Title: Revel v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 298, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RAY A.  REVEL,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No.  298, 2003 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County in Cr.  A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Nos.  S00-03-0275I & S00-05- 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
0070I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
Def.  ID No.  0002014354 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 24, 2003 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
September 24, 2003 
 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 24th day of September 2003, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Ray A. Revel, filed an appeal from an order of 
the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The appellee, State of Delaware, has 
moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  
We agree and affirm. 
 
2
 
(2) 
On September 7, 2000, Revel pleaded guilty to Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol (4th offense) and Escape in the Third Degree.  He 
was immediately sentenced, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
11(e)(1)(C), to a total of six  years at Level V, suspended after nine months 
for one year at a Level IV residential substance abuse treatment program, 
suspended after successful completion of the program for four years and 
three months at Level III.  Revel did not appeal. 
 
(3) 
In September 2001 and January 2002, the Superior Court 
sentenced Revel for having violated his probation.  Revel did not file an 
appeal from either proceeding.  In January 2002, Revel filed a motion for 
correction of sentence.  The Superior Court denied that ruling on January 29, 
2002, and   Revel did not appeal.   
 
(4) 
In March 2002, Revel filed a petition for a writ of prohibition 
that sought a correction of his most recent violation of probation sentence.  
By Order dated April 30, 2002, the Court dismissed the petition. 1   
 
(5) 
In July 2002, Revel moved in the Superior Court for 
modification of his sentence.  Revel’s motion was denied on July 16, 2002, 
and he did not appeal.  In March 2003, Revel again sought relief from his 
                                                                 
1In re Revel, 2002 WL 833257 (Del.  Supr.). 
 
3
sentence.  The Superior Court declined to revisit the issue,2 however, and 
Revel did not appeal.  Finally, on April 30, 2003, Revel moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The motion 
was denied on procedural grounds on May 23, 2003, and this appeal 
followed. 
 
(6) 
On appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion, Revel 
argues, as he did in the Superior Court, that the Court failed to honor Revel’s 
September 2000 plea agreement.  Revel argues that he agreed to plead guilty 
in exchange for placement only in the Crest Program.  Revel, however, was 
placed in the New Horizons Program, and he argues that this alleged change 
in placement, from the Crest Program to the New Horizons Program, is a 
breach of his plea agreement and rendered his plea involuntary.   
 
(7) 
At the September 2000 sentencing, the Superior Court ordered 
that Revel was required to complete the “Level 4 Crest Program.”3  The 
written sentencing order states, however, that Revel was required to 
complete a Level 4 “residential substance abuse treatment program.”  The 
record reflects that the New Horizons Program, which is a Level 4 
                                                                 
2See State v. Revel, Del.  Super., No. 0002014354, Stokes, J. (Mar. 27, 2003). 
3Hr’g Tr., Sept. 7, 2000, at 14. 
 
4
residential substance abuse treatment program, is the “primary portion” of 
the Crest Program.4 
 
(8) 
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when denying 
Revel’s motion for postconviction relief on procedural grounds.  When 
considering a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 61, the 
Superior Court must apply the procedural requirements before reaching the 
merits of the claim.5    
 
(9) 
To the extent that Revel’s claims of breach of plea agreement 
and involuntary plea were not raised in the Superior Court or on direct 
appeal, they are procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).  Revel has 
failed to show “cause for relief from the procedural default” or any 
“prejudice from [a] violation of [his] rights.”6  There is, moreover, no 
evidence of a “miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation 
that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of 
the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. 7 
 
(10) To the extent that the claims were raised in Revel’s March 2003 
request for sentence relief, and rejected by the Superior Court, the claims are 
                                                                 
4See State v. Revel, Del.  Super., No. 0002014354, Stokes, J.  (Mar. 27, 2003).  
5Bailey v.  State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.  1991). 
6Super. Ct. Crim.  R.  61(i)(3). 
 
5
barred under Rule 61(i)(4).   Under this provision, “any ground for relief 
which has already been adjudicated is barred unless reconsideration of the 
claim is warranted in the interest of justice.”8    
 
(11) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law, and to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly 
there was no abuse of discretion.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment 
of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7Super. Ct. Crim. R.  61(i)(5). 
8Super. Ct. Crim. R.  61(i)(4).