Title: Garner v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 186, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DEVON GARNER,
)
)  No. 186, 2000
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for New Castle County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  I.D. No. 9811012529
)
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  April 17, 2001
Decided:  August 7, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 7th day of August, 2001, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
appears to the Court that:
1.
Devon Garner appeals the judgment of the Superior Court following
his conviction by a jury of Attempted Murder First Degree, two counts of
Possession of a Firearm During the commission of a Felony, Conspiracy First
Degree, Recklessly Endangering First Degree and Conspiracy Second Degree.  On
March 24, 2000, the Superior Court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
2.
Garner alleges four errors in this appeal:
a)
Insufficient evidence presented by the State in its case
which should have resulted in the Superior Court granting Garner’s
Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal;
2
b)
Prosecutorial misconduct by improper remarks and
questions during cross-examination which violated a substantial right
that can be remedied only by a new trial;
c)
Insufficient evidence to support the Attempted Murder
conviction;
d)
The trial judge abused his discretion when he admitted
two letters Garner wrote to a female friend.
3.
Because all of Garner’s contentions lack merit, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
4.
We determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt when we review the denial of a Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal.  Here, the evidence showed that Garner fired three shots at the victim
from close proximity.  Two shots hit the victim, one in the arm and one in the
abdomen.  A rational trier of fact could easily conclude from these facts alone that
Garner intended to kill.
5.
Garner did not request a mistrial or any form of relief from any
improper remarks made by the prosecutor at trial.  No substantial right of the
defendant was implicated by the remarks for which he now requests a remedy.
Apparently, the prosecutor accused Garner of lying under oath by using a false
name and concluded his cross by the unnecessary comment:  “Your Honor, I have
no further questions of whatever his name is.”  The defendant’s actual birth
3
certificate name was neither an issue in the case nor did the fact Garner was
prosecuted under an alias have any bearing on the outcome.  Further, Garner
admitted that he had used aliases in the past to avoid prosecution and can, as a
result, hardly claim prejudice from the prosecutor’s overzealous attempt to be
clever.  This was not a close case.  The victim knew and clearly identified Garner
as the shooter.  Finally, Garner neither requested a curative instruction nor moved
for a mistrial.  Defense counsel’s timely objection to the alias question, followed
by his explanation in front of the jury allowed the jury to dispel any confusion over
Garner’s name and resolve any question of the lack of relevance of the alias to the
issues at trial.  Under the test set forth in Hughes v. State, Garner’s claim has no
merit.1
6.
Though Garner claims the evidence at trial to be legally insufficient to
identify him as the shooter, the victim directly identified him and that alone is
sufficient evidence for the jury, after assessing the relative credibility of the
witnesses, to find him guilty.
7.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he admitted one
letter and a portion of another Garner had written to a friend.  The State offered the
letters to establish consciousness of guilt on the theory that he sought her aid as a
                                          
1 Del. Supr., 437 A.2d 559 (1981).
4
defense witness.2  The trial judge weighed the probative value of the letters against
the danger of unfair prejudice as required after the objection by D.R.E. 403.  We
find that he properly exercised that discretion required when making such a ruling.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele______________
Justice
                                          
2 See Wooters v. State, Del. Supr., No. 258, 1992, Holland, J. (April 23, 1993) (Order).