Title: State v. Cox
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 210, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 23, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   No. 210, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. A. Nos. IN02-08-0616  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§       through 0623 and 
VINCENT COX,  
 
 
§   IN02-08-1428 through 1431 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§  
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  September 9, 2003 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  December 23, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  QUESTION ANSWERED. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Jr., Esquire, Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellee, Vincent Cox, was acquitted, following a jury 
trial in the Superior Court.  The State has applied for leave to appeal, 
pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 9903, from an adverse ruling by the 
Superior Court that was made during the course of Cox’s criminal trial.  The 
purpose of section 9903 “is to afford to the State the opportunity to have 
reviewed by this Court adverse rulings of law made by [trial] courts – not for 
the purpose of having an appellate decision in the specific case in which the 
question arose, but for the purpose of having the question finally decided for 
future cases – all with due regard for the double jeopardy guaranty.”1   
 
This Court granted the State’s request to appeal.  The Public Defender 
was asked to file an answering brief.  The question presented to this Court is:  
if there exists a rational basis in the evidence for a lesser included offense 
instruction, may a trial judge deny the State’s request for such an instruction 
to the jury, if that request is objected to by the defense?  We have concluded 
that any party is entitled to such an instruction, if requested, provided a 
rational basis exists in the evidence to acquit the defendant of the charged 
offense and to support a conviction for a lesser-included offense.   
                                          
 
1 State v. Roberts, 282 A.2d 603 (Del. 1971) (quoting State v. Clark, 270 A.2d 371, 372 
(Del. 1970)). 
 
3
Facts 
 
On July 28, 2002, at approximately 2:30 a.m., three brothers, Pedro, 
Juan and Santos Lopez were drinking in the Lafayette Apartment Complex 
parking lot when they were approached by two African-American males.  
The shorter of the two males asked Juan if he was interested in purchasing 
marijuana.  When Juan declined, the taller male, later identified as Vincent 
Cox, demanded money, while the shorter male, never identified, struck Juan 
in the face with a handgun.   
In defense of his brother, Pedro threw a beer can at the unknown 
assailant.  The shorter man tossed the gun he was carrying to Cox, who shot 
Pedro once in the abdominal area.  Santos then threw a can of beer at Cox, 
who proceeded to shoot Santos in the foot.  Both brothers survived their 
wounds.   
Police subsequently identified Cox as the shooter and arrested him. 
Cox was indicted in the Superior Court for Attempted Murder in the First 
Degree and related assault, robbery, weapons and conspiracy charges.  Trial 
began on March 11, 2003.   
At a pre-trial conference, the State first informed the trial court that it 
would be seeking an instruction on the lesser-included offense of Assault in 
the First Degree.  At the end of the State’s presentation of its case, the 
 
4
prosecutrix again requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser-included 
offense of Assault in the First Degree.  Cox objected to an instruction for the 
lesser-included offense.    
Superior Court Ruling 
 
The Superior Court found that there was a rational basis in the 
evidence to support of the State’s request for an instruction on the lesser-
included offense of Assault in the First Degree.  Specifically, the trial judge 
stated: 
First I’ll say, I think for everyday  use, there is a rational basis 
in the evidence for the lesser-included offense of Assault First 
Degree. 
 
. . . the evidence clearly supports the charge and that’s what I 
have right here. 
 
No Delaware case to my knowledge has spoken . . . to this 
issue, i.e., the granting of a lesser-included offense request of 
the State over defense objection [when there is] a rational basis 
in the evidence. 
 
If the defense requested a lesser included offense [with] the 
rational basis in the evidence I would give that instruction.  
 
