Title: LEAH ROSE FOSTER V DAVID KENNETH WOLKOWITZ
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 139872
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2010

FILED JULY 1, 2010 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
LEAH ROSE FOSTER, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 139872 
 
DAVID KENNETH WOLKOWITZ, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
YOUNG, J.  
 
At issue in this case is whether the statutorily required presumptive award of 
custody given to a mother when an acknowledgment of parentage (AOP) is executed 
pursuant to the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq., serves as an 
“initial custody determination” under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), MCL 722.1101 et seq.  We hold that it does not.  An 
acknowledgment of parentage, signed by the parents and filed with the State Registrar, is 
not an “initial custody determination” under the UCCJEA because it is does not satisfy 
the definition of “initial custody determination” provided in that act.  Nevertheless, the 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
 
 
 
 
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presumptive award of custody contained in the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act 
remains part of a valid agreement into which the parents entered, and may be set aside 
only when a custody determination has been made by the judiciary.  
Under the UCCJEA, a child’s initial custody determination must take place in the 
child’s home state, unless the home state declines to exercise home-state jurisdiction 
under the UCCJEA because another state would be a more appropriate forum.  In this 
case, we conclude that Illinois is the child’s home state, and thus only it has the authority 
to determine whether Michigan is the more appropriate forum.  We remand to the 
Monroe Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Pending 
resolution of the home-state jurisdictional issue, the award of custody to the mother that 
was stipulated by the parties pursuant to Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, as well as 
the temporary orders concerning parenting time and child support, remain intact. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff and defendant are the biological parents of M., born October 12, 2006.  
Plaintiff and defendant cohabitated but never married.  The parties moved from Illinois to 
Michigan months before M. was born in Michigan.  On January 25, 2007, plaintiff and 
defendant executed and filed an AOP naming defendant as the child’s father and 
establishing paternity.   
In April 2007, the parties and the child returned to Illinois and continued to reside 
together.  Plaintiff attended college and worked, while defendant attended law school.  
Both parties had Illinois driver’s licenses, and M. received state health insurance that 
required Illinois residency.  During the time that the family resided in Illinois, plaintiff 
 
 
 
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regularly returned to Michigan with the child for extended visits with Michigan family 
members.  
In May 2008, the relationship between the parties ended, and plaintiff and the 
child returned to Michigan to live with plaintiff’s parents.  Five days after returning to 
Michigan, plaintiff filed a paternity action in the Monroe Circuit Court.  Additionally, 
plaintiff filed an ex parte petition for alternative service, temporary custody, and the 
scheduling of a UCCJEA conference.  On May 18, 2008, the Michigan trial judge entered 
an ex parte order granting the request for alternative service and a UCCJEA conference, 
but declined to address the custody issue.  On June 4, 2008, defendant filed a custody 
action in Illinois.   
On July 7, 2008, a telephone conference was held between the judges from the 
Michigan and Illinois courts, as well as the parties, to discuss which state had home-state 
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.  Defendant argued that Illinois had jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA.  Plaintiff argued that Michigan should exercise jurisdiction because the child 
was residing with plaintiff in Michigan, plaintiff’s petition had been filed first, and both 
plaintiff and the child had significant ties to Michigan.  Both the Illinois and Michigan 
judges expressed initial agreement that jurisdiction should lie in Michigan, but also 
agreed that an evidentiary hearing should be held in Michigan in order to determine 
which state had home-state jurisdiction.  Defendant was granted parenting time in 
Michigan “at his convenience.”   
After adjournments, discovery, and failed settlement attempts, the jurisdictional 
hearing was conducted on January 6, 2009.  The AOP was entered into evidence in the 
 
 
 
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court record for the first time at this hearing.  On February 17, 2009, the trial court 
entered a five-page “decision and order regarding jurisdiction.”  The court ruled that 
Michigan had jurisdiction to hear the case because, by executing an AOP, the parents 
“consent[ed] to the jurisdiction of Michigan specifically on the issues of custody, support 
and parenting time.”  Furthermore, because an AOP granted “initial custody” of a minor 
to the mother, the judge reasoned that the “UCCJEA would not be invoked” because the 
“grant of initial custody was already made by the parents who voluntarily invoked the 
Acknowledgment of Parentage law.”1 
Subsequently, a trial was held to determine custody.  After taking testimony from 
a number of witnesses, the trial court applied the best interest factors contained in MCL 
722.23, awarding joint legal custody to both parties, and physical custody to the plaintiff.  
Defendant was awarded parenting time, and a child support order was entered.   
Defendant appealed the order of custody.  On September 15, 2009, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, “albeit for a different reason.”2  
The panel held that the trial court could properly exercise home-state jurisdiction under 
                                              
1 On March 3, 2009, after the Michigan court held that Michigan had jurisdiction 
over the case, the Illinois circuit court entered an order transferring the case to Michigan 
and dismissing defendant’s Illinois case with prejudice.  Subsequently, a motion was filed 
to vacate that order.  The Illinois court refused to vacate the order transferring the case to 
Michigan, but did amend the previous order to indicate that the case would be “merely 
taken off call” rather than dismissed with prejudice pending defendant’s Michigan 
appeal. 
2 Foster v Wolkowitz, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, 
issued September 15, 2009 (Docket No. 291825), at 1. 
 
 
 
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the UCCJEA because a properly executed AOP operated as an initial custody 
determination as a matter of law.  Because the Michigan AOP operated as an “initial 
custody determination” under the UCCJEA, Michigan had continuing jurisdiction and it 
was “not necessary to consider defendant’s argument that Illinois is the home state.”3 
This Court granted leave to appeal, asking the parties to address whether the Court 
of Appeals erred in relying on the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act rather than the 
UCCJEA to determine that Michigan should exercise subject-matter jurisdiction, and, if 
jurisdiction properly lies in Illinois as the child’s “home state” under the UCCJEA, 
whether Michigan is the more convenient forum for resolution of this matter.4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This case involves the requirements of the UCCJEA and the interplay between the 
UCCJEA and the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act.  Issues of statutory construction are 
questions of law reviewed de novo.5  Additionally, in the absence of any factual dispute, 
                                              
3 Id., unpub op at 7. 
4 485 Mich 999 (2009).  Given our resolution of this case, we find it unnecessary 
to address defendant’s constitutional challenge to the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act. 
5 Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). 
 
 
 
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whether Michigan may exercise home-state jurisdiction6 under the UCCJEA is a question 
of law reviewed de novo.7  
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq., provides a 
voluntary means for both parents, acting together, to establish paternity of a child born 
out of wedlock.  An AOP is “valid and effective” when the unwed parents complete the 
form, sign it, and have their signatures notarized.8  A validly executed AOP establishes 
paternity and may provide the “basis for court ordered child support, custody, or 
parenting time without further adjudication under the paternity act . . . .”9  The act further 
provides that the AOP is to be filed with the State Registrar and kept “in a parentage 
registry in the office of the state registrar.”10  
                                              
6 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) defines “home-state jurisdiction” as 
“jurisdiction based on the child’s having been a resident of the state for at least six 
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of the suit” where there is an 
interstate child-custody dispute governed by the UCCJEA. 
7 In re Petition by Wayne Co Treasurer, 478 Mich 1, 6; 732 NW2d 458 (2007); 
Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559, 566; 640 NW2d 567 (2002); 
Jodway v Kennametal, Inc, 207 Mich App 622, 632; 525 NW2d 883 (1994). 
8 MCL 722.1003. 
9 MCL 722.1004. 
10 MCL 722.1005(1). 
 
 
 
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The Acknowledgment of Parentage Act further provides that when an AOP is 
executed, “initial custody” is granted to the mother:11 
After a mother and father sign an acknowledgment of parentage, the 
mother has initial custody of the minor child, without prejudice to the 
determination of either parent’s custodial rights, until otherwise 
determined by the court or otherwise agreed upon by the parties in writing 
and acknowledged by the court.  This grant of initial custody to the mother 
shall not, by itself, affect the rights of either parent in a proceeding to seek 
a court order for custody or parenting time.[12] 
 
Lastly, parents who execute an AOP agree to consent to the “general, personal 
jurisdiction” of Michigan courts “regarding the issues of the support, custody, and 
parenting time of the child.”13   
 
The UCCJEA, MCL 722.1101 et seq., governs interstate child custody disputes.  
At issue in this case is MCL 722.1201, which governs a state court’s authority to make an 
“initial child-custody determination.”14  That provision states: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 204,[15] a court of this 
state has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only in 
the following situations:  
                                              
11 MCL 722.1007(c) requires that the AOP form provide notice to the parties that 
the mother has initial custody of the child.  This is consistent with the AOP signed by the 
parties in this case.  
12 MCL 722.1006 (emphasis added). 
13 MCL 722.1010 (emphasis added).  
14 If a state court has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination 
under the UCCJEA, that court retains “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” over the child 
custody matter.  MCL 722.1202(1) and 722.1203(a). 
15 MCL 722.1204(1) permits a state to exercise “temporary emergency 
jurisdiction” when a child has been abandoned or it is necessary to protect the child on an 
emergency basis because the child, his siblings, or his parent is “subjected to or 
 
 
 
 
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(a)  This state is the home state of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within 
6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is 
absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to 
live in this state.  
  
(b)  A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under 
subdivision (a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to 
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate 
forum under section 207 or 208, and the court finds both of the following:  
  
(i)  The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least 1 
parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this 
state other than mere physical presence.  
 
(ii)  Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the 
child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.   
 
(c)  All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (a) or (b) have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that a court of this state is 
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under 
section 207 or 208.  
  
(d)  No court of another state would have jurisdiction under 
subdivision (a), (b), or (c). 
 
(2)  Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a 
child-custody determination by a court of this state.   
 
(3)  Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a 
child is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child-custody 
determination.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
The UCCJEA also defines statutory terms that are critical to our resolution of this 
case.  Of note, a “child-custody determination” is defined as “a judgment, decree, or 
                                              
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”  The temporary emergency orders remain in 
effect until an order is obtained from the state court having proper jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA.  
 
 
 
9
other court order providing for legal custody, physical custody, or parenting time with 
respect to a child.  Child-custody determination includes a permanent, temporary, initial, 
and modification order.  Child-custody determination does not include an order relating 
to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.”16  Additionally, the 
child’s “home state” is defined as the state in which a child lived with a parent “for at 
least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody 
proceeding.”17  
ANALYSIS 
The Court of Appeals in this case held that an AOP, executed pursuant to the 
Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, operated as an initial custody determination for the 
purposes of the UCCJEA.  It is true that the plain language of the Acknowledgment of 
Parentage Act effectively conditions the parents’ ability to execute an AOP on their 
willingness to allow the mother to be granted “initial custody of the minor child . . . .”18  
While this grant of initial custody occurs by operation of law when the parties stipulate to 
the child’s paternity, the statutory language also makes clear that the initial grant of 
custody creates no impediment should either parent wish to seek a judicial determination 
of custodial rights.  MCL 722.1006 indicates that the grant of initial custody is “without 
prejudice to the determination of either parent’s custodial rights” and that the grant of 
                                              
16 MCL 722.1102(c) (emphasis added). 
17 MCL 722.1102(g) (emphasis added). 
18 MCL 722.1006. 
 
 
 
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initial custody “shall not, by itself, affect the rights of either parent in a proceeding to 
seek a court order for custody or parenting time.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, nothing in 
the plain language of the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act equates the execution of an 
AOP to a judicial determination regarding custody; rather, the statutory language leads to 
the opposite conclusion.19 
Additionally, for the purposes of an interstate custody dispute, an AOP does not 
satisfy the statutory definition of “child-custody determination” provided in the 
UCCJEA, because the acknowledgment is not a “judgment, decree, or other court order 
providing for legal custody, physical custody, or parenting time with respect to a child.”  
MCL 722.1102(c) (emphasis added).  An AOP is not issued or entered by any court, nor 
is it in the form of a “judgment, decree, or other court order . . . .”  Rather, the parental 
stipulation is filed in the executive branch with the State Registrar and kept in a specific 
parentage registry.  The judicial branch has absolutely no involvement in the execution of 
an AOP.  Indeed, the involvement of the judicial branch occurs, if ever, only after the 
AOP has been filed, as the acknowledgment serves as the “basis for court ordered child 
support, custody, or parenting time without further adjudication under the paternity 
                                              
19 Equating an AOP to a judicial determination would necessarily be prejudicial to 
the father, even if the child custody dispute were purely intrastate.  MCL 722.27(1)(c) 
provides that a court cannot modify or amend previous orders so as to change the 
established custodial environment of a child “unless there is presented clear and 
convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” The father would bear a 
heightened evidentiary burden when seeking to modify or amend the initial grant of 
custody to the mother, despite the clear directive contained in MCL 722.1006 stating that 
the filing of an AOP does not, by itself, “affect the rights of either parent in a proceeding 
to seek a court order for custody or parenting time.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
 
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act . . . .”20  Simply put, the initial grant of custody to the mother required under the 
Acknowledgment of Parentage Act is not an “initial child-custody determination” under 
the UCCJEA, and the Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise.  
It is true that the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act requires, as a condition of 
executing an AOP, that parents consent “to the general, personal jurisdiction” of 
Michigan courts regarding “the issues of the support, custody, and parenting time . . . .”21  
However, jurisdiction over a person22 has never been synonymous with jurisdiction over 
a case, and the parties’ consent to personal jurisdiction provides no support for the 
conclusion that Michigan has home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.  The plain 
language of the UCCJEA indicates that it provides “the exclusive jurisdictional basis for 
making a child-custody determination.”23  Merely having personal jurisdiction over a 
party or child is insufficient to make a child custody determination.24  Therefore, the 
consent to personal jurisdiction required by the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act 
provides no basis for Michigan to exert home-state jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA.   
                                              
20 MCL 722.1004. 
21 MCL 722.1010. 
22 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) defines “personal jurisdiction” as a “court’s 
power to bring a person into its adjudicative process.”  
23 MCL 722.1201(2) (emphasis added).  
24 “Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to make a child-custody determination.”  MCL 722.1201(3) 
(emphasis added). 
 
 
 
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The record reveals that the child’s home state for the purposes of the UCCJEA is 
the state of Illinois, because that is the state in which the child resided “for at least 6 
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody 
proceeding.”25  Plaintiff argues that, despite the fact that the state of Illinois has home-
state jurisdiction, the state of Michigan is a more convenient forum for the resolution of 
the custody dispute.  However, under the UCCJEA, it is the home state that must decide 
whether to “decline to exercise its jurisdiction” because “it determines” that “it is an 
inconvenient forum” and that “a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.”26  
Thus, while plaintiff presents persuasive arguments supporting the conclusion that 
Michigan is the more appropriate forum in which to resolve the interstate custody 
dispute, these arguments are best directed to the Illinois court. 
Finally, we take care to note that, pending resolution of the interstate child custody 
dispute, the stipulation of the parties granting custody to the mother, as contained in the 
AOP, remains intact.27  Additionally, the child support order, as well as the order 
concerning parenting time, likewise remains intact.28   
                                              
25 MCL 722.1102(g).  
26 MCL 722.1207(1); 750 Ill Comp Stat 36/207(a). 
27 The AOP signed by the parties specifically acknowledges that “[t]he mother has 
custody of the child unless otherwise determined by the court or agreed by the parties in 
writing.”  (Emphasis added.) 
28 The UCCJEA does not concern orders “relating to child support or other 
monetary obligation of an individual.”  MCL 722.1102(c).  However, the Family Support 
Act, MCL 552.451 et seq., specifically permits a custodial parent to petition the circuit 
court for support “to provide necessary shelter, food, care, and clothing for the 
 
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the presumptive award of custody 
given to a mother when an AOP is executed pursuant to the Acknowledgment of 
Parentage Act serves as an “initial custody determination” under the UCCJEA.  We 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the 
Monroe Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
KELLY, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, CORRIGAN, MARKMAN, and HATHAWAY, 
JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J. 
                                              
child . . . .”  MCL 552.451 and 552.451a.  Where there is a dispute regarding custody, the 
judge is required to issue “specific temporary provisions” concerning custody and 
parenting time pending resolution of the custody dispute.  MCL 552.452(4).