Title: Bostwick v. 44 Chestnut Street, Wakefield, Mass.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13061
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2021

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SJC-13061 
 
RICHARD D. BOSTWICK  vs.  44 CHESTNUT STREET, WAKEFIELD, MASS., 
& others.1 
 
 
November 23, 2021. 
 
 
Appeals Court.  Civil Rights, Availability of remedy.  Americans 
with Disabilities Act.  Immunity from Suit.  Judicial 
Immunity.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
The plaintiff, Richard D. Bostwick, brought this civil 
action in the Superior Court in 2015 against multiple 
defendants, including the Appeals Court, alleging various claims 
relating to property situated at 44 Chestnut Street in 
Wakefield.  Three judges in the Superior Court dismissed the 
claims against all defendants through rulings on a series of 
 
 
1 Unknown future property owners of 44 Chestnut Street, 
Wakefield, Mass.; unknown future title insurance companies 
providing title insurance for 44 Chestnut Street; Santander 
Bank, N.A. (Santander); Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae); Orlans Moran PLLC; Leonard J. Sims, Leonard J. 
Sims Co., General Contractors, and Leonard J. Sims Custom 
Carpentry; The Classic Group, Inc., previous known as Class 
Restorations, Inc.; Kyle Barnard; Philip Bates; Richard F. 
Gantt; unknown officers and directors of The Classic Group, 
Inc.; unknown insurance policy entities/companies insuring The 
Classic Group, Inc., and their officers and directors; 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health; Paul N. Hunter, 
individually and as director of the Childhood Lead Poisoning 
Prevention Program in the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health; Donna Levin; Warren M. Laskey; Massachusetts Appeals 
Court; and Middlesex Superior Court. 
2 
 
 
 
motions, and the plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Court.2  The 
plaintiff objected to the Appeals Court deciding the claims 
against it, and in service of "the efficient administration of 
justice," the Appeals Court reported to this court "that part of 
the appeal concerning the claims against the Appeals Court" 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211A, § 12.  See Bostwick v. 44 Chestnut 
Street, Wakefield, Mass., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2021).3  For 
the reasons discussed infra, we affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court judge dismissing the claims against the Appeals 
Court. 
 
"We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo" 
(citation omitted).  Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 
477 Mass. 456, 457 (2017).  "In deciding whether a count in the 
complaint states a claim under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 
Mass. 754 (1974), we accept as true the allegations in the 
complaint, draw every reasonable inference in favor of the 
plaintiff, and determine whether the factual allegations 
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief under the law."  Id. 
at 457-458. 
 
The relevant pleading in this case is the plaintiff's first 
amended complaint, filed on December 2, 2015.  The claims 
against the Appeals Court fall into two basic categories:  
(1) claimed violations of various Federal rights pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) claimed violations of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et 
seq.  For both categories of claims, the plaintiff seeks 
monetary damages. 
 
The plaintiff's § 1983 claims require little discussion.  
The Superior Court properly dismissed these claims because the 
Appeals Court is not a "person" amenable to suit under that 
statute.  See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 64 (1989).  Moreover, sovereign immunity bars suits for 
 
 
2 A more detailed summary of the procedural history of the 
case and the nature of plaintiff's claims against each of the 
defendants is contained in the Appeals Court's decision.  See 
Bostwick v. 44 Chestnut Street, Wakefield, Mass., 99 Mass. App. 
Ct. 1107 (2021). 
 
 
3 In its decision as to the remaining defendants, the 
Appeals Court remanded claims against two defendants (Santander 
and Fannie Mae) to the Superior Court for further proceedings, 
and otherwise affirmed the dismissals.  See Bostwick, 99 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1107. 
3 
 
 
 
damages against a State or its agencies under § 1983.  Id. at 
67; Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 178 (2004). 
 
The plaintiff's ADA claims against the Appeals Court also 
fail, but for different reasons.  Under the ADA, a State court, 
such as the Appeals Court, may be held liable for violating a 
duty to accommodate a person with a disability in cases 
"implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts."  
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–534 (2004).  In applying 
this principle, courts have drawn a distinction between a 
court's administrative functions, which may form the basis for 
liability under the ADA, and judicial conduct, which enjoys 
absolute immunity from suit.  See Geness v. Administrative 
Office of Pa. Courts, 974 F.3d 263, 274 n.12 (3d Cir. 2020), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2670 (2021) ("The parties do not 
present and we are not aware of any legal authority that would 
permit [the defendant] to be found liable [under the ADA] based 
on judicial conduct"); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 
1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (ADA claims against judge barred by 
judicial immunity where allegations concerned judicial acts, 
rather than administrative or other functions).  See generally 
LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 210 (1989) ("It is a well-
settled principle under our common law, too well settled to 
require discussion, that every judge, whether of a higher or 
lower court, is exempt from liability to an action for any 
judgment or decision rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction 
vested in him [or her] by law" [citation and quotation 
omitted]).  Moreover, the plaintiff cannot avoid the absolute 
immunity afforded to judicial conduct by naming the Appeals 
Court as a defendant, rather than an individual judge or judges.  
See Geness, 974 F.3d at 274 n.12; DiPasquale v. Miln, 303 F. 
Supp. 2d 430, 431-432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (adding housing court as 
named defendant did not "alter the result" that ADA claims based 
on judicial conduct were barred by absolute judicial immunity). 
 
Here, the plaintiff's ADA claims against the Appeals Court 
were based in large part on quintessential judicial conduct, for 
instance, the court's dismissal of an appeal by the plaintiff 
for lack of prosecution, along with a single justice's refusal 
to vacate the dismissal, see Bostwick vs. Sims, Appeals Court, 
No. 2014-P-1277, and in another case, the issuance of a decision 
affirming a Superior Court judgment dismissing a civil suit 
brought by the plaintiff, see Bostwick v. Sovereign Bank, 85 
Mass. App. Ct. 1101 (2014).  For the reasons discussed supra, 
claims under the ADA based on judicial conduct are barred by 
4 
 
 
 
absolute judicial immunity, and therefore, the Superior Court 
judge's dismissal of any such claims was proper.4 
 
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and excluding allegations indisputably based on 
judicial conduct, there remain some allegations of conduct by 
Appeals Court personnel that we must address.  For instance, the 
plaintiff alleges that on two occasions, he went to the Appeals 
Court clerk's office and expressed concern that if he filed an 
appeal in a case against a defendant who had filed for 
bankruptcy he would be in violation of the "automatic stay" 
imposed by Federal bankruptcy law.  According to the plaintiff, 
the Appeals Court clerks "stated that the [a]ppellate [c]lock 
under Rule 4 has started and there is no way to [s]top [i]t."  
On another occasion, the plaintiff alleges that the Appeals 
Court "refused to take any papers" from him in connection with 
an appeal.  Even taking these allegations as true, the Superior 
Court judge correctly concluded that these allegations did not 
suggest a plausible claim for relief under the ADA. 
 
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff 
must allege "(1) that he [or she] is a qualified individual with 
a disability; (2) that he [or she] was either excluded from 
participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's 
services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated 
against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 
discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability."  
Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 
2000).  Here, the complaint is devoid of factual allegations to 
support a conclusion that the actions of which the plaintiff 
complains constituted discrimination by or exclusion from access 
to the Appeals Court on the basis of a disability.5 
 
 
4 The Superior Court judge did not base his dismissal of 
these claims on the ground of judicial immunity, but we may 
affirm on any basis apparent in the record.  See, e.g., Lopes v. 
Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 181 (2004); Gabbidon v. King, 414 
Mass. 685, 686 (1993), and cases cited. 
 
 
5 In portions of the complaint, the plaintiff suggests that 
"discrimination" can be implied merely because the plaintiff is 
pro se and indigent, and because he is litigating against State 
agencies and large institutional defendants.  We reject this 
blanket contention.  To the extent that there are other claims 
against the Appeals Court that we have not addressed, we have 
not overlooked them; rather, they also fail to plausibly suggest 
a claim for relief, and we decline to discuss them. 
5 
 
 
 
 
In sum, we affirm the order of the Superior Court judge 
dismissing all claims against the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Richard D. Bostwick, pro se. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Abigail Fee, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the Appeals Court.