Title: Hanson v. PSRB
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46302
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2001

Filed: March 1, 2001  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

ROBERT W. HANSON,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD,
	Respondent on Review.
(Agency No. 95-1356; CA A91909; SC S46302)

	Argued and submitted March 3, 2000.
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Harris S. Matarazzo, Portland, filed the brief and argued
the cause for petitioner on review.
	Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the brief and argued the cause for respondent on review.  With
her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, and
Leeson, Justices.**
	CARSON, C.J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the Psychiatric Security Review Board is vacated, and the case
is remanded to the Board for further proceedings.
	*Judicial review from Psychiatric Security Review Board. 156 Or App 198, 965 P2d 1051 (1998).
    **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Kulongoski, Riggs, and
De Muniz, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case. 
	CARSON, C.J.
	This is a proceeding for judicial review of an order of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB), denying
petitioner's request for discharge.  The PSRB concluded that
petitioner, who was diagnosed as suffering from alcohol abuse,
was affected by a mental disease or defect under OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987) (set out below).  Based upon that
conclusion, the PSRB ordered that petitioner remain under the
PSRB's jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Hanson v.
PSRB, 156 Or App 198, 965 P2d 1051 (1998).  We reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the PSRB's order, and
remand the case to the PSRB.
	Petitioner's confinement with the PSRB stemmed from an
incident in September 1994, in which petitioner, without warning
or provocation, stabbed a man in the chest with a knife. 
Petitioner was charged with attempted murder and first-degree
assault.  Following a bench trial in December 1994, the trial
court entered an order on January 31, 1995, finding petitioner
guilty except for insanity of all charges.  In reaching its
decision, the court reviewed the police report and petitioner's
psychiatric records, which indicated that petitioner had been
suffering from an alcohol-induced delusion that the man who he
had stabbed had intended to kill him.  Based upon those reports,
the court found that petitioner suffered from a mental disease or
defect when he had engaged in his criminal conduct and that he
presented a substantial danger to others.  Consequently, the
court placed petitioner under the PSRB's jurisdiction, and the
PSRB had petitioner admitted to the Oregon State Hospital (OSH).
	In 1995, petitioner requested a discharge under ORS
161.341(4), (1) upon the ground that he no longer suffered from a
mental disease or defect.  The PSRB held a hearing in December
1995 to consider petitioner's request.  At that hearing, Dr.
Russell, a physician at OSH, testified that petitioner was
suffering from the Axis I (2) disorders "alcohol abuse" and
"alcohol-induced psychotic disorder, with delusions, resolved." 
	The PSRB denied petitioner's request, finding, among
other things, that:
		"2.  [Petitioner] is affected by a mental disease
or defect as demonstrated by the underlying facts shown
by the evidence, including the expert testimony of
Frank Russell, M.D., at the hearing, to the effect that
[petitioner] suffers from the Axis I diagnosis of
alcohol abuse and alcohol-induced psychotic disorder
with delusions, resolved.  He testified that the Axis I
diagnosis of alcohol abuse can substantially impair at
least one important area of [petitioner's] functioning. 
Although Dr. Russell stated that, in his opinion and
that of other members of the treatment team, this does
not constitute a mental disease or defect, the Board
finds that under its administrative rules, OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6), [petitioner] does suffer from a mental
disease or defect.  This finding is further supported
by the information contained in Exhibits 7, 8, 12 and
18.
		"3.  [Petitioner], without adequate supervision
and treatment, would continue to present a substantial
danger to others as demonstrated by the underlying
facts shown by the evidence, including the
circumstances surrounding the crimes for which he was
placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board[.]"
(Emphasis added.)
	Based upon those findings, the PSRB concluded that:
		"1. [Petitioner], being affected by a mental
disease or defect which, when active, renders him a 
substantial danger to others, is under the jurisdiction
of the Psychiatric Security Review Board.
		"2. [Petitioner] is a proper subject for
conditional release; however, the supervision and
treatment necessary are not currently available in the
community.  Therefore, it would not be in the best
interest of justice and the protection of society to
release him at this time."
	Petitioner sought judicial review of the PSRB's order
and, as noted above, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  We allowed
review to determine whether the PSRB erred in concluding that
petitioner's alcohol abuse diagnosis constituted a mental disease
or defect under OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987).
	The legislature has not defined the phrase "mental
disease or defect" directly, other than to exclude from that
phrase the following abnormalities:
	"* * * an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct * * * [and]
any abnormality constituting solely a personality
disorder."
ORS 161.295(2).  In 1985, pursuant to ORS 161.387(1), the PSRB
adopted rules in which it incorporated the foregoing statutory
exclusions, OAR 859-10-005(4) (1987), (3) and defined the terms
"mental disease" and "mental defect," OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6)
(1987).  Before a 1995 amendment, those rules, upon which the
PSRB based its order in this case, defined those terms as
follows: (4)
		"(5) * * * Mental disease is defined as any
diagnosis of mental disorder which is a significant
behavorial [sic] or psychological syndrome or pattern
that is associated with distress or disability causing
symptoms or impairment in at least one important area
of an individual's functioning and is defined in the
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric
Association.
		"(6) * * *  Mental defect is defined as mental
retardation, brain damage or other biological
dysfunction that is associated with distress or
disability casuing [sic] symptoms or impairment in at
least one important area of an individual's functioning
and is defined in the current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American
Psychiatric Association." 
OAR 859-10-005 (1987) (emphasis added).  
	Petitioner asks this court to vacate the PSRB's order. 
As explained below, we conclude that the PSRB's order should be
vacated because the order fails to comply with this court's prior
holdings with respect to OAR 859-10-005 (1987).
	In Osborn v. PSRB, 325 Or 135, 147, 934 P2d 391 (1997),
this court held that the PSRB may enact administrative rules that
define the terms "mental disease" or "mental defect," in part, by
referring to the DSM.  However, in Osborn, this court also held
that the "current" DSM, which is incorporated by reference in the
definitions of "mental disease" and "mental defect" in OAR
859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987), means the DSM-III, because that was
the edition that was in effect at the time when the PSRB adopted
the rule.  325 Or at 147.  Because the PSRB in Osborn had used a
version different from the DSM-III, this court vacated the order
at issue upon the ground that the PSRB lacked substantial
evidence to support its conclusion that the petitioner's
diagnosis constituted a mental disease or defect under OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987).  Id. at 150; see also Rios v. PSRB, 325
Or 151, 934 P2d 399 (1997) (same result in similar
circumstances).
	As in Osborn and Rios, the PSRB in this proceeding used
a version of the DSM other than the DSM-III to conclude that
petitioner suffered from a mental disease or defect under OAR
859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987).  The PSRB relied upon Russell's
testimony to identify petitioner's diagnosis and to conclude that
alcohol abuse is a mental disease or defect under OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987).  The PSRB also relied upon Exhibits 12 and
18, presented in the proceeding below, to support its conclusion. 
Although Russell did not testify about which version of the DSM
he had used to diagnose petitioner, Exhibits 12 and 18, which
were copies of different progress note updates that Russell had
signed, indicate that Russell relied upon the DSM-IV, not the DSM
III, to make his diagnosis. (5)  Because OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6)
(1987) required the application of the DSM-III, and because we do
not know if that version would have made a difference in
petitioner's case, we vacate the PSRB's order and remand for
further proceedings.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the Psychiatric Security Review Board is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the Board for further proceedings.



1. 	ORS 161.341 provides, in part:
		"(4) Any person who has been committed to a state
hospital designated by the Mental Health and
Developmental Disability Services Division for custody,
care and treatment or another person acting on the
person's behalf may apply to the board for an order of
discharge or conditional release upon the grounds:
		"(a) That the person is no longer affected by
mental disease or defect;
		"(b) If so affected, that the person no longer
presents a substantial danger to others; or
		"(c) That the person continues to be affected by a
mental disease or defect and would continue to be a
danger to others without treatment, but that the person
can be adequately controlled and given proper care and
treatment if placed on conditional release."

2. 	"Axis I" refers to the classification system of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).  The
DSM is a reference work compiled by the American Psychiatric
Association that categorizes mental disorders.  The DSM uses a
multiaxial system for classifying mental disorders.  The DSM has
undergone various revisions since its first edition.  As
explained later in this opinion, Russell consulted the DSM-IV in
making his diagnosis.  Under the DSM-IV, Axis I is reserved for
all disorders except for "Personality Disorders and Mental
Retardation (which are reported on Axis II)."  DSM-IV at 25.  See
generally Mueller v. PSRB, 325 Or 332, 339-40, 937 P2d 1028
(1997) (describing DSM and its relevance to PSRB proceedings).   

3. 	OAR 859-10-005(4) (1987) provided, in part:
		"(b) For offenses committed on or after January 1,
1984, the term 'mental disease or defect' does not
include any abnormality constituting solely a
personality disorder."  

4. 	Although the PSRB issued its order in this case after
the 1995 amendment, we conclude that the PSRB applied OAR 859-10-005 (1987), because the 1995 amendment renumbered the provisions
defining "mental disease" and "mental defect" as OAR
859-10-005(4) and (5).  Had the PSRB applied the most current
version, OAR 859-10-005 (1995), its order would have cited OAR
859-10-005(4) and (5), not OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6).

5. 	We note that the 1995 amendments to OAR 859-10-005
designate the DSM-IV as the pertinent reference for classifying
"mental diseases" and "mental defects."