Title: Shotts, etc. v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-1774
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1774 
____________ 
 
GAYLE SHOTTS, etc., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
OP WINTER HAVEN, INC., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
 
[November 23, 2011] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
Gayle Shotts, personal representative of the estate of Edward Henry Clark, 
seeks review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Shotts v. OP 
Winter Haven, Inc., 988 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), on the grounds that it 
expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another Florida district court of 
appeal on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § (b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
Edward Clark was involved in an automobile accident in 1977, and he 
sustained brain damage.  For many years, Clark's care was provided by his niece, 
Gayle Shotts, in her home.  Eventually, Clark was admitted to OP Winter Haven, 
 
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Inc.,1 a nursing home in Florida.  He remained there until his death in 2003, at 
which time Shotts, as his personal representative, filed a complaint against OP 
Winter Haven alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duties.  OP Winter 
Haven moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Shotts had signed on 
Clark‟s admission.  The agreement contained the following “limitations of 
remedies” provisions: (i) the arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the 
American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) rules; and (ii) the arbitrators will 
have no authority to award punitive damages.  The agreement also stated that its 
terms were severable.  At the hearing on the motion to compel, Shotts argued that 
the agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and violated 
public policy.  The trial court granted the motion, and the district court affirmed.  
Shotts sought discretionary review, which we granted. 
 
Shotts raises several issues, including the following: (1) whether the court or 
the arbitrator must decide whether the arbitration agreement violates public policy; 
(2) whether the limitations of remedies provisions violate public policy; and (3) 
whether the limitations of remedies provisions are severable.  OP Winter Haven, in 
                                          
 
 
1.  The respondents here include the following entities: OP Winter Haven, 
Inc.; RE Winter Haven, Inc.; Tandem Regional Management of Florida, Inc.; 
Tandem Health Care, Inc.; Gail Ward a/k/a Gail Lurie Ward; Nancy C. Thompson; 
Michael Bradley; and Irena Blackburn a/k/a Irena Tarran Blackburn (as to Tandem 
Health Care of Winter Haven).  In this opinion, the respondents are referred to 
collectively as OP Winter Haven, Inc., or OP Winter Haven.  
 
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counterpoint, contends that the United States Supreme Court‟s recent decision in 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), is applicable here 
and entitles OP Winter Haven to relief on its motion to compel.  
 
First, as explained more fully below, we hold that the district court below 
erred in failing to rule that the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the 
arbitration agreement violates public policy.  This Court in Seifert v. U.S. Home 
Corp., 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999), held that it was for the court, not the arbitrator, 
to determine “whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists.”  Id. at 636.  
Later, this Court in Global Travel Marketing, Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 
2005), explained the meaning of the term “valid” in this context: “No valid 
agreement exists if the arbitration clause is unenforceable on public policy 
grounds.”  Id. at 398.  Thus, it is for the court, not the arbitrator, to determine 
whether an arbitration agreement “is unenforceable on public policy grounds.” 
 
Second, we hold that the district court below erred in failing to rule that the 
limitations of remedies provisions in this case violate public policy, for they 
directly undermine specific statutory remedies created by the Legislature.  See 
§§ 400.022, 400.023, Fla. Stat. (2003).  In light of the recognized need for these 
remedies and the salutary purpose they serve, we conclude that any arbitration 
agreement that substantially diminishes or circumvents these remedies stands in 
violation of the public policy of the State of Florida and is unenforceable.  This 
 
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conclusion comports with the vast weight of authority in Florida, as explained 
below.  
 
Third, we hold that the district court below erred in ruling that the 
limitations of remedies provision that calls for imposition of the AHLA rules is 
severable.  Although the agreement in this case contains a severability clause, the 
AHLA provision goes to the very essence of the agreement.  If the provision were 
to be severed, the trial court would be forced to rewrite the agreement and to add 
an entirely new set of procedural rules and burdens and standards, a job that the 
trial court is not tasked to do.  See Local No. 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 
So. 2d 818, 821-22 (Fla. 1953).  Further, if the provision were to be severed, the 
trial court would be hard pressed to conclude with reasonable certainty that, with 
the illegal provision gone, “there still remains of the contract valid legal promises 
on one side which are wholly supported by valid legal promises on the other” id.—
particularly, when those legal promises are viewed through the eyes of the 
contracting parties.  See generally id. at 822.  
 
And finally, we conclude that the United States Supreme Court‟s recent 
decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), is 
inapplicable here.  Approximately two weeks after this Court heard oral argument 
in the present case, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Jackson, 
in which that Court addressed the issue of whether the court or the arbitrator must 
 
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determine whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable (Jackson claimed 
that the agreement was unconscionable because it required the splitting of 
arbitration fees) where the agreement contained a provision, known as a delegation 
provision, in which the parties specifically agreed to arbitrate the enforceability of 
the arbitration agreement.  The United States Supreme Court held that, where there 
has been no specific challenge to the delegation provision, the arbitrator, not the 
court, must decide the issue.  In the present case, because the arbitration agreement 
contains no delegation provision, Jackson is inapplicable.        
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The relevant facts of this case are set forth in the district court decision 
under review: 
 
Gayle Shotts, as personal representative of the estate of her 
uncle, Edward Henry Clark, appeals the nonfinal order granting the 
motion to compel binding arbitration filed by the defendants below: 
OP Winter Haven, Inc.; RE Winter Haven, Inc.; Tandem Regional 
Management of Florida, Inc.; Tandem Health Care, Inc.; Gail Ward 
a/k/a Gail Lurie Ward; Nancy C. Thompson; Michael Bradley; and 
Irena Blackburn a/k/a Irena Tarran Blackburn (as to Tandem Health 
Care Of Winter Haven) (hereinafter collectively “Tandem”). . . . 
 
In 1977, Mr. Clark was involved in an automobile accident, 
and he sustained brain damage.  He required twenty-four-hour-a-day 
care.  For many years, Mr. Clark's care was provided by his niece, 
Ms. Shotts, in her home.  Eventually he was placed in a nursing 
home.  Thereafter, on May 23, 2003, Mr. Clark was moved from the 
nursing home and admitted to Tandem Health Care of Winter Haven.  
He remained there until his death on November 23, 2003. 
 
Ms. Shotts, as personal representative, filed a complaint 
against the defendants alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duties.  The complaint contained a claim for wrongful death and an 
 
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alternative claim for injuries not resulting in death.  At least at this 
point, Ms. Shotts has not sought to amend the complaint to allege 
punitive damages. 
 
In response to the complaint, Tandem moved to compel 
arbitration based on an arbitration agreement executed by Ms. Shotts 
on behalf of her uncle.  In her memorandum in opposition to 
arbitration, and at the hearing conducted to consider the motion, Ms. 
Shotts argued that the agreement was not valid and enforceable 
because it was unconscionable and violated public policy.  The trial 
court found no merit in Ms. Shotts argument and granted the motion 
to compel.  It concluded that the agreement was “enforceable, not 
severable and not repugnant to the public policy of the State of 
Florida.”   
 
Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 988 So. 2d 639, 640-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) 
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 
The arbitration agreement that Shotts signed on behalf of her uncle included 
the following terms: 
 
—The arbitration shall be conducted . . . in accordance with the 
American Health Lawyers Association (“AHLA”) Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Service Rules of Procedure for Arbitration . . . . 
 
—All fees of the arbitrators shall be borne equally between the 
parties. 
 
—All matters relating the arbitration . . . shall remain 
confidential between the parties. 
 
—[T]he parties expressly agree that this Agreement will be 
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (“FAA”). 
 
—The parties agree that damages awarded, if any, in an 
arbitration conducted pursuant to this Binding Arbitration Agreement 
shall be determined in accordance with the provision of Florida law 
applicable to a comparable civil action, except that the parties 
acknowledge that the arbitrators shall have no authority to award 
punitive damages or any other damages not measured by the 
prevailing party‟s actual damages . . . . 
 
—In the event that any portion of this Agreement will be 
determined to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this 
 
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agreement will be deemed to continue to be binding upon the parties 
hereby in the same manner as if the invalid or unenforceable provision 
were not a part of the Agreement. 
 
—The execution of this Agreement is not a precondition to 
receiving medical treatment or for admission to the Facility. 
 
—The resident has the right to seek legal counsel concerning 
this Agreement.   
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Shotts appealed, and the district court affirmed the trial court‟s ruling on the 
motion to compel, concluding as follows with respect to the public policy issue: 
 
In summary, the trial court correctly found that the arbitration 
agreement was not unconscionable.  It is possible, especially if Ms. 
Shotts pursues a claim for punitive damages, that portions of the 
arbitration agreement could be found to be against public policy; 
however, the trial court erred when it concluded that the arbitration 
agreement was not severable.  Accordingly, because the arbitrators 
will have the ability to sever any offending clauses of the arbitration 
agreement, we affirm the trial court's order granting the motion to 
compel and remand this case for further proceedings. 
 
Shotts, 988 So. 2d at 644.  Shotts sought discretionary review in this Court, which 
the Court granted.  Shotts raises several claims,2 and we address three of them.3 
                                          
 
 
2.  Shotts raises the following claims: (a) the present district court decision 
conflicts with decisions of this Court and other district courts on the issue of which 
party bears the burden of proving an agent‟s authority under a power of attorney; 
(b) the present district court decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and 
other district courts on the issue of whether the authority issued through a power of 
attorney is to be strictly construed; (c) the present district court decision conflicts 
with decisions of other district courts on the issue of whether the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable as contrary to public policy; (d) the present district 
court decision conflicts with decisions of this Court which hold that it is for the 
court, not the arbitrator, to decide whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable; 
(e) the present district court decision conflicts with decisions of other district 
 
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II.  COURT OR ARBITRATOR 
 
In this claim, Shotts contends that the district court erred in remanding this 
case so that the arbitrator, not the court, could decide whether the arbitration 
agreement violates public policy.  The issue presented in this claim is a pure 
question of law, subject to de novo review.  See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 
1108 (Fla. 2010) (“Because this is a question of law . . . the standard of review is 
de novo.”).  Arbitration law that affects interstate commerce in Florida is governed 
by two acts—the Federal Arbitration Act, see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), and the 
Florida Arbitration Code.  See ch. 682, Fla. Stat. (2003).  Shotts contends that 
under these acts, it is the court, not the arbitrator, that must decide the public policy 
issue.  We agree. 
A.  Federal Arbitration Act 
 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which was originally enacted in 1925 
and then reenacted and codified in 1947 as title 9 of the United States Code, see 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), was intended to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility 
toward arbitration that had existed at English common law and that had been 
                                                                                                                                        
courts with respect to the showing that is required to support a finding of 
unconscionability; and (f) the present district court decision conflicts with 
decisions of other district courts on the issue of whether contract provisions that 
violate public policy are severable.   
 
3.  We address, in the following order, claims (d), (c) and (f).  We decline to 
address the remainder of Shotts‟ claims. 
 
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imported by American courts.  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 24 (1991).  The FAA was intended to place arbitration agreements on the 
same footing as other contracts.  Id.  The FAA‟s primary substantive provision is 
contained in section 2, which provides as follows: 
 
A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract. 
 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).  
In enacting section 2, “Congress declared a national policy favoring 
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the 
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”  
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).  Congress provided 
enforcement mechanisms within the FAA—notably in sections 3 and 4—to 
implement section 2‟s substantive rule. 
Under § 3, a party may apply to a federal court for a stay of the trial of 
an action “upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement 
in writing for such arbitration.”  Under § 4, a party “aggrieved” by the 
failure of another party “to arbitrate under a written agreement for 
arbitration” may petition a federal court “for an order directing that 
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such 
agreement.”  
 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010). 
 
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The United States Supreme Court recognizes only two limitations on the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements governed by the FAA, and it is the latter 
limitation that is of import here: 
 
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of 
arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: [1] 
they must be part of . . . a contract “evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce” and [2] such clauses may be revoked upon “grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  We see 
nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability 
is subject to any additional limitations under State law. 
 
Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The United 
States Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 
(2006), explained the latter limitation more fully: 
Challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” 
can be divided into two types.  One type challenges specifically the 
validity of the agreement to arbitrate.  The other challenges the 
contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire 
agreement (e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the 
ground that the illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders 
the whole contract invalid. 
 
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 (citation omitted). 
 
The Court in Buckeye reviewed its own precedent and then clarified the 
procedures for resolving the two types of challenges to arbitration agreements: 
 
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395 (1967), we addressed the question of who—court or arbitrator—
decides these two types of challenges.  The issue in the case was 
“whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract is to 
be resolved by the federal court, or whether the matter is to be referred 
 
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to the arbitrators.”  Id., at 402.  Guided by § 4 of the FAA, we held 
that “if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause 
itself—an issue which goes to the making of the agreement to 
arbitrate—the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.  But the 
statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims 
of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.”  Id., at 403-404 
(internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).  We rejected the view 
that the question of “severability” was one of state law, so that if state 
law held the arbitration provision not to be severable a challenge to 
the contract as a whole would be decided by the court. 
 
Subsequently, in Southland Corp., we held that the FAA 
“create[d] a body of federal substantive law,” which was “applicable 
in state and federal courts.”  We rejected the view that state law could 
bar enforcement of § 2, even in the context of state-law claims 
brought in state court. 
 
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444-45 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 
The Court in Buckeye articulated three key principles to guide courts in 
reviewing challenges to arbitration agreements, and again, it is the second principle 
that is of particular import here: 
First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration 
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.  Second, 
unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the 
contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.  
Third, this arbitration law applies in state as well as federal courts.  
 
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46 (emphasis added). 
 
And finally, the United States Supreme Court in Doctor‟s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996), articulated a fundamental tenet of the FAA: 
“Courts may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable 
only to arbitration provisions.  Allied-Bruce [Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 
 
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265, 281 (1995)]; Perry [v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493, n.9 (1987)].  By enacting 
§ 2, we have several times said, Congress precluded States from singling out 
arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be 
placed „upon the same footing as other contracts.‟  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).”  In Casarotto, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the FAA displaced a Montana statute that 
required that a special notice provision must be placed on the first page of all 
contracts containing an arbitration clause, but not on the first page of all contracts 
in general, thus singling out arbitration contracts for special treatment. 
B.  Florida Arbitration Code 
 
In Florida, an arbitration clause in a contract involving interstate commerce 
is subject to the Florida Arbitration Code (FAC), to the extent the FAC is not in 
conflict with the FAA.  This Court in Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633 
(Fla. 1999), held that, in a hearing on a motion to compel arbitration, the inquiry 
follows the same three-step process regardless whether the inquiry is conducted 
under the FAC or the FAA: 
 
Under both federal statutory provisions and Florida's arbitration 
code, there are three elements for courts to consider in ruling on a 
motion to compel arbitration of a given dispute: (1) whether a valid 
written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue 
exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived.  
 
Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636. 
 
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Challenges to arbitration agreements in Florida generally focus on the first 
of the Seifert elements—“whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists”: 
 
Today, arbitration provisions are common, and their use 
generally favored by the courts.  However, because arbitration 
provisions are contractual in nature, construction of such provisions 
and the contracts in which they appear remains a matter of contract 
interpretation.  See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Trailer Train Co., 
690 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir.1982).  Accordingly, the determination 
of whether an arbitration clause requires arbitration of a particular 
dispute necessarily “rests on the intent of the parties.”  Seaboard, 690 
F.2d at 1348; see also Regency Group, Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So. 2d 
192, 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“The agreement of the parties 
determines the issues subject to arbitration.”).  A natural corollary of 
this rule is that no party may be forced to submit a dispute to 
arbitration that the party did not intend and agree to arbitrate.  See 
Seaboard Coast Line, 690 F.2d at 1352 (holding that the federal policy 
favoring arbitration “cannot serve to stretch a contract beyond the 
scope originally intended by the parties”); see also Miller v. Roberts, 
682 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“The general rule is that 
where an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, arbitration 
is required only of those controversies or disputes which the parties 
have agreed to submit to arbitration.”); Regency Group, Inc., 647 
So.2d at 193 (“Only those claims which the parties have agreed are 
arbitrable may be subject to arbitration.”).  
 
Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636 (citations omitted). 
 
The issue of “whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists” is 
controlled by principles of state contract law: 
 
Although the states may not impose special limitations on the 
use of arbitration clauses, the validity of an arbitration clause is 
nevertheless an issue of state contract law.  Section 2 states that an 
arbitration clause can be invalidated on such grounds as exist “at law 
or in equity for the revocation of a contract.”  Thus, an arbitration 
clause can be defeated by any defense existing under the state law of 
contracts.  As the [United States Supreme] Court explained in 
 
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[Doctor‟s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)], 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements 
without contravening [the Federal Arbitration Act].”  
 
Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 
With respect to which contract defenses—besides “fraud, duress or 
unconscionability”—constitute “generally applicable contract defenses” for 
purposes of section 2, we conclude that public policy clearly is such a defense, for 
if an arbitration agreement violates public policy, no valid agreement exists.  
“[T]he rights of access to courts and trial by jury may be contractually relinquished 
[via an arbitration agreement], subject to defenses to contract enforcement 
including voidness for violation of the law or public policy, unconscionability, or 
lack of consideration. . . .  No valid agreement exists if the arbitration clause is 
unenforceable on public policy grounds.”  Global Travel Marketing, Inc. v. Shea, 
908 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2005) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
C.  Florida Case Law 
 
Although this Court has not confronted the specific issue of whether the 
court or the arbitrator must decide whether an arbitration agreement violates public 
policy, the Court in Seifert has ruled that it is for the court, not the arbitrator, to 
decide “whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists.”  Seifert, 750 So. 2d 
at 636 (emphasis added).  Later, this Court explained the meaning of the term 
 
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“valid” in this context: “No valid agreement exists if the arbitration clause is 
unenforceable on public policy grounds.”  Global Travel, 908 So. 2d at 398.  Thus, 
under Siefert and Global Travel, it is for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide 
whether an arbitration agreement violates public policy.      
 
