Title: State v. Kramer
Citation: 139 N.W.2d 374
Docket Number: 39669
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 1965

139 N.W.2d 374 (1965) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Donald KRAMER, Appellant. No. 39669. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 3, 1965. Rehearing Denied January 31, 1966. Goodrich M. Sullivan, Minneapolis, for appellant. Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., Linus J. Hammond, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, D. P. Mattson, County Atty., Rochester, for respondent. NELSON, Justice. Defendant, Donald R. Kramer, was convicted of the crime of incest by his own plea of guilty entered before the district court. He had been charged, in an information filed against him, with having committed the crime of incest by having sexual relations with a 14-year-old daughter on October 11, 1963, in violation of Minn. St. 609.365 (L.1963, c. 753, § 609.365). He now appeals from the judgment of conviction therein. A complaint was filed with the municipal court at Rochester, Minnesota, charging the defendant with incest, and a warrant was thereupon issued and defendant was brought before the municipal court on October 15, 1963. That court set October 28 as the date for a preliminary hearing and made arrangements to have counsel appointed after defendant had represented to the court that he desired representation but was financially unable to procure counsel because of his poverty. An order appointing Harold Krieger as counsel was entered by a judge of the district court sitting at Rochester, Minnesota, on October 16, 1963. Harold Krieger continued as defendant's counsel in his appearances before the municipal court and the district court. On October 28, defendant appeared before the municipal court with his attorney *375 and waived preliminary hearing. Mr. Krieger was reappointed as defendant's counsel before the district court. Defendant was brought before the district court on October 30, 1963, at which time his court-appointed attorney, Mr. Harold Krieger, requested further time to confer with defendant and that defendant be provided a mental examination. The district court appointed two commissioners, Dr. Paul F. Wilson, a psychiatrist on the staff of the Mental Health Center at Rochester, and Dr. Maurice J. Martin, a psychiatrist of the Mayo Clinic. These commissioners made their report on November 5, 1963, finding that defendant was not in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making a defense and reporting further that the defendant knew what he was doing and knew that it was wrong at the time of committing the crime with which he had been charged. On November 27, 1963, defendant was arraigned in the district court, Mr. Krieger appearing as his counsel. The information was read to him and a copy presented to him. Thereafter the following took place: The court then placed the defendant under oath and conducted a presentence examination of the defendant, and defendant admitted sexual relations with his daughter on six or seven occasions over a six months' period. After the presentence examination the court imposed a sentence of up to ten years. The defendant contends on appeal that his constitutional rights were violated in that when taking statements from him the deputy sheriffs failed to advise him of his right to counsel or of his right to remain silent; that the deputy sheriffs took statements from him on October 14 and 15, 1963, before counsel was appointed on October 16 and that these statements were involuntary and a violation of due process by reason of Deputy Sheriff Fischer's stating that "there would be nothing much come of it." There is no showing that any statement made or signed by defendant in the presence of the deputy sheriffs was ever referred to or made a part of the record, except the above-quoted inquiry by the court resulting in a voluntary plea of guilty by defendant. No testimony was taken at the preliminary hearing of October 28 because defendant, represented by counsel and pursuant to his advice, waived a preliminary hearing. There is no showing that any statements or testimony of statements made to the deputy sheriffs was ever presented or admitted into evidence during any of the proceedings had before the district court prior to defendant's entry of his plea of guilty. In the proceedings preceding the plea of guilty the court fully informed the defendant that if he had made or signed any statements at the instance of the deputy sheriffs under any belief that they were to be treated lightly or that he was told that "there would be nothing much come of it," the court would carefully consider such statements as to their admissibility should the defendant choose to plead not guilty. The defendant has directed this court's attention to cases bearing on the admissibility of confessions in the trial of a case, but those cases are hardly pertinent here where a plea of guilty has been voluntarily entered. The record indicates that the application for appointment of counsel was made on October 15, 1963, and the order of appointment was made and entered one day later. Defendant first appeared in the district court on October 30, 1963, at which time Mr. Krieger appeared as defendant's attorney and the court promptly reappointed him to represent the defendant before the *379 district court. A reading of the transcript of the proceedings in the district court which preceded defendant's plea of guilty shows that the court exercised the utmost caution in order to fully protect the rights of the defendant. The transcript makes it clear that the defendant, through the assistance of court-appointed attorney and the court, was fully advised of the nature of the proceedings and the consequences of a plea of guilty should he choose to voluntarily enter one. The presumption of fair and orderly conduct by state officials without coercion or distortion exists until challenged by facts to the contrary. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 77 S. Ct. 510, 1 L. Ed. 2d 376. In Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 79 S. Ct. 1157, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1234, the United States Supreme Court held that although defendant in a state criminal proceeding has an unqualified right to be represented at trial by retained counsel such right to counsel has not been extended to the investigation stages of such proceeding. We do not find that Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, applies to the facts in this case or that that decision has changed the law expressed in the two aforementioned cases. The lower Federal courts have so expressed themselves. Long v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 338 F.2d 549; Latham v. Crouse (10 Cir.) 338 F.2d 658. The record of the proceedings in the instant case establishes conclusively that the statements and admissions made by defendant before the court were freely and voluntarily made, no force, persuasion, pressure, or undue influence being used to exact them from him. His admissions of guilt were voluntary, as was his plea of guilty entered in the presence of his counsel, and free from any ruling by the court working to the prejudice of the defendant in deciding whether to enter a plea of not guilty and stand trial. So far as we are able to determine from the record herein defendant's own admissions and statements were conclusive as to his guilt of the crime charged, and the court under the circumstances did not err in accepting defendant's plea of guilty upon the record before us on this appeal.[1] Affirmed. [1] See, State v. Roggenbuck, Minn., 136 N.W.2d 857.