Title: Heritage Mutual Insurance Company v. William E. Larsen
Citation: 2001 WI 30
Docket Number: 1998AP003577
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2001

2001 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3577 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company and Larsen 
Laboratories, Inc.,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
William E. Larsen and Labor and Industry Review 
Commission,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 525, 611 N.W.2d 470 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 4, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 31, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael G. Malmstadt 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX and SYKES, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Richard T. Mueller, John C. Possi and Mueller, 
Goss & Possi, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Richard T. 
Mueller. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, William E. Larsen, 
there was a brief by Robert T. Ward and Ward Law Firm, Waukesha, 
 
2 
and oral argument by Robert T. Ward. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Labor and Industry 
Review Commission, the cause was argued by Stephen M. Sobota, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. 
Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 30 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3577 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company and  
Larsen Laboratories, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners 
     v. 
 
William E. Larsen and Labor and Industry  
Review Commission,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals.1  The 
court of appeals affirmed an order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Michael Malmstadt, Judge.  The circuit court 
affirmed in part and reversed in part a decision of the Labor 
and 
Industry 
Review 
Commission 
(the 
Commission) 
awarding 
worker's compensation benefits to William E. Larsen for the 
partial amputation of his fingers and thumb, which were injured 
by frostbite. 
                     
1 Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Larsen, No. 98-3577, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 14, 2000) (per curiam). 
FILED 
 
APR 4, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The circuit court affirmed the Commission's decision 
to award worker's compensation benefits but reversed the 
Commission's 
decision 
regarding 
the 
15% 
reduction 
of 
compensation.  The court of appeals affirmed the order of the 
circuit court.  Heritage Mutual Insurance Company seeks review 
in this court.  We affirm both aspects of the Commission's 
decision. 
¶3 
On a cold winter day in 1996, Larsen was traveling to 
his northern Wisconsin mobile home, which doubled as a sales 
office.  He stopped on the way at a tavern and consumed several 
drinks after he had taken two diet pills.  Larsen later passed 
out trying to enter the mobile home, spent the night exposed to 
the below-zero temperatures, and suffered frostbite.  The 
employer and its insurance company (hereafter referred to 
together as Heritage Mutual) argue that they should not be 
liable in any way for the employee's injury. 
¶4 
The Commission, however, concluded that Larsen was 
entitled to compensation under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) (1997-
98)2 of the worker's compensation law as a traveling employee of 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) (1997-98) provides as 
follows: 
Every employe whose employment requires the employe to 
travel shall be deemed to be performing service 
growing out of and incidental to the employe's 
employment at all times while on a trip, except when 
engaged in a deviation for a private or personal 
purpose.  Acts reasonably necessary for living or 
incidental thereto shall not be regarded as such a 
deviation.  Any accident or disease arising out of a 
hazard of such service shall be deemed to arise out of 
the employe's employment. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
3 
Larsen Laboratories, Inc., because he was performing acts 
"reasonably necessary for living or incidental thereto" at the 
time of his injury.  The Commission further concluded that the 
award should be reduced by 15% under Wis. Stat. § 102.58 because 
Larsen's injury resulted from intoxication. 
¶5 
The present case must be viewed in the context of the 
worker's compensation law.  The worker's compensation law 
strikes a balance between the competing interests of employers 
and employees.  Although employers are liable for more injuries 
under worker's compensation law than under fault-based tort law, 
the amount of compensation employers must pay to injured 
employees is limited under worker's compensation, and employers 
are immune from employee tort actions.  In return for recovering 
for injury even when they are at fault, employees are awarded 
less money than they would recover in fault-based tort actions, 
and employees give up the right to bring tort actions against 
their employers.3  "Worker's compensation laws are basically 
economic regulations by which the legislature, as a matter of 
public policy, has balanced competing societal interests."4 
                                                                  
 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 See Bauernfeind v. Zell, 190 Wis. 2d 701, 713, 528 N.W.2d 
1 (1995). 
4 Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 180, 290 
N.W.2d 276 (1980). 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
4 
¶6 
Under Wisconsin worker's compensation law, employers 
are 
liable 
for 
work-related 
injuries 
that 
befall 
their 
employees, even if an employee is intoxicated.  Nearly sixty 
years ago the court recognized that "[t]he wisdom of a policy 
which permits drunken employees to recover even a diminished 
compensation, where the intoxication causes injury, may be 
arguable as an original proposition, but after all, this is a 
matter in which the legislative intention is clear and the 
legislative power is plenary."5  Therefore, under Wisconsin 
worker's compensation law, "[i]ntoxication does not defeat a 
workmen's compensation claim but only decreases the benefits."6 
¶7 
Furthermore, the legislature has authorized a state 
agency, the Labor and Industry Review Commission, to decide 
disputes between employers and employees relating to worker's 
compensation, and the legislature and our case law have limited 
judicial review of the Commission's decisions. 
¶8 
We conclude that the record contains substantial and 
credible evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact 
in this case.  We further conclude that the Commission's 
application of the law to this fact situation must be affirmed 
as a reasonable interpretation, even if this court might have 
decided the case differently. 
                     
5 Nutrine Candy Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 243 Wis. 52, 55-56, 9 
N.W.2d 94 (1943). 
6 Dibble v. ILHR Dep't, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 350, 161 N.W.2d 913 
(1968).  
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
5 
¶9 
Accordingly, we affirm that part of the order of the 
circuit court and that part of the decision of the court of 
appeals awarding Larsen benefits under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) 
as a traveling employee who was performing acts reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto at the time of 
injury.  We reverse that part of the order of the circuit court 
and that part of the decision of the court of appeals denying 
the 15% reduction ordered by the Commission under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.58 because Larsen's injury resulted from intoxication. 
 
I 
 
¶10 The Commission determined the following facts upon 
which it based its decision about awarding worker's compensation 
to Larsen. 
¶11 William E. Larsen worked in various capacities for 
Larsen Laboratories, Inc., a metals testing and analysis 
business owned by Larsen and his wife.  One of Larsen's 
functions within the business was sales, including phone calls 
and personal visits to potential customers. 
¶12 At approximately 12:30 p.m. on January 31, 1996, 
Larsen left the company's office in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, to 
make the 150-mile drive to Tigerton, Wisconsin, where he and his 
wife owned a mobile home that they sometimes used as a sales 
office.  Larsen intended to spend the night in the mobile home, 
do company paperwork there, and then make a sales call to a 
former customer the next day.  
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
6 
¶13 Upon arriving in Tigerton at about 3:30 p.m., Larsen 
stopped to buy liquor, groceries, and feed corn for deer.  He 
then proceeded to the local tavern.  He admitted having four to 
five mixed drinks there, over a period of approximately one hour 
and forty-five minutes.  The alcoholic beverages were in 
addition to a couple of Dexatrim diet pills Larsen had taken 
earlier that day.  After leaving the tavern, Larsen drove to his 
mobile home at approximately 6 p.m., intending to prepare dinner 
and work on sales matters.   
¶14 However, Larsen had difficulty opening the door to the 
mobile home, which was blocked by snow, and also had trouble 
getting his key to work.  He felt dizzy and suffered from a 
slight headache.  He broke a plastic window in the door, reached 
through the hole to open the door from the inside, and then lost 
consciousness.  When he woke up the next morning at about 8:45 
a.m., he was on the floor inside the trailer with the door open. 
 The outside temperature had been 25 below zero when Larsen 
reached 
the 
home, 
and 
Larsen 
suffered 
severe 
frostbite, 
resulting in the amputation of the fingers and thumb of both 
hands.   
¶15 The Commission concluded that Larsen's purpose in 
going to Tigerton was business-related and that Larsen was a 
traveling employee pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).  The 
Commission further determined that Larsen was injured while 
performing acts reasonably necessary for living or incidental 
thereto and was not engaged in a deviation for a private or a 
personal purpose at the time of injury.  According to the 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
7 
Commission, at the time of injury, Larsen was simply attempting 
to enter his domicile for the night, an act reasonably necessary 
for living.  
¶16 In reaching this conclusion, the Commission applied 
the "positional risk doctrine."  The positional risk doctrine is 
a body of law that is used to determine whether an accident 
causing injury arose out of employment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f).  Under the positional risk doctrine an injury is 
compensable if the injury would not have happened except that 
the employment put the claimant in the position where he was 
injured, that is, the employment put the employee in a zone of 
special danger.7 
¶17 According to the Commission, the zone of special 
danger to which Larsen was exposed in the present case was the 
extremely cold weather in Tigerton, and it was by reason of an 
employment activity (sheltering himself for the night while a 
traveling employee) that Larsen was exposed to this special 
danger. 
¶18 The determinative fact, the Commission wrote, was that 
Larsen was performing acts reasonably necessary to living when 
his injury occurred.  Even if the trip to the tavern was a 
deviation, wrote the Commission, the deviation ceased when 
Larsen returned to the home; at the time of injury he was 
                     
7 See, e.g., Weiss v. City of Milw., 208 Wis. 2d 95, 107, 559 
N.W.2d 588 (1997); Goranson v. ILHR Dep't, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 555-
57, 289 N.W.2d 270 (1980); Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 86, 62 N.W. 2d 567 (1954). 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
8 
entering his home, an act reasonably necessary for living.  Thus 
the 
Commission 
concluded 
that 
Larsen 
was 
entitled 
to 
compensation, reasoning as follows: 
 
Even were it to be found that the applicant had 
deviated from acts reasonably necessary for living by 
going to the tavern, a finding which the commission 
does not make, it would have to be found that the 
deviation had ceased by the time the applicant arrived 
at the trailer.  
¶19 The Commission inferred that Larsen's intoxication was 
a substantial factor in causing the frostbite "because it was 
probable that he remained asleep for such an extended period due 
in part to his intoxication."  Therefore the Commission reduced 
the worker's compensation award by 15%. 
 
II 
 
¶20 The first issue in this case is what standard of 
review this court should apply in reviewing the Commission's 
decision under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).  
¶21 The 
Commission's 
determination 
presents 
a 
mixed 
question of fact and law.  Thus two standards of review come 
into play.  
¶22 The 
Commission's 
determinations 
regarding 
the 
historical facts relating to Larsen's conduct and Larsen's 
purpose in traveling to Tigerton are findings of fact.   
¶23 The Commission's determination of whether Larsen was 
performing service growing out of and incidental to the 
employee's employment or was engaging in a deviation for a 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
9 
private or personal purpose raises questions of law.  Another 
question of law is whether the accident arose out of a hazard of 
such service.  
¶24 Judicial review of the Commission's findings of fact 
is significantly limited by statute.  First, the legislature has 
decreed that a court may not set aside an order or award unless 
"the findings of fact by the commission do not support the order 
or award."8  Second, the statutes provide that findings of fact 
made by the Commission acting within its powers shall, in the 
absence of fraud, be conclusive.9  Third, the statute instructs 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.23(1)(e) provides as follows:  
Upon such hearing, the court may confirm or set aside 
such order or award; and any judgment which may 
theretofore have been rendered thereon; but the same 
shall be set aside only upon the following grounds: 
 
    1. That the commission acted without or in excess 
of its powers. 
 
    2. That the order or award was procured by fraud. 
 
    3. That the findings of fact by the commission do 
not support the order or award. 
 
The only ground relevant in the present case for setting 
aside the Commission's award is § 102.23(1)(e)3. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) provides, inter alia: 
The findings of fact made by the commission acting 
within its powers shall, in the absence of fraud, be 
conclusive.  The order or award granting or denying 
compensation, either interlocutory or final, whether 
judgment has been rendered on it or not, is subject to 
review only as provided in this section and not under 
ch. 227 or s. 801.02. 
 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
10
that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commission as to the weight or credibility of the evidence on 
any finding of fact.  A court may set aside the Commission's 
order or award if the order or award depends on any material and 
controverted finding of fact that is not supported by credible 
and substantial evidence.10  The Commission's findings must be 
upheld even though they may be contrary to the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence.11 
¶25 The question of whether Larsen was performing service 
growing out of and incidental to the employee's employment, 
whether he was engaged in a deviation for a private and personal 
purpose, and whether the accident arose out of a hazard of such 
service involves an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) 
and an application of the statute to the facts in the present 
case.  Interpretation and application of statutes are questions 
of law.12  The court has recognized, however, that when the 
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.23(6) provides: 
If the commission's order or award depends on any fact 
found 
by 
the 
commission, 
the 
court 
shall 
not 
substitute its judgment for that of the commission as 
to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any 
finding of fact.  The court may, however, set aside 
the commission's order or award and remand the case to 
the commission if the commission's order or award 
depends on any material and controverted finding of 
fact that is not supported by credible and substantial 
evidence. 
 
11 Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 554. 
12 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. LIRC, 226 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 
595 N.W.2d 23 (1999); CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564, 572, 
579 N.W.2d 668 (1998). 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
11
legislature has vested a state agency with the administration of 
a statute, the agency's decision, although not controlling, is 
entitled to deference.13  We have previously stated that great 
weight deference is appropriate in the following circumstances: 
(1) the agency is charged by the legislature with 
administering the statute;  
(2) the interpretation of the agency is one of long 
standing;  
(3) the agency employed its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in forming the interpretation; and  
(4) the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity 
in the application of the statute.14 
¶26 
All these circumstances exist in the present case.  
The Commission is charged by the legislature with administering 
the worker's compensation law, the Commission's interpretation 
of the traveling employee statute is of long standing, the 
Commission employed its expertise in its interpretation of the 
statute, and the Commission's interpretation of the traveling 
                                                                  
Earlier cases indicated that the application of the statute 
to the facts was a question of fact and that the Commission's 
decision would be upheld if it was supported by credible and 
substantial evidence.  See, e.g., Hunter v. ILHR Dep't, 64 
Wis. 2d 97, 102, 218 N.W.2d 314 (1974).  In all of the cases, 
however, the court repeatedly stated that it would not set aside 
a Commission's decision unless the decision was unreasonable. 
13 This 
court 
reviews 
the 
Commission's 
determination 
independently of the court of appeals or circuit court, 
benefiting from their analysis.  West Bend Co. v. LIRC, 149 
Wis. 2d 110, 117, 438 N.W.2d 823 (1989). 
14 CBS, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 572. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
12
employee statute provides uniformity in the application of the 
traveling employee statute.15  Under these circumstances the 
court will give the Commission's application of the statute to 
the facts in this case great weight deference. 
¶27 Under the great weight deference standard of review, a 
court 
will 
uphold 
the 
Commission's 
interpretation 
and 
application of the statute to the facts found unless the 
interpretation is unreasonable.16  An unreasonable interpretation 
of a statute is one that directly contravenes the words of the 
statute, is clearly contrary to legislative intent, or is 
otherwise without rational basis.17 
¶28 Heritage Mutual asks this court to reconsider the 
appropriate standard of review and asks the court to subject the 
Commission to stricter judicial review.  We cannot do so.  
Section 102.23 of the statutes governing judicial review 
represents a considered legislative judgment that the Commission 
is the appropriate institution to make findings of fact, so long 
as credible and substantial evidence exists.  In keeping with 
Wis. Stat. § 102.23, we have concluded that in cases such as the 
one before us, the Commission's interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) will be given great weight 
deference and will be upheld so long as the Commission's 
                     
15 CBS, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 572-73. 
16 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 787; CBS, Inc., 
219 Wis. 2d at 572-73. 
17 CBS, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 573. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
13
decision is reasonable.  The legislative purpose in restricting 
judicial review in worker's compensation is to discourage 
litigation so as to attain speedy justice for the employee.18  
This court's standard of review is governed by this legislative 
purpose. 
 
III 
 
¶29 Heritage Mutual disputes the Commission's findings of 
fact that Larsen's purpose in traveling to Tigerton was to 
engage in a business trip for his employer.  In its brief to 
this court, Heritage Mutual refers to evidence that Larsen had a 
non-business purpose for traveling to Tigerton.  There is, 
however, competing evidence from which the Commission found that 
Larsen's purpose was to transact business.  
¶30 The Commission's finding of fact that Larsen's purpose 
was to engage in a business trip and that he was a traveling 
employee is supported by credible and substantial evidence.19  
Heritage Mutual is asking this court to substitute its judgment 
for that of the Commission as to the weight or credibility of 
the evidence on a finding of fact.  We are prohibited by statute 
from doing so. 
                     
18 Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 553; Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. 
ILHR Dep't, 76 Wis. 2d 210, 216, 251 N.W.2d 69 (1977); R.T. 
Madden v. ILHR Dep't, 43 Wis. 2d 528, 536, 169 N.W.2d 73 (1969). 
19 CBS, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 568 n.4. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
14
¶31 In reviewing the Commission's legal conclusion that 
Larsen was entitled to worker's compensation, we examine Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).  Section 102.03(1)(f) provides that every 
traveling employee is covered for worker's compensation purposes 
at all times while on a trip, including all acts reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto, except when engaged 
in a deviation for a private or personal purpose.  The statute 
reads as follows: 
102.03 (1) Liability under this chapter shall exist 
against 
an 
employer 
only 
where 
the 
following 
conditions occur: 
 
. . .  
 
(c) Where, at the time of the injury, the employe is 
performing service growing out of and incidental to 
his or her employment. 
 
. . .  
 
(e) Where the accident or disease causing injury 
arises out of the employe's employment. 
 
(f) 
Every 
employe 
whose 
employment requires the 
employe to travel shall be deemed to be performing 
service growing out of and incidental to the employe's 
employment at all times while on a trip, except when 
engaged in a deviation for a private or personal 
purpose.  Acts reasonably necessary for living or 
incidental thereto shall not be regarded as such a 
deviation.  Any accident or disease arising out of a 
hazard of such service shall be deemed to arise out of 
the employe's employment. 
¶32 The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) is to give 
traveling employees broader protection when their employment 
causes them to be away from home.20  As this court has often 
                     
20 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 788; CBS, Inc., 
219 Wis. 2d at 579. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
15
noted, after the court had denied compensation for injuries 
arising from normal living activities of traveling employees, 
the legislature enacted the traveling employee provision in 
order to expand protections for traveling employees.21  The 
statute must be liberally construed to afford coverage for all 
services that can be reasonably said to come within it.22 
¶33 The statute creates a presumption that a traveling 
employee is performing services incidental to employment at all 
times during the business trip.23  In order to rebut the 
statutory presumption, the employer must show both that the 
employee deviated from the business trip and that the deviation 
was for a private or personal purpose that was not reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto.24 
¶34 The Commission concluded that even if Larsen's trip to 
the tavern was a deviation from the business trip for a personal 
purpose, the deviation ceased by the time he arrived at the 
mobile home.  The extreme cold weather in Tigerton was a zone of 
special danger to which Larsen was exposed by reason of an 
employment activity, according to the Commission. 
                     
21 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 788; Hansen v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 258 Wis. 623, 628, 46 N.W.2d 754 (1951).  
22 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 792; CBS, Inc., 
219 Wis. 2d at 579. 
23 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 788-89; CBS, 
Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 578-79. 
24 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 789-90. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
16
¶35 Applying the great weight deference standard, the 
question for this court is whether the Commission's application 
of the statute to the facts in the present case is reasonable. 
¶36 
The law is clear that an employee is not covered under 
the worker's compensation law if injured during a deviation.  
The law is equally clear that an employee who has deviated will 
be covered under the worker's compensation law once the employee 
resumes activities that are reasonably necessary to living.  In 
Lager v. ILHR Department, 50 Wis. 2d 651, 661, 185 N.W.2d 300 
(1971), this court expressed this position as follows: 
 
It is clear, as a matter of law, that, in the event a 
salesman commences travel in the course of his 
employment 
and 
subsequently 
deviates 
from 
that 
employment but later resumes his route which he would 
have to follow in the pursuance of his employer's 
business, 
the 
deviation 
has 
ceased 
and 
he 
is 
performing services incidental to and growing out of 
his employment.25 
¶37 
Whether Larsen's multiple drinks at the local tavern 
are a deviation for purely personal purposes not reasonably 
necessary to living or incidental thereto is irrelevant in this 
case 
because 
Larsen, unlike 
the 
claimant-employees 
denied 
benefits 
in 
other 
worker's 
compensation 
cases 
involving 
intoxication, was not injured while at the tavern or while on 
the road coming from or going to the tavern.  In contrast, 
Larsen was injured at his mobile home, when he struggled in the 
cold to open the door and lost consciousness. 
                     
25 See also Olson v. Indus. Comm'n, 273 Wis. 272, 275-76, 77 
N.W.2d 410 (1956); Nutrine Candy Co., 243 Wis. at 56. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
17
¶38 The Commission concluded that by the time Larsen was 
attempting to enter his mobile home, he was engaged in an act 
that was reasonably necessary to living or incidental thereto.  
The deviation, if any, had concluded, wrote the Commission, and 
Larsen had resumed the route that he would have to follow in the 
pursuit of his employer's business. 
¶39 Granting the Commission's decision the great weight 
deference due it, we affirm the decision as did the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  It is reasonable.  The Commission's 
decision does not directly contravene the words of the statute. 
 It is not clearly contrary to legislative intent.  It 
represents a rational conclusion based upon factual findings 
supported 
by 
credible 
and 
substantial 
evidence. 
 
The 
Commission's decision is consistent with the legislative intent 
to give traveling employees broader protection when working away 
from home.26 
¶40 Heritage Mutual seems to argue that Larsen's stop at 
the tavern and his resulting intoxication were such that the 
deviation continued even upon Larsen's return to his mobile 
home, his business site while traveling.  Heritage Mutual urges 
this court to reverse the Commission's conclusion by imposing an 
outer limit on an employee's ability to resume his employment 
following a substantial deviation.  It refers this court to a 
decision of the Michigan supreme court, in which that court 
stated that the right to coverage is not a "blank check" that 
                     
26 CBS, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 579. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
18
the deviating employee may "cash" at any time no matter how 
extensive the deviation.  Under the reasoning of the Michigan 
supreme court, a significant deviation may break the employment 
nexus.27 
¶41 In applying worker's compensation statutes, this court 
has declined to set forth a bright-line rule regarding when a 
deviation will break the employment nexus.  See Van Roy v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d 416, 425-26, 92 N.W.2d 818 (1958). 
 Rather than adopt a bright-line rule barring recovery based on 
the time or distance of the deviation, this court concluded that 
variations in the nature and setting of employment call for a 
case-by-case inquiry.  Id. at 425-26. 
¶42 In the present case, the Commission concluded that, if 
a deviation had occurred, the business trip resumed when Larsen 
was at the home; therefore, no break in the nexus of employment 
occurred.  This decision is reasonable. 
¶43 Finally, Heritage Mutual argues that even if Larsen 
was engaged in an employment activity at the time of his injury, 
his injury was caused by factors that were purely personal to 
him.  Thus Heritage Mutual is arguing that the accident did not 
arise out of a hazard of his service under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f).  Heritage Mutual urges this court to reverse the 
Commission's determination based on the evidence of Larsen's 
intoxication.  We conclude, however, that the Commission acted 
                     
27 See Bush v. Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 320 
N.W.2d 858, 865 (Mich. 1982). 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
19
reasonably in light of the legislative determination that 
intoxication reduces, but does not necessarily eliminate, an 
employee's recovery.  Wis. Stat. § 102.58.  
¶44 In 
Wisconsin, 
unlike 
several 
other 
states,28 
intoxication does not bar a worker's compensation award.  
Instead, the legislature has instructed the Commission to reduce 
a worker's compensation award by 15% if the injury resulted from 
intoxication.29  Section 102.58 represents the legislature's 
judgment 
regarding 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
an 
employee's 
intoxication should affect recovery under worker's compensation.  
¶45 Evidence 
of 
intoxication 
is 
relevant 
to 
the 
determination of whether the employee was engaged in a deviation 
at the time of injury.  The Commission may, however, determine 
                     
28 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 50—6—110(a) (2000) (denying 
compensation where injury is due to intoxication); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 4123.54 (Anderson 2000) (denying compensation where 
injury resulted from intoxication); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-3-2-8 
(Michie 2000) (denying compensation when injury is due to 
intoxication).  
See also Idaho Code § 72-208 (Michie 2000) (denying income 
benefits where "intoxication is a reasonable and substantial 
cause of an injury").  Like Wisconsin, Idaho used to require 
only a percentage reduction in benefits for injuries caused by 
intoxication.  See Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 552 
P.2d 482 (Idaho 1976) (applying a 50% reduction in accordance 
with prior Idaho statute). 
29 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.58, 
Decreased 
compensation, 
provides: 
If injury . . . results from the intoxication of the 
employe by alcohol beverages, as defined in s. 125.02 
(1), . . . the compensation and death benefit provided 
in this chapter shall be reduced 15% but the total 
reduction may not exceed $15,000. 
 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
20
that an employee, although intoxicated, was not engaged in a 
deviation at the time of injury.  "This court has pointedly 
refrained from ruling as a matter of law that intoxication is 
synonymous with personal deviation.  . . .  [I]ntoxication, 
while indicative of intent to deviate, does not per se defeat a 
claim but only decreases benefits."30  That Larsen was a 
traveling employee under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) does not 
change the effect of Wis. Stat. § 102.58.  To conclude otherwise 
would give traveling employees less protection than other 
employees.  Such a result is contrary to the legislature's 
intent 
to 
give 
employees 
broader 
protection 
when 
their 
employment causes them to be away from home.31 
¶46 Heritage Mutual further relies on Goranson v. ILHR, 94 
Wis. 2d 537, 289 N.W.2d 270 (1980), in which the court upheld 
the Commission's denial of coverage to a traveling employee who, 
while in a hotel room with a woman who was not his spouse, 
climbed out of the window of his third-floor room and jumped 
from the ledge.  The Goranson court concluded that there was 
credible evidence to support the Commission's determination that 
the employee's injury did not arise out of a zone of special 
danger created by the fact that his employment required him to 
be at the hotel, but rather out of forces that were purely 
personal to the employee. 
                     
30 City of Phillips v. ILHR Dep't, 56 Wis. 2d 569, 579, 202 
N.W.2d 249 (1972). 
31 See Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 788; 
CBS, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 579. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
21
¶47 Heritage Mutual attempts to draw an analogy from 
Goranson to the present case, arguing that Larsen's injury did 
not arise out of the cold weather, which is the zone of special 
danger created by his employment, but rather out of Larsen's own 
intoxication, a force that was purely personal to him. 
¶48 However, Goranson does not stand for the proposition 
that an employee is barred from recovery when a purely personal 
force contributes to an injury.  Indeed, the court in Goranson 
made clear that an injury is noncompensable if the Commission 
concludes that the injury was caused by purely personal forces, 
so that employment contributes nothing to the injury.  See 
Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 556-57. 
¶49 We addressed the limits of the Goranson holding in 
Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 95, 559 N.W.2d 588 
(1997), when we concluded that an employee was entitled to 
worker's compensation when the employer disclosed personal 
information to the employee's assaultive ex-husband.  The 
disclosed information contributed to the employee's injury.  
Even though the animus of the ex-husband was a factor purely 
personal to the employee, the employee was covered. 
¶50 We conclude that Goranson does not require us to set 
aside the Commission's award in the present case.  In this case, 
as in Goranson, we are reviewing the Commission's decision for 
reasonableness.  Just as we concluded that the Commission's 
determination in Goranson was reasonable, so too do we conclude 
that 
the 
Commission's 
decision 
in 
the 
present 
case 
is 
reasonable. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
22
¶51 The Commission concluded in the present case that 
Larsen's frostbite arose out of the zone of special danger 
created by his employment, the cold weather, and Larsen's 
difficulties in opening the door of his mobile home.  The 
Commission could conclude that these are factors that are not 
purely personal to Larsen, but rather that they arose out of his 
employment.  Moreover, the Commission was mindful of the 
legislative determination that intoxication reduces, but does 
not necessarily eliminate, an employee's recovery.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.58. 
¶52 In affirming the Commission's decision in this case, 
the court recognizes that this is a close case.  The Commission 
might have ruled the other way.  In close, borderline cases like 
the present one, the Commission may very well rule in favor of 
the claimant, "principally because it was the intent and purpose 
of the act to bring border-line cases under it and to close up 
avenues of escape which would naturally be suggested to those 
seeking to evade liability under the act."32 
¶53 The Commission's conclusion is within the range of 
reasonableness, even as 
Heritage 
Mutual characterizes the 
determination as pushing, or even breaking, the envelope.  
Perhaps this court might have reached a different conclusion 
under the facts of the case if the legislature had authorized 
                     
32 Tesch v. Indus. Comm'n, 200 Wis. 616, 627, 229 N.W. 194 
(1930).  See also Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 226 Wis. 2d at 796; 
CBS, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d at 581 (quoting City of Phillips, 56 
Wis. 2d at 579-80). 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
23
this 
court 
to 
review 
Commission 
decisions 
de 
novo.  
Nevertheless, under the great weight deference standard of 
review, a reviewing court may not second-guess a reasonable 
interpretation of a statute by a state agency. 
¶54 For the reasons set forth we conclude that the 
Commission's determination is reasonable and must be affirmed by 
this court. 
 
IV 
 
¶55 The final issue in the present case is whether the 
Commission properly determined that Larsen's injury resulted 
from his intoxication, triggering a 15% reduction in his 
benefits under Wis. Stat. § 102.58.  Section 102.58, entitled 
decreased compensation, provides: 
 
If injury is caused by the failure of the employe to 
use safety devices which are provided in accordance 
with any statute or lawful order of the department and 
are adequately maintained, and the use of which is 
reasonably enforced by the employer, or if injury 
results from the employe's failure to obey any 
reasonable rule adopted and reasonably enforced by the 
employer for the safety of the employe and of which 
the employe has notice, or if injury results from the 
intoxication of the employe by alcohol beverages, as 
defined in s. 125.02 (1), or use of a controlled 
substance, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 
961.01 
(4), 
or 
a 
controlled substance analog, as defined in s. 961.01 
(4m), the compensation and death benefit provided in 
this chapter shall be reduced 15% but the total 
reduction may not exceed $15,000 (emphasis added). 
¶56 The questions of whether Larsen was intoxicated and 
whether his injury resulted from intoxication, so that the 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
24
compensation is reduced by 15% under Wis. Stat. § 102.58, have 
been treated in the case law as questions of fact.33  The 
Commission's factual findings are conclusive, as we have 
explained previously, in the absence of fraud, and an order or 
award may not be set aside unless the findings of fact are not 
supported by credible and substantial evidence.  If the record 
contains 
credible 
and 
substantial evidence 
regarding 
both 
intoxication and causation, the Commission may draw reasonable 
inferences from this evidence.  See Olson v. Indus. Comm'n, 273 
Wis. 272, 77 N.W.2d 410 (1956). 
¶57 The Commission's order stated: 
 
The commission infers from the applicant's testimony 
concerning how much he drank at the tavern on January 
31, 1996, that he was intoxicated.  It additionally 
infers that this intoxication was a substantial factor 
in causing the applicant's frostbite injuries, because 
it is probable that he remained asleep for such an 
extended period due in part to his intoxication. 
¶58 
The 
circuit court 
reversed 
the Commission's 15% 
reduction, holding that there was no evidence on the record that 
a person was more likely to remain asleep if intoxicated.  The 
circuit court further noted that the record contains no evidence 
linking the length of time Larsen remained asleep to the 
frostbite. 
¶59 Under Wis. Stat. § 102.58, an employer bears the 
burden of establishing that an employee was intoxicated at the 
                     
33 See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 8 
Wis. 2d 606, 609, 99 N.W.2d 809 (1959). 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
25
time of injury and of establishing a causal connection between 
the intoxication and the injury.34 
¶60 Larsen 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
reversed the Commission's 15% reduction because no evidence 
supports 
a 
finding 
of 
intoxication 
or 
a 
finding 
that 
intoxication caused Larsen to remain asleep long enough to 
suffer frostbite.35 
¶61 We disagree with Larsen, the circuit court, and the 
court of appeals and uphold the Commission's findings of fact 
that Larsen was intoxicated and that the injury resulted from 
intoxication.  While we agree with Larsen that there is no 
direct 
evidence 
in 
the 
record 
of 
intoxication 
or 
that 
intoxication caused Larsen to remain asleep for an extended 
period, or that Larsen's extended exposure to the cold caused 
his injury, these inferences may reasonably be drawn from the 
record. 
¶62 The renal consultation report of Dr. Matthew Hanna, on 
February 2, 1996, one day after Larsen's frostbite, stated the 
following "impressions" regarding patient Larsen: "1. Ethanol 
abuse; 2. Loss of consciousness secondary to the above.  3. 
Severe frostbite injury."  Dr. Hanna's report is credible and 
substantial evidence to establish intoxication, a causal link 
                     
34 See Haller Beverage Corp. v. ILHR Dep't, 49 Wis. 2d 233, 
237, 181 N.W.2d 418 (1970); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 8 
Wis. 2d at 608-09. 
35 The Commission has not appealed the circuit court's 
reversal of this portion of its order. 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
26
between Larsen's intoxication and his loss of consciousness and 
the injury. 
¶63 Larsen suggests that this report is not credible and 
substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings that 
intoxication caused the injury.  Larsen testified during the 
Commission hearing that he did not know what caused the injury 
and denied that any doctor had attributed his injury to 
intoxication.  The Commission, however, could have discounted 
Larsen's testimony regarding causation.  Indeed, the record 
contains reports from a psychiatrist and a social worker stating 
that Larsen was in denial regarding the seriousness of his 
drinking. 
¶64 Again, the Commission might 
have 
made 
different 
findings 
of 
fact 
on 
this 
record. 
 
Other 
factors 
than 
intoxication may have caused Larsen to lose consciousness.  The 
record shows Larsen used diet pills and had exerted himself in 
the cold.  No evidence was presented about the effect of 
alcoholic beverages on sleep patterns or the length of time 
exposure to cold causes frostbite.  Nevertheless, this court 
need not set aside the Commission's findings of fact.  The 
Commission could draw reasonable inferences from the credible 
and 
substantial 
evidence 
in 
the 
record 
that 
Larsen's 
intoxication caused him to lose consciousness and suffer 
frostbite as a result of exposure. 
¶65 Larsen relies on Haller Beverage Corp. v. ILHR 
Department, 49 Wis. 2d 233, 181 N.W.2d 418 (1970), in which an 
employee with a blood alcohol level of 0.29 percent crashed his 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
27
car into a bridge abutment.  The employer in Haller presented 
evidence that the employee was intoxicated, but the employer 
failed to present any evidence to establish a causal link 
between the intoxication and the crash.  Instead, the employer 
relied on the absence of evidence of any alternative cause for 
the accident.  This court upheld the Commission's determination 
that the employer had not met its burden of proof under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.58, stating: 
 
In meeting a burden of proof, absence of testimony is 
not the same as presence of testimony.  It is true 
that the employer and insurance carrier were not 
required to negate all possible explanations of the 
car veering to hit the abutment.  But they were 
required to establish a causal link between the 
condition of intoxication and the injury.  This they 
did not do. 
Haller, 49 Wis. 2d at 236 (citation omitted). 
¶66 Haller also drew 
on 
Massachusetts 
Bonding 
& 
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 8 Wis. 2d 606, 99 
N.W.2d 
809 
(1959), 
in 
which 
this 
court 
upheld 
the 
Commission's determination that the employer had failed to 
show that intoxication had caused an employee to fall down a 
flight of stairs.  The record contained no evidence 
whatsoever regarding how the accident occurred, so the 
employer's suggestion that the fall was due to intoxication 
was mere suspicion.   
¶67 Haller and Massachusetts Bonding stand in contrast 
to Olson v. Industrial Commission, 273 Wis. 272, 77 N.W.2d 
410 (1956), in which an intoxicated employee's vehicle 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
28
overturned when the vehicle struck a concrete ditch on the 
wrong side of the road.  In that case, the employee 
presented evidence of a mechanical defect in the vehicle, 
while the employer presented physical evidence that the 
employee had been driving for some distance on the wrong 
side of the road.  This court stated that the Commission 
could reasonably infer from this evidence that intoxication 
caused the employee to be driving on the wrong side of the 
road, which in turn caused the accident.  These three cases, 
taken together, demonstrate the court's deference to the 
Commission's findings regarding whether intoxication caused 
an injury under Wis. Stat. § 102.58. 
¶68 The Commission was entitled to draw the reasonable 
inference in the present case that intoxication caused 
Larsen to remain asleep for an extended period and that his 
injury was caused by his long exposure to the cold. 
¶69 Accordingly we conclude that there is credible and 
substantial 
evidence 
in 
the 
record 
to 
support 
the 
Commission's determination that the injury resulted from 
intoxication and that the 15% award reduction required by 
Wis. Stat. § 102.58 applies. 
¶70 Because we conclude that the Commission properly 
reduced Larsen's award under Wis. Stat. § 102.58, we reverse 
the portion of the circuit court's order and the decision of 
the court of appeals denying the 15% reduction.  We affirm 
the portion of the decision of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals upholding the Commission's determination 
No. 
98-3577 
 
 
29
that Larsen was entitled to coverage under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f).  The Commission's decision is therefore 
affirmed in its entirety. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
 
 
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
1 
¶71 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  The majority defers too much to great weight 
deference. 
 
The 
Labor 
and 
Industry 
Review 
Commission's 
determination that William E. Larsen suffered an injury covered 
by Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1) is neither reasonable nor in accord 
with the purpose of § 102.03(1).36  The Commission could not have 
simultaneously concluded both that there was a compensable 
injury here and that Larsen's intoxication caused his injuries, 
where the accident causing the injuries did not arise from 
Larsen's employment, but from a cause solely personal to him——
that is, his intoxication.  The Commission's determination thus 
contravenes the statutory directive that there is coverage only 
"[w]here the accident . . . causing injury arises out of the 
employe's employment."  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(e).   
¶72 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(1) imposes liability upon an 
employer for a traveling employee's injury only where the 
accident that caused the injury arises from the employment 
relationship.  
 
In order for liability to accrue, it is necessary both 
that the employee at the time of the accident be 
performing services growing out of and incidental to 
his employment and that the accident causing injury 
must arise out of his employment.  The phrase "arising 
                     
36 As noted in the majority opinion (at ¶27), even under the 
great weight deference standard of review, if the Commission's 
interpretation is unreasonable——that is, the interpretation 
"directly contravenes the words of the statute, is clearly 
contrary to legislative intent, or is otherwise . . . without 
rational basis"——it cannot be upheld.  Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. 
v. LIRC, 226 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 595 N.W.2d 23 (1999) (citations 
omitted). 
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
2 
out of" refers to the causal origin of the injury and 
the "course of employment" phrase refers to the time, 
place, and circumstances of the accident in relation 
to the employment.   
 
The "travelling employee" statute does not modify 
these 
two 
requirements, 
it 
merely 
provides 
the 
employee with a statutory presumption in favor of both 
of these requirements. . . . [E]ven in those cases 
where the travelling employee presumption applies, the 
"accident . . . must arise out of a hazard of such 
service. . . ."   
Goranson v. ILHR Dep't, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 549-50, 289 N.W.2d 270 
(1980) (citations, footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).37  
Typically, this court has addressed the "course of employment" 
element of liability rather than the causation or the "arising 
out of the employment" element.  Id. at 549 n.3.  However, this 
court did address the causation element, which is determinative 
here, in Goranson. 
¶73 This case is strikingly similar to Goranson.  Goranson 
was a bus driver for Whitie's Transportation, which provided a 
charter bus to a Green Bay Packers football game in Green Bay 
from Barron, Wisconsin.  Id. at 542.  On the night of the injury 
for which Goranson sought worker's compensation, he consumed a 
large amount of alcohol——a couple of drinks upon arrival at the 
hotel where he and the bus passengers were staying, and four 
more with a late dinner.  Id.  A witness reported that at about 
                     
37 It is noteworthy that the Commission did not discuss the 
traveling employee presumption.  Presumably, the Commission 
concluded 
that 
even 
if 
the 
presumption 
dropped 
out 
of 
consideration 
because 
evidence 
to 
the 
contrary 
had 
been 
presented (see Goranson v. ILHR Dep't, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 551, 289 
N.W.2d 270 (1980)), the Commission's conclusions would have been 
the same.  
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
3 
1:30 a.m., Goranson was in the lobby and had been drinking.  Id. 
at 543.  At about 2:30 a.m., another witness reported hearing 
"screaming and cussing" from Goranson's room and saw Goranson, 
"dazed or drunk, or something," climbing out of a window; then 
he jumped.  Id. at 544.   
¶74 Goranson claimed that he had gone to sleep and awoke 
to find someone in the room, with whom he scuffled.  Id. at 542-
43.  According to Goranson, he was pushed out of the window and 
was hanging on the ledge until he dropped to the roof of the 
hotel kitchen.  Id. at 541, 543.  When the police examined his 
room, they found that other than a tipped over chair and some 
blood on sheets and pillowcases, there was no sign of a struggle 
and nothing was missing from the room.  Id. at 544.  There was 
also no sign of forced entry and Goranson's room had been locked 
from the inside.  Id. at 542, 556.  Goranson suffered a broken 
hip and other injuries from jumping from his third floor room.  
Id. at 541.  
¶75 The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations 
determined that Goranson's injuries were not compensable.38  Id. 
                     
38 The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations is 
now known as the Department of Workforce Development.  The 
legislature renamed the Department of Industry, Labor and Human 
Relations the Department of Industry, Labor and Job Development, 
effective July 1, 1996.  However, the Department was given the 
option to use the name Department of Workforce Development which 
it did.  The legislature recognized the name change in 1997. 
Wisconsin 
Blue 
Book 
1999–2000 
493 
(Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Reference Bureau ed., 1999).  The Labor and Industry Review 
Commission now reviews decisions of the Department of Workforce 
Development.  Id. at 496.    
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
4 
at 540.  The Department concluded that although Goranson was 
performing services growing out of and incidental to his 
employment, Goranson's injuries did not arise out of his 
employment.  Id. at 542.  
¶76 This court agreed.  In determining whether the injury 
arose out of Goranson's employment, the court applied the 
"positional risk doctrine." 
 
The definition of the positional risk doctrine can be 
stated 
as 
follows: 
"[A]ccidents 
arise 
out 
of 
employment if the conditions or obligations of the 
employment create a zone of special danger out of 
which the accident causing the injury arose. Stated 
another way, an accident arises out of employment when 
by reason of employment the employee is present at a 
place where he is injured through the agency of a 
third person, an outside force, or the conditions of 
special danger."   
Id. at 555 (quoting Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 
Wis. 2d 247, 254, 92 N.W.2d 824 (1958)).   
¶77 This 
court 
has, 
where 
appropriate, 
applied 
the 
positional risk doctrine to uphold a determination that an 
employer is liable for a traveling employee's injury.  "Such 
cases include, among others, accidents arising from horseplay, 
weather conditions, and assaults."  Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 86, 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954).  
Goranson apparently tried to fit into the assault category.   
However, unlike the applicant in Nash-Kelvinator, Goranson was 
not subjected to mob violence by co-workers.  Id. at 83.  There 
also was not an assault as there was in Weiss v. City of 
Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 95, 99-100, 559 N.W.2d 588 (1997) where 
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
5 
the employer released confidential information about an employee 
who was subsequently harassed by her ex-husband.   
¶78 Rather, the court concluded that Goranson's injuries 
"arose out of a cause solely personal to the employee and did 
not arise out of the employment . . . ."  Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d 
at 556.  The court found that credible evidence supported the 
Department's determination as such.39  Goranson "voluntarily 
allowed someone" into his hotel room.  Id. at 556.  And, "for 
reasons known only to Mr. Goranson he crawled out of the window, 
stood on the ledge, and jumped."  Id.  In other words, 
Goranson's actions, and not his employment, created a zone of 
special danger or hazard out of which his injuries arose.  "The 
situation in which Mr. Goranson found himself was not one which 
was created by the risk of staying at the hotel."  Id. at 557.  
¶79 Similarly, here, the situation in which Larsen found 
himself was not one created by the risk of staying at his mobile 
home.  The situation Larsen found himself in was created by his 
own, voluntary actions, namely, his intoxication.  Indeed, 
because of that fact, this case indicates, more strongly than in 
                     
39 At the time that Goranson was decided, this court applied 
a credible evidence standard of review to determinations of 
whether there was a deviation from employment or whether the 
injury arose from the employment.  Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 553; 
Hansen v. Industrial Comm'n, 258 Wis. 623, 626, 46 N.W.2d 754 
(1951).  Now, such determinations are reviewed as questions of 
law——statutory interpretation——by way of great weight deference. 
 See CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564, 584-85, 579 N.W.2d 668 
(1998) (Crooks, J., concurring).  Accordingly, here, whether 
Larsen's injuries arose from his employment is considered a 
question of law.  
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
6 
Goranson where the court did not rely upon any finding that 
Goranson was intoxicated, that the injuries did not arise from 
the employment relationship.  
¶80 Here, the Commission failed to apply, reasonably, the 
positional risk doctrine when it ignored its own finding that 
Larsen's intoxication caused his injuries.  For the positional 
risk doctrine to be applied correctly, "[a]ll that is required 
is that the 'obligations or conditions' of employment create the 
'zone of special danger' out of which the injury arose."  Butler 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 265 Wis. 380, 385, 61 N.W.2d 490 (1953).  
The Commission initially concluded that sub-zero temperatures 
created a special zone of danger out of which Larsen's injuries 
arose.  More importantly, the Commission also concluded that 
Larsen's intoxication caused his injuries, and reduced his 
compensation correspondingly.  See majority op. at ¶55; see also 
Wis. Stat. § 102.58 (benefits are reduced where there is a 
causal connection between the intoxication and the injury).40  It 
was not the weather that was the special zone of danger or 
hazard for Larsen.  It was his intoxication.  But for the fact 
that he passed out, and that he lost consciousness, while half 
inside, half outside of his mobile home, the weather would have 
been of no effect.  The accident that caused Larsen's injuries——
passing out——did not arise "out of a hazard of such service [of 
                     
40 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.58 provides in pertinent part: 
"[I]f injury results from the intoxication of the employe by 
alcohol beverages, . . . the compensation and death benefit 
provided in this chapter shall be reduced 15% but the total 
reduction may not exceed $15,000."  
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
7 
employment]."  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).  Thus, the accident 
could not "be deemed to arise out of the employe's employment." 
 Id. 
¶81 Rather, here, as in Goranson, the cause of Larsen's 
injuries was solely personal to him.  When Larsen arrived in 
Tigerton, he consumed five to six alcoholic drinks within less 
than two hours at the Split Rock Tavern.  There was no 
connection between his employment and his drinking.  He was not 
entertaining potential clients.  "It cannot be said the 
intoxicants he ordered were in any way in the furtherance of his 
employer's business."  Dibble v. ILHR Dep't, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 
350, 161 N.W.2d 913 (1968) (intoxication relevant to issue of 
personal deviation).  As in Goranson, Larsen "deliberately acted 
to place himself in a position where he sustained an injury 
which 
was 
not 
a 
risk 
incidental 
to 
his 
employment 
relationship . . . ."  94 Wis. 2d at 557.  The cold was not, and 
would not have been, a risk for Larsen, but for his self-induced 
intoxication. 
¶82 The Commission admits that Larsen was intoxicated and 
that that intoxication caused his injuries.  But the Commission 
fails to make the required and necessary connection to find a 
compensable injury here——that the accident causing the injury 
was related to Larsen's employment.  Here, the accident, losing 
consciousness or passing out, was not caused by the weather.  It 
was not caused by an outside force or third person.  Here, as in 
Goranson, there was no special zone of danger that arose from 
the employment relationship, but instead a self-created zone of 
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
8 
danger, even though the place of the injury was connected to the 
requirements of his employment.  Simply, there was nothing about 
his employment that put him in harm's way. 
¶83 Although it is not necessary to find that the 
Commission also unreasonably concluded that Larsen had returned 
to the "course of employment" if he had deviated from his 
business trip (see majority op. at ¶¶41-42), there is certainly 
a basis for such a finding, given the extent of Larsen's 
deviation.  Larsen's deviation——imbibing at least 4 or 5 drinks 
of 
Kessler 
Whiskey 
and 
diet 
Coke 
without 
dining——could 
reasonably be considered as unnecessary for living or not 
incidental thereto.  Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 550 n.3.  As this 
court indicated in Dibble v. ILHR Dep't, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 161 
N.W.2d 913 (1968), "[w]hile a cocktail or two before dinner 
probably is an acceptable social custom incidental to an act 
reasonably necessary to living, the department could conclude 
that Dibble's indulgence was beyond reasonableness."  Id. at 
350. 
¶84 Indeed, Larsen's consumption of at least 4 or 5 
alcoholic drinks in less than two hours is more reasonably 
considered as a break in the employment nexus.  See Bush v. 
Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413 Mich. 444, 457, 320 
N.W.2d 858 (1982).  In Bush, the applicant employee had attended 
a seminar out of town, and, on his way back home, had become 
intoxicated.  Id. at 448-49.  A restaurant where he had stopped 
had attempted to have him take a cab home, but he refused.  Id. 
at 448.  He left, and was murdered shortly thereafter.  Id.  The 
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
9 
Michigan 
Supreme 
Court 
vacated 
the 
award 
of 
worker's 
compensation benefits, finding that the "nexus between the 
employment and the injury was dissolved" by the employee's 
deviation.  Id. at 460.  Similarly here, Larsen's drinking and 
subsequent intoxication was a deviation from the purpose of his 
business trip, so that it dissolved any connection——if any there 
was——between his employment and his injuries. 
¶85 Nonetheless, the Commission unreasonably concluded 
that the accident causing Larsen his injuries arose from his 
employment. 
The 
Commission's 
conclusion 
is 
not 
only 
unreasonable, but also directly contravenes the requirement of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) that there is coverage only where the 
accident arises out of a hazard of such service of employment.  
Accordingly, the Commission determination, even under a great 
weight deference standard of review, must be overturned.  CBS, 
Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564, 573, 579 N.W.2d 668 (1998).  
Certainly the legislature did not intend to provide worker's 
compensation 
for 
those 
injuries 
caused 
by 
an 
employee's 
intoxication where there is no connection whatsoever between the 
employment relationship and the intoxication. 
¶86 The conclusion that Larsen is not entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits because his injury did not arise from his 
employment, but arose from a self-created zone of danger due to 
his intoxication, does not ignore Wis. Stat. § 102.58, or, as 
the 
majority 
suggests, 
undermine 
the 
travelling 
employee 
protections in § 102.03.  The legislature's intent to limit, but 
not preclude, compensation where the employee's injury results 
No. 98-3577.npc 
 
10
from intoxication presumes that there already is a compensable 
injury.  Where the injury does not arise from the employment, 
there is no compensable injury.  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(e), (f). 
 Here, Larsen's intoxication is not the cause of an otherwise 
compensable injury, so § 102.58 does not even come into play.  
Nonetheless, I concur in the majority's conclusion that, at the 
very least, the Commission correctly reduced Larsen's award by 
15% on account of his intoxication.       
¶87 For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent 
to that portion of the majority's opinion that upholds the 
Commission's decision to award Larsen worker's compensation 
benefits. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
and Justice DIANE S. SYKES join in this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
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