Title: Suess v. Heale
Citation: 416 P.2d 458, 68 Wash. 2d 962
Docket Number: 38440
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1966

68 Wn.2d 962 (1966) 416 P.2d 458 C. ROBERT SUESS et al., Appellants, v. ROBERT H. HEALE et al., Respondents.[*] No. 38440. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. June 30, 1966. Edmund J. Jones, for appellants. *963 BARNETT, J.[] Plaintiffs appeal from a default judgment entered in their favor by which they were denied attorney's fees. Plaintiffs Robert and Helen Suess and Glen and Fay Scott, as sellers, and defendant Robert Heale, as purchaser, entered into a real-estate contract for the sale of certain property located in King County, upon which is located an apartment house. It recited a purchase price of $45,000; $4,000 down, the balance to be paid at the rate of at least $340 per month. The following provisions of the contract are pertinent: Subsequent to entering into this contract, defendant married. Though his wife is named codefendant in this litigation, Robert Heale is discussed in this opinion as if he were the sole defendant. Defendant, through tenants took possession under the terms of the contract. Thereafter he failed to pay certain *964 monthly installments and taxes, which failure constituted a breach of his contractual obligations. Following these defaults, plaintiffs served notice upon defendant, requesting him to make the delinquent payments within a specified time. By this notice defendant was informed that, in the event the payments were not timely made, the plaintiffs "will elect to declare a forfeiture of and cancel the said contract." Despite the notice, defendant failed to satisfy his contractual obligations. Thereafter, plaintiffs served defendant with a notice forfeiting out his rights under the terms of the contract. Defendant refused plaintiffs' request of a quitclaim reconveyance, and remained in possession through his tenants. This suit was brought to quiet title to the property, and to restore plaintiffs to possession. Defendant made no appearance, and was adjudged in default. Among the trial court's findings was one that "a reasonable attorney's fee for the forfeiture of real estate contract by judicial action, allowed to pass by default, is the sum of $1,240.64." Judgment was entered for plaintiffs, quieting title in them, and restoring them to possession. However, the trial court refused to include in its judgment an award for reasonable attorney's fees. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiffs their attorney's fees. The record does not reveal the basis of the court's refusal to allow attorney's fees. However, counsel for plaintiffs stated in his brief, and also in oral argument, that: [1] That a covenant to pay attorney's fees is rendered ineffective by an election of the covenantee to forfeit the other out of his contract rights as provided for in the agreement, is a non sequitur. Insofar as the trial court based its *965 refusal to grant attorney's fees on this ground, the ruling was erroneous. The declaration of forfeiture was in affirmance of the contract, not a repudiation of it. The case of Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 455, 298 Pac. 705, 79 A.L.R. 29 (1931), involved a defaulting conditional vendee. The contention was made that the vendor, having cancelled the contract and forfeited all of the rights of the vendee thereunder, was precluded, as the contract no longer existed, from resorting to any provision of that contract to derive the benefit of attorney's fees therefrom. We said then: Plaintiffs declaration of forfeiture in the instant case did not foreclose them from recovering their attorney's fees if this recovery were provided for in the contract. We now reach, sua sponte, the question of whether the contract does, in fact, provide for the recovery of attorney's fees in the event a suit was made necessary to quiet title and gain repossession following a declaration of forfeiture. The written document, it will be remembered, contains the *966 following clause: "In any suit or action to enforce any covenant of this contract or to collect any installment payment or any charge arising therefrom, the purchaser agrees to pay a reasonable sum as attorney's fees...." The question arises: Are plaintiffs bringing an "action to enforce any covenant" in this suit to quiet title and regain possession of the premises? The contract contains no express promise to pay attorneys in the event of a suit of this specific nature. It is likewise silent with reference to the delivery of possession by the defaulting purchaser subsequent to his acquiescence to the declaration of forfeiture. He refused to relinquish possession which he held through his tenants. [2, 3] The contract expressly gave defendant the right to possession. It was therein agreed that plaintiffs were entitled to forfeit him out of this right should he default in performing certain covenants. In our view, this raises an implied promise to relinquish possession upon a valid declaration of forfeiture. Necessary implications are as much a part of an agreement as though the implied terms were plainly expressed. Geyen v. Time Oil Co., 46 Wn.2d 457, 282 P.2d 287 (1955); Reeker v. Remour, 40 Wn.2d 519, 244 P.2d 270 (1952); Stusser v. Gottstein, 178 Wash. 360, 35 P.2d 5 (1934). The parties cannot have intended that defendant should have been entitled to remain in possession after his rights had been forfeited and cancelled. How can it be contended, upon regarding the contract as a whole, that the parties, as honest and just men, did not intend that defendant would surrender possession following forfeiture and the cancellation of his rights? Such a contention would be absurd. [4] Considering the contract before us in the light of both its expressed and necessarily implied provisions, it was the duty of the defendant to vacate the premises upon the giving of the required notice of forfeiture. He did not vacate, and plaintiffs were compelled to go to court to vindicate their legal rights. This is an action, essentially, to enforce the implied covenant to vacate, within the purview of the attorney's fees clause contained in the contract; hence, plaintiffs' attorney's fees should have been allowed by the trial court. Except as modified herein, the judgment is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., DONWORTH, FINLEY, and WEAVER, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 416 P.2d 458. [] Judge Barnett is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.