Title: Commonwealth v. Adonsoto
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11978
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2016

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SJC-11978 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GLENIS A. ADONSOTO. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     February 11, 2016. - September 16, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Constitutional 
Law, Self-incrimination, Breathalyzer test, Confrontation 
of witnesses.  Evidence, Breathalyzer test, Hearsay. 
Interpreter.  Practice, Criminal, Interpreter, Hearsay, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Stoughton Division 
of the District Court Department on July 23, 2012.  
 
 
The case was tried before James H. McGuiness, Jr., J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. 
 
Varsha Kukafka, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Eric R. Atstupenas, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendant, Glenis A. AdonSoto, was convicted 
by a jury of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  The 
defendant, whose native language is Spanish, was stopped in the 
early morning hours of July 22, 2012, by a Stoughton police 
officer in response to a telephone call from a concerned driver.  
After the defendant was arrested and transported to the police 
station, the police secured the services of a telephonic 
language interpreter service to read the defendant her rights 
and instruct her on how to perform the breathalyzer test.  The 
defendant did not properly perform the test during three 
attempts, producing no usable result.  At the trial, the judge 
admitted in evidence the defendant's failure to perform the 
breathalyzer test. 
 
The defendant appealed, asserting as error (1) the 
admission of her failure to produce a usable breathalyzer 
result, claiming that it should have been excluded as "refusal" 
evidence under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e); (2) the admission of 
the interpreter's English language version of her statements as 
hearsay and a violation of her constitutional right of 
confrontation; (3) insufficiency of the evidence of impairment; 
and (4) prejudicial errors in the instructions to the jury.  We 
granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.  
3 
 
We affirm the conviction based on our conclusions that the 
failure to properly perform a breathalyzer test after giving 
consent is not inadmissible as refusal evidence; that the 
police-appointed interpreter acted as the defendant's agent in 
the circumstances of this case, and thus, the statements were 
not hearsay; that the defendant's unpreserved confrontation 
claim is unavailing, as there is no showing of a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice; that the evidence was 
sufficient to establish her impairment; and that the jury 
instructions did not create prejudicial error.2 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain details for our discussion of the specific 
issues raised.  At approximately 2:30 A.M. on July 22, 2012, a 
Stoughton resident who had just left his home to drive to work 
noticed the defendant driving down the middle of a two-lane 
road, straddling the solid double-yellow line.  A tractor-
trailer truck driving in the opposite direction blew his horn as 
a warning signal to the defendant.  The resident was driving in 
the same direction as the defendant, and he followed behind her 
for ten to twelve minutes.  There was "extremely light traffic" 
at the time.  The defendant swerved back and forth in her lane, 
and she crossed the fog line approximately twenty times. 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc. 
4 
 
While following the defendant, the resident called the 
Stoughton police.  In response, a Stoughton police officer 
stopped his police cruiser in the roadway along the route that 
the defendant's vehicle was traveling.  The officer observed the 
defendant drive through a four-way stop intersection without 
stopping.  He activated his lights and followed her, and she 
stopped. 
 
The defendant was alone in the vehicle.  The officer 
smelled the odor of alcohol through the vehicle's open window 
and noticed that the defendant's eyes were glassy.  The 
defendant responded to the officer's questions in Spanish and, 
although he knew only a "little" Spanish, he knew enough to 
notice that her speech was slurred.  He ordered the defendant 
out of the vehicle.  She was unsteady on her feet, but the 
officer could not perform a field sobriety test because he could 
not effectively communicate with her in a language that they 
both understood.  He arrested the defendant and took her to the 
police station. 
 
When they arrived, the officer telephoned a telephonic 
language interpreter service to speak to a "registered, 
certified interpreter."  The telephone was placed on 
speakerphone loud enough for the officer and defendant to hear 
the conversation.  The telephone call was not recorded.  The 
officer read the defendant the Miranda rights in English, and 
5 
 
the interpreter relayed them to the defendant in Spanish.  The 
defendant nodded her head up and down while the interpreter was 
speaking and when asked if she understood, she responded, "Yes," 
in Spanish.  The defendant explained to the interpreter that she 
had been at a friend's house and because the friend was 
intoxicated, she borrowed her friend's vehicle to drive herself 
home.  The officer, through the interpreter, asked if the 
defendant would take a breathalyzer test, and the defendant 
agreed.  The officer explained the instructions, and the 
interpreter relayed them in Spanish.  The interpreter asked the 
defendant in Spanish if she understood the instructions, and she 
verbally responded, "Yes." 
 
