Title: Robbins v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 712, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DUANE ROLLINS, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 712, 2009  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
          § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0606006060 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November 1, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 1st day of November 2010, upon careful consideration of the 
briefs on appeal and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Duane Rollins, appeals from a Superior Court 
January 28, 2010 order denying his motion for postconviction relief under  
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We have determined that there is no merit 
to the appeal and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
 
(2) 
Rollins and Demond Laws engaged in a verbal dispute on June 
8, 2006.  The argument took place on the street near Rollins’ house and was 
witnessed by Laws’ girlfriend.  The argument escalated when Rollins 
retrieved something from a nearby vehicle and approached Laws with what 
 
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appeared to be a handgun. When Laws’ girlfriend called the police, Rollins 
retreated into his house. 
 
(3) 
Wilmington Police Detective Patrick Conner arrived at the 
scene to find other officers securing the premises and trying to get Rollins to 
come out of the house.  Detective Conner left the scene to apply for a search 
warrant.  By the time Conner returned with the warrant, Rollins had 
surrendered to the police and was in custody. 
 
(4) 
As a result of his search of the house, yard and vehicle, 
Detective Conner seized several rounds of ammunition, an electronic scale, 
clear plastic bags in various sizes, a pot of marijuana plants, and two 
different substances that he suspected were cocaine or heroin.  Conner also 
recovered a handgun. 
 
(5) 
In July 2006, Rollins was indicted on drug charges, weapon 
charges, aggravated menacing and resisting arrest.  The Superior Court held 
a two-day jury trial in March 2007.  Rollins elected not to testify at his trial. 
 
(6) 
The jury convicted Rollins of the drug charges and resisting 
arrest, but deadlocked on the weapon/ammunition and aggravated menacing 
charges.  Those latter charges were eventually dismissed by nolle prosequi. 
 
(7) 
Rollins filed a direct appeal.  Rollins’ trial counsel, an assistant 
public defender, prepared and filed the notice of appeal.  Thereafter, a 
 
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different assistant public defender filed a substitution of counsel and took 
over Rollins’ representation on appeal.  Rollins’ appellate counsel later filed 
a brief and motion to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  By 
order dated March 10, 2008, we granted the State's motion to affirm, and did 
affirm the Superior Court judgment.1 
 
(8) 
In his motion for postconviction relief filed on March 23, 2009, 
Rollins claimed that he was denied the right to counsel because (i) “the 
Public Defender’s policy and procedures” prevented trial counsel from 
providing effective representation;2 (ii) to gain credibility with the jury, trial 
counsel admitted that Rollins “was growing marijuana in a potted plant in 
his back yard”;3 and (iii) trial counsel was replaced by appellate counsel on 
direct appeal.  For those and numerous other reasons, Rollins also claimed 
that his trial counsel was ineffective,4 as was appellate counsel for having 
failed to examine the record conscientiously to identify appealable issues. 
                                          
 
1 Rollins v. State, 2008 WL 637782 (Del. Supr.). 
2 Rollins alleged that “the Public Defender’s policy and procedures . . . are geared toward 
economy of time and resources, as oppose[d] to client[] needs and rights.” 
3 The trial transcript reflects that at the outset of the closing statement by the defense, 
trial counsel stated, “Can the defense stand up here and say marijuana growing in the 
back yard in a potted plant didn’t happen here?  No.  He was growing marijuana in a 
potted plant in his back yard.”  Trial tr. at 15-16 (Mar. 16, 2007). 
4 The other allegations as summarized are that trial counsel was ineffective when he 
failed to:  (i) personally attend the preliminary hearing and arraignment; (ii) conduct a 
reasonable pretrial investigation into the legality of the search and seizure; (iii) file a 
motion to suppress; (iv) interview witnesses who could “potentially provide critical 
testimony of an exculpatory nature”; (v) prevent Rollins from appearing before the jury 
 
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(9) 
The Superior Court referred the postconviction motion to a 
Commissioner for proposed findings of fact and recommendations.  The 
Commissioner issued an order directing that trial counsel and appellate 
counsel file affidavits in response to Rollins’ allegations of ineffective 
assistance, and that counsel for the State file a legal memorandum.  The 
order also allowed Rollins to reply. 
 
(10) In a twenty-one page report dated October 29, 2009, the 
Commissioner recommended that the postconviction motion be denied.  The 
Commissioner made factual findings based primarily on the parties’ written 
submissions and the trial transcript.  Applying the Strickland standard, the 
Commissioner determined that Rollins’ ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, were without merit after finding that Rollins had not demonstrated 
that the actions of either counsel fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness or that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.5 
 
(11) In his objections to the Commissioner’s report, Rollins claimed 
that the Commissioner had “an unreasonable determination of the facts, 
                                                                                                                             
 
in prison clothing; (vi) challenge various evidentiary rulings, and (vii) file a motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
5 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984) (holding that a defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial). 
 
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without conducting an evidentiary hearing.”  After considering the matter de 
novo, the Superior Court adopted the report and denied Rollins’ motion for 
postconviction relief.  The Superior Court’s order provided:  
[The] objections to [the] report do nothing but restate the 
grounds for relief set forth in [Rollins’] initial motion and reply.  
The Commissioner correctly applied the appropriate legal 
standard to [Rollins’] claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and correctly developed a factual record from which to 
evaluate those claims.6 
 
 
(12) On appeal, Rollins argues that the Superior Court was required 
to analyze his denial of counsel claim under the presumed-prejudice 
standard articulated in United States v. Cronic.7  The argument is without 
merit.  The record does not reflect “a complete breakdown of the adversary 
process,” as Rollins contends, or any other circumstances warranting a 
presumption-of-prejudice analysis under Cronic. 
 
(13) Next, Rollins argues that the Superior Court erred in adopting 
the Commissioner’s report without addressing his specific objections to the 
factual determinations or conducting an evidentiary hearing.  Rollins urges 
                                          
 
6 State v. Rollins, 2010 WL 424447 (Del. Super.). 
7 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984) (articulating three situations 
in which the prejudice requirement under Strickland is presumed:  (i) when the defendant 
is denied counsel at a critical stage; (ii) when counsel entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (iii) when the circumstances are 
such that there is an extremely small likelihood that even a competent attorney could 
provide effective assistance).  
 
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the Court to remand the matter “for a more specific determination of the 
facts." 
 
(14) In the circumstances of this case, we determine that the 
Superior Court properly exercised its discretion when disposing of the 
postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing.  Having carefully 
considered the parties’ briefs on appeal and the evidentiary record, the Court 
concludes that Rollins’ “conflicting facts warranting further inquiry” were, 
in fact, either reasonably discounted as not supported by the record, 
persuasively rebutted by counsel’s affidavits, or not material to a 
determination of Rollins’ claims.  Nor does the record support Rollins’ claim 
that the judge who decided the postconviction motion, who was not the trial 
judge, failed to give his claims due consideration. 
 
(15) This Court has determined that Rollins has not demonstrated 
that the Superior Court erred when it decided his postconviction motion on 
the basis of the report and without conducting an evidentiary hearing.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice