Title: State v. Brown
Citation: 181 Kan. 375, 312 P.2d 832
Docket Number: 40,300
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 1957

181 Kan. 375 (1957)
312 P.2d 832
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH ZEBEDEE BROWN, Appellant.
No. 40,300

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 8, 1957.
William H. Towers and Myles C. Stevens, both of Kansas City, and Elisha Scott, of Topeka, argued the cause; Harry Hayward, of Kansas City, was with them on the briefs for appellant.
Newell A. George, Assistant County Attorney, and James P. Davis, Assistant County Attorney, argued the cause; John Anderson, Jr., Attorney General, Paul Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. Martin, County Attorney, and Robert J. Foster, Assistant County Attorney, were with them on the briefs for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is a criminal action in which the defendant, Joseph Zebedee Brown, appellant herein, was tried and convicted on three separate counts: kidnaping in the first degree, forcible rape, and assault with intent to rape. From the verdict and judgment *377 entered against him, the defendant appeals to this court, specifying as error certain rulings of the court.
Trial began on the 30th day of January, 1956, and concluded with a verdict on the 9th day of February, 1956.
Mrs. Harris, one of the complaining witnesses in this criminal action, lived at 3617 Freeman Avenue, Kansas City, Kansas. She was a white woman and at the time of the trial was fifty-seven years old. After she got off from her work on February 21, 1955, at about 9:00 o'clock p.m., she went to her car which was in a parking lot at Eighth and Nebraska, Kansas City, Kansas. When she sat down in her car, some man stepped up from behind, opened the door, slid into the driver's seat and forced Mrs. Harris over to the other side of the car with a gun. She asked the man, "What are you going to do?" The man said, "Be quiet and you won't get hurt." Mrs. Harris worked at the Bodker's Clothing Store. She stated that the man, later identified as the defendant  a nineteen-year-old colored youth, drove her automobile out of the parking lot without her consent. He drove up and down streets and finally drove down an alley and behind a building in which the Nebraska Waste Paper Company was located.
According to the testimony of Mrs. Harris, the defendant said, "I don't want your money, I don't want your car." She then asked the defendant, "What do you want?" and he said "I am going to rape you."
After the defendant turned in behind the said building, he stopped the car and told Mrs. Harris to take off her clothing. This she refused to do. Then, the defendant forced her to the opposite side of the car and hit her on the shoulder with a gun. Mrs. Harris testified that the defendant took off her undergarments and forced her at the point of a gun to have sexual relationship with him.
After this incident, Mrs. Harris was released by the defendant at a stop light, where he jumped out of the car and ran off into the darkness. She went to a tavern and called the police. A detective named Don Adams, answered the call and took Mrs. Harris to her son's home.
Later Mrs. Harris went to police headquarters and identified defendant in a line-up of five men. Mrs. Harris testified at the trial that the defendant was the man that she identified at police headquarters, and she pointed him out in the courtroom as the man who raped her.
*378 On the night of February 28, 1955, exactly one week after the foregoing incident, Mrs. Ruth Brakey was assaulted. Mrs. Brakey lived in North Kansas City, Missouri, at 2815 East 56th Street and worked at Maslan's Department Store in Kansas City, Kansas. At approximately 9:00 o'clock p.m., on the 28th day of February, she went to the alley after work to get into her parked car. As she got in from the right side a man who wore a mask and had a revolver in his hand tried to get into her car from the left side. Mrs. Brakey kicked so furiously that she kicked the mask off the man and got a good look at him. In the process she screamed and attracted the attention of persons nearby. The defendant escaped into the darkness and later Mrs. Brakey picked the defendant out at police headquarters and identified him as the man who attempted to get into her car.
Don Adams, a detective working out of the police department of Kansas City, Kansas, met Mrs. Harris on the night of February 21, 1955, at a tavern located at 11th and Quindaro in Kansas City, Kansas, pursuant to a call he had received from headquarters. He related that Mrs. Harris was nervous, excited, crying and emotionally upset at the time.
Subsequently, on the 28th day of February, 1955, Mr. Adams saw the defendant, Joseph Zebedee Brown, at the detective bureau headquarters where he had conversation with him. At that time the defendant made a statement in writing as follows:
The foregoing confession was signed "Joseph Zebedee Brown" and the witnesses indicated were William Pickering, K. Van Horn and Don Adams.
