Title: MAYOR OF LANSING V MPSC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124136
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2004

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 9, 2004  
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LANSING,
CITY OF LANSING, and INGHAM
COUNTY COMMISSIONER LISA DEDDEN, 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
v 
No. 124136 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION and WOLVERINE PIPE 
LINE COMPANY, 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.   
In this case, we are called on to determine if 
defendant Wolverine Pipe Line Company (Wolverine) must 
obtain the permission of the city of Lansing before 
constructing a gas pipeline longitudinally in the right-of­
way adjacent to an interstate highway when part of the 
pipeline would be constructed within city limits. 
We 
affirm the Court of Appeals decision that Wolverine must 
obtain local consent but that such consent need not be 
 
 
                                                 
obtained before the 
Michigan Public Service
application 
Commission (PSC). 
I 
is submitted to the 
Wolverine 
is 
an 
interstate 
common 
carrier 
that 
constructs, operates, and maintains pipelines used for 
transporting petroleum products. It planned to construct a 
twenty-six-mile 
liquid 
petroleum 
pipeline 
along 
the 
Interstate-96 (I-96) corridor, within the right-of-way of 
the interstate highway. 
Although the land is under the 
control and jurisdiction of the state’s Department of 
Transportation, several miles of the highway are within the 
city limits. 
In December 2001, Wolverine, before commencing any 
work on the project, filed an application with the PSC for 
approval of its plan. 
The mayor and the city, as well as 
Ingham County Commissioner Lisa Dedden, were allowed to 
intervene in the PSC proceeding.1
 The application was 
treated as a contested case and a hearing was held. 
The 
city moved to dismiss the application, arguing that the PSC 
had no jurisdiction because Wolverine’s application lacked 
the requisite consent from the city. 
The PSC denied the 
1 Because of the similarity of interests, these three
parties will be referred to as “the city.” 
2  
 
 
 
 
motion and authorized the project, finding that the city’s 
consent was not required to accompany the application. 
With regard to the reasonableness of the project, the PSC 
determined that there were no equal protection violations 
in the route selection and found the project necessary and 
safe. 
The city appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
The Court 
reviewed the plain language of MCL 247.183 and determined 
that 
the 
statute 
did 
require 
local 
consent 
before 
construction began, but not before the applicant sought PSC 
approval. 
257 Mich App 1, 16; 666 NW2d 298 (2003). 
Both 
sides sought leave to appeal. 
Wolverine and the PSC 
asserted that no local approval is required, and the city 
argued that approval is required during the application 
stage. 
This Court granted leave to appeal on both 
applications. 469 Mich 898 (2003). 
II 
We 
review 
de 
novo 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
construction. 
In construing a statute, we are required to 
give effect to the Legislature’s intent. 
That intent is 
clear if the statutory language is unambiguous, and the 
statute must then be enforced as written. 
Weakland v 
Toledo Engineering Co, 467 Mich 344, 347; 656 NW2d 175 
(2003). 
We use the same rules of construction both for 
3  
 
 
statutes and for administrative regulations. 
Soap & 
Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 
756-757; 330 NW2d 346 (1982). 
III 
The statute that controls this case is MCL 247.183, 
which reads: 
(1) Telegraph, telephone, power, and other
public 
utility 
companies, 
cable 
television 
companies, and municipalities may enter upon,
construct, and maintain telegraph, telephone, or
power lines, pipe lines, wires, cables, poles,
conduits, sewers or similar structures upon,
over, across, or under any public road, bridge,
street, or public place, including, subject to
subsection (2), longitudinally within limited 
access highway rights of way, and across or under
any of the waters in this state, with all 
necessary 
erections 
and 
fixtures 
for 
that 
purpose. A telegraph, telephone, power, and other
public utility company, cable television company,
and municipality, before any of this work is
commenced, shall first obtain the consent of the
governing body of the city, village, or township
through or along which these lines and poles are
to be constructed and maintained. 
(2) A utility as defined in 23 C.F.R. 
645.105(m) 
may 
enter 
upon, 
construct, 
and 
maintain 
utility 
lines 
and 
structures 
longitudinally 
within 
limited 
access 
highway
rights of way in accordance with standards 
approved by the state transportation commission
that conform to governing federal laws and 
regulations. The standards shall require that the
lines and structures be underground and be placed
in a manner that will not increase highway
maintenance costs for the state transportation
department. The standards may provide for the
imposition 
of 
a 
reasonable 
charge 
for 
longitudinal use of limited access highway rights
of way. The imposition of a reasonable charge is 
4  
 
 
                                                 
a governmental function, offsetting a portion of
the capital and maintenance expense of the 
limited access highway, and is not a proprietary
function. The charge shall be calculated to 
reflect a 1-time installation permit fee that
shall 
not 
exceed 
$1,000.00 
per 
mile 
of 
longitudinal use of limited access highway rights
of way with a minimum fee of $5,000.00 per 
permit. 
All 
revenue 
received 
under 
this 
subsection 
shall 
be 
used 
for 
capital 
and 
maintenance expenses incurred for limited access
highways. 
Wolverine does not here dispute that it is both a 
“public utility,” as that phrase is used in subsection 1 of 
the statute, as well as a subsection 2 “utility as defined 
in 23 C.F.R 645.105[.]”2
 Definitionally, both subsections 
are applicable to Wolverine unless something in the statute 
excludes Wolverine from the reach of one subsection or the 
other. Wolverine argues that such exclusionary language is 
found in subsection 1, which, paraphrased, states that any 
covered utility, including those subject to subsection 2, 
2 This includes 
a privately, publicly, or cooperatively owned 
line, 
facility 
or 
system 
for 
producing,
transmitting, 
or 
distributing 
communications,
cable 
television, 
power, 
electricity, 
light,
heat, gas, oil, crude products, water, steam,
waste, storm water not connected with highway
drainage, 
or 
any 
other 
similar 
commodity,
including any fire or police signal system, which
directly or indirectly serves the public. 
The 
term utility shall also mean the utility company
inclusive of any wholly owned or controlled 
subsidiary. [23 CFR 645.105.] 
5  
 
