Title: Pauley, et al. v. Reinoehl, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 679, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JASON F. PAULEY, a minor, by his  
) 
mother and natural guardian and next  
)  No. 679, 2002 
friend Louise Ford Pauley, BRYAN F. 
) 
PAULEY, a minor, by his mother and  
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
natural guardian and next friend Louise 
)  of the State of Delaware 
Ford Pauley, LOUISE FORD PAULEY, 
)  in and for Kent County 
individually, and PATRICK J. PAULEY, 
) 
 
 
)  C.A. Nos. 99C-06-030 and 
Plaintiffs Below,  
 
)  OOC-08-042 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
)  (Consolidated) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
ROBERT HLUDZINSKI, R.R. SEASIDE, ) 
INC., R.R. BAYSIDE, INC., R.R.  
 
) 
OUTLET MALLS, INC., and CHARTER 
) 
OAK GROUP, LTD. dba CHARTER  
) 
OAK PARTNERS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
KIMBERLY A. REINOEHL, THE 
 
) 
DELAWARE STATE POLICE, THE  
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT ) 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, THE STATE  
) 
OF DELAWARE, and LONDON 
 
) 
FOG INDUSTRIES, INC., 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
) 
 
2
Submitted:  February 24, 2004 
Decided:  April 26, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS 
Justices (constituting the Court en banc). 
 
Upon Plaintiffs Below/Appellants’ Motion for Reargument/Clarification.   
 
Richard E. Poole and Somers S. Price, Jr. of Potter Anderson & Corroon 
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for Plaintiffs Below, Appellants. 
 
John D. Balaguer of White and Williams LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Defendants and Cross Claimants Below, Appellants. 
 
Jeffrey M. Weiner of Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant Below, 
Appellee Kimberly A. Reinoehl. 
 
Kevin J. Connors of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant Below, Appellee, London Fog Industries, 
Inc. 
 
George H. Seitz, III, Patricia P. McGonigle, and Carrie I. Dayton of Seitz, 
Vanogtrop & Green, Wilmington, Delaware, for Delaware State Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
3
This matter is again before us on Plaintiffs Below/Appellants' Motion for 
Reargument/Clarification.  The factual background is set forth in detail in the 
opinion of the Superior Court which we incorporate herein by reference.1   
I 
The procedural history of this case can be summarized briefly as follows: 
Appellants, the Pauley Plaintiffs, brought suit in the Superior Court to 
recover for injuries from an auto accident, which also resulted in the death of a 
passenger in the Pauley vehicle.  Appellants claimed that the negligence or gross 
negligence of Appellee, Kimberly A. Reinoehl (a state police officer), caused the 
accident.  They further claim that Appellees, the State Institutional Defendants, are 
liable as Reinoehl’s employer and as the owner of the police car Reinoehl operated 
at the time of the accident.  The Appellants further claimed that the state police 
negligently trained and supervised Reinoehl and that their independent negligence 
also proximately caused the accident.  On the date of the accident, the State had 
available insurance that provided a maximum of $1,000,000 coverage per accident.  
A portion of this $1,000,000 limit has been used to settle the passenger’s family’s 
wrongful death claim.  The State Defendants offered the remaining insurance 
coverage to settle the Pauley Plaintiffs’ claim, to no avail.   
                                                 
