Title: State v. Terry Thomas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP002665-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 18, 2000

2000 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Terry Thomas,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  228 Wis. 2d 508, 597 N.W.2d 733 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 18, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David Hansher 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Jeffrey W. Jensen and Law Offices of Jeffrey W. Jensen, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey W. Jensen. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 13 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2665-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Terry Thomas,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Terry Thomas1 seeks review of 
an unpublished court of appeals decision,2 which affirmed a 
circuit court's denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
 The circuit court found that a factual basis supporting 
Thomas's plea had been established, and therefore denied the 
plea withdrawal request.  The court of appeals affirmed, holding 
that Thomas had not demonstrated the "manifest injustice" 
required to withdraw his guilty plea.  Slip op. at 10.  We 
agree.  A factual basis supporting the plea was established, 
                     
1 Terry Thomas is also known as Terry Lovell Thomas, or 
Terry L. Thomas.  
2 State v. Thomas, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. April 13, 
1999).  
FILED 
 
FEB 18, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark, Acting 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
2 
because when the record is viewed under the totality of the 
circumstances, it is evident that Thomas assented to the facts 
as stated by the assistant district attorney.  Since a proper 
factual basis was established, the guilty plea does not result 
in manifest injustice.  
I. 
 
¶2 
In the evening of October 10, 1995, Terry Thomas 
(Thomas) was involved in an altercation concerning drugs.  A 
shoot-out ensued, and Tyrone Doss, a childhood friend, died.  
Ultimately, 
Thomas 
pled 
guilty 
to 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide while using a dangerous weapon, as a party to a crime. 
 Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06, 939.05, 939.63(1)(a)2 (1993-94).3  The 
circuit court, the Honorable David A. Hansher presiding, 
convicted Thomas on his guilty plea, and he was sentenced to a 
fifteen-year prison term.  After his conviction and sentencing, 
Thomas moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that a factual basis 
was not established to support it.   
 
¶3 
The facts leading to the guilty plea are as follows.  
According to Thomas's statement as set forth in the criminal 
complaint, he, Doss, and several other individuals met at Doss's 
house in Milwaukee to discuss a drug operation they were 
involved in.  A scuffle broke out during the discussion, and 
Doss mumbled something about "going to war."  (R. at 2:8.)  
                     
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1993-94 text unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
3 
Thomas and his friends then left and headed to Thomas's nearby 
residence. 
¶4 
A short time later, Thomas and his roommate "Shawn" 
walked back to Doss's house through an alley by the house.  At 
that same time, Larry Harris, Zorris (Doss's brother), and their 
friend Rob, drove into the alley.  Thomas was carrying an AK-47 
semiautomatic rifle.  Shawn carried a sawed-off, pistol-grip 
shotgun.  When Harris got out of the car, he and Thomas were 
facing each other across the alley.  Harris pulled a nine-
millimeter handgun from the front of his waistband and pointed 
it at Thomas.  Thomas then lifted his AK-47 and shot at Harris. 
 Harris started running through yards, while Thomas continued to 
shoot in his direction.  Thomas stated in the complaint that he 
shot at Harris to prevent Harris from shooting him.   
¶5 
The rifle, upon being fired, knocked Thomas to the 
ground.  When he stood up, he began to walk to his own 
residence, but saw Shawn standing in the alley firing his sawed-
off shotgun toward Doss's house.  Thomas turned back and started 
"shooting wildly" in the same direction from behind a bush.  (R. 
at 2:8.)  He claimed he could not see what he was shooting at, 
but kept firing to keep anyone from shooting back at Shawn or 
him.  Doss, who was standing outside his house, was shot in the 
chest.  He died a few hours later. 
¶6 
Thomas 
was 
charged 
with 
second 
degree 
reckless 
homicide while armed and habitual criminality, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06, 939.63(1)(a)2, and 939.62.  However, at 
the plea hearing the state amended the information orally to add 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
4 
"party to the crime" to the charge under Wis. Stat. § 939.05, 
and it dismissed the habitual criminality allegation.4  Thomas 
pled guilty to the charge.  The court then questioned Thomas 
directly.  The following exchange occurred: 
 
THE COURT:  The Court will accept the stipulation.  
Sir, you signed both guilty plea questionnaire, waiver 
of rights forms before for F-966162 [the homicide 
charge] and F-966044?  These two pieces of paper I'm 
holding in front of you? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.5 
(R. at 20:8.)  The court then inquired:   
 
THE 
COURT: 
 
Did 
you 
read 
both 
these 
criminal 
complaints and the informations in this case? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Or was it read to you?  Which one was it 
or both? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Both. 
 
                     
4 At the plea hearing, Thomas also entered a guilty plea to 
the charge of felon in possession of a firearm as a habitual 
criminal.  That charge was in connection with a separate case, 
and is not the subject of this appeal.  
5 The guilty plea questionnaire explicitly states that 
Thomas 
[has] read (or [has] had read to [him]) the criminal 
complaint and the information in this case, and I 
understand what I am charged with, what the penalties 
are and why I have been charged.  I also understand 
the elements of the offense and their relationship to 
the 
facts 
in 
this 
case 
and 
how 
the 
evidence 
establishes my guilt. 
 
(R. at 6.) 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
5 
THE COURT:  Both of them?  So it was both read to you 
and you read it yourself so you understand what you're 
charged 
with 
now 
with 
the 
amendment, 
what 
the 
penalties are, why you've been charged and the 
elements of the offense of first degree or second 
degree reckless homicide while armed with a dangerous 
weapon, party to a crime, and felon in possession of a 
firearm, habitual criminality.  Do you understand 
that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you also understand by pleading guilty 
you're giving up all possible defenses, including but 
not limited to self-defense, intoxication, insanity 
and alibi and your right to file motions by your 
attorney such as a motion challenging your -- any 
statements you made, a motion to suppress the physical 
evidence, a motion to suppress your identification 
among various other motions.  Do you understand that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you understand by pleading guilty to 
both 
charges 
you're 
giving 
up 
the 
following 
constitutional rights, your right to remain silent, 
your right to have your attorney cross-examine or ask 
questions of the State's witnesses, your right to have 
your own witnesses come to court to testify for you, 
your right to make the jury -- your right to a court 
trial, meaning to me, or a jury trial, and a jury 
trial is where 12 people listen to the evidence and 
all 12 have to agree you're guilty in order to find 
you guilty and your right to make the State prove the 
case against you beyond a reasonable doubt as to each 
element of these two charges.  Do you understand that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.   
(R. at 20:9-11.) 
Later, the court questioned the defendant again: 
 
THE COURT:  Do you have any questions you want to ask 
me about the pleas to either one of these charges, any 
questions? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  About the pleas? 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
6 
 
THE COURT:  Yes.  Just the pleas . . . .  
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I understand what you're saying, that 
they can be ran concurrent, I mean, consecutive or 
concurrent. 
 
THE COURT:  But . . . do you have any questions 
regarding anything else we've discussed? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
(R. at 20:13.)   
¶7 
The state then listed the elements that it would have 
to prove against Thomas, and Thomas agreed he understood them.  
The assistant district attorney attempted to establish a factual 
basis for the plea by reading the factual allegations from the 
criminal complaint.  The complaint consists of ten pages of 
statements from various witnesses.  The court asked if there was 
some way to speed up the process.  The state and the defense 
counsel proceeded to come to an understanding as to which parts 
of the criminal complaint they could stipulate to as a factual 
basis for the plea.6  Finally, the court asked: 
 
THE COURT:  So, you'll stipulate to [the above-stated 
facts] as a basis for the plea? 
 
MR. SCHNAKE (Defense Counsel):  Yes. 
 
