Title: Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Melendez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13054
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 3, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13054 
 
SHAW'S SUPERMARKETS, INC.  vs.  MARGARITA MELENDEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 5, 2021. - September 3, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Limitations, Statute of.  Negligence, Limitation of liability.  
Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Statute of limitations. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 11, 2020. 
 
The case was reported by Kafker, J. 
 
 
Kristyn Dery Kaupas for the plaintiff. 
Michael V. Caplette for the defendant. 
Brendan G. Carney, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, & J. 
Michael Conley, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  Margarita Melendez, the plaintiff in the 
underlying District Court case, commenced legal action against 
the defendant, a grocery store chain, after being injured inside 
one of its stores in a collision with a grocery cart, allegedly 
as a result of the negligence of one of the defendant's 
2 
 
employees.  The complaint was filed after the expiration of the 
applicable period of limitation, based on the three-year statute 
of limitations for tort actions set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2A, 
but in light of this court's order that "[a]ll civil statutes of 
limitations were tolled . . . from March 17, 2020, though 
June 30, 2020," due to the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
See Supreme Judicial Court, Third Updated Order Regarding Court 
Operations Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-
19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic, No. OE-144 (June 24, 2020).  The 
defendant moved to dismiss, on the ground that the tolling order 
applied only to those civil statutes of limitations that expired 
between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 2020, and, thus, that the 
plaintiff's cause of action, which it argued accrued on 
September 3, 2017, was time barred at the time she filed her 
complaint on September 24, 2020.  A District Court judge denied 
the defendant's motion based on the plain language of the order, 
which tolled all civil statutes of limitations regardless of 
their expiration.1 
1.  Background.  We review the denial of a motion to 
dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), 
for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting as true all 
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing all 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
3 
 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.  See Rafferty v. 
Merck & Co., 479 Mass. 141, 147 (2018); Curtis v. Herb Chambers 
I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). 
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was injured on 
September 3, 2017, while shopping at a grocery store operated by 
the defendant Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. (Shaw's), in Sturbridge.  
A Shaw's employee pushed a cart out from a back room into the 
consumer area of the store, colliding with the plaintiff and 
knocking her to the floor.  She suffered multiple injuries as a 
result of the fall, including a concussion and injuries to her 
neck, back, left wrist, and right knee.  The plaintiff filed a 
complaint for negligence in the District Court on September 24, 
2020. 
Shaw's subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the plaintiff failed to file the complaint within the 
three-year period prescribed by the statute of limitations, 
G. L. c. 260, § 2A ("actions of tort . . . shall be commenced 
only within three years next after the cause of action accrues."  
Relying upon our multiple orders concerning the exigent 
circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, a District Court 
judge denied the motion to dismiss. 
2.  Orders concerning court operations during COVID-19 
pandemic.  "The power, authority, and jurisdiction of this 
court . . . rest on at least the following grounds, among 
4 
 
others:  (a) the inherent common law and constitutional powers 
of this court, as the highest constitutional court of the 
Commonwealth, to protect and preserve the integrity of the 
judicial system and to supervise the administration of justice; 
(b) the supervisory powers confirmed to this court by G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, as amended; (c) the power of this court to maintain 
and impose discipline with respect to the conduct of all members 
of the bar, either as lawyers engaged in practice or as judicial 
officers; and (d) the power of this court to establish and 
enforce rules of court for the orderly conduct (1) of officers 
and judges of the courts and (2) of judicial business and 
administration.  We need not now decide what other common law, 
equity, or inherent judicial powers and jurisdiction may exist."  
(Footnote omitted.)  Matter of DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 757, 758–
759 (1971).  See Opinion of the Justices, 372 Mass. 883, 889 
(1977); Keenan, petitioner, 310 Mass. 166, 181-182 (1941); 
Russell v. Howe, 12 Gray 147, 152-153 (1858); art. 29 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
The court's superintendence powers over all of the courts 
in the Commonwealth include the authority to issue "such writs, 
summonses and other processes and such orders, directions and 
rules as may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of 
justice, the regular execution of the laws, the improvement of 
5 
 
the administration of such courts, and the securing of their 
proper and efficient administration."  G. L. c. 211, § 3.2 
Pursuant to our superintendence and rulemaking authority, 
this court has issued a variety of orders since March 2020 
regarding court operations in the Commonwealth during the COVID-
19 pandemic.  These orders have sought to safeguard the health 
and safety of the public, as well as court personnel, while 
recognizing the importance to all litigants and, indeed, to all 
residents of the Commonwealth of an efficient and functioning 
judiciary during this unprecedented period. 
Among other measures, our third updated order, referencing 
our second updated order, stated: 
 
 
2 General Laws c. 211, § 3, provides: 
 
"The supreme judicial court shall have general 
superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to 
correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other 
remedy is expressly provided; and it may issue all writs 
and processes to such courts and to corporations and 
individuals which may be necessary to the furtherance of 
justice and to the regular execution of the laws. 
 
"In addition to the foregoing, the justices of the supreme 
judicial court shall also have general superintendence of 
the administration of all courts of inferior jurisdiction, 
including, without limitation, the prompt hearing and 
disposition of matters pending therein, and the functions 
set forth in section 3C; and it may issue such writs, 
summonses and other processes and such orders, directions 
and rules as may be necessary or desirable for the 
furtherance of justice, the regular execution of the laws, 
the improvement of the administration of such courts, and 
the securing of their proper and efficient 
administration . . . ." 
6 
 
"All civil statutes of limitations were tolled . . . from 
March 17, 2020, through June 30, 2020, and will not be 
tolled any further unless there is a new surge in COVID-19 
cases in the Commonwealth and the [Supreme Judicial Court] 
determines that a new or extended period of tolling is 
needed. . . .  The new date for the expiration of a statute 
of limitation is calculated as follows:  determine how many 
days remained as of March 17, 2020, until the statute of 
limitation would have expired, and that same number of days 
will remain as of July 1, 2020 in civil cases . . . .  For 
example, if fourteen (14) days remained as of March 17 
before the statute of limitation would have expired in a 
civil case, then fourteen (14) days will continue to remain 
as of July 1, before the statute of limitation expires 
(i.e., July 15)." 
 
Our more recent fourth, fifth, and sixth updated orders did 
not concern tolling periods for civil actions. 
After the District Court judge denied its motion to 
dismiss, Shaw's filed an emergency petition for relief in the 
county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Shaw's argued that 
our orders tolled only those civil statutes of limitations that 
had been set to expire between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 
2020, and thus were inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim, for 
which, under G. L. c. 260, § 2A, the statute of limitations 
would have expired on September 3, 2020.  The single justice 
reserved and reported the emergency petition to the full court. 
3.  Discussion.  In interpreting rules and orders adopted 
by this court, we rely upon basic principles of statutory 
construction.  Thus, we begin with the plain language of the 
order.  See, e.g., Bar Counsel v. Farber, 464 Mass. 784, 791 
(2013) (interpreting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 9, as appearing in 425 
7 
 
Mass. 1312 [1997], regarding bar discipline based on "plain 
language" of rule).  See also Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. 345, 357 
(2006).  If the language is clear and unambiguous, we "must give 
effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and . . . need not look 
beyond the words."  Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 
487, 491 (2020), quoting Milford v. Boyd, 434 Mass. 754, 756 
(2001).  While language is ambiguous when it "reasonably can be 
construed in multiple ways," Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 
Mass. 786, 797 (2018), citing Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
447 Mass. 814, 818 (2006), "ambiguity is not created simply 
because a controversy exists between parties, each favoring an 
interpretation contrary to the other," Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. 
v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 419 Mass. 462, 466 (1995). 
Here, we conclude that the phrase "all civil statutes of 
limitations" is clear and unambiguous.  As indicated by the use 
of the word "all," the plain meaning of these words encompasses 
each and every civil statute of limitations, not just those 
where the statutory period of limitation expired between March 
17, 2020, and June 30, 2020.  Where a word is not defined in a 
statute, we give the word its usual and accepted meaning, so 
long as those meanings are consistent with the statutory 
purpose.  Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477-478 (2008), and 
cases cited.  In common usage, "all" means "the whole of"; "the 
greatest possible"; "every"; and "any."  Webster's New Universal 
8 
 
Unabridged Dictionary 54 (2003).  We adopted this broad tolling 
order cognizant of the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic has 
engendered not only for the judiciary and court staff, but also 
for attorneys and litigants considering the initiation of legal 
action.  In light of ongoing State and local restrictions 
imposed to combat the spread of COVID-19, and the effect of such 
restrictions on the ability of attorneys and litigants to 
prepare civil claims, we decline Shaw's request that we narrow 
our order.3  "All" means all. 
 
