in thecalibration process. The State urges us to find that the Special Master held itto a standard far exceeding its evidentiary burden. The State further asks this Court to reject the Special Master’s findingsthat the black key and agency’s probes’ temperature readings are not NIST-traceable, arguing that question was not within the scope of the remand. B. Defendant asks us to adopt the Special Master’s findings and contendsthe use of a NIST-traceable thermometer is essential because miscalibrationsleading to inaccurate breath test readings could otherwise occur. Defendantstresses that the black key and agency’s temperature probes do not produceNIST-traceable temperature readings and the use of an independentthermometer is the only way to verify the solutions’ temperatures during thecalibration process. C. Amicus curiae the New Jersey State Bar Association agrees with theSpecial Master’s findings and conclusions. It asserts that the fundamentalproblem with skipping the NIST-traceable measurement is not that itintroduces uncertainty, but that it introduces an unquantifiable amount of 8 uncertainty. In the State Bar Association’s view, the Special Master affirmedthis Court’s assumption in Chun that NIST-traceable temperaturemeasurements are integral to the reliability of the Alcotest. D. Participating attorney John Menzel, who represented the respondents inChun, asks us to adopt the Special Master’s findings, but notes the SpecialMaster applied a more general clear and convincing evidence standard ratherthan the stricter general acceptance standard. III. As a preliminary matter, we hold this case is justiciable despitedefendant’s passing. As this Court explained in State v. Gartland, we “willentertain a case that has become moot when the issue is of significant publicimportance and is likely to recur.” 149 N.J. 456, 464 (1997). We granted the State’s application for direct certification from themunicipal court because of the far-reaching implications of this case. Thepivotal issue is whether the Alcotest is sufficiently reliable absent the use of aNIST-traceable thermometer in its calibration. Defendant’s case is emblematicof each case, pending or closed, in which the State used or seeks to use one ofthe 20,667 breath samples called into question by Dennis’s allegedmisconduct. The reliability -- and, consequently the admissibility, see 9 Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 80 (1984) -- of thousands of breathsamples, often used as the sole evidence to support a conviction, is undeniablyof significant public importance. IV. Generally, the Court will defer to a special master’s credibility findingsregarding the testimony of expert witnesses, but we owe no deference to aspecial master’s legal conclusions. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 247(2011). The Court also accepts the fact findings of a special master to theextent they are supported by “substantial credible evidence in the record.”Chun, 194 N.J. at 93. A. Scientific test results are admissible in a criminal trial only when thetechnique is shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the relevantscientific community. Id. at 91. The general acceptance standard is commonlyknown as the Frye standard. See State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 280 (2018). Although this Court recently adopted the factors identified in Daubert v.Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 593-95 (1993), and amethodology-based approach for determining scientific reliability in certainareas of civil law, we have not altered our adherence to the general acceptance 10 test for reliability in criminal matters. In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340,398-99 (2018); J.L.G., 234 N.J. at 280. “Proof of general acceptance within a scientific community can beelusive,” and “[s]atisfying the test involves more than simply counting howmany scientists accept the reliability of the proffered [technique].” State v.Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 171 (1997). General acceptance “entails the strictapplication of the scientific method, which requires an extraordinarily highlevel of proof based on prolonged, controlled, consistent, and validatedexperience.” Ibid. (quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 125 N.J. 421,436 (1991)). The proponent of the technique has the burden to “clearlyestablish” general acceptance, State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 171 (1964), andmay do so using “(1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and legal writings, and (3)judicial opinions,” State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 521 (1982) (quoting Paul C.Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. UnitedStates, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1215 (1980)). To be clear, the party proffering the evidence need not show infallibilityof the technique nor unanimity of its acceptance in the scientific community.Chun, 194 N.J. at 91-92; Harvey, 151 N.J. at 171; Johnson, 42 N.J. at 171. 11 B. The State had the burden to clearly establish that the Alcotest issufficiently reliable under the general acceptance standard without the use of aNIST-traceable thermometer in the calibration process. The State contends itcarried that burden by showing the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer isunnecessary to ensure the accuracy of the temperature of the simulator solutionused to calibrate the Alcotest. According to the State, the temperature of thesolutions can be indirectly verified by the two Draeger-manufactured probes,which were themselves checked against NIST-traceable temperaturemeasurements at the time they were calibrated. We disagree. We begin with a brief review of the Special Master’s credibilitydeterminations. The State proffered four witnesses in addition to TrooperKlimik, who demonstrated and answered questions about the calibrationprocess. Of those four witnesses, the Special Master found only the testimonyof Dr. Brettell, who “was qualified in this proceeding to render expert opinionsin the fields of forensic chemistry, forensic toxicology, scientific measuring,and breath testing,” worthy of substantial weight. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 53-55). As for defendant’s expert, Dr. Andreas Stolz, the Special Master foundhim credible. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 78). We defer to and adopt the SpecialMaster’s detailed credibility findings. See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 247. 12 Based on the credible testimony, the Special Master determined thataccurate temperature readings of the simulator solutions are “the foundationupon which the entire calibration process is built.” Infra at ___ (slip op. at190). The Special Master found NIST traceability “essential” to confidence inthe Alcotest’s results. Ibid. And, after considering the NIST’s standards fortraceability, the Special Master found that the black key and agency’s probeswere not NIST-traceable and were insufficient substitutes for the use of aNIST-traceable thermometer. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 187-88). Dr. Stolz testified that accurate temperature readings of the simulatorsolutions were critical to the accuracy of the Alcotest. He opined that if thetemperature of the simulator solution was off by a single degree, and that errorwent undetected, the Alcotest’s blood alcohol measurements would be off byseven percent. That is, a breath sample with an actual alcohol concentration of.075%, could be read as .082%. Clearly, the accuracy of the temperature ofthe simulator solutions used to calibrate the Alcotest is critically important tothe fidelity of its readings. The Special Master reproduced the standards for NIST-traceability in hisreport and detailed Draeger’s process for calibrating the black key andagency’s temperature probes. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 87-99). The SpecialMaster’s detailed description of that process need not be reprinted here; it is 13 sufficient to note that Draeger’s process does not meet the NIST’s standardsfor an unbroken chain of measurement comparisons or for estimating theoverall degree of uncertainty of the comparison measurements. The SpecialMaster concluded the black key and agency’s temperature probes are notNIST-traceable. The Special Master’s findings that the probes are not NIST-traceable did not exceed the scope of the remand and are supported bysubstantial credible evidence in the record. We see no reason to question theSpecial Master’s determination. As the Special Master observed, the Draeger temperature probes do notproduce NIST-traceable measurements, in part, because the level ofuncertainty in those measurements is unknown. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 96).Both Dr. Brettell and Dr. Stolz acknowledged there is some amount ofuncertainty in every temperature measurement. Dr. Stolz explained that it isnot such uncertainty itself that is problematic; rather, for a measurement to bescientifically reliable, the amount of uncertainty must be known so the errorrate of a given temperature measurement can be determined. Dr. Stolztestified that it is not knowing the level of uncertainty in a given measurementthat makes the measurement scientifically unreliable. Dr. Brettell likewise stressed the importance of NIST-traceablemeasurements. He acknowledged the scientific reliability of the Alcotest was 14 reduced absent the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer. He agreed with Dr.Stolz that, without the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer, there was anunquantifiable amount of uncertainty in the Alcotest’s measurements. Dr.Brettell conceded: “Collectively, [the steps in the calibration process] arerequirements that would be necessary for calibrating the instrument . . . .” TheSpecial Master asked: “To ensure scientific reliability?” Dr. Brettellanswered: “Yes.” The Special Master also found it particularly significant that the NIST-traceable thermometer was the only temperature measuring device used in thecalibration process that was independent from the Alcotest and notmanufactured and calibrated by Draeger. See infra at ___ (slip op. at 125-41,180, 190-91). Dr. Stolz explained that if Draeger accidently used the wrongtemperature in calibrating the calibration units and the probes, then thetemperature variance would go undetected and the Alcotest’s readings wouldbe factually inaccurate. Dr. Brettell testified he included the use of a NIST-traceablethermometer to independently verify the temperature of the solutions in lightof the legal significance of the Alcotest. He explained that if you put everything into Draeger’s hands as far as certifying the solutions, the instrument, the calibrating unit and everything else, what if -- what if there is a 15 bias or an error in Draeger’s laboratory? What impact would that have on the breath test program in New Jersey? And so as far as the risk assessment, I took every step I could to independently test as much as I could of this program independently of Draeger to make sure that if that happened, we have a good chance of stopping it before it proliferated out. The Special Master found it “extremely important and persuasive” thatcurrent protocol treats the failure to achieve an in-range temperature readingusing the NIST-traceable thermometer as an event of sufficient magnitude toabort a calibration. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 187). The Special Master reasonedthat such facts clearly cut against the State’s argument that the use of thethermometer is an unnecessary redundancy. Infra at ___ (slip op. at 189-90). Further, the Special Master rejected the State’s theory that tensimultaneous failures would need to occur for the certainty of Alcotest resultsto be compromised, finding instead that the evidence showed that threerelatively minor errors could cause undetected miscalibrations. Infra at ___(slip op. at 130, 183). Though the Special Master found that it would not becommon for the three errors to occur simultaneously, he found that they were“plausible, evidence-based occurrences.” Infra at ___ (slip op. at 183-84).The Special Master’s main concern was that miscalibrations could goundetected without the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer and the State had“failed to quantify the magnitude of the reduced scientific reliability” of the 16 calibration process when no NIST-traceable device is used. Infra at ___ (slipop. at 184). The State disputed the need for the use of a NIST-traceablethermometer, noting that New Jersey is the only jurisdiction using the Alcotestthat mandates the thermometer’s use in the calibration process. The SpecialMaster rejected that claim because “uncontroverted evidence established thatthe instrument was highly customized for each jurisdiction.” Infra at ___ (slipop. at 162-63). That customization complicates comparative analysis of thestates’ processes because not enough states use the Alcotest to establishgeneral acceptance and because, even among those states that do use theAlcotest, New Jersey “was possibly the most substantial user of theinstrument.” Infra at ___ (slip op. at 169-70). The Special Master determinedthat the State had not shown New Jersey to be an outlier or that other states’practices revealed general acceptance of the reliability of Alcotest resultswithout the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer. Infra at ___ (slip op. at170). We owe a great debt to the Special Master for his diligence andinsightfulness so evident in his extensive and thorough report. Because hisfindings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, we adoptthem. 17 Applying the general acceptance standard to the Special Master’sfindings, we hold the State failed to carry its burden and affirm the SpecialMaster’s conclusion. Contrary to the State’s contentions that the Special Master held it to astandard of infallibility, we find he did not. The State’s argument that theaccuracy of the simulator solutions’ temperatures can be indirectly verifiedusing the black key and agency’s probe cannot overcome the fact that thetemperature measurements of those probes are not NIST-traceable. Simplyput, temperature measurements that are NIST-traceable are generally acceptedas reliable by the scientific community. Part of that reliability lies in the factthat the level of uncertainty of each temperature measurement is known.Because the probes fail to meet the NIST’s standards for traceability and themeasure of uncertainty in their temperature readings is unknown, the scientificreliability of the probes’ temperature measurements are left in doubt. We do not accept the State’s contention that the risk of miscalibration isinfinitesimal due to the numerous other fail-safes in the calibration procedure.It is improbable such a showing could satisfy the general acceptance standardbecause the temperature probes used in the calibration process would still havean unknown level of measurement uncertainty and would not be traceable tothe national standards. But assuming such a showing could satisfy the State’s 18 burden, the State failed to demonstrate why we should reject the SpecialMaster’s findings, specifically his concern that a laboratory error or aconfluence of multiple minor errors could lead to undetected miscalibrations.Dr. Stolz and Dr. Brettell testified that they were concerned Draeger, whichcalibrates the other temperature probes used in the calibration procedure, couldaccidentally miscalibrate all the probes due to a laboratory mistake. In fact, asDr. Brettell testified, it was that very fear of a laboratory bias that led him toinclude the NIST-traceable thermometer in the calibration procedure. V. We order the State to notify all affected defendants of our decision thatbreath test results produced by Alcotest machines not calibrated using a NIST-traceable thermometer are inadmissible, so that they may take appropriateaction. We further commend to the State that it require the manual recordingof the NIST-traceable readings going forward as a check against negligentperformances of this integral human test. Further, we lift the stay on all pending cases so that deliberations maycommence on whether and how those cases should proceed. For those casesalready decided, affected defendants may now seek appropriate relief.Because the State waited approximately a year to notify the affecteddefendants, we relax the five-year time bar, R. 7:10-2(b)(2), in the interests of 19 justice. We ask the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts tomonitor these cases and recommend how best to administer them in the eventany special measures are needed. Finally, as to defendant Cassidy, weexercise our original jurisdiction and vacate her conviction. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 20 APPENDIX SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY M-2 4 4 / 2 4 5 / 2 4 6 September Term 2 0 1 6 078 3 9 0STATE OF NEW JERSEY , Plainti f f -Movant , v.EILEEN CAS S I DY , Defendant-Respondent . REPORT OF FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF REMAND COURT On remand from the Supreme Court of New Jersey : April 7 , 2 0 1 7 Findings and Conc lusions Submitted to Supreme Court : May 4 , 2 0 1 8 Robert H . C zepie l , Jr . , Supervis ing Deputy Attorney General , Robyn B . Mitchel l , Deputy Attorney General , Jamie A . Gallaghe r , Deputy Attorney General , appeared on behalf of plaint i f f -movant State of New Jersey ( Gurbir S . Grewal , Attorney General , attorney ) . Michael R . Hobbie and Elyse s. Schinde l appeared on behalf of defendant-respondent E i leen Cass idy ( Hobbie , Corrigan & Bertucc io , attorneys ) . Sharon A. Balsamo ( New Jersey State Bar Association ) , Arnold N. F i s hman ( Fi s hman & F i shman ) , Miles S . Winde r , I I I ( Carl Taylor Law , LLC ) , Jeffrey E. Gold and Zachary I. Hashmi ( Gold & Hashmi , P . C . , ) appeared on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association . Matthew w. Riesig appeared as a Participating Attorney . John Men z e l appeared as a Participating Attorney . Samuel Louis Sachs appeared as a Participating Attorney . 1LISA, P . J . A . D . ( retired and temporarily a s s igned on reca l l ) , SPEC IAL MASTER TABLE OF CONTENTS I• INTRODUCTION p.4 II . BACKGROUND p.6 A. Legal and factual background o f breath testing in New Jersey p.6 B. State v . background and procedural history p.21 c. The c a l ibration check proc e s s p.31 III . WITNESSES : QUALIFICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY p . 50 A. State's witne s s e s p . 50 1. Trooper David Klimik p. 50 2• Dr . Thomas A . Bret tel l p.51 3. Brian Shaffer p . 55 4. Dr . Howard J . Baum p. 61 5. Dr . Ali M . Alaouie p . 71 Due to health i s sues , Mr . Sachs only appeared in the initial stages of the remand proceeding . 2 B. Defense witness p . 76 1. Dr . Andreas Sto l z p . 76 IV . DISCUSS ION p . 78 A. Burden o f proof and pos itions o f the parties p . 78 B. NI ST-traceability p . 82 c. Importance of NIST-traceable thermometer step p. 108 D. Undetected miscalibrations p . 114 E. Discus s ion of Baum and Alaouie opinions p . 14 1 F. Discu s s ion of Brette l l opinions p . 154 G. Other states p . 162 H. Conforming product s lis t p . 170 v. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW p . 175 A. Findings o f f act p . 175 B. Conc lus ions of law p . 185APPENDIX I - Order Appointing Special MasterAPPENDIX II - Exhibit ListAPPENDIX I I I - Transcript ListAPPENDIX IV - Stipulations of Fact 3 I. INTRODUCTION This report deals with the scientific re liability of breathtest readings used for evidential purposes in DWI c a s e s . Formany years , such readings have been admis sible in evidence onlyif the State proves , among other things , that the breath tes tingdevice which produced the reading was in good working order .That proof is accomplished, in large part , by the production ofa certification by a State Police coordinator who performed themost recent c alibration of the breath testing device . Suchc alibrations are required at intervals not to exceed six months ,and the coordinator ' s certification must attest to the fact thata l l steps in the calibration proc e s s were performed acc ording tothe authori zed procedure . The breath testing device presently in use in New Jersey isthe Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MKI I I -C ( the Alcotest , the 7 1 1 0 , or theinstrument ) . One of the mandatory steps in the authorizedcalibration procedure requires coordinators to measure thetemperature of the simu lator solutions used in the calibrationproc e s s with a thermome ter that produces temperaturemeasurements traceable to the National Ins titute of Standardsand Technology ( NIST ) . I f the NI ST-traceable thermometer doesnot produce temperature readings for a l l simulator s olutions 4 that are within the required range , the coordinator is notpermitted to proceed further with the c a l ibration proce s s . The State a l leges that one coordinator failed to performthis step in c a l ibrating three Alcotest 7 1 1 0 instruments , but hesi gned certi f i c ations falsely attesting that he performed a l lrequired steps , including u s e of the NI ST-traceable thermometer .The State determined that over 2 0 , 0 0 0 evidential breath sampleswere taken using breath testing devices cal ibrated by thatcoordinator over the course of several years . The State made an app l ication directly to the SupremeCourt , elaborating on the information discussed above andasserting that fai lure to perform the NI ST-traceable thermometerstep would not undermine or c a l l into ques t ion the scientificrel iab i l ity of breath test results from those devices ,notwithstanding that the step is mandatory and legally requiredas a prerequisite to admi s s ion in evidence of breath testresults . Because of the mu ltitude of c a s e s potentiallyaf fected , a l l of wh ich would contain a common i s sue , the St ateasked the Court to appoint a Special Master to deal with thatis sue i n a s ingle proceeding . The Court granted the State ' s request and is sued an orderon Apr i l 7 , 2 0 1 7 appointing me as the Spe c i a l Maste r , directingthat I conduct an evidentiary hearing and , after hearing the 5 arguments of the partie s , make findings of fact and conclus ionsof law to be submitted in a written report upon the fol lowingquestion : Does the fai lure to test the s imulator solutions with the NIST-traceable digital thermometer before c a librating an Alcotest machine undermine or c a l l into question the scientific re liabi l ity of breath tests subsequently performed on the Alcotest machine? [ Appendix I . ] For the reasons set forth in this report , I answer thatquestion in the a f f irmative . II . BACKGROUND A. and factual of breath in New For over f ifty years , the results of evidentiarybreath-testing ins truments have been used to estab lis h the bloodalcohol concentration ( BAC ) of individuals who have operatedmotor vehic les in viol ation of N . J . S . A . 3 9 : 4 - 5 0 . State v . 6 4 N . J . Super . 2 6 2 , 2 6 8 ( App . Div . 1 9 6 0 ) ( holding that" [ t] he Drunkometer is suff ic iently established and accepted as ascientifically rel iable and accurate device for determining thealcoholic content of the blood to admit tes timony of the readingobtained upon a properly conducted test" ) . Breath testing "hasthe advantage" over blood testing "of prompt and easy 6 administration by non-medic al ly trained personne l and withrelatively inexpensive equipment . " State v . 42 N.J. 146, 170 ( 1964 ) ( referencing the drunkometer , the alcometer , thebreathalyzer , the drunkote ster and the intoximeter and notingthat " [ a] l l are now generally s c ientifically recognized assufficiently rel iable '' ) . Proof that the breath-testing instrument used was in goodworking order has always been a key foundational requirement ofadmi s s ibil ity . Mi l ler , 6 4 N . J . Super . at 270( setting as ide conviction for lack of foundational proof andholding that " [ a] s a minimum . . . the State should prove( unless such proof is waive d ) that the operator was qua lified ,that the machine and its components were in proper conditio n ,and that the test was properly administered" ) . In theSupreme Court cautioned : It is , of cours e , most es s ential , in view of the heavy impact the result can have , that proper adminis tration of the te s t be c learly e s tablished before the reading i s admitted in evidenc e . This includes full that the was in order , the operator qua l i f ied and the test given correct ly . 4 2 N . J . at 1 7 1 ( emphas is added ) . ] I n 1 9 8 4 , the Supreme Court rej ected an argument thatcertain bre athalyzer mode l s were insuf ficiently rel iable due topotent i a l radio frequency interference ( rf i ) affecting breath 7 test result s . Romano v . 96 N . J . 66, 72 ( 19 8 4 ) . TheRomano Court held that breathalyzers continued to be" s c ientif ica lly reliable and accurate devices for determiningthe concentration of blood a lcoho l " and that " [ s] uch s c ientificreliab i lity shall be the sub j ect of j udicial not ice in the tri alof a l l c a s e s under N . J . S . A . 3 9 : 4-50 . " Ibid . The Courtexplained that breathalyzer test results were admi s s ib l e wherethe State e s t abli shed that "(l) the equipment was in properorder - that it was periodi c a l ly inspected in accordance withaccepted procedures; ( 2 ) the operator was qua l i f ied toadminister the instrument - that thes e qual ifications as abreathalyzer operator were properly cert ified ; and ( 3 ) the testwas given correctly - that it was administered in accordancewith the official instructions for the use of the instrument . "I d . at 8 1 . The State bore the burden o f estab l i shing theseconditions of admi s s ibility by c lear and convincing evidenc e .I d . at 8 9 - 9 1 . The Romano Court noted that , " under the most unusualcircumstanc e s , which are h i ghly unlikely to occur , " rfi couldinterfere with breath test results , but it held that variousprocedures and prec autions , inc luding continuing "the currentpractice of banning hand-held transmitters from any are a in 8 close proximity to the breathalyzer ins trument , " sufficientlysafeguarded against rfi . I d . at 7 2 -7 3 , 8 3- 8 3 . The Court r e j ected another cha l l enge to the sc ientificreliab i l ity of the breathalyzer in State v . 117 N . J . 450( 1990 ) . There , the defendants as s erted that "because peoplehave broadly divergent ratios of breath alcohol relative toblood a lcoho l , the 2 1 0 0 : 1 partition ratio" used by thebreathalyzer was inaccurate and rendered its test resultsscienti f ica lly unre l iable . Id . at 4 5 1- 5 2 . The Court rej ectedthis argument and found that "breathalyzer testing is apractical and reasonably accurate way o f f u l f i l l ing theLeg i s l ature's intent to punish drunk drivers . " I d . at 4 5 2 . For decade s , New Jersey used breathalyzer instrument s , butthose devices would eventually "become technologic a l ly outdated ,with the result that replacement parts are no longer avai l ableand the machines themse lves , when they f a i l , cannot be repairedor replaced with l ike e quipment . " State v . 194 N . J . 5 4 ,64 ( 2008 ) . "Faced with an increas ingly dif ficult s ituation , theAttorney General ' s office began to cons ider alternate devices touse for breath-testing purpos es . '' Ibid . To replace the breathalyzer , the Attorney General's officeselected the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 . Ibid . The Alcotest i s a breath­testing instrument , manufactured and marketed by Draeger Safety 9 Diagnostics Inc . ( Draeger ) . The Alcot es t was approved as amethod o f chemic al breath tes ting by the Attorney Generalpursuant to N . J . A . C . 1 3 : 5 1-3 . 5 and was f irst uti l i zed in NewJersey in December 2 0 0 0 as part of a year-long pi lot pro j ect inPenns auken , Camden County . See State v . 3 7 0 N . J . Super . 3 4 1 , 3 4 5 ( Law Div . 2 0 0 3 ) . The scientific reliability of the Alcotest was addressed bythe Law Division j udge in fol lowing an appl ication by theC amden County Prosecutor for a consol idated j oint proof hearingas to numerous cases pending in Pennsauken . Ibid . On December1 2 , 2 0 0 3 , the court found that " [ t] he reportable readingsproduced by the 7 1 1 0 within the establi shed tolerances ares c ient if ic a l ly accurate and reliable and therefore will beadmitted into evidence without the need for expert testimony , "with the qua l ification that " no person who delivers a breaths ample of at least . 5 l iters may be charged with refusal . " Id.at 359 . The court focused primarily on ( 1 ) the " infrared( IR ) absorption ana l ysis and elect rochemical ( E C ) celltechnology analys i s " used by the instrument to measure ethanolin a breath s ample , and ( 2 ) the " breath testing sequenc e " usedby the police when administering a breath test to an individualsubj ect . The court did not discuss the proc e s s involvedin p l ac ing an instrument into service or performing periodic 10 c a l ibration check s , and it is not c lear whether any informationon this i s sue was presented to the court . Fol lowing the dec i s ion , the Alcotest instrument wasutili zed county-wide in Middl es ex County and in s omemunicipalities in other countie s , and Draeger created revisedfi rmware' for use in the instrument . Chun , 1 9 4 N . J. at 6 6 . Whentwenty defendants charged in various Middlesex Countymunic ipalities with driving whi l e intoxicated challenged theadmi s s ib i l ity of the Alcote s t results in their respectiveproceedings , ( 1 ) the Law Division cons o l idated the matters anddenied the State's motion to recogni ze as bindingauthority , ( 2 ) the Appe llate Divis ion granted the State's motionfor leave to appe a l , and ( 3 ) the Supreme Court certified thepending appeal pursuant to Rule 2 : 1 2 - 1 . I d . at 6 7 . By order dated December 1 4 , 2 0 0 5 , the Supreme Courtremanded the Chun matter to a Special Maste r , retired Appe l lateDivision Presiding Judge Michael Patrick King , to conduct aplenary hearing on the rel iabil ity of Alcotest breathinstruments . Ibid . Judge King heard testimony over the courseof four months and , on February 1 3 , 2 0 0 7 , i s s ued a report Brian Shaffer , a technic a l specialist at Draeger , testified that " f irmware " is " s oftware that is employed to run on a specific hardware " a s opposed to "many d i f f e rent types of hardware " ( 9T 5 8 ) . 11 concluding that the Alcotest i s generally s c ient i f ical l yreliab l e , but recommending that several changes be incorporated( King SMR) . 3 I d . at 6 9 . F o l lowing a remand and additionalhearings to addr e ss f irmware-re l ated evidence that was notbefore the Spec i a l Master in the original hearings , Judge Kingi s sued a supplemental report on November 8 , 2 0 0 7 , making somefurther recommendations but concluding that the additionalevidence presented did not a lter his f inding that the Alcotestis scienti f i ca lly reliable ( King SMR I I ) . I d . at 70 . Thefirmware being u t i l i zed at the time of the Chun dec i s ion was"New Jersey Firmware version 3 . 1 1 . " I d . at 8 2 . That samefirmware ve rs ion i s being u t i l i zed today ( 1 0 T 1 2 9 ) . ' Judge King ' s initial report can be found at State v . 2 0 0 7 N . J . LEXIS 3 9 ( Feb . 1 3 , 2 0 07 ) ; however , the pagination of the onl ine version differs from the original report . The c ites herein are to the origina l . Pb = State ' s Proposed F indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Db = Defendant ' s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conc lus ions of Law Rb = Re i s ig ' s letter j o ining defendant's f i l ing Ab = New Jersey Bar Association ' s Proposed F indings of Fact and Conc lusions of Law Mb = Menzel's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conc lus ions of Law lT = transcript of July 1 3 , 2 0 17 conference 2 T = transcript of August 1 7 , 2 0 1 7 conference 3 T = transcr ipt of September 1 9 , 2 0 17 conference 4 T = transcr ipt of October 1 2 , 2 0 17 conference ST = transcript of November 2 , 2 0 1 7 conference 6 T = transcript of December 1 4 , 2 0 17 demons tration 7T = transcript of January 3 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 12 On March 1 7 , 2 0 0 8 , adopting most but not a l l of JudgeKing's recommendations , the Supreme Court held , "We have nodoubt that the device , with the safeguards we have required , i ssuffic iently s c ientifically rel iable that its reports may beadmitted in evidence . " I d . at 1 4 8 . The dispute in Chun centered primarily on the defenseposit ion that the sc ientific theory behind a l l breath testresults was f lawe d , so the Alcotest could not accuratelydetermine BAC even if functioning properly ( King SMR at 2 0 4-0 5; 2 1 3 - 2 2 ) . In additio n , the defendants raised concerns thatthe source code underlying the Alcotest firmware wasunne c e s s ar ily comp lex , contained numerous errors , and had not ST = transcript of January 5 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 9T = transcript of January 8 , 2 0 1 8 hearing lOT = transcript of January 9 , 2 0 1 8 hearing l lT = transcript of January 1 0 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 12T = transcript of January 1 1 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 13T = transcript of January 1 6 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 14T = transcript of January 1 7 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 15T = transcript of January 1 8 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 16T = transcript of January 2 2 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 17T = transcript of January 2 4 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 18T = transcript of January 3 0 , 2 0 1 8 hearing 19T = transcript of March 2 2 , 2 0 1 8 oral argument 13 been developed in accordance with any recogni zed standards ( KingSMR II at 3 6 - 5 2 ) . Evidence regarding the proc es s central to the currentdispute , namely the semi-annual calibration check proc e s s , waspresented to Judge King during the Chun hearings , but it was notlitigated in detail and the defe ndants did not dispute thesufficiency of that process as described by State witne s s e s . 'Dr . Thomas A . Brette l l , Director of the O f f i c e of ForensicSciences for the New Jersey State Police ( OF S ) from 2 0 0 1 toMarch 2 0 0 7 , testified i n the Chun hearings that he was involvedin selecting the Alcotest device over other devices , and he "setup the policies and procedures on the inst rument" 34T14-3 4T 1 6 ; 3 6T 6 9 ; 3 6 T 7 6 ; 4 1T 6 0 ; 5 2 T4 2 ) . 6 H e testi fied that his"recommendations for the cal ibration testing and checkingl inearity , that ' s a l l part of the qual ity control program" ( Chun4 4T 8 1 ) . No written cal ibration che c k procedure was made part of therecord in Chun , although Brett e l l testified generally about the5 Because the cal ibration check procedures are at the center of the i s sue before me , spec i f i c a l ly whether s kipping a step in those procedures undermines or c a l l s into question the scientific rel iabil ity of l ater breath t es t s per formed on the instrument , a detailed descript ion of those procedures i s included i n Section I I ( C ) .' "Chun" transcript cites refer to the transcripts l isted in Appendix A to the King SMR . 14 procedure and Kevin M . Flanagan , a Sergeant with the New JerseyState Police ( NJSP ) who trained and supervised the coordinatorsat the time of the Chun hearings , testified about the proceduresin more detail 3 6 T72 - 3 6T7 3; 5 2 T 6 - 5 2 T l l ; 5 4T 2 0 - 5 4 T 2 9 ; 5 5 T 6 4 -5 5 T 6 8 ; 5 7T 5 - 57T6; King SMR a t 4 5 ) . Both Brette l l and Fl anagan testified generally regardingthe use of the Ertco-Hart digital thermometer in the c a l ibrationcheck proc e s s . Brettel l noted that the Ertco-Hart thermometeris a " N IST traceable thermometer" used only by coordinators 3 6T72 - 3 6 T 7 3 ) . Fl anagan testified that the Ertco-Hartthermometer i s an " ( e] xternal device that is used" by thecoordinators " j ust corroborating temperature of the s imulatorprior to it being used on the Alcote s t " ( Chun 57T5 ) . Hetestified that the thermometer is "NIST traceab l e " and the" ( c] al ibration is checked by Draeger " 5 7 T5 ) . Brettel lacknowledged that the annual c a l ibration certificate for theErtco-H art thermometer was one of the " f airly fundamentaldocuments that give inf ormation as to the accuracy as defined byNew Jersey for each of the s e unit s " 3 6 T73 ) . Thus , the c a l ibration check proc e s s that Brett e l l developedwe l l prior to the 2 0 0 6 hearings in Chun bec ame part of theSpecial Master ' s recommendation and was adopted by the SupremeCourt almost without a l teration , except that the c a l ibration 15 check had to be performed once every s ix months instead of oncea year . Notwithstanding the abs ence of dispute regarding thesuffic iency of the State ' s calibration check procedure s , theChun Court c learly regarded the process as critical . The Courtnoted that its determination of scienti fic rel iabil ity of theAlcotest was " grounded, in part , on our expectation that therewi ll be proof that the particular device " used in a sub j ect ' sbreath test "was in good working order . " I d . at 1 3 4 . Thelion ' s share of that proof comes from documents related to thecalibration check proce ss . The Chun Court noted : Calibration of the machines involves attaching the machine to an external simu lator which uses a variety of solutions of known alcohol concentrations to create vapors that approximate human breath . By exposing the IR and EC mechanisms to thes e differing concentrations , and by analy z ing the device ' s abil ity to identify accurately each of those s amples within the acceptable range of toleranc e , referred to as a linearity t e s t , the coordinator is able to ensure that the machine is corre ctly c al ibrated . [ I d . at 8 4 . ] The foundational docume nts that the Chun Court held " needto be entered into evidence " in each case to demonstrate thegood working order of the instrument are the "most recent 16 cal ibration report prior to a defendant ' s t es t . . • and thecredentials of the coordinator who per formed the calibration , "together with the most recent new standard solution report priorto a defendant ' s te s t , and the certificate of analysis of the0 . 1 0 s imulator solution used in a defendant ' s control tests ( keyfoundational documents ) . I d . at 1 4 5 . The Court also identifiednine other categories of foundational documents that mu st beproduced in discovery because they "are part and parcel ofensuring that the machine i s in good working order , " althoughtheir admis sion i s not routinely required ( di s coveryfoundational documents ) . I d . at 1 3 5 , 1 4 4 -4 5 . All but one ofthe dis covery foundational documents are certif icates attestingto the accuracy of equipment or solutions used during thecal ibration check proce s s . Ibid . The other discoveryfoundational document i s the new s tandard s o lution reportgenerated at the end of the c alibration check proce s s . Ibid . 