Title: P. v. Kim
Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 1078
Docket Number: S153183
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 2009

Filed 3/16/09 (this opinion should follow the companion case, S151561, also filed 3/16/09) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S153183 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H029324 
HYUNG JOON KIM, 
) 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SM970463 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendant Hyung Joon Kim was born in South Korea and entered this 
country legally with his parents when he was a young child.  He has lived in this 
country as a legal resident for more than two decades but never became a citizen.  
As a result of his multiple criminal convictions, the federal government now seeks 
to remove him from the country and return him to South Korea.  He petitioned for 
a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court, seeking to vacate the state felony 
convictions that triggered his federal removal proceedings.  His case is one of two 
we decide today in which litigants seek to challenge the validity of old, otherwise 
final criminal convictions to eliminate them as a possible basis for removal from 
this country by federal authorities.  As we explain in a companion case (People v. 
Villa (Mar. 16, 2009, S151561) __ Cal.4th ___), a person in federal immigration 
detention is ineligible for a writ of habeas corpus from a state court if his state 
sentence and probation or parole have been completed.  In the instant case, we 
conclude defendant Kim is ineligible for a writ of error coram nobis on the facts of 
 
1
this case.  Accordingly, because the Court of Appeal below correctly reversed the 
trial court’s decision to issue the writ, we affirm. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Background 
Defendant Kim was born in South Korea in 1977.  His parents brought him 
and his brother to this country on a family visa when defendant was six years old.  
He became a lawful permanent resident in 1986 and has resided continuously in 
this country since his initial entry.  His mother and brother are naturalized citizens; 
his father is a lawful permanent resident.   
While still a juvenile, defendant was arrested on several occasions and 
eventually became a ward of the court in February 1995, having been found to be 
a minor in possession of live ammunition, a misdemeanor.  (Pen. Code, § 12101, 
subd. (b).)1  The juvenile court placed him on probation on certain conditions, 
including a specific prohibition against possessing weapons or ammunition.  
Defendant turned 18 years old in December of that year.  
In April 1996, while still on juvenile probation, defendant and two 
juveniles burglarized a tool shed behind a residence in Pacific Grove, Monterey 
County, stealing three firearms.  When police searched a storage shed to which 
defendant had access, they found the three stolen guns, some ammunition, and a 
ski mask.  Police also found a fourth gun, a .38-caliber revolver with matching 
ammunition and an attached laser sight that had been stolen in a burglary in the 
City of Marina in 1995.  Defendant was convicted of first degree burglary (§ 459), 
but imposition of sentence was suspended and he was sentenced to five years’ 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
2
probation on the condition he serve 180 days in jail.  He was, however, granted an 
early release, with 117 days suspended, so that he could begin his freshman year at 
the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB).  
Later that same year (1996), defendant was arrested and convicted of 
misdemeanor petty theft and second degree burglary for stealing four CD-ROM 
games, batteries, and cables from the UCSB bookstore.  (§§ 484, subd. (a), 459, 
460, subd. (b), 461, subd. 2.)  The total value of the stolen merchandise was about 
$184.  He was sentenced to three years’ probation on the condition he serve 30 
days in jail, which was suspended until the end of the school year.   
In February 1997, defendant’s parents gave him some money to buy 
groceries before returning to college.  He went to a Costco store in Monterey 
County with two younger friends, one a juvenile.  They proceeded to shoplift three 
prepaid telephone cards and a video game.  They acted in concert, two of them 
using their bodies to shield the third from other customers while packages were 
opened.  The trio then purchased other items and attempted to leave the store.  
Their activities had been observed by security personnel, however, and security 
guards detained them.  Costco recovered the stolen merchandise, which was 
valued in the aggregate at less than $100.   
As a result of this last incident, the People charged defendant with felony 
burglary for the Costco crimes (§ 459), a strike (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) for the 
tool shed burglary, a misdemeanor petty theft with a prior (§§ 666/484), and 
misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor (§ 272).  Defendant 
negotiated a plea bargain in which he would plead guilty to felony petty theft with 
a prior theft-related conviction and admit the strike allegation.  In exchange, the 
prosecution agreed to dismiss the charges of felony burglary and misdemeanor 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  Significantly, in connection with this 
plea, defendant personally executed a written waiver of rights and placed his 
 
3
initials next to several statements, including this one:  “I understand that if I am 
not a citizen of the United States a plea of ‘Guilty’/‘No Contest’ could result in 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country, and/or denial of 
naturalization.” 
The trial court accepted the plea and noted in the record that it would 
reserve jurisdiction to strike the prior serious felony allegation at the time of 
sentencing.  At sentencing in October 1997, the trial court struck the strike 
allegation and sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years for felony 
petty theft with a prior and to the lower term of two years, to be served 
concurrently, for violating his probation in the Monterey County tool shed 
burglary case.   
B.  Subsequent Federal Proceedings and Defendant’s Responses 
Defendant’s 1997 plea to felony petty theft with a prior theft-related 
conviction plunged him into a labyrinth of legal problems.  On December 16, 
1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)2 initiated proceedings for 
defendant’s mandatory deportation based on his status as an alien who has been 
convicted of an “aggravated felony,”3 which for deportation purposes is defined as 
                                              
2  
Like the Court of Appeal below and the parties, we will continue to refer to 
the federal authorities as the “INS,” although that agency has since been 
reorganized into the Department of Homeland Security.  Deportations are now 
prosecuted by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  (See U.S. v. 
Garcia-Beltran (9th Cir. 2006) 443 F.3d 1126, 1129, fn. 2 [“The INS is now 
known as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)”].) 
3  
Title 8 United States Code section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) provides:  “Any alien 
who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is 
deportable.”  The parties refer to deportation based on a conviction of an 
aggravated felony as “mandatory” removal, presumably because such aliens are 
subject to mandatory detention by the INS (id., § 1226(c)(1)(B)) and are ineligible 
for discretionary cancellation of removal (id., § 1229b(a)(3)).  
 
4
“a theft offense . . . or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at 
least one year.”  (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).)  A few months later, on February 1, 
1999, defendant completed his three-year term (reduced by applicable credits) and 
was released on parole.  He was detained by the INS the next day (Kim v. Ziglar 
(9th Cir. 2002) 276 F.3d 523, 526) and held in federal custody without bond.  He 
was eventually released from INS custody on August 20, 1999. 
Defendant successfully completed his three-year parole on February 1, 
2002.  On August 16 of that year, the INS filed an amended charging document, 
alleging that in addition to mandatory removal, defendant was also subject to 
discretionary removal due to his having been convicted of two crimes involving 
moral turpitude:  the tool shed burglary and the Costco felony petty theft with a 
prior.  (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).)4 
Defendant then began filing collateral challenges to his various state 
convictions in an attempt to eliminate them as the basis for deportation.  In 2003, 
he filed a nonstatutory motion to vacate his three-year sentence (but not the actual 
convictions) for the Costco petty theft with a prior and the concurrent two-year 
sentence for the tool shed burglary.  Although both sentences had been served, he 
claimed that when he entered his plea, he did not know the sentences would 
subject him to mandatory deportation by the INS.  When the trial court asked the 
prosecutor whether he opposed the motion, the prosecutor replied:  “No.  I just 
                                              
4  
Title 8 United States Code section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) provides:  “Any alien 
who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving 
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, 
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions 
were in a single trial, is deportable.”  (Italics added.)  We assume the parties refer 
to this as “discretionary” removal because aliens in violation of this provision are 
not subject to mandatory preremoval detention and may seek discretionary 
cancellation of removal.  (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).) 
 
