Title: State v. Fortenberry
Citation: 307 So. 2d 296
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 1975

307 So. 2d 296 (1975) STATE of Louisiana v. Major Lee FORTENBERRY. No. 55034. Supreme Court of Louisiana. January 20, 1975. Rehearing Denied February 21, 1975. *297 Leroy Smith, Jr., Mulhearn &amp; Smith, Tallulah, for defendant-appellant. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thompson L. Clarke, Dist. Atty., John T. Seale, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. DIXON, Justice. Defendant was tried under a bill of information and convicted of armed robbery by a twelve man jury. R.S. 14:64. A prior conviction for this crime had been reversed by this court. (Supreme Court Docket No. 54271, decided April 29, 1974). On retrial, defendant was again sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor. Five bills of exceptions were perfected. These bills were reserved when the trial court permitted the introduction of in-court identifications of the defendant by two eyewitnesses. Defendant contended that previous out-of-court identifications by these witnesses had been made under circumstances so suggestive as to taint any in-court identification and thus violate his right to due process. On August 4, 1972 about 5:00 p. m. two black men entered Goodrum's Grocery Store in Madison Parish. After asking that some meat be cut for them, one of the men, later identified as the defendant, pointed a .22 caliber pistol at James E. Goodrum, the owner of the store. The other man, later identified as Robinson, armed himself with a meat cleaver from the butcher's counter. The only other person in the store was Alonzo King, an employee of the store. The armed men then took a radio and money from the cash register and from Goodrum; after destroying the telephone, they left. Both eyewitnesses clearly saw the participants, who were not disguised and were within several feet of them. A few days after the robbery, the two witnesses were asked to come to the sheriff's office to identify two men who were suspected of the crime. Mr. Goodrum then viewed three or four men (the testimony is conflicting) through a one-way mirror; two of the men were suspects. The suspects were much taller than the others and were lighter skinned. The deputy testified that the suspects stood 6' 1" and weighed 165-170 pounds while the other men were about 5' 9" and weighed about 190 pounds. The deputy who conducted the lineup admitted there was no attempt to place the suspects with men of similar physical appearance. Assuming that the lineup was unduly suggestive, the question arises whether the in-court identification of the defendant was consistent with due process requirements. In State v. Newman, 283 So. 2d 756 (La.1973), this court stated the following factors to be considered in determining whether there was a sufficient independent basis for the in-court identification: This position was reaffirmed and applied subsequently in State v. Moseley, 284 So. 2d 749 (La.1973). Applying these factors we conclude that the in-court identification had a source independent of the questioned lineup. Goodrum, the victim, was able to observe the defendant in his store over a period of five to ten minutes while defendant held him at gun point and took money from him and the cash register. Goodrum was in a position to make an identification of the defendant which was not based upon the lineup. King, the other eyewitness, testified that he had known the defendant prior to the crime. As King knew the defendant and his confederate, his positive identification was not tainted by any improper procedure. These bills are without merit. This bill was reserved when the trial court refused defendant's motion for a new trial based upon the fact that the foreman had taken notes during the trial and had used them during the deliberations. The foreman testified that he had taken some notes on a scrap of paper about 1½ × 2" in size. During the deliberations he had referred to them; no one else saw the notes, but other jurors might have seen him refer to them. While C.Cr.P. 793 clearly prohibits the use of notes by any juror, the impeachment of a verdict by a juror is prohibited by R.S. 15:470, as follows: This precise question was before the court in State v. Ledet, 298 So. 2d 761 (La.1974). We refused to reverse, holding that the policy of R.S. 15:470 prevailed over that of C.Cr.P. 793 in this situation. Ledet is not distinguishable and we reaffirm our holding. This bill is without merit. This bill was based upon the alleged exclusion of women from the jury venire. This court has consistently upheld the exemption provided women by Article VII, § 41, La.Const.1921 and C.Cr.P. 402. State v. Stevenson, 292 So. 2d 488 (La. 1974). This bill is without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons. BARHAM, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I cannot join in the majority's disposition of Bill of Exceptions Number 4, which was reserved when the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial based on the allegation that the foreman of the petit jury had taken notes during the trial and had used them in the deliberations with the other jurors. In my opinion, the majority errs in its conclusion that State v. Ledet, 298 So. 2d 761 (La.1974) is not distinguishable from the case at bar. *299 In State v. Ledet the majority of this Court held, under the particular facts and circumstances of that case, that note-taking and reference to notes by a juror was not prejudicial error. The majority considered that juror note-taking and reference thereto was a matter which could be inquired into and that evidence taken from a juror could be used to determine whether or not there was prejudicial error. The facts in the present case and in Ledet differ. The juror in Ledet who had taken the notes and used them during deliberations was not foreman of the jury. It was not indicated in Ledet that the jury members knew that the juror with notes was looking at notes when he discussed the case with them. In Ledet there was testimony that the notes were not used to settle disputes and that the independent recollection of the juror was the only thing relied upon by him in his deliberation. In the case at hand during the hearing on the motion for new trial the foreman testified without any objection on the part of the State that he took notes during the trial which concerned points that had been made by the State's witnesses and the defense witnesses; that he took the notes into the jury room with him for deliberation; that he used the notes taken in the courtroom and that he referred back to the notes while he and the other jurors were discussing the case. He did not show his notes to the other jurors or allow them to read them, but he admitted that during the deliberation the other jurors could see that he was reading from the notes he had taken during trial. The greatest difference in this case is that the foreman of the jury stood before that body as they deliberated, and in his discussion of the case, in full view of the other jurors, referred to the notes he had taken during the trial. In my opinion, the taking of the notes and the reference to them by the juror during deliberations upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant is a substantial violation of a statutory right. La.Code of Criminal Procedure Article 793 prohibits the reference to notes by a juror. It provides: As the majority said in State v. Ledet, The majority in Ledet was influenced to some extent by the policy consideration of La.R.S. 15:470, which provides that no juror "* * * is competent to testify to his own or his fellows' misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach * * * any verdict, * * *" of the jury on which he serves. In Ledet, in a dissenting opinion, the rationale and the methods of impeachment of jury verdicts were discussed at length: "The common formula relative to impeachment of jury verdicts has been stated as `a juror's testimony or affidavit is not receivable to impeach his own verdict.' 