Title: Roy S. Thorp v. Town of Lebanon
Citation: 2000 WI 60
Docket Number: 1998AP002358
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2000

2000 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2358 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Roy S. Thorp and Helene T. Thorp,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Town of Lebanon, and County of Dodge,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Petitioners.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
225 Wis. 2d 672, 593 N.W.2d 878 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999 – Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 21, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 6, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel W. Klossner 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY AND SYKES, J.J., join concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, there 
were briefs by E. Joseph Kershek and Kershek Law Offices, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by E. Joseph Kershek. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross petitioner 
Town of Lebanon, there were briefs by Michael J. Cieslewicz, 
Patti J. Kurth and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Michael Cieslewicz. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross petitioner 
Dodge County, there were briefs by John M. Moore, W. Scott 
McAndrew, Sheila M. Sullivan and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by W. Scott McAndrew. 
 
2000 WI 60 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2358 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
 
Roy S. Thorp and Helene T. Thorp,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Lebanon, and County of Dodge,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Cross Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioners, Roy S. Thorp and 
Helene T. Thorp, seek review of a published court of appeals 
decision,1 which affirmed in part and reversed in part a Dodge 
County Circuit Court order granting summary judgment.  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment to the Town of Lebanon 
("the Town") and the County of Dodge ("the County") in an action 
brought by the Thorps when the Town and the County failed to 
rezone the Thorps' property back to a rural development zoning 
                     
1 Thorp v. Town of Lebanon and County of Dodge, 225 Wis. 2d 
672, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).  
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 98-2358 
 
2 
classification from a general agricultural classification.  The 
Thorps brought three claims, alleging that 1) the rezoning of 
their property to general agricultural was invalid and violated 
their right to equal protection and due process, 2) the rezoning 
amounted to inverse condemnation and a taking without just 
compensation, and 3) they were denied a fair and impartial 
hearing before the County Board.  
¶2 
In an earlier unpublished decision, the court of 
appeals determined that the notice provisions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(1993-94)2 did not apply to the Thorps' federal 
constitutional claims.  Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, No. 96-2449, 
unpublished slip op. at 13 (Ct. App. May 15, 1997).  On remand, 
the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Town and the 
County.  The circuit court dismissed the Thorps' federal 
constitutional claims on summary judgment because the Thorps did 
not first avail themselves of any state law remedies.   
¶3 
The Thorps appealed.  On the second appeal, the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision to dismiss the 
Thorps' claims of deprivation of substantive and procedural due 
process.  Thorp v. Town of Lebanon and County of Dodge, 225 
Wis. 2d 672, 689, 697, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).  However, 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1993-94 text unless otherwise noted.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.80 sets forth the prerequisites to filing an action 
against governmental bodies.  Subsections (1)(a) and (b) of the 
statute state what notice is necessary to commence and maintain 
such an action.  
No. 98-2358 
 
3 
it concluded that the Thorps' "complaint does state a claim for 
relief under the equal protection clause."  Id. at 691. 
¶4 
We affirm.  We first hold that according to Felder v. 
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), the Thorps did not have to comply 
with the Wisconsin notice statute to bring their federal 
constitutional claims.  Further, the Thorps complied with Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)'s notice provisions. Second, the Thorps' 
complaint stated a valid claim for relief under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but not a claim for the denial of substantive 
due process.  Third, the Thorps are barred at this time from 
bringing a procedural due process claim because certiorari was 
an adequate state law remedy available to them when they brought 
their initial action.  Finally, the Town should not be dismissed 
from the suit.  The Thorps would be entitled to relief from the 
Town if they would succeed in proving that the Town's actions in 
amending the ordinance violated their right to equal protection. 
I. 
 
¶5 
The Thorps own approximately 255 acres in the Town of 
Lebanon, which is located in Dodge County.  The property is a 
mix of open land, woods, and wetlands, with some of the land 
being within the floodplain.  Before July 7, 1994, the Thorps' 
land was zoned to a rural development classification. 
 
¶6 
The process of rezoning the Thorps' land began in 
1993, when the Town of Lebanon Board of Supervisors conducted a 
survey to determine whether public opinion would favor rezoning 
Town land.  On July 7, 1994, the Town Board of Supervisors 
approved a new rezoning map that extensively revised the zoning 
No. 98-2358 
 
4 
classification of most of the Town land from a rural development 
classification to a general agricultural classification.  The 
Town Board also asked the Dodge County Board of Supervisors to 
adopt the same zoning map. 
 
¶7 
In October 1994, the Dodge County Board of Supervisors 
amended its "official zoning map" to incorporate the Town's 
zoning reclassifications.  The Thorps' land was one of the 
properties 
reclassified from 
rural 
development 
to general 
agricultural.  According to the Thorps, the change in zoning 
substantially interfered with the use of their property and had 
a material adverse effect on its value.  The Thorps' attorney 
sent a letter to both the Town and the County on November 21, 
1994, notifying them that the rezoning was handled improperly 
and requesting that the property be rezoned to a rural 
development classification. 
 
¶8 
On November 28, 1994, the Thorps filed a petition with 
the Town of Lebanon Plan Commission to rezone the non-wetland 
and floodplain areas of their property, which constituted 
approximately 155-165 acres.  The Town Plan Commission denied 
their petition in February 1995, and they appealed to the Town 
Board of Supervisors.  The Town Board of Supervisors voted to 
grant the Thorps' request and authorized approximately 165 acres 
to be rezoned to its original classification.   
¶9 
The Thorps then petitioned the Dodge County Planning 
and Development Department to confirm the Town Board of 
Supervisors' vote.  They also brought a petition before the 
Dodge County Planning and Surveyor Committee in March 1995.  The 
No. 98-2358 
 
5 
County Planning and Surveyor Committee voted to confirm the Town 
Board of Supervisors' vote.  However, a few days later the 
County Board of Supervisors voted against the Thorps' proposed 
rezoning.  The Thorps' entire property therefore retained its 
general agricultural classification. 
 
¶10 On May 23, 1995, the Thorps filed a summons and 
complaint stating three claims against the Town and the County 
and seeking declaratory, 
injunctive, 
and monetary relief.  
First, the Thorps alleged that the Town and the County's zoning 
ordinance was invalid and violated their due process and equal 
protection rights.3  In support of their claim, they alleged that 
the Town Zoning Committee did not consist of five members, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 60.61(4).  The Thorps also stated that 
their property is best suited for rural development because it 
has poor soil for agriculture.  Moreover, "the Town and [the] 
County left numerous 'islands' throughout the Town that have not 
                     
3 In their complaint, the Thorps specifically claimed that  
the present classification of the Plaintiffs' property 
prohibiting 
its 
use 
for 
rural 
development 
is 
arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable; it bears 
no reasonable relation to the public health, safety 
and general welfare of the Town of Lebanon and Dodge 
County; it is not designed to accomplish the stated 
Town and County zoning purposes; it amounts to an 
unlawful exercise of police power; and deprives the 
Plaintiffs of their property without due process 
and/or equal protection of the laws as set forth in 
the United Stated [sic] and State of Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
(R. at 1:4.)  
No. 98-2358 
 
6 
been rezoned and have been left with a rural development 
classification without any logical explanation."  (R. at 1:4.)  
Finally, they alleged that a survey conducted before the zoning 
change showed the Town residents did not object to residential 
development and that the Town misread another soil survey map.  
(R. at 1:4-5.)      
¶11 Second, the Thorps claimed that the rezoning amounted 
to an inverse condemnation and taking of their land, for which 
they were not justly compensated.  They alleged that the 
rezoning resulted in a substantial decrease in the property's 
value per acre, as well as a permanent and substantial 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.  (R. at 
1:5.)   
¶12 Third, the Thorps claimed that they were denied a fair 
and impartial hearing.  The complaint stated that the Dodge 
County Planning and Surveyor Committee voted 4-1 to grant the 
Thorps' rezoning request and that Betty Balian, the Town Board 
Chairman, cast the only negative vote.  The complaint further 
alleged that chair of the County Planning and Surveyor Committee 
informed the County Board of Supervisors that the vote was 3-2, 
and that he cast one of the negative votes.  According to the 
complaint, Balian also made numerous misrepresentations to the 
Board of Supervisors relating to the Thorps' motives for 
requesting the zoning change, and yet failed to recuse herself 
from voting on the issue.  (R. at 1:5-6.) 
 
¶13 In response, the Town and the County moved to dismiss 
the Thorps' complaint for failure to comply with the notice 
No. 98-2358 
 
7 
requirements contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a)-(b).  The 
circuit court, the Honorable Daniel W. Klossner presiding, 
agreed and granted the motion to dismiss on that basis.  Citing 
Felder, 487 U.S. 131, the court concluded that a "simple 
allegation 
of 
constitutional 
violations 
does 
not 
render 
Sec. 893.80, Stats., inoperative."  (R. at 20:9.) 
 
¶14 The Thorps appealed.  In an unpublished decision, the 
court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
circuit court.  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of 
the circuit court to dismiss the Thorps' takings claim.  The 
court held that the Thorps' complaint failed to state a claim 
for a taking under either federal or state law.  Thorp, No. 96-
2449, unpublished slip op. at 11.  The Thorps' complaint was 
flawed, the court determined, because it did "not provide a 
basis for concluding that the rezoning deprived the Thorps of 
all or substantially all practical uses of the property."  Id. 
¶15 Recognizing that the claims were brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
dismissal of the Thorps' federal constitutional claims.  Thorp, 
slip op. at 5-6, 13.  Since the claims were grounded in the 
federal constitution, the court concluded that they were not 
subject to the notice requirements in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).  
Id. at 7.  The court remanded the case to the circuit court to 
reinstate the Thorps' deprivation of due process and equal 
protection claims.  Id. at 13.   
 
¶16 The Town and the County then filed motions for summary 
judgment.  The County argued that because adequate state post-
No. 98-2358 
 
8 
deprivation remedies existed, the Thorps could not assert their 
federal constitutional claims.  The Town additionally argued 
that the Town Board's actions did not violate the Thorps' 
constitutional rights.  The circuit court granted their motions, 
holding that the Town was not liable for the rezoning as a 
matter of law, since the Town Board had voted in favor of 
rezoning the Thorps' property back to rural development.  The 
circuit court also determined that the Thorps failed to avail 
themselves of adequate state remedies, and therefore, they could 
not then base their claims on the federal constitution. 
 
¶17 On the Thorps' second appeal,4 the court of appeals 
held that the circuit court could hear the parties' motions for 
summary judgment, even if the motions were untimely, since the 
circuit 
court 
reasonably 
interpreted 
its 
own 
ambiguous 
                     
4 The court of appeals did not address the Thorps' claim for 
inverse condemnation under Wis. Stat. § 32.10 and takings under 
the federal Constitution.  The court noted that in its first 
opinion, it held that the "allegations of the complaint were 
insufficient 
to 
state 
a 
claim 
for 
relief" 
for 
inverse 
condemnation or takings under either federal or state law.  
Thorp, 225 Wis. 2d at 682 n.3.  The Thorps did not petition this 
court for review of this issue, and therefore, we will not 
consider it.  (Pet. Review at 1-2.)   
No. 98-2358 
 
9 
scheduling order.5  Thorp, 225 Wis. 2d at 683 (citing Schultz v. 
Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 802, 535 N.W.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
 The court of appeals then determined that the Thorps did not 
state a claim for a deprivation of procedural due process.  Id. 
at 688-89.  The court stated that "the Thorps have not suffered 
a deprivation of property without procedural due process if 
there is an adequate state remedy."  Id. at 688.  Common law 
certiorari provides an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, 
but the Thorps did not seek review of the County Board's 
decision to deny their rezoning request by certiorari.  Id. at 
                     