 
                                                 
 
may use a public road longitudinally within the limited 
access highway right-of-way if it has local permission 
before work commences. 
The company’s construction of this 
passage is that the quoted phrase serves to remove 
subsection 2 utilities from subsection 1 rules and thus 
such utilities must only comply with the requirements of 
subsection 2. In support of this, Wolverine primarily 
contends that this reading is the only proper construction 
because otherwise the language “subject to subsection (2)” 
would be left without meaning. 
Because such constructions 
are to be avoided, and because Wolverine believes its 
reading gives the phrase meaning, it urges us to adopt that 
reading.3  We decline to do so, as did the Court of Appeals 
before us, because we think the reading urged by the city 
also gives meaning to and more accurately reflects the 
statute. 
3 Wolverine also suggests several ways in which the
statute could have been worded to clearly indicate an
intent to impose both subsections on longitudinal projects.
Wolverine posits that because the statute is not worded in
one of the ways it suggests, it follows that the 
Legislature intended to impose only the requirements of
subsection 2 on longitudinal projects. 
This argument is
unconvincing because, while the Legislature doubtlessly 
could have made its intentions clearer in this statute, the
fact that it has not done so by adopting any of Wolverine’s
suggested approaches does not relieve this Court of giving
meaning to what actually was written. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
We note that Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 
(2001 ed), defines “subject” when used as an adjective in 
six ways. 
The most applicable is the fourth definition, 
“dependent upon something (usu. fol. by to): His consent is 
subject to your approval.” 
This definition, in essence, 
gives to the word “subject” the meaning, “dependent upon.” 
When used as it is here and in other places in the 
Legislature’s work, it is clear that the subsections work 
together,4 see, e.g., MCL 15.443, 18.1237, and 168.677. 
That is, both subsections are applicable because the 
relevant words in subsection 1, the “subject to” words, do 
not mean that the requirements of subsection 1 do not apply 
to those utilities that are covered also by subsection 2. 
Further, because the Legislature expressly (and uniquely) 
used the word “including” before the “subject to” phrase, 
the implication is even stronger that the two subsections 
4 Moreover, even if one were inclined to utilize one of
the other five definitions in the dictionary (“under the
domination, control, or influence of something [often fol.
by to]”; 
“being under the dominion, rule, or authority of
a sovereign, state, etc. [often fol. by to]”; “open or
exposed [usu. fol. by to]: subject to ridicule”; “being
under the necessity of undergoing something [usu. fol. by
to]: All beings are subject to death”; or “liable, prone
[usu. fol. by to]: subject to headaches”), these also lead
to the same conclusion that “dependent upon” yields: that
interaction, rather than disconnection, of the subsections
is called for. 
7  
 
 
 
 
are to be read in combination. 
Thus, subsection 1 means 
the project cannot go forward without local approval and, 
not at all incompatibly, subsection 2 means it cannot go 
forward unless it meets certain construction standards. 
We are aware, and, indeed, Wolverine forcefully 
argues, that this reading of the statute may facilitate 
frivolous and potentially crippling resistance from local 
governments along the route of a utility project. 
Such an 
argument, however, misunderstands the role of the courts. 
Our task, under the Constitution, is the important, but yet 
limited, 
duty 
to 
read 
into 
and 
interpret 
what 
the 
Legislature has actually made the law. 
We have observed 
many times in the past that our Legislature is free to make 
policy choices that, especially in controversial matters, 
some observers will inevitably think unwise. 
This dispute 
over the wisdom of a law, however, cannot give warrant to a 
court to overrule the people’s Legislature. See Oakland Co 
Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Cas Guaranty Ass’n, 456 
Mich 590, 612-613; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). 
We therefore 
affirm the Court of Appeals decision that subsection 1 as 
well as subsection 2 control and Wolverine is required by 
MCL 247.183 to get local consent before constructing its 
pipeline longitudinally in the right-of-way of I-96. 
8  
 
 
   
                                                 
IV  
Because we find that Wolverine is required to obtain 
local consent for its project, we must also address the 
question of when that consent must be obtained. 
The Court 
of Appeals found that local consent only has to be secured 
before work is commenced. 
Thus, at the time the permit 
from the PSC was sought, proof of local consent did not 
need to accompany the application. 
We agree with this 
holding. 
We 
begin 
our 
analysis 
with 
the 
statute 
that 
unambiguously requires local consent “before any of this 
work is commenced . . . .” MCL 247.183.  We note also that 
the PSC’s applicable rule, 1999 AC, R 460.17601(2)(d), 
indicates that applications for new construction of utility 
facilities “shall set forth, or by attached exhibits show, 
. . . [t]he municipality from which the appropriate 
franchise or consent has been obtained, if required, 
together with a true copy of the franchise or consent.”5 
5 1999 AC, R 460.17601 reads in its entirety: 
(1) An entity listed in this subrule shall
file an application with the commission for the
necessary authority to do the following: 
(a) A gas or electric utility within the
meaning of the provisions of Act No. 69 of the
Public Acts of 1929, as amended, being §460.501
(continued…) 
9  
 
 
                                                 
(…continued)
et seq. of the Michigan Compiled Laws, that wants
to construct a plant, equipment, property, or
facility for furnishing public utility service
for which a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is required by statute. 
(b) A natural gas pipeline company within
the meaning of the provisions of Act No. 9 of the
Public Acts of 1929, as amended, being §483.101
et seq. of the Michigan Compiled Laws, that wants
to construct a plant, equipment, property, or
facility for furnishing public utility service
for which a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is required by statute. 
(c) A corporation, association, or person
conducting oil pipeline operations within the 
meaning of the provisions of Act No. 16 of the
Public Acts of 1929, being §483.1 et seq. of the
Michigan Compiled Laws, that wants to construct
facilities to transport crude oil or petroleum or
any crude oil or petroleum products as a common
carrier 
for 
which 
approval 
is 
required 
by
statute. 
(2) The application required in subrule (1)
of this rule shall set forth, or by attached
exhibits show, all of the following information: 
(a) The name and address of the applicant. 
(b) The city, village, or township affected. 
(c) The nature of the utility service to be
furnished. 
(d) 
The 
municipality 
from 
which 
the 
appropriate 
franchise 
or 
consent 
has 
been 
obtained, if required, together with a true copy
of the franchise or consent. 
(e) A full description of the proposed new
construction or extension, including the manner
in which it will be constructed. 
(continued…) 
10  
 
 
                                                 
