Title: Livingston v. State
Citation: 519 So. 2d 1218
Docket Number: 56698
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 1988

519 So. 2d 1218 (1988) Rickey LIVINGSTON v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 56698. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 3, 1988. *1219 William B. Kirksey, Kirksey &amp; DeLaughter, Jackson, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman and Mike Moore, Attys. Gen. by Henry C. Clay, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. ANDERSON, Justice, for the Court: The appellant, Rickey Livingston, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hinds County on a charge of rape. After the jury failed to return a sentence of life imprisonment, the trial judge imposed a sentence of 40 years to be served consecutively with previously existing sentences. The only questions we need address are those regarding identification, right to counsel at lineup and comments by the prosecutor. After careful review of each assignment, we find no reversible error and affirm. At around noon on December 14, 1984, the 24-year-old prosecutrix, who lived alone in her apartment, answered a knock on her door. There was a young, black male, in his mid-twenties standing about a foot from her door. There was plenty of sunlight in that area and she got a clear and unobstructed view of his face. She later positively identified the man as the appellant Rickey Livingston. He pretended to solicit subscriptions or donations for National Geographic magazine. The prosecutrix said, "no" and he asked if anyone else there would like to contribute. Again, she answered "no" and attempted to close her door, whereupon the man forced his way in. She screamed and he slammed the door shut and choked her until she passed out momentarily. He continually chocked her and threatened her several times saying, "shut up or I'll kill you." The assailant raped the prosecutrix twice and demanded money before leaving. The entire episode lasted ten to fifteen minutes. A college student, Steve Gifford, who resided in the apartment complex testified for the state that around noon on the day in question he heard a woman scream and a door slam in the vicinity of the victim's *1220 apartment. About fifteen minutes later he observed a man, whom he positively identified as Livingston, run from the direction of the prosecutrix' apartment. Medical testimony showed that semen collected from the prosecutrix' underclothes was analyzed and compared with blood and saliva samples from the defendant. The results showed that the semen came from a person with Blood Type A and a secreter. Livingston is a Type A secreter. This test was not conclusive proof of appellant's guilt, but was evidence that the appellant could not be excluded as a suspect. The appellant's mother offered testimony that the appellant was home during the time of the alleged rape. The appellant did not testify and offered no other evidence. On December 19, 1984, the prosecutrix identified the appellant as her attacker from a series of photographs shown her by the police. A warrant was issued and on December 20, Livingston was arrested at his mother's house. On the same day he was placed in a lineup for identification by the state's witness Gifford. On December 22 he was placed again in a lineup for identification by the prosecutrix. The record is silent as to whether counsel for the appellant was present at either of the lineups. Now on appeal, appellant alleges error in the admission of testimony by the prosecutrix, state's witness Gifford and Detective Knowles regarding the out-of-court identification made without benefit of counsel. We first address the issue of appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel which is also embodied in Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution (1890). The Federal Courts have consistently held that the right to counsel does not attach until initiation of formal charges or adversarial proceedings. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986); and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S. Ct. 477, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). This state in past years embraced the view that the right to counsel did not apply to pre-indictment lineups. Lannom v. State, 464 So. 2d 492, 495 (Miss. 1985); Wilson v. State, 451 So. 2d 718 (Miss. 1984); Bankston v. State, 391 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Miss. 1980); Scott v. State, 359 So. 2d 1355, 1363 (Miss. 1978); Fells v. State, 345 So. 2d 618, 620 (Miss. 1977); Cox v. State, 326 So. 2d 794 (Miss. 1976) cert. den. 429 U.S. 849, 97 S. Ct. 136, 50 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1976); Howard v. State, 319 So. 2d 219, 220 (Miss. 1975); cert. den. 425 U.S. 954, 96 S. Ct. 1733, 48 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1976); Hobson v. State, 285 So. 2d 464, 466 (Miss. 1973). In this case, we look to more recent caselaw and the applicable law found in Mississippi Code Annotated, section 99-1-7 (Supp. 1986). Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984); Page v. State, 495 So. 2d 436 (Miss. 1986). In Cannaday, the defendant had been criminally charged and a preliminary hearing had been conducted when the challenged statements were solicited by law enforcement officers outside the presence of her already appointed counsel. That Court held that "the time at which the right to counsel attaches to a defendant is when adversary proceedings have been initiated...." Page, supra, involved the solicitation of incriminating statements after the defendant had been arrested and released on bond. See also, Williamson v. State, 512 So. 2d 868, 876 (Miss. 1987) and Tolbert v. State, 511 So. 2d 1368, 1375 (Miss. 1987). Both Cannaday and Page refer to MCA § 99-1-7 (1972) for determination of the commencement of judicial proceedings. See Note, Attachment of the Sixth *1221 Amendment Right to Counsel in Mississippi, 5 Miss.Coll.L.Rev. 227, 254 (1985); but see Rules 1.02 and 1.04, Miss.Unif. Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac. It is undisputed in this case that an arrest warrant had issued for appellant and he was in custody. Clearly his right to counsel had attached. MCA § 99-1-7 (1972). However, the record does not affirmatively indicate that counsel was not present at the lineup. Not only is this an unsupported assumption this Court is asked to make, more importantly, no objection to the alleged absence of counsel was made at trial. It is a well-established principle that errors such as these will not be entertained when raised for the first time on appeal. Secondly, appellant complains that admission of testimony regarding the identification was error. The traditional rule holding that such testimony would be hearsay and impermissible bolstering was modified in Fells v. State, 345 So. 2d 618, 619 (Miss. 1977). The Court stated: 345 So. 2d at 622. Accordingly, the testimony of the witness for the prosecution and the prosecutrix regarding out-of-court identifications was permissible. Fells, by its language, does not restrict the testimony to only the first identification nor to one person designated as the principal witness as appellant argues. Fells further held that "if the principal witness' identification is impeached, then independent evidence of the identification may be introduced through third persons present at the out-of-court identification." Without impeaching the testimony of the witnesses, Detective Knowles was allowed to testify that she was present during the identifications made by Gifford and the prosecutrix. Under Fells, this testimony may have been improper but under the circumstances would be no more than harmless error. Moreover, the new Mississippi Rules of Evidence provide that such identification evidence is not hearsay and is admissible as substantive material (See Rule 801(D)(1)(C). Finally, we note that no objections were made to the introduction of the testimony at trial. Therefore, all claims regarding the identification are procedurally barred. Appellant complains that the remarks below by Assistant District Attorney Patricia Bennett, coupled with those following by District Attorney Ed Peters, constituted impermissible comment upon the defendant's failure to testify and was reversible error. These comments by the Assistant District Attorney constitute no more than a routine request for the jury to consider the evidence and were not improper. Peters' statements were in reference or response to testimony by defendant's mother that she only wanted the truth told and the fact that she and her husband had earlier refused to answer questions by the police. He also improperly alluded to the absence of testimony by appellant's father. Peters' remarks in this case, though improper, were not of such a prejudicial nature so as to require reversal. Considering the overwhelming weight of the evidence, under no circumstances would the jury have found appellant not guilty. The remark of the District Attorney constituted harmless error. Therefore, the defendant's conviction of rape and sentence of forty years' imprisonment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. SULLIVAN, J., dissents to part II on the authority of Griffin v. State, 504 So. 2d 186, 193 (Miss. 1987).