Title: DiMasi v. Secretary of the Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13071
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 5, 2023

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SJC-13071 
 
SALVATORE F. DiMASI  vs.  SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2022. - January 5, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, 
JJ. 
 
 
Secretary of the Commonwealth.  Statute, Construction.  Moot 
Question.  Practice, Civil, Moot case.  Words, "Shall 
automatically disqualify." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 10, 2020. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Julie E. Green, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Meredith G. Fierro for the plaintiff. 
 
Edmund D. LaChance, Jr., pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In 2011, Salvatore F. DiMasi, a former Speaker 
of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, was convicted of 
2 
 
seven Federal felonies arising from his sale of political favors 
while serving as Speaker.  After his release from prison in 
March 2019, DiMasi attempted to register as a lobbyist with the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary).  Citing G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (m), the Secretary denied DiMasi's application.  General 
Laws c. 3, § 45 (m) (disqualification provision), provides that 
the Secretary must disqualify an individual from registering as 
a lobbyist for ten years if that individual has been convicted 
of a felony under G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A.  The Secretary 
determined that even though DiMasi was convicted of Federal 
offenses, the conduct underlying his convictions would have 
violated G. L. c. 3 or 268A, and thus warranted rejection of his 
application for registration as a lobbyist.  DiMasi challenged 
the denial on the ground that the language of G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (m), does not encompass Federal offenses. 
 
Accordingly, we are asked to decide whether a statutory 
provision which contains an "automatic" consequence of 
disqualification for a felony conviction under G. L. c. 3, 55, 
or 268A, allows the Secretary discretion to decide whether a 
conviction of a nonenumerated offense nonetheless triggers the 
same automatic consequence.  The Secretary maintains that the 
disqualification provision grants him discretion to determine 
whether an individual has been convicted of a felony in another 
jurisdiction for conduct that would be proscribed under G. L. 
3 
 
c. 3, 55, or 268A.  If so, the Secretary maintains, the 
individual automatically must be disqualified from registering 
as a lobbyist, even if the person has not been convicted of a 
felony in the Commonwealth under one of the three enumerated 
chapters.  The Secretary contends that because the language of 
the disqualification provision is ambiguous, his interpretation 
is reasonable and should be afforded deference. 
 
We conclude that the language of the disqualification 
provision is unambiguous, and that the Secretary's 
interpretation contravenes the plain statutory language and the 
Legislature's intent in enacting the provision.  General Laws 
c. 3, § 45 (m), does not afford the Secretary discretion to 
consider what other offenses might require automatic 
disqualification, even if the underlying conduct that resulted 
in a conviction could support a felony conviction pursuant to 
G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A.  Rather, the disqualification provision 
limits automatic disqualification to individuals who have been 
convicted of a felony set forth in G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A.  
Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court judge's order granting 
DiMasi's motion for judgment on the pleadings.1 
 
1.  Background.  DiMasi served as Speaker of the House from 
September 2004 through January 2009.  In June 2011, a jury 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed in support of the 
plaintiff by Edmund D. LaChance, Jr. 
4 
 
convicted him of seven Federal felonies:  one count of 
conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; two counts of 
honest services mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 
and 1346; three counts of honest services wire fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346; and one count of 
extortion under color of official right, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951.  DiMasi was not convicted of any crimes under 
Massachusetts law.  He was sentenced to eight years in prison 
but ultimately only served five years before he was 
compassionately released for medical reasons in November of 
2016.2 
 
In March 2019, DiMasi filed an application with the 
Secretary to register as a lobbyist,3 the first step in obtaining 
a Massachusetts lobbying license.  See G. L. c. 3, § 41.  The 
Secretary denied DiMasi's application on the ground that, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), DiMasi was automatically 
disqualified from engaging in State lobbying for ten years from 
the date of his Federal convictions.  The rejection letter 
stated that DiMasi's Federal convictions "include convictions 
 
 
2 See United States v. DiMasi, 220 F. Supp. 3d 173, 201 (D. 
Mass. 2016); 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 
 
3 The lobbying law uses the terms "executive agent" and 
"legislative agent" to refer to lobbyists.  See G. L. c. 3, 
§ 39.  For simplicity, we use the term "lobbyist" throughout. 
5 
 
for conduct in violation of [G. L. c. 3 or 268A]."  DiMasi 
appealed from the rejection and requested a hearing. 
 
