Title: Commonwealth v. Brea
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12753
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 6, 2021

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SJC-12753 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHARLIE BREA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 5, 2020. - August 6, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Defense of Others.  Evidence, Consciousness of guilt, 
Flight, Hearsay, Information stored on computer, Motive.  
Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Request for jury 
instructions, Argument by prosecutor, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 11, 2011. 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
Amy M. Belger for the defendant. 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant, Charlie Brea, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation.1  The jury could have found that, during a scuffle 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm. 
2 
 
outside a bar, he fired multiple shots, one of which struck and 
killed the victim, Luis Montanez. 
The defendant makes four claims on appeal:  (1) that the 
judge erred in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as 
the defendant had requested; (2) that the judge erred in 
allowing a Boston police detective to testify about the contents 
of a certain record of the United States Customs and Border 
Protection agency (Customs) that he saw on a computer screen at 
Logan Airport, showing that the defendant left the country 
shortly after the shooting; (3) that the judge improperly 
instructed the jury in response to the defendant's closing 
argument, in which his attorney argued the absence of evidence 
of motive; and (4) that the prosecutor in his closing argument 
improperly asked the jurors to recall an event, unrelated to the 
case, that occurred during a view of the crime scene.  We 
affirm, and having reviewed the entire record, we decline to 
grant relief pursuant G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.2  The shooting occurred in the early morning 
hours of October 23, 2010, outside the Breezeway bar on Blue 
Hill Avenue in the Roxbury section of Boston.  The defendant and 
several of his friends and acquaintances arrived at the bar 
 
2 We recite the basic facts regarding the homicide and the 
defendant's flight, reserving for the analysis section 
additional facts that pertain to the specific issues raised by 
the defendant. 
3 
 
shortly after 1 A.M.  Some of them had also been together at a 
different bar in the South Boston section of Boston earlier in 
the night.  Among the group was Wendy Perellu, who had been 
romantically involved with the defendant.3  Also in the group 
were the defendant's friend Jonathan Aguasvivas and Aguasvivas's 
younger brother, Waldo Aguasvivas, who was casually acquainted 
with the defendant.4  The defendant, Perellu, and another friend 
had traveled to the Breezeway from South Boston in the 
defendant's automobile. 
 
There was some evidence that while the defendant and his 
group were inside the bar, one of the other patrons directed a 
homophobic slur at Waldo.  There was no physical altercation, 
and the situation was eventually defused by Jonathan.  At some 
point after that incident, the defendant told Perellu to wait 
for him and then left the bar. 
 
Some of the following relevant events were captured by 
security cameras that were mounted outside the Breezeway and on 
a market located a short distance away on Blue Hill Avenue.  
Footage from both locations was in evidence.  The footage showed 
that the defendant left the bar at approximately 1:43 A.M. and 
 
3 Perellu testified that she was no longer romantically 
involved with the defendant at the time of the murder. 
 
4 Because the Aguasvivas brothers share a last name, we 
refer to them by their first names. 
4 
 
spoke with the Aguasvivases' uncle outside for about one minute.  
He then walked to his car, which was parked near the market, and 
entered the vehicle.  The defendant then started the engine, 
turned on the headlights, and made some type of movements near 
the dashboard and center console.  Fewer than two minutes later, 
he turned off the vehicle and the headlights, left the vehicle, 
and walked back to the bar. 
A police search of the defendant's car days after the 
shooting revealed that the vehicle had a secret compartment 
("hide") located behind the dashboard.  The hide could be 
unlocked by turning on the vehicle and the headlights; 
activating the rear window defroster, the button for which was 
located on the dashboard; and pressing the control button for 
the side mirrors on the driver's side door.5  The Commonwealth 
maintained at trial that, when he went to his vehicle, the 
defendant retrieved a firearm from the hide that he later used 
to shoot the victim.  Because there was evidence that patrons 
sometimes were frisked when they entered the bar, and because 
there was also evidence, described infra, that the defendant 
shot the victim shortly after returning from his vehicle, the 
jury could infer that the defendant was not armed when he 
 
5 Inside the hide the police found plastic bags containing 
cocaine, pills, a possible "cutting" agent, and air fresheners.  
The defendant's fingerprint was found on one of the bags. 
5 
 
entered the establishment earlier in the night and that he 
retrieved the weapon from his vehicle after leaving the bar. 
 
The victim and two of his friends arrived at the bar at 
approximately 1:46 A.M., a few minutes after the defendant had 
left and gone to his vehicle but before he returned.  They 
remained outside the bar.  A handful of others were outside as 
well.  The defendant returned from his vehicle at 1:47 A.M. and 
remained outside, too.  Within a minute or two, most of the 
members of his group left the bar and gathered outside.  At 
approximately 1:50 A.M., an argument occurred and a fistfight 
broke out.6  There was evidence that the fight began after 
someone "sucker punched" Waldo.  The security footage showed 
both the victim and the defendant entering the fray just moments 
after the fistfight began; there was no testimony, however, and 
the footage does not show, that anyone physically struck the 
defendant at any point either before or after the fight began.  
Within seconds, someone fired multiple shots, one of which hit 
the victim in the face and killed him.7 
 
6 The security footage showed the defendant using his cell 
phone at approximately 1:48 A.M. as he waited outside the bar, 
and members of his group hastily leaving the bar shortly 
thereafter.  The Commonwealth argued that he had planned with 
his group to meet outside for a confrontation.  The defendant 
argued that the victim and his two friends acted in concert with 
the man who earlier had verbally assaulted Waldo inside the bar. 
 
