Title: Floyd Persaud v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1406
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
Nos. SC02-1406, SC02-1858, & SC02-2198
____________
FLOYD PERSAUD,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
____________
WARDELL SANDERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
____________
RAYMOND BAKER,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 23, 2003]
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners Floyd Persaud and Wardell Sanders have filed petitions for writs
of habeas corpus, see art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const., seeking review of the decisions
of the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Persaud v. State, 814 So. 2d
1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Sanders v. State, 805 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA
2002).  Petitioner Raymond Baker has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, see
art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const., seeking review of the decision of the Fifth District in
Baker v. State, 820 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  We consolidate these cases
for purposes of this opinion and, for the reasons expressed below, dismiss the
petitions for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS
The decision from the Fourth District in Persaud's case reads in its entirety: 
"Affirmed.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)."  Persaud, 814 So. 2d
at 1101.  Persaud argues that "[h]abeas corpus is the proper remedy to challenge
the denial of [his] claim in the Fourth District Court of Appeal that [he] was denied
due process under the Constitution of the United States by not receiving effective
assistance of trial counsel."  He further states that "[i]t is from [the] affirmance [of
the trial court's summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, filed
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, by] the Fourth District [that
1.  Persaud also filed a notice of supplemental authority in his case calling this
Court's attention to our recent decision in Ford v. State, 825 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 2002),
and a motion seeking a remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the rule 3.850
motion in light of this Court's decision in Ford.
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he] seeks a writ of habeas corpus herein."  Persaud indicates that he filed his
petition in this Court in an effort to "exhaust his state remedies before filing a
petition for federal habeas relief" as is required by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999).  In an apparent
effort to demonstrate why the Fourth District's affirmance of the trial court's
summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion was in error, Persaud argues at length in
his petition why the trial court should have granted him an evidentiary hearing on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and ordered a new trial. 1 
The decision from the Fifth District in Sanders' case reads in its entirety: 
"AFFIRMED.  See Banck v. State, 798 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)." 
Sanders, 805 So. 2d at 1064.  Sanders argues that his sentence for the crime of
lewd and lascivious assault upon a child is illegal under this Court's decision in
Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000).  Sanders indicates that he
unsuccessfully challenged the illegality of his sentence under Heggs in the trial court
in a motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a), and on appeal from the trial court's denial of relief in the Fifth
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District.  Sanders also asserts that "[a] complete exhaustion of judicial remedies has
been thoroughly met by the Petitioner" with regard to his illegal sentence claim and
that he now seeks relief from this Court.  In his prayer for relief, Sanders asks this
Court for an order "reversing and remanding the instant case for a guidelines
sentence."  These statements in Sanders' petition collectively indicate that he
intends for his petition in this Court to be the next step in the review process
relative to his illegal sentence claim, as opposed to a true original writ proceeding.
The decision from the Fifth District in Baker's case reads in its entirety: 
"AFFIRMED.  See Fla. Stat. § 782.04(2) (2001)."  Baker, 820 So. 2d at 382. 
Baker asks this Court to compel the Fifth District to recall its mandate in his case,
arguing that the Fifth District clearly "overlooked and or misapprehended" its duty
to correct illegal sentences "whenever presented with [a] motion indicating that [a]
sentence is truely [sic] illegal."  Baker explains the procedural history of his case as
follows:
On April 15, 2002, Petitioner filed [a] motion for correction of
his illegal sentence in the trial court, in which he argues his sentence of
99 years illegally exceeds the statutory maximum authorized under the
1983 statute 775.082(3)(a) whereas his charged offenses occurred
December 19, 1983.  On the 30th day of April, 2002, the trial court
rendered its order denying Petitioner's 3.800(a) motion without
addressing any of the claims presented therein, [and instead] based its
denial on [an] uncontested ground which [was] not relevant to any of
Petitioner's claims. 
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A timely appeal of the trial court's order of denial was ensued
by Petitioner to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, whereupon, on May
28, 2002, the court issued its none [sic] final order of a per-curiam
decision citing Florida Statute 782.04 (2001), without any
consideration of the fact that the charged offenses occurred December
19, 1983, and the fact that the charged offense under count one of the
indictment, reduced to second degree murder by jury verdict, being a
first degree felony "must be reclassified to a life felony" pursuant to
775.087(3)(a), Fla. Stat.  Petitioner filed a timely motion for rehearing,
which was ultimately denied and mandate issued on the 19th day of
July, 2002.
On the 6th day of August, 2002, Petitioner submitted his motion
to withdraw mandate to the Fifth District Court of Appeal.  There,
Petitioner further pointed out facts and matters which the court had
obviously overlooked and or misapprehended thus requiring that the
mandate be withdrawn or recalled.  Nevertheless, on August 16, 2002,
the court issued its order denying Petitioner's motion to withdraw the
mandate.
  
(Citations to accompanying appendix omitted.)  At the conclusion of this
procedural history, Baker states that he "has no other available remedy to redress
the issues presented herein thus he seeks mandamus relief."  This statement, when
coupled with the procedural history and arguments presented in the petition,
indicates that Baker intends for this mandamus proceeding to be a review of the
district court's decision in his case, as opposed to a true original writ proceeding.
ANALYSIS
This Court's decisions in Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial America, S.A.,
385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980), and Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981), when
2.  In fact, this Court specifically stated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston,
655 So. 2d 91, 93 n.1 (Fla. 1995), that it "does not have jurisdiction based on alleged
conflict with a rule of civil procedure."  
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read together, stand for the proposition that this Court does not have jurisdiction to
review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with
citations to cases not pending review in this Court.  In Dodi Publishing, we rejected
"the assertion that we should reexamine a case cited in a per curiam decision to
determine if the contents of that cited case . . . conflict with other appellate
decisions." 385 So. 2d at 1369.  In Jollie, we reaffirmed that "mere citation PCA
decisions . . . will remain nonreviewable by this Court" and distinguished those
district court PCA opinions that cite as controlling authority "a case that is pending
review in or has been reversed by this Court."  405 So. 2d at 421. 
The decision in Dodi Publishing explicitly addressed this Court's lack of
jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions from the district courts of appeal that
merely cite to a case not pending on review in this Court.  However, this Court has
historically applied the reasoning of Dodi Publishing to other district court citation
per curiam decisions, like those in Persaud's and Baker's cases, which merely cite
to a statute, a rule,2 or a decision of the United States Supreme Court or this Court. 
See, e.g., Herrera v. State, 804 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA) (affirming with citations
3.  Although all of the orders dismissing review in these cases were unpublished,
the records of this Court indicate that each of the orders cited to this Court's decision
in Dodi Publishing as authority for the dismissals.
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to a decision of this Court, a decision of the Second District, and a statute), review
dismissed, 819 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2002); Colonel v. State, 756 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 3d
DCA) (affirming with citations to Strickland and a decision of this Court), review
dismissed, 767 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2000); Anderson v. State, 748 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999) (affirming with citations to three decisions of this Court and a citation
to a rule of criminal procedure), review dismissed, 753 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2000).3 
Our decision in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988), explains why
our application of the reasoning in Dodi Publishing beyond its specific facts, in
each of these described circumstances, is entirely consistent with the parameters of
this Court's limited discretionary review jurisdiction.
As we explained in Florida Star, this Court's discretionary review jurisdiction
can be invoked only from a district court decision "that expressly addresses a
question of law within the four corners of the opinion itself" by "contain[ing] a
statement or citation effectively establishing a point of law upon which the decision
rests."  Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 288.  We further explained that "there can be no
actual conflict discernible in an opinion containing only a citation to other case law
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unless one of the cases cited as controlling authority is pending before this Court,
or has been reversed on appeal or review, or receded from by this Court, or unless
the citation explicitly notes a contrary holding of another district court or of this
Court."  Id. at 288 n.3.  This is true because, in those cases where the district court
has not explicitly identified a conflicting decision, it is necessary for the district
court to have included some facts in its decision so that the question of law
addressed by the district court in its decision can be discerned by this Court.  See
Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986) (denying review in case where
"[t]he district court decision correctly states and applies the law based on the facts
given," and noting that "[c]onflict between decisions must be express and direct,
i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision"); Ford Motor
Co. v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981) ("It is not necessary that a district
court explicitly identify conflicting district court or supreme court decisions in its
opinion in order to create an 'express' conflict under section 3(b)(3).").
In Grate v. State, 750 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 1999), we concluded that
"[r]egardless of how a petition seeking review of a district court decision is styled,
this Court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions rendered
without opinion and this Court's holding in Jenkins [v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.
1980)] cannot be circumvented simply by seeking relief by filing an extraordinary
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writ petition."  We held, therefore, "that those provisions of the Florida
Constitution governing this Court's jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs may not
be used to seek review of an appellate court decision issued without a written
opinion."  Grate, 750 So. 2d at 626.  In Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla.
2002), we recently summarized the facts upon which the decision in Grate was
based:
In Grate, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus which
sought review of an affirmance by the Third District, issued without
opinion, of a trial court order denying the petitioner's motion to
correct sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800.  In his petition, petitioner Grate alleged that the district court's
decision in his case was inconsistent with an opinion of this Court,
and he asserted that he had no avenue available to him for seeking
review of the district court's decision other than a petition for an
extraordinary writ, because the district court had not provided any
form of written opinion supporting its per curiam affirmance. After
discussing the decisions in both Jenkins and St. Paul [Title Insurance
Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1980)], this Court concluded
that it was without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner Grate's
petition . . . .
Id. at 978 (citations omitted).
The reasoning and holding in Grate, even though specifically applicable to
extraordinary writ petitions seeking review of district court per curiam affirmances
issued without written opinion, applies with equal force to extraordinary writ
petitions seeking review of per curiam decisions from the district courts of appeal
4.  The pending motion for remand in Persaud's case is also denied.
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that merely cite to a case not pending on review in this Court, or to a statute or rule
of procedure.  We therefore apply the reasoning in Grate to citation per curiam
affirmances and specifically hold that this Court's extraordinary writ jurisdiction
may not be used to seek review of per curiam decisions of the district courts of
appeal like those issued in Persaud's, Sanders' and Baker's cases.
Accordingly, we hereby dismiss the petitions in these cases.4  Consistent
with the recent amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(d),
promulgated "to expressly provide that the Court will not entertain motions for
rehearing addressed to the dismissal of a petition for an extraordinary writ when
that writ is used to seek review of a district court of appeal decision without an
opinion," Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 827 So. 2d 888,
890 (Fla. 2002), no motions for rehearing or clarification will be entertained in these
cases or in cases which are dismissed in the future based on the reasoning set forth
in this opinion.
It is so ordered. 
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ.,
and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
Three Cases Consolidated:
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Two Original Proceedings - Habeas Corpus
Jo Ann Barone Kotzen, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner Floyd Persaud;
and Wardell Sanders, Polk City, Florida, for Petitioner, pro se
No appearance for Respondent 
and One Original Proceeding - Mandamus
Raymond Baker, Raiford, Florida, for Petitioner, pro se
No appearance for Respondent