Title: State v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 3A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-85 
No. 3A20 
Filed 13 August 2021 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
BRYAN XAVIER JOHNSON 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 269 N.C. App. 76 (2019), finding no error after appeal from an 
order denying defendant’s Motion to Suppress entered on 29 June 2018 by Judge 
Forrest D. Bridges in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  Heard in the Supreme 
Court on 22 March 2021. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kristin J. Uicker, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the State-appellee. 
 
Kimberly P. Hoppin for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant’s appeal requires this Court to review the trial court’s order denying 
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a bag of narcotics seized from his vehicle 
during a traffic stop on 14 January 2017. The dispositive question on appeal is 
whether the law enforcement officers conducting a search for weapons on defendant’s 
person and in the areas of defendant’s vehicle under his immediate control possessed 
the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate such a warrantless search pursuant to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Because we hold that the law enforcement officer 
who conducted the traffic stop presented articulable facts at the suppression hearing 
which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous, 
the trial court did not commit error in denying defendant’s request to suppress the 
controlled substances which were discovered as a result of the search of the areas of 
defendant’s vehicle which were under defendant’s immediate control.  
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
As a seven-year veteran of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department 
(CMPD) and a member of the law enforcement agency’s Crime Reduction Unit, Officer 
Whitley was conducting patrol operations in the early morning hours of 14 January 
2017 in a location of the city that he described at the suppression hearing as a “very 
high crime area.” Officer Whitley and his partner, Sergeant Visiano, were traveling 
along Central Avenue in the Hickory Grove section of Charlotte when they observed 
a black Dodge Charger. While Officer Whitley continued to operate their patrol 
vehicle, Sergeant Visiano ran the license plate displayed on the Dodge Charger 
through the agency’s computer system and discovered that the license plate was 
actually registered to an Acura MDX. Having determined that the tag displayed on 
the Dodge Charger was “fictitious,” Officer Whitley initiated a traffic stop, and the 
two vehicles pulled into a Burger King parking lot.  
¶ 3 
 
While approaching the driver’s side of the Dodge Charger, Officer Whitley 
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noticed that the car’s occupant had raised his hands in the air. It was determined 
that the individual in the Dodge Charger was defendant. Officer Whitley 
subsequently testified at the suppression hearing that he had observed persons 
raising their hands in such a manner ten to twenty times previously and that, based 
upon his experience which included specialized training in recognizing armed 
individuals, this behavior can “sometimes . . . mean that they have a gun.” Officer 
Whitley conversed with defendant at the driver’s window as defendant remained 
seated in the Dodge Charger, while Sergeant Visiano positioned himself at the 
passenger side window in order to see defendant’s right side. Officer Whitley asked 
for defendant’s driver’s license and registration and inquired about the possible 
presence of any weapons in the vehicle; defendant denied the presence of such items. 
Officer Whitley explained that the mismatched license plate served as the reason for 
the traffic stop, prompting defendant to volunteer that defendant had just purchased 
the Dodge Charger in a private sale that day and that defendant knew that the 
displayed tag did not belong to the vehicle that he was driving. Defendant readily 
produced his driver’s license but had to search for the car’s registration and bill of 
sale in the center console of the vehicle. Officer Whitley testified at the suppression 
hearing that during this interaction, defendant “seemed very nervous . . . like his 
heart is beating out of his chest a little bit. He was very nervous.” Further, as 
defendant reached into the center console to find the requested documentation, 
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Officer Whitley recalled during his testimony that defendant was “blading [his body] 
. . . as if he is trying to conceal something that is to his right, as if he’s using his body 
to distance what I can see from what he’s doing.” This appeared odd to Officer 
Whitley, who testified at the suppression hearing that while “typically people 
obviously reach and turn” to retrieve items from the center consoles of their vehicles, 
defendant did so “to the extent where his shoulders were completely off the seat.”   
¶ 4 
 
“[A]t this point,” Officer Whitley testified, defendant’s positioning of his hands 
above his head as the officers approached his vehicle, his nervousness, and the 
“blading” of his body as he reached into the center console were “adding up as . . . 
characteristics of an armed subject.” After defendant produced a bill of sale for the 
Dodge Charger from the center console, Officer Whitley left defendant in the driver’s 
seat of the vehicle while defendant spoke with Sergeant Visiano. Meanwhile, Officer 
Whitley returned to his patrol car in order to process the information and paperwork 
provided by defendant through multiple law enforcement intelligence databases, 
which is “a standard practice for every traffic stop that” the officer conducts. 
Information gathered from Officer Whitley’s search of North Carolina’s CJLEADS 
system—a database which details a person’s history of contacts with law enforcement 
in the form of a list of criminal charges filed against the individual—indicated that 
defendant had been charged with multiple violent crimes and offenses related to 
weapons from the years 2003 through 2009. While he could not offer testimony as to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
which charges against defendant had resulted in convictions, Officer Whitley testified 
that the “trend in violent crime” revealed by the CJLEADS search, combined with 
the “holding up of the hands, as well as the blading of the body,” and the fact that 
defendant appeared very nervous, “led [the officer] to believe that he was armed and 
dangerous at that point.”  
¶ 5 
 
Officer Whitley exited his patrol car, returned to defendant’s vehicle, and asked 
defendant to step out of the Dodge Charger, with the intent of conducting a frisk of 
defendant’s person and a search of the vehicle. Defendant got out of his car and went 
to the rear door on the driver’s side of the vehicle at Officer Whitley’s request before 
defendant consented to be frisked by the law enforcement officer for weapons. A pat 
down of defendant’s clothing revealed no weapons or other indicia of contraband. At 
this point, Officer Whitley walked to the rear of defendant’s Dodge Charger and asked 
for defendant’s consent to search the vehicle. Defendant refused to grant such 
consent. Officer Whitley then explained that the officers were going to conduct a 
limited search of defendant’s vehicle nonetheless based on defendant’s “criminal 
history . . . and some other things.” While defendant continued to protest the search 
of the Dodge Charger, Officer Whitley left him with Sergeant Visiano and began a 
search of the front driver’s side of defendant’s vehicle. Immediately upon opening the 
unlocked center console, Officer Whitley discovered a baggie of “[w]hat appeared to 
be powder cocaine” and removed the suspected contraband from the vehicle. After 
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completing his search of the area of the vehicle immediately behind the driver’s seat, 
Officer Whitley placed defendant under arrest.   
¶ 6 
 
On 14 January 2017, defendant was charged with the felonious offense of 
possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and the misdemeanor offense of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and was formally indicted by a Mecklenburg 
County grand jury for possession of cocaine on 25 September 2017.  
¶ 7 
 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress on 16 May 2018, which came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Forrest D. Bridges in Superior Court, Mecklenburg 
County, on 26 June 2018. Officer Whitley testified about the course of events which 
resulted in defendant’s arrest. Additionally, the trial court viewed Officer Whitley’s 
body camera recording of the incident after defendant’s counsel stipulated to the 
video’s admissibility. After hearing arguments from counsel for the State and 
defendant, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. While defendant 
initially indicated a desire to proceed to trial, he agreed to plead guilty to felony 
possession of cocaine and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia after a short 
recess before the jury was selected. The trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea 
and noted for the record that defendant had preserved his right to appeal the trial 
court’s earlier ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress.   
¶ 8 
 
