Title: Short v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 118, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 19, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RONTAY L. SHORT, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 118, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0605016207A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 7, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: September 19, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 19th day of September 2007, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s 
motion to withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Rontay L. Short, was found guilty by 
a Superior Court jury of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of 
a Felony, Aggravated Menacing, and Resisting Arrest.  Short was sentenced 
to five years of Level V incarceration on the weapon conviction and six 
months of Level V incarceration on the conviction of resisting arrest.  On the 
conviction of aggravated menacing, Short was sentenced to five years of 
 
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Level V incarceration, to be suspended after two years for decreasing levels 
of supervision.  This is Short’s direct appeal. 
 
(2) 
Short’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that arguably could support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Short’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Short’s counsel informed Short of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete trial transcript.  Short also was informed of his right 
to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Short responded with a brief that 
raises five issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to 
                                          
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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the position taken by Short’s counsel as well as the issues raised by Short 
and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Short raises five issues for this Court’s consideration, which 
may fairly be summarized as follows.  He claims that: a) the State 
improperly amended the indictment to charge him with a more serious 
weapon offense; b) the State improperly failed to call the police officer with 
direct knowledge of the facts of the case as a witness at trial; c) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the charge of resisting arrest; and d) the 
police officer who swore out the arrest warrant provided false information 
that was inconsistent with the testimony of another officer. 
 
(5) 
The trial transcript reflects that, during the prayer conference, 
the Superior Court judge brought a clerical error in the indictment to the 
attention of the State and defense counsel.  Specifically, Count 11 of the 
indictment was entitled “Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony,”2 but the crime described in the text of Count 11 
was “Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.”3 The 
prosecutor requested that the clerical error be corrected and defense counsel 
had no objection.  The Superior Court noted that the only weapon that was 
                                          
 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447. 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A. 
 
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ever at issue in the case was a “firearm”, as reflected in the text of Count 11, 
so that the defendant was not prejudiced by the correction.     
 
(6) 
The evidence presented at trial was as follows.  On May 17, 
2006, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Trooper Eric Glasco and Corporal Rickey 
Hargis of the Delaware State Police, along with Officer Calloway of the 
Laurel Police Department, were conducting a search for Short at the 
Hollybrook apartment complex in Laurel, Delaware.4  During the search, 
Trooper Glasco encountered Short on the second floor of one of the 
apartment buildings.  As Trooper Glasco approached Short, Short pointed a 
gun at him.  Corporal Hargis and Officer Calloway arrived on the scene and, 
confronting Short, ordered him to drop his weapon.  Short did not comply 
with the order, but waved the gun around.  Eventually Short dropped the gun 
and the officers brought him to the ground.   
 
(7) 
Short’s first claim is that the State improperly amended the 
indictment to charge him with a more serious weapon offense.  Because 
Short makes this claim for the first time in this appeal, we review it for plain 
error.5  The correction of the language in the indictment did not result in any 
                                          
 
4 The police were searching for Short in connection with charges of stalking his ex-
girlfriend.  Those charges were severed from the charges tried in this case. 
5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (Under the plain error standard 
of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.). 
 
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prejudice to Short.  As noted by the Superior Court judge during the prayer 
conference, Short was aware from the outset of the case that the only 
weapon at issue was a gun.  The correction to the indictment altered only the 
title of the charge, not its substance.  Short has failed to demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced in any way by the correction of the indictment,6 and has 
failed to demonstrate any error, plain or otherwise, on the part of the 
Superior Court with respect to his first claim. 
 
(8) 
Short’s second claim is that the State improperly failed to call 
Officer Calloway of the Laurel Police Department as a witness at trial.  
According to Short, Officer Calloway would have pointed out 
inconsistencies in the testimony of Trooper Glasco and Corporal Hargis.  
Because this claim was not presented to the Superior Court in the first 
instance, we review it, too, for plain error.7  Short has failed to demonstrate 
any factual basis for his claim.  Moreover, the State was not required to call 
Officer Calloway to testify.  It is reasonable to infer that, if Officer 
Calloway’s testimony would have been beneficial to Short, defense counsel 
would have called him to testify.  Short has, thus, failed to demonstrate any 
                                          
 
6 Robinson v. State, 600 A.2d 356, 359 (Del. 1991); Malloy v. State, 462 A.2d 1088, 1092 
(Del. 1983). 
7 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d at 1100.  
 
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error, plain or otherwise, on the part of the Superior Court with respect to his 
second claim.    
 
(9) 
 Short’s third claim is that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to support the conviction of resisting arrest.  In reviewing a claim 
of insufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.8  A defendant is guilty of resisting arrest when he “intentionally 
prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an arrest . . . 
.”9  The evidence at trial was that the police encountered Short on a staircase 
where he pointed a gun at a police officer and did not immediately comply 
with the order to drop the gun.  Trooper Glasco testified that, when Short 
finally complied, “all three of us grabbed Mr. Short and went down to the 
ground with him.”  The testimony presented at trial provided ample support 
for Short’s conviction of resisting arrest.  We, therefore, conclude that 
Short’s third claim is without merit. 
 
(10) Short’s fourth claim is that Corporal Hargis provided false 
information when he swore out the arrest warrant and that the information he 
provided was not consistent with the testimony of Trooper Glasco.  Short 
                                          
 
8 Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 990 (Del. 2004). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1257(b). 
 
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has provided no support for his claim that information in the arrest warrant 
was false.  Moreover, inconsistencies in testimony go to the weight of the 
testimony, not to its admissibility.10  The jury is the sole judge of the 
credibility of witnesses and is responsible for resolving any conflicts in the 
testimony.11  In fulfilling its duty, the jury must consider all of the evidence, 
but is free to accept part of a witness’ testimony while rejecting other parts.12  
We, thus, conclude that Short’s fourth claim also is without merit.       
 
(11) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Short’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Short’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Short could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                          
 
10 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Del. 1997). 
11 Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del. 1982). 
12 Id.