Title: People v. Raybon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S256978
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
GOLDY RAYBON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
[And four other cases*] 
 
S256978 
 
Third Appellate District 
C084853 
 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
09F08248 
 
 
August 12, 2021 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Jenkins concurred. 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in  
which Justice Cuéllar concurred.
 
* People v. Cooper (No. C084911 [Super. Ct. No. 13F03230]); 
People v. Davis (No. C084960 [Super. Ct. No. 08F07402]); People 
v. Haynes (No. C084964 [Super. Ct. No. 12F00411]); People v. 
Potter (No. C085101 [Super. Ct. No. 06F11185]).   
1 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
S256978 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
This case requires us to interpret Proposition 64, the 
Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act (Prop. 
64, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) (Proposition 
64 or the Act)).  The question we must answer is whether 
Proposition 64 invalidates cannabis-related convictions under 
Penal Code section 4573.6, which makes it a felony to possess a 
controlled substance in a state correctional facility.  Although 
Proposition 64 generally legalizes adult possession of cannabis,1 
it contains several exceptions.  One such exception provides that 
the Act does not amend or affect “[l]aws pertaining to smoking 
or ingesting cannabis or cannabis products on the grounds of, or 
within, any facility or institution under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . .”  (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 11362.45, subd. (d).)  The Attorney General 
contends this exception applies to violations of Penal Code 
section 4573.6, meaning that possession of cannabis in a 
correctional facility remains a felony.  Defendants2 disagree, 
 
1  
In 2017, the Legislature replaced all references to 
“marijuana” in the Health and Safety Code with the term 
“cannabis.”  (Stats. 2017, ch. 27, §§ 113–160.)  Thus, although 
Proposition 64 used the term “marijuana,” we refer to the 
amended terminology “cannabis” throughout this opinion. 
2  
Defendants are Goldy Raybon (No. C084853), Anthony L. 
Cooper (No. C084911), Dwain Davis (No. C084960), Scott 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
arguing that because the exception only refers to “[l]aws 
pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis,” it does not apply 
to laws that merely criminalize possession of cannabis. 
Ultimately, we find the Attorney General’s proposed 
reading of Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, subdivision 
(d)3 to be more persuasive.  As discussed below, the phrase 
“[l]aws pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis” (ibid.) is 
broad 
enough 
to 
encompass 
statutes 
that 
criminalize 
possession.  Moreover, there is no law that makes it a crime to 
smoke, ingest or use cannabis (or any other form of drug) in 
prison.  Instead, the Legislature has taken a “ ‘ “prophylactic” ’ ” 
approach to the problem of drug use in prison by criminalizing 
only the possession of such drugs.  (People v. Low (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 
372, 
388 
(Low).) 
 
Thus, 
under 
defendants’ 
interpretation, section 11362.45, subdivision (d)’s carve-out 
provision would fail to preserve any preexisting law regulating 
cannabis in prisons from being “amend[ed], repeal[ed], 
affect[ed], restrict[ed], or preempt[ed]” (§ 11362.45), and would 
instead render the possession and use of up to 28.5 grams of 
cannabis in prison entirely lawful.  It seems unlikely that was 
the voters’ intent.  Stated differently, it seems implausible that 
the voters would understand the requirement that Proposition 
64 does not “amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt” any 
“[l]aws pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis” (§ 
11362.45, subd. (d)) to convey that, as of the date of the 
initiative’s enactment, possessing and using up to 28.5 grams of 
 
Wendell Haynes (No. C084964), and James Potter (No. 
C085101). 
3  
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are 
to the Health and Safety Code. 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
cannabis would now essentially be decriminalized in prisons.  In 
our view, the more reasonable interpretation of section 
11362.45, subdivision (d) is that the statute is intended “to 
maintain the status quo with respect to the legal status of 
cannabis in prison.”  (People v. Perry (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 885, 
893 (Perry).)  Thus, possession of cannabis in prison remains a 
violation of Penal Code section 4573.6. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The five defendants in this case were each found in 
possession of less than 28.5 grams of cannabis in a state prison 
and were subsequently convicted of violating Penal Code section 
4573.6.  Most of the defendants were serving time for a prior 
serious or violent felony at the time of their possession offenses, 
resulting in second-strike sentences that added several years to 
their current term.4      
In 2016, the voters passed Proposition 64, which makes it 
lawful for persons aged 21 years and older to engage in various 
types of conduct involving cannabis, including the possession of 
up to 28.5 grams of cannabis (approximately one ounce), subject 
to certain exceptions.  (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 
 
4   
Four of the five defendants were incarcerated at the time 
of their possession violation:  defendant Goldy Raybon, who 
admitted a prior strike and was sentenced to a consecutive term 
of four years; defendant James Potter, who was found to have a 
prior strike and was sentenced to a consecutive term of six years; 
defendant Anthony Cooper, who was found to have a prior strike 
and was sentenced to a consecutive term of six years; and 
defendant Dwayne Davis, whose sentence is not indicated in the 
record.  The fifth defendant, Scott Haynes, brought concentrated 
cannabis into a prison to give to an inmate.  Haynes’s sentence 
is not stated in the record, but he was on probation at the time 
he filed his petition for relief. 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
(Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 64, § 4.4, p. 180 (Voter Guide); Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11362.1, subd. (a).)5  The initiative also includes 
a remedial provision that allows persons currently serving a 
sentence for a cannabis-related crime that is no longer an 
offense under Proposition 64 to file a petition requesting the 
dismissal of their sentence.  (Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 
64, § 8.7, p. 207; § 11361.8, subd. (a).)  Acting pursuant to that 
new provision, defendants filed petitions in the Sacramento 
County Superior Court arguing that their sentences for 
violating Penal Code section 4573.6 should be dismissed because 
adult possession of less than an ounce of cannabis in prison no 
longer qualifies as a crime.   
The district attorney opposed the petitions, asserting that 
Penal Code section 4573.6 falls within an exception set forth in 
Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, subdivision (d) stating 
that Proposition 64 has no effect on laws “pertaining to smoking 
or ingesting cannabis or cannabis products” in state correctional 
facilities.  (§ 11362.45, subd. (d) (hereafter section 11362.45(d)).)  
The trial court agreed and issued orders denying the petitions.  
Defendants appealed to the Third District and their cases were 
consolidated for purposes of argument and decision.     
While the appeal was pending, the First District issued 
Perry, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 885, which held that “Proposition 
64 did not affect existing prohibitions against the possession of 
marijuana in prison or otherwise affect the operation of Penal 
 
5  
The 
Voter 
Guide 
is 
available 
at 
<https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/complete-
vig.pdf> (as of Aug. 10, 2021); all Internet citations in this 
opinion are archived by year, docket number, and case name at 
. 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
Code section 4573.6.”  (Id. at p. 890, italics omitted.)  Like the 
trial court in this case, the First District concluded that the 
phrase “ ‘[l]aws pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis [in 
prison]’ ” implicitly extends to possession under Penal Code 
section 4573.6 because the possession of cannabis is directly 
related to smoking or ingesting the substance.  (Perry, at p. 891.) 
The Third District disagreed with Perry and held that the 
phrase “pertaining to smoking and ingesting” was not 
“intend[ed] to include a third distinct activity, possession.”  
(People v. Raybon (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 111, 121 (Raybon).)  
The court further held that the clear and unambiguous intent of 
the phrase “pertaining to” was “to describe the . . . means of 
[cannabis] consumption” that do “not strictly involv[e] smoking 
or ingesting, such as inhal[ing] as a non-burning vapor or 
appl[ying] topically such that it is absorbed through the skin.”  
(Ibid. [“there is no ambiguity [in section 11362.45(d)]”].)  Having 
found the “conduct underlying [defendants’] convictions is no 
longer criminal under Penal Code section 4573.6,” the Court of 
Appeal directed the superior court “to enter orders granting the 
petitions for relief.”  (Raybon, at p. 126.) 
The Attorney General filed a petition for review seeking 
resolution of the following question:  “Did Proposition 64, which 
generally legalized the simple possession of less than an ounce 
of cannabis, also legalize such possession in state prisons and 
other custodial institutions?”6       
 
6  
During the pendency of our review, the Fourth and Sixth 
Districts issued published decisions rejecting Raybon, supra, 36 
Cal.App.5th 111, and agreeing with Perry’s conclusion that 
Proposition 64 was not intended to affect laws criminalizing the 
possession of cannabis in prison.  We granted review in those 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Legal Framework  
1. Statutory prohibitions on cannabis possession prior 
to Proposition 64  
Division 10 of the Health and Safety Code comprises the 
California Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  (§ 11000 et seq.)  
Chapter 2 of the act contains schedules listing the controlled 
substances that are subject to the provisions of division 10, 
which includes cannabis.7  (See § 11054, subd. (d)(13).)  Chapter 
6 of the act describes offenses associated with controlled 
substances, and article 2 (§ 11357 et seq.) sets forth offenses 
related to cannabis.  Prior to Proposition 64, section 11357 made 
it a crime to possess nonmedical cannabis and set forth the 
applicable punishments for such conduct.  (See former § 11357, 
subd. (a); Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 64, § 8.1, pp. 204–
205.)   
Penal Code section 4573 et seq. “place restrictions 
on possessing and importing drugs and other contraband in 
custody.”  (Low, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 382.)  Two of these 
provisions target the possession of drugs in custodial settings.  
The offense at issue here, Penal Code section 4573.6 , makes it 
a felony to knowingly “possess[] in any state prison, . . . or in any 
county . . . or city jail, . . . any controlled substances, the 
 
matters and deferred further action pending our resolution of 
this case.  (See People v. Whalum (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1, 
review granted Aug. 12, 2020, S262935 (Whalum); People v. 
Herrera (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 982, review granted Oct. 14, 
2020, S264339 (Herrera).)  To date, no published Court of Appeal 
decision has agreed with Raybon.      
7  
Unspecified statutory references to “division 10” in this 
majority opinion are to this act.  
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 . . . of the 
Health and Safety Code . . . , without being authorized to so 
possess . . . by the rules of the Department of Corrections, [the] 
rules of [the correctional facility] or by the specific authorization 
of the [persons in charge of the facility] . . . .”  (Pen. Code, § 
4573.6, subd. (a).)  A violation of this section is “punishable by 
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for 
two, three, or four years.”  (Ibid.)  Penal Code section 4573.8 has 
broader application, making it a crime to possess “in any state 
prison . . . drugs in any manner . . . or alcoholic 
beverages,  without being authorized to [so] possess the same by 
[the] rules of the [prison].”  This latter section is also a felony, 
but carries a lesser sentencing range of 16 months, two or three 
years.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 18, 4573.8.)  Because both offenses are 
felonies, persons convicted under Penal Code section 4573.6 or 
4573.8 who have previously been convicted of a serious or violent 
felony — likely a common situation given that both statutes 
involve conduct committed while on the grounds of a 
correctional facility — will have their sentence doubled unless 
the trial court elects to remove the prior strike.  (See Pen. Code, 
§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1385, subd. (b); People v. Romero (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 497, 504 (Romero).)  Other similar provisions prohibit 
bringing controlled substances and other forms of drugs into 
prisons or causing such substances to be brought into prisons.  
(See Pen. Code, §§ 4573, 4573.5.)   
These statutes, which target the possession rather than 
the consumption of unauthorized drugs in prison, “flow from the 
assumption that drugs . . . and other contraband promote 
disruptive and violent acts in custody, including gang 
involvement in the drug trade.  Hence, these provisions are 
viewed as ‘ “prophylactic” ’ measures that attack the ‘ “very 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
presence” ’ of such items in the penal system.”  (Low, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 388.)  There is no law that criminalizes the actual 
consumption of drugs in a custodial setting. 
2.  Proposition 64 
In November 2016, voters enacted Proposition 64, which 
was intended “to establish a comprehensive system to legalize, 
control and regulate the cultivation, processing, manufacture, 
distribution, testing, and sale of nonmedical marijuana, 
including marijuana products, for use by adults 21 years and 
older, and to tax the commercial growth and retail sale of 
marijuana.”  (Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 64, § 3, p. 179.)  
In addition to regulating the production and sale of nonmedical 
cannabis, the Act was intended to “[p]ermit adults 21 years and 
older to use, possess, purchase and grow nonmedical marijuana 
within defined limits . . . as set forth in [the Act].”  (Id., § 3, subd. 
(l).) 
Proposition 64’s legalization provision, set forth in newly 
added section 11362.1, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part:  
“Subject to Sections 11362.2, 11362.3, 11362.4, and 11362.45, 
but notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be 
lawful under state and local law, and shall not be a violation of 
state or local law, for persons 21 years of age or older to: [¶] (1) 
Possess . . . not more than 28.5 grams of cannabis not in the 
form of concentrated cannabis; [¶] (2)  Possess . . . not more than 
eight grams of cannabis in the form of concentrated 
cannabis . . . ; [¶] (3) Possess, plant, cultivate, harvest, dry, or 
process not more than six living cannabis plants . . . ; [¶] (4) 
Smoke or ingest cannabis or cannabis products; and [¶] (5) 
Possess, . . . use, . . . or give away cannabis accessories to 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
persons 21 years of age or older without any compensation 
whatsoever.” 
Section 11362.3, subdivision (a) places limitations on the 
possession and use of cannabis, directing that “[s]ection 11362.1 
does not permit any person to” (among other things):  “Smoke or 
ingest cannabis or cannabis products” in a public place (§ 
11362.3, subd. (a)(1)); “Smoke cannabis or cannabis products 
within 1,000 feet of a school” while children are present (id., 
subd. (a)(3)); “Possess an open container . . . of cannabis or 
cannabis products” while in a car or other form of motor vehicle 
(id., subd. (a)(4)); “Possess, smoke, or ingest cannabis or 
cannabis products” on the grounds of a school when children are 
present (id., subd. (a)(5)); “Smoke or ingest cannabis or cannabis 
products while driving” a motor vehicle or while “riding in the 
passenger seat or compartment of a motor vehicle” (id., subd. 
(a)(7), (8)).   
The penalties for engaging in any of these prohibited 
activities are set forth in newly added section 11362.4.  (See 
Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 64, § 4.7, pp. 181–182.)  
Proposition 64 also amended former section 11357, which had 
previously criminalized the possession of nonmedical cannabis.  
(See ante, at p. 6.)  As amended, section 11357 now sets forth the 
penalties for possessing cannabis in quantities that exceed the 
limits described in section 11362.1 or by persons under the age 
of 21.  (See Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 64, § 8.1, pp. 204–
205.) 
Section 11362.45, also added by Proposition 64, describes 
various categories of laws and rules the Act does not affect or 
restrict.  Of particular importance here, the section provides:  
“Section 11362.1 does not amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
preempt . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  (d) Laws pertaining to smoking or 
ingesting cannabis or cannabis products on the grounds of, or 
within, any facility or institution under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or the Division of 
Juvenile Justice, or on the grounds of, or within, any other 
facility or institution referenced in Section 4573 of the Penal 
Code.”  (§ 11362.45(d).) 
Other subdivisions of section 11362.45 exempt “[l]aws 
making it unlawful to drive or operate a vehicle . . . while 
smoking, ingesting, or impaired by, cannabis or cannabis 
products . . .” (§ 11362.45, subd. (a)) and “[l]aws providing that 
it would constitute negligence or professional malpractice to 
undertake any task while impaired from smoking or ingesting 
cannabis or cannabis products” (§ 11362.45, subd. (e)).  The 
section also preserves the “rights . . . of public and private 
employers to maintain a drug and alcohol free workplace . . . .” 
(§ 11362.45, subd. (f)) and allows government and private 
entities to prohibit any of the conduct permitted under section 
11362.1 in government buildings or on private property (§ 
11362.45, subds. (f) & (g)). 
Finally, Proposition 64 added remedial provisions for 
persons convicted of a cannabis-related crime “who would not 
have been guilty of an offense, or who would have been guilty of 
a lesser offense under [the Act].”  (§ 11361.8, subd. (a);  see id., 
subd. (e).)  Section 11361.8, subdivision (a) allows persons 
currently serving a sentence for such an offense to “petition for 
a recall or dismissal of sentence before the trial court that 
entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request 
resentencing or dismissal in accordance with Sections 11357, 
11358, 11359, 11360, 11362.1, 11362.2, 11362.3, and 11362.4 as 
those sections have been amended or added by [the Act].”    
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
B.  Rules of Construction Governing Voter 
Initiatives 
“ ‘In interpreting a voter initiative . . . , we apply the same 
principles that govern statutory construction.’ [Citation.]  
Where a law is adopted by the voters, ‘their intent governs.’  
[Citation.]  In determining that intent, ‘we turn first to the 
language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary 
meaning.’  [Citation.]  But the statutory language must also be 
construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall 
statutory scheme.  [Citation.]  We apply a presumption, as we 
similarly do with regard to the Legislature, that the voters, in 
adopting an initiative, did so being ‘aware of existing laws at the 
time the initiative was enacted.’ ”  (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 857, 879–880.)  
“ ‘Absent ambiguity, we presume that the voters intend 
the meaning apparent on the face of an initiative measure 
[citation] and the court may not add to the statute or rewrite it 
to conform to an assumed intent that is not apparent in its 
language.’ [Citation.]”  (Professional Engineers in California 
Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1037.)  
However, where “statutory ambiguity exists,” our role is “to 
ascertain the most reasonable interpretation.”  (People v. Canty 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1277 (Canty).)  In making that 
determination, we may “ ‘refer to other indicia of the voters’ 
intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in 
the official ballot pamphlet.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Rizo (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 681, 685 (Rizo).)   
C. Analysis 
The question we must decide in this case is whether, after 
Proposition 64, possession of less than an ounce of cannabis in a 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
state correctional facility remains a violation of Penal Code 
section 4573.6.  The Attorney General argues Proposition 64 has 
no effect on section 4573.6 offenses because the statute qualifies 
as a “[l]aw[] pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis” within 
the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11362.45(d).  
Defendants disagree, contending that section 11362.45(d) only 
exempts laws “involving [the] consumption of marijuana in 
prison,” and therefore does not extend to possession offenses. 
As an initial matter, we disagree with the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that “there is no ambiguity” (Raybon, supra, 
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 121) in section 11362.45(d).  In our view, 
both parties have presented reasonable interpretations of the 
statute.  (See People v. Dieck (2009) 46 Cal.4th 934, 940 [“A 
statutory provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two 
reasonable interpretations”].)  As the defendants argue, had the 
drafters intended to carve out laws that prohibit possession of 
cannabis in prison, they could have simply included the word 
“possession” in section 11362.45(d), just as they did in other 
sections of the Act.  (See, e.g., § 11362.3, subd. (a)(5) [the Act 
does not permit a person to “[p]ossess, smoke, or ingest cannabis 
or cannabis products” on school grounds].)  On the other hand, 
as the Attorney General asserts, had the drafters meant to limit 
section 11362.45(d)’s application to laws that actually prohibit 
smoking or ingesting cannabis in prison, they could have simply 
used the phrase “laws prohibiting smoking or ingesting.”  
Instead, the drafters chose the modifying term “pertaining to” 
(ibid.), suggesting they intended some broader application of the 
provision.  Complicating matters further, apart from the text of 
section 11362.45(d) itself, the Act and the Voter Guide do not 
contain any other statements referencing how Proposition 64 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
was intended to affect laws relating to cannabis in correctional 
facilities.   
Despite such ambiguity, we must nonetheless attempt to 
discern which of the parties’ interpretations is most reasonable.  
(See Canty, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1277.)  For the reasons that 
follow, we agree with the Attorney General that Proposition 64 
is most reasonably construed as having no effect on section 
4573.6 offenses.   
1. Section 11362.45(d) is most reasonably construed 
as encompassing laws that prohibit the possession 
of cannabis in prison  
Section 11362.45 expressly provides that Proposition 64 
does “not amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt” various 
categories of laws and rules related to cannabis, including “(d) 
Laws pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis [in 
correctional facilities].”  As Perry and other decisions have 
observed, on its face, the phrase “laws pertaining to smoking or 
ingesting cannabis” is broad enough to encompass statutes that 
prohibit the possession of cannabis.  (See Perry, supra, 32 
Cal.App.5th at p. 891 [the term “pertain” has “wide reach”]; 
Whalum, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 11, rev. granted; Herrera, 
supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 991, rev. granted.)  In interpreting a 
statute, we generally “accord words their usual, ordinary, and 
common sense meaning.”  (In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 
155.)  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pertain” to mean “[t]o 
relate directly to; to concern or have to do with.”  (Black’s Law 
Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 1383, col. 1.)  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary defines the term to mean, among other 
things, “to have some connection with or relation to something:  
have reference: relate.”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. 
(2002) p. 1688, col. 1.)  Numerous other dictionary sources 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
similarly define “pertain” in terms of having reference to or a 
relation to.8  As the Fourth District has aptly explained, “[a]ll of 
these definitions demonstrate that ‘pertaining to’ has a 
definition similar to the phrase ‘relating to.’  The phrase is 
plainly meant to refer to a relation between two things rather 
than an exact correspondence.”  (Whalum, at p. 11; see Garner, 
Dict. of Modern American Usage (1998), p. 47 [“pertain usually 
means ‘to relate to; concern’ ”].)  Thus, the text of section 
11362.45(d) suggests the drafters did not intend the statute to 
encompass only laws that explicitly regulate ingesting or 
smoking cannabis in prison, but rather intended it to include 
laws that relate to smoking or ingesting cannabis in prison. 
We think it clear that laws barring possession of cannabis 
in prison relate to drug use.  The act of possessing cannabis and 
the act of using cannabis have an obvious relation insofar as “a 
person has to possess cannabis to smoke or ingest it.”  (Whalum, 
supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 12, rev. granted; see Perry, supra, 32 
Cal.App.5th at p. 891  [“[w]e would be hard pressed to conclude 
that possession of cannabis is unrelated to smoking or ingesting 
the substance”].)  Long before Proposition 64 was passed, our 
 
8  
See 
Dictionary.com 
 (as of Aug. 10, 
2021) (“to have reference or relation; relate”); Oxford English 
Dictionary 
Online 
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141585?redirectedFrom=pert
ain#eid> (as of Aug. 10, 2021) (“To relate to; to refer to.  
Frequently in present participle in pertaining to” (boldface 
omitted)); 
Cambridge 
Dict. 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/pertain
-to-something?q=pertain> (Aug. 10, 2021) (defining “pertain to 
something” to mean “to relate to or have a connection with 
something” (boldface omitted)).) 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
courts had repeatedly observed that while Penal Code section 
4573.6 and its ancillary provisions (see Pen. Code § 4573 et seq.) 
target possession of drugs in prison rather than their use, the 
primary purpose of those provisions is nonetheless to deter drug 
use in such facilities:  “ ‘[T]he ultimate evil with which the 
Legislature was concerned [when enacting Penal Code section 
4573 et seq.] was drug use by prisoners.  Nevertheless, it chose 
to take a prophylactic approach to the problem by attacking the 
very presence of drugs and drug paraphernalia in prisons and 
jails.’ [Citation.]”  (People v. Harris (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1456, 
1461 (Harris); see Low, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 388; People v. 
Parodi (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1186, fn. 4; People v. 
Gutierrez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 386.)  Indeed, there is no 
statute that specifically criminalizes the use of cannabis or any 
other type of drug in prison, nor did any such provision exist 
when Proposition 64 was adopted.  Instead, through the 
adoption of Penal Code section 4573 et seq., the Legislature has 
aimed to eliminate drug use in prison by targeting the 
possession of those illicit substances.  In that way, the Penal 
Code’s prohibitions on drug possession in prison directly pertain 
to drug use. 
The Attorney General’s proposed reading of section 
11362.45(d) finds further support in the text of the other 
subdivisions within that statute.  Unlike subdivision (d), several 
of section 11362.45’s other subdivisions utilize the terms “laws 
prohibiting” or “laws making it unlawful” when describing the 
categories of statutes that Proposition 64 does not amend or 
affect.  Section 11362.45, subdivision (a), for example, exempts 
from Proposition 64’s legalization provision laws making it 
“unlawful to” operate a vehicle while “smoking, ingesting, or 
impaired 
by, 
cannabis”; 
subdivision 
(b) 
exempts 
laws 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
“prohibiting” the sale or furnishing of cannabis to persons under 
21 years of age; and subdivision (c) exempts laws “prohibiting” 
minors from engaging in any of the activities listed in section 
11362.1.  Had the drafters intended to limit subdivision (d) in 
the manner defendants suggest, they could have incorporated 
language similar to that used in subdivisions (a) through (c) by 
exempting laws that “prohibit” smoking or ingesting cannabis 
in prison, or laws that make it “unlawful” to do so.  Instead, the 
drafters chose to use the modifying term “pertaining to,” which 
implies an intent to encompass not only laws that actually 
prohibit smoking or ingesting cannabis, but also laws that have 
a relation to smoking or ingesting cannabis. 
We also find it significant that the only existing laws 
regulating cannabis use and possession in correctional facilities 
target the act of possession, rather than use.  Thus, if section 
11362.45(d) is interpreted to apply only to laws that bar the use 
of cannabis, the statute would not preserve any existing law 
relating to cannabis in prison from being “amend[ed], repeal[ed], 
affect[ed], restrict[ed], or preempt[ed].”  (Ibid.)  To the contrary, 
the statute would effectively operate to remove all of the central 
existing criminal prohibitions on cannabis in prisons, making it 
lawful to both possess and use the drug while incarcerated.9  
Stated differently, defendants contend that the phrase “[s]ection 
11362.1 does not amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt” any 
 
9  
Smoking (but not ingesting) cannabis in a correctional 
facility would presumably remain chargeable as an infraction 
under section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(2), which prohibits 
smoking cannabis “in a location where smoking tobacco is 
prohibited.”  (See § 11362.4, subd. (b) [violation of § 11362.3, 
subd. (a)(2) is an infraction].) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
“[l]aws pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis or cannabis 
products” in prison (§ 11362.45(d)) is intended to convey that, as 
of the date of the initiative’s enactment, possessing and using 
up to 28.5 grams of cannabis would now essentially be 
decriminalized in prisons.  We agree with the Attorney General 
that if the drafters had intended to so dramatically change the 
laws regarding cannabis in prison, we would expect them to 
have been more explicit about their goals.  Moreover, we think 
it likely that voters, who we must assume were aware that 
existing laws governing cannabis in prisons targeted possession 
rather than use (see People v. Orozco (2020) 9 Cal.5th 111, 118; 
Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1326, 
1332 [electorate is “conclusively presumed to have enacted the 
new laws in light of existing laws having direct bearing upon 
them”]), would have read section 11362.45(d) to retain those 
laws, rather than repeal them.  
Finally, 
between 
the 
parties’ 
two 
proposed 
interpretations, we find the Attorney General’s construction to 
be more “ ‘compatible with common sense.’ ”  (In re Estate of 
Todd (1941) 17 Cal.2d 270, 275 [“ ‘the language of a statute must 
be given a reasonable interpretation . . . and . . . , when 
opportunity arises, made compatible with common sense’ ”]; City 
of Chula Vista v. Sandoval (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 539, 560 
[“ ‘ “ ‘if the clear meaning of the statutory language is not 
evident . . . , we will “apply reason, practicality, and common 
sense to the language at hand.  If possible, the words should be 
interpreted 
to 
make 
them 
workable 
and 
reasonable 
[citations], . . . practical [citations], in accord with common 
sense . . . ” ’ ” ’ ”].)  While perhaps not illogical to distinguish 
between the possession and use of cannabis, it is nonetheless 
difficult to understand why the electorate would want to 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
preclude laws criminalizing cannabis possession in prison, but 
permit laws criminalizing cannabis consumption in prison.  
Defendants theorize that voters may have wanted to 
“decriminalize[] simple possession” while “retaining sanctions 
for those who actually use it” because “it is the consumption of 
marijuana that is the problem . . . .”  But if voters were truly 
concerned about cannabis use in prison, why would they want 
to remove the existing penal provisions that target that very 
problem?  Moreover, defendants have not identified any reason 
why a person might possess cannabis within a correctional 
facility other than to have it consumed by someone.  (See Perry, 
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 892 [“For what purpose would an 
inmate possess cannabis that was not meant to be smoked or 
ingested by anyone?”].)  Simply put, we are dubious that the 
voters intended to legalize the possession of cannabis in prison 
but permit laws that criminalize the use of cannabis in prison 
(of which there are currently none).   
2.  Defendants’ counterarguments  
Defendants raise numerous counterarguments in support 
of their assertion that Proposition 64 invalidates cannabis-
related convictions under Penal Code section 4573.6.  We find 
these arguments unavailing.   
a.  Defendants’ arguments regarding the text of 
section 11362.45(d) 
Defendants’ primary contention is that if the drafters had 
meant section 11362.45(d) to extend to offenses involving the 
possession of cannabis, they would have expressly stated as 
much, just as they did in other provisions of Proposition 64.  
(See, e.g., §§ 11362.1, subd. (a)(1), (2), (3) & (5), 11362.3, subd. 
(a)(4), (5), 11362.45, subd. (f).)  Section 11362.3, subdivision (4), 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
for example, states that persons are not permitted to “possess” 
an open container of cannabis in a vehicle, while subdivision (5) 
states that persons are not permitted to “possess, smoke or 
ingest cannabis” on school grounds while children are present.  
In defendants’ view, these provisions demonstrate the “drafters 
knew how to reference possession when they wanted to.  A voter 
would view possession outside the purview of section 
11362.45(d) because the distinct acts of ‘smoking or ingesting’ 
are explicitly flagged but possession is not.”  
 If section 11362.45(d) merely stated that Proposition 64 
was not intended to affect laws prohibiting or criminalizing 
smoking or ingesting cannabis in prison, we would attach more 
significance to the absence of the term “possession.”  But the 
drafters chose broader language, exempting “[l]aws pertaining 
to smoking and ingesting” cannabis in prison.  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  While using the word “possession” may well have 
provided a simpler means of encompassing laws that bar 
possession of cannabis in prison, we must nonetheless give effect 
to “pertaining,” a term that generally “signals a relation to 
something.”  (Whalum, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 12, rev. 
granted.)  And as explained above, we think it clear that 
possession of cannabis is directly related to smoking or ingesting 
the substance.  (See ante, at pp. 13–15.)  The conclusion that 
laws prohibiting possession of cannabis relate to cannabis 
consumption 
accords 
with 
our 
courts’ 
long-standing 
acknowledgment that the primary intent of section 4573.6’s 
prohibition of possession is in fact to stop “drug use by 
prisoners.”  (Harris, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461.)  Indeed, 
there is no criminal provision that makes it unlawful to use 
cannabis or other controlled substances in prison; instead, the 
Legislature has elected to attack drug use in correctional 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
facilities by prohibiting “the ‘ “very presence” ’ of such 
[substances] in the penal system.”  (Low, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 
388.)  For all those reasons, we reject defendants’ assertion that 
the absence of the term “possession” precludes section 
11362.45(d)’s application to possessory offenses.10    
 
10   
Defendants similarly argue that if “pertaining to” was 
meant to include possession, the drafters could have used the 
phrase “pertaining to marijuana.”  In their view, reading 
possession into the statute effectively “writes the limiting words 
[‘smoking or ingesting’] out of the statute completely.”  We do 
not agree that interpreting the term “pertaining to smoking or 
ingesting cannabis” to include possession offenses necessarily 
renders the words “smoking or ingesting” meaningless.  Rather, 
the inclusion of that language seems intended to signal that 
section 11362.45(d) is meant to encompass laws that relate to 
the use of cannabis.  The drafters could quite logically endeavor 
to limit the possible range of laws in this way (i.e., to all laws 
pertaining to smoking or ingesting of cannabis) to avoid 
invoking the much broader category of laws that relate in any 
conceivable way to cannabis, many of which would have no 
applicability in a prison setting, such as laws related to labeling, 
advertising, packaging, or transporting in an automobile.     
Moreover, “like all . . . interpretive canons, the canon 
against surplusage is a guide to statutory interpretation and is 
not invariably controlling.”  (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
347, 381 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) (Valencia), citing People v. 
Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 782; see In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
200, 209; Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy 
(2006) 548 U.S. 291, 299, fn. 1; Lamie v. United States Trustee 
(2004) 540 U.S. 526, 536.)  To the extent our interpretation 
results in some level of redundancy, we nonetheless believe it “is 
more consistent with voter intent” than defendants’ proposed 
reading (Rizo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 687 [canon against 
surplusage “is only a ‘guide[] and will not be used to defeat 
legislative intent’ ”]), which would render section 11362.45(d) 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
Recognizing that the term “pertaining to” cannot be read 
out of the statute entirely, defendants posit that such language 
was simply intended to “encapsulate” other methods of cannabis 
consumption that “do not strictly involve smoking or ingesting.”  
Defendants assert those alternative means include, for example, 
vaping and absorption through the skin.  The Court of Appeal 
found this argument persuasive, explaining that “[b]y including 
the language ‘pertaining to smoking and ingesting,’ the drafters 
allowed for these various [additional] forms of consumption in 
prison to remain unlawful.”  (Raybon, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 122 [“We agree with defendants that consumption can be 
achieved in ways not strictly involving smoking or ingesting, 
such as inhaled as a nonburning vapor or applied topically such 
that it is absorbed through the skin”].)      
We find defendants’ proposed interpretation of “pertaining 
to” in section 11362.45(d) unpersuasive.  First, we question 
defendants’ unexamined assumption that the term “smoking or 
ingesting” is not broad enough to encompass the alternative 
means of consumption they have identified.  Section 11362.3, 
subdivision (b)(2), for example, demonstrates that regardless of 
whether vaping is technically a form of smoking, the drafters 
appear to have equated those activities.  (See ibid. [“ ‘Smoke’ 
includes the use of an electronic smoking device that creates an 
aerosol or vapor, in any manner or in any form, or the use of any 
oral smoking device for the purpose of circumventing the 
prohibition of smoking in a place”].)  Moreover, the term “ingest” 
is commonly defined to mean “to take in: swallow, absorb.”  
 
inapplicable to any existing statute and effectively legalize the 
possession and use of cannabis in prison.   
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
(Merriam-Webster’s 
Unabridged 
Dict. 
Online 
 
[as of Aug. 10, 2021], italics added; see Webster’s 3d New 
Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 1162, col. 2; Roget’s Thesaurus (5th ed. 
1992) p. 938 [listing “absorb” as synonym of “ingest”].)  That 
definition seems broad enough to incorporate cannabis 
consumed through topical applications or other forms of 
absorption. 
Second, and more importantly, other sections of 
Proposition 64 strongly suggest the drafters intended the words 
“smoking or ingesting” to encompass all forms of consumption.  
Section 11362.1, subdivision (a)(4), for example, makes it legal 
to “[s]moke or ingest cannabis.”  Similarly, section 11362.3 
prohibits “[s]mok[ing] or ingest[ing] cannabis” in public (id., 
subd. (a)(1)), while on school grounds when children are present 
(subd. (a)(5)) and while driving or operating a motor vehicle (id., 
subd. (a)(7)).  Section 11362.45, subdivision (e) additionally 
provides that Proposition 64’s legalization provision does not 
affect “[l]aws providing that it would constitute negligence or 
professional malpractice to undertake any task while impaired 
from smoking or ingesting cannabis.”   
In each of these circumstances, we believe the drafters 
intended “smoking or ingesting” to cover all forms of cannabis 
consumption.  We find it doubtful, for example, that the drafters 
meant to prohibit people from smoking or eating cannabis while 
driving but permit them to vape or absorb cannabis products 
while driving.  We are equally dubious that the drafters 
intended to allow laws providing that it would constitute 
professional negligence to undertake a task while impaired from 
smoking or eating cannabis, but not while impaired from vaping 
or absorbing cannabis.  Because numerous other sections of 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
Proposition 64 appear to use the phrase “smoking or ingesting” 
to refer to all methods of consumption, we are not persuaded 
that the term “pertaining to” was merely intended to capture 
alternative means of consumption that do not strictly involve 
smoking or ingesting.  Instead, as described above, we conclude 
that term is most reasonably construed as intending to broaden 
the scope of section 11362.45(d) to laws that relate to cannabis 
use, which necessarily includes possession offenses.11 
Defendants also discount the absence of any law making 
it a crime to smoke, ingest or consume cannabis in prison or jail.  
They argue that section 11362.45(d) was never intended to carve 
out preexisting laws involving cannabis in prison, but rather was 
meant to authorize the Legislature to pass future laws that 
“proscrib[e] smoking or ingesting (or other forms of consuming) 
marijuana on jail or prison grounds, should legislators consider 
them appropriate.”   Defendants contend that in the absence of 
 
