Title: State v. Reyes-Camarena
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44042
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 28, 2000

FILED: JULY 28, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
	v.
HORACIO ALBERTO REYES-CAMARENA,
Appellant.
(CC 95CR2419FE; SC S44042)
	En Banc
	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death entered by the Douglas County Circuit
Court.
	Thomas Kolberg, Judge.
	Argued and submitted May 16, 2000.
	David E. Groom, Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for
appellant.  With him on the brief was Stephen J. Williams, Deputy
Public Defender.  
	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With him on the briefs were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	DURHAM, J.
	The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death are
affirmed.
	DURHAM, J.
	This criminal case is before the court on automatic and
direct review of defendant's conviction for aggravated murder and
sentence of death. 	Former ORS 163.150(1)(g), repealed by Or Laws
1999, ch 1055, § 1. (1)  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of conviction and the sentence of death.  
	Defendant was employed as a foreman at a farm where the
victim worked.  Defendant agreed to drive the victim and her
sister to a farm in Washington to find work.  After defendant,
the two women, and a male companion left the farm, defendant
robbed and repeatedly stabbed the women, and left them beside
rural roads in Douglas County.  The victim died as a result.  
	In October 1996, a jury found defendant guilty of
aggravated felony murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of
aggravated murder.  In January 1997, after a penalty phase
proceeding in which the jury answered affirmatively the four
death-penalty questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b), the trial
court sentenced defendant to death.  Defendant asks this court to
reverse his conviction or, alternatively, to vacate the sentence
and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
I.  VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS

	After defendant's arrest, police officers advised
defendant of his Miranda rights in both English and Spanish, and
he signed waivers in both languages.  The police then interviewed
defendant.  The trial court admitted evidence of some statements
that defendant made to the police. 
	In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that
he is a Mexican citizen and that the court should have suppressed
his statements to the police, because the state obtained them in
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened
for signature April 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, TIAS No 6820 ("VCCR"). 
Defendant reasons as follows.  The VCCR is a treaty entered into
by the federal government.  See US Const, Art II, § 2 (President
shall have power, subject to concurrence of two-thirds of the
Senate, to make treaties).  As such, under the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, the VCCR is binding on state
courts.  US Const, Art VI.  Article 36 of the VCCR requires
designated authorities in signatory countries (1) to inform
foreign consulates when police arrest or detain one of the
citizens of the foreign country, (2) to allow communication
between foreign consulates and their arrested or detained
citizens, (3) to allow consulates to assist their citizens, and
(4) to advise arrested or detained foreign citizens of their
rights under the VCCR.  The police in this case did not comply
with the VCCR.  In particular, the police did not inform the
Mexican Consulate that defendant was in custody or inform
defendant of his rights under the VCCR.  Defendant argues that
the trial court should have suppressed statements that he made to
police as a remedy for those violations of the VCCR.  
	The state asserts a number of arguments in response to
that assignment of error.  First, the state contends that this
court should not review the assignment, because the claim of
error was not preserved.  The state observes that defendant
raised no issue regarding the VCCR in the trial court.  Defendant
did not move to suppress his statements, and neither he nor
anyone else mentioned the VCCR at trial.  The state further
argues that the assignment is not subject to review under the
plain error doctrine, because the legal point at issue is not
obvious and the error does not appear on the face of the record. 
See ORAP 5.45(2) (unpreserved error of law may be considered on
appeal if error is apparent on face of record).  Next, the state
contends that the record in this case is insufficient to
establish that the VCCR applies.  Third, the state argues that,
if this court reach the merits, then it should conclude, as have
several federal courts, that the VCCR confers no rights that
individuals may enforce.  Fourth, the state contends that, to the
extent that the VCCR confers individual rights, an individual
must establish prejudice to be entitled to relief, and defendant
has not done so.  Finally, the state argues that, even if
defendant is entitled to relief under the VCCR, suppression of
his statements to the police is not an appropriate remedy.
	Defendant concedes that the claim of error was not
preserved.  Ordinarily, this court will not consider any matter
assigned as error unless it was preserved in the lower court. 
ORAP 5.45(2); see also State v. Stevens, 328 Or 116, 123-24, 970
P2d 215 (1998) (defendant sought to exclude evidence as
inadmissible profile evidence; court declined to consider whether
evidence was inadmissible scientific evidence, because defendant
did not preserve that issue); State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 356,
927 P2d 64 (1996) (because defendant did not object to testimony
on grounds asserted on appeal, claim of error not preserved).  In
this case, defendant raised no issue about the admissibility of
his statements to police, let alone whether evidence of those
statements was inadmissible because of asserted violations of the
VCCR. 
	Even if a party fails to preserve a claim of error,
appellate courts nonetheless possess discretion to consider it if
it is plain error, also known as error "apparent on the face of
the record."  ORAP 5.45(2); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355, 800
P2d 259 (1990); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381,
823 P2d 956 (1991).  An appellate court may review unpreserved
error as plain error if (1) it is an error of law, (2) the error
is "obvious, not reasonably in dispute," and (3) it appears "'on
the face of the record,' i.e., the reviewing court * * * need
[not] go outside the record to identify the error or choose
between competing inferences," and the facts constituting the
error are irrefutable.  Ailes, 312 Or at 381-82.  Even if an
appellate court concludes that an error is plain, it must
exercise its discretion, explaining its reasons for doing so, to
consider the claim of error.  Id. at 382, 382 n 6 (stating
nonexhaustive list of factors appellate court weighs when
deciding whether to exercise discretion to consider plain error).
 	The state argues that any error here is not obvious,
because courts that have considered similar issues have reached
different conclusions.  The state further argues that, even if
the asserted error is plain, this court should exercise its
discretion against considering it, because the Ailes factors
counsel against considering the error as plain error.  Defendant
does not attempt to counter the state's argument against plain
error.  
	The asserted error here is not plain, because the legal
point on which defendant relies is not obvious and reasonably is
in dispute.  No Oregon appellate court has considered the issue,
let alone held that defendant's position is correct. 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has not decided the
issue.  See Van De Hey v. U.S. National Bank, 313 Or 86, 95, 95 n
9, 829 P2d 695 (1992) (only decisions of United States Supreme
Court are binding on this court in interpretation of federal
law).  The only pertinent Supreme Court case is Breard v. Greene,
523 US 371, 118 S Ct 1352, 140 L Ed 2d 529 (1998).  Breard is a
habeas corpus case in which the petitioner argued that the Court
should overturn his conviction and sentence because of alleged
violations of the VCCR.  The Court held that, because the
petitioner had not raised the claim in state court, he had lost
any claim under the VCCR.  523 US at 375.  Accordingly, the only
Supreme Court holding that addresses a claim under the VCCR does
not establish that defendant here was entitled to suppression of
his statements to police because of an alleged VCCR violation.  
	Other discussion of the VCCR in Breard is equivocal and
does not help defendant satisfy the plain error rule.  For
example, as the state observes, to prevail on his VCCR claim,
defendant must establish that the VCCR creates individual rights. 
The Breard Court referred to that issue in passing, noting:  "The
Vienna Convention -- which arguably confers on an individual the
right to consular assistance following arrest -- has continuously
been in effect since 1969."  Id. at 376 (emphasis added).  Even
if that statement were necessary to the holding in Breard, it is
insufficient to permit this court to conclude that the claimed
individual right plainly exists. (2) 
	Defendant argues that, even if he failed to preserve
any claim of error and the error is not plain, this court
nevertheless should consider his VCCR argument.  He presents
three reasons:
	"[T]his issue is largely unexplored throughout the
United States.  * * * Relationships with foreign
countries depend on the court rulings on this issue. 
In addition to that, this defendant's life depends on
Oregon's treatment of this issue."
For the following reasons, we disagree.  
	Defendant's first reason -- the lack of precedent on
the meaning and effect of the VCCR -- actually militates against
considering the unpreserved VCCR issue as plain error. 
Significant disputes regarding the VCCR persist because no
pertinent legal authority has resolved them.  See Ailes, 312 Or
at 381 (unpreserved error not considered "plain" if legal point
disputed).  Second, defendant has not persuaded us that the
diplomatic issues to which he alludes are sufficiently real or
significant to overcome the important considerations that
undergird the preservation doctrine.  See State v. Hitz, 307 Or
183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (rules pertaining to preservation of
error are intended to advance goals such as ensuring that
positions of parties are presented clearly to initial tribunal
and that parties are not taken by surprise, misled, or denied
opportunities to meet an argument).  Finally, this court applies
the preservation of error principles discussed above uniformly in
all cases, including capital cases.  See, e.g., State v. Barone,
329 Or 210, 242, 986 P2d 5 (1999) (declining to consider
unpreserved claim of error in death penalty case). 
	Any claim of error with regard to defendant's
statements to police was not preserved.  Any error attributable
to violation of the VCCR is not plain error.  We decline to
consider defendant's first assignment of error.
II.  DISCOVERY

	Before trial, defendant moved to require the state to
provide discovery.  In paragraph 24 of his written motion,
defendant sought discovery of "the name and case number of every
capital murder trial in Oregon in which the expert has testified
for the prosecution about the future dangerousness issue."  The
trial court denied that request.  
	Defendant assigns error to that denial, contending that
he sought discovery relevant to "proportionality review." (3) 
Defendant explains that he sought the identified documents to
show that the manner in which the state charges criminal
defendants with aggravated murder and seeks the death penalty is
arbitrary and capricious.  He also contends that juries in Oregon
do not impose the death penalty in a consistent manner.  Finally,
he argues that evidence that the state has filed aggravated
murder charges and obtained death sentences in an arbitrary
manner is "exculpatory" evidence that the state must disclose to
defendant under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S Ct 1194, 10 L
Ed 2d 215 (1963), and various provisions of the state and federal
constitutions.  
	The state first argues that defendant failed to
preserve that claim of error.  Defendant does not address whether
he preserved this assignment of error at trial.
	The requirement of preservation of error ensures that
the trial court will have an opportunity to consider the
pertinent issue and to correct an asserted legal error without
the need for an appeal.  See Brown, 310 Or at 356 (reasons for
preservation rule are to allow adversary to present its position
and to permit trial court to understand and correct any error.) 
On appeal, our task is to determine whether defendant preserved
at trial his claim that the trial court erred by refusing to
require the state to provide the information that he sought. 
Defendant contends that "defendant's pretrial motion * * * would,
in essence, have required the trial judge to undertake a
proportionality review of the imposition of the death penalty
throughout the State of Oregon."
	Defendant's written motion sought identifying
information about capital cases in which future dangerousness was
at issue.  That request did not inform the trial court that
defendant actually wanted information about the state's charging
decisions or the results of jury verdicts in aggravated murder
cases to establish arbitrariness of the kind that he describes on
appeal.  The reference to expert testimony and the phrase "the
future dangerousness issue" in defendant's discovery motion
indicate that the apparent objective of that motion did not
resemble the discovery purposes that he now asserts on appeal.
	Neither was defendant's argument at the hearing on the
motion sufficient to present to the trial court the issues that
defendant raises on appeal.  At that hearing, the following
colloquy occurred:
		"[The state]:  * * * There are, of course, some
objections having to do with -- I believe there was a
request in there having to do with prior death penalty
prosecutions and the State providing that to the
defense.  I have no objection to the Court entering an
order that we comply with the discovery statutes and
provide all police reports.  * * *  The only thing I
would object to, of course, has to do with other
prosecutions.
		"[Defendant]:  I think State vs. Cunningham
discusses that.  I wouldn't expect the trial court to
disagree with the Supreme Court.  So unless the issue
has federal validity I am not going to push it any
further.
		"The Court:  You mean you would want a copy of all
previous capital case records pertaining to any other
death penalty cases in Douglas County as well as other
counties in --
		"[Defendant]:  Yes.  That motion has been filed in
a lot of cases.  I think the Supreme Court addressed it
in State vs. Cunningham.  As I say unless --
		"The Court:  Yeah, I remember it was raised in
Cunningham.
		"[Defendant]:  I'm not going to push it beyond
what's in the paperwork because for purposes at this
point the Supreme Court addressed the question."
	In that colloquy, defendant conceded that, in State v.
Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 880 P2d 431 (1994), this court affirmed
the denial of the defendant's request for certain records in
other death penalty prosecutions.  Defendant further conceded
that he knew that the trial court would follow this court's
decision in Cunningham and deny any request by him for discovery
of similar records on that basis.  Defendant did not state -- as
he now attempts to argue on appeal -- that Cunningham was wrongly
decided or that some other reason justified his request. 
Defendant did not hint that he wanted the court to examine the
issues regarding death penalty prosecutions that he raises on
appeal.  If defendant was attempting to extend the scope or
purpose of his request beyond the four corners of his written
motion, then he did not make that position clear to the trial
court.  In fact, defendant stated that he was "not going to push
it beyond what's in the paperwork * * *."  That statement
indicated to the trial court that defendant wished to pursue only
his written motion.  As we have determined above, the written
motion did not preserve the claim of error that defendant seeks
to raise on appeal.  Because defendant's claim of error under
this assignment was not preserved, we decline to consider it.
III.  SYMPATHY INSTRUCTION
	Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not
giving his requested jury instruction as follows:
		"A decision to grant HORACIO REYES CAMARENA mercy
does not violate the law.  The law does not forbid you
from being influenced by pity for HORCIO [sic] REYES
CAMARENA and you may be governed by mere sentiment and
sympathy for HORACIO REYES CAMARENA in arriving at a
proper penalty in this case.
		"You need not find the existence of any mitigating
fact or circumstance in order to return a sentence of
less than death.  You may consider any aspect of
defendant's life in your determination on the fourth
question and any aspect of defendant's life that may be
relevant in your determination of the first three
questions.  Defendant need not prove the existence of a
mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.  If
you reasonably believe that a mitigating circumstance
exists, you may consider it as established."
Defendant argues that juries are entitled to consider mercy and
sympathy in their deliberations and, accordingly, that the trial
court should have given his requested instruction.  The state
responds that this court previously has upheld a decision not to
give an instruction nearly identical to the first part of the 
instruction requested here.  As to the second part, the state
contends that the trial court adequately instructed the jury on
the same issue using different words.
	We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested
jury instruction for errors of law.  State v. Moore, 324 Or 396,
427, 927 P2d 1073 (1996). 
	In Moore, the trial court refused to give the following
instruction requested by the defendant:
		"A decision to grant [the defendant] mercy does
not violate the law.  The law does not forbid you from
being influenced by pity for [the defendant] and you
may be governed by sentiment and sympathy for [the
defendant] in arriving at a proper penalty in this
case.
		"You need not find the existence of any mitigating
fact or circumstances in order to return a sentence
less than death."
This court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to
give that instruction, because it was not a correct statement of
the law.  Id. at 427-28.  That instruction is identical to the
first part of the instruction that defendant challenges in this
assignment of error.  Defendant does not contend that Moore was
decided incorrectly.  Because defendant's requested sympathy
instruction, considered in its entirety, did not state the law
correctly in all respects, the trial court did not err in
refusing to give that sympathy instruction regardless of whether
the instruction was correct in part.  See, e.g., Hernandez v.
Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106, 957 P2d 147 (1998) (trial
court does not err in refusing to give requested instruction that
is not correct in all respects).
IV.  FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS INSTRUCTION

	Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
not giving his requested jury instruction on future dangerousness
as follows:
		"'Criminal acts of violence' refers to a
relatively narrow range of acts characterized by the
application or overt threat of force which have the
potential for inflicting bodily injury on another
person."
The trial court gave the following instruction: 
		"The second question asked by the law is, is there
a probability, meaning is it more likely than not, that
the Defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society. 
'Criminal acts of violence' refers to acts
characterized by the application of force which has the
potential for inflicting bodily injury on another
person or the overt threat of such force."
	Defendant's requested jury instruction defined
"criminal acts of violence" as "a relatively narrow range of"
acts, while the instruction given by the trial court did not
contain that phrase.  Defendant argues that the trial court erred
by refusing to include that phrase in its instruction, relying on
State v. Huntley, 302 Or 418, 428, 730 P2d 1234 (1986), in which
this court addressed the meaning of the term "dangerousness of
the defendant" in ORS 161.725, the dangerous offender sentencing
statute.  
	This court rejected an argument similar to defendant's
in State v. Tucker, 315 Or 321, 336-37, 845 P2d 904 (1993). 
Defendant does not argue that Tucker was decided incorrectly.  We
follow Tucker and conclude that the trial court did not err in
refusing to give the future dangerousness instruction proposed by
defendant.  
V.  PRESUMPTION INSTRUCTION

	Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
not giving his requested jury instruction as follows:
		"The law presumes that the defendant will not
commit criminal acts of violence in the future.  That
presumption stays with the defendant unless and until
the probability of his commission of acts of criminal
violence is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The
burden is upon the State to prove the probability of
the defendant committing criminal acts of violence in
the future."
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to give
his requested instruction, because a defendant is presumed to be
peaceable, even after a guilty verdict, and "to suggest otherwise
would improperly shift the burden of persuasion on the sentencing
issues."  
	The state argues that this court has held that a
presumption instruction of the kind requested here is not
required.  See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 310 Or 438, 451, 800 P2d
288 (1990) (presumption of peaceableness instruction not
required). Defendant does not argue that Douglas and similar
cases were decided incorrectly.  The trial court did not err in
refusing to give the presumption instruction that defendant
requested.
VI.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEATH PENALTY
	
	Finally, defendant assigns error to the trial court's
rejection of his contention that Oregon's statutory death penalty
scheme is unconstitutional in a number of respects.  He concedes
that this court has rejected the same challenges in previous
death penalty appeals.  That concession is well taken.  See State
v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 414, 963 P2d 667 (1998) (declining to
discuss such challenges, because it would not benefit bench or
bar in light of previous holdings); Moore, 324 Or at 429 n 19
(same).
VII.  CONCLUSION 

	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of
defendant's assignments of error provides a basis for reversal.  
	The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death
are affirmed.

1. 	Judgments of conviction and sentences of death now are
subject to automatic review in this court under ORS 138.012(1). 
In enacting ORS 138.012(1), the legislature renumbered the
statute that described the court's review authority in death
penalty cases, but made no substantive change to that authority. 
That statutory change does not affect the analysis or disposition
of this case.

2. 	In addition, this court "ordinarily * * * respect[s]
the decisions of lower federal courts on issues of federal law,"
although this court is not bound by them.  State v. Moyle, 299 Or
691, 707, 705 P2d 740 (1985).  We observe that at least one lower
federal court decision manifestly is contrary to defendant's
position.  In U.S. v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F3d 882, 888 (9th
Cir 2000), an en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
		"The language of the Vienna Convention and its
operation over the last 30 years support the
government's position that a foreign national's post-arrest statements should not be excluded solely because
he made them before being told of his right to consular
notification."
Not only would that holding undercut the substance of defendant's
argument, were we to reach it, but it demonstrates that the legal
point that the court should suppress statements if the police
obtain them before VCCR notification is not "plain."

3. 	We continue to question the propriety of using the term
"proportionality review" in this context.  See State v.
Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 64 n 16, 880 P2d 431 (1994) (so stating).