Title: People v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93758
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 17, 2003

Docket No. 93758-Agenda 4-March 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							ISMAEL LOPEZ, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this case we decide whether a trial court can order the physical
examination of an alleged sex offense victim. Defendant was charged
with aggravated criminal sexual abuse under section 12-16(c)(1)(i) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS
5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998)). He sought a gynecological
examination of the alleged victim, B.B., who was three years old at
the time. The circuit court of Du Page County granted defendant's
request, and B.B.'s family refused to comply. As a sanction, the court
granted defendant's motion in limine to prohibit the State from
introducing any medical expert evidence of its own. On appeal, the
appellate court reversed, finding that the record did not establish a
compelling need for the examination, and remanded the cause for a
hearing on the issue. 328 Ill. App. 3d 563. We granted defendant leave
to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm in part, vacate in part,
and remand. We hold that a trial court cannot order the physical
examination of a complaining witness in a sex offense case. We further
hold that, when a trial court rules on the admission of evidence in a
sex offense case where a defendant has requested the physical
examination of a complaining witness and the witness refuses to
submit to the examination, the court must balance the due process
rights of the defendant against the privacy rights of the alleged victim,
by deciding what medical evidence, if any, the State is allowed to
introduce.
I. BACKGROUND
	At the behest of B.B.'s family, Dr. E. Anderson examined B.B.,
who was 20 months old at the time, and concluded that she was a
victim of sexual abuse. This conclusion was based in part on Dr.
Anderson's finding that her labial origin "show[ed] a small false
passage, suggestive of partial tearing" and also on the presence of scar
tissue surrounding the vagina. Dr. Anderson reported that he was
unable to inspect B.B.'s hymen adequately because B.B. complained
of discomfort and "with[drew] from the situation." Dr. Anderson
explained that, while he could not "100%" rule out a developmental
anomaly, he felt that B.B.'s condition was the result of a traumatic
injury. He further commented that:
		"[c]ertainly, visualization of the hymen would provide
additional useful info[rmation] for a definitive [diagnosis],
although the synechia is suggestive of previous scarring and
raw edges coming together, suggestive of trauma. *** Due
to the swelling of the tissues, I should note that it was
difficult to decide whether the tissue adhesion was with the
labia minora or with the actual [vaginal] wall, although it
would appear to be most likely labial."
	Dr. M. Flannery also examined B.B. She prepared 17 colposcopic
photographs of B.B.'s vaginal region. Based on her examination, Dr.
Flannery concluded that B.B.'s condition was "suspicious for trauma
most likely consistent with digital penetration." Dr. Flannery's
findings, in part, noted:
		"Thin hymenal rim with partial obliteration of the rim
posteriorly. Edges of the hymen are thickened. Notched areas
at approximately the two o'clock and ten o'clock positions.
Widened elongated hymen."
	Following B.B.'s medical examinations, defendant was indicted
for aggravated criminal sexual abuse under section 12-16(c)(1)(i) of
the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998)).
Approximately three months after the medical examinations, the State
presented defendant with the reports of Dr. Anderson and Dr.
Flannery. On defendant's request, the State later provided defendant
with copies of the photographs taken by Dr. Flannery.
	Approximately 13 months after the examinations, when B.B. was
about three years old, defendant filed a motion to produce B.B. for an
independent gynecological examination. Attached to defendant's
motion to produce was the affidavit of his medical expert, Dr. R.
Slupnik. Dr. Slupnik stated that she had reviewed the medical records
and the photographs of B.B. According to Dr. Slupnik, she was
"unable to arrive at a conclusion" about Dr. Flannery's finding of a
"partial obliteration of the [hymenal] rim posteriorly." Dr. Slupnik
opined:
			"Partial obliteration of the hymen is not conclusively seen
on the photographs submitted to me. Some clarification of
the area of the hymen at 6 or 7 o'clock could be obtained by
various other exam techniques, including a change of
position.
			A repeat examination of the alleged victim would resolve
whether there is partial obliteration posteriorly. The
examination would be conducted with the patient in supine
(lying on her back) position, with the knees apart (so-called
'frog-leg' position) as well as in the prone position ('knee
chest'). One ounce of sterile water would be used to rinse the
hymen of any mucus or other debris and to facilitate its
depiction. The exam would take approximately 5 minutes.
Other than Q-tips, no other instruments would be used during
the exam.
			Further, 'findings' which were allegedly present during Dr.
Flannery's exam 14 months ago should still be present now,
if they are specific for sexual abuse. A female hymen does not
re-grow, re-generate, or re-attach if truly traumatized by
blunt force penetrating trauma. Findings that are specific for
sexual abuse will be permanent."
	A hearing was held on the motion to produce B.B. for an
independent gynecological examination. At the hearing, the State
contended that an examination as proposed by Dr. Slupik would last
longer than five minutes and also denied that the evidence of trauma
seen by Dr. Flannery would still be present. The State complained that
defendant waited too long to file his motion to produce B.B. The
State further clarified that Dr. Flannery did not suggest that there was
medical evidence conclusive of "digital penetration," but simply that
the condition of B.B.'s genitalia was "suspicious for trauma most
likely consistent with digital penetration."
	Defendant argued that the chief reason Dr. Slupik wished to
examine B.B. independently was that she did not believe the
photographs conclusively showed a partial obliteration of the hymen.
In response to the State's reference to defendant's delay in requesting
the independent physical examination, defendant suggested that the
trial court's congested docket was, in part, responsible for the delay.
