Title: - The Florida Bar v. Henry T. Swann, III
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-836
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2013

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-836 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
HENRY T. SWANN, III, 
Respondent. 
 
[June 20, 2013] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent 
Henry T. Swann, III, be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended for 
ninety-one days.  The Florida Bar has filed a petition for review of the report, 
asking the Court to disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction and instead 
disbar Swann from the practice of law.  Respondent Swann has filed a cross-
petition for review.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  As 
discussed below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as 
to guilt.  However, we disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline.  We 
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conclude that Swann’s extensive misconduct, and the often egregious nature of the 
misconduct, warrant disbarment.   
FACTS 
 
In April 2011, The Florida Bar filed a five-count complaint against 
Respondent Swann, alleging that he engaged in misconduct in violation of several 
of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules).  A referee was appointed to 
consider the matter.  Following a hearing, the referee submitted his report for the 
Court’s review, in which he makes the following findings and recommendations. 
Count I 
 
Count I involves Swann’s conduct as the personal representative for his 
father’s estate, of which Swann’s mother was the sole beneficiary.  Beginning in 
2003, Swann used $463,429 from his father’s estate to make several investments, 
particularly investments in four real estate properties.  During the final hearing 
before the referee in this case, Swann testified that he borrowed this money from 
his mother as a personal loan.  However, despite the large sum of money involved, 
Swann did not create any written documentation to memorialize the loan or its 
terms.  Moreover, the referee found that at various times before the final hearing, 
Swann gave a different explanation for his use of the estate’s funds.  In a letter he 
sent to the Bar responding to a Bar inquiry, Swann stated that, as the personal 
representative for his father’s estate, he was authorized to invest estate funds for 
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the benefit of the beneficiary.  Similarly, during a 2005 deposition that Swann gave 
during his divorce proceedings, he testified under oath that he invested the 
$463,429 on his mother’s behalf so that there would be sufficient funds for her 
continued care.  Swann claimed that his investments had substantially increased his 
mother’s money.  However, the referee found there was no evidence that Swann 
paid his mother (or his father’s estate) any of the profits from these real estate 
investments.   
 
Swann repaid $400,000 to his father’s estate in August 2005.  He claimed 
that the remaining $63,429 was used to pay his mother’s bills.  However, the 
referee found that Swann’s assertion was not supported in the evidence; the 
estate’s account records do not reflect a deposit of $63,429. 
 
As noted, Swann used the money from his father’s estate to purchase four 
investment properties.  Significantly, the referee found that Swann structured these 
real estate transactions in such a way as to confuse true ownership of the money 
and assets involved.  The first of these real estate investments occurred in April 
2003.  Swann used estate funds to purchase a property identified as the Coquina 
Key property.  Swann purchased Coquina Key in the name of Beach Street 
Properties, a limited liability company that he wholly owned and controlled.  
Immediately after purchasing the property, Swann conveyed Coquina Key to 
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himself individually.  Thereafter, he used Coquina Key to obtain a personal loan 
from Washington Mutual Bank (the Washington Mutual loan).   
 
Subsequently, in 2003 and 2004, Swann used funds from his father’s estate 
to purchase the second and third investment properties, known as Surf Club and 
Atlantic View, respectively.  Swann purchased Surf Club in his own name; he 
purchased Atlantic View in the name of Beach Street Properties.  Swann later sold 
both properties for a profit.  During his deposition in his divorce case, Swann 
testified under oath that he credited the profits from the sale of the Surf Club 
property to his father’s estate.  However, the referee found there was no evidence 
to substantiate this claim.   
 
In June 2004, Swann sold Coquina Key (his first investment property).  
Swann acted as the closing agent for the sale.  He received $32,055 in cash at the 
closing and took a wrap-around mortgage from the buyers for $535,000.  The 
referee found that the existing Washington Mutual loan on Coquina Key had a 
clause providing that the mortgage held by Washington Mutual Bank was 
assumable only with the bank’s prior approval.  Nonetheless, Swann did not notify 
Washington Mutual of the sale.   
The Coquina Key buyers fully paid the wrap-around mortgage in May 2005.  
Although Swann should have used these funds to satisfy the Washington Mutual 
loan, he did not do so.  Instead, in August 2005 Swann used proceeds from the sale 
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of a separate property (the Ocean Hammock property) to pay the loan.  The referee 
found that Swann misused the funds intended to satisfy the Washington Mutual 
loan for his own purposes and violated his fiduciary duties as closing agent.   
In October 2004, Swann purchased the fourth investment property, the 
Ocean Hammock property, using at least some funds associated with his father’s 
estate.  Swann purchased the property in his own name.  He then used Ocean 
Hammock to secure a loan from the Bank of St. Augustine (the Bank of St. 
Augustine loan).   
Subsequently, in July 2005, Swann sold Ocean Hammock to Green Ville, 
LLC, a limited liability corporation owned by Swann’s client, Christiane Martinot.  
Although the company was owned by Martinot, it is clear that during this period 
Swann actually controlled the company and directed Martinot’s actions related to 
these real estate transactions.  Swann did not notify Bank of St. Augustine that he 
transferred Ocean Hammock to Green Ville, LLC.  Shortly after the property was 
transferred, Martinot, on behalf of Green Ville, executed a mortgage in favor of 
Swann’s father’s estate for $400,000, secured by Ocean Hammock.  This was the 
first time that Swann took any action to secure the money he borrowed from the 
estate.   
In August 2005, Swann prepared a subsequent deed transferring Ocean 
Hammock from Green Ville, LLC to K.R.H. Investments, LLC, a limited liability 
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corporation owned and controlled by Swann; the Articles of Incorporation for the 
company name Swann’s girlfriend, Khadija Rhoualmi, as the registered agent and 
manager.  Swann again failed to notify the Bank of St. Augustine of the transfer.   
Immediately after Swann transferred the Ocean Hammock property to 
K.R.H. Investments, K.R.H. Investments sold the property to E.C.N. Properties, 
LLC (a company independent from Swann).  Swann used some of the proceeds 
from the sale to pay off the Washington Mutual loan.  He also used $400,000 from 
the proceeds to satisfy the mortgage on Ocean Hammock held by his father’s 
estate. 
Based on these facts, the referee found that Swann, as personal 
representative for his father’s estate (and as attorney-in-fact for his mother), 
utilized estate funds as if they were his own and extensively commingled estate 
assets with his own in such a manner as to obscure true ownership of the 
investments and the profits from the investments.  Swann’s actions had the 
potential, if not the actual effect, of jeopardizing the money needed for his 
mother’s care.  Accordingly, the referee recommends that he be found guilty of 
violating the following Bar Rules: 3-4.3 (the commission by a lawyer of any act 
that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in 
the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise, may constitute a 
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cause for discipline); 4-1.7(a)1
Count II 
 (a lawyer shall not represent a client if there is a 
substantial risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer); 4-3.4(a) (a lawyer shall not 
unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully 
alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material that the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know is relevant to a pending proceeding); 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer 
shall not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 
4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of 
law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
 
Count II concerns Swann’s relationship with Khadija Rhoualmi, and his 
involvement in her actions to emotionally and financially exploit one of Swann’s 
clients, William Shelton.  Rhoualmi is a Moroccan citizen; during the period of 
                                         
 
1.  In counts I, II, IV, and V, the referee recommends that the Court find 
Swann guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.7(b).  The reference to subdivision (b) 
appears to be a scrivener’s error.  The referee stated that Swann was guilty of 
violating the rule that provides, “A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment in the representation of 
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person or by the lawyer’s own interest.”  This conduct is 
prohibited under Bar Rule 4-1.7(a)(2). 
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time at issue in this case, she was living in Florida.  Swann met Rhoualmi in 2003 
and hired her to clean his office.  He also assisted Rhoualmi with her application 
for United States citizenship.  The two took several trips together while Swann was 
married, including visits to the Virgin Islands, Las Vegas, and New Orleans.  
Swann has stated that he and Rhoualmi had an “adult relationship” during this 
period; the referee found that they were sexually involved. 
 
In April 2005, Rhoualmi referred Shelton, who was seventy-one years old at 
the time and in poor physical and mental health, to Swann, purportedly for help 
with a zoning matter related to a nursery that Shelton owned (the nursery 
property).  Shelton paid Swann $1,000 for his legal services.   
 
About a week after meeting with Swann, Shelton suffered a medical 
emergency that resulted in his hospitalization.  Shortly after he was released from 
the hospital, on May 6, 2005, Shelton executed a warranty deed transferring his 
home from himself to both himself and Rhoualmi as joint tenants with rights of 
survivorship.  On the face of the deed are notations indicating that it was “prepared 
by Henry Swann,” that it was recorded on May 9, 2005, and that the recording fees 
totaled $27.70.  The Bar presented a copy of a check drawn from Swann’s law 
office account, dated May 9, 2005, payable to the clerk of court for $27.70.  
Although Swann claimed that he did not prepare the deed or the check, and that his 
secretary must have prepared them for Rhoualmi and Shelton without his 
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involvement, the referee rejected his explanation as lacking credibility.  The 
referee found that Swann prepared the check himself. 
 
