Title: Roberts v. Wettlin
Citation: 431 So. 2d 524
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 1983

431 So. 2d 524 (1983)
Keith ROBERTS
v.
David D. WETTLIN and United Plating, Inc.
81-656.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 22, 1983.
James T. Baxter, III of Berry, Ables, Tatum, Little &amp; Baxter, Huntsville, for appellant.
George R. Stuart, III of Stuart &amp; Ward, Birmingham, and Robert H. King, Gadsden, for appellee David Wettlin.
L. Tennet Lee, III, Harvey B. Morris, and D. Scott McLain of Cleary, Lee, Morris, Evans &amp; Rowe, Huntsville, for appellee United Plating, Inc.
BEATTY, Justice.
Default judgments were entered against defendants Keith Roberts and Huntsville Plating, Inc. The trial court denied the motion by Roberts to set aside the default judgments, and this appeal followed. The question presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing *525 to set aside the default judgments. We hold that it did not and affirm.
The record shows that this case was called for trial before the Honorable Daniel B. Banks, Jr., in the Circuit Court of Madison County on January 25, 1982. The trial court's order reads in part:
Final judgments were entered on January 28, 1982, and Roberts's motion to set aside the default judgment was denied.
Roberts asserts three reasons requiring reversal by this Court. First, he contends that there was an agreement under specified terms to settle the case which relieved him of the duty to appear and comply with the agreement or defend. Next, he claims that the entry of default was erroneous because his lawyer withdrew from representation after appearing at trial ready to defend his case. Finally, Roberts contends it was his understanding that the crossclaim was not set for trial on January 25, 1982.
The facts surrounding the settlement agreement between Roberts and plaintiff's attorney, Mr. King, are in dispute. It is clear from the record, however, that Mr. King asked Roberts's attorney, Mr. Timberlake, if he had the settlement check at 9:00 a.m. on January 25, prior to the case being called for trial. Timberlake stated that he did not, but he was sure it could be obtained through the First Alabama Bank. Timberlake contacted the bank and was told that no arrangements had been made, and that it would take a minimum of 24 hours to transfer funds from an out-of-state bank. This was related to plaintiff's attorney, who advised Timberlake that he considered that this "blew" the settlement.
At this point the judge advised Mr. Timberlake to be prepared to try the case at 1:30 p.m. Timberlake stated that he attempted to contact Roberts at the only telephone number which he had for him and could not reach him. The following dialogue occurred as court convened at 1:30 p.m.:
Judge Banks, in refusing to set aside the default judgments, considered affidavits from both Roberts and Timberlake concerning the disputed facts as to the settlement agreement and the alleged severance of the cross-claim. Further, the record indicates that Judge Banks was aware of the January 20 settlement conference and would have knowledge of any severance of the cross-claim from the original claim. A hearing was afforded defendants and, all things considered, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the default judgments. It is well established that if the defendant is properly within the jurisdiction of the court, and if he has notice of the trial date and does not appear and defend, the court has no choice but to enter judgment for the plaintiff. Gray v. Handy, 204 Ala. 559, 86 So. 548 (1920); Wonder v. Southbound Records, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1173 (Ala.1978). We find no abuse of discretion.
We also find no error by the trial court in allowing Mr. Timberlake to withdraw as attorney for the defendants in this case. The circumstances found Mr. Timberlake with no client and no settlement proceeds as trial convened at 1:30 p.m. His client was informed of the trial date and knew that, absent settlement, they would proceed with trial. Timberlake had made efforts to contact his client for instructions or information regarding the settlement proceeds, without success.
The standard of review in the case of an order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, a default judgment proceeds on the basis that the trial judge has great discretion, and his judgment will not be disturbed unless he has clearly abused such discretion. Elliott v. Stephens, 399 So. 2d 240 (Ala.1981). After a careful review of the record we find no such abuse. Further, a defaulting party seeking to have a default judgment set aside, either under Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, must allege and prove that he has a meritorious defense to the action. Vestavia Country Club v. Armstrong, 271 Ala. 294, 123 So. 2d 130 (1960); AAA Sewing Machine Company v. Shelby Finance Company, Inc., 384 So. 2d 126 (Ala.Civ.App.1980). No defense was set forth by defendant Roberts in either his motion or his supporting affidavits.
This case has been in the Alabama court system since 1974. We find no abuse on the part of the trial court in bringing this case to a resolution. The default judgments as to the original claim and cross-claim were *527 properly granted. Let the judgment on the motion be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.