Title: Bon Harbor, LLC and Michael F. Hinds v. United Bank
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070902
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2009

REL: 04/10/09
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070902
_________________________
Bon Harbor, LLC, and Michael F. Hinds
v.
United Bank
_________________________
1070994
_________________________
Bon Harbor, LLC, and Michael F. Hinds
v.
United Bank
Appeals from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-07-240)
WOODALL, Justice.
1070902; 1070994
2
Bon Harbor, LLC, and Michael F. Hinds appeal from two
orders entered against them in an action commenced by United
Bank ("the Bank").  We dismiss their appeals.
The underlying dispute arose following a series of
transactions by which Bon Harbor received money from the Bank
that Bon Harbor used to purchase certain real estate in
Baldwin County.  During these transactions, Hinds, one of Bon
Harbor's general managers, executed several continuing-
guaranty 
agreements 
by 
which 
he 
assumed 
certain
responsibilities for Bon Harbor's indebtedness to the Bank.
The details of these transactions and documents are not
relevant to our decision.
On April 5, 2007, the Bank sued Bon Harbor and Hinds, as
well as three other alleged guarantors of Bon Harbor's
indebtedness to the Bank.  The complaint alleged that Bon
Harbor and Hinds had breached a promissory note and a
guaranty, respectively.  After Bon Harbor and Hinds answered
the complaint, the Bank amended the complaint to assert claims
seeking relief under multiple theories and to request, among
other things, a declaration that the note and guaranty were
valid and enforceable.
1070902; 1070994
3
On July 13, 2007, Bon Harbor and Hinds answered the
amended complaint and filed a counterclaim against the Bank
and three of its employees -- Frank Meigs, Jamie Lipham, and
Russell Banks.  The counterclaim alleged that the Bank and its
employees were guilty of breach of duty, fraud, and fraudulent
suppression and demanded damages related to those claims.
Further, the counterclaim sought a judgment declaring the
Bank's rights, if any, under the various transactional
documents.  The Bank and its employees answered the
counterclaim, denying any liability.
On January 4, 2008, the Bank filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  Although its employees were identified as movants,
the motion never mentioned the counterclaim or the causes of
action alleged in it.  Instead, the motion argued only that
Bon Harbor and the guarantors, including Hinds, were
contractually liable to the Bank as a matter of law.  Thus,
the motion can only be construed as a motion for a partial
summary judgment.
On March 20, 2008, the trial court granted the summary-
judgment motion, giving no explanation.  On that same day, Bon
Harbor and Hinds filed their first notice of appeal to this
Court.  The appeal was docketed as case no. 1070902.
1070902; 1070994
4
On March 25, 2008, the trial court purported to enter a
second order granting the Bank's motion for a summary
judgment.  This order was more detailed than the March 20
order and, among other things, purported to enter a summary
judgment for the Bank and its employees on the counterclaim.
On April 11, 2008, Bon Harbor and Hinds filed a second notice
of appeal to this Court.  The appeal was docketed as case no.
1070994.
The 
parties 
do 
not 
question 
the 
subject-matter
jurisdiction of this Court.  However, we "are not confined to
the 
arguments 
of 
the 
parties 
in 
our 
subject-matter-
jurisdiction analysis because subject-matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived by the failure to argue it as an issue."
Riley v. Hughes, [Ms. 1080006, February 6, 2009]     So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. 2009).  It is clear that this Court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction over either appeal filed by
Bon Harbor and Hinds.
"The general rule is that a trial court's order is not
final [for purposes of appeal] unless it disposes of all
claims as to all parties."  Dickerson v. Alabama State Univ.,
852 So. 2d 704, 705 (Ala. 2002). 
1070902; 1070994
5
"The one exception is that where the court has
completely disposed of one of a number of claims, or
one of multiple parties, and has made an express
determination that there is no just reason for
delay, the court may direct the entry of judgment on
that claim or as to that party." 
Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 54(b), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  Consequently, standing alone, "[a] partial summary
judgment is not a final, appealable judgment."  Baugus v. City
of Florence, 968 So. 2d 529, 533 (Ala. 2007).
As previously discussed in this opinion, the trial
court's bare-bones order of March 20, 2008, granted what can
only be construed as a motion for a partial summary judgment.
That order left pending, at the very least, Bon Harbor and
Hinds's counterclaim, which was not mentioned, much less
challenged, 
in 
the 
Bank's 
summary-judgment 
motion.
Consequently, their appeal in case no. 1070902 must be
dismissed, because it is not supported by a final, appealable
judgment.
While Bon Harbor and Hinds's appeal from the March 20
order was pending in this Court, the trial court purported to
enter another order granting the Bank's summary-judgment
motion, specifically including the counterclaim within the
scope of its ruling.  However, the trial court was without
1070902; 1070994
6
jurisdiction to enter the order, and, thus, the order is void.
"Jurisdiction of a case can be in only one court at a time."
Reynolds v. Colonial Bank, 874 So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003).
Consequently, after an appeal is taken, the trial court "can
do nothing in respect to any matter or question which is
involved in the appeal, and which may be adjudged by the
appellate court."  Foster v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d
605, 608 (Ala. 1984)(overruled by Ex parte Andrews, 520 So. 2d
507 (Ala. 1987), to the extent Foster held that filing a
notice of appeal ousts the trial court of jurisdiction to
consider a timely filed postjudgment motion).  "Any action
taken by a trial court without subject-matter jurisdiction is
void."  Riley,    So. 3d at __.  Finally, of course, "a void
order or judgment will not support an appeal."  Gallagher
Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 991 So. 2d 697, 701 (Ala.
2008).  For these reasons, Bon Harbor and Hinds's appeal in
case no. 1070994 must also be dismissed.
1070902 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
1070994 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and Smith, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.