Title: State ex rel. Wishom v. Honorable Bryant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99949
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2023

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
STATE EX REL. STEVEN WISHOM, 
) 
) 
Relator, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No.  SC99949 
) 
THE HONORABLE PAULA P. 
) 
BRYANT, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
Steven Wishom petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition barring the circuit court 
from taking any further action in Wishom’s pending criminal case other than to dismiss the 
charges pending against him.  In his writ petition, Wishom alleges the circuit court violated 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) when it continued his criminal case and failed 
to conduct a trial within 180 days of his request to dispose of his pending charges.  Because 
the State waived any argument that Wishom failed to properly invoke his rights under the 
IAD and the circuit court lacked good cause to continue Wishom’s trial when all the parties 
were ready and prepared to try his pending case within the 180-day period, the IAD 
mandates dismissal of Wishom’s case.  For these reasons, the Court makes permanent its 
Opinion issued August 29, 2023
2 
 
preliminary writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any further action in Wishom’s 
pending criminal matter other than dismissing the charges. 
Background 
 
On January 29, 2020, the State filed a complaint in the St. Louis circuit court 
charging Steven Wishom with rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse.1  Wishom was arrested and 
detained, and retained counsel appeared on his behalf on March 4, 2020.  After posting a 
monetary bond, Wishom was taken into federal custody on criminal charges in May 2020.  
He ultimately pleaded guilty to those federal charges and was sentenced to 36 months in 
federal prison. 
 
In February 2022, while Wishom was serving his federal sentence at a penitentiary 
in Kentucky, a warrant issued for his arrest on the state charges in St. Louis.  Based on this 
warrant, a detainer was lodged with the federal penitentiary in Kentucky preventing his 
release after he finished serving his sentence.  Pursuant the IAD, Wishom filed a request 
to dispose of the St. Louis charges.  The circuit court and the State received this request on 
April 14, 2022.  If properly invoked, the IAD required the State to dispose of Wishom’s 
pending charges within 180 days of the State’s and the court’s receipt of his request to 
dispose of the charges.   
In response to Wishom’s request, the State, on April 20, 2022, sent the federal prison 
a request to take temporary custody of Wishom.  The State’s request for temporary custody 
                                                 
1 A grand jury returned an indictment charging Wishom with the same offenses on March 
5, 2020.  Before the scheduled trial date, a substitute information in lieu of indictment was 
filed on October 7, 2022, charging him with rape and sodomy but not sexual abuse. 
3 
 
was made pursuant to a form titled “IAD/STATE WRIT – PROSECUTOR’S 
CERTIFICATION,” which required the State to choose between two separate boxes 
indicating whether the request for temporary custody was made pursuant to the “IAD” or 
“State Writ.”  The State checked the IAD box, causing the form to state:  “I, [Assistant 
Circuit Attorney], hereby request temporary custody of Steven Wishom via IAD.”  Federal 
officials at the penitentiary thereafter sent an offer to deliver temporary custody of Wishom 
to the State under the IAD to dispose of his pending charges.  In addition, the federal prison 
sent a certificate of Wishom’s inmate status, stating the length of his federal sentence, the 
time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good 
time earned, the time of parole eligibility, and any decision of the parole agency governing 
his federal sentence.  This certificate was received by the State and filed by the circuit 
court.   
The State received custody of Wishom on June 8, 2022.  On June 13, private 
counsel, who had not formally entered an appearance on Wishom’s behalf, requested a 
short continuance to confer with Wishom until June 21.2  During a June 21 hearing, the 
circuit court found Wishom indigent and appointed him a public defender.  At the hearing, 
the State notified the court that Wishom’s charged offenses were required to be disposed 
by October 23, 2022, to comply with the 180-day IAD deadline.  The State also notified 
the court it filed a motion to compel Wishom to provide a biological sample for DNA 
testing and asked the court to set a date for a hearing on the motion.  In response, the court 
                                                 