The officer explained that "[y]ou have to seal your lip[s] 
tightly around the . . . mouthpiece and blow until the machine 
tells you to stop" in order for the breathalyzer to read a 
result.  The defendant did not properly seal her lips during the 
first test, and the officer then physically demonstrated the 
instructions.3  After the demonstration, the officer asked 
through the interpreter if the defendant understood him, and 
"she nodded 'Yes' up and down."  The defendant did not seal her 
lips around the mouthpiece when the officer administered the 
                     
 
3 The police officer described the defendant's actions as 
having both sides of her mouth exposed from the mouthpiece that 
she was supposed to seal her lips around and blow into, so that 
"air was going all over the place." 
6 
 
test a second and third time.  After the second test, the 
officer explained the instructions again and stated that the 
breathalyzer machine allowed three attempts so there was only 
one more chance to perform the test correctly.  There were no 
results from any of the three attempts. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Evidence of failed breathalyzer test.  The 
defendant claims that the judge erroneously admitted evidence of 
her failure to properly complete the breathalyzer test, arguing 
that evidence of a defendant's "failure" or "refusal" to take a 
breathalyzer test is inadmissible in a civil or criminal 
proceeding as it is excluded under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).  
The defendant also argues that the evidence should have been 
excluded under Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016), because any 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.  The defendant's arguments are unavailing. 
 
Exclusion of refusal evidence is based on a defendant's 
privilege against self-incrimination under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Commonwealth v. Lopes, 459 
Mass. 165, 170 (2011), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 412 
Mass. 1201, 1211 (1992).  In Opinion of the Justices, supra, we 
stated that a person's refusal to take a breathalyzer test is 
testimonial in nature because it creates a "'Catch-22' 
situation," where a defendant would be forced to "take the test 
and perhaps produce potentially incriminating real evidence; 
7 
 
refuse and have adverse testimonial evidence used against him at 
trial."  We explained that a refusal is akin to a defendant 
stating, "I have had so much to drink that I know or at least 
suspect that I am unable to pass the test," and accordingly, may 
not be admitted at trial.  Id. at 1209.  That rationale for 
exclusion of refusal evidence does not apply where, as here, the 
defendant initially consented to the test.4 
 
The Appeals Court reached this conclusion in Commonwealth 
v. Curley, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 167-168 (2010), on which the 
                     
 
4 As additional support for her argument, the defendant 
cites 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.16 (2010), entitled, "Breath Test 
Refusal," which instructs officers to mark a failed performance 
as a "refusal," and provides: 
 
 
"If after being advised of his or her rights and the 
consequences of refusing to take a breath test, the 
arrestee refuses to submit to a breath test, none shall be 
given.  The Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) shall be 
notified of such refusal in a format approved by the 
Registrar.  If at any time following an arrestee's initial 
consent to the breath test and prior to the successful 
completion of the test, the arrestee refuses to participate 
or declines to cooperate, the test shall be terminated and 
it shall be noted as a refusal.  If the arrestee fails to 
supply the required breath samples upon request, the test 
shall be terminated and it shall be noted as a refusal"  
(emphasis added). 
 
When the emphasized language is read together with the remainder 
of the provision, however, it is clear that the regulation 
ensures that failure to properly perform a breathalyzer test 
does not allow a person to avoid the automatic 180-day 
suspension of his or her driver's license under the so-called 
implied consent statute, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (f) (1).  We do not 
consider a "refusal" under this regulation to be a "refusal" for 
constitutional purposes. 
8 
 
judge relied in allowing the Commonwealth's motion in limine to 
admit the disputed evidence.  The Appeals Court analyzed whether 
a defendant's failure to properly perform a breathalyzer test 
after giving consent was testimonial in nature and thus, 
required exclusion as "refusal" evidence.  Id.  The court 
concluded that the evidence was properly admitted because 
consent vitiated the defendant's self-incrimination claim, and 
the jury could have inferred that the defendant "was trying to 
avoid giving a sample while appearing to try to take the test."  
Id. at 168.  The defendant recognizes that the judge properly 
relied on Curley, but she distinguishes it, claiming that in her 
case there was a likelihood that she was "simply confused and 
flustered by the language barrier and the use of a remote 
translator" instead of deliberately trying to frustrate the 
breathalyzer machine.  The defendant's initial consent to the 
breathalyzer test, however, was all that was required for 
admissibility.  See id.  Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 
at 1211.  Any explanation for the failure to complete the test 
was properly left to the jury. 
 
Moreover, where the defendant and officer effectively 
communicated through physical actions, there was little danger 
of unfair prejudice from a potential misunderstanding during the 
translation.  The interpreter verbally advised the defendant of 
translated instructions, the defendant acknowledged her 
9 
 
understanding of the verbal instructions by stating "Yes," the 
police officer physically demonstrated the instructions, and the 
defendant acknowledged her understanding of the physical 
instructions by "nodd[ing] 'Yes' up and down." 
 
2.  Hearsay and confrontation claim.  The defendant next 
argues that admission of her statements violated the rule 
against hearsay and her right to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 12.  The 
defendant's challenge arises from the testimony of the police 
officer, who relayed the content of the defendant's statements 
at trial, even though the officer only heard and understood the 
interpreter's English language version of those statements.  A 
defendant's own statements are admissible as statements of a 
party opponent.  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2016).  The 
issue is whether the statements still may be considered those of 
the defendant where they are communicated through an interpreter 
to a third party and the third party testifies to the statements 
at trial. 
 
a.  Hearsay.  Generally, out-of-court statements offered to 
establish the truth of the matter asserted are inadmissible at 
trial as hearsay.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 802 (2016).  Statements 
"authorized" by the defendant or made by an "agent" of the 
defendant, however, are not hearsay and are admissible as those 
of the defendant.  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(C),(D).  We 
10 
 
previously have considered an interpreter to be a "joint agent" 
for persons choosing to speak through an interpreter, and 
therefore, admitted the translated statements as those of the 
speaker.  See Commonwealth v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 395 (1892) 
(where parties jointly agree to use interpreter, "words of the 
interpreter, which are [the] necessary medium of communication, 
are adopted by both, and made a part of their conversation as 
much as those which fall from their own lips").  See also 
O'Brien v. Bernoi, 297 Mass. 271, 273 (1937) (translated 
statements of defendant, made by defendant's son, properly 
admitted through plaintiff's testimony). 
 
The defendant argues that the interpreter may not be viewed 
as her agent because the interpreter was appointed by the 
police.  Although no appellate court in Massachusetts has 
analyzed this specific issue, other jurisdictions have rejected 
similar challenges.  See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 722 
F.3d 1319, 1321, 1326-1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (admission of 
government-appointed interpreter's out-of-court translated 
statements not hearsay violation because interpreter agent of, 
or authorized by, defendant); United States v. Da Silva, 725 
F.2d 828, 832 (2d Cir. 1983) (same).  See also United States v. 
Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (government-
contracted interpreter "language conduit" for speaker); United 
States v. Sanchez-Godinez, 444 F.3d 957, 960-961 (8th Cir. 2006) 
11 
 
(Federal agent was agent for defendant in "language conduit" 
capacity but was not as interrogating officer); United States v. 
Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1985) (State-appointed 
interpreter agent of, or authorized by, defendant). 
 
We agree with the defendant that a government-appointed 
interpreter should not always to be considered an agent for the 
speaker, but in the circumstances of this case, we conclude that 
the interpreter acted as an agent of the defendant.  To 
determine whether an interpreter acts as an agent or language 
conduit for the speaker, we rely on the factors outlined by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 775 (2012).  The relevant factors include 
"which party supplied the interpreter, whether the interpreter 
had any motive to mislead or distort, the interpreter’s 
qualifications and language skill, and whether actions taken 
subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the 
statements as translated."  Id., quoting United States v. 
Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 835 (1992). 
 
Although the police supplied the interpreter, and thus, the 
first factor weighs in favor of the defendant's claim, on the 
specific facts of this case, the remaining factors demonstrate 
that the interpreter was acting as an agent of the defendant.  
12 
 
First, the defendant's actions were consistent with the 
statements as translated.  The officer, through the interpreter, 
read the defendant her rights and, in response, the defendant 
nodded her head "up and down" and verbally stated, "Yes," in 
Spanish.  Moreover, after the officer's verbal instructions 
about how to perform the breathalyzer test, the defendant 
performed most of the actions as instructed -- bringing the 
mouthpiece to her lips and blowing into the hose.  The defendant 
failed to properly seal her lips around the mouthpiece, but her 
conduct indicated that the translator properly relayed at least 
part of the instructions.  Also, the interpreter's 
qualifications were not in dispute.  The officer testified that 
the interpreter was "registered" and "certified," and trial 
counsel did not challenge these descriptions.  Last, there is no 
indication that the interpreter, obtained through a third-party 
interpreter service, had any motive to distort the translation.  
In these circumstances, the interpreter may properly be 
considered an agent of the defendant for hearsay purposes, 
negating exclusion on hearsay grounds.5  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(2)(D). 
                     
 
5 Generally, a judge must make a preliminary finding of fact 
that the agent was authorized to act on the subject or within 
the scope of the relationship before statements are admitted 
under Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) (2016).  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 104(a) (2016).  See also Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 
 
13 
 
 
b.  Confrontation clause.  The defendant argues that even 
if the statements made through the interpreter are not hearsay, 
admission of the statements violated her confrontation rights 
under the Sixth Amendment and art. 12.  The confrontation clause 
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees a defendant the opportunity to confront the declarant 
of "testimonial" statements to be used against him or her at 
trial in the "crucible of cross-examination."  Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-52, 59, 61 (2004) (Crawford).  The 
right to confrontation embodied in art. 12 is "coextensive with 
the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment."  Commonwealth v. 
Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 785 n.15, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 462 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. De Oliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57n.1 
(2006).  The defendant did not object to the police officer's 
testimony on these grounds.  Therefore, we review the 
defendant's claim for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Traylor, 472 Mass. 260, 267 (2015), 
                                                                  
Mass. 600, 606 n.13, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 487 (2012).  The 
judge also must instruct the jury to consider the evidence only 
if they find the same.  Id.  The defendant did not claim any 
error in this regard, and we conclude that any error did not 
create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice for the 
reasons discussed in this decision.  Judges considering 
admissibility of translated statements through an alleged agent 
should analyze the factors discussed in United States v. Orm 
Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
775 (2012), as set forth above, in making such a determination. 
14 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015). 
 
As discussed above, the defendant's statements in this case 
are not hearsay because the interpreter was acting as an agent 
of the defendant.  Nonetheless, confrontation rights are not 
governed by common-law hearsay determinations.  See Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 61.  See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. 305, 317 (2009) (rejecting "invitation to return to [the 
rule] that evidence with 'particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness' was admissible notwithstanding the 
Confrontation Clause" [citation omitted]).  The Sixth Amendment 
precludes a mechanical application of the hearsay rule to permit 
the admission of the defendant's statements to the interpreter, 
particularly where the reliability and trustworthiness concerns 
implicit in Crawford are extant. 
 
Federal courts, in the absence of guidance from the United 
States Supreme Court post-Crawford, have grappled with the issue 
of a defendant's right to confrontation of an interpreter, 
reaching different outcomes.6  The defendant relies on United 
                     
 
6 Prior to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the 
prevailing view was of an interpreter as a "mere language 
conduit" for language and that the confrontation clause did not 
apply.  United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 835 (1992).  See United States v. 
Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Da 
Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 832 (2d Cir. 1983).  We question the 
 
15 
 
States v. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324-1325, in which the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 
the defendant has a right to cross-examine an interpreter where 
the interrogating officer testified to the English language 
version of the defendant's Creole language statements because 
the interpreter was the "declarant" of English language 
statements.7  In Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139-1141, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, expressly 
recognizing that Crawford may have changed the analysis for the 
right of confrontation, nonetheless declined to depart from its 
ruling in an earlier case that "a person may testify regarding 
statements made by the defendant through an interpreter without 
raising either hearsay or Confrontation Clause issues because 
the statements are properly viewed as the defendant's own, and 
the defendant cannot claim that he was denied the opportunity to 
confront himself."  Orm Hieng, supra at 1139, citing Nazemian, 
948 F.2d at 525-526.  The court held that there was no 
                                                                  
validity of these earlier decisions inasmuch as they predate 
Crawford and rely in large part on the reliability principles 
that Crawford and its progeny deemed insufficiently protective 
of a defendant's confrontation rights. 
 
 
7 The court concluded, however, that it was not "plain" 
error to admit the testimony without such cross-examination 
because, prior to that decision, there was no binding circuit 
precedent or "Supreme Court precedent clearly articulating that 
the declarant of the statements testified to by the [Customs and 
Border Protection] officer is the language interpreter."  United 
States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013). 
16 
 
confrontation clause issue because the analysis was the same for 
hearsay and confrontation clause purposes.  Orm Hieng, supra at 
1140-1141. 
 
We have not previously considered whether, for the purposes 
of the confrontation clause, an interpreter is the "declarant," 
in which case the defendant would be entitled to the right of 
confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable and the 
defendant has had an opportunity for cross-examination.  
Although the issue is significant for the development of our 
criminal and constitutional jurisprudence, we decline to wade 
into this thicket of unsettled constitutional principles where, 
at least as concerns the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
not yet provided guidance, and where, in any event, it is 
unnecessary to do so because we can decide the issue in this 
case on State constitutional grounds.  See Commonwealth v. 
Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 743 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Paasche, 391 Mass. 18, 21 (1984) ("We do not decide 
constitutional questions unless they must necessarily be 
reached"). 
 
We are content to bypass the issue in this case because, 
even if the defendant's confrontation rights attached to the 
statements of the interpreter offered at trial, she has not 
demonstrated a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Moreover, the procedure we announce infra, requiring, when 
17 
 
practicable, the recording of a defendant's statement for which 
an interpreter is employed, would satisfy future concerns about 
reliability, such as those asserted by the defendant in this 
appeal. 
 
Here, the defendant's statements to the police as reported 
by the interpreter were not inculpatory on the central issue at 
trial:  impairment.  The officer testified to the English-
language version of the following statements made by the 
defendant through the interpreter:  (1) her nodding or saying 
"Yes," in response to questions regarding whether the defendant 
understood her rights, consented to the breathalyzer test, and 
understood the instructions for taking the test; and (2) that 
the defendant "was at a friend's house, her friend was 
intoxicated so she decided to take the friend's car and drive 
herself home.  She felt it was the right thing to do."8  The 
defendant's explanation about why she was driving is not 
relevant to the issue of impairment, nor is the verbal 
acknowledgement that she understood her rights or consented to 
take the breathalyzer test.  The defendant's affirmative 
response to whether she understood the instructions regarding 
                     
 
8 When reviewing a challenge based on the confrontation 
clause, we look to the statements made by, not the questions 
posed to, the declarant.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 
n.1 (2006) ("it is in the final analysis the declarant's 
statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the 
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate"). 
18 
 
the breathalyzer test is potentially relevant to the impairment 
issue in that, if the jury believed that the defendant 
understood the instructions, they could interpret the 
defendant's failure to perform the test correctly either to mean 
that the defendant was too impaired to properly follow the 
directions or to suggest a consciousness of guilt.  In either 
event, we conclude that this statement was not likely to affect 
the result at trial because it was merely cumulative of properly 
admitted evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Salcedo, 405 Mass. 346, 
350 (1989).  The officer testified that the defendant 
acknowledged her understanding by nodding her head up and down 
after the interpreter verbally instructed her on how to perform 
the test and he physically demonstrated the required actions. 
 
3.  Electronic recording of language interpreter services.  
Although we reject the claim concerning the admission of the 
interpreter's statements through testimony of the police 
officer, it is appropriate to address the defendant's complaint 
that our current procedure lacks a method for assessing the 
reliability of an interpreter's translation of a defendant's 
statements.  We now announce a new protocol to mitigate such 
concerns.  Going forward, and where practicable, we expect that 
all interviews and interrogations using interpreter services 
19 
 
will be recorded.9  We have long recognized that recording 
interviews and interrogations enhance reliability by providing a 
complete version of a defendant's statements.  See Commonwealth 
v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 441-442 (2004).  This new 
protocol fits squarely in the line of cases recognizing the 
value of recordings to the fairness of criminal proceedings, but 
stopping short of requiring recordings for admissibility.  See 
id. at 449. 
 
This protocol should not impose undue burden on police 
departments.  We are advised by amicus, the Massachusetts Chief 
of Police Association, Inc., that the use of telephonic language 
interpreter services is a regular practice in several State 
agencies.  Telephonic language services rely on interpreters 
located in different States and different countries, and these 
interpreters may not be always be available to testify at 
trial.10  These services provide police officers the ability to 
                     
 
9 The defendant must be advised that the conversation is 
being recorded.  See Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 
705 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 507 
(1976) ("A recording that is made with the actual knowledge of 
all parties is not an interception, even if they have not 
affirmatively authorized or consented to it).  Cf. G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99 (B) (4), (C) (1) (prohibiting secret recordings).  Any 
statements made by a defendant after being advised of the 
recording are deemed to be made with consent to the recording. 
 
 
10 Several police departments, including the Stoughton 
police department use LanguageLine Solutions.  LanguageLine 
Solutions advertises available positions for interpreters in ten 
 
20 
 
communicate with speakers of many different foreign languages in 
a prompt and efficient manner.11  Police departments record 
interviews regularly at station houses and, as here, the use of 
these services often takes place at the station.  In those 
circumstances, all that would be required is for police to 
conduct the speakerphone translation in a room equipped for 
recording and to engage the recording equipment.  Thus, it will 
be the rare case where the police will be unable to record the 
interview. 
 
The implementation of this protocol will provide 
significantly enhanced protections and assurances of reliability 
for defendants who speak through an interpreter.  Reliability is 
an essential factor of due process to the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Camblin, 471 Mass. 639, 648-649 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Given, 441 Mass. 741, 747 n.9, cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 948 (2004) ("due process demands that evidence be reliable 
in substance").  A recording allows defendants and judges to 
independently evaluate accuracy, and thus, the reliability of 
                                                                  
countries.  See LanguageLine Solutions, Interpreter Careers, 
https://www.languageline.com/careers/interpreters-overview 
[https://perma.cc/G8G4-QUUJ]. 
 
 
11 LanguageLine advertises that it employs "professional 
interpreters fluent in 240+ languages" and can connect a 
telephone caller "within seconds," any time of any day, to an 
interpreter.  See LanguageLine Solutions, Phone Interpreting, 
https://www.languageline.com/interpreting/phone 
[https://perma.cc/R73E-QYLK]. 
21 
 
interpreter services.  See Commonwealth v. Portillo, 462 Mass. 
324, 332 (2012).  That reliability is further enhanced by 
application of the rule in Portillo, supra, requiring the 
Commonwealth to provide the defendant with a translated 
transcript of a recording containing foreign-language statements 
that it intends to use as evidence. 
 
Additionally, this protocol will provide a method to 
determine whether the confrontation clause applies at all.  
"Crawford 'does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted.'"  Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 590, 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013), quoting Williams v. 
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235 (2012).  If we had not concluded 
that the interpreter was acting as the defendant's agent for 
hearsay analysis, we would have reviewed the purpose for which 
the statements were offered as part of our determination as to 
whether the testimony violated the hearsay rules or 
confrontation clause.  See Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 
Mass. 827, 854 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 
53, 65 n.12, (2009) (confrontation clause and hearsay analysis 
depends on whether statement is "offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted").  Here, the Commonwealth introduced the 
officer's testimony of those statements, as translated by the 
interpreter, for their truth.  Indeed, the relevancy of the 
22 
 
officer's testimony in this regard was dependent upon the jury 
accepting the accuracy of the translation.  See generally 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 472 Mass. 707, 714 (2015) (reviewing 
relevancy of out-of-court statements).  If, however, the 
translation was not accurate, the statements would not be 
introduced for their truth.  Along with providing a method to 
gauge reliability, a recording of the translation provides an 
independent basis to evaluate the truth of the testimony for 
purposes of determining the applicability of the confrontation 
clause. 
 
