Title: State v. Couch
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122156
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: August 11, 2023

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 122,156 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL WAYNE COUCH, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, criminal 
defendants generally have the right to self-representation provided that they knowingly 
and intelligently forgo their right to counsel and that they are able and willing to abide by 
rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. 
 
2.  
 
To invoke the right to self-representation, a defendant must clearly and 
unequivocally express a desire to proceed pro se. If a defendant invokes the right after 
trial starts, the district court has discretion in deciding whether to grant the request. If 
invoked before trial, our court has described the right as "unqualified." But an unqualified 
right to self-representation does not mean the right is absolute. In fact, the unqualified 
right to self-representation rests on an implied presumption that the court will be able to 
achieve reasonable cooperation from the pro se defendant. The right to self-representation 
does not permit defendants to abuse the dignity of the courtroom or to disregard the 
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus, a district court may deny a pretrial 
request to proceed pro se based on defendant's serious and obstructionist misconduct. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3.  
 
To justify denial of a timely pretrial request to proceed pro se, a criminal 
defendant must have exhibited seriously disruptive behavior during pretrial proceedings, 
and that behavior must strongly indicate the defendant will continue to be disruptive in 
the courtroom. 
 
4. 
 
When a district court denies a defendant's request to proceed pro se based on the 
defendant's seriously disruptive behavior, we review the district court's decision using a 
bifurcated standard of review. We review the district court's fact-findings about the 
defendant's behavior for substantial competent evidence, and we review the district 
court's legal conclusion de novo. 
 
5.  
 
When the jury instructions define the essential elements of the offense more 
narrowly than the charging document, due process considerations require the reviewing 
court to measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the narrower statutory elements 
of the jury instructions, rather than the broader statutory elements charged in the 
complaint. 
 
6.  
 
In determining whether a lesser-included offense instruction is factually 
appropriate, the question is not whether the evidence is more likely to support a 
conviction for the greater offense. Instead, the question is whether the court would 
uphold a conviction for the lesser offense in the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence. 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed August 19, 2022. 
Appeal from Finney District Court; MICHAEL L. QUINT, judge. Oral argument held March 30, 2023. 
Opinion filed August 11, 2023. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court on the issues 
subject to review is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part 
and reversed in part on the issues subject to review, and the case is remanded with directions. 
 
Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Tamara S. Hicks, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Susan Lynn Hillier Richmeier, 
county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  Michael Wayne Couch broke into the home of H.D., threatened her 
with a knife, and then raped and sodomized her. The State charged Couch with several 
offenses, including aggravated battery, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated criminal 
sodomy, and rape. Dissatisfied with his appointed counsel, Couch filed a pretrial motion 
to represent himself, but the district court denied the motion based on his previous 
courtroom behaviors. Couch's case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Couch on 
all charges.  
 
Couch appealed his convictions and sentence to a panel of the Court of Appeals, 
raising several claims of error. The panel affirmed Couch's convictions. It also affirmed 
Couch's sentence, except for an attorney-fee assessment not relevant to this opinion. 
Couch now argues the panel erred in holding that:  (1) the district court properly denied 
his request to proceed pro se; (2) Couch's aggravated-kidnapping conviction is supported 
by sufficient evidence; (3) lesser-included-offense instructions for aggravated battery 
were not factually appropriate; and (4) cumulative error did not deprive him of a fair trial.  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
We agree with the judgment of the panel of the Court of Appeals, if not its 
rationale, on all but one of Couch's issues. As to Couch's pretrial motion to proceed pro 
se, we conclude that substantial competent evidence supports the district court's fact-
findings about Couch's disruptive pretrial behavior. And that behavior provided a lawful 
basis for the district court to deny Couch's request to represent himself at trial.  
 
But as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Couch's aggravated-
kidnapping conviction, we conclude the State did not present sufficient evidence to 
sustain that conviction. While the State charged Couch with kidnapping to "facilitate 
flight or the commission of any crime," the jury instructions more narrowly defined the 
crime by including only the specific intent to facilitate "commission of any crime" and 
eliminating the specific intent to "facilitate flight." See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5408(a)(2). 
Due process considerations require us to measure the sufficiency of the evidence against 
the theory of criminal liability reflected in the jury instructions. And while the record 
evidence may have supported an aggravated kidnapping with intent to facilitate flight, 
there is insufficient evidence to sustain an aggravated kidnapping with intent to facilitate 
any crime. In short, the evidence failed to show the crimes of rape or sodomy were 
facilitated by a confinement independent of the force used to carry out the sex crimes, as 
required under State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 214, 547 P.2d 720 (1976).  
 
As to Couch's instructional-error claim, we agree with Couch that the panel erred 
by holding that jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery 
were not factually appropriate. But we affirm the panel's judgment because the 
instructional error does not warrant reversal of Couch's aggravated-battery conviction.  
 
Finally, as to Couch's cumulative-error claim, even assuming the cumulative-error 
doctrine applies, the cumulative effect of the trial errors do not require reversal.  
 
 
5 
 
 
 
In sum, we reverse Couch's conviction for aggravated kidnapping and vacate his 
sentence for that conviction. We affirm Couch's remaining convictions and remand for 
resentencing under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6819(b)(5). 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
On the morning of December 18, 2018, H.D. traveled to Walmart. She returned 
home at about 10:50 a.m. She left the garage door open because she planned to be home 
for only a few minutes before leaving to meet a friend for lunch.  
 
 
While wrapping a gift for her friend at the dining room table, H.D. heard the 
access door connecting the garage to the kitchen open. As she went to shut the door, a 
stranger came through the door, pushed H.D. against the kitchen sink, and held a knife to 
her throat. As H.D. struggled with her assailant, she grabbed his knife trying to protect 
herself and cut her hands. H.D. fell to the ground screaming for help, but the assailant 
threatened to hurt her if she did not stop yelling. About that time, H.D. and the assailant 
noticed the cuts on H.D.'s hands. The assailant repeatedly said, "oh shit," and let H.D. 
wash her hands and wrap them in a towel. The assailant then grabbed H.D.'s right arm 
and began to lead her out of the kitchen. H.D. reached for her phone, but the assailant 
pushed the phone back onto the counter and told H.D. she would not need it. The 
assailant then took H.D. to the master bedroom.  
 
 
The assailant placed H.D. on the bed, unbuckled her belt, and pulled her pants and 
underwear off. The assailant demanded that H.D. kneel on the floor and ordered her to 
put his penis in her mouth, but he soon became frustrated when he could not maintain an 
erection. He ordered H.D. back onto the bed and penetrated her vagina with his fingers. 
The assailant threatened H.D. with a pocketknife, telling her he would hurt her if she 
"didn't finish the job." He then penetrated H.D.'s vagina with his penis. As he did so, he 
lifted his sweatshirt, and H.D. noticed he had three swastika tattoos on his right abdomen.  
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
Still unable to maintain an erection, the assailant became increasingly frustrated. 
He retrieved H.D.'s toothbrush from her bathroom and forcibly anally sodomized her 
with it. He then demanded H.D. come to the nearby hallway bathroom with him. In the 
bathroom, he put some lotion on her hands. He then ordered H.D. to follow him back to 
the bedroom and forced her to manipulate his penis. He again told her he would hurt her 
if she "didn't finish the job," and demanded that she put his penis in her mouth.  
 
 
Sometime during the attack, H.D. used her Apple Watch to contact her emergency 
contact, and her husband, parents, and sister began calling her. The assailant then tore off 
her Apple Watch and threw it on the ground.  
 
 
After the attack, the assailant told H.D. his name was Michael and H.D.'s husband 
had paid him to rape her. He wrapped H.D. in a comforter, pulled the charging cords for 
H.D.'s phone and Apple Watch from the wall, and used the cords to bind her hands and 
feet. He also left his knife so she could cut herself free but told her not to use it until he 
had left. After the assailant left, H.D. wriggled her arms out of the restraints and cut her 
legs free. She retrieved her phone from the kitchen and informed her husband she had 
been attacked. She then grabbed a gun, hid in the bedroom closet, and called 911.  
 
 
H.D. described her assailant as wearing a black stocking cap, a brown work jacket, 
and a gray sweatshirt with the words "Nova Scotia" on it. Law enforcement showed her 
several photo lineups, but she did not identify Couch, who was depicted in one of the 
photo arrays. She also told police that a bottle of lotion, a bottle of hand soap, and her 
toothbrush were missing from her home after the attack.  
 
 
The sexual assault nurse who examined H.D. reported that H.D. had injuries to her 
genitalia and rectum consistent with her reported history. H.D. had cuts on three of her  
 
7 
 
 
 
left fingers and two of her right fingers, all of which required sutures. She also had four 
superficial lacerations on her neck, ligature abrasions on both her wrists, and bruising on 
her right upper arm.  
 
 
Surveillance video collected by police showed that a white truck had followed 
H.D. home from Walmart on the day of the attack. Garden City police posted an image of 
the truck on social media and later received a tip that the truck was in an impound lot in 
Goodland, Kansas. Apparently, a few days after the attack, local police had encountered 
Couch in Goodland. They arrested Couch and impounded the white truck after learning it 
was stolen. At the time Couch was arrested, he was wearing a black stocking cap, a 
brown work jacket, and a gray sweatshirt with the words "Nova Scotia" on it. Booking 
photos also showed he had several swastika tattoos on his torso.  
 
 
During a search of the white truck, officers found a duffel bag containing a bottle 
of the same type of lotion used during H.D.'s attack and a bottle of hand soap. The lotion 
bottle found in the truck contained a mixture of DNA from at least two individuals, with 
a major DNA profile consistent with H.D. and a partial minor DNA profile consistent 
with Couch. Police also found a suitcase in the white truck with a pair of blue jeans 
inside. DNA testing of several blood stains on the jeans revealed DNA profiles consistent 
with H.D. and Couch.  
 
 
At trial, the State presented more DNA evidence tying Couch to the scene. A 
vaginal swab taken during H.D.'s sexual assault examination, a swab of a blood stain on 
the knife H.D. used to free herself, and a swab of the doorknob from the access door to 
the garage all contained a male DNA haplotype consistent with Couch. And a swab of a 
blood stain from the access door showed a major DNA profile consistent with Couch.  
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
H.D. also identified Couch as her assailant at trial. She said she had trouble 
picking him out of the photo lineups because she could not see his body or hear his voice, 
and she only wanted to identify him if she was "110 percent certain."  
 
 
Couch testified in his own defense. He said he drove to Liberal, Kansas, on the 
evening of December 17, 2018. There, he picked up a stranger, began drinking, and then 
passed out in his truck. He later woke up in Colby, Kansas, on the afternoon of December 
18 but could not remember how he had gotten there. He saw the stranger he had picked 
up standing outside wearing Couch's brown work jacket. Couch demanded his jacket 
back, and then drove to Goodland without the stranger. He was then arrested in Goodland  
for reasons unrelated to the attack on H.D. Couch admitted telling an investigating 
officer:  "Couldn't control myself and that's what happened. I cut the fucking dog shit out 
of her, blood everywhere."  
 
 
A jury convicted Couch of three counts of aggravated criminal sodomy and one 
count each of rape, aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, and aggravated kidnapping. 
The district court sentenced Couch to 1,306 months' imprisonment and ordered Couch to 
pay $3,962.84 in restitution, and $31,612.50 in BIDS attorney fees.  
 
 
Couch appealed, raising several issues related to his convictions and sentence. On 
appeal, the State conceded that the district court erred in imposing BIDS attorney fees, 
and the Court of Appeals vacated that order. State v. Couch, No. 122,156, 2022 WL 
3570874, at *10 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion). But the panel otherwise 
affirmed Couch's convictions, sentence, and restitution. 2022 WL 3570874, at *1. 
 
Couch petitioned for review, and we granted review of all issues raised in his 
petition. We heard oral argument in March 2023. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 60-
2101(b) (providing for Kansas Supreme Court review of Court of Appeals decisions). 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Couch raises four claims of error. First, he argues the district court violated his 
right to self-representation when it improperly denied his pretrial request to proceed pro 
se. Second, he argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping. Third, he argues the district court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery. Finally, he argues cumulative 
error deprived him of a fair trial. We address these issues in turn.  
 
I. 
The District Court Did Not Commit Structural Error by Denying Couch's Motion to 
Represent Himself 
 
 
For his first issue, Couch argues the panel erred by affirming the district court's 
denial of his pretrial request to proceed pro se. Couch contends his right to proceed pro se 
was "unqualified" because he timely asserted it before trial. And he argues the panel erred 
in affirming the district court's decision based on Couch's lack of decorum at pretrial 
proceedings. Couch claims these rulings deprived him of his right to self-representation 
—a structural error requiring reversal of all his convictions. See State v. Bunyard, 307 
Kan. 463, 471, 410 P.3d 902 (2018) (failure to honor the defendant's properly asserted 
right to self-representation is structural error). 
 
 
To resolve Couch's challenge, we first identify additional facts relevant to his 
pretrial motion. Then, we review the controlling legal framework governing a defendant's 
constitutional right to self-representation. Finally, we apply that framework by analyzing 
whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's fact-findings and 
whether those fact-findings support the court's legal conclusion. Ultimately, we affirm the 
panel's holding.  
 
 
10 
 
 
 
A. Additional Facts Relevant to Couch's Pretrial Motion 
 
 
A month before trial, Couch moved to represent himself. At a hearing on the 
motion, the district court provided Couch with an opportunity to argue his position. 
Couch explained he was "tired of lawyers" and said his appointed attorneys had accused 
him of committing the crimes. He then explained what he believed were the weaknesses 
in the State's case against him. He said he "ha[d] a lot of motions to put in, Your Honor." 
At one point, he said, "[F]or the prosecution to say that that is my DNA on that vagina 
swab, excuse me, but fuck you. And you too." And later he told the court, "The fucking 
dude's [perpetrator's] fingerprints are on the Goddamn cell phone. If you want to gag me, 
that's fine. But gag me after I say this. His fingerprints are on the Goddamn cell phone, 
which I'm putting a motion in to have that tested."  
 
 
Later in the hearing, when one of Couch's attorneys addressed the court, Couch 
told her, "Ma'am, if you continue I'll bite your fucking face off." The district court then 
inquired into Couch's education level. The court also asked if Couch had any legal 
training, to which he responded, "Illegal, that's it."  
 
 
The district court then denied Couch's request to proceed pro se: 
 
"I'm going to make the finding that you are not competent even in your own case to 
represent yourself for purposes of trial. The concern I have is that you have on numerous 
occasions in my presence spoke out at a time when other people were talking or trying to 
represent their position to the court. You have effectively threatened your own attorney 
here in today's hearing . . . Court is not going to grant your request for pro se 
representation. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
". . . And, to be honest, in every hearing that we've had, other than the waiver of 
the preliminary hearing, you have been disruptive of the proceedings and, frankly, you've 
been threatened with at least some form of contempt action on at least two occasions.  
 
 
"I would anticipate that if you cannot control your own actions, there is a very 
real possibility you'll be watching your trial from a camera and that you won't be allowed 
to be personally present. That may pose problems for your appeal or for your proper 
representation, but we will not have disruptive behavior in the courtroom, which seems to 
go with your—your approach to this particular case at least. So the attorneys will 
continue to act as your primary legal representative."  
 
 
The district court later filed a journal entry addressing several pretrial motions. In 
that journal entry, the court summarized its findings and conclusions on Couch's motion 
to proceed pro se, explaining: 
 
"Despite the defendant's experience in criminal cases, the defendant has shown lack of 
restraint and understanding the full scope of defenses that are available to him at his 
upcoming trial. He has, on at least three occasions given verbal out bursts when he 
disapproves of something that's been said or presented in court. On one particular 
occasion, the defendant specifically threatened his defense attorney with language to both 
threaten and disturb his attorney. Court finds defendant lacks both legal understanding 
and restraint to approach criminal jury trial in a professional manner. Defense counsel 
will be given exclusively, the right to cross examine State's witnesses and present 
evidence on behalf of the defense."  
 
 
On the first and second days of trial, Couch continued to engage in disruptive 
behavior. He used profanity, insulted the prosecutor, and claimed he would strangle 
someone if his restraints were removed. Couch renewed his request to represent himself 
on two more occasions, but the district court affirmed its earlier ruling on his motion. 
Eventually, the court ordered Couch's removal from the courtroom on the second day of  
 
12 
 
 
 
trial, and he was placed in a separate room where he could observe his trial via closed-
circuit television. Couch remained physically absent from the courtroom until the fourth 
day of trial when he testified in his own defense.  
 
B. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
 
 
Generally, we review questions related to the rights of assistance of counsel and 
the related right to self-representation de novo. Bunyard, 307 Kan. at 470. But in denying 
Couch's request, the district court made fact-findings about Couch's behavior during 
pretrial proceedings. Thus, we will apply a bifurcated standard of review, reviewing the 
district court's fact-findings for substantial competent evidence and the district court's 
legal conclusion de novo. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 62 Kan. App. 2d 802, 808, 522 P.3d 
355 (2022) (exercising unlimited review over questions related to right to counsel and 
self-representation but reviewing district court fact-findings related to waiver of counsel 
for substantial competent evidence); see also United States v. Tucker, 451 F.3d 1176, 
1180 (10th Cir. 2006) (in reviewing trial court's denial of request to proceed pro se, 
appellate court reviews factual findings for clear error and ultimate question of whether 
constitutional violation occurred de novo). 
 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
 
 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
While the Sixth Amendment does not expressly provide for the right to self-
representation, the United States Supreme Court has held that such a right is implied from 
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 821, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). And the Court has clarified that 
defendants have the right to conduct their own defense, "provided only that [defendant] 
knowingly and intelligently forgoes [the] right to counsel and that [defendant] is able and 
willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 
465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984). 
 
