Title: Tikalsky v. Friedman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP000170
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2019

2019 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP170 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
J. Steven Tikalsky, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Susan Friedman a/k/a Susan Tikalsky, James 
Tikalsky and Amended and Restated Donald and 
Betty Lou Tikalsky Revocable Trust, 
          Defendants, 
Terry Stevens, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 830,917 N.W.2d 232 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 23, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Maria S. Lazar 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents (opinion filed). 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Dean P. Laing, and O’Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong & 
Laing S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Dean P. 
Laing. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Mark J. Mingo and Mingo Yankala, S.C., Milwaukee; with whom on 
the brief was Thomas C. Armstrong and Cabaniss Law, Milwaukee. 
There 
was 
an 
oral 
argument 
by 
Mark 
J. 
Mingo.
 
 
2019 WI 56
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP170 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV1733) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
J. Steven Tikalsky, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Susan Friedman a/k/a Susan Tikalsky, James 
Tikalsky and  
 
Amended and Restated Donald and Betty Lou 
Tikalsky Revocable Trust, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Terry Stevens, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAY 23, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   In a vigorous dispute over the 
distribution of Donald and Betty Lou Tikalsky's estate, J. 
Steven Tikalsky sued his sister, Terry Stevens, to obtain part 
of the inheritance she received from their parents.  His 
Complaint contains a count labeled "constructive trust," which 
he deployed against his sister as a cause of action.  Terry 
Stevens asks us whether a "constructive trust" may play that 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
2 
 
role, and whether it may be used against those who have engaged 
in no inequitable behavior.  We hold that a constructive trust 
is a remedy, not a cause of action.  We also hold that, under 
the proper circumstances, a constructive trust may be imposed on 
property in the possession of one who is wholly innocent of any 
inequitable conduct.  But because the Complaint in this case 
does not state a cause of action against Terry Stevens, nor 
assert any other grounds upon which a constructive trust could 
be imposed, the circuit court properly dismissed her from the 
case with prejudice.  We reverse the court of appeals' decision 
reversing the circuit court.1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Donald 
and 
Betty 
Lou 
Tikalsky 
(jointly, 
the 
"Tikalskys", 
and 
individually, 
"Mr. 
Tikalsky" 
and 
"Mrs. 
Tikalsky," respectively) jointly developed an estate plan that 
included the "Donald J. Tikalsky and Betty Lou Tikalsky 
Revocable Trust dated January 15, 1999" (the "1999 Trust"), as 
well as two associated wills (the "Wills").  The 1999 Trust and 
Wills provided that, when the Tikalskys had both passed, the 
bulk of their estate would be divided equally between their four 
children:  J. Steven Tikalsky ("Steven"); Susan Friedman 
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished opinion of the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Tikalsky v. Stevens, No. 2017AP170, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 30, 2018), reversing the 
Waukesha County Circuit Court, the Honorable Maria S. Lazar, 
presiding. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
3 
 
("Susan"); 
Terry 
Stevens 
("Terry"); 
and 
James 
Tikalsky 
("James").2 
¶3 
A few years after execution of the 1999 Trust and 
Wills, the relationship between Steven and his parents started 
deteriorating.  Eventually, they became estranged.  A succession 
of amendments to the estate planning documents followed.  In 
2007, the Tikalskys executed the "Donald J. Tikalsky and Betty 
Lou 
Tikalsky 
Revocable 
Trust" 
(the 
"2007 
Trust") 
as 
a 
replacement for the 1999 Trust.3  Unbeknownst to Steven, the 2007 
Trust provided that "J. Steven Tikalsky and his children are 
intentionally left out of this bequest or any bequest under this 
document."  The Tikalskys amended the 2007 Trust in 2008; the 
amendment provided that "[i]t is the intent of Donald J. 
Tikalsky and Betty Lou Tikalsky that J. Steven Tikalsky be 
eliminated completely from this Trust or any Wills or the estate 
of the parties."4  The Tikalskys amended and restated the 2007 
Trust the final time in April of 2009.  Mr. Tikalsky died 
approximately five months later, at which time Steven first 
                                                 
2 Although referring to Mr. and Mrs. Tikalsky's children by 
their first names would ordinarily suggest an unwarranted 
familiarity, we do so here purely for the sake of clarity. 
3 While we generally cite from revisions to the Tikalskys' 
various trust documents, the Tikalskys also had executed 
individual wills.  Our references to the Tikalskys' estate 
planning documents encompass their respective wills and trust 
documents unless context necessitates otherwise. 
4 Prior to the 2008 revision, the 2007 Trust provided that 
Steven would receive certain effects from Mr. Tikalsky's law 
office under certain circumstances. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
4 
 
learned that his parents had disinherited him and his family.  
Mrs. Tikalksy died in 2014, five years after her husband. 
¶4 
Steven believes two of his siblings, Susan and James, 
wrongfully caused his estrangement from his parents and his 
subsequent disinheritance.  His Complaint seeking redress for 
the latter injury named not just Susan and James as defendants, 
but Terry as well.5  Steven asserted nine claims:  (1) a request 
for a declaration that his parents lacked capacity to execute 
their respective testamentary documents; (2) a request for a 
declaration that Susan and James exercised undue influence over 
his parents in the drafting and execution of their testamentary 
documents; 
(3) 
intentional 
interference 
with 
expected 
inheritance; (4) common law conversion/fraud; (5) statutory 
theft in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 895.446 (2015-16)6 and 
943.20; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) civil conspiracy; (8) 
punitive damages; and (9) constructive trust.  The cardinal 
numbers in this list correspond to the numbered causes of action 
in Steven's Complaint.  As we trace the disposition of each of 
                                                 
5 The Complaint also identifies the "Amended and Restated 
Donald J. Tikalsky and Betty Lou Tikalsky Revocable Trust by 
Susan Friedman a/k/a Tikalsky, Trustee" as a defendant in this 
action.  Steven filed an Amended Complaint, but it merely 
incorporates the original Complaint by reference.  Consequently, 
the Amended Complaint comprises only new allegations and such 
paragraphs from the original that it amends, none of which are 
relevant to the matters we discuss here.  Therefore, we will 
refer only to the original Complaint in this opinion. 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
5 
 
these counts, we will maintain the cardinal number associated 
with each one to assist with clarity. 
¶5 
After his siblings moved for summary judgment, Steven 
voluntarily dismissed five of the Complaint's nine counts and 
acknowledged that "punitive damages" is not a cause of action.7  
Consequently, when the circuit court considered the summary 
judgment 
motion, 
the 
remaining 
claims 
were: 
 
(2) 
undue 
influence; 
(3) 
intentional 
interference 
with 
expected 
inheritance; and (9) constructive trust.  Neither count two nor 
three 
alleged 
anything 
against 
Terry. 
 
The 
ninth 
count 
(constructive trust) referred to Terry only obliquely (inasmuch 
as she was one of the defendants): 
143.  The funds that constituted a one-quarter 
share in Donald and Betty Lou's joint estate plan and 
were converted from Steven to the defendants were at 
all times after the conversion held by the defendants 
in constructive trust for Steven. 
144.  Steven therefore now holds a beneficial 
property interest in all funds converted by the 
defendants.  To the extent that the defendants spent 
or otherwise disposed of funds since the conversion 
beginning in or around April 8, 2009, a legal 
presumption exists that the funds spent came from 
monies other than those funds converted, and that any 
assets now in the defendants' possession are the 
subject of Steven's constructive trust to the maximum 
extent.  In addition, the converted funds remain in 
                                                 
7 Specifically, Steven voluntarily dismissed the following 
causes of action: (1) declaratory judgment regarding the 
Tikalskys' lack of testamentary capacity; (4) common law 
conversion/fraud; (5) statutory theft; (6) unjust enrichment; 
and (7) civil conspiracy. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
6 
 
constructive trust in the hands of all persons who 
knew or had reason to know the funds were converted. 
¶6 
The circuit court granted summary judgment against 
Steven on counts two (undue influence) and nine (constructive 
trust).  With respect to dismissal of the claim for constructive 
trust, the circuit court said: 
Plaintiff 
Steven 
urges 
the 
Court 
to 
keep 
the 
constructive 
trust 
cause 
of 
action 
because 
the 
defendants 
were 
unjustly 
enriched 
and 
he 
is, 
therefore, entitled to the equitable remedy of a 
constructive trust.  But as just noted by the 
Defendants, Plaintiff Steven voluntarily dismissed his 
unjust enrichment cause of action.  So accordingly 
this cause of action for constructive trust is 
unsupported.  Summary judgment dismissing this cause 
of action is granted. 
¶7 
The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion 
with respect to count three (intentional interference with 
expected inheritance), which left this as the sole remaining 
claim in the case.  Because this count asserted nothing against 
Terry, the circuit court dismissed her from the lawsuit with 
prejudice.  The order of dismissal was final as to Terry, and 
Steven appealed in due course.8 
¶8 
Steven named Terry as the only respondent; neither of 
his other siblings participated in the appeal in any capacity.  
The sole issue he presented to the court of appeals was the 
circuit court's dismissal of count nine (constructive trust) as 
against Terry.  The "Statement Of The Issue" in his opening 
                                                 
8 Count 
three 
(intentional 
interference 
with 
expected 
inheritance) remains pending in the circuit court against Susan 
and James. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
7 
 
brief asked:  "Did the trial court err in dismissing Steven 
Tikalsky's cause of action seeking to impose a constructive 
trust on inheritance alleged to be wrongfully distributed to the 
defendant Terry Stevens, on the basis that Steven Tikalsky 
previously dismissed his cause of action for unjust enrichment?"  
The circuit court did err, the court of appeals said.  Although 
the cause of action for unjust enrichment was gone, the court of 
appeals concluded that Steven had nevertheless "presented enough 
material on summary judgment to continue seeking a constructive 
trust."  Tikalsky v. Stevens, No. 2017AP170, unpublished slip 
op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 30, 2018).  According to the court of 
appeals, a constructive trust remained as a "permissible 
equitable remedy" as to Terry because Steven alleged "some 
measure of untoward conduct on the part of Susan and James," and 
therefore "the factual claims undergirding the potential remedy 
of a constructive trust have been sufficiently established at 
this stage of the proceedings."  Id.  The court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's order dismissing Terry from the 
case.  Id. 
¶9 
We granted Terry's petition for review and now reverse 
the court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 We review the disposition of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same methodology the circuit 
courts apply.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. 
Jackson Cty., 2010 WI 95, ¶11, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
8 
 
("We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de 
novo . . . .").  While our review is independent from the 
circuit court and court of appeals, we benefit from their 
analyses.  See Preisler v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, 
¶16, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136. 
¶11 "The first step of that [summary judgment] methodology 
requires the court to examine the pleadings to determine whether 
a claim for relief has been stated."  Green Spring Farms, 136 
Wis. 2d at 315.  "In testing the sufficiency of a complaint, we 
take all facts pleaded by plaintiff[] and all inferences which 
can reasonably be derived from those facts as true."  Id. at 
317.  And we liberally construe pleadings "with a view toward 
substantial justice to the parties."  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.02(6)). 
¶12 Under the second step of this methodology, "[i]f a 
claim for relief has been stated, the inquiry then shifts to 
whether any factual issues exist."  Id. at 315.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); see 
also Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶11, 
261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776 (quoting and applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) (2001-02)). 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
9 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶13 Terry says the circuit court correctly dismissed her 
from the case because the Complaint's only claim against her was 
for a constructive trust.  This is a remedy, not a cause of 
action, she says, and the former may not be imposed in the 
absence of the latter.  Steven says a constructive trust's legal 
taxonomy is of no moment; all that matters is whether the facts 
presented at summary judgment justify its imposition.  The court 
of appeals agreed:  "Though the parties spend considerable time 
debating whether constructive trust should be labeled a cause of 
action or a remedy, the answer to that question is largely 
immaterial."  Tikalsky, 2017AP170, unpublished slip op., ¶7. 
¶14 At the most basic level, Steven and the court of 
appeals are right.  A complaint's success does not depend on 
accurate labeling.  When we "examine the pleadings to determine 
whether a claim for relief has been stated," Green Spring Farms, 
136 Wis. 2d at 315, we focus on the factual allegations, not the 
plaintiff's 
characterization 
of 
their 
legal 
significance.9  
Shelstad v. Cook, 77 Wis. 2d 547, 553, 253 N.W.2d 517 (1977) 
("The theory of the plaintiff's case is not controlling.  A 
plaintiff is bound by the facts alleged, not by his theory of 
recovery.").  Not even misidentifying the cause of action will 
distract us from our independent assessment of the factual 
                                                 
9 Our cases at various times have referred to "causes of 
action," "claims for relief," "theories of recovery," and 
"theories of liability."  The terms are interchangeable. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
10 
 
allegations' legal consequences:  "Neither any misstatement as 
to the precise nature of the wrong, as classible by common law 
names, or misstatement as to the kind of relief, or mere 
indefiniteness of statement are of any particular moment, as 
regards either sufficiency of cause or proper joinder of causes 
of action."  Weinstein v. McCabe, 43 Wis. 2d 76, 80, 168 
N.W.2d 210 (1969).  See also Bieri v. Fonger, 139 Wis. 150, 153, 
120 N.W. 862 (1909) ("If facts are stated constituting a good 
cause of action, though not the one the pleader intended, the 
pleading is good as against a general demurrer.").10  
¶15 While Steven is right about our responsibility to look 
past labels, that does not mean we may treat causes of action 
and remedies as if they were the same thing.  It just means we 
do not depend on the complaint to properly label the claims or 
to marshal the supporting facts into a logically cogent 
grouping.  Even as we look past such formalities, we still 
distinguish between causes of action and remedies:  "A cause of 
action is distinguished from a remedy which is the means or 
method whereby the cause of action is effectuated."  Goetz v. 
                                                 
10 This is not to say that labels cannot be helpful.  
Artfully drafted complaints are often organized and divided into 
conceptually distinct sections (e.g., "Parties," "Background 
Facts," "Causes of Action," etc.).  Labeling the sections, as 
well as each individual cause of action, provides the court with 
convenient navigational markers. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
11 
 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 267, 273-74, 142 
N.W.2d 804 (1966) (citation omitted).11   
¶16 The distinction is important, especially at the 
summary judgment stage, because the court must determine whether 
the alleged facts comprise one or more causes of action.  The 
substantive law governing a cause of action tells us what types 
of facts a plaintiff must allege.  If the facts satisfy all of 
the constitutive elements of the claim, then the complaint has 
stated a good cause of action and the analysis may proceed to 
the second step in the summary judgment methodology: 
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the 
plaintiff's allegations must be informed by the theory 
of liability: "In sum, Twombly[12] makes clear the 
sufficiency 
of 
a 
complaint 
depends 
on 
[the] 
substantive law that underlies the claim made because 
it is the substantive law that drives what facts must 
be pled.  Plaintiffs must allege facts that plausibly 
suggest they are entitled to relief."   
                                                 
11 See also Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 226 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (explaining that "[f]ederal law defines a 'cause of 
action' as 'a core of operative facts which give rise to a 
remedy[.]'" (brackets in original)); Eklund v. Evans, 300 
N.W. 617, 618-19 (Minn. 1941) ("A cause of action is to be 
distinguished from the remedial rights arising therefrom and the 
remedies by which such rights are enforced.  The cause of action 
is the legal wrong done to plaintiff by defendant. . . .  The 
cause of action gives rise to a remedial right in favor of 
plaintiff against the defendant.  This may be a right to 
specific performance, damages, injunction, or other relief.  The 
remedy is the legal process by which the remedial right is 
consummated or satisfied."). 
12 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
12 
 
Springer v. Nohl Elec. Prod. Corp., 2018 WI 48, ¶35, 381 
Wis. 2d 438, 912 N.W.2d 1 (quoting Data Key Partners v. Permira 
Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶31, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693).  
See also Val-Lo-Will Farms, Inc. v. Irv Azoff & Assocs., Inc., 
71 Wis. 2d 642, 644, 238 N.W.2d 738 (1976) ("A cause of action 
is defined as an aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a 
right or rights termed 'right' or 'rights of action' which will 
be enforced by the courts." (citation and some internal marks 
omitted)).  The cause of action is important, therefore, because 
it is the standard against which we measure the sufficiency of 
the complaint's factual allegations. 
¶17 As we assay Steven's Complaint for a cause of action, 
we will proceed in two steps.  First, we will determine whether 
"constructive trust" is a cause of action or, instead, a remedy.  
Second, we will review Steven's Complaint to determine whether 
the alleged facts, without regard to the labels, comprise a 
cause of action against Terry.  The first step is necessary 
because if "constructive trust" is a cause of action, we need to 
identify its substantive elements so that, in the second step, 
we may determine whether the alleged facts satisfy its terms.  
If "constructive trust" is not a cause of action, however, then 
we must determine whether the Complaint nonetheless alleges a 
set of facts that comprises some other cause of action that 
might warrant imposition of a constructive trust on property in 
Terry's possession.  
No. 
2017AP170   
 
13 
 
A.  "Constructive Trust" Is A Remedy 
¶18 Our first step begins with a brief word about the 
nature of constructive trusts.  This will not only help 
illuminate its essential function (remedy versus cause of 
action), it will also lay the groundwork for understanding the 
circumstances in which it is available as against innocent 
owners.  Conceptually, a constructive trust is an equitable 
device used to address situations in which the legal and 
beneficial interests in a particular piece of property lie with 
different people.  Under proper circumstances——more about that 
later——the beneficial owner may ask the court to impose a 
constructive trust on the property.  Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 
Wis. 2d 466, 476, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971) ("A constructive trust 
can only be applied to some specific res [that is, property] to 
which the party has acquired legal title.").  The purpose of a 
constructive trust is to protect the beneficial owner against 
the legal owner:  "Such a trust is implied by operation of law 
as a remedial device for the protection of a beneficial interest 
against one who . . . holds the legal title to property which he 
ought not in equity and in good conscience beneficially enjoy."  
Bautista v. Schneider, 16 Wis. 2d 304, 312, 114 N.W.2d 449 
(1962).  In operation, a constructive trust reunites the 
beneficial and legal ownership interests in the same person.  
"By means of this device, the person equitably entitled to the 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
14 
 
res becomes the cestui que trust[13] and may obtain possession 
from the wrongful holder, the constructive trustee."  Richards 
v. Richards, 58 Wis. 2d 290, 297, 206 N.W.2d 134 (1973).  See 
also Zartner v. Holzhauer, 204 Wis. 18, 21, 234 N.W. 508 (1931), 
overruled on other grounds by Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 35 
N.W.2d 203 (1948) ("It is well established that equity will 
afford relief at the suit of heirs to place them in possession 
of, or to quiet their title in, real property, the legal title 
to which is held by another, under circumstances giving rise to 
a constructive trust."); Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment § 55 cmt. b (2011) ("Constructive trust is a 
flexible device by which a court directs that property to which 
B holds legal title be transferred to A."). 
¶19 With those general principles as background, we can 
recognize the first clue that a constructive trust is a remedy, 
not a cause of action:  it functions as a means of repairing 
divided ownership interests, not as a means of determining 
whether they are in need of repair.  It is for the "protection 
of a beneficial interest," Bautista, 16 Wis. 2d at 312 (emphasis 
added), as opposed to determining who owns that interest.  It 
allows the beneficial owner to "obtain possession from the 
wrongful holder," Richards, 58 Wis. 2d at 297, but it does not 
establish the wrongfulness of the holding.  It allows the court 
                                                 
13 Black's Law Dictionary defines "cestui que trust" as 
"[s]omeone who possesses equitable rights in property, usu[ally] 
receiving the rents, issues, and profits from it; beneficiary."  
Cestui Que Trust, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
15 
 
to "direct[] that property to which B holds legal title be 
transferred to A," Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment § 55 cmt. b, but it does not provide the basis for 
ousting party B from his legal title.  Constructive trust is a 
kinetic device that operates on a presupposed liability.  And 
that leads us to the second clue, which is embedded in the way 
we talk about that presupposition.   
¶20 We commonly say that "[a] constructive trust is 
imposed by a court of equity to prevent unjust enrichment 
arising when one party receives a benefit the retention of which 
would be unjust as against the other."  Prince v. Bryant, 87 
Wis. 2d 662, 667, 275 N.W.2d 676 (1979).  When we speak of 
"constructive trust" and "unjust enrichment," the pattern 
matches what we described in Goetz, in which we said a "remedy" 
is "the means or method whereby the cause of action is 
effectuated."  Goetz, 31 Wis. 2d at 273.  In other words, we 
determine 
whether 
the 
defendant 
owes 
the 
plaintiff 
an 
enforceable duty, and then we identify a method by which to 
actualize it.  We used that exact formulation in Schmalz v. 
McKenna:  "'Where a person holding title to property is subject 
to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that 
he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, 
a constructive trust arises.'"  58 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 206 
N.W.2d 141 (1973) (quoting Restatement (First) of Restitution 
§ 160 (1937)).  See also Warsco v. Oshkosh Sav. & Tr. Co., 190 
Wis. 87, 90-91, 208 N.W. 886 (1926) ("'Whereever [sic] one 
person has wrongfully taken the property of another, and 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
16 
 
converted it into a new form, or transferred it, the trust 
arises and follows the property or its proceeds.'[14]  It appears 
to us that the foregoing quotation from Pomeroy not only 
constitutes good logic, but sound law.") (emphasis omitted).  A 
constructive trust is what arises when the defendant violates an 
antecedent duty that will leave him unjustly enriched.  It is 
the defendant's obligation to perform the duty that is the cause 
of action.  The constructive trust exists for the purpose of 
providing a remedy when he fails to do so. 
¶21 As an aside, it is important to note that although 
proving unjust enrichment means the plaintiff is entitled to a 
remedy, it does not necessarily entitle him to this remedy.  
After establishing unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must next 
demonstrate that a constructive trust is warranted.  "A 
constructive 
trust 
will 
be 
imposed 
only 
in 
limited 
circumstances."  Wilharms v. Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d 671, 678–79, 
287 N.W.2d 779 (1980).  The limitation to which Wilharms refers 
is the "additional showing" a plaintiff must undertake before he 
may have this remedy: 
Despite the suggestion of this rule[15] that unjust 
enrichment alone will give rise to a constructive 
trust, however, the decisions of this court have 
consistently 
required 
an 
additional 
showing. 
A 
constructive trust will be imposed only where, by 
means of ". . . actual or constructive fraud, duress, 
                                                 
14 Quoting 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) pp. 
2397-2401. 
15 Restatement (First) of Restitution § 160 (1937). 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
17 
 
abuse of confidence, mistake, commission of a wrong, 
or by any form of unconscionable conduct," the one 
against whom the trust is imposed "has either obtained 
or holds the legal title to property which he ought 
not in equity and in good conscience beneficially 
enjoy . . . [.]" 
Gorski v. Gorski, 82 Wis. 2d 248, 254-55, 262 N.W.2d 120 (1978) 
(quoting Baustista, 16 Wis. 2d at 312).  See also Prince, 87 
Wis. 2d at 667 (explaining the factors that must be shown in 
addition to unjust enrichment include "actual or constructive 
fraud, duress, abuse of confidential relationship, mistake, 
commission of a wrong or any form of unconscionable conduct."); 
Meyer v. Ludwig, 65 Wis. 2d 280, 285–86, 222 N.W.2d 679 (1974) 
("[B]oth cases[16] go beyond the unjust enrichment-only test, 
suggested 
by 
the 
Restatement 
rule, 
to 
require 
something 
additional 
[such 
as] . . . 'duress, 
abuse 
of 
confidence, 
mistake, commission of a wrong, or by any form of unconscionable 
conduct . . . ."); Masino v. Sechrest, 268 Wis. 101, 107, 66 
N.W.2d 740 (1954) ("The underlying principle of a constructive 
trust is the equitable prevention of unjust enrichment which 
arises from fraud or the abuse of a confidential relationship.  
'A constructive trust arises if, but only if, it is shown that 
the transferee was guilty of fraud or the abuse of a 
confidential relationship, or if the transfer was made in 
contemplation of death, or is in the nature of a mortgage.'  
Scott on Trusts, vol. 3, § 481.3, 2358.").  Therefore, Steven is 
                                                 
