Title: State v. Washington
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP000238-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 2018

2018 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP238-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael L. Washington, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 214, 890 N.W.2d 592 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 6 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 9, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Allan B. Torhorst, David W. Paulson, and Wayne 
J. Marik 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
GABLEMAN, J. concurs, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. 
and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief filed by 
Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general, and an oral argument by Sarah L. 
Burgundy.
 
 
2018 WI 3
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2016AP238-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF414) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael L. Washington, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 9, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Michael L. 
Washington ("Washington"), seeks review of a published court of 
appeals decision affirming his judgment of conviction and the 
circuit court's order denying his postconviction motion.1  He 
asserts that the court of appeals erred in determining that, by 
                                                 
1 State v. Washington, 2017 WI App 6, 373 Wis. 2d 214, 890 
N.W.2d 592 (affirming the judgment and order of circuit court 
for Racine County, Wayne J. Marik, Allan B. Torhorst, and David 
W. Paulson, Judges). 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
2 
 
his conduct, he waived his statutory right to be present at 
trial. 
¶2 
Washington specifically contends that his right to be 
present at trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(b) (2013-14) 
was violated.2  He argues that the court erred in determining 
that his conduct waived his statutory right to be present given 
that § 971.04(3) permits waiver only after the trial has begun.3 
¶3 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) does not apply 
here.  It does not place any limitation on a defendant's ability 
to waive the right to be present at any portion of trial. 
¶4 
We further determine that Washington, by his conduct, 
waived his Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) right to be present at trial.  
Although we reach this determination under the facts presented, 
we emphasize that the best practice is an on-the-record waiver 
colloquy. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶6 
The 
State 
charged 
Washington 
with 
burglary 
and 
obstructing an officer.  He was apprehended near the apartment 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(b) provides, in relevant part:  
"Except as provided in subs. (2) and (3), the defendant shall be 
present:  . . . [a]t trial . . . ." 
 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
3 See infra, ¶¶22 n.7, 29. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
3 
 
where the burglary occurred and was uncooperative with law 
enforcement. 
¶7 
Washington's first appointed attorney was allowed to 
withdraw from the representation due to a breakdown in the 
attorney-client 
relationship. 
 
Less 
than 
a 
month 
later, 
Washington's second appointed attorney filed a motion to 
withdraw as counsel, citing an attorney-client relationship that 
was "irreparably broken" and a "fundamental difference of 
opinion regarding what defenses are appropriate and viable in 
this case."  The circuit court granted the motion to withdraw 
and a third attorney was appointed to represent Washington. 
¶8 
Washington's third appointed attorney also moved to 
withdraw.  The circuit court initially granted the motion, but 
then rescinded its ruling to give effect to Washington's 
previously filed speedy trial demand. 
¶9 
On the eve of jury selection, Washington's third 
appointed attorney again moved to withdraw, citing a broken 
attorney-client 
relationship 
as 
evidenced 
by 
Washington's 
repeated filing of pro se motions without consulting counsel.  
The circuit court denied the motion to withdraw, explaining its 
belief "that this is in a sense an act of manipulation on the 
part of Mr. Washington[.]" 
¶10 The case proceeded to jury selection the following day 
and a jury was chosen.  The next morning, before the jury was 
sworn, Washington's counsel informed the court that she had 
learned 
of 
some 
new, 
possibly 
exculpatory 
information.  
Washington agreed to withdraw his speedy trial demand and the 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
4 
 
circuit court dismissed the jury.  It rescheduled the trial for 
a date approximately three months later. 
¶11 Washington's counsel further advised the court that 
her relationship with Washington had improved and the two "have 
been working very well together[.]"  She therefore asked "the 
[c]ourt to not consider [her] motions to withdraw."  The circuit 
court indicated that it was "pleased to hear that 
the 
relationship has improved, and that you are now working together 
very well." 
¶12 However, Washington's relationship with his counsel 
quickly soured again.  At the next status hearing, Washington's 
counsel submitted yet another motion to withdraw.  The circuit 
court expressed concern that "we have a pattern developing where 
no matter who is appointed to represent you[,] if they don't 
tell you what you want to hear you're going to not get along 
with them and you're going to ask them to withdraw.  And I can 
see this going on indefinitely."  Consequently, the circuit 
court denied the motion to withdraw. 
¶13 On the day the second scheduled trial was to commence, 
Washington's counsel informed the circuit court that Washington 
was again being uncooperative.  She explained that "[h]e stated 
that [she] was not his attorney."  The circuit court then turned 
to address Washington and the following exchange ensued: 
THE COURT:  Well, sir, we've been down this road so 
many times over and over and over. 
DEFENDANT:  And we can keep going over and over it 
again. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
5 
 
THE COURT:  No, we're —— 
DEFENDANT:  She's not representing me, man. 
THE COURT:  Sir, the matter is set for trial. 
DEFENDANT:  I don't know what it's set for, she ain't 
representing me. 
THE COURT:  All right, Mr. Washington? 
DEFENDANT:  I'm telling you she's not representing me, 
man. 
THE COURT:  Sir, will you let me speak.  The matter is 
scheduled for a jury trial this afternoon.  And it is 
going to be going forward as a jury trial.  We have 
addressed this issue of who is your —— 
DEFENDANT:  I said she's not representing me and we 
ain't going no trial now, I mean that. 
THE COURT:  Sir, we will go forward with the trial and 
if necessary you may have to be removed from the 
courtroom. 
DEFENDANT:  I'm gone.  She's not representing me. 
¶14 The circuit court then stated:  
[T]he record may reflect that Mr. Washington semi was 
removed and semi left on his own after the last 
outburst.  So we are out of his presence right now.  
And the real issue that has come up here is one of 
manipulation.  I think Mr. Washington has been trying 
to manipulate this case in my opinion for a very long 
period of time.   
In the words of the circuit court, Washington's demeanor was 
"physically aggressive and threatening." 
¶15 Washington was taken back to the jail and refused to 
return to the courtroom.  Outside of Washington's presence, the 
circuit court discussed with both counsel how it was going to 
proceed.  Citing State v. Divanovic, 200 Wis. 2d 210, 546 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996), the circuit court ultimately 
determined that the trial should proceed because the defendant 
had waived his right to be present.4  The circuit court suggested 
that the "proper procedure" indicated that Washington should be 
"escorted involuntarily to court for trial" and that "[i]f he is 
uncooperative he should be warned on the record by the court 
that if his lack of cooperation continues he will be removed 
from the courtroom." 
¶16 However, the circuit court did not follow this course 
of 
action. 
 
Instead, 
it 
determined 
that 
"attempting 
to 
involuntarily bring Mr. Washington back into court would unduly 
jeopardize 
the 
safety 
of 
officers 
and 
perhaps 
even 
Mr. 
Washington since his aggressiveness and his attitude suggest 
that he may be physically resistant to being brought back in and 
that it could result in an altercation."  The circuit court 
further observed the prejudice that could result to Washington 
if he were to be brought in against his will in front of the 
jury. 
¶17 Determining that Washington waived his constitutional 
right to be present, the circuit court concluded that the trial 
                                                 
4 In 
State 
v. 
Divanovic, 
200 
Wis. 2d 210, 
214, 
546 
N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996), the defendant refused to participate 
in proceedings.  The record revealed repeated contacts by the 
defendant's counsel, various court representatives, and the 
judge urging the defendant to attend the proceedings and warning 
him that the trial would proceed without him if he refused to 
attend.  Id. at 221.  The court of appeals determined that the 
defendant had waived his constitutional right to be present.  
Id. at 222. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
7 
 
would go forward in Washington's absence.  It observed that 
"[Washington's] conduct has been so disruptive that there's no 
way to proceed with the trial with him here."  The circuit court 
emphasized the manipulative history of Washington's conduct and 
his unwillingness to be present and cooperate or communicate 
with his attorney.5  It further explained that Washington would 
have the opportunity to consult with counsel and return to the 
courtroom if he could maintain the proper decorum: 
Certainly at any point in time that Mr. Washington is 
willing to cooperate and behave he has the opportunity 
to return to this courtroom.  Counsel will continue to 
represent 
him. 
 
