Title: Gloria Pullen v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1482
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC00-1482
____________
GLORIA PULLEN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[September 13, 2001]
REVISED OPINION
HARDING, J.
We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal that affects a
class of state or constitutional officers.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3),
Fla. Const.
Gloria Pullen appealed an order from the Division of Administrative Hearings
authorizing her continued involuntary civil commitment under Florida’s Baker Act. 
See §§ 394.451-394.4789, Fla. Stat. (2000).  Pullen’s appointed counsel from the
1. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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public defender’s office filed an Anders1 brief, stating that he could discern no
reversible error in the proceedings below.  Despite being given the opportunity to
file her own pro se brief, Pullen did not do so.  The State filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal, arguing that the Anders procedure does not apply to civil commitment
proceedings.  The First District Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed Pullen’s
appeal with a written opinion.  See Pullen v. State, 764 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA
2000).
The district court concluded that because Anders procedures are grounded
in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecutions while Baker Act
proceedings are civil in nature and the right to counsel in such proceedings arises
from the due process clause, Anders is inapplicable to appeals from involuntary
civil commitment orders.  The First District Court noted that the Fourth District
Court had reached the same conclusion as to the inapplicability of Anders
procedures in termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings.  See Ostrum v.
Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). 
The First District Court adopted the procedures outlined in Ostrum, i.e., where
counsel conducts a conscientious review of the record and can find no meritorious
grounds on which to appeal, counsel can move to withdraw on that basis and the
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court will give the pro se appellant an opportunity to file a brief; where the pro se
appellant fails to do so, the case will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  See
Pullen, 764 So. 2d at 705. Based on this procedure, the district court dismissed
Pullen’s appeal.  See id.
Pullen sought review by this Court on two grounds:  (1) the decision below
expressly construes the due process and right to counsel provisions of the Florida
and United States Constitutions; and (2) the decision expressly affects all public
defenders who routinely represent indigent patients in Baker Act proceedings.  See
art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  The Court granted review and heard oral argument
from the parties in June 2001.
In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the United States Supreme
Court addressed the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a
first appeal when the attorney has conscientiously determined that there is no merit
to the indigent’s appeal.  The Supreme Court held that the procedure in such
circumstances must ensure that the indigent defendant is furnished with counsel
acting in the role of an advocate and that the appeal will be given the full
consideration and resolution of the matter as is received when counsel is acting in
that capacity.  See id. at 743.  The Supreme Court concluded that a no-merit letter
from counsel to the court does not suffice.  Instead, the Supreme Court outlined
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the following procedure for appointed counsel to follow:  if, after a conscientious
examination of the case, counsel concludes that the case is wholly frivolous,
counsel may request permission to withdraw; however, that request must be
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal and a copy of the brief should be furnished to the indigent
defendant to permit him or her to raise any points he chooses; the court then makes
a full examination of the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly
frivolous; if so, it may grant counsel permission to withdraw and either dismiss the
case or proceed to a decision on the merits; if the appeal is not found frivolous, the
court must provide the indigent with counsel to argue the appeal.  See id. at 744;
see also In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991) (explaining Anders
procedure); State v. Wooden, 246 So. 2d 755, 757-58 (Fla. 1971) (stating that
court-appointed counsel must follow Anders procedure in order to withdraw from
direct appeal which he believes to be without merit).
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court explained that the procedure outlined
in Anders is not mandatory upon the states.  See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259
(2000) (holding that the Anders procedure is merely one method of satisfying the
requirements of the Constitution for indigent criminal appeals).  The Supreme Court
explained that states may craft variations of the Anders procedure “so long as it
2. People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979).  Under the Wende
procedure, counsel, upon concluding that an appeal would be frivolous, files a brief
with the appellate court that summarizes the procedural and factual history of the
case, with citations to the record.  Counsel also attests that he or she has reviewed
the record, explained this evaluation of the case to the client, provided the client
with a copy of the brief, and informed the client of the right to file a pro se
supplemental brief.  Counsel further requests that the court independently examine
the record for arguable issues.  Unlike the Anders procedure, counsel following the
Wende procedure neither explicitly states that the review has led him or her to
conclude that an appeal would be frivolous (although that is considered implicit)
nor requests leave to withdraw.  Instead, counsel is silent on the merits of the case
and expresses availability to brief any issues on which the court might desire
briefing.  The appellate court, upon receiving a Wende brief, must conduct a review
of the entire record, regardless of whether the defendant has filed a pro se brief.  If
the appellate court, after its review of the record pursuant to Wende, also finds the
appeal to be frivolous, it may affirm.  If, however, it finds an arguable (i.e.,
nonfrivolous) issue, it orders briefing on that issue.  See id. at 1074-76; see also
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 265 (explaining the Wende procedure).
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reasonably ensures that an indigent’s appeal will be resolved in a way that is related
to the merit of that appeal.”  Id. at 276-77.  In Robbins, the Supreme Court
concluded that California’s Wende2 procedure, which diverged from the Anders
procedure, meets this standard.  See id. at 279.  In making this determination, the
Court noted four ways in which alternative procedures have been judged
inadequate:  (1) if the procedure does not require either counsel or the appellate
court to determine that the appeal is frivolous, but merely that the defendant is
unlikely to prevail on appeal; (2) if the procedure permits an appellate court to allow
counsel to withdraw and thereafter decide the appeal without appointing new
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counsel; (3) if the procedure permits counsel to file a no-merit letter stating only the
“bare conclusion” that the appeal has no merit; and (4) if the procedure only
provides for one tier of review.  See id. at 761-62.
Thus, while the Supreme Court will permit variations on Anders in the
criminal context, the procedures still must protect the defendant’s right to appellate
counsel.  In a criminal context, a “no-merit” letter and withdrawal, such as the
procedure used in the instant case, would clearly not be sufficient.  See id.
Thus, the real issue here is what procedure is required in the context of a civil
appeal.  The process to which an individual is entitled “depends on the extent to
which [the] individual will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.’  The question is
not merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of the
interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
(addressing the applicability of due process to parole revocation proceedings).
Clearly, an individual who faces involuntary commitment to a mental health
facility has a liberty interest at stake.  Accordingly, this Court has held that “[t]he
subject of an involuntary civil commitment proceeding has the right to the effective
assistance of counsel at all significant stages of the commitment process.  By
significant stages we mean all judicial proceedings and any other official proceeding
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at which a decision is, or can be, made which may result in a detrimental change to
the conditions of the subject's liberty.”  In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla.
1977) (citation omitted); accord Jones v. State, 611 So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA
1992).
In reaching the decision in the instant case, the district court relied upon the
decision of the Fourth District Court in Ostrum, which involved an appeal following
the termination of parental rights.  See 663 So. 2d at 1360.  After Ostrum’s attorney
filed a motion to withdraw accompanied by an Anders brief, the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based upon
the Anders brief and the court’s policy of expeditiously resolving cases involving
the interests of children.  See id. at 1361.  The Fourth District Court granted the
attorney’s motion to withdraw and summarily affirmed the termination of parental
rights order.  See id. at 1361-62.  The district court explained that the Anders
procedures do not apply to appeals from termination of parental rights proceedings
for the following reasons:  (1) the right to counsel in Anders is based on the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings, while the right to counsel in
civil TPR proceedings is derived from the constitutional guarantee of due process;
(2) applying the full panoply of Anders procedures would delay proceedings to
determine the future of the children who are the subject of the TPR proceedings;
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(3) Anders requires the appellate court to leave its neutral role and serve as
advocate for the party whose counsel seeks to withdraw; and (4) the appellant can
file a pro se brief after counsel files the motion to withdraw.  See id. at 1361.