3 Prior to commencing legal action, attorneys determining 
whether to initiate civil legal action, specifically in tort 
claims, are encouraged to conduct an in-depth client interview, 
gather all medical records, collect narrative reports from key 
physicians and health care providers, identify and interview 
witnesses, inspect the incident site and involved 
instrumentalities, and photograph the incident site, 
instrumentalities, and the plaintiff's injuries, among other 
things.  See G.D. Lee, Preparation of a Plaintiff's Case, Tort 
Law Manual §§ 21.1 et seq. (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 3d ed. 2017 
& Supp. 2019).  Many of the restrictions imposed in light of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, specifically those limiting individual 
mobility, business activity, and in-person meetings, 
substantially impair these activities. 
 
In adopting its own civil tolling order due to the 
pandemic, the Court of Appeals of Maryland invoked these same 
concerns: 
 
"The impact of the restrictions required to respond to the 
COVID-19 pandemic has had a widespread detrimental impact 
upon the administration of justice, impeding the ability of 
parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, 
conduct research, gather evidence, and prepare complaints, 
pleadings, and responses, with the impact falling hardest 
upon those who are impoverished . . . .  [T]he detrimental 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is so widespread as to have 
9 
 
We note that, elsewhere in our COVID-19 orders, where this 
court sought exclusively to extend legal terms or deadlines that 
expired within a specific period, we did so explicitly.  For 
example, in contrast to the provision tolling civil statutes of 
limitations, our third updated order specified that "all 
deadlines set forth in statutes or court rules, standing orders, 
tracking orders, or guidelines that expired at any time from 
March 17, 2020, through June 30, 2020, were tolled by Prior 
[Supreme Judicial Court] Orders from March 17, 2020, through 
June 30, 2020" (emphasis added).  We placed no such limit upon 
the tolling of civil statutes of limitations.  The example cited 
in the third updated order, for which the statute of limitations 
was to expire between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 2020, is just 
that, an example, and does not limit the plain and ordinary 
language of the extent of the order.  Similarly, the period of 
time from March 17, 2020, through June 30, 2020, was excluded 
from speedy trial calculations in criminal cases under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 909 (1979).  See Commonwealth v. 
 
created a general and pervasive practical inability for 
certain deadlines to be met . . . ." 
 
Second Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency 
Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and 
Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of 
Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in 
Pending Matters (June 3, 2020) (Second Revised 
Administrative Order). 
10 
 
Lougee, 485 Mass. 70, 77-80 (2020).  See also Commonwealth vs. 
Lucien, Mass. Appeals Ct., No. 2020-J-0547 (Dec. 29, 2020) 
("Accordingly, the time period from March 13, 2020 until now 
must also be excluded from the [G. L. c. 276, § 58A,] 
calculation"). 
The tolling orders adopted by the courts of our sister 
States in light of the COVID-19 pandemic reflect the balancing 
of similar concerns.  Some of their policies -- whether the 
result of executive decision-making, legislative action, or 
judicial order -- explicitly toll only those statutes of 
limitations set to expire within a particular period,4 while 
approximately twice as many others apply, as here, more broadly.5 
 
4 Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, 
Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia have adopted such policies.  
See Delaware Supreme Court, Administrative Order No. 3 (Mar. 22, 
2020); New Hampshire Supreme Court, Renewed and Amended Order 
Suspending In-Person Court Proceedings Related to New Hampshire 
Circuit Court and Restricting Public Access to Courthouses (Mar. 
27, 2020); Order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina (May 21, 2020); Ohio House Bill No. 197 
(effective Mar. 27 2020); Tennessee Supreme Court, In re:  
COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Mar. 13, 2020); Texas 
Supreme Court, Twelfth Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 
State of Disaster, Misc. Docket No. 20-9059 (Apr. 27, 2020); 
Vermont Senate Bill No. 114 (effective Apr. 28, 2021); West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Administrative Order, Re:  
Judicial Emergency Declared (Mar. 22, 2020). 
 
