Title: In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of W.W.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 2021

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of W.W. Annotate this Case SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of W.W. (A-63-19) (083890)Argued November 9, 2020 -- Decided March 11, 2021FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the State must present testimony from a psychiatrist in support of the need for continued involuntary commitment of a convicted sexually violent offender at an annual review hearing under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. W.W. was civilly committed after pleading guilty to the sexual assault of a five- year-old girl. At his annual review hearing for 2019, the State presented expert testimony from psychiatrist Dr. Marta Scott and psychologist Dr. Jamie Canataro. The State’s two experts presented conflicting opinions on W.W.’s risk of reoffending and whether he should remain committed. Dr. Scott recommended conditional discharge, while Dr. Canataro concluded further commitment was appropriate. The trial court ordered the continued commitment of W.W. The court concluded that neither the State nor the court was bound by the testimony of the State’s psychiatrist, and it credited Dr. Canataro’s testimony over Dr. Scott’s. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court granted W.W.’s petition for certification. 241 N.J. 468 (2020).HELD: The plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires the State to produce psychiatric testimony in support of commitment when the State seeks the initial or continued commitment of a sexually violent predator. The State therefore did not meet its burden in this case by producing a psychiatrist who did not support commitment.1. A person who has been committed under the SVPA is entitled to an annual review hearing of the need for involuntary commitment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires that “[a] psychiatrist on the person’s treatment team . . . shall testify at the hearing to the clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment.” That provision is identical to its corollary in the general civil commitment statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13(b), and is also substantially similar to the court rule governing civil commitment of adults, R. 4:74-7(e). The Appellate Division has determined that both N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13 and Rule 4:74-7(e) require that a psychiatrist on the patient’s treatment team testify at the hearing, and provide medical testimony supporting the need for commitment. (pp. 15-17) 1 2. Because the SVPA does not define the phrase “to the clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment,” the Court interprets that language according to its generally accepted meaning. The Court reviews the definitions of “basis” and “need” and notes that the statute’s express focus on testimony by a psychiatrist, who holds a medical degree, cannot be interpreted to encompass testimony by a psychologist, who does not. The Legislature has distinguished between psychiatric and psychological experts in the Rules of Evidence. And when it intends that the evaluation of either a psychiatrist or psychologist suffice for a particular purpose, it has said so explicitly. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4- 5. The clear language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) indicates that a psychiatrist must testify to those underlying facts that require involuntary commitment of the individual. It is not enough that a psychiatrist testifies -- even if that testimony is against involuntary commitment -- and that someone else testifies to the need for commitment. (pp. 17-19)3. The Legislature deliberately modeled the SVPA’s commitment procedures after the general civil commitment statute. Five years before the enactment of the SVPA, the Appellate Division held that the language “to the clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment to treatment” in the civil commitment statute requires the psychiatrist’s testimony to be in support of commitment. See In re Commitment of Raymond S., 263 N.J. Super. 428, 432 (App. Div. 1993). The Court presumes that, as it crafted the SVPA, the Legislature was aware that the courts had interpreted the general civil commitment statute to require psychiatric testimony in support of commitment. The Legislature nevertheless used the exact same phrasing in the SVPA, without a corrective definition, thus reflecting legislative intent to require psychiatric testimony in support of commitment under the SVPA as well. (pp. 19-21)4. The SVPA itself maintains an important and consistent burden on the State, requiring psychiatric testimony in support of commitment at each stage in the proceedings. To initiate commitment proceedings under the SVPA, the State must present at least one clinical certificate prepared by a psychiatrist in support of commitment. N.J.S.A. 30:4- 27.2(b), -27.28(c). The SVPA further requires the State to produce psychiatric testimony at both the initial commitment hearing and at each review hearing. When viewing the statute as a whole, it would be discordant to demand more from the certifications required to commence a hearing than from the testimony provided at the hearings. (p. 21)5. Because of the passage of time between the trial court’s decision and the issuance of this opinion, the Court affords the State an opportunity to provide a psychiatrist in support of commitment in a new review hearing. Pending the court’s determination after that rehearing, W.W. shall remain committed under the SVPA. (p. 22) REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 63 September Term 2019 083890 In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of W.W., SVP-86-00. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided November 9, 2020 March 11, 2021 Susan Remis Silver, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant W.W. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Susan Remis Silver, on the briefs). Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Stephen Slocum, on the brief). Tess Borden argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Tess Borden, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 The New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38, requires an annual review hearing to assess the continuingneed for the involuntary commitment of a convicted sexually violent offender.The statute directs that a psychiatrist “shall testify at the hearing to the clinicalbasis for the need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b). The issue in this appeal is whether the State mustpresent such testimony in order to support commitment, or whether the Statecan nevertheless meet its burden to show the need for continued commitmentdespite producing a psychiatrist who does not support commitment. Here, the State produced a psychiatrist who recommended conditionaldischarge rather than commitment. Based on testimony by the State’s otherexpert, a psychologist, the trial court ordered the continued commitment ofW.W. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial court was notrequired to accept the psychiatrist’s opinion because commitment decisions arelegal ones, not medical ones. We disagree with the Appellate Division’s findings. We conclude thatthe plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires the State to producepsychiatric testimony in support of commitment, and such a reading issupported by the legislative history and statutory scheme of the SVPA. 2 Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division andremand for a rehearing. I. A. We begin by summarizing the pertinent facts and procedural history.In 1994, W.W. was arrested and charged with sexual assault and aggravatedsexual assault for events that occurred over a period of four months in 1993.W.W. admitted to sexually assaulting a five-year-old girl who lived at hismother’s house, touching her breasts and vaginal area, performing cunnilinguson her, and masturbating in his pants. W.W. pled guilty to sexual assault and was sentenced to seven years ’imprisonment. An evaluation found that W.W. met the requirements of theNew Jersey Sex Offender Act, and that he was eligible for treatment at theAdult and Diagnostic Treatment Center, where he served five years of hisseven-year sentence. On May 30, 2000, the State petitioned to civilly commit W.W. under theSVPA. On October 27, 2000, W.W. was committed to a Special TreatmentUnit (STU), where he has been for approximately twenty years. At the timeW.W. was evaluated by the experts in this case, he was seventy-one years old. 3 While committed, W.W. “disclosed a longstanding history ofexhibitionism, voyeurism, and stalking behavior.” He reported driving aroundnaked and described a “long-standing sexual fantasy of driving in his carnaked and picking up a small female child to molest.” He also reported afantasy in which he would kill his victim to avoid being caught, although histreatment team reported that he has since downplayed that statement. W.W. also revealed three other previously unreported victims inincidents that occurred when W.W. was nineteen, twenty-seven, and forty-three-years-old, respectively. The first victim was a five-year-old girl W.W.’smother was babysitting. W.W. reported bouncing her on his knee, beingaroused, and masturbating that night. The second was his neighbor’s daughter,who was between five and eight years old. W.W. disclosed that he had hercome to his house and “lay down on the living room floor with her backtoward him,” while he masturbated. W.W. wanted the girl to touch him, butstopped when her siblings knocked on the door. The third was a five- to eight-year-old girl who sat on W.W.’s knee at church while he fondled her chest.W.W. reported that he then masturbated while thinking of her that night. In June 2011, his treatment team recommended W.W. begin furloughs.However, shortly after they began, he failed a polygraph examination. W.W.admitted he had been masturbating to thoughts of a young girl he had seen in a 4 mall. He added that he had been fantasizing about seeing a young girl andsexualizing her for years. Following those admissions, W.W.’s furloughs wereterminated. He acknowledged to his treatment team that he chose not to usethe relapse prevention techniques he was taught. B. W.W.’s review hearing required by the SVPA was conducted on January10 and 23, 2019. The State proposed to present expert testimony frompsychiatrist Dr. Marta Scott and psychologist Dr. Jamie Canataro. W.W. didnot present any witnesses, nor did he testify. On the first day of the hearing, the State recognized that its two expertswere going to present conflicting opinions on W.W.’s risk of reoffending andwhether he should remain committed. Dr. Scott recommended conditionaldischarge, while Dr. Canataro concluded further commitment was appropriate.As a result of that conflict and Dr. Scott’s adverse testimony, the Stateinformed the trial court that Dr. Scott would not be the State’s witness. Thetrial court rejected the State’s attempt, telling the State that “[i]t’s yourobligation under the statute to produce psychiatric testimony. . . . If you don’tdo that, you can’t possibly prevail.” The State then called Dr. Scott, the psychiatrist who recommended thatW.W. be conditionally discharged. Dr. Scott’s testimony centered around her 5 opinion that W.W.’s “tendency to say things that he doesn’t mean whenangry,” cognitive difficulties, and “low average” IQ all led to a number ofconfusing reports, including about whether and under what circumstancesW.W. experiences arousal and whether he felt he could refrain fromreoffending. Dr. Scott testified that W.W. “demonstrates a great deal of confusion” indescribing his arousal or lack thereof. She referred to a roleplay where W.W.did not experience an erection, yet, after the group purported to observe hissexual interest, W.W. acknowledged that he was aroused. She also testifiedabout a period in which W.W. was placed on probation as a result of statingthat he was not able to refrain from reoffending and that he was glad that hewould not be discharged from the STU. Dr. Scott questioned the validity ofthose statements. In her conclusion, Dr. Scott diagnosed W.W. with pedophilic disorderand borderline intellectual functioning. Regarding his risk to sexuallyreoffend, Dr. Scott found that “the likelihood of him committing anothercontact offense does not meet the threshold of highly likely,” andrecommended conditional discharge. Dr. Scott testified that the mostimportant factor in her analysis was W.W.’s age, which resulted in his“declining sexual drive, increased self-control, and decreased access to 6 victims.” Dr. Scott also testified that W.W. took a combination of Prozac andProscar or Finasteride, which reportedly “significantly decreased his sexualurges.” On the second day of the hearing, the State presented a psychologist, Dr.Canataro, who testified in support of commitment. Dr. Canataro’s testimonycentered around W.W.’s strong arousal, inability or unwillingness to useintervention techniques, and obsessiveness over victims he never made contactwith, all despite twenty years of treatment. Dr. Canataro emphasized W.W.’s“longstanding arousal pattern” with victims exclusively between the ages offive and eight. She testified that this arousal remains strong even in W.W.’sadvanced age and after years of treatment. For example, Dr. Canataro testifiedto stopping a discussion about a female child because “[W.W.] became sosexually aroused that it interfered with the interview.” She also detailed a timeduring a roleplay in which W.W.’s arousal was so strong that he chose not toimplement the intervention techniques he had learned. In response to Dr. Scott’s recommendation of conditional discharge, Dr.Canataro pointed out that the same conditions were available when W.W. wason furlough in 2008. She emphasized that, even under those conditions, W.W.reported masturbating on multiple occasions to a young girl he saw for only aninstant at the mall. Dr. Canataro testified that it was important for her to 7 inform the court that W.W.’s only intervention technique is abstinence. Shetestified that “[h]e cannot refrain. We’re basically asking him to extinguish,give up his total sexual identity,” which is not a reasonable long-term solution. In support of her recommendation, Dr. Canataro testified that if W.W. isnot recommitted to the STU, his risk to sexually reoffend is high. Shediagnosed W.W. with pedophilic disorder, voyeuristic disorder, sexualmasochistic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. The trial court issued its oral decision on January 28, 2019, finding theneed to continue W.W.’s commitment. It concluded that neither the State northe court was bound by the testimony of the State’s psychiatrist. Unpersuadedby Dr. Scott’s reliance on W.W.’s age and conditions to reduce his risk, thetrial court credited Dr. Canataro’s testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. Specifically addressing W.W.’sargument that the State failed to meet its burden because its psychiatrist didnot support commitment, the Appellate Division reasoned that “the trial court[was] 'not required to accept all or any part of’ an expert’s opinion.” Because“[t]he ultimate determination [regarding involuntary civil commitment] is 'alegal one, not a medical one, even though guided by medical experttestimony,’” the Appellate Division concluded the trial court had the abilityand a reasonable basis to credit Dr. Canataro over Dr. Scott. 8 We granted W.W.’s petition for certification. 241 N.J. 468 (2020). Wealso granted the motion of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey(ACLU) to participate as amicus curiae. II. A. Petitioner W.W. argues that the State failed to meet its burden ofproduction for commitment under the SVPA because Dr. Scott, the State’sonly psychiatrist, testified that W.W. did not meet commitment standards andrecommended conditional discharge. He submits that the trial court andAppellate Division erred in concluding that the State was not bound by thepsychiatric testimony it was required to produce. Relying on the plainlanguage of the SVPA, W.W. submits that psychiatric testimony in support ofcommitment must be the basis of the State’s petition for commitment and thatadditional testimony permitted under the SVPA, such as testimony by apsychologist, is not sufficient on its own to meet the burden to commit orrecommit. W.W. stresses that the extraordinary liberty interest at stake makesit imperative that the State satisfy its burden of producing a psychiatrist totestify in support of commitment. 