Title: TORCHIA v BURLINGTON NORTHERN IN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13097
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 1977

No. 13097 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 H E L E N TORCHIA, i n d i v i d u a l l y and a s a personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC. a corporation, Defendant and Respondent and Cross Appellant. Appeal-from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. Paul G. Hatfield, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Cordell Johnson argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Hoyt and Bottomly, Great F a l l s , Montana John C. Hoyt argued and Richard V. Bottomly argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: June 6 , I977 Filed: '_?I" I I ; f E & m , . # : ~ ' ~ ~ ~ i ~ - ~ - #+'* . Clerk Hon. M. James Sorte, District Judge, delivered the Opinion of the Court: This i s a wrongful death action f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County, under the Federal ~mployers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. $51 e t u s e q . (FELA). Plaintiff Helen Torchia a s personal representative of the estate of decedent Gennaro Torchia, and on behalf of t h e i r children, sued defendant Burlington Northern, Inc. for damages occasioned by the death of her husband Gennaro Torchia. Gennaro Torchia, a Burlington Northern fireman, was killed in a head-on collision between two railroad trains. In her complaint p l a i n t i f f alleged negligence under the FELA and prayed for compensatory damages. She also, individually and as personal representative of the minor children, alleged willful and wanton conduct and prayed for punitive damages. In i t s amended answer, defendant admitted 1 i a b i l i t y " f o r negli- gence under the FELA. The t r i a l court denied defendant's motion t o strike those allegations from the complaint which had reference t o punitive damages. The case was tried t o a jury on the issues of compensatory damages and conduct which would form the basis for an award of punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict for p l a i n t i f f for compensatory damages only, in the amount of $580,000. The jury found the facts did not justify an award of punitive damages. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on the jury verdict. Plaintiff crossappeals from an order denying her motion for a new t r i a l on the issue of punitive damages. The facts of t h i s care are: A t approximately 11:45 p.m. on May 11, 1971, a t a point near Sheffels on the Burlington Northern line between Great Falls and Havre, there was a head-on collision between two trains. Four of defendant's employees were killed and several others injured. One of those killed was p l a i n t i f f ' s husband, Gennaro Torchia. The movement of trains between Great Falls and Havre i s controlled out of the dispatcher's office i n Havre. Trains are operated over t h i s segment of the track by t r a i n orders and clearances. The Havre to Great Falls route consists of but one track, Thus, the orders and clearances are significant i n controlling t r a i n movements where a "meet" i s anticipated between trains traveling i n opposite directions. A dispatcher issues various orders t o the operators a t various stations on the line. The orders are communicated from the dispatcher to the operator by telephone. The operator then copies the orders on t r a i n order forms. The orders are then read back t o the dispatcher to insure the copied orders are correct. It is also the responsibility of the dispatcher t o issue clearances which are communicated t o and copied by the operator in the same manner as are t r a i n orders. A t r a i n i s not allowed t o move over a track which i s controlled by t r a i n orders and clearances unless a proper clearance i s issued for the t r a i n move- ment. Typically, orders and clearances are not issued u n t i l the t r a i n has been "called", that is, assembled and ready for de- parture. Generally, the conductor in charge of the t r a i n and crew picks up the orders and clearances from the operator. When it becomes necessary t o issue a second order and clearance on a given t r a i n movement, the f i r s t orders and clearance are taken up and destroyed. - 3 - I n 1971 it was and had been for many years the practice in Havre for the operator t o place copies of the completed clearances and orders on the t r a i n register desk i n the Havre Relay Office. There was no procedure whereby it could be deter- mined when the orders were actually picked up by the conductor. In t h i s case Dispatcher Newel1 was on s h i f t from 7:30 a.m. u n t i l 3:30 p.m. on May 11, 1971. H e issued orders and a clear- ance a t 3:08 p.m. for the Havre to Great Falls train, designated as "Extra 2013 West." Newel1 expected the t r a i n would be called momentarily. Operator Wirtzberger then placed the clearance and orders on the t r a i n register desk. A t that time Newel1 was unaware a t r a i n was being assembled i n Great Falls destined for Havre, also t o leave on May 11. Newel1 turned over h i s dispatching d i s t r i c t to Dispatcher McMaster a t 3:30 p.m. Pursuant t o the then operative "staggered shift" work system, McMaster who was on duty dispatching another d i s t r i c t was ,in addition, given responsibility for Newell's d i s t r i c t u n t i l 4:30 p.m. Newel1 explained t o