Title: State v. Neff
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 18S-IF-478
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2019

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-IF-00478 
State of Indiana, 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee (Plaintiff below), 
–v– 
Beth A. Neff, 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant (Defendant below). 
Argued: September 27, 2018 | Decided: February 27, 2019 
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court,  
No. 18C01-1707-IF-000015 
The Honorable Marianne L. Vorhees, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 18A02-1708-IF-01933 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Slaughter concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 27 2019, 3:21 pm
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Goff, Justice. 
Turning to the judiciary to remove a duly-elected public official from 
office is a radical departure from our usual democratic process because it 
risks silencing the collective voice of the people, spoken in each election.  
As such, it is a remedy rarely sought and even more rarely granted.  This 
appeal involves such a request by the State to remove the Town of 
Yorktown’s Clerk-Treasurer, Beth Neff, but it does not fall within the 
exceptionally rare category of cases that warrant removal.  Under the 
statute relied on by the State for this removal action, a public official may 
be removed from office for only a general failure to carry out his or her 
required duties.  Because the State has not shown that Neff’s failures and 
errors constitute such a general failure, she is not subject to removal.   
Factual and Procedural History 
At all times relevant to this appeal, Beth Neff served as the elected 
Clerk-Treasurer of the Town of Yorktown and was responsible for, among 
other things, managing and keeping account of Yorktown’s finances.  In 
connection with these responsibilities, her office was subject to financial 
examination by the Indiana State Board of Accounts (the “SBOA”).  Two 
such examinations by the SBOA, along with actions taken in response to 
those examinations, laid the foundation for this proceeding. 
The first examination related to the 2012 calendar year, and the SBOA 
uncovered several deficiencies in Yorktown’s financial records and 
processes.  The deficiencies included improper bank account 
reconciliations, errors in Yorktown’s report of its yearly financial 
activities, and a financial account showing a negative cash balance of 
approximately $140,000.  In a November 2013 exit conference, the SBOA 
discussed the results of its examination with Neff, the Yorktown Town 
Council President, and the Yorktown Town Manager, and it provided 
some direction to Neff on avoiding future deficiencies.  
The second examination related to the 2013, 2014, and 2015 calendar 
years, and the SBOA found that the deficiencies noted in the 2012 
examination continued into 2013, 2014, and 2015.  In fact, the SBOA Audit 
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Manager who oversaw both examinations testified that Yorktown’s 
financial records worsened after the first examination, and, as a practical 
matter, there were too many errors to identify.  In an October 2016 exit 
conference, the SBOA again discussed the results of its examination with 
Neff, the Yorktown Town Council President, and the Yorktown Town 
Manager.  
In response to the second examination, the Yorktown Town Council 
approved hiring an outside accounting firm to review Yorktown’s books 
and to complete bank account reconciliations for the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 
2015 calendar years.  The accounting firm’s review revealed over 150 
errors that, without considering whether each error increased or 
decreased the balance of Yorktown’s books, totaled approximately 
$3,090,000.  The net effect of these errors was that Yorktown’s books were 
understated by approximately $346,000.  After completing the bank 
account reconciliations, the accounting firm was able to identify and 
propose adjustments to Yorktown’s books to reduce the errors to just near 
$250.  Yorktown initially contracted to spend $20,000 for this work but 
ultimately spent almost $70,000 after discovering the full extent of the 
work required. 
On July 12, 2017, about a month after the outside accounting firm 
completed its work reviewing Yorktown’s 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 
books, the State, by the Delaware County prosecuting attorney, filed its 
Complaint for Removal from Office against Neff.  Relying on Indiana 
Code section 5-8-1-35 (the “Removal Statute”), the State sought Neff’s 
removal for her alleged “refus[al] or neglect[], on numerous occasions, to 
perform the official duties pertaining to the office of the Yorktown Clerk-
Treasurer.”  Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 23, ¶4.  The State brought three 
specific counts alleging that Neff failed to: (1) complete monthly 
accounting reconciliations; (2) follow the directions of the SBOA, the 
relevant state examiner; and (3) use the accounting and financial reporting 
systems adopted by the SBOA in its Accounting and Uniform Compliance 
Guideline Manual for Cities and Towns (the “SBOA Manual”).  Neff 
sought dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6), but the 
trial court denied her motion.   