At a prehearing conference in June 2019, the Secretary 
reaffirmed his position that, pursuant to G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), 
DiMasi automatically was disqualified from acting as a lobbyist 
because of his Federal convictions.  The Secretary also raised 
an alternative theory for disqualification:  he argued that 
DiMasi should be disqualified under G. L. c. 3, § 45 (j),4 
because DiMasi had violated the State lobbying law while serving 
as Speaker.  Following the prehearing conference, the Secretary 
sent a subsequent notice pursuant to G. L. c. 3, § 45 (a), 
asserting that DiMasi had committed such State violations and 
requesting an adjudicatory proceeding on that alternative 
theory. 
 
DiMasi filed a motion to strike the Secretary's theory of 
disqualification that relied on G. L. c. 3, § 45 (j).  DiMasi 
argued that the Secretary had not complied with the statutory 
prerequisites to initiate an adjudicatory hearing under G. L. 
c. 3, § 45 (a)-(k).  Based on these assertions, the Secretary 
moved to consolidate DiMasi's appeal of the automatic 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 3, § 45 (j), provides that "[u]pon a 
finding pursuant to an adjudicatory proceeding that there has 
been a violation [of G. L. c. 3, §§ 39-50], the [S]tate 
[S]ecretary may issue an order . . . suspending for a specified 
period or revoking the license and registration of the 
violator." 
6 
 
disqualification with his motion to strike the alternate theory 
of disqualification. 
 
On November 26, 2019, a presiding officer of the 
Secretary's lobbyist division conducted an adjudicatory hearing 
on DiMasi's appeal and his motion to strike.  At the hearing, 
DiMasi argued that automatic disqualification under G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (m), should be understood as disqualifying only persons who 
have been convicted of crimes enumerated in G. L. c. 3, 55, or 
268A. 
 
The presiding officer issued a decision upholding the 
Secretary's automatic disqualification of DiMasi, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), and denying DiMasi's appeal.  He rejected 
DiMasi's argument that the statute should be construed narrowly 
and found that because DiMasi's convictions of Federal honest 
services crimes "closely align[ed]" with the language of G. L. 
c. 268A, the "conditions for [DiMasi's] automatic 
disqualification under [§ 45 (m)] ha[d] been satisfied."  The 
presiding officer allowed DiMasi's motion to strike the 
alternative theory of disqualification due to procedural 
deficiencies and granted the Secretary leave to refile. 
 
DiMasi then filed a complaint against the Secretary in the 
Superior Court, seeking judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14, and the certiorari statue, G. L. c. 249, § 4, of the 
decision upholding his automatic disqualification.  In addition, 
7 
 
DiMasi sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, 
that the Secretary's alternate theory of disqualification was 
invalid and unenforceable.  Both parties filed motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
A Superior Court judge granted DiMasi's motion for judgment 
on the pleadings.  The judge interpreted the disqualification 
provision as allowing only the automatic disqualification of 
persons who have been convicted of felonies for crimes 
specifically identified in G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A.  Because 
DiMasi had not been convicted of a felony under those chapters, 
the judge held that DiMasi should not have been disqualified 
under G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), from registering as a lobbyist. 
 
The Secretary appealed to the Appeals Court the same month, 
and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.  
After the transfer, the Secretary requested that the case be 
decided on the briefs, so that an expedited decision could be 
issued before the exclusionary period expired on June 15, 2021.  
We declined to do so, because such a decision would be of little 
benefit, as DiMasi's ten-year period of exclusion from lobbying 
would end that June, whether or not an expedited decision was 
issued before that point. 
 
In light of the expiration of the ten-year exclusionary 
period, however, we ordered the parties, if they believed the 
appeal should not be dismissed as moot, to provide reasons why 
8 
 
the case should be heard.  In response, the Secretary argued 
that the court should exercise its discretion to decide the case 
because the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review.  
DiMasi took no position with respect to whether the court should 
dismiss the case as moot. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Mootness.  As a preliminary matter, we 
address the question of mootness.  An issue is moot where no 
actual controversy remains, or the party claiming to be 
aggrieved "ceases to have a personal stake in its outcome" 
(citation omitted).  Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 61 (2014).  
Here, the question whether DiMasi properly was precluded from 
registering as a lobbyist in 2019 undisputedly is moot.  His 
ten-year period of exclusion expired on June 15, 2021, and he 
has been able to register and practice as a lobbyist in the 
Commonwealth for more than one year.  Nonetheless, even where an 
issue is moot, appellate review may be appropriate where the 
issue is one of public importance and was fully argued on both 
sides; where the question is certain, or at least very likely, 
to arise again in similar factual circumstances; and where 
appellate review could not be obtained before the recurring 
question again would be moot.  Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 
Mass. 780, 783 (1984). 
 
We agree with the Secretary that such is the case here.  
The issue raised is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" 
9 
 
(citation omitted).  First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Haufler, 377 
Mass. 209, 211 (1979).  "An issue apt to evade review is one 
which tends to arise only in circumstances that create a 
substantial likelihood of mootness prior to completion of the 
appellate process."  Id.  The Secretary will be required to 
continue to interpret the disqualification provision, as it 
applies to future cases of felons who attempt to register as 
lobbyists.  Issues raised by such applications appear likely to 
evade appellate review at least in some circumstances.  For 
example, an individual with Federal felony convictions may 
attempt to register as a lobbyist with only a few months or 
years remaining before the end of the ten-year period of 
disqualification.  As this case demonstrates, that well may be 
an insufficient period for the applicant to appeal from the 
denial of an application for registration as a lobbyist through 
the Secretary's administrative process and then, perhaps, 
through the judicial appellate process. 
 
The question at issue here also undoubtedly is of public 
significance.  Clarification of the scope of the Secretary's 
discretion under the disqualification provision, which the 
Legislature intended to serve as a gatekeeping function for 
lobbyists, will aid the Secretary in preserving the integrity of 
the lobbying industry and in investigating campaign- and 
10 
 
election-related malfeasance.  Given these considerations, we 
exercise our discretion to decide the case. 
 
b.  Whether G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), is ambiguous.  Questions 
of statutory interpretation, such as the extent of the 
Secretary's discretion under G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), to disqualify 
individuals from registering as lobbyists for reasons other than 
a conviction of one of the enumerated offenses, are questions of 
law and thus are reviewed de novo.  See Bridgewater State Univ. 
Found. v. Assessors of Bridgewater, 463 Mass. 154, 156 (2012).  
"We give substantial deference to a reasonable interpretation of 
a statute by the administrative agency charged with its . . . 
enforcement" (citation omitted).  Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010).  "An 
incorrect interpretation of a statute by an administrative 
agency[, however,] is not entitled to deference."  Id., quoting 
Kszepka's Case, 408 Mass. 843, 847 (1990). 
 
"A fundamental tenant of statutory interpretation is that 
statutory language should be given effect consistent with its 
plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless 
to do so would achieve an illogical result."  Olmstead v. 
Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 466 Mass. 582, 588 (2013), 
quoting Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  Where 
the meaning of a statute is at issue, "[w]e begin with the canon 
of statutory construction that the primary source of insight 
11 
 
into the intent of the Legislature is the language of the 
statute."  Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, 
LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 253 (2015), quoting International Fid. Ins. 
Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 (1983).  "[I]f the language is 
clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the intent of the 
Legislature," Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., supra, and we 
enforce the plain wording unless it would yield an absurd or 
unworkable result, Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board of 
Appeals of Shirley, 461 Mass. 469, 477 (2012). 
 
i.  Plain language.  General Laws c. 3, § 45 (m), provides 
that "[t]he [S]tate [S]ecretary shall automatically disqualify 
any person convicted of a felony in violation of [G. L. c. 3, 
55, or 268A,] from acting or registering as an executive or 
legislative agent for a period of [ten] years from the date of 
conviction."  Accordingly, the plain meaning of the words 
"shall" and "automatically" are critical to our interpretation.  
We have recognized the word "shall" as an imperative that 
indicates the Legislature's intent to prescribe a mandatory act.  
See Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 488 Mass. 449, 454 (2021), 
citing Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983).  In common 
usage, the word "automatic" has been defined as "having a self-
acting or self-regulating mechanism that performs a required act 
at a predetermined point in an operation."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 148 (2002).  Thus, the language of 
12 
 
G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), is clear and unambiguous; it mandates that 
the Secretary "shall automatically disqualify" from registering 
as a lobbyist any individual who has been convicted of a felony 
enumerated in G. L. c.  3, 55, or 268A. 
 
