Title: Malary v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13034
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 2021

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SJC-13034 
 
JAHI MALARY  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
January 22, 2021. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Continuance. 
 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Jahi Malary, appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  In the petition, he sought relief from a 
Superior Court judge's order denying his motion to continue the 
third day of an evidentiary suppression hearing that began in 
November 2019.  We affirm. 
 
 
In August and September 2018, Malary was indicted on 
several charges, including trafficking a person for sexual 
servitude, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), and deriving 
support from prostitution, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 7.  
He pleaded not guilty and was released on bail with certain 
conditions.  In September 2019, he filed a motion to suppress, 
and the first day of an evidentiary hearing on the motion was 
held in November 2019.  The second day of the hearing was held 
on February 12, 2020.  A third day was scheduled for February 
26, 2020, but was continued at the Commonwealth's request.  
According to the Commonwealth, the hearing was scheduled to 
resume on March 18, 2020.  Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
hearing did not take place and was later rescheduled for July 
29, 2020. 
 
 
On July 23, 2020, a judge in the Superior Court ordered 
Malary to choose between proceeding on July 29 in person or via 
video conference.  The following day, Malary filed an "objection 
to conducting an evidentiary hearing by video conference or an 
2 
 
 
in-person evidentiary hearing," in which he argued against both 
options.  An in-person hearing could not safely be held because, 
in his view, the Trial Court's existing protocols to safeguard 
against COVID-19 were inadequate.  A video conference, on the 
other hand, was also unacceptable because, again in his view, it 
would violate various of his constitutional rights.  The judge 
continued the July 29 hearing date and rescheduled it for 
September 15.  At a video status conference on September 8, 
Malary continued to object to proceeding with the third day of 
the suppression hearing either in person or via video conference 
and requested a continuance until such time as the risks of 
appearing in person were, in his view, reduced.1 
 
 
In an order issued on September 15, the judge denied 
Malary's request to continue the third day of the hearing 
indefinitely, ordered that the hearing take place in October, 
and ordered Malary to choose whether to appear in person or via 
video conference.  The judge also gave Malary the choice of two 
different court houses if he chose to appear in person or, if he 
chose to appear via video conference, the choice whether to be 
in the same physical location as his counsel.  Malary thereafter 
filed, in the Superior Court, a motion for further relief, in 
which he argued that he could not choose whether to appear in 
person or via video conference without additional information 
related to the Trial Court's COVID-19 safety protocols.2  The 
judge denied the motion.  In doing so, she noted that the Trial 
Court had already made significant information regarding its 
safety protocols publicly available. 
 
 
Malary then filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the 
county court, in which he argued that the Trial Court has failed 
to provide adequate safety protocols and has failed to provide 
transparent information about the steps taken to evaluate the 
risks of appearing in person in a court house.  He also argued 
that "compelling" him to submit to a video conference would 
                                                 
 
1 The Commonwealth was amenable to moving forward with the 
suppression hearing either in person or via video conference. 
 
 
2 Malary sought information related to, among other things, 
"the current Minimum Efficiency Reporting Values . . . ratings 
for recirculated air levels;" the "cubic feet per minute . . . 
for outside air pumped into the courtrooms;" and "the percentage 
of air that is 'return' v. 'make-up.'"  He also requested 
"reports or opinions of medical experts retained or consulted by 
the Trial Court regarding the risk of Covid-19 transmission at 
in-person court proceedings." 
3 
 
 
violate several of his constitutional rights, including his 
right to be present "in the courtroom;" his right to confront 
witnesses against him; and his right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  In the petition, Malary asked the court to reverse the 
judge's order directing him to choose between appearing in 
person or via video conference and to allow Malary's motion to 
stay the proceedings.  The single justice denied the petition 
without a hearing on the basis that there was no claim of a 
violation of a substantive right and no extraordinary 
circumstance that warranted the exercise of this court's 
authority pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that 
"review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be 
obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial 
court or by other available means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).  It 
is questionable whether Malary can make such a showing.  He 
argues that he does not have an adequate appellate remedy 
because if he appears in person for the suppression hearing, the 
issue whether the hearing was conducted safely, particularly if 
Malary contracts COVID-19, will be moot after a trial.  
Additionally, in his view, if he is compelled to choose between 
appearing in person and appearing via video conference, a 
postjudgment appeal will not provide an adequate appellate 
remedy because "the basis for raising [the] issues will not be 
properly analyzed . . . during the actual motion to suppress 
hearing."3 
 
                                                 
 
3 In his memorandum filed pursuant to rule 2:21, Malary 
focuses primarily on issues related to appearing in person for 
the suppression hearing.  As to issues related to holding an 
evidentiary suppression hearing via video conference, he 
"adopts" the arguments made by the defendant in Vazquez Diaz vs. 
Commonwealth, SJC-13009, which is currently pending before this 
court.  Relying on arguments made by a party in a case wholly 
separate from his own does not amount to adequate appellate 
argument.  In any event, the issues raised in the Vazquez Diaz 
case, which involve whether, in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the constitutional considerations attendant to a 
suppression hearing may be satisfied by a hearing via video 
conference, are not what is at issue here.  In the Vazquez Diaz 
case, a Superior Court judge ordered that the evidentiary 
suppression hearing take place via video conference.  Here, 
Malary was given a choice, albeit one which he has not yet made. 
4 
 
 
 
Malary's request for relief from this court is premature.  
His arguments themselves emphasize the point.  Even assuming for 
the sake of discussion that, if he chooses one forum or the 
other, the related issues would later be moot, Malary has not in 
fact made any choice.  His arguments about what rights might be 
violated if he chooses one forum or the other are, at this 
stage, conjectural.  The simple act of the judge ordering Malary 
to choose a forum for the suppression hearing was not a 
violation of Malary's rights.  The order did not, for example, 
bear on any substantive issue or right at stake in the 
proceedings or prevent the case from proceeding in a particular 
way.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 485 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2020) 
(single justice did not err in denying Commonwealth's G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition seeking relief from trial court judge's 
interlocutory discovery ruling; preliminary ruling requiring 
Commonwealth to provide discovery did not foreclose 
Commonwealth's ability to prosecute or have any detrimental 
effect on prosecution).  Malary is not being forced to appear in 
person or being forced to appear via video conference; he is 
simply being directed to make a choice. 
 
 
The only issue before the single justice was whether that 
directive to Malary, to make a choice, was sufficiently 
important and extraordinary as to warrant the exercise of this 
court's extraordinary power pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  On 
that point, the single justice permissibly decided that it was 
not.  He did not err or abuse his discretion in doing so.  If 
and when Malary is ordered to appear either in person or by 
video, he can assert whatever substantive challenges he has at 
that time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Aviva Jeruchim for the petitioner.