Title: Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Moni
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S129448
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2007

1
Filed 8/2/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ACTION APARTMENT ASSOCIATION, ) 
INC., et al.,  
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
)  
S129448 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B165082 
CITY OF SANTA MONICA, 
) 
 
) 
 Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SC274023 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
 
In this case, we determine whether and to what extent the litigation 
privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), conflicts with and thus 
preempts a section of the City of Santa Monica’s “Tenant Harassment” ordinance.  
In relevant part, the ordinance authorizes civil and criminal penalties against a 
landlord who maliciously serves a notice of eviction or brings any action to 
recover possession of a rental unit without a reasonable factual or legal basis.  The 
Court of Appeal held that the litigation privilege conflicts with and thus preempts 
the entirety of this section of the City of Santa Monica’s Tenant Harassment 
ordinance.  We conclude, however, that while the litigation privilege preempts 
entirely the second provision of this section regarding filing an action to recover 
possession of a rental unit, it preempts only partially the first provision regarding 
serving a notice of eviction. 
 
 
2
 
I.  THE CITY’S TENANT HARASSMENT ORDINANCE 
In 1979, the City of Santa Monica (City) adopted a rent control charter 
amendment, which established a rent control board to regulate rentals “so that 
rents will not be increased unreasonably and so that landlords will receive no more 
than a fair return.”  (Santa Monica City Charter, art. XVIII, § 1800.)  Pursuant to 
this charter amendment, the rent control board adopted regulations that established 
a maximum percentage by which rental rates could increase each year.  (Kavanau 
v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 730, 732.)   
In August 1995, California enacted the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act 
(Costa-Hawkins), which established “what is known among landlord-tenant 
specialists as ‘vacancy decontrol,’ declaring that ‘[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law,’ all residential landlords may, except in specified situations, 
‘establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling or unit.’ (Civ. Code, § 1954.53, 
subd. (a).)”  (DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 41.)  The effect of this 
provision was to permit landlords “to impose whatever rent they choose at the 
commencement of a tenancy.”  (Cobb v. San Francisco Residential Rent 
Stabilization and Arbitration Bd. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 345, 351.)  The 
Legislature was well aware, however, that such vacancy decontrol gave landlords 
an incentive to evict tenants that were paying rents below market rates.  (Bullard v. 
San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization Bd. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 488, 492 
(Bullard).)  Accordingly, the statute expressly preserves the authority of local 
governments “to regulate or monitor the grounds for eviction.”  (Civ. Code, 
§ 1954.53, subd. (e).) 
 
A month later, in October 1995, the City enacted its Tenant Harassment 
ordinance.  (Santa Monica Mun. Code, § 4.56.)  When the Santa Monica City 
Council amended the ordinance in 1996, residents testified “that instances of 
tenant harassment [had] been increasing in the City since the passage of [Costa-
 
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Hawkins]—the statewide vacancy decontrol measure.”  (Santa Monica Ord. No. 
1859ccs, § 1, subd. (a).)  In addition, “[s]tatistical information supplied by the 
Rent Control Board staff show[ed] that since the passage of [Costa-Hawkins], 
controlled rental units [were] being vacated at substantially higher rates.”  (Santa 
Monica Ord. No. 1859ccs, § 1, subd. (b).)  
 
The City’s Tenant Harassment ordinance prohibits a variety of malicious 
acts by landlords directed at tenants in rental housing units, including prohibiting a 
landlord from, for example, abusing a tenant with offensive words, threatening a 
tenant with physical harm, or interfering with a tenant’s right to quiet use and 
enjoyment of a rental housing unit.  (Santa Monica Mun. Code, § 4.56.020.)1  At 
                                              
1  
Section 4.56.020 of the Santa Monica Municipal Code provides: 
 
“No landlord shall, with respect to property used as a rental housing unit 
under any rental housing agreement or other tenancy or estate at will, however 
created, do any of the following with malice: 
     “(a)   Interrupt, terminate or fail to provide housing services required by 
contract or by State, County or local housing, health or safety laws; 
     “(b)   Fail to perform repairs and maintenance required by contract or by State, 
County or local housing, health or safety laws; 
     “(c)   Fail to exercise due diligence in completing repairs and maintenance once 
undertaken; 
     “(d)   Abuse the landlord’s right of access into a rental housing unit as that right 
is specified in California Civil Code Section 1954; 
     “(e)   Abuse the tenant with words which are offensive and inherently likely to 
provoke an immediate violent reaction; 
     “(f)    Influence or attempt to influence a tenant to vacate a rental housing unit 
through fraud, intimidation or coercion; 
     “(g)   Threaten the tenant, by word or gesture, with physical harm; 
     “(h)   Violate any law which prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, 
sexual preference, sexual orientation, ethnic background, nationality, religion, age, 
parenthood, marriage, pregnancy, disability, AIDS or occupancy by a minor child; 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
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issue in the instant case is Santa Monica Municipal Code section 4.56.020, 
subdivision (i)(1) (hereafter section 4.56.020(i)(1)), which prohibits a landlord 
from maliciously serving a notice of eviction or bringing any action to recover 
possession of a rental unit without a reasonable factual or legal basis.   
 
The ordinance provides for both criminal and civil penalties.  Any person 
convicted of violating the ordinance is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined 
in an amount not exceeding one thousand dollars, imprisoned for not more than six 
months, or both.  (Santa Monica Mun. Code, § 4.56.040, subd. (a).)  A civil 
enforcement action may be brought under the ordinance by “[a]ny person, 
including the City.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  Civil penalties may include the greater of 
statutory damages in the amount of $1,000 or actual damages, attorney fees and 
costs, and punitive damages.  (Id., subd. (d).)  The ordinance also provides that a 
court may enjoin “[a]ny person who commits an act, proposes to commit an act, or 
engages in any pattern and practice which violates Section 4.56.020.”  (Id., subd. 
(c).) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
     “(i)  (1) Take action to terminate any tenancy including service of any notice to 
quit or other eviction notice or bring any action to recover possession of a rental 
housing unit based upon facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to 
believe to be true or upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known 
to the landlord,  [¶]  (2)  This subsection shall not apply to any attorney who in 
good faith initiates legal proceedings against a tenant on behalf of a landlord to 
recover possession of a rental housing unit; 
     “(j)    Interfere with a tenant[’]s right to quiet use and enjoyment of a rental 
housing unit as that right is defined by California law; 
     “(k)   Refuse to acknowledge receipt of a tenant’s lawful rent payment; 
     “(l)    Interfere with a tenant’s right to privacy.” 
 
