Title: Batteries Plus, LLC v. Clinton Mohr
Citation: 2001 WI 80
Docket Number: 1999AP001319
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2001

2001 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1319 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Batteries Plus, LLC  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Clinton Mohr,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 153 
Reported at:  237 Wis. 2d 776, 615 N.W.2d 196 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 29, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 27, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick L. Snyder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Roger L. Pettit and Petrie & Stocking, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Roger L. Pettit. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Richard R. Grant and Consigny, Andrews, Hemming & Grant, S.C., 
Janesville, and oral argument by Richard Grant. 
 
2001 WI 80 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1319 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Batteries Plus, LLC  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Clinton Mohr,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Batteries Plus, LLC v. Mohr, 
2000 WI App 153, 237 Wis. 2d 776, 615 N.W.2d 196.  Batteries 
Plus, a retail seller of batteries, sued Clinton Mohr (Mohr), 
one of its former at-will employees, for repayment of past 
wages.  Batteries Plus claimed that it accidentally overpaid 
Mohr approximately $11,500 for mileage expenses when Mohr was a 
commercial 
sales 
specialist 
for 
the 
company. 
 
Mohr 
counterclaimed, 
alleging 
that 
Batteries 
Plus 
wrongfully 
discharged him when he refused to agree to reimburse the 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-1319 
 
2 
company, through deductions from his future wages, for the 
alleged overpayment. 
¶2 
The case was tried to a jury in the circuit court for 
Waukesha County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge.  The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Mohr, awarding him damages for wrongful 
discharge and underpayment of wages.  In allowing Mohr's 
counterclaim, the circuit court ruled that Wis. Stat. § 103.455 
(1995-96)1 provided a well-established and important public 
policy 
basis 
to 
preclude 
Batteries 
Plus 
from 
lawfully 
discharging Mohr for his refusal to agree to have repayment 
amounts deducted from his wages.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
¶3 
We disagree with the circuit court and the court of 
appeals in their application of the law.  Although Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.455 embodies a fundamental and well-defined public policy, 
the policy does not apply to the fact situation in this case.  
Neither the letter nor the spirit of § 103.455 covers this 
situation in which an employer claims that it overpaid its 
employee by mistake and the employee gives the employer no 
choice but to go to court to recover the money.  We conclude 
that Mohr may not maintain an action for wrongful discharge 
under these circumstances.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
 
I 
                     
1 All statutory references are to the 1995-96 volumes of the 
Wisconsin Statutes. 
No. 99-1319 
 
3 
 
¶4 
In 1993, Mohr sold his battery business to Batteries 
Plus but he remained with the company as an employee.  At the 
outset, Mohr worked as a store manager.  In 1994, Batteries Plus 
made Mohr a commercial sales specialist.  Mohr's compensation 
package included a base salary and a commission of a percentage 
of the gross profits on all sales.  Mohr used his own vehicle in 
his sales position, and he received reimbursement for mileage 
expenses from the start of his new position in August 1994 until 
April 1996.   
¶5 
In 1996, Batteries Plus informed Mohr that it had 
mistakenly paid him for mileage expenses.  It claims that it had 
been paying Mohr an extra two percent in commissions to 
accommodate his travel expenses and that he was not supposed to 
receive additional reimbursement for mileage.  Batteries Plus 
asked him to agree to deductions from future wages in order to 
reimburse it for the overpayment.  Mohr refused and denied that 
he had been overpaid.  Over a period of several months the 
parties discussed the company's claim of overpayment.  There 
were sharp exchanges of words and letters, including a rejected 
request for an employment contract.  Mohr's employment ended 
July 1, 1996, with Mohr claiming that he had been fired and the 
company claiming that Mohr had quit. 
¶6 
Batteries Plus thereafter instituted a collection 
action against Mohr in circuit court to recover the alleged 
overpayment.  Mohr counterclaimed, alleging wrongful discharge, 
breach of employment contract, and violation of Wis. Stat. Ch. 
No. 99-1319 
 
4 
109 on wage claims.  After a trial, the jury found that Mohr had 
not been overpaid.  Instead, it found that Mohr had been 
underpaid and was entitled to $3400.  The jury also found that 
Mohr was an at-will employee as opposed to a contract employee, 
and that he had been wrongfully discharged.  As a result, the 
jury awarded Mohr $60,000 in damages. 
¶7 
Following the trial, Batteries Plus moved the circuit 
court for various forms of relief.  First, Batteries Plus asked 
the circuit court to change the jury's special verdict answer as 
to the underpayment of wages, on grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence for such a jury finding. 
¶8 
Second, Batteries Plus moved the circuit court to 
change the jury's answer on the issue of whether Mohr was 
wrongfully discharged.  Batteries Plus argued that there was 
insufficient evidence for such a jury finding.  It also argued 
that the jury's answer on the question of wrongful discharge was 
invalid as a matter of law because no public policy embodied in 
existing law precluded Batteries Plus from conditioning Mohr's 
continued employment on his agreeing to repay the compensation 
for mileage expenses.  Batteries Plus made the latter argument 
both before and after trial. 
¶9 
Third, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.15, Batteries Plus 
moved the circuit court for a new trial on its collection claim 
and Mohr's claim for unpaid wages.  It argued that the jury 
verdict was "contrary to the law and to the weight of evidence 
and that a new trial should be awarded on those two issues in 
the interest of justice." 
No. 99-1319 
 
5 
¶10 The circuit court denied all of Batteries Plus's 
motions, although it reduced the jury's answer on Mohr's claim 
for underpayment of wages from $3400 to $137.  The $137 
underpayment occurred because of a clerical mistake by the 
employer that was discovered during the course of the trial.  
The circuit court also awarded Mohr double costs and interest 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01, the statute relating to 
settlement offers. 
¶11 Batteries Plus appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.  The court ruled 
that (1) Mohr identified a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy that applied to the facts of this case; (2) there was 
credible 
evidence 
for 
the 
jury's 
finding 
that 
Mohr 
was 
discharged 
for 
refusing 
to 
act 
in 
contravention 
of 
the 
fundamental and well-defined public policy; and (3) the circuit 
court properly awarded interest and double costs pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 807.01.  Batteries Plus, 237 Wis. 2d at ¶¶18, 26, 
30. 
¶12 We granted Batteries Plus's petition for review.  The 
appeal to this court challenges only the propriety of Mohr's 
claim for wrongful discharge and does not involve the award for 
underpayment of wages or the award of interest and double costs. 
 Batteries Plus also has not appealed its unsuccessful claim 
that it overpaid Mohr. 
 
II 
 
No. 99-1319 
 
6 
¶13 The employment-at-will doctrine is an established 
general tenet of workplace relations in Wisconsin.  Hausman v. 
St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 663, 571 N.W.2d 393 
(1997).  It has been recognized in case law since 1871.  
Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131, 133 (1871).  Its "centrality" 
in the marketplace was reaffirmed this term in Mackenzie v. 
Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI 23, ¶12, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 623 N.W.2d 
739, where this court explained that the employment-at-will rule 
serves the interests of employees as well as employers.   
¶14 The interest of employees is well understood.  An at-
will relationship allows an employee to leave the employer at 
any time for any reason.  This right is especially appealing 
when the economy is strong and labor is in short supply, because 
it permits the employee to move freely from one position to 
another. 
¶15 The employer's side of the equation is often less 
understood.  Employment-at-will usually reaches a court in the 
context of a contested employee discharge, a situation in which 
the individual employee is pitted against a seemingly more 
powerful employer.  This context seldom facilitates a detached 
appreciation that the employer should have the same right, for 
whatever reason, to dispense with the services of an employee as 
the employee has to quit.  The antidote for both parties to the 
potential unfairness arising from a party's change of heart is 
an employment contract. 
¶16 The employment-at-will doctrine permits an "employer 
[to] discharge an employee 'for good cause, for no cause, or 
No. 99-1319 
 
7 
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of 
legal wrong.'"  Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 
567, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).2 
¶17 In 1983, in Brockmeyer, this court recognized a 
"narrow public policy exception" to the employment-at-will 
doctrine, allowing an employee a cause of action "for wrongful 
discharge when the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and 
well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law."  Id. 
at 572-73. 
¶18 In the years since 1983, the court's formulation of 
this exception has been tested many times.  Last term, we 
unanimously reaffirmed the exception in Strozinsky v. School 
District of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 
443.  As we noted in Strozinsky, "statutory modifications to the 
rule 
of 
employment-at-will 
targeted 
the potentially 
harsh 
application of the doctrine by allowing employees to seek relief 
for certain types of terminations."  237 Wis. 2d at ¶34 (citing 
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 567-68).  For example, statutes make 
it unlawful for employers to terminate employees because of 
                     
2 The 
Brockmeyer 
opinion 
cites 
Lawrence 
E. 
Blades, 
Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405 
(1967), which in turn quotes Payne v. Western & Atlantic 
Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other 
grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915), as the 
source of this formulation.  Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, 567 n.4, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). 
No. 99-1319 
 
8 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;3 participation in 
union 
activities, 
jury 
service, 
or 
military 
service; 
or 
testifying at an occupational, safety, and health proceeding.  
Id. (citing Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 567-68). 
¶19 Brockmeyer 
was 
this 
court's 
first 
decision 
to 
recognize an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.4  In 
Strozinsky, we summarized the law on the subject: 
 
The Brockmeyer court recognized a narrow public 
policy exception that allows a cause of action "for 
wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a 
fundamental 
and 
well 
defined 
public 
policy 
as 
evidenced by existing law."  This exception properly 
balances 
the 
need 
to 
protect 
employees 
from 
terminations that contradict public policy with the 
employer's 
historical 
discretion 
to 
discharge 
employees under the freedom to contract embodied in 
the at-will doctrine.  Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 
134 
Wis. 
2d 
136, 
148, 
396 
N.W.2d 
167 
(1986) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring).  Our acceptance of this 
public policy exception mirrored the approach taken by 
sister courts in other states. 
 
Plaintiffs 
seeking 
relief 
under 
this 
narrow 
exception must: (1) first identify a fundamental and 
well 
defined 
public 
policy 
in 
their 
complaint 
sufficient to trigger the exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine; and (2) then demonstrate that the 
discharge violated that fundamental and well defined 
public policy.  Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 168 
                     
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964); Wis. Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395 (Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act). 
4 The Brockmeyer court cited Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 
Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980), as providing a 
foundation for its decision.  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 572.  
The court decided another case on the same day, Scarpace v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 608, 335 N.W.2d 844 (1983), 
reiterating the Brockmeyer holding. 
No. 99-1319 
 
9 
Wis. 2d 12, 24, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992); Wandry v. 
Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 41-42, 384 
N.W.2d 325 (1986).  Once the plaintiff satisfies these 
first two steps, the burden shifts to the employer to 
show that the discharge actually was sparked by just 
cause.  Winkelman, 168 Wis. 2d at 24. 
Strozinsky, 237 Wis. 2d at ¶¶36-37 (footnotes and citation 
omitted).  As noted, the burden of demonstrating a fundamental 
and 
well-defined 
public 
policy 
rests 
with 
the 
employee.  
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574.   
¶20 Since Brockmeyer, a series of cases has contoured the 
scope of the cause of action for wrongful discharge in the 
No. 99-1319 
 
10
employment-at-will context.5  One of the cases, Wandry v. Bull's 
Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 42-43, 384 N.W.2d 325 (1986), 
outlines four tenets of public policy articulated in Brockmeyer. 
 
1. 
An employer is liable for wrongful discharge 
if it discharges an employee for refusing to violate a 
constitutional or statutory provision.  Employers will 
be held liable for those terminations that effectuate 
an unlawful end. 
                     
5 Strozinsky v. School Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶63, 
237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443 (finding sufficient public policy 
in federal taxation statutes requiring accurate reporting of tax 
information); Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 99, 
115-16, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998) (holding that refusal to sign a 
nondisclosure and noncompete agreement did not give rise to a 
cause of action for wrongful discharge under Brockmeyer); 
Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 667-68, 571 
N.W.2d 393 (1997) (declining to adopt a general "whistle-blower" 
exception, but finding a sufficient public policy when nursing 
home employees reported abuse or neglect as required by 
statute); Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 
113-14, 564 N.W.2d 692 (1997) (finding a sufficient public 
policy when a trucker refused employer's command to operate his 
vehicle without a valid operators' license); Winkelman v. Beloit 
Mem'l Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d 12, 24, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992) (finding 
a sufficient public policy when an employer conditioned a 
nurse's continued employment on the violation of a provision in 
the Wisconsin Administrative Code); Schultz v. Prod. Stamping 
Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 17, 23, 434 N.W.2d 780 (1989) (finding 
sufficient public policy not established in plaintiff's claim 
that employer did not disclose details of a pension plan before 
requiring employees to join the plan as a condition of 
employment); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 142, 
396 N.W.2d 167 (1986) (holding that conduct by employee that 
merely promoted the public interest in safety and proper 
hazardous waste disposal——and did not involve the employer 
forcing the employee to violate a law——did not provide a 
sufficient public policy); Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union, 
129 Wis. 2d 37, 384 N.W.2d 325 (1986) (recognizing that a 
discharge can violate the spirit of a statutory provision). 
A summary review of these cases is set forth in Strozinsky, 
237 Wis. 2d at ¶¶33-47. 
No. 99-1319 
 
11
 
2. 
The discharge must clearly contravene the 
public 
welfare 
and 
gravely 
violate 
paramount 
requirements of public interest. 
 
3. 
An employer is liable for wrongful discharge 
if the employer discharges an employee for conduct 
that is "consistent with a clear and compelling public 
policy." 
 
4. 
An employer is not liable for wrongful 
discharge 
merely 
because 
the 
employee's 
conduct 
precipitating the discharge was praiseworthy or the 
public derived some benefit from it. 
Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 42-43 (citing Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 
573-74), reviewed in Strozinsky, 237 Wis. 2d at ¶37 n.10.  The 
situation in Wandry is also the most pertinent to the case at 
hand. 
 
III 
 
¶21 Donna Wandry was an at-will employee at the Bull's Eye 
Credit Union.  She worked as a cashier.  A customer asked her to 
cash a payroll check from a local corporation, and after 
submitting the check to her supervisor for approval, she cashed 
it, giving the customer almost $500.  She did not realize that 
the check was stolen and forged.  The employer later told Wandry 
that she had to reimburse Bull's Eye for the money or she would 
not be bondable and could not work for Bull's Eye.  She refused 
to pay, and Bull's Eye terminated her for that reason.  Wandry, 
129 Wis. 2d at 39-40.  
¶22 Wandry 
sued, 
claiming 
that 
she 
was 
wrongfully 
discharged, 
that 
in 
firing 
her, 
Bull's 
Eye 
violated 
a 
No. 99-1319 
 
12
fundamental and well-defined public policy.  Id. at 40.  She 
cited Wis. Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84) as the source of the 
policy.6  Id. at 43. 
¶23 In holding for Donna Wandry, this court acknowledged 
that Bull's Eye had not violated the letter of the law, but it 
held that Wandry's termination violated "a fundamental and well-
defined public policy proscribing economic coercion by an 
employer upon an employee to bear the burden of a work-related 
loss when the employee has no opportunity to show that the loss 
was not caused by the employee's carelessness, negligence, or 
wilful misconduct."  Id. at 47.  
¶24 The court stated that "[t]he public policy of a 
statute is not limited to the circumstances described in the 
statute.  The public policy of a statute may be invoked in 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84) reads in part: 
 
Deductions for faulty workmanship, loss, theft or 
damage.  No employer shall make any deduction from the 
wages due or earned by any employe, who is not an 
independent 
contractor, 
for 
defective 
or 
faulty 
workmanship, lost or stolen property or damage to 
property, unless the employe authorizes the employer 
in writing to make such deduction or unless the 
employer 
and 
a representative designated 
by the 
employe shall determine that such defective or faulty 
work, loss or theft, or damage is due to worker's 
negligence, carelessness, or wilful and intentional 
conduct on the part of such employe, or unless the 
employe is found guilty or held liable in a court of 
competent jurisdiction by reason thereof.  If any such 
deduction is made or credit taken by any employer, 
that is not in accordance with this section, the 
employer shall be liable for twice the amount of the 
deduction or credit taken in a civil action brought by 
said employe. 
No. 99-1319 
 
13
contexts outside the precise reach of the statute."  Id. at 46-
47.  In Strozinsky, we reiterated "that a discharge can violate 
the spirit, if not the exact letter, of a statutory provision." 
Strozinsky, 237 Wis. 2d at ¶43.  As a result, we do not 
necessarily restrict our inquiry "to the literal language" of 
the statute.  Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 
148, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
 
IV 
 
¶25 In a wrongful discharge case, the question whether an 
employee has established a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy is a question of law.  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574; 
Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 99, 110, 579 N.W.2d 
217 (1998); Kempfer v. Automated Finishing Co., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 
107-08, 564 N.W.2d 692 (1997).  We review this question de novo, 
Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hospital, 168 Wis. 2d 12, 24, 483 
N.W.2d 211 (1992); Strozinsky, 237 Wis. 2d at ¶31, benefiting 
from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals. 
 As noted, the employee has the burden of showing that his or 
her dismissal violated a clear and compelling public policy.  
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574. 
¶26 In Brockmeyer, the court explained that state courts 
had recognized two theories to protect workers from wrongful 
discharge in circumstances not covered by legislation.  "The 
first, and the more expansive of the two theories, is imposing 
upon an employer an implied duty to terminate an employee only 
No. 99-1319 
 
14
in good faith."  Id. at 569.  The court rejected this theory.  
"We refuse to impose a duty to terminate in good faith into 
employment contracts."  Id. 
 
To do so would "subject each discharge to judicial 
incursions into the amorphous concept of bad faith."  
Moreover, we feel it unnecessary and unwarranted for 
the courts to become arbiters of any termination that 
may have a tinge of bad faith attached.  Imposing a 
good faith duty to terminate would unduly restrict an 
employer's discretion in managing the work force. 
Id.7 
¶27 The court then embraced the second theory, "widely 
known as the 'public policy exception.'"  Id.  It cited cases of 
wrongful discharge of an employee for refusing to commit perjury 
before 
a 
legislative 
committee, 
for 
filing 
a 
worker's 
compensation claim, for complying with jury duty, and for 
supplying 
information 
about 
a 
fellow 
employee 
to 
law 
enforcement.  Id. at 569-71.  The court summed up its view of 
public policy, saying that it was "a broad concept embodying the 
community common sense and common conscience."  Id. at 573. 
¶28 This "common sense and common conscience" is displayed 
in the cases in which this court has recognized a fundamental 
and well-defined public policy: Wandry, Winkelman (a nurse's 
                     
7 In Scarpace, this court reviewed the discharge of an 
employee who had sustained non-work related injuries that 
prevented her from working all of her scheduled hours.  The 
court upheld her discharge saying, "Scarpace was terminated for 
legitimate business reasons.  She was unable to work her 
assigned hours.  It is irrelevant whether Sears could have or 
should have acted in better faith when making its termination 
decision."  Scarpace, 113 Wis. 2d at 609-10.  
No. 99-1319 
 
15
continued employment conditioned on the violation of a provision 
in the Wisconsin Administrative Code); Kempfer (trucker fired 
after refusing employer's command to operate vehicle without a 
valid operators' license); Hausman (nursing home employees 
terminated after reporting abuse or neglect as required by 
statute); and Strozinsky (employee harassed for complying with 
tax law).  Each of these cases has a clear, well-defined policy 
in which the public has an interest and each case has compelling 
facts. 
¶29 By contrast, in Brockmeyer, Scarpace, Bushko, Schultz, 
and Tatge, we faced personnel problems or employer-employee 
tensions within the workplace.  In traditional employment 
relations, the fact that a discharged employee has been treated 
unfairly or even with a tinge of bad faith is simply not enough 
to invalidate the employer's decision to discharge for "no 
cause, or even for cause morally wrong."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 
2d at 567.  This is the reality of employment-at-will.  The 
employee does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
until the employee is able to demonstrate that the employer has 
violated a fundamental and well-defined public policy. 
¶30 In this case, the jury found that Mohr was an at-will 
employee.  This means that he could have left Batteries Plus at 
any time for any reason.  Conversely, Batteries Plus was 
entitled to terminate him abruptly without cause.  In this very 
dispute, Batteries Plus required Mohr to pay his own travel 
expenses as of April 1996.  Even if this decision were 
unreasonable, it was well within the company's rights. 
No. 99-1319 
 
16
¶31 Mohr's claim is that he refused to sign a note to pay 
back $11,500 in contested travel expenses from his future wages 
in order to keep his job, and because of that refusal he was 
fired.  He argues that this discharge violated the fundamental 
and 
well-defined 
public 
policy 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.455 
"proscribing economic coercion by an employer upon an employee 
to bear the burden of a work-related loss."  Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d 
at 47.  Wandry quotes Donovan v. Schlesner, 72 Wis. 2d 74, 82, 
240 N.W.2d 135 (1976), in explanation of the policy: "The entire 
purpose of the statute is to preclude any deduction for losses 
until the employee has an opportunity to show his lack of 
fault."  Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 46. 
¶32 This case involves a very different dynamic.  The 
circuit court submitted instructions to the jury that said: 
"Public policy in Wisconsin prohibits the firing of an employee 
for contesting deductions from wages due or earned by the 
employee for an economic loss to the employer."  The court of 
appeals expanded the "well-defined" public policy to "prohibit[] 
an employer from extracting repayment of expenses from employees 
by means of economic duress."  Batteries Plus, 237 Wis. 2d at 
¶1.  "The spirit of the statute is the legislature's intention 
of ensuring that employees do not unfairly bear the employer's 
costs of operating a business."  Id. at ¶17.  "We conclude that 
the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine . . . prohibits 
an employer from using its coercive economic power to shift the 
burden of operating its business to the employee, including the 
No. 99-1319 
 
17
employer's overpayment of travel expenses or wages."  Id. at 
¶18. 
¶33 These formulations of the public policy exception go 
beyond both the facts and the statute.  They would interject 
government agencies and the courts into traditional employment 
relations in a manner inconsistent with employment-at-will.  We 
can foresee situations in which an employer is entitled 
legitimately to use its leverage to recoup money from an 
employee because of the overpayment of wages or expenses, or 
because of an employee's overextension of a monthly draw.  
Requiring an employer to go to court in every situation in which 
an employee disputes the alleged overpayment would undercut the 
employer's position and foster instability in the workplace.  
The employer cannot always be faulted for self-help when it 
attempts to settle a dispute with the employee and, failing 
that, takes action.  The statute does not reach every potential 
deduction by an employer from an employee's wages. 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.455 (1995-96) reads in part: 
 
Deductions for faulty workmanship, loss, theft or 
damage.  No employer shall make any deduction from the 
wages due or earned by any employe, who is not an 
independent 
contractor, 
for 
defective 
or 
faulty 
workmanship, lost or stolen property or damage to 
property, unless the employe authorizes the employer 
in writing to make such deduction or unless the 
employer 
and 
a representative designated 
by the 
employe shall determine that such defective or faulty 
work, loss or theft, or damage is due to worker's 
negligence, carelessness, or wilful and intentional 
conduct on the part of such employe, or unless the 
employe is found guilty or held liable in a court of 
competent jurisdiction by reason thereof.  If any such 
No. 99-1319 
 
18
deduction is made or credit taken by any employer, 
that is not in accordance with this section, the 
employer shall be liable for twice the amount of the 
deduction or credit taken in a civil action brought by 
said employe. 
¶35 The 
statute 
speaks 
of 
"defective 
or 
faulty 
workmanship, lost or stolen property or damage to property."  
The present case does not involve this type of work-related 
loss.  The disagreement about an alleged overpayment of expenses 
is in essence a dispute about compensation, historically a 
flashpoint in employer-employee relations.  If we were to 
repudiate the employer's position on these facts, we would have 
difficulty finding a sensible stopping point in future cases.  
Cf. Tatge v. Chambers & Owens, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 99, 579 N.W.2d 
217 (1998). 
¶36 The statute speaks of prohibiting a deduction from 
wages due or earned unless (1) the employee authorizes the 
employer in writing to make such a deduction; or (2) the 
employee and a representative of the employer determine that the 
"loss" is due to the "worker's negligence, carelessness, or 
wilful and intentional conduct"; or (3) the employee is found 
guilty or held liable in a court of competent jurisdiction.  
Here, Mohr refused to sign anything, as was his right.  He and 
his representative refused to concede anything.  Batteries Plus 
never contended that the overpayment was his fault and, 
naturally, he would not have conceded that it was.  He also 
denied that he owed anything.  Consequently, the only option 
that Batteries Plus had left was to go to court.  The record 
shows that Mohr's attorney told Batteries Plus that it would 
No. 99-1319 
 
19
have to drop that option, or Mohr would consider himself fired.8 
 Because of the jury's verdict, we take as a fact that Batteries 
Plus discharged Mohr.  Undeniably, the discharge came after 
Batteries Plus received his attorney's blunt communication.  A 
discharge under these highly strained circumstances, in which 
the employer is given no option except to sue the employee for 
what the employer believes is an overpayment of expenses, is not 
a wrongful discharge that violates the spirit of Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.455. 
¶37 The statute also provides that if a "deduction is made 
or credit taken" in contradiction of this section, "the employer 
shall be liable for twice the amount of the deduction or 
credit."  Here, the employer did not take the deduction or 
credit, yet when it went to court to recover the alleged 
overpayment, it was assessed damages of $60,000 for wrongful 
                     
8 A June 14, 1996, letter to Batteries Plus from Mohr's 
attorney stated in part:  
 
Clinton Mohr hereby offers to be employed by 
Batteries Plus as a Commercial Sales Specialist as 
follows: 
 
 
1. 
That Batteries Plus agrees not to attempt to 
collect 
or 
assert 
any 
alleged 
overpayments 
of 
commissions and expenses to Clinton Mohr.  General 
Release would be signed by both parties. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
If Batteries Plus does not elect to have Clinton 
Mohr continue to be employed as a Commercial Sales 
Specialist under the above conditions, you are hereby 
notified that Clinton Mohr will consider himself 
fired, effective July 1, 1996. 
No. 99-1319 
 
20
discharge——$37,000 more than it would have been assessed if it 
had explicitly violated the statute. 
¶38 Mohr argues that his discharge is contrary to the 
spirit of the statute, but we find his situation falls outside 
the terms of the statute.  The more a court moves beyond the 
terms of the statute, the more encompassing the "narrow" public 
policy 
exception 
becomes. 
 
"Public 
policy 
considerations 
invariably are vague and beg judicial caution."  Strozinsky, 237 
Wis. 2d at ¶38.  A "discharge must clearly contravene the public 
welfare and gravely violate paramount requirements of public 
interest," Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 43 (citing Brockmeyer, 113 
Wis. 2d at 573-74), before it qualifies as a wrongful discharge 
under established law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
¶39 Our task in this case is to apply the precedent to the 
facts.  We conclude that the Wandry case is good law but that 
this case presents different facts and would extend the spirit 
of the statute beyond Wandry into a fact-intensive dispute about 
compensation.  We conclude that Mohr has not shown a fundamental 
and well-defined public policy that prevented Batteries Plus 
from discharging him under these circumstances.  Accordingly, 
the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 99-1319.ssa 
 
1 
¶40 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
The crux of the present case is that Batteries Plus asserts it 
overpaid Clinton Mohr approximately $11,500, Mohr refused to 
agree to Batteries Plus deducting approximately $11,500 from his 
paychecks, and Mohr asserts that he was then wrongfully 
discharged.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court, based on the jury's finding that Mohr had not 
been overpaid and had indeed been underpaid, as well as 
wrongfully discharged.  I would affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
¶41 As to the wrongful discharge, the court of appeals 
concluded as a matter of law that Mohr identified a fundamental 
and well-defined public policy that Batteries Plus had violated, 
namely, that an employer may not terminate employment when an 
employee refuses to agree to have disputed amounts deducted from 
his or her wages.  I agree with the court of appeals. 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.455 expresses a fundamental and 
well-defined public policy that governs this case.  The court 
has stated that Wis. Stat. § 103.455 proscribes economic 
coercion by an employer upon an employee and ensures that 
employees do not unfairly bear an employer's costs of operating 
No. 99-1319.ssa 
 
2 
a business.9  The public policy is to prohibit an employer from 
using self-help to settle a financial dispute with an employee 
without the consent of the employee or a court order. 
¶43 Everyone agrees that Wis. Stat. § 103.455 does not 
cover the precise fact situation involved in this case.  But 
that conclusion is not determinative of the present case.  This 
court has repeatedly stated that "[t]he public policy of a 
statute is not limited to the circumstances described in the 
statute.  The public policy of a statute may be invoked in 
contexts outside the precise reach of the statute."10  The 
majority opinion acknowledges this oft-stated rule but refuses 
to apply it here. 
¶44 The majority opinion, contrary to the policy embodied 
in Wis. Stat. § 103.455, favors allowing an employer to use its 
economic "leverage" to recoup money from an employee to save the 
                     
9 Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 47, 384 
N.W.2d 325 (1986) (Section 103.455 "articulates a fundamental 
and well-defined public policy proscribing economic coercion by 
an employer upon an employee to bear the burden of a work-
related loss . . ."); Erdman v. Jovoco, Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 736, 
769, 512 N.W.2d 487 (1994) ("The objective of [§ 103.455] is 
violated either by an employer who requires an employe to be 
bound by deductions before any claimed loss or indebtedness 
arises or by an employer who requires an employe to agree to the 
deductions and release all claims as a condition for receiving 
compensation, without giving the employe an opportunity to 
challenge the deductions.").   
10 See Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 46-47; see also Strozinsky v. 
Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶43, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 44, 
614 N.W.2d 443 ("a discharge can violate the spirit, if not the 
exact letter, of a statutory provision"). 
No. 99-1319.ssa 
 
3 
employer the trouble of suing the employee.11  The majority 
opinion thus allows an employer to deduct disputed amounts from 
an employee's paycheck and puts the onus on the employee to sue 
the employer to recover full compensation.  Why is the majority 
opinion willing to shift the burden to employees to sue an 
employer to recover illegitimate wage deductions when the public 
policy embodied in Wis. Stat. § 103.455 is that the employer may 
not deduct disputed amounts from a paycheck? 
¶45 Like the court of appeals, I would affirm the circuit 
court judgment based on the jury verdict in this case, which 
concluded that Batteries Plus's discharge of Clinton Mohr 
violated 
the 
public 
policy 
prohibiting 
an 
employer 
from 
extracting repayment of disputed expenses from an employee by 
means of the economic coercion of the paycheck. 
¶46 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶47 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
 
                     
11 See majority op. at ¶33. 
No. 99-1319.ssa 
 
1