Title: Eddie Lee Sexton v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-487
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 15, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
  
____________
No. SC94487
____________
EDDIE LEE SEXTON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[October 12, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Eddie Lee Sexton.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V,          §
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
BACKGROUND
The instant appeal arises from the retrial of Sexton as ordered by this Court
in Sexton v. State, 697 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1997).  Sexton was initially tried and
1As noted in this Court's opinion in Sexton, 697 So. 2d at 834-35, Willie was named a
codefendant in Joel's death in the first trial but was later found incompetent to stand trial.
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convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 1994 for the killing of
Joel Good, the husband of Sexton's daughter, Estella Mae Good ("Pixie").  Joel
was murdered by Sexton's mentally challenged twenty-two-year-old son, Willie
Sexton, who strangled him to death under Sexton's direction.  On appeal, this
Court reversed the judgment and sentence and ordered a new trial.  See id. at 838. 
The Court determined that the testimony of five of Sexton's children concerning
bizarre behavior and abuse they had endured from their father should not have been
admitted because the relevance of the testimony was outweighed by its  prejudicial
impact.  See id. at 837-38.
Upon retrial, Sexton was again convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death.  Although much of the testimony introduced at the second trial
was similar to the testimony introduced at the first trial, Willie testified.1  In
exchange for his testimony against Sexton, Willie pled guilty to second-degree
murder and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.  The State's theory
of prosecution was that Sexton so totally dominated, controlled and directed every
facet of Willie's life that Willie killed Joel at Sexton's direction.  On retrial, the State
2DHS had Sexton's six youngest children removed from the home in 1992.  Several months later,
three of the children were returned to Sexton's wife, Mrs. Sexton, but Sexton was ordered to have no
contact with the children or with Mrs. Sexton.  Following a hearing on the matter in November 1992,
Sexton barricaded himself and his family in their home demanding the immediate return of his three children
who remained in foster care.  Sexton threatened to kill anyone from  Child Protective Services or the police
department who tried to take his children.  Eventually, Sexton turned himself in to the authorities.  A search
of the Sexton residence revealed a .357 revolver, a 20-gauge shotgun, and seventy rounds of ammunition.
After his release, the Sextons failed to appear at a scheduled court hearing.  Arrest warrants were issued
for Sexton and his wife in October 1993.
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introduced the following evidence.
Sexton fled to Florida in 1993 with his family and the victim to avoid arrest
and prevent the Ohio Department of Human Services ("DHS") from removing his 
children from the home.2  Sexton was the father of thirteen children, not counting
the three children he allegedly fathered with his two daughters.  After leaving Ohio,
Sexton and his family moved to Oklahoma, Indiana, and eventually to Hillsborough
River State Park in Florida.  During this time, Sexton trained his children to use
guns and a garrote, an apparatus used in strangulation, in case authorities came to
return the children to foster care.
While residing in Hillsborough River State Park, Sexton's infant grandchild,
Skipper Lee Good, the son of Pixie and Joel, died under suspicious circumstances. 
Several of the Sexton children, including Pixie, testified about the events
surrounding the baby's death.  Pixie testified that the baby had been ill for several
3In exchange for a plea to manslaughter and testimony against Sexton, Pixie was sentenced to
twelve years imprisonment.
-4-
weeks, but Sexton would not allow her to take the child to a doctor out of fear that
authorities would find him and his family.  One night, the baby would not stop
crying.  Sexton ordered Pixie to quiet the baby or else he would do it for her.  Pixie
put her hand over the baby's mouth until the child stopped crying.  The next
morning the baby was dead.  Sexton instructed Willie and Joel to bury the baby in
the woods inside the Hillsborough River State Park.  Pixie was eventually arrested
for the death of the baby and entered into a plea bargain with the State.3
According to Pixie, Joel was very upset over the loss of his child and wanted
to bring the child back to Ohio for a proper burial.  Shortly before the death of his
infant son, Joel had learned Sexton was the father of Pixie's two daughters.  After
Joel confronted Sexton with this information, Sexton and Joel got into a fight. 
Because Joel knew about the baby's death and the fact that Sexton fathered two
children with his daughter, Pixie, Sexton would not allow Joel and Pixie to return to
Ohio.  Sexton feared Joel would provide authorities with information pertaining to
the Sexton family's current whereabouts, the death of the baby, and ongoing child
abuse.
4On cross-examination, Willie admitted that he previously had told different versions of the events
surrounding the murder of Joel.  According to Willie, he told different versions of the murder because he
feared Sexton and because he wanted to get back at Sexton for all of the bad things that Sexton did to him.