11  
Moreover, if the drafters were truly concerned that 
“smoking or ingesting” was not broad enough to encompass 
different forms of consumption, adding the term “pertaining to” 
would seem an odd way of trying to capture those alternative 
means of consumption.  As we have explained, the term 
“pertain” generally signifies a direct relationship with 
something else.  (See ante, at pp. 13–14.)  Thus, using the phrase 
“laws 
pertaining 
to 
smoking 
or 
ingesting” 
seems 
a 
counterintuitive way to convey the concept that the law was 
intended to capture smoking or ingesting cannabis, along with 
any other different forms of consumption.  (See Whalum, supra, 
50 Cal.App.5th at p. 12, fn. 8, rev. granted [“Because ‘pertaining 
to’ means ‘relating to,’ someone would not normally describe the 
topical application or vaporizing of cannabis as ‘pertaining to’ 
the smoking or ingesting of cannabis, as they are different ways 
of using cannabis and therefore do not relate to one another”].) 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
section 11362.45(d), our Constitution would prevent the 
Legislature from passing such laws without the electorate’s 
approval.  (See Cal. Const. art. 2, § 10, subd. (c) [Legislature 
must obtain the electorate’s approval before amending “an 
initiative statute by another statute . . . unless the initiative 
statute permits amendment . . . without [their] approval”].) 
Assuming arguendo that the language of section 
11362.45(d) permits the Legislature to pass or repeal laws that 
pertain to cannabis use in prison without electorate approval, 
we are not persuaded a reasonable voter would interpret that to 
be the sole intent of the provision.  As explained above, if section 
11362.45(d) were only meant to permit the Legislature to pass 
future laws criminalizing cannabis use in prison, one would 
expect some language clarifying that prospective intent.  
Instead, the statute states only that Proposition 64 does not 
“amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt” any “[l]aws 
pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis” in prison.  
(§ 11362.45(d).)  The clear implication is that the initiative 
would leave intact some existing restriction on cannabis in 
prison.  We find defendants’ proposed reading of this 
language — to convey that the initiative would remove existing 
penal restrictions regulating cannabis in prison but authorize 
the Legislature to pass future laws criminalizing cannabis use 
in prison — to be far more strained.  (See People v. Nuckles 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 611–612 [a reviewing court should “ ‘not 
strain to interpret a penal statute in defendant’s favor if it can 
fairly discern a contrary legislative intent’ ”].)12      
 
12  
Although multiple subdivisions of section 11362.45 are 
clearly intended to preserve preexisting laws (see § 11362.45, 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
Defendants next contend that section 11362.1, subdivision 
(a)’s use of the statutory phrase “notwithstanding any other 
provision of law” makes clear that adult possession of less than 
28.5 grams of cannabis in prison no longer qualifies as a 
violation of Penal Code section 4573.6.  The relevant clause of 
section 11362.1, subdivision (a)(1) states:  “Subject to Sections 
11362.2, 11362.3, 11362.4, and 11362.45, but notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, it shall be lawful . . . for persons 21 
years of age to  . . . [¶] . . . [p]ossess . . . not more than 28.5 grams 
of cannabis.”  As defendants note, “ ‘[t]he statutory phrase 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” has been called a 
“ ‘term of art’ ” [citation] that declares the legislative intent to 
override all contrary law.’ [Citation.]”  (Arias v. Superior Court 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 983.)  Defendants assert that because 
Penal Code section 4573.6’s prohibition on cannabis possession 
in prison conflicts with Health and Safety Code section 11362.1’s 
 
subds. (a), (i)), other subdivisions seem intended to operate on a 
prospective basis.  Subdivisions (g) and (h), for example, 
preserve public and private entities’ “ability . . . to prohibit or 
restrict any of the actions or conduct otherwise permitted under 
Section 11362.1” within government buildings and on private 
property.  Subdivision (d), however, does not speak in terms of 
retaining the Legislature’s “ability” to act, and the preexisting 
statutory provisions barring drug possession in prison (see Pen. 
Code, §§ 4573.6, 4573.8) have long been understood as 
prophylactic measures intended to deter drug use in such 
facilities (see ante, at pp. 14–15).  In light of these factors, we 
think section 11362.45(d) is more reasonably construed as 
incorporating preexisting possessory offenses, rather than 
operating solely to allow the Legislature to adopt laws 
prohibiting cannabis consumption in the future.           
 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
legalization provision, it is necessarily rendered inapplicable by 
the “notwithstanding” clause.  This argument, however, 
overlooks the limiting language in section 11362.1 that 
expressly lists section 11362.45 as an exception to the 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” clause.  For the 
reasons discussed above, we are of the view that section 
11362.45, subdivision (d)  carves out from Proposition 64’s 
legalization provision offenses involving the possession of 
cannabis in prison.  Accordingly, the “notwithstanding” 
provision is of no aid to defendants’ interpretation. 
Finally, defendants argue the Voter Guide provides 
“rich . . . support” for the conclusion that Proposition 64 was 
intended to legalize the possession of cannabis in prison.  They 
note that the Voter Guide contains no language informing voters 
that Proposition 64 would leave in place existing prohibitions on 
cannabis possession in prison.  Defendants also cite to a table in 
the Legislative Analyst’s summary listing what activities would 
become lawful under the measure and what activities would 
remain unlawful.  The section of the table addressing possession 
states that while it would be allowable for persons 21 or over to 
possess up to 28.5 grams of cannabis, it would not be allowable 
to possess cannabis on school grounds while children are 
present.  (See Voter Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 64 by the 
Legis. Analyst, p. 92, figure 2.)  According to defendants, the 
electorate would have likely inferred from this table that 
possession in prison would become legal because such conduct 
was not listed as an activity that would remain unlawful.   
We find nothing in the Voter Guide that provides 
substantial support for either side’s interpretation.  As 
defendants acknowledge, the Voter Guide does not contain a 
single reference to laws regulating cannabis in prisons nor does 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
it explain how Proposition 64 would impact those laws.  While 
defendants argue voters would have inferred from such silence 
that possession in prison would become legal, we think it just as 
likely they would have interpreted such silence to mean that 
Proposition 64 would have no effect on existing laws prohibiting 
the possession of cannabis in prison.  Moreover, it is clear the 
table that defendants have identified provided only an 
incomplete summary of what forms of conduct the Act would 
preclude.  That table, for example, fails to note that possession 
of an open container of cannabis in a vehicle would remain 
unlawful and omits numerous other forms of conduct and laws 
that fall outside Proposition 64’s purview, including most of the 
activities referenced in section 11362.45.  Given the Voter 
Guide’s total silence on the issue of cannabis in prison, we do not 
believe it would have any appreciable effect on voters’ 
understanding of section 11362.45(d).   
b.  Defendants’ arguments regarding the text of 
Penal Code section 4573.6 
Defendants additionally argue that even if section 
11362.45(d) does generally extend to possession offenses, their 
convictions should nonetheless be dismissed because the act of 
possessing cannabis in prisons no longer falls within the 
category of conduct proscribed under Penal Code section 4573.6.  
Defendants note that the text of Penal Code section 4573.6 does 
not state that it is unlawful to possess any controlled substance 
in prison; rather, the statute states that it is unlawful to possess 
“a[] controlled substance[ ], the possession of which is prohibited 
by Division 10 . . . of the Health and Safety Code.”  In defendants’ 
view, this statutory language means that Penal Code section 
4573.6 applies only when the circumstances of the person’s 
possession in prison would also violate an independent 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
prohibition on possession set forth in division 10.  They further 
contend that while cannabis remains listed as a controlled 
substance, Proposition 64’s addition of section 11362.1 and its 
amendments to section 11357 mean that there is no longer any 
provision in division 10 that prohibits an adult from possessing 
less than 28.5 grams of cannabis (except in limited 
circumstances not at issue here).  As a result, defendants reason, 
their conduct no longer constitutes a violation of Penal Code 
section 4573.6, and their convictions must be dismissed.13 
 
13  
The Attorney General argues that even if cannabis 
possession no longer violates Penal Code section 4573.6 on a 
prospective basis, we must nonetheless reject defendants’ 
petitions because “the remedial procedure in Health and Safety 
Code section 11361.8” does not extend retroactive relief to 
persons who were previously convicted of violating that statute.  
Section 11361.8, subdivision (a) allows any person “who would 
not have been guilty of an offense, or who would have been guilty 
of a lesser offense” under Proposition 64 to file a petition seeking 
dismissal or resentencing “in accordance with Sections 11357, 
11358, 11359, 11360, 11362.1, 11362.2, 11362.3, and 11362.4 as 
those sections have been amended or added by that act.”  The 
Attorney General appears to argue that because Penal Code 
section 4573.6 is not among the statutes listed in section 
11361.8, subdivision (a), persons convicted of violating that 
section are not eligible for relief.  We disagree with that analysis.  
If defendants are correct that cannabis possession is no longer a 
violation of Penal Code section 4573.6, that is a result of 
Proposition 64’s new legalization provision (§ 11362.1) and the 
Act’s amendments to section 11357, which had previously made 
it unlawful to possess nonmedical cannabis.  Thus, defendants 
are in fact seeking relief “in accordance with” two of the statutes 
listed in section 11362.8, subdivision (a) “as those sections have 
been amended or added by the act.”  (Ibid.) 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
Our Courts of Appeal are currently divided as to the 
meaning of the phrase “any controlled substance[], the 
possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 . . . of the 
Health and Safety Code,” which appears in multiple Penal Code 
sections regulating drugs in prisons.  (Pen. Code, § 4573.6, subd. 
(a); see Pen. Code, §§ 4573, subd. (a) [“any controlled substance, 
the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 . . . of the 
Health and Safety Code”], 4573.9 [same].)  In People v. Fenton 
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965 (Fenton), the Court of Appeal 
considered the meaning of that phrase within the context of 
Penal Code section 4573, which makes it unlawful to bring or 
send into a prison “any controlled substance, the possession of 
which is prohibited by Division 10.”  (Pen. Code, § 4573, subd. 
(a).)  The defendant, who was found smuggling hydrocodone into 
a jail, argued that he could not be convicted under Penal Code 
section 4573 because he had had a physician’s prescription for 
the substance, and thus his possession was not “prohibited by 
Division 10” of the Health and Safety Code.  (See § 11350, subd. 
(a) [prohibiting possession of hydrocodone “unless upon the 
written prescription of a physician”].)  The Fenton court agreed, 
concluding that Penal Code section 4573 was inapplicable 
because the manner of defendant’s possession did not violate 
any provision in division 10.  (Fenton, at p. 969.)   
In People v. Taylor (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 115, review 
granted April 14, 2021, S267344 (Taylor), the defendants relied 
on Fenton in arguing that Proposition 64’s amendments to  
section 11357 mean that possession of less than 28.5 grams of 
cannabis in prison by an adult no longer qualifies as a violation 
of Penal Code section 4573.6.  The court rejected that argument 
(and Fenton), concluding that “[b]ased on the entire statutory 
scheme, . . . the phrase ‘any controlled substance, the possession 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
of which is prohibited by Division 10 . . .’ [citation] refers to a 
general category of controlled substances, rather than a 
particular instance of possession, and encompasses those 
controlled substances, the possession of which is in any way 
prohibited by Division 10.”  (Taylor, at p. 130.)  In the Taylor 
court’s view, because cannabis possession remains unlawful 
under some circumstances, possession of cannabis in prison 
continues to qualify as a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6.  
We need not resolve that dispute  here.  Regardless of how 
Penal Code section 4573.6 might apply with respect to other 
controlled substances, the unique language of Health and Safety 
Code section 11362.45(d) makes clear that the voters intended 
cannabis possession to remain a violation of that felony 
provision.  There is no question that before the enactment of 
Proposition 64, possession of cannabis in prison qualified as a 
violation of Penal Code section 4573.6.  Section 11362.45(d), in 
turn, expressly directs that Proposition 64’s newly added 
legalization provision, which declares it is now lawful for adults 
to possess up to 28.5 grams of cannabis in most circumstances 
(§ 11362.1, subd. (a)(1)), does not “amend” or “affect” any laws 
pertaining to cannabis use in prison, which we have found to 
include possessory offenses.  (See ante, at pp. 13–18.)  Voters 
would have reasonably understood this language to mean that 
any preexisting laws regulating cannabis possession in prison 
would remain in place.  Under that view, voters would expect 
cannabis possession to remain a violation of Penal Code section 
4573.6 unless and until further amendments are made to the 
statutory scheme.  (See Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 64, § 
10, p. 210 [authorizing the Legislature to “amend, add, or repeal 
any provisions to further reduce the penalties for any of the 
offenses addressed by this [Act]”].)  Under defendants’ 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
interpretation of Penal Code section 4573.6, in contrast, 
Proposition 64 would directly “amend” or “affect” a law 
pertaining to smoking of ingesting cannabis.  More specifically, 
their interpretation would “amend” and “affect” the scope of 
Penal Code section 4573.6 by making it no longer applicable to 
cannabis possession.   (See Perry, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 
896 [“We decline to adopt an interpretation of . . . Penal Code 
section 4573.6 that appears to be so at odds with the intent 
behind and language of Proposition 64”]; Herrera, supra, 52 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 994–995, rev. granted [adopting Perry’s 
reasoning].)14  
The dissent takes a different view, though for reasons that 
are distinct from the arguments made by defendants or any 
other court that has addressed this issue.  While agreeing that 
Health and Safety Code section 11362.45(d)’s carve-out 
provision operates to preserve cannabis-related convictions 
under Penal Code section 4573.8 (which makes it a felony to 
 
14  
The Court of Appeal concluded that this case was 
controlled by its prior decision in Fenton, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 
965.  (See Raybon, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 116–119.)   As 
the Perry court explained, however, the situation in Fenton was 
substantially 
different 
than 
the 
one 
presented 
here.  
Specifically, Fenton’s conclusion that Penal Code section 4573 
“ ‘permit[s] controlled substances to be in penal institutions 
under proper circumstances’ [citation] . . . . did not conflict with 
any other provision of law.  Here, a conclusion that Division 10 
does not prohibit the possession of not more than 28.5 grams of 
cannabis for purposes of Penal Code section 4573.6 would make 
meaningless the express provision of Proposition 64 that its 
legalization of cannabis did not ‘amend, repeal, affect, restrict, 
or preempt: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [l]aws pertaining to smoking or 
ingesting cannabis’ in penal institutions.  (§ 11362.45, subd. 
(d).)”  (Perry, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 894.) 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
possess any drug or alcohol in prison), the dissent does not 
believe the carve-out provision preserves cannabis-related 
convictions under Penal Code section 4573.6, subdivision (a) 
(which applies to “controlled substances, the possession of which 
is prohibited in Division 10”).  (See conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, 
J., post, at pp. 1, 7.)  According to the dissent, whether cannabis 
possession remains a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6 
turns instead solely on the meaning of the clause, “controlled 
substance[], the possession of which is prohibited by Division 
10.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  As noted above, the meaning of that 
language has divided our courts.  (See ante, at pp. 28–30.)   The 
dissent, however, declines to choose a side in that debate and 
would leave the question open.  (See conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, 
J., post, at p. 6.)  
Before turning to the merits of the dissent’s proposed  
interpretation of Proposition 64, we first address the dissent’s 
assertion that there is no reason for this court to even decide 
whether cannabis possession remains a violation of Penal Code 
section 4573.6.  The dissent reasons that it is unnecessary to 
address that issue because the defendants’ petitions seek 
dismissal of their sentences, but the most relief they could 
possibly obtain under Proposition 64 would be resentencing 
pursuant to Penal Code section 4573.8’s “relatively lighter” 
(conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 8, fn. 3) triad of 
penalties.   That reasoning rests on the assumption that Penal 
Code section 4573.8 might qualify as a “lesser offense” of Penal 
Code section 4573.6 within the meaning of Proposition 64’s 
remedial provision.  (See § 11361.8, subd. (a) [persons “currently 
serving a sentence for a conviction . . . who would not have been 
guilty of an offense, or who would have been guilty of a lesser 
offense [under Proposition 64]” may petition for “resentencing or 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
dismissal”].)  In the dissent’s view, regardless of whether the 
defendants would be entitled to resentencing had they sought 
that remedy (another issue the dissent would leave open), they 
are not entitled to dismissal, negating the need to address 
Proposition 64’s effect on Penal Code section 4573.6.        
While the dissent concludes that we should avoid this 
issue entirely based on the manner the defendants have styled 
their request for relief, we think the question is properly before 
us and should be decided now.  Indeed, the defendants’ briefs in 
both the Court of Appeal and this court include an entire section 
expressly arguing that even if section Health and Safety Code 
section 11362.45(d) generally extends to possessory offenses, the 
other changes Proposition 64 made to division 10 mean that 
cannabis possession no longer qualifies as a violation of Penal 
Code section 4573.6.  Moreover, whether cannabis possession 
remains a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6 is an issue that 
has already divided our lower courts and therefore requires 
resolution by this court.  We think the better course is to decide 
this fully briefed legal question now rather than avoid it merely 
because defendants described their request for relief as one 
seeking dismissal rather than resentencing.15        
 
15  
Deciding whether cannabis possession remains a violation 
of Penal Code section 4573.6 now also furthers the interest in 
judicial economy.  During the pendency of this case, we have 
granted and held over 40 cases addressing whether Proposition 
64  legalized possession of cannabis in prisons.  A vast majority 
of those cases involve defendants who were convicted of 
violating Penal Code section 4573.6.  The dissent’s proposed 
course would effectively force the five defendants in this case 
(along with every other similarly situated person seeking relief 
under Proposition 64) to refile new petitions under section 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
Turning to the merits of the dissent’s interpretation, a 
brief review of Proposition 64’s structure is helpful.  The central 
provision of Proposition 64 is newly added section 11362.1, 
which declares that, subject to certain exceptions, it is now legal 
for persons age 21 years or older to engage in a wide array of 
cannabis-related conduct, including possessing up to 28.5 grams 
of the drug.  To conform to section 11362.1’s broad legalization 
provision, Proposition 64 also amended language in section 
11357 that had previously made possession of up to 28.5 grams 
of cannabis an infraction. That amended language modifies 
section 11357 to state the penalties for conduct that falls outside 
the parameters of section 11362.1’s legalization provision (i.e., 
possessing more than 28.5 grams of cannabis or possession by 
persons under the age of 21).  Section 11362.45(d), in turn, states 
 
11361.8  seeking resentencing (rather than dismissal), requiring 
our lower courts to decide anew whether cannabis possession 
remains a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6.  Given that the 
defendants have expressly raised and briefed whether cannabis 
possession remains a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6, we 
see no need to force them to relitigate (and for our lower courts 
to redecide) that pure question of law.  The dissent suggests 
there might be some benefit to proceeding in that way because 
our lower courts would then be able to consider defendants’ 
entitlement to resentencing “in a case in which the relevant 
arguments had been appropriately raised and litigated, which is 
not the case here.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., Kruger, J., post, at p. 8, 
fn. 3.)  But  whether cannabis possession remains a violation of 
Penal Code section 4573.6 is a precursor question our lower 
courts would have to answer before considering any possible 
entitlement to resentencing.  The resolution of the Penal Code 
section 4573.6 issue here means our lower courts do not need to 
even reach the resentencing issue. 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
that Proposition 64’s affirmative legalization provision has no 
effect on laws pertaining to cannabis use in prison.16        
As described above, we think the key statutory language 
is not that complicated:  Section 11362.45(d) references section 
11362.1, which is the broadly worded catch all provision from 
Proposition 64 that declares it is now legal for adults to possess 
up to 28.5 grams of cannabis under most circumstances.   
Section 11362.45(d) then says that this broad legalization 
provision does not “amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt” 
any “[l]aws pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis,” which 
the dissent agrees encompasses possessory offenses.  We think 
that when voters were told the broad pronouncement legalizing 
cannabis contained in section 11362.1 would not affect laws 
 
16  
While at times referencing to section 11362.1 as a 
“legalization provision” (see, e.g., conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, J., 
post, at p. 4), the dissent characterizes it as “in essence, a 
preemption provision” (ibid.), while describing section 11357 as 
a separate “legalization provision” (conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, 
J., post, at p. 11).  We disagree with those characterizations.  
Although section 11362.1 contains a preemption clause, that 
new provision — one of the very first provisions presented in 
Proposition 64 — also broadly pronounces that a wide range of 
cannabis-related conduct is now lawful, including the possession 
of not more than 28.5 grams of cannabis by persons over the age 
of 21.  The amendments to section 11357, in comparison, appear 
far later in the text of Proposition 64 and in our view were made 
to conform to the broad legalization pronouncement made in 
section 11362.1.  Stated differently, section 11362.1, not section 
11357, is the “legalization provision” and the amendments to 
section 11357 simply ensure consistency with section 11362.1.  
Indeed, it would seem to make little sense to adopt a new 
provision declaring cannabis possession generally legal (section 
11362.1), while leaving in place a preexisting statute declaring 
cannabis possession generally unlawful (section 11357).   
   
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
prohibiting possession in prison, they would understand this 
language to mean that existing laws prohibiting cannabis 
possession in prison would remain in place.   
The dissent disagrees, concluding that the language is, in 
fact, quite complicated.  The dissent concludes that the voters 
were asked to journey through a phalanx of complex statutory 
cross-references and legal conclusions and, at the end of the 
journey, would have concluded that Proposition 64 might 
actually “amend, repeal, affect, restrict, [and] preempt” some 
laws prohibiting the possession of cannabis in prisons, but not 
others.  The journey goes something like this:  The dissent first 
contends that when voters were told Proposition 64’s key 
legalization provision would have no effect on in-prison 
possession offenses, they would have understood that language 
to mean the initiative would have no effect on convictions under 
Penal Code section 4573.8, but might have an effect on 
convictions under Penal Code section 4573.6.  In the dissent’s 
view, voters would have come to this conclusion because they 
would have understood that section 11362.45(d)’s “no effect” 
clause references Proposition 64’s legalization provision (§ 
11362.1), but not the amendments made to section 11357.  They 
then would have understood that Proposition 64 removed 
section 11357’s previous general prohibition on cannabis 
possession and replaced it with more narrow prohibitions.  They 
then would have realized that section 11357 is part of division 
10 of the Health and Safety Code. And they would have noted 
that Penal Code section 4573.6 cross-references the prohibitions 
in division 10.  (See Pen. Code, § 4573.6, subd. (a) [making it a 
felony to possess a “controlled substance[], the possession of 
which is prohibited under Division 10”].)  Voters would then 
realize that because division 10 no longer contains a general 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
prohibition on cannabis possession (it instead conforms to 
Proposition 64’s legalization provision by prohibiting a more 
narrow class of cannabis-related crimes involving persons under 
the age of 21 and quantities in excess of 28.5 grams), and 
because section 11362.45(d) fails to state that the amendments 
to section 11357 were not intended to affect prison offenses (it 
only cross-references section 11362.1’s general legalization 
prohibitions), cannabis possession might no longer qualify as a 
violation of Penal Code section 4573.6.   
But the work of the voter would still not be done.  From 
that, the voters would then deduce that whether Proposition 64 
affects convictions under Penal Code section 4573.6 will 
ultimately depend on how courts interpret the phrase “the 
possession of which is prohibited under Division 10” (which the 
dissent declines to do here).  More specifically, they would 
understand that if the courts ultimately side with the Fenton’s 
line of analysis (see ante, at pp. 28–29), then criminal 
convictions under Penal Code section 4573.6 would be 
prohibited under most circumstances, but if courts side with 
Taylor’s line of analysis (see ante, at pp. 29–30) criminal 
convictions under Penal Code section 4573.6 would remain 
unaffected by Proposition 64.  
While the dissent has come up with an intricate 
interpretation, we do not think it is the most reasonable 
interpretation of the initiative. (See People v. Jones (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 1142, 1150 (Jones) [when faced with ambiguous 
statutory language, our duty is to discern “the most reasonable 
reading of” the law].)  Simply put, we are dubious that when 
voters were told Proposition 64’s new legalization provision 
would have no effect on laws regulating possession of cannabis 
in prison, they would have understood that language to require 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
the complex  series of deductions and statutory cross-references 
that the dissent’s interpretation is built upon.  (See Valencia, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 370, 371 [while voters are presumed to 
“ ‘study and understand the content of complex initiative 
measures’ ” “it is unreasonable to presume that the voters had 
such a ‘degree of thoroughness’ that they . . . analyzed various 
provisions using the acumen of a legal professional”].)  We do 
not read the language, “Section 11362.1 does not amend, repeal, 
affect, restrict, or preempt . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [l]aws pertaining to 
smoking or ingesting cannabis . . .”  (§ 11362.45(d)) as meaning, 
as the dissent seems to read it:  “We hereby (might) do away 
with the more serious criminal sanctions for cannabis 
possession in a penal setting under Penal Code section 4573.6, 
but people in prison may continue to be prosecuted and receive 
shorter sentences pursuant to Penal Code section 4573.8.”  If 
Proposition 64 were truly intended to have no effect on 
possessory offenses under Penal Code section 4573.8, but 
potentially preclude possessory offenses under Penal Code 
section 4573.6, we would expect the text to say so in a less 
convoluted manner.17   
 
17  
The dissent finds it significant that while two published 
appellate decisions have concluded that Health and Welfare 
Code section 11362.45(d) operates to preserve cannabis 
convictions under Penal Code section 4573.6 (see Perry, supra, 
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 896; Herrera, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 994–995, rev. granted), the Attorney General did not 
expressly rely on that argument here and his briefing appears 
to leave open whether cannabis possession remains chargeable 
under that provision.  (See conc. & dis. opn., Kruger, J., post, at 
pp. 8–9.)  At oral argument, however, the Attorney General 
clarified that the People do believe cannabis possession remains 
a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6, citing the Sixth 
 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
The dissent’s reading of section 11362.45(d) would also 
have curious consequences regardless of how our courts 
ultimately interpret the language in Penal Code section 4573.6 
(which again, the dissent has declined to take a position on).   
Under the view espoused in Taylor, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 115, 
review granted, cannabis possession, regardless of the 
defendant’s age, would remain a violation of Penal Code section 
4573.6 because division 10 still prohibits possession under some 
circumstances.  (See ante, at pp. 29–30.)  But under the view 
espoused in Fenton, only inmates under the age of 21 could be 
prosecuted under Penal Code section 4573.6, and therefore 
inmates under the age of 21 would face harsher felony treatment 
for possession of cannabis than inmates over the age of 21.18  
This means that if the dissent’s theory ultimately came to 
fruition, culminating in the application of Fenton, 20-year-old 
inmates (or any 20 year old who happens to be on prison 
grounds) could be prosecuted under Penal Code section 4573.6, 
 
District’s decision in Taylor, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 115 (see ante 
at pp. 29–30).  Having embraced Taylor’s conclusion that 
cannabis possession remains a violation of Penal Code section 
4573.6, we find little significance in the fact that the Attorney 
General did not expressly approve of an alternative legal theory 
that results in the same outcome.    
18  
As discussed above, Fenton, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 
concluded that Penal Code section 4573 (which includes the 
same operational language as Penal Code section 4573.6) 
applies only when the circumstances of defendant’s possession 
would independently violate a  provision in  division 10.  (See 
ante, at pp. 28–29.)  Section 11357, in turn, retains prohibitions 
on possession by persons under the age of 21 (see § 11357, subd. 
(a)), meaning that possession by such persons would violate a 
provision in division 10.  Thus, under Fenton, persons under the 
age of 21 could still be prosecuted under Penal Code section 
4573.6. 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
but 21 year olds could not.  We find it unlikely that the voters 
would have understood the text of sections 11362.45(d) and 
11357 to mean that a 20-year-old inmate found in possession of 
cannabis would remain chargeable under Penal Code section 
4573.6, but a 21-year-old inmate — perhaps in the same 
correctional facility and even sharing the same cell — who 
engaged in the same conduct would not.  Indeed, such an 
outcome, particularly punishing less mature inmates more 
harshly than more mature inmates, would seem to make little 
sense in a penological setting.19  So in the end, the dissent’s 
interpretation either ends in the same place as the majority view 
(albeit, through a more winding road) or would mean that 
possession of cannabis in prison by persons under the age of 21 
would face harsher felony treatment than persons over the age 
of 21. 
It is true that the amendments Proposition 64 made to 
division 10 have created tension between the “no effect” 
principle set forth in Health and Safety Code section 
11362.45(d) and Penal Code section 4573.6, subdivision (a)’s 
reference to controlled substances “the possession of which is 
prohibited under Division 10.”  When faced with such ambiguity, 
however, our task is “ ‘to identify the interpretation that best 
effectuates the [voters’] intent.’ ”  (Rossa v. D.L. Falk 
 
19  
While the dissent  contends “the possibility that 
Proposition 64 affected charging under Penal Code section 
4573.6 is not so far-fetched that we can dismiss it out of hand”  
(conc. & dis. opn., Kruger, J., post, at p. 13), it offers no 
justification for why the electorate would want to punish 
younger people more harshly for cannabis offenses in prison  
than more mature people.  (See Jones, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 
1150 [when interpreting ambiguous language, court’s role is to 
ascertain “the most reasonable reading of” the law].) 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
Construction, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 392; see Lungren v. 
Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [“The intent prevails over 
the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform 
to the spirit of the act”].)  In this case, we think a more plausible 
conclusion is that when voters read language stating that the 
newly added statute legalizing adult possession of cannabis in 
most situations would have no effect on laws prohibiting 
possession of cannabis in prison, they would have understood 
that language as an assurance that Proposition 64 would not 
affect any preexisting laws prohibiting possession of cannabis in 
prison.  (See Perry, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 895–896; 
Herrera, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 995, rev. granted.)       
Indeed, as far as we are aware, no court has ever 
concluded (nor has any party ever argued) that voters would 
construe section 11362.45(d)’s reference to Proposition 64’s 
central legalization provision, but not to the conforming 
amendments made to section 11357, as a signal that the 
initiative was intended to have different effects on convictions 
under Penal Code section 4573.6 versus those under Penal Code 
section 4573.8.  Or rather, that the initiative might have 
different effects on those two provisions depending on how our 
courts ultimately interpret the language of Penal Code section 
4573.6.  By offering an interpretation that no other court or 
party has ever articulated, it seems it is the dissent that has 
“step[ped] out on its own.”  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, 
at p. 9.)          
c. Defendants’ policy arguments 
Defendants also raise a series of policy-related arguments, 
contending that the consequences of continuing to treat 
possession of small amounts of cannabis in prison as a violation 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
of Penal Code section 4573.6 is inconsistent with the public’s 
evolving attitude toward the drug and its “changing views about 
the societal costs of incarceration.”  (See, e.g., Prop. 215, as 
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) [decriminalizing 
possession of cannabis possession if the person has a physician’s 
oral or written recommendation]; Stats. 2010, ch. 708, § 1 
[reclassifying possession of less than 28.5 grams of cannabis as 
an infraction]; Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 
6, 2012) [removing three strikes life sentences for those 
committing nonviolent felonies]; Prop. 47, as approved by voters, 
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) [reducing certain drug-related and 
theft-related offenses that previously were felonies or wobbler 
offenses]; Prop. 57, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 
2016) [reducing prison terms for nonviolent offenders by 
advancing parole consideration dates].)  They note that while 
possession of cannabis is now generally legal outside the 
confines of prison, the Attorney General’s interpretation would 
subject inmates (and potentially anyone else on prison grounds) 
to two to four years of imprisonment for engaging in that same 
conduct when inside a custodial facility.  Adding to the severity, 
for many inmates found in possession of cannabis, a section 
4573.6 offense can constitute an in-custody second strike, 
resulting in a consecutive sentence adding anywhere from four 
to eight years of incarceration to their present term.  This is 
likely to be a common result given that Penal Code section 
4573.6 involves conduct committed on the grounds of a 
correctional facility.  The present case is illustrative.  As the 
result of strike enhancements, two of the five defendants 
received six-year consecutive sentences for possessing small 
amounts of cannabis, while a third defendant received a four-
year consecutive sentence.  (See ante, at p. 3, fn. 4.)  In Herrera, 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
43 
supra, 52 Cal.App.5th 982, review granted, the defendant was 
punished even more harshly, receiving an eight-year prison 
term after being found in possession of less than one gram of 
cannabis.  (See id. at pp. 985–986.) 
We are sympathetic to the view that section 11362.45(d) 
creates extreme disparity between how our legal system treats 
the possession of cannabis generally versus the possession of 
such a substance inside a correctional facility.  That is also true 
of many other substances, including alcohol.  (See Pen. Code, § 
4573.8 [unauthorized possession of alcohol in prison constitutes 
a felony].)  Some may well view an eight-year prison sentence 
for the possession of less than one gram of cannabis (one gram 
is the approximate weight of a single paper clip or a quarter 
teaspoon of sugar) as unduly harsh.  The wisdom of those policy 
judgments, however, are not relevant to our interpretation of 
the statutory language.  (See Superior Court v. County of 
Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“The judiciary, in reviewing 
statutes . . ., may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the 
policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional 
prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations 
in enacting laws is a legislative function”].)  Rather, our role is 
limited to determining the most reasonable construction of 
Proposition 64.  For the reasons set forth above, we believe 
section 11362.45(d) is most reasonably construed to leave in 
place the prohibitions against cannabis possession in prison.    
Our interpretation notwithstanding, prosecutors of course 
retain discretion whether a person found in possession of a small 
quantity of cannabis on prison grounds warrants felony 
treatment.  (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 477 
[“Prosecutors have broad discretion to decide whom to charge, 
and for what crime. . . . ‘[A] district attorney’s enforcement 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
authority includes the discretion either to prosecute or to decline 
to prosecute an individual when there is probable cause to 
believe he has committed a crime’ ”].)  As defendants note, “there 
are already [prison] regulations in place . . . to punish and deter 
this conduct.”  Cannabis possession in prison remains classified 
as a serious rules violation that is subject to a custody credit 
forfeiture of between 121–150 days (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 
§ 3323, subd. (d)(7)), which effectively translates into an 
additional four to five month jail sentence.  Such conduct can 
also result in substantial loss of visitation rights, including up 
to three months of no visitation and three additional months of 
no contact visitation for a first offense, with increasing loss of 
visitation rights with each consecutive offense.  (See Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 15, § 3315, subd. (f).)  Moreover, depending on the 
nature of the defendant’s sentence, a rules violation involving 
the possession of cannabis could also impact parole eligibility.  
(See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281, subd. (c)(6) [circumstances 
tending to show unsuitability for parole for life prisoners include 
“Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious 
misconduct in prison or jail”].)     
In cases where prosecutors do elect to pursue criminal 
punishment, they may consider a charge under Penal Code 
section 4573.8, which carries a lower sentence than Penal Code 
section 4573.6.20  (See ante, at p. 7; see also Whalum, supra, 50 
Cal.App.5th at p. 5, rev. granted [“As cannabis is a drug and a 
 
20  
The Attorney General appears to agree with this 
suggestion, arguing that while possession of cannabis in prison 
remains chargeable under either Penal Code section 4573.6 or 
Penal Code section 4573.8, “going forward [such conduct] might 
be better charged . . . as a violation of Penal Code section 
4573.8.”    
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
controlled substance regulated in division 10 of the Health and 
Safety Code [citations], both statutes have been used to convict 
prisoners 
who 
possesses 
cannabis” 
(italics 
omitted)].)  
Alternatively, depending on the defendant’s circumstances, a 
prosecutor might recommend a disposition that does not require 
a prison term.  (See Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(4)  [“Nothing in 
this subdivision shall be construed to prevent other dispositions 
authorized by law, including pretrial diversion, deferred entry 
of judgment, or an order granting probation pursuant to Section 
1203.1”].)  Similarly, in cases where a defendant is convicted 
under Penal Code section 4573.6 and has a prior strike (as most 
of the defendants here did), the prosecution may move to dismiss 
the strike allegation, or the trial court may elect to do so on its 
own motion.  (See Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (d)(2), 1385, subd. 
(a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.)  Finally, in cases 
where the defendant is already serving a sentence for a prior 
conviction under Penal Code section 4573.6, the prosecution or 
prison officials might recommend that the court recall the 
sentence previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the 
interests of justice pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, 
subdivision (d).  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3076–3076.2.)   
The Legislature, in turn, remains free to revisit whether 
the harm associated with possessing small quantities of 
cannabis in or on the grounds of a correctional facility, conduct 
that is now generally lawful outside the confines of a 
correctional facility, continues to justify the substantial 
penalties set forth in Penal Code section 4573.6.  (See Voter 
Guide, supra, text of Prop. 64, § 10, p. 210 [permitting the 
Legislature, by majority vote, to reduce the penalties for any 
offense addressed in Prop. 64]; People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 821, 840 [“ ‘The Legislature is responsible for 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
determining which class of crimes deserves certain punishments 
and which crimes should be distinguished from others’ ”]; In re 
Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 [“it is the function of the 
legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishments, 
and that such questions are in the first instance for the 
judgment of the Legislature alone”].) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
  GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
1 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
S256978 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
I agree with the majority that Proposition 64, fairly read, 
did not legalize cannabis possession in California’s prisons and 
jails, even as it either overrode or lifted state and local 
prohibitions on possessing small quantities of cannabis in most 
other places.   
It is, however, a separate question whether, after 
Proposition 64, prosecutors may continue to charge in-prison 
cannabis possession exactly as they have been — that is, by 
choosing at will between two overlapping felony statutes, one of 
which carries steeper penalties than the other, and whose 
coverage is expressly tied to the scope of state-law prohibitions 
applicable outside of prison.  The majority concludes that 
prosecutors are still permitted to choose (though the majority 
encourages them to make their choices wisely).  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 30–31, 43–45.)  Because I do not think the particular 
reasons the majority gives for extending this permission can be 
squared with the statutory text, and because the majority’s 
conclusions on this subject are unnecessary to resolve this case 
in any event, I do not join this portion of the majority opinion. 
I. 
For many decades, Penal Code section 4573.6 (section 
4573.6) served as a general criminal prohibition on possessing 
contraband substances in prisons, jails, and other detention 
facilities.  As originally enacted in 1949, former section 4573.6 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
made it a felony to possess “any narcotics, or drugs . . . , or 
alcoholic beverage” without authorization.  (Stats. 1949, ch. 833, 
§ 3, p. 1583.)  So it remained (with occasional modifications not 
pertinent here) until 1990, when the Legislature determined 
that possession offenses involving controlled substances 
generally should be punished more harshly than the possession 
of other drugs or alcohol.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill 
No. 2863 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1990, Summary Dig., 
pp. 647–648; see Stats. 1990, ch. 1580, § 4, pp. 7555–7556.) 
The result was a new two-part scheme for addressing the 
in-prison possession of contraband substances.  As currently 
written, Penal Code section 4573.8 (section 4573.8) provides the 
basic prohibition, making it a felony to possess “drugs . . . or 
alcoholic beverages” without authorization.  Like violations of 
the old version of section 4573.6, violations of section 4573.8 are 
punishable by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three 
years in state prison.  (Pen. Code, § 18.) 
Section 4573.6, meanwhile, was recast as a prohibition on 
the possession of controlled substances, punishable by a steeper 
triad of penalties:  two, three, or four years in state prison.  By 
its terms, however, the revamped section 4573.6 does not 
purport to punish the possession of all controlled substances; 
rather, it punishes the possession of substances “the possession 
of which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing with Section 
11000) of the Health and Safety Code” — a division otherwise 
known as the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  
(Pen. Code, § 4573.6, subd. (a); see Health & Saf. Code, § 11000.)  
Possession of other drugs — i.e., drugs the possession of which 
is not prohibited by division 10 — may be prosecuted only under 
section 4573.8. 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
3 
Since 1990, both section 4573.8 and section 4573.6 have 
been used to prosecute prisoners found in possession of 
cannabis.  (See People v. Whalum (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1, 5, 
review granted Aug. 12, 2020, S262935.)  Cannabis is, of course, 
a drug within the meaning of the basic prohibition in section 
4573.8.  (Whalum, at p. 5.)  And before Proposition 64, division 
10 also generally prohibited the unauthorized possession of 
cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11357), making 
cannabis a controlled substance “the possession of which is 
prohibited” for purposes of section 4573.6 (Pen. Code, § 4573.6, 
subd. (a)).  (See also Health & Saf. Code, § 11054, subd. (d)(13) 
[provision of div. 10 listing cannabis as a Schedule I 
hallucinogenic drug]; id., § 11007 defining “ ‘[c]ontrolled 
substance’ ” to include Schedule I drugs.)  
Enter Proposition 64, the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult 
Use of Marijuana Act (the Act), which amended division 10 to 
substantially loosen cannabis restrictions.1  In enacting the 
statute, voters found and declared an intent to, among other 
things, “incapacitate the black market” in cannabis “and move 
[cannabis] purchases into a legal structure with strict 
safeguards against children accessing it.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 64, § 2, subd. D., 
p. 178.)  Voters also declared an intent to “alleviate pressure on 
the courts” handling nonviolent drug offenses, “but continue to 
allow prosecutors to charge the most serious [cannabis]-related 
offenses as felonies, while reducing the penalties for minor 
[cannabis]-related offenses.”  (Id., § 2, subd. G., p. 179.) 
 
1  
Like the majority, I use the term “cannabis” instead of the 
original 
statutory 
term 
“marijuana,” 
in 
keeping 
with 
subsequent legislative revisions to the statutory text.  (See maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 1, fn. 1.) 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
4 
Three provisions of Proposition 64 are particularly 
relevant to our analysis here, listed in the order in which they 
appear in the current version of the Health and Safety Code.  
First, voters amended Health and Safety Code section 11357 to 
lift its prohibitions on possessing small amounts of cannabis 
(28.5 grams or less) for most adults (prohibitions remain in place 
for individuals under 21) in most places (prohibitions remain for 
possession on school grounds).  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, as 
amended by Prop. 64, § 8.1.) 
Second, voters added a legalization provision displacing 
other state and local prohibitions on cannabis possession:  
“Subject to” various provisions, including newly added Health 
and Safety Code section 11362.45, “but notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, it shall be lawful under state and local 
law, and shall not be a violation of state or local law, for persons 
21 years of age or older to” possess 28.5 grams of cannabis or 
less.  (Id., § 11362.1, subd. (a)(1), added by Prop. 64, § 4.4.)  This 
legalization provision is also, in effect, a preemption provision; 
through the use of the “notwithstanding” clause, section 11362.1 
signals that “its provisions prevail over all contrary laws 
prohibiting the activities that it legalizes, except as ‘[s]ubject 
to’ ” certain other provisions, including section 11362.45.  
(People v. Whalum, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 7, review 
granted, citing In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 406.) 
Third, voters enacted Health and Safety Code section 
11362.45, 
which 
specifies 
certain 
exceptions 
from 
the 
legalization provision in section 11362.1 for various categories 
of laws.  It provides, as relevant here:  “Section 11362.1 does not 
amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt:  [¶] . . .  [¶] (d) Laws 
pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis or cannabis 
products on the grounds of, or within, any facility or institution 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
5 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation or the Division of Juvenile Justice,” or on the 
grounds of, or within, other detention facilities including local 
jails.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.45, subd. (d), added by Prop. 
64, § 4.8 and amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 27, § 133.)   
The central question presented in this case concerns the 
relationship 
between 
these 
latter 
two 
provisions, 
the 
legalization provision in Health and Safety Code section 11362.1 
and the savings provision in Health and Safety Code section 
11362.45, subdivision (d).  Petitioner Goldy Raybon argues,2 and 
the Court of Appeal below agreed, that the legalization 
provision — which says that “notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, it shall be lawful under state and local law” to 
possess 28.5 grams of cannabis or less (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11362.1, subd. (a)(1)) — by its plain terms overrides any 
statute prohibiting possession of small amounts of cannabis, 
including both sections 4573.6 and 4573.8.  Raybon further 
argues, and the Court of Appeal further agreed, that the savings 
provision in Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, 
subdivision (d), for prisons and other detention facilities does 
not apply because that provision refers only to “[l]aws pertaining 
to smoking or ingesting,” and does not speak of laws pertaining 
to possession.  It follows, in Raybon’s telling, that in-prison 
cannabis possession is now lawful, and because it is lawful, he 
is entitled to have his prior section 4573.6 conviction wiped away 
under Proposition 64’s resentencing provision.  (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11361.8, subd. (a).) 
 
2 
Raybon’s case has been consolidated in this court with that 
of four other petitioners; references in this opinion to arguments 
made by Raybon include those made by the petitioners in the 
consolidated cases.  
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
6 
I agree with the majority that Raybon takes too cramped 
a view of the savings provision, and thus too broad a view of the 
preemptive effect of the legalization provision.  The phrase 
“[l]aws pertaining to smoking or ingesting” (id., § 11362.45, 
subd. (d)) is perhaps inartful.  But, fairly read, the language 
indicates that voters did not wish for section 11362.1’s 
legalization provision to override laws prohibiting cannabis 
possession in prison — laws that bear an obvious and close 
logical relationship to smoking or ingesting cannabis in prison.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–27.) 
The majority goes on, however, to answer the separate 
question whether, after Proposition 64, in-prison cannabis 
possession remains chargeable under section 4573.6.  As the 
majority explains, this question raises an interpretive dilemma.  
Section 4573.6 incorporates the scope of prohibitions in division 
10 of the Health and Safety Code, which Proposition 64 
largely — but not completely — eliminated.  The issue, then, is 
how section 4573.6 applies to the possession of controlled 
substances that division 10 prohibits in some situations but not 
others.  This is an interpretive issue that predates Proposition 
64, but which Proposition 64’s regime of partial legalization has 
brought to the fore, and that has now become the subject of a 
conflict in the Courts of Appeal.  (Compare People v. Fenton 
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 966–967 [identical language in Pen. 
Code, § 4573 criminalizes the possession of substances only to 
the extent possession would be prohibited in like circumstances 
by div. 10] with People v. Taylor (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 115, 131, 
review granted Apr. 14, 2021, S267344 [§ 4573.6 criminalizes 
possession 
of 
substances 
that 
are 
prohibited 
in 
any 
circumstances under div. 10]; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29–31.)   
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
7 
The majority decides to avoid this interpretive dilemma — 
which has not been adequately briefed in this court in any 
event — because it sees in Proposition 64’s savings provision an 
alternative path to answering the charging question.  In the 
majority’s view, Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, 
subdivision (d), means not only that prison laws are exempt 
from the provision of Proposition 64 generally making it lawful 
to possess small quantities of cannabis (id., § 11362.1), but that 
prison laws are not affected in any way by any other provision 
of the Act — not even indirectly, through section 4573.6’s 
express incorporation of other provisions that were amended by 
Proposition 64. 
For a number of reasons, I do not join this portion of the 
majority opinion.  For one thing, it is unnecessary.  We do not 
need to answer questions about post-Proposition 64 charging 
practices to resolve Raybon’s claim concerning his pre-
Proposition 64 conviction.  Raybon’s only argument here is that 
he is entitled to the retroactive dismissal of his prior conviction 
under Proposition 64 because he is a person “who would not 
have been guilty of an offense” had Proposition 64 been in effect 
at the time.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.8, subd. (a).)  As the 
Attorney General notes, it is a full answer to observe that 
Proposition 64 did not legalize cannabis possession in prison; 
whatever indirect effect Proposition 64 may have had on future 
prosecutions under section 4573.6, cannabis possession remains 
punishable as a felony under section 4573.8.  Because Raybon 
would have been guilty of that offense even had Proposition 64 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
8 
been in effect at the time, he is not entitled to the only form of 
relief he has sought in this proceeding.3 
The majority’s alternative resolution of the issue also 
depends entirely on an argument about the import of 
Proposition 64’s savings provision that none of the parties have 
made.  While the Attorney General relies on the savings 
provision to argue that Proposition 64 did not legalize cannabis 
possession 
in 
prison, 
he 
expressly 
acknowledges 
that 
Proposition 64 might still “have an effect on future charging 
decisions.”  He explains that “due to the removal of certain 
 
3 
Perhaps we would have needed to address the future of 
section 4573.6 if Raybon had asked the court for resentencing 
based on the differences between section 4573.6’s relatively 
heavier penalties and section 4573.8’s relatively lighter ones.  
(See Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.8, subd. (a) [authorizing 
resentencing for a person “who would have been guilty of a 
lesser offense under [Proposition 64] had that act been in effect 
at the time of the offense”].)  But Raybon did not do so, instead 
opting to seek outright dismissal.  There is therefore no need for 
us to decide here whether in-prison cannabis possession remains 
punishable under section 4573.6 as well as section 4573.8.  Nor 
is there any reason for us to address any other interpretive issue 
that might arise in a case involving a request for resentencing 
under section 4573.8, including whether section 4573.8 qualifies 
as a lesser offense of section 4573.6.  (Cf. maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 32.)  
 
The majority observes that it is more efficient to reach this 
question here; were we instead to reserve it, Raybon and others 
like him would have to file new petitions seeking this more 
modest form of relief.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 33–34, fn. 15.)  
True.  But were they to do so, we would presumably be able to 
address their statutory entitlement to that form of relief in a 
case in which the relevant arguments had been appropriately 
raised and fully litigated, which is not the case here. 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
9 
prohibitions from division 10 of the Health and Safety Code, 
going forward, the possession of cannabis in a custodial 
institution might be better charged prospectively as a violation 
of Penal Code section 4573.8 (which prohibits the possession of 
drugs) rather than of Penal Code section 4573.6 (which prohibits 
the possession of controlled substances ‘the possession of which 
is prohibited by Division 10’).”  Despite ample encouragement 
from the two published appellate decisions adopting arguments 
much like the majority’s (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31–32 & 
fn. 14 [citing cases]), the Attorney General has studiously 
avoided arguing that Proposition 64’s savings provision for 
prison-related laws means that prosecutors may treat section 
4573.6 as though it were partly suspended in amber, preserving 
division 10’s cannabis-related prohibitions as they existed 
before the proposition passed.  In reaching this conclusion 
anyway, the majority steps out on its own. 
But the most fundamental reason I do not join the 
majority on this issue — and the crux of our disagreement 
here — is that the majority’s resolution of the issue depends on 
a reading of the savings provision that departs from its plain 
text.  As noted, Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, 
subdivision (d), is written as an exception to Proposition 64’s 
legalization 
and 
preemption 
provision, 
providing 
that 
“Section 11362.1 does not amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or 
preempt” prison laws.  The majority reads this language as 
though it instead provided that the Act — as a whole — should 
not be understood to amend or affect laws relating to in-prison 
cannabis.  (E.g., maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40–41.)  This subtle but 
important substitution is what leads the majority to conclude 
that no matter how section 4573.6 “might apply with respect to 
other controlled substances,” the “unique language” of the 
savings provision in section 11362.45, subdivision (d), requires 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
10 
applying Health and Safety Code division 10’s restrictions on 
cannabis precisely as they existed before Proposition 64.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 30.) 
The “unique language” of the savings provision is more 
limited than the majority acknowledges.  The provision does not 
preserve prison-related laws from the Act in its entirety.  
(Accord, maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40–41.)  Rather, by its terms, the 
savings provision carves prison laws out from only the 
legalization provision in Health and Safety Code section 
11362.1, 
which 
had 
made 
cannabis 
possession 
lawful 
notwithstanding state and local laws to the contrary.  This 
means prison laws are not subject to the preemptive effects of 
section 11362.1.  But it says nothing about other effects that 
other provisions of Proposition 64 might have on the operation 
of prison-related laws such as section 4573.6.  And it is 
ultimately the operation of those other provisions — in 
particular, the dramatically narrowed scope of restrictions on 
cannabis possession in Health and Safety Code section 11357 — 
that matters here. 
Recall that section 4573.6 was written in a manner that 
explicitly ties its prohibition on in-prison possession of 
controlled substances to whether possession of that controlled 
substance is prohibited outside of prison under division 10.  
Recall also that before Proposition 64, it was understood that 
former section 4573.6 could be used to prosecute in-prison 
cannabis possession because division 10 (in Health & Saf. Code, 
former § 11357) generally prohibited cannabis possession 
without authorization.  (See People v. Whalum, supra, 50 
Cal.App.5th at p. 5, review granted.)  Now, finally, recall that 
one of the many changes made by Proposition 64 was to lift the 
prohibitions in section 11357 on the possession of small 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
11 
quantities of cannabis, for most people and in most settings.  
(See ante, at p. 3.) 
Had Proposition 64 repealed all of Health and Safety Code 
division 10’s restrictions on cannabis possession, then, as a 
textual matter, there could be no genuine question about 
whether in-prison cannabis possession could be prosecuted 
under section 4573.6.  The answer would be no — possession 
could be punished only under section 4573.8, and the savings 
provision in Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, 
subdivision (d), would have nothing to do with it.  The savings 
provision is not more relevant because Proposition 64 stopped 
short of full repeal. 
The majority acknowledges the textual limitations of the 
savings provision, but dismisses them as a technicality.  Yes, 
Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, subdivision (d), does 
no more than carve prison laws out from preemption through 
Proposition 64’s affirmative legalization provision, Health and 
Safety Code section 11362.1.  But, the majority argues, the 
amended Health and Safety Code section 11357 is a kind of 
legalization provision, too, as are various other provisions of the 
measure.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 35, fn. 16 [arguing that the 
amendments to § 11357 were necessary “to conform to the broad 
legalization pronouncement made in section 11362.1”]; accord, 
People v. Perry (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 885, 894.)  Surely the 
voters who chose to save prison laws from preemption under 
section 11362.1 would also have wished to save prison 
possession laws from the indirect effects of cannabis legalization 
in these other provisions.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 35–36.) 
The initial difficulty with this argument is that there is 
nothing in the materials before us to support this set of 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
12 
assumptions about voter intent.  Had voters intended to wall off 
prison laws from Proposition 64 entirely, it would have been 
easy enough to say so.  Instead of referring specifically to Health 
and Safety Code section 11362.1, the savings provision in 
Health and Safety Code section 11362.45 could have been 
written to say that the Act as a whole “does not amend, repeal, 
affect, restrict, or preempt” prison laws, period.  That is not how 
the provision was written, and the ballot materials contain no 
indication that this is how voters would have understood it.  To 
the extent the ballot materials shed any light on voter intent at 
all, they point to a general intent to prescribe more lenient 
treatment for possessing small quantities of cannabis.  While 
the savings provision indicates that voters intended to maintain 
restrictions on cannabis possession in prison, nothing in the 
ballot materials indicates that voters also intended to foreclose 
any possible, limited measure of leniency for individuals 
prosecuted under the harsher of two potentially applicable 
felony statutes forbidding cannabis possession in prisons and 
jails.  
But the difficulty is even greater than attributing this sort 
of unexpressed intent to Proposition 64 voters, because here it 
is not only the voters’ intent that counts; it is also the intent of 
the legislators who enacted the current versions of sections 
4573.6 and 4573.8.  The legislators who enacted the current set 
of prison possession laws deliberately chose to make possession 
of drugs in prison a felony offense punishable by the default 
penalties prescribed in Penal Code section 18, while reserving 
heightened felony punishment for possession of controlled 
substances whose possession would be prohibited under division 
10.  Even if we accepted for argument’s sake that the voters who 
enacted Proposition 64 assumed no aspect of the measure would 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
13 
have an effect on prison possession laws, it is unclear why, in 
the event of a conflict between the two sets of provisions, that 
assumption would or should prevail over legislators’ intent to 
reserve harsher punishment for possession cases where 
possession would also be prohibited outside of prison under 
Health and Safety Code division 10.   
The majority’s remaining justifications for its approach 
focus on what the majority sees as its practical advantages over 
concluding that Proposition 64 did, in fact, affect charging under 
section 4573.6.  The majority worries that the relationship 
between section 4573.6 and Proposition 64 is overly complicated, 
and that giving effect to that relationship could yield some 
“curious” results (maj. opn., ante, at p. 39).  The majority also 
worries about the various additional questions we would need to 
answer, none of which have been briefed here, should a 
defendant in Raybon’s position seek resentencing based on the 
different penalties prescribed in section 4573.6 and section 
4573.8.  None of these points, in my view, justifies refusing to 
read Health and Safety Code section 11362.45, subdivision (d), 
in accordance with its plain text. 
As to the first point, the relationship between Penal Code 
section 4573.6 and Proposition 64 is not, near as I can tell, 
appreciably more complex than issues we have seen in other 
cases concerning the relationship between voter-initiated 
reform measures and preexisting criminal laws.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903; People v. Gonzales 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 858.)  Sometimes statutes are, in fact, 
complicated.  And our cases have recognized that the most 
faithful reading of a statutory scheme is not always the simplest 
one — even when the scheme has been enacted in whole or in 
part by voters.   
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
14 
As to the majority’s second point, the possibility that 
Proposition 64 affected charging under section 4573.6 is not so 
far-fetched that we can dismiss it out of hand.  The practical 
result would be that prosecutors would be limited in most cases 
to charging cannabis possession in prison the same way the 
possession of other drugs or alcohol is charged, instead of 
charging it the same way as the possession of, say, heroin or 
methamphetamines. 
 
That 
result 
creates 
no 
obvious 
inconsistency with the overarching objectives of Proposition 64.   
But to the majority’s final point, I do share many of the 
majority’s concerns about the various questions that could arise 
in future cases concerning the relationship between Proposition 
64 and section 4573.6.  This is precisely why I would not attempt 
to answer these questions here, and would instead await an 
appropriate case where the necessary arguments have been 
briefed and the issues joined.  I write separately here because I 
do not think we should foreclose further exploration of these 
issues by leaning on Proposition 64’s savings provision.  The text 
will not withstand the weight.   
II. 
The practical upshot of the majority opinion is this:  Even 
though the heightened penalties under section 4573.6 are 
directly tied to the scope of prohibitions that were dramatically 
scaled back by Proposition 64, prosecutors may continue to 
charge in-prison cannabis offenses under that provision (at least 
in the absence of further legislation directing otherwise).  For 
individuals previously convicted under section 4573.6 who 
might wish to have their sentences adjusted downward to the 
less harsh penalties prescribed by section 4573.8, any pathway 
that might otherwise have existed for resentencing under 
PEOPLE v. RAYBON 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
15 
current law has been closed off.  All this in a case that did not 
require laying down a rule with these broad consequences.  
Because I do not think the majority’s reasons for reaching 
this result fit with the relevant statutes, and because it is 
unnecessary to resolve the issue in this case in any event, I do 
not join this portion of the majority opinion.  In all other 
respects, I concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J.  
 
I Concur: 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Raybon  
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 36 Cal.App.5th 111 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S256978 
Date Filed:  August 12, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Sacramento 
Judge:  Curtis M. Fiorini 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Paulino G. Durán and Steven Garrett, Public Defenders, David Lynch 
and Leonard K. Tauman, Assistant Public Defenders, for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan, 
State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy 
State Solicitor General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney 
General, Ryan B. McCarroll, Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie A. 
Hokans, Nicholas M. Fogg and Barton Bowers, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
David Lynch 
Assistant Public Defender 
700 H Street, Suite 0270 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 874-6958 
 
Ryan B. McCarroll 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-7668