Title: Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity
Citation: 662 So. 2d 894
Docket Number: 1931030, 1931031, 1931141, 1931142, 1931149, 1931150
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 1995

662 So. 2d 894 (1995)
Joyce PINTO, et al.
v.
ALABAMA COALITION FOR EQUITY, et al.
Joyce PINTO, et al.
v.
ALABAMA COALITION FOR EQUITY, et al.
Robin SWIFT
v.
ALABAMA COALITION FOR EQUITY, et al.
Robin SWIFT
v.
ALABAMA COALITION FOR EQUITY, et al.
Walter ANDERTON, et al.
v.
ALABAMA COALITION FOR EQUITY, et al.
Walter ANDERTON, et al.
v.
ALABAMA COALITION FOR EQUITY, et al.
1931030, 1931031, 1931141, 1931142, 1931149 and 1931150.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 19, 1995.
Thomas F. Parker IV and Samuel Adams, Montgomery, John Eidsmoe, Pike Road, for Pinto appellants.
Ted Pearson, Birmingham, for Anderton, Hall and Trucks appellants.
Richard N. Meadows, Denise B. Azar and Ashley H. Hamlett, Montgomery, for Alabama State Board of Education and State Superintendent of Education.
Thomas L. Stewart and Mary H. Thompson of Gorham, Stewart, Kendrick, Bryant &amp; Battle, P.C., Birmingham, for Governor Jim Folsom, Jr.
PER CURIAM.
Joyce Pinto, Robin Swift, and Walter Anderton appeal as class-action representatives from a judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court denying their motions to intervene in these actions. We reverse and remand as to Pinto and Anderton, and we dismiss the appeals by Swift.
*895 The factual background of this case was broadly described in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala.1993). For the convenience of the reader, the factual statement is reproduced here (quoting the trial court's order as it was quoted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338):
1 The plaintiff school systems [were]: Barbour, Butler, Clarke, Coosa, Crenshaw, Geneva, Hale, Lawrence, Lowndes, Macon, Pickens, Pike, Winston, Greene, Bullock, Conecuh, Henry, Limestone, Perry, Walker, Wilcox, Chambers, Talladega, and Dallas County Boards of Education and the Troy City Board of Education."
624 So. 2d  at 110-12 (footnote 1 in original; other footnotes omitted).
*896 On March 31, 1993, the court entered in the "liability phase" a judgment, which included the following findings and declarations (as quoted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338):
624 So. 2d  at 165-66 (footnotes omitted).
On April 22, 1993, Governor Hunt was convicted of a felony; he was that day, by operation of law, removed from office, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 36-9-2, and replaced by Lieutenant Governor Jim Folsom, Jr., pursuant to Ala. Const.1901, § 127. On May 28, 1993, the following parties moved to be realigned as defendants in their official capacities: (1) the speaker of the House of Representatives, James Clark; (2) the State superintendent of education, Wayne Teague; and (3) Alabama State Board of Education members John Tyson, Jr., Steadman Shealy, Jr., Dan Cleckler, Ethel Hall, Willie Paul, Betty Fine Collins, Victor Poole, and Tazewell Shepard. On June 8, 1993, Governor Folsom moved to be substituted formally as an official-capacity defendant in the place of former Governor Hunt.
On June 9, 1993, these parties jointly moved the trial court to certify the liability-phase order as a final judgment, pursuant to Ala.R.Civ.P. 54(b). On that day, the trial court made that order final; it also granted the motions for substitution, realignment, and certification. Additionally, the court ordered the defendants to develop, in cooperation with the plaintiffs and with Dr. J. Wayne Flynt, a court-appointed "facilitator," a "single comprehensive Remedy Plan for the purpose of ensuring full and complete compliance with" the liability-phase judgment. No appeal was taken from that judgment.
On July 14, 1993, the plaintiffs moved the court to substitute as a party defendant the presiding officer of the Senate, Senator Ryan deGraffenried, who, pursuant to Ala. Const. 1901, § 51 and amend. 57, had assumed the duties that had been formerly performed by Lieutenant Governor Folsom. The motion was granted, without contest, on July 19, 1993.
On October 1, 1993, defendants Folsom, deGraffenried, Clark, and James White, Sr.,[1] submitted a proposed "Remedy Plan" for the court's consideration. On October 22, 1993, the court issued an order incorporating the Remedy Plan with "preliminar[y] approv[al] subject to notice to the class and subclass, and a class-action fairness hearing for the purpose of determining its fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy." The court further ordered that a "Notice Of Proposed Order Settling Class Action be published at least three times in the following newspapers": (1) Mobile Press Register, (2) Dothan Eagle, (3) Tuscaloosa News, (4) Huntsville Times, (5) Opelika-Auburn News, (6) Florence Times Daily, (7) Daily Mountain Eagle, (8) Montgomery Advertiser, (9) Birmingham Post-Herald, (10) Birmingham News, (11) Gadsden Times, and (12) Anniston Star. The court also ordered that "a copy of the notice and proposed remedy order be sent to all school superintendents and school principals in the state, for posting in [the] school system and school administrative offices." The court further scheduled for November 18, 1993, a "fairness hearing," during which it proposed to entertain "arguments from class counsel and from the parties who ... submitted the proposed remedy order relating to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed remedy order."
Two days before the scheduled "fairness hearing," Walter Anderton and others purporting to represent "taxpayers and citizens" of Alabama ("Anderton"), filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" in the action. Also, by a letter addressed to the trial judge and by appearance of counsel at the fairness hearing, Joyce Pinto and others ("Pinto") notified the court "of [their] intent to intervene on behalf of a class of parents and public school students who," they alleged, had "not been represented." Pinto's filings were supplemented on December 8, 1993, with a "Complaint in Intervention." Meanwhile, on December 3, 1993, the court had issued an order *898 in which it formally approved a modified form of the Remedy Plan.
At a hearing convened on January 25, 1994, arguments were presented by Pinto, Anderton, and former finance director Robin Swift, who also sought to intervene in the action. From judgments denying intervention, Pinto, Anderton, and Swift appealed. Pinto's appeals are identified by case numbers 1931030 and 1931031; Anderton's appeals are identified by case numbers 1931149 and 1931150; and Swift's appeals are identified by case numbers 1931141 and 1931142.
While this appeal was pending, Fob James, Jr., pursuant to a general election held on November 8, 1994, succeeded Jim Folsom as Governor of Alabama. Governor James sought a writ of prohibition in this Court directing Judge Reese "to vacate his orders... of March 31, 1993, ... October 22, 1993, and December 3, 1993; to dismiss [the] actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and to exercise no further jurisdiction in [the] cases." Ex parte James, (no. 1940679). Petition for Writ of Prohibition, at 12. On April 10, 1995, we unconditionally denied the petition as it related to the liability aspect of this cause; we also denied the petition as it related to the remedy aspects, but noted that issues raised in that regard could be presented on appeal following the entry of a final order. We concluded that "because the trial court retained jurisdiction of this cause," the order entered on December 3, 1993, did not constitute a final judgment.[2] It is against the backdrop of this holding that we consider the arguments for intervention in this case.
Pinto seeks to intervene on behalf of three classes of persons involved with Alabama public schools. One class she describes as composed of "students who are enrolled or will be enrolled in statutory gifted programs in public schools in Alabama" ("Gifted-Student class"). Brief of Pinto Appellants, at 6-7. A second class she describes as composed of "students who are enrolled or will be enrolled in public school systems in Alabama that at a minimum are providing constitutionally adequate educational opportunities" ("General Student class"). Id. A third class she describes as composed of "parents of students enrolled or who will be enrolled in public schools in Alabama" ("Parent class"). Id. Anderton attempts to intervene on behalf of "taxpayers and citizens" of Alabama.
Both Pinto and Anderton contend that the classes they purport to represent are entitled, pursuant to Ala.R.Civ.P. 24(a), to participate in this action as a matter of "right." Rule 24(a) provides:
Alabama courts have often explained that "as a general proposition, Rule 24 is to be liberally construed to allow intervention." Alabama Federal Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n v. Howard, 534 So. 2d 609, 612 (Ala.1988) (emphasis added); see also Hughes v. Newton, 295 Ala. 117, 324 So. 2d 270 (1976); Finkenbinder v. Burton, 452 So. 2d 880 (Ala.Civ.App. *899 1984). We can discern nothing about this litigation that would counsel a departure from this general rule of construction. On the contrary, the peculiar procedural posture of this litigation and the issues involved advise the Rule's most liberal application.
