Title: Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11792
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 5, 2015

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SJC-11792 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PAVEL LAVRINENKO. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 7, 2015. - October 5, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Alien.  Constitutional Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel.  Due 
Process of Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, 
Criminal, Plea, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Springfield Division 
of the District Court Department on April 11, 2005. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, filed on December 3, 
2013, was heard by John M. Payne, Jr., J.; a motion for 
reconsideration was also heard by him, and a second motion for 
reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney (Jane 
Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Wendy S. Wayne & Jennifer Klein, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, & Laura Murray-Tjan, for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The issue on appeal is whether a noncitizen 
defendant, admitted into the United States as a refugee, is 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to a complaint charging 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon, where his attorney did 
not make a reasonable inquiry regarding the defendant's 
citizenship, and therefore did not learn that he was a refugee.  
We conclude that, under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, constitutionally effective representation of a 
criminal defendant requires defense counsel to make a reasonable 
inquiry of the defendant to determine whether he or she is a 
citizen of the United States and, if the defendant is not, to 
make a reasonable inquiry into the defendant's immigration 
status, including whether the defendant was admitted into this 
country as a refugee or has been granted asylum. 
 
We also conclude that, in determining whether a defendant 
suffered prejudice from counsel's deficient performance, 
"special circumstances" regarding immigration consequences, as 
contemplated in Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47-48 
(2011), should be given substantial weight in determining, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, whether there is a 
reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected 
the plea offer and insisted on going to trial had counsel 
provided competent advice regarding the immigration consequences 
of the guilty plea.  Moreover, a defendant's status as a refugee 
3 
 
or an asylee is a special circumstance entitled to particularly 
substantial weight.  Because the motion judge found that 
counsel's performance was deficient but did not consider the 
defendant's refugee status in finding that the defendant 
suffered no prejudice, we vacate the denial of the motion for a 
new trial and the motions for reconsideration, and remand the 
matter to the District Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.1 
 
Background.  The following facts are drawn from the motion 
judge's findings of fact, supplemented with details from the 
record where they are consistent with the judge's findings. 
The defendant was born in Novokuznetsk, Russia, and came to the 
United States with his parents and two siblings in 2000 at the 
age of thirteen.  They had left Russia to escape religious 
persecution as Pentecostal Christians, and were admitted into 
the United States as refugees. 
 
On April 10, 2005, when the defendant was seventeen years 
old, he operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and crashed 
into a streetlamp post.  The defendant drove away, but police 
officers observed the defendant's vehicle with heavy damage and 
began following him in a marked police cruiser to perform a 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Immigration Impact Unit of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (CPCS). 
4 
 
motor vehicle stop.  With the officers in pursuit, the 
defendant's vehicle sped away but eventually struck a tree; the 
defendant got out of the vehicle, ran, and jumped into a nearby 
river.  After the police officers arrived at the river bank, the 
defendant began moving back toward shore.  According to the 
police report, the officers observed the defendant holding a 
"stick" as he approached them, and one of the officers ordered 
the defendant to drop the stick several times.  The defendant 
continued to hold the stick "in a threatening manner" until an 
officer used pepper spray on the defendant, and he dropped the 
stick into the water and came on shore, where he was arrested.2 
 
A complaint issued on April 11, 2005, charging the 
defendant in the Springfield Division of the District Court 
Department (Springfield District Court) with seven counts, 
including driving while under the influence of alcohol, leaving 
the scene of property damage, and assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon (the stick).3  In addition, as a result of the 
                                                          
 
 
2 According to the defendant's affidavit, he held onto a 
floating branch to steady himself in the strong river current, 
as he was standing in cold water on a soft river bottom.  He 
could not hear anything that the officer said but used the 
branch for balance as he moved toward the river bank.  The 
defendant attests that he never intended to hit or threaten a 
police officer with the branch. 
 
 
3 The defendant was also charged with failure to stop for 
police, speeding, a motor vehicle equipment violation, and a 
marked lanes violation. 
5 
 
defendant's conduct on April 10, the defendant was charged with 
violating the conditions of probation that he was serving on a 
continuance without a finding for knowingly receiving stolen 
property.  At the time, he also had pending charges in 
Springfield District Court of malicious destruction of property 
and attempt to commit a crime.  As part of what the judge 
described as a "global resolution" of all outstanding cases, the 
defendant pleaded guilty on April 28 to the earlier charges of 
malicious destruction of property and attempt, and was sentenced 
to ninety days in a house of correction, to be served 
concurrently.  On April 29, he pleaded guilty to driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, leaving the scene of property 
damage, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon; he also 
admitted to the probation violation, and a guilty finding was 
entered on the charge of knowingly receiving stolen property.4  
He was sentenced on these charges to a total of ninety days in a 
house of correction, with the sentences to be served 
concurrently with each other and with the sentences imposed on 
April 28. 
                                                          
 
 
4 The defendant also pleaded guilty to failing to stop for 
police, and pleaded "responsible" for the motor vehicle 
equipment violation, speeding, and the marked lanes violation; 
all four charges were placed on file with the defendant's 
consent. 
6 
 
 
On October 31, 2012, the defendant was detained by United 
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and subsequently 
placed in removal proceedings.  An immigration judge granted the 
defendant's application for adjustment of status to lawful 
permanent resident, but the United States Department of Homeland 
Security appealed the decision, and the board of immigration 
appeals remanded the case for further proceedings to determine 
whether the defendant is a "violent or dangerous" individual. 
 
On December 3, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon.  The judge who had accepted the defendant's 
guilty plea in 2005 conducted a nonevidentiary hearing, and 
denied the motion.  After the defendant filed a motion for 
reconsideration, the judge held an evidentiary hearing during 
which the defendant, the defendant's criminal defense attorney 
at the time of his guilty plea (plea counsel), and the 
defendant's immigration counsel testified. 
 