7Thus , documents generated by or related to the cal ibration checkproc e s s are e s s ential in es tablishing the good working order ofthe Alcotes t . In some c a s e s , this report might be the " most recent new standard solution report prior to a defendant ' s t es t " and , thus , a key foundational document rather than a discovery foundational document . 17 A few years after in State v . Holland , 4 2 2 N . J.Super . 1 8 5 ( App . Div . 2 0 1 1 ) and State v . Holland ,4 2 3 N . J . Super . 3 0 9 ( App . Div . 2 0 1 1 ) the Appe l l ateDivi sion addressed the State ' s change from the Ertco-Hartthermometer to a thermometer manufactured by Control Company . Evidence in this c a s e s hows that , in December 2 0 0 8 , the OFSevaluated the requirements for a thermometer to use in thec a l ibration check proce s s . A December 2 3 , 2 0 0 8 memo from Dr .Howard J . Baum, then-Director of the OFS and a witnes s in bothHolland and this case , state d : Calibration o f the Alcote s t 7 1 1 0 MKI I I -C requires accurate temperature determination of the s imulator solutions . Currently the ERTCO Hart digital thermometer is used for this purpos e . However other digital thermometers wi l l also suffi ce . The criteria for acceptab i l ity of the digital thermometer are as follows : ( 1 ) Traceabi lity to a NIST ( National Institute of Standards and Technol ogy ) st andar d ; ( 2 ) C a l ibration of the digital thermometer by an accredited laboratory complying with I SO 9 0 0 1 , I SO/ IEC 1 7 0 2 5 , and ANS I /NCSL Z 5 4 0 - 1 ; ( 3 ) Use of the digital thermometer between the C a l ibration Date and the Calibration Due ( Expiration ) Date ; ( 4 ) Resolution of at least 0 . 0 1 ° C ; ( 5 ) Accuracy o f at least ± 1 ° C between 0 . 0 to 100 . 0 °c . Since a digital thermometer from VWR ( Model 6 1 2 2 0 - 6 0 1 ) and a digital thermometer from Control Company ( Model 4 0 0 0 ) meet or exceed 18 the criteria li sted above, they are acceptab le for temperature determination . [ S - lOC; D-2 . ]The OFS se lected a NI ST-traceable digital thermometermanu factured by Control Company ( CC thermometer ) . In two defendants chall enged the s u f f ic iency ofthe State ' s foundational proofs as to the Alcotest ins trumentsused in their respective breath tests because the State hadprovided a Control Company " Traceable Certificate of Cal ibrationfor Digital Thermometer " rather than the " Draeger Safety, Ertco-Hart Digital Temperature Measuring System Report of Cal ibration,NIST traceabil ity" that was identif ied as a foundationaldocument in Chun . Holland I, 4 2 2 N . J . Super . at 1 9 3 -9 4 . TheHolland I court held that using a non-Ertco-Hart thermometerduring the cal ibration proce s s did not nece s s ar il y violate theChun Court ' s strictures, and it remanded for a f i nding as towhether the CC thermometer was comparable to the Ertco-Hartthermometer . Id . at 2 0 0 . On remand, the Law Divis ion j udge conducted a three-dayhearing and concluded that the CC thermometer was comparable ina l l material respects to the Ertco-Hart thermometer . Holland 4 2 3 N . J . Super . at 3 1 2 . The Appe l l ate Divis ion agreed andheld that the Control Company certi ficates produced in thedefendants ' cases were " f acially valid and s at is fie [ d] the 19 requirements a s a foundational document as required by Chun . "Id. at 319 . I n 2 0 1 3 , the Supreme Court addre s s ed certain f irmwarerevisi ons ordered in Chun that had not yet been implemented .State v . 2 15 N . J . 4 8 9 , 492 ( 2 0 1 3 ) ( Chun I I ) . As relevanthere , the ordered revisions to the firmware woul d have included ,on the documents generated during each c a l ibration che c k ,( 1 ) t h e " s erial number of the Ertco-Hart digital temperaturemeasuring system uti l i z ed , " and ( 2 ) " the temperature probeserial number and value" for both the black key and agencyprobe . 1 9 4 N . J . at 1 5 2 . These revis ions were never madeto the f irmware , and the Chun I I Court excu sed the State fromcomp l ying with these and other firmware revis ions that had beencontemp lated . ' The record in Chun and this c a s e establish that even though the f irmware was not altere d , the serial numbers for the NIST­ traceable thermometer and temperature probes used during a c a l ibration check have been recorded by hand from about Apri l 2 0 0 6 onward . O n April 3 , 2 0 0 6 , Stephen H . Monson , D . A . G . , circul ated a memo to the head of the ADTU entitled "Legal Advice : Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I-C , Temperature Probe Documentation" ( April 2 0 0 6 memo ) , ( 1 ) noting that , because the instrument itself did not record and print out " the serial number and probe value of any spec if ic probe " used , " some de fense counsel" were arguing that the absence of this information was a basis "to exclude otherwi s e valid chemical breath test result s , " ( 2 ) opining that "such a c l a im i s wholly lacking in both factual and legal merit , " but ( 3 ) neverthe l e s s recommending as "a temporary course of corrective action" that the s erial numbers for the NIST -traceable thermometer and both temperature probes 20 B. State v . and Marc w. Denn is was a coordinator in the New Jersey StatePolice ' s Alcohol Drug Test ing Unit ( ADTU ) , and in that capacityhe perf ormed semi-annual c a librations on Alcotests over thecourse of seven years in municipalities in five counties ,spec ifically Middlesex , Monmouth , Ocean , Somerset , and Union( Honig Cert . at� 3 ) . 9be hand-printed on the documents generated during the cal ibration proce s s ( D- 1 6 ) . Then , when F l anagan testi fied in Chun in November and December 2 0 0 6 , he noted the "interim policy" was to record temperature probe s erial numbers by hand , and that the "intention with the next f i rmware upgrade" was to have the c a l ibration records report "the probe serial number and the probe value " and "the Ertco-Hart serial number" 5 3T 3 6 ; 6 0T2 4 ) . On March 3 , 2 0 1 3 , Dr . Ali M . Alaouie sent a memo to the head of the ADTU , referencing the April 2 0 0 6 memo and requiring coordinators to u s e papers for the c a l ibration documents with the words "Black Key Temperature Probe Serial , " Digital NIST Temperature Measuring System Serial , " and "Temperature Probe Serial Number" pre-printed , together with a bl ank on which the coordinator can record the respective serial number ( D- 1 5 ) . The format with the pre-printed pages remains in u s e , as demonstrated by K limik ( S-lM ) . Although the probe value does not appear on the c a l ibration documents , the probe value for each probe is written on the Draeger certific ate of accuracy for that probe , and these certi fi c ates are inc luded in discovery material s . Certification by E lie Honig , Director o f the Divis ion of Criminal Justice , in Support of Motion for Direct Certi ficatio n , Relaxation o f Court Rule s , Notice t o the Bar , and Appointment o f Special Maste r , dated October 1 7 , 2 0 1 6 . 21 On September 1 9 , 2 0 1 6 , Dennis was charged with violationsof N . J . S . A . 2 C : 2 8 - 7 ( a ) ( l ) ( tampering with pub l i c records orinf ormation ) and N . J . S . A . 2 C : 2 1 - 4 ( a ) ( f a l s i fying or tamperingwith records ) ( Honig Cert . at� 2 ; S-4; S-4A ) . The comp l aintstated that Dennis did : KNOWINGLY MAKE A FALSE ENTRY IN A RECORD BELONGING TO , OR RECEIVED OR KEPT BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR INFORMATION OR RECORD , THAT BEING AN ALCOTEST 7 1 1 0 CALIBRATION RECORD AND CERTIFICATE REQUIRING A SIGNED TRUE STATEMENT THAT CALIBRATION CHECKS WERE PERFORMED CONSISTENT WITH THE CALIBRATION CHECK PROCEDURE FOR ALCOTEST 7 1 1 0 AS ESTABLISHED BY THE CHIEF FORENSIC SCIENTIST OF THE DIVIS ION OF STATE POLICE , WHEN HE HAD NOT PERFORMED THE PROCEDURE CONSISTENT WITH THOSE STANDARDS , WITH THE PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD OR INJURE ANYONE , IN VIOLATION OF N . J . S . A . 2 C : 2 8 - 7 A ( l ) ( A THIRD DEGREE CRIME ) . UTTER A WRITING OR RECORD KNOWING THAT IT CONTAINED A FALSE STATEMENT OR INFORMATION WITH PURPOSE TO DECE IVE OR INJURE ANYONE OR TO CONCEAL A WRONGDOING , THAT BEING AN ALCOTEST 7 1 1 0 CALIBRATION RECORD AND CERT I F ICATE REQUIRING A S I GNED TRUE STATEMENT THAT CALIBRATION CHECKS WERE PERFORMED CONSISTENT WITH THE CALIBRATION CHECK PROCEDURE FOR ALCOTEST 7 1 1 0 AS ESTABLISHED BY THE CHIEF FORENSIC SCIENTIST OF THE DIVIS ION OF STATE POLICE , WHEN HE HAD NOT PERFORMED THE PROCEDURE CONSISTENT WITH THOSE STANDARDS , IN VIOLATION OF N . J . S . A . 2 C : 2 1 - 4A ( A FOURTH DEGREE CRIME ) . [ Exhibit A to Honig Cert . ]Spec i f ically , the State a l leges that Dennis "fai led to use theNIST-traceable digital thermometer prior to s tarting the 22 ca libration " of Alcotest instruments in Asbury Park City , LongBranch City , and Marlboro Township on October 6 and 7 , 2 0 1 5 , butthat he neverthe l e s s certified that " [ p)ursuant to andcons istent with the current ' Ca l ibration Check Procedure for theAlcotest 7 1 0 0MKI I I -C' as established by the Chief ForensicScienti st , I performed a c a l ibration check on the approvedins trument ident i f i ed on this certificate" ( Honig Cert . at� 5 - �6 ; S - 4 ; S-4 A) . Dennis was indicted on December 1 4 , 2 0 1 6 , and a supersedingindictment was returned on June 2 7 , 2 0 1 7 , charging him with onecount of third-degree tampering with pub l ic records and onecount of fourth-degree f a ls ifying records ( S-4 ; S-4A ) . 10 Dennis ' scriminal proceeding is ongoing . On September 8 , 2 0 1 6 , about e leven months after Dennisal legedly failed to use the NIST-traceable digital thermometerwhen c a l ibrating three spec ific Alcote s t devices , and e levendays before he was formal ly charged with a crime for thatfailure , defendant E ileen Cass idy pl ed gui lty in Spring LakeMunic ipal Court to driving under the inf luence ( Honig Cert . atExhibit D ) . Although it was not one of the three Alcotestdevices giving rise to the charges against Denni s , the device on10 The original indictment al s o contained a count of second- degree official misc onduct , in violation of N . J . S . A . 2C : 3 0 - 2 , but that count was dismis sed ( S -4 ) . 23 which Cassidy had provided an evident ial breath s ample had als obeen cal ibrated by Dennis , and he certified that he had fol lowedthe establi shed procedure in performing that cal ibration ( HonigCert . at Exhibit D; Appendix IV at ii 3 - 9 ) . On September 1 9 , 2 0 1 6 , the s ame day that Dennis wascriminally charge d , Elie Honig , the Director of the Division ofCriminal Justice o f the New Jersey Attorney Genera l ' s O f f ic e ,wrote to the Honorable Glenn Grant , Acting Director o f theAdministrative Office of the Courts ( AOC ) , advis ing the AOC ofthe charge s against Dennis and the bas i s for them ( AOC letter ) .Honig questioned the sc ient ific nec e s s i ty o f the NI ST-traceabledigital thermometer step in the estab lis hed procedure , butacknowledged that the step was required by the Supreme Courtpursuant to Chun . Without referencing any particular case ,Honig s t ated that " [ t] he State therefore anticipates thatadditional legal challenges may be f i led regarding the resultsof any Alcotest instrument that had been cal ibrated in the pastby Denni s " a s to some of the " identi f ied 2 0 , 6 6 7 individuals whoprovided evidentia l breath samples on thos e instruments . " Honigstated that " [ g] iven potential legal chal lenges and theunderlying s c ie nt ific nature of any potential chal lenge s " theSupreme Court should " i s sue a Notice to the Bar and appoint a 24 Spec ial Master to handle any l itigation ari s ing from thec ircums tanc e s set forth in this letter . " One week l ater , on September 2 6 , 2 0 1 6 , based on therevelation of the criminal charges against Dennis and the AOCletter , Cas s idy moved in Spring Lake Municipal Court to withdrawand vacate the guilty p le a she had entered e arl ier that month{ Honig Cert . at� 1 2 , Exhibit D ) . On October 4 , 2 0 1 6 , Judge Grant advised the State that hehad reviewed the AOC letter but that a request for a spec i a lmaster should b e made directly t o the Supreme Court through "anappropriate acti on; for instance , direct certifi cation . " On October 1 7 , 2 0 1 6 , the State applied to the Supreme Courtto ( 1 ) take direct certific ation of Cassidy ' s municipal courtmotion to vacate , and ( 2 ) appoint a spec ial mas ter . The Statereferenced Cass idy's spec i f i c case , but then stated : The State antic ipates that many additional legal chal lenges wil l be fil ed regarding breath test results from Alcote s t instruments that were calibrated b y Denni s . As a coordinator for over seven years , Dennis c a l ibrated instruments in Middlesex , Monmout h , Ocean , Somer set , and Union Counties . The State has identif ied 2 0 , 6 6 7 individuals who provided evident i a l breath s ampl e s on those ins trument s . Underscoring any potential legal challenge to the evidentia l breath s amples provided wi l l be the s ame s c ientific is sue as that presented in the captioned matter : whether the failure to use a NIST-traceable digital thermometer prior to beginning the 25 c a l ibration of the Alcotest instruments undermined the s c ientific reliab i l ity of the instrument . The State argued that direct certi f ic ation and appoi ntmentof a spec ia l master would result in "a c lear s c ientific rulingat the out s e t " that would " provide immediate guidance tomunicipal courts concerning the underlying s c ientific i s sue" andwould " ensure predictable, uniform results throughout theState . " As to C a s s idy, the State has stipulated that, on July 10,2 0 15, Dennis rec a librated the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 on which sheprovided a breath sample ( Appendix IV at�3 ) . The State hasalso s t ipulated : It cannot be corroborated whether Sgt . Dennis checked the temperature of the s imulator so lutions with the Control Company NI ST-traceable digital thermometer after a l lowing the s imulators to heat to the required temperature prior to beginning the recal ibration of Spring Lake Borough ' s Alcotest ins trument with Serial Number ARXB- 0 0 7 6 as is required by the Cal ibration Protoco l . [ Appendix IV at� 6 . ] On October 3 1, 2 0 1 6 , C a s s idy opposed direct certificationand the appointment of a special master . On November 1 0, 2 0 1 6, the Court invited the New JerseyState Bar Association ( NJSBA ) , the Association of CriminalDefense Lawyers of New Jers ey, and four attorneys who had 26 represented defendants in Chun to submit a response to theState ' s pending motions , noting that "some of the reliefrequested by the State may imp l icate the app l ication of certainaspects of the Court ' s j udgment" in Chun . On January 1 9 , 2 0 17 ,the Court invited the s ame entities and attorneys , a s well asparties in the matter , to " submit writtenrecommendations regarding the scope of the t as ks to be performedby a spec ia l master , should the Court determine to appoint one . " On April 7 , 2 0 17 , the Supreme Court largely granted theState ' s motion and appointed me to sit as Special Master ,ordering , in pertinent part : ORDERED that the matter is remanded to the Special Master who wil l consider and decide the fol lowing question , along with any other questions that the Spec ial Master , in his dis cretion , deems relevant to the undertaking : "Does the failure to test the s imulator solutions with the NIST-traceable digital thermometer before c a l ibrating an Alcotest machine undermine or c a l l into question the sc ient i f ic reliabil ity of breath tests subsequently per formed on the Alcotest machine ?" [ Appendix I . J The Court a lso set May 8 , 2 0 17 , as the deadline for a l lmotions for participation i n the remand , and i t l e f t it t o me to"determine the extent of participation of any person or entityin addition to the State and defendant . " I rece ived and grantedmotions to partic ipate in the remand from the NJSBA and three of 27 the attorneys who had been counsel in spec ifically SamuelLouis Sachs , Matthew w. Re i s i g , and John Menz e l . I held f ive case management conferences between July andNovember 2 0 1 7 and addre s s ed various motions and discoverydispute s . On July 2 7 , 2 0 1 7 , the State f i led a motion asking me toenter an order " directing the State to provide notice to the2 0 , 6 6 7 individuals referenced in the State ' s motion to appoint aSpec ial Master . " I denied the motion as beyond the scope of theauthority granted to me in the Court's order appointing me aSpec ial Master , noting , however , that "[t] he den ial o f thismotion in no way impairs the abil ity of the State , if itchoos e s , to identify the potent ially af fected individu als or tofurni sh them with individual notice . " The State subs equentlyprovided notice to potentially af fected individuals . On September 1 5 , 2 0 1 7 , C as s idy f iled a "Motion to DeclareDef endant as Indigent to Enable Def endant to apply to the Offic eo f the Public Defender for Anc i l lary Services for the Cost o fthe Fees for the Defense Experts i n This Matter , Pursuant toN . J . S . A . 2 A : l58A-1 . " Four days late r , C a s s idy f iled an amendedmotion seeking expert fees and costs from " the State or theOffice of the Public Defender" ( motion for expert fees ) . OnOctober 1 9 , 2 0 1 7 , I is sued a dec is ion and order granting 28 defendant ' s motion to compel the State to pay the costs ofdefense experts . On October 1 7 , 2 0 17 , the State moved for a stay ofproceedings in other courts that raise i s sues potentiallyaf fected by the Supreme Court ' s u ltimate determination in thiscase cases ) . On November 2 , 2 0 17 , I entered an ordergenera lly s taying Denn is cases . On November 2 8 , 2 0 1 7 , I entereda supplemental order providing that the prosecutor has theaffirmative obligation to determine whether a pending proceedingis a Dennis case . Discovery disputes included obtaining and reviewing incamera both Marc Dennis's personnel file and the discovery inhis pending criminal matte r , and determining which materialscould be disseminated to counse l , sub j e c t to a protective order . At the final c a s e management conference of November 2 ,2 0 1 7 , I s c heduled the hearing to begin on Monday , December 4 ,2017. However , over the Thanksgiving holiday , the Statedelivered a late discovery submi s s ion , containing new andvoluminous material s . Al l de fense counsel strenuously ob j ectedto the u s e of these materials at the hearing . They asked thateither the material be barred or , alternativel y , a thirty-dayadj ournment be granted to al low them and their experts time toanaly z e and be prepared to ef fectively deal with the materials 29 at the hearing . The State did not ob ject to a thirty-dayadj ournment , and I chose that as the appropriate relie f . I therefore adj ourned c ommencement of testimony by expertsunti l January 3 , 2 0 1 8 , and I scheduled an in-court demonstrationby a coordinator of an Alcotest calibration check procedure tobe held on December 1 4 , 2 0 1 7 . O n that date , the State presentedTrooper David Klimik , who demonstrated a c a l ibration checkprocedure and testif ied in detail regarding the proce s s . Beginning on January 3 , 2 0 1 8 and ending on January 2 2 ,2 0 1 8 , the State presented four expert witne s s es : Brettell;Shaffer; Baum, Director of the OFS from March 2 0 0 8 unt i l June2 0 17; and Alaouie , a research s c ientist at the OFS . The State had a l s o provided a report from Dr . Fiona Couperof Washington State . However , despite numerous ef forts by thecourt and the parties to accommodate Couper's sc hedule , theState was unable to produce her for live tes timony . The Staterequested that she be permitted to testify by e lectronic meansthrough a video teleconference . Defendant opposed thisprocedure on the grounds that it would viol ate her confrontationrights under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions . Iagreed with defendant's position and , by decis ion and orderdated December 2 8 , 2 0 1 7 , held that the State would need to 30 produce Couper l ive in court i f it wanted to rely on hertest imony . Couper did not appear . Defendant produced one expert , Andreas Stol z , from MichiganState Univers ity , who testified on January 2 4 , 2 0 1 8 . Defendanthad a l so provided expert reports from two additional expert s ,but chose not to c a l l them . I dealt with evidence i s sues on January 3 0 , 2 0 1 8 , and thepart ies and part ic ipating couns el submitted proposed findings offact and conclus ions of l aw on March 5 , 2 0 1 8 . At my reque s t ,coun s e l appeared for l imited oral argument o n March 2 2 , 2 0 1 8 . C. The c a l ibration check The cal ibration check performed on the Alcotest by acoordinator from the ADTU of the NJSP is e s sential toestabli shing that an in strument is in good working order . SeeN . J . A . C . 1 3 : 5 1 -4 . 3 ( b ) ( requiring that each Alcotest instrumentin u s e in New Jersey undergo a c a l ibration check performed by acoordinator when p laced into service initially or followingrepa ir , within 1 8 2 days of the l a s t cal ibration check , or at anytime that a coordinator considers it "nece s s ary or otherwi s eappropriate" ) . N . J . A . C . 13 : 5 1 - 2 . l and -2 . 2 spec ify therequirements and qua l i f i c ations for a member of the NJSP tobecome a coordinator , including "the knowledge to properlyperform • . . c a l ibration of approved instrument s , " but the 31 regulations do not desc ribe the specific procedures acoordinator s hould use for a c a l ibration check. No prior case in New Jersey has explored detai l s of theperiodic c a l ibration proc e s s and its relationship to thee s s ential e l ement of proof that the particular instrument inquestion was in good working order . In the Court notedthe importance of the proc e s s and the documents generated by it ,but the spec if ics of the procedure were not in dispute . TheHolland court addre s s ed the proc e s s in s omewhat more detail but ,again , the deta ils of the procedure and the importance of eachcomponent of it were not in dispute . Here , the importance andnec e s s ity of the NIST-traceable thermometer step is directly inis sue . Because an understanding of the fu l l c a l ibration checkproc e s s is e s s ential to understanding the nec e s s ity of the NIST­traceable thermometer step , I address that proc e s s in detai l . Brettel l developed the calibration check procedures for theinstrument , and the written " Ca l ibration Check Procedure forAlcote st 7 1 1 0 MK I I I -C , " admitted into evidence as S - 3 2 , wasdrafted by Brett e l l ( Ca libration Check Procedure ) ( 7T 1 5 ; 7T 6 3 -7T6 5 ) . The document was l a s t revised o n December 1 3 , 2 0 0 4 , andthe procedures it delineates are s t i l l appl i c able to c a l ibrationchecks perf ormed by ADTU coordinators today . Brette l l could notrecall how many versions preceded the final version in 2 0 0 4 or 32 when the first version was drafted , but he thought there hadbeen fewer than five revisions ( 7 Tl00-7 Tl03 ) . The first versionmust have been drafted by December 2 000 , which is when theAlcotest pi lot program began in Pennsauken . The requirement fora NI ST-traceable thermometer was in every revision ( 7 T 1 04 ) . After performing a cal ibration check on a specificinstrument , the coordinator signs a certification , attesting , inpertinent part : Pursuant to , and consistent with , the current " C a libration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 10 , " as established by the Chief Forensic Sci e ntist of the Division of State Police , I p erformed a cal ibration Chec k on the approved i nstrument identified on this certificate . The results of my Cal ibration Check are recorded on this certificate , which consists of two parts on two pages : Part I - Control Tests; and Part I I - Linearity Tests . I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true . I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are wil lfully false , I am subject to punishment . [ S -lM . ] The Cal ibration Check Procedure contains six numberedparagraphs ( S - 3 2 ) . The NIST-traceable thermometer requirementat issue in this case is referenced i n paragraphs one and two ,which provide : 1) For purposes of these procedures , the CU34 S imulator will be referenced as a " C a l ibrating Unit." Al l references to "Alcotest 7 1 10 " are intended to 33 indicate the Alcotest 7 1 10 MK I I I or MK I I I-C . The Calibrating Unit will be prepared with a new bottle of 0 . 10% solution from a lot certified by the Chief Forensic Sc ientist , or qualified designee , which will be run as a control. At the same time , a second Calibrat ing Unit will be prepared with a new bottle of 0 . 04 % solution certified by the Chief Forensic Sc ientist , or qual ified designee , a third Calibrating Unit will be prepared with a new bottle of 0 . 0 8 % solution certified b y the Chief Forensic Scientist , or qualified designe e , and a fourth Cal ibrating Unit will be prepared with a new bottle of 0 . 1 6 % solution certified by the Chief Forensic Sc ientist , or qualified designe e . These will be run as a quality assurance and l inearity check . Ensure that each Calibrating Unit is approp r i ately marked with the concentration contained therein and sealed with a plug or temperature probe and tygon loop to seal inlet and outlet . Allow a l l three Units to heat for 1 hour and then check the simulator with a NIST traceable thermometer . must be 34 Celsius or minus 0 . 2 Connect the keyed "coordinator's probe " to the Alcotest 7 1 10 and use the "PROBE" function to "ADJUST" to the correct "probe value" .2) Attach the 0.10% Cal ibrating Unit to introduce a vapor sample directly to the cuvette . The " coordinator ' s keyed" temperature probe should be inserted in the rubber grommet of the Calibrating Unit . that the of the Unit is 3 4 . 0 Celsius or minus 0.2 with the NIST thermometer. Use the "CALIBRATE" function to perform 34 a c alibration of the unit . Follow the Alcotest 7 1 10's prompts to enter data for the Operator , Calibrating Unit , and Solution . Upon completion of data entry , the Alcotest 7 1 10 will obtain a vapor sample from the Calibrating Unit and will adjust its calibration based on this " Known Standard . " This process will output the "Alcotest 7 1 10 Calibration report . " [ S- 3 2 ( emphasis added ) . ] When questioned about developing the Ca libration Chec kProcedure , Brett e l l said , " I put the steps in there to lay outthe best possible c alibration of the Alcotest instrument in mymind" ( 7 T105 ) . On cross-examination , Brett e l l was pressed onwhether each and every step was scientifica l l y necessary . Ithen interjected with the following : THE COURT : Can you answer that directly? Do you have a direct answer for that question ? THE WITNESS : He's using t he word " nec essary " and I don ' t really want to use that word , bec ause I don ' t think it's a scientific word . Q. Reliable , do you like that word? How about reliable? THE COURT : Were they collectively scientific ally necessary , as opposed to parsing one against the other? THE WITNESS : Collective ly , they are requirements that would be necessary for c alibrating the instrument , yes . THE COURT : Scientific ally ? 35 THE WITNESS : Scientifica l ly . THE COURT : To e nsure scientific reliabi l ity? THE WITNESS : Yes . [ 7Tl06-l to 1 8 ) . On December 1 4 , 2 0 1 7 , ADTU coordinator Klimik appeared as awitness for the State and gave a demonstration of a cal ibrationcheck from beginning to end ( 6 T ) . Coordinators such as Klimikare tasked with ca librating designated Alcotest instruments inmunicipalities in a particular region. Typ i c a l l y , eachcoordinator per forms two c a l ibration checks per day , four daysper week ( 6 Tl60 ) . Klimik demonstrated and exp l ained each step of thec a l ibration check process in detai l , also answering questionsfrom counsel and from me ( 6 T ) . He e xp l a i ned that , as a coordinator , he is assigned certainequipment that he brings with him and uses at each c a l ibrationcheck he performs . This equipment consists of ( 1 ) three CU34simulators , ( 2 ) a black key temperature probe , and ( 3 ) a CCthermometer" ( 6Tl8 ; S - 1 B ; S - 1 C ; S - 1E ; S- 1 G ; S - 1 I ; S - 1 J ; S- 1K ) . He also11 As noted above , when Chun was decided, the NIST-traceab l e digital the rmometer used b y coordinators was manufactured by Erto-Hart. 1 9 4 N.J . at 152 ; King SMR 1 3 9 ) . I n Holland , 4 2 3 N . J . Super. at 3 1 2 , the Appe l late Division held that the CC 36 brings with him ( 1 ) bottles of s imulator solution withconcentrations of 0.0 4 , 0 . 0 8 , 0 . 1 0 , and 0 . 1 6 , and ( 2 ) a powerstrip to use for his CU34 s imu lators ( 6 T2 0 ; 6T3 l ; S - 1 D ; S - 1A ; S -lF ; S-lH ; S- lL ) . The pol ice station or agency that operates the particularAlcotest to be tested supplies , for the cal ibration che c k ,( 1 ) the instrument itse l f , ( 2 ) one CU 3 4 , and ( 3 ) an agencytemperature probe . The agency also maintains a supply ofbottles of s imulator solution with a concentration of 0. 1 0 , oneof which the coordinator uses at the end of the calibrationcheck proc e s s for a s o lution change. A CU3 4 , also known a s a c a l ibrating unit or a s imulator , i sa device manufactured b y Draeger that accompanies , but i sseparate from, the Alcotest itself. The CU3 4 holds about a halfliter of l iqui d , and it resembles a mason j ar with a black topthat contains a motor , microproc e s s o r , and other components( 9 Tl2 0 ; S - 1 B ; S-1 E ; S- 1G ; S - 1 I ) . The CU34 top plugs into a powersource and , on the underside extending into the s imulatorsolution , it contains a propeller , heat source , and attachedprobe to measure and ma intain the temperature of the solutionwithin the CU34 ( 9T l 2 0 - 9T l 2 1 ) . The top also has a hole throughthermometer "is comparable in a l l material respects to the Ertco-Hart digital thermometer." 37 which the black key probe , agency probe , or NIST thermometerwill fit when being used by the coordinator. A CU3 4 does nothave a gauge , screen , or other device that displays thetemperature of the solution inside. Each CU3 4 is returnedannually to Draeger for recertification. As Brettell testified : The simulator , which is the c a l ibrati ng unit for the Alcotest instrument s , is an independent component. It sits outside the i nstrument. And a l l of the readings that the Alcotest takes are based upon that c a l ibrating unit working properly. It has to heat up the standard solution to 3 4 degrees, plus or minus . 2. And if it doesn ' t , the instrument wi l l not b e in ca l ibration. So it's very , very important for the ca l ibrating unit to operate proper l y , to be working properly. [ 7 T 8 9 - 15 to 2 4 . ] The CU3 4 is a "wet bath " simulator , meaning that it usesl iqui d , known as simulator solution , rather than dry gas.S imulator solution is water-based and has a " known concentrationof ethanol" ( 15T 1 9 2 ) . New Jersey purchases the simulator solution through Draegerfrom a non-Draeger vendor that provides the solution in lots of1 400 bottles ( 15T75 ; 15T 1 9 4 ) . The vendor sends " the first twobott les , the last two bott les , and four bottles from the middle" 38 of each lot to the OPS for analysis ( 15T75- 15T7 6 ) . 12 If thesolutions pass the test criter i a , the OPS issues a c e rtificateand approves the lot for purchase by the State Pol i c e or otheragencies ( 1 5T 7 6 ; 15T 1 9 2 - 15Tl 9 5 ; 15T2 2 9 - 15T2 30 ) . The CU 3 4 and simulator solution util i z e the principle of" Henry's law , " which the Supreme Court has explained as follows : Henry's l aw , i n physical chemistry , states that when a liquid that contains a volat i l e substanc e , such a s alcohol , makes contact with air in a closed container and at a known temperature , a certain amount of alcohol wil l escape into the air space above in the form of vapor . The rate at which the alcohol vaporizes wi ll depend on the concentration of the alcohol in the liquid and on the temperature . The higher the temperature , the more alcohol wi l l escape to the vapor . When there is a fixed temperature and concentration of alcohol , a state of equ i l ibrium wi ll result in which the amounts of alcohol in air and liquid are static . v. 1 1 7 N . J . 450, 459 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . ]See also King SMR at 1 6 3 ( " Henry ' s law states that i n a c losedsystem and at a given temperature , there is a fixed ratiobetween a volatile substanc e , such as alcoho l , in a l iquid andthe same volatile substance in a gas . " ) .12 At the t ime of the Chun hearings , the solution was purchased i n lots of 1000 bottles , of which six were tested by the OPS ( King SMR at 4 6 , 108 -09 ) . 39 The concentration of each simulator solution used by thecoordinator during the c alibration c he c k , 0.0 4 , 0 . 0 8 , 0 . 1 0 , and0 . 1 6 , is such that , when the solution is heated to 3 4 ° C , plus orminus a tolerance of . 2 ° C , and a l lowed to reach equi l ibrium, theair between the top of the l iquid and the bottom of the CU3 4l i d , known as the headspace , will conta in ethanol molecules ofthe stated concentration , within a spec ified tolerance . During each ca l ibration check , the coordinator uses twotemperature probes that plug into the back of the Alcotestinstrument , the black key probe assigned to the coordinator andthe agency probe used by the agency for breath tests andsolution changes between cal ibration checks . These probes have"a spec i a l kind of resiste r " that has "physical properties thatchange depending on temperature" ( 9 Tll8 ) . When the " key" end ofa temperature probe is plugged into the instrument and the metalprobe end is immersed in the simulator solution , the i nstrument"goes into a calculation that resolves and reports degreeCelsius temperature" ( 9 Tll8 ) . "For the purposes of measuring temperature there ' s nodifference" between the black key probe and the agency probe( 9T 1 2 8 ) . The difference is that the black key probe has a "fewadditional components which establish access rights for theperson with this key to get at more menu functions" ( 9 T 1 2 8 ) . 40 The only function that can be accessed with an agency probe is"Time" ( 6T 70 ) . Both types of probes are t es ted and recertifiedannually by Draeger ( 6 T45-6T4 6 ; 9 T 1 2 8 ) . When tested by Draeger at each annual recertific ation , thespecific resistance of each temperature probe is determined at3 4 ° C and , based on that resistance , the probe is as signed aprobe value between 9 2 and 108 ( 6T 4 3 ) . sometime s the probevalue changes for a specific temperature probe , meaning that aprobe could be returned by Draeger after recertific ation with adifferent probe value than that s ame probe had previously( 6T 4 4 ) . This change is sometimes referred to as probe valuedrift . Shaffer explained that a Draeger temperature probe " c an'trecord temperature , " but that : It's using a-as a sensor for the temperature it's using what they call a-it ' s a special kind of resister c a l led an NTC , Nancy , Tom, Charlie , which has physical properties that change depending on temperature . And so using that resistance of the probe along with the probe value that's as signed during our certification proc e s s , inserting that probe into the instrument its e l f , together it goes into a calcul ation that resolves and reports degree Cel sius temperature . [ 9T 1 1 7 - 25 to 9 T 1 1 8 - 10 . ] Sto l z explained that probe value is " j u s t a parameter"assigned to a probe by Draeger in its annual certification 41 process "to compensate for the differences of the differenttemperature probes" ( 1 7 Tll4 ) . It is not the actual resistance ,nor does it reveal the resistance measured by the probe . Theprobe value goes into the algorithm and is factored into thetemperature ca lculat ion of the instrument ( 1 7Tll 4 - 1 7 Tll5 ) . Ifthe probe value is incorrectly inputted into the instrument , thetemperature c a lculation wil l be incorrect ( 6 T8 1 ; 7T8 3 ; 8Tl2 7 ;10Tl4 6 ; 1 7 Tll5 ) . The CC thermometer is a separate , hand-held deviceconsisting of a probe to immerse in the simulator solution and aunit that displays a temperature reading ( S -lK ) . The CCthermometer comes i n a padded box "to make sure it doesn ' t getdamaged during transport" ( 6 T53 ) . Each CC thermometer iscertified for two years ( 6T 6 1 ) . Bec ause the cost ofrecertifying a used CC thermometer is about the same aspurchasing a new one , the used thermometers are discarded at theend of two years and replaced with new thermometers . Klimik testified that agenc ies typically have theirAlcotest instruments set up and runn i ng , with the agency CU3 4attached , twenty-four hours a day ( 6Tl51 ) . Thus , when he goesto an agency to perform a cal ibration check on an instrument inservice , as opposed to a new instrument or one returning toservice after repair , the first thing he does is detach and 42 empty the solution in the agency CU3 4 . Once that solution isempt ied , the coordinator must either conduct a solution changeor comp lete a ca l ibration check of the i nstrument beforereturning the instrument to service ( 6T 1 1 4 ; 6T156 ) . Each agency usually has one CU3 4 in service and one inreserve . Typic a l l y , the coordinator will not perform thec alibration check with the same agency simulator that wasalready in use , but will put into service the agency simulatorthat is " i n a sealed box with the corresponding certi ficates"fol lowing its annual recertification and return from Draeger( 6T3 1 - 6T3 2 ) . This is not mandatory , but the goal is to use inthe c a libration che ck , and to leave in service at the agenc y , asimulator with a cert i f ication date that extends beyond the nextrequired ca l ibration check ( 6T 3 3 ) . The coordinator then prepares the agency CU 3 4 , using thebottle of 0 . 10 simulator solution he brought with him . Hechecks the seal " two or three times" by blowing into a tube andconf irming that bubbles are not escaping from the side of thesimulator ( 6T 1 5 - 6 T 1 6 ) . He then plugs the agency CU34 into thepower strip , turns it o n , and confirms that " the propeller isspinning and there ' s an orange l ight indicator on top of theheater which indicates that the unit is being heated " ( 6Tl6 ) . 43 The coordinator then goes through the same steps to preparethe three CU34 simulators he brought with him, using the 0 . 04 ,0 . 08 , and 0 . 1 6 solutions ( 6 T 1 6 -6T 1 8 ; 6T20- 6T2 4 ) . The coordinator writes the serial numbe r of the simulatoron the corresponding bottle of solution and records the time onthe final solution prepared ( 6T 1 6 ; 6T2 4 ) . When the CU34 reachesthe proper temperature range according to its internaltemperature probe , the orange light begins " turning on and off"to indicate that it has reached and is maintaining the correcttemperature ( 6T2 5 ) . 1 3 This usually takes about thirty minutes ,but the Calibration Check Procedure requires that coordinatorsal low each CU34 to heat for a full hour ( S - 3 2 ; 6T2 5 ; 8 T 1 2 3 ) . While the CU34s are heating , the coordinator will typic a l lydo various administrative tasks, such as downloading any data onthe instrument since the last automatic weekly download ,preparing pages for the discovery that will be produced as partof the c alibration chec k , and confirming several settings thatare checked " every time before performing a c alibration toensure that they are at their correct settings , " inc luding" The CU34s are designed to reach and maintain a temperature of 3 4 ° C , plus or minus a tight tolerance of . 02 ° C ; however , the actual temperature of the solution cannot be determined until measured with a separate measuring device . 44 tolerances and l inearity configurations ( 6 T 3 6 -6T3 8 ; 6T45 ; 6T 6 8 -6T69 ) . The coordinator then adjusts the probe value setting in theinstrument to the probe value of the black key temperature probe( 6T 6 9 ) . The probe value function in the instrument would be setto the probe value of the agency probe when the coordinatorarrives , so unless the values of both the agency and black keyprobes happen to be the same , the coordinator must adj ust theprobe value function to the probe value of the black keytemperature probe before beginning the test s , and then mustad j ust it back to the probe value of the agency probe beforeperforming a solution change at the end of the process ( 6T 7 8 -6T 7 9 ; 6T 1 4 2 ) . The probe value that the coordinator enters intothe instrument does not print out on any of the reportsgenerated by the c a l ibration , nor is it handwritten by thecoordinator ( 6T 7 1 - 6T7 2 ; 6T 1 4 2 ) . Once the CU34s have been heating for an hour , thecoordinator checks a l l four simulators with the CC thermometer ,which is equipped with a digital read-out screen that reportstemperature to three decimal p l aces ( 6T 8 6 - 6 T8 7 ; 6Tll5 ) . Eachtime , the coordinator inserts the probe portion of thethermometer into the solution , waits about thirty seconds forthe temperature reading to "stab i l i z e , " and then visually 45 confirms that the temperature is within the required range of3 3 . 8 ° C to 3 4 . 2 ° C ( 6T 8 7 - 6T8 8 ) . Kl imik noted that the temperaturereading on the CC thermometer wi l l continue to fluctuate withina few thousandths of a degree after it has stab i l i zed ( 6T 8 8 ) .He testified that he will "wipe the temperature probe to ensurethat there's no cross-contamination " before moving theCC thermometer from one CU34 to the next ( 6 T 8 8 - 6T8 9 ) . Once the temperatures of all four CU3 4s have been checkedand determined to be within range , the coordinator is thenfinished with the NIST thermometer for the rest of the processand can return i t to its carrying case ( 6 T 1 1 6 ; 6Tll9 ) . Thetemperature readings from the N I ST thermometer are not writtendown or captured anywhere ( 6T8 9 ) . The coordinator will then attach the agency CU3 4 with the. 10 solution to the rear of the instrument and place the blackkey probe i n the solution ( 6T 1 1 8 - 6 T 1 20 ) . The coordinator thentypes in " CALIBRATE " and responds to prompts asking for variousinformation regarding the coordinator and the solution and CU34being used ( 6T 1 20 ) . Kl imik noted that he and the othercoordinators " always review the data , sometimes multiple times"( 6T 1 20 ) . K limik expla ined that , during the CALIBRATE function ," [ i] t ' s te l l ing the Alcotest what a . 10 solution is supposed to 46 look l i ke " ( 6T 1 2 1 ; 6 T 1 2 5 ; 1 1T l l3 ) . The CALIBRATE function iscritically important because the standard by which theinstrument measures all headspace and breath samples after thatpoint is based on its performance of that function . As Shafferexpl ained : what ' s inside the instrument a cal ibrate function is an That ' s where we're telling the sensors inside the instrument , hey , you know what? Whatever you bel ieved before , we ' re going to introduce a certain concentration to your sensors and I want you to adjust yourself interna l ly so that you read exactly the target concentration that we t e l l you during this calibrate process . And so because of that , it's actually i n a very sensitive mode at that point . It ' s told trust whatever we in this That's a fundamental of the And if this was we would be it And the i nstrument would not detect a problem because of the solution alone . [ 1 0T5 1 - 2 0 to 1 0T52 - 1 0 ( emphasis added ) . ] The next step is the Control Test , whi c h is performed withthe same CU34 and simulator solution that was used in theCALIBRATE funct i on ( 6T 1 2 6 - 6 T 1 2 7 ) . The purpose of this test ,which is repeated three times, is to assure that the instrumenthad adjusted properly and reports the 0 . 1 0 concentration withinthe allowable tolerance . The control test certification prints 47 out and the coordinator can proceed to perform the l i nearitytest . But first , the coordinator wi l l empty the agency CU34 andput a different bottle of . 10 solution in to heat for thesolution change at the end of the c a l ibration check process( 6T 1 3 3 ) . The . 10 solution used by the coordinator to do theCALIBRATE function and control test must be a different lotnumber from the . 10 solution used for the solution change( 6T 1 3 4 ) . Usual l y , the coordinator brings a bottle of . 10solution to use for the CALIBRATE function and uses a bottlefrom the agency stores for the solution change . The next step is the l i nearity test , which tests eachsolution i n the coordinator ' s CU34s twice to ensure that theinstrument reads the ethanol as within tolerance over a range ofconcentrations ( 6 T l 3 3 ) . The . 04 CU3 4 is used first , then the. 08 , then the . 1 6 ( 6T 1 3 3 ; 6 T l 3 7 -06T 1 3 8 ) . The b lack key probe isused throughout the linearity test ( 6 T 1 3 3 ; 6 T 1 3 7 ) . Klimik statedthat he will "triple-chec k " the results for accuracy ,acknowledging that more than one check for accuracy is important( 6T 1 3 9 ) . Once the l i nearity test is comp lete , the coordinator typesin the data for a solution change , after which there is a " 60-minute loc kout " before that solution change can actually be 48 performed ( 6Tl40- 6Tl4 1 ) . During the data entry for the solutionchange , the coordinator must adj ust the probe value function inthe instrument t o match the value of t he agency probe ratherthan the black key probe ( 6 Tl4 2 ) . The agency probe is used during the solution change , andduring this part of the process , the instrument runs three teststo assure that the i nstrument measures the new solution withinthe allowable tolerances, in accordance with the adjustment madeduring the CALIBRATE function . The results of these tests printon the new standard solution report . At the end of the cal ibration check , the coordinatorproduces "discovery" consisting of ( 1 ) "Alcotest 7 1 10Cal ibration Record , " ( 2 ) "Alcotest 7 1 10 Cal ibration Certi ficatePart I - Control Tests , " ( 3 ) "Alcotest 7 1 10 Cal ibrationCert i f icate Part II - Linearity Tests , " ( 4 ) "C al ibrating UnitNew Standard Solution Report , " ( 5 ) Draeger certif icates ofaccuracy for the four CU3 4s and two probes used, (6) acert i f ic ate of c a l ibration for the CC thermometer , ( 7 ) OFScertif ications of analysis for the f ive simulator solutionsused , and ( 8 ) the coordinator's credent ials ( S -lM ) . 49 I I I . WITNESSES : AND ASSES SMENT OF CREDIBILITY A. State ' s witnesses 1. David Klimik Trooper David Klimik is a NJSP coordinator in the ADTU . Asof the time of his testimony , he had been performing this rolefor nearly three years . He performed a demonstration of thec alibration procedure in open court on the first hearing date .He was sworn and answered questions posed to him throughout thedemonstration by a l l counsel and by me . A l l questions , answers ,and colloquy were transcribed ( 6T ) , and video recorded .( Exhibit S - 4 2 ) . The demonstration lasted the better part of afull day . Klimik has received a l l required training to qualify as acoordinator . See N . J . A . C . 1 3 : 5 1 - 4 . 2 ( a ) ( l ) ( ii ) . Klimik hadperformed approximately 500 Alcotest calibr ation s . It was clearfrom his testimony that Klimik was very wel l versed in themanner in which the device and a l l of its component partsoperate and with the calibration procedure and the sequence andmanner in which a l l required steps are conducted . He was ableto expl ain what he was doing throughout the procedure and toanswer questions about each step . He answered a l l questionsforthrightly and without hesitation . When asked questions thatrequired knowledge of science , computer programming , or the 50 l i ke , he dec l ined to answer , bec ause such questions were beyondthe scope of his knowledge . Klimik was a very credible witness in a l l respects . 2. Dr . Thomas A . Brettell Dr . Thomas A . Brettel l received an undergraduate degree inchemistry i n 1 9 7 3 f rom Drew University, fol lowed by a Master ' sDegree in chemistry i n 1 9 7 5 from Lehigh University . I n 1 9 8 7 , herece ived a Ph . D . degree in analytical chemistry from V i l l anovaUniversity . He subsequently took additional graduate courses inforensic toxicology and general toxicology . I n 1 9 7 6 , Brette l l began what would become a thirty-one yearcareer i n the OFS . He began as a forensic chemist and waspromoted in January 1 9 8 0 to the position of Supervising ForensicSc ientist . I n 1 9 90 he became assistant to the Chief ForensicScientist . Then , f rom 1 9 9 8 to 2 00 1 , he was the Chief ForensicSc ientist , the highest position in the OFS at that time . F rom200 1 until his retirement in March of 2007 , Brettel l served asthe f i rst Director of the OFS . He has subsequently worked as an assoc iate professor ofchemistry at Cedar Crest College in Pennsylvan ia . He has taughtboth undergraduate and graduate courses in chemistry andforensic scienc e . These courses have inc luded forensicadministration , which deals with administering and managing a 51 crime laboratory . Since his retirement , Brett e l l has a l s oprovided consulting services t o the Inspector General ' s Officeof New York State and to the District Attorney's Office in BucksCounty , Pennsylvani a , regarding the toxicology unit of the crimelaboratory in that office . Brettell holds a number of professional certific ations andmember s hips inc luding the fol lowing : Diplomat of the Americ anBoard of Crimina listic s , Certified Forensic Laboratory Director ,Laboratory Accreditation Board ( ASCLAD ) and LaboratoryInspector , the American C hemic al Society , the American Societyof Crime Laboratory Directors , the ASCLAD Laboratory Board ofDirectors , the American Ac ademy for Forensic Scientists , and theSociety of Forensic Toxicologists . He has tes tified more thanninety times as an expert in the courts of New Jersey andPennsylvania . He provided exten sive testimony in Chun . During his long c areer in the OFS , Brettell performed asubstantial role in the breath testing program and acquiredsubstantial knowledge and expertise in breath t es ting and breathtesting ins truments . Brettel l ' s role with the Alcote s t 7 1 10 began when he wasassistant to Chief Forensic Scientist Dr . Char l e s Tindall . Theyevaluated breath test ins truments for purchase for the State ofNew Jersey to replace the breathalyzer instrument which was then 52 in use . After evaluating several diffe rent products , theyrecommended the Alcotest 7 1 10 . Brettell then took on theresponsibility for developing the technical proc edures foroperating this device and for developing the c a libration checkprocedure for it . He is the author of the Calibration Chec k P rocedure whichis at the heart of this proceeding ( S - 3 2 ) . The final revisionof that document was effective December 1 3 , 2004 , and it remainsin effect at this time without alteration . Brettell could notrecol lect how many previous versions preceded that finalrevision . He estimated no more than five . The first versionmust have been in effect by December 2 000 , when the pilotprogram for the Alcotest 7 1 10 began in Pennsauke n . Brettelltestified that every version contained the requirement to testthe simu lator solutions with a NI ST-traceable thermometer beforeactivating the CALIBRATE function during the c alibrationprocess . Brettell was qualified in this proceeding to render expertopinions in the fields of forensic chemistry , forensictoxicology , scientific measuring , and breath testing . Brettel l demonstrated a very high level of knowledge andexpertise in the fields for whic h he was qualified . Inparticular , h e possessed a very high level of knowledge 53 regarding the Alcotest 7 1 10 instrument and its component parts .He performed the testing and validation of the instrument beforefinalizing the decision to purchase it . He developed a l l of theprotocols to effectuate nec essary scientific safeguards toassure scientific re liability in the breath tests it wouldproduce . The safeguards were incorporated into the CalibrationCheck Procedure or other protocols in the OPS . Brette l l ' sknowledge of these safeguards , the reasons for them and theirimportance was c le arly superior to that of any other witness whotestified in this proceeding. Brettel l answered a l l questions candidly and forthrightly ,regardless of who was asking them. He was very sincere andcareful in giving his a nswers . He disp layed a very high levelof appreciation for the solemn responsibility he had inselecting a breath testing device and developing scientific allyreliable protocols to achieve in the best way possib le thehighest level of scientific re liability in breath test results .This demonstrated his appreciation , spoken as a scientist , ofwhat l awyers and judges would refer to as the constitutionaldimension of the need for breath test results that aresufficiently scientific a l ly reliable to be used for evidentialpurposes and which , standing alone , constitute proof of guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt . 54 Brettel l's testimony was very credible . The facts to whichhe testified and the opinions he rendered are entitled to verysubstantial weight . 3. Brian Shaffer Brian Shaffer is an emp loyee of Draeger . He rec eived aBachelor of Sc ience degree in engineering in 1 9 9 2 from theUniversity of Pittsburg h . H e holds no post-graduate degrees .He worked in several jobs before being employed by Draeger in2003 . Whi l e employed by Draeger , Shaffer received in-housetraining regarding breath testing instruments manufactured byDraeger . He also attended the Robert Borkenstein School , takinga one-week seminar for alcohol , and another program for drugs .He also took a Windows CE course dealing with operating systemsand designing imbedded systems . Although Shaffer does not have formal education incomputer science or computer programming , and he ac knowledgesnot being trained in computer sc ience , he began his c areer atDraeger as a software engineer , a position which he held forabout nine years . I n this rol e , he collected and managedspecificat ions and requirements from customers and formed thoseinto source codes and a lgorithms that are placed i nto firmware .Shaffer explained that breath testing instruments have a basic 55 firmware that is developed at the factory , in Draeger ' s case inGermany . Then , customi zed codes are written to be imbedded inthe firmware for each custome r , and they are different dependingupon the needs of each customer . Shaffer wrote the source codesthat customi zed the Alcotest 7 1 10 for New Jersey'sspec i f ications . In Shaffer was c a l led by Judge King to test i fy asboth a fact witness and an expert in source code wr itingregarding the source code customized for New Jersey ( King SMR IIat 8 ; 1 4 ; 62 ) . The sub j ects on which he test i f ied are unrelatedto the present c ase ( King SMR II at 6 2 - 7 9 ) . 1 4 From 2 0 1 3 to 2 0 1 7 , Shaf fer worked as a "bid and tendermanager . " I n that role , he carried many of the sameresponsibi l ities as he had when he was a software engineer ,serving as a l i a ison between the customer and the variousinternal departments of the company , including the research anddevelopment , logistics , service , and legal departments ." Defendant contends that Shaf fer " held the opinion in the Chun l i t i gation that the use of a NIST-traceable thermometer was not necessary" and that "Judge King did not find Mr . Shaffer ' s opinion persuasive i n as Judge King recommended the use of a N IST-traceable thermometer to the New Jersey Supreme Court , contrary to Mr . Shaf fer's opinion" ( Db 3 3 -Db34 ) . This is incorrect . Shaf fer's testimony in Chun rel ated solely to software development , he discussed nothing regarding New Jersey ' s Cal ibration Check Procedures or the use of a NIST thermometer , and Judge King found his testimony to be " comp l etely re l i able and forthri ght " ( King SMR II at 7 9 ) . 56 Since 2 0 1 7 , Shaffer ' s t itle has been " TechnicalSpe c i alist . " He is the sole responsible party in the UnitedStates to support the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 . That instrument iscurrently used i n New Jersey and Alabama , as we l l as in a fewcounties in Cal ifornia . Shaffer is a " remote " employee , working primarily from hishome in Colorado . He occasionally travels to each of the twoDraeger locations i n Texas , mostly to the service workshop , onaverage a few times a year . He also travels around the countryto trade shows , where he engages in sales activities onDraeger ' s behalf . He also travels to customer locations toengage in customer relations and provide service support toexisting customers , inc luding New Jersey . Shaffer described the a llocation of his work as " about two­thirds sales, one-third would be pro j e c t management related tothe technic a l aspects of my role " ( 10T6 8 ) . Thus, heac knowledged that " two-thirds of [ his] time is spent dedicatedto making money for Draeger " ( 10T6 9 ) . Essenti a l l y , Shaffer isthe national sales manager for Draeger ' s breath testinginstruments . Most of his t ime with Draeger is devoted topromoting sales of Draeger products . Shaffer was primarily a fact witness in this case . It wasc lear from his voir dire examination that he did not profess to 57 have expertise i n certain relevant areas , and the State madec lear that i t was not offering him as an expert in those areas .Thus , he was not being offered to give expert testimony insource code writing nor as an expert i n the New Jerseycalibration check procedure ( 9 T50 ) . Likewise , he was notoffered as an expert in traceabil ity ( 9 T 7 9 ) . Although Shafferstated that he had an understanding of what NIST is and that itprovides a nationally recogni zed standard of measurement s , heacknowledged that he had never read the NIST guidelines fortraceability ( 9 T 7 7 - 9 T7 8 ) . Although the State proffered Shaffer as an expert on theworkings of Alcotest 7 1 10 , it was l imited to " the internalDraeger procedures for testing and certifying the CU 3 4 , theblack key temperature probe and the agency temperature probes . "[ 9T 8 8 : 1 3 - 2 1] . Further , counsel for the State made clear thathe was " not offering [ S haffer] as a scientific expert' ( 9T 9 3 ) . 'His expertise with regard to the Alcotest 7 1 10 would be limitedto his working knowledge from a technical aspect of " theinternal Draeger procedures for testing and certifying the CU3 4 ,the black key temperature probe , and the agency temperatureprobe s " ( 9 T 9 3 ) . Stated more simply , the State offered Shafferas an expert with respect to "what does the instrument do "( 9T9 4 ) . 58 Subject to those limitations , I qualified Shaffer asfol lows : THE COURT : All right . Here ' s - I'm going to allow this witness to continue to testify with regard to his expertise about the devic e , i nstrument itse lf , the 7 1 10 , wh ich he was a participant in the development of the firmware and the refinement of it to its current form . He ca n testify about the interna l Draeger procedures with which he is fami l iar as a long-time employee of Drae ger , and in his role there for testing and certifying the CU3 4 units , and the black key temperature probes , and agency probes and what the results of the c al ibration process , in his opinion , would be with or without the N I ST­ traceable thermometer being used as an early step in the process . He is qualified , in my view , to give testimony in those regards . Everything else will go to weight . [ 9T 1 0 7 - 7 to 2 2 . ] Shaffer's level of expertise is c learly limited . Hiseducation i n e l ectrical engineering does not qualify him totestify as an expert i n the fie lds of chemistry or physics ,which drive the issue i n this case . There is no dispute thatShaffer is not a scientist and he was not proffered as ascientific expert . His knowledge of breath testing programs andi nstruments is l imited to their technical aspects . Shaffer's testimony was candi d , he was knowledgeableregarding Draeger procedures , and he provided answers withoutundue evasion or equivocation . Howeve r , I further find from his 59 background , experience and the testimony he gave and the mannerin which he gave it , that Shaffer has a built-in bias whichserves to favor the State's position. He is a long-time Draegeremployee. Having written the source codes for the New Jerseyversion of the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 , he is invested with defending thefirmware and the device itse l f , when operated in accordance withDraeger's recommendations, without the need for additionalsafeguards imposed by an end-user , inc luding New Jersey . Basedon his employment , he has an interest in defending and promotingthese devices as highly desirable for use by governmentalentities , which are the present and prospective customers withwhom he deals on Draeger's behalf. It is only natural that hewould view any additional safeguards , beyond those recommendedby Draeger , as not necessary or even important to assurere liability. When testifying about various additional safeguardsBrette ll put into the c alibration procedure , inc luding but notlimited to the use of the NI ST-traceable thermometer , S hafferrepeatedly refused to acknowledge their worth or importance ,stating instead that they did no harm but they were notnecessary . These assertions were at odds with other credibletestimony in the case , including from the State ' s other experts. 60 Based upon Shaffer's limited educational background , lackof scientific expertise , and his bias in favor of Draeger andits products, inc luding the New Jersey Alcotest 7 1 10 and itsfirmware , I find Shaffer ' s credibility to be limited , and I donot attribute high weight to it . 4. Dr . Howard J . Baum Dr . Howard J . Baum served as the Director of the OPS fromMarch 1 7 , 2008 to his retirement on June 1 , 2 0 1 7 . Prior tothat , Baum had never been employed by the State of New Jersey inany capacity . His prior professional experience was in theState of New Yor k . His educational background is as fol lows : He received aBachelor of Science degree in biology with a concentration inbiochemistry from Corne l l University in 1 9 7 9 . I n 1 9 8 6 , hereceived from Brandeis University a Ph . D . degree in biochemistrywith a concentration in molecular biology , which is DNA . Prior to being employed in New Jersey , Baum served asAssistant Director , and eventually Deputy Director , of theForensic Biology Department of the Office of the Chief MedicalExaminer in New York City . He also served as the DNA TechnicalLeader in that office . He was responsible for the day-to-dayoperation of the Forensic Biology Department , which concentratedon DNA testing and some serology . Notab l y , Baum was responsible 61 for the World Trade Center DNA ident i f icat ion of the missingpersons and crime scene reconstruction. It is c lear that Baum's primary area of scientificexpertise is i n the field of DNA studies and analysis . Indeed ,since his retirement i n 2 0 1 7 from his position i n New Jerse y , heis an owner of Baum Sc ienti fic Consulting , LLC , through which heis now handling only DNA cases. He holds six patents , a l ldealing with DNA . Of his thirty-seven pub l ications, aboutthirty involve DNA. None i nvolve breath testing. Heacknowledged that it is we l l known in the scient ific communitythat he is a nat ionwide expert on DNA testing. Prior to becoming employed in New Jersey in 2008 , Baum hadno experience whatsoever in breath testing programs or withbreath testing devices . After being employed in New Jersey asDirector of the OFS , he took some training from the State Policeand Draeger to learn the basics of New Jersey's breath testingprogram and the device used , whi c h , at the time of his hire wasthe Alcotest 7 1 10 ( 1 2 T2 2 ) . He acknowledged that he had neverused or touched an Alcotest device in his prior position( 12T36 ) . His training encompassed an aggregate time of aboutthree to four weeks over a period of about a year ( 1 3 T l 7 ) . Whil e employed as Director of the OFS , Baum generallydevoted about ten to f i fteen percent of his time to the breath 62 testing program ( 1 2 T 3 7 ) . When he f irst arrived , an individualon the existing staff was the manager of the breath testingprogram. At some point , Baum hired Alaouie ( also a witness i nthis c ase ) , whom he designated a s the manager o f the program .As such , those individuals were responsible for the day-to-dayoperations of the breath testing program, for testing andcert i fying the accuracy of simulator solutions, and for settingup and monitoring the ce ntral database , also known as theAlcotest Inquiry System . Baum is a certi f ied ISO 1 7 0 2 5 laboratory assessor ( 1 2T20-1 2 T2 1 ) . He acknowledged that through A2LA he performs ISO 1 7 0 2 5accreditation evaluations , and h e acknowledged that I SO 1 7 0 2 5accreditation i s the hi ghest level of accreditation and c a n becharacteri z e d as the "gold standard" ( 12T47 ) . He alsoacknowledged that N I ST is the gold standard for traceabil ity( 1 2 T53 - 1 2T54 ) . He acknowledged his fami l iarity with the NISTpol icy review materials in evidence ( A- 1 ) ( 12Tl ll-12Tll3 ) . I t is c lear f rom a review o f Baum ' s over a l l testimony overa period of three days that he never took a particularly activerole in the breath testing program, never fami l iarized himse l fthoroughly with i t , and possesses limited knowledge about it .For example , he did not know that the simulator solutions comeinto the OFS with a certif ication of accuracy from the 63 laboratory that produced them . Therefore , he did not know thatthe testing of sample bottles in the OFS constituted a retestingas an added safeguard to assure scientific rel i ability. Thesame was true regarding Alcotest instruments received fromDraeger after repair . He said that " [ u] sually the Alcotesti nstruments are not certified" when repaired by Draeger , addin g ,"They're not cert ified , per se '' ( 1 3T54 ) . But when pressed andshown a Draeger certificate of accuracy for an Alcotest 7 1 1 0 , heagreed that " [ t] here is paperwork with certification" fromDraeger with the instruments returned after repair ( 1 3T54-1 3T55 ; S - 9 G ) . Another significant example can be found i n his testimonyregarding CU3 4 read-out models. The CU34s uti l i zed in NewJersey with the 7 1 1 0 do not have a screen to read outtemperature . Baum described in great detail that he consideredobtaining CU34s for use with the 7 1 10s which did contain such aread-out screen . He said he obtained them, and had them testedin the lab. He said he was considering using them as areplacement for the NIST-traceable thermometer step i n theprotocol . When asked why he didn ' t do so , he said his time ranout before his retirement , and also that there were fundingproblems. I directed the State to produce documentation toverify this information bec ause Baum had never referred to it in 64 his reports and it constituted a surprise . The following day ,counsel for the State reported that upon checki ng , it waslearned that the simulator devices Baum was referring to did notapply to the 7 1 10 at . a l l . They appl ied to the consideration theState was then giving to obtaining a new instrument , and one ofthe models it was considering was Draeger ' s new generation 9 5 1 0 ,which evidently comes with a simulator that contains a read-out . Much of Baum's testimony was self-contradictory . I n someinstances , the contradictions were within testimony he gave i nthis very hearing . On other occasions , he gave testimony inthis hearing that conflicted with a statement he gave tocriminal investigators in the Dennis case in December 2 015. Andhe also rendered testimony in this case that was contradictoryto testimony he gave in the Holland hearing . I will discusssome of those with more particularity in the remainder of thissection . I n addition to noting Baum's l imited knowledge of thebreath testing program and inconsistency in his testimony , Ialso note shortcomings in his recollection of events . Further ,as I observed his demeanor and manner of answering questions, Inote that his answers were often vague or qua l ified , resultingin a l a c k of c l arity and allowing for him to change his answers 65 if challenged . He also bec ame argumentative and evasive on manyoccasions in an ef fort to avoid having to answer questions . For a l l of these reason s , which I will continue to discussin further detail , I did not attach to Baum's tes timony a highlevel of credibility , nor do I attribute significant weight toit . Baum was qualified a s an expert in the three fields forwhich he was offere d , namely the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 , the breathtes ting program, and scientific measurement . He proceeded inhis substantive tes timony to dis cuss those areas and renderopinions in them. As I have previous ly describe d , some of hisopinions were at odds with opinions he previously gave in otherproceedings , and some were internally inconsistent within histes timony in this proceeding . I t is apparent to me that Baum went out of his way toconform his tes timony to fit a significant argument the Stateoriginally made in seeking this Special Master proceeding ,name ly that use of the NIST-traceable thermometer is merely apre-step 15 for administrative convenience to prevent the waste oftime by a coordinator if he were to begin the CALIBRATE functionand one of the simulator solutions was out of range . However ,15 Baum and the State used the terms " pre-step " and " pre-te s t " interchange ably . 66 Baum then ac knowledged that the same purpose can be achievedwith the black key temperature probe ( i f that probe could berelied upon for the required accuracy ) . He explained that acoordinator could plug the black key probe into the Alcotestdevice , pull up the correct screen , and get a read-out , aprocedure which could be per formed on each of the four CU3 4sbefore activating the CALIBRATE function ( 1 2T58 ; 1 3T2 3 ) . At another point i n his testimony , Baum said this about theNIST-traceable thermometer : And the temperature probe from the thermometer i s , in a pre-test , is put i nto the simulator solution to make sure that it ' s c lose to the 3 4 degrees that is necessary . When I say c lose , between 3 3 . 8 and 3 4 . 2 degrees Celsius and it's used to take temperature of the simulator solution i n this process . [ 1 2T2 2 4 -9 to 15 . ]When asked why he ca l l e d it a " p re-step , " Baum said : [ I] t's i n the protocol for the cal ibration of the instrument , but it's a test to make sure that they are at approximately the proper temperature before plugging it i n with a black key temperature probe and plugging it into the instrument , the Alcotest instrument . [ 1 2T2 2 4 - 2 2 to 2 2T 2 2 5-2 . ] This testimony is an example of a witness trying to fit aproverbial round peg into a square hole . Baum attempted tominimize the importance of the NI ST-traceable thermometer step 67 by calling it a " pre-test " and stating that it only has to showthat the solutions " are at approximately the propertemperature . " Yet , those concepts are internally inconsistentbec ause he also identified the range which he characterized asbeing sufficient if they are " approximate l y " correct . The rangehe described is the precise range that is required in thecalibration procedure . Further , he twice said that the NIST­traceable thermometer is used to "make sure " the temperaturesare within the precise required range . Of course , "make sure "means to be certain that the required range is achieved . Although characteriz ing this step as a mere " pre-test , "Baum did not dispute that i f the NIST-traceable thermometer doesnot give readings within range for al. l four CU3 4 s , thecoordinator is prohibited from proceeding with the calibration( 1 4T 8 ) . Thus , Baum ' s attempted minimi z ation of the importanceof this step is contradicted by his own testimony and that ofevery other witness in the case . At another point , Baum was again asked whether theprocedure , prepared by Brettell , recommended by Judge King , andapproved by the Supreme Court , was required to be fol lowed toensure scientific reliabi l i ty . Baum tried to avoid the key partof the question by saying the Court " said the procedure had tobe fol lowed . " When pressed as to whether the Court required it 68 to "ensure and guarantee tbe sc ientific reliab i l ity of theAlcotest , " he finally said ' 'Corre c t " ( 1 3Tl05- 1 3 T 106 ) . There were significant discrepancies between Baum's answersto investigators in his December 2 1 , 2015 interview and histestimony before me . I n that interview , he said that i f theNIST-traceable thermome ter was not used , if the " internalthermometer , • by which he meant the Draeger black key or agencyprobe , was not operating correctly , but read between 3 3 . 8 and34 . 2 , ' 'the would even it shouldn ' t " ( 1 4Tl 7 3 )( emphasis added ) . He then tried to negate that answer in histestimony in this case i n two ways . First , he said it was apoor question so his answer didn ' t come out right . Second, hesaid that he only meant one calibration test would pass , not theentire c a l ibration procedure ( 1 4 T 1 7 8 ) . S imilarly , i n his December 2 1 , 2015 statement , he answeredthe fol lowing questions i n the following manner : Q. So it says , HB . I ' m going to start with the quest ion . Question . This is from D - 1 8 as wel l . That NIST thermometer then comes into play to ensure that the temperature of those solut ions are 3 4 degrees? A. Correct . Q. If they weren't 3 4 degrees , uh , and the coordinator proceeded with the recalibration process , would he be successful , he or she be successful ? 69 A. Yes, he would. Q. Question : How so? A. I t would generate a linear line . However , when went to an individual was arrested for drunk it wouldn ' t be an accurate of their blood alcohol concentration . [ 1 4 T l 8 3 - 2 to 1 6 ( emphasis added ) .]The n , continuing with '' live '' questioning in this hearing : Q. And you read that - I ' m reading this correctly . It wouldn ' t be an accurate reading of their blood alcohol concentration . That's what you state d , correct? A. That ' s what I state d , correct . Q. Okay . And there ' s no qualifying l anguage by you there , correct? A. Correct. [ 1 4 Tl 8 3 - 1 7 to 2 4 .]Yet , Baum then tried to negate the testimony he gave in thatstatement by saying that skipping the NI ST-traceable temperaturemeasurement in the c alibration process wou l d not be a problembecause if the CU34 temperatures were out of range , it would bepicked up by the black key probe or the agency probe or theCU3 4s themselves ( 1 4Tl 8 7 ) . This clearly contradicts what hesaid in his previous statement given in the Dennis criminal 70 investigation . This is yet another example of why I c annot relyon Baum ' s opinions , which are often in conflict with each other . This witness exhibited a low leve l of knowledge ,recol lection , candor and consistency . His "reliable enough"approach to the requirement of NIST traceab i l ity to assurescientific reliabi l ity is not we l l supported by his owntestimony . Nor is it persuasive in estab lishing that withoutthe NI ST-traceable step the Alcotest device does not drop belowthe level required to render results that are suffic ientlyscientific a l ly reliable for their intended purpose , namely forevidential use , in which they establish per se gui lt beyond areasonable doubt . 