Title: In re Green
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11999
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2016

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SJC-11999 
 
JAMES GREEN, petitioner. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 10, 2016. - October 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion.  
Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Superior Court Department on August 
11, 2011. 
 
 
The case was heard by Laurence D. Pierce, J., and a motion 
for a new trial was heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Mary P. Murray for the Commonwealth. 
 
Michael A. Nam-Krane for the petitioner. 
 
Joseph M. Kenneally, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  This is an appeal from the denial of the 
Commonwealth's motion for a new trial after a jury found the 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
petitioner, James Green, no longer sexually dangerous in a 
proceeding brought pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  In the 
motion for a new trial, the Commonwealth challenged as erroneous 
and prejudicial the judge's instruction that in order to find 
the petitioner sexually dangerous, the jury must credit the 
expert opinion testimony of the qualified examiner.  The 
Commonwealth claims that the judge's instruction was erroneous 
because it improperly commented on the weight a jury must give 
to a witness's testimony and prejudicial because it precluded 
the jury's full consideration of testimony by the community 
access board (CAB).2 
 
We granted direct appellate review to clarify the reach of 
Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544 (2009), where we 
interpreted G. L. c. 123A as creating a unique and central role 
for the qualified examiner3 in proceedings under the statute.  
                     
 
2 The community access board (CAB) reviews all records of a 
person adjudicated as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and 
confined at the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment 
center) and reports those findings to the chief administrative 
officer of the treatment center.  G. L. c. 123A, § 6A, second 
par.  The CAB also conducts annual reviews of the current sexual 
dangerousness of each person held at the treatment center.  Id.  
These reports are admissible in hearings involving persons 
adjudicated as sexually dangerous.  Id. 
 
 
3 A qualified examiner is either (1) a physician who is 
licensed by the Commonwealth and certified or eligible to be 
certified in psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and 
Neurology; or (2) a psychologist who is licensed by the 
Commonwealth.  In all cases, a qualified examiner is designated 
as such by the Department of Correction and has at least two 
3 
 
 
Our conclusion in Johnstone, that a petitioner is entitled to be 
discharged without trial if neither qualified examiner opines 
that the petitioner remains a sexually dangerous person (SDP) 
and that the Commonwealth may not rely on the CAB or other 
sources to obtain the necessary expert testimony, established a 
"gatekeeper" role for the qualified examiner.  While our holding 
in Johnstone makes clear that a trial is foreclosed unless at 
least one qualified examiner opines that the petitioner remains 
sexually dangerous, we did not explicitly address whether, after 
crossing that threshold, the Commonwealth may meet its burden to 
prove sexual dangerousness regardless of the probative value of 
the qualified examiner's testimony.  We conclude, based on the 
centrality of the qualified examiner's role in SDP proceedings, 
that a finding of sexual dangerousness must be based, at least 
in part, on credible qualified examiner opinion testimony and 
that a jury instruction to that effect is essential to the 
informed exercise of the jury's fact-finding function.4  
Therefore, we affirm the judge's denial of the Commonwealth's 
motion for a new trial. 
                                                                  
years of experience with diagnosis or treatment of sexually 
aggressive offenders.  Qualified examiners need not be employees 
of the Department of Correction (department) or of any facility 
or institution of the department.  G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
4 
 
 
 
Background.5  After being convicted of three separate sex 
offenses between 1991 and 2002, Green volunteered for treatment 
while incarcerated.  After being convicted of another sex 
offense in 2006, he was transferred to the Massachusetts 
Treatment Center in 2007.  Prior to his scheduled release, the 
Commonwealth filed a petition6 to commit Green as an SDP.7  In 
July, 2011, after a jury trial, Green was found sexually 
dangerous.  Two months later, in August, 2011, Green filed a 
petition for discharge pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9.8  As 
                     
 
5 Although both parties recite at great length the 
underlying facts of the defendant's convictions, we need not 
repeat that history, as it is relevant only to prejudice, an 
issue we do not reach given our conclusion that the challenged 
jury instruction was not erroneous. 
 
 
6 After a person has been convicted of a sex offense, 
adjudicated as a sexual offender, or charged with a sex offense 
but deemed incompetent to stand trial, the Commonwealth may file 
a petition alleging that the individual is an SDP who should be 
civilly committed when his or her criminal custody ends.  G. L. 
c. 123A, §§ 1, 12 (b).  See Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 
583, 585-587 (2006). 
 