The PSC rule only requires utilities to provide proof 
of local consent if such is required to be obtained at the 
time the application is made, and the statute here does not 
require it. 
Thus, we agree with the PSC and the Court of 
Appeals that proof of local consent need not be filed with 
the application for this project. 
Although local consent 
was not filed with the application, the statute and the 
rules have been complied with and the PSC proceeded well 
within its authority. 
V 
Concerning 
the 
dissent, 
we 
offer 
the 
following 
observations: 
(1) The justices in this majority do not necessarily 
disagree with the dissent that MCL 247.183, as we construe 
it here, may be “cumbersome.” 
Post at 17. 
Nor, by this 
opinion, does any justice in this majority suggest that, 
had they been in the Legislature, they would have cast a 
(…continued)
(f) The names of all utilities rendering the
same type of service with which the proposed new
construction or extension is likely to compete. 
(3) A utility that is classified as a 
respondent pursuant to the provisions of R 
460.17101 may participate as a party to the 
application proceeding without filing a petition
to intervene. 
It may file an answer or other
response to the application. 
11  
 
 
 
 
vote in support of MCL 247.183 as it is interpreted here. 
Nor are the justices in this majority oblivious to the 
practical difficulties that our interpretation of the law 
may impose upon utilities such as Wolverine Pipe Line 
Company. 
Rather, what we decide today is merely that the 
language of MCL 247.183 compels a particular result, and 
the justices of this majority do not believe themselves 
empowered to reach a different result by substituting their 
own policy preferences for those of the Legislature. 
(2) Rather than interpreting the language of MCL 
247.183, 
the 
dissent 
prefers 
to 
divine 
what 
it 
characterizes as the Legislature’s “true intent.” 
Post at 
1. 
This “true intent” is not one to be gleaned from the 
words actually enacted into law by the Legislature, but 
through reliance on various random facts and circumstances 
that the dissent selectively picks out from the universe of 
potentially 
available 
facts 
and 
circumstances. 
In 
contrast, rather than engaging in legislative mind-reading 
to discern the “true intent” of the law, we believe that 
the best measure of the Legislature’s intent is simply the 
words that it has chosen to enact into law. 
Among other 
salutary consequences, this approach to reading the law 
allows a court to assess not merely the intentions of one 
12  
 
 
  
                                                 
or two highlighted members of the Legislature, but the 
intentions of the entire Legislature. 
(3) The dissent avoids the difficult task of having to 
read the actual language of the law and determine its best 
interpretation by peremptorily concluding that MCL 247.183 
is “ambiguous.” 
Post at 2. 
A finding of ambiguity, of 
course, enables an appellate judge to bypass traditional 
approaches 
to 
interpretation 
and 
either 
substitute 
presumptive “rule[s] of policy,” see Klapp v United 
Insurance, 468 Mich 459, 474; 663 NW2d 447 (2003), quoting 
5 Corbin, Contracts (rev ed, 1998), § 24.27, p 306, or else 
to engage in a largely subjective and perambulatory reading 
of “legislative history.” 
However, as Klapp, relying on 
the treatises of both Corbin and Williston, concluded, a 
finding of ambiguity is to be reached only after “all other 
conventional means of [ ] interpretation” have been applied 
and found wanting.6 
Klapp, supra at 474. 
Where the 
majority applies these conventional rules and concludes 
that the language of MCL 247.183 can be reasonably 
understood, the dissent, without demonstrating the flaws of 
6 While Klapp concerned contract interpretation and the
instant case statutory interpretation, the rule stated in
Klapp, supra at 474—that ambiguity is a finding of last
resort—applies with equal force whether the court is 
interpreting a statutory text or a contractual one. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the majority’s analysis except to assert that its opinion 
is not in accord with the “true intent” of the Legislature, 
opines that an “ambiguity” exists. 
An analysis, such as 
that of the dissent, that is in conflict with the actual 
language of the law and predicated on some supposed “true 
intent” is necessarily a result-oriented analysis. 
In 
other words, it is not a legal analysis at all. 
(4) In peremptorily reaching its conclusion that MCL 
247.183 is “ambiguous,” the dissent entirely misstates the 
standard for discerning ambiguity. 
The dissent would 
hasten findings of “ambiguity” by courts by predicating 
these findings on the basis of whether “reasonable minds 
can differ regarding” the meaning of a statute. Post at 3. 
Especially in the context of the types of cases and 
controversies considered by this Court—those in which the 
parties have been the most determined and persistent, the 
most persuaded by the merits of their own respective 
arguments—it is extraordinarily difficult to conclude that 
reasonable minds cannot differ on the correct outcome. 
That is not, and has never been, the standard either for 
resolving cases or for ascertaining the existence of an 
ambiguity in the law. 
The law is not ambiguous whenever a 
dissenting 
(and 
presumably 
reasonable) 
justice 
would 
interpret such law in a manner contrary to a majority. 
14  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Where a majority finds the law to mean one thing and a 
dissenter finds it to mean another, neither may have 
concluded 
that 
the 
law 
is 
“ambiguous,” 
and 
their 
disagreement by itself does not transform that which is 
unambiguous into that which is ambiguous. 
Rather, a 
provision 
of 
the 
law 
is 
ambiguous 
only 
if 
it 
“irreconcilably conflict[s]” with another provision, id. at 
467, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a 
single meaning. 
In lieu of the traditional approach to 
discerning “ambiguity”—one in which only a few provisions 
are truly ambiguous and in which a diligent application of 
the rules of interpretation will normally yield a “better,” 
albeit perhaps imperfect, interpretation of the law—the 
dissent would create a judicial regime in which courts 
would be quick to declare ambiguity and quick therefore to 
resolve cases and controversies on the basis of something 
other than the words of the law.7
 Moreover, the dissent 
implies that the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Yellow Transportation, Inc, v Michigan, 537 US 36; 
7 
The 
dissent 
also 
confusingly 
conflates 
unambiguousness and clarity. 
Post at 5. 
Instead, a great
many unambiguous provisions of the law are far from clear.
The interpretative process is often quite difficult,
struggling to remove a great deal of textual underbrush. A 
provision of law that is unambiguous may well be one that
merely has a better meaning, as opposed to a clear meaning. 
15  
 
 
 