Citing the first reason in Ostrum, the district court in the instant case
concluded that Anders is not applicable to Baker Act appeals because they are not
criminal in nature and the right of counsel in such proceedings is derived from the
constitutional right to due process rather than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
protected by Anders.  See Pullen, 764 So. 2d at 705.  The district court adopted
the Ostrum procedure in appeals from involuntary civil commitments under the
Baker Act.  See id.  Thus, under the procedure adopted by the Pullen court,
counsel may move to withdraw on the basis that he or she has conducted a
conscientious review of the record and found no meritorious grounds on which to
appeal; the appellate court need not conduct an independent review of the record;
and the appellant will be given an opportunity to file a pro se brief.  See id.
While Anders involved an indigent criminal defendant, the United States
Supreme Court expressed an overriding concern for “substantial equality and fair
process” in the appellate process.  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  The Supreme Court
noted that a long line of cases have addressed “discrimination against the indigent
defendant on his first appeal” and concluded that “equal justice was not afforded an
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indigent appellant where the nature of the review ‘depends on the amount of money
he has.’ ”  Id. at 741.  Additionally, as the Supreme Court explained in Robbins, the
line of cases dealing with an indigent’s right to appellate counsel derive support
from both the equal protection and due process clauses, which “as a practical
matter, . . . largely converge to require that a State’s procedure ‘afford adequate and
effective appellate review to indigent defendants.  A State’s procedure provides
such review so long as it reasonably ensures that an indigent’s appeal will be
resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal.’” Robbins, 528 U.S. at
276-77 (citation omitted).  Furthermore, in civil proceedings where the "individual
interests at stake . . . are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere
loss of money,' " due process places a higher burden on the state.  Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (termination of parental rights); see also
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (involuntary commitment); Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118 (1943) (denaturalization).  As this Court has explained, “[t]he deprivation of
liberty which results from confinement under a state’s involuntary commitment law
has been termed a ‘massive curtailment of liberty.’ ”  Shuman v. State, 358 So. 2d
1333, 1335 (Fla. 1978) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)). 
“Those whom the state seeks to involuntarily commit to a mental institution are
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entitled to the protection of our Constitutions, as are those incarcerated in our
correctional institutions.”  Id.  As the Supreme Court warned in Anders, “[t]he
constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be
attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client,
as opposed to that of amicus curiae.”  386 U.S. at 744.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the applicability of
Anders to those civil proceedings in which a state has determined that an indigent
party is entitled to appointed appellate counsel.  While the federal Constitution does
not require the states to create appellate review, see Robbins, 528 U.S. at 755 n.5,
constitutional constraints are imposed on the state when it chooses to do so.  See
id. at 755.  Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed
the applicability of the Anders procedures to civil proceedings such as these, i.e.,
where the “individual interests at stake ... are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more
substantial than mere loss of money.’ ”  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 756.  In
Florida, several district courts have addressed this issue and concluded that Anders
does not apply to appeals in various proceedings where the right to counsel arises
from the due process clause.  See, e.g., Ostrum v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs., 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (termination of parental rights); Jiminez
v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 669 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
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(same); In re J.A., 693 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (same); In re K.W., 779 So.
2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (same); Gantt v. State, 714 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998) (noncapital postconviction proceeding where court exercised discretion to
appoint public defender); Pullen v. State, 764 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
(involuntary civil commitment).
Other states that have addressed the application of Anders to civil
proceedings have come to varying conclusions.  Some have held that Anders is
applicable to termination of parental rights or similar proceedings.  See J.K. v. Lee
County Dep’t of Human Res., 668 So. 2d 813 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (juvenile
dependency proceeding); In re Keller, 486 N.E.2d 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); In re
Christopher B., No. L99-1065, 2000 WL 281739 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2000); In
re D.C. & L.C., 963 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).  Others have not applied
Anders to such proceedings.  See Denise H. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 972
P.2d 241 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); In re Sade C., 920 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1996); In re
Harrison, 526 S.E.2d 502 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).  Some states have applied Anders
to involuntary civil commitment proceedings.  See In re McQueen, 495 N.E.2d 128
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (applying to involuntary civil commitment); In re E.M., No. 03-
96-00703-CV, 1997 WL 217186 (Tex. App. May 1, 1997) (applying Anders analysis
by analogy to involuntary civil commitment without holding that it is necessary);
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Jeffrey M. v. Milwaukee County, 520 N.W.2d 112 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1994) (applying
to involuntary civil commitment).  Other states have not.  See In re Leon G., 26 P.
3d 481, (Ariz. 2001) (finding Anders not applicable to involuntary commitment
under sexually violent predator act); In re Richard A., 771 A. 2d 572, (N.H. Apr.
2001) (not applying state alternative to Anders procedure in involuntary commitment
proceedings).
In most cases where Anders has not been extended to civil proceedings, the
courts have noted that Anders derives from the constitutional right to counsel in
criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., In re Leon G., 26 P. 3d at 483-84, (“The right to
full review of the record on appeal when appointed counsel files an Anders brief,
attached as it is to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases, does not
apply in civil proceedings.”); Denise H., 972 P.2d at 243 (“The right to file an
Anders brief derives from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which applies to
persons ‘accused’ in ‘criminal prosecutions.’ ”); County of Kern v. Dillier, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 318, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that “Anders’s ‘prophylactic’
procedures are designed solely to protect the indigent criminal defendant's right . . . 
to the assistance of appellate counsel appointed by the state” and thus are not
applicable to termination of parental rights proceedings); In re Richard A., 771 A.
2d at 576 (holding that New Hampshire’s alternative to Anders procedures, which
3. See § 394.467(4), Fla. Stat. (2000).
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are required in criminal cases, do not apply to an involuntary civil commitment case
because individuals subject to civil commitment “are not entitled to the same level of
due process as individuals subject to incarceration for criminal wrongdoing”). 
Conversely, those courts that have applied Anders-type procedures to civil
proceedings have focused on the similarities between the proceedings and the rights
at issue.  See, e.g., In re Keller, 486 N.E.2d at 292 (finding that application of
Anders procedure in appeal of termination of parental rights puts “indigent
appellants on the same footing as those able to afford private counsel and
accomplishes the constitutional or statutory purpose for their appointment”); In re
McQueen, 495 N.E.2d at 129 (same as to involuntary civil commitment
proceedings); In re D.C. & L.C., 963 P.2d at 763-64 (noting that the right to
counsel is statutorily guaranteed in appeal of termination of parental rights, that
court-appointed counsel owes same duties to client as in criminal proceeding, and
that counsel faces same ethical dilemma between representation of client and bar rule
prohibiting frivolous claims).
While the right to appointed counsel in Baker Act involuntary civil
commitment proceedings is provided by Florida statute,3 the constitutional
guarantee of due process would require no less.  See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
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378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (stating that due process applies to involuntary civil
commitments and requires that the person who is the subject of the commitment
proceeding be represented by counsel, appointed if necessary); In re Beverly, 342
So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977) (“The subject of an involuntary civil commitment
proceeding has the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all significant stages
of the commitment process.”).  While the United States Supreme Court has never
ruled that Anders procedures are required in the civil context, we agree with the
courts cited above that the policies and interests served by the Anders procedure in
criminal proceedings are also present in involuntary civil commitments under
Florida’s Baker Act, namely, that the resolution of an appeal of the commitment
order be related to the merits of the appeal rather than to the individual’s ability to
hire private counsel.  Cf. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 276-77 (stating that due process
requires state appellate process to provide fair opportunity for indigent’s appeal to
be resolved on the merits).  Further, the curtailment of the fundamental right of
liberty is implicated in both criminal proceedings and involuntary civil commitments. 
See Shuman v. State, 358 So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Fla. 1978).
The State noted in both its brief and at oral argument that civil commitment
hearings under the Baker Act are “usually brief and factually straightforward” and
“[v]ery rarely is the person’s mental illness contested.”  Instead, the State contends,
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“the most common points on appeal” assert that evidence as to the person’s
likelihood to harm himself or others does not meet the clear and convincing
standard.  Thus, we do not agree with the State’s contention that the independent
appellate court review which is part of the Anders-type procedure will cause an
undue burden to the court or result in unnecessary delay.
While we determine that the Anders procedure should apply to involuntary
civil commitments, we are concerned that it may be a hollow remedy for those
appellants who pursue an Anders appeal.  At oral argument, the parties recognized
that under the present time frame the appeals process often exceeds the six-month
commitment period.  See Fla R. App. P. 9.110 (governing appeal proceedings to
review final orders of lower tribunals, including the time for filing the notice of
appeal, preparation of the record by the clerk, and serving the initial brief), 9.210(f)
(governing the time for service of answer and reply briefs).  In fact, this delay would
also occur in cases where counsel files an arguably meritorious appeal of a civil
commitment order under the Baker Act.
In light of this time frame, we request the Appellate Rules Committee to
consider the adoption of expedited procedures for the appeal of civil commitment
orders under the Baker Act.  Procedures that the committee should consider
include, but are not limited to, an expedited time frame for the filing of the notice of
4.  "Anders procedure" refers to the procedure described in Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and elaborated in our decision of In re Anders
Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1991).
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appeal, a shortened time for the serving of briefs, and a provision requiring the
appointment of a guardian ad litem.
For the reasons expressed above, we quash the decision of the First District
Court of Appeal and remand this case to the district court with directions to
consider Pullen’s appeal under the Anders procedures outlined in this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
WELLS, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I wholeheartedly concur in the majority's concern over the need for expedited
procedures for appeal of civil commitment orders under the Baker Act and, in
particular, a provision requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem.  I do not,
however, concur with the extension of the Anders procedure4 to Baker Act civil
commitment proceedings, especially after appellate counsel has certified that he or
5.  For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Anders approach, see
Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants' Equal Protection is
More Equal than Others', 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625 (1996).
6.  This procedure applies only to court-appointed lawyers--either appellate
public defenders or conflict counsel.  However, privately retained lawyers are
ethically bound not to prosecute an appeal that is wholly frivolous.   
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she has conducted a conscientious review of the record and could find no
meritorious grounds on which to appeal.  The majority would have this good faith
certification by appellate counsel trigger a responsibility on the part of the appellate
court "to conduct a full and independent review of the record to discover any
arguable issues apparent on the face of the record" as is now required by our
Anders procedure in criminal appeals.  See In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151
(Fla. 1991).  Instead, I would find any additional review by the appellate court to
perform an independent verification that no meritorious points exist to be
unnecessary in light of the good faith certification procedure. 
Indeed, I have substantial doubts about the necessity of our current Anders
procedure in the criminal context.5  I have never understood the logic of requiring
appellate courts to provide a heightened review for those appeals that are the least
meritorious by placing on the appellate courts the responsibility of searching the
record for potential errors.6 
Given these reservations about our current Anders procedures, in my opinion,
7.  Eldridge sets forth a three-factor test to determine whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates additional procedures.  It
instructs that we look to (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and
probable value of substitute procedures; and (3) the Government's interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burden of substitute procedures.  See 424
U.S. at 335.
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extending the Anders procedure to Baker Act proceedings is an unnecessary and
unwarranted use of judicial resources.  Further, we have no information as to what
effect extending Anders to Baker Act civil commitment appeals would have on the
appellate workload. 
I hasten to add that I do not minimize the significant deprivation of liberty
resulting from an involuntary commitment.  In my opinion, however, the very
safeguards attendant to the Baker Act proceedings, including the right to appellate
review, the appointment of appellate counsel to determine any procedural or
substantive irregularities in the commitment, and the maximum duration of a six-
month period of commitment before another review, comport with due process. 
Considering the three-factor test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),
I would find no due process deprivation.7  I would rely instead on the certification
of counsel.  Moreover, rather than extending Anders to Baker Act civil commitment
proceedings, I would consider revisiting the wisdom and necessity of our current
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Anders procedures in criminal cases. 
WELLS, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Class of Constitutional Officers
First District - Case No. 1D99-4384  
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Charlie McCoy, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Marcia Perlin, Assistant Public Defender,
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida,
for Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., Amicus Curiae