Counsel 
will 
have 
reasonable 
opportunities to confer with him during the course of 
trial.  And he should be periodically advised and 
we'll figure out how frequently this will be done and 
in what way it will be done of his right to return to 
the courtroom if he wishes to do that. 
                                                 
5 In making its determination, the circuit court stated: 
I think that given the history first of all we have a 
series of positions taken by Mr. Washington and 
various instances of conduct on his behalf that again 
I don't want to wear out the word, but I can't 
characterize 
it 
as 
being 
anything 
other 
than 
manipulative in attempting to prevent this matter from 
going forward now to the point of refusing to come to 
court and to participate.  And given that history and 
given his conduct today without there being any real 
showing that except for his attitude there's been any 
interference with the attorney/client relationship 
. . . , but that is due solely to the conduct of Mr. 
Washington it appears, and his unwillingness to even 
communicate with much less cooperate with counsel.  
That he has in fact waived his constitutional rights 
to be present. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
8 
 
The case proceeded to jury selection in Washington's absence, 
and the selected jurors returned the next day to be sworn and 
begin the trial. 
¶18 As will be more fully detailed below, Washington was 
offered the opportunity to return to the courtroom five times.  
See infra, ¶¶41-50.  Court personnel or counsel communicated 
with him twice prior to jury selection and three times during 
the single-day trial——directly prior to the beginning of trial, 
during a recess in testimony, and prior to the verdict being 
read.  Each time Washington refused to participate. 
¶19 Washington's trial, not including jury selection, 
lasted five to six hours.6  The State presented three witnesses 
and Washington did not present any. 
¶20 The 
jury 
convicted 
Washington 
of 
both 
charges.  
Approximately three months after trial, with Washington present, 
the circuit court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment, 
bifurcated as five years of initial confinement followed by five 
years of extended supervision. 
¶21 Washington filed a motion for postconviction relief.  
He did not challenge the circuit court's determination that he 
had 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
waived 
his 
                                                 
6 There is a discrepancy in the record regarding the time 
the jury began its deliberations.  According to the court 
minutes, the jury was excused for deliberations at 1:55 p.m., 
while the transcript of the trial indicates it was at 2:55 p.m.  
In either event, Washington's trial occupied only a short period 
of time. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
9 
 
constitutional right to be present at trial.  Rather, he 
premised his motion on Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3), contending that 
the trial should not have taken place in his absence unless he 
was "present at the beginning of trial."7  The circuit court 
denied the motion. 
¶22 On appeal, Washington renewed this argument.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that 
"Washington waived his statutory right to be present at the 
trial and the court held that right open to Washington 
throughout the trial proceedings."  State v. Washington, 2017 WI 
App 6, ¶21, 373 Wis. 2d 214, 890 N.W.2d 592. 
II 
¶23 This case requires the court to interpret and apply 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) and (3).  Statutory interpretation and 
application present questions of law that this court reviews 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶14, 343 
Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04(3) provides in relevant part:   
If the defendant is present at the beginning of the 
trial and thereafter, during the progress of the trial 
or before the verdict of the jury has been returned 
into court, voluntarily absents himself or herself 
from the presence of the court without leave of the 
court, the trial or return of verdict of the jury in 
the case shall not thereby be postponed or delayed, 
but the trial or submission of said case to the jury 
for verdict and the return of verdict thereon, if 
required, shall proceed in all respects as though the 
defendant were present in court at all times. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
10 
 
¶24 Similarly, 
whether 
a 
defendant's 
statements 
and 
actions in a criminal proceeding constitute a waiver of the 
statutory right to be present is a question of law.  Id. (citing 
State 
v. 
Ward, 
2009 
WI 
60, 
¶17, 
318 
Wis. 2d 301, 
767 
N.W.2d 236).  Again, we review this question independently of 
the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Id. 
III 
¶25 To provide context to the questions before us, we 
examine first the bases of the defendant's right to be present 
at trial. 
¶26 A defendant has both a constitutional and a statutory 
right to be present at trial and at certain pre-trial 
proceedings.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Wis. Const. art. 1, 
§ 7; Wis. Stat. § 971.04; see also State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 
70, ¶22, 349 Wis. 2d 327, 833 N.W.2d 126 (citing Leroux v. 
State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 689, 207 N.W.2d 589 (1973)). 
¶27 The constitutional right to be present arises from the 
confrontation clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and grants the right to be present in the 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
11 
 
courtroom at every stage of trial.8  State v. Haynes, 118 
Wis. 2d 21, 25, 345 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1984) (citation 
omitted).  However, a defendant may waive this right by conduct 
or by express waiver.  Divanovic, 200 Wis. 2d at 220; see also 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1970).  "[W]hen a 
defendant is voluntarily absent from the trial proceedings, a 
defendant's failure to assert the right to be present can 
constitute an adequate waiver and an express waiver on the 
record is not essential."  Divanovic, 200 Wis. 2d at 220. 
¶28 In addition to the constitutional right to be present, 
Wisconsin law provides a statutory right to be present at 
certain proceedings.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1), a 
defendant has the right to be present at arraignment, trial, 
voir dire, and the return of the verdict, among other 
proceedings.9 
A 
¶29 Washington does not dispute that he waived his 
constitutional right to be present.  Rather, he focuses on one 
                                                 
