Title: White v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 271, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GEOBORIS WHITE 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant-Below-  
 
§ 
No. 271, 2003 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior  
V. 
§ 
Court, of the State of 
§ 
Delaware, in and for 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID 02-050788  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
 
 
§ 
through -0792 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Date Submitted: 
November 12, 2003 
 
 
          Date Decided:        December 24, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, STEELE, and JACOBS, Justices 
 
ORDER 
 
This 24th day of December 2003, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant below-appellant, Geoboris White, appeals from a 
judgment of conviction by a Superior Court jury of Trafficking in Cocaine 5 
to 50 grams (under 16 Del. C. § 4753A); Possession of Cocaine with Intent 
to Deliver A Controlled Substance (under 16 Del. C. § 4751); and 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree (under 11 Del. C. § 512). White also 
appeals from the denial by the trial court of his motion for judgment of 
acquittal or a new trial.  We find no merit to the appeal and, accordingly, 
affirm. 
 
2
 
(2) 
The underlying facts are as follows:  on April 23, 2002, the City 
of Wilmington Police received a tip from a confidential informant about a 
planned drug sale. The information supplied by the informant included a 
description of the car the sellers were expected to be driving—i.e., a green 
Cadillac.  Because the informant was not available to testify, the jury was 
not told of the informant’s involvement or that the police had been waiting 
for the informant to arrive.  The police (who wore plain clothes and drove an 
undercover vehicle) followed the green Cadillac to the Boston Market on 
Pennsylvania Avenue, where the driver of the Cadillac appeared nervous 
since he was continually moving the car from parking space to parking 
space.  An unmarked police car with uniformed police officers then pulled 
into the parking lot, at which point the green Cadillac fled without stopping 
for traffic.  The Cadillac sped west on Pennsylvania Avenue, weaving in and 
out of traffic.  The undercover vehicle, the unmarked police car and an 
undercover police “take down” van were in hot pursuit along Pennsylvania 
Avenue.  The Cadillac ran three red lights in heavy traffic at a high rate of 
speed before making a left turn onto Union Street.   
(3)  
Just after the Cadillac made the turn, the officers in the 
undercover vehicle and the van saw a package emerge from the driver’s side 
of the vehicle, hit the pavement, and pop open in a large puff of white 
 
3
powder.  Three officers who testified at the trial could not identify if the 
package came from the front or the rear window.  A fourth officer testified 
that he “believe[d] it came from the front of the vehicle.”  Although a 
significant amount of powder on the roadway was not recovered and was 
washed away by the police, the Medical Examiner’s office later determined 
that the officers had recovered 66.92 grams of cocaine. 
(4) 
The Cadillac continued at a high rate of speed along Union 
Street until it collided with three other vehicles while running a red light at 
Fourth Street.  The police van was within 2 blocks of the Cadillac when the 
crash occurred.  The officers rendered aid to the occupants, but the 
defendant, who was in the back seat, became combative and fought with the 
police until he was subdued and taken by ambulance to the hospital. 
(5) 
The driver of the Cadillac, Michael Hackett, pled guilty to 
Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine.  The front seat passenger, 
Richard O’Neil, pled guilty to Possession of Cocaine and Conspiracy in the 
Second Degree.  After Hackett pled guilty and was sentenced, he testified at 
White’s trial that he (Hackett) had asked to borrow the Cadillac from 
White’s aunt so that he could “kill two birds with one stone”—by making 
the drug delivery and buying White’s aunt something to eat from Burger 
King, in the same trip.  Hackett also testified that unbeknownst to White, he 
 
4
(Hackett) had the cocaine in his pocket, and that he (Hackett) threw the 
cocaine out the window without White’s assistance.   
(6) 
As earlier noted, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury found 
White guilty of Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver a 
Controlled Substance, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  Thereafter, 
White moved for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
The Superior Court denied that motion.  White appeals on two grounds, 
namely, that (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict, and (2) the 
prosecutor made “improper and unruly prejudicial statements” that deprived 
White of a fair trial. 
(7) 
On appeal from the denial of a judgment of acquittal, this Court 
makes a de novo determination of  “whether any rational trier of fact, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find [the] 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”1  To establish Trafficking in 
Cocaine, the State must prove that White knowingly had actual or 
constructive possession of cocaine in the amount of 5 grams or more.2  To 
establish Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, the State must prove 
that White had actual or constructive possession of cocaine with intent to 
                                                 
