Title: MATTER OF SHAW
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-018
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 1980

No. 80-18 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN THE MATTER OF THE REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF JAMES T. SHAW, Professional Land Surveyor. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, The Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Astle & Astle, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : Alan J. Joscelyn, Helena, Montana Submitted on Briefs: July 7, 1980 Decided : 2 5 19.80 Filed: . & J G 2 5 l$:gQ M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his i s an appeal from the D i s t r i c t Court, Flathead County, which affirmed an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n by the Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors of t h e Department of Professional and Occupational Licensing, revoking a p p e l l a n t ' s c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n as a r e - g i s t e r e d land surveyor. I n February 1976 James T. Shaw w a s h i r e d by D r . John L. Fenner t o conduct a boundary survey of some property owned by D r . Fenner i n Section 20, Township 26 North, Range 20 West, Flathead County, Montana. Work on t h e boundary survey was t o be commenced a s soon a s p o s s i b l e with completion estimated i n four t o s i x weeks. During t h e spring, summer and f a l l of 1976, t h e survey remained uncompleted, d e s p i t e numerous i n q u i r i e s and prompt- i n g by D r . Fenner. On December 7, 1976, Shaw f i l e d a certi- f i c a t e of survey with t h e Flathead County Clerk and Recorder which i n d i c a t e d t h a t monumentation on t h e survey had been completed. On t h e f a c e of the survey p l a t w a s Shaw's certi- f i c a t i o n t h a t a l l e i g h t corners shown on t h e p l a t had been monumented by a p i p e 2-1/2" by 30" s e t i n t o t h e ground and topped with a marked aluminum o r b r a s s cap. Shortly a f t e r t h e p l a t w a s f i l e d , D r . Fenner paid Shaw i n f u l l f o r work done on t h e survey. I n March o r A p r i l 1977 D r . Fenner discovered, contrary t o Shaw's c e r t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t monumentation f o r t h e boundary survey w a s n o t complete. On May 23, 1977, Fenner issued a formal complaint with t h e Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors (Board) l i s t i n g the problems he had had with Shaw. After receiving t h e complaint, t h e ~ o a r d as- signed Roy Bulger t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s . ~ u r i n g h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , Bulger interviewed Shaw, a t which t i m e Shaw admitted t h a t t h e monuments f o r t h e p r o j e c t were n o t properly i n s t a l l e d and i n some i n s t a n c e s n o t i n s t a l l e d a t a l l . Shaw advised Bulger t h a t t h e work would be completed by June 22, 1977. O n J u l y 28, 1977, Shaw appeared before t h e Board regard- i n g t h e Fenner complaint. Shaw advised t h e Board a t t h a t t i m e t h a t a l l necessary work had been completed on t h e survey. Based on t h e assurances of Shaw, t h e Board made a finding t h a t t h e "missing monuments a r e now i n and recorded," and closed the complaint f i l e . D r . Fenner, a f t e r being informed by t h e Board t h a t h i s complaint f i l e was closed, inspected h i s property and d i s - covered t h e work was s t i l l n o t complete. D r . Fenner, s h o r t l y afterwards, informed t h e Board of h i s discovery. Upon l e a r n i n g t h a t t h e work was still n o t completed, t h e Board n o t i f i e d D r . Fenner and Shaw and asked them t o appear on September 29, 1977. A t t h e t i m e set f o r t h e i r appearances, Fenner appeared and reviewed t h e matter with the Board. Shaw d i d n o t appear. Upon hearing D r . Fenner, t h e Board i n s t r u c t e d i t s a t t o r n e y t o begin proceedings t o suspend o r revoke Shawls c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n . The Board a l s o assigned Bulger and Charles Hegman t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e site of the boundary survey. When inspecting t h e site on October 4 , 1977, they found t h a t t h e proper monumentation f o r t h e property had s t i l l n o t been completed. The Board m e t on February 16, 1978, and a f t e r reviewing t h e r e p o r t by Bulger and Hegman, unanimously passed a motion t o i n s t r u c t i t s a t t o r n e y t o suspend Shaw's c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n and n o t i f y Shaw of t h e a c t i o n . However, shawls c e r t i f i c a t e was n o t suspended, nor was he n o t i f i e d t h a t it had been a t t h a t t i m e . I n September 1978, Shaw was advised t h a t t h e Board proposed t o suspend o r revoke h i s c e r t i f i c a t e and of h i s opportunity f o r a hearing on t h e matter. Notice s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e grounds f o r t h e proposed a c t i o n was delivered t o Shaw and t o h i s attorney. A hearing on t h e matter was held November 2 , 1978. A hearings examiner i s s u e d findings of f a c t and conclusions of l a w on January 19, 1979. On t h e b a s i s of t h e s e f i n d i n g s and conclusions, t h e Board voted t o revoke Shawls c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n . Subsequently, Shaw f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing and a motion f o r s t a y with t h e Board. Both t h e p e t i t i o n and t h e motion were denied. Shaw then f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review with the D i s t r i c t Court, and a motion f o r a s t a y of t h e Board's decision. The Board's d e c i s i o n w a s stayed pending t h e j u d i c i a l review. O n December 1 0 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court affirmed t h e Board's decision. Shaw appeals t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Appellant f i r s t r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of whether, pursuant t o s e c t i o n 37-67-331(2), MCA, t h e Board is precluded from proceeding on t h e charges a s brought. Section 37-67-331(1), MCA, s t a t e s t h a t t h e Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors can revoke o r suspend t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of a r e g i s t r a n t i f found g u i l t y of "gross negligence, incompetency o r misconduct i n t h e prac- tice of . . . land surveying as a r e g i s t e r e d p r o f e s s i o n a l . . . land surveyor." Section 37-67-331(2), MCA, p r i o r t o i t s amendment i n 1979, i n d i c a t e s t h a t charges a g a i n s t a r e g i s t r a n t engaging i n t h e above improper a c t i v i t y may be brought by any person s o long a s t h e charges a r e made by a f f i d a v i t and f i l e d with t h e Board. The s e c t i o n goes on t o s t a t e t h a t once charges a r e brought they w i l l e i t h e r be "dismissed by the board a s unfounded o r t r i v i a l , o r s h a l l be heard by t h e board within t h r e e (3) months a f t e r t h e d a t e on which they were made." (Emphasis added. ) I t should be noted t h a t due t o an amendment i n 1979, s e c t i o n 37-67-331 ( 2 ) now provides t h a t within - s i x months of charges being brought, t h e Board only has t o " a c t " on t h e charges by dismissing them o r notifying t h e accused of i t s i n t e n t t o revoke o r suspend h i s l i c e n s e . The Board under t h e amendment i s n o t required t o provide a hearing within t h e six-month period; however, i n t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y involved i n t h i s appeal occurred during 1977 and 1978, w e must look t o t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e a s s t a t e d p r i o r t o t h e 1979 amendment. Appellant's main contention of e r r o r c e n t e r s on t h e hearing held November 2, 1978, which r e s u l t e d i n t h e Board revoking h i s l i c e n s e . Appellant argues t h a t t h e Board f a i l e d t o hold t h e hearing within t h r e e months of t h e d a t e on which t h e charges w e r e made, as required by s e c t i o n 37- 67-331, MCA. Appellant, i n support of t h i s argument, p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e charges a l l e g e d i n t h e Board's n o t i c e of pro- posed a c t i o n and opportunity f o r a hearing, dated September 15, 1978, and then d e a l t with a t t h e hearing on November 2, 1978, are t h e same charges brought by D r . Fenner on May 23, 1977, some s i x t e e n months e a r l i e r . The Board, i n response, argues t h a t t h e charges w e r e i n i t i a t e d on t h e Board's own motion and s i n c e t h e r e i s no s p e c i f i c reference t o a period of l i m i t a t i o n as t o when a hearing must be held on such charges, t h e proceeding on November 2, 1978, w a s n o t barred and thus proper under t h e s t a t u t e . This Court argees t h a t the Board has a u t h o r i t y t o i n i t i a t e i t s own charges and complaint a s t o alleged improper a c t i v i t y , b u t w e disagree t h a t it a l s o has unlimited d i s c r e - t i o n a s t o when it w i l l provide a hearing on those charges. W e can f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t r e a t i n g t h e Board d i f f e r e n t from t h e general public as t o the procedure t o be followed when charges a g a i n s t a r e g i s t r a n t have been made. A r e g i s t r a n t who has been charged with improper conduct should n o t be forced t o w a i t an i n d e f i n i t e period of t i m e before being granted an opportunity t o be heard a t a proper a d m i n i s t r a t i v e hearing merely because t h e complaint w a s i n i t i a t e d by t h e Board. The procedure f o r dealing with charges a g a i n s t a r e g i s t r a n t are s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 37-67- 331(2), MCA, and t h a t s e c t i o n , p r i o r t o i t s amendment i n 1979, s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t charges w i l l be heard by t h e Board within t h r e e months of t h e i r being made. W e f i n d t h i s l i m i t a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e