At issue is whether the disqualification provision also 
grants the Secretary authority to disqualify individuals with 
convictions that are the result of conduct that would be 
proscribed by G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A.  We conclude that it 
unambiguously does not empower the Secretary with such 
discretionary interpretative authority.  The plain language of 
the statute identifies specific statutory violations and 
automatic consequences applicable for convictions under those 
provisions; it goes no further.  The requirement of G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (m), is triggered by a "felony" "convict[ion]" that is "in 
violation of" G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A.  The statutory text does 
not reference "conduct"; it does not use the words "including," 
"containing," or "similar to"; and it does not reference the 
laws of other jurisdictions.  The inclusion of any such language 
undoubtedly would give weight to the Secretary's interpretation.  
Given the absence of such words from the text, however, we 
cannot interpret the provision as if it contained them.  See 
Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 672 
(2014) ("We will not add words to a statute that the Legislature 
13 
 
did not put there, either by inadvertent omission or by 
design"). 
 
The Secretary contends that the language of the 
disqualification provision is inherently ambiguous, and 
therefore, the court should defer to the Secretary's 
interpretation.  In particular, the Secretary maintains that the 
phrase "shall automatically disqualify" is susceptible to two 
distinct interpretations.  The first, narrower interpretation is 
that the Secretary may not use conscious thought or intent when 
disqualifying applicants from registering as lobbyists.  The 
second, broader interpretation, which the Secretary favors, is 
more nuanced.  Under this interpretation, the Secretary may 
disqualify an applicant for conduct that falls within the scope 
of conduct proscribed by G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m).  Consistent with 
this broader interpretation, the Secretary would have discretion 
to examine whether an applicant's conduct would warrant a felony 
conviction under G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A, even if the applicant 
had not been convicted of an offense under any of those three 
chapters.  The Secretary maintains that the first, narrower 
interpretation is erroneous because he necessarily must act with 
some level of thought or intent in his role as executive agent. 
 
Contrary to the Secretary's argument, we do not view the 
use of the word "automatic" in the disqualification provision as 
a source of ambiguity.  Although the Secretary must use 
14 
 
conscious thought to determine whether an individual falls 
within the statutory purview, the word "automatic" indicates 
that, once such a determination has been made, the Secretary 
must disqualify any person who has a prior conviction falling 
within the specific statutory confines; the Secretary lacks the 
discretion to do otherwise.  See Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 413 Mass. 265, 273 (1992).  The Secretary's proffered 
interpretation, that the "conscious application of law to facts" 
requires an inquiry beyond the ministerial determination whether 
there has been a conviction under G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A, is 
unsupported by the plain meaning of the statutory language. 
 
The remainder of the statutory text of G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (m), specifically the language "any person convicted of a 
felony in violation of [G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A]," which follows 
the phrase "shall automatically disqualify," ends any question 
of ambiguity.  As the Secretary asserts, the word 
"automatically," which eliminates any discretion, "says nothing 
about whether the felony convictions covered by G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (m), must have been entered in [S]tate or [F]ederal court."  
The remainder of the disqualification provision, however, does. 
 
Reading the phrases "shall automatically disqualify" and 
"any person convicted of a felony in violation of [G. L. c. 3, 
55, or 268A]," as one, the lack of discretion afforded to the 
Secretary under the disqualification provision is evident.  We 
15 
 
agree with the motion judge that "[t]he Secretary's only task 
under G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), is to look at a person's criminal 
record and determine whether he or she has been convicted [of a 
felony] under G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A[,] in the past ten years.  
If yes, then disqualification from lobbying shall automatically 
follow."  We must presume that the Legislature intended what the 
words of the statute say, and where the language is clear, it is 
"conclusive as to legislative intent" (citation omitted).  
Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 331 
(2021).  See Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 
687 (1986). 
 
To support his interpretation that the "automatic[]" 
consequence mandated by the disqualification provision requires 
deliberation by a State actor, the Secretary analogizes G. L. 
c. 3, § 45 (m), to the pension forfeiture statute and the 
firearms licensing statute.  Such comparisons are inapposite. 
 
This court's previous interpretations of the pension 
forfeiture statute underscore why the Secretary's comparisons to 
G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), are inapt.  The Secretary points to G. L 
c. 32, § 15 (4), which mandates that "after final conviction of 
a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to 
his office or position," a member of the State retirement board 
system automatically is disqualified from receiving a retirement 
allowance.  See Mahan v. Boston Retirement Bd., 490 Mass. 604, 
16 
 
609-610 (2022).  Under the terms of G. L c. 32, § 15 (4), the 
State retirement board is required to determine which laws 
constitute "the laws applicable to [an individual's] office or 
position" when applying the terms of the provision.  See State 
Bd. of Retirement v. Finneran, 476 Mass. 714, 719 (2017).  This 
determination requires a fact-specific inquiry to decide whether 
there is a "direct link between the criminal offense and the 
member's office or position" (citation omitted).  Id. at 722.  
The enforcing executive agent is granted discretion by virtue of 
the intentionally indeterminate construction of the provision, a 
situation that does not exist in G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m). 
 
The permissiveness of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), stands in 
contrast with the specificity of a related provision, G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (3A); language of this provision might be a more 
appropriate guide for the proper interpretation of G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (m).  General Laws c. 32, § 15 (3A), mandates the 
forfeiture of pension benefits where an individual has been 
"convict[ed] of an offense set forth in [G. L. c. 268A, § 2,] or 
[G. L. c. 265, § 25]."  We considered the proper construction of 
this provision in Collatos, 396 Mass. at 687.  There, we 
reasoned that in enacting G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A), "[t]he 
Legislature ha[d] chosen two crimes that are to be enforced by 
[automatic disqualification], and it has precisely denoted 
them."  Collatos, supra.  So too here.  The Legislature has set 
17 
 
forth the specific convictions that must trigger automatic 
disqualification under G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m); those convictions 
are the felonies enumerated in G. L. cc. 3, 55, and 268A.  
Similar to our interpretation of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A), we 
conclude that the offenses enumerated in G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m), 
must be applied as a list, thus necessarily cabining the 
Secretary's discretion. 
 
The Secretary's reliance on the firearms licensing statute 
likewise suffers from the same flaw as his comparison to the 
pension forfeiture provisions.  General Laws c. 140, 
§ 131 (d) (i) (C), requires automatic disqualification from 
obtaining a firearms license for conviction of a "violent 
crime," which, in turn, is defined as a crime "involv[ing] 
conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to 
another."  G. L. c. 140, § 121.  Like the broad definition of 
"laws applicable to [an individual's] office or position" in the 
pension forfeiture statute, the similarly broad definition 
applicable to G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (i) (C) -- "conduct that 
presents a serious risk of physical injury" -- requires 
interpretation by an executive agent.  The general language in 
the definition of "violent crime" that triggers 
disqualification, however, contrasts with other provisions of 
that statute that enumerate specific crimes that also trigger 
disqualification.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (i) (B) 
18 
 
("misdemeanor[s] punishable by imprisonment for more than [two] 
years"); G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (i) (F) ("misdemeanor crime[s] 
of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. [§] 921[a][33]").  
General Laws c. 3, § 45 (m), contains a similarly definite list 
of enumerated offenses as these latter two provisions of the 
firearms licensing statute. 
 
ii.  Legislative history.  The legislative history of the 
automatic disqualification provision supports its clear and 
unambiguous terms.  See Sullivan, 435 Mass. at 360; Commonwealth 
v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 401 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 
684 (1932) ("Statutes are to be interpreted . . . in connection 
with their development . . ."). 
 
We agree with the Secretary that a primary purpose of the 
disqualification provision's enabling statute, An Act to improve 
the laws relating to campaign finance, ethics, and lobbying, St. 
2009, c. 28 (2009 lobbying law), was to reduce the risk of 
corruption in the lobbying profession.  Prior to 2009, the 
Secretary had authority only to disqualify a person from 
registering as a lobbyist for cause.  See St. 1973, c. 981, § 8.  
In 2008, then-Governor Deval Patrick directed a task force to 
recommend changes to the Commonwealth's then-existing statutes 
on public corruption.  See Executive Order No. 506 (Nov. 7, 
2008).  In its report and recommendations to the Governor, 
submitted January 6, 2009 (task force report), the task force 
19 
 