The foregoing confession was introduced in evidence by and through Don Adams, the detective, without any objection on the part of counsel for the defense, except for the fact that Don Adams in reading the statement indicated where a correction was made and counsel for the defense then addressed the court:
Thereupon the court struck the observation.
The further detailing of facts necessary for the disposition of this appeal will be set forth as the assignments of error are presented.
The defendant's appeal was properly perfected and all rights protected on those matters which the defendant specifies as error. Principally, the specifications of error may be grouped into three points. The defendant sets them forth in his brief as follows:
"I.
*380 "II.
"III.
Focusing our attention now upon the first proposition presented, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to require the state to elect upon which of the two separate offenses charged in the amended information the state would rely for a conviction of the defendant, that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion to quash for the same reason, and the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion requiring the state to elect at the close of all the testimony. The defendant's precise contention is that it was illegal to join the counts which charged the defendant with kidnaping in the first degree and the rape of Eva Harris, with the offense of assault with intent to rape. It is argued that these are unrelated offenses not arising out of the same transaction, that the motive was not identical and that the different offenses were not part of one comprehensive plan, purpose and design on the part of the defendant.
In support of this contention the defendant cites State v. Thompson, 139 Kan. 59, 29 P.2d 1101. This case involved the joinder of felonies in different counts of the same information in which the first count charged rape of a woman and the second count charged robbery of a man of an automobile. The court held this joinder to be proper on the ground that these offenses grew out of the same transaction and the fact that the car belonged to the companion of the girl raped did not affect the essential unity and identity of the hideous action which was all part of one comprehensive plan. The language seized upon by the defendant in the Thompson case was a dictum by Burch, J., in commenting:
The law might well have grown in this direction as it has in other jurisdictions. Cases dealing with the joinder of felonies which grow out of one comprehensive plan or design can be cited to support the proposition. It must be emphasized that these cases are supported only by the facts with which the court was then confronted. (State v. Neff, 169 Kan. 116, 218 P.2d 248; State v. Aspinwall, 173 Kan. 699, 252 P.2d 841; State v. Aldrich, 174 Kan. 335, 255 P.2d 1027; and State v. Martin, 175 Kan. 373, 265 P.2d 297.)
These cases do not deal with the precise question we now have before this court. It should be noted that these cases are authority for the joinder of felonies whether they be of the same general character or not, where the offenses constitute one comprehensive plan, transaction or where one offense is a corrollary to the other.
In the history of Kansas law we find in 1891 that this court in The State v. Hodges, 45 Kan. 389, 26 Pac. 676, established the law relative to the joinder of separate and distinct felonies charged in several counts of the information, provided, of course, that only one offense is charged in each of the several counts of the information. The court there speaking through Valentine, J., said:
The foregoing proposition of law has been cited many times and followed in this court. (The State v. Warner, 60 Kan. 94, 55 Pac. 342; State v. Powell, 120 Kan. 772, 245 Pac. 128; re-hearing denied in State v. Richardson, 121 Kan. 722, 250 Pac. 313.)
The established law in Kansas is well stated in 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations, § 183, p. 1143, as follows:
In State v. Toelkes, 139 Kan. 682, 33 P.2d 317, this court said:
As heretofore quoted in the Hodges case this court adheres to the proposition that the question of joinder of separate and distinct felonies is largely a question of procedure, resting in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, whether or not the rights of a defendant will be prejudiced by the trial of several charges at one time. (State v. Odle, 121 Kan. 284, 246 Pac. 1003; Wiebe v. Hudspeth, 163 Kan. 30, 180 P.2d 315; State v. Aspinwall, supra; and 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations, § 183.)
With the foregoing law established in Kansas prior to the writing of the Thompson case, Burch, J., recognized the discretionary power in the trial court by using the word "should" in his dictum instead of a more commanding word. In fact, the Thompson case was written in 1934 and in the same year shortly thereafter the Toelkes case was written by Johnston, C.J., citing the Hodges case and the Odle case.
Turning our attention now to the instant case, let us examine the felony counts joined in the information. The counts charging the defendant with kidnaping in the first degree and with the rape of Mrs. Harris grew out of the same transaction and were part of the *383 same plan of the defendant in perpetrating the acts. These are properly joined with the count charging assault with intent to rape committed one week later. As between the first two and the latter, the offenses are of the same general character, requiring the same mode of trial, the same kind of evidence and the same kind of punishment. The trial of the defendant, therefore, on the several counts joined was within the sound discretion of the trial court and no error was committed by the trial court in overruling the defendant's motions.