 
7 In accordance with the statutory definition, an SDP either 
(1) "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder 
which makes the person likely to engage in sexual offenses if 
not confined to a secure facility;" or (2) has been previously 
adjudicated as an SDP and engages in misconduct that "indicates 
a general lack of power to control . . . sexual impulses," 
making the person "likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury 
on . . . victims because of uncontrolled or uncontrollable 
desires."  See G. L. c. 123A, § 1; Nieves, 446 Mass. at 586-587. 
 
8 A person committed to the treatment center is entitled to 
file a petition for examination and discharge once every twelve 
months.  G. L. c. 123A, § 9, first par.  A discharge petition 
can be filed by the committed person or that person's parents, 
spouse, issue, next of kin, or friend.  The Department of 
5 
 
 
permitted by the statute, the Commonwealth requested a jury 
trial to determine whether the petitioner remained an SDP. 
 
During pretrial hearings in March, 2015, the judge informed 
the parties of his intention to instruct the jury that they may 
not find the petitioner to be sexually dangerous unless they 
credited the testimony of a qualified examiner who so opines.  
See Johnstone, 453 Mass. at 553.  The judge provided a written 
copy of the instructions, and the Commonwealth renewed its 
objection. 
 
At trial, the qualified experts disagreed as to whether the 
defendant had a qualifying mental condition, whether his age 
reduced his likelihood of reoffending, and whether his treatment 
protocol during confinement was effective.  The Commonwealth 
presented two experts who opined that Green remained sexually 
dangerous.  The qualified expert called by the Commonwealth, Dr. 
Nancy Connolly, testified that the defendant had "personality 
disorder with antisocial features," and that if released, "he 
would not be able to control his sexual impulses."  Dr. Angela 
Johnson, representing a unanimous vote among CAB members,9 agreed 
with Dr. Connolly's diagnosis and testified that the CAB was 
                                                                  
Correction may file a petition if it concludes that a person is 
no longer an SDP.  Id.  In all cases, a fact finder must 
determine that the petitioner is no longer sexually dangerous in 
order for the petitioner to be released. 
 
9 The CAB determines a petitioner's sexual dangerousness by 
a majority vote. 
 
6 
 
 
concerned about the defendant's plan to return to the town where 
he perpetrated his second offense without the benefit of 
monitoring by the probation department.  Green presented three 
experts who opined that he was no longer sexually dangerous.  
Dr. Joseph Plaud and Dr. Leonard Bard testified that Green did 
not meet the criteria for either a personality disorder or 
mental abnormality.  The other qualified examiner, Dr. Margery 
Gans, joined Green's experts in opining that he was no longer 
sexually dangerous, given his advanced age, participation in 
treatment, improvements in impulse control, cooperation with 
authority, and identification of cognitive distortions that 
"drove" his behavior in the past. 
 
The judge instructed the jury as follows:10 
 
"In order to find that Mr. Green is a sexually 
dangerous person you must credit the opinion of Dr. Nancy 
Connolly, who testified in her capacity as a qualified 
examiner and opined that Mr. Green is a sexually dangerous 
person as defined in the law at the present time.  It is 
not required that you accept all of the reasons given by 
Dr. Connolly for her opinion.  You might find support for 
the opinion anywhere in the evidence, including the 
testimony of Dr. Angela Johnson, the CAB representative.  
However, you cannot find that Mr. Green is a sexually 
dangerous person today unless you give credit to the 
opinion of Dr. Connolly that Mr. Green suffers from a 
                     
 
10 See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury 
Instructions § 10.1.3 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2013), entitled 
"Opinion of CAB Representative Insufficient," proposing a model 
instruction for cases "[w]here the opinions of the Qualified 
Examiners are split and a Qualified Examiner and a member of the 
CAB testify that Petitioner is today a sexually dangerous 
person." 
7 
 
 
mental condition that causes him serious difficulty in 
controlling his sexual impulses at the present time." 
 
 
On the second day of the jury's deliberations in this case, 
the Appeals Court issued its decision in Souza, petitioner, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 162, 173 (2015), concluding in dicta that a 
nearly identical instruction was erroneous in "suggesting the 
relative weight the jury can or should assign to the various 
Commonwealth experts."11  The Appeals Court added that the 
judge's instruction was "not compelled by Johnstone" because 
"Johnstone held only that the Commonwealth cannot continue to 
pursue SDP confinement of someone unless at least one of the two 
assigned [qualified examiners] concludes that the person is an 
SDP."  Id.  In this case, relying on Souza, the Commonwealth 
moved to reinstruct the jury.  After a telephone hearing, the 
judge denied the motion, reasoning that the parties were 
informed before trial that the instruction would be given; seven 
hours of deliberation had already occurred; and reinstruction 
                     
 
11 The instruction deemed erroneous in Souza, petitioner, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 162, 172 (2015), stated: 
 
 
"You heard of testimony from Dr. Tomich, a 
representative of the community access board. The law 
permits a representative of the community access board to 
testify in all proceedings like this one, and you may 
certainly rely upon the testimony of Dr. Tomich.  However, 
you cannot find that the petitioner, Mr. Souza, is sexually 
dangerous based solely on the testimony of Dr. Tomich.  In 
order for you to find that Mr. Souza is today a sexually 
dangerous person, you must find support for that 
determination in the opinion that [sic] Dr. Kelso, who 
testified as a qualified examiner." 
8 
 
 
would lead to confusion and distract from the jury's fair 
consideration of the evidence.  That same day, the jury returned 
their verdict that Green was not an SDP. 
 
On the day of the defendant's anticipated discharge, the 
Commonwealth moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a 
stay of discharge pending appeal.  The judge denied the motion 
for a new trial but reserved decision on the motion for a stay 
in order to determine whether the probation department could 
supervise the defendant after release.12  After further hearings, 
the judge also denied the Commonwealth's motion to stay the 
petitioner's discharge pending appeal but stayed the effective 
date of discharge by five days to permit the Commonwealth to 
seek review by a single justice of the Appeals Court, which it 
then did. 
 
After a single justice of the Appeals Court granted the 
Commonwealth's motion for stay, Green appealed that decision to 
the full Appeals Court and filed an application for direct 
appellate review by this court.  The Commonwealth also filed a 
separate appeal from the jury's verdict and an application for 
direct appellate review.  Both applications for direct appellate 
                     
 
12 The judge determined that he lacked the authority to 
require the probation department to supervise Green where the 
probation department itself had determined that it lacked 
jurisdiction to monitor individuals released from civil 
confinement because such persons have not been "charged with 'an 
offense or crime'" or "adjudicated a delinquent," G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 87, 87A, and G. L. c. 119, § 58. 
9 
 
 
review were granted, and the appeals were consolidated for 
hearing by this court.  Thereafter, Green filed a motion to 
vacate the stay in the county court.  On April 28, 2016, this 
court ordered that Green be discharged effective May 2, 2016.  
Green's motion pending in the county court was thereafter 
dismissed as moot on May 18, 2016. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review jury 
instructions for legal error resulting in prejudice to the 
moving party.13  See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 687-
688 (2015);  Kelly v. Foxboro Realty Assocs., 454 Mass. 306, 310 
(2009).  A "charge is to be considered as a whole to determine 
whether it is legally correct, rather than tested by fragments 
which may be open to just criticism" (citation omitted).  
McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass. 143, 156 (2005), cert. denied, 547 
U.S. 1114 (2006).  Instructions that convey the proper legal 
standard, particularly when tracking model jury instructions, 
are deemed correct.  Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 210 
(2012).  Because the judge's instruction is derived from our 
ruling in Johnstone, we review it within that context to 
determine if it was error. 
                     
 
13 The issue was preserved by the Commonwealth's written 
motion in limine, its objection at the charge conference, and 
repeated acknowledgements by the trial judge.  See Commonwealth 
v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016) (motion in limine preserves 
appellate rights as to subject of motion in limine). 
10 
 
 
 
2.  The principle of Johnstone.  As noted, Johnstone, 453 
Mass. at 545, established a gatekeeper role for the qualified 
examiner in an SDP proceeding, mandating discharge of the 
petitioner before trial unless at least one qualified examiner 
opines that the petitioner remains sexually dangerous.  
Underlying the Commonwealth's challenge to the jury instruction 
is an interpretation of Johnstone that limits the qualified 
examiner's statutory role to that of gatekeeper.  We disagree 
that Johnstone should be interpreted so narrowly. 
 