-5-
Several of the Sexton children, including Willie, Pixie, Matthew and Charles
testified that Sexton often referred to Joel as a "snitch" and stated that a "good
snitch is a dead snitch."  According to their testimony, Sexton often stated that Joel
had to be disposed of because he "knew too much."  In addition to the testimony
of the Sexton children, Gail Novak, a librarian at the University of South Florida,
also testified about a statement Sexton made in which he indicated his desire to
have Joel killed.  Novak testified that Sexton, Pixie, Joel and Willie came into the
library in November 1993 and that Pixie requested information about crib death. 
Novak stated that she had overheard Willie telling Sexton that Joel intended to go
back to Ohio.  Sexton replied that the only way that Joel would be returning to
Ohio would be in a "body bag."
At some point, the Sextons moved to Little Manatee State Park, the place
where Joel was killed.  Willie testified to the following course of events surrounding
the murder.4  As Joel continued to express his interest in returning to Ohio, Sexton
began telling his son, "Willie, I got a job for you to do," and that he wanted Willie
to "put Joel to sleep."  On the day of Joel's murder, Sexton told his wife that
5Sherri testified for the defense in the first trial, see Sexton, 697 So. 2d at 835, but did not testify
in this trial.
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"today is the day that Willie is going" to kill Joel.  Thereafter, Sexton, his wife, and
a few of the younger Sexton children left the campsite for a picnic.  Sexton's
daughters Sherri Sexton,5 Pixie, and their respective children, along with Willie and
Joel, stayed behind.  Soon thereafter, Willie and Joel left the campsite and went into
the woods.  Both Pixie and Willie testified that Sexton returned from the picnic and
joined Willie and Joel in the woods.  According to Willie, Sexton told him to take
the garrote out of his pocket and place it around Joel's neck.  After placing the
garrote around Joel's neck, Sexton told Willie to turn it "fast and hard."  Willie told
Joel that he was "just trying to put you to sleep."  While Willie twisted the rope,
Joel yelled "Eddie" (Sexton).  After Willie saw blood coming out of Joel's ears, he
asked Sexton what had happened.  Sexton stated that Willie had just killed Joel. 
Sexton subsequently kicked the body and, upon seeing Joel's leg move, told Willie
to "finish him off."
In addition to Willie, several other Sexton children testified to the events
surrounding the murder of Joel and provided testimony that differed from Willie's
recollections of the homicide.  For instance, according to Pixie, on the day of Joel's
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murder, Sexton and Willie had gone for a walk.  Approximately thirty minutes later,
Sexton and Willie returned.  After Sexton and several family members left for the
family picnic, Pixie and Sherri went into the camper to prepare lunch, while Joel and
Willie watched television together.  Thereafter, Pixie saw Willie and Joel go into the
woods.  She followed them and found them smoking cigarettes.  Upon her return
to the campsite, she heard Joel yelling, "Ed."  Pixie and Sherri ran into the woods
and found Willie holding a rope around Joel's neck.  Thus, Pixie and Sherri ran
back to the campsite and told Sexton, who had returned from the picnic, that Willie
was hurting Joel.  After leading Sexton into the woods to find Joel and Willie, Pixie
observed Willie holding Joel in his lap.  According to Pixie, Sexton proceeded to
kick Joel's leg and, when Joel's leg moved, ordered Pixie to return to campsite and
told Willie to "finish him off."
Another one of Sexton's children, Charles Sexton, who did not testify at the
first trial, also testified that he witnessed Joel's murder.  His version of the murder
differed from both Pixie and Willie's version.  In particular, Charles testified that he
witnessed the murder and that Sexton actually committed the final act that led to
Joel's death.  Charles claimed that although he initially went along on the family
picnic, he returned from the picnic sooner than the rest of the family.  After finding
6The State's medical examiner, Doctor Marie Hermann, confirmed portions of Willie's testimony.
According to Dr. Hermann, who assisted in the recovery of Joel's body and performed the autopsy, she
observed a deep wound on the victim's right hand that was caused by a sharp instrument with great amount
of force.  The wound was consistent with an attempted dismemberment of the right hand.  Dr. Hermann
also observed that, upon recovery of Joel's body, there was a ligature device around Joel's neck.  Dr.
Hermann opined that the cause of death was asphyxiation as a result of ligature strangulation.
-8-
the campsite empty upon his return, Charles walked into the woods and observed
both Sexton and Willie killing Joel.  Charles claimed that while Joel was fighting for
his life, he overhead Sexton telling Willie, "It's either Joel or the both of you." 
Charles also testified that although Willie initially had placed the choking device
around Joel's neck, Sexton actually "finished Joel off" by pulling on the choking
device.
As to the post-murder events, Pixie testified that when Sexton returned from
the woods, he instructed her to get rid of Joel's belongings and told her that if she
ever talked about Joel's murder that she "would be next."  She also testified that
Sexton ordered her and Charles to go and purchase a shovel. Willie stated that
before placing Joel's body in the grave, Sexton ordered him to chop Joel's hands
off with a machete so that there would be no fingerprint evidence to identify the
body.6  Willie, however, was unable to complete this task.