5. Dr . Ali M . Alaouie Dr . Ali M . Alaouie rece ived an undergraduate degree inchemistry from the College of Staten Island in New York in 1 9 9 9 .He received a Master ' s Degree in environmental sc ience from LongIsland University in New Yor k . I n 2006 , he received a Ph . D .degree from North Carol ina State University in Raleigh , NorthCarol ina in chemistry . He subsequently participated i n twoone-year appointments for post-doctoral work . The first was inbiochemistry a t the University of Edmonton i n Canada ; t he secondinvolved ca ncer research at New York University at thePolytechnic Institute in Brooklyn . Alaouie also received a 71 professional certific ate from New York University in U . S . Lawand Methodologies . Alaouie has been employed in the OFS since January 3 0 ,2012 . His official title is Research Scientist , and hisfunctional title is Program Manager of the Breath Testing Unit .As such , his primary functions are to conduct va lidationstudies , scientific measurements , and any kind of data-drivenanalysis or research . As Program Manager of the Breath Testing Unit , Al aouieoversees the Alcotest Online Public Database ( also known as theAlcotest Inquiry System ) . This database captures and preservesthe data from breath tests administered to subjects and solutionchanges . Because of a "bug" in the Alcotest firmware , thesystem does not capture calibration records . The system alsodoes not capture the probe value of the Draeger probes itreports upon . Alaouie limits his role in this regard tochecking on a weekly basis to be sure that all police agenciesare uploading their data into the system. If there is atechnic a l problem, he makes arrangements to send appropriatetechnicians to that police department to address it . If morethan two or three weeks go by during which a department has notuploaded its data , a reminder is sent . However , neither he noranyone acting under his supervision reviews the data for 72 purposes of analysis , which might identify and address anytrends that might be problematic . Alaouie took the Robert Borkenst e i n course on alcohol andhighway safety in 2 0 10. I n 2 01 1 , he took training coursesadmi nistered by the New York City Police Department regardingthe I ntoxilyzer breath testing device . He also receivedtraining provided by N I S T , consisting of a two-day workshop in2 01 3 , which de alt with trends in synthetic drugs . In 2015,Alaouie completed a course which resulted in his certificationto i nspect accredited l aboratories according to ISO 1 7025standards . He has e i ther observed or performed about 100cal ibrations of the 7 1 10 while employed by the OFS . Another major part of Alaouie's role is to check simulatorsolutions for accuracy and cert ify them before they can be usedby the State Police or local police departments in cal ibratingAlcotest i nstruments or administering breath tests . Thesolutions are generated by various suppl iers , and they come witha certificate of accuracy issued by those suppliers . However ,it is part of the protocol established by Brettell that thesesolutions must be checked by the OFS before they can be used .The testing procedure compl ies with ISO 17025 standards , ac rossfive data points using five separate concentrations . Themeasurements are made against NI ST-traceable standards, and the 73 measurement results are NIST-traceable . Alaouie oversees andreviews the work done by scientists under his supervision and ,upon his satisfaction that all procedures have been performedcorrectly and a l l calculations are correct , he signs thecertificates of accuracy for the simulator solutions . Alaouie does not possess any specialized computerknowledge , including the ability to write or understand sourcecodes , programming , algorithms , and the like . He is not acomputer scientist or programmer . Alaouie has performed a significant role in validating theAlcotest 9 5 1 0 , which is expected to be the next breath testinginstrument used in New Jersey when it replaces the Alcotest7 1 10 . As part of the v alidation process of the 9510 , Alaouiedid not per form any SIM TEMP error statistical testing betweenthe 7 1 10 and the 9510 . He has never interrogated the 7 1 10system regarding SIM TEMP errors for the purpose of conducting astatistical analysis of such errors . Al aouie ac knowledged that in every procedure in whichaccuracy of measurement of temperature is critic a l , themeasurement must be made with a N I ST-traceable instrument . Hefurther acknowledged that the user is obligated to satisfyitse lf of NIST traceability . He has relied upon the Draegercertificates of accuracy for the black key and agency probes . 74 Those certificates do not contain the subst antial documentationrequired to sati sfy NIST standards . Alaouie has never contactedDraeger in an effort to determine whether NIST standards aresatisfied and to obtain the required documentation to s atisfyhims e lf , on behalf of the State of New Jers e y , the user , of NISTtraceabil ity. I qualified Alaouie as an expert in the Alcotest 7 1 10 , thetesting of s imulator solution s , and sc ientific measurement . Ifound him to be a very credible witne s s . He was forthright i nanswering questions posed b y a l l parties . The bul k of Alaouie's substantive testimony dealt with thetesting of s imulator solutions . This was not a hotly contestedi s sue . Alaouie's testimony demonstrated that appropriatesc ientific procedures were utili zed before he s i gnedcertificates of accuracy for the simulator solutions . Thetesting was comp l iant with all NIST-traceab i lity standards , asevidenced by the certificates he i s sued . I attributesubstantial weight to his testimony in this r egard. As to other i s sues deal ing directly with the questionbefore me , namely whether the fai lure to use the NIST-traceablethermometer undermines or c a l l s into question the s c ientificreliabil ity of resulting breath tests , Alaouie • s knowledge andexperience i s l imited . For the reasons I will d iscus s , I did 75 not find persuasive the underlying reasons he gave for hisul timate opinion that failure to use the NI ST-traceablethermometer woul d not undermine or c a l l into question thescientific re liability of breath tests . Thus , in areas otherthan the testing of the simu lator solutions , I did not attachsignificant weight to Alaouie ' s opinions . B. Defense witness 1. Dr . Andreas Sto l z Dr . Andreas Sto l z holds a Ph . D . degree i n physics , which heobtained from the Technical University in Munich , Germany .Metrology , the study of how to measure and the analysis ofmeasurements , is part of his educ ation in physics . He has beenin the United States since 2001 . He has been employed atMichigan State University since that time , first as an assistantprofessor , then an associate professor , and is now the head ofoperations for the National Superconducting Cycl otron Laboratoryat Michigan State . Dr . Sto l z has presented many seminars and programs toattorneys , prosecutors , and j udges in several states regardingthe science of breath testing . Of the fourteen presentationslisted in his CV, seven include in the tit l e the word metrology ,five others in their titles refer to measurements , and the 76 remaining two deal with forensic analysis in drunk driving cases( 1 7T l7 ) . Stolz has test i f ied as an expert in drunk driving casesabout twenty times, always for the defense . He has co-authore d ,together with a DWI defense attorney , many pub lications dealingwith breath test i ng . Although these c ircumstances indicate adefense-oriented leani n g , they also demonstrate extensiveknowledge and experience in the field of breath testing . I qual i f ied Stolz as an expert in physics , metrology , andthe science of breath testing ( 1 7T53 ) . I n broad general terms ,Stolz's opinion is that without using the NI ST-traceablethermometer there is no way of knowing what the temperature ofthe simulator solution i s . He was emphatic that neither theDraeger black key nor agency probes are NIST-traceable , i . e .they are not capable of produc ing NI ST-traceable measurements .And , because the measurement results from the probes do notinclude any expression of measurement uncertainty , there is noway of knowing the range of that uncertaint y . I t i s thatproblem that cause s , i n his op inion , a loss of scient i f i creliab i l ity i n t h e ca l ibration process . He ac knowledged , as everyone does , that all measurementshave uncertainty . This is not a problem in science . I t isnorma l . It is accounted for by determining and expressing the 77 extent of the measurement uncertainty , which then provides arange within which an accurate measurement would fall . Withoutthe NI ST-traceable thermometer step , it is the absence ofmeasurement uncertainty with the Draeger i nstruments thatrenders the c a l ibration process scientifically unreliable . I found his testimony to be credible . He was veryforthright and precise in his responses . He " gave ground" whenit was cal led for , and his testimony was very candid . Hisdescription of the science underlying breath testing wasthorough and demonstrated a very good understanding of thescientific principles involved . I attribute significant weightto his testimony . IV . DISCUSS ION A. Burden of and of the The Chun Court held that the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 , "with thesafeguards we have required , is sufficiently scientificallyreliable that its reports may be admitted in evidence . " 194 N . J . at 1 4 8 . The Court further explained : Our analysis of the general sc i entific reli abi lity of the Alcotest is grounded , in part , on our expectation that there will be proof that the particular device that has generated an AIR being offered into evidence was in good work ing order and that the operator of the device was appropr iately qua l ified to administer the test . This requirement that the test results be supported by foundational proofs for 78 admissibil ity has been part of our j urisprudence since we decided Romano . There we demanded that , as a precondition for admissibil ity of the results of a breathaly z e r , the State was required to establish that : ( 1 ) the device was in working order and had been inspected according to procedure ; ( 2 ) the operator was cert i f i e d ; and ( 3 ) the test was administered according to official procedure . at 1 3 4 Romano , 9 6 N . J . at 8 1 . J These elements, inc luding the good working order of thebreath testing i nstrument at issue , must be proven by the Stateby c l e a r and convincing evidence . Romano , 9 6 N . J . at 9 0 ( " I ndrunk driving prosecutions a substantial burden of proof toestablish the competence or admissibil i ty of the results of thebreathalyzer test is appropriate because of the seriousconsequences of the breathalyzer reading in suchprosecutions . " ) . As the Romano Court explained : Under conditions of admissibil ity must be "c learly established . " 42 N . J . at 1 7 1 . To avoid any confusion over what is intended by this level of proof , it should be understood that it conforms to that standard conventionally ref erred to as " c lear and convincing proof . " The conditions of admissibility to which this burden of proof sha ll apply inc lude those presently required to establish the admissibility of the results of a breathalyzer test , name l y , the proper operating condition of the machi ne , the requisite qual i f ications of the operator , and the proper administration of the test . at 90- 9 1 . ] 79 Clear and convincing evidence " is a higher standard ofproof than proof by a preponderance of the evidence but a lowerstandard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt . " Mut .Ins . C o . v . 186 N . J. 163, 1 6 9 - 70 ( 2006 ) . Evidence that isc lear and convincing " should produce in the mind of the trier offact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of theallegations sought to be established . " Ibid . In re 134 N . J . 2 2 8 , 240 ( 19 93 ) ) . " To sat isfy theintermediate cl e ar-and-convincing standard , the fact finder'must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is " highlyprobabl e . " ' " In re 207 N . J . 2 75 , 2 8 9 - 90 ( 201 1 ) ( quoting2 McCormick on 3 4 0 , at 4 8 7 ( Broun ed . , 6th ed .2006 ) ) . The evidence must be " so c l e a r , direct and weighty andconvincing" as to enab l e the factfinder to come. to a " c learconviction , wi thout hesitancy , " of the facts in issue . Ibid ."Notab l y , evidence that is uncontroverted may nonetheless failto meet the elevated c l ear and convincing evidence standard . "Ibid . " This heightened standard is typically app lied where theevidentiary matters are complex , prone to abuse , error ori n j ustice , and also where an individual's i nterests i n libertyor personal welfare are at stake . " State v . 449 N.J.Super . 2 3 1 , 2 5 7 ( App . Div . 2 0 1 7 ) . 80 The State has conceded that it bears the burden of provingby clear and convincing evidence that the omis sion of the NIST-traceable thermometer step in the c alibration proc e s s does notundermine or c a l l into ques tion the scientific reliability ofthe Alcote s t 7 1 10 ( 1T l 6 ; Pb2 ) . 1 6 The State' s position is that " [ u] sing the NIST-traceabledigital thermometer improves confidence in the results but doesnot affect the scientific reliability of the ins trument " ( Pb5 2 ) .This position is premised on the arguments that ( 1 ) Draeger usesNIST-traceable instruments to test and rece rtify the Draegerprobes and CU 3 4 s , so those devices are sufficiently reliablewithout an independent check ( Pb 4 ; Pb 3 8 -Pb 4 0 ; Pb4 4 -Pb4 8 ; Pb 5 8 -Pb 7 9 ) , and ( 2 ) even without the NIST thermometer , the checks andbalances built into the calibration procedure , combined with thescientific principles of breath testing , make it astronomic a l lyunlikely that a CU34 heating to an out-of-range temperaturewould go undetected through the whole c alibration check proc e s s( Pb3 ; Pb l 9 -Pb2 0 ; Pb 5 4 -Pb57 ) .11 I n its brief, the state characteriz es the is sue as ' 'general acceptance in the scientific community , " but this mis states the standard ( Pb 2 ) . Chun e s t ablished the general acceptance of the Alcote st . The question here , as in Romano , goes to the good working order of a breath-testing instrument that has a lready achieved gener a l acceptanc e . 81 Defendant and the parti c ipating attorneys stress theimportance of having an independent , NIST-traceable measurementresult for the CU34s during each c a l ibration check procedure ,and they contend that nothing short of that wi l l suf f ice ( Db 7 7 -Db7 9 ; Mb2 5 -Mb2 6 ; Rb l ) . The NJSB argues that the many safeguardsrequired by the Chun Court , inc luding use of the NIST-traceablethermometer , form " a careful balance of many parts needed tomake a ' suffic iently ' scientifical l y reliable system' for breath 'testing and that removing the NIST thermometer part of thisbal anced system creates an unjust i f ied leve l of scientificuncertainty for evidence used in criminal and quasi-criminalmatters ( Ab 8 -Ab l 2 ) . B. As detai le d above , having the temperature of the simulatorsolution i n the CU3 4s be 3 4 ° C , plus or minus . 2 ° c , is ofcritical importance to the c a l ibration and operation of theAlcotest . Being able to measure the solution temperature withreasonable scienti fic certainty is fundamental to ascertainingthe good working order of the CU3 4s and , indirectly , the goodworking order of the Draeger probes and the i nstrument itse l f . Measuring temperature is not as simple or straightforwardas measuring , say , a length of wood . Dr . Sto l z explained whytemperature is more dif f icult to measure : Wel l , temperature is actually difficult to measure , bec ause it's one of the few things that you can't measure directly . If you measure a length , you can compare two items of the same length easi ly . Just hold it ba ck t o back together and you can compare it . Temperature is different . And so in sc ience we measure temperature by the effect it has on other things . I t changes the properties of other things . I t might be changing the volume of somethin g . That is what you usually have i n thermometers that have a l ittle column inside . It might change the resistance of a smal l e lectronic element and that is what's built into those [ Draeger] probes . [ 1 7 T7 5-5 to 1 7 . ) I n the case of the black key and agency probes , bythemse lves they cannot provide a temperature reading ( 1 7 T 7 6 ) .Stolz explained : [ I)n order to achieve a temperature reading , the resistance [ reported by the probe) needs to be measured by the Alcotest , the resistance needs to be transformed by some e lectronic component into a voltage , the voltage is being measured by an analog digital converter and the number is then being c alculated with software into a temperature reading . [ 1 7 T 7 6 - 2 0 to 1 7 T 7 7 -l . ] Brett e l l expressly required the use of " a N I ST traceablethermometer " to verify the CU34 temperatures during thecal ibration check process ( S - 3 2 ) . He agreed that when heselected the Ertco-Hart thermometer , it was important that it be 83 traceable to a N I ST standard ( 7 Tll7 ) . He emphasized thecritical importance of an accurate temperature reading of thesimulator solutions : Wel l , like I s aid , the calibrating unit is what a l l the tests are based off of . The Alcotest gets c a librated against this c a librating unit and the s olution that ' s in it . And so the temperature that that solution ris e s to and equilibrates to is extreme ly , extremely important . And I wanted to make sure that the ca librating unit was tested against the standards of NIST when - before we started anything . [ 7T120- 1 9 to 7 T 1 2 1-l . ] " NIST refers to the National Institute of Standards andTechnology , which is responsible for es tablishin g , maintainingand publishing basic standards of measurement consistent withtheir international counterpart s . ' ' Holland I , 4 2 2 N . J . Super .at 1 9 1 n . 2 ( citing King SMR at 4 5 ) . NIST is part of theDepartment of commerce and was formerly known as the NationalBureau of Standards ( Chun 3 T 7 3 ) . During the Chun hearings , Samuel E . Chappel l , who hadworked for NIST for thirty-eight years before becoming aconsultant in legal metrology , expl ained : N I ST is the national metrology lab for the United State s , meaning the national measurement laboratory for the United State s . They have the responsibility for establishing and maintaining and dis seminating the basic s tandards of measurement that are consistent with 84 international standards and also they have responsibi l ity for c arrying out research and development related to requests from other federal agencies, and they cooperate , of course , with our industry in supporting the i r efforts that may need standard references and so forth . 3 T 7 3 - 4 to 1 4 . ]I n this case , Brettell noted that NIST sets " the standards forthe United States measureme nts , the SI units , volume , weight ,temperature " ( 7 T 4 9 ; 8T52 -8T53 ) . It is "the primary office forthe United States as far as standards are concerned" ( 7 T50 ) .Baum ac knowledged that NIST is the "gold standard" fortraceability ( 1 2 T53 - 1 2T54 ) . The concept of N IST traceabil ity is key in this case . NISTstates that " [ t] he definition of traceabil ity that has achi evedglobal acceptance i n the metrology community" is thattraceabil ity is the "property of a measurement result wherebythe result can be r e l ated to a reference through a documentedunbroken chain of c a l ibrations , each contribut ing to themeasurement uncertainty" (A- 1 at 1 ) . This defi n it ion wasaccepted by the experts in this case ( 7 Tl8 8 ; 9 T6 2 - 9T6 3 ; 10Tl4 2 -10Tl4 3 ; 1 1T35- 1 1T3 6 ; 1 4T- 3 3 ; D- 1 2 at 3 ) . Trace abi l ity of measurement results ensures that onemeasurement of a particular value is equivalent to anothermeasurement of that same value ( 1 4T3 2 - 1 4T 3 3 ) . I n the case of 85 temperature and the Alcotest , " [ w)hen we say 3 4 degrees Celsiusplus or minus . 02 degrees, we want to be absolutely certain thateverybody in the world would agre e " with that reference ( 1 4 T 3 3 ) . Only measurement results are traceable , not device s ,instruments , standards o r organiz ations ( A - 1 a t 1 -2 ) . " I t isimportant to note that traceability is the property of theresult of a measurement , not of an instrument or c alibrationreport or laboratory" ( A- 1 at 1 ) . Agai n , the experts did notdispute this basic principle ( 7T200 ; 10T 1 40 - 1 0T 1 4 2 ; 1 4 T52 ; 1 7 T 6 6 -17T67 ) . NIST has further explained : It [ traceability) is not achieved by following any one particular procedure or using special equipment . Merely having an instrument ca librated , even by N I ST , is not enough to make the measurement result obtained from that instrument traceable to realizations of the appropriate SI unit or other specified references . The measurement system by which values and uncertainties are transferred must be clearly understood and under control . [ A- 1 at 1 - 2 . ] The experts agreed that the NIST policy ( A- 1 ) isauthoritative ( 7 T200- 7T201 ; 1 4 T 3 1 - 1 4 T3 2 ; 15T 1 20- 15Tl2 1 ) . Brettellspecifically acknowledged that even having NIST calibrate aninstrument does not , alone , create traceability . 86 Because measurements rather than i nstruments are NISTtraceable , reference to a "NIST traceable thermometer " isinherently a bit of a misnomer . However , the phrase has beenused throughout the case as a shorthand term to signify athermometer providing temperature measurement results that aretraceable , meaning results that can be related to a NISTreference standard through an " unbroken chain of c a l ibrations ,each contributing to the measurement uncertainty " ( 1 2 T 1 9 5 ) . 17 I n its Supplementary Materials for NIST Policy Review, NISTaddressed the quest ion , " I want my measurement results to betraceable to NIST . What do I have to do? " ( A- 1 at 7 ) . Itexplained : To achieve traceabil ity of measurement results to standards maintained by N I ST , you need to reference your measurement results through an unbroken chain of c a l ibrations , inc luding determining the uncertainties at each step , to N I ST standards as the specified references . . . . The chain of c a l ibrations may be short , if the user has i nstruments or artifacts c a l ibrated by NIST or acquires standards from NIST and references measurement results to those . It may b e longer , if the user references other cal ibrations in a chain of cal ibrations back to sta ted references developed and maintained by N I ST . [ A- 1 at 7. ]17 As detailed below, the State • s effort to "water down" the definition of N I ST traceab i l ity is inconsistent with the global ly-accepted definit ion of the term . 87 N I ST has also explained the necessary e l ements tosupporting a valid c laim of traceab ility : To support a claim ( of traceabil ity] , the provider of a measurement result must document the measurement process or system used to establish the c laim and provide a description of the chain of cal ibrations that were used to establish a connection to a particular spec i f ied reference . There are several common elements to all valid statements or cl aims of traceabi lity : • a c learly defined particular quantity that has been measured • a compl ete description of the measurement system or working standard used to perform the measurement • a stated measurement result , which includes a documented uncertainty • a comp lete spec i f i cation of the reference at the time the measurement system or working standard was compared to it • an 'internal measurement assurance' program for establishing the status of the measurement system or working standard at all times pertinent to the c l aim of traceab i lity • an 'internal measurement assurance ' program for establishing the status of the spe c i fied reference at the t ime that the measurement system or working standard was compared to it An internal measurement assurance program may be quite simple or very complex , the level or r i gor to be determined depending on 88 the level of uncertainty at issue and what is needed to demonstrate its credib ility . Users of a measurement result are responsible for determining what is adequate to meet their needs . [ A- 1 at 2 - 3 . ] Consistent with these requirements , the AmericanAssoc iation for Laboratory Accreditation ( A2 LA ) " has noted that" [ t] raceabi lity is characterized by six essential e lements , " asfollows : 1. an unbroken chain of going back to a stated reference acceptable to the parties , usually a national or international standard; 2. measurement the uncertainty of measurement for each step i n the traceability chain must be c alculated or estimated according to agreed methods and must be stated so that an overall uncertainty for the whole chain can be calculated or estimate d ; 3. documentation : each step i n the chain must be performed according to documented and generally ac knowledged procedures ; and the results must be recorded ; 4. the laboratories or bodies performing one or more steps in the chain must supp ly evidence for their techn i ca l competence ( e . g . by18 A2LA is an accreditation body that accredits laboratories providing c a l ibration services , among others ( 1 7 T80- 1 7 T 8 1 ) . Stolz test i f ied that the A2LA Policy on Measurement Traceab il ity is recogn i z e d as authoritative by the scientific community ( 1 7 T 7 9 - 1 7 T8 0 ) . 89 demonstrating that they are accredite d ) ; 5. reference to SI units : the chain of comparisons must , where possible , end at primary standards for realization of the S I units ; 6. c alibration intervals : c a librations must be repeated at appropriate interval s ; the length in of these intervals will depend on a number of variables ( e . g . uncertainty required , frequency of use , way of use , stability of equipment ) . [ D- 1 2 at 4 . ] The cc thermometer used in the ca libration process providesNIST-trace able measurement results, and the " TraceableCertific ate of Ca libration for Digital Thermometer " provided byControl Company satisfies the e lements needed to establish NISTtrace ability [ 7T204- 7T206 ; 1 2Tl 1 3 ; 1 3 T6 2 - 1 3T 6 6 ; 1 7 T8 2 - 1 7 T8 3 ; 1 7 T l 4 3 -1 7 T l 4 4 ; 1 7 T2 1 1 - 1 7T2 1 2 ; D- 1 0 ; D - 10A] . The State has taken somewhat confusing and contrarypositions regarding the asserted NIST trace ability of theDraeger temperature probes , at times suggesting that the probesare NIST traceable and at others relying on the NISTtrace ability of the instrumentation used to c alibrate theprobes . For example , the State argues that "Draeger relies onfundamentally fol lowing a traceability of measurements reflectedin their operations , trainin g , and procedures , " that "NIST- 90 traceable standards were used to certify the CU- 3 4 s , thetemperature probes and the simulator solutions , " and that it has" proven NIST-traceabi lity of' the " safeguards' in place that ' 'ensure scientific reliability even if the N I ST thermometer stepis skipped ( Pb4 ; Pb57-Pb58 ) . But it also states that " [ i)ntesting the component parts of the Alcotest , Draeger usesinstruments that are third-party certified as traceable to NIST"and that the probes "are certified for accurac y usinginstrumentation with measurements traceable to NIST "( Pb 1 9 ; Pb 30 ) . For the reasons detai led below, I find that neither theblack key probes nor the agency probes provide N I ST-traceablemeasurement results. Shaffer explained the process by which Draeger checks andcertifies the accuracy of its probes. He noted that Draegeruses a "service workshop " rather than a " l aboratory , " and theservice technic ians perform the procedures ( 9 T4 4 ; 9T60 ) . Hestated that "our organi z ation is covered by an ISO 9001accreditation , and equipment that we use in our process is fromlaboratories that maintain NIST traceability for the ir 91 equipment " ( 9 T 6 5 ) . The service workshop does not haveaccreditation beyond ISO 9 0 0 1 ( 9 T 6 5 - 9T6 6 ; 1 0 Tl3 9 ) . 19 When doing an annual certification on a black key or agencytemperature probe , Draeger prepares "a 34 degree C water bath "( 9Tl3 2 ) . This i s " a large tank , maybe about the s i z e of a largefish tank" ( 9 Tl5 9 ) . It " has a pretty sophi sticated piece ofequipment at its core " called an " immersion c irculator " ( 9 Tl5 9 ) .The technician sets the temperature , and it heats and c irculatesthe liquid ( 9Tl5 9 ) . Typically , the water bath is " prepared theday before and there ' s plenty of equilibration that goes on "( 9Tl5 6 ) ." Accreditation i s a proc e s s by which an internationally recogniz e d accrediting organi z ation determines that a laboratory or company adheres to a set of recogn i zed standards ( 1 2 T 2 0 6 ) . ISO 9 0 0 1 ca n apply to any company and " s ets out the criteria for a qual ity management sy stem . " ISO 1 7 0 2 5 i s " the standard for calibration of testing laborator ie s " in particular ( 7T 4 8 ; 8Tl0 1 - 8Tl0 2 ) . I S O 1 7 0 2 5 accreditation indicates " a finding of a laboratory's competence and capabi l ity to provide technically sound and appropriate measurement services within the scope of [ the ] accreditation " ( 7 T 4 8 ) . ISO 1 7 0 2 5 i s " the hi ghest level of accreditation " for a testing laboratory ( 1 2 T 4 7 ) . ISO 1 7 0 2 5 accreditation i s not nece s s ary to e stablish NIST-traceab i l ity , but such accreditation i s evidence of the competence of the laboratory performing ca l ibrations ( 7 Tll8 ; 7 Tl2 1 ; 1 3 T 4 5 - 1 3 T4 6 ; 1 7 T2 2 2 ) . As N I ST exp l a ins : "Laboratory accreditation does not speak to the specifics of any individual measurement result but to overall capabil ity of a lab to provide the serv i c e " ( A - 1 at 9) • 92 The technician measures the temperature in the water bath"with equipment that has certificates with NIST-traceablemeasurements at its core , " specifically an Ome ga HH4 1 modeldigital thermometer ( Omega thermometer ) ( 9T 159 - 9 T l 60 ) . Shaffernoted, " So everything e l s e that happens in the rest of ourprocedure comes from the integrity of that measurement rightthere " ( 9 Tl59 ) . Shaffer ac knowledged that , if Draeger failed touse a NIST-traceable th ermomet er such as the Ome ga thermometerduring this water bath proc e s s , " that would be a problem"because it would undermine the " fundamental measurement " ( 1 1T58 -1 1 T59 ) . Baum agreed that the s cientific r el iab i l ity ofDraeger's proc e s s for testing its probes would be undermined ifthe Omega thermometer was not used to ensure the correcttemperature of the water bath ( 1 3T2 4 9 ) . The " current proc e s s " at Draeger i s to use three Omegathermometers to test the water tank at the s ame time ( 9T 1 6 3 ) .Previou s l y , only one Omega thermometer was used , but thatchanged at some point prior to 2015 ( 9 Tl 6 7 ; 10T6 - 10T7 ) . Draegerbegan using three Omega thermometers because "we thought itwould be good to have additional val idation of this temperatures ince so much of subsequent c a l ibration activity comes from thatwater tank " ( 10T7 ) . The three Omega thermometers are " not 93 always giving an identical result , " and i n that c ircumstance thetechnic i an relies on " t he middle readin g " ( 9Tl6 5 ; 10T6 ) . The water bath is set to exactly 3 4 ° C using the thermometerthat gave the middle reading ( S - 1 2 ) . The " correction factor " ofthe water tank is adjusted until the temperature reads exactly3 4 ° C , even i f i t is only sl ightly higher or lower ( S - 1 2 ; S - 1 2A ) . Whi l e the probes are p l aced and rema i n i n the water bath ,the technic ian measures and records the resistance of the probeto the third decimal point , using a Fluke mulitmeter ( 9 Tl 6 8 -9Tl7l ; S - 1 2 B ) . This resistance number will determine thepreliminary probe value assigned to the probe ( S - 1 2 B ; S - 1 2 C ; S -12D ) . Then , whi l e still i n the water bat h , the probe is attachedto a 7 1 10 instrument and the assigned probe value is entered( 9T l 7 l ; S - 1 2 B ) . "And i f it's accu�ate , it will pass with thatprel iminary probe value . And if an adjustment is neede d , thetechnic i a n will change the probe value to read the correcttemperature , thereby making that measuremen t match what is inthe water temp " ( 9Tl 7 l - 9 Tl 7 2 ) . Once the service technician determines that the probe" passes , " Draeger issues a cert i f icate of accuracy for thatprobe ( 9Tl3 2 ) . This document contains the serial number , probevalue , and certification dates for the probe and states : 94 This is to certify that the Alcotest 7 1 10 Temperature Probe has been tested for accuracy with instrumentation that is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology ( N IST ) . The manufacturer recommends accuracy verification of the Temperature Probe within 12 months of the certification date below , or sooner , according to your State Spec ification. For accurate temperature readings , the probe value on this certifi cate , noted below, must be programmed into the Alcotest 7 1 10 . [ S- 3 3C ; S - 3 3J ; S -3 6 ; S - 3 6 B ; D-4 . ] The measurement results from the Draeger probes do notsatisfy the basic e lements of e ither an unbroken chain ofc a l ibrations back to a NIST standard or an ascertainablemeasurement uncertainty , so those measurements c annot be NISTtraceab le . Stolz opined that the documents detail ing Draeger'sprocedures for checking the accuracy of its temperature probes[ S - 1 2 through S - 1 2 D] are "procedures and how certain operationsare being done , " but they " have no meaning regardingtraceabil ity . . . [ b] ec ause they cannot connect a measurementresult obtained with any of the black key temperature probeswith a reference standard at N I S T " ( 1 7T2 15 ) . Stolz testifiedthat an unbroken chain of comparisons is " absolutely essenti a l "t o traceabi l ity ( 1 7 T 8 7 - 1 7 T 8 8 ) . He opined that the black keytemperature probe c annot satisfy the NI ST-traceable thermometer 95 requirement in the Ca libration Check Procedures " [ b] ecause theblack key temperature probe cannot provide a NIST-traceablemeasurement result" ( 1 7Tl08 ; 1 7 Tlll ; D- 3 8 ) . Moreover , the Draeger probe measurement results are notmade with a stated uncertainty , which is fatal to any c l aim ofNIST traceability . Stolz expl ained that "measurement consists of a measurand ,an expression of the unit of measure we ' re concernedwith . . • [ c] oupled with a statement of the quantifieduncertainty , " and that " it ' s a combination of the measurand withthe stated uncertainty that makes it a valid measurementprovided we can trace it to NIST " ( 1 7T2 2 2 ) . Brettell agreedthat "me asurement is a combination of measurand plusuncertainty" ( 7T200-7 T201 ) . Baum also testified that the resultobtained from a measurement is c a l led a measurand , and he agreedthat "in order for the expression of a measurement to bescientific ally reliable" the measurand must be "expressed withan uncertainty" ( 1 4T52 - 1 4 T5 3 ) . NIST policy explains that achieving traceability includes"determining the uncert ainties at each step " ( A - 1 at 7 ) . TheA2LA policy states that " [ a] crucial e l ement of the concept ofmeasurement traceability is measurement uncertainty " ( D- 1 2 at6). That policy explains : 96 Not onl y should there be an unbroken chain of comparisons , each measurement should be accompanied by a statement of uncertainty associated with the farthest link in the chain from N I ST , that is , the last facility that provided the measurement value . NIST does not have that information ; only the facilities that provided the measurement values to the customer can provide the associated uncertainties and describe the traceability chain . [ D- 1 2 at 10 . ) Brettell ac knowledged that " [ t] here's uncertainty in everymeasurement " ( 7 T206 ) . He noted that measurement uncertainty isgreater the further it goes down the chain from the NISTstandard ( 7 T 2 2 4 ) . Stolz noted that the existence of uncertainty inmeasurement is not a problem, but not knowing the extent of theuncertainty makes a measurement unreliable ( 1 7T2 1 7 ) . Heexplained : Wel l , every measurement has a measurement uncertainty . As a matter of fact , a measurement result is never , ever j ust a single number . It ' s always a range of values where the true value of the quantity that I want to measure lies within. And this interval where the true value lies within is usual l y stated as a measurement uncertainty , a range of value where the actual true value-it ' s impossibl e to know the true value . Even with the best possibl e measurement instruments , even with many , many repeated measurements you would not know the true value . But you on ly know it within that measurement uncertainty 97 interval . That ' s not a problem in sc ience . That is a wel l - accepted fact in science and scientists have l ived with that since ages . [ 1 7T8 8 - 1 6 to 1 7 T 8 9 -5 . ] Stolz noted that knowing the uncertainty of a measurementresult " is essential bec ause without the uncertainty , again , Iwould not know what kind of conc lusions can I draw from ameasurement result . And so the knowledge of measurementuncertainty is essentia l " ( 17T89 ) . "The test temperature needsto be actually stated with their own uncertainty and the resultneeds to be stated with the uncertainty" ( 1 7 T 1 4 6 ) . The uncertainty of the measurement results obtained by theDraeger probes is unknown , so those results cannot be NISTtraceable . The State seeks to discount Stoltz ' s testimony regardingthe need for a stated uncertainty by noting ( 1 ) the expertsdisputed whether the c a libration certificates for the Omegathermometers and Fluke multimeter suffic iently stated theuncertainties as to the measurement results from thoseinstruments , and ( 2 ) Brettell testified that the NISTthermometer " is not going to have an effect on the measurementunc ertainty " of the instrument itself ( Pb 1 7 -Pbl8 ) . However ,these issues are unrelated to the uncertainty that is criticalto N I ST-traceabi l i t y , spe c ifically the uncertainty assoc iatedwith measurement results from the Draeger probes . 98 As to the documentation r elating to the Ome ga thermometersand F luke multimeter , regardless of whether the uncertaintiesare properly stated for measurement results obtained from thoseinstrument s , knowing those uncertainties does not resolve theuncertainty issue for the Draeger probes . There is no disputethat the uncertainties of measurement results from the Draegerprobes are unknown . The Brettell testimony cited by the State had nothing to dowith the measurement uncertainty of the Draeger probes at all .I questioned Brette l l as to why the protocol he developed would"bother with this NIST thermometer" if the Alcotest instrumentwas "a failsafe machine" without it . He responded that "it's astandard laboratory pract ice t o do two independent tests foranything , " and he reiterated that the NIST-thermometer step was"not meaningless at a l l" and that using it "wou ld tell you thatthe c a l ibrating unit is either working or not working before yougot into the probe or anything" ( 8 Tl3 5- 8 Tl 3 9 ) . Brettell agreedthat , without the NIST tmermometer step , "there is some reducedlevel of certa inty" as to the good working order of theAlcotest , although "you can't quantify it" ( 8T 1 3 9 ) . I asked if this reduced level of certainty was related tothe concept that "there's always some amount of uncertainty withevery measurement , " and Brette l l said that "maybe we're using 99 the wrong term of the uncertainty " in that context ( 8 T l 40-8Tl 4 1 ) . He explained that " there's an uncertainty even with "the BAC reported by the Alcotest and " t his traceable thermometeris not going to have an effect on that uncertainty , okay ,because it's only chec king the calibrating unit " ( 8T 1 4 1 ) . Henoted that the problem with reduced certainty in the goodworking order of the instrument had to do with " the error rate "rather than measurement uncertainty ( 8T 1 4 1 - 8 Tl4 2 ) . None of thistestimony concerned the problem that uncertainty of themeasurement results from the Draeger probes is unknown. Notwithstanding the " g lobal acceptance in the metrologycommunity" and by the experts in this case that traceability isthe " property of a measurement result whereby the result can berelated to a reference through a documented unbroken chain ofcalibrations , each contributing to the measureme nt uncertainty , "the State tries to water down the definition of N I STtraceability to mean something other than this for the Draegerprobes. During the hearings , counsel for the State ac knowledgedthat " [ w] ithout NIST traceability . to the CU3 4 and the[ Draeger] temperature probes , " the State ' s case has " a problem"( 12Tl74 ) . However , counsel appeared to conflate " tested with 100 instruments traceable to NI ST" with the concept of actual NISTtraceabi lity ( 1 2 T l 75 ) . Baum's testimony also attempted to conflate these separateconcepts . Baum agreed with the six essential e lements oftraceability set forth i n the A2LA policy ( 1 3 T 3 9 - 1 3 T 4 2 ) .However , he referred to the Draeger probes as "NIST-traceabletemperature probes" even though they plainly fai led to satisfythe six e lements ( 1 4T20-14T2 1 ) . At one point , Baum said thatthe black key probe does not have to be traceable to N I ST aslong as it's c a l ibrated with instrumentation traceable to N I ST( 1 3T 9 1 - 13T 9 2 ) . Later , he also equated NIST traceable devices tothose that are " c a l ibrated using instrumentation that'straceable to NIST" ( 1 4 T 1 6 4 - 1 4 T l 6 5 ) . Baum even suggested thatthe references to " a NIST traceable thermomete r " in theCal ibration Check Procedure only means a " thermometer that'sc a l ibrated with N I ST-traceable equipment " ( 1 3 T 9 2 - 1 3 T 9 3 ) . Atanother point , he stated that " [ t] here ' s no c l aim fortraceabi l i t y " of the independent thermometer used by thecoordinators , and he only inc luded the phrase " [ t] raceab il ity toa NIST . • . standard" as a requirement for a replacement forthe Ertco-Hart thermometer in his December 2008 memo as "anexample of qua l ity" ( 1 4 T7 1 - 1 4 T 7 2 ; D- l ) . 101 I n a footnote in its brief , the State contends that " [ i ] tis understood " that the statement that "a ' thermometer is NIST­traceable' refers to the fact that it was c a l ibrated usingmeasurements that are traceable to NIST , " c i t ing to testimony byShaffer and to a record statement by me ( Pb45 n . 2 0 ) . Thismisstates the record . Shaffer merely stated that " it's amisnomer i n the scientific community" to refer to NIST-traceableinstruments bec ause measurements , not instruments , are NISTtraceable ( 10T 1 40 ) . Shaffer ' s overall testimony was consistentwith the NIST definition of trac e abi lity , and he never statedthat terming an instrument NIST-traceable i ndicates merely thatit was ca l i brated using NIST-traceable measurements ( 10T 1 40-10T1 4 4 ) . My statement on the record was in direct contrast to theState ' s synopsis of i t . I acknowledged that the parties , thewitnesses , and the Court have a l l referred to " NIST traceableinstruments , " despite the fact that only measurements can beNIST t raceabl e . What was actua l ly understood by the phrase , andwhat I c learly said , was that referring to an instrument asNIST-traceable was " a shorthand way of saying the measurementsderived from this i nstrument are traceable to NIST" ( 1 2 T 1 95 ) . I n another footnote , the State appears to recog n ize this,stating : 102 The State recognizes that " instruments " cannot be traceable to NIST , but only measurements and standards can be traceable to NIST . For purposes of this Brie f , references to "NIST-traceable instruments " or " instruments traceable to NIST " are intended to refer to instruments "with measurements " or "with standards" traceable to N I ST. [ Pb2 8 n . 10 . ]Even this explanation is confusing . Only measurement resultsare traceable , and those results are traceable to standards keptby NIST , so it is not c lear what the State means by instruments" 'with standards' traceable to NIST . " I r e j ect Baum ' s testimony and the State's contention thatthe Draeger probes can be considered N I ST traceable by virtue ofbeing c a librated or checked for accuracy with " instrumentationthat is traceabl e " to NIST . Even assuming that the State hasfirmly established that the measurement results of the threeOmega thermometers and the Fluke multimeter that Draeger used tocertify the accuracy of its probes were NIST-traceab le , " simplyusing those instruments to check or adjust the accuracy of theprobes does not make those probes N I ST-traceable . As the NISTpolicy notes, " ( m)erely having an instrument c a librate d , even by20 The parties dispute the adequacy of the underlying documentation re l ating to the Omega thermometers and Fluke multimeter for establishing the NIST-traceability of the measurement results of those instruments Pb 4 4 -Pb4 8 ; Pb 5 9 - Pb6 1 ) . 103 NIST , is not enough to make the measurement result " from thatinstrument NIST traceable ( A- 1 at 2 ) . I n two footnotes , the State contends that Judge King ' sreport in Chun " recognized the NI ST-traceability of the blackkey and agency temperature probes" ( Pb 3 1 n . 1 1 ; Pb3 9 n . 1 8 ) .This , however , mischaracterizes Judge King ' s statements . First ,as noted above , there was no dispute in Chun regarding thenature or extent of the calibration check process or the meaningof N I ST traceability . Second , Judge King ' s statements in hisChun report do not actually " recogni z e " the NI ST traceability ofthe probes at a l l . Judge King stated : Calibration of the Alcotest 7 1 10 involves a wet bath simulator , the Draeger CU3 4 , and one bottle of 0 . 10 ethanol alcohol solution . The ethanol alcohol solution is poured into the simulator j ar where it is heated to 3 4 plus or minus 0 . 2 degrees c . A NIST­ traceable temperature probe monitors the temperature of the simulator solution . NIST refers to the National Institute of Standards and Technology , which is responsible for establishing , maintaining and pub lishing basic standards of measurement consistent with their international counterparts . Each temperature probe has a probe value , which ca n be changed only by a coordinator using the " black-key " functio n . When the instrument determines that the simulator has reached the correct temperature , the coordinator hooks up the simulator to the back of the instrument through the rear port of the cuvette . The coordinator then hits the escape key , the function appears on the display screen , the coordinator types in 104 cal ibrate , and fol lows the instrument's prompts . [ King SMR at 4 4 - 45 . ] I t is not c lear f rom this description whether Judge Kingwas referring to the Ertco-Hart thermometer as a "NIST-traceabletemperature probe " or did not c learly understand that thethermometer was an independent component from the Draegerprobes . His later reference to " the NIST-verified temperatureprobe " c ites testimony from F lanagan that the temperature of theCU3 4s is ver i f i ed " using ERTCO HART digital N I S T " ( King SMR at1 4 1 - 4 2 , citing 54T25 ) . In short , despite some apparentconfusion regarding the distinction between probes andthermometers , Judge King understood that the c a l ibration checkprocess required a NIST-traceable measurement result for theCU3 4 s . This proceeding has c l arified that the only way toobtain such a measurement result is to us an independent NIST-traceable thermometer i n the process , not just the Draegerprobes . I also f ind persuasive two reasons given by Stolz inaddition to lack of NIST traceabi lity as to why the Draegerprobes c annot serve as an e f fective substitute for the CCthermometer in the ca l i bration check process . First , Stolznoted that the Alcotest will report an incorrect temperature i fthe probe value i s not entered correctly ( 1 7Tlll- 1 7 T 1 15 ; D- 3 8 ) . 105 As discussed i n more de tail in the following section , both thisproblem and the potential for probe value drift between annualrecertif i cations is a c ause for concern regarding the accuracyof the probe's temperature reading . Second , Stolz explained that a probe failure could occursuch that the resistance reported by the probe might not changein accordance with a temperature change in the solution beingmeasured ( 1 7Tl2 3 ; 1 7 Tl58 ) . This problem would not be detected byDraeger's recertification process, which checks the probes at asingle point and does not test over a range of temperatures( 1 7Tl2 3 ) . Stolz explai ned that , because the probes are onlytested at a single temperature , if the resistance of a givenprobe did not change as the temperature of the solution changed ,it "would a lways report the resistance corresponding to 3 4degrees Ce lsius" regardless of the actual temperature of thesolution ( l 7Tl58 ) . 2 1 The State concedes that using an independent NI ST-traceablethermometer " improves confidence in the results , " but itcontends that i t " does not affect the scientific reliability of" Stolz also opined that the Draeger probes cannot be an effective subst itute be cause a hardware or software malfunction in the Alcotest could affect the temperature reading of the Draeger probes ( 1 7Tl2 2 ) . I find this unpersuasive bec ause there was no evidence of any such malfunction ever occurring or that such an unspec ified malfunction would produce an incorrect temperature reading . 106 the instrument" ( Pb 5 2 ) . This sets up a false dichotomy treating"confidence" and "re liabil ity" as separate concepts . AsBrettel l's testimony showed , confidence and reliabil ity areinterrelated concepts, not separate ones . Brette l l explained that "when we t al k about reli ab i l ity ,and you ' re asking a question about the degree of reliabi l ity ,it's really the degree of confidence that you have in themeasurement of that instrument " ( 7 T 2 4 2 ) . Thus , Brette l lessentially equated degrees of reliability with degrees ofconfidence . This cuts against the State's effort to distinguishthe two concepts and argue that Brette l l ' s only purpose i nrequiring the NIST thermometer was to i ncrease confidence butnot reliabil ity . Brett e l l continued that thought as fol lows :"So when you t a l k about the degree of r el iab i l i t y , sc ientificreliab i l ity of a n i nstrument , you ' re really talking about theuncertainty and level of confidence that you make in thatmeasurement" ( 7 T 2 4 4 ) . On redirect examination , Brett e l l expanded upon the conceptof confidence and rel iabil ity : And I thought I explained that the word necessity really wasn ' t a technical term. And I went on to explain about confidence levels and the difference - the different levels of reliabil ity based upon the confidence leve l s . [ 8T 6 - 2 to 6 . ] 107 c. of NIST-traceable thermometer From the outset of this proceedi n g , the State has arguedthat the NIST thermometer step is not even part of thecal ibration check procedure . Instead , it argues , it is only a" pre-step , ' the purpose of which is to provide an '" administrative convenience" and which has very l ittle ornothi n g to do with scientific rel iabil ity. The convenience ,according to the State , is to enable the coordinator to beassured that the simulators have heated to the correcttemperature range before he attaches the b lack key probe to theAlcotest instrument and activates the CALIBRATE function . Oncethat function is activated , if any S IM TEMP or other error isgenerated, the ca l ibration process will automatically abort . The coordinator will then be confronted with two choices .Assuming the error indicates that one of the CU34s is out oftolerance , the coordinator could replace that CU34 with adifferent one ( if one is available ) , put in a new solution ofthe same concentration that had previously been in that unit ,heat it up for an hour , and start the process over agai n . Thesecond choi c e would be to take that Alcotest instrument out ofservice . Both choices , of course , would cause inconvenience . 108 I n its September 1 9 , 2 0 1 6 letter to Judge Grant requestingthe appointment of a special master , the State i nc luded afootnote stating : As bac kground , the Office of Forensic Sc ience included the prel iminary N I ST­ traceable thermometer step in New Jersey's cal ibration procedure not because of scientific necessity but rather for a practi cal purpose - to confirm that the liquid simulator solutions are within the accepted temperature range before the coordinator initiates the actual ca l ibration . This preliminary step is distinct from the actual c a libration , in which the temperature of the l iquid simulator solutions is measured independently by a black key temperature probe connected to the instrument , separate and apart from the NI ST-traceable digital thermometer . If the black key temperature probe confirms that the temperature of the liquid simulator solutions is within the required ranges , the Alcotest instrument records that temperature on the resulting printed reports . If the black key temperature probe records that the temperature of the liquid simulator solutions is not within the required ranges , the Alcotest instrument will end the c alibration and will give an error message . I n other words , the black key temperature probe ensures proper c a libration of the Alcotest instrument , regardless of the use ( or non-use ) of the NI ST-traceable digital thermometer . [ D- 6 . ] This assertion by the State , which i t has continued toadvance throughout the proceedings before me and in its post- 109 hearing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law i ss imply not supported by the evidence . I n his overall test imony , Brettel l repeatedly stated thatthe purpose for which he put the NIST thermometer . step in theprocedure was to achieve s cientific reliabi lity. He emphasizedthe extreme importance of an accurate temperature in the CU 3 4 s ,espec i a l ly the agency CU3 4 that i s used in the CALIBRATEfunction . All experts agreed with him on that . Brette llrepeatedly explained that only by a direct temperaturemeasurement with an independent and out s i de N I ST-traceablethermometer could a s c i entifically reliable measurement of thosetemperatures be achieved . The CU3 4 s themse lves are not equippedwith any kind of read-out screen , as a result of which thetemperature of the solutions they contain are unknown untilmeasured . Brettel l was unwi l ling to rely on the Draeger probes forthat measurement , i n s i s ting that an out s ide NI ST-traceabletemperature measuring device , completely independent of Draeger ,was neces sary . I f the NIST thermometer measured thetemperatures of the solutions as within range , that wouldestab l i s h that the CU3 4 s were in good working order .There after , having accurately determined that the temperaturesof the s imulator solutions were within the required range , the 110 good working order of the Draeger probes could be "verified" ifthey also reported in-range temperatures . I re ly upon several aspects of the evidence in rejectingthe State ' s "pre-test" argument . First , if this were merely anadministrative convenience to avoid activating the CALIBRATEfunction without first checking the CU3 4 temperatures , the sameresult could be achieved by using the black key temperatureprobe . Klimik and Shaffer both testified that with the blackkey probe , the coordinator could , before activating theCALIBRATE function , simply press the escape key , pull up theappropriate scree n , and , using the black key probe , get atemperature reading on each of the CU3 4 s without activating theCALIBRATE function. The obvious inference to be drawn from this is thatBrett e l l did not have suffic ient confidence in the sc ient ificreliab i l ity of using the black key probe for that purpose ,notwi thstanding the many safeguards built i nto the Draegerequipment. Of course , this would be consistent with hisunwavering testimony that the black key probe could only beverified for accuracy by indirect means after first measuringthe solution temperatures with an independent NI ST-traceablethermomete r . And Brett e l l , as we ll as most other witnesses ,would leave the step i n the procedure i f writing it anew today . 111 I n the seventeen years that the Alcotest 7 1 10 has been inuse in New Jerse y , neither Brettell nor his successors ever tooksteps to remove the NIST step from the check procedure andreplace it with the black key probe as an administrativeconveni ence before activating the CALI BRATE function . My second point of reli ance is based on Brette l l ' s verycredible and forceful testimony when confronted with the abovequoted footnote from the State ' s September 1 9 , 2 0 1 6 letter .Brette l l was shown the footnote and asked to read its contentsout loud , after which this col loquy occurred : Q. Thank you . Do you agree with that statement? A. No , I don ' t . Q. What don ' t you agree with? A. Wel l , it's - it's not to confirm that the l i quid simulator solutions are within the accepted temperature range , but it's to confirm - i n a way , that's true , but it's more to confirm that the actual simulator , or c a l ibrating unit ' s operating properly to get to that temperature . Q. And do you agree that that step was not scientific a lly necessary? A. Wel l , it was for me . [ 7 T 1 4 8 - 2 5 to 7Tl4 9 - 1 2 . ] I remember very distinctly that Brettell expressed hisinitial answer , "No , I don't , " in an emphatic tone . When he 112 went on to answer what he didn ' t agree with , about half-waythrough , just before s aying "in a way, that's true , " he pausedin a reflective manner , and then allowed that it would have theeffect of informing the coordinator that he could now actuatethe c a libration functio n , but that is not the purpose for thestep . The purpose is to make sure that the CU34 is operatingproperly , which would be indicated by the fact that it achievedan in-tolerance temperature reading , as measured by a NIST­traceable thermometer . Third , after learning that the Ertco-Hart thermometerscould no longer be used , the State did not take steps to removethe NIST thermometer step from the Calibration Check Procedure .Ins tead , it doub led down through Baum's Dec ember 2 3 , 2 008memorandum recommending the purchase of a new model digitalthermometer which would comply with all of the strictrequirements for NIST trac eability and would be produced by anISO 1 7 02 5 accredited lab . His recommendation was accepted andthe Control Company thermometer was put into use. In the Holland litigation , defendants chall enged the use ofthis substitutio n , c laiming that , under Chun's literal terms ,only the Ertco-Hart could be us ed . The Holland Court rejectedthat argument and , after a remand for an evidentiary hearing,concluded that the Control Company thermometer was comparable 113 and a sufficient substitute for the Ertco-Hart . The State neverasserted in that litigation , either as its primary oralternative position , that a NIST-traceable thermometer is notrequired to assure scientific re liability . It did not seekauthorization to remove the NIST thermometer step from thec alibration check procedure or to designate it as an optionalstep . It certainly did not argue to the Hol land court that itwas a mere pre-step for administrative convenience that hadnothing to do with scientific reliability . Finally , the State inte nds to leave the NIST thermometerstep in as a mandatory part of the c alibration check proc ess .It does not seek j udicial authorization to remove it ordesignate it as optional . The evidence supports the finding that the NIST thermometerstep is an integral part of the c a libration check procedure , nota " pre-test " or administrative convenience . Indeed , if thatstep reveals a simulator solution temperature even slightlyoutside the precise range allowed , the coordinator is requiredto stop everything and not proceed with the CALIBRATE function . D. Undetected miscalibrations The witnesses agreed that it is critic a l that the CU34sheat to 3 4 ° C , plus or minus . 2 ° C . This precise temperaturerange is important because , at the correct temperature , the 114 headspace i n the CU34 will generate an ethanol concentrationwithin the correct tolerance to pass control and l inearitytests . Having the temperature in the correct range is particularlycritical for the agency CU34 when used in connection with theCALIBRATE function. During control and l i nearity tests , theinstrument measures the ethanol concentration but makes nointernal changes . During the CALIBRATE function , however , theinstrument is essent i a l l y being instructed that the headspaceethanol concentration it is measuring is 0 . 1 0 , and it adjustsitself to that and bases a l l of its subsequent cal culations onthat instruction unt i l the next CALI BRATE function ( 7 T8 4 ; 1 0 T5 1 ;1 1 Tll3 ) . If the headspace ethanol concentration is not 0 . 1 0 ,the adj ustment and subsequent c alculations will be wron g . Both Brette l l and Stolz testified that each 1 ° C change i nthe temperature of the simulator solution from the target 3 4 ° Cwould cause a change i n the ethanol concentration of theheadspace of approximately seven percent ( 7 T 9 2 ; 1 1T 1 6 8 ) . AsStolz expla i ned , if a coordinator performed the CALIBRATEfunction with an agency CU3 4 heated to 3 3 ° C rather than 3 4 ° C ,then " everything that i nstrument sees " unt i l its next CALI BRATEfunction "would actually be reported as seven percent highe r "( 17T16 8 ) . Performing the CALIBRATE function based on an 115 incorrect headspace calibration ( a miscalibration ) , if leftundetected throughout the remainder of the ca libration checkprocess , would impact l ater breath tests pe rformed on thatinstrument because the coordinator would have " taught theinstrument that a .1 sample looks like a .09 3 samp l e " and thenplaced the instrument back in service ( 1 7Tl6 8 ) . Thus, anundetected miscalibration based on a too-low temperature wouldhave the effect of overstating the true BAC during later breathtests . Conversely , if the agency CU34 was heated to 3 5 ° C duringthe CALIBRATE function , the instrument woul d report headspacereadings as seven percent lower than the actual concentrationbeing measured until the next CALIBRATE function was pe rformed .An undetected miscalibration based on a too-high temperaturewould have the effect of understating a sub j ect's BAC in laterbreath tests . The State's witnesses did not dispute that , if theCALI BRATE function was completed using an agency CU34 heated tothe wrong temperature , then a miscalibration would occur and theAlcotest would fail to read subsequent ethanol concentrationscorrectly . It also does not dispute that , if undetected , thismiscalibration would have the effect of either overstating orunderstating the results of breath tests performed on that 116 instrument , depending on whether the agency CU3 4 temperature wastoo low or too high . Using the NIST thermometer as required i n the calibrationcheck proc e s s would e f f ectively prevent an undetectedmiscalibration from ever happening because the out-of-range CU34would be identif ied and rep laced before the coordinator everbegan the CALIBRATE function ( 6Tl55 ; 7 Tl07 ) . Both Klimik andBrette l l testified that coordinators are trained not to proceedwith the c a l ibrat ion check if the NIST thermometer shows any ofthe CU3 4 s to be heating out of range ( 6T l 55 ; 7Tl07 ) . Thus , nomiscalibration could ever occur unle s s the NIST thermometer stepwas s kipped . The State does not dispute this . Rather , the State ' sargument i s that the NIST thermometer i s not e s s ential becausethe instrument i tse l f and other components have so many checksand balances that it would be ( 1 ) unlikely for a mis cal ibrationto occur during the CAL IBRATE function , and ( 2 ) virtuallyimpos s ibl e for a mi s c al ibration to pass undetected during theremainder of the ca l ibration check proc es s . Shaffer was theprimary proponent of this theory , although Brettell agreed withit in h i s test imony ( 7 T 8 9 - 7 T 9 6 ) . Shaffer tes t i f ied that as i tuation i n which an unident i f ied mi s c a l ibration could occurwas " pretty unimaginab l e " ( 10T58 ) . Brette l l , referring to 117 Shaffer ' s theory as expressed in Shaffer's report , said that itwould be " l ike trying to line u p t he moon and a l l the planets atthe same time for that to really happe n " ( 8T 1 3 3 ) . Shaffer noted that the NIST thermometer requirement in thecal ibration process is specific to New Jersey and neitherrequired nor recommended by Draeger ( 10T3 4 - 10T3 5 ) . I n hisopinion , a check with the NIST thermometer is not necessary forscientific rel iabil ity because of " three fundamental measurementmechanisms" in other components used in the cal ibration check( 10T3 7 - 10T3 8 ) . First , the Draeger temperature probes "aremeasuring the solution temperature as an integrated part of thecal ibration process bui lt into the instrumentation" ( 10T3 8 ) .Second, the CU34 is "an independent piece of equipmentseparately and independently certified and tested , " its " solepurpose " is to heat simulator solution to the proper temperaturerange , and it " has an i ndependent temperature measuring probeinside it which operates independently and generates itsperformance independentl y " ( 10T3 8 - 10T3 9 ) . Third , the simulatorsolutions are independently certified for accuracy and , bec auseof Henry ' s l aw , if the temperature of a CU3 4 were out of range ,the headspace concentration of ethanol would be out oftoleranc e , " and this would be identified throughout the process"( 10T40 ) . 118 Shaffer drew an exhibit de lineating each step i n thecal ibration check process and listing the CU3 4 , probe , andsolution used at each point ( 10T 4 2 - 10T58 ; S- 4 6 ) . He opined that ,if the agency CU34 had an out-of-range temperature , that errorwould necessarily be detected unless both probes, all threeother CU3 4 s , and four of the five simulator solutions used werealso wrong or malfunctioning ( 10T4 2 - 10T58 ) . Moreover , accordingto Shaffer , each of the malfunc tioning components would have tobe wrong " in tandem" with the others to avoid detection of theerrors ( 10T4 2 - 10T58 ) . Shaffer explained that , if the agency CU34 were heating outof range during the CALIBRATE function , the black key probe usedto perform that function would report a SIM TEMP error ratherthan perform the function unless that probe , too , wasmalfunctioning ( 10T50- 10T5 1 ) . He further explained : Not only that , but they would have to be wrong in the same direction , meaning they would have to both be false l y , you know , creating and reporting a temperature too low or too h i gh . And then even further , they would need to be reporting in the same direction , but also the same magnitude . It wouldn't be enough if they were just too low and one was , let's say , 2 degrees too low and the other 5 degrees too low . They would have to be wrong together . [ 10T5 1 - 3 to 1 1 . ] 119 Thus, before a miscalibration could occur , both the agency CU34and the black key probe would have to be incorrect . If a miscalibration occurred , Shaffer noted that thecontrol test would not detect it , as the same agency CU34 andblack key probe used in the CALIBRATE function are used in thattest ( 10T53 - 10T54 ) . However , Shaffer testified that a miscalibration would bedetected in the first step of the linearity test , when thecoordinator uses his own 0 . 04 CU3 4 and a bottle of 0 . 04 solution( 10T54 ) . If the black key probe had incorrectly reported theagency CU34 temperature to be in range , thus allowing themisc alibration , then the 0 . 04 CU34 would have to ' 'fail also inthe same direction and the same magnitude " for the black keyprobe to consider its temperature to be in range ( 10T54 ) . Inaddition , if the instrument had been calibrated to the wrongethanol concentration during the CALIBRATE function , then theinstrument's reading of the headspace of the 0 . 04 solution wouldbe out of tolerance unless the coordinator ' s bottle of 0 . 04solution was not the concentration it purported to be ( 10T54 ) .He explained : To complicate matters , in this hypothetical , this solution , bec ause of Henry ' s Law, a very we l l understood scientific principle , the foundation of what was used as wet bath simulators , this solution needs to fail , but it needs to fail in an opposite direction . 120 Bec ause if-if we ' re assuming in the hypothetical that A, B and C [ the agency CU3 4 , the black key probe , and the coordinator ' s 0 . 04 CU3 4] are low, then in order for us to pass this ste p , this solution would need to be correspondingly higher because Henry ' s Law , if it ' s truly cooking at a temperature lower than 3 4 , then its concentration would need to be too high in order for it to come into the proper tolerance range for the instrument . [ 10T54 - 1 2 to 2 4 . ] The same rationale applicable to the 0 . 04 portion of thelinearity test would also be present for the 0 . 08 and 0 . 1 6portions , meaning that the coordinator ' s 0 . 08 CU 3 4 , 0 . 1 6 CU3 4 ,bottle of 0 . 08 solution , and bottle of 0 . 1 6 solution would a l lalso have t o fail i n tandem, " i n a correspondingly incorrectoffset , " for the instrument to get through the linearity testwithout detecting the misca libration and triggering an error( l0T54 - 1 0T56 ) . Finally , even assuming that all of these coordinated errorsoccurred , in the final step of the c alibration process thecoordinator performs a solution change using the agency probeand a new bottle of 0 . 10 solution from a different lot than thesolution used during the control test ( 10T57 ) . Shaffertestified that the agency probe would have to be wrong in thesame way and to the same degree that the black key probe waswrong , or it would detect a SIM TEMP error in the agency CU3 4 , 121 which was used for the CALI BRATE function and is used again forthe final solution change ( 10T57 ) . Moreover , the 0 . 10 solutionused in the solution change wou ld have to be wrong in tandemwith the wrong solutions used during the l i nearity test , or theethanol concentration readings taken during the solution changewould be out of tolerance ( 10T57 ) . Shaffer conclude d , " [ T] hat's 10 different independentunique things failing together in an orchestrated way in orderfor that scenario to hold true " ( 10T60 ) . He stated , " I almostc an ' t even imagine i t " ( 10T60 ) . Brettel l also noted that for anundetected miscalibration to occur , the CU3 4 s , probes, andsimulator solutions wou ld " al l have to be off in the samedirection" ( 8 T l 3 3 ) . I refer to this theory as the ten-tandem­failures theory. Shaffer also noted that each of the four differentsimulator solutions that would have to be wrong in the ten­tandem-failures theory " has its own NIST traceability trail "( 10T58 ) . Because " those solutions would have to be wrong inorder for such a scenario t o p l ay out without fai lure b y theinstrument , " he was even more confident that " such ahypothetical could not be rea l i z ed " ( 10T58 ) . This theory has a certain appeal . The NIST thermometerserves the purpose of ensuring that the CU3 4s are heating 122 ' properly. I f multiple oth e r safeguards serve the same purposeand actually make it "pretty unimaginable" that an undetectedmiscalibration could actua lly occur and lead to incorrect BACresults , then the NIST thermometer would serve l ittle practicalpurpose . Shaffer ' s insistence that four of the f ive simulatorsolutions would have to be wrong for an undetectedmiscalibration to occur , if true , would be particularlypersuasive . Although lots of simulator solution are purchasedthrough Draeger , ( l ) they are manufactured to the spec i f iedconcentrations by an independent vendor , ( 2 ) Draeger provides acertif ication as to the accuracy of the concentration i n eachlot , and ( 3 ) the OFS tests and certifies the accuracy of samplesof every lot before author i z ing purchase of bottles within thatlot ( 10T 1 1 6 - 10Tll6 ; 15T7 4 - 15T7 6 ; 15T1 9 2 - 15Tl9 5 ; 15T 2 2 9 -15T2 3 0 ; KingSMR 6 7 , 108 ) . Alaouie test i fied in detail about the processused by the OFS to certify the accuracy of each lot of simulatorsolution, and he noted that he could not recall any c ircumstancein which the OFS tested a lot and determined that its statedethanol concentration was inaccurate ( 15Tl 9 2 - 15T2 2 7 ; 15T2 3 1 ; S-15through S-2 4 ) . The OFS testing of the solutions does indeedmeet NIST standards and the measurement of the solutions isN I ST-traceable . 123 The parties did not dispute this evidence , and it compelsthe conc lusion that the stated ethanol concentrations of thebottles of simulator solutions used by ADTU coordinators andpolice agencies are correct . There is no basis to suppose thatany lot of mislabeled solution or wrong-concentration solutioncould somehow slip through both the or iginal and OFS analyses ,much less that unrelated lots of different concentrations wouldslip through and then a l l be used during the same c a l ibrationcheck procedure. Thus , if the State is correct in its positionthat an undetected miscalibration simply could not occur unlessfour of the five bottles of simu l ator solution were wrong , thenterming the ten-tandem-failures theory " pretty unimaginable "would be accurate . Defendant , amicus, and part ic ipating counsel have allessentially fa i l e d to address t he ten-tandem-fai lures theory ,either i n expert report s , through Stolz's direct testimony , orin their proposed findings of fact and conc lusions of law . However , Stolz was asked about i t on cross-examination . Heposited " a scenario" in which an undetected misc a l ibration couldoccur " even if a l l your solutions are absolutely correct or havevery sma l l tolerances i n concentration" ( 1 7 T 1 6 7 - 1 7 T 1 6 9 ) . Henoted that , if one were to "assume that the temperature thatDraeger use [ d] " to test and certify all of the probes and CU3 4s 124 used in a given c alibration check was 3 3 ° C rather than 3 4 ° C ,then a misca l ibration would occur , but i t would remainundetected because a l l of the other solution concentrations ,whi le actually seven percent higher than reported , "would fallneatly on the ca l ibration curve that we want to verify and itwould not indicate a problem" ( 1 7Tl6 8 - 1 7 T 1 6 9 ) . Thus, Sto l zpresents a scenario i n which it would b e possible for a nundetected miscalibration t o occur if t h e solutionconcentrations were correct and the only " problem" was that thetwo probes and four simulators provided by Draeger had beensomehow "misse t " to treat 3 3 ° C as if it were 3 4 ° C . On the surfac e , Stol z's scenario appears to target thestrongest aspect of the ten-tandem-failures theory , namely theastronomi c a l ly-unlikely possibility that four of five simulatorsolutions could somehow be wrong in a coordinated manner duringa cal ibration check . I n the Stolz scenario , the solutions couldbe fine and only the six devices provided by Draeger would haveto be wron g . The Stolz scenario also posits a hypothet ical asto how it would be possible for all six devices to be wron g ;specifical l y , Draeger could have mistakenly misset everything tothe wrong temperature . Brettell echoed this concern when explaining why heconsidered i t necessary to include the NIST thermometer step in 125 the c a l ibration check process in the first place . I n designingthe c a l ibration check procedures , Brette l l was aware of theimportance and legal significance of "the results that come outof the evidential breath testers , " so he wanted "to doeverything in my power to make sure the instruments are workingproperly" ( 7 T2 3 8 ) . So , even though he thought "Draeger puts outa great instrument" with many checks and balances, he "wanted anindependent test done on the cal ibrating unit to be done to makesure that that c a l ibrating unit was working" ( 7 T2 3 8 ) . Hetestified , "I wanted to make sure it was working . It ' s assimp l e as that . And I wanted to make sure it was - I didn ' twant to rely on Draeger to · tell me that this thing was working"( 7 T2 40-7T2 4 1 ) . Brettel l later explained : I felt - it was my view of this is that the Alcotest 7 1 10 MK I I I is manufactured by Draeger and calibrated by Draeger . The CU34 simulator c a l ibrating units are manufactured by Draeger and certified by Draeger . The simulator solutions are purchased from [ Guth] through Draeger . Draeger puts a solution ( sic] on that , and we independently check that and test that . And so I wanted an independent temperature check to make sure that the c a l ibrating unit was working . Because the calibrating unit is what the Alcotest is based on . And it ' s an independent component . And so i f we independently tested the solution it was in , and we independently tested the temperature 126 it was i n , at least that part of the component and the instrument is independently tested from Draeger . And I fe lt that was very import ant , okay . * * * And it's simply bec ause of one very sma l l part of the ca l ibration chec k , which I think is important . But if you put everything into Draeger • s hands as far as certifying the solutions , the instrument , the ca librating unit and everything else , what if - what if there is a bias or an error in Draeger ' s laboratory? What impact would that have on the breath test program in New Jersey? And so as far as the risk assessment , I took every step I could to independently test as much as I could of this program independently of Draeger to make sure that if that happened , we have a good chance of stopping it before it proliferated out . And so that's my view of this situation . [ 8T2 9 - l to 8 T 3 0 - 1 3 . ]Brettell confirmed this is " exactly why I added this step "( 8T3 0 ) . He later added : The NIST thermometer would tell you that the ca l ibrating unit is either working or not working before you got into the probe or anything . Because is it - I don ' t even know, is it possible that something could go through Draeger that the c a librating unit and the probe are tied together and there ' s a bias and it goes right into the instrument and nothing catches it? Okay . And so it you can test that with an independent thermometer , then I'm sure that calibrating 127 unit is working and then we can move on from there . [ 8T l 3 8 - 7 to 1 7 . ) Brettell's concern was justified that , absent the inc lusionof the NIST thermometer step , a potential systemic bias inDraeger's e quipment or procedure might have gone undetected .The NIST thermometer step has been part of the process since itsinception and , notwithstanding the fact that Dennis a l legedlyfailed to use his NIST thermometer when performing threecalibration checks , there is no reason to suppose that Klimikand the other coordinators have ever failed to use their NISTthermometers as they were trained to do . The problem with Stol z's ' 'Draeger could have set everythingto 3 3 ° C by mistake' theory is that it does not present a 'realistic scenario of a problem that could actua lly haveresulted from a single coordinator skipping the NIST thermometerstep . A sce nario in which both an agency ' s and coordinator ' sequipment could a l l be misset to accept a temperature outsidethe required range of 3 3 . 8 ° C to 3 4 . 