123 S Ct 371; 154 L Ed 2d 377 (2002), should be read to 
compel the adoption of his view of how we determine if a 
statute is ambiguous. 
We believe this is a misreading of 
Yellow Transportation.
 The United States Supreme Court 
established 
no 
rule 
in 
Yellow 
Transportation 
for 
determining or resolving statutory ambiguity. 
Moreover, 
even if the Court had fixed upon a method it chooses to use 
to determine if a statute is ambiguous, it could not be 
understood to have superceded the rules that state courts 
may use in a like undertaking. 
The United States courts, 
of whatever sort, when they rule, are of course always 
respectfully reviewed by state court judges but such 
holdings are only binding in a narrow range of cases such 
as, classically, in the construction and meaning of the 
United 
States 
Constitution. 
Statutory 
construction 
techniques are not of this genre. 
With that distraction 
clarified, Yellow Transportation should be understood as a 
narrow holding that stands for the simple proposition that 
if a federal administrative agency has given a defensible 
construction to a federal statute that it applied, that all 
state 
courts 
must 
follow 
that 
construction 
even 
if 
alternative constructions are also reasonable. 
We deal 
with no such situation in this case, and thus Yellow 
16  
 
 
 
 
Transportation is inapposite in all particulars to this 
matter. 
(5) The dissent wrongly asserts that “the majority 
fails to construe subsection 1 in light of subsection 2 
. . . .” 
Post at 6-7. 
Rather, we assert that “subsection 
1 means the project cannot go forward without local 
approval and, not at all incompatibly, subsection 2 means 
it cannot go forward unless it meets certain construction 
standards,” p 8, and further assert that the “including, 
subject to subsection (2)” language in subsection 1 makes 
“the implication . . . even stronger that the two 
subsections are to be read in combination.” Pp 7-8. It is 
the dissent that misapprehends the relationship between 
subsections 1 and 2 by attempting to read these provisions 
in isolation and concluding that when read in this manner 
they compel different results and thus are “ambiguous.” 
However, the subsections of MCL 247.183, as with all other 
provisions of law, are not to be read discretely, but as 
part of a whole. 
The dissent errs in first reading these 
subsections “alone” and then asserting that it is reading 
these subsections “together” when it merely combines its 
“alone” interpretations. 
Post at 6. 
Rather, to read the 
law as a whole, it must, in fact, be read as a whole. The 
interpretative process does not, as the dissent does, 
17  
 
 
 
remove words and provisions from their context, infuse 
these 
words 
and 
provisions 
with 
meanings 
that 
are 
independent of such context, and then reimport these 
context-free meanings back into the law. 
The law is not 
properly read as a whole when its words and provisions are 
isolated and given meanings that are independent of the 
rest of its provisions. 
This is especially true when, as 
here, one of these provisions expressly cross-references 
the other. 
(6) Therefore, even if the existence of a reasonable 
disagreement were the standard for identifying ambiguity— 
which it is not—the dissent’s interpretation of MCL 247.183 
is simply not a reasonable one when subsections 1 and 2 are 
read together, as opposed to being read discretely. 
It 
cannot correctly be said that these subsections “apply to 
different entities,” post at 7, when subsection 1 expressly 
observes 
that 
its 
provisions 
are 
made 
“subject 
to 
subsection (2).” 
Contrary to the mandate of this Court, 
the dissent fails to “give effect to every word, phrase, 
and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that 
would render any part of the statute surplusage,” State 
Farm & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 
NW2d 
715 
(2002), 
by 
essentially 
ignoring 
the 
term 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
“including 
subject 
to 
subsection 
(2)” 
in 
its 
interpretation. 
(7) The dissent further asserts that MCL 267.183 is 
ambiguous because “application of the statute to the facts 
has rendered the correct application of the statute 
uncertain.” 
Post at 4. 
It is hard to know what this 
means. 
While any interpretation of the law is in some 
sense “fact specific,” the dissent fails to identify why 
the interpretation of this statute, any more than any other 
statute, is rendered ambiguous by the instant facts. 
This 
majority’s view of the law is that, whenever a public 
utility constructs a pipeline or other utility project 
longitudinally within limited access highway rights-of-way, 
MCL 247.183 requires that the utility must both obtain the 
consent of the local governing body (subsection 1) and 
construct the pipeline in accordance with state and federal 
standards (subsection 2). 
Is it the dissent’s view that 
its interpretation pertains in some instances but not in 
others? 
If not, what is the relevance of the dissent’s 
observation that its interpretation is “fact specific”? 
(8) 
Moreover, 
even 
if 
MCL 
247.183 
were 
truly 
ambiguous, the dissent’s analysis of what it views as the 
relevant legislative history is altogether unpersuasive. 
In In re Certified Question  (Kenneth Henes v Continental 
19  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
Biomass Ind, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 
(2003), this Court emphasized that not all legislative 
history is of equal value, which “results in varying 
degrees of quality and utility of legislative history.” 
There, we stated that examples of “the highest quality of 
legislative history that relates to an action of the 
Legislature 
from 
which 
a 
court 
may 
draw 
reasonable 
inferences about the Legislature’s intent with respect to 
an ambiguous statutory provision” are “actions of the 
Legislature intended to repudiate the judicial construction 
of a statute” or “actions of the Legislature in considering 
various alternatives in language in statutory provisions 
before settling on the language actually enacted.” Id. It 
is noteworthy that the dissent fails to rely on legislative 
history of either type. 
Instead, the dissent largely 
relies on the least persuasive form of legislative history— 
staff analyses—which we have found are of “considerably 
diminished quality,” and thus “are entitled to little 
judicial consideration in resolving ambiguous statutory 
provisions . . . .” Id.8 
8 “The problem with relying on bill analyses is that
they do not necessarily represent the views of even a
single legislator. 
Rather, they are prepared by House and
Senate staff. 
Indeed, the analyses themselves note that
they do not constitute an official statement of legislative
(continued…) 
20  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
(9) Even examining this legislative history on the 
dissent's own terms, we are perplexed about how it supports 
the dissent’s position. For example, the dissent cites the 
fact that “SB 1008 was passed without a single ‘nay’ vote 
in either the House or Senate . . . .” 
Post at 15. 
How 
does this fact, this bit of legislative history, support 
the dissent’s understanding of the law, i.e., that the 
Legislature did not intend that utilities must obtain local 
consent 
before 
constructing 
utility 
projects 
in 
longitudinal 
highway 
rights-of-way? 
How 
does 
this 
demonstrate 
anything 
more 
than 
that 
the 
Legislature 
unanimously approved the statute being considered today?9 
Similarly, we believe that the dissent misapprehends 
the “changes” in which “the Department of Transportation 
(…continued) 
intent.” 
Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 
Mich 578, 588 n 7; 624 NW2d 180 (2001).  
9 Our 
confusion 
over 
the 
dissent’s 
analysis 
of 
legislative history is heightened by its assertion that
“the 1994 statutory amendment transformed Michigan from a
state that generally did not allow entities to use limited
access highway rights-of-way to a state that generally does
allow the use of limited access highway rights-of-way, even
though that use is subject to the requirements contained in
subsection 2.” 
Post at 9. 
This seems to us not only
incorrect, but also contrary to the dissent’s own prior
analysis, post at 8, in which it notes that pre-1994
subsection 2 did allow use of rights-of-way by federally
defined utilities. 
21  
 