Later that evening, Pixie overheard Sexton discussing the killing with Mrs.
-9-
Sexton, at which time, Sexton stated that he had Willie murder Joel.  According to
all of the Sexton children who testified, they were instructed by their father to tell
anyone, if asked, that Joel had taken the baby and had returned to Ohio.  Matthew
Sexton also testified that his father told him not to say anything about Joel’s death
because Sexton and Willie "could get the electric chair."
The State presented evidence that Willie had killed Joel because he was
ordered to do so by Sexton and because he was afraid of his father.  Doctor Eldra
Solomon, a clinical psychologist with extensive training in the treatment of child
abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder, testified that Willie was controlled by his
father, whom Willie "was very eager to please."  After reviewing Willie's school
records and having Willie conduct the Wechsler Intelligence Test, Dr. Solomon
concluded that Willie was developmentally behind and that he had problems with
language, speech, memory and motor coordination.  The I.Q. test revealed that
Willie functioned at the level of a seven or eight-year-old and that ninety-nine
percent of the people in his age group would have performed better on the test.  Dr.
Solomon opined that Willie could not comprehend the concept of death, suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder, and was incapable of planning a homicide.
When Willie talked about Sexton, Dr. Solomon noticed that Willie's
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demeanor changed dramatically.  She observed that Willie began to shake, stammer
and stutter, which Dr. Solomon believed were physical manifestations of his fears
of his father.  Both Dr. Solomon and many of the Sexton children, including Willie
himself, testified regarding how Sexton had physically and mentally abused Willie. 
According to Willie, Sexton began having anal intercourse with him at age nine. 
This activity continued during the Sextons' stay in Florida.  Sexton physically beat
Willie with his fists, a belt, a baseball bat, and an electric belt.  In addition, Sexton
mentally abused Willie by calling him "retarded" and a "stutter bug."  Sexton often
told Willie, "I brought you into this world, I can take you out of it."
In contrast to the first trial, at the conclusion of the State's case, Sexton
presented no defense during the guilt phase of the trial.  The jury convicted Sexton
and recommended death by a vote of eight to four.  The trial court found the
following aggravating circumstances: (1) Sexton was previously convicted of a
prior violent felony (robbery) (little weight); (2) the murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest (great weight); and (3) the murder
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense
of legal or moral justification (CCP) (great weight).  In mitigation, the trial court
found one statutory mitigator, that Sexton was under an extreme mental or
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emotional disturbance at the time the murder was committed and gave this mitigator
great weight.  This mitigator was established based upon the testimony of two
psychologists, Doctors Irving Weiner and Frank Wood, who observed Sexton. 
Dr. Weiner's testing of Sexton revealed that Sexton has an I.Q. in the low 80s,
suffers from brain dysfunction, has limited tolerance to stress, and has diminished
self-control.  Additionally, testing by Dr. Wood revealed that Sexton's brain was
diseased, causing him to be non-responsive to emotional situations.  
In addition, the trial court found and gave some weight to several
nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) Sexton was capable of kindness to children and would
even act as Santa Claus at Christmas; (2) Sexton was the pastor of a church
attended by family and friends; (3) Sexton often helped his mother and sisters with
household chores and repairs; (4) Sexton's father died when the defendant was ten
years old, depriving him of a male role model; and (5) the codefendant, Willie,
received a lesser sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment.  Finding that the
aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the trial court sentenced Sexton to death. 
Sexton raises five issues on appeal.
ANALYSIS
TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE DEATH OF SKIPPER LEE GOOD
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The first issue that Sexton raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence testimony relating to the death of the infant, Skipper Lee
Good.  Sexton did not object to the admission of this testimony.  Therefore, this
claim of error is procedurally barred.  See Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 964
(Fla. 1997).  Even if this issue had been preserved for review, however, we would
find it to be without merit.  During the retrial, the trial court made every effort to
limit evidence of collateral bad acts to those that were relevant to two issues:  (1)
whether Sexton had a motive for killing the victim, his son-in-law, Joel Good; and
(2) whether, and to what extent, Sexton could control and manipulate his son,
Willie.  For the reasons explained in our first opinion, the testimony relating to
Skipper's death was relevant to explain Sexton's motive for having Joel killed and
the total domination Sexton exerted over his family.  See Sexton, 697 So. 2d at
837.
In addition, although Sexton now challenges the admissibility of this
evidence, part of the defense strategy in this case was to show that Pixie, not
Sexton, orchestrated Joel's murder.  The defense used the evidence that Pixie
smothered her own child to demonstrate that Pixie was capable of murder and that
Pixie had a motive to have Joel killed because she was fearful that Joel would
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implicate her in the death of the child.  Therefore, as we found following the original
trial, we again find that the evidence surrounding the death of Skipper Lee Good
was relevant in the retrial.
Finally, Sexton contends that even if the evidence of the baby's death was
relevant, the State should not have been allowed to present details of the death and
burial of the infant.  In addition to being procedurally barred, the testimony relating
to the death and burial of the infant did not become the focal point of the trial.  See
Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674, 683 (Fla. 1995) (holding that the collateral crime
evidence was not unduly prejudicial because the testimony did not become the
focal point of the proceedings).  Steve Ready of the Stark County, Ohio, Sheriff's
Office testified that he went along with Detective John King of the Hillsborough
County Sheriff's Office to Hillsborough River State Park to recover the infant's
body.  Both Ready and King testified that Charles pointed out the location of the
infant's body.  In addition, both Pixie and Willie testified about the events leading
up to the death of the infant and Joel's desire to return to Ohio with the dead infant
so that the infant would have a proper burial.  Willie briefly testified that prior to
burying the baby, Sexton drew a picture of a star on the ground, laid the baby in
the middle of the star, and proceeded to recite "weird words."  Despite Sexton's
7In addition to being charged with first-degree murder, Sexton was also charged in a separate
criminal information with one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.  Sexton subsequently pled
guilty to the charge and was sentenced to thirty years in prison.  However, on July 13, 1998, Sexton filed
a motion for postconviction relief in which he argued that his guilty plea to conspiracy was involuntary
because the plea was made based upon a reasonable expectation from the trial court and defense counsel
that Sexton would receive a guidelines sentence.  Prior to Sexton's first-degree murder trial, the State
alleged that Sexton's attorney, Rick Terrana, could potentially be placed in a conflicting position by
defending Sexton in the first-degree murder trial, while also being required to testify in a manner potentially
adverse to Sexton's interests in the conspiracy case.
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assertions, there were no graphic details of the infant's death or burial and the
evidence surrounding the death of the infant was not a focal point of the trial.
In summary, this Court recognized the relevance of the baby's death in its
prior decision in Sexton, 697 So. 2d at 837.  Thus, even if this claim were not
procedurally barred, we reject it on the merits.  
SEXTON'S REQUEST FOR NEW COUNSEL
In his second issue on appeal, Sexton contends that the trial court erred in
failing to adequately address Sexton's request for new counsel.  To put this issue in
perspective, we begin by noting that one month before trial, on July 15, 1998, the
trial court heard the State's motion suggesting a possible conflict of interest with
Sexton's attorney, Rick Terrana.7  During that hearing, Sexton specifically stated
that he wanted to waive any alleged conflict so that he could retain his current
attorney to represent him in his first-degree murder trial.
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On August 24, 1998, a week before trial, the court held a subsequent hearing. 
At the beginning of the hearing, Sexton presented the court with a handwritten letter
in which Sexton requested new counsel.  The gist of the letter is that Sexton
expressed general dissatisfaction with the trial preparation of his lawyers and asked
the Court "to delay my trial until I can be given an attorney or attorneys that I will
have confidence in to represent me."  During an oral exchange with the trial court,
Sexton again stated that he lacked "confidence" in his lawyers and asked that the
letter be part of his record.  The trial court explained that he could not replace
court-appointed lawyers solely because clients lacked confidence in them.  Sexton
then replied that he wanted the letter placed in the record "for appellate purposes." 
In Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074-75 (Fla. 1988), this Court
adopted the procedure announced in Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (Fla.
4th DCA 1973), to be followed when a defendant complains that his or her
appointed counsel is incompetent.  "When this occurs, the trial judge is required to
make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant to determine whether or not appointed
counsel is rendering effective assistance to the defendant."  Howell v. State, 707
So. 2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1998).  As a practical matter, however, the trial judge's
inquiry can only be as specific as the defendant's complaint.  See Lowe v. State,
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650 So. 2d 969, 975 (Fla. 1994).  This Court has consistently found a Nelson
hearing unwarranted where a defendant presents general complaints about defense
counsel's trial strategy and no formal allegations of incompetence have been made.
 See Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055, 1058-59 (Fla. 1997); Gudinas, 693 So. 2d at 
962 n.12; Branch v. State, 685 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1996).  Similarly, a trial
court does not err in failing to conduct a Nelson inquiry where the defendant merely
expresses dissatisfaction with his attorney.  See Davis, 703 So. 2d at 1058-59;
Branch, 685 So. 2d at 1252; Dunn v. State, 730 So. 2d 309, 311-12 (Fla. 4th DCA
1999).
In the present case, it does not appear that Sexton made a formal allegation
of incompetence entitling him to a Nelson hearing.  In considering the propriety of
failing to conduct a more extensive inquiry, we note that a month before trial, at a
prior hearing on the State's motion suggesting a possible conflict by Sexton's
attorney before the same trial court, Sexton expressly stated that he wanted to
waive any alleged conflict so that he could retain his current attorney.  Accordingly,
because Sexton was merely noting his disagreement with his attorney's trial strategy
and preparation and was not asserting a sufficient basis to support a contention that
his attorney was incompetent, we find this point on appeal to be without merit.
