Title: In Re Johnson
Citation: 210 Kan. 828, 504 P.2d 217
Docket Number: 46,850
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1972

210 Kan. 828 (1972)
504 P.2d 217
In the Interest of NICHOLS JOHNSON, ROBERT JOHNSON, JR., and RHONDA JOHNSON, Minor Children.
(LOUISE SCHAFER, Appellant,
v.
CAROL MESIGH, Probation Counselor, and TOM VALENTINE, Guardian ad litem, Appellees.)
No. 46,850

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 9, 1972.
Roger L. McCollister, of the Legal Aid Society of Topeka, Inc., argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Tom Valentine, guardian ad litem, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Carl R. Pearson, Assistant County Attorney, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
This case originated in the juvenile court of Shawnee County in proceedings in which (three children) Nicholas Johnson, Robert Johnson, Jr., and Rhonda Johnson were found to be dependent and neglected children. The mother of the three children, Joann Schafer Johnson, was killed in an automobile-train accident on September 22, 1971. Their father, Robert Johnson, Sr., who had previously been divorced by Joann and subsequently abandoned the children, had his parental rights severed in the juvenile court proceedings. When the proceedings were initiated the approximate ages of the three children were Nicholas five; Robert, Jr., three and one-half, and Rhonda two.
The orders of the juvenile court decreeing the children to be dependent and neglected were entered on October 29, 1971. On December 8, 1971, Nicholas and Robert were committed to the care of Carol Mesigh, Probation Counselor for the juvenile court for adoption. Rhonda was committed to the care of the Kansas State Department of Social Welfare. Louise Schafer, the natural grandmother of the three children appealed to the district court which affirmed the orders of disposition of the juvenile court. Mrs. Schafer then perfected this appeal.
The appellant's arguments on appeal center around her claim that the decision on disposition of the district court was against the best interests of the children in the light of the existing bond of love and affection between the children and herself as their grandmother.
When an appeal such as that in this case has been perfected to the district court the pertinent statute K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 38-834 (c) governs the proceedings. It provides:
In other words, the district court has the same jurisdiction as the juvenile court and must treat the case de novo subject to all the *830 limitations as to jurisdiction and issues which apply to a juvenile court. (In re Templeton, 202 Kan. 89, 447 P.2d 158.)
In order to acquire the jurisdiction over the custody of a child the juvenile court must first decide that the child is dependent and neglected. (Murrow v. Powell, 167 Kan. 283, 205 P.2d 1193.) In this case the juvenile court did find the three children to be dependent and neglected and this finding is undisputed. The only matter appealed from to the district court and then to this court is the question of disposition of the children.
When a juvenile court makes an order severing the parental rights of the only surviving parent, as was done in this case, the court may, pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 38-824 (c), commit the child to one of the following:
"(4) to the state department of social welfare."
The commitment orders of the juvenile court, which we have recited, were in compliance with the provisions of the statute.
When this appeal was perfected to the district court Thomas A. Valentine was appointed guardian ad litem for the three minor children and has appeared in that capacity in all subsequent proceedings in the district court and in the appeal to this court. The guardian ad litem takes the position that the appellant's appeal should be overruled on all points raised and that the disposition be sustained in its present form. The state joins with the guardian ad litem in the position taken by him.
The appellant first argues that a grandparent, when next of kin, is a natural guardian under common law and thus entitled to a preference. The common law rule to the effect that guardianship vested in father, mother, and next of kin in that order was first modified by Article 15, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Kansas, wherein women were given equal rights with respect to the possession of children. The common law rule was further modified by K.S.A. 59-3014 and its successor K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 59-3014 which provides with respect to priority of a guardian that priority shall be given in the following order:
"(2) To the nominee of a natural guardian...."
Neither condition prevails in this case. The term "natural guardian" is defined in K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 59-3002 (3) as follows:
Even though grandparents do not fall within the statutory definition of natural guardian, appellant claims that as next of kin she is entitled to preference under the common law rule which should be applied in the instant case. Appellant cites K.S.A. 77-109 and the case of Paronto v. Armstrong, 161 Kan. 720, 171 P.2d 299, in support of her position. While 77-109 provides that common law, as modified, "shall remain in force in aid of the General Statutes of this state;" it further provides:
The purpose which underlies our Juvenile Code and the beneficent objectives which it seeks to attain are expressed in K.S.A. 38-801 which reads:
The mandate of 38-801 directing liberal construction of the code so as to "best serve the child's welfare and the best interests of the state," has received consistent adherence in the decisions of this court. (Lennon v. State, 193 Kan. 685, 396 P.2d 290; and In re Armentrout, 207 Kan. 366, 485 P.2d 183, and cases cited therein.)
The point raised by appellant was settled many years ago in the *832 case of In re Bullen, 28 Kan. (2nd Ed.) * 781, wherein Mr. Justice Brewer speaking for the court said:
The Paronto case, cited by appellant, was an original proceeding in habeas corpus wherein grandparents were awarded custody of a three-year-old child whose parents were deceased. The decision does not rest on any legal right of the grandparents to custody, but was decided on the issue of what was the best interests of the child. The holding in Paronto is set out as follows:
In the Paronto case it was pointed out that the maternal grandmother  as next of kin  had the right to maintain the action. The love of the grandmother, as a factor to be recognized in determining the best welfare of the child, was acknowledged by the court in the opinion wherein it was said of the grandmother 
In the instant case the trial court's memorandum decision reveals that compassionate consideration was given to the bond of affection that exists between appellant and the three children involved. The court's memorandum reads:
The trial court reviewed the evidence and made extensive findings of fact which support its conclusions. It is apparent from the record that the trial court carefully weighed the facts and circumstances surrounding the placement of the children. Pertinent facts concerning Mrs. Schafer's situation were recited by the trial court as follows:
Appellant admits that it is the long established law in this state that the paramount consideration of the court is the welfare and best interests of the child. Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705, and cases cited therein.)
This court has repeatedly taken the position that the trial court is the best judge of the best interests of the child and, therefore, *834 in the absence of abuse of judicial discretion its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. (Jackson v. Jackson, supra; Goetz v. Goetz, 180 Kan. 569, 306 P.2d 167; and Travis v. Travis, 163 Kan. 54, 180 P.2d 310.)
Appellant has a right to have considered her bond of love with her grandchildren; this, however, is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the disposition of the children in their best interests. The trial court considered this bond together with the other evidence of appellant's health, the responsibility of her own children, and other circumstances surrounding her welfare and home conditions. We find no abuse of discretion in the orders of disposition.
Appellant makes a further point on appeal that as a natural guardian she has an interest in continuing contact, i.e., visitation rights with her grandchildren. In this regard the instant case presents a situation quite different from a simple custody suit. The disposition of the children here is for adoption purposes and has the effect of prohibiting appellant from exercising visitation rights as the children, when adopted, will have new parents and new grandparents. The effect of adoption is set forth in K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 59-2103 in pertinent part as follows:
Under the statute the adoptive parents are entitled to exercise all of the rights of a natural parent, thus whether a natural grandparent can continue contact with an adopted child is a matter within the discretion of the adoptive parents. This principle may seem harsh in view of the existing love of a grandparent, but the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration.
Finally, appellant complains because an attorney for prospective adoptive parents was permitted to remain as an observer in the courtroom during the proceedings. The record fails to reveal an objection was lodged on this point. Thus, the question is not before us under the familiar rule that it must be shown that a question raised on appeal was presented to and determined by the trial court in order that it receive consideration on appellate review. *835 (Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Berge, 205 Kan. 755, 473 P.2d 48; and Schneider v. Washington National Ins. Co., 200 Kan. 380, 437 P.2d 798.)
K.S.A. 38-822 provides that the juvenile court may exclude all noninterested parties from the courtroom. We have held the authority to exclude under the statute is discretionary. (Lennon v. State, supra.) In any event, as we have noted, no motion to exclude was made nor was any objection lodged to the presence of the attorney referred to.
The instant case was carefully and thoroughly tried below. It is apparent that all available evidence which might bear upon the issue was presented by industrious counsel. We join the trial court in expressing compassion for this unfortunate grandmother, but sympathy cannot be allowed to overshadow the best interests of the three children which is the paramount issue to be determined. There is substantial competent evidence to support the findings and judgment of the trial court and the judgment must be affirmed.