Title: Williamson v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 228, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TROY WILLIAMSON,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 228, 2014 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
v. 
 
 
 
§ 
Superior Court of the  
§ 
State of Delaware, in and for 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 1306022407 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  February 18, 2015 
Decided:   March 23, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
Morgan T. Zurn, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
VALIHURA, Justice: 
 
 
1	  
In this appeal, we consider what it means to suffer a “physical  injury” as an 
element of the crime of Assault Second Degree against a law enforcement officer.   
Defendant-below Troy Williamson (“Williamson”) was arrested on June 25, 
2013, and charged with offensive touching of a law enforcement officer.  The 
misdemeanor offense was later upgraded, and he was indicted on September 3, 
2013, for the felony offense of Assault Second Degree of a law enforcement 
officer.  After a bench trial in March 2014, Williamson was convicted of Assault 
Second Degree1 and was sentenced to four years of incarceration at Level V, 
suspended after two years for six months of Level IV supervision at the discretion 
of the Department of Correction, followed by one year of Level III probation.  On 
appeal, Williamson argues that there was insufficient evidence concerning physical 
injury to a law enforcement officer to convict him of Assault Second Degree.  He 
argues that the verdict should have been a finding of guilty of the lesser included 
offense of offensive touching of a law enforcement officer, 11 Del. C. § 601(c) – a 
Class A misdemeanor – rather than Assault Second Degree, which is a Class D 
felony.  We disagree and for the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 25, 2013, Williamson, who had agreed in his plea agreement to 
cooperate in the prosecution of his codefendants for a series of pizza delivery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3). 
2	  
robberies, reported to the Delaware Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and was 
brought into a conference room.  Members of the DOJ, Ipek Medford (“Medford”) 
and Jamie McCloskey (“McCloskey”), accompanied Detective Thomas Abram 
(“Abram”) in prepping Williamson for the upcoming trial.  Williamson appeared 
disinterested in reviewing his expected testimony and refused to answer questions.  
Instead, he put on his sunglasses and pretended to be sleeping.  As a result of 
Williamson’s behavior, Medford and McCloskey left the conference room.  Abram 
followed, but returned to the room a short time later. 
Williamson asked Abram if he was being detained.  Abram responded that 
he did not know, but that if Williamson left, Williamson likely would be violating 
his probation.  Williamson stood up with the transcript and his subpoena for the 
upcoming trial in his hands.  Abram told Williamson that he could not leave with 
the transcript.  Williamson then said, “f*** you, I’m leaving,” and threw the 
transcript and subpoena at Abram.  Abram picked up the subpoena and extended it 
to Williamson’s chest.  Williamson started throwing punches and Abram punched 
back.  Williamson tried to grab hold of Abram’s shirt, and pushed Abram into the 
corner of a table.  Abram was eventually able to pin Williamson’s face down into a 
3	  
chair and yell for help.  An officer then entered the room and helped Abram 
handcuff Williamson.2 
As a result of the struggle, Abram sustained a bruise on the back of his left 
leg and pulled his left groin muscle.  Abram testified that he did not go to the 
hospital or seek any medical treatment for his injuries.  Abram further testified that 
he had to use his left arm to lift his leg up to get into his car.  He testified that this 
lasted approximately four to six weeks.  Abram also testified that he frequently 
went to the “Y” and that he “couldn’t really do anything during [the four to six 
weeks after the struggle] because of the discomfort.” 
Before the judge rendered a verdict, Williamson asked the Superior Court 
“to find [him] not guilty, or, at most, [guilty of] offensive touching of a law 
enforcement officer.”  The thrust of Williamson’s argument was that the State had 
not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Williamson caused the police officer 
physical injury, and thus, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that 
Williamson committed Assault Second Degree against a law enforcement officer.  
The Superior Court indicated that before it reached a verdict, it would review prior 
cases concerning physical injury. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
2 We note that Williamson was a material witness and had agreed to testify at the trial of his 
codefendants.  Further, this incident occurred within the Criminal Division of the Attorney 
General’s Office in the busy State Office Building where Detective Abram and others were 
armed.  Ultimately, Williamson was not called to testify in the trial because he was 
uncooperative. 
4	  
However, Williamson did not ask the trial court to enter a judgment of 
acquittal.  After the judge returned the verdict, Williamson did not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of Assault Second Degree.  Further, 
Williamson failed to raise this issue in a post-trial motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.  Accordingly, the parties also dispute what standard of review we apply 
when reviewing a claim for insufficiency of the evidence to convict in a bench trial 
where the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not explicitly seek a 
judgment of acquittal. 
DISCUSSION 
As for the threshold issue of which standard of review we should apply, it is 
well-settled that in a jury trial, if a defendant fails to make a motion for acquittal to 
the trial court, the defendant has failed to preserve the right to appeal the issue of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, and we would apply the plain error 
standard of review.3  The issue of what standard of review we apply here, where 
the substance of the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence was put before the trial 
court in a bench trial, but where no motion for a judgment of acquittal was made, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
3 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8.  See also Williams v. State, 98 A.3d 917, 920 (Del. 2014) (citing Turner 
v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010); Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995)); Gordon 
v. State, 604 A.2d 1367, 1368 (Del. 1992).  Under the plain error standard of review, “[t]he error 
complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial process.”  Dougherty v. State, 21 A.3d 1, 2 (Del. 2011) (quoting Turner, 5 
A.3d at 615).  Plain error is “limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the 
record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an 
accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”  Id. 
5	  
appears to be a question of first impression.  Superior Court Criminal Rule 29 
governs motions for a judgment of acquittal.4  The analogous federal rule is 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.  Both rules, although worded differently, 
contemplate that a court may, on its own, consider whether the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction.5  Numerous federal appellate courts have held 
that a plea of not guilty in a bench trial is tantamount to a motion for acquittal, and 
accordingly, find that no waiver of the sufficiency of the evidence claim has 
occurred.6  Although the better practice for the defense is to move for a judgment 
of acquittal in a bench trial in order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we hold, consistent with the majority of federal appellate courts that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 29. 
5 Compare Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 29(a) (“The court on motion of a defendant or of its own 
motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the 
indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient 
to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.”), with Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) (“After the 
government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s 
motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction.  The court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction.”). 
6 See United States v. Orgovan, 377 Fed.Appx. 227, 229 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Grace, 367 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Hogan, 89 F.3d 403, 404 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(citing United States v. South, 28 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hon, 306 F.2d 52, 54 
(7th Cir. 1962)); United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1159 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United 
States v. Rosas-Fuentes, 970 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pitts, 428 F.2d 
534, 535 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970)); United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 
501, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Besase, 373 F.2d 120, 121 (6th Cir. 1967); Hall v. 
United States, 286 F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 910 (1961); see also 
Charles Alan Wright et al., 2A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 469 Appellate Review (4th ed. 2014) 
(“[After a bench trial,] it is held that the sufficiency of the evidence will be considered on appeal, 
even though there was no motion for acquittal, on the theory that ‘the plea of not guilty asks the 
court for a judgment of acquittal, and a motion to the same end is not necessary.’” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
6	  
have addressed this issue, that where the defendant has entered a plea of “not 
guilty” but fails to formally move for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial, the 
issue of the sufficiency of the evidence will be reviewed the same as if there had 
been a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal.   
Thus, we will review the claim here to determine “whether any rational trier 
of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find [a] 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”7  This conclusion follows from the 
well-settled view that where there is no substantial evidence to support a 
conviction in a criminal case, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict of 
acquittal, regardless of whether a motion to that effect is made.8 
Turning to the merits of his appeal, Williamson argues that the evidence 
presented at trial did not establish “physical injury” as statutorily defined and, as a 
result, he should only have been convicted of the lesser included offense of 
offensive touching of a law enforcement officer.  Ordinarily, Assault Second 
Degree requires “serious physical injury to another person”9 or “physical injury to 
another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
7 Monroe, 652 A.2d at 563 (quoting Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991)). 
8 See Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 28 (Del. 2003) (holding that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it failed to enter a judgment of acquittal sua sponte after the State conceded 
that the jury would “probably acquit” on four counts). 
9 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
10 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(2).  
7	  
However, where the assault is directed at a law-enforcement officer, only “physical 
injury” is required.11  Delaware law defines physical injury as “impairment of 
physical condition or substantial pain.”12  The parties disagree about the 
application of this definition to the facts of the case. 
