Title: Commonwealth v. Ferreira
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11479
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2019

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SJC-11479 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTONIO MARCOS FERREIRA. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 9, 2018. - March 18, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Exculpatory, Admission by silence, 
Consciousness of guilt, Testimony at prior proceeding.  
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Search and Seizure, Probable cause, 
Exigent circumstances, Warrant, Affidavit.  Probable Cause.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause, 
Admissions and confessions.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Motion to suppress, New trial, Admissions and 
confessions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 19, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Bruce 
R. Henry, J.; the case was tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on May 15, 2017, was 
considered by her. 
 
 
 
James E. Methe for the defendant. 
 
Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In the early morning of October 2, 2009, the 
victim, Sheila dos Santos, was stabbed to death near the back 
2 
 
 
 
entrance to her apartment building.  A Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendant, her former boyfriend, of murder in the 
first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
In this consolidated appeal from his conviction and from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial on the ground of 
undisclosed exculpatory evidence, the defendant challenges the 
denial of the motion for a new trial.  He argues also that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that it was an 
abuse of discretion to have denied his motion to suppress 
evidence that was seized without a warrant, and that a number of 
the judge's evidentiary rulings were erroneous.  In addition, 
the defendant seeks relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
We affirm the defendant's conviction of murder in the first 
degree, and, having reviewed the entire record pursuant to our 
statutory duty under G. L. c. 278, 33E, we decline to order a 
new trial or reduce the verdict. 
 
1.  Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving some details for 
later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 
442 (2012). 
 
The victim lived on the fourth floor of an apartment 
building on Main Street in Everett.  She, along with her 
3 
 
 
 
sisters, Rose Angela Carla dos Santos and Ana Paula Carla dos 
Santos, worked as dancers at a strip club in Chelsea, and later 
in Stoughton.1  She met the defendant at the Chelsea club at some 
point in 2006.  The defendant became friends with the victim and 
her sisters, and eventually started dating the victim.  That 
relationship ended approximately six months prior to the 
victim's death.  Despite the break up, the defendant continued 
to socialize with the victim and her sister, Ana.  The three of 
them went out together to nightclubs and other gatherings 
attended by members of the Brazilian community, and the three 
frequently spoke on the telephone. 
 
In April 2009, the victim entered into a relationship with 
a married man named Oliver.2  On September 26, 2009, a week 
before the victim's death, the defendant and Oliver were at the 
Stoughton club where the victim and her sisters worked.  The 
victim paid attention to Oliver in between dances, and the 
defendant did not stay long.  The next day, the defendant 
visited Ana at her house.  He sat down on the floor, and was "a 
little sad" and "quiet"; he expressed dismay over the victim's 
decision to date a married man. 
                     
1 Because they share the same last name, we refer to the 
victim's sisters by their first names. 
 
 
2 A pseudonym. 
4 
 
 
 
 
On September 30, 2009, the defendant and one of his 
roommates, Darles DeSouza, attended a barbeque at Ana's house to 
celebrate her birthday.  The defendant got "a bit agitated" when 
the victim did not show up.  He asked Ana to contact the victim 
to get her to join them.  When Ana told the defendant that the 
victim was on a date and might stop by later, the defendant 
commented that he had suspected that she was out with someone.  
As the night progressed, the defendant called the victim to see 
what time she would arrive; he held his cellular telephone in 
his hand and appeared to be waiting for her.  After the 
defendant and DeSouza returned to their Somerville apartment, 
the defendant remained outside in his silver Nissan Murano and 
attempted to telephone the victim. 
 
In the early morning hours of October 1, 2009, the 
defendant telephoned Ana and told her that he could no longer be 
friends with her "because he wasn't a good person."  The 
defendant explained that he had been using drugs and that his 
life for the past six months had had no meaning.  He asked Ana 
to give her sister (the victim) a message that "[s]he was 
dealing with a person who has no life."  Ana attempted to 
console the defendant; she told him to think about his family 
and children, and that she would help him find another 
girlfriend.  The defendant responded that he only was interested 
in the victim. 
5 
 
 
 
 
Later that morning, the defendant sent Ana a text message 
that he was feeling better.  He also would "not do anything 
wrong."  Before Ana left for her evening shift at the club, she 
and the defendant spoke by telephone.  The defendant said that 
he had not wanted to go to work that day because he "wasn't in 
the mood."  He asked Ana, "Is your sister going to work today?"  
Ana replied, "I don't know.  I think so." 
 
At that time, the defendant lived on Melvin Street in 
Somerville with DeSouza and another roommate, Washington 
Silveira.  The defendant slept on a spare mattress in DeSouza's 
bedroom, and stored some of his belongings in the closet.  In 
the evening of October 1, 2009, DeSouza came home from work, ate 
dinner with the defendant, and began watching a movie in the 
living room.  The defendant went into the bedroom before the 
movie ended.  After the movie, DeSouza went into his bedroom, 
and noticed that the defendant was lying on his mattress wearing 
a jacket and pants.  This was slightly unusual, but not entirely 
out of the ordinary; the defendant sometimes would be in bed, 
dressed, when he planned to go out later that night.  DeSouza 
fell asleep.  When he woke up the next morning, at 6 A.M., the 
defendant was talking to someone on his cellular telephone. 
 