For example, few contemporary issues affect the citizens of Alabama as directly or as personally as the educationat taxpayers' expenseof future generations. It is undisputed that the persons who are presently parties to these actions have not identified the individuals Pinto and Anderton attempt to represent as constituting the distinct classes Pinto and Anderton have described. Thus, notwithstanding the protestations of the appellees,[3] logic dictates that to allow these individuals to represent their respective classes could, and would, much more adequately serve their interests, as well as those of all Alabama citizens in this extraordinary litigation, than would the present parties.
Also significant in this connection is the interlocutory nature of the trial court's remedy order. As we noted in our order in Ex parte James (see footnote 3 of this opinion), the trial court expressly "retained jurisdiction of this cause." As the following excerpts of the trial court's December 3, 1993, order clearly demonstrate, the court intended to oversee and direct the processes of education "reform" for an indefinite period:
(Emphasis added.)
These and numerous other provisions of the Remedy Order obviously contemplate perennial revision and reassessment of the progress of the process, the purpose of which is to convert a system that failed to "offer equitable and adequate educational opportunities to the schoolchildren of the state," Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 110 (Ala.1993) (emphasis added), into a system that succeeds in doing so. This ambitious *900 goal cannot be achieved without significantly impactingdirectly or indirectlyvirtually every Alabama citizen for years to come. It is difficult to understand, therefore, how, in this ongoing process, the supplementary ideas and viewpoints presented by Pinto and Anderton would impede the litigation's laudable goals or prejudice the present parties' interests.
Thus, we hold that Pinto and Anderton are entitled to intervene in the remedy phase of this unique litigation, as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a). That this holding does not extend to the liability phase, however, cannot be overemphasized. In other words, the intervenors will not be permitted to reopen or relitigate the question of the constitutionality of the educational system, which issue was adjudicated by an order dated March 31, 1993, and made final on June 9, 1993, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R.Civ.P. To the extent that the trial court's judgment in cases 1931030, 1931031, 1931149, and 1931150 denied intervention in the remedy phase, that judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Although Swift initially appealed the denial of his motion to intervene, he has taken no active part in the appeal. Indeed, in a letter filed with this Court on July 5, 1994, Swift's counsel expressed the opinion that Swift lacked standing to intervene. Consequently, the appeals in cases 1931141 and 1931142 are dismissed.
In cases 1931030, 1931031, 1931149, and 1931150, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As to cases 1931141 and 1931142, the appeals are dismissed. All motions by the appellants not previously ruled on are denied.
ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, INGRAM, and COOK, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., concurs specially.
HOUSTON, J., concurs in the result.
BUTTS, J., recused.
MADDOX, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the holding that permits Pinto and Anderton to intervene in the remedy phase of this lawsuit, but in view of the fact that my colleagues, in reaching the result to permit intervention of these parties, state that "this holding does not extend to the liability phase," I desire to express some separate views on the doctrine of the separation of powers of government, which has been one of the paramount issues in this case, and which continues to be the subject of both legal and political debate, and which could continue to be an issue in the remedy phase.
Since this case was filed, several things have happened. Alabama has had three Governors. Many of the members of the Legislature who held office when the two actions that commenced these lengthy proceedings were filed are no longer in the Legislature, but the provisions of the Constitution have not changed. When the Justices of this Court were requested to give their individual opinions on one of the paramount issues in this case, they opined:
Opinion of the Justices, No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 109-110 (Ala.1993). (Emphasis added.)
I have the same opinion today that I had then regarding the separation of powers issue and the jurisdiction and power of a circuit court "to interpret the constitution." Although it might be considered somewhat simplistic, my view of the separation of powers doctrine is: "The Legislature makes the laws, the Executive executes the laws, the Judiciary interprets the laws."
Because the circuit court specifically retained jurisdiction, and because the question of the power of the circuit court, in the remedy phase, might, and probably will, present questions involving the division of powers between the Executive Branch and the Legislative and Judicial Branches of government, I concur to permit the intervention in this case. In fact, I believe it to be not only just and fair, but in accordance with law.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring in the result).
I applaud the majority for permitting intervention. I write to express my reasons for permitting intervention.
The trial court held that (1) taxpayers, (2) citizens, (3) students who are or will be enrolled in public school systems in Alabama that at a minimum are providing constitutionally adequate educational opportunities, and (4) students who are enrolled in statutory "gifted programs" in public schools in Alabama are not entitled to intervene in this action because either they do not have "a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in the proceeding," Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 640 So. 2d 925, 931 (Ala. 1994) (quoting an earlier case), or they were adequately represented by the parties to the action. I disagree; therefore, I concur in the result permitting intervention, and I write to express why I think these intervenors have "a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in [these proceedings]" and why they were not adequately represented by the parties to this action.
On March 23, 1993, a circuit judge elected only by the majority of the citizens in the 15th Judicial Circuit of Alabama, a circuit consisting of Montgomery County, held that the present system of public schools in Alabama violates the Alabama Constitution (Article I, §§ 1, 6, and 22 (phantom equal protection); Article I, § 13 (civil due process); and Article XIV, § 256), the United States Constitution (due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment), and certain state statutes.
This case was bifurcated into liability and remedy phases. The March 31, 1993, order was made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., at the request of the plaintiffs. By that order, the circuit judge reached a result different from the result reached by the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973). The trial court determined that *902 Rodriguez did not control, because, the court said, the question was "the nature of the right to education under the Constitution of Alabama." The trial court's order was not appealed.
One cannot read the trial court's March 31, 1993, liability order without wondering why this was not appealed to this Court (a Court composed of Justices elected from the state-at-large by taxpayers and citizens and parents of school students) and without concluding either that additional taxes must be imposed or that existing educational tax dollars must be redistributed to carry out the mandate of the trial court's order.
The dreaded "taxation without representation" may occur if the trial court, for whom the Anderton intervenors had no right to vote, attempts to impose taxes in the remedy phase of this trial to fulfill the duties imposed upon State officials in the liability phase. The assurance that there would be no taxation without representation was a concept upon which this nation was founded. If that concept is not sufficient to provide a class of taxpayers "a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in the proceeding," I do not know what is![4]
The power to tax is a legislative and not a judicial power. The Constitution of Alabama of 1901, Article III, § 43, provides:
If an assurance that our constitutional system of government remains our system of government is not sufficient to provide a class of citizens "a direct, substantial, and *903 legally protectable interest in the proceeding," I do not know what is!
Those students who are or who will be enrolled in public school systems in Alabama that at a minimum are providing constitutionally adequate educational opportunities and those students enrolled in statutory gifted programs in public schools, in my opinion, have "a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in the proceeding" that entitles them to at least attempt to preserve the educational systems that they have, in the event that the trial court, in the remedy phase, orders the redistribution of existing educational tax dollars.
My discussion of adequacy of representation is limited to the representation that the intervenors had at the time the trial court denied intervention. Since that time, Governor Fob James, Jr., has become a party to this action and he and Attorney General Jeff Sessions sought to appeal to this Court the liability and remedy orders issued by the trial court.
On April 10, 1995, in response to a petition filed by Governor Fob James, Jr., and Attorney General Jeff Sessions, this Court wrote:
Ex parte James (No. 1940679, April 10, 1995, order not officially reported).
I do not think that any of the intervenors were adequately represented by the defendants, who were realigned as plaintiffs and who joined the plaintiffs' request for relief in the liability phase of this litigation; and who, after liability attached, were realigned as defendants. The defendants did not object to the plaintiffs' request that the liability order be made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., and did not appeal from the final order resulting from the Rule 54(b) procedure. The intervenors at no point have had a consistent laboring oar in this litigation.
Before I discuss why, in my opinion, the intervenors were not adequately represented in this action, I must state that I am an ardent supporter of public education. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."[6] I concur with this thought. I am most impressed with the definition of adequate educational opportunities in the March 31, 1993, order; and I do believe that all Alabama public schools should provide students an equal opportunity to be as unequal as they can be; to develop a sense of self worth and to acquire skills in oral and written communication; to acquire mathematical skills, scientific knowledge, knowledge of governmental processes, knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and knowledge of history; and to acquire an introduction to all of the arts.
However, I am not a member of the legislative branch or the executive branch of government, whose responsibilities include providing for public education. I am a member of the judicial branch of government, which is enjoined by the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, Article III, § 43, to "never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them." This limitation does not impinge upon the judicial duty to interpret the constitution and say what the law is. However, it is in the failure of the defendants, realigned as plaintiffs, and then, after the liability order *904 was entered, realigned as defendants, to challenge the trial court's interpretation of the constitution in the liability order and in the non-final remedy orders that causes me to hold that these intervenors were not adequately represented. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra.
The trial court bases its authority to judicially declare constitutional educational rights on its interpretation of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, §§ 1, 6, and 22, which it interprets to provide equal protection. It is my belief that judicial error can never create a nonexistent constitutional right to unconstitutionally increase judicial power and restrict the power of the legislative or executive branches of government. Sections 1, 6, and 22 of the Constitution of 1901 do not provide a right to equal protection under the law. The concept that they do was erroneously conceived by relying on an erroneous annotation to Article I, § 1, of the Constitution. What does § 6 of the Constitution have to do with education, or equality of education, or adequacy of education, or equal protection of the laws? Nothing.
Article I, § 6, provides:
This section addresses only rights of an accused in criminal prosecutions. It has absolutely nothing to do with education, equality of education, or adequacy of education. Certain rights are enumerated therein, but they are not applicable in the cases before us; there is no general equal protection provision contained in this section.
What does § 22 of the Constitution have to do with education, or equality of education, or adequacy of education, or equal protection of the laws? Nothing.
Article I, § 22, provides:
What do ex post facto laws, or impairment of obligations of contracts, or irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities have to do with education, or equality of education, or adequacy of education, or equal protection? Absolutely nothing. There is nothing in § 22 that provides for equal protection under the law. None of the rights enumerated in § 22 is applicable to the cases before us. Likewise, no combination of §§ 6 and 22 can be construed to have anything to do with the equality or adequacy of education or generalized equal protection.
What does § 1 of the Constitution have to do with education, or equality of education, or adequacy of education, or equal protection of the laws? Article I, § 1, Constitution 1901, provides:
Nothing in § 1 pertains to equality or adequacy of education. Is it possible that § 1 alone clearly and unambiguously provides for equal protection of the law? "[A]ll men are equally free and independent." What does *905 "free" encompass? What does "independent" encompass?
"Free" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 663 (6th ed. 1990) as:
In the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 524 (1969), the adjective "free" is defined as:
(Emphasis in original.)
In Black's Law Dictionary 770, "independent" is defined as:
The adjective "independent" is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary, 668, among other ways that are clearly irrelevant to the cases before us, as:
Therefore, "equally free and independent" can mean, among other things, equally not subject to the legal constraint of another and equally self-governing; equally at liberty and not subject to control, restriction, or limitation from a given outside source; equally governed by consent and possessing civil liberties and free from the influence, guidance, or control of another. Consequently, the meaning of "equally free and independent" is unclear and ambiguous, and this phrase is not clarified or made less ambiguous by the phrases that follow it: "that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
Nothing in § 1 by itself, or when combined with §§ 22 and 6, clearly and unambiguously provides equal protection under the law.
Therefore, to resolve the ambiguity in § 1, one must construe it to arrive at the intent of the drafters, by considering extrinsic matters such as the wording of previous constitutions and the debates in the 1901 Constitutional Convention. Ex parte Bozeman, 183 Ala. 91, 63 So. 201 (1913); see Garner v. Covington County, 624 So. 2d 1346, 1351-54 (Ala.1993).
What appears as § 1 of the Constitution of 1901 first appeared in the Constitution of 1875, where it was followed by § 2, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(Emphasis added.) What was § 2 in the Constitution of 1875 first became a part of an Alabama Constitution in the Constitution of 1868. The first two sections of the 1868 Constitution provided:
In the Constitution of 1875 the phrase "That all men are created equal" was deleted from § 1, and the phrase "That all men are equally free and independent" was substituted therefor. The remainder of § 1 was unchanged. All of § 2 remained in the Constitution of 1875 except the last three words, "and public privileges."
