Title: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jennifer Bennett et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051721
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2007

REL: 04/27/07 State Farm v. Bennett
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051721
_________________________
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
v.
Jennifer Bennett et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-04-5699)
WOODALL, Justice.
This Court granted State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company ("State Farm") permission to appeal from the denial of
its motion to dismiss in an action for uninsured-motorist
benefits filed against State Farm by several of its insureds,
1051721
2
including Jennifer Bennett. See Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P.  We
affirm.
In 
March 
2003, 
Bennett 
and 
the 
other 
insureds
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "Bennett") were
involved in a motor-vehicle accident allegedly caused by the
negligence of Roy Williams, an uninsured motorist.  In
September 2004, Bennett sued Williams and State Farm, seeking,
in pertinent part, uninsured-motorist benefits under an
automobile insurance policy issued by State Farm.
Bennett attempted to serve the summons and complaint upon
Williams by certified mail, but it was returned to the circuit
clerk's office as "unclaimed."  In November 2004, the clerk
notified Bennett's counsel that failure to perfect service
upon Williams could result in his dismissal as a defendant.
Bennett 
made 
no 
further 
effort 
to 
serve 
Williams.
Consequently, in April 2005, the trial court dismissed
Williams as a defendant "without prejudice ... for lack of
service."  State Farm and Bennett agree that the practical
effect of the order was to dismiss Williams with prejudice,
because, before the dismissal, the statute of limitations on
1051721
3
Bennett's tort claim had expired.  See Riddlesprigger v.
Ervin, 519 So. 2d 486, 487 (Ala. 1987).
After Williams was dismissed, State Farm filed a motion
to dismiss, claiming that the dismissal of Williams, the
uninsured motorist, entitled it to a dismissal of Bennett's
uninsured-motorist claim.  In support of its motion, State
Farm made two arguments, which the trial court summarized as
follows in its Rule 5(a) certification for an immediate
permissive appeal:
"First, State Farm argues that by virtue of the
expiration of the statute of limitations as to
[Bennett's] claims against Williams, [whom Bennett]
elected to sue, [Bennett] will never be 'legally
entitled to recover damages' from Williams, which is
a condition precedent to the recovery of [uninsured-
motorist] benefits under Alabama law.  In other
words, State Farm argues Williams'[s] statute of
limitations 
defense is among the tortfeasor's
substantive defenses an insurer may assert to
preclude [Bennett's uninsured-motorist] 
claim, 
under
the rationale of Ex parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332
(Ala. 
2003), 
and 
its 
progeny, 
most 
recently
Continental National Indemnity Company v. Fields,
926 So. 2d 1033 (Ala. 2005).
"Second, State Farm argues that under the
holding of Healy v. Medlock, 861 So. 2d 396 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2002), [Bennett's] 'procedural default' in
failing to perfect service upon Williams, the
alleged uninsured motorist, which resulted in the
dismissal of Williams also compels the dismissal of
[Bennett's uninsured-motorist] claim against State
Farm."
1051721
4
The trial court rejected State Farm's arguments and
denied its motion to dismiss.  In its certification for
immediate appeal, the trial court identified two controlling
questions of law:
"1.
Whether 
an 
uninsured-motorist 
insurer 
may
assert 
the 
purported 
uninsured 
motorist's
statute of limitations defense to preclude a
plaintiff's/insured's claim for [uninsured-
motorist] 
benefits, 
especially 
where 
the
plaintiff/insured 
has 
elected 
to 
sue 
the
uninsured motorist.
"2.
Whether 
a 
'procedural 
default' 
by 
the
plaintiff/insured that results in the dismissal
of 
the 
tort 
claims 
against 
a 
purported
uninsured motorist also compels the dismissal
of the claim for [uninsured-motorist] benefits
against the uninsured-motorist insurer."
To answer these questions of law, we must interpret Alabama's
uninsured-motorist statute, § 32-7-23, Ala. Code 1975.  Thus,
our review is de novo.  "This Court reviews de novo a trial
court's interpretation of a statute, because only a question
of law is presented."  Scott Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So. 2d
1221, 1223 (Ala. 2003). We answer both questions in the
negative.
Certain principles concerning uninsured-motorist claims
are well established.
1051721
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"Under Alabama law, a plaintiff may join as a
defendant 
his 
uninsured-/underinsured-motorist
carrier in an action against another motorist.  Ex
parte Boles, 720 So. 2d 911, 914-15 (Ala. 1998).
The plaintiff is not required to first obtain a
judgment 
against 
the 
uninsured/underinsured
motorist.  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Lambert,
291 Ala. 645, 649, 285 So. 2d 917, 919 (1973).
Alabama's uninsured-motorist statute, Ala. Code
1975, § 32-7-23, provides protection for 'persons
... who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death, resulting therefrom.'  Ala. Code
1975, § 32-7-23(a); see also Walker v. GuideOne
Specialty Mut. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 769, 772 (Ala.
2002).  For the [plaintiffs] to demonstrate that
they are 'legally entitled to recover' damages under
their policy, they '"must be able to establish fault
on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives
rise to damages and must be able to prove the extent
of those damages."' LeFevre v. Westberry, 590 So. 2d
154, 157 (Ala. 1991)(quoting Quick v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 429 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Ala.
1983))."
Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 1111, 1115
(Ala. 2004).  Also, as State Farm points out, "early Alabama
cases recognized that in a direct action against an insurer
for [uninsured-motorist] benefits '"the insurer would have
available, in addition to policy defenses, the substantive
defenses that would have been available to the uninsured
motorist."' State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 470 So. 2d
1230, 1233 (Ala. 1985)(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
1051721
6
v. Griffin, 51 Ala. App. 426, 431, 286 So. 2d 302, 306
(1973))."  State Farm's brief, at 19 (emphasis added).
As the trial court stated in its certification order,
"State Farm argues Williams'[s] statute of limitations defense
is among the tortfeasor's substantive defenses an insurer may
assert to preclude [Bennett's uninsured-motorist] claim."  On
appeal, although State Farm continues to insist that the
statute-of-limitations defense is available to it, State Farm
cites no authority indicating that the statute of limitations
is a substantive defense.  Consequently, this Court may
disregard State Farm's argument.
"[I]t is well settled that a failure to comply with the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] requiring
citation of authority in support of the arguments presented
provides this Court with a basis for disregarding those
arguments."  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So.
2d 806, 822 (Ala. 2005).  We may do so because "'it is not the
function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to
make and address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient
authority or argument.'" Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1,
1051721
7
20 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.
2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)).
We note further, however, that State Farm's argument that
the statute-of-limitations defense is a substantive defense
appears to be without merit.  This Court has stated that a
true statute of limitations is considered a procedural, rather
than a substantive, defense.  See Etheredge v. Genie Indus.,
Inc., 632 So. 2d 1324, 1326 (Ala. 1994); Cofer v. Ensor, 473
So. 2d 984, 987 (Ala. 1985).
We have not overlooked the cases upon which State Farm
primarily relies, namely, Ex parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332
(Ala. 2003), and Continental National Indemnity Co. v. Fields,
926 So. 2d 1033 (Ala. 2005).  However, neither case supports
State Farm's argument in this case.  Carlton merely confirmed
that an uninsured-motorist insurer has available to it a
substantive immunity defense that would be available to the
uninsured motorist and overruled cases that had "held that
there were certain substantive [immunity] defenses available
to the uninsured motorists that were not available to the
insurers."  State Farm's brief, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
1051721
8
As State Farm states, in Fields "this Court held that
since under the survival statute (Ala. Code § 6-5-462) a
deceased insured's tort claim against an uninsured motorist
did not survive her death, the deceased's estate could not
establish in a direct action against the [uninsured-
motorist's] insurers that it is '"legally entitled to recover
damages" against the uninsured motorist, a condition precedent
to the recovery of [uninsured-motorist] benefits under
Alabama's uninsured-motorist statute.'"  State Farm's brief,
at 21 (quoting Fields, 926 So. 2d at 1035 (footnote omitted)).
However, the application of a survival statute affects
substantive 
rights, 
not 
mere 
procedural 
requirements.
"'[W]hile a statute of limitations is a period of repose
designed, if asserted, to prevent recovery on stale claims, a
survival statute gives life to a substantive right that but
for the statute would have been destroyed.'" Keefe v.
Glasford's Enters., Inc., 248 Neb. 64, 68, 532 N.W.2d 626, 629
(1995)(quoting Van Pelt v. Greathouse, 219 Neb. 478, 484, 364
N.W. 2d 14, 19 (1985)).  See also Swindle v. Big River Broad.
Corp., 905 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Cf.
1051721
9
Etheredge, supra (a statute creating a right is deemed
substantive). 
State Farm's second argument, namely, that Bennett's
"'procedural default' in failing to perfect service upon
Williams, the alleged uninsured motorist, which resulted in
the dismissal of Williams also compels the dismissal of
[Bennett's uninsured-motorist] claim against State Farm," is
also without merit.  In support of this argument, State Farm
claims "that any defense available to the tortfeasor that
precludes his ... liability to the plaintiff-insured also bars
the insured's claim for [uninsured-motorist] benefits."  State
Farm's reply brief, at 9-10.  However, as previously
explained, it is not "any defense" that is available to State
Farm, only substantive defenses.  Obviously, the alleged
"procedural default" does not amount to a substantive defense.
Further, it would be inconsistent to penalize the insured for
actions taken in pursuing a claim against an uninsured
motorist, when Alabama law does not require, as a prerequisite
to the recovery of uninsured-motorist benefits, that the
insured sue and obtain a judgment against the uninsured
motorist.  Ex parte State Farm, 893 So. 2d at 1115 (citing
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10
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Lambert, 291 Ala. 645, 649, 285
So. 2d 917, 919 (1973)).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's
order denying State Farm's motion to dismiss Bennett's
uninsured-motorist claim.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Lyons, J., concurs specially.
Stuart and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
1051721
11
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully in the main opinion.  I accept the
distinction between substantive and procedural defenses as a
basis 
for 
distinguishing 
Continental 
National 
Indemnity 
Co. 
v.
Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033 (Ala. 2005), a case in which I did not
participate; in so doing, however, I do not wish to be
understood as agreeing with this Court's decision in Fields.