	Following the hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion
for an examination of B.B. by Dr. Slupik. The trial court record is
silent as to the rationale behind this decision. The lone comment on
the issue is the court's observation during argument that Dr. Flannery
would not be permitted to testify at trial regarding her conclusions
because Dr. Flannery could not "even testify as to a speculation." The
trial court later denied the State's motion to reconsider without
hearing argument from the parties.
	B.B.'s family refused to produce her for the examination. As a
result, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. Defendant
contended that Dr. Slupik's examination "could clearly exonerate"
him and that his "due process right to a fundamentally fair trial will be
destroyed without the opportunity to obtain the potentially
exonerating evidence that could come along only from an independent
examination of [B.B.]."
	In response, the State sought an evidentiary hearing to determine
the appropriate sanction to be levied for the failure to produce B.B.
so that the parties could present the testimony of their experts. The
trial court stated that it considered the issue of the appropriate
sanction "a simple legal issue" and scheduled a hearing for legal
argument only. At that hearing, the trial court informed the State that
a sanction of dismissal or exclusion of evidence would follow if the
State did not produce B.B. for an independent medical examination.
	B.B.'s family still refused to produce B.B. for the examination.
The State again requested that the court conduct an evidentiary
hearing before deciding the appropriate sanction. The court denied the
request and dismissed the indictment. In its written order, the court
indicated that its decision was based upon "the U.S. Constitution,
Illinois Constitution, effective assistance of counsel, due process and
reasons more fully set out in the record."
	The parties then agreed that it would be more logical from a
procedural standpoint to reinstate the indictment and allow the court
to address defendant's motion as a motion in limine to exclude
evidence. Thus, the court reinstated the indictment. Defendant then
filed a motion in limine to bar the State from presenting the testimony
of Dr. Anderson and Dr. Flannery concerning their examinations of
B.B., as well as any other evidence derived from those examinations.
	At the hearing on defendant's motion in limine, the State made
its third request for an evidentiary hearing. In response, defendant
argued that the court had already "balanced the discovery due process
interests of *** defendant against the privacy interests of the victim"
when it granted defendant's request for the examination. Defendant
also contended that B.B. had already been examined twice and that
the proposed examination was "nonphysically invasive." Defendant
further urged that fairness would be served neither by the
cross-examination of Dr. Anderson and Dr. Flannery nor by the
testimony of nonexamining experts concerning the colposcopic
photographs, as the photographs would have the physical
examinations as their "direct source."
	The State answered that the court's previous balancing of the
respective interests was inadequate in that the court had not taken into
account all of the evidence that the State intended or attempted to
present. The State noted that Dr. Slupnik's sole disagreement with Dr.
Anderson and Dr. Flannery concerned the finding that B.B.'s genital
area showed a partial posterior obliteration of the hymen. The State
again suggested that an evidentiary hearing should be conducted to
determine whether a finding of a partial posterior obliteration of
B.B.'s hymen is necessary to a conclusion that her genital area had
been traumatized. The State further asserted that the real concern with
another physical examination was its potential psychological impact
given its nature and that it would be the third examination for B.B.
	Following the hearing on defendant's motion in limine, the court
denied the State's request for an evidentiary hearing and granted
defendant's motion. The court, in relevant part, found that:
			"the body of the young child is effectively still the physical
evidence in this case ***. The proposed defense examination
of the 'evidence' would be more than potentially useful. In
light of the incomplete or inconclusive findings of the State's
two experts and as it could determine whether or not
'findings' specific for sexual abuse are present, that exam
could determine whether the alleged victim is a victim indeed
(leaving as the only practical issue the identity of the
perpetrator of the abuse). There is a clear need for the exam."
	The trial court recognized that both defendant's due process
rights and the alleged victim's rights were at issue. Nevertheless, the
court found that under People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310 (1995),
and People v. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d 298 (1992), cross-examination of
the State's experts was insufficient to protect defendant's rights
because an expert who has personally examined a victim is in a better
position to render an opinion than a nonexamining expert.
	In particular regard to Newberry, the court commented:
		"[The Newberry court] was concerned with the examination
of physical evidence unlike People v. Wheeler which dealt
with a psycho therapist's [sic] interview with a rape victim.
The People v. Wheeler court barred the State's use of
evidence of rape trauma syndrome through the testimony of
an examining expert. The State would be allowed to
introduce rape trauma evidence through a nonexamining
expert. That is, arguably, the State could call an expert to
describe the syndrome and its symptoms, and call other
witnesses to offer evidence of those symptoms. The People
v. Newberry court upheld the dismissal of the charge because
of the inability of the State to provide the physical evidence
for the defense expert's examination. This is the situation in
the case before this court. The State has shown that they are
able, and willing, to present the young child, the physical
evidence, to State's experts but not to a defense expert."
As a result of these findings, the court ordered that the expert
testimony and reports of Dr. Anderson and Dr. Flannery be excluded
from evidence. In addition, the trial court precluded the State from
introducing the evidence of nonexamining experts.
	On the State's appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that
defendant failed to demonstrate a compelling need to have the victim
examined by his medical expert. 328 Ill. App. 3d 563. According to
the appellate court, the "critical inquiry" involved in applying the
"compelling need" test is " 'whether the evidence sought by the
defendant is of such importance to his defense that it outweighs the
potential for harm caused by the invasion of the complainant's
privacy, including the prospect that undergoing a physical examination
might be used for harassment of a prosecuting witness.' " 328 Ill.
