Title: Deuley, et al. v. DynCorp International, Incorporated, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 155, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MICHELLE DEULEY, Individually, and in ) 
Her Capacities as Surviving Spouse of` 
)  No. 155, 2010 
John Deuley, as Executrix of the Estate of 
) 
John Deuley, Deceased, And as Mother, 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
Guardian and/or Next Friend of Amberlye 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
Marie Deuley, Justin Andrew Deuley, and 
)  and for New Castle County 
Jordan Aubrey Deuley, Minor Children of 
) 
John Deuley, JOSEPH AND KIM 
 
)  C.A. No. 06C-08-188 
DICKINSON; KATHY GIBSON,  
 
) 
Individually, and in her Capacities as  
) 
Surviving Spouse of Gerald Gibson and as ) 
Executrix of the Estate of Gerald Gibson, 
) 
Deceased, 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiffs Below Appellants, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DYNCORP INTERNATONAL, 
 
) 
INCORPORATED, a Delaware Corporation) 
Parent of the co-defendant DYNCORP 
) 
Entities, formerly known as DI   
 
) 
Acquisition Corp; DYNCORP   
 
) 
INTERNATIONAL LLC, a Delaware  
) 
Limited Liability Corporation; and CSC 
) 
APPLIED TECHNOLOGIES LLC, 
 
) 
Formerly known as Dyncorp Technical 
) 
Services, LLC, a Delaware Limited 
 
) 
Liability Corporation, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendants Below Appellees. ) 
 
Submitted:  September 15, 2010 
Decided:  December 8, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
2 
 
 
 
Neilli Mullen Walsh and Ben T. Castle of Young Conaway Stargatt & 
Taylor LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; James E. Beasley, Jr. and Maxwell S. 
Kennerly (argued) of The Beasley Firm, LLC, of counsel, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania for appellants. 
 
 
Robert K. Beste, III of Smith, Katzenstein & Furlow LLP, Wilmington, 
Delaware; Robert B. Wallace (argued), Kevin Farrell and Chrissy Costantino of 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP of counsel, Washington, DC 
for appellees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
3 
 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether a Superior Court judge erred by holding 
that under Delaware law the liability clause in civilian police officers’ employment 
contracts released claims arising out of injuries suffered in Afghanistan.   The 
complainants contend that the liability clause and relevant language purporting to 
release “any claim” is insufficient to release their employer and its affiliates from 
claims of negligence.  Because the language of the employment agreement clearly 
and unambiguously releases those claims, we AFFIRM the Superior Court’s 
judgments. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On August 29, 2004, a terrorist attack on the United States Department of 
State Civilian Police (CIVPOL) headquarters building in Kabul, Afghanistan, 
killed CIVPOL officers John Deuley and Gerald Gibson and seriously injured 
Joseph Dickinson.  The terrorist operative detonated a vehicle borne improvised 
explosive device on the street outside the building.  Deuley’s wife and Gibson’s 
wife filed wrongful death and survival actions, Dickinson filed a personal injury 
claim, and his wife filed a loss of consortium claim against the general contractors 
of the mission.   
4 
 
The Officers worked for DynCorp International FZ, LLC, a Dubai 
corporation.  DynCorp, FZ is not a party to this action.1 Appellees/Defendants 
DynCorp International Inc., DynCorp International LLC, and CSC Applied 
Technologies LLC (collectively, DynCorp) were the general contractors to the 
CIVPOL mission.  They managed employee housing, logistical support, and 
supervision.  DynCorp International, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Reston, Virginia.  DynCorp International LLC is a 
limited liability Delaware company with its principal place of business in Fort 
Worth, Texas.  CSC Applied Technologies LLC is a Delaware limited liability 
company that maintains an office in New Castle, Delaware.   
DynCorp filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) 
based on the terms of the Employment Agreement the Officers signed.  The 
agreement contained a “Liability” provision at Paragraph 10, stating: 
The Employee understands and accepts the fact that he or she may be 
exposed to dangers due to the nature of the mission.  The Employee agrees 
that neither Employer nor its affiliates will be liable in the event of death, 
injury, or disability, to Employee, except as stated below.  Employer will 
obtain the insurance described in Attachment A on behalf of the Employee.  
The Employee agrees to accept these insurance benefits as full satisfaction 
                                                           
1 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(4), the Defense Base Act, which applies Section 904(a) of the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act to any employment under a contract (or 
subcontract with respect to such contract) entered into by the United States for engaging in 
public works abroad, subcontractor employer FZ-LLC Dubai secured DBA coverage for its 
employees, John Deuley, Joseph Dickinson, and Gerald Gibson. 
 
5 
 
of any claim for death, injury, or disability against Employer and its 
affiliates.2 
 
The agreement also contained a choice of law provision stating “[t]his 
contract shall be governed by and interpreted under the laws of the Dubai Internet 
City in the Dubai Technology, Electronic Commerce and Media City Free Zone.”3 
Both parties submitted expert testimony attempting to demonstrate the applicable 
Dubai law in support of and against the Motion to Dismiss.   
 
In accordance with the agreement, DynCorp purchased insurance for 
Deuley, Gibson, and Dickinson.  Upon their deaths, Deuley’s and Gibson’s 
beneficiaries received $160,000 under their policies.4  Dickinson receives disability 
benefits of $1030.78 per week, and will receive free medical treatment until his 
doctor releases him to return to work or he reaches his maximum medical 
improvement.5 
The Superior Court judge granted DynCorp’s Motion to Dismiss based on 
the above stated contract provision. 
                                                           
2 Appellants’ Appendix at A000077, A000083, A000090. 
 
3 Appellants’ Appendix at A000079, A000086, A0000902. 
 
4 Deuley v. DynCorp Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 704895, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2010). 
 
5 Id.  Dickinson’s injuries include loss of hearing and impairment to his left leg. 
 
6 
 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review a decision to grant a Motion to Dismiss under Superior Court 
Rule 12(b)(6) de novo to determine whether the judge erred as a matter of law in 
formulating or applying legal precepts.6  In reviewing the grant or denial of a 
Motion to Dismiss, “we view the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, accepting as true its well-pled allegations and drawing all reasonable 
inferences that logically flow from those allegations.”7  We do not, however, 
accept “conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts, nor do we draw 
unreasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.”8  In limited circumstances a court 
may consider the plain terms of a document incorporated in the complaint without 
converting the motion into one for summary judgments.9  
 
A judge’s ruling on foreign law is a question of law we review de novo.10 
                                                           
6 Clinton v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009). 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 Id. (citing White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 549 (Del. 2001)). 
 
9 In re Gen. Motors S'holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 169 (Del.2006);  see also In re Santa Fe Pac. 
Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 69 (Del. 1995). 
 
10 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 30 (Del. 2005). 
 
7 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
The Choice of Law Analysis 
Delaware courts use the “most significant relationship test” when conducting 
a contract choice of law analysis.11   The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws 
Section 6(2) provides that the following seven factors are relevant in conducting a 
choice of law inquiry: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
 
 In general, Delaware Courts will honor “a contractually designed choice of 
law provision so long as the jurisdiction selected bears some material relationship 
to the transaction.”12  A material relationship exists where a party’s principal place 
of business is located within the foreign jurisdiction,13 a majority of the activity 
                                                           
11 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 41 (Del. 1991). 
 
12 J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., Inc., 750 A.2d 518, 520 (Del. 2000); 
Annan v. Wilmington Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1289, 1293 (Del. 1989). 
 
13 Maloney-Refaie v. Bridge at Sch., Inc., 958 A.2d 871, 879 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2008); Shadewell 
Grove IP, LLC v. Mrs. Fields Franchising, LLC, 2006 WL 1375106, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 8, 
2006); Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 112 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 
8 
 
underlying the action occurred within the foreign jurisdiction,14 and where parties 
to a contract performed most of their services in the foreign state.15  However, a 
foreign jurisdiction’s laws may not be used to interpret a contractual provision “in 
a manner repugnant to the public policy of Delaware.”16 
The Officers’ employment agreement plainly states that Dubai law governs 
the contract.17  While Dubai arguably does not have a strong material relationship 
to this action —Deuley was from Arkansas, Gibson was from Missouri, Dickinson 
is a resident of Virginia, the DynCorp Defendants are Delaware business entities, 
and the Officers’ employment and their injuries occurred in Afghanistan—Dubai’s 
relationship to the case is similar to Delaware’s.  As we explain below, the result 
would be the same under both Delaware and Dubai law.  Therefore “[a]ccording to 
conflicts of law principles  . . .  there is a ‘false conflict,’ and the Court should 
avoid the choice-of-law analysis altogether.”18 
                                                           
14 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Bayer CropScience L.P., 958 A.2d 245, 249 n.9 (Del. Ch. 
2008). 
 
