Title: Riddle v. Franklin
Citation: 286 So. 2d 841
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 6, 1973

286 So. 2d 841 (1973)
Jesse RIDDLE
v.
Garmon FRANKLIN et al.
David Wayne RIDDLE
v.
Garmon FRANKLIN et al.
SC 162, SC 163.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 6, 1973.
*842 J. Wm. Thomason, Bessemer, for appellants.
Rives, Peterson, Pettus, Conway &amp; Burge and Edgar M. Elliott, III, Birmingham, for appellees.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Plaintiffs appeal from judgments for defendant in actions for damages for personal injury sustained by one of the plaintiffs when a motorcycle on which he was riding as a passenger collided with an automobile operated by defendant.
The collision occurred at approximately nine o'clock at night in December on Warrior River Road, which is a blacktop road leading to campsites on the river. The injured plaintiff testified at the trial that he was seventeen years old. The motorcycle driver testified that he was sixteen years old. The motorcycle was traveling in an easterly direction.
Defendant was traveling in a westerly direction. She turned left into a driveway on the south side of the road. When she placed her car in reverse to back into the highway the motor stalled. Part of the car remained in the eastbound traffic lane. While the car was stalled the motorcycle ran into the car, and the motorcycle passenger was injured.
The plaintiff in one action is the motorcycle passenger and his father is the plaintiff in the other action. The two actions were consolidated for trial and on the appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that the rulings of the trial court were erroneous in three respects.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in overruling plaintiffs' motion for new trial for that the verdict is contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence.
Plaintiffs argue that the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is that defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. There is evidence that at nine o'clock at night on Warrior River Road, in December, defendant was driving in a westerly direction; that she could see clearly for two or three blocks to the east and two or three blocks to the west; that no traffic was coming from either direction; that her front and rear lights were on; that she turned left into the entrance to a driveway on the south side of the road; that her car stalled and was partially in the eastbound traffic lane; that she attempted to start the car but was not able to do so through no fault on her part; that, while her car was stalled, the motorcycle on which plaintiff was riding came into view from the west traveling at a speed of fifty miles an hour and did not slow down until it hit defendant's car over the right rear wheel; and that there is a posted speed sign indicating a speed limit of forty-five miles per hour for traffic traveling east on Warrior River Road at the point of impact.
*843 This court has said:
In light of the evidence noted above we are not persuaded that there is no evidence to support a finding by the jury that defendant was not guilty of negligence which proximately caused plaintiff's injury, or that the trial court erred in overruling those grounds of the motion for new trial wherein plaintiffs assert that the verdict is not sustained by or is contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence.
Plaintiffs assign as error giving to the jury defendant's requested charge as follows:
The son's complaint contained two counts, (A) charging negligence, and (B) charging wantonness. The father's complaint contained only one count, (A) charging negligence.
Plaintiffs first argue that there is a scintilla of evidence to prove that defendant was guilty of wantonness because plaintiff had pulled across the eastbound lane, was blocking a substantial portion of it, and that the lights on plaintiff's car were not on. The witness, Letson, was the driver of the motorcycle on which the plaintiff, who was injured, was riding. Plaintiffs say that the testimony of Letson furnishes evidence to support an inference that defendant's lights were not on. Defendant says that the testimony of Letson does not provide such evidence. Pertinent testimony of Letson is next set out.
*845 Letson testified unequivocally that he saw taillights and could not see taillights on the car that was coming toward him. He also saw some lights he thought were off the road. The only cars shown to be present were defendant's car and the car coming toward Letson. The only taillights Letson could have seen, according to his testimony, were the taillights on defendant's car. We are of opinion that there is no testimony to support an inference that defendant's lights were not on.
As stated above, at the place where defendant turned, she could see two or three blocks in both directions. There is no testimony that any vehicle was in sight of defendant at the time she made the turn to the left. No evidence is pointed out which shows that defendant was aware of any danger from approaching traffic, or other cause, at the time she made the left turn, or that there was any reason for defendant to anticipate danger arising out of making a left turn at the time and under the circumstances shown by the evidence.
This court has said:
See also: Naugher v. L. &amp; N. R. Co., 206 Ala. 515, 91 So. 254; Smith v. Roland, 243 Ala. 400, 10 So. 2d 367; and Johnson v. McNear, 255 Ala. 457, 52 So. 2d 154.
Under the authorities cited, the evidence fails to show wantonness on the part of defendant.
Plaintiffs' second argument is that giving charge 17 prejudiced plaintiffs because there was a Count B in the complaint filed by the son but there was only one count, Count A, in the father's complaint. It is correct that the father's complaint contained only one count; i. e., Count A, which charges defendant with negligence. The son's complaint contained two counts; i. e., Count A charging defendant with negligence and Count B charging defendant with wantonness.
Plaintiffs state in brief:
Plaintiffs argue further to the effect that plaintiffs were prejudiced by charge 17 because, in charging with respect to contributory negligence of the son, the court, in oral charge, had previously stated to the jury: "... if the son is prohibited from recovery the father is prohibited from recovery."
Prior to the last statement quoted from the oral charge, the trial court, in the oral charge, had instructed the jury as follows:
We are of opinion that the court did not err in giving defendant's charge 17.
Plaintiffs assign as error the action of the trial court in sustaining defendant's objection to certain questions propounded by plaintiffs to certain witnesses.
Two questions were propounded by plaintiffs to the defendant on cross examination as follows:
No evidence was produced to qualify defendant as an expert in the operation of an automobile, or that she had gained by experience an acquaintance with the subject, a knowledge not common to others. Even if other reasons be pretermitted, objections to the questions propounded to defendant were sustained without error for the absence of evidence qualifying her as an expert on procedure for operating an automobile.
Plaintiffs assign as error the action of the court in sustaining objection to three questions propounded by plaintiffs to Garmon Franklin, husband of defendant, on cross examination. He is a defendant in the cases, but the affirmative charge in his favor was given by the trial court. No exception to this ruling is taken by plaintiffs. The testimony given by this witness is summarized by plaintiffs in their brief as follows:
The three questions appear in the pertinent testimony of the witness on cross examination as set out below and are identified by the numbers (1), (2), and (3) which precede the respective questions, to wit:
(1) "Q What's the safest way, Mr. Franklin, to turn an automobile around?
(2) "Q (By Mr. Thomason) Do you know the recommended way to turn an automobile around?
(3) "Q (By Mr. Thomason) Do you know, in the publication the State Department puts out to turn automobiles around they recommend ways to turn one around?
Plaintiffs argue that a party to a suit who has been a policeman for twelve years and has the experience shown by the testimony of the witness should be required to testify as to the safest course of conduct available to a person turning a car around to go in the opposite direction. Plaintiffs say that the witness is shown to be qualified to answer and that the court abused its discretion in the rulings complained of.
*848 The three questions clearly call for an opinion of the witness based on his expert knowledge. This court has said:
None of the three questions here contains any suggestion of facts as to surrounding circumstances on which the opinion called for is to be based. The questions as asked hypothecate no facts but call for a naked abstract or theoretical conclusion unclothed with any circumstance related to the issues in the case.
The charge against defendant is that she was guilty of negligent or wanton conduct in operating the automobile. The facts showing the circumstances of the collision are in evidence. The determination of the issues must rest on the circumstances shown by the evidence. Conduct which is safe or is the exercise of reasonable care under some circumstances may not be safe or the exercise of reasonable care under different circumstances. In a case where plaintiff was riding a motorcycle which collided with an automobile driven by defendant, the Court of Appeals said:
The language quoted from Lessman is taken from the second paragraph of the opinion of this court in Matson v. Maupin &amp; Co., 75 Ala. 312.
If it be assumed arguendo that the witness was qualified to express an expert opinion on the manner in which an automobile may safely be operated, and if other objections to which the questions asked may be subject are not considered, the objections to the questions were properly sustained for the omission of facts on which the opinion of the witness is to be based.
Questions (2) and (3) are subject to the further objections of vagueness and uncertainty as to the meaning of "recommended way" and "the publication of the State Department" on which the opinion of the witness is to be based.
Affirmed.
HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, McCALL, and JONES, JJ., concur.