Title: Coast Community College District v. Commission on State Mandates
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S262663
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES, 
Defendant and Respondent;  
 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.  
 
S262663 
 
Third Appellate District 
C080349 
 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
34-2014-80001842CUWMGDS  
 
 
August 15, 2022 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
1 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
S262663 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution 
requires the state to reimburse local governments “[w]henever 
the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or 
higher level of service . . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. 
(a).)  In this case, several community college districts seek 
reimbursement for regulations that specify various conditions 
the districts must satisfy to avoid the possibility of having their 
state aid withheld.  The conditions describe standards governing 
several core areas of community college administration, 
including matriculation requirements, hiring procedures, and 
curriculum selection.  
The districts filed a claim with the Commission on State 
Mandates, “ ‘ “a quasi-judicial body [that] has the sole and 
exclusive authority to adjudicate whether a state mandate 
exists” ’ ” (California School Boards Assn. v. State of California 
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1200; see Gov. Code, § 17551), 
arguing  that reimbursement was required under Article XIII B, 
section 6 because:  (1) the regulations imposed a legal duty to 
satisfy the conditions described therein (“legal compulsion”); or 
(2) the regulations otherwise compelled compliance as a 
practical matter (“practical compulsion”).  (See Department of 
Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
727, 741 (Kern) [“reimbursable state mandate arises” when 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
entity is compelled to comply; distinguishing legal and practical 
compulsion]; Department of Finance v. Commission on State 
Mandates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1365–1366 (Department 
of Finance) [reimbursement not required “if a local government 
participates ‘voluntarily,’ i.e., without legal compulsion or 
compulsion as a practical matter, in a program with a rule 
requiring increased costs”].)   
The Commission rejected the claims, concluding that the 
districts had failed to show they were legally compelled to 
comply with the regulations because there was no provision 
creating a mandatory duty that they do so; instead, 
noncompliance merely raised the possibility that some portion 
of their state funding would be withheld.  The Commission 
further concluded that the districts had failed to establish they 
were compelled to comply as a practical matter, explaining that 
no evidence had been submitted demonstrating the districts 
were unable to function without state funding or that they 
otherwise lacked any true choice but to comply with the 
conditions.   
In subsequent mandate proceedings, the trial court 
affirmed the Commission’s findings with respect to both legal 
and practical compulsion.  The Court of Appeal reversed, 
concluding that the districts were legally compelled to comply 
with the regulations because those regulations “apply to the 
underlying core functions of the community colleges, functions 
compelled by state law.”  The court also rejected the 
Commission’s finding that legal compulsion was inapplicable 
because noncompliance merely placed the districts at risk of 
having some portion of their state aid withheld.  According to 
the court, state laws that required the funding of community 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
colleges and other evidence in the record demonstrated the 
districts rely on state aid to function, leaving them no choice but 
to comply with the regulations.  Having found the districts had 
a legal duty to comply with the regulations, the court declined 
to review the trial court’s conclusion that the districts had failed 
to show practical compulsion.   
We reverse.  Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation, the fact that the standards set forth in the 
regulations relate to the districts’ core functions (matriculation, 
hiring of faculty and selecting curriculum, etc.) does not in itself 
establish that the districts have a mandatory legal obligation to 
adopt those standards.  (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 741.)  
The regulations make clear that if a district fails to comply, the 
California Community Colleges Chancellor has discretion to 
pursue any number of remedial measures that range from 
taking no action to “withhold[ing] or reduc[ing] all or part of the 
district’s state aid.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, subd. 
(b)(5).)  Thus, the districts are not legally obligated to adopt the 
standards described in the regulations, but rather face the risk 
of potentially severe financial consequences if they chose not to 
do so.  Because the regulations induce rather than obligate 
compliance, legal compulsion is inapplicable.  (See Kern, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at p. 742 [legal compulsion applicable when a local 
entity “has a legal obligation” to comply].)   
Moreover, while the Court of Appeal appears to have 
reasoned that the districts have no true choice to comply with 
the regulations insofar as they depend on state aid to function, 
those arguments sound in practical, rather than legal, 
compulsion.  (See generally City of Sacramento v. State of 
California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 74 (City of Sacramento) [finding 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
practical compulsion where “[t]he alternatives were so far 
beyond the realm of practical reality that they left the state 
‘without discretion’ to depart from federal standards”].)  Because 
the Court of Appeal chose not to address whether the districts 
established practical compulsion, we will remand the matter to 
allow the court to evaluate that issue in the first instance.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Summary of Applicable Statutes 
1.  Proposition 4 and implementing legislation   
“Article XIII A (adopted by the voters in 1978 as 
Proposition 13), limits the taxing authority of state and local 
government.  Article XIII B (adopted by the voters in 1979 as 
Proposition 4) limits the spending authority of state and local 
government.”  (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 735.)   
Section 6 of article XIII B provides:  “Whenever the 
Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or 
higher level of service on any local government, the State shall 
provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local 
government for the costs of such program or increased level of 
service.”  The purpose of section 6 “is to preclude the state from 
shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental 
functions to local agencies, which are ‘ill equipped’ to assume 
increased financial responsibilities because of the taxing and 
spending limitations that articles XIII A and XIII B  impose.”  
(County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 
81 (County of San Diego).) 
In 1984, the Legislature adopted statutory procedures for 
determining whether a statute or executive action (which 
includes executive orders and regulations) imposes state-
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
mandated costs on a local agency.  (See Gov. Code, § 17500 et 
seq.)  That legislation provides a two-step procedure.  First, a 
local agency seeking reimbursement must file a “test claim” with 
the Commission on State Mandates, a quasi-judicial body 
established to “hear and decide” such matters.  (Id., § 17551, 
subds. (a)–(b).)  The test claim process allows the claimant and 
other interested parties to present written evidence and 
testimony at a public hearing.  (Id., § 17553, subd. (a)(1)); see 
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 1183.1, subd. (b) [authorizing multiple 
claimants “to file a test claim as a joint effort” and providing that 
“[o]ther similarly situated affected agencies may participate in 
the process”].)  Based on that evidence, the Commission must 
decide whether the challenged statute or executive order 
mandates a new program or increased level of service.   
In making that determination, the Commission is 
required to address a series of questions.  First, it must decide 
whether the legal provision for which subvention is sought 
compels the local agency to act or merely invites voluntary 
action.  If the provision compels action, the Commission must 
next decide whether the compelled activity requires the agency 
to provide “a new program or higher level of service.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. XIII B, § 6.)  Finally, if the Commission finds a 
statute or executive action mandates a new program or higher 
level of service, it must consider if any of the enumerated 
exceptions to reimbursement apply.1  This case involves only the 
 
1   
Those exceptions include, among other things:  (1) when 
the state has imposed the new program or service to comply with 
a federal mandate; (2) when the state has provided the local 
agency offsetting savings that are commensurate with costs of 
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
first of those inquiries:  whether the regulations at issue compel 
community college districts to act or, alternatively, merely 
invite voluntary action.    
If the Commission ultimately determines there is a 
reimbursable mandate, it must then “determine the amount to 
be subvened to local agencies and school districts for 
reimbursement.  In so doing it shall adopt parameters and 
guidelines for reimbursement of any claims relating to the 
statute or executive order.”  (Gov. Code, § 17557, subd. (a); see 
County of San Diego, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 81.) 
2.  Statutes and regulations governing community 
colleges 
California community colleges offer two-year degree 
programs and other forms of instruction.  There are currently 
73 community college districts that collectively operate 116 
community colleges.  Each community college district is run by 
a board of trustees (district board) (see Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. 
(a)(1)) that is responsible for “establish[ing], maintain[ing], 
operat[ing], and govern[ing] [the community colleges it 
oversees] in accordance with law.”  (Ibid.)  Under what is 
commonly referred to “as the ‘permissive code’ concept” (Service 
Employees Internat. Union v. Board of Trustees (1996) 
47 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1666), district boards are permitted to 
“initiate and carry on any program, activity, or may otherwise 
act in any manner that is not in conflict with . . . any law and 
that is not in conflict with the purposes for which community 
 
the new program or service; or (3) when the local agency is 
authorized to fund the new program or service by imposing fees 
or assessments.  (See Gov. Code, § 17556.) 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
college districts are established.”  (Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. 
(a)(1).)  Thus, the “only limitation placed on a [district] board’s 
authority under the permissive code is that the board may not 
act in any manner” that is inconsistent with any law.  (Service 
Employees Internat. Union, at p. 1666.) 
 
The Legislature has, however, cabined the authority of 
district boards in some ways.  Education Code section 66010.4, 
subdivision (a), for example, sets forth the general mission and 
functions of the community colleges, requiring that they: “offer 
academic and vocational instruction . . . through, but not 
beyond, the second year of college” (id., subd. (a)(1)); offer 
courses to provide “remedial instruction for those in need of it” 
(id., subd. (a)(2)(A)); “instruct[] in English as a second language” 
(ibid.); and offer “adult noncredit instruction” (ibid.). 
 
The Legislature has assigned general oversight authority 
of the districts to the Board of Governors of the California 
Community Colleges (the Board of Governors), which enacts 
regulations and reviews major decisions of community college 
districts, such as the creation of new colleges.  (See Ed. Code, § 
70901, subd. (b).)  The Board of Governors is headed by the 
California Community Colleges Chancellor, who is responsible 
for carrying out and enforcing the Board’s regulations and 
overseeing the annual apportionment of state funds. 
 
In 1988, the Legislature passed new statutory directives 
requiring the Board of Governors to establish two categories of 
regulations.  (See Stats. 1988, c. 973, § 8 [adding Ed. Code, § 
70901].)  First, the Board was required to adopt regulations 
establishing “minimum standards as required by law” for 
various aspects of community college operations.  (Ed. Code, § 
70901, subd. (b)(1).)  Those regulations (hereafter operating 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
standards regulations) set out mandatory “minimum standards” 
related to (among other things) “graduation requirements,” “the 
employment of academic and administrative staff,” student 
discipline, and curriculum.  (Ibid.; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 
5, §§ 53000–59606.)2   
 The Legislature also directed the Board of Governors to 
adopt 
separate 
regulations 
that 
“[e]stablish 
minimum 
conditions entitling districts to receive state aid for support of 
community colleges” and to adopt procedures to “periodic[ally] 
review” whether each district has met those minimum 
conditions.  (Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(6)(A); see Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 5, § 51000.)  Pursuant to those provisions, the Board 
passed 19 regulations (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 51002–
51027; hereafter funding entitlement regulations), many of 
which overlap with (and in some cases directly incorporate) 
requirements set forth in the operating standards regulations.3        
 
2  
Except where otherwise noted, all further references to 
“Regulation” or  “Regulations” are to title 5 of the California 
Code of Regulations.  
 
3  
Regulation 51002, for example, directs the districts to 
“adopt regulations consistent with the standards of scholarship 
contained in articles 2 through 5 (commencing with section 
55020) of subchapter 1 of chapter 6” of the Regulations, which 
refers to the operating standards regulations that govern 
scholarship.  Similarly, Regulation 51004 directs the districts to 
“adopt regulations consistent with regulations contained in 
articles 6 and 7 (commencing with section 55060) of subchapter 
1 of chapter 6,” which refers to the operating standards 
regulations that govern the issuance of degrees and certificates.  
As discussed in more detail below (see post, at pp. 13–14), the 
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
 
Unlike the operating standards regulations, the districts 
are not expressly required to comply with the funding 
entitlement regulations.  Instead, the Education Code and its 
implementing 
regulations 
provide 
that 
noncompliance 
authorizes the Chancellor to initiate a process that may result 
in withholding or reduction of state funding.  (See Ed. Code, § 
70901, subd. (b)(6); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 51000, 51102.)  If 
the Chancellor determines a district is out of compliance with 
some or all of the funding entitlement regulations, she must 
provide the district notice identifying the noncompliance issues 
and request a response.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, 
subd. (a).)  Once the district responds (or time has lapsed to do 
so), the Chancellor “shall pursue one or more . . . courses of 
action” that include (among other things) accepting the district’s 
response, requiring the district to adhere to a remedial plan or 
“withhold[ing] or reduc[ing] all or part of the district’s state aid.”  
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, subd. (b).)  The regulations 
further require that the remedy the Chancellor selects “shall be 
related to the extent and gravity of noncompliance.”  (Id., subd. 
(c).)  
B.  Procedural History 
1.  The Commission’s resolution of the test claims 
 In June 2003, the Los Rios, Santa Monica, and West Kern 
community 
college 
districts 
filed 
test 
claims 
seeking 
reimbursement for costs associated with 27 sections of the 
Education Code and approximately 140 related regulations.  
 
Court of Appeal’s decision found that numerous other provisions 
in 
the 
funding 
entitlement 
regulations 
overlap 
with 
requirements in the operating standards regulations.   
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
The test claims included (among other provisions) the operating 
standards regulations and the funding entitlement regulations.  
After nearly a decade of review, the Commission issued a 164-
page statement of decision that authorized reimbursement for 
over 90 of the alleged mandates, many of which related to the 
operating standards regulations implemented pursuant to 
Education Code section 70901, subdivision (b)(1).  The 
Commission later adopted parameters and guidelines for the 
reimbursement of those mandates. 
 However, the Commission rejected all claims related to 
the funding entitlement regulations, concluding that the 
districts had failed to establish those regulations compelled 
them to take any action.  The Commission reasoned that unlike 
the operating standards regulations, compliance with the 
funding entitlement regulations was not legally mandated, but 
instead operated to remove the possibility that the Board of 
Governors might withhold some portion of the noncomplying 
district’s state aid.  The Commission further explained that the 
regulations provided the Chancellor and the Board of Governors 
discretion to choose what “actions to take” in response to a 
district’s noncompliance, meaning that a district might still 
retain all its aid even if it chose not to comply.  The Commission 
noted that the districts’ evidence showed only one case in which 
the Chancellor had ever recommended that the Board of 
Governors withhold funding from a district, which occurred 
after the San Mateo Community College had failed to comply 
with an equal opportunity hiring regulation when choosing its 
new superintendent.  The Board, however, ultimately rejected 
the Chancellor’s recommendation to withhold funding and chose 
instead to increase monitoring over the district.  The 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
Commission concluded the case demonstrated that while “there 
is . . . a possible loss of funding, [there is no] . . . evidence of the 
certainty of this loss.”  
      
2.  The trial court’s ruling  
The districts filed a writ petition seeking reversal of the 
Commission’s finding that the funding entitlement regulations 
did not qualify as a mandate.  Although the Department of 
Finance (the Department) joined the Commission in opposing 
the petition, the Department chose not to seek review of the 
portion of the Commission’s decision finding that over 90 
statutes and regulations (including most of the operating 
standards regulations) qualified as reimbursable mandates. 
The trial court affirmed the Commission’s decision and 
adopted most of its reasoning.  The court concluded that the 
districts “are not legally compelled to comply with the minimum 
conditions.  Instead, . . . [they] only have to comply with the 
minimum conditions if they want to become entitled to receive 
state aid.”  (Italics omitted.)  The court also rejected the districts’ 
assertion that even if not legally compelled to comply, they were 
nonetheless practically compelled to do so “because they cannot 
operate without state funding and thus have no meaningful 
choice but to comply with the minimum conditions.”  The court 
explained that it could not evaluate that assertion because the 
districts had “cite[d] no evidence in their briefs about how much 
community colleges receive from state aid, how much they 
receive from property taxes, and how much they receive from 
other funding sources. . . .  With no evidence on this 
issue, . . . [the districts] fail to prove the key point (i.e., that they 
cannot operate without state funds).”  (Italics omitted.)    
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
The trial court further concluded that even if there were 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the districts relied 
on state funds to operate, the districts had failed to show that 
noncompliance was reasonably likely to result in the 
withholding of state funds.  The court reasoned that while the 
funding entitlement regulations authorized the Chancellor “to 
withhold state aid if a district fails to comply,” the districts had 
not proved that “loss of state aid is . . . reasonably certain to 
occur” or that the amounts withheld would necessarily be 
“severe.”  Like the Commission, the trial court cited evidence 
regarding the disciplinary action the Board of Governors had 
taken against San Mateo Community College District for failing 
to comply with funding entitlement regulations related to equal 
opportunity hiring.  The trial court noted that the Board’s 
meeting minutes showed it had rejected the Chancellor’s 
recommendation to withhold $500,000 in state aid because “of 
the worry that doing so would negatively impact students.”  In 
the court’s view, these actions showed that it was “unlikely that 
a district would actually lose any state aid if it failed to comply 
with the minimum conditions.” 
 
3.  The Court of Appeal’s partial reversal 
The Court of Appeal reversed in part, concluding that the 
districts had shown they were legally compelled to comply with 
the funding entitlement regulations because those regulations 
related to the community college districts’ core functions:  “[T]he 
[funding entitlement regulations] apply to the underlying core 
functions of the community colleges, functions compelled by 
state law. . . .  California community colleges are required to 
provide 
specified 
academic, 
vocational, 
and 
remedial 
instruction, along with support services.  (Ed. Code, § 66010.4.)  
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
The [funding entitlement regulations] direct the community 
college districts to take specific steps in fulfilling those legally-
compelled core mission functions, including requirements 
pertaining 
to 
scholarship, 
degrees, 
courses, 
campuses, 
counseling, and curriculum.” 
The court further concluded that while the Commission 
had found “the [funding entitlement regulations] are not legally 
compelled because the community colleges are free to decline 
state aid,” that conclusion was “inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme and the appellate record.”  The court explained that the 
California Constitution requires “a specific minimum level of 
state General Fund revenues be guaranteed and applied for the 
support of community college districts” and further requires 
that the state provide districts sufficient funding “to permit 
them to carry out their mission.”  Without citing a specific 
source, the court noted that “in the most recent year for which 
the appellate record in this case provides information, more 
than half of California community college funding came from the 
state General Fund.  In that same year, other funding sources, 
including federal funds, local funds, and student fees, provided 
significantly less support.  Like public school districts in 
general, community college districts are dependent on state 
aid.”  (Italics omitted.)  Because the court found that the 
districts were legally compelled to comply with the funding 
entitlement regulations, it declined to address the trial court’s 
alternative finding that the districts had failed to demonstrate 
they “faced practical compulsion based on severe and certain 
penalties.”  
The Court of Appeal went on to rule, however, that the 
districts were not entitled to reimbursement for many of the 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
funding entitlement regulations because the programs or 
services described within those regulations were duplicative of 
requirements 
imposed 
under 
the 
operating 
standards 
regulations, which the Commission had previously found to be 
reimbursable.  In total, the Court of Appeal found that only six 
of the nineteen funding entitlement regulations involved 
programs or services that did not overlap with operating 
standards regulations or other statutory requirements the 
Commission had already found to be reimbursable.  For those 
six regulations, the court remanded the matter back to the 
Commission to evaluate whether they imposed a new program 
or higher level of service within the meaning of the mandate law. 
The Commission and the Department (collectively 
respondents) filed petitions for review challenging the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that the districts were legally compelled to 
comply with the funding entitlement regulations.4 
 
4  
The Commission has also requested review of a separate 
portion of the Court of Appeal’s decision that directs the 
Commission to make further findings regarding the districts’ 
entitlement to reimbursement for various sections of the 
Education Code that are unrelated to the regulations discussed 
above.  The Commission asserts it lacks fundamental 
jurisdiction to address those sections of the Education Code 
because:  (1) the districts’ test claims do not expressly reference 
those statutes; and (2) some of those statutes were the subject 
of a prior test claim.  The Department, which has not joined in 
this argument, is of the view that while a claimant might be 
procedurally barred from seeking reimbursement for statutes 
that were not listed in a test claim or were the subject of a prior 
test claim, those circumstances do not result in a jurisdictional 
bar.   
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
“Courts review a decision of the Commission to determine 
whether it is supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]  
Ordinarily, when the scope of review in the trial court is whether 
the administrative decision is supported by substantial 
evidence, the scope of review on appeal is the same.  [Citation.]  
However, the appellate court independently reviews conclusions 
as to the meaning and effect of constitutional and statutory 
provisions.  [Citation.]  The question whether a statute or 
executive order imposes a mandate is a question of law.  
[Citation.]  Thus, we review the entire record before the 
Commission . . . and independently determine whether it 
supports the Commission’s conclusion that the conditions here 
were not . . . mandates.”  (Department of Finance v. Commission 
on State Mandates (2016) 1 Cal.5th 749, 762.)  
B.  Analysis  
Respondents argue the Court of Appeal erred in finding 
the districts were legally compelled to comply with the funding 
entitlement regulations.  They further contend that although 
the Court of Appeal did not reach the issue, we should 
additionally find that the districts failed to establish they were 
practically compelled to comply with those regulations. 
 
 
Although the Commission’s arguments regarding this 
secondary issue fall within the scope of our order granting 
review, we decline to address them.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.516(b)(3) [“The court need not decide every issue the parties 
raise or the court specifies”].)  
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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1. Distinction between legal compulsion and practical 
compulsion   
When evaluating whether a statute or executive action 
compels compliance for purposes of subvention claims, we have 
identified two distinct theories of mandate:  legal compulsion 
and practical compulsion.  Legal compulsion occurs when a 
statute or executive action uses mandatory language that 
“ ‘require[s]’ or ‘command[s]’ ” a local entity to participate in a 
program or service.  (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 741; see Long 
Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of California (1990) 
225 Cal.App.3d 155, 174 [construing the term “mandates” in art. 
XIII B, § 6 to mean “ ‘orders’ or ‘commands’ ”].)  Stated 
differently, legal compulsion is present when the local entity has 
a mandatory, legally enforceable duty to obey.  This standard is 
similar to the showing necessary to obtain a traditional writ of 
mandate, which requires the petitioning party to establish the 
respondent has “a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty 
to act. . . .  Mandate will not issue if the duty is . . . mixed with 
discretionary power.”  (Los Angeles County Prof. Peace Officers’ 
Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 866, 869.)    
Thus, as a general matter, a local entity’s voluntary or 
discretionary decision to undertake an activity cannot be said to 
be legally compelled, even if that decision results in certain 
mandatory actions.  In Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, for example, 
we held that school districts were not entitled to reimbursement 
for costs associated with a law that imposed new requirements 
related to the administration of certain voluntary, state-funded 
educational programs.  Under the original statutes governing 
these voluntary educational programs, “participating school 
districts [we]re granted state or federal funds to operate the 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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program, 
and 
[we]re 
required 
to 
establish . . . advisory 
committees [to] . . . administer the program.”  (Id. at p. 732.)  
The new law required participating districts to make those 
advisory committee meetings open to the public and provide the 
public notice of the meetings and post meeting agendas.  
In rejecting the districts’ reimbursement claim for those 
new open meeting requirements, we explained that because the 
“notice and agenda provisions [were merely] mandatory 
elements of [voluntary] programs” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 731), the districts were not legally compelled to comply with 
those provisions.  (See id. at p. 742 [“activities undertaken at the 
option or discretion of a local government entity . . . do not 
trigger 
a 
state 
mandate 
and 
hence 
do 
not 
require 
reimbursement of funds — even if the local entity is obliged to 
incur costs as a result of its discretionary decision to participate 
in a particular program or practice”]; but see San Diego Unified 
School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
859, 887 [declining to adopt a bright-line rule precluding 
reimbursement 
“whenever 
an 
entity 
makes 
an 
initial 
discretionary decision that in turn triggers mandated costs”].) 
Kern also discussed the concept of “practical compulsion,” 
a theory of mandate that arises when a statutory scheme does 
not command a local entity to engage in conduct, but rather 
induces 
compliance 
through 
the 
imposition 
of 
severe 
consequences that leave the local entity no reasonable 
alternative but to comply.  (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
pp. 748–752.)  Relying on our decision in City of Sacramento, 
supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, the claimants in Kern argued that we 
should construe section’s 6’s mandate provision (see Cal. Const., 
art. XIII B, § 6) to encompass both legal and practical 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
compulsion.  City of Sacramento addressed a different provision 
in article XIII B — section 9 — which lists various categories of 
appropriations that are excluded from the spending limitations 
article XIII B otherwise places on state and local governments.  
One of those exceptions excludes “[a]ppropriations required to 
comply with mandates of . . . the federal government.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. XIII B, § 9, subd. (b).)  As summarized in Kern, our 
decision in City of Sacramento examined whether section 9’s 
federal mandate exclusion applied to a federal law that provided 
substantial 
tax 
incentives 
for 
states 
to 
extend 
their 
unemployment insurance programs to cover public employees.  
To retain these significant tax advantages, our Legislature 
passed a statute requiring that government entities (including 
local entities) include their employees within the state 
unemployment program.  The question we had to decide was 
whether the federal law constituted a “federal mandate,” which 
would mean that local governments could exclude the costs of 
complying with the new state statute from their constitutional 
spending limits.  (Kern, at p. 749.) 
Although we found the federal law did not legally compel 
states to extend unemployment insurance coverage to all public 
employees, we nevertheless concluded that “because the 
financial consequences to the state and its residents of failing to 
participate in the federal plan were so onerous and punitive — 
we characterized the consequences as amounting to ‘certain and 
severe federal penalties’ including ‘double . . . taxation’ and 
other ‘draconian’ measures [citation] — as a practical matter, 
for purposes of article XIII B, section 9, the state was mandated 
to participate in the federal plan to extend unemployment 
insurance coverage.”  (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 749 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
[summarizing City of Sacramento]; see City of Sacramento, 
supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 76 [practical compulsion determination 
“must depend on such factors as the nature and purpose of the 
federal program; whether its design suggests an intent to coerce; 
when state and/or local participation began; the penalties, if 
any, assessed for withdrawal or refusal to participate or comply; 
and 
any 
other 
legal 
and 
practical 
consequences 
of 
nonparticipation, noncompliance, or withdrawal”].)  
The claimants in Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, argued that 
for purposes of consistency we should likewise construe the state 
mandate provision in article XIII B, section 6 to encompass both 
legal and practical compulsion.  (See Kern, at p. 750 [“claimants 
argue, the word ‘mandate,’ used in two separate sections of 
article XIII B, should not be given two different meanings”].)  
The Department, however, contended we should interpret 
section 6’s mandate provision more “narrowly . . . to include only 
programs in which local entities are legally compelled to 
participate.”  (Id. at p. 751.) 
We declined to resolve that issue, explaining that even if 
we were to assume “that our construction of the term ‘federal 
mandate’ . . . applies equally in the context of article XIII B, 
section 6” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 751), the claimants had 
failed to identify any “ ‘certain and severe . . . penalties’ ” or 
other “ ‘draconian’ consequences” that “reasonably could 
constitute . . . a ‘de facto’ reimbursable mandate.”  (Id. at 
p. 754.)  Rather, the record demonstrated that the new laws 
merely required each school district to decide whether to 
continue participating in the voluntary school programs, “even 
though the school district also must incur program-related costs 
associated with the notice and agenda requirements . . . .  
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
Presumably, a school district will continue to participate only if 
it determines that . . . , on balance, the funded program, even 
with strings attached, is deemed beneficial.”  (Id. at p. 753, 
italics omitted.)5  
2.  The districts have failed to show legal compulsion  
We first address the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the 
districts were legally compelled to comply with the funding 
entitlement regulations.  Education Code section 70901, 
subdivision (b)(6)(A) directs the Board of Governors to 
“[e]stablish minimum conditions entitling districts to receive 
state aid for support of community colleges” and to periodically 
review whether districts are in compliance with those 
conditions.  (See ante, at pp. 8–9.)  The implementing 
regulations, in turn, set forth the applicable funding entitlement 
requirements and describe how the Chancellor is to proceed in 
the event of noncompliance.  The regulations direct that after 
soliciting a response from a noncompliant district, the 
 
5  
While Kern’s general discussion of the distinction between 
legal and practical compulsion is helpful for evaluating the 
parties’ arguments in this case, the specific nature of the 
mandate claim at issue in Kern is factually somewhat distinct 
from the districts’ claims here.  As discussed above, 
participation in the underlying school programs that triggered 
the challenged costs in Kern was completely voluntary.  (Kern, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 744.)  Thus, nonparticipation in the 
underlying programs would have left the claimant school 
districts in the same position they would have been in otherwise, 
i.e., with no additional costs.  By contrast, as discussed in more 
detail below, the districts here allege that choosing not to comply 
with the funding entitlement regulations results in unavoidable 
severe consequences, namely placing their state aid in jeopardy.   
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
Chancellor may pursue a variety of remedies that range from 
accepting the district’s response to an inquiry to withholding 
some or all of the district’s state aid.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 
5, § 51102, subd. (b).) 
We are not persuaded that this enforcement scheme 
legally compels the districts to comply with funding entitlement 
regulations.  As summarized above, Education Code section 
70901, subdivision (b) required the Board of Governors to adopt 
two distinct sets of regulations:  the operating standards 
regulations that the Commission previously found to impose 
mandates (see Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(1)) and the funding 
entitlement regulations at issue in this case (see Ed. Code, § 
70901, subd. (b)(6)).  (See ante, at pp. 7–9.)  Unlike the 
mandatory language governing the operating standards 
regulations, which directs the Board to “[e]stablish minimum 
standards as required by law” (Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(1), 
italics added) and which requires that districts shall establish 
policies consistent with those standards (see Ed. Code, § 70902, 
subd. (b) [“board of each community college district shall” 
establish policies and procedures that are consistent with the 
operating 
standards]), 
Education 
Code 
section 
70901, 
subdivision (b)(6) and its implementing regulations contain no 
language “command[ing]” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 741) 
that the districts comply with the funding entitlement 
regulations.  Instead, those provisions make clear that districts 
that fail to comply may be subject to certain consequences, the 
most severe of which is withholding of state funds.  (See Ed. 
Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(6)(A) [directing board to establish 
minimum conditions “entitling districts to receive state aid”; 
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, subd. (b) [describing actions 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
Board may take in response to noncompliance, including 
withholding of state aid].)   
While the districts argue that the threat of such a penalty 
effectively forces community colleges to comply with the 
regulations (an issue discussed in more detail below), there is 
nothing in the statute or regulations that creates a mandatory 
legal obligation that they do so, which is the appropriate test for 
legal compulsion.  If a community college district is willing to 
risk the possibility of losing some or all its state aid, there does 
not appear to be any mechanism (or at least none the parties 
have identified) that would allow the Chancellor or any other 
state entity to compel compliance as a matter of law.6 
 
6   
At oral argument, counsel for the districts argued that 
several of the funding entitlement regulations include the word 
“shall,” which is generally indicative of a mandatory duty.  (See 
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 51002 [district “shall [¶] . . . adopt 
regulations consistent with the standards of scholarship 
contained in articles 2 through 5 (commencing with section 
55020),” italics added]; 51004 [district “shall [¶] . . . adopt 
regulations consistent with regulations contained in articles 6 
and 7 (commencing with section 55060),” italics added]; 51006 
[district “shall adopt” a policy making courses open to any 
enrolled students, italics added].)  Those regulations, however, 
must be read in the context of — and in conjunction with — 
Education Code section 70901, subdivision (b)(6) and Regulation 
51002, which explain the consequences of failing to comply with 
regulations, i.e., the Chancellor and Board of Governors are 
given discretionary authority to withhold state aid.  (See ante, 
at pp. 8–9.)  Regardless of whether those consequences are 
sufficient to support a claim of practical compulsion (an issue we 
do not reach here [see post at pp. 27–29]), the risk that funding 
might be withheld does not create a mandatory legal duty to 
comply with the regulations, which is the applicable test for 
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, 
finding that the districts were legally compelled to comply with 
the regulations because the funding entitlement regulations 
“apply to the underlying core functions of the community 
colleges, functions compelled by state law.”  In support, the court 
cited to Education Code section 66010.4, which describes the 
“missions and functions” of community colleges, including 
(among 
other 
things) 
“academic 
and 
vocational 
instruction . . . through but not beyond the second year of 
college.”  (Ed. Code, § 66010.4, subd. (a)(1).)  In the appellate 
court’s view, the funding entitlement regulations “direct the 
community college districts to take specific steps in fulfilling 
those legally compelled core mission functions, including 
requirements pertaining to scholarship, degrees, courses, 
campuses, counseling, and curriculum.”   
We do not dispute that many of the funding entitlement 
regulations are “in connection with” or relate to the “core 
functions” that community colleges are required to perform.  We 
are not persuaded, however, that such a relationship is 
sufficient to establish legal compulsion.  As we have previously 
explained, “[T]he proper focus under a legal compulsion inquiry 
is upon the nature of claimants’ participation in the underlying 
programs themselves.”  (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 743.)  
Applying that standard here, the proper inquiry is whether the 
language of the funding entitlement provisions legally obligates 
 
