Title: Myers v. State
Citation: 353 So. 2d 1364
Docket Number: 49848
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 1978

353 So. 2d 1364 (1978) Marvin MYERS, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 49848. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 11, 1978. Dodson, Kelly &amp; Butts, Robert J. Kelly, Oxford, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Frankie Walton White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before SUGG, WALKER and BROOM, JJ. SUGG, Justice, for the Court: This is the third appeal by defendant. His first conviction was reversed because a motion by defendant's court-appointed counsel to withdraw was heard out of defendant's presence. Myers v. State, 254 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 1971). Defendant's second conviction was reversed because he was effectively denied the right to counsel of his choice and because his motion to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony of a witness was overruled. Myers v. State, 296 So. 2d 695 (Miss. 1974). Defendant assigns as error that he was denied counsel of his choice in his third trial. With this we concur and reverse for a new trial. *1365 On April 7, 1975, the first day of the third trial, defendant made the following motion before the jury was empanelled: Defendant testified in support of his motion that he wanted John B. Farese and his law firm to represent him and that Mr. Farese (Sr.) had agreed to represent him. Various letters were offered as exhibits to the motion. Exhibit I was a letter dated July 10, 1974 signed by John B. Farese directed to defendant in which he stated that he would be happy to have Robert J. Kelly assist in the retrial of the case and that he and Mr. Kelly would visit defendant, who was in the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, to see about an early setting for retrial. On November 26, 1974, J. Kelly wrote John B. Farese that Kelly would be appointed to represent Myers unless an eligible member of the Farese firm announced to the court in writing that he would represent Myers. He further stated that an eligible member of the firm would be any member of the firm other than John Booth Farese, who was County Prosecuting Attorney of Benton County. In response thereto John B. Farese wrote the following letter dated November 27, 1974 to the circuit judge: On January 7, 1975 the district attorney wrote Robert J. Kelly the following letter: When the motion was made by defendant neither the judge, the district attorney, nor Robert J. Kelly knew that House Bill No. 746 General Laws of Mississippi (1975) was passed by the legislature on April 5, 1975 and approved by the Governor on April 7, 1975.[1] Mr. Farese made it clear in his letter of November 27, 1974 that he would represent Marvin Myers in the trial of his case if his son, John Booth Farese, would be permitted to participate. The letter is an unqualified offer of the Farese firm to represent the defendant, the defendant desired that the Farese firm represent him, and because the impediment against John Booth Farese participating in the trial was removed by the statute which became effective on the date of the trial, we hold that defendant was entitled to be represented by the Farese firm. We hold that the Farese firm is now counsel of record for the defendant and he is not entitled to have the court appoint another attorney to assist this firm in his fourth trial. It is unfortunate that the bill was passed, approved, and put into effect so that neither the court nor counsel were aware of the passage of the bill. This points up the fact that the legislature should not change existing judicial procedures by making acts of the legislature effective immediately, but should provide that such acts take effect at a future time so that courts and attorneys might have time to learn of statutory procedural changes. Because this case is being remanded for retrial, we deem it necessary to consider the following assignment of error: Defendant's motion for a change of venue was granted, and the trial was moved from DeSoto County to the First Judicial District of Panola County. Panola County was established in January, 1836 by Mississippi General Laws of 1836, page 12, and was divided into two judicial districts on January 31, 1880 by Chapter 25 Mississippi General Laws of 1880. Section 6 of the latter act provides: Defendant argues that, under our decisions, each district within a county is treated as if it were a separate county for jurisdictional purposes. Rogers v. State, 266 So. 2d 10 (Miss. 1972); Passons v. State, 208 Miss. 545, 45 So. 2d 131 (1950). We agree with defendant's contention that each judicial district within a two district county is to be treated as if each district were a separate county for jurisdictional purposes. However, this argument overlooks section 13-5-21 Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1977) which provides as follows: The above first appears as Section 755 Mississippi Code of 1871 and authorizes a trial court to summon a special venire from both districts within a county when the county contains more than one judicial district. In Burt v. State, 86 Miss. 280, 38 So. 233 (1905) we held this section applied to Perry County notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 116 Mississippi General Laws of 1892 which divided Perry County into two judicial districts and also provided that no person would be liable for jury service outside the district in which he lives. We held in Ferguson v. State, 107 Miss. 559, 65 So. 584 (1914) that, in a county having two circuit court districts, the venire may be drawn from both districts of the county, but where one jury box is exhausted it is not reversible error for the trial court to draw all names from the other district. In Taylor v. State, 148 Miss. 621, 114 So. 390 (1927), we held: Section 13-5-21 Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1977) specifically authorizes the trial court to require a juror to serve out of his district, (1) in its discretion and, (2) when such juror is drawn on a special venire. In a county having two judicial districts, the special venire may be drawn from both districts of the county, in the discretion of the trial judge. We therefore hold that the special venire was properly drawn from both districts of Panola County. Defendant also argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. We do not agree for several reasons. First, defendant had the venue changed from the county where the crime was committed and thereby prevented the state from trying his case in the county where the crime was committed. Second, the Sixth Amendment requirement that a defendant must be tried in a district, "which district shall have been previously ascertained by law" was met because Panola County was created in 1836, divided into two judicial districts in 1880 and the boundaries of the districts were fixed by law. Third, section 13-5-21 Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1977) authorizing the circuit court to draw a special venire from both judicial districts of a county meets the vicinage requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970); Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63 *1369 (D.C.Md. 1969); People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705 (1973). We therefore hold that selection of jurors from both judicial districts of Panola County meets the requirements of the Sixth Amendment and did not deny defendant due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant also contends that the court erred by permitting Miles Fowler to testify as a rebuttal witness. The testimony of Fowler was a proper subject of rebuttal and it was within the sound discretion of the court to allow the testimony. Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 827, 150 So. 774 (1933). The admission in rebuttal testimony rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and does not constitute reversible error, unless it is shown that no opportunity is afforded the defendant to reply by surrebuttal testimony. Gant v. State, 219 Miss. 800, 70 So. 2d 28 (1954). Defendant also argues that the testimony of Fowler with reference to the tracking by bloodhounds was inadmissible because the state failed to lay a proper predicate by proving that the bloodhounds were pure blood, properly trained and reliable. Hinton v. State, 175 Miss. 308, 166 So. 762 (1936); Fisher v. State, 150 Miss. 206, 116 So. 746 (1928); Harris v. State, 143 Miss. 102, 108 So. 446 (1926); Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 613, 46 So. 166, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 285 (1908). No preliminary proof was offered that the bloodhounds were of pure blood, had been well trained to track human beings, had been well tested by tracking other men and found reliable. However, defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection. The rule is well established that a contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve the right to raise an error on appeal. Ratliff v. State, 313 So. 2d 386 (Miss. 1975); Pittman v. State, 297 So. 2d 888 (Miss. 1974). In Blackwell v. State, 44 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1950), this Court stated: REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., INZER and SMITH, P. JJ., and ROBERTSON, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur. [1] Section 1. Section 19-23-13, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows: 19-23-13. The county prosecuting attorney shall not represent or defend any person in any criminal prosecution in the name of the state, county or municipality of the county, nor shall he give any advice against the state, his county or in a criminal case against a municipality of his county, and shall not represent any person in any case against the state, his county, or in a criminal case arising in a municipal court of his county. Nothing herein shall prohibit any county prosecuting attorney from defending any person in any criminal prosecution in any county not within the circuit court district of such county prosecuting attorney. Section 2. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.