2 ° C ( 1 ) could not occurabsent systemic errors in Draeger ' s processes , and ( 2 ) would bedetected unless no coordinators used their NIST thermometers . As to the first point , Stolz supposes a type of systemicerror within Draeger that would have to result in a very largenumber of misset probes and CU3 4 s . Mere isolated issues within 128 Draeger's recertification process affecting only a few probes orsimulators could not realistically lead to a scenario in whichan agency's two devices ( probe and CU3 4 ) and a coordinator'sfour devices ( b lack key probe and three CU3 4 s ) had all beenmisset to accept the same wrong temperature yet all c ametogether in one c alibration check procedure . Moreover , evenassuming this somehow happened at one agency , becausecoordinators typic a l ly visit two agencies per day , four days perweek , the misset c oordinator's devices would repeatedly run intoa problem unless the probes and CU34s at subsequent agencies hadalso been misset . Thus , only a systemic error at Draegerresulting in a missetting of large numbers of devices couldrealistic a l ly result in a circumstance in which an undetectedmisc alibration could occur and remain undetected as thecoordinator who performed it moved from agency to agency . Second, even assuming a systemic problem occurred atDraeger causing a large number of devices to be misset , theproblem would have been detected by coordinators using the NISTthermometer . Klimik's testimony that coordinators are trainedto do the NIST thermometer step " every time " with " [ n ] oexceptions" and that he has , in fact , done so , was c redible( 6Tl05-6Tl 0 6 ) . Accordingly , the Stolz theory that everything 129 from Draeger could be misset is an extremely unlikelypossibility . This analysis , while negating Stol z ' s theory , does serve toil lustrate the significant role of the NIST thermometer in theca libration process . Daily use of the NIST thermometer by thesix coordinators in the fie ld is what would reveal a systemicbias at Draeger . This il lustrates the critic al importance ofusing the NIST-traceable thermometer in this process . Thisanalysis also shows that the ten-tandem-failures theory is notirrefutable , as argued by the State . Continuing with the ana lysis , I am persuaded by otherevidence and testimony that the ten-tandem-failures theorysignific antly overstates the case in contending that ten errorswould have to happen in a coordinated manner for an undetectedmisca libration to occur . Taken together , the evidence suggeststhat under the right circumstances three p l ausible andrelatively minor failures , specifically in the agency CU3 4 andboth probes , could result in an undetected misc a libration .Significant l y , none of these failures would involve any of thesimul ator solutions or depend upon speculative software bugs orlarge-scale systemic error . The State ' s position is that an agency CU3 4 temperaturethat was even slightly outside the precise temperature range of 130 3 4 ° C , p lus or minus . 2 ° C , would result in a SIM TEMP errorbec ause the agency and black key probes would either ( 1 ) iffunctioning correctly , recogni ze the out-of-range temperature inthe agency CU3 4 during the CALIBRATE function , or ( 2 ) iffunctioning incorrectly , mistakenly read the temperature of thecoordinator CU3 4s as out-of-range during the l inearity test .Thus, the State contends that even malfunc tioning probes wouldgenerate a SIM TEMP error at some point during the c a l ibrationprocess unless a l l of the CU34s were malfunctioning in tandemwith the agency CU3 4 . However , the evidence regarding probe value suggests that ,in some circumstances , a Draeger probe might interpret asacceptable a temperature range that over l aps but is notcoextensive with the actual acceptable range of 3 4 ° C , p lus orminus . 2 ° C . All of the witnesses agreed that if the probe value enteredby the coordinator into the instrument was not the same as theactual probe value , then the reported temperature measurementfrom that probe ( the misaligned probe ) woul d not be correct( 6T4 4 ; 6 T 8 1 - 6 T8 3 ; 8 T l 2 7 - 8 T 1 3 0 ; 8T 1 5 7 - 8 T l 5 8 ; 9Tl 1 7 - 9 T 1 1 8 ; 10T 1 4 6 ;1 2 T 1 3 1 ; 1 4 T 6 - 14T7 ; 1 7Tl l l - 1 7 T l l 5 ) . Klimik noted that if the probevalue entered into the instrument was lower than the actual 131 probe value , the i nstrument wou ld " read" a lower temperaturethan the actual temperature of the simu lator ( 6T 8 2 ) . The evidence also established two pl ausib le ways in whichthe entered probe value could be wrong : ( 1 ) a data entry errorby the coordinator , or ( 2 ) probe value dri f t . As detailedabove , coordinators must manua lly input the probe value of theblack key probe before performing the CALIBRATE function and ofthe agency probe before performing the solution change , and norecord is made of the number entered ( 6 T 69 ; 6T7 1 - 6 T7 2 ; 6T7 8 - 6 T7 9 ;6Tl42 ) . A simp le typo by the coordinator , for example entering'' 5 '' rather than ' " for a probe value of 106 , could easily occur '6and potentially go undetected . Also , during its year of use , aprobe value could drift to the point at which , by the time it issent to Draeger for recertification , the probe value assigned tothat probe must be changed in order to match the manner in whic hthe probe is actually measuring resistance . Shaffer testified that entering the wrong probe value"would absolutely give an error message . . . [ p] robably in thef i rst step of the calibration process" ( l0T l 4 5 - 10T l 4 6 ) . He wasasked to consider a spe c i f i c example in which the actual probevalue was 108 and the coordinator incorrectly entered 9 8( 10T l 4 6 ) . Shaffer testified that , in that circumstance , theAlcotest wou ld report that a 3 4 ° C solution was " something l i ke 132 3 3 . 5 , maybe 3 3 . 0 , somewhere in that range , degrees C readin g "( 10Tl 4 6 ) . Shaffer , however , only addre ssed the hypothetical inwhich the entered probe value and the actu al probe valuediverged by ten points , and he was not aske d to quantify thetemperature that would be reported if the actual probe value wasonly s lightly different from the probe value entered into theins trument . Both Brettell and Klimik testified that a mis aligned probemight or might not abort the calibration check proce s s ,depending on the degree of mis alignment . Brettell testifiedthat , under some circumstance s , a misaligned probe might reporta s appropriate a simulator-solution-temperature range thatoverlaps but is not coextensive with the actual acceptable rangeof 3 4 ° C , plus or minus . 2 ° C . A probe misaligned in this waycould report as within range both ( 1 ) an agency CU3 4 that washeating s lightly below the correct temperature range , and( 2 ) three coordinator CU3 4 s that were heating properly .Brette ll explained it thus ly : Because if it happens that that probe value overlaps the real probe value , because when you put that probe value in there , there is a range of resistance that that probe is matching , okay . So let's s ay we put a probe value of 103 and we have a certain range , it's pos s ible that those two probe values in a certain part of 133 that range will overlap , okay , for the resistance . Follow me? So that if you put in the wrong probe value and it measures the resist ance , it might be out of range for that number and give you­ abort the test , or it could read the resistance in that range that overlapped what the real resist ance is and would say is temperature is okay . so it could . THE COURT : Would be confident that the is as a result? THE WITNESS : You wouldn ' t know . You wouldn ' t know unless tested with a NIST­ traceable thermometer . [ 8T 1 2 7 - 1 6 to 8Tl2 8 - 1 0 ( emphasis added ) . ] Brette l l thought that " most likely if you put in the wrongnumber , it will not read the temperature [ as ] right " and willabort the test ( 8 T 1 2 9 - 8Tl30 ) . He acknowl edged , however , thatbecause the probe value inputted by the coordinator is notrecorded, there would be no way to know if an inadvertentmistake had been made ( 8Tl2 9 ) . The same would be true if theprobe value had drifted from the number assigned in its lastDraeger recertific ation . Most signific antly , " [ y] ou wouldn ' tknow unless you tested with a NI ST-traceable the rmometer . " Later , Brettell acknowledged that if a probe value wasincorrectly inputte d , " the instrument may or may not pick itup , . . . depending on how c lose to the actual probe value hismistake is" ( 8 Tl56 ) . He explained : 134 A. Wel l , if the proper probe value was inserted , the resistance range would be lining up with the temperature range equal l ike this . Okay . If the probe value is put in differe ntly , such that the resistance range is shifted one way or the other , okay , now , the resistance range is here and the temperature range is here , there's an ove r l apping range where that - if that resistance reads in there , it's going to read the proper temperature , okay . If it reads the resistance down here , okay , it's not going to read the right temperature . Q. But then he removes the black key temperature probe and inserts - and substitutes for that the department's temperature probe , which has its own probe value , which he is then required to input into that mach ine , and he does that step proper ly , okay ? A. Okay . Q. Can tell me whether that ' s - that wouldn't the difference between an a . 0 7 9 and a . 0 8 0 on a breath test? A. I couldn't tell that . Q. cou l d . A. No . [ 8T157 - 2 5 to 8Tl5 8 - 2 2 ( emphasis added ) . ] K l imik acknowledged that a misa l i gned probe could indicatethat a temperature was within the appropriate range , even thoughit was not ( 6 T8 1 - 6T8 3 ) . He said that " [ h ] ypotheticallyspeakin g , " it was possible that the b l ack key temperature probecould show a CU3 4 temperature as within range even though the 135 NIST thermometer would show that it was s lightly out of range( 6Tl55 ) . This was hypothetical in Klimik ' s view becau s e he saidhe wou ld never proceed to c alibrate the instrument if the NISTthermometer was, not in range , but if someone did , it couldpossibly happen that the process would " go ( ) through c l e a r "{ 6T155 ) . Of cours e , if t h e CU34 was not initia l l y tested withthe NIST thermometer , the coordinator would not know that theblack key probe was incorrectly reporting a s light out-of-rangetemperature as being within range . I n addition to the problem of incorrectly entered probevalue or probe value drift , Stolz noted that the Draeger probescould fail in such a way that changes in temperature would notresult in corresponding changes in resistance ( 1 7 T 1 2 3 ; 1 7 Tl58 ) .If this happened to a black key probe , it wou ld fail to detectthe problem if the agency CU34 was out of range , but it wou ldstill " read " the coordinator ' s CU 3 4 s as within range . The State ' s position is that any or a l l of these is sueswith the Draeger probes would not result in an undetectedmiscalibration because , even if they occurred , if the simulatorsolutions were correc t , then the ethanol headspace concentrationwou ld be out of tolerance and the c a libration check procedurewould fail at the linearity test stage . I find this 136 unpersuasive. Like Shaffer's ten-tandem-failures theory , theState's position substant ially overstates the case. As stated in the Calibration Check Procedure , the acceptabletolerance in the l inearity test allows the ethanol headspace tobe "within plus or minus 5% or 0.005 , whichever is greater' ( S - '32 ) . Logic a l l y , given the range of this toleranc e , some out-of­range temperatures in the agency CU34 could lead to amiscal ibration that wou ld ( 1 ) change the linearity test resultsfrom what they would have been had the CU34 temperature beencorrect , but sti l l ( 2 ) fall within the acceptable tolerancerange and appear to "pass" the l inearity test . The State's position does not take into account thecredible testimony of its own witnesses , which establ ishes thatrelatively minor inaccuracies in three components could al lowmiscal ibrations to slip through undetected . And , very importantin the analysi s , the State's witnesses could not quantify theproblem because without performing the NIST thermometer ste p ,the process l ac ks NIST traceab i l i t y , as a result of which noscientifica l l y accurate temperature measurement of the CU34 wasever achieved and no measure of uncertainty in such ameasurement is known . Ma j or inaccuracies wou ld be detectedbecause of Henry ' s Law . But , even so , the evidence does notestablish where a line might be drawn with reasonable scientific 137 reliability . The State bears the burden of proof by cl ear andconvincing evide nce . Its failure to prove this critical fact bythat s tandard , if it is indeed capable of such proof , cannot bedisregarded and results in a substantial diminution in thescientific reliability of resulting breath tests . Signific antly , although Brettell general ly agreed with theten-tandem-failures theory , he still be lieved that it wasimportant to include the NI ST-traceable the rmometer step in thecalibration check proce s s . He testified : A. When I was the Director of the laboratory , I required the calibrat [ ing] units to be checked by a N I ST-traceable thermometer prior to being checked by the Draeger probes . And I - because I wanted an independent test that was traceable to NIST . Q. And you haven't changed that opinion? A. No . But I'm not the Director of the lab anymore . Q. I understand , but you ' re giving us your best opinion here today as an expert . A. Yes . Q. So the failure to use that - so the utiliz ation of that is nece s s ary , in your opinion ? A. I n my opinion , it's - you have to understand where I ' m coming from, okay? As the Director of the laboratory Q. Wel l , could you answer my ques tion yes or no 138 A. No, I woul d like to -THE COURT : Let him answer it the way he wants to answer it .MR . FISHMAN : Sure , Judge .A. As the Laboratory Director , my responsibility is for the quality of this breath testing program . And as you can see from this hearing , the results that come out of the evidential breath testers is very important . It expands a large number of people and there ' s a lot of lega l , you know , ramifications of it . So from where I ' m sitting I have a very - you know , I have a lot of responsibility for this . And so I ' m going to do everything in my power to make sure the instruments are working proper ly . Draeger puts out a great instrument . The probes work fine . If you have the solutions c a librated and the probes are working and calibrated , the instruments are working , everything is fine . And so they have a design-arranged - they have a really exuberant checks and bal ances . And I think we - I went over this and somebody explained them, but I think 10 or more things have to go wrong in a row for a wrong breath alcohol value to come out of the instrument . With a l l that said , all that data depends on Draeger . And from where I'm sitting , and my responsibilitie s , I wanted an independent test done on the c a librating unit to be done to make sure that that c a librating unit was working . And so that was j ust my c al l . The instrument reliably put out a breath test samp l e ? sure it wil l . 139 And so that's how I fee l . This word " necessary " keeps comin g up . It's only necessary from where you sit and stand on this . So that's my expl anation of it . [ 7 T2 3 7 - 2 to 7T2 3 9 - 3 . ] The evidence supports the conc lusion that a misc alibrationresulting from an agency CU34 heating slightly outside theacceptable range might not ( 1 ) trigger out-of-tolerance resultsfor ethanol concentration during the linearity test , or ( 2 ) bedetected by the black key or agency probe if ( a ) the probevalues entered into the instrument were incorrect , whetherbecause of coordinator error or probe drift , or ( b ) probefailure occurred . Having these three errors occur in a singlec alibration check process is unlike l y , but they are neverthelesspossib le errors based on the evidence . Signific ant l y , this evidence suggests a p lausib lecircumstance in which only three of the devices used during thecalibration check process ( the agency CU3 4 , the black key probe ,and the agency probe ) could be slightly wrong yet ultimatelyresult in an undetected miscalibration . These potential errorsare not " pretty unimaginable " or " like trying to line up themoon and a l l the pl anets at the same time . " I find that the State has failed to show that an undetectedmiscalibration could not p l ausibly occur during a calibration 140 check proc e s s if the NIST thermometer step was s kipped . Such anundetected mi sca l ibration would result in incorrect results inevidentiary breath tests done on such an instrument unti l thenext cal ibration . E. Discuss ion of B aum and Alaouie I n the previous section , I discussed in detail the bas i sfor Shaffer's opinion that the s c ientific reliability of breathtests produced by an Alcote s t device which was calibratedwithout using the NIST thermometer step would not be underminedor c a l l ed into que s tion . Shaffer's theory required detai ledanalys i s because it is somewhat complex and because it forms afundame ntal underpinning of the State's pos ition in this case .In this sect ion , I will go on to discus s the " bottom li ne "opinions rendered by two of the State ' s other experts , Baum andAlaouie . Unlike Shaffer's theor y , the opinions rendered bythese experts were supported by several dis crete reason s . Ineach c a s e , I find the reasons unpersuasive and I find itunneces sary to provide a n extens ive discus s i on . When Baum was a s ked for his ultimate opinion regarding thei s sue presented in this c as e , this was the colloquy : Q. I s i t a required legal step? A. It's required by the Chun dec i s ion , yes . 141 Q. Doctor , is the use of the Control Company digital thermometer , based upon your expertise , required scientifically in . order for the instrument to be scientifically reliable ?A. No, it is not .Q. Can you p lease explain to the Court the basis of your opinion?A. The basis of my opinion is , there ' s a number of systems in the instrument to indicate and stop i f the temperature is not appropriate . First of a l l , as I testified recent l y , during a solution change , it ' s not used or during evidential breath testing it ' s not used . Second , there is the CU3 4 , which is this c a l ibrat [ in g ) unit , and the CU3 4 is calibrated annually by Draeger Sc ienti f ic , and that is cal ibrated to show that it can hold the temperature 3 4 plus or minus 0 . 2 degrees Celsius . Also , there is the temperature probes , whether it's the black key or agency temperature probes that are c a l ibrated annua l l y . And those also have to be within range . And the instrument wi l l not go forward with the test . There ' s complic ated source code in the instrument that won't al low it to go forward if it is not reading . The overriding decision is the instrument , it's not the hand [ -] held thermometer , of whether to go forward or not with the test . * * *Q. Doctor , the black key temperature probe and the cal ibration process , what effect does that have on your opinion , i f any? 142 A. The cal ibration and the black key temperature probe is cruc ial to make sure that it properly c an read the temperature of 3 4 degrees . Q. The agency temperature probe and the calibration of the agency temperature probe , what e f fect does that have on your opinion? A. Agai n , it is cruc ial that it ' s cal ibrated so that it c an read the temperature of 3 4 degrees plus or minus the 0 . 2 degrees . Q. The testing of the CU 3 4 simu lators , the ca l ibration of the CU3 4 simulator s , what e f fect does that have on your opinion? A. Agai n , it shows that the simulators will heat up to and maintain the proper temperature , which is also very important . Q. And the testing of the simulator solution and the lots that you referred to earlier , what effect does that have on your opinion? A. That also a ffects the opinion because it's very important to have simulator solution with the right amount of alcohol , because it could not be proper l y ca l ibrated with the wrong amount of alcohol . [ 1 2 T 2 4 4 - 1 1 to 1 2 T2 45- 1 4 ; 1 2 T 2 45 : 2 3 to 1 2 T2 4 6 -2 2 ] . Baum ' s first reason contains two components . He rel ies onthe fact that the protocol does not require use of the NIST 143 thermometer ( 1 ) during a solution change , or ( 2 ) duringevidential breath testing . At the very end of the c a libration process , the coordinatorperforms a solution change , using the agency CU3 4 . There is noneed to test the agency's C U 34 at that time bec ause it was justtested an hour or two earlier with the NIST thermometer andproven to be produc ing a solution temperature within therequired range . Then , after the calibration procedure iscompleted and the coordinator leaves , the local or State Policewho are qua lified as operators in that agency are required toperform periodic solution changes after not more than twenty-f ive breath tests are administered . These solution changes areconducted during the six-month cycle preceding the nextcalibration chec k . I n Chun , a thorough analysis was conductedand it was determined that with a l l of the spec ifiedrequirements and procedures , including a six-month calibrationcheck interval ( as opposed to Draeger ' s recommended one-yearinterva l ) , the Alcotest device and its components would bedeemed suf f ic iently scientif ically reliable to be in goodworking order . Thus , there is no need during the six-monthinterval for further testing of the agency CU3 4 , which wasestablished in the previous c alibration check to be in goodworking order by virtue of measuring its temperature with a 144 NIST-traceable thermome ter . This same reasoning applies tobreath tests administered during the six-month interval . I n his second reason , Baum relies on the fact that theagency CU34 is c alibrated annua l l y by Draeger . F rom that , heconcludes that it has been estab l ished that the CU34 can berelied upon to produce in-range temperatures during that year .For reasons previously discussed in this report , whether Draegeruses NI ST-traceable instrumentation or not in its annualcalibration process , the device c a l ibrated does not achieve NISTtrace ability . Stated different ly , that device does not acquirethe abi lity through that process to produce temperaturemeasurements traceable to a NIST standard . The same is true with respect to the first portion ofBaum's third reason , namely that the black key and agency probesare c a l ibrated annually by Draeger and , in the course of thatc a libration , were determined to have read temperatures withinrange . Again , that process does not confer on the Draegerprobes the capability of rendering a NIST-traceable measurementresult . Reliance upon the CU3 4s and the Draeger probes withoutthe NIST thermometer results in a temperature determination thatsimply lacks NIST trace abil ity . That is the scient ifical lyrequired aspect of the temperature measurement that is essentialto dete rmining the good working order of the CU34s before the 145 CALIBRATE function can be activated and the c a libration checkprocedure can be comp leted . I n the second part of Baum ' s third reason , he states thatafter the CALIBRATE function is activated, the instrument willnot be able to go forward if there is a temperature errordetected by the Alcotest firmware . He continues that " [ t] heoverriding decision is the instrument , it ' s not the hand [ -] he l dthermometer , of whether to go forward or not with the test . "That statement is incorrect . Everyone in this case agrees thatif the " hand-held thermometer , " which is the NIST thermometer ,does not read within range , the coordinator is not permitted to" go forward " with the test . After expressing those three reasons, several additionalquestions were posed to Baum by way of fol low-up as set forthabove . To the extent that those fol l ow-up questions dealt withthe black key temperature probe , the agency temperature probe ,and the CU3 4 s , Baum ' s answers added nothing to his three statedreasons . Finally , he was asked whether the testing for accuracy ofthe simulator solutions affected his opinion . He answeredaffirmative ly . However , for reasons expressed e lsewhere in thisreport , the accuracy of the simul ator solutions wil l notnecessarily prevent miscalibrations if the agency CU 3 4 and the 146 Draeger probes are slightly misaligned . This is why it is soextremely important to ascert a i n , with an independent NIST­traceable temperature measuring device , that the temperaturesare precisely within range . If those temperatures , part icularlyin the agency CU3 4 , which is used in the CALIBRATE function andwhich " teac hes" the instrument what a 0 . 10% ethanolconcentration i s , are even slightly outside the allowabletolerance , that i nstrument could slip through the cal ibrationcheck process and result in a miscal ibration . There is no dispute that the accuracy of the solutionconcentrations is essential . The evidence c learly supports afinding that the testing pe rformed by the OFS achieves therequired NI ST-traceable accuracy . But that alone will notnecessarily prevent miscalibrations if temperatures are slightlyoff under c ircumstances described elsewhere in this report . Counsel for the State further questioned Baum about theShaffer theory , with which Baum said he agreed ( 1 2T25 1 - 1 2 T 2 52 ) .This does not require further discussion here , because , for thereasons set forth in the previous section of this report , I havere j ected Shaffer ' s theory . Accordi ngly , I do not find the reasons given by Baum insupport of his opinion to be persuasive , either individually orcollective l y . This finding is further ampl ified by my 147 assessment of Baum ' s credibility . I therefore reject Baum ' sultimate opinion . Alaouie expressed his opinion in the fol lowing col loquy : Q. Although the use of the Control Company digita l thermometer is a required step , if a coordinator does not use this step for whatever reason , would the fact that the coordinator skipped the step make the results of the calibration process scientific a l ly unreliab l e ? * * * A . No , it does not . Q. Why? A. Because the Control Company temperature - digital thermometer is used in a qualit ative administrative manner where the observation is only visua l . There's no documentation of the observation . The instrument does not perform any adj ustments based on that observation . And the vendor Draeger does not require the use of that temperature probe . THE COURT : So it's bec ause it ' s not recorded THE WITNESS : Correct . THE COURT : it's bec ause there are no manual or automatic prompts that would cause an adj ustment to be made? THE WITNESS : Correct . THE COURT : And bec ause Draeger does not require it? 148 THE WITNESS : Correct . And there i s a l s o no documenta�ion of that observation as well . THE COURT : That was the fir s t thing I a s ked . THE WITNESS : Yes . [ 1 6Tl0- 1 8 to 1 6 Tl l -2 4 . ]Counsel for the State fol lowed up with two additional questions ,asking whether the annual testing by Draeger of the black keytemperature probes and CU3 4 s played a role in his opinion .Alaouie answered a f f i rmative ly . With respect to the black keytemperature probes , he stated : A. The black key temperature probe or the agency temperature probe are the one s that are actually monitoring the temperature of the solution . Both of these are NIST traceab le . And the whatever l i ke status mes s ages will be triggered due to the fact that the temperature is out of tolerance will be reported by those spec i f i c temperature probe s , whether it's the bl ack key or whether it ' s the agency's temperature probe . [ 1 6T l 2 -6 to 1 4 . ]With re spect to the CU3 4 s , he stated : THE WITNESS : Yes , it does . Because the s ame thing, the CU34 gets cal ibrated annually . It comes with a certificate of accuracy to NHTSA, which i s N-H-T-S­ A, which stands for the National H ighway and Traffic Safety Adminis tration . [ 1 6 T l 3 - 8 to 1 2 ] . 149 I do not find any of these reasons, individually orcollective l y , persuasive as a basis for Alaouie ' s opinion . Hisfirst reason is that the coordinator only makes a visualobservation of the NIST thermometer temperature reading , butdoes not record the result . Whi le this is true as a statementof fact , it ignores that it is a mandatory part of thecal ibration process and , when a coordinator certifies that hehas performed a l l required steps in that process , he i s , ineffect , documenting that he observed a temperature readingproduce d by the N I ST-traceable thermometer in each CU34 between3 3 . 8 and 3 4 . 2 degrees Celsius . The fact that the specificreading is not memori a l i z ed does not detract from the importanceof this step . Indeed , if this step is not successfullycompleted , the protocol prohibits the coordinator fromcontinuing with the cal ibration check procedure . The lack of recording of the NIST thermometer temperaturereadings is no different than the lack of recording of the entryof the correct probe value . Nowhere does the coordinator writedown nor does the i nstrument capture the actual probe value thecoordinator entered . Therefore , by Alaouie's reasoning , it isnot documented that the coordinator entered a probe value thatmatches the probe value assigned to his black key probe or thatwhich is assigned to the agency probe . It is left to the 150 trustworthiness of the coordinator to do it in a diligent andreliable manner and , when signing his certification , indirectlydocumenting that he did so . No one would suggest that enteringthe correct probe value is not extremely important . Indeed , thecertificates of accuracy issued by Draeger for the black key andagency probes state s : " For accurate temperature readings , theprobe value on this certificate , noted below, must be programmedinto the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 " ( S - 3 3C ) . Alaouie ' s second reason is that " [ t] he instrument does notperform any adj ustments based on that observation . " Once theCALIBRATE function is activated, his statement is correc t .However , he agreed with my c l arification or ampl ification ofthat re ason that "it's because there are no manual or automaticprompts that would cause an adj ustment to be made . " If the NISTthermometer reading is out of range , the coordinator neveractivates the CALIBRATE function . This constitutes a manualprompt that there is a SIM TEMP error , and it directs thecoordinator to stop everything and refrain from activating theCALI BRATE function unless the malfunctioning CU3 4 is replacedand , after heating for an hour , produces a readi ng from the NISTthermometer that is within range . Alaouie ' s statement that the digital thermometer step ismerely used i n an " administrative manner " is consistent with the 151 State's position in this case that it is nothing more than a" pre-ste p " that was put into the procedure for administrativeconvenience so coordinators would not encounter a waste of theirtime if they blindly activated the CALI BRATE function only toget a SIM TEMP error through the black key temperature probe ,which would abort the test . If that happened , the coordinatorwould either start a l l over again or be required to take theAlcotest device out of service . As I have discussed elsewherein this report , and particularly in Section IV ( C ) , thischaracteriz ation by the State is completely unsupported by theevidence and I rej ect it . Alaouie's third reason , that Draeger does not require theNIST thermometer requires little discussion . Each State tailorsits own system to its own needs and specifications , putting inadditional safeguards as it deems appropriate beyond thoseminima lly required by the manufacturer . New Jerse y , underBrettel l's very capable direction , inst alled a number of these ,such as testing the simu lator solutions separately in the OFS ,c alibrating devices fol lowing the New Jersey c alibration checkprocess when rec eived from Draeger ( either new or after beingreturned from a repair ) , and requiring a one-hou r , rather thanthirty-minute , heat-up time . These are a l l beyond Draeger ' srecommendations . Likewise , as a result of based on Judge 152 King's recommendation , the Court shortened the ca libration timeto six months , rather than the one year recommended by Draeger .Indeed , in addition to the importance of NIST traceability oftemperature measurements , one of Brettell's primary reasons forinserting the NIST thermome ter step was to assure that ascientific ally reliable temperature measurement would beobtained by a N I ST-traceable thermometer , separate andindependent from Draeger and the Alcotest instrument . Al aouie ' s answer to the fol low-up questions cited above ,are likewise unpersuasive as a source of support for hisopinion . I n the first , he states that the Draeger black key andagency temperature probes are NIST traceab le . For the reasons Ihave previously stated at length , they are not . Alaouie'sstatement constitutes an acknowledgment that NIST trace abilityis essential to the temperature measurement . However , hisstatement that NIST traceability is achieved with the Draegerprobes alone is unsupported by the evidence . I n his other fol low-up answer , Al aouie said that hisopinion was also influenced by the fact that the CU34s arec a librated annually by Draeger with a certificate of accuracy toNHTSA standards . Such a certification is far removed from therequirements for NIST traceability . Like the Draeger probes ,the good working order of the CU34s cannot be determined in a 153 scientifically r e liable manner without the initial use of anindependent NI ST-traceable thermometer . According l y , I reject Al aouie's opinion that fai lure toperform the NIST-traceable step in the calibration process doesnot c a l l into question or undermine the scientific reliabilityof the cal ibration process and subsequent breath test resultsproduc ed by that i nstrument . F. Discussion of Brett e l l Of the State's four expert witnesses , the opinions renderedby three of them ( Shaffer , Baum and Alaouie ) on the ultimateissue in this case were expressed in definitive terms in favorof the State ' s position . For the reasons already state d , I haverejected those opinions as unsupported by the evidence . The opinions rendered on the ultimate issue by the State ' sother exper t , Brette l l , cannot be so simply described . Excerptsof his testimony can be picked out which might seem to supportthe State ' s position that fail ing to use the NIST thermometerwill not undermine or c a l l into question the reliability of thecal ibration procedure or resulting breath tests . Other excerptsare to the contrary . A ful l reading of Brete l l ' s testimony isnecessary for a fair assessment of what his opinion actual l y i s . I do not mention these potential ly conf l icting aspects ofhis testimony as indicating any measure of evasiveness , 154 deceitfulne s s , lack of knowledge , bia s , or the like . I n sectionI I I ( A ) ( 2 ) , discussing Brette l l ' s qualifications and credibi lity ,I stated that he answered all questions candidly andforthrightl y , regard l e s s of who was asking them, that he wasvery si ncere and careful in answering , and that he disp layed avery high level of appreciation for the solemn respons ibility hehad in se lect ing a breath testing device and developings c ient i f i c a l l y reliable protocols to achieve , as best as couldbe done , the highest level of sc ientific reliabil ity in breathtest result s . I concluded that his tes timony was very credibleand his opinions are entitled to very substantial weight . Iadhere to those a sse s sments . I al s o adhere to my credibilitya s s e ssment comments that Brettel l ' s knowl edge of the Alcotest7 1 1 0 , the c a l ibration check procedure ( which he developed andauthored) and the sa feguards in it , and New Jersey ' s breathtesting program are c le arly superior to that of any otherwitne s s in this case . Based upon my observations of Brettell ' s tes timony over twof u l l days and his demeanor in rendering that testimony , and nowhaving read through the transcripts of his testimony , this is myconc lus ion . Brette l l bel ieves that the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 i s areliable breath testing ins trument that produces reliable breathtest resul t s . After a l l , it was he who was largely responsible 155 for tes ting and validating the instrument and recommending itspurchase for use in New Jersey to replace the Breathalyzerins trument . And , in Chun , after a very protracted hearing ,Judge King rendered a comprehensive and thought ful report inwhich he concluded that the device is gener al l y scientificallyreliable . The Supreme Court then conducted its own exhaustiveanalys i s of the record and in a comprehensive opinion concludedthat the device is suffic iently sc ienti fically reli able to al lowits reports to be admitted in evidence . Everything stated in the preceding paragraph , however , istempered by a n indispen s able qual ification , namely that a l l ofthe necess ary procedures and s a feguards for testing the deviceand administering breath tests with it are fol lowed . Certainly , the Chun court expre s s ed this qualif ication instating that it had " no doubt that the device , with thesafeguards we have required , is suffici ently s c ientificallyreliable that its reports might be admitted . " 1 9 4 N . J . at 158 . My analys i s of Brettel l ' s testimony l eads me to concludethat the overriding thrust of his testimony and ultimate opinionregarding the role of the NIST thermometer in the c a l ibrationprocedure weighs in favor of the qua l i fication that the 7 1 1 0 isa good breath te sting device that produces r e l iable breath test 156 result s , if a l l requirement s22 are complied with , useof the NIST thermometer . I n other words , Brette l l holds two opinions relevant here ,namely that the device is generally reliable and that us e of theNIST thermometer in periodically cal ibrating it is a necessarycomponent in a s s uring that rel iabil ity . These opinions are notat odds with each other and are certainly not mutua l lyexclus ive . Indeed , their harmonization should be readilyunderstandable in l i ght of the extreme measures taken byBrett e l l and his OFS col league s to test and val idate the device ,to develop protoco ls and safeguards to achieve the highest leve lof sc ientific reliability pos s ible , and to put the ins trumentsinto the f i e l d , knowing they wou ld be in the years to comeessentially the final arbiter of guilt or innocence of manythousands of individu a ls - that is i f they are in good workingorder , and the breath test is administered correctly by aqua l i f i ed operator . My finding based on Brette l l ' s overall tes timony i s that heholds the opinion that s kipping the NI ST thermometer step would22 I do not suggest that " a l l requirement s " should be taken l itera l ly . I am aware that there might be s ome requi rements that are quite per functory or insignific ant and not performing them would be of little consequence in potent i a l ly af fecting s c ientific r e liab i l ity . 