legal compulsion.  (Cf., Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 745 
[regulation directing that school districts “shall” establish 
certain policies did not create a legal duty where other 
provisions made clear compliance was only necessary if the 
school districts chose to participate in a voluntary program].)      
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
the districts to comply with the conditions described therein, not 
whether those conditions relate to the core functions of the 
districts.  Section 70901, subdivision (b)(6) provides that 
compliance with the minimum conditions “entitl[es] districts to 
receive state aid” (italics added), while Regulation 51102, 
subdivision (b) describes the remedial actions the Chancellor 
may impose in the event of noncompliance, up to and including 
withholding of state aid.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, 
subd. (b)(5).)  Because these provisions do not create an 
enforceable obligation to comply with the funding entitlement 
conditions, but rather describe conditions the districts must 
satisfy to avoid the possibility of having their state aid reduced 
or withheld, the enactments are not “mandates” under a legal 
compulsion theory.    
The Court of Appeal also disagreed with the Commission’s 
conclusion that compliance with the funding entitlement 
regulations is not “legally compelled” because “community 
colleges are free to decline state aid.”  In rejecting this 
argument, the court noted that various statutes and 
constitutional provisions require the state to provide the 
community college system sufficient funding to carry out its 
mission.  Without citing a specific source, the court further 
explained that in the most recent year for which information 
was available “more than half of California community college 
funding came from the state General Fund. . . . [while] other 
funding sources . . . provided significantly less support.  (Italics 
omitted.)   Like public school districts in general, community 
college districts are dependent on state aid.”   
While the Court of Appeal may be correct that some (if not 
most) community college districts are heavily reliant on state 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
aid — and thus have no true alternative but to act in a manner 
that secures their funding — those arguments sound in 
practical compulsion, rather than legal compulsion.7  (See 
generally Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 731, 751 [practical 
compulsion occurs when the local entity has “ ‘no true option or 
choice’ ”]; City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 74 [finding 
practical compulsion where the consequences of noncompliance 
“were so far beyond the realm of practical reality that they left 
the state ‘without discretion’ to depart from federal standards”].)    
The Court of Appeal’s reasoning is consistent with the 
primary argument the districts have raised throughout these 
proceedings, which also sounds in practical compulsion.  In the 
trial court, for example, the districts argued that “the most 
serious error in the [Commission’s] decision is the conclusion 
that the ‘minimum conditions’ of receiving state aid are not 
mandates because the Colleges may choose not to receive state 
funding.  That conclusion is erroneous because the Colleges 
truly have no meaningful choice [but to comply].”  In support, 
they cited City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, a case that 
turned on practical compulsion.  (See ante, at pp. 17–19.)  The 
districts’ briefing in the Court of Appeal contains essentially 
identical language, asserting that because noncompliance with 
 
7   
The administrative record includes a letter the Chancellor 
submitted to the Commission in 2008 acknowledging that three 
(and in some prior years four) community college districts did 
not receive any general apportionment funding because they 
derived sufficient revenue from other sources (primarily 
property tax allocations from their respective counties) to meet 
their funding needs.  This evidence suggests that some districts 
may rely on state funding more heavily than others.   
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
the funding entitlement regulations could result in the “drastic 
loss” 
of 
funding 
necessary 
“to 
provide 
educational 
services, . . . the [c]olleges have no true choice but to comply.”  
Those same arguments remain central in the districts’ briefing 
before this court, where they again contend that “[t]he most 
serious 
error 
in 
the . . . Commission 
decision 
is . . . the 
conclusion that the minimum conditions of receiving State aid 
are not mandates because the [districts] may somehow choose 
not to receive state funding.  This conclusion is erroneous 
because the [districts] have no true choice.  . . . [¶] . . .  Put 
simply, the [districts] contend community colleges cannot 
function without state aid.”8  Like the Court of Appeal, the 
districts’ focus on the consequences of noncompliance, and the 
purported absence of any true choice, sounds in practical rather 
than legal compulsion.  That the financial situation of some (or 
most) districts may leave them with no reasonable alternative 
but to comply with the funding entitlement regulations does not 
transform this case into one involving legal compulsion.     
In sum, while many of the directives in the funding 
entitlement regulations relate to the districts’ core educational 
functions, that is insufficient to show legal compulsion.  Rather, 
to establish legal compulsion, the claimants had to show they 
had a mandatory duty to comply with the regulations.  The 
districts have pointed to no such provision.  Instead, they have 
 
8   
The districts’ answers to respondents’ petitions for review 
likewise focused on the consequences of noncompliance, arguing 
that they had not “voluntarily” complied with the funding 
entitlement regulations, but rather were “required to do so at 
risk of drastic fiscal loss of funds” and had no “true choice” but 
to comply given their reliance on state aid.    
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
asserted that because they rely on state aid to carry out their 
core functions, they have no true choice but to comply.  For the 
reasons discussed above, we conclude that argument should be 
evaluated under the lens of practical, rather than legal, 
compulsion.        
3. On remand, the Court of Appeal should consider 
practical compulsion  
The districts also argue that regardless of whether legal 
compulsion applies in this case, the record makes clear they 
were compelled to comply with the funding entitlement 
regulations as a practical matter.  (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal. 4th 
at p. 731 [“we do not foreclose the possibility that a reimbursable 
state mandate might be found in  circumstances short of legal 
compulsion”]; 
id. 
at 
p. 
736 
[leaving 
open 
question 
“whether . . . there are some circumstances in which a state 
mandate may be found in the absence of legal compulsion”]; id. 
at p. 744; see also Department of Finance, supra, 170 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1365–1366 [“if a local government 
participates ‘voluntarily,’ i.e., without legal compulsion or 
compulsion as a practical matter, in a program with a rule 
requiring increased costs, there is no requirement of state 
reimbursement”].)   
The Department, however, contends (as it did in Kern) 
that we should narrowly interpret article XIII B, section 6 to 
require reimbursement only when a local government has been 
legally compelled to provide a new program or higher level of 
service.  (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 736 [“the 
Department . . . asserts that article XIII B, section 6, reflects an 
intent on the part of the drafters and the electorate to limit 
reimbursement to costs that are forced upon local governments 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
as a matter of legal compulsion”].)  Alternatively, respondents 
collectively argue that even if practical compulsion is a valid 
theory of mandate (or is assumed to be so), claimants in this case 
have failed to introduce any evidence establishing that 
noncompliance with the applicable regulations is “reasonably 
certain to [result in] ‘ “severe,” ’ ‘ “draconian” ’ consequences.”  
(Quoting Kern, at pp. 750–751; see id. at p. 751 [finding it 
“unnecessary to resolve whether” practical compulsion is a valid 
theory of mandate where claimants had failed to demonstrate 
noncompliance would result in severe penalties].)  More 
specifically, respondents contend the districts have failed to 
show either that noncompliance is likely to result in withholding 
of a significant amount of state aid,9 or that the risk of such 
withholding leaves them with no true alternative but to comply.    
Because the Court of Appeal found the districts were 
compelled to comply with the funding entitlement regulations 
as a matter of legal compulsion, it chose not to address any of 
 
9   
As noted above, there appears to be substantial overlap 
between the directives described in the operating standards 
regulations (which the Commission has already found to qualify 
as mandates) and those set forth in the funding entitlement 
regulations.  (See ante, at pp. 8, fn. 3; 13–14.)  Thus, while the 
record before us is not clear on the point, the districts may 
already be compliant with (and reimbursed for) many or most of 
the activities described in the funding entitlement regulations.  
Given that the funding entitlement regulations direct that any 
remedy the Chancellor chooses to impose must relate to the 
“extent and gravity of noncompliance” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 
51102, subd. (c)), the fact that districts may already be 
compliant with (and compensated for) many of the conditions 
described in the funding entitlement regulations could be 
relevant to determining the appropriate remedy, including the 
size and scope of any withholding.         
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
the parties’ arguments regarding practical compulsion (also 
referred to as “nonlegal compulsion” [Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th.at 
p. 754]).  Having now rejected the Court of Appeal’s conclusion 
regarding legal compulsion, we find it “appropriate to remand 
for the [court] to resolve . . . in the first instance” whether the 
districts may be entitled to reimbursement under a theory of 
nonlegal compulsion.  (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 1127, 1149 [“It is appropriate to remand for the Court 
of Appeal to resolve . . . in the first instance” issues that the 
court chose “not [to] reach because of its holdings”]; see People 
v. Goolsby (2015) 62 Cal.4th 360, 368 [reversing finding that 
Pen. Code, § 654 barred retrying defendant for a lesser offense 
and remanding with directions that appellate court “decide . . . 
in the first instance” the unresolved question of whether retrial 
was barred under double jeopardy principles]; see Central Coast 
Forest Assn. v. Fish & Game Com. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 594, 606; In 
re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 820.)10    
 
10  
The concurrence agrees that the Court of Appeal erred in 
finding the statutes and regulations the parties have relied on 
throughout this litigation (namely Education Code section 
70901, subdivision (b)(6) and Regulation 51102) legally compel 
the districts to comply with the funding entitlement regulations.  
Rather than remand the matter to address only practical 
compulsion, however, the concurrence would remand with 
directions that the appellate court also consider whether a 
different section of the Education Code, section 70902, might be 
interpreted to legally compel the districts to comply with the 
challenged regulations.  The success or failure of such an 
argument, the concurrence explains, would appear to turn on 
whether there may be another “enforcement mechanism” apart 
from the provisions in Regulation 51102 that could be used to 
compel the districts to comply with the funding entitlement 
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the matter 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
 
regulations.  (See conc. opn. of Liu, J, post, at pp. 3–5.)  The 
concurrence identifies no such alternative mechanism, but 
hypothesizes that because one might exist, we should provide 
the parties an opportunity to explore the issue further. 
As the concurrence expressly acknowledges, no party has 
ever presented such a theory at any point during this litigation, 
which has now been ongoing for almost two decades.  (See conc. 
opn. of Liu, J, post, at p. 5.)  From the start of the proceedings, 
the districts’ reimbursement claim has focused on Education 
Code section 70901 and its implementing regulations.  That is 
not particularly surprising given that section 70901 is the 
statute that describes (and distinguishes) the operating 
standards regulations and the funding entitlement regulations.  
In any event, as a court of review, our role is to evaluate the 
arguments the parties have presented, not “construct 
[alternative] theor[ies that might be] supportive” of their claims.  
(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; see also In re 
Harris (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1100 [“it is not our role to 
make arguments for petitioner or to consider arguments not 
raised or . . . addressed below,” fn. omitted]; cf. Jibilian v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 862, 866, fn. 3 [“it is 
not our role to construct theories or arguments that would 
undermine the judgment”].)  Accordingly, we decline to direct 
the Court of Appeal to consider undeveloped legal theories that 
neither party has advocated for.  
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
 
 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
S262663 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that 
community college districts are legally compelled to comply with 
the regulations setting forth the “minimum conditions entitling 
districts to receive state aid” (Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(6)(A)) 
based on its view that the regulations “direct the community 
college districts to take specific steps in fulfilling th[eir] 
legally-compelled core mission functions.”  I agree with today’s 
opinion that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning and conclusion are 
incorrect, and I therefore concur in the judgment of reversal.  
However, given the way the parties argued this case, I do not 
think we have enough information to conclude that the 
minimum conditions are not legally compelled.  I would remand 
for further consideration of this issue in light of the relevant 
statutory and regulatory provisions. 
I. 
This case concerns the legal obligations of California’s 
community college districts.  Two sets of potential obligations 
are at issue:  “minimum standards” and “minimum conditions.”  
(Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(1), (b)(6).)  These two sets of 
regulations describe a variety of requirements related to 
community colleges’ operations and academic offerings, and 
they overlap substantially. 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
It is uncontested that the community college districts are 
legally obligated to comply with the minimum standards, 
making costs incurred in compliance with those regulations 
subject to reimbursement under provisions added to the 
California Constitution by Proposition 13.  (See Dept. of Finance 
v. Com. on State Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, 743 [costs that 
are “legally compelled . . . constitute reimbursable state 
mandates”].)  The court below determined that the districts are 
legally compelled to comply with the minimum conditions 
regulations as well.  We are asked to review that decision. 
The Education Code tells us where to look to understand 
the 
legal 
obligations 
of 
community 
college 
districts.  
Section 70900 of the Education Code says that “local districts 
shall carry out the functions specified in Section 70902.”  (Ed. 
Code, § 70900.)  Section 70902 of the Education Code 
(section 70902) then sets forth in detail the obligations of 
community college districts.  Certain provisions of that section 
specifically instruct districts to comply with at least some of the 
minimum standards.  For instance, subdivision (b) states that 
“each community college district shall [¶] . . . [¶] [e]stablish 
academic standards, probation and dismissal and readmission 
policies, and graduation requirements not inconsistent with the 
minimum standards” and shall “[e]mploy and assign all 
personnel not inconsistent with the minimum standards.”  (Ed. 
Code, § 70902, subd. (b), (b)(3), (b)(4).) 
Section 70902 does not specifically mention the minimum 
conditions.  But several provisions of section 70902 appear to 
create broad legal requirements for community college districts 
that might include compliance with those regulations.  For 
example, subdivision (a)(2) says districts “shall establish rules 
and regulations not inconsistent with the regulations of the 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Liu, J., concurring 
3 
board of governors,” the state’s supervisory entity that issues 
both the minimum standards and minimum conditions 
regulations.  (Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. (a)(2); see also § 70901, 
subd. (b)(1), (6) [requiring board of governors to establish 
minimum standards and minimum conditions].)  Section 70902 
also requires districts to initiate and operate their programs in 
ways that are “not in conflict with or inconsistent with, or 
preempted by, any law and that [are] not in conflict with the 
purposes for which community college districts are established.”  
(Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. (a)(1).)  These provisions could be read 
to require community colleges to comply with some or all of the 
specific requirements of the minimum conditions regulations. 
Because this statutory language is not free of ambiguity, 
we look to applicable regulations to discern what consequences 
may flow from noncompliance with the minimum conditions in 
order 
to 
decide 
whether 
they 
are 
legally 
compelled.  
Sections 51100 and 51102 of title 5 of the California Code of 
Regulations govern the investigation and enforcement of the 
minimum conditions.  When a district is found to be in 
noncompliance with the minimum conditions, section 51102 
describes several penalties that may be imposed, which include 
withholding or reduction of state funding.  (Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 5, § 51102, subd. (b).)  But section 51100 further instructs 
that “[t]he enforcement procedures and remedies set forth in 
this subchapter are in addition to any and all other enforcement 
mechanisms and remedies provided by law for violation of the 
provisions of this chapter” (i.e., the minimum conditions).  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51100, subd. (d).) 
Section 51100 does not say what other enforcement 
mechanisms and remedies are available for violations of the 
minimum conditions.  And we have received no briefing or 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Liu, J., concurring 
4 
argument about what legal obligations related to the minimum 
conditions may be imposed by section 70902 or what 
enforcement mechanisms besides withholding of funds are 
contemplated by section 51100.  Without further information 
about the meaning of those provisions, I do not see how we can 
determine whether compliance with the minimum conditions is 
legally compelled. 
II. 
Today’s opinion focuses instead on the language of 
section 70901 of the Education Code, the part of the Code that 
describes the obligations of the state board of governors.  (See 
Ed. Code, § 70900 [“The board of governors shall carry out the 
functions specified in Section 70901, [and] local districts shall 
carry out the functions specified in Section 70902 . . . .”].)  The 
court reasons that because subdivision (b)(6) of section 70901 
“and its implementing regulations contain no language 
‘command[ing]’ [citation] that the districts comply with the 
[minimum conditions] regulations,” compliance with the 
minimum conditions is not compelled by statute.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 21.) 
But, as noted, section 70901 does not set forth the legal 
duties of community college districts; it addresses the duties of 
the state board of governors.  The statute that describes the 
legal responsibilities of community college districts is 
section 70902, which today’s opinion does not consider in its 
assessment of the minimum conditions. 
Further, the court explains the procedure under 
section 51102 of the regulations by which state funding may 
potentially be withheld from districts for noncompliance with 
the minimum conditions.  It then declares that this is “the most 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.  
v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Liu, J., concurring 
5 
severe” consequence for noncompliance.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 21.)  If that were true, I would agree that the consequences 
for noncompliance with the minimum conditions are insufficient 
to impose a legal mandate.  But we do not know whether 
withholding of funds is “the most severe” consequence districts 
may face.  The court does not discuss section 51100, 
subdivision (d) — the regulation that makes that consequence 
nonexclusive — nor do we have any information about what 
other consequences are authorized by the regulations. 
The parties have not supplied briefing or argument on the 
language in section 70902 that may obligate districts to follow 
the minimum conditions or the provision of section 51100 of the 
regulations that makes withholding of funds a nonexclusive 
remedy for noncompliance.  They have focused instead on the 
language of section 70901, as the court does.  But we must 
consider all relevant provisions before reaching a conclusion as 
to whether compliance with the minimum conditions is legally 
compelled.  Indeed, the fact that neither the parties nor the 
courts below have discussed section 70902 or section 51100 is 
exactly why I would not go as far as the court does today.  (Cf. 
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29–30, fn. 10.)  I would hold only that the 
Court of Appeal’s analysis was incorrect and remand for that 
court to consider in the first instance any other theories of legal 
or practical compulsion, including any mandate that may be 
imposed by section 70902 or section 51100.  Without due 
consideration of those provisions, I would not hold, as today’s 
opinion does, that community college districts are not legally 
compelled to comply with the minimum conditions. 
I concur only in the judgment of reversal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Coast Community College District v. Commission 
on State Mandates 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 47 Cal.App.5th 415 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S262663 
Date Filed:  August 15, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Sacramento 
Judge:  Christopher E. Krueger 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Dannis Woliver Kelley, Christian M. Keiner, William B. Tunick, 
Juliane S. Rossiter, Chelsea Olson Murphy and Chelsea A. Tibbs for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Lozano Smith, Sloan R. Simmons, Nicholas J. Clair; and Robert Tuerck 
for California School Boards Association’s Education Legal Alliance as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Juliana F. Gmur and Camille Shelton for Defendant and Respondent.  
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, 
State Solicitor General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State 
Solicitor General, Douglas J. Woods and Thomas S. Patterson, 
 
 
Assistant Attorneys General, Samuel T. Harbourt, Deputy State 
Solicitor General, Paul Stein, Tamar Pachter and P. Patty Li, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Christian M. Keiner 
Dannis Woliver Kelley 
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 645 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 978-4040 
 
Juliana F. Gmur 
Senior Commission Counsel 
980 9th Street, Suite 300 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 323-2611 
 
Samuel T. Harbourt 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3919