Title: Boyer v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 418, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 4, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SEAN BOYER, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
) 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
) 
No. 418, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
of the State of Delaware in 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
) 
and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
) 
Cr. ID No. 86002568DI 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  May 6, 2003 
Decided:  August 4, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This 4th day of August 2003, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, 
it appears to the Court as follows: 
1.  This is an appeal from a New Castle County Superior Court Order 
denying Sean Boyer’s motion for correction of his October 5, 1995 sentence.  
Boyer raises four arguments on appeal.  First, Boyer argues that the Superior Court 
judge erred by denying his motion to correct his sentence under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 35(a).  Second, Boyer argues that the State’s delay in sentencing 
him violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy sentencing.  Third, Boyer 
argues that the State violated his rights by portraying his burglary convictions as an 
 
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attempted rape.  Finally, Boyer argues that the Superior Court judge abused his 
discretion by failing to grant relief given the circumstances surrounding Boyer’s 
case.  We conclude that the Superior Court judge did not err in his various rulings 
on the issues.   
2.  The circumstances of Boyer’s case are unusual and the procedural history 
is complicated.  On June 25, 1986, a New Castle County grand jury indicted Sean 
Boyer for the offenses of second degree burglary1 and misdemeanor theft.2  Both 
charges resulted from Boyer’s break into the residence of Irene Ermilio in Newark, 
Delaware on April 26, 1986.  Boyer entered into a plea agreement and pleaded 
guilty on October 7, 1986 to one count of second degree burglary.  The State later 
entered a nolle prosequi on the misdemeanor theft charge.  At a sentencing hearing 
in December 1986, a law enforcement agent from Pennsylvania informed the Court 
that Boyer’s arrest in Newark constituted a violation of Boyer’s parole in 
Pennsylvania.3  The sentencing judge rescheduled the hearing for April 1987.  
Boyer never attended that hearing, however, because Pennsylvania authorities took 
Boyer into custody on April 14, 1987.     
                                                 
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 825 (2003). 
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 841 (2003).   
3 Boyer had been convicted in Pennsylvania of attempted rape, involuntary deviate sexual 
intercourse, and two counts of burglary.   
 
3
3.  When Boyer failed to appear for his sentencing date, the New Castle 
County Superior Court issued a capias.  The Court did not know that Pennsylvania 
had incarcerated Boyer for violating his parole on his 1981 convictions in 
Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania authorities paroled Boyer on March 16, 1991 and he 
went to live with his mother in Clifton Heights, Pennsylvania.  In August 1993 
(thirty months after his Pennsylvania parole), a Delaware State trooper stopped 
Boyer for speeding in Delaware and took him into custody on the 1987 Superior 
Court capias.  Superior Court scheduled Boyer for sentencing on October 20, 1993, 
but the sentencing judge continued the hearing in order to obtain an updated pre-
sentence investigation.  After Delaware contacted Boyer’s Pennsylvania parole 
officer, Pennsylvania again violated Boyer for the Delaware speeding ticket and 
for leaving Pennsylvania without permission.  Delaware then voluntarily returned 
him to Pennsylvania custody.  Pennsylvania reincarcerated Boyer for an additional 
six months for his second parole violation.  Although released from prison in 
Pennsylvania on April 27, 1994, Pennsylvania again violated Boyer (this was his 
third violation) in July 1994 for smoking marijuana, and Pennsylvania 
reincarcerated him until he completed his original 20 year sentence in April 2002.   
4.  In May 1995, Delaware issued a detainer to Pennsylvania for Boyer for 
the purpose of sentencing him for the 1986 second degree burglary conviction.  On 
October 5, 1995, Boyer appeared in Delaware and a Superior Court judge 
 
4
sentenced Boyer to eight years at Level V, suspended after six years for one year 
Level IV work release, followed by an additional one year Level III probation.  
The sentencing judge ordered Boyer to begin his sentence when he completed his 
Pennsylvania sentence.   
5.  Boyer returned to Pennsylvania to serve out his Pennsylvania sentence 
and never appealed his 1995 Delaware sentence on the second degree burglary 
charge.  On April 23, 1999, Boyer filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.  
The Superior Court judge found it to be procedurally barred under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61(i)(e) because Boyer failed to file a motion for postconviction 
relief within three years after the judgment of conviction.  Boyer completed his 
Pennsylvania sentence in 2002 and returned to Delaware to begin serving the 
sentence imposed in 1995.  On March 11, 2002, Boyer filed a motion for 
modification of sentence in Superior Court.  After a remand from this Court, the 
parties endeavored to recreate what transpired at Boyer’s 1995 sentencing hearing.  
The Superior Court judge then denied Boyer’s motion for modification of 
sentence.  
6.  Delaware law is well established that appellate review of sentences is 
narrowly limited.4  This Court, when reviewing a sentence within statutory limits, 
will not find an error of law or an abuse of discretion unless it is clear from the 
                                                 
4 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
 
5
record below that a sentence has been imposed on the basis of demonstrably false 
information or information lacking a minimal indicium of reliability.5  
7.  Rule 35(a)6 allows this Court to correct an illegal sentence at any time.  
The “narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not 
to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the 
imposition of sentence.”7  Rule 35(a) is designed to correct errors only where a 
sentence was imposed outside of the statutory maximum, or where a sentence 
constitutes double jeopardy.8  Boyer’s claims reach beyond the scope of Rule 
35(a).  Boyer’s sentence neither exceeded the statutory maximum under 11 Del. C. 
§§ 825 and 4205(b) nor did it violate Boyer’s constitutional double jeopardy 
protection.  Furthermore, a sentence is illegal only if it “is ambiguous with respect 
to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits 
a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the 
sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize.”9  
Boyer does not contend that his sentence was illegal in any of these respects and 
we cannot construe Boyer’s sentence to be illegal in any other manner. 
                                                 
5 Id. at 843. 
6 DEL. SUPER. CT. CR. R. 35(a).  This rules states:  The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time 
and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of 
sentence.  
7 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 
424, 430 (1962) (emphasis in the original). 
8 Tatem v. State, 787 A.2d 80, 81 (Del. 2001); Brittingham, 705 A.2d at 577.   
 
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8.  The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and the Delaware Constitution, Article I, Section 7.10  The 
constitutional right to a speedy trial also governs one’s rights to speedy 
sentencing.11  As was the case when this Court decided Key v. State, there is no 
definitive U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution concerning “speedy sentencing.”  We acknowledge that there are 
perceptible distinctions between speedy trial concepts and the requirement of 
timely sentencing.  “The right to a speedy trial not only helps ensure ‘that all 
accused persons [will] be treated according to decent and fair procedures,’ but also 
protects society’s interest ‘in providing a speedy trial.’  The interest in maximum 
speed consistent with fairness, in fresh memories likely to approach full accounts 
of the facts, in prompt vindication and relief of the innocent, and in swift 
punishment of the guilty … are matters of broad public moment.”12  A speedy 
sentencing claim, however, concerns the rights of a convicted defendant as 
opposed to an accused awaiting trial.  We recognize the continuing public interest 
in promptly disposing of the Court’s business and that swift punishment is “of 
broad public moment.”13  Nevertheless, we reaffirm the approach taken in Key and 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Brittingham, 705 A.2d at 578 (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.2d 1514, 1515 (10th 
Cir. 1997)).  
10 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 270 (Del. 2002).   
11 Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 636 (Del. 1983).   
12 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273 (internal quotations omitted).   
13 Id. 
 
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assuming that the Sixth Amendment requires speedy sentencing, an allegedly 
unconstitutional delay should be examined in much the same way as an asserted 
denial of the right to speedy trial.   
9.  In Middlebrook v. State, this Court examined the United States Supreme 
Court decision of Baker v. Wingo and enumerated a four factor test to determine 
whether a particular defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.14  
These four factors include: (i) the length of delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) 
the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial and/or sentencing hearing; 
and (iv) prejudice to the defendant.15  These factors must be considered together 
with any other circumstances that may be relevant.16  Since “these factors have no 
talismanic qualities, courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing 
process.”17 
10.  As noted by the Superior Court judge, Boyer’s speedy sentencing 
argument is procedurally barred by the three-year time limitation under Rule 
61(i)(1).18  Even assuming arguendo that Boyer’s speedy sentencing claim was 
properly before this Court, Boyer’s speedy sentencing claim lacks merit.   
                                                 
14 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273 (referring to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 DEL. SUPER. CT. CR. R. 61(i)(1).  This rule states:  A motion for post-conviction relief may not 
be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a 
retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, 
 
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11.  The first Barker factor concerns the delay in the defendant’s trial and/or 
sentencing.  Boyer argues that the nine year delay between his arrest and sentence 
requires this Court to find a presumption of prejudice.  Despite Boyer’s 
incarceration in Pennsylvania for most of the time between his arrest and sentence, 
we cannot say that the nine years is so negligible as to obviate closer examination.  
Thus, the duration about which Boyer complains is pertinent to the issues here.19 
12.  The second Barker factor concerns the reason for the delay in the 
defendant’s trial and/or sentencing.  The length of delay requires a factual analysis 
that is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.20  “Different 
weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay.”21   For instance, a 
deliberate attempt to delay in order to hamper the defense is weighted heavily 
against the State whereas a more neutral reason for the delay should be weighted 
less heavily against the State.22  Moreover, a valid reason may justify appropriate 
delay and will not weigh against the State at all.23  In the present case, the State has 
offered a valid reason for the nine-year delay between Boyer’s arrest and sentence.  
Boyer was incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a substantial time during this delay.  
Boyer has not alleged a deliberate attempt to impair or harass the defense or that 
                                                                                                                                                             
more than three years after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by 
the United States Supreme Court.  
19 See Key, 463 A.2d at 636. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 274. 
22 Id. 
 
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the State sought to gain some unfair tactical advantage.  We cannot, however, 
overlook the fact that but for the capias issued by the Superior Court in 1987, the 
State made little effort, if any, to have Boyer sentenced on the burglary charge 
until the issuance of the detainer in 1995; and, in fact, voluntarily released Boyer to 
Pennsylvania before sentencing him. 
13.  The third Barker factor concerns when and if the defendant asserts his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial and/or sentencing.  When and if the defendant 
asserts his constitutional right to a speedy trial and/or sentencing hearing is 
important to determine whether the defendant was denied this constitutional 
right.24  Not surprisingly, Boyer never requested a sentencing hearing.  Even 
worse, Boyer waited approximately four years after his sentence to raise for the 
first time his right to a speedy sentencing.  “Lack of protest ‘will make it difficult 
for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.’”25  This factor weighs 
heavily in favor of the State. 
14.  The fourth Barker factor is prejudice to the defendant.  “Prejudice, of 
course, should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant which the 
speedy trial right was designed to protect.  This Court has identified three such 
interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 274. 
24 Id. at 275. 
25 Key, 463 A.2d at 637 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.). 
 
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and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be 
impaired.”26  We also recognize that until sentence is imposed, a defendant cannot 
seek an appeal, pardon, commutation, or a reduction of his sentence.27  Boyer has 
failed to assert any prejudice from the delay in sentencing.  In his brief, Boyer 
argues that he suffered the anxiety of never knowing whether Delaware had any 
intent to sentence him, that Pennsylvania might have discharged him from his 
parole or that he might not have violated his Pennsylvania parole on three different 
occasions had he been promptly sentenced in Delaware, that he fell in love and had 
a child during one of his brief stints out of Pennsylvania prison while on parole and 
that he has now been deprived of that relationship.28  While sitting in jail 
wondering if a neighboring State might require additional incarceration might 
cause anxiety, none of Boyer’s assertions of prejudice rise to level discussed in 
Barker.  Boyer did not suffer from any Delaware imposed pretrial (after sentence)  
incarceration nor was he concerned whether a trial would produce a not guilty 
verdict.  Boyer also did not suffer any impairment to his defense as a result of the 
delay.  In fact, the circumstances of his life at the time of the Delaware sentencing 
arguably improved his ability to assert mitigating circumstances.  Consequently, 
this factor weighs in favor of the State.    
                                                 
26 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  Of course, we consider these interest in light of the fact that Boyer 
stands convicted rather than accused.   
27 Key, 463 A.2d at 637.   
 
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15.  After balancing the four factors from Middlebrook and Barker, we 
conclude the State did not deprive Boyer of his constitutional right to speedy 
sentencing.  The Pennsylvania incarceration constituted a valid reason for the nine-
year delay between Boyer’s Delaware guilty plea and Delaware sentencing.  
Boyer, not the State, violated his Pennsylvania parole which caused the delay in 
sentencing.  Finally, Boyer has neither asserted nor suffered any prejudice as a 
result of Delaware’s delay in sentencing him.  Thus, even assuming that Boyer’s 
speedy sentencing claim is not barred by the three year time period for the filing of 
a postconviction relief motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, the State 
did not deprive Boyer of his constitutional right to a speedy sentence.  Further, we 
must consider Delaware’s policy against concurrent sentencing.  Title 11, Section 
3901(d)29 expresses clear legislative intent that no sentencing of confinement shall 
run concurrently.  Therefore, Boyer had every expectation that his Delaware 
sentence will be served after he served his time in Pennsylvania.  Any anxiety that 
he allegedly suffered as a result of this reality flows directly as a consequence of 
his conviction and not as a result of any delay in imposing punishment. 
16.  Boyer also argues that it was unconstitutional and unfair for the State, 
without ever indicting him on attempted rape and/or proving such an allegation 
                                                                                                                                                             
28 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 18.   
 
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beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, to ask the Superior Court judge to consider an 
alleged attempted rape at sentencing.  However, a sentencing judge has broad 
discretion to consider “information pertaining to a defendant’s personal history and 
behavior which is not confined exclusively to conduct for which that defendant 
was convicted.”30   Moreover, the Superior Court judge stated that he was well 
aware of the sentencing elements for second degree burglary and that he sentenced 
Boyer according to those elements and not the elements of the alleged attempted 
rape.31  Even if Boyer articulated a right grounded in either the U.S. or Delaware 
Constitutions supporting this claim, there could be no violation as the State’s 
comments were not considered by the sentencing judge. 
17. 
  Finally, Boyer argues that given the extraordinary circumstances 
surrounding the imposition of his sentencing, the Superior Court judge had an 
obligation to “right the wrong” of his 1995 sentence.  Boyer points to the following  
facts in making this argument: (i) after Boyer was sentenced in 1995, he spent an 
additional seven years completing his sentence in Pennsylvania; (ii) Boyer was a 
productive inmate who completed numerous prison programs and courses, 
including every program offered regarding the rehabilitation of sex offenders; (iii) 
Boyer’s family needs him to care for his elderly mother whose health is starting to 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901(d) (2003).  This section states:  No sentence of confinement of 
any criminal defendant by any court of this State shall be made to run concurrently with any 
other sentence of confinement imposed on such criminal defendant. 
 
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fail; (iv) Boyer will continue to be an incarcerated father to his ten-year old son; 
and (v) Boyer has recently undergone chemotherapy and surgery to treat cancer.  
However, the Superior Court judge properly rejected Boyer’s mitigating arguments 
in the exercise of his discretion.  Rule 35(a) is limited to correcting illegal 
sentences, not a sentence that occurs under circumstances that a defendant now 
considers unfair or inequitable.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
30 Mayes, 604 A.2d 842.  
31 State v. Boyer, Del. Super., ID #  86002568DI, Cooch, R.J. (June 21, 2002) (ORDER).