Title: Peters v. Weber
Citation: 175 Kan. 838, 267 P.2d 481
Docket Number: 39,226
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 1954

175 Kan. 838 (1954)
267 P.2d 481
MARIAN F. PETERS (Formerly MARIAN F. WEBER), Appellant,
v.
EDGAR L. WEBER, Appellee.
No. 39,226

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1954.
*839 A. Lewis Oswald and William L. Mitchell, both of Hutchinson, were on the briefs for the appellant.
Max Wyman and Don Wyman, both of Hutchinson, were on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
Because of the facts and circumstances, the question presented in this appeal is rather unusual, and concerns the liability of defendant husband for long past-due payments for child support.
The trial court held that plaintiff wife was barred by laches from enforcing her ex-husband's liability for such delinquent payments, and she has appealed.
In June, 1941, plaintiff was granted a divorce from defendant. Certain property rights, with which we are not now concerned, were adjusted by the decree. They were the parents of a two-year-old son, Phillip, and plaintiff was granted custody of the child. Defendant was ordered to pay the sum of $20 per month for the child's support, such payments to be made through the office of the clerk of the court.
About a year after her divorce from defendant the plaintiff married a man by the name of Peters, following which she, her son Phillip, and Peters lived as one family. She and Peters also had a child of their own. This marriage ended in a divorce in January, 1953 (Peters v. Peters, 175 Kan. 422, 263 P.2d 1019). During all of the years of her marriage to Peters the latter supported Phillip as though he were his own child. During this period, and in fact ever since her divorce in 1941 from defendant, plaintiff had not requested defendant to pay anything for Phillip's support. During all of this period defendant paid nothing.
In the meantime defendant, after serving in the army in World War II, remarried and established a home in Wichita. He and his second wife had a child of their own. Apparently his marriage to plaintiff, and their son Phillip, were a closed chapter in his life.
In the spring of 1953, following her divorce from Peters, plaintiff instituted a contempt proceeding against defendant because of his total failure to comply with the terms of the 1941 divorce decree *840 providing for child support. She also filed a motion for an order determining the amount of such delinquency and directing that it be paid. She further sought an order increasing the amount of future monthly payments.
After a full hearing thereon the court found defendant not guilty of contempt, that due to her laches plaintiff was barred from enforcing payment of past-due child support, and ordered defendant to pay $10 per week commencing March 28, 1953, for the support of Phillip, who at that time was about fourteen years of age.
Plaintiff has appealed, and contends the lower court erred in its ruling with respect to past-due payments, and in ordering the payment of only $10 per week for future support.
At the outset, we note defendant's contention the appeal should be dismissed for the reason that plaintiff did not file a motion for a new trial  hence there is nothing open for appellate review. Under the circumstances presented we do not consider the rule contended for to be applicable. At the time of rendering judgment with respect to the liability of defendant for the delinquent payments the trial court filed a lengthy written memorandum in the nature of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the absence of a motion for a new trial the facts as found by the trial court therefore stand as the unquestioned facts of the case, leaving, then, the only question whether they are sufficient to support the judgment rendered. (Arnall v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 157 Kan. 535, 538, 142 P.2d 838.) The court will consider the appeal.
Because of the nature of the question presented, and inasmuch as the trial court's written memorandum clearly sets forth the factual background of the matter and the reason for the judgment rendered, it is quoted in full:
From the foregoing it is obvious that in arriving at its decision the trial court followed the reasoning of McKee v. McKee, 154 Kan. 340, 118 P.2d 544, 137 A.L.R. 880, the syllabus of which reads:
It may be conceded that the question and principles there involved are quite similar to those of the instant case. On the other hand, we think the facts are readily distinguishable, and that it cannot be said that decision is controlling under the facts and circumstances of the case before us.
In the McKee case we have the affirmative acts of the father in paying $50 per month, and acceptance by the mother for the benefit of the child, for more than nineteen years. Here we are confronted with the fact defendant father paid nothing toward his child's support following the 1941 divorce  a period of twelve years. The record shows that he had notice of the pendency of the action. In the McKee case the child had become of age, she no longer required or asked support from either parent, and had executed a written release to her father and mother releasing both of them from any further claim as far as the judgment for child support was concerned, all prior to the action of the mother seeking to recover the alleged deficiency. No such circumstances are present here. The child is still a minor, and enforcement of the past-due payments would accrue directly to his benefit.
As found by the trial court, and as conceded by both parties, instalments decreed in a divorce action for the support of a minor child become final judgments as of the dates due, may be collected as other judgments, and are barred by the statute of limitations (G.S. 1949, 60-306, Sixth) the same as other judgments. (Sharp v. Sharp, 154 Kan. 175, 117 P.2d 561; McKee v. McKee, supra; Haynes v. Haynes, 168 Kan. 219, 212 P.2d 312; and Andrews v. Andrews, 171 Kan. 616, 237 P.2d 418.) In other words, defendant is liable, if at all, for only those payments which became due within five *844 years prior to the commencement of the instant proceeding, totalling $1,200.
We have no fault to find with what is said in the McKee case and in Calkin v. Hudson, 156 Kan. 308, 318, 319, 133 P.2d 177, also relied on by defendant, on the subject of laches. The general rules are stated correctly in both decisions. But, as was said in Edwards v. Moore, 143 Kan. 447, 453, 54 P.2d 933, whether laches bars action depends upon the special circumstances of each case. One "special circumstance" of the instant case is that for twelve years defendant paid nothing toward the support of his child, and, if compelled to pay the accrued five years' deficiency, he would in reality be paying the sum of only $100 per year for the twelve years during which he was delinquent.
Under all of the circumstances of the case we are unwilling to hold that defendant is entitled to invoke the defense of laches as a bar to the enforcement of his moral and legal obligation to his minor child. The rights of the latter are not to be waived by the inaction and passive acquiescence on the part of the mother. We are of the opinion the court erred in ruling that defendant was not liable for the payments which became due within five years prior to the commencement of this proceeding.
Inasmuch as the order requiring defendant to pay the sum of $10 per week, commencing in March, 1953, was undoubtedly based upon the premise that recovery of all delinquent payments was barred, the trial court may, in view of our contrary holding on that question, desire to change its order for future support. It of course has the right to do so, provided such further order does not operate retrospectively.
In her brief counsel for plaintiff mention the matter of the allowance of an attorney's fee for services in connection with the appeal. However, as the matter is not properly before us no order with reference thereto is made.
In view of what has been said it follows that the judgment of the trial court is reversed with directions to make such order with reference to payment by defendant of the deficiency in question as appears to be equitable and just in the light of all surrounding facts and circumstances.
PRICE, J., (dissenting):
I find myself in the somewhat awkward position of being unable to agree with the opinion of the court which *845 fell to my lot to write. But, I would be less than honest with myself if I did not register a brief dissent, for I am convinced that upon this record the decision of the trial court was correct.
I do not, for one moment, contend that defendant should not be censured and condemned for his delinquency in failing to provide support for his child during the twelve-year period. On the other hand, whose duty was it to see that the order was enforced? As a practical matter it was not the child's  it was plaintiff's duty, and from this record it is clear that she not only did not request any money but did not want any. By her inaction and acquiescence over the years, she, for all practical effects, due to the intervention of the statute of limitations, waived all rights she or her son possessed to collect delinquent payments accruing more than five years prior to the commencement of this proceeding. Why, then, was it not possible, as a matter of fact, and of law, for her to waive those rights, by her laches, as to the payments accruing within five years prior to its commencement? As was said in Calkin v. Hudson, 156 Kan. 308, 133 P.2d 177, cited in the opinion of the court 
My thought on this matter is that the court's decision fails to take into account those human elements and practical everyday realities of life so often present when parents are divorced. For all this record shows the child was properly and adequately supported during the period he lived with his mother and stepfather, Peters. There is no contention to the contrary. And, as far as the present and future are concerned, the trial court has already made an order for support, and can increase the amount to be paid as circumstances warrant.
The written memorandum of the trial court expresses my views in this matter, and for that reason I would affirm the judgment.