                     
6 During this discussion, the defense counsel disputed the 
following minor points:  1) whether there were two entry wounds 
from bullets on the victim's body; (R. at 20:25) 2) an 
explicative that Thomas allegedly stated to Larry Harris; (R. at 
20:27) and 3) the statements of Angela Rollins, a witness who 
was at the scene of the crime.  (R. at 20:28.)  The discussion 
regarding disputed points immediately preceded the court's 
question to Thomas as to whether Thomas disputed anything.  (R. 
at 20:25-29.)    
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
7 
MR. MOLITOR (Assistant District Attorney):  Just like 
something stated by the defendant he also agrees with 
those facts. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you dispute anything that has just been 
said, sir? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Yes.  He stipulates.  They both stipulate. 
 
MR. MOLITOR:  Okay, and you read that complaint and 
you understood – 
 
THE COURT:  I went through that with him. 
 
MR. MOLITOR:  Okay.  He said he read them.  He didn't 
say he understood them. 
 
THE COURT:  Of course he understood them.  I asked if 
you read the complaints and that if he understood 
them.  Are you willing to stipulate? 
 
MR. MOLITOR:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Hallelujah.  The Court will find there's a 
basis for the plea.  Was there a preliminary hearing? 
 
MR. SCHNAKE:  There was a waiver hearing. 
 
MR. MOLITOR:  No. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  The Court will find there's a basis 
for the plea.  The Court will find the plea to be 
freely, voluntarily and intelligently made.  I think I 
said that.  I lost track here already. 
 
MR. SCHNAKE:  Yes.  I believe it to be freely and 
intelligently waived.  Mr. Thomas and I have met and 
discussed this, I believe, for an excess of six hours, 
specifically as to the plea. 
(R. at 20:29-30.)   
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
8 
¶8 
At the sentencing, the assistant district attorney 
wanted to clarify that Thomas agreed with the defense counsel's 
stipulation to the facts at the plea hearing.   
 
MOLITOR:  . . . Mr. Thomas –- Mr. Schnake correctly 
summarized the stipulation of facts that you agreed to 
last time in the guilty plea last time, is that 
correct? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Huh? 
 
THE COURT:  Are you talking to Mr. Schnake or the 
defendant? 
 
MR. MOLITOR:  I'm talking to the defendant. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
(R. at 21:2-3.)   
¶9 
Thomas was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the 
reckless homicide charge.  After the conviction, Thomas moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea as to that charge.  He argued that the 
plea must be withdrawn because a factual basis had not been 
established to support the plea, and that he had a meritorious 
defense.  The circuit court denied the motion because it found 
Thomas did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
manifest injustice would occur if he could not withdraw his 
plea.  The plea would not result in manifest injustice, the 
court 
determined, 
because 
Thomas 
did 
not 
state 
what 
he 
specifically disputed during the plea hearing.  As to the 
meritorious defense, the court found that Thomas's actions did 
not meet the criteria required to sustain a privilege of self-
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
9 
defense and defense of others, according to Wis. Stat. § 939.48. 
Finally, the court found that the guilty plea was entered 
intelligently.    
¶10 Thomas appealed.  The only issue on appeal was whether 
a factual basis to support the plea had been established.  
Thomas again argued that a manifest injustice would occur if his 
plea were not withdrawn because he disputed the factual basis 
for the plea.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision, holding that Thomas had not demonstrated the required 
"manifest injustice."  Slip op. at 10.  The court of appeals 
relied on State v. Washington, 176 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 500 N.W.2d 
331 (Ct. App. 1993), which states that after a sentence has been 
imposed, a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea must 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the withdrawal 
will correct a "manifest injustice."  Slip op. at 5. 
¶11 The court of appeals held that Thomas had not shown by 
clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would 
result if his guilty plea were not withdrawn because a proper 
factual basis was established in support of the plea.  Slip op. 
at 10.  The court stated that under Wisconsin law, a circuit 
court can accept a guilty plea even if a defendant does not 
agree to the proffered factual basis.  Slip op. at 7 (citing 
State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995)).  
Moreover, 
the 
court 
noted 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08 
is 
Wisconsin's counterpart to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, which does not 
require a defendant to personally admit to the factual basis.  
Slip op. at 9 (citing Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 857-58).   
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
10
¶12 Judge Charles Schudson dissented.  The dissent argued 
that Thomas did not stipulate to the factual basis offered by 
the state at either the plea hearing, or at sentencing.  Slip 
op. at 11 (Schudson, J., dissenting).  In the dissent's opinion, 
Thomas's affirmative response to the circuit court's question, 
"[d]o you dispute anything that has just been said, sir?" 
demonstrates that Thomas did not agree to a factual basis.  Slip 
op. at 12.  Because the plea lacked a factual basis, the dissent 
concluded that a manifest injustice occurred when the motion to 
withdraw the plea was not granted.  Slip op. at 15 (citing State 
v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 25, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996)). 
 
