Title: People v. Shavers
Citation: 448 Mich. 389, 531 N.W.2d 165
Docket Number: 99095
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 1995

448 Mich. 389 (1995)
531 N.W.2d 165
PEOPLE
v.
SHAVERS
Docket No. 99095.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
Decided April 12, 1995.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Carl J. Marlinga, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert J. Berlin, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and Richard J. Goodman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Carolyn A. Blanchard for the defendant.
PER CURIAM:
The defendant was charged with *390 open murder, but convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The circuit court sentenced him to a term of ten to fifteen years in prison. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but set aside the sentence on the grounds that the circuit judge had improperly assumed the defendant to be guilty of murder, and that the circuit court had imposed a disproportionate sentence. We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.
I
The defendant was attending a party, when a fight broke out. One of the defendant's friends was apparently being beaten. The defendant retrieved a gun and shot the victim five times. Some of the shots struck the victim in the back. In a confession given to the police, the defendant said that he was attempting only to disperse the crowd, and that he did not intend to shoot anyone.
The defendant was charged with open murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of that felony. MCL 750.316, 750.227b; MSA 28.548, 28.424(2). At the conclusion of a jury trial at which the defense presented no proofs, the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and felony-firearm. MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553.
The circuit judge imposed a sentence of ten to fifteen years in prison. He explained:
In the Court of Appeals, the defendant filed a motion for remand, so that he might move the circuit court for resentencing. The Court of Appeals and the circuit court granted the respective motions.
The judge then reimposed the ten- to fifteen-year sentence, after essentially repeating the explanation he gave at the initial sentencing. Because Milbourn[1] had been decided between the initial sentencing and the resentencing, the judge added that this case involved facts that were of the most serious variety that one could encounter in a manslaughter case.[2]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions, but set aside his manslaughter sentence on several grounds. First, the Court of Appeals stated that the defendant was "deprived of due process" and "placed in double jeopardy" as a result of comments made by the sentencing judge. In particular, the Court of Appeals focused on the judge's characterization of the crime as "cold blooded" and on his conclusion that the defendant would "kill again."
The Court of Appeals also located a second ground upon which to reverse. It said that the defendant's ten-year minimum sentence "violates the principle of proportionality" as explained in Milbourn.
*393 Writing in dissent, Judge MURPHY stated:
The prosecutor has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.
II
We agree with and adopt the dissenting opinion of Judge MURPHY.
It is not disproportionate to impose a ten-year minimum sentence for manslaughter, where an unarmed victim was repeatedly shot in the back. Neither is there any basis for the conclusion that the sentencing judge improperly found that the defendant was actually guilty of first-degree murder. As indicated by Judge MURPHY, the sentencing judge was making permissible inferences from the evidence introduced at the trial.
*394 The defendant received a manslaughter sentence, not a murder sentence. For the reasons stated by Judge MURPHY, the judge's rationale was not improper. We therefore reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
BRICKLEY, C.J., and BOYLE, RILEY, MALLETT, and WEAVER, JJ., concurred.
LEVIN, J. (dissenting).
I would grant leave to appeal, and dissent from the peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals.
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with LEVIN, J.
[1]  People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
[2]  See 435 Mich 650-654.