Florida‟s district courts have addressed the public policy issue frequently in 
this context, and the decisions of those courts vary.  The Second District Court of 
Appeal, on the one hand, has indicated that it is the arbitrator who must decide 
whether an arbitration agreement violates public policy.  This position originated 
in a non-nursing home, non-public policy case, Rollins, Inc. v. Lighthouse Bay 
Holdings, Ltd., 898 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), where the Second District 
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether an arbitration agreement in a 
termite contract was unconscionable because it imposed limitations on statutory 
remedies.  The trial court had ruled that the agreement was unconscionable.  The 
district court reversed, ruling that the trial court erred in deciding the issue at all. 
 
In conducting its analysis in Rollins, the Second District Court of Appeal 
relied almost exclusively on federal precedent, reasoning as follows:  
 
In considering how to answer [this question], we have looked to 
the decisions of the federal circuit courts that have confronted these 
issues.  The consensus among those courts is that the arbitrator should 
decide in the first instance whether particular remedial limitations are 
permissible.  See [PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 
401, 407 (2003)]; Hawkins v. Aid Ass'n For Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 
807 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the adequacy of arbitration remedies 
has nothing to do with whether the parties agreed to arbitrate or if the 
 
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claims are in the scope of the arbitration agreement and thus they must 
first be considered by the arbitrator); Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v. 
Kawasaki Motors Corp., 334 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the party seeking to void remedial limitations on punitive 
damages and other relief has to address those arguments to the 
arbitrator); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Matrix Comms. Corp., 135 F.3d 
27, 33, n. 12 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that an argument that an 
arbitration agreement is invalid because it forecloses certain remedies 
otherwise available “must be brought to the arbitrator because it does 
not go to the arbitrability of the claims but only to the nature of 
available relief”); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 
232 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that “[t]he availability of punitive damages 
is not relevant to the nature of the forum in which the complaint will 
be heard. Thus, availability of punitive damages cannot enter into a 
decision to compel arbitration”).  But see Paladino v. Avnet Computer 
Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
arbitrability of statutory claims rests on the assumption that the 
arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to court remedies and 
pronouncing an arbitration clause unenforceable where it had 
provisions that deprived the plaintiff of the ability to obtain 
meaningful relief for allegations of statutory violations).  Even the 
Eleventh Circuit, which declared an arbitration provision with 
remedial limitations unenforceable in Paladino, appears to be 
rethinking its decision in that case and has limited its holding. 
Specifically, in Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc., 346 
F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2003), the court held that where the parties' 
agreement contains remedial limitations, but also contains a 
severability clause that permits any invalid provisions to be excised, 
the question of the validity of the remedial limitations is for the 
arbitrator to decide.  The court reasoned that the presence of the 
severability provision evidenced the parties' intention to enforce the 
remainder of the agreement in the event any portion of it is deemed 
invalid.  Id. at 1031.  The court concluded that because any invalid 
provisions were severable, the underlying claims should be arbitrated 
regardless of the validity of the remedial restrictions.  Id. at 1032. The 
court also noted that the case was going to arbitration, thus, an 
arbitrator and not the court should decide the validity of the remedial 
limitations because “[a] court compelling arbitration should decide 
only such issues as are essential to defining the nature of the forum in 
which a dispute will be decided.”  Id. at 1032-33 (quoting Musnick v. 
 
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King Motor Co. of Ft. Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 
2003)). 
 
In light of these authorities, we conclude that this case should 
be arbitrated and that the arbitrator should in the first instance decide 
the validity of the remedial restrictions in the arbitration provision.  
We believe that this approach is consistent with the policy Congress 
sought to advance with the FAA.  It also seems wise given that at this 
stage in the proceedings we can only speculate whether Lighthouse 
Bay will ever be affected by the remedial limitations of which it 
complains.  That will depend in part on whether Lighthouse Bay 
prevails on its claim, and it will also depend on how the arbitrator 
construes provisions in the contract outside the arbitration provision.  
We also note that the agreement in this case contains a severability 
clause.  Thus, even under the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit, 
this case should proceed to arbitration. 
 
Rollins, 898 So. 2d at 88-89.  Bound by its decision in Rollins, the Second District 
Court of Appeal later applied the same rationale to nursing home and public policy 
cases.4  That court now has acknowledged, however, that its rationale is in conflict 
with the decisions of the other Florida district courts.5 
  
In counterpoint to the above position of the Second District Court of Appeal, 
other Florida district courts of appeal have taken a different approach to the public 
policy issue.  The First District Court of Appeal, Fourth District Court of Appeal, 
                                          
 
 
4.  See, e.g., Manor Care, Inc. v. Estate of Kuhn, 23 So. 3d 773, 774 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2009); Jaylene, Inc. v. Steuer, 22 So. 3d 711, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Bland 
v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d 252, 257-58 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2006). 
 
5.  See Jaylene, 22 So. 3d at 713 (“We note that we are in conflict with 
decisions by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts holding that the trial court 
initially must determine whether an arbitration agreement's limitation on statutory 
remedies renders the agreement unenforceable on public policy grounds.”). 
 
 
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and Fifth District Court of Appeal all hold that the court, not the arbitrator, must 
make the initial decision as to whether an arbitration agreement violates public 
policy.6  A rationale supporting this position is expressed in the specially 
concurring opinion of Judge Altenbernd in Manor Care Health Services, Inc. v. 
Stiehl, 22 So. 3d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).  There, Judge Altenbernd voiced his 
misgivings about the position that his own court, the Second District Court of 
Appeal, had taken on the issue.  Stiehl is a nursing home case in which the district 
court remanded with directions that the arbitrator, not the court, decide whether the 
remedial limitations in the agreement violated public policy.  The remedial 
                                          
 
 
6.  See, e.g., Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2007) (affirming the trial court‟s ruling that the arbitration agreement 
conflicted with the Florida Nursing Home Residents Act and was unenforceable); 
Fletcher v. Huntington Place Ltd. P‟ship, 952 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) 
(reversing the trial court‟s ruling compelling arbitration and instead holding that a 
limitations of remedies provision in a nursing home contract violates public policy 
and is void); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton, 953 So. 2d 574, 578 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“The issue of whether the provision violated public policy 
goes to the first Seifert inquiry: whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate.  
This is a question for the trial court.”); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant, 937 So. 
2d 263, 267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“[T]he trial court properly considered whether 
the arbitration and limitation of liability provisions were valid.”); SA-PG-Ocala, 
LLC v. Stokes, 935 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“It is the court's 
obligation, in deciding a motion to compel arbitration, to determine whether a valid 
written agreement to arbitrate exists.”); Lacey v. Healthcare & Retirement Corp. of 
Am., 918 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (reversing the trial court‟s ruling 
compelling arbitration and instead holding that a limitations of remedies provision 
in a nursing home contract violates public policy and is void); Blankfeld v. 
Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (same). 
 
- 19 - 
limitations included a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages and a waiver of 
punitive damages. 
 
Judge Altenbernd wrote at length in Steihl, explaining why, in his view, the 
Second District Court of Appeal should abandon its position on this issue and 
adopt the approach of the other district courts: 
 
I concur in this decision because it is consistent with the 
existing precedent from this district.  I have come to the conclusion, 
however, that it is both bad policy and bad law to allow an arbitrator 
to make case-specific, non-precedential, confidential decisions about 
the enforceability of clauses in an arbitration agreement when those 
clauses limit or eliminate rights specially created by the legislature to 
protect nursing home residents.  Accordingly, I would prefer to follow 
the approach of the other districts and permit trial courts to make 
decisions about these restrictive clauses prior to arbitration. 
 
The language of this specific arbitration agreement heightens 
my concerns.  I do not question the value of arbitration as an alternate 
dispute mechanism for use in nursing home cases, but I believe the 
time has come for the legislature to regulate the content of such 
agreements—which should primarily provide dispute resolution 
procedures—because they are actually being used to eliminate 
substantive rights and remedies created by the Legislature in sections 
400.022 and 400.023, Florida Statutes, for the protection of some of 
our most vulnerable citizens.  If the legislature could establish a 
method by which approved, standard arbitration agreements, fair to 
both sides, were available for use by nursing homes and their residents 
in Florida, we could largely eliminate the seemingly endless supply of 
lawsuits and appeals addressing the language of arbitration 
agreements that ironically were intended to eliminate lawsuits and 
appeals. 
. . . 
 
 
The arbitration agreement in this case . . . is well written.  It is 
further explained in a short information pamphlet provided by Manor 
Care.  There is nothing to suggest that this agreement or the methods 
by which the resident is bound by this agreement are procedurally 
 
- 20 - 
unconscionable.  On the other hand, the drafters of this agreement do 
not disclose the very limited benefit of this agreement to the resident 
and the considerable benefit received by Manor Care.  A careful 
review of the agreement causes one to wonder why any resident who 
actually understood the agreement, assuming it is voluntary and does 
not affect the price of care at the facility, would ever sign such a one-
sided arrangement.  There is a good argument that the agreement is 
substantively unconscionable, but that is irrelevant in this district so 
long as it is not procedurally unconscionable. 
 
The agreement is repeatedly described as “voluntary,” and the 
resident or resident's agent is assured that the “signing” of this 
agreement is not “mandatory.”  However, if voluntarily signed, it 
creates mandatory, binding arbitration subject to extremely limited 
rights of appeal.  It is not a voluntary agreement in the sense that the 
parties decide whether to use the program only after a claim has 
arisen; it applies mandatorily to all future disputes. 
 
