Title: City of Springfield v. Civil Serv. Comm’n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11540
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11540 
 
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD  vs.  CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & another.1 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 8, 2014. - August 18, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.2 
 
 
Civil Service, Provisional promotion, Termination of employment, 
Notice.  Labor, Civil service.  Employment, Termination.  
Jurisdiction, Civil Service Commission.  Administrative 
Law, Evidence.  Notice, Termination of employment, 
Administrative hearing.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 29, 2010. 
 
 
The case was heard by Bertha D. Josephson, J. on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Maurice M. Cahillane, Jr. (William E. Mahoney with him) for 
city of Springfield. 
 
Andrew M. Batchelor, Assistant Attorney General, for Civil 
Service Commission. 
 
Bart W. Heemskerk for Joseph McDowell. 
 
                     
 
1 Joseph McDowell. 
 
 
2 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  Joseph McDowell was hired by the city of 
Springfield (city) in 1987 as a skilled laborer, and soon 
thereafter achieved the status of a permanent, tenured civil 
service employee of the city.  In 1993, he received the first of 
two provisional promotions;3 he worked in the second of these 
provisional positions until 2005, when the city terminated his 
employment.  One issue we consider in this appeal is whether, 
despite being terminated from his provisional position, McDowell 
was entitled to appeal his termination pursuant to the relevant 
provisions of the civil service statute, G. L. c. 31, §§ 41–45; 
agreeing with the Civil Service Commission (commission), we 
conclude that he was.  We also consider whether the commission, 
in deciding McDowell's appeal, permissibly could consider that 
subsequent to the city's discharge of McDowell, he had been 
indicted and then pleaded guilty to the crime of filing false 
tax returns.  We decide that in the particular circumstances of 
this case, the commission was permitted to take the criminal 
proceeding against McDowell and its disposition into account, 
                     
 
3 A provisional employee is an employee in a civil service 
position who does not hold the position on a permanent basis, 
i.e., without any restrictions on duration of the employment.  
See G. L. c. 31, § 1 (§ 1) (defining "[p]rovisional employee" 
and "[p]ermanent employee").  A civil service employee may 
receive a provisional promotion pursuant to c. 31, § 15.  Like a 
provisional employee, a provisionally promoted employee is not 
appointed on a permanent basis, and does not have tenure in the 
provisional promotion.  See G. L. c. 31, § 1 (defining 
"[t]enured employee"). 
3 
 
 
but that McDowell's indictment for filing false tax returns did 
not qualify as an indictment "for misconduct in [McDowell's] 
. . . employment" within the meaning of G. L. c. 268A, § 25, and 
thus a suspension based on the indictment would not have been 
valid. 
 
1.  Background.  McDowell began working as a skilled 
laborer for the city in 1987.  In 1989, he was promoted to the 
position of carpenter within the city's civil service system.  
After completing his probationary period, McDowell became a 
tenured employee in this position on a permanent basis, and 
served as such until 1993.  That year, McDowell was 
provisionally promoted to the position of assistant deputy of 
maintenance, and the next year, 1994, he was again provisionally 
promoted to become the deputy director of maintenance (deputy 
director) within the then-named facilities management department 
of the city.  The position of deputy director included 
responsibility for assigning work to approximately forty 
tradesmen and skilled laborers, interacting with private 
vendors, and responding to emergencies. 
 
On January 25, 2005, the city sent McDowell a notice of 
suspension, informing him that he was being suspended without 
pay from his duties as deputy director for five days, for 
inappropriate personal use of city property and for conducting 
4 
 
 
private business during working hours.4  The city held a two-day 
disciplinary hearing and on April 15, 2005, issued a letter to 
McDowell notifying him that his employment with the city had 
been terminated.  On April 22, McDowell filed an appeal with the 
commission.  The commission referred the case to the division of 
administrative law appeals (DALA), and a DALA magistrate 
conducted a full evidentiary hearing on December 18, 2006.  At 
the hearing, the city made an oral motion to dismiss McDowell's 
appeal, arguing that because McDowell was appointed 
provisionally to his position as deputy director, the commission 
did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  The magistrate 
ultimately agreed and on August 17, 2007, recommended to the 
commission that McDowell's appeal be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Almost two and one-half years later, on 
February 12, 2010, the commission issued an interim decision 
rejecting the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss the appeal 
and concluding that an employee who held a tenured civil service 
position and who, while in such tenured position, is 
provisionally promoted to a different position from which he is 
later terminated, has the right to appeal to the commission to 
challenge the just cause for his termination under G. L. c. 31, 
                     
