Title: Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88530
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2002

Docket No. 88530-Agenda 24-September 2001.
SAM SARKISSIAN, As Parent and Guardian of Sonya Sarkissian, 
a Minor, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF
EDUCATION, Appellant.
Opinion filed July 3, 2002.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	There are two issues in this appeal. The threshold issue is
whether an order vacating a default judgment on the ground that
it is void for lack of proper service of process is an appealable
order. The second issue is whether service of process was proper
in this case. The appellate court held that the order vacating the
default judgment was a final, appealable order. The appellate court
also found that service of process was proper. 308 Ill. App. 3d
137. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which remanded the cause to the trial court for
further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	On January 26, 1988, Sam Sarkissian (Sarkissian), as parent
and guardian of Sonya Sarkissian, a minor, filed a personal injury
action against the Chicago board of education (the Board) in the
circuit court of Cook County. The complaint alleged that, on
September 24, 1985, Sonya Sarkissian suffered an epileptic
seizure while attending Armstrong public school. It was further
alleged that the Board and its agents, although aware that Sonya
suffered from epilepsy, failed to promptly summon or render
appropriate medical assistance when the seizure occurred and, as
a result, Sonya sustained serious and permanent injuries.(1)
	On February 1, 1988, a deputy sheriff delivered a copy of the
complaint and summons, addressed to "the Chicago Board of
Education," to the Board's corporate offices at 1819 West
Pershing in Chicago. The summons and complaint were given to,
and accepted by, the receptionist of the Board's law department.
The Board's appellate counsel conceded during oral argument
before this court that the complaint and summons were received
by the receptionist and that she transmitted the documents to a
Board attorney. The Board attorney, in turn, forwarded the papers
to the Martin Boyer Company, which served at that time as the
Board's risk management company. It was the responsibility of the
Martin Boyer Company to acquire outside counsel to defend the
Board in personal injury matters. However, according to appellate
counsel, the case "slipped through the cracks." No one filed an
appearance on behalf of the Board and the complaint was never
answered.
	Notice that plaintiff would be seeking a default judgment was
sent to the Board on July 28, 1988, via certified mail. The Board's
time stamp appears on the certified mail receipt, showing that the
Board received this notice on July 29, 1988. Still no action was
taken by the Board. On August 29, 1988, an order of default was
entered and, after prove-up on April 17, 1990, the trial court
entered a $10 million default judgment in plaintiff's favor and
against the Board.
	The record further reveals that on August 25, 1997, plaintiff
petitioned to revive the default judgment. See 735 ILCS
5/12-108(a) (West 2000) (a judgment that is more than seven
years old must be revived prior to enforcement). The Board
received notice of the plaintiff's revival petition on September 2,
1997. Notice of the revival petition was served on the Board in
exactly the same manner as when the Board had been served with
notice of plaintiff's complaint-by leaving a copy of the petition
and summons with the receptionist at the law department. On
October 1, 1997, the Board filed a general appearance. Then, on
November 5, 1997, the Board filed a motion to vacate the default
judgment as void, claiming that under section 2-211 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, a summons issued to the Board must be served
on "the president or clerk or other officer corresponding thereto."
735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 2000). According to the Board, service
did not conform with section 2-211 because the summons was not
addressed to any specific individual and was left with a
receptionist in the Board's legal department, who was not
designated by statute to receive service of process. Thus, the Board
contended that the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction
over it and, as a result, the default judgment entered was void.
	Plaintiff denied that process served on the Board did not
satisfy the requirements of section 2-211. Plaintiff contended that
the Board's attorney was an "officer" within the meaning of
section 2-211 and that the attorney delegated authority to the
receptionist to accept service of summons. In support, plaintiff
submitted evidence that the Board's long-standing custom,
practice, and procedure was to have the receptionist of the Board's
legal department accept service of summons on behalf of the
Board. Plaintiff submitted the deposition testimony of 12
witnesses, including Frank Gardner, who had been the Board's
president between 1987 and 1989; Patricia Whitten, who had been
chief counsel for the Board from 1982 until 1990; and
receptionists Nancy Faulk and Yolanda Chavez. The deposition
testimony established that, for many years, the receptionist for the
law department was a person authorized and designated to accept
summons for the Board. No one could recall a time when service
of summons on the Board via the receptionist of the law
department had ever been contested as being improper.
	The Board, however, contended that the receptionist of the
law department accepted service of summons as an
"accommodation" to the public and that strict compliance with the
statute could be demanded by the Board. The Board contended
that its failure to contest service in other cases meant only that the
Board had waived proper service in those instances.
	The trial court ruled in the Board's favor, finding that the
summons served on the Board in this case was not in conformity
with section 2-211. The trial court vacated the default judgment,
but authorized the issuance of an alias summons, addressed to the
Board's president. On July 28, 1998, the alias summons-like the
original summons-was accepted by a receptionist in the Board's
law department. The Board has not filed an appearance in response
to the alias summons.
	Plaintiff appealed the trial court's order vacating the default
judgment. The Board, however, moved to dismiss the appeal,
arguing that appellate jurisdiction was lacking. The Board
contended that the order vacating the default judgment was not
final and, therefore, not appealable. The motion to dismiss was
taken with the case.
	The appellate court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that
the order was a final order, appealable pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 303. After rejecting the Board's jurisdictional challenge, the
appellate court ruled on the merits, finding that valid service on
the Board had been effectuated in compliance with section 2-211.
The appellate court reversed the order vacating the default
judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 308 Ill.
App. 3d 137.
	We allowed the Board's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a). In addition, we granted leave to the Illinois
Association of School Boards, the Illinois Association of Park
Districts, the Illinois Library Association, and the Illinois
Governmental Association of Pools to submit a joint brief as amici
curiae in support of the Board. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
	On January 29, 2001, this court filed an opinion, with two
justices dissenting. The majority, exercising this court's
supervisory authority, reversed the judgment of the appellate court
and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Thereafter, on July
6, 2001, plaintiff's petition for rehearing was granted.
	Now, having had the benefit of additional argument, we
affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which remanded the
cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction
	It is necessary, at the outset, to identify the basis for this
court's exercise of jurisdiction over this appeal. The Board argues
here, as it did before the appellate court, that a court of review has
no jurisdiction over a trial court's order vacating a default
judgment on grounds that service of process was defective. Such
orders, the Board claims, are not final orders and, thus, not
appealable under our supreme court rules. Although the Board
acknowledges that there is a split of authority on this issue, the
Board cites to cases which support its position. See Nelson v.
United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 795 (1993); Stankowicz v.
Gonzalez, 103 Ill. App. 3d 828 (1981); Alexander v. Burke, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 919 (1972); Mabion v. Olds, 84 Ill. App. 2d 291 (1967).
	Plaintiff disputes the Board's claim that the order here is not
final. Citing Cavanaugh v. Lansing Municipal Airport, 288 Ill.
App. 3d 239 (1997), and DiNardo v. Lamela, 183 Ill. App. 3d
1098 (1989), plaintiff argues, and the appellate court below held,
that an order vacating a default judgment for lack of proper service
is, in essence, an order quashing service of process. Relying on
this court's opinion in Brauer Machine &amp; Supply Co. v. Parkhill
Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569 (1943), for the proposition that orders
quashing service of process are final orders, plaintiff contends,
"where the judgment is vacated due to improper service *** an
appeal may be had from this order." DiNardo, 183 Ill. App. 3d at
1103.
	While we agree with the appellate court that appellate
jurisdiction exists in this case, we do so for different reasons.
Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1401 (West 2000)) authorizes a party to seek relief from a
final judgment, such as a default judgment, when brought more
than 30 days after judgment has been entered. See Smith v.
Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209 (1986); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West
2000). The filing of a section 2-1401 petition is considered a new
proceeding, not a continuation of the old one. 735 ILCS
5/2-1401(b) (West 2000); Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 149 (1994). Thus, a circuit court's ruling on such a petition
is deemed a final order and provision has been made for
immediate review of these orders in Supreme Court Rule
304(b)(3), which states that appeal may be taken from "a judgment
or order granting or denying any of the relief prayed in a petition
under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure" (155 Ill. 2d
R. 304(b)(3)).
	There are sound policy reasons for allowing review of orders
granting relief from final judgments. Once a final judgment has
been rendered, setting it aside is a matter of considerable
significance. Moreover, it is impractical to subject parties to the
time and expense of trial before it is known whether the circuit
court's decision to set aside an existing final judgment is proper.
	In the present case, the Board filed a motion seeking relief
from a final judgment, brought more than 30 days from the
judgment's entry. Regardless of the label which the Board gave to
its motion, the motion was, in substance, a section 2-1401 motion.
See Barnes v. Southern Ry. Co., 116 Ill. 2d 236 (1987) (the
caption of a motion is not controlling; the character of the pleading
is determined from its content, not its label); Padilla v. Vazquez,
223 Ill. App. 3d 1018, (1991) (when analyzing a pleading, a court
will look to the content of the pleading rather than its label). The
order which plaintiff now seeks to have reviewed is the circuit
court's order granting the Board's motion to vacate the final
default judgment. In light of the foregoing, one might expect that,
in the case at bar, there would be no question regarding appellate
jurisdiction. However, the problem here stems from the fact that
the Board's motion was brought more than seven years after the
default judgment was entered, on grounds that the judgment was
void for lack of proper service. As a general rule, petitions brought
pursuant to section 2-1401, to be legally sufficient, must be filed
within two years of the order or judgment, the petitioner must
allege a meritorious defense to the original action, and the
petitioner must show that the petition was brought with due
diligence. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b), (c) (West 2000); Airoom, 114 Ill. 2d  at 221-22.
	It is undisputed that, as a general matter, the Board had the
right to challenge the default judgment on voidness grounds in the
circuit court, for it is well settled that "[a] judgment, order or
decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or
of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make
or enter the particular order involved, is void, and may be attacked
at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally." Barnard
v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135 (1945). The controversy, however, is
over the proper labeling of the motion. The appellate court in
Mabion, Alexander, Stankowicz and Nelson did not recognize
petitions seeking to vacate void judgments as petitions for relief
from judgment brought pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (formerly section 72 of the Civil Practice Act).
These courts interpreted the language contained in paragraph (f)
of section 2-1401 (formerly section 72(6) of the Civil Practice
Act) as excluding motions brought on voidness grounds from the
purview of section 2-1401.
	Not all appellate court panels have reached the same
conclusion. In Slates v. International House of Pancakes, Inc., 90
Ill. App. 3d 716, 723 (1980), the court said:
		"We do not read this section, as some courts have, as
removing motions attacking a void judgment from the
ambit of section 72. [Citation.] Rather, we read section
72(6) as a clarification that section 72 provides a parallel
mode for contesting void judgments."
	Until recently, this court had not spoken on the issue of
whether motions attacking void judgments could be recognized as
section 2-1401 petitions. However, in People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444, 454 (2001), four members of this court held that a motion
to vacate a void judgment is properly designated a petition for
relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). Pursuant to Harvey,
paragraph (f) of section 2-1401, which provides, "Nothing
contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a
void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to
procure that relief," does not exclude, but merely differentiates,
post-judgment petitions brought on voidness grounds from general
section 2-1401 petitions. See 735 ILCS 5/1401(f) (West 2000).
Under paragraph (f), the general rules pertaining to section 2-1401
petitions-that they must be filed within two years of the order or
judgment, that the petitioner must allege a meritorious defense to
the original action, and that the petitioner must show that the
petition was brought with due diligence-do not apply. Petitions
brought on voidness grounds need not be brought within the two-year time limitation. Further, the allegation that the judgment or
order is void substitutes for and negates the need to allege a
meritorious defense and due diligence. People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444, 452 (2001) (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined
by Freeman, J.).
	We note, also, that paragraph (a) of section 2-1401 expressly
abolishes all other common law means of attacking void
judgments. It provides in pertinent part:
		"Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of
review and bills in the nature of bills of review are
abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the
grounds for such relief heretofore available, whether by
any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be
available in every case, by proceedings hereunder,
regardless of the nature of the order or judgment from
which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it
was entered." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a)
(West 2000).
	Moreover, nowhere else in the Code of Civil Procedure does
the legislature make provision for the filing of a motion to
challenge a judgment on voidness grounds.
	Harvey recognized that petitions seeking relief from void
judgments are section 2-1401 petitions. That being the case, it
follows that any order granting or denying such relief is a final
ruling, appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (155
Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(3)).
	In the present case, the Board petitioned for relief from a
default judgment which had been entered more than seven years
earlier. The Board alleged that the default judgment was void
because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction due to defective
service of process. We conclude, pursuant to Harvey, that the
Board's petition was one which sought post-judgment relief under
section 2-1401 and could validly be brought outside the two-year
limitations period. Also, there was no need for the Board to
establish that it had acted with due diligence or to allege that a
meritorious defense existed. Because the Board's motion was a
valid section 2-1401 motion, the trial court's order granting the
Board's motion to vacate is, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
304(b)(3), a final, appealable order.
	Justice Thomas maintains in his dissent that a motion to
vacate a judgment as void is not the same as a section 2-1401
petition. Slip op. at 32 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by
Fitzgerald, J.). Accordingly, in the present case, Justice Thomas
does not recognize the Board's motion to vacate as a petition
brought under section 2-1401. Instead, he distills the Board's
motion into a motion to quash service of process. Justice Thomas
then reads Brauer Machine &amp; Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co.,
383 Ill. 569 (1943), as standing for the proposition that the finality
of an order quashing service of process turns on whether, under
the facts of the particular case, the matter can move forward. He
further concludes in his dissent that, in the present case, the matter
is "on file and pending before the trial court" and that "we know
with certainty that plaintiff will be able to proceed to the merits of
the complaint." Slip op. at 31-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined
by Fitzgerald, J.).
	We observe that Justice Thomas' characterization of the
Board's motion as one seeking to quash service of process ignores
the fact that the circuit court's order does more than quash service,
it sets aside a final judgment. In addition, it seems clear that the
procedural posture of this case contradicts Justice Thomas' view
that this case is capable of moving forward.
