Title: Ex Parte EJM
Citation: 829 So. 2d 105
Docket Number: 1990510
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 2001

829 So. 2d 105 (2001)
Ex parte E.J.M. and Capouano, Smith, Warren &amp; Klinner, P.C.
(Re Montgomery County, Grand Jury, Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum No. 99-109).
1990510.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 7, 2001.
Rehearing Denied December 7, 2001.
*106 J. Mark White and William M. Bowen, Jr., of White, Dunn &amp; Booker, Birmingham, for petitioners.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen.; and George A. Martin, Jr., John Gibbs, and Miles M. Hart, asst. attys. gen., for respondent.
James L. Sumner, Jr., director/deputy atty. gen., and Hugh R. Evans III, asst. director/gen. counsel, amicus curiae Alabama Ethics Commission.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
E.J.M. and Capouano, Smith, Warren &amp; Klinner, P.C., petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to direct the trial judge to quash Montgomery County grand jury subpoena duces tecum no. 99-109. We grant the petition and issue the writ.
On May 7, 1999, the foreperson of the Montgomery County Grand Jury issued an instanter subpoena duces tecum no. 99-109 to the "Managing Partner" of the Capouano, Smith, Warren &amp; Klinner law firm ("the Law Firm"). The subpoena directed the "Managing Partner" to produce to "Bill Long, investigator, office of the Attorney General, State of Alabama" various documents relating to the relationship between the Law Firm and E.J.M., a lawyer and a former director of the Ethics Commission, and relating to the representation of certain clients by E.J.M. or by the Law Firm or by E.J.M. in association with the Law Firm.
On May 10, 1999, E.J.M. and the Law Firm moved to quash the grand jury subpoena duces tecum on various grounds. Following a telephone conference with the parties and the General Counsel of the Alabama State Bar Association, the trial court asked the General Counsel of the Bar Association to provide the court with opinions of the Disciplinary Commission and of the Office of the General Counsel regarding Rule 1.6, Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. By letter dated May 13, 1999, the General Counsel provided the trial court with the requested opinions. Thereafter, the Attorney General filed a brief in opposition to the motion to quash. Following a hearing on the motion to quash, the trial court directed the parties to brief the following issue:
The parties filed briefs addressing the specified issue. Following the submission of proposed orders by the parties, the trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the motion to quash and modifying the grand jury subpoena duces tecum.
*107 E.J.M. and the Law Firm petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to quash the subpoena duces tecum. On December 3, 1999, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted in part and denied in part the petition for a writ of mandamus, modified the subpoena duces tecum, but left it in effect for the production of some materials sought.
"`A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires the showing of: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty on the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'" Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 761 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala.1998)).
E.J.M. and the Law Firm assert: (1) that neither the trial court nor the Court of Criminal Appeals has the authority to "`reform' or `modify' a grand jury subpoena"; (2) that the Court of Criminal Appeals does not have the authority to change the wording of a grand jury subpoena; (3) that the grand jury subpoena is void because it directed a return of the subpoenaed materials outside of the presence of the grand jury to an investigator with the Attorney General's office; (4) that the grand jury subpoena "is indiscriminate and overbroad," and contrary to Rule 1.6, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.; and (5) that "[t]he Ethics Commission improperly referred the complaint to the Attorney General in disregard of certain procedural safeguards." We find the issue whether "[t]he Ethics Commission improperly referred the complaint to the Attorney General in disregard of certain procedural safeguards" to be dispositive.
Within the course of an investigation of a certain person, the Ethics Commission acquired information that caused it to believe that E.J.M. had violated the Ethics Act in his representation of that person and possibly other clients before the Ethics Commission. Without any complaint filed by anyone outside the Ethics Commission, the Ethics Commission itself initiated a complaint against E.J.M.; and, instead of following the mandate of § 36-25-4(c), Ala.Code 1975, to refer the complaint to a three-judge panel for hearing, the Ethics Commission "asked the Attorney General to handle the ... matter." June 28, 1999, Letter from Attorney General to the trial judge, p. 1. The Attorney General then convened a grand jury to investigate whether there was probable cause to believe that E.J.M. had, in fact, violated the Ethics Act; and that grand jury issued the subpoena duces tecum now being challenged.
