Title: Francis Penterman, Sr. v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP000164
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0164 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Francis Penterman, Sr. and Ruth Kamnik,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
Dupont Mutual Insurance Company, a  
Wisconsin Insurance Corporation,  
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company, a  
domestic corporation,  
          Defendant, 
Daniel M. Dasho,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  204 Wis. 2d 277, 556 N.W.2d 684 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 2, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 29, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Des Jardins 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Lynn R. Laufenberg and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., 
Brookfield and Scott Lawrence and Lawrence & Des Rochers, S.C., 
St. Nazianz and oral argument by Lynn R. Laufenberg. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent the cause was argued 
by Charles D. Hoornstra, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief Richard A. Victor, assistant attorney general, and 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 96-0164 
 
1 
` 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0164 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Francis Penterman, Sr. and Ruth Kamnik, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners 
 
Dupont Mutual Insurance Company, a 
Wisconsin Insurance Corporation, 
 
 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company, a 
domestic corporation, 
 
 
Defendant, 
 
Daniel M. Dasho, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals
1 affirming the order 
of the Circuit Court for Outagamie County, John A. Des Jardins, 
Judge.  The circuit court dismissed the claims of Francis 
Penterman, Sr. and Ruth Kamnik against Daniel Dasho, an employee 
of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, for failure to state 
                     
1  Penterman v. Wis. Electric Power Co., No. 96-0164, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1996). 
No. 96-0164 
 
2 
a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The circuit court 
also concluded that Dasho was entitled to qualified immunity 
against the plaintiffs' claims.  Penterman and Kamnik alleged in 
their amended complaint that Dasho deprived them of their 
constitutionally protected rights, and sought remedies under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.
2  
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court in 
part, holding that Penterman and Kamnik failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.  In a footnote to its 
decision, the court of appeals concluded that it was unnecessary 
to address the issue of qualified immunity for Dasho because the 
amended complaint failed to state a claim.  Slip op. at 2, n.2. 
¶3 
This case presents unique legal claims.  Because 
damage to livestock and loss of use of farm property are not 
commonly claimed to result from constitutional violations, and 
because the affirmative defense of qualified immunity turns on 
whether the plaintiffs have alleged a violation of clearly 
established constitutional rights, we consider the questions 
presented in reverse order from the court of appeals.  Since we 
conclude that Penterman and Kamnik have not made a sufficient 
showing that Dasho violated a clearly established constitutional 
right, defined in such a way that a reasonable official in 
                     
2  42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects,  or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
No. 96-0164 
 
3 
Dasho's position could believe that his or her conduct violates 
that right, we do not consider whether the plaintiffs have 
stated a claim against Dasho upon which relief can be granted.  
We therefore affirm the mandate of the court of appeals, but on 
the ground of qualified immunity.
3  In this case we make no new 
law but apply a traditional qualified immunity inquiry to 
unusual pleadings.  We caution, therefore, that our qualified 
immunity inquiry is fact-specific, limited to the facts alleged 
in the pleadings. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
For purposes of the qualified immunity analysis on 
review of a motion to dismiss, we accept the facts pled as true. 
 See State v. Wisconsin Telephone, 91 Wis. 2d 702, 720, 284 
N.W.2d 41 (1979).  Penterman and Kamnik acquired a farm in 
Waushara County in April, 1992.  They operated the property as a 
dairy farm.  A distribution line, owned and operated by 
Defendant Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCo), provided 
electrical service to the farm. 
¶5 
It appears from the complaint that for some time 
between April 1992 and January 12, 1993, Penterman and Kamnik 
experienced substantial problems with their dairy operation, 
including reduced milk production, increased illness and death 
of cattle, calves, and other livestock, and infertility.  On 
January 12, 1993, Penterman received an electrical shock from 
the bulk tank in the milk house located on the farm.  Penterman 
believed the shock originated from stray electrical voltage 
                     
3  Our decision that Dasho is entitled to qualified immunity 
has no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs' underlying 
claims against the defendant utility. 
No. 96-0164 
 
4 
accessing his barn through WEPCo’s distribution line.  On 
January 31, 1993, Penterman disconnected the barn service cable 
from the WEPCo distribution line and connected a portable 
generator to supply power to the barn equipment. Once he took 
that action, Penterman did not detect any voltage between 
equipment and fixtures and the concrete floor. 
¶6 
The next day, February 1, 1993, Penterman contacted 
the Wisconsin Public Service Commission’s (“PSC”) Stray Voltage 
Analysis Team (SVAT) about the problems on the farm.  Penterman 
was told that SVAT would contact WEPCo on his behalf to advise 
WEPCo 
of 
a 
possible 
stray 
voltage 
problem. 
 
WEPCo 
representatives conducted tests at the Penterman/Kamnik farm, 
concluding that the stray voltage was the result of “on farm 
problems.” 
¶7 
On February 8, 1993, WEPCo performed further tests at 
the Penterman/Kamnik farm.  Penterman and Kamnik claimed that 
WEPCo’s testing procedures contained irregularities and reported 
these claims to Daniel Dasho, Program Manager of SVAT.  On 
February 12, 1993, Dasho and WEPCo representatives came to the 
Penterman/Kamnik farm.  During that visit, Dasho supervised the 
reinstallation of WEPCo’s test equipment and observed voltage 
readings on Penterman’s test equipment. 
¶8 
On February 24, 1993, Dasho and WEPCo representatives 
again went to the Penterman/Kamnik farm.  Dasho observed 
additional tests conducted by WEPCo, and then told WEPCo’s 
representatives that the stray voltage was a utility problem.  
Dasho instructed WEPCo to “deep ground” its distribution line.  
No. 96-0164 
 
5 
WEPCo placed grounding rods, but Penterman and Kamnik contend 
that the excess voltage continued.  
¶9 
After the February 24, 1993 testing, Penterman and 
Kamnik continued to ask WEPCo and the PSC for additional testing 
and further assistance.  Dasho informed Penterman and Kamnik 
that the utility responsibility had been fixed, and that any 
remaining voltage was from “on-farm” sources.  Dasho also told 
Penterman and Kamnik that a full SVAT analysis was unnecessary. 
¶10 On March 24, 1994, almost fourteen months after 
Penterman first discovered the stray voltage on his farm, Dasho 
directed and supervised a limited SVAT analysis for stray 
voltage at the Penterman/Kamnik farm at Penterman's request.  
Dasho reported afterwards that SVAT had found no severe levels 
of stray voltage.  Penterman and Kamnik contend that there were 
irregularities in these SVAT tests and inconsistencies between 
Dasho’s report and the data actually discovered during the 
course of the testing. 
¶11 Penterman and Kamnik filed suit against WEPCo on 
January 
25, 
1995, 
alleging 
strict 
liability, 
nuisance, 
negligence, trespass, spoilation of evidence, and statutory 
violations.  After conducting some discovery, Penterman and 
Kamnik filed an amended complaint on June 13, 1995, adding Dasho 
as a defendant and asserting claims against Dasho and WEPCo for 
damages under 42 U.S.C. §  1983.  Penterman and Kamnik alleged 
that Dasho, acting under color of state law, deliberately, 
No. 96-0164 
 
6 
intentionally,
4 
and/or 
recklessly 
deprived 
them 
of 
their 
constitutionally protected rights to procedural due process, 
access to the courts, substantive due process, and equal 
protection.  Specifically, Penterman and Kamnik alleged that 
Dasho, in concert with WEPCo, 
 
(a) failed to follow or employ PSC procedures for the 
identification and measurement of stray voltage; 
 
(b) approved or ratified testing procedures and 
practices employed by WEPCo which he knew or should 
have 
known were 
ineffective for 
identifying or 
eliminating utility-caused stray voltage; 
 
(c) attributed stray voltage detected and documents 
by Penterman and Kamnik to faulty equipment or 
testing procedures when he knew or should have known 
that such attribution was false; 
 
(d) reported information obtained through testing he 
knew or should have known was improperly conducted 
and would produce inaccurate results; 
 
(e) 
attributed stray 
voltage to 
on-farm 
wiring 
problems or electrical usage patterns when he knew or 
should have known that such attribution was false; 
 
(f) 
refused 
to 
recommend 
or 
require 
WEPCo 
to 
implement corrective action which he knew or should 
have known was required to reduce or eliminate 
harmful utility-caused stray voltage on the farm; 
(g) 
characterized 
stray 
voltage 
on 
the 
Penterman/Kamnik 
farm 
as 
“not 
severe" 
or 
“insignificant” when he knew or should have known 
that such characterization was inaccurate; and 
 
(h) conspired with and/or aided and abetted WEPCo in 
its effort to conceal evidence of utility-caused 
stray voltage on the farm. 
                     