8 The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him[.]"  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.  "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment makes the guarantees of 
this clause obligatory upon the States."  Illinois v. Allen, 397 
U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1965)).  A similar provision is present in the Wisconsin 
Constitution:  "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face."  Wis. 
Const. art. 1, § 7. 
9 See infra, ¶38. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
12 
 
exception to the general rule of presence that is enumerated by 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3).  It provides in relevant part: 
If the defendant is present at the beginning of the 
trial and thereafter, during the progress of the trial 
or before the verdict of the jury has been returned 
into court, voluntarily absents himself or herself 
from the presence of the court without leave of the 
court, the trial or return of verdict of the jury in 
the case shall not thereby be postponed or delayed, 
but the trial or submission of said case to the jury 
for verdict and the return of verdict thereon, if 
required, shall proceed in all respects as though the 
defendant were present in court at all times. 
¶30 We begin by examining the text of the statute.  
Previously, we have determined that the phrase "beginning of the 
trial" in the context of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) occurs when the 
selection of the jury has been completed and the jury has been 
sworn, in other words, when jeopardy attaches.10  State v. 
Miller, 197 Wis. 2d 518, 521-22, 541 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1995); 
see also State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, ¶13, 563 N.W.2d 528 
(1997). 
¶31 The 
statute 
discusses 
a 
defendant 
voluntarily 
absenting him or herself without any mention of a requirement 
                                                 
10 We observe that this definition of the "beginning of 
trial" differs from that utilized in federal court.  "Initially 
present at trial" in the context of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43(c) 
refers to the day that jury selection begins.  U.S. v. Benabe, 
654 F.3d 753, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2011).  The concurrence seeks to 
overrule State v. Miller, 197 Wis. 2d 518, 541 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. 
App. 1995), and to instead interpret the "beginning of trial" 
for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) consistently with the 
federal rule.  No party has asked us to do this.  Further, we 
observe that the language of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) differs from 
that of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43(c). 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
13 
 
that the defendant's action be taken knowingly.  It sets forth a 
way that a defendant can forfeit the right to be present——by 
leaving after the jury has been sworn.11  The text of the statute 
does not limit a defendant's ability to waive the right to be 
present and does not purport to set forth the exclusive manner 
in which a defendant can relinquish the right to be present. 
¶32 Washington asserts that he was unlawfully tried in 
absentia because he was not present when the jury was sworn in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3).  His argument misses the 
mark.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04(3) was created to attend to the 
situation 
in 
which 
a 
defendant 
absconds, 
not 
where 
an 
obstreperous defendant seeks to delay and disrupt proceedings 
through his own actions. 
¶33 Additionally, the Judicial Council comments to Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(3) state that "Sub. (3) is designed to prevent a 
defendant from stopping a trial which has commenced by absenting 
himself."  § 63 note, ch. 255, Laws of 1969; see State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶51, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("legislative history is sometimes 
                                                 
11 Forfeiture is the "failure to make the timely assertion 
of a right."  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
761 N.W.2d 612.  Waiver, on the other hand, occurs when there is 
an affirmative "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege."  State v. Haynes, 118 Wis. 2d 21, 25, 
345 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1984) (citation omitted).  "In contrast 
to forfeiture, waiver typically applies to those rights so 
important to the administration of a fair trial that mere 
inaction on the part of a litigant is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that the party intended to forgo the right."  Soto, 
343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶37 (citing Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶31). 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
14 
 
consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation").  
The statute was aimed at a defendant the court cannot locate.  
It is not aimed at a defendant who is easily located in the jail 
but steadfastly refuses to participate in any proceedings.  A 
contrary interpretation would allow a defendant to be as 
disorderly as they pleased, and as long as the unruly conduct 
took place prior to the jury being sworn, there could be no 
consequence. 
¶34 Washington seeks support for his contention that the 
circuit court violated his statutory right to be present in 
State v. Dwyer, 181 Wis. 2d 826, 512 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1994) 
and Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670.  In Dwyer, the defendant did not 
return to court after a recess while jury selection was ongoing.  
181 Wis. 2d at 832.  Dwyer was tried and convicted in absentia.  
Id.  The court of appeals granted Dwyer a new trial, concluding 
that, because Dwyer was not present at the beginning of the 
trial, the circuit court violated Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3).  Id. 
at 836-37. 
¶35 In Koopmans, the defendant did not appear for two 
separate sentencing hearings, and there was evidence she had 
absconded to Belize.  Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, ¶4.  The 
circuit court concluded that Koopmans was voluntarily absent and 
sentenced her in absentia.  Id.  This court determined that 
although the circuit court may have "proceeded carefully and 
reasonably in attempting to resolve the situation[,]" Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1) is mandatory and requires a defendant's presence at 
sentencing.  Id., ¶15. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
15 
 
¶36 Washington argues that Dwyer and Koopmans cut in his 
favor because like Washington, the defendants in both cases 
clearly chose not to be in court.  However, Dwyer and Koopmans 
are forfeiture, not waiver cases.  Although couched in terms of 
waiver,12 both of these cases present situations where the 
defendant 
did 
not 
make, 
on 
the 
record, 
any 
affirmative 
intentional relinquishment of the right to be present.  Unlike 
Washington, who conveyed personal, on-the-record comments, the 
defendants in both Dwyer and Koopmans simply absconded.  Rather 
than decline repeated offers to participate in proceedings, they 
merely practiced avoidance, which is exactly the situation Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(3) addresses.  See supra, ¶¶32-35. 
B 
¶37 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) does not 
apply, we turn now to examine whether Washington waived his 
§ 971.04(1) right to be present. 
¶38 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04(1) provides a defendant with 
the right to be present at certain proceedings.  It states: 
(1) Except as provided in subs. (2) and (3), the 
defendant shall be present: 
(a) At the arraignment; 
(b) At trial; 
                                                 
12 This court has acknowledged that "cases sometimes use the 
words 'forfeiture' and 'waiver' interchangeably."  State v. 
Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  
However, "the two words embody very different legal concepts."  
Id. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
16 
 
(c) During voir dire of the trial jury; 
(d) At any evidentiary hearing; 
(e) At any view by the jury; 
(f) When the jury returns its verdict; 
(g) At the pronouncement of judgment and the 
imposition of sentence; 
(h) At any other proceeding when ordered by the 
court. 
¶39 Similar to the constitutional right to be present, a 
defendant may waive his or her statutory right to be present at 
certain proceedings enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1).  See 
Soto, 343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶40.  Waiver can be either express or by 
conduct.  See id., ¶45. 
¶40 "Although a formal colloquy is often employed to show 
waiver, it is not the only way in which waiver may be shown."  
Id.,; see also, State v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶66, 335 
Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831.  Determining whether there is 
waiver by conduct presents a fact intensive inquiry. 
¶41 Turning to the facts of this case, the record 
demonstrates that Washington, by his conduct, waived his Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(1) right to be present at trial.  Washington 
repeatedly refused to participate in proceedings after being 
offered the opportunity numerous times. 
¶42 After Washington "semi was removed and semi left on 
his 
own[,]" 
the 
circuit 
court 
indicated 
that 
it 
would 
periodically, 
over 
the 
course 
of 
the 
proceedings, 
"make 
inquiries as to whether he wishes to come back to the 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
17 
 
courtroom[.]"  He would also be given "reasonable opportunities" 
to confer with counsel during the course of trial.  The circuit 
court followed through with this course of action. 
¶43 Following Washington's last outburst and before jury 
selection, 
Washington 
was 
twice 
asked 
if 
he 
wanted 
to 
participate.  First, the bailiff called the jail.  The bailiff 
reported that "the officer upstairs asked Mr. Washington if he 
would like to come down and participate in his jury trial.  Mr. 
Washington said no.  No further comment." 
¶44 Subsequently, Washington's counsel was "escorted up to 
the jail to be given the opportunity to confer with Mr. 
Washington if he is willing to come out of his cell[.]"  After 
conferring with Washington, counsel reported back that "[h]e 
informed me he is not participating.  I did explain to him the 
[c]ourt's 
ruling. 
 
