Title: Waste Mangement, Inc. v. Rolando Mora, Et Al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-2024
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC05-2024 
_____________ 
 
 
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ROLANDO MORA, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[October 12, 2006] 
 
WELLS, J. 
 
We have for review the decision in Mora v. Waste Management, Inc., 911 
So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), which certified conflict with the decision in 
Beyer v. Leonard, 711 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
 
Rolando and Maura Mora (Moras) obtained a jury verdict against Waste 
Management, Inc. (Waste Management) in the amount of $42,000.  This verdict 
was intended to compensate the Moras for past and future medical expenses and 
lost earnings.  The verdict awarded nothing for past or future pain and suffering.  
The Moras filed a motion for new trial.  The Moras did not seek an additur. 
 
Over the Moras’ objection, the trial court denied the motion and instead 
imposed a $10,000 additur, $5000 of which was for past pain and suffering and 
$5000 for future pain and suffering.  The trial court based the additur on section 
768.043(1), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides: 
 
In any action for the recovery of damages based on personal 
injury or wrongful death arising out of the operation of a motor 
vehicle . . . wherein the trier of fact determines that liability exists on 
the part of the defendant and a verdict is rendered which awards 
money damages to the plaintiff, it shall be the responsibility of the 
court, upon proper motion, to review the amount of such award to 
determine if such amount is clearly excessive or inadequate in light of 
the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.  
If the court finds that the amount awarded is clearly excessive or 
inadequate, it shall order a remittitur or additur, as the case may be.  If 
the party adversely affected by such remittitur or additur does not 
agree, the court shall order a new trial in the cause on the issue of 
damages only. 
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, defendant Waste Management 
argued that in the case of additur, it was the defendant alone who had the choice of 
either accepting the additur or insisting on a new trial for damages.  Waste 
Management maintained that the “party adversely affected,” as referred to in the 
statute, had to be the party required to pay the damages that would be in excess of 
the jury’s verdict when there was an additur.  In response, plaintiffs, the Moras, 
contended that the “party adversely affected,” as referred to in the statute in the 
 
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case of an additur, was the party who had received a legally inadequate jury award 
of damages. 
The Moras appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal the order 
imposing additur and denying their motion for a new trial.  The Fourth District 
reversed, relying on that Court’s earlier holding in Brant v. Dollar Rent A Car 
Systems, Inc., 869 So. 2d 767, 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).  In Brant, the Fourth 
District had held that it would be “constitutionally dubious” for the Legislature to 
grant trial judges the authority to impose additur without the plaintiff’s consent and 
that section 768.043(1) is most reasonably read to allow a plaintiff to refuse an 
unacceptable additur and insist on a new trial. 
The Fourth District acknowledged that the Second District had upheld an 
additur in Beyer after reasoning that a plaintiff could not be the “party adversely 
affected” by additur.  Mora, 911 So. 2d at 1251.  The Fourth District then certified 
conflict with Beyer.  The First District Court of Appeal in Bamford v. Williams, 
896 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), agreed with the Fourth District. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The resolution of the conflict between the decisions of the First and Fourth 
Districts and the decision of the Second District is an issue of statutory 
construction.  Our standard of review is de novo.  Consistent with our precedent in 
Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1981), and ITT Hartford Insurance Co. of 
 
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the Southeast v. Owens, 816 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2002), we approve the decisions of 
the First and Fourth Districts and disapprove the decision of the Second District. 
 
Prior to the Legislature’s adoption of sections 768.043 and 768.74, we had 
not recognized a trial court’s power to grant an additur.  In Bennett v. Jacksonville 
Expressway Authority, 131 So. 2d 740, 744 (Fla. 1961), we held: 
 
Although we have referred to the additur ordered by the trial 
judge as indicating the extent to which he considered the verdict 
unjust, we do not recognize his authority to effectuate an increase in 
the verdict of the jury.  See Sarvis v. Folsom, Fla. App., 114 So. 2d 
490; State Road Department of Florida v. Cox, Fla. App., 118 So. 2d 
668; Wohfiel v. Morris, Fla. App., 122 So. 2d 235. 
In Sarvis v. Folsom, 114 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), to which we referred, the 
First District stated: 
We hold, in line with what we consider to be the better rule and the 
weight of authority, that in actions at law involving controverted and 
unliquidated damages courts are without power to require a party to 
consent to an additur as a condition to refusal to grant a new trial. 
Id. at 492. 
 
Shortly after the adoption of section 768.043, we decided Adams v. Wright, 
403 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1981), which was a constitutional challenge of the statute.  
The case involved a challenge by defendants to the trial court granting an additur 
or a new trial.  In our decision, we first held that section 768.043 was remedial in 
nature, granting authority to the trial judge to modify a clearly excessive or 
 
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inadequate verdict in a motor vehicle liability suit, and was designed to protect the 
substantive rights of litigants in those lawsuits.  Id. at 394.  We then stated: 
 
Defendants next contend that the statute substantially abridges 
the right to a jury trial.  We disagree.  The statute clearly provides for 
a new trial in the event the party adversely affected by the remittitur 
or additur does not agree with the remittitur or additur.  In other 
words, the complaining party need not accept the decision of the judge 
with respect to remittitur or additur.  The party may have the matter of 
damages submitted to another jury.  Defendants’ attack on the 
constitutionality of the statute is without merit. 
Id. at 395.  Thus, we equated the statute’s “party adversely affected” to the party 
complaining about the remittitur or additur and held that if that party chooses that 
party may decline the remittitur or additur and have the damage issue submitted to 
another jury. 
 
By giving the “party adversely affected” the “complaining party” 
construction, we found the statute to be constitutional.  When reasonably possible, 
a statute should be construed to avoid conflict with the constitution.  Schultz v. 
State, 361 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1978). 
 
In ITT Hartford, 816 So. 2d at 576, we specifically quoted the “complaining 
party” passage from our earlier decision in Adams in holding that a defendant had 
a right to a new trial on the issue of damages as an alternative to accepting additur.  
The Fourth District correctly followed our decision in Brant, which was the case 
which controlled the Fourth District’s decision in this case. 
 
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We reject the reasoning of the Second District in Beyer.  The Second 
District decided that a plaintiff in whose favor an additur is granted by the trial 
court had to accept the additur and was not entitled to choose a new trial rather 
than additur.  The Second District overlooked our decision in Adams and held: 
We find instead that the clear meaning of a “party adversely affected 
by such remittitur or additur” to be the party who suffers the remittitur 
or additur. 
 
In the case of remittitur, where damages previously awarded to 
the wronged party are reduced, the “party adversely affected” by the 
remittitur would be the party who receives less in damages than 
previously awarded.  Where there has been an additur, however, and 
the liable party is required to pay additional damages, it is that liable 
party who would be “adversely affected.”  The legislature, in its 
wisdom, did not provide, “If either party affected by such remittitur or 
additur does not agree, the court shall order a new trial on the issue of 
damages only.” 
Beyer, 711 So. 2d at 570.  This view conflicts with our decisions in Adams and 
ITT Hartford that “persons adversely affected” means “the complaining party.” 
 
Nor do we agree that only a party who receives “less in damages” can be 
affected by a remittitur, or only the party who has to pay more in damages can be 
affected by an additur.  To the contrary, a defendant who has a jury award in an 
excessive amount of damages against the defendant can be a party adversely 
affected by a trial judge’s remittitur that is too little to cure the excessiveness.  
Similarly, a plaintiff who has a jury award for inadequate damages on the 
plaintiff’s behalf is a party adversely affected by a trial judge’s additur that is too 
little to cure the inadequacy.  In each case, a defendant or plaintiff objecting to the 
 
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amount of the remittitur or additur would be the party complaining about a 
continued excessiveness or inadequacy and has the right to choose a new trial 
rather than the remittitur or additur.  Similarly, a plaintiff can be the party 
adversely affected by a trial judge determining a remittitur which is more than an 
amount reasonably necessary to cure an excessive verdict, or a defendant can be 
the party adversely affected by a trial judge determining an additur in an amount 
that is more than reasonably necessary to cure an inadequate verdict.  In each case, 
the party that is adversely affected by the amount has a right to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we conclude that a “party adversely affected” under section 768.043 
is the party complaining about the amount of the trial judge’s additur or remittitur 
which is ordered in lieu of a new trial because of the jury verdict’s excessiveness 
or inadequacy.  We recognize that our decision means that only when the parties 
agree with the trial court’s amount of remittitur or additur will the remittitur or 
additur be enforced in lieu of a new trial.  This construction also recognizes that 
the statute is authorization for a trial judge to decide the amount of a remittitur or 
additur which, if accepted by the parties, will avoid the time and expense of a new 
trial. 
 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we approve the Fourth District’s 
decision in Mora with directions that the case be remanded for a new trial.  We 
 
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disapprove the decision of the Second District in Beyer to the extent that it is 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concurring. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D04-2414 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Kevin T. Smith of Law Office of Bohdan Neswiacheny, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Michael P. Weisberg and Arthur J. Morburger of Miami, Florida 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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