Title: Smith Mountain Bldg. Supply v. Windstar Properties
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 080651
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2009

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
SMITH MOUNTAIN BUILDING SUPPLY, LLC 
 
 
                             OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
v.  Record Nos. 080651 and 080652      ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
   
February 27, 2009 
WINDSTAR PROPERTIES, LLC 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
William N. Alexander, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we determine whether the trial court 
erred in declaring invalid and unenforceable two mechanic's 
liens without allowing the lien claimant to present evidence 
that its inclusion in the memoranda of charges outside the 150-
day limitation period in Code § 43-4 was an "inaccuracy" within 
the meaning of Code § 43-15. 
I 
 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Smith Mountain 
Building Supply, LLC (Smith Mountain), supplied materials to a 
general contractor for the construction of a home on each of two 
properties owned by Windstar Properties, LLC (Windstar).  Smith 
Mountain furnished materials to the jobs from June 24, 2005, to 
March 9, 2006.  March 9, 2006 is the last day Smith Mountain 
supplied materials to the jobs.  The 150-day limitation period 
prescribed by Code § 43-4, therefore, is October 10, 2005, 
through March 9, 2006. 
 
Smith Mountain filed its memoranda of mechanic's lien on 
June 9, 2006.  The amount claimed on one of the memoranda is 
$15,253.44.  The amount claimed on the other of the memoranda is 
$51,835.34.  The charges for materials properly recoverable 
during the 150-day limitation period are $1,422.80 and 
$13,593.65, respectively. 
II 
 
Smith Mountain filed two actions against Windstar to 
enforce its mechanic's liens.  Windstar filed motions for 
summary judgment, asserting that the mechanic's liens sought to 
be enforced by Smith Mountain were invalid under Code § 43-4 
because they included sums due for materials furnished more than 
150 days prior to the last day on which materials were supplied 
to the jobs preceding the filing of the memoranda.  Windstar 
relied upon Carolina Builders Corp. v. Cenit Equity Co., 257 Va. 
405, 512 S.E.2d 550 (1999). 
 
Smith Mountain opposed the motions for summary judgment, 
asserting that its inclusion of sums due for materials furnished 
outside the limitation period is an inaccuracy that does not 
invalidate the liens under Code § 43-15 and that it was entitled 
to present evidence that its inclusion of such sums was an 
inaccuracy, rather than a mistake.  Smith Mountain relied upon 
Reliable Constructors, Inc. v. CFJ Properties, 263 Va. 279, 559 
S.E.2d 681 (2002). 
 
The trial court heard the two actions together and, upon 
the pleadings, memoranda of the parties, and argument of 
 
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counsel, granted Windstar's motions for summary judgment and 
dismissed Smith Mountain's actions to enforce the mechanic's 
liens.  The trial court determined that the inclusion of sums 
for materials supplied outside the 150-day limitation period 
rendered the mechanic's liens invalid and unenforceable.  The 
trial court also determined that Reliable Constructors did not 
apply.  We awarded Smith Mountain this appeal. 
III 
 
Code § 43-4 provides, in pertinent part, that "no 
memorandum filed . . . shall include sums due for labor or 
materials furnished more than 150 days prior to the last day on 
which labor was performed or material furnished to the job 
preceding the filing of such memorandum."  Code § 43-15 provides 
as follows: 
No inaccuracy in the memorandum filed, or in the 
description of the property to be covered by the lien, 
shall invalidate the lien, if the property can be 
reasonably identified by the description given and the 
memorandum conforms substantially to the requirements 
of §§ 43-5, 43-8 and 43-10, respectively, and is not 
wilfully false. 
 
On appeal, Smith Mountain contends that it should have been 
permitted to present evidence to show that its inclusion of 
charges outside the 150-day limitation period was an 
"inaccuracy" within the meaning of Code § 43-15.  Smith Mountain 
also contends that the two cases relied upon by the parties, 
Carolina Builders and Reliable Constructors, "reflect two 
 
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divergent rationals [sic] which cannot be reconciled."  Smith 
Mountain asserts that substantial compliance is the appropriate 
standard to apply in the present case. 
 
Windstar contends that Code § 43-4 must be strictly 
construed and that Smith Mountain's inclusion of charges outside 
the limitation period renders its mechanic's liens 
unenforceable.  Windstar also contends that Code § 43-15 is not 
applicable in, and that Reliable Constructors is distinguishable 
from, the present case. 
IV 
 
We do not agree with Smith Mountain that Carolina Builders 
and Reliable Constructors cannot be reconciled, and we agree 
with Windstar and with the trial court that, pursuant to 
Carolina Builders, the mechanic's liens sought to be enforced by 
Smith Mountain are invalid and unenforceable.  Therefore, we 
will affirm the trial court's judgments invalidating the 
mechanic's liens. 
 
In Carolina Builders, the builder filed a memorandum of 
mechanic's lien for sums owed to it for materials it had 
supplied for the construction of a residence.  257 Va. at 407, 
512 S.E.2d at 550-51.  The memorandum included sums due for 
materials furnished prior to the 150-day limitation period, and 
one of the defendants in the builder's enforcement action filed 
a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the lien was 
 
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invalid under Code § 43-4.  Id. at 408, 512 S.E.2d at 551.  The 
trial court agreed.  Id. at 409, 512 S.E.2d at 551.  In 
affirming the judgment of the trial court, we concluded that the 
150-day limitation period "is one of the prerequisites required 
by Code § 43-4 in order to perfect a mechanic's lien," and we 
cited the longstanding rule that "statutes dealing with the 
existence and perfection of a mechanic's lien must . . . be 
strictly construed."  Id. at 410-11, 512 S.E.2d at 552-53.  We 
also noted that Code § 43-15 was not applicable.  Id. at 411 
n.2, 512 S.E.2d at 553 n.2. 
 
In Reliable Constructors, a subcontractor that had supplied 
labor and materials for plumbing and mechanical work to a travel 
plaza construction project filed a memorandum of mechanic's 
lien, which it sought to enforce.  263 Va. at 280, 559 S.E.2d at 
682.  The memorandum included a claim for reimbursement of a 
$250 fine that had been levied against the subcontractor by the 
Commonwealth for failure to provide on-site hand-washing 
facilities for the subcontractor's employees.  Id.  The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lien 
was invalid under Code § 43-4 because the fine had been levied 
prior to the 150-day limitation period.  Id. at 281, 559 S.E.2d 
at 682.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the 
subcontractor's enforcement action.  Id.  In reversing the 
judgment of the trial court, we held that the subcontractor 
 
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should have been permitted to present evidence that the 
inclusion of the fine in the memorandum constituted an 
inaccuracy within the meaning of Code § 43-15 and that the 
inaccuracy was not willfully false.  Id. at 282, 559 S.E.2d at 
682-83.   
 
In reaching our holding in Reliable Constructors, we noted 
that "[t]he word 'inaccurate' is defined as:  'not accurate:  as 
. . . containing a mistake or error.' "  Id. at 282-83, 559 
S.E.2d at 682 (quoting Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1139 (1986)).  Thus, we focused on the nature of the 
sum erroneously included in the memorandum, and we distinguish 
Reliable Constructors on this basis.  A fine is clearly not a 
sum due for labor performed or materials furnished and is, 
therefore, not recoverable by a mechanic's lien.  The inclusion 
of a fine in a memorandum is akin to claming a larger sum than 
the lien claimant's proof would support rather than a violation 
of a statutory prerequisite to perfect a mechanic's lien. 
 
In the present case, Smith Mountain violated one of the 
prerequisites required by Code § 43-4 in order to perfect its 
mechanic's liens.  Code § 43-15 has no application. 
V 
 
 We hold, therefore, that the inclusion in the memoranda of 
charges for materials supplied outside the 150-day limitation 
period in Code § 43-4 rendered Smith Mountain's mechanic's liens 
 
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invalid and unenforceable and that the trial court did not err 
in so ruling.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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