16 Schmalz v. McKenna, 58 Wis. 2d 220, 206 N.W.2d 141 
(1973); Bautista v. Schneider, 16 Wis. 2d 304, 114 N.W.2d 449 
(1962). 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
18 
 
not entitled to a constructive trust as a remedy unless he can 
prove unjust enrichment and the "additional showing" described 
in Gorski. 
¶22 We recognize we have not been entirely consistent in 
identifying a constructive trust as a remedy.  Certainly, there 
have been times that we have explicitly recognized it as such.  
See, e.g., Prince, 87 Wis. 2d at 667-68 ("Since the doctrine of 
constructive trust is an equitable remedy . . . ."); Pluemer v. 
Pluemer, 2009 WI App 170, ¶9, 322 Wis. 2d 138, 776 N.W.2d 261 
("A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to prevent 
unjust enrichment."); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Merkel, 90 
Wis. 2d 126, 
130, 
279 
N.W.2d 715 
(Ct. 
App. 
1979) 
("A 
constructive trust is an equitable remedy . . . .").  But at 
other times, we have left the impression it is a cause of 
action.  See, e.g., Gorski, 82 Wis. 2d at 254 ("the amended 
complaint does allege facts sufficient to support a cause of 
action on the theory of a constructive trust."); see also Demos 
v. Carey, 50 Wis. 2d 262, 269, 184 N.W.2d 117 (1971) ("[T]he 
facts 
alleged . . . do 
not 
state 
a 
cause 
of 
action 
for 
constructive trust.").  To remove any confusion about the 
matter, we conclude that a constructive trust is a remedy, not a 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
19 
 
cause of action.  In doing so, we join the overwhelming majority 
of our sister jurisdictions who have addressed this question.17 
B.  Persistency of Constructive Trusts 
¶23  Conceptually, there are two potential paths by which 
a person may pursue a constructive trust against property in 
another's possession.  First, the plaintiff may directly assert 
a claim against the defendant (as described above) claiming she 
has been unjustly enriched and that the circumstances by which 
the unjust enrichment arose satisfy the "additional showing" 
described by Gorski.  Or second, the plaintiff may prove that 
the defendant came into possession of property that was already 
burdened with a constructive trust.   
¶24 Once a constructive trust exists, it travels with the 
property to which it attaches.  So, as long as the plaintiff can 
trace the property from one person to the next, he may have this 
                                                 
17 Over 30 jurisdictions recognize that a constructive trust 
is a remedy.  See, e.g., Freeland v. IRS, 264 B.R. 916, 924 
(N.D. Ind. 2001) ("A constructive trust is not a cause of action 
rather it is a remedy that may be invoked when one party has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another."); Keeling v. 
Keeling, 145 So. 3d 763, 769 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (per curiam) 
("'[A] constructive trust is an equitable remedy; and a request 
to impose such a trust is not a cause of action that will stand 
independent of some wrongdoing. . . .'  In other words, a 
request for the imposition of a constructive trust must be 
tethered to some viable underlying cause of action." (internal 
citations omitted) (bracket in original)); Sherer v. Sherer, 393 
S.W.3d 480, 491 (Tex. App. 2013) ("A constructive trust is a 
remedy——not a cause of action. . . .  An underlying cause of 
action such as a breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, or unjust 
enrichment is required.  The constructive trust is merely the 
remedy used to grant relief on the underlying cause of 
action."). 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
20 
 
remedy until the property comes into the hands of a bona fide 
purchaser for value and without notice of the claim: 
[E]quity impresses a constructive trust upon the new 
form or species of property, not only while it is in 
the hands of the original wrongdoer, but as long as it 
can be followed and identified in whosesoever hands it 
may come, except into those of a bona fide purchaser 
for value and without notice . . . .  
Warsco, 190 Wis. at 90 (quoting 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 
(4th Ed.) pp. 2397-2401) (emphasis omitted)).  See also 
Richards, 58 Wis. 2d at 298 ("'Where a person holding property 
transfers it to another in violation of his duty to a third 
person, the third person can reach the property in the hands of 
the transferee (by means of a constructive trust) unless the 
transferee is a bona fide purchaser.'") (quoting 5 Scott, Law of 
Trusts (3d ed.), p. 3444, § 470).  If the property reaches the 
hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, the constructive trust 
attaches to the proceeds from the purchase.  "As a necessary 
consequence of this doctrine, whenever property subject to a 
trust is wrongfully sold and transferred to a bona fide 
purchaser, so that it is freed from the trust, the trust 
immediately attaches to the price or proceeds in the hands of 
the vendor . . . ."  Warsco, 190 Wis. at 90 (quotation omitted). 
C.  Steven's Complaint 
¶25 Armed with these principles, we are now ready to 
scrutinize Steven's Complaint for a cause of action capable of 
implicating the property in Terry's possession.  As we discussed 
above, we will not be captured by labels as we do so, but 
neither will we rewrite Steven's Complaint.  He is the master of 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
21 
 
his 
pleadings. 
 
Nor 
will 
we 
countermand 
his 
strategic 
calculations, such as his affirmative decision to dismiss 
certain causes of action.  It is not for us to resurrect what he 
has let go.  We will consider the Complaint from two 
perspectives.  First, we will determine whether it pleads a 
cause of action directly against Terry.  Second, we will 
consider whether it pleads a cause of action against one of her 
siblings that could potentially call into question her ownership 
of the inheritance she received from her parents. 
1.  Claims Against Terry 
¶26 We begin by determining whether the Complaint states a 
cause of action against Terry.  As filed, two sections of the 
Complaint 
made 
allegations 
that 
relate 
to 
her 
potential 
liability to Steven.  In one of them, the Complaint claimed 
Terry had been unjustly enriched as a consequence of her 
siblings' representations and conduct, the result of which was 
that she received one-third of her parents' estates instead of 
one-quarter (count six——unjust enrichment).  As we described 
above, unjust enrichment is the cause of action for which a 
constructive trust is a potentially available remedy.  However, 
we are analyzing the Complaint not as it was filed, but as it 
was presented to the circuit court on the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment.  In response to that motion, Steven explicitly 
dismissed his unjust enrichment claim against all of the 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
22 
 
defendants.18  Consequently, count six (unjust enrichment) is no 
longer an operable part of the Complaint and is therefore 
incapable of asserting a cause of action against Terry. 
¶27 The other section of the Complaint containing factual 
allegations against Terry is count nine (constructive trust).  
There, the Complaint says "the defendants" converted Steven's 
one-quarter share of their parents' estates, such that each of 
them should be considered to be holding Steven's share of the 
inheritance as a constructive trust (count nine).  Because we 
construe pleadings liberally in the first step of the summary 
judgment methodology, we will understand Steven's reference to 
"defendants" to assert that Terry, as well as Susan and James, 
converted his share of the inheritance.19  Count nine does not 
itself describe the conversion; instead, Steven placed those 
allegations in count four (common law conversion/fraud), in 
                                                 
18 Steven's brief in response to the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment said:  "Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his 
Sixth Claim for Relief for Unjust Enrichment."  There was good 
reason for doing so.  The first element of an unjust enrichment 
claim requires "a benefit conferred on the defendant by the 
plaintiff . . . ."  Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, ¶30, 379 
Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789, reconsideration denied, 2018 WI 20, 
¶1, 380 Wis. 2d 107, 909 N.W.2d 176, and cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 101 (2018).  Steven's unjust enrichment claim does not 
allege he conferred anything on the defendants. 
19 See Wis. Stat. § 802.02(6) ("All pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice."); Springer v. Nohl 
Elec. Prod. Corp., 2018 WI 48, ¶10, 381 Wis. 2d 438, 912 
N.W.2d 1 ("we liberally construe pleadings 'with a view toward 
substantial justice to the parties.'" (citations omitted)). 
 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
23 
 
which he says that through "Susan and James' false and 
fraudulent representations and conduct described above, amongst 
others, Susan and James caused funds to be diverted from Steven 
to themselves."  Even if we could consider this an inartfully 
drawn claim of unjust enrichment, it would suffer the same fate 
as the actual claim of unjust enrichment:  Steven dismissed it 
in response to Terry's motion for summary judgment.20  With count 
four voluntarily dismissed, there is nothing in the Complaint to 
give meaning to the allegation of "conversion" in count nine.  
So nothing in count nine is capable of serving as an operable 
cause of action against Terry. 
¶28 For these reasons, the Complaint does not plead any 
cause of action directly against Terry.  So we must next 
determine whether the remaining claims Steven made against Susan 
and James might give him a right to impress a constructive trust 
on the inheritance Terry received from their parents.  
2.  Claims Against Others That Might Implicate Terry 
¶29 The two remaining claims presented to the circuit 
court on summary judgment were count two (undue influence) and 
count 
three 
(intentional 
interference 
with 
expected 
inheritance).  The circuit court dismissed count two, and Steven 
did not challenge that decision either in the court of appeals 
or here.  So the only remaining cause of action for us to 
                                                 
20 Steven's brief in response to the motion for summary 
judgment said:  "Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his Fourth 
Claim for Relief for Common Law Conversion/Fraud." 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
24 
 
consider 
is 
for 
"intentional 
interference 
with 
expected 
inheritance."  In this section of his Complaint, Steven alleged 
that: 
Susan and James intentionally interfered with Steven's 
expected inheritance through the exercise of undue 
influence on Donald and Betty Lou and other bad faith 
conduct, 
including 
the 
orchestration 
of 
the 
preparation and execution of the Last Will and 
Testament of Donald J. Tikalsky and the Amended and 
Restated Donald J. Tikalsky and Betty Lou Tikalsky 
Revocable Trust dated April 8, 2009, along with any 
other legal documents prepared for and executed by 
either Donald or Betty Lou on, about or subsequent to 
that date. 
He also alleged that "[b]ut not [sic] for Susan and James' 
conduct described above, Donald and Betty Lou would have left a 
legacy to Steven equal to that of the legacy left to each of 
their other three issue."21 
                                                 
21 Although this cause of action survived summary judgment, 
the same cannot be said with respect to all of the supporting 
allegations.  The circuit court concluded that the defendants 
had nothing to do with the "orchestration and preparation" of 
the Tikalskys' estate planning documents.  Specifically, it said 
that Steven presented no evidence "that the defendants were 
involved in any way in the preparation or arrangement of the 
2007, 2008, or 2009 wills or revocable trusts."  And it noted 
that it was undisputed that the defendants knew nothing of the 
Tikalskys' decision to disinherit Steven, or anything about the 
changes to their estate planning documents (prior to Mr. 
Tikalsky's death) to accomplish that objective. 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
25 
 
¶30 So Steven's challenge here is to explain how the 
allegations in his "intentional interference" claim can provide 
a vehicle by which he can reach property in Terry's possession.22  
Because these facts do not charge her with any culpable conduct, 
Steven turns to our "innocent beneficiary" line of cases to 
argue that he may have access to property in her hands 
notwithstanding the fact that she has engaged in no inequitable 
behavior.  However, the circumstances he describes in his 
Complaint do not fit the contours of the innocent beneficiary 
doctrine.   
¶31 Our opinion in Richards provides a good illustration 
of the situations that call for constructive trusts on property 
in the hands of innocent beneficiaries.  Richards, 58 Wis. 2d at 
290.  There, Mr. Richards was subject to a divorce decree that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent claims the circuit 
court's conclusions were erroneous, but she offers no support 
for that assertion other than a vague observation that "[a]ll 
one has to do is review the record to learn that Steven had a 
story to tell that is the opposite of what his sisters and 
brother told."  Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶80.  That 
may be true in gross, but it is incorrect in fine.  The parts of 
the record cited by the dissent have nothing at all to do with 
what the circuit court said about the lack of evidence proffered 
by Steven.  If the record contains evidence that contradicts the 
circuit court, neither the dissent nor Steven has found it. 
22 Although 
"intentional 
interference 
with 
expected 
inheritance" is a tort, we examine the claim without reference 
to how Steven labeled it.  The purpose of our review is to 
determine whether the alleged facts could be understood as 
making a claim of unjust enrichment that could potentially 
support imposition of a constructive trust on property in 
Terry's possession. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
26 
 
required him to name his minor children as beneficiaries of 
certain life insurance policies.  Id. at 292.  After he 
remarried, he designated his new wife as the beneficiary.  Id.  
We recognized that he who pays the premium of a life insurance 
policy gets to name the beneficiary.  Id. at 293.  But we also 
said that the divorce decree created in the children an 
equitable right to the insurance proceeds:  "[A]lthough a 
divorce judgment does not expressly prohibit the owner of an 
insurance policy from changing the beneficiary, the decree of 
the court is to be given the effect of a continuing obligation 
to carry out the provisions set forth therein."  Id. at 296.  
Therefore, 
when 
Mr. 
Richards 
changed 
the 
life 
insurance 
beneficiary, he was conveying a property interest to his wife 
that was already freighted with a constructive trust.  We said 
"the mere ignorance of the recipient of the original impropriety 
did not make the recipient an innocent purchaser or, as 
contemplated in the rules stated by Scott on Trusts, a bona fide 
purchaser."  Id. at 298.   
¶32 The general rule we gleaned from this was that 
"'[w]here a person holding property transfers it to another in 
violation of his duty to a third person, the third person can 
reach the property in the hands of the transferee (by means of a 
constructive trust) unless the transferee is a bona fide 
purchaser.'"  Id. at 298 (citation omitted).  This rule does not 
dispense with the need to prove unjust enrichment or establish 
Gorski's "additional showing."  When this pattern occurs, it is 
clear that the innocent beneficiary "was, in fact, enriched, 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
27 
 
although not because of any unconscionable conduct on her part."  
Prince, 87 Wis. 2d at 668.  The "additional showing" required by 
Gorski, in these situations, is resident in the violation of the 
transferor's obligation to a third person:  "[A] change of 
beneficiary in violation of an express provision of a divorce 
judgment is a sufficient additional factor," as is "a change of 
beneficiary in violation of an express promise supported by 
consideration . . . ."  Id. at 670.  The constructive trust 
attaches to the property in the transferor's hands, following 
which our normal rules about the persistency of trusts (see 
supra III.B) come into play, which allow the third party to 
reach the property in the hands of all transferees until it 
comes into the possession of a bona fide purchaser for value.   
¶33 Steven's Complaint does not fit this pattern.  The 
Richards rule contemplates the owners of the property conveying 
it to an innocent beneficiary in violation of a duty to transfer 
it to the plaintiff.  Steven imagines himself to be in the place 
of the person to whom the duty is owed, while Terry stands in 
for the innocent beneficiary.  Steven's Complaint does not 
describe a Richards scenario because it was the Tikalskys, not 
Susan and James, who transferred the property in question to 
Terry.  And the Tikalskys owed Steven no duty to make him a 
beneficiary of their estates.  See Bautista, 58 Wis. 2d at 229; 
see also Olszewski v. Borek, 254 Wis. 153, 157, 35 N.W.2d 209 
(1948), on reh'g, 254 Wis. 153, 35 N.W.2d 911 (1949) ("It has 
often been held by this court that one of the most important 
rights that a normal adult person has is his power to dispose of 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
28 
 
his property by will as he chooses.  In fact, it has been 
referred to by this court as a 'sacred right' and one that is 
guaranteed by the constitution."); Schaefer v. Ziebell, 207 
Wis. 404, 410, 241 N.W. 382 (1932) ("One of the most important 
rights that a person of full age, mature mind, and disposing 
memory enjoys is the absolute right to dispose of his property 
by will as he may choose.").  So the Tikalskys violated no duty 
to Steven when they caused their estate planning documents to 
transfer part of their estates to Terry.  And in the context of 
innocent beneficiaries, where there is no violated duty, there 
can be neither unjust enrichment nor an "additional showing," 
and so there can be no constructive trust.  Therefore, the sole 
remaining set of factual allegations in Steven's Complaint does 
not state a cause of action capable of implicating Terry or the 
property in her possession. 
3.  The Dissents 
a.  Chief Justice Roggensack 
¶34 Chief Justice Roggensack, however, believes there is a 
path we can follow from the Complaint's allegations all the way 
to a constructive trust over property in Terry's hands.  She 
says "a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy if Susan, 
James and Terry have converted property from their parents' 
estate that would have been devised to Steven but for wrongful 
influence 
over 
Donald 
and 
Betty 
Lou." 
 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
dissent, 
¶68. 
 
According 
to 
the 
Chief's 
formulation, the Complaint would need to allege facts sufficient 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
29 
 
to support two torts, to wit, conversion and undue influence.  
On the state of the record before us, it does not. 
¶35 With respect to the tort of conversion, the Chief's 
dissent says "Steven claims Terry converted property to her own 
use that should have been devised to him."  Id., ¶77.  And it 
faults Terry for not having rebutted that allegation in the 
summary judgment proceedings: 
Although Terry's answer denies the factual allegations 
and legal claims made in Steven's complaint, she makes 
no 
evidentiary 
offer 
of 
proof 
by 
affidavit 
or 
otherwise sufficient to show a prima facie case for 
summary judgment dismissing Steven's claim against her 
for possession and subsequent conversion of property 
that should have belonged to him. 
Id., ¶78.  Steven, of course, dismissed his conversion claim.  
The dissent, surprisingly, believes this was a non-event.  It 
says the "majority opinion mistakenly concludes that 'Steven 
voluntarily dismissed' his allegations of wrongful possession 
that led to conversion of the property."  Id., ¶78 n.13.  
"That," it says, "never happened."  Id.  The record begs to 
differ.  Steven's response to the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment said:  "Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his Fourth 
Claim for Relief for Common Law Conversion/Fraud."  That seems 
pretty definitive.  But perhaps the dissent means to say that 
the voluntary dismissal was merely a representation that Steven 
would no longer assert that the alleged facts add up to a 
conversion.  If that is what the dissent meant, it did not 
follow through with its own understanding of what Steven said.  
At every step of the analysis, the dissent relied on the 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
30 
 
viability of a conversion claim.23  That is to say, the dissent's 
analysis depends entirely on an inscrutable insistence that 
Steven might be able to prove a claim he voluntarily dismissed.  
Because the dissent's path to the imposition of a constructive 
trust depends on a nonexistent conversion claim, it must 
necessarily fail.  It must fail for the additional reason that 
the other claim upon which its rationale is founded does not 
exist either. 
¶36 The second tort necessary to the dissent's analysis is 
"undue influence."  But the circuit court granted Terry summary 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶73 ("The 
complaint alleges that '[t]he funds that constituted a one-
quarter share in Donald and Betty Lou's joint estate plan and 
were converted from Steven to the defendants were at all times 
after the conversion held by the defendants in constructive 
trust for Steven.'" (emphasis added)); id. ("'[A] complaint 
states a claim in conversion when it alleges that the plaintiff 
is "entitled to immediate possession" of a "chattel" over which 
the defendant had wrongfully retained dominion or control.'" 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. ("'An action for 
conversion is bottomed upon a tortious interference with 
possessory 
rights.'" 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citation 
omitted)); 
id., ¶76 ("In the matter before us, the allegations in the 
complaint state a claim for wrongful possession and conversion 
of property by Terry on which relief can be granted, and the 
answers join issues of fact and of law.") (emphasis added); 
id., ¶77 ("Steven claims Terry converted property to her own use 
that should have been devised to him.") (emphasis added); id. 
("Therefore, if one is in possession of property which in equity 
should belong to another and the possessor puts that property to 
his or her own use, the possessor has converted property of 
another.") (emphasis added); id., ¶78 ("[S]he [Terry] makes no 
evidentiary offer of proof by affidavit or otherwise sufficient 
to show a prima facie case for summary judgment dismissing 
Steven's claim against her for possession and subsequent 
conversion of property that should have belonged to him.") 
(emphasis added). 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
31 
 
judgment with respect to this claim, and entered a final order 
dismissing all claims against her with prejudice.  Steven has 
not appealed the circuit court's ruling on this claim.  The 
dissent, however, says we may ignore the circuit court's 
decision, as well as Steven's failure to appeal it: 
The dismissal was not a final judgment with regard to 
Susan and James or Steven; therefore, Steven had no 
right to appeal its dismissal, and he could not bring 
it to us.  Wis. Stat. § 808.03.  The majority opinion 
errs when it relies on Steven's not appealing the 
dismissal of his claim for undue influence and states 
that the "only remaining cause of action" is the claim 
of intentional interference with expected inheritance.  
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶67 n.10. 
¶37 The dissent is correct that the dismissal was not 
final "with regard to Susan and James," but we are not 
interested in the status of the claim as against them.  We are 
interested in its status with respect to Terry.  The circuit 
court 
thought 
the 
claim 
lacked 
merit, 
and 
the 
judgment 
dismissing Terry from the case made that conclusion final as 
between her and Steven.  Specifically, if proven, this the 
circuit court said "[t]he defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to the Second Claim for Relief asserted in the 
plaintiffs' complaint, for undue influence is hereby GRANTED, 
and that cause of action is hereby dismissed, with prejudice."  
The subsequent judgment made it clear the disposition was final 
as between Terry and Steven:  "All claims asserted by the 
plaintiff, J. Steven Tikalsky, against the defendant, Terry 
Stevens, are hereby dismissed, with prejudice."  It concluded 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
32 
 
with the admonition that "[t]his Judgment is final for purposes 
of appeal."   
¶38 It is an unremarkable precept in our rules of 
procedure that a party who does not raise an appealable issue 
before the appropriate appellate tribunal forfeits it.  See, 
e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("No 
procedural 
principle 
is 
more 
familiar . . . than 
that 
a 
constitutional right may be forfeited in . . . civil cases by 
the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a 
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."); Freytag v. 
C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 894-95 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
("Forfeiture is 'not a mere technicality and is essential to the 
orderly administration of justice.'") (citation omitted); State 
v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶11, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 
(stating "issues that are not preserved are deemed waived" and 
explaining that it would be more precise to use "forfeited" 
rather than "waived"); United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-
Mix Concrete, Inc., 2013 WI 72, ¶16, 349 Wis. 2d 587, 836 
N.W.2d 807 ("[b]y supreme court rule, '[i]f a petition [for 
review] is granted, the parties cannot raise or argue issues not 
set forth in the petition unless ordered by the' court.") 
(brackets 
in 
original) 
(citation 
omitted); 
Preisler, 
360 
Wis. 2d 129, ¶59 ("[w]e decline to consider issues not raised in 
petitions for review."); Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, Inc. 
v. Town Bank, 2014 WI 63, ¶61, 355 Wis. 2d 229, 850 N.W.2d 28 
(Bradley, Ann Walsh, J., dissenting) ("where a party has not 
raised an issue before the circuit court or the court of 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
33 
 
appeals, we deem that issue forfeited.").  The circuit court's 
adjudication of the undue influence claim, so far as it relates 
to Terry,24 became final and appealable upon entry of judgment 
disposing of all claims against her.  Steven appealed, but did 
not raise this issue before the court of appeals.  Nor does he 
address it here.  Therefore, one of two conclusions must obtain.  
Either Steven does not disagree with the circuit court's ruling, 
or he forfeited his opportunity to challenge it by failing to 
include the issue in his appeal.  Whichever it is, we cannot 
simply pretend this is a live claim when Steven has abandoned 
it.25  And the dissent does not explain why we should.  So the 
dissent's entire analytical framework is faulty because it 
presumes the existence of two well-pled torts, both of which 
have been irrevocably dismissed. 
b.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
¶39 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley also believes there is a 
path from the Complaint's allegations to a constructive trust 
over property in Terry's possession, although it is different 
from the one chosen by Chief Justice Roggensack.  Justice 
Bradley settled on count 3——intentional interference with 
                                                 
24 Resolution of the undue influence claim is not final with 
respect to Susan and James, of course, because there are still 
matters pending in the circuit court between them and Steven.   
25 "[T]he issues before the court are the issues presented 
in the petition for review and not discrete arguments that may 
be made, pro or con, in the disposition of an issue either by 
counsel or by the court."  State v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 789, 
476 N.W.2d 867 (1991) (footnote omitted).   
No. 
2017AP170   
 
34 
 
expected inheritance.  Unlike count 2 (undue influence) and 
count 4 (conversion), this is at least a live claim inasmuch as 
neither Steven nor the circuit court dismissed it.  It is not, 
however, capable of supporting imposition of a constructive 
trust. 
¶40 The dissent largely adopts the court of appeals' 
understanding that successfully proving count 3 would satisfy 
the requirements for imposing a constructive trust.  "With 
respect to the first element of a constructive trust," the court 
of appeals said, "Steven's allegations and supporting evidence 
raise material facts tending to show that his siblings hold 
title to property that equity dictates should go to him."  
Tikalsky, 2017AP170, unpublished slip op., ¶14.  Therefore, 
"'[i]f proven, this claim would establish that all three 
siblings 
(including 
Terry) 
were 
unjustly 
enriched 
by 
an 
inheritance that would have gone——at least in part——to Steven.'"  
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissent, ¶86 (emphasis in original).   
¶41 But that does not follow at all.  Proof of count 3 
means that Susan and James, not Terry, are liable to Steven.  No 
principle of equity so much as even hints that proving such a 
claim would make anyone other than the tortfeasor responsible to 
the victim.  Tortfeasors are liable for their own torts, not 
their non-tortfeasor siblings.  "It is a basic principle of law, 
as well as common sense, that one is typically liable only for 
his or her own acts, not the acts of others."  Lewis v. 
Physicians 
Ins. 
Co. 
of 
Wisconsin, 
2001 
WI 60, 
¶11, 
243 
Wis. 2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 484; see also Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
35 
 
Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 692, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979) ("An 
individual is personally responsible for his own tortious 
conduct."); CLL Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Arrowhead Pac. Corp., 174 
Wis. 2d 604, 610, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993) ("[A]s a matter of 
justice, tort law shifts the losses caused by a personal injury 
to the one at fault . . . ."); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Agency, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1891) ("I assume that common-
sense is opposed to making one man pay for another man's wrong, 
unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass according to 
the ordinary canons of legal responsibility . . . .").26 
¶42 The dissent and court of appeals disagree.  They would 
make Terry——a non-tortfeasor——liable to Steven for the torts of 
Susan and James through the expedient of imposing a constructive 
trust on property in Terry's possession.  But they do not 
describe the mechanism by which Terry could be held liable for 
James and Susan's torts.  Nor could they.  In the absence of a 
claim of unjust enrichment, the only other basis for a 
constructive trust is the transfer of property to an innocent 
                                                 
26 This is consistent with how the tort of intentional 
interference with expected inheritance was formulated in Harris 
v. Kritzik, 166 Wis. 2d 689, 480 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1992).  
There, the court of appeals said:  "One who by fraud, duress or 
other 
tortious 
means 
intentionally 
prevents 
another 
from 
receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he 
would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the 
other for loss of the inheritance or gift."  Id. at 695 
(adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 774B (1977)).  The 
liability link between tortfeasor and victim is explicit.  It is 
the one engaging in the tortious conduct who "is subject to 
liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift." Id. 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
36 
 
beneficiary in violation of a duty to transfer it to the 
plaintiff, as described in Richards.  Even Wilharms, upon which 
both the dissent and the court of appeals relied, recognized 
this.  In Wilharms, a husband changed the beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy contrary to a court order.  The Wilharms court 
quoted Richards for the controlling principle:  "'Where a person 
holding property transfers it to another in violation of his 
duty to a third person, the third person can reach the property 
in the hands of the transferee (by means of a constructive 
trust) unless the transferee is a bona fide purchaser.'"  
Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d at 679.  As discussed above, count 3 cannot 
possibly describe such a situation because the transferors——the 
Tikalskys——were under no obligation to transfer anything at all 
to Steven.  So the claim that Susan and James intentionally 
interfered with Steven's expected inheritance cannot support 
imposition of a constructive trust over property in Terry's 
possession.27 
                                                 
27 The dissent says Wilharms v. Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d 671, 
287 N.W.2d 779 (1980), recognized the existence of a free-
floating constructive trust that can attach to property without 
reference to a supporting cause of action.  Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley dissent, ¶83 n.2.  Wilharms did no such thing.  To the 
contrary, it tightly tied the availability of a constructive 
trust to the potential unjust enrichment consequent upon Dennis 
Wilharms having named a new insurance beneficiary in violation 
of a court order.  We remanded the Wilharms case, and in doing 
so we directed that future proceedings concentrate on whether 
there had been unjust enrichment:  "The question on remand 
therefore is whether the parents of Dennis Wilharms were 
unjustly enriched by their own or their son's wrongful conduct."  
Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d at 679.  In other words, a constructive 
trust would not attach in the absence of unjust enrichment.   
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP170   
 
37 
 
* 
¶43 Steven's Complaint cannot survive summary judgment if 
it does not state a claim on which relief may be granted.  
Before we assayed the Complaint for the existence of such 
claims, we first had to clarify what qualifies as a cause of 
action.  After concluding that a constructive trust does not 
fall into that category, we nonetheless scoured the alleged 
facts——without regard for how they were grouped or labeled——to 
determine whether they comprised one or more causes of action 
against Terry or were otherwise capable of calling into question 
her ownership of the inheritance she received from her parents.  
They did not. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 We hold that a constructive trust is not a cause of 
action and that Steven's Complaint does not state a claim for 
relief against Terry.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err 
when it dismissed her from the case with prejudice.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Because there can be no constructive trust in the absence 
of a good cause of action, the dissent's analysis is flawed.  
The dissent acknowledges there are no remaining claims against 
Terry.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissent, ¶83 n.2.  And it does 
not address how the Tikalskys' decision to disinherit Steven is 
comparable to Dennis Wilharms' decision to name a new life 
insurance beneficiary.  Because it was Mr. Wilharms' violation 
of a duty that potentially gave rise to a claim of unjust 
enrichment, the dissent must identify a correlative duty here.  
But the Tikalskys were under no obligation to make Steven an 
heir, so disinheriting him violated no duty.  Contrary to the 
dissent's 
argument, 
therefore, 
Wilharms 
does 
not 
say 
a 
constructive trust can be imposed in this case because there has 
been no violated duty.  So Wilharms can provide no succor for 
the dissent's belief in a self-animating constructive trust.   
No. 
2017AP170   
 
38 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
1 
 
¶45 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority but concur and write separately to further clarify 
the issue we were called upon to decide, which is, whether a 
constructive trust is an independent cause of action.  Because 
it is not and instead is a remedy, Terry Stevens ("Stevens") 
must be dismissed from this action.  Stated differently, it is 
undisputed that Steven Tikalsky ("Tikalsky") alleged only two 
causes of action against Stevens: (1) unjust enrichment and (2) 
constructive trust.  As the unjust enrichment claim was 
dismissed, we are left to decide whether a constructive trust is 
a stand-alone cause of action or instead, a remedy.  Because it 
is a remedy, Stevens was properly dismissed.  If this case were 
not now dismissed as to Stevens, she would remain solely to 
satisfy a remedy awarded if alleged wrongdoing of others is 
proven.  To the extent constructive trusts have been imposed, 
they are a potential remedy once a viable cause of action has 
been proven against that defendant.  Here, no viable cause of 
action remains against Stevens.  Constructive trust is not a 
stand-alone cause of action.  As a result, Stevens was properly 
dismissed from the action.  See, e.g., Sulzer v. Diedrich, 2003 
WI 90, ¶¶26–30, 263 Wis. 2d 496, 664 N.W.2d 641; Wilharms v. 
Wilharms, 
93 
Wis. 2d 671, 
679–81, 
287 
N.W.2d 779 
(1980);  
Richards v. Richards, 58 Wis. 2d 290, 296–99, 206 N.W.2d 134 
(1973); Schmalz v. McKenna, 58 Wis. 2d 220, 231, 206 N.W.2d 141 
(1973); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Merkel, 90 
Wis. 2d 126, 132–34, 279 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1979) (all cases 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
2 
 
of constructive trust with underlying causes of action being 
unjust enrichment).  
¶46 I write to further explain why here, Stevens does not 
properly remain in this case because no viable legal theory of 
liability has been alleged against her.  Although Tikalsky's 
arguments have morphed somewhat, Tikalsky makes no argument that 
any otherwise unstated cause of action, such as conversion, has 
been alleged against Stevens.1  Instead, he urges that the 
complaint 
be 
viewed 
to 
support 
"an 
equitable 
claim 
for 
imposition of a constructive trust" despite no allegation made 
against the innocent property holder.  Tikalsky argues, "once 
the elements of a constructive trust are established, the 
equitable claim can proceed."  I would clarify that absent a 
viable cause of action——which could be the violation of a court 
order or contract which resulted in wrongful distribution to an 
innocent beneficiary——there can be no consequent remedy of 
constructive trust against Stevens.  Here, no such violation of 
court order or contract has been alleged.  Tikalsky's argument 
instead rises and falls with variations of the same theme: 
whether a constructive trust is a viable, stand-alone cause of 
action.  Specifically, he argues that he has stated a viable 
cause of action by pleading the elements of constructive trust, 
                                                 
1 Under Wisconsin law, a plaintiff claiming conversion must 
show that (1) the defendant intentionally controlled or took 
property belonging to the owner; (2) the defendant controlled or 
took the property without the owner's consent or without lawful 
authority; and (3) the defendant controlling or taking the 
property seriously interfered with the owner's right to possess 
the property.   Wis. JI–Civil 2200 (2014). 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
3 
 
that a claim for "restitution" alone is viable, and because "the 
equitable claim or cause of action might be labeled 'unjust 
enrichment' based upon third party wrongdoing."  Here, seeking 
this constructive trust remedy, absent an underlying cause of 
action, is legally insufficient.2 
¶47 The majority correctly concludes that a constructive 
trust is a remedy, not a cause of action.  Additionally, the 
majority correctly concludes that Tikalsky could not seek a 
constructive trust without a viable underlying cause of action 
against Stevens.  Because no viable cause of action remains 
against 
her, 
the 
remedy 
of 
a 
constructive 
trust 
cannot 
independently exist as a stand-alone claim.  In other words, 
Tikalsky is precluded from asserting the right to this remedy 
absent an underlying cause of action that would give rise to a 
constructive trust.  While the majority is correct in its 
conclusions, I write to further emphasize the majority's 
conclusions.  There is a fundamental difference between an 
underlying cause of action——here, unjust enrichment——and the 
potential remedy of a constructive trust.  
¶48 I begin with the general distinction between a cause 
of action and a remedy.  The majority correctly states that 
causes of action and remedies are distinct legal concepts, and 
must be understood and applied as such.  "[A] cause of action 
                                                 
2 The remaining claims against the other siblings, however, 
are not affected by this determination.  Those other siblings 
have not made any allegations against Stevens so to otherwise 
make her a proper party to this litigation. 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
4 
 
owes its existence to a set of operative facts."  Wussow v. 
Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 145, 293 N.W.2d 897 
(1980); see also Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 582, 135 
N.W.2d 284 (1965) ("The operative facts, not the consequences, 
are determinative of a cause of action.").  A remedy is a 
consequence that flows from a successful cause of action.  Goetz 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 267, 273–74, 142 
N.W.2d 804 (1966); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. 
Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 73–74 (1992) (discussing the difference 
between a cause of action and a remedy, and stating that 
"[f]ederal courts cannot reach out to award remedies when the 
Constitution or laws of the United States do not support a cause 
of action").  A viable cause of action is thus a necessary 
precedent, separate and distinct from a potential remedy, but 
required in order to give rise to the potential relief prayed 
for in the complaint.  A cause of action owes its existence to a 
set of operative facts and legal conclusions that if proven 
require consideration of whether a remedy should be awarded.  
Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, such a distinction 
is not "largely immaterial."  Rather, the distinction between a 
cause of action and a remedy is essential.  
¶49 Since a constructive trust is a remedy and not a 
stand-alone cause of action, I will briefly discuss unjust 
enrichment as a cause of action.  Unjust enrichment is a stand-
alone cause of action.  See, e.g., Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, 
¶¶29–30, 379 Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789 (referring to "claims 
based upon unjust enrichment" and referring to "action[s] for 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
5 
 
recovery based upon unjust enrichment"); Admiral Ins. Co. v. 
Paper 
Converting 
Machine 
Co., 
2012 
WI 
30, 
¶¶49–50, 
339 
Wis. 2d 291, 811 N.W.2d 351 (describing unjust enrichment as a 
theory of recovery and as a claim); Watts v. Watts, 137 
Wis. 2d 506, 530, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987) (stating that unjust 
enrichment is a "theory of recovery" and describing it as a 
stand-alone 
cause 
of 
action); 
Lawlis 
v. 
Thompson, 
137 
Wis. 2d 490, 496, 405 N.W.2d 317 (1987) (describing unjust 
enrichment as "a well-recognized and long-accepted theory in 
Wisconsin jurisprudence," and referring to it as "a cause of 
action"); Puttkammer v. Minth, 83 Wis. 2d 686, 688–89, 266 
N.W.2d 361 (1978) (referring to unjust enrichment as a "cause of 
action" and considering whether the plaintiff stated a claim for 
relief for unjust enrichment). 
¶50 "[A]n action for recovery based upon unjust enrichment 
is grounded on the moral principle that one who has received a 
benefit has a duty to make restitution where retaining such a 
benefit would be unjust."  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 530 (citing 
Puttkammer, 83 Wis. 2d at 689).  In a cause of action for unjust 
enrichment, "the focus is on the benefit received by one party 
from the other party which would be inequitable to retain."  
Sands, 
379 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶41 
(citing 
Boldt 
v. 
State, 
101 
Wis. 2d 566, 573, 305 N.W.2d 133 (1981)).  To succeed on an 
unjust enrichment claim and thus be entitled to restitution, a 
plaintiff must show "(1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by 
the plaintiff; (2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of 
the benefit; and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
6 
 
the defendant under circumstances making it inequitable to do 
so."  See Sands, 379 Wis. 2d 1, ¶30 (citing Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 
at 531); see also Wis. JI-Civil 3028 (2016). 
¶51 While unjust enrichment is undoubtedly a cause of 
action, a constructive trust is but one method of providing 
restitution to a party who succeeds on an unjust enrichment 
claim and it has its own elements.  Although Wisconsin courts 
have not always been precise and uniform when describing a 
constructive trust, today we clarify that that a constructive 
trust is a remedy and not an independent cause of action.  We 
decline to extend here the doctrine of unjust enrichment under a 
third-party beneficiary theory so to create a constructive trust 
as a remedy for Tikalsky when no viable cause of action has been 
pled. 
¶52 "A constructive trust is an equitable device used to 
prevent unjust enrichment which arises when a party receives a 
benefit the retention of which is unjust to another party."  
Sulzer, 263 Wis. 2d 496, ¶20 (citing Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d at 
678-79).  Put differently, where unjust enrichment occurs, a 
constructive trust may be imposed as a remedy to ensure that an 
unjustly received benefit goes to the proper party.  However, a 
constructive trust is not always the automatic remedy when 
unjust enrichment has been proven.  This court has stated that 
the conditions precedent for such a constructive trust to be 
imposed are "(1) unjust enrichment and (2) abuse of a 
confidential relationship or some other form of unconscionable 
conduct."  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533–34.  Thus, a constructive 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
7 
 
trust might or might not be the proper remedy even when unjust 
enrichment is proven.  
¶53 This court has stated that circuit courts may impose a 
constructive trust in cases of "'actual or constructive fraud, 
duress, abuse of confidence, mistake, commission of a wrong, or 
by any form of unconscionable conduct,'" and only where "the one 
against whom the trust is imposed 'has either obtained or holds 
the legal title to property which he ought not in equity and in 
good conscience beneficially enjoy.'"  Gorski v. Gorski, 82 
Wis. 2d 248, 254–55, 262 N.W.2d 120 (1978) (quoting Bautista v. 
Schneider, 16 Wis. 2d 304, 312, 114 N.W.2d 449 (1962)).  Thus, 
as our jurisprudence reflects, no stand-alone cause of action 
exists for a constructive trust, and a constructive trust remedy 
will not be imposed absent successful prosecution of a viable 
cause of action and then the elements of constructive trust must 
be proven.  In this case, the relationship between unjust 
enrichment and a constructive trust is that of a cause of action 
and a remedy, not that of two independent causes of action.   
¶54 As a practical matter, consider for example, how a 
defense might ever be mounted to a request for a constructive 
trust if no cause of action exists to defend against.  If a 
constructive trust were to be considered a stand-alone cause of 
action, an asset-holder would be left with no defense or role 
other than to possibly assist in the defense of those against 
whom a claim has been made.  The asset-holder's property would 
be held hostage, subject to the will and decisions of those who 
are able to mount a defense, despite the fact that plaintiff 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
8 
 
asserts no claim or wrongdoing against the asset-holder.  It is 
most incongruous that one be a party to litigation simply 
because a plaintiff would prefer to, if successful, collect one 
person's property by a constructive trust rather than that of 
the parties for which liability is alleged.3  As highlighted by 
                                                 
3 I recognize that this court has imposed a constructive 
trust on innocent beneficiaries who engaged in no wrongdoing, 
but those cases have been limited to situations where a 
plaintiff has established a right to the innocent party's 
property due to an existing court order, contract, or a 
confidential relationship.  See Sulzer v. Diedrich, 2003 WI 90, 
¶¶26-30, 263 Wis. 2d 496, 664 N.W.2d 641 (imposing constructive 
trust where retirement benefits were not properly divided 
pursuant to divorce judgment due to mutual mistake); Wilharms v. 
Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d 671, 679–81, 287 N.W.2d 779 (1980) (holding 
that constructive trust may be imposed where divorced husband 
changed life insurance beneficiary designation to dispose of his 
ex-wife's interest in violation of a temporary court order, but 
remanding for further factual determination); Prince v. Bryant, 
87 Wis. 2d 662, 672–75, 275 N.W.2d 676 (1979) (stating that a 
constructive trust may be imposed where a divorced husband 
removed his ex-wife as a named beneficiary of his life insurance 
policies in violation of temporary court order, but remanding 
for further findings of fact on the issue); Richards v. 
Richards, 
58 
Wis. 2d 290, 
296–99, 
206 
N.W.2d 134 
(1973) 
(imposing constructive trust where divorced husband changed 
beneficiary of life insurance policy to the defendant in 
violation of divorce judgment); Bautista v. Schneider, 16 
Wis. 2d 304, 
312–14, 
114 
N.W.2d 449 
(1962) 
(imposing 
constructive trust to require divorced wife to return proceeds 
from bonds to her ex-husband's estate in conformity with their 
divorce judgment).  However, where no judgment, contract, or 
confidential relationship has been violated, this court has also 
declined to impose a constructive trust where the defendant 
engaged in no "fraud, duress, abuse of confidence, mistake, 
commission 
of 
a 
wrong 
or 
'any 
form 
of 
unconscionable 
conduct[,]'" and where the plaintiff established no right to the 
defendant's property.  Schmalz v. McKenna, 58 Wis. 2d 220, 231, 
206 N.W.2d 141 (1973) (declining to impose constructive trust 
where decedent added $10,000 bequest to defendant pursuant to a 
contract but defendant breached contract prior to decedent's 
death, because the will did not reference or depend on the 
contract and defendant engaged in no wrongdoing); see also 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
9 
 
the majority, nearly 40 jurisdictions have rejected such a 
proposition, holding that a constructive trust is a remedy and 
not a cause of action.  See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh v. DiMucci, 34 N.E.3d 1023, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) 
("We first note that a constructive trust is a remedy, not a 
cause of action."); Keeling v. Keeling, 145 So. 3d 763, 769 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2014) ("[A] constructive trust is an equitable 
remedy; and a request to impose such a trust is not a cause of 
action that will stand independent of some wrongdoing."); 
Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428, 437 (Colo. App. 2011) 
(citation omitted) ("[A] constructive trust, being a remedy to 
prevent unjust enrichment, is not to be pled as a separate cause 
of action . . . .").  
                                                                                                                                                             
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Merkel, 90 Wis. 2d 126, 
132–34, 279 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1979) (declining to impose 
constructive trust where divorced husband removed his ex-wife as 
a named beneficiary of his life insurance policy because no 
judgment 
or 
contract 
was 
violated). 
 
A 
"confidential 
relationship" in the context of constructive trust cases 
involves more than the presence of a familial relationship 
alone, as there must be "other facts indicating a relation of 
confidence" for a constructive trust to be imposed.  Gorski v. 
Gorski, 82 Wis. 2d 248, 256–58, 262 N.W.2d 120 (1978) (denying 
defendant's motion to dismiss and stating that a constructive 
trust may be imposed where the defendant retained funds his 
brother-roommate gave him over a period of 12 years in violation 
of an oral agreement, as the facts alleged indicated a close and 
"confidential relationship" between the parties); see also Meyer 
v. Ludwig, 65 Wis. 2d 280, 285–88, 222 N.W.2d 679 (1974) 
(imposing constructive trust to convey title to a house to 
defendant, where defendant made substantial improvements over a 
period of years on the house her parents promised to give her, 
and where the facts established a confidential relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendant, who were father and 
daughter and who lived on the same property for years and 
provided each other mutual support and assistance). 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
10 
 
¶55 By way of analogy, the remedy of a constructive trust 
operates similar to the remedy of punitive damages.  The remedy 
of punitive damages does not independently exist as a claim and 
in fact, is not provided for unless compensatory damages are 
first awarded.  Wisconsin law is clear that a party may not be 
awarded punitive damages without a viable underlying cause of 
action and a compensatory award.  See Groshek v. Trewin, 2010 WI 
51, ¶30, 325 Wis. 2d 250, 784 N.W.2d 163; Tucker v. Marcus, 142 
Wis. 2d 425, 440–41, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988); Hanson v. Valdivia, 
51 Wis. 2d 466, 474, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 895.043 allows punitive damages only where "evidence is 
submitted showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward 
the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of 
the plaintiff."  § 895.043(3).   
¶56 To seek either a constructive trust or punitive 
damages, a party must first succeed on an underlying cause of 
action.  If the party does not succeed on an underlying cause of 
action, then it is not entitled to any relief, and neither 
punitive damages nor a constructive trust may be sought.  Simply 
stated, neither are stand-alone causes of action.4 
                                                 
4 Punitive damages were available as a common law remedy. 
Since Wis. Stat. § 895.043(3) was created in 1995, Wisconsin 
courts have explained that punitive damages are a remedy, not a 
cause of action.  See Fouts v. Breezy Point Condo. Ass'n, 2014 
WI App 77, ¶23 n.2, 355 Wis. 2d 487, 851 N.W.2d 845 ("We observe 
that Fouts' complaint incorrectly frames his request for 
punitive damages as a separate cause of action."); Hansen v. 
Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 2013 WI App 2, ¶21, 345 Wis. 2d 669, 827 
N.W.2d 99 ("Punitive damages are a remedy, not a cause of 
action.").  Even prior to the creation of § 895.043, this court 
emphasized that punitive damages were a remedy and not a cause 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP170.akz 
 