8Although the trial court initially granted Sexton's request to videotape the testimony, the trial court
subsequently reversed its ruling when it decided to have the witnesses read prepared statements that could
be edited and reviewed by both the State and Sexton.  Accordingly, we reject Sexton's claim that it was
an abuse of discretion to deny his request to videotape the victim impact testimony.
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VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY
The third point raised by Sexton is that the trial court erred in the admission
of victim impact testimony.  Prior to trial, Sexton filed a motion to limit the number
of witnesses who would provide victim impact testimony, to seek pretrial
determinations on the admissibility of such testimony, and to videotape the
presentation of victim impact testimony to better provide for appellate review of the
evidence.8  At a pretrial hearing on the matter, the State suggested having the
witnesses provide their statements in writing to the trial court, which in turn could
edit the statements within the parameters of the law.  The witnesses would then read
their statements to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial.  The trial court
agreed to use this procedure and granted Sexton's motion to limit victim impact
evidence.  
Before the penalty phase of the trial began, written statements from Joel's
family members were submitted to the trial court.  After reviewing the family
members' written statements, the trial court removed portions of their testimony in
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an effort to conform their testimony to the requirements of the law.  
During the penalty phase, the State presented two of Joel's relatives, Teresa
Boron and Asby Barrick, for purposes of providing victim impact testimony. 
Defense counsel did not object when the witnesses read their prepared statements. 
However, at the conclusion of Boron's testimony, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial based partially on the fact that Boron wept during her testimony and
because there was an impermissible reference to the first trial.    
On appeal, Sexton now contends that it was error to admit victim impact
testimony that erroneously focused on the death of Joel's deceased infant, Skipper
Lee Good, and offer the witnesses' opinions of the killings rather than testify solely
to Joel's uniqueness as an individual and the community's loss from his death.  We
agree with the State that this issue is procedurally barred.  
The failure to contemporaneously object to a comment on the basis that it
constitutes improper victim testimony renders the claim procedurally barred absent
fundamental error.  See, e.g., Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 94 (Fla. 1997); see
also Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1997).  In Burns v. State, 699 So.
2d 646, 653-54 (Fla. 1997), this Court ruled that a defendant's challenge to victim
impact testimony on the basis that it was unduly prejudicial was procedurally barred
9Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), provides:
Victim impact evidence.--Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the
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because the defendant did not raise this specific objection at trial.  Moreover, in
Norton, this Court determined that a defendant's motion for a mistrial at the
conclusion of a witness's testimony was insufficient to preserve the witness's
impermissible comment for appellate review.  709 So. 2d at 94.
Sexton's claim that the State witnesses provided improper victim impact
testimony was not preserved for appellate review because defense counsel failed to
contemporaneously object during the testimony of either Boron or Barrick. 
Furthermore, even if the motion for a mistrial at the conclusion of Boron's
testimony was sufficient for preservation purposes, defense counsel did not request
the mistrial on the grounds now raised on appeal.  See Burns, 699 So. 2d at 653-54.
 Rather, defense counsel moved for a mistrial arguing that Boron wept during her
testimony and made an improper reference to Sexton's first trial.  Accordingly,
because Sexton did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review, Sexton's
claims pertaining to the victim impact testimony are procedurally barred unless the
victim impact testimony constitutes fundamental error.
On the merits, section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995),9 allows the State
existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the
prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence.  Such
evidence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human
being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death.
Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate
sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence.
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to introduce "victim impact" evidence, which shows "the victim's uniqueness as an
individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the
victim's death."  Damren v. State, 696 So. 2d 709, 712-14 (Fla. 1997); see Bonifay
v. State, 680 So. 2d 413, 419-20 (Fla. 1996); Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432,
438-39 (Fla. 1995); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 821-26 (1991).
Although the United States Supreme Court and this Court have ruled that
victim impact testimony is admissible, such testimony has specific limits.  Those
witnesses providing victim impact testimony are prohibited from giving
characterizations and their opinions about the crime.  See Payne, 501 U.S. at 826-
27; see also § 921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (1995) ("Characterizations and opinions about
the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a
part of victim impact evidence."). 
Addressing the admissibility of victim impact testimony in Windom, this
Court ruled that a police officer's victim impact testimony in which the officer
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testified about the effect of the victim's death on children in the community, other
than the victim's two sons, was erroneously admitted because it was not limited to
the victim's uniqueness and the loss to the community's members by the victim's
death.  656 So. 2d at 438.  The Court, however, found this evidence harmless in
light of the strong aggravating circumstances and lack of mitigation in the record. 