7 Six spent .22 caliber shells were found at the scene.  The 
Commonwealth's ballistics expert testified that they were all 
6 
 
The Commonwealth presented two witnesses who described the 
shooter.  Tyrone Brooks, one of the victim's friends, testified 
that the shots were fired from behind him, and when he turned to 
look in that direction, he saw a person holding what "looked 
like a gun."  He described the person as a male, shorter than 
him,8 weighing approximately 260 pounds or more, and wearing a 
gray hooded sweatshirt.  He identified the person he believed to 
be the shooter on the bar's security footage.  Two other 
witnesses who had testified previously -- Perellu and Joseph 
Monette -- each identified the defendant on the security footage 
as he entered the bar earlier that night; the jury could see the 
defendant's heavy-set build and the fact that he was wearing a 
gray hooded sweatshirt.  From this, the jury could conclude that 
the man described by Brooks (and pointed out by him on the video 
footage) was the defendant. 
The second witness to describe the shooter was Abdullah 
Galloway, a security employee of the bar who was off duty but 
present outside the bar that night.  Galloway initially stated 
at trial that he did not see who fired the shots.  However, 
given Galloway's evasiveness in response to the prosecutor's 
 
fired from the same weapon.  The bullet removed from the victim 
was also .22 caliber.  The weapon was never located. 
 
8 The jury could see, when the defendant and witness were 
asked at trial to stand side by side, that the defendant was the 
shorter of the two. 
7 
 
questions, the judge permitted the prosecutor to read from 
Galloway's grand jury testimony.  The judge instructed the jury 
that they could use that testimony as substantive proof in the 
case if they believed it.  See Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 
55, 65-75 (1984).  See also Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 
735, 741 (2000).  Galloway had testified before the grand jury 
that the shots were fired by "someone in a gray hoodie"; "about 
five-six, five seven"; and "a lot heavier" than 250 pounds.  He 
also had testified that he was "about two or three feet" from 
the shooter and had an unobstructed view of him. 
Most of those who were near the shooting -- including the 
defendant, members of his group, and the two friends with whom 
the victim had arrived -- ran from the scene.9  The security 
footage shows the defendant pulling up the hood on his gray 
sweatshirt to conceal his face as he fled.  He then got into his 
car and drove away quickly, without waiting for Perellu or the 
other friend with whom he had arrived.  Perellu, who up until 
that point had remained inside the bar, then left the building 
 
9 One of the defendant's acquaintances, Monette, ran to a 
friend's automobile parked nearby at the corner of Blue Hill 
Avenue and a side street, Waverly Street.  As Monette was about 
to enter the passenger's side of the vehicle, he was shot both 
of his legs.  He testified that he saw his shooter coming at him 
from Waverly Street, not from the direction of the bar.  A 
bullet removed from one of his legs was .38 or .357 caliber; it 
could not have been fired from a .22 caliber weapon.  His 
shooter was never identified. 
8 
 
and departed in a different vehicle driven by one of the 
defendant's other friends. 
The Commonwealth adduced evidence that the defendant not 
only fled the scene after the shooting, but also left the 
country.  Perellu, who lived next door to the defendant in the 
same housing complex in South Boston, testified that she saw him 
only once or twice in the days afterward.  Perellu testified at 
trial that the defendant had spoken previously about going to 
the Dominican Republic to visit his father.  The judge also 
allowed the prosecutor to read from Perellu's grand jury 
testimony, see Daye, 393 Mass. at 75, in which she stated that 
the defendant had told her he was planning to go to the 
Dominican Republic in December, "but not so fast like that."  
The other witnesses who knew the defendant testified at trial 
that they did not see him at all after the shooting. 
In addition, the Commonwealth presented testimony from 
Boston police Detective Steven Ridge, who had personally 
observed a record in the Customs computerized database that 
showed, among other things, that on October 30, 2010, seven days 
after the shooting, the defendant purchased a one-way ticket to 
travel to the Dominican Republic the next day, and that he in 
fact boarded the flights.  Although the defendant objected to 
this particular testimony and challenges it on appeal, as 
discussed infra, he did not dispute that he had traveled to the 
9 
 
Dominican Republic and remained there until he was extradited in 
May 2017 to face the charges in this case. 
 
The defense at trial was twofold.  First, the defendant 
argued mistaken identification, i.e., that he was not the 
shooter.  Second, and in the alternative, he maintained that he 
acted in response to reasonable provocation and sudden combat 
and in defense of Waldo. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Request for manslaughter instruction.  The 
defendant contends that the judge erred in failing to instruct 
the jury on manslaughter based on reasonable provocation, sudden 
combat, and excessive use of force in defense of another.  
Because the defendant preserved the issues, we review for 
prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 46 
(2019). 
 