2 The attorney appearing with Wishom on June 13 was not the same lawyer or associated 
with the lawyer who had previously appeared on Wishom’s behalf on March 4, 2020. 
4 
 
scheduled a hearing on the State’s motion and set Wishom’s case for trial on October 17, 
2022. 
On June 23, 2022, a public defender appeared on Wishom’s behalf, and Wishom, 
thereafter, filed objections to the State’s motion to compel.  In the objections, Wishom 
noted that October 11, 2022, not October 23, was the appropriate IAD deadline.  After a 
hearing on the State’s motion to compel, the court entered an order sustaining the motion 
to compel and rescheduled Wishom’s trial for October 11. 
On October 11, 2022—within the 180-day period after the State and circuit court 
received Wishom’s IAD request to dispose of the pending charges—both the State and 
Wishom appeared in circuit court ready for trial.  Despite two other non-IAD jury trials 
commencing on that date in other divisions of the circuit court, the court failed to secure a 
jury panel and continued the case on its own accord without request from either Wishom 
or the State.  On October 14, Wishom filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds 
the court failed to dispose of the charged offenses within the required IAD timeframe. 
 
The circuit court held a hearing on October 18, 2022, regarding Wishom’s motion 
to dismiss.  At the hearing, and in response to Wishom’s motion to dismiss, the State 
conceded Wishom “did do everything that he was supposed to do” to comply with the IAD 
and the State “showed up prepared for trial within the 180 day period.”  The State, 
nevertheless, asked the court to find good cause for continuing the October 11 trial setting 
based on the court’s inability to secure a jury panel.  The court agreed with the State’s 
argument and overruled Wishom’s motion to dismiss.  In so doing, the court faulted 
Wishom for not requesting to be put on the circuit court’s “priority list” for the October 11 
5 
 
trial setting to ensure the court secured a jury panel from the summoned jury pool and 
entered an order finding “good cause for the continuance as there was not a jury panel 
available.”3  The court and parties agreed to set the case for trial on October 31, 2022, with 
a backup date of January 30, 2023. 
Wishom appeared October 31, 2022 in the circuit court again ready for trial, but the 
court again continued the case on its own accord to January 30, 2023.  On January 27, 
2023, Wishom sought a writ of prohibition from this Court prohibiting the circuit court 
from taking any further action in his pending criminal matter other than entering an order 
dismissing the charges against him.  This Court issued a preliminary writ directing the 
circuit court to show cause why a permanent writ should not be entered. 
Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs pursuant to article V, 
section 4.1 of the Missouri Constitution.  The writ of prohibition is an “extraordinary 
remedy” and is appropriate: 
(1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when a lower court lacks 
authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, jurisdiction or 
abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended; 
or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted. 
 
State ex rel. T.J. v. Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal quotation 
omitted).  Courts have utilized this extraordinary remedy and issued remedial writs to 
                                                 
3 The St. Louis circuit court, by administrative order, created the “priority list” to track and 
prioritize cases set for trial during the COVID-19 pandemic when in-person proceedings 
were limited.  The order required judicial officers to submit a priority trial request to the 
presiding judge to request placement on the priority jury trial docket. 
6 
 
prevent a circuit court from proceeding in a case when the 180-day deadline to dispose of 
pending charges has expired in violation of the IAD.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Suitor v. 
Stremel, 968 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Mo. App. 1998); State ex rel. Saxton v. Moore, 598 S.W.2d 
586, 592-93 (Mo. App. 1980). 
Analysis  
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
This case concerns the IAD’s applicability to the disposition of the state charges 
pending against Wishom resulting in the detainer lodged with the federal penitentiary 
where he was serving a federal sentence.  A detainer is “a request filed by a criminal justice 
agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either 
to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is 
imminent.”  Farish v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 416 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Mo. banc 2013) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985)).  The harmful effect of 
detainers has been “well documented.”  State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 355 
(Mo. banc 1982).  It is not uncommon for prison authorities to “accord[] detainers 
considerable weight in making decisions” regarding prisoner treatment.  United States v. 
Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1977).  Historically, a “prisoner was often deprived 
of the ability to take advantage of many of the prison’s programs aimed at rehabilitation, 
merely because there was a detainer lodged against him.”  United States v. Mauro, 436 
U.S. 340, 359 (1978).  An unresolved detainer, moreover, leaves the offender believing 
there is “little hope for his release[,]” Kemp, 629 S.W.2d at 355 (quoting E. Dauber, 
Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 669, 671 (1971)), and, 
7 
 