t o both charges brought by a member of t h e general p u b l i c and those brought by t h e Board. The charges brought by the Board on September 15, 1978, a r e a s follows: I' (1) F i l i n g t h e Fenner p l a t with t h e c e r t i f i c a - t i o n t h a t monuments shown on t h e p l a t were s e t , when, i n f a c t , only four monuments w e r e s e t a t most, and none were marked; " (2) F a i l i n g t o set and mark t h e missing monu- ments i n t h e Fenner matter f o r more than a year a f t e r t h e p l a t was f i l e d ; " (3) S t a t i n g t o D r . Fenner and t o t h e Board of Engineers and Land Surveyors t h a t t h e monuments were set and marked when i n f a c t they were not." T h e f i r s t two charges s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r t o a c t i v i t y t h a t D r . Fenner formally complained of i n May 1977. A t t h e time t h a t complaint w a s f i l e d , t h e Board was f u l l y aware t h a t it would have t o e i t h e r dismiss t h e complaint o r w i t h i n t h r e e months provide an administrative hearing on t h e matter. I n t h i s instance, t h e Board chose t o dismiss t h e complaint. I f t h e c o u r t w e r e t o now allow t h e Board t o r e f i l e those same charges s i x t e e n months l a t e r , under t h e g u i s e t h a t t h e charges a r e being i n i t i a t e d on i t s own motion and, thus, somehow renewed, t h e three-month l i m i t a t i o n would become vacuous of purpose and meaning. W e cannot t o l e r a t e such an outcome. The Board, i n response t o an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e three- month l i m i t a t i o n , argues t h a t even though t h e charges are based on a c t i v i t y complained of s i x t e e n months e a r l i e r , t h e period of l i m i t a t i o n s a s t o when a hearing must be held should n o t have run i n t h i s instance. I n support of t h i s argument, t h e Board contends t h a t had it n o t been f o r t h e f a l s e assurances by Shaw when he appeared before t h e Board on J u l y 28, 1978, t h e charges would n o t have been dismissed and t h e period of l i m i t a t i o n s would n o t have been allowed t o run. The Board concludes t h a t due t o a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s , he i s now estopped from a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e l i m i t a t i o n period has expired. The d o c t r i n e of e q u i t a b l e estoppel i s founded i n e q u i t y and good conscience. Its o b j e c t is t o prevent a p a r t y from taking an unconscionable advantage of h i s own wrong while a s s e r t i n g h i s s t r i c t l e g a l r i g h t . Levo v. General-Shea- Morrison (1955), 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086. The e s s e n t i a l elements of estoppel a r e : (1) t h e r e must be conduct, a c t s , language o r s i l e n c e amounting t o a repre- s e n t a t i o n o r concealment of f a c t s ; ( 2 ) f a c t s must be known t o t h e p a r t y estopped a t t i m e of h i s conduct; ( 3 ) t r u t h concerning the f a c t s must be unknown t o t h e other p a r t y ; ( 4 ) conduct must be done with t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t it w i l l be a c t e d upon by t h e o t h e r p a r t y , o r under circumstances t h a t i s both n a t u r a l and probable t h a t it w i l l be so acted upon; (5) conduct must be r e l i e d upon by t h e o t h e r party; and (6) t h e p a r t y must i n f a c t have acted upon it t o h i s detriment. Smith v. Krutar (1969), 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459; Kenco v. C a n t r e l l (1977), 174 Mont. 130, 568 P.2d 1225. This Court b e l i e v e s t h e Board has e s t a b l i s h e d t h e above elements. Appellant appeared before t h e Board on J u l y 28, 1977, and informed it t h a t a l l monuments on t h e Fenner p r o j e c t w e r e properly i n s t a l l e d . A t t h e November 2, 1978 hearing, D r . Fenner, owner of t h e property, Charles Hegman, a licensed surveyor and i n v e s t i g a t o r on t h e complaint a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t , and Roy Bulger, an a d d i t i o n a l i n v e s t i - g a t o r , a l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t upon examining t h e Fenner property a f t e r t h e appearance by a p p e l l a n t on J u l y 28, 1977, they discovered monuments t h a t had not been properly set, c o n t r a t o a p p e l l a n t ' s assurances. Had t h e Board been aware t h a t t h e monuments were n o t i n place on J u l y 28, 1977, it could have i n s t i t u t e d t h e process f o r revocation o r suspension of a p p e l l a n t ' s l i c e n s e based upon Fenner's charges w e l l within t h e three-month t i m e l i m i t . Appellant argues t h a t i n s p i t e of t h e testimony of Fenner, Hegman and Bulger, t h e record i s devoid of evidence necessary t o s u s t a i n a finding t h a t t h e monuments had n o t been s e t p r i o r t o h i s assurances t o t h e Board on J u l y 28, 1977. W e agree t h a t t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g evidence on t h i s