The benefit of this agreement is described in the first paragraph 
as helping the parties “avoid crowded court dockets and lengthy 
appellate procedures.”  Not only has that benefit not been achieved in 
this case and the many cases in which the parties fight over the 
content of the arbitration agreement, but also the first paragraph does 
not really explain the detriments of signing the agreement.  The 
resident is told in bold print that it does contain a waiver of statutory 
rights and that it should be read carefully, but a brief description of the 
rights waived and the consideration for that waiver, which easily 
could be recited, is not recited. 
 
The benefits for the parties and the primary substantive 
consideration for this agreement appear to be provided in section 1.2 
of the Limitation of Liability.  The benefit for the resident appears to 
be that, if a dispute arises over unpaid nursing home charges, Manor 
Care agrees not to make a claim for pre-judgment interest on those 
charges.  The benefit for Manor Care is that non-economic damages 
are capped at $250,000, and punitive damages can never be awarded 
no matter how egregious the violation of the nursing home resident's 
rights.  Intuitively, this does not appear to be an agreement in which 
both sides are receiving equivalent economic benefit. 
 
The imbalance, however, is perhaps more pronounced within 
the arbitration procedures.  The procedures require an extensive 
document production prior to arbitration, but only a designated expert 
may be deposed.  Thus, if Manor Care brings a claim for unpaid 
 
- 21 - 
nursing home charges, the resident has no ability to depose anyone in 
the billing department.  It seems highly unlikely that employees of 
Manor Care will be willing to give voluntary statements against the 
interest of their employers to the attorneys representing a resident.  Of 
even greater concern, if a resident has an accident in the facility, he or 
she will be unable to depose employees and other witnesses prior to 
arbitration.  As a result, it may be impossible even to obtain sufficient 
information to provide to an expert so that the expert can reach an 
opinion.  Given that residents tend to be elderly, frail, and forgetful, 
there is a real risk that a resident making a claim in arbitration will 
never be able to obtain useful statements from other residents for use 
in these proceedings, and compelling such resident witnesses to attend 
arbitration may not be feasible.  The arbitration agreement does not 
explain that the resident is avoiding crowded court dockets and 
lengthy appeals by agreeing to procedures that significantly reduce the 
resident's ability to prevail in the dispute. 
. . . 
 
 
In this district, we have decided that arbitrators in nursing home 
cases should decide on the validity of remedial limitations.  In the 
context of a dispute between two large corporations that have agreed 
to use arbitration to resolve disputes arising out of a unique contract, 
that approach seems workable.  However, in the context of a dispute 
between a corporation that essentially has physical custody of an 
elderly person and that person's guardian, when the dispute arises not 
from contract law, but from special rights created by the legislature 
for the protection of the elderly, and when the contract is not a unique 
contract negotiated on a level playing field, but a form contract 
applicable to a large group of senior citizens, I think it is a mistake to 
delegate these legal decisions to the arbitrator. 
 
If a trial judge decides that a clause of the arbitration agreement 
is enforceable or unenforceable, the order is a public order and an 
aggrieved party can appeal that ruling.  The district court can review 
the order, and whether the district court affirms or reverses, it can 
create precedent that resolves the matter for future similar claims.  If 
the agreement needs to be refined for future residents, the drafters 
have guidance, and if the legislature concludes that the court has 
misinterpreted the rights it created, the statute can be amended. 
 
If an arbitrator makes a similar decision, the parties have agreed 
to maintain the confidentiality of the arbitrator's “conclusions of law.”  
 
- 22 - 
The agreement prevents an appeal, and the limited judicial review in 
circuit court permitted by section 682.13 will not permit a judicial 
review of such a ruling.  Not only does this procedure prevent the 
creation of binding precedent, it creates nothing approaching the rule 
of law. 
 
For example, hypothetically, if a fire breaks out in a care 
facility due to the extraordinary negligence of the corporate owner 
under circumstances that would warrant punitive damages in circuit 
court and that fire kills five residents, they are likely to present their 
cases to five different arbitrators.  In this hypothetical, two arbitrators 
decide to override the agreement and permit punitive damages to be 
awarded.  Three do not.  Two arbitrators enforce all of the limitations, 
and one eliminates the cap on non-monetary damages but maintains 
the prohibition on punitive damages.  Only the nursing home 
corporation will know that the results were so different and resulted in 
vastly different awards.  None of the rulings will bind any future 
claims.  No one will have a right to appeal or challenge the different 
rules of law applied to the same circumstances under the same 
statutory and contractual law.  In passing the bill of rights for nursing 
home residents, the Legislature cannot conceivably have envisioned 
such a result. 
 
If anything, the “nonseverability” clause in this agreement 
makes this court's approach to this issue more troublesome.  The 
“nonseverability” clause provides that either party may cancel the 
agreement—even after an arbitrator has announced his or her ruling—
if the arbitrator determines that any provision of the agreement is 
unenforceable.  It is not obvious to me that Manor Care would ever 
argue that a portion of the arbitration agreement that it drafted was 
unenforceable.  Thus, only when a resident prevails before the 
arbitrator on the enforceability of some clause will the agreement 
become voidable.  Thus, in the above examples, in the two cases 
where the arbitrators awarded punitive damages, the nursing home 
will undoubtedly choose to cancel the agreement.  At that point, the 
resident must file a lawsuit.  In the two cases where all of the limiting 
provisions were enforced, in light of confidentiality, the corporation 
will pay the claims and the residents will never have a right to know 
that the other residents' cases were referred to the courts.  For the 
residents, on first examination, the “nonseverability” clause might 
appear bilateral, but in application it appears to benefit Manor Care 
exclusively. 
 
- 23 - 
. . . 
 
 
There are now over thirty-five written appellate opinions in 
Florida addressing arbitration agreements between nursing home 
operators and their residents.  Unquestionably there are many appeals 
involving these agreements that have not resulted in written opinions 
and even more challenges at the trial court level that did not result in 
appeals.  Arbitration was intended to create a speedy and 
economically efficient dispute resolution process for the residents of 
nursing homes.  Instead, it has tended to create a round of time-
consuming, expensive litigation prior to whatever dispute resolution 
method ultimately resolves the case.  It is only human that the nursing 
home facilities have tended to create arbitration agreements that favor 
the nursing homes.  In the case of the relationship between insurance 
companies and their insured Florida families, we have created 
regulations to level the playing field and protect the property rights of 
our families while recognizing the legitimate needs of the insurance 
companies.  It seems to me that we have reached a point where the 
human rights of our senior citizens deserve no less.  The judiciary is 
ill-equipped to provide that protection, but the Legislature could do so 
with ease. 
 
Stiehl, 22 So. 3d at 101-05 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (footnotes 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
 
And finally, with respect to the adverse conditions under which nursing 
home arbitration agreements are often signed, Judge Altenbernd wrote: 
 
Even when residents are given ample time and opportunity to 
review these form contracts, the reality is that the resident is often 
significantly incapacitated and may not be competent to sign the 
agreement.  A spouse, son, or daughter, relying on a power of 
attorney to sign for the resident, is often under time constraints to 
find a safe facility for a loved one during a very emotional time.  
Thus, in an unregulated market, these circumstances do not lend 
themselves to the natural creation of a level playing field. 
 
Stiehl, 22 So. 3d at 103 n.5 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially). 
 
- 24 - 
D.  The Present Case 
 
As noted above, this Court in Seifert held that it was for the court, not the 
arbitrator, to determine “whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists,” 
Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636 (emphasis added), and we later explained the meaning of 
the term “valid” in this context, with respect to arbitration and public policy: “No 
valid agreement exists if the arbitration clause is unenforceable on public policy 
grounds.”  Global Travel, 908 So. 2d at 398.  Thus, under Siefert and Global 
Travel, it is incumbent on the court, not the arbitrator, to determine whether an 
arbitration agreement violates public policy.  This conclusion is consistent with the 
vast weight of authority in Florida, as discussed above.  
 
Further, we conclude that the rationale expressed by Judge Alternbernd in 
his specially concurring opinion in Stiehl is cogent and more compelling than the 
opposing rationale set forth in Rollins.  We note that the district court in Rollins 
relied almost exclusively on federal precedent to support its position, whereas the 
matter at issue here—whether an arbitration agreement violates public policy—is 
properly a matter of state contract law.  See Global Travel, 908 So. 2d at 398 
(“[R]ights of access to courts and trial by jury may be contractually relinquished 
[via an arbitration agreement], subject to defenses to contract enforcement 
including voidness for violation of the law or public policy, unconscionability, or 
lack of consideration.”); Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 574 (“[T]he validity of an 
 
- 25 - 
arbitration clause is . . . an issue of state contract law.”).  The Second District Court 
of Appeal has now acknowledged that its position in Rollins is in conflict with the 
decisions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, and we note that 
one of the Second District‟s own judges, Judge Altenbernd, has suggested that the 
court abandon its position on this issue and adopt the approach of the other district 
courts.  
 
