Title: Stout v. Bartholomew
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 001204
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LYNN A. STOUT 
 
v. Record No. 001204  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
  April 20, 2001 
EDWARD L. BARTHOLOMEW, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Joanne F. Alper, Judge 
 
This action arises out of an accident between a 
motorcycle operated by the plaintiff, Lynn A. Stout, and a 
dog named Jackson.  The defendant, Edward L. Bartholomew 
(Bartholomew), and his wife, Carol J. Bartholomew, cared 
for the dog.1  The dispositive issues on appeal involve the 
circuit court’s refusal to grant an instruction on 
negligence per se, the court’s judgment setting aside a 
jury verdict in favor of Stout against Bartholomew, and the 
court’s decision to sustain a demurrer with regard to 
claims for failure to warn.  Because we find no error in 
the circuit court’s judgment on these issues, we will 
affirm that judgment. 
FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
In summarizing the evidence adduced at trial, we are 
guided by well-established principles of appellate review. 
“Even though the trial court set the verdict aside, we 
state the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn 
                     
1 The Bartholomews’ daughter owned Jackson. 
therefrom in the light most favorable to” Stout, who 
prevailed against Bartholomew before the jury.  Stump v. 
Doe, 250 Va. 57, 58, 458 S.E.2d 279, 280 (1995); accord 
Hoar v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 256 Va. 374, 378, 506 
S.E.2d 777, 780 (1998). 
The accident at issue occurred as Stout and her 
husband, Douglas Olin, were riding their motorcycles 
northbound on Glebe Road, a four-lane public highway in 
Arlington County.  Olin was riding in front of Stout and 
slightly to her left.  As they approached the intersection 
between Glebe Road and 37th Street, both Olin and Stout saw 
a dog, later determined to be Jackson, standing on the 
sidewalk.  In Olin’s words, the dog was in “an attack 
posture[,] . . . baring its teeth, [and] appeared to be 
growling.”  As Olin traveled past the dog, the dog ran out 
into the street and came at him.  Olin was able to take 
evasive action, but the dog leaped up against the front 
tire of Stout’s motorcycle, causing the tire to turn at a 
right angle to the frame of the motorcycle.  Consequently, 
Stout was thrown forward over the handlebars and landed on 
the pavement on Glebe Road.  As a result of the accident, 
Stout suffered personal injuries. 
 
The Bartholomews had cared for Jackson from October 
1996 through the date of the accident, April 13, 1997.  
 
2
Jackson was a forty-pound, mixed breed dog that was about 
ten months old at the time of the accident.  Mrs. 
Bartholomew described Jackson’s temperament as “sweet” and 
“animated.”  She also testified that the neighborhood 
children frequently played with him.  One of those children 
stated that Jackson was “a very friendly dog.”  That 
child’s mother, however, indicated that Jackson was 
“frisky” and acted aggressively toward other male dogs.  In 
spite of that tendency, the evidence established that, 
prior to the day in question, Jackson had not previously 
attacked or chased people, cars, bicycles, or motorcycles. 
Jackson was not the first dog that the Bartholomews 
had cared for or owned.  They had acquired another dog in 
approximately 1988 and decided about a year later to 
install a pet containment system that is based on the use 
of electronics coupled with training of the pet.  A dog 
wears an electronic shock collar that emits a beep when the 
dog approaches the boundary, which is established by an 
underground wire.  If the dog crosses the boundary, the 
collar shocks the dog.2  The Bartholomews chose this pet 
containment system instead of some other type of fencing 
partly because they both had had experience with dogs 
                     
2 The brand name of the pet containment system selected 
by the Bartholomews was “Invisible Fencing System.” 
 
3
getting out of boundaries enclosed by more traditional 
kinds of fences.  They concluded that this system was the 
most effective method of confining a pet to a specified 
area. 
Clark Associates Invisible Fence Corporation (Clark 
Associates) sold the “Invisible Fencing System” to the 
Bartholomews and installed it on their property located on 
Glebe Road.  Clark Associates’ contract with Mrs. 
Bartholomew contained the following warning in block 
capital letters: 
 
Occasionally an animal cannot be trained to avoid 
crossing the boundary, and sometimes even a properly 
trained animal may cross the boundary.  Therefore, 
[Clark Associates] cannot guarantee that the unit 
will, in all cases, keep a customer’s animal within 
the established boundary.  Accordingly, if a customer 
has reason to believe that their animal may pose a 
danger to others or harm itself if it is not kept from 
crossing the boundaries, customer should not rely 
solely upon the unit to keep the animal from crossing 
the boundary. 
 
