Title: P. v. Montes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S105781
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2003

1
Filed 7/31/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE,  
) 
 
) 
S105781 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 3 
 
v. 
) 
C036904 
 
 
) 
 
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ MONTES, 
) 
 
) 
Tehama County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. NCR52438 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) (section 186.22(b)(5)) 
provides that a defendant who commits “a felony punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison for life” for the benefit of a criminal street gang “shall not be 
paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.”  We granted 
review to determine whether this provision applies (a) if the defendant commits a 
felony which, together with the Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) 
(section 12022.53(d)) enhancement results in a life term, or (b) only if the 
defendant commits a felony that, by its own terms, provides for a life sentence. 
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that section 186.22(b)(5) applies 
only where the felony by its own terms provides for a life sentence. 
 
2
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On March 8, 2000, defendant shot a rival gang member several times, 
inflicting serious injuries requiring surgery.  Following a court trial, defendant was 
convicted of attempted murder.  (Pen. Code §§ 664, 187.)1  The court also found 
true that defendant intentionally discharged a firearm while committing the 
offense (§§ 12022.5, 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)), inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 
12022.7, 12022.53, subd. (d)), participated in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, 
subd. (a)), and acted for the benefit of that gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).  The trial 
court sentenced defendant as follows: the midterm of seven years for attempted 
murder (§§ 664, 187),2 plus a consecutive term of 10 years for the criminal street 
gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), plus a consecutive term of 25 years 
to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). 
The Court of Appeal, however, held that the trial court erred in imposing 
the 10-year enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (hereafter 
section 186.22(b)(1)) and modified the judgment.  It struck the section 
186.22(b)(1) enhancement and instead imposed the 15-year minimum parole 
eligibility date mandated by section 186.22(b)(5),3 which applies when a 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.  
2  
The Court of Appeal and the parties refer to defendant’s conviction as one 
of “attempted second degree murder.”  This terminology is erroneous.  In People 
v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 665-669, we held that attempted murder is not 
divided into degrees.  Instead, we stated that “an attempt to commit murder that is 
‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’ does not establish a greater degree of 
attempted murder but, rather, sets forth a penalty provision prescribing an 
increased sentence (a greater base term) to be imposed upon a defendant’s 
conviction of attempted murder when the additional specified circumstances are 
found true by the trier of fact.”  (Id. at p. 669, fn. omitted.) 
3  
In People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101, we held that section 
186.22(b)(5) is properly characterized as an alternate penalty provision. 
 
3
defendant is convicted of “a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison 
for life,” and provides that the defendant “shall not be paroled until a minimum of 
15 calendar years have been served.”  The Court of Appeal reasoned that 
attempted murder was “a felony punishable by imprisonment . . . for life,” within 
the meaning of section 186.22(b)(5) because the underlying felony of attempted 
murder and the section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement together resulted in a 
life term.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified and directed 
the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that reflected the 
modifications. 
The Attorney General disagrees.  He argues that section 186.22(b)(5) 
applies only where the underlying felony itself provides for a life sentence, ruling 
out any enhancement not included in the definition of the underlying felony.  
Under this view, the trial court correctly computed defendant’s sentence.  For the 
reasons stated below, we agree and reverse the Court of Appeal’s modification of 
judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The STEP Act  
 
Penal Code section 186.22(b)(5) is a provision that was added to the 
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act).  
(§ 186.20 et seq.)  The impetus behind the STEP Act, which was enacted in 1988, 
was the Legislature’s recognition that “California is in a state of crisis which has 
been caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and 
commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods.  
These activities, both individually and collectively, present a clear and present 
danger to the public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected.”  
 
