Title: Commonwealth v. Teixeira
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13007
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 2022

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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13007 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BAMPUMIM TEIXEIRA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 12, 2022. - October 20, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, 
Instructions to jury, Request for jury instructions, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 28, 2017. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Bampumim Teixeira, was 
convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, and felony-murder for the deaths of two 
anesthesiologists, Drs. Lina Bolanos and Richard Field.  The 
2 
 
victims, who were engaged to be married, were found in their 
Boston penthouse having been stabbed, Bolanos with twenty-four 
sharp force injuries to the neck, two of which severed her 
jugular veins, and Field with one stab wound to the neck that 
nearly severed his carotid artery.  The defendant, who had 
previously worked as a concierge in their building, was 
discovered by police at the scene.  He contended that he and 
Bolanos were having an affair, that the victims' engagement was 
a sham with Bolanos remaining in the relationship solely for 
financial reasons, that Field killed Bolanos, and that the 
defendant killed Field in self-defense. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the prosecutor 
improperly appealed to the emotions of the jury during closing 
argument, that the defendant's requested changes to the model 
jury instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty should have been 
allowed, that the trial judge should have instructed the jury 
that specific unanimity is required for the evidentiary factors 
relevant to extreme atrocity or cruelty, and that we should 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
defendant's convictions or grant a new trial.  We affirm the 
convictions and discern no reason to grant relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts are 
supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
3 
 
At the time of the killings, the victims were an engaged 
couple living in a penthouse unit on the eleventh floor of a 
condominium building in the South Boston section of Boston.  
They were both anesthesiologists; Bolanos practiced pediatric 
anesthesiology at Massachusetts Eye and Ear Hospital, and Field 
owned a pain management clinic. 
In March 2016, about thirteen months before the killings, 
the defendant began working as a concierge in the building.  
During his three-month employment at the building, he was 
trained on several of its unique policies and structural 
features.  For example, he learned that contractors working on 
the premises were required to leave the building by 4 P.M., and 
that although a key fob was required to access the residential 
floors from the elevator, the elevator would ascend from the 
parking garage with someone in it if it was called by a person 
on a higher floor.  In addition, he learned how to access the 
building's stairwells and which stairwell reached the eleventh 
floor, where the victims lived.  His training also included the 
monitoring of surveillance cameras, and he knew that security 
tours of the building were conducted at 4:30 or 5 P.M. 
On the day of the killings, the "runner"1 on duty for the 
building observed a man, presumably the defendant, wearing 
 
1 The lead concierge for the building explained that "the 
runner's position was to support the concierge staff -- help 
4 
 
glasses, a bright green reflective vest, black jeans, and a 
hoodie, and carrying a backpack, attempt to open the building's 
locked front door at around 2:40 P.M.  The runner walked to the 
front door to assist the man, but when he reached the door, he 
saw that the man had walked away and had turned toward the rear 
of the building.  Later in the afternoon, when the runner moved 
his car into the building's parking garage, he saw the same man, 
standing outside by the left side of the garage door.2  Video 
footage from a security camera showed the man following a car 
into the garage on foot at 3:47 P.M.3  Video footage from a 
surveillance camera in the lobby showed a carpenter who had been 
working in the victims' residence on the day of the killings 
leaving the building at 4 P.M. 
Bolanos returned home at 4:50 P.M.; she picked up a few 
packages from the concierge desk.  Between 5:19 P.M. and 6:10 
P.M., she received, but did not read, text messages from Field 
 
with packages, deliveries –- so that someone was at the desk all 
the time." 
 
2 The man was also shown wearing a green, fluorescent shirt 
and carrying a drawstring backpack between 2:30 P.M. and 3:47 
P.M. on footage captured by the security cameras installed on a 
garage across the street, and at 3:08 P.M. on footage captured 
by the apartment building's security cameras. 
 
3 Video footage from a camera inside the garage also 
captured the car and the man. 
5 
 
and others.  Field called Bolanos at 6:31 P.M., but she did not 
answer. 
Field arrived home at 6:38 P.M.  Between 7:05 P.M. and 7:09 
P.M., six calls to 911 were placed from his cell phone, one 
lasting four seconds and the others lasting zero seconds.  His 
cell phone received two unanswered callbacks from 911 after the 
fifth and sixth outgoing calls.  At 7:41 P.M., an almost three-
minute call to 911 was placed from Field's cell phone.  Three 
people were recorded on the call:  Field, Bolanos, and an 
unknown person.  After another unanswered callback from 911 at 
7:44 P.M., a one-second call was placed to 911 from Field's cell 
phone at 7:45 P.M. 
At 7:46 P.M., a series of text messages was sent from 
Field's cell phone to a friend, reading:  "Call 111," "Gun man," 
"In house," "Pls," "Nw," "Eriou," "Erious," and "Serious."  The 
friend did not see the messages until around 8:15 P.M.  The 
friend sent a text message to Field but did not receive a 
response.  The friend's girlfriend then called the concierge 
desk of the victims' building, prompting a concierge to call 
Field and Bolanos, who did not answer; the concierge then called 
the police. 
Five officers arrived at the building around 8:45 P.M. and 
took the elevator to the eleventh floor.  They saw through the 
frosted glass door of the victims' residence that it was dark.  
6 
 
They observed two packages on the floor of the hallway.  A set 
of keys also lay on the floor a few feet away from the door; 
using the keys, one officer unlocked the door and entered the 
unit with his gun drawn, after knocking and announcing himself 
as a police officer several times. 
The officer saw the defendant in silhouette at the end of a 
corridor and yelled to him to get on the ground.  Instead, the 
defendant held his hands outstretched and together as though he 
were holding a firearm.  The officers yelled at the defendant to 
drop the gun.  When an officer moved to gain cover in the 
kitchen area, the defendant turned towards the officer, and the 
officer fired his firearm.  The defendant attempted to escape 
from the unit, fleeing toward the elevator while pointing his 
outstretched arms at the officers.  Taking cover, officers 
discharged their weapons at the defendant. 
The defendant was shot twice but continued toward the 
elevator on his knees, shouting for police to shoot him.  
Officers knocked him to the floor and handcuffed him.  As they 
did so, the defendant smiled and said, "There's dead bodies."  
He told the officers that there was a sniper and that they were 
"going to die."  The defendant also said, "They killed my wife."  
He asked the police to "[j]ust kill me."  The defendant was 
wearing dark clothing and gloves. 
7 
 
After subduing the defendant, the officers, by then joined 
by officers from a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team, 
found the deceased victims inside the unit:  Field on the floor 
near the main bedroom, and Bolanos on the floor of the second 
bedroom.  Both victims were covered in household cleaning 
solutions and had their hands cuffed behind their backs. 
Bolanos's pants were open, unzipped, and pulled down, and 
both sides of her underwear were cut.  She had duct tape in her 
hair, and broken pieces of her necklace were in her hair and on 
her neck.  Her engagement ring was on her left ring finger with 
the stone turned in facing her palm.  Her jacket and blouse were 
discovered in the main bedroom closet, stuck together with duct 
tape.  The blouse was missing buttons, which were found in the 
kitchen and hallway. 
Bolanos had twenty-four sharp force injuries to the neck, 
two of which severed her jugular veins, three of which hit her 
vertebrae, and all of which contributed to her death.  She also 
suffered hemorrhages in her scalp and bruises on various parts 
of her body, including her left eye, her forehead, her right 
breast, both wrists, both legs, and the fingers of her right 
hand. 
Field had one stab wound to the neck and small abrasions to 
his right ear and around his mouth and nose.  His carotid artery 
was cut nearly in half, and he had swallowed one hundred 
8 
 
milliliters of blood.  The medical examiner determined that he 
likely died within a few minutes of the stab wound, after 
suffocating on his own blood.  He also had a bruise on his wrist 
and an abrasion on his right knee, and one pant leg was cut or 
torn off and had duct tape stuck to it. 
Officers discovered a backpack near the front door that 
contained jewelry and the missing portion of Field's pant leg.  
In the hallway outside the unit, they found boots, a baseball 
hat, a knit hat, a blood-stained yellow shirt with reflective 
material on the front and back, a large knife, and a black 
drawstring backpack containing a rubber mask, clumps of hair, 
duct tape with hair stuck on it, a folding knife, wire cutters, 
a satin sleep mask, a fake beard, scissors, a black BB gun, and 
bank cards in both victims' names.  Field's blood was on the 
large knife, and medical examiners concluded that the blood on 
the yellow shirt was likely from the victims.  The rubber mask 
had blood on both sides; Field was identified as "the possible 
major contributor to that mixture."  The sleep mask, wire 
cutters, and folding knife each had blood from one or both 
victims. 
In the kitchen, officers found a second large knife on the 
counter next to a reddish-brown stain, hair, and a wallet 
containing Bolanos's driver's license and credit cards.  
Bolanos's blood was on the knife.  Written on the wall of the 
9 
 
apartment in marker was the statement, "He killed my wife."  A 
large "X" was drawn through a photograph of Field that was 
hanging on the wall. 
The defendant was transported to the hospital to receive 
treatment for his gunshot wounds.  He refused to tell the 
emergency medical services responders his name, address, or date 
of birth. 
The following morning, the defendant was questioned at the 
hospital by two Boston police detectives.4  After reading the 
defendant his Miranda rights, the officers questioned the 
defendant for almost ninety minutes; the interview was recorded, 
and a redacted version of the recording was played for the jury.  
The defendant told the officers that he gained access to the 
building by following a car into the garage on foot, entering 
the elevator, and waiting until someone on an upper level 
summoned the elevator.  Once on an upper level, he used the 
stairs to reach the penthouse.  The defendant said that he had 
met Bolanos about a year earlier while he was the building's 
concierge, and that they had had a months-long affair.  He said 
 
4 The defendant's nurse determined that it was medically 
acceptable for the defendant to talk with officers because he 
was awake and alert, and because she had been communicating with 
him.  The defendant was receiving twenty-five micrograms per 
hour of fentanyl for pain. 
10 
 
that Bolanos had advised him to sneak into the building 
discreetly any time that he wanted to talk with her. 
The defendant told officers that, on the day of the 
killings, he was in the penthouse for about two to three hours.  
He said that Bolanos told him that Field was busy that evening, 
that they would have four or five hours together, that Field 
used to beat her, and that the engagement was sham, but she was 
staying with Field for financial reasons. 
The defendant said that when Field returned and saw the 
defendant and Bolanos talking or kissing, Field became enraged, 
punched her in the eyes, grabbed two knives, and continued to 
beat her.  According to the defendant, Field said that he was 
going to kill both the defendant and Bolanos, and then pointed a 
gun at them.  The defendant said that Field handcuffed Bolanos, 
and as she begged him not to hurt her, Field said, "You got no 
idea who I am," and stabbed her repeatedly.  The defendant said 
that he tried to help Bolanos, but Field swung a knife at him.  
Then Field covered Bolanos "with all kind of things," "white 
stuff and things like that," from the bathroom. 
The defendant stated that he managed to lock himself inside 
the bathroom.  The defendant heard running water, and Field said 
from the other side of the bathroom door that he was going to 
drown the defendant.  According to the defendant, Field found 
the bathroom key and opened the door; Field was carrying the gun 
11 
 
and a small knife.  A struggle ensued, and the defendant grabbed 
Field and swung his head into a wall; Field dropped the gun, and 
the defendant kicked it away.  The defendant grabbed the knife, 
held it to Field's throat, and then handcuffed Field with 
Field's second pair of handcuffs.  The defendant stated that, 
though handcuffed, Field nonetheless managed to kick the 
defendant to the ground and attack him.  Enraged, the defendant 
stabbed Field, which the defendant said was in self-defense. 
Afterwards, the defendant saw "a lot of jewelry"; he said 
to himself, "[T]hese two is [sic] dead let me have some myself"; 
and he put the jewelry in his backpack.  The defendant told 
officers that he realized that Field had covered Bolanos's body 
with substances from the bathroom to "get away with . . . 
murder."  Thinking that Field was "a smart dude," and because 
when someone kills, "you have to do the same thing to them" -- 
an "eye for an eye" -- the defendant covered Field's body with 
the same substances. 
According to the defendant, he did not open the penthouse 
door when the officers knocked because he knew he needed to 
think of an explanation for what had happened.  During the 
interview, he also told officers that he did not recall saying 
anything to the arresting officers about someone killing his 
"wife," and that he was unaware of the statement "He killed my 
12 
 
wife" written on the penthouse wall, but that he did tell them, 
"Kill me now." 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted in 
June 2017 on two counts of murder in the first degree in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; one count of home invasion in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 18C; two counts of kidnapping in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 26; and two counts of armed robbery 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17.  The defense at trial was 
that the defendant was having a "real or imagined" affair with 
Bolanos, that Field killed Bolanos, and that the defendant 
subsequently killed Field in self-defense. 
Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on 
all counts.  As to the two counts of murder in the first degree, 
the jury found the defendant guilty on all three theories:  
deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
felony-murder.  The defendant was given two consecutive life 
sentences for the two counts of murder in the first degree.5  The 
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
5 On the single count of home invasion, the defendant was 
sentenced to from twenty years to twenty years and a day, 
concurrent with his first life sentence.  On the two counts of 
kidnapping, he was sentenced to from nine years to ten years, 
consecutive with the home invasion sentence.  On the two counts 
of armed robbery, he was sentenced to from twenty-five years to 
twenty-five years and a day, concurrent with the kidnapping 
sentence. 
13 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant maintains that 
the prosecutor improperly appealed to the emotions of the jury 
during closing argument, that the defendant's requested 
modifications to the model jury instruction on extreme atrocity 
or cruelty should have been allowed, that the trial judge should 
have instructed the jury that specific unanimity is required for 
the evidentiary factors relevant to extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
and that we should exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce the defendant's convictions or grant a new 
trial.  We address each argument in turn. 
a.  Appeal to jury's sympathy.  The defendant first argues 
that during closing argument, the prosecutor improperly appealed 
to the emotions of the jury by stating that the victims are 
"[n]ow engaged for eternity" and "Lina [Bolanos] will forever be 
Richard[ Field]'s fiancée but never his bride."  The 
Commonwealth contends that the statement was proper for three 
reasons:  first, because it was relevant to "the consciousness 
and degree of suffering of the deceased," which was one factor 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty at the time of the trial, see 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 56 (2018); second, because 
it was in response to the defendant's claim in defense that the 
victims were in an abusive relationship and a sham engagement; 
and third, because it permissibly humanized the victims. 
14 
 
Because the defendant did not object at trial, we review to 
determine whether the statement was error, and if so, whether it 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Huang, 489 Mass. 162, 181 (2022).  "In 
determining whether an argument was improper we examine the 
remarks in the context of the entire argument, and in light of 
the judge's instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial" 
(quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 
199 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 273 
(2005).  It is well settled that a prosecutor may not appeal to 
the jury's sympathy.  Commonwealth v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 444-
445 (2009).  Neither may a prosecutor emphasize "personal 
characteristics [that] are not relevant to any material issue," 
if such emphasis would "risk[] undermining the rationality and 
thus the integrity of the jury's verdict."  Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 791 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 
831 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 495 
(1997).  A prosecutor may, however, "tell the jury something of 
the person whose life had been lost in order to humanize the 
proceedings," Fernandes, supra, quoting Santiago, supra, and 
"respond to the defendant's closing argument," Commonwealth v. 
Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 130 (2021). 
The defense was grounded on the theory that the engagement 
was a sham.  In these circumstances, the statement to which the 
15 
 
defendant now objects was a permissible -- if hyperbolic -- 
response to the defense.  See Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 
455, 472 (2022), quoting Henley, 488 Mass. at 131-132 ("where a 
prosecutor's language is 'based in fact' and tracks the 'odious 
. . . nature of the crime[] committed,' emotive language in a 
prosecutor's closing argument is permissible as merely 
'enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable 
hyperbole'"); Henley, supra at 130.  Significantly, in closing 
argument, defense counsel contended that any inconsistencies in 
the defendant's statement to police in the aftermath of the 
killings were the result of his injuries and the pain 
medications he had been prescribed following his surgery.  
Responding, the prosecutor referred to the evidence of the 
writing on the victims' residence's walls that "He killed my 
wife," which inferably was written by the defendant at a time 
when the defendant was not injured or under the influence of 
pain medication.  The challenged statement contrasted the 
couple's engagement and Bolanos's status as Field's fiancée with 
the statement written by the defendant on the penthouse wall, 
referring inferably to Bolanos as the defendant's "wife."  Thus, 
the prosecutor's statement, which was made once at the beginning 
of the closing argument, immediately following the defendant's 
closing, was not improper and was responsive to the defense. 
16 
 
Moreover, the challenged statement, together with the 
prosecutor's brief description of the victims' ages, "their 
. . . careers ahead of them in the areas of pain management and 
pediatric anesthesiology," and their lost future, "t[old] the 
jury something of the person[s] whose li[ves] had been lost in 
order to humanize the proceedings," Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 791, 
quoting Santiago, 425 Mass. at 495.  Accordingly, the brief 
statement was not improper. 
b.  Jury instructions on extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The 
defendant next contends that the trial judge erred by giving the 
instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty as set forth in the 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (2018) and declining to 
adopt the defendant's proposed changes to the instruction. 
Because the jury also convicted the defendant based on the 
theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, and no 
errors are presented as to those theories, the defendant's 
convictions would stand regardless of whether his arguments 
concerning his convictions on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty prevailed.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 
135 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 270 
n.5 (1994) (declining to address defendant's contentions 
regarding theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty because jury 
also convicted defendant based on theory of deliberate 
premeditation); Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 220 
17 
 
(2007), citing Chipman, supra ("If a jury return[ed] a guilty 
verdict based on two theories, the verdict will remain 
undisturbed even if only one theory is sustained on appeal").  
Nevertheless, because the issues are fully briefed, we address 
the defendant's arguments in connection with our review pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
The defendant preserved these issues with timely 
objections; accordingly, we review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  "This requires 
a two-part analysis:  (1) was there error; and (2) if so, was 
that error prejudicial."  Id.  "An error is not prejudicial if 
it did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect; 
however, if we cannot find with fair assurance, after pondering 
all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from 
the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, then it is prejudicial" (quotations omitted).  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
"A trial judge has the duty to state the applicable law 
clearly and correctly," Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 670 
(2014), citing Commonwealth v. Corcione, 364 Mass. 611, 618 
(1974), but "is not required to grant a particular instruction 
so long as the charge, as a whole, adequately covers the issue," 
Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 154 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 739 (1992).  "In assessing 
18 
 
the sufficiency of the jury instructions, we consider the charge 
in its entirety, to determine the 'probable impact, appraised 
realistically . . . upon the jury's factfinding function.'"  
Wall, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Batchelder, 407 Mass. 752, 
759 (1990). 
At the time of the defendant's trial, the model 
instructions on extreme atrocity or cruelty listed seven factors 
for jurors to consider, as articulated in Commonwealth v. 
Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  See Model Jury Instructions 
on Homicide 54-57 (2018).  Here, the trial judge properly 
instructed the jury with the model instructions that were in 
effect at the time of the trial.  See Commonwealth v. Bonner, 
489 Mass. 268, 285 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 
Mass. 52, 61 (2018) ("we have urged trial judges to adhere to 
the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, and to 'proceed with 
caution' when not doing so"). 
After the defendant's trial, we modified the Cunneen 
factors and issued a revised model instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-866 (2020).  We 
expressly held, however, that the revisions were "to be applied 
only in murder trials that commence after the date of issuance 
of this opinion."  Id. at 866.  Indeed, we declined to apply the 
revised instructions even to the defendant in Castillo.  See id. 
19 
 
("we do not apply [the Castillo factors] retroactively even 
here"). 
Moreover, the defendant's first suggested modification to 
the model instruction concerned restating that the Commonwealth 
has the burden of proof as to extreme atrocity or cruelty.6  Yet, 
the defendant is not entitled to instructions that repeat the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof at every turn.7  See Commonwealth 
v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 489 (2017). 
 
6 The defendant asked the judge to insert "To prove this 
element, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt" 
before the model jury instruction's first sentence, "that the 
defendant caused the person's death by a method that surpassed 
the cruelty inherent in any taking of a human life," and to 
insert that "the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant intended to commit an extremely 
atrocious or cruel death" after the subsequent two sentences 
that the defendant asked the judge to delete, see infra. 
 
7 For this same reason, we reject the defendant's argument 
that the jury should have been instructed specifically that the 
Commonwealth prove at least one Cunneen factor beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 55-57 
(2018) provide: 
 
"In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the 
deceased with extreme atrocity or cruelty, you must 
consider the following factors . . . .  You cannot make a 
finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty unless it is based 
on one or more of the factors I have just listed." 
 
In Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 651 (2002), we 
concluded that, where a judge told the jury that the jury "must" 
consider the Cunneen factors and stressed multiple times in the 
jury instructions that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, "a reasonable juror would have 
understood that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving at 
20 
 
The defendant's next proposed change, which would instruct 
the jury that the Commonwealth was required to prove that "the 
defendant caused the person's death by a method that 
substantially surpassed the cruelty inherent in any taking of 
human life," misstates the law, which did not at the time of 
trial, and does not presently, require the method of killing to 
"substantially" surpass the inherent cruelty in taking a human 
life.  See Castillo, 485 Mass. at 869 n.2 (Appendix), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 437 (2003) ("judge 
correctly impressed on the jury that '[e]xtreme cruelty means 
that the defendant caused the person's death by a method that 
surpassed the cruelty inherent in any taking of human life'"); 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 55 (2018). 
The defendant's next suggested change would delete two 
sentences from the model jury instruction:  "You must determine 
if the method or mode of killing is so shocking as to amount to 
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty"; and "The inquiry 
focuses on the defendant's actions in terms of the manner and 
means of inflicting death, and the resulting effect on the 
victim."  In their place, the defendant suggested: 
"Further the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant intended to commit an extremely 
atrocious or cruel death.  That is, [(1)] he intended to 
inflict extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering, 
 
least one of the Cunneen factors beyond a reasonable doubt."  
The same is true here. 
21 
 
or torture on the victim; or (2) the defendant was callous 
or indifferent to the extreme physical o[r] psychological 
pain, suffering or torture that this intentional conduct 
inflicted on the victim." 
 
