Title: Scheers v. Independent Newspapers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 199, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
JAMES SCHEERS, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   
 
 
Claimant Below-   
§ 
No. 199, 2003 
 
 
Appellant,   
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
and for Kent County,  
INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS 
§ 
C.A. No. 02A-05-002 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Employer Below-  
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: August 12, 2003 
Decided: 
September 16, 2003 
 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from Superior Court.   AFFIRMED IN PART AND 
REMANDED IN PART. 
 
 
Walt F. Schmittinger, Esquire, of Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A., 
Dover, Delaware, for the Appellant. 
 
 
Anthony M. Frabizzio, Esquire and Cheryl A. Ward, Esquire, of 
Heckler & Frabizzio, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
 
2
 
James Scheers, an employee of Independent Newspapers, Inc. 
(“Employer”), appeals from an order of the Superior Court upholding certain 
determinations of the Industrial Accident Board (“Board”).  Two issues are 
presented on this appeal: (1) whether the Board correctly determined that 
Scheers was entitled to partial, but not total, disability compensation 
benefits; and (2) whether the Board correctly awarded Scheers only one 
attorney’s fee rather than two.  On the first issue, which concerns the award 
of partial disability benefits, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.  
On the second issue, which concerns the award of attorney’s fees, we 
remand to the Superior Court for a finding by the Board of predicate facts 
that are essential for proper appellate review and determination of that issue. 
I.  FACTS 
 
At the time of the events in question, Scheers had worked for 
Independent News for about thirty years, during which time he held several 
different positions.  In August, 1995, while performing duties within the 
course and scope of his employment, Scheers was lifting a photocopier and 
immediately afterwards felt pain around the belt line and down his legs.  
Since that incident Scheers has been unable, and has not returned, to work. 
From 1995 until 2003, Scheers received 40% total disability benefits for an 
impairment of his lumbar spine, and 2 ½ % total impairment benefits for 
 
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each of his lower extremities. Scheers’ injuries required three separate back 
surgeries.  In December, 2000, while undergoing physical therapy for his 
back, Scheers experienced pain in his right knee which ultimately resulted in 
his undergoing right knee surgery, and for which Scheers incurred $9,056.64 
in outstanding medical bills that remained unpaid.  It is undisputed that 
Scheers continues to be disabled, although the extent of his disability is 
disputed.1 
 
On October 26, 2001, the Employer filed a Petition for Review of 
Compensation seeking to terminate Scheers’ total disability payments.  On 
December 5, 2001, Scheers filed a Petition for Additional Compensation 
Due, seeking (among other things) payment of his outstanding medical 
expenses.  A hearing on both petitions was held before the Board on March 
25, 2002.  Based upon the uncontradicted medical testimony, the Board 
found that Scheers was able to work in some capacity, and that he was 
capable of sedentary work beginning February 27, 2002 when his treating 
physician, Irene Mavrakakis, M.D., released him to sedentary work.   
                                                 
1 At the hearing on the Employer’s Petition For Review of Compensation held in March 
2002, Scheers testified that he currently experiences severe pain in the coccyx area, he 
cannot play with his nine year old daughter except for short periods, he can walk only a 
couple of blocks, he sweats profusely from his medication, and he can sit without pain for 
only 30 minutes. Although his pain medication was reduced to 30% of its original level, 
Scheers continues to suffer from hallucinations, depression and insufficient sleep, and has 
gained over 100 pounds. 
 
4
Specifically, the Board found that based on his age, physical 
limitations, education, medical capacity, and training, Scheers was not a 
prima facie displaced worker. The Board’s reasoning was based on the 
following facts:  Scheers was only fifty-five years old, had transferable skills 
from his years of experience with Independent Newspapers, had a high 
school degree, was qualified for entry-level positions, and was capable of 
working in a sedentary position where he can sit down and move around 
when necessary.2  Because Scheers was not a prima facie displaced worker, 
he had the burden to prove that he had made a reasonable effort to locate 
employment, but because of his disability was unable to do so.3  The Board 
found that Scheers had not met that burden, and that Scheers’ efforts to 
locate employment were insufficient.4 Accordingly, the Board concluded 
that Scheers was not totally disabled. 
The Board did find, however, that Scheers was partially disabled 
because his medical condition restricted him to sedentary duty jobs. The 
Board also found that Scheers would suffer a loss of earning capacity of 
$744 per week for the first six months, and thereafter, a loss of earning 
capacity of $577 per week.  The Board awarded Scheers partial disability 
                                                 
2 James Scheers v. Independent Newspapers, Inc., I.A.B. Hearing No: 1063573 (April 8, 
2002) (“Board Decision”) at 10-11. 
3 Wade Insulation, Inc. v. Visnovsky, 773 A.2d 379 (Del. 2001). 
4 Board Decision at 11. 
 