Therefore, it is evident that the drafters of the Constitution of 1868, which was drafted by a constitutional convention but then defeated by the Alabama electorate, and ratified by the Congress of the United States prior to the ratification of the 14th Amendment, felt that something more than the phrases "all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" was needed to provide for equal protection, because this was followed by § 2, which provided that citizens of Alabama "possessed equal civil and political rights and public privileges."
It is also evident that the drafters of the Constitution of 1875 felt that something more than the phrases "all men are equally free and independent; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" was needed to provide for equal protection, because this was followed by § 2, which provided that citizens of Alabama possessed equal civil and political rights.
Section 2 of the Constitution of 1875 was intentionally deleted from the Constitution of 1901, with the understanding that everything in § 2 was "covered already by the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] and we [the 1901 Constitutional Convention] could not change or alter it if we undertook to do so." Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1901, page 1640.
The minutes of the Constitutional Convention of 1901 show that after a motion was made to adopt what was Article I, § 2, of the Constitution of 1875, as a section of the 1901 Constitution, there was a motion to amend the section. Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 1901, pages 1622-23. After lengthy discussion (pages 1623-28), there was a motion "to lay the section on the table" (page 1628). This was discussed (pages 1628-34); and on the 37th day, the Convention was adjourned without action being taken on any of the motions (page 1634).
On the 38th day of the Convention, the motion to adopt § 2 of the 1875 Constitution and the proposed amendments to it were tabled upon a vote of 49 ayes and 42 noes (page 1642). Preceding this, Mr. Lomax, who the preceding day had moved for the adoption of § 2, stated: "We [the Committee on the Preamble and Declaration of Rights, page 1622] do not desire to get up a heated discussion about the meaning of words in the Declaration of Rights. We believe that everything in that particular section of the bill of rights [§ 2 above] is covered already by the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] and we could not change or alter it if we undertook to do so" (page 1640).
The Committee on the Preamble and Declaration of Rights accepted two proposed amendments to § 2 and asked for unanimous consent, to which objection was made (page 1640). Thereafter, the following transpired:
On the 46th day of the Convention, on motion of Mr. Lomax, the chairman of the Committee on the Preamble and Declaration of Rights, the Preamble and the Declaration of Rights (from which § 2 of the Constitution of 1875 had been deleted) were read a third time and adopted by the Convention by a vote of 116 ayes and 2 noes (pages 2254-60).
In Ex parte Southern Bell Tel. &amp;. Tel. Co., 267 Ala. 139, 143, 99 So. 2d 118, 121 (1957), Justice Stakely, writing for a unanimous court in a case that involved an issue that had been discussed during the 1901 Constitutional Convention, wrote:
So, also, is the discussion on equal protection during the Constitutional Convention highly persuasive for the proposition that the framers did not intend for the phrase "equally free and independent" to embrace equal protection of civil and political rights. Because the words "equally free and independent" are ambiguous, the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention are valuable in determining the meaning and purpose of that constitutional language. Hunt v. Hubbert, 588 So. 2d 848 (Ala.1991). As the debates of the Constitutional Convention indicate, Alabamians are afforded equal protection under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and not by any provision or provisions of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
This Court acknowledged this in Opinion of the Justices No. 102, 252 Ala. 527, 530, 41 So. 2d 775, 777 (1949):
It is evident that the Constitutional Convention of 1901 purposefully deleted what was Article I, § 2, of the Constitution of 1875, from the Constitution of 1901.
Of course, all persons within the territorial limits of the State of Alabama have the rights specified in the Declaration of Rights (Article I) in the Alabama Constitution. Neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judicial department has the power to deprive any person or group of persons of any of these rights; however, equality of education is not among those enumerated rights.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, when the Texas system of education, which appears to be substantially similar to Alabama's, was challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held that "the Texas system impinges upon no substantive constitutional right or liberties," 411 U.S.  at 62, 93 S. Ct.  at 1311.
In these cases, the trial court, not heeding the wisdom of the Supreme Court of the United States, opted to strike down Alabama's educational system.
This Court, in City of Hueytown v. Jiffy Chek Co. of Alabama, 342 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1977), and Peddy v. Montgomery, 345 So. 2d 631 (Ala.1977), erred in concluding that there was an equal protection clause in the Constitution of 1901. In City of Hueytown, the Court stated that §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the Constitution of 1901 combine to guarantee equal protection of the laws, without citation of authority or explanation. Later that same year, in Peddy v. Montgomery, the Court did tip its hand as to why the author of the opinion contended that §§ 1, 6, and 22 combine to guarantee equal protection, and in doing so, exposed the fact that unofficial annotations to Article I, §§ 1 and 22 of the Constitution (appearing in Ala.Code 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 79, 168 (1977) and appearing in Ala.Code 1940 (Recompiled 1958), Vol. 1, pp. 26, 89) rather than Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939), were the source of this erroneous comment; even though the Peddy opinion stated:
345 So. 2d  at 633.
This is an incorrect interpretation of Pickett v. Matthews, as even a cursory reading of Pickett v. Matthews shows that this Court knew that the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution provided the equal protection guarantee for Alabama citizens:
(Emphasis added.) 238 Ala. at 545, 192 So.  at 264.
Unfortunately, the unofficial annotation to Article I, §§ 1 and 22, appearing in the Code version of the Constitution, erroneously summarized the holding in Pickett v. Matthews, supra, as:
That annotation is absolutely wrong. The annotation to § 1 was corrected in the 1994 Cumulative Supplement to the Code of Alabama. Ala.Code 1975, Vol. 1 (1994 Cum. Supp., p. 62). This Court in Pickett v. Matthews recognized that the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution provided equal protection for Alabamians; that § 1 of the Alabama Constitution "protect[ed] persons as to their inalienable rights"; that § 6 of the Alabama Constitution "prohibit[ed] one from being deprived of his inalienable rights without due process"; and that § 22 of the Alabama Constitution "prohibit[ed] irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities." 238 Ala. at 545, 192 So.  at 264. Yet, this Court in Peddy v. Montgomery interpreted Pickett v. Matthews as holding "that §§ 1, 6, and 22 of Article I of the Constitution, taken together, guarantee the equal protection of the laws."
*909 This is wrong.
To demonstrate that even "Homer nods,"[7]Peddy v. Montgomery, continued:
(Emphasis added.) 345 So. 2d  at 633.
This also is wrong, as a comparison of the Constitution referred to in O'Neal and the 1901 Constitution shows:
There is no constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the present Alabama Constitution; and no constitutional restriction on the powers of government can be created by an erroneous judicial process that ignored the words of the case it relied on, that ignored the history of what happened during the Constitutional Convention of 1901, and that fails to acknowledge its error when its attention is directed to this error. In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary, 592 So. 2d 156, 170-71 (Ala.1991), a plurality of this Court, to strike down a tort reform provision, attempted to prove that §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the Constitution of 1901 guarantee citizens of Alabama equal protection, by citing In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 360-61 (Ala.1838), which was decided at a time when the Alabama Constitution of 1819 provided: "That all freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights...." These words do not appear in the 1901 Constitution.
Judicial error cannot change the Constitution of 1901, the wording of former constitutions, or the minutes of the Constitutional Convention. Judicial error has created a Phantom of the Operatives. Promulgating that judicial error to hide judicial error is one thing; using that judicial error as precedent to continue to strike down acts of the legislature as violating a nonexistent constitutional provision or to permit taxes to be imposed upon Alabama citizens solely to comport with a nonexistent constitutional right, in my opinion, is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine; and, if by the violation of that doctrine a citizen's enjoyment of life, liberty, or property is impinged, it would also constitute judicial usurpation and oppression. Article I, § 35, Constitution of 1901.
The majority of the United States Supreme Court wisely noted in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.  at 42-43, 93 S.Ct. at 1301-02:
(Emphasis added.)
Nonetheless, the trial court chose to enter this complex area. No appeal was taken from that decision, and the Alabama Judiciary is now involved in determining fiscal and educational policy. Certainly, taxpayers, citizens, and present and future school children whose education is at risk should be parties to help the judiciary in finding solutions to educational problems. I would reverse the trial court's order denying these parties the right to intervene; therefore, I concur in the result.
[1]  By October 1, White held the office of State finance director. In that office, he replaced James Rowell, who had replaced Robin Swift, who had resigned on September 30, 1991. White also was substituted for his predecessor as a defendant.
[2]  The order is heretofore unpublished, but its full text is as follows:

"IT IS ORDERED that the petition is denied as to the order of the trial court dated March 31, 1993, establishing liability, because that order became final and appealable on July 21, 1993 [sic], and no appeal was taken within the time allowed;
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to other orders of the trial court subsequent to March 31, 1993, the petition is denied at this time; because the trial court retained jurisdiction of this cause, issues regarding other orders may be raised on appeal in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure when such orders become final."
Our order stated that the trial court's March 31, 1993, order had become "final and appealable on July 21, 1993." Actually, as the statement of facts in this present opinion indicates, that March 31, 1993, order had become final, and therefore appealable, on June 9, 1993. On July 21, 1993, the 42-day appeal period expired, with no appeal having been taken.
[3]  The Harper plaintiffs, for example, contend that the classes Pinto seeks to represent are adequately represented, because, they contend, the litigation as currently postured contains some, or all, of the individuals composing the proposed classes. See Brief of Harper, ACE, ADAP, and John Doe Appellees, at 15-27.
[4]  Justice Kennedy wrote the following in his special writing in a 1990 case before the United States Supreme Court:

"Our statement in a case decided more than 100 years ago should apply here.
"`This power to impose burdens and raise money is the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is exercised, first, to raise money for public purposes only; and, second, by the power of legislative authority only. It is a power that has not been extended to the judiciary. Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State in the exercise of this authority at once so delicate and so important.' Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 116-117, 22 L. Ed. 72 (1874).
"The confinement of taxation to the legislative branches, both in our Federal and State Governments, was not random. It reflected our ideal that the power of taxation must be under the control of those who are taxed. This truth animated all our colonial and revolutionary history.
"`Your Memorialists conceive it to be a fundamental Principle ... without which Freedom can no Where exist, that the People are not subject to any Taxes but such as are laid on them by their own Consent, or by those who are legally appointed to represent them: Property must become too precarious for the Genius of a free People which can be taken from them at the Will of others, who cannot know what Taxes such people can bear, or the easiest Mode of raising them; and who are not under that Restraint, which is the greatest Security against a burthensome Taxation, when the Representatives themselves must be affected by every tax imposed on the People.' Virginia Petitions to King and Parliament, December 18, 1764, reprinted in The Stamp Act Crisis 41 (E. Morgan ed. 1952).
"The power of taxation is one that the Federal Judiciary does not possess. In our system `the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people,' The Federalist No. 48, p. 334 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison), for it is the Legislature that is accountable to them and represents their will....
"The operation of tax systems is among the most difficult aspects of public administration. It is not a function the Judiciary as an institution is designed to exercise. Unlike legislative bodies, which may hold hearings on how best to raise revenues, all subject to the views of constituents to whom the Legislature is accountable, the Judiciary must grope ahead with only the assistance of the parties, or perhaps random amici curiae. Those hearings would be without principled direction, for there exists no body of juridical axioms by which to guide or review them."
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 67-71, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1672-73, 109 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, with Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., joining his opinion; the majority consisted of White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). See "Taxation Without Representation: The Judicial Usurpation of the Power to Tax in Missouri v. Jenkins," 69 N.C.L.Rev. 741, 766 (March 1991); Judicial Taxation in Desegregation Cases, 89 Colum.L.Rev. 332, 341-42 (March 1989); "`No Taxation Without Representation... Unless Desegregation:' The Power of Federal Courts to Order Tax Increases to Desegregate Schools: Missouri v. Jenkins," 12 Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 191, 200 (Spring 1991).
[5]  See note 3 to the per curiam opinion. This Court's order of April 10, 1993, inadvertently gave the date July 21, 1993.
[6]  Letter to Colonel Charles Yancey (January 6, 1816).
[7]  Horace's Ars Poetica ("Indignor quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus. I'm aggrieved when sometimes even excellent Homer nods.")