Title: Shalabi v. City of Fontana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S256665
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LUIS ALEXANDRO SHALABI, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF FONTANA et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S256665 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E069671 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
CIVDS1314694 
 
 
July 12, 2021 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
Groban, and Jenkins concurred.  
 
1 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
S256665 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
The statute of limitations is a law that sets the maximum 
amount of time within which legal proceedings may be initiated.  
As established by Code of Civil Procedure section 12,1 the 
general rule for computing the time by which a plaintiff must 
bring a cause of action is to exclude the first day of the 
limitations period and include the last day.   
A tolling provision suspends the running of a limitations 
period.  When a minor is injured, the statute of limitations for 
any claim arising from the injury is tolled until the minor 
reaches age 18.  (§ 352, subd. (a); Fam. Code, § 6500.)  We 
granted review in this matter to decide whether, in cases in 
which the statute of limitations is tolled based on the plaintiff 
minor’s age, the day after which the tolling period ends is either 
included or excluded in calculating whether an action is timely 
filed within the limitations period.      
Here, the Court of Appeal held, consistent with section 12, 
that a minor’s 18th birthday is excluded in calculating when the 
statute of limitations begins to run.  The appellate court 
acknowledged that this court had reached a different conclusion 
more than a century earlier in Ganahl v. Soher (1884) 
2 Cal.Unrep. 415 (Ganahl I), an unreported Supreme Court 
 
1  
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
decision, but it resolved that Ganahl I was not controlling 
because that decision did not explicitly address the applicability 
of section 12.  (Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 
639, 644 (Shalabi).) 
We agree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that an 
individual’s 18th birthday is excluded when calculating the 
applicable limitations period.  As articulated in section 12, the 
ordinary rule for computation of time excludes the first day and 
includes the last.  We have long held that significant public 
order and security considerations compel a definite and certain 
method of computing time.  Before a given case will be deemed 
to fall outside the general rule, there must be a clearly expressed 
intention that a different method of computation was intended 
and provided for.  No such intent, compelling reason, or direction 
is evident from the relevant statutory language or history.   
We also agree that our decision in Ganahl I, supra, 
2 Cal.Unrep. 415 is not binding, but not for the reason expressed 
by the Court of Appeal.  This court granted hearing in bank in 
Ganahl I and issued a subsequent superseding decision, thereby 
vacating Ganahl I.  And so, although defendants in this case 
now urge us to uphold and not “overrule” the initial decision in 
Ganahl I, there is in fact nothing to uphold or overrule, because 
the former decision never possessed precedential authority.  Nor 
does the reasoning set out in that vacated decision have 
persuasive force.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 3, 2013, plaintiff Luis Alexandro Shalabi 
filed a lawsuit against the City of Fontana and several of its 
police officers (collectively, defendants) asserting a deprivation 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
of civil rights under title 42 United States Code section 1983 
(section 1983 claim).  Plaintiff alleged that on May 14, 2011, one 
of the officers wrongfully shot and killed plaintiff’s father.  
Plaintiff was a minor at the time of his father’s death.      
The parties agreed to a bifurcated bench trial (§ 1048, 
subd. (b)) concerning whether plaintiff’s section 1983 claim was 
barred by the relevant two-year statute of limitations.  The 
parties stipulated to the following facts:  (1) plaintiff’s date of 
birth is December 3, 1993; (2) plaintiff reached the age of 
majority on December 3, 2011; and (3) plaintiff filed his original 
complaint on December 3, 2013.     
The trial court ruled that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred 
because he filed suit one day outside the two-year limitations 
period.  It found that plaintiff’s 18th birthday must be included 
in calculating the limitations period, and, accordingly, plaintiff’s 
lawsuit had to be filed by December 2, 2013.  The court relied on 
the unreported decision in Ganahl I, supra, 2 Cal.Unrep. 415,2 
which, in its analysis, included the date on which the plaintiff 
 
2  
Approximately 1,800 opinions rendered over the course of 
this court’s first six decades were, through inadvertence or 
otherwise, not published in the California Official Reports.  (See 
generally, 1–7 Cal.Unrep. (1913); 1 Cal.Unrep. at p. v 
[describing the history and highlighting “the extent to which the 
unreported decisions have been cited by courts and legal 
writers,” and asserting that “the intrinsic value revealed in the 
opinions themselves . . . have placed the question of their 
importance to the practitioner beyond all controversy”].)  Most 
of these Supreme Court cases set out in the seven volumes of 
California Unreported Cases remain precedential unless and 
until overruled.  (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849, fn. 18; 
In re Little’s Estate (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 40, 43 [Supreme Court 
cases that have not been ordered officially reported are 
nonetheless binding upon lower courts].)   
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
reached the age of majority in calculating when the applicable 
statute of limitations period commenced after tolling during 
minority ended.        
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed.  
(Shalabi, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th 639.)  It held that plaintiff’s 
18th birthday should have been excluded pursuant to section 12 
in calculating when the statute of limitations period started 
running after tolling during minority ended.  (Shalabi, at 
pp. 643–644.)  It also determined that the 1884 opinion in 
Ganahl I was not controlling in light of that decision’s failure to 
address section 12.  (Shalabi, at p. 644.)  “Because [Ganahl I] 
did not cite section 12 or explain how the court could create an 
exception to a law created by the Legislature,” the Court of 
Appeal reasoned, “we conclude [Ganahl I] is not binding 
authority on the issue of how to calculate time under section 12.”  
(Ibid.)  Counting two years from December 4, 2011, the day after 
plaintiff’s birthday, the appellate court held that plaintiff’s 
complaint was timely filed.  (Id. at p. 643.)  It observed that “[i]f 
the Legislature prefers to include a plaintiff’s birthday when 
calculating time in cases in which the statute of limitations has 
been tolled awaiting the plaintiff’s 18th birthday, then the 
Legislature — not this court — must create that exception.”  (Id. 
at p. 644.)    
We granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A section 1983 cause of action is subject to the forum 
state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts.  (Wallace 
v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 387 (Wallace).)  California’s statute 
of limitations governing a personal injury claim is two years.  
(§ 335.1 [“Within two years:  An action . . . for the death of . . . an 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another”].)  
Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues and when 
the statute of limitations begins to run on a federal civil rights 
cause of action.  (Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park (9th Cir. 
1998) 159 F.3d 374, 379 (Cabrera).)  Plaintiff’s federal civil 
rights cause of action based on his father’s death accrued at the 
time of death.  (Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen (10th Cir. 2013) 710 
F.3d 1168, 1176.) 
A tolling provision suspends the running of a limitations 
period.  We have analogized tolling to “the stopping and 
restarting of a clock.”  (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 
507.)  State law controls the tolling of the statute of limitations 
for a federal civil rights claim.  (Wallace, supra, 549 U.S. at 
p. 394.)  In California, when a minor is injured, the statute of 
limitations is tolled during minority and until the minor turns 
18.  (§ 352, subd. (a) [“If a person entitled to bring an action 
. . . is, at the time the cause of action accrued . . . under the age 
of majority . . . , the time of the disability is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action”]; Fam. Code, § 6500 
[“A minor is an individual who is under 18 years of age.  The 
period of minority is calculated from the first minute of the day 
on which the individual is born to the same minute of the 
corresponding day completing the period of minority”]; In re 
Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 845 [“the period of minority 
terminates on the first minute of one’s 18th birthday”].)   
Thus, the two-year statute of limitations governing 
plaintiff’s federal civil rights cause of action, triggered by the 
death of his father, was tolled while plaintiff was a minor.  We 
now turn to the question of whether plaintiff’s 18th birthday — 
the day after the tolling period ended — should be included or 
excluded in calculating plaintiff’s final date by which to file suit. 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
Section 12 sets forth “the ordinary rule of computation of 
time.”  (Ley v. Dominguez (1931) 212 Cal. 587, 594 (Ley).)  This 
section provides in full:  “The time in which any act provided by 
law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and 
including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is 
also excluded.”  (§ 12.)  This general statutory rule was first 
codified in 1850 as section 307 of the Original Practice Act3 and 
has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1872.  (§ 12; see 
Cabrera, supra, 159 F.3d at p. 379.) 
