Title: State v. Green
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP002150-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2022

2022 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2150-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Valiant M. Green, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 8, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jay R. Pucek, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Jay R. Pucek, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by John A. Blimling.  
 
 
 
2022 WI 41 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP2150-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF594) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Valiant M. Green, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides in relevant part:  "no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation . . . ."1  After Valiant M. Green was arrested for 
operating while intoxicated (OWI), law enforcement obtained a 
warrant to draw his blood.  Green now argues the facts 
                                                 
1 See also Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
No. 
2019AP2150-CR   
 
2 
 
supporting that warrant were insufficient to find probable 
cause.  We disagree. 
¶2 
When we examine whether a warrant issued with probable 
cause, we review the record that was before the warrant-issuing 
judge.  State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶27, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517.  Specifically, we look at the affidavits supporting 
the warrant application and all reasonable inferences that may 
be drawn from the facts presented.  Id., ¶¶26, 28.  However, our 
review is not independent; we defer to the warrant-issuing 
judge's determination "unless the defendant establishes that the 
facts are clearly insufficient to support a probable cause 
finding."  Id., ¶21.  Probable cause exists where, after 
examining 
all 
the 
facts 
and 
inferences 
drawn 
from 
the 
affidavits, "there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."  
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
¶3 
Here, the circuit court issued a search warrant to 
draw Green's blood based on the affidavit of Kenosha Police 
Officer Mark Poffenberger.2  The affidavit took the form of a 
pre-printed document with blank spaces and check-boxes that 
Officer Poffenberger completed.  It stated that around 1:19 p.m. 
on May 25, 2014, Green "drove or operated a motor vehicle at 
driveway of [Green's home address]"——the underlined portion 
being part of the preprinted form, and the remainder Officer 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder of the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court signed the warrant and presided over all the 
circuit court proceedings relevant to this appeal. 
No. 
2019AP2150-CR   
 
3 
 
Poffenberger's handwritten addition.  Several checked boxes 
provided additional facts.  First, Green was arrested for the 
offense of "Driving or Operating a Motor Vehicle While Impaired 
as a Second or Subsequent Offense, contrary to chapter 346 
Wis.Stats."  Second, Green "was observed to drive/operate the 
vehicle by" both "a police officer" and "a citizen witness," 
whose name was written in by Officer Poffenberger.  A third 
checked box was labeled "basis for the stop of the arrestee's 
vehicle 
was," 
and 
Officer 
Poffenberger 
supplied 
"citizen 
statement" by hand. 
¶4 
The affidavit also described Green's statements and 
the officer's observations.  According to Officer Poffenberger's 
handwritten note, Green "admitted to drinking alcohol at the 
house."  And Officer Poffenberger checked several boxes noting 
that when he made contact with Green, he observed a strong odor 
of intoxicants, red/pink and glassy eyes, an uncooperative 
attitude, slurred speech, and an unsteady balance.  Finally, 
Officer Poffenberger checked boxes indicating that Green refused 
to perform field sobriety tests, refused to submit to a 
preliminary breath test, and was "read the 'Informing the 
Accused' Statement . . . and has refused to submit to the 
chemical test requested by the police officer." 
¶5 
After the warrant issued, medical staff drew Green's 
blood.  It revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.214 g/100 mL, an 
No. 
2019AP2150-CR   
 
4 
 
amount well above the legal limit.3  The State charged Green with 
fourth offense OWI, fourth offense operating with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration (PAC), and resisting an officer.  Green 
moved to suppress the results of the blood draw on the grounds 
that the warrant was deficient.  The circuit court denied the 
motion.  It concluded that even if the court erroneously issued 
the warrant (the court thought it had), the error did not merit 
suppression.4  At trial, the jury found Green guilty of OWI and 
PAC.  The circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss 
the OWI count and entered judgment against Green on the PAC 
count.  The court of appeals summarily affirmed, holding the 
circuit court properly issued the warrant in the first place.5  
We granted Green's petition for review. 
                                                 
3 Because 
Green 
had 
"3 
or 
more 
prior 
convictions, 
suspensions or revocations," his legal limit was 0.02.  Wis. 
Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c) (2013-14). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version. 
4 The circuit court's later disagreement with its own 
decision to issue the warrant does not change the scope of our 
review or our deference to its decision to issue the warrant.  
"[W]e are confined to the record that was before the warrant-
issuing commissioner" and give "[g]reat deference . . . to the 
warrant-issuing commissioner's determination of probable cause."  
State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 378-79, 511 N.W.2d 586 (1994).  
This deferential standard "is appropriate to further the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to 
a warrant."  Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733 (1984); 
see also United States v. Curry, 538 F.3d 718, 729 (7th Cir. 
2008) (giving deference to the warrant issuing judge but not the 
judge reviewing the decision to issue the warrant). 
5 State v. Green, No. 2019AP2150-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2021). 
No. 
2019AP2150-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
Before us, Green continues to argue the warrant was 
issued without probable cause.  He focuses not on the indicia of 
intoxication, but the location where he operated his vehicle.  
Green's main argument is that the handwritten word "driveway" on 
the form alleges only that he drove within the confines of his 
driveway.  This matters because the statute criminalizing OWI 
and PAC offenses——Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), (1)(b)——does "not 
apply 
to 
private 
parking 
areas 
at . . . single-family 
residences."  Wis. Stat. § 346.61.  Rather, the laws apply "upon 
highways"6 and "premises held out to the public for use of their 
motor vehicles."  Id.  Green's driveway is not a highway nor is 
it a held out to the public for motor vehicle use.7  Thus, 
because Green would not have committed an OWI or PAC by 
operating his vehicle on his driveway, Green contends the 
affidavit alleged only noncriminal activity and fell short of 
showing probable cause that any criminal activity occurred. 
¶7 
Green's argument fails, however, because reasonable 
inferences from the affidavit support finding probable cause 
that Green drove on a public road.  And that's all that is 
needed.  "Probable cause is not a technical, legalistic concept 
                                                 
6 Highways are defined as "all public ways and thoroughfares 
and bridges on the same."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22).  A highway 
also "includes a private road or driveway that is subject to an 
agreement for traffic regulation enforcement."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.01(1m). 
7 See City of La Crosse v. Richling, 178 Wis. 2d 856, 858-
60, 505 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1993) (analyzing whether a tavern's 
parking lot was held out to the public for motor vehicle use). 
No. 
2019AP2150-CR   
 
6 
 
but a flexible, common-sense measure of the plausibility of 
particular 
conclusions 
about 
human 
behavior." 
 
State 
v. 
Higginbotham, 
162 
Wis. 2d 978, 
989, 
471 
N.W.2d 24 
(1991) 
(quoting another source).  So when we examine a warrant 
application, the "test is not whether the inference drawn is the 
only reasonable inference."  Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶30.  
Rather, the "test is whether the inference drawn is a reasonable 
one."  Id.  This warrant passes the test. 
¶8 
Following the pre-printed word "at" is space for a 
location, which Officer Poffenberger identified as the driveway 
of Green's residential address.  It is reasonable to read the 
officer's addition of the phrase "driveway of [residential 
address]" to refer to a specific location on the road, much like 
an intersection would provide a similarly specific location.  
The affidavit does not say Green's driving occurred merely in 
his 
driveway, 
but 
at 
his 
driveway——a 
location 
that 
can 
reasonably be read to refer to a position on the road adjacent 
to his driveway.  Other portions of the affidavit are consistent 
with this reading.  The affidavit points to two witnesses who 
observed Green "drive/operate the vehicle":  a police officer 
and a named citizen witness.8  And the stop was occasioned by a 
citizen statement; someone besides the officer saw something 
that occasioned a call to the police.  Viewing the entire 
                                                 
8 See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (noting the 
reliability of "a tip from a known informant whose reputation 
can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her 
allegations turn out to be fabricated"). 
No. 
2019AP2150-CR   
 
7 
 
affidavit together, a judge could reasonably infer that Green 
operated his vehicle on the road while intoxicated, not solely 
in his driveway.  This "is not the only inference that can be 
drawn, but it is certainly a reasonable one."  Ward, 231 
Wis. 2d 723, ¶30. 
¶9 
Examining the totality of the facts laid out in the 
affidavit, we conclude Green has not met his burden to show the 
affidavit was clearly insufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause.  Accordingly, Green's challenge to the warrant 
and motion to suppress the evidence obtained thereby fails.9 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                 
9 Because we determine the search warrant properly issued, 
we do not address the State's arguments that suppression would 
not be an appropriate remedy if the warrant were deficient. 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶10 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Green's Fourth 
Amendment right protecting him against unreasonable searches was 
violated when law enforcement drew his blood based on a search 
warrant that wholly lacked probable cause.  The existence of 
probable cause to show that a crime was committed is not a mere 
technicality.  Rather it is basic to our Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
¶11 Confronted with the absence of probable cause here, 
the majority contrives to manufacture its presence.  The 
affidavit in support of the warrant said that Green drove his 
car while intoxicated "at his driveway."  But this isn't a 
crime.  The law requires that one drive on a highway,1 and 
Green's 
private 
driveway 
obviously 
does 
not 
meet 
that 
requirement.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.61.   
¶12 In retrospect, even the warrant-issuing judge in this 
case acknowledged that the facts alleged in the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant did not amount to probable cause.  
He recognized that "I did make an error in not frankly asking 
the officer" for "more data." 
¶13 Failing to acknowledge what in retrospect was apparent 
to 
the 
warrant-issuing 
judge, 
the 
majority 
nevertheless 
seemingly shrugs off this essential requirement and forges ahead 
to reach its inexorable conclusion.  It determines that "Green 
has not met his burden to show the affidavit was clearly 
                                                 
1 Throughout this opinion, I use "highway" as a catchall to 
refer 
to 
the 
public 
ways 
and 
thoroughfares 
upon 
which 
Wisconsin's operating while intoxicated laws apply.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 340.01(22). 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause."  Majority 
op., ¶9. 
¶14 The majority errs in at least two respects.  First, it 
insists that it is reasonable to draw several inferences from 
the affidavit despite the fact that the affidavit has a glaring 
omission:  it contained no indication that a crime had been 
committed at all.   
¶15 Second, the majority disregards this court's decision 
in State v. Tye, which addressed an analogous scenario resulting 
in the suppression of evidence when an essential search warrant 
requirement was lacking.  2001 WI 124, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 
N.W.2d 473.  The existence of probable cause to believe a crime 
has been committed "is so basic to the Fourth Amendment that the 
Court simply can't look at" the lack of it "as a technical 
irregularity not affecting the substantial rights of the 
defendant."  Id., ¶14. 
¶16 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the probable 
cause requirement should not be so readily subverted and that 
the results of this unlawful search should have been suppressed.  
Because the majority manufactures probable cause and in the 
process disregards an essential search warrant requirement, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶17 Valiant Green was arrested for operating a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated outside his home in Kenosha.  Majority 
op., ¶3.  Upon his arrest, the officer requested a breath test 
from Green, which he refused.  Id., ¶4.  The officer then sought 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
a search warrant to draw Green's blood and submitted an 
affidavit in support of the warrant, which was a fill-in-the-
blank form.2  Id., ¶3.  "[D]rove or operated a motor vehicle at" 
was preprinted on the affidavit, after which the officer 
handwrote in "driveway of [Green's home address]."  Id.   
¶18 The 
affidavit 
also 
indicated, 
without 
further 
explanation, that the "basis for the stop of the arrestee's 
vehicle" was a citizen statement and that Green admitted to 
drinking alcohol at the house.  Id., ¶¶3-4.  In checking off 
certain boxes on the pre-printed form, the officer marked 
various indicators of intoxication, including that the odor of 
intoxicants was "strong," that Green's eyes appeared "red/pink" 
and "glassy," that Green's speech was "slurred," and that Green 
was uncooperative and unsteady.  Id., ¶4.  The reviewing judge 
signed the search warrant, authorizing the police to draw 
Green's blood.  At the hospital, the same officer who applied 
for the warrant also executed it, and as a result, medical staff 
completed a blood draw.  Id., ¶5. 
¶19 Green was charged with operating while intoxicated 
(OWI) and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration 
(PAC), both as a fourth offense.  Id.  He moved to suppress the 
results of the blood draw, arguing that the warrant application 
did not provide sufficient facts to support a finding of 
probable cause.  The circuit court denied the motion, but at the 
suppression hearing, the same judge who issued the warrant 
                                                 
