Title: People v. Bradford
Citation: 2016 IL 118674
Docket Number: 118674
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2016

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JESSE 
TRAVIS BRADFORD, Appellant. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
118674 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
March 24, 2016 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. J. 
Casey Costigan, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Judgments reversed. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Jacqueline L. Bullard, 
Deputy Defender, and Joel C. Wessol, Assistant Appellate Defender, 
of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for 
appellant. 
 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jason Chambers, 
State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor 
General, and Michael M. Glick and Eric M. Levin, Assistant 
Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People. 
 
 
Justices 
 
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, 
Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and integrity 
of this document 
Date: 2016.05.11 
08:38:48 -05'00'
 
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OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Following a bench trial, the circuit court of McLean County convicted the defendant, Jesse 
Bradford, of burglary and sentenced him to three years in prison. On appeal, defendant 
contended the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he remained within a store 
without authority and with the intent to commit a theft therein, within the meaning of the 
burglary statute. See 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2012). The appellate court rejected this 
contention and affirmed defendant’s conviction. 2014 IL App (4th) 130288. 
¶ 2 
 
Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 315 
and 612 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013); R. 612 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)), which we granted. For 
the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts. 
 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
 
Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of burglary by “knowingly and 
without authority remain[ing] within the building of Walmart, with the intent to commit 
therein a felony or a theft,” in violation of section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 
ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2012)). 
¶ 5 
 
At defendant’s bench trial, the State presented the testimony of Stephen Norton, an asset 
protection associate at a Walmart store in Bloomington, Illinois. On July 19, 2012, Norton 
observed defendant enter the Walmart during the store’s regular business hours. Norton 
recognized defendant and continued to observe all of his movements and activities inside the 
store. At all times, defendant stayed in areas of the store which were open to the public. 
¶ 6 
 
Defendant first picked up two DVDs from a store display near the cash registers. He then 
brought the DVDs to the customer service desk and conducted a “no-receipt” return in 
exchange for a Walmart gift card. Next, defendant went to the men’s apparel department, 
where he picked up a hat, removed the price tag, and put it on. Defendant then went to the shoe 
department and picked up a pair of shoes. He placed the shoes in a Walmart bag which he 
produced from his pocket. Defendant proceeded to the cash registers, where he joined a male 
individual who had accompanied him to the store. Defendant paid for his friend’s merchandise 
using the same gift card he had received in exchange for the DVDs. He did not attempt to pay 
for the hat or the shoes. When defendant and his friend left the store, Norton and his partner 
approached them and identified themselves. Defendant refused to speak and kept walking, 
while the friend ran in another direction. Norton called the Bloomington police department and 
followed defendant on foot until the police arrived. 
¶ 7 
 
Bloomington police officer Ryne Donovan testified that he was called to the scene of a 
retail theft. He saw defendant outside the Walmart store alongside two of the store’s security 
personnel. Officer Donovan handcuffed defendant and brought him inside the store. Defendant 
confessed to taking the DVDs, conducting a fraudulent no-receipt return, and stealing a hat, 
shoes, and a 20-ounce bottle of Dr. Pepper. He also confessed to paying for his friend’s 
merchandise with the Walmart gift card he obtained from the DVDs. The State introduced into 
evidence a photograph depicting the hat, shoes, and Dr. Pepper found on defendant’s person, 
as well as the two DVDs. 
¶ 8 
 
At the close of the State’s case, the defense moved for a directed verdict. While conceding 
the evidence was sufficient to prove the crime of retail theft, defendant argued there was 
 
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insufficient evidence of burglary as defined in section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 
5/19-1(a) (West 2012)). Defendant’s motion was denied. The trial court convicted defendant 
of burglary as charged and sentenced him to three years in prison. 
¶ 9 
 
Defendant appealed, arguing there was no evidence that he remained within the store 
without authority as required by the burglary statute. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s 
conviction. 2014 IL App (4th) 130288. The court held, as a matter of law, that a defendant’s act 
of remaining within a building open to the public is “ ‘without authority’ ” if it is accompanied 
by an intent to steal. Id. ¶ 28. In the instant case, “[a]ny authority defendant may have had to 
remain in the store was implicitly withdrawn once he formed the intent to steal from Walmart.” 
(Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 34. Although the court did not identify the precise moment at 
which defendant began to unlawfully remain in the store, it held that defendant remained 
without authority “as he moved through the store and stole merchandise.” Id. 
 
¶ 10 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 11 
 
On appeal to this court, defendant repeats the same argument he raised in the appellate 
court, i.e., that the State failed to prove him guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt 
because there was insufficient evidence that he “remained within” the store without authority. 
¶ 12 
 
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must 
determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier 
of fact could have found the required elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People 
v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts 
in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. People v. 
Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375 (1992). Accordingly, a reviewing court will not substitute its 
judgment for the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility 
of the witnesses. Id. On appeal from a criminal conviction, we will not reverse the trial court’s 
judgment unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies 
a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Id. 
¶ 13 
 
Section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code provides, in part, that “[a] person commits burglary 
when without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a 
building, *** or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” 720 ILCS 
5/19-1(a) (West 2012). Thus, under the statute, there are two ways to commit the crime of 
burglary: (1) by entering without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft or (2) 
by remaining without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft. Id. 
¶ 14 
 
Defendant was charged with, and convicted of, the second type of burglary: “knowingly 
and without authority remain[ing] within the building of Walmart, with the intent to commit 
therein a felony or a theft,” in violation of section 19-1(a). 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2012). 
Because the parties disagree about what it means to remain without authority in a public place 
of business, we must first construe the statutory language before determining whether the State 
proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶ 15 
 
Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s 
intent. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6. The best indication of this intent is the statutory 
language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. The words and phrases in a statute should 
be construed in light of other relevant provisions and not in isolation. People v. Gutman, 2011 
IL 110338, ¶ 12. We may consider the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, the 
 
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purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Id. 
Where the language is plain and unambiguous, it must be applied without resort to further aids 
of statutory construction. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005). Where the language is 
ambiguous, however, we may consider external sources, such as legislative history, in order to 
discern the intent of the legislature. Id. The construction of a statute is a question of law which 
is reviewed de novo. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009). 
¶ 16 
 
Defendant contends that a person who commits theft after lawfully entering a public place 
is not guilty of burglary by remaining unless he exceeds the physical scope of his authority. In 
other words, burglary by remaining requires evidence that a defendant, with the intent to 
commit a felony or theft, is found in a place where the public is not authorized to be. Defendant 
relies on People v. Vallero, 61 Ill. App. 3d 413 (1978), and People v. McDaniel, 2012 IL App 
(5th) 100575, to support his interpretation of the burglary statute. 
¶ 17 
 
In Vallero, the defendant entered a dairy during business hours for the purpose of applying 
for a job. 61 Ill. App. 3d at 414. Defendant was instructed to complete a job application form in 
the office area of the dairy. After defendant left, it was discovered that a number of payroll 
checks were missing. Defendant later forged signatures on the checks and attempted to cash 
them. He was convicted of burglary, theft, and five counts of forgery. On appeal, the appellate 
court reversed the burglary conviction based on insufficient evidence that defendant remained 
in the dairy without authority. Id. at 415-16. According to the court, defendant could not be 
found guilty of burglary by remaining because he did not form the intent to steal until after he 
lawfully entered the dairy. Nor did he hide inside the dairy until after it had closed in order to 
commit a theft. Id. at 415 (citing People v. Manning, 46 Ill. App. 3d 877 (1977)). The 
concurring justice agreed there was no evidence that defendant “remained” in the dairy 
pursuant to the burglary statute, where defendant was permitted to enter the dairy, his presence 
on the premises was at all times lawful, and he did not remain there beyond authorized hours. 
Id. at 416 (Stengel, J., specially concurring). 
¶ 18 
 
In McDaniel, the defendant entered a Walmart store during the store’s regular business 
hours. 2012 IL App (5th) 100575, ¶ 3. A loss prevention agent saw defendant pick up three 
fishing reels from a store shelf and remove them from their packages. Defendant then placed 
the empty packages back on the shelf and secreted the reels inside his coat. The store’s agents 
stopped defendant after he walked past the cash registers without paying for the reels. Id. ¶ 4. A 
jury convicted defendant of burglary by unauthorized remaining, and the appellate court 
reversed defendant’s conviction. Id. ¶ 9. The court found that defendant entered the store 
lawfully, never exceeded the physical scope of his authority, and left immediately after 
stealing the reels. At all times, defendant remained within the general retail area of the store. 
Thus, although defendant was guilty of retail theft, he was not guilty of burglary by remaining 
within the store without authority. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19. 
¶ 19 
 
The McDaniel court contrasted the facts in that case with those in People v. Richardson, 
2011 IL App (5th) 090663, and People v. Glover, 276 Ill. App. 3d 934 (1995), where the 
defendants’ burglary convictions based on unlawful remaining were affirmed. McDaniel, 2012 
IL App (5th) 100575, ¶¶ 14-16. In those cases, the defendants’ initial entrances onto the 
premises were lawful. However, the defendants then entered areas of the premises that were 
off-limits to the public in order to commit thefts. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 16 (citing Richardson, 2011 IL 
App (5th) 090663, ¶ 17 (defendant stole cash and lottery tickets from an area of a store marked 
 
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“employees-only”), and Glover, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 938-39 (defendant stole vacuum cleaners 
from a church’s storage area after being told to stay by the entranceway)). The defendants in 
Richardson and Glover thus exceeded the scope of their physical authority by committing 
clear-cut acts of unauthorized remaining on the premises. Id. ¶ 16. 
¶ 20 
 
Based on the aforementioned case law, defendant argues that he never exceeded the scope 
of his physical authority to be in the Walmart. He contends that burglary by remaining is not 
intended to apply to ordinary shoplifting. Rather, it refers to situations in which a person 
lawfully enters a place of business but, in order to commit a theft or felony: (1) hides and waits 
for the building to close; (2) enters an unauthorized area within the building; or (3) continues to 
remain on the premises after being asked to leave. Since defendant lawfully entered the 
Walmart during regular business hours, shoplifted merchandise within public areas of the 
store, and left while the store was still open, defendant argues that he committed retail theft, a 
Class A misdemeanor, rather than burglary, a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16-25(f)(1) (West 
2012) (retail theft under $300)1; 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 2012). 
¶ 21 
 
In the State’s view, the facts in the instant case are distinguishable from those in Vallero 
and McDaniel. The State notes that, instead of leaving the premises immediately after 
committing a single act of theft, defendant lingered in the store and continued to steal 
merchandise following his fraudulent no-receipt return. Defendant’s subsequent thefts, the 
State argues, are sufficient evidence that defendant’s authority to remain in the store was 
implicitly withdrawn. The State proposes that an individual who engages in a “discrete act of 
remaining” within a store with the intent to commit a theft is guilty of burglary by remaining. 
In support of this theory, the State relies on People v. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d 434 (1968), which 
interpreted the portion of the burglary statute criminalizing burglary by entering. See 720 ILCS 
5/19-1(a) (West 2012). The State urges this court to extend the analysis set forth in Weaver to 
burglary by remaining. 
¶ 22 
 
In Weaver, police officers driving by a well-lit Laundromat at night spotted the defendant 
standing near a vending machine, the door of which was open. Police discovered keys to the 
vending machine inside vehicles belonging to defendant and his codefendant, as well as more 
than $50 in coins in defendant’s pocket. Defendant was convicted of burglary, possession of 
burglary tools, and theft. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 435. On appeal to this court, defendant argued 
there was insufficient evidence of burglary since the Laundromat was open to the public at the 
time in question, he could have entered as a business invitee, and his presence in the store was 
as consistent with his innocence as with his guilt. This court rejected defendant’s argument. Id. 
at 438-39. 
¶ 23 
 
We held that evidence that a defendant enters a place of business in order to commit a theft 
is sufficient to satisfy the “without authority” element of burglary by entering. Id. at 439. The 
“authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to 
those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open.” Id. Patrons of 
a Laundromat have no authority to enter if they intend to commit a theft inside the 
establishment. Consequently, evidence that the defendant entered the Laundromat with the 
                                                 
 
1There was no evidence at trial about the retail value of the merchandise stolen by defendant. For 
purposes of defendant’s argument, however, the State does not dispute that the retail value did not 
exceed $300. 
 
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intent of stealing from the vending machine—keys, coins, and the fact that defendant had no 
laundry—was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary by unauthorized entering. Id. 
¶ 24 
 
In the appellate court below, the court agreed with the State that Weaver’s definition of 
“without authority,” for purposes of burglary by entering, also applies to burglary by 
remaining. Citing Weaver, the court held, “just as a defendant’s entry is ‘without authority’ if it 
is accompanied by a contemporaneous intent to steal, so too must a defendant’s remaining be 
‘without authority’ if it also is accompanied by an intent to steal.” (Emphases in original.) 2014 
IL App (4th) 130288, ¶ 28. Throughout defendant’s multiple acts of shoplifting, his purpose 
for being in the Walmart was not consistent with the purpose for which the store was open to 
the public. Id. ¶ 34. Thus, in the court’s view, the evidence presented at trial that defendant 
“remained” in the store with the intent to commit a theft was sufficient in itself to convict 
defendant of burglary by remaining within. Id. 
¶ 25 
 
After examining the statutory language and weighing the parties’ arguments, we find that 
defendant presents the only reasonable reading of the burglary statute. In determining 
legislative intent, we may consider the consequences of construing the statute one way or 
another, and we presume that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or 
unjust results. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. Defendant’s interpretation offers a 
reasonable, workable test by which courts may evaluate whether a defendant is guilty of 
burglary by remaining within a place without authority. The State’s version, on the other hand, 
is unworkable, has the potential to lead to absurdity, and is inconsistent with both the retail 
theft statute and the historical development of the burglary statute. 
¶ 26 
 
First, under the State’s reading, adopted by the appellate court below, it is not clear what 
evidence would be sufficient to establish that a defendant “remains” within a public place in 
order to commit a theft. The appellate court provided no guidance as to what a defendant must 
do, or what duration of time he must spend in a place, to remain there without authority. 
Second, the court’s ruling arbitrarily distinguishes between a defendant who shoplifts one item 
in a store and leaves immediately afterward and a defendant who shoplifts more than one item 
or lingers inside a store before leaving. We do not believe the General Assembly intended to 
classify a single act of shoplifting as a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/16-25(f)(1) (West 
2012) (retail theft of property under $300)), while classifying several acts of shoplifting in a 
single course of conduct, totaling the same monetary value, as a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 
5/19-1(b) (West 2012) (burglary)). 
¶ 27 
 
Furthermore, we agree with defendant that the appellate court’s analysis conflicts with the 
legislative intent in enacting the retail theft statute. 720 ILCS 5/16-25 (West 2012). The court’s 
vague conclusion that “a defendant who develops an intent to steal after his entry into a public 
building may be found guilty of burglary by unlawfully remaining” (2014 IL App (4th) 
130288, ¶ 28) encompasses nearly all cases of retail theft, effectively negating the retail theft 
statute. This statute was enacted in 1975 for the purpose of combating the growing problem of 
retail theft in Illinois. 720 ILCS 5/16-25 (West 2012); 79th Ill. Gen. Assem., House 
Proceedings, June 11, 1975, at 113 (statements of Representative Sangmeister). The law takes 
into account various factors, including the value of the property taken, a defendant’s prior 
record, and how the property was acquired. 720 ILCS 5/16-25(f) (West 2012). Based on these 
factors, shoplifting can be charged in a range from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 2 felony. 
Id. Standard retail theft of the type occurring in this case is a Class A misdemeanor punishable 
 
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by up to 364 days in jail. 720 ILCS 5/16-25(f)(1) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a) (West 
2012). The burglary statute, on the other hand, does not consider any of these proportionality 
factors and classifies ordinary burglary as a Class 2 felony, punishable by three to seven years 
in prison. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2012). 
¶ 28 
 
Since the retail theft statute was enacted 14 years after the burglary statute’s “remaining 
within” provision became law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, ¶ 19-1), it strains logic to presume 
that the legislature intended most incidents of retail theft to be prosecuted as burglaries. 
Consequently, the appellate court’s broad reading of the burglary statute cannot be reconciled 
with the clear expression of legislative intent in the retail theft statute. 
¶ 29 
 
Finally, we reject the appellate court’s interpretation of the “remaining within” language 
for the additional reason that it is at odds with the historical development of the burglary 
statute. Prior to 1961, the Criminal Code contained five separate provisions pertaining to 
burglary: burglary, attempted burglary, burglar found in building, possession of burglary tools, 
and burglary with explosives. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 38, ¶¶ 84-88. The general burglary 
provision criminalized the unlawful entering of various buildings and structures. See Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1959, ch. 38, ¶ 84; People v. Myler, 374 Ill. 72 (1940); People v. Kelley, 274 Ill. 556 
(1916). The “burglar found in building” provision provided: “[w]hoever is found in any 
building, ship or vessel, with intent to commit the crime of murder, rape, robbery, larceny or 
other felony, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than five 
years.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 38, ¶ 86. In 1961, the general burglary provision was amended 
to include burglary by remaining without authority, and the separate “burglar found in 
building” provision was eliminated. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, ¶ 19-1. We can infer from 
these changes, and the fact that section 19-1 codified the existing law of burglary in Illinois, 
that the addition of language criminalizing “burglary by remaining” was intended to 
incorporate the crime of “burglar found in building.” See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 19-1, 
Committee Comments—1961, at 307-08 (Smith-Hurd 1970). 
¶ 30 
 
While the pre-1961 burglary statute did not define “burglar found in building,” the 
dictionary defines the word “find” as “to discover” or “to obtain by searching.” Webster’s New 
International Dictionary 330, 348 (1924). The “burglar found in building” provision 
necessarily implies, then, that the building or area where a defendant is found or discovered 
was closed to him or the public. It is unreasonable to say that a person is “found” or 
“discovered” when he is present in a store which is open to the public, during the store’s 
regular business hours. Accordingly, based on the history of the statute, we agree with 
defendant that burglary by remaining in a public building comprises only those individuals 
who are found or discovered in a place where they are not authorized to be. 
¶ 31 
 
We thus hold that an individual commits burglary by remaining in a public place only 
where he exceeds his physical authority to be on the premises. Under this definition, burglary 
by remaining includes situations in which an individual enters a public building lawfully but, 
in order to commit a theft or felony, (1) hides and waits for the building to close (People v. 
Manning, 46 Ill. App. 3d 877, 878-79 (1977), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 71 Ill. 2d 132 
(1978)), (2) enters unauthorized areas within the building (Richardson, 2011 IL App (5th) 
090663, ¶¶ 4-5, 8; Glover, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 938-39), or (3) continues to remain on the 
premises after his authority is explicitly revoked. Conversely, an individual who enters a 
building lawfully, shoplifts merchandise within areas which are open to the public, then leaves 
 
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during business hours, is guilty of ordinary retail theft. See McDaniel, 2012 IL App (5th) 
100575, ¶ 19. 
¶ 32 
 
In the case at bar, the State failed to prove that defendant remained within the Walmart 
without authority within the meaning of the burglary statute. See 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 
2012). Defendant entered the store during regular hours, never entered areas of the store which 
were off-limits to the public, shoplifted several items, then left while the store was open. 
Defendant did not exceed the scope of his physical authority as a member of the public to be in 
the store. The evidence presented by the State with respect to the element of unauthorized 
remaining is so insufficient as to justify a reasonable doubt that defendant committed burglary. 
 
¶ 33 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 34 
 
We conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant committed the crime of burglary by remaining in the store without authority. We 
further hold that the appellate court erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence upon 
which a fact finder could have based defendant’s conviction for burglary. 
¶ 35 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit 
courts. 
 
¶ 36 
 
Judgments reversed.