Title: MCGEE v BURLINGTON NORTHERN INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14233
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 1978

No. 14233 IN THE SUPRFME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 DONALD R. MCSEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- BURLETCN NOIITHERN, INC., a corporation, Defendant and Respondent , . Appeal fm: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable N a t Allen, District Judge presiding. Counsel of &cord: For Appellant: John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Wntana For Respondent: Gough, Snanahan, Johnson and Watennan, Helena, Montana Cordell Johnson argued, Helena, Montana Suhitted: October 12, 1978 Decided: - 3C' 2 - '978 Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. plaintiff appeals from an order of the District Court, Cascade County, setting aside a satisfaction of judgment. On November 15, 1977, this Court affirmed a jury verdict of $618,000 in favor of plaintiff in his personal injury ac- tion against defendant. McGee v. Burlington Northern (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 784, 34 St.Rep. 1304. On or about December 7, 1977, negotiations began between counsel for both parties to reach a mutually agreeable satis- faction of the judgment. In the course of these negotiations, defendant offered plaintiff $490,000 to satisfy the judgment. Allegedly this amount plus $171,306.04 obtained by plaintiff through executions on defendant's property, covers the full amount of the judgment with interest, and awards plaintiff his costs. Plaintiff accepted the offer. On December 9, 1977, defendant gave plaintiff's counsel a check for $490,000 in return for a satisfaction of judgment. Defendant thereafter filed the satisfaction of judgment with the District Court. Shortly after plaintiff's counsel had received defen- dant's check, cashed it and distributed the proceeds, defen- dant informed him that it was going to stop payment on the check. Defendant told plaintiff's counsel that it was going to stop payment because it had overpaid plaintiff $10,000. Defendant stated that in arriving at the $490,000 figure, it had overlooked $10,000 in advances given plaintiff in 1971 and 1972, which he had agreed to repay. Plaintiff's counsel L told defendant that it could not stop payment on the check, because it had been cashed and the proceeds distributed. Thereafter on December 28, 1977, defendant filed a mo- tion under Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P., to have the satisfaction of judgment s e t a s i d e on t h e grounds of mistake and seeking r e s t i t u t i o n of t h e $10,000 a l l e g e d l y overpaid t o p l a i n t i f f . The D i s t r i c t Court ordered t h e motion submitted on b r i e f s . B r i e f s were submitted by both s i d e s . The D i s t r i c t Court granted defendant's motion s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment. P l a i n t i f f now appeals from t h a t order. I n h i s appeal, p l a i n t i f f has r a i s e d f i v e s e p a r a t e i s s u e s f o r our consideration. W e w i l l d i s c u s s t h e s e i s s u e s i n t h e i r broader context. Accordingly, we r e s t a t e t h e underlying i s s u e i n t h i s manner: Was it proper f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o s e t a s i d e t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment through a motion under Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P.? Rule 60(b) s u p p l i e s a procedure whereby a p a r t y upon mo- t i o n can be r e l i e v e d from a " f i n a l judgment, order o r proceed- ing" f o r c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c reasons. One of t h e reasons t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e t o a p a r t y is "mistake". Defendant argues t h a t it was upon t h i s ground t h a t it made i t s motion. Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 5 ) provides t h a t a p a r t y may be r e l i e v e d from a f i n a l judgment upon a showing t h a t it has been s a t i s f i e d . The r u l e does not s p e c i f i c a l l y provide t h a t a s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment is a f i n a l judgment, order o r proceeding from which r e l i e f may be obtained. I f t h i s r u l e were intended t o be used i n t h e manner defen- dant used it, t h e r u l e would not provide t h a t a ground f o r r e l i e f from a judgment i s t o show t h a t it has been s a t i s f i e d . W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n granting defendant's motion under Rule 60 (b) . Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rule 60(b) i s bottomed on what we consider t h e i n t e n t of t h e d r a f t e r s . I n construing t h e ~ u l e s of C i v i l Procedure, we apply the r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y construc- t i o n . P i e r c e Packing Company v. D i s t r i c t Court (1978), Mont. , 579 P.2d 760, 35 St.Rep. 656. W e give e f f e c t t o t h e p l a i n language used i n its ordinary meaning and consider t h e r u l e i n its e n t i r e t y t o determine t h e i n t e n t of t h e d r a f t e r s . P i e r c e Packing Company v. District Court, supra; Gildroy v. Anderson (1973), 162 Mont. 26, 507 P.2d low. B y giving e f f e c t t o t h e p l a i n language used i n Rule 60(b) and considering t h e r u l e i n its e n t i r e t y , w e b e l i e v e t h e i n t e n t of t h e d r a f t e r s was t h a t a s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment could n o t be s e t a s i d e by a motion under t h i s r u l e . Our d e c i s i o n here does n o t mean t h a t a s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment cannot be s e t aside. I t may be vacated by a p p r o p r i a t e proceedings f o r proper cause. Such proceedings a r e governed by e q u i t a b l e r u l e s . 47 Am J u r 2d Judgments 81032, W e hold t h a t such appropriate proceedings a r e an inde- pendent a c t i o n i n equity. A s t h e Utah Supreme Court has s a i d : ". . . This a c t [ f i l i n g a s a t i s f a c t i o n of judg- ment] became f a i t accompli, and could be undone only by a conventional a c t i o n i n equity, claim- i n g f r a u d , mistake, undue influence, with r e g u l a r s e r v i c e of process, appropriate s p e c i f i c i t y a s b a s i s f o r invocation of equity, and t h e r e s t of t h e trimmings." [Bracketed m a t e r i a l added.] Utah C.V. Federal C r e d i t Union v. Jenkins (Utah 1974), 528 P. 2d 1187, 1189. If defendant d e s i r e s t o have t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment vacated, it must proceed i n t h i s manner. Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f a l s o claims t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between him and p l a i n t i f f terminated upon t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment. He then argues t h a t s e r v i c e of t h e motion upon him r a t h e r than p l a i n t i f f was improper. Under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, we f i n d no m e r i t t o t h i s argument. Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f appeared i n t h e a c t i o n i n t h e D i s - t r i c t Court t o argue a g a i n s t t h e motion of defendant. H i s f i l i n g of a b r i e f i n opposition t o t h e motion c o n s t i t u t e d a general appearance. This Court has s a i d t h a t when a duly licensed a t t o r n e y makes an appearance i n a proceeding, h i s appearance i s presumptive evidence of h i s a u t h o r i t y t o repre- s e n t t h e person f o r whom he appears. Coleman v. D i s t r i c t Court (1947), 1 2 0 Mont. 372, 186 P.2d 91. Counsel f o r plain- t i f f w i l l n o t now be heard t o claim t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p had terminated. F i n a l l y , counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f has requested t h i s Court t o impose sanctions upon defendant under Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P. He argues t h a t under t h i s r u l e , w e can impose sanctions upon defendant f o r i n s t i t u t i n g t h i s a c t i o n without reasonable grounds f o r it. W e disagree. Rule 32 provides t h a t sanctions may be imposed upon a p a r t y f o r bringing a f r i v o l o u s appeal. The sanctions a r e authorized a g a i n s t an a p p e l l a n t , n o t a respondent i n whose favor t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d . By no s t r e t c h of t h e language can damages be awarded a g a i n s t a respondent under t h e p l a i n language of Rule 32. The order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e s a t i s - f a c t i o n of judgment under Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., is vacated and t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment i s r e i n s t a t e d . ~~~ B. W&,& Chief J u s t i c e ' I ' b 2 2 . ce