2 The search warrant at issue is attached as an appendix to 
this dissent. 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
recognized that "I did make an error in not frankly asking the 
officer" for "more data."3   
¶20 At trial, the jury found Green guilty of OWI and PAC.  
Id.  On appeal, the court of appeals summarily affirmed, 
determining that the circuit court properly issued the warrant 
because the word "at" in the affidavit could mean Green was 
operating a vehicle on a public road "near" his driveway.  State 
v. Green, No. 2019AP2150-CR, unpublished order, at 3-4 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 31, 2021).  A majority of this court now affirms, 
determining that "reasonable inferences from the affidavit 
support finding probable cause that Green drove on a public 
road."  Majority op., ¶7. 
II 
¶21 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  Both 
constitutional provisions require that a search warrant not 
issue unless there is a finding of probable cause.4  "Fourth 
                                                 
3 I agree with the majority that the circuit court's later 
disagreement with its own decision to issue the warrant does not 
change the nature and scope of our review.  See majority op., ¶5 
n.4.  However, I find it persuasive that even the warrant-
issuing judge acknowledged that the facts alleged in the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant did not amount to 
probable cause. 
4 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Amendment rights are indispensable to the full enjoyment of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property."  
State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶19, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562 
(quotation omitted). 
¶22 It is true that our review of a decision to issue a 
warrant is guided by deference to the warrant-issuing judge's 
determination.  See majority op., ¶2; State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 
¶21, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.  However, "Deference to 
the magistrate . . . is not boundless."  United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).  The majority hides behind deference 
contrary to the command that "reviewing courts will not defer to 
a warrant based on an affidavit that does not provide the 
magistrate 
with 
a 
substantial 
basis 
for 
determining 
the 
existence of probable cause."  Id. at 915 (quotation omitted).   
A 
¶23 First, the majority errs by drawing several inferences 
from an affidavit that does not allege a crime has actually been 
committed.  Majority op., ¶¶7-8.  Wisconsin's OWI laws apply 
only to highways and "premises held out to the public for use of 
their motor vehicles."  Wis. Stat. § 346.61.  Such laws 
explicitly do not apply to "private parking areas" at single-
                                                                                                                                                             
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
(Emphasis added). 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
contains identical language. 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
family residences.  Id.  ("Sections 346.62 to 346.64 do not 
apply to private parking areas at farms or single-family 
residences."). 
¶24 "Highway"5 
and 
"Private 
road 
or 
driveway"6 
are 
specially defined in the Wisconsin Statutes.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(22), (46).  Simply put, operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated on a private driveway at a single-family residence 
like Green's is not a crime under Wisconsin law.7  See City of 
Kenosha v. Phillips, 142 Wis. 2d 549, 556, 419 N.W.2d 236 (1988) 
(rejecting an argument that OWI laws apply "even on home 
driveways or in the garages of private persons").  Probable 
cause does not exist where no crime has been alleged.  Thus, we 
owe no deference here where the affidavit fails to provide a 
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable 
cause.  See Leon, 468 U.S. at 915. 
¶25 Despite the fact that the OWI statutes apply only on 
highways and not private roads or driveways, the majority 
insists that the handwritten "driveway" could "refer to a 
specific location on the road, much like an intersection would 
                                                 
5 "'Highway' means all public ways and thoroughfares and 
bridges on the same . . .  but does not include private roads or 
driveways as defined in sub. (46)."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22) 
(emphasis added). 
6 Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46) provides, "'Private road or 
driveway' is every way or place in private ownership and used 
for vehicular travel only by the owner and those having express 
or implied permission from the owner . . . ."   
7 There is no question that "Green's driveway is not a 
highway nor is it held out to the public for motor vehicle use," 
as even the majority acknowledges.  Majority op., ¶6. 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
provide a similarly specific location."  Majority op., ¶8.  But 
the affidavit did not say "at the intersection" or "on the road 
adjacent to the driveway."  The majority would have us believe 
that "at the driveway" does not mean what it says.  How can it 
be reasonable to infer that a crime has been committed when the 
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the affidavit 
is that Green was operating a vehicle at his own driveway?   
¶26 Perhaps aware that "at the driveway" does not equate 
to a highway, the majority points to other facts alleged in the 
affidavit in support of its conclusion.  It offers the following 
facts as a basis for reasonably inferring the location necessary 
to establish probable cause.  That is, that Green was operating 
on a highway and not his private driveway: 
 
 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
Facts 
Reasonable inference from this 
fact that Green was operating a 
vehicle on a highway 
Green was observed to 
drive/operate the vehicle by 
both a police officer and 
citizen witness.  Majority op., 
¶8. 
There is no reference by either 
witness regarding location, 
other than "at the driveway." 
The basis for the stop was a 
citizen's statement. 
Id. 
The basis for the stop does not 
reference the location. 
The name of the citizen witness 
was written on the affidavit. 
Id., ¶3. 
 
