Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Joseph L. Sommers
Citation: 2012 WI 33
Docket Number: 2006AP002851-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 2012

2012 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2851-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Joseph L. Sommers, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Joseph L. Sommers, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SOMMERS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 30, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 3, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, J.J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs filed by 
Joseph L. Sommers, pro se, Oregon, and oral argument by Joseph 
L. Sommers. 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there were briefs 
filed by Julie M. Spoke and Thomas J. Basting, Sr., and oral 
argument by Julie M. Spoke.  
 
 
 
 
2012 WI 33
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2006AP2851-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Joseph L. Sommers, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph L. Sommers, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 30, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Joseph L. Sommers appeals a 
referee's recommendation that his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin be suspended for professional misconduct and that he 
be directed to pay a portion of the costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding.  After exhaustive review and consideration, we 
approve the referee's findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommendations relating to discipline and costs.  We suspend 
Attorney Sommers' license to practice law for 30 days, but we 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
2 
 
reduce, by one-half, the costs of the proceeding to be assessed 
against him. 
¶2 
We begin our discussion by noting that this has been a 
difficult case.  Pending some five years, it has implicated not 
only the allegations in the Office of Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) 
complaint, but an OLR complaint filed against Assistant District 
Attorney (ADA) Paul W. Humphrey, as well as a variety of unusual 
procedural developments, including Attorney Sommers' motion to 
substitute the first appointed referee, substantive motions 
regarding whether Attorney Sommers could pursue counterclaims 
against the OLR, Attorney Sommers' efforts to advance additional 
issues in the Humphrey disciplinary matter, Attorney Sommers' 
repeated challenges to the state of the record, extensive 
discovery, OLR's permissive appeal to this court regarding 
discovery and in camera review of OLR investigative files, the 
evidentiary hearing before the referee which Attorney Sommers 
declined to attend, various requests that all participating 
members of the court recuse themselves,1 and this appeal, which 
was further delayed because of Attorney Sommers' challenge to 
the documents to be included in the court record on appeal.   
                                                 
1 The participating members of this court, individually, 
have determined that none has a significant personal interest in 
the outcome of this disciplinary proceeding such as would 
require our disqualification.  Each is satisfied that his or her 
impartiality in this proceeding is unimpaired and, further, that 
our acting in this matter does not create the appearance of a 
lack of impartiality.  Accordingly, we have denied Attorney 
Sommers' requests for recusal and we address the merits of the 
appeal.  See order dated April 14, 2009 (denying Attorney 
Sommers' motion for recusal). 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Attorney Sommers was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin on September 3, 1992.  He practices in Oregon, 
Wisconsin, and has proceeded pro se throughout this litigation.  
He has not previously been disciplined.   
¶4 
This disciplinary matter and the disciplinary matter 
involving ADA Humphrey both stem from counsels' respective 
conduct during the three and one-half year prosecution of Adam 
Raisbeck.  Attorney Sommers defended Raisbeck and in April 2005, 
following a four-day jury trial, Raisbeck was acquitted of 
homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle.   
¶5 
Because the OLR complaint against Attorney Sommers 
derives from his conduct during his defense of Raisbeck, a brief 
summary of the Raisbeck matter is necessary.  On September 1, 
2001, Raisbeck, then 17 years old, was the driver in a one-car 
rollover accident near Medina that killed one passenger and 
injured the other passenger.  On December 12, 2001, Raisbeck was 
charged with negligent homicide by operation of a motor vehicle 
and reckless driving.  Attorney Sommers, a friend of the 
Raisbeck family, was retained as Raisbeck's defense counsel.  
ADA Humphrey was the prosecutor.   
¶6 
The State claimed that Raisbeck was traveling at an 
excessive rate of speed when the accident occurred.  Both 
parties considered the accident scene photographs critical.  
They disputed the meaning of certain tire markings seen in the 
pictures, argued over how Attorney Sommers was to obtain a set 
of the accident photos, and debated the opinions of accident 
reconstruction experts as to the speed of the vehicle and 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
4 
 
whether Raisbeck braked before entering the curve in the road 
where the accident occurred.  As the litigation proceeded, 
Attorney Sommers became increasingly persuaded that the evidence 
for such a serious charge against Raisbeck was lacking, was 
based on error, and that ADA Humphrey and others were engaging 
in a cover-up to avoid acknowledging that critical evidence was 
faulty.2  Attorney Sommers' serious and sweeping allegations 
necessarily pervade this opinion as they pervaded the underlying 
litigation.  However, it is important to recall that the case we 
                                                 
2 Indeed, this statement significantly understates Attorney 
Sommers' position regarding the Raisbeck case.  Attorney 
Sommers' primary goal in this proceeding appears to be to 
persuade the court that ADA Humphrey knowingly used inaccurate 
expert testimony, suborned perjury from an expert, coordinated 
removal 
of 
exculpatory 
evidence 
(i.e., 
accident 
scene 
photographs) from a deputy sheriff's locker so the exculpatory 
materials could not be produced in court, intentionally delayed 
disclosing 
exculpatory 
evidence, 
and 
intimidated 
defense 
witnesses by procuring a bench warrant against a witness for a 
trial that had been continued and when no subpoena had actually 
issued.  Although ADA Humphrey was charged with professional 
misconduct, Attorney Sommers contends the OLR's allegations and 
recommended sanction are minor as compared with the evidence he 
feels he has provided to the OLR and the courts regarding ADA 
Humphrey's alleged misconduct. 
Moreover, Attorney Sommers has asserted that the OLR and 
its staff are cooperating in a conspiracy to protect the 
district attorney's office as evidenced by what he perceives to 
be minor ethical charges against ADA Humphrey and unfair charges 
against him. 
Attorney Sommers has also claimed that this court's 
actions, including its refusal to act sua sponte on Attorney 
Sommers' allegations or to intervene prematurely in this matter, 
along with perceived anomalies in the court records, demonstrate 
that this court is a participant in a "cover-up" by the district 
attorney and the OLR.   
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
5 
 
decide today involves Attorney Sommers' appeal from a referee 
report concluding that Attorney Sommers committed professional 
misconduct warranting suspension of his license to practice law. 
¶7 
On November 17, 2006, the OLR filed a disciplinary 
complaint against Attorney Sommers alleging three counts of 
misconduct and recommending a 60-day suspension.3  As noted, this 
case was extensively litigated; every procedural twist and turn 
cannot be recounted here.  However, we mention a few specific 
procedural events.  These provide some insight into the tangled 
complexity of this case. 
I.  REFEREE SUBSTITUTION 
¶8 
Two 
referees 
have 
presided 
over 
this 
matter.  
Initially, both disciplinary complaints were assigned to Referee 
Russell Hanson.  On August 3, 2007, Referee Hanson issued a 
report and recommendation in the Humphrey matter.  On August 10, 
2007, Attorney Sommers asked this court to replace Hanson as 
referee in his own disciplinary proceeding.  This court granted 
Attorney Sommers' request, removed Referee Hanson, and on 
October 3, 2007, appointed Referee Stanley Hack.  Although 
Attorney Sommers now makes scathing references to "this court's 
hand-picked" 
referee, 
the 
removal 
of 
Referee 
Hanson 
was 
                                                 
