Title: Van Every v. McGuire
Citation: 348 N.C. 58
Docket Number: 159PA97
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 159PA97
FILED: 3 APRIL 1998
DAVID C. VAN EVERY
v.
KELLY W. McGUIRE (formerly KELLY DIANE WEBB VAN EVERY)
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 125 N.C. App. 578,
481 S.E.2d 377 (1997), affirming in part and reversing in part
the trial court’s order entered by Jones (William G.), J., on
20 December 1995 in District Court, Mecklenburg County, and
remanding for further proceedings.  Heard in the Supreme Court
18 November 1997.
The Tryon Legal Group, by Jerry Alan Reese, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Casstevens, Hanner, Gunter & Conrad, P.A., by Nelson M.
Casstevens, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
FRYE, Justice.
The Court of Appeals, relying on this Court’s decision
in Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996), reversed
an order requiring plaintiff to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees
and remanded that issue to the trial court for reconsideration
based on the evidence in the record and without a consideration
of the relative estates of the parties.  In this case, we examine
the parameters of our recent decision in Taylor in order to
assure that our decision in that case will be applied with
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“fairness to litigants and fulfillment of perceived legislative
intent.”  Id. at 58, 468 S.E.2d at 38.
In Taylor, the question before this Court was whether a
trial court, in ruling on a motion for attorney’s fees in a child
custody and support action, may determine that a party has
sufficient means to defray the costs of the action without
considering the estate of the other party.  We answered in the
affirmative, stating that “we do not believe that the
determination of whether a party has sufficient means to defray
the necessary expenses of the action requires a comparison of the
relative estates of the parties.”  Id. at 57, 468 S.E.2d at 37
(emphasis added).
We come now to the facts and circumstances of the
instant case.  Plaintiff David Van Every and defendant Kelly
McGuire were married in 1988.  Their only child was born in 1989. 
The two were separated in 1991 and divorced in 1992.  This action
was instituted on or about 11 July 1991 when plaintiff brought
suit against defendant for custody of their child, David
Christopher Van Every.  The parties have been in dispute over
child custody and support since that time.  On 27 July 1994, the
trial court, finding it “in the child’s best interests,”
appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the child in this
action.  On 19 December 1994, the trial court appointed two
psychologists to “assist the Court in determining what custodial
placement would be in the best interest of” the child.  On
27 September 1995, the trial court entered an order granting the
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“care, custody and control” of the child to defendant.  The trial
court granted plaintiff extensive visitation privileges.
On 20 December 1995, following a hearing, the trial
court ordered plaintiff to pay directly to defendant’s attorney
the sum of $55,688.35 in payment of the attorney’s “out of pocket
expenses” and the “services” performed by the attorney on behalf
of defendant.  With reference to the award of attorney’s fees to
defendant, the trial court, inter alia, found the following: 
(1) plaintiff’s annual income in 1991, 1992, and 1993 was well
over $1,000,000, and his net estate is worth $15,000,000;
(2) until April 1995, defendant had no income, but from April
until December 1995, defendant’s income per month was $10,000,
which was used to “pay for food and other household expenses”;
(3) defendant’s estate consisted of three automobiles worth a
total of $60,000, a savings account containing $3,000, and a
gaming machine, the value of which is unknown, from which she
received her monthly income; and (4) defendant had no debts.  The
trial court then concluded as a matter of law that defendant was
an interested party acting in good faith who had insufficient
means to defray the expenses of the litigation.
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending,
inter alia, that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s
fees to defendant under N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6 because defendant has
substantial means with which to defray the costs of the
litigation, has few if any monthly expenses, and would not have
to deplete her estate substantially in order to pay her own fees. 
Plaintiff also contended that the trial court erred in
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determining defendant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees under a
comparison of estates approach rather than based on defendant’s
ability to defray the expenses of the litigation.
In reversing the trial court on the question of
defendant’s entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees, the Court
of Appeals, citing Taylor, said:  “As a general proposition, the
trial court is not permitted to compare the relative estates of
the parties in assessing a party’s ability to employ ‘adequate’
counsel.”  Van Every v. McGuire, 125 N.C. App. 578, 581, 481
S.E.2d 377, 378 (1997).  This extends our holding in Taylor
further than intended.  The fact that N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6 does not
require the trial court to compare the relative estates of the
parties does not automatically mean that it does not allow or
permit the trial court to do so in a proper case.
In the instant case, the trial judge’s order was
entered prior to this Court’s decision in Taylor.  The transcript
shows that the Court of Appeals’ decision in Taylor v. Taylor,
118 N.C. App. 356, 455 S.E.2d 442 (1995), was presented to the
trial court as “the most recent case that sets forth the
standard.”  In Taylor, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court erred by not considering plaintiff’s estate in determining
that defendant had sufficient means to defray the expenses of the
action.  The Court of Appeals explained:
[T]he record reveals that the court made its
determination on this issue without
considering the relative estates of the
parties.  The trial court only made findings
on the value of defendant’s estate.  Whether
a party has insufficient means to defray the
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expenses of the action requires a
consideration of the estates of the parties.
Id. at 365, 455 S.E.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
In reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating the
trial court’s order, this Court stated the issue and answer as
follows:
The sole question on this appeal is
whether a trial court, in ruling on a motion
for attorney’s fees in a child custody and
support action, may determine that a party
has sufficient means to defray the cost of
the action without considering the estate of
the other party.  We answer in the
affirmative and reverse the Court of Appeals’
decision to the contrary.
343 N.C. at 51, 468 S.E.2d at 34.  In discussing the issue, we
said:
The trial judge made findings pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6 for a child custody and
support suit.  The trial court found that
defendant was an interested party and that
she was acting in good faith, and plaintiff
does not challenge these findings.  However,
after considering the testimony on
defendant’s financial condition, the trial
court found that defendant had sufficient
means to defray the expense of the action. 
Defendant contends, essentially, that the
trial court cannot make this determination
without considering the relative estates of
the parties.  Plaintiff, on the other hand,
contends that such a determination can be
made without a comparison of the estates of
the parties.  We agree with plaintiff.
Id. at 54, 468 S.E.2d at 36.  We then examined the record and
concluded:
The evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that defendant had the means to
defray her litigation expenses.  Defendant’s
estate, which is primarily liquid, was
sufficient to pay these expenses; and no
unreasonable depletion of her estate would be
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required to pay them.  The trial court’s
findings of fact thus support the conclusion
that an award of attorney’s fees was not
necessary to make it possible for defendant
to employ adequate counsel to enable her, as
litigant, to meet plaintiff in the suit.
Id. at 55, 468 S.E.2d at 36.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals examined the
record and concluded that the evidence before the trial court
“fails to show that [defendant] did not have ample income to
defray the expenses of this action and [that defendant] would
have been required to [unreasonably] deplete her estate to pay
these expenses.”  Van Every, 125 N.C. App. at 581, 481 S.E.2d at
379.  Based on this conclusion, with which we agree, the Court of
Appeals reversed the order requiring plaintiff to pay defendant’s
attorney’s fees and remanded for reconsideration “on the basis of
the evidence in the record and without a consideration of the
relative estates of the parties.”  Id. at 582, 481 S.E.2d at 379.
While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the case
must be remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s entitlement
to attorney’s fees, we believe that the order of remand is too
restrictive in two respects:  (1) since the trial court did not
have the benefit of this Court’s Taylor decision, it should not
be prohibited from ordering such additional evidence, if any, as
the trial court, in its discretion, may determine is necessary to
permit a proper finding by the trial court as to defendant’s
ability, or lack thereof, to pay her expenses from income or from
her estate or from some combination thereof without unreasonable
depletion of her estate; and (2) while the trial court should
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focus on the disposable income and estate of defendant, it should
not be placed in a straitjacket by prohibiting any comparison
with plaintiff’s estate, for example, in determining whether any
necessary depletion of defendant’s estate by paying her own
expenses would be reasonable or unreasonable.  Accordingly, the
order of remand must be modified to remove these restrictions.
Upon remand, if the trial court finds from the evidence
that defendant has sufficient means to defray the expense of the
suit, then defendant’s request for attorney’s fees shall be
denied.  If the trial court finds from the evidence that
defendant has insufficient means to defray the expense of the
suit, then it shall exercise its discretion in determining
whether it shall order payment of reasonable attorney’s fees to
defendant.
For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is modified as to the conditions of remand and,
as modified, is affirmed.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.