Title: Ex parte Becky Van Gilder.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1170995
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2019

REL: November 15, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1170988
____________________
Ex parte Kristi Kelley
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Arnold Curry, as administrator of the Estate of
A.C., a deceased minor
v.
Kristi Kelley et al.)
____________________
1170995
____________________
Ex parte Becky Van Gilder
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Arnold Curry, as administrator of the Estate of
A.C., a deceased minor
v.
Kristi Kelley et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-15-900134)
PER CURIAM.
This case addresses whether a foster-care provider and a
caseworker for the Department of Human Resources ("DHR") are
immune from liability.  
Arnold Curry filed this wrongful-death
action against Becky Van Gilder, a licensed foster-care
provider, and Kristi Kelley,1 a caseworker with the Montgomery
County DHR office, seeking damages for the death of his nine-
year-old son A.C., who died of complications related to
sickle-cell anemia after DHR removed him from Curry's home. 
Curry alleged that Van Gilder had acted negligently and
wantonly in caring for A.C. and that Kelley had acted
negligently and wantonly in managing A.C.'s case.  Van Gilder
and Kelley separately asked the Montgomery Circuit Court to
1In the materials before this Court, Kelley's first name
is spelled various ways, including "Kristi," "Kristie,"
"Christy," and "Christie."  Her last name is also sometimes
spelled "Kelly."  In this opinion, we use the spelling used by
Kelley in an affidavit she submitted to the trial court.
2
1170988, 1170995
enter summary judgments in their favor, denying liability and
arguing that they were protected by immunity based on their
respective roles as a foster parent and a DHR caseworker.  The
trial court denied their motions.  They have separately
petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus directing the
trial court to vacate its previous order denying their
summary-judgment motions and to enter a new order granting
those motions.  We have consolidated the petitions for the
purpose of issuing one opinion.  We grant the petitions in
part and deny them in part.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 25, 2013, DHR removed A.C. and his two
siblings from their home after receiving reports from
officials at the children's school and a neighbor of the
family indicating that Curry was physically abusing the
children.  DHR placed the children with Van Gilder and, after
conducting 
an 
investigation 
and 
substantiating 
the 
allegations
of abuse, DHR obtained legal custody of the children.  Kelley
was assigned to be the caseworker for the children and, in
accordance with 
DHR 
policy, 
drafted 
the 
initial 
Individualized
3
1170988, 1170995
Service Plan ("ISP"), setting forth DHR's plans and goals for
the family.
Van Gilder was told at placement that A.C. suffered from
sickle-cell anemia, and she subsequently took him to
appointments with his primary-care physician and received
instruction from the Sickle Cell Center associated with the
University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital.  Van Gilder
states that she was told it was important for A.C. to stay
hydrated and to rest when he was tired but that he could
otherwise engage in any activities that interested him.  She
also states that she was told to give him ibuprofen or
acetaminophen if he complained of pain but that, if that
medication did not alleviate his pain, if he complained of
chest pain, or if he had a body temperature of over 101
degrees, she should seek emergency medical treatment.  Kelley
also attended at least some of A.C.'s medical appointments and
visited the children on at least a monthly basis over the next
several months.
On May 18, 2013, Van Gilder's grandmother died, and she
made plans to attend the funeral, which was out of state.  Van
Gilder arranged for Susan Moss, a friend and another licensed
4
1170988, 1170995
foster parent, to care for A.C. and his siblings while she was
away.2  Van Gilder states that she told Moss about A.C.'s
condition and care and that, when she left the children with
Moss on May 24, 2013, she also left pain medication for A.C.
in case it was needed.  That evening, A.C. told Moss that he
had a stomachache; he subsequently felt better and no
medication was administered.  On May 25, 2013, A.C. again
reported that he had a stomachache.  Moss gave him
acetaminophen and, after taking a nap, A.C. said he felt
better.  Van Gilder states that she communicated with Moss and
A.C. later that day and that they both told her he was feeling
better.
A.C. did not complain of any discomfort over the next two
days.  On May 28, 2013, he woke up with a sore throat and
asked for a Sprite soft drink.  Shortly afterward, Van Gilder
retrieved him and his siblings from Moss's home; A.C.
apparently made no further complaints before going to bed that
night.  After A.C. went to bed, one of his siblings alerted
Van Gilder that A.C. was in pain and was crying.  Van Gilder
2Van Gilder states that she told Kelley of the substitute-
care arrangements, but Kelley states that she was not made
aware of the arrangements.
5
1170988, 1170995
checked on him, and, when he complained of chest pain, she
took him to the emergency room.  A.C. was admitted to the
hospital.  Van Gilder notified Kelley of his hospitalization
the next morning, and Kelley went to the hospital and visited
him.
A.C. initially appeared to be in stable condition, but on
May 30, 2013, his condition deteriorated, and the decision was
made to transfer him to a hospital in Birmingham because he
was showing symptoms of acute chest syndrome and hypoxia,
which are complications of sickle-cell anemia.  Van Gilder
accompanied A.C. in the ambulance to Birmingham, but before
A.C. could be given a needed blood transfusion, he suffered
respiratory failure and died.  
On January 26, 2015, Curry, initiated this wrongful-death
action against Van Gilder and Kelley, alleging that their
negligence and wantonness caused A.C.'s death.3  The essence
3The trial court was aware of the fact that A.C. had been
removed from Curry's custody before the events leading to this
petition because of alleged physical abuse.  In its order
denying the petitioners' motions for summary judgment, the
trial court indicated that it would consider at a later time
whether, "as a matter of equity or law," Curry may be entitled
to receive any settlement proceeds or to be awarded any
portion of any damages.  Those issues are not before this
Court on these mandamus petitions and remain outstanding
below.
6
1170988, 1170995
of Curry's complaint was that Van Gilder and Kelley failed to
act in accordance with DHR policies and guidelines and that
their failure to do so proximately caused A.C.'s death.  Curry
alleged that Van Gilder had been provided guidelines for
caring for a child with sickle-cell anemia and that she
violated those guidelines by not telling Moss to take A.C. to
the hospital after being apprised that he had complained of
stomach pain on consecutive days.  Curry alleged that Kelley
failed to properly manage A.C.'s case by not educating herself
about A.C.'s condition and by failing to ensure that necessary
information regarding his care was shared with all interested
parties, including the different divisions of DHR, Van 
Gilder,
and Moss.  Curry further alleged that, if Kelley had acted
properly, A.C. would have been classified as "medically
fragile" and, under DHR policy, his caretakers would have been
subject to additional training and oversight. 
On November 17, 2017, Van Gilder and Kelley filed
separate motions for a summary judgment.  Van Gilder argued in
her motion that the doctrine of parental immunity barred any
claim against her based on negligence and that Curry had
identified no evidence indicating that she had acted wantonly
7
1170988, 1170995
in caring for A.C.  In her summary-judgment motion, Kelley
argued that she was entitled to parental immunity as well as
State-agent immunity.  Kelley further argued that Curry had
identified no act or omission on her part that had proximately
caused A.C.'s death.  On February 1, 2018, the trial court
conducted a hearing on the motions for summary judgment. 
Several months later, the trial court denied both motions
without stating its rationale for doing so.  Van Gilder and
Kelley subsequently filed separate petitions for the writ of
mandamus with this Court.
Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus is a
"'drastic and extraordinary writ that will
be issued only when there is:  1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a
refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'
"Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d
501, 503 (Ala. 1993)."
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).  This Court
generally will not entertain a mandamus challenge to a trial
court's denial of a summary-judgment motion, but we make an
8
1170988, 1170995
exception to this rule when a trial court has denied a
summary-judgment motion that is "grounded on a claim of
immunity."  Id.  See also Ex parte Spurgeon, 82 So. 3d 663,
665 (Ala. 2011) (considering a petition for a writ of mandamus
filed by foster parents arguing that they were entitled to a
summary judgment on the basis of the doctrines of parental
immunity, State immunity, and State-agent immunity); Ex parte
Sumerlin, 26 So. 3d 1178, 1183 (Ala. 2009) (considering a
petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a DHR employee
arguing that a summary judgment should have been entered in
her favor based on the doctrine of State-agent immunity). 
Because one of the purposes of immunity is to spare a
defendant from the demands associated with defending a drawn-
out 
lawsuit, 
a 
defendant 
wrongfully 
denied 
immunity 
protection
has no adequate remedy if the case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial.  Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21, 31-32 (Ala. 2002).
We emphasize, however, that this Court will consider such
petitions only to the extent they challenge the trial court's
determination of immunity issues.  This Court will not
consider secondary arguments about the appropriateness of
summary judgment on other grounds or review the trial court's
9
1170988, 1170995
conclusions on other issues decided at the same time as the
immunity issue.  See Spurgeon, 82 So. 3d at 670 (stating that
this Court would not consider the trial court's rulings on
matters not "relevant to the resolution of the issues of the
applicability of parental, State, or State-agent immunity"
because those rulings were "beyond the proper scope of
mandamus review"); Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d 1115, 1120
(Ala. 2003) (explaining that on mandamus review of a denial of
a summary-judgment motion grounded on immunity "[w]e confine
our interlocutory review to matters germane to the issue of
immunity," and that "[m]atters relevant to the merits of the
underlying tort claim, such as issues of duty or causation,
are best left to the trial court").
As further explained in Wood, the standard of review we
apply on a petition for a writ of mandamus to a trial court's
denial of a motion seeking a summary judgment on immunity
grounds is the same standard of review we would apply in any
appeal reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for a
summary judgment:
"If there is a genuine issue as to any material fact
on the question whether the movant is entitled to
immunity, then the moving party is not entitled to
a summary judgment.  Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.  In
determining whether there is [an issue of] material
10
1170988, 1170995
fact on the question whether the movant is entitled
to immunity, courts, both trial and appellate, must
view the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving party all
reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence,
and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving
party, considering only the evidence before the
trial court at the time it denied the motion for a
summary judgment.  Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911,
912 (Ala. 2000)."
852 So. 2d at 708.
Van Gilder's Petition (no. 1170995)
Van Gilder argues first that the trial court erred by not
entering a summary judgment in her favor on Curry's wrongful-
death claim to the extent that claim is premised on alleged
negligence.  She bases her argument on the doctrine of
parental 
immunity, 
which 
she 
says 
bars 
negligence-based claims
against a foster parent.  In support of her argument, Van
Gilder cites multiple cases decided by this Court, including
Spurgeon, in which we stated the rule that "in Alabama the
parental-immunity doctrine extends to foster parents with
regard to simple negligence claims."  82 So. 3d at 668.  Curry
concedes that Van Gilder's argument is meritorious, and he
does not oppose this Court's granting her petition with regard
to the negligence allegations in his complaint.  
11
1170988, 1170995
Curry argues, however, that to the extent his wrongful-
death claim is based on wantonness, it is not barred by the
doctrine of parental immunity.  Van Gilder agrees.  The
parties' view of the scope of parental immunity is in accord
with the applicable law, which we explained in Spurgeon:
"The [foster parents] do not argue that they are
entitled to parental immunity on the wantonness
claims, and, indeed, our decision in Mitchell [v.
Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992)], makes it clear
that such claims against foster parents are not
barred by the parental-immunity doctrine.  Mitchell,
598 So. 2d at 805–06 ('[T]he trial court must
determine whether the acts by the defendants alleged
to give rise to liability would amount only to
simple negligence or would rise to the level of
wantonness....  If the alleged acts amounted to
wantonness ..., then the wantonness claim by the
foster children would not be barred by the parental
immunity doctrine.')."
82 So. 3d at 669.  Thus, there is no question that the
doctrine of parental immunity bars Curry's wrongful-death
claim against Van Gilder to the extent that claim is based on
alleged negligence, but not to the extent it is based on
alleged wantonness.
Despite the fact that the parental-immunity doctrine is
inapplicable to wantonness, Van Gilder argues that a summary
judgment should have been entered in her favor on Curry's
entire claim, because, she says, Curry has not put forth
12
1170988, 1170995
substantial evidence to support his wantonness allegation. 
Van Gilder's argument, however, is not appropriate for
mandamus review.  As we explained when discussing the standard
of review, our mandamus review in cases such as this is
limited to determining only whether immunity applies.  The law
is clear that foster parents are entitled to parental immunity
with regard to negligence-based claims but not with regard to
wantonness-based claims, and we decline to look beyond that
principle in this case.  Whether there is substantial evidence
to support Curry's allegation of wantonness is a decision for
the trial court to make, and its decision is not reviewable at
this stage of the litigation by mandamus petition.  See Ex
parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d at 1120 ("Matters relevant to the
merits of the underlying tort claim ... are best left to the
trial court ...."); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 805–06
(Ala. 1992) (explaining that in determining the applicability
of the doctrine of parental immunity the trial court must
determine whether the acts of the defendant foster parents
constitute negligence or rise to the level of wantonness).
In summary, Van Gilder has established that Curry's
wrongful-death claim is barred by the doctrine of parental
13
1170988, 1170995
immunity to the extent the claim is based on her alleged
negligence.  The doctrine of parental immunity, however, does
not shield Van Gilder from suit to the extent the wrongful-
death claim is based on alleged wantonness.  Her petition for
the writ of mandamus is therefore granted in part and denied
in part.
Kelley's Petition (no. 1170988)
Kelley first argues that, as a DHR caseworker, she too
has parental immunity.  In support of her argument, she cites
Mitchell, in which this Court, after extending the doctrine of
parental immunity to foster parents, explained:
"The parental immunity doctrine should also be
available, in a qualified form, to the commissioner
[of DHR], the [Barbour County DHR], the [Barbour
County DHR] director, and the case supervisor
charged with the care and custody of foster
children.  That is, they also should be able to
assert the parental immunity doctrine as a defense
to claims of simple negligence by foster children. 
Alabama has already concluded that DHR stands in
loco parentis to children of unfit parents. 
[Citations omitted].  As DHR stands in loco
parentis, so does the commissioner [of DHR], the
[Barbour County DHR], the [Barbour County DHR]
director, and the case supervisor."
598 So. 2d at 805.  It is undisputed that DHR had legal
custody of A.C. at the time of his death.  As A.C.'s
caseworker, Kelley states that she arranged and attended his
14
1170988, 1170995
medical 
appointments and 
helped 
determine 
what 
activities 
were
appropriate for him based on his health –– tasks that would
traditionally be performed by parents.  Kelley argues that the
logic of the Mitchell Court's decision to extend parental
immunity to DHR employees remains applicable, that this Court
has not abrogated that holding, and that parental immunity
therefore bars the claim against her.  
In response, Curry argues that Mitchell's holding
extending parental immunity to DHR employees is obsolete.  He
notes that Kelley has not cited a single post-Mitchell case in
which this Court has held that a DHR employee was entitled to
parental immunity, even though this Court has regularly
decided appeals involving DHR employees who have been sued in
their individual capacities.  See, e.g., Ex parte Watson, 37
So. 3d 752, 757-65 (Ala. 2009); Sumerlin, 26 So. 3d at 1183-
91; Gowens v. Tys. S., 948 So. 2d 513, 522-27 (Ala. 2006). 
Curry observes that those cases have instead focused
exclusively on State-agent immunity when considering the
liability of DHR employees, and he urges us to decide whether
Kelley is entitled to immunity solely under the State-agent
15
1170988, 1170995
immunity doctrine set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d
392, 405 (Ala. 2000).4  We disagree.
The absence of post-Cranman caselaw applying the Mitchell
parental-immunity shield to DHR employees does not mean that
Mitchell has been silently overruled.   Curry is correct that,
since Cranman, this Court's opinions analyze the immunity
afforded DHR employees sued in their individual capacities
exclusively by reference to the test restated in Cranman.  But
the doctrine of parental immunity undisputedly did not apply
in most of those cases.  Mitchell stated that, because DHR
stands in loco parentis to foster children, DHR employees
"should be able to assert the parental immunity doctrine as a
defense to claims of simple negligence by foster children." 
598 So. 2d at 805 (emphasis added).  None of the cases Curry
cites featured claims filed on behalf of foster children in
DHR custody.  Rather, the factual underpinning of the claims
in Watson, Sumerlin, and Gowens was that DHR employees should
have removed children from their parents and placed them in
4"Although 
Cranman was a plurality 
decision, 
the
restatement of law as it pertains to State-agent immunity set
forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by this Court in Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911 (Ala. 2000), and Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000)."  Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299,
305 (Ala. 2008).
16
1170988, 1170995
DHR custody before they suffered their injuries.  Because
those cases did not concern foster children who were injured
while in the custody of DHR, Mitchell did not apply. 
Therefore, the failure of the DHR employees in Watson,
Sumerlin, and Gowens to assert parental immunity, and the
corresponding absence of any discussion of Mitchell in those
cases, cannot be read as an implicit recognition that the
doctrine of parental immunity no longer applies to DHR
employees.
There are other reasons why this Court has not discussed,
post-Cranman, how parental immunity applies to DHR employees. 
First, it is well settled that this Court will not reverse a
trial court's judgment based on arguments not made to this
Court.  Maloof v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 60 So. 3d 263,
268 (Ala. 2010).  Thus, if a DHR employee seeks this Court's
review of a trial court's decision denying him or her immunity
–– but argues only that he or she was entitled to State-agent
immunity –– this Court will not go out of its way to analyze
whether parental immunity might also have applied.  For
example, in Watson, this Court exclusively applied the 
Cranman
test for State-agent immunity because that was the only basis
17
1170988, 1170995
upon which the defendant DHR employees had sought immunity. 
37 So. 3d at 757.
Second, this Court will not address every applicable
issue in a case if the resolution of another issue makes doing
so unnecessary.  Ex parte McClintock, 255 So. 3d 180 (Ala.
2017), for example, is similar to this case; it involved
claims against DHR employees alleging that the negligence and
wantonness of those employees caused the death of a child who
had been removed from his parent's custody and placed in
foster care.  The DHR employees moved for a summary judgment,
arguing "that they were entitled to immunity on several
bases."  255 So. 3d at 182.  After the trial court denied
their summary-judgment motion, the DHR employees petitioned
this Court for mandamus relief.  This Court granted their
petition and issued the requested writ, holding that the DHR
employees had established that they were entitled to "a
summary judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity
under Ex parte Cranman."  McClintock, 255 So. 3d at 186.
Because 
State-agent 
immunity 
was 
appropriate, 
it 
was
unnecessary for this Court to discuss any other basis upon
which the DHR employees might have been entitled to immunity.
18
1170988, 1170995
In sum, the fact that this Court has not cited Mitchell
in the post-Cranman era for the proposition that DHR employees
are entitled to parental immunity should not be taken to mean
that this Court has retreated from that aspect of Mitchell. 
See Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 818 (Ala. 2002)
("Arguments based on what courts do not say, logically
speaking, are generally unreliable and should not be favored
by the judiciary ....").  To the contrary, Mitchell continues
to apply, and Curry's wrongful-death claim against Kelley is
barred by the doctrine of parental immunity to the extent the
claim is based on allegations of negligence.5  The doctrine of
parental immunity does not, however, bar Curry's claim based
on wantonness.  See Spurgeon, 82 So. 3d at 669 ("If the
alleged acts amounted to wantonness ..., then the wantonness
claim by the foster children would not be barred by the
parental 
immunity 
doctrine.").  
Consequently, we 
next 
consider
Kelley's argument that she is entitled to State-agent
5We further note that Curry has not asked us to overrule
Mitchell, nor has he offered any reasons why it should be
overruled.  Instead, he operates as if it has already been
overruled.  As we have previously stated:  "[T]his Court has
long recognized a disinclination to overrule existing caselaw
in the absence of either a specific request to do so or an
adequate argument asking that we do so."  Ex parte McKinney,
87 So. 3d 502, 509 n. 7 (Ala. 2011). 
19
1170988, 1170995
immunity.  See McClintock, 255 So. 3d at 182 (holding that
State-agent immunity barred "claims of wrongful death of a
minor, negligence, wantonness, and negligent/wanton training
and supervision" asserted against DHR employees).  
Kelley contends that she has established a claim to
State-agent immunity under the third ground of the test set
forth in Cranman:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"....
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner ...."
792 So. 2d at 405.  She asserts that all the actions she took
with respect to A.C. were performed in accordance with DHR
rules and regulations and that Curry should be prevented from
second-guessing the discretionary decisions that she made. 
She further asserts that she was highly involved in A.C.'s
case, visiting him and his siblings on at least a monthly
basis, and that there is no evidence that A.C.'s death was
caused by any act or omission on her part.  Thus, she argues,
20
1170988, 1170995
the trial court erred by not entering a summary judgment in
her favor on the basis of State-agent immunity, and this Court
should now issue a writ directing the trial court to do so.
We agree that, under Cranman, Kelley has a presumptive
claim to State-agent immunity.  See Ex parte Terry, 239 So. 3d
1125, 1130-31 (Ala. 2017) (agreeing that "as a social worker
with DHR, [the petitioner] is entitled to 
State-agent immunity
under category (3) of the Cranman restatement because ... the
actions for which she is being sued involve her discharging
duties pursuant to DHR policy and procedures").  Our inquiry
is not complete, however, because Cranman also provides that,
despite the general availability of State-agent immunity, "a
State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or
her personal capacity ... when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law." 
792 So. 2d at 405.  In Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d
450, 452 (Ala. 2006), this Court explained the 
burden-shifting
analysis that courts must apply:
"In order to claim State-agent immunity, a State
agent bears the burden of demonstrating that the
plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would
entitle the State agent to immunity.  Giambrone [v.
21
1170988, 1170995
Douglas], 874 So. 2d [1046,] 1052 [(Ala. 2003)]; Ex
parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala. 2002).  If the
State agent makes such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent
acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, or beyond his or her authority.  Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex
parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  'A
State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore
not immune when he or she "fail[s] to discharge
duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations,
such as those stated on a checklist."'  Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.
2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000))."
Curry does not dispute that Kelley met her initial
burden, but he argues that State-agent immunity is not
available to her because, he says, she acted beyond the scope
of her authority.  Curry contends that Kelley generally failed
to learn about A.C.'s condition and failed to properly share
information about his case with all the DHR employees and
caretakers involved in A.C.'s case.  He also contends that
Kelley failed to follow specific, detailed rules set forth in
the DHR manual concerning ISPs.  Curry argues that those
failures 
make 
State-agent immunity 
inappropriate.  
See 
Gowens,
948 So. 2d at 527 (stating that the rules in the DHR manual
"are precisely the sort of 'detailed rules or regulations'
that State agents cannot ignore, except at their peril");
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003) ("A
22
1170988, 1170995
State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not immune
when he or she 'fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules or regulations ....'" (quoting Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000))).  But see Watson, 37 So. 3d
at 766 (Murdock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (expressing concern that "we are moving to a place in
our law in which we consider any violation of any regulation
and any violation of a memorandum of instruction (or for that
matter even an oral instruction) from a supervisor to deprive
an employee of otherwise applicable State-agent immunity on
the ground that he or she is acting 'beyond his or her
authority'").  Therefore, it is necessary to review DHR's
rules regarding ISPs to determine if Kelley was in compliance.
A written copy of DHR's ISP policy was submitted to the
trial court and has been submitted to this Court.  That
document describes its purpose as follows:
"This policy provides guidelines and procedures
related to the individualized service planning
process which results in the development of an
individualized service plan (ISP).  The ISP,
developed in partnership with the child and family
planning team, is the actual case plan that is
designed to achieve the desired case outcome.  It
also serves as an organizer of case activity and a
tool for communicating with the individuals involved
with the children and family."
23
1170988, 1170995
The ISP policy provides that "[i]nitial ISPs must be completed
within 30 days of when the determination is made that the case
will be opened for on-going child welfare services."  It is
undisputed that Kelley completed an initial ISP for A.C.; that
ISP has been submitted to this Court.  
The ISP policy also states in bold print that "[i]nitial
ISPs will be reviewed at a meeting of the child and family
planning team that is held within thirty (30) days of the date
of the initial ISP."  The ISP policy explains the twofold
purpose of this review:
"(1) to determine if implementation is occurring as
planned, and if not, what revisions need to be made;
and
"(2) to complete a more thorough ISP addressing
additional needs which have been identified and
prioritized during the assessment process following
the initial ISP."
The ISP policy provides that "[a] more thorough ISP includes,
at a minimum, addressing strengths and needs for the children
and family in the physical/medical, behavioral, emotional,
educational, and social (for children in out-of-home care)
areas of family functioning."  Curry argued in his response to
Kelley's motion for a summary judgment that Kelley never
performed this required, more thorough 30-day ISP review and,
24
1170988, 1170995
in fact, never updated A.C.'s initial ISP to include
information about his sickle-cell-anemia care and treatment. 
For that reason, Curry argues, the details of A.C.'s care and
treatment were not available to other interested parties and
could not be evaluated by Kelley's supervisor.  Curry further
argues that, if Kelley had been properly involved and had
completed these tasks, she would have ensured that A.C. was
designated a "medically fragile" child.
Kelley refutes Curry's assertion that she never performed
the required 30-day ISP review.  In a November 2017 affidavit,
Kelley states that she performed "a segmented ISP review" at
a doctor's appointment for A.C. on March 21, 2013.6  She
states that Van Gilder, Curry, and A.C.'s primary-care
physician were present at the review, that she concluded at
that time that the initial ISP was thorough, and that no goals
in that ISP needed to be changed.  Kelley had previously
stated in an October 2016 deposition that she was not required
to document the 30-day ISP review.  Thus, Kelley argues, she
complied with DHR's ISP policy, and any concerns Curry has
6The ISP policy explains that segmenting "means bringing
some of the team members together for a meeting, rather than
assembling the entire team."
25
1170988, 1170995
raised about decisions that she made regarding A.C.'s ISP are
impermissible attempts to second-guess those decisions.
Curry maintains that Kelley did not abide by DHR's rules
regarding the 30-day ISP review and argues that she is now
attempting to retroactively label A.C.'s March 21, 2013,
doctor's appointment as an ISP review.  He further argues that
Kelley's position that the initial ISP only has to be
"reviewed" by the 30-day mark, and not updated and documented,
is contrary to the written guidelines in DHR's ISP policy,
which indicate that one of the purposes of the 30-day ISP
review is "to complete a more thorough ISP."  In support of
his argument, Curry notes that the ISP policy provides that
all interested parties, or "team members," are to be given
"[s]ufficient advance notice ... of each ISP meeting ... to
allow them to prepare for and participate in the meetings." 
Moreover, the method of notification is to be documented "on
the ISP form," and all revisions and updates to the initial
ISP are to be completed within 10 days of the ISP meeting so
that the ISP can be distributed to appropriate team members
within that same time frame.  Finally, the DHR policy
specifically provides 
that 
supervisory 
review 
and 
approval, 
as
26
1170988, 1170995
evidenced by a signature, are required after "the 30-day
review following an initial ISP's development."  In this case,
Kelley acknowledged during her October 2016 deposition that no
one at A.C.'s March 21, 2013, doctor's appointment knew they
were attending an ISP meeting, and it is undisputed that an
updated ISP was not prepared, submitted for 
supervisor review,
or distributed to any team members following that alleged ISP
meeting.
When reviewing a trial court's decision on a summary-
judgment motion, our standard of review requires us to
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant –– in this case, Curry.  Curry has established that
there is at least a question of material fact about whether
Kelley failed to discharge her duties in accordance with DHR's
rules.  Specifically, he has identified evidence indicating
that Kelley violated DHR's ISP policy by failing to conduct
the required 30-day ISP review and by failing to complete a
more thorough ISP in conjunction with that review.  Thus,
under our caselaw, Kelley did not establish that she was
entitled to a summary judgment in her favor on the basis of
State-agent immunity.  See, e.g., Ex parte Jones, 52 So. 3d
27
1170988, 1170995
475, 484 (Ala. 2010) (holding that DHR employee was not
entitled to a summary judgment on the basis of State-agent
immunity where there was a genuine issue of material fact
about whether she had acted beyond her authority by failing to
turn in a required report); Watson, 37 So. 3d at 760-61
(holding that DHR employee did not establish that she was
entitled to a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity
where there was substantial evidence indicating that she had
not complied with a DHR regulation requiring her to conduct a
home visit); Gowens, 948 So. 2d at 527 (holding that DHR
employee was not entitled to a summary judgment on the basis
of State-agent immunity where employee failed to comply with
a DHR requirement that he verify, from an outside source, the
number of children in a household under investigation).
Finally, Kelley argues that, regardless of whether she is
entitled to immunity, there is no connection between her
alleged violations of DHR's ISP policy and A.C.'s death.  As
she states, the "alleged lack of documentation did not cause
the child's death" nor did the lack of "a 'more thorough'
ISP."  Petition at p. 29.  Such an argument, however, is
unrelated to Kelley's claim of immunity and thus is not an
28
1170988, 1170995
issue we can consider on mandamus review.  See Hudson, 866 So.
2d at 1120 (explaining that on mandamus "[w]e confine our
interlocutory review to matters germane to the issue of
immunity" and that "[m]atters relevant to the merits of the
underlying tort claim, such as issues of duty or causation,
are best left to the trial court" (emphasis added)). 
Moreover, in a previous appeal in which a government
employee's claim of State-agent immunity was rejected because
the employee failed to follow specific guidelines outlining
the manner in which she should perform her job, this Court
explained:
"The extent to which there is a causal relation
between the matters made the basis of the complaint
and the deviation from the guideline is an issue we
do not decide.  When entertaining interlocutory
review of the denial of a summary judgment in the
context of immunity we do not address other matters
dealing with the merits of tort liability."
Ex parte Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 48 So. 3d 621, 628 n.2
(Ala. 2010).  Therefore, because Curry has provided
substantial evidence that Kelley did not comply with the DHR
ISP policy, this Court may deny her petition for the writ of
mandamus without a consideration of proximate cause.  Of
course, Curry will be required to produce substantial evidence
29
1170988, 1170995
of causation at trial in order to submit his claims to the
jury for its consideration.  But to the extent Curry's
wrongful-death claim 
against 
Kelley 
is 
premised 
on 
allegations
of wantonness, Kelley has not established that she was
entitled to a summary judgment on the basis of State-agent
immunity, and her petition in that respect is denied.
Conclusion
Curry sued Van Gilder and Kelley following the death of
his son A.C., alleging that their negligent and wanton actions
wrongfully caused his death.  Van Gilder and Kelley argued
that they were immune from liability based on their respective
statuses as a foster parent and a DHR caseworker, and they
moved the trial court to enter summary judgments in their
favor on those bases.  After the trial court denied their
motions, Van Gilder and Kelley petitioned this Court for
mandamus relief, seeking writs directing the trial court to
enter summary judgments in their favor on the basis of
immunity.
For the reasons explained above, we grant Van Gilder and
Kelley's petitions in part.  To the extent Curry's wrongful-
death claims against Van Gilder and Kelley are based on
30
1170988, 1170995
allegations of negligence, those claims are barred by the
doctrine of parental immunity.  Parental immunity, however,
does not bar wantonness-based claims, and Kelley has not
established that she is entitled to State-agent immunity as to
the wantonness claim against her.  Therefore, Curry's
wrongful-death claims against Van Gilder and Kelley may
proceed to the extent those claims are based on allegations of
wantonness.
1170988 –– PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; 
WRIT ISSUED.
1170995 –– PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; 
WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, C.J., and Wise and Mitchell, JJ., concur
specially. 
31
1170988; 1170995
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
In Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992), this
Court extended parental immunity to the Department of Human
Resources 
and 
its 
employees 
(hereinafter 
referred 
to
collectively as "DHR"). The respondent, Arnold Curry, has not
asked us to overrule Mitchell, so I concur with the main
opinion.  However, I write to explain why Mitchell's grant of
parental immunity to DHR is both an anomaly in American
jurisprudence and contrary to the historical foundations of
parental immunity in Alabama.
First, Mitchell's extension of parental immunity to DHR
is an extreme outlier in the United States.  National
treatises suggest that Alabama is the only state to have
granted such immunity to a child-protection agency.  See
Marjorie A. Shields, Liability of Parents or Person in Loco
Parentis for Personal Tort Against Minor Child -- Willful or
Malicious Act, 118 A.L.R.5th 513, § 6 (2004); 43 Causes of
Action 2d 1, § 25 (2019); see also Grant Hayes Frazier,
Defusing a Ticking Time Bomb: The Complicated Considerations
Underlying Compulsory Human Genetic Testing, 10 Hastings Sci.
& Tech. L.J. 39, 73 n. 153 (2019).  I have found no other
32
1170988; 1170995
American case granting such immunity.  Indeed, other courts
that have considered this or similar claims of immunity have
expressly rejected them.  See, e.g., Bartels v. Westchester
Cty., 76 A.D.2d 517, 520, 522, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908, 909
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Wallace v. Smyth, 203 Ill. 2d 441, 443,
448, 451-52, 786 N.E.2d 980, 982, 985, 987, 272 Ill. Dec. 146,
148, 151, 153 (2002).
Second and more importantly, Mitchell's extension of
parental immunity to DHR runs counter to the historical
foundations of this type of immunity.  The doctrine of
parental immunity stems from a trio of American cases decided
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries:  Hewellette v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey,
111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); and Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).  Widespread adoption of the
doctrine quickly followed.  Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M.
Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the
Parent, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 1161, 1163 (1991).
From its inception, the doctrine has been rooted in the
nature of the parent-child relationship.  Courts reasoned that
the state bore a responsibility to protect and preserve the
33
1170988; 1170995
family unit but that allowing an unemancipated child to sue
the parent would promote family turmoil.  See, e.g.,
Hewellette, 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887; Owens v. Auto Mut.
Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 10, 177 So. 133, 134 (1937).  Because
"the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and
control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid
and comfort and obey," the parent should generally be immune
from suit by the child.  See Hewellette, 68 Miss. at 711, 9
So. at 887.  Although the doctrine has evolved since the early
1900s, this Court has continued to affirm the principle that
parental immunity "'exists only where the suit, or the
prospect of a suit, might disturb the family relations.'" 
Owens, 235 Ala. at 10, 11 So. at 134 (quoting Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 372, 150 A. 905, 915 (1930)); see Hurst
v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989); Mitchell, 598
So. 2d at 804.
As we recognized in Mitchell, this family-relationship
rationale naturally extends to foster parents.  Like natural
parents, "[f]oster parents provide food, shelter, and
discipline for children in their homes.  Foster parents must
also try to meet the emotional needs of the children." 
34
1170988; 1170995
Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 804.  Therefore, foster parents are
entitled to parental immunity. Id.
Despite this well established grounding of parental
immunity in the family relationship, in Mitchell this Court 
extended parental immunity to DHR without determining whether
the 
rationale 
underlying 
the 
doctrine 
supported 
that
extension.  See 598 So. 2d at 805.  Indeed, we observed that
"there is no familial relationship between DHR and foster
children that a lawsuit could disturb." Id.  That observation
remains true today.  Unlike foster parents, DHR does not
directly provide food and shelter to the children in its care,
has no legal authority to discipline them, and cannot meet
their emotional needs.  
The two state courts that have refused to extend parental
immunity to child-protection agencies and similar entities
have done so for precisely that reason.  A New York Supreme
Court Appellate Division considered an agency's argument that
it should have parental immunity against a charge of
inadequate supervision.  Bartels, 76 A.D.2d at 520, 429
N.Y.S.2d at 906.  The court held that parental immunity did
not 
extend 
to 
the 
agency 
because 
the 
public-policy
35
1170988; 1170995
consideration 
underlying the 
doctrine 
-- 
"the 
potential 
strife
between parent and child created by litigation" -- did not
apply. 76 A.D.2d at 522, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
issue in the context of a corporately owned children's home
that provided care under a contract with a child-protection
agency.  Wallace, 203 Ill. 2d at 148, 786 N.E.2d at 982, 272
Ill. Dec. at 443.  The children's home argued that, because it
controlled the daily care of the child, it was entitled to
parental immunity.  203 Ill. 2d at 151, 786 N.E.2d at 985, 272
Ill. Dec. at 448.  The court disagreed, reasoning that "while
the parental immunity doctrine logically reaches foster
parents, it cannot stretch to cover a corporate entity and its
employees.  The employees of a residential child care facility
... exercise their professional duties in handling state
wards; 
they 
are 
not 
parents, 
however 
similar 
their
responsibilities."  203 Ill. 2d at 152, 786 N.E.2d at 987, 272
Ill. Dec. at 451-52.  The court held that, because of the lack
of family relationship, there could be no parental immunity. 
Likewise, here in Alabama, the Department of Human
Resources and its employees are not parents exercising loving
36
1170988; 1170995
care and discipline of their children.  Rather, the department 
and its employees perform their professional duties as agents
of the State, "which by its nature cannot love," Ex parte
G.C., 924 So. 2d 651, 685 (Ala. 2005)(Parker, J., dissenting).
See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 638 (1979) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The social
worker-child relationship is not deserving of the special
protection and deference accorded to the parent-child
relationship, and state officials ... cannot be equated with
parents.").  Thus, given the lack of a family relationship
between DHR and foster children, the historical rationale for
parental immunity cannot justify the application of the
doctrine to DHR.    
In addition to those problems, the Court in Mitchell
relied on a faulty premise, at odds with history, that DHR
stands in loco parentis.  To the contrary, the origins of that
doctrine reveal that it is inextricably tied to the voluntary
delegation of authority by parents.
From its oldest recorded reference, the legal concept of
in loco parentis entailed a relationship based on consent of
a parent.  The doctrine first emerged in Roman law under the
37
1170988; 1170995
term patroni loco.  See Kaye Don Moran, An Historical
Development in the Doctrine of in Loco Parentis with Court
Interpretations in the United States 16, 20-22 (1967)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas).7 
According to the Roman jurist Gaius, parents could delegate
authority over and custody of their children to a tutor.  Id.
at 21-22.  The tutor became a quasi-legal guardian and
therefore stood patroni loco.  Id. at 22.
As early as the 13th century, this delegative concept of
patroni loco was adopted in England under its current moniker,
in loco parentis.  See id. at 31 (citing Roscoe Pound,
Readings on the History and System of the Common Law 28 (2d
ed. 1913)).  William Blackstone, the great commentator on the
English common law (on which Alabama law is based, see § 1-3-
1, Ala. Code 1975), described the doctrine as permitting a
parent to 
"delegate part of his parental authority, during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who
is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of
7This 
dissertation 
is 
available 
on 
the 
ProQuest
Dissertations & Theses Global database, as well as through the
Alabama Supreme Court library via an inter-library loan.
Copies of the pages referenced in this opinion are also
available in the case files of the clerk of the Alabama
Supreme Court. 
38
1170988; 1170995
the power of the parent committed to his charge,
viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is
employed."  
 
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *441.
On this side of the Atlantic, Chancellor James Kent
echoed Blackstone's comment: "The power allowed by law to the
parent over the person of the child, may be delegated to a
tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purposes of
education." 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 170
(1827). Kent's use of the doctrine of in loco parentis in the
context of the delegated authority of educators was later
adopted in Alabama.  See Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 171, 7
So. 268, 269 (1890).  Shortly thereafter, this Court extended
the doctrine to include anyone to whom parents had delegated
authority.  See Dean v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 49, 8 So. 38, 39
(1890).8
8This Court also sometimes used the term in loco parentis
to refer to the position of a guardian over an orphan. See,
e.g., Rittenberry v. Wharton, 182 Ala. 388, 391, 62 So. 672,
673 (1913).  
Those guardianships similarly involved consent of
parents, whether expressed by will or implied by intestacy.
Consistent 
with 
this 
Court's 
historical 
approach, 
a
Pennsylvania court recently affirmed that "in loco parentis
status cannot be achieved without the consent ... of ... a
parent."   E.W. v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super.
2007).
39
1170988; 1170995
In 1939, for the first time, this Court pronounced that
the State, in its child-protective role, stood in loco
parentis. In deciding a custody dispute between a child's
father and stepfather after her mother had died, the Court
remarked by way of legal background:
"In awarding custody of minors modern courts have
often said that the welfare of the child is
paramount, but this consideration will not suffice
to take children from parents who are decent and
responsible, if able to furnish the necessities for
their children, although the child's welfare and
prospects in life might be bettered thereby, but
custody may be taken away from parents manifestly
unfit by the State standing in loco parentis in
equity."
Chandler v. Whatley, 238 Ala. 206, 209, 189 So. 751, 754
(1939) (quoting 1 James Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of
Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations § 744
(6th ed. 1921) (emphasis added)).  It was on that language in
Chandler that Mitchell later relied in extending parental
immunity to DHR. Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 804.  However,
Chandler's pronouncement that the State stands in loco
parentis was made without any consideration of the historical
40
1170988; 1170995
understanding of that legal status as founded on consensual
delegation by parents.9
Further, that historical understanding comports with a
sound view of the State's role in protecting children.  In
this role, the State does not derive its authority from being
"in the place of a parent."  Rather, the State derives its
authority from its God-ordained nature as the State.  Like the
family, the State "is a separate and legitimate human
government within its proper sphere."  Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So.
3d 634, 650 (Ala. 2011) (Parker, J., concurring specially).
"[I]t possesses supreme authority within its own legitimate
bounds, with the rights and duties of its members ordained by
'a higher authority.'" Id. at 650-51 (quoting Ex parte
Sullivan, 407 So. 2d 559, 563 (Ala. 1981)).  See generally id.
(explaining 
divinely 
designed 
separate 
spheres 
of 
authority 
of
family and state, with historical references); G.C., 924 So.
2d at 674-77 (same, in greater detail).
9Chandler's pronouncement may have been rooted in the
philosophy of national socialism, which regrettably, but
briefly, influenced this Court in the early 20th century.  See
Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 656 (Ala. 2011) (Parker, J.,
concurring specially) (explaining this Court's mercifully
short foray into a socialist view of family vis-à-vis state
authority).
41
1170988; 1170995
In Alabama, the State's sphere of authority is defined by
its natural purpose, which is recognized in our State
constitution: "[T]he sole object and only legitimate end of
government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life,
liberty, and property ...."  Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, § 35. 
The "citizen[s]" whom the State is obligated to protect
include not only adults, but also their children.  "[A]side
from being members of families, children are also members of
the larger political community. That political community, via
the authorities which govern it, has certain responsibilities
and related rights with regard to children."  Melissa
Moschella, To Whom Do Children Belong?: Parental Rights, Civic
Education, and Children's Autonomy 151 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2016) (footnote omitted).  Thus, "State involvement in [cases
of abuse or neglect] is permissible, because in these cases
parents have acted improperly outside their jurisdiction and
thereby subjected themselves to the state's sword of 
justice." 
G.C., 924 So. 2d at 686 (Parker, J., dissenting); cf.
Moschella, supra (positing that state may exercise protective
authority over children "[o]nly in situations of 
genuine abuse
and neglect" "because in those cases parental authority has
42
1170988; 1170995
lost its legitimacy").  See generally G.C., 924 So. 2d at 676
(Parker, J., dissenting) (discussing the mutually corrective
roles of government spheres, which are "of divine creation
rather than human invention").
Because the State's authority over abused or neglected
children is inherent, not delegated from parents, the State
does not stand in loco parentis.  Thus, Chandler's
pronouncement and Mitchell's reliance on it to grant parental
immunity to DHR were misguided.
In summary, Mitchell's extension of parental immunity to
DHR stands as 
a solitary jurisprudential miscue among American
courts.  More importantly, it runs counter to the historical
foundations of the doctrine of parental immunity.  Although
the State has an interest in protecting family relationships,
DHR has no familial relationship with the children in its
care.  And although the State has a role in protecting
children from abuse and neglect, that role is not in loco
parentis.  Therefore, although I reluctantly concur because 
Curry has not asked this Court to abrogate this application of
the doctrine, this aspect of Mitchell ought to be overruled
upon appropriate request and argument in a future case.
Wise, J., concurs.
43
1170988; 1170995
MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur because Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala.
1992), is controlling precedent.  Like Chief Justice Parker
and Justice Wise, however, I am uncomfortable with the
principle that the State and its agents have parental immunity
equivalent to the immunity enjoyed by biological, adoptive,
and foster parents.  For that reason, I would be open to
reconsidering this principle in a future case in which this
Court is asked to overrule Mitchell.
44