Title: Roten v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 290, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BENNY ROTEN, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 290, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 0401005180 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 4, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 15, 2007 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 15th day of March 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the appellant’s response 
thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Benny Roten, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a 
motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the 
face of Roten’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Roten pled guilty in August 2004 to one 
count of first degree assault, as a lesser included offense to attempted first 
 
2
degree murder, and one count of aggravated menacing.  Prior to sentencing, 
Roten filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the Superior Court 
denied.  This Court affirmed Roten’s convictions and sentences on direct 
appeal.1  Thereafter, Roten filed a motion for postconviction relief, pursuant 
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, which the Superior Court denied.  This 
appeal followed. 
(3) 
Roten raises three issues in his opening brief on appeal.  First, 
he contends that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea.  Second, Roten contends that he was denied his constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel prior to the entry of his plea.  
Finally, Roten contends that the interest of justice requires reconsideration of 
whether Roten was under the influence of medication before the entry of his 
guilty plea. 
(4) 
Roten’s first and third arguments were considered and rejected 
in the context of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his appeal 
therefrom.2  Contrary to Roten’s contention, reconsideration of these 
previously adjudicated claims was not warranted in the interest of justice.3   
                                                 
1 Roten v. State, 2005 WL 2254202 (Del. Sept. 15, 2005). 
2 See id. 
3 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (2007). 
 
3
(5) 
With respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Roten contends that:  (i) counsel coerced him into accepting the plea; (ii) 
counsel failed to investigate his mental condition, including his use of 
medication; (iii) counsel failed to investigate the degree of injuries to the 
victim; and (iv) counsel failed to raise issues that Roten wanted to argue on 
appeal.  
(6) 
In order to obtain relief on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant 
must establish that his counsel acted unreasonably and that, but for counsel’s 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have 
pleaded guilty and instead would have chosen to proceed to trial.4  A 
defendant’s sworn statements to the Superior Court during the guilty plea 
colloquy are presumed to be truthful and pose a “formidable barrier to any 
subsequent collateral proceeding.”5  With respect to his first two issues, 
Roten has offered no “clear and convincing” evidence why he should not be 
bound by his sworn assertions during his plea colloquy that he was not 
coerced into entering a plea and that he was not under the influence of any 
medications.6 
                                                 
4 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) (quoting Voytik v. United 
States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
6 Id. 
 
4
(7) 
Roten next contends that counsel erred by failing to investigate 
the victim’s “mostly superficial” injuries in order to negotiate a plea to a 
lesser charge.  The record, however, shows no error on the part of counsel. 
As the Superior Court noted, the medical records regarding the victim’s 
injuries, reflecting a brain contusion and multiple complex facial fractures, 
contradict Roten’s contention that the victim’s injuries were “mostly 
superficial.”  Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s rejection 
of this claim of ineffectiveness. 
(8) 
Finally, Roten argues that his counsel was ineffective on direct 
appeal for failing to raise the issues Roten wished to argue.7  The issues 
involved the same grounds that formed the basis for the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea, which the Superior Court had rejected.  As this Court noted 
in its decision on Roten’s direct appeal, counsel conceded the issues because 
they were inconsistent with Roten’s own assertions made under oath at his 
plea colloquy.  The Superior Court did not err in concluding that the 
arguments did not form the basis for withdrawal of the plea and would not 
have been successful if counsel had pursued them on appeal.  Thus, there 
was no ineffective assistance of Roten’s appellate counsel. 
                                                 
7 The issues were related to Roten’s alleged lack of understanding of the plea 
agreement and the involuntary nature of his plea due to the influence of medication and 
the coercion of his counsel. 
 
5
 
(8) 
We find it manifest that the judgment of the Superior Court 
should be affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court=s well-reasoned 
decision dated May 18, 2006. The Superior Court did not err in concluding 
that Roten’s motion for postconviction relief was both procedurally barred 
and without merit.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice