Title: State of Wisconsin, v. Wandell Lee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1993AP002546-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 17, 1996

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Wandell Lee, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JAN 17, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross 
Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Thomas Casey, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross 
Appellant. 
                                                                
   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Vacated in 
part. 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lee, 192 Wis. 2d 260, 
531 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1995), affirming the orders of the 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
2 
circuit court for Milwaukee County, John A. Franke, Judge.  With 
leave of the court of appeals, the state had appealed a nonfinal 
circuit 
court 
order 
directing 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Crime 
Laboratories to conduct additional analysis requested by the 
defendants.  With leave of the court of appeals, the defendants 
Wandell Lee and Thomas Casey had cross-appealed from nonfinal 
circuit court orders denying their motions to dismiss the 
prosecutions.   
 
Before the court of appeals issued a decision, the state 
filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of its appeal pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 (1993-94).1  The court of appeals 
nevertheless decided the merits of both the state's appeal and the 
defendants' cross-appeal, affirming the orders of the circuit 
court.   
 
The limited issue before this court is whether the court of 
appeals may refuse to dismiss an appeal when an appellant notifies 
the court of appeals of its voluntary dismissal pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 prior to the court of appeals' issuance of a 
decision on the merits of the appeal.2  We conclude that under 
                     
     1  All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
     2  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 provides as follows:    
 
809.18 Rule (Voluntary dismissal).  An appellant may dismiss 
an appeal by filing a notice of dismissal.  The notice 
must be filed in the court or, if not yet docketed in 
the court, in the trial court.  The dismissal of an 
appeal does not affect the status of a cross-appeal or 
the right of a respondent to file a cross-appeal. 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
3 
Rule 809.18, the court of appeals must dismiss an appeal when an 
appellant files a notice of voluntary dismissal before the court 
of appeals issues its decision on the appeal.  We therefore vacate 
that part of the decision of the court of appeals relating to the 
state's appeal.   
 
The procedural history relating to the state's attempt to 
dismiss its appeal in the instant case is somewhat tangled but not 
in dispute.   
 
On December 12, 1994, after the parties had filed their 
briefs with the court of appeals but before the cases had been 
submitted for decision, the state filed with the court of appeals 
a document entitled "Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Appeal by 
State of Wisconsin."  Although the title of the document contains 
the word "notice" and the body of the document refers to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.18, the initial and concluding paragraphs of 
the document are phrased not in terms of the state's notice of 
voluntary dismissal but in terms of the state's motion for 
voluntary dismissal.  The defendants opposed the dismissal. 
 
On December 22, 1994, Judge Ted E. Wedemeyer dismissed the 
state's appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18.  Despite 
the dismissal, the court of appeals submitted the case for 
decision on January 3, 1995.  On February 28, 1995, more than 60 
days after Judge Wedemeyer had dismissed the state's appeal, a 
three-judge panel of the court of appeals composed of Judges 
Wedemeyer, Ralph Adam Fine and Charles B. Schudson issued a 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
4 
decision authored by Judge Wedemeyer resolving the merits of both 
the state's appeal and the defendants' cross-appeal.   
 
Subsequently, by order of March 6, 1995, the court of appeals 
asked 
the 
parties 
to 
submit 
simultaneous 
legal 
memoranda 
addressing whether the court of appeals had properly reached the 
merits of the state's voluntarily dismissed appeal on the issue of 
crime lab retesting. 
 
By order dated March 30, 1995, the court of appeals stated 
that it had "inadvertently" affirmed the state's notice of 
voluntary dismissal and that, "[a]s a result," it was invoking 
"its inherent power to correct this error" by vacating Judge 
Wedemeyer's December 22 order dismissing the state's appeal.   
 
On April 3, 1995, the court of appeals revised its decision, 
adding a footnote stating that "[b]ecause the issue on appeal is 
one of statewide concern, we invok[e] our inherent power to vacate 
the December 22 order and exercis[e] our discretionary authority 
to deny the State's motion for voluntary dismissal."  Lee, 192 
Wis. 2d at 264 n.1.  The state petitioned this court for review; 
this court accepted review on the issue of whether the court of 
appeals is authorized to retain jurisdiction of an appeal after an 
appellant has voluntarily dismissed the appeal. 
 
The starting point for our analysis is Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.18, which empowers an appellant to dismiss an appeal by filing 
a notice of dismissal.  The rule provides as follows: 
809.18 Rule (Voluntary dismissal).  An appellant may dismiss 
an appeal by filing a notice of dismissal.  The notice 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
5 
must be filed in the court or, if not yet docketed in 
the court, in the trial court.  The dismissal of an 
appeal does not affect the status of a cross-appeal or 
the right of a respondent to file a cross-appeal. 
 
The language of the rule clearly places the decision of 
voluntary dismissal with the appellant; it makes no reference to 
the court of appeals' authority to reject or deny a notice of 
voluntary dismissal.   
 
This meaning of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 is reinforced by 
the accompanying 1978 Judicial Council Committee note.  The court 
has frequently referred to drafters' notes for assistance in 
interpreting the rules.3   
 
The committee note explains that an appellant may dismiss an 
appeal "without approval of the court or the respondent" because 
                     
     3  State v. Williquette, 190 Wis. 2d 677, 692-93, 526 N.W.2d 
144 (1995) (stating that although a Judicial Council Committee 
note "is not controlling authority, it is certainly persuasive" in 
determining the meaning of a rule or statute); State v. Guck, 176 
Wis. 2d 845, 856, 500 N.W.2d 910 (1993) (relying on a Judicial 
Council Committee note as part of the legislative history to be 
used in determining the meaning of a statute); State v. Hanson, 
149 Wis. 2d 474, 480-83, 439 N.W.2d 133 (1989) (relying on a 
Judicial Council Committee note in interpreting the Wisconsin 
Rules of Evidence); State v. Krause, 161 Wis. 2d 919, 926-27, 469 
N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991) (relying on a Judicial Council 
Committee note as one of the "extrinsic aids to help discern 
legislative intent"); see also Milwaukee County v. DILHR, 80 
Wis. 2d 445, 452, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977) (legislative history of a 
statute 
includes 
reports 
of 
committees 
reporting 
to 
the 
legislature, which "can be valuable interpretive aids"); In re 
Estate of Haese, 80 Wis. 2d  285, 297, 259 N.W.2d 54 (1977) 
(reports 
of 
nonlegislative 
committees 
are 
valid 
aids 
in 
interpreting statutes originating in those committees). 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
6 
the dismissal does not affect the respondent who has filed or 
intends to file a cross-appeal (emphasis added).4 
 
The committee note further explains that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.18 modifies Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.5  We can therefore glean insight about Rule 809.18 by 
examining Fed. R. App. P. 42. 
 
In contrast to our Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18, Fed. R. App. 
P. 42 provides that when an appellant moves for voluntary 
dismissal, an appeal may be dismissed "upon such terms as may be 
agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court."6  Federal case 
                     
     4  The note to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 states: 
 
An appeal may be dismissed by the appellant at any time prior 
to a court decision on the appeal without approval of 
the court or the respondent.  This changes the former 
procedure and modifies Rule 42, FRAP [Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure].  The Rule specifically protects a 
respondent who has or intends to file a cross-appeal, 
and for this reason the appellant is authorized to 
dismiss the appeal at will.  The filing of a notice of 
dismissal does not affect the liability of the appellant 
for costs or fees, or the power of the court to impose 
penalties under Rule 809.83(1). 
 
 
In his dismissal of the state's appeal, Judge Wedemeyer cited 
this commentary as support for the proposition that "[a]ppellants 
are permitted to dismiss their appeals any time prior to a court 
decision on the appeal without the approval of the court or the 
respondent."  
     5  As the committee note states, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 
also changed former Wisconsin procedure regarding the voluntary 
dismissal of appeals.  In 1879 the court declared that "hereafter 
appellants will not be allowed to dismiss their appeals, except by 
consent or upon notice to the respondents."  Loucheine v. Strouse, 
46 Wis. 487, 488, 50 N.W. 595 (1879).  
     6  Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) (Voluntary Dismissal in the Court of 
Appeals) provides as follows: 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
7 
law has consistently interpreted this language as granting the 
federal court of appeals broad discretion in ruling on an 
appellant's motion for dismissal.7  In addition to the federal 
courts of appeals' discretionary authority to dismiss on the 
motion of an appellant, Federal Rule 42(b) provides for mandatory 
dismissal when all the parties to an appeal agree to the 
dismissal.  Upon agreement of all the parties, "the clerk of the 
court of appeals shall enter the case dismissed."  Fed. R. App. P. 
42(b)  
(..continued) 
 
If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding shall sign 
and file with the clerk of the court of appeals an 
agreement that the proceeding be dismissed, specifying 
the terms as to payment of costs, and shall pay whatever 
fees are due, the clerk shall enter the case dismissed, 
but no mandate or other process shall issue without an 
order of the court.  An appeal may be dismissed on 
motion of the appellant upon such terms as may be agreed 
upon by the parties or fixed by the court. 
     7  Ormsby Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 240, 
241 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) authorizes 
the court of appeals to dismiss an appeal upon request of the 
appellant, "subject to appropriate conditions fixed by the 
court"); American Auto Mfrs. Ass'n v. Commissioner Mass. Dep't of 
Envtl. Protection, 31 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1994) (court "has 
broad discretion to grant voluntary motions to dismiss" under Fed. 
R. App. P. 42(b)); HCA Health Services of Va. v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1992) (while motion to 
dismiss appeal is generally granted, "courts of appeal have the 
discretionary authority not to dismiss the case in appropriate 
circumstances"); United States v. Washington Dep't of Fisheries, 
573 F.2d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1978) (motion to dismiss appeal 
under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) has been granted unless "the appellee 
has shown financial or other injury caused by prosecution of the 
appeal"); Township of Benton v. County of Berrien, 570 F.2d 114, 
119 n.9 (6th Cir. 1977) ("use of the word 'may' in the last 
sentence [of Fed. R. App. P. 42(b)] indicates that the Court of 
Appeals has discretion in deciding whether or not to dismiss an 
appeal").  
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
8 
 
A comparison of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 and Fed. R. App. 
P. 42(b) clearly demonstrates that in the Wisconsin court of 
appeals, unlike in the federal court of appeals, the consent of 
neither the court nor the parties is required when an appellant 
voluntarily chooses to dismiss an appeal before the court of 
appeals issues a decision.   
 
In an effort to counter the state's reliance on the language 
and legislative history of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18, the 
defendants raise several arguments in support of the court of 
appeals' refusal to dismiss the state's appeal.  First, the 
defendants assert that the state did not properly give notice of a 
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 809.18 but instead filed a 
motion seeking the court of appeals' approval of the dismissal.  
Because the state requested dismissal through a motion rather than 
the notice prescribed by Rule 809.18, the defendants claim that 
the state has conferred upon the court of appeals the authority to 
refuse its request for dismissal, thus waiving any right to 
unilateral dismissal that it might have had under Rule 809.18. 
 
The state concedes, as it must, that its use of motion 
language in its notice of voluntary dismissal document was 
unartful.  But the state argues, and we agree, that its document 
clearly relies on Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18.  We conclude, as did 
Judge Wedemeyer's dismissal order, that the state's notice of 
voluntary dismissal was intended to obtain an automatic dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 809.18.  The mere fact that the document was 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
9 
labelled a motion does not mean that the state could thereby vest 
a power in the court of appeals which the court of appeals does 
not have.  Nor could the court of appeals thereby profess power 
over a voluntary dismissal in direct contravention of the language 
of Rule 809.18 itself.  Neither the state nor the court of appeals 
has the power to change Rule 809.18. 
 
The defendants' second argument is that Wisconsin circuit 
courts have the power to grant or refuse a motion to dismiss "in 
the public interest" and that the court of appeals should be 
accorded a similar power.  The defendants thus analogize the court 
of appeals' power of dismissal to that of the circuit court.   
 
A 
circuit 
court 
can 
refuse 
to 
terminate 
a 
criminal 
prosecution or a civil action.  See, e.g., State v. Kenyon, 85 
Wis. 2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978) (criminal prosecution); 
Russell v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 2d 406, 413, 111 N.W.2d 193 (1961) 
(civil action).  These cases, however, do not pertain to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.18, and they are not applicable to the court of 
appeals.  An appellant who voluntarily dismisses an appeal is 
returned to the position occupied prior to appeal and is bound by 
the order or judgment appealed from.  Were plaintiffs allowed to 
voluntarily dismiss complaints without leave of the circuit court, 
the resulting absence of such a judgment or order could 
potentially compromise both judicial economy and fairness by 
prolonging a matter that might otherwise have been resolved.8  It 
                     
     8  See, e.g., State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 46, 270 N.W.2d 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
10 
is consequently left to the sound discretion of the circuit courts 
to determine whether such dismissals might compromise the 
interests of the parties or the public.  
 
Although it is arguable that the protection of the public 
interest might militate against dismissing some appeals, in 
adopting Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 this court has determined that 
both fairness to the appellee and judicial economy outweigh any 
public interest in continuing an appeal which an appellant wishes 
to dismiss.  
 
Pointing to occasions on which this court has refused to 
dismiss a case at the request of one or both parties, the 
defendants also try to establish an analogy between the practice 
of this court and the court of appeals.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 440a-440b, 477 N.W.2d 608 
(1991), 480 N.W.2d 444 (1992) (advising litigants of the court's 
procedure upon a filing of a notice of dismissal).9  For different 
reasons, this analogy also fails. 
(..continued) 
160 (1978) (refusing to dismiss complaint because it "would be 
unfair" to the defendant, who had traveled from Texas to attend 
the preliminary and who would potentially be subjected to a second 
preliminary at a later date if the state were allowed to dismiss); 
Russell v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 2d 406, 413, 111 N.W.2d 193 (1961) (a 
plaintiff's leave to discontinue may be denied; plaintiff's 
absence from court on day appointed for trial resulted in 
inconvenience to the defendant and the jury); Burling v. Burling, 
275 Wis. 612, 82 N.W.2d 807 (1957) (upholding circuit court's 
refusal to grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss in a divorce 
action, noting, inter alia, that the defendant had not been given 
an opportunity to refute charges made against her).   
     9  This court also denied the parties' motion for voluntary 
dismissal by unpublished order in Hefty v. Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d 124, 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
11 
 
The rules of appellate practice applicable to the court of 
appeals are not always applicable to this court, which functions 
primarily as a law-developing court.  Partly as a consequence of 
the different functions served by Wisconsin's two appellate 
courts, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.63 provides that the rules 
governing procedure in the court of appeals are applicable to 
proceedings in the supreme court "unless otherwise ordered by the 
supreme court in a particular case."  Hence the defendants' 
analogy between their case and Foust--in which the court relied on 
Rule 809.63 to depart from Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 and decline 
the parties' stipulation to dismiss this court's review--is 
misplaced. 
 
The defendants' third argument relies upon State v. Thiel, 
171 Wis. 2d 157, 491 N.W.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1992), in which the court 
of appeals invoked its authority under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.24 
(allowing reconsideration) to reinstate an appeal that had 
previously been voluntarily dismissed under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.18.   
 
In Thiel, a criminal case, the state appealed the circuit 
court's order suppressing the accused's statement and the accused 
cross-appealed from both the circuit court's determination that 
his confession was voluntary and two other orders.  Three weeks 
(..continued) 
493 N.W.2d 33 (1992).  For this court's internal operating 
procedure regarding voluntary dismissal, see Internal Operating 
Procedures II(L)(4) (Wis. 1994). 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
12 
after the accused filed his cross-appeal and before briefing had 
begun, the state filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and a 
motion to dismiss the accused's cross-appeal, arguing that the 
dismissal of its appeal mandated dismissal of the cross-appeal as 
well.   
 
The court of appeals dismissed the state's appeal but denied 
the state's motion to dismiss the cross-appeal.  The state then 
moved to reinstate its voluntarily dismissed appeal.  While noting 
that it was "loathe to condone" the state's manipulative tactics, 
Thiel, 171 Wis. 2d at 159, the court of appeals granted the 
state's motion to reconsider its prior dismissal order, citing 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.24.  Id.10   
 
The state's explicit request to rescind its voluntary 
dismissal distinguishes Thiel from this case.  In Thiel the 
appellant itself asked for a withdrawal of its prior voluntary 
dismissal, a situation not covered by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18. 
 This case, however, is expressly governed by Rule 809.18.  The 
court of appeals cannot unilaterally rewrite that rule, thereby 
                     
     10  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.24 provides as follows:   
 
809.24 Rule (Reconsideration).  The court of appeals may on 
its own motion reconsider a decision or opinion at any 
time prior to remittitur if no petition for review under 
s. 809.62 is filed or within 30 days of the filing of a 
petition for review.  A motion for reconsideration is 
not permitted. 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
13 
frustrating an appellant's exercise of the prerogative which that 
rule confers.11  
 
For the reasons set forth we conclude that the court of 
appeals must dismiss an appeal when an appellant files a notice of 
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18 before 
                     
     11  The defendants also raise a jurisdictional challenge to 
the court's decision to review this case.  Citing Neely v. State, 
89 Wis. 2d 755, 279 N.W.2d 255 (1979), the defendants point out 
that under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1), a party can only appeal 
from an adverse decision in the court of appeals; a party cannot 
appeal from a favorable decision reached through a rationale with 
which it disagrees.  The defendants argue that the court of 
appeals' affirmance of the circuit court decision was favorable to 
the state because it produced precisely the result that the state 
had originally sought through voluntary dismissal:  a return to 
the status quo ante under which the defendants were entitled to 
retesting by the crime laboratory.  
 
 
We reject this argument.  It is simply not true that the 
court of appeals' decision was "favorable" to the state.  The 
court of appeals' failure to dismiss the state's appeal infringed 
directly upon the state's statutory right under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.18 to voluntarily and unilaterally dismiss its 
appeal.  
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
14 
the court of appeals issues a decision on the appeal.  Upon 
dismissal of an appeal, the appellant is returned to the same 
position occupied before the appeal was initiated.  
 
By the Court.—That part of the decision of the court of 
appeals relating to the state's appeal is vacated.  
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-2546-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
T.C. #F-931864 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent- 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Wandell Lee, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent- 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Thomas Casey, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  192 Wis. 2d 260, 531 N.W.2d 351 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 17, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 30, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 93-2546-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
93-2546-CR  State v. Lee/Casey 
 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross 
respondent-
petitioner the cause was argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant 
attorney general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, 
attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross appellants there was a 
brief by Robert R. Henak and Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Robert R. Henak.