The victim worked at the Stoughton club in the evening of 
October 1-2, 2009, and drove home in her 2006 Honda CR-V shortly 
after the club closed at 1 A.M.  At 1:11 A.M, during her drive 
6 
 
 
 
home, the victim called her sister Ana; she sounded "normal."  
At 1:12 A.M, a vehicle that appeared to be consistent with the 
defendant's Nissan Murano was captured by a surveillance video 
camera located on the corner of Melvin Street and Broadway in 
Somerville.  The video recording showed this vehicle pull out of 
a parking space on Melvin Street, near the defendant's apartment 
building. 
 
At 1:38 A.M., a vehicle resembling the defendant's Nissan 
Murano drove around a traffic circle in Everett and headed in 
the direction of the victim's apartment building.  A few minutes 
later, at 1:42 A.M., a Honda CR-V drove around the traffic 
circle, heading in the same direction.  At 1:44 A.M., 
surveillance footage from a camera facing Tileston Street in 
Everett captured an image of a similar vehicle driving near the 
victim's apartment building.  Back on Melvin Street in 
Somerville, at 1:53 A.M., a vehicle that appeared similar to the 
defendant's Nissan Murano pulled up and parallel parked in the 
same space from which a vehicle like a Nissan Murano had pulled 
out fifty-one minutes earlier.  A man got out of the vehicle and 
walked in the direction of the defendant's apartment building.3 
 
Shortly before 2 A.M., one of the victim's neighbors, who 
lived on the second floor of the building, was awakened by a 
                     
 
3 The distance between the victim's apartment building and 
the defendant's apartment building is approximately three miles. 
7 
 
 
 
woman's screams coming from the parking lot behind the apartment 
building.  He got up, heard another scream, looked outside, and 
did not see anything.  Approximately thirty to forty seconds 
after the second scream, the neighbor saw someone walk down the 
last few steps of the rear staircase, and jog through the 
parking lot and around a Dumpster.  The neighbor described the 
individual as a man in his twenties or thirties, wearing a tan 
or brown jacket and jeans.  The neighbor went back to bed 
sometime around 2 A.M. 
 
At 1:43 A.M., a woman who lived on Laurel Street, in an 
apartment that faced the rear of the victim's building on Main 
Street, also was also awakened by a woman's screams.  She heard 
the woman yell, "Get off me, get off me, get away from me," but 
did not see anything amiss when she looked outside.  Believing 
that the screams were connected to one of the many parties that 
her neighbors hosted, the woman went back to bed without calling 
the police. 
 
At 4:30 A.M., a resident of the victim's building went 
outside to empty his trash and found the victim lying face down 
in a pool of blood on the landing outside the back door.  She 
had been stabbed or cut thirty-one times; she had seventeen stab 
wounds in the torso, and multiple knife wounds in both arms.  
The victim's handbag, cellular telephone, and keys were next to 
8 
 
 
 
her body.  The wallet contained her credit cards and a few 
hundred dollars in cash.  This neighbor telephoned 911. 
 
Police investigators spoke to members of the victim's 
family.  Ana told the officers, "I have a suspect for you."  The 
police then attempted to locate the defendant.  A detective was 
able to reach the defendant on his cellular telephone.  The 
defendant agreed to meet investigators at the Everett police 
station at 2 P.M.; he did not appear at the police station at 
that time.  Eventually, the defendant informed police that he 
was at the Malden District Court paying traffic fines.  Three 
Everett police officers drove to the Malden District Court and 
met the defendant there.  He agreed to accompany the officers to 
the Everett police station.  When they arrived at the station, 
one of the officers noticed injuries on the back of the 
defendant's hands.  An officer contacted a forensic scientist, 
Eric Koester, who worked at the State police crime laboratory 
(crime lab), and asked him to come to the police station to test 
for possible nonvisible blood.  Koester swabbed both of the 
defendant's hands, and the defendant then left the police 
station. 
 
A crime lab analyst examined deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
extracted from the swabs collected by Koester and determined 
that the victim was included as a possible contributor to a DNA 
mixture on the back of both of the defendant's hands.  The swab 
9 
 
 
 
from the right hand was a mixture of at least three people.  The 
defendant matched the major profile, and the victim was included 
as a potential contributor to the minor profile.  The swab from 
the left hand contained a mixture of DNA from at least two 
people; the defendant's DNA matched the major profile, and the 
victim was included as a potential contributor to the minor 
profile. 
 
On October 2, 2009, police executed search warrants for the 
defendant's apartment and his two vehicles (the Nissan Murano 
and a GMC pickup truck).  Police seized a pair of bloodstained 
sneakers from a bedroom closet.  Later testing showed that DNA 
from a bloodstain on the top of the toe of the left sneaker 
matched the victim's DNA profile.  Another bloodstain on the 
side of the right sneaker, not visible to the naked eye, 
contained a mixture of DNA; the major profile from that sample 
matched the victim's DNA profile.4 
 
Police also collected scrapings from underneath the 
victim's fingernails.  The scrapings from her left hand tested 
                     
 
4 The search of the GMC truck and the Nissan Murano revealed 
no inculpatory evidence.  Forensic chemists conducted screening 
tests of the exterior and interior of the vehicles for the 
presence of blood, in locations where one might expect to find 
transferred blood, e.g., on the steering wheel, control knobs, 
door handles, gear shift, and seats.  All areas tested negative 
for the presence of blood. 
10 
 