consequently, with “little inclination toward self-improvement.”  Id. (quoting Smith v. 
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379 (1969)).  As a result, unresolved detainers risk defeating the 
objective of the correctional system to rehabilitate the offender and reduce recidivism.  See 
id. (quoting Dauber, supra at 671).  
To combat the problems posed by unresolved detainers, the federal government and 
almost all states —including Missouri — have entered into the IAD.  See 5 Wayne R. 
LaFave et. al., Crim. Proc. § 18.4(c) (4th ed. 2022); Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343-44; Kemp, 
629 S.W.2d at 355.  Missouri has codified the IAD in section 217.490.4  The IAD applies 
to criminal charges pending against a prisoner while the prisoner is incarcerated in another 
jurisdiction’s correctional system.5  Kemp, 629 S.W.2d at 355.  Its stated purpose is “to 
encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the 
proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or 
complaints.”  Section 217.490, art. I.  The participating states agree to be bound by the 
terms of the IAD because detainers “produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of 
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.”  Id. 
 
 
                                                 
4 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016.  Missouri previously codified the IAD in 
sections 222.160-.220.  See Kemp, 629 S.W.2d at 355. 
5 Missouri has also adopted the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law 
(UMDDL), currently codified in sections 217.450-.485.  The UMDDL provides for the 
prompt disposition of detainers based on untried state charges pending in Missouri against 
a prisoner held within the Missouri Department of Corrections.  Kemp, 629 S.W.2d at 354.  
A “basic principle of statutory construction is that statutes relating to the same subject 
matter, such as the [UMDDL] and the [IAD], are in pari materia and must be considered 
together.”  Id. at 359 (internal citation omitted). 
8 
 
To encourage the speedy disposition of lodged detainers, the IAD provides: 
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or 
correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance 
of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any 
untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer 
has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one 
hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the 
prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s 
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request 
for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; 
provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel 
being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the 
prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being 
held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the 
sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the 
prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
 
Id. art. III, sec. 1 (emphasis added). 
  
The IAD further provides: 
If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody 
of the person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or 
complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought 
to trial within the period provided in article III or article IV of this agreement, 
the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or 
complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with 
prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or 
effect. 
 
Id. art. V, sec. 3. 
In this case, the State and the circuit court, on April 14, 2022, received Wishom’s 
request under the IAD to dispose of his pending charges.  If properly invoked, the 180-day 
time limit mandated by the IAD started running on that date.  Id. art. III, sec. 1 (“[H]e shall 
be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered 
9 
 
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction 
[his IAD request.]”); Kemp, 629 S.W.2d at 356 (holding the 180-day IAD period began 
upon receipt of the prisoner’s request by both the prosecuting attorney and circuit court).  
The IAD, therefore, required the charges against Wishom to be dismissed if not tried or 
disposed within 180 days after the State and the circuit court received his request to dispose 
of the pending charges.  Section 217.490, art. III, sec. 1; Id. art. V, sec. 3.   
After receiving his request, the State accepted custody of Wishom under the IAD, 
and both parties appeared ready for trial on October 11, 2022—within 180 days after 
Wishom’s request was received.  The circuit court, however, failed to secure a jury panel 
to try Wishom on October 11 or otherwise dispose of the charges against him.  The State 
now puts forth several reasons why the period of limitations the IAD imposed did not run 
on October 11 and Wishom’s pending charges should not be dismissed.  None of its 
arguments is availing. 
Waiver 
The State argues, for the first time in this appeal, that Wishom’s rights under the 
IAD were never properly invoked because he failed to accompany his request for 
disposition of his charges with a certificate of his inmate status from the federal prison.6  It 
is true, a prisoner must accompany a request to dispose of charges under the IAD with a 
certificate of inmate status in order to properly invoke the IAD. Section 217.490, art. III, 
                                                 
6 The record reflects the State did receive a certificate of inmate status from the federal 
penitentiary where Wishom was incarcerated, but the certificate did not accompany his 
request for disposition of his charges. 
10 
 
sec. 1 (“The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate 
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of the commitment under which 
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the 
sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and 
any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.”).  Without this certificate, 
the State may lack the information necessary to decide how to proceed on a prisoner’s IAD 
request.7  The certificate, therefore, is an essential requirement to invoke the provisions of 
the IAD.8  Id. art. III, sec. 1. 
The State, however, may waive a prisoner’s compliance with the provisions of the 
IAD, as several appellate courts have recognized.  See, e.g., Suitor, 968 S.W.2d 221; 
Saxton, 598 S.W.2d 586.  In Suitor, an Oklahoma prisoner filed a motion in the circuit 
court seeking disposition of a pending Missouri charge but failed to accompany his request 
with a certificate of inmate status from the prison warden.  968 S.W.2d at 222, 224.  The 
prosecutor responded to the prisoner’s request by sending an “Acceptance of Temporary 
Custody Offered in Connection with a Prisoner’s Request for Disposition of a Detainer” to 
the warden of the Oklahoma prison.  Id. at 222.  The form set forth the prosecutor’s 
                                                 
7 Upon reviewing the certificate of inmate status, for example, the State may determine it 
an unwise use of resources to take temporary custody of a prisoner if the prisoner has a 
lengthy sentence in another jurisdiction and the interests of justice do not warrant pursuing 
the pending charges.  In such cases, the State, in its discretion, may decide to remove the 
detainer or dismiss the case rather than pursue the charges. 
8 Missouri appellate courts have suggested including a certificate of inmate status is not 
essential to properly invoke the IAD.  To the extent prior cases have so held, they should 
no longer be followed.  See, e.g., State v. Severance, 453 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. App. 2014); 
State v. Woods, 259 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Mo. App. 2008); Suitor, 968 S.W.2d at 225. 
11 
 
acceptance of temporary custody and intent to bring the prisoner to trial within the IAD’s 
specified timeframe.  Id.  The prisoner was not brought to trial within 180 days of his 
request, however, and sought a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals.  Id. 
The court of appeals granted mandamus relief.  Id.  It found the prosecutor’s 
acceptance of custody under the IAD waived the requirement that the certificate of inmate 
status accompany his request for disposition of the pending charges.  Id. at 224-25.  Finding 
180 days had elapsed between the prisoner’s request and his motion for dismissal, the court 
of appeals ordered the charge dismissed.  Id. at 225. 
The court of appeals reached a similar result in Saxton, 598 S.W.2d 586.  A detainer 
had been lodged against a federal prisoner in Oklahoma based upon untried charges in 
Missouri.  Id. at 587.  The prisoner sent a request for disposition of the charges to the 
prosecutor’s office, attempting to invoke the IAD, but the prisoner failed to mail his request 
to the circuit court as the IAD required.  Id. at 588.  The State, however, mailed a form to 
the federal prison titled “Prosecutor’s Acceptance of Temporary Custody Offered in 
Connection with a Prisoner’s Request for Disposition of a Detainer.”  Id.  In its 
communication with the federal penitentiary, the State “raised no objection to the 
procedure followed by the prisoner” and “formally declared the prosecutor’s acceptance of 
the prisoner’s custody for the purpose of trial, and declared the prosecutor’s intention to 
bring him to trial within the time allowed by the [IAD].”  Id. at 591-92.  The court of appeals 
found the State thereby waived any objection to the prisoner’s failure to notify the court as 
required by the IAD.  Id. 
12 
 
As in Suitor and Saxton, the State here waived any objection it may have made that 
Wishom improperly invoked the IAD.  After receiving Wishom’s request to dispose of his 
pending charges pursuant to the IAD, the State forwarded the federal prison a form titled 
“IAD/STATE WRIT – PROSECUTOR’S CERTIFICATION.”  This form required the 
State to choose between two separate boxes indicating whether the request for temporary 
custody was made pursuant to the “IAD” or “State Writ.”  The State checked the IAD box, 
causing the form to state:  “I, [Assistant Circuit Attorney], hereby request temporary 
custody of Steven Wishom via IAD[.]”9  The State never objected and claimed Wishom 
failed to properly invoke his rights under the IAD.  Further, as evidenced by the form, the 
State specifically received custody of Wishom with the intention to proceed to trial to 
dispose of the pending charges before the 180-day deadline expired pursuant to the IAD 
provision.  Indeed, the State conceded at the October 18, 2022, hearing on Wishom’s 
motion to dismiss that it believed Wishom “did do everything that he was supposed to do” 
to comply with the IAD.  Having requested and accepted temporary custody of Wishom 
under the IAD and admitting Wishom complied with the IAD, the State conceded the IAD 
                                                 
9 The State also filled out a section on the form reserved for requests for temporary custody 
pursuant to state writs and now suggests Wishom was brought to St. Louis pursuant to a 
state writ or writ ad prosequendum, rather than pursuant to the IAD.  A writ ad 
prosequendum or other state writ is issued by the circuit court rather than a request for 
temporary custody made by a prosecutor and does not invoke the protections of the IAD in 
cases in which no underlying detainer has been lodged.  See Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 at 360-
61.  Here, there was a detainer lodged against Wishom entitling him to the protections of 
the IAD, and the record clearly shows the circuit court entered no writ and the State 
requested and received temporary custody of Wishom to bring him to trial under the IAD 
despite filling out the section of the form reserved for use with state writs.  
 
13 
 
applied and waived any post hoc objection as to the sufficiency of Wishom’s request to 
dispose of his pending charges.10  Suitor, 968 S.W.2d at 224-25; Saxton, 598 S.W.2d at 
591-92. 
Good Cause 
The State also alleges good cause warranted continuing Wishom’s trial due to the 
absence of jurors to hear Wishom’s case.  Section 217.490, article III, section 1 provides 
that, “for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”  
“Good cause,” however, is not a license to evade the purpose and intent of the IAD.   
The court of appeals from this state and courts in other jurisdictions have routinely 
held that a court’s crowded trial docket does not, on its own, provide “good cause” to 
extend the IAD time period.  See, e.g., State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 548-49 (Mo. App. 
1985); State ex rel. Hammett v. McKenzie, 596 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Mo. App. 1980); Brown v. 
Wolff, 706 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1983); Ford, 550 F.2d at 743; Haigler v. United States, 
531 A.2d 1236, 1244-45 (D.C. 1987); State v. Gipson, 670 S.W.2d 637, 639-40 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1984).  Rather, the circuit court is obligated to take affirmative steps to 
prioritize an IAD case as necessary to try the prisoner within the applicable time limits.  
Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 548-49; Hammett, 596 S.W.2d at 58; Brown, 706 F.2d at 906; Ford, 
                                                 
10 Even though the State checked the box indicating it was requesting temporary custody 
of Wishom from the federal prison pursuant to the IAD, the circuit court in its return to 
Wishom’s writ petition contends the State merely requested temporary custody of Wishom 
for the court to conduct an indigency hearing and allow the State to obtain a buccal swab 
for DNA evidence.  As discussed above, the record clearly shows the State sought 
temporary custody of Wishom to bring him to trial under the provisions of the IAD. 
14 
 
550 F.2d at 743; Haigler, 531 A.2d at 1244-45; Gipson, 670 S.W.2d at 639-40.  The Court 
is not unaware or unappreciative of the excessive case load trial courts must manage, but, 
absent good cause, circuit courts must give priority to IAD cases over other criminal and 
civil cases to ensure IAD cases are tried within the appropriate timeframe.  Hammett, 596 
S.W.2d at 58; Gipson, 670 S.W.2d at 639.  Failure to do so warrants dismissal of the 
charges with prejudice.  Compare, e.g., Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 548-49; Hammett, 596 
S.W.2d at 58-60, with Commonwealth v. Dickson, 434 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Mass. 1982) 
(finding “good cause” to continue pending charges beyond the IAD deadline when the 
court had to prioritize a murder case over an IAD case because the murder case involved 
many witnesses due to leave for an extended voyage overseas).  These principles are in 
accordance with this Court’s holding that “[t]he right to a speedy trial is an important right 
that the courts of this state are duty-bound to honor, even in the face of heavy trial dockets 
and competing demands for trial.”  State ex rel. McKee v. Riley, 240 S.W.3d 720, 731 (Mo. 
banc 2007).  “Protracted and unreasonable delays in criminal cases due to crowded dockets 
cannot become routine.”  Id. 
As noted, the circuit court in this case failed to try Wishom on October 11, 2022, 
within 180 days of receiving his IAD request, and failed to provide any reason on the record 
for continuing his case on that date.  See section 217.490, art. III, sec. 1 (providing “that 
for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance” 
(emphasis added)).  It was seven days later when the court finally proffered an explanation 
in open court as required under article III.  The circuit court, on October 18, faulted 
15 
 
Wishom for not requesting to be put on the court’s “priority list” to ensure the court secured 
a jury panel from the summoned jurors and found there was “good cause for the 
continuance [on October 11] as there was not a jury panel available.”   
Having received Wishom’s IAD request, however, the circuit court was obligated 
to dispose or try Wishom’s case within the applicable time limit.  Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 
548-49; Hammett, 596 S.W.2d at 58; Brown, 706 F.2d at 906; Ford, 550 F.2d at 743; 
Haigler, 531 A.2d at 1244-45; Gipson, 670 S.W.2d at 639.  To this end the court—not 
Wishom—had the responsibility to take the affirmative steps necessary to ensure 
Wishom’s case was tried or disposed.  Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 548-49; Hammett, 596 S.W.2d 
at 58; Brown, 706 F.2d at 906; Ford, 550 F.2d at 743; Haigler, 531 A.2d at 1244-45; 
Gipson, 670 S.W.2d at 639-40.  This included prioritizing Wishom’s case over non-IAD 
cases to secure a jury panel.  Hammett, 596 S.W.2d at 58; Gipson, 670 S.W.2d at 639-40; 
see also Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 548-49.  The St. Louis circuit court secured jury panels for 
at least two non-IAD cases on October 11, refuting any notion it was unable to try Wishom 
on that date.  And there is no indication that good cause otherwise existed to prioritize 
either of the two non-IAD cases over Wishom’s case justifying the continuance.11  
Accordingly, the post hoc justifications for a continuance the circuit court proffered do not 
constitute “good cause” under the IAD.12  Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 549; Hammett, 596 S.W.2d 
at 58; c.f. McKee, 240 S.W.3d at 731. 
                                                 
11 One of the non-IAD cases tried on October 11 was a civil case. 
12 In its return to Wishom’s writ petition, the circuit court claims the trial was delayed 
because the State was not ready for trial due to pending DNA analysis and the resignation 
 
16 
 
Tolling 
The State also contends the IAD imposed limitation period was tolled during the 
time it took for Wishom to transition legal representation.  The State is correct that 
Wishom’s actions could waive or toll the IAD’s time limitations.   “It is generally held that 
any delay of a prisoner’s trial which results from his affirmative action or agreement is not 
to be included in the period of limitation.”  Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 547 (internal citations 
omitted).  Retained counsel initially entered an appearance on behalf of Wishom on March 
4, 2020.  On June 13, 2022, a different attorney who had not entered an appearance on 
Wishom’s behalf moved for a continuance until June 21 to confer with Wishom.  The 
circuit court sustained the motion and, on June 21, found Wishom indigent and appointed 
him a public defender.  The public defender entered his appearance on June 23.  Thus, 
Wishom was unrepresented for one to three days, and there is no evidence the process of 
transitioning counsel did, in fact, delay the trial.  C.f. id. at 548 (finding a defendant’s 
request for disclosures prior to trial did not provide a basis for extending the IAD time 
period because there was “no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial”).  
Even if the IAD 180-day deadline was tolled for nine to eleven days to account for the 
short continuance his counsel requested on June 13 and the few days Wishom was 
unrepresented, the IAD 180-day deadline would have been extended only to  
                                                 
of the assigned prosecutor.  The record refutes this claim, however, as the State appeared 
ready for trial on October 11 as it stated at the October 18, 2022 hearing on Wishom’s 
motion to dismiss. 
 
17 
 
October 20-22, 2022, and Wishom was not brought to trial or his case disposed by those 
dates.13   
Finally, the State argues the IAD deadline was tolled by Wishom’s agreement to 
trial dates beyond the 180-day deadline.  “If a defendant acquiesces to a trial date beyond 
the 180-day period, … the statute is tolled.”  State v. Jackson, 155 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Mo. 
App. 2005).  Wishom did agree to resetting his trial to later in October or to a backup date 
of January 30, 2023.  Wishom cannot be faulted for this, however, as he had maintained 
since June 23, after the public defender was appointed to represent him, that he desired an 
October 11, 2022, trial—within 180 days of his initial IAD request.  He agreed to 
rescheduling the October 11 trial date only after the circuit court failed to try his case on 
October 11 and overruled his motion to dismiss.  Cf. State v. Overton, 261 S.W.3d 654, 
                                                 
13 The State also contends a motion to withdraw filed by Wishom’s counsel on April 12, 
2021, tolled the 180-day deadline until the entry of Wishom’s public defender on June 23, 
2022, because Wishom was essentially unrepresented during this time period.  Contrary to 
the State’s argument, Wishom remained represented throughout this period, at least until 
June 21, 2022, when the circuit court found Wishom indigent and appointed the public 
defender.  Wishom’s lawyer was never granted leave to withdraw from representing 
Wishom until new counsel was appointed on June 21.  State v. Wilkinson, 423 S.W.2d 693, 
697 (Mo. 1968) (citing State v. Mimms, 349 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Mo. 1961)) (“[T]he 
determination of whether counsel should be permitted to withdraw from a case is generally 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.”).  Wishom’s lawyer, therefore, was obligated 
to represent Wishom despite the pending motion to withdraw, and the 180-day deadline 
was not tolled.  Rule 4-1.3, cmt. 4 (“Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in 
Rule 4-1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a 
client.”); Rule 4-1.16(c) (“A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to 
or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation unless the lawyer has filed a 
notice of termination of limited appearance.”); see also State v. Teter, 665 S.W.3d 306, 312 
(Mo. banc 2023) (“[Defendant’s] counsel [had] the responsibility to represent him until 
discharged[.]”). 
 
18 
 
661 (Mo. App. 2008) (holding the defendant acquiesced to a trial date beyond the 180-day 
IAD time limit by failing to object to the trial date at a hearing occurring before 180-day 
period expired).14  Therefore, Wishom’s actions did not waive, toll or otherwise justify 
extending the 180-day timeline the IAD mandates.  
Conclusion 
Because the State waived any argument that Wishom failed to properly invoke his 
rights under the IAD and the circuit court lacked good cause to continue Wishom’s case 
beyond the time limitation prescribed by the IAD, writ relief is warranted.  The preliminary 
writ is made permanent, and the circuit court is prohibited from taking any further action 
in Wishom’s case other than dismissing the pending charges.  
___________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
Russell, C.J., Powell, Breckenridge, Fischer,  
Ransom and Wilson, JJ., concur.  Draper, J., not participating. 
 
                                                 
14 Moreover, the circuit court also continued Wishom’s October 31 trial date, and, on that 
date, Wishom renewed his motion to dismiss for violation of the IAD.