1 Davis v. State, 706 A.2d 523, 525 (Del. 1988). 
2 See 16 Del. C. § 4753A. 
 
5
deliver it.3  White claims that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to 
convict him of either crime.4  The primary issue is whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support a jury finding that White had “constructive possession” 
of the cocaine.  To establish constructive possession, the evidence must be 
sufficient to establish that White had dominion, control, and authority over 
the drugs.5  The possession of drugs by a passenger in an automobile 
requires more than proximity to, or awareness of, the drug in the car. On the 
other hand, “[d]ominion and control [are] presumed where the defendant is a 
custodian of the vehicle.” 6 
(8) 
Although contested, the evidence was sufficient to enable the 
jury to conclude that White was a custodian of the Cadillac, even though 
Hackett was the driver.  The evidence included (i) a receipt showing that 
seven weeks before the crime, White had spent $1,130 to install stereo 
equipment in the Cadillac; (ii) White’s girlfriend retrieved personal 
belongings from the Cadillac before it was towed after the crash; and (iii) the 
vehicle was registered to White’s aunt.  Moreover, White’s combative 
behavior with the police after the crash strengthens the inference that White 
                                                 
3 See 16 Del. C. § 4751(a). 
4 White has not addressed the elements of Conspiracy.  Accordingly, any challenge to his 
conviction for that crime is deemed abandoned. 
5 McNulty v. State, 655 A.2d 1214, 1217 (Del. 1995) (citing Holden v. State, 305 A.2d 
320, 321 (Del. 1973)). 
6 Holden v. State, 305 A.2d at 322. 
 
6
was in constructive possession of the cocaine.7  Confronted with sufficient 
evidence to establish White as custodian of the vehicle, the jury could have 
found (despite Hackett’s testimony tending to exculpate White) that White 
failed to rebut the presumption of domination and control over the drugs. 
(9) 
White argues that because evidence of quantity and possession, 
without more, is insufficient to establish intent to deliver drugs to a third 
person,8 the evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding of intent to 
deliver.  But, the testimony of the State’s trial expert established that the 
quantity and value of the cocaine was inconsistent with a claim of personal 
use, and that no paraphernalia consistent with purely personal use was 
found.  A reasonable jury, therefore, had a sufficient basis to conclude that 
the cocaine was intended for distribution.9 
(10) White’s second claim of error is that prosecutorial misconduct 
was committed during the State’s opening statement, its closing argument, 
and in testimony adduced by the State.  This Court’s review of the propriety 
                                                 
7 Earle v. United States, 612 A.2d 1258, 1265-66 (D.C. App. 1992) (quoted with approval 
in McNulty v. State, supra, 655 A.2d at 1217) (“If the accused is found near the drugs, 
this may establish a prima facie case of constructive possession, if there also is evidence 
linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of which possession is a part.”) 
8 Malloy v. State, 462 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Del. 1983). 
9 The jury was also instructed on accomplice liability under 11 Del. C. § 271, which 
pertinently states that a “person is guilty of an offense committed by another person 
when…[i]ntending to promote the commission of the offense the person…[a]ids, 
counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it…” 
Because the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that White committed the 
acts for which he was convicted, that evidence was also sufficient for the jury to find that 
White acted as an accomplice. 
 
