Title: Lilley v. Gifford Phillips Wood Products, Inc.
Citation: 210 Or. 278, 310 P.2d 337
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1957

Affirmed May 1, 1957.
*279 Austin Dunn, Baker, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Dunn &amp; Jackson, Baker.
David C. Silven, Baker, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Banta, Silven &amp; Horton, Baker.
Before WARNER[*], Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, PERRY[**] and McALLISTER, Justices.
PERRY, C.J.
This action was commenced by plaintiffs G.P. Lilley and Louise P. Lilley, co-partners, d.b.a. Baker *280 Wood Products, against defendant Gifford Phillips Wood Products, Inc., a corporation, to recover damages for the defendant's breach of a parol lease.
The basis of the complaint is that Hughson Lumber Ventures orally rented from the plaintiffs, on a month to month basis, buildings and woodworking equipment; and it was agreed between these parties that Hughson Lumber Ventures could remove the plaintiffs' machinery for its convenience, but that, at the termination of its tenancy, the machinery was to be replaced in position and in the same general condition as it was in at the commencement of the tenancy. In July, 1953, the defendant succeeded to the interests and became subject to the responsibilities of the Hughson Lumber Ventures; that at the voluntary termination of the tenancy defendant failed and refused to replace in the building the machinery and equipment removed or to restore it to the same general physical condition of repair as when received by Hughson Lumber Ventures. The defendant denied these conditions of the agreement. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and the defendant appeals.
The defendant assigns as error the giving by the trial court of the following instruction:
To the giving of this instruction the defendant took the following exception:
1, 2. In its answer, the defendant alleged that the issues presented here were res judicata by reason of previous litigated matters between these same parties. It must be noted that the exception as taken is not to the trial court's withdrawal of this defense from the consideration of the jury, but only to the effect that the instruction, as such, is a comment upon the evidence. The withdrawal of an issue from the consideration of the jury is the determination of a question of law and is not a comment upon the evidence condemned by ORS 17.255. This exception is entirely insufficient to raise the point argued in the brief,  that the present action is res judicata.
ORS 17.510 provides:
3. The purpose of requiring exceptions to instructions is to point out to the trial court wherein it may be in error, and give opportunity to that court to correct any error into which it may have fallen. Frangos v. Edmunds, 179 Or 577, 173 P2d 596; Green Mt. L. Co. v. C. &amp; N.R.R., 141 Or 188, 16 P2d 1106; State of Oregon v. Zorn, 22 Or 591, 30 P 317.
In Stose v. Heinrich and Horseny, 199 Or 386, 390, 261 P2d 675, we stated:
There is, however, no merit in defendant's contention.
This rule of law was again applied and approved in Wagner v. Savage, as Adm'r, 195 Or 128, 244 P2d 161.
An examination of the causes of action relied upon by the defendant as a bar to these proceedings discloses that each arises ex delicto.
One of the causes of action relied upon sounds in damages for waste committed by the defendant upon the real property of the plaintiff. These issues were formed upon the following allegations made by the plaintiffs in their complaint:
*284 This is an entirely different cause of action from the case in bar, which alleges a cause of action for breach of a clause in the contract that permitted the removal of the heavy machinery, but at the termination of the lease required its repositioning and reconditioning.
The second cause of action, previously adjudicated between these parties and relied upon by the defendant as barring this action, was alleged as follows:
These allegations were answered by a general denial.
It is clear that if there was a contract, express or implied, in the lease agreement to return the personal property of the plaintiffs, (which consisted of hand tools and fittings) at all, or in an equally good condition as when received, the plaintiffs by their pleadings waived their right to sue for breach of that agreement and sought recovery solely for a tortious taking of the property prior to the expiration of the time when, by reason of the contract of lease, demand for performance, under what we are required to assume was the agreement, could be enforced.
*285 4. It seems obvious to us that these former causes of action, relied upon by the defendant to defeat the present action, were purely and simply actions sounding in tort for waste and for the conversion of personal property. Therefore, the present suit is based upon another claim or demand, and the prior actions do not constitute a bar to the maintenance of this cause.
The defendant also assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to discharge from this jury certain jurors who had sat as jurors upon the trial of the previous cases between these parties. The challenge was upon the ground of implied bias.
5, 6. It is, of course, elementary that the parties to an action are entitled to try their issues before impartial jurors. An impartial juror is one whose state of mind is such at the commencement of the trial that he favors none of the litigants more than the other and will be influenced to favor the cause of one over the other only by a conviction of the right of a party's position, based upon competent evidence and the law of the case.
The general rule of implied bias is stated in 31 Am Jur 676, Jury § 162, as follows:
In this state, as in others where the statutes define implied bias, the statutory grounds alone are controlling. State v. Scoble, 28 Idaho 721, 155 P 969; *286 Sorseleil v. Red Lake Falls Milling Co., 111 Minn 275, 126 NW 903; State v. Morse, 35 SD 18, 150 NW 293.
Insofar as is pertinent to this case, ORS 17.140 reads as follows:
7. Defendant contends the words of the statute "or in another action between the same parties for the same cause of action" should be interpreted in a broad sense to include all causes between the same parties where a fact or a combination of facts offered to support a cause of action may be the same or similar although the cause of action is different.
The statute, however, speaks specifically of causes of action that are the same, and grants the challenge only when the causes of action are the same. We are not at liberty to substitute wording that would sustain defendant's viewpoint when it appears the legislature expressly provided that such a construction should apply only in criminal cases.
The previous causes of action upon which certain jurors sat are those previously discussed, together with proof there had been tried a cause of action for rent alleged to have accrued after the termination of the contract herein sued upon; therefore, the cause of action *287 in the case at bar is not the same as any cause of action previously tried.
We have carefully considered the other assignments of error set out in defendant's brief, but find them without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
[*]  Chief Justice when cause was argued.
[**]  Chief Justice when decision was rendered.

AFFIRMED.