He 
said 
he 
is 
not 
coming 
down 
to 
participate." 
¶45 In response to Washington's reaffirmation of his 
refusal to participate, the circuit court crafted a jury 
instruction, indicating that Washington was not present, he had 
waived his constitutional right to be present, and "his absence 
must 
not 
influence 
[the 
jury's] 
verdict 
in 
any 
manner 
whatsoever."  The circuit court read this instruction to the 
jury prior to voir dire, and reiterated during questioning of 
jurors that Washington's absence should have no effect on the 
jury's deliberations. 
¶46 The 
next 
morning, 
the 
circuit 
court 
initiated 
proceedings by stating:  "For the record I was advised earlier 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
18 
 
this morning that when Mr. Washington was contacted by a 
corrections officer or deputy to inquire as to whether he would 
be coming down and willing to come down for trial today he 
indicated that he would not."  Again, the circuit court gave 
Washington's counsel "the opportunity to go up to the jail to 
attempt to have contact with Mr. Washington and to discuss the 
matter with him."  Washington's counsel reported that she "spoke 
with him and he informed [her] that he does not want to come 
down." 
¶47 During a recess in testimony, counsel yet again met 
with Washington, and Washington again refused to participate.  
Counsel reported:  "I did speak with Mr. Washington.  He does 
not want to come down.  He does not want to participate in the 
trial.  I explained to him that we are approaching the point 
where he would have a constitutional right to testify on his own 
behalf.  He stated he did not want to do that." 
¶48 The circuit court responded:  "All right, once again 
contact has been made with Mr. Washington.  He's been given the 
opportunity to consult with his attorney and . . . been given 
the opportunity to appear here in court if he wishes to.  Based 
upon his continuing attitude and conduct the [c]ourt finds that 
he continues to waive his constitutional right to be present." 
¶49 After the close of testimony, the circuit court again 
instructed the jury that Washington's waiver of the right to be 
present "must not be considered by you in any way and it must 
not influence your verdict in any manner.  You are not to 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
19 
 
speculate about or draw any inferences from Mr. Washington's 
waiver of his right to be present."13 
¶50 Washington was given one more opportunity to be 
present——for the reading of the verdict.  The circuit court 
explained that "[p]rior to bringing the jury into the courtroom 
we have had a court officer contact jail personnel to inquire of 
Mr. Washington as to whether he would now come out of his cell 
and 
come 
down 
for 
purposes 
of 
receiving 
the 
verdict."  
Washington again refused to participate, indicating "very 
emphatically to personnel which was heard over the telephone by 
someone from this courtroom that he is not, does not wish to 
come down[.]". 
¶51 Given this sequence of events and the repeated 
opportunities the circuit court afforded to Washington to 
participate in the trial, we conclude that Washington knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his statutory right to be present at 
trial.  He knew he had the right to be present——counsel apprised 
him of that right on several occasions.  Further, his 
relinquishment of the right was voluntary——he refused numerous 
invitations to participate over the course of the relatively 
short single day of trial.  These circumstances demonstrate that 
Washington waived, rather than forfeited, the right to be 
present. 
                                                 
13 Like the court of appeals, we commend the circuit court 
for taking numerous steps to ensure that the jury was not 
prejudiced by Washington's absence.  See State v. Washington, 
2017 WI App 6, ¶19, 373 Wis. 2d 214, 890 N.W.2d 592. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
20 
 
IV 
¶52 Although 
we 
do 
not 
find 
Washington's 
arguments 
persuasive, we once again emphasize that the best practice is to 
engage the defendant in a colloquy.  A formal colloquy is by far 
the best practice to ensure that a defendant is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waiving a right.  State v. 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d 194, 
206, 
564 
N.W.2d 716 
(1997) 
(determining that a colloquy "is the clearest and most efficient 
means of insuring that the defendant has validly waived his 
right to the assistance of counsel, and of preserving and 
documenting that valid waiver for purposes of appeal and 
postconviction motions"). 
¶53 "[A] properly conducted colloquy serves the dual 
purposes of ensuring that a defendant is not deprived of his 
constitutional rights and of efficiently guarding our scarce 
judicial resources."  Id.  Indeed, a colloquy is required in 
some cases.  See State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, ¶24, 249 
Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301 (explaining that a colloquy is 
required to prove a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial); 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206 (mandating the use of a colloquy in 
every case where a defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel 
and proceed pro se). 
¶54 Consequently, 
in 
response 
to 
questions 
at 
oral 
argument regarding whether Washington should have been returned 
to the courtroom for a colloquy or if a court reporter should 
have been dispatched to his jail cell to record a colloquy, the 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
21 
 
State recognized that a colloquy is always preferable and the 
best practice. 
¶55 The State further acknowledged the obvious efficiency 
and savings of court resources——had the circuit court engaged in 
such a colloquy, this case likely would not be before this 
court.14  At oral argument, in response to a question from this 
court, the State's counsel asserted, with regard to best 
practices: 
That's just a matter of . . . when I'm standing before 
this court and you're asking me where on the record is 
there a knowing, intelligent waiver, I wouldn't be 
here if there was, or none of us would be here, if 
there was . . . .  
¶56 Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot fault 
the circuit court for failing to engage in a personal colloquy.  
Here, the circuit court's actions were sufficient and a colloquy 
was not required. 
¶57 The 
circuit 
court, 
on 
the 
record, 
described 
Washington's manipulative history and disruptive behaviors.  It 
explained that his demeanor was "physically aggressive and 
threatening."  The court surmised that returning Washington to 
court for a colloquy may have placed court personnel, as well as 
Washington himself, in danger.  See State v. Vaughn, 2012 WI App 
                                                 
14 We observed in State v. Denson, as we do here, that an 
on-the-record colloquy is the "better practice."  2011 WI 70, 
¶67, 335 Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831.  Similarly, we recognized 
in Denson that "had the circuit court engaged Denson in an on-
the-record colloquy regarding his right not to testify, this 
case likely would not be before us."  Id. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR 
 
22 
 
129, ¶26, 344 Wis. 2d 764, 823 N.W.2d 543 ("we will not impose 
on the circuit courts a rule that not only would be pyrrhic in 
the sense that if an obstreperous defendant is dragged into 
court and still does not cooperate, dragging that defendant into 
court accomplishes nothing, but would also endanger everyone 
including the defendant"). 
¶58 In 
conclusion, 
we 
determine 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.04(3) does not apply here because it does not place any 
limitation on a defendant's ability to waive the right to be 
present at any portion of trial.  We further determine that 
Washington, by his conduct, waived his § 971.04(1) right to be 
present at trial. 
¶59 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶60 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
 
 
 
No. 
2016AP238-CR.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶61 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the mandate of the majority, and join the majority's reasoning; 
that is, I agree that a defendant may waive his right to trial 
at any time, as Washington did through his conduct.1  However, I 
would go further and hold that Washington forfeited his right to 
be present at trial.  I would reach this conclusion by adopting 
the definition of "at the beginning of trial," Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(3), as "the day jury selection begins."  This is how 
federal courts define "initially present at trial."  See Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(1) (reciting the federal 
analogue to § 971.04(3)).2 
¶62 Currently, Wisconsin defines "at the beginning of 
trial" as "when . . . the jury is sworn."  State v. Miller, 197 
Wis. 2d 518, 521-22, 541 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1995).  The Miller 
court reached its conclusion through a syllogism.  Id.  It noted 
that in State v. Gonzalez, "a jury trial commences with the 
administration of the jury's oath."  Id. at 521 (quoting State 
v. Gonzalez, 172 Wis. 2d 576, 580, 493 N.W.2d 410 (Ct. App. 
1992)) (emphasis added).  The Miller court then reasoned that 
because the "beginning of trial" is when the trial "commences,"  
                                                 
1 Accordingly, I join the majority opinion except footnote 
ten. 
2 The majority puts significant stock in "beginning of 
trial" and "initially present at trial" being different words.  
Majority Op., ¶30 n.10.  The fact that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) 
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(1) do not use 
identical language is a distinction without a difference as one 
cannot be "initially present at trial" unless the "beginning of 
trial" has occurred. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR.mjg 
 
2 
 
id. (emphasis added), the "beginning of trial" is "when the jury 
is sworn."  Id. at 521-22.3 
¶63 Conversely, federal courts define "initially present 
at trial" as "the day that jury selection begins."  United 
States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2011); accord 
United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) 
("[E]very other circuit to address the issue . . . [has] held 
that a trial commences under Rule 43 when jury selection 
begins.").4 
¶64 The right to be present at trial was considered so 
sacrosanct at common law that for many years it could not be 
lost in felony cases—whether by waiver or forfeiture.5  Crosby v. 
                                                 