9 B. In opposition, the State contends that it “met its burden of production byproducing the psychiatric testimony of Dr. Scott,” and that it was the trialcourt’s decision to accept or reject it. Thus, the State claims the court made nomistake in relying on the credible testimony of Dr. Canataro. The State also argues N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) “does not dictate thesubstance of [the expert] testimony -- it does not, because it cannot, expect theexpert to simply serve as a mouthpiece in favor of recommitment despitetreatment progress or other changes in circumstances.” The State asserts thatif section 27.30(b) were interpreted to require psychiatric testimony in favor ofcommitment, “when taken to the extreme, it would preclude the State fromever agreeing that conditional discharge is appropriate.” C. Amicus curiae ACLU aligns itself with W.W.’s position. It stresses thatthe plain language of the SVPA and the dictionary definitions of “basis” and“need,” show that the psychiatric testimony must be in support of commitment. The ACLU also relies on the legislative history of the SVPA, pointingout that the SVPA was based on the general civil commitment statute whichuses the same phrase “clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment.”The Appellate Division found this phrase in the general civil commitment 10 statute to require testimony in support of commitment. Presuming theLegislature was aware of that decision and still chose to use the phrase, theACLU submits that the Legislature intended for the State to producepsychiatric testimony in support of commitment when making applicationsunder the SVPA. The ACLU further emphasizes that psychiatric testimony insupport of commitment is needed to initially commit someone and that itwould be inconsistent with the SVPA’s overall scheme not to require the sameat annual review hearings. III. A. Our Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. SeeManalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378(1995). Thus, this Court owes no special deference to the trial court’sinterpretation of the State’s burden under the SVPA. In re Civil Commitmentof D.Y., 218 N.J. 373 (2014) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P., 140 N.J. at 378). “[I]n the interpretation of a statute our overriding goal has consistentlybeen to determine the Legislature’s intent.” Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 25 (1995) (quoting Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994)). “'Todetermine the Legislature’s intent, [courts] look to the statute’s language andgive those terms their plain and ordinary meaning,’ because 'the best indicator 11 of that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature.’” State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020) (first quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492(2005); and then quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386(2016)). “If the language is clear, the court’s job is complete.” In reExpungement Application of D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433, 440 (2014). An appellatecourt will refer to extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent “[o]nly if thewords of the enactment are shrouded in ambiguity.” Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 513 (2009). Additionally, a statute must “be read in [its] entirety; each part or sectionshould be construed in connection with every other part or section to provide aharmonious whole.” D.J.B., 216 N.J. at 440 (quoting Burnett v. County ofBergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009)). And “when a 'literal interpretation ofindividual statutory terms or provisions’ would lead to results 'inconsistentwith the overall purpose of the statute,’ that interpretation should be rejected.”Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001) (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998)); see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 225 (1994) (supporting “[f]urther inquiry into a statute’s intendedmeaning . . . where the plain meaning seems inconsistent with the statutoryscheme”). 12 “[T]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of itsenactments.” DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494 (quoting N.J. Democratic Party, Inc.v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 195 n.6 (2002)). Thus, “a change of language in astatute ordinarily implies a purposeful alteration in [the] substance of the law.”Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 348(1951)). B. Here, we apply those principles to determine whether the psychiatrictestimony required by the SVPA in a review hearing must be in support ofcommitment. The Attorney General may initiate court proceedings for the involuntarycommitment “of an inmate who is scheduled for release upon expiration of amaximum term of incarceration by submission to the court of two clinicalcertificates for a sexually violent predator, at least one of which is prepared bya psychiatrist.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(c). A “clinical certificate” is defined as aform that is prepared, approved, and completed as prescribed by statute andthat states, in part, “that the person is in need of involuntary commitment totreatment.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(b). “In need of involuntary commitment” or“in need of involuntary commitment to treatment” is defined, in turn, to mean that an adult with mental illness, whose mental illness causes the person to be dangerous to self or dangerous 13 to others or property and who is unwilling to accept appropriate treatment voluntarily after it has been offered, needs outpatient treatment or inpatient care at a short-term care or psychiatric facility or special psychiatric hospital because other services are not appropriate or available to meet the person’s mental health care needs. [N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(m).] After a finding of probable cause, it is the responsibility of the State topresent to the court “the case for the person’s involuntary commitment as asexually violent predator” at an initial hearing. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(b). TheState must establish three elements: (1) that the individual has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; (2) that he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) that as a result of his psychiatric abnormality or disorder, “it is highly likely that the individual will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend. [D.Y., 218 N.J. at 380-81 (quoting In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 173 (2014)).]“The terms of the statute must be strictly met”; involuntary commitment underthe SVPA is “limited to those who are highly likely to sexually reoffend.”Ibid. (emphasis omitted). “The State bears the burden of proving all three elements by clear andconvincing evidence.” R.F., 217 N.J. at 173. “Clear and convincing evidenceis evidence that produces 'a firm belief or conviction’ that the allegations are 14 true; it is evidence that is 'so clear, direct and weighty and convincing’ that thefactfinder can 'come to a clear conviction’ of the truth without hesitancy.”Ibid. (quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407 (1987)). A person who has been committed under the SVPA is entitled to “anannual court review hearing of the need for involuntary commitment as asexually violent predator.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. The hearing is conductedpursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30, which requires in part that [a] psychiatrist on the person’s treatment team who has conducted a personal examination of the person as close to the court hearing date as possible, but in no event more than five calendar days prior to the court hearing, shall testify at the hearing to the clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator. Other members of the person’s treatment team and any other witness with relevant information offered by the person or the Attorney General shall also be permitted to testify at the hearing. [N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b).] “If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the personneeds continued involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator, itshall issue an order authorizing the involuntary commitment . . . .” N.J.S.A.30:4-27.32(a). “Given the statutory definition of a 'sexually violent predator,’expert witnesses in the fields of psychiatry and psychology routinely playleading roles in SVPA commitment hearings.” D.Y., 218 N.J. at 382. 15 Commitment under the SVPA is closely connected to the general civilcommitment statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1, but was enacted by the Legislature inrecognition that “[t]he nature of the mental condition from which a sexuallyviolent predator may suffer may not always lend itself to characterizationunder the existing statutory standard.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(b). The keyprovision in this case, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b), is identical to its corollary in thegeneral civil commitment statute. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13(b) (“A psychiatriston the patient’s treatment team . . . shall testify at the hearing to the clinicalbasis for the need for involuntary commitment to treatment.”). The languageof N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) is also substantially similar to the language used inthe court rule governing civil commitment of adults. See R. 4:74-7(e) (“Theapplication for commitment to treatment shall be supported by the oraltestimony of a psychiatrist on the patient’s treatment team . . . .”). That language and the phrase “clinical basis for the need for involuntarycommitment” have been considered before by the Appellate Division in bothgeneral civil commitment and SVPA commitment cases. See In reCommitment of Raymond S., 263 N.J. Super. 428, 432 (App. Div. 1993); In reCivil Commitment of A.H.B., 386 N.J. Super. 16, 24-25 (App. Div. 2006).The Appellate Division determined that both N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13 and Rule4:74-7(e) “require that a psychiatrist on the patient’s treatment team testify at 16 the hearing, and provide medical testimony supporting the need forcommitment.” A.H.B., 386 N.J. Super. at 25 (emphasis added) (quotingRaymond S., 263 N.J. Super. at 432). IV. Applying the principles of statutory construction to the relevantprovision of the SVPA, we conclude that the Legislature intended for N.J.S.A.30:4-27.30(b) to require a psychiatrist to testify in support of commitment andthat the State therefore did not meet its burden by producing a psychiatrist whodid not support commitment. A. Once again, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]psychiatrist on the person’s treatment team . . . shall testify at the hearing tothe clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violentpredator.” The statute is clear that a psychiatrist must testify at the hearing.At issue is the meaning of the phrase “to the clinical basis for the need forinvoluntary commitment.” Because the SVPA does not supply its own definition of the phrase, weinterpret that language according to its generally accepted meaning. See In rePlan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 467(2013). A “basis” is “[a] fundamental principle; an underlying fact or 17 condition; a foundation or starting point.” Black’s Law Dictionary 185 (11thed. 2019). And “need” is “[t]he lack of something important; a requirement.”Id. at 1243. The statute’s express focus on testimony by a psychiatrist, who holds amedical degree, cannot be interpreted to encompass testimony by apsychologist, who does not. The Legislature has distinguished betweenpsychiatric and psychological experts in our Rules of Evidence -- N.J.R.E. 505provides for a psychologist-patient privilege, whereas the privilege betweenpsychiatrists and their patients is part of the physician-patient privilege setforth in N.J.R.E. 506. See State v. Kane, 449 N.J. Super. 119, 135 (App. Div.2017). And when the Legislature intends that the evaluation of either apsychiatrist or psychologist suffice for a particular purpose, it has said soexplicitly. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5 (“Whenever there is reason to doubt thedefendant’s fitness to proceed, the court may on motion by the prosecutor, thedefendant or on its own motion, appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist orlicensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of thedefendant.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the clear language of the statute indicates that a psychiatrist musttestify to those underlying facts that require involuntary commitment of theindividual. It is not enough, under the statute’s plain terms, that a psychiatrist 18 testifies -- even if that testimony is against involuntary commitment -- and thatsomeone else testifies to the need for commitment. Since the statute’slanguage is not ambiguous, we need not look to extrinsic sources for furtherguidance. We nevertheless note that the provision’s plain meaning accordswith both the legislative history of the Act and the overarching statutoryscheme. B. The SVPA’s legislative history clearly establishes that the Legislaturedeliberately modeled the SVPA’s commitment procedures after the generalcivil commitment statute that predated it. The Sponsor’s Statement to the billthat became the SVPA provides that the SVPA’s procedures are similar to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.10 and N.J.S.A.30:4-27.12, which set out the commitmentprocess for general civil commitment. Sponsor’s Statement to S. 895 15-16(L. 1998, c. 71). The findings in the SVPA itself declare that it was enacted inpart “to modify the involuntary civil commitment process in recognition of theneed for commitment of those sexually violent predators who pose a danger toothers.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(c). And, finally, the Legislature took thelanguage at issue, that a psychiatrist “shall testify to the clinical basis for theneed for involuntary commitment,” directly from the general civil commitment 19 guidelines for initial commitment and review hearings. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13. Because the Legislature clearly intended the SVPA’s procedure tofollow that of the general civil commitment statute, and because theLegislature was presumptively aware of the judicial construction of suchprocedure, we review precedent from the general civil commitment statute todecipher the Legislature’s intent in regard to the SVPA. While considering the general civil commitment statute in 1993, theAppellate Division was presented with the same question that is before thisCourt: whether the language “to the clinical basis for the need for involuntarycommitment to treatment” requires the psychiatrist’s testimony to be insupport of commitment. Raymond S., 263 N.J. Super. 428 (App. Div. 1993).The Appellate Division answered in the affirmative. Id. at 432. Five years later, the Legislature enacted the SVPA. We presume that, asit crafted the SVPA, the Legislature was aware that the courts had interpretedthe general civil commitment statute to require psychiatric testimony insupport of commitment. See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494. So informed, theLegislature nevertheless used the exact same phrasing in the SVPA, without acorrective definition. Using the same language thus reflects legislative intent 20 to require psychiatric testimony in support of commitment under the SVPA aswell. And the SVPA itself maintains an important and consistent burden onthe State, requiring psychiatric testimony in support of commitment at eachstage in the proceedings. To initiate commitment proceedings under the SVPA, the State mustpresent two clinical certificates “which state[] that the person is in need ofinvoluntary commitment to treatment.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(b). At least one ofthose certificates must be prepared by a psychiatrist. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(c).Therefore, to begin the commitment process under the SVPA, a psychiatristmust support commitment. The SVPA further requires the State to produce psychiatric testimony atboth the initial commitment hearing and again at each review hearing pursuantto N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b). See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. When viewing the statuteas a whole, it would be discordant to demand more from the certificationsrequired to commence a hearing than from the testimony provided at thehearings. As such, interpreting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) to require psychiatrictestimony in support of commitment at hearings is harmonious with thecommencement procedure and creates a consistent burden on the Statethroughout the commitment process. 21 C. We find that the plain text of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires apsychiatrist to testify in support of commitment when the State seeks the initialor continued commitment of a sexually violent predator. Because of the passage of time between the trial court’s decision onJanuary 29, 2019, and the issuance of this opinion, the Court shall afford theState an opportunity to provide a psychiatrist in support of commitment in anew review hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. Pending the court’sdetermination after that rehearing, W.W. shall remain committed under theSVPA. V. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand forfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 22