Title: State v. Ortiz
Citation: 399 P.2d 171, 97 Ariz. 228
Docket Number: 1378
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1965

97 Ariz. 228 (1965) 399 P.2d 171 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Roy Vargas ORTIZ, Appellant. No. 1378. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. February 17, 1965. Rehearing Denied March 16, 1965. *229 Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., and Norman E. Green, Pima County Atty., by Carl Waag, Deputy County Atty., for appellee. Nathan Falk, Tucson, for appellant. ALICE TRUMAN, Judge. The defendant, Roy Vargas Ortiz, was convicted of burglary first degree and appeals therefrom. For the purpose of the appeal we need only consider Assignment of Error No. 2, which reads as follows: The only question to be determined here is whether the court's admission of the defendant's purported confession into evidence was done in a manner inconsistent with the correct trial procedure, as set out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, and as interpreted by us in State v. Owen, 96 Ariz. 274, 394 P.2d 206, and State v. Gallagher, 97 Ariz. 1, 396 P.2d 241. In State v. Owen we said: During the State's presentation of its case the defendant's attorney asked for and received a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the issue of voluntariness of the confession. The testimony was conflicting in some respects. The trial procedure on the issue of voluntariness was as follows: *230 With the jury present the County Attorney had started to ask Detective Bright questions to lay a foundation to introduce defendant's alleged confession into evidence. In substance the detective stated that at approximately 8:00 A.M. on February 7th, the morning defendant was arrested, he took the defendant to the Detective Division of the Tucson Police Department. He asked him questions, the defendant answered them and made a statement at that time in the presence of Detective Bright, another officer and a secretary. Defendant had been in custody approximately eight and one-half hours. He was questioned forty-five minutes to a hour before he gave the statement. No one used abusive language, hit him or physically abused him in any way before or during the taking of his statement. No one made any threats. There was no lawyer present. It was explained to him that anything he said would be reduced to writing and could be used against him. He was told of the accusation against him and that he did not have to make a statement. He read the statement and signed it. At this point defendant's attorney asked for a hearing on voluntariness outside the presence of the jury. During this hearing the detective was cross-examined but did not vary from his story and indicated that defendant did not appear sleepy, did not ask for food or drink, that he was given the statement and asked if he could read it, and he said, "yes." The defendant testified that he had smoked a marijuana cigarette butt while in his jail cell, and in answer to the question as to his recollection of giving the statement, he said: The following questions and answers were asked by defendant's attorney and answered by defendant concerning the defendant's statement: The court then proceeded as follows: We feel that the record does not show the procedure was clearly consistent with Jackson v. Denno, supra, and State v. Owen, supra. The conviction must therefore be reversed, because the trial judge did not make a definite determination whether the purported confession was voluntary or involuntary, as is *232 now required.[1] Jackson v. Denno, supra 378 U.S. at pp. 378-379, 84 S. Ct. 1774. Now when there is a conflict in the evidence the court must make a definite determination, determinable from the record, whether the purported confession was voluntary or involuntary, and must resolve the issue of voluntariness against the defendant before the jury is allowed to consider the question. State v. Costello, 97 Ariz. 220, 399 P.2d 119 (1965). Prior to Jackson, supra, it was unclear in Arizona whether the Massachusetts or New York procedure was the law. See 378 U.S. page 378, appendix page 396 and appendix A page 418, 84 S. Ct. 1791, and 1802, Jackson, supra. We are therefore unable to determine from the record what was in the judge's mind. Did he feel there was a conflict in the evidence which the jury should decide or did he resolve the question of coercion against the defendant and submit the whole matter to the jury, either of which was proper under State v. Preis, supra? The Massachusetts rule, which was approved by the Court, was thus described in Jackson, supra, 378 U.S. at page 378, 84 S.Ct. at page 1781: If the trial judge merely found there was a conflict on which responsible persons could differ, then according to Jackson, the defendant was deprived of his right to be free of a conviction based in whole or in part upon a confession which responsible persons could find was involuntary. Since we cannot determine whether he was so deprived, the case is reversed and remanded for a new trial *233 not inconsistent with the rules set forth in State v. Owen, supra. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and BERNSTEIN and UDALL, JJ., concurring. NOTE: Justice ERNEST W. McFARLAND did not participate in the determination of this appeal. [1] At the time of the trial judge's ruling, the ruling was correct. State v. Preis, 89 Ariz. 336, 338, 362 P.2d 660, 661: "If the trial court concludes thereafter that the confession was freely and voluntarily made or there is a conflict as to whether it was freely and voluntarily made it must admit it into evidence and then submit it to the jury under proper instructions."