3 The court also noted that jeopardy attaches when the jury 
is sworn.  Id. at 522 (citing Wis. Stat. § 972.07(2)). 
4 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has since made clear 
that the phrase "when jury selection begins" it used in United 
States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) is 
substantively identical to the phrase "the day jury selection 
begins" used by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2011).  United 
States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 236 (11th Cir. 2013) ("Reading 
Bradford . . . together with the persuasive reasoning of Benabe, 
we conclude that trial commences no later than on the day of 
jury selection, without respect to whether the defendant is 
present at the time prospective jurors enter the courtroom.").  
5 "Although cases sometimes use the words 'forfeiture' and 
'waiver' interchangeably, the words embody very different legal 
concepts.  'Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely 
assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right.'" State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 
¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612  (quoted source omitted).  
Because the majority adequately analyzes a defendant's ability 
to waive his right to be present at trial, I focus on the issue 
of forfeiture. 
No. 
2016AP238-CR.mjg 
 
3 
 
United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (1993) (citing W. Mikell, 
Clark's Criminal Procedure 492 (2d ed. 1918)).  Courts began 
recognizing a defendants' forfeiture6 of that right due to 
efficiency concerns.  Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 457 
(1912) ("It does not seem to us to be consonant with the 
dictates of common sense that an accused person, being at large 
upon bail, should be at liberty, whenever he pleased, to 
withdraw himself from the courts of his country and to break up 
a trial already commenced.") (quoting Falk v. United States, 15 
App. D.C. 446, 454 (1899)).  Rule 43(c)(1) codified this 
holding.  See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 259-60.  Wisconsin similarly 
seeks to balance the right of one accused of criminal conduct to 
be present at trial with efficiency concerns.  State v. Dickson, 
53 Wis. 2d 532, 545-46, 193 N.W.2d 17 (1972) (construing prior 
version of Wis. Stat. § 971.04). 
¶65 Defendants may forfeit their right to be present 
after, but not before, trial begins because "the costs of 
suspending a proceeding already under way will be greater than 
the cost of postponing a trial not yet begun."  Crosby, 506 U.S. 
at 261.  See also  Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("there can be no doubt whatever that 
the governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be 
defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from 
                                                 
6 Though the federal courts use the term "waiver," a plain 
reading shows they use waiver to encompass both waiver and 
forfeiture.  See, e.g., Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 
460 (1899).   
No. 
2016AP238-CR.mjg 
 
4 
 
going forward").7  The balance between the rights of a defendant 
and judicial efficiency are better met by the federal rule than 
by the Miller holding.  Under Miller, a jury panel could be 
assembled, brought into the courtroom, and put through voir 
dire, yet be rendered unnecessary if the defendant chooses to  
absent himself before the jury is sworn.  State v. Koompans, 210 
Wis. 2d 670, 679, 563 N.W.2d 528 (1997).   
¶66 This result is as absurd as it is wasteful.  Like the 
First and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, I find that "the 
concept that a defendant could go through trial proceedings to 
the point of selecting the entire jury and then, perhaps because 
he was dissatisfied with the complement thereof, freely depart, 
does not appeal to" me.  Benabe, 654 F.3d at 772 (quoting United 
States v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600, 603 (1st Cir. 1972)).  The 
reality is "[m]odern American courts simply do not have the 
luxury of time to indulge the obstructionist tactics of these 
defendants.  Budgets, calendars, and administrative capacities 
are already too strained."  Benabe, 654 F.3d at 770. 
¶67 The time has come to overrule State v. Miller, 197 
Wis. 2d 518, 521-22, 541 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1995), and 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) consistent with Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 43(c)(1).  In addition to furthering our 
general policy of interpreting state provisions consistent with 
their federal counterparts,  this also presents the most logical 
balance between honoring the rights of those charged with 
                                                 
7 This language was quoted approvingly in Taylor v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (per curiam). 
No. 
2016AP238-CR.mjg 
 
5 
 
criminal conduct while at the same time acting as prudent 
stewards of the public fisc.  For the foregoing reasons, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP238-CR.mjg 
 
 
 
1