1 Shepard, et al. v. Reinoehl, et al., 830 A.2d 1235 (Del. Super. Ct., August 21, 2002). 
 
4
All Defendants moved for summary judgment.  The State Defendants 
claimed immunity from recovery of any sums above the amount of the State’s 
available insurance coverage limits.  A Superior Court judge granted all defense 
motions for summary judgment.  The Order granting summary judgment was 
subject to the State tendering the Pauley Plaintiffs all remaining insurance 
proceeds.  The Pauley Plaintiffs appealed.   In this Court’s en banc Opinion dated 
December 17, 2003, we held, inter alia, that 21 Del. C. § 4106, the Emergency 
Vehicle Statute (EVS), did not waive completely the State’s immunity from 
liability in the circumstances of this case.  We held that subsection (d) of the EVS 
dealt only with the waiver of governmental immunity, not sovereign immunity, and  
opined that if the General Assembly intended subsection (d) to waive completely 
the State’s sovereign immunity, it would have done so expressly.  Our initial 
reading of the EVS, as well as a survey of the law of other jurisdictions, supported 
our view that the terms “sovereign immunity” and “governmental immunity” have 
distinct and separate meanings.  
We granted reargument by an Order dated January 28, 2004 on the following 
issues: (1) whether the General Assembly’s passage of EVS constituted a waiver of 
the State’s immunity from liability in the specific circumstances of this case; (2) 
whether a jury should evaluate the record evidence of the police officer’s gross 
negligence; and, (3) whether a jury should evaluate the facts supporting allegations 
 
5
of Appellee London Fog’s liability.  Although all three issues are the subject of the 
Pauley Plaintiffs’ Motion, we need only address in detail the issue of whether the 
General Assembly intended not only to waive sovereign immunity as an absolute 
bar to recovery, but also to remove any cap or ceiling on the dollar amount of 
claims the State would have to pay if and when found liable under the EVS. 
II 
After considering the additional briefing by the parties and the reargument 
en banc, we conclude that the EVS does evince an intent by the General Assembly 
to bar the State, as owner of a police emergency vehicle, from asserting the State’s 
sovereign immunity as a complete bar to an injured party’s claim for personal 
injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act of the State’s driver or the State.  
We find that Delaware Law existing at the time of the EVS’s passage2, together 
with inferences that may be drawn from the limited available legislative history, 
support the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to prevent the State 
from asserting sovereign immunity as a complete bar to claims against the State 
under the circumstances contemplated by 21 Del.C. § 4106(d).3  We now recognize 
that the term “governmental immunity,” while used distinctly from the term 
                                                 
2 63 Del. Laws, c. 162 (1981). 
3 We are compelled by Appellants’ view that, read together, the narrow language of subsections 
(d) and (e) expressly waives the State’s immunity.  This reading does not conflict with the policy 
of the State Insurance Program because the legislative policy embodied in 18 Del.C. § 6511 
presumes a waiver of sovereign immunity up to the amount in a funded program or available by 
way of purchased applicable commercial insurance.  The General Assembly, in effect, places a 
cap on exposure to damages by its implementation of the program. 
 
6
“sovereign immunity” by other jurisdictions, was used interchangeably at the time 
of the passage of the EVS by both the Delaware General Assembly and the 
Delaware Judiciary to refer to the immunity of both the State and other 
governmental agencies.4  To the extent our earlier opinion reached a contrary 
conclusion, we vacate that portion of the opinion. 
III 
A conclusion that the General Assembly intended to preclude the State, its 
subdivisions and agencies from asserting sovereign immunity as a complete bar to 
recovery under the circumstances contemplated by the EVS does not end our 
inquiry.  Reading the language of 21 Del. C. § 4106(d) and (e) narrowly does not 
compel a conclusion that the General Assembly also intended to remove the cap on 
recovery from losses occurring from negligent operation of State-owned 
emergency vehicles.  The State Insurance Program existed when the General 
Assembly enacted the EVS in 1981.  The purpose of the Program was to protect 
the public from wrongful acts committed by governmental officials by waiving the 
State’s sovereign immunity up to a legislatively imposed ceiling.5  As this Court 
noted in Doe v. Cates, the General Assembly made it clear when it enacted 18 
Del.C. § 6511 that it intended to waive sovereign immunity only to the extent that 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., 62 Del. Laws, c. 124 (1979) (The General Assembly passed an Act entitled 
“Reestablishing the Principle of Sovereign Immunity for Counties and Municipalities 
Throughout the State of Delaware”); Pajewski v. Perry, 363 A.2d 429, 434 n.3 (Del. 1976); 
Simon v. Heald, 359 A.2d 666, 667 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976). 
5 Doe v. Cates, 499 A. 2d 1175, 1177 (citing Pajewski, 363 A.2d at 435; 18 Del.C. § 6503). 
 