5 The parties and circuit court treated the procedural 
posture of this case as one for summary judgment.  As the court 
of appeals discussed, Thorp, 225 Wis. 2d at 684, a circuit court 
evaluates a motion for summary judgment using a two-part 
methodology.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  A circuit court must first "examine 
the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been 
stated" by the moving party and then ascertain whether any 
material facts are disputed.  Id.  If a claim for relief has 
been stated and no material facts are disputed, then summary 
judgment will be granted.  Id.  This court applies the same 
standards as the circuit court when it reviews a motion for 
summary judgment.  Kierstyn v. Racine Unified School Dist., 228 
Wis. 2d 81, 88, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999) (citing Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980)). 
The circuit court's analysis centered on the allegations 
contained in the complaint because the Town and the County 
submitted no evidentiary materials with their motions for 
summary judgment.  The circuit court's analysis necessarily 
ended with the conclusion that the Thorps' pleadings did not 
state a claim for relief.  Because the motions for summary 
judgment lacked any evidentiary materials, the circuit court 
properly could have treated them as requesting dismissal of the 
complaint.  We agree with the court of appeals, Thorp, 225 
Wis. 2d at 684, that for the purpose of this appeal, it is 
immaterial whether the motions were for summary judgment or 
dismissal.  
No. 98-2358 
 
10
689.  Furthermore, none of the factual allegations contained in 
the complaint constituted a basis for a substantive due process 
claim.  Id. at 698-99.  However, the Thorps' factual allegations 
relating to the lack of a reasonable basis for the change in 
zoning did state a claim for a violation of equal protection.  
Id. at 691.  Finally, the court of appeals held that the Town 
could not be dismissed from the action.  The Thorps could 
recover from the Town if they proved that the Town's actions in 
amending the ordinance deprived them of equal protection.  Id. 
at 700.   
II. 
 
¶18 We first consider the issue of whether the Thorps 
complied with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)the notice of claim 
statute.  We address the issue of whether the Thorps complied 
with the state notice provision because the Thorps based their 
claims 
on 
both 
the 
state 
constitution 
and 
the 
federal 
Constitution, and they alleged that the Town violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 69.61(4).  Moreover, the issue of whether the Thorps complied 
with § 893.80(1) was one of the issues presented in the Thorps' 
petition for review, and the parties addressed it in their 
briefs before this court.  (Pet. Review at 1-2.)  "The 
application of a statute to a given set of facts is a question 
of law," which we review de novo.  DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d 178, 189, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994). 
 
No. 98-2358 
 
11
 
¶19 We begin our analysis by noting that the Thorps 
brought this action in part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6  State 
courts have jurisdiction over actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  Riedy v. Sperry, 83 Wis. 2d 158, 160, 265 N.W.2d 475 
(1978). 
 
Section 1983 
provides 
a 
tort 
remedy 
when 
the 
government, acting under the color of state law,7 deprives a 
person of his or her rights under federal law or the United 
States Constitution.  Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 
57, 65, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986).  It does not create any 
substantive rights.  Penterman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 211 
Wis. 2d 458, 472, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997).  A municipality is 
subject to liability under § 1983 if "the action that is alleged 
to 
be 
unconstitutional 
implements 
or 
executes 
a 
policy 
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted 
                     
6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: 
Every 
person 
who, 
under 
color 
of 
any 
statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
 
7 "Under color of state law" is defined as a "'[m]isuse of 
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law 
. . . .'"  Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 65 n.3, 
384 N.W.2d 333 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Soc. 
Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).  
No. 98-2358 
 
12
and promulgated by that body's officers."  Monell v. Department 
of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).   
¶20 Although the Thorps' complaint does not expressly 
state that the claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a 
complaint does not have to identify § 1983 explicitly as the 
source for the remedy a plaintiff seeks.  Boldt v. State, 101 
Wis. 2d 566, 584, 305 N.W.2d 133 (1981).  See also Riedy, 83 
Wis. 2d at 160.  To be actionable under § 1983, the complaint 
must simply allege that a person acting under the color of state 
law deprived the plaintiff of a right under federal law or the 
federal constitution.  Id.; Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 472.  We 
conclude that this action was brought under § 1983 since the 
complaint alleges that the Town and the County violated the 
Thorps' federal constitutional rights by implementing a local 
zoning ordinance. 
¶21 We hold that according to Felder, 487 U.S. 131, the 
Thorps did not have to comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) to 
bring their federal constitutional claims.  In Felder, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a federal civil rights 
action brought in state court preempts § 893.80(1)'s notice 
requirements.  487 U.S. at 138.  The underlying rationale is 
that according to the federal Supremacy Clause, "'[t]he relative 
importance to the State of its own law is not material when 
there is a conflict with a valid federal law,' for 'any state 
law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which 
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.'"  
Id. (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).  Here, 
No. 98-2358 
 
13
the Thorps brought their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
and 
therefore, 
their 
federal 
claims 
are 
not 
barred 
by 
§ 893.80(1). 
¶22 Moreover, 
the 
Thorps 
fulfilled 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)'s notice provisions for the purpose of claiming that 
the Town failed to comply with Wis. Stat. § 60.61(4) and that 
the Town and the County violated the Wisconsin constitution as 
well.  Section 893.80(1)8 contains two notice provisions.  Each 
                     
8 Wisconsin 
Statute 
893.80(1)(a)-(b). 
 
Claims 
against 
governmental bodies or officers, agents or employes; notice of 
injury; limitation of damages and suits. 
(1) Except as provided in subs. (1m) and (1p), no action 
may be brought or maintained against any volunteer 
fire 
company organized under ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision 
or 
agency 
thereof nor against any officer, official, agent or 
employe of the corporation, subdivision or agency for 
acts done in their official capacity or in the course 
of their agency or employment upon a claim or cause of 
action unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employe 
under s. 801.11.  Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employe; and 
No. 98-2358 
 