Under the above standard of review, we hold that the district court in the 
present case erred in failing to rule that the trial court, not the arbitrator, must 
decide whether the arbitration agreement violates public policy. 
III.  LIMITATIONS OF REMEDIES 
 
In this claim, Shotts contends that the district court erred in failing to rule 
that the limitations of remedies provisions in the present case violate public policy.  
This issue is a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.  See Aills v. Boemi, 
29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 2010).  As noted above, the arbitration agreement in the 
present case contains the following limitations of remedies provisions: (1) “[t]he 
arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the American Health Lawyers 
Association (“AHLA”) Alternative Dispute Resolution Service Rules of Procedure 
for Arbitration”; and (2) “the arbitrators shall have no authority to award punitive 
damages.”  The district court below did not decide whether these provisions violate 
public policy, but rather left that matter for the arbitrator to determine.  Shotts 
 
- 26 - 
contends that the district court erred in this respect—she contends that the 
limitations of remedies provisions in this case violate public policy, and that the 
district court should have so ruled.  We agree.  
A.  Florida Case Law 
 
Although this Court has not addressed the issue of whether a limitations of 
remedies provision in a nursing home arbitration agreement violates public policy, 
the matter has been addressed by Florida‟s district courts, and the decisions of 
those courts vary.  The Second District Court of Appeal has confronted the issue 
on several occasions, but has never ruled on it, instead leaving the decision to the 
arbitrators in the various cases.  That court‟s own position on the issue is unclear.  
On occasion, the court has indicated that such a provision might not violate public 
policy: 
 
We are mindful that some courts, on public policy grounds, 
have refused to enforce remedial limitations in nursing home 
arbitration or have refused totally to order arbitration where such 
restrictions are present.  The remedial limitations in nursing home 
arbitration may be troubling to some.  After all, the Nursing Home 
Residents' Rights Act is “[a] remedial statute . . . designed to correct 
an existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regulations 
conducive to the public good.”  Unquestionably, the legislature 
enacted the statute to protect some of Florida's most vulnerable 
residents.  Arguably, therefore, the Agreement's remedial limitations 
undermine the statute's salutary purposes.  While superficially 
appealing, the argument is too facile. 
 
We also must recognize that Florida public policy favors 
arbitration.  Nothing in the Nursing Home Residents' Rights Act 
reflects a legislative hostility to arbitration.  Moreover, as a general 
proposition, a party may waive statutory rights.  The Nursing Home 
 
- 27 - 
Residents' Rights Act does not expressly prohibit a contractual waiver 
or limitation of statutory rights.  The legislature could have included 
such a restriction in the Nursing Home Residents' Rights Act.  
Accordingly, a compelling argument can be made that, absent a 
legislative restriction, the courts should honor a party's decision to 
contract away statutory protections. 
 
Bland, 927 So. 2d at 257-58 (citations omitted) (quoting Lacey, 918 So. 2d at 334).  
And yet in other cases, including the present case, the same district court has 
indicated that such a provision may well violate public policy.7   
 
In contrast, other district courts of appeal have expressed a clear point of 
view on this issue.  The First District Court of Appeal,8 Fourth District Court of 
Appeal,9 and Fifth District Court of Appeal,10 have all held that a limitations of 
                                          
 
 
7.  See, e.g., Jaylene, 22 So. 3d at 713 (“[W]e share the circuit court‟s 
concern over the limits of liability . . . .”); Stiehl, 22 So. 3d at 99 (“Additionally, 
courts in this state have specifically found arbitration agreements containing 
remedial limitations similar to those presented here to render an agreement to 
arbitrate void and unenforceable.”); Shotts, 988 So. 2d at 643 (“Because it appears 
that provisions of this agreement may violate public policy, we consider the issue 
of severability . . . .”); id. at 644 (“It is possible, especially if Ms. Shotts pursues a 
claim for punitive damages, that portions of the arbitration agreement could be 
found to be against public policy . . . .”).  
 
8.  See Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton, 953 So. 2d 574, 578 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2007). 
 
9.  See Place at Vero Beach v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); 
Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant, 937 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Lacey v. 
Healthcare & Retirement Corp. of Am., 918 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); 
Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 
 
10.  See Fletcher v. Huntington Place Ltd. P‟ship, 952 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2007); SA-PG-Ocala, LLC v. Stokes, 935 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2006). 
 
- 28 - 
remedies provision in a nursing home (or assisted living facility) contract violates 
public policy.  And although the Third District Court of Appeal has not addressed 
this matter from a public policy perspective, it has ruled that a limitation of 
remedies provision in a nursing home contract is unenforceable as 
unconscionable,11 as has the Fourth District Court of Appeal.12 
 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, 
Inc., 902 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), stated its position with respect to 
limitations of remedies provisions and public policy: 
 
A remedial statute is one which confers or changes a remedy.  
The Nursing Home Resident's Act is remedial.  The “Residents 
Rights” provisions in section 400.022 were enacted in 1980 to 
respond to a Dade County Grand Jury investigation of nursing homes 
which revealed detailed evidence of substantial elder abuse occurring 
in nursing homes.  In 1993, the Legislature amended the statute by 
enacting section 400.023 (“Civil Enforcement”), providing civil 
remedies for nursing home residents for violation of the statute.  A 
cause of action “may be brought in any court of competent 
jurisdiction to enforce such rights and to recover actual and punitive 
damages for any violation of the rights of a resident or for 
negligence.” 
 
If nursing home residents had to arbitrate under the NHLA 
rules [now known as the AHLA rules13], some of the remedies 
provided in the legislation for negligence would be substantially 
affected and, for all intents and purposes, eliminated.  The provision 
requiring arbitration under those rules is accordingly contrary to the 
                                          
 
 
11.  See Prieto v. Healthcare and Retirement Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2006). 
 
12.  See Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
 
13.  See Shotts, 988 So. 2d at 642. 
 
- 29 - 
public policy behind the statute and therefore void.  Mullis v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229, 235 (Fla.1971) (insurance 
policy provision limiting uninsured motorist protection provided in 
statute held void as contrary to public policy); Holt v. O'Brien Imps. 
of Fort Myers, Inc., 862 So.2d 87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (automobile 
purchase contract providing for arbitration which limited remedies 
provided by Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act held 
void as contrary to public policy); see also Green v. Life & Health of 
America, 704 So.2d 1386, 1390 (Fla.1998) (parties can contract 
around state or federal law except where such a contract provision 
would be void as contrary to public policy). 
 
Blankfeld, 902 So. 2d at 298-99 (citations omitted) (quoting § 400.023(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2001)).  The above rationale is echoed in the decisions of the First District 
Court of Appeal, Fourth District Court of Appeal, and Fifth District Court of 
Appeal.14 
                                          
 
 
14.  See, e.g., Linton, 953 So. 2d at 578 (“The arbitration agreement in the 
present case defeats the remedial purpose of the Act by eliminating punitive 
damages and capping noneconomic damages, so the trial court correctly ruled that 
it was void as against public policy.”); Bryant, 937 So. 2d at 266 (“This court has 
held repeatedly that arbitration agreements eliminating punitive damages and 
capping non-economic damages defeat the remedial purpose of the NHRA and are, 
therefore, void as against public policy.”); Stokes, 935 So. 2d at 1243 (“It would be 
against public policy to permit a nursing home to dismantle the protections 
afforded patients by the Legislature through the use of an arbitration agreement.”); 
Lacey, 918 So. 2d at 334 (“To the extent that a contractual limitation defeats the 
purpose of a remedial statute, the limitation may be found void as a matter of 
law. . . .  [The arbitration agreement here] eliminates punitive damages, which are 
expressly provided for in the Act.  It also caps non-economic damages at $250,000, 
which would seem to substantially affect the compensatory damage remedy. These 
provisions are thus void under the public policy rationale utilized in this district.”); 
Romano, 861 So. 2d at 62 (“Although parties may agree to arbitrate statutory 
claims, even ones involving important social policies, arbitration must provide the 
prospective litigant with an effective way to vindicate his or her statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum.  When an arbitration agreement contains provisions 
 
- 30 - 
 
With respect to the specific limitations of remedies provisions in the present 
case, all the above district courts, with the exception of the Second District Court 
of Appeal, have held that those provisions violate public policy or are otherwise 
unenforceable.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal15 and the Fifth District Court 
of Appeal16 have held that the first provision—“[t]he arbitration shall be conducted 
in accordance with the American Health Lawyers Association (“AHLA”) 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Service Rules of Procedure for Arbitration”—
violates public policy.  The First District Court of Appeal17 and the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal18 have held that the latter provision—“the arbitrators shall have no 
authority to award punitive damages”—violates public policy.  And the Third 
District Court of Appeal19 and the Fourth District Court of Appeal20 have held that 
the latter provision is unenforceable as unconscionable. 
                                                                                                                                        
which defeat the remedial provisions of the statute, the agreement is not 
enforceable.”) (citations omitted). 
 