II. 
¶13 In this case, we review the circuit court's denial of 
Thomas's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  A court's decision 
to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea is a matter of discretion, 
subject to the erroneous exercise of discretion standard on 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
11
review.7  State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 635, 
579 N.W.2d 698 (1998) (citations omitted) (relating to the entry 
of an Alford plea).   
¶14  For a circuit court to accept a guilty plea, there 
must be an affirmative showing or "allegation and evidence" that 
a plea is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.  State 
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) (quoting 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 1969)).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(b) sets forth an additional requirement that a 
circuit court must "[m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged."  This "factual 
basis" 
requirement 
is 
distinct 
from 
the 
above-stated 
"voluntariness" requirement for guilty pleas.  White v. State, 
85 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978).  The factual basis 
requirement "protect[s] a defendant who is in the position of 
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the 
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually 
                     
7 We also note that a court's decision to accept a guilty 
plea involves findings of fact.  This court does not disturb a 
circuit court's factual findings, unless the findings are 
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  State v. Bagnall, 61 Wis. 2d 297, 310, 212 N.W.2d 122 
(1973) (applying the great weight and clear preponderance 
standard to a circuit court's determination of the factual basis 
for a guilty plea).  See also Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) (applying 
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) to criminal proceedings).  According to 
§ 972.11(1), we may only overturn a circuit court's findings if 
the findings are clearly erroneous.  The "clearly erroneous" and 
"great 
weight 
and 
clear 
preponderance" 
standards 
are 
interchangeable because they are essentially the same test.  See 
State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 250 n.6, 557 N.W.2d 245 
(1996).    
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
12
fall within the charge."  Id. (quoting McCarthy v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969)).  See also Ernst v. State, 43 
Wis. 2d 661, 673, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 260. 
¶15 When a defendant later seeks to withdraw a guilty 
plea, two standards apply, depending on when the defendant moves 
to withdraw.  If a defendant moves to withdraw the plea before 
sentencing, a circuit court should permit the withdrawal for 
"any fair and just reason."  State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 
861, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  The defendant must prove that a 
fair and just reason exists by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 Id. at 862.    
¶16 If a defendant moves to withdraw the plea after 
sentencing, 
the 
defendant 
"carries 
the 
heavy 
burden 
of 
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the trial 
court should permit the defendant to withdraw the plea to 
correct a 'manifest injustice.'"  Washington, 176 Wis. 2d at 
213.  See also Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d at 635.  The higher standard 
of proof is used after sentencing, because once the guilty plea 
is finalized, the presumption of innocence no longer exists.  
Id. (quoting State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 103, 325 N.W.2d 
687 (1982)).  "'Once the defendant waives his [or her] 
constitutional rights and enters a guilty plea, the state's 
interest in finality of convictions requires a high standard of 
proof to disturb that plea.'"  Id. (quoting Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 
at 103).  The "manifest injustice" test requires a defendant to 
show "a serious flaw in the fundamental integrity of the plea." 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
13
State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379, 534 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (citing Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128, 208 
N.W.2d 331, 335 (1973)).     
¶17 When this court originally adopted the "manifest 
injustice test" in State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 385-86, 151 
N.W.2d 9 (1967), we looked to the American Bar Association's 
tentative draft of sec. 14-2.1, the plea withdrawal standard 
included in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.  Washington, 
176 Wis. 2d at 213.  That provision set forth six examples of 
situations that might later result in "manifest injustice" if a 
plea is not withdrawn.  Id. (citing ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice sec. 14-2.1(b)(ii)(A)-(F)).  One of those situations is 
when a "defendant d[oes] not personally enter or ratify a plea." 
 Id. at n.2.  This court has also stated that it is one of a 
circuit court's duties to determine "[t]hat the conduct which 
the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the 
indictment or information or an offense included therein to 
which the defendant has pleaded guilty."  White, 85 Wis. 2d at 
488 (quoting Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 
(1969)).  Therefore, if a circuit court fails to establish a 
factual basis that the defendant admits constitutes the offense 
pleaded to, manifest injustice has occurred.  Id. (citing 
Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 231 N.W.2d 31 (1973)).    
 
¶18 This case requires us to determine to what extent a 
defendant must admit the facts of a crime charged in order to 
accept the factual basis underlying a guilty plea.  We hold that 
a defendant does not need to admit to the factual basis in his 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
14
or her own words; the defense counsel's statements suffice.  We 
also hold that a court may look at the totality of the 
circumstances when reviewing a defendant's motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea to determine whether a defendant has agreed to the 
factual basis underlying the guilty plea.8  The totality of the 
circumstances includes the plea hearing record, the sentencing 
hearing record, as well the defense counsel's statements 
concerning the factual basis presented by the state, among other 
portions of the record. 
 
¶19 We find support in Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure for our conclusion that a defendant need not 
personally articulate his or her agreement with the factual 
basis presented.  The factual basis requirement in Wisconsin is 
based on Rule 11(f).9  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 258.  Rule 11(f) 
states:  "Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, 
the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without 
making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual 
basis for the plea."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f).  In Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1969), the United States Supreme 
Court made Rule 11 applicable to state courts.  This court 
                     
8 We do not address Thomas's second argument that a circuit 
court "is not permitted to make 'findings of fact' which are 
contrary to the plain meaning of the words in the transcript."  
(Pet. Br. at 12.)  Our holding that a court may look at the 
totality of the circumstances when reviewing a defendant's 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea subsumes this argument.  
9 Rule 11 governs the procedure for accepting pleas in the 
federal courts.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.  
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
15
adopted Rule 11(f) in Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d at 673-74.  We stated 
that to comply with Rule 11(f), a judge must "personally 
determine 
'that 
the 
conduct 
which 
the 
defendant 
admits 
constitutes the offense charged . . . .'"  Ernst v. State, 43 
Wis. 2d at 674 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Rules, 18 USCA, p. 558).   
¶20 It is significant that both the federal rule and the 
Wisconsin adaptation speak in terms of a judge's determination 
that a factual basis exists.  Neither the rule nor the case law 
interpreting the rule requires a defendant to personally 
articulate the specific facts that constitute the elements of 
the crime charged.  The federal courts have long held that a 
judge does not have to "engage in a colloquy with the defendant 
to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea."  United States 
v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1991).  All that is 
required is for the factual basis to be developed on the 
recordseveral sources can supply the facts.  See Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); United States v. King, 604 
F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that Rule 11(f) was not 
violated, even though the district court did not directly 
question the defendant as to the factual basis for the plea).  
See also Davis v. United States, 470 F.2d 1128, 1129 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (stating that "it is not necessary that the defendant 
personally be asked any questions" to establish the factual 
basis).   
¶21 Nowhere in our case law interpreting Rule 11(f) do we 
require a judge to make a factual basis determination in one 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
16
particular manner.  In Ernst, this court stated that a judge 
must question a defendant to ascertain that "'the defendant 
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts.'"  43 Wis. 2d at 673 (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466). 
 That statement acknowledges that a judge must establish the 
factual basis on the record, but it does not dictate how a judge 
must do this.  While a judge must ensure that a defendant 
realizes that his or her conduct does meet the elements of the 
crime charged, see McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467, he or she may 
accomplish this goal through means other than requiring a 
defendant to articulate personally agreement with the factual 
basis presented.  A factual basis may also be established 
