Title: Ex Parte Dept. of Human Resources
Citation: 620 So. 2d 619
Docket Number: 1920532
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 1993

620 So. 2d 619 (1993)
Ex parte DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF the STATE OF ALABAMA.
(In the Matter of F.P., a child under 18 years of age).
1920532.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 30, 1993.
William Prendergast and Stephen K. Simpson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.
Edgar W. Greene, Deputy Dist. Atty. for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The Alabama Department of Human Resources ("the Department") has petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable James M. White, judge of the Juvenile Court of Bibb County, to vacate his order requiring the Department to pay for the treatment of a delinquent child at a private, residential mental health facility. The writ is granted.
The parties in this case agree that the child in question, who was adjudged delinquent after engaging in certain acts of sexual misconduct, desperately needs the treatment that he is presently receiving in the Three Springs Sexual Offender Program. The parties also agree that someone must pay for this treatment. The parties disagree, however, as to exactly where the financial responsibility for the child's treatment lies. Judge White and the assistant district attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit contend that the Department, which presently has legal custody of the child, is responsible for the cost of his treatment. The Department contends, however, that Judge White had no legal authority to require that its funds be used to pay for the child's treatment. It argues that Bibb County is statutorily obligated to pay for the kind of treatment that is being provided to the child. We agree with the Department.
Initially, we note that orders of the kind entered by Judge White are subject to mandamus review. See In re McCain, 348 So. 2d 780 (Ala.1977). Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that will issue only when the following four requirements are met: 1) there is a clear legal right in the petitioner *620 to the relief sought; 2) there is an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) there is no adequate remedy at law; and 4) the jurisdiction of the court is properly invoked. Martin v. Loeb &amp; Co., 349 So. 2d 9 (Ala.1977).
Section 12-15-71(c)(4), Ala.Code 1975, authorizes a juvenile court to "[m]ake such... order as the court in its discretion shall deem to be for the welfare and best interests of the [delinquent] child." Article IV, § 88, of the Alabama Constitution states that "[i]t shall be the duty of the legislature to require the several counties of this state to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the poor." Section 12-15-70 specifically provides:
(Emphasis added.) As was noted in In re McCain, supra, § 12-15-10 clarifies the phrase "unless otherwise provided for":
(Emphasis added.) Sections 12-15-9 and 12-15-11 provide a means for assessing the cost of a child's medical treatment against the parents or other persons legally obligated to care for and support the child. Section 12-15-11 also authorizes payment from the child's estate in the hands of a guardian or trustee. Neither of these sections would appear to apply in this case.
In Ex parte Department of Mental Health, 511 So. 2d 181 (Ala.1987), the Juvenile Court of Houston County placed a child in the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation and then ordered the Department to pay for the child's treatment at Charter Woods Hospital. This Court held that the trial court's order violated § 12-15-10 by placing the financial responsibility for the maintenance and care of the child on a department of the state instead of on the county. It is clear, therefore, that the Department in the present case is not legally obligated to pay for the child's treatment out of funds allocated to it by the legislature.
WRIT GRANTED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  The provision in § 12-15-10 making attorney fees valid charges and preferred claims against the county and directing that such fees be paid by the county treasurer was specifically repealed. See § 12-15-10.1