The trial court then asked the State’s attorney to prepare an order reflecting 
the details of the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress. In providing direction 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
regarding the desired contents of the order, the trial court recounted the factual basis 
upon which it had concluded that Officer Whitley had established the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to conduct a Terry search1 of defendant’s vehicle. In open court, 
the trial court recalled the manner in which Officer Whitley had conducted the traffic 
stop in the location which the officer had described as a high-crime area and the 
officer’s discovery of defendant’s prior charges, upon researching the state’s criminal 
record databases, for robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon 
with the intent to kill, and discharging a weapon into occupied property. The trial 
court noted that defendant raised his hands out of the window of the Dodge Charger 
as Officer Whitley approached, which had put the officer “on alert for the possible 
presence of a gun within the vehicle.” In addition, the trial court explained that, while 
Officer Whitley reasonably believed that defendant’s maneuver to raise his hands out 
of the car’s window could indicate the presence of a gun, defendant had acted 
appropriately in holding his hands up and out of the window “in this day and time,” 
and such conduct was not to be considered independently incriminating. The trial 
court entered a written order dated 29 July 2018 which included the above findings 
and concluded:  
2. That based on the totality of [the] circumstances, 
including but not limited to: the [d]efendant’s hands in the 
air upon the Officer’s approach, and the [d]efendant’s prior 
                                            
1 A shorthand reference commonly used to describe a warrantless search which is 
performed pursuant to the principles stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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criminal history, that the limited frisk of the lungeable 
areas of the vehicle was justified. 
3. That the Officer’s scope of the frisk was properly limited 
only to areas where the [d]efendant would have had access 
to retrieve a weapon if he chose to do so.  
¶ 9 
 
Defendant was sentenced to a term of 8 to 19 months in prison, which was 
suspended for 24 months of supervised probation. Defendant appealed to the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals, where a divided panel issued its decision on 17 December 
2019 affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant 
appeals to this Court as a matter of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) based upon 
the dissenting opinion filed in the lower appellate court’s consideration of this matter.  
II. 
Analysis 
¶ 10 
 
Defendant argues before this Court that several of the trial court’s findings 
and conclusions announced in open court and reproduced in the subsequent written 
order in which the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress were not 
supported by the evidence. In removing these disputed findings and conclusions from 
the trial court’s contemplation, defendant contends that Officer Whitley did not have 
a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed, that the Terry search of 
defendant’s vehicle represented an unconstitutional extension of the traffic stop, and 
that this Court’s correction of the trial court’s supposed error should result in an 
outcome which vacates the trial court’s order and overturns defendant’s conviction. 
We disagree with defendant’s assertions and address them in turn.  
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A. Standard of Review 
¶ 11 
 
We review a party’s challenges to a trial court’s findings of fact to ascertain 
whether those findings are supported by any competent evidence, the presence of 
which will render such findings binding on appeal. State v. Reed, 373 N.C. 498, 507 
(2020). The trial court’s conclusions of law, including the ultimate conclusion as to 
whether a law enforcement officer had the constitutional authority to conduct a Terry 
frisk of a defendant’s vehicle, are reviewed on a de novo basis. Id.  
B. Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusions 
¶ 12 
 
As an initial matter, defendant complains of the consideration by the Court of 
Appeals of Officer Whitley’s uncontroverted testimony concerning defendant’s 
nervousness and the “blading” of defendant’s body as defendant accessed the center 
console of his vehicle, as well as the lower appellate court’s recognition that the traffic 
stop took place late at night. To bolster his position, defendant observes that the trial 
court did not make express findings concerning these factors. Although North 
Carolina statutory law establishes that, “in making a determination whether or not 
evidence shall be suppressed,” the trial court is required to “make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which shall be included in the record, pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. [§] 
15A-977(f)[,]” N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(b) (2019), nonetheless the reduction of the trial 
court’s considerations to a written order is not required. State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 
268 (2012) (“While a written determination is the best practice, nevertheless 
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[N.C.G.S. § 15A-977(f)] does not require that these findings and conclusions be in 
writing.”). In the present case, the trial court, in its discretion, included a recitation 
of some of the evidence before the tribunal in its written order and specifically noted 
the sufficiency of the evidence to establish reasonable suspicion in the mind of the 
officer to support a Terry search, which involved the trial court’s evaluation of factors 
which “includ[ed] but [was] not limited to” the factors listed in the written order. 
“Although [N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(b)’s] directive is in the imperative form, only a 
material conflict in the evidence” requires a trial court to make “explicit factual 
findings that show the basis for the trial court’s ruling.” State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 
309, 312 (2015) (citing State v. Salinas, 366 N.C. 119, 123–24 (2012)). Thus, “[w]hen 
there is no conflict in the evidence,” an appellate court may infer a trial court’s 
findings in support of its decision on a motion to suppress so long as that unconflicted 
evidence was within the trial court’s contemplation. Bartlett, 368 N.C. at 312 (citing 
State v. Munsey, 342 N.C. 882, 885 (1996)). In applying these enunciated principles 
to the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not wrongly infer from the 
uncontroverted evidence before the trial court adduced at the suppression hearing 
and the subsequent findings and conclusions which the trial court entered in its 
order, that the factors—among other factors—of Officer Whitley’s testimony about 
defendant’s nervousness, defendant’s “blading” of his body, and the late hour of the 
traffic stop constituted circumstances which provided reasonable suspicion for the 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Terry search to be conducted. The lack of controverted evidence at the suppression 
hearing strengthened the trial court’s ability to choose the evidentiary facts and the 
resulting persuasive factors which the trial court elected to expressly include in its 
order. 
¶ 13 
 
Furthermore, defendant does not contest the evidence, in the form of Officer 
Whitley’s testimony and the body camera footage viewed by the trial court, regarding 
defendant’s nervousness and defendant’s maneuver of “blading” his body; rather, 
defendant opts to attempt to contextualize these behavioral displays by 
characterizing defendant’s emotional and physical issues during his interaction with 
Officer Whitley. In this regard, defendant merely attempts to relitigate the veracity 
of Officer Whitley’s interpretation of defendant’s conduct. “The weight, credibility, 
and convincing force of such evidence is for the trial court, who is in the best position 
to observe the witnesses and make such determinations.” Macher v. Macher, 188 N.C. 
App. 537, 540, aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 505 (2008). The trial court in this matter 
was “the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence,” and it was free to 
“accept or reject the testimony of a witness, either in whole or in part, depending 
solely upon whether it believes or disbelieves the same.” Moses v. Bartholomew, 238 
N.C. 714, 718 (1953). For this Court to accept defendant’s invitation to reinterpret 
Officer Whitley’s suppression hearing testimony, when the original interpretation of 
defendant’s conduct made by the officer on scene has already been evaluated by the 
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trial court in a manner contemplated by, and consistent with, the operational 
structure of our legal system, would be to ignore the trial court’s status as “the sole 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight of their testimony.” State v. 
Johnson, 230 N.C. 743, 745 (1949). 
¶ 14 
 
Likewise, defendant does not challenge the evidentiary basis for the trial 
court’s consideration of Officer Whitley’s discovery of defendant’s criminal history as 
a contributing factor to the officer’s development of reasonable suspicion to justify the 
officer’s execution of a Terry search; instead, defendant submits that the evidence 
“did not support a finding that Officer Whitley had reasonable concerns for his safety 
based on [defendant’s] prior criminal history.” Additionally, defendant endeavors to 
fortify his impression that the officer’s concerns for the officer’s safety were not 
supported by the evidence of the officer’s awareness of defendant’s criminal history 
at the time of the traffic stop by emphasizing that the officer did not fully recall at 
the suppression hearing all of the details and the outcomes of defendant’s criminal 
history, which therefore negated the manifestation of reasonable suspicion in the 
mind of the officer during Officer Whitley’s interaction with defendant. Again, like 
defendant’s concerns about Officer Whitley’s observance of defendant’s nervousness 
and “blading” of his body, this amounts to defendant’s renewed invitation for our 
Court to substitute our judgment regarding the veracity and accuracy of a witness’s 
testimony for the determination of a trial court which occupied “the best position to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
observe the witnesses and make such determinations.” Macher, 188 N.C. App. at 540 
(quoting Freeman v. Freeman, 155 N.C. App. 603, 608 (2002)). Here, Officer Whitley 
testified without contravention that he “discovered that the defendant did have a 
history, violent history, related to firearms” in the form of various charges extending 
from 2003 to 2009, which the officer described as a “trend in violent crime” that, in 
conjunction with the other evidentiary facts already discussed, “led [him] to believe 
that [defendant] was armed and dangerous at that point.” Defendant’s position from 
this cosmetically different, yet fundamentally identical, premise is also without 
merit.  
¶ 15 
 
 By way of review, the unconflicted evidence introduced by the State at the 
hearing conducted by the trial court on defendant’s motion to suppress—that (1) the 
traffic stop occurred late at night (2) in a high-crime area, with (3) defendant 
appearing “very nervous” to the detaining officer to the point that it “seem[ed] like 
his heart [was] beating out of his chest a little bit[,]” with (4) defendant “blading his 
body” as he accessed the Dodge Charger’s center console, and (5) defendant’s criminal 
record indicating a “trend in violent crime” and weapons-related charges—was 
sufficient for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that the 
investigating law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry 
search of defendant’s person and in areas of defendant’s vehicle under defendant’s 
immediate control for the officer’s safety.  
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C. Reasonable Suspicion for the Terry Search 
¶ 16 
 
Both the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
article I, section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution protect private citizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Otto, 366 N.C. 134, 136 (2012). Traffic 
stops are considered seizures subject to the strictures of these provisions and are 
“historically reviewed under the investigatory detention framework first articulated 
in Terry v. Ohio.” Id. at 136–37 (quoting State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 (2008)); 
Reed, 373 N.C. at 507. Law enforcement officers may initiate a traffic stop if the 
officer has a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Styles, 
362 N.C. at 414 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). The 
reasonableness of a traffic stop is determined “by examining (1) whether the traffic 
stop was lawful at its inception, and (2) whether the continued stop was ‘sufficiently 
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.’ ” 
Reed, 373 N.C. at 507 (citations omitted) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983)). Once the traffic stop is initiated, a law enforcement officer may conduct a 
limited search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle so long as the officer 
develops a reasonable suspicion that the suspect of the traffic stop is armed and 
dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
extended the reasonable suspicion standard originally established in Terry to allow 
for these limited searches:  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may 
be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer 
possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the officer 
in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect 
may gain immediate control of weapons. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
Reasonable suspicion demands more than a mere “hunch” on the part of the officer 
but requires “less than probable cause and considerably less than preponderance of 
the evidence.” State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 117 (2012). In any event, reasonable 
suspicion requires only “some minimal level of objective justification,” Styles, 362 
N.C. at 414 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)), and arises from 
“specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant” the intrusion presented by the limited search of the 
vehicle, Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  
¶ 17 
 
As discussed above, competent evidence exists in the record of the suppression 
hearing that Officer Whitley encountered a “very nervous” individual—specifically, 
defendant—late at night in a high-crime area. The officer saw defendant “blade” his 
body by way of defendant’s assumption of a physical position which the officer 
interpreted to be an effort by defendant to conceal defendant’s entry into the vehicle’s 
center console. “All [of] these things,” Officer Whitley testified, were “adding up as, 
from my training and experience, as characteristics of an armed suspect.” Also, upon 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Officer Whitley’s return to his patrol car in order to conduct a criminal records check 
of defendant, the officer obtained information about defendant’s criminal history that 
solidified the existence of reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a Terry 
search, based on the belief developed by Officer Whitley that defendant was armed 
and dangerous.  
¶ 18 
 
Standing alone, defendant’s criminal record for which defendant has already 
paid his debt to society does not constitute reasonable suspicion and hence cannot 
singly serve as a basis for the law enforcement officer who effected the traffic stop to 
conduct a Terry search of the passenger compartment of defendant’s vehicle.2 
Likewise, defendant’s mere presence in a high-crime area does not solely provide the 
officer with the necessary reasonable suspicion to authorize the officer to order 
defendant to exit the vehicle so that the officer can look for weapons. See State v. 
Jackson, 368 N.C. 75, 80 (2015). Similarly, defendant’s nervousness does not in and 
of itself amount to reasonable suspicion when displayed to a detaining officer. State 
v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 276 (1998). However, we do not assess each of these factors, 
specifically articulated by Officer Whitley in this case, in isolation. See Jackson, 368 
                                            
2 However, a law enforcement officer’s specific knowledge of a suspect’s felonious 
criminal convictions alters the reasonable suspicion inquiry when the officer (1) conducts a 
lawful investigative stop of the suspect for the very conduct which serves as the basis for 
those criminal convictions (albeit this circumstance is not present here), and (2) testifies that 
based on the training and experience of the officer, the felonious conduct for which defendant 
has been convicted and is currently being investigated is normally associated with the 
possession of weapons. State v. McGirt, 122 N.C. App. 237, 240 (1996), aff’d per curiam, 345 
N.C. 624 (1997). 
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N.C. at 80. We examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding Officer 
Whitley’s interaction with defendant in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis as 
to whether the officer’s conclusion that defendant may have been armed and 
dangerous was reasonable. Id. In the case at bar, in which the officer rendered 
uncontroverted testimony that he conducted a late-night traffic stop of defendant’s 
vehicle in a high-crime area and encountered defendant who acted very nervous, 
appeared to purposely hamper the officer’s open view of defendant’s entry into the 
vehicle’s center console, and possessed a criminal history which depicted a “trend in 
violent crime,” we conclude that the officer’s suspicion of defendant’s potentially 
armed and dangerous status was reasonable. Therefore, Officer Whitley operated 
within the bounds of both the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and article I, section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution in removing 
defendant from the Dodge Charger and searching the area of the vehicle’s passenger 
compartment that was within defendant’s control for weapons.  
¶ 19 
 
In determining that the aforementioned factors were sufficient to constitute 
reasonable suspicion for the officer’s Terry search based on the totality of the 
circumstances, we have purposely and expressly removed from the assemblage of 
factors which were considered by the trial court to establish reasonable suspicion the 
factor gleaned from Officer Whitley’s uncontroverted testimony that defendant’s act 
of raising his hands and extending them from the driver’s side window, so that 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
defendant’s hands could readily be seen by the approaching officers, was interpreted 
by Officer Whitley as a sign that there could be the presence of a firearm in the 
vehicle. The officer testified at the suppression hearing that defendant’s placement of 
defendant’s hands figured into the officer’s belief that defendant “was armed and 
dangerous at that point.” The Court of Appeals, in giving deference to the officer’s 
right “to rely on his experience and training” and to the trial court’s order, included 
this factor of “raising one’s hands” as defendant did in the present case to be properly 
considered in the totality of the circumstances which resulted in the existence of the 
officer’s reasonable suspicion to execute the Terry search. Johnson, 269 N.C. App. at 
85–86. 
¶ 20 
 
In his brief, defendant’s appellate counsel argues that defendant’s action of 
raising defendant’s hands and clearly exposing them to the officers as they neared 
defendant’s vehicle during the traffic stop should be construed differently than Officer 
Whitley, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals did: 
In this case, the trial court commended [defendant] for 
raising his hands and placing them out the window upon 
being stopped by officers . . . . He was praised by the trial 
court for taking action considered helpful to avoid getting 
shot, but this same action was found to establish, in part, 
the basis for a frisk for weapons. This presents an unjust 
choice.   
¶ 21 
 
We do not need, nor choose, to address any such real or perceived conundrum 
with regard to the existence of reasonable suspicion for the Terry search because in 
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this Court’s view, the factor of defendant’s raised hands upon the officer’s effectuation 
of the traffic stop is unnecessary to consider for the purpose of the establishment of 
reasonable suspicion in light of the totality of the circumstances which include the 
other factors comprising the officer’s reasonable suspicion which collectively have 
already been deemed by this Court to be sufficient in the present case. Like the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, we harbor some “concern about the inclination of 
the [State] toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as 
indicia of suspicious activity.” State v. Nicholson, 371 N.C. 284, 291 n.4 (2018) 
(quoting United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011)). Nonetheless, for 
the purpose of our legal analysis as to the State’s establishment of the existence of 
reasonable suspicion for the officer’s Terry search, we conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances supports the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that such reasonable 
suspicion existed, even after this Court eliminates defendant’s gesture of raising his 
hands as a factor.  
D. Extension of the Stop 
¶ 22 
 
