Title: Killen v. Alben
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 471, 2022
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
MICHAEL KILLEN, 
§ 
 
§ 
No. 471, 2022 
 
Respondent Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Family Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
§ 
 
 
§ 
File No. CN22-01660 
CANDICE ALBEN, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
Petition No. 22-04577 
 
Petitioner Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 12, 2023 
 
 
Decided: 
September 7, 2023 
 
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court of the State of Delaware. AFFIRMED IN 
PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
Curtis P. Bounds, Esquire, Kara M. Swasey, Esquire, Megan McGovern, Esquire, 
BAYARD, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Respondent Below, Appellant Michael 
Killen. 
 
Jennifer A. Hartnett, Esquire, HARTNETT & HARTNETT, Hockessin, Delaware, 
for Petitioner Below, Appellee Candice Alben. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGROW, Justice:
Michael Killen1 appeals from a Family Court order awarding alimony to his 
ex-wife, Candice Alben, and directing Killen to maintain a pre-existing life 
insurance policy during the alimony period with Alben as the sole beneficiary.  
Killen challenges aspects of both rulings on appeal. 
With respect to the alimony award, Killen argues on appeal that the Family 
Court designated the incorrect date for his payment obligations to begin.  The parties 
continued to reside in the marital residence after their divorce and through the date 
of trial.  Before the matter was submitted, the parties agreed to sell the home and to 
divide the proceeds at the court’s direction.  The court’s order directed the parties to 
continue to split household expenses while they resided together and required Killen 
to begin making alimony payments upon the residence’s sale.  Killen argues that his 
alimony obligations instead should commence on the divorce date.   
With respect to the insurance policy, Killen argues that the Family Court 
directed the policy’s continued maintenance based on an inadequate record.  Alben 
did not seek any relief concerning the policy at trial.  Instead, the Family Court 
ordered the policy’s maintenance sua sponte.  According to Killen, the Family Court 
did not have sufficient evidence to order such relief and therefore abused its 
discretion. 
 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this 
matter to the Family Court.  Designating the date on which a party’s alimony 
obligations begin is within the Family Court’s discretion, and we conclude the court 
did not abuse its discretion in this case.  On the other hand, the Family Court did not 
have a sufficient factual record to order Killen to maintain the policy with Alben as 
the sole beneficiary.  On remand, the Family Court may accept any additional 
evidence or submissions that it deems necessary to determine its authority, if any, to 
direct the policy’s continued maintenance. 
I. 
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 6, 2022, the Family Court entered a divorce decree ending the parties’ 
marriage of 14 years and 9 months.2  Candice Alben (“Wife”) is a grant analyst at 
the University of Delaware, earning $56,000 annually.3  Michael Killen (“Husband”) 
earns $118,000 annually working for Xerox.4  The parties moved to Delaware from 
New York City in 20145 and share two children.6   
Throughout the marriage, the parties divided responsibility for household 
expenses under a longstanding arrangement:  Husband paid the mortgage, while 
Wife paid “other bills” concerning the home.7  Wife testified at trial that she always 
 
2 Am. Opening Br. Ex. A (“Ancillary Order”) at 3, 17. 
3 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A18, A50. 
4 Id. at A77–78, A86–87. 
5 Id. at A35. 
6 Id. at A14, A18. 
7 Id. at A35. 
3 
 
fulfilled her end of this marital bargain, even during a period of unemployment after 
she left her job in New York City to relocate to Delaware.8  Wife also testified that 
Husband took sole responsibility for the mortgage but ultimately fell behind on 
monthly payments, resulting in a foreclosure notice being posted to the door of the 
marital residence around 2018.9  According to Wife, when she asked Husband about 
the notice, Husband told her not to worry about it because “the mortgage is not 
[Wife’s] business.”10 
The parties separated on August 22, 2019, but continued to reside in the 
marital residence, along with their children, through the date of trial.11  For the first 
few years after the parties’ separation, Wife resided in the master bedroom, while 
Husband resided in the shared living space.12  But shortly after Wife filed her divorce 
petition, Husband removed Wife’s belongings to the “back room” of the home.13  
From that point on, Wife shared a bedroom with the parties’ daughter, and Husband 
resided in the master bedroom while purporting to limit Wife’s access to the 
residence by placing signs on various doors throughout the home.14 
 