recommended legislation that granted the Secretary new authority 
to suspend or permanently revoke a lobbyist's license.  See task 
force report at 41; task force report, App. C, § 14.  The task 
force's recommendations would have authorized the Secretary, if 
the Secretary felt there was sufficient evidence, to initiate a 
preliminary inquiry into violations of G. L. c. 3, §§ 39 to 50, 
and, if the inquiry provided reasonable cause, to initiate an 
adjudicatory proceeding to determine a remedy.  See task force 
report, App. C, § 14.  The remedies afforded to the Secretary 
would have included suspending or rejecting a lobbying license 
or registration, issuing orders requiring the violator to cease 
and desist from engaging in the violation, requiring the 
violator to remedy the violation, or requiring the violator to 
pay a civil penalty.  See id.  Those provisions were codified 
almost verbatim5 as G. L. c. 3, § 45 (a)-(k).  Compare St. 2009, 
c. 28, § 12, with task force report, App. C, § 14. 
 
As a result, the Secretary currently holds broad civil 
enforcement authority over the lobbying industry pursuant to 
 
 
5 The language of G. L. c. 3, § 45 (a)-(k), that ultimately 
was adopted, however, does contain a few substantive differences 
from the language of the proposed legislation.  These 
differences include removing the provisions expressly 
authorizing the Secretary to share records from a confidential 
inquiry under G. L. c. 3, § 45 (a), with certain other 
enforcement agencies, and removing a witness's right to be 
represented by counsel in adjudicatory proceedings under G. L. 
c. 3, § 45 (f). 
20 
 
G. L. c. 3, § 45 (a)-(k); the Secretary need not rely only upon 
the disqualification provision to prevent individuals who have 
engaged in corrupt conduct, or who have been convicted of a 
felony in another jurisdiction, from registering as lobbyists.  
For example, if a person who attempts to register as a lobbyist 
recently was charged or convicted under a Federal statute for 
conduct that also is prohibited by G. L. c. 3, §§ 39 to 50, the 
Secretary can initiate proceedings and suspend or revoke the 
individual's lobbyist license and registration, see G. L. c. 3, 
§ 45 (a)-(j).  Indeed, as discussed, the Secretary attempted to 
invoke this provision against DiMasi as an alternative theory of 
disqualification. 
 
The original recommendations by the task force did not 
include language concerning automatic disqualification for 
criminal convictions.  While the House was considering the 2009 
lobbying law, and after receiving a public comment to the same 
effect, a member of the House proposed legislation that 
automatically would have disqualified all felons from 
registering as lobbyists, regardless of the jurisdiction of 
their felony convictions.  See 2009 House Doc. No. 3500, § 3.  
This bill was not taken up by the House.  Later, during floor 
debates, the same language was reintroduced as an amendment to 
the draft 2009 lobbying law, and immediately was tabled.  
Subsequently, a "redrafted" version of the amendment was 
21 
 
introduced that limited automatic disqualifications to felony 
convictions under G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A.  See 2009 House J. 
122.  This constrained version of the original provision was 
adopted and enacted as G. L. c. 3, § 45 (m).  St. 2009, c. 28, 
§ 12. 
 
The "statutory expression of one thing is an implied 
exclusion of other things omitted from the statute."  Collatos, 
396 Mass. at 687.  Because the Legislature repeatedly rejected 
language that would have disqualified all felons, and instead 
included language that limited automatic disqualification to 
felony convictions under G. L. c. 3, 55, or 268A, the 
Legislature evidently did not intend the Secretary to have the 
broad "automatic" disqualification discretion that the Secretary 
suggests.  See Conservation Comm'n of Norton, 488 Mass. at 335.  
To the contrary, if the Legislature's intent was to disqualify 
individuals based on their underlying conduct, regardless of the 
conviction, "the wording of the statute could have easily 
reflected it.  It does not."  Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 
Mass. 786, 796 (2018), quoting Rowley v. Massachusetts Elec. 
Co., 438 Mass. 798, 802 (2003). 
 
iii.  Felonies in G. L. c. 55.  The Secretary's argument 
that the disqualification provision is inherently ambiguous also 
rests on the reference to convictions of felonies under G. L. 
c. 55.  The Secretary posits that because G. L. c. 55 "defines 
22 
 
no felony offenses," limiting the triggering offenses in the 
disqualification provision only to State felonies would render a 
significant portion of the provision superfluous.  "[A] felony 
in violation of chapter 3, chapter 55, or chapter 268A," the 
Secretary contends, instead must mean "conduct proscribed by" 
those chapters; otherwise, the provision containing the word 
"felony" would be meaningless. 
 
The Secretary argues that the motion judge's reasoning to 
the contrary indicated that competing canons of statutory 
construction were applicable and, thus, that the provision is 
inherently ambiguous.  We need not decide between any competing 
canons of statutory interpretation, however, because G. L. c. 55 
indeed does contain reference to a felony.6 
 
At first blush, the language of G. L. c. 55 mentions no 
felonies.  General Laws c. 55 contains multiple sections that 
include both a requirement of campaign finance administration 
and a corresponding penalty for violating that requirement.  
 
 
6 A felony is "[a] crime punishable by death or imprisonment 
in the [S]tate prison."  G. L. c. 274, § 1.  "All other crimes 
are misdemeanors."  Id.  Because a sentence to a house of 
correction may not exceed two and one-half years, statutes that 
prescribe terms of imprisonment longer than that period are 
crimes necessarily punishable by confinement in State prison, 
and thus are felonies.  See Commonwealth v. Zawatsky, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 392, 395-396 (1996); G. L. c. 279, §§ 19, 23. 
 
23 
 
These penalties are all misdemeanors.7  Thus, considering only 
the language of G. L. c. 55, all penalties explicitly set forth 
within the chapter are misdemeanors.  At least one section of 
G. L. c. 55, however, defines prohibited conduct in which the 
penalty for a conviction is set forth in a different chapter of 
the General Laws.  Specifically, G. L. c. 55, § 32,8 which 
defines corrupt practices by candidates, denotes several 
practices that are prohibited to all candidates for public 
office.  The penalties for these prohibited practices are 
described throughout G. L. c. 56 and include at least one 
 
 
7 See, e.g., G. L. c. 55, §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 16A, 16B, 17, 18, 18B, 18G, 22, 22A, 23. 
 
 
8 General Laws c. 55, § 32, provides: 
 
"A candidate shall be deemed to have committed a corrupt 
practice who commits any of the following offences: 
 
"Making or permitting any person or non-elected political 
committee authorized by him to make a false return in any 
statement filed under [G. L. c. 55, §§ 18, 19, and 24,] by 
him or on his behalf. 
 
"Making a false return in any statement filed under [G. L. 
c. 55, §§ 18 and 24,] by a candidate for nomination or 
election. 
 
"Any candidate fraudulently and wilfully obstructing and 
delaying a voter, interfering with, hindering or preventing 
an election officer from performing his duties, forging an 
endorsement upon, altering, destroying or defacing a 
ballot, tampering with or injuring or attempting to injure 
any voting machine or ballot box to be used or being used 
in a primary or election, or preventing or attempting to 
prevent the correct operation of such machine or box." 
 
24 
 
potential felony sentence for tampering with a voting machine.  
See G. L. c. 56, § 51.9  General Laws c. 55 thus does prohibit 
conduct that could lead to a felony conviction.10  Consequently, 
the Secretary's claim of ambiguity created by the reference to 
purportedly nonexistent felonies in G. L. c. 55 is unavailing.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 56, § 51, provides: 
 
"Any person who shall tamper with or injure or attempt to 
tamper with or to injure any voting machine to be used or 
being used in an election, or who shall prevent or attempt 
to prevent the correct operation of such machine, or any 
unauthorized person who shall make or have in his 
possession a key to a voting machine to be used or being 
used in an election, shall be punished by a fine of not 
less than one hundred [dollars] nor more than [$500], or by 
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than two and 
one half years or in the [S]tate prison for not less than 
two and one half nor more than five years, or both." 
(emphasis added). 
 
 
10 Felony punishment for tampering with voting machines has 
existed in Massachusetts for more than a century.  See St. 1913, 
c. 835, § 474 (stating that tampering with ballots is to be 
"guilty of a felony" and listing imprisonment in State prison as 
potential penalty). 
 
 
11 Because we resolve the matter in favor of DiMasi on the 
basis of the statute's plain meaning, we need not reach DiMasi's 
constitutional arguments.