Title: Jody Helgeland v. Wisconsin Municipalities
Citation: 2008 WI 9
Docket Number: 2005AP002540
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2008

2008 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2540 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jody Helgeland, Jessie Tanner, Virginia Wolf, 
Carol Schumacher, Diane Schermann, Michelle 
Collins, Megan Sapnar, Ingrid Ankerson, Eloise 
McPike, Janice Barnett, Jayne Dunnum and Robin 
Timm, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Municipalities, 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Wisconsin State Senate and Assembly, 
          Co-Appellant, 
 
Department of Employee Trust Funds, Employee 
Trust Funds Board, Eric Stanchfield and Group 
Insurance Board, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 7, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs.   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. 
ROGGENSACK and ZIEGLER, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Michael 
D. Dean and Michael D. Dean, LLC, Waukesha, and oral argument by 
Michael D. Dean. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by Linda 
Roberson and Balkisle & Roberson, Madison; Laurence J. Dupis and 
ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, Inc., Milwaukee; John A. Knight 
and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Chicago; and Rose 
 
 
2 
A. Saxe, James D. Esseks and American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation, New York, NY, and oral argument by John A. Knight. 
 
For the defendants-respondents the cause was argued by 
Jennifer Sloan Lattis, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2005AP2540  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV1265) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jody Helgeland, Jessie Tanner, Virginia Wolf, 
Carol Schumacher, Diane Schermann, Michelle 
Collins, Megan Sapnar, Ingrid Ankerson, Eloise 
McPike, Janice Barnett, Jayne Dunnum and Robin 
Timm, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Municipalities, 
 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Wisconsin State Senate and Assembly, 
 
          Co-Appellant, 
 
Department of Employee Trust Funds, Employee 
Trust Funds Board, Eric Stanchfield and Group 
Insurance Board, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 7, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
2 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   Eight 
Wisconsin 
municipalities, municipal school boards, and school districts 
(collectively "the municipalities")1 seek review of a published 
court of appeals decision2 affirming an order of the Circuit 
Court for Dane County, David T. Flanagan, III, Judge.  The 
circuit court denied the municipalities participation as parties 
in the instant case brought by state employees relating to state 
benefits.3  The court of appeals affirmed the order of the 
circuit court.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
¶2 
We begin by explaining what this case is about and 
what it is not about.   
¶3 
The 
case 
is 
about 
court 
procedure. 
 
Eight 
municipalities want to insert themselves into a lawsuit brought 
by several state employees challenging their state benefits.  
The question before this court is whether the court should allow 
these eight municipalities to inject themselves into a state-
                                                 
1 The parties referred to herein as "the municipalities" are 
the Town of Caledonia, the Town of Cottage Grove, the City of 
Green Bay, the City of Watertown, the Village of Hobart, the 
Village of Oostburg, the School Board of New Berlin, and Raymond 
School District #14. 
2 Helgeland v. Wis. Municipalities, 2006 WI App 216, 296 
Wis. 2d 880, 724 N.W.2d 208. 
3 The Wisconsin State Senate and Assembly (the legislature) 
also moved to intervene in the plaintiffs' action.  The circuit 
court denied the legislature's motion in the same order that the 
municipalities 
now 
challenge. 
 
This 
court 
denied 
the 
legislature's petition for review of the court of appeals 
decision affirming the circuit court's order. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
3 
 
employee-oriented lawsuit, instead of bringing their own lawsuit 
governing the rights of their own municipal employees.   
¶4 
The procedural issue before the court is known in the 
law as "intervention" or "joinder."   
¶5 
Procedure is important in the law.  Our judicial 
system values procedure because we view good procedure as 
tending to produce fair and sound outcomes.  In deciding the 
procedural issue presented in the instant case, we must consider 
the positions of the complaining parties, the named defendants, 
and the eight municipalities, as well as the public's and 
court's interest in fair, effective, efficient case management. 
The municipalities do not have a monopoly interest on the 
procedural issue in the instant case, as they and the dissent 
want the reader to believe.  
¶6 
Broadly speaking, a court determines whether an 
outside entity should intervene in or join an existing lawsuit 
by striking a balance between allowing the original parties to a 
lawsuit to conduct and conclude their own lawsuit and allowing 
others to join a lawsuit in the interest of the speedy and 
economical resolution of a controversy without rendering the 
lawsuit fruitlessly complex or unending.  Whether to order 
intervention or joinder turns on judgment calls and fact 
assessments.   
¶7 
The eight municipalities in the present case make only 
generalized claims that they have interests related to the 
subject of the action.  As we explain at length below, and as 
Justice Butler's concurrence explains, the municipalities have 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
4 
 
failed to demonstrate in the circuit court or here how their 
interests relate to the subject of the action in a direct and 
immediate fashion.  Indeed, the dissent concedes, as it must, 
that 
the 
record 
does 
not 
detail 
the 
effects 
on 
the 
municipalities 
of 
a 
decision 
favoring 
the 
complainant.4  
Importantly, the Department of Employee Trust Funds and the 
Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin adequately represent 
the interest of the eight municipalities in defeating the 
lawsuit.  The municipalities' disagreement with the way DETF and 
the Attorney General are handling the action is not a basis for 
intervention. 
¶8 
Procedure is what the instant case is about. 
¶9 
The instant case is not about the merits of the state 
employees' assertion that Wis. Stat. § 40.02(2) (2003-04), the 
state 
statute 
defining 
"dependent," 
violates 
the 
equal 
protection guarantees of Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution by denying gay male and lesbian state employees and 
their same-sex domestic partners employment benefits that are 
available to similarly situated heterosexual state employees and 
their spouses.  We do not even come close to addressing this 
issue. 
¶10 After acknowledging that the constitutional issue of 
benefits for persons in gay and lesbian domestic relationships 
is not at issue in the instant case,5 the dissent immediately 
                                                 
4 Dissent, ¶¶185-86, 193.   
5 Id., ¶154. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
5 
 
stirs the cauldron of hot-button issues.  It touches on many 
issues totally unrelated to the narrow procedural question 
presently before this court and not even tangentially related to 
the constitutional question that may ultimately be raised and 
decided in the instant lawsuit when it is remanded to the 
circuit court.   
¶11 Within its first four paragraphs, the dissent asserts 
elliptically that the present case involves "one of the great 
social and political controversies of our time"6 and that the 
case affects "every public employer that operates under the 
Public Employee Trust Fund" and "potentially, every employer 
governed by Wisconsin's Family and Medical Leave Act."7 The 
dissent also identifies the instant action as part of the 
American Civil Liberties Union's National Lesbian and Gay Rights 
Project.8  The dissent is certainly mindful that any reference to 
the ACLU stirs up partisan passions.  See George H.W. Bush's 
criticism of presidential candidate Michael Dukakis as a "card-
carrying member of the ACLU."9 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 Id., ¶3. 
8 Id. 
9 The Presidential Debate; Transcript of the First TV Debate 
Between 
Bush 
and 
Dukakis, 
N.Y. 
Times, 
Sept. 
26, 
1988, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DEFD9113EF935A
1575AC0A96E948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1 (last visited Jan. 29, 
2008).  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
6 
 
¶12 Although  musing that "[i]t can be argued that courts 
exist for the very purpose of vindicating 'rights' that might 
otherwise be disregarded by political majorities,"10 the dissent 
in effect undermines the legitimacy of court decisions that 
review the constitutionality of legislative enactments.11  The 
dissent's thesis appears to be, in contrast to the Code of 
Judicial Conduct, that courts should not determine as a matter 
of constitutional law politically controversial issues raised in 
cases legitimately before them.12  
¶13 The 
dissent 
does 
not 
present 
the 
traditional, 
mainstream, well-accepted view that courts in the United States 
are, in settling disputes brought to them, supposed to protect 
the rights guaranteed to each of us by the United States 
Constitution Bill of Rights and the Wisconsin Constitution 
Declaration of Rights, even when such protection may be 
unpopular.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803), the 
best-known case in American legal history (and indeed in 
jurisprudence across the world), announced the basic tenet of 
                                                 
10 Dissent, ¶191. 
11 Id., ¶¶155, 190. 
12 Id., ¶¶155, 190-91. 
In contrast, the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR 
60.04(1)(b), explains that "[a] judge shall be faithful to the 
law and maintain professional competence in it.  A judge may not 
be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of 
criticism."  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
7 
 
judicial review, namely that courts have the power and duty to 
hold that "a law repugnant to the Constitution is void." 
¶14 Finally, the fifth paragraph of the dissent contrives 
to raise the specter of abortion, questioning the legitimacy of 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the United States Supreme 
Court's decision on abortion.13  Abortion?  Hard to believe that 
abortion has found its way into the instant case!14  
¶15 The only issue the dissent hasn't brought in to rile 
up as many readers as possible is, as far as we can tell, the 
issue of immigration.  
¶16 Unfortunately, the dissent encourages the reader to 
confuse the legislative function, which determines public policy 
in a forum open to all and not governed by court rules of 
evidence, and the judicial function, which resolves a legal 
dispute between named parties according to the facts and law 
(including rules of evidence) in a fair, neutral, impartial, and 
nonpartisan way.   
                                                 
13 Dissent, ¶155. 
14 In an attempt to arouse the "homer" sentiments of a 
Wisconsin 
reader, 
the 
dissent 
complains 
about 
the 
state 
employees' perfectly lawful decision to retain out-of-state 
counsel, inexplicably suggesting that the question whether the 
state employees' counsel may appear before the Wisconsin courts 
somehow has bearing upon the question whether the municipalities 
have a right of intervention under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  
Dissent, ¶212.   
The 
dissent 
also 
raises 
other 
wedge 
issues: 
state 
government versus local government, taxes, statutory revenue and 
levy limits, and increased costs of local government.  Dissent, 
¶¶189, 190, 205.   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
8 
 
¶17 As United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
Roberts has stated, a judge's job is like an umpire's, "to call 
balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat,"15 to make calls 
according to the rules, not according to the voices of a 
partisan crowd.   
¶18 Without support in the facts or law on intervention 
and joinder, the dissent has unfortunately turned to political 
considerations and appeals to emotions. 
¶19 We turn now to the procedural issues before us and the 
facts and law governing intervention and joinder.  
¶20 Our painstaking and thorough consideration of the 
municipalities' and the state employees' numerous arguments has 
resulted in a very long opinion.  To assist the reader, we set 
out the following roadmap to our discussion:   
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background: ¶¶21-34 
II. The Municipalities Do Not Have the Right to 
Intervene: Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1): ¶¶35-120 
A. 
Motion to Intervene is Timely: ¶42 
B. 
The 
Municipalities' 
Interests 
Are 
Insufficiently Related to the Subject of the Action: 
¶¶43-74 
(1) The 
Financial 
Interest 
of 
Three 
Municipalities in DETF Health Plans Is Not 
Direct, Immediate, or Special: ¶¶47-53 
                                                 
15 Roberts: "My job is to call balls and strikes and not to 
pitch 
or 
bat", 
CNN.com, 
Sept. 
12, 
2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/index.h
tml (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
9 
 
(2) The 
Municipalities' 
Collective 
Bargaining Agreements Are Not at Stake: ¶¶54-58 
(3) The 
Municipalities' 
Pension 
and 
Deferred Compensation Plans Are Not at Stake: 
¶¶59-66 
(4) The Municipalities' Home Rule Authority 
Is Not at Stake: ¶¶67-69 
(5) Summary: ¶¶70-74 
C. 
Disposition of the Action Does Not Impair 
the 
Municipalities' 
Ability 
to 
Protect 
Their 
Interests: ¶¶75-84 
D. 
The 
Municipalities 
Are 
Adequately 
Represented by DETF and the Attorney General in the 
Action: ¶¶85-114 
E. 
Summary: ¶¶115-118 
III. The 
Circuit 
Court 
Did 
Not 
Err 
in 
Denying 
Permissive Intervention: ¶¶119-127 
IV. Joinder is Not Required: ¶¶128-143 
A. 
Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1.: ¶¶129-137  
B. 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11): ¶¶138-143 
Conclusion: ¶¶144-145 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
¶21 The facts and procedural background may be simply 
stated. 
¶22 Jody Helgeland and five other current or former state 
employees, 
along 
with 
their 
same-sex 
domestic 
partners 
(collectively "Helgeland"), brought suit against DETF, DETF 
Secretary Eric Stanchfield, the Employee Trust Funds Board, and 
the Group Insurance Board (collectively "DETF").  Helgeland 
challenges the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20) 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
10 
 
(2003-04),16 which defines "dependent" for purposes of state 
employee health insurance eligibility, and alternatively asserts 
that DETF's interpretation and administration of this provision 
are unconstitutional.17  Helgeland argues that in applying the 
provision's definition of "dependent," DETF violated the equal 
protection guarantees of Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution18 by denying gay male and lesbian employees and 
their same-sex domestic partners the employment benefits of 
health insurance, sick leave carryover, and family leave that 
are available to similarly situated heterosexual employees and 
their spouses.  In the amended complaint, Helgeland requests, 
among other things, that the circuit court enjoin DETF from 
excluding lesbian and gay male employees and their same-sex 
domestic partners from the same employment benefits provided to 
similarly situated heterosexual employees and their spouses.   
¶23 Eight municipalities seek to participate as parties in 
Helgeland's law suit.  Judgment in favor of Helgeland could not 
                                                 
16 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated.   
17 Helgeland also challenges the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 103.10, which defines those family members with a 
serious health condition for whom an employee may take family 
leave.  This aspect of Helgeland's action is not relevant to the 
municipalities' motion. 
18 Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in full: "All people are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed." 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
11 
 
possibly impose an award of damages against any person or entity 
other than the named defendants.  
¶24 Each municipality involved in the instant suit offers 
health and dental benefit plans to its employees and pays all or 
some premium costs on behalf of employees who enroll in these 
plans.19  The Town of Cottage Grove, the City of Watertown, and 
the Village of Oostburg each pay premium costs on behalf of 
employees who enroll in health or dental plans administered by 
DETF.  The remaining municipalities apparently arrange for their 
employees' health or dental benefits without utilizing any DETF 
plan. 
¶25 Employees of the Town of Cottage Grove, the City of 
Watertown, and the Village of Oostburg who enroll in health or 
dental plans administered by DETF are given the option of 
obtaining either "family" or "single" coverage.  The "family" 
option provides coverage to employees and to employees' spouses 
and dependents.   
¶26 All eight municipalities participate in the Wisconsin 
Retirement System, which is administered by DETF.  A number of 
municipalities also sponsor the DETF-administered Wisconsin 
Deferred 
Compensation 
plan. 
 
The 
municipalities 
pay 
no 
contributions on behalf of employees participating in the 
Wisconsin Deferred Compensation plan. 
                                                 
19 The School District of New Berlin states in its affidavit 
that it also offers vision insurance to its employees.   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
12 
 
¶27 DETF is represented by the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice.  Peggy Lautenschlager served as Attorney General of the 
State of Wisconsin while both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals considered the municipalities' motion.  Subsequent to 
the court of appeals' decision, Lautenschlager completed her 
term as attorney general and was replaced by the newly elected 
J.B. Van Hollen. 
¶28 DETF has moved for judgment against Helgeland on the 
pleadings before the circuit court on the ground that Phillips 
v. 
Wisconsin 
Personnel 
Commission, 
167 
Wis. 2d 205, 
482 
N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1992), forecloses Helgeland's claim.   
¶29 Helgeland has moved to compel discovery.   
¶30 The circuit court has not ruled on either DETF's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings or Helgeland's motion to 
compel discovery, but has ruled only on the municipalities' 
motion to participate as parties.  The circuit court denied the 
municipalities' motion to intervene, as a matter of right or by 
permissive intervention, in the declaratory action brought by 
Helgeland.   
¶31 The circuit court also rejected the municipalities' 
request to be added by the court sua sponte as a necessary 
party.  The circuit court ruled that the municipalities' 
interests are indirect, hypothetical, and somewhat speculative.   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
13 
 
¶32 The 
circuit court invited the municipalities to 
participate as amicus curiae.20 
¶33 The municipalities contend (1) that they have a right 
of intervention under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) as a matter of law; 
(2) that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in denying the municipalities permissive intervention under Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(2); and (3) that the circuit court erred in 
refusing to join the municipalities sua sponte under either Wis. 
Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. or § 806.04(11).   
¶34 We agree with the circuit court and court of appeals: 
the municipalities' arguments are unpersuasive.  We conclude (1) 
that the municipalities have no right of intervention under Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(1); (2) that the circuit court properly exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
denying 
the 
municipalities 
permissive 
intervention under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2); and (3) that the 
circuit court did not err in refusing to join the municipalities 
sua 
sponte 
under 
either 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
803.03(1)(b)1. 
or 
                                                 
20 Amicus curiae (friend of the court) refers to a procedure 
whereby a court "may be informed by persons not parties to a 
legal action, who are nonetheless particularly informed or 
interested in the outcome (or at least in the law being 
declared)."  Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A 
Fragment, 94 Yale L. J. 1855, 2012 (1985).  Briefs by amicus 
curiae can provide assistance to a court by presenting an 
argument or citing authority not found in the parties' briefs or 
by providing important technical or background information which 
the parties have not supplied.  See Joseph D. Kearney et al., 
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 
U. Penn. L. Rev. 743, 745 (2000).  For a discussion of amicus 
briefs, see Neal Nettesheim et al., Friend of the Court Briefs: 
What the Curiae Wants in an Amicus, Wis. Lawyer, May 2007, at 
11.     
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
14 
 
§ 806.04(11).  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of 
appeals 
affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
denying 
intervention or joinder. 
 
II. The Municipalities Do Not Have a Right to Intervene: 
Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) 
¶35 We first consider whether the circuit court erred in 
denying the municipalities' motion for intervention as of right 
under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).   
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.09(1), governing intervention as 
of right, provides as follows: 
Upon timely motion anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action when the movant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the action and the movant is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability 
to protect that interest, unless the movant's interest 
is adequately represented by existing parties. 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.09(1) is based on Rule 24(a)(2) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and interpretation and 
application of the federal rule provide guidance in interpreting 
and applying § 803.09(1).21   
¶38 A movant must satisfy four requirements to intervene 
as a matter of right under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  The movant 
must show:  
(A) that the movant's motion to intervene is timely;  
                                                 
21 Fox v. DHSS, 112 Wis. 2d 514, 536, 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
15 
 
(B) that the movant claims an interest sufficiently related 
to the subject of the action;22  
(C) that disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that 
interest; and  
(D) that the existing parties do not adequately represent 
the movant's interest.23 
                                                 
22 The word "sufficiently" has been a part of our interest 
test since at least 1983.  State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of 
Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 547, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983) ("The 
question 
remains whether the [movant's] legally protected 
interest is sufficiently related to the transaction which is the 
subject of the action to justify the [movant's] intervention in 
this case as a matter of right.").  See also Armada Broad., Inc. 
v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 472, 516 N.W.2d 357 (1994) ("In 
determining whether [the movant] claims an interest relating to 
the transaction which is the subject of the action, we must 
determine whether [the movant] has an interest 'sufficiently 
related' to Armada's mandamus action.") (citing and quoting 
Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 547).   
The word "sufficient" is also part of the federal rule.  
See 7C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure 
§ 1908.1 
at 
300 
(2007) 
(entitled 
"Intervention . . . What Constitutes a Sufficient Interest"). 
For a different phrasing of the rule, see City of Madison 
v. WERC, 2000 WI 39, ¶11 n.9, 234 Wis. 2d 550, 610 N.W.2d 94 
("The interest which entitles one to intervene in a suit between 
other parties must be an interest of such direct and immediate 
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct 
operation of the judgment.") (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
23 See City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 (footnotes and 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Armada Broad., 183 Wis. 2d at 
471.  See also Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, Inc., 316 
F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir. 2003). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
16 
 
¶39 A movant must meet each of these four criteria to 
claim a right of intervention.24  At the same time, the criteria 
need not be analyzed in isolation from one another,25 and a 
movant's strong showing with respect to one requirement may 
contribute to the movant's ability to meet other requirements as 
well.26  We shall discuss each of these four requirements 
separately, but there is interplay between the requirements; the 
                                                 
24 See Armada Broad., 183 Wis. 2d at 471-76 ("setting forth 
the four requirements for intervention as of right . . . ," 
declaring that the movant would have a right of intervention "if 
he meets each of the requirements," and considering the four 
requirements seriatim). See also 6 James Wm. Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice § 24.03[1][a], at 24-23 (3d ed. 2002) 
("In the absence of statutory authority granting a right to 
intervene, an applicant must make a timely application and 
satisfy all three of the [other] criteria in order to qualify 
for intervention of right" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) 
(cross-references omitted); "[f]ailure to satisfy any one of the 
criteria justifies denial of the application to intervene.").  
25 For example, the nature of the interest claimed by a 
movant may be important to the question whether an existing 
party can adequately represent that interest.  See, e.g., Armada 
Broad., 183 Wis. 2d at 471-76 (considering the intensely 
"personal nature of the interests" demonstrated by the movant as 
one factor establishing that the movant's interests were not 
represented by existing parties).  As a further example, the 
nature of the relationship between a movant's interests and the 
subject of the action into which the movant seeks to intervene 
may have bearing upon whether the movant is able to meet the 
"impairment" prong of the test for intervention as of right.     
26 See 6 Moore, supra note 24, § 24.03[1][b], at 24-25 ("[A] 
lesser showing of impairment may be required by the court if the 
applicant's interest is very strong.  Likewise, intervention of 
right may be granted if the applicant's claimed interest may be 
significantly impaired by the action, even if some uncertainty 
exists regarding the sufficiency of that interest.") (footnote 
omitted).   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
17 
 
requirements must be blended and balanced to determine whether 
the municipalities have the right to intervene.27   
¶40 "Courts have no precise formula for determining 
whether a potential intervenor meets the requirements of 
§ 803.09(1) . . . ."28  The analysis is holistic,29 flexible, and 
                                                 
27 See 6 Moore, supra note 24, § 24.03[1][b], at 24-25; 7C 
Wright et al., supra note 22, § 1908, at 297. 
28 Wolff v. Town of Jamestown, 229 Wis. 2d 738, 742, 601 
N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1999).  See also 6 Moore, supra note 24, 
§ 24.03[1][b], at 24-25 ("The inquiry under Rule 24(a)(2) must 
focus on the particular facts and procedural posture of each 
application.") (footnote omitted); 7C Wright et al., supra note 
22, § 1908.1, at 300; Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 
964, 
970 
(3d 
Cir. 
1998) 
(concluding 
that 
no 
fact 
"pattern . . . will easily support or defeat intervention in all 
circumstances" and that "the variety of factual situations and 
their resolution demonstrate [the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit's] 
adherence 
to 
the 
elasticity 
that 
Rule 
24 
contemplates . . . .").  
29 Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election 
Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1999). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
18 
 
highly fact-specific.30  A court must look at the facts and 
circumstances of each case "against the background of the 
policies underlying the intervention rule."31  A court is mindful 
that Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1) "attempts to strike a balance 
between two conflicting public policies."32  On the one hand, 
"[t]he original parties to a lawsuit should be allowed to 
conduct and conclude their own lawsuit . . . ."33  On the other 
hand, "persons should be allowed to join a lawsuit in the 
interest 
of 
the 
speedy 
and 
economical 
resolution 
of 
controversies."34   
                                                 
30 Citing and quoting City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 
n.11, the court of appeals concluded that it should "allow 
intervention as a matter of right only where the intervenor is 
'necessary to the adjudication of the action.'"  Helgeland, 296 
Wis. 2d 880, ¶6.  At the municipalities' urging, we clarify that 
a rigid test for intervention as of right was not established in 
City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11, n.11 (citation omitted), 
in which the court stated that intervention as a matter of right 
requires that a person be in some sense "necessary to the 
adjudication of the action."  City of Madison should not be 
interpreted to indicate a departure from our flexible and 
pragmatic 
approach 
to 
intervention 
as 
of 
right, 
nor 
to 
contradict the text of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), which provides 
that a right of intervention can exist even where the movant 
shows that disposition of the action "may as a practical matter 
impair or impede the movant's ability" to protect some interest, 
as opposed to showing that impairment or impediment will 
necessarily occur. 
31 Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 549.  
32 Id. at 548.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
19 
 
¶41 Whether to allow or to deny intervention as of right 
is a question of law that this court decides independently of 
the circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from the 
analyses of each court.35  One federal court concluded: "Despite 
its nomenclature, intervention 'as of right' usually turns on 
judgment calls and fact assessments that a reviewing court is 
unlikely to disturb except for clear mistakes."36 
A. Motion to Intervene Is Timely 
¶42 The question of the timeliness of a motion to 
intervene is left to the discretion of the circuit court.37  
Neither Helgeland nor DETF disputes that the municipalities 
timely moved to intervene.  We agree with the parties that the 
municipalities satisfied the first requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(1).  
 
B. The Municipalities' Interests Are Insufficiently Related to 
the Subject of the Action 
¶43 No precise test exists "for determining which type of 
interest is sufficient to allow a party to intervene as a matter 
                                                 
35 Armada Broad., 183 Wis. 2d at 470 (citing Bilder, 112 
Wis. 2d at 549.   
36 Daggett, 172 F.3d at 113. 
37 City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 n.10. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
20 
 
of right."38  The "interest" requirement is nebulous; courts have 
not been able to develop more than general guidelines.39  Instead 
of a precise test, courts employ a "broader, pragmatic approach 
to intervention as of right," viewing "the interest sufficient 
to allow the intervention practically rather than technically."40  
As 
the 
municipalities' 
brief 
recognizes, 
the 
interest 
requirement has generated a spectrum of approaches.   
¶44 We thus approach the second requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(1) with the same flexibility that we bring to the 
statute as a whole, measuring "the sufficiency of the interest 
by 
focusing 
on 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
of 
the 
particular case before [us] as well as the stated interest in 
intervention" and analyzing "these factors against the policies 
underlying the intervention statute,"41 namely to strike a 
balance between allowing the original parties to a lawsuit to 
conduct and conclude their own lawsuit and allowing persons to 
join a lawsuit in the interest of the speedy and economical 
                                                 
38 Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 547.  See also Security Ins. Co. 
v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1380 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The 
'interest' required by Rule 24(a)(2) has never been defined with 
particular precision."); 6 Moore, supra note 24, § 24.03[2][a], 
at 24-28 ("[T]here is no authoritative definition of precisely 
what kinds of interest satisfy the requirements of" Rule 
24(a)(2).).   
39 Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1987). 
40 Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 548.  Bilder may, however, be 
interpreted to require that an interest at least be "legally 
protected."  See id. at 546-47.  
41 Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 548. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
21 
 
resolution 
of 
controversies without rendering the lawsuit 
fruitlessly complex or unending.  We treat "the interest test as 
primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by 
involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible 
with efficiency and due process."42   
¶45 At the same time, a claimed interest does not support 
intervention if it is only remotely related to the subject of 
the action.43  There must be some sense in which the interest is 
"of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will 
either gain or lose by the direct operation of the judgment."44  
A movant may intervene as of right when the movant needs "to 
protect a right that would not otherwise be protected in the 
litigation."45   
¶46 The 
subject 
of 
the 
present 
action 
is 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20), which defines 
"dependent" for purposes of state employee health insurance 
eligibility.  Although the municipalities' employees are not 
                                                 
42 Id. at 548-49 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
43 See 6 Moore, supra note 24, § 24.03[2][b], at 24-29 
("[I]nterests that are remote from the subject matter of the 
proceeding plainly do not satisfy the interest requirement of 
Rule 24(a).").   
44 City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 n.9 (quoting Lodge 
78, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Nickel, 20 Wis. 2d 42, 46, 121 
N.W.2d 297 (1963)).  
45 City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 n.8 (quoting White 
House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 249, 81 N.W.2d 725 
(1957)).   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
22 
 
involved 
in the subject of the action so defined, the 
municipalities put forth a number of interests and assert that 
each is sufficiently related to the subject of the action to 
allow intervention as of right.46  They argue that they meet the 
interest requirement for the following reasons: (1) three 
municipalities (Cottage Grove, Watertown, and Oostburg) would 
have to pay increased premiums on behalf of municipal employees 
enrolled in DETF health or dental plans should Helgeland 
prevail; (2) the collective bargaining agreements of all eight 
municipalities would be affected should Helgeland prevail, 
because employees' spouses are covered under the agreements but 
employees' same-sex domestic partners are not; (3) most of the 
municipalities 
participate 
in 
or 
sponsor 
the 
Wisconsin 
Retirement System qualified plan and the Wisconsin Deferred 
Compensation Program (both administered by DETF) that would be 
adversely affected should Helgeland prevail; and (4) the 
municipalities' home rule authority over their local affairs and 
government would be adversely affected by Helgeland's action.  
We discuss each argument in turn. 
 
(1) The Financial Interest of Three Municipalities in DETF 
Health Plans Is Not Direct, Immediate, or Special 
¶47 We first consider the municipalities' argument that 
three of the eight municipalities' financial interest in their 
                                                 
46 In Wolff v. Town of Jamestown, 229 Wis. 2d 738, 601 
N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals concluded that 
the movant need not demonstrate it has a judicially enforceable 
right to challenge a decision in order to intervene in the 
action.   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
23 
 
employees' DETF health benefit plans is an interest sufficiently 
related to the subject of Helgeland's action.   
¶48 Cottage Grove, Watertown, and Oostburg each pay 
premium costs on behalf of employees who enroll in health or 
dental plans administered by DETF pursuant to collective 
bargaining agreements.  The municipalities argue that including 
same-sex domestic partners in the plan could impose additional 
costs on municipal employers.47  The municipalities therefore 
assert a financial interest that they claim is directly related 
to the subject of Helgeland's action.48 
¶49 The court of appeals voiced some agreement with this 
portion of the municipalities' argument.  While not reaching a 
definitive conclusion on the matter, the court of appeals 
conceded that "[i]t appears likely that . . . Cottage Grove, 
Watertown, 
and 
Oostburg[] may have interests sufficiently 
related to the declaratory action by virtue of being enrolled in 
                                                 
47 According to the affidavits, however, all six employees 
of the Village of Oostburg are already enrolled in a DETF plan 
offering family coverage, and the Village appears not to be 
affected by the instant action. 
The affidavits for Cottage Grove, Watertown, and Oostburg 
each indicate that employees eligible to enroll in DETF plans 
have only two coverage options: "family" and "single."  The 
affidavits further indicate that the price of the "family" 
coverage plans does not vary depending on the number of persons 
other than the employee who are covered by the plan. 
48 The municipalities assert that should Helgeland prevail, 
DETF would be required to amend the very plans in which 
employees 
of 
Cottage 
Grove, 
Watertown, 
and 
Oostburg 
are 
enrolled. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
24 
 
the DETF health plans."49  The court of appeals reasoned that 
"[a] 
decision 
affecting 
the 
applicability 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 40.02 . . . to same-sex domestic partners of state employees 
could directly affect these Municipalities in the administration 
of their health plans pursuant to these statutes, because a 
judgment in Helgeland's favor would likely increase the amount 
of benefits these Municipalities would be required to pay."50  
The court of appeals concluded, however, that the remaining five 
municipalities do not have sufficient interests because they are 
parties only to DETF pension plans, which Helgeland did not 
directly challenge.51 
¶50 Helgeland and DETF respond, arguing that municipal 
employees' plans, including plans administered by DETF, are in 
no way the subject of Helgeland's action and that any judgment 
in favor of Helgeland would apply solely to DETF plans offered 
to state employees.  Helgeland and DETF point to Wis. Stat. 
§ 40.51(7), which provides that DETF may establish different 
                                                 
49 Helgeland, 296 Wis. 2d 880, ¶19. 
50 Id.  
51 Id., ¶19 n.13.  
The municipalities disagree with the court of appeals' 
limited interpretation of the complaint; they assert that the 
remedies Helgeland seeks apply to all DETF plans (including 
pension and deferred compensation plans in which all eight 
municipalities are enrolled) and that all the municipalities 
therefore have an interest in Helgeland's action. 
We address the municipalities' arguments regarding DETF-
administered pension and deferred compensation plans below. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
25 
 
eligibility standards for nonstate employees participating in 
DETF plans.  According to Helgeland and DETF, judgment in favor 
of Helgeland does not directly affect the municipalities.    
¶51 The municipalities make an additional argument.  They 
charge that Helgeland has deliberately designed her action to 
gain "a tactical advantage" by excluding the municipalities from 
the litigation through "shrewd pleading" and "cherry picking."   
¶52 The municipalities seem to be arguing that when 
challenging the constitutionality of state conduct, Helgeland is 
obligated to name as defendants any conceivable state or 
municipal entity that may be engaging in the conduct challenged.  
No such requirement exists in the law.   
¶53 We need not decide the legal issue of the effect of a 
judgment in the present case on the municipalities; under the 
practical standard we apply in interpreting and applying Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(1), whether municipal employees' DETF plans are 
the exact plans considered in the action is not dispositive.  A 
relationship may exist between the plans that DETF offers to 
state 
employees 
and 
the 
DETF 
plans 
offered 
to 
the 
municipalities' 
employees. 
 
The 
relationship 
between 
the 
municipalities' interest and the subject of Helgeland's action 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
26 
 
is, however, too remote and speculative to support a right of 
intervention.52 
 
(2) The Municipalities' Collective Bargaining Agreements Are Not 
at Stake 
¶54 The municipalities' second claimed interest is that 
their collective bargaining agreements will be affected by 
Helgeland's action.  They argue that this interest alone is 
sufficient to require intervention.  We do not agree with the 
municipalities' statement of the law.  
¶55 The 
municipalities 
cite 
a 
number 
of 
cases 
as 
"overwhelming" support for the position that a government or 
private entity has a right of intervention whenever a judgment 
may modify an agreement to which the entity is party.   
¶56 These cases do not provide the support that the 
municipalities seek.  Four of the cases cited simply do not 
                                                 
52 Contra Zabel v. Zabel, 210 Wis. 2d 336, 565 N.W.2d 240 
(Ct. App. 1997), in which the court of appeals, in a joinder 
case, concluded that the joinder of a husband's mother as a 
third-party defendant in a divorce action was necessary for a 
just and complete adjudication of the parties' material property 
rights when the wife alleged that certain real property titled 
in her mother-in-law's name was marital property and therefore 
subject to division as part of the divorce. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
27 
 
consider the question of intervention.53  In a fifth case, a 
federal district court granted permissive intervention under 
Rule 24(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but did 
not reach the question of intervention as of right under Rule 
24(a)(2).54  In an sixth case, a federal district court denied a 
motion to intervene on grounds that the movant could not meet 
the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2).55   
¶57 Only one case that the municipalities cite lends any 
aid to their argument.  In EEOC v. AT&T, 506 F.2d 735, 741-42 
(3d Cir. 1974), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled 
that a movant union had the right to intervene as party 
defendant to oppose a consent decree that could modify or 
invalidate provisions in the union's collective bargaining 
agreement with defendant AT&T.  The EEOC court did not, however, 
                                                 
53 U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 
(1977) (considering whether a state's statutory repeal of its 
covenant with another state was void under the Art. I, § 10, 
cl.1, Contract Clause of the United States Constitution); United 
States v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming the district court's refusal to approve a consent 
decree over an intervenor's objection but not reviewing the 
district court's decision to permit intervention); Linton v. 
Comm'r of Health & Env't, 30 F.3d 55 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(considering whether an intervenor had standing to appeal the 
district court's decision but not reviewing the grant of 
intervention); In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 1980 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13500 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (interpreting the bankruptcy code 
to permit a debtor to disaffirm a collective bargaining 
agreement). 
54 Cox Cable Commc'ns, Inc. v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 
917 (M.D. Ga. 1988).  
55 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 696 F. Supp. 57, 96 (D. Del. 1988).   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
28 
 
establish a general rule that a person may always claim an 
interest supporting intervention as of right when judgment in an 
action may leave the person unable to enforce rights under an 
agreement to which it is party.56   
¶58 Although no judgment for Helgeland as a state employee 
would directly bind the municipalities, on a practical level——
the level at which our analysis must focus——the municipalities 
arguably may be affected if a judgment is entered against DETF.  
Accordingly, the municipalities are concerned about the effect 
of stare decisis upon them.  As we explain below, although the 
effect of stare decisis is a consideration in determining 
intervention as of right, it is not determinative. 
 
(3) The Municipalities' Pension and Deferred Compensation Plans 
Are Not at Stake 
¶59 Thirdly, 
the 
municipalities 
allege 
that 
their 
interests in both the Wisconsin Retirement System and the 
Wisconsin Deferred Compensation Program (both administered by 
DETF) are at stake in the action.  The court of appeals refused 
to consider the municipalities' arguments regarding pension 
benefits on grounds that Helgeland's complaint made no reference 
to pension plans.57  Applying our practical standard, we examine 
                                                 
56 EEOC is further distinguishable from the instant case in 
that the consent decree at issue in EEOC threatened directly to 
modify or invalidate parts of a collective bargaining agreement 
that the movant union had negotiated with a party defendant that 
would be bound by judgment in the action.  EEOC v. AT&T, 506 
F.2d 735, 741 (3d Cir. 1974).  In this case, the municipalities 
do not claim contractual rights against DETF or any other party 
to the action. 
57 Helgeland, 296 Wis. 2d 880, ¶18. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
29 
 
the relation of the municipalities' interests in the retirement 
and deferred compensation plans to the present action.  
¶60 The municipalities explain the relationship between 
their interest in the retirement and deferred compensation plans 
and Helgeland's action as follows:  Although employees are free 
to designate any pension or deferred compensation beneficiary 
they wish, Wisconsin law provides that employees' "spouses" have 
specific rights to those benefits under qualified domestic 
relations orders.  A qualified domestic relations order divides 
the participant's pension and deferred compensation benefits at 
divorce between the participant and the former spouse.58   
¶61 The municipalities argue that because Helgeland asks 
that the court classify "same-sex domestic partners of state 
employees as dependents for purposes of participation in all 
employee benefit contracts and plans . . ."59 and because the 
Wisconsin Retirement System and Wisconsin Deferred Compensation 
Program are administered by DETF, any judgment in favor of 
Helgeland will necessarily entail that DETF be compelled to 
permit a participant's former same-sex domestic partner to seek 
a qualified domestic relations order dividing the participant's 
benefits between the participant and the former same-sex 
domestic partner.   
                                                 
58 In support of this position, the municipalities cite Wis. 
Stat. §§ 40.02(48m) and 40.24(7)(a), as well as Wis. Admin. Code 
ETF § 20.055 (Jan. 2004). 
59 Petr.'s Br. 42 (quoting Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 
31).   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
30 
 
¶62 The municipalities further argue that such a remedy 
would jeopardize the tax-exempt or tax-deferred status of these 
plans if a former same-sex domestic partner were, like a spouse, 
permitted to obtain a qualified domestic relations order 
dividing a participant's benefits between the participant and 
the former same-sex domestic partner.  The municipalities 
surmise that by allocating such a right to former same-sex 
domestic partners, DETF would in some way render the plans 
inconsistent with the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which 
provides that in determining the meaning of any federal statute 
or regulation, the word "marriage" means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife and the word 
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.  The municipalities cite two IRS private 
letter rulings that the municipalities claim support their 
reading of federal law.60 
¶63 The municipalities' arguments on federal law are 
extremely weak.  Life insurance policies, deferred compensation 
plans, retirement plans, and pension plans administered by DETF 
already permit participants to name beneficiaries of their 
choice.61 
 
Private 
letter 
rulings, 
as 
the 
municipalities 
themselves 
acknowledge, 
have 
no 
precedential 
value.  
                                                 
60 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200524016 (June 17, 2005), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0524016.pdf; I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200524017 (June 17, 2005), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0524017.pdf. 
61 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 40.02(8)(a). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
31 
 
Furthermore, the private letter rulings do not necessarily 
support the municipalities' position. 
¶64 The private letter rulings instead conclude that each 
plan examined "is an eligible deferred compensation plan,"62 
while also noting that "a registered domestic partner . . . is 
not a spouse . . . for purposes of" the federal law and that if 
spousal provisions in the plans are "not interpreted and applied 
in a manner consistent with the Defense of Marriage Act, the 
operation of [the plans]" would not comply with federal law.63  
The 
private 
letter 
rulings 
do 
not 
explain 
whether 
an 
interpretation or application of a plan's spousal provisions 
would be inconsistent with the Defense of Marriage Act if, 
pursuant to state law, the plan provided the same benefits to 
registered domestic partners that it provides to spouses. 
¶65 Lastly, the municipalities' argument depends upon an 
interpretation of the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the 
word "spouse."  The only word at which Helgeland takes aim is, 
however, the word "dependent" in the state statute.  The 
municipalities offer no reason to conclude that a judgment in 
favor of Helgeland interpreting the word "dependent" might 
entail interpretation of the word "spouse" as well. 
¶66 The municipalities' arguments about federal law are 
based on "likely scenarios" and speculation about the effect of 
                                                 
62 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200524016, at 10; I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 200524017, at 9.   
63 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200524016, at 10; I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 200524017, at 9. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
32 
 
Helgeland's action on the tax status of the retirement and 
deferred compensation plans and application of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 
1974 
(ERISA), 
and 
the 
Comprehensive 
Omnibus 
Budget 
Reconciliation Act (COBRA).  The municipalities spin an argument 
but cite no examples or case law illustrating the dire 
consequences they predict.  In contrast, numerous governmental 
entities now grant employees domestic partner benefits and 
retain federal tax benefits and apparently do not run afoul of 
federal laws. 
(4) The Municipalities' Home Rule Authority Is Not at Stake 
¶67 We turn finally to the municipalities' contention that 
judgment for Helgeland would deprive the municipalities of 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
home 
rule 
powers.64 
 
The 
                                                 
64 The home rule amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution, 
Article XI, Section 3(1), provides in relevant part that 
"[c]ities and villages organized pursuant to state law may 
determine their local affairs and government, subject only to 
this constitution and to such enactments of the legislature of 
statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or 
every village. . . . ").   
Wisconsin's home rule statute further provides that 
[e]xcept as elsewhere in the statutes specifically 
provided, the [municipal] council shall have the 
management and control of the city property, finances, 
highways, navigable waters, and the public service, 
and shall have power to act for the government and 
good order of the city, for its commercial benefit, 
and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, 
and may carry out its powers by license, regulation, 
suppression, 
borrowing 
of 
money, 
tax 
levy, 
appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and 
other necessary or convenient means. . . . 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
33 
 
municipalities 
suggest 
that 
Helgeland 
threatens 
the 
municipalities' 
authority to hire personnel and negotiate 
employment 
contracts, 
to 
negotiate 
collective 
bargaining 
agreements, to establish and administer benefit plans for 
municipal 
employees, and generally to determine municipal 
policy.  
¶68 Helgeland's position does not threaten to deprive the 
municipalities of any part of their home rule powers.  The 
municipalities apparently would have this court hold that they 
face deprivation of their home rule authority——and accordingly 
may claim an interest supporting intervention——every time a 
court considers whether a constitutional or statutory provision 
prohibits the state or municipalities from engaging in some 
particular form of conduct.  We do not so hold.  The 
municipalities' home rule authority is not related to the 
subject of Helgeland's action.  
¶69 That a judgment for Helgeland might affect the 
constitutional 
or 
statutory 
powers 
of 
a 
municipality 
in 
operating health care or pension plans does not constitute a 
deprivation of the municipalities' home rule powers.  Home rule 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
34 
 
powers are explicitly constrained by the state constitution and 
the statutes.65    
(5) Summary 
¶70 In summary, we examine all of the municipalities' 
arguments about their interests together and apply the broad, 
pragmatic approach to intervention as of right required by Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(1).  We determine whether the municipalities' 
interests are sufficient to allow the intervention practically 
rather than technically and examine the interest factor in 
relation to the other factors to decide whether to allow 
intervention as of right.  We balance the right of the original 
parties to conduct their own lawsuit with allowing others to 
join the lawsuit in the interest of speedy and economical 
resolution of the controversy. 
¶71 Although the municipalities claim that they have 
interests related to the subject of Helgeland's action, they 
have failed to show in the circuit court or here how their 
interests relate to the subject of the action in a direct and 
immediate fashion.  Furthermore, the municipalities' interest in 
the present case is not a unique or special interest but rather, 
as Justice Butler's concurrence demonstrates, one that other 
municipalities or other entities or individuals could claim in 
                                                 
65 See Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1) (granting home rule 
powers "subject only to this constitution and to such enactments 
of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall 
affect every city or every village"); Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5) 
(granting home rule powers "[e]xcept as elsewhere in the 
statutes specifically provided").  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
35 
 
almost any action challenging the constitutionality of a state 
statute, or that any employer could claim when an action before 
a court affects a similar contract or threatens to increase 
costs that employers are obligated to pay on behalf of their 
employees.66  When the interests of a movant are substantially 
similar to those of a party, as the municipalities claim, it is 
more difficult for the movant to demonstrate that it is not 
adequately represented by the party.67  The municipalities' 
interests do diverge from DETF's.  The municipalities' interest 
is in the employees covered by their own plans, not in the state 
employees who have brought the action.  Furthermore, the 
municipalities' interest in the outcome is more attenuated than 
the State's.  The municipalities, unlike the State, would not be 
subject to immediate potential damages as well as costs to the 
taxpayers should the court ultimately rule in Helgeland's favor.   
¶72 The municipalities cite no case holding that a movant 
meets the interest requirement of either Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) 
or Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely 
                                                 
66 Cf. Armada Broad., 183 Wis. 2d at 474, 476 (movant had a 
"unique" and "personal" interest in persuading the court that a 
report containing speculative and uncorroborated information 
about the movant should remain closed to the public); Wolff, 229 
Wis. 2d at 746 (movant town's unique statutory responsibility to 
provide fire protection services to plaintiff and plaintiff's 
property was implicated in plaintiff's action to develop a 
rugged and difficult-to-reach tract of land for residential 
use). 
67 See, 
e.g., 
Armada 
Broad., 
183 
Wis. 2d 
at 
471-76 
(considering the intensely "personal nature of the interests" 
demonstrated by the movant as one factor establishing that the 
movant's interests were not represented by existing parties). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
36 
 
when it engages in, and wishes to continue engaging in, conduct 
identical to another's conduct challenged on constitutional 
grounds 
but 
governed 
by 
a 
different 
contract. 
 
The 
municipalities also adduce no precedent recognizing a right of 
intervention based on a widely shared financial interest such as 
presented in the instant case.  Many entities may be concerned 
with Helgeland's action, but involving them as intervenors as of 
right is not likely to be compatible with efficiency and would 
not contribute to the resolution of the controversy unless the 
movant had a sufficiently different stake in the controversy, 
was not adequately represented by a party, and could make a 
unique contribution to the proceedings.   
¶73 The municipalities conclude their interest argument by 
asserting that when, as in the present case, the claimant 
(Helgeland) brings public interest litigation that may change 
constitutional doctrine and statewide governmental practice, 
greater consideration should be given for intervention by 
parties of differing perspectives to allow fuller development of 
the issues.  Under this theory, any significant legal question 
of 
first 
impression 
cannot 
be 
resolved 
without 
allowing 
intervention by every person whose rights in a future case might 
be affected by the stare decisis effect of the decision.  This 
type 
of 
free-for-all 
intervention 
could 
not 
have 
been 
contemplated by the legislature.  The municipalities' reasoning 
is therefore flawed. 
¶74 The 
municipalities' 
generalized 
interest 
in 
the 
subject of the instant action, namely, the constitutionality of 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
37 
 
a statute applicable to a plan for state employees, is at the 
far edge of what may constitute a sufficiently related interest 
for purposes of the right to intervene statute.  The weakness of 
the municipalities' showing with respect to the interest 
requirement means that to demonstrate a right of intervention 
the municipalities should make a strong showing in the other 
requirements to intervene as of right.   
 
C. Disposition of the Action Does Not Impair the Municipalities' 
Ability to Protect Their Interests 
¶75 We now consider the third requirement to intervene as 
a matter of right under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), namely, that the 
disposition of Helgeland's action may, as a practical matter, 
impair 
or 
impede 
the 
municipalities' 
ability 
to 
protect 
interests that may be related to the subject of Helgeland's 
action.68  The municipalities are not parties to any contract 
actually at issue in the present litigation; the municipalities' 
interest 
in 
excluding 
same-sex 
domestic 
partner 
coverage 
therefore cannot be directly impaired by Helgeland's action.   
¶76 The municipalities argue that the effect of stare 
decisis might impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interest in excluding same-sex domestic partner coverage.  The 
circuit court concluded that the interests of the municipalities 
"while not directly involved in this lawsuit, may be impaired in 
                                                 
68 7C Wright et al., supra note 22, § 1908.2, at 368 
(determining whether disposition of the action will impede or 
impair a movant's ability to protect its interest must be put in 
practical terms). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
38 
 
some future circumstance by a decision in this litigation, 
through the operation of stare decisis" and that "the possible 
future problem arising from stare decisis" is not a sufficient 
basis for intervention. 
¶77 Wisconsin courts have not considered, for purposes of 
intervention as a matter of right under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), 
the effect of stare decisis.  We therefore turn to the federal 
decisions for guidance. 
¶78 The federal courts have reached no consensus on the 
question under what circumstances the effect of stare decisis 
may constitute an impairment for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2), 
governing intervention as of right.  In Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. 
Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit 
court of appeals has declared that stare decisis effects should 
establish a Rule 24(a)(2) impairment "infrequently" and "only 
when the putative intervenor's position so depends on facts 
specific to the case at hand that participation as amicus curiae 
is inadequate to convey essential arguments to the tribunal."  
Other federal courts consider the effect of stare decisis on a 
case-by-case basis.69  
¶79 We approach the third requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(1), namely, that the disposition of Helgeland's action 
may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the municipalities' 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 
(9th Cir. 1988) ("[A] stare decisis effect is an important 
consideration in determining the extent to which an applicant's 
interest may be impaired.").   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
39 
 
ability to protect interests that may be related to the subject 
of Helgeland's action, as we approach intervention as of right 
generally.  We take a pragmatic approach and focus on the facts 
of each case and the policies underlying the intervention 
statute.70  Although we examine the inability of a movant to 
protect its interests separately, it is part and parcel of 
analyzing the interest involved and determining whether an 
existing party adequately represents the movant's interest.    
¶80 Two factors might be considered as weighing for or 
against a movant's claim that the effect of stare decisis may as 
a practical matter impair the movant's ability to protect a 
claimed interest.  First, a court considers the extent to which 
an adverse holding in the action would apply to the movant's 
particular circumstances.  The movant's ability to meet the 
impairment requirement is weakened to the extent that any future 
action 
against 
the 
movant 
is 
likely 
to 
be 
factually 
                                                 
70 See 6 Moore, supra note 24, § 24.03[3][a], at 24-42 ("The 
practical impairment test is flexible, and its application 
depends on a pragmatic analysis of the circumstances of a given 
case . . . .").  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
40 
 
distinguishable from the action into which the movant seeks to 
intervene.71   
¶81 Second, a court considers the extent to which the 
action into which the movant seeks to intervene will result in a 
novel holding of law.  The effect of stare decisis is more 
significant 
when 
a 
court 
decides 
a 
question 
of 
first 
impression.72  Consideration of these two factors may aid a court 
in determining whether the impact of stare decisis may harm the 
movant as a practical matter. 
¶82 DETF concedes that if judgment is entered in favor of 
Helgeland, "by operation of stare decisis, other government 
employers, such as the municipalities, would likely either have 
to provide for same-sex domestic partner coverage . . . or would 
have to forego providing family health insurance coverage to its 
[sic] 
employees 
entirely . . . ."73 
 
In 
oral 
arguments, 
                                                 
71 See 6 Moore, supra note 24, § 24.03[3][b], at 24-42.2 
("Recurring common law actions such as breach of contract and 
negligence are unlikely to achieve the practical stare decisis 
impairment necessary to satisfy Rule 24(a)."); Worlds v. Dep't 
of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 929 F.2d 591, 594 (11th Cir. 
1991) (concluding that there was "little likelihood that stare 
decisis would leave [the potential intervenor] in a worse 
position if he [were] not allowed to intervene" because the 
potential intervenor would have use of factual evidence in the 
future action he contemplated that was excluded from the action 
into which he sought to intervene).   
72 See 6 Moore, supra note 24, § 24.03[3[b], at 24-42.2 
("Stare decisis is not a relevant concern if the case does not 
involve the resolution of new legal issues."); Int'l Paper Co. 
v. Town of Jay, 887 F.2d 338, 344 (1st Cir. 1989) (recognizing 
that the adverse impact of stare decisis is especially important 
"where a court is deciding questions of first impression").   
73 Def.-Respt.'s Br. 9. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
41 
 
Helgeland's counsel also conceded that the municipalities' 
benefit plans would be indirectly affected if this court 
ultimately were to agree that the definition of "dependent" 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20) is unconstitutional for the 
reasons argued by Helgeland.   
¶83 We agree with the municipalities that a judgment in 
favor of Helgeland might present a novel holding of law.  
Helgeland does not appear to contend that any Wisconsin court 
has previously held that Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20), or any similar 
statute, contravenes the constitution for the reasons that 
Helgeland puts forth.74  
¶84 Without speculating about the precise relationship 
between Helgeland's present action and a hypothetical case that 
                                                 
74 In contrast, DETF argues that Helgeland's action presents 
a question of law already decided against Helgeland in Phillips 
v. 
Wisconsin 
Personnel 
Commission, 
167 
Wis. 2d 205, 
482 
N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1992).  DETF's brief quotes Phillips as 
follows:  
But whether to allow or disallow same sex-marriages——
or even whether to allow extension of state employee 
health insurance benefits to companions of unmarried 
state 
employees 
of 
whatever 
gender 
or 
sexual 
orientation——is a legislative decision, not one for 
the 
courts. . . . "Creation" 
of 
verification 
and 
registration 
systems 
designed 
to 
facilitate 
the 
extension of state employee benefits to the employees' 
unmarried companions——and an enforcement mechanism to 
ensure that only stable and committed same-sex couples 
are eligible for such benefits——is precisely the type 
of action committed to the legislature, as the 
policymaking branch of government.  It is beyond all 
powers of this or any other court. 
Def.-Respt.'s Br. 19 n.6. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
42 
 
one of the municipalities' employees might bring against the 
municipalities, we acknowledge that judgment in favor of 
Helgeland might expose the municipalities to the adverse effect 
of stare decisis.  However, just as the municipalities claim 
only a generalized interest in the subject matter of the present 
action, an effect of a judgment in favor of Helgeland on the 
municipalities is essentially the same effect that any employer 
might claim when an action before the court threatens to 
increase costs that the employer is obligated to pay on behalf 
of its employees, or that municipalities or other entities or 
individuals could claim in nearly any action challenging the 
constitutionality of a state statute.  If stare decisis were 
enough of a justification for the municipalities' intervention 
in the present case without an unusually strong showing with 
respect to other requirements for intervention as of right, then 
constitutional litigation would, as Justice Butler's concurrence 
demonstrates, become unwieldy with parties intervening as a 
matter of right.  As with the interest requirement, the 
municipalities' showing with respect to this third requirement 
is weak at best. 
 
D. The Municipalities Are Adequately Represented by DETF and the 
Attorney General in the Action 
¶85 We turn finally to the fourth requirement of Wis. 
Stat. § 809.03(9), namely, that the existing parties do not 
adequately 
represent 
the 
movants' 
interests. 
 
As 
the 
municipalities' brief recognizes, the adequate representation 
requirement has generated a spectrum of approaches.  The court 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
43 
 
has declared that "the showing required for proving inadequate 
representation 
'should 
be 
treated 
as 
minimal.'"75 
 
The 
requirement, however, "cannot be treated as so minimal as to 
write the requirement completely out of the rule."76  
¶86 Indeed, this requirement is blended and balanced with 
the other requirements.  If a movant's interest is identical to 
that of one of the parties, or if a party is charged by law with 
representing the movant's interest, a compelling showing should 
be required to demonstrate that the representation is not 
adequate.77  When the potential intervenor's interests are 
substantially similar to interests already represented by an 
existing party, such similarity will weigh against the potential 
intervenor.78 
                                                 
75 Armada Broad., 183 Wis. 2d at 476 (quoting Trbovich v. 
United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)).   
76 Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984).  See 
also Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2006) 
("Although 
the 
burden 
of 
establishing 
inadequacy 
of 
representation may be minimal, the requirement is not without 
teeth . . . .").    
77 7C Wright et al., supra note 22, § 1908, at 394-95 (in 
contrast, if the movant's interest is similar to a party's a 
discriminating judgment is required on the circumstances of the 
particular case). 
78 See 7C Wright et al., supra note 22, § 1909, at 394 
("[I]f the absentee's interest is identical to that of one of 
the present parties, or if there is a party charged by law with 
representing the absentee's interest, then a compelling showing 
should be required to demonstrate why this representation is not 
adequate.") (footnote omitted). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
44 
 
¶87 In determining whether an existing party adequately 
represents a movant's interest, we look to see if there is a 
showing of collusion between the representative and the opposing 
party; if the representative fails in the fulfillment of his 
duty; or if the representative's interest is adverse to that of 
the proposed intervenor.79  
¶88 The municipalities do not allege any collusion between 
Helgeland and DETF.  They do not demonstrate that the DETF's 
interest is adverse to theirs; and do not show that the DETF has 
failed in the fulfillment of its duty.  
¶89 In considering whether DETF adequately represents the 
municipalities, two rebuttable presumptions come into play and 
work against the municipalities in the instant case.   
¶90 First, adequate representation is ordinarily presumed 
when a movant and an existing party have the same ultimate 
                                                 
79 See 
Armada 
Broad., 
183 
Wis. 2d 
at 
476 
(citations 
omitted).  See also Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee v. DNR, 104 
Wis. 2d 182, 189, 311 N.W.2d 677 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing United 
States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 
1972)) ("Ordinarily a party's representation is deemed adequate 
to protect the proposed intervenor's interest if there is no 
showing of collusion between the representative and the opposing 
party; if the representative does not represent an interest 
adverse to that of the movant; and if the representative does 
not fail in the fulfillment of its duty.").  
See Wolff, 229 Wis. 2d at 748 (movant's interests "need not 
be 
wholly 
adverse" 
to 
existing 
parties'; 
significant 
"differences" between movant's position and that of existing 
party sufficient).   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
45 
 
objective in the action.80  This presumption applies in the 
instant case because the municipalities claim no objective that 
DETF does not also share.  Both DETF and the municipalities ask 
the court to uphold the constitutionality of DETF's plans and of 
Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20).   
¶91 Second, 
"when 
the 
putative 
representative 
is 
a 
governmental body or officer charged by law with representing 
the interests of the absentee, a presumption of adequate 
representation arises whether the would-be intervenor is a 
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 
2006) ("When an applicant for intervention and an existing party 
have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of 
representation arises.") (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 
1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 
186 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[A]pplicants have not overcome the 
presumption of adequacy of representation that arises when the 
proposed intervenor and a party to the suit (especially if it is 
the state) have the same ultimate objective.") (citation 
omitted); Daggett, 172 F.3d at 111 ("[A]dequate representation 
is presumed where the goals of the applicants are the same as 
those 
of 
the 
plaintiff 
or 
defendant . . . .") 
(citations 
omitted).  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
46 
 
citizen or subdivision of the governmental entity."81  This 
presumption applies in the present case because, as we will 
discuss below, both DETF and the Department of Justice are 
charged by law with the duty to defend the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20), the very position advocated by the 
municipalities, the would-be intervenor. 
¶92 In support of their position that the DETF does not 
adequately 
represent 
the 
municipalities' 
interests, 
the 
municipalities argue (1) that former Attorney General Peggy 
Lautenschlager was not adequately committed to DETF's position 
in the present case; (2) that institutional features render DETF 
unable to defend against Helgeland's action with the same 
vehemence that the municipalities could provide; (3) that DETF 
cannot adequately represent the municipalities' interests in any 
                                                 
81 Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 
1996) (citation omitted).  See also Curry v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen a 
government entity is a party and the case concerns a matter of 
sovereign interest, the government is presumed adequately to 
represent 
the 
interests 
of 
the 
public . . . ." 
(citation 
omitted); Wade, 673 F.2d at 186 ("[A]pplicants have not overcome 
the presumption of adequacy of representation that arises when 
the proposed intervenor and a party to the suit (especially if 
it is the state) have the same ultimate objective.") (citation 
omitted); Prete, 438 F.3d at 956 (There is "an assumption of 
adequacy 
when 
the 
government is acting on behalf of a 
constituency that it represents.  In the absence of a very 
compelling showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that a 
state adequately represents its citizens when the applicant 
shares the same interest.") (quotation marks and citation 
omitted); Daggett, 172 F.3d at 111 ("[T]he government in 
defending the validity of the statute is presumed to be 
representing adequately the interests of all citizens who 
support the statute.") (citation omitted). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
47 
 
remedy phase that might later occur; (4) that DETF has failed to 
raise defenses against Helgeland that the municipalities wish to 
raise; and (5) that DETF cannot adequately represent the 
municipalities' interests given that DETF argues that the 
municipalities do not meet the interest requirement of the test 
for intervention as of right.  None of these arguments yields 
any showing that DETF does not adequately represent the 
municipalities' interests.   
¶93 With regard to the municipalities' argument concerning 
former 
Attorney 
General 
Peggy 
Lautenschlager's 
alleged 
"conflicted loyalties," the municipalities make the following 
allegations: (1) Lautenschlager's spokesperson criticized the 
legislature 
for 
attempting 
to 
intervene 
in 
this 
action, 
asserting that the dispute between Helgeland and DETF was "a 
matter best left up to the courts"; (2) During an October 25, 
2002, debate between attorney general candidates, Lautenschlager 
made statements in support of civil unions for same-sex domestic 
couples; (3) Lautenschlager spoke at a 2005 Madison Gay Pride 
Rally at which two of Helgeland's co-plaintiffs and Helgeland's 
attorney also spoke; and (4) Lautenschlager made the "reckless" 
decision to move for judgment on the pleadings. 
¶94 We spend little time on these allegations relating to 
Attorney General Lautenschlager's out-of-court statements.  The 
allegations relating to the Attorney General's statements go 
solely to the question of Lautenschlager's personal beliefs, not 
to her official conduct as attorney general.  We generally agree 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
48 
 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
analysis 
relating 
to 
these 
statements.82   
¶95 In the absence of any showing to the contrary, we must 
presume that Lautenschlager has fulfilled her duty as attorney 
general to put aside her personal and political beliefs in 
defending 
against 
Helgeland's 
action 
attacking 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
statute.83 
 
An 
attorney 
general's 
statements of personal or political beliefs, without more, do 
not constitute a showing that the attorney general will violate 
the statutory duties of the office.  
¶96 The Attorney General of Wisconsin has the duty by 
statute to defend the constitutionality of state statutes.84  
Indeed, "Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) recognizes that it is the duty 
                                                 
82 See Helgeland, 296 Wis. 2d 880, ¶¶26-29.   
83 See White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 249 
(1957) ("Public officers are always presumed, in the absence of 
any showing to the contrary, to be ready and willing to perform 
their duty . . . .").  The municipalities object to the court of 
appeals' reliance on White House Milk, because at the time of 
White House Milk Wisconsin's right of intervention statute 
differed substantially from Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  However, 
like the court of appeals, we do not rely on White House Milk in 
construing Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  The presumption that public 
officers will perform their duties does not depend upon Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(1) or any former statute governing intervention 
as of right. 
84 State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶23 n.14, 232 
Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 ("[O]nce legislation is enacted it 
becomes the affirmative duty of the Attorney General to defend 
its constitutionality.") (citation omitted).  For a general 
discussion of the office of Wisconsin Attorney General, see 
Arlen C. Christenson, The State Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L. 
Rev. 298 (1970).   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
49 
 
of the attorney general to appear on behalf of the people of 
this state to show why [a] statute is constitutional,"85 making 
service on the attorney general a jurisdictional matter in a 
declaratory 
action 
attacking 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
statute.86   
¶97 The 
municipalities' 
complaints 
against 
Attorney 
General Lautenschlager are, in any event, irrelevant now that 
she has completed her term as attorney general.  The Department 
of Justice is continuing the present action under the new 
attorney general on the course previously undertaken.  The 
municipalities do not claim that the present attorney general is 
biased or is prevented in any manner from changing the trial 
strategy of the Department of Justice in the present case.87  
                                                 
85 City of Oak Creek, 232 Wis. 2d 612, ¶35 (citation 
omitted). 
86 See Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) (providing that "[i]f a 
statute, 
ordinance 
or 
franchise 
is 
alleged 
to 
be 
unconstitutional, the attorney general shall . . . be served 
with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard").  
See Seitzinger v. Cmty. Health Network, 2004 WI 28, ¶1 n.3, 
270 Wis. 2d 1, 676 N.W.2d 426 (holding that the court had no 
jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of a state statute 
when the attorney general had not been given notice as required 
by Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11)). 
87 Whether the municipalities had a right of intervention at 
some point in the past is not determinative.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 803.06(1) provides that "[p]arties may be dropped or added by 
order of the court on motion of any party or on its own 
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are 
just. . . ."  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
50 
 
¶98 For 
these 
reasons, 
the 
allegations 
relating 
to 
Attorney General Lautenschlager provide no support to the 
municipalities' argument.   
¶99 The municipalities apparently intend their fourth 
allegation 
concerning 
DETF's 
motion 
for 
judgment 
on 
the 
pleadings as evidence that Attorney General Lautenschlager was 
reckless in handling the present case and in some sense betrayed 
her official responsibilities.  This argument goes nowhere. 
¶100 The municipalities accuse Lautenschlager of risking 
that the action will reach "this court for decision on the 
merits without an evidentiary record to support deferential 
review."88   
¶101 The municipalities apparently are concerned that the 
present action will reach this court "without an evidentiary 
record to sustain the legislature's" decision to grant state 
employee benefits to spouses but not to same-sex domestic 
partners.89  To avoid this result, the municipalities want DETF 
to move to compel discovery at the circuit court.  This position 
puts the municipalities squarely in agreement with, of all 
                                                                                                                                                             
The municipalities suggest that Lautenschlager's conduct is 
still relevant to our Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) inquiry given that 
the court of appeals did not address this question of relevance 
despite receiving notice that Lautenschlager was defeated in a 
primary election 10 days before the court of appeals released 
its opinion.  This court determines a movant's right to 
intervention independently of the court of appeals.  
88 Petr.'s Br. 59. 
89 Petr.'s Br. 60. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
51 
 
people, Helgeland.  Helgeland moved the circuit court to compel 
discovery shortly after the municipalities moved to intervene. 
¶102 The municipalities do not explain why they think that 
the circuit court will grant DETF's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and why the circuit court will not grant Helgeland's 
motion for discovery. 
¶103 Curiously, the municipalities do not object to DETF's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that it is a 
weak motion destined to be denied.  To the contrary, the 
municipalities 
explicitly 
acknowledge 
concerns 
that 
DETF's 
motion will be granted.90  In their brief, the municipalities 
predict, without explanation, that the circuit court will grant 
DETF's motion and that the court of appeals will then affirm the 
circuit court's decision granting judgment to DETF.91 
¶104 The municipalities' very unusual claim is thus that 
Lautenschlager somehow failed in her duties as attorney general 
by setting DETF on a course to defeat Helgeland before the 
circuit court and court of appeals. 
¶105 The municipalities concede that should DETF prevail in 
the circuit court and court of appeals on its motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, this court nevertheless could remand 
for development of an evidentiary record if we determine, 
contrary to the circuit court and court of appeals, that DETF's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings should not have been 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Id.     
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
52 
 
granted.92  Yet the possibility of such a remand leaves the 
municipalities dissatisfied——not with the outcome, but rather, 
they claim, with the "extraordinary waste of time and resources" 
that would result if the action were to proceed to this court 
and then back to the circuit court whence it came.   
¶106 The 
municipalities' criticism is baseless.  The 
municipalities cannot persuasively argue that the Attorney 
General 
is 
abdicating 
her 
or 
his 
duty 
to 
defend 
the 
constitutionality of statutes by persuading two courts that a 
statute is constitutional.  By moving for judgment on the 
pleadings, DETF has not waived its right to move for discovery 
in the event that its motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
ultimately denied.   
¶107 We now move to the municipalities' argument that 
institutional elements prevent DETF from opposing Helgeland's 
action with sufficient vehemence.  The municipalities argue that 
DETF merely administers the law that Helgeland challenges, while 
in contrast the municipalities establish and provide funding for 
their own employee benefit policies.  The municipalities 
additionally allege that DETF is subject to the pressures of a 
"diverse" constituency, some portion of which may sympathize 
with Helgeland's position in the present action.93   
                                                 
92 Id. at 60-61. 
93 Is it not possible that the municipalities too may have 
diverse constituencies, some portion of which may sympathize 
with Helgeland's position in the present action?   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
53 
 
¶108 These arguments founder on much the same ground as the 
municipalities' attack on Attorney General Lautenschlager.  In a 
declaratory action to determine the constitutionality of a 
statute, it is the duty of the "public officers charged with the 
enforcement of the challenged statute or ordinance . . . [to] 
act in a representative capacity in behalf of all persons having 
an interest in upholding the validity of the statute or 
ordinance under attack."94  Moreover, DETF's counsel, the 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
is 
charged 
by 
statute 
with 
the 
responsibility to "appear for the state and prosecute or defend 
all actions . . . in which the state is interested or a 
party . . . ."95  The obligation of both the Department of 
Justice and public officers charged with the enforcement of 
state statutes is clear: they must defend the statute regardless 
of whether they have diverse constituencies with diverse views.  
DETF 
and 
the 
Department 
of 
Justice 
are 
composed 
of 
professionals, and absent some showing to the contrary, we 
presume that they will fulfill their duties under the law.96   
¶109 The 
municipalities 
next 
argue 
that 
DETF 
cannot 
adequately represent the municipalities in any potential remedy 
phase of the action because DETF is incapable of advising the 
court on issues such as "collective bargaining agreements, duly 
adopted budgets, revenue limitations, [and] vested employee 
                                                 
94 White House Milk, 275 Wis. at 249. 
95 Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1).   
96 See White House Milk, 275 Wis. at 249. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
54 
 
rights . . . ."97  Even assuming that DETF is in fact incapable 
of grappling with issues such as these, this argument fails 
because the municipalities do not explain how information about 
these issues may assist in deciding the constitutional issue 
involved in the Helgeland action or in crafting any remedy to 
which Helgeland might be entitled.   
¶110 The municipalities merely state in conclusory fashion 
that the issues in which the municipalities claim expertise are 
relevant to the state constitutional question presented, that 
is, whether the state constitution requires DETF to provide the 
same benefits to employees' same-sex domestic partners as 
provided to employees' spouses.  The municipalities cannot call 
the adequacy of DETF's representation into question merely by 
vaguely positing that information they possess will somehow be 
useful to the court.  Statutory revenue and levy limits imposed 
upon municipalities do not necessarily implicate a different 
evidentiary record for constitutional law purposes than the 
record that the state makes on the constitutional issue.  The 
municipalities do not explain what this "different" evidentiary 
record might look like and why information the municipalities 
wish to present may be relevant to the question whether the 
state constitution requires DETF to provide the same benefits to 
state employees' same-sex domestic partners as those provided to 
employees' spouses.   
                                                 
97 Petr.'s Br. 57-58.   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
55 
 
¶111 We turn next to the municipalities' argument regarding 
DETF's failure to raise a long list of defenses favored by the 
municipalities.  This assertion amounts to little more than a 
difference over trial strategy.  We cannot declare as a matter 
of law that DETF's defense against Helgeland's action is 
inadequate simply because the municipalities disagree with DETF 
about which defenses should be presented before the circuit 
court.  Reasonable lawyers and litigants often disagree about 
trial strategy.   
¶112 We 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
mere 
disagreements over trial strategy such as the one apparent here 
are not sufficient to demonstrate inadequacy of representation.98  
Moreover, the municipalities do not show any weakness in the 
legal position DETF has taken in the case.  As we have already 
explained, the municipalities flatly predict that both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals will be persuaded by 
DETF's motion for judgment on the pleadings.   
                                                 
98 See 7C Wright et al., supra note 22, § 1909, at 431-33 (a 
mere difference of opinion concerning litigation tactics or 
dislike of the representative party's lawyer do not constitute 
inadequate representation); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 
912, 919 (8th Cir. 1962), quoted in Helgeland, 296 Wis. 2d 880, 
¶33 ("Mere difference of opinion among attorneys is not of 
itself inadequate representation within the meaning of [Rule 24 
of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]. If it were, 
intervention 
of 
right 
would 
become 
almost 
automatic.");  
Daggett, 172 F.3d at 112 ("[T]he use of different arguments as a 
matter of litigation judgment is not inadequate representation 
per se," though "one can imagine cases where . . . a refusal to 
present obvious arguments could be so extreme as to justify a 
finding 
that 
representation 
by 
the 
existing 
party 
was 
inadequate."). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
56 
 
¶113 The municipalities may supplement DETF's defenses 
simply by accepting the circuit court's invitation to file an 
amicus curiae brief.  
¶114 Finally, we reject the municipalities' argument that 
because DETF asserts that the municipalities' interests do not 
support intervention as of right, DETF's representation of the 
municipalities' interests is, as the municipalities' counsel put 
it at oral arguments, inadequate "per se."  DETF's position that 
it adequately represents the municipalities' interests is wholly 
consistent with its additional position that the municipalities' 
interests do not satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(1).  DETF's construal of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) does 
not amount to a denial that the municipalities have no interests 
that DETF might represent.  
E. Summary 
¶115 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err in denying the municipalities' motion 
to intervene as a matter of right under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  
Although it is arguable that the municipalities may claim a 
financial interest related to the DETF plans that are the 
subject of Helgeland's action and that disposition of the 
Helgeland action may, under the effect of stare decisis, as a 
practical matter impair or impede their ability to protect their 
stated interests, the municipalities make no showing that the 
financial interest is sufficient, direct, immediate, or special 
and that DETF inadequately represents their interests, much less 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
57 
 
a showing that could overcome the presumptions of adequacy 
applicable in this case.   
¶116 The court weighs all the factors, including the nature 
of the municipalities' alleged interests, against the adequacy 
of representation by existing parties.  Municipalities (or other 
entities or persons) will always have something at stake when 
the constitutionality of a statute affecting municipalities (or 
other entities or persons) is at issue, and there will always be 
potential movants that disagree at some level with decisions 
made by state agency defendants or their counsel.  The 
municipalities have shown no special, personal, or unique 
interest in the present case.  Were the municipalities granted a 
right to intervene upon such grounds, virtually any declaratory 
action for constitutional review of a statute would present a 
case in which at least some persons or entities may intervene as 
of right, as Justice Butler's concurrence demonstrates.  To 
construe Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) and intervention as of right so 
broadly would unduly hamper the rights of parties to a 
declaratory action such as the present case to conduct and 
conclude their own lawsuit.99   
                                                 
99 Cf. Town of Blooming Grove v. City of Madison, 275 Wis. 
328, 334, 81 N.W.2d 713 (1957) (citation omitted) (refusing to 
construe Wisconsin's Declaratory Judgment Act "as requiring that 
where a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a statute or 
ordinance is sought, every person whose interests are affected 
by the statute or ordinance must be made a party to the action.  
If it were so construed, the valuable remedy of declaratory 
judgment 
would 
be 
rendered 
impractical 
and 
indeed 
often 
worthless 
for 
determining 
the 
validity 
of 
legislative 
enactments, either state or local, since such enactments 
commonly affect the interests of large numbers of people.").   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
58 
 
¶117 The 
municipalities' 
generalized 
interest 
in 
the 
constitutionality of distinguishing between a spouse and a same-
sex domestic partner requires a greater showing of inadequate 
representation by DETF.  The municipalities do not demonstrate 
that their generalized interest is adverse to, or more powerful 
than, DETF's interest.100  The municipalities further do not show 
that DETF has inadequately worked to realize the municipalities' 
and DETF's mutually-shared objective in the action, namely to 
defeat Helgeland's lawsuit.  They do not allege collusion 
between the parties.  They fail to demonstrate that DETF or its 
counsel has in any way failed in its duty to defend the action. 
¶118 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
municipalities have no right of intervention under Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(1). 
 
III. The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Denying Permissive 
Intervention 
¶119 We turn now to the question whether the circuit court 
erred in denying the municipalities' motion for permissive 
intervention.  Wisconsin Stat. § 803.09(2) provides in relevant 
part: 
Upon 
timely 
motion 
anyone 
may 
be 
permitted 
to 
intervene in an action when a movant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or 
                                                 
100 
Cf. 
Armada 
Broad., 
183 
Wis. 2d at 
476 
(movant's 
"personal" interest in the particular document at issue in the 
action unshared by party defendant, which had only a general 
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its personnel 
files); Wolff, 229 Wis. 2d at 746 (movant town "may have more at 
stake than" defendant county due to movant town's statutory 
duties not shared by defendant county). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
59 
 
fact in common. . . .  In exercising its discretion 
the court shall consider whether the intervention will 
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the 
rights of the original parties. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 803.09(2) is based on Rule 24(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.101   
¶120 As the text of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2) itself makes 
clear, the circuit court has discretion to decide whether a 
movant may be permitted to intervene when the movant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in 
common.102  This court will not disturb a circuit court's 
discretionary decision so long as the record reflects "the 
circuit court's reasoned application of the appropriate legal 
standard to the relevant facts in the case."103 
¶121 The municipalities assert that the circuit court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
by 
denying 
the 
municipalities' motion for permissive intervention on the sole 
ground that the municipalities' suggestion that the action be 
converted into a class action indicated that the municipalities 
were likely to unduly delay adjudication of Helgeland's and 
DETF's rights.   
¶122 The municipalities provide three arguments in support 
of their position that the circuit court erred in relying upon 
this single concern in denying the municipalities' motion: (1) 
                                                 
101 See Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 2d at 186. 
102 See City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 n.11.   
103 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 
(1999). 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
60 
 
The 
municipalities 
did 
not 
raise 
the 
issue 
of 
class 
certification in the context of their argument for permissive 
intervention under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2) but instead suggested 
class 
certification 
as 
an 
alternative 
to 
joining 
all 
municipalities in the state under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11); (2) 
The circuit court had power to prevent undue delay by denying 
any motion the municipalities would have brought for class 
certification; and (3) The municipalities are willing to 
withdraw their suggestion of class certification.  
¶123 The municipalities' arguments are unpersuasive.  The 
circuit 
court 
was 
free 
to 
consider 
the 
municipalities' 
suggestion of class certification regardless of whether the 
municipalities made this suggestion specifically in the context 
of discussing permissive intervention.  The circuit court's 
concern about delay was also reasonable despite its authority to 
deny any motion for class certification.  Indeed, consideration 
of a motion for class certification could itself substantially 
delay the action.   
¶124 That the municipalities are now willing to withdraw 
their suggestion also has no bearing upon whether the circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
considering 
the 
suggestion 
before 
the 
municipalities made known their willingness to withdraw it. 
¶125 Finally, though the circuit court addressed only the 
municipalities' 
suggestion 
of 
class 
certification, 
the 
municipalities' opposition to DETF's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and their desire to introduce evidence supports the 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
61 
 
circuit court's conclusion that the municipalities' intervention 
would unduly delay adjudication of the parties' lawsuit. 
¶126 The circuit court based its decision whether to grant 
permissive intervention on reasonable consideration of delay, a 
factor explicitly specified in Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2).  Thus, no 
grounds exist on which to hold that the circuit court failed to 
apply the appropriate legal standard in a reasoned manner to the 
relevant facts of the case.   
¶127 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
in 
denying 
the 
municipalities' motion for permissive intervention under Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(2).   
IV. Joinder Is Not Required 
¶128 We turn lastly to the municipalities' argument that 
the circuit court erred in refusing to join the municipalities 
sua sponte under either Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. or Wis. 
Stat. § 806.04(11).  This issue requires us to apply Wis. Stat. 
§§ 803.03(1)(b)1. and 806.04(11) to the undisputed facts of this 
case.  As such, the issue presents a question of law that this 
court determines independently of the circuit court and court of 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
62 
 
appeals, 
benefiting 
from 
the 
analyses 
provided 
by 
these 
courts.104 
A. Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. 
¶129 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.03(1) provides in full: 
A person who is subject to service of process shall be 
joined as a party in the action if: 
 (a) In the person's absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties; or 
 (b) The person claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in the person's absence may: 
  1. As a practical matter impair or impede the 
person's ability to protect that interest; or 
  2. Leave any of the persons already parties subject 
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his or 
her claimed interest. 
This provision is based on Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.105   
                                                 
104 Fire Ins. Exch. v. Basten, 202 Wis. 2d 74, 81-82, 549 
N.W.2d 690 (1996) (application of Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) to a 
set of undisputed facts presents a question of law); Glaeske v. 
Shaw, 2003 WI App 71, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 549, 661 N.W.2d 420 
("Whether a party is a necessary party [under Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)] is a question of law" the court of appeals decides 
de novo) (citing Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 
2002 WI App 259, ¶10, 258 Wis. 2d 210, 655 N.W.2d 474).  
105 In its current form, Rule 19(a) provides in relevant 
part as follows:  
(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible. 
(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to 
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be 
joined as a party if: 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
63 
 
¶130 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. contains language 
essentially identical to the second and third requirements of 
intervention as of right under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), namely 
the requirements that the movant claim an interest sufficiently 
related to the subject of the action and that disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's 
ability 
to 
protect 
that 
interest. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1. does not list the first and fourth requirements 
of intervention as of right under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), namely 
timeliness of the motion and inadequacy of representation by the 
existing parties. 
¶131 Nevertheless, the court of appeals declared in the 
present case that 
[t]he inquiry of whether a movant is a necessary party 
under § 803.03(1)(b)1. is in all significant respects 
the same inquiry under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) as to 
whether a movant is entitled to intervene in an action 
as a matter of right, including the factor of whether 
                                                                                                                                                             
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot 
accord complete relief among existing parties, or  
(B) that person claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action and is so situated that 
disposing of the action in the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 
person's ability to protect the interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, 
or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of 
the interest.  
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
64 
 
the interest of a movant is adequately represented by 
existing parties.106   
In so holding, the court of appeals relied on its own precedent 
interpreting City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission, 2000 WI 39, ¶11 n.8, 234 Wis. 2d 550, 610 N.W.2d 
94.107 
 
In 
City 
of 
Madison 
the 
court 
declared 
that 
"[i]ntervention as a matter of right may . . . be compared to 
'joinder of persons needed for just and complete adjudication' 
under Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1."108 
¶132 The municipalities object to the court of appeals' 
interpretation on grounds that it ignores the textual difference 
between the two provisions.  They argue that we should interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. to impose only the second and third 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) and not the requirement 
of inadequate representation.   
¶133 We agree with the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals 
advanced 
an 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1. that is substantially supported by federal 
court decisions construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a), the federal 
analogue to Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1.  Furthermore, by 
applying our ordinary principles of statutory construction, we 
                                                 