8 Id. at A35–36. 
9 Id. at A33–34. 
10 Id. at A34. 
11 Id. at A14–15.  The record on appeal does not indicate whether the parties have since moved out 
of the marital residence. 
12 Id. at A15–17. 
13 Id. at A16–17.  Wife filed her divorce petition on February 16, 2022.  Ancillary Order at 2. 
14 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A16–17, A32–33. 
4 
 
Trial on matters ancillary to the parties’ divorce occurred on 
November 7, 2022.15  Before the case was submitted, the parties agreed to list the 
marital residence for sale and to divide the sale proceeds at the Family Court’s 
direction.16  Trial was relatively inefficient.  Husband was self-represented and, 
perhaps as a result, failed to provide the court with key information.17  The gaps in 
Husband’s evidence required the trial court to go to “great lengths to ‘mine’ 
information that Husband should have been prepared to present.”18   
The court issued its Order on Matters Ancillary to Divorce (the “Ancillary 
Order”) not long after trial.  Several aspects of the Ancillary Order are relevant to 
this appeal.  First, the court found that Husband earned 67% of the parties’ combined 
income.19  The court ordered the proceeds from the sale of the marital home to be 
used to satisfy certain marital debts, with the balance to be divided by a 65–35 split 
between Wife and Husband.20  Because the sale would inevitably take time, the court 
ordered each party to contribute to the mortgage payment and household expenses, 
 
15 Ancillary Order at 3. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 For example, Husband sought credits for certain expenses that he claimed he incurred during 
the marriage, but he provided no supporting documentation and failed to include within those 
expenses his monthly payments on the life insurance policy. Id. at 8–9, 21.  He also failed to 
provide documentation showing the amount in his 401(k) account that accrued before the parties’ 
marriage.  Id. at 13–14.  The court ultimately gave Husband credit for his monthly payments on 
the life insurance policy.  See id. at 27. 
18 Id. at 2. 
19 Id. at 20. 
20 Id. at 21. 
5 
 
with Husband paying two-thirds of those expenses and Wife paying for the 
remaining one-third.21  The court’s division of these expenses accorded with the 
portion of the household income each spouse earned.22 
Second, the Family Court found Wife financially dependent and awarded her 
monthly alimony of $1,300 for 84 months.23  Acknowledging that the parties “will 
undergo significant financial changes as they implement th[e] [A]ncillary [O]rder,” 
the court ordered Husband’s alimony obligations to begin upon the sale of the 
marital residence.24 
Finally, after noting that Husband’s life insurance policy (the “Policy”) was 
“not discussed during the hearing,” the court ordered Husband to “continue [the 
Policy]” and to “ensure that Wife remains the 100% primary beneficiary” until 
Husband’s alimony obligations end.25  On appeal, Husband points out that Wife did 
not expressly seek this relief.26  
 
21 Id. at 21, 24.  
22 The court found that Husband earned $118,000 per year (id. at 18), which constituted 67% of 
the household income.  Id. at 20.  The court found that Wife earned $56,000 per year.  Id. at 18. 
23 Id. at 30.  The maximum alimony period in light of the length of the parties’ marriage was 88 
months.  See id. at 30 n.26; 13 Del. C. § 1512(d).  
24 Ancillary Order at 30.  
25 Id. at 21–22. 
26 See Am. Opening Br. at 4, 6 n.18. 
6 
 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the Family Court’s legal determinations de novo.27  “If the law was 
correctly applied, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”28  We will 
disturb the Family Court’s factual findings only if they are “clearly wrong.”29 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Husband presents two issues for review on appeal.  First, he contends that the 
Family Court erroneously ordered him to maintain the Policy, with Wife as the sole 
beneficiary, without adequate evidence of the Policy’s existence or terms.30  Second, 
Husband argues that the Family Court erred by ordering his alimony obligations to 
commence upon the sale of the marital residence, instead of the parties’ divorce 
date.31 
A. 
The Family Court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to maintain 
the Policy based on an inadequate record 
Husband contends that the Family Court ordered the Policy’s continued 
maintenance, with Wife as the sole beneficiary, based on an inadequate record.32  
Although Husband concedes that the Family Court has the statutory authority to 
order the continuation of life insurance policies under certain circumstances, he 
 