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II.  FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In October 2002, plaintiffs Action Apartment Association, Inc., and Doreen 
Dennis, an owner and manager of multiunit apartment buildings in Santa Monica, 
filed an amended class action complaint against the City, challenging section 
4.56.020(i)(1), which, as noted above, provides:  “No landlord shall . . . do any of 
the following with malice:  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  (i)(1) Take action to terminate any tenancy 
including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice or bring any action 
to recover possession of a rental housing unit based upon facts which the landlord 
has no reasonable cause to believe to be true or upon a legal theory which is 
untenable under the facts known to the landlord.” 
 
Plaintiffs alleged that the City had “engaged in a custom and practice of 
threatening housing provider class members with criminal and civil prosecution 
. . . for simply talking to their tenants, and/or serving their tenants or having their 
attorneys serve their tenants with a Notice to Cure or Quit or Notice to Terminate 
Tenancy; and/or filing an unlawful detainer complaint or having their attorneys 
file an unlawful detainer complaint against their tenants.”  They further alleged 
that the City had threatened Dennis with criminal and civil prosecution for 
“speaking to her tenant,” and for directing her attorney to serve her tenant with a 
notice to quit and to file an unlawful detainer lawsuit for the purpose of allowing 
the owner to retake possession of the rental unit.  Plaintiffs contended that section 
4.56.020(i)(1) abridges a landlord’s rights to free speech, to petition the 
government for redress of grievances, and to due process under the federal 
Constitution; violates a landlord’s civil rights under title 42 United States Code 
section 1983; and is preempted by Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 and the 
litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).  With respect to their 
claim that the litigation privilege preempts section 4.56.020(i)(1), plaintiffs sought 
a writ of mandate directing the City to “vacate and annul section 4.56.020(i)(1)” as 
 
6
preempted by the litigation privilege.  The City demurred as to each cause of 
action, contending that plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a cause of 
action.  The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered 
judgment for the City. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  Without reaching any of plaintiffs’ 
alternative claims, it held that the entirety of section 4.56.020(i)(1) is preempted 
because it conflicts with the litigation privilege.2  It reasoned that “under the 
litigation privilege, a landlord serving an eviction notice or filing an unlawful 
detainer is immune from suit based on those notices or filings, and cannot be 
enjoined from that conduct, even if the motivation is malicious, the factual 
allegations known to be untrue, and the legal theory untenable under the true facts. 
Under the ordinance, that same landlord, with that same lawsuit, is subject to 
criminal penalties, a civil lawsuit, and an injunction. The ordinance thus punishes 
what the Civil Code protects, is contradictory to state law, and is preempted.”    
The Court of Appeal concluded that the litigation privilege would bar every 
                                              
2  
The Court of Appeal did not reach the issue of standing, noting that the 
City’s demurrer did not challenge plaintiffs’ standing to raise the argument that the 
ordinance is preempted by state law.  It appears from the record, however, that the 
City may have challenged plaintiffs’ standing with respect to all causes of action.  
Because neither party has raised the issue of standing in this court, we do not reach 
it.  Under article VI, section 12, subdivision (b) (article VI, section 12(b)), of the 
California Constitution, this court has jurisdiction to “review the decision of a 
court of appeal in any cause.”  We granted review in this case to address the sole 
issue considered by the Court of Appeal, whether the litigation privilege conflicts 
with and thus preempts section 4.56.020(i)(1).  We may review this issue without 
first reaching the issue of standing.  (See also Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 442, 454, fn. 8 [“Nothing in article VI, section 12(b) suggests that, having 
rejected the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on the preliminary issue of standing, we 
are foreclosed from ‘review[ing]’ the second subject addressed and resolved in its 
decision.”].) 
 
7
application of section 4.56.020(i)(1).  It concluded also that the litigation privilege 
bars criminal prosecutions brought to enforce section 4.56.020(i)(1), reasoning 
that “the fact that the Legislature may create exemptions to a statutory privilege 
does not mean that the City may also do so.”  Additionally, the Court of Appeal 
directed the trial court to enter a judgment declaring that “Santa Monica Municipal 
Code section 4.56.020, subdivision (i) is preempted by state law.” 
We granted the City’s petition for review to determine whether and to what 
extent section 4.56.020(i)(1) conflicts with and is preempted by the litigation 
privilege.  The Court of Appeal’s decision that the litigation preempts section 
4.56.020(i)(1) was correct only in part.  The litigation privilege preempts entirely 
the second provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1), but preempts only partially the first 
provision of this section. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), 
provides that a “publication or broadcast” made as part of a “judicial proceeding” 
is privileged.  This privilege is absolute in nature, applying “to all publications, 
irrespective of their maliciousness.”  (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 
216 (Silberg).)  “The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any 
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants 
or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; 
and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.”  (Id. at p. 212.)  
The privilege “is not limited to statements made during a trial or other 
proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.”  (Rusheen 
v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 (Rusheen).) 
“The principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and 
witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of 
being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. [Citations.]”  (Silberg, 
 
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supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.)  In order to achieve this purpose of curtailing 
derivative lawsuits, we have given the litigation privilege a broad interpretation.  
The litigation privilege “derives from common law principles establishing a 
defense to the tort of defamation.”  (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, 
Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1163.)  “Its placement in 
the Civil Code immediately following the statutory provisions defining the 
elements of the twin defamation torts of libel and slander [citations] makes clear 
that, at least historically, the section was primarily designed to limit an 
individual’s potential liability for defamation.”  (Ibid.)  Beginning with Albertson 
v. Raboff, which involved an action for defamation of title, we first extended the 
litigation privilege to apply to torts other than defamation.  (Albertson v. Raboff 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 375 (Albertson).)  As we observed in Silberg, the litigation 
privilege has since “been held to immunize defendants from tort liability based on 
theories of abuse of process [citations], intentional infliction of emotional distress 
[citations], intentional inducement of breach of contract [citations], intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage [citation], negligent 
misrepresentation [citation], invasion of privacy [citation], negligence [citation] 
and fraud [citations].”  (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 215.)   
The litigation privilege, however, is not without limit.  For example, in 
Albertson, we did not extend the privilege to actions for malicious prosecution, 
explaining that “[t]he policy of encouraging free access to the courts that underlies 
the absolute privilege applicable in defamation actions is outweighed by the policy 
of affording redress for individual wrongs when the requirements of favorable 
termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied.”  (Albertson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p. 382.)   
We review the Court of Appeal’s determination that the litigation privilege 
preempts the entirety of section 4.56.020(i)(1).  “ ‘If otherwise valid local 
 
9
legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.’ ”  
(Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 (Sherwin-
Williams), quoting Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School 
Dist. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885 (Candid Enterprises, Inc.).)  “[A]bsent a clear 
indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature,” we presume that local 
regulation “in an area over which [the local government] traditionally has 
exercised control” is not preempted by state law.  (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. 
County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.)  “The party claiming that 
general state law preempts a local ordinance has the burden of demonstrating 
preemption.”  (Ibid.) 
State preemption of local legislation is established by article XI, section 7 
of the California Constitution, which provides that “[a] county or city may make 
and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and 
regulations not in conflict with general laws.”  In Sherwin-Williams, this court 
identified three types of conflict that cause preemption:  “ ‘A conflict exists if the 
local legislation “ ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by 
general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.’ ” ’ ”  (Sherwin-
Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, quoting Candid Enterprises, Inc., supra, 
39 Cal.3d at p. 885.)  Local legislation “is ‘contradictory’ to general law when it is 
inimical thereto.”  (Sherwin-Williams, at p. 898; Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 
636, 641-648 [a city ordinance that set a lower maximum speed than the maximum 
speed permitted by state law was preempted].)  A local ordinance is preempted by 
a state statute only to the extent that the two conflict.  (Cohen v. Board of 
Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 304 (Cohen); see also Peatros v. Bank of Am. 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 147, 173, fn. 6 (Peatros).) 
 
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Plaintiffs argue that the litigation privilege is inimical to and thus preempts 
(1) the provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) authorizing a suit based on a defendant 
bringing “an action to recover possession of a rental housing unit based upon facts 
which the landlord had no reasonable cause to believe to be true or upon a legal 
theory which is untenable under the facts known to the landlord” and (2) the 
provision of this section authorizing a suit based on “serving any notice to quit or 
other eviction notice” without a reasonable factual or legal basis.   
A. 
An Action to Recover Possession of a Rental Unit 
 
Plaintiffs allege that the City has threatened action against Dennis pursuant 
to section 4.56.020(i)(1) based on her direction to her attorney to file an unlawful 
detainer lawsuit for the purpose of allowing her to retake possession of a rental 
unit.  This alleged threatened action would arise under the second provision of 
section 4.56.020(i)(1), which provides:  “No landlord shall . . . do any of the 
following with malice:  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  (i)(1) Take action to terminate any tenancy 
including . . . bring any action to recover possession of a rental housing unit based 
upon facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true or 
upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to the landlord.”  
(Italics added.)  When considering whether this provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) 
is preempted, we ask whether it conflicts with the litigation privilege.  (Sherwin-
Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898.)   
This provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) is inimical to the important 
purposes of the litigation privilege.  First among these is “afford[ing] litigants and 
witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of 
being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.  [Citations.]”  (Silberg, 
supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.)  Whether actions pursuant to this provision of section 
4.56.020(i)(1) are brought by the City, a third party, or a tenant, such actions 
 
11
alleging that a landlord had improperly filed an action to recover possession of 
rental housing would severely restrict landlords’ freedom of access to the courts.   
We recognize that the City enacted its Tenant Harassment ordinance for the 
legitimate government purpose of protecting the City’s residents from abuse by 
landlords.  As described above, the City was motivated by then recently enacted 
Costa-Hawkins, which provided an incentive for landlords improperly to cause 
tenants to vacate rental units, and evidence that, after the passage of Costa-
Hawkins, instances of tenant harassment increased and rent-controlled units were 
vacated at higher rates.  (Santa Monica Ord. No. 1859ccs, § 1, subds. (a) and (b).)  
However, that the City was motivated by a legitimate government purpose does 
not justify its enforcement of a law that discourages all landlords, including those 
motivated by honest intentions, from initiating unlawful detainer actions.  The 
City’s enforcement of the provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) that creates a civil 
and criminal cause of action based on the act of initiating litigation would cut 
against the litigation privilege’s “core policy” of protecting access to the courts.  
(Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1198 (Rubin).)  Knowing that the City or 
any other person could bring an action under section 4.56.020(i)(1), even against a 
landlord who prevailed in an unlawful detainer action, would have a chilling effect 
on landlords pursuing evictions through the courts.  
This and other courts have emphasized the importance of the litigation 
privilege’s absolute protection of access to the courts, while recognizing that this 
absolute protection has its costs.  “ ‘[It] is desirable to create an absolute privilege 
. . . not because we desire to protect the shady practitioner, but because we do not 
want the honest one to have to be concerned with [subsequent derivative] actions 
. . . .’ ”  (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 214, quoting Thornton v. Rhoden (1966) 
245 Cal.App.2d 80, 99.)  “ ‘[W]hen there is a good faith intention to bring a suit, 
even malicious publications “are protected as part of the price paid for affording 
 
