Title: PEOPLE OF MI V SHAWN LEON JENKINS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125141
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 125141 
SHAWN LEON JENKINS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PER CURIAM. 
This case requires us to consider when defendant’s 
consensual encounter with a police officer was transformed 
into an investigatory stop, which gives rise to Fourth 
Amendment protections and must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion. 
Defendant argues that the officer seized him 
without reasonable suspicion to do so. 
The trial court 
agreed, 
granting 
defendant’s 
motion 
to 
suppress 
the 
incriminating evidence later found by the officer and 
dismissing the pending charges. 
The Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
We conclude that 
defendant was not “seized” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until after the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
gave 
the 
officer 
a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant had been engaged in 
criminal behavior. Accordingly, the trial court erred when 
it granted defendant’s motion. 
We reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial 
court for reinstatement of the charges brought against 
defendant and for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
During the evening of August 23, 2001, the Ann Arbor 
Police Department received a complaint regarding a party in 
progress in the common area of a housing complex on North 
Maple Road. 
Officers Geoffrey Spickard and Jeff Lind were 
dispatched to the housing complex, which was known to the 
police as a high crime and drug area. 
Upon their arrival, 
they found a gathering of fifteen to twenty people drinking 
and talking loudly. 
Defendant and another man were seated 
on stairs leading to one of the housing units. 
Officer Spickard approached defendant, and the two 
engaged in a general conversation about the party. At that 
point, a woman emerged from the attached housing unit and, 
using profane language, asked defendant who he was and why 
he was seated on her porch. 
After hearing this, Officer 
Spickard asked defendant if he lived in the housing 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
complex. 
Defendant said that he did not, and Officer 
Spickard asked to see defendant’s identification. 
When 
defendant handed over his state identification card, 
Officer Spickard pulled out his personal radio and started 
to place a call to the Law Enforcement Information Network 
(LEIN). 
Defendant’s behavior immediately changed.1
 He became 
obviously nervous and made furtive gestures toward a large 
pocket on the side of his pants. 
He began to walk away, 
despite the fact that Officer Spickard still held his 
identification card and was speaking to him.2
 Several 
residents of the housing complex called out invitations for 
defendant to enter their homes. 
1 
The 
dissent 
fails 
to 
note 
these 
changes 
in 
defendant’s behavior. Post at 5-6. The dissent may view
these facts as irrelevant but, when the governing Fourth
Amendment principles are correctly applied, these changes
in defendant’s behavior support the officers’ ultimate 
decision to seize the defendant. 
2 This fact is also omitted from the dissent’s 
analysis. 
Thus, while the dissent concludes that no 
reasonable person would walk away under the circumstances,
post at 8, this view was obviously not shared by the
defendant, who walked away “under those circumstances.” 
That Justice CAVANAGH finds our reference to the record 
“enigmatic[]” 
and 
“befuddl[ing],” 
post 
at 
9 
n 
10,
demonstrates the dissent’s belief that we are entitled to 
rewrite 
the 
events 
underlying 
this 
appeal 
with 
an 
unrealistic legal formalism. 
It is only with a lawyer’s
armchair detachment that the dissent can hypothesize about
what a “reasonable person” would do while ignoring the
actions of the individual who actually observed the 
officers’ conduct and whose liberty was actually at stake. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At that point, Officer Spickard and his partner walked 
alongside defendant, encouraging him to wait for the 
results of the LEIN inquiry. 
When defendant did not stop, 
Officer Spickard placed a hand on defendant’s back and told 
him that he was not free to leave. 
The LEIN inquiry revealed an outstanding warrant for 
defendant’s arrest. 
As Officer Spickard was placing 
defendant in handcuffs, a gun fell from defendant’s 
waistband to the ground. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed 
weapon, MCL 750.227; possession of a firearm by a felon, 
MCL 750.224f; and possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. 
He 
moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds 
and sought dismissal of the charges. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which 
both Officer Spickard and defendant testified. 
The trial 
court 
considered 
Officer 
Spickard’s 
testimony 
and 
determined that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, 
defendant 
was 
"seized" 
when 
he 
was 
asked 
for 
identification. 
In reaching this conclusion, the trial 
court relied on Officer Spickard’s testimony that he 
believed that defendant was not free to leave at that 
point. 
The trial court concluded that the officer did not 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
have 
a 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
support 
such 
an 
investigative stop. 
It granted defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence and dismissed the case. 
A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed.3
 The 
majority agreed with the trial court that Officer Spickard 
seized 
defendant 
when 
he 
asked 
defendant 
for 
identification.4
 It concluded that the seizure was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion because defendant was 
seated in a public area, was not engaged in the conduct for 
which the officers were summoned, and ”forthrightly” 
answered the officer’s questions. 
As a result, the 
majority held that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated 
and 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
properly 
granted 
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. 
The dissenting judge, on the other hand, 
determined 
that the initial encounter, including Officer Spickard’s 
request for defendant’s identification, did not constitute 
an investigatory stop. 
The dissent further concluded that 
subsequent events gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
possible criminal activity and entitled Officer Spickard to 
transform the encounter into an investigatory stop. 
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 18,
2003 (Docket No. 240947). 
4 The majority criticized the trial court’s reliance on
Officer Spickard’s subjective belief that defendant was not
free 
to 
leave 
once 
he 
had 
been 
asked 
to 
produce
identification, but concluded that there was objective
evidence as well to support this conclusion. We disagree.
5 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
The prosecutor seeks leave to appeal in this Court. 
After hearing oral argument from both parties on the 
prosecution’s application for leave to appeal, we have 
determined that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must 
be reversed and that this matter must be remanded to the 
trial court for reinstatement of the charges against 
defendant and further proceedings. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in 
a suppression hearing for clear error. 
People v Custer, 
465 Mich 319, 325-326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). 
But the 
“[a]pplication of constitutional standards by the trial 
court is not entitled to the same deference as factual 
findings.” 
People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 631 n 7; 505 
NW2d 266 (1993). Application of the exclusionary rule to a 
Fourth Amendment violation is a question of law that is 
reviewed de novo. Custer, supra at 326. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The United States Constitution and the Michigan 
Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
US Const, Am 
IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.5 
Under certain circumstances, a police officer may 
approach and temporarily detain a person for the purpose of 
5  Cf. Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 6 n 3; 664 NW2d
767 (2003). 
6 
 
 
  
                                                 
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there 
is no probable cause to support an arrest. 
Terry v Ohio, 
392 US 1, 22; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).  A brief 
detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the 
officer 
has 
a 
reasonably 
articulable 
suspicion 
that 
criminal activity is afoot. Custer, supra at 327; People v 
Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 192; 627 NW2d 297 (2001); Terry, 
supra at 30-31. 
Whether an officer has a reasonable 
suspicion to make such an investigatory stop is determined 
case by case, on the basis of an analysis of the totality 
of the facts and circumstances. 
Oliver, supra at 192. 
A 
determination regarding whether a reasonable suspicion 
exists “'must be based on commonsense judgments and 
inferences about human behavior.'” 
Id. at 197 (citation 
omitted). 
Of course, not every encounter between a police 
officer and a citizen requires this level of constitutional 
justification. 
A “seizure” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment occurs only if, in view of all the 
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that 
he was not free to leave.6 
People v Mamon, 435 Mich 1, 11; 
6 Justice CAVANAGH recognizes that this inquiry is an
objective one, but asserts that “an officer’s subjective 
intent is relevant to the extent that it may have been
conveyed to the defendant by the words or actions of the
officers.” 
Post at 8. 
Justice CAVANAGH relies on a 
proposition that secured only two votes in United States v 
Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554 n 6; 100 S Ct 1870; 64 L Ed 2d
7 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
457 NW2d 623 (1990). 
When an officer approaches a person 
and 
seeks 
voluntary 
cooperation 
through 
noncoercive 
questioning, there is no restraint on that person’s 
liberty, and the person is not seized. 
Florida v Royer, 
460 US 491, 497-498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983) 
(plurality opinion). 
Here, 
Officer 
Spickard’s 
initial 
encounter 
with 
defendant was consensual. 
Officer Spickard did not seize 
defendant when he asked whether defendant lived in the 
housing complex, 
nor did he seize defendant when he asked 
for identification. 
No evidence indicated that Officer 
Spickard told defendant at this juncture to remain where he 
was or that defendant was required to answer the officer's 
questions. 
Asking such questions to elicit voluntary information 
from private citizens is an essential part of police 
investigations. 
Hiibel v Sixth Judicial Dist Court of 
497 (1980). 
Also, he appears to misunderstand the meaning
of this passage. 
Mendenhall simply recognizes that an
officer’s subjective intent may be relevant if it is 
objectively manifested. 
In other words, it restates the
principle that only objective conduct and circumstances are 
relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
The dissent errs, therefore, by asserting that Officer
Spickard’s 
subjective 
beliefs 
are 
relevant 
without 
determining whether those subjective beliefs were, in fact,
objectively manifested. 
Instead, the dissent “presume[s]”
that the officer’s beliefs were apparent to defendant.
Post at 
10. 
Assuming arguendo that we are entitled to 
insert our presumptions into the record, Justice CAVANAGH’s 
presumption is disproved by the fact that defendant himself 
walked away from the officers during the LEIN check.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevada, 542 US __; 124 S Ct 2451; 159 L Ed 2d 292 (2004). 
“In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a 
person for identification without implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.” 
542 US ___; 124 S Ct 2458; 159 L Ed 2d 302; 
see also Royer, supra at 501. As the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized, “[w]hile most citizens will respond 
to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so 
without being told they are free not to respond, hardly 
eliminates 
the 
consensual 
nature 
of 
the 
response.” 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v Delgado, 466 US 210, 
216; 104 S Ct 1758; 80 L Ed 2d 247 (1984). 
This summary of governing Fourth Amendment principles 
demonstrates that the Court of Appeals majority erred when 
it analyzed the initial conversation between Officer 
Spickard and defendant, and Officer Spickard’s request for 
identification, as if the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment were implicated. 
The Fourth Amendment was not 
implicated 
until 
Officer 
Spickard 
actually 
hindered 
defendant’s attempt to leave the scene, thereby “seizing” 
him 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
Specifically, this “seizure” occurred when Officer Spickard 
followed defendant as he tried to walk away, orally 
discouraged him from leaving, and, finally, put a hand on 
his back and told him to wait for the results of the LEIN 
inquiry. 
This point—when Officer Spickard physically 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
hindered defendant’s departure and instructed him to stay 
in the officer’s presence—is the earliest at which a 
reasonable person might have concluded that he was not free 
to leave. 
By this point, however, Officer Spickard had a 
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. First, 
the officer knew that a female resident had challenged 
defendant’s unconsented-to presence on her front porch. 
Second, when defendant saw that Officer Spickard was 
initiating a LEIN inquiry, he immediately began to act 
nervously and reached toward his pocket.7  Third, defendant 
attempted to walk away from the officer, apparently so 
intent on leaving that he was willing to lose possession of 
his identification card.8
 Fourth, although defendant did 
not live in the area, 
various people invited him into 
their homes, offering him protection from further police 
questioning.9
 
Considering 
the 
totality 
of 
these 
7 This Court and the United States Supreme Court agree
that “'nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion.'” 
Oliver, supra at 197,
quoting Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124; 120 S Ct 673;
145 L Ed 2d 570 (2000). 
8 Presence in a high crime area coupled with unprovoked
flight can also give rise to a reasonable suspicion to
support an investigatory stop. Oliver, supra at 197. 
9 An experienced officer could infer that these 
bystanders had reason to know that defendant desired to
avoid further police scrutiny. 
This inference adds to the 
quantum of evidence supporting the conclusion that Officer
Spickard had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant.
10 
 
 
 
 
circumstances, Officer Spickard had a reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to warrant transforming the consensual encounter 
into an investigatory stop and briefly detaining defendant 
until the LEIN inquiry could be completed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated and that the incriminating evidence produced 
by 
the 
investigative 
stop 
in 
this 
case 
should 
be 
suppressed. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for 
reinstatement of the charges against defendant and for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
  
                                                 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 125141 
SHAWN LEON JENKINS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Despite recognizing that a police officer must have a 
reasonably articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot 
before 
detaining 
a 
person, 
today’s 
majority 
incorrectly identifies the point at which defendant was 
seized to justify a detention based on suspicions formed 
after the detention occurred. Because defendant was seized 
without reasonable suspicion, and because the Fourth 
Amendment 
expressly 
prohibits 
using 
after-acquired 
suspicions to justify a seizure, Florida v JL, 529 US 266, 
271-272; 120 S Ct 1375; 146 L Ed 2d 254 (2000), I 
respectfully dissent. 
The Search and Seizure Clause of both the United 
States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution1 protects 
1 US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures 
conducted by governmental actors. 
Whren v United States, 
517 US 806, 809-810; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996); 
People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 52; 378 NW2d 451 (1985). 
Before detaining an individual, a police officer must have 
a 
particularized 
and 
objective 
basis 
for 
suspecting 
criminal activity by the particular person detained. 
Shabas, supra at 59. 
An “inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or ‘hunch’” is an insufficient basis for seizing 
a person. 
Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 27; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L 
Ed 2d 889 (1968). 
Rather, the officer must have at least 
“a 
particularized 
suspicion, 
based 
on 
an 
objective 
observation, that the person stopped has been, is, or is 
about to be engaged in criminal wrongdoing.” Shabaz, supra 
at 59. 
“As long as the person to whom questions are put 
remains free to disregard the questions and walk away,” 
there has been no Fourth Amendment violation. 
United 
States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554; 100 S Ct 1870; 64 L 
Ed 2d 497 (1980). 
But at the moment that person is 
restrained, he is seized. Terry, supra at 16. 
Generally, “‘a person has been “seized” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.’” 
2  
 
 
 
California v Hodari D, 499 US 621, 627-628; 111 S Ct 1547; 
113 L Ed 2d 690 (1991), quoting Mendenhall, supra at 554. 
Where a seizure by show of authority is alleged, rather 
than a seizure by physical force, the test “is an objective 
one: 
not whether the citizen perceived that he was being 
ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s 
words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable 
person.” Hodari D, supra at 628. 
Interestingly, the majority concludes that defendant 
was not seized until the officers physically restrained 
defendant after he tried to walk away. 
But the majority 
ignores that a seizure can also occur by a police officer’s 
show of authority. 
The majority states, “When an officer 
approaches a person and seeks voluntary cooperation through 
noncoercive questioning, there is no restraint on that 
person’s liberty, and the person is not seized.” 
Ante at 
8-9, citing Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 497-498; 103 S Ct 
1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983). 
I agree that the initial 
questioning and the officers’ request to see defendant’s 
identification were part of a consensual citizen-police 
encounter. 
But the majority fails to address the next 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
critical event—the LEIN2 check—and instead jumps to events 
that occurred while the LEIN check was in progress. 
On the evening in question, Officer Geoffrey Spickard 
and his partner responded to an Ann Arbor housing complex 
after receiving a complaint about a large group of people 
drinking and being loud in the complex’s courtyard. 
When 
the officers arrived, they observed fifteen to twenty 
people engaged in those activities. 
Nonetheless, they 
bypassed those people and approached defendant and another 
gentleman who were sitting quietly on some steps and who 
were not drinking. 
According to Officer Spickard’s 
preliminary examination testimony, he approached these 
particular two gentlemen because he did not recognize them. 
At the suppression hearing, however, he testified that he 
approached them because he believed defendant’s companion 
resided at the apartment connected to the steps on which he 
was sitting, and the officer wanted to ask him some 
questions about the gathering. 
Officer Spickard testified 
that while he was talking to the gentlemen, a woman opened 
the adjacent door, asked defendant who he was and why he 
was on her porch, and retreated inside. 
2 Law Enforcement Information Network. 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Thus, according to Officer Spickard, he initially 
asked for defendant’s identification because he suspected 
that defendant might not belong at the complex, and he 
wanted to determine where defendant lived. 
Defendant 
voluntarily informed him that he did not live in the 
complex, and he voluntarily gave him his facially valid 
identification card. 
At that point, any suspicions the 
officers had about where defendant lived were resolved, and 
there was no need to detain defendant.3
 Of course, the 
officers were free to continue the consensual encounter by 
asking defendant additional questions, such as why he was 
there, but, instead, they confiscated the identification 
card and, without requesting permission, initiated a LEIN 
check.4 
3 The majority apparently does not contest that there
was no need to detain defendant because it does not find 
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain 
defendant at the time of the LEIN check. 
See ante at 10. 
And at the suppression hearing, Officer Spickard offered no
rationale whatsoever that would indicate that he or his 
partner had a reasonable suspicion that any other sort of
criminal activity was afoot. 
4 The majority claims that I “fail[] to note” changes
in defendant’s behavior that occurred after the officers 
began the LEIN check, and that I thus erroneously fail to
properly assess the facts supporting reasonable suspicion.
Ante at 3 n 1. 
Apparently, the majority misses my point
that at the time those subsequent behaviors occurred,
defendant had already been seized. Thus, not only do those
behaviors add nothing to the analysis whether the officers 
5  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
The 
LEIN 
check 
in 
this 
case 
was 
not 
only 
nonconsensual, but it was more than a momentary detention.5 
A person “‘may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so . . . .’” 
Shabaz, supra at 57, quoting Royer, supra at 498. When the 
trespass theory is discounted, as it should be,6 even the 
majority can find no facts that support a finding that the 
had reasonable suspicion at the time of the seizure, but
considering subsequent behavior violates the United States
Supreme Court’s clear prohibition on using after-acquired
suspicions in a totality of the circumstances analysis.
See Florida v JL, supra at 271-272. 
5 In fact, in this case, the wait for the LEIN check
results was unusually long because the police dispatcher 
was busy. 
6 MCL 750.552, in relevant part, defines trespass as
follows: 
Any person who shall wilfully enter, upon
the lands or premises of another without lawful
authority, after having been forbidden so to do
by the owner or occupant, agent or servant of the
owner or occupant, or any person being upon the
land or premises of another, upon being notified
to depart therefrom by the owner or occupant, the
agent or servant of either, who without lawful 
authority 
neglects 
or 
refuses 
to 
depart
therefrom, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
. . . . 
Of course, a LEIN check would not assist the officers
in determining whether the putative occupant had previously
asked defendant to leave, and the officers had not seen the
putative occupant ask defendant to leave. 
Thus, any 
alleged suspicion of trespass was unrelated to the LEIN
check and the subsequent detention. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when 
the LEIN check was initiated.7 
The situation that occurs when an officer asks for 
identification and a person produces it involves a question 
and 
a 
response, 
an 
exchange 
that 
can 
be 
fairly 
characterized as a “consensual encounter” as that term is 
used in Fourth Amendment context. 
But here the officers’ 
next action did not involve a question to which defendant 
had the opportunity to choose to respond. The exchange had 
ceased. 
By confiscating defendant’s identification card 
and beginning an investigation, the officers turned the 
otherwise voluntary encounter into a detention. 
By 
skirting that issue entirely, the majority fails to 
correctly identify the point at which defendant was seized. 
Using the objective test set forth in Hodari D, supra 
at 628, the focus must be on whether, when the LEIN check 
began, 
“the 
officer’s 
words 
and 
actions 
would 
have 
7 The officers would find out later that defendant was 
there visiting his two daughters, who did live in the
complex. 
While that fact has no direct bearing on this
analysis, Officer Spickard claimed that he continued 
speaking with defendant because he suspected him of 
trespassing. But the fact that the officers did not elicit 
this information from defendant, which could have been
obtained by asking the simple question, “Why are you
here?”, but instead chose to run a LEIN check, which would
not answer the question, supports defendant’s theory that
the officers were acting on inchoate suspicions unrelated
to trespass. 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
conveyed” to a reasonable person that he was being seized. 
“[T]he threatening presence of several officers, the 
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching 
of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or 
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s 
request might be compelled” are some circumstances that 
suggest that a seizure has occurred. 
Mendenhall, supra at 
554. 
Here, two uniformed, armed police officers, who had 
already resolved their initial concern about defendant’s 
residence, nonetheless retained defendant’s identification 
card and initiated a LEIN check with no particularized, 
articulable basis for doing so.8
 The officers’ actions 
would have objectively conveyed to a reasonable person that 
the person was not free to leave, and I cannot conceive of 
a reasonable person who would feel free to walk away under 
8 This particular situation differs from those in which
our courts have considered LEIN checks run in the course of 
lawful vehicle stops. 
See, e.g., People v Davis, 250 Mich
App 357, 367-368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002), and People v Walker,
58 Mich App 519, 523-524; 228 NW2d 443 (1975). 
In those 
cases, the officers already had reasonable suspicion and 
conducted LEIN checks in furtherance of their initial stop.
Here, the officers conducted the LEIN check without first
having reasonable suspicion to make the detention. 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
those circumstances.9 The critical distinction between this 
and a consensual encounter is that defendant was no longer 
being asked questions he could refuse to answer. 
Moreover, an officer’s subjective intent is relevant 
to the extent that it may have been conveyed to the 
defendant 
by 
the 
words 
or 
actions 
of 
the 
officer. 
Mendenhall, supra at 554 n 6. 
In the following testimony, 
Officer Spickard confirmed that defendant was not free to 
leave once he initiated the LEIN check: 
Q. [Defense counsel]: At the point that you
approached Mr. Jenkins and asked him for his
I.D., he was not free to leave at that point,
correct? 
A. 
[Officer Spickard]: 
That would be 
correct. 
Q. And if he would have tried to run away,
you would have run after him, correct? 
A. That would be correct. 
Q. And if he would have tried to run away,
you would have stopped him? 
9 The majority enigmatically states that while I 
“conclude[] that no reasonable person would walk away under
the circumstances, this view was obviously not shared by
the 
defendant, 
who 
walked 
away 
‘under 
those 
circumstances.’” 
Ante at 3 n 2. 
Not only am I befuddled
at what this lends to the majority’s analysis, it seems to
assume that I state that defendant was a reasonable person.
I do not. 
Moreover, the test to determine when a person
was seized does not consider the defendant’s subjective
feelings or actions; rather, it asks whether a reasonable
person in defendant’s position would feel free to leave.
Hodari D, supra at 627-628. 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
A. That would be correct. 
Q. And, in fact, as you testified on direct,
you 
encouraged 
him 
throughout 
this 
whole 
encounter to stick around? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Because you wanted to see what the 
results were of the LEIN check? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And he was never free to leave throughout
that entire encounter? 
A. I would characterize that as correct. 
Q. And he was never able to get his I.D.
back from you, correct? 
A. I believe we maintained possession of his
identification, yes. 
* * * 
Q. And if he had asked you for the I.D. back
at that point, you would have said no? 
A. Pending the results of the LEIN check, 
yes. 
Officer Spickard was an experienced officer with a 
ten-year history with the Ann Arbor Police Department. 
It 
is reasonable to presume that these officers, by their 
conduct and by withholding defendant’s identification card, 
were effectively conveying to defendant that he was not 
free to leave.10 
10 The majority misreads my analysis by concluding that
I find the officers’ subjective beliefs, without more,
material. 
But what I conclude is that the officers’ show 
10 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The officers could have easily avoided offending the 
Fourth Amendment. They could have extended the exchange by 
asking defendant if he had any warrants, thereby giving 
defendant an opportunity to answer “yes” or “no” or refuse 
to answer altogether. They could have then asked him if he 
minded if they checked. 
Again, defendant could have 
answered or refused to answer. 
But despite the simplicity 
and legitimacy of this method, and the well-settled 
recognition that the police may approach people and ask 
noncoercive 
questions 
without 
needing 
constitutional 
justifications, today’s majority contravenes well-settled 
constitutional law by installing a rule by which an officer 
can approach a person, ask for identification, and run a 
warrant check without reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot merely because that person is in a high­
crime area. 
Indeed, it cannot be clearer that “[a]n 
individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal 
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a 
reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is 
committing a crime.” 
Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124; 
of authority, actions, words, and conduct were objective 
manifestations of their clearly held subjective belief that
defendant was not free to leave. 
Such a conclusion is 
perfectly within the confines of the rules governing the
consideration of subjective beliefs. See Mendenhall, supra
at 555 n 6. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 S Ct 673; 145 L Ed 2d 570 (2000), citing Brown v Texas, 
443 US 47; 99 S Ct 2637; 61 L Ed 2d 357 (1979). 
Thus, like each court that has heard the matter until 
now, I would hold that defendant was illegally seized 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
The 
officers 
retained 
defendant’s 
identification 
card 
and 
initiated a LEIN check without defendant’s permission and 
after having already resolved their initial stated concern. 
The officers did not identify, nor do the facts show, any 
circumstances that suggested that the officers had a 
reasonable, 
articulable 
suspicion 
based 
on 
objective 
observations that defendant had been, was, or was about to 
engage in criminal wrongdoing at that point. Shabaz, supra 
at 59. 
Moreover, I believe that the officers’ conduct and 
the circumstances surrounding the detention would have 
persuaded any reasonable person to conclude that he was not 
free to leave. As such, I would affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
12