E.J.M. and the Law Firm contend that the Ethics Commission violated the Ethics Act by referring the matter to the Attorney General without heeding the prerequisites and restrictions of § 36-25-4(c), which prescribes the way for the Ethics Commission to investigate or to initiate a complaint:
E.J.M. and the Law Firm contend that the violation of these statutory mandates invalidates the consequent subpoena duces tecum. We agree.
The Attorney General and the Ethics Commission first argue that § 36-25-4(a)(8), which provides that the Ethics Commission shall "[r]eport suspected violations of law to the appropriate law-enforcement authorities," authorized the disclosure by the Ethics Commission directly to the Attorney General rather than only to the three-judge panel required by § 36-25-4(c). Likewise, the Attorney General and the Ethics Commission argue that § 36-25-27(c) authorized the disclosure by the Ethics Commission directly to the Attorney General rather than only to the three-judge panel. Section 36-25-27(c) reads, in pertinent part:
The specific strictures of § 36-25-4(c), however, control the effect of both § 36-25-4(a)(8) and § 36-25-27(c).
Geter v. United States Steel Corp., 264 Ala. 94, 97, 84 So. 2d 770, 773 (1956). See also Crawford v. Springle, 631 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala.1993) ("Where statutes in pari materia are general and specific, the more specific statute controls the more general statute."). Moreover, a conflict in statutory provisions should not be resolved in a way that nullifies safeguards. See State v. Bragg, 710 So. 2d 417 (Ala.1998), and Starlite Lanes, Inc. v. State, 283 Ala. 48, 214 So. 2d 324 (1968). Therefore, § 36-25-4(c) provides the procedure for the Ethics Commission to follow in order to report suspected violations of law pursuant to § 36-25-4(a)(8); and § 36-25-27(c) authorizes the Ethics Commission to refer directly to the Attorney General only those complaints filed by others than the Ethics Commission itself, not complaints initiated in-house by the Ethics Commission, which are governed by the strictures and safeguards of § 36-25-4(c) mandating referral to a three-judge panel.
Finally, the Attorney General and the Ethics Commission argue that the Attorney General can investigate the alleged wrongdoing of E.J.M. pursuant to that part of § 36-25-27(c) which provides:
We cannot agree. The investigation by the Attorney General is illegal notwithstanding his independent right to investigate granted by this part of § 36-25-27(c) because the matter to be investigated was the confidential information of the Ethics Commission illegally disclosed to the Attorney General.
Ethics Commission proceedings and information are confidential. Section 36-25-4(b), governing the Ethics Commission, provides:
Section 12-16-214, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
*110 Section 12-16-215 provides, in pertinent part:
Section 12-16-216 provides, in pertinent part:
The Ethics Commission could not disclose its confidential information about E.J.M. except pursuant to authority of law. The controlling authority, as already explained, was, and is, § 36-25-4(c). The only action § 36-25-4(c) authorized for this type of complaint, one originating within the Ethics Commission itself, was reference of the matter to a three-judge panel. No law authorized the Ethics Commission to disclose information about E.J.M. to the Attorney General.
The Ethics Commission admits in its brief that it disclosed the confidential matter to the Attorney General without obeying § 36-25-4(c). Thus, the Ethics Commission violated the confidentiality commands of § 36-25-4(b). The Attorney General does not claim any independent knowledge of wrongdoing by E.J.M. Therefore, the Attorney General's investigation and convening of the grand jury were and are illegal as the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), and Ex parte Yarber, 375 So. 2d 1231 (Ala.1979). Because the investigation and this grand jury were and are illegal, the subpoena duces tecum issued by the grand jury is illegal.
E.J.M. and the Law Firm have shown a clear legal right to the relief they seek. Therefore, we issue a writ of mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its denial of the petition for a writ of mandamus and to issue a writ directing the trial court to quash Montgomery County Grand Jury subpoena duces tecum no. 99-109.
WRIT GRANTED.
MOORE, C.J., and LYONS, BROWN, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., recuses himself.