Title: State v. Arberry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP000866-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 19, 2018

2018 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP866-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Diamond J. Arberry, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 179, 895 N.W.2d 100 
PDC NO:  2017 WI App 26 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 19, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 14, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter L. Grimm 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and an oral argument by Ellen J. Krahn, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
2018 WI 7
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP866-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF294) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Diamond J. Arberry, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 19, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Arberry, 
2017 WI App 26, 375 Wis. 2d 179, 895 N.W.2d 100, affirming the 
Fond du Lac County circuit court's1 denial of Diamond J. 
Arberry's ("Arberry") postconviction motion seeking expunction2 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Peter L. Grimm presided. 
2 There are two different words for the noun form of 
"expunge": we use "expunction," but "expungement" is also used.  
To be clear, "expungement" and "expunction" mean the same thing. 
See Expunction of Record Black's Law Dictionary 702 (10th ed. 
2014).  But see Bryan A. Garner, Legal Usage 346 (3rd ed. 2011). 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
2 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015 (2013-14)3 vis-à-vis sentence 
modification under Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h). 
¶2 
In a criminal action by the State, Arberry was charged 
with five crimes relating to an incident of shop-lifting on 
May 13, 2015: two counts of felony retail theft under Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.50(1m)(d) 
and 
(4)(bf) 
for 
intentionally 
concealing 
merchandize worth between $500 and $5,000; one count of 
attempted misdemeanor retail theft under § 943.50(1m)(b) and 
(4)(a) for intentionally attempting to take merchandise worth 
less than or equal to $500; one count of obstructing an officer 
under Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1); and one count of resisting an 
officer under § 946.41(1).  All counts were charged with 
repeater enhancers.    
¶3 
In the circuit court, Arberry pled no contest to 
counts one and three; count two was dismissed and counts four 
and five were dismissed but read in.  At the plea hearing, the 
circuit court accepted Arberry's pleas, found Arberry guilty, 
and proceeded to sentencing.  No mention was made during 
sentencing of Arberry's eligibility for expunction.  After the 
judgments of conviction were entered and the sentence imposed, 
Arberry filed a postconviction motion for sentence modification 
seeking entry of amended judgments of conviction finding that 
Arberry was eligible for expunction.  The circuit court denied 
the 
motion, 
holding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015 
requires 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-
14 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
3 
 
expunction to be granted at the time of sentencing.  Arberry 
appealed. 
¶4 
The court of appeals affirmed.  It held that this 
court's recent case, State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 353 
Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811, controlled and directed that the 
determination regarding expunction "must be made at sentencing."  
Arberry, 375 Wis. 2d 179, ¶1. 
¶5 
We consider one issue on this appeal: whether a 
defendant may seek expunction after sentence is imposed.  We 
conclude that a defendant may not seek expunction after sentence 
is imposed because both the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.015 and 
Matasek require that the determination regarding expunction be 
made at the sentencing hearing. 
¶6 
Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
The State charged Arberry with the following five 
crimes: (1) retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50(1m)(d) and 
(4)(bf), for intentionally concealing merchandise worth between 
$500 and $5,000 held for resale by Victoria's Secret without the 
consent of the merchant and with intent to deprive the merchant 
permanently of possession of the merchandise; (2) retail theft 
under § 943.50(1m)(d) and (4)(bf), for intentionally concealing 
merchandise worth between $500 and $5,000 held for resale by TJ 
Maxx without the consent of the merchant and with intent to 
deprive 
the 
merchant 
permanently 
of 
possession 
of 
the 
merchandise; 
(3) 
attempted 
misdemeanor 
retail 
under 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
4 
 
§ 943.50(1m)(b) and (4)(a), for attempting to intentionally take 
and carry away merchandise worth up to $500 held for resale by 
the Buckle without the consent of the merchant and with intent 
to deprive the merchant permanently of possession of the 
merchandise; (4) obstructing an officer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.41(1), for knowingly obstructing an officer while such 
officer was doing an act in an official capacity and with lawful 
authority; and (5) resisting an officer under § 946.41(1), for 
knowingly resisting an officer while such officer was doing an 
act in an official capacity and with lawful authority.   
¶8 
On August 27, 2015, Arberry pled no contest to count 
one without the repeater enhancer, and to count three as 
charged.  Count two was dismissed and counts four and five were 
dismissed but read in.  The circuit court accepted Arberry's 
pleas as to counts one and three and found Arberry guilty.  
¶9 
The circuit court then sentenced Arberry.  On count 
one, for felony retail theft in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.50(1m)(d), Arberry was sentenced to one year initial 
confinement and two years extended supervision, to be served 
concurrently.  On count three, for misdemeanor attempted retail 
theft in violation of § 943.50(1m)(b), Arberry was sentenced to 
two years of probation, to be served consecutively to the 
sentence for count one, with an imposed and stayed sentence of 
one year of initial confinement and one year of extended 
supervision.  The issue of expunction was not raised during this 
hearing. 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 On February 17, 2016, Arberry filed a postconviction 
motion for sentence modification under Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h) 
seeking entry of amended judgments of conviction finding that 
she was eligible for expunction.  She argued that the circuit 
court has inherent power to modify a sentence if there is a "new 
factor."4  She then argued that Matasek's "clarification of when 
the court must exercise its discretion to determine eligibility 
for [expunction] constitutes a 'new factor' that [the circuit 
court] may take into consideration" in modifying her sentence 
because, although it was in existence at the time of the 
original sentencing, it was "unknowingly overlooked by all of 
the parties."5   
                                                 
4 A "new factor" is 
a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the 
imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial 
judge at the time of original sentencing, either 
because it was not then in existence or because, even 
though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly 
overlooked by all of the parties.   
State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶40, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828 
(quoting Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 
(1975)). 
5 The parties do not dispute that, at the time of 
sentencing, 
Arberry 
met 
the 
threshold 
requirements 
for 
expunction under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m): 
[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 
the commission of an offense for which the person has 
been found guilty in a court for violation of a law 
for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 
years or less, the court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence . . . . 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 On March 24, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing on 
Arberry's postconviction motion.  The circuit court held: 
[T]he Court is constrained by the statute.  It does 
require the matter to be granted at the time of 
sentencing. . . .    
Granted, no one brought it up.  I didn't bring it up.  
I don't think as a judge, I have to say no when no one 
has asked me to say no or asked me to grant it.  So I 
think technically the motion is barred by the case law 
that's been rendered.[6] 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 973.015(1m)(a)1.  In this regard, we note that Arberry has not 
raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the 
expunction issue.  See Wis JI——Criminal SM-36 (2013) ("After the 
finding of guilt and decision as to the sentence to be imposed, 
the court shall, if requested by the defendant or defendant's 
counsel, and may, on the court's own motion, determine whether 
the defendant should be afforded [expunction] under § 973.015."  
(Emphasis added)).  To succeed on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, Arberry would have had to demonstrate that 
failure to raise expunction was deficient performance and that 
the deficient performance was prejudicial.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).   
We further note that since filing the present case, 
Arberry's extended supervision on count one has been revoked; 
that is, she did not successfully complete her sentence as to 
count one and she is not entitled to expunction on count one.  
See Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) ("A person has successfully 
completed the sentence if the person has not been convicted of a 
subsequent offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the conditions of 
probation.").  This does not, however, render the case moot 
because we nonetheless address issues that are "likely to arise 
again and should be resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty."  
See State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶14, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 
N.W.2d 341 (quoting State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Cir. Ct. 
for La Crosse Cty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 340 N.W.2d 460 
(1983)). 
6 The circuit court also ruled on the merits of expunction: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
7 
 
On April 4, 2016, the circuit court entered its order denying 
Arberry's postconviction motion. 
¶12 On April 22, 2016, Arberry appealed.  On March 8, 
2017, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  See 
Arberry, 375 Wis. 2d 179.  The court of appeals held that, under 
Matasek, "the determination of [expunction] must be made at 
sentencing."  Id., ¶1.  It further held that there was no 
factual support for a new factor analysis because "Arberry was 
sentenced well after Matasek was decided"7 and "[t]here is no 
indication that the court, much less the prosecutor, or even 
Arberry's counsel, overlooked [expunction]."  Id., ¶4. 
¶13 On April 7, 2017, Arberry filed a petition for review 
in this court.  On June 12, 2017, we granted the petition. 
                                                                                                                                                             
[O]n the merits, even if I were to reconsider or think 
about it——and I can be honest and I can tell you that 
if you had asked me at sentencing, I would have said 
no.  And I'm also going to say no today for the reason 
that convictions have consequences and they are of 
public 
record 
so 
that 
the 
public 
can 
protect 
themselves.  The public has the right to know who 
commits what crimes so they can make decisions to 
decide how to best interact with an individual for 
their own mutual decisions of mutual benefit of 
commerce or trade or employment or otherwise. 
Because we affirm on procedural grounds, we need not address 
whether this post-sentencing ruling on the merits of the motion 
was a proper exercise of discretion, and decline to do so.  See 
Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 
1983) (holding that an appellate court need not decide an issue 
if the resolution of another issue is dispositive). 
7 Arberry was sentenced on August 27, 2015; State v. 
Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811, was 
decided on May 23, 2014. 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
8 
 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 "The interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law that this court reviews de novo while 
benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 
Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  Whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
permits a circuit court to decide the issue of expunction after 
sentence is imposed is a question of statutory interpretation.  
See Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶10.  Thus, we review de novo 
whether § 973.015 requires a circuit court to decide the issue 
of expunction at the sentencing hearing. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶15 We consider one issue on this appeal: whether a 
defendant may seek expunction after sentence is imposed.  We 
conclude that a defendant may not seek expunction after sentence 
is imposed because both the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.015 and 
Matasek require that the determination regarding expunction be 
made at the sentencing hearing. 
¶16 Arberry argues that expunction may be raised in a 
postconviction motion for sentence modification as a "new 
factor" because sentence modification is a "time of sentencing" 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.015 and eligibility for expunction is a 
"new factor" where it was unknowingly overlooked and highly 
relevant to the sentence.  The State argues that expunction can 
never be a new factor because it is not relevant to sentencing; 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
9 
 