Lastly, defendant contends that Officer Whitley’s search of defendant’s vehicle 
after discovering defendant’s criminal history represented an unconstitutional 
extension of the traffic stop because “it seems evident that Officer Whitley was 
satisfied that a traffic citation for displaying a fictitious tag was not warranted under 
the circumstances as he did not issue such a citation.” Therefore, defendant posits 
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that the officer’s subsequent Terry frisk of defendant’s person and accompanying 
search of defendant’s vehicle were not in furtherance of the officers’ safety while 
fulfilling the purpose of the traffic stop itself, but were instead independent 
investigative actions targeting other unarticulated suspicions of criminal activity. In 
defendant’s view, since Officer Whitley did not demonstrate a reasonable suspicion 
prior to leaving defendant to conduct the criminal records check, coupled with the 
officer’s inability to form reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry search based on 
defendant’s criminal history alone, then the officer’s decision to search defendant 
after the juncture when defendant assumes that Officer Whitley had decided not to 
charge defendant for the traffic violation constituted an unlawful extension of the 
traffic stop. This description mischaracterizes the timing of Officer Whitley’s 
interactions with defendant and disregards the totality of the circumstances which 
yielded the factors upon which Officer Whitley formed the reasonable suspicion 
required to conduct the limited Fourth Amendment search. 
¶ 23 
 
“[T]he duration of a traffic stop must be limited to the length of time that is 
reasonably necessary to accomplish the mission of the stop, unless reasonable 
suspicion of another crime arose before that mission was completed.” State v. Bullock, 
370 N.C. 256, 257 (2017) (citations omitted). While this rule describes the temporal 
nature of the scope of a constitutionally appropriate traffic stop, the exercise of “police 
diligence ‘includes more than just the time needed to issue a citation.’ ” Reed, 373 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
N.C. at 509 (quoting Bullock, 370 N.C. at 257). To ensure that the exercise of such 
enterprise by law enforcement remains within the confines of the Fourth 
Amendment, however, “an investigation unrelated to the reasons for the traffic stop 
must not prolong the roadside detention.” Reed, 373 N.C. at 509. In order to prolong 
a traffic stop beyond the amount of time necessary to investigate and address the 
reason for the stop itself, the detaining officer must “possess a justification for doing 
so other than the initial traffic violation that prompted the stop in the first place.” Id. 
at 510 (quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008)). The 
development of a reasonable suspicion that a suspect may be armed in the normal 
course of an investigation into the basis for a traffic stop provides one such 
justification. Id. (quoting Branch, 537 F.3d at 336, to explain that prolonging a traffic 
stop “requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity 
is afoot”). 
¶ 24 
 
Here, Officer Whitley testified that after observing that defendant exhibited 
some of the characteristics of an armed subject, the officer returned to the officer’s 
patrol car in order to conduct a records check of defendant and of the vehicle itself to 
confirm the veracity of defendant’s statements as to the ownership of the car. Such a 
course of action on the part of Officer Whitley is readily recognized as a proper 
function of the police during traffic stops which are effected under the Fourth 
Amendment, and the officer’s deeds were directly related to addressing the purpose 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
of the stop itself. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015). The officer’s 
activities were not, as represented by defendant, exercises of the officer which were 
external to the traffic stop, nor did they prolong the stop beyond the mission’s 
purpose. Although Officer Whitley testified that he did not intend to arrest defendant 
for the minor traffic infraction of a fictitious license plate which served as the impetus 
for the traffic stop, the officer did not testify—inconsistent with defendant’s self-
serving assumption—that the officer had already made a determination to refrain 
from charging defendant for the traffic violation at the time that the officer was 
engaged in the process of performing the records check.  The officer’s declination to 
issue a citation to defendant for the traffic offense, with only defendant’s speculation 
as to the timing of the officer’s decision to refrain from charging defendant with the 
violation in the dearth of any evidence to support defendant’s theory, does not equate 
to a conclusion that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop. This is 
particularly true in light of the testimony rendered by Officer Whitley as to the actual 
chain of events and the observations by the officer which culminated in the Terry 
search. The officer represented at the suppression hearing that the records check was 
a standard aspect of any traffic stop that he conducted. The information obtained by 
the officer from the records check disclosed defendant’s “trend in violent crime.”  
¶ 25 
 
The entirety of the sequence of events which was started by virtue of Officer 
Whitley’s initiation of a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle in order to investigate an 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
apparent license plate violation, during which the officer’s interaction with defendant 
featured behavioral cues by defendant that prompted Officer Whitley to consider that 
defendant might be armed, which in turn led the officer to particularly note during 
the officer’s routine records check that he performed pursuant to every traffic stop 
that he effectuated that defendant’s criminal history indicated a “trend in violent 
crime,” thus compelling Officer Whitley to believe that defendant was “armed and 
dangerous” and establishing reasonable suspicion in the officer’s mind so as to justify 
a Terry frisk of defendant’s person and a Terry search of defendant’s vehicle for 
weapons in areas that were subject to defendant’s direct and immediate control, 
demonstrate that there was not an unconstitutional extension of the traffic stop. In 
light of these facts, we adopt the observant phrase employed by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, “[c]learly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to 
the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers.” United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 687 (1985).   
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 26 
 
Based upon the foregoing factual background, procedural background, and 
analysis, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals finding no error in the trial 
court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress in agreement with the 
conclusion of the Court of Appeals as modified by our discussion in this opinion. 
AFFIRMED. 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Justice BERGER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 
case. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice NEWBY concurring. 
¶ 27 
 
I agree with the well-reasoned majority opinion that the evidence it considers 
was sufficient for the trial court to find Officer Whitley had reasonable suspicion to 
justify the limited Terry search for weapons in the area immediately surrounding 
defendant. Although not needed to resolve this case, however, I do not believe this 
Court should remove from the analysis defendant’s gesture of raising his hands out 
of his car window. Like other movements, which may be innocent standing alone, 
with the proper testimony the act of raising one’s hands can be a factor to support an 
officer’s reasonable suspicion.  
¶ 28 
 
The trial court here found:  
8. That after the Defendant stopped, he raised both of his 
hands in the air upon the officers’ approach. 
9. That Officer Whitley observed the Defendant’s hands in 
the air, and based on Officer Whitley’s training and 
experience, he believed that the gesture of raising one’s 
hands in the air can indicate that a person has a gun inside 
the vehicle. 
10. That based on his training and experience, Officer 
Whitley was on alert about the possible presence of a gun.  
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded:  
1. That the motion of having hands up upon an officer’s 
approach does not automatically incriminate an individual 
by itself, and the Defendant’s action of showing his hands 
was reasonable. However, based on an officer’s experience, 
it is reasonable for an officer to infer that the motion of 
hands up upon an officer’s approach could indicate the 
presence of a weapon.  
 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Newby, C.J., concurring 
 
 
 
Thus, based on Officer Whitley’s testimony, the trial court included defendant’s action 
of raising his hands as a factor to support reasonable suspicion.  
¶ 29 
 
The trial court properly considered all the relevant factors to determine that 
Officer Whitley had reasonable suspicion justifying the limited Terry search for a 
weapon. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, this Court “consider[s] 
‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,’ ” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 
437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 
101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)), including the perspective “of a reasonable, cautious officer, 
guided by his experience and training,” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 
438, 439 (2008) (quoting Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70). Other courts 
have found that a defendant’s raised hands can support reasonable suspicion for a 
limited Terry search. See Clark v. Clark, 926 F.3d 972, 979 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding 
that the defendant’s action of “pull[ing] over and put[ting] his hands outside the 
driver’s side window” supported reasonable suspicion for a Terry investigatory 
seizure and search of the defendant’s vehicle for a gun); State v. King, 206 N.C. App. 
585, 590, 696 S.E.2d 913, 916 (2010) (holding that “the unusual gesture of 
[the d]efendant placing his hands out of his window” supported reasonable suspicion 
for a limited Terry search); cf. State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403, 404–10, 721 S.E.2d 218, 
219–22 (2012) (analogizing the “reasonable to believe” standard from Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), to the Terry reasonable suspicion standard to 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Newby, C.J., concurring 
 
 
 
conclude that officer had reason to believe the defendant’s vehicle contained 
additional evidence of the offense of arrest to justify search for handgun while the 
defendant was detained outside the vehicle based on, inter alia, the defendant’s 
furtive behavior of lowering hands off the steering wheel), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 864, 
133 S. Ct. 224 (2012). Therefore, I believe the trial court properly relied on defendant’s 
raised hands as a factor in finding the existence of reasonable suspicion. Otherwise, 
I fully concur with the majority opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting. 
 
¶ 30 
 
The sole question before this Court is whether, under “the totality of the 
circumstances as viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer,” State v. Wilson, 371 N.C. 920, 926 (2018) (cleaned up) (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 370 N.C. 32, 34–35 (2017)), it would be reasonable for an officer “to believe 
that he [was] dealing with an armed and dangerous individual” after initiating a 
traffic stop of Bryan Xavier Johnson. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The 
majority answers in the affirmative. To reach this conclusion, the majority converts 
a jumble of subjective, innocuous, or irrelevant facts into indicia of dangerousness. 
The result is a decision inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment and which fails to 
consider the racial dynamics underlying reasonable suspicion determinations. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
Reasonable suspicion under Terry 
¶ 31 
 
According to the majority, five factors contribute to the reasonable belief that 
Johnson was armed and dangerous under Terry: “(1) the traffic stop occurred late at 
night (2) in a high-crime area, with (3) defendant appearing ‘very nervous’ to the 
detaining officer to the point that it ‘seem[ed] like his heart [was] beating out of his 
chest a little bit[,]’ with (4) defendant ‘blading his body’ as he accessed the Dodge 
Charger’s center console, and (5) defendant’s criminal record indicating a ‘trend in 
violent crime’ and weapons-related charges.” The majority repeatedly asserts that 
 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
although no one individual factor may be sufficient to justify the search “standing 
alone,” these factors are sufficient when viewed collectively under the “totality of the 
circumstances.” Although I agree with the majority that Terry demands a flexible, 
holistic approach, I cannot join the majority in its refusal to enforce the limits 
imposed by the Fourth Amendment on the State’s authority to conduct warrantless 
searches. Facts which individually do not contribute to reasonable suspicion in 
isolation should not be accorded outsized significance merely because they appear 
alongside other facts which also do not contribute to reasonable suspicion. Even 
viewed under the “totality of the circumstances,” I would hold that the State has 
failed to meet its burden of proving that an objective officer would reasonably believe 
Johnson was armed and dangerous at the time Officer Whitley initiated the search 
of his vehicle.  
1. Presence in a “high crime area” late at night 
¶ 32 
 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Whitley described the area in which he 
apprehended Johnson as a “very high crime area, where we have a lot of narcotic 
sales.” A defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” can sometimes be “among the 
relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 124 (2000) However, a defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” is only 
probative when it is paired with conduct suggesting the defendant’s presence is in 
some way connected to the criminal conduct known to occur in that area. There must 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
be some basis for suspecting the individual was someone other than one of the 
countless innocent people whose daily routines involve spending time in a “high crime 
area” for the individual’s mere presence to be relevant.  
¶ 33 
 
Thus, in State v. Butler, it was not the defendant’s mere presence on a street 
corner the arresting officer “knew . . . to be a center of drug activity” which contributed 
to reasonable suspicion, it was the defendant’s presence coupled with the fact that 
the defendant “was seen in the midst of a group of people congregated on a corner 
known as a ‘drug hole’ ” and that “upon making eye contact with the uniformed 
officers, [the] defendant immediately moved away, behavior that is evidence of flight.” 
331 N.C. 227, 233 (1992). Similarly, in State v. Jackson, the defendant’s presence in 
a “high crime area” contributed to reasonable suspicion because the defendant “stood 
at 9:00 p.m. in a specific location known for hand-to-hand drug transactions . . . 
walked in [the] opposite direction[ ] upon seeing a marked police vehicle approach . . . 
came back very near to the same location once the patrol car passed . . . [and] walked 
[away] a second time upon seeing [the police officer] return.” 368 N.C. 75, 80 (2015). 
In both cases, it was the combination of a defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” 
with behavior suggestive of the defendant’s personal involvement in the area’s 
criminal activities which made the defendant’s geographic location relevant under 
Terry. 
¶ 34 
 
By contrast, in this case, Johnson did not do anything to suggest his presence 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
in a “high crime area” was in any way motivated by or connected to the alleged 
prevalence of drug trafficking in that neighborhood. He was simply driving his vehicle 
down Central Avenue in Charlotte. He was stopped because the license plate on his 
vehicle was not registered to the type of vehicle he was driving. He was not observed 
interacting with suspected drug dealers, visiting places where drug transactions were 
known to occur, or attempting to evade the police. Nothing Officer Whitley observed 
distinguished Johnson from the many other people who undoubtedly pass through 
this “high crime area” with no intention of doing anything other than getting from 
one location to the next. In my view, this renders Johnson’s physical location 
irrelevant to the Terry analysis.  
¶ 35 
 
There is nothing reasonable about believing that an individual is armed and 
dangerous merely because he drove his vehicle down a particular street, no matter 
where that street is located. The majority’s rejoinder that Johnson’s location is 
probative when considered “in the totality of the circumstances” does not answer the 
question of why Johnson’s presence in this particular location in any way suggested 
he was armed and dangerous. Johnson’s conduct did nothing to convert Officer 
Whitley’s generalized observation about the nature of the area into a reasonable, 
particularized, and individualized suspicion regarding Johnson. The majority’s 
position risks “making the simple act of [driving] in one’s own neighborhood a possible 
indication of criminal activity.” Jackson, 368 N.C. at 80. 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 36 
 
In his brief, Johnson does not appear to directly challenge the trial court’s 
implied finding of fact that the area he was travelling through was fairly 
characterized as a “high crime area.” However, in a different case, it may be necessary 
for this Court to define what a “high crime area” is, what competent evidence is 
necessary to support the finding that a defendant was located in one, and the 
circumstances under which a defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” supports an 
officer’s reasonable suspicion that he is armed and dangerous.   
¶ 37 
 
For example, the First Circuit has held that in order for a defendant’s location 
in a “high crime area” to contribute to reasonable suspicion, the government is 
required to present evidence tending to prove “(1) [a] nexus between the type of crime 
most prevalent or common in the area and the type of crime suspected in the instant 
case, (2) limited geographic boundaries of the ‘area’ or ‘neighborhood’ being evaluated, 
and (3) temporal proximity between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the 
date of the stop or search at issue.” United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Further, while it is certainly appropriate to credit “the 
testimony of police officers[ ] describing their experiences in the area” in determining 
whether an area is a “high crime area,” I would agree with the First Circuit that we 
should also look to data and other sources of information to ensure the reasonableness 
inquiry at the heart of the Terry analysis remains tethered to objective facts. Id. at 
54; see also N. Mariana Islands v. Crisostomo, 2014 WL 7072149, at *2 (N. Mar. I. 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Dec. 12, 2014) (“[A]n officer’s confident body language and tone of voice are not 
enough to prove a high-crime claim. Allowing such a finding solely through 
unsubstantiated testimony (no matter how confidently stated) would give police the 
power to transform ‘any area into a high crime area based on their unadorned 
personal experiences.’ ” (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 
1143 (9th Cir. 2000))).  
¶ 38 
 