Actually, the state was obligated to charge the defendant with each of these counts in one information, unless there was an intention to abandon the third count completely. G.S. 1949, 62-1449, provides as follows:
This statute was construed in State v. Momb, 154 Kan. 435, 119 P.2d 544:
The confession of the defendant in the instant case included statements regarding all three counts of the information. A similar situation was presented in the case of State v. Neff, supra, where the court said in the fifth syllabus:
If the state used the confession as evidence it became mandatory, unless the state abandoned the third count, that all three counts be joined in one information. In the instant case all of the felonies charged could be properly joined, and the defendant was not prejudiced by the court's ruling on the defendant's motions to require the state to elect.
Prior to discussing the admission of the testimony of Mrs. Brakey given at the preliminary hearing, we shall consider a construction of the kidnaping statute, G.S. 1949, 21-449.
This is the first time this court has been directly called upon to construe and interpret the above cited statute concerning kidnaping in the first degree. Cases dealing with the construction of G.S. 1949, 21-450, kidnaping in the second degree, have been before this court. (State v. Lammon, 153 Kan. 822, 113 P.2d 1052; and State v. Myers, 154 Kan. 648, 121 P.2d 286.)
The defendant specified as error the giving of certain instructions by the trial court to the jury relating to kidnaping in the first degree. The defendant complains generally of the instructions throughout wherein kidnaping is referred to, but specifically objects to Instruction No. 5 which reads:
The principal objection of the defendant is that kidnaping in the first degree defined by the statute hereinafter set forth embraces just one crime, which is kidnaping with the intention of causing another to pay ransom or reward. The defendant goes back into history as far as Moses wherein manstealing was denounced and made a serious crime punishable by death. (Ex. 21:16 and Deut. 24:7.) By this process the defendant, tracing the law of kidnaping through the civil law, the common law, and into the modern kidnaping statutes, endeavors to establish that statutes dealing with kidnaping are grouped into two types. The first includes the words "reward or ransom" and limits the offense to extortion generally, and the second type prescribes and punishes any "forcible taking away" for whatever purpose. Defendant points out that the kidnaping statute under which he is charged, G.S. 1949, 21-449, was adopted by the legislature of this state in the year 1935, which was just a few years after the enactment of the original Lindbergh law by Congress in 1932, which was amended in 1934. This federal law grew out of the Lindbergh kidnaping case where ransom was the motive and the victim was taken from one state to another.
The original Kansas kidnaping law was very general in wording and very broad in its application. In substance, it provided that every person who shall without lawful authority forcibly seize or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be sent or taken out of the state, or to be secretly confined within the state against his will, or in any way held against his will, shall upon conviction be punished by confinement at hard labor not less than five nor more than ten years. The gist of the offense under the old law was the unlawful seizure, taking, detention, concealment or carrying away of the kidnaped person.
This act was broad enough to include any purpose of kidnaping which the perpetrator might consider of sufficient benefit to himself to induce him to undertake the kidnaping.
G.S. 1949, 21-449, makes kidnaping in the first degree punishable by life or not less than twenty years imprisonment in the penitentiary at the option of the court or the jury trying the case. For purposes of clarity in further discussion we have separated certain *386 clauses of the statute by inserting the numbers (1), (2), (3) and (4) in the statute which provides:
The statutory enactment in 1935 broke down the offense of kidnaping into three degrees. The original kidnaping act of 1868 as it appears in R.S. 1923, 21-438, was changed and re-defined into first and second degree kidnaping. R.S. 1923, 21-440, was reenacted with some changes, increasing the penalty, and re-defined as kidnaping in the third degree.
In an effort to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of a criminal statute, a court may resort with propriety to the evil which the statute was designed to remedy. For this it will look to the contemporaneous events and situation that existed at the time the statute was pressed upon the attention of the legislature. (Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; and United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 23 L. Ed. 224.)
Application of the foregoing rule of construction is significant in that we must know how much to read out of G.S. 1949, 21-449, on the ground that a literal application of the words would lead to absurd consequences. Thus, under provision No. 1, the repeated use of the disjunctive "or" leads to numerous possibilities far removed from kidnaping. For example, a literal application of a *387 certain word arrangement would define what normally constitutes an act of simple assault as kidnaping in the first degree. This construction is absurd and clearly not the legislative intention. Generally criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused. (State v. Bowser, 158 Kan. 12, 145 P.2d 135.) In a strict construction of a penal statute a presumption exists that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence, since the reason for the law in such case prevails over its letter.
In State v. Waite, 156 Kan. 143, 131 P.2d 708, this court in explaining the strict construction rule regarding penal statutes said:
A reasonable construction must be given criminal statutes to promote the efficient enforcement of the criminal law, to prevent crime and to promote the ends of justice. The object of statutes prohibiting kidnaping is to secure the personal liberty of citizens and to secure to them the assistance of the law necessary to release them from unlawful restraint. (State v. Myers, supra; and Macomber v. State, 137 Neb. 882, 291 N.W. 674.)
The element of "intent" in a kidnaping statute is treated in 31 Am. Jur., Kidnapping, § 8, p. 815, where it is said:
The defendant argues that the words "so kidnaped" used in provision No. 3 in G.S. 1949, 21-449, above quoted, refer to an offense described by provisions No. 1 and No. 2 in the statute. In other words, the defendant argues that the kidnaping must have been done with the intention of exacting ransom or reward before the provision relating to bodily harm has application. This construction *388 would nullify provision No. 3 in the statute since the crime of kidnaping in the first degree would be complete under provisions No. 1 and No. 2 without provision No. 3.
The word "kidnap" has a technical meaning. It is derived from the common law, and must be interpreted in the light of its technical meaning in common law. Both under the common law and under a statute, unless clearly modified, it means to take and carry away any person by unlawful force or by fraud, and against his will.
By provision No. 4 the prohibited acts are made kidnaping in the first degree. Provision No. 1 is designed to define kidnaping in the statute. Significantly contained within the wording of both provisions No. 2 and No. 3 are the words "so kidnaped." These words are important because they specifically have reference to provision No. 1 only, which defines kidnaping.
This leads to the conclusion that the provisions of G.S. 1949, 21-449, denounce two acts as kidnaping in the first degree. The one is kidnaping with the intention of exacting ransom or reward and the other is kidnaping if bodily harm is in any way inflicted upon the person or persons kidnaped. The dominating element of the offense in the former is the intent with which the act is done, while in the latter the gist of the offense is the actual inflicting of bodily harm upon the person kidnaped. There the criminal intent necessary to the existence of the offense is implied in the prohibited act. (State v. Myers, supra; 114 A.L.R. 870.)
The situation which existed at the time the Kansas legislature passed the act under consideration has a definite bearing upon the act adopted. Public feeling was tense. Charles A. Lindbergh was the first flier to cross the Atlantic Ocean non-stop. While exceedingly popular in this country his eldest son of tender years was kidnaped, taken across a state line and held for ransom. When the boy was eventually found he was dead. Newspaper publicity was carried daily in headlines on the front page throughout the nation as to progress and reports on the case. It began with the events of the kidnaping and continued through the trial of the offender. As an outgrowth of the case the federal law directed against kidnaping commonly known as the "Lindbergh Law" was enacted. Kansas followed by strengthening its kidnaping law, and it was without doubt the intention of the legislature to denounce two acts in the statute as kidnaping in the first degree.
*389 A California kidnaping statute provided the death penalty for kidnaping if a person suffered bodily harm and that statute was held to be valid notwithstanding the fact that it was enacted allegedly as a result of an aroused public feeling against kidnaping. In People v. Tanner, 3 C.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324, the California court spoke of "bodily harm" in the following language:
Bodily, used singly, is defined as pertaining to the body. "... It is opposed to mental ... physical is often synonymous with bodily; as, physical discomfort, physical suffering ..." Harm is defined as "1. Injury; hurt; damage; ... 2. Grief; pain, sorrow. 3. Evil; wrong; wickedness." (Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition.)
It was held in People v. Brown, 29 C.2d 555, 176 P.2d 929, that any touching of a victim against her will, with physical force, in an intentional, hostile and aggravated manner, or the projecting of such force against the victim by the kidnaper is "bodily harm" within the meaning of the statute providing the death penalty if the person kidnaped suffered bodily harm. There the defendant was convicted of robbery in two counts, of rape and of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. That court said the forcible rape itself constituted bodily harm.
We are in full accord with the position taken by the California court in the Tanner and Brown cases.
Other cases dealing with the California kidnaping statute are: People v. Chessman, 38 C.2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001; People v. Mendoza, 122 C.A.2d 185, 264 P.2d 223; and People v. Thompson, 133 C.A.2d 4, 284 P.2d 39.
In People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881, the New York court held that kidnaping and abduction of a woman were separate offenses.
The fact that rape in the instant case must be construed to supply the element of bodily harm required by the kidnaping statute *390 is no obstacle to a prosecution for both offenses in the criminal law. (See annotation in 17 A.L.R.2d 1003.) In the case of Wagner v. Edmondson, 178 Kan. 554, 290 P.2d 98, it was held by this court that the test concerning whether a single transaction may constitute two separate and distinct offenses is whether the same evidence is required to sustain each charge, and if not, the fact that both charges relate to and grow out of one transaction does not make a single offense where two distinct offenses are defined by the statute. (See, also, Wiebe v. Hudspeth, supra.)
Under all of the facts and circumstances presented by the record before this court, we are of the opinion that the trial court properly instructed the jury on kidnaping in the first degree. The instruction was properly limited to such matters as were before the jury on the evidence presented.
Defendant next argues that if it was proper to give an instruction on kidnaping in the first degree, the court should also have instructed on kidnaping in the second degree which is defined in G.S. 1949, 21-450, even though no request was made for such instruction by the defendant. A careful examination of the record before this court in the instant case does not disclose any evidence which would justify the trial court in giving an instruction concerning kidnaping in the second degree. The defendant was either guilty of kidnaping in the first degree under the evidence or he was not guilty of kidnaping in any degree. The defense was concentrated on alibi.
We shall next consider the admission into evidence of the transcript testimony of Mrs. Brakey given at a preliminary hearing where the defendant was confronted by the witness and cross-examined her.
On this point defendant specified as error the admission of the testimony of Mrs. Ruth M. Brakey: To be read from the transcript to the jury; to remain in the record after timely objections to the same; in refusing to declare a mistrial; in ruling that the testimony of Mrs. Brakey was not available on the day the transcript was read to the jury; and in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial.
Prior to the admission of testimony given in a prior hearing two requirements are essential  first, that the testimony at the prior hearing be given under oath, and second, that the defendant be confronted by the witness at the prior hearing and have the right *391 to cross-examine. (The State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189; The State v. Simmons, 78 Kan. 852, 98 Pac. 277; and State v. Foulk, 57 Kan. 255, 45 Pac. 603.)
The first syllabus in the case of The State v. Nelson, 68 Kan. 566, 75 Pac. 505, reads:
The admissibility of the testimony of a witness at a former trial does not depend so much on the presence or the availability of the witness as it does on the availability of the testimony, such as where a statutory privilege is claimed because of relationship to the accused, (The State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 Pac. 489; and State v. Woods, 130 Kan. 492, 287 Pac. 248) or where a witness is excused from testifying on the ground his testimony would incriminate him. (State v. Helbert, 135 Kan. 726, 12 P.2d 726; and State v. Neff, supra.)
In the instant case it cannot be denied that the witness, Mrs. Ruth M. Brakey, was under oath or that the defendant had a right to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. What is of greater concern, however, is whether or not the testimony of the witness was available. This is dependent upon the foundation laid for the admission of such testimony at the trial of the defendant.
It must be made to appear that the witness who gave such testimony at the former hearing cannot by the exercise of reasonable diligence be produced. (The State v. McClellan, 79 Kan. 11, 98 Pac. 209.) In the McClellan case this court spoke of the rule as follows:
Regarding the fact that a proper foundation must be laid and that it must be shown to the satisfaction of the court that due diligence has been exercised to secure the presence of the witness, the following language appears in State v. Carter, 149 Kan. 295, 87 P.2d 818:
The query, therefore, is whether the state in the instant case laid a proper foundation for the admission of the transcript testimony of Mrs. Ruth M. Brakey.
After the assistant county attorney, Mr. George, finished with his last witness in the prosecution's case before the trial court, he made this statement out of the hearing of the jury:
"Mr. Hayward: You know I am going to object.
"The Court: All right, we will have a recess.
"(Jury dismissed for recess.)"
*393 Many pages in the abstract of the record before this court consist of colloquy between court and counsel concerning the efforts made to procure this witness. Briefly summarized, they amount to the fact that Mrs. Brakey worked at a department store in Kansas City, Kansas; that she was highly nervous and temperamental; that the deputy sheriff had served a subpoena by leaving it with Mrs. Brakey's employer at Maslan's Department Store where she worked in Kansas City, Kansas, while Mrs. Brakey was out at lunch; that the assistant county attorney was in contact with Mrs. Brakey by telephone on several occasions; that Mrs. Brakey lived in Kansas City, Missouri, and on the day that her testimony was to be given refused to come to Kansas; that the attempted service of the subpoena was made approximately one week prior to the presentation of the prosecution's case; and that Mrs. Brakey's doctor who resided in Kansas City, Missouri, submitted a letter through Mrs. Brakey to the assistant county attorney stating that Mrs. Brakey should not be subjected to any conditions which excited her.
Further conversations took place on January 31, 1956, as follows:
"The Court: Where?
"Mr. Hayward: A subpoena could have been served.
"The Court: Did she say she couldn't?
"The Court: Did you issue a subpoena?
"Mr. Thornton Brown, Deputy Sheriff: Yes.
"The Court: What do your records show?
*394 Counsel for the defendant repeatedly objected throughout the trial to the admission of the transcript testimony of Mrs. Brakey who was a complaining witness. On the 7th day of February, 1956, counsel for the defense informed the court that he had information that Mrs. Brakey had consistently been at her work at Maslan's Store in Kansas City, Kansas, since the date upon which she was to testify, and had been there before that date. Unexpectedly on the afternoon of the 7th day of February, 1956, the state produced Mrs. Ruth M. Brakey who was present in the courtroom. The defendant was interrupted in the presentation of his case to the jury when one of the assistant county attorneys announced that he had brought in Mrs. Brakey. He requested that her testimony should then be taken. That is, that defendant's counsel should then withdraw his witness and let Mrs. Brakey testify. This placed the defendant in a very precarious position. If the defendant objected to her testimony it would be prejudicial to his cause, and if he did not object it would be prejudicial in that the testimony of Mrs. Brakey would be before the jury on two different occasions, once as part of the prosecution's case by transcript testimony, and again in the middle of defendant's case by the direct testimony of the witness. Furthermore, the state brought Mrs. Brakey into the courtroom and had her seated there while the rule was invoked that witnesses were to be separated from the courtroom. This was unknown to the defendant until the state announced that they had Mrs. Brakey in the courtroom to testify.
Counsel for the defendant objected to the interruption and to the admission of the testimony of Mrs. Brakey in person during the defendant's case. He moved the court to discharge the jury and declare a mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection to Mrs. Brakey testifying but overruled defendant's motion for a mistrial.
The foregoing facts represent the substance of the statements made by counsel for the state. They were made for the purpose of establishing a foundation for the admission of the testimony of Mrs. Brakey by transcript as given at the preliminary hearing. Statements of counsel, however, are not evidence any more than are the opening statements of counsel in the presentation of a case before a jury or to the court. The foundation, which the law contemplates, is a foundation in evidence. It is proof that is required. Proof that due diligence has been exercised and that the testimony of the witness is not available. A proper foundation for the introduction *395 of testimony of the character now under consideration required that the assistant county attorney and the deputy sheriff, as well as the other necessary witnesses, testify under oath with respect to the facts relied upon as the foundation, giving the defendant full opportunity to cross-examine. In addition, documentary evidence relied upon for the foundation should be properly introduced in evidence. (State v. Carter, supra.)
In a recent case, In re Estate of Snyder, 181 Kan. 222, 310 P.2d 944, this court upon motion of the appellee struck an abstract from the files of this court wherein the appellant's version of the evidence was narrated from statements of counsel made in the trial court.
In the instant case the only evidence before the court was that presented by the defendant, when he called Dr. R.L. Edwards, Jr., of Kansas City, Missouri, to the witness stand to testify. He was the doctor of Mrs. Brakey and testified that he did not at any time advise Mrs. Brakey that she should not appear in court, although he did say from a nervous standpoint she was not able to appear in court. He further acknowledged that he had written a letter for the county attorney several months prior to the date of his testimony concerning Mrs. Brakey.
It was improper for the trial court to admit the testimony of Mrs. Brakey as given at a former hearing without a proper foundation. To admit such evidence, particularly of a complaining witness, was materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. Aggravating the prejudice was the effort made by the state to have Mrs. Brakey testify in person as a witness during the presentation of the defendant's case. Such interruption was highly prejudicial. Counsel for the defense had no legal avenue from which to extricate the defendant from the predicament.
Taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances presented by the record in this case, we are of the opinion that the introduction of testimony of the character now under consideration without proper foundation resulted in reversible error and requires the granting of a new trial.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial.
WERTZ, J., dissents from paragraph 7 of the syllabus and the corresponding portion of the opinion, and would affirm the judgment in toto.