Title: State v. Daron Josephs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-113-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2002

LaVecchia, J., writing for a majority Court. In this capital appeal, Daron Josephs challenges his murder convictions and death sentence, claiming errors in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. He also asserts that his capital sentence is disproportionate. The shootings that caused the deaths of Leon Mitchell, Barrington McLean and Christine Williams on January 22, 1995, resulted from a dispute among brothers and friends involved in a marijuana distribution operation led by Emil Josephs. Emil lived in Camden, and invited those involved in the operation to live with him. Defendant was part of the operation, as were all of the victims. Also staying in the apartment were Turan Josephs and Hugh Josephs, Jr. (Junior). All four of the Josephs had the same father, but defendant and Junior had a different mother than Emil and Turan. Junior and defendant arrived at the apartment together in December of 1994. Emil testified at defendant's trial. According to Emil, he learned from a friend and associate that defendant and Junior were selling marijuana from another source at Emil's sales location and pocketing the money for themselves. Emil confronted defendant and Junior in the apartment on the evening of January 21, 1995. Mitchell and McLean also were present. Emil told defendant and Junior that they were out of the business, and ordered them to leave. A scuffle ensued between Emil and Junior. Defendant, brandishing a knife, approached Emil from behind, but McLean disarmed him. Emil went to defendant and Junior's bedroom and took their handguns - a nine millimeter and .45 caliber from their bags and packed their clothes. Mitchell interceded and persuaded Emil to let defendant and Junior stay for the remainder of the night because it was past midnight. Emil took the two guns with him to the attic, where he slept and where he had a third gun, a .357 magnum. Emil later gave the nine millimeter handgun to McLean, who was in the kitchen. According to Emil, a handgun would usually be kept under the kitchen sink for emergencies. Early the next morning, Emil went down to the kitchen, where he joined Mitchell and Williams. Mitchell left the room, and Junior came in pointing a nine millimeter handgun at Emil. Junior pulled the trigger, but the weapon was empty and did not fire. While Junior reloaded the gun, Emil jumped through the kitchen window, breaking the glass. Two neighbors were in the alley, and they heard the breaking glass and found Emil in the alley covered with blood. Emil told them he was in a fight and someone was trying to kill him. Emil testified that he heard three shots, a pause, and then additional shots. He also stated that the shots sounded as if they were coming from different guns. The neighbors also heard the shots, and one indicated she was going inside to call the police. When the neighbor returned to the alley, Emil had gone. The neighbor then observed two men matching the description of defendant and Junior emerge from the front door of Emil's apartment. When Turan Josephs returned to the apartment later that day, he discovered that Mitchell, McLean and Williams had been shot to death, and reported the murders to police. On arrival, police found no sign of forced entry. The three bodies were found in different locations in the apartment. McLean had been shot six times with three different guns: a nine millimeter, a .45 caliber, and possibly a .357 revolver. He also suffered blunt force injuries to the head and arms inflicted by a steam iron. The cause of death was the combined effects of all of the wounds. Mitchell had been shot four times, the wounds being caused by .45 caliber bullets and nine millimeter bullets. The cause of death was the combination of all four wounds. Williams had been shot twice, once in the head and once in the face, both with a nine millimeter handgun. Defendant was arrested and indicted on charges of first-degree murder of Mitchell, McLean and Williams, attempted murder of Emil, conspiracy to murder, and weapons offenses. Junior apparently has not been located. Before trial, the State served notice that it would seek the death penalty based on the following aggravating factors: defendant was previously convicted of murder, and the offense was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of or attempting to commit murder (murder-within-murder aggravating factor). To avoid the guilt- phase jury from being impermissibly influenced by defendant's prior murder conviction, separate juries were empaneled for the guilt and penalty phases. The jury acquitted defendant of the murder of Williams, but found him guilty of the capital murders of McLean and Mitchell, conspiracy, and the weapons offenses. During the penalty phase, the defense alleged the mitigating factors that defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution, his age at the time of the crimes, and thirteen circumstances of defendant's life under the catch-all mitigating factor. The jury unanimously found the two aggravating factors, and some jurors found various mitigating factors. The jury concluded, however, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. On April 6, 2000, judgments of two capital convictions and two death warrants were filed. HELD: The trial court's instructions to the guilt-phase jury on own-conduct murder and accomplice liability could have affected that jury's determinations that defendant committed the murders by his own-conduct. As a result, the death sentence cannot be sustained. The error does not affect the murder convictions provided the State is willing to accept non-capital sentences. 1. Defendant claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered McLean and Mitchell by his own conduct. He argues that because there was no direct evidence linking him to the murders, the jury was required to speculate that he retrieved the other weapons and used them to kill McLean and Mitchell. The Supreme Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The forensic evidence established that two different guns were used in the death of Mitchell, three different guns were used in the death of McLean, and that all of the gunshot wounds contributed to each of their deaths. Also, Emil and neighbors heard gunshots being fired at different intervals in the apartment. From the jury's acquittal of defendant in the murder of Mitchell, who died from two nine millimeter gunshot wounds, it is apparent that the jury regarded Junior as the shooter of the nine millimeter handgun. The evidence supported an inference that another shooter was involved, namely defendant. (Pp. 24-35) 2. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in the sequential instructions to the jury on own-conduct murder and accomplice liability, and its admonition to the jury to reach the accomplice-liability issue only if it first found that defendant had committed the own-conduct murder. He argues that the instructions precluded the jury from reaching a non-unanimous verdict on own-conduct murder that would have rendered defendant ineligible for the death penalty. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c), only those defendants who commit purposeful or knowing murder by their own conduct or who hire others to do the same are death eligible. Even if a jury disagrees about whether the defendant committed murder by his own conduct or as an accomplice, it may still find the defendant guilty of murder. The consequence of the disagreement, however, is that the jury's decision will constitute a final verdict that results in a sentence of life imprisonment. When a rational basis exists for a jury to convict a capital defendant of a non-death-eligible alternative form of homicide, a trial court should charge that offense in a manner that allows the jury to consider it simultaneously with death-eligible murder. The trial court also must make it clear to the jury that it need not be unanimous on the own-conduct determination. Here, there were two defendants and three guns, and accomplice liability was a very viable theory for defendant. If the jury followed the suggestions of the trial court, however, it might not have even considered accomplice liability until after it decided on own-conduct murder. This error requires reversal of the death sentences, but does not affect the murder convictions provided the State is willing to accept non-capital sentences. However, if the State intends on remand to seek capital sentences for the murders, then