15 Bozic, 769 A.2d at 112.  See also Knight v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 2007 WL 143099, at *5 n. 14 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 2007) (“Alabama clearly satisfies this test because the claims and 
counterclaims that the Settlement Agreement resolved were pending in its State courts.”). 
 
16 J.S. Alberici Constr. Co.,750 A.2d at 520. 
 
17 Appellants’ Appendix at A000079, A000086, A0000902. 
 
18 Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hill Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d. Cir. 2006); see also Lagrone v. 
Am. Mortell Corp., 2008 WL 4152677, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2008) (“In such instances 
of ‘false conflicts’ of laws, the Court may resolve the dispute without a choice between the laws 
of the competing jurisdictions.”). 
 
9 
 
B. 
Dubai/UAE Law Analysis 
The laws of Delaware, the United Arab Emirates,19 and Dubai are similar if 
a worker is injured or killed during the course of his employment.  In the UAE and 
Dubai, if an employee is killed or injured during the course of his employment, the 
law provides certain remedies.  In the event of the death of an employee, UAE 
Labor Law requires that a certain amount be paid to the employee’s family.  The 
judge here found the release valid under UAE labor law based upon the expert 
declaration of Omar Al Shaikh, a Dubai attorney specializing in UAE labor law:   
[I]n order for [the general release] to be valid where an employee has died as 
a result of an accident at work[,] the employer is required to pay the 
employee’s family (as defined in Article 149) a one time lump sum payment 
equal to his basic remuneration for 24 months, provided that the amount of 
the compensation is not less that AED 18,000 (USD $4,904.63) nor greater 
than AED 35,000 (USD $9,536.78).20   
 
                                                           
19  The Dubai Internet City is a free zone in the UAE that facilitates foreign investment 
opportunities in the UAE.  The TECOM Employment Regulations of 2004 apply to all 
companies that operate in Dubai and regulate the employment relationship between 
employer/licensee and its employees.  Article 12.2 of the TECOM Employment Regulations 
requires that:   
“A licensee worker’s compensation insurance shall include cover [sic] employment 
injury and/or disability and related medical expenses in accordance with the UAE Labor 
Law.”   
TECOM regulations may provide additional or enhanced requirements between employer and 
employee in Dubai, but the employment relationship is still governed by the UAE Labor Law 
which creates the statutory minimum obligations of the employer.  Appellants’ Appendix at 
A000049. 
 
20 Id. 
 
10 
 
UAE Labor Law enforces the waiver provision in the Officers’ employment 
contract as long as it is “more advantageous to the worker.”21  In the instant case, 
the Officers’ estates were paid more than the amount required under the UAE 
Labor Law.  The statutory amount owed to Deuley’s estate was approximately 
$134,769.12 and the insurance policy paid a lump sum payment of $160,000.22  
The statutory amount owed to Gibson’s estate was approximately $106,444.80 and 
the insurance policy paid a lump sum payment of $160,000.23  The statutory 
amount owed to Dickinson for his injuries is $60,923.07 and to date he has 
received $237,951.15 in benefits under the contractually mandated insurance 
policy.24  He received medical treatments for injuries at no cost to him and will 
continue to receive a temporary partial disability payment of $1,030.78 per week.25 
 
The judge also found the release valid under the UAE Civil Code.26  Expert 
Hassan Arab, partner in a Dubai law firm, opined that the release is valid not only 
under UAE labor law, but also under the Civil Code.  Article 296 of the Civil Code 
states that “[a]ny condition purporting to provide exemption from liability for a 
                                                           