106 Helgeland, 
296 
Wis. 2d 880, 
¶46 
(citing 
Dairyland 
Greyhound Park, 258 Wis. 2d 210, ¶10). 
107 See Dairyland Greyhound Park, 258 Wis. 2d 210, ¶10 
(citing City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 n.6).   
108 City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11 n.8. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
65 
 
independently 
determine 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. is correct. 
¶134 "Despite the distinction in the language" of Rules 
19(a) and 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "some 
courts have held that joinder will not be compelled under the 
'impair or impede' provision of Rule 19(a) if the absentee's 
interest is adequately represented by an existing party."109  The 
reasoning behind this interpretation appears to be that "[a]s a 
practical matter, an absent party's ability to protect its 
interest will not be impaired by its absence from the suit where 
its interest will be adequately represented by existing parties 
to the suit."110  The court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. is in line with this view of Federal Rule 
19(a). 
¶135 More importantly, this interpretation is also dictated 
by recognized principles of statutory interpretation.  In 
construing any provision we begin with its text and give 
                                                 
109 4 Moore, supra note 24, § 19.03[3][f][ii], at 19-56.  
See also, e.g., Ohio Valley Envt'l Coalition v. Bulen, 429 F.3d 
493, 504-05 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's holding 
"that joinder was not required because the parties are capable 
of representing the interests of" absent parties); Gwartz v. 
Jefferson Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 23 F.3d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(disposition of action "will not as a practical matter impair or 
impede [absentee's] ability to protect its interest because [one 
party to the action] has the same interest establishing the 
facts that [absentee] does"). 
110 Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that absentee tribes were not necessary parties to an 
action challenging fishing regulations because the United States 
adequately represented their interests).   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
66 
 
appropriate consideration to related provisions.  We give effect 
to every word so as to not render any part of the statute 
superfluous. 
¶136 The 
municipalities' 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1. cannot be correct because it would render Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(1)(b)1. superfluous.  Under the municipalities' 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1., a movant who 
fails to meet the fourth requirement of intervention as of right 
under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) may simply turn around and force 
its way into the action by arguing that the court must join the 
movant, sua sponte, as a necessary party under Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1.  The municipalities would thus have this court 
read Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1. in a manner rendering the 
fourth requirement of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) entirely optional.  
This 
interpretation 
undermines 
both 
§ 803.09(1) 
and 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1. 
¶137 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not 
err 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law 
in 
refusing 
to 
join 
the 
municipalities 
as 
necessary 
parties 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1.  If a person has no right of intervention under 
Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), the courts have no duty to join that 
person sua sponte as a necessary party under Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1. 
B. Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) 
¶138 The relevant portion of Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11), a 
subsection of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, states that 
"[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
67 
 
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected 
by the declaration, and no declaration may prejudice the right 
of persons not parties to the proceeding. . . . "   
¶139 The 
municipalities assert that they qualify for 
joinder 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.04(11) 
because 
the 
same 
"substantial 
legal, 
contractual, 
economic 
and 
policy 
interests"111 that 
the municipalities propose as interests 
warranting a right of intervention will be affected by judgment 
in Helgeland's declaratory action.  We disagree with the 
municipalities. 
¶140 This 
court 
has 
determined 
that 
the 
Declaratory 
Judgment Act does not require "the joinder as parties, in a 
declaratory action to determine the validity of a statute or 
ordinance, of any persons other than the public officers charged 
with the enforcement of the challenged statute or ordinance."112  
We have not construed Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) to require "that 
where a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a statute or 
ordinance is sought, every person whose interests are affected 
                                                 
111 Petr.'s Br. 70.   
112 White House Milk, 275 Wis. at 249.  See also North Side 
Bank v. Gentile, 129 Wis. 2d 208, 215, 385 N.W.2d 133 (1986) 
(citation omitted) (Declaratory Judgment Act "should not be 
construed to require that all interested parties must be joined 
in a declaratory judgment action seeking to adjudge the validity 
of a statute."); Bence v. Milwaukee, 84 Wis. 2d 224, 234-35, 267 
N.W.2d 25 (1978) (citing this court's assertion in White House 
Milk that it "was sufficient where a public law was involved to 
have the interest of other parties represented by the public 
officer who has the duty of upholding the constitutionality of 
the statute.").   
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
68 
 
by the statute or ordinance must be made a party to the 
action."113  If the statute "were so construed, the valuable 
remedy of declaratory judgment would be rendered impractical and 
indeed 
often 
worthless 
for 
determining 
the 
validity 
of 
legislative enactments, either state or local, since such 
enactments commonly affect the interests of large numbers of 
people."114 
¶141 Applying this court's established interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) to the instant case,115 we determine that 
this subsection does not require joinder of the municipalities.  
The municipalities are not "public officers charged with the 
enforcement of" Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20), the statute that 
Helgeland challenges.116 
¶142 The municipalities mistakenly adduce cases in support 
of the position that in a declaratory action to determine rights 
                                                 
113 Blooming Grove, 275 Wis. at 334.   
114 Id. (citation omitted).  See also North Side Bank, 129 
Wis. 2d at 215 ("Strict application of [Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) 
to require that all interested parties must be joined in a 
declaratory judgment action] would make the statute unworkable 
with respect to determining the validity of a statute or 
ordinance.") (citation omitted). 
115 Besides citing a single foreign state opinion holding 
that a declaratory action to review the constitutionality of a 
statute could not proceed without joinder of 16 highway 
construction firms whose contracts with the state depended for 
their validity upon the challenged statute, Haynes v. Anderson, 
77 N.W.2d 674 (Neb. 1956), the municipalities offer no reason 
that we should not interpret Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) as we have 
in our prior cases.   
116 See White House Milk, 275 Wis. at 249. 
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
69 
 
under an agreement, Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) requires joinder of 
all parties to the agreement.117  These cases are inapposite 
because Helgeland has not brought an action to declare her 
rights under any agreement, much less an agreement to which the 
municipalities are party.  Helgeland seeks a declaration of her 
rights under state statutes and the state constitution, not 
rights under the interpretation of a contract.  Helgeland is not 
a party to any contract asserted by the municipalities.     
¶143 For the reasons set forth, we determine that the 
circuit court did not err in refusing to join the municipalities 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11). 
* * * * 
¶144 We conclude (1) that the municipalities have no right 
of intervention under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1); (2) that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying the 
municipalities 
permissive 
intervention 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 803.09(2); and (3) that the circuit court did not err in 
refusing to join the municipalities under either Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1. or § 806.04(11).  Accordingly, we affirm the 
                                                 
117 In their brief, the municipalities rely on Lozoff v. 
Kaisershot, 11 Wis. 2d 485, 105 N.W.2d 783 (1960) (considering 
an action for declaration of rights under deed restrictions); 
Rudolph v. Indian Hills Estates, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 768, 229 
N.W.2d 671 (1975) (considering an action in which individual 
members of a corporation sought to dissolve the corporation by 
declaratory relief); and Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson, 384 
S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964) (considering an action to 
declare rights under various contracts).     
No. 
2005AP2540   
 
70 
 
decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's 
order denying intervention or joinder.   
¶145 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2005AP2540.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶146 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  Twelve 
individuals (including six current or former state employees) 
bring a legal action against the Wisconsin Department of 
Employee Trust Funds (DETF), DETF Secretary Eric Stanchfield, 
the Employee Trust Funds Board, and the Group Insurance Board 
(collectively "DETF").  DETF is ably represented by the 
Wisconsin Attorney General.  Yet simply because other entities 
who are not at all involved in this action are concerned that 
any decision rendered by a court of law might become binding 
precedent in some future legal action against them, the dissent 
asserts that as a matter of right, these uninvolved entities can 
essentially highjack this lawsuit from the parties and turn it 
into a political referendum unrelated to the action filed.  Give 
me a break. 
¶147 For purposes of this concurrence, the nature of the 
lawsuit and the issues presented are, for me, irrelevant.  What 
is relevant is the impact of what the dissent suggests should 
happen here.  Every published opinion of the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals or of this court is binding precedent on all future 
litigants as to the issues presented.  Thus, does every criminal 
defendant facing sentencing have a right to intervene in every 
appellate case involving sentencing?  They will be bound by the 
result.  What about parties to a contract?  Can they intervene 
in any appellate case involving contract law and/or the economic 
loss doctrine?  They certainly have an interest in the outcome.  
What about tort reform?  Can Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin 
No.  2005AP2540.lbb 
 
2 
 
(CTCW) and the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers (WATL)1 
intervene in every tort action brought on appeal?  The precedent 
the court will decide as to tort law will most certainly bind 
them.  And therein lies the absurdity of the dissent. 
¶148 Under 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case, 
the 
Wisconsin 
municipalities who have sought to intervene are definitely not 
the only outside entities that have an interest in the outcome 
of this case.  Are we prepared to allow every pro- and anti-gay 
rights group, nationally and within Wisconsin, intervention as a 
matter of right in this case?  What about every labor union that 
has members that might be affected by the outcome?  Political 
leaders, church groups, social activists, and others will be 
bound by any published decision an appellate court will make.  
Are we prepared to let them all in, effectively taking over the 
litigation and running up costs, or do we hear from the parties 
who brought the action in the first place? 
¶149 Let us keep in mind that the municipalities, and any 
other interested party, for that matter, can seek permission to 
file an amicus brief, putting forth their position.  Such 
requests 
are 
routinely 
granted. 
 
Thus, 
I 
suspect, 
the 
municipalities will not be precluded from being heard in this 
matter.  What the dissent suggests, however, will ultimately 
reduce the average citizen's access to the courts, in that large 
organizations with deep pockets will be allowed to intervene in 
any case in which they express an interest, driving up the costs 
                                                 
1 Now known as the Wisconsin Association for Justice (WAJ), 
as of January 14, 2008. 
No.  2005AP2540.lbb 
 
3 
 
to the point that the average Joe can no longer afford to be 
heard.  This is unacceptable. 
¶150 For the foregoing reasons, I join the majority 
opinion, and respectfully concur.  
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
1 
 
¶151 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This is an 
action 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 40.02(20), which defines the term "dependent" in Chapter 40 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes relating to the Public Employee Trust 
Fund.  It also challenges the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(3)(b)3., which defines the persons with a serious 
health condition for whom an employee may take family leave 
under Wis. Stat. § 103.10, Wisconsin's Family and Medical Leave 
Act. 
¶152 In their complaint, the plaintiffs describe themselves 
as six "lesbian couples in committed, intimate relationships."  
They set out a series of health-related hardships that they 
believe would be alleviated if they were able to obtain certain 
health care benefits from the state.  Although each couple 
includes a current or former state employee, none of these 
employees is eligible to obtain for her domestic partner family 
health benefits that are available to state employees who are 
married to an opposite-sex spouse.  In sum, the plaintiffs seek 
access to the same health insurance and family leave options 
that the state offers to employees in a traditional marriage. 
¶153 The plaintiffs' action is sweeping and significant.  
It is part of the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) 
National Lesbian and Gay Rights Project.  It presents a major 
civil rights issue that could affect every public employer that 
operates under the Public Employee Trust Fund and, potentially, 
every employer governed by Wisconsin's Family and Medical Leave 
Act. 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
2 
 
¶154 This phase of the action does not address the merits 
of the suit.  It is confined to the procedural question whether 
eight "municipalities"——two cities, two villages, two towns, and 
two school districts——may intervene in the suit as parties.  The 
majority denies the municipalities the right to intervene.  Its 
crimped legal analysis treats the municipalities' request as 
though the case involved nothing more than a routine zoning 
variance instead of one of the great social and political 
controversies of our time. 
¶155 The majority opinion brings to mind the lament of 
former United States Congressman and United States Court of 
Appeals Judge Abner Mikva about the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  In 1999 
Judge Mikva told an interviewer that he supported the result in 
Roe v. Wade but regretted that the Supreme Court had "preempted 
the whole political process," which he believed was moving 
legislatively toward greater abortion rights.  The Court's 
decision "pleased a lot of us," Mikva said, "[b]ut it angered 
[the] minority with a passion, because they had just been short-
circuited in their efforts to fight it out in the political 
arena."  Mikva continued: 
You can't write a justice of the Supreme Court and say 
"Vote No."  You can't even picket at the Supreme 
Court, though they tried to.  There is a frustration 
that these five or six people, unelected, had made 
this basic decision which had been the subject of 
political process for so many years before.  The 
justices were surprised.  The late justice Blackm[u]n 
expressed his shock at how angry the minority was with 
the decision.  I could have told him that was going to 
happen.  And in retrospect, I wish the [C]ourt had 
stayed its hand and allowed the political process to 
continue, because we would have legislated the effect 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
3 
 
of Roe v. Wade in most states——not all of them, but in 
most states——and we wouldn't have had to pay the 
political price we've had to pay for it being a court 
decision.  The people who are angry at that court are 
angry beyond measure.  As far as they are concerned, 
the whole system is rotten because they've lost their 
opportunity to slug it out.1 
 
¶156 Once again, this phase of the action does not address 
the merits of the suit.  However, the effect of the majority 
decision is to deprive eight representative municipalities of 
the opportunity to slug it out in the process leading to an 
ultimate decision.  As a result, they will have no real say 
about their future ability to determine whether to extend 
dependent health care benefits to same-sex couples, as some 
municipalities voluntarily have.  The decision to exclude the 
municipalities is not good for the Wisconsin judiciary, and it 
is not good law.  As a result, I must respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶157 The principal legal issue before the court is whether 
the municipalities satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(1) to intervene in this suit as a matter of right.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 803.09(1) reads as follows: 
 
Upon timely motion anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action when the movant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the action and the movant is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability 
                                                 
1 Interview by Harry Kreisler with Abner Jay Mikva, former 
United States Congressman, former United States Court of Appeals 
Judge for the D.C. Circuit, and former White House Counsel, in 
Berkeley, 
California 
(April 
12, 
1999) 
available 
at 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Mikva/mikva-con4.html 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008) (emphasis added). 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
4 
 
to protect that interest, unless the movant's interest 
is adequately represented by existing parties. 
¶158 With the exception of one word, the quoted language is 
identical to the rule adopted by this court in 1975 as part of 
the new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure.2  See 67 Wis. 2d 585, 
650-51 (1975). 
¶159 Subsection (1) is based on Rule 24(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Charles D. Clausen and David P. Lowe, 
The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure Chapters 801-803, 59 
Marq. L. Rev. 1, 108 (1976) (hereinafter Clausen).  Accordingly, 
"we look to cases and commentary relating to Rule 24(a)(2) for 
guidance in interpreting sec. 803.09(1)."  State ex rel. Bilder 
v. Twp. of Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 547, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983). 
¶160 Federal 
Rule 
24 
evolved 
significantly 
from 
its 
inception in 1937.  A 1946 amendment provided that upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene "(3) when the 
applicant 
is 
so 
situated 
as 
to 
be 
adversely 
affected 
by . . . disposition of property which is in the custody or 
subject to the control or disposition of the court or officer 
thereof."  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(3) (1946).  
This language amplified and restated federal practice.  See 
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 
129, 134 (1967).  However, the rule was altered in 1966 to 
facilitate substantially expanded intervention as of right.  
This revised rule, which drew upon federal civil rules related 
to joinder of persons needed for just adjudication (Rule 19) and 
                                                 
2 In the original rule, the word "he" was used in place of 
the word "movant" in the current phrase "the movant is so 
situated." 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
5 
 
class actions (Rule 23), provides that an applicant is entitled 
to intervene in an action when the applicant's position is 
comparable to that of a person under Rule 19(a)(2)(i), unless 
the movant's interest is already adequately represented in the 
action.3  See Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendment, 28 
U.S.C.A., Rule 24 at 755-57. 
¶161 Intervention, as a procedural mechanism under Rule 24, 
is to be construed liberally, and doubts resolved in favor of 
the proposed intervenor.  See 6 James William Moore, et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice § 24.03[1][a], at 24-24, 24-25 (3d ed. 
2002)(hereinafter 
Moore); 
Southwest 
Center 
for 
Biological 
Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 2001); Stupak-
Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 2000); Purnell 
v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986).  Some 
federal 
courts 
have 
stated 
that 
the 
requirements 
for 
intervention are to be construed in favor of intervention.  Am. 
Maritime Transp., Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 1559, 1561 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("the requirements for intervention are to be 
                                                 
3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) currently 
reads: 
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the 
court must permit anyone to intervene who: 
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene 
by a federal statute; or 
(2) claims an interest relating to the property 
or transaction that is the subject of the action, and 
is so situated that disposing of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability 
to protect its interest, unless existing parties 
adequately represent that interest. 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
6 
 
construed in favor of intervention"); Westlands Water Dist. v. 
United States, 700 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) ("we recognize 
that the requirements of Rule 24(a) are to be construed in favor 
of the applicant for intervention") (citation omitted). 
¶162 Under Federal Rule 24, the intervention inquiry must 
be flexible, involving a balancing and blending of requirements, 
often applying them as a group.  Moore, supra, § 24.03[1][a], at 
24-25.  Intervention as of right may be granted if the 
applicant's claimed interest may be significantly impaired by 
the action, even if some uncertainty exists regarding that 
interest.  Id. 
II 
¶163 Wisconsin's adoption of Federal Rule 24(a)(2) in Wis. 
Stat. § 803.09(1) was a departure from our prior law——namely, 
Wis. Stat. § 260.205 (1973)——because intervention under the 
prior statute "was only permissive, i.e., permitted in the 
court's discretion."  Clausen, supra, at 108.  Professor Clausen 
observed: 
While the intervention under subsection (1) is of 
right ("shall be permitted"), the rule is still 
discretionary insofar as the court must make a 
determination as to [1] whether or not the motion is 
timely, [2] whether the absent party's ability to 
protect his interest may as a practical matter be 
impaired, and [3] whether the absent party's interest 
is adequately represented by existing parties. 
Id. 
 