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2345 (McNaughton Rev.1961). Wigmore criticizes this rule of thumb as `* * * neither strictly correct as a statement of the acknowledged law nor at all defensible upon any principle in this unqualified form. * * * ` The professor analyzes this general rule in terms of three independent principles dealing with petit jury verdicts. "The scope of the privileged communication principle is limited, mattering only where what was actually said during deliberations is in issue. Acts of misconduct would not be privileged under the principle. Wigmore, supra, § 2346 notes the differences in application of the three principles: "In applying the parol evidence rule to a jury's verdict, several situations are possible: (a) the jurors' deliberations preceding the verdict, (b) the issues submitted to a jury, (c) the jury's failure to obey formalities of conduct. It is with reference to (c), to which the parol evidence rule would not apply to exclude, that Lord Mansfield's rule has been applied. Wigmore says of this: "This doctrine that a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude was applied first to the situation of jury misconduct by Lord Mansfield in Vaise v. Delaval, 1 Term R.11 (K.B. 1785). Before this decision, the unquestioned practice had been to receive jurors' testimony on affidavits without scruple. Wigmore, supra, § 2352; Note, 53 Marquette L.Rev. 258 (1970) at 260-261. "The actual rule of Vaise distinguished between jurors whose testimony was excluded and third persons whose testimony was not: "Justification for the rule has been based largely on policy reasons. The U. S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S. Ct. 783, 59 L. Ed. 1300 (1915), stating that a policy choice must be made between the interest of the litigant in redressing injury and the double public interests of finality of verdicts and freedom and frankness in reaching them, chose the latter. "However, broad application of this rule has been soundly criticized, especially in the situation where it is misconduct or overt acts which is sought to be proved. See Note, 53 Marquette L.Rev. 263-268; Wigmore, supra § 2353. One of the leading cases distinguishing the application of the broad application of the rule is Wright v. Illinois &amp; Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866). The so-called `Iowa' rule was enunciated: "The basic distinction in Wright was between matters which `inhere in the verdict' and those that do not. Stated otherwise, the distinction might be between the motives, methods, or processes by which the verdict was reached and the existence of conditions or occurrences of events bearing on the verdict. State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955). See Note, 56 Col.L.Rev. 952 (1956). That the drawing of the distinction may be less than perfectly precise should not detract from the validity of this rule, which at least allows an examination of the particular situation to determine whether the testimony should be admitted, rather than blanket exclusion. "The approved draft of the ABA Standards relating to Trial by Jury (1968) states: "The state law on the subject is discussed by Wigmore, supra, § 2354. Those jurisdictions where the Iowa rule is accepted are: Federal, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin. See § 2354, n. 1. In the other jurisdictions Lord Mansfield's rule seems to be settled law. "The applicable Louisiana statute is R.S. 15:470, which states: `§ 470. Jurors incompetent to impeach finding; rebuttal of attacks "Despite the language, it is submitted that this is not a rule of absolute incompetency, but is rather a reflection of policy. State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937) supports this conclusion. In that case we stated: "Kifer recognizes the conflicting interests involved: That of the litigant seeking individual redress versus that of the public in finality of verdicts and verdicts reached through free and open deliberation. The interest of the individual on balance prevailed and the testimony of the jurors was allowed." The defendant has a constitutional right to be convicted upon the evidence presented in the jury room. Because the Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth such a strong policy consideration recognizing the adverse effect on the rights of an accused of a juror's reference to notes during deliberation, it appears to me that the action by the foreman of the jury in this case constitutes reversible error. La.R.S. 15:470 permits the drawing of a distinction between an inquiry into the motives, methods, or process upon which the verdict was reached, and an inquiry into the existence *304 of conditions or occurrences of events which affected the verdict. In this case, if the Court is trying to decide which policy consideration should prevail as the overriding expression of legislative will, in my opinion, the Court must conclude that the policy expressed in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 793 is controlling over that of La.R.S. 15:470. The prohibition in the Code against referring to notes can be effectively enforced only by the use of testimony of the jurors themselves. Only the jurors will know whether or not notes were referred to during the deliberations. It is my opinion that reference to notes is an act or occurrence which, in the case at hand, had a bearing upon external conditions of the jury deliberations and on the rendition of a verdict. There was no objection by the State to the taking of the testimony from the juror in this case. The note-taking juror was not simply one of a panel of twelvehe was the foreman of the jury and had great influence over the deliberations of the jury. There has been a substantial violation of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 793. The redactors of the article must have presumed that prejudice would flow from the act prohibited in the article. The foreman of the jury admitted that he used notes he had taken while in the courtroom during the trial to clear up points which were being discussed during the deliberations. As he referred to his notes, the other jurors could observe that he was reading from memoranda and were probably influenced to rely upon the recordation of what had been said in the courtroom rather than upon their independent memories. The very prejudice which the majority recognized in Ledet as being the object of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 793's prohibition was exhibited in the case at hand. In my opinion the conviction and sentence should be reversed. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.