Title: Wollenzien v. BOARD OF ED. OF MANSON
Citation: 297 N.W.2d 215
Docket Number: 63840
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 1980

297 N.W.2d 215 (1980) Norene WOLLENZIEN, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the MANSON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee. No. 63840. Supreme Court of Iowa. October 15, 1980. *216 Murray &amp; Blackburn, P.C., Fort Dodge, for appellant. McCullough Law Firm, P.C., Sac City, for appellee. Considered by UHLENHOPP, P. J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, LARSON, and SCHULTZ, JJ. HARRIS, Justice. Plaintiff lost her teaching position when it was eliminated as a part of the school's staff reduction policy. The action of the school board was upheld on appeal to an adjudicator, acting pursuant to section 279.17, The Code 1979. The trial court, sitting in review of the adjudicator, upheld the termination of plaintiff's employment on substantive grounds. We do not reach the substantive grounds because we find the adjudicator's determination became final and binding when it went unchallenged for ten days. We dismiss the appeal. Plaintiff was employed by the Manson Community School District as a high school English teacher beginning with the fall term 1974. In the fall of 1976 the Manson school superintendent became concerned with declining enrollment and, together with his administrative team, prepared a study of anticipated staff requirements for the 1977-78 school year. It was concluded that it would be necessary to eliminate two teaching positions. To accomplish this reduction the school board formally adopted a staff reduction policy, which provided in part: Plaintiff was evaluated on three occasions under standard criteria then in effect for local teachers. Ten others with whom she was competing for the remaining jobs were evaluated from one to three times. All 11 teachers were found to be doing satisfactory work and all were competent and possessed relative skill and ability. Accordingly the administrative team proceeded to consider "professional preparation, experience, and total teaching experience." Plaintiff was singled out at this stage because she was certified to teach only English, whereas the other candidates for termination were either certified in more than one area or possessed some additional characteristic, such as a master's degree. In January 1977 plaintiff was advised by the superintendent that she would be recommended for termination after the 1976-77 contract period. Pursuant to section 279.15, The Code, plaintiff requested a private hearing before the school board. The hearing was held in April 1977 and resulted in written findings and conclusions which terminated her contract at the end of that school year. Thereafter, pursuant to section 279.17, plaintiff appealed her termination to an adjudicator. *217 The adjudicator filed a decision June 9, 1977. That decision upheld the school board. Plaintiff took no action upon the adjudicator's decision until July 5, 1977, when she filed a notice of appeal, pursuant to section 279.18, The Code. That appeal was submitted to the trial court and resulted in the decision which is the subject of this appeal. The first question, which we find dispositive, is whether section 279.17 requires written rejection of an adjudicator's decision by the teacher to the school board before the teacher may appeal under 279.18. Section 279.17 provides in relevant part: Section 279.18 provides for an appeal to the courts. It states in relevant part: Plaintiff did not reject the adjudicator's decision by notifying the school board secretary in writing within ten days following the filing of the adjudicator's decision. The question becomes whether the provisions of section 279.17, providing for rejection, are a prerequisite to appeal under section 279.18. We believe they are. The canons for statutory construction are at once well settled and familiar: Where language is clear and plain, there is no room for construction. [Authorities.] Iowa Nat. Indus. Loan Co. v. Iowa State, etc., 224 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1974). In Northern Natural Gas Company v. Forst, 205 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Iowa 1973), we adopted the following: The pivotal sentence is of course the last one above quoted from section 279.17: "The teacher may reject the adjudicator's decision by notifying the board's secretary in writing within ten days . . . ." The parties aim their dispute at the word "may" in this sentence. Plaintiff contends the word manifests a permission as opposed to a mandatory legislative intent, citing Iowa Nat. Indus. Loan Co. v. Iowa State, etc., supra, 224 N.W.2d at 440-41. The board argues that *218 the word "may," in the sentences, is permissive only, that it provides alternatively for acceptance or rejection of the adjudicator's decision. We think the purpose of the ten-day notice requirement conforms with budgeting needs of a school district. Thus, if a school board does not receive notice of rejection by the teacher within ten days following the adjudicator's decision, it may proceed to use or commit the funds saved by discharging the teacher. A needed teacher qualified for a different course might be hired. Without such a provision the board would be in limbo about the finality of the adjudicator's decision for at least 20 more days. The provision also allows the board at least 20 days in which to decide if it wants to fight for dismissal on appeal to district court. The board might very well capitulate following the adjudicator's decision or following the teacher's notification of its rejection. This provision allows the school board to weigh the cost of fighting the appeal before deciding whether to go ahead with litigation. The plain wording of section 279.17 indicates the adjudicator's decision became final and binding when it was not rejected by the plaintiff. We hold the statute means what it says and says what it means. Because the adjudicator's decision was final and binding it was not subject to a later appeal. The board is right in urging that the appeal must be dismissed. APPEAL DISMISSED.