 
Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights also provides that "[i]n all 
prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person, or by 
counsel." And we have authority to interpret the Kansas Constitution independent of 
corresponding provisions of the United States Constitution. Comparing section 10 with 
the Sixth Amendment, the two provisions have obvious textual differences. And such 
textual differences may provide a basis for recognizing different constitutional guarantees 
under our state Constitution. See State v. Albano, 313 Kan. 638, 644, 487 P.3d 750 
(2021) (recognizing textual and structural differences between Sixth Amendment's jury 
trial right and section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights' jury trial right means 
the provisions may not provide the same protections in all cases); Hodes & Nauser, MDs 
v. Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 624-25, 638, 440 P.3d 461 (2019) (independently interpreting 
section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights in manner different from the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution based on textual differences). 
But we have not previously analyzed the text of section 10 to determine whether the 
scope of the right to self-representation is coextensive with or broader than the right as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  
 
 
Couch bases his constitutional challenge on both the Sixth Amendment and 
section 10. But his briefing does not use our established rules of constitutional 
interpretation to analyze whether the textual differences between section 10 and the Sixth 
 
14 
 
 
 
Amendment are legally significant. See State v. Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 759, 511 P.3d 883 
(2022) (Issues not adequately briefed are deemed waived and abandoned.). Further, both 
his petition for review and his briefing rely on federal caselaw interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment's right to self-representation and Kansas decisions applying this federal 
caselaw. Thus, we analyze Couch's alleged error under Sixth Amendment principles only.  
 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Couch's Motion to Proceed Pro Se 
Based on Couch's Disruptive Behavior 
 
To invoke the right to self-representation, a defendant must clearly and 
unequivocally express a desire to proceed pro se. State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782, 793, 127 
P.3d 307 (2006). Couch did just that by filing a pretrial motion requesting to represent 
himself. If defendant invokes the right after trial starts, the district court has discretion in 
deciding whether to grant the request for self-representation. State v. Cromwell, 253 Kan. 
495, 505, 856 P.2d 1299 (1993). If invoked before trial starts, our court has described the 
right to self-representation as "unqualified." 253 Kan. at 505.  
 
But an "unqualified" right to self-representation does not mean the right is 
absolute. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 
(2008) (right to self-representation is not absolute); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 
Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161, 120 S. Ct. 684, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000) 
(same). In fact, an unqualified right to self-representation "rests on an implied 
presumption that the court will be able to achieve reasonable cooperation" from the pro 
se defendant. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The 
right to self-representation "permits defendants neither 'to abuse the dignity of the 
courtroom' nor to disregard the 'relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.'" United 
States v. Taylor, 21 F.4th 94, 104 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46). 
Thus, a district court "may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately 
engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. And "a 
 
15 
 
 
 
defendant's conduct may prove obstreperous enough to justify denying his request [to 
proceed pro se] at the outset in some cases." Taylor, 21 F.4th at 104; see also Tucker, 451 
F.3d at 1180 ("To properly invoke the right to self-representation . . . the defendant 'must 
be "'able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol."'"); Davis v. 
Grant, 532 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[A] judge may use willingness and ability to 
abide by courtroom protocol as prerequisites for accepting a defendant's waiver of his 
right to counsel."). 
 
 
That said, behavior which merely tries the district court's patience is not enough to 
deny a defendant's request to proceed pro se. See Taylor, 21 F.4th at 104-05. Rather, to 
justify denial of a timely pretrial request to proceed pro se, the defendant must have 
exhibited seriously disruptive behavior during pretrial proceedings, and that behavior 
must strongly indicate the defendant will continue to be disruptive in the courtroom. See 
United States v. Smith, 830 F.3d 803, 810-11 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Flewitt, 
874 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1989); Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 340, 22 P.3d 1164 
(2001); People v. Battle, 200 A.D.3d 1712, 1715, 158 N.Y.S.3d 517 (2021), rev. denied 
38 N.Y.3d 1132 (2022). Such extreme behavior was exhibited by the defendant in United 
States v. Hausa, 922 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2019), when he hummed and screamed, and 
rambled incoherently; cursed at the judge and threatened to kill him; and repeatedly had 
to be removed from pretrial hearings. The Second Circuit held the defendant's conduct 
provided an independent basis for denying his pretrial request to proceed pro se. 922 F.3d 
at 136. 
 
 
In denying Couch's initial motion to proceed pro se, the district court mainly 
focused on Couch's disruptive behavior, finding Couch had regularly been disruptive at 
pretrial hearings and had threatened his attorney. The district court also reasoned that 
Couch lacked the legal understanding to represent himself. Couch focuses on this latter 
rationale, arguing it is not a valid basis for denying a pretrial request to proceed pro se.  
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Couch is correct that a "'defendant's "technical legal knowledge" is "not relevant" 
to the determination whether he is competent to waive his right to counsel'" and proceed 
pro se. State v. Burden, 311 Kan. 859, 865, 467 P.3d 495 (2020) (quoting Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 [1993]). And if the district 
court also considered Couch's motive or reasons underlying his request to proceed pro se, 
that would also be an invalid basis for denying a pretrial request to proceed pro se—a 
court may only consider that factor when ruling on a request made after trial has started. 
See Cromwell, 253 Kan. at 505. 
 
Even so, the heart of the district court's decision rested on Couch's disruptive 
pretrial behavior. Indeed, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court's denial of 
Couch's motion because "the true foundation for its denial was Couch's inability to 
restrain himself." Couch, 2022 WL 3570874, at *4. Because a defendant's seriously 
disruptive behavior is valid grounds for denying a motion to proceed pro se, we may still 
affirm the district court's decision despite its other comments about Couch's legal 
acumen. See United States v. Simpson, 845 F.3d 1039, 1051 (10th Cir. 2017) ("Our case 
law permits us to affirm the district court['s denial of motion to proceed pro se], 
notwithstanding the court's statements about a defendant's lack of preparedness, if the 
district court's decision appears to be justified by a valid reason."). 
 
Here, the record supports the district court's fact-findings about Couch's unruly 
pretrial conduct. For example, at Couch's first appearance, he was absent from the 
courtroom because he "refus[ed] to cooperate to come into court." Couch spoke out of 
turn at multiple pretrial hearings, used profanity, and often tried to argue about the 
strength of the State's case against him. The district court also warned Couch twice that 
he would be removed if he could not be quiet.  
 
As an illustration of Couch's conduct, the following exchange took place during a 
pretrial hearing on Couch's motion for DNA testing: 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
"THE COURT:  [Addressing defense counsel.] Do you know who would be 
testing it? Have you identified the scientist that— 
 
"Mr. Couch, you are probably being heard by your attorney, but I can't hear you, 
and that's okay. I don't need to hear you so long as you are passing the message. If you 
would like a tablet to write on to pass messages to her, that would probably be well for 
you and her both, if that would help you in any way. 
 
"[COUCH]:  I just—I want everything tested, Your Honor. I want everything 
tested. Anything that the victim says that he touched, I want it fingerprinted. I mean—
hey—no, no, enough! The victim says, hey, he touched my cell phone. 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Mr. Couch— 
 
"[COUCH]:  —but the detectives did not test that cell phone. They didn't even 
fingerprint it. What kind of a detective agency wouldn't even fingerprint a cell phone? I 
don't care about the DNA. Find the motherfucker— 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Mr. Couch— 
 
"[THE COURT]:  Okay. My question is, whether there is enough time between 
now and trial time for [DNA] test results to be validly taken."  
 
Later at that same hearing, the prosecutor offered some DNA reports into evidence 
only for evaluating the veracity of Couch's statements about the DNA test results. The 
following exchange took place: 
 
"[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . Mr. Couch caused me to pull these [reports] and I asked 
to admit them sooner than I would have other than— 
 
"[COUCH]:  Please, Your Honor, please look at those reports. 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
"[PROSECUTOR]:  —once I got through my argument. That's also part and 
parcel— 
 
"[COUCH]:  Oh, shit. 
 
"[PROSECUTOR]:  —with the arguments, though. May I approach judge? 
 
"[THE COURT]:  Yeah. 
 
"[COUCH]:  By all means, approach. 
 
"[THE COURT]:  Mr. Couch, I think you need to be quiet. If I need to, we can 
gag you. I don't want to do that, so please— 
 
"[COUCH]:  What the hell. 
 
"[THE COURT]:  —participate quietly or send messages to your attorney in 
written form. 
 
"[COUCH]:  Yes, sir."  
 
 
Couch was also recalcitrant when given a chance to argue in support of his motion 
to proceed pro se. He told the prosecutor, "Fuck you," and began cursing while 
discussing the State's failure to fingerprint H.D.'s cellphone. He also threatened to "bite 
[his counsel's] fucking face off."  
 
 
In its opening brief, the State also highlights some of Couch's behavior on the first 
and second day of trial. But by that point, the district court had denied Couch's motion. 
So we do not consider this behavior in determining whether the district court erred in 
denying Couch's initial request to proceed pro se. See United States v. Dougherty, 473  
 
19 
 
 
 
F.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("We begin by rejecting the Government's approach of 
using 'disruptive' incidents following the denial of the pro se motions as reasons to 
support that denial."). 
 
