Title: City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
Citation: 2003 WI 52
Docket Number: 1999AP000500
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2003

2003 WI 52 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-0500 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
City of Madison, a municipal corporation of Dane 
County, Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, and 
IAFF Local 311,  
 
Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
C. William Foust   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, JJ., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Larry W. O'Brien, acting city attorney. 
 
For 
the 
respondent-respondent, 
Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations Commission, there was a brief (in the court of 
appeals) by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, IAFF Local 311, there were 
briefs by John C. Tallis, Bruce F. Ehlke, and Shneidman, Hawks & 
Ehlke, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Bruce F. Ehlke. 
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Scott Herrick and 
Herrick, Kasdorf, Dymzarov & Twietmeyer, Madison, on behalf of 
the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of 
Madison. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) 
by Curtis Witynski, Madison, on behalf of the League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
2003 WI 52 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  99-0500  
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 1397) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Madison, a municipal corporation  
of Dane County, Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations  
Commission, and IAFF Local 311,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
C. William Foust, Circuit Court Judge.   Reversed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  The issue in this case is whether 
a fire chief's decision to return a firefighter promoted on a 
probationary 
basis 
to 
his 
previous 
rank 
for 
failure 
to 
successfully complete probation may be subjected to arbitration.  
We hold that it may not. 
¶2  Given the statutory authority vested in the chief of 
the fire department under Wis. Stat. § 62.13 (1999-2000),1 as 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version. 
No. 
99-0500   
 
2 
 
specifically recognized in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, an arbitrator may not substitute his judgment for the 
chief's determination that a firefighter under his command has 
not successfully completed probation and is therefore not 
qualified to advance from probationary promotion status to the 
permanent rank.2 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
On December 6, 1994, the chief of the City of Madison 
Fire Department promoted firefighter Chris Gentilli to the 
position of fire apparatus engineer, subject to the approval of 
the Madison Police and Fire Commission ("PFC") and subject to a 
one-year probationary period. The PFC approved the promotion, 
effective January 1, 1995, subject to Rule 5.04 of the PFC Rules 
and Regulations, which states: 
All promotional appointments shall be probationary for 
[12] 
months 
unless 
extended 
by 
the 
appointing 
authority for a longer probationary period.  During 
said probationary period, the Chief may reduce the 
person appointed to that person's former rank.  The 
appointee shall not be entitled to an appeal to the 
Board 
from 
the 
termination 
of 
a 
probationary 
appointment or any reduction in rank which results 
therefrom. 
                                                 
2 This case also presents a threshold question regarding the 
chief's authority to promote on a probationary basis in the 
first instance.  In Kraus v. City of Waukesha Police and Fire 
Commission, 2003 WI 51, ¶3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
also released today, we concluded that police and fire chiefs 
may promote officers on a probationary basis, and also held that 
the "just cause" hearing procedures of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) 
are not available in cases of non-disciplinary reductions in 
rank for failure to successfully complete a probationary period 
associated with a promotion. 
No. 
99-0500   
 
3 
 
Madison Police and Fire Commission Rule 5.04.   
¶4 
Eleven months into the probationary promotion, on 
November 29, 1995, the fire chief informed Gentilli that his 
probationary appointment as an apparatus engineer was revoked.  
On December 22, 1995, Gentilli, through his union, filed a 
grievance seeking reinstatement to the rank of fire apparatus 
engineer and back pay and benefits associated with that higher 
rank.  
¶5 
The City of Madison ("City") declined to arbitrate the 
grievance, asserting that the Wisconsin Statutes and the 
collective bargaining agreement prohibited arbitration of this 
management decision.  Specifically, the City pointed to section 
9.Q.2 of the collective bargaining agreement, which states that 
"[a]rbitration shall not apply where section 62.13 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes is applicable and where Management has 
reserved rights relating to arbitration. . . . "3   
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Statutes § 62.13(4)(a) provides that "[t]he 
[police and fire] chiefs shall appoint subordinates subject to 
approval by the board. Such appointments shall be made by 
promotion when this can be done with advantage, otherwise from 
an eligible list provided by examination and approval by the 
board and kept on file with the clerk."  The statute further 
provides: 
For the choosing of such list the board shall adopt, 
and may repeal or modify, rules calculated to secure 
the best service in the departments. These rules shall 
provide for examination of physical and educational 
qualifications and experience, and may provide such 
competitive examinations as the board shall determine, 
and for the classification of positions with special 
examination for each class. The board shall print and 
distribute the rules and all changes in them, at city 
expense.   
No. 
99-0500   
 
4 
 
¶6 
The union filed a prohibited practices complaint with 
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission ("WERC"). WERC 
held that the City was obligated to arbitrate the grievance and 
that its refusal to do so violated Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a)5.4  
WERC ordered the City to arbitrate the grievance.   
¶7 
The City sought review in Dane County Circuit Court.  
The Honorable C. William Foust affirmed WERC's order. On review, 
the court of appeals certified the case to this court pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 809.61, on two issues: 1) whether a firefighter 
who is promoted on a probationary basis but is returned to his 
or her former rank for failing to successfully complete 
probation for a non-disciplinary reason is entitled to the just 
cause protections of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em); and 2) whether 
the fire chief's decision not to recommend successful completion 
of a probationary 
period 
for a 
promotion 
of 
a tenured 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c). 
4 The Municipal Employment Relations Act, Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70 (3)(a)5, provides:  
It is a prohibited practice . . . . 
[t]o 
violate 
any 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
previously agreed upon by the parties with respect to 
wages, hours and conditions of employment affecting 
municipal 
employees, 
including 
an 
agreement 
to 
arbitrate questions arising as to the meaning or 
application of the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement or to accept the terms of such arbitration 
award . . . .   
 
No. 
99-0500   
 
5 
 
firefighter to a higher position is subject to arbitration.  We 
accepted the certification.   
¶8 
 The court of appeals subsequently certified Kraus v. 
City of Waukesha Police and Fire Commission, No. 01-1106, which 
raised the threshold question of a chief's authority to promote 
on a probationary basis, as well as the issue of the 
availability of the "just cause" hearing procedures of Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) in cases of non-disciplinary reduction in 
rank for failure to successfully complete probation associated 
with promotion. We concluded in Kraus, released with this 
opinion today, that a police or fire chief may promote on a 
probationary basis, and that the "just cause" provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) are not available when an officer promoted 
on a probationary basis is returned to his or her prior rank for 
failing to successfully complete probation.  Kraus, 2003 WI 51, 
¶3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  Thus, the sole remaining 
issue in this case is the arbitrability of a dispute over this 
particular type of management decision by a fire or police 
chief. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
This case involves consideration of the powers vested 
in police and fire chiefs and police and fire commissions by 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13, in light of the Municipal Employment 
Relations Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70-77 ("MERA"), and the 
applicable collective bargaining agreement.  We have previously 
held that de novo review is appropriate when the court must 
No. 
99-0500   
 
6 
 
interpret a collective bargaining agreement in light of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 62.13 and 111.70: 
In the typical case, the application of §§ 111.70-77 
to a particular labor dispute requires the expertise 
of the Commission [WERC], the agency primarily charged 
with administering it.  Here the question does not 
concern the application of a labor statute but the 
Commission's power to enforce it in the first instance 
in the light of another state statute [Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13].  This issue, the relationship between two 
state statutes, is within the special competence of 
the courts rather than the Commission. 
Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 
100-01, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978).  See also City of Brookfield v. 
WERC, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 827, 275 N.W.2d 723 (1979)("We are 
persuaded by the Glendale reasoning that the WERC should not be 
accorded the authority to interpret the appropriate statutory 
construction to ch. 62."). 
¶10  Thus, we "undertake an independent judicial inquiry 
into the proper construction of [§ 111.70] and its impact on the 
exercise of municipal powers enumerated in ch. 62."  Brookfield, 
87 Wis. 2d at 826; see also County of La Crosse v. WERC, 180 
Wis. 2d 100, 107, 508 N.W.2d 9 (1993) (holding that de novo 
review is proper when considering the relationship between Wis. 
Stat. § 111.70 and another state statute).   
¶11 Where a party has "challenged the arbitrability of [a] 
question and reserved the right to challenge in court an adverse 
ruling on arbitrability, the court [will] decide the issue of 
arbitrability de novo."  City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police 
Ass'n ("Milwaukee II"), 97 Wis. 2d 15, 21, 292 N.W.2d 841 
No. 
99-0500   
 
7 
 
(1980)(quoting Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 
78 Wis. 2d 94, 106, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977)).  See also Milwaukee 
Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I"), 92 Wis. 2d 
145, 150, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979)(the question of an arbitrator's 
jurisdiction is for the court); Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City 
of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee III"), 113 Wis. 2d 192, 198, 335 N.W.2d 
417 
(Ct. 
App. 
1983), 
rev. 
denied, 
114 
Wis. 2d 602, 
340 
N.W.2d 201, (arbitrability is a question of law for the courts).   
¶12 Because this case requires us to interpret the 
arbitration language in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement in light of the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13, we 
review WERC's conclusion de novo.5 
III.  THE APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
¶13 Section 62.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes establishes a 
comprehensive 
system 
for 
the 
appointment 
of 
municipal 
                                                 
5 See also Crawford County v. WERC, 177 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 501 
N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1993).  
[W]hether the proposal is bargainable turns on whether 
it abrogates or impermissibly interferes with the 
legal right of the three officials to appoint the 
designated subordinates. That is a question involving 
the interpretation of statutes outside the area of 
labor relations and the relationship of these sections 
to 
the 
applicable 
provisions 
of 
the 
Municipal 
Employment Relations Act. The issue is thus one of law 
'within the special competence of the courts rather 
than the Commission.' . . . As a result, we do not 
defer to the commission's decision.  
Id. (quoting City of Brookfield v. WERC, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 826-28, 
275 N.W.2d 723 (1979), and Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. 
Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 100-01, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978)). 
No. 
99-0500   
 
8 
 
firefighters and police officers.  See Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  It 
requires cities with populations of 4,000 or more to maintain a 
police and fire commission with jurisdiction over the hiring, 
promotion, and discipline of members of police and fire 
departments.  This statutory grant of authority is shared by the 
chief and the board of commissioners in the manner directed by 
the legislature. It is a legislatively designed system of 
accountability in the appointment of sworn officers, and it 
subjects 
the 
appointing 
authorities 
to 
mutual 
report, 
recommendation, and approval responsibilities.  The statute 
provides:   
The chiefs shall appoint subordinates subject to 
approval by the board.  Such appointments shall be 
made 
by 
promotion 
when 
this 
can 
be 
done 
with 
advantage, otherwise from an eligible list provided by 
examination and approval by the board and kept on file 
with the clerk. 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(a). 
For the choosing of such list the board shall 
adopt, and may repeal or modify, rules calculated to 
secure the best service in the departments. These 
rules shall provide for examination of physical and 
educational qualifications and experience, and may 
provide such competitive examinations as the board 
shall 
determine, 
and 
for 
the 
classification 
of 
positions with special examination for each class. The 
board shall print and distribute the rules and all 
changes in them, at city expense. 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c). 
¶14 The provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13 "shall be 
construed as an enactment of statewide concern for the purpose 
of 
providing 
a 
uniform 
regulation 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
No. 
99-0500   
 
9 
 
departments."  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(12); see also Racine Fire and 
Police Comm'n v. Stanfield, 70 Wis. 2d 395, 398-99, 234 N.W.2d 
307 (1975)(holding that the PFC may "assert its authority even 
when it may appear to be antagonistic to the policies of the 
city upon the overriding consideration that uniformity of 
management of fire and police affairs is a matter of statewide 
concern").   
¶15 The statute gives the chiefs of fire and police 
departments the exclusive power to appoint subordinates.  Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(4)("the chiefs shall appoint subordinates").  Such 
appointments "shall be made by promotion when this can be done 
with advantage" and are subject to approval by the board of 
police and fire commissioners, which has the power to adopt and 
modify "rules calculated to secure the best service in the 
departments."  Id.   
¶16 The Madison PFC has formalized the department's long-
standing practice of requiring probationary periods as part of 
the appointment process by adopting various written rules, 
including Rule 5.04, which pertains to probation in the context 
of promotion: 
All promotional appointments shall be probationary for 
[12] 
months 
unless 
extended 
by 
the 
appointing 
authority for a longer probationary period. During 
said probationary period, the Chief may reduce the 
person appointed to that person's former rank.  The 
appointee shall not be entitled to an appeal to the 
Board 
from 
the 
termination 
of 
a 
probationary 
appointment or any reduction in rank which results 
therefrom. 
Madison Police and Fire Commission Rule 5.04. 
No. 
99-0500   
 
10 
 
¶17 Probationary periods are a valuable part of the 
appointment process, as they allow fire and police chiefs an 
opportunity to assess a candidate's performance in the position, 
and thus better measure a candidate's qualifications prior to 
making a final decision on appointment.  Kaiser v. Bd. of Police 
and Fire Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 498, 504, 311 N.W.2d 646 (1981); 
see also Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee, 795 F.2d 612, 624-25 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Hussey v. Outagamie County, 201 Wis. 2d 14, 19-21, 
548 N.W.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1996); Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 
196.  In the context of new hires, this court has stated that 
"[t]here is no doubt that the use of a probationary period is an 
excellent means of examining candidates and is well-suited to 
securing the best service available."  Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 
504.   
¶18 Promotion decisions implicate these same managerial 
considerations and public safety policies.  Accordingly, in 
Kraus, 2003 WI 51, ¶3, we have concluded that fire and police 
chiefs are authorized to impose probation when making promotions 
from within under Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  Therefore, the Madison 
PFC's rule subjecting all promotions to a 12-month probationary 
period is valid, and Madison's fire chief had the authority to 
promote Gentilli to fire apparatus engineer on a probationary 
basis. 
¶19  We have also concluded in Kraus that the "just cause" 
hearing provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) are not 
available to an officer who is returned to his or her prior rank 
for failure to successfully complete a probationary period 
No. 
99-0500   
 
11 
 
associated with a promotion.  Kraus, 2003 WI 51, ¶3.  Here, in 
any event, neither Gentilli nor the City has asked that this 
matter be returned to the PFC for a "just cause" hearing under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em); they have instead focused their 
arguments on the arbitration issue. 
IV.  ARBITRABILITY 
¶20 The determination of whether an employment dispute is 
subject to arbitration centers on the arbitration language in 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement.  "'An order to 
arbitrate [a] particular grievance should not be denied unless 
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 
asserted dispute.'"  Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 152 (quoting  
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).  There is "a broad presumption of 
arbitrability," and courts are limited to determining whether 
the arbitration language in the contract encompasses the 
grievance in question and whether any other provision of the 
contract excludes arbitration.  Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 22.  
"When the court determines arbitrability, it is limited to 
considering whether the arbitration clause can be construed to 
cover the grievance on its face and whether any other provision 
of the contract specifically excludes it."  Id. (emphasis 
added)(citing Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wis. 2d at 111). 
¶21 Thus, there are two relevant contractual inquiries in 
the analysis of arbitrability: 1) does the arbitration clause 
cover the grievance on its face; and 2) is there another 
No. 
99-0500   
 
12 
 
provision 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
that 
specifically excludes arbitration?  Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 
22; Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 151; Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 
Wis. 2d at 111.  The fact that the arbitration clause covers the 
grievance on its face does not end the inquiry; if another 
provision of the contract specifically excludes arbitration of 
the 
relevant 
dispute, 
then 
arbitration 
is 
unavailable.   
Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 22; Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 151; 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wis. 2d at 111.  
¶22 In Milwaukee I, the collective bargaining agreement at 
issue expressly commanded that "the arbitrator shall take into 
account the special statutory responsibilities granted to the 
Chief of Police."  Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 156 (emphasis 
added).  Far from prohibiting arbitration, the collective 
bargaining agreement in Milwaukee I expressly required the 
arbitrator to evaluate the chief's statutory powers.  
¶23 In Milwaukee II, the collective bargaining agreement 
directed that "[i]n reviewing any difference over application of 
a departmental rule or regulation under this grievance and 
arbitration procedure the arbitrator shall take into account the 
special statutory responsibilities granted to the Chief of 
Police under the 1911 Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, 
Chapter 586, and amendments thereto."  Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d 
at 28 (emphasis added).  That provision specifically authorized 
the arbitrator to consider and review the statutory powers of 
the chief. 
No. 
99-0500   
 
13 
 
¶24 Similarly, in Glendale, the collective bargaining 
agreement explicitly provided that the "arbitrator shall have 
initial authority to determine whether or not the dispute is 
arbitrable."  Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 95.  The agreement also 
expressly required the chief to appoint the most senior 
qualified candidate.  Id. at 101.  It did not contain any other 
provision specifically excluding arbitration.6 
¶25 Here, the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
broadly recognizes and protects the management rights of the 
City and the chief of the fire department, including the right 
"[t]o hire, schedule, promote, transfer, assign, train or 
retrain employees in positions within the Fire Department."  
CBA, Article 5.C.  The following additional provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement are important here: 
Any dispute with respect to Management Rights shall 
not in any way be subject to arbitration but any 
grievance with respect to the reasonableness of the 
application of said Management Rights may be subject 
to the grievance procedure contained herein. 
CBA, Article 5.K. 
Arbitration shall 
be 
limited 
to 
grievances 
over 
matters 
involving 
interpretation, 
application 
or 
enforcement of the terms of this Agreement. 
                                                 
6 By requiring the chief to "appoint the most senior 
qualified candidate," the agreement in Glendale only permitted 
appointment of those candidates found to be qualified by the 
chief, and did not transfer to an arbitrator the chief's 
statutory power to decide which candidates were qualified in the 
first instance.  That is, it did not allow an arbitrator to 
decide, contrary to the decision of the chief, that a candidate 
was qualified to hold a particular position.  Glendale, 83 Wis. 
2d at 106-07.   
No. 
99-0500   
 
14 
 
CBA, Article 9.Q.1. 
Arbitration shall not apply where Section 62.13 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes is applicable and where Management 
has reserved rights relating to arbitration in Article 
5 of this Agreement. 
CBA, Article 9.Q.2. 
¶26 The first two sections quoted above might be read to 
generally 
permit 
arbitration 
of 
disputes 
regarding 
the 
reasonableness of individual applications of reserved management 
rights, as well as disputes regarding the interpretation, 
application, or enforcement of the terms of the agreement.  The 
third quoted section, however, specifically and unequivocally 
excludes arbitration of matters falling within the chief's or 
PFC's statutory authority under Wis. Stat. § 62.13: arbitration 
"shall not apply" when Wis. Stat. § 62.13 is applicable and 
management has reserved its rights in this regard.  CBA, Article 
9.Q.2. 
¶27  Therefore, unlike the collective bargaining agreements 
at issue in Glendale, Milwaukee I, and Milwaukee II, which 
specifically granted arbitrators the authority to consider the 
chief's statutory powers, the collective bargaining agreement at 
issue in this case specifically precludes arbitration of matters 
falling within the statutory authority of the chief and the PFC 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  Furthermore, neither Glendale, nor 
Milwaukee I, nor Milwaukee II permit the "transfer[] from the 
Chief or the Board the authority to determine who is qualified" 
or 
the 
"transfer[] 
away 
[of] 
the 
appointing 
authority." 
Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 107.  And that is what WERC's 
No. 
99-0500   
 
15 
 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and the 
statutes effectively does here. 
¶28 The Madison fire chief has determined that Gentilli 
failed to qualify for permanent promotion to fire apparatus 
engineer 
because 
he 
did 
not 
successfully 
complete 
his 
probationary promotion to that position.  Gentilli's grievance 
seeks 
an 
arbitrator's 
reversal 
of 
the 
chief's 
decision, 
restoration of the promotion, and back wages and benefits.  The 
authority to determine who is qualified for appointment and 
promotion (and therefore who is entitled to wages and benefits 
associated with appointment or promotion) is statutorily vested 
solely with the chief and the PFC and may not be transferred to 
an arbitrator.  See Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 106-07. 
¶29 "[T]he chief is under no compulsion to promote an 
unqualified 
person," 
because 
a 
labor 
agreement 
may 
"not 
transfer[] from the Chief or the Board the authority to 
determine who is qualified" and must "preserve[] the statutory 
requirement that only qualified persons be appointed."  Id.; see 
also Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 158 (holding that an arbitrator 
has no authority to direct that a particular officer be given an 
assignment 
"since 
both 
the 
statutes 
and 
the 
collective 
bargaining agreement vest authority in the chief" to make such 
decisions); Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 26, 32 (holding that an 
arbitrator may not "substitute his own discretion for that 
vested in one or another of the parties" and vacating the 
arbitration award in light of the statutory obligations and 
prerogatives of a municipal officer).  The relief Gentilli seeks 
No. 
99-0500   
 
16 
 
cannot be granted by an arbitrator, because the power to 
evaluate qualifications, to appoint, and to promote belongs 
exclusively to the chief and the PFC under Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  
This dispute regarding the chief's decision to return Gentilli 
to his previous rank for failure to successfully complete the 
probation promotion is not arbitrable.7    
¶30 The court of appeals has reached a similar conclusion 
in the context of probationary new hires.  Milwaukee III, 113 
Wis. 2d at 198.  In Milwaukee III, the court of appeals 
considered whether a police chief's decision to terminate a 
probationary police officer was arbitrable: 
We 
believe 
that 
to 
make 
a 
probationary 
termination arbitrable 
is 
to wholly vitiate the 
significance of a probationary term.  As our supreme 
court noted in Kaiser, "In examining candidates the 
board may limit persons on the basis of 'residence, 
health, 
habits 
and 
character.'" 
 
To 
allow 
an 
arbitrator to reinstate a terminated probationary 
officer destroys the board's power to limit the 
selection of police officers on statutorily founded 
bases.  Were we to so read the collective bargaining 
agreement 
to 
allow 
such 
a 
termination 
to 
be 
arbitrable, we would be allowing a general contractual 
                                                 
7 Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II came before this court after 
arbitration had already taken place, and in each case this court 
vacated the relief granted by the arbitrator, holding that it 
violated the chief's statutory powers. See City of Milwaukee v. 
Milwaukee Police Ass'n ("Milwaukee II"), 97 Wis. 2d 15, 292 
N.W.2d 841 (1980), and Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of 
Milwaukee 
("Milwaukee I"), 
92 
Wis. 2d 145, 
285 
N.W.2d 119 
(1979).  The court did not vacate the award and then proceed to 
order the arbitrator to craft a new measure of relief.  Had 
those cases come before the court in the posture of this case, 
it is doubtful that the court would have remanded for an 
arbitration which the court had already declared could not be 
given effect.   
No. 
99-0500   
 
17 
 
term to govern over an express power to select as 
vested in police chiefs and boards granted in sec. 
62.13(4), 
Stats., 
and 
a 
clear 
manifestation 
of 
legislative intent that the standards for the training 
and education of police officers are matters of 
statewide concern, as evinced in sec. 165.85(1), 
Stats.  That we cannot do.  Where a contractual 
provision is in direct conflict with a statute, the 
statute governs. 
Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 196 (citations omitted).   
¶31 The court of appeals further noted that "[i]f an 
arbitrator may reverse the board's or chief's exercise of 
discretion in terminating a probationary employe and reinstate 
him, the board's or chief's decision becomes meaningless; it may 
then always be overridden by an arbitrator."  Id. at 197.  The 
court concluded that "[b]ecause the strong public policy behind 
secs. 62.13 and 165.85, Stats., would be thwarted if the broad, 
general, and not express language of the collective bargaining 
agreement 
were 
read 
to 
make 
probationary 
terminations 
No. 
99-0500   
 
