Title: Florida Department Of Corrections v. Watts
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1591
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1591
____________
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Appellant,
vs.
TONY RANDALL WATTS,
Appellee.
[November 8, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
This is an interlocutory appeal of an order entered by the trial court during
capital postconviction proceedings.  Pursuant to our decision in Trepal v. State,
754 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2000), we have jurisdiction based on article V, section 3(b)(1)
of the Florida Constitution to review interlocutory orders in capital collateral
postconviction proceedings.  
In Trepal, we adopted a two-prong test for determining whether to grant
relief of interlocutory orders in death cases: (1) whether the trial court's order
1  The trial court's order finding Watts incompetent to proceed was not
appealed.
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conformed to the essential requirements of law; and (2) whether the order would
cause an injury that could not adequately be corrected on appeal from the final
order.  754 So. 2d at 707.  Because the Florida Department of Corrections
("DOC") has no other adequate remedy and would suffer irreparable harm if the
trial court exceeded its authority in this case, we must determine whether the order
conformed to the essential requirements of law.  See id.; see also Carter v. State,
706 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1997) (granting review of a defendant's challenge to an
interlocutory order entered during postconviction proceedings); cf. State Dep't of
Children & Families v. Morrison, 727 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). 
The trial court in this case found appellee Tony Randall Watts to be
incompetent to proceed with his collateral postconviction proceedings.1  
Subsequently, the trial court entered an order that Watts remain confined at Florida
Department of Corrections' Mental Health Institution at Florida State Hospital
("CMHI") for further treatment.  DOC appeals this order, asserting that the trial
court exceeded its authority by specifying where Watts should be confined and
treated.
The issue in the case is whether a trial court, which previously determined
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that a capital defendant was incompetent to proceed during capital collateral
proceedings, has the authority under this Court's decision in Carter and the
applicable Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to order that the defendant remain
at a particular mental health hospital controlled by the DOC, when the purpose of
that order is to restore the defendant to competency so that he or she can seek
postconviction relief.  
We conclude that under the narrow circumstances presented in this case, the
trial court's order conformed to the essential requirements of law.  The trial court
did not exceed its authority set forth in the applicable rules to enter orders that are
directed to the goal of restoring the defendant's competency in capital collateral
postconviction proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Watts was convicted of first-degree murder, armed burglary with an assault,
armed robbery, and sexual battery using physical force, and was sentenced to
death on September 15, 1989.  This Court affirmed the convictions and death
sentence in Watts v. State, 593 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1992).
In 1999, capital collateral counsel filed a motion on behalf of Watts to
determine whether he was competent to assist in the capital postconviction process
pursuant to our decision in Carter, 706 So. 2d at 876, which held that in
2  Although on direct appeal Watts raised an issue as to his competency, this
Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Watts
was competent to proceed.  See Watts, 593 So. 2d at 202.
3  The CMHI facility subsequently was moved to Zephyrhills, Florida, and
the trial court authorized that Watts be transferred to the facility's new location.
4  Chapter 916, entitled "Mentally Deficient and Mentally Ill Defendants," sets
forth specific procedures for defendants found incompetent to proceed due to their
mental illness.  To be found mentally incompetent, the defendant must satisfy the
criteria set forth in section 916.12, entitled "Mental competence to proceed," which
provides in pertinent part:
(1) A defendant is incompetent to proceed within the meaning
of this chapter if the defendant does not have sufficient present ability
to consult with her or his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding or if the defendant has no rational, as well as factual,
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considering the issue of competency to proceed in postconviction proceedings,
courts should follow the basic procedures set forth in Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure 3.210 through 3.212.2  The trial court appointed experts to evaluate
Watts' competency, and the experts concluded that Watts was incompetent due to
active psychosis and mental retardation.  Accordingly, on May 4, 1999, the trial 
court entered an order determining that Watts was not competent to proceed and
unable to assist collateral counsel.  In addition, the trial court ordered that Watts be
transferred and committed to CMHI.3  The trial court found that Watts satisfied the
criteria for involuntary hospitalization as set forth in section 916.12, Florida Statutes
(1999),4 and section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1999),5 also known as 
understanding of the proceedings against her or him.
(2) The experts shall first determine whether the person is
mentally ill and, if so, consider the factors related to the issue of
whether the defendant meets the criteria for competence to proceed; 
that is, whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult
with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
whether the defendant has a rational, as well as factual, understanding
of the pending proceedings.
5  Part I of chapter 394, Florida Statutes (1999), entitled "Florida Mental
Health Act," authorizes courts to place individuals in the custody of the Department
of Children and Family Services for involuntary treatment for their mental illness
when the mental illness causes a likelihood of harm if left untreated.  Section
394.467, entitled "Involuntary placement," provides in pertinent part:
(1) Criteria.--A person may be involuntarily placed for treatment
upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) He or she is mentally ill and because of his or her mental
illness:
1. a. He or she has refused voluntary placement for treatment
after sufficient and conscientious explanation and disclosure of the
purpose of placement for treatment;  or
b. He or she is unable to determine for himself or herself
whether placement is necessary;  and
2. a. He or she is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with
the help of willing and responsible family or friends, including available
alternative services, and, without treatment, is likely to suffer from
neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself, and such neglect or
refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his or her
well-being;  or
b. There is substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she
will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person,
as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening
such harm;  and
(b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives which
would offer an opportunity for improvement of his or her condition
-5-
have been judged to be inappropriate.
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"The Baker Act."  The court instructed the administrator of CMHI to advise the
court when Watts was restored to competency or no longer qualified for
involuntary commitment.  The trial court retained jurisdiction over the matter and
further ordered that Watts "shall not be discharged or released from involuntary
hospitalization without further Order of this Court."
On July 19, 1999, DOC filed a motion to terminate the involuntary
hospitalization of Watts and return him to the death row facility at Union
Correctional Institution.  At a subsequent hearing on the motion, DOC stated that
although it was unable to make a determination as to whether Watts was competent
to proceed, physicians at CMHI had reported that Watts was no longer in need of
involuntary hospitalization as he was not a threat to himself or others.  Moreover,
DOC urged the court to send Watts back to death row, arguing that DOC had
absolute discretion in determining where to house inmates in its custody. 
In response, counsel for Watts argued against his return to death row. 
Counsel reminded the trial court that Watts was sent to CMHI to ensure
compliance with the prescribed medication regimen.  In addition, counsel argued
that if DOC was allowed to return Watts to the Union Correctional Institution,
6  The Attorney General has not filed a brief or otherwise taken a position in
this appeal.
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Watts would not receive the proper treatment to restore him to competency.
During this hearing, the trial court also heard argument from the Assistant
Attorney General, who argued in favor of Watts' position that he continue to be
housed and treated at CMHI.  The Assistant Attorney General agreed with Watts'
counsel that death row was "not the setting the doctors are contemplating that
[Watts] can function in" and argued that CMHI was the place to restore him to
competency.6
After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court stated that it could not
change its previous order committing Watts to CMHI "without hearing testimony in
an adversarial proceeding from expert witnesses about [Watts'] competency." 
However, DOC presented no such testimony and the trial court subsequently
denied DOC's motion to terminate the involuntary hospitalization of Watts and to
return him to death row at the Union Correctional Institution. 
On January 3, 2000, DOC filed a motion for an amended order authorizing
that DOC be permitted to transfer Watts to another facility for outpatient treatment. 
On January 7, 2000, the trial court conducted another hearing regarding DOC's
request to transfer Watts back to death row.  Doctor Bruce Welch, a psychiatrist at
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CMHI, testified at the hearing and stated that Watts was diagnosed as suffering
from schizophrenia and paranoia.  Doctor Welch stated that CMHI is the only
mental hospital for inmates within the DOC and that it was designed to treat the
most severe mental health cases and patients that require involuntary medication. 
Doctor Welch opined that Watts did not meet the criteria for treatment at CMHI
and that he did not require treatment in a hospital setting.  Rather, according to Dr.
Welch, Watts was better suited for a transitional care facility, such as the facility at
the Union Correctional Institution.
Moreover, Dr. Welch acknowledged that Watts had a history of not taking
his medication while on death row and Dr. Welch stated that he could not predict
whether Watts would continue to take his medication in a different setting or
facility.  Doctor Welch also acknowledged that Watts recently had refused to take
his medication at CMHI, reported hearing voices, believed one of the security
guards was Jesus, and reported a number of hallucinatory events and delusional
ideas.  However, because in a recent interview with Dr. Welch, Watts had denied
experiencing such phenomena, Dr. Welch concluded that Watts should be
discharged and sent back to death row. 
Although DOC's counsel stated that DOC had no statutory obligation to
restore capital inmates in its custody to competency and that DOC generally treats
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mentally ill inmates to make them "compliant" and "capable of living in a general
prison setting," Dr. Welch testified that Watts was being treated to the best of
DOC's ability and that the current treatment plan "by happenstance . . . would
restore him to competency."  The court thereafter denied DOC's motion and issued
a written order on April 18, 2000, which provided that Watts would continue to
reside and be treated at CMHI "until such a time as the Department of Corrections
can show the Court that the Defendant is voluntarily taking his medication, is stable
and can be returned to UCI."  This appeal followed.
CARTER AND THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Watts contends that reading Carter and the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure together, it is apparent that the trial court had the authority to order that
Watts continue to be treated at CMHI to restore his competency.  DOC, however,
asserts that by issuing an order directing that Watts remain at CMHI, the trial court
violated separation of powers principles because the authority to determine where
to house and treat inmates is an executive decision that only DOC can make.  Thus,
the issue in this case is whether the trial court exceeded its authority in entering the
order directing that Watts remain at CMHI for further treatment.
In Carter, the Court addressed whether a capital inmate was entitled to a
competency determination during postconviction proceedings.  706 So. 2d at 874.
7  In Carter, we asked the Florida Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to
propose rules in accordance with our opinion.  706 So. 2d at 876 n.3.
-10-
We held that 
a judicial determination of competency is required when there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a capital defendant is incompetent
to proceed in postconviction proceedings in which factual matters are
at issue, the development or resolution of which require the
defendant's input.  There can be no question that a capital defendant's
competency is crucial to a proper determination of a collateral claim
when the defendant has information necessary to the development or
resolution of that claim.  Unless a death-row inmate is able to assist
counsel by relaying such information, the right to collateral counsel, as
well as the postconviction proceedings themselves, would be
practically meaningless.
Id. at 875. 
The Court recognized in Carter that no Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
governed competency proceedings during capital collateral proceedings.  See id. at
876.  However, the Court held that "[u]ntil such time as the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure are amended to specifically address competency during capital
collateral proceedings, the rules for raising and determining competency at trial
should be looked to.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210-3.212."  Carter, 706 So. 2d at 876
(footnote omitted).7
Although the Court in Carter provided trial courts with instructions to follow
when a capital defendant is believed to be incompetent for purposes of
8  Rule 3.212(c), entitled "Commitment on Finding of Incompetence,"
provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds the defendant is incompetent to proceed, or that the
defendant is competent to proceed but that the defendant's
competence depends on the continuation of appropriate treatment for
a mental illness or mental retardation, the court shall consider issues
relating to treatment necessary to restore or maintain the defendant's
competence to proceed.