15.  See Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773; Blankfeld, 902 So. 2d 296. 
 
16.  See Fletcher, 952 So. 2d 1225; Stokes, 935 So. 2d 1242. 
 
17.  See Linton, 953 So. 2d 574. 
 
18.  See Bryant, 937 So. 2d 263; Lacey, 918 So. 2d 333. 
 
19.  See Prieto, 919 So. 2d 531. 
 
20.  See Romano, 861 So. 2d 159.  
 
- 31 - 
B.  The Present Case 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the limitations of remedies 
provisions in the present case violate public policy, for they directly undermine 
specific statutory remedies created by the Legislature.  See §§ 400.022, 400.023, 
Fla. Stat. (2003).  This conclusion comports with the vast weight of authority in 
Florida, as discussed above.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Romano v. 
Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), explained succinctly: 
 
Sections 400.022 and 400.023 are remedial statutes, designed to 
protect nursing home residents.  The Nursing Home Resident's Rights 
Act, section 400.022, was originally enacted after a Dade County 
Grand Jury investigation of nursing homes revealed substantial elder 
abuse occurring in many nursing homes without any remedial action 
being taken.  The law set up rights of residents, including the right to 
appropriate medical care, and requires nursing homes to make public 
statements of the rights and responsibilities of the residents.  To 
enforce these rights, the legislature provided each resident with a 
cause of action for their violation. . . .  The legislature also provided 
for the award of punitive damages for gross or flagrant conduct or 
conscious indifference to the rights of the resident.  Moreover, there 
was no cap on pain and suffering damages in the statute. 
 
Romano, 861 So. 2d at 62-63 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
In light of the recognized need for these remedies and the salutary purpose 
they serve, we conclude that any arbitration agreement that substantially 
diminishes or circumvents these remedies stands in violation of the public policy 
of the State of Florida and is unenforceable.  In this respect, we find the rationale 
of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Blankfeld and Romano cogent and 
 
- 32 - 
compelling.  Under the above standard of review, we hold that the district court 
below erred in failing to rule that the limitations of remedies provisions in the 
present case violate public policy. 
IV.  SEVERABILITY 
 
In this claim Shotts contends that the district court below erred in ruling that 
the limitations of remedies provisions in the present case are severable.  To the 
extent this claim is based on written materials before this Court, the issue is a pure 
question of law, subject to de novo review.  See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 
1108 (Fla. 2010).  The trial court below held that the provisions were not 
severable.  The district court reversed.  The district court held that, if the arbitrator 
were to conclude that these provisions violate public policy, they are severable.  
Shotts contends that the district court erred in so ruling—she contends that these 
limitations of remedies provisions violate public policy and are not severable.  We 
agree. 
A.  Florida Case Law 
 
Although this Court has not addressed the specific issue of whether a 
limitations of remedies provision that violates public policy is severable from the 
remainder of an arbitration agreement, this Court has set forth the following 
general standard for determining whether a contractual provision is severable from 
the whole: 
 
- 33 - 
 
As to when an illegal portion of a bilateral contract may or may 
not be eliminated leaving the remainder of the contract in force and 
effect, the authorities hold generally that a contract should be treated 
as entire when, by a consideration of its terms, nature, and purpose, 
each and all of its parts appear to be interdependent and common to 
one another and to the consideration.  Stated differently, a contract is 
indivisible where the entire fulfillment of the contract is contemplated 
by the parties as the basis of the arrangement.  On the other hand, a 
bilateral contract is severable where the illegal portion of the contract 
does not go to its essence, and where, with the illegal portion 
eliminated, there still remains of the contract valid legal promises on 
one side which are wholly supported by valid legal promises on the 
other.  
 
Whether a contract is entire or divisible depends upon the 
intention of the parties.  And this is a matter which may be determined 
by a fair construction of the terms and provisions of the contract itself, 
and by the subject matter to which it has reference. 
 
Local No. 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So. 2d 818, 821-22 (Fla. 1953) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
Florida‟s district courts have specifically addressed the issue of whether a 
limitations of remedies provision that violates public policy in a nursing home 
contract is severable from the remainder of an arbitration agreement, and the 
decisions of those courts vary.  The First District Court of Appeal has held that 
such a provision is severable, where the agreement itself contained a severability 
clause.  See Linton (finding severability where contract included severability 
clause and provisions that capped noneconomic damages at $250,000 and waived 
punitive damages).  And the Second District Court of Appeal has held that such a 
provision is severable, regardless of whether the agreement contained a 
 
- 34 - 
severability clause and even when it included a nonseverability clause.  See Gessa 
v. Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 4 So. 3d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (finding severability 
where contract capped noneconomic damages, precluded punitive damages, and 
had no severability clause), quashed, No. SC09-768 (Fla. Nov. 23, 2011); Stiehl 
(finding severability where contract capped noneconomic damages, precluded 
punitive damages, and had a nonseverability clause). 
 
In the present case, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled as follows 
with respect to the limitations of remedies provisions in the arbitration agreement: 
 
In our de novo review, we conclude that the trial court erred 
when it found the offensive arbitration clauses could not be severed 
from the remainder of the arbitration agreement.  We hold that the 
remedial limitation provisions which state that the arbitration 
agreement be conducted in accordance with the AHLA Procedures 
and that “arbitrators shall have no authority to award punitive 
damages” are not so interrelated and interdependent with the 
remainder of the arbitration agreement that they cannot be severed by 
the arbitrators if necessary.  We note that the agreement anticipates 
the use of AHLA procedures but specifies that damages “shall be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of Florida law 
applicable to comparable civil action, except [for punitive damages].”  
Nothing suggests that the arbitrators could not easily resolve this case 
using proper elements of damage under Florida law and with the 
appropriate burden of proof.   
 
Shotts, 988 So. 2d at 643-44. 
 
In counterpoint to the above decisions of the First District Court of Appeal 
and Second District Courts of Appeal, other district courts of appeal have ruled 
otherwise on this issue.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that a 
 
- 35 - 
limitation of remedies provision is not severable, regardless whether the agreement 
contained a severability clause.  See Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773 (rejecting severability 
where contract contained a severability clause and a provision that adopted the 
AHLA rules); Lacey, 918 So. 2d 333 (rejecting severability where contract 
contained no severability clause and contained provisions that capped 
noneconomic damages at $250,000 and waived punitive damages).  And the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal has held that such a provision is not severable, regardless 
of whether the agreement contained a severability clause.  See Fletcher, 952 So. 2d 
1225 (rejecting severability where contract contained a severability clause and 
provisions that capped noneconomic damages at $250,000 and waived punitive 
damages); Stokes, 935 So. 2d 1242 (rejecting severability where contract contained 
no severability clause and contained provisions that capped noneconomic damages 
at $250,000 and waived punitive damages).  
 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 
953 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), addressed a limitations of remedies provision 
imposing the AHLA rules, and the district court ruled as follows: 
This court's recent decision in Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, 
Inc., [902 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)], sheds light on the issue 
before us.  The arbitration provision in Blankfeld stated: “[A]ny 
action, dispute, claim or controversy of any kind . . . now existing or 
hereafter arising between the parties . . . shall be resolved by binding 
arbitration administered by the [AHLA].”  This court determined that 
AHLA Section 606 rendered the provision unenforceable.  Section 
606 provides: 
 
- 36 - 
 
[T]he arbitrator may not award consequential, exemplary, 
incidental, punitive or special damages against a party 
unless the arbitrator determines, based on the record, that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the party 
against whom such damages are awarded is guilty of 
conduct evincing an intentional or reckless disregard for 
the rights of another party or fraud, actual or presumed. 
 
However, the Nursing Home Resident's Act, found in section 
400.023(2), Florida Statutes, calls for a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  Based on this difference, this court determined that the 
arbitration provision was unenforceable. 
 
Unlike the provision in Blankfeld, the provision in the 
Agreement in this case stated it was governed by Florida law, 
addressed compensatory or punitive damages or attorney's fees, and 
referenced Chapter 400.  The Place argues that the language in the 
provision stating, “[t]his agreement shall be governed by and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida,” means 
the parties have entered into a written agreement to vary the AHLA 
rules.  The Place also argues that the language stating that an award 
which is tied to a violation of Chapter 400 should be in accord with 
Chapter 400, incorporates Florida law into the agreement.  We 
disagree. 
 
The arbitration provision in the Agreement does not constitute a 
written agreement to vary the AHLA rules.  The language regarding 
Florida law is standard and is meant to guide an arbitrator in 
interpreting the rest of the agreement.  Moreover, contrary to the 
Place's assertion, the provision does not read “arbitration „shall be 
governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the state 
of Florida.‟ ”  We find the trial judge was correct in finding that the 
arbitration provision is in conflict with the NHRA and is 
unenforceable. 
 
The Place argues further that the trial court, using the 
severability clause in the agreement, should have severed the portion 
of the arbitration agreement which detailed that the AHLA and its 
rules should be used in arbitrating any disagreement.  “As a general 
rule, contractual provisions are severable, where the illegal portion of 
the contract does not go to its essence, and, with the illegal portion 
 
- 37 - 
eliminated, there remain valid legal obligations.”  Fonte v. AT & T 
Wireless Servs., Inc., 903 So. 2d 1019, 1024 (Fla.2005). 
 