4
(§ 186.21.)  The Act’s express purpose is “to seek the eradication of criminal 
activity by street gangs . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
 
On March 7, 2000, the California electorate passed Proposition 21, which 
amended the STEP Act.  As is relevant here, section 186.22(b)(1) now provides 
that, “Except as provided by paragraphs (4) and (5), any person who is convicted 
of a felony committed for the benefit of . . . any criminal street gang, with the 
specific intent to promote, further or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 
members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and consecutive to the 
punishment prescribed for the felony . . . , be punished as follows:  [¶] (A) Except 
as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the person shall be punished by an 
additional term of two, three, or four years at the court’s discretion. [¶] (B) If the 
felony is a serious felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, the 
person shall be punished by an additional term of five years. [¶] (C) If the felony is 
a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be 
punished by an additional term of 10 years.”   
 
Additionally, Proposition 21 renumbered section 186.22, former 
subdivision (b)(4) as section 186.22(b)(5).  Its substantive language was 
unchanged.  Section 186.22(b)(5) provides:  “Except as provided in paragraph (4), 
any person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum 
of 15 calendar years have been served.” 
B. Court of Appeal Opinion 
 
The Court of Appeal first noted that a defendant is subject to the section 
186.22(b)(5) alternate penalty provision when a court “imposes a life term on a 
felony committed for the gang’s benefit.”  “This raises the question,” stated the 
Court of Appeal, “whether the phrase ‘felony punishable by imprisonment in the 
 
5
state prison for life’ in section 186.22(b)(5) means the underlying felony in the 
abstract or the felony actually committed, including conduct that results in 
enhanced punishment.”   
 
The Court of Appeal believed that because the “Legislature did not specify 
that the felony be punishable by a ‘base term’ of imprisonment in the state prison 
for life, nor did it expressly include felonies punishable by life imprisonment as 
the result of an enhancement,” the phrase “felony punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison for life” was ambiguous.  As such, “courts must construe the 
ambiguity in favor of the defendant, giving him the benefit of every reasonable 
doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of the statute.  
[Citations.]  This ‘rule of lenity’ is an appropriate ‘tiebreaker’ where there are 
equally plausible interpretations of law. [Citation.]”4  The Court of Appeal, 
because it found “no logical reason why a felony punishable by life imprisonment 
as a result of an enhancement should be treated differently [than a felony 
punishable by a ‘base term’ of imprisonment for life],” struck the section 
186.22(b)(1) enhancement and instead imposed the 15-year minimum eligible 
parole date of section 186.22(b)(5).  We disagree. 
                                             
 
4  
In People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57-58, we limited the applicability 
of the rule of lenity as a means of resolving a perceived ambiguity in a penal 
statute: “As Witkin explains, ‘The rule [of lenity] applies only if the court can do 
no more than guess what the legislative body intended; there must be an egregious 
ambiguity and uncertainty to justify invoking the rule.’ (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 
Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Introduction to Crimes, § 24, p. 53.) . . . [¶] Thus, 
although true ambiguities are resolved in a defendant’s favor, an appellate court 
should not strain to interpret a penal statute in defendant’s favor if it can fairly 
discern a contrary legislative intent.” 
 
6
C. Analysis 
 
As stated earlier, the STEP Act was enacted in 1988.  At that time, the 
language that now appears in section 186.22(b)(5) was contained in section 
186.22, subdivision (b)(3).5  While current section 186.22(b)(5) has been 
renumbered several times since 1988, the section’s substantive language has 
remained the same since 1988, through the voters’ passage of Proposition 21.6  
Where a voter initiative contains a provision that is identical to a provision 
previously enacted by the Legislature, in the absence of an indication of a contrary 
intent, we infer that the voters intended the provision to have the same meaning as 
the provision drafted by the Legislature.  (See People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
237, 241 [“Section 190.2 was enacted by voter initiative in 1978, but the language 
of its subdivision (a)(2) is identical to a provision that the Legislature enacted as 
part of the 1977 death penalty law.  [Citation.]  In the absence of anything 
suggesting the contrary, we infer that the voters who enacted section 190.2 
intended subdivision (a)(2) to have the same meaning as the identically worded 
                                             
 
5  
As enacted in 1988, section 186.22, subdivision (b)(3) provided: “Any 
person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 
15 calendar years have been served.”  (Stats. 1988, ch. 1256, § 1, p. 4180.) 
6  
In 1991, when the STEP Act was repealed and reenacted effective January 
1, 1993 by the Legislature, then section 186.22, subdivision (b)(3) was 
renumbered as section 186.22, subdivision (b)(2).  (Stats. 1991, ch. 661, § 2, p. 
3039.)  Its language was unchanged.  In 1995, the Legislature amended the STEP 
Act.  At that time, then section 186.22, subdivision (b)(2) was renumbered as 
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4).  (Stats. 1995, ch. 377, § 2, p. 1942.)  Again, its 
language was unchanged.  The provision remained designated as former section 
186.22, subdivision (b)(4) until the passage of Proposition 21.  As noted, it was 
then renumbered as section 186.22(b)(5) by Proposition 21 and, while the 
initiative added the phrase “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (4),” the section’s 
substantive language otherwise remained unchanged. 
 
7
provision drafted by the Legislature.”].)7  Because there is no evidence of a 
contrary intent here, we infer that the voters intended section 186.22(b)(5) to have 
the same meaning as the identically worded provision drafted by the Legislature in 
1988. 
 
In People v. Casteneda (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 746-747, we stated: “ ‘In 
construing the relevant provisions of the STEP Act, as with any statute, we strive 
to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.’  [Citations.]”  “We begin by 
examining the words of the [statute]; if the statutory language is not ambiguous, 
then we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the 
language governs.  [Citations.]  If, however, the statutory language lacks clarity, 
we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved 
and the legislative history.  [Citation.]  In such situations, we strive to select the 
construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, 
with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statute[’s] general purposes.  
[Citation.]  We will avoid any interpretation that would lead to absurd 
consequences.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 581 
(Walker).)   
1. Ambiguity   
 
It is unclear, focusing solely on the statutory language, whether the section 
186.22(b)(5) phrase “a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 
                                             
 
7  
The issue here is distinguishable from the issue that was before us in Robert 
L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 904-905, where the voters, subsequent 
to failed legislative efforts to amend Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (d), 
passed Proposition 21, which contained the amended version of section 186.22, 
subdivision (d) that the Legislature failed to enact.  In this situation, we held that 
evidence of the intent behind those failed legislative efforts was irrelevant in 
ascertaining the voters’ intent because such evidence was not presented to the 
voters. 
 
8
life” is limited to those crimes where the underlying felony itself provides for a 
term of life imprisonment, or whether section 186.22(b)(5) also includes the 
situation where a defendant is sentenced to a term of life imprisonment because 
the underlying felony and enhancement together result in a life term.8  Because the 
statutory language lacks clarity, we strive to ascertain the meaning that most 
closely comports with the voters’ intent.  (Walker, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 581).9 
2. Voters’ Intent 
 
In 1988, when the predecessor to section 186.22(b)(5) was enacted, an 
enrolled bill report, written by the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, analyzed 
the financial impact of the provision: “This proposed provision relating to life 
terms [former section 186.22, subdivision (b)(3), now section 186.22(b)(5)] would 
apply to all lifers (except life without possibility of parole).  This would result in 
these lifers having their first parole hearing delayed, except for first degree 
murderers with a sentence of 25 years to life.  Attachment A summarizes the 
                                             
 
8  
Compare People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1127 (for purposes of 
sentencing under the three strikes law, the “felony” referred to in the section 
667.5, subdivision (c)(7) phrase “[a]ny felony punishable by [life] imprisonment” 
“must itself be punishable by life imprisonment [and does not] . . . include any 
felony the commission of which may result in a life sentence, even if the sentence 
is based on conduct other than the commission of the current felony”) with People 
v. Kramer (2003) 29 Cal.4th 720, 723 (for purposes of selecting a “base term” 
when determining the longest potential term of imprisonment, the section 654 
phrase “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different 
provisions of the law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the 
longest term of imprisonment” directs the sentencing court to consider the 
underlying offense plus any enhancements attached to the underlying offense).  At 
oral argument, the Attorney General conceded that section 186.22(b)(5) is 
ambiguous. 
9  
Defendant asks that we take judicial note of the Legislative Analyst’s 
Office Analysis of the 2001-2001 Budget Bill, Board of Prison Terms for the 
purpose of showing that determinate terms and indeterminate terms are markedly 
different.  This request is hereby granted. 
 
9
offenses punishable by imprisonment for life and the current and proposed 
minimum eligible parole dates (MEPD).  Those with a current MEPD of less than 
15 years would serve additional time.”  (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional 
Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2013 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) 
prepared for Governor Deukmejian (Sept. 1, 1988) p. 2.)  Attachment A to that 
report, entitled “Summary of Current and Proposed Minimum Eligible Parole 
Dates (MEPD) for Lifers” (Attachment A), listed nine felonies potentially 
impacted by the predecessor to section 186.22(b)(5).10 
                                             
 
10  
Attachment A reads in full: 
“SUMMARY OF CURRENT AND PROPOSED 
MINIMUM ELIGIBLE PAROLE DATES (MEPD) 
FOR LIFERS 
 
 
 
 
      Description of 
          Current Law        Proposed Law 
  “Penal Code 
             Crime and Penalty                MEPD                   MEPD        
“PC § 187/189      First degree murder with-     16 yrs. 8 mos.         No change 
         /189 
        out special circumstances 
 
 
 
        (25 yrs. to life) 
 
 
 
        Second degree murder 
 
    10 yrs. 
 
15 yrs. 
 
 
        (15 yrs. to life) 
 
“PC § 209 
        (a) Kidnapping for ransom          7 yrs. 
 
15 yrs. 
 
 
        [without death or injury] 
 
 
        (life with possibility of parole) 
 
 
         
 
 
        (b) Kidnapping for robbery         7 yrs. 
 
15 yrs. 
 
 
        (life with possibility of parole) 
 
 
         
“PC § 217.1         Attempt to murder specified        7 yrs. 
 
15 yrs. 
 
 
        public officials (15 yrs. to life) 
 
 
 
          
“PC § 219 
        Train derailing [without death]   7 1/2 yrs.  
15 yrs. 
 
 
        (life with possibility of parole) 
 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
10
 
In each felony listed in Attachment A, the statute defining the felony itself 
provided for a life term.  Even those felonies in Attachment A that incorporate 
disparate elements (i.e., sections 667.51 and 667.7 [specified prior convictions] 
and section 12310 [exploding a device causing great bodily injury]), the life term 
is encased in the definition of the felony itself.  No statute listed in Attachment A 
looked beyond the language of the statute itself, namely, to another section of the 
Penal Code, in order to provide for a life term.   
 
The Court of Appeal in the present case looked to a different section of the 
Penal Code (section 12022.53(d)), not incorporated in the language of the felony 
provision itself (attempted murder), in order to find that the felony provided for a 
life term.  We decline to interpret the attempted murder statute in the manner 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“PC § 664 
        [P]remeditated attempted             7 yrs. 
 
15 yrs. 
 
 
        murder (life with possibil-         
 
 
        ity of parole) 
 
“PC § 667.51         [Lewd acts on child under 14]     7 1/2 yrs.  
15 yrs. 
 
 
        with 2 or more specified sex  
 
 
        crimes (15 yrs. to life) 
 
“PC § 667.7         [F]elony involving great bodily    10 yrs. 
 
15 yrs. 
 
 
        injury, [with] 2 prior separate 
 
 
        prison terms for specified 
 
 
        felonies (20 yrs. to life) 
 
“PC § 4500         Assault by life prisoner 
       9 yrs. 
 
15 yrs. 
 
 
        [without death] (life without  
 
 
        possibility of parole for 9 yrs.) 
 
 
         
“PC § 12310         Exploding destructive device        7 yrs. 
 
15 yrs.” 
 
 
        [causing] mayhem or [GBI] 
 
 
        (life with possibility of parole) 
 
11
suggested by the Court of Appeal because the enactment of a statute that provides 
for a term of life imprisonment is best left within the province of the Legislature.  
As we stated in People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 307: “Nor does [the 
dissent] explain why, if our Legislature intended a sentence enhancement to be 
‘part of the criminal offense to which it is attached’ [citation], it did not simply say 
so.  When the Legislature wishes to create a substantive offense having as one of 
its elements another substantive offense, it knows how to do so.”11 
 
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that section 12022.53(d), the 
firearm enhancement at issue here, was enacted in 1997 as part of the “10-20-Life” 
bill (Assem. Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.)), and thus predates Proposition 21 
by more than two years.  In that ensuing period leading up to Proposition 21, 
section 186.22(b)(5) was left intact by the Legislature and was left intact in 
Proposition 21.  
 
But section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), which was also enacted as part of 
Proposition 21 and contains new language,12 provides that where a defendant 
                                             
 
11  
While the Court of Appeal found support for its interpretation of section 
186.22(b)(5) by pointing to the fact that section 186.22(b)(1) “contemplate[s] 
enhancements” because it refers to “violent felonies” that incorporate “specified 
enhancements,” such as gun use or causing great bodily injury (see, e.g., § 667.5, 
subd. (c)(8)), we are not persuaded.  In this particular violent felony, like the 
felonies in Attachment A that incorporate disparate elements, the statute defining 
the felony provision itself contains the so-called enhancement.  The Court of 
Appeal erred in the present case because it incorporated into the attempted murder 
statute a firearm enhancement that is not contained within the definition of the 
attempted murder statute. 
12  
Current section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4) was added by Proposition 21.  It 
provides in full: “Any person who is convicted of a felony enumerated in this 
paragraph committed for the benefit of . . . any criminal street gang . . . shall, upon 
conviction of that felony, be sentenced to an indeterminate term of life 
imprisonment with a minimum term of the determinate sentence calculated as the 
greater of: [¶] (A) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
12
commits a gang-related crime such as carjacking (§ 215) or home invasion robbery 
(§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)), he shall be “sentenced to an indeterminate term of life 
imprisonment with a minimum term of the determinate sentence calculated as the 
greater of: [¶] (A) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for 
the underlying conviction including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 
4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Because Proposition 21 enacted section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), a STEP 
Act provision that combines an underlying felony with an enhancement in order to 
establish a minimum term, it follows that section 186.22(b)(5) would have been 
written in the same manner if such was the intent of the voters. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
the underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 
4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2 [of the Penal Code], or 
any period prescribed by Section 3046, if the felony is any of the offenses 
enumerated in subparagraphs (B) or (C) of this paragraph. [¶] (B) Imprisonment in 
the state prison for 15 years if the felony is a home invasion robbery, in violation 
of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 213; carjacking, 
as defined in Section 215; a felony violation of Section 246; or a violation of 
section 12022.55. [¶] (C) Imprisonment in the state prison for seven years, if the 
felony is extortion, as defined in Section 519; or threats to victims and witnesses, 
as defined in Section 136.1.” 
 
13
 
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 186.22(b)(5) is also 
contrary to the voters’ intent when passing Proposition 21 to impose increased 
penalties on those who commit crimes to benefit a criminal street gang.  In the 
“FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS” section of Proposition 21, “[t]he people 
[found] and declare[d]” that:  [¶]  “Criminal street gangs have become more 
violent, bolder, and better organized in recent years.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary 
Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (b), p. 119.)  “Gang-related crimes 
pose a unique threat to the public because of gang members’ organization and 
solidarity.  Gang-related felonies should result in severe penalties.”  (Id., § 2, subd. 
(h), p. 119.)  “Dramatic changes are needed in the way we treat . . . criminal street 
gangs . . . if we are to avoid the predicted, unprecedented surge in . . . gang 
violence.”  (Id., § 2, subd. (k), p. 119.) 
 