"[V]oluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing that is 
mitigated by extenuating circumstances."  Commonwealth v. Haith, 
452 Mass. 409, 415 (2008).  The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that no mitigating circumstances, such as 
reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or excessive use of force 
in defense of another, existed to reduce the defendant's 
culpability.  See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 602 
(2015); Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 716 (1998).  
When assessing whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction 
on voluntary manslaughter, we consider the trial evidence in the 
10 
 
light most favorable to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 57 (2018); Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 
Mass. 435, 442-443 (2006). 
 
Viewing the evidence in that light, the jury could have 
found that there was a name-calling incident inside the bar at 
some point during the night on which the defendant was there; 
that the victim and his friends, acting in concert with the man 
who had insulted Waldo, someone with whom the defendant was 
casually acquainted,10 inside the bar, later instigated an 
argument and fight outside the bar; that someone in the victim's 
group was the first aggressor, having "sucker punched" Waldo as 
he stood outside; that the defendant either witnessed the punch 
or at least immediately became aware that a fight had broken 
out; and that he fired multiple shots in response.  There was no 
evidence, however, that anyone else among the combatants had 
displayed a gun or other weapon before the defendant fired, let 
alone that the defendant saw (or even though he saw) a gun or 
other weapon.  After examining each of the defendant's arguments 
in the context of these facts, we discern no error. 
a.  Reasonable provocation.  "Reasonable provocation is 
provocation by the person killed [or, in the case of transferred 
 
10 Waldo also testified that he knew the defendant because 
his brother was friendly with the defendant.  He was not a 
"close friend," but "like just an acquaintance, like hi and bye 
situation." 
11 
 
intent, by someone else] that would be likely to produce such a 
state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or nervous excitement in 
a reasonable person as would overwhelm his capacity for 
reflection or restraint and did actually produce such a state of 
mind in the defendant.  The provocation must be such that a 
reasonable person would have become incapable of reflection or 
restraint and would not have cooled off at the time of the 
killing, and that the defendant was so provoked and did not cool 
off at the time of killing" (footnotes omitted).  Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 75-76 (2018), and cases cited.  See 
Howard, 479 Mass. at 59-62 (discussing instruction on reasonable 
provocation).  To support an instruction on manslaughter based 
on reasonable provocation, "[t]he evidence must be sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt in the minds of a rational jury that a 
defendant's actions were both objectively and subjectively 
reasonable."  Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 Mass. 727, 738, cert. 
denied sub nom. Aiello v. Massachusetts, 474 U.S. 919 (1985).  
See Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 443; Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 
201, 220 (2001). 
Two flaws with the defendant's argument render it 
unpersuasive.  First, there was no evidence presented at trial 
that the defendant was subjectively provoked.  See Commonwealth 
v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 220, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007) 
("Provocation and 'cooling off' time must meet both a subjective 
12 
 
and an objective standard" [emphasis added]); Commonwealth v. 
Iacoviello, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 242 (2016) ("The law, 
however, also requires subjective evidence that [the defendant] 
actually did lose control in a heat of passion, thereby leading 
him to immediately fire his weapon back at [the victim]").  
Although the defendant did witness an acquaintance get punched 
and the resulting scuffle between some of his friends and their 
adversaries, he did not indicate in any way that this caused him 
to experience "a sudden transport of passion or heat of blood."  
McLeod, 394 Mass. at 738, quoting Commonwealth v. Hicks, 356 
Mass. 442, 445 (1969).  Without such evidence, the defendant's 
argument fails at the outset. 
Second, no rational jury, considering the situation 
objectively, could have believed on this record that a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would be provoked 
to act as he did.  No threatening action was directed toward the 
defendant.  At most, he witnessed a casual acquaintance being 
punched before he joined in and fired.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 387 Mass. 220, 227 (1982) (unarmed victim choking 
defendant with shirt insufficient provocation to explain 
stabbing victim twenty-seven times); Commonwealth v. 
Rembiszewski, 363 Mass. 311, 321 (1973) ("It is an extravagant 
suggestion that scratches [inflicted by the victim on the 
defendant's face] could serve as provocation for a malice-free 
13 
 
but ferocious attack by the defendant with a deadly 
instrument").  The defendant points to no case, nor are we aware 
of any, in which we have held that a person acting as he did -- 
employing deadly force in response to a punch directed at 
someone with whom he was only casually acquainted -- was 
entitled to a manslaughter instruction based on reasonable 
provocation.  Considering that even "physical contact between a 
defendant and a victim [who initiated the contact] is not always 
sufficient to warrant a manslaughter instruction," Commonwealth 
v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 727 (1980), we decline to create such 
a precedent here. 
 