(1) The court may order the defendant to undergo
treatment if the court finds that the defendant is mentally ill or
mentally retarded and is in need of treatment and that treatment
appropriate for the defendant's condition is available.  If the
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postconviction proceedings, the opinion in Carter did not discuss trial courts'
authority to order that incompetent death row inmates be committed to particular
mental health facilities for proper treatment to restore competency.  Nevertheless,
we made it clear that the procedures were adopted "in the hope of ensuring the
consideration of all viable collateral claims a death-row inmate may have, thereby
furthering society's interest in the proper imposition of the death sentence while at
the same time promoting the timely commencement and resolution of
postconviction proceedings."  Id. at 876-77 (emphasis supplied). 
Because at the time of the hearing in this case the rules had not been
amended to specifically address competency during capital collateral proceedings,
the trial court properly looked to rule 3.212(c),8 as we directed in Carter.  See
court finds that the defendant may be treated in the community
on bail or other release conditions, the court may make
acceptance of reasonable medical treatment a condition of
continuing bail or other release conditions.
(2) If the defendant is incarcerated, the court may
order treatment to be administered at the custodial facility
or may order the defendant transferred to another facility
for treatment or may commit the defendant as provided in
subdivision (3).
(3) A defendant may be committed for treatment to
restore a defendant's competence to proceed if the court
finds that:
(A) the defendant meets the criteria for
commitment as set forth by statute;
(B) there is a substantial probability
that the mental illness or mental retardation
causing the defendant's incompetence will
respond to treatment and that the defendant
will regain competency to proceed in the
reasonably foreseeable future;
(C) treatment appropriate for
restoration of the defendant's competence to
proceed is available;  and
(D) no appropriate treatment
alternative less restrictive than that involving
commitment is available.
(Emphasis supplied.)  
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Carter, 706 So. 2d at 876.  Rule 3.212 (c)(2) provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the
defendant is incarcerated, the court may order treatment to be administered at the
custodial facility or may order the defendant transferred to another facility for
treatment."  (Emphasis supplied.)  
9  This Court recently adopted the proposed amendments in Amendments to
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S995 (Fla. Nov. 2,
2000).  The amendments to rule 3.851, entitled "Collateral Relief After Death
Sentence Has Been Imposed and Affirmed on Direct Appeal," became effective on
January 1, 2001.
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During the pendency of this appeal, rule 3.851 was amended in accordance
with our directive in Carter.9  Although not in effect at the time of the proceedings
in this case, rule 3.851(d)(13) now explicitly provides that after the trial court has
found an inmate to be incompetent to proceed, the court must follow the
procedures outlined in rule 3.212(c).  Chapter 916 is the applicable statute that sets
forth the criteria for commitment.  Rule 3.851(d)(13) also provides that if an inmate
requires treatment for his or her incompetency, such treatment, "to the extent
practicable . . . shall take place at a custodial facility under the direct supervision"
of the DOC.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(13). 
ANALYSIS
We acknowledge the general proposition advanced by DOC that ordinarily
the decision as to where to house an inmate is a decision outside of the authority of
the trial court and properly within the authority of DOC.  Cf. Morrison, 727 So. 2d
at 405; Singletary v. Acosta, 659 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).  However,
10  Chapter 944, Florida Statutes (1999), entitled "State Correctional
System," is also known as "The Florida Corrections Code of 1957."  Section
944.17, Florida Statutes (1999), entitled " Commitments and classification;
transfers," provides in pertinent part:
(1) Each prisoner sentenced to the state penitentiary shall be
committed by the court to the custody of the department.
(2) Each prisoner committed to the custody of the department
shall be conveyed to such institution, facility, or program in the
correctional system as the department shall direct, in accordance with
its classification scheme.
. . . .
(7) Pursuant to such regulations as it may provide, the
department may transfer prisoners from one institution to another
institution in the correctional system and classify and reclassify
prisoners as circumstances may require.
(Emphasis supplied.)
11  Chapter 945, Florida Statutes (1999), defines and explains the
responsibilities of the Department of Corrections.  Section 945.43(1), Florida
Statutes (1999), entitled "Admission of inmate to mental health treatment facility,"
provides that "[a]n inmate may be admitted to a mental health treatment facility if he
or she is mentally ill and is in need of care and treatment."  (Emphasis supplied.) 