However, no one from Clark Associates suggested to the 
Bartholomews that, because of the heavy volume of traffic 
on Glebe Road, their property was not an appropriate 
location to use an invisible fence. 
During the eight years that the Bartholomews used the 
fence for their other dog, it “worked perfectly,” according 
to Bartholomew.  Because of their previous success with the 
fence, the Bartholomews decided to utilize the same system 
 
4
when they started caring for Jackson.  At that time, the 
Bartholomews asked Clark Associates to service the system.  
Clark Associates performed some repairs to the fence where 
the underground wire had been cut and also provided a shock 
collar for Jackson to wear. 
 
After the Bartholomews commenced training Jackson by 
using the shock collar, he responded quickly to the system 
and did not have any difficulty learning the boundary, 
according to Mrs. Bartholomew.  In fact, she testified that 
Jackson responded better than their other dog had.  Prior 
to the incident in question, Jackson had never crossed the 
boundary of the invisible fence while he was wearing the 
shock collar, nor had the Bartholomews received any 
complaints about Jackson getting out of their yard.  
Bartholomew further stated that, when the neighborhood 
children were in his yard playing with Jackson, the dog did 
not follow them across the boundary of the invisible fence 
when the children left the Bartholomews’ yard. 
 
On the day of the accident, Bartholomew put the collar 
on Jackson and let him out of the house.  A short time 
later, Bartholomew received a call from a neighbor advising 
him that Jackson was not in the yard.  Bartholomew 
subsequently learned about the accident involving Jackson.  
When he found the dog later that evening near the boundary 
 
5
of the invisible fence, Jackson was still wearing the 
collar, which was beeping as it should when a dog is near 
the boundary. 
 
Richard Henry Polsky, an applied animal behaviorist, 
testified at trial on behalf of Stout.  He qualified as an 
expert in the field of dog behavior and training, including 
electronic shock collars and pet containment systems.  
Polsky opined that it was unreasonable for Clark Associates 
to install the invisible fence on the Bartholomews’ 
property because the heavy volume of traffic on Glebe Road 
made the fence less effective as a pet containment system.  
He also testified that a shock collar can cause some dogs 
to become aggressive toward humans and other dogs, and can 
prevent a dog from re-entering the boundary after it has 
crossed the invisible fence.  However, Polsky admitted that 
it was his understanding that the invisible fence and 
collar were working on the day of the accident, that 
Jackson was wearing the collar, and that the dog had not 
previously violated the invisible fence. 
Stout filed this action against Bartholomew, Clark 
Associates, and Invisible Fence Company, Inc. (IFCO), the 
company that designed and manufactured the invisible fence.  
In her amended motion for judgment, Stout asserted one 
count of negligence against Bartholomew, and both 
 
6
negligence and breach of warranty claims against IFCO and 
Clark Associates. 
 
In response, IFCO and Clark Associates filed a 
demurrer to those portions of Stout’s amended motion for 
judgment alleging claims for breach of warranty and/or 
failure to warn.  The circuit court sustained the demurrer, 
in part, and dismissed Stout’s claims against IFCO and 
Clark Associates for failure to warn.3  On the morning of 
trial, Stout dismissed her remaining claims against IFCO.4  
She proceeded to trial on her negligence and breach of 
warranty claims against Clark Associates and her negligence 
claim against Bartholomew. 
 
At the close of Stout’s evidence, Clark Associates and 
Bartholomew moved to strike that evidence.  The court 
sustained Clark Associates’ motion as to the breach of 
warranty claim but took the motions under advisement on the 
negligence counts against Bartholomew and Clark Associates.  
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Stout against 
Bartholomew, awarding her damages in the amount of $27,408.  
                     
3 The court denied the demurrer with regard to Stout’s 
breach of warranty claims. 
 
4 Stout reserved her objection to, and right to appeal, 
the prior dismissal of the failure to warn claim against 
IFCO. 
 
7
However, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Clark 
Associates. 
Bartholomew subsequently renewed his motion to strike 
and also moved to set aside the jury’s verdict.  After 
considering the parties’ memoranda and hearing argument of 
counsel, the circuit court sustained the motions and 
entered judgment in favor of Bartholomew.  The court found 
that there was no evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded that Bartholomew did not act reasonably in the 
restraint of the dog.  The court further concluded that 
Bartholomew could not have anticipated that using the 
invisible fence to confine Jackson was likely to result in 
injuries to others.  We awarded Stout this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Three of the errors that Stout assigns are dispositive 
of this appeal.  She challenges the circuit court’s refusal 
to instruct the jury on negligence per se, its ruling to 
set aside the jury verdict in her favor, and the court’s 
sustaining the demurrer with regard to the failure to warn 
claims.  We will address these issues seriatim. 
In Stout’s first assignment of error, she contends 
that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury to find Bartholomew negligent per se if he violated  
Arlington County Code § 2-6, which requires all dogs to be 
 
8
“secured by a leash or lead, and under the control of the 
owner . . . or within the real property limits of its 
owners.”5  Stout contends that the undisputed evidence 
establishes that Bartholomew violated this ordinance, and 
that the purpose of the ordinance is to protect members of 
the public, such as herself, from the hazards of unleashed 
dogs.  Thus, argues Stout, she was entitled to have the 
jury instructed on negligence per se. 
 
In Butler v. Frieden, 208 Va. 352, 352-53, 355, 158 
S.E.2d 121, 122-23 (1967), this Court held that a city 
ordinance, which subjected a dog owner to a fine if the dog 
“shall go at large upon any public street . . . unless such 
dog is accompanied by an attendant or held in leash,” 
supplied the standard for deciding whether the owner had 
exercised the duty of ordinary care.  However, in that 
case, the defendants did not contest their violation of the 
ordinance.  Instead, the issue on appeal was “whether the 
ordinance was designed to protect the public from personal 
injuries inflicted by dogs.”  Id. at 354, 158 S.E.2d at 
122.  In concluding that the ordinance was so designed and 
that the trial court, therefore, did not err in instructing 
                     
5 Stout offered Instruction No. 31, which the circuit 
court refused.  In pertinent part, that instruction told 
the jury that, if it believed “from the greater weight of 
 
9
the jury that violation of the ordinance constituted 
negligence, we recognized that, prior to the enactment of 
the ordinance, the defendants’ failure to keep the dog 
leashed would not have been a breach of their duty to the 
plaintiff because the defendants had no reason to believe 
that the dog would inflict injuries if allowed to run 
unleashed.  However, under the standard created by the 
ordinance, the defendants breached their duty to the 
plaintiff because they permitted the dog to roam at large 
on a public street.  Id. at 355, 158 S.E.2d at 123. 
 
Relying on Butler, Stout argues that Arlington County 
Code § 2-6 supplies the standard for determining whether 
Bartholomew exercised his duty of care and that the circuit 
court therefore erred in failing to instruct the jury with 
regard to negligence per se.  However, to establish 
negligence per se, Stout must initially prove that 
Bartholomew “violated a statute that was enacted for public 
safety.”  Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 259 Va. 171, 
176, 523 S.E.2d 823, 825 (2000) (citing MacCoy v. Colony 
House Builders, Inc., 239 Va. 64, 69, 387 S.E.2d 760, 763 
(1990); Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Savoy Const. Co., 
224 Va. 36, 45, 294 S.E.2d 811, 817 (1982)).  Bartholomew 
_________________________ 
the evidence that defendant violated the ordinance, than 
[sic] the defendant is guilty of negligence.” 
 
10
contends that Stout failed to do so.  He argues not only 
that Arlington County Code § 2-6 is not applicable to this 
case but also that he did not violate that ordinance.  We 
agree with Bartholomew. 
 
As previously stated, Arlington County Code § 2-6 
requires that dogs “be kept secured by a leash or lead, and 
under the control of the owner . . . or within the real 
property limits of its owners.”  This ordinance cannot, 
however, be read in isolation.  It must be construed in 
conjunction with other ordinances having the same purpose.  
See Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405, 100 S.E.2d 
4, 7 (1957) (“statutes are not to be considered as isolated 
fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of . . . a 
single and complete statutory arrangement”). 
 
In addition to § 2-6, the Arlington County Code 
contains other relevant sections dealing with animals.  For 
instance, Arlington County Code § 2-5 provides that “[i]t 
shall be unlawful for the owner of any dog to permit such 
dog . . . to run at large in the county . . . .”  The term 
“[r]unning at large” is defined as “any dog, while roaming, 
running or self-hunting off the property of its owner or 
custodian and not under its owner’s or custodian’s 
immediate control.”  Arlington County Code § 2-4. 
 
11
 
When considering these ordinances “as parts of . . . a 
single and complete statutory arrangement,” Prillaman, 199 
Va. at 405, 100 S.E.2d at 7, we conclude, as Bartholomew 
argues, that § 2-6 does not apply in this case.  
Bartholomew had in place a system designed to keep Jackson 
within the Bartholomews’ real property limits.  Bartholomew 
did not take Jackson off his property without a leash.  The 
exceptions to the requirements of § 2-6, i.e., for “off-
lead training, obedience matches and trials, [and] when the 
dog has a skin condition which would be exacerbated by the 
wearing of a collar,” confirm that § 2-6 applies when an 
owner chooses to take a dog off the owner’s real property 
limits.  When a dog escapes from a pet containment system 
designed to keep the dog within the owner’s real property 
limits, the owner has not violated § 2-6.  Thus, the 
circuit court was correct in refusing to give Stout’s 
Instruction No. 31 because Arlington County Code § 2-6 does 
not supply a standard of care applicable to this case. 
Notably, Stout did not rely on Arlington County Code 
§ 2-5, which utilizes the term “permit.”  As we stated in 
Rice v. Turner, 191 Va. 601, 605, 62 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1950), 
such language “implies knowledge, consent, or a willingness 
on the part of the owner for . . . domestic animals to run 
at large.”  In Rice, we concluded that the statute at issue 
 
12
there, which made it “unlawful for the owner of any horse, 
mule, cattle, hog, sheep, or goat, to permit any such 
animal to run at large[,]” did not “cover a situation where 
the owner has used ordinary care to keep his stock confined 
to his premises.”  Id. at 604-05, 62 S.E.2d at 25-26.  The 
same conclusion applies in this case. 
In her second assignment of error, Stout contends that 
the circuit court erred in finding that there was no 
evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
Bartholomew did not act reasonably in the restraint of 
Jackson.  In support of her argument, Stout points to 
Bartholomew’s admissions that he relied solely on the 
invisible fence to keep Jackson confined in the yard; that 
he knew the invisible fence would not work all the time, 
for example, when a power outage occurs; and that, even 
when the fence is working properly, a well-trained dog may 
still cross the boundary despite the shock received when 
doing so.  Stout also relies on the warning contained in 
Clark Associates’ sales contract, the fact that the 
Bartholomews’ property was located adjacent to a heavily 
traveled highway, and the evidence that Jackson was a 
young, recently trained, frisky dog that displayed some 
aggressiveness when confronted by other male dogs.  Stout 
argues that, based on this evidence, the jury could have 
 
13
concluded that ordinary care requires more than reliance on 
merely one system of confinement that did not physically 
restrain Jackson.  We do not agree. 
In addressing this assignment of error, we are mindful 
of the following principles of appellate review: 
In a case such as this, where the trial court has 
set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the 
verdict is not entitled to the same weight as one 
which has been approved by the court.  But such a 
verdict must be reinstated and judgment rendered on 
the verdict if we find any credible evidence in the 
record that supports the jury’s finding.  In viewing 
the evidence, we accord the plaintiff benefit of all 
substantial conflicts in the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence. 
 
Oberbroeckling v. Lyle, 234 Va. 373, 378, 362 S.E.2d 682, 
685 (1987) (citations omitted). 
This Court has previously held that the owner of a 
domestic animal must exercise ordinary care to keep the 
animal off public highways.  Wilkins v. Sibley, 205 Va. 
171, 173, 135 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1964); Rice, 191 Va. at 605-
06, 62 S.E.2d at 26; see also Page v. Arnold, 227 Va. 74, 
80, 314 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1984) (owner of domestic animal 
“must exercise reasonable care”).  Applying that standard 
of care in Page, we upheld a trial court’s decision to 
strike the plaintiff’s evidence because the record was 
devoid of proof that the pony in question had either the 
propensity or ability to jump a particular fence.  Id. at 
 
14
80, 314 S.E.2d at 61.  The plaintiff in that case argued 
that the pony got out of the field because the fence was 
inadequate to restrain the animal.  Id. at 79, 314 S.E.2d 
at 60.  However, we concluded that “there was no reason for 
the defendants to have anticipated that confining this pony 
in this fenced enclosure was liable to result in injury to 
others.”  Id. at 80, 314 S.E.2d at 61; see also Wilkins, 
205 Va. at 175, 135 S.E.2d at 767; Rice, 191 Va. at 609, 62 
S.E.2d at 27. 
 
Similarly, there was no reason for Bartholomew to 
foresee that using the invisible fence to confine Jackson 
would cause injury to others.  Bartholomew had successfully 
used the fence with his other dog.  After he decided to 
confine Jackson by utilizing the same system, Jackson 
responded quickly to the training with the shock collar and 
had not crossed the boundaries of the fence until the day 
of the accident.  Other than the warning contained in the 
contract between Clark Associates and Mrs. Bartholomew, 
there was no evidence that an invisible fence is generally 
less reliable than other types of fences.  There was also 
no evidence that the system was not functioning properly on 
the day of the accident or that Jackson had the propensity 
to chase cars or motorcycles, or to attack humans.  As 
Bartholomew correctly notes, the question in this case is 
 
15
not whether the invisible fence was always effective.  Even 
Stout’s expert witness, Polsky, agreed that no pet 
containment system is 100 percent effective.  Instead, the 
relevant inquiry is whether Bartholomew’s reliance on the 
invisible fence was reasonable. 
For these reasons, we conclude, as a matter of law, 
that Bartholomew’s reliance on the invisible fence to 
confine Jackson was reasonable and that Bartholomew did not 
fail to exercise ordinary care to keep Jackson off the 
public highways.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not 
err in setting aside the jury verdict and entering judgment 
for Bartholomew.  Ordinarily, negligence is an issue for a 
jury to decide.  Parham v. Albert, 244 Va. 73, 77, 418 
S.E.2d 866, 868 (1992).  However, when there is no evidence 
to support a contrary conclusion and, thus, reasonable 
minds could not differ about the issue, as in this case, it 
is a matter of law for a court to decide.  Id.
 
Finally, Stout asserts that the circuit court erred in 
sustaining the demurrer with regard to the failure to warn 
claims.  Stout claims that IFCO and Clark Associates had a 
duty to warn Bartholomew about three specific alleged 
problems with the invisible fence: (1) that the invisible 
fence system can cause aggressive or violent behavior in 
some dogs, (2) that the system can inhibit a dog that has 
 
16
crossed the electronic boundary from returning to the area 
within the boundary, and (3) that the system is ineffective 
when used in areas adjacent to heavily traveled streets 
such as Glebe Road. 
 
Although the circuit court did not articulate any 
reasons for sustaining the demurrer with regard to the 
failure to warn claims, IFCO and Clark Associates argued in 
their memorandum in support of the demurrer that any 
alleged duty to warn Bartholomew did not extend to Stout 
and that they had no duty to warn Stout as a member of the 
public at large.  On appeal, IFCO and Clark Associates 
claim that, even if the circuit court erred in sustaining 
the demurrer, the error was harmless because Stout, in 
pursuing her negligence count against Clark Associates, 
presented all the evidence that would have been pertinent 
to the failure to warn claims.  They also point out that 
the jury returned a verdict against Stout on her negligence 
claim against Clark Associates.  Stout disagrees and argues 
that she was precluded from pursuing a distinct legal 
theory of liability.  We agree with these defendants. 
 
At trial, the premise of Stout’s negligence claim 
against Clark Associates was that it had a duty to exercise 
ordinary care in the sale, installation, and service of the 
invisible fence to Bartholomew.  In fact, the circuit court 
 
17
instructed the jury that “[n]egligence is the failure to 
use ordinary care.”  Stout asserted that Clark Associates 
breached that duty because the invisible fence, as a pet 
containment system, created an unreasonable risk of danger 
to the public from animals that violate the fence’s 
boundary.  Based on testimony from Stout’s expert witness, 
Polsky, Stout claimed that the invisible fence was 
unreasonably dangerous because it was installed adjacent to 
the heavily traveled Glebe Road, and because the shock 
collar can cause some dogs to become aggressive and can 
prevent a dog from re-entering the boundary. 
In McCoy v. Norfolk & C.R. Co., 99 Va. 132, 137, 37 
S.E. 788, 788 (1901), this Court held that a trial court’s 
decision sustaining a demurrer to two counts was harmless 
error because the allegations in the remaining count were 
sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to introduce the 
evidence that would have been admissible with regard to the 
two counts that were dismissed.  See also Childress v. 
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 94 Va. 186, 189, 26 S.E. 424, 425 
(1897).  The alleged problems with the invisible fence upon 
which Stout relied to claim that the fence was unreasonably 
dangerous are the same deficiencies about which Stout now 
contends there was a duty to warn Bartholomew.  Thus, under 
Stout’s theory of her negligence claim against Clark 
 
18
Associates, she presented all the evidence that would have 
been relevant to her allegations concerning the duty to 
warn.  Accordingly, she was not prejudiced in the 
presentation of her evidence. 
Furthermore, as reflected by the jury’s verdict in 
favor of Clark Associates, Stout failed to establish that 
Clark Associates breached its duty of ordinary care by 
selling, installing, or servicing a product that created an 
unreasonable risk of danger to Stout as a member of the 
public.  In light of the evidence presented and the jury’s 
verdict, we fail to see how Stout could have prevailed on a 
duty to warn claim.  Having lost under her negligence 
theory, she could not have established that the same 
alleged problems with the invisible fence made it 
“dangerous for the use for which it is supplied[.]”  
Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 
962, 252 S.E.2d 358, 366 (1979).  However, proof of that 
element is necessary to prevail on a cause of action for 
failure to warn.  Id.
Despite Stout’s assertion that she was precluded from 
pursuing a distinct theory of negligence liability, her 
memorandum to the circuit court in support of her request 
to file an amended motion for judgment reveals that she was 
 
19
not advancing a new legal theory through her amendments 
regarding the failure to warn.  Stout stated: 
 
 
Defendants in this case will not be prejudiced or 
unduly inconvenienced by Plaintiff’s proposed 
amendment.  Save for including additional facts in 
paragraphs 33-35 and 49-51 regarding the failure to 
warn of certain dangers associated with the invisible 
fence systems, the First Amended Motion for Judgment 
is virtually identical to the original Motion for 
Judgment . . . . 
 
 
 
Plaintiff is not attempting to assert new and 
different claims, or advance a new legal theory, but 
seeks only to refine the negligence and breach of 
warranty allegations contained in the original Motion 
for Judgment. 
 
Stout’s intent is further reflected by the fact that, in 
her amended motion for judgment, she did not assert 
separate counts against IFCO and Clark Associates for their 
alleged breach of the duty to warn but included the 
allegations concerning that duty in her general negligence 
counts against those defendants.  Consequently, we conclude 
that the judgment of the circuit court sustaining the 
demurrer, if erroneous, was harmless error.  McCoy, 99 Va. 
at 137, 37 S.E. at 788. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court.6
Affirmed. 
                     
6 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address Stout’s remaining assignment of error. 
 
20