Title: In re Estate of Jolliff
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91563
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2002

Docket No. 91563-Agenda 13-March 2002.

In re ESTATE OF WILLIE JOLLIFF, Deceased
(Edith Porter, Appellant, v. Cheryl Jolliff, Appellee).

								
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Edith Porter appeals the Cook County circuit court's order
holding section 18-1.1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS
5/18-1.1 (West 2000)) unconstitutional and dismissing her
statutory custodial claim under that section. We reverse and
remand.
BACKGROUND
	In 1970, Willie Jolliff and his wife, Dorothy, separated, but
subsequently never divorced. On March 28, 1977, Willie was
completely disabled after suffering a brain stem injury in a motor
vehicle accident. Three months later, Porter, Willie's sister, was
appointed conservator of his person and estate. Willie resided in
either a hospital or a skilled-care facility for nearly 10 years until
Porter brought him into her home in 1987, where he stayed for
more than 12 years. Willie died intestate on August 30, 1999.
Between 1977 and 1999, Porter collected $275,880 in conservator
fees and $70,925 in helper fees from Willie's guardianship estate.
	After Willie's death, Dorothy filed a petition for letters of
administration. Cheryl Jolliff, one of Willie and Dorothy's
daughters, was appointed independent administrator of Willie's
estate. On July 13, 2000, Porter filed a $200,000 statutory
custodial claim under section 18-1.1. Porter's claim stated:
			"Edith Porter, Sister of the deceased, was the plenary
Guardian of the Person and Guardian of the Estate for
Willie Jolliff, deceased, from the period 1977 though
August 30, 1999, the decedent's date of death. During the
period 1987 up to and including August 30, 1999, Edith
Porter was the primary caretaker and personally cared for
her brother, Willie Jolliff, who was adjudicated a disabled
person in the Circuit Court of Cook County in 1977. From
the period 1987 until the date of death in 1999, Willie
Jolliff resided full time with Edith Porter at her home. The
nature of Willie Jolliff's disabilities were extensive and
included the following: 100% physically disabled and
100% mentally disabled due to a brain stem injury; he was
unable to perform activities of daily living independently
such as bathing, grooming, dressing, meal preparation and
laundry; Mr. Jolliff was unable to transfer himself from
one body position to another without assistance; he
required full time assistance to attend any out of the home
function and/or activity.
			Edith Porter, now age 68, assumed full-time care of her
brother, Willie Jolliff since 1987. During the period 1977-1987, while Willie Jolliff was a full-time resident of a
skilled care facility, Edith Porter, as plenary guardian, was
very involved in the care, supervision and daily care plan
of Willie Jolliff."
	Cheryl filed a motion to dismiss Porter's claim, arguing that
section 18-1.1 violated various constitutional provisions. The trial
court agreed with Cheryl. The court held that section 18-1.1
violated both the special legislation clause and the equal protection
clause of the State constitution. Quoting an opinion by another
trial court judge, the court stated:
		" 'In this case the statute creates a gift for only certain
persons who provide care for the ward to the exclusion of
all others who could have provided the same care. The
determination that only the spouse, parent, brother, sister
or child of the ward may receive this gift excludes all
others who may be similarly situated. A doting niece,
nephew, grandchild or friend who otherwise meets the
requirements of Section 18-1.1 is denied the gift it
bestows. The classifications in the statute create a
situation for gifts for only certain persons, to the
exclusions of others, and therefore is a denial of equal
protection.
			***
			This court is unable to determine why only certain
relatives were selected to receive the gifts by means of
claims as stated in the statute. Moreover, Section [18-1],
the general law, should be applied in this instance.
Section [18-1] of the Probate Act clearly provides that a
claim may be filed against the estate of the disabled
person or a decedent for the care of a disabled person.' "
	The court also held that section 18-1.1 violates the due
process clause of the state constitution because it creates an
irrebuttable presumption that one of the beneficiaries named in the
statute, who lives with and cares for a disabled person for three
years, has suffered a minimum amount of damages. Again, quoting
the same trial judge, the court stated:
			" 'Such a presumption violates due process in that it is
arbitrary and unreasonable and denies heirs and legatees
their property without due process of law. *** The state
may have a legitimate purpose in compensating a person
who provides nursing and other care for a disabled
person, but it does not have an interest in providing a
"gift" to such a person in addition to the compensation
received for such care. The statute does not set forth any
requirement as to the proof necessary to show the extent
of care provided. Neither does it provide any facts or
standards to determine the percentage of disability in
order to determine the minimum award.' "
According to the court, the statute also was arbitrary because the
legislature failed to articulate a reason why the minimum amounts
were chosen.
	Finally, the court held that section 18-1.1 violates the
separation of powers provision of the state constitution because it
requires a court to award a statutory minimum amount without any
discretion to award a lesser amount. According to the court, the
legislature unconstitutionally encroached upon the power of the
judiciary to decide cases. The trial court dismissed Porter's claim,
and she appealed directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R.
302(a)(1).



ANALYSIS


	Section 18-1.1 provides:
			"Any spouse, parent, brother, sister, or child of a
disabled person who dedicates himself or herself to the
care of the disabled person by living with and personally
caring for the disabled person for at least 3 years shall be
entitled to a claim against the estate upon the death of the
disabled person. The claim shall take into consideration
the claimant's lost employment opportunities, lost
lifestyle opportunities, and emotional distress experienced
as a result of personally caring for the disabled person.
The claim shall be in addition to any other claim,
including without limitation a reasonable claim for
nursing and other care. The claim shall be based upon the
nature and extent of the person's disability and, at a
minimum but subject to the extent of the assets available,
shall be in the amounts set forth below:
				1. 100% disability, $100,000
				2. 75% disability, $75,000
				3. 50% disability, $50,000
				4. 25% disability, $25,000[.]"
		755 ILCS 5/18-1.1 (West 2000).(1)
	Under section 18-1.1 a claimant must meet two requirements:
(1) the claimant must be an immediate family member-a spouse,
parent, sibling, or child-of a disabled person; and (2) the claimant
must have dedicated himself or herself to the disabled person for
at least three years. The legislature referred to "living with and
personally caring for" a disabled person in describing the term
"dedicate," but that term encompasses more than care. See
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 589 (1993)
("dedicate" means "to commit to something as a constant goal or
way of life"). Section 18-1.1 laudably recognizes the often unseen
and intangible sacrifices made, and opportunities foregone, by
immediate family members who commit their lives every day to
making the lives of disabled persons better.
	All statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality,
and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of clearly
rebutting this presumption. Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57-58 (2001). A court will affirm a statute's constitutionality if the
statute is reasonably capable of such an interpretation. See Miller,
196 Ill. 2d  at 58; Delany v. Badame, 49 Ill. 2d 168, 171 (1971)
(this court will resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of a statute's
validity). The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, and
our review is de novo. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 31 (2001).
	In this appeal both Porter and Cheryl repeat the arguments
that they made before the trial court. We address these arguments
in turn.

Special Legislation/Equal Protection
	Porter asserts that the trial court erred in holding that section
18-1.1 violates the special legislation clause and the equal
protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. The special
legislation clause of our state constitution provides: "The General
Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is
or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be
made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §13. The equal protection clause provides:
"No person shall *** be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2.
	In defense of the trial court's holding, Cheryl initially
contends that section 18-1.1 is special legislation because a
general law, section 18-1(a) of the Probate Act, already allows
anyone to bring nursing care claims against a disabled person's
estate. Section 18-1(a) provides for the filing of claims against an
estate. See 755 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2000) ("A claim against the
estate of a decedent or ward, whether based on contract, tort,
statutory custodial claim or otherwise, may be filed with the
representative or the court or both"). Section 18-1(a), however, is
not a general law as we have used that term. See County of Bureau
v. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d 323, 345 (1990) ("A general law is a law
that by its terms applies to all who are in a like position, who are
'similarly situated' "); Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 111
(1972). Section 18-1(a) describes which claims may be filed
against an estate and with whom to file them; unlike section
18-1.1, section 18-1(a) does not create a new claim. The General
Assembly understood this when it amended section 18-1(a) to
include section 18-1.1 statutory custodial claims among the types
of claims which may be filed with the estate representative or the
trial court.
	Additionally, as we have noted, section 18-1.1 concerns
something apart from nursing or other care. The General Assembly
knew that section 18-1(a) already was an available avenue to
recoup such expenses. The legislature enacted section 18-1.1 to
allow immediate family members to recover the additional
opportunity and emotional costs of committing their lives to
disabled relatives. Section 18-1(a) is not a general law in relation
to section 18-1.1.
	This conclusion, however, does not end our constitutional
inquiry. Cheryl further contends that section 18-1.1 violates the
special legislation and equal protection clauses because it makes
an irrational classification. According to Cheryl, section 18-1.1
includes only members of a disabled person's immediate family
within the class that may make statutory custodial claims, while it
excludes persons outside a disabled person's immediate
family-grandparents or grandchildren, nieces, nephews, aunts,
uncles, cousins, and even friends-who have provided identical
care to a disabled person.
	The special legislation clause expressly prohibits the General
Assembly from conferring a benefit or privilege upon one group
while excluding other similarly situated groups. Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (1997). The legislature
enjoys broad discretion in making statutory classifications, and the
special legislation clause does not prohibit all classifications, only
arbitrary ones. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995); Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano, 83 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (1980) (special legislation "preferentially and
arbitrarily" applies to a class while it excludes all others). That is,
the purpose of this clause is to prevent legislative classifications
which discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound and
reasonable basis. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 391; Chicago National
League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 367 (1985).
Accordingly, the special legislation clause supplements the equal
protection clause, which prohibits arbitrary discrimination against
a person or class. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 236 (1988); Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. IV, §13,
Constitutional Commentary, at 217 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("In many
cases, the protection provided by [the special legislation clause] is
also provided by the equal protection clause").
	Our inquiry here is two-fold. We first must determine whether
the statute discriminates in favor of a select group. If so, we must
determine whether the classification created by the statute is
arbitrary. See Phillips v. Browne, 270 Ill. 450, 453 (1915) ("That
the statute operates uniformly upon all members of a class created
as the beneficiaries of the act is not the sole test to be applied, but
in order to avoid the constitutional inhibition *** it must also
appear that there is a sound basis, in reason and principle, for
regarding the class of individuals as a distinct and separate class
for the purpose of the particular legislation"). In this regard,
special legislation and equal protection challenges are judged by
the same standard. See Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 417
(1994); Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter, 82 Ill. 2d 116, 124 (1980); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 315
(1979). Because section 18-1.1 does not affect fundamental rights
or make a suspect classification, the appropriate measure of its
constitutionality is the deferential rational basis test, which asks
whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 394; Bilyk,
125 Ill. 2d  at 236; see also Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d  at 337. The
legislature has great flexibility in making statutory classifications
as dictated by common experience, and our constitution does not
mandate " ' "abstract symmetry." ' " See People ex rel. Carey v.
Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67, 81 (1980), quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 539-40, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 1659,
62 S. Ct. 1110, 1112 (1942), quoting Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144, 58 L. Ed. 539, 543, 34 S. Ct. 281, 282 (1914).
Accordingly, if a court can reasonably conceive of circumstances
which justify distinguishing the class benefitted by the statute from
the class outside its scope, the classification is constitutional.
Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d  at 122; see Cutinello, 161 Ill. 2d  at 420
(the rational basis test requires only a reasonable relationship
between the challenged legislation and a conceivable, even though
unarticulated, governmental interest).
	Here, section 18-1.1 discriminates in favor of a select group.
It provides that only "certain classes of caregivers"-spouse, parent,
sibling, and child-are entitled to make statutory custodial claims.
Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d  at 195. Other classes of caregivers are excluded.
Thus, in order to pass constitutional muster, the classification in
section 18-1.1 must share a rational relation with the problem
targeted by the General Assembly.
	In 1988, after the Illinois House of Representatives had
approved House Bill 4116, the Senate judiciary committee
proposed several amendments. Both houses appointed conference
committees, and both houses adopted the joint conference
committee report, which included section 4 containing the
statutory custodial claim provision of section 18-1.1. See 1988 Ill.
S.J. 3833-36; 1988 Ill. H.J. 5413-16. Governor Thompson
disapproved. In an amendatory veto message, he wrote:
			"Section 4 of this legislation attempts to address the
difficulty a family member faces in seeking fair
compensation for personal custodial care services
rendered to a disabled person. While I understand
monetary, as well as emotional hardships endured by the
family of disabled person are often extreme, Section 4 of
this bill is inequitable and unworkable, and will lead to
complex probate litigation.
			Section 4 of this bill contains serious inconsistencies
and ambiguities. 'Disabled person' is a crucial category,
as well as 'degrees of disability'; however, no definition
is given for either in the text of the bill. Moreover, the
category of persons who are entitled to conditional gifts is
unfairly restricted, and the custodial claimant is given 1st
class creditor status-superior to those of all beneficiaries
under the disabled person's will. Further, it denies the
State reimbursement for care given the disabled person
until after all the statutory custodial care claims have been
paid. Finally, the quality of care given is never addressed,
nor is there any distinction, or increased claim provisions
made, between a person who provides 3 years of care and
one who provides 30 years of care.
			I believe Section 4 of this bill is inequitable,
unworkable, and will no doubt cause havoc with the
handling of probate estates. Moreover, I cannot in good
faith support and approve legislation which might put
disabled persons in the role of 'pawn' being tossed to and
fro in a battle between persons eager to grant and claim a
'conditional gift' upon the disabled person's death." 1988
Ill. S.J. 5896-97 (Governor Thompson's amendatory veto
message); 1988 Ill. H.J. 7524-25 (same).
	Both houses of the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly
to pass House Bill 4116 with section 4, notwithstanding the
Governor's suggestions. 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., 1988 Sess., Final
Legislative Synopsis &amp; Digest 1934. The legislature was mindful
of the class of persons who usually live with and personally care
for disabled persons. See 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, December 1, 1988, at 54-56, 58 (statements of
Senator Poshard); 
85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, December 1, 1988, at
58 (statements of Senator Geo-Karis); 85th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, November 16, 1988, at 19 (statements of
Representative Tate). The legislature also undoubtedly was
mindful of other provisions of the Probate Act. State v. Mikusch,
138 Ill. 2d 242, 247-48 (1990) ("It is presumed that the legislature,
in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and with full
knowledge of all previous enactments"). Section 2-1 of the
Probate Act provides rules of intestate descent and distribution.
Under section 2-1, an intestate decedent's estate is distributed first
to the decedent's surviving spouse and the decedent's descendants.
755 ILCS 5/2-1(a) through (c) (West 2000). If the decedent has no
surviving spouse or descendants, then the estate is distributed to
the decedent's parents, siblings, and siblings' descendants. See
755 ILCS 5/2-1(d) (West 2000). Section 18-1.1 refers to these
same family members: spouse, parent, sibling, and child. Those
with the highest intestate priority are those who are entitled to
make statutory custodial claims.
	Cheryl contends that the classification in section 18-1.1 is
based upon the claimant's status as an immediate family member,
not the claimant's activity in caring for the disabled person. We
have previously acknowledged "a particularly strong presumption
that legislation which classifies on the basis of activities does so
on the basis of legitimate differences as to the problem involved
or the degree of harm applicable to the activity in question."
People ex rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata &amp; Kassabaum, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 252, 262 (1986); see Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455,
460 (1967); Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill. 2d 60, 67 (1964)
(classifications based on function are constitutionally permissible).
This strong presumption in favor of activity-based classifications,
however, does not mean that status-based classifications are never
constitutionally permissible. A status-based classification which
is rationally related to the purpose of the statute does not violate
the special legislation or equal protection clauses.
	Here, the classification bears a rational relationship to the
purpose of the statute. Section 18-1.1 allows only immediate
family members to make statutory custodial claims; this restriction
clearly serves the legislative goal of encouraging immediate family
members to commit themselves to disabled relatives. As Porter
aptly notes in her reply brief, "the unique and abiding nature of
these family ties will best insure the provision of quality home
care on a sustained and continuing basis." Expanding the group
who may make statutory custodial claims actually would
exacerbate one of the problems identified by Governor Thompson.
A wider pool of potential claimants would mean more jockeying
to receive the statutory distribution. The class of persons most
likely to provide dedicated residential and personal care with a
loving and altruistic motive is the class identified in the statute.
	Section 18-1.1 does not violate the special legislation clause
or the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution.
Due Process
	Porter asserts that the trial court erred in holding that section
18-1.1 violates the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution.
The due process clause provides: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law ***." Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2.
	Porter initially argues that Cheryl and Willie's other heirs do
not have vested property rights in his estate, but only mere
expectancies unprotected by due process, because the legislature
controls inheritance law. See, e.g., In re Estate of Webster, 214 Ill.
App. 3d 1014, 1022 (1991) (a legacy under a will is not a vested
property right protected by due process). Here, the heirs'
expectancies ripened into vested, and constitutionally protected,
property rights when Willie died. See 11A Ill. L. &amp; Prac.
Constitutional Law §232 (1981) ("at the moment of the death of
a person the rights of his heirs *** to succeed to his estate are
fixed and vested beyond the power of the General Assembly to
change"). Additionally, though the legislature has plenary power
to regulate the descent of property, this power is limited: "its
exercise shall not violate any provision of the constitution."
Jahnke v. Selle, 368 Ill. 268, 271 (1938). We proceed to the merits
of this issue.
	Section 18-1.1 does not affect fundamental rights, and the
proper measure of constitutionality under the due process clause
is, again, the deferential rational basis test. Russell v. Department
of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 446 (1998). Our only
inquiry is whether the statutory means are rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. See Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 176 (1993); People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174, 180
(1989).
	Cheryl contends that section 18-1.1 violates the due process
clause for several reasons. First, argues Cheryl, section 18-1.1's
minimum claim amounts are arbitrary because these amounts are
unrelated to the value of the care the immediate family member
making a statutory custodial claim has given to the disabled person
and unrelated to any compensation the immediate family member
already may have received for such care. Cheryl labels these
amounts as "irrebuttable presumptions" that immediate family
members have suffered a statutorily specified amount of damages.
See First National Bank of Chicago v. King, 263 Ill. App. 3d 813,
827 (1994).
	Here, the minimum claim amounts bear a rational relationship
to the purpose of the statute. Section 18-1.1 sets these amounts at
modest levels, subject to the available assets in the disabled
person's estate. An immediate family member who provided
dedicated residential and personal care to the disabled person for
just three years would receive, at a minimum, slightly more than
$33,000 for each year he or she dedicated to the disabled person.
In Willie's case, Porter dedicated more than 12 years of her life to
her brother. She bathed him, groomed him, dressed him, and
moved him; she prepared his meals and washed his clothes. Porter
now asks for $200,000-less than $16,000 for each year she lived
with and personally cared for Willie.
	To borrow a phrase from Senator Poshard, one of the sponsors
of section 18-1.1, it is "simply not fair or right" that Cheryl and
Willie's other heirs who, from the record before us, never
provided one day of care for Willie in the 22 years between his
accident and his death could recover more from his estate than
Porter, who voluntarily dedicated more than 12 years of her life to
her brother. 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, December
1, 1988, at 54. Such a result would be truly arbitrary. Given what
section 18-1.1 claims require-at least three years of dedicated
residential and personal care-and what they compensate-the lost
opportunities and emotional hardships that necessarily accompany
such dedication-we cannot conclude that the minimum claim
amounts are unconstitutional. As this case demonstrates, the
statutory amounts are a reasonable lower limit for such a
commitment and, like the statutory classification, serve the
legislative goal of encouraging immediate family members to
commit themselves to disabled relatives. Additionally, because a
section 18-1.1 claim does not compensate nursing care, it would
supplement any guardianship fees that Porter received for Willie's
maintenance. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a) (West 2000).
	Second, Cheryl argues, section 18-1.1 is unconstitutionally
vague because the statute does not provide any criteria as to what
extent of care is required to make a statutory custodial claim or
how to determine the percentage of disability. See Spinelli v.
Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 389, 402 (1987). We acknowledge that section 18-1.1 is not a
model of clarity in legislative drafting. See In re Estate of Rollins,
269 Ill. App. 3d 261, 273 (1995) (recognizing that section 18-1.1
"is not as clear as it could be"). Section 18-1.1, however, is not so
vague that it cannot be applied. As we have noted, a section
18-1.1 claimant must meet two requirements: The claimant must
be an immediate family member and must have dedicated himself
or herself to the care of the disabled person by living with and
personally caring for the disabled person for three years. See 755
ILCS 5/18-1.1 (West 2000); see generally In re Estate of Hoehn,
234 Ill. App. 3d 627 (1992) (construing the requirements of
section 18-1.1). Upon meeting these requirements, the family
member receives the minimum claim amount which corresponds
to the disabled person's percentage of disability. Whether the
family member has met these requirements and the percentage of
disability are fact questions for the jury. See 755 ILCS 5/18-6
(West 2000) (any interested person may demand a jury trial on a
claim against an estate). Of course, we decide only that the
statutory requirements and percentages do not violate due process,
not that Porter has satisfied the statute and, consequently, may
recover.
	Cheryl raises the possibility that more than one immediate
family member could file a claim under section 18-1.1. We agree
that section 18-1.1 could allow more than one immediate family
member to make a statutory custodial claim; we do not believe that
this makes the statute unconstitutional. The legislature chose to
encourage private residential care by rewarding any immediate
family member who lives with and cares for a disabled person for
three years. Though we believe that this circumstance would rarely
arise, more than one immediate family member may make a
statutory custodial claim if more than one meets the requirements
of section 18-1.1.
	Section 18-1.1 does not violate the due process clause of the
Illinois Constitution.



Separation of Powers
	Porter finally asserts that the trial court erred in holding that
section 18-1.1 does not violate the separation of powers provision
of the Illinois Constitution. The separation of powers provision of
our constitution states: "The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly
belonging to another." Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1.
	In defense of the trial court's holding, Cheryl contends that
the legislature encroached upon the powers of the judiciary by
setting minimum claim amounts. These amounts, Cheryl argues,
disregard the jury's deliberative process in determining damages,
as well the trial court's authority to reduce excessive damage
awards. Cheryl relies upon Best, where we held that a cap on
noneconomic compensatory damages in tort cases violated the
separation of powers provision. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 414. In
Best, we reasoned that the damage cap "unduly encroache[d] upon
the fundamentally judicial prerogative of determining whether a
jury's assessment of damages is excessive within the meaning of
the law." Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 414.
	Each branch of government has its own unique powers, and
the separation of powers doctrine ensures that the power of two or
more branches does not rest in a single branch. People v. Walker,
119 Ill. 2d 465, 473 (1988). The legislature is prohibited from
enacting laws which infringe upon the inherent powers of the
judiciary. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 411; Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 149 (1952); see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §1 (the judicial
power is vested in this court, the appellate court, and the various
circuit courts). However, we have noted that "legislative limits
upon certain types of damages may be permitted, such as damages
recoverable in statutory causes of action ***." Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at
415; see Jones v. Karraker, 98 Ill. 2d 487, 492 (1983) (placing a
minimum or maximum amount on wrongful death damages is "a
legislative prerogative"); Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (1958)
(the legislature unquestionably has the power to limit wrongful
death recoveries because it created both the cause of action and the
remedy); see also Butler v. Chicago Transit Authority, 38 Ill. 2d 361, 365 (1967); cf. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 30-31
(1961). Because the General Assembly created statutory custodial
claims in section 18-1.1, it could dictate the minimum claim
amounts. Further, unlike the damage cap in Best, the statutory
amounts here set a floor, not a ceiling, for statutory custodial
claims. The claim amounts do not operate as an unconstitutional
"legislative remittitur" (Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 413), but rather as an
equitable distribution from a disabled person's estate to those, like
Porter, who have provided years of dedicated residential and
personal care.
	Section 18-1.1 does not violate the separation of powers
provision of the Illinois Constitution.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand the cause to that court for further
proceedings.
Circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
 
1.      Public Act 85-1417, which created section 18-1.1, also
created section 11a-18.1 of the Probate Act. Section 11a-18.1
provides that the trial court may authorize the guardian of a
disabled person's estate to make conditional gifts from the estate
to "any spouse, parent, brother or sister of the disabled person who
dedicates himself or herself to the care of the disabled person by
living with and personally caring for the disabled person for at
least three years." 755 ILCS 5/11a-18.1(a) (West 2000). This
statute does not set a minimum amount for such gifts.
     Additionally, Public Act 85-1417 amended section 18-1 and
18-10 of the Probate Act. Section 18-1(a) now provides that
statutory custodial claims under section 18-1.1 are claims against
a decedent's estate which may be filed with the estate
representative or the trial court. See 755 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West
2000). Section 18-10 now provides that statutory custodial claims
are first priority claims. See 755 ILCS 5/18-10 (West 2000).