Although plea counsel could not remember whether he advised 
the defendant about immigration consequences, he explained that, 
as a matter of course, he gave a standard warning to all of his 
clients that essentially repeated the same warnings included in 
the "green sheet," that is, the District Court Department's 
7 
 
preprinted "Tender of Plea or Admission Waiver of Rights" form.5  
That form, which the defendant signed on the day of his guilty 
plea, included the following statement:  "I understand that if I 
am not a citizen of the United States, conviction of this 
offense may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from 
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization, 
pursuant to the laws of the United States."6  Plea counsel 
testified that he typically prefaced the discussion of 
immigration consequences with a client by stating that he did 
not know the client's immigration status and "it wasn't really 
[his] concern."  He would then tell the client that he did not 
know whether the client had "any immigration concerns at all," 
                                                          
 
 
5 In his affidavit, the defendant's criminal defense 
attorney at the time of the defendant's guilty plea (plea 
counsel) stated, "I have no specific recollection of discussing 
potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea with [the 
defendant], but it was at that time and has always been my 
practice to advise all criminal defense clients that if they 
were not United States citizens, deportation was a risk as a 
result of a criminal conviction." 
 
 
6 This statement in the defendant's waiver of rights form 
mirrors the warning that a judge is required by statute to 
provide a defendant during the plea colloquy.  See G. L. c. 278, 
§ 29D ("The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . from 
any defendant in any criminal proceeding unless the court 
advises such defendant of the following:  'If you are not a 
citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised that the 
acceptance by this court of your plea of guilty . . . may have 
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws 
of the United States'"). 
 
8 
 
but would add, "[I]f you're convicted of any offense . . . you 
could be deported or excluded."7 
 
Plea counsel further testified that, unless "there was some 
red flag" or an issue that the client brought to his attention, 
he would give this standard advice regardless of the particular 
charges in the case.  He noted that, if the client "brought 
something to [his] attention and [he] thought that it might be 
. . . in [the client's] best interests to do some further 
research, [he has] done that over the years."  However, he was 
not aware at the time of the defendant's plea of any immigration 
law issues specific to refugees and did not "remember ever 
having a discussion with any client regarding refugee status." 
 
The judge acknowledged that he possessed "no independent 
memory of this defendant or the events surrounding the plea," 
and found that neither the defendant nor plea counsel had 
significant memory of any discussions regarding immigration 
issues.  Thus, it was unclear "what if any immigration warnings 
were discussed between the defendant and [plea counsel]."  The 
judge found that "it is clear that the issue of the defendant's 
                                                          
 
 
7 The defendant testified that he did not tell plea counsel 
about his immigration status and did not receive advice about 
immigration consequences.  The defendant did not remember 
whether plea counsel asked him about his immigration status. 
 
9 
 
refugee status was not addressed," and for that reason, 
counsel's performance was deficient.8 
 
The judge, however, concluded that the defendant was not 
prejudiced by the attorney's deficient performance because the 
plea served as a "global resolution . . . offering a [lesser] 
total period of incarceration."  Considering that the defendant 
"was facing the possibility of jail time possibly upwards of 
[two and one-half years]" in a house of correction, the judge 
found that "[t]here is every reason to believe that [the 
defendant] was more than satisfied with the result at that time 
and would have had little if any leeway in successfully 
defending" the charges arising from the April 10, 2005, incident 
to which he pleaded guilty.  The judge denied the defendant's 
motion for reconsideration and then denied a second motion for 
reconsideration.  The defendant appealed, and we granted his 
motion for direct appellate review. 
                                                          
 
 
8 In his affidavit, plea counsel stated, "I have no specific 
recollection of being aware of [the defendant's] refugee status 
when I represented him on these charges, or of addressing any 
refugee status-specific issues when I discussed the pros and 
cons of a potential guilty plea with him.  Refugee status-
specific advice was not part of the standard immigration 
consequences discussion I would have with my criminal defense 
clients."  Furthermore, he stated, "I can affirmatively state 
that I did not advise [the defendant] about the potential impact 
of a guilty plea to the charge of assault with a dangerous 
weapon on his eligibility for asylum in the United States." 
 
10 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "A motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001)."  Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 178 (2014), 
citing Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009).  We 
"examine the motion judge's conclusion only to determine whether 
there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  
In doing so, "[w]e accept the judge's findings of fact if 
supported by the evidence, because the judge who heard the 
witnesses testify is the 'final arbiter on matters of 
credibility.'"  DeJesus, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 
467 Mass. 336, 344 (2014). 
 
2.  Refugee status.  Before turning to whether counsel's 
performance was constitutionally deficient, we discuss the 
defendant's refugee status and the immigration consequences at 
issue in this case.  Under Federal law, a noncitizen who is 
outside the United States may be admitted into the United States 
in the discretion of the United States Attorney General if 
granted refugee status.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c) (2012) (subject 
to limitations on number of refugees able to be admitted per 
year, United States Attorney General may in his or her 
discretion "admit any refugee who is not firmly resettled in any 
foreign country, is determined to be of special humanitarian 
11 
 
concern to the United States, and is admissible").9  To be 
admitted as a refugee, a noncitizen must meet the definition of 
"refugee," as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(act), that is, a person "who is unable or unwilling to return 
to . . . [the person's country of origin] because of persecution 
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion."10  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
 
Although not defined in either the act or the immigration 
regulations, "persecution" generally means abuse that has 
"reached a fairly high threshold of seriousness, as well as some 
regularity and frequency."  Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5, 11 
(1st Cir. 2013), quoting Rebenko v. Holder, 693 F.3d 87, 92 (1st 
Cir. 2012).  See Barsoum v. Holder, 617 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 
                                                          
 
 
9 Under a related provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (act), a noncitizen who is present in the United 
States may seek asylum to remain in the United States.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) ("Any alien who is physically present in 
the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . , 
irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum"). 
 