14
provision must be satisfied since each serves a different 
purpose.  Vanstone v. Town of Delafield, 191 Wis. 2d 586, 593, 
530 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Colburn v. Ozaukee County, 
39 Wis. 2d 231, 238, 159 N.W.2d 33 (1968)).   
¶23 Subsection (1)(a) is the notice of injury provision.  
Id. at 592.  The notice of injury provision allows governmental 
entities to "investigate and evaluate" potential claims.  Id. at 
593 (citing Mannino v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 610, 299 
N.W.2d 823 (1981)).  It states that an action cannot be brought 
against a governmental entity unless a signed "written notice of 
the circumstances of the claim" is served on the governmental 
entity within 120 days of the initial event.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(a).  Even if a claimant fails to comply with the 
120-day deadline, however, the claimant may still comply with 
subsection (1)(a) by showing that the governmental entity had 
actual notice of the claim and was not prejudiced by the 
claimant's 
failure 
to 
give 
the 
requisite 
notice.  
§ 893.80(1)(a).  See also DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 
at 197.   
¶24 A governmental entity must affirmatively plead that a 
plaintiff did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  
Elkhorn School Dist. v. East Troy School Dist., 110 Wis. 2d 1, 
                                                                  
(b) A claim containing the address of the claimant and an 
itemized statement of the relief sought is presented 
to the appropriate clerk or person who performs the 
duties of a clerk or secretary for the defendant fire 
company, corporation, subdivision or agency and the 
claim is disallowed.   
No. 98-2358 
 
15
5, 327 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1982).  A plaintiff then needs to 
prove that the plaintiff gave formal notice or actual notice and 
that the governmental entity was not prejudiced by actual, 
rather than formal, notice.  Id.  Both the Town and the County 
affirmatively plead the Thorps' lack of compliance with the 
Wisconsin notice statute.  (R. at 3:6; 5:6.)  The Thorps, 
however, also met their burden of proof. 
¶25 The 
Thorps 
complied 
with 
subsection 
(1)(a) 
by 
providing notice within 120 days of the initial event.9  On 
November 21, 1994, approximately one month after the zoning 
change became official, the Thorps notified the Town and the 
County of their request to rezone their property by letter.  
This letter complied with the 120-day formal notice requirement. 
¶26 Moreover, the Thorps' letter set forth "written notice 
of the circumstances of the claim," permitting the Town and the 
County to evaluate and investigate the possibility of rezoning 
the Thorps' property.  Vanstone, 191 Wis. 2d at 595 (quoting 
Liberty Trucking Co. v. DILHR, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 
457 (1973)).  The letter stated that the zoning ordinance was 
"improper" because "the methods and procedures utilized by the 
                     
9 We note the court of appeals' decision in Kapischke v. 
County of Walworth, 226 Wis. 2d 320, 326, 595 N.W.2d 42 (Ct. 
App. 1999), which held that the 30 day time limit involved in a 
certiorari review would take precedence over the 120 days a 
municipality has to disallow a claim.  Later in this opinion, we 
discuss the availability of certiorari review to the Thorps with 
regard to their procedural due process claim.  However, since 
the Thorps did not avail themselves of certiorari review, the 
court of appeals' decision in Kapischke is inapplicable in this 
instance.  
No. 98-2358 
 
16
Town of Lebanon and Dodge County were defective."  (R. at 10:5.) 
 The letter then proceeded to specify in detail what procedures 
were defective.  First, the letter alleged that the Town Zoning 
Committee consisted of three members, not five, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 60.61(4).  Second, citing Wis. Stat. § 60.61(2), the 
letter 
alleged 
that 
the 
Town 
"may 
[not] 
have 
had 
any 
jurisdiction to act in rezoning the entire town" since the 
County already had adopted a county zoning ordinance.  (R. at 
10:5.)  
Third, the letter 
claimed 
that 
the 
zoning map 
demonstrated the discriminatory nature of the zoning ordinance. 
 Fourth, according to the letter, the Town Zoning Committee also 
used a flawed and unscientific survey.  Fifth, the letter 
alleged that the Town Board knew the Thorps' property was not 
suitable to being classified as general agricultural.  Finally, 
the rezoning "resulted in a substantial loss of value per acre" 
for the Thorps' property and other properties in the Town.  (R. 
at 10:6.)  As a result of the specificity with which the Thorps 
set forth their claims in their letter, the Town and the County 
were able to evaluate and investigate the Thorps' claims.  The 
minutes from the Town Board's meeting, for instance, demonstrate 
that the Town reviewed the Thorps' letter of intent to rezone 
and that a discussion ensued before a vote was taken.  (R. at 
1:14.) 
¶27 We also note that the Thorps alternatively complied 
with subsection (1)(a) by providing actual notice of the claim 
without prejudice to the Town or the County.  The Thorps argued 
before the circuit court that the defendants were not prejudiced 
No. 98-2358 
 
17
by a lack of formal notice, because the Thorps had corresponded 
with the defendants on numerous occasions and presented their 
case before them in person.  In short, the Town and the County 
could not have been prejudiced because "they were part of the 
entire process."  (R. at 24:6.)  In DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d at 197, we determined that the City of Waukesha was not 
prejudiced by the state's failure to formally notify the city.  
The city was not prejudiced, we held, because the state and the 
city had been in contact for four years over the city's 
inability 
to 
comply 
with 
water 
safety 
standards. 
 
Id.  
Similarly, in this case, the Thorps waited to file their 
complaint with the circuit court until they had exhausted their 
options for administrative review with the Town and the County. 
 Therefore, we conclude that the Town and the County were not 
prejudiced by the Thorps' lack of a more formal notice than the 
one that the letter provided. 
¶28 Subsection (1)(b) is the notice of claim provision.  
DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 197.  This provision 
affords a municipality the opportunity to compromise and settle 
a claim.  Vanstone, 191 Wis. 2d at 593.  A notice must 
substantially comply with each of the four requirements listed 
in subsection (1)(b).10  DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 
197-98.  A notice must 1) state a claimant's address, 2) include 
an itemized statement of the relief sought, 3) be presented to 
                     
10 We note our earlier decision that "only substantial, and 
not strict, compliance with notice statutes is required."  Figgs 
v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 55, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984).  
No. 98-2358 
 
