Title: Brenner v. City of New Richmond
Citation: 2012 WI 98
Docket Number: 2010AP000342
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2012

2012 WI 98 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP342 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Robert E. Brenner, Steven J. Wickenhauser, 
Cristy K. Wickenhauser, Allan J. Seidling and 
Susan M. Seidling, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
New Richmond Regional Airport Commission and 
City of New Richmond, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 334 Wis. 2d 807, 800 N.W. 2d 957 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 7, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
St. Croix   
 
JUDGE: 
Howard W. Cameron, Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Benjamin Southwick and Benjamin Southwick Law 
Office, Richland Center, and Ronald L. Siler and Van Dyk, 
O’Boyle, & Siler, S.C, New Richmond, and oral argument by 
Benjamin Southwick. 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Phillip 
R. 
Krass 
and 
Malkerson, 
Gunn, 
& 
Martin, 
LLP, 
Minneapolis, and oral argument by Phillip R. Krass. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James S. Thiel and 
Corey F. Finkelmeyer, assistant attorneys general, with whom on 
 
 
2
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, on behalf of the State of 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
2012 WI 98
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP342   
(L.C. No. 
2007CV1153) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert E. Brenner, Steven J. Wickenhauser, 
Cristy K. Wickenhauser, Allan J. Seidling  
and Susan M. Seidling, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
New Richmond Regional Airport Commission  
and City of New Richmond, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, reversing an order 
of the St. Croix County Circuit Court, Howard W. Cameron, Jr., 
Judge.  The circuit court dismissed the inverse condemnation 
claims of several landowners whose property is close or 
immediately adjacent to the New Richmond Regional Airport 
(Airport).  The landowners alleged that an extension of the 
Airport's runway by 1500 feet amounted to the compensable taking 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
2 
 
of an easement because the resulting overflights had adverse 
effects on their properties, including diminished use and 
enjoyment and decrease of value. 
¶2 
The 
circuit court acknowledged that the subject 
properties had been adversely affected, but it concluded that 
"for a taking by the government to be compensable, the property 
owner must be deprived of all or practically all of the 
beneficial use of the property or of any part.  The Court must 
consider 
the 
whole 
property and not just a portion of 
each . . . property."  The court of appeals reversed, holding 
that the "standard for regulatory takings does not apply to 
physical occupation cases."  Brenner v. City of New Richmond, 
No. 2010AP342, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 10, 
2011).   
¶3 
We are presented with the following question:  In 
airplane 
overflight 
cases, 
is 
the 
proper 
standard 
for 
determining a taking (1) whether the overflights are low enough 
and frequent enough to have a direct and immediate effect on the 
use and enjoyment of property, or (2) whether the overflights 
deprive 
the 
property 
owner 
of 
all 
or 
substantially 
all 
beneficial use of the property? 
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
a 
taking 
occurs 
in 
airplane 
overflight cases when government action results in aircraft 
flying 
over 
a 
landowner's 
property 
low 
enough 
and 
with 
sufficient frequency to have a direct and immediate effect on 
the use and enjoyment of the property.  We remand the case to 
the circuit court to make further factual findings and apply 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
3 
 
this standard to determine whether there were takings of the 
properties in this case.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
The New Richmond Regional Airport is owned and 
operated by the City of New Richmond (City) in St. Croix County.  
The Airport is located on the north end of the city on 
approximately 350 acres of land.1  The Airport is bounded on the 
west by County Trunk Highway CC (CTH CC).   
¶6 
In September 2006 the Airport began a construction 
project to extend its 4000 foot Northwest/Southeast main runway 
by 1500 feet.  The project was completed in June 2007.  To make 
the extension possible, the City2 acquired by direct condemnation 
approximately 
62 
acres 
of 
land 
from 
Steven 
and 
Cristy 
Wickenhauser (the Wickenhausers) whose 142.5 acres of land 
abutted the north end of the Airport.  The City also acquired a 
3.813 acre avigation easement3 over two parcels within the 
                                                 
1 The Airport is located approximately 30 miles northeast of 
St. Paul, Minnesota, so that it provides service to the Eastern 
Twin Cities Metro Area as well as to western Wisconsin. 
2 In this case, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
the Wisconsin Department of Transportation Bureau of Aeronautics 
(State), and the City worked together in acquiring the land for 
the Airport.  The FAA and the State have a "block grant 
agreement" in which the State acts on behalf of the FAA as well 
as municipalities in acquiring land for municipal airports.  For 
the sake of simplicity, we refer to the City acquiring property.  
These statements should be understood to represent the full 
relationship among government actors. 
3 An avigation or avigational easement is "An easement 
permitting unimpeded aircraft flights over the servient estate."  
Black's Law Dictionary 527 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
4 
 
remaining 80 acres of the Wickenhauser property.  The avigation 
easement covered airspace above the Wickenhausers' personal 
residence and dairy barn.  The Wickenhausers asked the City to 
condemn their entire 142.5 acres.  The City declined.  
¶7 
The Airport and the Wickenhauser property are on the 
east side of CTH CC.  Robert Brenner (Brenner) and Allan and 
Susan Seidling (the Seidlings) own properties on the west side 
of CTH CC.   
¶8 
The Brenner property consists of approximately 5 acres 
and 
includes 
his 
personal 
residence, 
a 
barn, 
and 
other 
miscellaneous improvements.  The house is 816 feet from the 
closest point of the extended runway.  The edge of the Brenner 
property borders CTH CC and is closer to the runway than the 
house. 
¶9 
The Seidling property consists of approximately 15 
acres including their personal residence, crop fields, and 
pasture land.  It borders CTH CC on the east and is directly 
south and west of the Brenner property.  The Brenner property 
was once part of the Seidlings' acreage.  The Seidlings' home is 
approximately 1503 feet from the runway.  Susan Seidling 
indicated that she runs a daycare business out of her home. 
¶10 Some of the Seidling land and much of the remainder of 
the Wickenhauser land are rented for crops or other agricultural 
uses. 
¶11 Like the Wickenhausers, both Brenner and the Seidlings 
asked the City to condemn their land after they learned of the 
planned airport extension.  The City declined. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
5 
 
¶12 The 
landowners and their witnesses testified in 
various proceedings about the adverse effects of the Airport 
expansion.  In essence, the landowners complained that the 
extended runway led to noise, dust, dirt, flashing lights, 
disruption of their sleep, diminished enjoyment of their 
property, concerns about safety, direct overflights, and a 
decrease in property value. 
¶13 As noted, the City condemned approximately 62 acres of 
the Wickenhausers' property and acquired an additional avigation 
easement.  The State made a jurisdictional offer4 for the land, 
the easement, and severance damages.5  On December 14, 2007, the 
                                                 
4 See Lamar Co. v. Country Side Rest., 2012 WI 46, ¶8 n.3, 
340 Wis. 2d 335, 814 N.W.2d 159 ("Notice to the property owner 
of a jurisdictional offer is a jurisdictional requisite for the 
condemnor to proceed in condemnation. Wis. Stat. § 32.05(4). 
Pursuant to § 32.05(3), notice of a jurisdictional offer has 
eight necessary components, including, inter alia, a brief 
statement of the nature of the project for which the property is 
intended to be acquired, a description of the property and the 
interest therein sought to be taken, the proposed date of 
occupancy, and the amount of compensation offered."). 
5 The cover letter for the jurisdictional offer as well as 
an affidavit by the landowners' attorney refer to an avigation 
easement 
over 
the 
remaining 
acreage 
of 
the 
Wickenhauser 
property.  However, the jurisdictional offer does not reflect an 
easement over the 77 remaining acres and the parties have not 
represented to us that any interest was acquired in the 77 
remaining acres.  Therefore, we assume for this opinion that the 
only damages paid with respect to the remaining acreage were 
severance damages——not an acquisition of an interest in the 
property.  
Severance damages are defined in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e) 
as: 
Damages resulting from actual severance of land 
including 
damages 
resulting 
from 
severance 
of 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
6 
 
Wickenhausers notified the State that they were rejecting the 
jurisdictional offer, which led to a separate lawsuit on 
December 28, 2007, Wisconsin Bureau of Aeronautics v. Steven 
Wickenhauser, No. 2007CV1210 (St. Croix County Circuit Court).  
This condemnation suit against the Wickenhauser property is 
completely separate from this case.6 
                                                                                                                                                             
improvements or fixtures and proximity damage to 
improvements remaining on condemnee's land.  In 
determining severance damages under this paragraph, 
the condemnor may consider damages which may arise 
during 
construction 
of 
the 
public 
improvement, 
including 
damages 
from 
noise, 
dirt, 
temporary 
interference with vehicular or pedestrian access to 
the property and limitations on use of the property.  
The condemnor may also consider costs of extra travel 
made necessary by the public improvement based on the 
increased distance after construction of the public 
improvement necessary to reach any point on the 
property from any other point on the property. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 
version unless otherwise noted. 
The City asserts that the severance damages paid to the 
Wickenhausers preclude an inverse condemnation claim for the 77 
remaining acres.  The City relies on Hoekstra v. Guardian 
Pipeline, LLC, 2006 WI App 245, ¶13, 298 Wis. 2d 165, 726 
N.W.2d 648, which states that "[s]everance damages are defined 
as 'the diminution in the fair market value of the remaining 
land that occurs because of a taking.'" (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, severance damages represent 
the loss of the value to the land due to the severance of the 
land, not the loss of value due to new or increased overflights.  
Therefore, the Wickenhausers' claim is still alive for the land 
not included in the direct condemnation action.  However, if the 
court calculates diminution of the fair market value of the 
land, it must consider that damages were already paid for the 
diminution of value that was attributable to the severance. 
6 For discussion of the impact of the condemnation case on 
this action, see ¶13 n.5, supra, and ¶¶33 and 86, infra. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
7 
 
¶14 The present case was filed December 13, 2007, by 
Brenner, the Wickenhausers, and the Seidlings.  These landowners 
alleged inverse condemnation, nuisance, and trespass.  To 
perfect their claim, they filed a verified petition for inverse 
condemnation, under Wis. Stat. § 32.10, in June 2008. 
¶15 After a number of motions and pretrial proceedings 
designed in part to clarify the issues, the case proceeded to a 
court trial before Judge Cameron on June 10 and July 10, 2009.  
The landowners and their witnesses focused on the adverse 
effects created by additional aircraft flying in new flight 
patterns at the Airport, while the City emphasized that much of 
the value of the respective properties had not been lost. 
Robert Brenner 
¶16 Robert Brenner lived on his property with his fiancée 
and her daughter.  A licensed pilot, Brenner testified that 
because of the runway extension, crosswinds caused aircraft to 
fly directly over his property, sometimes at less than 100 feet 
in altitude. 
¶17 While some of Brenner's testimony indicated that 
aircraft travelled over his house during the FAA recommended 
approach, he also indicated that some pilots did not follow "the 
standard traffic patterns" and showed "[t]otal disregard for any 
traffic regulations or rules."     
¶18 During the first day of the trial, Brenner offered 
video evidence of this claim and testified:  "[Y]ou will see how 
aircraft totally disregard the air traffic patterns that 
are . . . set up by the FAA, and how they deliberately fly over 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
8 
 
either my house or Steve's house."  The City objected to this 
testimony, asking the court: "How can the City be responsible 
for what pilots do when they're acting illegally and contrary to 
FAA regulations?"    
¶19 Brenner also testified that "this is an uncontrolled 
airport; and so pilots can do basically whatever they want, 
and . . . actually——you know, it's the pilot's responsibility, 
but it's also the airport's responsibility to ensure proper 
traffic patterns are followed." 
¶20 Brenner testified that, after the expansion, residing 
in his home had been a "living nightmare."  He testified about 
helicopters flying in and out at all hours of the night.  He 
testified that jets that could not previously use the shorter 
runway are now flying in and out of the airport.  He testified 
that, since the extension of the runway, air traffic has 
increased and that his whole family's sleep is interrupted 
because of the noise of the airport and the flashing strobe 
lights at night during landings and take-offs.  He testified 
that he and his family cannot sit outside and have a 
conversation or a picnic or a cookout because of the noise.  He 
testified to being concerned about safety issues because the 
planes fly close to the house, noting that the power lines in 
front of his home were lowered ten feet from their original 
level because the aircraft were getting dangerously close.  He 
testified about the debris and dust kicked up by the jets, as 
well as the kerosene smell.    
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
9 
 
¶21 Brenner complained about vibrations in his home, 
particularly with the windows.  The 9-year-old daughter of his 
fiancée testified that, at one time, she was mixing a cake for 
her grandmother and vibrations from a plane flying over caused 
the bowl of cake mix to vibrate off the table and break on the 
floor.  She also testified that the noise often wakes her up at 
night and is scary. 
The Seidlings 
¶22 The Seidlings have lived on their property since about 
1991.  Allan Seidling testified that he can feel vibrations 
while he is sitting in the house when planes come in.  He 
described the odor drifting in from the east.  He said he had 
installed air conditioning but would rather have his windows 
open.  He testified it was hard to have conversations outside 
the house.  Susan Seidling testified that she and her husband do 
not host family gatherings because people complain about the 
noise.  She said the strobe light from the Airport is bothersome 
in the winter.  She said that even with a fan in the house, the 
loud helicopters still create a noise problem.  She also 
testified that aircraft caused her china hutch to shake. 
¶23 Allan Seidling expressed fear about his family's 
safety because of the decreased altitude of the aircraft flying 
over their house and property.  He testified that he was afraid 
to fly kites because they might hit approaching aircraft. 
The Wickenhausers 
¶24 The Wickenhausers have lived on their property since 
1987, although Steven Wickenhauser owned the property in the 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
10 
 
early 1980s.  In addition to the house, there is a large dairy 
barn, bunker silos, and other improvements on the property.  The 
Wickenhausers objected to diminution of their property value and 
"inconvenience, nuisance, annoyance, discomfort and emotional 
distress from the lights, smoke, noise, disruption, vibration, 
smell, trespass onto private property, and significant safety 
concerns" caused by the extension and increased use of the 
Airport.  Respondent's Brief, at 14.  Steven Wickenhauser 
indicated that planes sometimes disrupt his sleeping.  He said 
his windows and china rattle because of vibration.  The State 
has apparently indicated an intent to cut down trees near the 
Wickenhausers' house. 
¶25 The City, of course, offered rebuttal testimony, and 
the circuit court was impressed by some of the remedial efforts 
that the Airport had taken, including the installation of a 
launch pad buffer zone, and a "blast pad . . . to control dust 
and erosion."  The court found that there is no longer a medical 
helicopter stationed at the Airport and that the main jet that 
used the Airport is no longer hangared there.   
¶26 There was mixed testimony about the number of planes 
using the Airport following extension of the runway.  The court 
found that "usage by jet aircraft had increased by 2/3," 
according to an exhibit, but that the number of aircraft on 
instrumental flight plans (IFP) appeared to decrease at night 
and was the same in 2008 as it was before the expansion.  The 
City showed that recreational use of the Airport had declined. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
11 
 
¶27 The City was adamant that it should not be responsible 
for pilots who deviate from FAA flight patterns in taking off or 
landing.  It also contended that there had been no taking of the 
respective properties because they had not been reduced to 
almost no value for all uses. 
¶28 The circuit court, relying on the testimony of James 
Rawson, a real estate appraiser, found that the highest and best 
use of the Wickenhauser property is agriculture and in ten 
years, light industrial.  It added: 
The effect of the runway was a reduction in value of 
5-15 percent and at most 20 percent.  Rawson said the 
best 
use 
of 
the 
Seidling 
property 
is 
rural 
residential.  He testified the airport has a 5-10 
percent impact on the property value.  As to the 
Brenner property the highest and best use was rural 
residential.  The Court concludes that all the 
properties still maintain much of their value even 
with the airport addition. 
¶29 The court also found that airplanes and helicopters 
use the space above the home and property of each plaintiff.  
"The Defendants concede that as a result of the [runway] 
extension there has been a diminution in the peaceful and quiet 
use of the plaintiffs' homes for residential homes and there has 
been a reduction in the value of the homes and the Court would 
concur."   
¶30 Nevertheless, the court distinguished United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), and said: 
 
Having considered all of the arguments presented, 
the 
Court 
concludes 
that 
for 
a 
taking 
by 
the 
government to be compensable, the property owner must 
be 
deprived 
of 
all 
or 
practically 
all 
of 
the 
beneficial use of the property or of any part.  The 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
12 
 
Court must consider the whole property and not just a 
portion of each of the plaintiffs' property. . . .  
While the Court is sympathetic with the Plaintiffs in 
this action, it is not the law that a person who loses 
some enjoyment of their property has suffered an 
unconstitutional taking.  In the present case, the 
flights over the private land of the Plaintiffs are 
not a taking because they have not rendered the 
subject property uninhabitable or destroyed existing 
business on the property. 
¶31 The court also dismissed the landowners' trespass and 
nuisance claims. 
¶32 The court of appeals reversed.  The court of appeals 
distinguished regulatory takings from actual occupation takings, 
determining that a party need not show that he or she has been 
deprived of all or substantially all value of his or her 
property in an actual occupation case.  Brenner, No. 2010AP342, 
unpublished slip op., ¶9.  The court said that in an actual 
occupation case, "the occupation is the taking.  If the rule 
were otherwise, then public entities would rarely be required to 
compensate property owners for taking easements."  Id.   
¶33 In addition, the court of appeals noted that the 
circuit court did not address whether the FAA recommended flight 
path was over other parts of the landowners' properties or 
whether the aircraft deviated from that path.  Id., ¶11.  It 
determined that the Wickenhausers could not recover in this 
action for the 3.813 acres covered by the avigation easement, 
only the 77 acres not covered by the easement.  Id., ¶13.  The 
court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court to make 
further findings of fact as necessary to determine whether a 
taking had occurred. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
13 
 
¶34 We accepted the Airport's petition for review and now 
affirm. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶35 "Whether government conduct constitutes a taking of 
private property without just compensation is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo."  E-L Enters. v. Milwaukee 
Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 785 
N.W.2d 409.  Interpretation of statutes, such as Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10, also is a question of law that this court reviews de 
novo. 
¶36 We accept the findings of fact made by the circuit 
court unless they are clearly erroneous.    
III. ANALYSIS 
¶37 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."  
U.S. Const. amend. V. 
¶38 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applied 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., ___ U.S. ___, 
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. 
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).  
¶39 Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides as follows: "The property of no person shall be taken 
for public use without just compensation therefor."  Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 13. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
14 
 
¶40 In Wisconsin, the government may acquire property by 
various means, including gift, purchase at an agreed price, or 
condemnation.  Wis. Stat. § 32.02.  When government condemns 
property for public use, it must act in conformity with the 
cited constitutional provisions on eminent domain and Chapter 32 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 32.05: 
Condemnation 
for 
sewers 
and 
transportation 
facilities.  
Condemnation, which often involves an element of compulsion, 
frequently raises challenges about the purpose of the taking, 
the extent of the taking, and whether the compensation offered 
or paid for a taking is "just compensation."   
¶41 There are other situations in which government does 
not seek to acquire property directly, but it effectively 
controls property by regulation, or takes property by other 
action, whether the government wishes to or not.  In these 
situations, a property owner may bring suit for compensation 
from the government entity that "took" the owner's property 
without formally exercising its power of condemnation.  These 
actions by property owners seeking compensation for takings are 
called inverse condemnation.  See Black's Law Dictionary 332 
(9th ed. 2010); Koskey v. Town of Bergen, 2000 WI App 140, ¶1 
n.1, 237 Wis. 2d 284, 614 N.W.2d 845; Hillcrest Golf & Country 
Club v. City of Altoona, 135 Wis. 2d 431, 435 n.1, 400 
N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1986). 
¶42 In Wisconsin, inverse condemnation claims are filed 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  This statute reads as follows: 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
15 
 
Condemnation proceedings instituted by property 
owner.  If any property has been occupied by a person 
possessing the power of condemnation and if the person 
has not exercised the power, the owner, to institute 
condemnation proceedings, shall present a verified 
petition to the circuit judge of the county wherein 
the land is situated asking that such proceedings be 
commenced.  The petition shall describe the land, 
state 
the 
person against which the condemnation 
proceedings are instituted and the use to which it has 
been put or is designed to have been put by the person 
against which the proceedings are instituted.  A copy 
of the petition shall be served upon the person who 
has occupied petitioner’s land, or interest in land.  
The petition shall be filed in the office of the clerk 
of the circuit court and thereupon the matter shall be 
deemed an action at law and at issue, with petitioner 
as plaintiff and the occupying person as defendant.  
The court shall make a finding of whether the 
defendant is occupying property of the plaintiff 
without having the right to do so.  If the court 
determines 
that the defendant is occupying such 
property of the plaintiff without having the right to 
do so, it shall treat the matter in accordance with 
the 
provisions 
of 
this 
subchapter 
assuming 
the 
plaintiff 
has 
received 
from 
the 
defendant 
a 
jurisdictional offer and has failed to accept the same 
and assuming the plaintiff is not questioning the 
right of the defendant to condemn the property so 
occupied. 
¶43 In six places, Wis. Stat. § 32.10 uses some form of 
the word "occupy."  The precise meaning of "occupy" is sometimes 
problematic.  In any event, the procedure set out in § 32.10 has 
been used by property owners seeking compensation for a 
"taking," whether the alleged taking results from government 
regulation or from physical occupation.   
¶44 This court discussed regulatory takings in Eberle v. 
Dane County Board of Adjustment, 227 Wis. 2d 609, 595 N.W.2d 730 
(1999).  It explained that a taking need not arise from an 
actual physical occupation of property.  Id. at 621 (citing 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
16 
 
Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 81, 
284 N.W.2d 887 (1979) (Howell II)).  However, "[a] taking can 
occur absent physical invasion only where there is a legally 
imposed restriction upon the property's use."  Howell II, 92 
Wis. 2d at 88. 
¶45 Citing Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 
374, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996), the Eberle court recognized the sine 
qua non for a regulatory taking——a regulation must deny the 
property owner all or substantially all practical uses of a 
property 
in order 
to be considered a taking for which 
compensation is required.  Eberle, 227 Wis. 2d at 622. 
¶46 The Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005), discussed other 
standards related to regulatory takings, including "regulations 
that completely deprive an owner of 'all economically beneficial 
us[e]' of her property."  (citing Lucas v. S.C. Costal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).  But the standard to be applied in 
Wisconsin is stated in Eberle and Zealy. 
¶47 The circuit court concluded that the circumstances in 
this case do not show a regulatory taking.  We agree.  
Consequently, the circuit court should not have applied the 
standard for a regulatory taking. 
¶48 The other form of taking involves "actual physical 
occupation" of private property.  E-L Enters., 326 Wis. 2d 82, 
¶22 (quoting Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 66 
Wis. 2d 720, 726, 226 N.W.2d 185 (1975) (Howell I)); see Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
17 
 
¶49 The Loretto Court observed that "a permanent physical 
occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard 
to the public interests that it may serve."  Loretto, 458 U.S. 
at 426.  Something less than permanent occupation of property 
also can amount to a taking.  "[E]ven if the Government 
physically invades only an easement in property, it must 
nonetheless pay just compensation."  Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). 
¶50 In 
E-L 
Enterprises, 
the 
Milwaukee 
Metropolitan 
Sewerage District drained groundwater near and under E-L's 
building to facilitate the construction of sewer pipe parallel 
to E-L's property.  Removal of the groundwater caused 14 wood 
piles that were supporting E-L's building to rot.  E-L's takings 
claim fluctuated between a "taking" of the wood piles and a 
"taking" of the groundwater.  Because E-L did not prove "the 
value of the extracted groundwater," E-L Enterprises, 326 
Wis. 2d 82, ¶5, the court focused on the alleged taking of the 
wood piles and concluded that "the Sewerage District did not 
physically 
occupy 
the 
property 
for 
which 
E-L 
seeks 
compensation."  Id. (emphasis added).  It decided the case by 
denying compensation for "mere consequential damages to property 
resulting from governmental action."  Id. 
¶51 The property owners here assert that the extension of 
the Airport runway has led to actual occupation of the airspace 
over their land——airspace in which they have a recognized 
property interest.  This thesis rests in part on the landmark 
Supreme Court decision in Causby.   
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
18 
 
¶52 Causby involved frequent and regular flights of Army 
and Navy aircraft over a residence and chicken farm in North 
Carolina.  Id. at 258.  The aircraft passed directly over the 
property at a height of 83 feet, along a path approved by the 
Civil Aeronautics Authority.7  Id.  The aircraft were so close to 
the property that they barely missed the tops of the trees.  Id. 
at 259.  The aircraft were so disruptive to the Causby property 
that 150 chickens on the farm were killed when they flew "into 
the walls from fright," and the property owners had to give up 
their business.8  Id.     
¶53 The Causby Court addressed whether a taking had 
occurred and what the test for such a taking would be.  The 
Court needed to grapple with common law doctrine relating to 
land ownership.  Justice William O. Douglas wrote: 
It is ancient doctrine that at common law 
ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the 
universe——Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum.  
But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.  
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared.  
Were that not true, every transcontinental flight 
would subject the operator to countless trespass 
suits.  Common sense revolts at the idea.  To 
recognize such private claims to the airspace would 
clog these highways, seriously interfere with their 
control and development in the public interest, and 
                                                 
7 The Civil Aeronautics Authority has been replaced by the 
Federal Aviation Administration.  See generally The Federal 
Aviation Administration, 21 Cath. U. L. Rev. 732 (1972).   
8 The 
Court 
also 
stated: 
"Respondents 
are 
frequently 
deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and 
frightened."  United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).  
These concerns are similar to claims made by the plaintiffs. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
19 
 
transfer into private ownership that to which only the 
public has a just claim. 
Id. at 260-61. 
¶54 The Court recognized that Congress had placed into the 
public domain, as a public highway, the navigable airspace above 
the minimum safe altitude of flight——then 500 feet by day and 
1000 feet by night for air carriers.  Id. at 263.  However, the 
Court recognized that if a property owner is to have full 
enjoyment of his land, he must have "exclusive control of the 
immediate 
reaches 
of 
the 
enveloping 
atmosphere," 
the 
"superadjacent 
airspace" below the altitude that Congress 
appropriately determines to be a public highway.  Id. at 264-65.   
¶55 Thus, the Court determined that, "Flights over private 
land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as 
to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and 
use of the land."  Id. at 266 (emphasis added).  The Court 
agreed with the Court of Claims that "a servitude" had been 
imposed upon the Causby land.  Id. at 267. 
¶56 While Causby involved flights by government aircraft, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
later 
addressed 
the 
applicability of Causby to private flights landing at and 
departing 
from 
airports 
owned 
and 
operated 
by 
local 
municipalities.  Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962). 
¶57 In Griggs, Allegheny County in Pennsylvania owned and 
operated the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, which the county had 
designed in conformance with Civil Aeronautics Administration 
rules and regulations.  Id. at 85.  The county designed the 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
20 
 
airport in such a way that one approved glide angle for aircraft 
was 81 feet above the ground or 11.36 feet above the chimney of 
a property owner.  Id. at 86.  All flights remained within Civil 
Aeronautics 
Administration 
recommendations, 
but 
they 
were 
regularly at an altitude of 30 feet above the property owner's 
residence.  Id. at 86-87.   
¶58 The Griggs court dealt with the questions of whether 
Causby remained good law after Congress had redefined navigable 
airspace to include space necessary for takeoffs and landings, 
and whether a county could be liable for flights that take off 
and land at its airport.  The Court concluded that the 
legislative definition of navigable airspace did not necessarily 
determine whether a taking could occur.  Id. at 88-89.  The 
Court also held that, on the facts and law before it, the county 
could be liable for a taking.  Id. at 89-90. 
¶59 One of the early United States Court of Appeals 
decisions interpreting Causby and Griggs was Palisades Citizens 
Association v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 420 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969).  The court said:   
It is true that Congress, by statute, has declared 
"exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the 
United States" and has defined navigable airspace as 
all airspace "above the minimum altitudes of flight 
prescribed by regulations."  However, "[r]egardless of 
any congressional limitations, the land owner, as an 
incident to his ownership, has a claim to the 
superadjacent 
airspace" 
to 
the 
extent 
that 
a 
reasonable use of his land involves such space.  
Accordingly, 
an 
"invasion 
of 
the 
'superadjacent 
airspace' will often 'affect the use of the surface 
land itself.'"  Moreover, where that invasion is 
destructive of the landowner's right to possess and 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
21 
 
use his land, it is compensable either through private 
tort actions or under the fifth amendment where the 
use, by the government, amounts to a "taking." 
Id. (citations omitted).   
¶60 Causby and Griggs represent the controlling law with 
respect 
to 
"takings" 
of 
private 
property 
by 
aircraft 
overflights.  In applying these cases to the present litigation, 
we underscore the fact that our analysis is directed to three 
purported uncompensated "takings" of private property under 
constitutional standards.  Our analysis does not address 
potential remedies a property owner may have in tort.  It is 
confined to whether the Airport is responsible for a partial 
"taking" of plaintiffs' property in a "constitutional sense."  
¶61 Causby concluded that the overflights of military 
aircraft had imposed a "servitude" upon Causby's land.  Causby, 
328 U.S. at 267.  The Court added that, "The Court of Claims 
held . . . that an easement was taken."  Id.  In Griggs, the 
Court described the Causby taking as the "'taking,' in the 
constitutional sense, of an air easement for which compensation 
must be made."  Griggs, 369 U.S. at 88.  The Court added, upon 
the facts of that case: 
The Federal Government takes nothing [from its role in 
helping to develop the Greater Pittsburgh Airport]; it 
is the local 
authority [Allegheny County] which 
decides to build an airport vel non, and where it is 
to be located.  We see no difference between its 
responsibility for the air easements necessary for 
operation of the airport and its responsibility for 
the land on which the runways were built.   
Id. at 89 (emphasis added).  The Court went on: 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
22 
 
 
The glide path for the northeast runway is as 
necessary for the operation of the airport as is a 
surface right of way for operation of a bridge, or as 
is the land for the operation of a dam.  As stated by 
the Supreme Court of Washington in Ackerman v. Port of 
Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 401, 413, 348 P.2d 664, 671, 
" . . . an adequate approach way is as necessary a 
part of an airport as is the ground on which the 
airstrip, itself, is constructed . . . ."  Without the 
"approach areas," an airport is indeed not operable.  
[Allegheny County] in designing [the airport] had to 
acquire some private property.  Our conclusion is that 
by constitutional standards it did not acquire enough. 
Id. at 90 (citation omitted). 
¶62 Strict adherence to property principles limits the 
application of eminent domain.  The government cannot "take" 
private property from a person if the person does not have an 
interest in the property.  Generally speaking, a landowner has a 
three dimensional property interest in airspace:  The person has 
a property interest in the block of air that is bounded by the 
length and width of the person's land holdings (i.e., Brenner's 
five acres) and rises up to approximately the height of the 
government-defined minimum safe altitude of flight.  Physical 
invasions of this superadjacent airspace may constitute a 
taking.  Generally speaking, actions that occur outside or above 
this block of air do not constitute a taking, even if the 
actions have adverse consequences to the person's property.   
¶63 Stated differently, flights that are not directly over 
a person's property cannot "take" the person's property.  
Flights that are above the government-defined minimum safe 
altitude of flight are very unlikely to take a person's 
property. 
 
But 
overflights 
that 
invade 
the 
person's 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
23 
 
superadjacent block of airspace, even takeoffs and landings, may 
constitute a taking for which compensation is required. 
¶64 Thus, the standard for a taking in an airplane 
overflight case is very different from the standard applied by 
the circuit court.  The standard for a taking in an airplane 
overflight case is whether the overflights have been low enough—
—that is, invasions of a person's block of superadjacent 
airspace——and frequent enough to have a direct and immediate 
effect on the use and enjoyment of the person's property.  If 
this standard can be satisfied, the government has "taken" an 
easement without paying compensation for it.  Because the 
circuit court applied the much more stringent standard of a 
regulatory taking, the circuit court erred.  As the court of 
appeals directed, this case must be remanded to the circuit 
court to apply the correct standard. 
¶65 The principles stated about the taking of an avigation 
easement have engendered considerable controversy throughout the 
nation.  We discuss several of the attendant issues in an effort 
to assist the circuit court.   
¶66 There is some uneasiness in a holding that courts will 
recognize damages for a taking caused by government-authorized 
action that occurs inside a block of air but not recognize 
damages emanating from government-authorized action outside that 
block of air, even though the consequences for property owners 
may be identical.  The theory behind the dimensional distinction 
is set out in Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 
1962), the leading case in disallowing claims of noise and smoke 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
24 
 
damage from a nearby airport when direct overflights were not at 
issue.  In Batten, the majority said: 
 
The case at bar is one of first impression in the 
federal appellate courts and presents an issue of 
widespread current interest.  The jet airplane is a 
great boon to the traveler but a veritable plague to 
the 
homeowners 
near 
an 
airfield. 
 
The 
noise, 
vibration, and smoke incidental to the operation and 
maintenance of jet planes disturb the peace and quiet 
in every residential area located near an airport used 
by the jets.  This disturbance is felt not only by 
those whose property is crossed by the planes on take-
offs or landings but also by those who live outside of 
the established flight patterns.  The Supreme Court 
has allowed recovery under the Tucker Act to a 
landowner whose property was crossed by low-elevation 
flights of military planes on take-offs and landings.  
The novelty in the instant case is that liability is 
asserted not because of disturbance in conjunction 
with any over-flights but because of the noise, 
vibration, and smoke alone which harass the occupants 
of nearby properties.  The amount of harassment varies 
with the proximity of the property to the scene of jet 
operations. 
 
No amount of sympathy for the vexed landowners 
can change the legal principles applicable to their 
claims.  We do not have either a tort or a nuisance 
case.  The plaintiffs sue under the Tucker Act and 
whether the applicability of that Act depends on a 
taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment or on an implied promise to pay for property 
taken, the claims are founded on the prohibition of 
the Fifth Amendment, "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." 
 
In construing and applying this constitutional 
provision 
the 
federal 
courts 
have 
long 
and 
consistently recognized the distinction between a 
taking and consequential damages.  
 
. . . .  
 
Because of this rule which denies the recovery of 
consequential damages in the absence of any taking, 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
25 
 
many state constitutions provide in substance that 
private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without compensation.  However, the federal 
obligation has not been so enlarged either by statute 
or by constitutional amendment. 
 
. . . .  
 
The vibrations which cause the windows and dishes 
to rattle, the smoke which blows into the homes during 
the summer months when the wind is from the east, and 
the noise which interrupts ordinary home activities do 
interfere with the use and enjoyment by the plaintiffs 
of their properties.  Such interference is not a 
taking.  The damages are no more than a consequence of 
the operations of the Base and as said in United 
States v. Willow River Power Co., [324 U.S. 499 
(1945)], they "may be compensated by legislative 
authority, not by force of the Constitution alone."  
As we see the case at bar, the distinctions which the 
Supreme Court has consistently made between "damages" 
and "taking" control and compel denial of recovery. 
Id. at 583-85. 
¶67 7A Nichols on Eminent Domain § G14.02[2][a] (3d ed. 
2012)  views Batten as the majority rule but quotes at length 
from the dissenting opinion of Judge Alfred Murrah and cites 
exceptions.9   
¶68 Some of these exceptions rely on tort theories to 
provide a remedy.  In this case, the circuit court should adhere 
to property principles in determining whether there have been 
"takings" of air easements by invasions of the property owners' 
                                                 
9 See e.g., Foster v. City of Gainsville, 579 So. 2d 774 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Alevizos v. Metro. Airports Comm'n 
of Minneapolis & St. Paul, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1974); 
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962); City of 
Austin v. Travis Cnty. Landfill, 25 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App. 1999); 
Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964). 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
26 
 
superadjacent airspace.  This decision is not intended to 
address possible tort claims. 
¶69 On remand, there may be a dispute about the height of 
the property owner's superadjacent airspace——namely, where does 
it end?  Throughout the country, there have been disagreements 
about whether takings could ever occur above the minimum safe 
altitude of flight, and what the minimum safe altitude of flight 
is in a given circumstance. 
¶70 In 1946, Causby identified the minimum safe altitude 
as 500 feet by day and 1000 feet by night.  Causby, 328 U.S. at 
263-64.  In 1962, Batten, 306 F.2d at 585, identified the 
minimum safe altitude as 1000 feet over congested areas and 500 
feet over sparsely populated areas, citing a section of the Code 
of Federal Regulations.     
¶71 We take note of 14 C.F.R. § 91.119, which reads as 
follows: 
 
Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no 
person may operate an aircraft below the following 
altitudes: 
 
(a) Anywhere.  An altitude allowing, if a power 
unit fails, an emergency landing without undue hazard 
to persons or property on the surface. 
 
(b) Over congested areas. Over any congested 
area of a city, town, or settlement, or over any open 
air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet 
above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius 
of 2,000 feet of the aircraft. 
 
(c) Over 
other 
than 
congested 
areas. 
 
An 
altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over 
open water or sparsely populated areas.  In those 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
27 
 
cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 
500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure. 
 
(d) Helicopters, powered parachutes, and weight-
shift-control aircraft. If the operation is conducted 
without hazard to persons or property on the surface——   
 
(1) A helicopter may be operated at less than 
the minimums prescribed in paragraph (b) or (c) of 
this section, provided each person operating the 
helicopter complies with any routes or altitudes 
specifically prescribed for helicopters by the FAA; 
and  
 
(2) A powered parachute or weight-shift-control 
aircraft may be operated at less than the minimums 
prescribed in paragraph (c) of this section. 
14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (2011). 
¶72 One commentator has suggested that tying takings to 
the minimum safe altitude of flight——known as the "fixed height" 
theory——"misread[s] 
the Supreme Court's analysis."  Colin 
Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-
Man's Land, 56 J. Air L. & Com. 157, 171 (1990).  The Cahoon 
article, which lays out six separate theories of airspace 
ownership, asserts that the Supreme Court rejected the "fixed 
height" theory by its reasoning in such cases as Griggs.  Id. at 
179-81.  "If the 'fixed height' theory were to be followed to 
its logical conclusion, no taking could have occurred, since the 
planes flying over Mr. Griggs' house were within navigable 
airspace."  Id. at 180.  The Cahoon article cites Section 159 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965),10 Branning v. United 
                                                 
10 "(2) Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land 
of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the 
immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it 
interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of 
his land."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 159 (1965). 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
28 
 
States, 654 F.2d 88 (Ct. Cl. 1981), aff'd 784 F.2d 361 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986), and Stephens v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 352 
(1986), among authorities that do not strictly adhere to the 
"fixed height" theory.  Cahoon, supra, at 182, 189-90, 194. 
¶73 There are competing answers in the case law regarding 
whether the congressional definition of navigable airspace and 
the minimum safe altitude of flight preclude a taking at a 
height greater than the minimum safe altitude of flight.11  We 
need not decide this question because the allegations in the 
record are that aircraft were frequently travelling below the 
minimum safe altitude in flights over the plaintiffs' property.  
                                                 
11 Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that isolated high altitude flights did not effect 
taking); Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(discussing cases); Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88 (Ct. 
Cl. 1981) (rejecting the minimum safe altitude as the measure of 
taking when an increase in noise and aircraft created a further 
taking, while recognizing that noise alone from navigable 
airspace is not enough to effect a taking); Aaron v. United 
States, 311 F.2d 798, 801 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (holding that recovery 
could not be had for flights above the minimum safe altitudes 
unless the flights amounted to a "practical destruction" of the 
property); A.J. Hodges Indus., Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 
592, 594 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ("The courts have held that when regular 
and frequent flights by Government-owned aircraft over privately 
owned land at altitudes of less than 500 feet from the surface 
of the ground constitute a direct, immediate, and substantial 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the property, there 
is a taking by the Government of an avigation easement, or 
easement of flight, in the airspace over the property, and that 
this taking is compensable under the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution."); Lacey v. United States, 595 F.2d 614 (Ct. Cl. 
1979) (holding that a taking can occur only below 500 feet, the 
minimum safe altitude of flight); Matson v. United States, 171 
F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (allowing recovery only for those 
flights under 500 feet). 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
29 
 
However, there are several factors that merit consideration for 
future cases. 
¶74 First, Wis. Stat. § 114.03 provides: 
Landowner's rights skyward.  The ownership of the 
space above the lands and waters of this state is 
declared to be vested in the several owners of the 
surface beneath, subject to the right of flight 
described in s. 114.04. 
This section, as well as sections 114.04 and 114.07,12 come word 
for word from the Uniform Law for Aeronautics (1922), which was 
approved by the Wisconsin legislature in 1929.  Chapter 348, 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 114.04 provides:  
Flying and landing, limitations.  Flight in 
aircraft or spacecraft over the lands and waters of 
this state is lawful, unless at such a low altitude as 
to interfere with the then existing use to which the 
land or water, or the space over the land or water, is 
put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be 
imminently 
dangerous 
or 
damaging 
to 
persons 
or 
property lawfully on the land or water beneath.  The 
landing of an aircraft or spacecraft on the lands or 
waters of another, without the person's consent, is 
unlawful, except in the case of a forced landing.  For 
damages caused by a forced landing, however, the owner 
or lessee of the aircraft or spacecraft or the 
aeronaut or astronaut shall be liable, as provided in 
s. 114.05. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 114.07 provides:  
Criminal jurisdiction.  All crimes, torts and 
other wrongs committed by or against an aeronaut, 
astronaut, or passenger while in flight over this 
state shall be governed by the laws of this state; and 
the question whether damage occasioned by or to an 
aircraft or spacecraft while in flight over this state 
constitutes a tort, crime or other wrong by or against 
the owner of such aircraft or spacecraft, shall be 
determined by the laws of this state. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
30 
 
Laws of 1929.  The Uniform Law embodied a "Public Easement 
Theory" which the Cahoon article summarizes as follows: 
2. 
Public Easement Theory 
This theory espoused the idea that the owner in 
fact owns the airspace above his property, but that 
property is subject to a public easement to aviation 
traffic.  This theory is one of two modifications to 
the ad coel[u]m rule.  That the owner does in fact own 
all the airspace above his property is recognized, but 
aviation 
is 
legally 
afforded 
a 
property 
right 
(easement) to traverse this property.  Flight over the 
property is only actionable in the event the easement 
is misused. 
Cahoon, supra, at 164. 
¶75 Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 114.03 has to mesh with 
the Supreme Court's interpretations of Congress's power to 
regulate air navigation under the commerce clause.  However, 
unless Congress has adopted the minimum safe altitude of flight 
as the ceiling to a property owner's superadjacent airspace, the 
Wisconsin statute may permit the recognition of direct and 
immediate injuries to property from overflights above the 
minimum safe altitude of flight.13   
¶76 Second, the minimum safe altitude of flight for 
helicopters can be less than the minimum safe altitude of 
airplanes, provided that "each person operating the helicopter 
complies with any routes or altitude specifically prescribed for 
helicopters by the FAA."  14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d)(1).  This is an 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 114.07 recognizes crimes and torts 
committed in the air above Wisconsin, irrespective of the 
minimum safe altitude of flight. 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
31 
 
exception to a "fixed height" theory.  The fact that an 
authorized flight plan could regularly send helicopters into a 
property owner's superadjacent airspace would not mean that 
these flights would not constitute the taking of an easement. 
¶77 Third, setting a "fixed height" ceiling for a property 
owner's superadjacent airspace may facilitate a relatively easy 
determination of one factor in an overflight takings analysis.  
However, arbitrary lines can produce unfair results, and 
arbitrary height lines are likely to accelerate the development 
of tort remedies.  Consequently, some think it would be better 
for the law to presume a non-taking by overflights above the 
minimum safe altitude of flight, but permit property owners to 
overcome the presumption with compelling proof in egregious 
circumstances.  See Cahoon, supra, at 188. 
¶78 There 
is 
another critical consideration for the 
circuit court that injects a fourth "dimension" into the 
determination of a taking.  That dimension is time, evidenced by 
the element of "frequency." 
¶79 As 
noted, 
the 
Loretto 
Court 
concluded 
that 
"a 
permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a 
taking without regard to the public interests that it may 
serve."  Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426  (emphasis added.)  "When 
faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical 
occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a 
taking."  Id. at 427 (emphasis added).  "We affirm the 
traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of 
property is a taking."  Id. at 441 (emphasis added). 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
32 
 
¶80 Loretto discussed Causby approvingly, noting that 
there 
was 
a 
"distinction 
between 
a 
permanent 
physical 
occupation, a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a 
regulation that merely restricts the use of property."  Id. at 
430.  Loretto stressed the "frequent flights" in Causby, id., 
and asserted that the damages to the respondents in Causby "were 
not merely consequential.  They were the product of a direct 
invasion of the respondents' domain."  Id. at 431 (quoting 
Causby, 328 U.S. at 265-66). 
¶81 In airplane overflight cases, a "permanent" occupation 
of property is not necessary.  However, the second sentence in 
Causby speaks of "frequent and regular flights," Causby, 328 
U.S. at 258, and the Court's holding refers to flights that are 
"so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate 
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land."  Id. at 
266 (emphasis added).  In short, isolated, irregular invasions 
of a property owner's superadjacent airspace may be annoying but 
they do not necessarily amount to a taking in a constitutional 
sense.  "Frequency" is an important element of proof in 
overflight cases. 
¶82 The City has urged the court to add another factor to 
the test for whether a taking has occurred.  It contends that 
only those overflights that follow FAA-approved flight plans 
should be considered in determining a taking——that the City 
cannot be held responsible for overflights that disregard FAA-
approved flight plans.  We cannot agree with this contention.   
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
33 
 
¶83 It is true that government action of some sort is a 
prerequisite for a taking under the constitution.  Cases 
applying Causby often involve government aircraft.14  But 
government also is liable for a taking when it authorizes 
physical occupation.  Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.  A city that 
designs and builds an airport is liable for aircraft using the 
airport when those aircraft invade surrounding property owners' 
superadjacent airspace because the city has not acquired enough 
property.  Griggs, 369 U.S. 84, 90. 
¶84 In this case, the Airport manager testified that 
pilots were following the FAA recommended approach patterns and 
that he worked to enforce those standards.  Brenner testified 
that pilots would deviate from those standards, especially in 
high winds.  A city cannot operate an airport and permit some of 
the aircraft that use it to disregard established FAA flight 
paths.  The City bears responsibility if aircraft are regularly 
deviating from FAA flight patterns and those deviations result 
in invasions of the superadjacent airspace of neighboring 
property owners with adverse effects on their property.  The 
City is in a far superior position to enforce the FAA's flight 
standards than the property owners.  Placing the burden on the 
                                                 
14 E.g., Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (military aircraft); Argent, 
124 F.3d 1277 (Navy aircraft); Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 
1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("United States Air Force planes"); Persyn 
v. United States, No. 96-5033, unpublished op., 106 F.3d 424 
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 27, 1996) (government aircraft); A.J. Hodges, 
355 F.2d at 594 ("Government-owned aircraft over privately owned 
land"). 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
34 
 
property owners to seek enforcement against individual airlines 
or pilots would effectively deprive the owners of a remedy for 
takings of their property. 
¶85 The 
record 
does 
not 
contain 
sufficient 
factual 
findings by the circuit court to resolve this case.  We remand 
to the circuit court to make further factual findings and to 
determine whether takings have occurred.  After the circuit 
court has made further factual findings, it must apply the 
standard set forth in this decision. 
¶86 We note that the Wickenhausers' claim in this action 
relates only to the 77 acres not included in the separate 
condemnation action.  Direct condemnation actions and inverse 
condemnation actions are mutually exclusive.  See Maxey v. 
Redevelopment 
Authority 
of 
Racine, 
94 
Wis. 2d 375, 
288 
N.W.2d 794 (1980); Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  Should the circuit court 
find that a taking occurred with respect to the 77 remaining 
acres of the Wickenhauser property, it must consider that 
severance damages were paid on that property when it calculates 
just compensation.  See, ¶13 n.5, supra. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶87 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
equivalent provision in Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution do not prohibit the taking of private property for 
public use, but instead place a condition on the exercise of 
that power.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).  
These provisions are designed "not to limit the governmental 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
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interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure 
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking."  Id. at 315. 
¶88 The creation and expansion of airports is usually 
deemed a public good.  But that good frequently comes at a 
significant cost to neighboring landowners.  This cost cannot be 
ignored.   
¶89 "One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause 
is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.'" Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
¶90 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
conclude that a taking occurs in airplane overflight cases when 
government action results in aircraft flying over a landowner's 
property low enough and with sufficient frequency to have a 
direct and immediate effect on the use and enjoyment of the 
property.  We remand the case to the circuit court to make 
further factual findings and to hold additional hearings, as 
necessary, to determine whether a taking occurred in this case.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
  2010AP342 
 
 
 
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