	In the present case, when the circuit court vacated the default
judgment that had been entered, it did not do so merely to allow
the Board to interpose a defense. The circuit court did not
recognize the Board's appearance as a general appearance and
require the Board to answer. Rather, the circuit court ordered
plaintiff to serve an alias summons on the Board. We know from
the record that an alias summons, addressed to the Board
president, was delivered to the Board and, like the original
summons, was accepted by a receptionist in the Board's law
department. The Board has not filed an appearance in response to
the alias summons. Moreover, appellate counsel conceded at oral
argument that, should this court reverse the appellate court
judgment and plaintiff attempt to proceed to trial on the underlying
action, service of process on the alias summons would be
contested as improper and a Rule 103(b) motion seeking dismissal
with prejudice would be filed. This is the reason that the Board,
though it continues to contest appellate jurisdiction over this
matter, suggests in its brief that, to "avoid undue delay," this court
should exercise its supervisory authority to reach the merits of the
appeal and determine whether service of process was proper.
	The general appearance filed by the Board on October 1,
1997, to which Justice Thomas' dissent makes reference, was filed
in response to plaintiff's revival action, which the trial court
dismissed when it vacated the default judgment as void. Thus,
while, technically, the case may be pending in the circuit court,
this court does not know with certainty that plaintiff will be able
to proceed to the merits of the complaint. In fact, the opposite is
true. Thus, even if Justice Thomas were correct in finding that
Brauer did not intend to make all orders quashing service of
process final and appealable orders, a matter on which we express
no opinion, we observe that his rationale for finding the order here
to be nonfinal is based on a misunderstanding of the posture of this
case.

Service of Process
	Having found no jurisdictional barrier, we address the merits
of this appeal and review the trial court's order vacating the
default judgment that was entered against the Board. As noted
earlier, the trial court's vacatur order was premised on its finding
that it had no jurisdiction to enter the default judgment because the
Board was not served with summons in accordance with section
2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.
110, par. 2-211 (now codified at 735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 2000)).
Consequently, our review of the vacatur order requires that we
determine whether summons served on the Board was in
conformance with the requirements of that section.
	Section 2-211 provides:
			"In actions against public, municipal, governmental or
quasi-municipal corporations, summons may be served by
leaving a copy with the chairperson of the county board or
county clerk in the case of a county, with the mayor or
city clerk in the case of a city, with the president of the
board of trustees or village clerk in the case of a village,
with the supervisor or town clerk in the case of a town,
and with the president or clerk or other officer
corresponding thereto in the case of any other public,
municipal, governmental or quasi-municipal corporation
or body." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-211.
	The Board is a quasi-municipal body. Thus, pursuant to
statute, the Board is to be served by leaving a copy of the
summons with "the president or clerk or other officer
corresponding thereto." 735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 2000). Because
the Board has a "president," but no "clerk," the parties, in
attempting to establish compliance with the statute, have focused
primarily on construing the language "other officer corresponding
thereto."
	Plaintiff urges us to uphold the appellate court and find that
"other officer corresponding thereto" is ambiguous, but may be
interpreted to include the Board's attorney, who then delegated her
authority to accept service of process to her receptionist. The
Board, however, argues that the term "other officer corresponding
thereto," properly construed, refers to the Board's secretary.
	As noted above, when the appellate court found that the
Board's attorney was an "other officer corresponding thereto," it
also held that the attorney could delegate the authority to accept
service to the receptionist. This notion-that a person authorized by
statute to accept service of process on behalf of a public entity may
delegate that authority to another-was fundamental to the appellate
court's holding. However, the appellate court offered no legal
support for this holding and the parties have not directly addressed
the issue. In our view, however, it is essential to our resolution of
the issues in this case to consider whether a person who is
statutorily designated to accept service has the legal authority to
delegate that duty to another, for it is of no moment whether the
Board's attorney is, as the appellate court held, an "other officer
corresponding thereto" if the attorney had no legal authority to
delegate her duty to accept service of process on the Board's
behalf. Similarly, if a person who is statutorily designated to
accept process may legally delegate his or her authority to another,
this court may consider whether, on the facts of this case, the
president of the Board, who is specifically designated by statute as
one who may accept service, delegated that authority, by custom
and practice, to the receptionist. In that event, there would be no
need to decide whether the attorney or the secretary is the "other
officer corresponding thereto." The issue of whether there was
compliance with the statute would turn on whether there was
sufficient evidence that the Board's president had, by custom and
practice, delegated the authority to accept process to the
receptionist.
	Due to its dispositive nature, we now turn to the question of
whether a public entity may delegate authority to accept service of
process to someone other than those persons designated by statute
to accept service. We begin by acknowledging that the general and
well-established rule is that strict compliance with statutes
governing service of process on public entities is required. See
Miller v. Town of Cicero, 225 Ill. App. 3d 105, 110 (1992), relying
on Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 317, 32 L. Ed. 946, 952, 9 S. Ct. 530, 536 (1889). See also 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations §792, at 730-31 (2000); 17 McQuillin on Municipal
Corporations §49.32, at 306 (3d rev. ed. 1993). Thus, it has
generally been held that, where a statute specifies a particular
officer upon whom service may be made, all others are excluded
and, absent a general appearance or waiver, personal jurisdiction
over the public entity will not attach unless the return of service
shows that the person served is one who was statutorily authorized
to accept service. See, e.g., Miller v. Town of Cicero, 225 Ill. App.
3d 105, 110 (1992) (service, to be valid, had to be on the president
of the board of trustees or village clerk). Because of the necessity
for strict compliance, attempts to show that summons was served
on an alternate person, based on the process server's mistaken
belief that the alternate had the authority to accept service or based
on the process server's mistaken belief that the alternate was the
agent of the statutorily designated person, have been unavailing.
In these instances, service has been held defective, even if the
public body had actual notice of the suit. See Miller, 225 Ill. App.
3d at 111 (and cases cited therein).
	Notably, our review of the relevant case law has revealed no
case which has squarely addressed the question of whether
delegation of authority to accept service of process is permissible.
However, we have found a few cases in which courts have held
that service of process on someone other than the statutorily
designated person was valid. In these instances, the evidence
established that the public entity, either expressly or by custom,
adopted an alternate means of accepting service.
	Such was the case in Avery v. O'Dwyer, 201 Misc. 989, 110 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1952), mod. on other grounds, 280 A.D. 766, 113 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 658, 112 N.E.2d 428 (1953).
In Avery, the evidence showed that summons was left with a clerk
in the office of the corporation counsel pursuant to a sign in the
office directing that service of process be made at that place.
Finding that service was validly made, the Avery court said:
		"Civil Practice Act, section 228 provides that, if an action
is brought against the City of New York, personal service
of the summons must be made by delivering a copy within
the State 'to the mayor, comptroller, or counsel to the
corporation.' It is clear that service on the corporation
counsel is expressly authorized by law and constitutes
service on the city. Was there service on corporation
counsel in this case? I think there was unquestionably
service on him. Service was made at the place and in the
manner prescribed by him, presumably for his
convenience and to enable him to administer his office in
an orderly fashion. To treat such service as ineffectual
because summons was not handed to the corporation
counsel himself would be inadmissible. The corporation
counsel has set up a regular system and has invited
litigants to abide by and rely on that system. To permit the
corporation counsel at his whim to treat service made as
directed by him as not being service on him would place
the public at his mercy and lead to chaos. I therefore hold
that the corporation counsel was served as required."