5
want to say we’re not opposing it.  That’s as far into it as I want to get.”  The trial 
court granted the motion, vacated the sentences, and resentenced defendant to 
serve a one-day probation on the condition he serve 364 days in jail, with credit 
for time served.5  The result of this resentencing was that defendant served no 
additional time in prison (having already served a full three-year sentence), but his 
official sentence for the Costco crimes was now modified to be one day short of a 
year, thereby avoiding having either crime characterized as an aggravated felony 
for immigration purposes.6   
As a result of this retroactive resentencing, the INS amended its charging 
document, dismissing the allegation of mandatory removal based on the 
aggravated felony conviction (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) and clarifying that it 
was proceeding only on the basis of discretionary removal as a result of 
defendant’s two convictions involving moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)).  The elimination of the allegation based on an aggravated 
felony conviction opened another avenue of possible relief for defendant in that he 
became eligible to move for cancellation of removal.7  He so moved, and on 
                                              
5  
As the People did not seek appellate review of the court’s order, that matter 
is now final and its merits are not before us.  
6  
In re Song (2001) 23 I. & N. Dec. 173, 174 (resentencing to less than one 
year removes a crime from the category of aggravated felony); see 6 Gordon et al., 
Immigration Law and Procedure (rev. ed. 2007) Deportation, section 71.05[2][b], 
pages 71-160 to 71-160.1 and footnote 435 (rel. 115 12/06).  
7  
Title 8 United States Code section 1229b(a) provides:  “The Attorney 
General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or 
deportable from the United States if the alien—  [¶] (1) has been an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, [¶] (2) has resided in 
the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, 
and [¶] (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.”  (Italics added.) 
 
6
June 27, 2003, a federal immigration judge granted his motion, thereby permitting 
him to remain in the country.  On the INS’s appeal to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA), however, the BIA reversed, concluding it was “unconvinced that 
[defendant’s] long residence in the United States, his family ties and his 
rehabilitation outweigh his substantial criminal history and recidivism.”  
Consequently, the BIA ordered defendant “removed from the United States to 
South Korea.”  
Despite this setback, defendant continued his efforts to avoid deportation.  
First, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.  That 
matter has since been removed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals under the 
REAL ID Act of 2005.8  Second, he began proceedings to vacate his remaining 
state court convictions.  On October 19, 2004, the Santa Barbara County Superior 
Court granted his motion to vacate his misdemeanor convictions for petty theft and 
second degree burglary stemming from his thefts at the UCSB campus bookstore.  
The same court later dismissed both charges.  Having ameliorated the effect of his 
                                              
8  
On May 11, 2005, “President Bush signed into law the REAL ID Act of 
2005 (‘RIDA’), Pub.L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Section 106(a) of RIDA eliminated habeas corpus as an avenue 
of review for aliens seeking to challenge a final order of removal, making petitions 
for review in the courts of appeals the ‘sole and exclusive means for judicial 
review’ of a removal order.  See § 1252(a)(5).  At the same time, Congress 
restored jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over petitions for review brought by 
criminal aliens, creating a unitary path of review for criminal and non-criminal 
aliens alike.  See § 1252(a)(2)(D) (permitting review of ‘constitutional claims or 
questions of law’ raised by any alien in a petition for review); see also Puri v. 
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing how RIDA created 
jurisdiction over criminal aliens’ petitions for review).  Importantly, however, 
Congress did not modify the requirement that petitions for review must be filed 
within 30 days of the issuance of a final order of removal by the BIA.  See 
§ 1252(b)(1).”  (Singh v. Mukasey (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1103, 1105.) 
 
7
convictions for petty theft with a prior (the Costco crimes) and burglary (the tool 
shed crime) by having his aggregate sentence reduced to less than one year, and 
having obtained dismissal of his Santa Barbara misdemeanor theft-related 
convictions, all that remained for defendant to do was to obtain dismissal of his 
Costco conviction for petty theft with a prior, which would leave him with only a 
single conviction for a crime of moral turpitude (the tool shed burglary) and thus 
ineligible for removal from the country (because 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
requires convictions of “two or more crimes involving moral turpitude”).  That 
brings us to the present proceeding. 
C.  The Proceedings Below 
On July 8, 2005, defendant filed two motions in Monterey County Superior 
Court.  The first, termed a “MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT (CORAM NOBIS),” 
sought to vacate his 1997 guilty plea to felony petty theft with a prior theft-related 
conviction (the Costco crimes) on the ground that the judgment was “based on a 
mistake of fact, in that no one knew:  [¶] (a) South Korea was incarcerating 
Jehovah’s Witnesses (like Mr. Kim) for three years in prison for refusing on 
religious grounds to serve in the military, and that Mr. Kim would face that fate if 
deported as a result of this plea; [¶] (b) the problem that the plea of guilty would 
cause defendant’s deportation, even without a sentence of one year in custody; or 
[¶] (c) the solution that an equivalent plea to burglary under Penal Code section 
459, if properly framed, would not cause this result, and if these facts had been 
known to court and counsel, the plea would not have been entered. . . .  [¶] The 
plea was therefore not knowing, intelligent, free or voluntary, and was void ab 
initio in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution.”  
(Original italics and underscoring.) 
 
8
The second motion, termed a “NON-STATUTORY MOTION AND MOTION 
TO VACATE JUDGMENT,” sought to vacate the same 1997 guilty plea on different 
grounds.  This motion alleged defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights 
were violated because his trial counsel “rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
for his failure adequately to investigate the immigration consequences of the 
conviction” and also “for his failure to defend Mr. Kim against a plea that would 
result in mandatory deportation or to make any effort to get an equivalent 
nondeportable conviction.” 
In support of these motions, defendant’s then trial attorney, Thomas 
Worthington, provided a declaration stating that at the time of defendant’s pleas, 
counsel “was unaware . . . that a conviction of petty theft with a prior conviction 
would be considered a ‘crime of moral turpitude’ by the immigration authorities, 
and trigger deportation for Mr. Kim, exposing him to arrest by the immigration 
authorities, requiring him to post a bond and hire immigration counsel, and 
resulting in his mandatory deportation if he was unsuccessful in obtaining a waiver 
of deportation.  Therefore, I did not advise Mr. Kim of the actual adverse 
immigration consequences of this plea.  [¶] . . . If I had been aware that an 
alternative plea to burglary, in the language of the statute, entry with intent to 
commit ‘theft or any felony,’ would have avoided deportation on account of a 
crime of moral turpitude conviction, I believe there is a reasonable probability the 
prosecution and [trial] court would have been willing to agree to this plea.”  
In a joint opposition to both motions, the prosecution argued it would have 
been improper to change the wording of the plea in order to thwart the 
immigration consequences flowing from the plea, that no mistake of fact supports 
issuance of a writ of error coram nobis, that evidence of defendant’s religious 
beliefs is not relevant, that a correction nunc pro tunc is inappropriate because 
defendant does not seek to correct a clerical error, that no court authority exists to 
 
9
grant a nonstatutory motion to vacate and to withdraw the plea, that defense 
counsel was not ineffective, and that the trial court should not attempt to nullify 
the order of another court (i.e., the BIA).  In support, the prosecutor in defendant’s 
petty theft case, Charles Olvis, provided a declaration stating:  “I would not have 
agreed to allow the defendant to plead to a charge to assist the defendant in 
thwarting actual or potential immigration consequences.  I specifically would not 
have agreed to a plea to a felony violation . . . with the altered language to reflect 
‘any felony.’  I believe that a criminal conviction should appropriately reflect the 
criminal conduct engaged in by the defendant.” 
After a hearing, the trial court granted both motions.  Regarding the 
nonstatutory motion to vacate, the court explained:  “[T]he Court does find that — 
and based in no small part on Mr. Worthington’s own declaration in that regard — 
that given the facts presented in this case, the fact that the defendant is a Korean, 
that was known at the time.  It was clear that there was some belief that there was 
— there were ties to Korea and even some possibility of him leaving the country 
for Korea, that immigration should have probably been an issue.  [¶] As to the 
prejudice, based on my 30-plus years of experience in this business, I believe it’s 
not only reasonably possible but frankly highly likely that had Mr. Worthington 
realized what the situation was, he would have been able to find a way to avoid the 
immigration consequences of . . . the defendant’s conduct.  I base that in part on 
actually Judge Curtis’s remarks at the time of sentencing . . . wherein he actually 
demonstrates some sympathy for and some optimism for the defendant’s future in 
striking the strike. . . .  [¶] So the Court does find that there is prejudice, given the 
facts and circumstances of this particular case, and that it’s likely Mr. Worthington 
would have had an opportunity to prevail on either or probably both the 
[prosecutor] and Judge Curtis in part in arriving at a disposition that . . . would not 
have incurred the consequences that Mr. Kim faces at this time.”  The trial court 
 
10
granted the petition for a writ of error coram nobis as well, explaining:  “I don’t 
know if it’s necessary for the Court to even rule on that at this point, but for the 
sake of the record, the Court — I must say I’m a lot less sanguine about the 
distinctions between a mistake of fact and mistake of law and how you categorize 
those.  But so the record is clear, the Court grants that motion as well on the 
grounds that there was a mistake in fact which materially affected the result.”  
The Court of Appeal reversed, and we granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Writ of Error Coram Nobis 
1.  Background 
The writ of error coram nobis is a nonstatutory, common law remedy 
whose origins trace back to an era in England in which appeals and new trial 
motions were unknown.9  “Far from being of constitutional origin, the ‘proceeding 
designated “coram nobis” . . .’ . . . was contrived by the courts at an early epoch in 
the growth of common law procedure to provide a corrective remedy ‘because of 
the absence at that time of the right to move for a new trial and the right of appeal 
from the judgment.’ ”  (People v. Sica (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 59, 62.)  The 
grounds on which a litigant may obtain relief via a writ of error coram nobis are 
narrower than on habeas corpus (In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 724-725); the 
writ’s purpose “is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a judgment 
rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if 
                                              
9  
Although the writ technically is available in civil as well as criminal cases 
(see generally 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal 
Judgment, § 182, p. 211), “[i]n California, the writ has been used almost 
exclusively to attack judgments in criminal cases” (id., § 183, p. 212).  We address 
in this case the availability of the writ in criminal cases only. 
 
11
the trial court had known it and which, through no negligence or fault of the 
defendant, was not then known to the court” (People v. Adamson (1949) 34 Cal.2d 
320, 326-327).   
We described the writ of error coram nobis in People v. Reid (1924) 195 
Cal. 249:10  “The principal office of the writ of error coram nobis was to enable 
the same court which had rendered the judgment to reconsider it in a case in which 
the record still remained before that court.  The conventional language of this writ 
in the King’s Bench makes reference to the record ‘which remains before us [the 
king], quae coram nobis resident.’  In the Common Pleas the form of the writ was 
[‘]coram vobis,’ ‘before you’ (the judges).  The most comprehensive statement of 
the office and function of this writ which has come to our notice is the following 
. . . :  ‘The office of the writ of coram nobis is to bring the attention of the court to, 
and obtain relief from, errors of fact, such as the death of either party pending the 
suit and before judgment therein; or infancy, where the party was not properly 
represented by guardian, or coverture, where the common-law disability still 
exists, or insanity, it seems, at the time of the trial; or a valid defense existing in 
the facts of the case, but which, without negligence on the part of the defendant, 
was not made, either through duress or fraud or excusable mistake; these facts not 
appearing on the face of the record, and being such as, if known in season, would 
have prevented the rendition and entry of the judgment questioned.’ ”  (Id. at 
pp. 254-255.) 
We long ago emphasized the limited nature of this legal remedy.  Quoting 
from an old treatise, we opined the writ of error coram nobis “ ‘does not lie to 
                                              
10  
Reid was overruled on other grounds in People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 
Cal.2d 342, 347-348. 
 
12
correct any error in the judgment of the court nor to contradict or put in issue any 
fact directly passed upon and affirmed by the judgment itself.  If this could be, 
there would be no end of litigation. . . .  The writ of error coram nobis is not 
intended to authorize any court to review and revise its opinions; but only to 
enable it to recall some adjudication made while some fact existed which, if before 
the court, would have prevented the rendition of the judgment; and which without 
fault or negligence of the party, was not presented to the court.’ ”  (People v. 
Mooney (1918) 178 Cal. 525, 528.)  As one Court of Appeal described it:  “It is 
not a writ whereby convicts may attack or relitigate just any judgment on a 
criminal charge merely because the unfortunate person may become displeased 
with his confinement or with any other result of the judgment under attack.”  
(People v. Hayman (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 620, 623.)   
With the advent of statutory new trial motions, the availability of direct 
appeal, and the expansion of the scope of the writ of habeas corpus, writs of error 
coram nobis had, by the 1930’s, become a remedy “practically obsolete . . . except 
in the most rare of instances” (People v. Lumbley (1937) 8 Cal.2d 752, 755) and 
applicable to only a “very limited class of cases” (People v. Sandoval (1927) 200 
Cal. 730, 737).  (See Prickett, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in California (1990) 
30 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1, 14-24; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, 
Criminal Judgment, § 182, p. 211 [“the statutory motion for new trial has, for most 
purposes, superseded the common law remedy; and, until recent years, coram 
nobis was virtually obsolete in California”].) 
The seminal case setting forth the modern requirements for obtaining a writ 
of error coram nobis is People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226.  There we stated:  
“The writ of [error] coram nobis is granted only when three requirements are met.  
(1) Petitioner must ‘show that some fact existed which, without any fault or 
negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and 
 
13
which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the judgment.’  
[Citations.]  (2) Petitioner must also show that the ‘newly discovered evidence . . . 
[does not go] to the merits of issues tried; issues of fact, once adjudicated, even 
though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial.’  
[Citations.]  This second requirement applies even though the evidence in question 
is not discovered until after the time for moving for a new trial has elapsed or the 
motion has been denied.  [Citations.]  (3) Petitioner ‘must show that the facts upon 
which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due 
diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the 
time of his motion for the writ. . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 230.)  These factors set forth in 
Shipman continue to outline the modern limits of the writ.  (People v. McElwee 
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1352.) 
Several aspects of the test set forth in Shipman illustrate the narrowness of 
the remedy.  Because the writ of error coram nobis applies where a fact unknown 
to the parties and the court existed at the time of judgment that, if known, would 
have prevented rendition of the judgment, “[t]he remedy does not lie to enable the 
court to correct errors of law.”  (People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 378; see 
People v. McElwee, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 [defendant’s belief he 
would serve only 15 years in prison “was not a mistake of fact but one of law”].)  
Moreover, the allegedly new fact must have been unknown and must have been in 
existence at the time of the judgment.  (People v. Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at 
p. 230.)   
For a newly discovered fact to qualify as the basis for the writ of error 
coram nobis, we look to the fact itself and not its legal effect.  “It has often been 
held that the motion or writ is not available where a defendant voluntarily and with 
knowledge of the facts pleaded guilty or admitted alleged prior convictions 
 
14
because of ignorance or mistake as to the legal effect of those facts.”  (People v. 
Banks, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 378.) 
Finally, the writ of error coram nobis is unavailable when a litigant has 
some other remedy at law.  “A writ of [error] coram nobis is not available where 
the defendant had a remedy by (a) appeal or (b) motion for a new trial and failed 
to avail himself of such remedies.”  (People v. Blalock (1960) 53 Cal.2d 798, 801; 
see People v. Howard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 237, 238 [claims could have been raised 
on direct appeal]; People v. Adamson, supra, 34 Cal.2d at p. 327 [claims should 
have been raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus].)  “The writ of error 
coram nobis is not a catch-all by which those convicted may litigate and relitigate 
the propriety of their convictions ad infinitum.  In the vast majority of cases a trial 
followed by a motion for a new trial and an appeal affords adequate protection to 
those accused of crime.  The writ of error coram nobis serves a limited and useful 
purpose.  It will be used to correct errors of fact which could not be corrected in 
any other manner.  But it is well-settled law in this and in other states that where 
other and adequate remedies exist the writ is not available.”  (People v. Martinez 
(1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 767, 774.) 
A quick perusal of the types of situations in which the writ of error coram 
nobis has issued illustrates these limitations.  Thus, the writ has issued in these 
circumstances:  “Where the defendant was insane at the time of trial and this fact 
was unknown to court and counsel [citations].[11]  Where defendant was an infant 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
11  
In People v. Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d 226, we held that the defendant’s 
allegations that he “was insane at the time of the offense, but did not present this 
defense because he was also insane at the time of the plea” (id. at p. 229), “if true, 
would meet the requirements for a writ of [error] coram nobis.  His legal sanity at 
the time of the crime is a material question that was neither put in issue nor tried.”  
 
15
and appeared by attorney without the appointment of a guardian or guardian ad 
litem [citations].  Where the defendant was a feme covert and her husband was not 
joined [citation].  Where the defendant was a slave and was tried and sentenced as 
a free man [citation].  Where the defendant was dead at the time judgment was 
rendered [citations].  Where default was entered against a defendant who had not 
been served with summons and who had no notice of the proceeding [citations].  
Where counsel inadvertently entered an unauthorized appearance in behalf of a 
defendant who had not been served with process [citation].  Where a plea of guilty 
was procured by extrinsic fraud [citation].  Where a plea of guilty was extorted 
through fear of mob violence [citations].  Where defendants and their counsel 
were induced by false representations to remain away from the trial under 
circumstances amounting to extrinsic fraud [citation].  Where by the failure of the 
clerk to properly file an answer the party was deprived of his defense [citation].”  
(People v. Reid, supra, 195 Cal. at pp. 258-259.)  More recently, a lower federal 
court granted coram nobis relief where, many years after the fact, a Japanese-
American plaintiff convicted of a misdemeanor for failing to report to a civilian 
control center in preparation for internment during World War II proved the 
federal government had intentionally suppressed favorable evidence showing the 
absence of any military necessity for removing those of Japanese ancestry from 
the West Coast.  (Hirabayashi v. United States (W.D.Wn. 1986) 627 F.Supp. 
1445, affd. in part & revd. in part (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 592.) 
By contrast, the writ of error coram nobis was found unavailable in the 
following situations:  where trial counsel “improperly induced” the defendant to 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
(Id. at p. 233; cf. People v. Welch (1964) 61 Cal.2d 786 [same, with regard to a 
petition for a writ of error coram vobis].) 
 
16
plead guilty to render him eligible for diversion and the trial court eventually 
denied diversion (In re Nunez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 234, 236); where the defendant 
pleaded guilty to having a prior felony conviction when he was eligible to have the 
prior reduced to a misdemeanor (People v. Banks, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 379 
[mistake of law]); where the defendant discovered new facts that would have 
bolstered the defense already presented at trial (People v. Tuthill (1948) 32 Cal.2d 
819, 827 [concluding that although the new facts “would have been material and 
possibly beneficial to the defendant” at trial, they would not have precluded entry 
of the judgment]); where the defendant mistakenly believed his plea to second 
degree murder meant he would serve no more than 15 years in prison (People v. 
McElwee, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 [this was “not a mistake of fact but 
one of law”]); where the defendant claimed neither his attorney nor the court had 
advised him before he pleaded that his convictions would render him eligible for 
civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (People v. 
Ibanez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 537, 546 [“[d]efendant’s ignorance regarding the 
potential for civil commitment under the SVPA is a legal, not a factual, 
question”]); and where the defendant challenged “the legality of his arrest, the 
identity of the informant, and the failure of the court to make findings on the prior 
convictions” (People v. Del Campo (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 217, 220 [coram nobis 
denied on the ground that “[a]ll of these matters could have been raised on 
appeal”].) 
Likewise any number of constitutional claims cannot be vindicated on 
coram nobis.  (See, e.g., People v. Howard, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 238 [claim of an 
unconstitutional sentence and inadequate representation]; People v. Blalock, 
supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 801 [double jeopardy]; People v. Soriano (1987) 194 
Cal.App.3d 1470, 1477 [ineffective assistance of counsel]; People v. Parseghian 
(1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 1, 3 [improper admission of evidence]; see generally 
 
17
Prickett, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in California, supra, 30 Santa Clara 
L.Rev. at pp. 24-28.) 
We now apply these rules to the trial court’s decision to issue a writ of error 
coram nobis, mindful that a lower court’s ruling on a petition for the writ is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. McElwee, supra, 128 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1352; People v. Ibanez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 544; cf. 
People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192 [trial court’s 
ruling on the defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction under § 1016.5 reviewed 
for abuse of discretion].) 
2.  Application to This Case 
a.  Procedural bars to relief 
Defendant contends he is eligible for a writ of error coram nobis as a result 
of two distinct mistakes of fact that, he claims, undermine the validity of his guilty 
plea to felony petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction.  First, he claims he 
“was not aware, prior to entering his plea, of the fact that his plea to a petty theft 
with a prior would qualify as a ‘crime of moral turpitude’ and subject him to 
deportation to South Korea.”  Second, he contends he did not know at the time of 
his plea that “if deported, he would almost certainly face religious persecution, 
including beatings and imprisonment by the authorities because of his religious 
objections to serving in the South Korean army.”  In his nonstatutory motion to 
vacate his plea, he also contends he is entitled to relief because Worthington, his 
trial counsel, was constitutionally ineffective in failing to adequately investigate 
the true immigration consequences of defendant’s plea, and in failing to arrange 
for defendant to plead to a nondeportable offense.    
As a nonstatutory motion to vacate has long been held to be the legal 
equivalent of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis (People v. Shipman, supra, 
 
18
62 Cal.2d at p. 229, fn. 2; People v. Adamson, supra, 34 Cal.2d at p. 325), we 
consider these claims together. 
Before we turn to the merits of these claims, however, we find defendant’s 
entitlement to the writ fails at the threshold for three distinct procedural reasons.  
First, he has not satisfied the requirement that he show due diligence when seeking 
such extraordinary relief.  “It is well settled that a showing of diligence is 
prerequisite to the availability of relief by motion for coram nobis” (People v. 
Shorts (1948) 32 Cal.2d 502, 512; see People v. Carty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 
1518, 1528), and the burden falls to defendant “to explain and justify the delay” 
(People v. Castaneda (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1618).  “[W]here a defendant 
seeks to vacate a solemn judgment of conviction . . . the showing of diligence 
essential to the granting of relief by way of coram nobis should be no less than the 
similar showing required in civil cases where relief is sought against lately 
discovered fraud.  In such cases it is necessary to aver not only the probative facts 
upon which the basic claim rests, but also the time and circumstances under which 
the facts were discovered, in order that the court can determine as a matter of law 
whether the litigant proceeded with due diligence; a mere allegation of the 
ultimate facts, or of the legal conclusion of diligence, is insufficient.”  (Shorts, at 
p. 513, italics added; see also People v. Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 230 
[defendant “ ‘must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to 
him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at 
any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ’ ”].) 
This diligence requirement is analogous to that which we apply to petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus, where we require a petitioner to set forth with 
specificity when the “petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should 
have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis 
for the claim.”  (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780.)  Indeed, we previously 
 