 
4 Since 1994, McDowell was the sole proprietor of a company 
named McDowell and Sons, and in that capacity worked as a 
contractor, designing and installing kitchens. 
5 
 
 
§ 41.5  On May 6, 2010, the commission issued a final decision on 
McDowell's appeal and concluded that although the city was 
justified in disciplining McDowell on account of the use of city 
property in connection with his private business, there was not 
just cause to terminate his employment.  The commission modified 
the termination, reducing it to a nineteen-month suspension to 
run from April 15, 2005, to November 15, 2006;6 thereafter, 
McDowell was to be deemed reinstated to his permanent civil 
service position of carpenter.   
 
On April 13, 2007, while McDowell's appeal from his 
termination was pending before the commission but before it had 
been decided, McDowell was indicted for violation of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7206(1) (2006) (filing false return under oath),7 and 
                     
 
5 In the same decision, the Civil Service Commission 
(commission) also determined that the one-year contract between 
McDowell and the city of Springfield (city), dated July 1, 2001, 
in which McDowell purported to agree that the provisional 
position he held was not subject to the civil service law or any 
collective bargaining agreement, was unenforceable because 
against public policy.  The city wisely does not challenge this 
determination on appeal, and we do not discuss it further. 
 
 
6 The commission's final decision contained a typographical 
or scrivener's error with respect to the end date of McDowell's 
suspension, which the commission subsequently corrected.  There 
is no disagreement that the end date was to be November 15, 
2006. 
 
 
7 The city and the commission refer to the statute under 
which McDowell was indicted as 26 U.S.C. § 2706(1).  There is no 
statute designated as 26 U.S.C. § 2706.  We assume the reference 
is intended to refer to 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). 
6 
 
 
subsequently pleaded guilty on November 27, 2007.8  Eight days 
after the issuance of the commission's final decision of May 6, 
2010, the city filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting 
the commission to consider McDowell's indictment and conviction.9  
The city argued that if McDowell had still been working for the 
city at the time of his April, 2007, indictment -- which he 
would have been pursuant to the commission's subsequent decision 
imposing a nineteen-month suspension that would have ended 
November 15, 2006 -- the city would have suspended McDowell 
pursuant to G. L. c. 268A, § 25, upon his indictment, and would 
have terminated him under G. L. c. 31, § 50, upon his 
conviction.10  McDowell opposed the motion.  On March 24, 2011, 
the commission allowed the city's motion in part, concluding 
that the city would have suspended McDowell without pay on 
April 13, 2007; would have terminated him effective November 27, 
2007; and would have had just cause to take both actions.  The 
commission also modified its original determination that a 
nineteen-month suspension was to be imposed, ruling that the 
                     
 
8 The indictment charged McDowell with filing false income 
tax returns for the years 2001 through 2005. 
 
 
9 The city apparently raised the issue of including evidence 
of McDowell's indictment for and subsequent conviction of tax 
fraud at a prehearing conference in the case, but was instructed 
not to raise this issue before the commission issued its final 
decision, but, if necessary, to raise it through a motion for 
reconsideration. 
 
 
10 We discuss both of the cited statutes, infra. 
7 
 
 
suspension should have been for six months.  As a consequence of 
this modification, the commission's decision created a 
reinstatement period for McDowell between October 16, 2005, and 
April 13, 2007. 
 
Both the city and McDowell sought judicial review of the 
commission's decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  In May, 
2012, a judge in the Superior Court denied both parties' motions 
for judgment on the pleadings and affirmed the decision of the 
commission.  The judge ruled that (1) the commission had 
reasonably interpreted G. L. c. 31, § 41, to permit an employee 
such as McDowell, who held a tenured civil service position but 
then accepted a provisional promotion, to appeal his termination 
to the commission; and (2) the city was entitled to suspend 
McDowell under G. L. c. 268A, § 25, upon his indictment on 
April 13, 2007, and thereafter entitled to discharge him 
pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 50, upon his conviction on 
November 27, 2007.  McDowell and the city both appealed the 
judge's decision to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The city's appeal raises a single issue, 
the correctness of the commission's, and the judge's, 
determination that although McDowell was terminated from his 
employment in a position to which he was appointed only 
provisionally and in which he was not tenured, nonetheless he 
8 
 
 
was entitled to appeal his termination to the commission.  
McDowell agrees with the commission on this issue and raises 
separate issues in his appeal:  (1) the commission should not 
have considered his 2007 indictment and conviction at all in 
connection with his appeal from the city's 2005 termination 
decision because these events occurred long after the city 
terminated him; (2) in any event, the commission erred in 
concluding the city permissibly could suspend him pursuant to 
G. L. c. 268A, § 25, on account of his indictment; and (3) his 
termination based on his conviction was improper and should be 
deemed void because the city, in violation of his statutory due 
process rights set out in G. L. c. 31, § 41, never gave him 
proper notice of this alleged basis for termination, or an 
opportunity for a hearing on it.  We consider the city's and 
McDowell's claims separately, and in turn. 
 
a.  Effect of a provisional promotion on a tenured civil 
service employee's right to appeal to the commission.  The city 
contends that McDowell was not entitled to appeal the 
termination of his employment as deputy director to the 
commission under G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45.  We disagree. 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 31, §§ 41 (§ 41) and 43 (§ 43),11 a 
civil service "tenured employee" may be terminated only for just 
                     
 
11 General Laws c. 31, § 41 (§ 41), provides in pertinent 
part: 
9 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
"Except for just cause and except in accordance with 
the provisions of this paragraph, a tenured employee shall 
not be discharged, removed, [or] suspended for a period of 
more than five days . . . .  Before such action is taken, 
such employee shall be given a written notice by the 
appointing authority, which shall include the action 
contemplated, the specific reason or reasons for such 
action and a copy of [G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45], and shall be 
given a full hearing concerning such reason or reasons 
before the appointing authority or a hearing officer 
designated by the appointing authority. . . . 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"If it is the decision of the appointing authority, 
after hearing, that there was just cause for an action 
taken against a person pursuant to the first . . . 
paragraph[] of this section, such person may appeal to the 
commission as provided in [G. L. c. 31, § 43]." 
 
 
General Laws c. 31, § 43 (§ 43), in turn, provides in 
relevant part: 
 
 
"If a person aggrieved by a decision of an appointing 
authority made pursuant to [§ 41] shall, within ten days 
after receiving written notice of such decision, appeal in 
writing to the commission, he shall be given a hearing 
before a member of the commission or some disinterested 
person designated by the chairman of the commission. . . . 
 
 
"If the commission by a preponderance of the evidence 
determines that there was just cause for an action taken 
against such person it shall affirm the action of the 
appointing authority, otherwise it shall reverse such 
action and the person concerned shall be returned to his 
position without loss of compensation or other rights; 
provided, however, if the employee, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, establishes that said action was based upon 
harmful error in the application of the appointing 
authority's procedure, an error of law, or upon any factor 
or conduct on the part of the employee not reasonably 
related to the fitness of the employee to perform in his 
position, said action shall not be sustained and the person 
shall be returned to his position without loss of 
10 
 
 
cause and in accordance with certain procedural protections 
including written notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to 
appeal to the commission.  A "tenured employee" is defined as 
one "who is employed following (1) an original appointment to a 
position on a permanent basis and the actual performance of the 
duties of such position for the probationary period required by 
law or (2), a promotional appointment on a permanent basis."  
G. L. c. 31, § 1 (§ 1). 
 
The city reads this definition as indicating that McDowell, 
who had been promoted provisionally to the position of deputy 
director, held a "promotional appointment" but not on a 
permanent basis, and therefore was not a "tenured employee" at 
the time the city terminated him.  Therefore, it argues, the 
protections that §§ 41 and 43 afford tenured employees, 
including the right to appeal to the commission, were not 
available to McDowell.  The commission advances a different 
interpretation, contending that the definition of "tenured 
employee" in § 1 describes two separate and independent 
categories of tenured civil service employees, and if a person 
(such as McDowell) meets the qualifications of the first 
category -- i.e., he receives "an original appointment to a 
[civil service] position on a permanent basis" and completes the 
                                                                  
compensation or other rights.  The commission may also 
modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority." 
11 
 
 
probationary period -- nothing in the language or structure of 
§ 1 suggests that he loses the "tenured employee" status if he 
is later provisionally promoted.  Rather, the commission states, 
as a "tenured employee," such a person is entitled to the 
procedural protections of §§ 41 and 43, including the right to 
appeal an appointing authority's termination decision to the 
commission.  In the commission's view, interpreting the statute 
in this manner is necessary to protect the loss of an employee's 
tenured status through no fault of his own. 
 