18
the appropriate clerk, and 4) be disallowed by the governmental 
entity.  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  We follow two principles 
when analyzing whether the Thorps satisfied the requirements of 
§ 893.80(1)(b).  DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 198.  
The notice must provide enough information to apprise a 
governmental entity of the budget it will need to set aside in 
case of litigation or settlement.  Id. (citing Figgs v. City of 
Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 55, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984)).  The 
notice should also "be construed so as to preserve bona fide 
claims."  Id. 
¶29 The Thorps also complied with the requirements listed 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  First, the Thorps' November 1994 
letter to the Town and the County contained the address of the 
Thorps' attorney.  A notice may satisfy the first requirement by 
listing the address of the claimant's attorney.  DNR v. City of 
Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 198. 
¶30 Second, the letter contained an itemized account of 
the relief sought.  A notice of claim must state the requested 
relief in terms of a specific dollar amount.  Id. at 199.  In 
this case, the letter estimated the loss to the Thorps as a 
result of the changed zoning.  It stated that 
 
the net effect of the recent rezoning action taken by 
the Town and County has resulted in a substantial loss 
of value per acre of not only the Thorp property, but 
many of the other properties in the Town of Lebanon. I 
[the Thorps' attorney] have been informed by local 
appraisers in your area that agricultural/farmland 
sells for approximately $850.00 to $1,000.00 per acre. 
On the other hand, rural development zoned land sells 
for approximately $3,000.00 to $4,000.00 per acre.  As 
No. 98-2358 
 
19
a result thereof, the recent rezoning ordinance has 
dropped the value of the Thorp property by more than 
50%. 
(R. at 10:6.)  The letter also noted that the Thorps' property 
consists of 255 acres of land.  (R. at 10:5.)  Finally, the 
Thorps' attorney stated that the purpose of the letter was to 
request the Town to rezone the Thorps' property. Certainly, the 
letter provided enough information to notify the Town and the 
County of the budget it would need to set aside in case of 
litigation or settlement.  As such, we conclude that the letter 
sufficiently stated an itemized request for relief. 
 
¶31 Third, the letter was submitted to the appropriate 
individuals.  We have found substantial compliance with the 
third requirement when the claimant has not presented the notice 
to the clerk or secretary, if the notice was presented to a 
"proper representative."  DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 
at 200.  In that case, the state submitted its claim directly to 
the Waukesha city attorneys.  Id. at 199.  We stated that by 
failing to file with the city clerk, the claimant did not 
"follow the letter of the statute," but even so, the state 
"present[ed] the claim to a proper representative of the city." 
 Id. at 200.  We held that presenting the claim to a "proper 
representative" was substantial compliance.  Id. 
¶32 In this case, the letter was addressed to several 
officials:  Betty Balian, the Town Chairman; LeRoy Tietz, a Town 
Supervisor; Allen Behl, another Town Supervisor; and James 
Erdmann, the Executive Director of the Dodge County Planning and 
Development Department.  A copy of the letter was also sent to 
No. 98-2358 
 
20
Dan Creydt, the Town Planning Committee Chair; Joan Wilson, the 
Planning Committee Secretary; and Alfred Schoenike, a Planning 
Committee member.  However, the letter was not sent to either 
the town clerk or the county clerk.  While the statute was not 
followed literally in this case, the claim was presented to 
several individuals who were all involved in the rezoning 
effort.  Under the circumstances in this case, the above-named 
Town and County officials were all proper representatives, and 
therefore, the Thorps substantially complied with the third 
requirement. 
 
¶33 Finally, the claim was disallowed by both the Town and 
the County.  The Town initially refused to rezone the Thorps' 
property for rural development, and the County flatly refused to 
rezone the property. 
 
¶34 In sum, the Thorps satisfied the notice requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) for the purpose of bringing any state 
claim. 
                 
III. 
No. 98-2358 
 
21
 
¶35 We now turn to the constitutional claims presented in 
the Thorps' complaint.11  We must determine whether the Thorps' 
complaint stated any claims for relief.  On the second appeal, 
the court of appeals reviewed this case using standards 
appropriate for a dismissal motion, even though the circuit 
court and the parties treated the appeal as a review of a 
summary judgment motion.  Thorp, 225 Wis. 2d at 684.  The court 
of appeals did so because the Town and the County did not submit 
evidentiary materials in support of or in opposition to the 
motion.  Id.  We employ the same reasoning and thus the same 
approach as the court of appeals.  The legal sufficiency of a 
complaint presents an issue of law, which we review de novo.  
Irby v. Macht, 184 Wis. 2d 831, 836, 522 N.W.2d 9 (1994) 
(overruled on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 
(1995)).  In making our determination of the complaint's legal 
sufficiency, we accept the facts pleaded, and the reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from those facts, as true.  Id. 
                     
11 We 
treat 
the 
Thorps' 
claims 
under 
the 
federal 
Constitution consistently with their claims under the state 
constitution 
because 
ordinarily 
there 
is 
no 
discernible 
difference in intent between the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses under the Wisconsin Constitution and the United 
States Constitution.  Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV with Wis. 
Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8.  State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180-
81, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (stating that "[w]here . . . the 
language 
of 
the 
provision 
in 
the 
state 
constitution 
is 
'virtually identical' to that of the federal provision or where 
no difference in intent is discernible, Wisconsin courts have 
normally construed the state constitution consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's construction of the federal 
constitution") (citing State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 133, 
423 N.W.2d 823 (1988)).  
No. 98-2358 
 
22
¶36 The Thorps alleged that the zoning ordinance was 
invalid 
and 
violated 
their 
right 
to 
equal 
protection, 
substantive due process, and procedural due process.  We 
conclude that the complaint stated a claim for deprivation of 
equal protection, but not a claim for deprivation of procedural 
or substantive due process.  We first address the equal 
protection claim. 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM 
¶37 The Equal Protection Clause ensures that people will 
not 
be 
discriminated 
against 
with 
regard 
to 
"'statutory 
classifications and other governmental activity.'"  Jackson v. 
Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 901, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998) (quoting 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)); U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  See also Browndale v. Board of 
Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182, 203-04, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973) 
(stating that in the context of zoning ordinances, equal 
protection must be granted to those individuals who are 
similarly situated and who cannot be reasonably distinguished). 
  