19
have recognized that petitions for writs of habeas corpus and error coram nobis are 
essentially identical in this regard.  (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 779 [“a 
habeas corpus petitioner, like a petitioner who mounts a collateral attack by 
petition for writ of [error] coram nobis,” must allege facts showing due 
diligence].) 
The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed 
randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between 
the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a 
reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated.  
“[I]t is the trial that is the main arena for determining the guilt or innocence of an 
accused defendant . . . .  At trial, a defendant is afforded counsel and a panoply of 
procedural protections, including state-funded investigation expenses, in order to 
ensure that the trial proceedings provide a fair and full opportunity to assess the 
truth of the charges against the defendant and the appropriate punishment.  
Further, . . . [i]t is the appeal that provides the basic and primary means for raising 
challenges to the fairness of the trial.”  (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 777.)  
Thus, although coram nobis exists as a possible remedy in cases where this system 
breaks down, the availability of that extraordinary remedy, like habeas corpus, 
“properly must be tempered by the necessity of giving due consideration to the 
interest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its 
laws and to the important public interest in the finality of judgments.”  (Id. at 
p. 778.)  Nor is the diligence requirement for coram nobis unique, for in addition 
to habeas corpus petitions, we require diligence for other types of collateral attacks 
on the validity of a plea.  (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Zamudio), supra, 
23 Cal.4th at pp. 203-207 [diligence requirement for a motion to vacate a plea 
under § 1016.5]; People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023 [defendant’s 
 
20
complaint that he was not advised of the collateral consequences of his plea 
requires a timely objection].) 
In this case, defendant — who presumably knew he was not a citizen — 
entered his plea in April 1997 and initialed the statement stating he understood his 
plea “could result in deportation, exclusion from admission to this country, and/or 
denial of naturalization.”  The INS first moved to deport him in December 1998, 
filing a notice to appear.  Upon his parole from state prison in February 1999, he 
was immediately detained by federal immigration authorities.  Although he was 
involved in the state and federal judicial systems and was represented by counsel 
throughout this time, he did not file his petition for a writ of error coram nobis or 
move to vacate his plea until July 2005, almost seven years after the INS first 
attempted to deport him.  (See People v. Trantow (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 842, 847 
[filing a petition for a writ of error coram nobis eight years after filing a habeas 
corpus petition and 14 years after conviction constitutes inexcusable delay].) 
Further undermining his claims, defendant fails to allege with specificity 
when he learned the facts forming the basis of his petition.  He declared in an 
affidavit accompanying his petition that (1) he is concerned he would be forced to 
serve in the South Korean military if deported; (2) that he may be punished for 
refusing on religious grounds; (3) that he was not aware at the time he entered his 
plea that he was admitting a deportable offense; and (4) that had he known he had 
the option of pleading to a different, nondeportable offense, “I would have worked 
with my attorney to bring it to the attention of the court in negotiating an 
equivalent plea and sentence that [would have] avoided my deportation.”  But 
nowhere does he allege when he learned these facts. 
Counsel himself declared that at the time of the plea he was “unaware” the 
plea would render defendant deportable, although he does not speak to whether he 
failed to investigate.  He further declares that had he been aware an alternative 
 
21
plea to burglary in the language of the statute would have avoided deportation, “I 
believe there is a reasonable probability the prosecution and court would have 
been willing to agree to this plea.”  Although counsel mentions he subsequently 
became aware of the immigration consequences defendant faces, he does not 
declare when he learned of these facts.   
In sum, with regard to the allegedly new facts on which defendant relies for 
his petition for the writ of error coram nobis, he fails to allege with specificity “the 
time and circumstances under which the facts were discovered” so as to permit 
this court to “determine as a matter of law whether [defendant] proceeded with 
due diligence.”  (People v. Shorts, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 513.) 
Defendant’s claim fails for a second procedural reason:  he failed to avail 
himself of other remedies when he had the chance.  “The maxim, ‘for every wrong 
there is a remedy’ (Civ. Code, sec. 3523) is not to be regarded as affording a 
second remedy to a party who has lost the remedy provided by law through failing 
to invoke it in time—even though such failure accrued without fault or negligence 
on his part.”  (People v. Reid, supra, 195 Cal. at p. 260; see also Mendez v. 
Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 791, 798 [quoting Reid with approval].)12  
                                              
12  
The federal courts apparently follow a different rule.  (United States v. 
Morgan (1954) 346 U.S. 502, 510-511 [rejecting the claim that a prisoner should 
be prohibited from proceeding on coram nobis because he could previously have 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court]; U.S. v. Kwan (9th Cir. 
2005) 407 F.3d 1005, 1012 [availability of other remedies is not a bar to coram 
nobis so long as petitioner shows he had a valid reason for the delay].)  But these 
decisions are linked to the purpose of the federal habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255; see Morgan, at pp. 510-511 [discussing the purpose of § 2255]) and do not 
address our state writ practice or the purpose of our state procedural bar, which 
has been a part of the law of coram nobis since at least 1924.  (People v. Reid, 
supra, 195 Cal. at p. 260.)  Accordingly, we do not find these federal authorities 
persuasive.  
 
22
This procedural requirement is analogous to the general rule applicable to writs of 
habeas corpus “that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, and, 
in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to 
employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have 
been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.”  
(In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.)  In the instant case, defendant could have 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus while he was still in actual or constructive 
state custody, that is, in prison or on parole.   
Defendant argues that neither of these procedural bars (delay and other 
remedies) precludes his entitlement to relief, but his arguments are unpersuasive.  
The INS first moved to deport defendant by filing a notice to appear in December 
1998 while he was still in prison and thus in actual custody.  At this time 
defendant could have sought to vacate his plea or otherwise invalidate his 
conviction by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Although defendant 
asserts the basis of the 1998 notice to appear was merely the length of his sentence 
and not his plea, so that he could not have sought to vacate the plea, he is 
mistaken.  The 1998 INS filing against him was based on his status as an 
“aggravated felon,” i.e., that he was an “alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission.”  (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).)  Thus, the 
1998 notice to appear informed him he was deportable because (1) he had been 
convicted (2) of a theft offense for which the term of imprisonment was at least 
one year, i.e., an aggravated felony.  (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).)  That 
defendant’s conviction was achieved by a guilty plea rather than a jury trial is 
irrelevant; the critical fact was his conviction of the type of offense authorizing 
deportation.  Thus, it cannot be said he was not fairly on notice in 1998 that the 
INS intended to deport him based on his conviction for the Costco crimes.  
(Compare People v. Gontiz (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1312-1313 & fn. 2 
 
23
[defendant placed on notice of adverse immigration consequences when, four 
years after his plea, the INS brought permanent deportation charges against him]13 
with People v. Totari (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209 [defendant had no notice 
INS would deport him based on his criminal convictions when the initial 
deportation proceedings were based on his alleged violation of his student visa, 
not his convictions].)  Although he asserts “[h]e was never sleeping on his rights,” 
his assertion is belied by the record, for nearly seven years passed after the INS’s 
first action against him — based on his conviction for an aggravated felony — 
before he filed his petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court and 
sought to vacate his plea in the Costco crimes.   
Defendant next claims he was not placed on notice he could actually be 
deported until 2004, when the BIA reversed the immigration judge’s grant of his 
motion for cancellation of removal.  (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).)  Although the BIA’s 
action made his removal more likely, to conclude this ruling constituted the very 
first time defendant learned he could actually be deported is unreasonable.  The 
INS’s December 1998 notice to appear notified defendant not merely of the 
potential adverse immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony petty theft 
with a prior, but of the actual consequences.  (Cf. People v. Superior Court 
(Zamudio), supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 204 [addressing § 1016.5].)   
Even were we to assume defendant first learned the facts underlying his 
coram nobis petition sometime around 2003 (when he first began challenging his 
state convictions), the petition is procedurally defective for a third reason:  
defendant has engaged in the piecemeal presentation of claims.  Defendant 
                                              
13  
Gontiz was disapproved on another ground in People v. Superior Court 
(Zamudio), supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 200, footnote 8. 
 
24
maintains he has at all times taken a “[]holistic” view of his immigration 
predicament, following a strategy that prioritized his legal challenges to attack first 
the most serious of the various bases for his removal from the country, and that he 
should not be penalized for “proceed[ing] in a logical progression to deal with the 
worst threat first.”  However prudent or efficacious defendant and his legal 
representatives may have believed this strategy to be, a litigant seeking 
extraordinary relief from a final judgment is not entitled to bring his legal claims 
to court seriatim.  The analogy to habeas corpus is again apt; for relief on habeas 
corpus, it has long been the rule that “piecemeal presentation of known claims” is 
prohibited.  (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 777; see also In re Horowitz (1949) 
33 Cal.2d 534, 547 [a habeas corpus petitioner “ ‘cannot be allowed to present his 
reasons against the validity of the judgment against him piecemeal by successive 
proceedings for the same general purpose’ ”]; In re Connor (1940) 16 Cal.2d 701, 
705 [“a defendant is not permitted to try out his contentions piecemeal by 
successive proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment against him”].)  As 
with petitions for writs of habeas corpus, one seeking relief via coram nobis may 
not attack a final judgment in piecemeal fashion, in proceedings filed seriatim, in 
the hopes of finally convincing a court to issue the writ.  Although defendant 
contends he has not violated this rule, his 2005 motion in the trial court to vacate 
his guilty plea (and hence his conviction) for the Costco crimes frankly concedes 
the motion was based “on the same grounds that all parties acknowledged in 
2003” in support of his successful motion for resentencing in the same case.  If 
defendant knew of these grounds in 2003, he was not entitled to reraise them in 
2005. 
Defendant claims the People’s failure, in 2003, to contest his request for 
resentencing to an aggregate 364 days for the Costco crimes and the tool shed 
burglary necessarily conceded for all purposes that he has proceeded with 
 
25
diligence.  But the prosecutor’s equivocal statements at that 2003 hearing (“No.  
I just want to say we’re not opposing it.  That’s as far into it as I want to get”) 
cannot fairly be read as a concession that defendant’s subsequent petition for a 
writ of error coram nobis, filed two years later, was timely.  Nor, as defendant 
claims, did the People forfeit the timeliness objection by failing to raise the issue 
below.  As the party moving the court to issue the writ, defendant, not the People, 
had the burden of producing evidence.  (People v. Totari, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1206.)  Moreover, in opposing both the habeas corpus and the coram nobis 
writ petitions below, the People specifically argued that defendant “has failed to 
prove diligence.”  
In sum, defendant’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis is procedurally 
defective.  The petition was not diligently filed, defendant failed to avail himself 
of the adequate legal remedy of habeas corpus, and the petition is successive and 
improperly raises claims piecemeal.   
b.  The merits of the claim 
Even were we to overlook the procedural flaws in defendant’s application 
for a writ of error coram nobis, we would conclude he has not demonstrated that 
facts existed at the time of his plea that satisfy the strict requirements for this 
extraordinary type of collateral relief from a final judgment.  Specifically, he has 
not shown “ ‘that some fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his 
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which if 
presented would have prevented the rendition of the judgment.’ ”  (People v. 
Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 230.)   
As noted, defendant asserts as allegedly new facts that (1) he would be 
deported because his 1997 plea to petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction 
was his second conviction of a crime of moral turpitude “even without a sentence 
 
26
of one year in custody” (underscoring omitted); (2) if deported, he would be 
obligated to serve in the South Korean military and, on refusing such service on 
religious grounds, he would be imprisoned there; (3) his trial attorney was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate the immigration consequences 
of the plea; and (4) his attorney was ineffective for failing to negotiate an 
alternative plea to a nondeportable offense. 
None of these alleged new facts supports issuance of a writ of error coram 
nobis.  To qualify for issuance of the writ, the alleged facts must be such that “ ‘if 
presented would have prevented the rendition of the judgment.’ ”  (People v. 
Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 230.)  As noted, ante, facts that have justified 
issuance of the writ in the past have included a litigant’s insanity or minority, that 
the litigant had never been properly served, and that a defendant’s plea was 
procured through extrinsic fraud or mob violence.  (People v. Reid, supra, 195 
Cal. at pp. 258-259.)  Defendant’s alleged new facts, in contrast, speak merely to 
the legal effect of his guilty plea and thus are not grounds for relief on coram 
nobis.  (People v. Banks, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 378 [coram nobis is unavailable 
where a defendant, “with knowledge of the facts,” pleads guilty “because of 
ignorance or mistake as to the legal effect of those facts”]; see also People v. 
McElwee, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 [defendant’s belief, at the time of his 
plea, that he would only serve 15 years in prison “was not a mistake of fact but 
one of law”]; People v. Ibanez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 546 [“[d]efendant’s 
ignorance regarding the potential for civil commitment under the SVPA [as a 
result of his plea] is a legal, not a factual, question”].)14 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
14  
Defendant was in fact warned about the possibility of deportation prior to 
entering his plea, and knowledge that the INS would actually seek to remove him 
from the country as a result of his conviction is not a “new” fact for purposes of 
 
27
Defendant’s allegations that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been 
armed with these additional facts, or that counsel would have been successful in 
arranging a plea to a nondeportable offense had these facts been known, 
fundamentally misapprehends the pertinent inquiry.  To qualify as the basis for 
relief on coram nobis, newly discovered facts must establish a basic flaw that 
would have prevented rendition of the judgment.  (People v. Shipman, supra, 62 
Cal.2d at p. 230; see People v. Trantow, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 845 
[defendant’s ignorance that her alien status might result in deportation would not 
have “prevented” the judgment].)  Such facts often go to the legal competence of 
witnesses or litigants, or the jurisdiction of the court.  New facts that would merely 
have affected the willingness of a litigant to enter a plea, or would have 
encouraged or convinced him or her to make different strategic choices or seek a 
different disposition, are not facts that would have prevented rendition of the 
judgment. 
In arguing to the contrary, defendant relies heavily on People v. 
Wiedersperg (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 550, but that decision cannot bear the weight 
of his argument.  In that case, an Austrian national was charged with having 
committed a minor drug offense.  He submitted the case on the preliminary 
hearing transcript, was convicted, and served his probation.  Later, he successfully 
convinced the trial court to expunge the conviction.  He was thereafter deported 
but filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeking to vacate his conviction 
on the ground that at the time of his plea no one knew he was an alien.  The trial 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
coram nobis review.  The INS’s decision to deport him speaks only to the relative 
risk of deportation, not the fact of deportation itself.  (Cf. People v. Castaneda, 
supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1619 [addressing § 1016.5].) 
 
28
court denied the coram nobis petition on the ground the court lacked jurisdiction 
because the conviction had already been expunged.  (Id. at p. 553.)  The appellate 
court disagreed on the jurisdictional point and remanded, opining that the trial 
court, “in its discretion and if the proof is sufficient, could grant the relief sought.”  
(Id. at p. 555.)   
In so holding, the Wiedersperg court suggested that the defendant’s 
allegations described errors of fact, not of law.  (People v. Wiedersperg, supra, 44 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 554-555; accord, In re Azurin (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 20, 27, 
fn. 7 [stating the denial of habeas corpus relief to an out-of-custody defendant was 
without prejudice to “filing a petition for error coram nobis in the superior court,” 
citing Wiedersperg].)  Defendant asserts:  “Wiedersperg remains a principled and 
analytically sound example of when coram nobis relief is warranted.”   
We disagree.  The Wiedersperg court never explains why it considered 
allegations of alienage an error of fact and not of law, nor why such an allegedly 
unknown fact would have prevented rendition of the judgment.  (People v. 
Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 230.)  Later courts have found the opinion 
unpersuasive.  As the Court of Appeal explained in People v. Soriano, supra, 194 
Cal.App.3d at page 1475, the decision of the Wiedersperg court “was an extremely 
limited one.  It found only that the trial court to whom the writ was directed had 
erred in finding it had no jurisdiction to consider the petition, and that [the 
petitioner] had stated facts which, if they could be proven, would permit issuance 
of the writ in the discretion of the trial court.”  (See also People v. Ibanez, supra, 
76 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 [making the same point].)  In any event, as the Soriano 
court observed, because the trial court in Wiedersperg did not advise the defendant 
on the record of the possible immigration consequences of his plea, Wiedersperg 
has effectively been superseded by the enactment of section 1016.5, which created 
a statutory basis for a motion to vacate and to withdraw a guilty plea entered under 
 
29
such circumstances.15  Because a statutory remedy is now available for the 
situation posed in Wiedersperg, coram nobis cannot lie.  (Mendez v. Superior 
Court, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) 
Finally, with regard to defendant’s claims that his counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate and for failing to negotiate a 
different plea, we conclude neither allegation states a case for relief on coram 
nobis.  That a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which relates more to a 
mistake of law than of fact, is an inappropriate ground for relief on coram nobis 
has long been the rule.  (People v. Soriano, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1477; In 
re Nunez, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 236; People v. Buggs (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 285, 
289.)  Although an attorney has a constitutional duty at least not to affirmatively 
misadvise his or her client as to the immigration consequences of a plea (In re 
Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 235, 240 (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.); id. at p. 255 
(conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)), any violation in this regard should be raised in a 
motion for a new trial or in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Bautista (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229 [issuing order to show cause on 
habeas corpus].)  Nor does defendant in any event assert he was misadvised. 
                                              
15  
Subdivision (b) of section 1016.5 provides in pertinent part:  “If, after 
January 1, 1978, the court fails to advise the defendant as required by this section 
and the defendant shows that conviction of the offense to which defendant pleaded 
guilty or nolo contendere may have the consequences for the defendant of 
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States, the court, on defendant’s 
motion, shall vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty.  Absent a record that 
the court provided the advisement required by this section, the defendant shall be 
presumed not to have received the required advisement.” 
 
30
3.  Proposed Expansion of Coram Nobis 
Perhaps recognizing that his case falls outside the traditionally narrow 
limits of the writ of error coram nobis as that remedy has been defined in 
California, defendant joined by amici curiae contends we should modify our 
coram nobis procedure to make it consistent with what he terms the “vast majority 
of all U.S. jurisdictions.”  He characterizes coram nobis jurisprudence in this state 
as “incoherent” and a “deformed and hobbled creature,” and insists some form of 
postconviction remedy is necessary to ameliorate the harshness of the situation in 
which fundamental constitutional violations have occurred but will go unremedied 
because the offender is now out of custody and unable to seek relief on habeas 
corpus.16 
                                              
16  
Defendant and amici curiae place much reliance on United States v. 
Morgan, supra, 346 U.S. 502, contending it represents the modern trend of 
broadening the scope of coram nobis.  The petitioner in Morgan was no longer in 
custody on a prior conviction, but sought relief on coram nobis (claiming he had 
been denied counsel) when that prior conviction was alleged as the basis of a 
sentence enhancement in a prosecution for a new New York State offense.  The 
high court held coram nobis was an available remedy under the “all writs” section 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (28 U.S.C. § 1651), explaining the constitutional right 
of which the petitioner allegedly was deprived was fundamental in nature.  
“Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist.  
Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties [and] civil rights may be 
affected.”  (Morgan, at pp. 512-513.) 
 
The continuing efficacy of Morgan’s holding is in doubt, however, for 
more recently the high court has reiterated the limited nature of the writ of error 
coram nobis.  “[I]t was traditionally available only to bring before the court factual 
errors ‘material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself,’ such 
as the defendant’s being under age or having died before the verdict.”  (Carlisle v. 
United States (1996) 517 U.S. 416, 429.)  Moreover, although the petitioner in 
Carlisle, as in Morgan, argued the writ of error coram nobis was available under 
title 28 United States Code section 1651, the high court explained that with the 
advent of the modern Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “ ‘it is difficult to 
conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of error 
coram nobis] would be necessary or appropriate’ ” (Carlisle, at p. 429). 
 
31
That other jurisdictions (see, e.g., Skok v. State (2000) 361 Md. 52 [760 
A.2d 647]; U.S. v. Kwan, supra, 407 F.3d 1005) may have broadened the grounds 
for coram nobis so that it resembles a generalized postconviction remedy available 
to persons no longer in custody may be true, but for several reasons we are 
unconvinced a similar change is appropriate in this state.  First, the weight of 
authority in this state holds that the writ of error coram nobis “ ‘is not broad 
enough to reach every case in which there has been an erroneous or unjust 
judgment on the sole ground that no other remedy exists, but it must be confined 
to cases in which the supposed error inheres in facts not actually in issue under the 
pleadings at the trial and were unknown to the court when the judgment was 
entered, but which, if known, would have prevented the judgment.’ ”  (In re 
Lindley, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 725-726; see also People v. Hayman, supra, 145 
Cal.App.2d at p. 623 [coram nobis is a limited remedy]; People v. Martinez, 
supra, 88 Cal.App.2d at p. 774 [same].) 
Second, criminal defendants have ample opportunities to challenge the 
correctness of the judgments against them.  They are of course provided attorneys 
to defend them and are guaranteed the right to a jury trial.  Following a plea or 
conviction, a defendant can move to withdraw a plea,17 or can appeal a judgment 
of conviction and then if necessary seek discretionary review in this court.  Having 
exhausted those avenues of potential relief, the defendant during the time of actual 
or constructive custody can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in an 
                                              
17  
Section 1018 provides in pertinent part:  “On application of the defendant at 
any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is 
made if entry of judgment is suspended, the court may, and in case of a defendant 
who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall, for a good 
cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty 
substituted.”   
 
32
appropriate court.18  Following completion of probation, an offender may in some 
circumstances petition the trial court to withdraw a guilty plea and enter a not 
guilty plea or set aside a verdict of guilty and have the matter dismissed.  
(§ 1203.4.)  One convicted of a crime can also seek a pardon from the Governor.  
(Mendez v. Superior Court, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.)  In short, criminal 
defendants do not lack reasonable opportunities to vindicate their constitutional 
rights or otherwise correct legal errors infecting their judgments. 
Third, when these established remedies have proved inadequate, the 
Legislature has enacted statutory remedies to fill the void.  For example, a 
criminal defendant, even if no longer in custody, can now move to withdraw a 
guilty plea if the trial court accepting the plea failed to admonish the accused of 
the immigration consequences of the plea.  (§ 1016.5.)  Similarly, defendants 
convicted in part by the false testimony of government agents may, even if no 
longer in custody, move to vacate the judgment.  (§ 1473.6; see People v. 
Germany (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 784, 791 [statute responded to a scandal in Los 
Angeles County in which police officers falsified reports, planted evidence, and 
                                              
18  
The People argue that by enacting statutes implementing the habeas corpus 
remedy, the Legislature has occupied the field, thereby undermining this court’s 
ability to expand the coram nobis remedy.  In support, they request that we take 
judicial notice of the legislative history of section 1473, which sets forth a 
nonexclusive list of grounds for authorizing issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.  
The People also argue that expanding the coram nobis remedy as defendant 
requests would “open the floodgates” because over 19,000 inmates (about 11 
percent) were subject to an INS hold.  In support, the People request that we take 
judicial notice of certain statistics compiled by the Data Analysis Unit of the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  Because it is 
unnecessary to address these arguments, the requested legislative and agency 
materials are superfluous.  Accordingly, we deny the requests for judicial notice.  
(County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, 
fn. 29.) 
 