App. 3d at 573, quoting State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tenn.
1993). The appellate court remanded the cause to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing to determine the need for an independent
physical examination of B.B., providing the trial court with detailed
instructions on how to proceed. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 572-75. In an
unpublished portion of its opinion, the appellate court further held that
the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion in limine to bar the
State from introducing any evidence or testimony from B.B.'s
examining physicians. By leave of this court, defendant appeals from
the appellate court decision. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Physical Examination
	In People v. Glover, 49 Ill. 2d 78 (1971), the defendant, charged
with deviate sexual assault, sought both a psychiatric examination of
the complaining witness to investigate her alleged history of
" 'emotional instability and immaturity' " and an ophthalmological
examination "to determine her ability to see and identify the
defendant" because it was dark at the time of the alleged assault.
Glover, 49 Ill. 2d  at 81. The trial court denied the motion to compel
the examinations. On appeal, this court stated that "[t]here is no
question of [an Illinois court's] jurisdiction to order an examination of
the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation." Glover,
49 Ill. 2d  at 82, citing People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288
(1957). Nevertheless, we affirmed the trial court's denial of the
motions for the examinations and held that: (1) requests for such
examinations must be premised upon a compelling reason
demonstrated by the defendant; and (2) the decision to order an
independent examination is subject to the discretion of the trial court.
Glover, 49 Ill. 2d  at 82.
	It is well settled that prior precedent should be overturned "only
on the showing of good cause," only where there is " 'special
justification' " for the departure, or only where the reasons for
departure are "compelling." People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 228-29
(2002) (quoting Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing
Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 167 (1955), Chicago Bar Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2d 502,
510 (1994) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984)), and People v. Robinson,
187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999)). This court has recognized that it will
not depart from precedent " 'merely because the court is of the
opinion that it might decide otherwise were the question a new one.' "
Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d  at 464, quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193,
196-97 (1968). For the reasons that follow, we find that such
compelling justification exists in this case. We, therefore, overrule
Glover and hold that a trial court may not order the physical
examination of a complaining witness in a sex offense case.
1. Criminal Versus Civil Proceedings
	Noren, the sole case cited in Glover for the proposition that a
trial court can compel the physical examination of a complaining
witness, involved a negligence action for personal injuries suffered by
a plaintiff in an automobile accident. The defendant sought a physical
examination of the plaintiff to determine the extent of the plaintiff's
injuries in order to prepare for trial. He requested the entry of an order
requiring the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by a
physician chosen by the defendant. The trial court granted the
defendant's request and the plaintiff filed a writ of mandamus to
compel the trial court to expunge the order. This court denied the
writ, reasoning, in part, as follows:
			"It is common knowledge that the circuit court of Cook
County has for years consistently ordered plaintiffs to submit
to physical examinations in appropriate cases. In People ex
rel. Leighty v. Fisher, No. 30219 (1947, unreported), this
court denied leave to file an original petition for mandamus
to expunge an order of the circuit court of Cook County that
required the plaintiff in a personal injury case to submit to
physical examination. The time has come for this court to
recognize explicitly the propriety of this practice. *** [C]ases
that have asserted a want of power in our courts to order a
physical examination when physical condition is in issue are
overruled." Noren, 10 Ill. 2d  at 294.
Thus, it is apparent that Noren was concerned solely with civil cases,
involving a plaintiff's physical condition.
	Alleged victims in criminal cases, unlike plaintiffs in civil cases,
are not parties to the action, nor are they under control of the State.
The appellate court in People v. Visgar, 120 Ill. App. 3d 584 (1983),
noted Glover's shortcoming of relying on a civil case. Visgar, 120 Ill.
App. 3d at 587. Nevertheless, due to the apparent unequivocal nature
of our holding in Glover and given that Glover was again cited with
approval in People v. Rossi, 52 Ill. 2d 13 (1972), and in a handful of
appellate court cases (see, e.g., People v. Davis, 97 Ill. App. 3d 299
(1981); People v. Dentley, 31 Ill. App. 3d 679 (1975)), the Visgar
court relied on it to justify the continued power of a trial court to
compel the physical examination of a complaining witness in a sex
offense case.
	The defendant in Visgar, charged with the lewd fondling of a
child, sought a physical examination to determine "whether [the
complaining witness'] hymen was intact." Visgar, 120 Ill. App. 3d at
587. Reasoning that there was no allegation that the complaining
witness was injured or that her vagina had been penetrated, the trial
court found that an examination "would not be necessary for any
purpose." Visgar, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 587. Thus, unlike the case at
hand, the appellate court in Visgar was not faced with the decision of
affirming a trial court's decision to order the physical examination of
a complaining witness.
2. Other Jurisdictions
	Here, the appellate court turned to the other jurisdictions that
utilize the "compelling need" test because neither Glover nor Visgar
provided any guidance on how to implement the test. See, e.g., People
v. Chard, 808 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1991); Bartlett v. Hamwi, 626 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. App. 1993); State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 604 A.2d 89
(1992); State v. Garrett, 384 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. App. 1986); State
v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059 (R.I. 1989); State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Delaney, 187 W. Va. 212, 417 S.E.2d 903
(1992). In Chard, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court
considered a defendant's request for involuntary, independent
psychological and physical examinations of a child who was an alleged
victim of a sex offense. Relying on prior case law relating to
involuntary psychological examinations, the court expressly adopted
the "compelling need" test for involuntary physical examinations.
