Title: Higgason v. State
Citation: 435 N.E.2d 558
Docket Number: 381S79
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 1982

435 N.E.2d 558 (1982)
James H. HIGGASON, Jr., Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 381S79.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 27, 1982.
John D. Breclaw, Griffith, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., William E. Daily, Chief Counsel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
DeBRULER, Justice.
Petitioner-appellant, James H. Higgason, Jr., was indicted in 1975 on a charge of first degree murder, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-13-4-1 (Burns 1975) (repealed). He entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-1-54-1(b) (Burns 1975) (repealed), and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fifteen to twenty-five years.
In October, 1979, Higgason filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Ind.R.P.C. 1, alleging two grounds:
1. The failure of the sentencing court to advise him pursuant to the requirements of Ind. Code Ann. § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1979).
2. The lack of a factual basis for the plea of guilty. The petition was denied and the defendant appeals, raising the sole issue of whether there was a factual basis for the plea of guilty to second degree murder.
Petitioner contends that the record of his guilty plea hearing did not support the post-conviction relief court's finding that there was a factual basis for the plea. Indiana Code Ann. § 35-4.1-1-4(b) (Burns 1979) provides:
The statute setting out the crime of murder in the second degree provided:
The petitioner claims that because he steadfastly denied that he intended to kill the victim of the shooting, there was no factual basis for the elements of purpose and malice.
In the post-conviction order denying relief, the court cited the following colloquy between the guilty plea hearing judge and Higgason as evidence that there was a factual basis for the plea on the elements of purpose and malice:
The post-conviction court rejected the petitioner's claim that his case was controlled by Boles v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 354, 303 N.E.2d 645, observing that in Boles the defendant maintained his innocence, while the petitioner merely denied an element  intent.
The court held that the petitioner's testimony at the hearing that he intentionally shot the victim three times with a shotgun from a distance of twenty-five to thirty yards, knowing that a shotgun blast from that distance would kill, supplied the factual basis for a plea of guilty. The factual basis for the elements of purpose and malice could be inferred from the manner in which the killing was done, the court held.
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.R.P.C. 1, § 5. In order to prevail on appeal from a denial of his petition, appellant must satisfy the court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Lagenour v. State, (1980) Ind., 414 N.E.2d 295; Sotelo v. State, (1980) Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1215. The petitioner has not met this burden.
Malice is a state of mind which can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon and the circumstances in which the *560 killing took place. Henson v. State, (1979) Ind. 392 N.E.2d 478. The evidence in this case cannot be said to lead unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the court below. The denial of the petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.