11 
 
¶57 Turning to the case at hand, the majority correctly 
concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim against 
Stevens because the only remaining claim against her——here, 
unjust enrichment——was dismissed.  Since no claim exists against 
Stevens, the imposition of a remedy, a constructive trust, is 
not allowable under the law.  Tikalsky does not argue that the 
complaint otherwise states an alternative cause of action not 
specifically pled.  As a result, a constructive trust cannot be 
imposed with respect to Stevens.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals was incorrect to conclude that a constructive trust 
could be sought against Stevens without the existence of a 
viable cause of action against her. 
¶58 While I join the majority, I write separately to 
highlight the distinction between a cause of action——here, 
unjust enrichment——and the remedy sought——here, a constructive 
trust. 
¶59 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
of action.  In Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 431, 369 
N.W.2d 677 (1985), this court stated "that the availability of a 
punitive damage award is not dependent upon the classification 
of the underlying cause of action, but, rather, upon proof of 
the requisite 'outrageous' conduct" (footnote omitted).  This 
court further "stress[ed] that punitive damages are in the 
nature of a remedy and should not be confused with the concept 
of a cause of action."  Id. 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶60 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
question presented is whether Terry Stevens (Terry), one of four 
children of Donald and Betty Lou Tikalsky, is properly joined in 
this action to recover property from her that she received from 
her parents through what is alleged to be tortious conduct by 
Susan Friedman (Susan) and James Tikalsky (James), two other 
children of Donald and Betty Lou.  Because I conclude that 
J. Steven Tikalsky (Steven) has made a sufficient claim against 
Terry, which if proved would warrant the imposition of a 
constructive trust on some of the property she received from the 
estate of Donald and Betty Lou, for which claim Terry did not 
make an evidentiary, prima facie case for dismissal, and for 
which Steven provided sufficient evidentiary support to create 
material issues of fact, I would affirm the court of appeals' 
reversal of the circuit court's summary judgment, and I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
I.  BACKGROUND1 
¶61 The majority opinion ably sets forth the circumstances 
from which Steven's claims arise; therefore, I will relate here 
only what is necessary for the reader to understand the 
following discussion.  In 1999, Donald and Betty Lou's estate 
planning documents divided their property equally among their 
four children.  In 2007, Donald and Betty Lou revised those 
documents specifically to exclude Steven and Steven's children 
from any inheritance.  Although some of the estate planning 
                                                 
1 The factual assertions that follow are either uncontested 
facts or shown as allegations from Steven's complaint. 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
2 
 
documents were revised in 2008 and 2009, they continued to 
exclude Steven and his children from any inheritance from Donald 
and Betty Lou.   
¶62 Donald died in 2009, five months after he and Betty 
Lou made the final revision to their estate plan.  It is the 
difference in Steven's inheritance in Donald and Betty Lou's 
1999 estate plan and the estate plan finalized in 2009 that 
Steven alleges was caused by Susan's and James' tortious 
influence of his parents' decision making.   
¶63 Betty Lou died in 2014, and in 2015, Steven filed the 
action now before us.  Steven alleged, among other claims, that 
Susan and James intentionally exerted undue influence over 
Donald 
and 
Betty 
Lou 
and 
interfered 
with 
his 
expected 
inheritance by arranging the preparation and execution of his 
parents' wills and the changes to their trust documents that 
excluded Steven and his children.  The complaint also alleged a 
claim for unjust enrichment against Terry.2  Steven voluntarily 
dismissed that claim, so it is not before us.  However, 
dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim did not dismiss the 
factual allegations that preceded or followed that label as they 
                                                 
2 The elements of unjust enrichment are:  (1) a benefit 
conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) knowledge by 
the defendant of the benefit; and (3) acceptance and retention 
of the benefits by the defendant under circumstances making it 
inequitable to do so.  Puttkammer v. Minth, 83 Wis. 2d 686, 688-
89, 266 N.W.2d 361 (1978).  The benefit that Terry retains was 
not conferred by Steven, but by her parents; therefore, 
dismissal of the claim for unjust enrichment was reasonable.  
See also Estate of Lade v. Ketter, 82 Wis. 2d 80, 85, 260 N.W.2d 
665 (1978). 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
3 
 
were incorporated by reference into subsequent portions of the 
complaint.    
¶64 Furthermore, 
the 
allegations 
in 
the 
complaint 
incorporate Terry as participating in rewards from Susan's and 
James' allegedly tortious conduct.  For example, the complaint 
alleges that "[b]ut not for Susan and James' conduct described 
above, Donald and Betty Lou would have left a legacy to Steven 
equal to that of the legacy left to each of their other three 
issue."3  The complaint goes on to state that "Susan and James' 
false and fraudulent representations and conduct described above 
resulted in a benefit being conferred upon Susan, James and 
Terry by making them each one-third beneficiaries of Donald and 
Betty 
Lou's 
joint 
estate 
plan 
rather 
than 
one-fourth 
beneficiaries along with Steven."4  The complaint alleges that 
Terry was aware of Susan's and James' conduct and that she 
benefitted from it.  For example, the complaint states, "Susan, 
James and Terry had knowledge of and appreciation of the 
benefit;"5 and "Susan, James and Terry accepted and retained the 
benefit under circumstances that make it inequitable for them to 
retain the benefit."6   
¶65 The complaint also alleges that by retaining a one-
third interest in her parents' estate, Terry was a participant 
                                                 
3 Complaint, ¶123.   
4 Complaint, ¶133. 
5 Complaint, ¶134. 
6 Complaint, ¶135.   
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
4 
 
along with Susan and James in converting property to their own 
use that Steven claims should have been his.  The complaint 
alleges that "[t]he funds that constituted a one-quarter share 
in Donald and Betty Lou's joint estate plan and were converted[7] 
from Steven to the defendants were at all times after the 
conversion held by the defendants in constructive trust for 
Steven."8   
¶66 Steven prayed for relief that included a declaration 
that all estate planning documents executed in 2009 are invalid; 
that assets of his parents' estate be returned, except for 
payment of debt, taxes and administrative expenses; that trust 
property be returned pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 701.0604 (2017-
18);9 and a judgment issued against Susan, James and Terry in an 
amount to be determined at trial that is sufficient to award him 
a one-quarter interest in his parents' estate.    
¶67 The circuit court granted summary judgment on Steven's 
claim of undue influence10 and his request for a constructive 
                                                 
7 Black's Law Dictionary defines "conversion" as "[t]he 
wrongful possession or disposition of another's property as if 
it were one's own."  Black's Law Dictionary, 381 (9th ed. 2009).  
It is in that form that "conversion" is alleged against Terry in 
Steven's complaint. 
8 Complaint, ¶143.   
9 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
10 Whether the claim for undue influence (Steven's second 
claim) was properly dismissed is not before us.  The dismissal 
was not a final judgment with regard to Susan and James or 
Steven; therefore, Steven had no right to appeal its dismissal, 
and he could not bring it to us.  Wis. Stat. § 808.03.  The 
majority opinion errs when it relies on Steven's not appealing 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
5 
 
trust.  The circuit court also dismissed Terry from the lawsuit, 
with prejudice.  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that 
Steven had made sufficient allegations, which had not been set 
aside by Terry, to permit the remedy of constructive trust to be 
applied against property held by Susan, James and Terry if 
Steven prevailed at trial.11 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶68 The majority opinion gets mired down in deciding 
whether constructive trust is a claim or a remedy.  It concludes 
that constructive trust is a remedy, a conclusion with which I 
agree.  However, that determination is not the question on which 
the outcome of Steven's allegations against Terry turns.  
Rather, a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy if Susan, 
James and Terry have converted property obtained from their 
parents' estate that would have been devised to Steven but for 
wrongful influence over Donald and Betty Lou.   
A.  Standard of Review 
¶69 Steven seeks the equitable remedy of a constructive 
trust.  Whether to impose a constructive trust is a two-step 
process.  Sulzer v. Diedrich, 2003 WI 90, ¶16, 263 Wis. 2d 496, 
664 N.W.2d 641.  In the first step, we independently review 
                                                                                                                                                             
the dismissal of his claim for undue influence and states that 
the "only remaining cause of action" is the claim of intentional 
interference with expected inheritance.  Majority op., ¶29.   
11 Tikalsky v. Stevens, No. 2017AP170, ¶16, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 30, 2018).   
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
6 
 
whether a constructive trust could be imposed on property of the 
defendants.  Id. 
¶70 We also independently review the court of appeals' 
reversal of the circuit court's summary judgment dismissing 
Terry, while benefitting from discussions of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court.  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate 
Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶15, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.   
B.  Constructive Trust 
¶71 A constructive trust could be imposed if Steven proves 
that the wrongful influences of Susan and James caused the 
division of his parents' estate into three, rather than four 
shares and that Susan, James and Terry each received property 
that they converted to their own use that in equity should have 
been devised to him.  Wilharms v. Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d 671, 678-
79, 287 N.W.2d 779 (1980).   
¶72 A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that a 
court may impose to prevent the retention of property that was 
obtained 
by 
fraud 
or 
by 
the 
abuse 
of 
a 
confidential 
relationship.  Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, Inc., 2000 WI 
App 258, ¶13, 240 Wis. 2d 23, 621 N.W.2d 669.  "In the 
constructive trust case, the defendant has legal rights in 
something that in good conscience belongs to the plaintiff."  
Id., ¶14 (citing 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(1), at 
587-88 (2d ed. 1993)).  "It is not necessary that the person 
against whom the constructive trust is to be imposed be the 
wrongdoer or know of wrongdoing initially."  Ross, 240 Wis. 2d 
23, ¶15.  Rather, a constructive trust will in equity follow the 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
7 
 
property or the proceeds from the property that was obtained by 
wrongful means.  Id., ¶16.  
¶73 The 
complaint 
alleges 
that 
"[t]he 
funds 
that 
constituted a one-quarter share in Donald and Betty Lou's joint 
estate plan and were converted from Steven to the defendants 
were at all times after the conversion held by the defendants in 
constructive trust for Steven."12  "[A] complaint states a claim 
in conversion when it alleges that the plaintiff is 'entitled to 
immediate possession' of a 'chattel' over which the defendant 
had wrongfully retained dominion or control."  Methodist Manor 
of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 2002 WI App 130, ¶7, 255 Wis. 2d 
707, 647 N.W.2d 409.  "An action for conversion is bottomed upon 
a tortious interference with possessory rights."  Id.   
¶74 Steven alleges that the wrongful conduct of Susan and 
James resulted in invalid estate planning documents for Donald 
and Betty Lou, thereby permitting Susan, James and Terry to 
convert to their own use property, which absent Susan's and 
James' wrongful conduct, would have been his.  If Steven 
prevails at trial, a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy 
to impose on property that Terry possessed and converted to her 
own use, just as it is for property Susan and James possessed 
and converted.  Furthermore, even though imposing a constructive 
trust on property held by an innocent recipient may require 
"[a]dditional factors," abuse of a confidential relationship is 
such a factor.  Prince v. Bryant, 87 Wis. 2d 662, 667, 275 
                                                 
12 Complaint, ¶143.   
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 676 (1979).  Steven alleges abuse of parent-child 
relationships, certainly they are confidential relationships.   
C.  Summary Judgment 
¶75 Terry was granted summary judgment of dismissal, with 
prejudice, which the court of appeals reversed.  When reviewing 
summary judgment, Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) is our guide.  We apply 
the same methodology as the circuit court and court of appeals.  
Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 2005 WI 113, ¶5, 283 Wis. 2d 
606, 699 N.W.2d 189.  We first examine the complaint to 
determine whether it states a claim, and then we review the 
answer to determine whether it joins a material issue of fact or 
law.  Ande v. Rock, 2002 WI App 136, ¶8, 256 Wis. 2d 365, 647 
N.W.2d 265.  The label of a claim is not determinative; it is 
the factual allegations that drive whether the complaint states 
a claim for relief.  Strid v. Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 418, 422-23, 
331 N.W.2d 350 (1983).  If the complaint and answer join issue, 
we examine the moving party's evidentiary submissions to 
determine whether they establish a prima facie case for summary 
judgment on some or all of the issues joined by answer.  Ande, 
256 Wis. 2d 365, ¶8.  If they do, we consider the evidentiary 
submissions in opposition to summary judgment to determine 
whether there are issues of material fact that require a trial.  
Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶15.  Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there are no issues of material fact.  Linden, 283 
Wis. 2d 606, ¶5.    
¶76 In the matter before us, the allegations in the 
complaint state a claim for wrongful possession and conversion 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
9 
 
of property by Terry on which relief can be granted, and the 
answers join issues of fact and of law.  Methodist Manor, 255 
Wis. 2d 707, ¶7.  I do not discuss all the claims because only 
Terry has been dismissed from the lawsuit.   
¶77 Steven's claims against Terry are that she obtained 
possession of property from Donald and Betty Lou, some of which 
should have belonged to him, and thereby benefitted from the 
tortious acts of Susan and James.  Stated otherwise, Steven 
claims Terry converted property to her own use that should have 
been devised to him.  Although Steven's allegations could have 
been more particularized, they give fair notice of the gravamen 
of his claims against Terry.  As we have explained in regard to 
wrongful conversion, "[t]he gravamen of the action is the 
wrongful conversion, to which the possession is matter of 
inducement.  The action does not rest upon the fraudulent nature 
of the possession, but upon the subsequent tortious conversion."  
Kalckhoff v. Zoehrlaut, 40 Wis. 427, 430-31 (1876).  Therefore, 
if one is in possession of property which in equity should 
belong to another and the possessor puts that property to his or 
her own use, the possessor has converted property of another.  
Id. 
¶78 Although Terry's answer denies the factual allegations 
and legal claims made in Steven's complaint, she makes no 
evidentiary offer of proof by affidavit or otherwise sufficient 
to show a prima facie case for summary judgment dismissing 
Steven's claim against her for possession and subsequent 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
10 
 
conversion of property that should have belonged to him.13  
Therefore, she has made no evidentiary showing that if Steven is 
able to prove the factual allegations in his complaint, that a 
constructive trust is not an equitable remedy that should attach 
to some of the property she received from Donald and Betty Lou.  
Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d at 678-79.   
¶79 One also could argue that Terry is an indispensable 
party to this action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b).14  To 
explain further, Terry was dismissed with prejudice.  Therefore, 
if that judgment stands and Steven prevails at trial, the court 
may be without power to affect the property Terry received from 
her parents; and therefore, Susan's and James' property will be 
subject to recovery for the full amount of Steven's one-third 
share, while Terry's property will not be affected by the final 
                                                 
13 The majority opinion mistakenly concludes that "Steven 
voluntarily dismissed" his allegations of wrongful possession 
that led to conversion of the property.  Majority op., ¶35.  
That never happened.  Steven's dismissal of his claim of unjust 
enrichment against Terry does not negate all the factual 
allegations in the complaint or the affidavits that Steven 
submitted in opposition to Susan's, James' and Terry's motions 
for summary judgment.   
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)2. provides:  "PERSONS TO 
BE JOINED IF FEASIBLE.  A person who is subject to service of 
process shall be joined as a party in the action if: . . . . 
(b) The person claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in the person's absence may: . . . . 
2.  Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of his or her claimed 
interest. 
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
11 
 
judgment 
on 
Steven's 
claims.15 
 
No 
party 
has 
raised 
§ 803.03(1)(b)2. so I go no further with it except to note its 
interest.  
¶80 The majority opinion errs because it does not complete 
the requisite analysis for summary judgment, and in so doing 
repeats the error of the circuit court.  For example, the 
majority opinion relies on a circuit court's finding of fact 
that "the defendants had nothing to do with the 'orchestration 
and preparation' of the Tikalskys' estate planning documents."16  
That factual determination was erroneously made on a motion for 
summary judgment.  Summary judgment is appropriate only when 
there are no disputes of material fact.  Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 
606, ¶5.  All one has to do is review the record to learn that 
Steven had a story to tell that is the opposite of what his 
sisters and brother told.  See Affidavit of J. Steven Tikalsky 
(R. 47);17 Affidavit of John R. Pankraz (R 40);18 Affidavit of 
                                                 
15 All three defendants are represented by the same attorney 
in this matter.  Therefore, if counsel were to prevail on his 
arguments in favor of Terry and lose at trial, Susan and James 
could be adversely affected by his representation of Terry.   
16 Majority op., ¶29 n.21. 
17 Steven's affidavit sets out a significant adult sibling 
rivalry imposed during the course of Donald's cognitive decline, 
including specific acts by Terry that fed into family discord 
when Donald and Betty Lou were no longer well equipped to 
address it.  He describes repeated acts of his siblings to 
preclude his access to both Donald and Betty Lou.  R. 47.  
18 John R. Pankraz averred that in 2006, it was apparent to 
him that Donald had suffered a "significant cognitive decline."  
R. 40, ¶8.  He said, "Don Tikalsky then stated 'the kids want me 
to sue Steven.'  The 'kids' referred to Steven Tikalsky's 
siblings, Terry, Jim and Susan."  R. 40, ¶11.  
No.  2017AP170.pdr 
 
12 
 
E. John Raasch (R. 39).19  Summary judgment is not a trial by 
affidavit, but that is what occurred at the circuit court.   
¶81 The court of appeals correctly overturned the circuit 
court's summary judgment dismissing Terry from this lawsuit.  
Steven's allegations are sufficient to give fair notice of his 
claims against Terry and any evidentiary showing that supports 
her position is controverted by the evidentiary showing Steven 
made.  Terry should proceed to trial along with Susan and James.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 Because I conclude that Steven has made a sufficient 
claim 
against 
Terry, 
which 
if 
proved 
would 
warrant 
the 
imposition of a constructive trust on some of the property she 
received from the estate of Donald and Betty Lou, for which 
claim Terry did not make an evidentiary prima facie case for 
dismissal, and for which Steven provided sufficient evidentiary 
support to create material issues of fact, I would affirm the 
court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's summary 
judgment, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
 
                                                 
19 E. John Raash avers that Steven and his father had a 
strong relationship for many years that began to falter after 
Donald retired and his mental health declined.  R. 39.   
No.  2017AP170.awb 
 
1 
 
¶83 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree in part 
with Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent.  Specifically, I agree 
that 
a 
constructive 
trust 
is 
a 
remedy, 
but 
that 
this 
determination is not the question on which this case turns.  See 
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶68.  I further agree that 
Steven may continue to pursue the remedy of a constructive 
trust.1  However, I do not join Chief Justice Roggensack's 
dissent because, like the majority opinion, it appears to 
conflate the imposition of a constructive trust on Terry's 
property with a claim against Terry herself.2 
                                                 
1 As the majority opinion does, I refer to the members of 
the Tikalsky family by their first names for the sake of 
clarity.  See majority op., ¶2. 
2 For example, Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent indicates 
that Steven has claims against Terry that remain.  Specifically, 
the dissent states, "Steven claims Terry converted property to 
her own use that should have been devised to him.  Although 
Steven's allegations could have been more particularized, they 
give fair notice of the gravamen of his claims against Terry."  
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶77; see also id., ¶76 ("In 
the matter before us, the allegations in the complaint states a 
claim for wrongful possession and conversion of property by 
Terry . . . .").  Contrary to this assertion, no causes of 
action against Terry remain.  What remains is the request for a 
constructive trust on Terry's property——not a claim against 
Terry as a party. 
Similarly, the majority tethers the imposition of a 
constructive trust over property in Terry's possession to the 
existence of a cause of action against Terry herself.  See 
majority op., ¶¶39-40.  Such a connection is not required by our 
case law.  See Wilharms v. Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d 671, 679, 287 
N.W.2d 779 (1980) ("It is not necessary that the person against 
whom the constructive trust is to be imposed be a wrongdoer or 
know of the wrongdoing initially.  If the other elements for 
imposing a constructive trust have been satisfied, and the 
holder of the legal title is not a bona fide purchaser, a 
constructive trust may be imposed."). 
No.  2017AP170.awb 
 
2 
 
¶84 Rather than focusing on any alleged conversion on 
Terry's part, I would follow the approach taken by the court of 
appeals.  That is, because the surviving cause of action for 
intentional 
interference 
with 
expected 
inheritance 
"would 
establish both elements necessary for a constructive trust, 
these elements remain for further adjudication."  Tikalsky v. 
Stevens, No. 2017AP170, unpublished slip op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. 
May 30, 2018).3 
¶85 A constructive trust is an equitable device that will 
be imposed in limited circumstances only.  Wilharms v. Wilharms, 
93 Wis. 2d 671, 678-79, 287 N.W.2d 779 (1980).  In order to 
impose a constructive trust, two elements must be fulfilled.  
First, "[t]he legal title must be held by someone who in equity 
and good conscience should not be entitled to beneficial 
enjoyment."  Id. at 679.  Second, "[t]itle must also have been 
obtained by means of actual or constructive fraud, duress, abuse 
of a confidential relationship, mistake, commission of a wrong, 
or by any form of unconscionable conduct."  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
¶86 As the court of appeals determined, "[w]ith respect to 
the first element of a constructive trust, Steven's allegations 
and supporting evidence raise material facts tending to show 
                                                 
3 Unlike the court of appeals, which utilized the cause of 
action for intentional interference with expected inheritance 
against Susan and James as a pathway to a constructive trust, 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
dissent 
bases 
a 
potential 
constructive trust on "a claim for wrongful possession and 
conversion of property by Terry . . . ."  See Chief Justice 
Roggensack's dissent, ¶76. 
No.  2017AP170.awb 
 
3 
 
that his siblings hold title to property that equity dictates 
should go to him."  Tikalsky, No. 2017AP170, unpublished slip 
op., ¶14.  "If proven, this claim would establish that all 
three siblings (including Terry) were unjustly enriched by an 
inheritance that would have gone——at least in part——to Steven."  
Id.  I agree. 
¶87 Likewise, 
sufficient 
allegations 
are 
stated 
with 
respect to the second element of a constructive trust.  The 
court of appeals explained: 
As 
to 
the 
second 
element, 
Steven's 
claim 
for 
intentional interference is sufficient to potentially 
establish that title to the inheritance was "obtained 
by means of actual or constructive fraud, duress, 
abuse 
of 
a 
confidential 
relationship, 
mistake, 
commission 
of 
a 
wrong, 
or 
by 
any 
form 
of 
unconscionable conduct."  As the circuit court noted, 
part of Steven's claim for intentional interference 
was that Susan and James made false statements and 
"innuendos" to Donald and Betty in an attempt to get 
the parents to disinherit Steven. 
Id., ¶15.  Similarly, I agree. 
¶88 The fact that Terry is not alleged to have committed 
any misconduct is irrelevant:  "It is not necessary that the 
person against whom the constructive trust is to be imposed be a 
wrongdoer or know of the wrongdoing initially.  If the other 
elements for imposing a constructive trust have been satisfied, 
and the holder of the legal title is not a bona fide purchaser, 
a constructive trust may be imposed."  Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d at 
679.  Thus, a constructive trust may be imposed on Terry's 
property even if there remain no active claims against her 
personally. 
No.  2017AP170.awb 
 
4 
 
¶89 Accordingly, I agree with the court of appeals that 
"[b]ecause Steven's claim for intentional interference would 
establish both elements necessary for a constructive trust, 
these elements remain for further adjudication."  Tikalsky, No. 
2017AP170, unpublished slip op., ¶16.  It correctly observed 
that Steven may continue to seek a constructive trust against 
Terry's property if he is able to establish two elements:  (1) 
"that she holds property that 'in equity and good conscience 
[she] should not be entitled to,'" and (2) "title to that 
property was 'obtained by means of actual or constructive fraud, 
duress, 
abuse 
of 
a 
confidential 
relationship, 
mistake, 
commission of a wrong, or by any form of unconscionable 
conduct.'"  Id. (citing Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d at 678-79). 
¶90 For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. 
¶91 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP170.awb 
 
1