12
litigants the utmost freedom of access to the courts.” ’ ”  (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. 
Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 392, 405.)  Additionally, “in 
immunizing participants from liability for torts arising from communications made 
during judicial proceedings, the law places upon litigants the burden of exposing 
during trial the bias of witnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby enhancing the 
finality of judgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of litigation, an evil far 
worse than an occasional unfair result.”  (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 214.) 
In arguing that section 4.56.020(i)(1) is not preempted by the litigation 
privilege, the City first would have us evaluate section 4.56.020(i)(1) as if it had 
been enacted by the Legislature, noting that landlord-tenant relations is an area of 
the law in which the Legislature expressly allows local governments to act.  The 
City is correct only insofar as it observes that this and other courts have held that 
state law allows municipal governments the authority to enact and enforce 
particular local laws governing landlord-tenant relations, including those related to 
evictions and rent control.  (See, e.g., Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court 
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 952; Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 707-708; 
Birkenfeld v. Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 148-149; Bullard, supra, 106 
Cal.App.4th 488.)  That state legislation allows local governments to adopt laws 
regulating evictions, however, does not give those local laws the force of state law.   
The Legislature also has included savings clauses in rental housing 
legislation, preserving the authority of local governments to regulate in this area.  
These clauses are not intended to give local ordinances additional force or to 
expand the authority of local governments, but instead are intended only to 
preserve their existing authority.  Costa-Hawkins provides that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to affect any authority of a public entity that may 
otherwise exist to regulate or monitor the grounds for eviction.”  (Civ. Code, 
§ 1954.53, subd. (e), italics added.)  This section “is a strong statement that the 
 
13
state law establishing vacancy decontrol is not meant to affect the authority of 
local governments to monitor and regulate the grounds for eviction, in order to 
prevent pretextual evictions.”  (Bullard, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 492, italics 
added.)  Legislation enacted in 2003 that prohibits a landlord from engaging in 
specified conduct in order to encourage a tenant to vacate a dwelling includes a 
similar savings clause.  (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (d).)  However, we see nothing 
in these narrowly focused savings clauses that is designed to give local 
governments the new and additional authority to adopt ordinances limiting state 
laws of general application, including the litigation privilege.  
Second, the City contends that the privilege does not apply to criminal 
prosecutions, whether brought pursuant to state statute or local ordinance.  We 
disagree.  The City correctly notes that on more than one occasion we have treated 
it as obvious that the litigation privilege does not bar certain government actions, 
including criminal prosecutions and regulatory actions brought pursuant to state 
statutes.  (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 361 
(Hagberg); Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1198; Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 
pp. 218-219.)  However, these exceptions to the privilege have all involved suits 
brought under state laws, each of which makes clear that the Legislature did not 
intend its enforcement to be barred by the litigation privilege.  Local governments 
do not have the same authority to create exceptions to the litigation privilege.   
We have observed that the litigation privilege does not apply to the 
following crimes:  perjury (Pen. Code, § 118 et seq.); subornation of perjury (id., 
§ 127); criminal prosecution under Business and Professions Code section 6128; 
false report of a criminal offense (Pen. Code, § 148.5); and “attorney solicitation 
through the use of ‘runners’ or ‘cappers’ ” (Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1098, 
quoting Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6152-6153).  (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 218-
219; Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 361.)  State Bar discipline of attorneys who 
 
14
engage in solicitation and enforcement of the antisolicitation statute is also 
excepted from the litigation privilege.  (Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1198.)  Our 
recognition that prosecutions of these crimes and specified State Bar actions are 
not barred by the litigation privilege does not reflect that an exception for criminal 
prosecutions is inherent in the litigation privilege itself.  Instead, our recognition 
of these exceptions to the litigation privilege has been guided by the “rule of 
statutory construction that particular provisions will prevail over general 
provisions.”  (In re James M. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 522; Code Civ. Proc., § 1859.) 
Each of the above mentioned statutes is more specific than the litigation 
privilege and would be significantly or wholly inoperable if its enforcement were 
barred when in conflict with the privilege.  The crimes of perjury3 and subornation 
of perjury4 would be almost without meaning if statements made during the course 
of litigation were protected from prosecution for perjury by the litigation privilege.   
The misdemeanors established by Business and Professions Code section 6128 
evince a legislative intent that certain attorney conduct not be protected from 
prosecution by the litigation privilege:  “Every attorney is guilty of a misdemeanor 
                                              
3  
“Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, 
depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of 
the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, 
willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or 
she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or 
certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, 
declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of 
California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter 
which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.”  (Pen. Code, § 118, 
subd. (a).) 
4  
“Every person who willfully procures another person to commit perjury is 
guilty of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he would 
be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured.”  (Pen. Code, § 127.) 
 
15
who either:  [¶]  (a) Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or 
collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party.  [¶]  (b) Willfully delays 
his client’s suit with a view to his own gain.  [¶]  (c) Willfully receives any money 
or allowance for or on account of any money which he has not laid out or become 
answerable for.”  Although tort liability may not be imposed when a person 
contacts law enforcement to report suspected criminal activity, the Legislature has 
provided that a person may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor for reporting to a 
peace officer, deputy attorney general, district attorney, or other specified official 
“that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed, knowing the report to be 
false.”  (Pen. Code, § 148.5, subd. (a); Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 361.)  
Similarly, while attorney solicitation may not be the basis for tort liability, the 
Legislature has specified that certain attorney solicitation in or near prisons, 
hospitals, courts and other designated locations is a crime.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 6152- 6153; Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1198.)  As we observed in Rubin, the 
Legislature has also charged the State Bar with disciplining attorneys who engage 
in solicitation and enforcement of the antisolicitation statute.  (Rubin, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at p. 1198.) 
In all of the above examples, we found exceptions to the litigation privilege 
based on irreconcilable conflicts between the privilege and other co-equal state 
laws.  Fundamental to the doctrine of preemption is the distinction between state 
and local laws:  local governments lack the authority to craft their own exceptions 
to general state laws.  (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.)   
Third, the City suggests that any claims brought by parties not involved in 
the underlying litigation, including government entities, are not barred by the 
privilege.  The City relies on Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1187, in which we held that 
claims brought by a co-owner of a mobilehome park against a park resident and 
her attorney for soliciting other residents as clients in anticipated litigation against 
 
16
the co-owner regarding park conditions were barred by the litigation privilege, 
including a claim for injunctive relief under the unfair competition law (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.).  (Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1198, 1204.)  We 
stated in dictum “that the policy underlying the unfair competition statute can be 
vindicated by multiple parties other than plaintiff,” including the Attorney 
General, district attorneys, certain city attorneys, and “members of the public who, 
unlike plaintiff, are not adversaries in collateral litigation involving the same 
attorneys.”  (Id. at p. 1204.)  This dictum does not support the City’s argument that 
parties not involved in the underlying litigation are not barred by the litigation 
privilege from bringing actions pursuant to section 4.56.020(i)(1).  In Rubin, we 
considered the application of the litigation privilege to actions brought pursuant to 
the unfair competition law, a state statute, whereas here we consider its application 
to actions brought pursuant to a local ordinance.  As stated above, local 
governments may not create their own exceptions to the litigation privilege.  
While the Legislature remains free to create exceptions to the litigation 
privilege, for parties to the underlying litigation and others, we decline to 
recognize a broad exception to the litigation privilege for any party who did not 
participate in the underlying litigation.  An exception to the litigation privilege for 
all suits brought by parties who were not involved in the underlying litigation 
would be antithetical to the privilege’s purposes.  The litigation privilege “has 
been referred to as ‘the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial 
system.’ ”  (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 214-215, quoting McClatchy 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 970.)  It 
“promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging ‘open 
channels of communication and the presentation of evidence’ in judicial 
proceedings.”  (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.)  We have observed that an 
“ ‘external threat of liability is destructive of [the] fundamental right [of access to 
 
17
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings] and inconsistent with the effective 
administration of justice.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The litigation privilege is meant to protect 
more than the parties to a lawsuit from derivative suits that they might later bring 
against each other.  Derivative litigation brought by parties who did not participate 
in the underlying litigation, like litigation brought by parties who did participate, 
would pose an external threat of liability that would deter potential litigants, 
witnesses, and others from participating in judicial proceedings.     
Fourth, the City contends that the litigation privilege does not apply to an 
action brought under the ordinance because eviction notices and actions are 
noncommunicative conduct.  A threshold issue in determining if the litigation 
privilege applies is whether the alleged injury arises from a communicative act or 
noncommunicative conduct.  (Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 211.)   
“The distinction between communicative and noncommunicative conduct hinges 
on the gravamen of the action.  [Citations.]  That is, the key in determining 
whether the privilege applies is whether the injury allegedly resulted from an act 
that was communicative in its essential nature.  [Citations.]  The following acts 
have been deemed communicative and thus protected by the litigation privilege: 
attorney prelitigation solicitations of potential clients and subsequent filing of 
pleadings in the litigation [citation], and testimonial use of the contents of illegally 
overheard conversation [citation].  The following acts have been deemed 
noncommunicative and thus unprivileged:  prelitigation illegal recording of 
confidential telephone conversations [citation]; eavesdropping on a telephone 
conversation [citation]; and physician’s negligent examination of patient causing 
physical injury [citation].”  (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058, italics added.) 
 
18
 
The City argues that the gravamen of initiating an eviction action is 
improperly terminating a tenancy because such initiations, without more, 
frequently cause tenants to terminate their tenancies.  It argues that a landlord who 
violates section 4.56.020(i)(1) engages in a “course of conduct designed to wrest a 
tenant from his or her home without complying with legal requirements.”  We 
have drawn “a careful distinction between a cause of action based squarely on a 
privileged communication, such as an action for defamation, and one based upon 
an underlying course of conduct evidenced by the communication.”  (White v. 
Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 888.)  “As a general rule, the 
privilege ‘ “applies only to communicative acts and does not privilege tortious 
courses of conduct.” ’ ”  (Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 830, 
quoting LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 345.)  For example, in 
LiMandri, the Court of Appeal held that the litigation privilege did not bar 
plaintiff’s “cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations 
because it [was] based upon an alleged tortious course of conduct,” including the 
preparation and execution of documents creating a security interest in a portion of 
settlement proceeds and the “refusal to concede the superiority of [plaintiff’s] 
contractual lien.”  (LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.) 
 
The gravamen of the City’s alleged action arising under the provision of 
section 4.56.020(i)(1) that prohibits a landlord from bringing an action to recover 
possession of a rental unit, is not a course of conduct.  An action brought pursuant 
to this provision of the ordinance is necessarily based on the filing of a legal 
action, which by its very nature is a communicative act.  The filing of a legal 
action is not “an independent, noncommunicative, wrongful act.”   (Rusheen, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)  We contemplate no communication that is more 
clearly protected by the litigation privilege than the filing of a legal action. 
 
19
 
Finally, the City suggests that “in cases brought under [section 
4.56.020(i)(1)] where the tenant has already prevailed in a groundless and 
malicious unlawful detainer lawsuit, the three conditions required to bring a 
malicious prosecution action are satisfied” and thus the litigation privilege does 
not apply.  As noted above, we have recognized an exception to the litigation 
privilege for the tort of malicious prosecution because “the requirements of 
favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied.”  
(Albertson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 382.)  However, section 4.56.020(i)(1) does not 
require that all three of the conditions of malicious prosecution be met.  Favorable 
termination is not an element of a cause of action under section 4.56.020(i)(1), and 
we need not address whether a similar ordinance that included this element would 
be excepted from the litigation privilege.  A tenant who has successfully defended 
against an eviction action may, of course, bring an action for malicious 
prosecution.   
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the litigation privilege conflicts 
with and, thus, preempts the provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) authorizing a suit 
based on a defendant bringing “an action to recover possession of a rental housing 
unit based upon facts which the landlord had no reasonable cause to believe to be 
true or upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to the 
landlord.”5 
                                              
5  
In dissent, Justice Corrigan agrees with our conclusion “that the policies 
underlying the privilege tend to support its application in this context.”  (Dis. opn. 
of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 2.)  She disagrees, however, with our conclusion that the 
litigation privilege preempts this provision of the City’s Tenant Harassment 
ordinance.  She suggests that the Legislature did not enact the litigation privilege 
“to invalidate any particular causes of action.”  (Id., at pp. 2-3.)  On this point, the 
dissent misconstrues both the role of declaratory relief and the nature of 
preemption.     
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
20
B. 
Notice of Eviction in Order to Recover Possession of a Rental Unit 
 
 
Plaintiffs also allege that the City has threatened action against Dennis 
pursuant to section 4.56.020(i)(1) for directing her attorney to serve her tenant 
with a notice to quit for the purpose of allowing the owner to retake possession of 
the rental unit.  This alleged threatened action is authorized by the first provision 
of section 4.56.020(i)(1), which provides:  “No landlord shall . . . do any of the 
following with malice:  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  (i)(1) Take action to terminate any tenancy 
including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice . . . based upon facts 
which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true or upon a legal 
theory which is untenable under the facts known to the landlord.”  (Italics added.)  
When considering whether this provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) also is 
preempted, we ask whether it, too, conflicts with the litigation privilege.  
(Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898.)   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
In this case, plaintiffs did not wait until the City brought an action under the 
relevant provisions of the Tenant Harassment ordinance to raise the defense of the 
litigation privilege, but instead sought prospective relief declaring that the 
litigation privilege would be a successful defense to such an action.  It is well 
established that parties may seek declaratory relief with respect to the 
interpretation and application of local ordinances.  (See, e.g., Walker v. County of 
Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 637 [“The interpretation of ordinances and 
statutes are proper matters for declaratory relief.”];  California Water & Tel. Co. v. 
County of Los Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 24 [“A person need not violate 
or plan to violate a penal ordinance before he can obtain a declaration construing it 
and deciding its application to him.”].)  It is also well established that preemption, 
like other affirmative defenses, may be raised in a complaint seeking declaratory 
or other prospective relief.  (Malish v. City of San Diego (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 
725; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374.)  Thus, we do not 
convert the litigation privilege from a “shield” into a “sword,” as Justice Corrigan 
contends, but instead clarify when the use of the litigation privilege as a “shield” is 
effective.  (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 1.) 
 
21
This provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) conflicts only in part with the 
litigation privilege.  The privilege applies only to a “publication or broadcast” 
made as part of a “judicial proceeding.”  (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).)  A notice of 
eviction is a communication regarding prospective litigation, and, as such, it is not 
necessarily part of a judicial proceeding.  (See, e.g., Edwards v. Centex Real 
Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 30 (Edwards).)  As described below, 
courts have developed a test for determining when a communication regarding 
prospective litigation is subject to the litigation privilege.  Because this test 
involves a question of fact, it is impossible to conclude, as the Court of Appeal 
did, that every action brought pursuant to the notice provision necessarily would 
be barred by the litigation privilege. 
To be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be “in 
furtherance of the objects of the litigation.”  (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 219.)  
This is “part of the requirement that the communication be connected with, or 
have some logical relation to, the action, i.e., that it not be extraneous to the 
action.”  (Id. at pp. 219-220.)  A prelitigation communication is privileged only 
when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious 
consideration.  (Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 
1359, 1381 (Eisenberg); Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 36; Laffer v. 
Levinson (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 117, 124 (Laffer); Fuhrman v. California Satellite 
Systems (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 408, 421 (Fuhrman), disapproved on other 
grounds in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 219; Rest.2d Torts, § 586, com. e, 
p. 248.)   
 
The policy supporting the litigation privilege is furthered only if litigation 
is seriously considered:  “It is important to distinguish between the lack of a good 
faith intention to bring a suit and publications which are made without a good faith 
belief in their truth, i.e., malicious publications.  The latter, when made in good 
 
22
faith anticipation of litigation, are protected as part of the price paid for affording 
litigants the utmost freedom of access to the courts.  This policy consideration is 
not advanced, however, when the person publishing an injurious falsehood is not 
seriously considering litigation.  In such a case, the publication has no ‘connection 
or logical relation’ to an action and is not made ‘to achieve the objects’ of any 
litigation [citation].  No public policy supports extending a privilege to persons 
who attempt to profit from hollow threats of litigation.”  (Fuhrman, supra, 179 
Cal.App.3d at p. 422, fn. 5; accord, Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 36; 
Laffer, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 124.) 
 
Whether a prelitigation communication relates to litigation that is 
contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration is an issue of fact.  For 
example, in Eisenberg, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment on the basis of the litigation privilege because “[i]t 
remain[ed] a triable issue of fact whether . . . imminent litigation was seriously 
proposed and actually contemplated in good faith as a means of resolving the 
dispute between [the parties].”  (Eisenberg, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381; see 
also Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 fn. 10; Fuhrman, supra, 179 
Cal.App.3d at p. 422.)  Because a factual inquiry is required in order to determine 
whether a particular eviction notice is privileged, it is impossible to conclude that 
the litigation privilege would bar every action arising under the provision of 
section 4.56.020(i)(1) authorizing suits based on unfounded notices of eviction.  
Here, plaintiffs’ complaint offers very little description of the City’s threatened 
action or the notice of eviction that Dennis allegedly served on her tenant.   
Because a factual inquiry is required in order to determine whether a 
particular eviction notice is privileged, the Court of Appeal erred in its holding 
that this provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) is entirely preempted by the litigation 
privilege.  This provision is preempted only to the extent that it actually conflicts 
 
23
with the litigation privilege.  (Cohen, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 304; Peatros, supra, 
22 Cal.4th at p.173, fn. 6.)  That is, this provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) 
conflicts with, and is preempted by, the litigation privilege to the extent it 
prohibits, criminalizes, and establishes civil penalties for eviction notices where 
litigation is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.6  
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment to the extent that it 
directs the superior court to enter a judgment declaring that section 4.56.020(i)(1) 
is preempted by the litigation privilege. 
                                              
6  
In dissent, Justice Corrigan suggests that our opinion is inconsistent in that 
we hold that the provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) authorizing suits based on 
unfounded notices of eviction is only partially preempted, based on the particular 
factual circumstances, but hold that the provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) based 
on a defendant bringing an eviction action is entirely preempted, regardless of 
whether the elements of malicious prosecution have been met.  This argument 
overlooks the distinction between factual and legal questions.  The analysis 
required to determine whether the litigation privilege applies to a prelitigation 
communication involves a question of fact.  In contrast, the question whether an 
action under the provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) based on an eviction action 
contains the same elements as a malicious prosecution action, and is therefore 
exempt from the litigation privilege, is a question of law requiring a categorical 
determination.  As explained above, the fact that an eviction action was terminated 
in the tenant’s favor does not alter that determination.  This additional fact does 
not transform an action under the provision of section 4.56.020(i)(1) based on a 
defendant bringing an eviction action into one that is “analogous” to malicious 
prosecution (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 4, fn. 2), such that we could 
recognize a categorical exception to the litigation privilege as a matter of law, 
because the ordinance does not require all of the elements of a malicious 
prosecution action. 
 
24
IV.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent that it reverses 
the superior court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and 
reverses the resulting judgment of dismissal, but reverse the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment to the extent that it directs the superior court to enter a judgment 
declaring that section 4.56.020(i)(1) is preempted by the litigation privilege.  We 
remand the matter to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with 
the views expressed in this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues.  There is no 
conflict between the litigation privilege and the City of Santa Monica’s “Tenant 
Harassment” ordinance.  Had the city attempted to create some version of a 
privilege at odds with Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), that law would have 
been preempted.  But the ordinance before us does not interfere with the operation 
of the litigation privilege.  It is not “inimical” to the privilege in the relevant sense; 
it “does not prohibit what the statute commands or command what it prohibits.”  
(Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 902.)  
Landlords are free to raise the litigation privilege in actions brought under the 
ordinance, and in such cases the scope of the defense could properly be explored 
and established.  The majority, however, wields the defense not as the shield it 
was intended to be but as a sword against the legislative authority of local 
government.  Doing so, it distorts both the doctrine of preemption and the 
privilege itself.  
The majority states the rule we recently reaffirmed in Big Creek Lumber 
Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139:  “[A]bsent a clear indication 
of preemptive intent from the Legislature,” we presume that local regulation “in an 
area over which [the local government] traditionally has exercised control” is not 
preempted by state law.  (Id. at p. 1149; maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  However, the 
majority does not follow this rule.  By no stretch of logic or language can it be said 
that when the Legislature enacted the litigation privilege, it intended to invalidate 
 
2
local regulations penalizing landlords for bad faith conduct in legal disputes with 
their tenants.  (Compare Cacho v. Boudreau (2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 349-355.) 
As the majority explains, the privilege was enacted as a limitation on 
defamation liability, and has been expanded by judicial decision to apply to a wide 
range of tort actions other than malicious prosecution.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  
Now, the majority further extends the privilege to apply to causes of action 
brought under Santa Monica’s Tenant Harassment ordinance.  I would be 
sympathetic to such an extension were the privilege raised as a defense in an 
appropriate case.  I agree with the majority that the policies underlying the 
privilege tend to support its application in this context.  However, the privilege 
merely provides immunity from liability.  It does not operate to abolish the 
underlying cause of action; it simply limits the availability of the remedy in 
particular circumstances.  (See, e.g., Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 
1063 [“the litigation privilege . . . narrows the scope of the tort of abuse of process 
in the judgment enforcement context”].) 
Thus, there are two separate reasons why it cannot logically be said that the 
litigation privilege was intended by the Legislature to preempt local legislation.  
First, the privilege was enacted as a defense to defamation claims, and while its 
scope has been enlarged by the courts, it has thus far not been applied beyond the 
tort liability context.  The Legislature’s failure to limit the reach of Civil Code 
section 47, subdivision (b) may be taken as an indication that it approves a broad 
application of the privilege in tort cases (see Hagberg v. California Federal Bank 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 369), but no such implication may be indulged, as yet, with 
regard to causes of action arising under local ordinances. 
Second, the Legislature plainly intended to provide immunity for 
communications made in connection with judicial proceedings, not to invalidate 
any particular causes of action.  The majority cites no case in which a statute 
 
3
providing a defense has been held to preempt an ordinance providing a remedy.  
There is no reason for such a holding; the defense may simply be raised in an 
enforcement action and given its appropriate application, without violating the 
presumption favoring the validity of the ordinance against an attack of state 
preemption.  (See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 38 
Cal.4th at p. 1149; for a discussion of the analogous federal preemption doctrine, 
see Viva! International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail 
Operations (July 23, 2007, S140064) __ Cal.4th __ [pp. 4-5, 7.)1 
The majority opinion is not only inconsistent with the principles of 
preemption and privilege; it is also internally inconsistent.  Insofar as the 
ordinance applies to actions to recover possession, the majority holds it is flatly 
preempted.  In response to the city’s argument that the privilege would not apply 
to actions that meet the requirements for a malicious prosecution claim, the  
majority notes that (1) the ordinance is not limited to the circumstances in which a 
malicious prosecution action would lie, and (2) the tenant is free to bring a 
malicious prosecution action if the requisite elements are satisfied.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 19.)  However, insofar as the ordinance applies to eviction notices, the 
majority takes a different tack.  Because the courts have limited the scope of the 
litigation privilege in tort actions arising from prelitigation communications, the 
majority reasons that the privilege is similarly limited in actions brought under the 
ordinance, resulting in only partial preemption.   
                                              
 
1  The majority responds that declaratory relief may be sought to test the 
interpretation of local ordinances, and that preemption is itself a defense that may 
be raised in such a proceeding.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 19-20, fn. 5.)  I have no 
quarrel with these observations.  I note only that the majority refers to no instance 
in which a statutory defense has been applied preemptively to an entire category of 
actions. 
 
