Title: STATE v BAILEY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-100
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1982

N o . 82-100 I N THE SUPREPIE COURT O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1982 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , GORDON A. BAILEY, Defendant and Respondent. AL3peal from: District Court o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and. f o r t h e County o f Missoula, The Honorable James B. Wheelis and The Honorable John S. IJenson, Judges p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: F o r A p p e l l a n t : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y General, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County A t t o r n e y , Missoula, Montana F o r Resgondent: Fred R. Van Valkenburg; Smith, Connor & Van Valkenburg, Missoula, I~Iontana Submitted on B r i e f s : September 2 3 , 1982 Decided: December 1 6 , 1982 F i l e d : DEC 1 6 ?SB2 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s case comes b e f o r e t h i s Court on a p p e a l from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Missoula County. The D i s t r i c t Court d i s m i s s d t h e charge of attempted sale of dangerous d r u g s , a f e l o n y , on t h e grounds t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s denied h i s r i g h t to speedy t r i a l . The d e f e n d a n t , B a i l e y , w a s a r r e s t e d and charged w i t h t h e f e l o n y o f f e n s e of attempted s a l e of dangerous d r u g s on February 1 8 , 1981. H e waived p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g . On March 3 1 a n i n f o r - mation was f i l e d . The d e f e n d a n t appeared i n D i s t r i c t Court on A p r i l 2 2 , 1981, and moved t o d i s m i s s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e grounds t h a t it was f i l e d f i v e days beyond t h e t h i r t y day t i m e l i m i t s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 46-11-203, MCA. T h a t i n f o r m a t i o n was d i s m i s s e d p u r s u a n t to t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion on May 26. A f t e r t h a t d i s m i s s a l and i n a p p a r e n t r e l i a n c e on t h e District C o u r t ' s o r d e r , t h e d e f e n d a n t moved t o I n d i a n a and o b t a i n e d employment. A f t e r t h e d i s m i s s a l , t h e S t a t e submitted a motion to t h e District Court r e q u e s t i n g t h a t it be allowed to renew its o r i g i - n a l motion f o r l e a v e to f i l e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s motion was d e n i e d on J u l y 22 and on J u l y 23, 1981, t h e S t a t e moved t h e D i s t r i c t Court to r e c o n s i d e r t h e motion f o r renewal. T h a t motion was also denied on August 12. On t h e same day t h e motion to r e c o n s i d e r w a s d e n i e d , t h e S t a t e f i l e d a new i n f o r m a t i o n a l l e g i n g a t t e m p t e d sale of dangerous d r u g s , a f e l o n y . T h i s was done p u r s u a n t to t h e s u g g e s t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n its o r d e r denying t h e motion. On t h a t day t h e d a t e of t h e i n i t i a l appearance was s e t f o r September 14. T h i s was done p u r s u a n t to an agreement between t h e S t a t e and t h e d e f e n d a n t , to allow him to avoid e x t r a d i t i o n to Montana. The i n i t i a l appearance and a r r a i g n m e n t w a s held on September 14. A t t h a t t i m e t h e t r i a l d a t e was set f o r September 21, b u t was postponed on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t u n t i l February 1982. On J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1982, t h e d e f e n d a n t moved to d i s m i s s t h e c h a r g e on t h e ground t h a t he was denied h i s r i g h t to speedy t r i a l . T h i s motion was g r a n t e d on February 2. I n its o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e c h a r g e , t h e District Court noted t h a t t h e t i m e between t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e f i r s t i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e f i l i n g of t h e second s h o u l d be charged a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e , because i n r e a l i t y t h i s is b u t one cause of a c t i o n c o n t i n u o u s l y pursued by t h e S t a t e . Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d when it included t h e t i m e between t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e f i r s t i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e f i l i n g of t h e second i n its c a l c u l a t i o n of t i m e t o s e e i f speedy t r i a l had been d e n i e d ? 2. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d when it determined t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s denied a speedy t r i a l ? I n t h e case a t hand, t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t i m e between d i s m i s s a l of t h e f i r s t i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e f i l i n g of t h e second s h o u l d n o t be included i n t h e computation of t i m e f o r a speedy t r i a l , and t h a t t h e speedy t r i a l c l o c k b e g i n s to run anew upon t h e f i l i n g of t h e second i n f o r m a t i o n . Based on t h a t , they also contend t h a t l o o k i n g a t a l l t h e f a c t o r s enumerated under Barker v. Wingo ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407 U.S. 514, 3 3 L.Ed.2d 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182, t h e r e is no d e n i a l of a speedy trial h e r e . I n s u p p o r t of its p o s i t i o n , t h e S t a t e p r i n c i p a l l y relies on f o u r cases, S t a t e v. Sanders ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d 372; S t a t e v. F i f e ( 1 9 8 1 ) r 632 P.2d 712, 38 St.Rep. 1334; Arnold v. McCarthy ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 566 F.2d 1377; a n d , United S t a t e s v. McDonald ( 1 9 8 2 ) f -- - U.S. -. - , 7 1 L.Ed.2d 696, 1 0 2 S.Ct. 1497. A s t o t h e f i r s t two d e c i s i o n s , - Sanders - - - - - . - - and -- F i f e , -- they h e l d t h a t when a cause is r e v e r s e d and re-anded f o r r e t r i a l , t h e s p e e d y t r i a l c l o c k begins anew on t h e d a t e of the r e m i t t i t u r and c o n t i n u e s u n t i l t r i a l . W e do not b e l i e v e t h a t the r u l e set o u t i n S a n d e r s and F i f e -- is a p p l i c a b l e to t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n . Both t h o s e cases d e a l w i t h post-appeal s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e defen- d a n t h a s a l r e a d y been t r i e d b u t r e v e r s a l is r e q u i r e d due t o some i m p r o p r i e t y i n t h e proceed ing . B u t , t h i s is n o t t h e s i t u a t i o n i n M r . B a i l e y ' s c a s e . It w a s through an e r r o r i n f i l i n g t h e i n i t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t it was d i s m i s s e d . Although no formal c h a r g e s were p n d i n g d u r i n g t h e i n t e r i m between t h e t w o i n f o r m a t i o n s , B a i l e y s t i l l seemed to t e c h n i c a l l y be a n accused. During t h a t i n t e r i m , t h e deputy c o u n t y a t t o r n e y attempted to c o n t i n u e h i s p r o s e c u t i o n . He t r i e d twice t o have t h e in£ ormat i o n r e i n s t a t e d , through mot i o n s . These a t t e m p t s were opposed by t h e d e f e n d a n t through h i s c o u n s e l . The District C o u r t , i n its o r d e r denying t h e motion t o r e c o n s i d e r , had t o p o i n t o u t t o t h e county a t t o r n e y how t o proceed. Only t h e n was t h e p r o p e r documentation to r e f i l e t h e charge submitted t o t h e c o u r t . Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , B a i l e y is s t i l l a n accused as h i s l i b e r t y is r e s t r a i n e d , because of t h e u n c e r t a i n t y as to whether h i s p r e s e n c e w i l l be r e q u i r e d , t h a t t h e s e e f f o r t s to p r o s e c u t e cause i n h i s normal l i f e , and he is s u b j e c t to p u b l i c a c c u s a t i o n as t h e s e a t t e m p t s were r e p e a t e d l y made i n open c o u r t . T h i s p l a c e s him i n a comparable s i t u a t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t who h a s been a r r e s t e d t h u s p u t t i n g him i n t h e c a t e g o r y of a c c u s e d . United S t a t e s v. Marion ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 404 U.S. 307, 321, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455. Being an accused is a l l t h a t is r e q u i r e d f o r t h e r i g h t to speedy t r i a l to a t t a c h . S t a t e v. Larson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 623 P.2d 954, 957. The Arnold case r e l i e d on by t h e S t a t e is f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e case a t