Title: Stern v. State Board of Law Examiners
Citation: 199 N.E.2d 850, 245 Ind. 526
Docket Number: 30,577
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 1964

245 Ind. 526 (1964)
199 N.E.2d 850
STERN
v.
STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS ET AL.
No. 30,577.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed July 10, 1964.
*527 Briggs, Berner, Sommer &amp; Tinkham, of Indianapolis, for petitioner.
*528 MYERS, J.
This is an original action commenced in this court by one Stuart I. Stern (formerly known as Isidore Stern) against the State Board of Law Examiners, naming each member individually, and Helena Nichols (the Secretary to such Board). Jurisdiction is asserted by virtue of the Acts of the Indiana General Assembly of 1931 as amended in 1951, being ch. 143, § 1, p. 382, of the Acts of 1951, and known as Burns' Ind. Stat., § 4-3605, 1946 Replacement (Supp.), which reads as follows:
Petitioner seeks a review of a final determination by the State Board of Law Examiners (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") rendered on or about March 30, 1964, denying petitioner's application for admission to the Bar on the basis of a foreign license. The jurisdiction of this court is based upon Supreme Court Rule 3-13A, which reads as follows:
Petitioner was a resident of New York City, in the State of New York, on or about November, 1963, when he moved to Indianapolis and took up residence there. He alleges in his petition that on or about December 30, 1963, he filed his Application for Admission to the Bar of the State of Indiana on the Basis of a Foreign License, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3-5. This rule reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
*531 The petition was referred to the Board, which held a hearing on March 19, 1964, where petitioner appeared in person. On March 30, 1964, petitioner was notified that the Board had denied his application on the ground that he had not complied with the requirements of Rule 3-5c. Petitioner claims that this determination was contrary to fact and law in that for the period of seven years preceding the filing of his application he had handled for and on behalf of Curtain Corporation of America, a New York corporation employing over one hundred employees, "all of its contracts, arbitrations, collections, labor relations, closings of real estate, landlord and tenant matters, leases, formation of corporations and partnerships, mergers, acquisitions, summons, complaints, answers, bills of particulars, examinations before trial, and preparation of cases for trial."
In an affidavit filed with this petition, it is stated that petitioner was president and one of two stockholders of Curtain Corporation of America from 1946 to March, 1961, and served as house counsel therein; that during this period he was also counsel to Best Curtain Company, a partnership, in which he was a partner, representing the manufacturing arm of the business; that he also was a partner in Best Realty Company and acted as counsel to it; that he had other clients, such as friends and relatives, to whom he gave advice and for whom he drew legal documents, "often without compensation"; that in March, 1961, he sold his stock in Curtain Corporation of America; that from May, 1961, to July, 1962, he was a partner in a real estate investment business and was house counsel for it; that from July, 1962, to April, 1963, he was a partner in Realty Associates of America, serving as legal counsel therein; that during this period he acquired a large apartment complex in Baltimore, Maryland, of which *532 he is still supervisory manager as well as trustee and co-owner; that he syndicated and sold a shopping center, a leasehold in Pelham, New York, and an apartment house in the Bronx, New York.
Petitioner further states that he used stationery during this period of time with the following letterheads:
that his name was listed in the telephone book as an attorney; that his name appeared on the directory of the building as an attorney; that certain named persons could attest that he actively engaged in the practice of law; that his income tax return for the year 1963 would show that he earned approximately $3,000 as legal fees.
It is further stated that since coming to Indianapolis on December 1, 1963, he entered into a contract to purchase a substantial piece of real estate on behalf of himself and associates for the purpose of improvement; that he frequently is negotiating for various other properties for himself and his associates; that at the present time he is established in a real estate office at 3436 East 38th Street, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Petitioner says in his affidavit:
*533 The Board, through its Secretary, notified petitioner as of April 16, 1964, that, after due consideration of his application, the following resolution was adopted by the Board:
In a brief accompanying the petition, it is argued that it is not necessary for an attorney to actually engage in the handling of trials or to take part in litigation in order to be engaged in the practice of law, but that the preparation of various legal instruments and documents and handling matters such as the drafting of wills, together with giving advice, may constitute the practice of law. The following are cited as authorities: State v. Indiana Real Estate Association, Inc. (1963), 244 Ind. 214, 191 N.E.2d 711; State ex rel. Gary Bar Assn., etc. v. Dudak, etc. (1955), 234 Ind. 413, 127 N.E.2d 522; State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Assn. v. Osborne (1961), 241 Ind. 375, 172 N.E.2d 434; Fink v. Peden (1938), 214 Ind. 584, 17 N.E.2d 95; Eley v. Miller (1893), 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836; 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 3, pp. 262, 263. Petitioner also cites the following passage from 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 3g., pp. 703, 704:
We are entirely in accord with the authorities which petitioner has cited. There are many other facets to the practice of law than the mere engaging in litigation and appearing in court.
Upon making proper application and on meeting all the other requirements for admission to the Bar of Indiana (Supreme Court Rule 3-1 et seq.), petitioner could take the bar examination and, if successful, be admitted to the practice of law in Indiana by this court. Under such circumstances, it would be entirely within his prerogative as to whether he would actively engage in the practice of law. He could make it a side line or let his license to practice law lie dormant for as long a period as he chose.
However, the same cannot be said when one appears before this court from a foreign jurisdiction and seeks to be admitted to the bar of this state without going through the prerequisite of a bar examination and other requirements provided by rule. This court can refuse to grant a license to practice law in this state to one who comes from another state if, *535 for instance, it determines the applicant is "rusty," incompetent, or actually does not wish to practice law for a livelihood, but only incidentally. It is to be noted that petitioner's quotation from 7 C.J.S., supra, says as follows:
From what petitioner has set forth in his affidavit, it is apparent to us that his practice of law during the period of five of the seven years preceding the application was not for the purpose of gaining a livelihood or for gain, but was subordinate to his real estate business. This court interprets Rule 3-5c to mean that an out-of-state resident who wishes to practice law in Indiana must have been engaged in the practice of law previously on a substantial basis and motivated by the desire to earn a living from it. It is obvious to us from his own statement that petitioner is primarily interested in the real estate business both in Indianapolis and elsewhere. He says:
His real estate business in New York, involving apartment houses, shopping centers and office buildings, makes his law business, at least for the year 1963, insignificant in that the most he can say he obtained from it was the sum of $3,000.
We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the Board had sufficient grounds upon which to deny petitioner the right to practice law in the State of Indiana on admission by foreign license.
*536 A further reason to uphold the Board's ruling appears in the requirement of Rule 3-5e, that the petitioner must file a "Judge's Certificate of Practice Upon Foreign License." A copy of the Certificate made an Exhibit and attached to the Petition reveals that George J. Beldock, the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Judicial Department, of the State of New York, states that he has "No knowledge of practice" by the petitioner in the Supreme Court of New York, which is the highest court of original jurisdiction in the state; that petitioner's good standing in that court is only "according to the records of this court," and that the Certificate is based only on "the records of this court," and not upon personal knowledge of the Judge. At most, this is an indefinite statement that petitioner was engaged in the practice of law in New York State.
Board's decision affirmed.
Achor, C.J., and Arterburn and Landis, JJ., concur. Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 199 N.E.2d 850.