No. 98-2358 
 
23
¶38 Generally, two levels of judicial scrutiny are applied 
to equal protection challenges.12  State ex rel. Watts v. 
Combined Community Serv., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 81 n.8, 362 N.W.2d 104 
(1985).  The first level of scrutiny applies to statutes (or 
ordinances) that involve "fundamental interests or rights, . . . 
suspect classifications or 'discrete and insular minorities.'"  
Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
153 n.4 (1938)).  If a statute or governmental activity applies 
to one of the protected classes, a reviewing court applies a 
strict scrutiny test.  In re Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 894, 
580 N.W.2d 660 (1998).  For a statute or ordinance to pass 
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny, a governmental 
entity "must prove that the classification is necessary to 
promote a 'compelling governmental interest' . . . ."  Id. 
(quoting State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 319, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995)); State ex rel. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 81 n.8.  Further, 
the classification must be carefully tailored so that the 
                     
12 We note that the federal and state Equal Protection 
Clauses are interpreted in an equivalent manner.  In re Hezzie 
R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 893, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998).  The United 
States Supreme Court has also employed a middle level of 
scrutiny, in which a governmental entity must demonstrate the 
"'important 
governmental 
objectives'" 
served 
by 
the 
classification, 
and 
the 
substantial 
relationship 
between 
"'discriminatory means employed'" and "'the achievement of those 
objectives.'"  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(1996).  This level of scrutiny has been applied to official 
classifications based on gender.  Id. at 532.  See also State ex 
rel. Watts v. Combined Community Serv., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 82 n.8, 
362 N.W.2d 104 (1985) (suggesting that the middle level of 
scrutiny could be applied to a classification based on mental 
illness).  
No. 98-2358 
 
24
statute or ordinance uses the least drastic means to achieve the 
compelling state interest.  See State ex rel. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d 
at 82.   
¶39 Nowhere have the Thorps alleged that they belong to a 
suspect class such as a racial minority.  See Jackson, 218 Wis. 
2d at 901-02.  Moreover, it has been held that zoning does not 
involve fundamental rights.  Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 
17 F.3d 1227, 1239 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 870 
(1994).  Because neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right 
is implicated in this case, the strict scrutiny test does not 
apply to the ordinance at issue. 
¶40 The second level of scrutiny applies "[w]here a 
suspect class or fundamental interest is not involved . . . ." 
State ex rel. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 82 n.8.  This level of 
scrutiny involves a rational basis test, wherein classifications 
are upheld "if they are in any way rationally related to the 
asserted purpose of the legislation."  Id.; In re Hezzie R., 219 
Wis. 2d at 894 (quoting State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 
447 N.W.2d 654 (1989)).  The statute (or ordinance) must only 
meet a legitimate state interest.  Id.  We have also stated the 
test in terms of whether a legislative enactment is "reasonable 
and practical" in light of the government’s objective in 
creating the legislation.  In re Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d at 895 
(quoting McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 131).  
¶41 Therefore, the Thorps’ complaint must allege facts 
that the ordinance is not rationally related to its purpose.  We 
conclude that the Thorps have alleged sufficient facts to state 
No. 98-2358 
 
25
a claim for deprivation of equal protection.13  The following 
allegations from the complaint support the Thorps' claim that 
the ordinance lacks a rational basis: 
 
(b) The 
highest 
and 
best 
suited 
use 
of 
the 
Plaintiffs' property is not agricultural, but 
rather rural development.  The Plaintiffs' land 
is hilly, rocky and has a light gravel soil base 
which dries out after any type of rain.  The soil 
is very erodible.  Part of the Plaintiffs' 
property is located within wet lands. 
 
(c) In adopting the new zoning map, the Town and 
County left numerous 'islands' throughout the 
Town that have not been rezoned and have been 
left with a rural development classification 
without any logical explanation.  Some of the 
land 
that 
has 
kept 
its 
rural 
development 
classification 
is 
even 
more 
suitable 
for 
agricultural and farming than the Plaintiffs' own 
property.  To that extent, there has been 
discriminatory zoning. 
(R. at 1:4.)  It appears from these pleadings, which we must 
accept as true, that the ordinance may not be "rationally 
related to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
                     
13 The Thorps alleged that the County Board violated their 
right to equal protection by not conducting a fair and impartial 
hearing.  First, they alleged in subpart (f) of the first claim 
that Betty Balian, a member of both the Town Board and the 
County Board, as well as the County Planning and Surveyor 
Committee, 
was 
clearly 
biased 
against 
rural 
development.  
Therefore, the Thorps alleged, her participation in the rezoning 
violated the Thorps' right to a fair and impartial hearing.  
Second, in a separate claim, the Thorps alleged that the County 
Planning and Surveyor Committee Chairman misrepresented its vote 
regarding the rezoning.  They also further characterized 
Balian's participation in the rezoning as improper.  We do not 
address these allegations with regard to equal protection, 
however, because the Thorps have not requested such review by 
this court, and it was not an issue presented to the court of 
appeals.       
No. 98-2358 
 
26
welfare" of the Town of Lebanon residents.  State ex rel. Grand 
Bazaar v. Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 2d 203, 211, 313 N.W.2d 805 
(1982).  The pleadings indicate that the Town may have engaged 
in wholesale rezoning efforts, without examining the particular 
suitability of the land to its zoned usage. 
 
¶42 Citing case law from the Seventh Circuit and the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the County 
argues that "[t]he Thorps do not allege any intentional 
discrimination based on their membership in a particular group" 
and that the Thorps’ allegations merely amount to claims of 
imperfect zoning.  (Resp't County Br. at 9-11.)  We have already 
established that the first level of scrutiny applicable to 
suspect classifications is not at issue in this case.  As such, 
the Thorps’ membership in a group or class is irrelevant to a 
determination of whether a rational basis exists for the 
ordinance, since the question of a suspect class is not involved 
in application of the rational basis test.  See Penterman, 211 
Wis. 2d at 483-84. 
 
¶43 The County also argues that the Thorps are barred from 
making an equal protection claim because they did not avail 
themselves of an adequate state law remedy, namely certiorari 
review 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 68.13. 
 
