Title: State v. Felton
Citation: 194 Kan. 501, 399 P.2d 817
Docket Number: 44,074
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 1965

194 Kan. 501 (1965)
399 P.2d 817
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
JOHNNY VICTOR FELTON, Appellant.
No. 44,074

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1965.
James M. Brewster, of Mission, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
Bernis G. Terry, Assistant County Attorney, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, and Hugh H. Kreamer, County Attorney, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the district court of Johnson County, Kansas, denying appellant's motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 to vacate, set aside or correct a prior judgment and sentence of that court in a criminal action.
The facts required for a proper understanding of the issue involved on appellate review will be related as briefly as the state of the record permits.
On March 23, 1956, appellant who at all times was represented by competent court-appointed counsel, was convicted by a jury in the district court of Johnson County of the crime of robbery in the first degree, as defined by G.S. 1949, 21-527 (now K.S.A. 21-527), which was alleged in the amended information to have occurred on November 17, 1954.
*502 On April 2, 1956, his motion for a new trial having been overruled, appellant appeared before the court for sentencing and, pursuant to appellee's notice to proceed under the Habitual Criminal Act (G.S. 1949, 21-107a [now K.S.A. 21-107a]), the court received in evidence, without objection, an authenticated copy of appellant's conviction, on December 14, 1954, of the crimes of burglary and grand larceny, in the district court of Sedgwick County.
Thereupon, in view of his previous felony conviction in Sedgwick County, appellant was sentenced by the district court of Johnson County to confinement and hard labor in the Kansas State Penitentiary under G.S. 1949, 21-530 (now K.S.A. 21-530) and 21-107a; supra, for not less than twenty nor more than forty-two years, and took no appeal from his judgment and sentence.
In passing we note there is nothing in the record disclosing the date upon which the crimes resulting in the Sedgwick County conviction were committed. However the record does definitely reflect that appellant's conviction and sentence in the Sedgwick County court occurred approximately a month after the date on which he was charged with having committed the Johnson County offense. Thus it becomes obvious that the commission of the Johnson County offense of November 17, 1954, antedated the Sedgwick County conviction and sentence of December 14, 1954.
On May 4, 1964, pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507, appellant filed a motion in the district court of Johnson County to vacate, set aside and correct his judgment and sentence of April 2, 1956. This motion was overruled on May 6, 1964. On May 28, 1964, appellant filed a petition for rehearing which was overruled on the same day. Later, and on June 25, 1964, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the court's order of May 6, 1964, an affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis, and a motion for court appointment of counsel. On the same day the court entered an order wherein it authorized appellant to proceed in forma pauperis, and appointed James M. Brewster, a competent attorney of Mission, to represent him for the purpose of this appeal. Mr. Brewster accepted that responsibility and since his appointment has filed a proper record and brief and orally argued the cause on the date appellant's appeal was heard by this court on its merits.
Boiled down the over-all issue raised by appellant in the instant case may be stated thus:
That at the time of sentencing appellant in the Johnson County court it was erroneous and improper for that court to apply the *503 Habitual Criminal Act (K.S.A. 21-107a) where the authenticated copy of a prior conviction in Sedgwick County, which was relied upon by the sentencing court as requiring the application of such act, affirmatively disclosed that such prior conviction had been obtained, as shown by the amended information and the verdict of the jury in the Johnson County case, after the commission of the offense resulting in the second conviction.
From the foregoing issue, supported by an uncontroverted record from the standpoint of controlling facts on which it is based, it appears that we are confronted with a question of law that, contrary to contentions advanced by appellee, can properly be raised by motion pursuant to existing provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507 which, so far as here material, read:
For an interesting discussion, supporting what has just been stated and dealing at length with the right afforded to prisoners under the provisions of 60-1507, supra, as implemented by this court's Rule No. 121 (now appearing in Volume 193, Advance Sheet No. 4 of the Kansas Reports), see the first three pages of the opinion in State v. Richardson, 194 Kan. 471, 399 P.2d 799.
The issue, to which we have previously referred, requires consideration and construction of our Habitual Criminal Act, K.S.A. 21-107a, which reads:
Inherent in the over-all issue involved, when it is stripped of all excess verbiage, is the decisive question whether, in order to enhance punishment under the Habitual Criminal Act, the offense on which a second or subsequent conviction is based (here the Johnson Connty offense of November 17, 1954) must, from the standpoint of the date of its commission, follow the date of the first conviction (here the Sedgwick County conviction of December 14, 1954).
With commendable candor, counsel for the respective parties concede they have been unable to find any Kansas decisions wherein the foregoing decisive question has been either considered or determined and our extended research has failed to disclose any. However, it may be stated, this court has frequently dealt with the subject of the fundamental purpose and objective of the Habitual Criminal Act.
In the early case of State v. Woodman, 127 Kan. 166, 272 Pac. 132, where the validity of the act, as it existed in 1928, was first challenged, the court made the following statement:
Later, and with respect to the same subject, Justice Jochems, concurring specially, in the case of State v. Close, 130 Kan. 497, 287 Pac. 599, had this to say:
In a more recent case, State v. Ricks, 173 Kan. 660, 250 P.2d 773, we held:
And in the opinion said:
Still later in Johnson v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 694, 383 P.2d 978, we said:
Although, as heretofore indicated, there are no cases from this jurisdiction dealing with the precise question now under consideration, there is no occasion here to write a thesis on the subject for it has been dealt with elsewhere on numerous occasions. For a recent and comprehensive annotation, entitled, "Chronological or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty for subsequent offense under habitual criminal statutes," see 24 A.L.R.2d, Anno., pp. 1247 to 1280, incl., citing numerous cases from foreign jurisdictions, where the following general statement appears:
After correlating all known cases dealing with the subject the annotator reaches the conclusion that, as applied by the courts of the United States, there is a majority rule and a minority rule.
With respect to the majority rule the following statement appears in the annotation:
As to the minority rule it is said:
For further annotations supplementing 24 A.L.R.2d. Annotations, pp. 1247 to 1280, incl., see 2 A.L.R.2d Supplement Service For Annotations (1960) and subsequent Supplement Service For Annotations (1962), (1963) and (1964). See, also, 25 Am. Jur., Habitual Criminals, §§ 10, 12, pp. 265, 266.
Nothing would be gained by extended analysis of the many decisions listed and discussed in the foregoing annotations. It suffices to say, we have carefully reviewed such decisions, especially those dealing with habitual criminal statutes similar to our own (21-107a, supra), and have concluded that the great weight of authority, as well as the better reasoned cases, hold it is a prerequisite that the prior conviction or convictions precede the commission of the principal offense in order to enhance the punishment under the habitual criminal statutes. Moreover, in this a case of first impression, and particularly in view of what it has said and held in its decisions dealing with the subject of the fundamental purpose and objective of our Habitual Criminal Act, this court is in accord with the majority rule as previously announced, to which we adhere. Therefore, we are impelled to hold that, since the undisputed facts of record are that the prior conviction here involved did not precede  but followed  the commission of the principal offense, the trial court's action in invoking the act to increase the punishment for the principal offense was not warranted and cannot be upheld.
The conclusion just announced does not mean that appellant is entitled to be released from custody. The record is clear that in *507 the Johnson County case the information charged, and the defendant was convicted by a jury of, the crime of robbery in the first degree, as defined by 21-527, supra, and that proper sentence should have been imposed under 21-530, supra.
Therefore, under the authority of Richardson v. Hand, 182 Kan. 326, 320 P.2d 837; Johnson v. Hand, 189 Kan. 103, 367 P.2d 70; Wiles v. Board of Probation &amp; Parole, 191 Kan. 705, 383 P.2d 969; McQueen v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 821, 391 P.2d 68, it is ordered and directed that the appellant be taken by the proper authorities before the district court of Johnson County and that such court impose a proper sentence in accord with the provisions of K.S.A. 21-530, in the original case.
Finally it should be stated that it cannot be said the original sentence in the district court, although irregular, furnishes no purpose whatsoever. It does fix the time at which the corrected sentence begins to run. See e.g., State v. Cox, 194 Kan. 120, 397 P.2d 406, where it is said:
The order denying appellant's motion to set aside and correct his prior sentence is reversed and the trial court is directed to resentence appellant in the original case in accord with the views herein expressed.