Great weight is given to a "reasonable construction of a 
regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with . . . 
[its] enforcement."  School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of 
Educ., 362 Mass. 417, 441 n.22 (1972), quoting Investment Co. 
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-627 (1970).  A reviewing court 
"must apply all rational presumptions in favor of validity of 
the administrative action and not declare it void unless its 
provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted 
in harmony with the legislative mandate."  Middleborough v. 
Housing Appeals Comm., 449 Mass. 514, 524 (2007), quoting Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Wellesley v. Housing Appeals Comm., 385 Mass. 
651, 654 (1982).  However, an administrative interpretation will 
not be followed if it is contrary to the "plain and unambiguous 
terms . . . [in] a statute."  School Comm. of Springfield, 
supra, quoting Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 319 
12 
 
 
Mass. 81, 86 (1946).  The burden of proving the invalidity of an 
administrative action rests with the party challenging that 
action.  Middleborough, supra. 
 
As the commission argues, its interpretation is consistent 
with the language used by the Legislature in the statutory 
provisions at issue:  an individual who holds a tenured, 
permanent civil service position and is then provisionally 
promoted is still "a civil service employee who is employed 
following (1) an original appointment to a position on a 
permanent basis."  G. L. c. 31, § 1.  See Andrews v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 446 Mass. 611, 613 (2006) ("A tenured employee in the 
civil service system is one who initially occupied a position by 
original appointment . . . and has completed the probationary 
period, or one who has received a 'promotional appointment' on a 
permanent basis . . .").  Moreover, and importantly, the 
commission's construction of §§ 1 and 41 to permit a discharged 
provisional employee who previously held tenured employee status 
to appeal his discharge to the commission is reasonably related 
to and furthers the purpose of the civil service law, which is 
"to free public servants from political pressure and arbitrary 
separation from the public service" while providing for removal 
13 
 
 
of those that are incompetent or unworthy.  See Cullen v. Mayor 
of Newton, 308 Mass. 578, 581 (1941).12 
 
Because the commission's reading of the relevant statutory 
provisions is "reasonable, consistent with the statutory 
language and purposes, and appropriate," Zoning Bd. of Appeals 
of Amesbury v. Housing Appeals Comm., 457 Mass. 748, 762 (2010), 
we accept it.  Accordingly, McDowell, as a provisionally 
promoted civil service employee who previously held tenure in 
his original, appointed position of carpenter, was a "tenured 
employee" who retained the right to appeal from the termination 
of his employment with the city to the commission.13 
                     
 
12 The commission stated that due to a lack of civil service 
examination administration, there was an over-use of provisional 
appointments and promotions, and that in these circumstances, 
providing the protections of §§ 41 and 43 to a provisionally 
promoted employee who initially held a tenured civil service 
position on a permanent basis would best promote the legislative 
intent of the civil service laws.  We note that McDowell held 
his provisional appointment as deputy director for over ten 
years. 
 
 
13 The city suggests that this interpretation of §§ 1 and 41 
of the civil service statute will require appointing authorities 
always to permit provisionally promoted employees who are 
terminated from employment "through their own fault" to return 
to and remain in their original, tenured civil service 
positions.  The city is not correct.  Although such a civil 
service employee has the right to appeal his or her termination 
to the commission, if the commission finds just cause for the 
appointing authority's decision to terminate, the commission 
must affirm that decision.  See G. L. c. 31, § 43.  In such a 
case, the employee must leave his or her municipal employment 
altogether and has no right to return to the original, tenured 
position.  A return to the original position may only occur if, 
pursuant to its authority under § 43, the commission reverses 
14 
 
 
 
We turn to McDowell's appeal. 
 
b.  Suspension for "misconduct in office".14  The commission 
determined that the city, pursuant to G. L. c. 268A, § 25 
(§ 25), would have suspended McDowell without pay effective 
April 13, 2007, on account of his indictment for filing false 
tax returns.  The city agrees with the commission's decision in 
this respect, but McDowell argues that the commission committed 
                                                                  
the appointing authority's penalty of termination or, as in this 
case, modifies it. 
 
 
14 As previously indicated, the first issue McDowell raises 
in his appeal is that it was error for the commission to have 
considered his 2007 indictment and conviction at all in this 
case, because they took place two years after the city 
terminated him, and as such, they cannot qualify as "after-
acquired evidence" as the city suggested to the commission.  The 
after-acquired evidence principle permits an employer to show 
that later-discovered but legitimate reasons for taking adverse 
employment action against an employee, if they had been known at 
the time, would have justified or mitigated the employer's 
otherwise impermissibly discriminatory action (e.g., discharge) 
relating to that employee, and can serve to limit the employee's 
recovery.  See, e.g., Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 
410 Mass. 805, 815-816 (1991).  We agree with McDowell that his 
criminal indictment and conviction are not "after-acquired 
evidence" because they did not occur before the city terminated 
McDowell in 2005.  Nevertheless, the fact that the criminal 
charges do not so qualify is of no import in this case because, 
as the judge concluded, at issue here are two separate 
terminations by the city:  (1) the April 15, 2005, termination 
for misuse of city property; and (2) the November 27, 2007, 
termination based on McDowell's criminal conviction.  The city 
asked the commission to consider McDowell's indictment for and 
conviction of filing false tax returns as a basis for the second 
termination only, and accordingly, the after-acquired evidence 
principle does not come into play.  We consider the issue of two 
terminations, infra. 
15 
 
 
error of law in ruling that § 25 authorized the city to suspend 
him upon his indictment.  We agree with McDowell. 
 
A public employer may suspend an employee without pay 
pursuant to § 25 during any period the employee is under 
indictment for "misconduct in such office or employment."15  The 
applicability of § 25 in each case is "controlled by the duties 
and obligations accompanying the particular employment," 
Perryman v. School Comm. of Boston, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 349 
(1983), and there must be a direct relationship between the 
employee's misconduct and the office held.  Id. at 348.  In 
general, a criminal indictment arising out of an employee's off-
duty activities is not considered to be one implicating 
misconduct in office.  Dupree v. School Comm. of Boston, 15 
Mass. App. Ct. 535, 537 (1983).  "There are, however, 
circumstances where the crime charged, no matter where or when 
performed, is so inimical to the duties inherent in the 
employment that an indictment for that crime is for misconduct 
                     
 
15 General Law c. 268A, § 25 (§ 25), provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
 
"An officer or employee of a county, city, town or 
district . . . may, during any period such officer or 
employee is under indictment for misconduct in such office 
or employment . . . be suspended by the appointing 
authority . . . . 
 
 
"Any person so suspended shall not receive any 
compensation or salary during the period of suspension 
. . . ." 
16 
 
 
in office."  Id.  In addition, "[t]here are certain forms of 
employment which carry a position of trust so peculiar to the 
office and so beyond that imposed by all public service that 
conduct consistent with this special trust is an obligation of 
the employment."  Perryman, supra at 349.  Police officers fall 
into such a category; in order to perform their jobs, they 
"voluntarily undertake to adhere to a higher standard of conduct 
than that imposed on ordinary citizens," must "comport 
themselves in accordance with the laws that they are sworn to 
enforce and behave in a manner that brings honor and respect for 
rather than public distrust of law enforcement personnel."  
Attorney Gen. v. McHatton, 428 Mass. 790, 793-794 (1999), 
quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Civil Service Comm'n, 22 
Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371 (1986).  See Dupree, supra at 538, and 
cases cited.  School teachers do as well, because they have an 
"extensive and peculiar opportunity to impress [their] attitude 
and views" on their students.  Dupree, supra, quoting Faxon v. 
School Comm. of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 534 (1954). 
 
The commission argues that McDowell's indictment for filing 
false tax returns constitutes misconduct in office because the 
income from his privately owned business that he failed to 
report was, in part, earned while he was working for the city 
17 
 
 
and using public resources.16  The commission asserts that 
because its determination that McDowell's charged tax fraud 
constituted misconduct in office was reasonable and supported by 
substantial evidence, that determination is entitled to 
deference. 
 