Chard, 808 P.2d  at 353. Chard listed the factors to be considered in
determining whether a "compelling need" is present. Those factors
are: (1) the complainant's age; (2) the remoteness in time of the
alleged criminal incident to the proposed examination: (3) the degree
of intrusiveness and humiliation associated with the procedure; (4) the
potentially debilitating physical effects of such an examination; and (5)
any other relevant considerations. Chard, 808 P.2d  at 355, citing
Ramos, 553 A.2d  at 1062. In assessing those factors, the trial court
must " ' "balance the possible emotional trauma, embarrassment or
intimidation to the complainant against the likelihood of the
examination producing material, as distinguished from speculative,
evidence." ' " Chard, 808 P.2d  at 356, quoting People v. Estorga,
612 P.2d 520, 523 (Colo. 1980), quoting People v. King, 581 P.2d 739, 741 (Colo. 1978).
	Like Chard, the other jurisdictions that have adopted the
"compelling need" test for involuntary physical examinations have
relied, at least in part, on the court's authority to order a
psychological examination. See D.R.H., 127 N.J. at 257, 604 A.2d  at
93 (noting, where defendant sought only a physical examination, the
inherent power of the judiciary to order a witness to submit to a
psychiatric or psychological examination); Ramos, 553 A.2d  at 1062
(noting, where defendant sought only a physical examination, that a
number of courts have held that a trial court has discretionary power
to order a witness in a criminal trial to submit to a psychiatric
examination); Barone, 852 S.W.2d  at 221 (noting, where defendant
sought only a physical examination, the trial judge has the inherent
power to compel a psychiatric or psychological examination of the
victim). In the other jurisdictions that hold a trial court may not order
an unwilling witness to submit to a physical examination (see, e.g.,
State v. Hewett, 93 N.C. App. 1, 9, 376 S.E.2d 467, 472 (1989); State
ex rel. Wade v. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987)), the courts likewise have no discretionary authority to order a
complaining witness to submit to a mental examination (State v.
Clontz, 305 N.C. App. 116, 121, 286 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1982); State
ex rel. Holmes v. Lanford, 764 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989)).
	Similarly, in Illinois, a court has no authority to "order [the]
mental examination of [a] sex victim." 725 ILCS 5/115-7.1 (West
1998). When our decision in Glover was issued, section 115-7.1 was
not yet in existence. See 725 ILCS 5/115-7.1 (West 1998) (added by
Pub. Act 83-289, §1, eff. January 1, 1984). Accordingly, the
legislature's decision to prohibit trial courts from ordering the mental
examination of complaining witnesses provides further support for our
decision to likewise proscribe trial courts from ordering physical
examinations.
3. Wheeler and Physical Examinations
	Section 115-7.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115-7.1, now codified as 725 ILCS
5/115-7.1 (West 1998)) was at issue in People v. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d 298 (1992), relied on by the trial court in this case. In Wheeler, the
defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault. Before trial, he
had learned that the State intended to introduce expert testimony that
the alleged victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome. According to
section 115-7.2 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
115-7.2, now codified as 725 ILCS 5/115-7.2 (West 1998)), such
testimony was admissible. The defendant moved the trial court to
order the alleged victim to submit to a psychological examination by
his own expert, but section 115-7.1 precluded such an order. At trial,
the State called its expert, who had personally examined the alleged
victim. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that sections
115-7.1 and 115-7.2, as applied, denied him due process of law. The
appellate court disagreed and affirmed. People v. Wheeler, 216 Ill.
App. 3d 609 (1991). We granted the defendant's subsequent leave to
appeal and reversed. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 313.
	Initially, we noted that a defendant's right to due process is the
right to a fundamentally fair trial, including the right to present
witnesses in his own behalf. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 305, citing
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308,
93 S. Ct. 1038, 1045 (1973). We then described the legislative intent
of the relevant sections of the Criminal Code:
		"Section 115-7.1 was intended to protect sex-offense victims
from the embarrassment of psychological examinations
regarding the victim's competency and credibility as a
witness. The protection afforded by section 115-7.1 was
necessary because, until recently, sex-offense victims were
subjected to increased scrutiny by the courts. The rationale
for this higher scrutiny was grounded on the often quoted
maxim that rape ' "is an accusation easily made, hard to be
proved and still harder to be defended by one ever so
innocent." ' People v. Freeman (1910), 244 Ill. 590, 594,
quoting 3 S. Greenleaf, Evidence §212 (15th ed. 1892)."
Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 306.
	We then recounted the unwarranted suspicion that victims of
sexual assaults faced in criminal trials, as exemplified by passages
found in Wigmore on Evidence (3A J. Wigmore, Evidence §924a, at
737 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)). These passages recommended
mandatory psychiatric evaluation for all complaining witnesses in sex
offense cases to ascertain the victims' " ' "probable credibility" ' " and
"to determine whether the victim ' "suffers from some mental or moral
delusion or tendency *** causing distortion of the imagination in sex
cases." ' " Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 307, quoting 3A J. Wigmore,
Evidence §924a, at 747 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970), quoting ABA
Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence (1938).
	Next, we acknowledged that while Illinois wisely chose not to
adopt the extreme position presented in Wigmore, our courts still
retained the discretionary authority to order victims of sex offenses to
undergo psychological examinations when supported by compelling
reasons. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 307, citing Glover, 49 Ill. 2d  at 82.