¶164 Clausen's discussion of circuit court "discretion" in 
making certain determinations under our rule is somewhat at odds 
with recent pronouncements in federal cases.  For instance, in 
the Southwest Center case, the court said: "Rule 24 provides for 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
7 
 
intervention as of right and permissive intervention. . . .  We 
review de novo a district court's denial of a motion to 
intervene as of right, with the exception of timeliness, which 
we review for abuse of discretion."  Southwest Center, 268 F.3d 
at 817 (emphasis added).  See also United States v. BDO Seidman, 
337 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2003) ("This court reviews the 
[intervention] factors de novo, with the exception of the first 
factor——the timeliness of the intervention——which this court 
reviews for an abuse of discretion."); Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d 
at 471 ("We review a district court's decision regarding 
timeliness (the first element) for abuse of discretion; the 
remaining three elements are reviewed de novo.").  What these 
courts are saying is that three of the four factors are deemed 
questions of law. 
 
¶165 Analytically, the more discretion this court gives to 
our circuit courts to deny motions for intervention as of right, 
the more we revert to our prior law in which there was no 
intervention "as of right." 
 
¶166 Immediately after the Clausen discussion quoted in 
¶163, herein, Professor Clausen added:  "Nevertheless, the new 
rule is founded upon the same considerations underlying section 
803.03 which define those parties who must be joined in an 
action if feasible."  Clausen, supra, at 108; see also City of 
Madison v. WERC, 2000 WI 39, ¶11 n.8, 234 Wis. 2d 550, 610 
N.W.2d 94.  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 803.03 is pertinent to our 
review.  It reads in part: 
Joinder of persons needed for just and complete 
adjudication. 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
8 
 
(1) Persons to be joined if feasible.  A person 
who is subject to service of process shall be joined 
as a party in the action if: 
 
(a) In the person's absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties; or 
 
(b) The person claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in the person's absence may: 
1. 
As a practical matter impair or impede 
the person's ability to protect that interest.  
(Emphasis added.) 
In my view, the words in the title of § 803.03——"just and 
complete adjudication"——suggest the spirit in which the section 
ought to be interpreted.  See, e.g., Zabel v. Zabel, 210 
Wis. 2d 336, 343, 565 N.W.2d 240 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding 
that the joinder of a husband's mother as a third-party 
defendant in a divorce action was necessary for a just and 
complete adjudication of the parties' martial property rights).   
¶167 The present case, of course, is a civil rights action.  
Plaintiffs candidly acknowledge that their suit is intended to 
have wide impact.  Although the named plaintiffs include only 
six same-sex couples, their suit is intended to affect all same-
sex couples in state service.  It is reasonable to suppose that 
they also intend a favorable decision to affect same-sex couples 
who work for Wisconsin counties, cities, villages, towns, and 
school districts . . . and thus, by necessity, their employers.  
The fact that the plaintiffs have chosen strategically not to 
include in this suit any same-sex couples from Wisconsin local 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
9 
 
governments4 should not preclude representative municipalities 
from weighing in for a "just and complete adjudication" of the 
controversy because, as "a practical matter," a decision for the 
plaintiffs will "impair or impede" the municipalities' ability 
to protect their interests.  As "a practical matter," this suit 
is equivalent to a class action. 
III 
¶168 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) has multiple 
elements and requires interpretation.  The first major case 
interpreting the rule was Bilder in 1983.  The court declared 
that the Wisconsin intervention rule establishes a four-part 
test that the proposed intervenor must meet: 
 
(1) timely application for intervention; 
 
(2) an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action; 
 
(3) that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical 
matter 
impair 
or 
impede 
the 
proposed 
intervenor's ability to protect that interest; and 
 
(4) that the proposed intervenor's interest is 
not adequately represented by existing parties. 
Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 545. 
¶169 In a second major case involving intervention, this 
court summarized the four-part test as follows: 
 
(1) that the motion to intervene be made in a 
timely fashion; 
                                                 
4 This suit is nearly identical to Alaska Civil Liberties 
Union v. State of Alaska & Municipality of Anchorage, 122 P.3d 
781 (Alaska 2005), except that the Alaskan plaintiffs named the 
"Municipality of Anchorage" as a defendant, and Anchorage had 
its own representation in the case throughout.  See also Baker 
v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (action brought against state, 
city, town). 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
10 
 
 
(2) that the movant claims an interest relating 
to the property or transaction which is the subject of 
the action; 
 
(3) that the movant is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that 
interest; and 
 
(4) that the movant's interest is not adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
Armada Broad., Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 471, 516 
N.W.2d 357 (1994). 
 
¶170 These two decisions either paraphrase or repeat the 
exact language of the rule.  The same may be said of City of 
Madison v. WERC, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶11, and Wolff v. Town of 
Jamestown, 229 Wis. 2d 738, 740-41, 601 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 
1999).  However, the majority opinion supplements the language 
of our rule and the formulations in previous opinions by adding 
a new word to the element relating to the intervenor's claimed 
interest.  The majority rephrases the "interest" test to read: 
"that the movant claims an interest sufficiently related to the 
subject of the action[.]"  Majority op., ¶38 (emphasis added).   
¶171 This subtle change is not insignificant.  Its effect 
is to vest courts with discretion to determine whether a 
potential intervenor's "interest" is "sufficient" to satisfy the 
second prong of the rule.  The "interest" element or test of the 
rule happens to be the only element that Professor Clausen did 
not mention as involving some judicial discretion.  See ¶163, 
herein. 
 
¶172 Although the majority opinion ultimately concedes that 
the municipalities satisfy the "interest" element, it uses its 
new formulation of the test to attack the interest claimed, so 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
11 
 
that it can conclude: "The municipalities' generalized interest 
in 
the 
subject 
of 
the 
instant 
action, 
namely, 
the 
constitutionality of a statute applicable to a plan for state 
employees, is at the far edge of what may constitute a 
sufficiently related interest for purposes of the right to 
intervene statute."  Majority op., ¶74 (emphasis added).  The 
majority opinion then applies the coup de grâce: "The weakness 
of the municipalities' showing with respect to the interest 
requirement means that to demonstrate a right of intervention 
the municipalities should make a strong showing in the other 
requirements to intervene as of right."  Id.  In other words, it 
is not enough for a potential intervenor to satisfy all four 
elements or tests for intervention as of right; now, a potential 
intervenor must "strongly" satisfy these elements, or it may not 
be permitted to intervene as of right. 
IV 
¶173 The first element of the rule is timely application 
for intervention.  There is no dispute that the municipalities' 
motion for intervention was timely.  Consequently, the first 
element of the rule is satisfied. 
V 
¶174 The second element of the rule is interest, namely, 
whether the municipalities' claim an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action. 
¶175 In Bilder, like Armada, City of Madison, and Wolff, 
the court approved intervention.  The decision in Bilder turned 
on the intervenor's "interest."  See Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 549-
50. 
 
The 
court's 
discussion 
admittedly 
uses 
the 
word 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
12 
 
"sufficient" in several places, but the spirit of the discussion 
is quite different from what we see in the majority opinion.  
The Bilder court said: 
 
The federal courts and commentators have not been 
able to derive a precise test for determining which 
type of interest is sufficient to allow a party to 
intervene as a matter of right. 
 
. . . .  
 
The various federal courts have differed in their 
approaches.  Some appear to verbalize the sufficiency 
of interest factor as in part a question of standing 
or as requiring a "direct, substantial, legally 
protectable interest in the proceedings." 
 
Other courts have viewed the interest test for 
intervention more broadly. 
 
. . . .  
 
We agree with the broader, pragmatic approach to 
intervention as of right.  In deciding whether to 
allow a party to intervene as a matter of right, the 
court should view the interest sufficient to allow the 
intervention practically rather than technically. 
 
. . . .  
 
Courts using the pragmatic, policy-based approach 
[ ] view the interest test as "primarily a practical 
guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many 
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with 
efficiency and due process."  Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 
694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 547-49 (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
¶176 The Bilder court then quoted with approval a passage 
from Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969): 
 
The decision whether intervention of right is 
warranted thus involves an accommodation between two 
potentially conflicting goals: to achieve judicial 
economies of scale by resolving related issues in a 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
13 
 
single lawsuit, and to prevent the single lawsuit from 
becoming fruitlessly complex or unending.  Since this 
task will depend upon the contours of the particular 
controversy, general rules and past decisions cannot 
provide 
uniformly 
dependable 
guides. . . .  
[T]he 
[interest] 
requirement 
should 
be 
viewed 
as 
a 
prerequisite 
rather 
than 
relied 
upon 
as 
a 
determinative criterion for intervention.  If barriers 
are needed to limit extension of the right to 
intervene, the criteria of practical harm to the 
applicant and the adequacy of representation by others 
are better suited to the task.  If those requirements 
are met, the nature of his "interest" may play a role 
in determining the sort of intervention which should 
be 
allowed——whether, 
for 
example, 
he 
should 
be 
permitted to contest all issues, and whether he should 
enjoy all the prerogatives of a party litigant. 
Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 549 (emphasis added). 
 
¶177 In Chief Judge David Bazelon's view, the interest 
requirement should not be used as the determinative criterion 
for intervention as of right.  "It would be unfortunate," he 
said, "to allow inquiry to be led once again astray by a myopic 
fixation upon 'interest.'"  Smuck, 408 F.2d at 179. 
¶178 Here, the majority opinion devotes 28 paragraphs to 
discrediting the municipalities' interest.  The reason for this 
laborious effort is revealed in ¶39 of the opinion, where the 
majority admits that "a movant's strong showing with respect to 
one requirement may contribute to the movant's ability to meet 
other requirements as well."  Majority op., ¶39 (citing Moore, 
supra, 
§ 24.03[1][b], 
at 
24-25 
("[A] 
lesser 
showing 
of 
impairment may be required by the court if the applicant's 
interest is very strong. . . .")).  The majority portrays the 
municipalities' interest as "weak" so that it can characterize 
the "interest" element as dragging down the municipalities' 
position on the other three elements.  See majority op., ¶74. 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
14 
 
¶179 What is the municipalities' interest? 
¶180 According 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 40.01(a), 
the 
Public 
Employee Trust Fund was created to aid public employees in 
protecting 
themselves and their beneficiaries against the 
financial hardships of old age, disability, death, illness, and 
accident.  The trust fund includes multiple programs, such as 
the retirement system and health care coverage, that make 
provision for these concerns. 
¶181 The Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS) is one of the 
largest in the United States.  Any public employer in Wisconsin 
may elect to participate in the WRS, Wis. Stat. § 40.21, but for 
some employers——such as the state and all counties except 
Milwaukee County——participation is mandatory.  Art Zimmerman, 
Wisconsin Retirement System Informational Paper 78, Wisconsin 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau 8 (January 2007).  The Fiscal Bureau 
reports that a total of 1,412 public employers, including 58 
state agencies, participate in the WRS.  Other participants in 
the WRS include 71 counties, 186 cities, 218 towns, 236 
villages, and 426 school districts.  Zimmerman, supra, at 9.  
This listing includes the eight municipalities seeking to 
intervene in this case. 
¶182 For purposes of this suit, it is clear that not nearly 
as many local public employers participate in the Department of 
Employee Trust Funds (DETF) health insurance programs as in the 
WRS.  The exact number of local employers who participate is not 
known to the writer.  Nonetheless, according to the DETF's 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for 2004, 11,669 "active" 
local employees and 1,787 retired local employees participated 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
15 
 
in a health insurance program through the fund in 2004.  This 
figure includes employees from the city of Watertown, village of 
Oostburg, and town of Cottage Grove whose employers seek to 
intervene in this suit. 
¶183 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 40.02(20) 
defines 
the 
word 
"dependent" for use throughout Chapter 40, except for Wis. Stat. 
§ 40.98.  Subsection (20) reads: 
 
(20) "Dependent" means the spouse, minor child, 
including 
stepchildren 
of 
the 
current 
marriage 
dependent on the employee for support and maintenance, 
or child of any age, including stepchildren of the 
current 
marriage, 
if 
handicapped 
to 
an 
extent 
requiring continued dependence.  For group insurance 
purposes only, the department may promulgate rules 
with a different definition of "dependent" than the 
one otherwise provided in this subsection for each 
group insurance plan. 
¶184 The word "dependent," as defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 40.02(20), appears in Wis. Stat. § 40.03(6)(b) (granting the 
Group Insurance Board the power to provide employees and their 
dependents with group insurance plans), § 40.04(10) (providing 
for an accumulated sick leave conversion account for retired 
employees 
and 
their 
surviving 
dependents), 
§ 40.04(11) 
(providing for a health insurance premium credit account for 
retired employees and their surviving dependents), §§ 40.05(b), 
(bc), and (be) (providing for unused sick leave to be credited 
to payment of health insurance premiums for employees and their 
surviving insured dependents), § 40.51(3) (providing that health 
insurance contracts shall establish provisions for employees and 
dependents to continue group coverage), § 40.52(1)(a) (providing 
for a "family coverage option" to allow coverage for all 
eligible dependents), § 40.52(2) (allowing for special insurance 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
16 
 
plan provisions when one spouse or other dependent is eligible 
for 
federal 
health 
and 
hospital 
care 
for 
the 
aged), 
§ 40.80(2r)(a)2. (defining "domestic relations order," taking 
into consideration a court's decision to assign deferred 
compensation assets to "a spouse, former spouse, child, or other 
dependent"), and §§ 40.95(1)(a) and (2) (providing that the DETF 
administer a program to provide credits for the purchase of 
health insurance for retired employees and their surviving 
insured dependents). 
¶185 Thus, a court decision altering the interpretation of 
the word "dependent" is likely to have wide effect on local 
participants in a number of programs in Chapter 40.  Some of 
these effects will be clear and direct; others will be unclear 
and indirect.  If there were an evidentiary record in this suit, 
the uncertainty about the effects of a decision favoring the 
plaintiffs would be reduced. 
¶186 Watertown, Oostburg, and Cottage Grove are enrolled in 
the specific DETF plans that the plaintiffs seek to modify.  
Thus, these three municipalities——and all other municipalities 
similarly situated——will experience the direct costs of any 
court decision mandating that DETF plans cover a same-sex 
domestic partner and the children of a same-sex domestic partner 
when those children are dependent upon the employee-partner for 
support and maintenance.  The remaining five municipalities——
Caledonia, Green Bay, Hobart, the School Board of New Berlin, 
and 
Raymond 
School 
District 
#14, 
and 
all 
municipalities 
similarly situated——would likely confront more expensive health 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
17 
 
care coverage if they wanted to join a DETF health care plan, or 
if they were required to join a DETF health care plan. 
¶187 Watertown, Oostburg, and Cottage Grove have collective 
bargaining agreements.  Court-ordered coverage of same-sex 
domestic partners would rewrite these collective bargaining 
agreements by mandating benefits that were not negotiated at the 
bargaining table.  These new benefits would be provided in 
addition to, not in lieu of, previously negotiated benefits, 
adding to the cost of fringe benefits.  The spillover of a 
decision favoring the plaintiffs to the collective bargaining 
agreements of other municipalities——through arbitration or legal 
action, as well as negotiation——would be certain if not direct. 
¶188 The 
eight 
municipalities 
here 
claim 
that 
every 
municipality that is part of any DETF program employing the term 
"dependent," as defined in Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20), will be 
directly affected by any change in the interpretation of this 
definition.5  This includes all programs and subjects enumerated 
in ¶¶181-82 above, including deferred compensation programs and 
qualified domestic relations orders (QDRO).  They contend 
persuasively that "[t]he Wisconsin [C]onstitution is not so 
                                                 
5 The plaintiffs' complaint seeks to change every DETF 
benefits 
plan. 
 
Under 
the 
heading 
"Relief 
Sought," 
the 
plaintiffs' first amended complaint asks the circuit court to: 
C. 
Enter an order enjoining the defendants from 
excluding lesbian and gay male employees and their 
same-sex domestic partners from the same employment 
benefits provided to similarly-situated employees and 
their 
spouses, 
including 
by 
classifying 
same-sex 
domestic partners of state employees as dependents for 
purposes of participation in all employment benefit 
contracts and plans[.] (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
18 
 
facile that it requires redefining 'spouse' in one DETF program, 
but completely disregards the very same effect in another 
[program]." 
¶189 The municipalities posit additional interests that are 
less tangible than increased costs and modification of existing 
contracts.  They contend that a judicial decision favoring the 
plaintiffs would constitute an incursion into their core powers 
to govern their own affairs.  In our system of government, 
municipalities have the power to hire employees and negotiate 
individual contracts or collective bargaining agreements with 
these employees.6  These negotiations involve tradeoffs.  Because 
their revenues are limited, local governments are seldom in a 
position to afford all the compensation and benefits that local 
employees would like.  Thus, the granting of one benefit often 
comes at the expense of another and may affect overall 
compensation.  When a new benefit is imposed upon local 
governments from the outside, it strips these governments of 
their authority to negotiate or perhaps even plan for the new 
benefit. 
¶190 Of course, the legislature may impose controversial or 
unwanted benefit obligations upon local governments and thereby 
                                                 
6 The 
legislature 
has 
delegated 
general 
power 
to 
municipalities 
to 
hire personnel and negotiate employment 
contracts via Wis. Stat. § 111.70.  See Glendale Prof'l 
Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 108, 264 
N.W.2d 594 (1978) ("Sec. 111.70, Stats., is legislation that 
specifically authorizes local action, i.e., the adoption of 
collective bargaining agreements covering wages, hours, and 
conditions of employment even though statutes of statewide 
concern 
also 
govern 
wages, 
hours, 
and 
conditions 
of 
employment.").   
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
19 
 
affect 
their 
costs 
and 
existing 
contracts. 
 
However, 
legislatively 
created 
benefits 
represent 
the 
fruit 
of 
a 
political process in which local governments freely and actively 
participate.  Legislatively imposed benefit obligations can be 
given a delayed effective date or be softened by increased state 
aid, 
as 
political 
accommodations. 
 
Legislatively 
imposed 
benefits can also be repealed at a later date.  By contrast, 
benefits 
ordered 
by 
a 
court 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution do not permit political accommodations.  They are 
simply ordered.  If the change involved is not only costly but 
also unpopular, it will understandably be perceived as denying 
local governments the power to control their own destiny.   
¶191 It can be argued that courts exist for the very 
purpose 
of 
vindicating 
"rights" 
that 
might 
otherwise 
be 
disregarded by political majorities.  But courts undermine their 
legitimacy in making calls that antagonize majority opinion when 
they slam the door on a full airing of facts and views.  The 
municipalities here are representative of many other local 
governments in Wisconsin whose interests should be fully 
considered. 
VI 
¶192 The third element of the rule is impairment of 
interest.  The essence of this element is that the movant's 
interest may as a practical matter be impaired if the movant is 
not allowed to protect it by participating in the suit. 
¶193 It is clear that a decision on the merits in the 
plaintiffs' favor would immediately impair the rights of Cottage 
Grove, Watertown, and Oostburg because these municipalities are 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
20 
 
currently enrolled in DETF health care plans.  The court of 
appeals reached the same conclusion, Helgeland v. Wisconsin 
Municipalities, 2006 WI App 216, ¶19, 296 Wis. 2d 880, 724 
N.W.2d 208, but the majority inexplicably does not.  The 
majority concludes that, since the municipalities are not 
parties to any contract at issue in the present litigation, the 
municipalities' 
interest 
"cannot 
be 
directly 
impaired 
by 
Helgeland's action."  Majority op., ¶75.  The majority's 
conclusion cannot be correct.  The three municipalities are part 
of DETF plans that would be directly affected by a ruling 
favoring the plaintiffs.  As a result, their financial interests 
would be impaired in a direct and immediate fashion.  If we do 
not know in more detail the financial effect on the three 
municipalities, 
we 
can 
attribute 
that 
deficiency 
to 
an 
underdeveloped record caused by the involuntary absence of the 
municipalities as intervenors. 
¶194 The 
municipalities also couch the impairment of 
interest element in terms of the negative effect of stare 
decisis on all eight movants if the plaintiffs were to prevail 
on the merits.  The majority acknowledges the adverse effect 
that stare decisis might have on the municipalities, but it 
describes this impact as generic, that is, "essentially the same 
effect that any employer might claim when an action before the 
court threatens to increase costs that the employer is obligated 
to pay . . .".  Majority op., ¶84 (emphasis added).  This 
comment 
unduly 
downplays 
the 
effects 
of 
a 
possible 
constitutional ruling on future litigation. 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
21 
 
¶195 Black's Law Dictionary defines "stare decisis" as 
"[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a 
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points 
arise again in litigation."  Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (7th 
ed. 1999).  Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a legal 
precedent is established when a court expressly decides a 
specific issue of law.7  Moore, supra, § 24.03[3][b], at 24-42.2.  
Thus, an intervenor's interest can be impaired, as a practical 
matter, if a pending action will cause a stare decisis impact 
that is harmful to the applicant.  Id.   
¶196 Federal courts have analyzed the impact of stare 
decisis in different ways.  The majority cites Bethune Plaza 
Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 1998), for the 
proposition that stare decisis should establish a Rule 24(a)(2) 
impairment "infrequently," and it cites authority for the notion 
that stare decisis is merely "an important consideration."  
Majority op., ¶78, ¶78 n.69 (citing United States v. State of 
Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988)).  However, other 
federal courts have found the impact of stare decisis to be a 
determinative factor.  See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 
1305, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that "the potential for a 
negative stare decisis effect 'may supply that practical 
disadvantage which warrants intervention of right'"); Coal. of 
                                                 
7 The doctrine of stare decisis differs from that of res 
judicata, which involves a decision about a factual controversy 
rather than an issue of law.  6 James William Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice § 24.03[3][b], at 24-42.3 (3d ed. 
2002).  The 1966 amendment to Rule 24 eliminated the requirement 
that a movant be legally bound by the outcome of the action.  
Id. at 24-42.4.   
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
22 
 
Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dept. of 
Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that 
"the stare decisis effect of the district court's judgment is 
sufficient impairment for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)"); 
Anderson Columbia Envtl., Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 
880, 882 (1999) ("The potential stare decisis effect of a 
decision often supplies the 'practical impairment' required by 
Rule 24(a)."). 
¶197 There are several reasons why stare decisis is a 
weighty factor in this case.  In 1992 the court of appeals 
rejected a discrimination and equal protection claim based on 
facts similar to the present suit.  Phillips v. Wis. Pers. 
Comm'n, 167 Wis. 2d 205, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1992).  The 
Phillips decision has served as the controlling precedent in 
Wisconsin for 15 years.  It continues to bind the court of 
appeals and circuit courts.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 
560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  Any decision overruling Phillips will 
require action by this court.  If this court were to overrule 
Phillips, the new decision would bind Wisconsin courts just as 
Phillips has bound Wisconsin courts; and if this court's 
decision were based on the Wisconsin Constitution, as plaintiffs 
request, even the legislature could not change the law without 
first securing an amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Thus, the municipalities have a vital interest in shaping the 
record that will be presented to this court.  To do so, they 
must intervene.  If the municipalities are denied the right to 
intervene in the circuit court, they are less likely to gain 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
23 
 
intervenor status at the appellate level and will lose any right 
to shape the record.  
¶198 The import of stare decisis is neatly presented by 
novel 
issues 
of 
statutory 
construction, 
Moore, 
supra, 
§ 24.03[3][b], at 24-42.2, and this suit is a classic example.  
Negative stare decisis would impede the municipalities' efforts 
if they chose to assert their interest separately in future 
litigation, 
as 
the 
controlling 
construction 
of 
the 
word 
"dependent" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 40.02(20) 
would 
effectively 
foreclose their position.  Courts are not going to construe the 
statutory term "dependent" to have different meanings in 
municipal and state beneficiary contexts. 
¶199 In short, there are both direct financial impacts and 
likely stare decisis impacts potentially at play in this case, 
and 
these 
effects 
satisfy 
the 
impairment 
of 
interest 
requirement. 
VII 
¶200 The fourth and final requirement for intervention as 
of right is that the movant's interest is not adequately 
represented by existing parties.   
¶201 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
adequate 
representation 
requirement 
"is 
satisfied 
if 
the 
applicant shows that the representation of his interest 'may be' 
inadequate" and "the burden of making that showing should be 
treated as minimal."  Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of 
America, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (citing 3B J. Moore, 
Federal 
Practice 
24.09-1 
(4) 
(1969)) 
(emphasis 
added).  
"[P]roposed intervenors need show only that there is a potential 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
24 
 
for inadequate representation" to satisfy this requirement.  
Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999). 
Accordingly, the key inquiry for this requirement is whether an 
existing party may not adequately represent the interest of a 
proposed intervenor, not whether an existing party will not 
adequately represent that interest.  In this regard, it may be 
enough to show that the existing party will not make all the 
arguments that the proposed intervenor would make.  See Michigan 
State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1997) 
("For example, it may be enough to show that the existing party 
who purports to seek the same outcome will not make all of the 
prospective intervenor's arguments."). 
¶202 In 
1994 
this 
court 
listed 
several 
factors 
for 
evaluating adequacy of representation.  The court said it looked 
to see (1) whether there is a showing of collusion between the 
existing "representative" party and the opposing party; (2) 
whether the representative party's interest is adverse to that 
of the proposed intervenor; or (3) whether the representative 
party has failed in the fulfillment of its duty.  Armada, 183 
Wis. 2d at 476 (citing Sewerage Comm'n of City of Milwaukee v. 
State DNR, 104 Wis. 2d 182, 189, 311 N.W.2d 677 (Ct. App. 
1981)).  The court also repeated the statement from Trbovich 
that the showing required should be treated as "minimal."  Id. 
(quoting Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10). 
¶203 Although 
the 
court's 
three 
criteria, 
properly 
interpreted, do not create an especially difficult hurdle to 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
25 
 
intervention, these criteria are not meant to be exhaustive.8  
There may be a variety of additional circumstances that suggest 
that representation by an existing party is inadequate.  See 
Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 
172 F.3d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 1999) (observing that the trilogy——
"adversity of interest, collusion or nonfeasance"——may not have 
been intended to be an exclusive list).  Demonstrating that a 
movant's interest is different in kind or degree from that of a 
named 
party 
may 
suffice 
to 
establish 
inadequacy 
of 
representation.  B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, 
Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 544-47 (1st Cir. 2006).   
¶204 Diversity of interest can be the conclusive factor 
when evaluating the adequacy of representation.  As the Wright 
treatise notes, "[t]he most important factor in determining 
adequacy of representation is how the interest of the absentee 
compares with the interests of the present parties.  If the 
interest of the absentee is not represented at all, or if all 
existing parties are adverse to the absentee, then there is no 
adequate representation."  7C Charles Alan Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil 3d § 1909, at 393-94 
(2007) 
(footnotes 
omitted) 
(emphasis 
added) 
(hereinafter 
Wright).  Significantly, the treatise goes on to state:  
If there is a significant difference between the 
interest of the absentee and that of the party, there 
                                                 
8 See 7C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure:  Civil 3d § 1909, at 393 (2007) ("The wide variety of 
cases that come to the courts make it unlikely that there are 
three 
and 
only 
three 
circumstances 
that 
would 
make 
representation 
inadequate 
and 
suggest 
that 
adequacy 
of 
representation is a very complex variable."). 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
26 
 
is a risk that the party will not provide adequate 
representation of the interest of the absentee. A 
discriminating appraisal of the circumstances of the 
particular case is required. Since the rule is 
satisfied if there is a serious possibility that the 
representation 
may 
be 
inadequate, 
all 
reasonable 
doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing the 
absentee, who has an interest different from that of 
any existing party, to intervene so that the absentee 
may be heard in his own behalf. 
Id. at 440 (emphasis added). 
¶205 Diversity of interest tips the balance toward granting 
intervention in this case.  DETF and the municipalities have 
different functions.  DETF administers benefit plans for public 
employees.  It is an agency of state government; it is not a 
separate government entity.  By contrast, cities, villages, 
towns, and school districts are separate governments.  Although 
they must operate within "limits" imposed by state law, these 
governments set their own budgets and make their own policy.  
The limits include revenue limits for public schools (Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.91), and levy limits for cities, villages, and towns (Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0602).  These limits distinguish the municipalities 
from the state, which has much greater latitude than local 
governments in taxing and spending.  These limits implicate a 
different evidentiary record than the record that might serve 
the state's exclusive interest. 
¶206 Given 
the 
difference 
in 
their 
status, 
the 
municipalities question the strategy the Attorney General has 
employed 
to 
defend 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 40.02(20), i.e., the strategy of opposing discovery and moving 
for judgment on the pleadings.  The State's strategy relies 
entirely on the continuing validity of Phillips, even though 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
27 
 
Phillips did not decide head-on some of the issues now presented 
by the plaintiffs.   
¶207 Wright notes that "[a] mere difference of opinion 
concerning the tactics with which the litigation should be 
handled does not make inadequate the representation of those 
whose interests are identical with that of an existing party or 
who are formally represented in the lawsuit."  Wright, supra, 
§ 1909, at 431-36 (emphasis added).9  Fair enough.  However, the 
interests of DETF and the municipalities are not identical, and 
the differences should not be dismissed using words like 
"attenuated" to shore up the analysis.  See Majority op., ¶71 . 
¶208 In the court of appeals, Judge Charles Dykman observed 
in his concurrence/dissent that the approach of an attorney 
general is fundamentally different from that of private counsel 
hired to represent a client.  See Helgeland, 296 Wis.2d 880, ¶59 
(Dykman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Alluding 
to former Attorney General Peggy Lautenschlager, Judge Dykman 
stated:  "The attorney general is required to defend the statute 
at issue, but how she does so and what issues she raises or does 
not raise are up to her.  She determines how the case will be 
defended, for better or worse."  Id.  This is precisely the 
                                                 
9 The Wright treatise notes that when parties have identical 
interests mere differences of opinion regarding litigation 
tactics are not evidence of inadequate representation.  See 7C 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure:  
Civil 3d § 1909, at 431-36 (2007).  However, the treatise makes 
the 
important 
point, 
by 
implication, 
that 
when 
parties' 
interests are not identical, a difference of opinion regarding 
strategy may be a factor to consider. 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
28 
 
problem facing the municipalities and one that should not be 
summarily dismissed.   
¶209 Judge Dykman added: 
A good way to create mistrust is to deny 
participation in government.  Of course, there is an 
endpoint to participation; lawsuits cannot be open to 
whoever wants to participate or only chaos wins.  But 
here, the only factor keeping the municipalities from 
participation as a party is the majority's conclusion 
that, despite statements by the State's attorney which 
at least raise doubts, the statements do not amount to 
much.  Perhaps they do not, but I believe that there 
is a reasonable perception that the attorney general 
has taken a position contrary to the one she advocates 
on the merits of this litigation.  
Id., ¶61.   
¶210 From 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
the 
supreme 
court, 
Department of Justice attorneys have opposed intervention by the 
municipalities.  A change in attorneys general has not altered 
the Department's position.  If the State ultimately wins this 
case 
on 
the 
merits, 
its 
consistent 
opposition 
to 
the 
municipalities' intervention will be forgotten.  But if the 
State loses the case, the State's opposition will be seen as 
hubris or collusion, and, in either event, a contributing factor 
to the defeat.   
¶211  If intervention by the municipalities were likely to 
make this suit "fruitlessly complex or unending," Smuck, 408 
F.2d at 179, denial of intervention would make sense.  But 
denial of intervention here has prolonged the litigation, not 
shortened it, and has undermined the alleged urgency of the 
plaintiffs' circumstances.  The municipalities' desire to 
develop a factual record establishing their particular financial 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
29 
 
and policy-setting interest cannot reasonably be described as 
weakening the State's position.   
¶212 When 
this 
case 
returns 
to 
circuit 
court, 
the 
municipalities will have been kicked off the field and told they 
have the privilege of cheering for the State from the bleachers.  
As they prepare to wave their rally towels, they may note the 
irony of the plaintiffs' importing counsel from Illinois to 
explain Wisconsin civil procedure to Wisconsin courts, and of 
the 
American 
Civil 
Liberties 
Union 
seeking 
to 
vindicate 
diversity of lifestyles while successfully squashing diversity 
of views.   
¶213 If the municipalities are disappointed by their remote 
seats, they will surely get over it once they accept the 
heartening "presumption" that the DETF adequately represents the 
municipalities' interest. 
VIII 
¶214 This is not a close case.  The municipalities have 
satisfied all the tests under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) for 
intervention as of right.  Because the majority holds otherwise, 
I respectfully dissent.   
¶215 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this dissent. 
 
No.  2005AP2540.dtp 
 
 
1