Title: Flint v. Mincoff
Citation: 137 Mont. 549, 353 P.2d 340
Docket Number: 10054
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1960

353 P.2d 340 (1960) 137 Mont. 549 Calvin FLINT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Pete MINCOFF, Defendant and Appellant. No. 10054. Supreme Court of Montana. Submitted March 28, 1960. Decided June 9, 1960. Rehearing denied July 14, 1960. *341 Hugh J. Lemire, Colgrove &amp; Brown, Miles City, Hugh J. Lemire, argued orally, for appellant. Sandall, Moses &amp; Cavan, Billings, J. J. Cavan, Jr., argued orally, for respondent. CASTLES, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict. The jury found for the plaintiff and assessed his damages at $13,540. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that on March 3, 1956, plaintiff and defendant entered into a lease agreement by which the defendant leased to plaintiff certain lands in Garfield County for the period from April 1, 1956, to March 31, 1957. The lease also provided for four subsequent renewals each being of the same duration and required the lessee, plaintiff herein, to give notice in writing of his intention to renew at least 30 days before the expiration of the existing lease period. On January 9, 1957, more than 30 days before the expiration date of the existing lease, plaintiff, at defendant's request, wired $1,000 to the defendant in Las Vegas, Nevada. Plaintiff alleged that this $1,000 was sent pursuant to a verbal agreement that this sum would be applied on the amount due for the next one-year period commencing on April 1, 1957. Plaintiff gave no written notice of his intention to renew the lease and subsequently defendant gave notice that because of this failure the lease would be cancelled as of March 31, 1957. Defendant's answer, in addition to relying upon the failure to give written notice, set up an affirmative defense in which he alleged that the parties had entered into another written agreement which provided that the $1,000 previously paid the defendant *342 would apply as a rental payment for the month of April 1957. This agreement made other provisions for the removal of plaintiff's livestock from the premises and also contained the following language: This agreement was signed by plaintiff and it is defendant's contention that by this agreement plaintiff abrogated any rights which he might have had under the lease. Plaintiff's reply alleged failure of consideration to support the agreement; that such agreement was an accord and satisfaction of the dispute over the lease, but that defendant had not performed the obligations which he incurred in the agreement. Defendant relies mainly upon two specifications of error: (1) That the evidence relating to the verbal agreement was inadmissible to alter the terms of the written lease agreement; and (2) That the subsequent agreement entered into by the parties was in fact a substituted contract and not an accord and satisfaction. Concerning the first specification of error set out above, the jury was instructed as follows: The general rule regarding waiver of notice is set out in 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, § 62d, p. 611: This same authority in discussing the statute of frauds, states that "Where the extended term of the lease is fixed by and is a part of the original written lease, and comes into existence merely by the lessee exercising his option and giving the required notice, no question as to the application of the statute of frauds arises. The lessee holds for the extended term by virtue of the original lease which is in writing and which satisfies the statute; and the execution of a new lease is not required. This rule may apply even where the notice of intention to exercise the option is verbal, as where the provisions of the lease as to written notice are waived, or where there is no provision in the lease as to whether the notice shall be written or verbal." 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of § 113, p. 605. Though the instant case is not governed by the statute of frauds, the lease being for less than the statutory period, the reasoning of the above discussion applies to this case. *343 Defendant relies upon section 13-907, R.C.M. 1947, which provides as follows: "A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not otherwise." The waiver of the requirement of written notice, however, was fully executed when the money was received by the defendant. There is a conflict in the evidence regarding the telephone conversation but there was sufficient testimony to enable the jury to determine that the defendant did agree to renew the lease during the course of this conversation. When the money was paid the oral agreement became fully executed and operated to renew the lease for the subsequent year at that time. Griffiths v. Thrasher, 95 Mont. 210, 26 P.2d 995. Cases decided under section 13-907 where the oral agreement was not fully executed are not in point. The evidence of this oral agreement was properly before the jury and there was no error in the instruction relating to waiver. The second question presented for our determination is whether the subsequent agreement was in fact a substituted contract. If it was then the rights and liabilities of the parties under the lease agreement are extinguished. If it was not, then the question becomes whether this was an accord which was satisfied by the mutual promises of the agreement, or an accord executory which would only extinguish the pre-existing rights and liabilities of the parties upon full and complete performance by both parties. Section 58-501, R.C.M. 1947, defines an accord as follows: The general rule is stated in 10 A.L.R. 222, as follows: Professor Corbin, in his comprehensive treatise on contracts, states that "The term `accord executory' is and always has been used to mean an agreement for the future discharge of an existing claim by a substituted performance. In order for an agreement to fall within this definition, it is the promised performance that is to discharge the existing claim, and not the promise to render such performance. Conversely, all agreements for a future discharge by a substituted performance are accords executory." 6 Corbin, Contracts, § 1268, pp. 50, 51. In the instant case, the agreement was made in order that the plaintiff might have time to get his stock and personal property removed from the leased property. All parts of the agreement contained obligations by both parties relating to the removal of this stock and property. In this connection the jury was instructed as follows: The court also gave an instruction which was offered by the defendant and read as follows: These instructions correctly embodied the theory of the case; that of accord and satisfaction and not substituted contract. Though an accord executory operates as a temporary bar to any cause of action on the prior agreement, this is true only as long as there is no breach of the provisions of the accord. Upon this breach the prior claim is again enforceable. There was ample evidence from which the jury could determine that the defendant had breached one or more of the provisions of the accord. The record reveals by substantial evidence, if believed, that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's operation. After plaintiff rounded up his cattle for moving, the defendant came to the premises and forced plaintiff's cowhands to move the cattle several miles where they were scattered and some of them lost and never recovered. At a later time the defendant refused to permit the movement of the cattle until an asserted claim was paid. Then the defendant refused to permit the plaintiff from removing the personal property referred to in Exhibit "C". Without reciting the testimony, we observe that there was much testimony proving a breach by the defendant. Finding no reversible error in the record before us, the judgment is affirmed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, MR. JUSTICE ADAIR, THE HONORABLE NAT ALLEN, District Judge, sitting in place of MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY, and THE HONORABLE C.B. ELWELL, District Judge, sitting in place of MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN, concur.