33
committed perjury].)  And because certain misdemeanor convictions related to 
domestic violence might affect one’s right to own or carry a firearm under federal 
law, the Legislature, in enacting section 12021, subdivision (c)(2), has created a 
statutory remedy to permit peace officers to expunge such convictions and avoid 
the federal firearm ban.19   
As the foregoing examples indicate, the Legislature has been active in 
providing statutory remedies when the existing remedies such as habeas corpus 
have proven ineffective.  Section 1016.5 especially shows the Legislature’s 
concern that those who plead guilty or no contest to criminal charges are aware of 
the immigration consequences of their pleas.  Because the Legislature remains free 
to enact further statutory remedies for those in defendant’s position, we are 
disinclined to reinterpret the historic writ of error coram nobis to provide the 
remedy he seeks.  Indeed, by specifying in which court a person should file a 
petition for a writ of error coram nobis (§ 1265), the Legislature has impliedly 
recognized the existence of the common law writ and can modify it should it so 
desire. 
                                              
19  
We take judicial notice, as requested by amici curiae California Rifle and 
Pistol Association and the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, of an 
information bulletin by the California Attorney General informing state criminal 
justice agencies that the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives does not recognize an expungement under Penal Code section 12021, 
subdivision (c) and continues to prohibit persons with qualifying convictions from 
owning or possessing firearms.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) [official acts of the 
executive branch are subject to judicial notice].)  We also take judicial notice, as 
amici curiae request, of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in a Los Angeles 
County Superior Court action in which a police officer seeks to restore his right to 
own and possess firearms by vacating his plea in 1993 to misdemeanor spousal 
abuse, a violation of Penal Code section 273.5.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) 
[court records are subject to judicial notice].)   
 
34
Finally, expanding coram nobis to create a generalized common law 
postconviction, postcustody remedy would accord insufficient deference to a final 
judgment.  We have addressed the importance of finality for the analogous remedy 
of habeas corpus, explaining:  “Generally, of course, habeas corpus claims must 
surmount the presumption of correctness we accord criminal judgments rendered 
after procedurally fair trials. ‘ “For purposes of collateral attack, all presumptions 
favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence; defendant 
thus must undertake the burden of overturning them.  Society’s interest in the 
finality of criminal proceedings so demands, and due process is not thereby 
offended.” ’ ”  (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1240.)  Moreover, we reject 
defendant’s argument that the interest in the finality of judgments predominates 
only if the judgment is just and error free.  “ ‘Endless litigation, in which nothing 
was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of 
justice.’ ”  (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 
11 [declining, in a civil case, to create a new tort for spoliation of evidence despite 
evidence of fraud and destruction of evidence].) 
For the above stated reasons, we decline defendant’s invitation to expand 
the historic boundaries of the writ of error coram nobis.  In light of this 
conclusion, we express no opinion as to whether the trial court possessed the 
inherent power to do so.20 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
20  
We also reject defendant’s contention that in light of the Legislature’s 
enactment of section 1016.5, which necessarily reflects that body’s assessment of 
the need for a remedy when pleading defendants are unaware of the immigration 
consequences of their pleas, we should expand the scope of that statutory motion 
to vacate to provide some form of relief for defendant here.  We note the trial 
court properly admonished defendant regarding the possible immigration 
consequences of his plea, and his further claim that his trial attorney was somehow 
ineffective is not a wrong encompassed by the statute.  (See People v. Chien 
 
35
B.  Availability of Habeas Corpus Relief 
Finally, defendant argues he is entitled to relief via a writ of habeas corpus.  
Although he did not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, he 
contends he should be excused from doing so because not until People v. Villa, 
supra, __ Cal.4th ___, was filed in the Court of Appeal did case law authorize a 
habeas corpus petition by a person in out-of-state custody.  But the petitioner in 
Villa alleged he was currently in ICE custody, whereas defendant here is 
apparently free on bail from ICE custody.  Even were we to assume such bail 
status could constitute a form of constructive custody for habeas corpus purposes, 
as explained in Villa and contrary to the Court of Appeal, persons like defendant, 
who have completely served their sentence and also completed their probation or 
parole period, may not challenge their underlying conviction in a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus because they are in neither actual nor constructive custody 
for state habeas corpus purposes.  Accordingly, we reject this claim as well. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The United States Congress has plenary power over matters of immigration 
and naturalization (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4), including deportation, and 
judicial power regarding immigration and naturalization is extremely limited 
(Fiallo v. Bell (1977) 430 U.S. 787, 792).  “In the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”  (Mathews v. Diaz (1976) 426 U.S. 67, 79-80.)  
Because of federal immigration laws concerning the commission of certain types 
of crimes by resident aliens, defendant is facing the possibly permanent separation 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1283 [ineffectiveness of counsel claim is not cognizable 
in a motion to vacate under § 1016.5].)   
 
36
 
37
from his family, his friends, and the only home he has ever known.  But despite 
this harsh consequence flowing from his 1997 conviction for petty theft with a 
prior theft-related conviction (following his conviction for the tool shed burglary 
in 1996), we conclude that at this late date, he is procedurally barred from 
obtaining relief by way of coram nobis because his presentation of claims is 
untimely, he had other legal remedies, and he presented his legal claims 
piecemeal.  We also conclude that defendant has not stated a case for relief on the 
merits because he alleges no mistake of fact which, had it been known at the time 
of his plea, would have prevented rendition of the judgment.  Accordingly, the 
trial court abused its discretion in granting relief.  Because the Court of Appeal 
below correctly reversed the trial court’s decision to issue a writ of error coram 
nobis, we affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Kim 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 150 Cal.App.4th 1158 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S153183 
Date Filed: March 16, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Terrance R. Duncan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Mary Jo Graves and Dane 
R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. 
Share, Laurence K. Sullivan and Amy Haddix, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of Norton Tooby, Norton Tooby; Law Offices of A.J. Kutchins, AJ Kutchins; Law Offices of 
Joel Franklin and Joel Franklin for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Ralph S. Greer as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Immigrant Crime and Justice and Karl W. Krooth for National Immigration Project of National Lawyers 
Guild as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Linda Starr, Paige Kaneb; and Michael Willemsen for Northern California Innocence Project as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Law Offices of Michael K. Mehr, Michael K. Mehr and Rachael Keast for Immigrant Legal Resources 
Center, San Francisco Public Defender, UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic, San Francisco Public 
Defender’s Office, South Asian Network and Asian Law Caucus as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
Denise M. Gragg, Assistant Public Defender (Orange), for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Trutanich • Michel, C. D. Michel, Brigid Joyce, Joseph A. Silvoso and Erin Eckelman for California Rifle 
& Pistol Association, Inc., and Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Amy Haddix 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5893 
 
Norton Tooby 
Law Offices of Norton Tooby 
6333 Telegraph Avenue, Suite 200 
Oakland, CA  94609 
9510) 601-1300