hand. D e s p i t e it d e a l i n g w i t h a p e r i o d between t h e d i s m i s s a l of a charge a f t e r a mistrial and t h e s u b s e q u e n t r e f i l i n g of t h a t c h a r g e , t h e p r o s e c u t o r i n t h a t c a s e d i d n o t make a t t e m p t s t o c o n t i n u e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e i n t e r i m be- tween t h e f i r s t and second c h a r g i n g . T h i s cannot be s a i d of t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y i n B a i l e y ' s c a s e though. A s pointed o u t above, h e t r i e d to c o n t i n u e t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , between the d i s m i s s a l of t h e f i r s t and the f i l i n g of t h e second c h a r g e . A l s o , as p o i n t e d o u t above, t h i s continued a t t e m p t t o p r o s e c u t e placed B a i l e y i n a p o s i t i o n similar t o t h a t of one who had been a r r e s t e d t h u s making him an accused. The S t a t e a l s o relies on t h e r e c e n t p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n United S t a t e s v. McDonald, s u p r a . I n t h a t c a s e a c a p t a i n s t a t i o n e d a t F o r t Bragg, North C a r o l i n a , was f o r m a l l y charged w i t h t h e murder of h i s wife and c h i l d r e n . Those c h a r g e s were dismissed and he was honorably d i s c h a r g e d . B u t , a t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e J u s t i c e Department, t h e A m y ' s C r i m i n a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n D i v i s i o n ( C I D ) continued its i n v e s t i g a - t i o n . A l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n gathered was forwarded t o t h e J u s t i c e Department. The in£ ormation w a s u l t i m a t e l y p r e s e n t e d to a grand j u r y which i n d i c t e d McDonald f o r t h e murders. However, t h e McDonald c a s e is also d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e one p r e s e n t l y b e f o r e u s . D e s p i t e McDonald being aware of t h e ongoing i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t took p l a c e d u r i n g t h e s e v e r a l y e a r s between t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e army c h a r g e s and h i s subsequent i n d i c t m e n t by t h e grand j u r y , it cannot be s a i d t h a t he was tech- n i c a l l y an accused. But, t h i s is not t h e c a s e w i t h Bailey. D e s p i t e no formal c h a r g e s pending, it is c l e a r from t h e record he is an accused, because a s pointed o u t above, i n o u r d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e o t h e r c a s e s t h e S t a t e relies on, he is i n a s i m i l a r posi- t i o n to an a r r e s t e d person due t o t h e S t a t e ' s continued e f f o r t s to charge him d u r i n g t h e i n t e r i m between t h e f i r s t and second i n f o r m a t i o n . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t under t h e s e f a c t s t h a t B a i l e y meets t h e t h r e s h o l d requirement of being an accused, t h u s , t h e r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l a t t a c h e s . The S t a t e contends t h a t i n applying t h e ad hoc t e s t , which is mandated by Barker v. Wingo, s u p r a , to d e t e r m i n e i f a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to speedy t r i a l has been denied t h a t t h e c l o c k should begin t o r u n anew on t h e f i l i n g of t h e second i n f o r m a t i o n . But, a s set o u t above, t h i s is not t h e c a s e , because B a i l e y was an accused from t h e t i m e of h i s i n i t i a l a r r e s t , due to t h e proceedings t h a t t o o k p l a c e i n t h e i n t e r i m between t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e f i r s t i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e f i l i n g of t h e second and t h e e f f e c t of t h o s e proceed i n g s on him. T h e r e f o r e , a l l t h a t remains to be done is t o a p p l y t h e Barker - -- ad hoc b a l a n c i n g test t o B a i l e y ' s case. T h i s Court h a s s e t o u t how t h i s test is to be a p p l i e d i n S t a t e v. Larson, s u p r a , where it s t a t e d : "Four f a c t o r s to be c o n s i d e r e d under t h e ana- l y s i s a r e : (1) l e n g t h of d e l a y ; ( 2 ) r e a s o n f o r d e l a y ; ( 3 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t ; and ( 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . B a r k e r , - 407 U.S. a t 530, 92 S.Ct. a t 2191. I t must be remembered, however, none of t h e f o u r f a c t o r s is recognized as e i t h e r a n e c e s s a r y or s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n t o a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l h a s been d e p r i v e d . R a t h e r , t h e y are r e l a t e d f a c t o r s and must be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r w i t h such o t h e r cir- cumstances as may be r e l e v a n t . The Court must still engage i n a d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s . See B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 533, 92 S.Ct. a t 2193." 625-Fr2d a t 957. Length of d e l a y is t h e f i r s t f a c t o r to be looked a t under t h e t e s t . T h i s is t h e t r i g g e r i n g mechanism, S t a t e v. F i f e , 632 P.2d a t 715, and u n l e s s t h e r e is a p e r i o d of d e l a y long enough t o be p r e s u m p t i v e l y p r e j u d i c i a l , no f u r t h e r i n q u i r y is r e q u i r e d ; S t a t e v . Armstrong ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 616 P.2d 341, 351, 37 St.Rep. 1563. B a i l e y claims a d e l a y of 216 d a y s i n t h i s c a s e . However, i n o u r view, o n l y 186 d a y s , t h e p e r i o d from h i s i n i t i a l arrest u n t i l t h e f i l i n g of t h e second i n f o r m a t i o n , should be used to d e t e r m i n e if t h e d e l a y is p r e s u m p t i v e l y p r e j u d i c i a l . The remaining t i m e is due t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s need f o r time to p u t h i s a f f a i r s i n I n d i a n a i n o r d e r p r i o r to r e t u r n i n g to Montana to f a c e t h e d r u g c h a r g e s and a r e q u e s t f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e g r a n t e d to him. The 186 d a y s i n t h i s c a s e is s u f f i c i e n t to t r i g g e r t h e i n q u i r y to see i f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to speedy t r i a l w a s d e n i e d . The l e n g t h of t h e d e l a y n e c e s s a r y to provoke such an i n q u i r y is dependent on t h e p e c u l i a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e case and a lesser d e l a y w i l l be t o l e r a t e d f o r s i m p l y street crimes, as w e have h e r e , than f o r complex ones; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. a t NOW w e must look a t t h e second f a c t o r under t h e t e s t set o u t by B a r k e r , t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y . It is clear from t h e f a c t s t h a t t h e c a u s e of t h i s d e l a y was t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y ' s error i n f i l i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , t h e e n t i r e 186 d a y s from B a i l e y ' s arrest u n t i l t h e second i n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d is a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e S t a t e . The t h i r d f a c t o r to be c o n s i d e r e d is t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s asser- t i o n of h i s r i g h t . The S t a t e , when d i s c u s s i n g t h i s f a c t o r , u r g e s t h i s Court t o adopt t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t B a i l e y ' s a s s e r t i o n was suf- f i c i e n t t o r a i s e i n q u i r y as to whether t h e r i g h t w a s d e n i e d , b u t is i n s u f f i c i e n t to s u s t a i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s claim on its merits because t h e r i g h t was n o t a s s e r t e d o f t e n enough. However, t h i s is n o t t h e case, because a s long a s t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l p r i o r to t r i a l , he h a s m e t t h e t h i r d f a c t o r i n t h i s test; S t a t e v. Steward (1975)r 1 6 3 Mont. 385, 5 4 3 P.2d 178, 182; S t a t e v. Larson, 623 P.2d a t 958. The S t a t e , when d i s c u s s i n g t h e a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t , also claims t h a t B a i l e y d i d n o t want a speedy t r i a l because he exer- c i s e d h i s r i g h t t o have t h e i n f o r m a t i o n d i s m i s s e d and r e s i s t e d its r e i n s t a t e m e n t a f t e r t h e S t a t e f a i l e d to comply w i t h s e c t i o n 46-11-203, MCA. T h i s p o s i t i o n is u n t e n a b l e . W e cannot p e n a l i z e t h e d e f e n d a n t f o r e x e r c i s i n g h i s s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s o r f o r t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s m i s t a k e . To do s o would be to d e p r i v e him of due p r o c e s s of l a w which is guaranteed under Article 11, S e c t i o n 7 o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . N e i t h e r can we f o r c e him t o chose one r i g h t o v e r a n o t h e r , t h i s was made clear by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Simmons v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 390 U.S. 377, 1 9 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967, where it addressed a similar i s s u e and s t a t e d : ". . . w e f i n d it i n t o l e r a b l e t h a t one c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l r i g h t should have to be s u r r e n d e r e d to a s s e r t a n o t h e r . " Because t h i s a n a l y s i s seems to a p p l y w i t h e q u a l s t r e n g t h n o t o n l y t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s b u t t o a l l r i g h t s , B a i l e y should n o t and c a n n o t be f o r c e d to chose between h i s s t a t u t o r y r i g h t under sec- t i o n 46-11-203, MCA, and h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l . The f o u r t h f a c t o r to be c o n s i d e r e d under t h e Barker a n a l y s i s is t h a t of p r e j u d i c e : " P r e j u d i c e i n a speedy t r i a l c o n t e x t is to be a s s e s s e d i n l i g h t of the i n t e r e s t s of defen- d a n t s which t h e speedy t r i a l r i g h t w a s d e s i g n e d to p r o t e c t . I n t h i s r e g a r d , d e f e n d a n t s ' i n t e r e s t s have been i d e n t i f i e d as : ' ( i ) to p r e v e n t o p p r e s s i v e p r e tr i a1 i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; ( ii) to minimize a n x i e t y and, c o n c e r n of t h e accused; and (iii) to l i m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e d e f e n s e w i l l be impaired. ' Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. a t 532, 92 S.Ct. a t 2192." S t a t e v. Larson, 623 P.2d a t 658-659. I n a d d r e s s i n g t h i s f a c t o r , t h e S t a t e a s s e r t s t h a t no p r e j u - d i c e whatsoever e x i s t s . However, t h e d e f e n d a n t claims p r e j u d i c e due to t h e f a c t t h a t he was r e q u i r e d to g i v e up h i s job i n I n d i a n a and r e t u r n to Montana t o defend t h e c h a r g e s . Economic h a r d s h i p h a s been recognized as one form of p r e j u d i c e t h a t can f l o w from t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t ' s speedy t r i a l r i g h t ; S t a t e v. Harvey ( 1 9 7 9 ) r 603 P.2d 661, 668, 36 St.Rep 2035; United S t a t e s v. Marion, 404 U.S. a t 320. Here, t h e county a t t o r n e y claims t h a t any economic loss is not p r e j u d i c e caused by t h e S t a t e ' s c o n d u c t , as it was t h e r e s u l t of B a i l e y ' s ignorance of t h e l a w and n o t a s a r e s u l t of t h e S t a t e ' s p r o s e c u t i o n of t h i s o f f e n s e . W e d i s a g r e e . The economic h a r d s h i p t h e d e f e n d a n t suf- f e r e d is a d i r e c t r e s u l t of error i n t h e h a n d l i n g of t h i s case by t h e S t a t e . The d e f e n d a n t ' s loss would have n e v e r o c c u r r e d i f t h e f i l i n g of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n would have been handled p r o p e r l y i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . The l e n g t h of d e l a y i n t h i s c a s e s h i f t e d t h e burden t o t h e S t a t e to e x p l a i n t h e r e a s o n s f o r it and to show t h e absence of p r e j u d i c e to t h e d e f e n d a n t ; S t a t e v. F i f e , 632 P.2d a t 715. It d i d n e i t h e r a d e q u a t e l y , as it is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s own a c t i o n s caused t h e d e l a y and as shown above t h e r e w a s p r e j u d i c e . These c o n s i d e r e d a l o n g w i t h t h e o t h e r r e l e v a n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s such a s t h e l e n g t h of d e l a y and t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t u s as an a c c u s e d , d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d of d e l a y a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e S t a t e , sup- p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s denied h i s r i g h t to speedy t r i a l . W e t h e r e f ore af f i r m . Justice - 8 - * ' 8' I,Ve concur: & d o 4 C h i e f Justice