3 A three-count disciplinary complaint against ADA Humphrey 
was filed the same week.  The referee found violations and 
recommended a public reprimand.  ADA Humphrey appealed.  This 
court ordered the Humphrey disciplinary matter held in abeyance 
until further order of the court.  The disciplinary proceeding 
against ADA Humphrey is being resolved in a separate opinion 
also issued today.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Paul W. Humphrey, 2012 WI 32 (Case No. 2006AP2842-D). 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
6 
 
permitted as a courtesy in response to Attorney Sommers' request 
and is not reflective of any finding of misconduct by Referee 
Hanson. 
II.  COUNTERCLAIM AND COMPLAINTS AGAINST OLR 
¶9 
Attorney Sommers contested the allegations in the OLR 
disciplinary complaint and also sought to file a counterclaim 
against the OLR alleging misconduct by the OLR in the crafting 
of the disciplinary complaint.  OLR moved to dismiss Attorney 
Sommers' counterclaim on the ground that the supreme court rules 
contain no procedure for permitting a formal counterclaim in an 
OLR proceeding.  Attorney Sommers asserted that Referee Hanson 
initially indicated a counterclaim would be permitted and then 
concluded that instead, Attorney Sommers would be permitted to 
introduce evidence of OLR actions as an affirmative defense.   
¶10 On February 29, 2008, Referee Hack dismissed Attorney 
Sommers' counterclaim but agreed that Attorney Sommers could 
present the substance of his arguments regarding alleged OLR 
misconduct as an affirmative defense.  The decision was 
memorialized in a written order dated June 5, 2008.  Attorney 
Sommers appeals this determination, maintaining his right to 
pursue a counterclaim.  Indeed, he asserts that this court 
authorized Referee Hanson and Attorney Sommers, himself, to 
proceed with a counterclaim.  He cites to a letter from the 
deputy clerk of court to Referee Hanson dated February 1, 2007.  
The referee had written to the court inquiring whether a 
procedure exists for evaluating a complaint made against the 
director of the office of lawyer regulation and OLR staff 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
7 
 
counsel.  The response advised the referee that "SCR 22.25 
provides a procedure for evaluating allegations of misconduct or 
malfeasance by lawyer regulation system participants."  The 
letter does state, in response to the referee's inquiry, that 
"it would be appropriate for the referee to consider such 
allegations [against the OLR] in the context of the disciplinary 
proceeding in the form of a counter claim or challenge to the 
complaint, as you propose in your letter" and continues that if 
the respondent "is not satisfied with a referee's resolution of 
the matter, the respondent retains the right to appeal the 
referee's determination."   
¶11 Ultimately, both referees declined to permit a formal 
counterclaim opting instead to allow Attorney Sommers to present 
evidence in the form of an affirmative defense.  Attorney 
Sommers, not satisfied with this ruling, appeals.   
¶12 We affirm the referee's decision to dismiss the 
counterclaim.  We agree that the applicable supreme court rules 
do not contemplate a formal counterclaim in disciplinary 
proceedings.  An individual alleging malfeasance by the OLR may 
file a complaint pursuant to SCR 22.25(8),4 the rule that governs 
malfeasance complaints against the OLR director and staff. 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.25(8) provides: 
Allegations of malfeasance against the director, 
retained counsel, a member of a district committee, a 
member of the preliminary review committee, a member 
of the board of administrative oversight, a special 
investigator, a member of the special preliminary 
review panel, or a referee shall be referred by the 
director to the supreme court for appropriate action.  
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
8 
 
¶13 Attorney Sommers is aware of this option.  In addition 
to litigating this disciplinary case before the referee, 
Attorney Sommers has also written a series of letters directly 
to the court and individual justices trying to persuade this 
court to intervene in his case or to rule directly on various 
complaints and allegations against ADA Humphrey, the district 
attorney's office, the OLR, specific OLR staff, and others.5  
¶14 In December 2006, after the Sommers and Humphrey 
complaints were filed, Attorney Sommers filed a letter in the 
supreme court alleging malfeasance by the OLR.  He sent a 
similar follow-up letter directly to the supreme court justices.  
These documents were submitted to the court for review pursuant 
to SCR 22.25(8).  
¶15 The court typically considers such complaints against 
the OLR premature when——as here——the person alleging the 
                                                 
5 In his filings to this court Attorney Sommers has made 
allegations of unethical and/or criminal conduct against a 
number of entities and individuals including the Dane County 
District Attorney's office, the circuit court, the OLR, both 
referees, and most of the supreme court justices.  He has 
specifically named the following individuals: ADA Humphrey, 
Detective Judith Boehm, Dane County Deputy Sheriff Gnacinski, 
Accident Reconstruction Specialist Robert Krenz, Deputy District 
Attorney (DDA) Judy Schwaemle, ADA Timothy Verhoff, District 
Attorney Brian Blanchard, Judge Paul Higginbotham, Judge Robert 
Pekowsky, Judge Daniel Moeser, OLR Director Keith Sellen, OLR 
Counsel Julie Falk (now Spoke), Referee Russell Hanson, Referee 
Stanley Hack, Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Supreme Court 
Justice N. Patrick Crooks, and various unnamed clerk's office 
staff who are accused of intentionally removing documents from 
the court record.  These allegations far exceed the scope of the 
matter before the court today, and many of the named individuals 
have had no formal opportunity to respond to Attorney Sommers' 
claims. 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
9 
 
malfeasance is presently the subject of a pending disciplinary 
matter.  The complainant is typically advised——as Attorney 
Sommers was here——that his or her complaint against the OLR may 
be 
pursued 
when 
the 
underlying 
disciplinary 
matter 
has 
concluded.  Accordingly, on February 12, 2007, the court issued 
a letter advising Attorney Sommers that, consistent with 
standard court procedure, an SCR 22.25(8) complaint against OLR 
is deemed premature when a complainant is presently the subject 
of a pending disciplinary matter.   
¶16 On May 21, 2007, Attorney Sommers filed another letter 
directly with this court making allegations against the OLR and 
its staff.  The court construed Attorney Sommers' letter as a 
renewed request to file an SCR 22.25(8) complaint.  The court 
issued another letter dated August 29, 2007, reminding Attorney 
Sommers that he retains the option of filing an SCR 22.25(8) 
grievance against the OLR director upon conclusion of his 
pending disciplinary matters.  See also order dated June 18, 
2009 (advising Attorney Sommers that no action would be taken on 
premature requests for review of the OLR).  These letters and 
the order dismiss Attorney Sommers' premature requests to 
commence an SCR 22.25(8) complaint against the OLR; they are not 
rulings in the Sommers disciplinary matter.   
¶17 We affirm the referee's determination that Attorney 
Sommers may not advance a counterclaim against the OLR and 
reiterate that Attorney Sommers retains his right to file a 
complaint against the OLR pursuant to SCR 22.25(8) upon the 
conclusion of this litigation.   
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
10 
 
III.  DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE COURT FILES 
¶18 In the fall of 2007, Attorney Sommers alleged that 
documents were "missing" or had been "removed" from his court 
file and/or from the Humphrey court file.  Accordingly, shortly 
after Referee Hack was appointed, he and Attorney Sommers and 
OLR counsel together undertook a review to ensure the integrity 
and completeness of the court files.  Their review, conducted at 
the clerk's office, revealed that some documents apparently 
intended for the Humphrey file had been filed in the Sommers 
file and vice versa.  The parties apparently agreed that the 
court files were complete after this review.  Attorney Sommers 
has asserted that these documents were intentionally removed 
from the files.  The referee, however, concluded that any filing 
anomalies were unintentional.  We agree with that finding, 
noting that many of the documents in question were submitted to 
the court without proper caption and/or file numbers, greatly 
complicating the filing process in these related cases.   
IV.  OLR'S APPEAL 
¶19 Meanwhile, discovery in the Sommers matter continued.  
Attorney Sommers took many depositions including the depositions 
of nearly all of the judges involved in the Raisbeck case, the 
director 
of 
OLR, 
the 
chair 
of 
the 
District 
Committee 
investigating the Sommers and Humphrey matters, expert witnesses 
involved 
in 
the 
Raisbeck 
case, 
members 
of 
the 
district 
attorney's office staff, members of the Dane County sheriff's 
department, and others.    
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
11 
 
¶20 A dispute arose regarding Attorney Sommers' demand for 
disclosure of the OLR's investigative files pertaining to both 
Attorney Sommers and ADA Humphrey.  Attorney Sommers wanted to 
ascertain whether OLR had followed up on his claims against ADA 
Humphrey, and also to see whether the Preliminary Review 
Committee had received the evidence he submitted when it made 
its decision to proceed in both cases.   
¶21 OLR 
declined 
to 
produce 
the 
files 
citing 
confidentiality.  Referee Hack directed the parties to brief 
whether OLR investigative files are confidential.  On May 14, 
2008, Referee Hack issued an order directing the OLR to produce 
its files to permit him to conduct an in camera review.  OLR 
sought leave to appeal the May 14, 2008 order.6  The court 
granted the OLR's request.  Oral argument was heard in December 
2008.   
¶22 In February 2009 this court issued an order ruling 
that the order for in camera inspection of the files was overly 
broad, but permitting Attorney Sommers to pursue discovery of 
certain matters.  Discovery continued. 
¶23 Referee 
Hack 
conducted 
evidentiary 
hearings 
on 
August 15, August 28, September 8, and September 25, 2008, and 
then again on May 27 and May 28, 2009.  According to Attorney 
                                                 
6 The issue presented to the court was this: 
Can a referee in a disciplinary proceeding order 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) to provide him 
with full access to OLR's internal files, or should 
access be denied pursuant to SCR 22.40, PRIVILEGE and 
the work product doctrine?   
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
12 
 
Sommers, these hearings "revolved primarily around the issue of 
whether Humphrey and Krenz [one of the State's experts] 
conspired to present falsified expert analysis and testimony in 
Raisbeck."   Referee Hack declined Attorney Sommers' request 
that he make specific factual findings on these matters, 
concluding this information was not sufficiently relevant to his 
determination of whether Attorney Sommers committed professional 
misconduct.  The final evidentiary hearing was scheduled to 
begin on June 15, 2009.   
¶24 Attorney Sommers, who disagreed with the referee's 
decision, opted not to appear at the evidentiary hearing.  
Consequently, Attorney Sommers did not present any evidence in 
his own defense.  The referee denied OLR's motion for default 
judgment and required OLR to present its case.   Both parties 
were invited to file post-hearing briefs.  OLR filed a brief; 
Attorney Sommers did not.   
¶25 The referee issued his report and recommendation on 
October 16, 2009.  He recommended dismissal of Count One, found 
a clear violation of Count Two and, after describing Count Three 
as "more complicated," concluded Attorney Sommers had also 
committed 
misconduct 
with 
respect 
to 
Count 
Three. 
 
He 
recommended a 30-day suspension and suggested imposing two-
thirds of the costs.  Attorney Sommers appealed, the parties 
filed briefs, and this court conducted oral argument on 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
13 
 
November 3, 2010.7  The matter is now ripe for review pursuant to 
SCR 22.17(1). 
¶26 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are "clearly erroneous."  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Charlton, 
174 
Wis. 2d 844, 
874, 
498 
N.W.2d 380 
(1993); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Swartout, 116 Wis. 2d 380, 382, 342 N.W.2d 406 (1984).  The 
court does not grant deference to the referee's conclusions of 
law.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hetzel, 118 
Wis. 2d 257, 259, 346 N.W.2d 782 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
857, 105 S. Ct. 186 (1984); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 122, 310 N.W.2d 789 (1981). 
¶27 We first consider the referee's factual findings.  For 
purposes of this appeal, the OLR concedes that the referee's 
factual findings are not clearly erroneous.  Attorney Sommers 
disagrees and asserts that the referee report is "riddled with 
omissions, 
half—truths 
and, 
in 
some 
instances, 
outright 
falsehoods."  He provides a number of specific examples which we 
have carefully considered.  In particular, Attorney Sommers 
objects to what he perceives to be an important lack of 
specificity in the referee's summary of factual events.   
                                                 
7 The appeal in this matter was delayed nearly a year 
because Attorney Sommers failed to file a timely statement on 
transcript, 
and 
then 
asserted 
certain 
documents——namely 
deposition transcripts——were missing from the official court 
record.  This generated a dispute and extensive file review 
which lasted from December 2009 to July 2010.   
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
14 
 
¶28 Attorney Sommers' objection to the factual findings 
highlights an issue present since the onset of this proceeding.  
For Attorney Sommers this case is primarily about what happened 
in Raisbeck——a series of events he perceives to reflect gross 
injustice followed by extensive institutional cover-up.   
¶29 For the referee——and for this court——the case involves 
whether the OLR has proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
Attorney Sommers committed the professional misconduct alleged 
in the OLR complaint.  We conclude that the referee's decision 
not to add additional information to the report does not render 
the facts, vis-à-vis the pending disciplinary charges, "clearly 
erroneous."  Having reviewed the entire record in this matter we 
are of the opinion that the factual findings set forth in the 
report, while not wholly comprehensive of the evidence proffered 
by Attorney Sommers, are not clearly erroneous.   
¶30 We turn to the allegations against Attorney Sommers.   
Count One 
¶31 The first count of misconduct relates to allegations 
that Attorney Sommers falsely asserted in a motion there was no 
evidence that a subpoena had been served on a potential witness. 
¶32 Kevin McCoy was an acquaintance of Sommers' client, 
Raisbeck.  McCoy was present at a social gathering before the 
accident.  McCoy made a routine statement to a Dane County 
sheriff's deputy that he had seen Raisbeck's passengers the 
evening before the accident but did not know where they went or 
who they were with after that.  McCoy's innocuous statement was 
duly provided to Attorney Sommers during discovery.  
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
15 
 
¶33 On October 21, 2003, McCoy was asked to come into the 
district attorney's office to meet with ADA Humphrey for 
pretrial preparation.  At the time, trial was scheduled for 
October 27-30, 2003, although both Attorney Sommers and ADA 
Humphrey expected this trial date to be postponed.  Deputy 
Steven Greiber ("Greiber") attended the meeting and took notes.  
During the meeting, McCoy told ADA Humphrey and Greiber that he 
had a conversation with Raisbeck after the accident in which 
Raisbeck made some specific comments about the accident and 
expressed regret for what happened.  The details of this 
statement were deemed significant because previously, Raisbeck, 
who was injured in the accident, had stated he had no memory of 
the accident.  Greiber told McCoy he might be served with a 
subpoena for a court appearance as a witness at the trial.  The 
State maintains McCoy was subpoenaed for trial on October 27.  
Attorney Sommers contends he was not. 
¶34 On October 23, 2003, Raisbeck's trial was postponed 
until January 20, 2004.  During the week of October 27-30, 2003, 
McCoy did not appear at the Dane County Courthouse for trial.  
¶35 On November 12, 2003, ADA Humphrey filed an Affidavit 
for Bench Warrant and Material Witness Warrant against McCoy 
asserting that McCoy had failed to appear on the October 27-30, 
2003 dates and that this failure to appear was in violation of a 
previously served subpoena.  A bench warrant commanding the 
arrest of McCoy was issued.   
¶36 On January 7, 2004, ADA Humphrey disclosed McCoy's 
October 21 statements to Attorney Sommers via a cover letter 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
16 
 
stating that "[w]hile it is not discoverable, I thought I would 
send these notes aong [sic] anyway."8  In early 2004, ADA 
Humphrey was removed from the Raisbeck case.  
¶37 On February 24, 2004, Attorney Sommers (who maintains 
that McCoy was not properly subpoenaed for the October 27 trial 
date and that ADA Humphrey had sought to pressure and intimidate 
McCoy) sent a six-page letter to successor counsel, ADA Timothy 
Verhoff, that asserted in bold typeface: "It appears that 
Mr. McCoy was never subpoenaed for the trial the week of 
October 27, 2003."  In support of this assertion, Attorney 
Sommers attached, inter alia, a January 13, 2004 affidavit of 
Kevin McCoy.   
¶38 On March 15, 2004, ADA Verhoff responded: 
 
I am unable to produce for you at this time a 
copy of the subpoena served on to Kevin McCoy for the 
trial week of October 27, 2003, as I am unable to 
locate a copy of it in the case file.  I would note, 
however, Detective Janet Anderson [now Janet Boehnen] 
recalls 
serving 
the 
subpoena 
on 
Mr. 
McCoy 
on 
October 7, 2003.9  The subpoena was served on him at 
                                                 
8 Greiber had prepared a report dated October 27, 2003, 
summarizing the meeting with McCoy.  ADA Humphrey did not 
provide Attorney Sommers with a copy of Greiber's report until 
January 7, 2004.  At the time, trial was scheduled to commence 
on January 20, 2004, although it was later postponed again.  The 
delay in communicating this report to Attorney Sommers formed 
the basis for one of the disciplinary charges against ADA 
Humphrey. 
9 Detective 
Janet 
Boehnen 
later 
testified 
that 
she 
remembered serving a subpoena on McCoy in early October 2003.  
She was able to provide evidence from her notes including the 
address, the date, and returning the subpoena to the victim 
witness coordinator.  The actual subpoena for the October 27 
trial date, however, was never located. 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
17 
 