In this appeal, the defendant does not quarrel with the 
actual translation provided by the interpreter.  Rather, she 
claims only that the translation may not be reliable or accurate 
because of her asymmetric relationship with the police and the 
prosecutor.  Although the availability of a recording and a 
transcript of the interview in this case would have allowed 
defense counsel to address any issues with the accuracy of the 
translation in advance of trial, see Portillo, supra, we discern 
no basis on this record to conclude that the translation was not 
reliable or accurate. 
 
4.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
the judge erred in denying her motion for a required finding of 
not guilty.  We review a claim of sufficiency of the evidence 
under the oft-repeated Latimore standard, viewing the evidence 
23 
 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth 
v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  "[T]he evidence and 
the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be 'of 
sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and 
sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a reasonable 
doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 8 (2010), quoting 
Latimore, supra at 677.  It is for the jury to assess the weight 
and credibility of the evidence.  Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 
Mass. 469, 481 (2014).  There was no error. 
 
To obtain a conviction of operating a vehicle while 
intoxicated, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) 
physically operated a vehicle; (2) "on a public way or place to 
which the public has a right of access; and (3) had a blood 
alcohol content percentage of .08 or greater or was impaired by 
the influence of intoxicating liquor."  Zeininger, 459 Mass. at 
778, citing G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  Only the third 
element is in dispute here.  To establish that the defendant was 
under the influence, the Commonwealth must prove a diminished 
capacity to operate safely.  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 
624, 635-636 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 
169, 173 (1985). 
 
The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of 
diminished capacity.  Specifically, a driver who followed the 
defendant for ten to twelve minutes testified to her erratic 
24 
 
driving:  swerving, straddling the solid-double center line, and 
crossing the fog lines approximately twenty times.  The police 
officer testified to the odor of alcohol coming from the 
defendant, slurred speech, unsteadiness when standing, and 
glassy eyes.  These characteristics are evidence supporting a 
finding of impaired driving.  See Jewett, 471 Mass. at 636.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Lavendier, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 506-507 
(2011) (describing "obvious signs of . . . intoxication [slurred 
speech, belligerent demeanor, strong odor of alcohol, poor 
balance, and glassy, bloodshot eyes]"); Commonwealth v. 
Reynolds, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 218-219 (2006) (swerving in 
good road conditions supports finding of diminished capacity).  
Although the defendant minimizes the effect of this evidence -- 
asserting that she was an "inexperienced" driver, but not 
impaired -- the assessment of the weight and credibility of the 
evidence was properly left to the jury.  Forte, 469 Mass. at 
481. 
 
5.  Jury instructions.  Last, the defendant challenges the 
omission of certain words during three portions of the jury 
instructions.  Because the defendant did not object, we review 
this claim to determine if it created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 15 
(1999).  "Jury instructions must be construed as a whole to 
prevent isolated misstatements or omissions from constituting 
25 
 
reversible error where there is little chance that the jury 
would have misunderstood the correct import of the charge."  
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 844 (2006), citing 
Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 607 (1993). 
 
The record reflects that the judge omitted words from the 
model jury instructions in three instances.  First, when 
instructing on the presumption of innocence, the judge should 
have said, "It requires you to find the defendant not guilty 
unless," but he omitted "not guilty."  See Instruction 2.160 of 
the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court (2009).  Second, when instructing on credibility of 
witnesses, the judge said, "You should give the testimony of 
each witness whatever degree you believe and what you judge it 
is fairly entitled to receive," where the model instruction 
reads, "You should give the testimony of each witness whatever 
degree of belief and importance that you judge it is fairly 
entitled to receive."  See Instruction 2.260 of the Criminal 
Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court.  Last, 
the judge omitted the words "a reasonable" from the following 
sentence in the reasonable doubt instruction:  "That is what we 
mean by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  See Instruction 2.180 
of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court. 
26 
 
 
Each of these omissions is properly characterized as a 
"slip of the tongue" and was not likely to mislead the jury 
where the charge as a whole properly conveyed the instructions.  
See Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 84 (1994).  
Accordingly, the jury instructions did not create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.