5 California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Virginia have adopted this 
approach.  See Judicial Council of California, Rule 9 of the 
Emergency Rules Related to COVID-19 (amended effective May 29, 
2020); Connecticut Executive Order No. 7G (Mar. 19, 2020); 
11 
 
In some instances, the orders explicitly incorporated the 
language that Shaw's asserts was the intent of the orders at 
issue here, expressly limiting the tolling period to matters 
where the statutes of limitations or repose would expire within 
those dates, whereas in others the language expressly excluded 
the tolled period of time from any subsequent calculations of 
time.  Compare Delaware Supreme Court, Administrative Order No. 
6, Extension of Judicial Emergency (May 14, 2020) ("Statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose that would otherwise expire 
during the period between March 23, 2020 and June 13, 2020 are 
extended through July 1, 2020.  Deadlines, statutes of 
 
Georgia Supreme Court, Second Order Extending Declaration of 
Statewide Judicial Emergency (May 11, 2020); Indiana Supreme 
Court, Case No. 20S-CB-123, Order Extending Trial Courts' 
Emergency Tolling Authority and Setting Expiration of Other 
Emergency Orders (May 29, 2020); Iowa Supreme Court, Matter of 
Ongoing Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court 
Services (Mar. 17, 2020); Kansas Supreme Court, Administrative 
Order No. 2020-PR-047 (May 1, 2020); Louisiana Executive 
Department, Proclamation No. JBE 2020-30 (Mar. 16, 2020); 
Maryland Court of Appeals, Second Revised Administrative Order, 
supra; Michigan Supreme Court, Administrative Order No. 2020-3 
(Mar. 23, 2020); Minnesota House Bill, H.F. No. 4556 (effective 
Apr. 16, 2020); Nevada Executive Department, Declaration of 
Emergency Directive No. 009 (Revised) (Apr. 1, 2020); New Jersey 
Supreme Court, Order (Mar. 17, 2020); New York Governor, 
Executive Order No. 202.8 (Mar. 20, 2020); Oklahoma Supreme 
Court and Court of Criminal Appeals, SCAD No. 2020-36, Third 
Emergency Joint Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster 
(Apr. 29, 2020); Oregon House Bill No. 4212 (effective June 30, 
2020); Virginia Supreme Court, In re:  Order Declaring a 
Judicial Emergency in Response to COVID-19 Emergency (Mar. 16, 
2020).  The District of Columbia has done similarly.  See 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Order (amended Mar. 
19, 2020). 
12 
 
limitations, and statutes of repose that are not set to expire 
between March 23, 2020 and June 13, 2020 are not extended or 
tolled by this order"), with New Jersey Supreme Court, COVID-19 
-- Fourth Omnibus Order on Court Operations and Legal Practice 
(June 11, 2020) ("in the computation of time periods under the 
Rules of Court and under any statute of limitations for matters 
in all trial divisions of the Superior Court, the period from 
March 16, 2020 through May 10, 2020 will not be included in 
calculating those trial court filing deadlines").  The absence 
of such explicit language in this court's orders on how tolling 
limitations are to be implemented, however, does not suggest to 
us that we should read into the orders the limitation that 
Shaw's proposes, which was not included in the plain language. 
Moreover, all of these orders are relatively new, and we 
are aware of no court in another jurisdiction that has been 
presented with the issue now before us.  We recognize that, in 
certain jurisdictions, the language of the order evinces a lack 
of ambiguity with respect to the applicable tolling provisions 
that is absent from this court's second and third updated 
orders.  Nonetheless, we see no reason to impose such limits 
upon our broader and more widely applicable order. 
Moreover, at least some of Shaw's reasoning may be 
attributable to a misconception of the reference to the 
"statutes of limitation" in the second and third updated orders.  
13 
 
A statute of limitations does not refer to the date on which the 
cause of action expires, but, rather, to the period during which 
a legal proceeding may be initiated.  See McGuinness v. Cotter, 
412 Mass. 617, 621 (1992), quoting Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 
701, 702 (1982) ("A statute of limitations is a procedural 
measure which 'normally governs the time within which legal 
proceedings must be commenced after the cause of action 
accrues").  Hence, a synonymous term is "limitations period."  
See Black's Law Dictionary 1069 (11th ed. 2019).  In ordering 
"[a]ll civil statutes of limitations . . . tolled . . . from 
March 17, 2020, through June 30, 2020," we thus did not refer 
only to those causes of action for which the date of statutory 
expiration fell within that time period.  Rather, we included 
all causes of action for which the relevant limitations period 
ran for some period between, or through, those dates.  To 
construe this phrase as having any other meaning also would be 
substantively contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
term "toll," which means "to stop the running of."  Black's Law 
Dictionary, supra at 1716.  See Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary 1992 (2003) (defining "toll" as "to 
suspend or interrupt").  See also Walsh v. Ogorzalek, 372 Mass. 
271, 271-272 (1977) (providing for "suspension or 'tolling'" of 
statute of limitations in certain circumstances, such as where 
defendant in suit lives outside Commonwealth). 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  dismiss affirmed.