Title: Ex Parte Carter
Citation: 627 So. 2d 1030
Docket Number: 1910887
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 1993

627 So. 2d 1030 (1993)
Ex parte Bennie Mack CARTER.
(Re Bennie Mack Carter v. State).
1910887.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 23, 1993.
Rehearing Denied June 4, 1993.
*1031 John A. Lentine of Sheffield, Sheffield, Sheffield &amp; Lentine, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Robin Blevins, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
We granted certiorari review in this case to examine one question: Is a Batson violation established if the defendant can show that one black veniremember was struck because of her race?[1] We affirm.
Bennie Mack Carter was indicted and was convicted on four counts of first degree robbery and one count of attempted murder. During his trial, after the voir dire examination, his counsel made a timely Batson challenge to one of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes:
(R. at 101-05; emphasis supplied.)
The record clearly shows that the trial court erroneously concluded that a single instance of racial discrimination (i.e., the prosecutor using one peremptory strike in a racially discriminatory manner) is insufficient to establish a Batson violation. We hold that a single instance of purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes does violate Batson.
In Harrell v. State, 555 So. 2d 263, 267 (Ala.1989) this Court cited United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1986), United States v. Hughes, 864 F.2d 78, 79 (8th Cir.1988), and United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1989), and stated:
(Emphasis supplied.) (Citation omitted.)
Also, recently, in Huntley v. State, 627 So. 2d 1013 (Ala.1992), this Court stated: "Upon the exercise of the prosecution's first peremptory challenge to a black veniremember, a defendant is entitled to a Batson hearing." (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, other courts have stated the law similarly. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987), vacated, rev'd and remanded in part on other grounds on reh., 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265, 109 S. Ct. 28, 101 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1988) (stating that "under Batson, the striking of a single black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors."); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) (same); Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 19, 553 A.2d 228, 230 (1989) (stating, "A new trial will be mandated if any one of the peremptory challenges to black jurors was exercised with a discriminatory purpose, as the State will not be allowed `one free discriminatory strike.' Any violation requires a new trial."); United States v. Matha, 915 F.2d 1220, 1221 (8th Cir.1990) *1033 (stating, "It is a violation of the equal protection clause to strike even one black juror if the strike was made for a racial reason."); and United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, "It is the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons that invokes the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause, even though other black jurors are impanelled.").
Thus, a single instance of purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes can establish a prima facie case under Batson. The trial court, therefore, incorrectly concluded that the striking of just one juror is insufficient to establish a Batson violation.
The trial court's statement that one strike was insufficient, however, must be considered in light of the particular facts of this case. The record shows that the State and the defense used three strikes each to remove black veniremembers and that six blacks were left on the jury. In view of those facts, we conclude, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, 627 So. 2d 1027, that the trial court's finding of no purposeful discrimination by the State is due to be affirmed.
In Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676, 679 (Ala. 1991), this Court took the "opportunity to underscore the rule and policies that we announced in [Ex parte Jackson, 516 So. 2d 768 (Ala.1986),] and Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala.1987)." Also, in Bird, we discussed the strengths and weaknesses of a prima facie case when significant numbers of blacks serve on the trial jury. We stated:
594 So. 2d 676, 680-81. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the fact that 50% of the trial jury was black sustains the trial court's determination that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes. Although we conclude that the trial judge incorrectly stated the law relating to the use of one peremptory strike to remove a prospective juror solely because of race, we nevertheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Given the facts *1034 and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial judge's determination that there was no purposeful discrimination was "clearly erroneous." Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d  at 625 (wherein this Court said that "`[w]e may only reverse the trial judge's determination that the prosecution's peremptory challenges were not motivated by intentional discrimination if that determination is clearly erroneous.'") Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., concurs specially.
STEAGALL, J., concurs in the result.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring specially).
It is not necessarily a Batson violation for a party not to be able to give race-neutral reasons for every peremptory strike made by that party. See Bui v. State, 627 So. 2d 855 (Ala.1992); In re DeMunn, 627 So. 2d 1010 (Ala.1992). The trial court's inquiry and the reviewing court's inquiry should "focus solely upon the `propriety of the ultimate finding of discrimination vel non.'" Huntley v. State, 627 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Ala.1992), quoting United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1987). However, a party's being unable to give race-neutral reasons for a particular strike is different from an established single instance of purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes.
[1]  The petitioner presented another issue in his petition for writ of certiorari: whether age alone is a sufficiently race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike. Although we did not grant certiorari review to address this issue, we note our discussion of age as a race-neutral reason in Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676, 683 (Ala.1991):

"[W]e realize that in certain cases age may serve as a legitimate racially neutral reason for a peremptory strike. However, the age rationale is highly suspect because of its inherent susceptibility to abuse.... A mere summary declaration that age was a factor in the decision to strike is, therefore, constitutionally deficient and warrants reversal."
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)