7
either the State insurance coverage program was funded by direct appropriation 
(self-insurance) or that the State purchased commercially available insurance to 
cover the loss.  18 Del.C. § 6511 itself provided: 
The defense of sovereignty is waived and cannot and will not be asserted as 
to any risk or loss covered by the state insurance coverage program, 
whether same be covered by commercially procured insurance or by self-
insurance, and every commercially procured insurance contract shall contain 
a provision to this effect, where appropriate.6  (emphasis supplied) 
 
The Claims Asserted Against the State Defendants 
There can be no question that the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides 
that neither the State nor a State agency can be sued without its consent.  The 
General Assembly, however, can waive sovereign immunity by an Act that clearly 
evidences an intention to do so.7 
Actions against the State, however, are further limited by the requirements 
of the State Tort Claims Act, 10 Del. C. §§ 4001-4005.  For plaintiffs to prevail in 
a suit against the State, they must show that:  (1) the State has waived the defense 
of sovereign immunity for the actions mentioned in the complaint; and, (2) the 
State Tort Claims Act does not bar the action.8 
In this appeal, the Pauley plaintiffs claim the State defendants have 
unlimited exposure in two respects.  First, they contend the State is liable because 
                                                 
6 499 A. 2d at 1177 (quoting 18 Del.C. § 6511). 
7 Del. Const. Art. I § 9; Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. v. State, 187 A.2d 71, 74 (Del. 1962). 
8 See Stevenson v. Brandywine School District, et. al., 1999 WL 742932, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1999). 
 
8
its agents negligently trained and supervised Reinoehl.  Second, they assert that the 
State is liable by reason of Reinoehl’s operation of the State owned police car. 
Negligent Training and Supervision 
 
With respect to the negligent training and supervision claim, Pauley has 
failed to cite any statute evidencing that the General Assembly has waived the 
State’s immunity.  As the Superior Court judge found, “No statutory enactment has 
been identified in which the General Assembly has waived sovereign immunity for 
claims arising from the way the State Police trains and supervises its officers.”9  
Pauley, therefore, has not met the first requirement for bringing this claim against 
the State.  Thus, the Superior Court judge properly granted summary judgment on 
this claim. 
Officer’s Operation of the Police Car 
 
As to the second claim, the State conceded that it waived sovereign 
immunity, but asserted that it waived sovereign immunity only to the extent of the 
available commercial insurance coverage.  Thus, for the Pauley Plaintiffs to prevail 
on a claim for unlimited liability they must identify a statute that clearly expresses 
the General Assembly’s intent to waive the bar of sovereign immunity with respect 
to claims exceeding the amount of available insurance coverage.  The Pauley 
Plaintiffs contend that 21 Del.C. § 4106 is such a waiver and expresses the General 
                                                 
9 Shepard, C.A. No. 99C-06-030, at *9. 
 
9
Assembly’s clear intention both to bar sovereign immunity as an absolute defense 
and to expose the State to unlimited liability for grossly negligent operation of 
State owned emergency vehicles. 
 
Authorized emergency vehicles are the subject of Title 21, Section 4106 of 
the Delaware Code.  The subject is treated in Title 21 – “Rules of the Road.”.  The 
specific provision at issue here is subsection “d,” which states:  “The owner of 
such emergency vehicle may not assert the defense of governmental immunity in 
any action on account of any damage to or loss of property or on account of 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of 
such driver or owner.”10  (emphasis supplied)  The Superior Court judge found that 
Reinoehl was negligent.  Section 4106(e) makes it clear that State owned police 
vehicles are authorized “emergency vehicles” within the meaning of the EVS.  
Thus, we conclude, the State may not assert sovereign immunity as an absolute bar 
to the Pauley Plaintiffs’ recovery. 
 