defendant's guilt by his own conduct will have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a second guilt-phase trial. (Pp. 36-52) 3. Any other errors in the trial court's guilt-phase instructions either were harmless or did not constitute plain error. The Court also rejects defendant's claims that the jury voir dire was inadequate. (Pp. 52-66) 4. Concerning the penalty phase, the prosecutor improperly diminished one juror's sense of responsibility by suggesting that the appellate process would take care of the juror's concern about the execution of innocents. The totality of the instructions to the jury may have ameliorated the possibility that this was reversible error, but trial courts are urged to prevent this type of suggestiveness in the future. (Pp. 66-73) 5. Defendant is correct in arguing that the State is required to reprove the elements of murder in the penalty phase to establish the 4(g) aggravating factor of murder in the course of murder. This does not mean that the penalty- phase jury is permitted to alter the guilt-phase verdicts, but they can consider anew the evidence supporting the murder convictions so that they can properly weigh the aggravating factor against the mitigating factors. The instruction that appears in the Judges' Bench Manual requires correction. Defendant also challenged the State's evidence of his prior murder conviction, claiming that it was unnecessarily graphic and detailed, and therefore prejudicial. In the event of a retrial, only the more limited and general description of that victim's death should be permitted. And, the trial court has the authority to control the prejudicial effect of the prior-murder evidence by requiring, if necessary, that it be submitted by stipulation or other limited form. (Pp. 73-110) 6. The Court rejects the dissent's contention that a heightened, no doubt standard of proof is required in capital prosecutions based on evidence of a circumstantial nature. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof is imposed by our Code of Criminal Conduct for convictions of all offenses. Numerous other jurisdictions have similarly rejected the call for a heightened standard of proof where circumstantial evidence is involved. (Pp. 111-115) 7. The Court also reaffirms the constitutionality of New Jersey's death penalty statute. (Pp. 115-122) The non-capital convictions and the conviction of purposeful or knowing murder are AFFIRMED. The jury's determination that defendant committed the murder by his own conduct, however, is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG join, expressing agreement with the majority's affirmance of defendant's murder convictions and its holding that the trial court's sequential charge deprived defendant of a fair trial on the own-conduct death-eligibility issue. He dissents, however, from the majority's holding that the State can elect to retry defendant for capital murder because he concludes that the State's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a jury determination that defendant caused the deaths by his own conduct. Justice Coleman would impose a heightened, beyond any doubt standard to the jury's determination of own-conduct, death-eligibility in cases where the State relies exclusively, or nearly exclusively, on circumstantial evidence. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreeing with the reversal of defendant's death sentence. She dissents from the majority's and Justice Coleman's opinions to express her view that the issue of the constitutionality of New Jersey's death penalty statute requires reassessment. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI join in that part of JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion affirming defendant's murder convictions and holding that the sequential instructions to the guilt-phase jury on own-conduct murder and accomplice liability require reversal of the death sentence. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion concurring and dissenting from Section IV A of the opinion, in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE LONG join. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate opinion concurring and dissenting. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARON JOSEPHS, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ Argued October 23, 2001 -- Decided July 15, 2002 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County. Robert L. Sloan and Susan C. Green, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, argued the cause for appellant (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Sloan, Ms. Green, Claudia Van Wyk, Deputy Public Defender II, Bernadette N. DeCastro and Mordecai D. Garelick, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, of counsel and on the briefs). Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). John J. Gibbons, argued the cause for amici curiae, Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger &amp; Vecchione, attorneys; Mr. Gibbons, Lawrence S. Lustberg and Jessica A. Roth, on the brief). State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967), established that the general test to be applied when determining the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then discussed the application of the concept of unanimity to own-conduct murder: However, the practice is different when, as here, one of the charges is murder. If the jury convicts the defendant of murder in such a case, I then must ask if the jury unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt finds two things. One, that the defendant committed a purposeful or knowing murder; and, two, that the defendant committed the fatal act by his own conduct . . . . It is permissible for a jury to find a person guilty of a murder if some jurors see the person as the principal while others see him as an accomplice. What is essential is that each juror be satisfied in his or her own mind that all of the elements necessary to establish guilt under the theory upon which the individual juror convicts has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction of purposeful or knowing murder or any other kind of murder under these circumstances is perfectly proper. However, under our law a person is guilty of murder by his own conduct only if all 12 jurors find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt or both, one, that the defendant committed a purposeful and knowing murder; and, two, that he did so as a principal, not as an accomplice. And you'll be given a verdict sheet which is designed to capture that information. And if I might make a suggestion. You may find it convenient to first decide if all 12 jurors agree whether the defendant is guilty of murder. If the jury does so agree, then you should decide if the jurors individually and unanimously agree that it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a purposeful or knowing murder as a principal; that is, by his own conduct. However, the order in which you consider these questions in your deliberations is entirely your own decision. During a recess, counsel for defendant objected to the court's instructions on the ground that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that defendant committed murder by his own conduct without the assistance of Junior. In addition, defendant contended that the court's charge on own- conduct murder was premature because the jurors had not been told the meaning of accomplice liability and so might presume that it applied to any concerted action between multiple defendants. Counsel requested that the court clarify for the jury that the first issue before them . . . is to determine whether Daron Josephs is guilty of murder; whether it's by direct responsibility as a principal or as [an] accomplice and that it doesn't matter if they unanimously agree on the theory to make that determination. Noting counsel's objection, the court stated that it would explain accomplice liability to the jury at a later point and that its charge would be clear when read as a whole. Now, if you're satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the answers to the first question as to any of the decedents is in the affirmative, you'll then address his state of mind when he did so. Was his purpose to kill or inflict serious bodily injury that resulted in death? Was he aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause death? You then ask the question if the wounds inflicted by Daron Josephs contributed in some substantial way to the death of the decedents. If Daron Josephs did inflict wounds which contributed to the death of the decedents in a substantial way, and he did so with the purpose to kill or to inflict serious bodily injuries resulting in death, or with knowledge that his conduct was practically certain to kill, he's guilty of a purposeful and knowing murder as a principal; that is, the acts would be by his own conduct. A person is guilty -- strike that. A person is an accomplice in the commission of an offense if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime he (a), solicits such other person to commit it; or (b), he aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime . . . . In order to find Daron Josephs guilty of committing the crime of murder as an accomplice of Hugh Josephs, the following elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (a), that Hugh Josephs, Jr. committed the crime of murder. And (b), that Daron Josephs aided him in planning or committing the murder. Or agreed to aid or attempted to aid him in planning or committing the murder. Or solicited him to commit the murder. And (c), that Daron Josephs purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. And (d), that Daron Josephs possessed the same criminal state of mind that's required to be proven against the person who actually committed the murder . . . . If you find that Daron Josephs with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime of murder solicited Hugh Josephs, Jr. to commit murder or aided or agreed to aid or attempted to aid him in planning or committing murder, then you should find him guilty of murder as an accomplice and not by his own conduct. Remember, if you find Daron Josephs guilty of murder as an accomplice, you cannot find him guilty of murder by his own conduct . . . . Should you find that it has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Daron Josephs inflicted the wound upon the decedents, but that Hugh Josephs, Jr. alone inflicted the wounds, you must consider whether Daron Josephs is guilty as an accomplice to murder. He would be deemed to be an accomplice if you find he aided Hugh Josephs, Jr. in committing the crimes and if, when he did so, he had the purpose to aid or assist Hugh Josephs, Jr. in the commission of a crime of murder. Later, the court instructed the jury that if it found that the State failed to prove defendant inflicted the wounds that caused death, it still had to determine whether he was guilty as an accomplice. The court explained to the jury that it could find an accomplice guilty of a lesser degree of offense than was actually committed by the principal depending on the accomplice's state of mind. Finally, when discussing conspirator liability, the court repeated that these questions only come up if you decide that the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Daron Josephs inflicted wounds which contributed in any substantial way to the death of the decedents. Defense counsel again objected to that portion of the instructions that suggested the order of deliberation by saying well, you won't have to consider this if you consider by your own conduct first and only in the event you don't find that would you have to then worry about accomplice liability. Counsel argued that this was not a situation where it was proper [for the court] to direct the order of deliberation. By telling the jurors the order in which to address the issues, counsel argued that the court implie[d] that you have this murder by your own conduct and then accomplice murder. And in terms of unanimity we know you can have [a] unanimous verdict of murder where some people believe it's accomplice and some people believe it's by your own conduct. And so it's not really necessary that they kind of conclude that it's not one thing before they consider it's another thing. It really suggests a manner of deliberation and unanimity that's not really appropriate. Counsel requested the court to instruct the jurors that they can deliberate in any order they choose and can split on whether defendant committed murder by his own conduct or as an accomplice. Counsel also suggested that when handing out the verdict sheets the court could explain the jury's options in respect of own conduct and accomplice liability. Following another break, the court instructed the jury that unanimity was required to convict defendant of all offenses except own-conduct murder, where a non-unanimous verdict was permissible. In reference to the verdict sheets, the court instructed the jurors that in respect of each victim they were to check off first whether defendant was guilty of murder and then check off whether they unanimously agreed that defendant committed murder by his own conduct. No mention was made of the possibility of accomplice liability. In reviewing this claim of error, we begin with the requirement, fundamental to the assurance of a fair trial, that the trial court ensure that jury deliberations are based solely on the evidence and in accordance with proper and adequate jury instructions. State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 531 (1992). A trial court must make absolutely certain the jury is aware, not simply of the consequences of its actions, but of its total responsibility for the judgment. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 316 (1987). In furtherance of the trial court's responsibility, it is not uncommon for the trial court to suggest an order of deliberation as part of jury management. State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 404-05 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146, 103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989). To be sure, a sequential jury charge can perform a useful function. State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 223 (1990). Trial courts consistently instruct that a jury not consider lesser-included offenses until it first finds the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. Ibid. However, a sequential jury charge can be problematic when that charge encourages the jury to convict on the first, and most serious, charge because the jury believes the defendant is guilty of some crime. United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S. Ct. 1647, 56 L. Ed 2d 84 (1978). Here, the presentation of the own-conduct murder charge and the accomplice-liability charge, and the relationship between the two, is of critical importance. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c) renders death eligible those defendants who commit purposeful or knowing murder by their own conduct or who hire others to do the same. The own-conduct requirement is not an element of purposeful or knowing murder; it is the triggering device for the death penalty phase of the trial. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 99 (1988). The jury must be satisfied unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed murder by his or her own conduct in order to proceed to the penalty phase. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 511 (1994). In contrast, even if the jury disagrees about whether the defendant committed murder by his own conduct or as an accomplice, it may still find the defendant guilty of murder. Id. at 527. The consequence of that disagreement is that the jury's decision will constitute[] a final verdict that results in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. Id. at 511. Thus, because the principal and accomplice are equally guilty of purposeful or knowing murder under New Jersey's statutory scheme, accomplice-liability murder constitutes an alternative, not a lesser-included form of murder. State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 485 (1995). State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S. Ct. 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2001), reaffirmed that when a rational basis exists for a jury to convict a capital defendant of a non-death-eligible alternative form of homicide, a trial court should charge that offense in a manner that allows the jury to consider it simultaneously with death-eligible purposeful-or-knowing murder. Id. at 39. That requirement assures that the jury will properly consider all available options before rendering a death-eligible verdict, an important safeguard in light of the qualitative differences between the death penalty and other penalties. Ibid. (quoting Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 511). Cf. State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 369-70 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084, 120 S. Ct. 809, 145 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2000) (upholding use of sequential charge in case involving capital murder and felony murder because offenses not mutually exclusive); Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 485 (concluding that trial court committed reversible error in giving sequential instructions on intent-to-kill murder and serious-bodily-injury murder because charge did not allow option of convicting defendant of purposeful or knowing murder without unanimously agreeing on defendant's mental state); Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 222-23 (finding harmful error in trial court's sequential charge on purposeful murder and passion/provocation manslaughter, reasoning that sequential charge had the potential to foreclose jury consideration of whether passion/provocation should reduce an otherwise purposeful killing from murder to manslaughter). As the Court in Feaster explained: Ultimately, it was determined that the error was harmless for two reasons. Ibid. First, counsel failed to object at trial, indicating a trial strategy aimed at avoiding a compromise verdict and securing a complete acquittal for defendant. Id. at 41. Second, because the victim died as a result of a single shotgun wound, the facts rendered resolution of the own-conduct question essentially equivalent to rejection of an accomplice liability theory. Id. at 40. The prejudicial capacity of a sequential charge depends always on the 'circumstances of the case.' Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 484 (quoting Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 406). Here, unlike in Feaster, defendant objected to the sequential jury instructions. Therefore, the applicable standard of review is whether the alleged defective jury charge constitutes harmless error. Because the charge placed such emphasis upon the determination of own-conduct murder, including the repeated references to deciding own conduct responsibility before deciding accomplice liability, it is improbable that the jury understood that it could decide those issues in whatever order it saw fit. Unlike the situation in Feaster, the sequential instructions in this case were highly likely to have affected the jury's deliberations. As noted earlier, Feaster did not have a co- defendant and he admitted to being the triggerman, so accomplice liability was not a feasible theory in that case. Here, there were two defendants and three guns. Accomplice liability was a very viable theory for defendant. If the jury followed the suggestions of the trial court, however, it might not have even considered accomplice liability until after it decided on own-conduct murder. That risk creates an unmitigated flaw in the reliability of the jury's verdict. If defendant is to be found guilty of purposeful or knowing murder by his own conduct, we must have confidence that the jury understood the availability of an accomplice-liability theory, and instead unanimously chose the own-conduct theory. We have no reason to be confident of that here, either from the charge to the jury, considered in its totality, or from the facts of the case, as in Feaster. Indeed, as the discussion of the prior issue reveals, although the jury reasonably could infer from the evidence and testimony that defendant engaged in murder by his own conduct, it also would have been possible for the jury to fail to find unanimously that defendant committed the murders by his own conduct -- and not as an accomplice. Thus, it was critically important for the jury to have understood its options as it deliberated through the various choices it had to make with regard to defendant's role in the deaths of McLean and Mitchell. Of equal importance is that on review we can be confident that defendant was found unanimously guilty of own-conduct murder by a jury that knew it was rejecting an alternative choice -- that he was an accomplice. The proofs of this case could support the conclusion that the various gun shot wounds inflicted by the .45 and .357 guns, as well as the blunt force head injuries to McLean indicated purposeful and knowing murder, and that defendant inflicted some or all of them by his own conduct in respect of the victims McLean and Mitchell. However, we have no assurance that that jury determination was made by the jury with the knowledge that it was rejecting accomplice liability for defendant when it made that finding. On the determination of own-conduct murder hinged defendant's death eligibility. By no means can an error in the determination of own-conduct murder on these facts be deemed inconsequential. We conclude that this error in the sequential instructions to the jury on own-conduct murder and accomplice liability constitutes error that is not harmless, and that it requires reversal of the jury determination of death eligibility. Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 526-27. The erroneous instruction does not affect defendant's murder convictions, however, because the jury could have convicted him of the murders notwithstanding a disagreement about whether he committed them by his own conduct or as an accomplice. Id. at 527. The issue raised by defendant is whether the State should be required to reprove the elements of murder to establish that he committed murder in the course of murder pursuant to aggravating factor 4(g). In cases of felony murder, the model jury charge on aggravating factor 4(g) requires the trial court to instruct the penalty-phase jury to disregard the guilt-phase jury's conclusion that the defendant did commit the predicate felony. That is because the commission of the predicate felony constitutes an element of aggravating factor 4(g). Similarly, in the case of murder within murder, where the predicate felony is murder and where murder constitutes an element of aggravating factor 4(g), it follows that the penalty-phase jury should be instructed to deliberate anew in conformance with this Court's holding in Marshall. Although the jury in Marshall was the same for the guilt and penalty phases, that does not distinguish the Marshall holding such that application of the principle of deliberation anew should not occur here. Further, to accomplish that deliberation, the prosecution is required under N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 3c(2)(c) to reintroduce relevant guilt-phase evidence when the factfinder at the penalty phase is different from the factfinder at the guilt phase. Defendant argues not that the penalty-phase jury should have been permitted to acquit him of the murders, but that it should have been given an opportunity to consider anew the evidence supporting his convictions and to view it from a different perspective than that of the guilt-phase jury. Properly instructed, the penalty-phase jury could have concluded that the 4(g) aggravating factor should have been accorded less weight in the balancing process in conformance with this Court's holding in Biegenwald. Although the guilt-phase verdict would have remained intact, defendant might have received a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. We conclude, therefore, that the instruction as it appears in our Judges Bench Manual, and as used here, requires correction. Because the charge had the capacity to affect seriously the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors by a separate penalty-phase jury, its use would have necessitated reversal of defendant's penalty-phase judgment but for our ruling on the jury's own-conduct determination that itself warrants reversal of defendant's death sentence. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's introduction of inadmissible evidence of the similarity between the circumstances of defendant's prior murder conviction and the present matter improperly encouraged the imposition of the death sentence. Defendant contends that the prosecutor elicited testimony during the penalty phase that defendant and his prior murder victim worked together in a large marijuana distribution network, a fact that, in the minds of the jurors, would have linked that murder to the present offenses. Moreover, he says the details of the prior murder, including diagrams of the locations of the wounds, were inflammatory and should not have been admitted. Defendant's point of error includes an argument that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to accept defendant's offer to stipulate to the prior murder conviction. The trial court believed that it could not require the stipulation and, therefore, the State proceeded to call both the New York Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the prior murder case and the medical examiner who examined the victim. Our jurisprudence reflects an abiding effort to guard against jury prejudice in the penalty phase of a capital case. State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 638-39 (1989). Other-crimes evidence is of special concern because of its capacity to prejudice the capital-sentencing deliberations. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 586 (1990). The prejudicial effect of prior-conviction evidence is particularly high when the prior conviction is for a similar crime. State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 386 (1993). In proving the aggravating factor of prior murder, the State may offer evidence of a prior homicide in the form of the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f). Ordinarily, the existence of a prior murder conviction is established simply by the introduction into evidence of the judgment of conviction. Simon, supra, 161 N.J. at 460. Because the conviction itself constitutes the statutory aggravating factor, Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 276, the judgment is introduced for the limited purpose of aiding the jury's determination whether to impose a life or death sentence. Thus, although the State may offer evidence of a prior conviction to prove the aggravating factor of prior murder, the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) is 'to avoid turning the sentencing proceeding into a second trial of the previous case and at the same time to provide the jury with some information about the prior conviction.' State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 136 (1991) (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to Senate No. 950, at 2, concerning purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f)). In Erazo, supra, this Court considered thoroughly the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) and the policy considerations that support it. Rejecting the claim that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, the Court stated that the statute makes evidence of a prior murder admissible not for the purpose of punishing defendant for that murder, but to enable the jury to determine the appropriate sentence for the present murder. Id. at 134. The Court noted that [t]he history of c(2)(f) reflects the Legislature's concern about the amount of evidence of prior murders that is admissible on the penalty phase. Id. at 136. Reiterating the need to guard against 'jury prejudice,' the Court held that in addition to complying with the statutory restrictions on evidence used to prove a prior murder, a trial court also must instruct the jury on the limited relevance of prior-murder evidence. Id. at 135-36. Case law has examined the parameters of various aspects of prior murder that are admissible in a capital penalty trial. See generally, State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 595-97 (1992) (Bey III) (stating that medical evidence presented in clinical terminology does not eliminate potentially prejudicial effect and instructing that manner of death should be described in general terms); Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 574-75 (citing prosecutor's conduct as improper and an attempt to inflame penalty jury in case decided prior to Erazo when prosecutor exceeded defense stipulation and court instruction on prior murder by telling jury that defendant 'blew away half of the victim's face' and 'crippled another human being' ). The amount of prior murder information that should be disclosed concerning a victim's relationship to the defendant has not been addressed by this Court. Here, the State called the New York Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the prior murder case. After testifying to the charges against defendant in that case and the age of the prior victim, the witness was asked about the relationship between defendant and the prior victim. He replied: I learned through the trial testimony that [defendant] and the victim as well as Mr. Nicholas [a co-defendant in the prior murder] were not only close friends but also involved in a major drug distribution network involving marijuana. Defendant objected to the irrelevant and highly prejudicial nature of the testimony. The trial court sustained the objection on the ground that the prosecutor was allowed only to show that defendant and the victim were friends and [a]nything beyond that such as involving a major drug distribution is irrelevant. We concur with the trial court's ruling. That defendant and the victim were friends is admissible under N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 3c(2)(f). However, the further circumstances surrounding the nature of the relationship exceeded permissible limits under the statute. The evidence had the ability to prejudice defendant given the similarity between the circumstances surrounding the prior murder and that of the current murders. Due to the potentially prejudicial effect of the testimony, the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction immediately after the prosecutor elicited the testimony about the New York drug operation. In no uncertain terms, the court instructed the jury not to consider that information in its deliberations: Ladies and gentlemen, I instruct you that under our law when the State intends to prove that one of the aggravating factors is a prior murder, there's certain limitations that are in place upon it insofar as the proofs are concerned. When evidence is admitted concerning prior murders, nothing of the facts of the murders beyond name and age of [sic] victim, the manner of death and the victim's relationship to the defendant should be allowed. Anything else is irrelevant. Therefore, I instruct you that anything you heard about these people being involved in a major drug distribution business, although you heard it, I can tell you to disregard it but I'm also going to tell you that it's not to be considered at all during your deliberations. Consistent with this Court's direction in Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 135-36, the court also charged the jury that defendant already had been punished for the prior murder and that they were not to consider the offense for that purpose. We note defendant's argument that the prosecutor raised the issue of defendant's New York drug distribution activities during cross-examination of the mitigation expert and during summation. However, because the mitigation expert's testimony on defendant's New York drug activities was admissible testimony and not stricken from the record, the prosecutor was permitted to discuss that testimony in her summation. Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to prove the manner of death in the prior murder with diagrams illustrating the location of the victim's wounds. Specifically, the prosecutor called the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on the victim in the New York case. When the medical examiner took the stand, the prosecutor inquired as to his name, position, and qualifications. The following ensued concerning the autopsy: Q. Now after completing the autopsy, did you reach a conclusion as to the cause of Philip Rowe's death? A. Yes, I did. Q. And did he sustain a gunshot wound to the hand? A. Yes, he did. Q. That was a through and through wound? A. From the back of the left hand through the palm side through and through, correct. Q. Did he sustain two gunshot wounds to the head? A. Yes, he did. Q. Did one enter through the left temple and exit through the ear? A. That's correct. Q. And did the other enter through the back of the head and exit through the parietal orbit? A. On the right side. Yes. True. Q. Did he sustain any injuries that were consistent with what are known as defensive wounds? A. Yeah . . . . [T]here was no such cluster of [defensive] wounds in this case except for an abraded mark that was circular on the back of the left hand but isn't what we would typically call a cluster of defense wounds. The prosecutor then had the medical examiner identify photographs and diagrams of the wounds that were either taken during the autopsy or prepared by the witness. The diagrams were later admitted over the defense's objection that they were inflammatory. Defendant's objection is similar to the one raised by the defendant in Erazo. At issue in Erazo was the admissibility of three pages from the autopsy report from the defendant's prior murder conviction. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 131. The selected pages described in detail the multiple stab wounds to the victim and contained a diagram showing the location of the wounds. Ibid. Noting that the evidence was admitted pursuant to a stipulation by both parties, the Court declined to find plain error. Id. at 136. However, because the case was being remanded on other grounds, the Court held that the defendant should not be bound by his prior stipulation in his new trial, reasoning: We believe that the statutory purpose can be served with less than the stipulated evidence. The prejudicial effect of a graphic and detailed account of the victim's death might exceed its probative value. On remand, the purposes of the statute will be served if the evidence of the manner of [the former victim's] death is described as multiple stab wounds to the chest, lungs, and heart. Similarly, the evidence here presented a graphic and detailed account of the victim's death. For purposes of the statute, the description of the manner of death should have been more general, providing no more detail than that death resulted from two gunshot wounds to the head. However, as the Court similarly found in Bey II, supra, 129 N.J. at 597, we do not find that the difference between the testimony presented here and the more limited permissible manner of death testimony was of such magnitude that it prejudiced the jury, or that it clearly was capable of producing an unjust result. We direct, however, that in the event of a penalty retrial only the more limited and general description of the victim's death should be permitted. Finally, we turn to the issue of defendant's proposed stipulation to the prior murder. In other contexts, courts have allowed defendants to stipulate to a prior conviction to avoid the prejudice that can arise when the jury learns of the nature of the prior crime. See generally, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174, 117 S. Ct. 644, 647, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574, 584 (1997) (finding that district court's rejection of defendant's stipulation of prior crime constituted abuse of discretion, noting prejudice attendant to jury learning of nature of earlier crime); Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 574-75 (holding that prosecutor's reference to slashing that occurred in prior murder constituted improper conduct because it exceeded court's ruling and defendant's stipulation ); State v. Alvarez, 318 N.J. Super. 137, 154 (App. Div. 1999) ( allowing defendant to stipulate prior conviction, and holding that where defendant's prior conviction was similar to charged offense, only date and sentence are admissible at trial); State v. Harvey, 318 N.J. Super. 167, 173 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that failure to bar disclosure of defendant's past crime constituted abuse of discretion; probative value of prior conviction outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice). N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) authorizes the admissibility of evidence relating to a prior murder conviction. However, the statute does not circumscribe the trial court's inherent ability to limit the prejudicial effect of admissible evidence. Trial courts have latitude to control the impact that prior murder conviction evidence may have on the jury. Here, the trial court rejected defendant's proposed stipulation under the belief that it could not compel the prosecutor to enter into a stipulated form of such evidence. The trial court took an unduly narrow view of its ability to act as gatekeeper of the evidence presented to the jury. On retrial, the court should exercise control over the prejudicial effect of prior-murder evidence by requiring, if necessary, that that evidence be submitted by stipulation or other limited form. Defendant contends, for the first time on appeal, that he is entitled to a new penalty-phase trial because the court failed to inform the jury of the exact length of the New York sentence. He argues that the trial court's omission of the exact length of the New York sentence in the jury instructions violated his Eighth Amendment rights under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994). A capital sentencing jury must be fully informed of its responsibility in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 370 (1996) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976)). As was explained in Ramseur, supra, [t]o hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options, thus permitting its decision to be based on uninformed and possibly inaccurate speculation, is to mock the goals of rationality and consistency required by modern death penalty jurisprudence. 106 N.J. at 311. Generally, in capital sentencing proceedings, the trial court should inform the jury of prior sentences being served by the defendant because that information may bear on the jury's thought process in determining the adequacy of a life sentence as opposed to death. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 373; Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 603 (noting that jury's sentencing decision may be affected by uncertainty about whether the defendant has been punished adequately for the earlier murder, when prior murder is presented as aggravating factor); Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 372 (stating that jury should be informed of defendant's prior sentences if there is a reasonable likelihood that [the judge] will impose a sentence to be served consecutively to any of defendant's prior sentences ). However, a trial court is not required to inform the jury about a defendant's prior sentence absent a request by the defendant or an inquiry by the jury. Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 603. Defendant concedes that he made no such request at trial. However, he contends that the failure to inform the jury of the length of the New York sentence constituted plain error, and alternatively, that a jury inquiry was made in the form of a request to clarify the verdict sheet. We disagree that the jury instructions prejudiced defendant. The jury was told on numerous occasions that if it did not vote for death, defendant would be sentenced to two life terms with sixty years of parole ineligibility to run consecutive to his New York sentence. Specifically, in his opening statement, defense counsel informed the jury that defendant will never get out of prison, and that even without the New York sentence the earliest defendant would be released is when he is eighty-seven years old. Defense counsel reminded the jury of that fact in his closing argument. In addition, the court charged the jury that if defendant was not sentenced to death for both victims, it would impose consecutive life sentences with 60 years to be served before parole eligibility which sentence shall be made to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in the State of New York. Because the jury was adequately informed of its sentencing options and the effect the prior sentence would have on the present sentence, we find that the omission in the jury instructions of the exact length of defendant's prior murder sentence does not constitute plain error. Regarding the jury's inquiry made in the form of a request to clarify the verdict sheet, we note that the inquiry in question was as follows: A and B refer to a unanimous decision on which set of factors outweigh the other and on what the appropriate punishment is. C refers to the punishment with no reference to the factors. Are we being asked to unanimously agree on both the factors and the punishment? Nothing in that inquiry pertained to the New York sentence. Indeed, in addition to answering the jury's question, the court clarified that the total amount of parole ineligibility that it would impose would be sixty years since the sentences would be made to run consecutively. Finally, defendant urges us to reconsider our holding in Loftin, supra, to the extent that it interpreted Simmons, supra. In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that when future dangerousness is alleged as an aggravating factor, and the defendant is ineligible for parole under state law, the jury must be informed that the defendant is ineligible for parole. 512 U.S. at 156, 114 S. Ct. at 2193, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 138. As we noted in Loftin, Simmons is not applicable in New Jersey because future dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey. 146 N.J. at 371. We recently reaffirmed Loftin in Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 531-32. Defendant presents no novel argument or law that undermines our holding in Loftin, and thus we reaffirm that Simmons is inapplicable to our jurisprudence on aggravating factors. We now turn to defendant's last penalty-phase issue. He contends that the jury reached a non-unanimous verdict in the penalty phase, as evidenced by the fact that it initially concluded, without formal vote that either one or the other aggravating factors had been proven. In response, the State argues that the record demonstrates that the jurors were in agreement that the State had proven both aggravating factors (4(a) and 4(g)) beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, the State maintains that no reasonable juror could have concluded otherwise. Further, the State asserts that because the jurors were convinced that either one or the other factor outweighed the mitigating factors, there was no risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had it been instructed to weigh both aggravating factors against the mitigating factors. Our death penalty statute requires the jury's verdict to set[] forth in writing the existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3). If the jury finds that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 3a(3)(a). See Bey II, 112 N.J. at 158-59 (1988) (citing Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 62-63. However, if the jury finds that all of the aggravating factors which exist do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors, a sentence of imprisonment is imposed. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3)(b). By requiring that the jury be unanimous on the imposition of the death penalty, the statute assures that each juror must accept full responsibility for the imposition of that sanction. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 157. Requiring a unanimous finding on the existence of the aggravating factors is consistent with the general requirement of unanimous verdicts in criminal actions. Id. at 159. And, as important as correct jury instructions are in all criminal cases, they have enhanced significance in capital cases. Id. at 162. Because we do not allow aggravating factors to be totaled up as bean-counters would do, State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 473 (1991), the jury charge must instruct the jurors to make a normative judgment that all of the aggravating factors do or do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162. Further, a specific charge on the requirement for unanimity is necessary when 'there is a danger of a fragmented verdict.' State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 637 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939, 112 S. Ct. 1483, 117 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1992) (quoting United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 875 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part and rev'd in part on rehearing, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The risk of a fragmented penalty-phase verdict is present when there are multiple aggravating factors and the court's instructions fail to make clear that the jurors have to be unanimous as to the existence of each. State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 564 (1995) (stating when there are potentially two aggravating factors . . . the possibility of a patchwork verdict might genuinely exist ). In State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434 (1994), the defendant argued that the court's instructions permitted a death sentence where six jurors found one aggravating factor and six jurors found another aggravating factor. Id. at 489. Among those instructions was the statement that '[i]f [the jurors] individually and unanimously find that the State has proven one or more aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond a reasonable doubt such factor or factors outweigh the mitigating factor or factors . . . then the punishment shall be death.' Id. at 490. This Court found no error in that instruction, in part, because it made explicit the requirement for unanimous agreement on aggravating factors. Id. at 491-92. In addition, any error was rendered harmless by the verdict sheet and the polling of the jury, which together demonstrated the jurors' correct understanding of the law. Id. at 492. The present circumstances leave no doubt that the jurors misunderstood the instructions on the unanimity requirement for each aggravating factor. Although the jurors were instructed by the trial court, and were reminded on the verdict sheet that they had to find the aggravating factors unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, they apparently understood that to mean that each juror only had to agree[] that one or both of the aggravating factors was proven. Indeed, when the trial court learned that the jurors had interpreted the charge to mean that the individual aggravating factors need not be found unanimously, it agreed that their interpretation was a reasonable one and that the court's explanation was not as clear as it should have been. Accordingly, after discussion with counsel, the trial court sent the jurors back to vote separately on each of the aggravating factors. However, the jurors were not required to weigh again the aggravating factors that they found existed against the mitigating factors. Nonetheless, as noted, the jurors had informed the court that they had concluded that either aggravating factor, individually, or both weighed together, outweighed the mitigating factors. Thus, the court's action succeeded in eliminating the risk that any aggravating factor was found to exist without a unanimous vote by the jury. Reweighing was not required in light of the jury's earlier disclosure. We have held that errors that strike at the core of the jury's obligation to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors in accordance with statutory requirements and prior case law are not rendered harmless merely because the evidence is 'overwhelming.' Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 540. In a capital sentencing it is essential that each juror individually determine whether each mitigating factor exists and then individually decide whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 628 (2000). Here, a question arose concerning the unanimity of the findings on the aggravating factors. The polling of the jury had informed the court of the jury's weighing of each aggravating factor compared to the mitigating factors, and the combined weight of the aggravating factors compared to the mitigating factors. The desire for certainty should have led the trial court to have the jury engage in a reweighing of any aggravating factor found unanimously. But, under the circumstances, we view the remoteness of prejudice as not rising to the level of concern voiced in Koskovich, supra. Here, aggravating factor 4(a), prior murder, was found unanimously. Defendant made no attempt to refute it during the penalty-phase trial and the State's evidence left no room for doubt. Further, the jury had informed the court that either aggravating factor, standing alone, outweighed the mitigating evidence. The court's actions eliminated the initial unanimity question concerning aggravating factor 4(a). Thus, we view this issue of error as harmless under the circumstances. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 113 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARON JOSEPHS, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ COLEMAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority that the sequential charge was so prejudicial to defendant that it had the effect of depriving him of a fair trial on the by own conduct death-eligibility issue. The Court, however, requires a new trial. I disagree that a new capital murder trial should be conducted because I conclude that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's determination on the by own conduct issue even if the jury had been properly instructed. Hence, I would preclude a second trial on death eligibility. The overall error rate for the entire 1973-1995 period, i.e. the proportion of fully reviewed capital judgments overturned at one of the three stages (direct appeal, post-conviction, and/or federal habeas corpus) due to serious error, was 68%. On retrial, when the errors are cured, an astonishing 82% (247 out of 301) of the capital judgments that were reversed were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or no sentence at all. In the latter regard, 7% (22/301) of the reversals for serious error resulted in a determination on retrial that the defendant was not guilty of the capital offense. [Koosed, supra, 