As defined by section 945.42(8), Florida Statutes (1999), "mentally ill," means 
an impairment of the emotional processes, of the ability to exercise
conscious control of one's actions, or of the ability to perceive reality
or to understand, which impairment substantially interferes with a
person's ability to meet the ordinary demands of living, regardless of
etiology, except that, for the purposes of transfer of an inmate to a
mental health treatment facility, the term does not include retardation or
developmental disability as defined in chapter 393, simple intoxication,
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having reviewed all of the statutes cited by DOC, specifically chapter 94410 and
chapter 945,11 we are convinced that these statutes do not address the 
or conditions manifested only by antisocial behavior or drug
addiction.
The phrase "In need of care and treatment" is defined as follows:  "[A]n inmate has
a mental illness for which inpatient services in a mental health treatment facility are
necessary, which mental illness poses a real and present threat of substantial harm
to the inmate's well-being or to the safety of others."  § 945.42(5), Fla. Stat.
Section 945.43  also provides procedures for the admission of mentally ill
inmates to CMHI:
(2) Admission to a mental health treatment facility.--
(a) An inmate may be admitted to a mental health treatment
facility after notice and hearing, upon the recommendation of the
superintendent of the facility where the inmate is confined and of the
director.  The recommendation shall be entered on a certificate and
must be supported by the expert opinion of a psychiatrist and the
second opinion of a psychiatrist or psychologist.  The certificate shall
be filed with the court in the county where the inmate is located and
shall serve as a petition for a hearing regarding placement.
(b) A copy of the certificate shall also be filed with the
department, and copies shall be served on the inmate and the inmate's
representatives . . . . 
(c) The petition may be filed in the county in which the inmate is
being treated at any time within 6 months of the date of the certificate. 
The hearing shall be held in the same county, and one of the inmate's
physicians at the facility shall appear as a witness at the hearing.  If the
court finds that the inmate is mentally ill and in need of care and
treatment, it shall order that he or she be admitted to a mental health
treatment facility or, if the inmate is at a mental health treatment facility,
that he or she be retained there.  However, the inmate may be
immediately transferred to and admitted at a mental health treatment
facility by executing a waiver of the hearing by express and informed
consent, without awaiting the court order.  The court shall authorize
the mental health treatment facility to retain the inmate for up to 6
months.  If, at the end of that time, continued treatment is necessary,
the superintendent shall apply to the court for an order authorizing
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continued placement. 
12  For example, section 945.45, Florida Statutes (1999), entitled "Procedure
for continued placement of inmates," sets forth the procedures DOC must follow
to continue to treat an inmate in a mental health treatment facility and contemplates
that an administrative law judge will determine whether continuing treatment is
appropriate.  
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unique circumstance of restoring a capital defendant to competency in order to
enable a postconviction motion to proceed.  In fact, by their very terms, these
statutes are inapplicable to the manner in which a trial court would address
continued placement of a capital defendant who has been found incompetent to
proceed with postconviction proceedings.12
In the absence of a contrary statutory directive to DOC and in light of the
affirmative responsibility placed on trial courts and this Court with respect to the
death penalty, we conclude that the trial court in this case acted properly in
following the dictates of the existing rules of criminal procedure and in directing
that Watts remain at CMHI, where he could continue to receive the necessary
treatment aimed at restoring him to competency in order to allow the
postconviction process to proceed. 
As we have acknowledged, "[W]e have a constitutional responsibility to
ensure the death penalty is administered in a fair, consistent and reliable manner, as
well as having an administrative responsibility to work to minimize the delays
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inherent in the postconviction process."  Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 326,
326-27 (Fla. 1999).  Further, as Chief Justice Wells stated in a concurring opinion
in Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 68 (Fla. 2000):
The procedures of postconviction in capital cases must be focused so
that the defendant who should not be on death row is removed from
that condition at as early a time as possible.  That is the legitimate goal
of postconviction proceedings and the abiding reason that we must
continue our efforts in removing unwarranted delay from the
processing of these cases.
The very purpose of Carter was to set forth procedures that would ensure the
"consideration of all viable collateral claims a death-row inmate may have," which in
turn would further "society's interest in the proper imposition of the death sentence
while at the same time promoting the timely commencement and resolution of
postconviction proceedings."  Carter, 706 So. 2d at 876-77.  Yet, in this case, the
postconviction proceedings cannot commence, and most certainly cannot be
resolved, until Watts is restored to competency.
Thus, it is in the interest of not only the defendant, but also the victim's
family, the State, this Court, and society that a capital defendant found to be
incompetent in postconviction proceedings be treated in a manner to restore the
defendant to competency as soon as possible.  As noted above, although the DOC
asserts that the trial court exceeded its authority, the Attorney General on behalf of
13  We distinguish Acosta, 659 So. 2d at 450, which dealt solely with the
issue of treatment and placement of a sentenced defendant in the prison system and
did not address the question of the scope of the trial court's authority with regard
to the issue of restoring a defendant to competency for purposes of postconviction
relief.  We also distinguish Morrison, 727 So. 2d at 405, which addressed a trial
court's placement of a noncapital defendant, who was found to be incompetent to
proceed pretrial, in a specific facility operated by the Department of Children and
Families.  In contrast to this case, Morrison involved circumstances that explicitly
were covered by chapter 916 of Florida Statutes.
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the State has not challenged the propriety of the trial court's order.  In fact, at the
hearing below, the Assistant Attorney General argued that Watts should remain at
CMHI because this facility was the best place to restore him to competency. 
The trial court's order in this case was aimed at restoring the defendant to
competence in a timely and efficient manner so that the court could proceed with
the resolution of the postconviction proceedings.  The trial court's order is in
conformity with the rules of criminal procedure regarding commitment of a
defendant for treatment for restoration of competency and with chapter 916
governing mentally ill defendants.13  We note that in this appeal, DOC does not
challenge the constitutionality of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210 through
3.212 or rule 3.851(d)(13).
This case does not involve an issue as to which mental health hospital Watts
should be transferred.  CMHI is the only mental health hospital available to inmates
within the DOC and CMHI is specifically recognized as a forensic facility under
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section 916.106(8).  The trial court's order contemplated that Watts be returned to
Union Correctional Institution, the facility selected by DOC, once "the Department
of Corrections can show the Court that [Watts] is voluntarily taking his medication,
is stable and can be returned to UCI."  Thus, we hold that the trial court has not
usurped DOC's general authority of where to house inmates.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not act outside of its authority
and, accordingly, we affirm the order under review.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
HARDING, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
HARDING, J., dissenting.
I admit  that the result advocated by the majority, i.e., to “restor[e] the
defendant to competence in a timely and efficient manner so that the court [can]
proceed with the resolution of [his] postconviction proceedings,” majority opinion
at 18, is both compelling and desirable.  However, I must respectfully dissent from
the majority as I find that the route to that result crosses forbidden territory.
Under Florida’s Constitution, “[n]o person belonging to one branch [of
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government] shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided [in the Constitution].”  Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.  “The
separation of powers doctrine is founded on mutual respect of each of the three
branches for the constitutional prerogatives and powers of the other branches.” 
Orr v. Trask, 464 So. 2d 131, 135 (Fla. 1985).  “Judicial intervention in the
decision-making function of the executive branch must be restrained in order to
support the integrity of the administrative process and to allow the executive branch
to carry out its responsibilities as a co-equal branch of government.”  Key Haven
Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 427 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1982).
In light of this separation of powers doctrine, Florida courts have
consistently recognized that “[t]he authority of the criminal court to issue orders
concerning the conditions and treatment of incarcerated inmates ceases when [the
Department of Corrections] receives the inmate into custody.”  Moore v. Peavey,
729 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (finding that court lacked jurisdiction to
compel DOC to allow visitation privileges to an inmate in DOC custody); see also
Singletary v. Duggins, 724 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (same as to sentencing
order prohibiting DOC from cutting inmate’s hair because of his religious beliefs). 