The thrust of Johnstone is that because a person may be 
involuntarily and indefinitely committed as an SDP, due process 
and G. L. c. 123A require proof of sexual dangerousness beyond a 
reasonable doubt based on expert testimony from a designated 
qualified examiner.  Johnstone, 453 Mass. at 547, 549, citing 
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997), and Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9 (2002).  
Although both qualified examiner and CAB evidence are 
presumptively admissible to prove sexual dangerousness, "the 
statutory scheme . . . expressly sets the qualified examiners 
apart from the other sources of expert evidence."  Johnstone, 
supra at 552.  Qualified examiner opinion testimony, regardless 
of its probative value, merely opens the door to trial.  
However, to prevail at trial, the Commonwealth may not rely 
solely on the fact that the qualified examiner has satisfied his 
11 
 
 
or her gatekeeping responsibility.  At trial, the qualified 
examiner testimony serves a different and more important 
purpose; it is the essential basis for a finding of sexual 
dangerousness.  This is because qualified examiners are 
recognized in G. L. c. 123A as independent, skilled, and 
accountable experts who play a unique and central role in G. L. 
c. 123A proceedings.  "Allowing the Commonwealth to rely on 
other potential sources of expert testimony, such as the CAB, to 
prove the petitioner's current sexual dangerousness . . . would 
deny the examiners their place in a statutory scheme," 
Johnstone, supra, which is intended to strike an appropriate 
balance between fairness to an offender and the interest in 
public safety.  Johnstone, therefore, elevates the qualified 
examiner's role beyond mere gatekeeping. 
 
3.  The propriety of the qualified examiner instruction.  
The statutory imperative undergirding Johnstone would be 
nullified if the jury were permitted to find a person sexually 
dangerous by relying on evidence that we have concluded is 
insufficient to meet the Commonwealth's burden.  See Johnstone, 
453 Mass. at 545 (testimony of CAB member and accompanying CAB 
report insufficient to avoid directed verdict).  A jury verdict 
finding the petitioner sexually dangerous based on evidence 
other than the qualified examiner's opinion is a distinct 
possibility where qualified examiner and CAB testimony are both 
12 
 
 
presented but the jury are not informed of the qualified 
examiner's centrality to the proceeding.  To avoid this result, 
the jury must, in some fashion, be guided in distinguishing the 
role of the qualified examiner from that of the CAB members who 
testify at trial.  A jury instruction that the qualified 
examiner's opinion must be found credible to warrant a finding 
of sexual dangerousness satisfies this purpose.  Thus, there was 
no error in the judge's instruction that the jury must credit 
the qualified examiner's opinion to reach a finding of sexual 
dangerousness. 
 
We address briefly the Commonwealth's argument that any 
instruction directing jurors to credit a specific expert's 
opinion interferes with the jury's function.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cowen, 452 Mass. 757, 762 (2008) ("The matter of how much 
weight is to be given a witness, particularly an expert witness, 
is a matter for the trier of fact, not an appellate court").  
This argument is unavailing.  The instruction at issue does not 
usurp the jury's function because it does not dictate the weight 
to be given to the qualified examiner's opinion.  It merely 
instructs the jury that they must determine it to be credible in 
order to find a person sexually dangerous.  Our decision today 
does not remove a jury's ability to decide for themselves 
13 
 
 
whether a witness's opinion is credible.14  The jury remain free 
to credit or discredit an expert's opinion testimony.  See 
Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 267, 275 (2009) (Ireland, J., 
concurring) ("appropriate remedy for a fact finder who views an 
opinion as baseless is to disregard it").  To the contrary, we 
reinforce the jury's role by declining to sever the pivotal 
function of the qualified examiner from the Commonwealth's duty 
to present sufficient evidence of a petitioner's sexual 
dangerousness. 
 
Conclusion.  The judge's instruction appropriately 
preserved the centrality of qualified examiners in proceedings 
to determine sexual dangerousness.  Accordingly, there was no 
error in the judge's instructions to the jury, and we conclude 
that there is no basis on which to grant a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed. 
                     
 
14 Indeed, we can infer that the jury did not credit the 
opinion of the Commonwealth's qualified examiner, Dr. Connolly, 
because the jurors concluded that Green was no longer sexually 
dangerous.