McMaster that he had cleared the Havre to Great Falls train. The clearance i s reflected i n the clearance record kept by the dispatcher. There was no dispatching activity during the hour McMaster had responsi- b i l i t y for the d i s t r i c t so no further entries were made in the dispatcher's book. A t the end of h i s s h i f t McMaster merely initialed the record book and passed it on t o Dispatcher Magnuson. There i s a dispute i n the evidence as t o whether McMaster verbally informed Magnuson the Havre t o Great Falls t r a i n was cleared when the dispatching d i s t r i c t was turned over t o him. McMaster t e s t i f i e d he informed Magnuson of the clearance. Magnu- son t e s t i f i e d no such statements were made. However, there i s no dispute the records McMaster turned over t o Magnuson clearly indicated the t r a i n had been cleared a t 3:08 p.m. by Newell. Magnuson, during h i s dispatching s h i f t , was informed that a t r a i n would soon be leaving Great Falls bound for Havre. To arrange for a "meet" between the respective trains whereby one would take a side track as the other passed by, Magnuson issued a second order and clearance a t 8:18 p.m. The second order and clearance were communicated t o Operator Porter, who prepared them and placed them on the t r a i n register desk. Sometime between the time Operator Wirtzberger placed the f i r s t order and clearance on the t r a i n register desk and the time the second order and clearance were placed on the desk, Conductor Freeburg, conductor for "Extra 2013 West", came into the Havre Relay Office and picked up the f i r s t orders and clear- ance. H e was not seen picking up the orders and clearance by any dispatcher or operator. P l a i n t i f f ' s husband, Gennaro Torchia, was a member of the crew of the Great Falls to Havre train. Under the second orders issued t o that t r a i n , but unknown to Conductor-Freeburg of "Extra 2013 West" and i t s crew, it was to proceed t o Portage: where a "meet" would take place. The Havre t o Great Falls t r a i n was t o wait a t Portage t o permit the Great Falls t o Havre t r a i n t o take the siding. The Havre t o Great Falls t r a i n passed the siding a t Portage without stopping and, shortly beyond Sheffels, the head-on c o l l i - sion between the two trains occurred. Gennaro Torchia was killed instantly. A t the time of h i s death he was 49 years of age. Additional pertinent facts w i l l appear l a t e r i n t h i s opinion. Defendant raises numerous points of error on appeal. For t h i s opinion we w i l l discuss eight determinative issues: 1. Whether punitive damages are recoverable i n an action under the FELA? 2. Whether thetverdict should be s e t aside as being excessive and based on passion or prejudice? 3. Whether the voir dire examination by counsel for plaintiff was improper? 4. Whether admission of evidence pertaining t o future railroad retirement benefits was error? 5. Whether the t r i a l court erred i n admitting certain t e s t i - mony given by p l a i n t i f f ' s expert witness i n the area of economics? 6. Whether a potential witness for defendant, whose name was not listed on the p r e t r i a l order, should have been permitted t o t e s t i f y ? 7. Whether the t r i a l court erred i n selection of instructions and form of verdict? 8. Whether admission into evidence of a portion of the Federal Railroad Administration Accident report was prejudicial error? Issue 1. A major contention of defendant i s that punitive damages should not have been an issue i n the case, and evidence and proposed instructions related thereto should not have been permitted. Defendant asserts such issue should have been removed upon i t s motion t o strike. Defendant alleges punitive damages are not allowable under the FEU, and allowing plaintiff t o intro- duce proof not only of l i a b i l i t y , but also on the question of punitive damages was prejudicial and resulted i n an excessive award as a result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. A s noted, defendant admitted i t s l i a b i l i t y for ordinary negligence. A t the outset w e reject defendant's theory that upon such an admission, p l a i n t i f f ' s case must be limited solely t o the issue of damages. Under the facts of t h i s case p l a i n t i f f could prove her case as she wishes subject, of course, t o the ordinary control and discretion exercised by the t r i a l judge. Whether or not evidence of punitive damages&as a proper place i n an action under the FELA, the jury here refused t o allow such damages to plaintiff. In view of the evidence pre- sented by plaintiff and the result reached by the jury, the presence of the element of punitive damages did not prejudice defendant i n t h i s case. S l i f e r v. Yorath, 52 Mont. 129, 155 P. 1113; Martin v. Corscadden, 34 Mont. 308, 86 P. 33. Further, the same reasoning applies with reference t o the alleged error i n the giving of instructions on willful and wanton misconduct and other matters relative t o punitive damages. The salient fact remains the jury refused t o award such damages and, i n f a c t , specifically found there was no evidence of conduct which would form the basis for punitive damages. Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result. H i l l v. Chappel Bros. of Montana, Inc., 93 Mont.92, 18 P.2d 1106. Issue 2. Was the jury verdict excessive and based upon passion and prejudice? Defendant asserts there must be substantial evidence i n the record upon which the jury award can be predicated, citing Montana cases. While there was more than substantial evidence i n the record to justify the jury's award, nevertheless t h i s is not the applicable standard under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In Resner v. The N.P.Railway, 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86 (1973), t h i s Court quoted the standard as s e t out i n Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L ed 916, 923, a Federal Employers' Liability Act case. There the United States Supreme Court said: I 1 I It i s no answer t o say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are i n dispute o r the evidence i s such that f a i r - minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is t o s e t t l e the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts t o support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where * * * there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury i s free t o discard or disbelieve whatever facts a r e in- consistent with its conclusions. And the appellate court's function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference o r f e e l that an- other conclusion is more reasonable. ' (Emphasis added. )" 161 Mont. 183. P l a i n t i f f ' s evidence of damages was almost entirely uncon- tradicted. Through the testimony of various witnesses, plaintiff e l i c i t e d facts and figures which, when projected into the future and discounted t o present value, would reasonably support a ver- d i c t such as was rendered i n t h i s case. The t r i a l judge agreed the verdict was not unjust and a new t r i a l was not granted t o defendant. W e refuse t o disturb the findings of the jury, Issue 3. This issue involves alleged improper voir d i r e examination of prospective jurors by counsel for plaintiff. Nothing a t a l l appears i n the record suggestive of the statements attributed t o counsel. The law is clear that unless there is a record of the alleged error, t h i s Court w i l l not consider the matter. Kipp v. Willoughby, 1 6 1 Mont. 432, 506 P.2d 1365; Nissen v. Western Construction Equipment Co., 133 Mont. 143, 320 P.2d 997, Defendant's argument i n t h i s regard is without merit. Issue 4. Did the t r i a l court e r r in allowing the testimony of p l a i n t i f f ' s witness, Judith Kirkness, an employee of the United States Railroad Retirement Board, concerning retirement benefits? The core of defendant's argument i s that the witness was asked t o make certain assumptions, while the facts forming the basis for such assumptions were not of record o r i n evidence. The record shows that, a t some time i n advance of t r i a l , defense counsel verbally stipulated t o the evidence to be e l i c i t e d from witness Kirkness. In f a c t , he had so stipulated i n a previous F E L A action. However, immediately before the instant t r i a l , defense counsel informed counsel for p l a i n t i f f Burlington Northern had assigned a Minnesota attorney to direct the case for defendant and a s a result the prior stipulation was no longer valid. H e then suggested p l a i n t i f f c a l l Judy Kirkness a s a witness. W e note a t t h i s point that such tactics on the part of the new counsel are strongly disapproved by t h i s Court. The proposed evidence and the procedure t o be employed i n developing it was discussed i n chambers and fully considered by the t r i a l judge. The witness was t o determine the amount of benefits Gennaro Torchia would have been entitled t o upon retirement from the railroad. The factors to be considered i n arriving a t such a computation are the employee's age, marital status, length of employment, r a t e of compensation, and length of military service. These facts pertaining t o Gennaro Torchia, were substantially in evidence and presented i n a correct fashion to the witness for her determination. The resulting testimony was properly admitted as it was based upon evidence before the court. Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263; Burns v. Fisher, 132 Mont. 26, 313 P.2d 1044. Issue 5. Defendant alleges e r r o r i n the admission by the t r i a l court of testimony of p l a i n t i f f ' s economic expert, D r . George P. Heliker, on the issue of economic l o s s suffered a s a r e s u l t of the death of Gennaro Torchia. It is argued the expert opinions were speculative on future inflationary trends, i n forecasting loss of earnings, i n forecasting future earnings without considering the impact of income taxes thereon, and i n forecasting l o s s of future Railroad Retirement Benefits. Proof of the present value of a future economic l o s s i s necessarily uncertain t o a degree. Any determination of factors such a s growth i n the s i z e of the t o t a l labor force, output per madhour, wage trends and inflationary patterns i s admittedly grounded i n probabilities. However, t h i s does not mean the amount of a future l o s s is not provable. Such losses a r e b e s t proved through employment of economic and s t a t i s t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s , applied t o the very factors l i s t e d above, a s t h i s Court has recognized i n numerous p r i o r decisions. Where, a s here, the testimony of a s p e c i a l i s t presents a jury with a reasonable basis upon which t o estimate, with some degree of c e r t a i n t y , the probable future losses occasioned by t h e death of decedent, such testimony should be admitted. Resner v. The N.P. Railway, supra; Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979. See Lavender v. Kurn, supra, f o r a general discussion of trends in- volving speculation and conjecture i n ascertaining damages i n FELA actions. Defendant was aware, p r e t r i a l , t h a t p l a i n t i f f intended t o call D r . Heliker t o t e s t i f y t o precisely those matters defendant now disputes. The opportunity t o contest the accuracy of such testimony, through i t s own expert testimony, was available t o defendant. However, it chose not t o c a l l an expert witness on these matters. - 10 - Issue 6. Did the t r i a l court e r r i n excluding t h e t e s t i - mony of defendant's proposed witness S. M. Smiland, with respect t o insurance benefits, wages, damages, etc.? W e emphasize here t h a t considerable p r e t r i a l discovery and discussion was had i n t h i s case, during which the i d e n t i t i e s of a l l witnesses were disclosed and l i s t e d i n the p r e t r i a l order. However, the name of S.M. Smiland f i r s t appears following p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief. There i s no record p l a i n t i f f knew witness Smiland, o r t h a t he was present i n Great F a l l s during a portion of the t r i a l . He was never introduced t o p l a i n t i f f and p l a i n t i f f was afforded no opportunity t o t a l k t o Smiland before h i s proposed testimony was t o begin. Under the circum- stances, it was c e r t a i n l y within the discretion of the t r i a l judge t o allow o r disallow the witness t o t e s t i f y . Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., supra. Issue 7. This issue concerns instructions given and refused by the t r i a l court. Court's instructions No. 14 and No. 20 were objected t o by defendant on the grounds a decedent f a t h e r ' s comfort, pro- tection, society, education and companionship a r e not proper elements of damage recoverable under the FELA. Instruction No. 14 provides i n p a r t : "You may a l s o consider and award such sum a s you may determine represents the pecuniary value of any l o s s , i f any, sustained by the widow and the family by reason of being deprived of Gennaro Torchia's comfort, protection, society, education and companion- ship. I n considering such pecuniary l o s s , you may consider the age and l i f e expectancy of the wife and family i n r e l a t i o n t o the age of the decedent, the disposition of the deceased, whether it was kindly, affectionate, o r otherwise, the degree of intimacy existing between the deceased and h i s family, t h e i r s t a t i o n i n l i f e , and such other f a c t s shown by the evidence which may throw l i g h t upon such loss which the h e i r s reasonably might have expected t o receive from the deceased, had he lived. * * *'I Instruction No. 20 states: "You are instructed that: "You have heretofore been instructed on damages which may be allowed t o wife and family for the death of Gennaro Torchia. One of the elements of such damage is the pecuniary value of the society, comfort, care, companionship, protection and education the wife and family have l o s t by reason of h i s death. I f you find from the evidence that the deceased did provide society, comfort, care, companionship, protection and education, which went t o the moral or physical training and well-being of the widow and family, t h i s loss i f it has ,pecuriiary o r .financial value, may be measured and compensated. * * *'I It i s true damages under the F E L A are measured by and limited t o the pecuniary loss sustained by the survivors as a result of the death of the employee. Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 48 S.Ct. 541, 72 L ed 906; Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L ed 417. Recovery i s authorized only t o the extent the survivors are shown t o have been deprived of a reasonable expectation of financial benefits, assistance or support. Mellon v. Goodyear, supra; See Anno: 67 ALR2d 745,746. However, the pecuniary value associated with the loss of parental care, guidance and education the decedent would expectably have given h i s minor children, i s recoverable under the FELA. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 143, 59 L ed 392; Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra. I n determining the extent of contribution which i s reasonable to be anticipated by the beneficiaries, the jury may properly consider evidence the decedent was industrious, t h r i f t y , kind and faithful t o h i s family. Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co., 8 I11.2d 164, 133 N.~.2d 288, 79 A L R ~ ~ 241, cert. den. 352 U.S.833, 77 S.Ct. 49, 1 L ed 2d 53, reh.den. 352 U.S. 937, 77 S.Ct. 219, 1 L ed 2d 170. Contained within the court's instructions No. 14 and No. 20 is language having the effect of limiting recovery t o the pecuniary value of losses sustained. Further, the language speaks t o limiting losses t o Chose which the survivors reason- ably might have expected to receive from decedent, had he lived. P l a i n t i f f ' s evidence pertaining to the extent of the loss of parental care, guidance and education was ample and uncontra- dicted, a s was the evidence demonstrating the decedent was in- dustrious, t h r i f t y , kind and faithful to h i s family. Thus, while there may have been minor variations i n the instructions from the accepted measure of damages in FELA actions, they cannot be said t o have prejudiced the defendant. The instructions were not totally confined t o an FELA death action, there being variations but on those variations no evidence was adduced a t t r i a l . W e find no prejudice. Defendant also objects to the giving of court's instruction No. 19, which provides: "You are instructed that: "In considering the loss of contribution t o the family from future earnings of decedent you are instructed that you should f i r s t reduce future earnings to present value using a reasonable r a t e of discount for t h i s purpose. The evidence a s t o annual inflation which has an effect on depreciating the value of a dollar should also be considered a s to what extent such depreciation offsets the interest that could be earned on an award of future earnings. I n addition, you may consider wage increases the deceased might have expected t o receive i n arriving a t deceased's true loss of future earnings and earning capacity." A s previously pointed out, t h i s Court approves of considera- tion by the jury of the fact of inflation i n arriving a t an award for loss of future earnings, where the evidence a s t o annual inflation and related matters i s presented, as here, i n a competent manner. Resner v. The.N.P. Railway, supra. The t r i a l court refused defendant's proposed instruction No. 8 a s being duplicitous.' W e find it t o have been properly refused by the t r i a l court. The court a l s o refused t o give defendant's proposed instruc- tions No, 14, No. 15 and No. 16, on consideration of the impact of income taxes on damage awards. I n so doing, the t r i a l court was i n accord with the weight of authority, Future income t a x l i a b i l i t y is not a proper consideration i n an award f o r loss of future earnings. Bracy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848. Defendant r e l i e s on Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284 (1975), f o r the proposition t h a t future tax l i a b i l i t y should be considered i n making a damage award. A careful reading of Boxberger, however, discloses t h a t it is an admitted departure from the majority position. The court therein s t a t e d rhat an instruction on the e f f e c t of future income t a x l i a b i l i t y is proper when competent evidence i s brought forth a t t r i a l showing the l i k e l y amount of tax. Defendant here has made no such showing. , A further objection raised by defendant was t o the form of the verdict approved by the t r i a l court i n t h a t it includes items of compensatory damage not contemplated under t h e FELA, The same reasoning employed regarding defendant's objection t o c o u r t ' s instructions No. 14 and No. 20 i s no l e s s applicable i n t h i s instance. Defendant was not prejudiced by the form of verdict in t h i s case. Issue 8. This issue concerns the propriety of admission i n evidence of conclusions contained i n the Federal Railroad Adminis- t r a t i o n Report of its investigation of the t r a i n wreck of May 11, 1971. 45 U.S.C.541 s t a t e s : "Neither the report required by section 38 of t h i s t i t l e nor any report of the investigation provided f o r i n section 40 of t h i s t i t l e nor any p a r t thereof s h a l l be admitted a s evidence o r used f o r any purpose i n any s u i t o r action f o r damages growing out of any matter mentioned i n said report o r investigation ." During t r i a l counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f read i n t o the record, before the jury, a verbatim copy of c e r t a i n conclusions contained i n the accident report, which were incorporated into the complaint. Counsel was a l s o permitted, over objection, t o read t o the jury an interrogatory t o defendant and the amended answer thereto. The answer a l s o contained accident report conclusions. I n neither case was the report i t s e l f made a p a r t of t h e record. A t no time was the jury informed the statements being read were taken from the accident report o r based on findings of the Federal Railroad Administration. This Court does not condone such a method of bringing poten- t i a l l y objectionable material before the jury. However, here the e r r o r , i f any, was harmless. The manifest purpose of the prohibi- t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n is the prevention of the use i n evidence of a report which, being issued by a federal agency, has the outward appearance of being conclusive on the f a c t s . The e v i l t o be avoided i s the undue weight the jury would give to the report, denominated a s such, over other evidence produced a t the t r i a l . Here, it was defendant's own answer t o the interrogatory, produced a t t r i a l , which was the vehicle f o r introduction in evidence of c e r t a i n of the report conclusions. W e cannot see how t h i s procedure, given the other evidence produced i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, prejudiced defendant i n a substantial manner. The judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury i s affirmed. on.. J ~ ~ H M . ~ o r t F , D i s t r i c t w* Judge, s l t t i n g f o r M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G. Hatfield. We Concur: / i Justices.