The problem, however, is that although sovereign immunity cannot be 
asserted as an absolute bar to recovery, the Pauley Plaintiffs have failed to show 
why a waiver (a bar to asserting the defense of “governmental immunity”) under 
4106(d) necessarily compels the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to 
expose the State treasury to unlimited monetary claims for negligent operation of a 
                                                 
10 21 Del. C. § 4106(d). 
 
10
State owned emergency vehicle.  The EVS does not discuss the extent of the 
State’s exposure to damage claims at all.  The statute’s location in that portion of 
the code denominated the “Rules of the Road” suggests a focus on operation of the 
vehicle, not the collateral consequences going beyond the defenses applicable to 
negligent operation.  It is difficult to conceive that the General Assembly would 
remove a cap on the State’s exposure to damages without specifically indicating an 
intent to do so and without referring to 18 Del.C. ch. 65.  It is 18 Del.C. ch. 65 that 
addresses the State Insurance Program and the methodology by which the 
Executive and Legislative branches determine the extent that it is feasible for the 
State to provide coverage for liability risks. 
 
As we indicated in our Opinion of December 17, 2003:  “This Court has 
confirmed that sovereign immunity is waived to the extent any risk or loss is 
covered by the State Insurance Program.”11  The Pauley plaintiffs nevertheless urge 
us to conclude that the EVS, 21 Del. C. § 4106(d) and (e), completely waives the 
State’s sovereign immunity without regard to the availability of insurance.12   
Any analysis must begin with the inescapable premise that:  “Where a party 
seeks to hold the state or a state agency liable under a statute, any reasonable doubt 
as to the proper construction of the statute should be resolved in favor of the 
                                                 
11 See Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1376 (Del. 1995).   
12 We addressed the STC in our December 17, 2003 Opinion and adopt the same reasoning here. 
 
11
State.”13  The Pauley Plaintiffs’ correctly maintain that subsections (d) and (e), 
when read together, do indicate that the General Assembly, under the 
circumstances contemplated by that statute, intended to prevent the assertion of 
sovereign immunity as a total bar to recovery.  We must conclude, nevertheless, 
that the General Assembly did intend that the State’s exposure to damage claims 
continue to be limited to the amount of self-insurance or commercial insurance 
applicable to the occurrence giving rise to the claim.  As we stated on December 
17, 2003:   
   We affirm recognizing that the trial judge’s interpretation of governmental 
immunity, of course, has no bearing on any limitation on thresholds of 
monetary liability or any limitation on the extent to which sovereign immunity 
may have been waived by the State or its political subdivisions.  It is, 
nonetheless, an interpretation entirely consistent with public policy that 
suggests that when the State or any of its political subdivisions make 
insurance available for the purpose of remedying harm caused by its 
emergency vehicles in an accident, then governmental immunity may not be 
asserted to bar a claim up to the limit of that coverage.  In the context of 21 
Del. C. § 4106(d), the trial judge’s view is affirmed.  
      
   The legislative history of the State Insurance Program and the EVS 
suggests that subsection (d) of the EVS does not reflect any intent of the 
General Assembly to waive sovereign immunity completely.  In 1969, the 
General Assembly enacted the State Insurance Program.  The purpose of that 
Program was to protect the public from wrongful actions of State officials and 
employees, by waiving the State’s sovereign immunity up to the threshold of 
insurance coverage made available by the State.14   
 
                                                 
13 Doe, 499 A.2d at 1180. 
14 Id. at 1181.   
 
12
 
This view, is not, as the Pauley Plaintiffs suggest, contrary to existing 
precedent.  The Pauley Plaintiffs claim that:  “The General Assembly enacted the 
EVS knowing that the State Insurance Program had not been implemented and, 
therefore, that the presumptive limited waiver of sovereign immunity in 18 Del.C. 
§ 6511 had expired because of lack of follow through.”  They cite Doe v. Cates15 
as support for that view.16  In fact, Doe exhaustively examines the history of the 
State Insurance Program and its relationship to waiver of sovereign immunity, and 
concludes that where neither self-insurance nor commercially procured insurance 
provides coverage, the State has in fact “met its burden under the Pajewski case 
and has overcome the presumptive waiver of immunity in 18 Del.C. § 6511 at 
1179.”  Doe does not discuss the EVS at all, but it does explain that the State Tort 
Claims Act “did not waive sovereign immunity in all cases where a ministerial act 
was performed with gross or wanton negligence or in bad faith.”17  Tellingly and 
consistently with the application of the doctrine of limited waiver in Delaware, the 
Doe Court went on to say:  “Appellants’ interpretation reads much too much into 
this limited statute and would expose the state to liabilities which would not 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 But see Turnbull, 668 A.2d at 1376. (contradicting that view both as to the law and as to the 
holding in Doe.) 
17 Doe, 499 A.2d at 1180. 
 
13
otherwise exist.  It was clear in 1979 that the General Assembly had declined to 
fund its program to provide increased protection for injured persons.”18   
Like the STC in 1979, when the EVS passed in 1981,19 the General 
Assembly “is presumed to have been aware of the existing law which included 18 
Del.C. § 6511.”20  Section 6511 waived immunity only as to risks covered by the 
State Insurance Program – a program which at the time of the occurrence giving 
rise to the Pauley Plaintiffs’ claims, consisted solely of an applicable commercial 
insurance policy.  Just as the Doe Court rejected a claim that the State waived 
sovereign immunity for unlimited exposure where no insurance was available, the 
State has waived sovereign immunity on the Pauley Plaintiffs’ claims but only to 
the extent that the State has provided applicable insurance coverage.  As Doe 
makes clear, “the mode of abolishing or limiting” the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity must be by an Act of the General Assembly.21   
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not judicially created nor can it be 
abolished or modified by judicial opinion.  When, where, under what 
circumstances, and to what degree the State purchases commercial insurance to 
cover a risk, acts to self-insure or to remove any cap on the State’s exposure to 
damages, is entirely a matter for the General Assembly. 
                                                 
18 Id. at 1180. 
19 63 Del. Laws ch. 162 (1981). 
20 DuPont v. DuPont, 87 A.2d 394 (Del. 1952). 
21 Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94, 96 (Del. 1974) (emphasis added). 
 
14
 
We, as reluctantly as the Court in Doe, are constrained to apply the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity as a limited bar to exposure to damages arising from an 
occurrence under the EVS.  The State has waived sovereign immunity in this case 
because it purchased commercial insurance to indemnify against the risk of loss 
contemplated by the EVS, but only to the extent coverage is available. 
 
The Superior Court judge did not err when he concluded that the State faced 
exposure up to the amount of the insurance coverage but that 21 Del.C. § 4106(d) 
did not evidence an intent to remove the cap on exposure to damages determined 
by the policy limits of the insurance procured and applicable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding any holding or arguably contrary dictum in this Court’s 
Opinion of December 17, 2003, we conclude that the General Assembly enacted 
Del.C. § 4106(d) and (e) with the intent to remove sovereign immunity as an 
absolute or complete bar to recovery under the circumstances provided for in 21 
Del.C. 4106.  Because the General Assembly has not acted to fund payment of 
losses in excess of the insurance coverage provided, it has not acted to waive 
sovereign immunity beyond the coverage available by applicable commercial 
insurance. 
We further conclude that while questions of gross negligence are ordinarily 
for the jury and summary judgment was precipitately granted here, there is no basis 
 
15
for a remand or a new trial, given our conclusion on the issue of sovereign 
immunity.  Even if a jury were to determine on remand that Reinoehl’s grossly 
negligence act caused the injuries to the Pauley plaintiffs, the State would still not 
be open to unlimited exposure for their loss.   
We further conclude the trial judge correctly concluded that London Fog 
was entitled to summary judgment for the reasons stated in his opinion of 
November 18, 2002. 
It is ordered that the time within which a motion for reargument may be 
timely filed under Supreme Court Rule 18 is shortened to five days from the date 
of this Opinion.  This Order is due to the impending change in the composition of 
the Supreme Court, arising out of the retirement of the Chief Justice in April 2004.