Title: Estate of Farrell v. Gordon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 408, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM B.
§
FARRELL, BY AND THROUGH
§
ITS ADMINISTRATRIX,
§
JACKIE BENNETT,
§
§ No. 408, 2000
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant/Cross Appellee,
§ Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in
v.
§ and for Kent County 
§ C.A. No. 98C-08-012
AUSTIN S. GORDON and 
§
KIMBERLY D. GORDON,
§
§
Plaintiffs Below,
§
Appellees/Cross Appellants.
§
Submitted: February 21, 2001
Decided:
April 11, 2001
Before WALSH, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices.
Appeal from Superior Court.  Affirmed in Part.  Reversed in Part.
Richard W. Pell, Esquire (argued) and Susan A. List, Esquire, Tybout,
Redfearn & Pell, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant/Cross Appellee.
William D. Fletcher, Jr., Esquire, Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P.A.,
Dover, Delaware, for Appellees/Cross Appellants.
Per Curiam:
2
In this appeal from the Superior Court, we address two issues of first
impression.  The first question is whether the collateral source rule permits
a plaintiff to recover motor vehicle property damages from a tortfeasor
despite payment for such damage by the plaintiff’s collision carrier.  The
second question, posed by cross-appeal, is whether punitive damages may be
recovered against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor.  We answer both
questions in the affirmative.
I
The factual basis underlying this matter is undisputed.  Plaintiffs below-
appellees/cross-appellants, Austin S. Gordon and Kimberly D. Gordon, (“the
Gordons”) filed suit in the Superior Court to recover damages arising out of
a motor vehicle collision which occurred on March 22, 1997.  The driver of
the other vehicle, William B. Farrell, pleaded guilty to vehicular assault and
driving under the influence.  Farrell died seven months after the accident and
suit was filed against the administratrix of his estate, Jackie Bennett (“the
Estate”).  The Gordons sought both compensatory and punitive damages
3
based on Farrell’s reckless conduct and intoxication.  Prior to trial, the Estate
conceded negligence.
The damage to the Gordons’ motor vehicle was total and initially they
sought  recovery from their own collision carrier who honored their claim in
the amount of $19,000.  The Gordons’ collision carrier pursued subrogation,
through intercompany arbitration, against Farrell’s liability carrier who then
paid the Gordons’ collision carrier $13,000.  Despite receiving payment in
full for their motor vehicle loss, the Gordons sought to recover, in their suit
against the Estate, the $6,000 difference between their actual loss and the
amount paid by Farrell’s liability carrier.
Prior to trial, the Estate filed a motion in limine to preclude the
Gordons from presenting evidence of their property damage in view of the
payment by their collision carrier of the full value of the motor vehicle.  The
Superior Court ruled, however, that the collateral source rule permitted the
Gordons to present evidence and recover that portion of their property
damage ($6,000) not previously paid by or on behalf of the tortfeasor.  The
trial court further ruled that Delaware’s no fault statute (21 Del. C. §
2118(a)(2) and (3)) bars the recovery of only medical expenses and lost wages
4
in an action against the tortfeasor, and, by implication at least, does not
prevent recovery of property damage.  We agree.
While the result here is somewhat anomalous to the extent that the
Gordons will recover more than the value of their motor vehicle, the
collateral source rule supports such recovery.  The collateral source rule is
firmly embedded in Delaware jurisprudence and permits an injured party to
look to any contractual source for recompense notwithstanding the availability
of recovery against a tortfeasor who “has no interest in, and no right to
benefit from, monies received by the injured person from sources
unconnected with the [tortfeasor].”  Medical Center of Delaware v. Mullins,
Del. Supr., 637 A.2d 6, 10 (1994) (quoting Yarrington v. Thornburg, Del.
Supr., 205 A.2d 1, 2 (1964)).
Recently, this Court limited the collateral source rule where an injured
party received loss of earnings compensation from a collateral source for
which the plaintiff had paid no consideration.  See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Nalbone, Del. Supr., 569 A.2d 71 (1989).  Notwithstanding this
limitation, we explicitly held that whenever the injured party has paid even
the smallest consideration to the collateral source, the tortfeasor, or its
1While the Gordons’ recovery may be deemed a windfall under the unusual facts
of this case, they concede that had Farrell’s liability carrier reimbursed their own collision
carrier in the full amount of their loss through subrogation, the collateral source rule would
treat such payment as on behalf of the tortfeasors and bar further recovery.
5
insurer, must still fully compensate the plaintiff.  See id. at 75.  Double
recovery by a plaintiff is acceptable so long as the source of such payment is
unconnected to the tortfeasor.  See Yarrington v. Thornburg, Del. Supr., 205
A.2d 1, 2 (1964).
Nor is the force of the collateral source rule, as applied here,  mitigated
by Delaware’s no-fault statute.  While § 2118(h) also precludes “pleading or
introducing into evidence in an action for damages against a tortfeasor”
certain damages for which compensation is available under PIP coverage,
those restrictions are specifically limited to medical expenses and lost
earnings, sustained within certain time periods.  See 21 Del. C. § 2118
(a)(2)a.  While it may be argued that recovery of property damage in a tort
action is contrary to the “spirit” of speedy first party insurance recovery
underlying no-fault insurance, we are not free to impose limits on recovery,
or dilute the force of the collateral source rule in the absence of specific
legislative direction.1
2“The purposes of awarding punitive damages, or ‘exemplary damages’ as they are
frequently called, are to punish the person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him
and others from similar conduct in the future....  Punitive damages are not awarded against
the representatives of the deceased tortfeasor nor, ordinarily, under an action under the
death statute.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977).
6
II
The Gordons’ cross appeal is prompted by the Superior Court’s
rejection of their claim for punitive damages against Farrell’s estate.  The
trial court, relying upon recent Superior Court precedent and the Restatement
of Torts, ruled that such damages are not recoverable against the estate of a
tortfeasor.2  The Gordons contend that the Superior Court’s ruling failed to
consider the language of the Delaware Survival Act, 10 Del. C. § 3701,
which is in derogation of the common law and provides a legal basis for
preserving a claim for punitive damages, notwithstanding the death of the
tortfeasor.
The Delaware Survival Statute provides in pertinent part:
All causes of action, except actions for defamation, malicious
prosecution, or upon penal statutes, shall survive to and against
the executors or administrators of the person to, or against
whom, the cause of action accrued.  Accordingly, all actions so
surviving, may be instituted or prosecuted by or against the
executors or administrators of the person to or against whom the
cause of action accrued.  This section shall not affect the
survivorship among the original parties to a joint cause of action.
7
10 Del. C. § 3701.
The obvious purpose of the survival statute is to insure that “all causes
of action” are assertable against the estate of any deceased person, whether
the person dies before or during the pendency of the litigation.  The three
exceptions to the surviving claims are specifically noted: defamation,
malicious prosecution or actions based upon penal statutes.
An award of punitive damages as a supplement to a compensatory
damage award in egregious cases has long been recognized in Delaware.  See
Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, Del. Supr., 523 A.2d 518, 528-29 (1987)
(tracing the evolution of the doctrine under Delaware decisional law).
Punitive damages serve a dual purpose — “to punish wrongdoers and deter
others from similar conduct.”  Id.  Courts that have considered the imposition
of punitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, however, have
disagreed over the result.
A majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question have ruled
that punitive damages are not recoverable from the estate of the tortfeasor,
although the limitation is the result of statutory restrictions in many of these
states.  See cases collected in G.J.D. v. Johnson, Pa. Super., 669 A.2d 378
8
(1995), aff’d G. J. D. By G.J.D. v. Johnson, Pa. Supr., 713 A.2d 1127
(1998).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 926 (1977) (“Under
statutes providing for the survival ... of tort actions, the damages ... for
which the tortfeasor is responsible are not affected by the death of either party
before or during trial except that ... the death of the tortfeasor terminates
liability for punitive damages.”). The debate in those states that have no
statutory restriction centers over whether the deterrence purpose is served by
imposing a monetary penalty against a tortfeasor who is deceased.  Compare
Perry v. Melton, W.Va. Supr., 299 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1982) (considering the
effect of punitive damages on deterring others from engaging in similar acts
in allowing punitive damage award against estate of deceased tortfeasor) and
Hofer v. Lavender, Tex. Supr., 679 S.W.2d 470 (1984) (same), with
Jaramillo v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., N.M. Supr., 871 P.2d 1343,
1352 (1994) (refusing to allow punitive damages against estate of deceased
tortfeasor because death of tortfeasor defeats the central purpose of awarding
such damages, which is to punish the tortfeasor and deter him or her from
repeating the wrongful act), and Lohr v. Byrd, Fla. Supr., 522 So.2d 845
(1988) (same). 
3“All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, shall survive the death of
the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants.”
42 Pa.C.S. § 8302.
9
Although there is some merit in questioning the deterrence factor, we
believe the better approach is to recognize the continued viability of punitive
damage claims against the estate.  Thus we align ourselves with the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which expressed the following rationale for its
holding.
While one of the two purposes served by an award of punitive
damages is defeated by the death of the tortfeasor, the deterrence
effect of the award is unaltered, and perhaps even enhanced, by
the assessment of punitive damages against the estate of the
tortfeasor.
G.J.D. v. Johnson, 669 A.2d at 383.
Moreover, unlike the Pennsylvania statute3 that contains no exclusions,
the Delaware Survival Statute, as previously noted, contains specific
limitations on recovery.  Had the General Assembly intended to exclude
claims for punitive damages from recovery against the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor, it could easily have done so.  The omission is significant and we
are not inclined to engraft a further restriction by embracing the Restatement
provision.  
10
In sum, we conclude that in the absence of a specific statutory
restriction there is no basis to bar recovery for punitive damages against the
estate of a deceased tortfeasor.
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED as to the appeal
and REVERSED as to the cross-appeal.