Title: State v. Daws
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 108716
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 2016

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 108,716 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL C. DAWS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b), aggravated burglary is defined as 
"knowingly and without authority entering into or remaining within any building . . . in 
which there is a human being, with intent to commit a felony . . . therein." As used in the 
statute, the phrases "entering into" and "remaining within" each refer to a legally distinct 
factual situation. The entering into element is satisfied when the evidence shows a 
defendant crossed the plane of a building's exterior wall. Remaining within refers to a 
defendant's presence in the building's interior after entry, authorized or unauthorized, has 
been accomplished. 
 
2. 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b) requires a human being's presence in the dwelling, 
but the crime can be committed either by entering into or remaining within the structure. 
 
3. 
When the defendant is charged only with the entering into means of committing 
aggravated burglary, the human being must be present at the time of entry. The contrary 
2 
 
 
 
holdings of State v. Reed, 8 Kan. App. 2d 615, 663 P.2d 680, rev. denied 234 Kan. 1077 
(1983), and its progeny are overruled.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed November 1, 
2013. Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; WESLEY K. GRIFFIN, judge. Opinion filed February 19, 
2016. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district 
court is reversed, and the challenged conviction is reversed.   
 
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Lydia Krebs, of the 
same office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Edmond D. Brancart, chief deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Christopher Mann, 
assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were 
on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  There are two ways of committing aggravated burglary under K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 21-5807(b):  a person can either "enter into" or "remain within" the dwelling. 
Michael C. Daws was convicted of aggravated burglary after a homeowner returned to 
discover the front door kicked in and Daws inside. The jury was instructed it had to find 
Daws "knowingly entered . . . a residence . . . without authority . . . with the intent to 
commit theft . . . at the time there was a human being in the dwelling." (Emphasis added.) 
In other words, the jury was instructed as to the first of the two ways of committing 
aggravated burglary. Daws argues his conviction should be reversed because the evidence 
is undisputed that the homeowner was not in the dwelling when he entered it. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction based upon its existing caselaw that 
the victim does not have to be in the dwelling at the time defendant enters it—so long as 
the victim arrives before defendant leaves. State v. Daws, No. 108,716, 2013 WL 
3 
 
 
 
5925960, at *3-5 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted January 15, 2015. 
A majority of this court reverses the aggravated burglary conviction and overrules the 
line of cases the Daws panel relied on. See State v. May, 39 Kan. App. 2d 990, Syl. ¶ 1, 
186 P.3d 847, rev. denied 287 Kan. 768 (2008); State v. Romero, 31 Kan. App. 2d 609, 
610-12, 69 P.3d 205 (2003); State v. Fondren, 11 Kan. App. 2d 309, 310-12. 721 P.2d 
284, rev. denied 240 Kan. 805 (1986); State v. Reed, 8 Kan. App. 2d 615, 616-19, 663 
P.2d 680, rev. denied 234 Kan. 1077 (1983). Under the aggravated burglary statute and 
these facts, the State should have charged Daws with "remaining within" the dwelling, 
which it did not do. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
During the middle of the day on November 20, 2011, Raul Flores Ramos stopped 
by the house he was moving out of. The front door was shut, but it had been kicked in 
and the door jamb broken. He entered and discovered Daws in the living room. Ramos 
told Daws to leave, and Daws complied. Afterwards, Ramos discovered some boxes had 
been moved around and property removed from them. Ramos also noticed two grocery 
bags containing property that did not belong to him. The State charged Daws with 
aggravated burglary based on the intent to commit theft. The information alleged Daws 
"did unlawfully without authority enter into a building . . . which is a dwelling, in which 
there was a human being, to wit:  Raul Flores, with the intent to commit a theft therein." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
At trial, Daws admitted he was in the house. He testified he saw someone kick in 
the front door, followed that person inside, and then stayed for a night because he thought 
the house was abandoned. Daws confirmed Ramos found him inside the next day and that 
he left when asked. Daws testified he never intended to take any property. 
 
4 
 
 
 
At the jury instruction conference, Daws requested a lesser included offense 
instruction for simple burglary because the victim was not in the house when Daws 
entered it. The State argued it did not matter when the victim was in the house as long as 
he was there while the burglary was occurring. The district court refused the simple 
burglary instruction, noting "the caselaw does not differentiate" between circumstances 
when the victim was present at the time of entry or arrived later. 
 
