Title: Jedediah J. Haltom v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84S01-0409-CR-434
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 16, 2005

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Jessie A. Cook 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Terre Haute, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew A. Kobe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 84S01-0409-CR-434 
 
JEDEDIAH HALTOM, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court, No. 84D05-0106-DF-1580 
The Honorable Barbara L. Brugnaux, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 84A01-0310-CR-415 
_________________________________ 
 
August 16, 2005 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
 
Jedediah Haltom crashed his truck into a woman’s car while driving under the influence.  
He settled with her for his car insurance’s limits, and she executed a release from any future 
damages or compensation “of whatever nature.”  In the collateral criminal prosecution, Haltom 
argued that the trial court’s award of cash restitution to the victim violated the release.  The trial 
court had authority to award restitution: a private contract to which neither the State nor the court 
 
are parties cannot impinge upon the authority of the State to seek and the court to impose a 
criminal sanction. 
 
Background 
 
 
On June 21, 2001, Jedediah Haltom drove his truck into Linda D. Meyer’s car.  Haltom’s 
blood alcohol content at the time of the collision measured .179%.  As a result of the crash, 
Meyer suffered serious head and neurological injuries and subsequently accrued $27,956.68 in 
medical expenses and lost wages. 
 
 
Before Haltom’s criminal trial commenced, Meyer entered into a civil settlement agree-
ment on October 23, 2001, with Haltom’s insurance carrier, Nationwide Insurance Company, in 
compensation for the injuries she suffered.  On the advice of her private attorney, Meyer agreed 
in exchange for $100,000.00 to release Nationwide Insurance, Haltom, and Haltom’s mother, 
Cindy Stone, from any further liability for damages arising from the accident.  In relevant part, 
Meyer agreed that: 
 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF the payment to me/us the 
sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($100,00.00) 
dollars, and other good and valuable consideration, I/we, being of 
lawful age, have released and discharged, and by these presents do 
for myself/ourselves, my/our heirs, administrators, executors and 
assigns, release, acquit and forever discharge Cindy Stone and 
Jedediah Haltom and Nationwide Insurance and any and all other 
persons and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or 
not, of and from any and all past, present and future actions, causes 
of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of service, ex-
penses, compensation, third party actions, suits at law or in equity, 
including claims for suits or contributions and/or indemnity, of 
whatever nature, and all consequential damage on account of, or in 
any way growing out of any and all known or unknown personal 
injuries, death, and/or property damage resulting or to result from 
an accident that occurred on or about 6-21-01 at or near 15TH 
STREET, TERRE HAUTE, VIGO COUNTY, INDIANA. 
 
Def.’s Ex. 2.  Meyer received payment of $100,000.00 from Nationwide Insurance on December 
18, 2001, which was the limit of Haltom’s policy. 
 
2
 
 
After the start of Haltom’s criminal trial, Meyer, through her private attorney, filed a Vic-
tim’s Restitution Claim on February 27, 2002.  Haltom objected to Meyer’s restitution claim on 
the basis that she had waived her right to do so under the release she had signed on October 23, 
2001.  Haltom pled guilty to causing serious bodily injury while operating a motor vehicle with a 
blood alcohol content measuring greater than .10.1
 
 
At his sentencing hearing, the State asked that the trial court order Haltom to pay restitu-
tion.  The trial court sentenced Haltom to probation and a period of home detention.  Further the 
court ordered Haltom to serve 100 hours of community service and to pay $27,956.88 in restitu-
tion to Meyer.  Haltom appealed the court’s restitution order. 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed.  Haltom v. State, 808 N.E.2d 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  It 
held that the trial court’s restitution order was an abuse of its discretion, concluding that the Re-
lease signed by Meyer precluded the court from ordering Haltom to pay any further restitution as 
a condition of his probation.  Id. at 765.  The State sought, and we granted, transfer.  822 N.E.2d 
977 (Ind. 2004) 
 
Discussion 
 
 
Criminal restitution is provided for by Indiana Code Section 35-50-5-3.  It states in rele-
vant part that: 
in addition to any sentence imposed under this article for a felony 
or misdemeanor, the court may, as a condition of probation . . . or-
der the person to make restitution to the victim of the crime. . . .  
The Court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of: 
(2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (be-
fore the date of sentencing) as a result of the crime; 
 
(4) earnings lost by the victim (before the date of sentenc-
ing) as a result of the crime including earnings lost while 
the victim was hospitalized or participating in the investiga-
tion or trial of the crime. 
 
                                                 
1 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(1) (1998). 
 
3
Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a)(2), (4) (1998).  The statute further instructs that “[a]n order of restitu-
tion under subsection (a) does not bar a civil action for:  (1) damages that the court did not re-
quire the person to pay to the victim under the restitution order but arise from an injury or prop-
erty damage that is the basis of restitution ordered by the court; and (2) other damages suffered 
by the victim.”  Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(e)(1), (2) (1998). 
 
 
“Restitution, as a condition of probation, can be an instrumental part of the offender’s 
rehabilitation.”  Miller v. State, 502 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. 1986).  While its principal purpose is to 
vindicate the rights of society, an ancillary result is that it also serves to compensate the of-
fender’s victim.  See Id. (citing United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1982)).  
This ancillary function, however, does not alter the fact that “an order of restitution is as much a 
part of a criminal sentence as a fine or other penalty.”  Id.  (citation omitted).  Because restitution 
is part and parcel to our system of criminal punishment, its application cannot be precluded by 
the existence of a civil settlement agreement. 
 
 
We have held that “civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punish-
ment.”  Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 781 (Ind. 2002).  See also Dupin v. State, 524 N.E.2d 
329, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that “[s]ettlements in civil cases can have no effect upon 
sentences meted out in criminal cases”).  At the same time, a trial court remains free to “consider 
a civil settlement when deciding whether to impose a restitution order or the amount of restitu-
tion to order.”  Crawford, 770 N.E.2d at 781.  This level of discretion permits the trial court to 
order a greater amount in restitution to compensate a victim fully for damages and injuries not 
yet covered, or order less or no restitution at all to prevent the victim from receiving a windfall.2
                                                 
2 In the instant case the trial court ordered Haltom to pay $27,956.88 in restitution to Meyer on the basis 
that: 
If a restitution order for the full value of her actual expenses had been en-
tered before Mrs. Meyer settled with Defendant’s insurance company, 
she would easily have qualified for the maximum his insurance would 
pay for the pain and suffering that is awarded in civil cases.  After de-
ducting attorney fees, typically one-third, she would have received in 
hand about $67,000, a little more than twice her actual damages.  The 
Court does not see why [Meyer] should not receive the same benefit she 
could have received if she had waited the length of time it took to get this 
case resolved. 
 
 
4
 
However, allowing a civil settlement to preclude restitution altogether would infringe 
upon the State’s power to administer criminal punishment.  See U.S. v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 
1041 (6th Cir. 2001) (advancing the policy that “private individuals should not be allowed to 
thwart the penal goals of the criminal justice system by entering into releases or settlements with 
wrongdoers”).  The State is the only party with standing to exercise such power.  See Johnston v. 
Dobeski, 739 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. 2000) (the State and the defendant are the only two parties 
with standing in a criminal sentencing proceeding). 
 
By our holding today, we do nothing to constrain the ability of parties to settle civil dis-
putes prior to the commencement or conclusion of collateral criminal proceedings.  Parties re-
main free to enter into agreements to settle civil matters, and we are confident that they will do 
so.  But the civil courts, not the criminal courts, are the proper venue to adjudicate these matters.  
See Ramsey v. Hicks, 91 N.E. 344, 354 (Ind. 1910) (noting that it is the prerogative of the civil 
courts to determine the meaning and legal effect of civil contracts).  An aggrieved party, includ-
ing a criminal defendant, remains free to seek enforcement of the terms of a release in civil court.    
Our criminal courts are permitted to take note of these agreements in deciding whether to order 
restitution and in what amount, but these agreements in no way preclude a criminal court from 
ordering restitution when appropriate under statute. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Having previously granted transfer, we hold that civil settlements have no preclusive ef-
fect on the power of a criminal court to order restitution.  The trial court’s order for restitution is 
affirmed. 
 
 
Rucker, J., concurs.  Dickson, J., concurs with separate opinion.  Boehm, J., concurs in 
part and dissents in part with separate opinion.  Shepard, C.J., dissents with separate opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Appellant’s App. at 21. 
 
5
Dickson, Justice, concurring  
 
 
I concur, and write separately only to point out an alternative available to courts ordering 
criminal restitution.   
 
 
Indiana Code Section 35-50-5-3 authorizes an order of restitution “to the victim of the 
crime.”  It may well be that in some cases, the “victim” is the liability insurance carrier that has 
already paid full compensation to a person injured by the charged criminal conduct.  In such a 
situation, a court may seek rehabilitation of a defendant by requiring accountability through resti-
tution, but direct that the restitution be made to the entity that ultimately suffered the loss, which 
in some cases could be an insurance company.   
 
 
In the present case, because Meyer suffered serious head and neurological injuries and 
incurred medical expenses and lost wages totaling  $27,956.68, and Nationwide Insurance Com-
pany paid its full liability limits of $100,000, it is likely that such insurance proceeds represent 
less than full compensation for her damages sustained and to be sustained.  The award of further 
restitution to her, rather than to Nationwide Insurance, thus appears appropriate.   
 
I also observe that the fact and/or amount of contingent attorney fees incurred by an in-
jured person should not be a relevant consideration in this determination.  While the trial court 
here referred to consideration of attorney fees, the amount of restitution ordered was equal to 
Meyer’s special damages, not her presumed attorney fees, and thus was consistent with the 
criminal court's interests in reformation of the defendant. 
 
6
Boehm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the trial court was not bound by the agreement between 
Haltom and his victim.  But the parties (the victim, Haltom, and Haltom’s insurer) can be bound 
by contract. Accordingly, what happens to the money if the court orders any restitution should be 
viewed as a matter of private contract that can be agreed among Haltom, his insurer, and the vic-
tim.  As I see it, it was arguably a breach of contract for the victim to seek restitution after having 
agreed that the payment from Haltom’s insurer was in full satisfaction of her claims against 
Haltom.   Unlike the Court of Appeals, however, I would not give Haltom the benefit of that 
breach, if that is what it was. 
 
Even if the victim was in breach in seeking restitution, the trial court could have ordered 
it on its own initiative, or the prosecution could have requested it.  I would leave it to the victim 
and Haltom’s insurer to duke out who gets what under these circumstances.  If there is in fact a 
collectible judgment against Haltom, who gets the benefit could have been resolved by agree-
ment concurrent with the initial settlement of the victim’s claim against Haltom.  Or, as appears 
to be the case here, it could have been  left open to future resolution, in which case ordinary 
principles of estoppel, indemnity and subrogation apply. Either way, it seems to me that most of 
the issues the Chief Justice identifies disappear because both the insurer and the victim will settle 
the tort claim against Haltom, or not, based on their valuations of that claim, plus the value, if 
any, they assign to the prospect of a restitution award that is agreed to benefit that party.  Who-
ever gets the benefit of any restitution award, it will not reduce the net payment to the victim be-
low the negotiated settlement amount. Nor should it inure to Haltom’s benefit, if it is to serve its 
purpose of compensating one who has been harmed by the crime, at least in the absence of an 
explicit provision in the settlement agreement that requires remitting any restitution award to 
him. 
 
7
Shepard, Chief Justice, dissenting. 
 
 
The novel question presented in this case could be resolved either way.  Judicial policy 
could either recognize or decline to recognize civil settlement agreements when deciding 
whether to impose restitution in a criminal case.  I think the choice made today will turn out to be 
problematic for just about everyone concerned. 
 
 
For example, an injured plaintiff who receives an offer of civil settlement with standard 
release language will have no way of knowing whether further compensation might be achieved 
through criminal restitution notwithstanding the release.  The facts in this case are that the offer 
was the other driver’s insurance policy limits, but whenever the damages are plausibly less than 
the available amount of insurance, the claimant will face an unattractive choice.  Should she set-
tle now for less than the limits and hope for more from the criminal disposition?  Will the other 
driver be found guilty—or not guilty, in which case there will be no criminal penalty imposed at 
all? 
 
 
More pertinent to the interests of claimants will be the impact of today’s decision on how 
easy it is for them to obtain settlement offers from defendants and their insurance carriers.  How 
can a carrier manage an effective settlement for its insured if the release obtained will not protect 
it or its insured from additional claims?  Because the carrier has a duty of good faith with its in-
sured, any settlement for less than the policy limits will subject the carrier to a later contention 
by the insured that the settlement wrongly left the policyholder to additional damages imposed 
by the restitution system. 
 
 
If the wrongdoer is a person with assets, it would be even more difficult to imagine a 
prompt settlement.  An insured wrongdoer would find that the only route to closure would be a 
civil trial on the merits.  The delay required for this outcome would have an adverse impact all 
the way around.  The wrongdoer would likely face sentencing before the criminal court without 
having agreed to an amount of compensation, and the injured party would have to wait longer to 
be compensated. 
 
 
8
 
The Court does say that a criminal defendant ordered to pay restitution may reclaim it by 
suing the injured party for breach of the settlement agreement.  Slip op. at  5.  Thus, the victim’s 
additional compensation through the restitution system is a short-lived one.  And one that, be-
cause of the cost of legal representation, could also work quite adversely to both the injured party 
and the wrongdoer.  The restitution claim here was filed by the victim’s private attorney, who 
was presumably still at work under the terms of an ordinary contingent fee arrangement seeking 
to find additional compensation for the client.  If so, the victim would receive only a share of the 
$27,000 paid by the defendant through the criminal restitution system.   
 
The defendant would then hire counsel to pursue return of the $27,000, and he would un-
derstandably owe his attorney a fee for representing him in that litigation.  Even if he obtains a 
judgment for the full amount, he is thus not made whole. 
 
He has company.  The victim will owe $27,000 (more than she received in the first place) 
and presumably need to hire counsel to defend her in the wrongdoer’s recovery action. 
 
 
Finally, I agree completely with the majority that restitution serves two purposes:  reha-
bilitation of the offender and compensation of the victim.  Slip op. at 4.  But, the rule it adopts 
will pose serious questions about who should receive the restitution.  In a case where the actual 
damages were $80,000, and the carrier paid $80,000, and the criminal court ordered restitution of 
$27,000, it would be the insurance carrier who should receive the restitution. 
 
 
Those are not the facts before us, but the present facts pose yet another question.  Here, 
the trial judge did not find that the actual damages suffered by the victim exceeded $100,000.    
The trial judge’s sentencing statement, slip op. at 4 n.2, seems to say that the court chose to order 
$27,000 in restitution based on the idea that the victim could have waited until the criminal case 
was disposed of and received a restitution order of $100,000 without hiring counsel.  The victim 
should not be in a worse position for having settled earlier, goes the theory, and thus should re-
ceive enough restitution to make up for the contingent fee presumably owed to her lawyer on the 
$100,000.  To the extent this constitutes a finding that the actual value of the damage was 
$100,000, it poses yet another difficult legal issue concerning who should receive the $27,000. 
 
9
 
 
At the end of the day, I think the Court’s solution to this case prompts much running in 
place that will do little to serve any of the participants.  Their lives, and ours, would be more ful-
some if the Court simply decided that this was a moment when the judiciary should abide by the 
financial decisions of the victim and the tortfeasor.  Because the Court has taken a different path, 
victims, tortfeasors, and insurance premium payers will all be worse off. 
 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse. 
 
 
 
10