Title: Soucy v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11779
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2015

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SJC-11779 
 
DAVID SOUCY  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
March 6, 2015. 
 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
David Soucy appeals from a judgment of a single justice of 
this court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
Soucy was indicted for trafficking in a class B substance 
in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E.  In moving to dismiss the 
indictments, he argued that because the charges concerned 
pharmaceutical drugs (oxycodone tablets), the weight 
requirements under § 32E should be measured by the weight of the 
controlled substance (oxycodone) contained in the tablets, not 
by the tablets' total weight, and that there was an insufficient 
amount of the controlled substance in the tablets to meet the 
statutory weight requirements.  His motion was denied by a judge 
in the Superior Court.  His G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the 
county court challenged that interlocutory ruling.  The single 
justice denied relief without a hearing. 
 
 
Under S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), 
Soucy is required to "set forth the reasons why review of the 
trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal 
from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other 
available means."  He has not done so.  If and when he is 
convicted on one or more of the indictments, any challenge to 
the weight requirements under § 32E or to the sufficiency of the 
2 
 
evidence in support of those requirements can adequately be 
reviewed in the normal appellate process. 
 
 
"The denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is 
not appealable until after trial, and we have indicated many 
times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to circumvent that 
rule.  Unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits 
or reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which 
occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his motion to dismiss."  
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002), and cases 
cited.  A very limited exception exists where, before a trial or 
a retrial, a defendant raises a double jeopardy claim of 
substantial merit.  Id.  See Neverson v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 
174, 175-176 (1989).  But we have consistently rejected attempts 
to obtain interlocutory review as a matter of right under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, of denials of motions to dismiss on other bases 
that defendants have attempted to analogize to double jeopardy 
claims.  See, e.g., Grand-Pierre v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 
1003, 1004 (2011) (challenge to constitutionality of statute 
under which defendant was charged); Garden v. Commonwealth, 460 
Mass. 1018, 1019 (2011) (statute of limitation claim); 
Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2009) 
(jurisdictional claim); Bateman v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 1024, 
1024-1025 (2007) (challenge to sufficiency of evidence before 
grand jury); Cousin v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1046, 1046 (2004) 
(speedy trial claim); King v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1043, 1044 
(2004) (claim of preindictment delay); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 
supra (due process challenge to prosecution).  See also 1 
Appellate Practice in Massachusetts § 1.5, at 1-14 (Mass. Cont. 
Legal Educ. 3d ed. Supp. 2014) ("The exception is based on the 
unique nature of the guarantee not to be placed in jeopardy 
twice").  There is simply "no case in which we have held that a 
. . . claimant [in Soucy's position], like a double jeopardy 
claimant, is entitled to review pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3."  
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra. 
 
 
The single justice neither erred as a matter of law nor 
abused his discretion in denying the petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
William J. Barabino for the petitioner. 
 
Elin H. Graydon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.