Prior to the enactment of the general rule, the cases were 
not in agreement regarding whether the first day was included 
or excluded in computing a time period.  (People v. Clayton 
(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 440, 443 (Clayton).)  “In early common 
law cases, where the computation was to be made from the doing 
of an act, the usual practice was to include the day when that 
act was done.  [Citations.]  In later cases, however, this rule of 
construction was gradually repudiated and the rule excluding 
the first day of the period was adopted.  [Citation.]  For more 
than two centuries, however, the cases were in conflict and there 
was no fixed rule.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)  Thereafter, Lord 
Mansfield set forth a rule that was dependent upon the context 
and subject matter of each case.  (Ibid.)  The general statutory 
rule was subsequently enacted to resolve and foreclose any 
otherwise inherent uncertainty in computing a time period 
based on the circumstances of each case.  (Id. at p. 444.) 
 
3  
Section 307 of the Original Practice Act similarly 
provided:  “The time within which an act is done, as herein 
provided, shall be computed by excluding the first day and 
including the last; if the last day be Sunday, it shall be 
excluded.”  (Stats. 1850, ch. 142, § 307, p. 455.) 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
A uniform rule governing the method of computing time 
promotes clarity and stability.  (See Ley, supra, 212 Cal. at 
pp. 594–595.)  In Ley, we explained that “[t]he gravest 
considerations of public order and security require that the 
method of computing time be definite and certain.”  (Id. at 
p. 594.)  In keeping with these important policy concerns, we 
held that “[b]efore a given case will be deemed to come under an 
exception to the general rule the intention must be clearly 
expressed that a different method of computation was provided 
for.”  (Id. at p. 595; see also In re Rodriguez (1964) 60 Cal.2d 822, 
825–826.)  Put differently:  “Consistent with the need for 
certainty in the method of computing time, a case will not be 
found to come under an exception to the general rule unless 
there is a clear expression of provision for a different method of 
computation.”  (DeLeon v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 
33 Cal.3d 456, 460–461.)  
In Ley, we rejected the argument that section 12 did not 
apply in calculating when a 30-day publication period specified 
in a city charter began to run.  (Ley, supra, 212 Cal. at p. 594.)  
We elucidated:  “The express language . . . of the charter is that 
no ordinance shall go into effect ‘until’ the expiration of thirty 
days from its publication.  Properly interpreted, this would seem 
to mean thirty days after the publication, which necessarily 
excludes the day of publication.  [¶]  We can see no reason for 
applying to the above charter provisions a method of reckoning 
different from and an exception to the ordinary method of 
computation.”  (Ibid.)   
Subsequent to our decision in Ley, appellate courts have 
held that “[a]bsent a compelling reason for a departure, [section 
12] governs the calculation of all statutorily prescribed time 
periods.”  (In re Anthony B. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 677, 682; see 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
ibid. [“Our Supreme Court has encouraged the use of uniform 
rules so that the method of computing time not be a source of 
doubt or confusion”]; see also Latinos Unidos de Napa v. City of 
Napa (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 [“Defendants identify 
no clear expression of intent, or compelling reason, to except the 
computation of the [statutory limitations period] from the 
general rule of . . . section 12”]; Clayton, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 445, fn. omitted [“Given the unambiguous language of [the 
statute of limitations], the uniform method adopted by the 
Legislature for computing days within which an act provided by 
law is to be done, and our Supreme Court’s encouragement that 
the general rule be used absent a clear intent to the contrary, 
we hold that the 10-day period . . . is to be computed by 
excluding the [first] day”]; Mox, Inc. v. Leventhal (1928) 
89 Cal.App. 253, 256 (Mox) [section 12 “is a general rule for 
computing time, applicable to any act which is required by law, 
except where a statute specifically otherwise provides”].)  In 
Wixted v. Fletcher (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 706 (Wixted), the Court 
of Appeal aptly summarized the reason for the rule as follows:  
“[N]ot only do ‘considerations of public order and security 
require that the method of computing time be definite and 
certain,’ but some measure of uniformity in the law is achieved 
by adherence to the principles declared in [Ley].  Thus, for years 
the rule of the first day’s exclusion has been applied in a variety 
of procedural situations . . . .  There are already enough legal 
subtleties without adding the further refinement that one rule 
of time computation must be applied to certain statutes of 
limitation and still another to procedural situations.”  (Id. at 
p. 709.) 
Defendants argue that an exception to the general first 
day exclusion rule applies when, as here, the plaintiff has the 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
whole of the first day to sue.  They maintain that the law 
recognizes no fractions of a day, and the purpose of section 12’s 
exclusion of the first day is to give parties the full measure of 
days to satisfy statutory deadlines.  Defendants assert that 
when the cause of action accrues on a partially spent day, then 
that day is excluded under section 12; but, they maintain, when 
a cause of action accrues on the first minute of a day, that day 
should be included when calculating the running of the statute 
of limitations.  
We are unpersuaded.  Although defendants claim that 
section 12 was enacted to ensure that fractions of a day are not 
to be counted in calculating the applicable limitations period, no 
such purpose is apparent from the statutory language or 
legislative history.  Instead, as our prior decisions demonstrate, 
the general rule for computing time was adopted to end the 
uncertainty inherent in deciding whether the first day is to be 
included or excluded based on the particular context and subject 
matter of each case.  (See, e.g., Dingley v. McDonald (1899) 
124 Cal. 90, 95 [conflicting decisions concerning whether the 
first day should be included in the computation of time was “set 
at rest by section 12 . . . , which requires the exclusion of the 
first day”]; see also Clayton, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 443 
[observing that “[f]or more than two centuries [prior to the 
enactment of the general rule for computing time], . . . the cases 
were in conflict and there was no fixed rule” regarding whether 
to exclude or include the first day].)  
The Association of Southern California Defense Counsel, 
amicus curiae on behalf of defendants, asserts that interpreting 
section 12 to exclude a plaintiff’s 18th birthday would clash with 
the statutory definition of a year as being 365 days (Gov. Code, 
§ 6803), because a plaintiff would have 366 days to file suit, and 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
thereby “thrust the statutes into inexorable conflict.”  Again, we 
are unconvinced.  It is well settled that, generally speaking, if 
the 365th day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday, that day 
is also excluded, thereby giving a plaintiff more than a “year” in 
which bring an action.  (§§ 12, 12a, subd. (a); see, e.g., Alford v. 
Industrial Acc. Commission (1946) 28 Cal.2d 198, 200; Mox, 
supra, 89 Cal.App. at p. 257.)  We do not discern any serious 
difficulty for the lower courts in calculating such a limitations 
period. 
Amicus curiae also asserts that section 12’s exclusion of 
the first day is “inextricably linked to the law’s refusal to 
recognize fractional days” and that there is no reason to apply 
the general rule when a person attains the age of majority 
because an individual always turns 18 on the first minute of his 
or her birthday.  However, the statute instructs that “[t]he time 
in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by 
excluding the first day . . . .”  (§ 12, italics added.)  It does not 
limit the first day exclusion rule to partially spent days.  If the 
Legislature wished to exclude only fractional days, it could have 
easily so stated.  In light of the plain language of the statute, 
which has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1872 and 
does not limit its application to a first “partial” day, we cannot 
conclude that the first day to sue should be exempted from the 
general rule, and therefore counted, when it is a “whole” day.  
Moreover, the legislative history indicates that the general rule 
for computing time was enacted to achieve uniformity and 
certainty.  In our view, the significant goals of ensuring order 
and security weigh in favor of applying the general rule 
governing computing time to calculating the applicable statute 
of limitations period after tolling based on minority ends.  
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
We continue to adhere to our holding in Ley, that an 
exception to the ordinary rule for computation of time must be 
clearly expressed in the limitations statute.  (Ley, supra, 
212 Cal. at p. 595.)  Turning to the statutory provisions at issue 
in this case, we perceive no such expression of an intention to 
depart from the general rule for computation of time.  The 
statute of limitations regarding a wrongful death claim simply 
requires that the action be brought “[w]ithin two years.”  
(§ 335.1.)  It is well settled that when the limitations provision 
requires that an action be brought “within” a specified time, the 
first day of that period is excluded, as required by section 12.  
(See, e.g., Scoville v. Anderson (1901) 131 Cal. 590, 594 
[excluding first day in calculating whether an action was taken 
“within a month”]; Wixted, supra, 192 Cal.App.2d at pp. 707–
709.)  Similarly, the language of the age-based tolling statute 
provides no indication that the Legislature intended to include 
the first day after the tolling period ends in calculating the 
statute of limitations deadline to file suit.  (§ 352, subd. (a).)  
Section 352, subdivision (a) provides that the time during which 
a plaintiff is under the age of majority “is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action.”  Defendants do not 
identify a clear expression of intent concerning the applicable 
limitations period or tolling provision sufficient to justify 
excepting the computation of that time from the general rule of 
section 12. 
Indeed, the legislative history of section 352 most 
reasonably supports an argument that section 12, properly 
construed, excludes the day a minor reaches the age of majority.  
In enacting this tolling statute in 1872, the Legislature was 
focused on preserving the rights of children during minority.  
(Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1968) 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
68 Cal.2d 599, 602 [explaining that § 352, subd. (a) “effectuate[s] 
a deep and long recognized principle of the common law and of 
this state:  children are to be protected during their minority 
from the destruction of their rights by the running of the statute 
of limitations”]; Barker v. Garza (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1449, 
1462 [recognizing “the strong public policy in protecting minors 
from the sometimes harsh application of statutes of 
limitations”]; see also Inclusion or Exclusion of First and Last 
Day for Purposes of Statute of Limitations (1952) 20 A.L.R.2d 
1249, § 2 [“The general policy of the law to protect rights and 
prevent forfeitures has also been found to be applicable to the 
computation of time under statutes of limitation”].)  In West 
Shield Investigations & Security Consultants v. Superior Court 
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 935, the Court of Appeal succinctly 
described the rationale for the age-based tolling provision as 
follows:  “ ‘Because a minor does not have the understanding or 
experience of an adult, and because a minor may not bring an 
action except through a guardian . . . special safeguards are 
required to protect the minor’s right of action.’  [Citation.]  
Therefore, statutes of limitations are tolled to protect the 
minor’s rights from being destroyed during the period of 
disability.  [Citations.]  The tolling provision is not easily 
overcome.”  (Id. at p. 947.)   
Consistent with the principles effectuated by section 352, 
subdivision (a), by allowing a minor to exclude the first day on 
which he or she could personally sue (i.e., without a guardian) — 
the individual’s 18th birthday — from the applicable limitations 
period, the law better serves to protect a minor’s rights.  Not 
only does such a construction ensure that a plaintiff minor 
receives the same first day exclusion benefit as a plaintiff adult 
whose cause of action has accrued, but it also avoids creating an 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
exception to the generally applicable rule that could become a 
source of confusion and error.  Defendants do not identify any 
similarly significant objectives that would be achieved by 
allowing a different method of computation under the 
circumstances.    
Citing our unreported decision in Ganahl I, defendants 
maintain that this court has already concluded that an 
exception to the general rule for computation of time applies 
after the tolling period based on minority ends and that the 
Court of Appeal erred by not following Ganahl I.  Defendants 
recount that in Ganahl I, Henry Gordon Ganahl (Gordon) 
claimed title to land that had been owned by Henry Ganahl, who 
died intestate.  (Ganahl I, supra, 2 Cal.Unrep. at pp. 415–416.)  
The cited decision held that Gordon’s lawsuit was barred by the 
statute of limitations.  (Id. at p. 416.)  It observed that Gordon 
became of age “the first minute of the eleventh day of April, 
1876,” and therefore “he was entitled to commence an action for 
the recovery of whatever interest he had in the land within the 
period of five years thereafter, but not after the expiration of 
that period.”  (Ibid.)  The opinion reasoned:  “In computing the 
period of five years we must include the eleventh day of April, 
1876, because, as the plaintiff in question attained his majority 
the first minute of that day, he had the whole of the day in which 
to sue; and computing that as the first day of the five years, the 
whole period of five years expired with the tenth day of April, 
1881, and the action not having been commenced until the 
eleventh of April, 1881, was barred by the provisions of the 
statute.”  (Ibid.)  Although section 12 was enacted more than a 
decade before the 1884 Ganahl I decision, the opinion in Ganahl 
I does not consider the role of, or even mention, this general rule 
governing computation of time.   
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
Putting aside the question of whether the Ganahl I 
decision stands for the proposition that, notwithstanding 
section 12, the day after minority tolling ends is included in 
calculating the applicable limitations period, we conclude that 
Ganahl I has no precedential authority.  As defendants 
acknowledge, we granted the plaintiffs’ “Petition for Hearing in 
Bank” in that case and subsequently filed a superseding opinion, 
Ganahl v. Soher (1885) 68 Cal. 95 (Ganahl II).   In Ganahl II, we 
again upheld the trial court’s ruling against Gordon — but this 
time on the basis of a three-year, rather that the five-year, 
statute of limitations.  (Id. at p. 96 [“At the time of sale the 
plaintiff, Henry Gordon Ganahl, was a minor, but he attained 
his majority more than three years before the commencement of 
this action”].)  Unlike the initial decision in Ganahl I, our 
subsequent opinion in Ganahl II did not mention, let alone 
address, whether Gordon’s 21st birthday was included in 
calculating the applicable limitations period.  (Compare Ganahl 
I, supra, 2 Cal.Unrep. at p. 416 with Ganahl II, supra, 68 Cal. 
at p. 96.) 
The constitutional provisions applicable at the time of the 
Ganahl proceedings make clear that our decision in Ganahl I 
was vacated as a matter of law and has never had any 
precedential authority.  Article VI, section 2 of the California 
Constitution of 1879 established the court’s structural practice 
(abandoned five decades later) of operating in two three-justice 
“departments,” each with “the power to hear and determine 
causes.”  This section provided that either the Chief Justice or 
any four justices may, “before or after judgment by a 
department, order a case to be heard in bank.”  (Ibid.)  
Significantly, this section also specified that an order for a 
hearing in bank “shall have the effect to vacate and set aside the 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
[prior] judgment.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Thus, Ganahl I is 
not — and never has been — a binding decision of this court.     
Indeed, our case law, both well before and at the time this 
court ordered hearing in bank following Ganahl I, reflects this 
fundamental rule of appellate procedure.  In Argenti v. City of 
San Francisco (1860) 16 Cal. 255, Chief Justice Field explained, 
in the course of denying rehearing in that matter:  “[W]hen a 
rehearing is granted, the opinion previously delivered falls, 
unless reaffirmed after the reargument.  Until such 
reaffirmance, the opinion never acquires the force of an 
adjudication, and is entitled to no more consideration than the 
briefs of counsel.  The opinion subsequent to the reargument 
constitutes the exposition of the law applicable to the facts of the 
case, and the only one to which the attention of the Court can be 
directed.”  (Id. at p. 276.)  Likewise, in Gray v. Cotton (1913) 
166 Cal. 130, 138, we held that it was error for the appellants to 
rely on a department decision “which never became final, but 
was vacated by an order directing a hearing in Bank,” and “[t]he 
court in Bank subsequently reached a different conclusion from 
that announced in department” (id. at pp. 138–139).  And in 
Miller & Lux v. James (1919) 180 Cal. 38, 48, we explained that 
an initial decision rendered on appeal was vacated by the order 
granting a rehearing.  We noted that even if the order granting 
such rehearing limited the argument to a specific issue, “the 
order, nevertheless, vacated the previous opinion and judgment 
and set the whole matter at large.”  (Ibid.)4   
 
4  
See also In re Jessup (1889) 81 Cal. 408, 462 [when the 
court grants rehearing, this “put[s] the case in the same position 
as if it had never been decided or submitted”]; Poppe v. Athern 
 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
As summarized by Witkin:  “An order granting a rehearing 
vacates the decision and any opinion filed in the case and sets 
the cause at large in the Supreme Court.  (Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 8.536(e).)  The old opinion, though previously printed in the 
advance sheets and California Reporter or Pacific Reporter, is 
wholly superseded, and never appears in the final official 
volumes of California Reports or California Appellate Reports.  
(Miller & Lux v. James[, supra,] 180 Cal. [at p. 48], 179 P. 174, 
175.)”  (13 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 948, 
p. 1004; Morgan v. Stubblefield (1972) 6 Cal.3d 606, 624 [“The 
granting of a rehearing had the effect of vacating the decision 
and eliminating the rule of law upon which [the party] relied”]; 
Bell v. Board of Supervisors (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 629, 634 [“An 
opinion is superseded by an order granting rehearing and the 
rule of law set forth therein is thereby eliminated”].) 
Nevertheless, various past appellate decisions (including 
by this court) in addition to the one we review here have failed 
to apprehend this rule’s application with respect to Ganahl I and 
have purported to give precedential effect to that decision.5   We 
 
(1872) 42 Cal. 606, 610 [reporter’s note:  “After a rehearing the 
first opinion is understood to be no longer the opinion of the 
Court, unless it is adopted in the subsequent opinion”]; 
Carpentier v. Small (1868) 35 Cal. 346, 364 [observing that 
“[t]he former judgment of this case, so far as it relates to the 
defendants . . . , to whom a rehearing was granted, is vacated”].   
5  
See, in chronological order, Ex Parte Wood (1907) 
5 Cal.App. 471, 473 [citing the Ganahl I decision and purporting 
to follow it regarding computation of age of majority], abrogated 
by In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 850; Bynum v. Moore 
(Okla. 1923) 223 P. 687, 690–691 [citing the Ganahl I decision 
regarding computation of age of majority]; People v. Dudley 
 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
have no doubt that this lapse may be attributed, in part, to the 
fact that services such as Westlaw and LexisNexis’s Shepard’s 
Citations Service do not show the relevant subsequent or prior 
history with regard to either the initial decision in Ganahl I or 
the superseding decision in Ganahl II.  Nevertheless, it is plain 
that Ganahl I, having been reheard by this court before it 
became final and superseded by Ganahl II, was vacated and 
never had precedential effect — as we now recognize, better late 
than never.  To the extent the published appellate decisions 
cited ante, footnote 5, contain language inconsistent with our 
conclusion that Ganahl I is not precedential, we disapprove of 
them.   
Nor, for the reasons expressed above, do we find the 
reasoning set out in Ganahl I to be independently persuasive.  
We reject the approach to calculating commencement of the 
statute of limitations articulated in that decision and instead 
endorse and apply the rule set out in section 12 — that is, we 
exclude the first day of the limitations period and include the 
last day.  
Defendants urge us to follow the decisions of other 
jurisdictions that have included the first date after age-based 
tolling ends when calculating the limitations period, relying 
 
(1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 181, 183–185 [same], abrogated by In re 
Harris, at p. 850; Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 576 
[same]; Johnson v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1093 
[same]; In re Harris, at pp. 845–850 & fn. 18 [discussing Ganahl 
I decision regarding computation of age of majority and 
affirming that merely because it was not officially published 
does not undermine its precedential authority]; Cabrera, supra, 
159 F.3d at p. 379 [“Despite its age, the Ganahl [I] holding is 
still good law”].  
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
primarily on Phelan v. Douglass (N.Y. 1855) 11 How.Pr. 193.  
There, the New York Court of Appeals held that the ordinary 
rule of computing time, similar to California’s section 12, did not 
apply when calculating the limitations period after tolling based 
on minority ends.  (Phelan, at p. 196.)  It explained that the 
reason for the rule excluding the first day was that “the law will 
not take notice of fractions of a day, . . . [b]ut the reason of the 
rule ceases whenever the party affected has the whole and entire 
day.”  (Ibid.)  The Phelan court concluded that “[w]henever the 
whole day, and every moment of it, can be counted, then it should 
be; whenever, if counted, the party would, in fact, have but a 
fractional part of it, then it should not be counted.”  (Ibid.)  The 
Texas Supreme Court similarly held that the general rule 
excluding first day did not apply to limitations period that ran 
after a minor attained his or her majority because the minor 
“could have instituted his suit at any moment of that day.”  (Ross 
v. Morrow (Tex. 1892) 19 S.W. 1090, 1091; see also Pate v. 
Thompson (Tex.Ct.App. 1944) 179 S.W.2d 355, 356.)   
As defendants acknowledge, however, other states that 
have more recently addressed the issue have reached a different 
conclusion.  For example, in Nelson v. Sandkamp (Minn. 1948) 
34 N.W.2d 640 (Nelson), the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that the ordinary rule for computing time, which excludes the 
first day and includes the last, applies in calculating the 
applicable limitations period after age-based tolling ends.  
(Id. at p. 643.)  It specifically rejected the defendant’s argument 
that because “the reason for the application of the rule at 
common law is that the law takes no notice of fractions of days,” 
it should follow “that the rule . . . should not be applied here, in 
that plaintiff had the whole, and not a mere fraction, of the day” 
to sue.  (Ibid.)  The court determined that “ ‘[i]nasmuch as the 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
certainty of a rule is of more importance than the reason of it, 
we think the legislature intended by [the statute setting forth 
the general rule] to put an end to all this confusion and 
uncertainty by adopting a uniform rule for the computation of 
time alike applicable to matters of mere practice and to the 
construction of statutes.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The Alaska Supreme Court 
has similarly held that the ordinary method for computing time 
periods applies after age-based tolling ends, reasoning that 
“attainment of the age of majority is analogous to other events 
that trigger running of time periods; the limitation period 
excludes the day of the event (attainment of majority), and 
includes the last day in the period . . . .”  (Fields v. Fairbanks 
North Star Borough (Alaska 1991) 818 P.2d 658, 661; see also 
Mason v. Board of Educ. of Baltimore County (Md.Ct.App. 2003) 
826 A.2d 433, 438 [court applied common law “coming of age” 
rule, in which a minor becomes an adult one day before the 
minor’s 18th birthday; nevertheless, the date of removal of the 
disability (the day before the minor’s 18th birthday) was 
excluded from the statute of limitations period under the 
general rule for computation of time].)   
We are in accord with the high courts of Minnesota and 
Alaska.  More than a century ago, the Legislature enacted 
section 12 to exclude the first day in calculating the applicable 
limitations period.  A general rule governing the computation of 
time serves to promote order and certainty.  Even assuming, as 
defendants suggest, that section 12’s first day exclusion rule was 
originally meant only to exclude partial days, we agree with the 
Minnesota Supreme Court that “certainty and uniformity in the 
application of the rule for the computation of time is of more 
importance than the reason for its application at common law.”  
(Nelson, supra, 34 N.W.2d at p. 643.)  And, as noted above, 
SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
applying section 12 to exclude a plaintiff’s birthday in 
calculating a limitations period after age-based tolling ends 
under section 352, subdivision (a) serves to protect the rights of 
minors.  By contrast, allowing an exception to the general rule 
when a plaintiff reaches the age of majority would punish the 
minor plaintiff whom section 352 is meant to protect.   
Therefore, in cases in which the statute of limitations is 
tolled based on a plaintiff minor’s age, as set forth in section 12, 
the day after tolling ends is excluded in calculating whether an 
action is timely filed.   
We now apply the holding to the facts of this case.  Under 
section 352, subdivision (a), the statute of limitations was tolled 
during the time when plaintiff was a minor.  His 18th 
birthday — December 3, 2011 — was the triggering event 
because that was the first day he was no longer a minor.  
Excluding this date and including the last date two years later, 
plaintiff was required to file suit no later than December 3, 2013.  
(§ 335.1.)  He did so.  His lawsuit was therefore timely filed.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Shalabi v. City of Fontana 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 35 Cal.App.5th 639 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S256665 
Date Filed:  July 12, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: San Bernardino  
Judge: Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr.  
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Ortiz Law Group, Jesse S. Ortiz, Nolan Berggren and Andres Salas for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Lynberg & Watkins, S. Frank Harrell, Pancy Lin, Ruben Escobedo III 
and Jesse K. Cox for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Steven S. Fleischman, Scott P. Dixler and Sarah E. 
Hamill for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jesse Ortiz 
Ortiz Law Group, APC 
1510 J Street, Suite 100 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 443-9500 
 
S. Frank Harrell 
Lynberg & Watkins, APC 
1100 Town & Country Road, Suite 1450 
Orange, CA 92868 
(714) 937-1010 
 
Scott P. Dixler 
Horvitz & Levy LLP 
3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor 
Burbank, CA 91505 
(818) 995-0800