Consistent with the charge as described in the information, the jury was instructed 
on aggravated burglary based on the State's theory that Daws "knowingly entered a 
building" without authority. This instruction was consistent with PIK Crim. 4th 58.130, 
and stated in relevant part:     
 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
1. That the defendant knowingly entered a building . . . which is a dwelling; 
2. That the defendant [ ] Daws did so without authority; 
3. That the defendant did so with the intent to commit Theft therein; 
4. That at the time there was a human being in the dwelling, to-wit: Raul Flores; and 
5. That this act occurred on or about the 20th day of November, 2011, in Wyandotte 
County, Kansas."  
 
The district court also issued what is referred to as the any/any reasonable doubt 
instruction, which states in relevant part: 
 
 
"The test you must use in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty is this: If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required 
to be proved by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you have no 
reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved by the State, 
you should find the defendant guilty." (Emphasis added.) 
 
5 
 
 
 
The jury convicted Daws of aggravated burglary. The district court sentenced 
Daws to the standard term in the applicable grid box, factoring in his criminal history 
score. 
 
Daws timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising five issues:  (1) There was 
insufficient evidence of aggravated burglary because the victim was not present upon 
entry; (2) the district court should have instructed the jury on simple burglary; (3) the 
district court erroneously denied a motion for mistrial; (4) the jury was improperly 
instructed on reasonable doubt; and (5) the district court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), when it used Daws' criminal 
history to enhance his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed in Daws, 2013 WL 
5925960, at *5-9. 
 
Daws petitioned for this court's review of all his claims except the denial of the 
motion for mistrial. We granted review, and jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 60-2101(b) 
(review of Court of Appeals decisions). 
 
Before proceeding, we note the last two issues have already been decided 
adversely to Daws in other cases. We upheld the "any/any" reasonable doubt instruction 
in State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124, 299 P.3d 292 (2013) ("While the older PIK 
instruction used in Herbel's trial was not the preferred instruction, it was legally 
appropriate."). And, as Daws concedes, this court has repeatedly held the State is not 
required to prove a defendant's criminal history to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See, e.g., State v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, Syl. ¶ 6, 319 P.3d 506 (2014). We dispose of those 
latter two issues based on these prior decisions. 
 
6 
 
 
 
REVERSAL OF THE AGGRAVATED BURGLARY CONVICTION 
 
Aggravated burglary requires a human being's presence in the dwelling, but the 
crime can be committed either by "entering into" or "remaining within" the structure. 
Since Daws was convicted under the "entering into" means, the issue is whether his 
conviction must be reversed because there was no human being present in the house 
when he entered it. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, an appellate court reviews all 
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. The court must be convinced a 
rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness 
credibility determinations. State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). 
 
Discussion 
 
The distinction between burglary and aggravated burglary is that aggravated 
burglary requires an additional element—the presence of a human being. Compare 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(a) and K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b). The aggravated 
burglary statute provides: 
 
 
"Aggravated burglary is, without authority, entering into or remaining within any 
building, manufactured home, mobile home, tent or other structure, or any vehicle, 
aircraft, watercraft, railroad car or other means of conveyance of persons or property in 
which there is a human being with intent to commit a felony, theft or sexually motivated 
crime therein." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b). 
 
7 
 
 
 
"[T]he phrases 'entering into' and 'remaining within' refer to legally distinct factual 
situations." State v. Gutierrez, 285 Kan. 332, Syl. ¶ 2, 172 P.3d 18 (2007). Stated another 
way, these phrases constitute alternative means of committing the crime. State v. 
Frierson, 298 Kan. 1005, 1011, 319 P.3d 515 (2014). The entering into element is 
satisfied when the evidence shows a defendant crossed the plane of a building's exterior 
wall. In contrast, the remaining within element refers to a defendant's presence in the 
building's interior after entry has occurred. Gutierrez, 285 Kan. at 337. Both situations 
may take longer than a mere moment, but "remaining within connotes at least briefly 
continuous behavior." 285 Kan. at 337-38. 
 
The focus on these alternative means is dictated by the State's decision to 
prosecute Daws for unlawfully entering the dwelling, as opposed to pursuing the alternate 
approach that Daws committed aggravated burglary by remaining within the dwelling. He 
argues that under the State's entering into theory, a human being must be present when 
the defendant enters the building. And since it is undisputed that the homeowner was not 
present when Daws entered, he contends there is insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction. 
 
The Court of Appeals caselaw the Daws panel relied on to affirm the conviction 
under these facts stems from State v. Lora, 213 Kan. 184, 515 P.2d 1086 (1973). In Lora, 
the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated burglary based on a fact pattern 
in which Lora was lying in wait to commit rape when the victims returned home. Lora 
argued it was error to convict him of aggravated burglary because there were no persons 
present when he entered the house. The Lora court quickly disposed of this challenge 
based on the language of the aggravated burglary statute. 
 