The name of the citizen witness 
provides no information about 
location. 
Green admitted to drinking at 
the house. 
Id., ¶4. 
The admission only references 
Green's private home as the 
location. 
 
The officer observed Green 
exhibit indicators of 
intoxication.  Id. 
The observation says nothing 
about location. 
Green refused to perform field 
sobriety tests or submit to a 
breath test.  Id. 
The refusals indicate nothing 
regarding location. 
¶27 What do all of these facts have in common?  None of 
them indicates that Green was observed operating a vehicle 
anywhere other than his private driveway.  The majority's math 
doesn't add up——zero plus zero plus zero still equals zero.  The 
majority pulls the reasonableness of its inferences out of thin 
air, seemingly assuming the existence of probable cause by the 
sole fact that law enforcement applied for a warrant.  
¶28 Given the brevity of the majority opinion, there is an 
apparent limit to the analytical gymnastics that the majority is 
willing to engage in, endeavoring to explain that "at the 
driveway" somehow does not really mean what it says.  Such 
flimsy rationale is inadequate when the court is depriving a 
defendant of a constitutional right.  Why would the officer 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
write in the word "driveway" if that is not precisely where 
Green was operating his vehicle?   
¶29 All we can glean from the affidavit was that Green may 
have been drunk in his driveway, which is obviously not a crime.  
If Green had been driving on a highway near his home, the 
officer's handwritten inclusion of the word "driveway" would 
have been completely unnecessary.   
¶30 Admittedly probable cause is a low standard, but the 
court needs at least something to show that a crime was 
committed.  Here the majority attempts to manufacture that 
something out of nothing. 
B 
¶31 Second, the majority disregards this court's decision 
in State v. Tye.  In Tye, the court reviewed whether evidence 
must be suppressed when an affidavit lacks the oath or 
affirmation 
required 
by 
both 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutions.  248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶3.  In that case, the court 
determined "that the total absence of any statement under oath 
to support a search warrant violates the explicit oath or 
affirmation 
requirement 
of 
both 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutions and that the warrant therefore is constitutionally 
infirm."  Id. 
¶32 In so concluding, the Tye court explained that "[t]his 
court has long recognized an oath or affirmation as an essential 
prerequisite to obtaining a valid search warrant under the state 
constitution."  Id., ¶13.  It further reasoned that "failure to 
swear to the information upon which a warrant is obtained cannot 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
be dismissed as a mere failure to comply with a technicality" 
and "the oath or affirmation requirement 'is so basic to the 
Fourth Amendment that the Court simply can't look at it as a 
technical irregularity not affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant.'"  Id., ¶14 (citation omitted).  Accordingly, 
"The warrant was facially defective because no sworn affidavit 
was attached."  Id., ¶5. 
¶33 If the oath or affirmation requirement is so essential 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
why 
isn't 
the 
probable 
cause 
requirement equally as essential?  Both the state and federal 
constitutions contain more than just an oath or affirmation 
requirement.  They say no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation.  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 11; U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The court's reasoning in Tye 
applies equally to the probable cause requirement here. 
¶34 Like the oath or affirmation requirement, the probable 
cause requirement is "so basic to the Fourth Amendment that the 
Court simply can't look at it as a technical irregularity not 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant."  Tye, 248 
Wis. 2d 530, ¶14.  As was the result in Tye, the good faith 
exception does not apply and suppression is the appropriate 
remedy here because without the fulfillment of this essential 
search warrant requirement, "it is plainly evident that a 
magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant."  Id., 
¶24. 
¶35 Green's Fourth Amendment right protecting him against 
unreasonable searches was violated when the police drew his 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
blood based on a warrant that wholly lacked probable cause.  The 
results of this unlawful search should have been suppressed.  
And even if suppression of the blood evidence would lead to 
results that may appear to the court as "unjust or contrary" to 
the state's policies on operating while intoxicated, "that does 
not give this court the leeway" to deprive Green of his 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches.  See 
Phillips, 142 Wis. 2d at 560.   
¶36 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2019AP2150-CR.awb 
 
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