Avery, 201 Misc. at 992, 110 N.Y.S.2d  at 572.
	Similarly, in Petersen v. Kansas City, 324 Mo. 454, 23 S.W.2d 1045 (1930), the court found that notice delivered to an
assistant city counselor constituted service on the mayor. Although
substantial compliance with the notice provision was all that was
required, the court did not rule on that basis. The court found that
personal service on the mayor had been achieved. The evidence
had established that the mayor did not expressly authorize the
assistant to accept service on his behalf, but that,
		"during the previous administration the mayor had
referred all such notices to the city counselor, and had
given him and his assistants authority to accept service
and make acknowledgments thereof for and on behalf of
the mayor. The practice so inaugurated was followed by
succeeding administrations and had been in vogue 10
years at the time of the acknowledgment of service
entered upon the paper in question." Petersen, 324 Mo. at
458, 23 S.W.2d  at 1047.
	In Crabtree v. City of Durham, 136 N.C. 816, 819, 526 S.E.2d 503, 505 (2000), the court held that, "in order to establish valid
service of process, the plaintiff is not precluded from offering his
own proof in addition to the officer's return of service." The court
concluded, after considering affidavits submitted into evidence,
that service of process on the secretary of the city manager, at the
direction of the city manager, constituted service on the city
manager.
	Other courts have recognized, in principle, that delegation of
authority to accept process may be permitted. Although in these
cases the courts found that the evidence was insufficient to show
that an agency relationship was created, the cases suggest that
service on a duly delegated agent would be valid. See White v.
Berryman, 187 W. Va. 323, 418 S.E.2d 917 (1992); Franz v.
Board of Education of the Elwood Union Free School District,
112 A.D.2d 934, 492 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1985); Meadowdale
Neighborhood Committee v. City of Edmonds, 27 Wash. App. 261,
616 P.2d 1257 (1980); Fillyow v. County of Westchester, 33 Misc.
2d 501, 225 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1961).
	We conclude from these cases that the authority to accept
service of process may be delegated. Thus, when service of
process on a public entity is governed by a statute that designates
certain persons who may accept service on behalf of the public
entity, a person so designated may, either expressly or by custom,
validly delegate his or her authority to accept service of process to
another. Clearly, there are sound policy reasons for allowing
delegation. It is often the case that a public entity, such as the
Board here, will receive numerous summons on a daily or weekly
basis. As a practical matter, it may be too disruptive to the
operation of the public entity to insist that all summons be handed
directly to a designated officer. Also, a person designated by
statute to accept service may not be readily available. For example,
in the present case, the president of the Board, who was authorized
by statute to accept service, was a volunteer who was rarely at the
Board offices. It may be more efficient and convenient for the
public entity to put into place a specific procedure for accepting
service of process. That being the case, we find that an officer
designated to accept summons on behalf of a public entity-such as
the president of the Board here-may delegate the authority to
accept service of process and that summons served on a duly
delegated agent will constitute valid service under the statute.
	 Having concluded that a public entity may authorize persons
to accept service of process, we now turn to the case at bar. The
evidence shows that the Board was served with summons in this
matter on February 1, 1988. The return of service indicates that
summons was delivered to "M. Chavez," who, it was later shown,
was a receptionist in the Board's law department and not a
statutorily designated person to receive service on behalf of the
Board. The question we must decide, then, is whether plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to show that the Board president, by
custom and practice, delegated his authority to accept service on
behalf of the Board to the receptionist. We find that plaintiff has
met this burden.
	 Plaintiff submitted the deposition testimony of Marvin
Thomas, the Cook County sheriff who served the summons in this
case. Thomas testified that, in 1988, the Board was located at 1819
West Pershing. Thomas testified that, although the corporate
offices of the president and secretary were on the sixth floor,
whenever he served summons on the Board in 1988, he was
directed to deliver all summons to the receptionist for the law
department, located on the fifth floor. Thomas explained that, on
a daily basis, he never served fewer than 25 summons on the
Board and sometimes served more than 100 summons at a time.
He said that he was always directed to deliver the summons to the
law department and he did not recall ever delivering summons to
any other location within the Board.
	Frank Gardner was a member of the Board from 1984 until
1989 and the Board's president from 1987 until 1989. Gardner
testified that he had never been served with process on behalf of
the Board. Gardner also testified that he believed the vice-president or any other officer, in addition to anyone in the law
department, could accept service for the Board and it would be
considered valid service.
	Norma Tsuhako testified that she was the assistant secretary
to the Board from 1981 until 1993, at which time she became
secretary-a position she still held at the time of her deposition in
1998. Tsuhako testified that, because the office of president was
a volunteer position, the president was rarely in the office. It was
her understanding that he authorized others, including the
secretary of the Board and the receptionist on the sixth floor, to
accept service of process on his behalf. Tsuhako testified that
when she was assistant secretary, she was authorized to accept
service in the secretary's absence.
	Thomas Corcoran was the secretary of the Board from 1981
to 1993. His deposition testimony established that, when he
accepted service of process for the Board, he simply signed the
receipt and sent the papers to the law department. Corcoran
believed that the assistant secretary or the receptionist on the sixth
floor had the authority to accept service.
	Nancy Faulk, who had been a receptionist for the law
department between 1984 and 1985, testified that when she began
working as a receptionist she was told that it was her responsibility
and duty to accept summons on behalf of the Board. Faulk also
testified that she continued to work for the Board, in other
positions, until 1997. Throughout that time it was the Board's
practice and procedure to have the receptionist for the law
department accept summons for the Board.
	Patricia Whitten, who was the Board's chief attorney from
1982 until 1990, testified that from 1978 until 1990, and quite
possibly much longer, the Board's accepted practice was to
authorize the receptionist for the law department to accept service
of process on behalf of the Board. Whitten explained that she did
not actually know if authority to accept process had been formally
issued by the president, but that the practice had been in effect
before she took office and she continued the practice throughout
her tenure. Whitten also believed that she, as Board attorney, had
the authority to determine the practice to be used and that she
could authorize the receptionist to accept service of summons.
Thus, she believed that Chavez, who had been the receptionist in
1987 and accepted summons in this case, was authorized to accept
service of process on behalf of the Board. Significantly, Whitten
admitted that, in this case, once Chavez had accepted process on
behalf of the Board, the summons and complaint were actually
transmitted to the proper authorities, in the normal course of
business.
	Plaintiff also submitted into evidence a list which identified
more than 30 law suits which had been filed in the law division of
the Cook County circuit court against the Board during 1986,
1987, and 1988. The listing showed that, in each case, service of
summons was served on a receptionist for the law department and
a general appearance was filed, acknowledging proper service.
	We also take note that, in this case, when the Board was
served with notice of the motion to revive judgment, process was
served on the receptionist of the law department, whereupon the
Board responded by filing a general appearance. Moreover, after
the trial court granted the Board's motion to vacate the default
judgment and directed plaintiff to serve an alias summons on the
Board, summons-addressed to the president of the Board-was
delivered to and accepted by the receptionist of the law
department.