This Court has held that 11 Del. C. § 222(23) does not require the victim to 
seek medical treatment in order to establish physical injury.13  Thus, Abram’s 
failure to seek medical treatment does not bar a conviction of Williamson for 
Assault Second Degree.  Additionally, this Court has held that the “victim’s 
testimony concerning the extent of [his or her] physical injuries [is] sufficient by 
itself” to establish a conviction.14  Accordingly, Abram’s testimony regarding his 
injuries is sufficient to convict Williamson, if this Court finds that the injuries rise 
to the level of “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”15 
This Court has defined “impairment of physical condition” to mean “harm to 
the body that results in a reduction in one’s ability to use the body or a bodily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
11 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3) (“A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: . . . The 
person intentionally causes physical injury to a law-enforcement officer . . . who is acting in the 
lawful performance of duty.” (emphasis added)). 
12 11 Del. C. § 222(23).   
13 King v. State, 2007 WL 2949146, at *3 (Del. Oct. 11, 2007) (“Although ‘physical injury’ 
requires a ‘physical impairment or substantial injury,’ the statute does not require confirmation 
through medical treatment.”). 
14 McKnight v. State, 753 A.2d 436, 438 (Del. 2000) (quoting Snowden v. State, 1995 WL 
478370 (Del. Aug. 10, 1995)); Davis v. State, 1999 WL 86055 (Del. Jan. 20, 1999) (finding 
sufficient evidence to support a jury’s finding that defendant was guilty of second degree assault 
where the only evidence presented was that of the complainant-victim).  
15 See 11 Del. C. § 222(23).   
8	  
organ.”16  This Court has not defined the term “substantial pain,” but has 
“concluded that the term should be given ‘its commonly accepted meaning.’”17   
Further, we have held that the victim need not “say the specific statutory words 
‘substantial pain’” to meet the standard.18  A review of this Court’s decisions in 
this area convinces us that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Abram suffered “physical injury” within the meaning of the statute. 
To illustrate, in Davis v. State, the defendant kicked a police officer 
underneath the ribs and was charged with Assault Second Degree.19  The kick 
knocked the wind out of the officer and caused “an immediate sharp pain” under 
his ribs.20  The area became “inflamed and it reddened, and by the end of the day it 
was showing bruising.”21  Although the officer did not seek medical treatment and 
did not miss any time from work, he experienced pain and bruising for 
approximately one month after the incident and general tenderness for several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
16 Harris v. State, 965 A.2d 691, 694 (Del. 2009) (applying the Oregon Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation of the same statutory language).   
17 Mumitt v. State, 2009 WL 3191709, at *2 (Del. 2009) (citing 11 Del. C. § 221(c)).  
18 Id. at *3. 
19 Davis v. State, 1999 WL 86055 (Del. Jan. 20, 1999). 
20 Id. at *1. 
21 Id. 
9	  
months.  This Court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish physical 
injury.22 
In Walker v. State, a police officer intervened in a conflict among inmates at 
the Sussex County Violation of Probation Center and was struck in the face.23  The 
officer suffered abrasions, cuts, and scratches on his face, hands, and neck, which 
caused swelling and redness.  He did not leave work at the time, but went to the 
hospital later and got a tetanus shot and had the cuts cleaned out.  The officer 
testified that he took Tylenol for a few days after the incident.24  This Court held 
that although the injuries were not serious, they required medical treatment to 
avoid infection and control the pain, and therefore, the injuries were sufficient to 
satisfy the definition of physical injury.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
22 The Superior Court addressed a similar situation involving the question of whether a 
defendant’s actions caused a “physical injury” in the context of Robbery First Degree under 11 
Del. C. § 832(a)(1) in McKnight v. State.  In that case, the defendant punched a security guard in 
the face resulting in pain, abrasions and swelling to the security guard’s jaw, but no bleeding.  
The officer did not seek medical treatment and only took aspirin for the pain.  This Court 
affirmed the Superior Court’s conclusion that the evidence supported a conviction of Robbery 
First Degree where in the course of committing Robbery Second Degree, he caused “physical 
injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime.”  McKnight, 753 A.2d at 437.  In so 
holding, this Court observed that we have “held that bruised ribs and a bruised arm were 
sufficient evidence of physical injury to submit a charge of Robbery First Degree to a jury.”  Id. 
at 438 (citing Dunham v. State, 497 A.2d 786 (Del. 1985)); see also Handy v. State, 1998 WL 
15013 (Del. Jan. 13, 1998) (visible bruising that required two weeks to heal and testimony by a 
victim that she was “very sore” established “physical injury”). 
23 Walker v. State, 2002 WL 229500 (Del. Feb. 11, 2002). 
24 Id. at *1. 
25 Id. 
10	  
In Raymond v. State, this Court determined that the evidence relating to the 
charge of Assault Second Degree was sufficient to establish that the defendant 
intentionally caused physical injury to a law enforcement officer.26  There, the 
officer suffered two broken bones in his hands as a result attempting to subdue the 
defendant. 
In Moye v. State, this Court found the evidence sufficient to establish 
“physical injury” for three individuals.27  There, the defendant punched a bus 
driver in the mouth and went back to his seat.  A short time later, he returned and 
started punching the driver in the head.  The driver used his shoulders to block the 
punches.  The defendant “tussled” with a police officer, biting him on the arm.28  
That officer and another officer eventually handcuffed the defendant and 
transported him to the Wilmington Hospital.  As a result of blocking the punches, 
the driver pinched a nerve.  The driver also testified that he felt a “sharp pain” from 
the defendant’s first punch.29  He treated his injuries with medication and a heating 
pad, and missed a few days of work.  This Court held that a reasonable jury could 
have concluded from this evidence that the driver “suffered substantial pain and/or 
that the pinched nerve reduced his ability to use his shoulder and arm,” and that in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
26 Raymond v. State, 2007 WL 666778 (Del. Mar. 6, 2007). 
27 Moye v. State, 2010 WL 376872 (Del. Jan. 20, 2010). 
28 Id. at *1. 
29 Id. 
11	  
either event, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of physical injury.30  
Although the officer did not realize he had been bitten at the time the bite occurred, 
this Court held that based upon the teeth marks and broken skin, the “jury could 
infer from this evidence that [the officer] suffered ‘physical injury.’”31  At the 
hospital, the defendant kicked a nurse in the arm, causing a large bruise that was 
“quite sore” for several days.32  This Court noted that her injuries were “sufficient 
to support a finding of ‘physical injury’ based on ‘substantial pain.’”33 
However, in Harris v. State,34 the evidence presented was insufficient to 
establish “physical injury.”  There, the defendant elbowed a police officer in the 
forehead, causing a red mark, and the officer suffered scratches on his knee during 
a scuffle with the defendant.35  The officer testified that he treated his injuries by 
washing them off and applying Neosporin, but he did not seek medical attention.  
This Court concluded that the police officer’s injuries were de minimis, and 
therefore, did not rise to the level of physical injury under the statute.  In doing so, 
this Court noted that there was no evidence of bruising, swelling, or other “after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
30 Id.   
31 Id. at *2. 
32 Id. at *1-2. 
33 Id. at *2; see also Slaton v. State, 1996 WL 147619 (Del. Mar. 26, 1996) (victim sustained 
“serious physical injury” consisting of pulled ligaments and tendons in her arm which caused her 
to miss approximately three weeks of work). 
34 965 A.2d 691 (Del. 2009). 
35 Id. at 693. 
12	  
effects” that impaired the officer’s physical condition or caused any continuing 
discomfort or limited use of his body.36  Further, there was no evidence “that the 
scratches caused any continuing discomfort or limited the use of his knee.”37  As to 
whether there was evidence of “substantial pain,” the police officer felt a “jarring 
sensation” when he was elbowed in the forehead, but testified that he did not feel 
any pain.38  He also testified that his scraped knee hurt.39  Based upon that 
evidence, this Court concluded that there was no “substantial pain.”40   
Abram’s injuries are more akin to those described in Davis, Walker, 
Raymond, and Moye than those in Harris.  Here, Abram was pushed into a corner 
of a table and unlike the situation in Harris, Abram suffered physical effects, 
namely, the bruising of his leg and the pulling of his left groin that caused him 
some limitations in the movement of his leg for four to six weeks.41   Accordingly, 
Abram’s injuries were sufficient to satisfy a showing of impairment of physical 
condition. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 694. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Binaird v. State, 967 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2009) (holding that an abrasion on the victim’s arm 
supported a finding of physical injury after the victim testified that the abrasion was painful and 
that he had to clean and wrap it). 
13	  
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby 
AFFIRMED.