Title: Martin v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
Citation: 387 S.W.2d 334
Docket Number: 5-3464
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 1965

387 S.W.2d 334 (1965) Clay E. MARTIN, Appellant, v. AETNA CASUALTY &amp; SURETY COMPANY et al., Appellees. No. 5-3464. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 1, 1965. M. F. Highsmith, Batesville, Robert V. Light, Little Rock, for appellant. Gentry &amp; Gentry, Clayton Freeman, Little Rock, for appellees. *335 JOHNSON, Justice. This is a suit against a hospital and its employee for injuries to a patient sustained while in the hospital. Appellant Clay E. Martin was admitted to St. Vincent Infirmary on November 3, 1961, after suffering a fractured femur when his horse fell on him. The broken leg was set surgically and instead of a cast, a steel plate or bar was attached to the bone to hold the fracture site rigid. Thereafter, while appellant was in the hospital, this metal bar was broken and the leg re-injured. On March 14, 1963, appellant filed suit in Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division, against appellees Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Company, the hospital's insurer, under the provisions of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 66-3240 (Supp.1963), and Evelyn Willis, a hospital employee. The complaint alleged two separate re-injuries, the first on November 22, 1961, when the leg rest of a wheel chair in which appellant was seated collapsed, throwing his leg to the floor, resulting in displacement of the bone fragments and a breaking of the metal plate attached to the femur. The second injury occurred ten days later while appellant was in traction when allegedly appellee Willis, the admitted agent of St. Vincent Infirmary, handled his broken leg so roughly or carelessly a further re-injury and displacement of the bone fragments was caused. The case was tried to a jury on February 10, 1964. The jury returned a verdict signed by nine jurors, which found for appellee Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Company. Appellant brings this appeal from judgment on the verdict dismissing his complaint. For reversal appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his offered Instruction No. 9 which would have submitted the case to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence that comes into play when: Appellant's testimony about the first reinjury was that he was placed in a hospital wheel chair, taken to the physiotherapy department where he underwent the prescribed physiotherapy, was returned to the wheel chair and taken back to his room by an orderly. The orderly left the room and before other hospital personnel came to put him back into bed, the leg rest which was extended straight out to hold up his leg suddenly dropped, causing his leg to fall violently to the floor. The patient sharing the room then called the nurse. Appellant testified that he did not make any attempt to release the mechanism that held up the leg rest and had no idea, even at time of trial, how the mechanism was operated. In harmony with this and other testimony, appellant offered his Instruction No. 9, as follows: Tested by the guide-lines laid down in Southwestern Tel. &amp; Tel. Co. v. Bruce, supra, the evidence in the case at bar clearly contains every element necessary to entitle him to the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The summary of the court in Pierce v. Gooding Amusement Co., 90 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio App., 1949), involving injury sustained on a merry-go-round, is particularly apt: It follows, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's Instruction No. 9, and for that error it is necessary that the entire case be reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.