 
10 The definition of "refugee" applies both to persons 
outside of the United States seeking refugee status and to 
persons inside the United States seeking asylum.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (Secretary of Homeland Security or United States 
Attorney General may grant asylum to noncitizen who has properly 
applied if either "determines that such alien is a refugee 
within the meaning of [the act]").  Here, the defendant had been 
granted refugee status, but because persons granted asylum must 
meet the definition of "refugee," the holding of this opinion 
also applies to persons granted asylum. 
 
12 
 
2010) ("The 'severity, duration, and frequency of physical 
abuse' are factors relevant to this determination, . . . as is 
whether harm is 'systematic rather than reflective of a series 
of isolated incidents'" [citations omitted]).  The person 
seeking refugee status "must also demonstrate that the 
persecution he [or she] experienced occurred 'on account of' a 
statutorily-protected ground," that is, race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.  Ivanov, supra at 12, quoting Lopez de 
Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 
Here, the defendant was admitted into the United States 
with his family as a refugee, and his refugee status had not 
been terminated at the time of the plea.11  Although he could not 
remember in great detail how Pentecostal Christians had been 
treated in Russia at the time he was granted refugee status, he 
testified that he remembered churches were closing and his 
family was not allowed to pray.  At the nonevidentiary hearing 
on the motion for a new trial, the defendant provided the judge 
with a summary of various governmental and nongovernmental 
entity reports, United States congressional resolutions, and 
news articles on the conditions in Russia relevant to 
                                                          
 
11 It is unclear from the record whether the defendant's 
refugee status was derivative of a parent's refugee status.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 207.7 (2011). 
 
13 
 
Pentecostal Christians.  At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, 
the defendant's immigration attorney testified to the 
information he learned about the conditions in Russia through 
reading these submissions.  He stated that from the decade of 
the 1990s through at least 2005, there had been violence brought 
directly against Pentecostal Christians and their places of 
worship, with a rise in church burnings between 2005 and 2006 
that resulted in hearings by the United States Helsinki 
Commission.12 
 
3.  Discretionary immigration relief.  One year after a 
refugee is admitted into the United States, he or she may be 
eligible to adjust his or her status to be regarded as "lawfully 
admitted to the United States for permanent residence," and 
receive what is commonly known as a "green card."  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1159(a) (2012).  To adjust one's status from refugee to lawful 
permanent resident, a refugee must satisfy the admissibility 
                                                          
 
 
12 At the evidentiary hearing, the judge allowed the 
defendant's immigration attorney to testify about the summary of 
country conditions de bene, and no motion to strike this 
testimony was presented.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 104(b) (2015) 
("When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact 
exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding 
that the fact does exist.  The court may admit the proposed 
evidence, de bene, on the condition that the proof be introduced 
later.  Evidence so admitted is subject to a motion to strike if 
that proof is not forthcoming").  The judge did not refer to the 
conditions in Russia for Pentecostal Christians in his findings 
and order. 
 
14 
 
requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).  A noncitizen who has 
committed two or more crimes "involving moral turpitude" is 
inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2), and is deportable.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) ("Any alien who at any time 
after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving 
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and 
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is 
deportable").  The defendant in his immigration appeal did not 
challenge the immigration judge's determination that he is 
inadmissible and deportable because he committed two crimes 
involving moral turpitude, specifically malicious destruction of 
property and knowingly receiving stolen property. 
 
However, even where, as here, a refugee is inadmissible and 
deportable, the refugee may still seek an adjustment of status 
from refugee to lawful permanent resident by applying for a 
waiver of inadmissibility.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2012).  A 
waiver of inadmissibility may be granted in the discretion of 
the United States Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or 
when it is otherwise in the public interest."  Id.  Where a 
refugee in removal proceedings obtains a waiver of 
inadmissibility and adjusts his or her status from refugee to 
lawful permanent resident, removal proceedings are terminated.  
15 
 
See Matter of Rainford, 201 I. & N. Dec. 598, 602 (B.I.A. 1992) 
("the conviction which renders the respondent deportable . . . 
will not preclude a showing of admissibility . . . , and . . . 
if granted adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, 
the respondent will no longer be deportable on the basis of this 
prior conviction").  See also Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 113 (2d 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez-Roque, 301 F.3d 39, 42 n.1 
(2d Cir. 2002).  See generally R.D. Steel, Steel on Immigration 
Law § 14:27, 586-588 (2014) ("Adjustment of status is a complete 
remedy, since the [applicant] becomes a permanent resident and 
the removal proceedings are terminated"). 
 
The United States Attorney General in 2002 published an 
opinion that limited the availability of a discretionary waiver 
of inadmissibility regarding refugees who are "violent or 
dangerous individuals."  In re Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373, 383 
(A.G. 2002).  The Attorney General declared that it would not be 
"a prudent exercise" of this discretion "to grant favorable 
adjustments of status to violent or dangerous individuals except 
in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national 
security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an 
alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment 
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship."  
Id.  The Attorney General added that, "depending on the gravity 
of the alien's underlying criminal offense, such a showing might 
16 
 
still be insufficient."  Id.  Under this opinion, refugees who 
commit violent or dangerous crimes are not automatically barred 
from obtaining a waiver, see Jean v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 392, 397 
(5th Cir. 2006), but their waiver request is subject to a 
"heightened standard."  Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 466-467 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
 
Here, the defendant argues that as a result of his guilty 
plea to the charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, he 
was subject to the heightened standard under In re Jean.  
Because there are no facts showing any likelihood that the 
defendant could meet the heightened standard, he claims that his 
chances of receiving a waiver of inadmissibility and an 
adjustment of status were extinguished by this guilty plea. 
 