The trial judge then ruled that he would not give the lesser-included 
offense instruction over the defendant’s objection.  Accordingly, even 
though the trial judge determined that there was a rational basis in the 
evidence to acquit Cox of the greater charged offense and to convict Cox of 
the lesser-included offense requested by the State, the trial judge held that 
 
5
the defendant’s objection entitled the defendant to invoke the “all-or-nothing 
doctrine,” i.e., to insist that the jury only be instructed on the charged 
offense and not any lesser-included offenses.  
Common Law History 
Lesser-Included Instructions 
 
 
“At common law the jury was permitted to find the defendant guilty 
of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.”2  This 
practice offered the jury a choice other than a guilty verdict on the offense 
charged or acquittal- often described as “all or nothing.”  It has long been 
recognized that jury instructions on lesser-included offenses can be 
beneficial to a criminal defendant by “providing the jury with the ‘third’ 
option of convicting on a lesser included offense [thereby] ensur[ing] that 
the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt 
standard.”3   
A lesser-included offense instruction, however, may also be beneficial 
to the State.  Indeed, the common law rule originally developed as “an aid to 
the prosecution in cases in which [its evidence] failed to establish some 
                                          
 
2 Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860, 863-64 (Del. 2002) (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 633 (1980)).  See also 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 302-302 (1736); 2 W. 
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 623 (6th ed. 1787); 1 J. Chitty, Criminal Law 250 (5th Am 
ed 1847); T. Starkie, Treatise on Criminal Pleading 3521-352 (2d ed 1822). 
3 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 634.  
 
6
element of the crime charged.”4  From these common law origins, the 
principle that one indicted for a greater offense can properly be convicted of 
an uncharged lesser-included offense is now well established.5   
The purpose and rationale for this almost universal practice of 
granting requests to give lesser-included offense instructions, when there is a 
rational basis in the evidence to support them, has been explained as follows:  
The doctrine is a valuable tool for defendant, prosecutor, and 
society. From a defendant's point of view, it provides the jury 
with an alternative to a guilty verdict on the greater offense. 
From the prosecutor's viewpoint, a defendant may not go free if 
the evidence fails to prove an element essential to a finding of 
guilt on the greater offense. Society may receive a benefit 
because, in the latter situation, courts may release fewer 
defendants acquitted of the greater offense. In addition, the 
punishment society inflicts on a criminal may conform more 
accurately to the crime actually committed if a verdict on a 
lesser included offense is permissible.6 
 
Jurisdictional Approaches 
Lesser-Included Instructions 
 
 
The approaches applied by various courts in determining whether a 
lesser-included offense instruction should be presented to a jury have been 
divided into three categories:  trial integrity jurisdictions, party autonomy 
                                          
 
4 Id. (citing 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 515, n.54 (1969)). 
5 See Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 800-01 (Md. 1989).  The lesser-included offense 
doctrine has been codified in most jurisdictions, either by statute, or rule of criminal 
procedure.  Id. at 810 n.5 & n.6.  In Delaware, this doctrine is codified at Del. Code. Ann. 
tit. 11, § 206. 
6 Note, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Pennsylvania: Uncertainty in the Courts, 
84 Dick. L. Rev. 125, 126 (1979). 
 
7
jurisdictions, and hybrid jurisdictions.7  Courts in the first category require 
an instruction on any lesser-included offense supported by the evidence, 
even if neither party requests one.8  In such jurisdictions, “the key question 
is whether trial process is compromised by omission of the lesser-included 
instruction.”9  The rationale for this “trial integrity approach”10, is that it is 
the judge’s role to “fully instruct the jury on the law applicable to each 
particular case.”11   
In trial integrity jurisdictions, if lesser-included instructions are 
warranted by the evidence, the trial judges must sua sponte give such an 
instruction.  This analytical model does not permit the parties to adopt an all-
or-nothing trial strategy.  Very few states have adopted a pure trial integrity 
`model because of the historical deference that courts give to parties to 
develop their own trial strategy within the American adversarial process.   
                                          
 
7 See In re Nathan L., 776 A.2d 1277, 1280-82 (N.H. 2001).  See also Catherine L. 
Carpenter, The All-or-Nothing Doctrine in Criminal Cases: Independent Trial Strategy or 
Gamesmanship Gone Awry? 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 257 (1999) (hereinafter “All or 
Nothing”). 
8 See, e.g., State v. Haanio, 16 P.3d 246, 254 (Haw. 2001); People v. Barton, 906 P.2d 
531, 535 n.4 (Cal. 1995); Hubbard v. State, 817 P.2d 262, 263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); 
Lisby v. State, 414 P.2d 592 (Nev. 1966). 
9 Catherine L. Carpenter, All or Nothing, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. at 278. 
10 Id.  
11 In re Nathan L., 776 A.2d at 1280 (quotations omitted). 
 
8
Accordingly, many courts in other jurisdictions apply what is referred 
to as the “party autonomy” approach.12 These jurisdictions have concluded 
that the trial judge should not interfere with the trial strategies of the parties.  
Consequently, in these jurisdictions, trial judges withhold deciding the issue 
of whether there is a rational basis in the evidence to charge the jury on a 
lesser-included offense unless requested to do so by a party.13  Pursuant to 
the party autonomy approach, the burden is initially on the parties rather 
than the trial judge to determine whether a lesser-included offense 
instruction is to be considered as an option for the jury.   
A third approach takes the middle ground.  In these “hybrid” 
jurisdictions,14 the trial judge has the discretion to instruct sua sponte on a 
lesser-included offense.15  This approach attempts to remove the “all or 
nothing” trial strategy present in “party autonomy” jurisdictions, while still 
affording the trial judge the discretion over whether to give a lesser-included 
                                          
 
12 Catherine L. Carpenter, All or Nothing, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. at 283. 
13 See, e.g. Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1358 n.4 (Del. 1992) (quoting Walker v. United 
States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (“[a] trial judge should withhold charging 
on lesser included offense unless one of the parties requests it, since that charge is not 
inevitably required ... [and] ... is an issue best resolved, in our adversary system, by 
permitting counsel to decide on tactics.”); Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 804 (1989) 
(describing this approach as the “better view”). 
14 Catherine L. Carpenter, All or Nothing, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. at 288. 
15 See, e.g., In re Nathan L., 776 A.2d at 1281; Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 21 (Ga. 
1998); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 300.50 (Mckinney 1993); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 §  13-
A (West 1983). 
 
9
offense instruction that is not present in  “trial integrity” jurisdictions.16  The 
discretionary authority granted to trial judges in these hybrid jurisdictions 
also allows for a trial judge to withhold the giving of a lesser-included 
offense instruction, even though there is a substantial basis in the evidence, 
in the absence of a request for such an instruction by one of the parties.  Not 
surprisingly, there appears to be “significant conflict” in these jurisdictions 
concerning the scope and application of such discretion.17   
Delaware Law 
Party Autonomy Approach 
 
In Chao v. State, this Court explained that Delaware is a “party 
autonomy” jurisdiction.18  We continue to be persuaded by the rationale of 
the many other jurisdiction that also follow the “party autonomy” approach:  
“[t]he better view… is that the trial court ordinarily should not give a jury 
instruction on an uncharged lesser included offense where neither side 
requests or affirmatively agrees to such instruction.”19  As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained: 
                                          
 
16 In re Nathan L., 776 A.2d at 1281. 
17 Patrick D. Pflaum, Comment, Justice is Not All or Nothing: Preserving the Integrity of 
Criminal Trials Through the Statutory Abolition of the All-or- Nothing Doctrine, 73 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 289, 318 (2002); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, All or Nothing, 26 Am. J. 
Crim. L. at 289-91. 
18 See Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1357-58 (Del. 1992). 
19 Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 804 (Md. 1989); see also e.g., Walker v. United States, 
418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Woodward v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 261 
 
10
In general the trial judge should withhold charging on lesser 
included offense unless one of the parties requests it, since that 
charge is not inevitably required in our trials, but is an issue 
best resolved, in our adversary system, by permitting counsel to 
decide on tactics. If counsel asks for a lesser-included offense 
instruction, it should be freely given. If it is not requested by 
counsel, it is properly omitted by the trial judge, and certainly 
should not be initiated by the judge after summations are 
completed, except possibly in an extreme case.20 
 
The “party autonomy” approach allows the defendant to exercise or 
waive the “full benefits of reasonable doubt” that a lesser included offense 
instruction may promote, while also allowing the prosecution to seek the 
proper punishment for a criminal act that a jury may not believe rises to the 
level of the original offense charged.  We adhere to our holding that in 
Delaware, the burden of requesting lesser-included offense instructions is 
properly placed upon trial counsel, “for it is they who determine trial tactics 
and presumably act in accordance with a formulated strategy.”21   
                                                                                                                             
 
(D.C. 1999); State v. Porter, 948 N.W.2d 127, 142 (Idaho 1997); People v. Romero, 694 
P.2d 1256, 1269 (Colo. 1985). 
20 Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citations omitted). In 
addition to the D.C. Circuit, this approach is followed in several other federal circuits. 
See United States  v. DiPalermo, 606 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Colon, 
268 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Meyers, 443 F.2d 913, 914 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Duran, 127 
F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997). 
21 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d at 1358.  See also Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 633 (Del. 
2001). 
 
11
Mutuality of Right 
 
 
It is well established in the federal courts that the defendant is entitled 
to an instruction on a lesser-included offense “if the evidence would permit a 
jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the 
greater.”22  That principle is equally well established in state courts.23  
Almost twenty-five years ago, in Beck v. Alabama, the United States 
Supreme Court stated, “[w]hile we have never held that a defendant is 
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction as a matter of due process, 
the nearly universal acceptance of the rule in both state and federal courts 
establishes the value to the defendant of this procedural safeguard.”24   
 
Pursuant to Delaware’s lesser-included offense statute, a trial judge is 
not required to instruct a jury with respect to a lesser-included offense 
“unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense 
                                          
 
22 Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973).  Accord Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 635 (1980); Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1357 (Del. 1992).   
23 Id. at 1357-58. 
24 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 637.  In Beck v. Alabama, the United States Supreme 
Court did hold, however, that a sentence of death may not be imposed unless the jury is 
permitted to consider a verdict of guilt on a non-capital lesser-included offense – if such 
an instruction is requested by the defense – when the evidence would have supported 
such a verdict.  Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1359 (citing Beck v. Alabama, 947 U.S. at 
643-44).  
 
12
[instead].”25  This Delaware statutory provision makes no distinction 
between requests made by the State or a defendant.  Similarly, this provision 
does not limit the granting of such a request only to situations where no 
objection to the request is made by the opposing party. 
 
The mutuality of right doctrine affords the prosecution the equivalent 
right of the defendant to request and to have the jury receive lesser-included 
offense instructions.  Those jurisdictions that otherwise permit the parties to 
adopt an all-or-nothing trial strategy abide by the general maxim that one 
party cannot demand an all-or-nothing strategy over the objection of the 
other.26  In State v. Howland, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that 
“the State is entitled to have the lesser included offense instruction submitted 
to the jury if the evidence justifies it.  The defendant is not entitled to ‘force 
an all or nothing verdict’ by objecting to instructions on the lesser included 
offense if the evidence warrants it.”27 
 
We have concluded that the mutuality of right doctrine is a logical 
corollary to Delaware’s party autonomy approach to giving lesser-included 
offense instructions.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge must give a 
                                          
 
25 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(c); see also Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1358 (Del. 
1992). 
26 See Hawthorne v. United States, 829 A.2d 948, 951 (D.C. 2003); State v. Jarvis, 483 
S.E.2d 38, 44 (W. Va. 1996); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1137 (Wyo. 1993); State v. 
Howland, 402 A.2d 188, 191 (N.H. 1979); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, All-or-
Nothing, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 257, 277. 
27 State v. Howland, 402 A.2d at 191. 
 
13
lesser-included offense instruction at the request of either the defendant or 
the prosecution – even over the objection of the other party – if the evidence 
presented is such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the 
lesser-included offense and acquit the defendant of the greater offense.  The 
only exception to this mutuality of right principle is when the State asks for 
a lesser-included instruction “if at the time the offense is presented to the 
court, its prosecution is time barred.”28 
Conclusion 
 
In criminal proceedings, a trial judge is required to instruct the jury on 
a lesser-included offense over the objection of an opposing party if:  it is 
requested by any party; there exists a rational basis in the evidence for the 
jury to convict the defendant of the lesser charge and acquit the defendant of 
the greater charge; and prosecution for the lesser-included offense is not 
time barred.  In this case, the trial judge committed legal error by sustaining 
the defendant’s objection and denying the State’s request for a lesser-
included offense instruction that was rationally supported by the evidence. 
                                          
 
28 Cane v. State, 560 A.2d 1063, 1066 (Del. 1989).