Further, I share the concern expressed by many courts that encouraging 
reliance on undefined, amorphous signifiers like “high crime area” as a proxy for 
suspected criminal activity risks subjecting identifiable racial minority communities 
to disproportionate, invasive, and unlawful searches. See, e.g., United States v. 
Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[L]abeling an area ‘high-crime’ raises 
special concerns of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic profiling.”); Montero-Camargo, 
208 F.3d at 1138 (“The citing of an area as ‘high-crime’ requires careful examination 
by the court, because such a description, unless properly limited and factually based, 
can easily serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.”). There is research demonstrating 
that the reported rate of crime in a particular geographic area is driven not only by 
the actual incidence of criminal conduct in that area, but also by law enforcement’s 
choices regarding where and how to conduct enforcement activities. See Sandra G. 
Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 Yale L.J. 2218, 2253 (2019) (“Blacks are more likely 
than others to be arrested in almost every city for almost every type of crime. 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Nationwide, black people are arrested at higher rates for crimes as serious as murder 
and assault, and as minor as loitering and marijuana possession.”); see also K. Babe 
Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened 
Criminal Justice System, 27 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 285, 298 (2014) (“It is the police who 
choose what areas to target, who respond to calls, and who make the initial decision 
whether to make an arrest or issue an informal warning when minor misconduct 
occurs.”). My concern is especially acute in this case because Officer Whitley “did not 
observe [defendant] engage in any type of behavior that is consistent with [the 
criminal] activity” thought to occur with greater frequency in the area where he was 
apprehended. United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 570 (6th Cir. 2011).  
¶ 39 
 
I have similar concerns regarding the majority’s reliance on the fact that “the 
traffic stop took place late at night.” It is correct that this Court has previously held 
the time of night when a stop occurs to be “an appropriate factor for a law enforcement 
officer to consider in formulating a reasonable suspicion.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 
437, 442 (1994). Yet we have also recognized a difference between being present late 
at night in a place where it is expected people might be found at that hour and being 
present late at night somewhere where one’s presence is anomalous. Thus, in 
Watkins, we distinguished between a defendant “standing in an open area between 
two apartment buildings . . . in Greensboro, an urban area, shortly after midnight” 
and a defendant who was observed “proceeding slowly on a dead-end street of locked 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
businesses at 12:50 a.m. in an area with a high incidence of property crime.” Id. The 
latter circumstance was indicative of reasonable suspicion while the former was not.  
There must be some other objective basis from which to infer that the individual is 
travelling late at night for a nefarious purpose and is not just a parent heading home 
to tuck his or her children in after a late-night shift. 
¶ 40 
 
In this case, there is no evidence indicating Johnson’s presence or behavior was 
unusual or alarming for the place and hour. There is no evidence that individuals 
who drive down Central Avenue late at night are disproportionately likely to be 
armed and dangerous. Nor is there any evidence that individuals who possess guns 
and present a danger to law enforcement officers tend to travel at night. Cf. United 
States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2015) (“This record does not make an 
evidentiary connection between nocturnal travel and drug trafficking . . . . Absent 
such a connection, that the traffic stop of [the defendant] occurred at about 12:37 a.m. 
does not contribute to a reasonable, articulable suspicion for extending the otherwise-
completed traffic stop . . . .”). Accordingly, I would hold that neither the location nor 
the time of the traffic stop contribute to a reasonable suspicion that Johnson was 
armed and dangerous under Terry. 
2. Nervousness 
¶ 41 
 
We have previously held that nervousness can be “an appropriate factor to 
consider when determining whether a basis for a reasonable suspicion exists.” State 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 638 (1999). But nervousness only supports an officer’s 
reasonable suspicion when it is something “more than ordinary nervousness.” Id. at 
639. “This Court has expressly determined that general nervousness is not significant 
to reasonable suspicion analysis because many people become nervous when stopped 
by a [law enforcement officer].” State v. Reed, 373 N.C. 498, 515 (2020) (cleaned up) 
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 276 (1998)). We have 
treated nervousness as supporting an officer’s reasonable suspicion when the 
defendant “was fidgety and breathing rapidly, sweat had formed on his forehead, he 
would sigh deeply, and he would not make eye contact with the officer,” but we also 
explained that when “the nervousness of the defendant [is] not remarkable . . . it 
d[oes] not support a reasonable suspicion.” McClendon, 350 N.C. at 639. 
¶ 42 
 
None of the twenty-four findings of fact contained in the trial court’s order on 
the motion to suppress included any reference to Johnson’s alleged nervousness. 
While the trial court was not required by statute to reduce all its findings to writing, 
it goes beyond the scope of appellate review to accord deference to a supposed fact 
based solely on the officer’s observations of the witness’s demeanor, when the trial 
court itself made no such finding.  Silence by the trial court is not endorsement of the 
witness’ veracity nor does it give the appellate court any guidance as to the weight to 
accord that testimony.  
¶ 43 
 
Finally, even if it is proper to consider evidence not incorporated into any of 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
the trial court’s express findings of fact, the record does not support the conclusion 
that Johnson was unusually or remarkably nervous. The only evidence attesting to 
Johnson’s level of nervousness is Officer Whitley’s testimony that he “seemed very 
nervous and to the point of where, as you can imagine, his heart’s beating, but it 
seems like his heart is beating out of his chest a little bit. He was very nervous. . . . 
you could see his heart rising in his chest.” However, Johnson did not exhibit any 
physical symptoms of anything other than an ordinary response to an understandably 
stressful situation. He did not act in an inexplicable or aberrant manner, he did not 
appear disoriented or disheveled, and he did not do anything other than respond to 
Officer Whitley’s questions appropriately and intelligibly. Absent any evidence that 
Johnson was inordinately nervous, Officer Whitley’s bare assertion that Johnson was 
“very nervous” in no way contributes to the reasonable suspicion that he was armed 
and dangerous. 
¶ 44 
 
Other courts have expressed skepticism regarding the probative value of an 
officer’s observation that the defendant was nervous during a traffic stop. See, e.g., 
United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 (10th Cir. 1994) (“We have repeatedly 
held that nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion 
and that the government’s repetitive reliance on the nervousness of either the driver 
or passenger as a basis for reasonable suspicion ‘in all cases of this kind must be 
treated with caution.’ ” (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
720, 722 (10th Cir. 1992))). And with good reason. Common sense tells us it is not at 
all surprising that an individual might look and feel nervous, even “very nervous,” 
when interacting with a law enforcement officer in this context. See, e.g., United 
States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir. 1998) (“It certainly cannot be deemed 
unusual for a motorist to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by a law 
enforcement officer.”); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It 
is certainly not uncommon for most citizens—whether innocent or guilty—to exhibit 
signs of nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer.”); State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989) (“When confronted with a traffic stop, it 
is not uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to 
turn to look at an approaching police officer.”). Even physical manifestations of 
nervousness do not necessarily warrant the inference that an individual is hiding 
something. See State v. Anderson, 258 Neb. 627, 641 (2000) (“Trembling hands, a 
pulsing carotid artery, difficulty locating a vehicle registration among documents in 
a glove box, and hesitancy to make eye contact are signs of nervousness which may 
be displayed by innocent travelers who are stopped and confronted by an officer.”).  
¶ 45 
 
Our traditional distinction between general nervousness—which does not 
support an officer’s reasonable suspicion—and extreme nervousness—which may 
support an officer’s reasonable suspicion—reflects this reality. The majority’s 
decision to rely upon Johnson’s nervousness in this case, based solely upon Officer 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Whitley’s testimony that he observed Johnson’s heart “beating out of his chest a little 
bit,” erodes that distinction and turns an entirely understandable physiological 
response into a ground for conducting a warrantless search.   
¶ 46 
 
There are numerous completely innocent reasons why any person might be 
nervous during a traffic stop. There are also specific reasons why someone who looks 
like Johnson—a large Black man—might be especially nervous during a traffic stop. 
Black people are more likely than white people to be pulled over while driving, more 
likely than white people to be subjected to investigatory stops, and more likely than 
white people to be shot and killed by law enforcement officers.1 Any driver who has 
followed the news in recent years would have learned the names of numerous people 
of color killed during or after routine traffic stops. These encounters can be fraught 
under any circumstance and especially so when the driver fears that one false step 
might cost him his life. Thus, I cannot agree with the majority that Johnson’s 
purported level of apparent nervousness, as described by the officer’s testimony in 
                                            