Based upon this rationale, the Third District Court of Appeal quashed a trial court
order requiring DOC to administer particular medical treatment to a confined
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prisoner.  See Moore v. Wilson, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D717 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 
Florida courts have also concluded that trial courts act in derogation of the doctrine
of separation of powers when they order an inmate to be placed in a specific
treatment facility following an involuntary commitment under chapter 916.  See,
e.g., Quiala v. State, 659 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (finding that HRS has
exclusive authority to determine appropriate facility placement over involuntarily
committed defendant); Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Pelz, 609
So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (same).
Because the relevant statutory provisions do not address the circumstances
of an inmate found to be incompetent during postconviction proceedings, the
majority concludes that the court acted properly in directing the treatment of the
inmate.  See majority op. at 16.  However, in light of DOC’s express statutory
authority for the “supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of” adult
offenders, see § 945.025, Fla. Stat. (1999), the case law recognizing  DOC’s
authority over the conditions and treatment of incarcerated inmates, and the
overarching doctrine of separation of powers, I believe that the courts have no
authority to order that an incompetent inmate be placed in a specific treatment
facility.
In the instant case, the psychiatrist at CMHI testified that CMHI is the only
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mental hospital for inmates within the DOC and it was designed to treat the most
severe mental health cases.  Further, the psychiatrist stated it was his professional
opinion that Watts did not meet the criteria for continued treatment at CMHI and
that he did not require treatment in a hospital setting.  See majority op. at 8.
Under amended rule 3.851(d)(13), which now governs incompetence to
proceed in capital collateral proceedings, a finding that a death-sentenced prisoner
is incompetent to proceed gives the court authority to order treatment at a custodial
facility under the direct supervision of DOC, to the extent practicable.  Thus, even
the amended rule does not contemplate the court ordering treatment at a specific
facility.
Just as the courts may not dictate the specific conditions that DOC must
afford incarcerated inmates nor mandate the facility in which they will be housed, 
courts should not specify where an incompetent prisoner will be treated.  Not only
is this a decision best left to DOC, I believe that the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers requires it.
The mental health of a defendant sentenced to death is of concern to the
courts under rule 3.851(d), which requires the defendant to be able to assist
counsel in the development or resolution of factual matters at issue in
postconviction proceedings, and under rule 3.811, which prohibits execution of an
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insane person.  When the Governor is informed that a person under sentence of
death may be insane, the Governor is statutorily required to conduct certain
proceedings.  See § 922.07, Fla. Stat. (2000).  If the Governor determines that a
death-sentenced person is insane then “the Governor shall have the convicted
person committed to a Department of Corrections mental health treatment facility.” 
Id. § 922.07(3) (emphasis added).  Moreover, the statute requires that the person
“be kept there until the facility administrator determines that he or she has been
restored to sanity.”  Id. § 922.07(4).
Thus, it is the responsibility of the executive branch to provide treatment
where needed to allow the judicial process to proceed.  If the executive branch fails
in this regard and the defendant remains incompetent, then the judicial process will
come to a standstill.  The executive branch bears the responsibility for any failure to
adequately treat the defendant.  I see no compelling reason to cross the separation
of powers boundaries to “speed up” the process.
However, because this is an issue which concerns more than one branch of
government, I believe the better course is to call upon the Legislature and Governor
to resolve this matter so that such cases can be resolved in a fair and timely
manner.
-24-
An Interlocutory Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
L. Page Haddock, Judge - Case No. 88-11505-CF
Susan Schwartz, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, Andrew Thomas, Chief Assistant
CCRC, William J. Edwards, Staff Attorney, and John A. Tomasino, Assistant CCC,
Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Northern Region, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Appellee