Title: Williams v. Staples
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95873
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2004

Docket No. 95873-Agenda 13-November 2003.
PAUL WILLIAMS, Appellee, v. NANCY STAPLES, Hospital Adm'r
of the Elgin Mental Health Center, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Paul Williams, plaintiff in the proceedings below and defendant in the
original criminal proceedings, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to section 10-124 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2000)). Williams' petition
alleged that he was in the custody of the Department of Human Services
(DHS) in Elgin, Illinois, and that his detention was illegal because his
maximum period of confinement under section 5-2-4(b) of the Unified
Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000))
had expired. The circuit court denied Williams' petition for writ of habeas
corpus and remanded Williams to the custody of the DHS. The appellate
court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the cause to the
circuit court for a determination concerning whether Williams should be
civilly committed. 337 Ill. App. 3d 445. This court allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the following
reasons, we affirm the decision of the appellate court in part and vacate
in part.
	In the original criminal proceedings, Williams was charged with first
degree murder for killing and dismembering his sister. At the time of the
murder, Williams was abusing narcotics. On December 19, 1982, the trial
court found Williams not guilty by reason of insanity. Williams was
involuntarily committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities (now the DHS), and was confined
to the Elgin Mental Health Center (Elgin). Williams was involuntarily
committed pursuant to section 5-2-4(b) of the Code.
	Section 5-2-4(b) provides that the maximum period of time that a
defendant can be involuntarily committed cannot exceed the maximum
length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve, less
credit for good behavior, before becoming eligible for parole had
defendant been convicted of and received the maximum sentence for the
most serious crime for which he was found not guilty by reason of insanity.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000), formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981,
ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4(b). This maximum length of time is known as the
defendant's Thiem date. See People v. Thiem, 82 Ill. App. 3d 956
(1980). In this case, the circuit court originally determined that Williams'
maximum period of commitment was 80 years. Based upon subsequent
case law, however, the trial court on December 8, 2000, reset Williams'
Thiem date to September 26, 2001.
	Also on December 8, 2000, the trial court granted the petition of the
Elgin facility director to conditionally release defendant for a period of five
years, pursuant to section 5-2-4(d)(2) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/5-2-4(d)(2) (West 2000)), over Williams' objection to the five-year
period. Sometime after September 26, 2001, but prior to the expiration
of the five-year conditional release period, Williams violated the terms of
his conditional release by preliminarily testing positive for cocaine. The
State therefore filed a petition to revoke Williams' conditional release.
Williams filed a special and limited appearance contesting the circuit
court's jurisdiction and seeking to dismiss the State's petition to revoke
his conditional release. Thereafter, Williams again tested positive for
cocaine. The circuit court then issued a contempt citation and issued a
warrant for Williams' arrest. Williams was arrested around four days later.
	At the hearing on the contempt citation, Williams argued that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction over him because his Thiem date had
expired. The circuit court held that even though the Thiem date had
expired, the conditional release period provided jurisdiction. The circuit
court entered a finding that Williams had violated his conditional release
and remanded Williams to the custody of the DHS for an evaluation of
whether he required involuntary commitment. The circuit court did not
enter a finding on the contempt citation. Over Williams' continuing
objection to the court's jurisdiction, Williams was evaluated and found to
be subject to inpatient treatment, but not to involuntary commitment.(1)
Williams then filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
	As noted, the circuit court denied Williams' petition for writ of
habeas corpus. On appeal, Williams claimed that he was entitled to an
immediate release because the circuit court could not continue to confine
him past September 26, 2001, his Thiem date. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 450.
Williams also argued that neither his conditional release nor his alleged
violation of the conditional release could extend his maximum period of
commitment beyond his Thiem date. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 450. The State,
on behalf of Nancy Staples, hospital administrator of the Elgin Mental
Health Center,(2) responded that once a defendant is conditionally released,
the five-year period of conditional release set forth in section
5-2-4(a)(1)(D) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000))
supercedes the defendant's Thiem date.
	In reversing the circuit court, the appellate court found that the circuit
court lost jurisdiction over Williams on September 26, 2001, when his
Thiem date expired. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 460. The appellate court
examined the legislature history of the statute and concluded that the
legislature did not intend for the five-year conditional release period to
extend a court's jurisdiction over a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)
defendant past his Thiem date. The appellate court held that although an
NGRI defendant may be conditionally released prior to his Thiem date,
the five-year period of conditional release may be limited by the amount
of time remaining on his Thiem date. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 460.
Consequently, once an NGRI defendant's "Thiem date has expired, his
or her period of conditional release must necessarily expire as well." 337
Ill. App. 3d at 460.
	Before this court, the State argues that the appellate court erred in
holding that an NGRI defendant's conditional release automatically
terminates on his Thiem date. The State claims that the appellate court
ignored the mandate of section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D) of the Code, which states
that the trial court "shall" place an NGRI defendant on conditional release
for a period of five years. The State contends that because Williams was
conditionally released under section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D) prior to his Thiem
date, Williams' Thiem date became irrelevant because he was no longer
confined. Rather, Williams was now subject to a five-year period of
conditional release, with the possibility of one three-year extension. The
State compares this conditional release period to the mandatory
supervised release period, or parole, imposed upon convicted defendants.
	Williams responds that after the expiration of his Thiem date, he
could no longer be confined as an NGRI defendant, but had to be
released or committed pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq.
(West 2000)). Williams argues that because the Thiem date is the outside
limit for his period of confinement, the conditional release period cannot
extend beyond his Thiem date.
	At issue in this case, then, is which portion of section 5-2-4 of the
Code controls when an NGRI defendant is conditionally released prior to
his Thiem date, but his Thiem date expires prior to the expiration of his
conditional release period. Because our analysis of this issue involves the
construction of a statute, the issue presents a question of law that we
review de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).
	The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v.
County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). This court determines
legislative intent by examining the language of the statute, which is "the
most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting a
particular law." Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. All
provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a whole. People ex rel.
Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (2003). Accordingly, words and
phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the
statute and must not be construed in isolation. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d  at 279-80. Each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given reasonable
meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d  at 280. In determining the intent of the legislature, a court may
consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and
necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to
be achieved. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d  at 280. "Legislative intent can be
ascertained from a consideration of the entire Act, its nature, its object and
the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the
other." Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96
(1990).
	The relevant provisions of the Code are as follows. Section 5-2-4
(b) provides, in pertinent part:
			"If the Court finds the defendant subject to involuntary
admission *** the initial order for admission of a defendant
acquitted of a felony by reason of insanity shall be for an
indefinite period of time. Such period of commitment shall not
exceed the maximum length of time that the defendant would
have been required to serve, less credit for good behavior,
before becoming eligible for release had he been convicted of
and received the maximum sentence for the most serious crime
for which he has been acquitted by reason of insanity." 730
ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000).
Thereafter, if the court finds that the defendant is in need of mental health
services but is no longer in need of inpatient care, the court shall order the
defendant released under conditions that the court deems appropriate.
730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(h) (West 2000). The section defining conditional
release provides that "[s]uch conditional release shall be for a period of
five years, unless the defendant, the person or facility rendering the
treatment, therapy, program or outpatient care, or the State's Attorney
petitions the Court for an extension of the conditional release period for
an additional three years." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000).
During this period of conditional release, if the court determines that the
defendant has not fulfilled his conditions of release, the court shall hold a
hearing and:
		"if the Court finds that the defendant is subject to involuntary
admission ***, it shall enter an order remanding him or her to the
Department of Human Services or other facility. If the defendant
is remanded to the Department of Human Services, he or she
shall be placed in a secure setting unless the Court determines
that there are compelling reasons that such placement is not
necessary." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i) (West 2000).
	Although the statute provides for a maximum period of commitment
and provides for conditional release, the statute does not address which
time period prevails when an NGRI defendant's conditional release period
exceeds his Thiem date. As noted, the State contends that because
Williams was conditionally released prior to his Thiem date, Williams'
Thiem date became irrelevant and Williams was now subject to a five-year period of conditional release. Williams argues that because the Thiem
date is the outside limit for his period of confinement, the conditional
release period cannot extend beyond his Thiem date.
	On its face, section 5-2-4 of the Code can be construed in several
ways. Both provisions of section 5-2-4 indicate that the time periods are
mandatory. For example, section 5-2-4(b) provides that "[s]uch period
of commitment shall not exceed the maximum length of time that the
defendant would have been required to serve ***." (Emphasis added.)
730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000). Likewise, section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D)
provides that "[s]uch conditional release shall be for a period of five
years" unless an extension of the conditional release period for an
additional three years is sought. (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS
5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000). Consequently, the statute can be
construed in the manner suggested by the State to provide that the
conditional release provision supercedes the Thiem date when an NGRI
defendant is released prior to his Thiem date, so that the conditional
release period then sets the outside limit for the court's jurisdiction over
an NGRI defendant. The statute can also be construed in the manner
suggested by Williams to provide that the Thiem date sets the outside limit
for a court's jurisdiction over a defendant, so that an NGRI defendant's
conditional release expires on the same date as the Thiem date.
Moreover, in an attempt to reconcile the two provisions, the statute could
be construed in a third way to provide that an NGRI defendant's
conditional release period can extend beyond his Thiem date, but the
NGRI defendant cannot be recommitted for a violation of his conditional
release once his Thiem date has expired. When a statute "is capable of
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more
different senses," it is ambiguous. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282,
288 (1994), citing 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction
§45.02 (5th ed. 1992). Where statutory language is ambiguous, courts
may consider other sources to determine legislative intent. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d  at 288.
	When the provisions of section 5-2-4 are examined in light of the
legislative history of the statute, it is evident that the legislature did not
intend for the conditional release period to be used to allow a court to
exercise jurisdiction over an NGRI defendant beyond the expiration of his
Thiem date. The original version of section 5-2-4 provided as follows:
			"(a) After a finding or verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity ***, a hearing shall be held under the Mental Health
Code of 1967 to determine whether the defendant is in need of
mental treatment. If the defendant is found to be in need of
mental treatment the court shall enter an order so specifying." Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4(a).
Public Act 81-1497 amended this section effective September 19, 1980.
Public Act 81-1497 broadened the scope of a court's authority over
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. Following the
amendment, section 5-2-4 provided:
			"(a) After a finding or verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity ***, the defendant shall be ordered to the Department
of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities for an
evaluation as to whether he is subject to involuntary admission or
in need of mental health services. The order shall specify whether
the evaluation shall be conducted on an inpatient or outpatient
basis.
			The Department shall provide the Court with a report of its
evaluation within 30 days of the date of this order. The Court
shall hold a hearing *** to determine if the individual is: (a)
subject to involuntary admission; (b) in need of mental health
services on an inpatient basis; (c) in need of mental health
services on an outpatient basis; (d) a person not in need of
mental health services. The Court shall enter its findings.
			If the defendant is found to be subject to involuntary
admission or in need of mental health services on an inpatient
care basis, the court shall order the defendant to a facility of the
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. If
the defendant is found to be in need of mental health services, but
not on an inpatient care basis, the Court shall conditionally
release the defendant, under such conditions as set forth in this
Section as will reasonably assure the defendant's satisfactory
progress in treatment or rehabilitation and the safety of the
defendant or others. If the Court finds the person not in need of
mental health services, then the Court shall order the defendant
discharged from custody." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.
1005-2-4(a).
	Public Act 81-1497 began as House Bill 1010. Lengthy legislative
debates preceded the adoption of House Bill 1010. During the debates on
House Bill 1010, Representative Katz explained the history of the bill as
follows:
		"I doubt if there is an issue that is brought to Legislators more
often in terms of complaint of the citizenry than the instances of
individuals who are found not guilty by reason of insanity who
are released because they are not in need of mental
treatment and they are released and then they go on to
commit another violent crime. *** What the Bill does is to
provide that in the instance of an individual found not guilty by
reason of insanity that that [sic] individual will be sent to the
facilities of the Department of Mental Health where they will
make an evaluation of the defendant. On the evaluation they may
find that he can be involuntarily admitted because he is a danger
to himself or others and that's currently the situation.
However, they can also find that the individual is in need of
mental health services. If the individual is found to be in
need of mental health services he is given a conditional
discharge, or a conditional release by the courts and for a
period then of five years he will be under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Mental Health. They may decide that he
needs hospitalizing and institutionalized [sic] and may keep him
in the hospital. They may also put him on an outpatient basis. But
rather than letting the individual simply float around in the
community and be unknown to everyone until he commits a
violent crime or Act again, the Superintendent of the Department
of Mental Health follows that individual. *** This is ... will be a
great help in terms of trying to eliminate those terrible cases in
which individuals who have committed violent crimes are
released to go on to commit another crime." (Emphases added.)
81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 17, 1979, at
101-02 (statements of Representative Katz).
In response to a question from Representative Van Duyne concerning the
five-year conditional release period, Representative Katz explained:
		"It [the five-year period] strengthens the present law. *** Under
the present law, if the individual is brought in and he is
found not in need of treatment, the Judge can release him
immediately. This Bill broadens that concept. This Bill broadens
the ... if he is in need of mental health services and so. The
Department of Mental Health powers are greatly strengthened by
this Bill. *** This Bill gives the Department of Mental Health the
power to put an individual who is a danger to himself or to
others, they can put him in involuntary admission and confine him
in a State hospital to [sic] as long as he is such a threat. If he
does not fall into that category, rather than releasing him as
maybe the case in some instances now, if he is in need of
mental health services, he is given a conditional discharge,
a release for five years. During the five year period he is
monitored. He is required to report regularly. If he does not do
so, he can then be put by the Department of Mental Health into
the hospital and kept there as long as they feel that he needs so."
(Emphases added.) 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
May 17, 1979, at 106-07, 108-09 (statements of
Representative Katz).
	Likewise, in the Senate, Senator Sangmeister explained the purpose
of House Bill 1010:
		"Under the present law, as you know, a person if found not guilty
by reason of insanity is committed to the Department of Mental
Health. There's an evaluation made there and the person can
be, by the department, put back out in the street. There's
long been [a] feeling that we ought to do something more
than that and that's what Committee Bill 1010 does. It sets
up the fact that you still go to the Department of Mental Health,
there's an evaluation made there. Whether you are to be
released, which would be very doubtful under those
circumstances, whether you should need ... outpatient care or
inpatient care, you're then brought back to the court and the
court has to hear that testimony and evaluation is made. From
there on the ... the defendant is under the jurisdiction of that court
for five years subject to whatever ... orders the court may wish
to impose upon that particular defendant." (Emphasis added.)
81st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 27, 1979, at
340-41 (statements of Senator Sangmeister).
	Senator Sangmeister subsequently explained that:
			"There are two new standards that we're going to add. In
addition to the present involuntary admission, there will be
two new categories, in need of mental health services on an
inpatient basis and in need of mental health services on an
outpatient basis. These standards will apply only to persons
who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. *** What
we're attempting to do here in the State of Illinois with this
is ... to give the courts jurisdiction over a person for a period
of at least five years after he has been found not guilty by
reason of insanity rather than under the present law where
he is committed to the Department of Health ... Mental
Health, reviewed every sixty days and then a
recommendation made back to the court whether or not he
should be discharged." (Emphases added.) 81st Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 30, 1980, at 23, 24
(statements of Senator Sangmeister).
	The only discussion concerning the impact that the conditional release
provision would have on a defendant's maximum period of commitment
occurred when Senator Nimrod asked:
			"Senator Sangmeister, it seemed to me that the unfit to ... or
not guilty by reason of insanity, that we had a provision in there
that would have kept the individual under the jurisdiction of the
court for the same period of time as though he had been found
guilty. Have we ... have we changed that section at all? That was
a bill that we passed here ... I had sponsored here a couple of
years ago and I want to make sure that we're not affecting that
particular provision." 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
June 30, 1980, at 27-28 (statements of Senator Nimrod).
Senator Sangmeister responded, "that's not in this bill at all, Senator
Nimrod. This is a five year period from the date that that finding is
entered." 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 30, 1980, at
28 (statements of Senator Sangmeister).
	The State argues that the legislative history of House Bill 1010
establishes that the purpose of the conditional release statute was to
protect the public by gradually integrating NGRI defendants back into
society, rather than simply releasing those defendants outright on their
Thiem date. We disagree. In fact, the legislative history establishes that the
conditional release provision was not directed at the NGRI defendants
that were involuntarily committed following their acquittal. Rather, the
conditional release provision was added to address the situation where
defendants were found not guilty by reason of insanity and then released
because they were not in need of mental treatment or did not meet the
standard for involuntary admission. Prior to the adoption of House Bill
1010, those defendants were simply released without any supervision. As
the legislative history reflects, House Bill 1010 added the conditional
release provision to allow the Department of Mental Health and the courts
to impose conditions upon those defendants for a period of five years, and
to allow the court to recommit that person if he violated the conditions of
his release. Indeed, as the appellate court found, the legislature expressly
stated that the conditional release provision did not affect the provision
setting a maximum period of commitment. Based upon the legislative
history, as well as the language of section 5-2-4, we find that the
conditional release provision does not extend the trial court's jurisdiction
over an NGRI defendant beyond his Thiem date.
	In so holding, we note that we have considered and rejected a third
interpretation of the statute that would hold that an NGRI defendant's
conditional release period may extend beyond the expiration of his Thiem
date, but that the NGRI defendant cannot be recommitted for a violation
of his conditional release once his Thiem date expires. Under this third
interpretation, an NGRI defendant's Thiem date sets the maximum period
of confinement, but is not jurisdictional. The problem with the third
interpretation of the statute, however, is that it would render section
5-2-4(i) of the Code superfluous. Section 5-2-4(i) provides that if an
NGRI defendant on conditional release has not fulfilled the conditions of
his release, the trial court shall hold a hearing and, if the trial court finds
that the NGRI defendant is subject to involuntary admission or in need of
mental health services on an inpatient basis, "it shall enter an order
remanding him or her to the Department of Human Services." 730 ILCS
5/5-2-4(i) (West 2000). If this court holds that an NGRI defendant's
conditional release period can extend beyond his Thiem date but that the
NGRI defendant cannot be remanded to the DHS following the expiration
of his Thiem date, the trial court has no recourse if the NGRI defendant
violates his conditional release and is found to be subject to involuntary
admission or in need of mental health services on an inpatient basis after
his Thiem date expires. Because each word, clause and sentence of a
statute must be given reasonable meaning and should not be rendered
superfluous (Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 280), we find that the correct
interpretation of section 5-2-4 of the Code is to find that an NGRI
defendant's Thiem date sets the outside limit of this court's jurisdiction
over that defendant.
	The State further argues, however, that the legislature's recent
amendment to section 5-2-4 establishes that under the prior version of the
statute, which is at issue in this case, an NGRI defendant's conditional
release could extend beyond his Thiem date. Public Act 93-78, effective
January 1, 2004, amends section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D) to provide that in
addition to the initial five year period of conditional release, "[a]dditional
5-year periods of conditional release may be ordered following a hearing
as provided in this Section." Pub. Act 93-78, eff. January 1, 2004
(amending 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2002)). Public Act 93-78
further provides, however, that "in no event shall the defendant's period
of conditional release continue beyond the maximum period of
commitment ordered by the court pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
Section." Pub. Act 93-78, eff. January 1, 2004. The State argues that the
amendment to section 5-2-4 demonstrates that under the previous statute
a defendant's conditional release could extend past his Thiem date,
because when the legislature amends a statute, it is presumed that the
legislature intended to effect a change in the law.
	While it is true that a material change in a statute made by an
amendatory act is presumed to change the original statute, the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of an amendment must be
considered. O'Connor v. A&amp;P Enterprises, 81 Ill. 2d 260, 271 (1980).
"An amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change
the law, while no such purpose is indicated by the mere fact of an
amendment of an ambiguous provision." O'Connor, 81 Ill. 2d  at 271,
citing 1A Sutherland, Statutes &amp; Statutory Construction §22.30, at 179
(1972). Here, the portion of the statute amended by Public Act 93-78
was ambiguous. In any event, the amendment changes the law with regard
to the length of the conditional release period. That the amended statute
now expressly references an NGRI defendant's Thiem date is merely
incidental to the change in the law and not the reason for the change.
Consequently, we reject the State's argument that the recent amendment
to section 5-2-4 establishes that under the current version of the statute,
an NGRI defendant's conditional release period is not limited by his
Thiem date.
	Finally, the State argues that it was inappropriate for the appellate
court to remand the cause with directions to appoint the Cook County
public guardian for Williams to ascertain whether civil commitment
proceedings should be commenced. The State claims that this order is
inappropriate because Williams already has pro bono counsel and
because this is not the type of case in which the Cook County public
guardian is authorized to act. As Williams notes, however, the appellate
court directed the trial court to appoint the public guardian to determine
whether it was appropriate to initiate civil commitment proceedings against
Williams, not to represent Williams at those proceedings.
	Nonetheless, we do find it unnecessary at this time to remand the
case with directions to appoint the Cook County public guardian. Section
1-119 of the Mental Health Code provides for civil involuntary admission
of a person with a mental illness "who because of his or her illness is
reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or herself
or another in the near future" or "who because of his or her illness is
unable to provide for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard himself
or herself from serious harm." 405 ILCS 5/1-119(1), (2) (West 2000).
The Mental Health Code provides that the "State's Attorneys of the
several counties shall represent the people of the State of Illinois in court
proceedings under this Chapter" and "shall ensure that petitions, reports
and orders are properly prepared." 405 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2000).
Pursuant to statute, then, the Cook County State's Attorney is the proper
party to initiate civil commitment proceedings against Williams. To date,
the Cook County State's Attorney has not initiated civil commitment
proceedings against Williams, nor has he indicated that he intends to do
so. While the State's Attorney certainly can seek Williams' civil
commitment, we find that it is premature to remand this cause for a
determination of whether civil commitment procedures should be
commenced absent any indication from the State that it believes civil
commitment is necessary at this time. Consequently, we vacate that
portion of the appellate court's order remanding the cause to the circuit
court with directions to appoint the Cook County public guardian for the
purpose of ascertaining whether civil commitment procedures should be
commenced.
	For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court's order
reversing the circuit court's denial of Williams' petition for writ of habeas
corpus and reversing the circuit court's order remanding Williams to the
custody of the DHS. We vacate that portion of the appellate court's order
remanding the cause to the circuit court for the appointment of the public
guardian. We find that Williams is entitled to his immediate release unless
his civil commitment is sought.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and vacated in part;
circuit court reversed.
1.                
          
         
           
         
    
  At oral argument, the State, on behalf of Nancy Staples, hospital administrator of the Elgin Mental Health Center, 
stated that Williams was remanded to the DHS and received inpatient treatment for approximately one year, until December 16, 2002. Williams 
then was placed on conditional release again. Williams currently resides at the Rainbow Beach Nursing Center and receives outpatient 
treatment.
2.            At the hearing on Williams' petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
Williams' attorney stated that Nancy Staples was no longer the administrator of the Elgin Mental Health Center and that he wished to amend 
the record. All the filings in the appellate court and in this court, however, continue to reference Nancy Staples.