It held the convictions were proper because of "the provision in this statute which 
in the alternative proscribes knowingly and without authority 'remaining within any 
8 
 
 
 
building . . . in which there is some human being, with intent to commit a felony . . . 
[therein.]'" 213 Kan. at 195. Notably, the Lora court did not address how the jury was 
instructed, but an earlier portion of the decision indicates the State charged both means. 
Accordingly, the Lora court's holding, at the very least, implies that the person must be 
present at the time of entry when convicting under the entering into means. Otherwise, it 
would have been unnecessary to cite the remaining within means of committing 
aggravated burglary to uphold Lora's conviction. See 213 Kan. at 195. This would seem 
to answer the question presented, but the Court of Appeals interpreted Lora differently 
when presented with this issue in Reed, 8 Kan. App. 2d 615, and that interpretation has 
been applied by that court ever since.  
 
In Reed, the homeowner returned to discover burglars, and the two defendants 
were charged with aiding and abetting "'entering into a building . . . occupied during the 
time of said entrance'"—even though the State conceded no one was inside when the 
burglars entered. 8 Kan. App. 2d at 616. A divided panel upheld the convictions, holding 
that a charge of aggravated burglary "need not specify the point in time at which a victim 
was present so long as it is alleged that a human being was present sometime during the 
course of the burglary." (Emphasis added.) 8 Kan. App. 2d at 618-19. 
  
The majority relied on dicta from a different issue in Lora distinguishing between 
aggravated burglary and burglary based on the additional requirement that the place be 
occupied "'during the course of the burglary.'" 8 Kan. App. 2d at 617. And this language 
was taken out of context and was seemingly viewed as meaning that the aggravated 
burglary continues until the burglar vacates the premises. The majority also referred to 
the PIK instruction Notes on Use that stated:  "'When a person enters the premises after 
the burglary has commenced but before the defendant has left the premises, the offense 
constitutes aggravated burglary.'" 8 Kan. App. 2d at 617 (quoting PIK Crim. 2d 59.18, 
Notes on Use). 
9 
 
 
 
 
Notably, this PIK statement remains in the current version of the instruction and 
suffers from a lack of citation to any authority. See PIK Crim. 4th 58.130, Notes on Use. 
But the statement does not misstate the law because, as this court held in Lora, 
aggravated burglary has been committed if a person enters before the defendant leaves 
under the remaining within means. 213 Kan. at 195. Nevertheless, the PIK statement is 
confusing because it fails to distinguish between the two means of committing aggravated 
burglary. In other words, the statement is too broad if read to apply to both means, which 
appears to be how the Reed panel interpreted it. 
 
Regarding Lora, the Reed majority held:  "Despite Lora's apparent reliance on the 
'remaining within' clause, it is our conclusion that the rationale of the opinion need not 
confine its holding." 8 Kan. App. 2d at 618. It further held that the "troublesome 
language of the statute" concerning remaining within relates "to the timing of the 
burglar's formation of intent rather than the victim's presence." 8 Kan. App. 2d at 618. 
 
The tipping point for the Reed panel majority seems to be its conclusion that the 
victim suffers the same danger regardless of whether he or she is present when the 
burglar enters or when he or she arrives later. The panel wrote: 
 
"The purpose behind the aggravated burglary statute is to describe a more serious offense 
than simple burglary when there is the possibility of contact between the victim and the 
burglar and the accompanying potential for a crime against the person to occur. This 
danger is just as great regardless of when during the burglary the victim comes to be in 
the building. 8 Kan. App. 2d at 616.  
 
Judge Rees dissented. He would have held there was insufficient evidence of 
aiding and abetting aggravated burglary because the victim was not present when the 
burglars entered the building. 8 Kan. App. 2d at 622. (Rees, J. dissenting). And he 
10 
 
 
 
criticized the majority for suggesting the burglary was not completed until the accused 
exits the premises, noting this conflicted with the statute's plain language. 8 Kan. App. 2d 
at 622-23. Judge Rees would have held that the statute requires the victim's presence at 
the time the defendant enters when convicting under the entering into means. 8 Kan. App. 
2d at 624 ("The temporal requirement concerning the presence of the [victim] is precisely 
the link that elevates a burglary to an aggravated burglary."). 
 
Judge Rees' dissent never gained traction. Subsequent decisions from the Court of 
Appeals, including Daws, have followed Reed. See May, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 993; 
Romero, 31 Kan. App. 2d at 610-12; Fondren, 11 Kan. App. 2d at 310-12; State v. 
Montgomery, No. 108,164, 2014 WL 349558, at *4-6 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished 
opinion), petition for rev. filed March 3, 2014; Daws, 2013 WL 5925960, at *3-5.   
 
Even so, the rule has differed slightly between panels and that suggests an 
infirmity. For example, the May panel stated:  "We have consistently held that the 
presence of a person in a structure at any time during a burglary constitutes aggravated 
burglary." 39 Kan. App. 2d at 993. While in Fondren, the panel held that "[t]he 
occupancy requirement is satisfied so long as there are human beings present when the 
ulterior felony or theft is committed." 11 Kan. App. 2d at 311. Both rationales are 
questionable although the flaw is more obvious in Fondren, which undeniably reads an 
element into aggravated burglary that is not present—the commission of the ulterior 
felony. It becomes clear that the May panel's holding suffers from the same flaw when 
one attempts to define "during a burglary." Such statements suggest aggravated burglary 
is not complete until the defendant vacates the premises, which is contrary to the statute's 
plain language. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b).  
 
As charged and instructed in this case, aggravated burglary is defined as "without 
authority, entering into . . . any building . . . in which there is a human being with intent 
11 
 
 
 
to commit . . . theft . . . therein." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b) (no charge on instruction 
made for remaining within). A defendant is not required to commit the ulterior crime to 
complete the aggravated burglary. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b); see also State v. 
Shinn, No. 112,118, 2015 WL 4366534, at *3 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) 
(holding the defendant "did not have to successfully commit a theft; he only had to intend 
to do so" to commit aggravated burglary). And because aggravated burglary is complete 
once unauthorized entry occurs, the Court of Appeals view impermissibly extends the 
crime until the burglar leaves or completes the ulterior felony. See State v. Phillips, 295 
Kan. 929, 944-45, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (aggravated robbery complete when defendant 
takes possession of victim's property, so prosecutor's closing argument misstated the law 
by saying crime not complete until defendant left the premises). 
 
It is "a basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law that the physical conduct 
and state of mind must concur." 1 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.3(a), p. 451 (2d 
ed. 2003) (discussing actus reus and mens rea). In the context of aggravated burglary, 
this idea is embodied in this court's holdings that "[t]o support a conviction for 
aggravated burglary, the intent to commit a felony and the unauthorized entering into or 
remaining within must at some point in time coexist." Gutierrez, 285 Kan. at 338-39; see 
also State v. Bowen, 262 Kan. 705, 709, 942 P.2d 7 (1997) ("The specific intent in an 
aggravated burglary, where one is charged with entering into the dwelling without 
authority, must exist at the time of the unauthorized entry."). 
 
But the aggravated burglary statute's human presence element is not governed by 
this rule because it does not involve the required physical conduct (entering into) or the 
state of mind (intent to commit the ulterior crime). The human presence element is more 
aptly described as an attendant circumstance. See 1 LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 6.3(b). 
When the elements of a criminal statute include an attendant circumstance, that attendant 
circumstances must concur with the other elements. 1 LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 6.3(b) p. 
12 
 
 
 
455 ("With crimes which require physical conduct, mental fault, and attendant 
circumstances, the circumstances must concur with the conduct and fault."). To hold 
otherwise collapses the two means of committing aggravated burglary.  
 
In light of the uncontroverted testimony that Daws spent a day inside the victim's 
home before the homeowner returned, the remaining within means of committing 
aggravated burglary was the appropriate charge. Since the jury was only instructed on the 
entering into means of committing aggravated robbery and the victim was not present 
when Daws entered the residence, we hold there was insufficient evidence to sustain the 
aggravated burglary conviction and reverse that conviction. This necessarily requires us 
to overrule Reed and its progeny as they relate to the crime of aggravated burglary when 
the defendant is only charged with unauthorized entering into a building or residence and 
another person is not present at that time. Based on this, it is unnecessary to address the 
remaining issue concerning the defendant's request for a simple burglary instruction. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the district 
court and reverse the challenged conviction for aggravated burglary.  
 
* * * 
 
LUCKERT, J., dissenting:  I disagree with the majority's decisions (1) to overrule 
State v. Reed, 8 Kan. App. 2d 615, 663 P.2d 680, rev. denied 234 Kan. 1077 (1983), and 
its progeny and (2) to reverse Michael C. Daws' aggravated burglary conviction because 
of insufficient evidence. Not only do I disagree with the majority's reasoning that led to 
those decisions, I am troubled the law surrounding burglary and aggravated burglary 
becomes more confused under the majority's rationale.  
 
13 
 
 
 
I disagree with the majority's reasoning in two major respects. First, unlike the 
majority, I do not believe the legislature intended to create two "means" of committing 
burglary simply by describing two factual circumstances that amount to burglary—that is, 
an unauthorized presence achieved either by an entering in or remaining within. Second, I 
do not read K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b) (aggravated burglary) to require that all 
elements must be present at the moment a burglar crosses the plane of a dwelling's 
exterior wall (or that of any other structure or "means of conveyance" covered by the 
statute) when the State has charged only the option of "enter[ing] into." Rather, the 
burglary continues as long as the burglar maintains an unauthorized presence in the 
dwelling, another structure, or a means of conveyance. Thus, the crime can be proven by 
establishing a concurrence of all the elements and attendant circumstances at some point 
in time while the burglar remains within the structure without authority. See 3 LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law § 21.1(g) pp. 221-22 (2d ed. 2003).   
 
With regard to the first point of disagreement of whether the two factual 
circumstances constitute alternative means, I recognize our past caselaw has so held. E.g., 
State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 1098, 1107, 191 P.3d 294 (2008) ("Where the jury is instructed 
that the single offense of aggravated burglary may be committed by either the 
unauthorized 'entering into' or 'remaining within' a structure, an alternative means case 
has been presented."). But in State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 192-200, 284 P.3d 977 
(2012), we clarified the analysis for determining when the legislature intended to create 
an alternative means crime. We explained that phrases joined by the word "or" do not 
necessarily constitute alternative means. Rather, if alternatives merely describe a material 
element or describe the factual circumstances that can prove a material element, they are 
options within a means rather than alternative means.  
 
Post-Brown, in State v. Frierson, 298 Kan. 1005, 1011, 319 P.3d 515 (2014), we 
noted that the State had not presented any argument that the status of aggravated burglary 
14 
 
 
 
as an alternative means crime had changed after our decision in Brown. Without a request 
to change our approach, we applied our prior holdings that aggravated burglary was an 
alternative means crime. Likewise, in this case, the State has not requested us to revisit 
our pre-Brown caselaw. Generally, I am reluctant to decide an issue without proper 
argument and consideration. But failing to consider the question in this case leads the 
court to reverse a long line of cases and confuses the law of aggravated burglary. 
Consequently, it becomes necessary to reconsider whether the phrases "entering into" and 
"remaining within" are truly alternative means, as opposed to being phrases that manifest 
the legislature's intent to describe the "material element or a factual circumstance that 
would prove the crime [of aggravated burglary]," i.e., options within a means. See 
Brown, 295 Kan. at 200.   
 
I reach this conclusion in part because of the prior statutory law and common law 
from which the current crimes of burglary and aggravated burglary descend. See K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 21-5103(a) ("No conduct constitutes a crime against the state of Kansas 
unless it is made criminal in this code or in another statute of this state, but where a crime 
is denounced by any statute of this state, but not defined, the definition of such crime at 
common law shall be applied."); State v. Engel, 166 Wash. 2d 572, 578-80, 210 P.3d 
1007 (2009) (when determining if options stated in criminal provision create alternative 
means courts may look to common-law definition of crime to determine legislative 
intent); see also Brown, 295 Kan. at 193 (noting that Kansas has borrowed from 
Washington's caselaw regarding alternative means).  
 
The statutory crime of burglary loosely descends from the crime of breaking and 
entering, which was recognized at common law and in early Kansas statutes. At common 
law, a completed crime did not occur simply by creating a breach or an opening—a 
breaking. Rather, the burglar had to physically intrude into the structure, even if only 
momentarily. Modern statutory formulae dispense with the breaking but still require an 
15 
 
 
 
entry into—in other words, a presence within a structure. Nevertheless, they uniformly 
convey the essence of a breaking through some word or words that require proving that 
the burglar's presence is not privileged. For example, statutes may use the term 
"unlawful," "unauthorized," "without consent," or "trespass." See 3 LaFave, Subst. Crim. 
L. § 21.1(a), (b), pp. 208-12. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b) conveys the essence of 
"breaking" through the word "unauthorized" and, in my view, uses the alternatives of 
entering into or remaining within to explain that the burglar must assert some physical 
presence inside the structure.  
 
The phrase "remaining within" expands the reach of the modern crime beyond the 
reach of conduct condemned at common law—that is, the mere "entering." This 
"statutory expansion" makes "great sense" because, as Professor LaFave explains, it 
allows charging burglary in a situation where an individual enters the premises with 
authority (such as a bank customer) but remains once that authority is withdrawn or 
ceases (such as when the bank customer hides until the bank closes and then steals the 
bank's money). 3 LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 21.1(b), p. 212. By expanding the criminal 
act, the legislature did not intend to create legally distinct crimes. Instead, the intent was 
to describe all surreptitious factual circumstances where the presence could become 
unauthorized. Put simply, there is one "means" to commit burglary—unauthorized 
presence—and the statute describes two options.  
 
As this court has explained, the concepts of entering in and remaining within can 
overlap or be distinct—a burglar can cross the plane of the outside walls and immediately 
exit, can both enter and remain without authority, can enter with authority and lose 
permission, or can have fluctuating periods where authority is granted, taken away, and 
perhaps even be granted again. See Frierson, 298 Kan. at 1012 (quoting State v. 
Gutierrez, 285 Kan. 332, 337, 172 P.3d 18 [2007]). All of these situations involve an 
entry and an unauthorized presence within the structure, and the inclusion of both phrases 
16 
 
 
 
merely describes the various factual circumstance encompassed in the range of scenarios. 
Such descriptions of factual circumstances do not create alternative means. See Brown, 
295 Kan. at 200. 
 
Indeed, the factual scenario in State v. Lora, 213 Kan. 184, 515 P.2d 1086 (1973), 
which the majority discusses, amounts to reversible error under an alternative means 
analysis. In that case, the State charged Lora with both entering into and remaining 
within. Lora had waited for victims to return home in order to commit a rape, meaning 
there was no person present when he "entered in." Nevertheless, this court upheld his 
aggravated burglary conviction because there was evidence that he had "remained 
within." 213 Kan. at 195. Under an alternative means analysis—where evidence must 
support both means—Lora's aggravated burglary conviction was reversible because 
insufficient evidence supported the entering into means. See Brown, 295 Kan. at 188 
(noting that charges of alternative means require substantial evidence to support each 
alternative means).  
 
Under the majority's holding on the alternative means issue, however, the State 
cannot charge both factual descriptions in every case and rely on Lora to save an 
aggravated burglary conviction. Practically speaking, charging a clear-cut case becomes 
complicated by the fear that an evidentiary discrepancy about when exactly a person 
entered or when exactly intent formed might lead to insufficient evidence supporting one 
of the theories. Splitting the crime of aggravated burglary into distinct parts seems an 
exercise in form over substance and wipes out the "good sense" the statutory expansion 
was intended to accomplish. 
 
This seems especially true in light of the continuing nature of the crime of 
aggravated burglary, my second point of disagreement with the majority's opinion. For 
three decades since Reed, 8 Kan. App. 2d at 618, aggravated burglary occurred 
17 
 
 
 
"whenever a human being is present in the building during the course of the burglary." 
(Emphasis added.) Now here, unlike Reed, the majority does not view aggravated 
burglary as a continuing crime. In overruling Reed and its progeny, the majority notes 
that under the entering into theory a "burglary is complete as soon as unauthorized entry 
occurs," regardless of whether the criminal later completes the intended ulterior crime. 
That is true. But that only means that at that point there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction—that does not necessarily mean the actions constituting the offense have 
ended. See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5807(b); see also, e.g., People v. Davis, 18 Cal. 4th 
712, 718, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083 (1998) ("[B]urglary is complete upon the 
slightest partial entry of any kind, with the requisite intent, even if the intended larceny is 
neither committed nor even attempted."); State v. Office of Public Defender, 2012-
NMSC-029, ¶ 41 285 P.3d 622 (N.M. 2012) ("'The crime of burglary is complete when 
there is an unauthorized entry with the requisite intent.'"). I view the plain statutory 
language, which is contained in one sentence rather than in subparts of the statute, as 
describing what can be a continuous factual circumstance—an entering into along with a 
remaining within. See Brown, 295 Kan. at 196 ("[A] legislature will signal its intent to 
state alternative means through structure, separating alternatives into distinct subsections 
of the same statute."). 
 
 
Indeed, "burglary is in fact a rather unique type of attempt law, as all the required 
elements merely comprise a step taken toward the commission of some other offense." 3 
LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 21.1(g), pp. 221-22. Unlike other attempt laws, burglary does 
not merge with the completed offense. Thus, through burglary, the legislature has 
authorized additional punishment for the commission or attempted commission of a 
crime in a particular way. See State v. McClanahan, 251 Kan. 533, 537-38, 836 P.2d 
1164 (1992) (recognizing that burglary does not merge with intended theft); 3 LaFave, 
Subst. Crim. L. § 21.1(g), p. 222.  
 
18 
 
 
 
 
Some crimes, by their nature, do not happen instantaneously. Because burglary is 
the punishment of actions taken to accomplish some other crime, it is hard to view it as 
something other than a crime that continues so long as those actions are ongoing. See 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5107(f) ("An offense is committed either when every element 
occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing offense plainly appears, at the 
time when the course of conduct . . . is terminated.); see also State v. Gainer, 227 Kan. 
670, 673, 608 P.2d 968 (1980) ("To constitute a continuing offense it must plainly appear 
in the statute defining such offense that there is a clear legislative purpose to make the 
prohibited course of conduct a continuing offense."); State v. Zimmer, 198 Kan. 479, 504, 
426 P.2d 267 ("Kidnapping, which involves the detention of another, is a continuing 
offense."), cert. denied 389 U.S. 933 (1967).  
 
 
The United States Supreme Court explained the concept in the context of 
conspiracy, which, by its nature, is a continuing crime so long as the conspirators engage 
in overt acts towards its commission because "each day's acts bring a renewed threat of 
the substantive evil Congress sought to prevent." Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 
122, 90 S. Ct. 858, 25 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1970). The Reed justification echoes that same 
sentiment, finding evidence sufficient to support an aggravated burglary on the entering 
into theory regardless of when a victim became present:  
 
"The purpose behind the aggravated burglary statute is to describe a more serious offense 
than simple burglary when there is the possibility of contact between the victim and the 
burglar and the accompanying potential for a crime against the person to occur. This 
danger is just as great regardless of when during the burglary the victim comes to be in 
the building." 8 Kan. App. 2d at 616.  
 
 
Concededly, the Reed conceptualization of aggravated burglary as a continuing 
crime becomes strained when the focus is only on the entering into statutory language. 
But I read the phrases of "entering into" and "remaining within" as describing the range 
19 
 
 
 
of factual circumstances that can be used to prove an unauthorized presence in the 
structure, and I suggest the legislature intended that language to convey the continuing 
nature of the crime. We should recognize that the Reed conceptualization of aggravated 
burglary as—by its nature—a continuing offense made enough sense that the legislature 
has not changed it for decades. See McIver v. State Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 678, 
683, 426 P.2d 118 (1967) ("The failure of the legislature to disapprove the interpretation 
amounts to a ratification by it."). But see In re Adoption of J.M.D., 293 Kan. 153, 166, 
260 P.3d 1196 (2011) ("[T]his court has not always found that legislative inaction, even 
for long periods of time, precludes the subsequent correction of judicially created rules 
which are contrary to the plainly worded statutes.").  
 
This case illustrates how splitting aggravated burglary into distinct parts confuses 
the crime:  Daws entered into the home when no person was present—he completed a 
standard burglary. Later, while Daws maintained his unauthorized presence in the home, 
a person came in. At that point, Daws remained within the home. Seemingly, under the 
majority analysis in this case, Daws committed a subsequent aggravated burglary that 
was factually and legally distinct from the initial burglary.  
 
I doubt that multiple convictions for acts similar to Daws' could withstand a 
multiplicity analysis because I believe it was the legislature's intent to collapse the two 
factual circumstances, thereby generally proscribing any unauthorized presence in a 
building with the intent to commit a felony. See State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 471-
72, 133 P.3d 48 (2006) ("When the prosecution is based upon the same conduct, there 
can be only one conviction for that minimum unit of prosecution," which is "the nature of 
the conduct proscribed."). While one might argue the rule of lenity weighs in favor of 
reading K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b) to state alternative means in this case, when 
viewed broadly from a unit of prosecution standpoint a stronger argument can be made 
that lenity suggests treating the two options as descriptions of factual circumstances. I 
20 
 
 
 
find it problematic to view aggravated burglary not as a continuing crime but as a series 
of completed crimes.  
 
In essence, the majority's rationale seems to interject confusion into the law 
surrounding the crime of aggravated burglary. I would not change the longstanding 
caselaw of this state, which has recognized aggravated burglary as a continuing crime, 
because I find the rationale in Reed compelling. But I would clarify the alternative means 
analysis in light of our decision in Brown to apply the legislative intent as merely 
describing factual circumstances rather than alternative means.  
 
This would mean that, contrary to the majority's suggestion, the State need not 
prove that a person was in the dwelling at the moment Daws entered without authority. 
The plain language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807(b) does not demand the concurrence if 
both options are read together as allowing for a continuing act. Nor is such a reading 
demanded by general principles of law.  
 
The majority cites Professor LaFave for the "basic premise of Anglo-American 
criminal law that the physical conduct and state of mind must concur." 1 LaFave 
Substantive Criminal Law § 6.3(a), p. 451 (2d ed. 2003). It then cites two cases to 
support its conclusion this coexistence must occur at the moment of the unauthorized 
entry when the State charges only the option of entering into. In one of these cases, 
Gutierrez, 285 Kan. at 338-39, the court held that "[t]o support a conviction for 
aggravated burglary, the intent to commit a felony and the unauthorized entering into or 
remaining within must at some point in time coexist." (Emphasis added.) This language is 
consistent with my reading of the statute as providing for a continuing crime and does not 
specifically state that intent must be present at the moment of entry. The second case does 
support the majority's view. See State v. Bowen, 262 Kan. 705, 709, 942 P.2d 7 (1997) 
21 
 
 
 
("The specific intent in an aggravated burglary, where one is charged with entering into 
the dwelling without authority, must exist at the time of the unauthorized entry.").  
 
Nevertheless, the holding in Bowen and the view adopted by the majority ignores 
the point made by Professor LaFave in the two sentences that follow the one the majority 
quotes. He states: 
 
"Although it is sometimes assumed that there cannot be such concurrence unless the 
mental and physical aspects exist at precisely the same moment in time, the better view is 
that there is a concurrence when the defendant's mental state actuates the physical 
conduct. That is, mere coincidence in point of time is not necessarily sufficient, while the 
lack of such unity is not necessarily a bar to conviction." (Emphasis added.) 1 LaFave, 
Subst. Crim. L. § 6.3(a), p. 451. 
 
Professor LaFave illustrates by explaining that "[t]he physical conduct might begin first 
but continue until the requisite state of mind occurs." 1 LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 6.3(a), 
p. 451 n.5. He provides an example that illustrates that the various elements can occur in 
sequences other than only mental state actuating physical conduct. In that example of an 
assault case, a driver inadvertently parked a car on an officer's foot and "then, upon 
learning what he had done, did not move the car, as the requisite act was 'continuing.'" 1 
LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 6.3(a), p. 451 n.5.  
 
Here, we have evidence to support what Professor LaFave considered to be the 
better view, which I believe is also consistent with the plain language of the aggravated 
burglary statute and legislative intent. The State proved that Daws entered the dwelling 
without permission and during the time he was in the dwelling without authority—i.e., 
during the time leading up to commission of the ulterior crime of theft—the other 
elements and attendant circumstances coincided. Daws held the intent to commit a theft 
while Ramos was also in the structure that Daws had entered without authority. See 1 
22 
 
 
 
LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 6.3(b) p. 455. I would conclude sufficient evidence supports 
Daws' conviction for aggravated burglary.  
 
Daws also argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included 
offense of burglary. Daws can successfully meet the first two tests in our standard of 
review for an alleged failure to give a jury instruction, which is set out in State v. 
Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 283 P.3d 202 (2012):  (1) Daws preserved this issue by 
requesting the instruction during the jury instruction conference, and (2) an instruction on 
burglary is legally appropriate as a lesser included offense of aggravated burglary, see 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5109(b)(1) (defining lesser included offense as lesser degree of 
same crime); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5807 (defining burglary and aggravated burglary). 
 
In the third step of the analysis, Daws must establish that the instruction is 
factually appropriate because there is "some evidence which would reasonably justify a 
conviction of some lesser included crime." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3); Plummer, 295 
Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1. Even if we assume Daws met that standard, in order for him to prevail 
we must determine the failure to give the lesser included instruction was not harmless, 
and I would not make this finding in Daws' favor. Daws did not dispute Ramos' presence 
in the house. The only dispute related to whether Ramos had to be present at the instant 
of Daws' entry into the house. Because I reject this legal argument, I would find that any 
error in failing to give a lesser included offense instruction regarding burglary was 
harmless.  
 
In summary, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury, had it been instructed 
on the lesser included offense, would have found Daws guilty of burglary instead of 
aggravated burglary given the overwhelming evidence on the element that distinguishes 
aggravated burglary from burglar—the presence of a person in the dwelling. See State v. 
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 565, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (If an error implicates a constitutional 
23 
 
 
 
right, then "a Kansas court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was 
no impact on the trial's outcome, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the verdict."), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012); see also State v. Brown, 
298 Kan. 1040, 1051, 318 P.3d 1005 (2014) (if constitutional harmless error standard is 
met, then lower statutory standard under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-261 is also satisfied).  
 
I would affirm Daws' conviction for aggravated burglary. 
 
ROSEN and STEGALL, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.