that is, it is not a factor that circuit courts take into 
consideration in determining the sentence to be imposed, and 
thus, expunction may only be raised and addressed at the 
sentencing hearing.  We do not address the "new factor" 
arguments because we conclude that a post-sentencing motion 
seeking expunction is procedurally barred.8  See Sweet v. Berge, 
                                                 
8 We briefly note, however, that it does not make sense to 
characterize eligibility for expunction as a "new factor."  
First, expunction is not listed in the case law as a factor 
courts consider when imposing a sentence.  The traditional 
factors a circuit court considers when imposing a sentence are 
the gravity of the offense, the character of the offender, and 
the need to protect the public.  See State v. Gallion, 
2004 WI 42, ¶29, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197; see also Wis. 
Stat. § 973.017 (listing aggravating and mitigating factors in 
sentencing); Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519-20, 250 
N.W.2d 7 (1977) (listing 12 non-exclusive factors a circuit 
court should consider in exercising its sentencing discretion).  
Presumably then, expunction cannot be a "new factor" in sentence 
modification because it is not a "factor" that is "relevant to 
the imposition of sentence."  Harbor, 333 Wis. 2d 53, ¶40. 
Second, the facts underlying eligibility for expunction——
the 
age 
of 
the 
defendant 
and 
the 
maximum 
period 
of  
imprisonment——will always be known at the time of sentencing.  
Thus, expunction cannot be a "new factor" because the facts are 
not "new."  In this regard, we note that silence in the record 
is insufficient to establish that the court and all of the 
parties unknowingly overlooked these facts because the statute 
does not require a circuit court to consider expunction.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)1. ("[T]he court may order, at the 
time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence." (Emphasis added.)); see also infra 
note 11.  Silence could exist for a variety of reasons; here, it 
could very simply be that the court did not deem Arberry a 
candidate for expunction because she presented a high risk to 
reoffend.  And the court was right, as Arberry's extended 
supervision has been revoked since her appeal.  See supra note 
5. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
10 
 
113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that 
an appellate court need not decide an issue if the resolution of 
another issue is dispositive). 
¶17 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Wisconsin 
Stat. 973.015 states in relevant part as follows: 
[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 
the commission of an offense for which the person has 
been found guilty in a court for violation of a law 
for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 
years or less, the court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence if the court determines the 
person will benefit and society will not be harmed by 
this disposition. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)1. (emphasis added).  The question 
before us is whether "at the time of sentencing" means only at 
the time when sentence is imposed or whether it also encompasses 
post-sentencing motions for sentence modification.  We conclude 
                                                                                                                                                             
Simply stated, the fact that expunction, if it is to be 
considered, must be considered "at the time of sentencing" does 
not mean that it is a factor considered in imposition of the 
sentence; 
rather, 
it 
simply 
means 
that, 
procedurally, 
expunction, if it is to be addressed, must be addressed at the 
same proceeding where the sentence is imposed.  In this regard, 
we note that, in the infrequent event there is a resentencing 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, a circuit court could 
consider expunction at that hearing because it then is the 
hearing where sentence is imposed.  To be clear, expunction 
alone could not be the basis for granting a resentencing 
hearing, but it could be considered at resentencing. 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
11 
 
that "at the time of sentencing" means only at the time when 
sentence is imposed. 
¶18 "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45; see also 
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 69 (2012) ("Words are to be 
understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings——unless the 
context 
indicates 
that 
they 
bear 
a 
technical 
sense.").  
"Sentencing" is specially defined under Wis. Stat. § 809.30: 
"'Sentencing' means the imposition of a sentence, a fine, or 
probation 
in 
a 
criminal 
case. . . ." 
 
§ 809.30(1)(f).9  
Therefore, "at the time of sentencing" means "at the time of the 
imposition of a sentence, fine, or probation in a criminal 
case."  Imposition of a sentence happens during the sentencing 
hearing, not at a sentence modification hearing; by definition, 
sentence modification is the time at which a defendant may seek 
modification of an already-imposed sentence.  Thus, the phrase 
"at the time of sentencing" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 refers to 
the hearing where sentence is imposed.  
                                                 
9 Arberry's motion for sentence modification was brought 
under Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h), as permitted under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.19(1)(b).  Thus, this definition is applicable here as 
relevant statutory context.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used . . . in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes . . . ."). 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
12 
 
¶19 Additionally, "[w]ords are to be given the meaning 
that proper grammar and usage would assign them."  Scalia & 
Garner, supra ¶18, at 140.  "The" is a definite article "used as 
a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun 
equivalent refers to someone or something that is unique."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2368 (1986); see 
also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1333 (1969) ("The" is used "[b]efore singular or plural nouns 
and noun phrases that denote particular specified persons or 
things").  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)1.'s use of "the" 
before "time of sentencing" means that the statute contemplates 
only one unique, specified "time of sentencing"; if expunction 
may be addressed only at one unique, specified "time of 
sentencing," common sense counsels that it would be when 
sentence is imposed because not every criminal defendant will 
seek or be granted a sentence modification hearing. 
¶20 Similarly, in Matasek, we considered whether Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015 (2011-12)10 "allows a circuit court to delay the 
expunction decision until the offender's successful completion 
of the sentence."  Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶5.  We held that 
the phrase "'at the time of sentencing' in [] § 973.015 [meant] 
that[,] if a circuit court is going to exercise its discretion 
to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised at the 
                                                 
10 The operative language is the same as in the 2013-14 
version of the Wisconsin Statutes interpreted here. 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
13 
 
sentencing proceeding."  Id., ¶¶6, 45 (emphasis added).  Our use 
of "the" here also contemplates only one time of sentencing. 
¶21 Moreover, our analysis in Matasek dictates that that 
one time is when sentence is imposed.  In Matasek, we evaluated 
two proffered times for expunction: the sentencing hearing when 
sentence was imposed and after successful completion of the 
sentence.  Id., ¶8.  Between the two, we determined that the 
former——the sentencing hearing——was the only time at which the 
circuit court could exercise its discretion to expunge a record 
under the statute, if it was going to do so, because otherwise 
"at the time of sentencing" would be rendered surplusage.  Id., 
¶17.  Thus, as the court of appeals held, Matasek controls here 
and dictates that, if a circuit court is going to exercise its 
discretion to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised 
at the hearing where sentence is imposed.  See Arberry, 375 
Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶3, 5; Scalia & Garner, supra ¶18, at 322-26 ("If 
a statute uses words or phrases that have already received 
authoritative construction by the jurisdiction's court of last 
resort . . . they are to be understood according to that 
construction."). 
¶22 In sum, we conclude that the issue of expunction may 
be raised only at the sentencing hearing because the language of 
the statute and Matasek dictate that there is only one 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
14 
 
applicable time of sentencing, and it is the time at which a 
sentence is imposed.11 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶23 We consider one issue on this appeal: whether a 
defendant may seek expunction after sentence is imposed.  We 
conclude that a defendant may not seek expunction after sentence 
is imposed because both the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.015 and 
                                                 
11 Arberry asks this court, in the alternative, to exercise 
its superintending power under Article VII, section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to direct that circuit courts are 
required to consider expunction for eligible defendants at the 
sentencing hearing in order to effectuate Wis. Stat. § 973.015's 
purpose 
of 
"provid[ing] 
a 
break 
to 
young 
offenders 
who 
demonstrate the ability to comply with the law."  We decline 
this invitation.  First, the statute states that "the court may 
order 
at 
the 
time 
of 
sentencing 
that 
the 
record 
be 
expunged . . . ."  § 973.015(1m)(a)1. (emphasis added).  Thus, 
such a directive would contravene the permissive language of the 
statute.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 112 (2012) ("The traditional, 
commonly repeated rule is that shall is mandatory and may is 
permissive."). 
Second, 
our 
superintending 
authority 
is 
invoked 
"to 
implement procedural rules not specifically required by the 
Constitution or the [statute]" as "a remedy for a violation of 
recognized rights."  State ex rel. State Pub. Def. v. Ct. App., 
Dist. IV, 2013 WI 31, ¶18, 346 Wis. 2d 735, 828 N.W.2d 847 
(alteration in original).  Here, doing as Arberry asks would not 
remedy any violation of a recognized right because it is the 
defendant's burden to raise the issue of expunction, not the 
circuit court's.  See Wis JI——Criminal SM-36 (2013).  Thus, we 
decline to exercise our superintending power to place additional 
requirements 
on 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
specifically 
make 
determinations in every sentencing where expunction might be an 
option.  It simply is not required. 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
15 
 
Matasek require that the determination regarding expunction be 
made at the sentencing hearing. 
¶24 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2016AP866-CR   
 
 
 
1