4.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to adequately inform him of the immigration 
consequences of pleading guilty to the charge of assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon, and that his plea to that offense 
should be vacated and a new trial ordered.13  To prevail, the 
                                                          
 
 
13 Alternatively, the defendant argues that if this court 
does not grant his motion for a new trial, the case should be 
remanded to the District Court for reconsideration, with 
substantial weight given to his refugee status in determining 
whether he should prevail on the claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
 
17 
 
defendant bears the burden of showing that his attorney's 
performance fell "measurably below that which might be expected 
from an ordinary fallible lawyer," and that he suffered 
prejudice because of his attorney's unprofessional errors.  
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 45 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 
 
a.  Deficient performance.  In determining the level of 
performance required of an ordinary fallible lawyer, we look to 
the "professional standards of the legal community."  Clarke, 
supra at 45.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) 
("We long have recognized that '[p]revailing norms of practice 
as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like 
. . . are guides to determining what is reasonable'" [citation 
omitted]).  "The weight of prevailing professional norms 
supports the view that counsel must advise [his or] her client 
regarding the risk of deportation."  Id. at 367.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 436 (2013) ("under art. 
12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] defense counsel 
must accurately advise a noncitizen client of the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea or a conviction at trial"). 
 
Just as the ordinary physician must take a history from the 
patient before rendering a diagnosis, so, too, must the ordinary 
criminal defense attorney make a reasonable inquiry of his or 
her client regarding the client's history, including whether he 
18 
 
or she is a citizen of the United States.  See Clarke, 460 Mass. 
at 45-46, citing National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n, 
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 2.2(b)(2) 
(1995), and General Policies Applicable to all Assigned Counsel, 
CPCS Performance Standards Governing Representation of Indigents 
in Criminal Cases, §§ 2.2, 4.1, 5.4(o) (rev. 2004) ("National 
and Massachusetts performance guidelines require criminal 
defense counsel to interview a defendant and gather significant 
personal information in order to represent him").  Unless a 
criminal defense attorney knows whether a defendant is a United 
States citizen, the attorney cannot properly evaluate the 
likelihood that the defendant will face immigration 
consequences, investigate potential avenues of relief, minimize 
such consequences through plea negotiations, or understand how 
highly the defendant values staying in the United States.  See 
Clarke, supra at 46 ("That the defendant's counsel failed to 
ascertain that the defendant was not a United States citizen may 
be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Saferian 
standard because effective representation requires counsel to 
gather at least enough personal information to represent him"). 
 
Where a criminal defense attorney learns that his or her 
client is a noncitizen, the attorney must make further 
reasonable inquiry of the client to determine, where possible, 
the client's immigration status.  See L. Rosenberg, D. 
19 
 
Kanstroom, & J.J. Smith, Immigration Consequences of Criminal 
Proceedings 2-3 (2011) ("The first specific problem facing the 
criminal law practitioner who encounters a noncitizen in 
criminal proceedings is to determine as accurately as possible 
the person's exact legal status under the immigration laws of 
the United States"); American Bar Association Criminal Justice 
Standards for the Defense Function, Standard 4-5.5 (4th ed. 
2015) (pending publication) ("Defense counsel should determine a 
client's citizenship and immigration status, assuring the client 
that such information is important for effective legal 
representation and that it should be protected by the attorney-
client privilege").  See also D. Kesselbrenner & L. Rosenberg, 
Immigration Law & Crimes § 1:4, at 5 (2015) ("Within th[e] 
comprehensive category [of noncitizens], an individual 
noncitizen has a more specific immigration status, which is a 
relevant factor to the practitioner representing him or her in 
either the criminal or immigration arena, or in both").14 
                                                          
 
 
14 We recognize that there may be some circumstances in 
which a reasonable inquiry of the client may not reveal the 
client's citizenship or, more likely, the client's immigration 
status, especially where the client has little formal education 
or has intellectual, developmental, or mental health challenges.  
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 379-380 & n.1 (2010) 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("it may be hard, in 
some cases, for defense counsel even to determine whether a 
client is an alien").  In these circumstances, a reasonable 
inquiry may need to include an inquiry of family members of the 
client regarding these matters. 
20 
 
 
Without making a reasonable inquiry of the client's 
immigration status, defense counsel is not in an adequate 
position to determine what advice is "available."  Clarke, 460 
Mass. at 46, quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371 ("[i]t is 
quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide [his or] her 
client with available advice about an issue like deportation").  
See Benach, Zota, & Navarro, American Bar Association, Section 
of Litigation, How Much to Advise:  What Are the Requirements of 
Padilla v. Kentucky (2013) (practice advisory on Padilla stating 
that "[a] correct analysis of the actual immigration 
consequences of a plea depends upon numerous factors," including 
"immigration status," because undocumented defendant may be 
affected differently from lawful permanent resident).  
Therefore, the failure of a criminal defense attorney to make a 
reasonable inquiry of the client regarding his or her 
citizenship and immigration status is sufficient to satisfy the 
deficient performance prong of the ineffective assistance 
analysis.  See Clarke, supra.  See also State v. Paredez, 136 
N.M. 533, 539 (2004) ("We hold that criminal defense attorneys 
are obligated to determine the immigration status of their 
clients.  If a client is a non-citizen, the attorney must advise 
that client of the specific immigration consequences of pleading 
guilty, including whether deportation would be virtually 
certain"). 
21 
 
 
It is especially important that a criminal defense attorney 
learn whether his or her client was admitted into this country 
as a refugee.  "[D]eportation is an integral part -- indeed, 
sometimes the most important part -- of the penalty that may be 
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.  Where the client was 
admitted into this country as a refugee, the consequence of 
deportation might be especially severe, because the client 
obtained such status only after the immigration authorities 
determined that he or she faced persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion in his or her country of origin.  Because 
that persecution may result in many forms of harm or suffering, 
including potentially death or serious injury, the avoidance of 
deportation may be of immense importance to a refugee.  See id. 
at 370 n.11 ("were a defendant's lawyer to know that a 
particular offense would result in the client's deportation and 
that, upon deportation, the client and his [or her] family might 
well be killed due to circumstances in the client's home 
country, any decent attorney would inform the client of the 
consequences of his [or her] plea"). 
 