b.  Sudden combat.  The defendant's claim of sudden combat 
is also unpersuasive.  Sudden combat is "a form of reasonable 
provocation."  Howard, 479 Mass. at 58.  See Camacho, 472 Mass. 
at 601 n.19, quoting Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 820 
(2012) (Lenk, J., concurring) ("sudden combat is among those 
circumstances constituting reasonable provocation").  It 
"involves a sudden assault by the person killed [or, in the case 
of transferred intent, by someone else] and the defendant upon 
each other."  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 78.  
See Howard, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Peters, 372 Mass. 
319, 324 (1977) ("sudden combat is one of the events which may 
provoke the perturbation of mind that can end in" manslaughter).  
For sudden combat to be the basis for a voluntary manslaughter 
14 
 
instruction, someone "must attack the defendant or at least 
strike a blow against the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Espada, 
450 Mass. 687, 696-697 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Pasteur, 
66 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 822 (2006). 
To be sure, there were individuals involved in mutual 
combat here, but that combat did not involve the defendant until 
he inserted himself into it.  Additionally, that conflict was 
not directed against him; there was no "sudden assault" upon the 
defendant.  As stated, there was no evidence or reasonable 
inference to be drawn that the victim or anyone else attacked 
him or inflicted any blows on him at any time.  Therefore, no 
rational jury could have believed in these circumstances that 
the defendant shot in response to mutual combat involving 
himself, or, more precisely, could have formed a reasonable 
doubt as to mitigate to murder on that basis.  Hence no 
instruction was required on that possibility.  The only possible 
view of the trial evidence (including the security footage), and 
indeed the defendant's very theory at trial, was that he 
responded when a fight broke out among the others, not because 
anyone had attacked him. 
 
c.  Excessive force in defense of another.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that he acted in defense of Waldo and was 
entitled to a manslaughter instruction on that basis.  There was 
15 
 
no error in the denial of the defendant's request for this 
instruction. 
 
Because his intervention was not reasonably necessary, the 
defendant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 208 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 
(1976) ("An actor is justified in using force against another to 
protect a third person when [a] a reasonable person in the 
actor's position would believe [and the actor actually did 
believe] his intervention to be necessary for the protection of 
the third person, and [b] in the circumstances as that 
reasonable person would believe them to be, the third person 
would be justified in using such force to protect himself").  
See also Haith, 452 Mass. at 415 ("A manslaughter instruction is 
appropriate where the evidence shows that a defendant used 
excessive force in an otherwise appropriate exercise of self-
defense or defense of another and that death resulted from the 
use of excessive force").  The evidence shows only that Waldo 
was punched once in the face and that a scuffle followed.  There 
was no evidence that anyone displayed a gun or other dangerous 
weapon, that anyone directed any other form of deadly force 
toward Waldo or any other member of the defendant's group, or 
that the defendant thought he perceived a deadly weapon or 
deadly force.  Furthermore, Waldo remained standing after being 
16 
 
punched and did not stand alone:  he was surrounded by friends, 
and his brother even intervened after the blow landed.  Given 
these facts, the defendant's intervention -- never mind his 
armed intervention -- was unreasonable.11 
2.  Consciousness of guilt evidence.  To demonstrate 
consciousness of guilt, the Commonwealth produced evidence at 
trial that the defendant not only fled the scene after the 
shooting, but also left the country.  Specifically, the 
Commonwealth called Ridge, who testified that he had personally 
observed a record in the Customs computer database.  After 
conducting a voir dire of Ridge as well as allowing the parties 
time to research the issue further, the judge allowed the 
testimony.12  The defendant challenges this ruling on appeal, 
 
 
11 Even if there had been a right to intervene, there is no 
evidence that a reasonable person would have believed -- or that 
the defendant did believe -- that Waldo was in danger of either 
death or serious bodily harm from which he could only be saved 
solely by the use of deadly force.  See Commonwealth v. Espada, 
450 Mass. 687, 692, 695 (2008). 
 
12 The judge also raised a second concern:  the best 
evidence rule.  In response, the prosecutor represented that he 
had attempted to subpoena the airline's records, but that the 
records were purged after two years and no longer existed.  As 
for Customs's record, he reported, based on information he had 
received from Ridge and others, that it was not physically 
possible to print out a hard copy at the Customs office at Logan 
Airport and, further, that he had tried multiple times, through 
multiple means (telephone, e-mail, and subpoena), to secure the 
written record both from Customs and through the United States 
Department of Justice, all to no avail. 
 
17 
 
contending that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the 
flight information was computer-generated and thus not hearsay. 
We review a judge's evidentiary ruling for abuse of 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 410 
(2020).  Before setting out the facts pertinent to our analysis, 
a brief explanation of the distinction between "computer-
generated" and "computer-stored" information and its legal 
relevance is useful. 
"The classification of . . . records as computer-generated 
or computer-stored bears directly on the question whether the 
admission of the records would violate the rule against 
hearsay."  Commonwealth v. Thissell, 457 Mass. 191, 197 n.13 
(2010).  Hearsay requires a statement made by a declarant.  A 
"declarant" is "the person who made the statement," and a 
 
