Title: Payne v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S-CR-313
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2020

I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-313 
Jesse L. Payne, 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v–
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: October 15, 2019 | Decided: May 18, 2020 
Appeal from the Parke Circuit Court, 
No. 61C01-0505-FB-79 
The Honorable Sam A. Swaim, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 18A-CR-1359 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice David concur.  
Justice Massa dissents with separate opinion in which Justice Slaughter joins. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 18 2020, 2:44 pm
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Goff, Justice. 
  Our criminal legal system rests on the basic assumption that humans 
are rational agents of free will with the ability to exercise conscious choice 
in their everyday actions. So, when an individual possesses “sufficient 
mental capacity to fully comprehend the character and consequences of a 
criminal act,” the law holds him responsible accordingly. Goodwin v. State, 
96 Ind. 550, 563 (1883). The corollary to this maxim holds that “mental 
unsoundness does not merely mitigate the offence but excuses it.” Id. at 
576. That is, a person is not responsible for his conduct “if, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
the conduct at the time of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a) (2019).  
The defendant here has long suffered from acute mental illness, having 
spent most of his life under psychiatric care for chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia and delusional disorder. After confessing to burning down 
two bridges (and attempting to burn another), he spent the next eleven 
years undergoing competency restoration before standing trial, only to be 
found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI)1 by a jury and sentenced to the 
maximum aggregate term of ninety years in prison—all despite expert 
consensus that he was legally insane.  
Because the State presented insufficient demeanor evidence with which 
to rebut both the unanimous expert opinion and Payne’s well-
documented history of mental illness, we reverse the GBMI conviction to 
find him not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). On remand, we instruct 
the trial court, upon the State’s petition, to hold a hearing for Payne’s 
involuntary commitment under Indiana Code section 35-36-2-4.  
 
1 A GBMI verdict requires an evaluation and treatment of the defendant’s mental illness 
during incarceration “in such a manner as is psychiatrically indicated,” but otherwise imposes 
a criminal sentence “in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense.” I.C. § 35-
36-2-5(a), (c). 
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Factual and Procedural History 
In 2005, the State charged then thirty-five-year-old Jesse Payne with 
two counts of arson, accusing him of burning down two of Parke County’s 
historic landmarks: the Bridgeton Covered Bridge in 2005 and the Jeffries 
Ford Covered Bridge in 2002. Payne also stood accused of the attempted 
2005 arson of the Mansfield Covered Bridge. The State supplemented 
these charges with a habitual-offender enhancement. The trial court found 
him incompetent to stand trial until 2016. At his jury trial two years later, 
Payne asserted the insanity defense. Three court-appointed mental-health 
experts—two psychiatrists and a psychologist—unanimously concluded 
that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and delusional disorder, 
rendering him unable to distinguish right from wrong. Despite this expert 
unanimity, the jury rejected the insanity defense, finding Payne GBMI on 
all counts.  
The trial court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Payne to 
the Department of Correction for the maximum allowed by statute: 
twenty years for each count with a thirty-year enhancement for his 
habitual-offender status—each sentence to be served consecutively for an 
aggregate term of ninety years.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the demeanor evidence of 
Payne’s deliberate, premediated conduct was sufficient to support the 
jury’s conclusion that he was sane at the time of his offenses, despite 
expert opinion to the contrary.2 
 
2 The panel also (1) held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Payne’s 
polygraph, custodial statements, and confession; (2) affirmed Payne’s ninety-year sentence 
under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B); (3) affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to 
transfer venue; and (4) affirmed the trial court’s finding that the 2005 arson and attempted 
arson amounted to two separate offenses rather than a single episode of criminal conduct. 
Payne contests neither the third nor fourth issues on transfer, and we need not resolve the 
first or second issues because of our decision to reverse on the issue of insanity. 
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Standard of Review 
On review of a GBMI verdict, this Court will affirm the trial court’s 
decision “unless ‘the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the 
conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was 
committed.’” Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997, 1002 (Ind. 2018) (citation 
omitted). We do “not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of 
witnesses but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the 
judgment.” Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). And while 
the factfinder’s determination “that ‘a defendant was not insane at the 
time of the offense warrants substantial deference,’” Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 
1002 (citation omitted), the inferences drawn by the factfinder from the 
evidence at trial must be “reasonable and logical,” Thompson, 804 N.E.2d 
at 1149.  
Discussion and Decision 
In Barcroft, this Court affirmed the defendant’s GBMI conviction for the 
murder of her family pastor, citing her “deliberate, premeditated conduct 
in the weeks and days leading up to the crime,” along with her efforts to 
avoid detection of her criminal conduct during and after the crime. 111 
N.E.3d at 1005. This “evidence of Barcroft’s demeanor—taken together 
with the flaws in the expert opinion testimony and the absence of a well-
documented history of mental illness—was sufficient to support an 
inference of sanity.” Id. at 1008. 
In distinguishing this case from Barcroft, Payne argues that evidence of 
his insanity “is overwhelming,” a finding confirmed by each of the court-
appointed experts. Appellant’s Br. at 27. And “in light of his chronic 
schizophrenia and fixed delusion,” he insists, evidence of his demeanor is 
simply “not probative of sanity.” Id. at 20. To affirm the GBMI verdict, he 
contends, would conflict with the holding in Barcroft, effectively creating 
an “impossible standard of review.” Pet. to Trans. at 17. 
We agree. 
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I. Absent conflict in expert opinion, Payne’s long and 
well-documented history of mental illness clearly 
supports a finding of insanity. 
A defendant pleading insanity bears the burden, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, of proving that affirmative defense. I.C. § 35-41-4-1(b) (2017). 
And the factfinder, whether judge or jury, may consider all relevant 
evidence in reaching a verdict. Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1002–03. This 
evidence may include testimony from expert witnesses, proof of the 
defendant’s demeanor at the time of the offense, and the defendant’s 
history of mental illness. Id. at 1003, 1008. 
Here, the evidence leads only to the conclusion that Payne was insane 
at the time he committed the offenses. 
A. The unanimous expert opinion laid a solid foundation 
for establishing Payne’s insanity. 
Mental-health experts, whether retained by the parties or appointed by 
the court, offer their opinions on a defendant’s mental condition to assist 
the factfinder in deciding whether the defendant was insane at the time of 
the offense. Id. at 1003. Expert opinion is “purely advisory” and a 
factfinder may discredit their testimony, or disregard it completely, in lieu 
of other probative evidence. Id. Still, experts are “central to a 
determination of insanity.” Id. And their opinion that the defendant was 
insane at the time of the offense offers “a strong justification for raising the 
insanity defense” to begin with. Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, all three court-appointed experts—two psychiatrists and a 
psychologist—unanimously opined that Payne suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia and delusional disorder. Dr. Ashan Mahmood testified that 
“the records have been quite consistent” in showing Payne’s “long term 
mental illness,” an illness accompanied by a “pattern of delusions, 
hallucinations, non-adherence to medications,” and psychiatric treatment. 
Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 74–75. Payne’s schizophrenia and delusional disorder, Dr. 
Mahmood opined, ultimately precluded him from appreciating the 
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wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offenses. The other two 
experts, Dr. Rebecca Mueller and Dr. Jeffrey Huttinger, likewise 
concluded that Payne was legally insane when he committed the offenses. 
And Dr. Huttinger further explained that Payne’s demeanor, though 
superficially normal to a casual observer, was not necessarily inconsistent 
with schizophrenia when his actions were “driven by some type of 
delusion.” Id. at 112–18. 
In Barcroft, as in this case, all three mental-health experts testified that 
the defendant was legally insane, unable to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of her actions at the time of the crime. 111 N.E.3d at 999–1000. The Court, 
however, found several “flaws” and “inconsistencies” in the experts’ 
opinions. Id. at 1008. Conflicting diagnoses, inadequate document review, 
deficient psychiatric evaluations, and other issues, the Court concluded, 
“support[ed] the trial court’s rejection of Barcroft’s insanity defense.” Id. at 
1006–08. 
The record here, by contrast, reveals no discrepancies in diagnosis, no 
deficiency in evaluations, and no other substantive issues with the 
experts’ opinion. To be sure, Dr. Mahmood testified that he “d[id] not 
have a very strong opinion” of whether Payne “appreciated the 
wrongfulness of his conduct” at the time of the 2005 arson. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 
92–93. But this uncertainty arose in part from the comparatively stronger 
symptoms of psychosis Payne demonstrated at the time of the 2002 arson. 
Regardless, while conflicting expert testimony may create a presumption 
of sanity, a “conflict does not exist” when “one or several experts testify 
that the defendant was insane” and “another expert testifies that he or she 
is unable to give [such] an opinion” or, as here, a “strong” opinion. See 
Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 710 (Ind. 2010) (emphasis added). See also 
Lawson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (same), trans. 
denied.  
In short, this unanimous expert opinion laid a solid foundation for 
establishing Payne’s insanity. And the lack of “flaws” or “inconsistencies” 
in this expert opinion lends strong support to this conclusion. Cf. Barcroft, 
111 N.E.3d at 1006–08. 
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B. Payne’s well-documented history of mental illness 
deprives any relevant demeanor evidence of its 
probative value. 
When, as here, there is no conflict in expert opinion, there must be 
other probative evidence from which to infer the defendant’s sanity. Id. at 
1003. This may include evidence of the defendant’s demeanor at the time 
of the offense. Id. This evidence, which centers on the defendant’s actions 
and statements, may sufficiently prove the defendant’s sanity, even when 
expert witnesses conclude otherwise. Id. at 1004.  
In Barcroft, this Court cited the defendant’s “premeditated conduct in 
the weeks and days leading up to the crime,” her purchase of a handgun 
and ammunition, her preparation of farewell letters to members of her 
family, and her overall “calculated attempt to evade detection or to 
obscure her identity” on the day of the murder. Id. at 1005. This “ample 
demeanor evidence,” the Court concluded, reasonably “support[ed] the 
trial court’s rejection of Barcroft’s insanity defense.” Id. (emphasis added).  
Here, the prosecutor at trial introduced demeanor evidence to “show 
consciousness of guilt,” including Payne’s effort to avoid witnesses by 
acting late at night, his deceptive explanation to police that he had 
purchased the fuel found in his car for camping, and his attempt at 
establishing an alibi by presenting convenience store receipts. Tr. Vol. 5, 
pp. 199, 202–04. Standing alone, this evidence could, as in Barcroft, 
reasonably lead to an inference that Payne appreciated the wrongfulness 
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of his conduct at the time of the offense.3 Demeanor evidence, however, 
“must be considered as a whole, in relation to all the other evidence.” 
Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 714. See also Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1004–08 
(weighing the totality of the evidence). An analytical approach to the 
contrary “would give carte blanche to the trier of fact and make appellate 
review virtually impossible.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 714 (citing cases in 
which trial courts have found evidence of flight from police and evidence 
of cooperation with police both probative of a defendant’s sanity). See also 
Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1005 (recognizing that the defendant’s decision to 
spare the life of a witness to the crime could reflect either insanity, as the 
experts opined, or “an understanding that killing is wrong”). It would 
also render meaningless the statutory requirement that the trial court 
appoint two or three “competent” and “disinterested” mental-health 
professionals “who have expertise in determining insanity.” See I.C. § 35-
36-2-2(b) (2019). 
To be sure, “demeanor evidence may sufficiently prove a defendant’s 
sanity, even when expert and lay witnesses conclude otherwise.” Barcroft, 
111 N.E.3d at 1004. But analysis of that evidence forms only part of our 
inquiry. We must also look to the defendant’s history of mental illness—
an equally relevant “circumstance that a fact-finder may consider in 
evaluating an insanity defense.” Id. at 1008 (citation omitted). And “when 
a defendant has a serious and well-documented mental disorder, such as 
 
3 This demeanor evidence, Payne contends, does not show that he “appreciated the moral 
wrongfulness of his actions,” as the proper legal standard requires. Pet. to Trans. at 17–18. See 
Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 614, 251 N.E.2d 429, 437 (1969) (adopting the “wrongfulness” 
standard under the ALI’s Model Penal Code test for insanity to protect the defendant who 
“appreciated the fact that his conduct was criminal but because of a delusion, believed it to be 
morally justified”); I.C. Ann. § 35-41-3-6(a) cmt. at 227 (West 1978) (noting that this section 
codified the “[MPC] test for insanity that was adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court in Hill v. 
State”); Pub. L. No. 184-1984, § 1, 1984 Ind. Acts 1501, 1501 (repealing the volitional, or 
“irresistible impulse,” prong of the insanity test but leaving in place the existing 
“wrongfulness” standard), codified at I.C. § 35-41-3-6(a). Whatever the merits of this argument, 
we find it unnecessary to resolve, as Payne’s well-documented and consistent history of 
mental illness leads us “only to the conclusion that [Payne] was insane when the crime was 
committed.” See Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710 (citation omitted). 
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schizophrenia,” the probative value of demeanor evidence effectively 
dissolves. Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 713 (citation omitted). 
In Barcroft, this Court pointed to “the absence of a well-documented 
history of mental illness” to support an inference of sanity. 111 N.E.3d at 
1008 (emphasis added). With only “periodic psychiatric assessments on an 
outpatient basis” and with no formal diagnosis of “schizophrenia, 
delusional disorder, or other acute mental illness,” Barcroft’s 
“questionable” history of mental illness (as her medical record described 
it) offered little evidentiary support for her insanity defense. Id. 
Unlike Barcroft’s sparse medical record, Payne’s long history of mental 
illness is consistent and thoroughly documented. Payne first received 
mental-health treatment at the age of thirteen, inaugurating what would 
become a lifetime of involuntary commitments and psychiatric 
hospitalizations. Diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia in 2000, 
Payne has since been treated with a veritable cocktail of antipsychotic 
medications, including Risperdal, Prolixin, and Haldol. Mental-health 
evaluations over the ensuing decade regularly affirmed his schizophrenia 
diagnosis, reporting on a consistent pattern of hallucinations and 
delusional episodes. Doctors have also diagnosed Payne with 
polysubstance abuse and anti-social personality disorder, further evidence 
of amplified mental illness.  
Critically, the record reveals no deviation from these findings over the 
decades. Even when providers in 2016 deemed Payne competent to stand 
trial, there was no change to his schizophrenia diagnosis. As his 
psychiatrist explained, Payne fully understood the charges against him 
and could effectively participate in his defense only because “his 
psychotic symptoms [were] well controlled” by adhering to a strict 
regimen of antipsychotic medications. Ex. Vol. 7, p. 101.  
Even then, Payne’s delusional worldview persisted. Indeed, the trial 
transcript reveals that, despite the repression of any outward psychotic 
symptoms, he possessed little if any rational thought. With no obvious 
evidence of feigning, Payne testified to an elaborate conspiracy involving 
criminal activity and obstruction of justice by various government 
officials. These officials, he attested, had threatened, “terrorized,” and 
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physically abused him as a “strategy to stop [him] from exposing” their 
misdeeds. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 228, 245; Tr. Vol. 5, p. 7; Ex. Vol. 6 of 8, p. 87. 
Driven by personal “morals and ethics,” Payne considered himself an 
“informant,” dutybound to report these officials to the county prosecutor 
“for the future of our children, for our present state, [and] for society.” Tr. 
Vol. 5, p. 3.  
This well-documented and consistent history of mental illness, along 
with the unanimous expert opinion, fully undermines the probative value 
of any relevant demeanor evidence. And with no “reasonable [or] logical” 
inferences to draw from the evidence in support of the verdict, see 
Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149, we come “only to the conclusion that 
[Payne] was insane when the crime[s were] committed,” see Galloway, 938 
N.E.2d at 710 (citation omitted). Cf. Lawson, 966 N.E.2d at 1282 (opining 
that the “lack of a long-standing history of mental illness,” though not 
dispositive, may support an inference of sanity). To be sure, the 
“factfinder’s determination that ‘a defendant was not insane at the time of 
the offense warrants substantial deference from’ an appellate court.” 
Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1003 (citation omitted). But this standard does not 
and should not deprive this Court of meaningful appellate review. To 
conclude otherwise would amount to an abdication of our constitutional 
duty. See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4. 
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Conclusion 
Despite its reputation as a “get out of jail free” card,4 an insanity 
acquittal in Indiana requires the prosecuting attorney to petition the trial 
court for an involuntary commitment proceeding. See I.C. § 35-36-2-4(a) 
(2019). The trial court may then order a defendant committed to “an 
appropriate facility” or “therapy program” if it finds by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that the defendant is “mentally ill and either 
dangerous or gravely disabled.” I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e); I.C. § 12-26-7-5(a). A 
regular commitment continues until the individual is “discharged from 
the facility” or “released from the therapy program,” or when the court 
orders a termination or release. I.C. § 12-26-7-5(b). As a further safeguard, 
the superintendent of the commitment facility, along with the patient’s 
attending physician, must conduct and file with the court periodic 
reviews throughout the commitment. I.C. § 35-36-2-4(d); I.C. § 12-26-15-1. 
Notably, Indiana, like most states, imposes no limit on the duration of 
a commitment. So long as “the nature and duration of the detention [are] 
tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns,” the state might 
continue the commitment indefinitely, even if the person “has regained 
sanity.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87–88 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). See also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361–70 (1983) 
(holding that a defendant who successfully establishes the insanity 
 
4 Our case law implicating the insanity defense reflects this stubbornly persistent view. See 
Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ind. 2000) (quoting skeptical prospective jurors 
who, during voir dire, referred to the insanity defense as a “cop-out,” a “loophole,” and “a 
way to get a lesser plea”); Caldwell v. State, 722 N.E.2d 814, 816–17 (Ind. 2000) (finding 
reversible error when the trial court failed to either admonish the jury or give the defendant’s 
tendered instructions after the prosecutor implicitly argued in closing that the defendant 
would walk free if he were found NGRI); Dipert v. State, 259 Ind. 260, 262, 286 N.E.2d 405, 407 
(1972) (concluding that, while a defendant claiming insanity is typically “not entitled to an 
instruction as to what post-trial procedures are available to determine whether he should be 
released or subjected to confinement in a mental institution,” the defendant “will be entitled 
to inform the jury of such procedures where an erroneous view of the law on this subject has 
been planted in their minds”). 
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defense may be committed to a mental institution based on the insanity 
judgment alone).  
Because the State presented insufficient demeanor evidence with which 
to rebut the unanimous expert opinion and evidence of Payne’s well-
documented history of mental illness, we reverse the GBMI conviction to 
find Payne NGRI. On remand, we instruct the trial court to hold a hearing 
on the State’s petition for Payne’s commitment to “an appropriate facility” 
or “therapy program.” See I.C. § 35-36-2-4(a); I.C. § 12-26-6-8(a); I.C. § 12-
26-7-5(a). 
Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur. 
Massa, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Slaughter, J., joins. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Stacy R. Uliana 
Bargersville, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLE E  
Ian McLean 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
Massa, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from this opinion fundamentally misapplying the 
time-honored standard of review this Court recently reaffirmed in Barcroft 
v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997 (Ind. 2018). Today, the Court reverses a unanimous 
jury verdict rejecting the insanity defense, despite acknowledging the 
“‘substantial deference’” we should show that decision. Ante, at 4 (quoting 
Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1002). Instead, because we shouldn’t undermine 
this factfinder’s determination “‘unless the evidence is without conflict 
and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the 
crime was committed,’” ibid. (quoting Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1002) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), we should affirm.  
The Court plainly states that evidence of Payne’s demeanor—that is his 
behavior before, during, and after the offenses—conflicts with the expert 
testimony and his documented history of mental illness. Payne strived to 
“avoid witnesses by acting late at night.” Ibid. at 7; see Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d 
at 1005 (Barcroft “planned to confront the pastor during the early morning 
hours, before the day’s activities had started and to avoid potential 
witnesses.”). Payne deceptively explained “to police that he had 
purchased the fuel found in his car for camping.” Ante, at 7; see Barcroft, 
111 N.E.3d at 1005 (Barcroft kept her gun “concealed in her front pocket” 
while talking with a witness.). And Payne tried to establish “an alibi by 
presenting convenience store receipts.” Ante, at 7; see Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d 
at 1005–06 (Barcroft remarked to a detective “that she had ‘actually 
planned on not getting caught.’”). 
“Standing alone,” the Court opines, “this evidence could, as in Barcroft, 
reasonably lead to an inference that Payne appreciated the wrongfulness 
of his conduct at the time of the offense.” Ante, at 7–8. But under our 
deferential standard, this demeanor evidence indicative of sanity—even 
“standing alone”—compels our affirmance. The longstanding test 
recognized by the Court bears repeating: we must affirm “‘unless the 
evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the 
defendant was insane when the crime was committed.’” Ibid. at 4 (quoting 
Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1002) (internal quotation marks omitted). See 
generally Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 710 (Ind. 2010); Thompson v. 
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Page 2 of 2 
State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); Robinette v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1162, 
1167 (Ind. 2001); Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Ind. 1998); Gambill v. 
State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 672 (Ind. 1996); Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 64 
(Ind. 1995); Metzler v. State, 540 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ind. 1989); Rogers v. State, 
514 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (Ind. 1987); Mason v. State, 451 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind. 
1983); Thomas v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 1981).  
The Court ultimately does not—and cannot—conclude that the 
evidence of Payne’s insanity is without conflict. Instead, it asserts that 
there is “no ‘reasonable [or] logical’ inferences to draw from the evidence 
in support of the verdict.” Ante, at 10 (quoting Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 
1149). But as noted above through the Court’s own words, the jury could 
reasonably and logically infer sanity based on Payne’s behavior before, 
during, and after the crimes. Indeed, the Court notes that Galloway cited 
“cases in which trial courts have found evidence of flight from police and 
evidence of cooperation with police both probative of a defendant’s 
sanity” and that Barcroft recognized “that the defendant’s decision to 
spare the life of a witness to the crime could reflect either insanity, as the 
experts opined, or ‘an understanding that killing is wrong.’” Ibid. at 8 
(citing Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 714; Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1005). That 
demeanor evidence can often lead to different inferences underscores why 
we should leave this determination undisturbed. 
In the end, the Court discounts the evidence of Payne’s demeanor, 
elevates the documentation of his mental illness, reweighs the conflicting 
evidence, and supplants the factfinder’s determination. I fear the Court’s 
opinion, by flouting our standard of review, quiets the immutable trust 
we place in factfinders and permits appellate courts to inconsistently 
establish rejected insanity defenses. Yes, our appellate review must mean 
something. See ibid. at 10 (“[T]his standard does not and should not 
deprive this Court of meaningful appellate review.”). But that oversight 
must uniformly flow from the proper standard of review. Because today’s 
opinion does not, I respectfully dissent. 
Slaughter, J., joins.