1 See, e.g., Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police 
Stops Across the United States, 4 Nature Hum. Behav. 736, 736 (July 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0858-1 (“We assessed racial disparities in policing in the 
United States by compiling and analysing a dataset detailing nearly 100 million traffic stops 
. . . . Our results indicate that police stops and search decisions suffer from persistent racial 
bias . . . .”); Wesley Lowery, A Disproportionate Number of Black Victims in Fatal Traffic 
Stops, Washington Post (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-
disproportionate-number-of-black-victims-in-fatal-traffic-stops/2015/12/24/c29717e2-a344-
11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html (finding that one third of all individuals shot and killed 
during traffic stops in 2015 were Black, “making the roadside interaction one of the most 
common precursors to a fatal police shooting of a black person in 2015”). 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
this case, can support a rational inference that he was armed and dangerous.  
3. Blading 
¶ 47 
 
The majority holds that Officer Whitley’s testimony Johnson was “blading [his 
body] . . . as if he [was] trying to conceal something” contributes to reasonable 
suspicion under Terry. To be precise, this fact—which the trial court did not explicitly 
find—is based entirely upon Officer Whitley’s perception that Johnson did not reach 
into his center console in the way Officer Whitley believed a driver “typically” would. 
I do not dispute that “an obvious attempt to hide or to evade the authorities can be a 
factor in the calculus of reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 
7 (1st Cir. 2000). However, I disagree with the majority that Officer Whitley’s 
subjective perception that Johnson “bladed” his body contributes to reasonable 
suspicion in this case. 
¶ 48 
 
The significance of Johnson’s motion in retrieving his paperwork from the 
center console of his vehicle lies entirely in the meaning a reasonable officer would 
ascribe to the motion, not in the motion itself. “[N]ot every slouch, crouch, or other 
supposedly furtive movement justifies a stop. The proper inquiry is case-specific and 
context-contingent, and the surrounding circumstances ordinarily will tell the tale.” 
Id. (citation omitted). Here, Johnson’s body movement is probative only insofar as a 
reasonable officer would perceive his movement to be an effort to shield a weapon 
from view. For this reason, it is notable that when Johnson supposedly “bladed” his 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
body to shield the contents of his center console from Officer Whitley’s view, there 
was another officer standing on the other side of the vehicle looking in through the 
passenger side window. Further, it is not as if Johnson’s movements were unnatural 
or disconnected from the events of that moment. He was a large man reaching across 
his body while remaining seated in his vehicle. The fact that he lifted his shoulders 
off the seat to do is not a reason to conclude he was armed and dangerous. 
¶ 49 
 
We should be hesitant to rely so completely on the subjective perceptions of an 
individual officer whose interpretation of a body motion that is not inherently 
suspicious is the sole basis for the conclusion that Johnson’s movements contributed 
to reasonable suspicion. We should be especially hesitant to do so when the trial court 
did not enter an express finding of fact that Johnson “bladed” his body. This Court is 
not a factfinding tribunal, and it stretches both our competence and authority when 
we “[i]nfer[ ] additional findings, ones that go beyond what the trial court actually 
found, to rescue an otherwise insufficient ruling of the trial court.” State v. Johnson, 
269 N.C. App. 76, 88–89 (2019) (Murphy, J., dissenting).2 Further, “an officer’s 
impression of whether a movement was ‘furtive’ may be affected by unconscious racial 
                                            
2 The majority asserts that it is appropriate to imply facts not expressly found by the 
trial court because the trial court noted its ruling was “based on the totality of [the] 
circumstances, including but not limited to [the enumerated facts].” Similarly, the majority 
argues its factfinding endeavor is appropriate because Officer Whitley’s testimony was 
“uncontroverted.” But uncontroverted testimony is not the same as an established fact—it is 
for the trial court to “itself determine what pertinent facts are actually established by the 
evidence before it.” Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712 (1980).  
STATE V. JOHNSON 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
biases,” which is an additional reason to leave factfinding, which often involves 
credibility determinations, to the trial court. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
¶ 50 
 
Even if it is proper to treat Officer Whitley’s testimony regarding Johnson’s 
“blading” his body as an express finding of fact, this fact adds little to the reasonable 
suspicion calculus. Cf. State v. Johnson, 2006 WI App 15, ¶ 18, 288 Wis. 2d 718, 709 
N.W.2d 491, aff’d, 2007 WI 32, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182 (concluding that the 
defendant’s “furtive” movements did not support reasonable suspicion he was armed 
and dangerous because “[t]he officers pulled [the defendant] over for traffic violations 
. . . and not for a crime[,]” and the officers “had no prior contacts with [the defendant] 
that would suggest that he would be armed or otherwise dangerous”). This Court has 
never before recognized “blading” as a behavior which gives rise to the reasonable 
inference that an individual is armed and dangerous. In the only other Court of 
Appeals decision previously recognizing “blading” as a contributing factor under 
Terry, the defendant “bladed” his body in such a way as to prevent the arresting 
officer from viewing his hip, where a firearm is often carried, immediately after 
making eye contact with the officer. State v. Malachi, 264 N.C. App. 233, 238, appeal 
dismissed, 372 N.C. 702 (2019). In that case, there was no other reason for the 
defendant to move his body in that manner. Furthermore, the officer in that case 
testified about the basis for his suspicion including training he received that a person 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
with a gun often turns his hip to hide the weapon. See Malachi, 264 N.C. App. at 237-
38. Finally, officers had received an anonymous tip that someone wearing a red shirt 
and black pants had put a gun in his waistband.  Id., at 234.  By contrast, in this case, 
there was no tip, there was no testimony regarding the officer’s training, and most 
importantly, Johnson was moving his body to accomplish an apparent, noncriminal 
purpose. Indeed, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that movements which 
are contextually appropriate and not inherently suspect do not contribute to the 
reasonable suspicion analysis. Cf. United States v. Hood, 435 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 
2020) (rejecting the government’s “blading” argument because “the positioning of [the 
defendant’s] body seems consistent with an individual who was crossing a street at a 
diagonal from north to south”). Therefore, I would not consider Johnson’s alleged 
“blading” significant in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  
4. Prior record 
¶ 51 
 
 The majority finds probative Officer Whitley’s testimony that he believed 
Johnson was “armed and dangerous” after he reviewed Johnson’s criminal record and 
discerned a “trend in violent crime.” I would conclude this finding is unsupported by 
competent evidence in the record and thus cannot contribute to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis in this case. 
¶ 52 
 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Whitley could not recall the dates of the 
entries he viewed in Johnson’s record, whether those entries documented charges or 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
convictions, or the total number of charges or convictions Johnson’s record contained. 
He did recall that that the dates of these entries “started somewhere around 2003 to 
the 2009 mark.” In 2009, it might have been reasonable to conclude, based on this 
evidence, that Johnson’s criminal record indicated a “trend in violent crime.” In 2017, 
when the stop occurred, eight years had passed since Johnson had been charged or 
convicted of any crime, let alone a violent one. Notwithstanding this lengthy gap, the 
majority concludes Johnson’s criminal record supports the reasonable belief he was 
armed and dangerous in 2017.  
¶ 53 
 
A trend implies some accounting for recent events. Otherwise, it would be 
correct to say that the Seattle Supersonics have demonstrated a “trend in winning 
basketball games,” even though they ceased to exist around the same time as 
Johnson’s last conviction. By concluding that it would be reasonable for an officer to 
ignore the eight-year period during which Johnson maintained a clean record 
immediately preceding the traffic stop, the majority suggests that no matter how far 
back in time an individual’s prior charges and convictions occurred, no matter how 
successful that individual has been in re-entering society, it is reasonable for an 
officer to believe that an individual with a prior record is a threat. At a minimum, we 
should make clear that “the age of [a defendant’s] convictions is a factor to consider 
in determining their relevance” in the Terry analysis to avoid lending the impression 
that once an individual has been arrested or convicted of some crime, he is marked 
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2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
as presumptively dangerous for life. United States v. Scott, 818 F.3d 424, 431 (8th 
Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding 
with respect to warrant application based in part on 18-year-old conviction that “even 
if [the defendant’s] prior conviction were relevant to the analysis, it should have only 
been marginally relevant because the conviction was stale”).  
¶ 54 
 
Under these circumstances—where the defendant’s last conviction occurred 
eight years prior to the traffic stop and there is no indication the defendant continued 
to engage in criminal activity in the intervening years—I disagree with the majority 
that Johnson’s criminal record supports the reasonable belief he was armed and 
dangerous at the time of the traffic stop, “[s]tanding alone” or otherwise. I also note 
that prior convictions are not evenly distributed among all segments of the population 
and that the distribution of convictions does not necessarily track meaningful 
distinctions in the frequency or severity of criminal conduct engaged in by members 
of different racial or ethnic groups. See, e.g., Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 
1865 (2021) (“Under [federal] law, crack cocaine sentences were about 50 percent 
longer than those for powder cocaine. Black people bore the brunt of this disparity.” 
(citation omitted)); Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 220 (2d Cir. 2020) (“As 
the statistics show, there are significant racial disparities in arrest, conviction, and 
incarceration rates in this country.”). Absent further clarification from this Court 
regarding the significance of an individual’s prior criminal record, I worry that our 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
decision today will allow historic racial disparities in policing to perpetuate ongoing 
ones.   
¶ 55 
 
One of the fundamental principles of our common law jurisprudence is that we 
punish acts, not an individual merely because of his or her status.  See, e.g., Robinson 
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding a California law making it illegal to be a 
drug addict unconstitutional because the mere status of being a drug addict was not 
an act and thus not criminal.). The majority’s conclusion that Johnson’s prior criminal 
record contributes to reasonable suspicion—which treats his more recent, lengthier 
period of non-involvement with the criminal justice system as irrelevant—conveys 
the unmistakable impression that “felon” is a lifelong status which renders an 
individual’s choices and behavior irrelevant. Moreover, the majority’s reasoning 
contributes to a legal reality in which an individual’s felony conviction is used to 
justify according an entire class of people diminished constitutional protections, going 
well beyond the legal debilities imposed by our constitution and statutes on 
individuals who have been convicted of a felony offense.  
5. Raising hands 
¶ 56 
 
The majority notes that its conclusion there was reasonable suspicion to search 
Johnson’s vehicle is in no way predicated on the fact that Johnson placed his hands 
up in the air when he was stopped by Officer Whitley. I wholeheartedly agree that 
Johnson’s conduct in this respect should be given no probative weight in the Terry 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
analysis. I would also go a step further and resolve the “real or perceived conundrum” 
that arises when the State claims that a defendant’s raising his hands when 
surrendering to a law enforcement officer is evidence supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant is armed and dangerous.  
¶ 57 
 
The very obvious problem with this claim is that raising one’s hands in this 
manner is an entirely natural way for one person to signal to another that they mean 
no harm. Indeed, police officers will often order an individual suspected of being 
armed and dangerous to raise his hands, and the individual’s failure to do so would 
certainly contribute to reasonable suspicion under Terry. See United States v. Soares, 
521 F.3d 117, 121 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding there was reasonable suspicion where 
the defendant “refused repeated orders to remain still and keep his hands in [the 
officer’s] view”). At the same time, courts have held that it contributes to reasonable 
suspicion when a defendant moves his hands out of view of the arresting officer. See 
United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
the defendant’s “shoving down” motions with his hands were motions “which a 
reasonable officer could have thought were actually suggestive of hiding (or 
retrieving) a gun”). If raising one’s hands contributes to reasonable suspicion, and 
failing to raise one’s hands contributes to reasonable suspicion, then there is always 
reasonable suspicion.  
¶ 58 
 
The concurrence treats Johnson’s hand raising as the majority treats every 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
other fact it believes contributes to reasonable suspicion—according to the 
concurrence, while raising one’s hands may sometimes be an innocent gesture, it 
takes on talismanic significance when considered “in the totality of the 
circumstances.” The assertion is that “[l]ike other movements, which may be innocent 
standing alone, with the proper testimony the act of raising one’s hands can be a 
factor to support an officer’s reasonable suspicion.” But the “proper testimony” 
referred to here is only the officer’s subjective belief that the conduct was suspicious. 
This is not what the law requires. To protect Fourth Amendment rights this Court 
must ask whether the officer can articulate a reasonable, objective basis for his 
suspicion. Allowing “the proper testimony” to magically transform innocent acts into 
suspicious ones makes those rights illusory.  As we recently stated in Reed, 
An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, 
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 
145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). An obvious, intrinsic element of 
reasonable suspicion is a law enforcement officer's ability 
to articulate the objective justification of his or her 
suspicion. . . . [We cannot] conveniently presuppose a 
fundamental premise which is lacking here in the 
identification of reasonable, articulable suspicion: the 
suspicion must be articulable as well as reasonable.   
 
Reed, 373 N.C. at 514. Today’s decision fails to adhere to this recent precedent. 
¶ 59 
 
The majority pays lip service to our previously stated “concern about the 
inclination of the [State] toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity.” State v. Nicholson, 371 N.C. 284, 291 n.4 
(2018) (quoting United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011)). But the 
Fourth Amendment requires us to avoid “plac[ing] undue weight on [the arresting 
officer’s] subjective interpretation of the facts rather than focusing on how an 
objective, reasonable officer would have viewed them.” Nicholson, 371 N.C. at 291–
92. In this case, the only “evidence” linking Johnson’s hand motion to a risk of 
dangerousness was Officer Whitley’s testimony that “typically when people [raise 
their hands in this manner], sometimes it can mean that they have a gun.” We should 
not blindly acquiesce to one officer’s subjective interpretation, which runs contrary to 
common sense and which makes the individuals most likely to experience trepidation 
when interacting with law enforcement more likely to be deemed suspicious because 
of their efforts to mitigate the risk of an encounter turning violent. Absent specific 
evidence illustrating why a hand gesture commonly understood to convey that the 
individual making the gesture means no harm should instead be understood as 
evidence that the individual is a threat, I would hold that this hand gesture does not 
contribute to reasonable suspicion under Terry. 
II. 
Conclusion 
¶ 60 
 
Johnson did everything he was supposed to do when he was stopped by police 
officers. When he saw flashing lights in his rearview mirror, he pulled over “fairly 
immediately.” When an officer approached his vehicle, he placed his hands up and 
STATE V. JOHNSON 
2021-NCSC-85 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
out of the driver side window to show that he was unarmed. When the officer asked 
him why his license plate did not match the registration for his vehicle, he explained 
that he had purchased the vehicle earlier that day and reached into his center console 
to retrieve corroborating paperwork, including a bill of sale. When the officer asked 
him to step out of his vehicle, he stepped out of his vehicle. When the officer asked 
him to consent to a frisk for weapons, he consented. The officer found nothing 
suspicious on his person.  
¶ 61 
 
Under Terry, our analysis is supposed to focus on the behavior of each 
individual defendant under the circumstances of each individual case, but in this case 
nothing Johnson did mattered. Rather than hold the State to its burden under the 
Fourth Amendment, the majority reasons that the whole of the evidence supporting 
reasonable suspicion is greater than the sum of the parts. In doing so, the majority 
converts a generalized hunch into individualized suspicion, eroding the Fourth 
Amendment rights of all North Carolinians in the process. The majority also ignores, 
and may well exacerbate, issues relating to racially disparate policing, issues which 
have been forthrightly examined by many courts confronted with similar kinds of 
Terry claims. Therefore, respectfully, I dissent. 
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.