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compensation consistent with those findings.  The Board also found that 
Scheers’ k
nee injury and the cost of his knee surgery were related to his 
original industrial injury, and granted his Petition for Additional 
Compensation, awarding him $9,056.63 for outstanding medical bills 
incurred for his surgery and other treatment. The Board also awarded 
Scheers medical witness fees and an attorney’s fee of $7,036.50. The 
Superior Court affirmed those determinations.5 
II.  THE APPELLANT’S CLAIMS OF ERROR 
 
As noted, Scheers advances two claims on this appeal.  The first is 
that the Superior Court erred in upholding the Board’s determination that 
Scheers was not totally disabled.  The second is that the Superior Court erred 
in upholding the Board’s award of only one attorney’s fee (based on the 
partial disability award), because the Board was legally required to award an 
additional fee based on the separate award of medical expenses.   
 
This Court, replicating the role of the Superior Court, reviews de novo 
legal issues decided by the Board, and reviews factual findings to determine 
whether they are supported by substantial evidence.6 Substantial evidence 
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
                                                 
5 Scheers v. Independent Newspapers, Inc., 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 127 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2003). 
6 Keeler v. Metal Masters Foodservice Equip. Co., 712 A.2d 1004 (Del. 1998), citing 
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892 (Del. 1994). 
 
6
to support a conclusion.7  The appellate court does not weigh evidence, 
resolve questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.8 
  
A.  Scheers’ Claim That The Board Improperly  
 
      Found That He Was Not Totally Disabled 
 
Scheers contends that in finding that he was not totally disabled, the 
Board erred, as did the Superior Court in upholding that finding. The sole 
basis for this claim is that the Board disregarded the testimony of David 
Nixon, M.D., a psychiatrist.  Dr. Nixon’s testimony was that, in his opinion, 
Scheers was unable to engage in gainful employment because of his 
depression and pain, even though Scheers’ depression had improved since he 
began taking his new medication. The issue is whether the Board’s finding 
that Scheers was not totally disabled is supported by substantial evidence. 9   
The difficulty with Scheers’ argument is that (1) the Board did, in 
fact, consider Dr. Nixon’s testimony,10 and (2) that testimony supports the 
Board’s conclusion that Scheers was not totally disabled. On cross 
examination, Dr. Nixon testified that Scheers was not totally disabled 
because of his mood or depression.  Dr. Nixon also testified, however, that 
on the question of whether Scheers was totally disabled because of his pain, 
                                                 
7 Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610 (Del. 1981), quoting Consolo v. Federal Maritime 
Comm’n, 383, U.S. 607 (1966). 
8 Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n v. Newsome, 690 A.2d 906 (Del. 1996). 
9 A. Mazzetti & Sons, Inc. v. Ruffin, 437 A.2d 1120 (Del. 1981). 
10 Indeed, the Board summarized Dr. Nixon’s testimony in its Opinion.  See note 2 supra 
at pages 8-9. 
 
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he (Dr. Nixon) would defer to the opinion of Scheers’ treating physician, Dr. 
Mavrakakis.11  Dr. Mavrakakis opined, however, that Scheers was capable of 
sedentary work.12  Moreover, the other medical testimony, all summarized in 
the Board’s Decision, supports the Board’s determination that Scheers was 
partially—but not totally—disabled.13 
Because the Board’s determination is supported by substantial 
evidence, the Superior Court did not err in upholding that determination.  
B. The Claim That The Board Erred By Not 
  Awarding Appellant Two Attorney’s Fees 
 
Scheers’ second claim attacks the sufficiency of the Board’s award of 
attorney’s fees to him.  To understand this argument, some background is 
helpful.  The Board awarded Scheers one attorney’s fee, reasoning as 
follows: 
Claimant’s attorney attested that he spent twenty-three hours 
preparing for the hearing, which lasted approximately four 
hours.  His first contact with Claimant was on January 15, 
1997.  Claimant’s attorney has been practicing law in Delaware 
                                                 
11 On cross examination, Dr. Nixon was asked: 
Mr. Frabizzio: 
If I were to tell you that Dr. Mavrakakis, who 
testified…that she thought that Mr. Scheers could 
work in some capacity based on his physical 
condition 
and 
pain 
would 
you 
have 
any 
disagreement with that? 
 
 
Dr. Nixon: 
 
No, I would defer to her opinion there. 
    Hearing Transcript at p. 70-71 (see A-80-81). 
12 Hearing Transcript at p. 103 (see A-113). 
13 See Board Decision, Supra note 2 at pages 2-8. 
 
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for over thirty-five years.  Based on these factors, and on the 
results obtained, the Board awards one attorneys’ fee in the 
amount of thirty percent of the award or $7036.50, whichever is 
less.14 
 
The aggregate amount of Scheers’ partial disability award was 
$108,558.92.  The amount of medical expenses awarded was $9,056.03. 
Because thirty percent of the sum of these two awards exceeds $7,036.50,15 
the effect of the Board’s decision was to award $7,036.50 in attorney’s fees. 
Scheers claimed in the Superior Court, as he does here, that the Board 
awarded the $7,036.50 attorney’s fee on only the partial disability award, but 
was also required to award a
 separate fee on the medical expenses award.  
Had the Board done that, Scheers contends, the attorney’s fee award would 
have been increased by an additional $2,716.81 (30% of $9,056.03).   
Both sides take the position that the standard by which this claim must 
be reviewed is whether the single fee award is supported by substantial 
evidence.  Our decisions indicate, however, that for this purpose the 
appropriate review standard is whether, in awarding a single attorney’s fee 
under 19 Del. C. § 2320(10), the Board abused its discretion.16 
                                                 
14 Id., at 14 (citation omitted). 
15 $108,558.92 + $9056.03= $117,694.95 x 30%=$35.284.49.  The $7,036 award was the 
statutory maximum for a single attorney’s fee at that time.  19 Del. C. § 2320(10). 
16 General Motors Corp. v. Burgess, 545 A.2d 1186, 1194 (Del. 1988). 
 
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Delaware law clearly requires the Board to allow an attorney’s fee for 
each separate award of compensation.17  In its Order affirming the Board, the 
Superior Court acknowledged this requirement, but concluded that even 
though the Board had expressed the award as a single attorney’s fee, the 
Board apparently concluded that the fee actually granted was sufficient to 
encompass both compensation awards.  The Superior Court stated: 
The Board could easily have expressed the award as two fees, 
with substantially all of the fees attributed to the partial 
disability compensation and a nominal amount attributed to the 
medical expense compensation.  Under these circumstances, I 
am not persuaded that the Court should find error in the manner 
in which the Board acted in this particular case.18 
 
 
Our difficulty with this approach is that the Board’s Decision does not 
clearly and unambiguously disclose how the attorney’s fee award was 
determined.  Although the Board did take into account all of the attorney’s 
time expended in representing Scheers in this matter (consistent with an 
allowance of two fees expressed as a single award), it awarded only a single 
fee (equally consistent with a fee allowance for only one compensation 
award).  Thus, it is unclear from the record whether the Board intended to 
(and did) award two separate attorney’s fees (expressed as a single award) 
based on both compensation awards, or whether it intended to  (and did) 
                                                 
17 Simmons v. Delaware State Hospital, 660 A.2d 384, 3991-392 (Del. 1995) (holding that 
the Board must award attorney’s fees for each issue that is subject to an attorney’s fee 
award). 
18 Scheers v. Indep. Newspaper, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 127 at *10-11. 
 
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award a single attorney’s fee based solely on the disability compensation 
award. The difference is critical because the methodology used by the Board 
could affect the validity of the fee award.19  Here, the record was not 
sufficient for the Superior Court to conclude that the Board intended to 
award two attorney’s fees expressed as a single award.  The record is, for 
that reason, also insufficient for this Court to determine whether or not the 
Board’s award of attorney’s fees is legally correct.  Accordingly, the case 
must be remanded to the Superior Court, which shall remand the case to the 
Board to make the predicate findings necessary to enable both Courts to 
determine the legal correctness of the attorney’s fee award. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Superior Court is affirmed to 
the extent it upholds the Board’s award of partial disability compensation. 
The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings, limited 
to the attorney’s fee issue, consistent with this Opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 General Motors Corp. v. Burgess, supra.