Title: Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Acker
Citation: 228 Kan. 145, 612 P.2d 610
Docket Number: 51,343
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 1980

228 Kan. 145 (1980)
612 P.2d 610
KANSAS STATE BOARD OF HEALING ARTS, Appellee,
v.
STEVENS B. ACKER, M.D., Appellant.
No. 51,343

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 14, 1980.
Richard M. Klinge, of Kaplan, McMillan and Klinge, of Wichita, argued the cause and David L. Ryan, of Topeka, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Wallace M. Buck, Jr., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This appeal by Stevens B. Acker, M.D., of Wichita, from a district court decision upholding a decision of the Kansas State Board of Healing Arts (Board) to suspend appellant's license to practice medicine for two years culminates nearly ten years of controversy between Dr. Acker on one hand and Wesley Medical Center of Wichita (Wesley), the Medical Society of Sedgwick County (Society) and the Board on the other.
Dr. Acker is a graduate of the Kansas University School of Medicine and has been operating a general or family practice in Wichita since 1961. Prior to 1971 he performed general surgery, delivered babies and had general hospital privileges at Wesley and other Wichita hospitals. It appears that in 1971 a dispute arose between Dr. Acker and Wesley over some missing hospital records. Dr. Acker was suspended by Wesley from all admitting privileges, and subsequently other Wichita hospitals followed suit. Dr. Acker has not had hospital privileges in Wichita since the early 1970's. Nevertheless his practice flourished and he developed a substantial general practice with numerous obstetrical patients. Between 1971 and 1977, Dr. Acker sought to regain his Wesley privileges by compliance with certain requests from the Board and the Society but was not successful. Twice during this period of time the Society filed complaints with the Board, but on each occasion the Board declined to take any action.
*147 On October 13, 1977, the Board filed a petition against Dr. Acker in which it sought the revocation, suspension or limitation of his license to practice medicine. The allegations against Dr. Acker were:
After a hearing before a panel of the Board, which included thirty witnesses, eighty-four exhibits and covers eight hundred thirty-four pages of transcript, the panel issued its report. The panel found from the evidence that:
The panel then reached the following conclusions and recommendations:
"C. Conclusions of Law
"D. Recommendations to Board
On February 11, 1978, the Board issued its order of suspension in which it repeated verbatim the foregoing findings and conclusions of the hearing panel and then rendered its decision and orders as follows:
*148 "D. Decision of the Board
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE BOARD ORDERED:
Dr. Acker appealed to the district court where his request for a trial de novo was denied. On July 27, 1979, the trial court issued its memorandum decision affirming the action of the Board. This appeal by Dr. Acker followed. Additional facts will be set forth as they become necessary.
Although K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 65-2836 was amended in 1979, the amendments are not pertinent to this appeal and we will consider the statute as it now exists.
K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 65-2836 provides in part:
K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 65-2837 defines professional incompetency and unprofessional conduct setting forth seventeen specific instances of the latter.
K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 65-2865 provides:
The charges for which Dr. Acker's license was suspended were obviously based upon the commission of "dishonorable conduct" as set forth in 65-2836(b), thus the portion of the statute with which we are directly involved reads:
Appellant attacks the constitutionality of the statute as being vague and indefinite as the legislature has failed to provide by statute and the Board has failed to provide by rules and regulations any definition of the terms "immoral or dishonorable conduct."
Are the words "immoral" and "dishonorable" so vague and indefinite that a person admitted to the practice of the healing arts in the State of Kansas would not know his rights, obligations and limitations thereunder? We think not.
In considering the constitutionality of a statute, "[i]t is the duty of this court to uphold legislation rather than defeat it. It is presumed that the legislature intended to pass a valid law. If there is any reasonable way to construe legislation as constitutionally valid, it should be so construed." Parker v. Continental Casualty Co., 191 Kan. 674, 680, 383 P.2d 937 (1963).
Appellant argues that as neither the legislature, by statute, nor the Board, by rules and regulations, have defined what conduct is *150 proscribed as being immoral or dishonorable such terms are without sufficient clarity to withstand constitutional attack. He contends that as the terms "unprofessional conduct" and "professional incompetency" have been defined at length (K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 65-2837), similar specific definitions or standards must be adopted to establish what may be immoral or dishonorable. Several cases are relied upon to support appellant's position. See Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 593 P.2d 711 (1979); Megdal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 228 Or. 255, 605.P.2d 273 (1979); and Dentistry Board v. Blumer, 78 Mich. App. 679, 261 N.W.2d 186 (1977).
This court in Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968), had occasion to review proceedings against Dr. Foote for unprofessional conduct. In Foote, we stated:
....
*151 In Capland v. Board of Dental Examiners, 149 Kan. 352, 87 P.2d 597 (1939), two dentists had been charged by the Board with dishonorable conduct for advertising their services in Kansas City papers. While the constitutionality of the statute (G.S. 1935, 65-1407) which provided for revocation of a license for "dishonorable conduct" was not under attack, the following language from the opinion is pertinent:
This court has also had occasion to review the application of the term "dishonorable conduct" to specific acts of a medical or dental licensee in Crabb v. Board of Dental Examiners, 118 Kan. 513, 235 Pac. 829 (1925); Winslow v. Board of Dental Examiners, 115 Kan. 450, 223 Pac. 308 (1924); Richardson v. Simpson, 88 Kan. 684, 129 Pac. 1128 (1913).
In Simpson the term "dishonorable conduct" withstood a constitutional challenge that it was void as being too indefinite. This court stated:
In Morra v. State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 212 Kan. 103, 510 P.2d 614 (1973), the term "wrongful actions" as a ground for revoking or suspending a license was found not to be so vague and uncertain as to require a finding that the statute (K.S.A. 74-5324[e]) was unconstitutional. This court stated:
We adhere to our statements in Foote and hold that the terms "immoral conduct" and "dishonorable conduct" are not so vague and indefinite that the statute K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 65-2836 must be declared unconstitutional. While the adoption of specific rules and regulations as authorized by K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 65-2865 might be helpful in setting forth specific acts included within the term "dishonorable conduct," no such specification could be all-inclusive, and the failure to adopt such rules and regulations does not render the statute unconstitutional. When the terms "immoral" and "dishonorable" are given their ordinary meaning as understood in common usage, we think they are sufficiently clear that persons of common intelligence and understanding can determine whether any given factual circumstance falls within the proscribed conduct.
Next, Dr. Acker contends that the Board is required to make basic findings of fact supporting its conclusion of "dishonorable conduct" and that the findings made in this case are insufficient. Dr. Acker was charged with dishonorable conduct by failing to inform and deliberately misleading patients as to his privileges to deliver babies at Wesley Medical Center. While the findings of the Board did not outline the evidence presented, the Board did find:
Detailed findings of fact and conclusions are certainly recommended and are of great help to the trial court and appellate court in reviewing administrative decisions. See Blue Cross &amp; Blue Shield v. Bell, 227 Kan. 426, 607 P.2d 498 (1980). However, we have held:
In commenting upon the findings of the Board in this case, the trial judge stated:
We agree with the trial court and are of the opinion that the findings of the Board meet the minimum requirements necessary to allow meaningful review on appeal.
Next, appellant contends that the Board's decision was fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious and was not supported by the evidence. At this point we once again state the scope of review by the district court and the appellate courts when administrative decisions are involved:
Without going into detail, three former obstetrical patients of Dr. Acker testified that he affirmatively told them or led them to *154 believe that he had hospital privileges at Wesley and that he would personally deliver the babies. In addition, there was expert testimony concerning the personal relationship between a pregnant woman and her obstetrician and the traumatic emotional effect that might be caused a patient upon finding out at the last minute that her doctor was not going to be able to deliver her baby. While the testimony of the three patients was refuted, it would, if believed, be sufficient to support the findings of the Board and would be within the realm of dishonorable conduct. The intentional misrepresentation or misleading by a doctor to a patient of the scope of his ability and authority to practice medicine could very well be considered dishonorable conduct. The decision of the Board is substantially supported by evidence and there is no showing that the Board's action was fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.
Appellant next complains that a two-year suspension is too severe a sanction for the misconduct of Dr. Acker. It is argued that under the statute the Board could have limited the scope of his practice and could have prohibited him from further obstetrical practice without total suspension of his right to practice medicine. While we agree that the Board could have ordered such a limitation, the suspension ordered was within the statutory authority of the Board and its imposition based upon the evidence in this record does not amount to fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious conduct. Lacking such conduct by the Board, the sanctions imposed, being within the statutory authority of the Board, will not be disturbed on appeal.
Finally, appellant urges that he should have been granted a trial de novo in district court and asks that we overrule our recent holding in Behrmann. We decline to do so.
We have carefully reviewed the record and considered all points raised by appellant and find them to be without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.