Title: Palitz v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11678
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2015

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SJC-11678 
 
SUZANNE PALITZ, trustee,1  vs.  ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF 
TISBURY & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2014. - March 3, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Subdivision Control, Zoning requirements, Approval not required. 
Zoning, Nonconforming use or structure, Variance. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
October 10, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Karyn F. Scheier, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Daniel P. Dain for the plaintiff. 
 
Jonathan M. Silverstein (Katherine D. Laughman with him) 
for the defendants. 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                                                          
 
 
1 Of the 87 Main Street Nominee Trust. 
 
 
2 Building inspector and zoning enforcement officer of 
Tisbury. 
 
2 
 
 
Gareth I. Orsmond & Jesse W. Abair for Massachusetts 
Association of Regional Planning Agencies & others. 
 
Edward J. DeWitt for Association to Preserve Cape Cod. 
 
Benjamin Fierro, III, for Home Builders and Remodelers 
Association of Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In this appeal, we must decide whether a 
division of land pursuant to the subdivision control law's 
existing structures exemption, G. L. c. 41, § 81L (§ 81L),3 
entitles the structures on the resulting lots to "grandfather" 
protection against new zoning nonconformities created by the 
division.  As is more fully set forth herein, the plaintiff is 
the most recent owner of a lot in the town of Tisbury (town).  
The lot was created in 1994 by a division of land pursuant to 
the existing structures exemption.  On the lot is a structure 
built before both the subdivision control law and the Zoning 
Act, St. 1975, c. 808, went into effect. 
 
The plaintiff sought a permit to tear down the existing 
structure and build a new one, somewhat larger and taller than 
the existing structure.  The permit was denied on zoning 
grounds, and the plaintiff appealed to the Land Court.  A judge 
in the Land Court concluded that the § 81L division created new 
zoning nonconformities that deprived the plaintiff's dwelling of 
                                                          
 
 
3 As defined in G. L. c. 41, § 81L (§ 81L), a 
"[s]ubdivision" does not include "the division of a tract of 
land on which two or more buildings were standing when the 
subdivision control law went into effect in the city or town in 
which the land lies into separate lots on each of which one of 
such buildings remains standing." 
3 
 
the grandfather status it might have had under the Zoning Act.  
As a result, the plaintiff, who sought to tear down and rebuild 
her dwelling approximately ten feet taller, was required to 
obtain a variance. 
 
We conclude that an exemption from the subdivision control 
law entitles a landowner to an endorsement that planning board 
approval is not required for the division of qualifying 
properties into separate lots, each with its own structure, but 
that such an endorsement has no bearing on each structure's 
compliance with zoning bylaws.  See Alley v. Building Inspector 
of Danvers, 354 Mass. 6, 7-8 (1968).  In light of the new zoning 
nonconformities created by the division of land in this case, a 
variance was required -- and, in fact, was previously granted to 
the former owner -- to make the plaintiff's current dwelling 
lawful.  A variance cannot, however, serve as a launching pad 
for the expansion of zoning nonconformities.  See Mendes v. 
Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 527, 531 
(1990).  Consequently, we agree with the Land Court judge that, 
in order to proceed with her project, which would have 
eliminated an abutter's view of Vineyard Haven Harbor, the 
plaintiff was required to obtain a new or amended variance.4 
                                                          
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Association to Preserve Cape Cod; Home Builders and Remodelers 
Association of Massachusetts, Inc.; and the Massachusetts 
Association of Regional Planning Agencies, Martha's Vineyard 
4 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts relied on by the 
Land Court judge, supplemented where necessary by the undisputed 
facts in the record.  See 81 Spooner Road, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Brookline, 461 Mass. 692, 693 (2012).  From 1923 
until 1994, the parcels of land now known and numbered as 83, 
87, and 89 Main Street in the town were held in common ownership 
(original tract).  Three single-family residential buildings 
stood closely clustered on the original tract.  The town adopted 
a local zoning bylaw in 1959, and the subdivision control law 
went into effect in 1974. 
 
