Title: WILLIAM FRANK WARD V CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124533
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 8, 2005 
WILLIAM FRANK WARD, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124533 
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM 
The issue before us concerns the consequence, if any, 
of defendant’s inability to produce an allegedly defective 
locomotive handbrake at trial. 
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that 
because defendant disposed of the handbrake, it was 
presumed to be defective and the jury could infer that the 
missing evidence was unfavorable to defendant. 
This 
instruction was given despite the fact that defendant 
produced evidence that it discarded the handbrake in the 
regular course of business, for reasons unrelated to 
plaintiff’s claim. 
The jury returned a verdict for 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
plaintiff. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, in part, and 
remanded.1 
We conclude that the jury instructions were flawed in 
two respects. 
First, the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury that the handbrake was presumed to be 
defective. 
Such a presumption is not supported by the 
evidence. Second, the trial court erred when it instructed 
the jury that it could draw an adverse inference, but 
failed to explain that no inference should be drawn if 
defendant had a reasonable excuse for its failure to 
produce the evidence. 
Because these errors were not 
harmless, we reverse the part of the Court of Appeals 
judgment concerning the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 49 
USC 20302, and remand this case for a new trial on that 
claim before a properly instructed jury. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, a railroad engineer, claimed that he was 
injured by a faulty handbrake that he was using to secure 
one of defendant’s locomotives. The braking system employs 
two control levers. 
The brake is engaged by moving the 
application lever in an up-and-down arc; each upward stroke 
tightens a chain that runs from the lever to the brake. 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 7, 2003
(Docket No. 234619). 
2  
 
 
 
    
 
                                                 
 
 
The brake is disengaged through a separate release lever. 
Plaintiff claimed that his back was injured when the 
application lever unexpectedly stopped while he was in the 
middle of an upward stroke.2 
Plaintiff reported his injury to his employer the next 
day. 
Defendant had inspected the locomotive four days 
before plaintiff’s accident and the handbrake was working 
properly at that time. 
In response to plaintiff’s injury 
report, the entire handbrake assembly was inspected again, 
this time by defendant’s trainmaster and a locomotive 
machinist. 
They took apart and examined the assembly, 
including the levers, brake chain, and gear mechanism. 
They determined that the handbrake was functioning properly 
and returned the locomotive to service. 
Defendant’s employees then operated the locomotive 
regularly for more than two weeks, successfully using the 
application lever to engage the brake. Nineteen days after 
plaintiff’s injury, one of defendant’s employees reported 
that the release lever jammed and that the handbrake could 
not be disengaged. 
The locomotive was moved to a repair 
facility in Elkhart, Indiana, where it was examined by 
2 Defendant’s trainmaster had once before experienced
difficulty engaging the handbrake; the evidence showed that
this is a fairly common occurrence and is not considered a
defect in the brake. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
   
defendant’s 
maintenance 
supervisor. 
He 
removed 
and 
discarded the entire handbrake assembly and installed a new 
one. 
The Elkhart maintenance supervisor was unaware of 
plaintiff’s 
earlier 
report 
of 
a 
malfunction 
in 
the 
application lever. 
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit more than ten months 
later. 
He theorized that the application lever stopped in 
mid-stroke because of the presence of a repair link, or 
clevis, in the brake chain. 
He alleged that defendant was 
negligent under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA), 45 USC 51 et seq., and that defendant violated both 
the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act (FLIA), 49 US 20701 
et seq.,3 and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA), 49 
USC 20302.4 
In a motion for partial summary disposition, plaintiff 
informed the trial court that defendant discarded the 
entire handbrake assembly and argued that he was entitled 
3 The FLIA states, in relevant part, that a railroad
carrier may “use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender
on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and
its parts and appurtenances . . . [a]re in proper condition
and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal
injury . . . .” 49 USC 20701(1). 
4 The FSAA states, in relevant part, that a railroad
carrier may “use or allow to be used on any of its railroad
lines . . . a vehicle only if it is equipped with . . .
efficient hand brakes . . . .” 49 USC 20302(a)(1)(B). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
a 
presumption 
that 
the 
handbrake 
was 
defective. 
Defendant argued that no adverse presumption should be made 
because the handbrake was discarded in the ordinary course 
of business following a malfunction in the release lever—a 
mechanism different from the one plaintiff theorized caused 
his injury. 
Defendant supported its position with an 
affidavit from its Elkhart maintenance supervisor. 
The 
trial court resolved this issue in plaintiff’s favor and 
reaffirmed its ruling before the start of trial. 
The 
jury 
was 
made 
aware 
of 
the 
presumption. 
Plaintiff’s counsel said, during opening statement: 
And even though they knew about the injury,
they knew about these claims, the defect in this
hardware, they destroyed the evidence. 
The 
railroad destroyed the evidence. They threw away
the chain, they threw away the clevis, they threw
away the entire handbrake even though they had 
this knowledge. 
And it is for this reason that 
this Court has concluded there is a presumption
in this case that this handbrake was defective 
when Mr. Ward went to use it and got hurt on the
evening of February 19, 1998. 
This theme was repeated during jury voir dire and closing 
arguments. 
After the close of evidence, the trial court reminded 
the jury of the presumption and instructed it that it could 
infer that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable 
to defendant: 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
   
 
The Court made a determination that there 
was a presumption that the handbrake at issue was
defective due to the fact that the handbrake 
clevis and chain were discarded by defendant.
The defendant railroad has come forward with some 
evidence to rebut this presumption. Accordingly,
the law requires that I instruct you as follows: 
Certain evidence relevant to this case,
namely the handbrake, the clevis and chain, were
not 
available 
at 
trial 
because 
they 
were 
destroyed while in the possession or control of
the defendant. 
The Rules of Evidence provide
that you, the jury, may infer that this evidence
was unfavorable to the defendant. 
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. 
It found 
that defendant was not negligent under the FELA and that 
the handbrake was “in proper condition and safe to operate 
without unnecessary danger of personal injury” as required 
by the FLIA. 
The jury concluded, however, that the 
handbrake was not “efficient” as required by the FSAA and 
awarded plaintiff damages on this basis. 
Defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court properly granted plaintiff a presumption of 
defect and properly instructed the jury.5 
Defendant now seeks leave to appeal with this Court.6 
5 Defendant raised a total of thirteen issues in the 
Court of Appeals. It obtained relief on one issue relating
to the calculation of case-evaluation sanctions. 
6 We consider here only defendant’s claim that the
trial court erred when it granted plaintiff a presumption
that the missing handbrake was defective and when it 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review claims of instructional error de novo. 
Cox 
v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 8; 651 NW2d 356 
(2002). Jury instructions should not omit material issues, 
defenses, or theories that are supported by the evidence. 
Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 
(2000). 
Instructional error warrants reversal if it 
“resulted in such unfair prejudice to the complaining party 
that the failure to vacate the jury verdict would be 
‘inconsistent with substantial justice.’” 
Johnson v 
Corbet, 423 Mich 304, 327; 377 NW2d 713 (1985); 
MCR 
2.613(A). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The trial court’s instructions to the jury blurred the 
distinction between presumptions and inferences and were 
not tailored to the evidence submitted by the parties. 
In Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich 280, 289-290; 373 NW2d 
538 
(1985), 
we 
explained 
that 
a 
presumption 
is 
a 
“procedural device” that entitles the person relying on it 
to a directed verdict if the opposing party fails to 
introduce evidence rebutting the presumption. 
If rebuttal 
instructed the jury on this issue. 
In all other respects,
defendant’s application for leave to appeal is denied. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
evidence is introduced, the presumption dissolves, but the 
underlying inferences remain to be considered by the jury: 
Almost all presumptions are made up of 
permissible 
inferences. 
Thus, 
while 
the 
presumption 
may 
be 
overcome 
by 
evidence 
introduced, the inference itself remains and may
provide evidence sufficient to persuade the trier
of fact even though the rebutting evidence is
introduced. 
But always it is the inference and
not the presumption that must be weighed against
the rebutting evidence. [Id. at 289.] 
It is well settled that missing evidence gives rise to 
an adverse presumption only when the complaining party can 
establish “‘intentional conduct indicating fraud and a 
desire to destroy [evidence] and thereby suppress the 
truth.’” 
Trupiano v Cully, 349 Mich 568, 570; 84 NW2d 747 
(1957), quoting 20 Am Jur, Evidence, § 185, p 191; see also 
Lagalo v Allied Corp (On Remand), 233 Mich App 514, 520; 
592 NW2d 786 (1999). 
The evidence here does not warrant a presumption that 
the application lever of the handbrake was defective. When 
plaintiff requested the presumption, he established only 
that he gave defendant notice that the application lever 
had malfunctioned and that defendant discarded the entire 
handbrake assembly approximately three weeks later. 
This 
falls short of establishing that defendant committed 
“'intentional conduct indicating fraud and a desire to 
destroy [evidence] and thereby suppress the truth.'” 
8  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Trupiano, supra at 570, quoting 20 Am Jur, Evidence, § 185, 
p 191. 
Moreover, even if plaintiff’s initial evidentiary 
showing 
had 
been 
sufficient, 
no 