As earlier discussed in another context, deference is due 
when an agency interprets a statute it is charged with 
administering.  Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 
Mass. 478, 481 (2006).  The commission, however, is not 
specifically charged with administering § 25, which is a statute 
that applies generally to all officers, employees, and 
appointing authorities of county and local government.  
Accordingly, the commission's interpretation of this statute, 
while relevant, is not one to which we pay special deference.  
Furthermore, ultimately, "the duty of statutory interpretation 
rests in the courts."  Commerce Ins. Co., supra.  There is 
little or no evidence in the record before us linking the false 
tax returns at issue in McDowell's indictment -- which covered 
five separate years -- to the private business work the 
                     
 
16 The commission's decision on the city's motion for 
reconsideration summarizes the commission's conclusions that 
McDowell engaged in the following conduct:  (1) used his city-
owned cellular telephone on eleven occasions for a total of 
fourteen minutes during regular work hours for his private 
business; (2) used a city-owned facsimile machine at least twice 
for private business; (3) asked a city employee for advice about 
his private business during work hours; and (4) compiled or 
reviewed private business proposals during work hours. 
18 
 
 
commission found McDowell undertook during the hours of his 
employment.  As a consequence, the record did not provide a 
basis for the commission reasonably to have concluded that 
McDowell's indicted conduct represented misconduct in office 
within the meaning of § 25, rather than conduct qualifying as 
off-duty. 
 
The city takes a different tack, arguing that the position 
of deputy director, like that of a police officer or teacher, 
holds a higher expectation of trust than other public service 
jobs, and therefore McDowell's off-duty conduct cannot be 
separated from his on-duty conduct.  McDowell counters that at 
the time of his indictment in April of 2007, he would no longer 
have been a deputy director.  Rather, pursuant to the terms of 
the commission's original decision in this case, he would have 
returned to his original, tenured civil service position of 
carpenter following the suspension ordered by the commission.  
He argues that a carpenter is an ordinary employee "not subject 
to any special trust inherent in that position."  Accordingly, 
his filing of false tax returns, a crime arising from off-duty 
conduct (at least based on the record here), was not "misconduct 
in office" within the meaning of § 25, and therefore the city 
could not have properly suspended him pursuant to that statute. 
 
Had the commission issued in a more timely manner its 
decision to modify McDowell's termination to a nineteen-month 
19 
 
 
suspension, it is reasonable to assume, as McDowell does, that 
at the time he was indicted in April, 2007, he already would 
have completed his suspension and been employed as a carpenter 
for the city.17  In these circumstances, the city's contention 
that McDowell's role as deputy director was one of public trust 
becomes essentially irrelevant.  The appropriate focus must be 
on the relationship between the crime charged in the indictment 
and McDowell's "duties and obligations" as a carpenter.  
Perryman, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 349. 
 
The record is silent on the specific duties of a skilled 
carpenter in the employ of the city, but certainly the position 
is not on a par with that of a police officer or school teacher 
in terms of public trust.  There is no suggestion that a 
carpenter, even one who is a public employee, is sworn to uphold 
the law as an integral part of his job, nor any contention that 
a carpenter has any particular opportunity to act as a role 
model for or impress his attitudes on young students.  Rather, 
                     
 
17 While the record does not specify the cause of the delay, 
the commission does acknowledge that "this appeal was longer 
than usual" and "it is regrettable that a decision was not 
issued in a more timely manner."  McDowell's nineteen-month 
suspension would have run from April 15, 2005, to November 15, 
2006, at which point presumably he would have returned to his 
position as a carpenter for the city and would have been serving 
in that position in April, 2007, when he was indicted for filing 
false returns.  (Even with the commission's later modification 
of the nineteen-month suspension to a six-month suspension, the 
result would have been the same:  McDowell would have been 
employed as a carpenter when he was indicted.) 
20 
 
 
this appears to be a case to which the rule that "[a]n 
indictment for a crime arising from an employee's off-duty 
conduct is not generally considered misconduct in office under 
G. L. c. 268A, § 25," squarely applies.  Dupree, 15 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 537.  The city would not have been entitled to suspend 
McDowell without pay from his employment as a skilled carpenter 
as of April 13, 2007, pursuant to § 25, and the commission's 
contrary ruling was error. 
c.  Waiver of right to second termination hearing.18  
Finally, McDowell argues that even if the commission permissibly 
could consider his conviction as a separate ground for his 
termination, McDowell was deprived of his due process rights 
because the city did not comply with the necessary procedural 
requirements pursuant to § 41 when, through its motion for 
                     
 
18 We have discussed in the previous section McDowell's 
challenge to the substantive legal authority of the city to 
suspend him based on the indictment for filing false tax returns 
that was issued on April 13, 2007.  McDowell does not challenge 
on appeal the substantive legal authority of the city to 
terminate his employment based on his conviction of this crime, 
which occurred on November 27, 2007.  Rather, his challenge to 
his termination from employment based on the conviction, which 
we discuss in this section, is a procedural one.  As to 
substantive authority, the city has stated that it was permitted 
to terminate McDowell upon his conviction pursuant to G. L. 
c. 31, § 50, which provides in pertinent part, "No person . . .  
shall . . . be appointed to or employed in any . . . [civil 
service] position within one year after his conviction of any 
crime except that the appointing authority may, in its 
discretion, appoint or employ within such one-year period a 
person convicted of [certain specified crimes not applicable in 
this case] . . . ." 
21 
 
 
reconsideration, it sought respectively to suspend and then 
terminate McDowell based on his indictment and subsequent 
conviction.19  Section 41 requires, in part, that prior to 
suspending for more than five days or terminating a tenured 
employee, the appointing authority provide the employee with 
proper written notice.  McDowell contends that he never received 
such notice as to the city's intent to suspend and subsequently 
terminate his employment based on the indictment and conviction, 
and thus, he was not able to avail himself of his statutory due 
process rights to a hearing.  Accordingly, the commission's 
decision approving of his termination on this ground should be 
rendered void and he should be reinstated as a carpenter and 
awarded back pay and benefits to October 15, 2005.  We conclude 
that because McDowell failed to raise this issue properly before 
the commission, or the Superior Court, he has waived any claim 
to defective notice and therefore the commission's decision that 
he would have been terminated effective November 27, 2007, did 
not violate the procedural rights and protections that § 41 
afforded him. 
 
Failure to raise an issue before an appointing authority, 
an administrative agency, and a reviewing court precludes a 
party from raising it on appeal.  See Albert v. Municipal Court 
                     
 
19 This is the second termination decision referred to 
previously.  See note 14, supra. 
 
22 
 
 
of Boston, 388 Mass. 491, 493-494 (1983).  While there may be 
exceptional circumstances requiring appellate review of an issue 
not raised before the agency or the court below so as to avoid 
injustice, the presumption of waiver "has particular force where 
the other party may be prejudiced by the failure to raise the 
point below."  Id. at 494, quoting Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakely, 
372 Mass. 86, 88 (1977).  McDowell did not raise the claim of 
defective notice before the commission, did not appeal the 
commission's decision to the Superior Court, and did not raise 
the issue before the judge in that court when responding to the 
city's appeal -- despite his knowledge that the city did in fact 
seek to suspend and terminate him as a result of his criminal 
conduct.  Accordingly, the issue is waived.20 
                     
 
20 The city and the commission argue that McDowell did 
receive written notice in the form of the city's motion for 
reconsideration.  In the motion, the city stated that "upon 
indictment Mr. McDowell would have been suspended under [G. L. 
c. 268A] and upon conviction terminated."  This language placed 
McDowell on notice that, even if the commission's decision 
modifying his April 15, 2005, termination to a suspension was 
upheld, McDowell's employment with the city would have ceased 
upon his indictment and conviction in 2007.  It is reasonable to 
assume that McDowell understood the city's intent to terminate 
him, as evidenced by his opposition to the city's motion for 
reconsideration that discussed at length why his criminal 
activity should not be considered.  After receiving what 
McDowell alleges was defective notice, he could have filed a 
complaint, pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 42, within ten days in 
order to provide the city the opportunity to correct it, but he 
did not.  McDowell also could have exercised his right to a 
hearing as provided in the commission's decision, but he 
declined.  Once the commission issued its decision on the city's 
23 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of the Superior Court 
affirming the decision of the commission is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.  For reasons explained in this opinion, the 
city did not have the authority to suspend McDowell without pay 
upon his indictment for filing false tax returns, and therefore 
the decision of the commission ruling that McDowell would have 
been suspended as of April 13, 2007, must be reversed in that 
respect.  McDowell does not challenge the city's substantive 
legal authority to terminate him upon his conviction of the 
charged crime on November 27, 2007, and the commission's 
decision affirming McDowell's termination as of that date should 
be affirmed.  McDowell was not properly suspended during the 
period from October 15, 2005, the date on which the six-month 
suspension ordered by the commission would have been completed, 
to November 27, 2007, the date of McDowell's conviction.  The 
case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order 
remanding the case to the commission for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                  
motion for reconsideration, McDowell could have filed an appeal 
with the commission contesting the termination, but he did not.