27 Glanden v. Quirk, 128 A.3d 994, 999 (Del. 2015). 
28 Lankford v. Lankford, 157 A.3d 1235, 1241 (Del. 2017) (quoting Wright v. Wright, 49 A.3d 
1147, 1150 (Del. 2012)). 
29 Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175, 179 (Del. 2008). 
30 Am. Opening Br. at 7–10. 
31 Id. at 12–13.  
32 Id. at 7–8. 
7 
 
argues that the trial “record is inadequate to justify the [court’s] decision” because 
neither party raised the Policy during the proceedings and the court did not solicit 
evidence of, or otherwise request the parties’ positions about, the Policy.33 
The Family Court has express authority under 13 Del. C. § 1513(e) to “direct 
the continued maintenance and beneficiary designations of existing policies insuring 
the life of either party.”34  The second sentence of Section 1513(e), however, cabins 
that authority to “policies originally purchased during the marriage and owned by or 
within the effective control of either party.”35  Therefore, before the Family Court 
may order a policy’s continued maintenance, the court must determine whether the 
policy at issue was purchased during the marriage and whether either party owned 
or effectively controlled the policy.   
The Family Court’s opinion does not address when the Policy was purchased 
or whether Husband owned or controlled it.36  Likely because of Husband’s self-
represented status at trial and failure to produce certain evidence, the Policy was 
neither the parties’ nor the Family Court’s focus.37  From our review of the record, 
 
33 Id. at 8–9. 
34 13 Del. C. § 1513(e); see Am. Opening Br. at 8; Answering Br. at 10. 
35 13 Del. C. § 1513(e). 
36 Although the trial court might have fairly inferred that Husband owned or controlled the Policy 
based on his monthly premium payments and the lack of any evidence to the contrary, the court 
received no evidence about when the Policy was purchased or who the designated beneficiaries 
were. 
37 Wife introduced five exhibits at trial consisting of two credit card statements (Am. App. to 
Opening Br. at A19–23), a retirement account statement (id. at A28–30), an expense sheet (id. at 
A36–44), and an exhibit purporting to show certain expenses relating to her dog (id. at A44–47).  
8 
 
the only record evidence of the Policy’s existence was a line item on Husband’s pay 
statements, which the court acknowledged during a colloquy concerning Husband’s 
monthly expenses.38  The court could not have determined whether it had authority 
to direct Husband to maintain the Policy based on that evidence alone. 
In addition, the record does not support the Family Court’s order that Husband 
maintain Wife as the Policy’s sole beneficiary.39  Section 1513(e) permits the Family 
Court to “direct the continued maintenance and beneficiary designations of existing 
policies insuring the life of either party.”40  The term “continued,” as used in the 
statute, modifies both “maintenance” and “beneficiary designations.”41  The statute 
therefore precludes the Family Court from ordering the addition or removal of 
beneficiaries as well as the enlargement or reduction of the existing designees’ 
beneficiary interests.  Nothing in the record shows that Wife was a Policy 
beneficiary, much less the sole beneficiary. 
 
Husband introduced three exhibits at trial consisting of an email between the parties (id. at A64–
66) and two pay statements (id. at A96–99).  The only testimony introduced at trial came from 
Husband and Wife (see id. at A14–100), and neither party testified about the Policy (see Ancillary 
Order at 21).   
38 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A96–99. 
39 Ancillary Order at 22 (“Additionally, Husband shall ensure that Wife remains the 100% primary 
beneficiary on this account so long as alimony is owed to Wife.”). 
40 13 Del. C. § 1513(e) (emphasis added). 
41 See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147 
(2012) (“When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in 
a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.”). 
9 
 
Husband further argues that the Family Court committed reversible error by 
not ensuring that the life insurance coverage correlated with Husband’s alimony 
obligations.42  Relying on this Court’s decision in Norris v. Norris,43 Husband 
contends that when the Family Court directs the continued maintenance of life 
insurance for the benefit of an alimony recipient, the amount of coverage must 
correlate with the outstanding alimony obligation.44  Otherwise, Husband asserts, 
there is a risk of over-insuring the alimony obligation.45 
That argument, however, is at odds with Section 1513(e)’s plain language, 
which only permits the Family Court to direct “continued . . . beneficiary 
designations.”46  Husband’s position suggests that the Family Court may—or even 
must—require a policyholder to reduce or enlarge a beneficiary’s interest to 
correlate with the policyholder’s support obligations.  To do so, the court would need 
to direct changes to the beneficiary designations, instead of merely directing that the 
existing designations continue. 
 
42 Am. Opening Br. at 8–10. 
43 808 A.2d 758 (Del. 2002). 
44 Am. Opening Br. at 8–9. 
45 Id. at 9. 
46 13 Del. C. § 1513(e) (emphasis added); see Glanden, 128 A.3d at 1006 (finding the Family 
Court did not abuse its discretion by directing the maintenance of life insurance without 
sufficiently considering the value of an alimony award because Section 1513(e) “expressly 
authorizes the Family Court to ‘direct the continued maintenance and beneficiary designations of 
existing policies insuring the life of either party’” (quoting 13 Del. C. § 1513(e))). 
10 
 
In addition, Husband’s position extends Norris well beyond its holding.  In 
Norris, this Court held that rules against reopening property-division orders did not 
prohibit the Family Court from modifying an order to maintain life insurance when 
the order’s sole purpose was to backstop the policyholder’s support obligations and 
those support obligations had decreased over time.47  This Court noted that the 
Family Court’s original order requiring maintenance of life insurance imposed that 
obligation as a safety net in the event that the policyholder died before fully 
satisfying his support obligations.48  As those support obligations decreased over 
time, the Court explained, the amount of life insurance necessary to buttress those 
obligations also decreased.49  Accordingly, the considerations informing rules 
against modifying property-division awards—namely, finality and the possibility of 
“chaotic results”—were not implicated.50  Norris does not inform the analysis here 
and should not be interpreted as permitting the Family Court to decrease (or increase) 
a life insurance policy beneficiary’s interest under Section 1513(e). 
B. 
The Family Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Husband’s 
alimony obligations to begin upon the sale of the marital residence 
Husband also argues that the Family Court erred by ordering his alimony 
obligations to run from the date of the marital residence’s sale, instead of from the 
 
47 Norris, 808 A.2d at 759, 761. 
48 Id. at 761. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.     
11 
 
date of divorce.51  According to Husband, designating an undefined date in the future 
as the date on which his alimony obligations commence undermines principles of 
finality and therefore warrants reversal.52  In support of this contention, Husband 
cites several Family Court decisions in which the court, relying on this Court’s 
decision in Brenner v. Farrell,53 ordered alimony obligations to begin on the date of 
divorce based on the proposition that “[i]n all divorce cases, there must be finality 
as soon as possible.”54  Husband further contends that his alimony obligations should 
run from the date of divorce in light of “his substantial Court-ordered financial 
support of Wife while the parties reside together.”55 
The parties agree that Brenner does not control the outcome of this appeal.56  
Nevertheless, Husband maintains that Brenner is pertinent here because the Family 
Court has relied on it for the proposition that Delaware’s alimony statute favors 
finality as soon as possible and, by extension, requires alimony obligations to accrue 
on the divorce date.57   
 
51 Am. Opening Br. at 12–13. 
52 Id. at 13. 
53 865 A.2d 521, 2005 WL 77020 (Del. Jan. 11, 2005) (TABLE). 
54 Am. Opening Br. at 12 (quoting ADC v. JDC, 2011 WL 11549016, at *1 (Del. Fam. Dec. 2, 
2011)); see V.E.D., Sr. v. V.D.D., 2009 WL 5206718, at *3 (Del. Fam. Aug. 31, 2009) (“In reliance 
on Brenner, the Family Court recently held[] ‘[i]n all divorce cases there must be finality as soon 
as possible.’”). 
55 Am. Opening Br. at 13. 
56 See Answering Br. at 14; Reply Br. at 3. 
57 See Reply Br. at 3.  The Family Court has construed Brenner broadly: 
The Court finds the Supreme Court interprets the statutory authority to have 
intended for some finality in alimony obligations where the parties are married for 
less than 20 years. The Court finds under the existing facts and applicable legal 
12 
 
In Brenner, this Court held that the Family Court abused its discretion by 
awarding alimony in excess of the maximum time prescribed by Delaware’s alimony 
statute.58  After the parties’ divorce, the husband in Brenner began making monthly 
alimony payments under a stipulated order.59  Nearly two years after the husband 
began making the agreed-to payments, the Family Court issued its decision on 
ancillary matters, ordering the husband to make the statutory maximum number of 
monthly alimony payments, commencing shortly after the court issued its decision.60  
This Court reversed, finding that the Family Court abused its discretion by not 
crediting the payments already made under the parties’ stipulated order toward the 
total alimony obligation.61  Brenner thus stands for the narrow proposition that the 
Family Court may not award alimony in excess of the statutory limits. 
Husband also points to Family Court decisions predating Brenner in which 
the court arguably construed Delaware’s alimony statute, 13 Del. C. § 1512, as 
requiring the alimony period to commence on the divorce date.62  Husband does not 
 
authority, the date of divorce is the appropriate date for purposes of calculation of 
the period of alimony obligation. 
V.E.D., Sr., 2009 WL 5206718, at *4; see also ADC, 2011 WL 11549016, at *1 (citing V.E.D., Sr., 
2009 WL 5206718, at *4). 
58 See Brenner, 2005 WL 77020, at *1. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Am. Opening Br. at 12 n.38 (citing M.H. v. D.L., 2005 WL 4674274, at *5 (Del. Fam. Sept. 21, 
2005) and Joan M.G. v. Scott A.G., 1998 WL 420743, at *6 (Del. Fam. Feb. 24, 1998)); Reply Br. 
at 3 n.2 (same). 
13 
 
substantively address why this Court should follow those decisions.  But to the extent 
those decisions purport to adhere to a bright-line rule designating the divorce date as 
the beginning of a party’s alimony obligations,63 they misinterpret the statute.  
Section 1512 gives the Family Court discretion to decide when a party’s alimony 
obligations should start. 
The current version of Section 1512 does not address when a person’s alimony 
obligations begin.  The absence of prescriptive language is one indication that the 
legislature intended to give the Family Court discretion to determine the date from 
which a person’s alimony obligations run.  That reading is consistent with this 
Court’s recognition of the “Family Court[’s] . . . broad discretion in determining 
an alimony award.”64  The interpretation also finds support in the legislative history.  
Previous versions of Section 1512 expressly linked the alimony period to the divorce 
date, limiting the period of eligibility to “two years after marriage dissolution unless 
the parties were married for more than twenty years.”65  In 1988, the General 
 
63 See M.H., 2005 WL 4674274, at *5 (“The parties were married for 8 years and 6 months, 
therefore, Wife’s alimony eligibility could extend for 4 years and 3 months from the date of the 
divorce.” (emphasis added)); Joan M.G., 1998 WL 420743, at *6 (“Wife’s maximum period of 
eligibility for alimony is six and one-half years beginning on September 5, 1996, the date of the 
divorce.” (emphasis added)). 
64 Wright, 49 A.3d at 1153. 
65 62 Del. Laws, ch. 168, § 1 (1979) (“The court may grant alimony . . . for a petitioner, or for a 
respondent who does not qualify for alimony under subdivision (2) above, commencing after the 
entry of a decree of divorce or annulment but not to continue for more than two years after 
marriage dissolution unless the parties were married for more than twenty years.” (emphasis 
added)); Michael J.F. v. Carmela L.F., 437 A.2d 579, 580 (Del. 1981) (“We hold, therefore, that 
the plain language of [Section] 1512(a)(3) under consideration means that, with the exceptions 
14 
 
Assembly untethered the eligibility period from the divorce date, providing instead 
that the eligibility period simply may “not . . . exceed 50% of the term of marriage” 
when the marriage lasted less than 20 years.66  In other words, whereas the divorce 
date anchored the eligibility period under previous versions of Section 1512,67 the 
current version of Section 1512 provides a floating eligibility period that the court 
defines in the exercise of its discretion, giving due consideration to all relevant 
factors, including the importance of finality.  Here, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the alimony period should begin upon the sale of the 
residence, since the parties had already agreed to list the home with an identified 
realtor and to accept any reasonable offer in excess of 90% of the list price.68 
Husband further argues that the alimony period should run from the divorce 
date because the Family Court ordered Husband to shoulder a larger portion of the 
mortgage payment and household costs while the house was on the market and the 
parties resided under the same roof.69  The Family Court did not abuse its discretion 
 
noted in the Statute, a grant of alimony may not continue for more than 2 years after the entry of 
the divorce decree.”). 
66 See 66 Del. Laws, ch. 414, § 1 (1988) (codified as amended at 13 Del. C. § 1512).  The relevant 
language of the 1988 amendment appears in the current version of Section 1512.  
See 13 Del. C. § 1512(d) (“A person shall be eligible for alimony for a period not to exceed 50% 
of the term of the marriage with the exception that if a party is married for 20 years or longer, there 
shall be no time limit as to his or her eligibility; however, the factors contained in subsection (c) 
of this section shall apply and shall be considered by the Court.”). 
67 The pre-Brenner decisions of the Family Court upon which Husband relies followed this 
approach notwithstanding the 1988 amendment. 
68 Ancillary Order at 21. 
69 Am. Opening Br. at 13; Reply Br. at 4. 
15 
 
when it ordered Husband to pay alimony for 84 months beginning from the sale of 
the marital residence, while separately directing the division of household expenses 
during the period of shared residence.  In the alimony context, 
[t]he Family Court’s rulings “will not be disturbed on appeal if: (1) its 
findings of fact are supported by the record; (2) its decision reflects due 
consideration of the statutory factors found in [S]ection 1512; and (3) 
its explanations, deductions and inferences are the product of a logical 
and deductive reasoning process.”70   
The Family Court’s decision reflects appropriate consideration of the factors set 
forth in Section 1512(c).71  As the court acknowledged, the parties “will undergo 
significant financial changes as they implement th[e] [A]ncillary [O]rder.”72  
Importantly, despite being divorced, the parties continued to reside together and 
shared certain living expenses when the trial occurred.73  That arrangement would 
change when the marital residence was sold.74  Acknowledging that Wife could 
become eligible to receive child support after the parties no longer resided under the 
same roof,75 the court’s order provided that, “[i]n the event that Wife files and 
receives child support, Husband’s monthly [alimony] obligation shall be offset by 
the amount of the child support actually paid up to $1,300 per month.”76 
 
70 Glanden, 128 A.3d at 1002 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 102 A.3d 1138, 1142 (Del. 2014)). 
71 Ancillary Order at 27–29. 
72 Id. at 30. 
73 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A14. 
74 E.g., id. at A36.  For example, Wife testified that once the residence is sold, she intends “to 
move on and get a home of [her] own.”  Id.   
75 Ancillary Order at 29–30. 
76 Id. at 30–31. 
16 
 
Husband’s argument implies that the court’s order allocating responsibility 
for the interim mortgage and household expenses effectively required him to support 
Wife beyond the statutory maximum period.  We disagree.  The realities of the 
parties’ post-divorce living arrangement provided a sufficient basis for dividing 
responsibility for payment of the mortgage and household expenses:  the parties 
continued to reside in the same household with their children,77 and the court’s order 
effectively maintained the status quo while the parties sold the marital residence. 
The way in which the court distributed responsibility for the interim 
household expenses also finds support in the record.  First, Wife had not had access 
to the entirety of the marital residence since April 2022.78  Second, the division of 
responsibility was consistent with the parties’ longstanding cost-splitting 
arrangement and with their respective portions of the total household income.79  In 
light of these facts, ordering Husband’s alimony obligations to commence upon the 
sale of the home did not constitute an abuse of discretion, nor did the court’s 
distribution of responsibility for interim household expenses constitute a support 
obligation that extended alimony payments beyond the statutory maximum period. 
 
77 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A14. 
78 Ancillary Order at 4; Am. App. to Opening Br. at A32. 
79 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A33–35; see supra note 22. 
17 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Family Court did not have adequate evidence concerning the Policy to 
direct its continued maintenance.  We therefore REVERSE and REMAND that 
portion of the Family Court’s decision.  On remand, the Family Court may accept 
any additional evidence or submissions it deems necessary to determine its authority, 
if any, to direct the continued maintenance of the Policy. 
The Family Court has authority to determine when a party’s alimony 
obligations commence, and the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering 
Husband’s obligations to begin upon the sale of the marital residence.  We therefore 
AFFIRM that portion of the Family Court’s decision. 
Jurisdiction is not retained.