Title: State v. Albright
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116408
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 2, 2018

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 116,408 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM D. ALBRIGHT, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
Because the definition of an illegal sentence does not include a claim that the 
sentence violates a constitutional provision, a party cannot use a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 to seek relief based on the constitutional holding 
in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). 
 
2.  
 
The change in the law effected by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 
2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), cannot provide the manifest injustice necessary to 
excuse the untimeliness of a 60-1507 motion. 
 
 
3.  
 
 The change in the law effected by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. 
Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), cannot be applied retroactively to cases that were 
final when Alleyne was decided. 
 
Appeal from Kingman District Court; LARRY T. SOLOMON, judge. Opinion filed February 2, 
2018. Affirmed. 
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Christina M. Kerls, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 
brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  William Albright appeals the district court's denial of his "motion for 
resentencing." In his motion, Albright argued that Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 
133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), renders his hard 40 sentence unconstitutional. 
The district court construed Albright's "motion for resentencing" as a collateral challenge 
under K.S.A. 60-1507 and concluded that Albright was not entitled to relief because 
Alleyne cannot be applied retroactively to a sentence that was final when Alleyne was 
decided. We affirm.   
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On March 11, 1999, a jury convicted Albright of first-degree murder. The district 
court sentenced Albright to life in prison with no possibility of parole for 40 years. On 
June 1, 2001, this court affirmed that sentence. State v. Albright, 271 Kan. 546, 24 P.3d 
103 (2001).  
 
On March 25, 2002, Albright filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded Albright's case for a new trial. State v. Albright, No. 90,216, 2004 
WL 1041350 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 278 Kan. 843 (2004). At the 
second trial, a jury again convicted Albright of first-degree murder. 
 
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After Albright was convicted at the second trial, but before sentencing, Albright 
filed a motion to find the hard 40 sentencing scheme unconstitutional under Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). On March 28, 
2005, the district court denied the motion and again sentenced Albright to life in prison 
with no possibility of parole for 40 years. The hard 40 was imposed as a result of judicial 
fact-finding. Albright's seemingly clairvoyant talents did not result in relief. On March 
16, 2007, this court affirmed Albright's conviction and sentence after observing that 
judicial fact-finding does not bring the imposition of a hard 40 sentence into conflict with 
Apprendi. State v. Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 425, 153 P.3d 497 (2007). 
 
On March 10, 2016, Albright filed a "motion for resentencing on a Hard 40 
Sentence" asserting that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). The district court denied 
relief. Albright appealed to this court. On appeal, Albright argues that, under Alleyne, his 
hard 40 life sentence is unconstitutional because it is the result of judicial fact-finding.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
In his "motion for resentencing," Albright argued to the district court that his 
sentence was unconstitutional under Alleyne. The State contended there was no legal 
authority for Albright's "motion for resentencing," and the district court therefore should 
construe it as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because Albright challenged his 
sentence on constitutional grounds, and this court has held that a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence is an improper vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of a sentence, 
the State argued that Albright's motion should be dismissed. 
 
The district court instead opted to view Albright's motion as a collateral challenge 
to his sentence and reach the merits of Albright's claims. The district court then 
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concluded that Albright was not entitled to relief because in Verge v. State, 50 Kan. App. 
2d 591, 335 P.3d 679 (2014), the Court of Appeals conclusively decided the issue when it 
held that Alleyne cannot be applied retroactively. 
  
On appeal, Albright argues that the district court was correct when it construed his 
motion as a collateral attack under K.S.A. 60-1507(b). However, Albright contends that 
the district court should have granted his motion because, under Alleyne, his sentence is 
unconstitutional. He contends that the Kansas Court of Appeals cases that have held 
otherwise were wrongly decided. 
 
The State responds that, whether Albright's motion was viewed "as either a motion 
to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504, or as a motion for post-conviction 
relief under K.S.A. 60-1507," the district court should have dismissed his claim on 
procedural grounds. In the alternative, the State argues that Albright is not entitled to 
relief because this court held in Kirtdoll v. State, 306 Kan. 335, 393 P.3d 1053 (2017), 
that Alleyne does not apply retroactively. 
  
We conclude that, whether Albright's pleading is construed as a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence, or a collateral attack under K.S.A. 60-1507(b), he is not entitled to 
relief.  
 
This appeal concerns whether the district court correctly construed Albright's pro 
se pleading, whether it correctly interpreted statutory provisions, and whether it erred 
when it denied postconviction relief based on the legal conclusion that a change in law 
did not apply retroactively. Therefore, our review is de novo. See State v. Gilbert, 299 
Kan. 797, 802, 326 P.3d 1060 (2014) ("Whether the district court correctly construed a 
pro se pleading is a question of law subject to unlimited review."); State v. Eddy, 299 
Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12 (2014) (interpretation of a statute is a question of law over 
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which appellate courts have unlimited review); State v. Adams, 297 Kan. 665, 669, 304 
P.3d 311 (2013) (legal conclusions regarding K.S.A. 60-1507 motion are reviewed de 
novo).  
 
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3405 provides that an illegal sentence is one that is imposed 
by a court without jurisdiction, does not conform to the statutory provision, or is 
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served. Recently, in 
State v. Brown, we held that "because the definition of an illegal sentence does not 
include a claim that the sentence violates a constitutional provision, a defendant cannot 
use a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 to seek relief based on 
the constitutional holding in Alleyne." 306 Kan. 330, 332, 393 P.3d 1049 (2017). 
 
K.S.A. 60-1507 provides an avenue for a prisoner to collaterally attack his or her 
sentence. However, K.S.A. 60-1507(f) requires that any action under the statute be 
brought within one year and allows for an extension of the time limitation only "to 
prevent manifest injustice." K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). We recently held that "Alleyne's 
prospective-only change in the law cannot provide the exceptional circumstances that 
would justify a successive 60-1507 motion or the manifest injustice necessary to excuse 
the untimeliness of a 60-1507 motion." Kirtdoll, 306 Kan. at 341.  
 
Whether the district court correctly construed Albright's pleading as collateral 
attack, or whether it should have characterized it as a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
is of no consequence. Either way, Albright is not entitled to relief. Because Albright 
challenges the constitutionality of his sentence, a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
cannot provide the relief he seeks. Because he filed the pleading well after the one-year 
time limitation and an Alleyne-based challenge does not satisfy the manifest injustice 
exception, Albright cannot collaterally attack his sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507.  
 
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Finally, we note that, even if we were to reach the merits of Albright's claim, he 
would still not be entitled to relief. We recently concluded that Alleyne cannot be applied 
retroactively to cases that were final when Alleyne was decided. Kirtdoll, 306 Kan. at 
341. 
 
Albright was sentenced on March 28, 2005. His case was final when this court 
affirmed that sentence on March 16, 2007. Alleyne was decided in 2013. Therefore, 
Alleyne does not render Albright's sentence unconstitutional.  
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.