Title: Robert R. Reynolds v. Leon County Energy Improvement District, etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC14-710
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 2015

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-710 
____________ 
 
ROBERT R. REYNOLDS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
LEON COUNTY ENERGY IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, etc. et al., 
Appellees. 
 
[October 1, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a circuit court judgment 
validating a proposed bond issue.1  On the merits, we affirm the circuit court’s 
decision to validate the bonds, but as we required with a virtually identical 
financing agreement in Thomas v. Clean Energy Coastal Corridor, SC14-1282, slip 
op. at 9 (Fla. Oct. 1, 2015), we remand with instructions for the circuit court to 
require Leon County Energy Improvement District to amend the financing 
agreement to remove all references to judicial foreclosure and to file the amended 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. 
 
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agreement in the circuit court following its approval by the district’s governing 
board.  Cf. State v. City of Venice, 2 So. 2d 365, 367-68 (Fla. 1941) (remanding to 
circuit court “with directions to require the amendment of the resolution and the 
bonds” to correct language regarding the pledged funds that was “too broad to be 
sustained” and stating that “when the same are so amended the decree of validation 
. . . will stand affirmed”). 
We write further, however, because we conclude it is necessary to recede 
from our decision in Meyers v. City of St. Cloud, 78 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1955), on 
which the appellant relied to argue he has standing to file this appeal 
notwithstanding his failure to appear in the bond validation proceeding below.  In 
Meyers, 78 So. 2d at 403, we expressly addressed the question of “whether citizens 
and taxpayers may appear for the first time as appellants in bond validation 
proceedings.”  We concluded that parties who failed to appear in the bond 
validation proceedings in circuit court nonetheless had the right to appeal from the 
trial court’s decision.  Id. (citing State v. Sarasota Cnty., 159 So. 797 (Fla. 1935)).  
The reasoning of Meyers, however, fails to take into account central provisions of 
the statutory scheme governing bond validation proceedings.  When the relevant 
provisions of the statutory scheme are considered, the conclusion reached by 
Meyers cannot be sustained. 
 
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Under the plain terms of the statute, any person wishing to participate in 
bond validation proceedings must appear in the circuit court.  In connection with 
the filing of a bond validation complaint, section 75.05(1), Florida Statutes, 
requires that “[t]he court shall issue an order directed against the state and the 
several property owners, taxpayers, citizens and others having or claiming any 
right, title or interest in property to be affected by the issuance of bonds or 
certificates, or to be affected thereby, requiring all persons, in general terms and 
without naming them and the state through its state attorney or attorneys of the 
circuits where the county, municipality or district lies, to appear at a designated 
time and place within the circuit where the complaint is filed and show why the 
complaint should not be granted and the proceedings and bonds or certificates 
validated.”  Section 75.07, Florida Statutes, goes on to provide that “[a]ny property 
owner, taxpayer, citizen or person interested may become a party to the action by 
moving against or pleading to the complaint at or before the time set for hearing.”    
Under these provisions, full party status is granted only to those who appear 
and plead in the circuit court proceedings.  Only such parties may avail themselves 
of the right of appeal recognized in section 75.08, Florida Statutes.  This 
understanding of the right of appeal in bond validation proceedings is consistent 
with the general rule that “failure to participate as a party in the lower tribunal 
precludes the ability to invoke appellate proceedings.”  Bondi v. Tucker, 93 So. 3d 
 
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1106, 1108 (Fla 1st DCA 2012).  And it is in accord with the specific rule that 
“[e]ven class members who are already parties and bound by a judgment must 
intervene as named parties in the trial court before they can appeal.”  Id. (“See 
Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 714 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) 
(‘We agree with the Fourth District that ‘non-named class members must intervene 
formally in the class action to gain standing to appeal.’  Concerned Class 
Members[ v. Sailfish Point, Inc., 704 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)]).’ ”)).  
Accordingly, persons who have the status of “parties defendant to the action” 
resulting from the publication of notice under section 75.06, Florida Statutes, and 
are therefore bound by the judgment in the case are no more entitled to appeal 
without having formally participated in the trial proceedings than are class 
members who failed to intervene at trial. 
Therefore, we recede from Meyers.  Since Meyers, we have stated on three 
other occasions that citizens and taxpayers who failed to appear in the circuit court 
bond validation proceeding nevertheless had standing to appeal the final judgment.  
See Rowe v. St. Johns Cnty., 668 So. 2d 196, 197-98 (Fla. 1996); Lozier v. Collier 
Cnty., 682 So. 2d 551, 552 n.2 (Fla. 1996); Bruns v. Cnty. Water-Sewer Dist., 354 
So. 2d 862, 862 n.2 (Fla. 1977).  We recede from these decisions as well. 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
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LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
 
I do not disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion either on the 
merits or regarding the conclusion that the reasoning of Meyers is seriously flawed.  
But I am constrained to dissent because I conclude that this case should be 
dismissed.  For reasons the majority opinion makes plain, the appellant lacks 
standing to bring this appeal.  The proper disposition of such a case is dismissal.  I 
thus would give effect in this case to the abrogation of Meyers and its progeny.  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Leon County – Bond Validations  
Kevin John Carroll, Judge – Case No. 37-2013-CA-003396 
 
John Stephen Menton of Rutledge Ecenia, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Elizabeth Wilson Neiberger of Bryant Miller Olive P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; 
Susan Hamilton Churuti of Bryant Miller Olive P.A., Tampa, Florida; Jolinda L. 
Herring of Bryant Miller Olive P.A., Miami, Florida; Herbert William Albert 
Thiele, Leon County Attorney, Tallahassee, Florida; Jon Cameron Moyle, Jr. and 
Karen Ann Putnal of The Moyle Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida; and Georgia 
Anne Cappleman, Assistant State Attorney, Leon County Courthouse, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellees