Title: Seals v. City of Columbia
Citation: 641 So. 2d 1247
Docket Number: 1920237
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 1994

641 So. 2d 1247 (1994)
Robert Hence SEALS, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Misty Michelle Seals, deceased
v.
CITY OF COLUMBIA and Stanley E. Cook.
1920237.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 6, 1994.
*1248 Patrick M. Lavette of Hare, Wynn, Hewell &amp; Newton, Birmingham, for appellant.
Herman Cobb of Buntin, Cobb &amp; Shealy, P.A., Dothan, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
The opinion of June 25, 1993, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
The plaintiff, Robert Hence Seals, individually and as administrator of the estate of Misty Michelle Seals, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, the City of Columbia and Stanley E. Cook.
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. In Seals v. City of Columbia, 575 So. 2d 1061 (Ala.1991), an appeal from a dismissal, Justice Houston set forth the facts as follows:
575 So. 2d  at 1062. In reversing the dismissal, Justice Houston stated, "By [its holding in Madison v. Weldon, 446 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 1984) ], this Court recognized that a lack of due care on the part of a police officer in operating his vehicle could be the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by, or the death of, a third party involved in a collision with the fleeing offender." 575 So. 2d  at 1063.
After the remand of this case, the parties moved on to discovery and, thereafter, the defendants moved for a summary judgment. In support of their motion, the defendants offered Cook's deposition, wherein he responded as follows to questions regarding the proper procedure when a roadblock has been set up to apprehend a fleeing offender:
Cook also stated that as soon as he was notified of the roadblock, he stopped pursuing the automobile driven by Watford and cut off his siren and blue lights.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Seals offered the affidavit of an eyewitness, who said that the officer appeared to be in continued pursuit of the vehicle at the 74-mile marker, where Cook had contended that he had abandoned the pursuit. The eyewitness further said that the siren and blue lights were engaged when he witnessed the officer in pursuit. He stated:
Seals also offered an expert witness, who testified that Cook negligently operated his police car during the pursuit. By affidavit, the expert stated:
(Emphasis added.)
On a motion for a summary judgment, once the defendant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.; see Gillion v. Alabama Forestry Ass'n, 597 So. 2d 1315, 1319 (Ala.1992). "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). (Citation omitted.)
The City would have us affirm the summary judgment on the authority of Blair v. City of Rainbow City, 542 So. 2d 275 (Ala. 1989), and Doran v. City of Madison, 519 So. 2d 1308 (Ala.1988). While we reverse the summary judgment in this case, we note that *1250 this reversal is not inconsistent with our holdings in Blair and Doran.
In Blair, the administrator of the estate of Donald Ricky Blair, who was killed while being pursued at a high speed by the police, sued Rainbow City and others, alleging that they were responsible for Donald Blair's death. The administrator also alleged civil rights violations and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sue 542 So. 2d  at 275. In Blair, it was the fleeing offender who was killed in the chase. He had ignored the siren and blue light signals of the officers to pull over. In doing so, he elected to evade the police, and he died as a result of injuries when his own motorcycle left the road. 542 So. 2d  at 276. Clearly, in Blair, the fleeing offender was responsible for his own injuries, because, as this Court stated in the opinion, he could have pulled over at any time during the chase. 542 So. 2d  at 276.
In Doran, police officers were pursuing a vehicle driven by a person suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. 519 So. 2d  at 1310. In support of their motion for summary judgment, three officers offered affidavits tending to show that at all times during their pursuit of the vehicle they had used their sirens and their blue lights. The accident occurred when the fleeing vehicle proceeded through an intersection and struck another vehicle. The police cars were in not involved in the collision.
In Doran, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff offered affidavits tending to show that the police officers exceeded the speed limit while in pursuit; however, there was no evidence offered to show that they did not exercise due care in their pursuit. 519 So. 2d  at 1314. Justice Houston stated in this Court's opinion:
519 So. 2d  at 1314. In Doran, the plaintiff presented no evidence that the police officers had operated their vehicles without due care.
Again, this Court stated in Seals v. City of Columbia, 575 So. 2d 1061 (Ala.1991):
575 So. 2d  at 1064.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Seals offered evidence tending to show that Cook did not discontinue his pursuit of Watford once the roadblock was in place. While Cook disputed this fact, he did state in his deposition that in regard to pursuit of a fleeing offender, proper procedure was to back off once a roadblock was in place. Seals's expert testified that Cook acted negligently and that no pursuit was necessary because a road block was in place. Thus, the plaintiff's evidence created a genuine issue of material fact. The summary judgment was inappropriate and must be reversed.
ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED; APPLICATION OVERRULED.
*1251 MADDOX, STEAGALL, KENNEDY, INGRAM and COOK, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., dissents.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
I would affirm on the authority of Doran v. City of Madison, 519 So. 2d 1308 (Ala.1988), and Blair v. City of Rainbow City, 542 So. 2d 275 (Ala.1989). Officer Cook's vehicle was approximately one-half mile away when the collision occurred.