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Sixteen days after the State filed its Complaint and within the Removal 
Statute’s twenty-day deadline, the trial court held a summary hearing on 
the merits.  See Ind. Code § 5-8-1-35(a) (2017).  A few days later, the trial 
court issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment 
in favor of Neff.  It found that “Neff failed to reconcile [Yorktown’s] books 
for forty-eight consecutive months[;] . . . did not follow [SBOA] 
directives; violated the [SBOA] Manual that should have directed her in 
doing her job; and committed errors that resulted in over $3 million in 
total errors affecting over thirty accounts.”  Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 81 
(emphases in original).  However, it also found that Neff was completing 
the other work of her office, including fulfilling her non-financial duties.  
Id. at 84.  After discussing this Court’s precedent interpreting the Removal 
Statute and applicable constitutional provisions, the trial court concluded 
that the Removal Statute applies in three situations: “complete failures to 
act, the inability to act due to mental conditions, or crimes.”  Id.  Because 
Neff was successfully completing some of her duties as Clerk-Treasurer, 
the trial court concluded that she had committed misfeasance rather than 
nonfeasance; that is, she had not completely failed to carry out her duties.  
Id.  Thus, the trial court entered judgment in her favor.  Id.  
The State appealed, arguing that the Removal Statute does not require 
the State to show a failure to fulfill all duties, all the time, to remove a 
public official.  Instead, the State contended that pervasive failures 
involving critical duties suffice for removal.  In response, Neff argued in 
favor of the trial court’s judgment, but she also cross-appealed the trial 
court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the complaint.  The Court of 
Appeals agreed generally with the State and held that “an officeholder 
like Neff need not abandon each and every statutory duty before removal 
from office may be warranted.”  State v. Neff, 103 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2018).  It concluded that the Removal Statute applied because Neff 
“neglected to perform a critical, official, and mandatory duty of her office 
for an extended period of time.”  Id. at 643.  Thus, it reversed the trial 
court.  Id. at 643–44. 
We granted Neff’s petition to transfer to address the merits of the 
State’s complaint for removal, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals 
opinion in part.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  We summarily affirm the 
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portion of the Court of Appeals opinion regarding Neff’s cross-appeal.  
See App. R. 58(A)(2). 
Standard of Review 
The parties do not dispute the trial court’s factual findings regarding 
what Neff did or did not do. 1  Instead, they disagree as to the standard for 
removing a public officer under the Indiana Constitution and the Removal 
Statute.  This disagreement concerning the meaning of our Constitution 
and statutes presents us with a question of law, which we review de novo.  
Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016).  See also State v. McRoberts, 
207 Ind. 293, 298–300, 192 N.E. 428, 430–31 (1934) (reviewing the trial 
court’s legal conclusions in an appeal of a removal proceeding de novo). 2 
Discussion and Decision 
Although public officials are normally voted in and out of office, our 
Constitution provides ways to remove an official outside of an election in 
certain circumstances.  See Ind. Const. art. 6, §§ 7–8.  One such way is 
through a judicial proceeding pursuant to the Removal Statute.  I.C. § 5-8-
                                                 
1 Neff erroneously characterizes the trial court’s conclusion that she committed misfeasance 
rather than nonfeasance as a factual finding.  While this conclusion was surely informed by 
the trial court’s findings regarding Neff’s actions, its determination was a conclusion of law, 
and we owe it no deference.  
2 Both parties contend that, because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the clearly erroneous standard of review applies here.  However, the clearly erroneous 
standard in this context comes from Trial Rule 52(A).  See Gittings v. Deal, 109 N.E.3d 963, 970 
(Ind. 2018).  In at least one case, we relied on the summary nature of proceedings under the 
Removal Statute in stating that “the ordinary rules of civil procedure do not apply to the 
procedure in the trial court, and no good reason is seen why they should be made to apply 
here.”  Beesley v. State, 219 Ind. 239, 242, 37 N.E.2d 540, 541 (1941).  Because we would review 
the legal issues in this appeal de novo whether we applied Trial Rule 52(A)’s clearly 
erroneous standard or not, compare Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1157 (noting the general rule that we 
review legal questions de novo) with Gittings, 109 N.E.3d at 970 (noting the rule that, when 
applying Trial Rule 52(A), we review legal questions de novo), we decline to address the 
rule’s applicability on appeal here. 
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1-35.  But judicial removal “is an extreme and extraordinary measure, 
intended only for extreme and extraordinary occasions.  It is fraught with 
seriousness and a demand for extreme caution both from the standpoint 
of [the person] who prefers the charge and [the person] who listens and 
pronounces judgment.”  State ex rel. Ayer v. Ewing, 231 Ind. 1, 16, 106 
N.E.2d 441, 447 (1952) (Emmert, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  As a 
result, we exercise restraint and caution in considering petitions for 
removal.  Bateman v. State, 214 Ind. 138, 149, 14 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (1938) 
(stating that removal “is a matter of serious importance” that “should be 
exercised with caution”).   
With this cautious approach in mind, we consider two related 
questions in this appeal.  First, under what circumstances do the Indiana 
Constitution and the Removal Statute allow for the judicial removal of a 
public official?  Second, should Neff have been removed?  We address 
each question in turn. 
I. The Removal Statute applies only in limited 
situations. 
The judiciary’s removal power originates from two provisions of the 
Indiana Constitution.  Article 6, section 7 provides, “All State officers 
shall, for crime, incapacity, or negligence, be liable to be removed from 
office, either by impeachment . . . or by a joint resolution of the General 
Assembly . . . .”  Article 6, section 8 states more generally that “[a]ll State, 
county, township, and town officers, may be impeached, or removed from 
office, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.”  We have said that 
these two sections should be construed together.  McComas v. Krug, 81 Ind. 
327, 333 (1882).  Thus, as relevant here, our Constitution provides that 
county, township, and town officers may be impeached, or removed from 
office, for crime, incapacity, or negligence in such manner as the 
legislature may prescribe.  Id. (construing Article 6, sections 7 and 8).   
While our Constitution lays the general foundation for removal, the 
Removal Statute supplies the specific mechanism applicable here by 
which a public official may be removed.  At issue in this case is Subsection 
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(a)(2) of the Removal Statute which allows for removal of an officer for 
“refusing or neglecting to perform the official duties pertaining to the 
officer’s office[.]”  I.C. § 5-8-1-35(a)(2); accord I.C. § 5-8-1-35(b).  When the 
State files an action according to the Removal Statute, the trial court must 
hear the case within twenty days in a summary proceeding, I.C. § 5-8-1-
35(a), where “the rules of civil procedure have been held 
inapplicable . . . .”  State ex rel. Durham v. Marion Circuit Court, 240 Ind. 
132, 139, 162 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1959) (citing Beesley v. State, 219 Ind. 239, 37 
N.E.2d 540 (1941); State v. Perry Circuit Court, 204 Ind. 673, 185 N.E. 510 
(1933)).  Because of the unique nature of the summary proceedings and 
the penalty mandated by the legislature, the Removal Statute must be 
strictly construed in favor of the defendant and not expanded further than 
the legislature has expressly provided.  Ayer, 231 Ind. at 5–6, 106 N.E.2d at 
442; Beesley, 219 Ind. at 244, 37 N.E.2d at 542. 
Although the language of Subsection (a)(2) of the Removal Statute has 
remained largely unchanged since the statute’s enactment in 1897, compare 
I.C. § 5-8-1-35 with McRoberts, 207 Ind. at 298, 192 N.E. at 430 (quoting the 
statute in effect without change since 1897), we have addressed it only a 
handful of times.  From these few cases, we can glean a broad rule that 
Subsection (a)(2) may be invoked to remove an officer only if there has 
been “a general failure to perform official duties.”  Ayer, 231 Ind. at 12, 106 
N.E.2d at 445.  Supporting this broad rule are three more specific 
guidelines.  First, as Subsection (a)(2) uses the plural “official duties” 
when describing a basis for removal, we have said that “a failure to 
perform just one duty required by law is not . . . sufficient” for removal.  
