Title: T.C. v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002124
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 94-2128, 94-2141,  
 
94-2384, 94-2852 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
John BBB Doe, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. Mary’s 
Congregation and Father Jerome Lanser, 
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Alias Insurance Company No.1 and Alias 
Insurance Company No. 2, 
 
Defendants. 
--------------------------------------- 
John MMM Doe, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Alias Insurance Company No. 1, Alias  
Insurance Company No. 2, Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee, St. Boniface Congregation 
and Father Michael Neuberger, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
--------------------------------------- 
T.C., 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Reverend 
S. Joseph Collova and St. James Catholic 
Church, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
--------------------------------------- 
J.J., 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Father Michael 
Neuberger and St. Boniface Congregation, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
---------------------------------------- 
A.C., 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Reverend 
William J. Effinger and St. Francis 
Desales Catholic Church, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
--------------------------------------- 
Susan Smith, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Reverend 
William J. Effinger and St. Mary’s 
Catholic Church, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
---------------------------------------- 
John Brown, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. Francis 
Desales Catholic Church and Reverend 
William J. Effinger, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 27, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 27, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Laurence Gram, John E. McCormick,  
 
 
Frank T. Crivello 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
CROOKS, J., took no part. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For John BBB Doe and John MMM Doe there were 
briefs by Jeffrey R. Anderson, Mark A. Wendorf and Reinhardt & 
Anderson, St. Paul, MN and oral argument by Mark A. Wendorf. 
 
 
For T.C., J.J., A.C., Susan Smith, John Brown  
there were briefs by Robert L. Elliott, Timothy J. Cesar and 
Hausmann-McNally, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument Robert L. 
Elliott. 
 
 
For 
Archdiocese 
of 
Milwaukee 
& 
St. 
Mary’s 
Congregation, St. Boniface Congregation, St. Francis Desales 
Catholic Church, St. Mary’s Catholic Church, there were briefs by 
Matthew J. Flynn, Katherine H. Grebe, Michael J. Fischer and 
Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee and oral argument by Matthew J. Flynn. 
 
 
For the Reverend S. Joseph Collova there were 
briefs by David J. Hase, Christopher J. Jaekels, Stacy C. Gerber 
Ward and Cook & Franke, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
 
No separate brief (in Supreme Court) filed in 
regards to Father William Effinger, and Father Jerome Lanser by 
Gerald P. Boyle, Milwaukee, as they joined in the briefs filed on 
behalf of Archdiocese of Milwaukee. 
 
 
No separate brief filed (in Supreme Court) in 
regards to Father Michael Neuberger by Alex Flynn, Milwaukee, as 
he joined in the briefs filed on behalf of Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-0423 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John BBB Doe, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
St. Mary's Congregation, and 
Father Jerome Lanser, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Alias Insurance Company No. 1, and 
Alias Insurance Company No. 2, 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
Case No. 94-0695 
 
John MMM Doe, 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Alias Insurance Company No. 1, 
Alias Insurance Company No. 2, 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
St. Boniface Congregation, and 
Father Michael Neuberger, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
Case No. 94-2124 
 
T.C., 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
2 
 
v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Reverend S. 
Joseph Collova, and St. James Catholic 
Church, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 94-2128 
 
J.J., 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Father 
Michael Neuberger, and St. Boniface 
Congregation, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
Case No. 94-2141 
 
A.C., 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
Reverend William J. Effinger, and St. 
Francis Desales Catholic Church, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
Case No. 94-2384 
 
Susan Smith, 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
Reverend William J. Effinger, 
and St. Mary's Catholic Church, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
Case No. 94-2852 
 
John Brown, 
 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
3 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
St. Francis  Desales Catholic Church, 
and Reverend William J. Effinger, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
APPEAL from judgments and orders of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County. 
 Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   Seven cases are before the court 
on a consolidated certification from the court of appeals.  The 
plaintiffs allege that as children, and in one case continuing 
into adulthood, he or she was sexually abused by a Roman 
Catholic priest employed by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  All 
of their complaints were dismissed by the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment 
on one or more of the following grounds: the claims were barred 
by the statute of limitations, for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, or on public policy grounds. 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the following question: 
Does the discovery rule save an otherwise untimely, non-
incestuous, sexual assault claim against the individual alleged 
perpetrator when the alleged victim was a minor, and the alleged 
perpetrator was a person in a position of trust vis-à-vis the 
child/victim?  Applying the discovery rule to these cases, we 
conclude that the plaintiffs' claims were not timely filed 
because each of the plaintiffs discovered, or in the exercise of 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
4 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered that he or she was 
injured at the time of the alleged assault(s) or by the last 
date of the alleged multiple assaults.  Consequently, each 
plaintiff should have filed his or her action within the 
applicable statutory period of one or two years after reaching 
majority.  We conclude that in each case, the circuit court 
properly held that the claims of each plaintiff are barred by 
the statute of limitations for minors, and therefore affirm. 
¶3 
The seven plaintiffs' claims are similar in nature, 
but not identical.  Five plaintiffs, T.C., J.J., A.C., Susan 
Smith, and John Brown, claim that they were not aware until 
recently that the sexual assault(s) caused their psychological 
and emotional injuries.  Two plaintiffs, John BBB Doe and John 
MMM Doe, claim that they repressed the memory of the incidents 
of abuse, and of the identity of the abusers.1  The Doe 
plaintiffs allege that they suffered injuries as a result of the 
abuse, but were not aware that the abuse caused these injuries 
until they recently recalled the abuse.  All seven plaintiffs 
claim the individual priest defendants negligently misused their 
positions of authority.  Each plaintiff also asserts claims 
against 
the 
churches 
and 
the 
Archdiocese 
for 
negligent 
employment, training and supervision of the defendant priests, 
and for failure to report the abuse. 
                     
1  Although the claim of repressed memory of the incident of 
sexual assault is not asserted in the BBB Doe and MMM Doe 
complaints, this allegation was included in their briefs in 
opposition to the motions to dismiss.  The circuit courts 
included this allegation in the facts that they considered as 
true 
when 
making 
their 
determinations 
as 
to 
the 
legal 
sufficiency of the Doe claims. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
5 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY - PLAINTIFFS T.C., J.J., A.C.,  
SUSAN SMITH, AND JOHN BROWN 
¶4 
Because these cases come to us following the grant of 
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, we must take as true 
all facts pled and all reasonable inferences therefrom, solely 
for the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of the claims. 
 Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987).  
For purposes of our legal analysis only, we accept the following 
facts.2  The claims of T.C. and J.J. are similar and can be 
discussed together.  From approximately 1980 until 1987, when 
T.C. was 14-21 years old, Father S. Joseph Collova sexually 
assaulted3 him on hundreds of occasions.  T.C. filed suit against 
Father Collova on December 7, 1993, approximately 6 years after 
the last date of sexual assault.  T.C. amended his complaint to 
include the Archdiocese of Milwaukee and St. James Catholic 
Church as defendants on February 21, 1994. 
                     
2  For ease of reference, appended to this opinion is a 
brief chart setting out the dates pertinent to each claim. 
3  In the civil tort realm, assault is defined as 
essentially a mental rather than a physical invasion.  It is the 
apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with a person.  
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 
10, at 43 (5th ed. 1984).  Battery is defined as a harmful or 
offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act intended 
to cause the plaintiff or a third person to suffer such contact, 
or apprehension that such a contact is imminent.  Id., § 9 at 
39. 
"Sexual assault" in our criminal code is defined as sexual 
contact or intercourse with another person, without the consent 
of that person.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.225.  For purposes of 
these complaints, we understand the plaintiffs' civil claims of 
sexual assault to mean a sexual battery, and not mental 
invasion. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
6 
¶5 
Approximately during the year 1968, when J.J. was 
still a minor,4 Father Michael Neuberger sexually assaulted him 
on a number of occasions.  J.J. filed suit against Father 
Neuberger, the Archdiocese, and St. Boniface Congregation on 
February 16, 1994, 26 years after the date of abuse. 
¶6 
As a result of the psychological distress caused by 
the sexual assaults, T.C. and J.J. each subsequently developed 
coping mechanisms.  According to T.C.’s complaint, he suppressed 
and was unable to perceive the existence, nature, or cause of 
his psychological and emotional injuries until approximately 
1992, when he was 26 years old.  T.C. was unaware that he had 
suffered emotional damage until it was subsequently diagnosed 
during treatment.  According to J.J.’s complaint, as a result of 
these coping mechanisms and his distress, he was unable to 
perceive or know the existence or nature of his psychological 
and emotional injuries and their connection to the sexual 
assault(s) until approximately December of 1992, 24 years after 
the date of assault. 
¶7 
Both T.C. and J.J.’s complaints include claims against 
the individual priest defendant for breach of fiduciary or 
ecclesiastical duty and breach of ministerial duties. Both 
complaints include claims against the local church for negligent 
                     
4  J.J.'s complaint does not recite his date of birth or age 
at the time of the assaults.  While the complaint does not 
allege that J.J. was a student of Father Neuberger's or of the 
Archdiocese, we take the allegations that Father Neuberger 
breached his duty to J.J. to "instruct, advise, teach and 
counsel, and to interpret truthfully and faithfully the doctrine 
and tenets of the Roman Catholic Church on matters of faith, 
morals and religious doctrine," that J.J. was at least of school 
age. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
7 
supervision and for liability under the doctrine of apparent 
authority. 
 
Both 
complaints 
include 
claims 
against 
the 
Archdiocese for negligent training, placement, and supervision 
of the priest, liability under the doctrine of apparent 
authority, and for breach of duty under Wis. Stat. § 48.9815 to 
report abuse and mitigate harm.  Both complaints include a claim 
for punitive damages against all defendants.  
¶8 
The facts for A.C., Susan Smith, and John Brown are 
similar because all allege sexual assault by Father William J. 
Effinger 
and 
all 
include 
claims 
relating 
to 
negligent 
consumption of alcohol.  During 1978, Father Effinger sexually 
assaulted A.C. on a number of occasions.  Although his complaint 
                     
5  Wis. Stat. § 48.981 (1995-96) Abused or neglected 
children. 
(2) PERSONS REQUIRED TO REPORT.  A physician, coroner, 
medical examiner, nurse, dentist, chiropractor, optometrist, 
acupuncturist, other medical or mental health professional, 
social worker, marriage and family therapist, professional 
counselor, public assistance worker, . . . school teacher, 
administrator or counselor, mediator under s. 767.11, child care 
worker in a day care center or child caring institution, day 
care provider, alcohol or other drug abuse counselor, member of 
the treatment staff employed by or working under contract with a 
county department under s. 46.23, 51.42, or 51.437, physical 
therapist, occupational therapist, speech-language pathologist, 
audiologist, emergency medical technician or police or law 
enforcement officer having reasonable cause to suspect that a 
child seen in the course of professional duties has been abused 
or neglected or having reason to believe that a child seen in 
the course of professional duties has been threatened with abuse 
or neglect and that abuse or neglect of the child will occur 
shall, except as provided under sub.(2m), report as provided in 
sub.(3).  Any other person, including an attorney, having reason 
to suspect that a child has been abused or neglected or reason 
to believe that a child has been threatened with abuse or 
neglect and that abuse or neglect of the child will occur may 
make such a report.  No person making a report under this 
subsection may be discharged from employment for so doing. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
8 
does not state A.C.'s age in 1978, it does allege that he was a 
school-age minor.  A.C. filed suit against Father Effinger, the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, and St. Francis DeSales Catholic 
Church on February 16, 1994, approximately 14 years after the 
assault(s).  After the Archdiocese was made aware of Father 
Effinger's assault on A.C., the Archdiocese failed to take 
appropriate 
action 
to 
treat 
A.C.’s 
mental 
and 
emotional 
problems.  According to A.C.'s complaint, he was unaware that he 
had suffered emotional and psychological damage until he was 
subsequently diagnosed during treatment.  He was unable to bring 
this action any earlier because he was unaware of the injury and 
its cause, and because defendants' actions and omissions 
precipitated an emotional condition making A.C. incapable of 
bringing suit. 
¶9 
Sometime in 1968 or 1969, when Susan Smith was 8 or 9 
years old, Father Effinger raped, assaulted and molested her.  
Based on the record, Susan Smith apparently reported the assault 
to several immediate family members shortly afterwards.  Smith 
filed suit against Father Effinger, the Archdiocese, and St. 
Mary’s Catholic Church on March 9, 1993, 24 years after the 
assault(s).   
¶10 During 1979, Father Effinger sexually assaulted and 
molested John Brown on a number of occasions.  The record 
indicates that John Brown was born in 1966, and thus was 
approximately 13 years old at the time of the assaults.  Brown 
filed suit against Father Effinger, the Archdiocese, and St. 
Francis DeSales Catholic Church on March 9, 1993, approximately 
14 years after the assaults.  
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
9 
¶11 As a result of the sexual assaults, A.C., Smith, and 
Brown experienced 
symptoms 
of psychological 
and 
emotional 
distress 
and 
subsequently 
developed 
coping 
mechanisms.  
According to their complaints, as a result of the psychological 
distress and the coping mechanisms, each suppressed and was 
unable to perceive or know the existence, nature, or cause of 
his 
or 
her 
psychological 
and 
emotional 
injuries 
until 
approximately January of 1993.  Thus, A.C. did not know of his 
injuries until approximately 13 years after his assault, Susan 
Smith did not know of her injuries until 24 years after her 
assault,6 and Brown did not know of his injuries until 14 years 
after his assault. 
¶12 A.C., Smith, and Brown each claim Father Effinger 
breached his ministerial duties.  They claim the Archdiocese was 
negligent in the training, placement, and supervision of 
priests; is liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, 
breached their contract for educational services, is vicariously 
liable for Father Effinger's negligent consumption of alcohol, 
and breached a duty under Wis. Stat. § 48.981 to report abuse 
and mitigate harm.  Similarly, they claim the churches are 
liable for negligent supervision, are vicariously liable for 
Father Effinger's negligent consumption of alcohol, and are 
liable under the doctrine of apparent authority.  A.C., Smith, 
and Brown also seek punitive damages against all the defendants. 
 
                     
6  While not expressly alleging in her amended complaint 
that she repressed knowledge of the sexual assault itself, there 
is evidence in the record that at some point, Smith repressed 
knowledge of the event itself.  
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
10
CIRCUIT COURT DISPOSITION OF THE CASES OF T.C., J.J., A.C., 
SUSAN SMITH, AND JOHN BROWN 
¶13 The Archdiocese and the churches in the T.C., J.J., 
and A.C. cases moved for dismissal on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, and that any actionable claims were time barred under 
the applicable statute of limitations.  The circuit court, Judge 
John E. McCormick, heard and decided together the motions 
pertaining to T.C., J.J., and A.C.  The court dismissed each of 
their complaints for three reasons.  First, the circuit court 
held that because each plaintiff was aware of the incident of 
sexual assault, he had a duty of due diligence to discover the 
injury.  Therefore, the complaints were barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations.  Second, the circuit court dismissed the 
complaints on the public policy grounds of prevention of fraud 
and protection of defendants from stale claims.  Third, the 
circuit court ruled that the complaints failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted against the Archdiocese and 
the churches because Wisconsin courts have not yet recognized 
the claim of negligent supervision.   
¶14 In Susan Smith’s case, the defendants moved for 
summary judgment based on a statute of limitations bar against 
all of Susan Smith’s claims, on public policy grounds, and for 
failure to state a claim against the Archdiocese and St. Mary’s. 
 The circuit court, Judge Frank T. Crivello, granted defendants’ 
summary judgment motion.  The circuit court held that Susan 
Smith’s action was time-barred by the statute of limitations and 
that public policy dictated an application of the discovery rule 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
11
consistent with the sexual exploitation by a therapist statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.585,7 which limited discovery to 15 years.   
¶15 In John Brown’s case, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court, Judge Frank T. Crivello, granted 
the motion, dismissing all of Brown’s claims as barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations.  The court dismissed Brown's 
claims against the Archdiocese and St. Francis DeSales, finding 
that Brown had failed to state a claim for respondeat superior 
and for failure to report abuse.  The court held that Father 
Effinger’s actions were beyond the scope of his employment and 
therefore, Brown could not recover under respondeat superior.  
The court further held that Wis. Stat. § 48.981 does not impose 
                     
7  Wis. Stat. § 893.585 (1991-92) Sexual exploitation 
by a therapist. (1) Notwithstanding ss. 893.54, 893.55 
and 893.57, an action under s. 895.70 for damages 
shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of 
action accrues or be barred.  
(2) If a person entitled to bring action under s. 
895.70 is unable to bring the action due to the 
effects of the sexual contact or due to any threats, 
instructions or statements from the therapist, the 
period of inability is not part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action, except that this 
subsection shall not extend the time limitation by 
more than 15 years. 
 
According to Wis. Stat. § 895.70, "'Therapist' means a 
physician, psychologist, social worker, marriage and family 
therapist, professional counselor, nurse, chemical dependency 
counselor, member of the clergy or other person, whether or not 
licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to 
perform 
psychotherapy." 
 
Under 
that 
same 
section, 
"psychotherapy" has the meaning designated in § 455.01(6). 
According to Wis. Stat. § 455.01(6), "'Psychotherapy' means 
the 
use 
of 
learning, 
conditioning 
methods 
and 
emotional 
reactions in a professional relationship to assist person to 
modify 
feelings, 
attitudes 
and 
behaviors 
which 
are 
intellectually, 
socially 
or 
emotionally 
maladjustive 
or 
ineffectual." 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
12
a duty on organizations to report abuse.  Finally, the circuit 
court ruled that Brown had failed to exercise reasonable 
diligence in discovering his cause of action for negligent 
supervision.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY - THE TWO DOE PLAINTIFFS 
¶16 Again, for purposes of reviewing the legal sufficiency 
of these claims, we must take the facts pled by the two Doe 
plaintiffs as true.  From 1964-1969, beginning when John BBB Doe 
was approximately age 8 and continuing until he was age 12 or 
13, Father Jerome Lanser misused his position of authority, 
trust, reverence, and control as a Roman Catholic priest by 
repeatedly engaging in unpermitted, harmful, and offensive 
sexual contact with Doe.  The sexual abuse included fondling and 
oral sex.  The abuse occurred at numerous locations on the 
grounds of St. Mary’s Congregation.  John BBB Doe filed suit 
against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. Mary’s Congregation, 
and Father Lanser on August 20, 1992, when BBB Doe was 36 years 
old.   
¶17 Beginning in approximately 1965 until 1967, when John 
MMM Doe was 16-18 years of age, Father Neuberger misused his 
position of authority, trust, reverence, and control as a Roman 
Catholic priest by repeatedly engaging in unpermitted, harmful 
and offensive sexual contact with Doe.  The sexual abuse 
included fondling and masturbation, and occurred on the premises 
of St. Boniface.  John MMM Doe filed suit against the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. Boniface Congregation, and Father 
Neuberger on April 12, 1993, when MMM Doe was 44 years old.   
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
13
¶18 According to each of the Doe complaints, as a result 
of the sexual abuse, the two Doe plaintiffs developed various 
coping mechanisms 
and 
symptoms of 
psychological 
distress, 
including 
shame, 
embarrassment, 
guilt, 
self-blame, 
denial, 
repression, and disassociation from their experiences.  As a 
result of their coping mechanisms and distress, the Doe 
plaintiffs were unable to perceive or know the existence or 
nature of their psychological and emotional injuries and their 
connection to the sexual abuse. 
¶19 According to his complaint, in approximately March of 
1990, when John BBB Doe was 34 years old, BBB Doe began to know 
or have reason to know that Father Lanser’s acts caused his 
psychological injuries.  In approximately 1992, John MMM Doe 
began to know or have reason to know that Father Neuberger's 
acts caused his psychological injuries. 
¶20 Each of the Doe plaintiffs claims that the individual 
priest defendant negligently 
counseled 
them, 
and breached 
fiduciary duties owed to them.  Each of the Does claims that the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee and the local church were vicariously 
liable, negligently supervised, and/or retained the individual 
priest, 
and 
negligently 
supervised 
the 
minor 
plaintiff.  
According to John BBB Doe's complaint, the individual priest 
defendant 
breached 
his 
ministerial 
duties 
by 
wrongfully 
instructing BBB Doe on matters of faith and morals and religious 
doctrine.  The defendant priest used his authority and influence 
as a minister to importune, cajole, coerce, and overpower John 
BBB Doe. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
14
¶21 John MMM Doe further alleges that Father Neuberger 
also breached his duty of care to Doe by failing to identify and 
properly respond to the transference and/or counter transference 
phenomenon which developed within their counseling relationship. 
  
¶22 The defendants in both Doe cases moved to dismiss the 
complaints against the Archdiocese and the churches.  The 
defendants asserted that the Doe complaints were barred by the 
statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.  These motions were heard and 
decided separately, by different circuit courts. 
¶23 The defendants in the BBB Doe case argued to the 
circuit court that the complaint failed to address many factual 
specifics central to this controversy.  Defendants contended 
that the plaintiff’s claims for vicarious liability were 
governed by the two-year statute of limitations for intentional 
torts.  They argued that even if the court accepted March of 
1990 as the date that the cause of action accrued, by not filing 
until August of 1992, BBB Doe had missed the statute of 
limitations deadline for vicarious liability.  In addition, 
defendants maintained that by utilizing due diligence, BBB Doe 
discovered or should have discovered the sexual assaults before 
August 20, 1989 (three years prior to commencement of suit).  As 
such, even under the discovery rule, the three-year statute of 
limitations for injuries bars Doe’s claims. 
¶24 John BBB Doe responded that he had not known nor had 
reason to know of the sexual abuse, or that his injuries 
resulted from the contacts until March of 1990.  Therefore, 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
15
under the discovery rule, his suit was not barred by the three-
year statute of limitations.  BBB Doe argued that the exercise 
of due diligence to discover the abuse and the resulting 
injuries was a question of fact.  Doe argued that the defendants 
did not provide sufficient facts to prove that in exercising due 
diligence, plaintiff should have known of the sexual contacts 
and his resulting injuries earlier.8  The circuit court, Judge 
Laurence C. Gram, Jr., dismissed John BBB Doe’s complaint as 
barred by the statute of limitations.  In doing so, the court 
adopted as its reasoning that part of the Archdiocese’s brief 
pertaining to the statute of limitations.  The circuit court did 
not indicate which of defendants’ reasons it had adopted as the 
basis for its decision. 
¶25 The circuit court declined to consider the affidavit 
of therapist Dr. Nancy Perry, first submitted as part of BBB 
Doe's opposition to the motion to dismiss.  In reviewing an 
order of dismissal under Wis. Stat. § 802.06, we will not 
consider matters outside the pleadings not accepted by the 
circuit court for its consideration.  Thus, we do not consider 
affidavits filed with BBB Doe's brief opposing the defendants' 
motions to dismiss. 
¶26 We turn to plaintiff John MMM Doe.  Although not 
specifically alleged in his complaint, MMM Doe asserted in his 
                     
8  We note that in his brief opposing defendants' motion to 
dismiss, John BBB Doe alternatively requested leave to amend his 
complaint if the court found that his complaint was not properly 
pled.  Because that issue is not presented in the question 
certified to us, nor is it presented in BBB Doe's briefs to this 
court, we need not address it. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
16
opposition brief that he had suppressed memory of the sexual 
contacts and was not aware of the sexual abuse until less than 2 
years before commencement of his suit, or until 1992.  According 
to MMM Doe, he had experienced psychological injuries over the 
years, but did not discover the cause of those injuries until 
1992.  John MMM Doe requested leave to amend his pleadings if 
the circuit court found them insufficient.   
¶27 Similar to BBB Doe, John MMM Doe submitted an 
affidavit of Dr. Basil Jackson, a psychiatrist, as part of his 
opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss.  The circuit 
court's memorandum decision and order made no reference to that 
affidavit.  
¶28 The circuit court, Judge John E. McCormick, granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The court held that, given the 
dates of injury or abuse from 1965-67, John MMM Doe did not take 
the proper steps to reasonably discover his repressed emotions. 
 Therefore, 
his 
claims 
were 
barred 
by 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations.  The circuit court further found that to permit a 
claim to proceed 26-28 years after the abuse would violate 
public policy.   
¶29 The circuit court also found that MMM Doe had failed 
to state a claim against the Archdiocese and St. Boniface for 
negligent supervision.  First, the court stated that Wisconsin 
had not yet recognized the tort of negligent supervision.  
Second, the alleged conduct of the priest was outside the scope 
of his employment as a matter of law, and, therefore the 
Archdiocese 
and 
St. 
Boniface 
could 
not 
be 
liable 
under 
respondeat superior.  
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
17
¶30 All seven plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their 
complaints by the circuit court.  These seven cases are before 
us on a consolidated certification from the court of appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶31 Plaintiffs T.C., J.J., A.C., John BBB Doe, and John 
MMM Doe seek reversal of the lower courts' orders of dismissal. 
 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the 
legal sufficiency of the complaint.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 512. 
 While we accept the facts pled as true for purposes of our 
review, we are not required to assume as true legal conclusions 
pled by the plaintiffs.  State v. Wisconsin Telephone, 91 Wis. 
2d 702, 720, 284 N.W.2d 41 (1979).  Dismissal of a claim is 
improper if there are any conditions under which the plaintiffs 
could recover.  Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 
723, 733, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979). 
¶32 If a motion to dismiss is filed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.06 and matters outside the pleadings are presented and 
accepted by the court for its consideration, the motion is 
considered a motion for summary judgment.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.06(3). Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 260 n.3, 418 
N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1987). 
¶33 Plaintiffs Susan Smith and John Brown seek reversal of 
the orders granting summary judgment.  In reviewing such an 
order, an appellate court applies the same standards as does a 
circuit 
court. 
 
Wisconsin 
Patients 
Compensation 
Fund 
v. 
Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan, 200 Wis. 2d 599, 
606, 547 N.W.2d 578 (1996).  These standards are set forth in 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
18
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).9  The summary judgment "methodology does 
not allow enlargement of the issues beyond those framed by the 
pleadings. . . . Were the rule otherwise, plaintiff's affidavit 
opposing a defendant's motion for summary judgment would itself 
constitute a complaint which must be answered and require a new 
motion for summary judgment."  C.L. v. Olson, 140 Wis. 2d 224, 
239, 409 N.W.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422 
N.W.2d 614 (1988). 
¶34 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), summary judgment 
must be entered if there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Firstar Trust Co. v. First National Bank of Kenosha, 197 
Wis. 2d 484, 492, 541 N.W.2d 467 (1995). "[W]here facts, even if 
material, are disputed, those facts become irrelevant if, in 
giving full benefit to the party against whom summary judgment 
is sought, the claim nevertheless is barred as a matter of law." 
 Byrne v. Bercker, 176 Wis. 2d 1037, 1045, 501 N.W.2d 402 
(1993).  Whether the defendants here are entitled to summary 
judgment depends upon whether the claims against them are barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
                     
9  Wis. Stat. § 802.08 (1993-1994) Summary judgment. 
. . .  
(2) . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
19
¶35 We 
first 
determine 
when 
the 
plaintiffs' 
claims 
accrued.  Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 559, 335 
N.W.2d 578 (1983).  Once the date of accrual is determined, we 
can assess whether the plaintiffs filed suit within the 
applicable statutory limitations period.  Then, if the suits 
were filed within the applicable statute of limitations, we 
address the substantive propriety of the claims. 
 
ACCRUAL OF THE CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS T.C., J.J., A.C., SUSAN 
SMITH, AND JOHN BROWN 
¶36 Plaintiffs T.C., J.J., A.C., Susan Smith, and John 
Brown contend that their claims accrued not on the date of the 
assaults, but on the date they discovered their injuries or the 
date on which, after reasonable diligence, they should have 
discovered their injuries.  Citing Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 
Wis. 2d 397, 420-21, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986), these five 
plaintiffs assert that their claims could not have accrued until 
four conditions were met, namely that each plaintiff knew, to a 
reasonable probability, 1) the identity of the responsible 
defendant, 2) that he or she had sustained an injury, 3) the 
cause of the injury, and 4) the nature of the injury.  For these 
five plaintiffs, the asserted dates of discovery range from 5 to 
25 years after the actual dates that the sexual assaults 
occurred or ended. 
¶37 The 
policy 
considerations 
behind 
statutes 
of 
limitations, and the rules for accrual of claims, are several.  
On the one hand, we are concerned with allowing tort victims a 
fair 
opportunity 
to 
enforce 
legitimate 
claims 
against 
wrongdoers.  On the other hand, we are concerned with protecting 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
20
defendants from having to defend against stale claims, where so 
much time has passed between the allegedly tortious act and the 
filing of the claim that witnesses and relevant evidence may be 
unavailable. 
 
Such 
deficits 
can 
preclude 
both 
the 
fair 
prosecution of claims and meaningful defenses.  We are also 
concerned with preventing the prosecution of fraudulent claims. 
 All of these considerations underlie statutes of limitations 
and ultimately promote efficient judicial administration. 
¶38 Prior to 1983, this court declined to adopt the 
discovery rule, reasoning that such a change in the law should 
be enacted by the legislature.  Our pre-discovery rule cases are 
summarized in Claypool v. Levin, __ Wis. 2d __, 562 N.W.2d 584, 
para. 13-14 (1997).  With our decision in Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 
550, we reversed a long line of cases that had established the 
accrual date for personal injury actions as the date of the tort 
causing the injury.  Hansen and several subsequent decisions 
have shaped the requirements for determining when a tort cause 
of action accrues in Wisconsin.10, 11  See Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 
550; Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397. 
                     
10  As recounted in Claypool v. Levin, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 562 
N.W. 2d 584 (1997), the accrual of a medical malpractice cause 
of action was determined by the legislature in 1979 when it 
enacted Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b). 
11  See, however, Estate of Makos, No. 96-0174, slip op. at 
2 (S. Ct. June 20, 1997) considering Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b). 
 Although the concurrence in this case refers to the Makos 
opinion, the only "majority" holding in that case is the 
mandate.  Of the four "majority" justices, three separate 
opinions give three distinct reasons for the result.  Therefore, 
none of the opinions in that case has any precedential value. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
21
¶39 In Hansen we wanted to avoid the harsh results 
produced by commencing running the statute of limitations before 
the plaintiff was aware of any basis for an action.  By adopting 
the discovery rule we balanced the competing policies favoring 
plaintiffs and defendants.  We adopted the rule "for all tort 
actions other than those already governed by a legislatively 
created discovery rule.  Such tort claims shall accrue on the 
date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence 
should be discovered, whichever occurs first.”  113 Wis. 2d at 
560.  In Borello, we said that the discovery rule required not 
only the discovery of the injury, but also discovery of the 
cause of the injury.  According to Borello, the statute of 
limitations should not commence to run until the plaintiff 
discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered his or her injury and that the injury may have 
been caused by the defendant's conduct.  130 Wis. 2d at 411. 
¶40 Shortly after Borello, the court of appeals considered 
application of the discovery rule to an intentional tort claim 
for incestuous abuse.  Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d at 258.  There, 
citing Borello and Hansen, the appellate court held that as a 
matter of law, a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not 
accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause 
of the injury.  142 Wis. 2d at 264.  The Hammer court analogized 
the facts regarding the date of discovery as pled by the incest 
victim to those pled in Borello.  Id. at 266.  A further 
justification for tolling the statute of limitations was that 
"[v]ictims of incest have been harmed because of a 'most 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
22
egregious violation of the parent/child relationship,'" and that 
to "protect the parent at the expense of the child works an 
'intolerable perversion of justice.'"  Id. at 267. 
¶41 The defendant father argued in Hammer that the statute 
of limitations for minors applied to his daughter's claim, and 
rendered her claim too late.  142 Wis. 2d at 263.  The court of 
appeals rejected this argument, and applied the discovery rule 
to claims of incest.  Id. at 267.  The legislature later 
codified the Hammer decision by enacting Wis. Stat. § 893.587 as 
the statute of limitations for claims of incest.12  See Pritzlaff 
v. Archdiocese, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 319, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996).  
¶42 We applied the discovery rule codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 to another case of alleged incest in Byrne, 176 Wis. 
2d 1037, 1046.  There we said that the discovery rule tolled the 
statute of limitations until the plaintiff first recalled her 
father's abuse as the cause of her emotional and psychological 
injuries.  At that point, she knew the nature and extent of her 
injuries, and knew that her father caused those injuries.  176 
Wis. 2d at 1046-47.  Nonetheless, we held that her claim was 
barred because she delayed too long after discovering the 
elements of her claim to file suit.  176 Wis. 2d at 1047-48. 
                     
12  Wis. Stat. § 893.587 (1995-96) Incest; limitation.  An 
action to recover damages for injury caused by incest shall 
be commenced within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers 
the fact and the probable cause, or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the fact and 
the probable cause, of the injury, whichever occurs first. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
23
¶43 More recently, we were asked to apply the discovery 
rule in a non-incestuous sexual assault case.  Pritzlaff, 194 
Wis. 2d 302.  There the plaintiff alleged that she was coerced 
into sexual relations with a priest.  Ms. Pritzlaff filed suit 
against the priest and the Archdiocese.  Although only the 
claims against the Archdiocese were before us on review, we 
considered Ms. Pritzlaff's claims against both the priest and 
the Archdiocese.  194 Wis. 2d at 311, n.1.  We described the 
discovery rule: 
 
[T]he discovery rule is so named because it tolls the 
statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers 
or with reasonable diligence should have discovered 
that he or she has suffered actual damage due to 
wrongs committed by a particular, identified person.  
Until that time, plaintiffs are not capable of 
enforcing their claims either because they do not know 
that they have been wronged or because they do not 
know the identity of the person who has wronged them. 
 Accordingly, "'[d]iscovery' in most cases is implicit 
in 
the 
circumstances 
immediately 
surrounding 
the 
original misconduct." 
194 Wis. 2d at 315-16 (citations omitted).  We held that the 
discovery rule did not save plaintiff's cause of action because 
she knew all of the elements of her underlying claim against the 
priest, at the latest, by the time their relationship ended.  
194 Wis. 2d at 315. 
¶44 In considering Ms. 
Pritzlaff's knowledge of the 
elements of her claim, we accepted her statement that she had 
always been aware of the tortfeasor and of the tortious conduct, 
conduct which was the result of force and coercion.  194 Wis. 2d 
at 316-17.  In light of the plaintiff's knowledge, we determined 
that the priest's alleged contact was immediately actionable as 
a civil battery or offensive bodily contact.  194 Wis. 2d at 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
24
317, citing Wis JICivil 2005; Wis JICivil 201013 (approved 
1960).  Thus we concluded that Ms. Pritzlaff, knowing both the 
identity of the tortfeasor and the injurious conduct, could have 
alleged a complete cause of action by the time the relationship 
ended.  Id. at 316-17.  Her claim that she was unaware of 
additional harm, i.e., the severe emotional distress, only 
created uncertainty as to the amount of damages suffered, and 
did not toll the period of limitations.  Id. at 317.  In 
essence, we applied the discovery rule to Ms. Pritzlaff, and 
determined as a matter of law that she discovered, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered all of 
the elements of her claim by the time her relationship with the 
defendant priest ended. 
                     
13  Wis JICivil 2005 provides in pertinent part: 
"Bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, illness, 
or any impairment of physical condition. 
 
The Comment appended to Wis JICivil 2005 states: 
When there has been a bodily contact, without injury 
except to the dignity and personal sensibilities of 
the person subjected to the battery, use Wis JICivil 
2010. 
 
Wis JICivil 2010 provides in pertinent part: 
The unlawful and intentional subjection of another to 
an offensive bodily contact is an assault and battery. 
Not every touching of one person by another is 
unlawful.  To constitute an assault and battery, there 
must be an infliction of force upon another, without 
regard to the degree of force applied, and such 
infliction of force must be made in anger, for 
revenge, or in a rude or insolent manner.  Every 
person is by right entitled to be free of offensive 
bodily contacts, that is, contacts which are offensive 
to a reasonable sense of personal dignity, contacts 
which are unwarranted by the social usages prevalent 
at the time and place at which they are inflicted. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
25
¶45 Consistent with our decisions in Hansen, Borello, and 
Pritzlaff, we now apply the discovery rule to the claims of 
these plaintiffs, to ascertain when they discovered or, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered all of 
the elements of their claims. 
¶46 Each of these five plaintiffs' complaints alleges 
sexual assault by an individual priest defendant on one or more 
occasions.  Those events took place between 1980-87 for T.C., in 
the year 1968 for J.J., during 1978 for A.C., in either 1968 or 
1969 for Susan Smith, and during 1979 for John Brown.  None of 
these five plaintiffs filed a civil complaint with regard to 
these acts before 1993.  At the time of the sexual assaults, at 
least three of the five plaintiffs were 8 years old or older.  
John Brown and T.C., at least, were abused as teenagers.  Susan 
Smith, who was 8 or 9 years old at the time of her rape and 
assault, apparently reported the assault to several immediate 
family members shortly afterwards.  The record indicates that 
John Brown told his parents within hours of the occurrence, and 
that his parents reported it to the Archdiocese.  From his 
complaint, we know that A.C. was a school-age minor at the time 
of the assault, and also according to the complaint, someone 
made the Archdiocese aware of the assaults on A.C. by Father 
Effinger.14  As the circuit court noted in ruling on the motions 
to dismiss the complaints of A.C., T.C., and J.J., none of the 
                     
14  Paragraph 27 of A.C.'s complaint alleges: "That after 
the ARCHDIOCESE had been made aware of the sexual assaults on 
A.C. by EFFINGER, the ARCHDIOCESE negligently failed to take 
appropriate action to provide proper care and treatment to A.C. 
to treat his mental and emotional problems." 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
26
plaintiffs alleged that they were unable to remember the abuse 
itself at any time between the occurrence and the filing of 
their claims. 
¶47 All five plaintiffs knew the perpetrators as their 
parish or school priests.  These five plaintiffs knew, according 
to their complaints, that these perpetrators engaged in sexual 
fondling or other sexual contact with the plaintiffs on one or 
multiple occasions, away from the view of their parents or other 
responsible persons.15  Thus, we conclude that these five 
plaintiffs knew at least the identity of the responsible 
defendant and the nature of their injury no later than the time 
of the last sexual assault.16 
¶48 According to Borello and Pritzlaff, we must also 
consider when the plaintiffs discovered or, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered that they were 
injured, and the cause of their injury.  Plaintiffs have a duty 
to inquire into the injury that results from tortious activity. 
 See E.J.M. v. Archdiocese, 622 A.2d 1388, 1394 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
                     
15  In addition, the plaintiffs assert in their briefs that 
this sexual fondling or other sexual contact was inflicted 
forcibly and was offensive. 
16  Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same 
conclusions.  See, e.g., E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817, 821 
(Mont. 1988)(superseded by statute)(finding it not unreasonable 
to assume that upon reaching majority age, the plaintiff was 
aware that child  molestation was a wrongful act); Lovelace v. 
Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 631 (Okla. 1992)(ruling that cause of 
action accrued at end of each sexual encounter, despite 
plaintiff's unawareness of all her injuries); Lindabury v. 
Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(per 
curiam)(stating that last contemporaneous injury begins the 
limitations period for intentional tort). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
27
1993).  The measure of diligence required of a plaintiff to 
discover the elements of his or her cause of action is such 
diligence as the great majority of persons would use in the same 
or similar circumstances.  Plaintiffs may not ignore means of 
information reasonably available to them, but must in good faith 
apply their attention to those particulars which may be inferred 
to be within their reach.  Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 
638, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989).  Such diligence, we later qualified, 
does not require that a plaintiff "officially be informed by an 
expert witness of his or her injury, its cause or the relation 
between the injury and its cause."  Clark v. Erdmann, 161 Wis. 
2d 428, 448, 468 N.W.2d 18 (1991).  If the plaintiff has 
information providing the basis for an objective belief as to 
his or her injury and its cause, he or she has discovered the 
injury and its cause.  Clark, 161 Wis. 2d at 448. 
¶49 Ordinarily, reasonable diligence is a question of fact 
for the fact-finder.  Spitler, 148 Wis. 2d at 638.  However, 
when the facts and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
them 
are 
undisputed, 
whether 
a 
plaintiff 
has 
exercised 
reasonable diligence in discovering his or her cause of action 
is a question of law.  Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 161, 
465 N.W.2d 812 (1991).  In addition, whether an inference is 
reasonable is a question of law.  Hennekens, 160 Wis. 2d at 162. 
¶50 These five plaintiffs contend that they did not 
discover the causal relationship between the priests' conduct 
and their injuries until at least approximately 1992.  The 
circuit courts viewed the records differently.  In granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the circuit court found 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
28
the record replete with instances whereby John Brown knew he was 
suffering from psychological injuries, and that he directly 
related his problems to the priest's conduct.  The circuit court 
that dismissed the claims of T.C., A.C., and J.J. found that the 
plaintiffs were aware of all of the facts necessary to put them 
in the position to discover that they were injured.17  While the 
circuit court that dismissed Susan Smith's claim did so based on 
public policy grounds, there is also evidence in the record that 
Susan Smith suffered from physical pain at the time, and also 
that she reported the assault to her parents.  
¶51 We conclude, as a matter of law, that because the acts 
complained of were conducted intentionally, and without the 
consent of the minor victims, that each of the five plaintiffs 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered that he or she was injured at the time of the 
assaults.  See Wis JICivil 2010.  Further, when a conscious 
person perceives an immediate injury, the causal link is 
obvious. We therefore also conclude, as a matter of law, that 
each of these five plaintiffs discovered or, in the exercise of 
                     
17  The circuit court specifically stated: 
[T]he plaintiffs were aware of all of the facts 
necessary to put them in the position to discover that 
they were injured, at all times, and the actions are 
therefore untimely and barred as a matter of law.  In 
a sexual abuse or assault case where the conduct 
causes harm as a matter of law when it occurs, the 
plaintiff should not be allowed to toll the statute of 
limitations indefinitely simply by alleging that he 
never knew what (sic) the incident had caused his 
harm. 
 
June 20, 1994 hearing transcript, at 10-11. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
29
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the cause of their 
injury at least by the time of the last incident of assault. 
¶52 Other jurisdictions agree with our conclusions.  See, 
e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, 689 A.2d 634, 640 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1997)(plaintiff who alleged sexual abuse by 
priests as an adolescent "suffered 'an invasion of a legally 
protected interest' immediately when the batteries actually 
occurred, even if his problems worsened over time"); DeRose v. 
Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (sexual 
abuse causes harm at time of abuse, as a matter of law);18 and 
Marsha V. v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) ("a young child sexually molested against his or her will 
suffers an actual and appreciable injury at the time, and would 
be entitled to more than nominal damages").  An Illinois court 
recognized the "inevitability of injury" and that "emotional 
harm is practically certain to result from sexual assaults . . . 
even if the abuse was not accomplished through violence or 
threats of violence" in cases of sexual assault of minors.  
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Havey, 887 F. Supp. 195, 198 (C.D. Ill. 
1995). 
¶53 The Marsha V. court concluded that the plaintiff, a 
victim of incest, knew or should have known she was injured from 
the time of the assaults.  There the plaintiff alleged sexual 
molestation by her stepfather for a number of years during 
                     
18  The holding in DeRose may have been superseded by a 
statutory amendment.  See Cal. Stats. 1990, c. 1578, pp. 6403-
05, see contra, Marsha V. v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
30
childhood, but did not file suit until she was 32 years old.  
231 Cal. App. 3d at 268.  According to her pleadings, the 
plaintiff 
claimed 
no lack 
of awareness of 
the acts of 
molestation at the time they were committed, nor did she claim 
"contemporaneous or belated ignorance of the wrongfulness" of 
that conduct.  Id. at 271.  Thus, the Marsha V. court concluded 
that unless the plaintiff had immediately suppressed awareness 
of the acts, she had always known the elements of her claim, 
including causation.  Id. at 273. 
¶54 We find, as a matter of law, the same measure of 
awareness in the claims of these five plaintiffs. As we 
recognized in Pritzlaff, actionable injury flows immediately 
from a nonconsensual, intentional sexual touching.  194 Wis. 2d 
at 317.  While the plaintiffs may not have known the extent of 
their injuries at the time of the sexual assaults, in Wisconsin 
accrual of an action is not dependent upon knowing the full 
extent of one's injuries.  Id.19   
                     
19  The two Doe plaintiffs characterize our conclusion that 
sexual abuse causes harm when it occurs as an "irrelevant 
truism."  Petitioner John MMM Doe reply brief at 2 n.1; 
Petitioner John BBB Doe reply brief at 3 n.2.  Although we agree 
that under the discovery rule, the proper question is when the 
plaintiffs reasonably should have known that injury occurred and 
the cause of that injury, the fact that the plaintiffs were 
harmed at the time of the assault(s) is not irrelevant but is 
the starting point for a determination of when the plaintiffs 
reasonably should have known they were injured and the cause of 
that injury.  In many tort cases, harm at the time of the 
assault is also the end point for that inquiry. See Borello v. 
U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 404 n.2, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).   
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
31
¶55 In cases where there has been an intentional, non-
incestuous assault by one known to the plaintiff, and the 
plaintiff sustains actual harm at the time of the assault, the 
causal link is established as a matter of law.  These plaintiffs 
knew the individual priests, knew the acts of sexual assault 
took place, and knew immediately that the assaults caused them 
injury.  We therefore conclude that these plaintiffs discovered, 
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered all the elements of their causes of action against 
the 
individual 
perpetrators 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
alleged 
assault(s), or by the last date of the alleged multiple 
assaults.20  As in Pritzlaff, the causes of action for T.C., 
J.J., A.C., Susan Smith, and John Brown accrued no later than 
the last incident of assault during their minority. 
                                                                  
Other jurisdictions also take the approach that accrual of 
an action is not dependent upon knowing the full extent of one's 
injuries.  See, e.g., Franke v. Geyer, 568 N.E.2d 931, 933 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991)(holding that a plaintiff need not know all of the 
facts or circumstances before the statute of limitations begins 
to 
run); 
Doe 
v. 
R.D., 
417 
S.E.2d 
541, 
542 
(S.C. 
1992)(interpreting statutory term of "reasonable diligence" to 
mean that injured party must act with promptness where the facts 
and circumstances of an injury put him on notice that a right 
has been invaded or that some claim might exist); Doe v. Roe, 
931 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 
(holding that, for the limitations statute to run, all that is 
required is knowledge of enough facts to prompt a reasonable 
person to investigate and discover full extent of the claim). 
20  These five plaintiffs essentially admit that they knew 
they suffered injury at or shortly after the alleged assaults.  
See, e.g., Petitioner T.C.'s brief at 11, "The injuries are 
psychological and they develop and manifest gradually beginning 
at childhood."  As noted above, there is evidence in the record, 
or at least a reasonable inference, that plaintiffs A.C., Susan 
Smith, and John Brown reported the assaults to their parents 
within a short time after the event(s). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
32
¶56 The plaintiffs would have us limit Pritzlaff to cases 
of sexual abuse of an adult victim, and not apply it to abuse of 
children. 
 
Plaintiffs 
rely 
on 
the 
Pritzlaff 
discussion 
distinguishing the special discovery rule for claims of incest. 
 See, e.g., Petitioner T.C.'s brief at 15-16, citing 194 Wis. 2d 
at 322.  But Pritzlaff did not suggest expanding the scope of 
the incest statute to include victims who are related neither by 
blood or adoption to their abusers.  That expansion is for the 
legislature. See Wis. Stat. § 893.587. 
¶57 Plaintiffs 
seek 
to 
benefit 
from 
a 
specialized 
discovery rule because they were victimized as young children or 
teenagers.  Because they were only children, they say, they 
viewed their abusers with respect and reverence.  Because they 
were only children, they say, they did not and could not 
discover their cause of action for assault, until much later in 
adulthood.  Based on the nature of a sexual assault by a known 
perpetrator, we conclude as a matter of law that the claims of 
these plaintiffs accrued by the time of the last incident of 
sexual assault. 
¶58 The legislature determines when the opportunity to 
file a claim for an accrued cause of action expires.  Unless 
otherwise specified by law, a period of limitation within which 
an action may be commenced is computed from the time that the 
cause of action accrues until the action is commenced.  Wis. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
33
Stat. § 893.04.21  The legislature has concluded, as evidenced by 
statute, that persons who are victimized as children have an 
extended opportunity to file their claims. 
 
[T]he provision tolling the statute of limitations 
during the period of the disability of infancy, dates 
back to at least 1848.  Wis. Rev. Stats. 1848, ch. 
127. 
 
The 
purpose 
of 
tolling 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations during a party's disability (in this case 
being within the age of 18) is to ensure that the 
minor 
does 
not 
lose 
rights 
because 
a 
guardian 
neglected to protect the minor's interest by bringing 
an action in a timely fashion.  The time period for 
initiating an action is extended by statute to allow 
the minor to enforce his or her own rights upon 
reaching the age of majority. 
Korth v. American Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 340 
N.W.2d 494 (1983).  This legislative suspension of the time 
within which an infant must commence a lawsuit is partly due to 
the requirement that infancy precludes the commencement of an 
action in the infant's name alone.  Christy v. Schwartz, 49 Wis. 
2d 760, 764, 183 N.W.2d 81 (1971).  Notably, however, the 
condition of infancy does not foreclose commencement of a 
lawsuit on the infant's behalf.  Wis. Stat. § 803.01(3).  An 
action on behalf of a minor can be commenced by a guardian ad 
litem. 
¶59 The legislature has tolled the statute of limitations 
for minors to file personal injury actions until they reach 
majority.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.16.22  Prior to 1971, the age of 
                     
21  Wis. Stat. § 893.04 (1993-94) Computation of period 
within which action may be commenced.  Unless otherwise 
specifically prescribed by law, a period of limitation 
within which an action may be commenced is computed from 
the time that the cause of action accrues until the action 
is commenced. 
22  Wis. Stat. § 893.16 (1979) Person under disability. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
34
majority in Wisconsin was 21 years. The relevant pre-1971 
statute mandated that a cause of action accruing during minority 
be brought within one year after the claimant's 21st birthday, 
or be barred.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 893.33 (1965). 
¶60 In 1971, the legislature lowered the age of majority 
to 18.  See § 5, ch. 213, Laws of 1971.  Thus, beginning on 
March 23, 1972 (the date after publication), § 893.33 mandated 
that a cause of action accruing during minority be brought 
within one year after the claimant's 18th birthday, or be 
barred.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 893.33 (1977). 
¶61 In 1979, Chapter 893 was repealed and recreated in its 
entirety.  § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  Section 893.33 was 
revamped and renumbered as § Wis. Stat. § 893.16, and the 
limitation period after minority was increased to two years.  
Thus, a claim accruing during minority had to be brought within 
two years of the claimant's 18th birthday, or be barred.  
However, § 893.16 does not apply to causes of action arising 
                                                                  
(1) If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time 
the cause of action accrues, either under the age of 18 
years, . . .; or insane, . . . the action may be commenced 
within 2 years after the disability ceases. . . . 
. . . . 
(5) This section applies only to statutes in this chapter 
limiting the time for commencement of an action or 
assertion of a defense or counterclaim except it does not 
apply to: 
. . . . 
(c) A cause of action which accrues prior to July 1, 
1980. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
35
prior to July 1, 1980.  See, e.g., § 893.16 (1987-88).  The 
statute has not undergone further changes in the interim. 
¶62 Although we conclude that, as a matter of law, these 
plaintiffs' claims accrued at the time of their last assaults, 
we recognize that the legislature has given them varying amounts 
of time to file their causes of action based upon their 
respective ages at the time of the assaults.  In permitting this 
extension of time to file a claim, the legislature undoubtedly 
recognized that human emotional and intellectual development is 
progressive.  For example, a six-year old child who suffers a 
sexual assault has twelve years to mature to legal adulthood.  
Only at that point will the statute of limitations begin to run 
on his or her claim.  Correspondingly, a sixteen-year old youth 
who 
suffers 
a 
sexual 
assault 
is 
more 
emotionally 
and 
intellectually developed.  The legislature affords him or her an 
additional two years to comprehend the wrongfulness of the 
defendant's conduct, and the harm that conduct caused.  In 
effect, 
the 
legislature 
has 
created 
a 
sliding 
scale 
of 
opportunity to file suit, based upon the minor's age at the time 
of accrual. 
¶63 We are also cognizant that a six-year old child, for 
example, may not fully realize at age 6 that he or she has been 
the victim of a completed tort, and that he or she has a cause 
of action.  Lack of a full understanding by the child victim can 
exist whenever the child has been the victim of any tortious 
act. The legislature obviously decided to address this problem 
by giving minors the extended statute of limitations.  The 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
36
younger the victim at the time of the tort, the longer that 
child has to commence his or her lawsuit. 
¶64 All seven plaintiffs here seek to benefit from two 
other statutes of limitations.  In 1985, the legislature 
extended 
the 
limitations 
period 
for 
claims 
of 
sexual 
exploitation by a therapist.  Wis. Stat. § 893.585.  In 1987, 
the legislature created an extended limitations period for 
claims of incest.23  Wis. Stat. § 893.587. 
¶65 None of the seven plaintiffs here assert that the 
defendant priests rendered psychotherapy to the plaintiffs.  Nor 
do they raise claims of incest.  Instead, the plaintiffs ask 
this court to draw analogies between their claims and the acts 
that fall within the ambit of the therapist and incest statutes. 
 The plaintiffs ask the court, and not the legislature, to 
create an extended limitations period for minor victims of non-
incestuous sexual assault when the perpetrators are in a 
position of trust vis-à-vis the child/victim. 
¶66 It is true that in 1983 this court chose to act in 
spite of legislative inaction.  In Hansen we concluded that the 
time had come to adopt the discovery rule in Wisconsin for all 
tort actions not otherwise covered by statute.  Hansen, 113 Wis. 
2d 557.  We do not face the same history of legislative inaction 
here.  Rather, we face a history of discrete legislative 
                     
23  Wis. Stat. § 893.587 (1993-94) Incest; limitation.  An 
action to recover damages for injury caused by incest shall 
be commenced within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers 
the fact and the probable cause, or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the fact and 
the probable cause, of the injury, whichever occurs first. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
37
measures to extend the tolling of the statute of limitations for 
certain types of personal injury actions.  
¶67 While our legislature has extended the statute of 
limitations for two types of sexual assault, incest, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587, and sexual exploitation by a therapist, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.585, it has not seen fit to extend the limitations period 
for other types of actions alleging sexual assault of minors.  
This is true even though, as the plaintiffs uniformly point out, 
other state legislatures have done so.24 
¶68 We cannot equate the sexual assaults alleged here to 
allegations of incest.  This is so despite the plaintiffs' 
claims  that they either failed to report the assaults or did 
not recognize the wrongfulness of the assaults because the 
plaintiffs held great admiration, trust, reverence, and respect 
for Catholic priests.  Trust and confidence should not "devolve 
into blind faith and exempt the plaintiff from the duty 
diligently to pursue potential claims."  Groom v. Professionals 
Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 241, 251 n.4, 507 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 
1993).25 
                     
24  In their briefs, these five plaintiffs refer to statutes 
in 19 other states for the proposition that "the overwhelming 
number of state legislatures who recognize delayed accrual of 
causes of action for childhood sexual abuse also attests to the 
strong public policy in favor of allowing otherwise 'stale' 
claims to proceed."  The quantity of those statutes makes a more 
compelling argument for leaving such an extension of the 
limitations period to the legislature, than to the courts. 
25  Societal stigmatization and familial constraints also 
may deter a victim from bringing a claim, but such dynamics, as 
characterized by the dissent in a Colorado case, do not toll the 
applicable statute of limitations.  See Cassidy v. Smith, 817 
P.2d 555, 557-58, 559 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
38
¶69 Further, 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
has 
already 
recognized that some adults may hold such sway over children as 
to prevent them from recognizing the wrongfulness of their 
conduct, or to prevent them from reporting that harmful conduct 
to others.  In light of that manipulative potential, the 
legislature has defined perpetrators of incest as persons 
related by blood or adoption.26  The legislature did not include 
within that limitations extension claims of abuse by other 
persons who may hold influence in a child's life. 
¶70 Section 893.587, Stats., is a specialized discovery 
rule applicable only to claims of incest.  Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 
2d at 321.  Other courts have drawn the same line, and have 
declined to judicially extend the incest statute of limitations 
                     
26  Wis. Stat. § 948.06 (1993-94) Incest with a child. 
 Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a 
Class C felony: 
 
(1) Marries or has sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact with a child he or she knows is related, 
either by blood or adoption, and the child is related 
in a degree of kinship closer than 2nd cousin; or 
 
(2) Is a person responsible for the child's welfare 
and: 
 
(a)  Has knowledge that another person related to the 
child by blood or adoption in a degree of kinship 
closer than 2nd cousin has had or intends to have 
sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the child; 
 
(b)  Is physically and emotionally capable of taking 
action that will prevent the intercourse or contact 
from occurring or being repeated; 
 
(c)  Fails to take that action; and 
 
(d)  The failure to act exposes the child to an 
unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may 
occur between the child and the other person or 
facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur 
between the child and the other person. 
 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
39
to persons not blood or adoptive relatives, but who are merely 
alleged to have some control or authority over the victim.27  
Extended limitations periods for claims of incest reflect a 
legislative recognition of the need to protect children in 
relationships involving legal rights vis-à-vis the child, such 
as those accorded to parents and other family members.  Other 
relationships between adults and children can, at any given 
time, exist or dissolve without continuing obligation.  Control 
or authority over a child that is not based on blood or adoption 
but on the adult's title or position, is transient in time and 
degree, and is always terminable by the parent or guardian.   
¶71 Neither should we assume that claims for sexual 
assault of minors by persons other than blood or adoptive 
relatives, or persons performing psychotherapy, were unknown to, 
or overlooked by the legislature.  The parties cite abundant 
literature on the incidence of child sexual abuse.  Despite this 
collection of data, the legislature has not expressly provided 
for an extended statute of limitations for non-incestuous sexual 
                     
27  See, e.g., State v. Shamp, 422 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 
Ct. App.)(ruling that where victim and defendant do not live in 
the same house, and the defendant does not control the victim's 
daily movements, defendant's authority is not sufficient to 
prevent the victim from reporting the crime), rev'd on other 
grounds, 427 N.W.2d 228 (1988); State v. French, 392 N.W.2d 596 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that statute of limitations 
not tolled where, although the victim was abused by her uncle, 
an elder in her church, her uncle did not control her day-to-day 
life, did not engage in "active coercion" to prevent her from 
reporting the abuse, and prior to reporting the abuse to law 
enforcement 
officials, 
the 
victim's 
church 
congregation 
attempted to resolve the matter in private), collected in 
Jessica E. Mindlin, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of 
Limitations: A Model for Reform, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 189, 207 n.61 
(1990). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
40
assault of a minor, when the alleged perpetrator is a person in 
a position of trust vis-à-vis the child/victim.  We will not 
furnish that extension.28  "Statutes creating limitations are to 
be reasonably and fairly construed, but should not be extended 
by [judicial] construction."  Korth, 115 Wis. 2d at 333, quoting 
Pugnier v. Ramharter, 275 Wis. 70, 77, 81 N.W.2d 38 (1957).  
Thus, the only applicable statute of limitations here is the 
statute concerning persons under a disability (minority).29   
¶72 Plaintiff T.C. was assaulted for 7 years, from 1980 
through 1987.  T.C. turned 18 years old in 1984.  The statute of 
limitations began to run in 1984 on his cause of action for 
assaults occurring when he was a minor, and expired in 1986.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.16 (1981-82).  T.C. did not file this action 
until 1994.  The statute of limitations began to run on his 
cause of action for the assaults occurring in the last year, 
1987, at the time of those assaults, and expired in 1989.  None 
                     
28  Other courts have shown similar restraint on the 
question of extending the statute of limitations in non-
incestuous sexual assault cases.  See, e.g., Anonymous v. 
Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713, 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (inviting 
legislative adoption of discovery rule for sexual abuse cases); 
Doe v. R.D., 417 S.E.2d 541, 543 (S.C. 1992)(holding that an 
exception to the unambiguous statute of limitations must come 
from legislature). 
29  However, we recognize that the statute of limitations 
for intentional torts applies to that part of T.C.'s claim for 
sexual assaults occurring after he reached the age of 18. 
In addition, A.C., Susan Smith, and John Brown all allege 
breach of contract by the local church and the Archdiocese.  The 
discovery rule, however, does not apply to contract causes of 
action.  Instead, a contract claim accrues at the moment of 
breach.  CLL Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Arrowhead Pacific 
Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
41
of T.C.'s claims are timely.  They are barred by the statute of 
limitations.  Wis. Stat. § 893.57 (1985-86). 
¶73 Plaintiff 
J.J. 
was 
sexually 
assaulted 
in 
1968.  
Because his complaint does not recite his date of birth, we will 
simply infer that J.J. was school-age, or at least 6 years old, 
at the time of the assaults.  Therefore, J.J. would have turned 
18 in 1980, at the latest.  Thus, at the latest, the statute of 
limitations began to run on his cause of action in 1980, and 
expired in 1981.  J.J. did not file this action until 1994.  
J.J.'s claims are not timely.  They are barred by the statute of 
limitations.  Wis. Stat. § 893.33 (1977). 
¶74 Plaintiff 
A.C. 
was 
sexually 
assaulted 
in 
1978.  
Because A.C.'s complaint does not recite his date of birth, we 
will simply infer that A.C. was school-age, or 6 years old, at 
the time of the assaults.  Therefore, A.C. would have turned 18 
years old in 1990.  The statute of limitations began to run on 
his cause of action for those assaults in 1990, and expired in 
1991.  A.C. did not file this action until 1994.  A.C.'s claims 
are not timely.  They are barred by the statute of limitations. 
 Wis. Stat. § 893.33 (1977). 
¶75 Plaintiff Susan Smith was sexually assaulted in either 
1968 or 1969.  Susan Smith turned 18 years old in 1978.  The 
statute of limitations began to run on her claims in 1978, and 
expired in 1979.  Susan Smith did not file this action until 
1993.  Susan Smith's claims are not timely.  They are barred by 
the statute of limitations.  Wis. Stat. § 893.33 (1977). 
¶76 Plaintiff John Brown was sexually assaulted in 1979.  
John Brown turned 18 years old in 1984.  The statute of 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
42
limitations began to run on his claims in 1984, and expired in 
1985.  John Brown did not file this action until 1993.  John 
Brown's claims are not timely.  They are barred by the statute 
of limitations.  Wis. Stat. § 893.33 (1977). 
¶77 We reach our conclusion in these cases not because we 
lack compassion for victims of non-incestuous sexual assault, or 
because such assault is somehow less reprehensible than incest. 
 These plaintiffs have brought very serious allegations that 
when they were children or teenagers, they were abused by 
clergymen.  Undoubtedly, claims of long ago assault and 
subsequent psychological and emotional injury can invoke pain 
and frustration not only for the victims but for their families 
and loved ones.  Certainly the pain and stigma of allegations of 
sexual assault are felt also by those accused of intentional and 
negligent misconduct.30 
¶78 When such allegations are made long after the alleged 
occurrence, the potential for fraud is heightened.  The 
                     
30  Recognizing this potential for stigma, some states have 
enacted statutes directly protecting defendants' privacy in 
sexual abuse cases, until at least the preliminary limitations 
inquiry, or a certificate of merit proceeding, is completed.  
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.1(g) (West Supp. 
1997)(plaintiffs 26 years or older at time of filing suit may 
not serve complaint upon defendant until after court finds claim 
reasonable 
and 
meritorious); 
La. 
Rev. 
Stat. 
Ann. 
§ 
9:2800.9(d)(West Supp. 1997)(court must find reasonable and 
meritorious cause for filing action before defendant may be 
named in petition); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 522(b)(West Supp. 
1995)(complaint to remain sealed, if defendant moves to dismiss 
claim as time-barred, motion hearing held in camera). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
43
opportunity to fairly prosecute, and to defend against, these 
claims is frustrated.31 
SUNBURSTING THEORY 
¶79 The plaintiffs suggest that if we should hold that the 
discovery rule does not save these claims, we thereby violate 
the doctrine of "sunbursting."  In other words, by holding that 
these plaintiffs discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered all the elements of their 
cause of action within one or two years after they reached 
majority, we have applied a new rule of law adversely to 
unsuspecting plaintiffs.  We disagree.   
¶80 In a recent decision of this court, Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 65 U.S.L.W. 2771, 1997 WL 253567, *7-8 
(Wis.), we described sunbursting as an exception to the general 
rule that a decision which overrules precedent is accorded 
retroactive effect.  Essentially, we said that when a court 
announces a new rule of law, it may invoke the device of 
prospective overruling to limit the effect of the newly 
announced 
rule, 
when 
retroactive 
application 
would 
be 
inequitable.  Jacque, 1997 WL 253567 at *8.  In this opinion, we 
announce no new rule of law.  Instead, our conclusion rests upon 
existing statutes of limitations, as well as a reading of case 
law interpreting those statutes.  The fact that plaintiffs here 
                     
31  One California justice identified the danger of allowing 
untimely claims like those now before us: "Society's justifiable 
repugnance toward (sexual abuse of a child) . . . is the reason 
why a falsely accused defendant can be gravely harmed."  John R. 
v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 963 (Cal. 
1989)(Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting).   
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
44
allege sexual assault as children, while the Pritzlaff plaintiff 
was allegedly assaulted as an adult, is not a sufficient 
distinction to transform our result here into "a new rule." 
 
ACCRUAL OF CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS ALLEGING REPRESSED  
MEMORY OF EVENTS 
¶81 According to their complaints, Plaintiffs John BBB Doe 
and John MMM Doe both developed coping mechanisms, including 
denial, repression and dissociation, as a result of their abuse. 
 According to briefs32 they filed in opposition to the motions to 
dismiss, BBB Doe suppressed his memory of the sexual contacts 
until sometime in 1990, and MMM Doe suppressed his memory of the 
sexual contacts until approximately 1992.  Because their 
recollections were delayed, both Doe plaintiffs assert that they 
were unable to discover the identity of the abuser and the fact 
of their abuse until their long-repressed memories returned.  
The circuit courts dismissed their claims, however,33 based on 
the fact that even if the discovery rule applied to these cases, 
                     
32  Briefs filed on behalf of the parties are not pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
admissions 
or 
affidavits, documents that a court normally considers to 
determine whether there is any genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.02(2).  Nonetheless, because 
the defendants' briefs respond to the Doe plaintiffs' assertions 
in their briefs that they repressed memory of the event of the 
sexual contacts, for purposes of these cases we consider those 
assertions of repression as if they were alleged in the 
pleadings. 
33  The circuit court in the MMM Doe case did not expressly 
consider the Jackson affidavit on the record.  According to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.06(2), 
if 
matters 
outside 
the 
pleadings 
are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, we treat the motion 
as one for summary judgment and dispose of it as provided in 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  See Brown v. LeChance, 165 Wis. 2d 52, 60-
61, 477 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
45
the Doe plaintiffs should have discovered their injuries 
earlier. 
¶82 In Pritzlaff, the plaintiff claimed that she had 
suppressed and been unable to perceive the existence, nature, or 
cause 
of 
her 
psychological 
and 
emotional 
injuries 
until 
approximately seven months before she filed her complaint.  194 
Wis. 2d at 307-09.  In affirming the order of dismissal in that 
case, we were not required to determine the sufficiency of 
Pritzlaff's 
suppression 
or 
repression 
claims, 
because 
we 
concluded that she knew all of the elements of her claim by the 
time her relationship with the defendant priest had ended.  Id. 
at 315.  Because the alleged acts were the product of force and 
coercion, such acts caused actual damage, and the forcible 
sexual contact was immediately actionable.  Id. at 317.   This 
was true even if Ms. Pritzlaff had suppressed, or been unaware 
of, additional harm resulting from the alleged acts. 
¶83 The Doe plaintiffs here contend not only that they 
have suppressed or repressed awareness of their emotional and 
psychological injuries, but that they have also suppressed or 
repressed knowledge of the assaults themselves.  The defendants 
respond that there is little or no reliable scientific basis for 
the Doe plaintiffs' claims of recently recovered memory of the 
events.  To date, Wisconsin appellate courts have not recognized 
a non-incestuous claim of sexual assault where the plaintiff 
asserts that he or she has repressed or suppressed all awareness 
of at least one element of his or her claim beyond the point at 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
46
which the applicable statute of limitations would expire.34  We 
look to other courts to consider their experience in this realm. 
¶84 Before holding that the discovery rule does not save a 
claim of incest filed more than two years after the plaintiff 
reached majority, the Texas Supreme Court considered the 
plaintiff's claim that she had repressed all memory of her 
father's abuse.  S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).  The 
court discussed the differing views in the scientific community 
on the phenomenon of repressed and subsequently recovered memory 
of childhood sexual assault.  Although the following excerpt is 
lengthy, it fairly summarizes in layman’s terms the concepts of 
repression, suppression, and dissociation, and the depth of the 
scientific and legal debate on those topics.  
 
Repression is the term used to describe unconscious 
forgetting of events that cause the individual pain.  
The terms “repression” and “dissociation”, however 
have variable meanings, (but) . . . [t]here is 
overwhelming consensus that repression exists.  It 
differs from “simple forgetting”, but there is debate 
in the scientific community about the extent to which 
amnesia stems from repression or simple forgetting.  A 
number 
of 
theories 
distinguish 
repression 
from 
suppression, which is the conscious forgetting of 
unpleasant thoughts or emotions.  With unconscious 
repression, a plaintiff may be said to be “blamelessly 
ignorant” of her amnesia.  On the other hand, a 
plaintiff who consciously suppresses memories of an 
event might not be as “ignorant”. 
                     
34  But see Byrne v. Bercker, 176 Wis. 2d 1037, 1040, 501 
N.W.2d 402 (1993)(daughter claimed repressed memory of incest by 
father; although experts opined that many incest victims repress 
their memories, the court did not have to rule on reliability of 
repression theory because the plaintiff admitted she recalled 
the sexual attacks more than two years before filing her 
complaint).  In Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 
N.W.2d 780 (1995), we limited the specialized discovery rule of 
Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 
1987), along with its subsequent codification, as applicable 
only to cases of incest.  194 Wis. 2d at 321. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
47
Some therapists believe that repressed material can be 
restored to consciousness if the anxiety associated 
with the memory is removed.  This belief, of course, 
assumes that the material has not been “simply 
forgotten” 
or 
confabulated.  In 
addition, 
since 
recalling is a constructive process, a host of defense 
mechanisms may distort images or feelings at that 
phase as well.  One nineteenth-century psychologist 
cautioned of the dangers inherent in recall of partial 
memories: 
Total 
forgetfulness 
is 
not serious; but 
partial 
forgetfulness is treacherous . . . .[W]e are liable to 
fill in from our imagination and disjointed fragments 
furnished by memory. . . . We unwittingly become 
creative artists. . . . 
The question whether recovered memories are valid has 
elicited the most passionate debate among scholars and 
practitioners, 
and 
the 
consensus 
of 
professional 
organizations reviewing the debate is that there is no 
consensus on the truth or falsity of these memories. . 
. . While virtually all would agree that memories are 
malleable and not necessarily fully accurate, there is 
no consensus about the extent or sources of this 
malleability. 
. 
. 
. 
It 
is 
not 
known 
how 
to 
distinguish, with complete accuracy, memories based on 
true events from those derived from other sources.  It 
is not known what proportion of adults who report 
memories of sexual abuse were actually abused . . . 
[T]here is no completely accurate way of determining 
the 
validity 
of 
reports 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
corroborating information.  The available scientific 
and 
clinical 
evidence 
does 
not 
allow 
accurate, 
inaccurate, 
and 
fabricated 
memories 
to 
be 
distinguished 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
independent 
corroboration. 
 
Recovered memories come to be regarded as true for a 
variety of reasons.  Therapists who expect to find 
abuse often do.  And because the therapist occupies a 
position of authority and trust with the patient, this 
“confirmatory basis” can lead to leading questions and 
other forms of suggestion (citation omitted). . . . 
Some therapists may jump to conclusions and may fail 
to explore other causes for the memories.  Therapists 
also may interpret certain symptoms as indicating 
childhood sexual abuse, but those symptoms may be so 
general that they do not eliminate other possible 
ills. 
. . . The point is this: the scientific community has 
not reached consensus on how to gauge the truth or 
falsity of “recovered” memories. 
933 S.W.2d at 17-18 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
48
¶85 Despite resolving factual inferences in favor of the 
Doe plaintiffs, including consideration of the Jackson affidavit 
on behalf of MMM Doe, other problems remain.  For instance, the 
record before us is unclear as to just how long after the sexual 
abuse took place that the Doe plaintiffs repressed their memory 
of the abuse.35  John BBB Doe's complaint does not assert when  
his 
coping 
mechanisms, 
including 
repression, 
developed.  
According to his brief, he diligently sought psychological 
counseling in 1983 at age 27, and had no memory of his early 
childhood up to the eighth grade until December, 1987.  BBB Doe 
brief at 5; A-36.  Similarly, John MMM Doe's complaint does not 
assert when his coping mechanisms developed.  His brief merely 
states that "throughout his adult years, Appellant repressed all 
memory of the sexual molestation."  MMM Doe brief at 5. 
¶86 A Maryland court explained one of the difficulties a 
claim of repression poses for limitations purposes.  The court 
compared the differences between two models, "serial repression" 
versus "collective repression" as described in repression theory 
literature. Doe v. Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087, 1088 n.3 (Md. 1996), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).  According to the serial 
repression model, a victim of sexual assault or some other 
traumatic 
event, 
could 
repress 
the 
memory 
of 
the 
event 
                     
35  If, in fact, Susan Smith also has alleged that she 
repressed memory of the event of the sexual assault, there 
remains the question of when she undertook or incurred that 
repression.  According to a portion of the Smith record, "the 
severity of the trauma, combined with the absence of any adult 
nurturance, accounts for 
the repression that 
subsequently 
occurred."  That statement does not indicate at what point Smith 
allegedly lost her memory of the event. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
49
immediately after occurrence.  This repression could occur 
following each of multiple events.  Under the collective 
repression model, a person could have awareness of the events 
for a length of time, even over the course of multiple events, 
and then repress those memories altogether, at some later date. 
 Id. (citation omitted).  Thus, the timing of when the memories 
are repressed poses another complication.  
¶87 The Maskell court, after reviewing the arguments for 
and against recognition of repression as a scientific phenomenon 
separate from the normal process of forgetting, declined to 
recognize repression of past sexual abuse as a means of 
activating the discovery rule.  It then invited the Maryland 
legislature to amend the statute of limitations for such claims, 
if it saw fit to do so.  Id.  
¶88 Some 
courts 
have 
accepted 
testimony 
regarding 
repressed memory.36  Cases cited by the Doe plaintiffs include 
Shahzade 
v. 
Gregory, 
923 
F. 
Supp. 
286, 
287 
(D. 
Mass. 
1996)(ruling on motion in limine, trial court considered factors 
from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), and found reliability of phenomenon of repressed memory 
established); and Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 
                     
36  The concurrence states that a substantial majority of 
courts hold that the discovery rule preserves the claims of 
those suffering from repressed memory, citing a dissenting 
opinion in an Arizona case.  We do not dispute that a majority 
of courts considering the question have allowed a claim of 
repressed memory to extend the accrual date for sexual assault 
claims.  The case cited by the concurrence, however, fails to 
distinguish between claims of incest and non-incestuous sexual 
assault, and also fails to identify which of those jurisdictions 
have a legislatively extended discovery rule. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
50
1063-64 (E.D. Mich. 1995)(considering motions in limine raised 
shortly before and during trial, court relied on Daubert and set 
foundational criteria for validity and reliability of repressed 
memory theory). 
¶89 In Shazade, the defendant moved for summary judgment 
shortly after the trial court decided to permit expert testimony 
about repressed memory.  Shazade v. Gregory, 930 F. Supp. 673 
(D. Mass. 1996).  The court declined to grant summary judgment, 
based on Massachusetts' statutory discovery rule for minor 
victims of sexual assault.  That statute was not limited to 
victims of incest or exploitation by a therapist. 
¶90 In Isely, the court held a Daubert type hearing and 
decided to admit testimony on repressed memory.  877 F. Supp. 
1055.  The motions in limine to disallow expert testimony on 
repressed memory were filed shortly before and during the trial. 
 877 F. Supp. at 1056 nn.1-2.  Presumably, the motions in limine 
were filed after the trial court had already denied defendant's 
motions for summary judgment.  See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 
880 F. Supp. 1138,  1159-60 (E.D. Mich. 1995).  Our concern here 
is more fundamental. 
¶91 The 
question presented in 
this certification is 
whether, when a plaintiff claims repression of an element of his 
or her cause of action for non-incestuous sexual abuse, and 
allegedly later regains memory of that element, the discovery 
rule saves his or her untimely claims for statute of limitations 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
51
purposes.37  In other words, we must decide whether an allegation 
of repressed memory invokes the discovery rule to save an 
untimely action. 
¶92 This question provokes an analysis of a number of 
significant public policy considerations.  The reliability and 
ascertainability of a repressed memory claim, however defined, 
is one consideration.  In addition to the problem of when the 
memories of assault became repressed, as pointed out in Maskell, 
we must consider valuable public policy goals served by statutes 
of limitations, namely preserving a plaintiff's right to bring a 
claim juxtaposed with a defendant's right to be free of stale, 
and potentially fraudulent claims.  The purposes for the 
limitations extensions already enacted by the legislature are 
additional examples of the public policy considerations that 
this certified question embraces. 
¶93 Based upon those considerations, as a matter of law we 
conclude that it would be contrary to public policy, and would 
defeat the purposes of limitations statutes, to allow claims of 
repressed 
memory 
to 
invoke 
the 
discovery 
rule 
and 
to 
indefinitely 
toll 
the 
statutory 
limitations 
for 
these 
plaintiffs.  We hold that a claim of repressed memory of past 
sexual abuse does not delay the accrual of a cause of action for 
non-incestuous 
sexual assault, 
regardless of 
the victim’s 
                     
37  Thus, we do not address the evidentiary question of 
whether, in a proper case, testimony regarding a plaintiff's 
repressed, and subsequently recovered, memory is admissible 
during the course of a trial. 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
52
minority and the position of trust occupied by the alleged 
perpetrator. 
¶94 The measured response of our legislature supports this 
conclusion.  Wisconsin law already protects claims that accrue 
during childhood.  Wis. Stat. § 893.16.  The legislature has 
also extended the tolling period for claims brought by children 
and adults for incest, and for sexual exploitation by a 
therapist.  Wis. Stat. §§ 893.587, 893.585.  Allowing plaintiffs 
to simply assert repressed memory in their pleadings or briefs 
and thereby revive a suit years if not decades after the non-
incestuous sexual assault occurred would extend the tolling 
period indefinitely.  Such an extension would increase the risk 
of fraudulent claims and severely undermine the statute of 
limitations.  The Wisconsin legislature has already afforded 
some, but not all, of the limitations extensions afforded by 
other states.  That legislative restraint, together with our 
balancing of the policies protecting plaintiffs' right to 
enforce legitimate claims and those protecting defendants from 
having to defend against stale or fraudulent claims, causes the 
balance to tip against judicially extending the applicable 
limitations period for these claims of repressed memory.  
¶95 Next, 
we 
determine 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
applicable to these plaintiffs.  As with the five claims 
discussed above, the claims of the two Doe plaintiffs are 
controlled by the statute of limitations for minors. 
¶96 Plaintiff John BBB Doe was assaulted between 1964 and 
1969.  BBB Doe turned 18 years old in 1974.  He filed this 
action in 1992.  The statute of limitations began to run in 1974 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
53
on his cause of action for assaults occurring when he was a 
minor, and expired in 1975.  John BBB Doe's claims are untimely. 
 They are barred by the statute of limitations.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.33 (1973). 
¶97 Plaintiff John MMM Doe was assaulted between 1965 and 
1967.  He turned 21 years old in 1970.  He filed this action in 
1993.  The statute of limitations began to run in 1970 on his 
cause of action for assaults occurring when he was a minor, and 
expired in 1971.  John MMM Doe's claims are untimely.  They are 
barred by the statute of limitations.  Wis. Stat. § 893.33 
(1965). 
CONCLUSION 
¶98 In light of our conclusion that all seven plaintiffs' 
claims based on intentional sexual assault are barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, we need not address their 
claims based on respondeat superior and negligent employment 
theories.  Plaintiffs' derivative causes of action against the 
Archdiocese and the churches accrued at the same time that the 
underlying intentional tort claims accrued, and similarly would 
be barred by the statute of limitations.  See Pritzlaff, 194 
Wis. 2d at 312 (statute of limitations period for actions 
against the Archdiocese begins on same date the cause of action 
accrued against the individual priest defendant).  Finally, 
without deciding whether Wis. Stat. § 48.981 permits a civil 
cause of action for failure to report child abuse, such claims 
by plaintiffs T.C., J.J., A.C., Susan Smith, and John Brown here 
are merely derivative of the underlying intentional tort claims, 
and are likewise untimely.  Therefore, we conclude that in each 
 
Nos. 94-0423, 94-0695, 94-2124, 
 
94-2128, 94-2141, 94-2384, 94-2852 
 
54
case, the respective circuit courts properly held that the 
claims of each plaintiff are barred by statutes of limitations. 
By the Court.—The decisions of the circuit courts are 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 94-0423.ssa 
 
1 
¶99 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   
This case is largely governed by and inexorably follows from 
Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 
N.W.2d 780 (1994). I join the mandate of the court because I 
recognize Pritzlaff as the law of Wisconsin, even though I did 
not agree with the majority opinion in Pritzlaff, and I continue 
to believe the decision unfortunate.  
¶100 I write separately to point out the nature of the rule 
the majority adopts and why I believe the court need not take 
this approach to the difficult problem of the validity and 
reliability of evidence in cases such as the ones presented. 
¶101 The majority opinion discusses at great length the 
facts of the cases before the court. Nonetheless, the majority's 
holding is not limited to the facts of the cases presented. The 
majority opinion enunciates a broad rule of law encompassing all 
children: A plaintiff who while a minor was sexually assaulted 
by a person in a position of trust (such as a clergyperson)38 is, 
as a matter of law, irrebuttably presumed to have discovered the 
injury and the cause thereof at the moment of the assault, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff repressed all memory of the 
assault or the plaintiff did not know and should not have 
reasonably known of the injury or cause thereof.  
                     
38   The rule does not apply when the offender was a family 
member. The legislature codified Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 
257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1987), in Wis. Stat. § 893.587 
declaring that a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not 
accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and 
probable cause of injury.  
 
 
No. 94-0423.ssa 
 
2 
¶102 I believe that the principal failing of both Pritzlaff 
and the majority opinion today is that the discovery rule is 
applied categorically; categories control, particular facts are 
irrelevant. But by its very nature, the discovery rule is a 
matter largely of a plaintiff's mental state (using both the 
subjective and objective criteria); a plaintiff's mental state 
is not a matter amenable to categorical application.39  
¶103 The flaw in attaching categorical rules to the 
discovery rule is readily apparent in today's decision involving 
plaintiffs who were children at the time of the assault. The 
court has 
reduced 
the mental and 
emotional 
state 
of a 
traumatized child, whether two years of age or 16 years of age, 
to an absolute rule of law, instead of applying the discovery 
rule to each child victim on the basis of the particular 
circumstances. 
¶104 I recognize that stale claims and repressed memories 
recovered after decades pose daunting problems for a court's 
search for the truth. But because testimonial reliability is a 
key issue, I would tackle it in the manner we handle such 
questions in other instances.40  
                     
39   It has been reported that the "substantial majority of 
courts hold that the discovery rule preserves the claims of 
those suffering from repressed memory." Doe. v. Doe, 931 P.2d 
1115, 1122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)(Lankford, J., dissenting in 
part), review granted, Feb. 26, 1997, citing Farris v. Compton, 
652 A.2d 49, 59 (D.C. App. 1994); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 
1345, 1349 (Utah 1993). See also McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 
797, 799-800 (N.H. 1994); Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 873 
(Ohio 1994).  
40   See Wis. Stat. chs. 904, 906 and 907 (1995-96). 
 
 
No. 94-0423.ssa 
 
3 
¶105 For those plaintiffs who do not allege repressed 
memory, the fact finder ordinarily determines when the plaintiff 
knew or should have known of the injury and its cause. For those 
plaintiffs who allege repressed memory I would treat repressed 
memory evidence like other challenged scientific evidence and 
expert witness opinion.  
¶106 Realizing that its approach to the discovery rule is 
contrary to our prior cases, the majority tries to narrow its 
decision by explaining that the acts complained of in this case 
were intentional. Majority op. at 31. But on what theory are we 
to distinguish for purposes of the discovery rule between 
negligent acts and intentional acts? Why would the running of 
the statute of limitations against the plaintiff be controlled 
by the mens rea of the defendant?  
¶107 Finally, I comment on the present case in relation to 
the recently issued Estate of Cheryl Makos v. Wisconsin Masons 
Health Care Fund, No. 96-0174 (S. Ct. June 20, 1997). Two 
members of the court (Justices Steinmetz and Crooks) concluded 
in Makos that the Wisconsin constitution precludes any statute 
of repose that operates to forestall a claim before the injury 
and cause thereof are known or should have been reasonably 
known. If, as a fair reading of the pleadings in the present 
case allows, these plaintiffs did not suffer injury until they 
recovered 
their 
harmful 
memories 
of 
their 
assaults, 
the 
courthouse doors have been closed to them by operation of the 
majority's decision in contravention of Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 
according to the two opinions in Makos. Just like Ms. Makos, who 
 
 
No. 94-0423.ssa 
 
4 
did not detect the wrong that occurred to her through the 
pathologist's 
misdiagnosis 
until 
after 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations (as limited by the statute of repose) had run, the 
plaintiffs here did not detect the wrongs that had been done to 
them until after the statute of limitations had run. The 
plaintiffs, like Ms. Makos' estate, allege they did not discover 
their injuries until the courthouse doors were barred. Ms. 
Makos' estate won; these plaintiffs lose. 
¶108 The foundation of our discovery rule jurisprudence 
has, in my opinion, been disturbed by Pritzlaff and this 
decision. 
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
 
 
NAME 
AGE AT TIME 
OF ABUSE 
DATE(S) OF 
ABUSE 
DATE 
COMPLAINT 
FILED 
AGE AT TIME 
COMPLAINT 
FILED 
 
John BBB Doe 
 
8-12 or 13 
 
1964-1969 
 
8/20/92 
 
36 
 
John MMM Doe 
 
16-18 
 
1965-1967 
 
4/12/93 
 
44 
 
T.C. 
 
14-21 
 
1980-1987 
 
2/22/94 
 
28 
 
J.J. 
 
School Age 
Minor 
 
1968 
 
2/16/94 
 
Unknown Age 
of 
Adulthood 
 
A.C. 
 
School Age 
Minor 
 
1978 
 
2/16/94 
 
Unknown Age 
of 
Adulthood 
 
Susan Smith 
 
8 or 9 
 
1968-1969 
 
3/10/93 
 
33 
 
John Brown 
 
13 
 
1979 
 
3/9/93 
 
27