4
If  the policy considerations supporting the maintenance of some tort claims 
based on prelitigation communications are sufficient to permit some claims under 
the ordinance to go forward, would not the policy considerations supporting the 
maintenance of malicious prosecution actions also justify permitting claims under 
the ordinance by tenants who can establish the elements of malicious prosecution?  
Or conversely, would not all claims based on prelitigation notices be preempted, 
because (1) the ordinance is not limited to circumstances in which the privilege 
would not apply, and (2) tenants are free to bring tort actions (for instance, abuse 
of process or infliction of emotional distress) if a landlord’s eviction notices are 
not privileged?2  
                                              
 
2  The majority suggests that privilege in the prelitigation communications 
context presents questions of fact, whereas privilege in the context of actions to 
recover possession presents only a legal question.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23, fn. 5.)  
However, the majority does not squarely answer the legal question raised by the 
city regarding actions to recover possession.  As noted by the majority, this court 
has declared that “[t]he policy of encouraging free access to the courts that 
underlies the absolute privilege applicable in defamation actions is outweighed by 
the policy of affording redress for individual wrongs when the requirements of 
favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied.”  
(Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 382; maj. opn., ante, at p. 8; see also, 
e.g., Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1203.)  The city contends that when a 
tenant successfully defends an action to recover possession, these elements are 
satisfied because malice on the part of the landlord and lack of probable cause are 
necessary conditions for a suit under the ordinance.  (For the relevant terms of the 
ordinance, see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3-4, fn. 1.) 
 
This is certainly a colorable argument; it deserves considerably more 
analysis than is provided by the majority.  I would prefer that we leave the 
question for a case in which a plaintiff actually brings such a claim.  If the city’s 
position were accepted, each case would of course turn on its own facts.   My 
point here is only that the majority does not consider whether the justification for 
an exception to the privilege in malicious prosecution actions would support an 
exception for analogous actions under the ordinance, while it accepts without 
question the policy justifications developed in tort cases arising from prelitigation 
communications.   
 
5
If this inconsistency were reconciled in favor of preserving some causes of 
action under the ordinance, there would in a sense be little practical difference 
between my position and the majority’s.  The availability of a defense to an action 
brought under the ordinance would be litigated on a case-by-case basis, either as a 
matter of privilege or as a matter of preemption.  However, I would still dissent.  It 
is a bad idea for courts to loosely employ preemption doctrine to explore whether 
a local ordinance is “inimical” to state law.  (See Viva! International Voice for 
Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __  [p. 
9].)  The constitutional prerogative of local lawmakers is entitled to more respect 
than that.  (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) 
I would not hold the drafters of ordinances to the standard of framing their 
provisions to avoid conflict with any conceivable defense available under state 
law.  To take only the examples nearest at hand, Civil Code section 47, 
subdivision (b) provides a privilege for publications made in official proceedings, 
in addition to the litigation privilege.  Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a) 
provides a privilege for statements made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official 
duty.”  Under the court’s decision today, these provisions stand as limitations on 
the scope of local legislative power, rather than as the sources of individual 
privilege they were meant to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
I CONCUR 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Action Apartment Association v. City of Santa Monica 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 123 Cal.App.4th 47 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S129448 
Date Filed: August 2, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Ray L. Hart 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
Law Offices of Rosario Perry, Rosario Perry, Robert J. Franklin and Dionne Marucchi for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
Heidi Palutke for California Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor, John E. Mueller and James R. Parrinello for San 
Francisco Apartment Association, San Francisco Association of Realtors and Coalition for Better Housing 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
Marsha Jones Moutrie, City Attorney, Joseph L. Lawrence, Assistant City Attorney, Barry Rosenbaum, 
Adam Radinsky, Cara Silver and Eda Suh, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Stephen L. Collier for Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Michael Jenkins, City Attorney (West Hollywood), J. Stephen Lewis, Alison Regan; Dennis J. Herrera, 
City Attorney (San Francisco), Burke E. Delventhal, Wayne K. Snodgrass and Marie Crolett Blits, Deputy 
City Attorneys, for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Jones Day, Scott Bertzyk, Erik K. Swanholt, Michelle Vizurraga, Rasha Gerges; Wendy Marantz Levine, 
Elissa D. Barrett; and Denise McGranahan for Bet Tzedek Legal Services and Legal Aid Foundation of Los 
Angeles as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Wartelle, Weaver & Schreiber, Paul Wartelle and J. Scott Weaver for San Francisco Tenants’ Union, San 
Francisco Housing Rights Committee, St. Peter’s Housing Committee and Oakland Just Cause as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
David R. LaBahn; Michael J. Aguirre, City Attorney (San Diego) and Cindy D. Davis, Head Deputy City 
Attorney, for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Rosario Perry 
Law Offices of Rosario Perry 
312 Pico Boulevard 
Santa Monica, CA  90405 
9310) 394-9831 
 
Adam Radinsky 
Deputy City Attorney 
1685 Main Street, Room 310 
Santa Monica, CA  90401 
(310) 458-8336 
 
Rasha Gerges 
Jones Day 
555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 489-3939