Recognizing that our courts did not have a similar power with respect
to victims of nonsexual offenses, we noted that in cases of sexual
assault a victim's competency and credibility was subject to attack
based only on the nature of the offense. To eliminate this disparity, as
well as the potential for embarrassment and intimidation of victims of
sex offenses by defense counsel through the use of psychological
evaluations focusing on the victims' competency and credibility, the
legislature enacted section 115-7.1. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 307-08.
	We then distinguished section 115-7.2 from section 115-7.1
because it did not relate to the victim's competency and credibility.
Rather, section 115-7.2 permitted the admission of expert testimony
concerning the presence of rape trauma syndrome, a subcategory of
post-traumatic stress syndrome. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 308. "Unlike
psychological evidence regarding the victim's competency and
credibility as a witness, evidence of rape trauma syndrome is
substantive evidence that a sexual assault occurred" by showing that
the complainant suffers from symptoms common among most sexual
assault victims. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 308.
	After recognizing the value of a personal examination to a
testifying expert, we stated that, although the defendant was free to
call a nonexamining expert, the State's ability to call an examining
expert gave it "a clear advantage" in its effort to prove that the alleged
victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at
311. Thus, we held that, under those circumstances, the defendant's
trial was "fundamentally unfair." Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 311.
	This court further concluded that, unless the complainant
consented to an examination by the defendant's expert, the State was
precluded from admitting an examining expert's testimony that the
victim had post-traumatic stress syndrome. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at
312. Even if the victim consented to the examination, we required the
defense expert to be qualified by the court and that the examination
"be strictly limited to whether the victim has symptoms consistent
with 'any recognized and accepted form of post-traumatic stress
syndrome.' (Emphasis added.) *** See 134 Ill. 2d R. 413(c)."
Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 312, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
115-7.2, now codified as 725 ILCS 5/115-7.2 (West 1998).
	We also emphasized the need to protect victims' privacy in cases
of sexual assault, as well as the concomitant right to refuse an
examination for any reason. Nonetheless, we acknowledged the need
for the victim's right to be free of intrusion to be balanced against the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. We concluded that if a
victim refuses to undergo an examination, the State is precluded from
introducing evidence of rape trauma syndrome from an examining
expert. The State could, however, still introduce rape trauma evidence
through the testimony of nonexamining experts. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d 
at 312. This decision protected the victim's rights by leaving the
victim with the ultimate decision on whether to submit to an
examination. It also ended the unacceptable and intolerable defense
tactic of using psychological examinations as tools to harass,
intimidate, and embarrass sexual assault victims. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d 
at 313.
	The same fundamental considerations and rights are at issue in
cases where a defendant seeks an order to compel a physical
examination. Victims of sexual assault should no more be subjected to
physical examinations by experts proffered by the defense than they
should be required to submit to psychological evaluations. The effects
of both types of examinations can be intolerably harassing and
intimidating and can cause further harm to the victim. We believe that
this court struck the proper balance between a victim's right to be free
of intrusions and a defendant's right to a fair trial, and that the
Wheeler holding should be applicable in cases where defendants seek
either psychological or physical examinations of victims in sexual
offense cases.
B. Discovery Sanction
	By our holding that the trial court could not order the physical
examination of B.B., we have rendered the issue of the discovery
sanction moot. See Chicago City Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, 386 Ill. 508 (1944) (a question is
moot when it involves an issue that has ceased to exist). Accordingly,
we vacate that portion of the appellate court and trial court decisions,
disposing of defendant's motion in limine. On remand, the trial court
should address the issue of what evidence can be produced by the
State in light of the considerations espoused in Wheeler. To this end,
we note that at oral argument, defendant conceded it was error for the
trial court to preclude the State from introducing nonexamining expert
testimony. We further note that it would be error for the trial court to
exclude expert evidence by the State that is objectively verifiable
without an independent physical examination. 
	For example, the affidavit of defendant's expert only challenged
the finding of a partial obliteration of B.B.'s hymen made by the
State's second expert. The affidavit made no mention of the
independent finding of trauma made by the State's first expert, i.e.
"apparent scar tissue surrounding the vagina *** suggestive of
previous trauma and raw edges coming together, suggestive of
trauma." If defendant continues to challenge only the conclusion of
the State's second expert, it would be improper for the trial court to
exclude evidence produced by the State's first expert.
III. CONCLUSION
	For these reasons, we hold that a trial court cannot order a
complaining witness in a sex offense case to submit to physical
examination. To ensure a defendant's constitutional rights to a fair
trial is not compromised by the inability to obtain an independent
physical examination, trial courts should exercise vigilance when
rendering decisions on what evidence the State is allowed to produce.
The appellate court decision is affirmed in part and vacated in part,
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment
affirmed in part and vacated in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I join in the result reached by the majority because I believe
defendant failed to demonstrate a compelling need for an independent
physical examination of the victim. I cannot join the balance of the
majority opinion, however, because the majority eschews the
compelling need test and holds that a trial court has no jurisdiction to
order the physical examination of a victim of a sex offense. While I
recognize that, in so holding, the majority attempts to protect victims
of sex offenses, I believe the majority needlessly hampers the State in
its prosecution of such crimes and unwittingly places the victims of
sex offenses in situations where they will feel compelled to comply
with the very requests for physical examinations the majority seeks to
deny.
	My consideration of this issue necessarily begins with an
examination of People v. Glover, 49 Ill. 2d 78 (1971), the opinion the
majority overrules. In Glover, the defendant filed separate motions to
require the victim of a sexual assault to submit to a psychiatric
examination and an examination by an ophthalmologist. In the motion
for the ophthalmological examination, the defendant alleged that the
victim was the only eyewitness, it was dark at the time of the assault,
and the examination was necessary to determine the victim's ability to
see and identify the defendant. In affirming the denial of the motion,
this court observed: "With respect to the ophthalmological
examination, although the court had jurisdiction to order it, the record
reflects no compelling reason therefor and the denial of the motion
was not an abuse of discretion." Glover, 49 Ill. 2d  at 82.
	The Glover court sought a balance between the rights of the
victim of a crime and the rights of the defendant. The defendant's
request for a physical examination was to be granted only upon the
showing of a compelling need. Further, the determination to grant or
deny such a request was to rest within the sound discretion of the trial
court. See Glover, 49 Ill. 2d  at 82. The court's holding in Glover
foreshadowed its holding in People v. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d 298
(1992).
	In Wheeler, the court considered whether a defense expert should
have been allowed to examine the victim to determine whether she
suffered from rape trauma syndrome. The court first commented on
the nature of the defendant's rights at trial:
		"A defendant's right to due process is the right to a
fundamentally fair trial, including the right to present
witnesses in his own behalf. [Citation.] 'Few rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense.' [Citation.] In this case the trial court did
not preclude defendant from presenting his own expert
witness. Rather, because defendant's expert was prevented
from personally examining the victim the basis on which the
expert could form an opinion was limited. In this manner the
court's order restricted the ability of defendant's expert to
form an opinion." Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 305.
In counterbalance to the rights of the defendant, the court commented
on the challenges faced by the victims of sex offenses in the
prosecution of these crimes, particularly the attacks on the
competency and credibility of the victims as witnesses. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 306-07. The court noted that in enacting section 115-7.1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,
par. 115-7.1), the legislature "intended to eliminate the defense
practice of intimidating sex-offense victims through psychological
examinations focusing on their competency and credibility as
witnesses." Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 307.
	The court drew a line, however, between psychological
examinations used to attack the competency and credibility of victims
of sex offenses and the examination the defendant sought to refute
evidence of rape trauma syndrome:
			"The issue addressed by section 115-7.2 [of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
115-7.2)] is fundamentally distinguishable from the issue of
the victim's competency and credibility as a witness. Section
115-7.2 permits the use of expert testimony relating to the
existence of post-traumatic stress syndrome. Rape trauma
syndrome is the subcategory of post-traumatic stress
syndrome which is common to victims of sexual assaults.
Unlike psychological evidence regarding the victim's
competency and credibility as a witness, evidence of rape
trauma syndrome is substantive evidence that a sexual assault
occurred. By showing that a complainant suffers from
psychological symptoms common to most victims of sexual
assault, this evidence tends to support the proposition that
the complainant was also the victim of a sexual assault.
			Initially, the State argues that defendant has not presented
a compelling reason for an examination of the victim. Thus,
the State contends that defendant is not entitled to a court-ordered examination of the victim even without regard to
section 115-7.1. The State's argument ignores the impact of
its rape trauma syndrome evidence. As previously stated, this
evidence tends to prove that the victim was subjected to a
sexual assault. The fact that the State is using evidence of
rape trauma syndrome to prove that the victim was assaulted
presents a compelling reason for defendant to examine the
victim.
			Defendant is not attempting to challenge the victim's
competency or credibility through a psychological
examination. Instead, defendant is attempting to examine the
victim for the purpose of challenging the State's assertion
that she suffers from rape trauma syndrome. ***
			The State does not dispute that defendant was entitled to
present evidence that C.K. did not suffer from rape trauma
syndrome. Rather, the State argues that defendant's expert
witness could have formed an opinion on this subject by
reviewing the various reports prepared in the case and
observing the trial testimony of the victim and the State's
expert, Pamela Klein. Because defendant was not completely
prevented from offering evidence that C.K. did not suffer
from rape trauma syndrome, the State argues that application
of sections 115-7.1 and 115-7.2 did not deprive defendant
of a fair trial. This argument ignores the inherent qualitative
differences between testimony from an examining expert and
a nonexamining expert.
			While it may be possible for an expert to form an opinion
regarding rape trauma syndrome based only on a review of
reports and trial testimony, this is clearly not the preferred
method. An expert who has personally examined a victim is
in a better position to render an opinion than is an expert who
has not done so." Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 308-09.
	Lastly, the court observed that the need in a criminal trial for a
complete presentation of the facts was hampered by the restriction on
the defendant's ability to rebut the State's rape trauma syndrome
evidence. Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 311. The court concluded:
		"Because the State in this case had the exclusive right to
examine C.K., the credibility of its expert was elevated above
that of any nonexamining expert defendant could call. Thus,
we find it is fundamentally unfair that the State was able to
present the testimony of an examining expert but the
defendant was limited to the testimony of a nonexamining
expert. [Citation.]
			We hold that unless the victim consents to an examination
by an expert chosen by the defendant, the State may not
introduce testimony from an examining expert that the victim
of an alleged sexual assault suffers from a 'recognized and
accepted form of post-traumatic stress syndrome' [citation].
Such an examination, if consented to, shall be conducted by
an expert qualified by the court [citation], and shall be strictly
limited to whether the victim has symptoms consistent with
'any recognized and accepted form of post-traumatic stress
syndrome.' " (Emphases omitted.) Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at
311-12.
	To summarize the holding in Wheeler, the court recognized the
need to protect the privacy of the alleged victim in a sex offense case.
The court also recognized the defendant's right to a fair trial and the
disadvantage to the defense when its expert is not allowed to examine
the victim. In the context of a psychological examination, the court
found that evidence of rape trauma syndrome is substantive evidence
that a sexual assault occurred and is in no manner equivalent to
evidence regarding the victim's competency and credibility as a
witness. The court sought balance between the rights of the defendant
and the alleged victim in allowing the trial court to order a
psychological examination to rebut rape trauma syndrome evidence,
but having the victim decide whether or not to comply with the order.
	Of course the defendant must show a compelling reason for the
examination in the first place (see Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 308; Glover,
49 Ill. 2d at 82), and the examination must be performed by an expert
qualified by the trial court (see Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d at 312). A
showing of a compelling need minimizes the occasions upon which
outside pressures may be brought to bear on the alleged victim to
agree to an examination. In other words, the victim is not faced with
a decision to comply or not comply with an order for an examination
where the defendant has not shown a compelling need for the
examination.
	The compelling need test is followed by the majority of the courts
in our sister jurisdictions. See State v. McIntosh, 30 Kan. App. 2d
___, 58 P.3d 716 (2002) (collecting cases); State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Delaney, 187 W. Va. 212, 417 S.E.2d 903 (1992) (collecting cases); People v. Chard, 808 P.2d 351
(Colo. 1991). As in Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d 298, these courts recognize
the defendant's interest in a fair trial. Chard, 808 P.2d  at 353. These
court also recognize the intrusive nature of a physical examination and
the potential for trauma, embarrassment and intimidation to the
alleged victim. Barone, 852 S.W.2d  at 222; Chard, 808 P.2d  at 355.
The courts highlight, however, the differences in purpose between a
psychological examination aimed at the credibility and competency of
the alleged victim and a physical examination to establish a substantive
defense to the charges against the defendant. Chard, 808 P.2d  at 354.
Balancing the intrusion upon the victim and the defendant's right to
a fair trial, these courts conclude that a trial court may exercise its
discretion to order an involuntary physical examination only when a
defendant demonstrates a compelling need or reason for the
examination. Barone, 852 S.W.2d  at 222; State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059, 1062 (R.I. 1989); Chard, 808 P.2d  at 356.
	The factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant
has shown a compelling need for an independent examination are the
age of the alleged victim; the remoteness in time of the alleged
criminal incident to the proposed examination; the degree of
intrusiveness and humiliation associated with the procedure; the
potentially debilitating physical effects of such an examination; the
probative value of the examination to the issue before the court; and
the evidence already available for the defendant's use. McIntosh, 30
Kan. App. 3d at ___, 58 P.3d  at 726; Barone, 852 S.W.2d  at 222;
Chard, 808 P.2d  at 355; Ramos, 553 A.2d  at 1062. As noted in
Ramos, 553 A.2d  at 1062, "[t]he practice of granting physical
examinations of criminal witnesses must be approached with utmost
judicial restraint and respect for an individual's dignity."
	Applying these factors to the case at bar, I conclude that
defendant has failed to show a compelling need for the physical
examination. I note the victim is of an extremely tender age. She was
a mere 20 months at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, and
about three years old when defendant requested that the court order
the State to produce her for an independent gynecological
examination. Defendant's request for the physical examination was
remote in time from the alleged criminal conduct. As of the time of
this writing, an additional 45 months have elapsed, making it even less
likely that an examination would result in evidence probative to the
defense. The proposed gynecological examination is extremely
intrusive. Given the nature of the proposed examination and the
victim's yet tender age, there exists the possibility of debilitating
physical and mental effects from such an examination. Lastly, there is
evidence already available for defendant's use, including 17
colposcopic photographs of the victim's vaginal area.
	The majority, however, eschews the compelling need test and
holds that the trial court is without jurisdiction to order a physical
examination of the alleged victim of a sex offense. Because this
holding is contrary to the conclusion in Glover that a trial court has
jurisdiction to order a physical examination of a victim of a sex
offense, the majority explicitly overrules Glover. Further, although the
majority purports to follow Wheeler, in actuality, the majority
overrules Wheeler. The court in Wheeler specifically distinguished
between mental examinations aimed at attacking the victim's integrity
and examinations focused upon obtaining substantive evidence to
refute the allegation of sexual assault. See Wheeler, 151 Ill. 2d  at 308.
In my estimation, a physical examination, as in the case at bar, is no
doubt closer to the second type of mental examination than the first.
The majority fails to provide a proper ground for differentiating
between a physical examination and a mental examination relating to
the existence of post-traumatic stress syndrome.
	The majority cites State v. Hewett, 93 N.C. App. 1, 376 S.E.2d 467 (1989), and State ex rel. Wade v. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d 141
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987), in support of its holding that a trial court has no
jurisdiction to order a physical examination of an alleged sex offense
victim. I note that the jurisdictions cited are not as supportive as
implied. In Hewett, 93 N.C. App. 1, 376 S.E.2d 467, the appellate
court considered whether the trial court properly denied the
defendant's motion for a physical examination of the sex offense
victim. In doing so, the appellate court rejected the defendant's
argument that the bodies of the alleged victims were physical evidence
susceptible to objective tests and examinations like any other physical
evidence. Hewett, 93 N.C. App. at 7, 376 S.E.2d  at 471. The court
then observed:
		"[C]ourts are rightly solicitous when a human being's privacy
faces invasion. At the same time, we recognize that this
defendant has been convicted of some of our most serious
non-capital offenses, and our concern for his due process
rights is, likewise, very strong. [Citation.]
			We have carefully reviewed the record, and we do not find
that defendant made a credible showing to the trial judge
that the additional examinations he requested would have
been probative. The last alleged incidence of abuse was 29
March; the new examinations would have taken place some
six months later. Defendant made no showing that dilations,
in September, of less than four millimeters would
demonstrate that no penetration had occurred in February
and March. He made no showing that normal measurements
would not have been the result of vaginal constriction rather
than non-abuse." (Emphases added.) Hewett, 93 N.C. App.
at 8, 376 S.E.2d  at 471-72.
The court also observed that the defendant had made no showing that
the new examinations were necessary. Hewett, 93 N.C. App. at 8, 376 S.E.2d  at 472. The court concluded:
			"We do not imply that a defendant charged with offenses
such as these is precluded, in all cases, from receiving an
independent medical examination of the alleged victim. On
appeal, both the State and defendant have focused on North
Carolina cases in which criminal defendants have asked trial
judges to compel witnesses to undergo psychiatric
examinations. The law in this State is that a judge has no
discretionary power to require an unwilling witness to submit
to such an examination. [Citation.] In our view, a trial judge
would have the discretionary power to permit a second
physical examination of an alleged sexual-abuse victim if the
defendant shows the court that the examination would be
probative, that it is necessary to the defendant's preparation
of his defense, and if the victim or the victim's guardian
consents to the examination. When, in a case such as this
one, four life sentences are in part contingent on a distance of
four millimeters, a defendant should not be absolutely
foreclosed from having his own expert examine the alleged
victim. In this case, however, defendant failed to make a
preliminary showing to the judge that the examinations
would be probative and were necessary, and thus we
overrule this assignment of error." (Emphases added and
emphasis omitted.) Hewett, 93 N.C. App. at 9, 376 S.E.2d  at
472.
	As the highlighted text in the foregoing discussion demonstrates,
the Hewett court applied a form of the compelling need test to balance
the interests of the alleged victims and the defendant's right to due
process.
	In State ex rel. Wade v. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987), the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, observed
that article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14 (Vernon 1979)) is a comprehensive
pretrial discovery statute which only allows discovery of tangible
objects that are not privileged. The appellate court held that article
39.14 defines and limits the authority of a trial court to order
discovery. Consequently, the appellate court required the trial court
to set aside its order requiring the victim to submit to a physical
examination. In State ex rel. Holmes v. Lanford, 764 S.W.2d 593
(Tex. Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth
District, agreed with the result of the Stephens decision, but not its
reasoning. In holding that a trial court has no inherent authority to
order the victim in a criminal case to undergo a psychological
examination, the Lanford court recognized that "circumstances may
arise under which a trial court could properly order discovery beyond
that outlined in article 39.14." Lanford, 764 S.W.2d  at 594. The
Lanford court's holding does not necessarily deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to order an examination. The Stephens decision, on the
other hand, is based on the court's construction of relevant Texas
statutory authority.
	Returning to the case at bar, I note there are unintended results
attached to the majority's holding. First, the holding needlessly
hampers the State in its prosecution of crimes involving sexual
offenses. Under the compelling need test, the defendant must show a
compelling reason for the proposed examination. If the defendant
meets this rather high burden, the trial court, in its discretion, orders
the physical examination. If the alleged victim does not submit to the
examination, the court considers what, if any, State evidence to
exclude at trial. With the elimination of the compelling need test, the
trial court automatically proceeds to a determination of what State
evidence must be disallowed. See slip op. at ___. Moreover, the trial
court must arrive at its determination without the detailed guidance
offered by the compelling need factors.
	Second, the alleged victim must decide to comply or not comply
with the request for the examination without a prior determination
that the defendant has shown a compelling need for the examination.
Upon receipt of a request for a physical examination, the prosecuting
attorney must approach the victim to determine whether the victim is
willing to undergo the examination. Fully cognizant that the use of
State expert testimony will be compromised if the victim does not
agree with the defendant's request, the prosecuting attorney may be
tempted to apply pressure on the victim to comply with the request.
Even if external pressures are not applied on the victim, the victim
may yet feel the need to comply with the request in order to safeguard
the prosecution's case. In contrast, in the majority of sister
jurisdictions, any pressure to comply with the defendant's request for
an independent examination would not come into play until the trial
court had determined that the defendant had made a showing of a
compelling need for the examination.
CONCLUSION
	The need to protect the alleged victim in this case is only more
compelling because of her tender age. Recognizing this, however, the
alleged victim, and other victims of sexual offenses, will receive
necessary protection through the judicious use of the compelling need
test. This court need only invoke the test, provide guidance to the
lower courts by adopting the factors noted above, and rest confident
in the trial courts' proper exercise of discretion. A physical
examination should not be granted lightly. The majority chooses a
different path, preferring to deny the trial courts jurisdiction to order
an independent physical examination by a defense expert. While well
intentioned, the majority's holding is misguided. The accused, the
victim, and the prosecution are the losers.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special
concurrence.