	Based on the evidence in this case, we find that plaintiff has
established that service on the receptionist constituted service on
the Board's president. Although the president of the Board may
not have given express consent to have the receptionist of the law
department accept service of summons on his behalf in this
particular instance, the evidence showed that there had been an
established procedure-a custom and practice that had been in place
for more than 20 years-whereby the receptionist of the law
department was delegated the authority to accept service of
summons on behalf of the president.
	We emphasize that our finding of proper service here is not
premised on the mere fact that the Board had actual knowledge of
the suit. Nor is this a situation where the litigant, in attempting to
serve the defendant, served an unauthorized person due to
ignorance, mistake, or misplaced reliance on false representations
of employees. Here the evidence was sufficient to show that the
Board put into place an alternate means of providing for
acceptance of service of process. We adopt the rationale of the
court in Avery and hold that, where the evidence overwhelmingly
established that the Board devised a regular system to accept
service of summons and invited litigants to abide by and rely on
that system, it is impermissible to allow the Board, at its whim, to
treat service made as directed by it as improper service. To allow
the Board to acknowledge that service was made in accord with a
procedure which it put in place for the "accommodation" of the
public, and then allow the Board to deny that proper service was
made when the summons, though catalogued and processed in the
appropriate fashion, later "fell through the cracks," would be
unjust.
	For the reasons stated, we find that, based on the
circumstances in this case, the receptionist of the law department
was a duly delegated agent of the Board's president for purposes
of accepting service of process. Thus, summons served on the
receptionist, in accord with the procedure put in place by the
Board, constituted valid service on the Board, in compliance with
section 2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

CONCLUSION
	The order of the circuit court of Cook County, granting the
Board's motion to vacate the default judgment entered against it
and in favor of Sarkissian, was a final, appealable order
reviewable by this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b).
In addition, this court holds that the trial court erred when it found
that the default judgment was void for lack of proper service of
process.
	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court, reversing the order of the circuit court and remanding the
cause for further proceedings.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	Although I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the
appellate court judgment must be affirmed, I write separately in
order to make several observations regarding the procedural
aspects of this case.
	It is important to remember in this case that plaintiff
possessed a final order of judgment from the circuit court of Cook
County. Ordinarily, once a judgment is entered by a court and the
judgment becomes final, the holder of the judgment can proceed
on its enforcement. However, such was not the case for plaintiff
due to the passage of time since the April 3, 1990, entry of default.
Pursuant to section 12-108 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
plaintiff had to revive the 1990 judgment in order to enforce it.
See 735 ILCS 5/12-108 (West 2000) (prohibiting enforcement of
judgments after the expiration of seven years). To that end, section
13-218 of the Code provides that judgments
		"in a circuit court may be revived as provided by Section
2-1601 of this Act, within 20 years next after the date of
such judgment and not after; and the provisions of Section
13-217 of this Act shall apply also to this Section."
(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-218 (West 2000).
Section 2-1601 of the Code provides that a party seeking to revive
a judgment must file a petition to that effect. See 735 ILCS
5/2-1601 (West 2000). This statutory provision codifies the
former writ of scire facias, which was the procedure used at
common law to revive a judgment. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1601 (West
2000). The revival proceeding is not a new action, but rather is a
continuation of the suit in which the judgment was originally
entered. Bank of Edwardsville v. Raffaelle, 381 Ill. 486 (1942). A
judgment of revival is binding until it is set aside. 23A Ill. L. &amp;
Prac. Judgments §479 (1979). The recognized effect of a revived
judgment is to "revive the judgment just as it formerly existed and
to reinvest it with the same attributes and conditions which
originally belonged to it." Bank of Eau Claire v. Reed, 232 Ill. 238, 241 (1908).
	This court has held that the only defense to an action for
revival is either a denial of the existence of the judgment or proof
of a subsequent satisfaction or discharge of the judgment. See
Bank of Edwardsville, 381 Ill. 2d  at 489; Bank of Eau Claire, 232 Ill.  at 240; Dec v. Manning, 248 Ill. App. 3d 341 (1993). These
defenses must appear on the face of the record without references
to any matters dehors the record. J.D. Court, Inc. v. Investors
Unlimited, Inc., 81 Ill. App. 3d 131, 134 (1980).
	In the present case, plaintiff filed the petition to revive
judgment on August 25, 1997. The Board filed a general
appearance in the revival action and moved to vacate the 1990
default judgment. In its motion to vacate, the Board contended that
plaintiff had failed to serve the Board in accordance with section
2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Discovery was conducted
in the matter, and the parties briefed the issue. Evidence
depositions were filed with the court, which ultimately found that
the 1988 service had been done contrary to section 2-211. The
circuit court, therefore, granted the Board's motion to vacate and
further ordered that an alias summons be served on the Board. It
is that order from which plaintiff appealed.
	In my view, the jurisdictional question that we are confronted
with in this case arose because the circuit court did not follow the
proper procedures in the revival proceedings that plaintiff had
commenced. Rather than deny the existence of the judgment or
prove its subsequent satisfaction, the Board in this case filed a
motion to vacate the judgment, arguing that service of process in
1988 had been improper. In essence, the Board's position was that
the judgment could not be revived because service of process in
1988 had been improper. However, this type of defense necessarily
goes to matters dehors the record. As such, it must be raised in a
collateral attack on the judgment. See Bank of Eau Claire, 232 Ill. 
at 240; Foreman v. Illinois Hair &amp; Feather Co., 337 Ill. App. 147
(1949) (and cases cited therein). Thus, the Board's service of
process challenge was premature at that point. The circuit court
should have granted plaintiff's petition to revive the judgment
before entertaining the Board's collateral attack regarding the
propriety of service.
	 Had the circuit court properly revived the judgment-the
effect of which would have been to reinvest the judgment with the
same attributes and conditions which originally belonged to it-the
circuit court would then have been able to review the Board's
motion to vacate the 1990 judgment within its proper procedural
context. A void judgment, order, or decree may be attacked at any
time or in any court either directly or collaterally, without any
showing of diligence or meritorious defense. R.W. Sawant &amp; Co.
v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309 (1986).(2) The court
could have then disposed of the Board's motion to vacate, and its
order would have been final and appealable for the reasons set
forth in the court's opinion.
	Does the fact that the circuit court did not revive the judgment
first before considering the Board's motion to vacate make any
kind of difference in this case other than an academic one? I
believe it does. Within the context of a revival proceeding, any
order entered by the circuit court in response to the Board's
motion to vacate would have been a final order because it would
have conclusively established the rights of the parties in the 1988
suit. Had the court denied the Board's motion, the only act that
would have remained for plaintiff would have been the execution
of the judgment. Had the court granted the Board's motion, the
1990 judgment would have been set aside. According to the
Illinois revival statute, in such a case, plaintiff would have had the
right to commence an entirely new suit against the Board. See 735
ILCS 5/13-218 (West 2000) (referring to section 13-217 of the
Code). In either event, the circuit court's order would have been
final and appealable because Rule 304(b) specifically allows an
appeal from either the granting of or the denial of a section 2-1401
petition. The circuit court did not follow the proper procedure, but
instead vacated the judgment and ordered an alias summons
issued, thereby causing "plaintiff's complaint [to] remain[ ] on file
and pending before the trial court" as Justice Thomas' dissent
notes. Slip op. at 31 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald,
J.).
	Normally, when the circuit court makes an error, the
reviewing court will vacate the erroneous ruling and remand the
matter for further proceedings. Although the circuit court did not
first take the step of actually reviving the 1990 judgment, its
ultimate ruling on the Board's motion to vacate did serve to open
the judgment. I therefore see no harm in treating this case as if the
1990 judgment had been revived and then was subsequently
vacated by the court. The effect of the court's order is to terminate
with finality the 1990 action. See Brauer Machine &amp; Supply Co.
v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569 (1943). The correctness of this
position becomes clear when one views the case from a different
angle-had the circuit court denied the Board's motion and revived
the 1990 judgment-there would be no question that the Board
would have been entitled to an appeal.
	In this respect, I must also point out my disagreement with 
the contention made by Justice Thomas in dissent that "a motion
to vacate a judgment as void is not the same as a section 2-1401
petition for relief from judgment." Slip op. at 32 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald, J.). The dissent does not enlighten
us as to what it believes is the proper procedural vehicle by which
a party is to bring forth a voidness challenge. The dissent appears
to characterize the Board's motion as one seeking to quash service
of process, but as the court rightly counters, the Board's motion
does "more than quash service, it sets aside a final judgment." Slip
op. at 9.
	Notwithstanding the above, even if one were to agree with the
dissenting viewpoint that jurisdiction under Rule 304(b) is
improper in this case, I do not believe that alone is the end of
discussion. Interestingly enough, the Board, on appeal in this case,
argues-not for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds-but for this
court to exercise its supervisory authority in order to provide
guidance to the parties in the interests of judicial economy. The
facts of this case amply illustrate why it is important for this court
to review the case on the merits. The issue here is whether the
Board's long-standing manner of accepting service of process is
in compliance with the provisions set forth by the legislature in
section 2-211. The record reveals, and the parties agree, that when
plaintiff served defendant in the revival action, plaintiff did so in
the exact manner as he did in 1988. Further, plaintiff served the
alias summons on the Board (as ordered by the circuit court) in the
exact manner as he did in 1988. The Board filed a general
appearance in the revival action, but filed a special and limited
appearance in the personal injury suit that is currently pending in
the circuit court. At oral arguments heard in conjunction with our
rehearing of this case on September 25, 2001, the attorney for the
Board was asked by a member of the court whether, if plaintiff's
default should be vacated by this court, anything exists which
would serve to preclude a trial on the merits. The attorney
answered that the first motion that would be filed by the Board
would be a motion a strike service. In response to yet another
question from the bench, the Board's attorney informed us that, in
the pending case, no "in personam" jurisdiction has attached. It is
clear to me, at least, the course that this litigation will take if this
court does not address the issue-the propriety of the manner in
which service of process was achieved will again be in issue.
Therefore, Justice Thomas misses the mark entirely when he states
that "we know with certainty that plaintiff will be able to proceed
to the merits of that complaint, as, on October 1, 1997, the Board
voluntarily submitted itself to the trial court's jurisdiction by filing
a general appearance. [Citation.] Thus, whether service was
properly obtained in the first instance no longer is relevant. The
trial court now possesses personal jurisdiction over the parties, and
plaintiff's action can move forward." Slip op. at 31 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald, J.).
	In light of the above, the analysis should not end, as Justice
Thomas suggests it should, just because one might believe that the
circuit court's order in this case was not final. I note that in this
court's opinion issued prior to our granting of rehearing, Justice
Miller recognized that a decision of the merits in this case was
appropriate because of, inter alia, "the likelihood that the issue
regarding proper service will be raised again on appeal if the
present case is returned unresolved, to the circuit court." Given the
Board's position, as explained to this court on rehearing, it would
be more than a "likelihood" that the issue would be raised if this
matter were returned to the trial court unresolved-it would be a
certainty. One of the most striking aspects of this case is the fact
that plaintiff, in the revival action, served the Board in the exact
manner that the Board complains of with respect to the 1988
service of process and would, apparently, complain of again in the
pending action if this case were returned to the circuit court.
However, the Board did not seek to invalidate the revival service
of process. It seems to me that the Board's long-standing practice
with respect to receiving service of process allows the Board to
"pick and choose" when it will recognize service and when it will
not. In order to effectuate valid service in cases such as this, our
courts demand strict compliance with the statute. See Miller v.
Town of Cicero, 225 Ill. App. 3d 105 (1992). However, strict
compliance is difficult to achieve under the procedures set up by
the Board. Thus, even if Rule 304(b) did not allow for jurisdiction
in this case, as the dissents believe, the invocation of our
supervisory authority would be more than appropriate under the
circumstances. Justice Thomas' dissent does not address this
argument and, for these reasons, its position that this court has "no
choice" but to dismiss the appeal (slip op. at 34 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald, J.)) does not persuade.
	In my view, the court today rightfully avails itself of the
opportunity that this case provides to bring needed clarity to the
issue that is beneficial to not just the parties here, but in future
cases as well.
	 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:
	I agree with Justice Thomas that the jurisdictional issue in this
case is not answered by our decision in Harvey and, under the
facts and circumstances of this case, appellate jurisdiction was
lacking. Therefore, I join in his dissent. Even if I agreed with the
majority, however, that review of this case was appropriate, I
would nonetheless disagree with the majority's analysis and
disposition of the substantive issue-whether service in this case
complied with section 2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-211 (West 2000)).
	The summons and complaint in this case were served on the
receptionist in the Board's law department. Section 2-211
requires, however, that a summons issued to the Board be served
on its "president or clerk or other officer corresponding thereto."
(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 2000). Because the
Board has a president, but no clerk, the parties have attempted to
identify the "other officer" that corresponds to a clerk. Plaintiff has
maintained that the Board's attorney constitutes an "officer" for
purposes of section 2-211, and that the attorney delegated her
authority to accept service to the receptionist. As set forth in its
September 1999 opinion, the appellate court found the "other
officer" language in section 2-211 patently ambiguous, ultimately
agreeing with plaintiff's position and holding that service in this
case complied with the statute. 308 Ill. App. 3d 137, 149-52.
	In February 2000, we allowed the Board's petition for leave
to appeal. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 187 Ill. 2d 591 (2000). The Board maintained that the appellate court
misconstrued section 2-211 and that the other officer
corresponding to a clerk is the Board's secretary-not the Board's
attorney. The brief of amici curiae echoed the Board's argument.
In January 2001, this court issued an opinion which squarely
addressed this issue. Guided by well-settled principles of statutory
construction, a majority of this court held that the phrase "other
officer corresponding thereto," contained in section 2-211, was
not ambiguous and that the Board's secretary, who performs
clerical and record-keeping functions, is the other officer who
corresponds to the position of a clerk. We thus concluded that
service was not accomplished in the manner prescribed by section
2-211.
	Thereafter, plaintiff petitioned for rehearing, pressing his
contention that the Board's attorney is a "corresponding" officer
for purposes of section 2-211. Four members of this court voted
to allow plaintiff's petition for rehearing, and the case was argued
again at the September 2001 term of court. Consistent with the
position set forth in his initial brief before this court and his
rehearing petition, plaintiff identified the issue at oral argument as:
"Who is this 'other officer corresponding thereto' as is set forth in
section 2-211?"
	As the protracted history of this case illustrates, the
substantive issue on review has always been one of statutory
interpretation focusing on the "other officer" language in section
2-211. Indeed, the majority opinion summed up the parties'
positions before this court as follows:
			"Plaintiff urges us to uphold the appellate court and
find that 'other officer corresponding thereto' is
ambiguous, but may be interpreted to include the Board's
attorney, who then delegated her authority to accept
service of process to her receptionist. The Board,
however, argues that the term 'other officer corresponding
thereto,' properly construed, refers to the Board's
secretary." Slip op. at 11.
	In light of the foregoing, I find it remarkable that the majority
has decided this case without any reference to the "other officer"
language in section 2-211 and without deciding the issue that has
been debated before this court for over two years. Instead, the
majority has based the outcome of this case on a newly identified
delegation issue. Specifically, the majority has determined that a
public entity, like the Board, may authorize persons to accept
service of process, and that plaintiff met his "burden" of
presenting "sufficient evidence to show that the Board president,
by custom and practice, delegated his authority to accept service
on behalf of the Board to the receptionist." (Emphasis in original.)
Slip op. at 15. Plaintiff, however, never argued that the Board
president had delegated his authority under section 2-211 to the
law department's receptionist. This was simply not the legal or
factual basis on which plaintiff maintained that service was valid.
	Additionally, the majority decision appears to be based on
principles of equitable estoppel, even though, as noted in our
earlier opinion in this case, plaintiff elected not to pursue any
argument that the Board was estopped from challenging the
sufficiency of service based on the Board's past practices. Indeed,
as the record demonstrates, plaintiff expressly withdrew and
waived this argument.
	Although plaintiff had argued estoppel in the appellate court,
based on its holding, the appellate court did not consider this
argument. Assuming that plaintiff would pursue his estoppel
argument in this court, the Board, in its opening brief, presented
a lengthy argument against application of estoppel principles in
this case. The Board maintained that "[t]he circuit court properly
found that principles of equitable estoppel did not provide a basis
for plaintiff to disregard the requirements of section 2-211 or
preclude the Board from requiring compliance with the statute."
Apparently deciding not to pursue an estoppel argument, plaintiff
stated in his response brief before this court:
			"Plaintiff hereby withdraws and waives any argument,
assertion or pleading presented that Defendant (1) is
estopped from asserting service of summons was invalid
herein or (2) has waived the right to assert service of
summons was invalid herein."
Given plaintiff's express withdrawal of his estoppel argument as
a basis for affirming the appellate court, I find the majority's
reliance on estoppel principles troubling.
	To be sure, the term "equitable estoppel" appears nowhere in
the majority opinion. Nonetheless, the majority holds:
		"[W]here the evidence overwhelmingly established that
the Board devised a regular system to accept service of
summons and invited litigants to abide by and rely on that
system, it is impermissible to allow the Board, at its
whim, to treat service made as directed by it as improper
service. To allow the Board to acknowledge that service
was made in accord with a procedure which it put in place
for the 'accommodation' of the public, and then allow the
Board to deny that proper service was made when the
summons, though catalogued and processed in the
appropriate fashion, later 'fell through the cracks,' would
be unjust." Slip op. at 17-18.
This is, at bottom, equitable estoppel. See Geddes v. Mill Creek
Country Club, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 302, 313-14 (2001) (discussing the
elements of estoppel and acknowledging that "[a]lthough fraud is
an essential element, it is sufficient that a fraudulent or unjust
effect results from allowing another person to raise a claim
inconsistent with his or her former declarations").
	Although the majority states that its decision was made after
"having had the benefit of additional argument" (slip op. at 4), I
am at a loss to discern what the possible "benefit" could have been
since the parties' arguments focused on an issue entirely different
than the one the majority now finds dispositive. Rather than
determining that plaintiff met an evidentiary burden in the trial
court of which neither party was aware, and implicitly adopting an
argument that plaintiff expressly withdrew, I would decide the
issue that the parties actually briefed, argued, rebriefed and
reargued-the issue this court considered in its earlier opinion.
	As a final matter, I note my disagreement with the majority's
assertion that:
		"[I]t is well settled that '[a] judgment, order or decree
entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties
or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent
power to make or enter the particular order involved, is
void, and may be attacked at any time or in any court,
either directly or collaterally.' " (Emphasis added.) Slip
op. at 6, quoting Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135
(1945).
This assertion is neither "well settled" nor accurate.
	In Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001), this
court clarified that the "inherent power" requirement is a relic of
our pre-1964 judicial system in which courts of limited
jurisdiction looked to the statutes for their authority to act. Our
circuit courts today, however, enjoy original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9. The "inherent
power" requirement is thus applicable only to administrative
agencies, who are statutory creatures and powerless to act without
statutory authority. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 529-30; see also
Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002) (discussing effects of 1964 amendments to the
judicial article of the 1870 Illinois constitution). The inclusion of
the "inherent power" language in the majority opinion is ill-advised in light of our recent holdings and will only serve to create
confusion in future cases. It is, moreover, unnecessary to the
majority opinion.
	There are only two issues in this case: whether this court has
jurisdiction over this appeal, and if so, whether the circuit court
acquired personal jurisdiction over the Board in the underlying
suit. The majority's commentary on the circuit court's so-called
"inherent power" is completely irrelevant and immaterial to these
issues.
	For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
	The law is well established that, unless specifically authorized
by the rules of this court, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to
review judgments, orders, or decrees that are not final. Department
of Central Management Services v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, 182 Ill. 2d 234, 238 (1998).
Consequently, where the appellate court has considered the merits
of a nonfinal order over which it lacked jurisdiction, this court
must vacate that court's judgment and dismiss the appeal.
Department of Central Management Services, 182 Ill. 2d  at 238.
An order or judgment is final if, on the issues presented in the
pleadings, it "ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights
of the parties." Department of Central Management Services, 182 Ill. 2d  at 238. Stated differently, a final order or judgment is one
that "terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or
disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire
controversy or a separate part thereof." R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G
Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (1998).
	The majority resolves the complicated jurisdictional question
in this case by relying almost exclusively upon this court's recent
decision in People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444 (2001). Even a
cursory inspection of Harvey reveals that the decision in no way
relates to-let alone definitively settles-the question identified.
Indeed, Harvey is not a default judgment case. Rather, it is post-conviction criminal matter in which the defendant filed a section
2-1401 petition attacking his extended-term prison sentence as
void. And not surprisingly, that sentence was not handed down by
default, but after a jury trial established defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d  at 446. Given the facts of
Harvey, one might wonder what in the world a discussion of the
finality of an order vacating a civil default judgment is doing in
there. The short answer is it's not. For that discussion, we must
look elsewhere. 
	There simply is no bright line rule that an order vacating a
judgment for lack of proper service is ipso facto final and
appealable. Rather, whether such an order is final and appealable
turns on the particular facts of the given case. More specifically,
whether such an order is final-indeed, whether any order is
final-turns on whether that order "ascertains and fixes absolutely
and finally the rights of the parties." Department of Central
Management Services, 182 Ill. 2d  at 238. With respect to a motion
to quash service, this is a fact-specific inquiry that will be
answered differently in different cases.
	For example, in Brauer Machine &amp; Supply Co. v. Parkhill
Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569 (1943), this court concluded that an order
quashing service of summons on a foreign corporation was a final,
appealable order. We reached this conclusion not because all such
orders are final and appealable, but rather because, under the
particular facts presented in Brauer, the order effectively
terminated the litigation on the merits. As the court explained:
			"It is true, the order, in form, was only an order
quashing the service of the summons. It was not an order
dismissing the suit, nor was it in the form of a final
judgment on the merits. Regardless of its form, however,
it was a complete and final disposition of the case, based
upon the conclusion the court had reached that appellee
was not amenable to the service of process in the manner
in which the summons was served. On that issue it was
not only as effectual and conclusive but it was as final as
any decision upon the merits. The result was the same."
(Emphasis added.) Brauer, 383 Ill.  at 577.
	Some appellate court decisions have construed the foregoing
language as a categorical statement that all orders quashing the
service of summons are final and appealable. See, e.g., Cavanaugh
v. Lansing Municipal Airport, 288 Ill. App. 3d 239 (1997);
DiNardo v. Lamela, 183 Ill. App. 3d 1098 (1989); In re Marriage
of Kelso, 173 Ill. App. 3d 746 (1988); Connaughton v. Burke, 46
Ill. App. 3d 602 (1977). These decisions misconstrue the holding
in Brauer. As the following passage demonstrates, the holding in
Brauer was driven solely by the particular facts of that case:
		"The facts alleged in this case, which must be accepted as
true, show that service could not be obtained in any other
manner. The order quashing the service was, therefore, as
final and conclusive as any order which could have been
entered." (Emphasis added.) Brauer, 383 Ill.  at 578.
Brauer therefore does not stand for the proposition that every
order quashing service is a final, appealable order. Rather, Brauer
confirms that the character of an order depends on the
circumstances of the case. In some instances, as in Brauer, it is
properly characterized as final and appealable. In other cases,
however, it is not. See, e.g., Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243
Ill. App. 3d 795, 799-800 (1993). Once again, the critical inquiry
is whether, under the particular facts of a given case, the order
quashing service "ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the
rights of the parties." Department of Central Management
Services, 182 Ill. 2d  at 238. 
	Looking at the particular facts presented in this case, this
court should easily conclude that the order vacating the $10
million default judgment for a lack of proper service is not final.
First, plaintiff's complaint remains on file and pending before the
trial court. More importantly, and in stark contrast to Brauer, we
know with certainty that plaintiff will be able to proceed to the
merits of that complaint, as, on October 1, 1997, the Board
voluntarily submitted itself to the trial court's jurisdiction by filing
a general appearance. See State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308 (court obtains personal jurisdiction upon filing of
general appearance). Thus, whether service was properly obtained
in the first instance no longer is relevant. The trial court now
possesses personal jurisdiction over the parties, and plaintiff's
action can move forward.
	Of course, as the Board correctly points out, the filing of a
general appearance cannot retroactively validate a judgment that
was entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 547 (1989); Christiansen v.
Saylor, 297 Ill. App. 3d 719, 723 (1998). Thus, if the trial court
correctly concluded that the $10 million default judgment was
void for a want of personal jurisdiction, that judgment remains
void today, irrespective of the Board's subsequent general
appearance. However, the filing of a general appearance does
constitute a submission to the trial court's jurisdiction on a
prospective basis. See J.C. Penney Co. v. West, 114 Ill. App. 3d
644, 647 (1983); Sullivan v. Bach, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1142
(1981). Had the Board wished to contest the trial court's
jurisdiction both at the time of the default judgment's entry and in
the future, the proper vehicle would have been a special and
limited appearance. See, e.g., Christiansen, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 723
("where a judgment has previously been entered against a party,
there is no need to file a special and limited appearance to
challenge past jurisdiction unless the party also wishes to contest
the court's prospective jurisdiction" (emphasis added)). By instead
filing a general appearance, the Board waived the receipt of proper
service and submitted itself to the trial court's jurisdiction going
forward. This case therefore is very different from Brauer, in
which "the plaintiff could not proceed further" because "service
could not be obtained in any other manner." Brauer, 383 Ill.  at
578.
	Because the order vacating the $10 million default judgment
is not final, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to review that
order absent specific authority from this court's rules. Department
of Central Management Services, 182 Ill. 2d  at 238. The majority
asserts that such authority exists in Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(3)), which permits a direct appeal from
orders granting relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). Like Harvey, Rule
304(b)(3) has no application to this case.
	The Board's motion to vacate the $10 million default
judgment clearly is not a petition for relief from judgment under
section 2-1401. It is well established that a motion to vacate a
judgment as void is not the same as a section 2-1401 petition for
relief from judgment. In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 19
(1994); Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 795, 799
(1993). Indeed, section 2-1401 itself expressly recognizes that
nothing set forth therein in any way limits a party's right to seek
relief from a void judgment through other means. 735 ILCS
5/2-1401(f) (West 2000). Thus, in Estate of Steinfeld, the court
held that, although filed within section 2-1401's two-year
limitations period, a motion to vacate an order as void was not a
section 2-1401 petition because the motion (1) was confined to
contesting the order as void, (2) did not invoke section 2-1401,
and (3) did not seek equitable relief under section 2-1401. Estate
of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d  at 18-19. To be sure, a party challenging a
void judgment may, for whatever reason, elect to proceed under
section 2-1401 by specifically invoking that section in his or her
petition. Such was the case in Harvey. But Estate of Steinfeld
teaches that a party challenging a void judgment may just as easily
elect not to proceed under section 2-1401 by not invoking that
section in his or her pleading.
	In this case, the Board clearly elected not to invoke section
2-1401 in its motion to vacate the $10 million default judgment.
Just as in Estate of Steinfeld, the motion filed by the Board (1) was
confined to contesting the default judgment as void, (2) did not
invoke section 2-1401, and (3) did not seek equitable relief under
section 2-1401. Indeed, the Board's motion explicitly states that
it is not bound by the requirements of section 2-1401 because it is
contesting the default judgment's validity under one of the
alternative methods alluded to in section 2-1401(f). Thus, as in
Estate of Steinfeld, the Board's motion to vacate is not a section
2-1401 petition. Consequently, the trial court's order granting that
motion is not subject to immediate appeal under Rule 304(b)(3),
and this court has no choice but to vacate the appellate court's
decision and dismiss this appeal. Department of Central
Management Services, 182 Ill. 2d  at 238.
	For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1Although the complaint did not state Sonya's injuries with
specificity, a later pleading indicates that Sonya suffered anoxic
encephalopathy (brain damage), which caused her to become a spastic
quadriplegic.

2.      2In this case, I view the Board's motion to vacate as having been
made pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code. I do so because the
Board's motion refers specifically to subsection (f) of the statutory
provision.