The defendant contends that the revised language would "refocus 
the issue as being whether the defendant had the intent to 
commit an extremely atrocious or cruel murder."  Notably, we 
considered and rejected the language urged by the defendant –- 
namely, that the defendant "intended to commit" an extremely 
atrocious or cruel murder.  See Castillo, 485 Mass. at 864-865, 
quoting Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227 ("proof of malice aforethought 
is the only requisite mental intent for a conviction of murder 
in the first degree based on murder committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty").  See also Commonwealth v. Sun, 490 Mass. 
196, 206 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 
165 (2021) ("A defendant need not intend 'to commit the murder 
in an extremely atrocious or cruel way'"). 
The defendant also suggested the elimination of the second 
Cunneen factor ("the consciousness and degree of suffering of 
the deceased").  In Castillo, 485 Mass. at 864, we concluded 
that although the "consciousness and degree of suffering of the 
victim," if "divorced from the egregiousness of the defendant's 
conduct," could not, by itself, support a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, "[a] victim's substantial degree of 
conscious suffering may support a finding of extreme atrocity or 
22 
 
cruelty where it is the reasonably likely consequence of the 
defendant's actions."  Here, the evidence of the victims' 
conscious suffering was not "divorced from the egregiousness of 
the defendant's conduct."  Id.  Rather, it was the direct and 
inescapable result of that conduct.  Therefore, the inclusion of 
this factor in the instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty 
was not error.8,9 
Finally, as to the defendant's request to instruct that the 
jury "must consider [the Cunneen] factors not in terms of the 
relative numbers of the factors, but in terms of their 
respective substantiality and persuasiveness," even the revised 
 
8 Regardless, we are confident that the inclusion of the 
second factor had very "slight effect."  Cruz, 445 Mass. at 591.  
There was abundant evidence on the other six Cunneen factors, 
for example, the stab wounds that hit Bolanos's vertebrae and 
severed both victims' veins and arteries (relevant to the 
"extent of physical injuries," Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227); the 
twenty-four stab wounds on Bolanos's neck and multiple 
contusions and abrasions on both victims (the "number of blows" 
and "manner and force with which delivered," id.); the large 
knife (the "instrument employed," id.); and the evidence that 
both victims' hands were bound  and that each was stabbed 
multiple times with great force (evidencing the "disproportion 
between the means needed to cause death and those employed," 
id.). 
 
9 As to the suggested elimination of the other Cunneen 
factors that the defendant requested at trial, the third factor 
("the extent of the injuries to the deceased"), the fourth 
factor ("the number of blows delivered"), the fifth factor ("the 
manner, degree, and severity of the force used"), and the 
seventh factor (the disproportion between the means needed to 
cause death and those employed) were retained in the revised 
model instructions.  Castillo, 485 Mass. at 869-870 (Appendix). 
23 
 
factors do not require this instruction.  See Castillo, 485 
Mass. at 869-870 (Appendix). 
c.  Specific unanimity on evidentiary factors.  The 
defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his request for 
an instruction that specifies that unanimity is required as to 
at least one of the Cunneen factors in order for the jury to 
convict the defendant of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  As the defendant 
acknowledges, however, we have already considered this same 
argument and concluded that a defendant is not entitled to a 
specific unanimity instruction on the Cunneen factors.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 407 (2009), S.C., 
467 Mass. 96, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 933 (2014) ("The jury need 
not unanimously agree on which of the Cunneen factors they have 
found in order to convict a defendant of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty . . ."); 
Commonwealth v. Obershaw, 435 Mass. 794, 809 (2002). 
We reaffirmed this holding in Castillo, concluding that 
"the jury did not need to be unanimous as to the particular 
Cunneen factor or factors they found"; rather, "it suffices that 
each individual juror found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the 
Cunneen factors."  Castillo, 485 Mass. at 859, citing Obershaw, 
435 Mass. at 809.  We reasoned that, because "the Cunneen 
factors are not elements of the crime or separate theories of 
24 
 
culpability," but rather are simply "'evidentiary 
considerations' that guide the jury's determination as to 
whether the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
the element of a killing with extreme atrocity or cruelty," the 
jury did not need to be unanimous as to a particular Cunneen 
factor.  Castillo, supra, quoting Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 197-
198.  We see no reason to disturb this conclusion. 
d.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After review of the 
entire record, we discern no error warranting relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
Judgments affirmed.