question b u t conclude t h a t t h e testimony of Fenner, Hegman and Bulger provides s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support a find- i n g by t h e h e a r i n g s examiner t h a t t h e assurances by a p p e l l a n t on J u l y 28, 1977, were f a l s e . Appellant misled the Board as to the work done on the Fenner project, thereby lulling it into not acting on the Fenner complaint within the required three months. We now find, therefore, that appellant is estopped from asserting the limitation period had run and, as a consequence, the Board was proper in proceeding with the charges as brought. To allow appellant to assert that the period had expired in this instance would be to allow him to take advantage of his own wrong. Such a holding would be both unconscionable and inequitable. A second issue raised by appellant is whether the decision of the Board, as affirmed by the District Court, was clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the record. In reviewing administrative decisions, this Court need only determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the administrative body if such evidence is found to exist. Public Utilities Commission v. Northwest Water Corp. (1969), 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266; Western Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of Springfield (1976), 274 Or. 37, 545 P.2d 592; Standard Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Employment Security Div. (1980), - Mont. , 605 P.2d 610, 37 St.Rep. 105. As to the first two grounds upon which the Board de- cided to revoke appellant's license, appellant makes no argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant merely states that these grounds are based upon Dr. ~enner's complaint and thus barred by the three-month limitation. This issue has already been decided and warrants no further discussion. As to the third ground upon which the decision to revoke was made, appellant argues the record is "devoid" of evidence needed to support the finding that appellant misled the Board as to work done on the Fenner project. This issue has also been discussed. As stated earlier, even though there was conflicting testimony, there still remains reli- able and substantial evidence which supports the findings made. Appellant being unable to persuade this Court that there is a lack of substantial evidence on the record as to the findings made, we are unable to rule that the decision by the Board was clearly erroneous. Appellant's final argument on appeal is that the hear- ings examiner failed to make findings of fact as requested on issues essential to the decision. See section 2-4- 704 (2) (g) , MCA. The first issue appellant claims is essential to a decision in this matter but not dealt with in the findings of fact as requested is that Dr. Fenner removed certain monumentations purposefully. The testimony of Dr. Fenner indicated that he removed certain monuments. However, he also testified that removal was done to show that the monuments had been set improperly. Dr. Fenner's testimony further indicated that monuments other than the ones removed were also set improperly or not set at all. The material issue in this case is whether or not all the monuments were set by appellant as certified. The fact that Dr. Fenner may have removed certain monumentations has a bearing on this issue. However, based on Fenner's reasons for disturbing certain monuments and his further testimony as to the discovery of other unset monuments, the finding requested by appellant is not so essential in this matter that to omit it alters the outcome of the decision or preju- dices appellant's rights. A second issue claimed by appellant to be essential and ignored by the hearings examiner is that the Board was of the opinion this action was not warranted because appellant was only technically wrong in filing a certificate indicating there were monumentations when in fact there were none. Without ruling on whether this issue is essential or even supported by the evidence, we need only note that appellant failed to include such a finding in his proposed findings of fact. The finding not having been requested, this Court cannot now rely on it to overturn the Board's decision. See section 2-4-704 (2) (g) , MCA. The third issue claimed to be essential but not dealt with in the findings of fact as requested is that the inves- tigations conducted pursuant to the hearing were done im- properly and that with surveying equipment the investigators would have been able to find all the monuments. We disagree with appellant's contention. Even without the use of surveying equipment, the investigators were able to testify that they discovered monumentation that was incomplete. Thus, even if all the monuments had been found, it would not have changed the outcome of the decision ren- dered. This. Court is unable to find that appellant's rights were prejudiced at the administrative level or by the Dis- trict Court's affirmation of the Board's decision. There- fore, the judgment of the District Courcris affirmed. J / p $ % Justice We concur: Chief Justice -)&&- 42. Justices