Title: Industrial Roofing Services, Inc. v. Randy J. Marquardt
Citation: 2007 WI 19
Docket Number: 2005AP000189
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2007

2007 WI 19 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP189 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Industrial Roofing Services, Inc. and Keith 
Dippel, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Randy J. Marquardt, Dale M. Marquardt, Bradley 
L. Engnath, Jeffrey P. Sampson and Roofing 
Design & Solutions, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Steven W. Schoen and John G. Dorrer, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 289 Wis. 2d 219, 709 N.W.2d 112 
(Ct. App. 2005—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 8, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert G. Mawdsley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR. J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Robert F. Johnson, Jane C. Schlicht, Paul D. Cranley, and 
Cook & Franke S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert F. 
Johnson. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Shepard 
A. Davis and Burton & Davis, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Shepard A. Davis. 
 
 
2007 WI 19
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP189  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV1475) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Industrial Roofing Services, Inc. and Keith 
Dippel, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Randy J. Marquardt, Dale M. Marquardt, Bradley 
L. Engnath, Jeffrey P. Sampson and Roofing 
Design & Solutions, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Steven W. Schoen and John G. Dorrer, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 8, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Industrial Roofing Services, 
Inc. and Keith Dippel (collectively "Industrial") seek review of 
an unpublished court of appeals decision affirming a circuit 
court ordered sanction dismissing with prejudice Industrial's 
complaint against defendants Randy Marquardt, Dale Marquardt, 
Bradley 
Engnath, 
Jeffrey 
Sampson, 
and 
Roofing 
Design 
& 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
2 
 
Solutions, Inc. (collectively, "Marquardt").1 Industrial contends 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
because, first, the attorney conduct underlying the dismissal 
was not egregious; second, that conduct should not be imputed to 
Industrial 
because 
Industrial 
was 
not 
at 
fault 
for 
its 
attorney's conduct; and third, the court based its decision on a 
mistake of fact.  
¶2 
We 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in entering an order of 
dismissal with prejudice. The court's conclusion that the 
conduct was egregious is one that a reasonable judge could 
reach. While we acknowledge that it is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion for a circuit court to impose the sanction of 
dismissal with prejudice when the client is blameless, the court 
in this case considered Industrial's conduct in imposing the 
sanction and found that Industrial was not blameless. Finally, 
we determine that the circuit court's decision was not based on 
a mistake of fact. Although we depart from some of its 
rationale, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 This is a case about the sanction of dismissal with 
prejudice. Cases involving sanctions are often fact intensive.  
                                                 
1 See Industrial Roofing Services, Inc. v. Marquardt, No. 
2005AP189, unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005) 
(affirming order of circuit court for Waukesha County, Robert G. 
Mawdsley, Judge). 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
3 
 
Additional facts will be discussed later in the opinion, 
supplementing the facts set forth here. 
¶4 
Keith Dippel founded and owns Industrial Roofing, 
which provides consulting services for roofing applications. 
Between July 2002 and January 2003 several employees (including 
the five Marquardt defendants) resigned from Industrial and 
established Roofing Design & Solutions, Inc., which provides 
similar consulting services. Other employees resigned and joined 
other roofing companies.  
¶5 
Industrial filed a complaint in the circuit court on 
June 19, 2003, against twelve defendants, asserting eight causes 
of action. The complaint alleges that the defendants used 
Industrial's information to set up a competing business in 
violation of Wisconsin law and their contractual duties and 
obligations 
to 
Industrial. 
Generally, 
without 
identifying 
individual Marquardt defendants, the complaint alleges that 
"individual defendants" breached oral employment contracts, 
breached 
the 
duty 
of 
good 
faith 
under 
those 
contracts, 
misappropriated Industrial's trade secrets and property, and 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
4 
 
intentionally 
interfered 
with 
Industrial's 
business 
relationships and contacts.2  
¶6 
The Marquardt defendants were represented by a single 
law firm. They denied the allegations of the complaint and 
asserted as an affirmative defense that the allegations were 
frivolous, "without basis in law or fact," and subject to 
statutory sanctions.  Between August 28 and September 19, 2003, 
Marquardt and other defendants served written discovery on 
Industrial, 
including 
requests 
for 
document 
production, 
interrogatories, 
and 
requests 
for 
admission. 
Realizing 
a 
potential for conflicts of interest in representing multiple 
defendants, the Marquardt attorney submitted interrogatories and 
requested documents regarding what allegations in the complaint 
applied to which Marquardt defendants. 
¶7 
On October 22, 2003, Industrial responded to each of 
Marquardt's requests for documents by objecting to the extent 
that 
the 
requests 
called 
for 
production 
of 
confidential 
information, and by stating that "responsive documents will be 
provided to the extent they exist." No documents were attached, 
                                                 
2 This 
review 
pertains 
only 
to 
the 
five 
Marquardt 
defendants. A different group, the "Clark" defendants, had their 
complaint dismissed for essentially the same reasons as the 
Marquardt defendants, but under a separate order. That order was 
not appealed, and thus the Clark defendants are not party to 
this review. The complaint raises additional allegations against 
the Clark defendants, including breach of express employment 
contracts and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaints against 
other of the original 12 defendants have also been dismissed, 
not appealed, and are not before the court for review. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
5 
 
and no time or place was given for an inspection of any 
documents.  
¶8 
Several defendants (though none of the Marquardt 
defendants) filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. The circuit court scheduled a hearing for October 
27, 2003, to hear those motions. Dippel attended the hearing. 
However, the hearing could not go forward because his attorney, 
Thomas Van Beckum (also Industrial's attorney), failed to serve 
on the opposing attorneys any responses to the motions. At the 
scheduled motion hearing, the court expressed disappointment 
that very little could be accomplished due to Industrial's 
failure to serve its response in a timely fashion. Industrial's 
attorney apologized to the Court for "wast[ing] quite a few 
people's time." 
¶9 
An attorney who filed a motion to dismiss asked the 
court to decide the motion only upon the papers timely filed, 
explaining that the response had been due at the beginning of 
September, and that he had written Industrial's attorney to let 
him know the response was overdue. The court responded that 
"[t]here are different sanctions that the Court can impose under 
the circumstances too for violations of the rules. So at this 
point I'm going to leave that for next time."  Accordingly, the 
court rescheduled the hearing on the motions to dismiss to 
November 17, 2003.  
¶10 Marquardt's attorney then advised the court that he 
had served interrogatories which exceeded the number allowed in 
the local court rule. He requested approval to go beyond the 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
6 
 
local limit, and argued that doing so was justified by the 
vagueness of the allegations, and the multiple counts and 
multiple defendants he represented. The court suggested that the 
attorneys should work together to resolve the issue regarding 
the number of interrogatories. 
¶11 Following the October 27 hearing, Marquardt's attorney 
repeatedly attempted to call Industrial's attorney to discuss 
the number of interrogatories. None of his telephone calls was 
returned. In an effort to contact him, Marquardt's attorney also 
sent Industrial's attorney letters and faxes. He received no 
responses.  
¶12 At the November 17 hearing, which Dippel attended, 
Industrial's attorney stated that his office was responsible for 
the mistake from the last hearing and that he, rather than his 
client, should pay any sanction. The circuit court responded by 
ordering a sanction of attorney's fees for failure to reply, 
failure to copy the other side, and for wasting a court hearing 
date. The court imposed the sanction against the plaintiff but 
allowed that plaintiff's counsel could pay: ". . . the Court 
would order that the attorneys fees for the appearance time 
would be a sanction to be paid for by the plaintiff. If 
plaintiff's counsel wants to do that, it's fine."  
¶13 After denying the motions to dismiss, the court  
issued a scheduling order which required that by March 30, 2004, 
Industrial produce a witness list, including expert witnesses, 
and an itemized list of special damages. Anticipating that the 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
7 
 
parties would be filing dispositive motions, the court deferred 
scheduling the trial until after the motions were heard. 
¶14 As of February 19, 2004, Marquardt had received none 
of the requested discovery. On that date Industrial filed a 
motion 
for 
a 
protective 
order 
regarding 
Marquardt's 
interrogatories and requests for admission. Notwithstanding its 
motion for a protective order, Industrial submitted a response 
to Marquardt's requests for admission with a blanket denial. 
¶15 The 
Clark 
defendants 
filed 
a 
motion 
to 
compel 
Industrial to answer discovery because they too had received a 
response to their request for document production indicating 
that the "documents will be provided." None had been received. 
In addition, Industrial's answers to Clark's interrogatories 
were unspecific and merely reiterated statements from the 
complaint. The hearing on that motion was set for February 23, 
2004. 
However, 
immediately 
before 
the 
scheduled 
hearing 
Industrial's attorney provided responses to Clark's request to 
admit, 
submitted 
answers 
and 
supplemental 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and in the hallway outside of the courtroom 
advised Clark's attorney that he would provide the documents 
requested by all of the defendants later that week. 
¶16 When the case was called, Clark's attorney complained 
about receiving the discovery in such a tardy fashion:  "The 
discovery requests were served back in August and here we are 
in, you know, mid February, end of February, and we're still, 
you know, just this morning receiving amended responses . . . ." 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
8 
 
¶17 He asked the court to consider imposing sanctions for 
what 
he 
thought 
to 
be 
another 
useless 
motion 
hearing.  
Specifically he requested that the court consider assessing 
attorney's fees and expenses for filing the motion and deeming 
certain matters to be admitted because of the late response.  He 
also advised the court that "not once did I receive a return 
phone call from Industrial's attorney in response to my letters 
and phone calls to him."  
¶18 The Court inquired if any of the other defendants were 
having difficulties or missing discovery.  Marquardt's attorney 
responded that he too had been "frustrated in the lack of 
communication with plaintiff's counsel." He continued: "As I sit 
here months and months after this case was initiated, I have no 
idea what the allegations against any of my clients really 
are. . . . I have no idea why the allegations even exist."3 
¶19 Marquardt's attorney advised the court that he had 
filed his request for production of documents in September, and 
that to date he had not received a single document. "I'm now 
being told just this morning again the same position, that 
documents will be available later this week. I guess I'd like 
                                                 
3 Marquardt's attorney further informed the court that he 
had been served with a motion for a protective order which 
challenged the number of interrogatories he filed on the grounds 
that each of the 30 interrogatories Marquardt filed had multiple 
parts. The court pointed out the Marquardt interrogatories' 
"multiplicity [was] caused by the complaint itself" insofar as 
there were numerous alleged causes of action and numerous 
defendants. It also noted that the general wording of the 
complaint would allow for responses that applied to multiple 
defendants. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
9 
 
the Court's assistance on when we're going to find out what this 
case is about." 
¶20 The 
court 
expressed 
concern 
about 
what 
it 
characterized as Industrial's attorney's pattern of failing to 
respond. This pattern included the attorney's failure to provide 
the other attorneys with Industrial's response to the motions 
before the October 27 hearing, his failure to provide sufficient 
response for the Marquardt defendants to assess whether the 
allegations 
had 
any 
merit, 
his 
failure 
to 
respond 
to 
communications from any of the other attorneys, and his 
continued failure to produce any documents. The court also 
expressed concern that the case was not progressing due to 
Industrial's inaction, and that the defendants, including 
Marquardt, believed that there was no merit to the allegations.  
¶21 The 
court 
instructed 
Industrial 
to 
provide 
"instantaneous answers" and that "[y]ou're going to be throwing 
some discovery at them, and I assume it will be promptly 
answered and completely answered." It further imposed payment of 
attorney's fees for the February 23 hearing as a sanction, and 
warned that the "next time it will be a larger sanction under 
the circumstances."  
¶22 The court set the matter for a status hearing on June 
14, 2004. It entered an order that Industrial was to respond to 
the outstanding discovery requests by March 1.  
¶23 No documents were provided to Marquardt "later that 
week" 
as 
Industrial's 
attorney 
had 
promised. 
No 
pending 
interrogatories or responses to requests for admissions were 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
10 
 
answered by March 1, as ordered by the court. Attorney's fees 
imposed as a sanction were not paid "forthwith" as ordered by 
the court.  
¶24 On March 22, after the response deadline had passed, 
Industrial answered Marquardt's requests for admission. The 
response consisted largely of objections and statements that 
Industrial could neither admit nor deny "until discovery has 
been taken from [Marquardt]." Industrial had to that point, nine 
months after filing its complaint, not made a single discovery 
request on Marquardt.  
¶25 Industrial continued in its failure to provide any 
documents in response to Marquardt's request for production. It 
also failed to meet the court-ordered deadline of March 30 for 
naming witnesses, designating expert witnesses, and itemizing 
damages.  
¶26 Marquardt 
and other defendants filed motions to 
dismiss, for summary judgment, and for sanctions. Marquardt's 
memorandum in support of its motion explains that it sought 
dismissal for discovery violations and violation of court 
orders, and that it sought sanctions "for filing and continuing" 
a frivolous matter under either Wis. Stat. § 814.025, § 802.05, 
or § 804.12(2) (2003-04).4 
                                                 
4 The cited statutes provide, among other things, that 
courts may impose sanctions for commencing and maintaining 
frivolous actions. All subsequent references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2003-04 version of the statutes. Wisconsin 
Stat. §§  814.025 and 802.05 were repealed and § 802.05 was 
recreated effective July 1, 2005. S. Ct. Order 03-06, § 1, 2005 
WI 38, 278 Wis. 2d xiii-xvi (eff. Mar. 31, 2005). 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
11 
 
¶27 At the June 14 hearing, which Dippel did not attend, 
Industrial's attorney advised the court that he was undergoing 
personal and emotional problems for which he was seeking 
professional treatment. He asserted that those problems were the 
root of his failure to respond to discovery and failure to 
comply with the court's orders. He stated: 
The fault in this case in terms of responding [has] 
been mine. My client wants to prosecute the case and 
wishes for the ability to do so without counsel. I 
explained to my client the need for someone else to 
take over the case. And if the Court's ruling today, 
to the extent there are sanctions to be levied, Judge, 
I would ask the Court to levy them against me in terms 
of any fees and not my client. 
¶28 The 
circuit court accepted the explanation, but 
inquired as to Industrial's knowledge of the ongoing compliance 
issues regarding the discovery order. Industrial's attorney 
correctly indicated that Dippel had been present at the November 
17, 2003, hearing when the scheduling order with the discovery 
timeline was issued, and in which the court had first imposed 
sanctions against the plaintiff. He also indicated that Dippel 
knew of the substance of the June 14 hearing and that he had 
already advised Industrial to seek new counsel. Attorneys for 
Clark and Marquardt mistakenly indicated to the court that 
Dippel was present at the February 23 hearing where the court 
warned of more severe sanctions for future discovery violations. 
The transcript from that hearing shows that Dippel was not 
present. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
12 
 
¶29 The court indicated that this was the worst case of 
discovery abuse that it had seen in an entire career. However, 
it also noted that the question of whether "the fault lies here, 
with the client versus the attorney" mattered to the appropriate 
sanction. The court therefore spent the remainder of the hearing 
considering various possibilities for sanctions, and discussing 
those possibilities with each of the attorneys present.  
¶30 The 
court 
weighed 
four 
options: 
dismissal 
with 
prejudice, dismissal without prejudice, allowing Industrial to 
retain different counsel and file a response, and, because of 
the assertion that the complaint was frivolous, having a hearing 
on "the issue of validity, where [Industrial] is to come up with 
the opportunity to demonstrate that this is not a frivolous 
case." The court indicated that it wanted to further reflect on 
the available options and that he would take the motions under 
advisement. 
¶31 After the June 14 hearing, Industrial hired new 
counsel. On June 24, Industrial's new attorneys filed a notice 
of appearance and an affidavit from Dippel. They also requested 
a status conference and an opportunity to present a plan to 
handle the claims.  
¶32 In his affidavit, Dippel disputed his attorney's 
statements that he had been aware of the existence and substance 
of the June 14 hearing. He stated that, contrary to his 
attorney's assertion, he had been advised to seek new counsel 
only after the June 14 hearing. Dippel also stated that he 
sought new counsel immediately after being advised to do so, 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
13 
 
that he first contacted his new attorney on June 18, and that he 
first met with the new attorney on June 21. He further described 
trying, repeatedly and unsuccessfully, to contact his attorney 
to retrieve Industrial's files in the week following the 
hearing. He stated that he did not retrieve those files until 
June 22.  
¶33 According to his affidavit, Dippel had been aware of 
neither the February 23 hearing nor the various defendants' 
motions to dismiss. In addition, he described his concerns about 
his attorney's conduct during discovery and the attorney's 
failures to communicate with him.  
¶34 In a decision filed on June 29, 2004, the circuit 
court denied Industrial's request for a status conference, 
stating that it would first decide the pending motions.  The 
court indicated that it would consider Dippel's affidavit in its 
decision. 
¶35 On August 10, 2004, the circuit court filed a written 
decision on the pending motions, and on September 16, the 
circuit court issued an order dismissing the complaint without 
prejudice. The dismissal allowed that Industrial could re-file 
with two conditions. First, Industrial would have to pay 
Marquardt attorney's fees of $3,926.81. Second, the re-filing 
would have to take place within 60 days of the order.  
¶36 The order stipulated that "[i]f the 60 days passes and 
the attorneys fees are not paid and the case is not re-filed, 
the case is then dismissed with prejudice as to the Marquardt 
Defendants." The order also revisited the hearing on viability 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
14 
 
of the claims as discussed at the June 14 hearing. It stated 
that upon re-filing Industrial would have to "demonstrate, at a 
hearing to be held immediately upon such re-filing, the 
viability of the allegations against the Marquardt Defendants in 
the complaint from both a factual and legal basis."5 Industrial 
filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court denied the 
motion at a hearing on October 21. 
¶37 On October 11, 2004, Industrial petitioned the court 
of appeals for leave to appeal the circuit court's September 16 
order dismissing the case without prejudice. The deadline for 
Industrial to re-file was November 15, 2004, and the court of 
appeals was reluctant to intervene before that date. It 
therefore issued an order on November 11 holding the petition in 
abeyance, 
noting 
that 
a 
dismissal 
with 
prejudice 
would 
constitute a final order from which Industrial could appeal.  
¶38 Industrial neither paid the sanctions nor re-filed the 
case, and the circuit court entered an order dismissing the 
claim against Marquardt with prejudice on December 9, 2004. The 
order was "based on the failure of plaintiffs to pay sanctions 
and re-file the case."6 Relying on Johnson v. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991), the court of 
                                                 
5 A similar order was entered with respect to the Clark 
defendants, for whom Industrial was to pay $16,077.50 in 
attorney's fees. As previously noted, Industrial did not appeal 
that order of dismissal.  
6 An order dismissing with prejudice the complaint against 
the Clark defendants was entered on January 5, 2005. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
15 
 
appeals affirmed the circuit court in a unanimous decision, and 
Industrial petitioned for review.  
II 
¶39 This case presents the issue of whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in dismissing the 
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice as a sanction for failure 
to respond to discovery and violation of court orders.  
¶40 Our inquiry is not whether we would have done the same 
thing if we were sitting as a circuit court judge. Our job is 
not 
to 
Monday-morning 
quarterback 
the 
decision 
with 
the 
advantage of 20/20 hindsight. Rather, the standard of review is 
to determine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  
¶41 The standard of review, although circumscribed by law, 
is a deferential standard. The decision to impose sanctions and 
the decision of which sanctions to impose, including dismissing 
an 
action 
with 
prejudice, 
are 
within 
a 
circuit 
court's 
discretion. Schultz v. Sykes, 2001 WI App 255, ¶8, 248 
Wis. 2d 746, 638 N.W.2d 604. "A discretionary decision will be 
sustained if the circuit court has examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated 
rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach." Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 273 (citing Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)). 
III 
¶42 We analyze first the circuit court's conclusion that 
the conduct was egregious. Although dismissing an action with 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
16 
 
prejudice is within a circuit court's discretion, it is a 
particularly harsh sanction. It is therefore appropriate only in 
limited circumstances. See Hudson-Diesel, Inc. v. Kenall, 194 
Wis. 2d 531, 542, 535 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1995).  
¶43 Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a) and § 805.03 
limit the sanctions that circuit courts may impose for failure 
to prosecute and for failure to comply with court orders to 
those that are "just."7 Wisconsin courts have interpreted this 
limitation to mean that dismissal requires that the non-
complying party has acted egregiously or in bad faith. Johnson, 
162 Wis. 2d at 275; Trispel v. Haefer, 89 Wis. 2d 725, 732, 279 
N.W.2d 242 (1979); Furrenes v. Ford Motor Co., 79 Wis. 2d 260, 
267-69, 255 N.W.2d 511 (1977). "[F]ailure to comply with circuit 
court 
scheduling 
and 
discovery 
orders 
without 
clear 
and 
justifiable excuse is egregious conduct." Garfoot v. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 707, 719, 599 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 
1999); see also State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 469-70, 592 
N.W.2d 628 (1999). Where the circuit court finds that failures 
                                                 
7 Under Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a) "If a party . . . fails to 
obey an order to provide or permit discovery, [the court] may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, 
[including] . . . dismissing 
the 
action." 
Section 
805.03 
provides: 
For failure of any claimant to prosecute or for 
failure of any party to comply with the statutes 
governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any 
order of the court, the court . . . may make such 
orders 
in 
regard 
to 
the 
failure 
as 
are 
just, 
including . . . orders 
authorized 
under 
§ 804.12(2)(a). 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
17 
 
to respond to discovery and follow court orders are "extreme, 
substantial, and persistent" it may dismiss the action with 
prejudice on the grounds that the conduct is egregious. Hudson-
Diesel, 194 Wis. 2d at 543. 
¶44 Industrial contends that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint with 
prejudice because the failures to respond to discovery and 
follow court orders were not egregious. The foundation of 
Industrial's argument is that it was in violation of the circuit 
court's discovery orders for only three months at the time the 
case was dismissed, and that this is not sufficient for 
Industrial's conduct to be considered egregious. Industrial 
contrasts 
its 
actions 
with 
those 
in 
Johnson, 
where 
the 
plaintiffs were in violation of discovery orders for over two 
years. Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 268-70.  
¶45 Johnson involved a products liability suit dismissed 
for failure to comply with scheduling and discovery orders. 
After the plaintiffs, for almost six months, had been in 
violation of a court order to provide a list of witnesses, 
deposition dates, and specific information regarding special 
damages, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit 
court initially declined to dismiss the action. After the 
plaintiffs had been in violation of the order for almost two 
years, the court granted a motion to dismiss. Id. at 269. At a 
hearing on a motion for reconsideration, the Johnsons testified 
that they had been unaware of the motions to dismiss until about 
four months before their case was dismissed. Id. at 270. This 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
18 
 
court determined that the dismissal was not an erroneous 
exercise of the circuit court's discretion. Id. at 287. 
¶46 While the Johnson plaintiffs were in violation of the 
circuit court's discovery orders for longer than Industrial, 
time alone is not reason enough to conclude that the conduct in 
this case was not egregious. In some respects, Industrial's 
conduct was more egregious than the Johnsons'. The Johnson 
defendants had some idea of the case against them, could 
identify what allegations applied to which defendant, and had 
received some document production. While the length of time in 
violation of court orders was longer in Johnson, the omissions 
in the instant case are more substantial. 
¶47 Industrial's complaint alleged that each of the 
Marquardt defendants misappropriated property, trade secrets, 
proprietary information, and customer information. However, it 
did not specify the property and information taken, and it did 
not specify which Marquardt defendants took what kind of 
property or information. In order to answer these basic 
questions Marquardt first served interrogatories and requests 
for document production on September 19, 2003. On October 22 
Industrial responded to the requests for document production 
merely by stating that "responsive documents will be provided to 
the 
extent 
they 
exist." 
It 
did 
not 
respond 
to 
the 
interrogatories.  
¶48 In 
addition 
to 
not 
meaningfully 
responding 
to 
defendants' discovery requests, Industrial impeded the case's 
progress by failing to timely respond to the August and 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
19 
 
September 2003 motions to dismiss. Moreover, by failing to serve 
its responses to those motions on the opposing attorneys, 
Industrial's attorney caused the court and each of the opposing 
attorneys to attend the October 27 hearing for naught. This led 
the court to later impose sanctions for failure to reply, 
failure to copy the opposing attorneys, and for wasting the 
court's hearing date. 
¶49 Industrial's failure to respond continued after the 
October 27 hearing. At that hearing, the court suggested that 
the Marquardt and Industrial attorneys should work together to 
resolve the issue regarding the number of interrogatories. 
Marquardt's attorney repeatedly called, mailed, and faxed 
Industrial's attorney in an attempt to work out some solution, 
but none of those communications was answered or returned.8 
¶50 Industrial's pattern of non-responsiveness continued. 
On February 19, 2004, it issued a blanket denial to the requests 
for admission. As of the February 23 hearing date Marquardt 
still had not received responses sufficient to establish what of 
Industrial's allegations pertained to which defendant and what 
property was alleged to have been taken.  
¶51 In order to end Industrial's continued failure to 
respond, the court exhorted Industrial's attorney to provide 
"instantaneous 
answers" and demanded that the defendants' 
                                                 
8 This failure to take seriously the court's suggestion that 
Industrial work with Marquardt led Marquardt to redraft its 
interrogatories to be within the local limit and supplement them 
with 
requests 
for 
admission. 
Marquardt 
served 
these 
on 
Industrial January 15, 2004. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
20 
 
requests would be "promptly answered and completely answered." 
The court even allowed that Industrial could provide narrative 
answers, so long as they were fact-laden enough to allow the 
defendants to assess the allegations. The court recognized that 
Industrial's failure to respond was so substantial that it left 
the Marquardt defendants unable to assess the nature of the case 
against them, explaining to Industrial's attorney that "[t]hey 
just want to get started. They want to know where they're 
going, . . . because at least from what they argued it says 
there's nothing here. So if there's nothing here they want to 
get out." 
¶52 The court also noted that Industrial's failures were 
persistent, and that "at this point a pattern has developed" in 
which Industrial failed to respond to discovery and failed to 
communicate with opposing attorneys trying to work out the 
discovery problems. As a response to that pattern the court 
imposed sanctions and warned of greater sanctions if the pattern 
continued. Industrial's attorney told the court that he would 
provide documents for the defendants the same week as the 
hearing. The court entered an order setting March 1 as the 
deadline for responding to the outstanding discovery requests.  
¶53 Again, Industrial failed to timely respond. Despite 
its attorney's assurance that it would provide requested 
documents the week of the February hearing, he did not provide 
them. Despite the court's order to respond to outstanding 
discovery requests by March 1, Industrial did not respond. While 
Industrial did respond to Marquardt's requests for admission on 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
21 
 
March 22, it did not produce any documents, and it did not 
respond to any interrogatories, even in the narrative format 
that the court had allowed at the February hearing.  
¶54 Moreover, Industrial failed to comply with the court's 
scheduling order by not producing a witness list or itemized 
damages by March 30, 2004. Even by the June 14, 2004 hearing on 
defendants' motions to dismiss, Industrial had not provided 
Marquardt any documents and had not answered any of Marquardt's 
interrogatories. 
¶55 The circuit court in this case explained that there 
was a persistent pattern in which Industrial's attorney failed 
to respond and follow court orders. The court considered the 
failure to be extreme. It said that this case represented the 
worst example of failure to respond that it had seen its entire 
career. It commented that "I've never had a situation like this. 
Maybe because I've never seen the lack of response [shown here]" 
and that "[a]t least in my career, I haven't seen this type of 
omission."9 Finally, the court recognized the failures to be 
substantial. The court determined that despite the personal and 
emotional problems of Industrial's attorney, "at this point and 
                                                 
9 The dissent contends that the circuit court's language is 
open to interpretation. Dissent, ¶111. It suggests that it is 
just as plausible that the circuit court was surprised because 
it was the first time in the circuit court's experience that a 
lawyer accepted full responsibility and blame. We do not 
consider it a plausible interpretation that the circuit court 
did not find the conduct egregious in light of its statements 
that "At least in my career, I haven't seen this type of 
omission. . . ." and "it fits into all the major sanction 
cases." 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
22 
 
certainly from the facts here, it fits into all the major 
sanction cases."  
¶56 Upon a review of the record we determine that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when 
it 
concluded 
that 
Industrial's 
attorney's 
actions 
were 
egregious. The court examined the facts and the law, and 
explained why it thought that those failures were persistent, 
substantial, and extreme. The court's conclusion was one that a 
reasonable judge could reach. Accordingly, the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion will be sustained. 
IV 
¶57 Industrial argues next that it was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion for the circuit court to impute the 
conduct of the attorney to the client where the client is 
blameless. It cites to Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. 
Wiegel, 
92 
Wis. 2d 498, 
285 
N.W.2d 720 
(1979), 
for 
the 
proposition that the decision to impute an attorney's failures 
to a client will depend upon the client's responsibility. 
Industrial argues that because it was reasonable and diligent 
during the case, Charolais suggests that the circuit court ought 
not to have imputed its attorney's conduct to Industrial.  
¶58 In Charolais, this court allowed that an attorney's 
failure "may constitute excusable neglect on the part of the 
client, when the client has acted as a reasonable and prudent 
person in engaging a lawyer of good reputation, has relied upon 
him to protect his rights, and has made a reasonable inquiry 
concerning the proceedings." 92 Wis. 2d at 514 (citing Wagner v. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
23 
 
Springaire Corp., 50 Wis. 2d 212, 221, 184 N.W.2d 88 (1971); 
Paschong v. Hollenbeck, 13 Wis. 2d 415, 423, 108 N.W.2d 668 
(1961)). The Charolais court concluded that the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion "may or may not call for imputation, 
depending on the facts of each case." Id.  
¶59 The discussion in Charolais appears to be at odds with 
this court's determination in Johnson. There the Johnsons, like 
Industrial here, argued that the egregious conduct of counsel 
should not be imputed to a blameless client. The Johnsons urged 
this court to adopt a per se rule "prohibiting dismissal absent 
a showing that the party itself bears some responsibility for 
the failure of its attorney-representative to comply with the 
court's orders." Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 281.  
¶60 This court declined to adopt such a rule, concluding 
that it was unworkable and would undermine the circuit court's 
ability to effectively administer judicial business. The court 
expressed concern that the sanction of dismissal would become 
"toothless" because clients could avoid the sanction simply by 
claiming that they were unaware of their attorneys' actions. Id. 
at 283. Balancing the equities, the court determined that "it is 
more equitable to allow the adverse consequences to fall upon 
the shoulders of the party who has chosen the attorney, rather 
than on the adversary and the other litigants who await their 
day in court." Id. at 285.  
¶61 The concerns of the Johnson court for both equity and 
effective judicial administration remain central to this court's 
analysis. However, we depart from the Johnson court's conclusion 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
24 
 
that it would be inequitable to adopt a rule akin to the 
proffered 
rule 
or 
that 
it 
would 
necessarily 
result 
in 
ineffective 
and 
"toothless" 
administration 
of 
justice. 
Accordingly, we determine that it is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion for a circuit court to enter a sanction of dismissal 
with prejudice, imputing the attorney's conduct to the client, 
where the client is blameless. To the extent that Johnson can be 
interpreted 
as 
concluding 
that 
the 
client's 
conduct 
is 
irrelevant or that a dismissal with prejudice is warranted even 
when the client is blameless, then that part of Johnson is 
overruled.10  
¶62 We find persuasive the five reasons set forth in the 
concurring opinion in Johnson which support our determination.  
One, as a practical matter, a layperson ordinarily 
cannot be expected to supervise his or her attorney 
through every pretrial phase of litigation. . . . 
Two, the consequence for the blameless litigant whose 
case is dismissed is extraordinarily severe. The 
litigant never gets the opportunity for a trial on the 
merits. . . . 
                                                 
10 The dissent and concurrence contend that from such a 
change in the law, it follows that the circuit court's conduct 
was beyond the limits of its discretion. Dissent, ¶102; 
concurrence, ¶96.  As explained above, there is no question that 
the circuit court's decision would be within its discretion 
under the Johnson standard that was in effect at the time of the 
decision. Under the standard we adopt here, the circuit court 
must find that the client is not blameless before it can dismiss 
a case with prejudice; that is precisely what the circuit court 
did here. Thus, under either standard, the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion was proper. That a circuit court 
exercised 
discretion appropriate to the stricter standard 
established here does not render its conduct beyond the limits 
of its discretion under the previous, less-strict standard. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
25 
 
Three, the harm to the opposing party is ordinarily 
limited, and the opposing party can be compensated. 
Four, the circuit court has other sanctions available 
to it short of dismissal of the litigant's case with 
prejudice, 
the 
most 
severe 
sanction 
possible. 
Sanctions could be imposed on the lawyer personally. 
Five, while a circuit court's efforts to move the 
docket expeditiously are important, dismissing actions 
for counsel's failure to comply with court orders does 
not necessarily foster sound, speedy administration of 
justice.  
Id. at 290-291 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted; 
citations omitted). 
¶63 Our departure from Johnson has been forewarned by more 
recent cases that address the issue of imputing an attorney's 
conduct to a client in the context of dismissal with prejudice 
as a sanction.11 In State v. Smythe, this court described the 
circumstances in which the egregious conduct of the attorney may 
be imputed to the client in order to justify dismissal. The 
court gave examples, such as a party's failure to act as a 
reasonable and prudent person and failure to inquire about the 
proceedings. 225 Wis. 2d at 469-70 n.11 (citing Charolais, 92 
Wis. 2d at 514). More recently the court in Garfoot v. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., after discussing Johnson, Charolais, and Smythe, 
set forth a standard: When an attorney's conduct is egregious 
                                                 
11 Though the general rule in other jurisdictions more 
closely aligns with Johnson and countenances dismissal with 
prejudice regardless of client fault, there are numerous 
jurisdictions that demand consideration of client conduct before 
imputing attorney conduct. See Annotation, Incompetence of 
counsel as ground for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 
A.L.R.4th 323 (1988, updated 2004), § 4d. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
26 
 
"the trial court is to consider the client's failure to act in a 
reasonable and prudent manner, and the client's knowledge of or 
complicity in that conduct, in deciding whether to impute the 
attorney's conduct to the client for purposes of a sanction." 
228 Wis. 2d at 728.12 
¶64 Even if the record supports the view that the client, 
Industrial, was not itself directly to blame for those failures, 
it 
does 
not 
follow 
that 
Industrial 
is 
without 
fault. 
Industrial's fault lies in its failure to act in a reasonable 
and prudent manner when it knew or had reason to know that its 
attorney was failing to properly manage the case. 
¶65 The circuit court relied on several facts in assessing 
Industrial's role in the dismissal. First, Dippel was present at 
the October 2003 hearing on motions to dismiss in which the 
parties could conduct no business because of Industrial's 
attorney's failure to provide copies of Industrial's response to 
the motions. Dippel was also present at the November 2003 
hearing in which the circuit court first imposed sanctions upon 
Industrial.  
¶66 The court also reviewed Dippel's affidavit and, in its 
August 10, 2004, decision, found that the affidavit demonstrated 
                                                 
12 Although a circuit court must consider the client's 
conduct when imposing sanctions generally, the focus of our 
inquiry 
is 
more 
limited. 
 
We 
consider 
the 
client's 
blameworthiness only in the context of the sanction of dismissal 
with prejudice.  
No. 
2005AP189   
 
27 
 
that 
some 
of 
his 
attorney's 
conduct 
should 
have 
raised 
suspicions:13 
The subsequent [i.e., to the November 2003 hearing] 
contacts Mr. Dippel had with [Industrial's attorney] 
should have raised suspicion as to his abilities to 
prosecute the case. . . . Merely because he relied on 
[his attorney's] assurance that things were being 
taken care of does not exonerate Mr. Dippel from the 
consequences and sanctions. 
At 
the 
October 
2004 
hearing 
on 
Industrial's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, the circuit court further explained the role of 
the affidavit in its decision: 
[I]n 
that 
affidavit is sufficient contacts with 
[Industrial's attorney] where things were not being 
accomplished and his concerns were elevated that the 
                                                 
13 Whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
should 
have 
granted 
an 
evidentiary hearing was not raised as an issue on appeal and is 
not before us. We note that on a motion for a sanction of 
dismissal with prejudice that if the circuit court relies upon 
disputed facts or inferences from those facts in its decision, 
an evidentiary hearing, rather than simply oral argument based 
on briefs, affidavits, and depositions, is necessary to resolve 
the disputes. Garfoot, 228 Wis. 2d at 725 n. 8. See also State 
v. Jason R.N., 201 Wis. 2d 646, 648, 549 N.W.2d 752 (Ct. App. 
1996). In this case, the circuit court did not rely on 
Industrial's attorney's claims during the June 14, 2004 hearing 
that Dippel was aware of the substance of that hearing and the 
February 23 hearing. Rather, the court relied on Dippel's 
affidavit as support for the view that Industrial did not act 
reasonably and prudently. 
The dissent asserts that Dippel's affidavit raises disputed 
facts or that more than one reasonable inference can be drawn 
from the facts set forth in the affidavit. Dissent, ¶¶127-28. 
However, the facts in the affidavit are not disputed, and the 
circuit court made no factual inferences from the affidavit. 
Rather, it determined that the facts in the affidavit supported 
the 
legal 
conclusion 
that 
Industrial 
was 
not 
blameless. 
Industrial disputes that legal conclusion, but not the facts 
upon which it is based. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
28 
 
flags had to be up . . . . Even the affidavit that 
[Dippel] files in this matter [i.e., the motion for 
reconsideration] basically supports the connections 
that the Court had made. 
¶67 In the affidavit Dippel states that he contacted his 
attorney about the status of discovery after the defendants 
filed a response to the lawsuit, after the November 17 
scheduling conference, in January, and in February. During that 
period, the attorney assured him that he was managing the case 
appropriately.  
¶68 The 
affidavit 
then 
describes 
a 
change 
in 
the 
attorney's behavior toward Dippel:  
During the February, March and April timeframe, I made 
repeated phone calls to [my attorney's] office and 
sent emails regarding the status of the case, the 
status of the witness list and experts and the status 
of discovery. Rarely was I able to reach [my attorney] 
by phone, and rarely did he return my phone calls. 
These statements, together with Dippel's presence at the October 
and November hearings, provide a sufficient basis for the 
conclusion that Industrial failed to act in a reasonable and 
prudent manner. Industrial knew or had reason to know that its 
attorney was failing to properly manage the case.14 
                                                 
14 Industrial's 
attorney 
received 
a 
public 
reprimand 
pursuant to SCR 22.09 for his conduct in this case (Reprimand 
06-OLR-12), and the dissent claims that the reprimand shows that 
Industrial was blameless. Dissent, ¶¶103, 114, 164-65. That view 
is incorrect. The reprimand makes clear that the attorney's 
conduct 
was 
egregious, 
and 
that 
the 
attorney 
made 
misrepresentations to Dippel and to the court. Those claims are 
not in doubt here. The question is whether Industrial failed to 
act reasonably and prudently when it became apparent that its 
attorney was failing to do his job.  
No. 
2005AP189   
 
29 
 
¶69 Additionally, Industrial bears some responsibility for 
the dismissal with prejudice. The circuit court initially 
entered an order of dismissal without prejudice that stated 
explicitly the conditions under which it would enter a dismissal 
with prejudice. Industrial was aware of those conditions and the 
consequences of failing to pay $3,926.81 in attorney's fees and 
re-file. Its failure to do so was neither reasonable nor 
prudent.15  
                                                                                                                                                             
Moreover, the dissent fails to adequately account for the 
limitations inherent to the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys and to disciplinary hearings, which by design do not 
form the basis for responsibility for the purpose of civil 
litigation. The preamble to SCR 20 makes this clear: 
Violation of a rule should not give rise to a cause of 
action nor should it create any presumption that a 
legal duty has been breached. The rules are designed 
to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary 
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for 
civil liability. 
SCR 20, Preamble (2006). The implication that the results of 
Industrial's attorney's disciplinary hearing ought to bear on 
the result of this case risks subverting the purpose of the 
rules by opening them to use by litigants as "procedural 
weapons." Id. See also Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, ¶25, n.8, 
290 Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160; Williams v. Rexworks, Inc., 
2004 WI App 228, ¶20, 277 Wis. 2d 495, 691 N.W.2d 897. 
15 The dissent's assertions that in order to avoid a 
dismissal with prejudice a client must now understand, assess, 
and monitor the attorney "every step of the way" (dissent, ¶136) 
misinterprets our holding. It fails to acknowledge the client's 
responsibility for the dismissal when he had both notice of the 
potential of a dismissal with prejudice and a reasonable 
opportunity to avoid it. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
30 
 
¶70 Industrial failed to act despite having an opportunity 
and instructions how to prevent its case from being dismissed 
with prejudice. The first order of dismissal (without prejudice) 
stated explicitly that "[i]f 60 days pass and the attorneys' 
fees are not paid and/or the case is not re-filed, then the 
dismissal of this case automatically will be deemed to be a 
dismissal with prejudice." Ultimately, however, Industrial chose 
to do neither. Finally, on December 9, 2004, the court entered a 
judgment of dismissal with prejudice. The order provided that 
the dismissal was "based on the failure to pay sanctions and to 
re-file the case." 
¶71 In its dismissal of this case without prejudice the 
circuit court provided notice to Industrial that its case was in 
danger of being dismissed with prejudice. Whether a client acts 
reasonably and prudently depends in part on whether the client 
knew, or should have known, about the attorney's failures and 
whether the client failed to act to correct the situation when 
presented with an opportunity to do so. Thus, before a client is 
subjected to dismissal with prejudice, the client should have 
notice that the court is considering such a harsh sanction. Here 
Dippel knew that the court was considering the dismissal with 
prejudice sanction and was given an opportunity by the court to 
avoid those consequences. 
¶72 Industrial 
attempts 
to 
justify 
its 
inaction 
by 
asserting that it could not comply with the conditions that the 
court set for avoiding the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. 
In its brief it argues that the court erred when it required 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
31 
 
that 
Industrial 
"'demonstrate . . . the 
viability 
of 
the 
allegations against the Marquardt Defendants from both a factual 
and legal basis,' after which the circuit court might have 
permitted the case to be re-filed." Industrial contends that the 
requirement of a hearing on viability creates an undefined and 
impermissible barrier.16  
¶73 Industrial misconstrues the record in two respects. 
First, the hearing on viability was not a condition that had to 
be met before the re-filing of the case. To the extent that 
Industrial interprets the September 2004 order to dismiss 
without 
prejudice 
as 
setting 
forth 
such 
a 
requirement, 
Industrial misreads the order. 
¶74 Additionally, the court set forth the rationale of its 
September 
2004 
order 
of 
dismissal 
without 
prejudice 
by 
incorporating into the order its August 10, 2004, written 
decision. In that decision the court stated:  
The motions to dismiss are granted without prejudice 
subject to the condition that any re-filing would 
require plaintiffs to pay the attorneys fees related 
to discovery failures. If the attorneys fees are paid 
and the case is re-filed, the Court requires that 
plaintiffs are immediately subject to a hearing to 
demonstrate the viability of the allegations in the 
complaint from a factual and legal basis before the 
case can proceed to any further scheduling. 
                                                 
16 We question whether the issue of an unclear standard is 
ripe and should even be before us. After all, Industrial never 
asked for a hearing, and thus no standard——whether clearly or 
unclearly defined——was ever applied. Nevertheless, we determine 
that the context in which the viability hearing arose and the 
court's statements about such a hearing provide sufficient 
clarity for Industrial to have proceeded. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
32 
 
¶75 Second, the context in which the viability hearing 
arose and the court's statements about such a hearing provide 
sufficient clarity for Industrial to proceed.17 In its response 
to Industrial's complaint, Marquardt asserted the affirmative 
defense that Industrial's claims were frivolous. Marquardt again 
asserted that the claims were frivolous in its motion for 
dismissal, summary judgment, and for sanctions filed on April 
14, 2004. The memorandum in support of that motion asked for 
sanctions pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 814.025, 804.12(2), and 
802.05.18 
These 
statutes 
provide 
for 
sanctions 
upon 
a 
determination that the claim is frivolous. A claim is frivolous 
if it is not well-grounded in fact or law. Jandrt v. Jerome 
Foods, Inc., 227 Wis.2d 531, 550, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999). 
                                                 
17 Admittedly, the circuit court describes the showing of 
viability in disparate ways. At various times it states that 
Industrial 
must 
"demonstrate . . . the 
viability 
of 
the 
allegations . . . from both a factual and legal basis"; "should 
be able make some kind of prima facie showing that there was 
merit"; should present evidence "beyond the . . . allegations in 
the complaint"; and must make "a showing of significant merit." 
Nonetheless, the discussions take place within the context of 
plausible assertions that Industrial's claims are frivolous, and 
the court's statements all suggest that Industrial must make a 
showing sufficient to proceed (and not enough to succeed on the 
merits, for example). This provides sufficient clarity for 
Industrial to conclude that the showing was just enough to allay 
doubts that the complaint was frivolous. 
18 Section 814.025 provides that costs and attorney's fees 
may 
be 
imposed 
if 
the 
claim 
is 
deemed 
frivolous. 
Section 804.12(2) provides for a myriad of discovery sanctions, 
including dismissal of the action. Section 802.05 requires that 
a pleading be "well-grounded in fact [and] warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument extending the law." 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
33 
 
¶76 At the June 14 hearing, when weighing its options, the 
circuit court considered the assertions that the claims were 
frivolous:  
One of the things in the brief was the fact that this 
was 
frivolous . . . . 
If 
it's 
dismissed 
with 
prejudice, 
I'm 
not 
going 
to 
worry 
about 
frivolous. . . . 
The 
other 
option 
might 
include 
basically starting out with, instead of holding a 
merit hearing, the issue of validity, where he is to 
come up with the opportunity to demonstrate that this 
is not a frivolous case. 
¶77 As noted above, the court in its August 10, 2004, 
written decision defined what would have to be shown at the 
hearing as "a hearing to demonstrate the viability of the 
allegations in the complaint from a factual and legal basis." 
¶78 The issue was again discussed at the October 21, 2004, 
motion for reconsideration hearing. There, Marquardt's attorney 
explained: 
[T]he fact of the matter is this case was supposed to 
have had a factual and legal basis since it was filed 
in 2003. Having the hearing and showing that it has a 
factual and legal basis shouldn't be an issue for 
these plaintiffs. They're already supposed to have 
that. That's supposed to be set in stone. . . .  
The fact of the matter is the defendants deserve to 
have this matter resolved. There is no merit to this 
case. 
That's 
what 
we've 
been 
arguing 
from 
the 
beginning. We've actually asked for sanctions for 
frivolousness. 
The hearing on viability was raised and discussed in the context 
of the assertion that Industrial's allegations were frivolous. 
The standard to meet the assertions of frivolousness is well 
defined: Industrial would only have to make a showing that its 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
34 
 
allegations had enough basis in law and fact to satisfy 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05. 
¶79 The hearing on viability was not, however, a hearing 
on the motions for sanctions for frivolousness. Rather, given 
the history of this case, it was a measure tailored to forestall 
one of the principal harms precipitated by Industrial's actions. 
One year after this case had been filed, the Marquardt 
defendants still did not know what allegations applied to which 
defendants, and did not know the factual basis of Industrial's 
allegations. The hearing on viability was therefore less a 
punitive measure against Industrial than a way to mitigate 
future harm.19 Because the standard Industrial would have to meet 
                                                 
19 The dissent maintains that Industrial is properly seen as 
the victim in this case. Dissent, ¶¶103, 164. This ignores the 
larger point that it is the Marquardt defendants who have 
suffered here, and who are truly not to blame for that 
suffering. They have been drawn into litigation which has been 
protracted for reasons beyond their control, they have complied 
with court orders, and yet they still do not have sufficient 
information to determine what causes of action apply to which 
defendant or the factual basis of the allegations. In contrast, 
Industrial had the opportunity to put the litigation back on 
track, and to re-file the case. To allow Industrial to continue 
without compensating Marquardt for its reasonable attorney fees 
and without giving Marquardt some idea of what causes of action 
apply to which defendants and of the factual basis for the 
allegations, as appears to be the dissent's preferred route, 
would be to put the onus of Industrial's actions on a party that 
is clearly innocent of wrongdoing.  
Similarly, the dissent's dissatisfaction with Industrial's 
choice between re-filing on condition of paying attorney fees 
and 
having 
a 
viability 
hearing 
ignores 
the 
choice 
from 
Marquardt's perspective. Dissent, ¶157. Allowing Industrial to 
simply re-file would require Marquardt to continue paying 
attorney fees for a lawsuit about which it did not have even 
basic information. 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
35 
 
was sufficiently defined, and because a viability hearing is an 
appropriate response to the particular violations of this case, 
Industrial's attempt to justify its inaction is unpersuasive. 
¶80 In imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice 
the court considered the issue of whether the client was 
blameless. Here the court examined the client's conduct and 
concluded that the client was at fault for failing to act in a 
reasonable and prudent manner. That conclusion is one that a 
reasonable judge could make. The court therefore did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in dismissing the case.  
V 
¶81 Industrial's third argument is that the circuit 
court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice was an 
erroneous exercise of discretion because it based that decision 
on a mistake of fact. During the June 14, 2004, hearing, both 
plaintiff's and defendants' attorneys mistakenly stated that 
Dippel had been present at the February 23 hearing in which the 
court admonished Industrial's attorney about its discovery 
failures and issued the motion to compel. The court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court had "corrected the mistake and 
reasonably concluded that it was not of such importance as to 
upset its final determination." Industrial Roofing Services, 
Inc. v. Marquardt, No. 2005AP189, unpublished slip op., ¶23 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005). We agree. 
¶82 As the court of appeals noted, the circuit court 
addressed 
the 
mistake 
in 
the 
October 
2004 
motion 
for 
reconsideration hearing. The court acknowledged that it had been 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
36 
 
mistaken, and that Dippel "wasn't there when I gave a lecture." 
But, the court asked, "Does that make a difference in the 
Court's mind? No." Rather, it determined that the information in 
Dippel's affidavit provided ample reason that Industrial ought 
to have been aware that its attorney was not adequately 
attending to the case. 
¶83 Thus, while the court was initially mistaken about 
Dippel's presence at the February 2004 hearing, the facts of the 
case provide sufficient reason for the court to conclude that 
Industrial had reason to be concerned about its attorney's 
management of the case and that Industrial did not act 
reasonably and prudently. Moreover, the court's remarks at the 
October motion hearing make it clear that it did not rely on any 
mistake of fact in reaching its decision to dismiss the case 
with prejudice. Thus, the court's decision to dismiss with 
prejudice was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
VI 
¶84 We will sustain a discretionary decision so long as 
the circuit court has examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational 
process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
reach. Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 273. The record reveals that the 
circuit court meets that standard in this case.  
¶85 In sum, we determine that the circuit court's decision 
to dismiss this action with prejudice was not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion. The court reasonably concluded that the 
conduct was egregious. We acknowledge that it is an erroneous 
No. 
2005AP189   
 
37 
 
exercise of discretion for a circuit court to impose the 
sanction of dismissal with prejudice when the client is 
blameless; 
however, 
the 
court 
in 
this 
case 
considered 
Industrial's conduct in imposing the sanction and found that 
Industrial was not blameless. Finally, we determine that the 
circuit court's decision was not based on a mistake of fact. 
Although 
we 
depart 
from 
its 
application 
of 
Johnson, 
we 
nevertheless affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2005AP189.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶86 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I concur.  
This matter involves the interpretation of two of our rules, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 
(Rules) 804.12(2)(a)3. 
and 
805.03 
(2003-04).1  
Simply stated, both rules provide that when a party fails to 
comply with statutes governing procedure in civil actions, 
including an order to make or permit discovery, "the court in 
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to 
the failure as are just," including dismissing the action on the 
merits.  Sec. 804.12(2)(a)3.; 805.03.  The sanctions created by 
these rules contemplate an act of discretion by the court.  Now, 
in the absence of rule changes by this court or independent 
legislative action, the majority abandons our precedent and 
strips judicial officers of the discretion clearly established 
by these rules to issue orders determined by them to be just.  
The 
majority 
concludes 
"it 
is 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion for a circuit court to enter a sanction of dismissal 
with prejudice, imputing the attorney's conduct to the client, 
where the client is blameless."  Majority op., ¶61.  While this 
conclusion is well intentioned, in the absence of any change 
implemented as part of our rule-making procedure, I cannot join 
the majority opinion.  I therefore write separately. 
¶87 This is not the first time this issue has been 
addressed by this court.  This question was first addressed in 
1991 in the case of Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 
Wis. 2d 261, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991).   
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP189.lbb 
 
2 
 
¶88 In Johnson, the circuit court was faced with multiple 
violations of pretrial discovery orders during a personal injury 
action by the Johnsons that lasted for a period of years.  Id.  
at 267-270.  At the hearing on defendant Allis Chalmers' motion 
to dismiss,2 Mrs. Johnson testified that she and her husband 
provided their attorneys with all requested materials and were 
unaware of the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants 
earlier in the case.  Id.  at 270.  The circuit court 
nevertheless granted Allis Chalmers' motion to dismiss (and 
denied the motion for reconsideration as to Sperry).  Id.  at 
271-72.  The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.  Id. at 
272. 
¶89 This court in Johnson recognized that "[a] circuit 
court's decision to dismiss an action is discretionary," and 
"will be sustained [on appeal] if the circuit court has examined 
the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using 
a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach."  Id.  at 273 (citations omitted).  
Dismissal is an erroneous exercise of discretion "if the 
aggrieved party can establish 'a clear and justifiable excuse' 
for the delay."  Id.  (citation omitted).  Dismissal is also 
improper, that is, not just, "unless bad faith or egregious 
conduct can be shown on the part of the noncomplying party."  
Id.  at 275 (citations omitted).  This court reasoned that the 
sanction of dismissal will be sustained if there is a reasonable 
                                                 
2 A second motion had been previously granted on behalf of 
defendant Sperry Rand Corporation, but was being reconsidered at 
the hearing. 
No.  2005AP189.lbb 
 
3 
 
basis 
for 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
that 
the 
noncomplying party's conduct was egregious and there was no 
clear and justifiable excuse for the party's noncompliance.  Id. 
at 276-77.   
¶90 Applying these principles to the case before it, this 
court held that there was no erroneous exercise of discretion by 
the circuit court in dismissing the Johnsons' claims.  Id.  at 
277.  Of more import to the present case, this court also 
rejected adopting a per se rule prohibiting dismissal when the 
failure to comply with court orders is due to counsel's conduct 
and the party bears no personal responsibility for that conduct.  
Id.  at 283.  This court recognized that circuit courts may 
exercise their discretion in appropriate cases by not punishing 
litigants for their counsel's errors or misconduct.  Id.  at 
284.  This court made it clear that it placed its faith in the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
when 
the 
circuit 
court 
imposes 
sanctions upon a party.  Id.  at 286. 
¶91 The Johnson court was not unanimous.  Then Justice 
Abrahamson, in a separate concurrence, urged this court to adopt 
a rule that would not impute counsel's conduct to the litigant 
without considering the personal fault of the litigant.  Id.  at 
289 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).  It is that rule that we adopt 
today,3 even though neither Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a)3. nor 
§ 805.03 have been substantively altered by this court or by the 
legislature.  
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶61. 
No.  2005AP189.lbb 
 
4 
 
¶92 The interpretation of statutes and court rules present 
questions of law that we review independently.  State v. 
Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶15, 234 Wis. 2d 648, 611 N.W.2d 240.  
When construing statutes and court rules, we assume that the 
intent of the legislature or this court is expressed in a 
statute or court rule.  State v. Denis L.R., 2005 WI 110, ¶35, 
283 Wis. 2d 358, 699 N.W.2d 154 (citation omitted).  Therefore, 
our analysis begins with the language of the statute or rule.  
Id.  In general, we give statutory language its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning.  Id.  "Further, we consider 
language 'in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results.'"  Id.  (quoting State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  If this analysis yields no 
ambiguity, our inquiry ends.  Id. 
¶93 I start with Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a)3.  That section 
provides in relevant part that if a party fails to obey an order 
to provide or permit discovery, the court may make such orders 
in regard to the failure as are just, "and among others the 
following: 
. . . [a]n 
order . . . dismissing 
the 
action 
or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party" (emphasis added).  The 
plain language of the rule clearly contemplates a circuit 
court's exercise of discretion, and clearly includes the 
sanction of dismissal as a remedy, as the Johnson court so held. 
No.  2005AP189.lbb 
 
5 
 
¶94 I look next at Wis. Stat. § 805.03.  That section 
provides in relevant part that "for failure of any party to 
comply with the statutes governing procedure in civil actions or 
to obey any order of court, the court . . . may make such orders 
in regard to the failure as are just, including but not limited 
to orders authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a)" (emphasis added).  
Once again, the plain language of the rule clearly contemplates 
a circuit court's exercise of discretion, and clearly includes 
the sanction of dismissal as a remedy, as the Johnson court so 
held.      
¶95 A per se rule that "it is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion for a circuit court to enter a sanction of dismissal 
with prejudice, imputing the attorney's conduct to the client, 
where the client is blameless[,]" majority op., ¶61, deprives 
the circuit court of the very discretion provided within the 
statute itself.  Such a rule also deprives the circuit court of 
a necessary tool to compel compliance with the statute by 
removing a critical power to sanction the noncomplying party.  I 
see no reason to adopt such a rule now, particularly when this 
court has already rejected it in the past. 
¶96 It certainly makes a difference which of the Johnson 
tests this court applies in this case.  I happen to agree with 
now Chief Justice Abrahamson that once this court adopts the 
Johnson concurrence as the standard to be applied in this case, 
a reversal is warranted.  First, I agree that the circuit court 
did not apply the test we adopt today when rendering its 
decision, and by definition, therefore, its conduct was "beyond 
No.  2005AP189.lbb 
 
6 
 
the limits of discretion."  See dissent, ¶102.  Second, I agree 
with the chief justice that Industrial Roofing (as opposed to 
its attorney) was blameless.  See dissent, ¶103.  If I were to 
join the majority in overruling Johnson, I would be forced to 
join the dissent in this case. 
¶97 It is not wise to abandon precedent unless there is a 
compelling reason to do so.  See Johnson Controls v. Employers 
Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶94-95, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257.  I find no such compelling reason in this case.  
Industrial repeatedly failed to comply with discovery throughout 
the pendency of this case.  The circuit court had been made 
aware during the proceedings that Industrial's attorney accepted 
fault for not responding.  The circuit court bent over backwards 
to bring about compliance without having to dismiss the action, 
postponing and ultimately denying the first motion to dismiss 
for noncompliance, imposing attorney's fees along the way as a 
sanction for noncompliance, and finally dismissing the complaint 
without prejudice.  Even then, the circuit court allowed that 
Industrial could re-file if it paid Marquardt's attorney's fees 
of $3,926.81 within 60 days, although it would have to 
demonstrate the viability of the allegations against the 
Marquardt defendants in the complaint both factually and 
legally.  When Industrial failed to meet the circuit court's 
conditions, the dismissal was then ordered with prejudice. 
¶98 I fail to see what else the circuit court could have 
done.  Industrial was not in compliance with the discovery 
orders.  Progressive sanctions were being implemented, to no 
No.  2005AP189.lbb 
 
7 
 
avail.  The circuit court gave Industrial every opportunity to 
comply; yet compliance was not forthcoming.  It was blatantly 
unfair to Marquardt to drag these proceedings out, without an 
end in sight.  When such an end was provided, Industrial was 
nonetheless given an escape clause that it did not avail itself 
of.  Under these circumstances, and applying the Johnson 
majority analysis, I find no erroneous exercise of discretion 
here.   
¶99 I therefore respectfully concur in the mandate that 
affirms the decision of the court of appeals.  I cannot, for the 
reasons stated, join the majority opinion.        
 
 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶100 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the legal principle advanced today by the majority opinion: 
"[I]t is an erroneous exercise of discretion for a circuit court 
to enter a sanction of dismissal with prejudice, imputing the 
attorney's 
conduct 
to 
the 
client, 
where 
the 
client 
is 
blameless."  Majority op., ¶60.  
¶101 I disagree, however, with the application of the legal 
principle in the present case, and I therefore dissent. 
¶102 The circuit court did not apply this legal principle 
but cited to and applied the majority opinion in the Johnson 
case, which allowed the circuit court to impose sanctions on a 
blameless client.  The circuit court therefore exercised its 
discretion upon an error of law.  "If a judge bases the exercise 
of his discretion upon an error of law, his conduct is beyond 
the limits of discretion."1  The majority insists that, while not 
required by Johnson, the circuit court nonetheless examined 
Industrial's blameworthiness before imposing the sanction.  I 
disagree.  Nevertheless I will discuss this case as the majority 
does, as if the circuit court applied the legal principle 
advanced by the majority opinion.   
¶103 Industrial was blameless.2  The record makes this fact 
clear and the subsequent public reprimand of Industrial's 
                                                 
1 State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968), quoted in Kenosha Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Garcia, 2004 WI 
105, ¶15, 274 Wis. 2d 338, 683 N.W.2d 425.  
2 Keith Dippel is the president of Industrial.  Both Dippel 
and Industrial are plaintiffs in this lawsuit, and the same 
attorney 
represented 
both. 
 
For 
purposes 
of 
review, 
my 
references to Industrial generally include both plaintiffs.   
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
2 
 
counsel reinforces this fact.3  The court-appointed referee saw 
Industrial as free of blame.  The circuit court and the majority 
opinion have transformed the client as a victim into the client 
as a perpetrator.   
¶104 Evidence of the circuit court's erroneous exercise of 
discretion in dismissing this case with prejudice permeates the 
record.  I describe separately six aspects in which the circuit 
court erred in dismissing the cases.  The following six errors 
are, however, interrelated:  
(I) The circuit court did not exercise its discretion by 
examining the relevant facts, by applying a proper standard of 
law, and by using a demonstrated rational process;  
(II) Industrial is a blameless client whom the circuit 
court 
and 
the 
majority 
opinion 
have 
transformed 
into 
a 
perpetrator;  
(III) 
Viewing 
the client's (Industrial's) conduct as 
blameworthy distorts the traditional lawyer-client relationship; 
 
(IV) The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in refusing to give Industrial's new counsel the opportunity to 
be heard when the circuit court was still undecided about the 
sanctions to be imposed;  
(V) Imposing a requirement of a "hearing on viability" as a 
sanction for discovery violations is imposing a requirement 
                                                 
3 Industrial's counsel was publicly reprimanded by a referee 
under SCR:22.09 for his conduct in this case.  The reprimand 
number is 2006-OLR-12 and the full text of the reprimand is 
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/services/public/lawyerreg/ 
statusreprimands.htm. 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
3 
 
unknown to the law, the parties, the circuit court, and the 
majority opinion; and  
(VI) Because Industrial could not comply with the circuit 
court's mandate that Industrial pay the attorney's fees, re-file 
the case, and succeed at a hearing on viability without 
jeopardizing its appeal rights, the circuit court's mandate was 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
¶105 I will address each of these incidents of the 
erroneous exercise of discretion in turn, after first providing 
a timeframe of the relevant events. 
 
• On June 19, 2003, Industrial's counsel commenced the 
present action.   
 
• In July and August 2003, several defendants moved to 
dismiss, 
alleging 
lack 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction.  
Argument was schedule for October 27, 2003. 
 
• Industrial's counsel failed to timely serve his 
client's 
response, causing the October 27, 2003 
hearing 
to 
be 
continued 
to 
November 
17, 
2003.  
Industrial's president, Keith Dippel, attended the 
October 27, 2003 hearing with counsel.  
 
• At the November 17, 2003 hearing, Industrial's counsel 
was 
successful 
in 
defeating 
the 
defendant's 
jurisdictional motion.  The circuit court awarded 
attorney's fees to the defendants for Industrial's 
untimely response to the motion, and Industrial's 
counsel offered to pay them personally.  Keith Dippel 
attended the November 17, 2003 hearing with counsel. 
 
• At the November 17, 2003 hearing, the circuit court 
also entered a scheduling order requiring Industrial 
and the defendants to produce witness lists by March 
30, 2004 and July 2, 2004, respectively.  The circuit 
court ordered discovery closed by September 1, 2004 
and dispositive motions filed by September 15, 2004. 
 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
4 
 
• In the interim, the parties exchanged discovery 
requests.  On August 28, 2003, the Clark defendants 
served 
Industrial 
with 
document 
requests, 
interrogatories, and requests for admission.  On 
September 19, 2003, the Marquardt defendants served 
document requests and 26 interrogatories.  Industrial 
responded to these requests on September 30, 2003 and 
October 22, 2003, respectively, but objected to some 
of the requests and interrogatories. 
 
• On January 15, 2004, the Marquardt defendants served 
"replacement interrogatories" in lieu of the 268 
interrogatories previously served.  They also served 
93 new requests for admission. 
 
• On January 23, 2004, the defendants filed a motion to 
compel discovery. 
 
• On February 19, 2004, Industrial's counsel responded 
by 
filing 
a 
motion 
for 
a 
protective 
order.  
Industrial's counsel and Keith Dippel also prepared 
and served supplemental responses to some of the 
interrogatories and requests for admission that were 
the subject of the motion to compel.  Industrial's 
counsel served them prior to the February 23, 2004 
hearing on the motion for a protective order. 
   
• During the February 23, 2004 hearing, a discussion was 
had 
concerning 
the 
inadequacy 
of 
Industrial's 
responses.  Attorney's fees were awarded, and harsher 
sanctions were threatened.  The circuit court ordered 
Industrial to comply with the remaining discovery 
requests by March 1, 2004.  Keith Dippel was not 
present at this hearing.  Industrial's counsel did not 
inform Industrial of the court orders entered on 
February 23, 2004. 
 
• On March 22, 2004, Industrial answered the Marquardt 
defendants' requests for admissions. 
 
• Between April 14 and May 17, 2004, the defendants 
filed 
motions 
to 
dismiss 
the 
case, 
to 
impose 
sanctions, 
and 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
based 
on 
Industrial's 
continued 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
discovery requests and orders.  Industrial's counsel 
did not respond to these motions. 
 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
5 
 
• A hearing was held on June 14, 2004 on the defendants' 
motions. 
 
Industrial's 
counsel 
did 
not 
inform 
Industrial of this hearing.  Industrial's counsel 
confessed 
in 
open 
court 
his 
personal 
problems, 
accepted 
blame 
for 
the 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
discovery, and asked the circuit court to allow time 
for Industrial to retain new counsel.  Industrial's 
counsel, however, deceived the circuit court about 
Industrial's knowledge of the hearing that day, of the 
discovery orders, and of counsel's failure to comply 
with discovery orders.  The circuit court indicated it 
was contemplating sanctions. 
 
• On 
June 
15, 
2004, 
Industrial's 
counsel 
advised 
Industrial 
he was resigning as counsel, without 
explaining to Industrial the events of the prior day.  
Industrial immediately hired new counsel, who, upon 
learning of the June 14, 2004 hearing, filed on June 
24, 
2004 
an 
affidavit 
and 
requested 
a 
status 
conference to address the pending motions and possible 
sanctions.   
 
• Industrial's original counsel delayed turning over the 
files to new counsel. 
 
• On June 29, the circuit court denied the request for a 
status conference. 
 
• On August 10, 2004, without hearing argument or 
evidence from Industrial's new counsel, the circuit 
court ruled that it would dismiss Industrial's case 
with prejudice unless Industrial paid the defendants' 
attorney's fees and refiled the case within 60 days, 
and thereafter satisfied the circuit court at a 
"hearing on viability."   
 
• On October 21, 2004, the circuit court finally heard 
arguments from Industrial's new counsel in the context 
of a motion for reconsideration; the motion for 
reconsideration was promptly denied at the end of the 
hearing.   
 
• On 
November 
11, 
2004, 
Industrial's 
new 
counsel 
petitioned for leave to appeal the circuit court's 
August 10 decision, which the court of appeals denied.  
  
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
6 
 
• On December 9, 2004, Industrial's complaint was 
dismissed with prejudice. 
¶106 As this 
timeline demonstrates and the following 
discussion illustrates, Industrial is a victim of its lawyer's 
misrepresentations.     
I 
¶107 The circuit court did not exercise its discretion by 
examining the relevant facts, by applying a proper standard of 
law, and by using a demonstrated rational process, as the 
majority opinion requires.  Majority op., ¶40. 
¶108 The majority opinion cobbles together miscellaneous 
statements in the record and fashions them into a story of 
noncompliance in the discovery process amounting to the circuit 
court's finding egregious attorney conduct.  But do not be 
fooled.  This is the majority opinion's story, not the facts and 
reasoning of the circuit court.     
¶109 The circuit court ordered dismissal in a written 
decision on August 10, 2004.  In its written decision, the 
circuit court did not specify the basis for this ruling and 
instead referred to its findings in a June 14, 2004 hearing:  
"The Court at the previous hearing has established findings 
sufficient for a sanction.  The Court will not repeat the 
determinations made at that time."4     
¶110 It is not clear, however, from the transcript of the 
June 14, 2004 hearing what "findings" the circuit court made, 
what legal principle it relied on, and what its decision-making 
                                                 
4 Record of June 14, 2004, set forth in Appendix to Brief of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners at P-App 032-036. 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
7 
 
process was.  There is no clearly articulated explanation as to 
why this particular sanction was warranted.  The circuit court 
was not required to employ any magic language, such as the word 
'egregious' or 'extreme' (although if a circuit court expressly 
articulates the proper standard of law it is more likely to 
reach a correct result and appellate review of the exercise of 
discretion is easier).    
¶111 Moreover, the circuit court's language is open to 
interpretation.  For instance, the majority opinion insists that 
the circuit court was aghast at the egregiousness of the 
conduct.  Yet, it is just as plausible that the circuit court 
was surprised because it was the first time in the circuit 
court's experience that a lawyer accepted full responsibility 
and blame for the "litany of failures" in discovery, and because 
the lawyer said he intended to wind down his litigation practice 
and seek professional help.  The circuit court (and indeed the 
defendants' counsel) were at a loss at how to proceed under 
these circumstances.5     
                                                 
5 After Industrial's counsel explained his personal problems 
and accepted full responsibility for the failure to comply with 
discovery requests and orders, the circuit court contemplated 
how to proceed with the case, musing that: 
Okay.  Well, certainly from the record here something 
was wrong.  Because I hadn't seen, you know, a lack of 
response before in any other case; so there was 
something wrong and didn't know where it was coming 
from, 
didn't 
have enough information, just like 
everybody else under the circumstances. 
So, at this point and certainly from the facts here, 
it fits into all the major sanction cases as far as 
that goes.  Okay.  My reaction is, and usually, you 
know, you don't have a situation where you do have a 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶112 In sum, it was an erroneous exercise of discretion for 
the circuit court to fail to state clearly its findings and 
reasoning on the record. 
II 
¶113 According to the majority opinion, a circuit court 
imputes an attorney's egregious misconduct to a client after 
considering "the client's failure to act in a reasonable and 
prudent manner, and the client's knowledge of or complicity in 
that conduct."  Majority op., ¶62.  A circuit court considers 
whether "the client has acted as a reasonable and prudent person 
in engaging a lawyer of good reputation, has relied upon him to 
protect his rights, and has made a reasonable inquiry concerning 
                                                                                                                                                             
situation where you can say, okay, the sanction is 
this.  And, you know, the fault lies here, with the 
client versus the attorney or with the attorney versus 
the client.  And there are provisions for that under 
the circumstances.   
So, under the circumstances, my question is——I've 
never had a situation like this.  Maybe that's because 
I've never seen the lack of response in——you stated 
it's your personal problem and it's your fault.  So in 
other cases where we have a lack of response in 
certain areas, we grant the sanction.   
Under 
the 
circumstances, 
does 
anybody 
have 
any 
statement they want to make? 
The circuit court was seemingly wrestling with how to 
proceed given the unique circumstances of the case and the 
attorney's assumption of full responsibility for the discovery 
violations.  Ordinarily sanctions may be called for on violation 
of a court order, but the circuit court was obviously unsure 
whether they were appropriate here. 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
9 
 
the proceedings."6  The circuit court——and the majority opinion——
did not properly apply this standard.  
¶114 It is clear here that the faults were with the 
attorney, not the client.  Industrial's attorney admitted 
personal 
blame 
for 
all 
failures 
to 
provide 
discovery.  
Repeatedly, the attorney explained how the blame rested solely 
with him:  "Because as I say, my client has not been the source 
of the problem.  It has been my, just my inability to focus on 
my practice like I should have."  The attorney further described 
how "[m]y client wants to prosecute the case."  The Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and a referee in the discipline case 
against Industrial's attorney have accepted the attorney's 
ownership of responsibility, agreeing that the attorney is 
solely responsible for the discovery violations, and the 
attorney has since been publicly reprimanded.7       
¶115 At the June 14, 2004 hearing, the circuit court noted 
only two possible faults of the client.  Neither was sufficient 
to find Industrial's conduct unreasonable or imprudent. 
¶116 First, 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
concerned 
because 
Industrial's president, Keith Dippel, had not yet attended a 
deposition and had not rescheduled a previously cancelled 
deposition.  The record makes clear that Dippel was not at 
fault.  Industrial's counsel cancelled the deposition and 
counsel 
accepted 
responsibility 
for 
the 
other 
scheduling 
                                                 
6 Charolais 
Breeding 
Ranches, 
Ltd. 
v. 
Wiegel, 
92 
Wis. 2d 498, 514, 285 N.W.2d 720 (1979). 
7 See SCR:22.09. 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
10 
 
difficulties, stating, "[I]t was my failure."  He explained 
further:  "I wasn't in a position to prepare the client.  Again, 
it was my fault."  Later in the hearing, counsel once again 
assumed blame:  "The responsibility for that second deposition 
not occurring was mine.  I don't think Mr. Dippel would have 
been resistive to it."  Industrial had no role in the discovery 
violations.     
¶117 Second, the circuit court was concerned because Mr. 
Dippel had failed to attend the June 14, 2004 hearing.  Counsel 
explained that the absence was due to out-of-town business 
obligations.  This explanation was a lie; the truth was that 
counsel had not told Dippel of the hearing.  In any event, there 
had been no court order or request for Dippel's personal 
attendance prior to this hearing.   
¶118 The circuit court erred when it ruled that Industrial 
was alerted to counsel's ineptitude prior to June 15.  The basis 
of the circuit court's error is clear and on the record.  Dippel 
attended the hearing on November 17, 2003, but that hearing was 
not sufficient to serve notice.  At that hearing, the circuit 
court ordered payment of attorney's fees as a sanction for 
Industrial's 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
respond 
to 
a 
motion.  
Industrial's counsel accepted blame, claiming it was a "mailing 
snafu," and offered to pay the sanction personally. 
¶119 This incident did not provide notice to Industrial 
that its lawyer was engaging in egregious conduct.  At best, 
Industrial learned that the attorney had blundered once, quickly 
accepted blame, and promised not to let it happen again.  
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
11 
 
Industrial reasonably could have viewed counsel's conduct as a 
minor glitch that was going to be repaired. 
¶120 The circuit court mistakenly thought Dippel was at a 
hearing on February 23, 2004, wherein the circuit court 
threatened more severe sanctions if Industrial's attorney failed 
to comply with discovery requests.  In actuality, Dippel was not 
present at that hearing, nor was he privy to the circuit court's 
admonishments.  Industrial thus could not have been "on notice" 
because of this hearing. 
¶121 The record demonstrates that Industrial acted in a 
responsible and prudent manner, both in engaging and in relying 
on counsel.  Industrial reasonably relied on the lawyer to 
protect its rights and made reasonable inquiry concerning the 
proceedings.  
¶122 Without these reasons to find Industrial knowledgeable 
of or complicitous with its attorney's conduct, the majority 
opinion asserts that the circuit court relied on the Dippel 
affidavit, dated June 24, 2004, and filed by new counsel on that 
date, requesting an opportunity to be heard before the circuit 
court on possible sanctions.  Majority op., ¶63 n.12.     
¶123 The affidavit explains that the present case was the 
first lawsuit Dippel was involved with and that he is not 
knowledgeable about legal proceedings; that he discussed the 
various proceedings with counsel numerous times; that he pressed 
the attorney to meet the scheduling timetable; that he sent the 
attorney responses and documents in response to discovery 
requests; that during February, March, and April he made 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
12 
 
repeated phone calls, sent e-mails to the attorney, and visited 
the attorney's office regarding the status of the case; that he 
received reassurances from the attorney that matters were 
proceeding; and that the attorney did not advise Industrial 
until June 15 that he could no longer represent Industrial 
because of personal issues.   
¶124 The affidavit was filed to show that the attorney had 
blatantly lied to the circuit court on June 14 when he claimed 
that he had advised Industrial of his personal problems and the 
problems with discovery.  The affidavit also demonstrated that 
Industrial was a reasonable and prudent client following the 
progress of its case and keeping lines of communication open 
with counsel.   
¶125 The circuit court's only reference to the affidavit in 
its August 10 decision states as follows: "The subsequent 
contacts [after November 17] Mr. Dippel had with [counsel] 
should have raised suspicion as to his abilities to prosecute 
the case.  The affidavit contains many contacts and questions of 
[counsel] 
by 
Mr. 
Dippel.  Merely because he relied on 
[counsel's] assurance that things were being taken care of does 
not exonerate Mr. Dippel from the consequences and sanctions."8  
¶126 Under these circumstances the circuit court should not 
have ruled on the sanctions without a hearing.  As the majority 
opinion acknowledges, majority op., ¶63 n.12, "on the motion for 
sanctions, if there are disputed facts or disputed inferences 
                                                 
8 In any event, I do not agree with the circuit court.  I 
think that a client can rely on an attorney's reasonable 
assurances at least for a reasonable time.  See Part III, infra. 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
13 
 
from the facts an evidentiary hearing, rather than simply oral 
argument based on briefs, affidavits and depositions, is 
necessary to resolve these disputes. See State v. Jason R.N., 
201 Wis. 2d 646, 648, 549 N.W.2d 752, 753 (Ct. App. 1996)."9    
¶127 In the present case there are disputed facts.  The 
statements of Industrial's counsel to the circuit court about 
Industrial's knowledge of the proceedings differ from Mr. 
Dippel's affidavit stating Industrial's knowledge; the circuit 
court expressed concern about this dispute.  Furthermore, more 
than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the affidavit 
about whether Industrial was prudent and therefore as a matter 
of law was blameworthy.  The circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in refusing to give Industrial's new counsel an 
opportunity to present Industrial's position.  See majority op., 
¶63 n.12.  
¶128 Industrial finally got a hearing, but was not given 
the 
opportunity 
to 
produce 
evidence. 
 
At 
the 
October 
reconsideration hearing, Industrial's new counsel advised the 
circuit court of the disputed facts and inferences evidenced in 
the affidavit.  If the attorney's lying to the client and the 
client's repeated efforts to keep abreast of the case would not 
change the circuit court's mind, what facts are left to show 
Industrial was blameless? 
¶129 In sum, the circuit court and majority opinion are 
wrong to impute the attorney's conduct to Industrial because (1) 
                                                 
9 See also Garfoot v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 228 
Wis. 2d 707, 725 n.8, 599 N.W.2d 411 (1999).  
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
14 
 
the lawyer continually lied to or kept information from 
Industrial; (2) Industrial did not know or have reason to know 
of any egregious conduct until the attorney advised Industrial 
after 
the 
June 
14 
hearing 
to 
retain 
new 
counsel; 
(3) 
Industrial's reliance on its attorney under the circumstances in 
the case was justified; and (4) Industrial acted promptly to 
address the problem when it became aware of the problem.  
Industrial is the victim, not the perpetrator.   
III 
 
¶130 Viewing Industrial's conduct as blameworthy distorts 
the traditional lawyer-client relationship.  
¶131 Industrial was simply trusting its lawyer to take care 
of its case, as clients generally do.  "[T]o impose the 
punishment for the lawyer's failure to prosecute on the 
plaintiff who . . . was simply trusting his lawyer to take care 
of his case as clients generally do" is to ignore "the 
practicalities 
and 
realities 
of 
the 
lawyer-client 
relationship."10 
¶132 The traditional lawyer-client relationship assumes 
that while the client sets the goals for representation, the 
lawyer 
manages 
the 
case. 
 
The 
Code 
of 
Professional 
Responsibility recognizes that clients often lack the training 
or knowledge to understand the technical aspects of their cases: 
"In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and 
prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on 
                                                 
10 Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 643, 646 (1962) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
15 
 
tactics that might injure or coerce others.  On the other hand, 
a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to describe trial or 
negotiation strategy in detail."  SCR 20:1.4, Comment.11  The 
Code also states that "[i]n questions of means, the lawyer 
should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical 
issues . . . ."  SCR 20:1.2, Comment.12 
¶133 In short, "[a] lawyer's work is sometimes complex and 
technical, often is performed in the client's absence, and often 
cannot properly be evaluated simply by observing the results."13  
¶134 Discovery is one of the many complex aspects of a 
successful litigation.  It involves complying with local rules 
that are technical and formalistic: limited requests, special 
forms, certain deadlines.  In involves exactly the "technical 
legal and strategic considerations difficult for a client to 
assess."14  These technical aspects of a case ordinarily fall 
within the lawyer's, not the client's, expertise.  
                                                 
11 See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 20 cmt. (2000) ("Legal representation is to be conducted to 
advance the client's objectives, but the lawyer typically has 
knowledge and skill that the client lacks and often makes or 
implements decisions in the client's absence.").  
12 See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 21 cmt. (2000) ("Such matters often involve technical legal 
and 
strategic 
considerations 
difficult 
for 
a 
client 
to 
assess.").   
13 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 16 
cmt. (2000). 
14 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 21 
cmt. (2000). 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶135 Industrial did what is traditionally required of a 
client; it kept asking questions and got what seemed like 
reasonable explanations.  "[A] layperson ordinarily cannot be 
expected to supervise his or her attorney through every pretrial 
phase of litigation.  A litigant may make appropriate inquiry 
and be victimized by counsel."15  What would the majority opinion 
have had Industrial do to prevent being deceived by his 
attorney?  Hire another attorney to audit the first one?   
¶136 With its opinion today, the majority now expects the 
client to understand and assess the lawyer's ability to conduct 
discovery every step of the way.  The circuit court and the 
majority opinion demand that a client engage in an unreasonably 
high level of supervision of an attorney and that a client 
respond rapidly should any question emerge about counsel's 
conduct of discovery.  To expect clients to keep such a close 
guard over their attorneys and any problems that may arise and 
to hire new counsel immediately upon the development of a 
problem is unrealistic and unfair.   
¶137 As a result of the majority opinion, clients are now 
obligated to monitor due dates for discovery and examine whether 
the materials provided by counsel are responsive.  The client 
can no longer just generally keep abreast of the case.  The 
client must make detailed inquiries and check with court 
records, not take the lawyer's word.  Unless the client so acts, 
the client risks being deemed blameworthy, having its case 
                                                 
15 Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 290, 
470 N.W.2d 859 (1991) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
17 
 
dismissed with prejudice, and being ordered to pay legal fees to 
opposing counsel. 
¶138 In sum, I conclude that imputing the conduct of 
Industrial's counsel to Industrial under the circumstances of 
the case at bar for the purposes of the sanction of dismissal 
with prejudice is an erroneous exercise of discretion as a 
distortion of the lawyer-client relationship. 
IV 
¶139 The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in refusing to grant Industrial a hearing with its new counsel 
while the circuit court was still undecided about the sanction 
for the previous counsel's misconduct. 
¶140 The circuit court had plenty of opportunities and time 
to hear from Industrial and its new counsel prior to entering 
the dismissal without prejudice.  At the start of the June 14, 
2004 hearing, Industrial's counsel apologized for his failures 
and, at more than one point, asked the court for time to allow 
Industrial to retain new counsel to respond to the pending 
motions and to postpone any decision until new counsel could 
participate on behalf of Industrial. 
¶141 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Industrial's 
counsel's 
requests, announcing that "it's not going to take me long" to 
make a ruling on the sanctions. 
¶142 Nevertheless, nearly two months lapsed before the 
circuit court issued its ruling of dismissal on August 10, 2004. 
¶143 In the interim, Industrial had promptly hired new 
counsel within a week of the June 14, 2004 hearing.  New counsel 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
18 
 
acted on June 24, 2004, filing Keith Dippel's affidavit and 
requesting a status conference to discuss the progress of the 
case, including the sanctions.  The circuit court denied that 
request on June 29, 2004.  The June 29, 2004 order denying new 
counsel's request for a status conference states: "The Court 
will not set a status conference until it has decided the 
motions to dismiss."  The circuit court did not render its 
decision on the sanctions until nearly a month and a half later. 
¶144 As a result of the circuit court's refusal to hear 
from new counsel, Industrial did not have the same opportunity 
as the numerous counsel for the numerous defendants did to 
recommend sanctions or to argue about the course the circuit 
court should take with regard to the disputed facts in issue and 
disputed inferences from the facts in issue (see Part II,  
supra). 
¶145 The circuit court should not have ruled on the 
sanctions 
without 
a 
hearing, 
as 
the 
majority 
opinion 
acknowledges.  Majority op., ¶63 n.12.  
¶146 Industrial's new counsel was given the opportunity to 
explain the Dippel affidavit and Industrial's position only on 
October 21, 2004 when the circuit court heard arguments on 
Industrial's motion for reconsideration.  By then the circuit 
court had already ruled on the matter several times and might 
not be inclined to admit error or change its mind.  It comes as 
no surprise, then, that the circuit court dismissed the 
importance of any disputes of facts by saying whatever the 
facts, it would not have changed its mind.   
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶147 In sum, the circuit court put itself in the situation 
of having heard from several counsel opposing Industrial and 
from Industrial's counsel who admitted that the misconduct was 
all his fault (and lied to the circuit court that he had advised 
his client of the problems and to get a new attorney) but 
refused to hear from Industrial.  The circuit court shut itself 
off from a valuable source of information necessary to tailor an 
appropriate sanction.  The failure to give Industrial an 
opportunity to present evidence and be heard on how to resolve 
the dispute was not fair process and was an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.   
V 
¶148 Requiring a "hearing on viability" as a sanction for 
discovery violations is imposing a requirement unknown to the 
law, the parties, and the majority opinion.  The circuit court 
ordered Industrial to demonstrate "viability" immediately after 
re-filing and before any further scheduling of the case.  This 
creative sanction cannot be satisfied because no one knows what 
it means.  
¶149 The circuit court failed to describe the objective and 
nature of a "hearing on viability."  Amazingly, the majority 
opinion is not troubled by the circuit court's failure to 
establish even the vaguest structure for this "hearing on 
viability."   
¶150 The circuit court failed to articulate a clear legal 
standard governing the "hearing on viability."  When first 
formulating the idea of a viability hearing at the June 14, 2004 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
20 
 
hearing, the circuit court described it as "instead of holding a 
merit hearing, the issue of validity, where [Industrial] is to 
come up with the opportunity to demonstrate that this is not a 
frivolous case."  In its August 10, 2004 decision, the circuit 
court ordered "a hearing to demonstrate the viability of the 
allegations in the complaint from a factual and legal basis."   
¶151 The majority opinion magically distills from these 
vague statements a "well defined" standard.  Majority op., ¶77.  
Even more remarkably, the majority opinion announces that this 
viability 
hearing 
is 
at 
the 
same 
time 
a 
hearing 
for 
frivolousness under Wis. Stat. § 802.05 and not such a hearing.  
I am sympathetic with the majority opinion: It needs to locate a 
clear legal standard for this viability hearing but does not 
want to get into the frivolousness thicket.  Majority op., ¶78.   
¶152 So what is this "hearing on viability"?  It is not a 
hearing on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
The complaint does state a claim.  Is it the circuit court's 
order to make the complaint more definite and certain?  The 
defendants 
could have made such a motion but did not.  
Industrial probably cannot make the complaint more definite and 
certain because its delinquent counsel failed to engage in 
discovery.  The majority opinion attempts to characterize this 
hearing as a preventative measure "to mitigate future harm" but 
does not explain why the circuit court should attempt to 
mitigate future harm through such an ill-defined device.  The 
"hearing on viability" seems to be just a different way of 
punishing Industrial for its counsel's misconduct.   
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶153 The circuit court has discretion in ordering sanctions 
for a party's misconduct and may tailor the sanction to the 
needs of a particular situation.  This discretion is not, 
however, unfettered.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 804.12(2)(a) and 805.03 
(2003-04) limit the sanctions to those that are "just."  An 
undefined condition not governed by any legal principle cannot 
be a "just" sanction.  No one has any clue how to satisfy the 
condition. 
¶154 I am at a loss to explain to circuit courts or 
litigants how to conduct a "hearing on viability."  Or to 
explain to an appellate court how to review a decision in a 
viability hearing.  The majority opinion certainly does not 
provide an answer. 
¶155 In sum, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in conditioning a refiling by requiring a "hearing on 
viability." 
VI 
¶156 The circuit court's mandate that Industrial pay the 
attorney's fees, refile the case, and succeed at a hearing on 
viability was an erroneous exercise of discretion.   
 
¶157 The circuit court gave Industrial two options:  (1) 
pay the attorney fees and refile with a hearing on viability; or 
(2) have the case dismissed with prejudice.  Some choice!   
 
¶158 The majority opinion narrowly focuses on Industrial's 
decision not to pay attorney's fees and refile, insisting this 
omission 
(which 
resulted 
in 
a 
dismissal 
with 
prejudice) 
demonstrates that Industrial was not reasonable and prudent and 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
22 
 
thus was blameworthy.  The circuit court placed Industrial in an 
impossible situation when it entered the dismissal without 
prejudice with these conditions. 
 
¶159 In any event, the majority opinion seems to view the 
order to pay less than $4,000 as a nuisance payment that 
Industrial should just pay and go on with the matter.  If a 
larger sum were involved, I suspect that the majority opinion 
would reach a different conclusion.  From my perspective, 
however, the amount should not be the key factor.   
 
¶160 If Industrial paid this fee and refiled its complaint, 
it is not clear what Industrial's rights on appeal might be and 
whether the circuit court would stay its proceedings pending 
appeal.  Industrial discussed its potential appeal rights at 
length with the circuit court at the October reconsideration 
hearing and no one seemed to know how to resolve the appeal 
issues.   
¶161 On October 11, 2004, Industrial filed a petition with 
the court of appeals for leave to appeal the orders dismissing 
the case without prejudice.  On November 11, 2004, the court of 
appeals held the request in abeyance, reasoning that if 
Industrial did not refile the case within the 60-day window, a 
dismissal with prejudice would be entered and that this final 
judgment could be appealed as a matter of right.   
 
¶162 If Industrial wanted to challenge the circuit court's 
initial sanction and was rightfully concerned about taking its 
chances on a hearing on viability, whatever that is, it seems to 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
23 
 
me its safest course was not to pay the attorney fees, not to 
refile, and not to go into a viability hearing.   
 
¶163 In sum, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it conditioned the dismissal without prejudice 
on Industrial's meeting the three requirements it established. 
* * * * 
 
¶164 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in dismissing the 
claim with prejudice and denying Industrial its day in court.  
As a result, Industrial, a blameless client in my view, has lost 
its opportunity to pursue its claims against the defendants for 
their allegedly ongoing wrongful conduct.  Industrial, the 
victim, has been transformed into a perpetrator. 
 
¶165 The 
public 
reprimand 
of 
Industrial's 
counsel 
demonstrates that Industrial's attorney deceived Industrial, 
hiding relevant information about the case, his misconduct, and 
Industrial's blamelessness.  Although a public reprimand does 
not serve as a basis for an attorney's civil liability,16 the 
public 
reprimand 
against 
the 
attorney 
states 
that 
the 
"[i]mposition of this public reprimand is conditioned on [the 
attorney's] assumption of responsibility for any sanctions 
imposed against the plaintiffs [Industrial and Dippel] in the 
underlying litigation as a result of his misconduct."17  
                                                 
16 SCR 20, Preamble (2006). 
17 Wis. 
Sup. 
Ct. 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
Public 
Reprimand No. 2006-OLR-12, at 9. 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
24 
 
 
¶166 I do not know how valuable the attorney's assumption 
of responsibility for any sanctions imposed on Industrial is.  I 
do not know whether the attorney is judgment-proof, has assets, 
or has malpractice coverage.  I wonder whether a malpractice 
suit will provide Industrial sufficient relief, especially when 
the 
majority 
opinion 
has 
characterized 
Industrial 
as 
a 
blameworthy participant.       
¶167 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  
¶168 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER, JR. and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
No.  2005AP189.ssa 
 
1