In 1994, the owner of the original tract, Michael Putziger, 
sought to divide the land into three lots, such that a single 
dwelling would stand on each lot, in conformance with the 
existing structures exemption from the definition of 
"subdivision" in § 81L.  Putziger submitted a plan to the town's  
planning board and received an "approval not required" 
endorsement pursuant to G. L. c. 41, § 81P (§ 81P) (ANR 
endorsement).  The ANR endorsement stated that it did "not stay 
enforcement of zoning violations."  The plan depicting the 
endorsement and the three newly created lots was duly recorded. 
 
The new lot at 87 Main Street, as created by the § 81L 
plan, did not conform to the town's zoning bylaw regarding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commission, Massachusetts Association of Planning Directors, 
Inc., and Massachusetts Chapter of the American Planning 
Association. 
5 
 
minimum lot size and frontage requirements.  The creation of the 
new lot also rendered the dwelling located thereon nonconforming 
with respect to its front and southern side yard setbacks.  
Putziger sought variances from the zoning board of appeals of 
Tisbury (zoning board) to make the lot and dwelling lawful and, 
therefore, saleable as such.5  In 1995, the zoning board granted 
the variances, finding:  "There will be no change in the 
appearance or use of the buildings on the . . . properties and 
their relation to adjoining . . . properties.  Therefore, 
desirable relief may be granted without either a substantial 
detriment to the public good or substantial derogation from the 
intent or purpose of this by-law" (1995 variance).  The variance 
was recorded, and 87 Main Street was sold soon thereafter. 
 
In 2007, the plaintiff acquired 87 Main Street.  In 2012, 
she sought a building permit to tear down the existing dwelling 
and construct a new dwelling that, while maintaining the same 
footprint, would have been approximately ten feet taller and 
added a bedroom, a third floor, and a full basement.  The zoning 
enforcement officer refused to issue the building permit unless 
the zoning board amended the 1995 variance.  As a result, the 
                                                          
 
 
5 The zoning board of appeals of Tisbury (zoning board) 
found that the newly created lot at 87 Main Street was 
undersized by 3,157 square feet and lacked 110 feet of required 
frontage.  The zoning board also found, inter alia, that the 
structure thereon had a front setback of only four feet, whereas 
twenty-five feet were required under the zoning bylaw. 
6 
 
plaintiff applied for an amended or new variance, which 
application was denied, in part, because the increased height of 
the new dwelling -- in conjunction with the nonconforming front 
yard setback -- would have eliminated the view of an abutter.6 
 
The plaintiff appealed the zoning board's decision to the 
Land Court and moved for summary judgment.  The plaintiff argued 
that 87 Main Street was entitled to grandfather protection under 
the Zoning Act, G. L. c. 40A, § 6,7 because the dwelling predated 
the town's zoning bylaw and the lot was created pursuant to the 
existing structures exemption from the subdivision control law.  
As such, she reasoned that neither the 1995 variance nor an 
amended variance was necessary to her project.  The judge 
disagreed, holding that the ANR endorsement did not establish 
                                                          
 
 
6 In addition to the elimination of the abutter's view, the 
zoning board found that the plaintiff "did not prove substantial 
hardship, financial or otherwise, since many of the 
modifications necessary could be done within the existing 
dwelling . . . and, further, that with the added bedroom, full 
basement and additional third floor, the density of the 
neighborhood will be negatively impacted." 
 
 
7 The grandfather protection afforded under the Zoning Act 
can be found in the first paragraph of G. L. c. 40A, § 6, which 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
"a zoning ordinance or by-law shall not apply to structures 
or uses lawfully in existence or lawfully begun, . . . but 
shall apply to any change or substantial extension of such 
use, . . . [and] to any reconstruction, extension or 
structural change of such structure . . . except where 
alteration, reconstruction, extension or structural change 
to a single or two-family residential structure does not 
increase the nonconforming nature of said structure." 
7 
 
zoning compliance and, as a result, 87 Main Street was not 
rendered lawful for zoning purposes by the grandfather 
protection afforded by § 6.  Rather, 87 Main Street was rendered 
lawful by the 1995 variance, and consequently, an amendment to 
that variance was required for the plaintiff to enlarge her 
dwelling.  Finding that the denial of the amendment was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious, the judge granted summary judgment in 
favor of the zoning board.  We granted the plaintiff's 
application for direct appellate review and now affirm the 
judgment of the Land Court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Analytical framework.  We review de 
novo a judge's decision granting summary judgment to the zoning 
board.  81 Spooner Road, LLC, 461 Mass. at 699.  "Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law."  Conley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 
405 Mass. 168, 173 (1989).  "Summary judgment, when appropriate, 
may be rendered against the moving party."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 
(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).  "An order granting or 
denying summary judgment will be upheld if the trial judge ruled 
on undisputed material facts and [her] ruling was correct as a 
matter of law."  M.P.M. Bldrs., LLC v. Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 89 
(2004), quoting Route One Liquors, Inc. v. Secretary of Admin. & 
Fin., 439 Mass. 111, 115 (2003). 
8 
 
 
Under the subdivision control law, a person may not 
subdivide a tract of land unless he or she has first submitted a 
plan of the proposed subdivision for approval by the town's 
planning board.  G. L. c. 41, § 81O.  However, planning board 
approval is not required for certain divisions of land that are 
specifically exempted from the definition of "subdivision" in 
§ 81L.  See G. L. c. 41, § 81P.  A plan falling within such an 
exemption is entitled to an ANR endorsement pursuant to § 81P.  
See Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Braintree, 24 Mass. 
App. Ct. 425, 426-427 (1987). 
 
An ANR endorsement allows a plan to be recorded and 
"creates a 'zoning freeze,' in which the laws applicable to the 
lot at the time of endorsement remain applicable for a period of 
three years."  Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 725 n.9 (1996).  An ANR endorsement 
does not, however, render a lot compliant with zoning laws. 
Alley, 354 Mass. at 7-8.  A landowner may nonetheless avoid such 
compliance by obtaining a variance or by seeking grandfather 
protection for the property under the Zoning Act, G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 6.  Grandfathered structures and uses may be extended or 
altered without obtaining a variance, so long as "(1) the 
extensions or changes themselves comply with the ordinance or 
by-law, and (2) the structures as extended or changed are found 
to be not substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood 
9 
 
than the preexisting nonconforming structure or structures."  
Rockwood v. Snow Inn Corp., 409 Mass. 361, 364 (1991). 
 
b.  Grandfather status of 87 Main Street.  The plaintiff's 
lot, 87 Main Street, was created through a division of land 
pursuant to the existing structures exemption.  Prior to that 
division, the existing structure's northern side yard setback 
was already nonconforming with the town's zoning bylaw.  Because 
the structure predated the effective date of the bylaw, it 
appears to have constituted a preexisting nonconforming 
structure entitled to grandfather status under the Zoning Act.8  
G. L. c. 40A, § 6. 
 
Although preexisting nonconforming status runs with the 
land, Derby Refining Co. v. Chelsea, 407 Mass. 703, 708 (1990), 
the "introduction of a new nonconformity to a pre-existing 
nonconforming residential structure requires a variance."  
Deadrick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 
539, 547, 553 (2014).  Zoning violations arising from 
nonconformities may be stayed by the doctrine of merger, "which 
treats adjacent lots currently in common ownership as a single 
lot 'for zoning purposes so as to minimize nonconformities.'"  
Marinelli v. Board of Appeals of Stoughton, 440 Mass. 255, 261 
                                                          
 
 
8 The Land Court judge did not make a determination as to 
whether the original tract and structures thereon were entitled 
to grandfather status prior to the § 81L division.  The parties 
agree that resolution of this issue is not critical to the 
disposition of the present appeal. 
10 
 
(2003), quoting Preston v. Board of Appeals of Hull, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 236, 238 (2001).  However, absent a variance, 
alienation of one of the nonconforming properties will result in 
realization of the zoning violations by the new owner.  Cf. 
Carabetta v. Board of Appeals of Truro, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 
271 n.10 (2008) (conveyance that "demerged" lots resulted in 
purchase of illegally nonconforming lot). 
 
The plaintiff notes that, regardless of any alteration to 
87 Main Street's lot, the § 81L division (and the additional 
nonconformities it may have created) did not result in a 
physical alteration to the preexisting structure thereon.  Thus, 
according to the plaintiff, the preexisting nonconforming status 
of the structure survived the § 81L division.  Under this logic, 
the 1995 variance was superfluous and the plaintiff should not 
have been required to amend it as a condition to her 
reconstruction project.  We think that the plaintiff 
misconceives the relationship between lots, structures, and 
uses.  See Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Edgartown, 444 
Mass. 852, 861 (2005) (Greaney, J., concurring) ("Creating a 
distinction in treatment between a nonconforming structure and a 
nonconforming lot is one that analytically and practically 
should not be made.  The two concepts are intertwined and 
separating them would permit a landowner to circumvent valid and 
useful minimum lot area requirements"); Marblehead v. Deery, 356 
11 
 
Mass. 532, 537 (1969) (setback violation created by subdivision 
rendered preexisting structure "an unprotected nonconforming 
use"). 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Zoning Act in 1975, we 
decided Howland v. Acting Supt. of Bldgs. & Inspector of Bldgs. 
of Cambridge, 328 Mass. 155 (1951).  In that case, the owner of 
a single tract of land with three dwellings located thereon 
sought to subdivide the tract into three lots with a dwelling on 
each.  Id. at 158.  The proposed division would have created new 
zoning nonconformities as to lot size, frontage, and setback.  
The plaintiff contended "that since his land and buildings 
existed in their present physical condition before any zoning 
ordinance had been enacted, he [was] entitled to dispose of his 
property as he [saw] fit free from the limitations of the zoning 
ordinance."9  Id. at 159.  We disagreed, concluding that the 
"proposed division of the plaintiff's lot into three separate 
lots owned by different persons would change the use of his land 
to a different use which would be contrary to the ordinance and 
beyond the protection of the previously existing use."  Id.  
                                                          
 
 
9 The local zoning ordinance included the following 
exception for existing buildings:  "This ordinance shall not 
apply to existing buildings or structures, nor to the existing 
use of any building or structure, or of land to the extent to 
which it is used at the time of adoption of this ordinance, but 
it shall apply to any change of use thereof."  Howland v. Acting 
Supt. of Bldgs. and Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge, 328 Mass. 
155, 159 (1951). 
12 
 
Accordingly, we held that, absent a variance, the plaintiff did 
not have "the right to make what is really a change of use of 
his land under the shelter of nonconformity existing when the 
ordinance was enacted."  Id. at 160. 
 
The Howland case is consistent with our subsequent 
interpretation of the Zoning Act's grandfather provision in 
Rockwood, 409 Mass. at 364.  In the Rockwood case, we explained 
that, "in the absence of a variance, any extension or structural 
change of a nonconforming structure must comply with the 
applicable zoning ordinance or by-law."  Id.  In other words, a 
new nonconformity is not entitled to grandfather protection 
under the Zoning Act.  Thus, even under the Zoning Act, the new 
nonconformities created by the division of land in the Howland 
case would have required a variance.  See id.  See also 
Deadrick, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 547. 
 
In this case, the § 81L division created new zoning 
nonconformities as to lot size, frontage, and front yard 
setback, among others.  Because the Zoning Act only permits 
changes to grandfathered structures if the "changes themselves 
comply with the ordinance or by-law," the Zoning Act did not 
render those new nonconformities lawful.  Rockwood, 409 Mass. at 
364.  Thus, contrary to the plaintiff's position, firmly 
entrenched principles of zoning law compel the conclusion that 
the 1995 variance was necessary to render the new 
13 
 
nonconformities lawful.  See id.  See also Howland, 328 Mass. at 
160; Deadrick, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 547. 
 
The plaintiff's reliance on Barron Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Danvers, 419 Mass. 404 (1995), is misplaced.  In that case, an 
automobile dealership obtained setback variances for the 
location of signs on its lot.  "The variances did not address, 
and were not conditioned on, the content or any other feature or 
quality of the signs."  Id. at 408-409.  A subsequent zoning 
change rendered the content and size of the signs nonconforming.  
When the dealership sought to replace the panels of its signs, 
the town insisted it obtain amended variances.  We held that the 
town was in error, because the proposed replacements had no 
bearing on the variance.  Id. at 408.  Rather, the replacements 
related to -- but did not expand -- the nonconformities made 
lawful by the signs' grandfather status.  Id. at 409-410. 
 
In contrast, here, the plaintiff's proposed reconstructed 
dwelling would not have affected the northern side yard setback 
nonconformity of 87 Main Street, which preexisted the § 81L 
division.  Rather, it would have expanded the nonconformities 
created by the § 81L division, which were made lawful by the 
1995 variance.10  See Bransford, 444 Mass. at 861 (lawful 
                                                          
 
 
10 It is of no consequence that the increased height would 
have been within the maximum height allowed for residential 
structures.  The increase in height was objectionable because, 
14 
 
increase in size of structure expanded lot size nonconformity).  
"It would be anomalous if a variance, by its nature sparingly 
granted, functioned as a launching pad for expansion as a 
nonconforming use"11 (footnote omitted).  Mendes, 28 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 531.  Because the proposed reconstruction in this case 
would have expanded nonconformities permitted by variance, the 
plaintiff was required to obtain a new or amended variance to 
proceed with her project. 
 
c.  Zoning effect of the existing structures exemption.  
The plaintiff contends that, even if new nonconformities created 
by a division of land could deprive a structure of grandfather 
protection under the Zoning Act, new nonconformities created 
pursuant to the subdivision control law's existing structures 
exemption should be ignored for zoning purposes.  We analyze 
§ 81L exemptions "in light of the over-all purpose of the 
subdivision control law."  Corcoran v. Planning Bd. of Sudbury, 
406 Mass. 248, 250 (1989).  "[W]e have emphasized repeatedly 
that a principal object of the law is to ensure efficient 
vehicular access to each lot in a subdivision, for safety, 
convenience, and welfare depend critically on that factor."  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
inter alia, it would have expanded the front yard setback 
nonconformity by blocking the view of an abutter. 
 
 
11 This concern is particularly acute here, as, in further 
contrast to the case of Barron Chevrolet, Inc. v. Danvers, 419 
Mass. 404 (1995), the grant of the 1995 variance was based, in 
part, on the building not being altered. 
15 
 
Gifford v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 376 Mass. 801, 807 (1978).  
See Daley Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd. of Randolph, 340 Mass. 
149, 153-154 (1959) (reviewing legislative history).  See also 
G. L. c. 41, § 81M (legislative purpose statement).  
Accordingly, "[w]here our statute relieves certain divisions of 
land of regulation and approval by a planning board ('approval . 
. . not required'), it is because the vital access is reasonably 
guaranteed in another manner."  Gifford, 376 Mass. at 807. 
 