21 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. at 108 (quoting Kamisar, LaFave &amp; Israel Modern Criminal Procedure 80-81 (9th ed, 2000 Supp.) (quoting the study)).] That study was updated in February 2002 and recommended that capital cases should require a higher standard of proof__beyond any doubt__rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. James S. Liebman, et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error In Capital Cases, And What Can Be Done About It, at 397-99 (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://justice.policy.net/ cjreform/dpstudy/ (last visited June 6, 2002). More than fifty years ago, this Court adopted the beyond any doubt standard for criminal cases in which the State relied substantially on circumstantial evidence to prove a defendant's guilt. In State v. Donohue, 2 N.J. 381, 390-91 (1949), this Court held that, to justify a murder conviction based largely on circumstantial evidence, all of the circumstances not only must concur to indicate a defendant's guilt but they must also be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. It is not enough that they coincide to render probable the hypothesis advanced by the prosecution; they must also exclude beyond a reasonable doubt every other hypothesis except that of guilt. Jackson v. Delaware, L. &amp; W.R. Co., 111 N.J.L. 487 (E. &amp; A. 1933). Where the essential facts are proved, and where they cannot be rationally explained on any theory other than that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, such circumstantial evidence will be considered as convincing as evidence of a direct and positive character. [Ibid.] That formulation was later rejected in favor of what has become known as the State v. Reyes beyond a reasonable doubt standard. State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 436-37 (1968) (stating that the Donohue standard has been repudiated because it would have defeated too many legitimate circumstantial prosecutions based on speculative hypotheticals consistent with the defendant's innocence). I believe the Court should adopt the Donohue beyond any doubt standard for by own conduct death-eligibility determinations in cases in which the State relies exclusively, or nearly exclusively, on circumstantial evidence. By restricting that standard to such death-eligibility determinations, the problem associated with defendant's advancing speculative hypotheticals consistent with innocence will not be presented because the purpose of such a standard is to separate principals from accomplices rather than the guilty from the innocent. [Ibid.] Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARON JOSEPHS, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________________________________________ LONG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join in Justice Coleman's thoughtful opinion that would impose a higher standard for the use of circumstantial evidence to prove own conduct in a capital case. I write separately to express my disagreement with the conclusion expressed in Point IV of the majority opinion that because the death penalty was declared constitutional in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987), that issue is resolved. In my view, and for the reasons I have previously expressed in detail, the constitutionality of the New Jersey death penalty requires reassessment. State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448 (2001) (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Contrary to the majority's assertion, I am not urging a wholesale departure from our well-established precedent. Rather, I am reiterating my view that it is time to revisit Ramseur, a decision rooted in conclusions about evolving standards of decency vis- -vis the death penalty, to take into account changes in our collective consciousness since it was decided. Indeed, as amici point out, a recent survey by the highly respected Eagleton Center for Public Interest Polling, a project of the Institute of Politics of Rutgers University, provides compelling evidence that community consensus against the death penalty is continuing to evolve. Eagleton Institute of Politics, New Jerseyans' Opinions on a Death Penalty Moratorium (May 2002) [hereinafter Eagleton Survey]. The study, based on interviews conducted with 803 New Jersey residents in May 2002, evinces a significant decrease in support for the death penalty. It shows that 60 percent of New Jersey residents support the death penalty as punishment for murder. Id. at 1. Sixty-three percent supported it when the issue was studied in 1999. Id. at 2. When we last considered the constitutionality of the death penalty, the then most recent surveys, conducted in 1977 and 1981 by the Eagleton Poll, showed public support for this State's death penalty at 72 percent. See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 174 n.10 (1987). When presented with the alternative of life in prison without parole, the public's support for the death penalty dropped to 36 percent, down from 44 percent in 1999. Eagleton Survey at 3. Moreover, as in prior years, New Jersey residents are less likely than other Americans to prefer the death penalty over life in prison without parole. Ibid. In addition, 66 percent of New Jersey residents -- including 60 percent of those who favor the death penalty overall -- favor a temporary halt to executions while a study is conducted to ascertain whether the death penalty is being administered accurately, fairly, and economically. Id. at 4. The majority's reliance on our legislature's inaction regarding the death penalty as the best and most reliable indicator of contemporary values is mysterious in light of its citation to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, ___ U.S. at ___, ___ S. Ct. ___ (2002), which held, among other things, that a national consensus has developed in the last thirteen years against the execution of mentally retarded persons.See footnote 11 Despite that national consensus, our capital legislation still authorizes the execution of the mentally retarded, indicating that, at least as far as the United States Supreme Court is concerned, our legislature is out of synchronicity with evolving standards of decency. Id. at ___, ___ S. Ct. at ___ (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642 (1958)). I am equally puzzled over the majority's suggestion that the actions of juries support its conclusion that community standards have not undergone a sea change. The statistics cited by the majority are meaningless unless they are compared to previous numbers: One final observation regarding contemporary standards of decency involves Ramseur's conclusion that it is a true reflection of society's morality that twenty-six juries in New Jersey imposed the death penalty from 1982 to 1987. 106 N.J. at 173, 524 A.2d 188. Based on that figure, if public standards remained constant, at least sixty-two death sentences would have been expected between 1987 and 1999. In fact, only twenty-six death sentences were imposed during that period, Hon. David S. Baime, Report of the Special Master on Proportionality Review: State v. Thomas Koskovich 1a (Jan. 24, 2000), obviously reflecting a diminishing level of support for that extreme sanction among our fellow citizens. [State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 580 (2001) (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] Coupled with what we now know about the death penalty's failure to deter criminals, those changed circumstances underscore the need to reconsider Ramseur. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner &amp; Ford Fessenden, States With No Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. Times, September 22, 2000 ( homicide rates had risen and fallen along roughly symmetrical paths, suggesting to many experts that the threat of the death penalty rarely deters criminals ). I remain mystified by the Court's resistance to revisiting a fifteen-year-old opinion that, by its very terms, was rooted in conclusions about the public's appetite for the death penalty that appear to have changed. The suggestion that the Court's past perfunctory rejection of equally perfunctory challenges to Ramseur over the years gives currency to that opinion is neither jurisprudentially sustainable nor an appropriate response to a case involving the ultimate sanction of death. Ante at ---. NO. A-113 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARON JOSEPHS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 11, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz