Title: State v. Michael D. Sykes
Citation: 2005 WI 48
Docket Number: 2003AP001234-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2005

2005 WI 48 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1234-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael D. Sykes,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  269 Wis. 2d 543, 674 N.W.2d 681 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 22, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 12, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
David C. Resheske   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, J.J., join the dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Jeffrey J. De La Rosa and Seymour, Kremer, Nommensen, Morrissy & 
Koch, L.L.P., Elkhorn, and oral argument by Jeffrey J. De La 
Rosa. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 48 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1234-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2002CF196) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael D. Sykes,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 22, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   Michael 
D. 
Sykes 
requests review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals.  The court of appeals affirmed an order of the circuit 
court for Washington County, Judge David C. Resheske, presiding, 
that denied his motion to suppress evidence of drug-related 
offenses.  Sykes argues that his wallet was searched in 
violation 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution because the officer did not have probable cause to 
arrest him for the drug-related offenses prior to the search.   
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
2 
 
¶2 
We conclude that the officer had probable cause to 
arrest Sykes for criminal trespass prior to the search of 
Sykes's wallet.  We also conclude that whether the officer 
intended to arrest Sykes for criminal trespass prior to the 
search, or whether Sykes was actually arrested for and charged 
with criminal trespass, are not dispositive of whether the 
search was lawful.  Rather, the search was lawful because law 
enforcement had probable cause to arrest Sykes for a crime prior 
to the search and also arrested Sykes immediately after the 
search, although for a different crime.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Sykes was charged with possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver, second or subsequent offense, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)3 and 961.48(1) (2001-02).1  Sykes 
moved to suppress the evidence.   
¶4 
His arrest arose out of a search that was conducted in 
the apartment of Stacy Hudson.  At the hearing on Sykes's 
suppression motion, Hudson, William Downham, Officer Kenneth 
Kluck and Lieutenant Thomas Horvath testified.  Hudson said she 
had leased an apartment in a building owned by Downham in 
Hartford, Wisconsin, but that she frequently stayed with friends 
and relatives rather than in her apartment.  On one occasion 
when Hudson returned to her apartment, she found Sykes and his 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
3 
 
girlfriend inside.  She said that Sykes refused to leave, that 
she never gave him permission to stay in her apartment, and that 
she did not want him living there.   
¶5 
Downham said that he learned there were people in the 
apartment whom Hudson did not want there and also that there was 
suspicious activity in the apartment, so he obtained Hudson's 
permission to enter the apartment and change the locks.  At 
Downham's request, Kluck went to the apartment with Downham and 
a locksmith.   
¶6 
Kluck had been sent by Horvath, then a patrol 
sergeant.  Horvath said he knew that Downham had requested law 
enforcement presence during the change of the apartment's locks 
for security reasons.  Horvath also knew, and had informed 
Kluck, that unwanted individuals may be in the apartment and 
that if that was the case, Kluck should contact Horvath for more 
officers. 
¶7 
When Kluck and Downham knocked on the door, no one 
answered.  When the locksmith started attempting to open the 
locks, a woman opened the door from the inside.  When Kluck 
asked her what she was doing there, she tried closing the door, 
but Kluck had put his foot in the doorway to prevent the door's 
closing.  The woman continued to push against the door, asking 
Kluck to wait because "her man was naked."  Kluck responded, 
"That's all right, I have seen naked men before."  She then ran 
down the hall of the apartment and entered the bathroom.  
¶8 
When Kluck entered the apartment, he found several 
other people in the living room, and he called for additional 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
4 
 
officers to assist him.  Kluck directed the woman who answered 
the door and Sykes to sit down.  After Horvath and another 
officer arrived at the apartment, Horvath asked Sykes for 
identification.   
¶9 
Horvath testified that he sought to obtain Sykes's 
identification as follows: 
A 
I asked Mr. Sykes if he had any identification, 
he said not on him but he had it in his wallet.  
I then asked where his wallet was. 
Q 
What happened then? 
A 
He advised me that it was laying in the living 
room area underneath a, I believe it was a cedar 
chest, that was up on legs so there was a space 
underneath it, and pointed that his wallet was 
laying right there.2  
Q 
What did you do?   
A 
I went and got the wallet where he advised me 
that it was.  I double checked and said, "Is this 
your wallet," and he said it was.  And I double 
checked, asked if the identification was in the 
wallet, he said it was. 
Q 
What happened then? 
A 
I opened the wallet to look for identification, 
and immediately found a baggie that I pulled out 
that I believed to be crack cocaine. 
Q 
Was the license also in there? 
A 
Yes, it was.  
                                                 
2 On cross-examination, Horvath clarified, "I asked him 
where his wallet was located, and he advised me that——I think he 
just nodded with his head and pointed to the area of the living 
room where the cedar chest was."   
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
5 
 
Horvath then placed Sykes under arrest.  Pursuant to consent 
from Hudson, a full search of the apartment was then conducted 
and more controlled substances were found. 
¶10 In an oral decision, the circuit court decided that 
the search of Sykes's wallet was lawful: 
Horvath 
. . . 
was 
making 
in 
my 
judgment 
an 
investigatory stop per se or, pat down, which he had a 
right to do under the circumstances to obtain the 
identity of the people in the apartment.  The only 
reason he went to the item on the floor, the wallet, 
was because he was directed there by the Defendant in 
response 
to 
the 
question: 
Do 
you 
have 
any 
identification. 
 
He 
is 
entitled 
to 
ask 
for 
identification.   
I think the items located within the wallet were 
located, in effect, in plain view while the officer 
was attempting to ascertain the identity of the 
Defendant, which he had lawful reason to do.   
After pleading guilty to amended charges, Sykes appealed the 
circuit court's decision.  The court of appeals affirmed, 
concluding that the search of Sykes's wallet was a reasonable 
search incident to a lawful arrest.   
¶11 Sykes then petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  Sykes asks us to review whether a search incident to 
arrest is lawful where there is probable cause to arrest for a 
crime, a search is conducted prior to that arrest, and the 
suspect is then immediately arrested and charged only with 
offenses based on evidence seized during the search.   
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶12 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence, 
we 
will 
uphold 
a 
circuit 
court's 
findings 
of 
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, ¶32, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829.  
However, we review de novo the circuit court's application of 
constitutional principles to those facts.  Id.   
B. 
Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest 
¶13 The constitutional provisions cited by Sykes, the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution3 and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution,4 provide protection 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.  State v. Pallone, 2000 
WI 77, ¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568.  These provisions' 
                                                 
3 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:  
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
4 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures 
shall 
not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.   
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
7 
 
purpose is to safeguard individuals' privacy and security 
against 
arbitrary 
governmental 
invasions, 
which 
requires 
striking a balance between the intrusion on an individual's 
privacy and the government's promotion of its legitimate 
interests.  State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 227, 455 N.W.2d 
618 (1990) (citations omitted).  Historically, we follow the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretations when construing 
both constitutions' search and seizure provisions.  Id. 
¶14 As discussed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63 (1969), a warrantless search of a person incident to a 
lawful arrest does not violate constitutional search and seizure 
provisions.  See also Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 228.  "'A 
custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a 
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion 
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no 
additional justification.'"  State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 169, 
388 N.W.2d 565 (1986) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).   
¶15 A 
Chimel 
search 
incident 
to 
arrest 
must 
be 
contemporaneous to the arrest.  Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 236.  
However, in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980), the 
Supreme Court explained that where a "formal arrest followed 
quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's 
person, we do not believe it particularly important that the 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
8 
 
search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa."5  Accord 
State v. Mata, 230 Wis. 2d 567, 574, 602 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 
1999) (citations omitted); see generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 5.4(a) (4th ed. 2004) (describing the 
evolution of the "search for evidence prior to arrest" case 
law).  Therefore, "[a] search may be incident to a subsequent 
arrest if the officers have probable cause to arrest before the 
search."  State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 484, 569 N.W.2d 
316 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111). 
¶16 The Court in Rawlings further explained that probable 
cause to arrest must have existed independent of the fruits of 
the search of the suspect's person.  Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111 & 
n.6; see also LaFave, supra, § 5.4(a).  As the court of appeals 
has said, "A search may immediately precede a formal arrest so 
long as the fruits of the search are not necessary to support 
the arrest."  Mata, 230 Wis. 2d at 574 (citation omitted).  
Accordingly, when a suspect is arrested subsequent to a search, 
the legality of the search is established by the officer's 
possession, before the search, of facts sufficient to establish 
probable cause to arrest followed by a contemporaneous arrest.  
See id.; Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 484; see also Rawlings, 448 
U.S. at 111. 
                                                 
5 In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980), Rawlings 
acknowledged ownership of drugs that were in the purse of 
another, thereby giving police probable cause to arrest him 
prior to searching him.  
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
9 
 
¶17 In the present case, the officers had probable cause 
to arrest Sykes for criminal trespass before initiating the 
search. 
 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.14, 
"[w]hoever 
intentionally enters the dwelling of another without the consent 
of some person lawfully upon the premises, upon circumstances 
tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace," commits 
criminal trespass to a dwelling.  The phrase "breach of the 
peace," as used in Wis. Stat. § 943.14, "need only be such as to 
put the victim in fear of bodily harm or otherwise disturb or 
disrupt the peace and sanctity of the home."  State v. Von Loh, 
157 Wis. 2d 91, 99, 458 N.W.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1990). 
¶18 There is probable cause to arrest "when the totality 
of the circumstances within that officer's knowledge at the time 
of the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to believe 
that the defendant probably committed a crime.  . . .  The 
objective facts before the police officer need only lead to the 
conclusion that guilt is more than a possibility."  State v. 
Cash, 2004 WI App 63, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 451, 677 N.W.2d 709 
(citations omitted); accord Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 
683-84, 207 N.W.2d 589 (1973). 
¶19 Here, Horvath knew before he searched Sykes's wallet 
that the apartment was rented to Hudson, that she was not 
present, that unwanted individuals had been in the apartment and 
that they would not leave when asked.  He also knew that the 
landlord had requested police assistance during the change of 
the locks due to safety concerns.  Based on these facts, it 
would be reasonable for a police officer to conclude first, that 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
10 
 
Sykes was in the apartment without permission and second, that 
Sykes had generated a certain amount of fear in Downham, or at 
least disrupted the sanctity of Hudson's home.  Horvath thus had 
probable cause to arrest Sykes for committing criminal trespass 
of Hudson's dwelling.   
¶20 The scope of a search incident to arrest is confined 
to "the area from within which [the suspect] might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," Chimel, 395 
U.S. at 763; accord United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749, 753 
(8th Cir. 1978) (referring to this area as the suspect's "wing-
span").  We have understood this to mean the area immediately 
surrounding the arrestee.  Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 231.   
¶21 Sykes has not asserted that the search of his wallet 
exceeded the area that may be searched incident to a lawful 
arrest.6  We note that the officers testified that prior to the 
search, Kluck had directed Sykes to sit in the living room; that 
when Horvath asked Sykes where his wallet was located, Sykes 
                                                 
6 The dissent says that we are shifting the burden to Sykes 
to prove the search was lawful.  Dissent, ¶45.  However, an 
unargued issue generally is not raised by this court sua sponte 
and then decided, because neither party will have had the 
opportunity to brief or argue it.  See A.O. Smith Corp. v. 
Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. 
App. 1998).  Additionally, when an issue is not raised in the 
circuit court, but is raised here, we have concluded that the 
issue is waived.  State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604-05, 563 
N.W.2d 501 (1997) (holding that the issue of whether there was 
probable cause to conduct an auto search was waived because it 
was not raised until appeal).  Accordingly, precedent does not 
support the dissent's assertion that by our not picking up an 
issue that was not presented to us, we have shifted the burden 
to prove the search was lawful to Sykes. 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
11 
 
nodded and pointed under a cedar chest located in the living 
room; and that the officers retrieved the wallet from under that 
cedar chest.7  For the purposes of the present discussion, it is 
reasonable to infer from these facts, together with Sykes's 
apparent concession, that law enforcement's search was confined 
to the area immediately surrounding Sykes.  Therefore, it was 
within the physical area for a lawful search incident to arrest.  
See Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 231. 
¶22 In sum, Horvath's search of Sykes's wallet was a valid 
Chimel search incident to arrest.   Horvath had probable cause 
to arrest Sykes for criminal trespass before the search was 
                                                 
7 The State argues that by this conduct Sykes consented to 
the search.  The Fourth Amendment is not violated by a 
warrantless search where consent to search is freely and 
voluntarily given.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 
N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citation omitted).  "The State bears 'the 
burden of proving by clear and positive evidence the search was 
the result of a free, intelligent, unequivocal and specific 
consent without any duress or coercion, actual or implied.'"  
State v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 233, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489, 492, 190 
N.W.2d 542 (1971)).  However, whether an individual has given 
consent is a question of fact, so we "uphold the trial court's 
finding on this issue unless it is against the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence."  State v. Tomlinson, 2002 
WI 91, ¶36, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367.  Here, the circuit 
court did not make a finding as to whether Sykes consented to 
the search, so there is no finding of fact for us to review.  We 
decline to consider the issue further, as it is outside the 
scope of the review we granted and its resolution is not 
necessary in light of our decision that the present search was 
lawful as a search incident to arrest.  For the same reasons, we 
do not address Sykes's arguments as to whether the challenged 
search was a lawful "pat down," whether the seizure in question 
was lawful because the contraband was in "plain view," or 
whether the search was lawful as an "identification search." 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
12 
 
conducted 
and 
independent 
of 
the 
fruits 
of 
the 
search.  
Immediately after the search, Horvath did arrest Sykes.  That 
the arrest led to drug-related charges being filed, not to a 
charge for criminal trespass, does not negate that probable 
cause to arrest existed prior to the search. 
¶23 Sykes argues that pursuant to State v. Swanson, 164 
Wis. 2d 437, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991), the search in question here 
would have been valid as a search incident to arrest only if the 
law enforcement personnel had subjectively intended to arrest 
him for criminal trespass before conducting the search and if, 
after the search, he had actually been arrested for criminal 
trespass.  In Swanson, a law enforcement officer conducted a pat 
down search of Swanson after observing Swanson's vehicle nearly 
hit a pedestrian while driving on the sidewalk at about 2:00 
a.m. and after detecting an odor of intoxicants on Swanson's 
breath.  Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d at 442.  In the course of that 
search, the officer discovered and seized a bag of marijuana in 
Swanson's pocket and then arrested him.  Id.  He was charged 
with possession of a controlled substance, but he was not 
charged with reckless endangerment or drunk driving.  Id. at 
443, 453.  We decided that the search was not a valid search 
incident to arrest.  Id. at 450-55. 
¶24 Swanson does not control the present case.  In 
Swanson, while noting that it was not necessary to address 
whether probable cause existed to arrest Swanson for another 
offense, id. at 453, we explained that the facts known to the 
officer established only a reasonable suspicion that Swanson had 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
13 
 
committed either operating under the influence or reckless 
endangerment, but without more, those facts did not provide a 
basis for probable cause to arrest for either crime, id. at 453 
n.6.  Therefore, in Swanson, the only crime for which the 
officers had probable cause to arrest was the drug charge, an 
arrest based on evidence seized during the search.  However, in 
the present case, as explained above, Horvath had probable cause 
to arrest Sykes for criminal trespass before the search and 
independent of the fruits of the search.   
¶25 The Swanson decision's requirement that "the State 
show that an arrest actually took place for something other than 
possession of a controlled substance" was meant to "ensure that 
the police do not arbitrarily violate an individual's privacy."  
Id. at 452.  The Swanson decision expressed concern that an 
individual's privacy could be invaded arbitrarily if police were 
allowed "to justify searches in the hope that the search would 
uncover something they could pursue."  Id. at 453.  However, 
where a law enforcement officer has probable cause to arrest 
before a search is undertaken, as Horvath had probable cause to 
arrest Sykes for criminal trespass, this concern is not 
implicated.  Horvath did not need to search Sykes in hopes that 
he would "uncover something" to pursue.  He already had 
"something" to pursue:  criminal trespass.   
¶26 Similarly, the State here is not requesting that we 
"carve out an exception to warrantless searches based solely on 
probable cause with no resulting arrest," as we declined to do 
in Swanson.  Id. at 453.  In the present case, there was both 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
14 
 
probable cause before the search and an arrest immediately after 
the search.  Accordingly, we reaffirm our statement in Swanson, 
that "[t]he actual making of a formal arrest . . . is . . . a 
significant event."  Id. at 451.  It is the arrest immediately 
following the search, along with the probable cause to arrest 
before the search, that causes the search to be lawful.  Mata, 
230 Wis. 2d at 574; Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 484; see also 
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.   
¶27 Sykes contends the search at issue here was not lawful 
because the crime he was arrested for immediately after the 
search was different than the crime for which the officer had 
probable cause to arrest before the search.  However, as long as 
there was probable cause to arrest before the search, no 
additional protection from government intrusion is afforded by 
requiring that persons be arrested for and charged with the same 
crime as that for which probable cause initially existed.  To 
conclude otherwise would put form over substance because Sykes 
could have been arrested for both criminal trespass and the 
drug-related offenses; the district attorney could have decided 
to prosecute only the drug-related offense, and Sykes would be 
in the same position as he is in now.  The intrusion on his 
privacy would have been no different.  Accordingly, we withdraw 
any language from Swanson that could be interpreted to limit the 
lawfulness of the search to requiring an arrest for the same 
crime for which probable cause existed prior to the search.   
¶28 As 
to 
the 
officer's 
subjective 
motivations 
for 
initiating the search, Sykes argues that the officers were in 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
15 
 
Hudson's apartment in a "community caretaker capacity" or 
"peacekeeping 
function," 
rather 
than 
in 
a 
"criminal 
investigative capacity," and because of their reason for being 
present, they did not intend to arrest Sykes until contraband 
was found in his wallet.  Sykes further argues that Kluck's and 
Horvath's conduct did not provide any indication that Sykes was 
going to be arrested until the drugs were found in his wallet.   
¶29 We note that characterizing law enforcement's presence 
during 
the 
changing 
of 
the 
locks 
as 
a 
"community 
caretaking/peacekeeping" function does not preclude an officer, 
once he has probable cause to arrest, from acting accordingly.  
Additionally, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996), the Supreme Court explained that it was "unwilling to 
entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual 
motivations of individual officers."  Accord Arkansas v. 
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (quoting Whren to articulate 
the same principle); Mata, 230 Wis. 2d at 574 (stating that a 
court is "not bound by an officer's subjective reasons for a 
search or arrest"); see also State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶23, 
234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795 (deciding that as to a 
protective 
frisk, 
an 
objective 
standard 
should 
apply 
to 
determine the reasonableness of the search); State v. Baudhuin, 
141 Wis. 2d 642, 650-51, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987) (deciding that the 
lawfulness of a vehicle stop depended on the objective facts 
observed by the officer, not the officer's subjective intent).  
Similarly, the Supreme Court recently stated in Devenpeck v. 
Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588, 594 (2004), "'[T]he fact that the 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
16 
 
officer does not have the state of mind [that] is hypothecated 
by the reasons [that] provide the legal justification for the 
officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'"  
(Quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.)  In Devenpeck, the Court 
further recognized that the application of objective standards, 
rather than standards that depend on the officer's subjective 
state of mind, promotes evenhanded law enforcement.  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
¶30 The court of appeals' reasoning in Mata is consistent 
with that of the Supreme Court.  In Mata, the court determined 
that the search being challenged was a search incident to 
arrest, regardless of the fact that the search, as here, 
preceded the arrest.  Mata, 230 Wis. 2d at 574.  The officer who 
arrested Mata stated a basis for the search that the court 
concluded was not sufficient.  Id.  However, because the officer 
was aware of objective facts that were sufficient to establish 
probable cause to arrest and the search was conducted incident 
to an arrest, the court of appeals upheld the search.  Id.  It 
explained that "the law provides" that the search was lawful, 
regardless of the officer's subjective reasons for conducting 
the search.  Id. 
¶31 Similarly here, whether law enforcement subjectively 
intended to arrest Sykes for criminal trespass is not the 
relevant inquiry.  Because an analysis of probable cause to 
arrest turns on the objective facts known to the officer, Cash, 
271 Wis. 2d 451, ¶24, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
17 
 
officer was aware of sufficient objective facts to establish 
probable cause to arrest before the search was conducted, as 
well as whether an actual arrest was made contemporaneously with 
the search.   
¶32 Sykes also relies on State v. Hart, 2001 WI App 283, 
¶10, 249 Wis. 2d 329, 639 N.W.2d 213, for the principle that, 
contrary to Mata's holding, "[t]he subjective intent of the 
police officer as a reasonable person would understand it is the 
driving force in these situations."  In Hart, a police officer 
pulled Hart over for drunk driving, administered a breath test 
to establish that Hart was intoxicated, and decided to drive 
Hart to the police station, rather than arrest him, so Hart 
could arrange for a ride home.  Hart, 249 Wis. 2d 329, ¶2.  The 
officer told Hart that he was not under arrest and that he would 
be allowed to go home once he had arranged for someone to drive 
him.  Id., ¶7.  The department had a policy that officers do a 
protective search prior to transporting a citizen in a squad 
car.  Id., ¶2.  During that search, the officer discovered a 
marijuana pipe and arrested Hart for possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  Id.   
¶33 The court in Hart distinguished the Mata decision, 
explaining that 
from the moment he had probable cause, the officer in 
Mata conducted himself the way a reasonable officer 
would in the course of making an arrest . . . .  In 
our case, unlike in Mata, the officer was entitled to 
make an arrest but chose not to; therefore, it was no 
longer reasonable to conduct himself as if an arrest 
was imminent. 
No. 
2003AP1234-CR  
 
18 
 
Id., ¶10 n.5.  However, that rationale is inconsistent with 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court and those of this 
court that have explained that the subjective intent of the 
officer 
(except 
for 
the 
facts 
that 
he 
knows) 
is 
not 
determinative of whether the search violates constitutional 
principles that prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Devenpeck, 125 S. Ct. at 594; Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771; Whren, 
517 U.S. at 813; McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶23.  We therefore 
conclude that the reasoning of Mata, not that of Hart, provides 
guidance for our decision.  Any discussion in Hart that could be 
interpreted to invalidate a search incident to an arrest for 
which arrest the officer has probable cause is overruled. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 We conclude that the officer had probable cause to 
arrest Sykes for criminal trespass prior to the search of 
Sykes's wallet.  We also conclude that whether the officer 
intended to arrest Sykes for criminal trespass prior to the 
search, or whether Sykes was actually arrested for and charged 
with criminal trespass, are not dispositive of whether the 
search was lawful.  Rather, the search was lawful because law 
enforcement had probable cause to arrest Sykes for a crime prior 
to the search and also arrested Sykes immediately after the 
search, although for a different crime.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion holds that the search leading to the recovery 
of the defendant's wallet was a valid Chimel search.  Majority 
op., ¶22.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).  I 
disagree. 
¶36 I also write to address an issue of appellate 
practice, namely, how an attorney should advise this court of an 
erroneous statement in his or her brief or oral argument. 
I 
¶37 A Chimel search is a search incident to a lawful 
arrest that allows law enforcement to search the area within the 
arrestee's "immediate control."  Law enforcement may search the 
area immediately surrounding the arrestee, for their protection 
and to preserve evidence.8  Unless this search fits into the 
Chimel exception, it is a warrantless search and is per se 
unreasonable under Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution.9     
                                                 
8 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); State 
v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 231, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990); 3 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3(b) (4th ed. 2004). 
Under Chimel, police may conduct a limited search of the 
area immediately surrounding an arrestee, "'the area from within 
which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence.'"  State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 
236, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
9 State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 22, 455 N.W.2d 618 
(1990). 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶38 The only evidence of the arrestee's physical relation 
to the wallet was that the arrestee was on a couch in the same 
room as was the wallet.  At the suppression hearing the officer 
who picked up and searched the wallet had the following to say 
about the wallet's location: "I think [the defendant] just 
nodded with his head and pointed to the area of the living room 
where the cedar chest was[; the wallet was under the cedar 
chest]."  (R.15:43.)  This testimony suggests only that the 
wallet was in the living room, nothing more. 
¶39 That the arrestee and the evidence are in the same 
room is simply insufficient under our case law to validate a 
search incident to an arrest.  Our court has stated that 
"[a]lthough an entire room might be an area into which an 
arrestee might gain access to a weapon or evidence, the Chimel 
standard authorizes a more limited scope of search which 
recognizes that rooms differ in size, shape and design."10  
Nothing in the record suggests the size, shape, and design of 
the living room.  Nor does the record indicate where the 
officers and the defendant were in the undescribed living room.  
The State carries the burden of persuasion in justifying a 
Chimel search and this record is insufficient for that purpose.11 
                                                 
10 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 236.  We continued in Murdock, in 
language relevant here: "Thus, [a bright-line allowance of 
searches of the room in which the arrest takes place], while 
attractively clear cut on its face, is overly broad.  As such, 
it is in direct conflict with the express language of Chimel, 
395 U.S. at 763 . . . ."  Id. at 217-18. 
11 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 222. 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶40 The State and the courts have struggled to find a 
theory to 
save the evidence from 
suppression. 
 At the 
suppression hearing the State argued that the officer looked in 
the wallet only to confirm identity.  The circuit court, in 
denying the motion to suppress, held that the officer picked up 
the wallet because he was directed to it by the defendant, or in 
the alternative, that the wallet was in plain view.  The circuit 
court did not, however, find that the defendant had consented to 
the search.12  The court of appeals upheld the search on grounds 
not argued by the parties, namely, that the search of the wallet 
was a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest.  The court 
of appeals did not cite Chimel, and in citing Murdock only once, 
did not do so for any proposition related to a Chimel search. 
¶41 The majority opinion agrees with the court of appeals, 
but must overcome a hurdle the court of appeals overlooked, 
namely, whether the search was confined to the area permissible 
under Chimel.  To overcome this difficulty, the majority opinion 
"infer[s]" that the officer's search was confined to the area 
permissible under Chimel.  Majority op., ¶¶21-22.  Although the 
State may be entitled to reasonable inferences from the evidence 
presented, nothing in the record allows a court to infer the 
size, shape, and design of the room, facts necessary to justify 
a Chimel search under this court's and the U.S. Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence.13   
                                                 
12 The majority opinion acknowledges that the defendant did 
not consent to the search.  Majority op., ¶21 n.6. 
13 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 217. 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶42 The lack of this evidence is not surprising; it is 
perfectly understandable.  The case was not tried on the theory 
of a reasonable search incident to an arrest, and through no 
fault of law enforcement officers, no testimony about the area 
within the arrestee's immediate control was introduced at the 
suppression hearing. 
¶43 Cognizant of the record's deficiency and the weakness 
of its reliance on an "inference" that the wallet was within the 
permissible searchable area, the majority opinion relies on what 
it characterizes as the defendant's "apparent concession, that 
law enforcement's search was confined to the area immediately 
surrounding" him.  Majority op., ¶21.  The majority is 
apparently asserting that the defendant conceded the validity of 
the Chimel search because he did not argue that the wallet was 
outside the searchable area, even though he contested the 
validity of the search.  The majority opinion cites no authority 
for its language about concession. 
¶44 The defendant never made such a concession on the 
record or in his briefs.  The court of appeals raised the 
question whether the search could be justified as a "protective 
sweep"14 and apparently the parties argued this issue before the 
court of appeals.  Neither the State nor the defendant argued in 
any court about the Chimel issue of the scope of the search, 
                                                 
14 See State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, ¶20, 238 
Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508 (relating to a protective sweep in a 
search incident to an arrest and a caretaker search).  See 
Notice of Oral Argument, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, September 
29, 2003. 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
although the defendant argued that the search of the wallet was 
not permissible within the scope of a pat down. 
¶45 The majority opinion errs.  That the search did not 
comply with Chimel is plain error.  The scope of the search 
affects substantial constitutional rights of the defendant, and 
this court should reach the issue and hold that the State failed 
to meet its burden to prove that the search was in the area 
within the arrestee's immediate control.  A reversal of 
conviction is required when plain error was committed.15  At a 
minimum the court should ask the parties to brief this issue, 
instead of relying on a non-existent concession or waiver.     
¶46 The majority opinion has relieved the State of its 
burden of establishing that the evidence was within the 
arrestee's immediate control and that the search falls under one 
of the "'jealously and carefully drawn'" exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.  Indeed, by asserting the defendant's 
failure to argue a point upon which the State clearly has the 
burden of persuasion, the majority opinion flips the burden of 
persuasion from the State to the defendant.     
¶47 Even if I were to agree with the remaining portions of 
the majority opinion——and I have my doubts——the record, despite 
the majority opinion's attempts to rectify its shortcomings, 
does not support the conclusion that the State has met its 
burden of persuasion under Chimel.  
                                                 
15 State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 87-91, 555 N.W.2d 189 
(1996); State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 176-77, 344 
N.W.2d 95 (1984). 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶48 Professor LaFave writes that when reviewing Chimel 
searches, some courts view a defendant "as a combination acrobat 
and Houdini who might well free himself from his restraints and 
suddenly gain access to some distant place."16  Here, the 
majority opinion has magically produced a valid Chimel search 
without a record delineating the location of the evidence in 
relation 
to 
the 
location 
of 
the 
arrestee. 
 
Like 
any 
illusionist's magical sleight of hand, the majority opinion is 
mystifying and puzzling, but ultimately not what it appears.  I 
therefore dissent. 
II 
¶49 I also write to address an issue of appellate 
practice, namely, how an attorney should advise this court of an 
erroneous statement in his or her brief or oral argument. 
¶50 On November 17, 2004, five days after oral arguments 
in this case, the experienced Assistant Attorney General 
representing the State filed a motion entitled: "MOTION TO 
CORRECT STATEMENTS MADE DURING ORAL ARGUMENT."  The State 
requested permission to submit a letter correcting statements 
made during oral arguments about an appellate decision, stating 
in part: 
The state is not submitting the proposed letter with 
this motion because the state does not want to place 
the additional information before the court in the 
above-entitled case before receiving permission from 
the court to do so.  A draft of the letter has been 
prepared and it would be approximately three pages 
long to identify the locations of the oral argument 
where the incorrect statements were made, to explain 
                                                 
16 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3(c) (2004). 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
the correct holding of the appellate decision and to 
explain how the [State's] statements were incorrect in 
reporting the holding of the case. 
 
¶51 What was remarkable about the State's motion is that 
the 
three-page 
double-spaced 
motion 
conspicuously 
and 
cryptically failed to mention the name of the erroneously 
represented case, the name of the "appellate court" issuing the 
erroneously represented case, the holding of the erroneously 
represented case, or how essential the erroneously represented 
case was to the State's position.  In my nearly 28 years on this 
court I cannot recall ever seeing a similarly worded motion.  
The ordinary practice is for a party's counsel to submit a 
letter to the court and to opposing counsel correcting any 
misstatement. 
¶52 The court denied the State's request in an unpublished 
order dated April 22, 2005, stating: "The court appreciates the 
candor of the State in wanting to correct any misstatement made 
during oral argument.  However, because the court relied on its 
own reading of the cases used in its decision and not on any 
statement made by the State during oral argument, it is not 
necessary to correct the representation that was made."   
¶53 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and I were the sole 
dissenters to the order.  We would have granted the State's 
motion, given the cost and time the parties invest in preparing 
for cases and the importance of the adversarial system.   
¶54 This court should care about representations made by 
parties.  When a party that will ultimately prevail (although 
the State could not have known that fact when it submitted the 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
motion) submits a motion to this court offering to correct an 
error, we should be receptive.  We need all the help we can get. 
¶55 The message that emerges from this court's order 
denying the State's motion should not be that the court does not 
care about what you say during oral argument.  The court does 
care.  The message for future litigants is: Do not ask 
permission to correct misstatements made at oral arguments or in 
the briefs, just do it.   
¶56 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶57 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this separate 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1234-CR.ssa 
 
1