 
and the major state utilities concurred” when SB 1008 was 
passed. 
Post at 16. 
The dissent suggests that the 
“changes” concerned the overall effect the bill would have 
on utility projects constructed in limited access highway 
rights-of-way. 
However, when read in context, it appears 
that the “changes” concerned only the “minor amendments” 
made by the House of Representatives to SB 1008 concerning 
the fee structure for such projects. Id. 
In fact, when we look at the most valuable type of 
legislative history available to us, that is, the actual 
change in statutory language made by the Legislature in 
1994, we find support for our view, rather than the 
dissent’s. 
Regardless of the vote count, the change that 
was enacted turned “except longitudinally within limited 
access highway rights-of-way” to “including, subject to 
subsection 
(2), 
longitudinally 
within 
limited 
access 
highway rights-of-way.” We find this legislative action to 
be a strong indication that the “true intent” of the 
drafters was to include such projects in both subsections, 
rather than exclude them from subsection 1. 
Finally, while we agree with the dissent that the 1994 
amendments were intended to “eliminate the ability of the 
state to deny access to these locations for construction of 
utility services,” the dissent relies on this statement to 
22  
 
 
 
 
     
                                                 
support its proposition that “[i]f the [1994] amendment 
were meant to remove the state’s power to deny access to 
these locations, it certainly could not have meant to grant 
this power to local entities . . . .” 
Post at 16-17. 
Perhaps, the dissent's assertion is correct, but it is 
hardly self-evident. 
There is nothing that logically 
impels the conclusion that authority is to be denied the 
locality if it is to be denied the state. 
While the 
dissent, and perhaps some justices in this majority, might 
question the wisdom of a policy that treats the state and 
localities differently in terms of the approval required 
for 
utility 
pipeline 
construction, 
it 
is 
hardly 
inconceivable that a Legislature committed to local control 
or to the principle of subsidiarity might adopt exactly 
such a policy.10 
10 Although not directly applicable to this case 
because I-96 is a federal highway and, thus, not a highway
“of” the city, perhaps the Legislature intended to require
local 
approval 
because 
such 
approval 
had 
been 
a 
longstanding part of Const 1963, art 7, § 29, which 
provides in relevant part: 
No person, partnership, association or corporation,
public or private, operating as a public utility shall have
the right to the use of the highways, streets, alleys or
other public places of any county, township, city or 
village for wires, poles, pipes, tracks, conduits or other
public utility facilities, without the consent of the duly
constituted authority of the county, township, city or
village . . . . 
23  
 
 
 
(10) The dissent states that “[w]hile the statute does 
not clearly indicate whether the Legislature intended to 
require 
federally 
defined 
utilities 
to 
obtain 
local 
consent, it appears that this lack of clarity is the result 
of a clerical error and the intent was not to reverse the 
1989 elimination of local control.” Post at 14 (emphasis 
added). 
What precisely is this supposed “clerical error”? 
What is the dissent’s basis for assuming such a “clerical 
error” occurred? 
What is the evidence in support of the 
existence of such a “clerical error”? 
Is the dissent 
justifying its conclusion that MCL 267.183 is “ambiguous” 
on the basis of a “clerical error”?  Or is the dissent, 
instead, asserting that the legislative history of MCL 
267.183 not only can be considered, but that this history 
can supersede its very language? 
(11) In the end, the essence of the dissent’s analysis 
is its (perhaps understandable) frustrated assertion that 
“I cannot believe that the Legislature intended to subject 
federally 
defined 
public 
utilities 
to 
local 
consent 
requirements.” 
Post at 17. 
This constitutes less a legal 
conclusion than a statement of discontent with the fact 
that the Legislature either had a different perspective on 
pipeline approval than the dissent or it failed effectively 
to communicate what the dissent alone knows to be its “true 
24  
 
 
 
intent.” 
In either case, there is no warrant for this 
Court replacing the words of the Legislature with those of 
its own. 
VI 
We conclude that the plain language of MCL 247.183 
requires Wolverine to obtain local consent before beginning 
construction of its project. However, local consent is not 
required at the time of application to the PSC. 
We 
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
all respects. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LANSING,
CITY OF LANSING, and INGHAM
COUNTY COMMISSIONER LISA DEDDEN, 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
No. 124136 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION and WOLVERINE PIPE 
LINE COMPANY, 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the majority in all but part V of its 
opinion. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LANSING,
CITY OF LANSING, and INGHAM
COUNTY COMMISSIONER LISA DEDDEN, 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
v 
No. 124136 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION and WOLVERINE PIPE 
LINE COMPANY, 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Today, 
the 
majority 
finds 
no 
ambiguity 
in 
the 
statutory provision at issue and, in so doing, ignores the 
true intent of the Legislature. Because I believe the true 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature 
must 
be 
given 
effect, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
The majority, apparently frustrated 
with my refusal to follow its lead and use a dictionary 
while turning a blind eye to reality, has issued a lengthy 
response to this dissent. 
While the majority asserts that 
I substitute my own policy preferences for those of the 
Legislature, I think it is necessary to note the following 
in regard to the majority’s approach: “A method of 
 
 
statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, 
and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the 
judge’s own policy preferences will affect the decisional 
process.” Bedroc Limited, LLC v United States, 541 US ___, 
___; 124 S Ct 1587, 1598; 158 L Ed 2d 338 (2004) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
This case requires us to examine MCL 247.183 to 
determine whether defendant Wolverine Pipe Line Company 
(Wolverine) must obtain permission from plaintiff city of 
Lansing to construct a gas pipeline longitudinally in the 
right-of-way of an interstate highway within the city 
limits. 
The majority finds no ambiguity in the statute 
and, thus, holds that Wolverine must obtain local consent 
before constructing the pipeline. 
I, on the other hand, 
believe that the statute is ambiguous and turn to the 
legislative history accompanying the statute to discern the 
Legislature’s true intent. 
A review of the legislative 
history indicates that the Legislature’s intent was to 
create a streamlined permit system that would not require 
consent from each municipality a pipeline crosses. 
On the 
bases of the history of the statute itself and of the 
legislative history recorded when the statute was enacted, 
I would hold that Wolverine is not obligated to obtain 
local consent. 
2  
 