 
 
positive for male "Y-STR" DNA,5 and contained a mixture of DNA 
from at least four men.  The defendant (and his paternal 
relatives) were included as possible contributors to the major 
profile.  Oliver (and his paternal relatives) were included as a 
potential source of the minor profile in this DNA mixture.  The 
crime lab obtained both STR and Y-STR DNA results from the 
victim's right fingernail scrapings.  With respect to the STR 
profile, the defendant was included as a possible contributor, 
and Oliver was excluded.  The Y-STR DNA testing produced a 
mixture of at least three male profiles.  The defendant (and his 
paternal relatives) were included as possible contributors to 
the major profile; and Oliver (and his paternal relatives) were 
included as possible contributors to the minor profile.6 
 
2.  Discussion.  In this direct appeal, the defendant 
presents four claims, and asks this court to grant him relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and order a new trial or direct the 
entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt.  The defendant 
contends that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying 
his motion for a new trial based in large part upon evidence 
                     
 
5 "Y-STR" refers to the Y-chromosome short tandem repeat 
method of testing DNA.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dirico, 480 
Mass. 491, 494 (2018). 
 
6 Oliver testified that he visited the victim's apartment at 
approximately 5 P.M. on October 1, 2009, and that they were 
intimate. 
11 
 
 
 
that forensic scientist Eric Koester had failed required 
proficiency tests.  The defendant also challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence that he killed the victim.  In 
addition, he argues that the police conducted an illegal 
warrantless search by swabbing his hands to detect the presence 
of nonvisible blood, and that a subsequent warrant authorizing a 
search of his apartment was not supported by probable cause.  
The defendant argues further that the trial judge abused her 
discretion in making certain evidentiary rulings, including 
allowing the introduction in evidence of an adoptive admission.  
Finally, the defendant asks this court to exercise its 
authority, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and order a new 
trial or direct the entry of a lesser degree of guilt. 
 
a.  Motion for new trial.  Following his conviction of 
murder in the first degree in March 2012, the defendant's appeal 
was entered in this court in June 2013.  In February 2015, the 
Commonwealth provided the defendant with postconviction 
discovery.  The discovery included a September 2014 memorandum 
from the crime lab reporting that Koester repeatedly had failed 
proficiency tests in bloodstain pattern analysis and the 
recovery of trace evidence.  The Commonwealth also provided the 
defendant with a "corrected" DNA STR and Y-STR report that 
showed a significant reduction in the probabilities of the 
12 
 
 
 
combined STR and Y-STR results appearing randomly in the 
population.7 
 
After receiving the information concerning Koester's failed 
proficiency tests, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial 
in this court, on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to 
provide exculpatory evidence.  In the alternative, the defendant 
argued that the information constituted newly discovered 
evidence that "casts real doubt on the justice of the 
conviction" and "probably would have been a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations."  See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 
310, 326 (2008).  In addition, the defendant maintained that 
errors in the DNA probability calculations, combined with other 
issues concerning the forensic testing, warranted a new trial.8  
                     
 
7 The corrected report did not combine the probability of 
the Y-STR and STR results, as the original report incorrectly 
had done. 
 
 
8 The defendant moved, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
17 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979) and Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (c) (4), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), for 
additional documents relative to Koester's employment and job 
performance.  The trial judge denied the motion.  She found that 
the defendant had not established that the "discovery is 
reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant 
granting a new trial," primarily due to Koester's "very limited 
role in this case."  Given the nature of Koester's involvement, 
we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision.  See 
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 407 (2005) (defendant is 
required to demonstrate discovery reasonable likely to uncover 
evidence that might warrant granting new trial). 
13 
 
 
 
The appeal was stayed in this court and the motion for a new 
trial was remanded to the Superior Court. 
 
The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing.  She 
found that the issues raised by Koester's failed proficiency 
tests did not negate the "overwhelming" evidence that the 
defendant had killed the victim.  As to the corrected statistics 
involving the probability of DNA matches, the judge noted that 
the new calculations did not eliminate the defendant as a 
possible contributor to the DNA found underneath the victim's 
right hand fingernails.  The judge concluded, "This court 
remains fully satisfied that the allegedly absent evidence would 
not have played any role in the jury's deliberations and 
conclusions, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's 
guilt." 
 
Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), a judge "may grant a new trial at any time if 
it appears that justice may not have been done."  In reviewing 
the denial of a motion for new trial, we "examine the motion 
judge's conclusions only to determine whether there has been a 
significant error of law or other abuses of discretion."  
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  In conducting 
this review, we afford particular deference to factual 
determinations made by a motion judge who was also the trial 
judge.  Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 488 (2014). 
14 
 
 
 
 
In addition, we review the consolidated appeal of the 
defendant's conviction and the denial of his motion for a new 
trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 
Mass. 799, 805 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Alicia, 464 Mass. 
837, 840 (2013).  Thus, we examine the denial of a motion for a 
new trial to determine whether there was error, and, if so, 
whether the error created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 
355 (2016). 
i.  Proficiency tests.  Turning first to the evidence 
concerning Koester's failed proficiency tests, the parties 
dispute whether this evidence was known to the Commonwealth 
before the March 2012 trial.  The defendant relies on an 
affidavit submitted by his DNA expert, and maintains that "an 
accredited forensic laboratory" would have known before trial 
that Koester had failed the proficiency tests.  According to the 
expert, laboratories typically evaluate tests before the results 
are finalized and reported to the forensic scientist.  He opined 
that "the information regarding the failed . . .  proficiency 
tests was available to the [State] laboratory by the beginning 
of 2012, well before the March 2012 trial."  Thus, the defendant 
argues, he is entitled to a new trial because the Commonwealth 
failed to provide exculpatory evidence in its possession prior 
to the time of trial. 
15 
 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the information concerning 
Koester's test results was not in its possession or control at 
the time of trial, because the information did not come into 
existence until after the defendant's trial.  The Commonwealth 
argues accordingly that, at most, the information regarding 
Koester should be considered newly discovered evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 312 (2008), cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009) ("obligation to disclose 
exculpatory information is limited to that in the possession of 
the prosecutor or police" [citation omitted]).  Although Koester 
was required to complete the tests in 2010 and 2011, the 
Commonwealth argues, the tests were not graded until May 2012, a 
few months after the trial from March 15 through March 30, 2012. 
 
In "March of 2012, [however, Koester] became the subject of 
an ongoing corrective action by Lab Management, due to 
deficiencies identified during the annual proficiency testing 
program."9  That the State police took "corrective action" 
against Koester in March of 2012 appears to indicate that the 
Commonwealth, through the State police, was aware of his 
deficient performance at least before the end of the defendant's 
trial.  Regardless of whether the prosecutor was aware of the 
                     
 
9 Koester also was the subject of a separate "contamination 
event" in October 2012.  Koester resigned from his position at 
the crime lab at the beginning of April 2014. 
16 
 
 
 
test results at any point during the trial, the defendant is 
unable to establish a reasonable possibility that the evidence 
would have made a difference in the jury's verdict.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 382 (2017). 
 
"To obtain a new trial on the basis of nondisclosed 
exculpatory evidence, a defendant must establish (1) that the 
evidence was in the possession, custody, or control of the 
prosecutor or a person subject to the prosecutor's control; 
(2) that the evidence is exculpatory; and (3) prejudice" 
(quotations, citation and alteration omitted).  Id. at 380.  
Where a defendant files a specific request for exculpatory 
evidence, "the defendant must demonstrate . . . the existence of 
a substantial basis for claiming prejudice," Commonwealth v. 
Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 582 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 231 (2015).  A defendant "can meet 
[this] burden 'with record support for the conclusion that the 
jury would have been influenced by timely disclosure of the 
evidence in question,'" Imbert, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 486 (2007), e.g., that "there is a 
reasonable possibility that the nondisclosed evidence would have 
made a difference."  Imbert, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Laguer, 448 Mass. 585, 594 (2007).  "Where, on the other hand, a 
defendant's pretrial motion was merely a general request for 
exculpatory evidence, the defendant must show that the withheld 
17 
 
 
 
evidence 'would probably have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations'" (citation omitted).  Watkins, supra. 
 
Here, the defendant concedes that he made a general request 
for exculpatory evidence, and did not make a specific request.  
Accordingly, we consider whether there was prejudice from the 
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence under the standard used to 
assess the impact of newly discovered evidence, Commonwealth v. 
Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 21 (2011), and evaluate "whether there is 
a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion if the evidence had been admitted at trial," 
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 413 (1992). 
 
Given Koester's limited role in this case, we conclude that 
there was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision 
that the defendant was not entitled to relief.  The judge's 
finding that Koester played a relatively minor role in the 
criminal investigation against the defendant is supported by the 
trial record.  Koester responded to the crime scene, marked the 
location of evidence, and performed a bloodstain pattern 
analysis that was not central to the case.  Later that day, 
Koester swabbed the defendant's hands at the police station.  
The swabs were submitted to another scientist for DNA testing.  
Although Koester officially supervised the two criminalists who 
searched the defendant's apartment, Koester was not present when 
they recovered the defendant's sneakers, and he did not test the 
18 
 
 
 
sneakers for the presence of blood or DNA.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Hernandez, 481 Mass. 189, 197 (2018) (no prejudice warranting 
new trial where Koester was present as supervisor but played 
limited role in investigation); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 
Mass. at 383 ("actual DNA testing, in which Koester had no 
direct role, likely did the most damage"). 
 
ii.  Calculation of DNA statistics.  We turn to the 
defendant's contention that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the crime lab has revised the method it uses to 
calculate the probability of random matches in cases involving 
both STR and Y-STR results. 
 
At trial, the DNA analyst testified that the STR profile 
obtained from the fingernail clippings of the victim's right 
hand was a mixture of at least two individuals, and that the 
victim's DNA matched the major profile.  The defendant was 
included as a potential contributor to the minor profile.  The 
analyst testified further that the Y-STR results revealed DNA 
from at least three males.  The defendant's DNA (and that of his 
paternal relatives) matched the major profile of the Y-STR 
profile, and Oliver's DNA (and that of his paternal relatives) 
matched the minor profile.  The analyst then explained that she 
had calculated the probabilities of the STR and Y-STR profiles 
found on the victim's right fingernails by "tak[ing] the 
statistic for the STR results . . . multiplied by the statistic 
19 
 
 
 
for the Y-STR results. . . ."  Based on this method, the analyst 
testified, the probability of a randomly selected unrelated 
individual having the same STR and Y-STR profile was one in 
326,900 of the Caucasian population, one in 423,000 of the 
African-American population, and one in 118,900 of the Hispanic 
population. 
 
After trial, the crime lab issued a "Corrected DNA STR/Y-
STR Report" that eliminated the original "combined STR and Y-STR 
frequency data (i.e. combined statistic)" from the report.  
According to the revised calculation, the probability of a 
randomly selected individual having contributed to the STR DNA 
mixture found on the fingernail cuttings from the victim's right 
hand was one in 307 of the Caucasian population, one in 452 of 
the African-American population, and one in 212 of the Hispanic 
population.  The Y-STR DNA from the same sample matched the 
defendant (and his paternal relatives) with a ratio of one in 
1,065 for the Caucasian population, one in 936 for the African-
American population, and one in 561 for the Hispanic population. 
We agree with the defendant's DNA expert that the 
difference between the original and corrected match 
probabilities is "statistically significant."  In the 
circumstances of this case, however, the revised probability 
calculations do not cast doubt on the justice of the conviction.  
The newly reported STR and Y-STR statistics were less damaging, 
20 
 
 
 
but not exculpatory.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Cameron, 473 
Mass. 100, 104-110 (2015) (newly discovered DNA evidence 
bolstered argument that DNA test results presented at trial were 
erroneous); Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 620 (2015) 
(outcome of trial might have been different because new DNA 
testing contradicted evidence that Commonwealth used to 
corroborate key witness).  Moreover, the value of the revised 
statistics must be considered in light of the other DNA evidence 
introduced at trial connecting the defendant to the crime.  This 
evidence includes a blood stain found on the defendant's left 
sneaker which matched the victim's DNA profile, with 
probabilities of one in 14.96 quintillion of the Caucasian 
population, one in 3.26 septillion of the African-American 
population, and one in 9.443 quintillion of the Hispanic 
population. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant contends 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the murder 
conviction.  He argues that the evidence, at best, established 
that he had had a prior relationship with the victim.  According 
to the defendant, in denying his motion for a directed verdict, 
the judge failed to take into account several pieces of 
exculpatory evidence including that the defendant's roommates 
did not hear him leave the apartment the night of the stabbing; 
the police searched his apartment and vehicles and did not 
21 
 
 
 
recover the murder weapon; he and the victim had ended their 
relationship amicably; and others had a motive to kill the 
victim, such as Oliver or an unknown strip club patron. 
 
We rely on the familiar Latimore standard in determining 
whether the Commonwealth met its burden to establish each 
element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  "[The] question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Id. at 677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979).  Although a conviction may be based entirely on 
circumstantial evidence, and the inferences drawn need only be 
reasonable, not inescapable, a "conviction may not rest on the 
piling of inference upon inference or on conjecture and 
speculation."  Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), 
citing Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 339–343 (2004). 
 
Here, as the judge discussed in denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, the evidence against the defendant was 
"overwhelming."  There was no error in the denial of his motion 
for a directed verdict. 
 
c.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant sought to suppress 
the DNA evidence from the swabbing of his hands, on the ground 
that the Everett police lacked probable cause and the defendant 
22 
 
 
 
did not consent to the taking of swabs from his hands at the 
police station, and that there was no probable cause to support 
the issuance of a warrant to search his apartment.  After a two-
day evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress.  The judge found that the 
warrantless search of the defendant's hands was supported both 
by probable cause to believe that the defendant's hands 
contained evidence of a crime and exigent circumstances.  The 
judge found also that the search warrant affidavit established 
probable cause to search the defendant's apartment. 
 
i.  Search of defendant's hands.  "In reviewing a ruling on 
a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the judge's subsidiary 
findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the 
responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be 
given oral testimony presented at the motion hearing."  
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004).  "We review 
independently the application of constitutional principles to 
the facts found."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Cassino, 474 Mass. 
85, 88 (2016). 
At the hearing, evidence was introduced that, on October 2, 
2009, Everett police responded to a 911 call and found the 
victim dead of apparent stab wounds, outside the rear entrance 
to her apartment building.  The victim's neighbor indicated 
that, at approximately 2 A.M. that morning, he had heard a 
23 
 
 
 
scream from the rear of the building.  He saw a white or 
Hispanic male, wearing a light brown jacket and jeans, "trot" 
away from the building, across the parking lot, in the direction 
of Laurel Street.  A Laurel Street resident heard a scream 
around 1:45 A.M., and another neighbor reported that a motion 
detector had activated at approximately the same time. 
A few hours after the discovery of the victim's body, her 
sister, Ana, identified the defendant as a suspect in the 
victim's death.  Ana told police that "Sheila [and the 
defendant] had dated . . . a while ago" and had stopped dating, 
but that the defendant was trying to get back together with 
Sheila.  Ana reported that "the defendant had been stalking 
[Shelia] or constantly calling [Sheila]."  On September 30, 
2009, while she was at a barbeque, Ana overheard the defendant 
yelling and arguing with the victim on his cellular telephone.  
At 1 A.M. on October 1, 2009, the defendant had called Ana and 
told her that he wanted to reestablish a romantic relationship 
with the victim, that he was desperate, and that the victim did 
not know who she was dealing with because he had nothing in his 
life. 
On the morning of October 2, 2009, investigators spoke with 
Alcenir Alvarenga, the victim's closest friend.  Alvarenga told 
the officers she had visited the victim on October 1, 2009.  
During that visit, the victim said that the defendant had 
24 
 
 
 
telephoned her and said that if he could not be with the victim, 
no one would, and that he would kill her and himself.  Alvarenga 
showed the investigators the defendant's house, pointed out the 
defendant's pickup truck, and told them that the defendant drove 
a silver Nissan Murano. 
Investigators examined traffic surveillance video footage 
and noted that, at approximately 1:42 A.M. on October 2, 2009, a 
Honda CR-V resembling the victim's vehicle entered Sweeter 
Circle and exited on Main Street.  A silver Nissan Murano 
entered the same traffic circle about four to five minutes 
before what appeared to be the victim's vehicle, and also exited 
onto Main Street.  Surveillance video footage from a commercial 
building showed a silver Nissan Murano on Tileston Street, near 
the victim's house, leaving the area at 1:44 A.M. 
Shortly before 1 P.M. on October 2, 2009, a detective 
contacted the defendant and asked to speak with him.  The 
defendant agreed to meet the detective at the Everett police 
station within an hour, but did not show up for the meeting.  At 
2:25 P.M., the same detective contacted the defendant and 
learned that he had gone to the Malden District Court to pay 
some traffic fines, and that he planned to stop by the Everett 
police station after he completed his errand at the court house.  
Three police officers went to the court house to meet the 
defendant.  The defendant confirmed that he owned a silver 
25 
 
 
 
Nissan Murano.  He agreed to accompany the officers to the 
police station in their vehicle.  He was not handcuffed, placed 
under arrest, or questioned during the ride. 
The defendant and the officers arrived at the police 
station at 3:30 P.M.  An officer took the defendant to an 
interview room, where the officer advised the defendant of the 
Miranda rights and provided him a waiver form.  The defendant 
asserted his right to counsel, and questioning ended. 
During this process, one of the officers noticed some cuts 
on the defendant's hands.  The investigators photographed the 
cuts and requested a State police chemist come to the station to 
test the defendant's hands for the presence of blood.  Koester 
arrived at 4:30 P.M.  He conducted a screening test for the 
presence of nonvisible blood.  The backs of both of the 
defendant's hands tested positive.  Koester then collected swabs 
from the backs of each of the defendant's hands.  The defendant 
was not provided an opportunity to refuse these tests.  After 
the testing, at approximately 5:20 P.M., the defendant left the 
interview room and waited in the police station lobby for a ride 
home. 
 
The motion judge found, based on "the information 
accumulated to that point," that there was probable cause to 
believe that the defendant "had been involved" in the killing, 
and that there might be trace evidence on his hands.  That 
26 
 
 
 
evidence "could easily have been lost if the defendant were 
allowed to leave the station and clean up his hands."  The judge 
concluded, "The actions of the investigators were warranted by 
the existence of probable cause and by the exigency of the 
situation in which evidence could be lost if not collected 
then."10 
 
"When a search is conducted without a warrant, the burden 
is on the Commonwealth to show that the search falls within a 
narrow class of permissible exceptions to the warrant 
requirement (citation omitted)."  Commonwealth v. Abdallah, 475 
Mass. 47, 51-52 (2016).  One such exception to the warrant 
requirement is a search based on probable cause and exigent 
circumstances that make obtaining a warrant impracticable.  
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 480 (2007).  "A 
reasonable belief as to the potential loss or destruction of 
evidence may create exigent circumstances permitting the 
warrantless . . . seizure of that evidence" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Parker, 481 Mass. 69, 73 (2018). 
 
We agree with the motion judge's determination that the 
Commonwealth established probable cause to swab the defendant's 
                     
 
10 At 11 P.M., the investigators obtained warrants 
authorizing the search of the defendant's apartment and 
vehicles. 
27 
 
 
 
hands, and that it was necessary to do so to prevent to loss or 
destruction of that evidence.  The officers knew that the victim 
had dated the defendant and that the defendant was trying to get 
back together with her.  The victim's sister reported that the 
defendant had been stalking or constantly calling the victim.  
According to one of the victim's friends, the day before the 
stabbing, the victim told her that the defendant had threatened 
to kill the victim.  The victim was stabbed in Everett at 
approximately 1:45 A.M. on October 2, 2009.  A short time 
earlier, a vehicle resembling the defendant's silver Nissan 
Murano entered a traffic circle in Everett and drove off in the 
direction of the victim's apartment.  At 1:42 A.M., the victim's 
vehicle had driven through the same traffic circle. 
 
As discussed, later on October 2, police spoke with the 
defendant and noticed cuts on the back of his hands.  The 
defendant was wearing a tan jacket and matched the general 
description provided by the victim's upstairs neighbor, who had 
been awoken by a woman screaming and, when he looked out the 
window, saw a Caucasian or Hispanic male wearing a light brown 
jacket and walking away from the building. 
 
In addition, there was no abuse of discretion in the motion 
judge's determination, based on uncontroverted evidence, that 
nonvisible blood might have been lost if the defendant were 
allowed to leave the police station and wash his hands.  See 
28 
 
 
 
Washington, 449 Mass. at 483-485; Commonwealth v. Hinds, 437 
Mass. 54, 62 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1205 (2003). 
 
ii.  Search of the defendant's apartment.  The defendant 
argues that evidence seized from his apartment should have been 
suppressed because there was insufficient evidence to have 
issued the search warrant.  The motion judge found that the 
warrant affidavit established "a substantial basis to believe 
that there was a nexus between the murder of [the victim], the 
defendant, his vehicles, and his apartment." 
 
The defendant challenges the reliability of information 
contained in the warrant affidavit that was attributed to the 
victim's sister, Ana, and the victim's friend, Alvarenga.  The 
officer who prepared the warrant affidavit, Trooper Jeffrey A. 
Saunders, stated that the police had learned, through interviews 
with the victim's family and friends, that the defendant "had 
been threatening to kill [the victim] if she did not have sex 
with him as recently as Thursday, October 1, 2009."  Ana told 
investigators about a conversation that she had had with the 
defendant, during which the defendant said that "he was shooting 
drugs because he was desperate to get back together with [the 
victim]."  The defendant also told Ana that "her sister 'did not 
know who she is dealing with.'"  On October 1, 2009, the victim 
told Alvarenga that the defendant had called her during the day 
29 
 
 
 
and told the victim that he would kill himself or her if she 
would not sleep with him. 
 
The defendant argues that these statements were "primarily" 
or "entirely" based on hearsay, and that the information did not 
satisfy the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test concerning an 
informant's basis of knowledge and veracity.  See Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
108 (1964).  Where the source of information is an identified 
witness to a crime, the informant generally is considered more 
creditable.  See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 793 
(2012); Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 297-298, cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989); Commonwealth v. Burt, 393 Mass. 
703, 710 (1985).  In addition, independent police corroboration 
may serve to bolster the reliability of information contained in 
an affidavit.  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 403 Mass. 163, 166 
(1988). 
 
Here, the basis of knowledge prong was satisfied because 
the victim's sister informed police of an admission made by the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 410 Mass. 75, 78-79 
(1991), S.C., 417 Mass. 40 (1994) (defendant's admission 
satisfies basis of knowledge); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 61 
Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (2004) (basis of knowledge inferred 
through witness's relationship with defendant).  Moreover, it 
was clear that the victim was the source of the information 
30 
 
 
 
provided by Alvarenga, as she said the victim had called her.  
Ultimately, the motion judge deemed the information was reliable 
because it was provided by an identified witnesses to a crime.  
See Commonwealth v. Beliard, 443 Mass. 79, 85 (2004); 
Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 422 Mass. 198, 204 (1996).  In 
addition, other evidence mentioned in the warrant affidavit, 
including video surveillance showing a silver Murano driving 
near the victim's apartment building during the relevant time 
frame, and the cuts on the defendant's hands, corroborated the 
statements.  We discern no error in the judge's determination 
that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant for 
the defendant's house and vehicles. 
 
d.  Adoptive admissions.  The Commonwealth moved in limine 
to admit certain statements by the defendant as adoptive 
admissions or as consciousness of guilt.  The defendant opposed 
the motion.  After a hearing, the judge allowed the testimony to 
be introduced, with a limiting instruction, as an adoptive 
admission. 
 
At trial, over the defendant's objection, Ana testified 
that, when she learned of the victim's death from her sister 
Rose, she called the defendant and asked him, "Where is my 
sister?"  The defendant answered, "I don't know.  I haven't seen 
her for a week."  Ana then accused the defendant of killing her 
sister, saying, "You killed my sister.  You can run.  I'm gonna 
31 
 
 
 
kill you.  I'm gonna kill your family.  I'm gonna kill your 
children.  I'm gonna kill everyone."  The defendant hung up. 
 
Immediately after this testimony was introduced, the judge 
gave a limiting instruction and told the jury that they must "be 
sure that any conclusions you draw are fair conclusions," and 
that they also must be sure that the defendant "heard any 
accusation and understood its significance."  She further 
instructed that the jury must be "satisfied that it is a fair 
conclusion that a person would always speak up in a situation 
like that if he were innocent.  After all, no one is required to 
respond to any negative comment made about him, and there may be 
other factors in a given situation apart from guilt or innocence 
with respect to the particular accusation that might explain why 
a person did not choose to respond." 
 
To prove that a statement was an adoptive admission on the 
basis that a defendant remained silent in the face of an 
accusation, the Commonwealth must establish that (1) the 
defendant heard and understood the statement; (2) the defendant 
had an opportunity to respond; and (3) the context was one in 
which an individual would have been expected to respond to an 
accusation of criminal conduct.  See Commonwealth v. Shea, 460 
Mass. 163, 170 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 
316 321 (2007).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(B) (2018).  
"Evidence of this nature is to be received with caution, 
32 
 
 
 
especially in criminal cases, due to the fact that the meaning 
of a defendant's response, or lack thereof, to an accusatory 
statement is often ambiguous."  Commonwealth v. McKenzie, 413 
Mass. 498, 506 (1992).  See Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 363 
Mass. 311, 316 (1973) (expressing court's "general wariness of 
adoptive admissions"). 
In these circumstances, where Ana had called the defendant 
and was expressly threatening to hunt him down, and kill him and 
his family, the judge's decision to allow the introduction of 
these statements as an adoptive admission was an abuse of 
discretion.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014).  We cannot say that it would be reasonable to believe 
that someone receiving such a threatening telephone call 
ordinarily would respond by denying having killed anyone.  
Hanging up the telephone and refusing to deal further with an 
irate and threatening caller would appear to be a natural 
response, and, in any event, cannot be seen as an admission of 
guilt.  See McKenzie, 413 Mass. at 506. 
Although the evidence should not have been admitted, there 
was no prejudice to the defendant from its admission requiring 
reversal.  See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 
(1994).  Other testimony already had been introduced indicating 
that Ana accused the defendant of killing her sister; indeed, 
that testimony was introduced by the defendant himself in his 
33 
 
 
 
challenge to the manner in which the police purportedly rushed 
to judgment during the investigation.  The jury most likely gave 
the testimony little weight given that Ana's threats did not 
reasonably call for a response.  In addition, as previously 
stated, the case against the defendant was overwhelming. 
 
e.  Grand jury testimony.  The defendant contends that the 
judge erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce a portion 
of a testifying witness's testimony to the grand jury as a 
"prior recorded statement."  The Commonwealth argues that there 
was "some confusion as to the basis on which the testimony was 
offered," and that the testimony was admissible for substantive 
purposes due to a feigned loss of memory.  Because the defendant 
objected, we review to determine whether there was prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 Mass. 168, 173 (2000).  
We conclude that the Commonwealth did not establish a sufficient 
foundation for the admission of this testimony, but that 
introduction of the testimony was not reversible error. 
The disputed testimony unfolded as follows.  The prosecutor 
asked the defendant's roommate, Washington Silveira, "What did 
the defendant tell you about [the victim] and his relationship 
with her?"  Silveira answered, "At first he would say that the 
relationship was good . . . ."  The prosecutor then asked if the 
relationship had changed at any point.  Silveira responded he 
"could not remember the exact words" the defendant used to 
34 
 
 
 
describe his changed relationship with the victim.  When the 
prosecutor attempted to refresh Silveira's recollection with his 
grand jury testimony, Silveira testified, "At the moment I don't 
remember anymore.  But if I said that at that time, that's what 
happened." 
The prosecutor then sought to introduce, as "prior recorded 
testimony," a portion of Silveira's grand jury testimony.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(1) (2018) (hearsay exception where 
declarant unavailable).  In making this argument, however, the 
prosecutor cited Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 72-75 
(1984), and Commonwealth v. Berrio, 407 Mass. 37, 45 (1990), 
which permit the introduction of prior inconsistent statements 
by a witness that were made under oath before the grand jury, 
where the statements were not coerced, and were more than a mere 
confirmation or denial of the interrogator's question.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A) (2018).  Defense counsel objected 
to the introduction of the statement as "past recollection 
recorded."  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(5) (2018).  The judge 
allowed the prosecutor to introduce the testimony as prior 
recorded testimony.  The prosecutor then read to the jury the 
following excerpt of Silveira's grand jury testimony: 
"Q.:  Did [the defendant] ever talk to you about [the 
victim]? 
 
"A.:  He told me once that he had to forget that low life, 
that he had to forget that low life women. 
35 
 
 
 
 
"Q.:  Did he refer to her as a low life women, or did he 
specifically use the word whore? 
 
"A.:  Yes, he did specifically used the word whore. 
 
"Q.:  And do you remember when this was in relation to when 
[the victim] was killed? 
 
"A.:  It was a long time ago.  I don't recall exactly.  
Maybe two or three months before. 
 
"Q.:  So that would have been sometime in July or August of 
2009? 
 
"A.:  It could be." 
 
We consider first whether, as the Commonwealth suggests, 
the judge properly allowed the grand jury testimony to be 
introduced based on a purported feigned loss of memory.  Under 
our jurisprudence, when a witness, who is on the witness stand 
and therefore subject to cross-examination, feigns memory loss, 
the witness's grand jury testimony may be admitted as 
substantive evidence.  See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 
614, 621 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 
742, 754-755, cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1125 (2014).  In order to 
allow the introduction of grand jury testimony as substantive 
evidence, "[a] judge must find, first, that the witness is in 
fact feigning his or her lack of memory; second, that the grand 
jury testimony was not coerced; and third, that the grand jury 
testimony was in the witness's own words, involving more than 
36 
 
 
 
mere confirmations or denials of statements made by the 
interrogator."  DePina, supra. 
Here, the Commonwealth did not ask the judge to allow the 
introduction of Silveira's grand jury testimony based on a 
feigned loss of memory, and the judge made no express findings 
that such a foundation had been established.  Based upon the 
judge's reference to the testimony as a prior recorded 
statement, and our review of the trial transcript, we do not 
agree with the Commonwealth's contention that the judge made 
implicit findings that supported the admission of the testimony.  
See DePina, 476 Mass. at 621-622.  Thus, the grand jury 
testimony should not have been admitted. 
Nonetheless, Silveira's testimony that the defendant 
referred to the victim as a "low life" and "whore" a few months 
before she was killed likely had little impact on the jury.  
Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353.  The prosecutor did not refer to 
these statements in her closing argument.  The significance of 
the derogatory comments is outweighed by the threats made by the 
defendant himself in the days immediately prior to the stabbing, 
on September 30 and October 1, 2009, as well as the 
circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to the killing.  
A new trial is not required on this basis. 
 
6.  Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have carefully 
reviewed the entire record, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
37 
 
 
 
discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the degree 
of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.