Title: State v. Kempainen
Citation: 2015 WI 32
Docket Number: 2013AP001531-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2015

2015 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1531-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Brian S. Kempainen, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 177, 848 N.W.2d 320 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No:2014 WI App 53 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 8, 2015  
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
Terence T. Bourke 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Melissa L. Mroczkowski and Kirk Obear and Associates, 
Sheboygan, and oral argument by Melissa L. Mroczkowski. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was argued by Sarah 
L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, and with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 32
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1531-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF691) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian S. Kempainen, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed the circuit 
court's2 dismissal of the criminal complaint and information 
filed against Brian S. Kempainen ("Kempainen").  On December 21, 
2012, the Sheboygan County District Attorney's Office filed a 
criminal complaint alleging Kempainen had engaged in two counts 
                                                 
1 State v. Kempainen, 2014 WI App 53, 354 Wis. 2d 177, 848 
N.W.2d 320. 
2 The Honorable Terence T. Bourke, presiding. 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
2 
 
of sexual assault of a child under 13 years of age, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2001-02).3  The complaint alleged that 
the first count of sexual assault occurred "on or about August 
1, 1997 to December 1, 1997."  The complaint alleged that the 
second count of sexual assault occurred "on or about March 1, 
2001 to June 15, 2001."   
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) provides that "[w]hoever has 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not 
attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) (1997-98), applicable to count one 
of the complaint and information, is identical to the 2001-02 
version. 
"Sexual contact" is defined, in relevant part, by Wis. 
Stat. § 948.01(5) as: 
(a) Intentional 
touching 
by 
the 
complainant 
or 
defendant, either directly or through clothing by the 
use of any body part or object, of the complainant's 
or defendant's intimate parts if that intentional 
touching is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or 
sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant. 
 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
3 
 
¶2 
Kempainen moved the circuit court to dismiss the 
complaint and information4 on the grounds that they were "not 
sufficiently definite and the defendant [was] not adequately 
informed of the charges against him" because the time periods in 
which the alleged crimes were committed were "too vague," such 
that he could not plead for, or prepare a defense against, 
"when" 
the 
crimes 
occurred. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Kempainen's motion and dismissed the complaint and information.  
The State appealed.  In a published decision, the court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court and remanded the case with 
the 
instruction 
that 
the 
complaint 
and 
information 
be 
reinstated.  The court of appeals relied on State v. Fawcett, 
145 Wis. 2d 244, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988) (setting forth 
seven5 "reasonableness" factors that a court may consider in 
                                                 
4 "The information is the charging document to which a 
defendant must enter a plea."  
State v. Copening, 103 
Wis. 2d 564, 576, 309 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing 
Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 142 N.W.2d 187 (1966)).  
"A defendant has the benefit of both the factual allegations 
required in the complaint and the final statutory charges 
alleged in the information."  Id.  However, "[t]he factual 
allegations relied on by the state which satisfy the elements of 
the crime are more likely found in the complaint.  The facts 
recited 
in 
the 
complaint 
need 
not 
be 
repeated 
in 
the 
information."  
Id. at 577.  Thus, when discussing the 
sufficiency of the factual allegations against Kempainen, we 
refer to the complaint. 
5 These seven factors are:  
(1) the age and intelligence of the victim and other 
witnesses; (2) the surrounding circumstances; (3) the 
nature of the offense, including whether it is likely 
to occur at a specific time or is likely to have been 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
4 
 
assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in a child sexual 
assault case), as a basis for its determination that Kempainen 
received adequate notice as to the nature of the charges against 
him. 
¶3 
Two issues are presented for our consideration: 1) 
whether a court is prohibited from considering the first three 
factors set forth in Fawcett when the defendant does not claim 
that the State could have obtained a more definite date through 
diligent efforts;6 and 2) whether the complaint and information 
charging Kempainen with two counts of sexual assault of a child 
under 13 years of age provided adequate notice to satisfy 
Kempainen's due process right to plead and prepare a defense. 
¶4 
First, we hold that in child sexual assault cases 
courts may apply the seven factors outlined in Fawcett, and may 
consider any other relevant factors necessary to determine 
                                                                                                                                                             
discovered immediately; (4) the length of the alleged 
period of time in relation to the number of individual 
criminal acts alleged; (5) the passage of time between 
the alleged period for the crime and the defendant's 
arrest; (6) the duration between the date of the 
indictment and the alleged offense; and (7) the 
ability of the victim or complaining witness to 
particularize the date and time of the alleged 
transaction or offense. 
State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 253 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
6 In State v. R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d 408, 411, 435 N.W.2d 315 
(Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals concluded that a court may 
consider the first three Fawcett factors only in situations 
where the defendant claims the State could have obtained a more 
definite charging period through diligent efforts. 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
5 
 
whether the complaint and information "states an offense to 
which [the defendant can] plead and prepare a defense."  
Holesome v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 102, 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968).  
No single factor is dispositive, and not every Fawcett factor 
will necessarily be present in all cases.  Second, we hold that 
the complaint and information provided adequate notice of when 
the alleged crimes occurred and thus did not violate Kempainen's 
due process right to plead and prepare a defense.  We therefore 
affirm the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court with 
the instruction to reinstate the complaint and information 
against Kempainen. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
On December 21, 2012, the Sheboygan County District 
Attorney's Office filed a complaint charging Kempainen with two 
counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of 13.  The 
first count of the complaint alleged that Kempainen had sexual 
contact with his stepdaughter, L.T., "on or about August 1, 1997 
to December 1, 1997."  The second count alleged that Kempainen 
had sexual contact with L.T. "on or about March 1, 2001 to June 
15, 2001."  L.T. was 8 years old when the first assault occurred 
and either 11 or 12 years old when the second assault occurred. 
¶6 
L.T. first reported the alleged assaults on October 
25, 2012, to Detective Brian Retzer of the Sheboygan Police 
Department.  L.T. told Detective Retzer that her stepfather, 
Kempainen, sexually assaulted her sometime around the start of 
the school year when she was in the second grade.  L.T. recalled 
this specific time period because it corresponded with the 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
6 
 
family's move to Sheboygan.  According to L.T., she was sleeping 
on the couch in the living room when, in the middle of the 
night, Kempainen laid down next to her so that he was on the 
innermost area of the couch and she was on its edge.  Kempainen 
allegedly began to rub L.T.'s vagina through her pajamas and 
then put L.T.'s hand down his sweatpants and compelled her to 
massage his penis for approximately two minutes.  Next, 
Kempainen allegedly performed oral sex on L.T. for "a long 
time."  L.T. told Detective Retzer that she was "very scared and 
nervous" while this was happening.  Eventually, Kempainen 
"passed out" on the couch, and L.T. immediately got up, went 
into the kitchen, and cried.  She then went somewhere else in 
the house to sleep. 
¶7 
L.T. stated that approximately one week after this 
incident, Kempainen asked her to come down to the basement with 
him.  Once there, Kempainen allegedly told her that he did not 
want her to tell her mother what had happened.  He also told 
L.T. that "I know you were bad" and that he would get in trouble 
if she told her mother what happened. 
¶8 
The second assault occurred when L.T. was in the sixth 
grade and it was "warm outside."  During this time, L.T. was 
responsible for waking Kempainen for work around 4:30 PM each 
day.  On one such day, L.T. was waiting to wake up Kempainen and 
was lying sideways at the foot of the bed watching "Disney."  
Kempainen woke up and began to rub L.T.'s back under her 
clothes.  Eventually, Kempainen allegedly moved his hands to the 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
7 
 
front of her chest and touched L.T.'s breasts.  L.T. immediately 
became scared and left her home to go to a friend's house. 
¶9 
L.T. did not immediately tell anyone about either 
incident because she was afraid that her mother would be mad at 
her and because she was afraid of what her mother might do to 
Kempainen.  When she was in eighth grade she did tell a close 
friend, J.B., about the assaults; however, J.B. did not tell 
anyone.   
¶10 Detective Retzer asked L.T. why she chose to come 
forward now, after such a long time had passed.  L.T., who was 
23 years old at the time of the interview, explained that she 
confided in her first serious boyfriend what Kempainen had done.  
The boyfriend urged L.T. to notify the police and to tell her 
mother, but L.T. remained too afraid to tell anyone.  In early 
October 2012, L.T.'s then ex-boyfriend informed L.T.'s mother 
about Kempainen's alleged sexual assault of L.T.  At this point, 
L.T. finally told her mother what had happened. 
¶11 On November 28, 2012, Detective Retzer contacted 
L.T.'s ex-boyfriend who confirmed much of L.T.'s account.  He 
also added that L.T. told him that "she felt responsible for 
[the assaults] and didn't want to talk about it."   
¶12 Detective Retzer arrested Kempainen on December 19, 
2012, for the alleged sexual assaults of L.T.  The Sheboygan 
County District Attorney's Office filed the complaint on 
December 21, 2012, and Kempainen made his initial appearance 
before the circuit court that same day.  An information was 
filed on December 26, 2012.  On January 29, 2013, Kempainen 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
8 
 
moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint and information 
because it was "not sufficiently definite and [he was] not 
adequately informed of the charges against him."  Specifically, 
Kempainen argued that the "several month time spans in which the 
crimes are alleged to have occurred are too vague to provide the 
defendant with adequate notice of the charges against him."   
¶13 The circuit court ordered briefing on Kempainen's 
motion and held a hearing on May 21, 2013.  Relying on Fawcett 
and State v. R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d 408, 435 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 
1988) (limiting a court's consideration of the first three 
Fawcett factors to situations where the defendant claims the 
State could have obtained a more definite charging period 
through diligent efforts), the circuit court concluded that the 
charges against Kempainen "are not sufficiently definite and 
that [Kempainen] was not adequately informed of the charges."  
Citing footnote two of the Fawcett decision, the circuit court 
stated that because Kempainen had not claimed that the State 
could have obtained a more definite charging period there was 
"no need to go into the first three [Fawcett] factors and you 
just skip right to the fourth factor."  The circuit court then 
dismissed the complaint and information. 
¶14 The State appealed.  In a published opinion, the court 
of appeals reversed the circuit court.  State v. Kempainen, 2014 
WI App 53, ¶1, 354 Wis. 2d 177, 848 N.W.2d 320.  The court of 
appeals determined that "[b]ecause the date of the commission of 
the crimes is not a material element of the charged offenses 
here, a date need not be precisely alleged" in the complaint and 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
9 
 
information.  Id., ¶24 (citations omitted).  "Any vagueness in 
L.T.'s memory will more properly go to her credibility and the 
weight of her testimony."  Id.  Thus, the court of appeals 
concluded that "the charging periods are reasonable and the 
details in the complaint provide Kempainen with adequate notice 
of the charges against him."  Id. 
¶15 Kempainen petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 18, 2014. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 Whether the time period alleged in a complaint and 
information is sufficient to provide notice to the defendant is 
a question of constitutional fact that we review de novo.  
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 249.  "The criminal complaint is a self-
contained charge which must set forth facts that are sufficient, 
in themselves or together with reasonable inferences to which 
they give rise, to allow a reasonable person to conclude that a 
crime was probably committed and that the defendant is probably 
culpable." 
 
Id. 
at 
250 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Hoffman, 
106 
Wis. 2d 185, 197, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982)).  The 
sufficiency of a pleading is a question of law reviewed 
independently.  Id.  In reviewing a complaint, our analysis is 
restricted to the charging document and we do not consider 
extrinsic evidence.   
¶17 In order to satisfy the requirements of the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions, the charges in the complaint 
and information "must be sufficiently stated to allow the 
defendant to plead and prepare a defense."  Id.  When reviewing 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
10 
 
the sufficiency of the complaint and information, we consider 
two factors: "whether the accusation is such that the defendant 
[can] determine whether it states an offense to which he [can] 
plead and prepare a defense and whether conviction or acquittal 
is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."  
Holesome, 40 Wis. 2d at 102.7 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶18 We first consider the appropriate factors courts may 
use to determine whether a defendant in a child sexual assault 
case has received sufficient notice of the charges against him.  
We hold that in child sexual assault cases courts may apply the 
seven factors outlined in Fawcett, and may consider any other 
relevant factors necessary to determine whether the complaint 
and information "states an offense to which [the defendant can] 
plead and prepare a defense."  Id.  We then apply the Fawcett 
factors to the facts of this case and conclude that Kempainen 
received adequate notice of the charges against him. 
A. 
Reviewing Courts May Consider All of the Fawcett Factors As 
Well As Any Other Relevant Factors. 
¶19 Due process requires that a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding must be "informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him."  Id.  This right is guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Article 
                                                 
7 Neither Kempainen nor the State raise the double jeopardy 
factor, 
whether 
conviction 
would 
be 
a 
bar 
to 
another 
prosecution.  Therefore, we do not address it. 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
11 
 
I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.8  As we explained in 
Holesome, in order to determine whether there has been a 
violation of the defendant's due process right to know the 
"nature and cause of the accusation," courts must look to 
whether the defendant can determine if the complaint and 
information "states an offense to which he [can] plead and 
prepare a defense and whether conviction or acquittal is a bar 
to another prosecution for the same offense."  Id.  When 
applying this test, we have focused our inquiry on the facts 
alleged in the complaint and the elements of the crimes 
involved.  See e.g., State v. Connor, 2011 WI 8, 331 
Wis. 2d 352, 795 N.W.2d 750; Blenski v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 685, 
245 N.W.2d 906 (1976); State v. George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 230 
N.W.2d 253 (1975). 
¶20 Thus, under Holesome, courts are to consider whether 
the complaint alleges facts that identify the alleged criminal 
conduct with reasonable certainty.  See Fink v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26, 28 (1863) ("It is an elementary rule of 
criminal law, that . . . the facts and circumstances which 
                                                 
8 The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation."  U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution has a 
nearly identical provision that provides, in pertinent part, 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him."  Wis. Const. art., I, § 7.  
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
12 
 
constitute the offense . . . must be stated with such certainty 
and precision that the defendant may be enabled to judge whether 
they 
constitute 
an 
indictable 
offense 
or 
not . . . .").  
Application of the Holesome test necessarily depends on the 
nature of the specific crime(s) alleged.  Therefore, courts are 
to determine whether a specific complaint and information 
provide the defendant with adequate notice of the charges on a 
case-by-case, or count-by-count, basis. 
¶21 Child sexual assaults are difficult crimes to detect 
and to prosecute, as typically there are no witnesses except the 
victim and the perpetrator.  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 249.  Often 
the child is assaulted by a trusted relative, and does not know 
whom to turn to for protection.  Id.  The child may have been 
threatened, or, as is often the case, may harbor a natural 
reluctance to come forward.  Id.  "These circumstances many 
times serve to deter a child from coming forth immediately.  As 
a result, exactness as to the events fades in memory."  Id.  
Thus, "[y]oung children cannot be held to an adult's ability to 
comprehend and recall dates and other specific events."  Id.  "A 
person should not be able to escape punishment for such 
a . . . crime because he has chosen to take carnal knowledge of 
an infant too young to testify clearly as to the time and 
details 
of 
such 
. . . activity." 
 
State 
v. 
Sirisun, 
90 
Wis. 2d 58, 65-66 n.4, 279 N.W.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1979) (citation 
omitted).  "However, no matter how abhorrent the conduct may be, 
a defendant's due process [rights] . . . may not be ignored or 
trivialized."  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 250. 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
13 
 
¶22 Because "[t]ime is not of the essence in [child] 
sexual assault cases," when the date of the commission of the 
crime is not a material element of the offense it need not be 
precisely alleged.  Id. at 250; see also Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d at 
198.  A "more flexible application of notice requirements is 
required and permitted [in child sexual assault cases].  The 
vagaries of a child's memory more properly go to the credibility 
of the witness and the weight of the testimony, rather than to 
the legality of the prosecution in the first instance."  
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 254. 
¶23 In Fawcett, the court of appeals properly interpreted 
Holesome by discussing seven factors which "assist us in 
determining" whether the complaint provides the defendant notice 
of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him" in child 
sexual assault cases.  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 253.  The seven 
factors considered by the court were taken from a New York case, 
People v. Morris, 461 N.E.2d 1256 (N.Y. 1984).  In Morris, the 
New York Court of Appeals cautioned against a bright-line rule 
for determining whether a complaint provides adequate notice to 
the defendant.  "It is . . . important to note that the 
requirements 
for 
a 
valid 
indictment 
will 
vary 
with 
the 
particular crime involved, and what is sufficient to charge [one 
crime] would be insufficient with respect to many other crimes."  
Morris, 461 N.E.2d at 294.  Accordingly, New York adopted what 
is essentially a totality of the circumstances test, grounded in 
reasonableness, for notice in criminal proceedings.  This test 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
14 
 
is consistent with our holding in Holesome and our prior case 
law. 
¶24 The 
Fawcett 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
Morris 
"reasonableness" test was consistent with Holesome, and, as a 
result, applied the following factors to determine "whether the 
Holesome test is satisfied": 
(1) 
The age and intelligence of the victim and other 
witnesses; 
(2) 
The surrounding circumstances; 
(3) 
The nature of the offense, including whether it 
is likely to occur at a specific time or is 
likely to have been discovered immediately; 
(4) 
The length of the alleged period of time in 
relation to the number of individual criminal 
acts alleged; 
(5) 
The passage of time between the alleged period 
for the crime and the defendant's arrest; 
(6) 
The duration between the date of the indictment 
and the alleged offense; and 
(7) 
The ability of the victim or complaining witness 
to particularize the date and time of the alleged 
transaction or offense. 
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 253 (formatting added).  We agree that 
these are proper factors to apply in cases involving child 
sexual assaults, in that they provide guidance to courts when 
applying the Holesome test and help determine whether a 
complaint and information are sufficient to satisfy due process. 
¶25 However, in R.A.R. the court of appeals refused to 
apply all seven Fawcett factors.  In R.A.R., the court 
determined that "the first three factors apply when the 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
15 
 
defendant claims that the State could have obtained a more 
definite date through diligent efforts."9  R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d at 
411.  Because the defendant in R.A.R. did not claim that the 
State could have obtained a more definite date through diligent 
efforts, the court did not consider the first three Fawcett 
factors.  Id.  As a result, the court of appeals considered only 
the last four Fawcett factors and held that the "charging 
periods set forth . . . are not sufficiently definite and that 
R.A.R. was not adequately informed of the charges against him."  
Id. at 413. 
 ¶26 The court's conclusion in R.A.R. was incorrect.  The 
court of appeals' decision below correctly noted that R.A.R. 
appeared to be in conflict with Fawcett.  Kempainen, 354 Wis. 2d 
177, ¶¶13-14.  Specifically, the court noted that  
in Fawcett, we stated that a court 'may look to the 
[first three factors]' when evaluating whether the 
prosecution was diligent, and further, that when 
assessing the overall reasonableness of the complaint 
under Holesome, relevant factors 'include but are not 
limited to' the last four factors.  Significantly, we 
then concluded that all seven factors can 'assist us 
in determining whether the Holesome test is satisfied' 
and proceeded to apply all seven factors. 
Id., ¶13 (internal citations omitted).  The court of appeals 
thus determined that "[t]o the extent R.A.R. suggests courts may 
                                                 
9 These factors are "(1) the age and intelligence of the 
victim and other witnesses; (2) the surrounding circumstances; 
and (3) the nature of the alleged offense, including whether it 
is likely to occur at a specific time or to have been discovered 
immediately."  R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d at 411 (quoting Fawcett, 145 
Wis. 2d at 253). 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
16 
 
not consider the first three Fawcett factors unless a defendant 
claims a lack of prosecutorial diligence, we cannot follow it."  
Id., ¶14. 
¶27 The court of appeals also explained that "only the 
supreme court . . . has the power to overrule, modify or 
withdraw language from a published opinion of the court of 
appeals."  Id. (quoting Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 
560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)).10  Furthermore, "[t]he ultimate question 
is whether the Holesome test has been met.  The seven 
Fawcett factors are tools to assist—not limitations upon—courts 
in answering this question.  A court may consider all of these 
factors, 
and 
others, 
if 
it 
deems 
them 
helpful 
in 
determining whether the requirements of Holesome are satisfied."  
Id., ¶15.   
¶28 The court of appeals reasoning in the present case is 
correct.  Courts are not confined solely to the seven Fawcett 
factors or any subset therein.  Rather, courts may consider 
these factors and any other relevant factors helpful in 
determining whether a complaint is sufficient to satisfy due 
process.  Because notice is concerned with whether the charging 
documents are sufficiently detailed so as to provide the 
defendant an opportunity to plead and prepare a defense, courts 
are not confined to only one set of factors when conducting 
                                                 
10 Both Fawcett and R.A.R. were decided in 1988.  However, 
Fawcett was decided May 18, 1988.  R.A.R. was decided on 
December 22, 1988. 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
17 
 
their inquiry.  The Holesome test requires courts to consider 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the nature of the 
accusations.  Cf. State v. Gaudesi, 112 Wis. 2d 213, 219, 332 
N.W.2d 302 (1983) ("The test under Wisconsin law of the 
sufficiency of the complaint is one of minimal adequacy, not in 
a hyper[-]technical but in a common sense evaluation, in setting 
forth 
the 
essential 
facts 
establishing 
probable 
cause.") 
(internal citations omitted).11  To the extent that R.A.R. 
conflicts with the holding in Fawcett, and thus limits the 
factors a court may consider when applying the Holesome test, it 
is overruled.   
¶29 There is good reason to overrule this portion of 
R.A.R.  First, a technical application of R.A.R.'s reasoning 
allows the defendant to plead so as to escape consideration of 
three factors that will often weigh against him.  Such an 
application is ripe for manipulation as a defendant could escape 
the first three Fawcett factors by simply remaining silent and 
refusing to argue that the State could have obtained a more 
definite date.  It would always be in a defendant's best 
interest to do this.  Further, the first three factors (the age 
and intelligence of the victim and other witnesses, the 
                                                 
11 In order to determine whether a complaint establishes 
probable 
cause, 
courts 
typically 
consider 
the 
following 
questions: who is charged; what is the person charged with; when 
did the alleged offense take place; where did the alleged 
offense take place; why is this particular person being charged; 
and who says so?  State v. Gaudesi, 112 Wis. 2d 213, 219, 332 
N.W.2d 302 (1983). 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
18 
 
surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the offense) are 
especially important given the nature of child sexual assault 
cases.  As the Fawcett court noted: 
[t]he child may have been assaulted by a trusted 
relative or friend and not know who to turn to for 
assistance and consolation.  The child may have been 
threatened and told not to tell anyone.  Even absent a 
threat, the child might harbor a natural reluctance to 
reveal information regarding the assault.  These 
circumstances many times serve to deter a child from 
coming forth immediately.  As a result, exactness as 
to the events fades in memory. 
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 249.  Second, the first three Fawcett 
factors necessarily inform other factors, such as the seventh 
factor, "the ability of the victim or complaining witness to 
particularize the date and time of the alleged transaction or 
offense."  Id. at 253.  It would be extremely difficult to 
consider the ability of a victim to particularize the date and 
time of the alleged crime without also considering the victim's 
age and intelligence, the surrounding circumstances, or the 
nature of the offense.  Finally, the R.A.R. decision rests upon 
a very narrow interpretation of Morris, which is at odds with 
its full holding.  Neither Morris nor Fawcett restrict a court's 
inquiry into the sufficiency of the charges based on the nature 
of the defendant's challenge. 
¶30 In sum, courts must apply the Holesome test by looking 
at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged 
complaint and information.  In cases involving the alleged 
sexual assault of a child, courts may be guided by the Fawcett 
factors, as well as any other relevant factors necessary for a 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
19 
 
determination of whether the complaint and information "states 
an offense to which [the defendant can] plead and prepare a 
defense."  Holesome, 40 Wis. 2d at 102.   
B. 
The Complaint and Information Are Sufficient to State an 
Offense to Which Kempainen Can Plead and Prepare a Defense. 
¶31 Having laid out the appropriate test for courts to 
follow, we now turn to the application of the Fawcett factors to 
Kempainen's case.  We hold that the complaint and information 
provided adequate notice and thus did not violate Kempainen's 
due process right to plead and prepare a defense. 
¶32 As the court of appeals did in both State v. Miller, 
2002 WI App 197, ¶30, 257 Wis. 2d 124, 650 N.W.2d 850, as well 
as Kempainen, we will "consider together the first three 
[Fawcett] factors," though courts may consider these factors 
separately.  Kempainen, 354 Wis. 2d 177, ¶16; Miller, 257 
Wis. 2d 124, 
¶30. 
 
These 
factors 
are 
(1) 
the 
age 
and 
intelligence of the victim and other witnesses; (2) the 
surrounding circumstances; and (3) the nature of the offense, 
including whether it is likely to occur at a specific time or is 
likely to have been discovered immediately.  Fawcett, 145 
Wis. 2d at 253.   
¶33 In the instant case, the victim was 8 years old when 
the first assault occurred and either 11 or 12 years old when 
the 
second 
assault 
occurred. 
 
Kempainen, 
the 
alleged 
perpetrator, was the victim's stepfather and held a position of 
authority over her.  As the court of appeals explained, 
Kempainen's position of dominance was highlighted by the sexual 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
20 
 
acts allegedly performed by him, "that is, he could do 
essentially whatever he wanted to [L.T.]"  Kempainen, 354 
Wis. 2d 177, ¶16.  In addition, approximately one week after the 
first incident, Kempainen allegedly called L.T. into the 
basement of the home and told her that she had been "bad" and 
warned her that if she told her mother, he would get in trouble.  
Following the second assault, L.T. was so afraid that she left 
her home and went to a friend's house.  A young girl in this 
situation would understandably be reluctant to tell anyone about 
the assaults at the time they occurred, and L.T.'s statements 
indicate that she was afraid of what would happen if she came 
forward.  It is also unlikely that the assaults would have 
occurred at a specific time.  Kempainen was L.T.'s stepfather, 
they lived in the same house, and the circumstances of the two 
assaults do not indicate that they occurred in conjunction with 
a specific date that would have stood out in a child's mind.  
Rather, they occurred during otherwise normal time periods.  
Given these circumstances, we conclude that the first three 
Fawcett factors weigh in favor of notice. 
¶34 The fourth Fawcett factor is the length of the alleged 
period of time in relation to the number of individual criminal 
acts alleged.  Here, the first assault occurred during a four 
month period, and the second assault occurred during a three-
and-a-half month period.  Kempainen claims that these ranges 
prevent him from preparing an alibi defense and are overly 
broad.  We are unpersuaded.  First, simply because a defendant 
wishes to assert an alibi defense does not change the fact that 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
21 
 
"where the date of the commission of the crime is not a material 
element of the offense charged, it need not be precisely 
alleged," Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 250, nor is time "of the 
essence in sexual assault cases."  Id.  In addition, 
[i]f we required that a complaint be dismissed for 
lack of specificity when a defendant indicated a 
desire to assert an alibi defense, such a holding 
would create potential for an untenable tactic: a 
defendant would simply have to interpose an alibi 
defense in order to escape prosecution once it became 
apparent that a child victim/witness was confused with 
respect to the date or other specifics of the alleged 
criminal event.  We decline to adopt such a rule. 
Id. at 254 n.3 (internal citation omitted).  We agree, and 
decline to adopt such a rule.  Ultimately, there is "little 
meaningful distinction between the individual offenses alleged 
to have occurred in this case within a four-month period (first 
offense) and a three-and-one-half-month period (second offense) 
and the two offenses alleged to have occurred over a six-month 
period in Fawcett."  Kempainen, 354 Wis. 2d 177, ¶19.  Thus, the 
fourth Fawcett factor weighs in favor of notice. 
¶35 The next two factors are related and take into account 
the passage of time between the alleged crime(s) and the 
defendant's arrest, and the length of time between the filing of 
the complaint and the alleged crime(s).  These two factors 
"address the problem of dimmed memories and the possibility that 
the defendant may not be able to sufficiently recall or 
reconstruct the history regarding the allegations."  Miller, 257 
Wis. 2d 124, ¶35.  In this case, the passage of time is the same 
for each factor.  The first alleged assault occurred between 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
22 
 
August 1 and December 1, 1997, and the second between March 1 
and June 15, 2001.  A total of 12 and 15 years elapsed between 
the alleged assaults and Kempainen's arrest and indictment. 
¶36 Typically, "[t]he statute of limitations is the 
principal device . . . to protect against prejudice arising from 
the lapse of time between the date of an alleged offense and an 
arrest."  Kempainen, 354 Wis. 2d 177, ¶21 (quoting State v. 
McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶45, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227).  
Here, a charge of first degree sexual assault of a child "may be 
commenced at any time," meaning there is no statute of 
limitations for the charges against Kempainen.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(2)(a)1 (2011-12).  However, "the statute of limitations 
is not the sole measure of a defendant's rights with respect to 
pre-indictment delay."  McGuire, 328 Wis. 2d 289, ¶45.  As we 
have stated, our test here is whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the complaint and information allege facts such 
that the defendant can plead and prepare a defense.  We cannot 
say that the passage of 12 to 15 years alone deprives Kempainen 
of due process.  Rather, we must consider why the delay occurred 
and how it impacts Kempainen's ability to prepare his defense. 
¶37 The complaint provides an explanation for the lengthy 
passage of time between the alleged assaults and Kempainen's 
arrest and charging.  In response to Detective Retzer's 
questions, L.T. explained that she did not come forward until 
2012 for a variety of reasons.  L.T. explained that she was 
afraid that her mother would be mad at her, and that she was 
afraid of what her mother would do to Kempainen.  It was not 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
23 
 
until L.T.'s boyfriend informed L.T.'s mother of the alleged 
assaults in early October 2012, that L.T. finally came forward. 
¶38 Generally, "child molestation is not an offense which 
lends itself to immediate discovery.  Revelation usually depends 
upon the ultimate willingness of the child to come forward."  
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 254.  There is no indication that L.T.'s 
delay in reporting the alleged assaults was for any improper 
purpose.  Nor is there any indication that the investigation was 
delayed once the assaults were reported.  It may be true that 
the passage of 12 and 15 years from the dates of the assaults 
makes a particular defense more difficult; it is equally true, 
however, that it makes prosecution of the offenses more 
difficult.  Further, if Kempainen wishes to challenge L.T.'s 
explanation for waiting to come forward, that is a question of 
credibility "left to the province of the jury."  Miller, 257 
Wis. 2d 124, ¶20.  Indeed, due to the nature of the allegations, 
L.T.'s credibility will likely be a central issue at trial.  
This is not a case of mistaken identity, and an alibi defense is 
not likely to be available to Kempainen.  See People v. Jones, 
792 P.2d 643, 657 (Cal. 1990) (noting that "if the defendant has 
lived with the victim for an extensive, uninterrupted period and 
therefore had continuous access to the victim, neither alibi nor 
wrongful identification is likely to be an available defense").  
A challenge to the victim's credibility does not, however, 
affect "the legality of the prosecution in the first instance."  
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 254. 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
24 
 
¶39 Even though there is no indication of impropriety due 
to the passage of time in this case, in order to satisfy due 
process we must still consider how it impacts Kempainen's 
ability to prepare a defense.  Kempainen argues that the passage 
of time prevents him from putting forth an alibi defense, but, 
as we have already explained, a victim is not required to allege 
a specific date for the assault simply because a defendant has a 
preferred defense.  To do so would place "an impossible burden" 
on the State to "pinpoint dates" in order to satisfy due process 
notice requirements.  State v. Stark, 162 Wis. 2d 537, 545, 470 
N.W.2d 317 (Ct. App. 1991).  In addition, the mere existence of 
alibi evidence "does not raise reasonable doubt as a matter of 
law[, and] is merely additional evidence which can be weighed 
and disregarded if not believed by the jury."  Id., at 548 
(citations omitted).  Kempainen has not articulated any way in 
which the charging periods have impaired his ability to prepare 
a defense, only that the charges make it difficult to prepare 
his preferred defense.  Thus, because the passage of time has 
not impaired Kempainen's ability to prepare a defense, the fifth 
and sixth Fawcett factors weigh in favor of notice. 
¶40 The final Fawcett factor concerns the victim's ability 
to particularize the date and time of the alleged offense.  
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 253.  While the complaint does not 
provide a specific date for either assault, it does provide 
specific times of day.  The first assault allegedly occurred 
late at night while L.T. slept on the living room couch.  The 
second assault allegedly occurred at approximately 4:00 PM, 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
25 
 
while L.T. waited to wake Kempainen for work.  This precision in 
identifying the time of day the assaults occurred, together with 
the detail L.T. provided regarding the specific sexual acts done 
to her, indicates that L.T. was able to identify the time of day 
and 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
alleged 
assaults 
with 
reasonable 
certainty. 
¶41 Taking account of all of the circumstances surrounding 
the charges against Kempainen, we hold that he was given 
sufficient notice of the nature of the charges against him and 
that he is able to plead and prepare a defense.  Despite the 
passage of 12 and 15 years from the dates of the alleged 
assaults, the complaint puts forth sufficient detail such that 
Kempainen was aware of the charges against him. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶42 We hold that in child sexual assault cases, courts may 
apply the seven factors outlined in Fawcett, and may consider 
any other relevant factors necessary to determine whether the 
complaint and information "states an offense to which [the 
defendant can] plead and prepare a defense."  Holesome, 40 
Wis. 2d at 102.  No single factor is dispositive, and not every 
Fawcett factor will necessarily be present in all cases.  
Second, we hold that the complaint and information provided 
adequate notice of when the alleged crimes occurred and thus did 
not violate Kempainen's due process right to plead and prepare a 
defense.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals and remand to 
the circuit court with the instructions to reinstate the 
complaint and information against Kempainen. 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
26 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause remanded for reinstatement of the 
complaint and information and for further proceedings. 
 
 
No. 
2013AP1531-CR   
 
 
 
1