1614 N. Thompson Drive, #409, Madison. (Footnote not 
in original.) 
¶39 After receiving this response, Attorney Sommers filed 
a Notice and Motion to Dismiss or Suppress dated May 4, 2004, in 
which he asserted to the circuit court that, "It appears that 
the bench warrant for Kevin McCoy was even in further bad faith 
in that there is no evidence that he was actually even 
subpoenaed for the trial the week of October 27, 2003." 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶40 Count One of the disciplinary complaint filed against 
Attorney Sommers alleged that: 
By asserting on May 4, 2004, in a motion to 
suppress the testimony of witness Kevin McCoy that, 
"It appears that the bench warrant for Kevin McCoy was 
even in further bad faith in that there is no evidence 
that he was actually even subpoenaed for the trial the 
week of October 27, 2003" [Attorney] Sommers knowingly 
advanced a factual position without a basis for doing 
so that was not frivolous, in violation of [former] 
SCR 20:3.1(a)(2)10 and knowingly made a false statement 
of 
fact 
to 
a 
tribunal 
in 
violation 
of 
                                                 
10 Effective July 1, 2007, substantial changes were made to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, SCR Chapter 20.  See S. Ct. Order 04-07, 2007 WI 4, 
293 Wis. 2d xv, 726 N.W.2d Ct.R-45 (eff. July 1, 2007); and 
S. Ct. 
Order 
06-04, 
2007 
WI 
48, 
297 
Wis. 2d xv, 
730 
N.W.2d Ct.R.-29 (eff. July 1, 2007).  Because the conduct 
underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2007, unless 
otherwise indicated, all references to Chapter 20 of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules will be to those in effect prior 
to July 1, 2007. 
SCR 20:3.1(a)(2) said that in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a factual position unless 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous; . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
18 
 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1);11 and engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).12 
This charge alleges several discrete ethical violations, namely, 
(1) knowingly advancing a position without a basis for doing so 
that is not frivolous, (2) knowingly making a false statement to 
a tribunal, and (3) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.   
¶41 The referee recommended dismissal of this count.  The 
referee noted that although the State maintains a subpoena was 
properly served on McCoy, the actual subpoena was never located.  
The referee concluded that the evidence presented by OLR did not 
rise to the level of clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
evidence that Attorney Sommers' statement in the motion violated 
the aforementioned rules.  The OLR has not appealed this 
recommendation.  We adopt the referee's recommendation and we 
dismiss Count One of the OLR complaint.   
¶42 We note that Attorney Sommers vehemently objects to 
the manner in which the OLR staff counsel litigated Count One, 
asserting, inter alia, that OLR staff misstated the record 
evidence in order to bolster an unsubstantiated claim against 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provided that a lawyer shall not 
knowingly "make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal, . . . ." 
12 SCR 20:8.4(c) said it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
19 
 
him.13  As previously noted, allegations of malfeasance by OLR 
staff may be evaluated pursuant to SCR 22.25(8).   
Count Two 
¶43 The second count of misconduct alleged in the OLR 
complaint relates to statements made by Attorney Sommers at a 
pretrial hearing in the Raisbeck matter before the Honorable 
Robert R. Pekowsky.   
¶44 On May 24, 2004, Judge Pekowsky was scheduled to hear 
arguments concerning pretrial motions in Raisbeck.  At the 
hearing, Judge Pekowsky expressed concern because someone had 
placed fliers on potential jurors' cars in the court parking lot 
containing factual information and evidence related to the 
Raisbeck matter.  DDA Judy Schwaemle testified that, upon a 
review of the flier, it was her opinion that Attorney Sommers 
must have contributed to the information contained within the 
flier.  
¶45 Attorney Sommers then made several statements to Judge 
Pekowsky that form the factual basis for the second count 
against him.  Attorney Sommers stated:  
                                                 
13 As one example, in his brief Attorney Sommers asserts 
that OLR Counsel Julie Falk referenced a police report as 
stating that, "We served him [McCoy] with a subpoena."  Attorney 
Sommers contends that the report actually stated, "McCoy was 
informed he may receive a subpoena for a later time as a 
witness."  Attorney Sommers describes Attorney Falk's statement 
as a "blatant falsification."  During discovery, Attorney 
Sommers sought sanctions against Attorney Falk from the referee.  
The referee denied this request on the grounds that he lacked 
authority to make such findings or sanction counsel for alleged 
misconduct because such allegations would be governed by 
SCR 22.25. 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
20 
 
I mean, Your Honor, this is -- You're to a 
certain extent, I guess, part of the problem that I 
have right now.  And I don't mean to get the Court 
upset, 
but 
to 
a 
certain 
extent 
I'm 
like 
a 
mathematician who is being forced to provide or try to 
disprove that two and two is five.  . . .  
Your Honor, I guess one thing I can just say, Your 
Honor, I don't know.  I think that I don't want to say 
this -- I don't know how to say this without offending 
the Court, but I don't know what else to say.  . . .  
I believe it is my opinion that this Court is 
absolutely determined not to give him [Raisbeck] a 
fair trial in order to cover up for the State.  
And because of that I believe that his potential 
to be acquitted in this case is going to be reduced 
for the obvious reasons.  . . .  I believe it is 
absolute. My opinion is –-  
It's obvious this Court is going to close us off. 
It's obvious that this Court is going to -- Both times 
today when this Court has carefully -- everything has 
been carefully cut off, there is no answers and the 
whole thing about the emails was right when -- they 
know and I got to believe this Court knows it was 
going to go for the evidence that would show that Judy 
Schwaemle [Dane County DDA] and Brian Blanchard [Dane 
County's elected DA] were involved in the whole thing.  
And everybody has been orchestrated throughout 
this proceeding to cut it off at that moment.  You cut 
it off right now at that moment.  You've cut 
everything off, everything in this case is done to 
keep the cover-up going.  That's my belief.  
I believe that your intention in this trial is to 
do everything that you can, because apparently, Judge, 
it's just too dirty, you can't take it.  
The bottom line is he's the one going -- that's 
going to pay the price.  You cover up for them, his 
right to a fair trial is going to be strongly, 
adversely affected by it. 
¶46 Judge 
Pekowsky 
responded 
to 
Attorney 
Sommers' 
statements:  
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
21 
 
I'm going to tell you something: What you just said is 
extremely insulting. Though you never use the word 
conspiracy between myself and any of the DA's, you 
came very close to suggesting this is orchestrated -- 
you used that word -- and I can tell you I deeply 
resent that.  And it is nearly contentious of you to 
bring that to this public forum today.  
¶47 Judge Pekowsky and Attorney Sommers then had the 
following exchange:  
THE COURT: You know, you can make most of your 
comments without further reference to me, whether you 
think that I'm going to treat you fairly or not, but  
-- So confine your comments, use good judgment, and 
confine your comments not to what you think I might 
do, make your arguments and be quiet.  I don't think 
that's asking too much.  Your innuendo time and time 
again, and not so much of an innuendo, is that I've 
already decided how to rule and this is carefully 
orchestrated and that somehow you say it publically 
[sic].  
MR. SOMMERS: And I will again and again.  
THE COURT: I know you will.  And I'm telling you 
not to do it again in this proceeding.  You have the 
opportunity to go public outside this courtroom, and 
you certainly have an opportunity to express your 
opinion. 
 
But 
this 
is 
so 
detrimental 
to 
the 
proceeding, it absolutely detracts from everything.  
¶48 Attorney 
Sommers then accused Judge Pekowsky of 
"glossing over" what he deemed a misrepresentation that the 
prosecutors made to Judge Pekowsky on May 7, 2004.  Attorney 
Sommers told Judge Pekowsky, "You go out of your way -- Even 
today you go out of your way as much as you can just to ignore 
it -- to have tunnel vision and say we can't acknowledge it."  
Judge Pekowsky cautioned Attorney Sommers to "[s]tick to 
business 
here" 
and 
admonished 
Attorney 
Sommers: 
"It 
is 
apparently very easy for you to accuse anyone of almost anything 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
22 
 
as you have done in —-," at which point Attorney Sommers 
interrupted, yelling at Judge Pekowsky, "Your Honor, how dare 
you ever say that about me."  Attorney Sommers then stated to 
Judge Pekowsky:  
You won't give me a hearing. You won't let me put 
-- You say how dare you accuse me when you will not 
put a witness on the stand.  You've gone out of your 
way to prevent any -- any evidence at all.  You've 
gone out of your way.  You won't even address the fact 
that he [Humphrey] has lied to you and the whole 
thing.  You won't address anything.  
Why don't you just be honest and say: You know 
what, we don't care folks, we don't care.  These 
people matter.  They're the club.  They're powerful. 
They matter.  Adam Raisbeck doesn't count.  Why don't 
you be -- Why don't just you [sic] be honest about it, 
damn it?  
¶49 Judge Pekowsky responded to Attorney Sommers, "Sir, 
you are totally out of control."  Attorney Sommers replied, "I'm 
not -- Judge, I am basically frustrated by the fact that this is 
now over the top."  Judge Pekowsky responded:  
You're 
not 
only 
disrupting 
this 
proceeding 
completely but obviously almost everybody in this 
entire hallway if not the building has heard you now 
shout -- yell at the top of your voice.  There is no 
reason for this, and you're out of control, . . . .  
¶50 Moments later, when Attorney Sommers again interrupted 
Judge Pekowsky, the judge told Attorney Sommers:  
Quiet.  No more talk.  Let me talk.  You are so 
totally out of control.  I have never, since 1976 on 
the bench, ever seen anyone so out of control in the 
courtroom.  . . .  
 
You wonder why all these bailiffs are in here, 
because we don't have this kind of disturbance.  And 
when we do, it's ordinarily a defendant who is 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
23 
 
outraged about something.  Should I hold you in 
contempt for your behavior today?  It's totally out of 
line.  Totally out of line.  You're out of control.  
¶51 Attorney Sommers then told Judge Pekowsky: 
 
What I'm saying is, you, though, for whatever 
reason, because maybe you have too much of a [sic] 
invested stake in the whole thing, you just cannot 
come to terms with what has happened in this case, and 
you are refusing and you are stubbornly refusing to 
come to terms with what is going on up to this very 
moment . . . .  I take this case seriously.  Adam 
Raisbeck is a son of Owen Raisbeck who has been one of 
my dearest and closest friends, and that has a lot to 
do with why I've done this. 
¶52 After listening to Attorney Sommers for a few more 
moments, Judge Pekowsky stated:  
THE COURT: Can you stop, please, Joe?  Joe 
Sommers listen to me.  I don't think I've ever done 
this across the bench before.  I have read this file 
twice.  This is not the first time that it appears 
that you're an attorney that's out of control.  The 
record reflects that.  And it clearly does today.  Oh, 
it isn't going to reflect the amount of volume that 
you had or how totally out of control you were, that 
it required six, seven, eight bailiffs in here to see 
what was going on to protect the dignity of the Court 
which 
diminished 
entirely 
with 
your 
outrageous 
demeanor.   
. . .  
I understand passion.  I've seen many of the 
defense attorneys that are sitting here passionate -- 
passionate about what they do.  They don't react in 
the manner that you just did.  They don't -- They tend 
to let go.  They tend to make their case.  They tend 
to make their motion, and if they lose it, they know 
there's an appellate route.  There is a way to get 
someone to review this.   
I seriously question whether you've got yourself 
together, Joe Sommers.  I'm sorry.  But you are not in 
control.  I am very fearful of going forward with a 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
24 
 
jury, it's almost a certain mistrial.  It is almost 
impossible to get you to stop talking, and there was 
no stopping you minutes ago when all those bailiffs -- 
there was no stopping you, nothing I said or could 
have done.   
. . .  
And I'm trying very hard, very hard to be fair under 
what I consider extraordinarily difficult proceedings 
today.  Very difficult.   
I -- I'm just amazed at how out of control you 
have become.  And today kind of the last nail in the 
coffin, so to speak, is when you tie me into the 
conspiracy.  And you said oh, no, it's not quite a 
conspiracy, you have a good record, Judge, for all 
these 
years, 
but 
this 
morning 
there 
was 
an 
orchestration with these people here-–  
MR. SOMMERS: That's not what I'm saying.  You 
can't understand what I'm saying?  
THE COURT: I think I understand quite well.  I'll 
bet you if I took a poll in here everybody would say 
that you are outrageously rude to me.  
MR. SOMMERS: And I bet if you took a poll in here 
everybody would say this is a kangaroo court.  
THE COURT: That's another thing that might cost 
you your license along the way.  Couldn't you be just 
-- Do you realize what you just said?  
¶53 Attorney Sommers later stated to Judge Pekowsky:  
Now and again, so I can clarify, I have not said 
that there has been a conscious orchestration between 
you and the district attorney's office in this case 
before today or today.   
What I am saying is, though, that basically it 
comes down to it -- This is -- I guess I'm more 
accusing you of a lack of nerve.  So I guess if it 
sounds better, it's better.  But I'm accusing you of a 
lack of nerve.  I'm accusing you of the lack of nerve 
to basically have the courage to come to terms with 
what has happened and to even enforce your own orders.  
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
25 
 
¶54 Further context for these remarks was obtained at the 
2009 evidentiary hearing before the referee.  Judge Pekowsky 
testified that throughout Attorney Sommers' statements, Attorney 
Sommers was not looking to Judge Pekowsky but was speaking to 
"his" (i.e. Attorney Sommers') audience in the courtroom and 
that the entire courtroom was "frozen" during Attorney Sommers' 
tirade.  Judge Pekowsky testified that the deputies in the 
courtroom kept getting closer to Attorney Sommers and he was 
afraid they would confront Attorney Sommers and cause a fight.  
Judge Pekowsky recalled that at one point during the May 24, 
2004 hearing Attorney Sommers was so loud——louder than anyone 
Judge Pekowsky had ever heard speak "in any courtroom at any 
time before"——up to nine bailiffs rushed into the judge's 
courtroom "because they were concerned there was a huge fracas 
going on down here and somebody was going to get hurt and they 
had to intervene."  Judge Pekowsky estimated that "most of the 
second floor of the City County Building" was disrupted by 
Attorney Sommers' behavior.   
¶55 Count Two of the OLR complaint alleged, and the 
referee found as follows: 
By engaging in loud, disorderly, contemptuous or 
insolent behavior during a hearing in the Raisbeck 
case on May 24, 2004; and by accusing Judge Pekowsky 
falsely——or with reckless disregard to truth or 
falsity——of covering up for the District Attorney's 
office, having tunnel vision, having a vested interest 
in the State's case, lacking nerve to enforce his own 
rulings, and running a kangaroo court, [Attorney] 
Sommers engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
26 
 
tribunal in violation of SCR 20:3.5(c);14 and made 
statements 
known 
to 
be 
false 
or 
with 
reckless 
disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the 
integrity of a judge, in violation of SCR 20:8.2(a);15 
and violated the Attorney's Oath, SCR 40.15, which 
states in pertinent part, "I will maintain the respect 
due to courts of justice and judicial officers," 
contrary to SCR 20:8.4(g).16 
¶56 Attorney Sommers appeals.  He states: 
Much has been made by OLR and this court's 
appointed referee of defense counsel's outburst on 
May 24, 2004; wherein he characterized the proceedings 
as a "kangaroo court."  What has been glossed over is 
Judge Pekowsky's actions on that date.  First, he 
refused to address a whole slew of issues relating to 
prosecutorial 
misconduct 
that 
he 
conceded 
were 
legitimate when deposed.  Second, he took strong 
exception 
to 
DDA 
Schwaemle's 
affidavit 
being 
challenged, despite it being pointed out to him that 
her affidavit and in—court statements were clearly 
implausible.  Third, he took strong exception to the 
notion that the DA's Office was "conspiring with 
Mr. Krenz to put together something other than an 
independent expert's opinion."  He  followed this up 
by ruling that Krenz could not be impeached with 
statements 
Humphrey 
attributed 
to 
him 
in 
court 
submissions.  Fourth, he declared that the case should 
settle and adjourned the proceedings for a possible 
settlement to be reached, which could only happen if 
Raisbeck pled out.  And fifth, not content with 
                                                 
14 SCR 20:3.5(c) stated a lawyer "shall not . . . engage in 
conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." 
15 SCR 20:8.2(a) provided as follows: 
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the 
lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as 
to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications 
or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or 
public legal officer, or of a candidate for election 
or appointment to judicial or legal office.    
16 SCR 20:8.4(g) provided it is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to "violate the attorney's oath." 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
27 
 
ignoring the numerous sworn affidavits, and denying 
Sommers 
the 
opportunity 
to 
present 
evidence 
substantiating the affidavits, Judge Pekowsky accused 
Sommers of dealing in "innuendo time and time again," 
and finding it "very easy to accuse anyone of almost 
anything."   
¶57 Attorney Sommers further states:  
It is also respectfully submitted that, while 
Atty. Sommers may have chosen better words than 
"kangaroo court" to characterize the proceedings in 
Raisbeck, truer words, objectively, were never spoken.  
In addition, the fact is, as this court knows, Atty. 
Sommers has been irreparably harmed, if not completely 
professionally 
and 
financially 
ruined, 
by 
the 
outrageous proceedings that have been orchestrated in 
this matter.  One can only hope that at some point 
truth and decency will win out, and this court will 
act accordingly.  
¶58 In his reply brief, with respect to Count Two, 
Attorney 
Sommers 
again 
reiterates 
his 
belief 
that 
Judge 
Pekowsky's 
decision 
to 
accept 
an 
affidavit 
and 
in-court 
assertions from DDA Schwaemle relating to the McCoy subpoena 
matter justified his outburst.  He adds: "Atty. Sommers' 
assertions in court on that day inferring a kangaroo court, 
while maybe disrespectful, were clearly made in good faith."  
¶59 Count Two of the OLR complaint alleges several 
separate ethical violations: (1) that Attorney Sommers engaged 
in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, (2) that Attorney 
Sommers made statements known to be false or with reckless 
disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the integrity 
of a judge, and (3) that Attorney Sommers' statements violated 
the Attorney's Oath.  We consider each of these allegations in 
turn. 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
28 
 
¶60 First, we consider whether Attorney Sommers engaged in 
conduct 
intended 
to 
disrupt 
a 
tribunal 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:3.5(c).  The referee explicitly found that Attorney 
Sommers engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal in 
violation of SCR 20:3.5(c).  We agree.  Attorney  	
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"!# $%  & $'( ) ''  Judge Pekowsky testified that Attorney 
Sommers' outburst "so totally disrupted this case, and for that 
matter, most of the second floor of the City County Building, 
that it was one of the most major disruptions that I have seen."  
Attorney 
Schwaemle's 
testimony 
corroborated 
the 
judge's 
statement. 
¶61 The uncontested record evidence also supports the 
referee's 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Sommers 
intended 
this 
disruption.  Attorney Schwaemle testified: 
[Attorney 
Sommers'] 
behavior, 
however, 
was 
extremely unruly and frightening to anybody who was 
there.  He was loud.  He pounded on the table.  It was 
shocking to me.  I had never seen such a performance 
in a courtroom, such a disrespectful performance in a 
courtroom.  Bailiffs came in number because he could 
be heard apparently out in the hall, and bailiffs came 
without being summoned.  They could hear shouting from 
the courtroom and -- . . .  
His tirade went on a little bit, and there was 
pounding on the table, and his voice was certainly 
raised, and he was red faced, and so I don't think he 
was out of control but -- because I think it was 
somewhat deliberate on his part.  
(Emphasis added.)  Similarly, the referee commented that 
Attorney Sommers' outburst was directed to "his audience" in the 
courtroom.  Attorney Sommers does not argue otherwise.   
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
29 
 
¶62 Next, 
we 
consider whether Attorney Sommers made 
statements to Judge Pekowsky known to be false or with reckless 
disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the integrity 
of a judge, in violation of SCR 20:8.2(a).  Attorney Sommers 
made a number of statements to Judge Pekowsky that concerned 
Judge Pekowsky's integrity as a judge: 
• 
"I believe it is my opinion that this Court is 
absolutely determined not to give him a fair trial 
in order to cover up for the State."  
• 
"And everybody has been orchestrated throughout 
this proceeding to cut it off at that moment.  You 
cut it off right now at that moment.  You've cut 
everything off, everything in this case is done to 
keep the cover-up going.  That's my belief. 
I believe that your intention in this trial is to 
do everything that you can, because apparently, 
Judge, it's just too dirty, you can't take it."  
• 
"But I think right now he has -- I believe I owe it 
to him.  I believe they're trying to railroad you 
like you never tried to railroad somebody in Dane 
County."  
• 
"You go out of your way -- Even today you go out of 
your way as much as you can just to ignore it -- to 
have tunnel vision and say we can't acknowledge 
it, . . .  Why do you refuse to do it."  
• 
"Why don't you just be honest and say: You know 
what, we don't care folks, we don't care.  These 
people matter.  They're the club.  They're 
powerful.  They matter.  Adam Raisbeck doesn't 
count.  Why don't you be -- Why don't just you 
[sic] be honest about it, damn it?"  
• 
"And I bet if you took a poll in here, everybody 
would say this is a kangaroo court."  
• 
"What I'm saying is, though, that basically it 
comes down to it -- This is -- I guess I'm more 
accusing you of a lack of nerve.  So I guess if it 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
30 
 
sounds better, it's better.  But I'm accusing you 
of a lack of nerve.  I'm accusing you of the lack 
of nerve to basically have the courage to come to 
terms with what has happened and to even enforce 
your own orders."  
¶63 At the evidentiary hearing Judge Pekowsky testified 
that these statements were not true.  DDA Schwaemle also 
testified the statements Attorney Sommers made were false and an 
insult to Judge Pekowsky.  Attorney Sommers did not appear at 
the evidentiary hearing.  In his written materials he asserts he 
made the statements in "good faith" but the record is devoid of 
credible evidence to support Attorney Sommers' extraordinarily 
disrespectful challenges to Judge Pekowsky's credibility.    
¶64 We agree with the referee's conclusion that on May 24, 
2004, Attorney Sommers made statements to Judge Pekowsky known 
to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or 
falsity concerning the integrity of a judge, in violation of 
SCR 20:8.2(a). 
¶65 Next, we consider whether Attorney Sommers violated 
the Attorney's Oath contrary to SCR 20:8.4(g).  Supreme court 
rule 20:8.4(g) provides that it is misconduct to violate the 
Attorney's Oath, which states in pertinent part as follows: 
I will maintain the respect due to courts of 
justice and judicial officers; 
. . .  
I will abstain from all offensive personality and 
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation 
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice 
of the cause with which I am charged; . . . .  
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
31 
 
See SCR 40.15.  The Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
SCR 
Chapter 
20, 
contains 
a 
preamble 
of 
a 
lawyer's 
responsibilities.  The initial paragraph of that preamble reads 
in part as follows: "A lawyer . . . is . . . an officer of the 
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility 
for the quality of justice."  The preamble further states that 
"[a] lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and 
for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and 
public officials."  Similarly, in State v. Eisenberg, 48 
Wis. 2d 364, 380-81, 180 N.W.2d 529 (1970), this court said:  
 
License to practice law in this state is granted 
on implied understanding that an attorney shall at all 
times demean himself in proper manner and refrain from 
such practices which bring disrepute upon himself, the 
profession and the courts.  This implied understanding 
is also affirmed by the oath taken by the attorney on 
admission to practice. 
See also State v. Postorino, 53 Wis. 2d 412, 419, 193 N.W.2d 1 
(1972) ("[a] lawyer is a professional man 24 hours a day, not 
eight hours, five days a week.")   
¶66 Attorney 
Sommers' 
outburst 
greatly 
demeaned 
the 
dignity of the court and fell far short of his ethical 
obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial 
officers.  We hold that the record evidence supports the 
referee's conclusion that Attorney Sommers' statements and 
conduct at the May 24, 2004 hearing before Judge Pekowsky 
violated the Attorney's Oath, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(g).   
Count Three 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
32 
 
¶67 We turn to the third charge against Attorney Sommers, 
which 
relates 
to 
allegations 
that 
Attorney 
Sommers 
made 
inappropriate 
extrajudicial 
statements 
and 
improperly 
contributed to pretrial publicity.   
¶68 Supreme 
court 
rule 
20:3.6 
is 
entitled 
"Trial 
publicity" and is intended to strike a balance between the 
important right to a fair trial and the important right of free 
expression.  As the Comment to the ABA Model Rule on trial 
publicity states, "[p]reserving the right to a fair trial 
necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may 
be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where 
trial by jury is involved."  Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct 
R. 3.6 cmt. (2010).  The rule is quite explicit in specifying 
types of information a lawyer may or may not disclose at various 
stages of litigation.  For example, at the investigation stage, 
a lawyer may state "without elaboration" the general scope of 
the investigation and a description of the physical evidence 
seized; after the complaint is filed and prior to trial, a 
lawyer is prohibited from making a statement relating to the 
character, reputation or prior criminal record of the accused 
but is not prohibited from stating the accused's name, age, 
residence, occupation, and family status.  The rule precludes a 
lawyer from disseminating information the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence 
in a trial and would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of 
prejudicing an impartial trial.  SCR 20:3.6(b)(5).  And, the 
Comment to the Model Rule notes that there are certain subjects 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
33 
 
that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial 
effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a 
criminal matter or any other proceeding that could result in 
incarceration. 
 
These 
subjects 
include 
"the 
character, 
credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect 
in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a 
witness, 
or 
the 
expected 
testimony 
of 
a 
party 
or 
witness; . . . ."  Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.6 cmt. 
(2010). 
 
Criminal 
jury 
trials 
are 
most 
sensitive 
to 
extrajudicial speech.  To this end, SCR 20:3.6(a) provided that: 
A lawyer who is participating or has participated 
in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall 
not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that it will have a substantial likelihood 
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding 
in the matter. 
¶69 On October 4, 2002, while the Raisbeck matter was 
still in litigation, Attorney Sommers provided an interview to 
the Isthmus "Daily Page" regarding ADA Humphrey's "unethical 
conduct" during the Raisbeck case.  Attorney Sommers informed 
the Isthmus that ADA Humphrey "frustrated his efforts to obtain 
exculpatory evidence, primarily photos taken at the scene," and 
accused ADA Humphrey of ongoing misrepresentations "he believes 
[are] intended to wear the defense down."  The article contained 
information concerning key expert testimony emphasizing that 
"[e]stimates by prosecution experts that Raisbeck was driving as 
fast as 88 mph are based on the assumption that marks left on 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
34 
 
the road were caused by his car careening out of control.  The 
defense believes they are actually brake marks, making these 
estimates unreliable." 
¶70 On February, 15, 2005, while the Raisbeck case was 
still 
pending, 
two 
individuals disseminated separate, but 
fundamentally identical, e-mail messages from an internet site, 
justicedanecountystyle@yahoo.com, 
to 
several 
Dane 
County 
attorneys, attaching documents entitled "The Raisbeck Case Made 
Simple," "Justice Dane County Style I," "Justice Dane County 
Style II," "Justice Dane County Style III," and "Justice Dane 
County Style V," which referenced witness statements, the 
results of expert speed calculations, and the character and 
credibility of the district attorney's office.  The "Raisbeck 
Case Made Simple" contained speed estimates from the State's 
expert witness. 
¶71 The 
web 
site 
www.justicedanecostyle.com 
contained 
various articles and factual timelines regarding the Raisbeck 
trial regarding "Withholding photographic evidence," "Judge 
Higginbotham's revision of the record," "District Attorney's 
office use of a fraudulent warrant to hold a reluctant witness 
in the Dane County Jail," "Dane County Court's attitudes toward 
prosecutorial misconduct/outrageous government conduct," "Other 
cases involving Assistant District Attorney Paul Humphrey," 
"Expert Testimony - Krenz (The DA's Office 2nd 'Expert')," and 
"Facts behind Channel 27's Coverage Correction (Speed Facts)." 
¶72 On March 18, 2005, the Isthmus reported that the 
Raisbeck case, then set for trial in April 2005, had its own web 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
35 
 
site, www.justicedanecostyle.com, which "offers vast amounts of 
information in support of the defense's contentions." The 
Isthmus article stated that, "Sommers says he's not the site's 
architect but concedes he's 'assisted and cooperated and 
provided information.'"  
¶73 On April 8, 2005, Attorney Sommers deposed Robert 
Krenz, one of the State's experts.  Between April 8, 2005, and 
the date the trial commenced on April 18, 2005, the transcript 
of Mr. Krenz's deposition was posted to the Justice Dane County 
Style web site.   
¶74 On 
April 
15, 
2005, 
an 
e-mail 
was 
sent 
from 
Truth4U@justicedanecostyle.com advising the recipients to review 
transcript pages purporting to provide evidence that the 
district attorney's office committed perjury and knew from the 
beginning of the Raisbeck case that the evidence utilized to 
bind Raisbeck over for trial was invalid. 
¶75 Count Three of the OLR's complaint alleged: 
By drafting documents and providing information 
for public dissemination via e-mail, the Internet, and 
the 
Isthmus regarding the expected testimony of 
witnesses, 
the 
results of examinations, and the 
character and credibility of the District Attorney's 
office in the upcoming Raisbeck case, [Attorney] 
Sommers 
made 
extrajudicial 
statements 
that 
a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by 
means 
of 
public 
communication 
when 
he 
knew 
or 
reasonably should have known that the statements would 
have 
a 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding, in violation 
of SCR 20:3.6.17 
                                                 
17 SCR 20:3.6 stated, in pertinent part:  Trial publicity. 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
36 
 
The referee concluded that the facts of record supported the 
conclusion that Attorney Sommers violated SCR 20:3.6.   
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) A 
lawyer 
who 
is 
participating 
or 
has 
participated in the investigation or litigation of a 
matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that  
a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by 
means of public communication if the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
proceeding in the matter. 
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) 
ordinarily is likely to have such an effect when it 
refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal 
matter, or any other proceeding that could result in 
deprivation of liberty, and the statement relates to:  
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or 
criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal 
investigation or witness, or the identity of a 
witness, or the expected testimony of a party or 
witness;   
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could 
result in deprivation of liberty, the possibility of a 
plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or 
contents of any confession, admission, or statement 
given by a defendant or suspect or that person's 
refusal or failure to make a statement;   
(3) the performance or results of any examination 
or test or the refusal or failure of a person to 
submit to an examination or test, or the identity or 
nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;  
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding 
that could result in deprivation of liberty;   
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence 
in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial 
risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; . . . . 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
37 
 
¶76 Attorney Sommers appeals.  Attorney Sommers focuses 
his attention on paragraphs 51-53 of the OLR complaint which 
alleged that Attorney Sommers was involved with the distribution 
of fliers to the public prior to the scheduled Raisbeck trial in 
May of 2004, including fliers allegedly distributed in a juror 
parking lot.  Attorney Sommers emphasizes that the referee did 
not address these specific factual allegations in his report and 
asserts that OLR Director Keith Sellen acknowledged in a 
deposition that it was "a mistake" for these paragraphs to have 
been included in the complaint because both the District 
Attorney's office and Mr. Sellen "had concluded that Atty. 
Sommers had nothing to do with the purported leafleting." 
Attorney Sommers then characterizes these three paragraphs as 
"the most critical factual assertions relating to Count Three." 
¶77 We 
do 
not 
agree 
with 
Attorney 
Sommers' 
characterization of these three paragraphs as the "most critical 
factual assertions" in Count Three.  The allegations in Count 
Three of the complaint and the referee's other factual findings 
with regard to Count Three are extensive.  These include 
Attorney Sommers' interviews with Isthmus and his admitted 
involvement with the web site that made public highly detailed 
information that would not be admissible at trial.  For example, 
the web site included expert witness deposition testimony 
despite the existence of a sequestration order.  OLR contends 
Attorney Sommers knew much of this information would not be 
admitted at trial, such as his allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct during the Raisbeck case.  
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
38 
 
¶78 Attorney Sommers has every right to publicly criticize 
the district attorney's office.  However, engaging in pretrial 
publicity consisting of speculation, unproven allegations, and 
release of inadmissible evidence in a manner likely to prejudice 
the integrity of the judicial process may violate SCR 20:3.6.18  
We conclude that the record supports the referee's conclusion 
that Attorney Sommers' actions during the Raisbeck matter 
violated SCR 20:3.6.  
¶79 We turn to the question of appropriate discipline.  
The OLR seeks a 60-day suspension.  The referee recommended a 
30-day suspension.  In making our determination we are free to 
impose discipline more or less severe than that recommended by 
the referee.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 
WI 39, ¶74, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 N.W.2d 894; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Elliott, 
133 
Wis. 2d 110, 
¶114, 
394 
N.W.2d 313 (1986). 
¶80 We consider the seriousness of the misconduct, the 
need to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system 
from repetition of misconduct, the need to impress upon the 
attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and the need to 
deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.  We 
                                                 
18 Attorney 
Sommers 
points 
out 
that 
SCR 
20:3.6(c)(6) 
provides that an attorney may warn the public of "danger 
concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is 
reason 
to 
believe 
that 
there 
exists 
the 
likelihood 
of 
substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest."  
He suggests that his pretrial publicity qualifies for this 
exception.  We are not persuaded. 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
39 
 
are guided by prior case law, aggravating and mitigating 
factors, and by the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 
279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.  Ultimately, each disciplinary 
case turns on its specific facts.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against O'Byrne, 2002 WI 123, 257 Wis. 2d 8, 653 
N.W.2d 111.   
¶81 Attorney Sommers has repeatedly alleged that ADA 
Humphrey and his colleagues at the Dane County District 
Attorney's 
office 
concocted 
evidence 
against 
Raisbeck 
or 
knowingly failed to correct mistaken conclusions about evidence 
because those incorrect conclusions were advantageous to the 
prosecution.  He has asserted that the OLR and its staff pursued 
the dual prosecution of ADA Humphrey and Attorney Sommers in bad 
faith.  He has asserted that various judges and the courts have 
aided and abetted prosecutorial misconduct by turning a blind 
eye to it.  The crux of Attorney Sommers' argument on appeal is 
that the circumstances in which he found himself in the Raisbeck 
case justify——or at least excuse——his actions.   
¶82 The 
referee 
was 
mindful 
of 
Attorney 
Sommers' 
perspective 
when 
he 
considered 
his 
recommendation 
for 
discipline.  He perceived both attorneys as at fault in the 
Raisbeck case, stating: 
There is no doubt that Sommers was frustrated with 
Humphrey's conduct in the Raisbeck case.  Sommers, 
however, was aggressive in his defense of Raisbeck.  
As the Deputy District Attorney [Schwaemle] indicated, 
Humphrey 
was 
probably aggravated by Sommers and 
responded in inappropriate ways.  
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
40 
 
Sommers appeared to have been too emotionally 
involved in the Raisbeck case.  While his client was 
found not guilty, his conduct raised serious ethical 
issues.  Sommers was also emotionally involved in his 
defense of this matter.  
¶83 Attorney Sommers' conduct during the Raisbeck matter 
was improper and violated the rules of professional conduct. 
Attorney 
Sommers' 
outburst 
before 
Judge 
Pekowsky 
was 
outrageously 
rude 
and 
his 
extrajudicial 
statements 
and 
participation in pretrial publicity contravened SCR 20:3.6.   
¶84 Typically, this court has adhered to a policy of 
imposing a minimum license suspension of 60 days.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2009 WI 38, ¶38, 317 
Wis. 2d 135, 765 N.W.2d 775; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Grady, 188 Wis. 2d 98, 108-09, 523 N.W.2d 564 (1994); In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schnitzler, 140 Wis. 2d 574, 
577-78, 412 N.W.2d 124 (1987). 
¶85 However, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
referee's 
implicit 
conclusion that a 60-day suspension, which would significantly 
disrupt Attorney Sommers' practice of law and ability to earn a 
livelihood, is not warranted.  Attorney Sommers was exonerated 
on the first count of the complaint, and we agree with the 
referee's conclusion that the conduct of ADA Humphrey is a basis 
for limited mitigation of a sanction.  However, a public 
reprimand is insufficient discipline for Attorney Sommers' 
misconduct, particularly his disruptive outburst in court before 
Judge Pekowsky.  We have concluded that we will deviate from our 
usual policy of requiring a minimum suspension of 60 days, and 
we hereby impose a 30-day suspension on Attorney Sommers' 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
41 
 
license to practice law.  This is an unusual case that calls for 
an unusual result.  We caution Attorney Sommers that to the 
extent he might object to our deviation from policy, the court, 
after extensive deliberation, concluded that the misconduct in 
this matter required a suspension.  Our choice was between a 60-
day suspension and a 30-day suspension.  
¶86 We turn to the question of the costs to be imposed in 
this proceeding.  This court's general practice is to assess the 
full costs of a disciplinary proceeding against a respondent.  
SCR 22.24(1m).19  Under SCR 22.24(1m), to award less than full 
costs, the court must find extraordinary circumstances.   
¶87 Attorney Sommers challenged the initial costs of this 
proceeding by letter dated November 16, 2009.  The referee's 
report includes a general suggestion that Attorney Sommers 
should pay for two-thirds of the costs of this proceeding.  The 
supplemental statement of costs filed November 17, 2010, 
reflects costs on that date were $94,612.56, a very expensive 
disciplinary proceeding.  In his appellate brief, Attorney 
Sommers commented that:  
The burden of paying for the aforementioned 
evidentiary hearings and related submissions, in all 
                                                 
19 SCR 22.24(1m) reads, in part: 
 
The court's general policy is that upon a finding 
of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, 
including the expenses of counsel for the office of 
lawyer regulation, upon the respondent.  In cases 
involving extraordinary circumstances the court may, 
in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount 
of costs imposed upon a respondent. 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
42 
 
probability, will fall upon Atty. Sommers.  If this 
court accepts Ref. Hack's position, Atty. Sommers will 
be responsible for roughly 2/3 of Ref. Hack's and 
OLR's time and costs.  If this court accepts OLR's 
position, Atty. Sommers will be responsible for 100% 
of 
Ref. 
Hack's 
and 
OLR's 
time 
and 
costs 
for 
meaningless evidentiary hearings and briefs.  Either 
way, Atty. Sommers, due to Ref. Hack's actions, will 
in all likelihood be stuck with paying thousands and 
thousands and thousands of dollars.  
¶88 This court carefully considered the costs and the 
referee's suggestion that a reduction in costs might be 
appropriate.  Attorney Sommers litigated this case vigorously, 
as is his right.  On one hand, Attorney Sommers was exonerated 
on Count One of the complaint, there were certain filing 
anomalies that were not entirely Attorney Sommers' fault, and 
the OLR did not wholly prevail on its interlocutory appeal.   
¶89 On the other hand, Attorney Sommers opted to pursue 
very extensive discovery of matters not directly related to 
defending the disciplinary allegations against him.  It is 
disingenuous for Attorney Sommers to attempt to shift the blame 
for the high costs of this litigation onto Referee Hack.  Both 
referees and this court repeatedly signaled to Attorney Sommers 
that this case was not the proper forum for him to try to prove 
misconduct 
or 
malfeasance 
by 
ADA 
Humphrey, 
the 
district 
attorney's office, the OLR, or any of the other persons accused 
by Attorney Sommers.  Attorney Sommers was advised by this court 
on February 12, 2007, that he would be able to seek redress 
against the OLR after the conclusion of this litigation.  In a 
letter to Chief Justice Abrahamson dated August 31, 2007, 
Attorney Sommers conceded that Referee Hanson had "emphatically 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
43 
 
held that no evidence will be permitted . . . pertaining to 
allegations against OLR (or the Dane County DA's Office)."  
Referee Hack formally denied Attorney Sommers' counterclaim on 
February 29, 2008.  Attorney Sommers thus made an informed 
tactical decision to continue to try to prove misconduct by 
others in a disciplinary proceeding that was intended to focus 
on his own alleged misconduct.  This decision contributed 
greatly to the length and the cost of this proceeding.  However, 
mindful that Attorney Sommers did prevail on one count and was 
required to litigate the OLR's interlocutory appeal in this 
court, we conclude that Attorney Sommers should be required to 
pay one-half of the full costs of the proceeding, which totaled 
$94,612.56 as of November 17, 2010.20 
¶90 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Joseph L. Sommers to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 30 days, 
effective May 7, 2012.   
¶91 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Joseph L. Sommers shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.  
¶92 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Joseph L. Sommers shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the imposed costs of this proceeding.  If the 
imposed costs are not paid within the time specified and 
                                                 
20 An objection to the specific amount of costs is not 
presently before this court.  See SCR 22.24(2). 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
44 
 
Joseph L. Sommers has not entered into a payment plan approved 
by the Office of Lawyer Regulation, then the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation is authorized to move this court for a further 
suspension of the license of Joseph L. Sommers to practice law 
in Wisconsin. 
¶93 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, 
J.J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2006AP2851-D   
 
 
 
1