through witnesses' testimony, or a prosecutor reading police 
reports or statements of evidence.  White, 85 Wis. 2d at 490 
(citations omitted).  Finally, a factual basis is established 
when counsel stipulate on the record to facts in the criminal 
complaint.     
¶22 Similarly, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(b), 
Wisconsin's 
codification of Rule 11(f), does not specifically require a 
defendant to articulate personally the factual basis presented. 
 Section 971.08 states that a court must "[m]ake such inquiry as 
satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime 
charged."  The phrase, "such inquiry," indicates that a judge 
may establish the factual basis as he or she sees fit, as long 
as the judge guarantees that the defendant is aware of the 
elements of the crime, and the defendant's conduct meets those 
elements.     
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
17
¶23 On a motion to withdraw, a court may look at the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant 
has accepted the factual basis presented underlying the guilty 
plea.  White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491 (stating that when a court 
undertakes a review for manifest injustice, it "may consider the 
whole record since the issue is no longer whether the guilty 
plea should have been accepted, but rather whether there was an 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to 
withdraw.")  Moreover, we have previously permitted a court 
reviewing the voluntariness requirement to make such an inquiry 
within the totality of the circumstances, and in particular, to 
review the record of the postconviction hearing.  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 251.  It makes sense for a court to view the record 
in its totality when a judge's initial inquiry into the factual 
basis may be satisfied by multiple sources spanning the entirety 
of the record. 
¶24 A review of the entire record may include a sentencing 
hearing record and a defense counsel's statements concerning the 
factual basis.  See id. (permitting facts from the preliminary 
hearing and motion hearing to be evaluated in considering the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea).  We have also analyzed 
specific transcript statements in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances evident in the record.  See Wilson v. State, 57 
Wis. 2d 508, 510, 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973) (stating that a circuit 
court's pronouncement of "guilty" constituted several findings 
under the circumstances preceding and after the pronouncement). 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
18
¶25 We turn now to the facts of this case.  We conclude 
that the circuit court followed the proper procedure for 
accepting a guilty plea, and that a factual basis for the plea 
was established.  At the plea hearing, Thomas agreed that he 
understood the elements of the crime charged.  The state and the 
defense counsel then stipulated to the factual basis.  The court 
asked the defense counsel if he would stipulate to the facts as 
the assistant district attorney read them from the complaint, 
and as the defense counsel and assistant district attorney had 
just discussed.  The defense counsel responded, "[y]es."   
¶26 The only confusion results from the court's question, 
"[d]o you dispute anything that has just been said, sir?" and 
Thomas's answer in the affirmative.  However, viewing this 
question and response within the totality of the circumstances, 
Thomas's answer becomes clear.  Just before the court asked 
Thomas if he disputed anything, both the defense counsel and 
assistant district attorney discussed what small points Thomas 
disputed from the record.  None of those facts imputed the 
elements of the crime.  The court could reasonably assume that 
the question and answer both reflected the defense counsel and 
assistant 
district 
attorney's 
recent 
discussion 
of 
these 
disputed points.  Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing, Thomas 
clarified that he agreed with the stipulation of facts as stated 
at the plea hearing. 
 
III. 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
19
 
¶27 We conclude, as the court of appeals did, that Thomas 
has not demonstrated the "manifest injustice" required to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  A factual basis supporting the plea 
was established, because when the record is viewed under the 
totality of the circumstances, it is evident that Thomas 
assented to the facts as his counsel stipulated to them.  Since 
a proper factual basis was established, the guilty plea does not 
result in manifest injustice.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
  
 
No. 
97-2665-CR 
 
 
1