Once the judge found that the best evidence rule was 
satisfied, Ridge's oral testimony regarding his recollection of 
the content of the record was a permissible substitute for a 
hard copy.  See generally Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 
6-7 (2001).  See also O'Connor v. Boston Retirement Bd., 304 
Mass. 471, 472-473 (1939) (written change of beneficiary form 
and acknowledgement that could not be located "properly shown by 
oral evidence"); Grover v. Smead, 295 Mass. 11, 13 (1936) (oral 
testimony of contents of certificate of registration that had 
been lost or destroyed); Fleming v. Doodlesack, 270 Mass. 271, 
275 (1930) (oral testimony concerning contents of letter; 
"[t]here 'are no degrees in secondary evidence'" [citation 
omitted]); 20 W.G. Young, J.R. Pollets & C. Poreda § 1008.1 
(2d ed. 1998) ("Massachusetts does not recognize 'degrees of 
secondary evidence'; nor, as a necessary corollary, do our 
courts compel a party authorized to resort to secondary evidence 
to produce one class of such evidence rather than any other"). 
18 
 
"statement" is "a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or 
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion" 
(emphases added).  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(a), (b) (2021).  Whether 
a computer record contains a statement depends on whether the 
record is "computer-generated," "computer-stored," or a hybrid 
of both.  Thissell, supra. 
"The distinction between computer-stored and computer-
generated records depends on the manner in which the content was 
created -- by a person or by a machine."  Commonwealth v. Royal, 
89 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 171 (2016).  Computer-stored records 
"merely store or maintain the statements and assertions of a 
human being."  Id., quoting State v. Kandutsch, 336 Wis. 2d 478, 
503 (2011).  They generally are "documents that contain writings 
of a person or persons that have been reduced to an electronic 
form."  Royal, supra at 171-172.  Computer-generated records, on 
the other hand, "are those that represent the self-generated 
record of a computer's operations resulting from the computer's 
programming."  Id. at 171, quoting Kandutsch, supra at 503-504.  
Such records are created "solely by the electrical or mechanical 
operation of a computer," not directly by human beings.  
Thissell, 457 Mass. at 197 n.13.  See Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 
Mass. 448, 465 (2021); Commonwealth v. Ubeda, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 
587, 594 (2021); Royal, supra. 
19 
 
Simply put, because computer-stored records contain 
statements of human beings, they can in certain circumstances 
constitute hearsay; but computer-generated records, which 
contain only the results of computer programs, cannot.13  See 
Davis, supra; Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478 Mass. 493, 498 
(2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018), citing Thissell, 
supra.  Admissibility of the detective's testimony in this case 
thus depends on whether the information he viewed was computer-
generated.  With this in mind, we turn to the pertinent facts. 
a.  Evidence from the Federal database.  Ridge testified 
that on or about November 6, 2010, he was assigned to locate and 
apprehend the defendant.  He had received some information in 
the course of his investigation that the defendant had gone to 
the Dominican Republic.  On November 10, 2010, he met with a 
Customs agent at Logan Airport in an attempt to confirm that 
information from the agency's database.  Customs maintains a 
database of all individuals who travel internationally to and 
from the United States.  Ridge stated that he was familiar with 
the agency, having worked there during college and for some time 
after graduating. 
 
13 Computerized records having both computer-stored and 
computer-generated content are sometimes referred to as "hybrid" 
records.  See Thissell, 457 Mass. at 197 n.13; Royal, 89 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 172. 
20 
 
Noting that the Commonwealth did not intend to offer a 
written record from the database, the defendant objected on 
hearsay grounds to testimony from the detective about the 
contents of any records.  There followed a lengthy discussion at 
sidebar.  The judge, recognizing the issue sua sponte, was 
especially concerned with whether the record in the agency's 
database was computer-stored information or computer-generated 
information and elected to conduct a voir dire of Ridge before 
proceeding further. 
Ridge testified on voir dire that all airlines are required 
by law to submit information regarding their international 
flights and international travelers to Customs.  When the 
Federal agent typed in the defendant's name and date of birth at 
Ridge's request, the computer displayed the details of the 
defendant's ticket (date purchased, manner of payment, date and 
time of flights, flight numbers, etc.) and the fact that the 
defendant actually was on board the scheduled flights.  This was 
information that had been generated by the airline, in this case 
JetBlue, and submitted by it to Customs. 
Ridge also testified that he last worked at the agency in 
1993, nearly twenty-five years before the trial; that he was 
generally familiar with the agency's record-keeping; that he did 
not believe the system had been updated a great deal since he 
worked at the agency; that the record he saw on the computer 
21 
 
screen in 2010 "didn't look much different" from the screen he 
saw when he worked at the agency; but that he did not know for 
certain whether the computer hardware or software had changed 
since then. 
 
Following the voir dire, the judge focused in her 
discussion with counsel specifically on whether the Customs 
record was computer-generated or computer-stored information and 
suspended the detective's testimony until the next trial day to 
give the parties the weekend to research that issue further.  No 
other evidence was taken on the point.  On the next trial day, 
the judge asked the prosecutor if he wished to be heard further 
on the issue.  The prosecutor stated that "we did a little 
research" and represented to the judge that, "once a person is a 
passenger on a plane or scheduled to be a passenger, that 
information is sent automatically" by the airline to Customs, 
and that "[t]here's not any human input from that stage 
forward."14 
 
14 The entirety of the prosecutor's representation was as 
follows: 
 
"Judge, only just to say that we did a little research, 
JetBlue uses a computer reservation system, CRS, also 
called Sabre, which is a global distribution system, it's a 
computer reservation system developed to automate the way 
that American airlines, not the name brand American 
Airlines, all American airlines, book reservations. 
 