157 undermine or c a l l into question the s c ienti fic r e l i abi lity ofthe c a l ibration proc e ss and breath test results . I n this report , I have quoted a number of pass ages fromBrette l l ' s testimony that i l lustrate the point . He testified,for example , that the NIST thermometer step , along with otherrequired steps in the calibration proce s s , was made a part of agroup of steps that were col lectively nece s s ary to ensure thes c ienti fic rel iabil ity of the proce s s . ( supr a , 3 5 - 3 6 ) . Hefurther testified that , because the accuracy of the CU3 4temperature is " extreme ly , extremely important , " the NISTthermometer step was put into the proc e s s " to make sure that thecalibrating unit was tested against the standards of NIST whenbefore we started anything . '' ( supra , 8 4 ) . He said , " I tookevery step I cou ld to independently test as much as I could ofthis program independently of Draeger to make sure that i f 11there was " a bias or an error in Draeger ' s laboratory , " we wou ld''have a good chance of stopping it before it pro l iferated out , ''and that was " exactly why I added this step . " ( supra , 12 7 ) . I n addressing the " neces s ity " of the N I ST thermometer step ,Brette l l s aid : Draeger puts out a great instrument . The probes work f ine . I f you have the solutions calibrated and the probes are working and 158 ca librate d , the ins truments are working , everything is f ine . [ s upr a , 1 3 9 . ] In other test imony , he made c l ear that the only way to makesure that the Draeger probes are working correctly is byindirect means , which i s rel iant upon prior testing with theN IST thermometer . He explained : The only thing that gets checked with that [ the NIST thermometer ] is the c a l ibrating unit . The ( Draeger ] probes do not . The probes are double checked once the c a l ibrat [ i ng ] unit is checked and working and up t ( o ] temperature . I f you put the probe in there and the probe reads the temperature , then now you know the probe i s a l s o working . [ 8 T 1 1 6 - 1 4 to 2 0 ( emphasis added ) . ] On another occ a s ion , when a s ked what would be theconsequence of skipping the NI ST thermometer step , Brett ellbegan his answer by s aying i f you went on with t he c a l ibrationprocedure " and everything ' s working properly , " you would l i ke lyget a correct reading because of the many " checks and balancesin there with the tempe rature probes , " so that if that step isleft out , " a s long as everything else i s working properly on theinstrument , you ' re going to get accurate readings " ( 7T97 ) . Onceagain , Brettel l expressed the view that you would probably get agood reading because the 7 1 1 0 i s generally reliab l e , but thatwould be the case only if everything is working properly . And , 159 throughout h is testimony , he reiterated that the only way tomake sure a l l of the Draeger components are operating properlyis by starting with the independent NI ST-traceable step in thec alibration procedure . On another occas ion , when pre s s e d about the accuracy ofresults coming through the " Alcote st machine , " Brettell said" the reason that you are doing this test with the cal ibration i st o make sure that that ' s a l l working " ( 8 T 4 4 ) . He then went onto say : "When you put a certified solut ion into the cal ibratingunit , and you set everything up properly and running and you getout the same concentrat ion , you have verified that everything i sworking properly " ( 8 T 4 4 ) . This reaff irms that " s ettingeverything up properly " means complying with the c alibrationcheck procedure . In turn , with an accurate s imu lator s o lution ,and the application of Henry ' s Law, obtaining a correct readingon the nomi nal ethanol concentration wi ll verify that everythingis working properly . Again , the ver i f i cation of an accurateresult is dependent upon complying with the procedure , includingthe NIST thermometer . I n another portion of his tes timony , Brettell wasquestioned about what would happen i f , hypothet ically , a NI ST­traceable thermometer was not us ed in the cal ibration proces s .He responded that " i f the probes are working properly and the 160 solutions are certified properly and the calibrating unit isheating u p properly , you ' re going t o get an accurate reading onthe Alcote s t 7 1 1 0 MKI I I - C " ( 7T 1 5 6-7T1 5 7 ) . Once agai n , heconditions the likel ihood of an accurate reading on the Draegerprobes having worked properly in the calibration proce s s . Intur n , as his other testimony repeatedly establishes , the goodworking order of the Draeger probes cannot be directlydetermined through the Alcote st firmware , but mu st be indirectlyverified by a prior temperature measurement with the NI STthermometer . I n Augu st 2 0 1 7 , in lieu of furn i s hing an expert report inantic ipation of his expert tes timony , Brette l l submitted to aQ&A st atement conducted by a State Police detective and twoattorneys from the Attorney General ' s Office representing theState in this case . I n his testimony in this hearing , heconf irmed that he was a s ked whether failing to use the NI STthermometer would undermine or c a l l into que stion the s c ientificrel iability of the breath test subsequently perf ormed on thatinstrument and that he gave the fol lowing answer : My answer : As as all of the of the instruments black were no . [ 8 T3 7 - 2 4 to 8 T3 8 - 1 ( emphas i s added ) . ] 161 Once again , Brette l l would expect an accurate reading but hisexpectation is qualified by the condition that a l l of thecomponents , including the black key temperature probe , wereoperating properly . From the tota lity of Brette ll ' s testimony and inrecognition of his high level of credibility and knowledge , I donot attribute these qua lifying comments to hedging , lack ofcertai nty , or evasivene s s . I attribute them to his honestbelief that the 7 1 1 0 is a reliable breath testing instrument ,but that reliabi lity depends very substant ially on the us e ofthe NI ST-traceable thermometer in the c alibration proce s s .Brette l l ' s test imony , taken as a whole , supports the findingthat f a ilure to use the NIST thermometer in the cal ibrationprocess does undermine or c a l l into que s tion the scient ificreliab i lity of the calibration process and of breath testresults produced by that device . G. Other states The State asks me to find that " [ t ] he use of a NI ST­traceable digital thermometer by a coordinator to test thetemperature of the simulator solutions before beginning the' Cal ibrate ' function to cal ibrate the Alcotest instrumentis not done in any other state " ( Pb 7 7 ) . It contends that thereis " uncontroverted evidence that no other state or j uri sdiction 162 that uses the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I-C , or a wet-bath s imu lator inits recal ibration protoco l , requires this pre-te st temperaturecheck to verify the temperature before beginning the c a l ibrationprocedure " ( Pb 5 3 ) . The fact that the NI ST-thermometer step " i sunique to New Jersey , " the State argues , shows that " not doing "this step i s generally accepted in the sc ienti f i c community( Pb 5 3 ) . I re j ect the State ' s proposed f i nding of fact on thispoint . The evidence i s insufficient for any finding regardingthe manner i n which other states us ing the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 haveensured the correct temperature of any wet bath simulators usedin connection with c a l ibrating or performing linearity tests onthe instrument . Moreover , uncontroverted evidence establis hedthat the instrument was highly cus tomi zed for each jur i sdictionand that other j uri sdictions had procedures and saf eguards notin use in New Jersey , so the State ' s attempt to equateprocedures in dif ferent j ur i sdictions creates a f a l s ecomparison . The State points to testimony by Shaff er and Baum assupporting the proposit ion that the NIST thermometer step " i sunique to New Jersey , '' and it seeks a f inding that" coordinator [ s ] " i n other states do not " te s t the temperature ofthe s imulator solutions before beginning the ' Ca l ibrate ' 163 function to ca l ibrate the Alcote st instrument " with a NISTthermometer ( Pb5 3 ; Pb7 7 ) , The evidence falls far short ofe s tab l i shing this point . Shaffer ac knowledged that there is " a step in the NewJersey protoc ol , the c a libration protocol s , requiring the use ofa Control Company NIST thermometer" and that this step was" spec i f ic to New Jer s e y " ( 1 0T34- 10T35 ) . However , Shaffer agreedon cro s s -examination that it was " [ v ] ery fair to s ay " that thestates using the instrument each " had different requirements asto ca libration " ( 1 0T9 3 - 1 0T 9 4 ) . For ins truments sold to NewJersey , Draeger "customi zed the 7 1 1 0 to be in compliance with "this s t ate ' s specific c a l ibration check procedures ( 9 T l 9 ) . Shaffer testified that " [ i ] n its heyday , " the Alcotest 7 1 1 0was used as the exc lus ive instrument in New Jersey ,Mas sachusett s , and Alabama ( 1 0 T 9 3 ) . He a l s o testi fied that , byJanuary 2 0 1 8 , only New Jers ey , Alabama , and " a few counties inCalifornia " were s t i l l u s ing the Alcote st 7 1 1 0 ( 9 T 7 ) . Shaffergave no tes timony regarding how any jurisdi ction other than NewJersey ca l ibrated its i nstrument s , whether CU3 4 s were u s e d , orwhat those j urisdictions did to ensure the correct temperatureof any CU 3 4 s used before performing the CALIBRATE function . Shaffer did testify tha t , for the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 , " thesoftware is highly cus tomi zed for every cus tomer , " so the 164 instruments may look the same in diff erent j ur is dictions and" the internal hardware c omponents may be mo stly the same , " butthe instruments are dif ferent ( 9 T l 0 ) . He explained : For applications like thi s , there ' s no possibi lity of us being able to j u s t take something off the she l f , as it were , and to be able to j u s t s ell it to any j uri sdiction . It requires a lot of customi zation . And so much so that the software becomes the most expensive part of what we provide in a sys tem to a j u r isdiction . [ 9 T 1 0 - 1 9 to 2 5 . )Shaffer also testified that Alabama has ' ' a very robust dataanalys is procedure and program in p lace " to review evidentialbreath tests and check the performance of its ins truments ( 9 T2 8 -9T29 ) . Baum testi f ied that he "be lieve [ d ] Alabama andMassachusetts " used a ''wet bath proce s s " but did not " u s e theseparate NI ST-traceable thermometer step which is spec ific inNew Jer s ey " ( 1 2 T2 3 1 - 1 2 T 2 3 2 ) . However , on the s econd day of histest imony , Baum contradicted this and s aid he had no realknowledge regarding steps other states did or did not take .Baum s a id that he was "wa s n ' t aware of what versions " of theAlcote s t Al abama used , and he never spoke to his Alabamacounterpart regarding the Alcotest program there ( 1 3 T 1 9 2 -13Tl93 ) . 165 Baum acknowledged that his earl ier tes timony was to theeffect that Alabama used a wet bath s imulator and the 7 1 1 0( 1 3T2 1 0 - 1 3 T2 1 1 ) . When pres sed on the dis crepancy , Baumanswered , " I s aid I bel ieve . I didn ' t s ay I was positive . Isaid I believed . That ' s what I testified on Thursday . " ( 1 3T2 1 2 -13T2 1 3 ) . Then , looking at Alabama ' s operator manual for the7 1 1 0 , with a reference to a " Dry Gas Calibration Check , " Baumconceded that " [ i ] t does appear that they did us e the dry gas "( 1 3T2 1 3 ; D- 2 1 ) . On cross -examination , Baum was asked about the respective" c alibration proce s s e s " of New Jersey, Alabama , andMassachusetts : Q . And that was it . And you also underst and each one of tho s e states had different requi rements that they wanted to do in their respective calibration proc e s s e s , correct? A . Correct . Q . Not a l l three states had the same ca l ibration proces s , correct? A . Correc t . Q . Each state had requirements that were some were different from the other state s , correct ? A . Correct . Q . And some were different from what Draeger had - what Draeger does in the cal ibration proc e s s , correct? 166 A . Correct . Q . S o the f act that - s o New Jersey had a couple of steps that s ome of the other states were n ' t us ing , correct? A. Correct . Q . And I ' m sure the other states had steps that New Jersey weren ' t u s i ng , correct? A . I don ' t know their Q . You don ' t know? A . I don ' t know. [ 1 3 T 5 6 - 1 7 to 1 3 T 5 7 - 2 1 . ] I find that Baum of fered no credible tes timony regardingprocedures in any other states . The "Al abama Breath Alcohol Testing Program OperatorManual , Draeger Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I C " and certain relevantportions of the Alabama Department of Foren s ic Sc iencesAdminis trative Code were admitted into evidence and furtheri l lustrate the impossibility of any meaningful comparisonbetween New Jersey ' s ca libration check procedures and theprocedures used in Alabama ( D- 2 l ; D- 2 2 ) . What Alabama terms a" c al ibration check" is not the periodic procedure by acoordinator including the CALIBRATE function and various tests ,but rather part of the breath testing sequence itself and thefunctional equivalent of the control test per formed in New 167 Jersey during an actual evidentiary breath test ( D-2 1 at 8 - 9 ; D-22 at 1 - 1 - 3 , 1 - 1 - 1 0 ) . For its • c alibration check , " Alabamautilizes dry gas cyl inders rather than wet bath s imulators ( D- 2 1at 1 9 ; D- 2 2 at 1 - 1 - 3 , 1 - 1 - 1 0 ) . Al so , in Alabama each Alcotest ins trument is sent to theAlabama Department of Forensic Sc iences ( ADFS ) annually for a" battery of tests • to confirm its good working order ( D- 2 2 at A­l to A- 7 ) . The ADFS performs a variety of tests and checks ,including a linearity check with wet bath s imulators ( D- 2 2 at A-3). I t appears that the ADFS cal ibrates each instrument priorto running the tests , but this is not entirely c lear from therecord ( D- 2 2 at 1 - 1 - 3 ) . Details of the annual evaluation by theADFS were included in the code • to inform the pub lic of thequality control or good laboratory practic e s • in p lace at theADFS but " do [ ] not constitute a rule " ( D- 2 2 at A- 1 ) . Thus , even the limited record regarding Alabama ' sprocedures shows ma j or differences from New Jersey ' s , one of themost si gnif icant being that Alabama does not s end a coordinatorinto the f ield to e ither ( l ) cal ibrate the instrument , or( 2 ) ensure that the simulator used by that agency is functioningproperl y . Plainly , Alabama procedures would not mandate a NISTthermometer be used to check the simulator solution temperatureof the agency ' s dry gas cylinders that do not us e a solution . 168 The ADFS c a l ibrates each ins trument in-hous e , and the record i ss i lent a s to the manner in which i t ensures that its own wetbath s imu lators are heating to the correct temperature . TheADFS might very we l l check its own equipment routinely us ing aNIST thermometer . Certainly , nothing suggests that the ADFSs imply a l lows the Alcote s t 7 1 1 0 probes to val idate the s imu latorsolution temperature when it c a l ibrates ins truments . Nothing whatever was presented regarding cal ibrationprocedures in Mas sachusetts or the counties in C a l i fornia us ingthe Alcotest 7 1 1 0 . In addition , even a s suming that the NIST thermometer stepis " unique to New Jer sey , " no conclus ions regarding generalacceptance could legitimately be drawn , given ( 1 ) the smallnumber of other j urisdi ctions us ing the ins trument , and ( 2 ) theindication that New Jer s e y , purchasing more than twice as manyins truments as Alabama , was poss ibly the most substantial userof the ins trument . The State ' s argument suggests that NewJersey i s an out l ier , dif fering from a large and uniform bl ockof " other state s " that have affirmatively chosen to skip theNIST thermometer step . This inference i s unsupported . The evidence shows that relatively few jur i sdict ions haveused the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 for evidenti a l breath testing and thatthose that have are in the proc e s s of replacing that instrument . 169 According to Shaffer , the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 stopped being of feredfor s a l e in the United States " anywhere in the time frame frommaybe 2 0 1 2 to 2 0 1 5 " ( 10T74 ) . Brettell testified that he wasaware that " Al abama had a program" using the. Alcotest 7 1 1 0 andthat " Massachusetts was evaluating i t " at the time of the Chunhearings in 2 0 0 6 ( 7 T 1 7 0 - 7 T 1 7 1 ) . Alabama has evidently s e lectedthe Intoximeter Datamaster to replace the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 ( 9T 2 6 -9T2 7 ) . New Jersey has se lected Draeger ' s Alcotest 9 5 1 0 toreplace the 7 1 1 0 ( 1 4 T 8 4 - 1 4 T 8 9 ) . That change has not yet beenfinali z ed or imp lemented . Shaffer e s t imated that New Jersey purchased between 6 0 0 and7 0 0 Alcotest 7 1 1 0 instruments ( 1 0 T l 9 5 ) . He noted that Al abamahas " around 2 8 0 " Alcote st 7 1 1 0 s , and he gave no figures for howmany instruments were purchased by Mass achu setts or the fourcounties in Cali fornia ( 9T 2 7 ) . These facts suggest that , far from being an out l ier , NewJersey was such a substantial us er of the Alcote st 7 1 1 0 that novalid conclusions regarding general acceptance of Alcotest 7 1 1 0cal ibration procedures cou ld be made that exc luded thos e usedhere . H. list The State also argues that the general acceptance of " notdoing " the N IST thermometer step is " further borne out by the 170 fact that the CU- 3 4 s imulator is on the Conforming Products Li s t( ' CPL ' ) . " Citing the King SMR in Chun , the State notes that theCU3 4 was " tested and evaluated by Volpe , a part of the Researchand Innovative Technologies Administration of the U . S .Department of Transportatio n , to make sure that it meets themodel specifications for a wet bath s imulator as set forth by "the National Hi ghway Traffic Safety Administration ( NHTSA )( Pb 5 3 ) . The presence of the CU3 4 on the CPL is merely an indicationthat the device is generally appropriate for purchase , but itdoes not inform the i s sue of whether , whe n , or how theperformance of the device should be periodically checked with aNIST thermometer . I ndeed , the f act that Draeger annually checksand certi fies each CU3 4 for accuracy us ing its own NISTthermometer indicates a recognition that inclus ion of the deviceon the CPL does nothing to ensure the continued performance ofindividual CU3 4 s . Moreover , the Chun hearing testimony of Edward Conde , theVolpe employee who performed various testing on the Alcotest7 1 1 0 , undermines rather than supports the State ' s po s itionregarding the use of the NIST thermometer . At the time of the Chun hearings , Conde had worked at Volpefor twenty years ( King SMR 1 3 1 ) . He testi f ied that Volpe tested 171 and evaluated both evidential breath testing ins truments andc a l ibrating units , and he noted that the evaluations are " forthe benefit of States when they ' re making purchasing de cis ions .It ' s j ust a recommendation " ( Chun 1 T 4 5 ) . " I n 1 9 9 6 , 2 0 0 3 , and2 0 0 6 , Volpe tes ted dif ferent firmware vers i ons of the Alcotest7 1 1 0 to determine if they met the mode l spec i f i cationsrecommended by NHTSA" ( King SMR 1 3 0 -3 1 ) . Conde was off ered as an expert in the chemi stry of breathtesting ( King SMR 1 3 1 ) . Judge King found him to be " verycredible and candid , " and he "was quite impressed" with Conde ' stestimony ( King SMR 1 3 7 ) . Conde testi fied in detail as to how Volpe tests breath-testing instrume nts and cal ibrating units ( King SMR 2 8 - 3 0 , 1 3 4 -35 ) . He exp la ined that , when testing breath-testing instrumentssuch as the Alcotest for prec i s ion and accurac y , Volpe used wetbath s imulators manufactured by Guth and Repco " to introduce acertain concentration of alcohol into" the instrument ( Chun1 T 5 5 - 1 T5 8 ) . Then the fol lowing exchange occurred : Q . To check the s imulator temperature , what piece of equipment i s used? A . The Draeger device has a thermistor probe , but I independently wi ll use a NIST thermometer to make sure that the temperature is what the probe s aid it was . Q . Would that thermometer also be traceab l e ? 172 A . That ' s NIST traceabl e , yes . 1 T 5 8 - 1 8 to 2 5 . ]Thus , when evaluating the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 and using Volpe ' s ownwet bath simulators , Conde did not s imply rely on e ither thegood working order of Volpe ' s s imu lators or the Alcotesttemperature probe s . Rather , he independently verified thes imulator solution temperature u s ing a NIST thermometer . I n addi tion , the Chun tes timony of Chappe l l , the formerN IST employee who was qua lified as an expert in legal metrology,contradicts the State ' s sugge stion that inclus ion on the CPLsomehow e l iminates the subsequent need for a NIST-traceablethermometer chec k . Chappe l l testified in general regarding the principles oflegal metro logy . He s a id that " [ i ] n order to have confidence inthe operation " of a " legal measuring instrument , " " responsibleofficial s " use a three- step proc e s s of "metrological control , "spec i f i c a l l y , ( 1 ) type evaluation or approval ; ( 2 ) initialveri fication ; and ( 3 ) subs equent veri fication 3 T8 8 ; KingSMR 1 5 3 ) . By following this proc e s s , " the responsible officialscou ld have some confidence that the ins truments that areproviding this evidence in the field or measurements in thefield were under control or giving an accurate reading" ( Chun3 T8 8 ) . 173 Testing by the NHTSA and inclusion on the CPL i s merely thefirst step , i . e . , type evaluation or approval 3T89-3T94 ) ." I t i s for information to - for the regulators and users of theinstrument to indicate that . this manu fac turer i s capableof measuring - of manufacturing such an ins trument and it meetsthese spec i f i cations " 3 T 9 3 -3T9 4 ) . Regarding the Alcotest , Chappe ll s aid that , in New Jers ey ,the cal ibration check proc e s s i s the initial veri fication stepfor new ins truments and the subs equent verification step forinstruments already in the f i e ld 3T 1 1 6 - 3 T l l 8 ) . The temperature of the s imulator solution " has to becorrect in order to get a reference sample of knownconcentrat ion " 3T143 ) . Chappe ll testified , " I n subs equentveri fication , of cours e , the ins trument - the temperaturemeasuring i nstrument as soc i ated with determin in g the temperatureof the reference solution would be verif ied , would be calibratedor veri f ied , me aning that it would be c ompared with a measuringdevice that has trace ability to temperature measuring referencestandards maintained by the national measuring in s titute orNIST" 3T137 ) . Chappel l ' s test imony i s consi stent with the conc lusion thatinclusion of an instrument on the CPL is only the first step inthe three-step proc e s s of " metro logical contro l " and that a 174 NI ST-traceable thermometer should be used to check the simulatorsolution during subs equent cal ibration procedures . V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUS IONS OF LAW A. of fact 1. Brette l l inc luded the NI ST-traceable thermometer stepin the cal ibration procedure ( D- 3 2 ) from the very beginning ofNew Jersey ' s use of the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 , approximately seventeenyears ago . 2. He inc luded this step for s c ientific reasons , to ensurethe good working order of the CU3 4 s by measuring the s imulatorsolution temperatures at the beginning of the c a l ibrationproc e s s and establishing their in-tolerance accuracy to a NI S Tstandard . 3. It is critical to the proper operation of the Alcotestinstrument that the simulator-solution temperatures be withinthe correct range when performing the CALIBRATE function ,running control and l inearity tests , and performing a s o lutionchange . 4. This requirement was inserted into the c a l ibrationprocedure as a mandatory part of the procedure . 5. As Brettel l acknowledged , a l l of the steps in thec a l ibration procedure are c o l lectively s c ienti fically neces s aryto the reliabil ity of the c a l ibration proce s s . 175 6. This requirement was put into the procedure long before there fore , i t was not mandated by a court but wasvoluntarily put in by the chief forensic s c ientist in NewJers ey . 7. The requirement has remained part of the protocolcontinuously s ince its inception . 8. I n the present litigation , the State has expre s s lys t ated that it has no intention of removing this step as arequired part of the calibration procedure , and is notrequesting court author i z ation to do s o . 9. Prior to two Attorney General memos suggested thes c i entific importance of this step . DAG Stephen Monson , advisedprosecutors in his August 2 3 , 2 0 0 5 memo ( D- 1 7 ) to providecertificates of accuracy of the NIST-traceable thermometer indiscovery in DWI cases because that document , together withothers , serves to " s upport " the cal ibration report andc a l ibrating unit new standard solution report , which mu st beplaced in evidence as one of the longstanding foundationaldocuments to establ ish the good working of the device , which inturn renders the BAC reading admis s ible in evidence . I n hisApr i l 3 , 2 0 0 6 memo ( D- 1 6 ) , DAG Monson provided legal adviceregarding temperature probe documentation in DWI cases . Hestated that the NIST-traceable temperature measuring system 176 information shou ld be recorded directly on the calibrationrecord a s part of the documentation " s atisfying the foundationalburden of proof of proper operation of the instrument . " 10. Coordinators began handwriting the serial numbers ontheir reports after the is s uance of the April 3 , 2 0 0 6 memo .When e f forts to revise the firmware to capture the serialnumbers on the printed reports proved unsuc c e s s fu l , Alaouiei s sued a memo on March 1 2 , 2 0 1 3 , establ i shing a procedure forwriting the serial number of the NIST-traceable temperaturemeasuring system on a pre-printed portion of the calibrationreport . 11. When Draeger informed the OFS that it would no longerperform annual c a librations and is sue new cert ificates ofaccuracy for Ertco-Hart digital thermometer s , the State did notchoose to e l iminate this step , nor is there any official recordof any internal discuss ion or s u ggestion that consideration begiven to deleting this step . 12 . Instead , Baum is sued a deta iled memorandum on December2 3 , 2 0 0 8 ( S - l O C ) , stating that calibration of an Alcotest 7 1 1 0requires the use o f a N IST-traceable thermometer to as sure anaccurate temperature determination of the s imulator solutions .He set forth five detailed criteria for a new NI ST-traceablethermometer to replace the Ertco-Hart . He recommended the 177 Control Company digital thermometer , which he stated met therequired criteria and would be " acceptable for temperaturedetermination . " His recommendation was accepted by ADTUofficial s , and the change from Ertco-Hart to Control Company wasimplemented . Notwithstanding any personal views that Baum maycl aim to have held to the contrary , his official position actingas a s c ientist and in his capacity as Director of the OFS wasthat a NIST-traceable thermometer should remain as a mandatorystep in the c a l ibration procedure . 13. The switch to Control Company generated the State v .Holland litigation , in which two Appellate Division dec i sionswere i s sued in 2 0 1 1 . Holl and 4 2 2 N . J . Super . at 1 8 5 , andHolland II 4 2 3 N . J . Super . at 3 0 9 . The defendants chal lengedthe switch , urging the court to find that only the Ertco-Hartthermometer was authorized in Chun and that no substitute couldbe allowed . I n that litigation , the State never as s erted ,either as its primary or alternative position , that use o f aNIST-traceable thermome ter was not scientifically nece s s ary toas sure rel iability of results . Instead , it adhered to theposition that a NIST-traceable thermometer was nece s s ary forthat purpose and the Control Company digital thermometer met therequirements of N IST traceabi lity . 178 14 . Putting as ide ver i f ic ation during the cal ibrationcheck proce s s of the s imu lator solution temperatures , a l l otheraspects of the ca l ibration process include methods to repeatedlyverify accuracy or steps that are more stringent than Draegerrequires or recommends . These are : ( a ) all Alcotest 7 1 1 0instruments , when received i n New Jersey from Draeger ( e ithernew or after being returned from a repair ) are recal ibratedfol lowing the New Jersey cal ibration protocol before beingplaced in service i n the fie l d , notwithstanding that Draeger hadi s sued a certi f i cate of accuracy for them; ( b ) the s imulatorsolutions , after being received from Draeger , are retested foraccuracy in the OFS ( random s amples ) although they come with acerti f ication of accuracy from the supplier ; ( c ) althoughDraeger requires only thirty minutes heating time for the CU3 4 s ,New Jersey requires a minimum of one hour ; and ( d ) althoughDraeger requires calibration every twelve months , New Jerseyrequires it every six month s . 15 . The temperature of a s imulator solution i s dependentupon the good working order of the CU3 4 , a Draeger product .Measurement of that temperature through the Alcotest instrumentduring the cal ibration process i s dependent upon the goodworking order of the black key temperature probe ( also a Draegerproduct ) and entry of the correct probe value a s s igned to that 179 probe by Draeger . Even i f the a s s igned probe value is correctlyinputted , it may be inaccurate due to probe value drift or probefai lure . The probe does not measure temperature . It detectsresistance , which is temperature dependent . The Alcotest 7 1 10ins trument then calculates and reports temperature based on thatresi stance through a series of complex cal culations utiliz ingal gorithms imbedded in the ins trument . ( The agency temperatureprobe determines temperature in the s ame way . ) 16. There is no s c ientifically reliable method todetermine the required accuracy of the temperature of thes imulator so lutions , and thus ve rify the good working order ofthe CU3 4 s , other than to measure the temperatures with anindependent NIST-traceable thermometer . 17 . Brette l l deemed it nec e s s ary to verify the critical l yimportant temperature o f the CU3 4 s through an out s ide andindependent NIST-traceable temperature measuring device . Such adevice would be outside of the Alcotest 7 1 10 algorithms andindependent of the Draeger equipment . He deemed this nece s s aryin the event there was some unknown " bia s " in the Draeger l ab ,and because it i s the only scientifically reliable way todirectly measure the temperature of the s imulator so lutions . 18 . I f , after heating for at least one hour , any of thes imu lator solutions are determined to be out of range , based 180 upon testing them with the NI ST-traceable thermometer , NewJersey protocol requires that the c a l ibration not proceed .Thus , even i f the black key or agency probe were to reveal anin-range temperature reading, New Jersey ' s protocol prohibitscoordinators from performing the c a l ibration if the NIST­traceable thermometer does not reveal correct temperatures . 19 . Although the NIST thermometer step occurs beforeactivating the CALIBRATE function , as it mu st to accomplish itspurpos e , it is not a mere pre-test or administrative convenienceas argued by the State . The NI ST-traceable thermometer step i san integral part of the cal ibration proces s , and it is nec e s s aryto ensure sc ientific r e l i ability of the proce s s . 20. As part of its argument in this lit igation , the Stateacknowledges that us ing the NI ST-traceable thermometer providesenhanced confidence in the sc ientific reliab i l ity of thecal ibration proc e s s and breath test results subsequentlyperformed on that device . Enhanced confidence incre as essc ient i f i c r e l i abil ity . 21. Brette l l , the State ' s most knowledgeable andpersuas ive witne s s , credibly testified that documenting the useof a NI ST-traceable thermometer is part of the documentationthat " s upports the good working order of the devic e " and thatfailure to use a NI ST-traceable thermometer results in " some 181 reduced level of certainty " in the reliabil ity of the device ,although he was unable to quantify the amount of reduction . 22 . The Draeger black key and agency temperature probesare not N IST traceable . 23. The Draeger temperature probes are not capable ofdirectly me asuring s imulator solution temperatures to a NIST­traceable standard . 24 . The Draeger temperature probes do not provide anacceptable substitute for the NI ST-trac eable probe required bythe c a l ibration procedure to accurately measure s imulatorso lution temperature s . 25. Scient i f i c a l ly accurate temperature measurements ofs imu lator so lutions through the use of Draeger temperatureprobes can only be indirectly ve r ified , based on a prior NI ST­traceable measurement that was within toleranc e , obtained by aNI ST-traceable thermometer ( in conjunction with the us e ofaccurate N IST-traceable s imulator s olutions and app l ic ation ofHenry ' s Law ) . 26 . The s imulator solutions used in the New Jersey breathtesting program are accurate . The OFS checks random s amplesfrom each lot produced by the supp l ier . The OFS conducts itscheck procedure in accordance with proper s c ientific practices 182 and determines accuracy by reference to NIST-traceablestandards . 2 7 . Contrary to the State ' s argument , if the NI ST-traceablethermometer step is skipped , it is not nec e s s ary that tenseparate things mu st malfunction in tandem in order for acal ibration check to be suc c e s s fully completed with an out -of­range s imu lator solution temperature . 28. A suc c e s s ful c a libration check procedure can occur i fthe agency CU34 i s producing a s imulator solution temperaturethat i s s l ightly out of range and the black key and agencytemperature probes are malfunctioning to about the s ame extentin the ir reported temperature measurement s , which could occureither because of the incorrect entry of a probe value , probevalue drift that has developed, or probe failure . I n suchci rcumstance s , the out-of -range temperature in the agency CU3 4would go undetected but would not result in a SIM TEMP error .As a result of the out -of -range temperature , the alcoholconcentration in the vapor used to calibrate the Alcotest wouldbe incorrect and would " teach" t he Alcotest instrument ahincorrect standard by which to report alcohol concentration invapor introduced into the device . 29. The potential for thes e three things to s l ightlymalfunction in the manner stated would not be a common 183 occurrence , but would be far l e s s unlikely than the ten thingspostulated by the State . These are plausible , evidence -basedpotential occurrences . 30. As a result of such a " misca libration , '' the Alcote stinstrument would erroneously yield incorrect BAC readings whenbreath tests are administered over the next s ix months , and theerror would go undetected . 31. Such miscal ibrations would e f f ectively be prevented byuse of the NI ST-traceable thermometer . 32 . Although the State admits , in accordance with thetestimony of its own experts , that fai lure to us e the NIST­traceable thermometer in the c a l ibration proc e s s reduces thesc ienti fic reliability of the c a l ibration proc e s s and thesubs equent breath tests from that instrument , it has f a i led toquantify the magnitude of the reduced s c ienti f ic reliab i l ity .Brette l l suggested that it might have been pos s ible to conductstudies for the determination of error rates or to makeprobabi lity c a lculation s , but this has not been done . 33. As a cons equence of Henry ' s Law, ma j or inaccuracies inthe Draeger probes and the agency CU3 4 s wou ld be detected duringthe cal ibration process becaus e , at s ome point , an out-of-rangeCU3 4 temperature would generate an out -of-tolerance ethanolheadspace concentration . However , the State has f ail ed t o show 184 where this point cou ld be e s tabl i s hed with scient i f i creliability . B. Conc lus ions o f law The question posed by the Court in these proceedings is : Does the f a i lure to test the s imulator solutions with the NIST-traceable digital thermometer before cal ibrating an Alcotest machine undermine or call into question the sc ient i f ic reliability of breath tests subsequently perf ormed on the Alcotest machine? In my view , the terms " undermine " and " ca l l into question , "describe s imi lar but d i f f erent concept s . To c a l l something intoque stion is to " ra i s e doubts about " it . Webster ' s II New 158 ( 1999 ) . To undermine something , withinthe context of the i s s ue presented here , is to "weaken , inj ure ,or impair [ it ] , often by degrees . " I d . at 1 2 0 1 . Based upon the f indings of fact set forth immedi atelyabove , and as described and analyzed in more detai l throughoutthe body of this report , I conclude that f a i lure to perform theNIST-traceable step in the c a l ibration proc e s s c learly c a l l sinto ques tion the subsequent validity of breath test resultsderived from that device . The evidence r ais es substantialdoubts about the s c ient i f ic reliabil ity of breath test resultsproduce d by Alcotest devi ces calibrated without the use of aNIST-traceable thermomete r . 185 The State ' s own experts have opined that reliab i lity i sreduced and that i t is better t o leave the NI ST-traceable stepin the procedure . It has been in the procedure s i nce theinception of u se of the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 in New Jersey . It hasremained in the proce s s s i nce the dis covery of the Dennisproblem, which has given r i s e to this proc eeding . There is noreason whatsoever to bel ieve that , as ide from Denni s , allcoordinators have not been f aithfully fol lowing t his step overthe years in the thousands of calibrations they have performed .The State does not ask in this proceeding for j udicialauthori z ation to delete the step . Instead , it has a f f irmativelystated its intention to continue to require the step as amandatory part o f the procedure . The evidence c learly supports the f i nding that this stepwas put into the procedure to as sure scient i f ic reliability . Inthe course of the Holland proceedings seven years ago , the State" doubled down " on the nec e s s ity for the requirement and theimportance of u si n g a temperature measuring device that meetsall of the strict criteria to qu alify as " N I ST traceable , '' inaccordance with the gold st andards applicable to the NISTcriteria as we l l a s the qua l i f ic ations and accreditation of thelaboratory that would certify its NIST traceabi lity . 186 I find it extremely important and persuas ive that for allof these years it h a s indisputably been a strict requi rementwithin the ca l ibration procedure that i f the NI ST-traceablethermometer temperature check of the simulator s o lutions in allfour CU3 4 s do not read within tolerance , t he coordinator is notpermitted to proceed with the cal ibration . I n other words ,based upon the mandatory provi s ions of the procedure , whichcontinue to be in e f fect and which wi ll continue to be in e f fectin the future , failure to achieve an in-tolerance NIST traceabletemperature reading o f these four solutions serves as a "manualSIM TEMP error , " which prompts the coordinator to stopeverything and not proceed to activate the CALIBRATE function .This should be treated no dif ferently than a SIM TEMP error thatis generated by the Alcotest device after the CALIBRATE functionis activate d , which automatically aborts the cal ibration proc e s sand prevents i t from proceeding further . I n e ither ca s e , thedetected error is of s u f f icient magnitude to require terminationof the intended ca libration . The only way to directly obtain ascientifically accurate and reliable temperature measurement ofan aqueous solution is t o insert a NIST-traceable thermometerinto it and obtain a reading . The Draeger probes are not NIST traceab le . They cannotproduce a NIST-traceable temperature measurement . Their 187 accurate functioning at the time of the cal ibration proc e s s canonly be determined ( or ver i f i e d ) by indirect means . Thus , i f( l) the solut ion temperatures are f irst determined t o b eaccurate b y u se o f a NI ST-traceable thermometer , ( 2 ) thes imulator s olution concentrations have been accuratelydetermined by applying NIST-traceabil ity s tandards (which is thec a s e in New Jersey ) , and ( 3 ) the concentration of ethanol in thevapor is determined to match the nominal concentration o f thatsolution ( within allowable toleranc es ) , then and only then canit be sai d that the Draeger temperature probes " must be workingright" because of Henry ' s Law . However , i f the NIST-traceable thermometer i s not f irstused t o directly obtain a s c ientifically reliable temper aturemeasurement of the s imulator solutions , then the temperature ofthose solutions is unknown and Henry ' s Law does not compel theconc lus ion that the Draeger probes must be working right if aconcentration result fa l l ing within the allowable tolerance i sachieved . O f course , asc ertaining a NSIT-traceable meas urementin the agency CU34 is of the utmost importance in the CALIBRATEfunc tion, during which the Alcotest ins trument i s being adj ustedto a concentration leve l given to it by the 0 . 1 0 simulatorsolution used in that funct ion . 188 For the reasons stated in this report , the evidencesupports the finding that miscalibrations can occur , whi c h , inturn , will produce inaccurate breath test readings which will goundetected . Although the c ircumstances in which miscal ibrationscan occur are somewhat limite d , they are indeed plausible andcan easily be prevented by s imp ly fol lowing all steps in thecal ibration procedure , as every coordinator is required tocert i f y that he or she has performe d , as one of the e s s entialprerequ i s ites to admi s s ibil ity in evidence of the reading . The State argues that the NIST-traceable thermometer stepwas only put into the proc e s s to increase conf idence in results .It impli e s that any such increased conf idence i s s l ight andunimportant . This argument contains two serious f l aws . First,as exp lained i n this report , confidence and reliab i l i ty are notmutually exclus ive concepts . They are part of the s ame conceptand part of a s ingle continuum. As Brettel l credibly explained ,as more steps are utili zed that increase conf idenc e , the greaterwill be the leve l of rel i ab i l i ty achieved . Second , the evidencec learly establishes that the NIST thermometer step was put inthe c a l ibration check procedure for the expres s purpose ofas suring the good working order of t he CU3 4 s us ed i n thecal ibration proce s s , e s pecially the agency CU34 which actuallycauses adju stments to be made in the Al cotest devic e , thus 189 c a l ibrating it to the ethanol concentration in the vapor itproduces during t h e CALIBRATE function . Accurate temperature inthe CU3 4 s is the foundation upon which the entire cal ibrationproc e s s is built and it is nec e s s ary to ensure s c ient i f icreliability . This i s not a s l ight conf idence builder of l ittleor no consequenc e . It i s e s s ential . As stated in the body of this report , Conde test i f iedaccordingly in Chun . He exp lained that in testing instrumentsfor Volpe , which was contracted by the NHTSA as part of theproc e s s of approving breath testing devices and s imulators forinclu s i on on the conforming products l i s t , he would not relyupon probes that c ome with the device but would always startwith his own NI ST-traceable thermometer to test s imulatorsolution temperatures to as sure their accurac y , and thus as surescient i f ic reliability of the entire proces s . In this litigation , it was e stab l i s hed that Draeger itse l f ,as explained by its employee , begins its c a l ibration proc e s s ofthe CU3 4 s and temperature probes in its s ervice workshop bytesting the wet bath to be utili zed in the proc e s s with a NI ST­traceable thermometer produced by an independent third-partycompany , Omega Engineer ing , Inc . Sha f f e r ac knowledged thatwithout this NIST-traceable starting point with a NIST-traceablethermometer , the s c ient i f i c re l i abi lity of its entire 190 cal ibration proc e s s would be cal led into question andundermined . Baum agreed with Shaffer on this point . And Bre tte l l required the s ame starting point when hedrafted the procedure for cal ibrating the Alcote st 7 1 1 0 . Hecontinues to hold the opinion that NIST-traceability is" c ritic ally important " in determining temperature accuracy inthe CU3 4 s before proceeding with the cal ibration . This is theestab li shed s c i ent ifically accepted practice in such procedure s . All experts agreed that breath test results are l e s sscienti fically rel iable without the NI ST-traceable thermometerstep . The State concedes this point . Therefore , the evidenceclearly raises substantial doubts about the sc ientificreliabi lity of breath test results without the NI ST-traceablestep , thus ca l ling into question the s c ientific reliabil ity ofthose results . Concomitantly , because the scient ific rel iability i sweakened or impaired by some degree , the literal dictionarydefinition of " undermin e " is also met . However , as I havestated , I view the concepts of " c alling into que stion '' and" undermining" as having di f ferent meanings , and the d if ferencerequires an a s s e ssment of the degree by which scientificrel iability is reduc ed . 191 As I perceive the ultimate question ref erred to me , it i swhether the ac knowledged reduction i n s c ientific reliability o fa n Alcotest device , cal ibrated without using the NIST-traceablethermometer , is o f suffic ient magnitude or degree to deprive thedevice of suffic ient sc ient if ic reliabi lity such that itsreadings can be admitted in evidence . Of cours e , this is aspecial kind o f evidence . It is evidence , produced by amachine , wh ich , standing alone , proves guilt beyond a reasonabledoubt , resul ting in consequences of magnitude . It is not thekind of evidence to which weight can be asc ribed depending uponthe quality o f the evidence . Nor can the machine be cross­examined . It i s evidence whic h , under our l aw , es tabl ishes aper se violation . For decade s , since the inception of breath testing in NewJersey , proof o f the good working order of the device has beenrequired as mandatory foundational evidence to . allow a breathtest reading in evidence . That proof i s e s t ab l i shed by theproduction of the coordinator ' s certification , atte sting to thef act that he or she performed the ca libration in accordance witha l l required procedures . Fai lure to have actually per formed theNI ST-traceable thermome ter step in the procedure renders inva lida cert i fic ation attesting that all steps were followed . 192 In the Court found the Alcote s t device sufficientlys c ienti f ically r e liable to al low its breath test readings to beadmitted in evidence . The Court concluded as follows : we are confident , based on this far-reaching and se arching inquiry , that the device i s suffic iently rel iable s o that t h e rights of a l l defendants have been protected . We are sat i s f ied that , with the directions we here adopt for pending and future matters , the confrontation r i ghts of all defendants have bee n , and will continue to be , protecte d . We have no doubt that the devic e , with the s afeguards we have required , is sufficiently scienti f i ca lly rel iable that its reports may be admi tted in evidence . And we are confident that , in so concluding , all of defendants ' rights have been advanced and considered . 1 9 4 N . J . at 1 4 8 . ] The quest ion therefore comes down to this . Does skippingthe use of the NI ST-traceab le thermometer , which the State ' switne s s e s have acknowledged reduces the level of s c ient i f i creliabili ty , reduce it t o a level below that which the Court inChun deemed " su f f ic ient l y " s c ientifically reliable to allowreadings to be admitted in evidence . Use of the NI ST-traceable thermometer i s one of thes a feguards required to establish sufficient s cientificreliab i l ity . It i s not a trivial or unimportant s a feguard . Noris it merely important or adv i s able . It i s the e s s entialstarting point of the ca l ibration proce s s , and f ai lure to use it 193 can result in mi s c a l ibrations , which in tur n , wi l l causeincorrect breath test results . The State , bearing the burden ofproof , has f ailed to quantify the likelihood thatmi scal ibrations may occur without use of the NIST-traceablethermometer or the leve l s to which temperature inaccuracieswou ld have to be off in order to trigger a SIM TEMP or ethanolconcentration error generated by the Alcotest devic e , whichwould abort the cal ibration and prevent a miscalibration . TheState insists that no quant i f ication is nec es sary because therecan never be an undetected miscal ibration . This position i sbased o n the ten-things -wrong theory posited b y Sha f fer , which Ihave rej ected . The evidence i s o f suf f ic ient strength to persuade me thatwithout the NIST-traceable step miscal ibrations are not merelytheoretical or s peculat ive , nor so unlikely as to be such as l i ght pos s ibility that the i s sue can be overlooked . Thec a l ibration of each device is good for s ix months , during whichit i s presumabl y u sed to perform breath tests on manyindividuals . Each of the approximately 6 0 0 ins truments now inservice in New Jersey i s c a l ibrated at least twice per year .Out of the 1 2 0 0 or so annual cal ibration procedures , i f theNI ST-traceable thermome ter is not used , it i s reasonable toconclude that some number of undetected miscal ibrations wi l l 194 occur . I do reach this conclusion . This i s not speculation .It i s grounded in the evidcence . The magnitude o f the problem is quite evident in l i ght ofthe premise upon which this spec ial master proceeding wasconvened : The State informed the Court that the devicescal ibrated by a s ingle coordinator , Denni s , over severa l yearsproduced 2 0 , 6 6 7 evidenti a l breath s amples , the validity of whichhas now been thrown into doubt because of the St ate ' s inabil ityto prove that Dennis used a NIST-traceable thermometer in thosecal'ibrations . The State ' s argument turns the relevant sc ience on itshead . The State contends that the virtual infallibili ty of themachine in the ca l ibration proc e s s serves a s the s af ety net thatassures scientific reliabi l ity , and that the us e of the NIST­traceable thermometer only adds s ome measure of conf idence thatthe s a fety net i s working . The State imp l i e s that this measureof conf idence , although unquant i f ied , i s ins ignif icant . The evidence persuade s me that the oppos it e i s the case .It i s the NIST-traceable thermometer that i s the s af ety net inthe cal ibration procedure . It i s the neces s ary beginning stepfrom which the s c ienti f i c reliabil ity of everything done in thecal ibration proc e s s flows . It i s the only temperature measuringdevice used in the proc e s s that produces NI ST-traceable 195 measurement results . It i s the sole source of determining ascientifically r el i able temperature measurement in the CU3 4 s .That measurement , in turn , is the only scient i f i cally r eliablebasis to determine whether the CU3 4 s are functioning properly .It i s the only means by which the good working orde r , and thusthe accurac y , of the Draeger black key and agency temperatureprobes can be indirectly veri fied . The l ikel ihood of an undetected miscal ibration i s notgreat , but it i s reasonably plausib l e . Of cours e , thatli kel ihood can be avoided s imp ly by u s i ng the mandatorilyrequired NIST-traceable thermometer in the cal ibration proce s s .It might be that a mi scalibration would. only affect c l o s e case s .Both s ides di spute this . The defense s ays that without theNIST-traceable thermometer , the temperature in the CU3 4 s isunknown and has no known measure of unc ertainty , as a result ofwhich all breath test results will be unrel iable . The States ays mi scal ibrations will affect no cas es because the built-insafeguards in the machine render the c a l ibration proc e s sinfall ible , so even i f the NIST- traceable thermometer i s notused there wi l l be no miscalibrations . As previ ously state d , Ihave r e j ected that a s s e rtion . App lying the c lear and convincing proof standard , theevidence presented by the State has f a i l ed to produce " a f i rm 196 belief or conviction'' that the State ' s pos ition , i . e . thatf ailure to use the NIST thermometer does not undermine or callinto question the scient i f i c rel iabi lity of breath tests , i scorrect . Mut . Ins . 1 8 6 N . J . at 1 6 9 . The evidencedoes not persuade me that the State ' s position is " highlyprobable . '' In re 2 0 7 N . J . at 2 9 0 . On the contrary, If ind that i t i s unsupported by the evidence . Most certainly theState ' s evidence is not " s o clear , direct and we i ghty andconvinc ing" to lead to a " c lear conviction , without hesitancy"that the sci ent i f i c reliab i l ity of breath test results withoutuse of the NIST thermometer in the c a l ibration proc e s s will notbe undermined or c a l led into que stion . Ibid . Indeed , the testimony of one of the State ' s witne s s e s , Dr .Brette l l , i s a prime source of my analys i s of the evidence , mydetermination o f what the facts are based on that evidence , andmy ult imate conc lus ions . H i s tes timony , cons idered in itsentiret y , has been instrumental in the determinations I havemade . Based upon my f i ndings of fact and my ana lys i s of them, Iconclude that the State has failed to c learly and convincinglyprove that failure to perform the NIST thermometer step in thecalibration proce s s does not undermine and c a l l into questionthe good working order o f the Alcotest instrument . Skipping the 197 NIST thermometer step removes from the proc e s s a substantial ande s s ential s a feguard , the magnitude of which reduces thereliability o f the device to a leve l that is less thansufficiently scienti fically reliable to allow its reports to beadmitted in evidence . Respectfully submi tte d , Jos Lisa, P . J . A . D . ( retired and temporarily a s s i gned on rec a l l )Dated : May 4 , 2 0 1 8 198 AP P E N D I X I SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY M - 2 4 4 / 2 4 5 / 2 4 6 September Term 2 0 1 6 078390 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, F I L E D Plainti f f - Movant , APR -7 2017 v. 0 R D E REILEEN CAS SIDY , �dteb Defendan t - Respondent . This matter having been opened on the S tate ' s motion s , andgood cause appearing ; it is hereby ORDERED that the motions for relaxation of the Rules ofCourt ( M - 2 4 4 ) and for direct certif ication ( M - 2 4 5 ) are granted,and the mi s ce l laneous motion for a remand, appointment of aspec ial mas t e r , and other relief ( M - 2 4 6 ) i s granted, in part , asprovided belciw; and it is further ORDERED that the Court hereby appoints as the SpecialMas ter Judge Joseph F . L i s a , J . A . D . , who is currently serving o nreca l l a s a member o f Part D i n the Superior Court , Appell ateDiv i s ion ; and it is further ORDERED that the matter is remanded to the Special Masterwho will consider and decide the fol lowing que s t ion , along withany other que s t ions that the Special Mas t e r , in his discre tion ,deems relevant to the undertaking : "Does t he failure to testthe s imulator so lut ions with the NIST- traceable digital 1 thermometer before cal ibrating art Alcot e s t machine undermine orcall into que stion the s c ient i f i c reliab i l i ty of breath testssubsequently performed on the Alcotest machine ? " ; and it i sfurther ORDERED that the Special Master shall determine the extentof part i c ipat ion of any person or entity in addition to theState and de fendant , E i leen Cassidy, provided that the Courthereby directs that all motions for partic ipation in the remandmust be served and f i led with the Special Master on or beforeMay 8, 2017 ; and it is further ORDERED that the Special Master shall hear testimony ,including expert test imony , hear the arguments of the partie s ,and make f indings of fact and conclusions o f law; and it isfurther ORDERED that the S tate shall make arrangements to ensurethat the Spec ial Master receives trans cr ipts of the remandproceedings conducted pursuant to this Orde r ; . and it i s further ORDERED that the Special Master shall complete and submitto the Court a written report of his f indings on the questionpresented expeditiously following the comp l e t ion of the hearing ;and it i s further ORDERED that upon the f i l ing of the Special Maste r ' swritten report , the partie s and other parti c ipants shall havethirty days to serve and f i le brie f s wi t h the Court and ten days 2 thereafter to f ile any responding brief s ,. and that no further�n.ibmi ssions will b<:i p<:irmitted unless requested by the Cour t ; andit is further ORDERED that upon 0ompletion of bri.e f ing , tbe- matter· ,shal lbe .set down for o:t;al a:t;gume;:tt a t a date and t ime t o beestablisbed by the Clerk of the Court ; and it is fur,ther ORD;ERED that j urisd.iction is reta1ned . wr_TNESS ' the Honorc(b'.Le Stuart Rabner, Chie·f Jusice I atTrenton , t his 6th day of ' l\Pril , 2017 . CI.ERK OF THE SUPREME COURT ,_ AP P E N D I X II S TATE v . CAS S I DY EXHIBIT LIST Exhibit No . Des cript ionS-1 Al cote s t 7 1 1 0 MKI I I -C with Serial No . ARWC - 0 0 6 4S-lA Coordinator ' s bottle of 0 . 1 0 0 % S imulator SolutionS-lB Agency ' s CU34 Simulator : Serial No . DDRK S 3 - 0 0 1 7S - lC Agency ' s Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Temperature Probe : Serial No . DDXK P 2 - 3 0 1 , Probe Value 1 0 3S-lD Coordinator ' s bottle of 0 . 0 4 0 % Simu lator SolutionS-l E Coordinator ' s CU3 4 Simulator : Serial No . DDRK S 3 - 0 0 0 5 ( used with 0 . 0 4 % simulator solution )S-lF Coordinator ' s bottle of 0 . 0 8 0 % Simu lator SolutionS-lG Coordinator ' s CU34 Simulator : Serial No . DDRF S 3 - 0 0 0 9 ( used with 0 . 0 8 % s imu lator solut ion )S - lH Coordinator ' s bottle of 0 . 1 6 0 % S imulator SolutionS-lI Coordinator ' s CU34 S imulator : Serial No . DDCN 0 0 5 4 ( used with 0 . 1 6 % simulator solution )S-lJ Black Key Temperature Probe : Serial No . DDWA P2 - 0 1 6 , Probe Value 1 0 5S - lK Control Company digital thermometer ( S erial No . 1 7 0 4 2 8 3 6 7 )S - lL Agency ' s bottle of 0 . 1 0 0 % s imulator solution used for solution changeS-lM Cal ibration D i scovery PacketS-lN Card- Plug in from computer to Alcotest for data downloadS-4 State o f New Jersey Original Indictment of Marc Dennis dated 1 2 / 1 4 / 1 6 ( SGJ6 9 3 - 1 6 - 2 4 -S /Docket No . 1 6 - 1 2 - 0 0 2 1 3 - S )S - 4A State of New Jersey Superseding Indictment of Marc Denn i s dated 6 / 2 7 / 1 7 ( SGJ7 0 2 - 1 7 - 1 7 -S / Docket No . 1 7 - 0 6 - 0 0 1 1 8 - S ) S-9B Exhibit A from sworn statement of Dr . Thomas Bret tell - Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MKI I I -C User Manual - Technical NJ vl . OS-9C Exhibit B from sworn statement of Dr . Thomas Bret tell - Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MKI I I -C User Manual - Operator NJ vl . lS-9D Exhibit C from sworn statement o f Dr . Thomas Bret tell - Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MKI I I-C us er Manual - Technical NJ v . 1 . 2S-9E Exhibit D from sworn statement of Dr . Thoma s Brettell - Report o f Calibration for Ertco Hart Digital Temperature Measuring SystemS-9F Exhibit E from sworn statement of Dr . Thomas Bret tell - Calibration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MKI I I-CS-9G Exhibit F from sworn s tatement of Dr . Thomas Brettell - Calibration Packet from Long Branch Police Department , cal ibration date 1 0 / 6 / 1 5 ( C alibration documents , Cert i f ic ates o f Accuracy , Certif ications of Analy s i s , Denni s ' Coordinator Certi f i c ation card )S-9H Exhibit G from sworn statement of Dr . Thomas Brettell - State v . Ca ssidy , 2 0 1 7 N . J . Lexis 4 1 8 ( 2 0 1 7 )S-9I " Cal ibration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MKI I I - C " ( a . k . a . S-32 )S-lOC Dr . Howard J . Baum, Ph . D . intero f f ice communication dated December 2 3 , 2 0 0 8S-12 Ver i f i c ation and Ad justment of 3 4 . 0 0 c Water Tank ( current )S- 12A Ver i f i c at ion and Ad j u s tment of 3 4 . 0 0 c water Tank ( ol d )S-12B Simulator Temperature Probe Cert i f ication Proc e s sS-12C WI 1 9 S imulator Temperature Probe Cal ibration Procedure , Revis ion 0 2 - 2 0 0 8S-12D WI 1 9 S imulator Temperature Probe Cal ibration Procedure , Rev i s ion 1 1 - 2 0 1 5S-13 Cert i f icate o f C a l ibration for Omega Digital Thermometer ( Model No . HH4 1 ; Serial No . 3 0 8 7 4 3 ) Cal Due Date 3 / 2 7 / 2 0 1 5 2 S - 1 3A Certif icate o f C a l ibration for Omega Digital Thermometer ( Model No . HH4 1 ; Serial No . 3 0 8 7 4 3 ) Cal Due Date 2 / 2 7 / 2 0 1 6S-13B Certifi cate o f C a l ibration f o r Omega Digital Thermometer ( Mode l No . HH4 1 ; Serial No . 3 0 1 3 1 6 )S-13C Certificate o f Cal ibration f o r Omega Digital Thermometer ( Model No . HH4 1 ; serial No . 3 0 8 4 2 8 )S-13D Cert i ficate o f Cal ibration for Fluke Mu l t imeter ( Model No . 8 7 - 5 ; Serial No . 9 9 3 8 0 0 4 2 ) , dated 4 / 1 2 / 2 0 1 4 , Certificate #10475S-13E Certifi cate of Cal ibration for F luke Mu ltimeter ( Model No . 8 7 - 5 ; Serial No . 9 9 3 8 0 0 4 2 ) , dated 2 / 2 7 / 2 0 1 5 , Certi f icate #12123S-15 Breath Alcohol Simulator Solution LOT # 1 3 1 1 2 0 , Date of Analys i s 1 0 / 2 5 / 2 0 1 3 - 0 . 0 4 0 % s imulator so lution used in Spring Lake on 7 / 1 0 / 1 5S-16 Breath Alcohol S imulator Solution LOT # 1 3 1 1 2 1 , Date of Ana lysi s 1 0 / 3 1 / 2 0 1 3 - 0 . 0 8 0 % s imulator s olution used in Spring Lake on 7 / 1 0 / 1 5S-17 Breath Alcohol Simulator Solution LOT # 1 3 1 1 2 3 , Date of Analy s i s 1 0 / 2 4 / 2 0 1 3 - 0 . 1 0 0 % s imulator solution used in Cal ibration and Part I -Control Tests in Spring Lake on 7/10/15S- 1 8 Breath Alcohol S imulator Solut ion LOT # 1 3K1 2 5 , Date of Ana lysis 1 2 / 0 9 / 2 0 1 3 - 0 . 1 0 0 % s imu lator solution used in the solution change ( s ee Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report ) in Marlboro on 1 0 / 7 / 1 5S-19 Breath Alcohol Simulator Solution LOT # 1 4A1 2 6 , Date of Ana lys i s 0 2 / 1 8 / 2 0 1 4 - 0 . 1 0 0 % s imulator s olution used in the solut ion change ( s ee C al ibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report ) in Long Branch on 1 0 / 6 / 1 5S-2 0 Breath Alcohol S imulator LOT # 1 4 H 1 3 1 , Date of Analysis 0 8 / 1 4 / 2 0 1 4 - 0 . 16 % s imulator solution u sed in Long Branch on 1 0 / 6 / 1 5 ( Bottle No . 0 8 7 1 ) and in Spring Lake on 7 / 1 0 / 1 5 ( Bottle No . 1 2 9 0 ) 3 S-2 1 Breath Alcohol S imulator Solution LOT # 1 4 L l 3 5 , Date of Analy s i s 1 / 2 1 / 2 0 1 5 - 0 . 1 0 0 % s imulator s olution us ed in the solution change ( s ee Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report ) in Spring Lake on 7 / 1 0 / 1 5S-22 Breath Alcohol S imu lator Solution LOT # 1 5 H l 4 1 , Date of Analysis 0 9 / 1 0 / 2 0 1 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 % s imulator solution used in Long Branch on 1 0 / 6 / 1 5S-23 Breath Alcohol Simulator Solution LOT # 1 5 H l 4 2 , Date of Ana l ysis 0 9 / 1 7 / 2 0 1 5 - 0 . 0 8 0 % s imulator solution used in Long Branch on 1 0 / 6 / 1 5S-24 Breath Alcohol Simulator Solution LOT # 1 5 H l 4 3 , Date of Analysis 0 9 / 1 4 / 2 0 1 5 - 0 . 1 0 0 % s imu lator solution used in the Calibration and Part I -Control Tests in Long Branch on 1 0 / 6 / 1 5 ( Bottle No . 0 3 2 0 ) and in Marlboro on 1 0 / 7 / 1 5 ( Bottle No . 0 3 1 8 )S-32 " Ca l ibration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MKI I I - C "S - 3 3C Cert ificate o f Accuracy for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Temperature Probe ( Serial No . DDXK P 2 - 3 7 6 , Certi f i cation date 9 - 2 - 1 4 , Next Certification due 9 - 2 - 1 5 ) - B l ack Key Temperature Probe a s s i gned to Sgt . DennisS-33J Cert ificate of Accuracy for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Temperature Probe ( Serial No . DDXK P 2 -3 7 6 , Cert i f i c ation date 7 - 2 7 -0 9 , Next Certi fic ation due 7 -2 7 - 1 0 ) - Black Key Temperature Probe a s s igned to Sgt . Dennis ; Used for Spring Lake C al ibrationS-34 Certificate o f Accuracy for CU3 4 Serial No . DDXD S 3 - 0 1 8 6 , Cert i f ication date 9 - 2 2 - 1 4 , Re-Certification Due Date 9 - 2 2 - 1 5 ( Used by Dennis in Spring Lake )S - 3 4A Certi ficate o f Accuracy for C U 34 Serial No . DDXD S 3 - 0 1 8 8 , Certific ation date 9 - 2 2 - 1 4 , Re-Cert if ication Due Date 9 - 2 2 - 1 5 ( U sed by Dennis in Spring Lake )S - 3 4B Cert i ficate of Accuracy for CU3 4 Serial No . DDXD S 3 - 0 1 9 1 , Cert i f i cation date 9 - 1 9 - 1 4 , Re-Certific ation Due Date 9 - 1 9 - 1 5 ( Used by Dennis in Spring Lake )S-36 Spring Lake Police Department ' s Certi f i c ates of Accuracy for its CU3 4 ( S erial No . DDYB S 3 - 0 0 0 2 ) & its Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Temperature Probe ( Serial No . DDXA P2 - 1 1 7 ) 4 S - 3 6A Certifi cates o f Accuracy for CU3 4 s us ed by Sgt . Dennis during c a l ibration of Spring Lake ' s Alcotest ( Serial Nos . DDXD S 3 - 0 1 8 6 , DDXD S 3 - 0 1 8 8 , DDXD S 3 - 0 1 9 1 )S-36B Certifi c ate of Accuracy for Bl ack Key Temperature Probe used by Sgt . Dennis during cal ibration of Spring Lake ' s Alcotest ( Serial No . DDXK P 2 - 3 7 6 )S-37 Spring Lake Police Department - Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Calibration Record dated 0 7 / 1 0 / 2 0 1 5S - 3 7A Spring Lake Police Department - Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Calibration Certi fi cate Part I - Control Tests dated 0 7 / 1 0 / 2 0 1 5S-37B Spring Lake Police Department - Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Calibration Certi ficate Part I I - Linearity Tests dated 0 7 / 1 0 / 2 0 1 5S-37C Spring Lake Pol ice Department - Calibrating Unit New Standard Solut ion Report dated 0 7 / 1 0 / 2 0 1 5S-42 S I M Card for Video Camera Demonstration of 1 2 / 1 4 / 1 7 in Court Cal ibration ( Di s c )S-44 Chun Court Order dated September 1 8 , 2 0 1 0S-46 Chart Created by Brian Shaf fer i n courtS-51 Article Authored by Dr . Stol z , Ph . D .S-53 State v . Chun dated February 1 3 , 2 0 0 7 Supreme Court f indingS-54 Federal Register vol . 8 2 No . 2 1 1 dated November 2 , 2 0 1 7D-1 C a l ibration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I-CD-2 Interof f ice Communication from Dr . Howard Baum, dated December 2 3 , 2 0 0 8D- 3 Draeger Temperature ProbeD-4 Draeger Simulator and Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Temperature Probe Certif icate of Accuracy , dated September 1 1 , 2 0 1 7 5 D-5 CU3 4 S imulatorD-6 Letter from Director E l i e Honig to the Honorable Glenn Grant , J . A . D . , dated September 1 9 , 2 0 1 6D- 7 Cal ibration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I-C , marked by Brian Shaff erD- 8 Chart ref lecting dis agreement with State ' s witne s s , Brian ShafferD-9 Memorandum of Decis ion , Commonwe alth of Massachusetts v . Evando Anani as , Chr is t ian and Others , Docket No . 1 2 4 8 C . R . 1 0 7 5 ( February 1 6 , 2 0 1 7 )D- 1 0 Control Company Traceable Certif icate of Cal ibration for Digital Thermometer , Certif ication No . 4 0 0 0 - 7 0 1 9 7 7 1D- l OA Trac eable Certi ficate of Calibration for Digital Thermomete r , Certificat ion No . 4 0 0 0 - 7 0 1 9 7 7 1 , marked by Brian ShafferD- 1 2 The American Association for Laboratory Accreditation , P l 0 2 -A2LA Policy on Me asurement Traceabil ity , dated October 2 2 , 2008D- 1 3 Draeger S imulator and Alcotest 7 1 1 0 Temperature Probe Certi f icate of Accuracy , dated September 1 1 , 2 0 1 7 , marked by Howard Baum, Ph . D .D- 1 4 Calibration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I -C , marked by Howard Baum, Ph . D .D- 1 5 Interoff ice Communication from Ali Alaouie , Ph . D . I dated March 1 3 , 2 0 1 3D- 1 6 Memorandum o f Legal Advice ; Al cote st 7 1 1 0 MK I I I -C , Temperature Probe Documentation , from Deputy Attorney General Stephen H . Monson to Lt . Lou Errao , dated April 3 , 2006D-17 Supplemental Memorandum to the Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I-C training , from DAG Monson to Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I - C - County Prosecutor Contact s , dated August 2 3 , 2 0 0 5 6 D-2 0 Exhibit of Matthew w. Rie s i g , Es quire - State ' s Oppos ition to the Motion in Aid of Litigant ' s Rights and State ' s Motion in Aid o f Litigant ' s Rights ( State v . Jane H . et al . )D-2 1 Exhibit of Matthew w. Re isig , Es quire - Alabama Breath Alcohol Testing Program, Operator Manual-Draeger Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I -CD- 2 2 Exhibit of Matthew w. Re i s i g , Es quire - Al abama Department o f Forensic Sciences Adminis trative Code , Chapter 3 7 0 - 1 - 1 Chemical Test for Intoxication .D-23 Control C ompany Digital Thermome terD-24 Chart - Howard Baum ' s "Wrong " ExhibitD-25 Traceable Certific ate of Calibration for Digital Thermometer , Certification No . 4 0 0 0 -7 0 1 9 7 7 1 , marked by Ali Alaoui e , Ph . D .D-26 Cal ibration Check Procedure for Alcotest 7 1 1 0 MK I I I -C , marked by Ali Alaouie , Ph . D .D-27 Chart r e f lecting Draeger Recommended Criteria versus New Jersey Required Criteria by Ali Alaouie , Ph . D .D-33 Chart re f lecting the New Jersey Supreme Court ' s QuestionD- 3 4 Chart ref lecting Temperature Probe resi stance , voltage , number , and value by Andreas Stol z , Ph . D .D-35 Traceable Cert i f icate of Calibration for Digital Thermometer , Certi fication No . 4 0 0 0 -7 0 1 9 7 7 1 , marked by Andreas Sto l z , Ph . D .D-36 International Standard 1 7 0 2 5 , General Requirements for the Competence of Test ing and Cal ibration Laboratories , Second Edition ( 2 0 0 5 )D-37 Traceable Certi fi cate of Calibration for Digital Thermometer , Certification No . 4 0 0 0 - 7 0 1 9 7 7 1 , marked by Andreas Sto l z , Ph . D .D-38 Chart r e f lecting so ftware or hardware f ailure and temperature probe failure 7 A- 1 NIST Policy - Supplementary Materials for NI ST Policy ReviewA-2 Control Company Traceable Certi ficate of Cal ibration for Digital Thermome terA- 3 Draeger CU34 and temperature probe Certificate of Accuracy exemplars 8 AP P E N D I X III APPENDI X I I I lT = transcript o f July 13, 2017 c a s e management conference 2T = transcript of August 17, 2017 c a s e management conference 3T = transcript o f September 19, 2017 c a s e management conference 4T = transcript of October 12 , 2 0 1 7 c a s e management conference ST = transcript of November 2 , 2017 c a s e management conference 6T = transcript o f December 14, 2017 demonstration ( Klimik ) 7T = transcript of January 3 , 2018 hearing ( Brette l l ) BT = transcript of January 5 , 2018 hearing ( Brette l l ) 9T = transcript o f January 8, 2018 hearing ( Shaffer )l OT = transcript o f January 9 , 2018 hearing ( Sh a f fe r )l lT = transcript o f January 10, 2018 hearing ( Sh a f f e r )12T = transcript of January 11, 2018 hearing ( Baum)13T = transcript of January 16, 2018 hearing ( Baum )14T = transcript o f January 17 , 2 0 1 8 hearing ( Baum)15T = transcript of January 18 , 2 0 1 8 hearing ( Alaouie )1 6T = transcript o f January 22, 2018 hearing ( Alaouie )17T = transcript o f January 24, 2018 hearing ( Stol z )18T = transcript of January 30, 2018 hearing on exhibits1 9T = transcript of March 22 , 2018 oral argument AP P E N D I X IV CHRISTOPHER S . PORRINO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY FOR PLAINT I F F - MOVANT BY : ROBERT CZEPI E L , JR . SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL PROSECUTORS SUPERVISION AND TRAINING BUREAU DIVISION OF CRIM INAL JUSTICE P.O. BOX 0 8 5 TRENTON , NEW JERSEY 08625 (609) 984-0941 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY DOCKET NO . M-244/245/246 SEPTEMBER TERM 2 016 078390STATE OF NEW JERSEY , CRIM INAL ACTION Plaint i f f - Movant , STI PULATIONS OF FACT v,EILEEN CASSIDY , Def endant -Re spondent .The State hereby s t ipulates that for purposes of the hearing before the Spec i a l Mas ter , the f o l lowing f a c t s are true : 1. On December 3, 2015, def endant E i leen Cassidy was arrested for DWI in Spring Lake Borough . 2. Prior to being charged with DWI , de f e ndant provided a breath samp l e on Spring Lake Borough ' s A l c o t e s t instrument with S e r i a l Number ARXB 0076 . 3 . Spring Lake Borough ' s Alcotest 7110 MKI I I C with Serial Number ARXB 0076 was re c a l ibrated by Sgt . Marc Dennis on July 1 0 , 2015 . 4 . Cal ibration records indicate that Sgt . Dennis prepared four CU 3 4 s imulators with s imulator solut ion prior to recal ibrating A l c o t e s t instrument with S e r i a l Number ARXB 0076 . The c a l ibration records further indi c a t e that one s imulator contained s imulator solution with an ethanol concentration of . 04 % ; one simulator contained s imulator solut ion with an ethanol concentration of . 08 % ; one s imulator contained s imulator solution with an ethanol concentration of . 10%; and one s imulator contained s imulator s o l ution with an e thanol concentrat ion o f . 16 % .5 . Cal ibration records indicate that Sgt . Dennis al lowed the four s imulators to heat to the required temperature of 34°C ± . 2°C.6. It cannot be corroborated whether Sgt . Dennis checked the temperature of the simulator solut ions with the Control Company N I ST - t raceable digital thermometer a f ter a l l owing the s imulators to heat to the required temperature prior to beginning the recalibration of Spring Lake Borough ' s Al cote s t i n s t rument with Serial Number ARXB 0076 as is required by the C a l i bration Protocol .7 . Cal ibration records indicate that Sgt . Dennis performed all other required s teps in the Calibration Protocol when recal ibrating Spring Lake Borough ' s Alcotest with Serial Number ARXB 0076 .8 . Cal ibration records demonstrate that Sgt . Dennis s i gned an Alcotest 7110 Ca l ibration Record for Spring Lake Borough ' s Alcotest with Serial Number ARXB - 0 0 7 6 c e r t i fying that he p e r formed all of the s teps in the c a l ibration protocol con s i stent with the Calibration Procedures e s t ab l i shed by the Chi e f Forens i c S c i e nt i s t .9 . Cal ibration records indicate that Sgt . Dennis s i gned an Alcotest 7110 Cal ibration Cert i f icate for Spring Lake Borough ' s Alcote s t with S e r i a l Number ARXB 0 0 7 6 certi fying that he performed all of the steps in the c a l ibration protocol cons i s tent with the Calibration Procedures e s t ab l i shed by the Chief Fore n s i c Sc ient i s t . CHRISTOPHER S . PORRINO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTI FF - MOVANT BY : ROBERT CZEPIEL , JR . SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL PROSECUTORS SUPERVISION AND TRAINING BUREAU DIVIS ION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE P.O. BOX 0 8 5 TRENTON , NEW JERSEY 08625 (609) 984 0941 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY DOCKET NO . M 244/245/246 S E PTEMBER TERM 2 0 1 6 078390STATE O F NEW JERSEY , P l a i nt i f f -Movan t , CRIMINAL ACTIONv. AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICEEILEEN CAS S ID Y , D e f endant Re spondent .STATE OF NEW JERSEY SS COUNTY O F MERCER ROBYN B . MITCHELL, of f u l l age , being duly sworn according to law upon her oath deposes and says : 1. I am a Deputy Attorney General in the employ of the S t a t e of New Jersey , Divi s ion of Criminal Jus t i c e , Prosecutors Supervi s ion and Training Bureau . 2. On Augus t 21, 2017 , I did m a i l v i a E le c tronic Mai l and Regular U . S . Ma i l , S t ipulation of Fac t s , to :Hon . Joseph F . Lisa, P.J.A.D. ( ret ired and t / a on recal l ) Sentry Building 216 Haddon Avenue Westmont , New Jersey 0 8 1 0 8 2 8 1 5 Elyse S. Schinde l , Esq . Hobbi e Corrigan & Bertu c i o , PC 125 Wyckoff Road Eatontown, New Jersey 0 7 7 2 4Sharon A . Bal samo , Esq . As s i s tant Executive D i r e c tor and General Couns e l New Jersey S t a t e Bar Associat ion New Jersey Law Center One Constitution S quare New Brunswi c k , New Jersey 0 8 9 0 1 1 5 0 0Samuel Louis Sachs , Esq . Sachs & Scarde l l a LLC Princeton Windsor O f f i c e Park 379 Princeton - Hi ghtstown Road P.O. Box 9 6 8 E a s t Windsor, New Jersey 0 8 5 2 0 sam@samsachs . comJohn Men ze l , J.D. 2 911 Route 88, Suite 12 Point Pleasant , New Jersey 0 8 7 4 2 j me n z e l@men z e l law . comMatthew W . Re i s i g , Esq . Re i s i g Criminal Defense & DWI Law, LLC One Broad Street Freeho l d , New Jersey 0 7 7 2 8Sworn to and subscribed before me this 2 1 s t day of Augus t , 2017 .An A t torney - At - Law of New Jersey