Yet, if the Court of Appeal’s construction of section 186.22(b)(5) was 
correct, the circumstance that a defendant committed a crime to benefit a criminal 
street gang would be meaningless in every case where the defendant committed a 
gang-related felony providing for a determinate term13 and was found in violation 
of the section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement.  This is so because the 15-year 
minimum eligible parole date set by section 186.22(b)(5) would not impact the 
defendant’s sentence of 25 years to life under section 12022.53(d) since section 
2933.1, subdivision (a) mandates that a defendant convicted of a “violent felony” 
                                             
 
13  
As provided in section 12022.53, subdivisions (a) and (d), such gang-
related felonies include, but are not limited to: attempted murder (§ 664/187), 
mayhem (§ 203), kidnapping (§ 207), robbery (§ 211), assault with a firearm, 
semiautomatic firearm or machine gun on a peace officer or firefighter (§ 245, 
subd. (d)(1)-(3)), rape (§ 261), discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling or 
occupied motor vehicle (§ 246), and discharging a firearm from an occupied motor 
vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (d)). 
 
14
shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit.14  We decline to thwart 
the will of the voters in such a manner.15 
                                             
 
14  
Section 667.5, subdivision (c)(22) provides that a violation of section 
12022.53(d) is a violent felony.  Thus, a defendant found in violation of section 
12022.53(d) would not be eligible for parole for at least 21 years and three months 
for that violation alone. 
15 
We are mindful that there is a conflict in the Courts of Appeal on the proper 
application of section 186.22(b)(5) when the underlying felony itself provides for 
a term of 15 years to life, 25 years to life, or life without the possibility of parole.  
(See, e.g., People v. Harper (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 520, and compare, e.g., 
People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480, 485-486 with People v. Herrera 
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364-1365; but see Justice Grignon’s dissent as to 
this portion of the Herrera majority opinion, id. at pp. 1368-1370 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Grignon, J.)  As that issue is not before us, we express no opinion on the 
matter.  We do recognize, however, that section 186.22(b)(5) was enacted in 1988 
to ensure that a defendant who committed a gang-related felony providing for a 
life term would not be eligible for parole until at least 15 calendar years elapsed.  
While newer and more powerful sentencing laws, such as section 190, have 
sapped the strength of section 186.22(b)(5), section 186.22(b)(5) still has vitality 
where, as here, the defendant is convicted of attempted murder without 
premeditation.  In this situation, section 186.22(b)(5) raises the seven-year 
minimum eligible parole date (see § 3046, subd. (a)) to a 15-year minimum 
eligible parole date.  (See, e.g., People v. Villegas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 
1228-1229.)   
 
At oral argument, the Attorney General cited Villegas for the proposition 
that defendant’s gang-related attempted premeditated murder sentence under 
section 186.22(b)(5) is properly characterized as a 15-year-to-life sentence that 
could be added to the 25-year-to-life-sentence for the section 12022.53(d) 
violation, resulting in a sentence of 40 years to life.  (People v. Villegas, supra, 92 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1228-1229.)  The question of whether such a characterization is 
appropriate is not before us and we express no opinion on the matter. 
 
15
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it struck the 
section 186.22(b)(1) enhancement and imposed the section 186.22(b)(5) alternate 
penalty provision.  The Court of Appeal is directed to order the trial court to 
amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant was convicted of 
attempted murder without premeditation.  In all other respects, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Montes 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 96 Cal.App.4th 518 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S105781 
Date Filed: July 31, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Tehama 
Judge: Dennis E. Murray 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Richard A. Levy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Mathew Chan and Charles V. 
Fennessey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard A. Levy 
21515 Hawthorne Boulevard, Suite 590 
Torrance, CA  90503-6559 
(310) 944-3311 
 
Mathew Chan 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5232