presumption 
would 
ultimately remain because defendant came forward with 
rebuttal evidence that provided a nonfraudulent explanation 
for its decision to discard the handbrake. 
See Widmayer, 
supra at 289. 
Once defendant presented this evidence, the 
initial presumption dissolved and, at best, the fact-finder 
was left with the possibility of considering the underlying 
inferences. 
Id.  As a result, the trial court erred when 
it granted plaintiff an unrebuttable, adverse presumption 
that the handbrake was defective and allowed the jury to be 
informed of its ruling. 
The trial court compounded this error when it read the 
jury a modified version of M Civ JI 6.01 and instructed the 
jury that it could infer that the evidence would have been 
unfavorable to defendant.7
 A jury may draw an adverse 
7 M Civ JI 6.01(c) addresses the situation, like this
one, where a party admits that it had control of evidence
but cannot produce it and seeks to offer a reasonable
excuse: 
(The [plaintiff / defendant] in this case 
has not offered [the testimony of [name] / 
[identify exhibit]]. As this evidence was under 
the control of the [plaintiff / defendant] and 
9  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
inference against a party that has failed to produce 
evidence only when: (1) the evidence was under the party’s 
control and could have been produced; (2) the party lacks a 
reasonable excuse for its failure to produce the evidence; 
and (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, 
and not equally available to the other party. 
Lagalo, 
supra at 520; M Civ JI 6.01. 
In this case, the trial 
court’s instruction omitted the critical language in M Civ 
JI 6.01 explaining that no adverse inference arises if 
defendant has a reasonable explanation for its failure to 
produce the missing evidence. We conclude, therefore, that 
the trial court erred both in regard to the adverse 
presumption ruling and the modified M Civ JI 6.01(c) 
instruction. 
Having determined that the trial court erred, we turn 
to the issue whether the error was harmless.8  Instructional 
could have been produced by [him / her], you may
infer that the evidence would have been adverse 
to the [plaintiff / defendant], if you believe
that no reasonable excuse for [plaintiff’s /
defendant’s] failure to produce the evidence has
been shown.) 
8 As an initial matter, before a “harmless error”
inquiry is performed by the reviewing court, the party
challenging the instruction must preserve the issue for
appeal. 
MCR 2.516(C). 
To preserve the issue, the party
must timely object to the instruction on the record,
“stating specifically the matter to which the party objects
and the grounds for the objection.” Id. 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
error is harmless unless a failure by the reviewing court 
to 
correct 
the 
error 
would 
be 
“inconsistent 
with 
substantial justice.” 
MCR 2.613(A). 
The error in this 
case was harmless with regard to the FELA and FLIA claims 
because the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action 
in favor of defendant. 
We do not disturb this aspect of 
the judgment. 
Id. 
The error was not harmless, however, 
with regard to the jury’s finding that the handbrake was 
“inefficient” and that defendant violated the FSAA. 
During 
trial, 
plaintiff’s 
counsel 
made 
repeated 
references to the erroneous adverse presumption ruling. 
Counsel for plaintiff told the jury during voir dire, 
opening arguments, and closing arguments that the handbrake 
At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff stipulated the
timeliness of defendant’s objection. 
Plaintiff’s counsel 
only challenged the specificity of the objection. 
At 
trial, defense counsel objected to the instruction given by
the trial court by stating, “The defendant objects to the
presumption 
instruction 
or 
the 
revised 
presumption
instruction that was given today. 
We object to the fact
that the requested instruction by the defendant regarding
inference that the prior and post condition of the brake
should have been considered.” 
While we acknowledge that defense counsel’s objection
is not a model of clarity, we conclude that defense counsel
satisfied the specificity requirements of MCR 2.516(C).
Counsel stated specifically the matter to which defendant
objected (i.e., the revised presumption instruction given
by the trial court) and the grounds for the objection
(i.e., that the trial court did not give the full inference
instruction requested by defendant). 
Accordingly, defense
counsel preserved the issue for appeal. 
11  
 
 
 
 
could be “presumed defective.” 
The trial court itself 
reminded the jury of the adverse presumption when it 
instructed the jury before deliberations. 
The trial 
court’s erroneous ruling on the adverse presumption and the 
numerous references by plaintiff’s counsel to the ruling 
during 
trial 
fundamentally 
prejudiced 
defendant 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
FSAA 
claim 
because 
it 
significantly 
interfered with the jury’s ability to "'decide the case 
intelligently, fairly, and impartially.'” Cox, supra at 15 
(quoting Johnson, supra at 327). 
Accordingly, failure to 
vacate this aspect of the judgment and to grant defendant a 
new trial on the FSAA claim would be “inconsistent with 
substantial justice.” MCR 2.613(A). 
We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that the 
trial court cured its erroneous adverse presumption ruling 
when it later read the jury a modified version of the 
adverse inference instruction contained in M Civ JI 
6.01(c). 
To the contrary, the trial court’s truncated 
version of M Civ JI 6.01(c) only compounded its prior 
error. 
The modified version of M Civ JI 6.01(c) omitted 
the critical language informing the jury that no adverse 
interference arises if the jury believes that a reasonable 
excuse for defendant’s failure to produce the missing 
evidence has been shown. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
At trial, defendant presented evidence that its 
maintenance supervisor, unaware of plaintiff’s earlier 
injury report, discarded the handbrake assembly during the 
normal course of business. Specifically, defendant offered 
evidence that its maintenance supervisor discarded the 
handbrake assembly in response to a separate complaint 
about the handbrake’s release lever—a lever different from 
the application lever, which plaintiff theorized caused his 
injury. 
Accordingly, 
because 
defendant 
presented 
a 
reasonable excuse for its failure to produce the handbrake 
at trial, we conclude that defendant was fundamentally 
prejudiced by the trial court’s modified version of M Civ 
JI 6.01(c). 
Defendant was entitled to have the jury hear 
the entire version of M Civ JI 6.01(c), not an abbreviated 
version 
that 
created 
an 
artificial 
and 
overwhelming 
advantage in favor of plaintiff. 
To hold otherwise would 
deny defendant a fair trial and would be “inconsistent with 
substantial justice.” MCR 2.613(A); see also Cox, supra at 
15 (holding that the failure to reverse on the basis of the 
trial court’s modified version of SJI2d 30.01, which 
effectively 
altered 
the 
burden 
of 
proof, 
would 
be 
inconsistent with substantial justice). 
13  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we reverse the part of the Court of 
Appeals judgment concerning the FSAA claim and remand this 
case to the trial court for a new trial on plaintiff’s FSAA 
claim before a properly instructed jury. 
On remand, the 
trial court shall instruct the jury that it may infer that 
the evidence would be unfavorable to defendant, but that no 
such inference should arise if the jury believes that 
defendant has a reasonable explanation for its failure to 
produce the missing evidence. M Civ JI 6.01(c). 
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
  
 
  
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
WILLIAM FRANK WARD, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124533 
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION,
d/b/a CONRAIL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
While I tend to agree that the trial court initially 
erred under existing law when it concluded that plaintiff 
was entitled to an adverse presumption,1 I am not as 
convinced as the majority that the trial court ultimately 
erred when it instructed the jury that it could infer that 
the 
missing 
evidence 
was 
unfavorable 
to 
defendant.2 
Moreover, even assuming that the trial court erroneously 
1 See Trupiano v Cully, 349 Mich 568, 570; 84 NW2d 747
(1957). 
2 See, e.g., In re Wood Estate, 374 Mich 278, 288-290;
132 NW2d 35 (1965). 
See also Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich
280, 289; 373 NW2d 538 (1985); Brandt v C F Smith & Co, 242
Mich 217, 222; 218 NW 803 (1928); Dowagiac Mfg Co v
Schneider, 181 Mich 538, 541; 148 NW 173 (1914); Vergin v 
City of Saginaw, 125 Mich 499, 503; 84 NW 1075 (1901);
Cooley v Foltz, 85 Mich 47, 49; 48 NW 176 (1891); Cole v 
Lake Shore & M S R Co, 81 Mich 156, 161-162; 45 NW 983
(1890). 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
instructed the jury, I would conclude that the error was 
harmless. 
Here, the jury found that defendant was not negligent 
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 USC 
51 et seq. 
The jury also concluded that the handbrake in 
question was in proper condition and safe to operate 
without unnecessary danger of personal injury as required 
by the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act (FLIA). 
See 49 
USC 20701(1). 
However, the jury found that the Federal 
Safety 
Appliance 
Act 
(FSAA), 
specifically 
49 
USC 
20302(a)(1)(B), had been violated because the handbrake was 
inefficient. On the facts before us, I fail to see how the 
perceived error in this case resulted in such unfair 
prejudice to defendant that permitting the jury’s verdict 
to stand would be inconsistent with substantial justice. 
In my view, the jury could have reached its verdict without 
the 
aid 
of 
the 
trial 
court’s 
arguably 
erroneous 
instruction. 
The jury could have concluded that defendant 
was not negligent and that the handbrake, even though not 
unnecessarily 
dangerous, 
was 
nonetheless 
inefficient.3 
Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
3 See, e.g., MCR 2.613(A); Urben v Pub Bank, 365 Mich
279, 287; 112 NW2d 444 (1961); Macklem v Warren Constr Co,
343 Mich 334; 72 NW2d 60 (1955).
2