18 
 
arbitrable, we reject so broad a reading and hold that the 
question is not arbitrable."8   Id. at 198. 
¶32 WERC's arbitration order, affirmed by the circuit 
court, would transfer to WERC and an arbitrator the statutory 
authority of the chief and the PFC to determine whether an 
employee is qualified to hold a particular position.  Nothing in 
MERA authorizes WERC or an arbitrator to displace the authority 
of the chief or the PFC to make the difficult judgments 
regarding hiring and promotion that they are statutorily 
entitled and uniquely qualified to make. 
¶33 Fire chiefs, police chiefs, and police and fire 
commissions 
are 
exclusively 
empowered 
to 
make, 
and 
are 
                                                 
8 WERC argues, and the circuit court held, that the court of 
appeals in Milwaukee III failed to engage in the arbitrability 
analysis employed in Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II. In Milwaukee 
III, the court of appeals discussed this court's decision in 
Glendale and noted that that case involved a collective 
bargaining agreement which "by express terms" had required the 
chief 
"to 
appoint 
the 
most 
senior 
qualified 
candidate."  
Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee III"), 
113 Wis. 2d 192, 197, 335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983), rev. 
denied, 114 Wis. 2d 602, 340 N.W.2d 201.  In contrast, the 
agreement at issue before the court of appeals in Milwaukee III 
was "without any such express term."  Id. at 197 (emphasis in 
original). Therefore, as we have noted, the court concluded that 
"the strong public policy behind secs. 62.13 and 165.85, Stats., 
would be thwarted if the broad, general, and not express 
language of the collective bargaining agreement were read to 
make 
probationary 
terminations 
arbitrable." 
 
Id. 
at 
198 
(emphasis added).  There is no conflict between the holding of 
Milwaukee III that a dispute is not arbitrable if the collective 
bargaining agreement does not expressly make it arbitrable, and 
the holdings of Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II that require the 
arbitration clause to "cover the grievance on its face."  See, 
e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 609 (7th ed. 1999) (equating "on 
the 'face'" with the "explicit part of a writing"). 
No. 
99-0500   
 
19 
 
responsible for, appointment and promotion decisions under Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13, in order to "secure the best service" in their 
respective departments.   Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c).  This 
statutory scheme does not contemplate that an arbitrator may 
overrule decisions that are specifically entrusted to the chief 
and the PFC; nothing in Wis. Stat. § 111.70 requires such an 
interpretation of § 62.13.  Moreover, the collective bargaining 
agreement in this case specifically excludes disputes regarding 
management rights under § 62.13 from arbitration, and any 
interpretation of the agreement that would effectively transfer 
to an arbitrator the statutory authority of the chief and the 
PFC to make appointment and promotion decisions would clearly 
conflict with § 62.13.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit 
court affirming WERC's order to arbitrate Gentilli's grievance 
must be reversed.   
By the Court.— The order of the Dane County Circuit Court 
is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
1
 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting). 
This 
case 
implicates 
the 
relationship 
between 
a 
statute 
governing terms and conditions of employment and a public sector 
bargaining agreement, one of the most difficult issues in public 
sector labor law.9  A rule that gives automatic priority to a 
statute can render the duty to bargain insignificant while a 
rule giving automatic priority to an agreement can result in 
effective repeal of state law.10  This court has thus demanded 
that 
"collective 
bargaining 
agreements 
and 
statutes 
also 
governing conditions of employment must be harmonized whenever 
possible."11   
¶35 I dissent because the majority opinion fails to 
harmonize 
Wis. Stat. §§ 62.13(5)(em) 
and 
111.70 
and 
thus 
contravenes both.  I would affirm the decisions of the circuit 
court and the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission that 
ordered the City to proceed with arbitration on the union's 
grievance.  
¶36 In Kraus v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 51, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, this court effectively held that 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) does not protect municipal employees 
who are promoted subject to successful completion of a period of 
                                                 
9 Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Assoc. v. City of Glendale, 83 
Wis. 2d 90, 105, 264 Wis. 2d 594 (1978). 
10 June Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope of Bargaining in 
the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin 
Experience, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 685, 740 (1977). 
11 Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 106. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
2
probation when they are denied that promotion during the period 
of probation for nondisciplinary reasons.  In the present case, 
this court now holds that the same statute bars those same 
municipal 
employees 
from 
collectively 
bargaining 
with 
a 
municipality under Wis. Stat. § 111.70 to require that a chief's 
or police and fire commission's decision to deny a promotion be 
reasonable.12   
¶37 When read together, these two decisions hold that when 
a police officer or firefighter is promoted contingent upon the 
successful completion of a period of probation, his promotion 
may 
be 
denied 
for 
a 
completely 
false, 
irrational, 
or 
unsubstantiated reason before the end of his probationary 
period, even if: 
(1) the actual reason for denying his promotion is 
disciplinary 
and 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
just 
cause 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em); and  
                                                 
12 The court of appeals certified the following question to 
this court: "Is a firefighter promoted on a probationary basis 
but returned to his former rank for failing to successfully 
complete probation for an allegedly non-disciplinary reason 
entitled to the just cause protections of § 62.13(e)(em)?"   
This court's decision in Kraus v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 
51, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ answered this question in 
the negative.  If Kraus had concluded that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) 
applies to non-disciplinary demotions, a question would arise 
whether a just cause hearing under § 62.13(5) is the exclusive 
remedy and trumps arbitration of grievance in a collective 
bargaining agreement.  The parties do not brief or argue this 
point, and I do not address it directly.  For a discussion of 
exclusivity, 
see 
City 
of 
Madison 
v. 
Dept. 
of 
Workforce 
Development, No. 01-1910, pending before this court; City of 
Janesville v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 
1995).        
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
3
(2) a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 111.70 requires that the denial be 
reasonable. 
¶38 I disagree with this interpretation of the statutes.  
The legislature did not intend § 62.13(5)(em) to be both a sword 
and a shield for municipalities, allowing them to fend off all 
requests for just cause hearings and deflect any efforts to 
negotiate alternative protections for officers promoted subject 
to a period of probation.  Nor did the legislature intend to 
leave police officers and firefighters helpless in the face of 
arbitrary and capricious personnel decisions when it enacted 
§ 111.70, 
codifying 
the 
right 
of 
municipal 
employees 
to 
collectively bargain over their wages, hours, and conditions of 
employment. 
¶39 The majority opinion here narrowly construes the 
collective bargaining agreement in order to create conflict 
between the agreement and Wis. Stat. § 62.13, contravening the 
rule that collective bargaining agreements and statutes must be 
harmonized 
whenever 
possible. 
 
The 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
at 
issue 
here 
can, 
I 
conclude, 
be 
reasonably  
construed to limit, not replace, the chief's discretion to 
return a firefighter to his prior rank during a period of 
probation, thereby giving effect to both the chief's power under 
§ 62.13 and the municipality's duty to bargain under § 111.70.  
Under this interpretation of the statutes and the agreement, the 
grievance is arbitrable. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
4
¶40 The majority opinion errs in two respects.  First, it 
changes the two-prong test to determine arbitrability.  Second, 
it erroneously applies the test of arbitrability.   
   
 
 
 
 
I 
¶41 To determine arbitrability in the present case, I, 
like the majority, must apply the two-prong test set forth in 
City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n, 97 Wis. 2d 15, 292 
N.W.2d 841 (1980) ("Milwaukee II").  Milwaukee II states the 
test as follows: "When the court determines arbitrability, it is 
limited to considering [1] whether the arbitration clause can be 
construed to cover the grievance on its face and [2] whether any 
other provision of the contract specifically excludes it."13  A 
similar test was set forth in Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of 
Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 2d 145, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979) ("Milwaukee 
I").  This two-prong test was set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960), which this court 
has frequently quoted with approval.14   
¶42 The 
majority 
opinion 
correctly 
and 
approvingly 
announces this oft-repeated two-prong test as the one to be 
applied in the present case to determine arbitrability.15  Yet 
while pretending to follow this test, the majority opinion 
                                                 
13 City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n ("Milwaukee 
II"), 97 Wis. 2d 15, 22, 292 N.W.2d 841 (1980) (citing to Joint 
Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 111, 
253 N.W.2d 536 (1977)) (emphasis added). 
14 Majority op., ¶20. 
15 Id. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
5
restates and changes the test.  The majority opinion declares a 
new two-prong test for determining arbitrability as follows: 
"[T]here are two relevant contractual inquiries in the analysis 
of arbitrability: 1) does the arbitration clause cover the 
grievance on its face; and 2) is there another provision of the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
that 
specifically 
excludes 
arbitration?"16   
¶43 Gone from the first prong of the test is the concept 
of liberal construction embodied in the phrase "whether the 
arbitration clause can be construed to cover the grievance."  
The newly stated test requires the arbitration clause to cover 
the grievance on its face, rather than being capable of a 
construction that covers the grievance.  The majority opinion 
reveals this sleight of hand when it states:  
There is no conflict between the holding of [Milwaukee 
Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d 192, 
335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Milwaukee III")] that 
a 
dispute 
is 
not 
arbitrable 
if 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
does 
not 
expressly 
make it 
arbitrable, and the holdings of Milwaukee I and 
Milwaukee II that require the arbitration clause to 
"cover the grievance on its face."  See, e.g., Black's 
Law Dictionary 609 (7th ed. 1999) (equating "on the 
'face'" with the "explicit part of writing").17   
¶44 In short, the long-standing Wisconsin/U.S. Supreme 
Court test requires that arbitration provisions are to be 
liberally and generously construed to cover an asserted dispute; 
that there is "a broad presumption of arbitrability"; and that 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶21. 
17 Id., ¶31 n.8.  
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
6
an issue should be found arbitrable if "the arbitration clause 
can be construed to cover the grievance on its face."18   
Arbitration is denied only when, as the court stated in 
Milwaukee I, "it may be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that 
covers the asserted dispute."19   
 
 
 
 
 
II  
¶45 When the long-standing two-prong test of arbitrability 
is properly applied in the present case, rather than the new 
test set forth by the majority opinion, the only conclusion that 
can be reached is that the grievance is arbitrable. 
 
 
¶46 As to the first prong of the test, the arbitration 
clause in the present case "can be construed to cover the 
grievance."  The applicable provisions in Articles 5 and 9 of 
the collective bargaining agreement are as follows: 
ARTICLE 5 
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
Union recognizes the prerogative of the City and the 
Chief of the Fire Department to operate and manage its 
affairs in all respects, in accordance with its 
responsibilities and the powers or authority which the 
City 
has 
not 
officially 
abridged, 
delegated 
or 
modified 
by 
this 
Agreement 
and 
such 
powers 
or 
authority are retained by the City. 
                                                 
18 See 
majority 
op., 
¶20 
(quoting 
Milwaukee 
II, 
97 
Wis. 2d at 22). 
19 See majority op., ¶20 (quoting Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. 
City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 2d 145, 152, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979) 
(Milwaukee I) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960))). 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
7
These management rights include, but are not limited 
to the following: 
A. 
To utilize personnel, methods, procedures, and 
means in the most appropriate and efficient manner 
possible. 
B. 
To manage and direct the employees of the Fire 
Department. 
C. 
To hire, schedule, promote, transfer, assign, 
train or retrain employees in positions within the 
Fire Department. 
D. 
To suspend, demote, discharge, or take other 
appropriate disciplinary action against the employees 
for just cause. 
 . . . . 
K. 
Any dispute with respect to Management Rights 
shall not in any way be subject to arbitration but any 
grievance with respect to the reasonableness of the 
application of said Management Rights may be subject 
to the grievance procedure contained herein. 
 . . . . 
ARTICLE 9 
GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURE 
 
A. 
Only 
matters 
involving 
interpretation, 
application, or enforcement of the terms of this 
Agreement shall constitute a grievance under the 
provision set forth herein. 
 . . . . 
 
I. 
ARBITRATION may be resorted to only when 
issues arise between the parties hereto with reference 
to the interpretation, application or enforcement of 
the provisions of this Agreement. 
CBA (emphasis added). 
¶47 Article 5.C. provides that the management rights are 
reserved to the City and Chief.  These management rights include 
the rights to "hire, schedule, promote, transfer, assign, train 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
8
or retain employees in positions with the fire department" and 
"to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other appropriate 
disciplinary action against the employee for just cause."20 
Article 5.K. further provides, however, that "any grievance with 
respect to the reasonableness of the application of said 
Management Rights may be subject to the grievance procedure 
contained herein."21   
¶48 Gentilli's grievance involves the reasonableness of 
the application of the management right to promote him.  Thus, 
as the majority opinion correctly explains, Article 5.K. "might 
be read to generally permit arbitration of disputes regarding 
the reasonableness 
of 
individual 
applications 
of reserved 
management rights."22 
¶49 I turn now to the second prong of the test: Does any 
provision of the collective bargaining agreement expressly 
exclude arbitrability of the grievance? 
¶50 The 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
places 
two 
relevant limits on the arbitrability of disputes in Article 9. 
No other provision of the collective bargaining agreement 
specifically excludes this grievance.  
¶51 First, 
Article 
9.Q.1 
of 
the 
agreement 
states, 
"Arbitration shall be limited to grievances over matters 
involving interpretation, application or enforcement of the 
                                                 
20 See CBA, Articles 5.D., 5.E. 
21 See CBA, Article 5.K. (emphasis added). 
22 See majority op., ¶26. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
9
terms of this Agreement."23  Gentilli's grievance implicates the 
application of a term of the agreement, namely application of 
the management right to promote.  Thus Gentilli's grievance 
falls within the express terms of an arbitrable issue and is not 
excluded by Article 9.Q.1.   
¶52 Second, 
Article 
9.Q.2 
of 
the 
agreement 
states, 
"Arbitration shall not apply where Section 62.13 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes is applicable and where Management has 
reserved 
rights 
relating 
to 
arbitration 
in 
Article 
5."24  
According to the majority opinion, this provision "specifically 
and unequivocally excludes arbitration of matters falling within 
the 
chief's 
or 
PFC's 
statutory 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13" and the power to evaluate qualifications, to 
appoint, and to promote belongs exclusively to the chief and the 
PFC under § 62.13.25  Thus, the majority opinion concludes, 
Gentilli's grievance is not arbitrable.   
¶53 The 
majority 
opinion 
suffers 
from 
two 
flawed 
arguments.  First, the majority opinion incorrectly argues that 
the collective bargaining agreement at issue in this case does 
not 
grant 
an 
arbitrator 
the 
authority 
to 
consider 
the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  The majority opinion notes 
that the arbitration agreements in Milwaukee I, Milwaukee II, 
and Glendale Professional Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 
83 
Wis. 2d 90, 
264 
Wis. 2d 594 
(1978), 
expressly 
granted 
                                                 
23 See CBA, Article 9.Q.1 (quoted in majority op., ¶25). 
24 See CBA, Article 9.Q.2 (quoted in majority op., ¶25). 
25 See majority op., ¶¶26-27. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
10
arbitrators 
the 
power 
to 
consider 
the 
chief's 
statutory 
authority, 
while 
Article 
9.Q.2 
here 
expressly 
excludes 
arbitration where Wis. Stat. § 62.13 applies.  The majority 
opinion 
suggests 
that 
this 
distinction 
eliminates 
an 
arbitrator's authority to determine whether § 62.13 applies in 
the first place.   
¶54 The majority's conclusion, however, ignores Article 
9.Q.1.  Article 9.Q.1 states that arbitration is available for 
grievances involving "interpretation . . . of the terms of this 
Agreement."  Article 9.Q.2, excluding arbitration where § 62.13 
applies, is, of course, a term of the agreement.  Thus, the 
collective bargaining agreement at issue here, like those in 
Milwaukee I, Milwaukee II, and Glendale, authorizes arbitrators 
to consider whether the chief's statutory powers under § 62.13 
are applicable to a particular grievance.  
¶55 Second, and more importantly, the majority opinion 
improperly compares the collective bargaining agreement in this 
case to the broad agreement in Milwaukee III and not the more 
limited agreement at issue in Glendale.   
¶56 The crux of the majority opinion is that arbitration 
of the decision to deny a promotion during a period of probation 
directly 
conflicts 
with 
the 
chief's 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13 and is therefore invalid.  Resting heavily on 
the court of appeals' decision in Milwaukee III,26 the majority 
opinion concludes, "any interpretation of the agreement that 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶¶30-32. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
11
would effectively transfer" the chief's right to promote 
officers under § 62.13 "would clearly conflict with § 62.13."27   
¶57 The majority opinion's conclusion, however, fails to 
account for this court's decision in Glendale. The collective 
bargaining agreement in Glendale required that the chief promote 
the most senior qualified candidate.  When a vacancy opened up, 
however, the chief promoted the officer who received the highest 
test score on a qualifying examination, despite the fact that of 
the three officers identified with the highest qualifying test 
scores, the selected officer was not the most senior.  The 
promotion decision was submitted to arbitration, and the 
arbitrator ordered the City to promote the most senior officer 
among the three highest scoring officers.   
¶58 This court approved the order of the arbitrator, 
concluding 
that 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement's 
requirement to promote based on seniority did not "take away 
power expressly conferred by law"; rather, it "merely restricts 
the discretion that would otherwise exist."28    
¶59 The 
Glendale 
court 
explained 
that 
a 
collective 
bargaining agreement may restrict the promotional authority of 
the PFC and the chief as long as it does not transfer or 
displace 
that 
promotional 
authority 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  The court stated as follows:  
                                                 
27 Majority op., ¶33. 
28 Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 
Wis. 2d 90, 102-03, 264 Wis. 2d 594 (1978). 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
12
Although by entering into the collective bargaining 
agreement the City relinquished some of the discretion 
the Chief and the Board enjoyed previously concerning 
appointments and promotions, it has not transferred 
from the Chief or the Board the authority to determine 
who is qualified, and it has not transferred away the 
appointing authority.29   
¶60 The collective bargaining agreement in the present 
case is analogous to the agreement in Glendale.  It does not 
transfer the chief's authority to promote (or demote) officers 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13 to an arbitrator.  Rather, it simply 
limits the chief's authority by requiring that the chief be 
reasonable in the application of this management right.   
¶61 The majority opinion mischaracterizes the scope of the 
restriction placed on the chief's promotion and demotion 
authority under the collective bargaining agreement in the 
present case by framing the dispute based on the relief sought 
in Gentilli's grievance, not the agreement itself.  The majority 
writes, "Gentilli's grievance seeks an arbitrator's reversal of 
the chief's decision, restoration of the promotion, and back 
wages and benefits."30  The grievance, according to the majority, 
therefore seeks an arbitrator's determination as to who is 
qualified for appointment and promotion——a power statutorily 
vested solely with the chief and the PFC. 
¶62 The fact that Gentilli wishes to have his promotion 
restored does not mean that the collective bargaining agreement 
transfers the authority to decide who is qualified for a 
promotion to an arbitrator.  In Glendale, the grievance of the 
                                                 
29 Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 107. 
30 Majority op., ¶28. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
13
most senior officer seeking promotion sought the same relief: 
order the Chief to promote the grieving officer despite the 
Chief's decision to the contrary.   
¶63 Yet this court correctly interpreted the grievance in 
Glendale not as a request to displace the Chief's authority to 
determine qualified officers under Wis. Stat. § 62.13 but as a 
request to enforce the limitation on that authority bargained 
for under the collective bargaining agreement.  The Glendale 
decision explained: "Under the labor agreement, the chief is 
under no compulsion to promote an unqualified person or a person 
determined solely by the union.  The seniority restriction 
operates 
only 
where 
there 
is 
more 
than 
one 
qualified 
candidate."31 
¶64 The same conclusion must be reached in the present 
case.  The collective bargaining agreement does not compel the 
chief to promote an unqualified person or a particular person.  
It requires only that the chief's discretion to promote 
qualified people be exercised reasonably.   
¶65 Gentilli alleges that "the Madison Fire Department 
arbitrarily 
and 
capriciously 
revoked 
[his] 
status 
as 
an 
Apparatus Engineer."  He believes that he was denied his 
promotion eleven months into a twelve-month period of probation 
because of a heated discussion with a senior officer despite 
receiving satisfactory marks on his performance evaluation, and 
                                                 
31 Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 106. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
14
that this decision was unreasonable and therefore subject to 
arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement.32   
¶66 As the hearing examiner properly concluded, "whether 
the 
revocation 
of 
Gentilli's 
probationary 
status 
in 
the 
Apparatus Engineer position constituted appropriate discipline 
for the violation of a work rule, a demotion, or the 
unreasonable application of certain management rights are issues 
that are to be decided by an arbitrator."   
¶67 The majority opinion avoids a thorough discussion of 
this court's decision in Glendale by following the decision of 
the court of appeals in Milwaukee III instead.33  Milwaukee III, 
however, is inapposite. 
¶68 In Milwaukee III, the court of appeals refused to 
permit arbitration of a probationary termination, in part, 
because the collective bargaining agreement used broad and 
general terms to describe the arbitrator's authority and the 
court was reluctant to craft those terms into a mere limitation, 
not usurpation, of a chief's statutory authority.  The Milwaukee 
III collective bargaining agreement generically provided for 
arbitration whenever there were "differences" involving the 
"interpretation, application or enforcement of the provisions" 
of the agreement. It also granted an arbitrator the authority to 
hear "matters of departmental discipline involving application 
                                                 
32 Gentilli was apparently the only officer among 54 who did 
not successfully complete the probationary period. 
33 Majority op., ¶¶30-32. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
15
of the rules or regulations of the Chief" whenever those matters 
were not subject to appeal to the PFC.   
¶69 The 
Milwaukee 
III 
decision, 
however, 
expressly 
distinguished the broad, general terms in the agreement before 
it from the agreement at issue in Glendale, which, "by express 
terms, merely required the chief 'to appoint the most senior 
qualified candidate.'"34  The same distinction is properly drawn 
in this case.35  The collective bargaining agreement here 
provides, in express terms, that the encroachment on a chief's 
statutory authority to promote is limited.  Under Article 5.K., 
the agreement authorizes grievances "with respect to the 
reasonableness of the application" of management rights.36 
                                                 
34 Milwaukee 
Police 
Ass'n 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
113 
Wis. 2d 192, 197, 335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983) (Milwaukee 
III). 
35 The Milwaukee III decision is distinguishable for other 
reasons as well.  Milwaukee III involved an initial probationary 
period, while this case involves a promotional probationary 
period. 
 
Milwaukee 
III 
involved 
the 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 165.85, which applies to law enforcement officers, 
while this case involves firefighters. 
36 The majority opinion also misreads the holding of 
Milwaukee III.  The majority opinion states that Milwaukee III 
concluded the grievance was not arbitrable because "'the strong 
public policy behind secs. 62.13 and 165.85, Stats., would be 
thwarted if the broad, general, and not express language of the 
collective bargaining agreement were read to make probationary 
terminations arbitrable.'"  Majority op., ¶31 n.8 (quoting 
Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 198).  While Milwaukee III may 
plausibly be read to rest on this conclusion, the language of 
the decision is confused and such a reading violates the two-
prong test for arbitrability announced in Milwaukee I. the 
Milwaukee III decision actually concluded that whenever a 
provision of a collective bargaining agreement is in direct 
conflict with a statute, the statute governs.  See Milwaukee 
III, 113 Wis. 2d at 196.  It is this latter reading of the 
decision that should be followed. 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
16
¶70 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  99-0500.ssa 
 
 
 
1