See id. at 438-39 (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)).  Similarly,
in Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998), the defendant alleged that the
trial court erred in permitting victim impact testimony because the testimony by the
victim's mother exceeded the scope of testimony allowed under Payne.  The Court
found that this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt "given the
strong case in aggravation and the relatively weak case for mitigation."  Alston, 723
So. 2d at 160.
In the present case, Joel's aunt, Teresa Boron, provided victim impact
testimony during the penalty phase of trial.  She prepared a statement describing
Joel's uniqueness as an individual and the loss to the community as a result of his
death.  Sexton contests the portion of Boron's testimony in which she made
reference to the death of the infant, Skipper Lee Good, and offered her own
characterizations and opinions about the infant's death:  "[Joel's brother] will never
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get to play catch with the only nephew he will ever have because Skipper's life was
also taken in a senseless act of violence."
We agree that the testimony relating to the death of the infant and Boron's
characterizations and opinions about the murder of the child exceeded the scope of
victim impact testimony as provided by section 921.141(7), because Boron did not
limit her testimony to Joel's "uniqueness as an individual human being and the
resultant loss to the community's members by" Joel's death.  However, even if it
had been preserved by proper objection, we would find this testimony harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Alston, 723 So. 2d at 160; Windom, 656 So. 2d
at 438.
First, although Boron's testimony about the death of the infant may have
been moving, jurors were already familiar with the circumstances surrounding the
baby's death.  In Payne, Justice O'Connor concluded that the defendant's due
process rights were not violated when a victim impact witness provided moving
testimony about the facts of the crime.  501 U.S. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
According to Justice O'Connor, "In light of the jury's unavoidable familiarity with
the facts of Payne's vicious attack, I cannot conclude that the additional
information provided by [the victim impact witness's] testimony deprived petitioner
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of due process."  Id.  Similarly, in the present case, although Boron may have
improperly provided testimony about the death of the infant,  jurors were already
familiar with the events and circumstances surrounding the infant's death.  Thus,
given the jurors' familiarity with the death of the infant, any improper comments
during the victim impact testimony would not rise to the level of fundamental error.  
Second, in light of the three aggravators and the fact that the testimony
regarding the effect of the infant's death on the surviving relatives was brief and not
made a focus of the penalty phase, we further find that not only did the error not
rise to the level of fundamental error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Alston, 723 So. 2d at 160; Windom, 656 So. 2d at 438.  Nevertheless, we
caution that any victim impact evidence must conform strictly to the parameters of
the statute and our prior case law in order to avoid any potential danger of the
testimony exceeding the purposes for which it is admissible.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The parties did not specifically raise the issue of whether there was sufficient
evidence to convict Sexton of first-degree murder.  Nevertheless, it is this Court's
independent obligation to review the record for sufficiency of evidence.  See
Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998) (citing                   § 921.141(4),
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Fla.  Stat. (1997)).  Upon our review of this record, in particular the testimony of
several of Sexton's children, we find that there was competent substantial evidence
to find Sexton guilty of first-degree murder.  See Brown, 721 So. 2d at 277.
PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
Finally, Sexton raises several claims with regard to the imposition of the
death penalty.  Sexton argues that his death sentence was unwarranted in this case
because:  (1) the trial court erred in the weight given to the aggravating
circumstances; (2) Sexton was not more culpable than the perpetrator of the crime,
Willie, who received a twenty-five-year prison sentence; (3) there was substantial
mitigation in the record that renders the death sentence disproportionate; and (4)
Florida's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it authorizes the
death penalty by a jury's bare majority vote.  
As to Sexton's claims that the trial court erred in giving substantial weight to
the prior violent felony and CCP aggravators, the weight to be accorded an
aggravator is within the discretion of the trial court and will be affirmed if based on
competent substantial evidence.  See Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419-20
(Fla. 1990).  Although Sexton claims that the trial court gave too much weight to
the prior violent felony aggravator because of the remoteness of the 1965
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conviction, the trial court accorded "little weight" to the prior violent felony
aggravator and therefore the trial court did in fact discount this prior felony because
of its age.  We find that there is competent substantial evidence supporting the
finding of the prior violent aggravating circumstance and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by affording the aggravator "little weight."
As to the CCP aggravator, Sexton claims that the trial court should not have
given that aggravator much weight because Sexton's significant mental illness
prevented him from planning or orchestrating the murder.  As stated in Larkins v.
State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999), the CCP aggravator is one of the "most
serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme."  Although the trial
court found the statutory mitigating circumstance of "under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance" at the time of the killing and afforded this
mitigator "great weight," nothing in the expert testimony presented suggests that
Sexton was incapable of planning Joel's murder and manipulating his children to
assist with the murder and the disposal of the victim.  Rather, the evidence showed
that Sexton had the ability to know that killing Joel was wrong and had the ability to
control his children to implement his plan.  According to the trial court's sentencing
order, the CCP aggravating circumstances was supported by the following
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evidence:
Focusing on the manner in which the crime was executed the
defendant's weapon of choice was Willie Sexton.  A method or
process of putting a person "to sleep" by the use of a rope placed
around the neck and then twisted tight with a stick was explained and
demonstrated to Willie by the defendant.  It was often discussed
between them in the 2-3 weeks preceding the killing.  The defendant
was his coach and Willie demonstrated the process for the defendant
and others.  After encouraging Willie to believe Mr. Good to be a
dangerous potential informant and threat to the Sexton family, the
defendant convinced Willie that the best way to dispose of Mr. Good
would be to "put him asleep."  On the morning of the day of the killing
the defendant told Willie that this was the day he needed to put Mr.
Good "to sleep" and a spot in the nearby woods to which the victim
would be enticed was suggested as the place to do it. . . . [Willie] and
others testified that the defendant was actually present at the critical
moment when the strangulation began to, and did, cause death,
encouraging Willie to "finish him off."  Willie testified that he
understood that he had killed Mr. Good and that he did it simply
because his father, the defendant, ordered him to do it.  The evidence
establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, heightened premeditation,
lengthy and careful planning and prearrangement and an execution-
style killing. 
We not only find that competent substantial evidence supports the existence of the
CCP aggravator, but also that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
affording it "great weight."
Turning to Sexton's argument that the death penalty is disproportionate, as
we have often stated, the death penalty is reserved "for the most aggravated and
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unmitigated of most serious crimes."  Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla.
1992) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973)).  This Court performs
proportionality review to prevent the imposition of "unusual" punishments contrary
to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.  See Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d
167, 169 (Fla. 1991).  In deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty, the
Court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the case and compare the
case with other capital cases.  See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla.
1998).  "It is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances."  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  
When a
codefendant is equally as culpable or more culpable than the defendant, the
disparate treatment of the codefendant may render the defendant’s punishment
disproportionate.  See Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 406 (Fla. 1996).  Sexton
claims that his death sentence should be reversed because he is not more culpable
than the perpetrator of the crime, Willie, who received a sentence of twenty-five
years in prison.  Nonetheless, if the defendant is the more culpable participant in the
crime, disparate treatment of the codefendant is justified.  See id. at 407.  "A trial
court's determination concerning the relative culpability of the co-perpetrators in a
first-degree murder case is a finding of fact and will be sustained on review if
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supported by competent substantial evidence."  Puccio v. State, 701 So. 2d 858,
860 (Fla. 1997).
The trial court’s thorough analysis indicates that the trial court carefully
considered the relative culpability of Sexton and Willie.  See Jennings v. State, 718
So. 2d 144, 153 (Fla. 1998).  As indicated by the trial court's sentencing order, the
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Sexton was the dominating
force behind the murder of Joel and that he was far more culpable than Willie, the
actual perpetrator of the homicide.  According to trial court's detailed sentencing
order:
The state's theory of prosecution was that the defendant so
totally dominated, controlled and directed every facet of Willie
Sexton's life that Willie would kill at his father's direction.  In addition,
the evidence showed that Willie is a dull-witted, childlike person who
was 22 years old at the time of the killings.  Further, the state urged as
a motive for the killing that Joel Good was believed by the defendant
to be about to reveal to law enforcement the defendant's whereabouts
(he was a fugitive from Ohio) and criminal activity (he was implicated
in the death and burial of an infant and had engaged in illicit sex with
his daughters).
. . . .
This court is sensitive to the issue of proportionality of sentence
in this case.  The actual killer, Willie Sexton, has received a sentence
of 25 years imprisonment after pleading guilty to the reduced charge of
second-degree murder.  This is not, however, merely a case of a son
killing because his father wanted him to.
Florida case law is clear - a defendant may not be sentenced to
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death if a more culpable co-defendant has been sentenced to life
imprisonment or less.  This reasoning probably also extends to equally
culpable co-defendants.  This court believes the defendant to be the
more culpable of the two co-defendants.
Willie Sexton had nothing to gain, and the defendant had
everything to gain, from the death of Joel Good.  This killing was
solely the idea of the defendant however tormented his thought
process was.
The evidence clearly showed the dominance of the defendant
over his simple-minded son achieved by a lifetime of cruel, insidious
and humiliating physical, emotional and sexual abuse.  As in another
Hillsborough County case, Witt v. State, 342 So.2d 497 (1977), the
co-defendant was peculiarly susceptible to domination.  Willie was the
son.  Willie was much younger.  Willie is childlike mentally and
emotionally.  The defendant clearly dominated the criminal episode. 
For these reasons and after considering the totality of the
circumstances and comparing this case to other capital cases this
court submits that the sentence of death is proportional.
The trial court's findings were established by the testimony of the Sexton
children and by the compelling expert testimony.  We find that the trial court's
ruling that Sexton was far more culpable than his son Willie is supported by
competent substantial evidence.  Thus, Willie's twenty-five-year prison sentence
does not render Sexton's death sentence disproportionate.
Comparing the circumstances of this case to other cases in which the death
penalty has been imposed, see Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 416-17, Sexton's death
sentence is proportionate to other cases where "masterminds" have been sentenced
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to death, even though they did not actually commit the murder.  See Larzelere,  676
So. 2d at 407; Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 792-94 (Fla. 1992).
In light of the circumstances of this crime, including the existence of the
CCP and avoiding arrest aggravators, we find the imposition of the death penalty to
be proportionate when compared to other similar cases.  See Larzelere, 676 So. 2d
at 407; Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 792-94.  In fact, we find the circumstances in
this case to be even more egregious than these cases.  Here, the record reflects that
Sexton, on numerous occasions, indicated to Willie that Joel needed to be "put to
sleep" and directed how this should be accomplished.   Sexton ruthlessly utilized
his own simple-minded and abused son as his murder weapon of choice to kill Joel
and to avoid detection by authorities.  In addition, Sexton was present for at least
part of the murder and may have actually participated in the killing.
In affirming Sexton's death sentence, we do not overlook the fact that the
trial court gave great weight to the statutory mitigator of "under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance."  We set forth the trial court's reasoning
as to this mitigator in order to put the court's finding in proper perspective:
Two psychologists, Dr. Weiner and Dr. Wood, examined the
defendant.  Dr. Weiner's testing of the defendant revealed an I.Q. in
the low 80s and showed large differences between his abilities in
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different measures.  His scores on some tests ranged from 16
percentile to 2 percentile suggesting some kind of brain dysfunction. 
Dr. Weiner recommended a Positron Emission Tomography (PET)
scan and that was administered by Dr. Wood.  According to Dr.
Wood it revealed a dysfunctional limbic system in the lower half of the
brain.  An MRI examination conducted on the defendant following an
auto accident in 1991 showed structural injury on the top half of his
brain as well.  Dr. Wood opined that, as a result, the defendant does
not respond normally to emotional situations and has memory deficits
confining his functions to the present moment without a continuity of
information from the past that normal people have.  Dr. Weiner opined
that the defendant had a 'rather limited tolerance for stress' tending to
diminish his self control below the normal level of expectation.
The anecdotal evidence of exceedingly bizarre episodes and
incidents too numerous to include herein, considered together with the
evidence of brain dysfunction shows a man with low-normal
intelligence and inability to cope placed under the stress of losing his
children to the Ohio authorities and turning desperate. 
Although the trial court found the evidence established this statutory
mitigator, this finding did not obviate the CCP aggravator, indicating Sexton's
capability of planning and directing the murder of his own son-in-law for purposes
of avoiding arrest.  See Cruse v. State, 588 So. 2d 983, 992 (Fla. 1991) (finding
that the defendant's advance procurement of weapon and ample time for reflection
supported CCP notwithstanding finding that defendant acted under extreme mental
or emotional disturbance).  The trial court here found the statutory mitigator to be
applicable because of the fact that as a result of brain dysfunction, Sexton does not
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respond normally to emotional situations and that he had turned "desperate" as a
result of the stress of losing his children.  The trial court properly evaluated and
weighed this statutory mitigator and considered it in light of the statutory
aggravators, including CCP and avoiding arrest.  Considering the existence of three
statutory aggravators in this case, the quality of both the statutory and nonstatutory
mitigation and the circumstances of the murder in this case, we find  this death
sentence to be proportionate.  Cf. Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Fla.
1996) (affirming defendant's death sentence for killing his wife based on the
presence of two aggravating factors--prior violent felony and HAC--despite the
existence of two statutory mental mitigators--extreme mental or emotional
disturbance and impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct, as well
as a number of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d
660, 66 (Fla. 1994) (affirming defendant's death sentence based on the presence of
two aggravators–prior violent felony and murder committed during the course of a
robbery--despite the existence of the statutory mitigator, extreme mental or
emotional disturbance); Lemon v. State, 456 So. 2d 885, 888 (Fla. 1984)
(upholding imposition of the death penalty where defendant was convicted of
stabbing a woman and the trial court found two aggravating factors–HAC and a
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prior violent felony conviction–and one mitigating factor, emotional disturbance).  
For his final claim, Sexton attacks the constitutionality of Florida’s capital
sentencing statute, which authorizes a death sentence recommendation by a bare
majority vote. This argument has been previously rejected by this Court.  See, e.g.,
Larzelere, 676 So. 2d at 407 n.7; Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995) (citing
James v. State, 453 So.2d 786, 792 (Fla. 1984).  In addition, this was not a bare
majority vote case because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of
eight to four.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
J. Rodgers Padgett, Judge - Case No. 94-1299-B
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Andrea Norgard, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
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for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee