Title: Stanley K. Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002529
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2529 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Stanley K. Miller and Deborah D. Miller, 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 24, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael T. Lucci 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Steinmetz, J. dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Wilcox, J. joins 
 
Not Participating: Geske, J. did not participate 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., withdrew from participation 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in 
the Supreme Court) by Thomas R. Thibodeau, Jerome D. Feriancek 
and Johnson, Killen, Thibodeau and Seiler, P.A., Duluth, MN and 
oral argument by Joseph J. Roby, Jr. and Jerome D. Feriancek. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there were briefs 
by Forrest O. Maki, Robert R. Kanuit and Weiby, Maki, Durst, 
Ledin, Bick & Lehr, S.C ., Superior and oral argument by Robert 
R. Kanuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark K. Thomsen 
and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield for Wisconsin Academy of 
Trial Lawyers.  
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Beth Rahmig 
Pless and Denissen, Kranzush, Mahoney & Ewald, S.C., Green Bay 
for Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
No.  96-2529 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2529 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Stanley K. Miller and Deborah D. Miller,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 24, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Douglas 
County, Michael T. Lucci, Judge.  Reversed and remanded. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-
Mart) appeals from the circuit court’s entry of judgment of a 
jury verdict awarding Stanley K. Miller (Miller) $50,000 in 
compensatory and punitive damages.  Three Wal-Mart employees 
stopped and detained Miller because they suspected him of 
shoplifting.  Miller filed this action, claiming that Wal-Mart 
unlawfully stopped, detained, interrogated, and searched him.  
The jury determined that Wal-Mart was negligent in the hiring, 
training or supervising of its employees, which caused Miller 
damages.  The jury further determined that the Wal-Mart 
employees did not have reasonable cause to believe that Miller 
had shoplifted. 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the case to this court 
to determine whether the tort of negligent hiring, training or 
No.  96-2529 
 
2 
supervising is a valid claim in Wisconsin thereby justifying the 
jury’s award of compensatory and punitive damages and whether 
merchant immunity under the retail theft statute applies to this 
case. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
negligent 
hiring, 
training 
or 
supervision is a valid claim in Wisconsin.  However, in this 
case the Special Verdict form did not present the proper 
questions regarding the elements of the tort: it did not 
completely ask whether Miller met the element regarding cause-
in-fact.  We also conclude that the retail theft statute is 
applicable to the tort of negligent hiring, training, or 
supervision, but Wal-Mart is not afforded immunity from civil 
and criminal liability in this case because it did not meet the 
statutory elements.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand for further proceedings only with 
respect to the elements of the tort as set forth in this 
opinion. 
¶3 
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows.  
When the plaintiff, Miller, left the Wal-Mart store in Superior, 
Wisconsin three Wal-Mart employees approached him in the store’s 
parking lot.  The Wal-Mart personnel stopped Miller because a 
loss prevention employee, Mr. Richard Maness (Maness), believed 
that Miller stole a swimsuit.  Upon approaching Miller, Maness 
asked for the swimsuit.  The parties dispute the exact nature of 
the exchange that ensued between Miller and the Wal-Mart 
employees.  Regardless, Maness did not find the swimsuit on 
Miller and the encounter ended. 
No.  96-2529 
 
3 
¶4 
Miller filed an action against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
alleging 
that 
the 
Wal-Mart 
employees 
unlawfully 
stopped, 
detained, searched, and interrogated him, which caused him 
damages.  Following a four-day jury trial, the jury, in 
answering questions on a Special Verdict form, rejected Miller’s 
claims that Wal-Mart, acting through one or more of its 
employees, was liable for false imprisonment, battery, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium claimed 
by Miller’s spouse.  The jury determined, however, that Wal-Mart 
was negligent in hiring, training or supervising its employees 
and this negligence was a cause of damage to Miller.  The jury 
also found that Wal-Mart did not have reasonable cause to 
believe that Miller carried away or concealed unpurchased 
merchandise.  The jury awarded Miller $20,000 in compensatory 
damages for past mental pain and suffering and $30,000 in 
punitive damages.   
¶5 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Wal-Mart’s 
post-verdict 
motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, change of verdict and answers and, in the alternative, 
a new trial.  Judgment was entered.  Wal-Mart appealed from the 
judgment and from the circuit court’s denial of its post-verdict 
motions.  We accepted the court of appeals’ certification of the 
case, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1993-94).1   
                     
1 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 
version unless otherwise noted.  
No.  96-2529 
 
4 
¶6 
This 
case 
presents 
two 
issues: 
first, 
whether 
Wisconsin recognizes the tort of negligent hiring, training or 
supervision and, if so, whether the elements of that tort were 
satisfied in this case so that the jury's award of compensatory 
and punitive damages was appropriate; and second, whether 
merchant 
immunity, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.50, 
is 
applicable in this case.   
¶7 
Turning to the first issue, the parties correctly 
agree that whether a cause of action for negligent hiring, 
training or supervision exists as a claim for relief in 
Wisconsin is a question of law.  See Paskiet v. Quality State 
Oil Co., 164 Wis. 2d 800, 805, 476 N.W.2d 871 (1991).  This 
court reviews questions of law de novo, benefiting from the 
analysis of the circuit court.  See State v. Szulczewski, 216 
Wis. 2d 494, 574 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1998). 
¶8 
This court has, on several occasions, expounded on 
Wisconsin's common law of negligence.  "In order to maintain a 
cause of action for negligence in this state, there must exist: 
(1) A duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of 
that duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the 
injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage as a result of the 
injury."  Rockweit v. Senacal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 
742 (1995) (citations omitted).  Even if these elements are met, 
public policy considerations may nevertheless preclude imposing 
liability on the defendant.  See Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. 
Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979).   
No.  96-2529 
 
5 
¶9 
We first address whether Wal-Mart has a duty of care 
to Miller.  In Wisconsin, everyone has a duty of care to the 
whole world.  See Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 732.   
 
[T]he proper analysis of duty in Wisconsin is as 
follows: “The duty of any person is the obligation of 
due care to refrain from any act which will cause 
foreseeable harm to others even though the nature of 
that harm and the identity of the harmed person or 
harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act . . 
. .” 
Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 419-20 (quoting A.E. Investment Corp. 
v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483-84, 214 N.W.2d 764 
(1974)).  “’A defendant’s duty is established when it can be 
said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may 
cause harm to someone.’”  Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 
532, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991).  The duty is to refrain from such 
act or omission.  See A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 485.   
¶10 Miller alleges that Wal-Mart failed to adequately and 
properly train its loss prevention employee, Maness.  As Miller 
points out, loss prevention employees are entrusted with special 
duties and given authority to stop individuals suspected of 
shoplifting.  Because it is foreseeable that if not properly 
trained, a loss prevention employee could cause harm to someone, 
we believe that Wal-Mart has a duty of care toward its patrons 
including Miller.  
¶11 The second question is whether Wal-Mart breached its 
duty of care toward Miller.   
 
A person fails to exercise ordinary care, when, 
without intending to do any harm, he or she does 
something or fails to do something under circumstances 
No.  96-2529 
 
6 
in which a reasonable person would foresee that by his 
or her action or failure to act, he or she will 
subject a person or property to an unreasonable risk 
or injury or damage. 
Wis JI-Civil 1005; see also Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 
443-44, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989).  
¶12 As discussed above, it is foreseeable that failing to 
properly train or supervise any employee, but especially a loss 
prevention associate, would subject shoppers to unreasonable 
risk, injury or damage.  If Wal-Mart fails to properly hire, 
train or supervise its employees, it breaches its duty to 
shoppers at its store.  The jury determined that Wal-Mart 
negligently 
hired, 
trained 
or 
supervised 
its 
employees.  
Therefore, Wal-Mart breached its duty to its patrons. 
¶13 The third consideration is whether there is a causal 
connection between the conduct and the injury.  "Legal cause in 
negligence actions is made up of two components, cause-in-fact 
and 'proximate cause,' or policy considerations."  Morgan, 87 
Wis. 2d at 735.  Regarding cause-in-fact, the test is whether 
the negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury. 
 See id.  "[T]here can be more than one substantial factor 
contributing to the same result and thus more than one cause-in-
fact."  Id.  If reasonable people could differ on whether the 
defendant's negligence was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's 
injuries, the question is one for the jury.  See id.  The 
determination of cause-in-fact is a question for the court only 
if reasonable people could not disagree.  See id. at 735-36.   
No.  96-2529 
 
7 
¶14 With respect to a cause of action for negligent 
hiring, training or supervision, we determine that the causal 
question is whether the failure of the employer to exercise due 
care was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the employee 
that in turn caused the plaintiff’s injury.  In other words, 
there must be a nexus between the negligent hiring, training, or 
supervision and the act of the employee.  This requires two 
questions with respect to causation.  The first is whether the 
wrongful act of the employee was a cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiff’s injury.  The second question is whether the 
negligence of the employer was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful 
act of the employee.  See, e.g., Louis Marsch, Inc. v. Pekin 
Ins. Co., 491 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ct. App. Ill. 1985) (“[T]here is 
no liability on [the defendant’s] part under the negligent 
hiring count unless [the plaintiff’s] negligence or otherwise 
wrongful 
conduct 
in 
operating 
the 
dump 
truck 
is 
also 
established.” (emphasis added)).  The act of the employee, 
whether intentional or unintentional, must be causal to the 
injury sustained.  But equally important, the negligence of the 
employer must be connected to the act of the employee. 
¶15 If the act of the employee was not a cause-in-fact of 
the injury, then there is no need to go further.  But if the 
wrongful act of the employee was a cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiff’s injury, then the trier of fact must further 
determine if the failure of the employer to exercise due care in 
the hiring, training or supervision of the employee was a cause-
in-fact of the act of the employee which caused the injury. The 
No.  96-2529 
 
8 
jury, in answering questions on the Special Verdict form, 
determined that Wal-Mart, acting through one or more of its 
employees, was not liable for the torts of false imprisonment, 
battery 
or 
negligent 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress.  
Nonetheless, the jury determined that Wal-Mart negligently 
hired, trained or supervised its employees, and this negligence 
caused damage to Miller.  The jury further determined that Wal-
Mart's employees did not have reasonable cause to stop Miller.  
What we do not know, and must remand to determine, is whether 
the act of stopping Miller without reasonable cause was caused 
by Wal-Mart's negligent hiring, training or supervision of its 
employees. 
¶16 Wal-Mart argues that if the tort of negligent hiring, 
training or supervision is a valid claim, it should include as 
an element, an underlying tort committed by the employee.  We 
disagree.  While we stop short of requiring an underlying tort, 
we do conclude that there must be an underlying wrongful act 
committed by the employee as an element of the tort of negligent 
hiring, training or supervision.  A wrongful act may well be a 
tort, but not necessarily.  If the act of the employee is 
contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as 
evidenced by existing statutory law, it is sufficient.  See 
Hausman v. St. Croix Care Center, 214 Wis. 2d 654, 663, 571 
N.W.2d 393 (1997) (citation omitted). 
¶17 Assuming all the necessary elements are proven, Wal-
Mart should not escape liability for its negligent act or 
omission simply because the employee’s underlying wrongful act 
No.  96-2529 
 
9 
is not an actionable tort.  The act of stopping Miller without 
reasonable cause was unquestionably a wrongful act, albeit not a 
tortious one.  It was contrary to fundamental and well-defined 
public policy as evidenced by existing statutory law: the retail 
theft statute gives rise to merchant immunity only if the 
merchant has reasonable cause to believe the person shoplifted. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3).  The act of stopping and physically 
detaining a person, absent reasonable cause, is tantamount to an 
arrest.  However, even the police do not have a right to arrest 
without probable cause.  See U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Stopping 
someone without reasonable cause in this situation is serious 
and it is wrong.  
¶18 The 
causal 
connection 
between 
Wal-Mart's 
alleged 
negligence and the wrongful act of the employee which caused the 
plaintiff's injuries is a determination that must be made by the 
jury.  If the jury determines that the wrongful act of the 
employee caused the plaintiff’s injury, the jury must then 
determine if the employer was negligent in hiring, training or 
supervising the employee which was a cause-in-fact of the 
wrongful act of the employee.  
¶19 Even when negligence and negligence as a cause-in-fact 
are present, liability does not necessarily follow.  If the jury 
determines that the defendant has a duty to the plaintiff, the 
defendant breaches that duty and the breach causes injury in 
fact, public policy considerations may nevertheless preclude 
imposing liability on the defendant.  See Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 
737.  This is solely a judicial determination.  See id.   
No.  96-2529 
 
10
 
Some of the public policy reasons for not imposing 
liability despite a finding of negligence as a 
substantial factor producing injury are: (1) The 
injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the 
injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm; or 
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or 
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely 
to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) 
allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point. 
Id. (citing Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 
132 (1976).  Although "it is generally better procedure to 
submit the negligence and cause-in-fact issues to the jury 
before addressing the public policy issue,” this court may make 
the public policy determination if such question is fully 
presented by the complaint and answer.  Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 
738 (citing Padilla v. Bydalek, 56 Wis. 2d 772, 779-80, 203 
N.W.2d 15 (1973)).  In the present case this court requested 
supplemental briefs from the parties regarding the public policy 
considerations.  Although the arguments were somewhat lacking, 
we nevertheless make the public policy determinations because 
the complaint and answer sufficiently set forth the plaintiff’s 
allegations. 
¶20 The first policy consideration is whether the injury 
is too remote from the negligence.  See Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 
737.  As Miller argues, the hiring, training and supervision of 
employees 
is 
exclusively 
within 
the 
employer’s 
control.  
Testimony at the trial in this case provided that Maness was not 
No.  96-2529 
 
11
trained regarding his duties and responsibilities under the 
retail theft statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.50.  We determine that 
assuming this failure to adequately train Maness led him to stop 
Miller without reasonable cause which in turn caused Miller’s 
injuries, 
the 
injury 
is 
not 
too 
remote 
from 
Wal-Mart’s 
negligence. 
¶21 The next policy consideration is whether “the injury 
is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the 
negligent tortfeasor.”  Id.  In this case, Wal-Mart was solely 
responsible 
for 
hiring, 
training 
and 
supervising 
Maness.  
Assuming their failure to properly train and supervise caused 
their employee’s wrongful act, holding Wal-Mart liable for the 
damages caused by Maness is not out of proportion to Wal-Mart’s 
culpability. 
¶22 Third, it is not highly extraordinary that Wal-Mart’s 
negligence would bring about harm to Miller.  See id.  Security 
agents are given considerable authority.  If not properly 
trained and supervised, it is not extraordinary that a security 
agent could bring about considerable harm. 
¶23 Fourth, we also determine that allowing recovery for 
Miller would not place an unreasonable burden on Wal-Mart.  In 
this case, the employee stopped and detained Miller without 
reasonable causean act which abrogates Wal-Mart’s privilege of 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3).  It is not unreasonable 
to impose civil liability on Wal-Mart because, assuming that 
Maness had been properly trained, he may not have stopped Miller 
without reasonable cause. 
No.  96-2529 
 
12
¶24 Fifth, allowing recovery for Miller will not open the 
door to fraudulent claims.  Wal-Mart argues that if this court 
recognizes the tort of negligent hiring, training or supervision 
it should require that the employee commit an underlying tort.  
Without this requirement, Wal-Mart argues, persons with criminal 
convictions will not be employable because the mere fact that a 
person has a criminal record would subject the employer such as 
Wal-Mart to liability.  We disagree.  Although we do not require 
that the employee commit an underlying actionable tort to hold 
the 
employer 
liable 
for 
negligent 
hiring, 
training 
or 
supervision, we have concluded that an element of the tort is 
that the employee commit a wrongful act that causes the 
plaintiff’s injury.  Simply having a criminal record does not 
cause an injury to a plaintiff.  It is only when that employee, 
like any other employee, commits an act that injures a third 
party may an employer be liable for negligent hiring, training, 
or supervision.  This requirement in itself will prevent, or at 
least minimize possible fraudulent claims. 
¶25 Sixth, we consider whether allowing Miller recovery 
would “enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping 
point.”  Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 737.  Wal-Mart asserts that 
plaintiffs would file an action based on their perceived 
potential for injury because the employer was negligent in 
hiring, training or supervising its employees.  However, as 
discussed above, we determine that an employer cannot be held 
liable for negligent hiring, training, or supervision if the 
employee 
simply 
does 
some 
act 
that 
the 
plaintiff 
finds 
No.  96-2529 
 
13
offensive. The employee’s conduct must be a cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiff’s injury.  Only then can a jury move to the second 
causation question of whether the employer’s negligence was a 
cause-in-fact of the employee’s wrongful and injurious act.  
Requiring that the employee’s act be a cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiff’s injury provides a just and sensible stopping point. 
¶26 In sum, we hold that the tort of negligent hiring, 
training or supervising is a valid claim in Wisconsin.  To state 
a claim for such negligence, the plaintiff must show that the 
employer has a duty of care, that the employer breached that 
duty, that the act or omission of the employee was a cause-in-
fact of the plaintiff’s injury, and that the act or omission of 
the employer was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the 
employee.  We also determine that in this case, applying the 
tort of negligent hiring, training or supervision does not 
contravene public policy considerations. 
¶27 In the present case, we cannot determine whether the 
elements 
of 
the 
tort 
of 
negligent 
hiring, 
training 
or 
supervising were satisfied because the Special Verdict did not 
present the proper questions regarding the elements of this 
tort.  The jury did not determine whether the wrongful act of 
the employee was caused by Wal-Mart’s negligent hiring, training 
or supervision.  Accordingly, we remand this case for the jury 
to make these determinations. 
¶28 Regarding 
the 
jury’s 
award 
of 
compensatory 
and 
punitive damages, this issue need not be retried on remand.  The 
new trial is confined to Wal-Mart’s liability under the elements 
No.  96-2529 
 
14
of the tort of negligent hiring, training or supervision as we 
have defined it in this opinion.  See, e.g., Kerkman v. Hintz, 
142 Wis. 2d 404, 407, 418 N.W.2d 795 (1988) (remanding for a new 
trial on the issue of negligence but affirming jury verdict for 
no damages for loss of consortium).   
¶29 Wal-Mart argues that there is no basis for the jury’s 
award of punitive damages.  A circuit court submits a question 
of punitive damages to the jury only after determining, as a 
matter of law, that there is evidence to support an award of 
punitive damages.  See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 
Wis. 2d 605, 614, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (citing Lievrouw v. 
Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 344, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1990)).  
“To determine whether, as a matter of law, the question of 
punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury, this 
court reviews the record de novo.”  Jacque, 209 Wis. 2d at 614 
(Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 155 Wis. 2d 724, 736, 456 N.W.2d 
585 (1990)).   
¶30 First, 
we 
agree 
with 
Wal-Mart’s 
assertion 
that 
punitive damages can only be awarded if the jury awards actual 
damages.  See Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425, 438-39, 418 
N.W.2d 818 (1988).  However, in this case the jury awarded the 
plaintiff $20,000 in compensatory damages for his past mental 
pain and suffering.  The circuit court entered judgment on this 
jury verdict.  This award of damages “represents a remedy 
recoverable in accordance with an order for judgment.”  Id. at 
439.  Accordingly, punitive damages may be awarded. 
No.  96-2529 
 
15
¶31 Wal-Mart further argues that Miller failed to present 
evidence of conduct justifying punitive damages.  There are 
generally two types of conduct that justify an award of punitive 
damages.   
 
“The first type is that in which the defendant desires 
to cause the harm sustained by the plaintiff, or 
believes that the harm is substantially certain to 
follow his conduct.  With the second type of conduct 
the defendant knows, or should have reason to know, 
not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk 
of harm, but also that there is a strong probability, 
although not a substantial certainty, that the harm 
will result but, nevertheless, he proceeds with his 
conduct in reckless or conscious disregard of the 
consequences.” 
Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 433, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985) 
(quoting J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and 
Practice, ch. 5, § 5.01 at 8-9 (1984)).   
¶32 Our independent review of the record shows that the 
circuit court was correctthere is sufficient evidence to 
support an award of punitive damages, assuming a causal 
connection between the employer's negligence and the employee's 
wrongful act.  The loss prevention employee, Maness, testified 
that Wal-Mart did not train him regarding Wisconsin’s retail 
theft statute on the rights and duties of merchants and 
customers.  As a result, Maness testified that he understood 
that he had the right to recover merchandise from suspected 
shoplifters; that he could make a “citizens arrest;” that he had 
more latitude than a police officer in conducting a search of a 
person; and that he did not need consent from a suspected 
shoplifter to question him or her.  Wal-Mart’s store manager and 
No.  96-2529 
 
16
assistant manager who were present when Maness stopped Miller, 
also testified that they were not trained regarding Wisconsin’s 
retail theft statute.  We conclude that this evidence is 
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages, assuming a 
causal connection between the employer's negligence and the 
employee's wrongful act.  Accordingly, the circuit court was 
correct to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury. 
 The part of the jury’s verdict awarding compensatory and 
punitive damages should not be upset unless, on remand, the jury 
does not find the elements of the tort of negligent hiring, 
training or supervision. 
¶33 We now turn to the issue of whether merchant immunity, 
pursuant 
to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.50(3) 
(reprinted 
below)2 is 
applicable to this case.  Resolution of this issue requires that 
                     
2 Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) provides: 
(3) A merchant, a merchant’s adult employe or a 
merchant’s security agent who has reasonable cause for 
believing that a person has violated this section in 
his or her presence may detain the person in a 
reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time to 
deliver the person to a peace officer, or to his or 
her parent or guardian in the case of a minor.  The 
detained person must be promptly informed of the 
purpose for the detention and be permitted to make 
phone calls, but he or she shall not be interrogated 
or searched against his or her will before the arrival 
of 
a 
peace 
officer 
who 
may 
conduct 
a 
lawful 
interrogation of the accused person.  The merchant, 
merchant’s adult employe or merchant’s security agent 
may release the detained person before the arrival of 
a peace officer or parent or guardian.  Any merchant, 
merchant’s adult employe or merchant’s security agent 
who acts in good faith in any act authorized under 
this 
section 
is 
immune 
from 
civil 
or 
criminal 
liability for those acts. 
No.  96-2529 
 
17
we interpret § 943.50(3).  Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law which we review de novo.  See Stockbridge School 
Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996).  The 
main goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent 
of the legislature.  See Anderson v. City of Milwaukee, 208 
Wis. 2d 18, 25, 559 N.W.2d 563 (1997).  We first look to the 
plain language of the statute.  See id.  If the plain language 
is ambiguous, we turn to extrinsic aids such as the legislative 
history, scope, context and purpose of the statute to determine 
legislative intent.  See id. 
¶34 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) immunizes 
a merchant from civil and criminal liability if all of the 
elements of the statute are met.  One of the elements is that 
the merchant must have reasonable cause for believing that the 
person shoplifted.  If the merchant does have the requisite 
reasonable cause, the merchant can then detain the suspected 
shoplifter in accord with the statute in order to maintain the 
privilege of immunity.  See Hainz v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 121 
Wis. 2d 168, 173, 359 N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1984).  A suspected 
shoplifter may only be detained in a reasonable manner and only 
for a reasonable length of time.  See id.   
¶35 “Any merchant, merchant’s adult employe or merchant’s 
security agent who acts in good faith in any act authorized 
under this section is immune from civil or criminal liability 
for those acts.”  Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3).  The statute does not 
discriminate regarding the type of civil liability from which a 
merchant is immune.  The plain language of the statute provides 
No.  96-2529 
 
18
that the merchant is immune if he or she acts in compliance with 
the statute.  Accordingly, if a merchant is liable for negligent 
hiring, training or supervision, the merchant may nevertheless 
be immune from liability if he or she meets the elements of 
§ 943.50(3). 
¶36 In this case, the jury determined that Wal-Mart did 
not have reasonable cause to believe Miller shoplifted.  Wal-
Mart argues that it presented undisputed testimony to satisfy 
each element of Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3).  Wal-Mart asserts that 
its employees did have reasonable cause to suspect Miller of 
shoplifting, 
and 
it 
did 
not 
abuse 
its 
privilege 
under 
§ 943.50(3).  Therefore, Wal-Mart argues that it is immune from 
civil and criminal liability and Miller’s action should be 
dismissed as a matter of law.  We disagree. 
¶37 Wal-Mart 
filed 
a 
post-trial 
motion 
for directed 
verdict.  The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the jury verdict is set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.14(1): 
 
(1) TEST 
OF 
SUFFICIENCY 
OF 
EVIDENCE. 
 
No 
motion 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a 
matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer in a 
verdict, 
shall 
be 
granted 
unless 
the 
court 
is 
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
finding in favor of such party. 
§ 805.14(1); see also Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 122 
Wis. 2d 94, 109-110, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985).  A circuit court’s 
denial of a motion for directed verdict should be overturned 
No.  96-2529 
 
19
only if such ruling is clearly erroneous.  See id.  “’[T]he 
trial court has such superior advantages for judging of the 
weight of the testimony and its relevancy and effect that this 
court should . . . disturb the decision [to deny a motion for 
directed verdict] . . . only when the mind is clearly convinced 
that the conclusion of the trial judge is wrong.’”  Olfe v. 
Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173, 186, 286 N.W.2d 573 (1980) (quoting 
Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 585, 207 N.W.2d 297 
(1973)). 
¶38 A review of the record shows that the testimony of the 
parties is in dispute regarding the nature of the encounter 
between Miller and the Wal-Mart employees.  However, when viewed 
most favorably to Miller, sufficient evidence exists to sustain 
the jury’s verdict that the Wal-Mart employees did not have 
reasonable 
cause 
to 
believe 
that 
Miller 
had 
shoplifted.  
Although reasonable minds could come to different conclusions, 
the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence.  Stopping is an 
“act authorized” only when the employee has reasonable cause.  
Having not acted with reasonable cause, the act of stopping was 
not “authorized under this section.”  Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3).  
Accordingly, Wal-Mart cannot gain the benefit of the merchant 
immunity statute.  We conclude that the circuit court’s denial 
of Wal-Mart’s motion for directed verdict was not clearly 
erroneous.  On remand, this issue need not be decided again. 
¶39 In sum, we hold that a cause of action for negligent 
hiring, training or supervision is a valid claim in Wisconsin.  
We conclude, however, that in this case, the Special Verdict 
No.  96-2529 
 
20
form did not present the proper questions regarding the elements 
of the tort; therefore, we cannot determine whether Miller met 
the elements.  We remand the case for the jury to determine 
whether the failure of the employer to exercise due care was a 
cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the employee which in turn 
caused the plaintiff’s injury.  The wrongful act of the employee 
does not necessarily have to be a tort; it is sufficient if the 
employee’s wrongful act is contrary to a fundamental and well-
defined public policy as evidenced by existing statutory law.  
In this case, the employee’s wrongful act was stopping Miller 
without reasonable causean act contrary to fundamental and 
well-defined public policy evidenced in Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3), 
the retail theft statute.  What the jury must determine is 
whether this wrongful act caused Miller injury.  If it did, the 
jury must then determine whether Wal-Mart’s alleged negligence 
in hiring, training or supervising its employee was a cause-in-
fact of the employee’s wrongful conduct.  Assuming the causal 
connection, however, the jury’s award of compensatory and 
punitive damages is supported by the record, and need not be 
retried. 
¶40 We also hold that Wis. Stat. § 943.50 regarding retail 
theft, is applicable to the tort of negligent hiring, training 
or supervision.  Although an employer may be liable for this 
tort, the employer may nevertheless be immune from liability 
under Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) which grants merchant immunity from 
civil and criminal liability if he or she meets the statutory 
elements.  In the present case Wal-Mart is not immune from 
No.  96-2529 
 
21
liability because the jury determined that Wal-Mart failed to 
meet one of the statutory elementsreasonable cause to believe 
Miller shoplifted.  
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE, withdrew from 
participation. 
¶42 JANINE P. GESKE, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 96-2529.dws 
 
1 
¶43 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.    (Dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that we should recognize a cause of action for 
negligent hiring, training, or supervision as a claim for relief 
in Wisconsin.  I dissent, however, because I would hold that the 
tort of negligent hiring, training, or supervision should 
include, as a necessary element, an underlying tort committed by 
the employee. 
¶44 Rather than requiring that the plaintiff prove that 
the 
employee 
committed 
an 
underlying 
tort, 
the 
majority 
concludes that an employer may be held liable for the negligent 
hiring, training, or supervision of an employee, if a plaintiff 
establishes that the employee committed an "underlying wrongful 
act."  The majority does not cite to any legal authority that 
defines an "underlying wrongful act."  The only guidance the 
majority provides is that a "wrongful act" is an act of the 
employee that is "contrary to a fundamental and well-defined 
public policy as evidenced by existing law."  Majority op. at 8. 
 This general and amorphous statement is no guidance at all for 
the litigants, attorneys, and courts to whom the majority has 
left the responsibility of defining this murky legal theory.   
¶45 The majority's decision, unfortunately, is a perfect 
example of the maxim that "hard cases make bad law."  This case 
could easily be decided by the straightforward application of 
well-established principles of tort law.  The jury in this case 
rejected every underlying claim filed against the Wal-Mart 
employees who stopped and searched the plaintiff.  Since the 
employee did not commit an underlying tort, the court should 
No. 96-2529.dws 
 
2 
have simply reversed the judgment of the circuit court.  The 
court, however, has taken it upon itself to craft a new, 
untested theory of law to allow this particular plaintiff to 
recover 
damages 
from 
the 
exonerated 
employee's 
employer.  
Relying solely on the employer immunity statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.50(3), the majority 
concludes 
that stopping someone 
without reasonable cause "is serious and it is wrong."  Wal-
Mart, the majority concludes, should not escape liability simply 
because its employee's underlying act is not an actionable tort. 
 See majority op. at 9. 
¶46 With this decision, the majority has departed from 
well-established principles of tort law.  The majority's 
approach 
provides 
no 
meaningful 
guidance 
to 
litigants, 
attorneys, and courts as to how a "wrongful act" is to be 
determined, and its decision no doubt will open the courtroom 
doors to a flood of litigation.  I refuse to follow the court 
down this path of uncertainty. 
  
¶47 I am authorized to state that Justice Jon P. Wilcox 
joins this dissenting opinion.   
  
 
No. 96-2529.dws 
 
1