Ayer, 231 Ind. at 12, 106 N.E.2d at 445 (discussing McRoberts).  And until 
proven otherwise, a defendant in a removal action is presumed to have 
carried out his or her duties.  See id. at 8, 106 N.E.2d at 443; McRoberts, 207 
Ind. at 299, 192 N.E. at 430.  Therefore, the State must affirmatively show 
that an officer has failed to perform multiple required duties before that 
officer is subject to removal under the Removal Statute.  Second, 
Subsection (a)(2) addresses nonfeasance rather than malfeasance or 
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misfeasance. 3  Ayer, 231 Ind. at 13, 106 N.E.2d at 446.  In other words, the 
statute is not concerned with degrees of failure—only complete failure to 
perform required duties will do.  Third, the officer’s nonfeasance must 
have a significant impact on the day-to-day operation of the officer’s 
office.  See Bateman, 214 Ind. at 148–49, 14 N.E.2d at 1011 (refusing to allow 
removal for “inconsequential matters”).  Nonfeasance of critical or 
essential duties of the office will necessarily have a significant impact on 
the day-to-day operation of the officer’s office and will thus warrant 
removal.  On the other hand, nonfeasance of a few ancillary duties will not 
always have an impact large enough to warrant removal.  Based on this 
broad rule and its related guidelines, Subsection (a)(2) of the Removal 
Statute does not apply when an officer has done his or her job poorly or 
even improperly; rather, it applies when an officer has effectively not 
done his or her job at all. 4 
While applying the rule and guidelines in previous cases, we provided 
two examples of situations that did not warrant removal and one 
hypothetical example that would.  In McRoberts, we held that the alleged 
failure of several members of the Gibson County Council to appropriate 
$300 for the travel expenses of the County Superintendent did not warrant 
removal.  207 Ind. at 295–300, 192 N.E. at 429–31.  “The petition . . . 
specifie[d] but one instance where it [was] claimed and alleged that [the 
councilmen] failed to perform the duties of the office[,]” and that was not 
enough to remove them.  Id. at 299, 192 N.E. at 430.  In Ayer, we held that a 
Hammond Township, Spencer County, trustee could not be removed 
under the Removal Statute for his alleged refusal to consider the 
                                                 
3 Nonfeasance is “[t]he failure to act when a duty to act exists.”  Nonfeasance, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also McRoberts, 207 Ind. at 298, 192 N.E. at 430 (providing a 
similar definition).  Malfeasance is “[a] wrongful, unlawful, or dishonest act[.]”  Malfeasance, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also McRoberts, 207 Ind. at 298, 192 N.E. at 430 
(providing a similar definition).  Misfeasance is “[a] lawful act performed in a wrongful 
manner.”  Misfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Ayer, 231 Ind. at 20, 
106 N.E.2d at 449 (Emmert, J., concurring) (providing a similar definition). 
4 We note that the legislature has provided other tools that could be used to address an 
officer’s performance when removal is not warranted.  See, e.g., I.C. ch. 34-27-3 (2018). 
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employment applications of two teachers unless they donated to his 
political campaign.  231 Ind. at 4–5, 8, 106 N.E.2d at 442–443.  These 
allegations did not allege a general failure by the trustee to perform the 
official duties of his office, and the Removal Statute did not apply.  Id. at 
12, 106 N.E.2d at 445–46.  On the other hand, in both McRoberts and Ayer 
we gave the same hypothetical example of when an officer would be 
subject to removal under the Removal Statute: “where a sheriff closes his 
office and remains away and refuses and neglects to discharge the duties 
thereof, and has no one to perform his official duties.”  McRoberts, 207 Ind. 
at 299, 192 N.E. at 430; Ayer, 231 Ind. at 12, 106 N.E.2d at 445.  Such a 
complete abandonment of the office “would come squarely within the 
statute.”  McRoberts, 207 Ind. at 299, 192 N.E. at 430.  These three examples 
provide the poles at opposite ends of the wide spectrum of errors and 
failures that could potentially fall within Subsection (a)(2) of the Removal 
Statute.  This case, however, falls in between these poles and thus presents 
a much closer question.  
II. Neff’s failures and errors do not rise to the level 
required for removal pursuant to the Removal 
Statute. 
Neff’s case is a particularly close call because she was undeniably 
ineffective in carrying out certain parts of her job.  Moreover, her shoddy 
performance cost Yorktown tens of thousands of dollars.  Given these 
facts it is not surprising that the local prosecutor would look to the 
Removal Statute to prevent further economic harm.  However, a careful 
analysis of Neff’s conduct, as it relates to her official duties as Clerk-
Treasurer, demonstrates that she was still carrying out the essential 
functions of her job and, thus, did not generally fail to perform her official 
duties.   
Our review of the record and of the applicable statutes reveals at least 
fourteen statutory duties of a town clerk-treasurer.  Eleven specific duties 
and one catch-all provision are provided in a single section of the Indiana 
Code dedicated to town clerk-treasurers.  This section required Neff to: 
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(1) Receive and care for all town money and pay the money out 
only on order of the town legislative body. 
(2) Keep accounts showing when and from what sources the 
clerk-treasurer has received town money and when and to 
whom the clerk-treasurer has paid out town money. 
(3) Prescribe payroll and account forms for all town offices. 
(4) Prescribe the manner in which creditors, officers, and 
employees shall be paid. 
(5) Manage the finances and accounts of the town and make 
investments of town money. 
(6) Prepare for the legislative body the budget estimates of 
miscellaneous revenue, financial statements, and the proposed 
tax rate. 
(7) Maintain custody of the town seal and the records of the 
legislative body. 
(8) Issue all licenses authorized by statute and collect the fees 
fixed by ordinance. 
(9) Serve as clerk of the legislative body by attending its 
meetings and recording its proceedings. 
(10) Administer oaths, take depositions, and take 
acknowledgment of instruments that are required by statute to 
be acknowledged, without charging a fee. 
(11) Serve as clerk of the town court under IC 33-35-3-2, if the 
judge of the court does not serve as clerk of the court or 
appoint a clerk of the court under IC 33-35-3-1. 
(12) Perform all other duties prescribed by statute. 
I.C. § 36-5-6-6(a) (2017).  The State did not allege any deficiencies in Neff’s 
performance of these eleven specific duties.  Rather, its allegations related 
to three additional duties imposed on town clerk-treasurers by other 
statutes.  See I.C. § 36-5-6-6(a)(12) (providing a catch-all provision 
incorporating other duties).  These other statutes required Neff to 
“reconcile at least monthly the balance of public funds, as disclosed by 
[her records], with the balance statements provided by the respective 
depositories[,]” I.C. § 5-13-6-1(e), to follow the SBOA’s directions, I.C. § 5-
11-1-10(2), and to use the systems of accounting and financial reporting 
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adopted by the SBOA, I.C. § 5-11-1-21.  The State focused on these final 
three duties in this removal proceeding. 
To determine whether Neff’s alleged failures to carry out her duties 
amounted to “a general failure to perform official duties” that would 
subject her to removal, we consider Neff’s duties and actions in light of 
the three specific removal guidelines discussed above.  First, an officer 
may be removed under the Removal Statute only for failure to perform 
multiple required duties.  Second, the officer’s failures must constitute 
nonfeasance rather than malfeasance or misfeasance.  Third, this 
nonfeasance must significantly impact the day-to-day operation of the 
officer’s office.  We address each guideline below. 
A. Neff’s failures and errors involved multiple duties. 
The State alleged and the trial court found that Neff’s failures related to 
multiple duties.  The State alleged that Neff failed to complete monthly 
account reconciliations, follow the SBOA’s directions, and adopt and use 
the systems of accounting and financial reporting required by the SBOA, 
and the trial court entered findings consistent with these allegations.  As 
noted above, each of these relates to a separate duty of a town clerk-
treasurer.  See I.C. §§ 5-13-6-1(e), 5-11-1-10(2), 5-11-1-21.  Thus, the first 
guideline in the removal analysis is met. 
B. Neff’s failures and errors resulted in nonfeasance of at 
least one duty, but we need not determine the full 
extent of her nonfeasance. 
While the trial court’s undisputed factual findings support the 
conclusion that Neff committed nonfeasance of at least one specific duty, 
they are less clear regarding whether Neff committed nonfeasance of 
multiple duties.  As discussed above, the State alleged, and the trial court 
found, that Neff failed to complete the required reconciliations, follow the 
SBOA’s directions, and adopt and use the accounting and financial 
reporting systems adopted by the SBOA as required in the SBOA Manual.  
Because Neff failed to complete monthly accounting reconciliations when 
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she had a duty to do so, she committed nonfeasance of this duty.  See 
Nonfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
nonfeasance as “[t]he failure to act when a duty to act exists”).  However, 
the trial court’s findings regarding Neff’s response to the SBOA’s 
directions and her adoption and use of the systems required by the SBOA 
Manual are less clear.  Compare Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 81 (“Neff did 
not follow [SBOA] directives [and] violated the [SBOA] Manual that 
should have directed her in doing her job . . . .”) with id. at 84 (“Neff is 
making mistakes and not performing up to the standards expected by the 
[SBOA] . . . .”).  If Neff wholly failed to act on all the SBOA’s directions 
and failed to adopt and use any of the systems required by the SBOA 
Manual, she would have committed nonfeasance of these duties.  But if 
Neff tried to follow the SBOA’s directions and adopt and use the required 
systems but just could not get it all done properly, she would have 
committed misfeasance.  See Misfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(defining misfeasance as “[a] lawful act performed in a wrongful 
manner”).  We need not resolve this question because, even assuming 
Neff committed nonfeasance in connection with each of these three duties, 
her nonfeasance did not have a significant impact on the operation of her 
office. 
C. Neff’s failures and errors did not have a significant 
impact on the day-to-day operation of her office. 
Neff’s failure to carry out three of her duties did not have a significant 
impact on the day-to-day operation of her office because those duties were 
not essential to the regular functioning of her office.  Those three duties—
completing reconciliations, following the SBOA’s directions, and adopting 
and using certain accounting and financial systems—dealt with 
maintaining proper oversight rather than ensuring the daily functioning 
of her office.  In other words, the fact that Neff failed to reconcile accounts 
and follow the SBOA’s directions had no impact on the ability of a 
Yorktown resident to pay his or her water bill.  Because Neff’s 
nonfeasance did not have a significant impact on the day-to-day operation 
of her office, the third guideline in the removal analysis is not met, and 
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she did not generally fail to perform her official duties.  Thus, she was not 
subject to removal.5 
Our conclusion that Neff’s failures did not significantly impact the day-
to-day operation of her office is driven home by the many duties she 
presumably did carry out.  As an initial matter, we note that Neff holds 
the dual office of Clerk-Treasurer, and her duties include some related to a 
traditional clerk’s role and others related to a traditional treasurer’s role.  
Despite this dual role, the State did not allege that Neff failed to perform 
any of the duties traditionally associated with a clerk, such as recording 
the proceedings of the town’s legislative body or keeping custody of the 
town seal.  See I.C. § 36-5-6-6(a)(7), (9).  Absent any contrary findings, we 
must presume she fully carried out these duties.  See Ayer, 231 Ind. at 8, 
106 N.E.2d at 443; McRoberts, 207 Ind. at 299, 192 N.E. at 430.  Further, the 
State did not allege that Neff failed to perform many of the duties 
traditionally associated with a treasurer, such as paying money out only 
on order of the town legislative body, investing the town’s money, or 
preparing budget estimates.  See I.C. § 36-5-6-6(a)(1), (5), (6).  As noted 
above, without proof otherwise, we presume she performed these duties.  
Thus, we cannot say that there was a “general failure to perform official 
duties.” 
Given all the duties she presumably carried out, Neff is more similar to 
the McRoberts councilmen and the Ayer trustee that were not subject to 
removal than the McRoberts/Ayer hypothetical sheriff that would have 
been.  Rather than effectively closing up shop like the hypothetical sheriff, 
Neff continued the daily operation of her office like the councilmen and 
trustee.  Although Neff failed to carry out some of her required duties, 
this did not amount to a general failure to carry out her duties as Clerk-
                                                 
5 We acknowledge that Yorktown spent almost $70,000 to fix the problems Neff’s performance 
caused, and that expenditure may have had a significant impact on Yorktown’s finances 
generally.  However, the Removal Statute and our cases require us to focus on the impact of 
Neff’s failures on her office specifically.  Thus, while this large, unexpected expense might be 
significant for Yorktown residents, it cannot be significant in our analysis. 
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Treasurer.  As such, she is not subject to the extreme and extraordinary 
measure of removal. 
Conclusion 
The judiciary has the power to remove a public official only in extreme 
situations, and we wield this power only after careful and cautious 
consideration.  For a public official to be removed pursuant to Subsection 
(a)(2) of the Removal Statute, the State must show that the official has 
generally failed to perform his or her official duties.  Here, Neff’s failures 
and errors did not result in such a general failure, so the Removal Statute 
does not apply.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor 
of Neff. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T/C R O S S -A P PE LL EE 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana  
Patricia C. McMath 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLE E/ C R OSS -A P PE LL AN T 
Jeffrey M. Heinzmann 
Heinzmann Law Office LLC 
Fishers, Indiana