Title: Matthews v. Matthews
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 081251
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2009

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
KATHY MATTHEWS, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 081251 
 
   JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
    APRIL 17, 2009 
INGEBORG D. MATTHEWS 
 
  
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 
F. Ward Harkrader, Judge 
 
 
In this case, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in failing to dismiss a probate appeal when the party appealing 
the probate order of the clerk had also submitted a different 
will for probate. 
 
On October 3, 2005, Donald A. Matthews, Sr. (Matthews) 
died, leaving a wife and three children from a prior marriage.  
Allan Scott Matthews, his son, qualified as administrator of 
Matthews’ estate in the Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County on 
December 28, 2005.  Allan Scott Matthews declared that his 
father died intestate and named himself, his two siblings, 
Donald A. Matthews, Jr., and Kathy L. Matthews, and his 
stepmother, Ingeborg D. Matthews (Mrs. Matthews), as his 
father’s heirs. 
On February 1, 2006, Mrs. Matthews attempted to probate a 
last will and testament of Matthews that was dated July 18, 1995 
(the 1995 will).  Mrs. Matthews explained to the clerk that the 
original of the 1995 will had been inside a safe that was 
 
 
stolen; the clerk refused to probate the 1995 will because it 
was a copy.  Later that day, Mrs. Matthews returned to the 
clerk’s office with the original of a will executed by Matthews 
on February 8, 1993 (the 1993 will).  The clerk probated the 
1993 will.  In effect, both wills left one dollar to each of the 
three children and the remainder of Matthews’ estate to his 
wife. 
 
Kathy Matthews and Donald Matthews, Jr.1 (the children), 
filed a bill to impeach the 1993 will, claiming that it was 
invalidated by the express terms stated in the copy of the lost 
1995 will, and because the 1995 will had been refused for 
probate, their father died intestate.  Mrs. Matthews filed an 
Answer and Grounds of Defense to that bill to impeach.  She also 
later timely filed an appeal from the clerk’s order denying 
probate of the 1995 will. 
The children filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. Matthews’ 
appeal of the clerk’s order regarding the 1995 will because Mrs. 
Matthews had offered the 1993 will for probate.  The circuit 
court denied the motion to dismiss.  The children’s devisavit 
vel non action and Mrs. Matthews’ appeal of the clerk’s order 
regarding the 1995 will were consolidated for trial.2  The 
                     
1 Allan Scott Matthews did not participate in the suit. 
2 Donald A. Matthews, Jr. died and his wife, Julie A. 
Matthews, the administrator of his estate, was substituted in 
his place. 
 
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children agreed to this consolidation and the matters were set 
jointly for trial with a jury. 
 
At trial, Mrs. Matthews offered evidence related to the 
loss of the 1995 will.  Mrs. Matthews testified that her husband 
put the original of the 1995 will in the family safe.  A police 
officer testified that a safe belonging to Matthews and Mrs. 
Matthews was stolen from the home.  Mrs. Matthews stated that 
she saw the 1995 will in the safe two weeks before the burglary.  
The children argued that Matthews died intestate because the 
copy of the 1995 will expressly invalidated the 1993 will, but 
the original of the 1995 will was not found among Matthews’ 
papers at the time of his death. 
At the close of trial, the circuit court granted a directed 
verdict on the validity of the 1993 will, ruling that it was not 
the decedent’s last will and testament.  The jury found that the 
1995 will was Matthews’ last will and testament, and the circuit 
court entered judgment consistent with that verdict.  The 
children appeal. 
Analysis 
 
On appeal, the children assign error to the circuit court’s 
denial of their motion to dismiss Mrs. Matthews’ appeal of the 
clerk’s order denying probate to the 1995 will.  The children 
claim that Mrs. Matthews forfeited her statutory right to timely 
appeal the clerk’s order concerning the 1995 will by offering 
 
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the 1993 will for probate.  They assert that because of Mrs. 
Matthews’ election to probate the 1993 will, her appeal of the 
clerk’s order regarding the 1995 will operated as an 
impermissible collateral attack upon the validity of the 1993 
will, resulted in Mrs. Matthews approbating and reprobating 
because she assumed mutually contradictory positions, and was 
barred by judicial estoppel.  Mrs. Matthews asserts that her 
appeal of the clerk’s order concerning the 1995 will was not a 
collateral attack upon the clerk’s order concerning the 1993 
will, her positions are not impermissibly inconsistent and 
judicial estoppel does not bar her appeal of the clerk’s order 
regarding the 1995 will. 
The clerk of any circuit court has the jurisdiction to 
probate wills, within his respective territorial jurisdiction, 
as defined by law. Code § 64.1-77.  In admitting a will, the 
clerk “acts in a judicial capacity and the order made by him, 
admitting or rejecting a will, is as much a judgment as though 
entered by the court.”  First Church of Christ v. Hutchings, 209 
Va. 158, 160, 163 S.E.2d 178, 179-80 (1968).  The validity of 
this judgment may only be drawn into question “in the manner and 
within the time prescribed by law.”  Id. at 160, 163 S.E.2d at 
180. 
Under Code § 64.1-78, any interested person may appeal a 
clerk’s order within six months after the entry of such an 
 
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order.  After entering the appeal, the circuit court shall hear 
and determine the appeal “as though it had been presented to the 
court in the first instance.”  Id.  At the same time, a person, 
who is not a party to the probate of a will, may bring a bill to 
impeach the will under Code § 64.1-88.  After a bill to impeach 
is filed, that statute provides that a trial by jury shall be 
ordered to ascertain the validity of the will admitted to 
probate by the clerk.  Id. 
The children argue that Mrs. Matthews’ appeal of the 
clerk’s order denying probate to the 1995 will was an improper 
collateral attack upon the 1993 will and the clerk’s order 
admitting it to probate.  A collateral attack is an attempt to 
impeach a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the 
purpose of annulling or reviewing that judgment.  See Sutherland 
v. Rasnake, 169 Va. 257, 266-67, 192 S.E. 695, 698 (1937).  
Thus, the alleged collateral attack must be upon the clerk’s 
order to probate the 1993 will. 
The children brought a bill to impeach the 1993 will as 
statutorily allowed by Code § 64.1-88.  Thereafter, Mrs. 
Matthews appealed the clerk’s refusal to probate the 1995 will 
as she is statutorily allowed to do.  Therefore, prior to Mrs. 
Matthews’ appeal, the clerk’s order concerning the 1993 will had 
been directly attacked by the children through their bill to 
impeach.  Pursuant to Code § 64.1-88, upon the children’s direct 
 
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attack upon the clerk’s order concerning the 1993 will, the 
will’s validity was to be ascertained in a trial by jury.  We 
hold that under the circumstances, Mrs. Matthews’ appeal could 
not be and was not a collateral attack upon the clerk’s order 
regarding the 1993 will. 
The children also claim that Mrs. Matthews’ appeal should 
have been dismissed by the court because she approbated and 
reprobated by offering both the 1993 and 1995 wills for probate.  
Mrs. Matthews claims that she did not approbate and reprobate 
because the children’s challenge to the clerk’s order concerning 
the 1993 will and her appeal of the clerk’s order concerning the 
1995 will were not the same litigation, but rather separate 
cases consolidated for purposes of trial.  Further, she claims 
that she merely sought alternative outcomes available to her, 
without taking impermissibly inconsistent positions. 
A litigant is not allowed to “approbate and reprobate.”  
Hurley v. Bennett, 163 Va. 241, 252, 176 S.E. 171, 175 (1934).  
This Court has stated that a party may not “in the course of the 
same litigation occupy inconsistent positions.”  Id.; see also 
Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2009) 
(this day decided) (citing Cangiano v. LSH Bldg. Co., 271 Va. 
171, 181, 623 S.E.2d 889, 895 (2006) and Powell v. Commonwealth, 
267 Va. 107, 144, 590 S.E.2d 537, 560 (2004)).  It is improper 
for a litigant to invite error and take advantage of the 
 
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situation created by her own wrong.  Rowe, 277 Va. at ___, ___ 
S.E.2d at ___; Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417, 374 
S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988). 
The prohibition against approbation and reprobation forces 
a litigant to elect a particular position, and confines a 
litigant to the position that she first adopted.  Hurley, 163 
Va. at 252, 176 S.E. at 175.  Mrs. Matthews was first the 
proponent of the 1995 will, so if she did approbate and 
reprobate, the remedy would not be to dismiss her appeal, but 
rather to confine her to the position she first adopted as 
proponent of the 1995 will.  The jury found the 1995 will to be 
valid. 
Further, if the children’s bill of impeachment and Mrs. 
Matthews’ appeal of the order concerning the 1995 will are 
considered to be the same litigation, Mrs. Matthews essentially 
sought alternative theories of recovery, as prescribed by the 
statutes governing the probate of wills in the Commonwealth, and 
permitted by Rule 1:4(k).  See Code § 64.1-77; Code § 64.1-88; 
Rule 1:4(k).  Rule 1:4(k) allows a party to “plead alternative 
facts and theories of recovery” as long as the alternative facts 
“arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.”  It further 
provides that “[a] party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether 
based on legal or equitable grounds.”  Rule 1:4(k).  Reading 
 
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previous cases in concert with this Rule, a litigant who takes 
inconsistent positions must also invite error and take advantage 
of the situation created by the inconsistency in order to 
approbate and reprobate.  See Hoar v. Great Eastern Resort 
Mgmt., 256 Va. 374, 382 & n.7, 506 S.E.2d 777, 782 & n.7 (1998) 
(distinguishing Smith v. Settle, 254 Va. 348, 492 S.E.2d 427 
(1997)); Fisher, 236 Va. at 417, 374 S.E.2d at 54.  Indeed, Code 
§ 64.1-88 provides that in trying a bill to impeach, a court may 
require all testamentary papers of the same decedent to be 
produced and direct the jury to ascertain, if there are more 
than one, which is the will of the decedent.  Code § 64.1-88. 
In this case, Mrs. Matthews’ alleged support of both wills 
did not invite error, nor did Mrs. Matthews take advantage of 
the situation created by the inconsistency.  Mrs. Matthews’ 
consistent position was that her husband died testate.  Mrs. 
Matthews told the clerk, when she attempted to probate the 1995 
will, that the original will had been stolen from her safe in 
2003.  She offered the 1993 will for probate because the clerk 
would not probate the copy of the 1995 will, and probate of 
either will had the same result, each child receiving one dollar 
from the estate, and Mrs. Matthews the remainder.  The circuit 
court did not err in refusing to dismiss Mrs. Matthews’ appeal 
of the clerk’s order concerning the 1995 will based on the 
allegations of approbation and reprobation on her part. 
 
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The children also assign error to the circuit court’s 
refusal to dismiss Mrs. Matthews’ appeal of the clerk’s order 
concerning the 1995 will based on the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel.  The modern-day doctrine of judicial estoppel is 
derived from the Scottish law prohibiting approbation and 
reprobation.  Lofton Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 268 Va. 
377, 381, 601 S.E.2d 648, 650 (2004) (citing Burch v. Grace 
Street Bldg. Corp., 168 Va. 329, 340, 191 S.E. 672, 677 (1937)).  
Judicial estoppel forbids a party “from assum[ing] successive 
positions in the course of a suit, or series of suits, in 
reference to the same fact or state of facts, which are 
inconsistent with each other, or mutually contradictory.”  
Lofton Ridge, 268 Va. at 380-81, 601 S.E.2d at 650 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In order for the doctrine to apply, 
the proceeding must involve the same parties.  Bentley Funding 
Group, L.L.C. v. SK&R Group, L.L.C., 269 Va. 315, 326, 609 
S.E.2d 49, 54 (2005).  Along with a prior inconsistent factual 
position or positions and identical parties, the party asserting 
the inconsistent position must have also persuaded the court to 
accept that earlier position.  Id. at 327, 609 S.E.2d at 55.  
“Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later 
inconsistent position introduces no risk of inconsistent court 
determinations, and thus poses little threat to judicial 
integrity.”  Id.  
 
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In this case, the children claim that Mrs. Matthews 
asserted an inconsistent factual position in a prior proceeding, 
by probating the 1993 will and defending it in the devisavit vel 
non action, then appealing the clerk’s order denying probate to 
the 1995 will.  They claim Mrs. Matthews held inconsistent 
factual positions concerning the validity of the 1993 will and 
the validity of the 1995 will.  However, whether a will is valid 
is not a factual assertion, but a legal assertion.  Further, 
Mrs. Matthews did not achieve success concerning the attempt to 
probate the 1993 will, because of the children’s bill to impeach 
that will. 
At the time she appealed the clerk’s order concerning the 
1995 will, the children had already challenged the 1993 will in 
their devisavit vel non action.  Because of the bill to impeach, 
Mrs. Matthews had not prevailed on the issue of the validity of 
the 1993 will, but rather faced a jury trial to determine the 
validity of that will.  Because Mrs. Matthews had not been 
successful in her prior proceeding concerning the 1993 will, 
Mrs. Matthews should not have been judicially estopped from 
appealing the clerk’s order denying probate of the 1995 will. 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court 
did not err in denying the children’s motion to dismiss Mrs. 
Matthews’ appeal of the clerk’s order concerning the 1995 will.  
 
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We will affirm the judgment of the circuit court and will enter 
final judgment for Mrs. Matthews. 
Affirmed. 
 
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