In Gifford, supra, we considered a challenge to an ANR 
endorsement granted pursuant to the subdivision control law's 
frontage-based exemption, for a plan dividing a forty-nine acre 
parcel into lots.12  We reasoned that, ordinarily, "lots having 
                                                          
 
 
12 The frontage exemption from the definition of 
"subdivision" provides, in relevant part: 
 
"the division of a tract of land into two or more lots 
shall not be deemed to constitute a subdivision within the 
meaning of the subdivision control law if, at the time when 
it is made, every lot within the tract so divided has 
frontage on (a) a public way or a way which the clerk of 
the city or town certifies is maintained and used as a 
public way, or (b) a way shown on a plan theretofore 
approved and endorsed in accordance with the subdivision 
control law, or (c) a way in existence when the subdivision 
control law became effective in the city or town in which 
the land lies, having, in the opinion of the planning 
board, sufficient width, suitable grades and adequate 
construction to provide for the needs of vehicular traffic 
in relation to the proposed use of the land abutting 
thereon or served thereby, and for the installation of 
municipal services to serve such land and the buildings 
erected or to be erected thereon." 
 
G. L. c. 41, § 81L. 
16 
 
[sufficient] frontage are fully accessible, and as the developer 
does not contemplate the construction of additional access 
routes, there is no need for supervision by the planning board 
on that score."  Id.  Nonetheless, we affirmed the judgment 
annulling the ANR endorsement because, despite technically 
sufficient frontage for each proposed lot on the parcel, the 
lots were laid out in such a way as to prevent sufficient access 
to each of them.  Id. at 808-809.  The Gifford case teaches that 
the effect of an § 81L exemption is circumscribed by its 
underlying purpose.  See Corcoran, 406 Mass. at 251 (guiding 
principle of Gifford case is that planning board may withhold 
ANR endorsement where access implied by frontage is illusory). 
 
The plaintiff contends, without citation, that the existing 
structures exemption contemplates the "traditional New England 
family compound."  The legislative history of § 81L does not 
draw distinctions in purpose between the frontage-based 
exemption and the existing structures exemption.13  See Report of 
                                                          
 
 
13 The creation of exemptions from "subdivision" under § 81L 
and "approval not required" (ANR) endorsements under G. L. 
c. 41, § 81P (§ 81P), were among the many revisions made to the 
subdivision control law in 1953 as result of the Report of the 
Special Commission on Planning and Zoning, 1953 House Doc. No. 
2249.  See Daley Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd. of Randolph, 340 
Mass. 149, 153-154 (1959).  The report explained the interaction 
of exemptions and ANR endorsements as follows: 
 
"it seemed best to require the person who intends to record 
such a plan and who contends that it is not a 'subdivision' 
within the meaning of the law, because all of the ways 
17 
 
the Special Commission on Planning and Zoning, 1953 House Doc. 
No. 2249, at 10-12, 54-55.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff's 
hypothesis is consistent with the presumption of access 
underlying § 81L exemptions generally.  It would have been 
reasonable for the Legislature to presume that family compounds 
were built to ensure vital access from the road to each dwelling 
located on the lot, thereby eliminating the need for planning 
board supervision.  Cf. Gifford, 376 Mass. at 807.  This would 
explain why plans depicting such structures are entitled to ANR 
endorsements, but it would not explain why a landowner should be 
entitled to carve up the land without any regard to zoning 
bylaws -- particularly in light of the long-standing principle 
that "a landowner will not be permitted to create a dimensional 
nonconformity if he could have used his adjoining land to avoid 
or diminish the nonconformity."  Planning Bd. of Norwell v. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
shown on the plan are already existing ways, to submit it 
to the planning board, and if the board agrees with his 
contention, it can endorse on the plan a statement that 
approval is not required, and the plan can be recorded 
without much more ado" (emphasis supplied). 
 
1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at 54-55.  This explanation suggests 
that each of the § 81L exemptions sprang from the same 
reasoning: that where the law's underlying purpose of access is 
presumably met, planning board oversight is unnecessary.  This 
was not intended to effect a sea change in the scope of 
subdivision controls.  Rather, it was intended to clarify the 
boundaries of planning board oversight and avoid confusion among 
conveyancers as to whether the subdivision control law was 
applicable and, if so, whether it had been followed.  Id. at 10-
12, 54-55. 
18 
 
Serena, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 690 (1989), S.C., 406 Mass. 1008 
(1990) (collecting cases). 
 
Although land divided pursuant to the existing structures 
exemption is likely done with the goal of alienating the divided 
lots, the same may be said of nearly all divisions of land, 
including divisions pursuant to the frontage-based exemption 
found in § 81L.  In Arrigo v. Planning Bd. of Franklin, 12 Mass. 
App. Ct. 802, 807-808 (1981), the Appeals Court held that 
although a planning board may waive the specific requirements of 
§ 81L's frontage-based exemption, see G. L. c. 41, § 81R, that 
waiver is only valid to the extent that zoning compliance is 
required to qualify for an ANR endorsement.  A planning board 
has no authority to "preclude a building inspector or board of 
appeals from performing their statutory duties of requiring 
adherence to the town's zoning by-law."  Id. 
 
The Appeals Court's analysis in the Arrigo case is in 
accord with the legislative history of the subdivision control 
law.   One of the reasons for the 1953 revisions was that 
"[i]t [was not] sufficiently clear that the application of 
the law [was] limited to regulating the design and 
construction of ways in subdivisions, and some well-
intentioned but overzealous planning boards ha[d] attempted 
to use their power of approving or disapproving plans of 
proposed subdivisions to enforce conditions doubtless 
intended for the good of the public, but not relating to 
the design and construction of ways within subdivisions; 
and it [was] said that some town counsels ha[d] approved 
this usurpation of power." 
 
19 
 
1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at 10.  The drafters were clearly 
concerned that the subdivision control law might be manipulated 
to encroach on other land use authorities.  Consistent with 
these concerns, the Arrigo court explained that landowners 
"seeking to make two building lots from a parcel lacking 
adequate frontage . . . are required to obtain two independent 
approvals:  one from the planning board, which may in its 
discretion waive the frontage requirement under the criteria for 
waiver set out in G. L. c. 41, § 81R, and one from the board of 
appeals, which may vary the frontage requirement only under the 
highly restrictive criteria of G. L. c. 40A, § 10."14  Arrigo, 12 
Mass. App. Ct. at 808. 
 
This dual approval requirement protects zoning bylaws as a 
distinct regulatory regime independent from subdivision rules 
and regulations.  See Beale v. Planning Bd. of Rockland, 423 
Mass. 690, 697 & n.10 (1996).  The independence of these two 
                                                          
 
 
14 General Laws c. 40A, § 10, provides that the grant of a 
variance shall be premised on a specific finding that 
 
"owing to circumstances relating to the soil conditions, 
shape, or topography of such land or structures and 
especially affecting such land or structures but not 
affecting generally the zoning district in which it is 
located, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the 
ordinance or by-law would involve substantial hardship, 
financial or otherwise, to the petitioner or appellant, and 
that desirable relief may be granted without substantial 
detriment to the public good and without nullifying or 
substantially derogating from the intent or purpose of such 
ordinance or by-law." 
20 
 
regimes "is acknowledged, not only in G.L. c. 41, § 81M, but 
also implicitly in § 81Q, which restricts subdivision rules and 
regulations that might address matters within the scope of 
zoning regulations."  Id. at 697.  In consequence, we have 
cautioned that landowners "are deemed to be on notice of zoning 
requirements, and are governed by them, without any need for 
independent reference to the requirements in the subdivision 
rules and regulations" (emphasis supplied).  Id. 
 
The notion, therefore, that a division of land would bestow 
immunity from zoning compliance simply because it was exempted 
from planning board oversight strikes us as abrasive to the 
independent character of these regulatory regimes.  See Alley, 
354 Mass. at 7-8; 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at 11-12 ("The 
purpose of the bill as now drawn [is] . . . [t]o clarify the 
language of the act, especially in some particulars where 
overzealous city planners have attempted to extend their 
authority to an extent greater than was intended by the framers 
of the law").  Indeed, when the Legislature has sought to modify 
zoning requirements as a result of the subdivision control law, 
it has done so explicitly.  Compare G. L. c. 40A, § 6 (zoning 
freeze for ANR plans), with G. L. c. 41, § 81Q ("Except in so 
far as it may require compliance with the requirements of 
existing zoning ordinances or by-laws, no rule or regulation 
shall relate to the size, shape, width, frontage or use of lots 
21 
 
within a subdivision, or to the buildings which may be 
constructed thereon . . ."). 
 
Notably, the Zoning Act's grandfather provision 
incorporates neither § 81L nor § 81P of the subdivision control 
law.  Yet, under the plaintiff's proposed rule, an ANR 
endorsement pursuant to the existing structures exemption would 
be tantamount to the grant of a variance.  Such a result is 
contrary to established precedent.  See Alley, 354 Mass. at 7-8 
(planning board endorsement under § 81P gave lot no standing 
under zoning bylaw); Citgo Petroleum Corp., 24 Mass. App. Ct. at 
427 ("just because a lot can be divided under [the existing 
structures] exception does not mean that the resulting lots will 
be buildable under the zoning ordinance"); Arrigo, 12 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 807 ("It does not follow that the planning board is 
authorized . . . to grant a variance"). 
 
We are persuaded that, unless otherwise provided in the 
Zoning Act, the consequences of an § 81L division should be 
confined to the regulatory regime of the subdivision control 
law.  Under that regime, an § 81L division qualifies a plan for 
an ANR endorsement.  See Citgo Petroleum Corp., 24 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 427.  We have explained that an "ANR indorsement serves 
merely to permit the plan to be recorded . . . and is not an 
attestation of compliance with zoning requirements."  Cornell v. 
Board of Appeals of Dracut, 453 Mass. 888, 892 (2009).  It 
22 
 
follows, then, that the mere fact that the new nonconformities 
in this case arose pursuant to an § 81L division did not mean 
that those nonconformities were entitled to grandfather 
protection under the Zoning Act or otherwise were excused from 
complying with the town's zoning bylaw.  See Citgo Petroleum 
Corp., 24 Mass. App. Ct. at 427.  As in Arrigo, 12 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 808, the owner of the original tract was required to 
obtain two independent assents to his project:  an ANR 
endorsement from the planning board and a variance from the 
zoning board. 
 
This interpretation does not render the existing structures 
exemption meaningless.  Qualification for the exemption entitles 
a landowner to an ANR endorsement and a concomitant three-year 
zoning freeze.  See Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 725 n.9.  See also 
G. L. c. 40A, § 6.  Moreover, the recording of a plan with 
zoning violations "may be preliminary to an attempt to obtain a 
variance, or to buy abutting land which would bring the lot into 
compliance, or even to sell the nonconforming lot to an abutter 
and in that way bring it into compliance."  Smalley v. Planning 
Bd. of Harwich, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 599, 604 (1980).  Although the 
plaintiff casts such variances as "usually unobtainable," she 
enjoys the benefit of one in this very case. 
 
As explained by the Land Court judge, the new 
nonconformities arising from the creation of 87 Main Street were 
23 
 
rendered lawful by the 1995 variance -- not by the subdivision 
control law's existing structures exemption or the Zoning Act's 
grandfather provision.  The proposed reconstruction of the 
dwelling thereon would have expanded those nonconformities and, 
consequently, required a new or amended variance from the town's 
zoning bylaw.  See Mendes, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 531-532 ("In 
view of the different approaches to the grant of a variance and 
a special permit, the former grudging and restricted, the latter 
anticipated and flexible, we do not think the Legislature 
intended in G. L. c. 40A, § 6, to authorize the expansion of 
uses having their genesis in a variance pursuant to the more 
generous standard applicable to a special permit" [footnote 
omitted]).  See also Rockwood, 409 Mass. at 364; Deadrick, 85 
Mass. App. Ct. at 547.  Because the plaintiff does not appeal 
the grounds on which that variance was denied, we need not go 
further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.