21 Id. at A000316. 
 
22 Id. at A000062. 
 
23 Id. at A000064. 
 
24 Id. at A000065. 
 
25 Id.  
 
26 Parlin v. DynCorp. Int’l., 2009 WL 3636756 at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 
11 
 
harmful act shall be void.”27  According to one treatise on the subject, however, “it 
is permissible for parties to limit compensation to a certain amount or to a 
specified remedy, provided that such agreement does not violate an existing law, 
regulation or public policy.”28  We agree with the judge that the release did not 
purport to provide an exemption from liability; it merely provided the Officers the 
stated benefits in lieu of their right to sue their employer in the event of death or 
injury during the course of their employment. 
 
Under Dubai law, the phrase “any claim” in this contract releases both 
contract and tort claims.  Arab explained that “any claim” in the release would, by 
its plain meaning, include tort claims and contract claims.29  He also said the 
contract “provides for the amount the parties have agreed shall be the 
compensation for [the Officers] and [their Estates] in the event of [] death [or 
injury] as long as [they are employees] of DynCorp FZ.”30  Essentially, Arab said 
as long as the Officers’ contract was in effect at the time of death or injury, then 
the release governs any claims in contract and tort.  The Officers have put forth no 
arguments that the contract was not in effect at the time of the accident.  In fact, the 
                                                           
27 Id. 
 
28 Appellants’ Appendix at A000160 (emphasis added).   
 
29 Appellants’ Appendix at A000342. 
 
30 Id.   
 
12 
 
Officers or their respective estates have recognized the financial benefit of the 
bargain by accepting the benefits awarded under the coverage purchased in 
exchange for the release.31 
C. 
Delaware Law Analysis 
 
Delaware courts recognize the validity of general releases.32  A clear and 
unambiguous release “will [only] be set aside where there is fraud, duress, 
coercion, or mutual mistake concerning the existence of a party’s injuries.”33   
In determining whether the release is ambiguous, the intent of the parties is 
controlling as to the scope and effect of the release.34  It must appear that the 
plaintiff, or a reasonable person in the place of the plaintiff, understood the terms 
of the release.35  A court determines the parties’ intent from the overall language of 
the document.36  The Officers signed an employment agreement, which plainly 
stated: “[t]he Employee understands and accepts the fact that he or she will be 
                                                           
31  See supra note 22, 23, 24. 
 
32 Chakov v. Outboard Marine Corp., 429 A.2d 984, 985 (Del. 1981). 
 
33 Parlin, 2009 WL 3636756, at *4 (quoting Edge of the Woods, Ltd. P'ship v. Wilmington Sav. 
Fund Soc'y, FSB, 2000 WL 305448, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.7, 2000). 
 
34 Tucker v. Alban, Inc., 1999 WL 1241073, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1999). 
 
35 Id. at *2. 
 
36 Id. 
 
13 
 
exposed to dangers due to the nature of the mission.”37  The next sentence clearly 
discusses the possibility of death, injury, and disability while limiting the 
employer’s liability to the coverage stated in the subsequent sentence.38  Finally, in 
the last sentence of the liability clause, the employee agrees to accept the insurance 
benefits as “full satisfaction” of “any claim” for “death, injury, or disability against 
Employer and its affiliates.”39  In this short, four sentence liability clause, the 
Officers were told they would be exposed to dangers “due to” the nature of the 
mission40 and they were told twice that death, injury, and disability were likely 
possibilities.   
The limitation on liability provision at issue here, where the Officers agreed 
to accept insurance benefits in exchange for a release, is more akin to a workers’ 
compensation relationship.  If the Officers died or were injured during the course 
of their employment in Delaware, Delaware’s Workers’ Compensation Law 
(insurance to which an employer must subscribe) would have provided an 
                                                           
37 Appellants’ Appendix at A000077, A000083, A000090 (emphasis added). 
 
38  See id.  
 
39 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
40 The trial judge took judicial notice that “at a minimum, when [the Officers] signed the 
releases, even a poorly informed American had to have appreciated that working in Afghanistan 
involved the general risk of insurgent or terrorist attacking by an IED.  The complaint offers no 
reason to find that any plaintiff here was probably unaware of the general risk of being injured or 
killed by a bomb.”  Deuley v. DynCorp. Int’l., 2010 WL 704895, at *4 (Del. Supr. Ct. Feb. 26, 
2010).  
 
14 
 
exclusive remedy based upon a schedule “regardless of the question of negligence 
and to the exclusion of all other rights and remedies.”41  Similarly, the employment 
agreement here states that each Officer “agrees that neither Employer nor its 
affiliates will be liable in the event of death, injury, or disability” and that “[t]he 
Employee agrees to accept [the] insurance benefits as full satisfaction of any claim 
for death, injury, or disability against Employer and its affiliates.”42   
We therefore hold that the language of the employment contract is clear and 
unambiguous.43  The overall language of the agreement implicates a risk shifting 
arrangement similar to workers’ compensation arrangements.  The Officers agreed 
to waive their right to sue their employer and affiliates in the event of death, injury, 
or disability for “any claims” related to the mission.   
D. 
Analysis of the Wrongful Death, Survival, Personal Injury and Loss of 
Consortium Claims  
 
 
The release says:  “The [Officers] understand[] and accept[] the fact that 
[they] may be exposed to dangers due to the nature of the mission.”44  This 
reference to the nature of the mission clearly contemplates a hazardous work 
environment and the reference to “any claim” in the release by its plain meaning 
                                                           
41 19 Del. C. § 2304. 
 
42 Appellants’ Appendix at A000077, A000083, A000090. 
 
43 The Officers put forth no arguments of fraud, duress, coercion, or mutual mistake.   
 
44 Appellants’ Appendix at A000077, A000083, A000090. 
 
15 
 
applies to both contract and tort claims under both Dubai45 and Delaware law.  The 
Officers’ employment contract was drafted with the intent to provide them with a 
form of workers’ compensation if they were killed or injured during the course of 
their employment.  The purpose of the Delaware Workers’ Compensation Statute, 
as well as other similar state statutes, is a trade off.  The first goal is prompt 
compensation to the injured worker for the job related injury without the worker 
being required to prove any fault.46 Conversely, the other goal is to preclude the 
employee from bringing a suit for a common law tort against the employer arising 
out of a job related accident. Accordingly, “[u]nder these statutes, most courts have 
held that the exclusivity provision of a Workers' Compensation statute precludes a 
suit for negligence under the common law, even if the injury was caused by the 
gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, reckless, culpable or malicious negligence, or 
other misconduct of the employer.”47 
Similarly, under Delaware law, derivative claims are barred under the 
workers’ compensation statute because the exclusivity provision extinguishes the 
predicate claim.48 
                                                           
45 Id. at A000342. 
 
46  Rafferty v. Hartman Walsh Painting Co., 760 A.2d 157, 159 (Del. 2000); see also Larson, 
Worker's Compensation Law § 103.03: 103-5 through 103-6. 
47  Rafferty, 760 A.2d at 159. 
 
48 Rafferty, 760 A.2d at 159 (holding a wrongful death action cannot be maintained when 
worker’s compensation provides the exclusive remedy); Lovett v. Chenney, 2007 WL 687228, at 
16 
 
E. 
Wrongful Death Claims 
We hold that Deuley and Gibson waived their eligible survivors wrongful 
death claims by signing the release in the employment agreement.  Under 
Delaware’s wrongful death statute,49 a wrongful death action is derivative and 
wholly dependent on whether the decedent had a right to bring a claim during his 
lifetime.  A Delaware wrongful death claim “has always been a separate and 
different right of action than that held by the deceased.”50  Nevertheless, in 
Delaware, wrongful death claims have been “held subject to the same infirmities as 
would have existed in a suit by the deceased if still alive.”51  The current wrongful 
death statute, specifically 10 Del. C. § 3721(5), imposes a condition precedent to 
the accrual of a wrongful death cause of action by the Officers— the decedent's 
ability to have maintained an action and recovered damages, if death had not 
ensued.52   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
*9 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2007), aff’d, 959 A.2d 28 (Del. 2008) (holding a loss of consortium 
claim is barred when worker’s compensation provides the exclusive remedy). 
 
49 10 Del. C. § 3724(c) 
In an action under this subchapter, damages may be awarded to the beneficiaries 
proportioned to the injury resulting from the wrongful death (emphasis added). 
 
50  Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1062 (Del. 1989); (quoting Milford Mem’l Hosp., 
Inc. v. Elliott, 210 A.2d 858, 860 (Del. 1965)). 
51 Drake at 561 (quoting Milford Mem’l, 210 A.2d at 860). 
 
52 10 Del. C. § 3721(5) 
“Wrongful Act” means an act, neglect or default including a felonious act which would 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had 
not ensued (emphasis added). 
 
17 
 
Although we agree with the trial judge’s holding we adopt different 
reasoning.53  The Officers have no direct claim against DynCorp because they 
waived “any claim” for negligence.  Because the Officers unambiguously waived 
their claim for negligence against DynCorp for their injuries and death, their 
eligible survivors’ wrongful death derivative claims cannot arise from any 
predicate claim.  Therefore, the Officers’ eligible survivors are barred from 
pursuing wrongful death claims for failure to meet the condition precedent because 
the Officers waived all of their claims against DynCorp in a pre-injury limitation 
on liability agreement in return for insurance.   
F. 
Survival Claims 
Under Delaware’s survival statute,54 “[a] survival action, filed by the 
personal representative of the estate, recovers any damage sustained by the 
decedent between the injury and his/her death, for which the decedent could have 
recovered had [he] lived.”55  We agree with the trial judge’s ruling in Parlin that by 
signing the employment agreement containing the release, the Officers waived 
                                                           
53  Deuley, 2010 WL 704895, at *3-*4.  
54 10 Del. C. § 3701  
All causes of action, except actions for defamation, malicious prosecution, or upon penal 
statutes, shall survive to and against the executors or administrators of the person to, or 
against whom, the cause of action accrued. Accordingly, all actions, so surviving, may be 
instituted or prosecuted by or against the executors or administrators of the person to or 
against whom the cause of action accrued. This section shall not affect the survivorship 
among the original parties to a joint cause of action. 
 
55  Franz v. U.S., 791 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D. Del. 1992). 
 
18 
 
their estates’ survival claims.  The agreement stated that the Officers “agree[d] to 
accept [the] insurance benefits as full satisfaction of any claim for death . . . against 
Employer and its affiliates.”  The Officers waiver of their right to sue DynCorp for 
their injuries and death, bars their personal representatives from pursuing the 
survival claim. 
G. 
Loss of Consortium Claims 
We hold Dickinson waived his wife’s loss of consortium claim by signing 
the release in the employment agreement.  We find the holding of Jones v. Elliot56 
distinguishable on the facts of this case.  In Jones we held a “physically injured 
spouse may not unilaterally extinguish the loss of consortium claim of the other 
spouse by signing a general release, for the loss of consortium claim is not his to 
extinguish.”57  In Jones, we explained “that the direct claim spouse must have a 
right to maintain a claim for personal injuries against the alleged tortfeasor before 
the noninjured spouse's claim for loss of consortium may arise.”58  Thus, loss of 
consortium is a derivative claim.  The difference between this case and Jones is 
that in Jones the injured spouse had a claim against the tortfeasor and released the 
claim after it arose without his wife’s knowledge or consent.  Here, Dickinson 
waived all of his claims against DynCorp in a pre-injury limitation on liability 
                                                           
56 551 A.2d 62 (Del. 1988). 
57 Id. at 64-65; see also Parlin, 2009 WL 3636756 at *5. 
 
58 Jones, 551 A.2d at 64. 
19 
 
agreement in return for benefits.  Dickinson has no “direct claim” against DynCorp 
because he waived “any claim” based on negligence and, therefore, his spouse’s  
loss of consortium claim has no predicate claim from which to derive. 
H. 
Personal Injury Claims 
 
Dickinson waived his personal injury claims by signing the release in the 
employment agreement.  Because the liability clause is valid and “any claim” 
includes claims of negligence against DynCorp, Dickinson’s claims for personal 
injury are barred. 
I. 
Assumption of the Risk 
Because we affirm the decision of the trial judge on other grounds we need 
not discuss assumption of the risk. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.