Shelton was hospitalized again in late May 2005.  Several days after his 
release, on June 1, 2005, Shelton executed a deed conveying his nursery property 
from himself to both himself and Rhoualmi as joint tenants with rights of 
survivorship.  Although the June 2005 deed does not indicate who prepared it, the 
form appears identical to the one recorded on May 9, 2005. 
 
In July 2005, Shelton underwent a medical procedure.  One day after he was 
released from the hospital, Rhoualmi drove Shelton to the bank where he added her 
name to his checking account and a certificate of deposit.  Rhoualmi then withdrew 
virtually all of the money from the account and deposited the funds into a checking 
account solely in her name.   
 
Later that month, Rhoualmi left the country for Europe.  While she was out 
of the country, Shelton’s son hired a lawyer, Harold Lippes, to bring civil cases to 
freeze Rhoualmi’s checking account and rescind the two deeds.  When Swann 
learned of these proceedings, he flew to Spain for several days and met with 
Rhoualmi.   
 
Rhoualmi returned from Europe in August 2005 and resumed her 
relationship with Shelton.  The two sought and obtained a marriage license.  
Thereafter, Rhoualmi attempted to have Shelton sign a prenuptial agreement.  The 
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referee found that the prenuptial agreement Rhoualmi proposed was extremely 
one-sided in her favor.  It would have provided that Shelton’s nursery property be 
listed for sale with Fun Coast Realty, LLC.; at the time, Swann had a real estate 
license registered with Fun Coast Realty.  This version of the prenuptial agreement 
was never signed. 
 
On November 18, 2005, Rhoualmi and Shelton were married.  Several 
months later, Shelton was declared incompetent to make financial and legal 
decisions.  He passed away in August 2006.  Ultimately, the Fourth Judicial Circuit 
Court entered a final judgment in In re Estate of Shelton, Case No. 2006-CP-1845 
(the Shelton case), which annulled the marriage between Shelton and Rhoualmi, 
ordered Rhoualmi to return the funds she withdrew from Shelton’s account, and 
rescinded the two warranty deeds for his home and nursery properties.  The circuit 
court’s order makes a number of findings regarding Swann’s involvement in the 
matter.  In relevant part, the circuit court found that Rhoualmi’s “real intention was 
to obtain Shelton’s money and property” and that “[s]he accomplished this, in part, 
with the active assistance of Henry T. Swann, III (“Swann”), an attorney with 
whom she became romantically involved by mid-2004.”  In re Estate of Shelton, 
Case No. 2006-CP-1845 (Fla. 4th Cir. order entered Nov. 16, 2007) (emphasis 
added). 
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Based on these facts, the referee recommends that Swann be found guilty of 
violating the following Bar Rules: 3-4.3 (the commission by a lawyer of any act 
that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in 
the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise, may constitute a 
cause for discipline); 4-1.7(a) (a lawyer shall not represent a client if there is a 
substantial risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer); 4-5.3(b) (providing that a lawyer 
having direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts 
to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations 
of the lawyer); 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with 
the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Count III 
 
Count III involves Swann’s conduct during his divorce proceedings.  Swann 
and his wife separated in May 2005.  Thereafter, the evidence demonstrates that 
Swann took actions prior to and during his divorce case designed to obscure and 
conceal marital assets from his wife and her attorneys.  The referee found that 
Swann titled marital properties in a manner intended to defraud his wife.  For 
example, he transferred the Ocean Hammock property from his own name to 
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Green Ville, LLC, and later from Green Ville to K.R.H. Investments, solely to 
prevent his wife and her attorneys from filing a lis pendens against the property.  
Swann then sold the Ocean Hammock property without informing his wife.  In 
addition, the referee found that Swann transferred some marital properties into his 
sister’s name; Swann concealed his actions from his sister by having the deeds sent 
to his own address.   
The attorney for Swann’s wife filed a sworn affidavit in these disciplinary 
proceedings stating that he was required to perform extensive legal work to 
identify and protect marital assets.  The attorney stated that he filed multiple lis 
pendens against properties held by Swann’s various companies.  Indeed, at one 
point it was necessary for Swann’s wife to pursue civil actions against Swann’s 
girlfriend, Khadija Rhoualmi, his client, Christiane Martinot, and his sister in order 
to secure marital property.  Although Swann argued that he eventually transferred 
all of the disputed properties back into his own name, the referee found that Swann 
took this step only after his actions had been exposed.  Swann’s conduct caused his 
wife to incur additional attorney’s fees and costs.  
 
The referee further found that Swann’s wife and her attorneys made 
reasonable efforts to schedule Swann for a deposition in the divorce case, without 
success.  Swann did not file required financial information in advance of a 
temporary support hearing held in the case.  Following that hearing, the circuit 
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court entered a Temporary Support Order finding that Swann’s testimony was 
evasive, that he was not a credible witness, and that his finances were “murky.” 
 
In June 2005, Swann applied for a home equity line of credit, secured by the 
marital home, with a maximum limit of $150,000.  Swann signed his wife’s 
signature on the loan application.  Thereafter, he obtained $150,000 from the line 
of credit and deposited the funds into his personal checking account.  Swann then 
wrote a check for $150,000 payable to John Zolsky, his friend and the owner of 
Fun Coast Realty.  Zolsky used the funds to purchase the mortgage on Swann’s 
law office condominium.  Pursuant to an earlier separation agreement between 
Swann and his wife, Swann was required to use the home equity loan to keep the 
mortgage on the couple’s marital home current; contrary to this agreement, the 
referee found that Swann used the funds without his wife’s permission to eliminate 
his personal debts. 
 
Finally, the referee found that Swann’s actions during the divorce case 
defrauded a lender.  In June 2005, Swann purchased a property known as the San 
Mateo house using at least some marital funds.  He bought the property in the 
name of First Coast Land and Title, LLC, a limited liability corporation owned and 
controlled by Swann; as with other companies Swann controlled, the Articles of 
Incorporation for First Coast Land and Title named Khadija Rhoualmi as the 
registered agent and manager.  Subsequently, First Coast Land and Title conveyed 
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the San Mateo property to K.R.H. Investments.  The referee found that Swann 
transferred the property shortly before his wife’s attorney recorded a lis pendens on 
the property; as a result, the attorney filed the lis pendens against the wrong 
property owner.  Swann then sought and obtained a loan secured by the San Mateo 
house, knowing that his wife had filed the lis pendens (against the wrong owner).  
Swann did not advise the bank of the existence of the lis pendens.  The referee 
found that, as the result of Swann’s material omission, the lender made the loan 
believing that the San Mateo property was free of encumbrances. 
 
Based on Swann’s actions in the divorce case, the referee recommends that 
Swann be found guilty of violating the following Bar Rules: 3-4.3 (the commission 
by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether 
the act is committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or 
otherwise, may constitute a cause for discipline); 4-3.4(a) (a lawyer shall not 
unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully 
alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material that the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know is relevant to a pending proceeding); 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
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Count IV 
 
Count IV concerns Swann’s involvement in business transactions with 
clients, particularly his client, Christiane Martinot.  Swann originally formed the 
company Green Ville, LLC on Martinot’s behalf, for her own real estate business.  
However, during the period of time at issue, Swann maintained control over the 
corporation.  Martinot provided an affidavit in this case, in which she stated that 
Swann asked her to hold some of his investment properties and money in Green 
Ville because he told her he was going through an “ugly divorce” and “his wife 
was trying to take everything he had.”  At Swann’s request, Martinot agreed to 
sign various papers and checks for the Green Ville account.  She also executed a 
mortgage on behalf of Green Ville in favor of Swann’s father’s estate, secured by 
the Ocean Hammock property.  Martinot stated that Swann’s actions caused her to 
have concerns regarding her potential tax liabilities.  His actions also led to 
Martinot being joined in Swann’s divorce case.   
 
In count IV, the referee recommends that Swann be found guilty of violating 
the following Bar Rules: 3-4.3 (the commission by a lawyer of any act that is 
unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in the 
course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise, may constitute a 
cause for discipline); 4-1.1 (a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client); 4-1.7(a) (a lawyer shall not represent a client if there is a substantial risk 
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that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a 
personal interest of the lawyer); 4-1.8(a) (a lawyer shall not enter into a business 
with a client unless the transaction is fair and reasonable to the client and fully 
disclosed in writing; the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking 
independent legal counsel; and the client gives informed written consent); 4-8.4(a) 
(a lawyer shall not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
Count V 
 
Count V concerns Swann’s actions as the co-personal representative for the 
estate of his client, Natalia Berwick Taylor, and as the trustee for the Natalia 
Berwick Taylor Trust (the Taylor Trust).  Taylor hired Swann in 1993 to prepare a 
Declaration of Trust for the Taylor Trust.  Ten years later, in 2003, Swann 
prepared a will for Taylor that named Swann and another person as co-personal 
representatives for her estate.  Swann also prepared a revised trust and a first 
amendment to the Taylor trust, which named Swann as the sole trustee.   
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Taylor passed away in October 2005, and Swann filed the will for probate.  
At that time, one of the assets in Taylor’s estate was her home (the Taylor home).  
The referee found that Swann allowed Khadija Rhoualmi, and later a client, to live 
in the Taylor home either rent free or paying rent in an amount below fair market 
value.  The referee also found that Swann did not fully inform the estate and trust 
beneficiaries of this arrangement.   
 
Additionally, Swann failed to provide the Taylor Trust beneficiaries with a 
timely accounting of trust assets.  Harold Lippes, the attorney for Shelton, became 
involved in this matter when he learned that Rhoualmi was living in the Taylor 
home.  Lippes testified that he spoke with the trust beneficiaries and learned that 
Swann’s communications with them had been poor.  Lippes agreed to represent the 
trust beneficiaries pro bono.  On May 12, 2006, he sent a letter demanding that 
Swann provide a full accounting and that he withdraw as trustee.  On May 15, 
Swann provided an interim accounting.  The trust and will beneficiaries ultimately 
reached an agreement, and Swann was discharged as trustee.   
 
Based on these facts, the referee recommends that Swann be found guilty of 
violating the following Bar Rules: 3-4.3 (the commission by a lawyer of any act 
that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in 
the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise, may constitute a 
cause for discipline); 4-1.1 (a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
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client); 4-1.7(a) (a lawyer shall not represent a client if there is a substantial risk 
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a 
personal interest of the lawyer); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
Recommendation as to Discipline 
 
The referee found five aggravating factors in this case: (1) a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (2) a pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple offenses; (4) vulnerability 
of the victim (in that Swann’s mother was elderly and may not have been 
sufficiently competent to approve his use of the estate funds, and Shelton was 
particularly vulnerable due to his mental incapacity); and (5) substantial experience 
in the practice of law.  The referee found one mitigating factor, the absence of a 
prior disciplinary record. 
 
Based on his recommendations as to guilt, the findings in aggravation and 
mitigation, and his consideration of the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions and case law, the referee recommends that Swann be suspended from the 
practice of law for ninety-one days.  The referee also awarded costs to The Florida 
Bar, in the amount of $16,327.05.   
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As noted, the Bar has filed a petition for review, challenging the referee’s 
recommended sanction.  Swann has filed a cross-petition for review, in which he 
urges the Court to approve the referee’s recommended ninety-one-day suspension; 
however, Swann also argues that the referee did not consider his “explanations and 
mitigating circumstances.” 
ANALYSIS 
The Referee’s Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt 
 
First, to the extent that Swann’s cross-petition for review challenges the 
referee’s findings of fact, we hold that such facts are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence in the record.  See Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 
(Fla. 2000) (stating that when the referee’s findings are supported by “competent, 
substantial evidence in the record,” this Court is “precluded from reweighing the 
evidence and substituting [our] judgment for that of the referee”) (quoting Fla. Bar 
v. Lange, 711 So. 2d 518, 520 n.5 (Fla. 1998)); see also Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 
2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  Swann’s argument that the referee did not consider his 
“explanations and mitigating circumstances” is, in essence, a challenge to the 
referee’s weighing of the evidence and his assessment of credibility—Swann 
contends the referee should have accepted his testimony, evidence, and 
explanations over that of the Bar’s evidence.  However, as we stated in Frederick, 
if the factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, this Court 
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will not reweigh the evidence presented to the referee.  Moreover, the Court has 
long held, “The referee is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
and his judgment regarding credibility should not be overturned absent clear and 
convincing evidence that his judgment is incorrect.”  Fla. Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So. 
2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 
1991)).  Here, Swann has not demonstrated that the referee’s factual findings are 
unsupported or that his credibility assessments are incorrect.  Accordingly, we 
approve the referee’s findings of fact without further discussion. 
 
We also approve the referee’s recommendations as to guilt.  Initially, we 
note that Swann’s cross-petition for review asks the Court to approve the referee’s 
recommended discipline.  Thus, we conclude that Swann has, in effect, waived any 
argument challenging the referee’s recommendations as to guilt.  Even if Swann 
had not waived the issue, we would nonetheless conclude that the referee’s 
findings of fact are sufficient to support the recommendations as to guilt.  See Fla. 
Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005) (“[T]he referee’s factual 
findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the 
recommendations as to guilt.”).  The referee’s factual findings show that Swann’s 
actions, both in his personal matters and in his practice of law, were dishonest, 
self-serving, and prejudicial to justice.  As the referee observed, conduct such as 
that engaged in by Swann taints how the legal profession is viewed by members of 
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the public and by people who seek the professional services of an attorney.  We 
have stated that “attorneys must be and are held to the highest of ethical standards 
and, unlike non-attorney citizens, are subject to discipline for a breach of those 
standards.”  Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So. 2d 76, 82 (Fla. 2005).  We address some of 
the most egregious of Swann’s ethical violations here. 
In count I, addressing Swann’s conduct as the personal representative of his 
father’s estate, the referee found Swann guilty of violating several Bar Rules, 
including rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(c).  Rule 3-4.3 provides: “The commission by a 
lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the 
act is committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or 
otherwise . . . may constitute a cause for discipline.”  Similarly, rule 4-8.4(c) states 
that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”  We conclude that the referee made numerous factual findings 
in count I that support his recommendation that Swann be found guilty of violating 
these rules.  Most notably, the referee found that Swann’s testimony during his 
divorce proceedings and his testimony before the referee in this case, both given 
while under oath, were directly contradictory.  During his divorce case, Swann 
testified in a deposition that he invested estate funds solely for his mother’s 
benefit.  However, before the referee, he testified that the money was a personal 
loan.  It is clear to this Court that Swann varied his sworn testimony to suit his own 
- 22 - 
 
purposes in each case.  Additionally, in count I the referee found that Swann used 
estate funds for various real estate transactions and structured the transactions to 
obscure the true ownership of the money and property involved; that although he 
refunded his father’s estate $400,000 from the total $463,429 used, there is no 
evidence that he repaid the estate the remaining $63,429; that Swann did not notify 
Washington Mutual Bank when he sold the Coquina Key property, even though he 
was obligated to do so under the terms of the loan; and that he failed to repay 
Washington Mutual Bank with the funds he received from the Coquina Key 
buyers, as required by the terms of the closing statement.  Based on these factual 
findings, we conclude that the referee’s recommendations that Swann be found 
guilty of violating rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(c) are well supported. 
Also in count I, the referee found that Swann created conflicts of interest in 
violation of rule 4-1.7(a).  The rule provides that a lawyer shall not represent a 
client if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client will 
be “materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former 
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”  We conclude that 
the factual findings are sufficient to support the referee’s conclusion that Swann’s 
independent professional judgment was materially limited by his own personal 
interests, in violation of this rule.  Swann, while serving as the personal 
representative for his father’s estate and the attorney for his mother, used money 
- 23 - 
 
from the estate for his own purposes and failed to protect the estate from the 
potential consequences of his actions.  As noted, Swann has presented two 
conflicting explanations for his use of the estate money.  To the extent he claims 
the funds were a loan from his mother, the referee found that Swann borrowed a 
large sum of money and did not act to protect the estate by reducing the loan terms 
to writing.  Alternatively, to the extent he claims he invested the money on behalf 
of the estate, Swann purchased all of the investment properties in his own name or 
in the name of corporations he controlled.  In fact, the referee found that the 
October 2004 mortgage in favor of his father’s estate secured by the Ocean 
Hammock property was the only time that Swann took any action to secure the 
money he borrowed from the estate.  Moreover, although Swann’s investments 
apparently made a profit, he did not share any of these profits with the estate.  
Based on these findings of fact, we conclude that the referee’s recommendation 
that Swann be found guilty of violating rule 4-1.7 is well supported. 
Turning to count II, the referee found that Swann helped his girlfriend, 
Khadija Rhoualmi, to exploit an elderly client.  This count may involve the most 
egregious instances of Swann’s misconduct.  The referee found Swann guilty of 
violating several Bar Rules in count II, including that he engaged in dishonest 
conduct in violation of rule 3-4.3.  We approve this recommendation as to guilt.  
Swann’s conduct was plainly contrary to honesty and justice.  Swann and 
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Rhoualmi had an ongoing personal “adult relationship.”  At the same time, Swann 
knew that Rhoualmi was also involved in a relationship with his client, Mr. 
Shelton.  Both the referee and the Fourth Judicial Circuit in the Shelton case found 
that Swann assisted Rhoualmi in exploiting Shelton and taking his property and 
money.  Among other things, Rhoualmi convinced Shelton to transfer his home 
and his nursery property from himself to both himself and Rhoualmi jointly.  The 
evidence indicates that Swann prepared the deeds transferring these properties and 
that he paid the recording fees.  When Rhoualmi left the country in July 2005, 
Swann flew to Spain to meet with her and update her on the pending civil case.  
The referee further found that Swann continued to act in concert with Rhoualmi 
throughout the course of that litigation.  Based on these findings, we agree with the 
referee’s conclusion that, not only was Swann aware of Rhoualmi’s actions, he 
actively assisted her in carrying them out.   
In count III, concerning Swann’s conduct in his divorce case, the referee 
recommends that Swann be found guilty of violating a number of Bar Rules, 
including dishonest conduct in violation of rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(c).  We conclude 
that the referee’s factual findings support this recommendation.  Swann took 
deliberate actions to conceal marital assets from his wife; he signed his wife’s 
name to an application for a home equity line of credit without informing the 
lender; he used the proceeds from the line of credit to satisfy his personal debts, 
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namely his law office condominium, in violation of the couple’s separation 
agreement; and he transferred the San Mateo house from one of his companies to 
another, solely to avoid his wife filing a lis pendens against the property.  Also in 
count III, the referee found that Swann sought and obtained a loan from Bank of 
America, secured by the San Mateo house, knowing that his wife had filed the lis 
pendens.  Swann did not advise the bank of the existence of the lis pendens, even 
though he knew it would not appear in a public records search and, as a result, the 
lender made the loan believing that the San Mateo property was free of 
encumbrances.  We conclude that these factual findings are sufficient to support 
the referee’s recommendations in count III that Swann be found guilty of violating 
rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(c). 
In count IV, the referee found, among other things, that Swann engaged in 
business transactions with his clients in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.8(a).  That rule 
provides that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client 
unless: (1) the terms of the transaction are fair and reasonable to the client and are 
fully disclosed to the client in writing; (2) the client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel, and is given a 
reasonable opportunity to do so; and (3) the client gives informed written consent 
to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction.  
We agree with the referee’s conclusion that Swann engaged in business 
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transactions with his clients, particularly with Christiane Martinot, and that he 
failed to make the required disclosures.  Swann established Green Ville, LLC for 
Martinot to use for her own real estate business.  Nonetheless, during the period of 
time at issue in this case, Swann maintained total control over the corporation.  He 
also directed Martinot’s actions regarding the company.  Martinot stated in her 
affidavit that Swann asked her to hold some of his investment properties and 
money in Green Ville in order to conceal those assets from his wife.  She also 
stated that Swann asked her to sign various papers and checks.  In fact, Martinot, 
on behalf of Green Ville, executed a mortgage in favor of Swann’s father’s estate 
secured by the Ocean Hammock property.  It is not disputed that Swann failed to 
make any of the written disclosures to Martinot that are required under rule 4-1.8.  
Moreover, his actions caused Martinot to fear whether she would have tax 
liabilities based on these transactions, and ultimately led to her being named in his 
divorce proceeding.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommendation that 
Swann be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.8(a). 
Finally, count V addresses Swann’s actions as the co-personal representative 
for the Taylor estate and as the trustee for the Taylor Trust.  As with counts I 
through IV, the referee found Swann guilty of violating several Bar Rules, 
including rule 3-4.3.  In support of this recommendation, the referee found that 
Swann used an asset of the Taylor estate, the Taylor home, to benefit his girlfriend, 
- 27 - 
 
Khadija Rhoualmi.  Swann allowed Rhoualmi, and later a client, to live in the 
Taylor home for a rent below the market value.  He did not fully advise the estate 
beneficiaries of this arrangement, and the evidence indicates that he did not fully 
account for the rental income he earned.  Based on these facts, we approve the 
referee’s recommendation that Swann be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 3-4.3. 
In sum, we have considered the referee’s findings of fact, and we conclude 
that such findings are sufficient to support the recommendations as to guilt.  
Accordingly, we approve those recommendations in full. 
The Referee’s Recommended Sanction 
 
We turn next to the referee’s recommended sanction, a ninety-one-day 
suspension.   In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope 
of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also Art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
 
The Bar urges the Court to disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction, 
and instead disbar Swann from the practice of law.  After considering the 
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numerous instances of Swann’s misconduct in this case, and the often egregious 
nature of the misconduct, we agree.  As discussed below, we conclude that 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 
 
The report of referee indicates that the referee considered several of the 
Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in making his recommendation 
as to discipline.  Among the Standards considered, we particularly note Standard 
7.1, which provides that disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the 
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or 
potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.  As discussed 
herein, Swann’s conduct in this case was often taken to benefit himself at the 
expense of others. 
In addition to the Standards, case law demonstrates that disbarment is 
appropriate.  Many of Swann’s actions, standing alone, would warrant at least a 
rehabilitative suspension.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Baker, 810 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2002) 
(suspending an attorney for ninety-one days for forging his former wife’s signature 
on legal documents relating to the sale of their home in Dade County); Fla. Bar v. 
Cibula, 725 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1998) (suspending an attorney for ninety-one days for 
misrepresenting his income to the court during his divorce and alimony 
proceedings in order to induce the court to modify the alimony payment); Fla. Bar 
- 29 - 
 
v. Langston, 540 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1989) (suspending an attorney for ninety-one 
days for, among other violations, transferring marital property out of his name in 
violation of a court order entered in his dissolution of marriage proceeding); Fla. 
Bar v. Collier, 506 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1987) (suspending an attorney for six months, 
where the referee found that the attorney and his wife convinced his wife’s father, 
who was not competent to make legal and financial decisions, to execute a waiver 
of his interest in a trust; the effect of the waiver would have been that the corpus of 
the trust passed immediately to the respondent’s wife, and her father would be left 
with no significant assets for his care). 
In this case, Swann’s various acts of misconduct must be considered 
together as a whole.  Swann engaged in twenty-six separate rule violations, 
spanning a period of several years.  Some of his conduct, especially his 
involvement with Ms. Rhoualmi to exploit his client, Mr. Shelton, is particularly 
serious.  Swann’s extensive and egregious misdeeds warrant a more severe 
sanction than the ninety-one-day suspension recommended by the referee.   
Moreover, every count described in the referee’s report involves some 
instance of Swann’s dishonest and deceitful conduct.  Our prior decisions have 
made clear that basic fundamental dishonesty is a serious flaw, one which cannot 
be tolerated by a profession that relies on the truthfulness of its members.  Fla. Bar 
v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2002); Fla. Bar v. Korones, 752 So. 2d 586, 
- 30 - 
 
591 (Fla. 2000).  We conclude that Swann’s numerous acts of dishonest conduct, 
together with his other serious ethical violations, warrant disbarment. 
Finally, the fact that much of the misconduct in this case involves Swann’s 
personal affairs does not change our conclusion that disbarment is warranted.  This 
Court has long held that ethical violations which occur while a member of The 
Florida Bar is not acting as an attorney can nonetheless subject the attorney to 
disciplinary proceedings. 
As this Court has stated before, “an attorney is an attorney is an 
attorney.”  Even in personal transactions and when not acting as an 
attorney, attorneys must avoid tarnishing the professional image or 
damaging the public. . . . The practice of law is a privilege which 
carries with it responsibilities as well as rights.  That an attorney 
might, as it were, wear different hats at different times does not mean 
that professional ethics can be “checked at the door” or that unethical 
or unprofessional conduct by a member of the legal profession can be 
tolerated. 
 
Fla. Bar v. Della-Donna, 583 So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1989) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This Court has previously imposed lengthy suspensions 
or disbarment when attorneys engage in dishonest conduct in their personal 
matters.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Draughon, 94 So. 3d 566, 571 (Fla. 2012) 
(suspending an attorney for one year for defrauding the former property owner in a 
real estate transaction) (“Although Draughon was acting on behalf of his own 
corporation, and not as a lawyer representing a client in a transaction, he is 
nonetheless a member of The Florida Bar and subject to the disciplinary authority 
- 31 - 
 
of this Court.  The Court expects members of the Bar to conduct their personal 
business affairs with honesty and in accordance with the law.”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Fla. Bar v. Hall, 49 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. 2010) 
(disbarring an attorney for harassing property owners who refused the attorney’s 
offer to buy their property and creating a false agreement for sale).  In Hall, the 
Court expressly noted that Hall “purposefully used her knowledge of the law to 
harm others, for her own personal benefit.”  Id. at 1258.  Similarly, in this case, we 
conclude that Swann used his knowledge of the law to manipulate others. 
 
Ultimately, based upon Swann’s numerous acts of dishonest conduct, 
together with the aggravating2 and mitigating3
                                         
 
2.  As noted, the referee found five aggravating factors, including dishonest 
or selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses; vulnerability of the 
victim; and substantial experience in the practice of law.  Swann does not 
challenge these findings.  We approve the referee’s findings without further 
discussion. 
 factors found by the referee, we 
conclude that disbarment is warranted.  Thus, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommended sanction, a ninety-one-day suspension, and instead disbar Swann. 
 
3.  The referee found one mitigating factor, the absence of a prior 
disciplinary history.  Although Swann suggests that the referee should have 
considered other mitigating circumstances, he declined to present mitigating 
evidence to the referee.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings in 
mitigation without further discussion. 
- 32 - 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Henry T. Swann, III, is hereby disbarred from the practice of 
law in Florida.  The disbarment will be effective thirty days from the filing of this 
opinion so that Swann can close out his practice and protect the interests of 
existing clients.  If Swann notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer 
practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court 
will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Swann shall 
fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  Further, Swann shall 
accept no new business from the date of this opinion. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Henry T. Swann, III, 
in the amount of $16,327.05, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT.  
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, The 
Florida Bar, Tallahasse, Florida, and Frances R. Brown-Lewis, Bar Counsel, The 
Florida Bar, Orlando, Florida,   
 
for Complainant  
 
- 33 - 
 
James C. Rinaman, Jacksonville,  
 
for Respondent