In 
support 
of 
that 
proposition, the County notably cites to Weber, 129 Wis. 2d at 
76, and Davis v. City of Elkhorn, 132 Wis. 2d 394, 398, 393 
N.W.2d 95 (Ct. App. 1986).  However, these cases dealt with 
procedural 
due 
process 
violations, 
not 
equal 
protection 
violations.  As we will discuss later, the availability of 
No. 98-2358 
 
27
certiorari review satisfies the requirement for procedural due 
process, Irby, 184 Wis. 2d at 843, but it does not satisfy the 
requirement for equal protection.  The Thorps brought a § 1983 
claim requesting money damages.  While it is possible to make an 
equal protection argument under certiorari review, see e.g., 
State ex rel. Madison Landfills, Inc. v. Dane County, 183 Wis. 
2d 282, 285, 515 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1994), monetary damages 
are not one of the forms of relief Wis. Stat. § 68.13 authorizes 
a court to grant.  Wisconsin Stat. § 68.13(1)Judicial 
Reviewstates in pertinent part that a court "may affirm or 
reverse the final determination, or remand to the decision maker 
for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision."  
Monetary damages are therefore not available to a plaintiff 
seeking relief under § 68.13.  However, such a plaintiff could  
join a claim for monetary damages with a Chapter 68 certiorari 
review, but is not required to do so.  Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 
2000 WI 61, ¶4 ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  Because the 
Thorps could not have received adequate relief by certiorari 
review of their equal protection violation claim, we conclude 
that their § 1983 action was not barred by the existence of a 
state law remedy in this instance.    
   
¶44 Finally, we note that the burden on a plaintiff to 
prove that an ordinance lacks a rational relationship to a valid 
governmental objective is difficult.  The rational basis test 
has been characterized as creating a "frequently insurmountable 
task" for the challenger of an ordinance to prove "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the ordinance possesses no rational basis 
No. 98-2358 
 
28
to any legitimate municipal objective."  Grand Bazaar, 105 Wis. 
2d at 209.  Moreover, ordinances enjoy a presumption of 
validity, even when they are challenged on the basis of equal 
protection.  State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 301, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995).  An opponent of an ordinance must establish the 
ordinance’s unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.; 
Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d 640, 651, 211 N.W.2d 
471 (1973).  We agree with the court of appeals, however, that 
our determination relates to the sufficiency of the Thorps’ 
pleadings, not their ability to prove an equal protection claim. 
 Thorp, 225 Wis. 2d at 692.  As such, the "frequently 
insurmountable" presumptions and burdens associated with the 
rational basis test do not apply at this point in the inquiry.  
Grand Bazaar, 105 Wis. 2d at 209. 
THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
 
¶45 Second, the Thorps did not state a claim for violation 
of substantive due process.  The Substantive Due Process Clause 
also emanates from the Fourteenth Amendment.  Penterman, 211 
Wis. 2d at 480.  See also Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.  It protects 
individuals against governmental actions that are arbitrary and 
wrong, "'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.'"  Id.  Substantive due process forbids a 
government 
from 
exercising 
"power 
without 
any 
reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental 
objective."  County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 
(1998).  A substantive due process claim may apply to a 
No. 98-2358 
 
29
violation of property interests.14  New Burnham Prairie Homes, 
Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 See also Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 216 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (when a party may have been denied a building permit 
because of "impermissible political animus," the party may claim 
a violation of substantive due process); Bello v. Walker, 840 
F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851 
(1988) (a party may bring a substantive due process claim if 
evidence shows the denial of a permit for "partisan political or 
personal reasons"); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 
1420-21 (4th Cir. 1983) (a party’s substantive due process claim 
was allowed when a county moratorium on building permits 
appeared to be intended only for the party’s application).  In 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the United 
States Supreme Court first articulated the Substantive Due 
Process Clause in relationship to a zoning ordinance.  It stated 
that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional when its "provisions 
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare."  Id. at 395.  The Euclid test was later affirmed in 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 
                     
14 The Seventh Circuit requires a "plaintiff [to] show 
either a separate constitutional violation or the inadequacy of 
state 
law 
remedies," 
besides 
showing 
the 
arbitrary 
and 
irrational nature of a decision.  Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 
551, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1989).   
No. 98-2358 
 
30
U.S. 1, 3-5 (1974); and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 
183, 187 (1928).        
¶46 This 
court 
has 
stated 
that 
when 
evaluating 
a 
substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
he or she has been deprived of a liberty or property interest 
that is constitutionally protected.  Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 
480.  See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972).  A property interest is constitutionally protected if 
"state law recognizes and protects that interest."  Penterman, 
211 Wis. 2d at 480. 
¶47 The Thorps argue that they have alleged a deprivation 
of substantive due process in both their first and third claims. 
 The first claim relates to the invalidity of the zoning 
ordinance, and the third claim relates to the denial of a fair 
and impartial hearing. 
 
¶48 We address the allegations contained in the claim 
relating to the invalidity of the ordinance first.  In their 
complaint, the Thorps stated that their substantive due process 
rights were violated because the Town failed to comply with the 
five member zoning committee requirement as set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 60.61(4).  The alleged violation of § 60.61(4) relates 
to the procedures used to create the zoning ordinance, not the 
property interest the Thorps have in their land.  In Roth, 408 
U.S. at 577-78, the United States Supreme Court held that an 
assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh did 
not have a property interest in his employment because his 
tenure was not secured by state statute or university rule. 
No. 98-2358 
 
31
Likewise, in this case the Thorps do not have a property 
interest in their land which was secured by § 60.61(4) or 
similar state statute.  Section 60.61(4) involves procedures for 
enacting town zoning ordinances. 
¶49 The Thorps also alleged that the Town and the County 
misinterpreted and misused the various surveys that were 
conducted before the rezoning was implemented.  Similarly, we 
agree with the court of appeals that the Thorps' allegations do 
not 
constitute 
a 
violation 
of 
substantive 
due 
process.  
Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of 
Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 245 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that a 
governmental entity does not have to justify its actions by the 
use of any specific studies). 
¶50 Finally, we note the similarity between the test for a 
violation of equal protection and substantive due process:  one 
test deals with the rational basis for a statute or ordinance, 
while the other test deals with the arbitrariness of the statute 
or ordinance.  See Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law, § 2.47 
(4th ed. 1997).  Here, the court of appeals found that the 
Thorps’ remaining allegations supporting a substantive due 
process claim were better suited to their equal protection 
claim, and therefore, did not permit the Thorps to use the 
allegations to support both claims.  Thorp, 225 Wis. 2d at 699. 
 We agree.  In Sacramento, the United States Supreme Court 
expressed its reluctance to expand the concept of substantive 
due process and stated that "'where a particular amendment 
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection 
No. 98-2358 
 
32
against 
a 
particular 
sort 
of 
government 
behavior, 
that 
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due 
process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'"  523 
U.S. at 842.  Because the factual allegations pertaining to the 
classification of the Thorps' property and other Town properties 
support the Thorps' equal protection claim, we necessarily do 
not address them with regard to the substantive due process 
claim. 
¶51 We also do not address the allegations in the 
complaint relating to the denial of a fair and impartial hearing 
at this point in our analysis.  The denial of a fair and 
impartial hearing implicates the procedural component of due 
process, not the substantive component.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
¶52 We conclude that the Thorps' complaint does not make 
any allegations that the zoning ordinance was clearly arbitrary 
and unreasonable.    
THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
 
¶53 Third, the Thorps have not stated a claim for relief 
under the Procedural Due Process Clause.  Like equal protection 
and substantive due process rights, procedural due process 
rights emanate from the Fourteenth Amendment.  Penterman, 211 
Wis. 2d at 473.  See also Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.  The 
procedural 
due 
process 
clause 
protects 
individuals 
from 
governmental 
"denial 
of 
fundamental 
procedural 
fairness."  
Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 845-46.  "[A] plaintiff must show a 
deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected 
No. 98-2358 
 
33
interest in 'life, liberty, or property' without due process of 
law."  Id. (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. at 125). The 
requirement of procedural due process is met if a state provides 
adequate post-deprivation remedies.  Irby, 184 Wis. 2d at 843. 
 
¶54 The state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy 
in the form of certiorari.  See State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 
50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-50, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971).  The adequate 
post-deprivation remedy available to the Thorps was to petition 
for certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13.   
¶55 In this case, the Thorps alleged that they were denied 
the right to a fair and impartial hearing, in violation of their 
procedural due process rights.  There is no indication in the 
complaint that the Thorps sought certiorari review under either 
the statute or the common law.  The complaint neither cited to 
Wis. Stat. § 68.13, nor did it state that certiorari review was 
requested.  Moreover, the Thorps failed to comply with the 
requirements of § 68.13 because they did not seek review within 
30 days of the final determination.   
¶56 Citing Tobler v. Door County, 158 Wis. 2d 19, 25, 461 
N.W.2d 775 (1990), the Thorps argue that by filing an ordinary 
summons and complaint they commenced a review by writ of 
certiorari.  However, Tobler is distinguishable because in 
Tobler, the complaint specifically "asked the circuit court to 
issue a writ of certiorari and to review the decision of the 
Door County Board of Adjustments."  158 Wis. 2d at 20-21.  Here, 
the Thorps did not ask for issuance of a writ of certiorari in 
their complaint.  As such, the Thorps did not meet the 
No. 98-2358 
 
34
requirements of either statutory or common law certiorari.  
Because the Thorps did not use the available state law remedy, 
they may not now claim that they were denied procedural due 
process. 
IV. 
 
¶57 The last issue we address is the dismissal of the Town 
of Lebanon.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court properly dismissed the Town from any constitutional 
deprivations on the basis that the Town voted to grant the 
Thorps' rezoning request.  However, the court of appeals found 
that the Town could not be dismissed on that basis as to the 
equal protection claim, since that claim related to the 
invalidity of the ordinance itself.  We agree with the court of 
appeals.  The Town was involved in the development of the 
revised zoning map.  As such, the Thorps may be entitled to 
relief from the Town if they succeed in their equal protection 
claim.  See Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 423, 334 N.W.2d 67 
(1983) (stating that a party may only be dismissed if a 
complaint clearly shows that the plaintiff will not be entitled 
to relief from the party).  
V. 
 
¶58 We conclude that the Thorps have stated a claim for 
relief alleging violation of equal protection.  However, they 
are barred from asserting a claim for either substantive or 
procedural due process.  Their factual allegations do not 
support 
a 
claim 
for 
substantive 
due 
process, 
and 
the 
availability of a remedy by certiorari satisfies the procedural 
No. 98-2358 
 
35
due process requirements.  We also conclude that the Thorps are 
not in violation of statutory notice requirements.  According to 
Felder, the federal constitutional claims brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 do not have to comply with the Wisconsin notice 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).  Furthermore, the Thorps 
satisfied the requirements of § 893.80(1).  Finally, we conclude 
that the Town should not be dismissed from this action because 
the Thorps may be entitled to relief from the Town on their 
equal protection claim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
      
 
 
No. 98-2358.ssa 
 
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¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
join the majority opinion except for the discussion about 
substantive due process.  I write separately to state that I 
would adopt the court of appeals discussion of the plaintiffs' 
substantive due process claim, Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 225 
Wis. 2d 672, 697-99, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999), in lieu of 
the discussion in the majority opinion at ¶¶ 45-52. 
¶60 I agree with the court of appeals, 225 Wis. 2d at 697-
99, that the law is unsettled about whether a zoning challenge 
can state a claim for violation of substantive due process.  The 
majority dismisses the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim 
based on the alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 60.61(4) by 
noting that the statute does not secure plaintiffs with property 
rights in their land.  Majority op. at ¶ 48.  The opinion's 
language suggests that plaintiffs need a statutorily created 
right to have a property interest in their land.  I disagree.  
¶61 For the reasons stated, I join the opinion except for 
the paragraphs relating to substantive due process.  I would 
adopt the opinion of the court of appeals on this issue.  
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DIANE S. SYKES join this concurrence. 
 
No. 98-2358.ssa 
 
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