4  The factual allegations of the amended complaint also 
appear to state a cause of action in negligence.  See, e.g., 
subsections (b) through (g), of paragraph 22 of the amended 
complaint.  To the extent the complaint alleges that Dasho was 
negligent, we agree with the court of appeals that the due 
process clause is not implicated by the negligence of an 
official causing unintended loss of, or injury to, life, 
liberty, or property.  Slip op. at 7 (citing Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)).  
No. 96-0164 
 
7 
¶12 On August 3, 1995, Dasho filed a motion to dismiss the 
amended complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.  In his brief in support of 
that motion, Dasho also argued that he was entitled to qualified 
immunity from the claims.  After a hearing, the circuit court 
granted Dasho’s motion to dismiss in an order dated November 27, 
1995.  The circuit court, basing its decision on the pleadings 
and the briefs, concluded that Penterman and Kamnik had failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against 
Dasho for interference with their right to procedural and 
substantive due process, access to courts, and to equal 
protection.  The circuit court also concluded that Dasho was 
entitled to qualified immunity from Penterman and Kamnik's 
constitutional claims. 
¶13 Penterman and Kamnik appealed.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court’s order, concluding that the amended 
complaint against Dasho failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.  The court of appeals further concluded 
that because Penterman and Kamnik failed to state a claim, it 
was unnecessary to determine whether Dasho was entitled to 
qualified immunity.  This court granted Penterman’s petition for 
review on both issues.
5 
                     
5  This court granted Penterman and Kamnik’s petition for 
review on the questions of substantive due process, equal 
protection, and qualified immunity.  Although the petition for 
review did not seek review of the court of appeals' ruling on 
procedural due process deprivation and access to the courts, 
those claims were presented in the briefs and oral arguments by 
counsel for Penterman and Kamnik as well as for Dasho.  The 
state acknowledged at oral argument that it has not been 
prejudiced by consideration of these issues.  We therefore 
exercise our discretion to consider all of the issues raised by 
the petitioners. 
No. 96-0164 
 
8 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
¶14 We begin our analysis by examining whether the circuit 
court correctly dismissed defendant Daniel Dasho from this 
action on the ground of qualified immunity.  This is a question 
of law that we decide independently and without deference to the 
lower courts.  Kara B. v. Dane County, 205 Wis. 2d 140, 555 
N.W.2d 630, 632 (1996); Barnhill v. Board of Regents, 166 Wis. 
2d 395, 406, 479 N.W.2d 917 (1992).  If the public official is 
immune from suit, the lawsuit does not proceed and there is no 
determination of liability on the merits.  Qualified immunity is 
appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage
6 before 
extensive measures are taken to defend the public official or 
employee.  Id.(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 
(1985)). 
¶15 Although 
"[q]ualified 
immunity 
is 
an 
affirmative 
defense," Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 327, 517 N.W.2d 
503 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1102 (1995), plaintiffs 
have the burden to demonstrate by closely analogous case law, 
that 
the 
defendant 
has 
violated 
a 
clearly 
established 
constitutional right.  Id. at 330. 
                     
6  We note that this case is before us on a motion to 
dismiss.  Although the plaintiffs engaged in some discovery 
prior to amending the complaint and adding Dasho as a defendant, 
we must decide a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
based only on the pleadings.  Although usually, the defense of 
qualified immunity is raised at the summary judgment stage, 
Penterman and Kamnik do not assert that it is premature for a 
qualified immunity determination simply because they are here on 
a motion to dismiss. 
No. 96-0164 
 
9 
¶16 Qualified immunity protects government officials from 
civil liability if their conduct does not violate a person’s 
clearly 
established 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
Harlow 
v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Kara B., 205 Wis. 
2d at 146; Burkes, 185 Wis. 2d at 326.  
In situations of abuse of office, an action for 
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for 
vindication of constitutional guarantees. . . .  
 
[A]t the same time, however, it cannot be disputed 
seriously 
that 
claims 
[against 
public 
officials] 
frequently run against the innocent as well as the 
guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, 
but to society as a whole.  These social costs include 
the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official 
energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence 
of able citizens from acceptance of public office.  
Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued 
will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, 
or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties.'   
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (citations omitted); see also Burkes, 
185 Wis. 2d at 325-26; Kara B., 205 Wis. 2d at 146. 
¶17 The question is whether the official acted reasonably 
under settled law in light of the circumstances, not whether 
another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of events 
can be constructed after the fact.  Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 
408.  The relevant inquiry, then, is whether a reasonable state 
official could have believed his or her act was constitutional 
“in light of clearly established law and the information [he or 
she] possessed” at the time of the official's action.  Burkes, 
185 Wis. 2d at 326 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
641 
(1987)). 
 
"The 
plaintiff's 
claimed 
right 
must 
be 
sufficiently particularized to put the defendants on notice of 
analogous case law indicating that their conduct is unlawful."  
Burkes, 185 Wis. 2d at 331.  The doctrine of qualified immunity 
No. 96-0164 
 
10
provides ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but 
the “plainly incompetent” or those who knowingly violate the 
law.  Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991). 
¶18 The United States Supreme Court has provided some 
guidance in determining what constitutes a clearly established 
constitutional right: 
 
The 
operation 
of 
this 
standard 
. 
. 
. 
depends 
substantially on the level of generality at which the 
relevant “legal rule”  is to be identified.  For 
example, the right to due process of law is quite 
clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and 
thus there is a sense in which any action that 
violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be 
that the particular action is a violation) violates a 
clearly established right. . . . The contours of the 
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.  This is not to say that an 
official action is protected by qualified immunity 
unless the very action in question has previously been 
held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of 
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 407-08 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. at 640)(citations omitted).  Other courts have 
articulated a similar test: 
 
The relevant inquiry is fact specific, and the 
plaintiff must point to a controlling case, decided 
before the events at issue, that establishes a 
constitutional violation on materially similar facts. 
.  . .[P]re-existing law must dictate, that is, truly 
compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question 
about), 
the 
conclusion 
for 
every 
like-situated, 
reasonable government agent that what defendant is 
doing violated federal law in the circumstances. 
Wright v. Butts, 953 F. Supp. 1352, 1359-60 (M.D. Ala. 1996) 
(citations omitted). 
¶19 Merely alleging a general violation of a right that 
may be clearly established in the constitution is insufficient 
to justify withholding qualified immunity.  Barnhill, 166 Wis. 
2d at 408.  Instead, the test is whether the law was clear in 
No. 96-0164 
 
11
relation to the specific facts confronting the defendant at the 
time of his action.  Burkes, 185 Wis. 2d at 330-331.  This 
inquiry focuses on the circumstances with which the official is 
confronted. 
¶20 Consequently, we must determine whether in February, 
1993 through March, 1994, according to clearly established law, 
a reasonable official in Dasho's position could have believed 
that his falsification and concealment of evidence of stray 
voltage 
at 
the 
Penterman/Kamnik 
farm 
would 
violate 
the 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights to procedural due process, 
access to the courts, substantive due process, and equal 
protection. 
No. 96-0164 
 
12
SECTION 1983 CLAIM 
¶21 Penterman and Kamnik's amended complaint added Dasho 
as a defendant and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against both Dasho and WEPCo. 
¶22 Section 
1983, 
by 
itself, 
does 
not 
create 
any 
substantive constitutional rights.  Section 1983 provides a 
remedy for a deprivation of such rights. Chapman v. Houston 
Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).  To 
state a cause of action under § 1983, a party must allege: (1) 
that a person acting under the color of state law committed the 
alleged conduct; and (2) that this conduct deprived the party of 
rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.  Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 
535, overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327 (1986); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). 
¶23 In applying this test, we first consider whether Dasho 
was acting under the color of state law when he falsified and 
concealed evidence of the extent of stray voltage on the 
Penterman/Kamnik farm.  Because the amended complaint alleges 
that Dasho was the Program Manager for the Wisconsin Public 
Service Commission’s (PSC) Stray Voltage Analysis Team (SVAT), 
we conclude that Penterman and Kamnik have satisfied the “under 
the color of state law” requirement.  We therefore focus our 
inquiry on the second requirement – whether Dasho’s conduct 
deprived Penterman and Kamnik of any right, privilege, or 
immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO COURTS 
No. 96-0164 
 
13
¶24 In support of their procedural due process claim, 
Penterman and Kamnik maintain that Dasho's falsification and 
concealment of evidence has thwarted their efforts to seek 
recovery of compensatory damages in their suit against WEPCo.  
Similarly, plaintiffs contend that Dasho's falsification and 
concealment of evidence of the cause of the stray voltage has 
violated their right of access to the courts.  Petitioners' 
Brief at 39.  Since both constitutional claims present us with 
the same question of whether Dasho should have reasonably 
believed that falsification and concealment of stray voltage 
testing 
results 
was 
a 
denial 
of 
a 
clearly 
established 
constitutional right to maintain their action against WEPCo, we 
consider these claims together. 
¶25 In a section 1983 claim for violation of procedural 
due process, a plaintiff must show a deprivation by state action 
of a constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or 
property" without due process of law.  Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125 
(citing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
7  
The right of access to the courts is secured by the First
8 and 
                     
7 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 
Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the 
United 
States, 
and 
subject 
to 
the 
jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
 
8  U.S. CONST. Amend. I provides in pertinent part: 
No. 96-0164 
 
14
Fourteenth Amendment.  It entitles the individual to a fair 
opportunity to present his or her claim.  Bell v. City of 
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (1984) (citing Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).  Such a right exists where the 
claim has a “reasonable basis in fact or law.”  Bell, 746 F. 2d 
at 1261 (citing Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
461 U.S. 731 (1983)).  Judicial access must be “adequate, 
effective, and meaningful.”  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 
(1977). 
¶26 To 
determine 
whether 
Dasho 
is 
entitled 
to 
the 
protections of qualified immunity, the relevant inquiry is 
whether a person in Dasho's position could have reasonably 
believed his or her act was constitutional in light of clearly 
established law and the information he possessed at the time he 
acted.  Burkes, 185 Wis. 2d at 326 (emphasis added).  Dasho’s 
conduct thus is measured by a standard of objective legal 
reasonableness, and in this context we focus on the degree to 
which clearly established case law provided him guidance when he 
acted.  Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 407-08 (emphasis added).  
Consequently, we must determine whether in March 1994, Dasho 
knew or should have known that his actions would deny Penterman 
and Kamnik their right to procedural due process and access to 
the courts. 
¶27 Penterman and Kamnik rely on Bell to establish their 
claim that Dasho’s actions denied them access to the courts and, 
inferentially, procedural due process.  In Bell, the Seventh 
                                                                  
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the 
right of the people . . to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances. 
No. 96-0164 
 
15
Circuit Court of Appeals held that under limited circumstances, 
this right is denied when key facts which would form the basis 
for a plaintiff’s claim are shielded from a plaintiff.  746 F.2d 
at 1261.  See also Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 
1983) (prosecutor murdered Rylands’ daughter and conspired with 
other prosecutors to conceal that fact from the Rylands).  
Penterman and Kamnik argue that Dasho shielded facts which would 
form the basis of their claim by knowingly reporting that no 
severe stray voltage existed, when in fact it did exist at such 
a level on their farm.  We disagree and distinguish Bell from 
the facts of this case on several grounds.  
¶28 In Bell, a Milwaukee police officer shot and killed an 
unarmed youth following a foot chase.  746 F.2d at 1215.  The 
officer then produced a knife and planted it in the victim’s 
hand.  Along with his partner, the officers devised a story to 
justify the killing as self-defense.  Id. at 1216.  Both 
officers then falsified reports related to the shooting and lied 
to their immediate supervisors.  The supervisors did not pursue 
contradictions 
present 
in 
the 
officers' 
accounts 
of 
the 
shooting.  The facts surrounding the killing were in the sole 
province of members of the Milwaukee police department.  Id. at 
1262.  While the youth’s father filed a wrongful death claim 
soon after his son’s murder, the officers’ cover-up and 
concealment of facts interfered with the Bell family’s efforts 
to seek redress in court.  Id. at 1261-62.  
¶29 In contrast, the facts relating to Penterman and 
Kamnik’s claim were available to any interested party, including 
the plaintiffs.  Indeed, the allegations in the amended 
No. 96-0164 
 
16
complaint suggest that the plaintiffs accumulated a substantial 
body of knowledge relating to their claim prior to the 
commencement of this action. In their complaint, Penterman and 
Kamnik allege that Dasho’s falsification and concealment of 
evidence of the extent of the stray voltage testing resulted in 
continued stray voltage on the farm, which caused, among other 
things, (1) death of livestock, (2) reduction in value of 
affected livestock, (3) reduction in milk production, and (4) 
reduction in the value of property.  At oral argument, however, 
Penterman and Kamnik acknowledged that Dasho played no role in 
causing the stray voltage on the farm.  Further, after detecting 
stray voltage, Penterman temporarily eliminated the problem by 
disconnecting the barn service cable from the WEPCo distribution 
line and connecting a portable generator to supply power to the 
barn equipment.  Petitioner's Brief at 4.   
¶30 Penterman and Kamnik were experiencing problems on 
their new farm before Penterman received an electrical shock on 
January 12, 1993.  It was at that point, according to the 
amended complaint, that Penterman first discovered there may be 
stray voltage on the farm.  Further, over the course of Dasho's 
visits to the Penterman/Kamnik farm in 1993 and 1994, Dasho only 
told the plaintiffs that the stray voltage on their property was 
insignificant, or not severe.  Amended Complaint, para. 22(h).  
The amended complaint does not allege that Dasho told the 
plaintiffs that no stray voltage was present on their farm.   
¶31 Unlike the plaintiff in Bell, the amended complaint 
here does not allege that facts related to Penterman and 
Kamnik's 
claim 
were 
shielded 
from 
them. 
 
Instead, 
the 
No. 96-0164 
 
17
allegations establish that Penterman and Kamnik, through their 
own efforts and through the involvement of the PSC, possessed 
first-hand knowledge of the facts related to the existence, and 
extent, of stray voltage on their farm.  Armed with this 
knowledge, Penterman and Kamnik are free to pursue their 
underlying claims.  The stray voltage was already present on the 
plaintiffs' farm prior to Dasho’s involvement.  Penterman and 
Kamnik, by installing an alternate energy source, had the means 
to eliminate or reduce further damage resulting from the stray 
voltage. 
¶32 The court of appeals succinctly distinguished both 
Bell and Ryland from this case.  In those cases, the facts 
surrounding the deaths were in the sole control of the 
defendants.  Slip op. at 6.  In contrast, here the evidence 
Dasho concealed was not in his sole control.  We therefore agree 
with the court of appeals that Dasho’s actions, at worst, 
hampered Penterman and Kamnik’s discovery of evidence.  Such 
factual assertions fall short of alleging a violation of a 
clearly established right of access to the courts, or of 
procedural due process, such that a reasonable official in 
Dasho's position would believe his or her conduct violated those 
rights.
9 
                     
9  In fact, the amended complaint tends to support the 
conclusion that Penterman and Kamnik have suffered no impediment 
to their right of access to the courts, or to procedural due 
process.  Paragraph 17 of the amended complaint seeks "attorneys 
fees and costs associated with pursuing rights and remedies 
afforded by state and federal law." 
No. 96-0164 
 
18
¶33 We further distinguish Bell from the facts of this 
case because Dasho did not cause Penterman and Kamnik’s injury. 
 The Bell court recognized this distinction: 
 
This case is especially distinguishable from Jackson 
v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), since 
here, unlike Jackson, the underlying injury (i.e., the 
killing of Daniel Bell) was caused by a government 
official acting under color of law and member of the 
subsequent conspiracy.  Jackson prudently holds that 
the due process clause does not impose a duty upon 
municipal employees to provide flawless and abundant 
social services.  Yet, the constitutional “duty”  
imposed in [Bell] is simply the requirement that 
municipal employees involved in the investigation of a 
wrong perpetrated by a co-employee under color of 
state law not conceal the perpetration of that wrong. 
Bell, 746 F.2d at 1262. 
¶34 Bell would apply if Dasho, acting under color of law, 
caused the injury to Penterman and Kamnik, and subsequently 
concealed the act which caused the injury during the course of 
his investigation.  Penterman and Kamnik allege, however, that 
WEPCo, not Dasho, was responsible for the stray voltage which 
injured 
their 
farm 
property. 
 
Bell, 
therefore, 
is 
not 
applicable.   
¶35 Finally, we are not persuaded by Penterman and 
Kamnik’s 
argument 
that 
their 
access 
to 
the 
courts, 
and 
inferentially, their right to procedural due process against 
WEPCo is illusory.  In their brief, the plaintiffs predict that 
Dasho will be called upon to testify at the trial against WEPCo. 
 They further forecast that a jury in that action will find 
Dasho more credible than the plaintiffs because Dasho is a 
public official.  Petitioners' Brief at 38-39. 
¶36 Penterman and Kamnik do not offer support for this 
theory of deprivation, and we are unaware of any authority that 
No. 96-0164 
 
19
would do so.  The law regarding witness credibility, however, is 
well settled.  The Wisconsin Jury Instructions specifically 
provide that juries are “the sole judges of credibility of 
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.”  Wis 
JICivil § 215.  (Approved in Collier v. State, 30 Wis. 2d 101, 
107, 140 N.W.2d 252 (1966).  See also, Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 
90 Wis. 2d 672, 681, 280 N.W.2d 226 (1979) (the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight given to their testimony are matters 
left to the jury’s judgment).   
¶37 As the Supreme Court stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539 (1974), the right of access to courts "assures that no 
person will be denied the opportunity to present to the 
judiciary 
allegations 
concerning 
violations 
of 
fundamental 
constitutional rights".  418 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added).  
Penterman and Kamnik remain free to present their claim 
regardless of whether their discovery is hampered. 
 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
¶38 Penterman and Kamnik also argue that Dasho’s conduct 
on their farm resulted in a deprivation of their property in 
violation 
of 
their 
right 
to 
substantive 
due 
process.  
Specifically, Penterman and Kamnik maintain that Dasho deprived 
them of their rights to use and enjoyment of the farm property 
by, among other things, (1) failing to follow or employ proper 
procedures for identifying and measuring stray voltage, (2) 
attributing the detected stray voltage to on-farm wiring 
problems or faulty equipment when he knew or should have known 
such information was false, and (3) conspiring with WEPCo to 
No. 96-0164 
 
20
conceal evidence of utility-caused stray voltage on the farm.  
Petitioners' Brief at 10. 
¶39 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits a state from depriving “any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.”  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the constitutional guarantee of due process to 
protect both procedural and substantive rights. See Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).  The substantive component of 
the Due Process Clause protects individuals from “certain  
arbitrary, wrongful actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.’”  Id. (citing Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).    
¶40 In evaluating a substantive due process claim, the 
threshold inquiry is whether the plaintiff shows a deprivation 
of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution. 
 See Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 
F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 569 (1972)). To determine whether a property interest is 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, courts must look to 
whether state law recognizes and protects that interest.  See 
Riedy v. Sperry, 83 Wis. 2d 158, 164 (1978).  “Property 
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, 
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law. . . .”  Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (1972).  
¶41 As Dasho concedes, it is well settled that the rights 
of ownership and use of property have long been recognized by 
No. 96-0164 
 
21
this state.
10  Respondent's Brief at 9.  See State ex rel. Carter 
v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 152 (1923).  It is equally clear, 
however, that the due process clause does not protect all 
deprivations of property rights, “but only those deprivations 
which were the result of some governmental action.”  Cospito v. 
Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 81 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1131 (1985). 
¶42 As we read the amended complaint, however, the 
plaintiffs do not really contend that Dasho has deprived them of 
their right to enjoy and use their property.  Penterman and 
Kamnik have already conceded that Dasho did not cause the stray 
voltage.  Despite their attempt to make out a claim of 
substantive due process violation, this third constitutional 
allegation is, at bottom, another claim for deprivation of 
information for use at trial against WEPCo.   
¶43 In an attempt to make a substantive due process claim, 
Penterman and Kamnik cite Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688 F.2d 
1328 (11th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that the deprivation 
of a person’s property interest by a government official who 
intentionally reports false information is a violation of the 
person’s substantive due process rights.  Petitioners' Brief at 
30. 
                     
10  The court of appeals misconstrued Penterman and Kamnik's 
argument when it stated that "mere property interests are not 
subject to substantive due process claims."  Slip op. at 10.  We 
agree with the appellate court that substantive due process 
protection has traditionally been afforded to liberty interests, 
such as marriage, family, procreation, and bodily integrity.  
Nonetheless, we do not take the court of appeals decision to 
mean that the right to enjoy and use personal property is not 
subject to constitutional protection. 
No. 96-0164 
 
22
¶44 In Hearn, a city of Gainesville employee, sued the 
city and the city’s personnel director after being laid off. 
Hearn claimed that the decision to eliminate his position was 
merely a pretext and that the personnel director’s dislike for 
him was the actual impetus for his termination.  Id. at 1332.  
Hearn alleged that the personnel director gave the city 
commissioner false information regarding the workload in Hearn’s 
department to cause the city to eliminate his position.  Id. at 
1332.  The court concluded that, under Florida law, Hearn had a 
property interest in his continued employment.  The court also 
upheld the jury's determination that the personnel director’s 
animosity toward Hearn was the sole cause of his termination.  
Id. at 1333.    
¶45 Penterman and Kamnik contend that Hearn is analogous 
to the instant case.  We disagree.  In Hearn, the personnel 
director’s intentional understating of the departmental workload 
was the direct and sole cause of the employee’s property rights 
deprivation.  Presumably, Hearn would not have lost his position 
absent the false information.  See id. at 1332.  In this case, 
the stray voltage was the direct source of Penterman and 
Kamnik’s loss of use and enjoyment of their farm property.  
Dasho’s conduct in supervising and reporting WEPCo's test 
results did not cause the stray voltage.  As Penterman and 
Kamnik acknowledged at oral argument, at most, Dasho’s conduct 
merely caused the continuation of the property loss.  The Hearn 
No. 96-0164 
 
23
decision is not, therefore, closely analogous to the facts 
before us.
11 
¶46 Without providing closely analogous case support for 
his claim that the continued deprivation of a property interest 
by a state actor violates a person’s substantive due process 
rights, Penterman has failed to show that Dasho knew or should 
have known that his falsification and concealment of evidence of 
 stray voltage violated Penterman’s substantive due process 
rights.  We, therefore, conclude that Penterman and Kamnik have 
failed to overcome Dasho’s qualified immunity defense as their 
substantive due process claim. 
 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
¶47 Finally, we consider whether Penterman and Kamnik have 
made a sufficient showing of a clearly established right to 
equal protection, such that a reasonable official in Dasho's 
position would have known his conduct violated that right. 
¶48 Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a state may not deny “any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  States, 
therefore, must treat all similarly situated persons alike.  
                     
11  Although Penterman and Kamnik cite a number of cases to 
establish a substantive due process violation, we read those 
cases as merely establishing that property rights, like those 
asserted here, can merit constitutional protection.  We do not 
read those cases as establishing, by closely analogous case law, 
that Dasho's falsification and concealment of evidence of stray 
voltage constituted a deprivation of Penterman and Kamnik's 
right to substantive due process.  See, e.g., Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment for Twp. of West Amwell, 53 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Noranda Exploration, Inc. v. M.E. Ostrom, 113 Wis. 2d 612, 335 
N.W.2d 596 (1983).   
No. 96-0164 
 
24
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985). 
¶49 Traditionally, we have recognized two types of equal 
protection 
claims. 
 
The 
first 
involves 
intentional 
discrimination based on membership in a particular class or 
group.  See, e.g.,  State v. Chosa, 108 Wis. 2d 392, 395-97, 321 
N.W.2d 280 (1982). The second involves challenges to legislation 
alleged to make irrational and arbitrary classifications.  See, 
e.g., State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  In 
this case, Penterman and Kamnik do not contend that their equal 
protection 
claim 
falls 
within 
either 
of 
these 
generally 
recognized theories. 
¶50 Penterman and Kamnik, however, argue that their claim 
falls within a third type of equal protection claim recognized 
by the Seventh Circuit in Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th 
Cir. 1995).  In Esmail, a liquor dealer, Esmail, brought a § 
1983 claim against the city mayor, maintaining that the mayor 
violated his equal protection rights by refusing to renew 
Esmail’s liquor licenses due to a “deep-seated animosity” toward 
him.  Id. at 177-78.  In his complaint, Esmail alleged that the 
mayor denied his two applications for liquor licenses “for the 
sole 
and 
exclusive 
purpose 
of 
exacting 
retaliation 
and 
vengeance” against Esmail due, in part, to Esmail’s success in 
getting an earlier revocation order of his liquor license 
changed to a brief suspension.  Id. at 178.  Although the mayor 
maintained that Esmail’s license had been denied because of 
previous violations, Esmail’s complaint provided an extensive 
list of examples where the mayor had renewed other license 
No. 96-0164 
 
25
applications by applicants who had been charged with more 
serious violations.  Id. at 178.    
¶51 In finding that Esmail had sufficiently stated a claim 
under § 1983, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s 
conclusion that Esmail’s complaint failed to state a claim 
because it did not allege that other liquor dealers, who were 
not subject to vindictiveness or animosity, received their 
license renewals at the same time that Esmail’s application had 
been denied.  Id. at 179 (emphasis added).  The court found that 
a complaint containing such “extensive” factual allegations, 
despite failing to list the dates of the infractions by the 
other liquor dealers, was sufficient to indicate that the mayor 
treated Esmail differently than similarly situated persons.  See 
id. at 179-80. 
¶52 Unlike Esmail, Penterman and Kamnik do not claim that 
they were treated differently than other persons who requested 
Dasho’s assistance in dealing with stray voltage problems.  In 
fact, Penterman and Kamnik allege that Dasho’s conduct was part 
of a continuing conspiracy with WEPCo to deprive Wisconsin 
farmers, including Penterman and Kamnik, of evidence necessary 
to support recovery of compensatory damages in lawsuits against 
WEPCo.  To establish that Dasho knew or should have known that 
by concealing and falsifying evidence of stray voltage on the 
Penterman/Kamnik farm, he violated a clearly established right 
of equal protection, Penterman and Kamnik must demonstrate that 
they were singled out as members of a particular class or as 
individuals.  See Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 
1992), aff’d, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (to state an equal protection 
No. 96-0164 
 
26
claim, a plaintiff, although a member of a class with only one 
member, must be singled out because of his membership in the 
class).  
¶53 Penterman and Kamnik do not allege that they were 
treated differently than other persons similarly situated.  We 
therefore conclude that they have failed to make a sufficient 
showing of a violation of a clearly established right to equal 
protection, such that a reasonable official in Dasho’s position 
would have known his conduct violated that right. 
¶54 For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
Penterman and Kamnik have not met their burden to sufficiently 
show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, 
such that a reasonable official in Dasho's position would know, 
or should have known, that his conduct violated those rights.  
Dasho is entitled to qualified immunity against these claims.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.