The trial judge determined, unlike the agreement addressed in 
Fonte, he would have to rewrite the terms of the Agreement to give it 
effect.  We find the trial court correctly refused to sever portions of 
the arbitration clause.  While the Agreement did contain a severability 
clause, the clause allows provisions, not portions of provisions, of the 
Agreement to be severed.  While in some cases offending sentences 
can be severed from a provision, these are instances in which there is 
no “interdependence between the arbitration clause and the remaining 
clauses of the agreement which would [require] the trial court to 
rewrite or „blue pencil‟ the agreement.”  Healthcomp Evaluation Serv. 
Corp. v. O'Donnell, 817 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).  In 
this case, the arbitration clause is built around the Place's intent that 
the AHLA and its rules would control the arbitration. The trial judge 
correctly determined that he would be unable to simply sever a 
sentence from the provision, but would be forced to add the 
requirements that Chapter 400 and the Florida rules of arbitration 
would apply. 
 
Hanson, 953 So. 2d at 774-76 (citations omitted).21  
 
The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Fletcher v. Huntington Place Limited 
Partnership, 952 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), also addressed the severance of 
such a provision: 
 
Nor does it make sense for a court to remake [the nursing 
home‟s] agreement to excise the offending provisions.  Given the 
nature of the relationship between a nursing home and its patient, the 
courts ought to expect nursing homes to proffer form contracts that 
fully comply with Chapter 400, not to revise them when they are 
challenged to make them compliant.  Otherwise, nursing homes have 
no incentive to proffer a fair form agreement.    
                                          
 
21.  See also Blankfeld, 902 So. 2d at 298 (“Requiring clear and convincing 
evidence of intentional or reckless misconduct [pursuant to the AHLA rules] 
effectively eliminates recovery for negligence, and is contrary to the Nursing 
Home Residents Act . . . .”). 
 
- 38 - 
 
Fletcher, 952 So. 2d at 1227. 
B.  The Present Case 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the limitations of remedies 
provision in the present case that calls for the imposition of the AHLA rules is not 
severable from the remainder of the agreement.  Although the arbitration 
agreement in this case contains a severability clause, the AHLA provision goes to 
the very essence of the agreement.  If the provision were to be severed, the trial 
court would be forced to rewrite the agreement and to add an entirely new set of 
procedural rules and burdens and standards, a job that the trial court is not tasked 
to do.  See Local No. 234, 66 So. 2d at 821-22. 
 
Further, if the AHLA provision were severed, the trial court would be hard 
pressed to conclude with reasonable certainty that, with the illegal provision gone, 
“there still remains of the contract valid legal promises on one side which are 
wholly supported by valid legal promises on the other,” id.—particularly, when 
those legal promises are viewed through the eyes of the contracting parties.  See 
generally id. at 822.  Accordingly, we conclude that the rationale expressed by the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Hanson is cogent and compelling.  We note that 
the trial court below ruled that the limitations of remedies provisions in the present 
case are not severable—and we agree with that assessment.  Under the above 
 
- 39 - 
standard of review, we hold that the district court below erred in ruling that the 
AHLA provision in this case is severable. 
V.  RENT-A-CENTER V. JACKSON 
 
Approximately two weeks after this Court heard oral argument in the present 
case, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Rent-A-Center, West, 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), in which that Court addressed the issue of 
whether the court or the arbitrator must determine whether an arbitration 
agreement is unconscionable (Jackson contended that the agreement was 
unconscionable under Nevada law because it required the splitting of arbitration 
fees) where the agreement contained a provision, known as a delegation provision, 
in which the parties specifically agreed to arbitrate the enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement.  The United States Supreme Court held that, where there has 
been no specific challenge to the delegation provision, the arbitrator, not the court, 
must decide the issue. 
 
After Jackson was decided, this Court sua sponte requested supplemental 
briefing from the present parties to address whether Jackson is applicable to the 
present case.  In its supplemental brief, OP Winter Haven contends that under 
Jackson the arbitrator, not the court, must decide whether the present arbitration 
agreement violates public policy because although Shotts challenged the arbitration 
 
- 40 - 
agreement, she failed to challenge the specific arbitration “clause” under which the 
parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute.  We disagree. 
 
In Jackson, after Antonio Jackson filed an employment discrimination claim 
against Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., which was his former employer, Rent-A-Center 
filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate 
Claims that Jackson had signed as a condition of his employment.  The agreement 
contained a delegation provision in which the parties agreed to arbitrate the 
enforceability of the agreement.  Jackson did not challenge the delegation 
provision specifically; rather, he opposed the motion on the ground that the entire 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.  The federal district court granted the 
motion, and the circuit court of appeals reversed.  The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and reversed, ruling that the delegation provision was 
controlling. 
The United States Supreme Court in Jackson engaged in a three-step 
analysis of the Rent-A-Center arbitration agreement under section 2 of the FAA.  
First, that Court reviewed the arbitration agreement under the key language of 
section 2 and noted that the agreement was multifaceted for section 2 purposes:     
 
The Agreement here contains multiple “written provision[s]” to 
“settle by arbitration a controversy.”  Two are relevant to our 
discussion.  First, the section titled “Claims Covered By The 
Agreement” provides for arbitration of all “past, present or future” 
disputes arising out of Jackson's employment with Rent-A-Center.  
Second, the section titled “Arbitration Procedures” provides that 
 
- 41 - 
“[t]he Arbitrator . . . shall have exclusive authority to resolve any 
dispute relating to the . . . enforceability . . . of this Agreement 
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this 
Agreement is void or voidable.”  The current “controversy” between 
the parties is whether the Agreement is unconscionable.  It is the 
second provision, which delegates resolution of that controversy to the 
arbitrator, that Rent-A-Center seeks to enforce.  Adopting the 
terminology used by the parties, we will refer to it as the delegation 
provision. 
 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2777 (citations omitted). 
 
Second, that Court examined its own precedent in this area and reiterated the 
basic contours of federal arbitration law arising from section 2: 
 
There are two types of validity challenges under § 2: “One type 
challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate,” and 
“[t]he other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that 
directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the agreement was 
fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the 
contract's provisions renders the whole contract invalid.”  Buckeye 
[Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006)].  In a 
line of cases neither party has asked us to overrule, we held that only 
the first type of challenge is relevant to a court's determination 
whether the arbitration agreement at issue is enforceable.  See Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404 
(1967); Buckeye, supra, at 444-446; Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 
353-354 (2008).  That is because § 2 states that a “written provision” 
“to settle by arbitration a controversy” is “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable” without mention of the validity of the contract in which 
it is contained.  Thus, a party's challenge to another provision of the 
contract, or to the contract as a whole, does not prevent a court from 
enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate.  “[A]s a matter of 
substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is 
severable from the remainder of the contract.”  Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 
445; see also id., at 447 (the severability rule is based on § 2). 
 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2778 (footnote omitted). 
 
- 42 - 
 
And finally, the United States Supreme Court superimposed the above 
section 2 template onto the arbitration agreement in Jackson: 
 
Here, the “written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a 
controversy,” 9 U.S.C. § 2, that Rent-A-Center asks us to enforce is 
the delegation provision—the provision that gave the arbitrator 
“exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . . 
enforceability . . . of this Agreement.”  The “remainder of the 
contract,” Buckeye, supra, at 445, is the rest of the agreement to 
arbitrate claims arising out of Jackson's employment with Rent-A-
Center.  To be sure this case differs from Prima Paint, Buckeye, and 
Preston, in that the arbitration provisions sought to be enforced in 
those cases were contained in contracts unrelated to arbitration—
contracts for consulting services, see Prima Paint, supra, at 397, 
check-cashing services, see Buckeye, supra, at 442, and “personal 
management” or “talent agent” services, see Preston, supra, at 352.  In 
this case, the underlying contract is itself an arbitration agreement.  
But that makes no difference.  Application of the severability rule 
does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the contract.  
Section 2 operates on the specific “written provision” to “settle by 
arbitration a controversy” that the party seeks to enforce.  
Accordingly, unless Jackson challenged the delegation provision 
specifically, we must treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it 
under [the other provisions of the FAA], leaving any challenge to the 
validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator. 
 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2779 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  Because 
Jackson challenged the arbitration agreement as a whole, but not the delegation 
provision specifically, he was entitled to no relief. 
 
In the present case, because the arbitration agreement contained no 
delegation provision, there was no such provision for Shotts to challenge.  Instead, 
she challenged the arbitration agreement itself.  This was the proper course of 
action under the section 2 template, for unlike the situation in Jackson, the entire 
 
- 43 - 
arbitration agreement in the present case operated as the “written provision . . . to 
settle by arbitration a controversy,” in the section 2 lexicon.  To the extent OP 
Winter Haven now claims that it is entitled to relief under Jackson because Shotts 
failed to challenge the particular arbitration “clause”—as opposed to the arbitration 
“agreement”—under which the parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute, this claim 
lacks merit.  OP Winter Haven has failed to point to the particular “clause” to 
which it is referring and has failed to distinguish this clause in any meaningful way 
from the agreement itself.  The present case thus differs from Jackson in this 
respect, and the decision in Jackson is inapplicable here.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court in the present 
case erred in the following respects: (i) in failing to rule that the trial court, not the 
arbitrator, must decide whether the arbitration agreement in this case violates 
public policy, (ii) in failing to rule that the limitations of remedies provisions in the 
present case violate public policy, and (iii) in ruling that the limitations of remedies 
provision that imposes the AHLA rules in the present case is severable.  We also 
conclude that the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Rent-A-Center, West, 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), is inapplicable here. 
 
We quash the decision of the district court in Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, 
Inc., 988 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). 
 
- 44 - 
 
It is so ordered.  
LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
 
Because the majority‟s opinion seriously violates the Federal Arbitration Act 
and its accompanying federal substantive law,22 I respectfully dissent.  This case is 
controlled by the United States Supreme Court‟s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, 
West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (holding that the arbitrator, rather 
than the court, is to decide the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, as 
required by the contract, because Jackson did not challenge the delegation 
provision specifically).   
Once again, this Court erroneously applies Florida law to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act.  See Cardegna v. 
                                          
 
 
22.  “Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] is a congressional declaration 
of liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.  The effect of the section is to 
create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any 
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.  Moses H. Cone Mem‟l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also Vaden v. Discover 
Bank, 129 S.Ct. 1262 ,1271 (2009) (“The „body of federal substantive law‟ 
generated by elaboration of FAA § 2 is equally binding on state and federal 
courts.”). 
 
- 45 - 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005) (applying Florida law to 
hold that Florida courts rather than an arbitrator should make determination), rev‟d, 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006) (rejecting 
“the Florida Supreme Court‟s conclusion that enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement should turn on „Florida public policy and contract law,‟ 894 So. 2d at 
864”).  As provided by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the arbitration 
agreement should be enforced as agreed by the parties, not stricken at the whim of 
this Court.  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int‟l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 
1774-75 (2010) (noting that the FAA requires courts to “give effect to the 
contractual rights and expectations of the parties,” parties who are free to structure 
their arbitration agreement regarding how the arbitration is to be done and what it 
will cover) (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
 
On May 23, 2003, Gayle Shotts signed an Admissions Agreement and a 
separate Resident and Facility Binding Arbitration Agreement for Edward Clark‟s 
admission to Tandem Health Care of Winter Haven, a skilled nursing facility 
located in Winter Haven, Florida.  The separate arbitration agreement states that 
the parties acknowledge that the admission is “a transaction involving interstate 
commerce” and that the parties expressly agree that “this Agreement will be 
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 1-16 („FAA‟).”   
 
- 46 - 
 
The scope of the arbitration agreement is very broad, applying to “any 
dispute that might arise during Ed Clark‟s . . . stay at Tandem Health Care of 
Winter Haven.”  (Emphasis added.)  The arbitration agreement further states: 
This Agreement includes, but is not limited to, violations of any 
right granted to the Resident by law, including statutory resident‟s 
rights, or by the Admission Agreement, breach of contract, fraud or 
misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, malpractice or any 
other claim based on any alleged departure from accepted standards of 
medical or health care or safety, whether sounding in tort resulting in 
personal injury, or in contract.  In no event shall this Agreement apply 
to any Facility dispute with Resident regarding payment for services 
rendered by Facility during Resident‟s stay. 
 
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, the arbitration 
hearing shall be conducted before a panel of three arbitrators, 
(selected from the AHLA Procedures Panel), one chosen by each side 
in the dispute with the third to be chosen by the two arbitrators 
previously chosen.  The arbitrator(s) shall be chosen within thirty (30) 
days of the service of the arbitration notice.  The arbitration hearing 
and other proceedings relative to the arbitration of the claim, 
including discovery, shall be conducted in accordance with the AHLA 
Procedures that do not conflict with the FAA.  The parties agree that 
damages awarded, if any, in an arbitration conducted pursuant to this 
Binding Arbitration Agreement shall be determined in accordance 
with the provisions of Florida law applicable to a comparable civil 
action, except that the parties acknowledge that the arbitrators shall 
have no authority to award punitive damages or any other damages 
not measured by the prevailing party‟s actual damages, and the parties 
expressly waive their right to obtain such damages in arbitration or in 
any other forum.  The arbitration panel shall have authority to award 
equitable relief (i.e. relief other than monetary), should the arbitrators 
so decide. 
Each party may be represented by counsel in connection with 
an arbitration proceeding covered under this Agreement, and each 
party agrees to bear its own attorneys‟ fees and costs.  In the event 
that any party to this Agreement refuses to go forward with 
 
- 47 - 
arbitration, the party compelling arbitration reserves the right to 
proceed with arbitration and the Resident and the Facility expressly 
acknowledge the applicability of the FAA allowing the aggrieved 
party to petition an appropriate court for enforcement of this 
Agreement and to obtain a stay of any other proceeding.  Submission 
of any dispute under this Agreement may only be avoided as 
specifically allowed by the FAA.  To the extent permitted by 
applicable law, any party to this Agreement who refuses to go forward 
with arbitration hereby acknowledges that the arbitrator will go 
forward with the arbitration hearing and render a binding decision 
without the participation of the party opposing arbitration or despite 
their absence at the arbitration hearing. 
  
. . . . 
In the event that any portion of this Agreement will be 
determined to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this 
Agreement will be deemed to continue to be binding upon the parties 
hereby in the same matter as if the invalid or unenforceable provision 
were not a part of the Agreement.  In the event that this entire 
Agreement would be determined to be invalid and unenforceable, 
then, and only then, the parties agree to revert to the  applicability of 
Paragraph 40 of the Admission Agreement between the parties, which 
requires mandatory mediation and mandatory non-binding arbitration. 
(Emphasis added.)   
The contract explicitly provides that the FAA applies, and otherwise 
acknowledges that the transaction involves interstate commerce that brings it 
within the scope of the FAA.  Therefore, the issue of “who decides” is governed by 
federal substantive law rather than Florida law.  See Anders v. Hometown Mortg. 
Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1033 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hether a court or arbitrator 
is to decide particular issues is not a question of contract law, but is instead 
governed by the FAA; it is a federal law issue to be decided under the „body of 
 
- 48 - 
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement 
within the coverage of the [FAA].”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem‟l Hosp., 460 
U.S. at 24).  Specifically, this “who decides” issue is controlled by the recent 
United States Supreme Court decision of Jackson.  The Jackson decision requires 
that the arbitration panel, rather than the court, decide the enforceability of the 
terms of the agreement because Shotts does not challenge the delegation provision 
specifically.  See Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (holding that the arbitrator, rather than 
the court, is to decide the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, as required by 
the contract, because Jackson did not challenge the delegation provision 
specifically). 
Instead of properly applying Jackson, the majority of this Court mistakenly 
attempts to distinguish it on the basis that “unlike the situation in Jackson, the 
entire arbitration agreement in the present case operated as the „written provision . . 
. to settle by arbitration a controversy,‟ in the section 2 lexicon.”  Majority op. at 
42-43.  However, in both Jackson and this case, the arbitration agreement is a 
separate, stand-alone agreement rather than a section of one contract.  In both 
cases, the entire arbitration agreement is challenged. 
 
Significantly, the majority also erroneously states that there is no delegation 
provision in the arbitration agreement at issue in this case.  See majority op. at 42.  
However, the agreement provides that “any dispute” will be arbitrated.  Petitioner‟s 
 
- 49 - 
challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement are within the scope of 
the agreement because they are within the scope of “any dispute” that might arise 
during the stay at the facility.23  Therefore, the determination of enforceability of 
the arbitration agreement that would have been determined by the court as a 
gateway matter has been clearly and unmistakably delegated to arbitration by the 
language of the contract, as in Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2777 n.1 (citing First Options 
of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).   
Petitioner has made no challenge to the delegation provision of the 
arbitration agreement that requires any dispute to be arbitrated.  Therefore, 
enforceability, as in Jackson, must be determined by the arbitration panel rather 
than the court, together with any other disputes24 as the contract requires.    
                                          
 
 
23.  The additional language in the agreement does not restrict this in any 
way.  The only restriction stated in the agreement, which is outside the scope of 
arbitration, is over the payment for services.  The listing of the types of disputes is 
not all-inclusive by the contract‟s explicit terms of “but is not limited to.”  
Moreover, the enforceability of the agreement is contemplated because it includes 
remedies associated with “fraud or misrepresentation.”  
 
 
24.  The dispute over severability should also be determined by arbitration 
rather than the court.  The majority refuses to enforce the explicit terms of the 
contract that provides for severability, under the surprising rationale of not wanting 
to rewrite the parties‟ contract.  It seems to me that by ignoring the explicit 
provision of the contract requiring severability, the majority has rewritten the 
contract to its liking to void an arbitration agreement.  This violates the FAA.  See 
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 443 (“To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, 
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.  Section 2 
embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements 
on equal footing with all other contracts . . . .”). 
 
- 50 - 
   
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-2635 
 
 
(Polk County) 
 
Isaac Ruiz-Carus, Bennie Lazzara, Jr. and Blair N. Mendes of Wilkes and 
McHugh, P.A., Tampa, Florida, and Susan B. Morrison of Law Offices of Susan B. 
Morrison, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Antonio Cifuentes, Daniel E. Dias, and Alyssa L. Katz of Mancuso and Dias, P.A., 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents 
 
Matthew J. Conigliaro, Sylvia H. Walbot, and Annette Marie Lang of Carlton 
Fields, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida, on behalf of Heartland of Zephyrhills, FL, 
LLC, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae