Title: LaBona v. State
Citation: 255 Kan. 66, 872 P.2d 271
Docket Number: 68,850
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 1994

255 Kan. 66 (1994)
872 P.2d 271
KEVIN J. LaBONA, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 68,850

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 15, 1994.
Steven R. Zinn, deputy appellate defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, chief appellate defender, was with him on the briefs for appellant.
Timothy J. Chambers, county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEGRUCCI, J.:
Kevin LaBona appealed from the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. He sought to set aside his convictions on two counts of indecent liberties with a child pursuant to State v. Williams, 250 Kan. 730, 829 P.2d 892 (1992). The Court of Appeals reversed pursuant to Carmichael v. State, 18 Kan. App.2d 435, 856 P.2d 934 (1993), which held that Williams states a jurisdictional rule that may be asserted at any time. We granted the State's petition for review.
On April 3, 1986, Kevin LaBona pled guilty to two counts of indecent liberties with a child in violation of K.S.A. 21-3503. The victim was his daughter.
LaBona filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, seeking to set aside his convictions pursuant to Williams. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Williams "does not state a retroactive application and is therefore not applicable."
*67 The Court of Appeals reversed pursuant to Carmichael and stated: "The district court lacked jurisdiction to convict LaBona of indecent liberties. The convictions on two counts of indecent liberties are reversed, and this case is remanded with directions to vacate the sentence for these convictions."
The sole issue raised is whether the district court erred in denying LaBona's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion seeking to set aside his convictions of indecent liberties with a child pursuant to State v. Williams. The same issue is raised in Carmichael v. State (No. 67,757, this day decided). In Carmichael, we rejected the Court of Appeals' determination that Williams stated a jurisdictional rule. In so doing, we said:
....
....
LaBona pled guilty to indecent liberties with his daughter, and a jury convicted Carmichael of the rape of his daughter. This difference distinguishes the present case from Carmichael. Our decision in Carmichael is not determinative of this appeal.
Since granting this petition for review, this court also decided State v. Reed, 254 Kan. 52, 865 P.2d 191 (1993). Reed failed to report when she became ineligible and continued to receive assistance from the ADC and Food Stamp programs. She was charged with theft by deception and making a false writing, pled guilty to felony theft, and was granted probation. Ten months later her probation was revoked. Reed appealed to the Court of Appeals. There she argued for the first time that her conviction should be vacated because the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept her plea because she had been erroneously charged with theft by deception instead of welfare fraud. She relied on State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76, 775 P.2d 177 (1989), and Williams.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Reed was improperly charged with theft by deception and that the district court therefore had no jurisdiction to accept Reed's guilty plea. The Court of Appeals vacated her conviction. The State's petition for review was granted.
This court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court stated:
Then, "[b]ecause Wilcox, Williams, and Sims dealt with sufficiency of the evidence for the crime charged and not with whether the district court had jurisdiction to accept Reed's plea to theft by deception," 254 Kan. at 59, the court shifted its attention to State v. Gibbens, 253 Kan. 384, 855 P.2d 937 (1993).
Gibbens pled nolo contendere to two counts of rape. On appeal he argued, based on Williams, that the district court lacked jurisdiction *69 to accept his plea because the victims were his stepdaughters. The court stated:
Hence, Gibbens did not decide Reed's question.
This court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in vacating Reed's plea to theft by deception. We stated:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed.
Gibbens was a direct appeal challenging the sentence as being excessive. The issue of the court's jurisdiction to accept Gibbens' plea was raised for the first time on appeal and not considered. Reed also was a direct appeal in which defendant challenged the court's lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. Here, as in Carmichael, the petitioner is challenging the State's failure to charge him with the specific offense which he claims ultimately resulted in the imposition of an illegal sentence. Pursuant to 60-1507 and K.S.A. 22-3504, the court has jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence at any time.
However, as in Reed, the petitioner was represented by counsel. He understood the nature of the charges, the effect of his guilty pleas, and the possible sentence. By entering a plea of guilty, he waived the right to challenge the failure of the State to charge the specific offense of aggravated incest and acquiesced in the convictions for indecent liberties with a child. Thus, the district *70 court was not required to vacate his pleas of guilty, and the sentence imposed was not erroneous. The petitioner cannot now complain that the sentence must be vacated.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the convictions on the two counts of indecent liberties with a child is reversed. The district court's order denying the petitioner's 60-1507 motion is affirmed.