 
 
I agree with the majority that this case involves 
principles of statutory construction and that in construing 
a statute, we are required to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent. I also agree that legislative intent 
must be gleaned from the statutory text if the language is 
unambiguous. 
However, when a statute is ambiguous, 
judicial 
construction 
is 
necessary 
to 
determine 
its 
meaning. 
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 
(1999). 
A statute is ambiguous when reasonable minds can 
differ regarding its meaning. 
Id. 
My dissent in Yellow 
Freight System, Inc v Michigan, 464 Mich 21, 38; 627 NW2d 
236 (2001) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), rev'd 537 US 36; 123 
S Ct 37; 151 L Ed 2d 377 (2002), vacated and remanded 468 
Mich 862; 659 NW2d 229 (2003), on remand 257 Mich App 602; 
669 NW2d 553 (2003), outlined the generally accepted method 
for making an ambiguity determination. 
[W]hen there can be reasonable disagreement over
a statute’s meaning, see People v Adair, 452 Mich
473, 479; 550 NW2d 505 (1996), or, as others have
put it, when a statute is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in
two or more different senses, that statute is
ambiguous. 
See 2A Singer, Statutes & Statutory
Construction (6th ed), § 45.02, pp 11-12. 
While 
the 
majority 
in 
Yellow 
Freight 
expressly 
disagreed with my determination that the statute was 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
ambiguous,1 the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the majority and held that the statute was 
ambiguous. 
Yellow Transportation, Inc v Michigan, 537 US 
36, 46; 123 S Ct 371; 154 L Ed 2d 377 (2002). 
My dissent in Yellow Freight collected cases where 
this Court has found statutes ambiguous. 
[T]his Court has concluded that statutes have
been ambiguous when one word in the statute has
an unclear meaning, see Perez v Keeler Brass Co,
461 Mich 602, 610; 608 NW2d 45 (2000), when a
statute’s interaction with another statute has 
rendered its meaning unclear, see People v Denio,
454 Mich 691, 699; 564 NW2d 13 (1997), or when
application of the statute to facts has rendered
the correct application of the statute uncertain,
see Elias Bros v Treasury Dep’t, 452 Mich 144,
150; 549 NW2d 837 (1996). [464 Mich 38.] 
In this case, application of the statute to the facts 
has rendered the correct application of the statute 
uncertain. 
1 In fact, the majority made the same argument in
Yellow Freight that they assert here: 
The 
dissent 
contends 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
ambiguous, asserting that this is demonstrated by
“the 
several 
interpretations 
of 
its 
wording
advanced by the parties.” 
If the parties’
conflicting interpretations were the measure of a
statute’s ambiguity, then almost every statute
litigated would be deemed ambiguous. 
A statute 
is not ambiguous because it requires careful 
attention and analysis. [Yellow Freight, supra at 
30 n 12.] 
4  
 
 
 
MCL 247.183, in pertinent part, reads: 
(1) . . . public utility companies . . . may
enter upon, construct, and maintain . . . pipe
lines . . . upon, over, across, or under any
public road, bridge, street or public place, 
including, 
subject 
to 
subsection 
(2),
longitudinally 
within 
limited 
access 
highway
rights of way, and across or under any of the
waters 
of 
this 
state, 
with 
all 
necessary
erections and fixtures for that purpose. A . . . 
public utility company . . . , before any of this
work is commenced, shall first obtain the consent
of the governing body of the city . . . through
or along which these lines and poles are to be
constructed and maintained. 
(2) 
A utility as defined in 23 C.F.R. 645.105[]
may enter upon, construct, and maintain utility
lines 
and 
structures 
longitudinally 
within 
limited 
access 
highway 
rights 
of 
way 
in 
accordance with standards approved by the state
transportation 
commission 
that 
conform 
to 
governing federal laws and regulations. . . . 
The majority’s statutory analysis begins and ends with 
the dictionary definition of “subject to.” 
The majority 
concludes that “subject to” does “not mean that the 
requirements of subsection 1 do not apply to those 
utilities that are covered also by subsection 2.” 
Ante at 
8. 
While the majority uses a double negative to hedge, I 
think the more direct statement to be gleaned from the 
inclusion 
of 
“subject 
to” 
in 
subsection 
1 
and 
its 
conspicuous absence from subsection 2 is that subsection 2 
utilities may not be “subject to” the requirements of 
subsection 1. 
Because subsection 2 utilities are a 
5  
 
 
 
specific group of federally defined utilities that are 
subject to regulations beyond those imposed on the broad 
general utilities in subsection 1, I think it is fair to 
say that the Legislature may have intended to create a 
regulatory scheme specific to the more-regulated entities. 
Thus, it is unclear whether the requirement in 
subsection 1, that public utility companies must obtain 
local consent, applies to a utility, as defined in 
subsection 2. 
When reading subsection 1 alone it appears 
that all public utilities must obtain local consent before 
constructing pipelines in any public place. 
When reading 
subsection 2 alone, however, it appears that federally 
defined utilities may construct pipelines longitudinally 
within limited access highway rights-of-way as long as they 
comply with the applicable state standards. 
When the two 
sections 
are 
read 
together, 
it 
is 
unclear 
whether 
subsection 2 utilities must comply with the local consent 
requirement in subsection 1. 
“It 
is 
a 
well-established 
rule 
of 
statutory 
construction that provisions of a statute must be construed 
in light of the other provisions of the statute to carry 
out the apparent purpose of the Legislature.” Farrington v 
Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 209; 501 NW2d 76 
(1993). 
Here, the majority fails to construe subsection 1 
6  
 
 
 
 
in light of subsection 2 and, thus, concludes that the 
statute is not ambiguous. 
I cannot agree that the meaning of MCL 247.183 is 
clear and unambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if there can 
be reasonable disagreement over the statute’s meaning. 
In 
re MCI, supra at 411. 
The meaning of this statute is 
subject to reasonable disagreement. 
There is a reasonable 
argument 
that 
subsection 
2 
imposes 
requirements, 
in 
addition to those imposed by subsection 1, on utilities 
that meet the definition of utility in 23 CFR 645.105, and 
that are looking to construct lines longitudinally within 
limited access highway rights-of-way. 
Under this reading 
of the statute, subsection 2 utilities would be required to 
obtain local consent. 
However, there is also a reasonable argument that 
subsections 1 and 2 apply to different entities and that 
subsection 2 entities are excepted from the requirements of 
subsection 1. 
Because there are at least two reasonable 
interpretations of MCL 247.183, the statute is ambiguous. 
When a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction is 
appropriate. 
In re MCI, supra at 411. 
As previously 
stated, it is a maxim of statutory construction that 
“provisions of a statute must be construed in light of the 
other provisions of the statute . . . .” Farrington, supra 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
at 209. 
In construing subsection 1 in light of subsection 
2, I find that the Legislature intended to create a special 
process for federally defined utilities that wish to 
construct pipelines longitudinally within limited access 
highway rights-of-way. 
The statutory and legislative history further supports 
the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend for 
federally defined utilities, such as Wolverine, to have to 
obtain 
local 
consent 
before 
constructing 
pipelines 
longitudinally in limited access highway rights-of-way. 
When the statute governing construction and maintenance of 
pipelines was originally enacted in 1925, it did not 
address 
longitudinal 
rights-of-way.2
 
Until 
1988, 
longitudinal 
use 
of 
interstate 
highway 
rights-of-way 
required a permit from the Federal Highway Administration. 
2 Section 13 of 1925 PA 368 provided, in pertinent
part: 
Telegraph, telephone, power and other public utility
companies and municipalities are authorized to enter upon,
construct, and maintain . . . pipe lines . . . upon, over,
across, or under any public road, bridge, street or public
places and across or under any of the waters in this state,
with all the necessary erections and fixtures therefor:
Provided that every such . . . public utility company . . .
before any of the work of such construction and erection
shall be commenced, shall first obtain the consent of the
duly constituted authorities of the city, village, or 
township through or along which said lines and poles are to
be constructed and erected. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
In 1988, the federal regulations were amended to allow use 
of longitudinal rights-of-way in accordance with federal 
regulations if such use was permitted by the state. See 23 
CFR 645.105. 
The Michigan statute was amended in 1989 to reflect 
this 
change. 
1989 
PA 
215. 
The 
phrase 
“except 
longitudinally within limited access rights of way” was 
added to subsection 1, and the Legislature also added 
subsection 2 to the statute.3  Essentially, MCL 247.183(1) 
provided that certain entities were authorized to construct 
pipelines upon, over, across, or under any public place, 
3 When subsection 2 was added in 1989, it read: 
The state transportation department may permit a
utility as defined in 23 CFR 645.105(m) to enter
upon, construct, and maintain utility lines and
structures longitudinally within limited access
highway 
rights 
of 
way 
in 
accordance 
with 
standards approved by the state transportation
commission. 
Such lines and structures shall be 
underground or otherwise constructed so as not to
be visible. 
The standards shall conform to 
governing federal laws and regulations and may
provide for the imposition of a reasonable charge
for longitudinal use of limited access highway
rights of way. 
The imposition of a reasonable
charge 
constitutes 
a 
governmental 
function,
offsetting 
a 
portion 
of 
the 
capital 
and 
maintenance 
expense 
of 
the 
limited 
access 
highway, and is not a proprietary function. 
All 
revenue received under this subsection shall be 
used 
for 
capital 
and 
maintenance 
expenses
incurred for limited access highways. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
except within limited access highway rights-of-way. 
In 
other words, according to subsection 1, Michigan generally 
did not allow longitudinal use of limited access highway 
rights-of-way. 
While general use was prohibited by 
subsection 1, subsection 2 allowed federally defined 
utilities to obtain a permit to use the rights-of-way. 
In 1994, the statute was amended again. 
1994 PA 306. 
The focus of the 1994 amendments was ensuring that it was 
feasible for utilities to construct in limited access 
highway rights-of-way. To this end, the fees that could be 
charged for longitudinal use of limited access highway 
rights-of-way were adjusted and the nature of the permit 
system 
was 
altered 
by 
changing 
the 
phraseology 
of 
subsection 1. 
In pertinent part, Senate Bill 1008 looked 
like this: 
Sec. 13. (1) Telegraph, telephone, power, and
other public utility companies, 
and 
cable 
television companies, and municipalities 
are 
authorized to 
MAY enter upon, construct and
maintain telegraph, telephone, or power lines,
pipe 
lines, 
wires, 
cables, 
poles, 
conduits, 
sewers and like 
OR SIMILAR structures upon,
over, across, or under any public road, bridge,
street, or public place, 
except 
INCLUDING,
SUBJECT TO SUBSECTION (2), longitudinally within
limited access highway rights of way . . . . 
Notably, the word “except” was replaced with the 
phrase “including, subject to subsection (2).” 
In other 
words, the 1994 statutory amendment changed Michigan from a 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
state that generally did not allow entities to use limited 
access highway rights-of-way, at least not without a 
permit, to a state that generally does allow use of limited 
access highway rights-of-way, even though that use is 
subject to the requirements contained in subsection 2. 
Before the 1994 amendments, subsection 1 permitted 
pipeline construction in public areas, but prohibited 
construction within limited access highway rights-of-way. 
Subsection 1 also required local consent. Subsection 2, on 
the 
other 
hand, 
allowed 
the 
state 
Department 
of 
Transportation to issue permits to federally defined 
utilities to construct pipelines within limited access 
highway 
rights-of-way. 
After 
the 
1994 
amendments, 
subsection 1 still permits construction in public areas, 
but it also provides that entities may construct pipelines 
longitudinally within limited access highway rights-of-way. 
The 
second 
sentence 
of 
subsection 
1 
still 
requires 
utilities to obtain local consent. Subsection 2 now states 
that a utility may construct within limited access highway 
rights-of-way if the utility pays a fee and conforms to 
state standards that comport with the federal standards; it 
no longer requires a state permit from the Department of 
Transportation. 
11  
 
 
 
 
While the history of the statute and the amendments 
themselves provide some insight into the Legislature’s 
intent, 
the 
legislative 
analyses 
and 
the 
documents 
contained in the House and Senate committee files provide 
even more insight. 
I recognize that this Court has held 
that “a legislative analysis is a feeble indicator of 
legislative 
intent 
and 
is 
therefore 
a 
generally 
unpersuasive tool of statutory construction.” 
Frank W 
Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 587; 624 
NW2d 180 (2001). 
However, this Court more recently 
recognized 
the benefit of using legislative history when a
statute is ambiguous and construction of an 
ambiguous provision becomes necessary. 
Stajos v
City of Lansing, 221 Mich App 223; 561 NW2d 116
(1997); People v Hall, 391 Mich 175; 215 NW2d 166
(1974); Liquor Control Comm v Fraternal Order of 
Eagles, Aerie No 629, 286 Mich 32; 281 NW 427
(1938). . . . Examples of legitimate legislative
history include . . . actions of the Legislature
in considering various alternatives in language
in statutory provisions before settling on the
language actually enacted. 
See, e.g., Miles ex 
rel Kamferbeek v Fortney, 223 Mich 552, 558; 194
NW 605 (1923). . . . 
By comparing alternative
legislative drafts, a court may be able to 
discern the intended meaning for the language
actually enacted. 
[In re Certified Question 
(Kenneth 
Henes 
Special 
Projects 
Procurement, 
Marketing 
and 
Consulting 
Corp 
v 
Continental 
Biomass Industries, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5;
659 NW2d 597 (2003).] 
The “various alternatives in language” examined by the 
Court in Miles were statutory amendments made over a 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
twenty-six year period. 
In that case, this Court found it 
telling that the Legislature eliminated words in 1917 that 
were added in 1909 and remained through the 1915 amendment. 
The amendments were to the general election law, which at 
the time of the election in question required election 
inspectors to indorse all ballots “in ink or with indelible 
pencil.” 
Miles, supra at 553. 
This Court concluded that 
the Legislature’s deletion of the words “or with lead” 
signified legislative intent to remove the possibility of 
signature with lead pencils. Id. at 558, 564. 
Although the Legislature added and then removed a 
specific term in Miles, that was not the case here. 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
Legislature 
did 
not 
eliminate 
the 
possibility of constructing pipelines longitudinally within 
limited access highway rights-of-way; rather, it subjected 
such construction to the requirements of subsection 2 only. 
It is clear from both the text of the statute and the 
legislative analysis of the 1989 amendment that the 1989 
amendment 
was 
intended 
to 
eliminate 
local 
control. 
Subsection 1 of the 1989 amendment prohibited construction 
within limited access highway rights-of-way. 
Thus, the 
local consent requirements of subsection 1 clearly did not 
apply 
to 
the 
prohibited 
actions. 
See 
also 
Senate 
Legislative Analysis, HB 4767, October 11, 1989 (“The bill 
13  
 
 
 
would amend Public Act 365 of 1925 . . . to authorize the 
Department of Transportation, rather than local governing 
bodies, to permit the longitudinal construction of utility 
lines . . . within limited access highway rights-of­
way. . . .”) 
However, the 1989 amendment of MCL 247.183 is not the 
language at issue because the most recent amendment of the 
statute was the 1994 amendment. While the statute does not 
clearly indicate whether the Legislature intended to 
require 
federally 
defined 
utilities 
to 
obtain 
local 
consent, it appears that the lack of clarity is the result 
of a clerical error and the intent was not to reverse the 
1989 elimination of local control. 
The legislative 
analysis accompanying the 1994 amendment suggests that the 
purpose of the amendment was simply to ensure that it was 
feasible for utilities to use limited access highway 
rights-of-way. This was accomplished by adjusting the fees 
for longitudinal use of limited access highway rights-of­
way and ensuring that the state standards prevent an 
increase 
in 
highway 
maintenance 
costs. 
See 
Senate 
Legislative Analysis, SB 1008, August 3, 1994. 
The House and Senate journals provide further support 
for the notion that the Legislature did not intend the 
amendment to impose a requirement that federally defined 
14  
 
 
 
 
utilities obtain local consent. The journals indicate that 
SB 1008 was passed without a single “nay” vote in either 
the House or Senate and the only amendments of the proposed 
bill were to subsection 2, which deals with the fees to be 
charged for longitudinal use of limited access highway 
rights-of-way. 1994 Journal of the Senate 1558, 1578; 1994 
Journal of the House 1639, 1978-1979. 
In addition to the journals, the standing committee 
records from the Senate Technology and Energy Committee and 
the discussions regarding the bill on the Senate floor also 
provide support for the notion that the Legislature did not 
intend to subject federally defined utilities to the local 
consent requirement. 
The Senate Committee on Technology 
and Energy held a committee hearing on March 23, 1994. 
Included 
in 
the 
committee 
records 
are 
the 
Senate 
Legislative Analysis, an analysis of the Senate Majority 
Policy Office, and written testimony of General Telephone 
and 
Electronics 
and 
the 
Michigan 
Department 
of 
Transportation. 
The analysis from the Senate Majority Policy Office 
states, “Senate Bill 1008 would amend current law to permit 
a utility to enter and construct utility services along the 
longitudinal axis of a limited access highway using 
standards adopted by the State Transportation Commission. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The amendatory language would also eliminate the ability of 
the 
state 
to 
deny 
access 
to 
these 
locations 
for 
construction of utility services.” 
Senate 
Bill 
1008, 
which 
resulted 
in 
the 
1994 
amendments of the act, was introduced by Senator Hoffman. 
SB 1008 was introduced on February 8, 1994, and sent on to 
the House of Representatives on April 26, 1994. 
On June 
12, 1994, the bill returned from the House to the Senate 
with minor amendments and Senator Hoffman explained the 
bill on the Senate Floor before a vote. 
He explained that 
the House of Representatives made two amendments to the 
bill concerning the fee structure for constructing in 
limited access highway rights-of-way. He conveyed that the 
Department of Transportation and the major state utilities 
concurred in the changes and he urged the Senate members to 
concur as well. 
Audio Tape: Michigan State Senate Session 
(June 21, 1994)(on file at the State of Michigan Archives).4 
If the amendment were meant to remove the state’s 
power to deny access to these locations, it certainly could 
4 Without stating what is missing from my alleged
recitation of “various random facts,” the majority asserts
that this dissent is underinclusive. 
Ante at 12. 
A few 
breaths later, however, the majority asserts that I have
included a useless “bit of legislative history.” 
Ante at 
20. 
I am at a loss for how to respond to a majority that
wants everything and nothing at the same time. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
not have been meant to grant this power to local entities, 
thus making it more cumbersome and maybe even impossible to 
construct within limited access highway rights-of-way. 
After reviewing the language used in the statute and the 
legislative history, I cannot believe that the Legislature 
intended to subject federally defined public utilities to 
local consent requirements. 
Because I believe that the statute is ambiguous and 
the true legislative intent was not to require local 
consent when federally defined utilities wish to construct 
pipelines longitudinally within limited access highway 
rights-of-way, I must respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
17