"The information from the PSN [sic] which is the Passenger 
Name Record that Detective Ridge would have been looking at 
22 
 
 
On this basis, the judge ruled that the agency's record was 
a computer-generated record and, therefore, not hearsay.  She 
overruled the defendant's objection and permitted Ridge to 
resume his testimony before the jury.  Ridge then testified 
that, according to the record he saw on the Customs computer 
screen, the defendant purchased a ticket on October 30, 2010, 
for travel the next day on a JetBlue flight from Boston to New 
York City, and then on a connecting JetBlue flight to the 
Dominican Republic, and that he was, in fact, aboard those 
flights. 
 
b.  Analysis of defendant's claim.  As its proponent, the 
Commonwealth had the burden to demonstrate that the record that 
the detective saw was computer-generated.  See Care & Protection 
of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 792 (1993).  Yet the Commonwealth never 
 
is a record that the CRS containing the itinerary, 
etcetera, that's sent to them. 
 
"The AT THE SCENE [sic], which is the Automated Targeting 
Passenger System, maintains the PNR information from 
commercial airlines for the Department of Homeland Security 
and U.S. Customs Border Patrol [sic]. 
 
"The bottom line is, Your Honor, is that once it's 
generated, once a person is a passenger on a plane or 
scheduled to be a passenger, that information is sent 
automatically to Homeland Security and the Department of 
Border Patrol [sic]. 
 
"There's not any human input from that stage forward, and 
therefore, it is a computer generated record and should be 
allowed into this case." 
23 
 
explained how the defendant's information came to be in 
JetBlue's computer system.  For this reason, admission of the 
detective's testimony was error. 
 
First, Ridge never testified -- nor was there any 
suggestion that he was competent to testify -- about JetBlue's 
computer systems, how JetBlue acquired the information it 
submitted to Customs, or what the processes were at JetBlue for 
handling that information before submitting it to the Federal 
government.  And there was no other evidence as to that.  In 
short, the record was inadequate to show that JetBlue's records 
(including the fact that the defendant actually was aboard the 
flights), and in turn the Federal record that was created based 
on the information supplied to it by JetBlue, had been created 
solely by computer processes without human intervention.15 
 
Moreover, the Commonwealth's representations to the court 
the next trial day begged rather than answered the question 
whether the information was computer-generated.  After spending 
a weekend researching how JetBlue received and processed flight 
information, the Commonwealth detailed what happened to this 
 
15 Any information contained in JetBlue's records that was 
provided to JetBlue by the defendant was exempt from the rule 
against hearsay.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2).  What we do 
not know, and what we are concerned with here, however, is 
whether there was any other human involvement in creating or 
processing JetBlue's records before they were submitted to 
Customs. 
24 
 
information once JetBlue had entered the information into its 
computer system.  The Commonwealth stated that "once [the 
information is] generated," there is "not any human input from 
that stage forward."  Yet the Commonwealth did not indicate how 
the information was generated -- that is, how the information 
initially is entered into the system.  What occurred between the 
defendant's decision to purchase a ticket and JetBlue's transfer 
of his flight information to the Federal government is absent 
from the Commonwealth's representations.  As such, we cannot 
tell whether the connection between these two links in the chain 
was forged by humans or computers. 
 
The subject matter at issue -- the inner workings of the 
computer systems of multiple entities, and the way in which 
information is received, processed, and passed on by those 
entities -- is clearly technical.  Without knowing how JetBlue 
received and processed the information at issue, the judge was 
in no position to assess the Commonwealth's representations to 
determine whether they adequately demonstrated that the Federal 
record was strictly computer-generated.  Consequently, the 
Commonwealth failed to carry its burden, and the detective's 
testimony was erroneously admitted.16 
 
16 We leave for another day the question whether a 
prosecutor's representations -- even assuming they are based on 
disclosed, reliable information -- would be a sufficient basis 
on which a judge can determine that computer records are 
25 
 
c.  Prejudicial error.  Despite this error, the defendant 
suffered no prejudice.  An error is not prejudicial "[i]f . . . 
the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect . . . .  But if one cannot 
say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened 
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is 
impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected."  Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 445 
(1983).  See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-765 
(1946). 
We can say with fair assurance that Ridge's testimony did 
not substantially sway the outcome.  No doubt, the testimony was 
probative of the defendant's flight from the country shortly 
after the shooting.  But it was merely cumulative of ample other 
evidence of his flight.  Indeed, it was undisputed at trial that 
the defendant had gone to the Dominican Republic at some point 
and remained there for six and one-half years until he was 
 
computer-generated, or whether there must be evidence in the 
record on that point.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 104(a), (b).  Cf. 
Davis, 487 Mass. at 455 n.7. 
 
26 
 
extradited.  Perellu, the defendant's former girlfriend17 who 
lived in the building next to his, testified that she only saw 
him once or twice after the night at the Breezeway before he 
left for the Dominican Republic, and other witnesses who knew 
him testified that they did not see him at all after that night.  
Perellu further testified that the defendant himself had often 
spoken of going to the Dominican Republic to visit his father, 
"but not so fast like that."  Finally, there was evidence that 
the defendant was not at his home when the police interviewed 
his mother and sister there on November 8 and 9, 2010, fewer 
than three weeks after the shooting. 
Although the additional testimony from Ridge about the 
particular details of the defendant's departure was more 
specific, both it and the other evidence of flight reasonably 
led to the same conclusion:  that the defendant left his friends 
and family and fled to the Dominican Republic in the aftermath 
of the homicide, not simply to see his father for a temporary 
visit but to move there indefinitely in order to avoid capture 
and prosecution.  See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 451 Mass. 566, 
579-580 (2008); Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 583 
 
17 Some of Perellu's testimony suggested they were no longer 
"romantically" involved.  They would continue to "see each 
other, but . . . didn't have any commitment." 
27 
 
(1982).18  Given the other strong evidence of flight that the 
Commonwealth offered to establish consciousness of guilt, we can 
safely say that Ridge's testimony was cumulative and therefore 
not prejudicial. 
3.  Jury instruction regarding motive.  In his closing 
argument, the defendant's trial counsel argued that the 
Commonwealth had not shown a motive for the shooting.19  The 
 
18 The judge instructed the jury thoroughly and correctly on 
the evidence of consciousness of guilt.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 1110(a) note, "Jury Instruction on Evidence of Consciousness 
of Guilt," and cases cited. 
 
19 Trial counsel began by stating that it was the 
Commonwealth's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  He continued: 
 
"And I submit to you today it totally and completely failed 
to do that.  They haven't brought you any physical evidence 
or video evidence that actually shows [the defendant] with 
a gun.  They have not brought you a single credible witness 
. . . who says that they saw the man in the gray hoodie 
with a firearm. 
 
"And most importantly, they have completely [failed] to 
explain to you why this happened if [the defendant] shot 
[the victim] that night.  Why?  What was the motive?  What 
was the reason? 
 
"They have not in any way explained this.  It is an event 
that occurs in a complete vacuum, and that is something 
else I'm going to ask you to consider very strongly when 
you decide whether they've proven this case." 
 
Later in the argument, after discussing the security 
footage and the ballistics evidence, he returned to the absence 
of motive evidence:  "So what else does the Commonwealth have?  
Did they have motive?  Did they have any reason, any explanation 
for why this would happen?" 
28 
 
prosecutor objected, claiming that counsel had incorrectly 
stated that the Commonwealth was required to prove motive as 
part of its case, and requested a curative instruction.  Trial 
counsel acknowledged that the Commonwealth was not required to 
prove motive, but denied telling the jury otherwise; rather, he 
argued that he had only made the point that the absence of 
evidence of motive was something the jury could properly 
consider.  The judge agreed with the Commonwealth and gave a 
cautionary instruction that the Commonwealth was not required to 
prove motive.  The defendant now contends that, having told the 
jury the Commonwealth did not need to prove motive, the judge 
erred by not also instructing them, as he had requested, that 
they could consider the absence of evidence of motive. 
It is well settled that the Commonwealth is not required to 
prove motive as an element of the crime of homicide.  
Commonwealth v. Carlson, 448 Mass. 501, 508-509 (2007).  Yet 
evidence of motive is not irrelevant.  Evidence of motive can be 
relevant and admissible, for example, on the issues of malice 
and intent, or perhaps to bolster the Commonwealth's proof of 
the identity of the perpetrator.  Id. at 509.  See Commonwealth 
v. Brooks, 422 Mass. 574, 581 (1996); Commonwealth v. Weichell, 
390 Mass. 62, 73 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984), and 
cases cited.  Conversely, the absence of any evidence of a 
motive is something a jury might consider as well.  Where, for 
29 
 
example, the Commonwealth's evidence of malice, intent, or 
identity is sparse, a jury might, in the absence of evidence of 
motive, be left unpersuaded that the Commonwealth has proved its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We have not spelled out the exact circumstances in which a 
defendant may be entitled to an instruction that the absence of 
evidence of motive can be considered, or what precisely a proper 
instruction should say.  See Commonwealth v. Keniston, 423 Mass. 
304, 313-314 (1996) (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of 
justice where defendant neither requested such instruction nor 
objected to judge's failure to give same); Commonwealth v. 
Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 546 (1946) (judge correctly and adequately 
charged jury, among other things, that "motive or absence of 
motive may present considerations of the utmost importance" 
[emphasis added]).20 
We need not explore in this case all the possible 
circumstances in which such an instruction should be given.  It 
suffices to say that where, as here, the Commonwealth requests 
an instruction informing the jury that it is not required to 
prove motive as part of its case, the judge should also inform 
 
20 Courts in other jurisdictions have taken various 
approaches on the matter.  For a discussion of the different 
approaches, see Annot., Necessity that Trial Court Charge upon 
Motive in Homicide Case, 71 A.L.R. 2d 1025 (1960), and cases 
compiled therein. 
30 
 
the jury of the corollary principle:  that the jury can consider 
an absence of motive evidence in determining whether the 
Commonwealth has proved all the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See State v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 790-792 
(1992) (proposing instruction for future use that fairly 
balances related principles, viz., that motive is not element of 
crime and need not be proved, that absence of evidence of motive 
may be considered on reasonable doubt, but that even total lack 
of evidence of motive does not necessarily create reasonable 
doubt).  See also State v. Hunter, 136 Ariz. 45, 49-50 (1983) 
(error to charge that motive is not element that needs to be 
proved without also charging, as requested, that "motive or lack 
of motive is a circumstance that may be considered in 
determining guilt or innocence"); People v. Hobbs, 35 Ill. 2d 
263, 268-269 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967) (noting 
value of such instruction, especially in "cases where there is 
some doubt as to who committed the offense"); Cook v. State, 544 
N.E.2d 1359, 1364 (Ind. 1989) (acknowledging that it is "more 
even-handed and complete," when instructing that motive is not 
element that needs to be proved, also to instruct that "presence 
or absence of motive is a circumstance which you may consider"). 
That said, the instruction that was given was not 
prejudicial.  The judge's statement that the Commonwealth was 
not required to prove motive was a correct statement of law.  
31 
 
She did not tell the jury that they were not permitted to 
consider absence of evidence of motive.  And perhaps most 
significantly, this was not a case where there was a complete 
absence of motive evidence, as the defendant argued; the 
Commonwealth maintained that the defendant and his group were 
prepared for a confrontation outside the bar, presumably related 
to the verbal insult that had been directed to Waldo inside the 
bar earlier in the night, and that the defendant had armed 
himself for that very purpose.  The motive was evident.  The 
judge's single, brief remark in these circumstances would have 
had "but very slight effect."  Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353. 
4.  Prosecutor's closing remarks regarding the view.  In 
his closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to recall an 
event, completely unrelated to this case, that had occurred 
while they were on the view, and to poll themselves as to the 
details of the event.21  He used this argument to make the point 
 
21 "Now think about this.  We were all together a week ago 
today when we went on our jury view.  When we were out on our 
jury view, we were standing outside of the Blue Hill Avenue 
Superette and there was a car with loud music going on while we 
were trying to make a recording so that the record was clear as 
to what we were asking, meaning [the defendant's trial counsel] 
and I were asking you to look at. 
 
"And an incident happened while that car was going.  There was 
music playing.  A guy came out and eventually got in that car.  
He had a couple of words with the police and he drove off. 
 
"You all remember that.  You all were there.  It was one week 
ago.  For you [twelve] people who wind up deliberating in this 
32 
 
that Brooks's testimony was credible despite some 
inconsistencies in what he had told the police, what he told the 
grand jury, what he had told the defendant's investigator, and 
to what he testified at trial.  Just as the jury might not agree 
on all the details of the incident that occurred on the view, 
but would agree generally on the "big picture," so too, the 
prosecutor argued, Brooks was believable notwithstanding his 
inconsistencies because he was consistent in recounting the "big 
picture," that the shooter was a heavy-set man with a gray 
hooded sweatshirt. 
 
The prosecutor's argument was ill advised.  Although a view 
can be helpful to a jury in understanding and assessing the 
evidence in a case, the view itself is not evidence in a strict 
sense.  See Commonwealth v. Curry, 368 Mass. 195, 198 (1975); 
Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 29-30 (1923).  Jurors 
are carefully instructed (as they were in this case) about the 
limited purpose of views, and about what they and the attorneys 
in the case can and cannot do on a view.  The jurors should not 
 
case, I'm going to ask you when you're in that jury room, take a 
poll . . . ask yourselves and write down these answers.  What 
color was the car?  What kind of clothing was the man wearing 
that drove the car away?  What did he say to the police 
officers? 
 
"I'm going to guarantee you that you won't get [twelve] of the 
same answers, but you'll have the concept.  You all were there.  
You all know what happened.  You all saw, but you're not going 
to see it in the same way." 
33 
 
be expected to take note of, let alone be asked to remember, 
events wholly unrelated to the case that they may observe while 
on a view.  Indeed, they should do the opposite.  Such events 
have no bearing on the purpose of the view or on the evidence in 
the case.  It therefore was error for the prosecutor to ask 
jurors to use the view as fodder for contemplating the 
fallibility of memory. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that it is permissible to invite 
jurors "to draw upon their own life experience and common 
sense."  Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 310 (2016).  
That is correct.  The prosecutor in this case went beyond that, 
however.  By calling on the jurors to test their memories of an 
event that occurred on the view -- unrelated to the facts of the 
case -- he essentially asked the jury to use the view for 
something other than the limited purpose for which a view is 
intended.  We have no doubt that he could have made the same 
point -- that memories are inexact -- just as effectively 
without invoking the jurors' memories of the event that occurred 
on the view. 
 
Nevertheless, nothing the prosecutor said rises to the 
level of prejudicial error.  Although he chose a poor example to 
make his point, the prosecutor's remarks did nothing more than 
illustrate a noncontroversial, commonsense principle about human 
memory.  The jury surely would have understood it as such.  
34 
 
Therefore, although the prosecutor's closing comments about the 
view were error, they were not prejudicial. 
 
5.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
reviewed the entire record, as the statute requires us to do, we 
find no reason to order a new trial, reduce the verdict of 
murder in the first degree, or grant any other relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.