7
of a prosecutor’s closing remarks is plenary.10  In conducting that review, the 
Court must consider (a) the closeness of the case, (b) the alleged error, (c) 
the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the alleged error, and (d) whether 
the prosecutor’s statements are repetitive errors that require reversal because 
they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.11 
(11) White first claims that the prosecutor, during his opening 
statement to the jury in which he referred to the green Cadillac speeding out 
of the Boston Market, improperly stated that it was “actually the car that 
they were looking for.”  Second, White claims that the prosecutor 
improperly caused the detective who had retrieved the cocaine from the 
street, to refer to the package that exploded on the pavement as “probably 
the evidence that we were looking for.”  These statements were prejudicial, 
White claims, for two reasons:  (a) all parties agree that testimony 
suggesting that the police were acting on information from a confidential 
informant was improper because the informant was unavailable to testify, 
and (b) the jury must have relied on these two improper statements as 
suggesting that the State had more evidence of White’s guilt than was 
presented to the jury, thereby misleading the jury to convict based on their 
speculation that the police had additional (albeit undisclosed) evidence. 
                                                 
10 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981).   
11 Hughes, supra; Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002). 
 
8
(12) Because White did not object to the first misstatement during 
trial, that statement will be reviewed for plain error.  To constitute plain 
error, the prosecutor’s misstatements, either individually or cumulatively, 
must have been “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize 
the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”12  White has made no 
reasoned effort to show that the first misstatement surmounts that high 
threshold. 
(12) White’s counsel did object to the second misstatement after the 
detective testified to it, and immediately moved for a mistrial.  The motion 
was denied, and the trial court warned the witness to limit his testimony. The 
trial court also stated its willingness to give a curative instruction to the jury, 
but the defendant elected not to request such an instruction because of the 
risk of highlighting the forbidden subject.  Because the trial judge took all 
necessary steps to mitigate the prejudice, the detective’s misstatement did 
not constitute reversible error. 
(13) Finally, White claims that two statements made during the 
prosecutor’s closing argument must be found to constitute reversible error.  
First, the prosecutor reviewed Hackett’s [the driver’s] criminal convictions, 
which included convictions for crimes of crimes of dishonesty. The 
                                                 
12 See Supr. Ct. Rule 8; Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 653 (Del. 2001). 
 
9
prosecutor then (appropriately) pointed out that Hackett had a history of not 
being truthful, but while making that comment, the prosecutor then 
(inappropriately) stated: 
So the defendant has a history of not being completely candid.  
The other thing that you have to look at is he didn’t say 
anything; he didn’t say word one until after he was convicted 
and sentenced.  He’s done.  The State can’t go back now and do 
something else. 
 
(14) White objected, and the trial court gave the following curative  
 
instruction: 
 
Members of the jury, I think [the prosecutor] misspoke when 
she spoke of the defendant.  Of course Michael Hackett is the 
witness who testified.  And, secondly, with respect to what can 
or cannot be done with respect to anyone who has pled guilty to 
years ago criminal charges [sic] that evidence and issue is not in 
front of you.  You should disregard completely anything said 
about that, nor should you speculate or consider that in any 
way. 
 
(15) Because that instruction quite properly identified the 
prosecutor’s misstatement and refocused the jury on the issues in the case, it 
adequately cured any prejudice resulting therefrom. 
(16) White also challenges the following statement made by the 
prosecutor during closing argument: 
So you can look at the evidence.  You can also look at the size 
of the cocaine in this particular instance and whether…it could 
be concealed or not concealed, and the other thing you have to 
look at is whether or not Michael Hackett would be able to 
drive and get that out of where ever he had it concealed on his 
 
10
person and he never really said and get that out the window 
without, you know, without some assurance from the defendant 
or Mr. O’Neil, and we knew it wasn’t Mr. O’Neil because he 
was on the other side of the car. 
 
(17) White claims that that statement was improper because it 
represented the prosecutor’s personal belief as to White’s guilt or innocence.  
We disagree.  A prosecutor is permitted to argue and explain all legitimate 
inferences of guilt that flow from the evidence.13  The quoted statements 
were logical inferences that flowed from the evidence presented, i.e., 
Hackett driving in a high-speed chase, and Hackett stating that the cocaine 
was in his pocket.  There is no suggestion that the statements represented the 
prosecutor’s personal belief.  Accordingly, this ground for appeal lacks merit 
as well. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACK B. JACOBS 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
13 Hughes v. State 437 A.2d at 567.