Title: Jackson (Jerry) v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031517
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
JERRY TERRELL JACKSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY 
v.  Record Nos. 031517 & 031518   JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 16, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 
AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY 
Samuel Taylor Powell, III, Judge 
 
 
A jury convicted Jerry Terrell Jackson of two counts 
of capital murder for the premeditated killing of Ruth W. 
Phillips in the commission of rape or attempted rape, and 
in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery in 
violation of Code §§ 18.2-31(5) and -31(4), respectively.  
The jury also convicted Jackson of statutory burglary, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-90; robbery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-58; rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-61; and petit 
larceny, in violation of Code § 18.9-96.  At the conclusion 
of the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury fixed 
Jackson’s punishment at death on each of the capital murder 
convictions, finding “that there is probability that he 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society.”  The 
jury also fixed punishment of two life sentences for the 
rape and the robbery convictions, a 20-year sentence for 
the burglary conviction, and a 12-month sentence for the 
petit larceny conviction.  The circuit court sentenced 
Jackson in accordance with the jury’s verdict.1
 
Jackson appealed his non-capital convictions to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Code § 17.1-406(A).  We 
certified that appeal (Record No. 031518) to this Court 
under the provisions of Code § 17.1-409 for consolidation 
with the defendant’s appeal of his capital murder 
convictions (Record No. 031517) and the sentence review 
mandated by Code § 17.1-313.  After considering Jackson’s 
assignments of error and conducting our sentence review, we 
find no error in the circuit court’s judgments and will 
affirm Jackson’s convictions and the imposition of the 
death penalty. 
I. FACTS 
A. GUILT PHASE 
 
Around 7 p.m., on Sunday, August 26, 2001, Richard 
Phillips discovered the body of his 88-year-old mother, 
Ruth Phillips, lying “twisted and exposed” on a bed in her 
bedroom.  Phillips explained that his mother’s “leg was 
twisted around, and her pubic region was exposed[; h]er 
breast was exposed[; and h]er nightgown was up around her 
neck.”  Mrs. Phillips lived alone in an apartment located 
                     
1  The circuit court also imposed fines in the total 
amount of $102,500 as fixed by the jury. 
 
2
in Williamsburg, and her son had become concerned about her 
well-being that day because she had not attended church and 
was not answering her telephone.  After finding his 
mother’s body, Phillips went outside and used a cellular 
telephone to call the “911” emergency number.  While 
waiting for emergency personnel to arrive, he noticed that 
the screen on a bathroom window in the apartment had been 
removed. 
 
A subsequent autopsy of Mrs. Phillips’ body revealed a 
contusion on her nose and some hemorrhaging of minute blood 
vessels in her cheeks and eyes.  There were also two 
lacerations to her vagina, one on the exterior area and the 
other one on the interior area.  The medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy opined that the cause of death was 
asphyxia.  Death by asphyxia, according to the medical 
examiner, occurs when the brain is without a supply of 
oxygen for four to six minutes although unconsciousness may 
come about within 15 to 30 seconds. 
 
An investigator with the James City County Police 
Department, Jeff Vellines, went to Mrs. Phillips’ apartment 
and collected several items of physical evidence.  He found 
a window screen, mirror case, and cosmetic items outside 
the apartment near the master bathroom window.  Inside, 
Vellines discovered a black pocketbook lying on the floor 
 
3
next to Mrs. Phillips’ bed, and a brown wallet underneath 
the pocketbook.  The wallet did not contain any money.  
However, a white square piece of paper found in the wallet 
contained one latent fingerprint of value for 
identification purposes.  That fingerprint was later 
compared with the fingerprints of the defendant and found 
to be “one and the same.” 
 
Another investigator at the crime scene recovered a 
hair from Mrs. Phillips chest area and another hair on the 
bed below the stomach area.  During the autopsy of Mrs. 
Phillips’ body, additional hairs were collected from her 
left thigh area.  Microscopic examination of those hairs by 
a forensic scientist revealed that one of the hairs 
recovered from Mrs. Phillips’ thigh area and the other two 
hairs were pubic hairs, but they were not consistent with 
samples of Mrs. Phillips’ pubic hair.  These same three 
hairs along with samples of the defendant’s blood and hair 
were later subjected to mitochondrial DNA analysis.  
According to the forensic scientist who performed the 
testing, Jackson could not be excluded as the source of the 
hairs found on Mrs. Phillips’ body and bed.  The “mtDNA 
sequence data” of each of those hairs matched the 
“corresponding mtDNA sequence of the blood” taken from the 
defendant. 
 
4
 
In December 2001, Vellines and Eric Peterson, also an 
investigator with the James City County Police Department, 
interviewed Jackson in the James City County Law 
Enforcement Center.  After waiving his Miranda rights, 
Jackson admitted entering Mrs. Phillips’ apartment, 
searching through and taking money out of her purse, and 
then exiting through a back window.  Jackson stated that he 
did not know that Mrs. Phillips was at home, and that, when 
he turned on the light and was going through her purse, 
Mrs. Phillips, who was lying in bed, confronted him and 
stated, “What do you want?  I’ll give you whatever, just 
get out.”  In the defendant’s words, “[I]t just scared me 
and I covered her up[.]”  Jackson acknowledged that he held 
a pillow over her face for two or three minutes and tried 
to make her “pass out” so she could not identify him.  
Jackson stated that, when Mrs. Phillips stopped screaming, 
that was his “cue that she [had] passed out.”  He also 
admitted that he inserted his penis into her vagina while 
he was holding the pillow over her face. 
  
Continuing, Jackson stated that he took Mrs. Phillips’ 
automobile when he left her apartment and drove it to 
another apartment complex, where he abandoned the vehicle 
with the keys lying on top of it.  He also used $60 that he 
had taken from her purse to purchase marijuana.  Throughout 
 
5
the interview, Jackson denied that anyone else was with him 
during this incident and insisted that he did not mean to 
kill Mrs. Phillips. 
 
At trial, Jackson testified to a different version of 
the events that supposedly transpired at Mrs. Phillips’ 
apartment.2  The defendant claimed that, on the day in 
question, he had been playing basketball until around 
midnight at the apartment complex where Mrs. Phillips 
lived.  Jackson stated that, as he was leaving, he came in 
contact with Alex Meekins and Jasper Meekins.  Jackson 
decided to participate in their plan to break into Mrs. 
Phillips’ apartment.  According to Jackson, Alex entered 
the apartment through a window and then let Jasper and the 
defendant in through the front door.  While Jackson was 
looking through Mrs. Phillips’ purse, she woke up and asked 
what was going on.  Jackson testified that the following 
events then took place in Mrs. Phillips’ bedroom: 
Jasper Meekins, he put the pillow over her face 
and smothered her.  While he was smothering her, I 
think she was struggling, but I told him at the end 
when I heard some sound, she was gurgling, I told him 
to stop.  I pushed him off.  As we were leaving, I 
pulled her nightgown down.  I put the blanket over 
her, and I picked the pillow up initially and I didn’t 
like what I saw, so I put the pillow back. 
                     
2 Jackson also testified at a hearing on a motion to 
suppress his confession.  His testimony at that hearing 
also differed from his statement to the police. 
 
 
6
 
 
Jackson explained that he confessed to Peterson 
because he thought that was what Peterson wanted to hear, 
and because he just wanted to “get out of there as fast as 
[he] could.”  Jackson also explained that he never told the 
investigators about Jasper’s and Alex’s participation in 
the crime because he was “scared for [his] family on the 
streets” and had concerns about being a “snitch.”  At 
trial, Jackson denied raping or killing Mrs. Phillips.  He 
also denied having any knowledge about who raped Mrs. 
Phillips or about how his pubic hairs got on her body.3
B. SENTENCING PHASE 
 
During the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial, 
the Commonwealth introduced into evidence 18 orders showing 
Jackson’s convictions or adjudications of delinquency for 
such offenses as grand larceny, petit larceny, trespassing, 
drug possession, receiving stolen property, contempt of 
court, identity fraud, statutory burglary, credit card 
theft, and obtaining money under false pretenses.  The jury 
also heard evidence from two correctional officers about 
two incidents involving the defendant while he was 
                     
3 A mitochondrial DNA analysis of blood taken from Alex 
Meekins showed that his mtDNA sequence did not correspond 
to the mtDNA sequence of the three hairs recovered from 
Mrs. Phillips’ body. 
 
7
incarcerated.  In the first incident, Jackson refused to 
obey the orders of a correctional officer, and that refusal 
led to a scuffle with several officers as they attempted to 
remove Jackson’s hand cuffs.  The other incident involved 
an altercation between the defendant and another inmate.
 
In mitigation of the offenses, Jackson presented 
evidence about his adjustment and behavioral problems when 
he was a youth.  In 1993, he was diagnosed with an 
“adjustment disorder with depressed mood and attention 
deficit, hyperactivity disorder.”  Jackson was evaluated 
again in 1996 because he was having behavioral problems at 
home and was not doing well in school.  Jackson expressed 
resentment toward his stepfather and acted out his negative 
feelings by behaving aggressively.  However, testing 
indicated that Jackson had average intellectual 
functioning. 
 
During his school years, Jackson took medication for 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, but his mother 
reported to Jackson’s pediatrician that her son continued 
to have behavioral problems at school, including fights.  
The defendant was eventually placed in a special school for 
students who cannot be controlled in a regular classroom 
 
8
setting.  There was also evidence that the defendant 
suffered physical abuse as a child.4
II. ANALYSIS 
A. DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENTS 
Jackson assigns error to the circuit court’s refusal 
to dismiss the capital murder indictments on the basis that 
Code § 19.2-264.4(B) is unconstitutional.  The defendant 
raised this claim in a pre-trial motion and supporting 
memorandum.  The circuit court denied the motion.  Jackson 
now argues that Code § 19.2-264.4(B) contains “a relaxed 
evidentiary standard that leads to inherently unreliable 
determinations of aggravating factors and unreliable death 
sentences.”  Citing the decisions in Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), Jackson 
also seems to suggest that, in Virginia, the aggravating 
factors of future dangerousness and vileness are not 
decided by a jury based on proof of those factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.5  We find no merit in the defendant’s 
arguments. 
                     
4 We will summarize additional facts and proceedings as 
necessary to address specific issues. 
 
5 Any argument about the vileness aggravating factor is 
irrelevant because Jackson’s sentence of death was 
predicated on the jury’s finding of future dangerousness. 
 
9
First, before the sentence of death may be imposed, 
the Commonwealth must prove at least one of the statutory 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(C).  Pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.3, a jury 
makes that determination, unless a jury trial is waived.  
Code § 19.2-257.  Thus, to the extent Jackson suggests 
otherwise, he is incorrect. 
Next, Code § 19.2-264.4(B) does not contain a relaxed 
evidentiary standard or produce unreliable determinations 
of aggravating factors.  Evidence relevant to sentencing in 
the penalty phase of a capital murder trial is admissible, 
“subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility.”  
Id.  We have held that this statute does not permit 
admission of irrelevant evidence.  See Powell v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2004) 
(decided this day); Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 
357, 551 S.E.2d 620, 634-35 (2001).  Presentence reports 
from probation officers are specifically not admissible.  
Id.  And, in Virginia, hearsay evidence also is not 
admissible during a penalty phase proceeding.  Lovitt v. 
Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259, 585 S.E.2d 801, 826 (2003). 
Finally, we note that, although the defendant argues 
that the full procedural safeguards employed during the 
guilt phase of a capital murder trial must also be provided 
 
10
in the penalty phase, he never identifies what procedural 
safeguards were missing in his penalty phase proceeding.  
He also fails to enunciate what unreliable information was 
admitted into evidence during the penalty phase of his 
trial as a result of the supposed relaxed evidentiary 
standard.  In other words, Jackson’s complaints about the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-264.4(B) are merely hypothetical 
in nature.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not err in refusing to dismiss the indictments. 
B. SUPPRESSION OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT 
Jackson filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the 
statement that he made to the police investigators.  After 
hearing evidence and argument of counsel, the circuit court 
denied the motion, finding that Jackson’s statement was 
voluntary and not the product of any psychological or 
physical coercion. 
The defendant assigns error to the court’s decision 
and argues that, “[b]ased on the totality of the 
circumstances, [his] will was overcome, his capacity for 
self-determination was critically impaired and his 
confession was not the product of a free and unconstrained 
choice.”  Jackson claims that the investigators who 
questioned him engaged in trickery and deceit because of 
statements such as, “I will work with you . . . I will be 
 
11
with you, thick and thin, boy . . . I will be in your 
corner” and “I’m here for you.”  As further evidence that 
his will was overborne, Jackson points to his repeated 
denials of culpability during the first part of the 
interrogation, his initial confession to a different crime, 
and his lack of knowledge that the crime for which he was 
being interrogated carried a possible sentence of death.  
In accordance with his testimony at the suppression 
hearing, Jackson claims that he simply told the 
investigator what the investigator wanted to hear so that 
he, the defendant, would be free to go. 
We find no merit in Jackson’s arguments.  The circuit 
court found, and we agree, that there was no evidence of 
any promises of leniency, any force, any threats, any 
intimidation, any coercion, or any deprivation of the 
defendant’s physical or mental needs.  Such “subsidiary 
factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness.”  Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 231, 441 
S.E.2d 195, 202 (1994).  The court also noted that the 
defendant had a reported IQ score of 100 and an educational 
level sufficient to read and write.  Furthermore, Jackson 
signed a waiver of his Miranda rights at the beginning of 
the interview.  And, he obviously understood the 
implications of making statements to the police because he 
 
12
had been charged with crimes on two previous occasions 
after confessing to those crimes. 
A defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is valid if 
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  Id.; 
Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 453, 423 S.E.2d 360, 
366 (1992).  “The test for voluntariness is whether the 
statement is the ‘product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker,’ or whether the maker’s 
will ‘has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired.’   Id. at 453-54, 423 
S.E.2d at 366 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 
568, 602 (1961)).  When determining whether a defendant’s 
statement was voluntarily given, we examine the totality of 
the circumstances, which include the defendant’s background 
and experience as well as the conduct of the police in 
obtaining the waiver of Miranda rights and confession.  
Swann, 247 Va. at 231, 441 S.E.2d at 202; Correll v. 
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987). 
Using these principles, we conclude that the 
defendant’s statement was made knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily.  Thus, the circuit court did not err in 
admitting Jackson’s incriminating statement. 
C. JURY SELECTION 
 
13
The defendant assigns error to the circuit court’s 
failure to strike three prospective jurors for cause.  An 
accused has a constitutional right to be tried by an 
impartial jury.  See U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; Va. 
Const. art. I, § 8.  By statute, a trial court is required 
to excuse any prospective juror who cannot “stand 
indifferent in the cause.”  Code § 8.01-358.  However, 
[b]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, 
which we lack, to observe and evaluate the 
apparent sincerity, conscientiousness, 
intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors 
first hand, the trial court’s exercise of 
judicial discretion in deciding challenges for 
cause will be not disturbed on appeal, unless 
manifest error appears in the record. 
 
Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 123-24, 360 S.E.2d 352, 
358 (1987) (citing Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 
258-59, 307 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983)); accord Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 191, 563 S.E.2d 695, 709 (2002); 
Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115-16, 546 S.E.2d 446, 
451 (2001); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 234, 427 
S.E.2d 394, 402 (1993).  Thus, on appellate review, we 
defer to the trial court’s decision whether to retain or 
exclude prospective jurors.  Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999).  Guided by these 
principles, we will now review the voir dire of the three 
jurors that the defendant claims should have been struck 
 
14
for cause.  In doing so, we consider the prospective 
juror’s entire voir dire, not just isolated portions.  Id.; 
Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 252, 372 S.E.2d 759, 
767 (1988). 
(1) Juror Reinsberg 
The defendant moved the circuit court to excuse this 
prospective juror because, among other reasons, she 
indicated at one point during her voir dire that she would 
probably require the defense to put on evidence during the 
trial.  However, her overall responses to voir dire 
questions relevant to this particular issue reveal that she 
could “stand indifferent to the cause” and would not 
require the defendant to present evidence to establish his 
innocence: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Do you have any feelings 
about the case from what you have read in the 
Gazette or from what you may have read in the 
Daily Press earlier? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  The seriousness of it. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Other than the seriousness? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  The charges. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Would you require the defense 
to put on evidence to change your mind or 
influence your decision considering what you have 
read? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Probably. 
 
THE COURT:  Let me ask, what do you mean by that? 
 
15
MS. REINSBERG:  From what we have read, I don’t 
know, I was thinking the newspaper — 
 
THE COURT:  Is accurate? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Is accurate, so I would — I would 
want to know, it was accurate or inaccurate.  
Sometimes certain parts can be made up.  That 
shouldn’t be. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  May I go on? 
Considering that response, have you formed an 
opinion of some sort as to the guilt or innocence 
of the Defendant if you are going to require us 
to put on evidence? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  No. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That’s based on what you have 
seen or read? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  (Nods head.)  Just the one 
article. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Have you formed an opinion on 
what you have heard, the facts of what you have 
read, have you formed an opinion as to what 
punishment Mr. Jackson should receive as a result 
of what you — 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  No. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You said that you would 
probably require us to put on some evidence.  
Tell us what you would be looking for from the 
defense. 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Well, were there other people 
involved, for one. 
 
* * * 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Judge, just a couple 
[of] follow-up questions if I may. 
 
Ms. Reinsberg, one of the questions [defense 
counsel] asked you involved a response in which 
you said you would want to hear if other people 
 
16
were involved.  Understanding that you read the 
newspaper, correct? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Right. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  That was Saturday’s 
Gazette? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Right. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Are you willing to 
put aside any opinions or thoughts you have 
regarding that newspaper article and judge this 
case based on the facts presented during the 
course of the trial? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Definitely. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  And are you going to 
hold the Commonwealth; that is, myself and Mr. 
McGinty, in our case to the proper burden of we 
have to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Uh-huh. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  And you understand 
that at sentencing, if the jury has convicted the 
Defendant of capital murder, that the burden is 
on us to prove certain things beyond a reasonable 
doubt — 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Right. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: — before you can 
impose the death penalty? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Right, I understand. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Are you open-minded 
to both the death penalty and life in prison? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Definitely. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Do you agree with the 
concept that the Defendant does not have to 
present any evidence at trial? 
MS. REINSBERG:  Right. 
 
17
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  In fact, the 
Defendant doesn’t have to present any evidence at 
sentencing? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Right. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]:  Are you willing to 
follow that principle of law? 
 
MS. REINSBERG:  Yes. 
 
 
The voir dire of prospective juror Reinsburg 
demonstrates that the circuit court correctly concluded 
that this juror understood both the Commonwealth’s burden 
of proof and the fact that the defendant did not have to 
present any evidence.  As we have previously stated, “[t]he 
real test is whether jurors can disabuse their minds of 
their natural curiosity and decide the case on the evidence 
submitted and the law as propounded in the court’s 
instructions.”  Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 329, 
362 S.E.2d 650, 662 (1987); accord Eaton v. Commonwealth, 
240 Va. 236, 247, 397 S.E.2d 385, 392 (1990).  Prospective 
juror Reinsberg satisfied this test.  Thus, we find no 
manifest error in the circuit court’s decision refusing to 
strike this juror for cause. 
(2) Juror Baffer 
 
 
Relying on the following series of questions, Jackson 
claims that the circuit court erred in refusing to strike 
prospective juror Baffer for cause: 
 
18
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]:  Do you hold the belief that 
death is the appropriate punishment for a person 
who commits a murder, rape and/or robbery unless 
he can convince you otherwise? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  Yes. 
 
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]:  Why is that? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  Because I believe in the State of 
Virginia, the Penal Code in the — it’s 
prescribed. 
 
* * * 
 
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]:  You were asked an 
“automatic” question by the Commonwealth.  Would 
you automatically vote to impose the death 
penalty on a person you determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt constituted a continuing serious 
threat to society? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  Yes. 
 
This isolated portion of juror Baffer’s voir dire is 
misleading because this prospective juror, when asked by 
the Commonwealth whether he would automatically impose the 
death penalty if the defendant were found guilty of capital 
murder, answered “No.”  The circuit court then engaged in 
the following exchange with prospective juror Baffer: 
THE COURT:  Mr. Baffer, let me ask you one 
question.  [Defense counsel] asked you a 
question.  He said that if you found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a consideration of the 
Defendant’s history and background there is a 
probability that he would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing 
serious threat to society, he asked you if you 
found that, would you always vote to impose the 
death penalty, and you said yes.  Is that your 
understanding of what the law in Virginia is? 
 
19
 
MR. BAFFER:  I’m not sure what the law of 
Virginia is on that.  You said automatically 
impose the death penalty? 
 
THE COURT:  If you found — you convicted the 
Defendant of capital murder and then you made a 
second finding, go to the second phase where 
evidence is presented regarding the possible 
sentence.  You have two possible sentences, life 
in prison or death, and the Court would instruct 
you that before you could impose the death 
penalty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that after consideration of the Defendant’s 
history and background, there is a probability 
that he would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing serious threat 
to society, you made that finding, is it your 
understanding that you must then impose the death 
penalty? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  I don’t know that I must impose.  I 
mean, get him out of society.  Life without 
parole removes him from society. 
 
THE COURT:  That’s correct. 
 
MR. BAFFER:  If he would pose a danger, that 
would be adequate that he doesn’t come back into 
society. 
 
THE COURT:  What would be adequate, life without 
parole? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  That would be adequate too, life 
without parole. 
 
THE COURT:  The question [defense counsel] asked 
you is if you found that this future danger 
existed, would you automatically vote to impose 
the death penalty? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  No, I would say no to that, if the 
alternative is he got life without parole, that 
would be adequate. 
 
 
20
THE COURT:  Well, that is your alternative.  You 
only have two choices.  If the Defendant is found 
guilty of capital murder, you have two choices:  
One is the death sentence; the other is life in 
prison without parole.  They are your only two 
options, and if you were to find the Defendant 
guilty of capital murder, and if you found the 
condition of future dangerousness existed, could 
you consider both? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  I could consider both. 
 
THE COURT:  Would you automatically impose the 
death penalty if you found future dangerousness 
existed? 
 
MR. BAFFER:  No, if he was removed from society. 
 
As stated previously, we must consider this juror’s 
entire voir dire.  See Vinson, 258 Va. at 467, 522 S.E.2d 
at 176.  Upon doing so, it is clear that, while prospective 
juror Baffer stated at one point, in response to confusing 
questions by defense counsel, that he would automatically 
impose the death penalty, he subsequently clarified his 
position and stated that he would follow the court’s 
instructions and consider both sentencing alternatives.  We 
have held that it is improper to ask prospective jurors 
speculative questions regarding whether they would 
automatically impose the death penalty in certain 
hypothetical situations without reference to a juror’s 
ability to consider the evidence and follow the court’s 
instructions.  Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 141, 
 
21
547 S.E.2d 186, 196 (2001).  Thus, we conclude that the 
circuit court ruled properly in seating this juror. 
(3) Juror Berube 
Jackson moved to strike prospective juror Berube on 
the basis that she answered “No” to one question asking 
whether she would be able to consider all mitigating 
factors in making her decision whether to impose a life 
sentence without parole or the death penalty.  However, the 
answer to this one isolated question does not accurately 
portray this juror’s positive assertions during voir dire 
that she would follow the court’s instructions and consider 
all mitigating evidence when making her sentencing 
decision.  Furthermore, when overruling the defendant’s 
motion to strike this juror, the circuit court noted that 
juror Berube had given careful thought to her answers and 
that she did not initially understand what mitigating 
factors are.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not err in finding that this juror would be fair and 
impartial. 
D. JUROR MISCONDUCT 
During a recess on the third day of trial, the jurors 
asked whether they could discuss among themselves the 
evidence and testimony that had already been presented.  
The parties and the circuit court agreed that the jurors 
 
22
should not do so until after the close of all the evidence 
and the jury’s deliberations began.  When the jury returned 
to the courtroom after the recess, the court instructed the 
jurors that they should deliberate and discuss the evidence 
only after all the evidence had been introduced.  The court 
further admonished the jurors to keep an open mind and to 
refrain from deciding any issue until the case was 
submitted to them for their deliberations. 
The defendant did not object to those instructions or 
ask for a mistrial at that time.  Thus, to the extent that 
Jackson now argues that the court should have granted a 
mistrial as soon as it learned of the jury’s question, 
which suggested, in Jackson’s view, that the jury had 
already been discussing the case, such a claim was not 
preserved for appeal.  See Rule 5:25. 
Jackson filed a post-trial motion for a new trial 
and/or an evidentiary hearing based on allegations that the 
jury had discussed his guilt or innocence prior to the 
close of all the evidence.  In support of the motion, the 
defendant submitted an affidavit from alternate juror 
Picataggi.  In the affidavit, Picataggi stated that she had 
“witnessed and heard discussion of this case, and its 
outcome, among the jurors before the close of evidence and 
in direct violation of the instructions of the court.” 
 
23
At a hearing on Jackson’s motion, defense counsel 
advised the court that he had contacted all the jurors 
after the conclusion of the trial because of his concerns 
about the jury’s question on the third day of trial.  
Counsel also told the court that this alternate juror 
agreed to speak with him but that many of the jurors would 
not do so or stated that such alleged discussions among the 
jurors did not occur before the close of the evidence.  
Defense counsel asked the court to summons all the jurors 
to an evidentiary hearing and to question them individually 
about what, if any, discussions occurred before the jury 
retired to deliberate.  The court decided to summons only 
alternate juror Picataggi to a hearing for the purpose of 
questioning her about the allegations stated in her 
affidavit. 
At that hearing, Picataggi explained, in response to 
questions from the court, that she had heard three 
discussions, two in the jury room and one at a local 
restaurant where the jury had gone for lunch.  She 
acknowledged that no third person, such as the restaurant 
owner or a waitress, participated in any of those 
discussions, either by comments to the jury or by comments 
from any of the jurors.  Picataggi could not recall whether 
any discussions ensued after the jurors asked the court 
 
24
during a recess whether they could discuss the evidence 
they had already heard. 
Picataggi also could not remember exact words used, 
but she described 
a discussion in regard to the testimony of the 
detective and [the defense counsel’s] questioning 
him in regard to the videotape and that was 
discussed among the jurors in that — well, they 
didn’t particularly like the way that he was 
questioning the detective, but that ultimately he 
got to the truth or to the bottom of it. 
 
However, she admitted that at no time did any juror come to 
a conclusion about Jackson’s guilt or innocence.  During 
cross-examination by the defendant, Picataggi indicated 
that the discussions concerned things that had happened in 
the courtroom and matters that had been presented there, 
and were not necessarily limited to comments about the 
lawyers’ styles of questioning. 
After hearing Picataggi’s testimony, the circuit court 
denied the defendant’s motion for further investigation and 
for a new trial.  The court concluded that the jurors’ 
comments addressed the cross-examination of investigator 
Peterson and defense counsel’s techniques of attacking that 
witness’s credibility.  The court found “no probable 
misconduct and clearly no prejudice” to the defendant. 
On appeal, Jackson argues that the evidence of jurors’ 
discussions “establishes a probability of prejudice and 
 
25
brings into question the fairness of the trial.”  The 
defendant also asserts that the comment that “he got to the 
truth or to the bottom of it” went to the issue of guilt or 
innocence.  At a minimum, the circuit court, according to 
Jackson, should have conducted an evidentiary hearing at 
which all the jurors should have been questioned.  We do 
not agree with the defendant’s position. 
In Virginia, we strictly adhere “ ‘to the general rule 
that the testimony of jurors should not be received to 
impeach their verdict, especially on the ground of their 
own misconduct.’ ”  Jenkins, 244 Va. at 460, 423 S.E.2d at  
370 (quoting Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Hulvey, 233 Va. 77, 
82, 353 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1987)).  We have also generally 
“ ‘limited findings of prejudicial juror misconduct to 
activities of jurors that occur outside the jury room.’”  
Id.  (quoting Caterpillar Tractor Co., 233 Va. at 83, 353 
S.E.2d at 751.)  For example, in Haddad v. Commonwealth, 
229 Va. 325, 330-331, 329 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1985), evidence 
showing juror misconduct in the form of expressing an 
opinion to third persons during trial proceedings was 
sufficient to establish a probability of prejudice to the 
accused. 
Applying this same probability of prejudice standard, 
we find that Jackson failed to carry his burden to 
 
26
establish such prejudice.  See id.  Upon reviewing 
Picataggi’s affidavit, the circuit court properly convened 
an evidentiary hearing to investigate further her 
allegations of juror misconduct.  See Kearns v. Hall, 197 
Va. 736, 743, 91 S.E.2d 648, 653 (1956) (when allegations 
of jury misconduct are sufficient to indicate the verdict 
was affected thereby, a trial court has a duty to 
investigate and determine whether, as a matter of fact, the 
jury did engage in misconduct).  The evidence presented at 
that hearing amply supported the court’s conclusions that 
there was probably no misconduct and clearly no prejudice 
to the defendant. 
At best, Picataggi could only recall juror discussions 
regarding defense counsel’s techniques of cross-examination 
and the comment “he . . . got to the bottom of it.”  She 
could not remember any other specific comments by the 
jurors, or whether any juror discussions about the evidence 
transpired after the court instructed them not to do so in 
response to the jury’s question.  And, Picataggi admitted 
that no juror expressed an opinion about Jackson’s guilt or 
innocence.  That fact distinguishes this case from Haddad. 
Thus, we conclude that neither a new trial nor any 
further investigation by the circuit court was warranted.  
We said many years ago that “[i]f gossip of [jurors] among 
 
27
themselves, or surmise, is to be the basis of new trials 
there would be no end to litigation.”  Margiotta v. Aycock, 
162 Va. 557, 568, 174 S.E. 831, 835 (1934).  That statement 
remains true today. 
E. VIDEO-TAPED CONFESSION AND TRANSCRIPT 
Jackson asserts that the circuit court erred in 
allowing the jury to use a transcript of his video-taped 
confession while the video was played during the trial, in 
overruling his motion for a mistrial because of problems 
that occurred while watching the video tape and using the 
transcript, and in allowing the jury to review the video-
taped confession during their deliberations.  We find no 
merit to any of these claims. 
The circuit court directed that a transcript of the 
video tape be prepared because portions of the video tape 
were inaudible and the court concluded that it would be 
helpful for the jurors to have the transcript while they 
were viewing the video tape.  At trial, Jackson claimed the 
transcript was not accurate and thus objected to the jury’s 
use of it.  The circuit court disagreed and found that the 
transcript was as accurate as it could be and that it was 
incomplete because some portions of the video tape were 
inaudible. 
 
28
Before the jurors watched the video tape, the court 
instructed them that the transcript was “merely a guide 
. . . [and was] not evidence.”  The court further 
instructed that the evidence was the tape itself and the 
audio portion of it, and that the transcript would be 
retrieved after the video tape was played and could not be 
taken into the jury room during deliberations.  Finally, 
the court told the jury that, although there would be 
places in the transcript stating that the video tape was 
inaudible, it was, nevertheless, the jury’s “responsibility 
to listen to the tape and determine what, in fact, [was] 
being said.”  The court reminded the jurors of these 
instructions when they finished viewing the video tape. 
“A court may, in its discretion, permit the jury to 
refer to a transcript, the accuracy of which is 
established, as an aid to understanding a recording.”  
Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 413, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 
(1988); accord Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 330, 541 
S.E.2d 872, 888 (2001).  Although Jackson argues on appeal 
that the transcript was inaccurate, he points only to the 
fact that some words were missing because the video tape 
was inaudible at certain points, that the transcript was 
incorrectly paginated, and that one page was missing.  
However, those problems did not render the transcript 
 
29
inaccurate.  In light of the lengthy instructions that the 
circuit court gave the jurors regarding the purpose of the 
transcript and their use of it, we are persuaded that the 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to 
use the transcript of the defendant’s video-taped 
confession.  See id. (trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing jury to use transcript that was not 
complete). 
During the playing of the video tape, it was 
discovered that the pages in one juror’s transcript were 
partially out of order.  After that problem was corrected, 
the court directed the Commonwealth to rewind the video 
tape approximately two minutes.  Subsequently, it was 
discovered that the jurors’ transcripts were missing one 
page.  Playing of the video tape was momentarily stopped 
while that problem was corrected.  Because of these 
problems and Jackson’s assertion that the jurors rarely 
looked up from the transcript and thus did not watch the 
video tape, he moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of 
the playing of his video-taped confession.  The circuit 
court overruled the motion, finding that the jurors had 
paid close attention to both the video tape and the 
transcript.  The court also noted that the amount of the 
video tape that was replayed was minimal and that all the 
 
30
problems with the transcripts were quickly corrected.  The 
court did not err in overruling the motion for a mistrial. 
Finally, Jackson claims that undue emphasis was placed 
on his confession and investigator Peterson’s testimony 
regarding his interrogation of the defendant because the 
jury was allowed to take the video tape into the jury room 
during deliberations.  However, Code § 8.01-381 provides 
that “[e]xhibits may, by leave of court, be” carried into 
the jury room.  “Exhibits requested by the jury shall be 
sent to the jury room or may otherwise be made available to 
the jury.”  Id.  Thus, any exhibit introduced into 
evidence, including a defendant’s written or recorded 
statement, is available to jurors during their 
deliberations.  See Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 
82, 90, 428 S.E.2d 16, 23 (1993).  That jurors may put 
emphasis on certain evidence, perhaps a particular exhibit 
or testimony of a certain witness, is simply part of what 
they do when weighing and considering the evidence.  Id.  
Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
the jury to take the video tape into the jury room during 
deliberations. 
F. PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
Jackson first challenges the circuit court’s ruling 
allowing the Commonwealth to use an “in-life” photograph of 
 
31
the victim.  Mrs. Phillips’ son identified the photograph 
during his direct examination,6 and the Commonwealth 
displayed the photograph during its closing argument in the 
guilt phase of the trial for approximately seven seconds.  
The court did not allow the jury to take the photograph 
into the jury room.  The defendant claims that the 
photograph had no probative value and was used to arouse 
the sympathies of the jury. 
 
We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the use of the “in-life” photograph 
of Mrs. Phillips.  See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 
448, 471, 374 S.E.2d 303, 317 (1988) (no abuse of trial 
court’s discretion to admit photograph showing victim one 
month before she died).  The photograph was displayed only 
twice for brief periods of time.  Additionally, the 
photograph was not given to the jury or taken into the jury 
room during deliberations. 
 
The defendant also claims that the circuit court erred 
in admitting into evidence photographs of Mrs. Phillips 
taken during the autopsy.  He specifically challenges the 
admission of duplicate photographs of Mrs. Phillips’ face 
                     
6 The circuit court noted for the record that the “in-
life” photograph of Mrs. Phillips was displayed in the 
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief for approximately 15 to 20 
seconds but that it was not passed to the jury. 
 
32
and an enlarged photograph of her vaginal area.  The 
defendant asserts that any probative value of these 
photographs was outweighed by their prejudicial and 
inflammatory effect upon the jury. 
 
Although Jackson does not identify the challenged 
photographs by exhibit number, we assume that he is 
complaining about two photographs of Mrs. Phillips’ face, 
Commonwealth Exhibit Numbers 47 and 48; and the enlarged 
photograph of her vaginal area, Commonwealth Exhibit Number 
51.  These are the photographs to which the defendant 
objected at trial.  The Commonwealth introduced each of 
these during the medical examiner’s testimony.  Number 47 
depicted the front of Mrs. Phillips’ face, and number 48 
was a side view.  Number 51 showed a laceration in the rear 
portion of her vaginal area.  Each photograph depicted 
different injuries suffered by Mrs. Phillips. 
 
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the 
two facial photographs were “not shocking” or “gruesome” 
and that Number 51 was simply “part of the facts of this 
particular case.”  Thus, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting these photographs.  The photographs 
were relevant to the issues of premeditation, intent, and 
malice.  See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 342, 356 
S.E.2d 157, 173 (1987); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 
 
33
124, 144, 314 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1984).  And, contrary to the 
defendant’s argument, any prejudicial effect of the 
photographs did not outweigh their probative value. 
G. USE OF PILLOW FOR DEMONSTRATIVE PURPOSES 
 
During closing argument, the Commonwealth used a 
pillow to demonstrate the length of time that Jackson held 
the pillow over Mrs. Phillips’ face.  The Commonwealth 
asked the jury how such an act could not be indicative of a 
specific intent to kill.  The defendant objected on the 
basis that the Commonwealth was not using the actual pillow 
found at the crime scene and that the demonstration would 
incite and inflame the jury.  The circuit court overruled 
the objection but directed the Commonwealth to tell the 
jury that the pillow was “not the actual size and shape of 
the pillow used” to suffocate Mrs. Phillips and that the 
Commonwealth was using a pillow only for demonstrative 
purposes. 
“Admission of items of demonstrative evidence to 
illustrate testimonial evidence is . . . a matter within 
the sound discretion of a trial court.”  Mackall, 236 Va. 
at 254, 372 S.E.2d at 768.  We conclude that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion.  As directed by the 
court, the Commonwealth instructed the jury that the pillow 
was not the actual pillow found at the crime scene and that 
 
34
it was being used for demonstrative purposes.  Furthermore, 
the court also told the jury that the pillow was not the 
one found on Mrs. Phillips’ bed.  Finally, the 
Commonwealth’s demonstration did not distort the evidence 
concerning the manner of Mrs. Phillips’ death. 
H. AUTOPSY REPORT 
Jackson asserts that the circuit court erred in 
admitting the autopsy report into evidence and allowing 
that report to be given to the jury.  When the defendant 
objected to the introduction of the report, the court 
indicated that it would redact any opinion expressed by the 
medical examiner in the report.  Although Jackson asserts 
on brief that the report was admitted into evidence during 
the medical examiner’s testimony, that factual statement is 
not accurate.  The defendant cross-examined the medical 
examiner about his report, but at no point during his 
testimony was the autopsy report admitted into evidence.  
The report is not marked as an exhibit and is only stamped 
as having been filed in both the General District Court and 
the Circuit Court of the City of Williamsburg and County of 
James City. 
Although Code § 19.2-188 provides that “[r]eports of 
investigations made by the Chief Medical Examiner, his 
assistants or medical examiners . . . shall be received as 
 
35
evidence in any court or other proceeding,” the autopsy 
report concerning Mrs. Phillips was not admitted into 
evidence in this case.  Thus, this claim has no merit.7   
I. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
 
Jackson moved to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as 
to guilt on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove that he possessed the willful, premeditated, and 
deliberate intent to kill Mrs. Phillips.  The defendant 
asserts that his testimony showed that the death of Mrs. 
Phillips was accidental and not premeditated.  We do not 
agree. 
 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 
appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prevailing party at trial, in this case the 
Commonwealth, and accord to it all reasonable inferences 
fairly deducible therefrom.  Commonwealth v. Bower, 264 Va. 
41, 43, 563 S.E.2d 736, 737 (2002); Higginbotham v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).  
We are obliged to affirm the judgment of the circuit court 
unless that judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence 
to support it.  Code § 8.01-680; Beavers v. Commonwealth, 
                     
7 In Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 630, 292 
S.E.2d 798, 806-07 (1982), we held that the Commonwealth 
was not required to elect between introducing an autopsy 
report or a medical examiner’s testimony. 
 
36
245 Va. 268, 282, 427 S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993).  When proof 
of premeditation is the subject of a sufficiency challenge, 
evidence showing that the premeditation was only slight or 
momentary is sufficient to sustain the conviction.  Id.  
This is so because “[p]remeditation is an intent to kill 
that needs to exist only for a moment.”  Green v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 104, 580 S.E.2d 834, 847 (2003) 
(citing Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 295, 302 
S.E.2d 520, 524 (1983)).  The question of premeditation is 
generally a factual issue.  Id.
 
Despite Jackson’s self-serving testimony that he did 
not smother Mrs. Phillips with a pillow and told Jasper 
Meekins to stop doing so, the jury could have concluded, 
based on the defendant’s confession, that he placed a 
pillow over Mrs. Phillips face and held it there for four 
to six minutes even though she would have become 
unconscious within 15 to 30 seconds.  That evidence is 
sufficient to show that the defendant had a willful, 
premeditated, and deliberate intent to kill Mrs. Phillips.  
See id.  Thus, we will not reverse the jury’s finding of 
premeditation. 
J. TESTIMONY FROM VICTIM’S SON 
Jackson claims that the circuit court abused its 
discretion by allowing Mrs. Phillips’ son to testify during 
 
37
the sentencing phase of the trial because he remained in 
the courtroom after he testified during the guilt phase in 
violation of the court’s order sequestering the witnesses.  
According to the defendant, the son’s presence in the 
courtroom throughout the trial unduly influenced the jury.  
We do not agree. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 19.2-265.01, a 
victim, which includes Mrs. Phillips’ son, see Code § 19.2-
11.01(B), “may remain in the courtroom and shall not be 
excluded unless the court determines, in its discretion, 
the presence of the victim would impair the conduct of a 
fair trial.”  We cannot say in this case that the court 
abused its discretion by allowing Mrs. Phillips’ son to 
remain in the courtroom after he testified during the guilt 
phase of the trial.  The court correctly concluded that 
Mrs. Phillips’ son did not learn anything while he was 
present in the court that would have changed or affected 
his victim impact testimony during the penalty phase.  
Thus, the defendant was not prejudiced by the fact that 
Mrs. Phillips’ son testified during the penalty phase after 
having heard much of the testimony during the guilt phase.  
See Bennett, 236 Va. at 465, 374 S.E.2d at 314 (a trial 
court has discretion to decide whether a witness who 
violates an order excluding witnesses from the courtroom 
 
38
can testify, and prejudice to the defendant is one factor 
to consider when answering that question). 
K. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
In assigning error to the circuit court’s denial of 
the defendant’s pretrial motion challenging the 
constitutionality of Virginia’s capital murder statutes, 
Jackson presents several reasons why he contends that the 
death penalty on its face and as applied violates the Sixth 
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as 
Article I, §§ 8, 9, and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia.  
We have previously rejected these arguments and find no 
reason to depart from our precedent. 
 
(1) The aggravating factor of future dangerousness is 
unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide 
meaningful guidance to the sentencing jury so as to avoid 
an arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty 
− rejected in Bell, 264 Va. at 203, 563 S.E.2d at 716; 
Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 508, 537 S.E.2d 866, 
874 (2000); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 476-78, 248 
S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978). 
 
(2) Virginia’s capital murder statutes do not require 
instructions to the jury regarding the duty to consider 
mitigating evidence, the meaning of mitigating evidence, 
 
39
the absence of any burden of proof on a defendant with 
regard to the mitigation evidence presented, and the 
liberty that each juror has to consider and give effect to 
mitigating evidence − rejected in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 
U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998); Lovitt, 260 Va. at 508, 537 S.E.2d 
at 874; Mickens v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 315, 320, 478 
S.E.2d 302, 305 (1996); Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 
82-83, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1995). 
 
(3) The use of unadjudicated conduct to prove the 
aggravating factor of future dangerousness fails to comport 
with the constitutional requirement of reliability for 
capital sentencing − rejected in Bell, 264 Va. at 203, 563 
S.E.2d at 716; Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 228, 
421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 192, 210, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206 (1991). 
 
(4) A sentence of death under Code § 19.2-264.5 is 
unconstitutional because a trial court may consider hearsay 
evidence contained in a post-sentence report − rejected in 
Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 459, 544 S.E.2d 299, 
303-04 (2001); Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 299-
300, 513 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1999). 
 
(5) A sentence of death under Code 19.2-264.5 is 
unconstitutional because a trial court is not required to 
 
40
set aside a death penalty upon a showing of good cause - 
rejected in Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 276, 455 
S.E.2d 219, 223 (1995); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 
76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76 (1994). 
 
(6) Virginia’s death penalty statutes do not provide 
for meaningful appellate review, including the 
proportionality review − rejected in Emmett v. Commonwealth, 
264 Va. 364, 374-75, 569 S.E.2d 39, 46  (2002); Lenz, 261 
Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 304; Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 723, 740-42, 529 S.E.2d 570, 580-81 (2000); Satcher, 
244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 826. 
 
(7) The expedited review of death penalty cases is 
unconstitutional − rejected in Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 
264 Va. 386, 398, 569 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2002). 
L. ISSUES WAIVED 
At oral argument, the defendant indicated that he was 
withdrawing assignment of error number 8, that the circuit 
court “erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 
capital murder indictment for failure to allege aggravating 
elements.”  In response to questions from the Court, he 
also acknowledged that he was no longer asking the Court to 
reverse his conviction on the basis that the circuit court 
erred by failing to grant a change in venue, as asserted in 
assignment of error number 7.  Specifically, defense 
 
41
counsel stated, “We could [seat] a jury. . . .  So to say 
that venue alone is not what I am seeking in this case for 
an error.”  Thus, we will not consider these two 
assignments of error. 
Next, we note that the defendant did not brief 
assignment of error number 20, that the circuit court 
“erred in allowing the prosecutor in his argument during 
the penalty phase to argue matters beyond those introduced 
during that phase of the case.”  In accordance with our 
precedent, we will not consider this assigned error.  See 
Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 207, 576 S.E.2d 471, 
479 (2003); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 413, 508 
S.E.2d 57, 60 (1998). 
III. STATUTORY REVIEW 
A. PASSION AND PREJUDICE 
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 17.1-313(C), we 
are required to determine whether the defendant’s sentence 
of death was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.  On this issue, 
Jackson claims that the jury’s verdict fixing his 
punishment at death was the result of passion and prejudice 
because the circuit court failed to grant a change of venue 
and because the court did not strike prospective jurors 
Reinsberg, Baffer, and Berube for cause.  As already noted, 
 
42
we rejected the substantive issue regarding those three 
jurors and did not address the change of venue question 
because the defendant withdrew it as a substantive basis 
for a reversal of his conviction.  We nonetheless have 
examined both of these issues to ascertain whether they 
created an atmosphere of passion and prejudice that 
influenced the jury’s sentencing decision.  We conclude 
that they did not do so.8  We also find no other indication 
that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence 
of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. 
B. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW 
We are also required to determine whether the sentence 
of death in this case is “excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the 
crime and the defendant.”  Code § 17.1-313(C)(2).  To 
comply with this statutory directive, we compare this case 
with “similar cases” by focusing on instances where the 
victim was murdered during the commission of robbery or 
rape and the death penalty was imposed based upon the 
future dangerousness aggravating factor.  The purpose of 
                     
8 We note that a jury was seated with relative ease in 
this case.  See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 231, 
559 S.E.2d 652, 660 (2002) (“The ease with which an 
impartial jury can be selected is a critical element in 
determining whether the prejudice in the community stemming 
 
43
our proportionality review is to identify and invalidate 
the aberrant death sentence.  See Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999). 
Our review in this case leads to the conclusion that 
the defendant’s sentence of death is not excessive or 
disproportionate to sentences generally imposed in this 
Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to Jackson’s 
murder of Mrs. Phillips.  Although we consider all capital 
murder cases presented to this Court for review, see Burns, 
261 Va. at 345, 541 S.E.2d at 896-97; Whitley v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 81-82, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171 
(1982), we cite the following cases as examples: Roach v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 468 S.E.2d 98 (1996); Beavers, 
245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d 411;  Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 
Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254, (1991); O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 
234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).  With regard to the 
proportionality analysis, the imposition of the death 
penalty in Beavers is particularly persuasive because of 
the striking similarity between the facts in that case and 
those presented here.  Both cases involved elderly women 
who were raped by their assailant and smothered with a 
pillow. 
                                                             
from pretrial publicity is so wide-spread that the 
defendant cannot get a fair trial in that venue.”) 
 
44
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we find no error in the 
judgments of the circuit court or in the imposition of the 
death penalty.  We also see no reason to commute the 
sentence of death in this case.  Therefore, we will affirm 
the judgments of the circuit court. 
Record No. 031517 − Affirmed. 
Record No. 031518 − Affirmed. 
 
45