 
The district court's findings about Couch's pretrial misconduct are supported by 
substantial competent evidence. And these findings provide a lawful basis for the district 
court's ruling. Even if one were to argue that Couch's pretrial conduct was not as extreme 
as the defendant's conduct in Hausa, Couch's conduct still demonstrated that he was 
unwilling or unable to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom decorum. His continued 
interruptions after warnings from the court, his ongoing use of profanity, his combative 
attitude, and his threat to "bite [his attorney's] fucking face off" show that Couch had 
engaged in serious obstructionist misconduct. And these behaviors provided the district 
court with good cause to believe the disruptions would continue. See United States v. 
Atkins, 52 F.4th 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2022) (trial court properly denied defendant's pretrial 
request to proceed pro se when defendant interrupted and argued with the court; refused 
to provide responsive answers; insisted trial was not going to happened; and at least once 
was removed from the courtroom for unruly behavior); State v. Johnson, 328 S.W.3d 
385, 396-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (defendant's pretrial behavior provided sufficient 
grounds to deny his request to proceed pro se when defendant launched into diatribes 
against his lawyers and the State, refused to cooperate with order to provide fingerprints, 
and cursed at the district court judge).  
 
 
In sum, our review of the record confirms that substantial competent evidence 
supports the district court's findings about Couch's disruptive pretrial behavior. And that 
behavior was egregious enough to lawfully support the district court's decision to deny 
Couch's pretrial request to represent himself. Thus, the district court's ruling did not 
improperly deprive Couch of his right to self-representation, and we affirm the judgments 
of the district court and Court of Appeals on this issue.  
 
 
20 
 
 
 
II. The Evidence Does Not Support Couch's Conviction for Aggravated Kidnapping 
when Measured Against the Jury Instructions 
 
 
Next, Couch challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction 
for aggravated kidnapping under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5408(a)(2) and (b). He claims the 
State relied only on his act of grabbing H.D.'s arm and dragging her to the bedroom to 
support this conviction. And he argues this act is not separate and distinct from the 
underlying sex crimes, as required to support a conviction under our precedent in Buggs.  
 
 
To resolve Couch's second issue, we first identify the standard of review and 
consider whether the sufficiency of the evidence should be measured against the statutory 
elements of the offense, the elements as charged, or the elements described in the jury 
instructions. Through this analysis, we conclude that due-process considerations require 
us to measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the narrower statutory elements  
defined in the jury instructions. Finally, we examine the record evidence against this 
standard and conclude that it cannot support Couch's conviction for aggravated 
kidnapping with intent to facilitate the commission of a crime.  
 
A. Standard of Review and the Proper Measure for Examining the Sufficiency 
of the Evidence 
 
The standard for appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a defendant's conviction is well-established: 
 
"When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to 
support a conviction, an appellate court looks at all the evidence 'in a light most favorable 
to the State to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' A reviewing court 'generally will "not reweigh 
evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations."' 
[Citations omitted.]" State v. Harris, 310 Kan. 1026, 1030, 453 P.3d 1172 (2019). 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, appellate courts often look to the jury 
instructions to determine the elements of the offense that the State needed to prove. But 
when the jury instructions do not accurately recite the statutory elements of the crime or 
do not match the elements of the crime as charged, we have departed from this approach. 
For example, in State v. Fitzgerald, 308 Kan. 659, 423 P.3d 497 (2018), the charging 
document listed the statutory elements of aggravated criminal sodomy under one 
subsection of the relevant statute, but the jury was instructed on the statutory elements of 
that crime under a different subsection. And in that case, we measured sufficiency of the 
evidence against the statutory elements of the charged crime rather than the elements of 
the crime as described in the jury instructions. 308 Kan. at 666.  
 
 
Here, we are presented with a different type of variance—the elements in the jury 
instructions are narrower than those identified in the charging document. Couch was 
charged with aggravated kidnapping under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5408(a)(2) and (b). 
Kidnapping as defined in subsection (a)(2) is "the taking or confining of any person, 
accomplished by force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person . . . to 
facilitate flight or the commission of any crime." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(a)(2). 
Aggravated kidnapping requires the added element that bodily harm be inflicted on the 
victim. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408(b). 
 
The complaint, as amended before trial, accurately reflects these statutory 
elements by alleging Couch "did unlawfully and feloniously take or confine a person, to 
wit:  [H.D.], accomplished by force, threat or deception and with the intent to hold said 
person to facilitate flight or the commission of any crime, and with bodily harm being 
inflicted on [H.D.]."  
 
But the jury instructions identifying the elements of aggravated kidnapping 
defined the crime more narrowly than the complaint. At the State's request, the district 
court gave the following aggravated kidnapping instruction: 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
"1. The defendant confined [H.D.] by force. 
"2. The defendant did so with the intent to hold [H.D.] for the commission of any crime. 
"3. Bodily harm was inflicted upon [H.D.]. 
"4. This act occurred on or about the 18th day of December, 2018, in Finney County, 
Kansas." 
 
 
By including only "confining" and not "taking," the instruction eliminated one of 
the alternative means of committing kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping. See State v. 
Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 208, 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("taking or confining" are alternative 
means of committing kidnapping). By including only "by force," the instruction also 
eliminated the "by threat or deception" options within a means for committing aggravated 
kidnapping. 296 Kan. at 208 ("force, threat or deception" are options within a means). 
Finally, the instruction included only the option of "facilitate . . . the commission of any 
crime" and eliminated the "facilitat[ing] flight" option for committing aggravated 
kidnapping. 296 Kan. at 209 ("facilitate flight or the commission of any crime" are 
options within a means).  
 
 
Given the disparity between the complaint and the jury instructions, we must 
first decide which of the two offers the proper measure for assessing the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting Couch's aggravated-kidnapping conviction. Couch argues 
sufficiency of the evidence should be measured against the narrower jury instructions. 
But with no exposition, the Court of Appeals panel appears to have measured sufficiency 
of the evidence against the broader statutory elements of the charged offense. See Couch, 
2022 WL 3570874, at *4.  
 
The jury instructions did not omit any essential element of the statutory offense of 
aggravated kidnapping. But they did narrow the scope of the charged offense by 
eliminating alternative means and options within a means for committing aggravated  
 
23 
 
 
 
kidnapping that were in the charging document. In these circumstances, we hold that due 
process considerations require us to measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the 
elements in the jury instructions, rather than the elements in the charging document.  
 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, one of our primary objectives is to 
give effect to defendant's due process right to receive a jury finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt on each element of the offense of conviction. Musacchio v. United 
States, 577 U.S. 237, 243-44, 136 S. Ct. 709, 193 L. Ed. 2d 639 (2016). And here, the 
elements instruction for aggravated kidnapping permitted the jury to convict Couch only 
if he confined H.D. with the intent to facilitate commission of any crime. Because the 
jury was never instructed on any other methods of committing aggravated kidnapping, 
the jury could not have found Couch guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on those 
omitted methods. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 63 
L. Ed. 2d 348 (1980) ("[W]e cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory 
not presented to the jury."); see also People v. Johnson, 498 P.3d 157, 161 (Colo. App. 
2021) (recognizing sufficiency of evidence generally measured against statutory elements 
rather than jury instructions but measuring against instructions which listed only one 
method of committing crime because "we cannot decide a factual issue not presented to 
the jury"), aff'd on other grounds 524 P.3d 36 (Colo. 2023). In sum, we cannot uphold 
Couch's conviction for aggravated kidnapping based on a theory of criminal liability that 
was not included in the instructions to the jury.  
 
The State does not object to this analytical approach. In fact, at oral argument, the 
State agreed that the sufficiency of the evidence should be measured against the jury 
instructions given at Couch's trial. Thus, in conducting our review, we consider whether 
the State offered sufficient evidence to prove the elements of aggravated kidnapping as 
defined by the jury instructions. 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
B. The Evidence Does Not Support Couch's Conviction for Aggravated 
Kidnapping when Measured Against the Jury Instructions 
 
 
To sustain a conviction for aggravated kidnapping as defined by the jury 
instructions, the State needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Couch confined 
H.D. by force to facilitate the commission of any crime. During closing argument, the 
State argued Couch confined H.D. by grabbing her arm and dragging her to the bedroom 
and he did so with the intent to facilitate commission of the rape and sodomies. On 
appeal, Couch argues the act of grabbing H.D.'s arm and dragging her to the bedroom is 
not distinct enough from the sex crimes to support a conviction for aggravated 
kidnapping under this court's holding in Buggs. 
 
 
Buggs held that "a kidnapping statute is not reasonably intended to cover 
movements and confinements which are slight and 'merely incidental' to the commission 
of an underlying lesser crime." 219 Kan. at 215. There, defendant accosted the victim in a  
parking lot and forced her inside a store, where he raped and robbed her. The defendant 
challenged his aggravated-kidnapping conviction on appeal, arguing the movement and 
confinement of the victim were merely incidental to the rape and robbery.  
 
In analyzing the defendant's claim of error, Buggs interpreted the term "facilitate" 
in the Kansas kidnapping statute to mean "something more than just to make more 
convenient." 219 Kan. at 215. The court then identified a three-part test for determining 
whether a taking or confinement was distinct enough from the underlying crime to 
support a conviction for kidnapping: 
 
"[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of 
another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: 
 
"(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; 
 
"(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
"(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes 
the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of 
detection." 219 Kan. at 216. 
 
 
And to illustrate the application of this framework, Buggs explained: 
 
"A standstill robbery on the street is not a kidnapping; the forced removal of the victim to 
a dark alley for robbery is. The removal of a rape victim from room to room within a 
dwelling solely for the convenience and comfort of the rapist is not a kidnapping; the 
removal from a public place to a place of seclusion is. The forced direction of a store 
clerk to cross the store to open a cash register is not a kidnapping; locking him in a cooler 
to facilitate escape is. The list is not meant to be exhaustive, and may be subject to some 
qualification when actual cases arise; it nevertheless is illustrative of our holding." 219 
Kan. at 216. 
 
 
Buggs affirmed the defendant's kidnapping conviction, reasoning that moving the 
victim from the parking lot "where they were subject to public view" to the "relative 
seclusion of the inside of the store . . . substantially reduced the risk of detection not only 
of the robbery but of the rape." 219 Kan. at 216.  
 
 
Some may question our continued adherence to Buggs given more recent 
developments in our multiplicity jurisprudence. Nevertheless, for nearly a half-century, 
our appellate courts have consistently relied on Buggs to determine whether a taking or 
confinement to facilitate the commission of any crime can support a conviction for 
kidnapping apart from the underlying crime. Neither party has asked us to overrule 
Buggs. Nor have they provided an argument justifying a departure from the doctrine of 
stare decisis in this case. See State v. Clark, 313 Kan. 556, 565, 486 P.3d 591 (2021) 
(doctrine of stare decisis provides that points of law established by a court are generally 
followed by the same court and courts of lower rank in later cases in which the same 
legal issue is raised). And we have previously declined to reconsider precedent under 
 
26 
 
 
 
similar circumstances. See Nguyen v. State, 309 Kan. 96, 108-09, 431 P.3d 862 (2018) 
(declining to reconsider precedent construing statute when parties did not ask court to 
reconsider that precedent or brief the issue); Central Kansas Medical Center v. Hatesohl, 
308 Kan. 992, 1006-07, 425 P.3d 1253 (2018) (declining to reconsider precedent because 
no party asked court to do so). Thus, for the purpose of analyzing Couch's sufficiency 
challenge, we apply Buggs.  
 
 
Here, the act of grabbing H.D. and dragging her to the bedroom does not meet the 
requirements of the Buggs test because the act had no independent significance apart 
from the rape and sodomies. Couch's exertion of physical control over H.D. and his 
confinement of her within her home were inherent in, and incidental to, the force or fear 
supporting Couch's rape and aggravated criminal sodomy charges. See State v. Cabral, 
228 Kan. 741, 745, 619 P.2d 1163 (1980) (confinement of rape victim within automobile 
was inherent in the nature of forcible rape and incidental to its commission); State v. 
Olsman, 58 Kan. App. 2d 638, 649, 473 P.3d 937 (2020) ("Rape through force 
necessarily and inherently requires confinement of the victim to a particular place where 
the rape occurs."). 
 
 
Moreover, grabbing H.D.'s arm and taking her to the bedroom neither made the 
rape and sodomies substantially easier to commit nor substantially lessened the risk of 
detection. See Buggs, 219 Kan. at 216. Nothing suggests that it would have been 
significantly harder for Couch to commit the sex crimes in the kitchen than the bedroom. 
See 219 Kan. at 216 (removal of rape victim from room to room within dwelling solely 
for convenience and comfort of the rapist is not kidnapping). Nor does the evidence 
suggest that taking H.D. to the bedroom substantially lessened the risk of detection. See 
Olsman, 58 Kan. App. 2d at 649 (evidence did not show movement of victim from one 
room to another within the seclusion of the home substantially reduced risk of detection). 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
Granted, this court has affirmed convictions where the victim was confined within 
a home or taken from room to room. But in those cases, the victim was moved multiple 
times, restrained for a long time, or secreted away from potential witnesses. For example, 
in State v. Chears, 231 Kan. 161, 164, 643 P.2d 154 (1982), the defendant moved the 
victim from the living room to the bedroom to sodomize her, "ensur[ing] there would be 
but one witness" because the defendant's accomplices and the victim's husband and 
daughter were in the living room and could not see what was happening in the bedroom. 
In State v. Howard, 243 Kan. 699, 702, 763 P.2d 607 (1988), the defendant confined the 
victim in his bedroom for at least one and a half hours (and possibly as long as three 
hours) as he raped and sodomized her. And when the victim tried to flee down a hallway, 
the defendant forced her back into the bedroom. 243 Kan. at 702. And most recently, in 
Harris, 310 Kan. at 1032-33, the defendant restrained the victim in her apartment for two 
hours, forcibly moving her from room to room while repeatedly demanding money and 
acting to prevent her from escaping.  
 
 
But Chears, Howard, and Harris are all distinguishable from this case. H.D.'s 
husband was at work at the time of the attack, and there is no evidence that any other 
potential witnesses were present in the home at the time of the crimes. The evidence also 
shows H.D.'s confinement lasted less than an hour. H.D. testified she got home from 
Walmart around 10:50 a.m. on the day of the attack. H.D.'s husband testified that H.D. 
sent out the emergency alert around 11:30 and he got in contact with her about five 
minutes later. And an officer testified that she responded to a burglary-in-progress call at 
H.D.'s home around 11:40 a.m.  
 
 
In its brief, the State points out that Couch prevented H.D. from picking up her 
phone before taking her out of the kitchen, and thus he lessened the risk of detection by 
preventing her from reporting the crime. But as noted, Couch's exertion of physical 
control over H.D., which would include preventing her from picking up her phone, was 
incidental to and inherent in the rape and sodomies.  
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
The State also argues that by taking H.D. to the bedroom during the sex crimes, 
Couch had easier access to the items in the bathroom as well as the charging cords he 
used to tie her up. But to satisfy Buggs, the taking or confinement must have made the 
rape and sodomies substantially easier to commit. Quicker access to items used during 
and after commission of the sex crimes would not have made those crimes substantially 
easier to commit. See Buggs, 219 Kan. at 215 ("'facilitate' . . . means something more 
than just to make more convenient").  
 
 
Along with grabbing H.D.'s arm and dragging her to the bedroom, the evidence 
shows that Couch also bound H.D.'s arms and legs after he completed the sex crimes. But 
because the act of binding H.D. occurred after Couch had completed those sex crimes, it 
could not have facilitated their commission. The State has identified no other crime that 
may have been facilitated by H.D.'s physical restraint after commission of the rape and 
sodomies. And while Couch's decision to bind H.D. may have facilitated Couch's flight 
from the crime scene, the jury was never instructed (nor did the State argue) that Couch 
could be found guilty of aggravated kidnapping if he confined H.D. with the intent to 
facilitate flight.  
 
 
In sum, the evidence shows Couch's actions were violent and degrading, and he 
may have aided his escape by tying up H.D. after raping and sodomizing her. But the jury 
instructions permitted the jury to convict Couch under a narrow theory of aggravated 
kidnapping. Thus, we are left to consider only whether the evidence shows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Couch's acts were done to facilitate the commission of any crime. 
We hold that the evidence cannot establish this element beyond a reasonable doubt under 
our precedent in Buggs. We thus reverse Couch's conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
III. The District Court Erred by Failing to Give Instructions on the Lesser-Included 
Offenses of Aggravated Battery Under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(A), but 
that Error Does Not Require Reversal 
 
 
Next, Couch argues the district court erred by failing to give instructions on 
the lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-
5413(b)(1)(A). To resolve this issue, we first identify the well-established standard and 
framework for examining instructional error. Then, we apply this framework to the 
instructional challenge. Through this analysis, we hold that the panel erred by concluding 
that the lesser-included offense instructions were factually inappropriate. Even so, we 
affirm the panel's judgment because this error does not warrant reversal.  
 
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
The multi-step process for reviewing instructional errors is well-known:  First, the 
court decides whether the issue was properly preserved below. Second, the court 
considers whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate. Third, upon a 
finding of error, the court determines whether that error is reversible. State v. Douglas, 
313 Kan. 704, 709, 490 P.3d 34 (2021). Whether the instructional error was preserved 
will affect the reversibility inquiry in the third step of this analysis. State v. McLinn, 307 
Kan. 307, 317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). 
 
 
Couch was charged with, and convicted of, aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2018 
Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(A). K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(b) defines aggravated battery as: 
 
"(1)(A) Knowingly causing great bodily harm to another person or disfigurement 
of another person; 
 
(B) knowingly causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or 
in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted; or 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
(C) knowingly causing physical contact with another person when done in a rude, 
insulting or angry manner with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily 
harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted; 
 
"(2)(A) recklessly causing great bodily harm to another person or disfigurement 
of another person; 
 
 
(B) recklessly causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or in 
any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted."  
 
 
Couch now argues that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 
lesser-included versions of aggravated battery as defined in subsections (b)(1)(B), 
(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(A), and (b)(2)(B).  
 
 
Couch concedes he did not request jury instructions on these lesser-included 
offenses or object to their absence, so any error will be reviewed for clear error. This 
means we must affirm his conviction for aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
5413(b)(1)(A) unless we are firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict had any instructional error not occurred. State v. Berkstresser, 316 Kan. 
597, 605, 520 P.3d 718 (2022).  
 
B. The Lesser-Included Offense Instructions Were Legally Appropriate 
 
 
Jury instructions on lesser-included offenses are generally legally appropriate. 
State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 721, 449 P.3d 429 (2019). And a lesser-included offense 
includes a lesser degree of the same crime. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5109(b)(1).  
 
 
Aggravated battery as defined in subsection (b)(1)(A) is a severity level 4 person 
felony. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(g)(2)(A). Aggravated battery as defined in subsection 
(b)(2)(A) is a severity level 5 person felony. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(g)(2)(C). 
 
31 
 
 
 
Aggravated battery as defined in subsections (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C) is a severity level 7 
person felony. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(g)(2)(B). And aggravated battery as defined 
in (b)(2)(B) is a severity level 8 person felony. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(g)(2)(D).  
 
 
Because the versions of aggravated battery defined in subsections (b)(1)(B), 
(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(A), and (b)(2)(B) are lesser degrees of aggravated battery charged under 
subsection (b)(1)(A), the Court of Appeals correctly held the instructions on those lesser-
included offenses were legally appropriate. Couch, 2022 WL 3570874, at *6. 
 
C. The Lesser-Included Offense Instructions Were Factually Appropriate 
 
Next, we must consider whether the lesser-included offense instructions were 
factually appropriate. "A legally appropriate lesser included offense instruction must be 
given when there is some evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, 
emanating from whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that would 
reasonably justify the defendant's conviction for that lesser included crime." Berkstresser, 
316 Kan. at 601; see also K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3414(3) ("In cases where there is some 
evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime . . . 
the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included 
crime."). In determining whether a lesser-included-offense instruction is factually 
appropriate, the question is not whether the evidence is more likely to support a 
conviction for the greater offense. Instead, the question is whether the court would 
uphold a conviction for the lesser offense in the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence. See 316 Kan. at 602. 
 
The lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
5413(b)(1)(A) can generally be divided into two categories:  (1) those versions of  
 
32 
 
 
 
aggravated battery that require a culpable mental state of knowingly but require less harm 
or injury than subsection (b)(1)(A); and (2) those versions of aggravated battery that 
require a culpable mental state of recklessly rather than knowingly.  
 
In rejecting Couch's claim of error, the Court of Appeals held that none of the 
lesser-included offense instructions were factually appropriate. The panel concluded that 
no evidence showed H.D. suffered anything less than great bodily harm. Couch, 2022 
WL 3570874, at *8. Likewise, the panel held that the evidence showed that Couch acted 
knowingly rather than recklessly. 2022 WL 3570874, at *8. 
 
In reaching its conclusion, the panel appears to have analyzed whether the 
evidence was more likely to support a conviction for the charged offense, aggravated 
battery under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(A), rather than the lesser-included 
offenses. But that is not the appropriate inquiry when determining whether a lesser-
included-offense instruction is factually appropriate. Rather, the question is whether the 
evidence would have been sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included 
versions of the offense. Here, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for 
those lesser-included offenses. And we bolster this conclusion by discussing the evidence 
supporting each of the two general categories of lesser-included offenses:  knowing 
aggravated battery requiring some harm less than great bodily harm and reckless 
aggravated battery. 
 
1. Instructions on the Lesser-Included Offenses of Knowing Aggravated 
Battery Were Factually Appropriate 
 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1) sets forth three versions of the crime of 
aggravated battery when committed with a culpable mental state of "knowingly." The 
distinction between these three crimes is the degree of bodily harm inflicted. K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(A) criminalizes causing great bodily harm or disfigurement. K.S.A. 
 
33 
 
 
 
2022 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(B) criminalizes causing bodily harm with a deadly weapon or 
in any way which could inflict great bodily harm, disfigurement, or death. And K.S.A. 
2022 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(C) criminalizes causing physical contact in a rude, insulting, 
or angry manner with a deadly weapon, or in any way which could inflict great bodily 
harm, disfigurement, or death.  
 
We have defined "bodily harm as '"any touching of the victim against [the 
victim's] will, with physical force, in an intentional hostile and aggravated manner."'" 
State v. Robinson, 306 Kan. 1012, 1027, 399 P.3d 194 (2017). And we have defined 
"great bodily harm" as "'more than slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, [that] does 
not include mere bruising, which is likely to be sustained by simple battery.'" 306 Kan. at 
1027. "Ordinarily, whether a victim has suffered great bodily harm is a question of fact 
for the jury to decide." State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 523, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). 
 
Here, the evidence showed Couch rushed at H.D. while holding a knife, H.D.'s 
hands were cut with the knife during a struggle, and those cuts required sutures. This 
evidence, which supported Couch's conviction for knowing aggravated battery causing 
great bodily harm, would also be enough to show he caused mere bodily harm or simply 
physical contact in a manner which could cause great bodily harm. See Williams, 295 
Kan. at 522-23 (Instruction on lesser-included offense for aggravated battery was 
factually appropriate where evidence showed victim was stabbed in the head with kitchen 
knife, wound required many stitches, but did not cause excessive pain or require ongoing 
follow-up care; facts reasonably could have supported a finding of either great bodily 
harm or mere bodily harm in a manner that could have caused great bodily harm.). 
Because the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated battery under 
subsection (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C), the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on 
those offenses.  
 
 
34 
 
 
 
2. Instructions for Reckless Aggravated Battery Were Factually 
Appropriate 
 
 
The primary difference between aggravated battery as defined in K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5413(b)(1) and (b)(2) is the culpable mental state. The versions of aggravated 
battery set forth in subsection (b)(1) require a culpable mental state of "knowingly." 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5202(i) defines the culpable mental state of "knowingly" as: 
 
"A person acts 'knowingly,' or 'with knowledge,' with respect to the nature of 
such person's conduct or to circumstances surrounding such person's conduct when such 
person is aware of the nature of such person's conduct or that the circumstances exist. A 
person acts 'knowingly,' or 'with knowledge,' with respect to a result of such person's 
conduct when such person is aware that such person's conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result."  
 
And we have held that under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(A), a person acts 
knowingly if "he or she acted while knowing that any great bodily harm or disfigurement 
of the victim was reasonably certain to result from the action." State v. Hobbs, 301 Kan. 
203, 211, 340 P.3d 1179 (2015).  
 
 
On the other hand, aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5413(b)(2) 
requires a culpable mental state of "recklessly." "A person acts 'recklessly' or is 'reckless' 
when such person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the 
situation." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5202(j). 
 
Thus, the primary difference between knowing aggravated battery and reckless 
aggravated battery would be the defendant's degree of awareness that their actions will 
 
35 
 
 
 
cause some degree of bodily harm. State v. Trefethen, No. 119,981, 2021 WL 1433246, 
at *6 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 314 Kan. 859 (2021). 
 
The State argues the evidence shows that Couch acted knowingly because he 
entered the home with the knife and used it to gain control and threaten H.D. And the 
panel agreed, holding the evidence "reflects an unquestionable awareness of the conduct 
undertaken and its attendant results" and that Couch "must have known that the infliction 
of great bodily harm was reasonably certain." Couch, 2022 WL 3570874, at *8. 
 
 
But as Couch argues, there is at least some evidence that Couch acted recklessly 
rather than knowingly. While Couch may have held the knife to H.D.'s throat, there was 
no evidence that he swiped or jabbed at H.D. Indeed, H.D. testified she cut her hands 
when she grabbed at the knife. And Couch's stream of expletives upon realizing H.D. had 
been cut suggests surprise at H.D.'s injuries. This evidence would support a finding that 
Couch consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he would cause 
H.D. bodily harm. See State v. Logue, No. 123,432, 2022 WL 2188028, at *4 (Kan. App. 
2022) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 317 Kan. ___ (March 30, 2023) (finding 
sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated battery 
when defendant pulled out a knife during an argument and victim was cut during physical 
struggle with defendant). 
 
 
Thus, instructions on reckless aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-
5413(b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B) were factually appropriate, and the district court erred in 
failing to give them. 
 
D. The Instructional Error Does Not Amount to Clear Error 
 
 
Having concluded the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on 
the lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-
 
36 
 
 
 
5413(b)(1)(A), we must now consider whether that error requires reversal. Because 
Couch did not properly preserve his instructional challenge, he bears the burden to firmly 
convince us the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instructional error not 
occurred. Berkstresser, 316 Kan. at 605. 
 
 
Based on the evidence at trial, it is possible that the jury could have reasonably 
convicted Couch of one of the lesser-included versions of aggravated battery. This 
conclusion holds especially true for those versions of aggravated battery requiring lesser 
degrees of bodily harm. See Williams, 295 Kan. at 523 (Whether a victim has suffered 
great bodily harm or mere bodily harm is a question of fact for the jury to decide.). 
 
 
But it is not enough that a rational jury could have convicted Couch of a lesser 
degree of aggravated battery—Couch must show the jury would have convicted him of 
the lesser offense if given the chance. See Berkstresser, 316 Kan. at 605. But the 
evidence here does not support his claim. Couch forced his way into H.D.'s home with a 
knife, shoved her against the kitchen sink, and held a knife to her neck to gain control 
over her. During the struggle, H.D. received deep cuts on her hands, causing blood loss 
and requiring sutures. And Couch himself told an officer, he "cut the fucking dog shit out 
of her, blood everywhere."  
 
 
As we have noted, in explaining why the lesser-included instructions were not 
factually appropriate, the Court of Appeals actually explained why the evidence would 
more likely support a conviction for aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-
5413(b)(1)(A). While this is not a relevant consideration for determining whether a 
lesser-included instruction is factually appropriate, it is a relevant consideration in 
determining harmlessness. And we agree with the panel that the evidence would more 
likely support a conviction of the charged offense. H.D.'s injuries were more severe than 
ones she would likely have sustained from simple battery. See Robinson, 306 Kan. at 
1027. And Couch's conduct overall reflects an awareness that bodily harm was 
 
37 
 
 
 
reasonably certain to result, even if he did not foresee the specific type of harm. See 
Hobbs, 301 Kan. at 211 (accused need not have foreseen specific harm that resulted as 
along as he or she acted while knowing any great bodily harm was reasonably certain to 
result). 
 
 
In sum, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that instructions on the lesser-
included versions of aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(B), 
(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(A), and (b)(2)(B) were not factually appropriate. Even so, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals because this instructional error does not require 
reversal. See State v. Brown, 314 Kan. 292, 306, 498 P.3d 167 (2021) (affirming the 
Court of Appeals judgment as right, although on different grounds). 
 
IV. Cumulative Error Did Not Deprive Couch of a Fair Trial 
 
  
Finally, Couch asserts the denial of his request to proceed pro se, the insufficient 
evidence to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction, and the aggravated battery 
instructional error cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree. 
 
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
 
In conducting cumulative error review, "an appellate court aggregates all errors, 
even if they are individually reversible or individually harmless." State v. Taylor, 314 
Kan. 166, 173, 496 P.3d 526 (2021). 
 
"The test for cumulative error is whether the errors substantially prejudiced the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial given the totality of the circumstances. In 
making the assessment, an appellate court examines the errors in context, considers how 
the district court judge addressed the errors, reviews the nature and number of errors and 
whether they are connected, and weighs the strength of the evidence. If any of the errors 
being aggregated are constitutional, the constitutional harmless error test of Chapman [v. 
 
38 
 
 
 
California, 386 U.S. 18] applies, and the party benefitting from the errors must establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the cumulative effect of the errors did not affect the 
outcome. Where, as here, the State benefitted from the errors, it has the burden of 
establishing the errors were harmless. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 
905, 914, 468 P.3d 323 (2020). 
 
 
The Court of Appeals found there were no errors and thus concluded Couch had 
no right to relief based on cumulative error. Couch, 2022 WL 3570874, at *9; see State v. 
Lemmie, 311 Kan. 439, 455, 462 P.3d 161 (2020) (if no error, or only single error, 
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply). 
 
 
But we have identified two errors:  insufficient evidence to support Couch's 
aggravated kidnapping conviction and the district court's failure to instruct on lesser-
included versions of aggravated battery. And a conviction based on insufficient evidence 
is an error of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Barker, 18 Kan. App. 2d 292, 295-96, 
851 P.2d 394 (1993) ("A conviction based upon insufficient evidence is a fortiori in 
violation of a defendant's due process rights."). Thus, the harmlessness test from 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), applies. 
Under that standard, we may declare the errors harmless if we are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that they did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire 
record. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 568-69, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (citing Chapman, 386 
U.S. 18). 
 
B. Even in the Aggregate, the Two Identified Trial Errors Did Not Deprive 
Couch of a Fair Trial 
 
Before addressing whether these two errors cumulatively require reversal, we 
pause to note an as-yet-unaddressed issue in applying the cumulative error doctrine under 
Kansas law. Kansas courts have often included unpreserved instructional errors that do 
not amount to clear error in cumulative error analyses. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 308 
Kan. 1439, 1462-63, 430 P.3d 448 (2018); State v. Seba, 305 Kan. 185, 215-16, 380 P.3d 
 
39 
 
 
 
209 (2016). But we have never squarely addressed whether it is appropriate to do so, and 
we recognize the potential for disagreement on this point. See State v. Logan, No. 
123,151, 2022 WL 1592702, at *5 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion) (Atcheson, J., 
concurring) (disagreeing with majority decision's exclusion of unpreserved instructional 
error from cumulative error analysis). Nevertheless, for the purposes of our decision 
today, we assume, without deciding, that such errors may properly be included in a 
cumulative error analysis. 
 
The aggregate effect of the two errors we have identified did not deprive Couch of 
a fair trial. The two errors were not interrelated. One was a failure of proof on the State's 
part to sustain a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. The other was an instructional 
error related to Couch's aggravated battery conviction. Further, the insufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain Couch's aggravated kidnapping conviction is not the type of error 
which would render his trial unfair. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-16, 98 S. 
Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) (explaining reversal for insufficient evidence results from 
failure of proof on part of the State after being given a fair opportunity to prove the 
defendant's guilt, while reversal for trial error "is a determination that a defendant has 
been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental 
respect"). Thus, the prejudicial effect of these errors is no greater when considered 
together than when the errors are viewed in isolation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We affirm the Court of Appeals judgment on three of the four issues Couch raised. 
First, as to Couch's Sixth Amendment claim, we agree with the panel that the district 
court lawfully denied Couch's motion to proceed pro se. Substantial competent evidence 
supports the district court's fact-findings about Couch's disruptive pretrial behavior, and 
that behavior provided a valid basis for denying his right to represent himself at trial. 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
Second, as to the instructional-error claim, we agree that the panel erred by 
holding that the lesser-included-offense instructions for aggravated battery were factually 
inappropriate. But we affirm the panel's judgment because the error was harmless.  
 
Third, as for cumulative error, we agree that the doctrine applies. But we hold that 
the cumulative effect of the trial errors does not require reversal.  
 
 
But we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment affirming Couch's conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5413(a)(2) and (b). There was 
insufficient evidence to establish all the elements of aggravated kidnapping, as defined in 
the jury instructions, beyond reasonable doubt. And because Couch's conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping was designated his primary offense for sentencing purposes, we 
remand the case for resentencing of Couch's other convictions. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
6819(b)(5). 
 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part on the 
issues subject to review. Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in 
part on the issues subject to review, and the case is remanded with directions. 
 
* * * 
 
STEGALL, J., dissenting:  Decades ago, our court decided that the Legislature could 
not have intended all or most rapes to also result in an aggravated kidnapping conviction. 
This arose out of a recognition that factually, it is likely impossible to commit a rape 
without simultaneously "confining" the victim to "facilitate" the rape. Apparently, the 
court was alarmed by the possibility of multiple convictions arising out of one 
occurrence. See State v. Butler, 317 Kan. ___ (No. 123,742, this day decided), slip op. at 
9 ("[A]t its core, the [Buggs] test appears to be designed to inoculate against 
multiplicity."). To avoid this outcome, we concluded Kansas' "kidnapping statute is not 
 
41 
 
 
 
reasonably intended to cover movements and confinements which are slight and 'merely 
incidental' to the commission of an underlying lesser crime." State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 
203, 215, 547 P.2d 720 (1976).  
 
The problem is that such convictions (rape and aggravated kidnapping for 
confining the victim to facilitate the rape) do not violate our more recent and well-
developed multiplicity doctrine. This is because they contain different elements—so 
convictions for both offenses arising out of the same conduct would not violate the same 
elements test for determining whether convictions are multiplicitous. See State v. 
Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 12, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). Because the Legislature has 
crafted different elements in defining these offenses—and those elements are clearly 
satisfied here—I would overrule Buggs and affirm Couch's convictions for aggravated 
kidnapping and rape.  
 
In Kansas, kidnapping is any "taking or confining of any person, accomplished by 
force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person . . . to facilitate flight or the 
commission of any crime." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5408. The Buggs court construed the 
term "facilitate" to mean the "taking or confining" must not be "slight, inconsequential 
[or] merely incidental to the other crime . . . [and] not . . . of a kind inherent in the nature 
of the other crime," "something more than just to make more convenient," but rather 
something having "significant bearing on making the commission of the crime 'easier.'" 
219 Kan. 203, Syl. ¶¶ 9-10. And our court relies on this rule today to overturn Couch's 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Couch, 317 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 25. 
 
Not only is the Buggs rule untenable as a species of our multiplicity doctrine, it 
fails as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation. The Buggs court never conducted a 
plain language analysis of the kidnapping statute and never found it to be ambiguous. Its 
analysis of the word "facilitate" in our kidnapping statute thus falls well short of our more 
recent and rigorous approach to statutory interpretation—one requiring we begin with the 
 
42 
 
 
 
legislative intent as expressed through the plain language of the statute and only turn to 
other tools of construction after first determining the statutory language is unclear or 
ambiguous. See, e.g., In re Estate of Taylor, 312 Kan. 678, 681, 479 P.3d 476 (2021); 
State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 243, 200 P.3d 22 (2009) ("When the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to that language, rather than 
determine what the law should or should not be."). In doing so, we "'giv[e] common 
words their ordinary meaning.'" State v. Eckert, 317 Kan. 21, 27, 522 P.3d 796 (2023).  
 
Instead of simply asking what the plain meaning of "facilitate" was in our 
kidnapping statute, the Buggs court considered a variety of other sources including:  
(1) the common-law definition of kidnapping; (2) caselaw from other states; (3) former 
iterations of the Kansas kidnapping statute; (4) the current statute's legislative history and 
Judicial Council notes; and (5) the statute's corresponding elements in the Model Penal 
Code. 219 Kan. at 209-13.  
 
In my view, the Buggs court improperly departed from the plain language of the 
statute to construe the statute in a way it believed would avoid potentially multiplicitous 
convictions for rape and kidnapping. But I find the statutory language of the aggravated 
kidnapping statute to be plain and unambiguous. An aggravated kidnapping conviction 
requires a showing that the defendant "confined" the victim by force "to facilitate the 
commission" of a crime. Confinement is accomplished by "restraining someone." 
Confinement, Black's Law Dictionary 373 (11th ed. 2019). "Facilitate" is defined as 
"mak[ing] the occurrence of (something) easier; to render less difficult," and in the 
context of criminal law, it is to render "the commission of (a crime) easier." Facilitate, 
Black's Law Dictionary 734-35 (11th ed. 2019). Giving these words their ordinary 
meaning—as again, we must under our well-established rules of statutory construction—
there is no doubt that by pinning the victim down on the bed or holding her at knifepoint 
to rape her, a defendant can be said to be "restraining someone" "to make the commission 
of a rape easier." These actions align with the plain language of the aggravated 
 
43 
 
 
 
kidnapping statute, i.e., confining the victim by force to facilitate a crime. And whether 
the commission of one crime (in this case rape) will almost always result in the 
commission of a second crime (aggravated kidnapping) should not be a judicial 
consideration when evaluating the plain language of a statute. 
 
And as already pointed out, there is no multiplicity concern under this plain 
language approach. We apply the same-elements test to questions of multiplicity as first 
announced in Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 12. The same-elements test is used to 
determine whether multiple convictions arising from the same course of conduct violate 
§ 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. It asks "whether each offense requires 
proof of an element not necessary to prove the other offense. If so, the charges stemming 
from a single act are not multiplicitous and do not constitute a double jeopardy violation." 
281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 12. 
 
To determine whether an aggravated kidnapping conviction would be 
multiplicitous with rape or aggravated criminal sodomy, then, we look to the elements 
of each offense and determine if each requires proof of an element not necessary to prove 
the other offense. 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 12; see State v. George, 311 Kan. 693, 699, 466 
P.3d 469 (2020).  
 
First, the jury was instructed that to be guilty of aggravated kidnapping, Couch 
must have confined H.D. by force to facilitate the commission of any crime. K.S.A. 2018 
Supp. 21-5408(a)(2) and (b). Aggravated criminal sodomy is "sodomy with a victim who 
does not consent" "[w]hen the victim is overcome by force or fear." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 
21-5504(b)(3)(A). And lastly, rape is "[k]nowingly engaging in sexual intercourse with a 
victim who does not consent to the sexual intercourse . . . [w]hen the victim is overcome 
by force or fear." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A). Because each of these offenses 
contain elements independent of the other, the convictions are not multiplicitous. 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
The majority here and in Butler, 317 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 9, acknowledge that 
Buggs' approach to multiplicity appears "out of step" with the same-elements test, yet it 
continues to apply it by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. It is true that once we have 
established a particular point of law we generally will follow that point of law in 
subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised. But we are not inexorably bound 
by our own precedents. Herington v. City of Wichita, 314 Kan. 447, 457, 500 P.3d 1168 
(2021). We may depart from them if we are clearly convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than 
harm will come by departing from precedent. McCullough v. Wilson, 308 Kan. 1025, 
1036, 426 P.3d 494 (2018).  
 
Stare decisis is weak when the precedent has proven difficult to apply. See State 
v. Hoeck, 284 Kan. 441, 463, 163 P.3d 252 (2007) ("[S]tare decisis . . . should not 
constrain a court from disapproving its own holdings 'when governing decisions are 
unworkable.'"); State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 579, 102 P.3d 445 (2004) (McFarland, 
C.J., dissenting) (departure from the rule of stare decisis may be justified when "the 
decision sought to be overturned has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
'workability'") (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
854-55, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 [1992]), rev'd on other grounds 548 U.S. 163, 
126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006).  
 
And indeed, the Buggs rule has proven ambiguous and difficult to apply. See, e.g., 
State v. Fisher, 257 Kan. 65, 77, 891 P.2d 1065 (1995) (discussing at length many 
previous kidnapping cases while attempting to conform to Buggs when the facts 
presented a close call); State v. Olsman, 58 Kan. App. 2d 638, 665, 473 P.3d 937 (2020) 
(Warner, J., dissenting) (describing how the Buggs standard is "difficult to apply"); State 
v. Richard, No. 88,893, 2004 WL 556747, at *4 (Kan. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion) 
("This is a difficult and complex problem. If one were to attempt to explain to the 
layperson what the crime of kidnapping consists of in this state, one might be greeted 
 
45 
 
 
 
with a blank stare. It is very difficult to define kidnapping. Theoretically, in this state, a 
movement of 10 feet, if done for the right reason, can constitute kidnapping. On the other 
hand, a movement of 10 miles, if done for other reasons, would not constitute 
kidnapping. The conundrum of defining kidnapping is a never ending one, and it is very 
difficult in this particular case."). 
 
We also take into consideration whether the rule "'is subject to a kind of reliance 
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling,'" because "[s]tare 
decisis is especially compelling when reliance interests are involved." Bergstrom v. 
Spears Manufacturing Co., 289 Kan. 605, 615, 214 P.3d 676 (2009) (McFarland, C.J., 
dissenting); State v. Sims, 308 Kan. 1488, 1504, 431 P.3d 288 (2018). Here, no reliance 
interest is at stake.  
 
Most significantly, the statutory language at issue is plain and unambiguous. We 
have repeatedly recognized that the Legislature, not the courts, is the primary policy-
making branch of government and that it is not within our power to rewrite statutes to 
satisfy our policy preferences. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 312 Kan. 
156, 170, 473 P.3d 869 (2020) ("'[Q]uestions of public policy are for legislative and not 
judicial determination, and where the legislature does so declare, and there is no 
constitutional impediment, the question of the wisdom, justice, or expediency of the 
legislation is for that body and not for the courts.'"); Fisher v. DeCarvalho, 298 Kan. 482, 
498, 314 P.3d 214 (2013) ("'"[T]he court cannot delete vital provisions or supply vital 
omissions in a statute"' . . . no matter how ludicrous an appellate court may find a 
legislative enactment to be, the court is not free to completely rewrite the statute to make 
the law conform to what the court believes it should be."). This approach is fundamental 
to our basic respect for the constitutionally mandated separation of powers between our 
three branches of government. See Glaze v. J.K. Williams, 309 Kan. 562, 567-68, 439 
P.3d 920 (2019) (explaining this court's efforts "to introduce more discipline into our  
 
46 
 
 
 
frequent tasks of statutory interpretation" which requires the court to "deliberately" stick 
to a "disciplined path . . . because it advances embedded values of judicial restraint and 
modesty and preserves respect for separation of powers and institutional competency").  
 
In my view, vindicating these principles far outweighs continued adherence to a 
wrongly decided and badly reasoned precedent. See Sims, 308 Kan. at 1503-04. 
Especially when there are no real reliance interests at stake and the precedent has proven 
difficult and cumbersome to apply. As such, I would abandon the Buggs rule. I dissent 
from the majority's decision to reverse Couch's aggravated kidnapping conviction and 
instead, would affirm all of the convictions. 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., and WILSON, J., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.