Here, although plea counsel had little memory of his 
representation of the defendant, he admits that in 2005 it was 
not his usual practice to ask clients facing criminal charges 
22 
 
whether they were noncitizens, and that his usual practice was 
simply to give all of his clients a standard warning on 
immigration consequences.  It is not sufficient for a criminal 
defense attorney, as a matter of practice, merely to give the 
same warning that the defendant will receive from the judge 
during the plea colloquy required by G. L. c. 278, § 29D.  See 
Clarke, 460 Mass. at 48 n.20 ("[T]he receipt of such warnings is 
not an adequate substitute for defense counsel's professional 
obligation to advise [his or] her client of the likelihood of 
specific and dire immigration consequences that might arise from 
such a plea").  See also DeJesus, 468 Mass. at 177 n.3. 
 
The motion judge also found that the defendant's refugee 
status was not "addressed."  Plea counsel had no recollection of 
being aware of the defendant's refugee status; he testified that 
refugee status would have been a "red flag" that, at a minimum, 
would have caused him to conduct further research.  Because plea 
counsel failed to make a reasonable inquiry of the defendant to 
learn of this "red flag," counsel failed to learn what he needed 
to know to advise his client competently regarding the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) ("counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision 
that makes particular investigations unnecessary").  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass.   ,    (2015) (Hines, J., 
23 
 
concurring) (defense counsel's performance is deficient where he 
or she is aware of information that may call into question 
defendant's criminal responsibility but declines to investigate 
or otherwise consider defendant's mental condition).15 
 
b.  Prejudice.  "In the context of a guilty plea, in order 
to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant has the 
burden of establishing that 'there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial.'"  Clarke, 460 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
15 We recognize that the ordinary, fallible criminal defense 
attorney may not be an expert on immigration law, but we expect 
such an attorney who learns of a complex immigration issue 
either to research the applicable immigration law or to seek 
guidance from an attorney knowledgeable in immigration law.  See 
American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Defense Function, Standard 4-5.5 (4th ed. 2015) (pending 
publication) ("If defense counsel determines that a client may 
not be a United States citizen, counsel should investigate and 
identify particular immigration consequences that might follow 
possible criminal dispositions.  Consultation or association 
with an immigration law expert or knowledgeable advocate is 
advisable in these circumstances.  Public and appointed 
defenders should develop, or seek funding for, such immigration 
expertise within their offices").  See also CPCS, Immigration 
Impact Unit, https://www.publiccounsel.net/iiu  
[http://perma.cc/3D3Y-NFT2] (inviting CPCS staff attorneys and 
bar advocates to fill out intake form to seek assistance in 
"analyzing the immigration consequences for a client"); 
Immigration Defense Project, Hotline, 
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/hotline 
[http://perma.cc/F54J-YVBU] (free hotline that offers "criminal-
immigration analyses to criminal defenders, immigration 
advocates, and immigrants and their loved ones").  Cf.  State v. 
Sandoval, 171 Wash. 2d 163, 172 (2011) ("counsel was required to 
correctly advise, or seek consultation to correctly advise, [the 
defendant] of the deportation consequence"). 
 
24 
 
at 47, quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  "At a 
minimum, this means that the defendant must aver that to be the 
case."  Clark, supra.  Additionally, the defendant must 
"convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain 
would have been rational under the circumstances."  Clarke, 
supra, quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.  The judge must 
determine, based on the credible facts, whether there is a 
reasonable probability that a reasonable person in the 
circumstances of the defendant would have chosen to go to trial 
had he or she received constitutionally effective advice from 
his or her criminal defense attorney regarding the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea.16  Clarke, supra.  See Ferrara v. 
United States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The 
elementary question is whether a reasonable defendant standing 
in the petitioner's shoes would likely have altered his [or her] 
decision to plead guilty . . .").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 361 (2014) (prejudice standard in Clarke 
                                                          
 
 
16 In making this determination, a judge may evaluate the 
credibility of the defendant and other witnesses in determining 
the facts, but a judge does not evaluate the credibility of the 
defendant's assertion that he or she would have gone to trial 
had the defendant known then what the defendant knows now.  
Rather, a judge must evaluate that assertion under a reasonable 
person standard, because a judge cannot evaluate whether the 
defendant is telling the truth about a decision the defendant 
never made. 
 
25 
 
"is identical to, and draws from the same source as, the 
standard in Ferrara"). 
 
To prove that rejecting the plea would have been rational 
under the circumstances, "the defendant bears the substantial 
burden of showing that (1) he [or she] had an 'available, 
substantial ground of defence,' . . . that would have been 
pursued if he [or she] had been correctly advised of the dire 
immigration consequences attendant to accepting the plea 
bargain; (2) there is a reasonable probability that a different 
plea bargain (absent such consequences) could have been 
negotiated at the time;[17] or (3) the presence of 'special 
circumstances' that support the conclusion that he placed, or 
would have placed, particular emphasis on immigration 
consequences in deciding whether to plead guilty."  Clarke, 460 
Mass. at 47-48.  Here, the defendant attests that he would not 
have pleaded guilty to the assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon charge had he been advised of its immigration 
consequences; he does not challenge his plea to the other 
counts, or his plea in the other cases. 
                                                          
 
 
17 Because the defendant does not contend that there is a 
"reasonable probability that a different plea bargain . . . 
could have been negotiated," we do not address this possibility.  
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47 (2011). 
 
26 
 
 
Having so attested, the defendant argues that, had he been 
properly advised of the immigration consequences, there is a 
reasonable probability that a reasonable person in his 
circumstances would have chosen to go to trial on the assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon charge for two reasons.  First, he 
contends that he had a substantial defense to this charge.  
"Under the common law, an assault may be accomplished in one of 
two ways -- either by an attempted battery, or by putting 
another in fear of an immediately threatened battery."  
Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 432 Mass. 244, 247 (2000).  The 
defendant correctly asserts that, under the circumstances 
described in the police report, the Commonwealth in this case 
would have needed to proceed under the theory of an immediately 
threatened battery.  "Under the immediately threatened battery 
category, what is essential is that the defendant intended to 
put the victim in fear of imminent bodily harm, not that the 
defendant's actions created a generalized fear . . . in the 
victim."  Id. at 248-249.  "The victim's apprehension of 
imminent physical harm must be reasonable."  Commonwealth v. 
Werner, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 102 (2008).  "In determining 
whether an apprehension of anticipated physical force is 
reasonable, a court will look to the actions and words of the 
defendant in light of the attendant circumstances."  
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 349 (1990). 
27 
 
 
The defendant argues that, where the police report declares 
that the defendant "dropped the stick into the water and came on 
shore" after the officer, who was on the river bank, used pepper 
spray on him, the defendant had a substantial defense that the 
officer reasonably could not have been in fear of imminent 
bodily harm.  In addition, the defendant in his affidavit 
attested that he simply held on to a "branch" he found floating 
in the water to maintain his balance against the strong current 
and soft river bottom in the cold water, and never intended to 
threaten a police officer with the branch. 
 
The judge made no factual findings as to whether this was a 
substantial defense, or as to the credibility of the assertions 
in the police report.18  Specifically, he made no finding as to 
whether the defendant held a "stick" or a "branch" in the water 
(or as to its size), or how far from shore the defendant was 
                                                          
 
 
18 The defendant initially sought to vacate his plea to the 
charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon based in part 
on the claim that the Commonwealth had failed to proffer 
evidence at the plea hearing sufficient to support each of the 
elements of this charge.  The judge, in denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, addressed this claim by rejecting it 
"summarily."  In the motion for reconsideration, the defendant 
focused on the claim that he was not advised of the immigration 
consequences of a plea to this charge.  In denying this motion, 
the judge found only that the defendant "would have had little 
if any leeway in successfully defending the outcome of Docket 
#0523CR2847," but this case docket includes all the counts, 
including the counts of operating while under the influence and 
leaving the scene of property damage, for which the defendant 
had no substantial defense. 
 
28 
 
when he dropped it.  Without these credibility determinations 
and factual findings, which would require a new evidentiary 
hearing, we cannot determine whether a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position in 2005 would have thought he or she had a 
substantial defense to this charge.19 
 
Second, the defendant contends that his refugee status 
alone established the presence of "special circumstances," and 
that the presence of special circumstances necessarily 
establishes prejudice.  We agree that a defendant's refugee 
status is a special circumstance and that the presence of 
special circumstances alone might establish prejudice, but we do 
not agree that the presence of special circumstances alone 
necessarily establishes prejudice. 
 
We have recognized that, in evaluating a proposed plea 
offer, "a noncitizen defendant confronts a very different 
calculus than that confronting a United States citizen."  
DeJesus, 468 Mass. at 184.  "For a noncitizen defendant, 
preserving his [or her] 'right to remain in the United States 
                                                          
 
 
19 To show that a "substantial defense" was available, the 
defendant need not show that it was more likely than not that 
such a defense would have resulted in acquittal.  See United 
States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated on 
other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 
(2013) ("The Supreme Court . . . requires only that a defendant 
could have rationally gone to trial in the first place, and it 
has never required an affirmative demonstration of likely 
acquittal at such a trial as the sine qua non of prejudice"). 
 
29 
 
may be more important to [him or her] than any jail sentence.'"  
Id., quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368.  "Thus, a determination 
whether it would be rational for a defendant to reject a plea 
offer 'must take into account the particular circumstances 
informing the defendant's desire to remain in the United 
States.'"  DeJesus, supra, quoting People v. Picca, 97 A.D.3d 
170, 183-184 (N.Y. 2012). 
 
A defendant may fervently desire to remain in the United 
States because of the depth and quality of the roots he or she 
has planted in this country.  For example, in DeJesus, supra at 
183-184, the defendant established special circumstances where 
he "had a lot to lose if he were to be deported," considering 
that "he had been in the country since he was eleven years old, 
his family was in Boston, and he had maintained steady 
employment in the Boston area."  Where the defendant is a 
refugee, however, a judge must also consider that the defendant 
might fervently desire to remain in the United States because of 
what he or she might face if deported, that is, the risk of 
persecution in his or her country of origin or the alternative 
of being deported to a country that might never have been that 
person's home, if that country would agree to accept that 
person.  See Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th 
Cir. 2004), quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) ("deportation is a 
30 
 
'harsh measure . . . all the more replete with danger when the 
alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or 
persecution if forced to return to his or her home country'").  
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) (2012) (procedure by which United 
States Attorney General determines country where noncitizen 
shall be removed); United States Department of Justice, Fact 
Sheet:  Asylum and Withholding of Removal Relief Convention 
Against Torture Protections (Jan. 15, 2009) (relief in form of 
"withholding of removal" prohibits removal to country where 
noncitizen's life or freedom would be threatened, "but allows 
removal to a third country where [the person's] life or freedom 
would not be threatened").  Therefore, a defendant's refugee 
status, by itself, is also a special circumstance. 
 
But special circumstances do not necessarily require a 
finding of prejudice.  As stated in Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-48, 
special circumstances simply "support the conclusion" that the 
defendant would have placed particular emphasis on immigration 
consequences in deciding whether to plead guilty; their presence 
does not require the conclusion that there is a reasonable 
probability that the special circumstances would have caused the 
defendant to choose to go to trial.  The prejudice determination 
rests on the totality of the circumstances, in which special 
circumstances regarding immigration consequences should be given 
substantial weight.  See Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 294 ("The ultimate 
31 
 
aim, common to every case, is to ascertain whether the totality 
of the circumstances discloses a reasonable probability that the 
defendant would not have pleaded guilty absent the misconduct").  
See also Clarke, supra at 48 n.19 (noting that in State v. 
Sandoval, 171 Wash. 2d 163, 175, 176 [2011], court gave "heavy 
weight" to fact that defendant had been "very concerned" about 
risk of deportation).  Because a defendant's refugee status is 
the result of a prior determination by the Federal government 
that deportation may be an especially severe and dangerous 
consequence, refugee status is entitled to particularly 
substantial weight in evaluating the totality of circumstances.  
Thus, refugee status, in essence, is a "special" special 
circumstance.20 
                                                          
 
 
20 A judge may consider other factors in the totality of the 
circumstances analysis including, but not limited to, the 
"defendant's assessment of the strength of the prosecution's 
case in relation to [the defendant's] own case."  People v. 
Martinez, 57 Cal. 4th 555, 564 (2013).  Where there are special 
circumstances such as a defendant's refugee status that might 
cause a defendant to fear deportation far more than a more 
severe sentence upon conviction, there may be a reasonable 
probability that a defendant would choose to go to trial even 
without a substantial defense, based on the small chance that 
the defendant would prevail at trial and avoid deportation.  But 
depending on the circumstances, where the evidence against a 
defendant is so overwhelming that a defendant has virtually no 
chance of prevailing at trial, the presence of special 
circumstances might not be enough to show that it was reasonably 
probable that the defendant would have forgone the benefits of a 
plea offer in favor of proceeding to trial.  See Clarke, 460 
Mass. at 47 (defendant must show that decision to reject plea 
bargain would have been "rational under the circumstances"). 
 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
The judge may also consider "the risks faced by a defendant 
in selecting a trial rather than a plea bargain."  United States 
v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2014).  This may include 
the risk that a conviction would result in a sentence at or 
close to the "maximum allowable sentence had [the defendant] 
gone to trial," Commonwealth v. Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 365 
(2015), or the risk that a conviction at trial would result in a 
mandatory minimum sentence substantially more severe than the 
sentence offered through a guilty plea to a lesser charge.  
Additionally, a defendant who faces only a house of correction 
sentence if convicted at trial may be more willing to forgo a 
plea bargain to avoid the risk of deportation than a defendant 
facing the possibility of a lengthy State prison sentence. 
 
 
In some cases, the judge might also consider the extent to 
which an acquittal at trial would reduce or eliminate the risk 
of immigration consequences.  A defendant who can eliminate the 
risk of deportation through an acquittal is more likely to 
insist on going to trial than a defendant who is deportable 
regardless of the outcome at trial.  See, e.g. People v. Haley, 
96 A.D.3d 1168, 1169 (N.Y. 2012) (no prejudice where "regardless 
of whether defendant pleaded guilty . . . , had been found 
guilty after trial or had been acquitted, his status as a 
deportable alien would not have been affected"). 
 
 
"Ultimately, a defendant's decision to tender a guilty plea 
is a unique, individualized decision, and the relevant factors 
and their relative weight will differ from one case to the 
next."  Roberts, supra at 365-366, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 356 (2014).  Under certain circumstances, 
even the near certainty of a lengthy State prison sentence if 
convicted may not deter a rational defendant from risking trial 
to preserve the possibility of acquittal.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. 
at 368, quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (preserving defendant's right to remain 
in United States may be more important than "any potential jail 
sentence"); Orocio, 645 F.3d at 645 (defendant facing ten-year 
minimum sentence "rationally could have been more concerned 
about a near-certainty of multiple decades of banishment from 
the United States than the possibility of a single decade in 
prison"). 
 
33 
 
 
A refugee seeking a new trial on these grounds and the 
prosecutor opposing the motion are entitled to offer evidence 
regarding the scope and severity of persecution that the refugee 
was likely to have faced in his or her country of origin at the 
time of the plea had the refugee been deported, because this is 
relevant to the importance a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would place on immigration consequences.  
Because direct evidence of this nature is rarely practicable, 
the same reliable hearsay information that an asylum officer may 
consider in deciding an asylum application is admissible at an 
evidentiary hearing in a refugee's motion for a new trial.  See 
8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2011) ("asylum officer may rely on 
material provided by the Department of State, other [United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services] offices, or other 
credible sources, such as international organizations, private 
voluntary agencies, news organizations, or academic 
institutions").21 
 
There is nothing in the judge's findings and order on the 
defendant's motion for a new trial or for reconsideration that 
suggests that he considered the defendant's refugee status in 
                                                          
 
 
21 A defendant with refugee status is not required to 
present evidence establishing the country conditions at the time 
of the plea for this special circumstance to receive 
particularly substantial weight. 
 
34 
 
finding the absence of prejudice.  The failure to consider this 
special circumstance is an error of law that requires that the 
judge's denial of the motion for a new trial and the motions for 
reconsideration be vacated and the matter remanded.22 
 
On remand, in deciding anew the question of prejudice, the 
judge will need to consider that this motion for a new trial 
differs from the more typical case where a defendant contends 
that defense counsel did not give fair warning that "if Federal 
authorities apprehended the defendant, deportation would be 
practically inevitable."  DeJesus, 468 Mass. at 181.  Here, the 
defendant does not seek to withdraw his guilty pleas to the 
charges of malicious destruction of property and knowingly 
receiving stolen property that formed part of the "global 
resolution" of his pending matters, and he does not dispute that 
these are crimes of moral turpitude that alone make him 
                                                          
 
 
22 The judge also appeared to err in finding no prejudice 
because the defendant "was more than satisfied" with the plea 
bargain "at that time."  The question is not whether the 
defendant was satisfied with the plea bargain at the time, 
having received inadequate advice about the immigration 
consequences of a conviction, but whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, in the absence of counsel's errors, a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have chosen 
to go to trial on the assault by means of a dangerous weapon 
charge rather than accept the plea offer.  See Commonwealth v. 
DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 184 (2014) (rejecting Commonwealth's 
argument that defendant was not prejudiced because he "got a 
very good deal" in receiving "straight probation when he was 
facing a mandatory minimum sentence of five years of 
incarceration"). 
 
35 
 
deportable.23  In light of those other pleas, his plea to the 
charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon does not affect 
whether he is deportable.  Rather, the relevant immigration 
consequence of his plea to that charge is the substantial risk 
of losing a viable avenue for discretionary relief because, 
unless the defendant is a "violent or dangerous" individual, a 
defendant who is a refugee has such a viable avenue even where 
the defendant has committed crimes of moral turpitude that 
render him deportable.  It was not clear in 2005 that a guilty 
plea to assault by means of a dangerous weapon would classify 
                                                          
 
 
23 Because the defendant does not challenge whether 
malicious destruction of property and knowingly receiving stolen 
property are crimes of moral turpitude, we need not determine 
whether they are.  Although it was clear at the time of the plea 
in 2005 that knowingly receiving stolen property was a crime 
involving moral turpitude, see Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 
114 (1st Cir. 1998); Matter of L, 61 I. & N. Dec. 666, 668 
(B.I.A. 1955), there is disagreement as to whether it was clear 
in 2005 that malicious destruction of property involves moral 
turpitude.  See Da Silva Neto v. Holder, 680 F.3d 25, 30 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (noting that there was "no case law directly on 
point" in affirming conclusion of board of immigration appeals 
that malicious destruction of property under Massachusetts law 
is crime involving moral turpitude).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Balthazar, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 442-443 (2014) (in 2009, 
"legal research would have indicated" that malicious destruction 
of property is crime involving moral turpitude); Hernandez-
Robledo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 777 F.2d 536, 
541-542 (9th Cir. 1985) (declining to announce per se rule that 
every incident of property destruction involves moral turpitude, 
but affirming determination of board of immigration appeals that 
petitioner's conviction of malicious destruction of property 
involved moral turpitude). 
 
36 
 
the defendant as "violent or dangerous" under In re Jean.24  But 
it was clear at that time that, if the defendant were not 
convicted of the charge of assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon, there was virtually no risk that the defendant would be 
subjected to the heightened standard regarding the grant of a 
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility, because he had no prior 
convictions for crimes that could be construed as violent or 
dangerous.  And it was also clear that, if he pleaded guilty to 
this charge, there would be a substantial risk that, having 
admitted to a violent crime, he would be subjected to the 
                                                          
 
 
24 The defendant argues that assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon is a "crime of violence," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 
(2012), see Almon v. Reno, 214 F.3d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 2000), and 
that it was clear in 2005 that a conviction of a "crime of 
violence" necessarily classifies an individual as "violent or 
dangerous."  In re Jean, 23 I. & N. 373, 383 (A.G. 2002).  There 
was Federal precedential support for this position prior to the 
defendant's plea.  See Togbah v. Ashcroft, 104 Fed. Appx. 788, 
794 (3d Cir. 2004) (Attorney General "created a heightened 
standard for cases of aliens who are inadmissible due to their 
convictions for crimes of violence" [emphasis added]).  There 
was also Federal precedential support for the proposition that 
the two categories were not necessarily equivalent, and that an 
immigration judge may look beyond the elements of the crime to 
determine whether, based on the underlying facts, an individual 
should be deemed "violent or dangerous."  See In re Jean, supra 
(heightened standard applies to violent or dangerous 
"individuals," and United States Attorney General relied on 
underlying facts of crime in finding refugee to be violent and 
dangerous).  Cf. Makir-Marwil v. Attorney General, 681 F.3d 
1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2012) ("Some crimes may be so serious and 
depraved that the [immigration judge] need only consider the 
elements of the offense to determine that the alien is violent 
or dangerous.  Sometimes the [immigration judge] may delve into 
the facts and circumstances of the prior offenses to determine 
whether the alien is violent or dangerous"). 
37 
 
heightened standard and that, under that standard, he would have 
virtually no chance of obtaining a discretionary waiver.  
Therefore, the clear immigration consequence of the defendant's 
plea to the assault by means of a dangerous weapon charge was 
the substantial risk that he would lose a viable opportunity for 
discretionary relief.  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized, as do we, the significance of this immigration 
consequence.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368, quoting Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv. v St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001) 
("'preserving the possibility of' discretionary relief from 
deportation . . . 'would have been one of the principal benefits 
sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or 
instead to proceed to trial'").  The motion judge must determine 
whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel not advising him 
of this consequence.25 
                                                          
 
 
25 We recognize that in Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-369, the 
United States Supreme Court drew a distinction between "truly 
clear" and unclear immigration consequences in determining what 
advice counsel is required to offer.  Here, the substantial risk 
of losing a viable opportunity for discretionary relief is a 
clear consequence of the defendant's plea to the charge of 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and the consequence is 
no less clear because it is a risk rather than a certainty.  
Where, as here, the defendant is a refugee and deportable, 
counsel should have advised the defendant of that risk.  We need 
not determine whether this result is dictated by Federal 
constitutional law; it is sufficient that it is dictated by art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
38 
 
 
Therefore, we remand the case to the District Court with 
instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding 
prejudice.  In deciding whether there is a reasonable 
probability that the defendant would have chosen to go to trial 
on the charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon had he 
been competently advised of the immigration consequences of a 
guilty plea, the special circumstance of the defendant's refugee 
status must be given particularly substantial weight in the 
totality of circumstances.  Here, the critical factual 
determination for the judge is what a reasonable defendant, 
under the circumstances, would have estimated to be the chance 
of acquittal on that charge had he gone to trial, bearing in 
mind that, in light of the weight to be given to the defendant's 
refugee status and the fact that the defendant faced only a 
house of correction sentence if convicted in the District Court, 
even a small chance of acquittal may be sufficient to show that 
it was reasonably probable that a person in the position of the 
defendant would have rejected the plea and insisted on going to 
trial. 
 
Conclusion.  The orders denying the defendant's motion for 
a new trial and the motions for reconsideration are vacated, and 
the matter is remanded to the District Court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.