Title: State v. Marty R. Caban
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP001015-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
94-1015-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Marty R. Caban, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  202 Wis. 2d 417, 551 N.W.2d 24 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 12, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 29, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Byron 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (Opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., joins. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Diane M. Nicks, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Katherine R. Kruse and University of Wisconson Law School, 
Criminal Appeals Project and oral argument by Katherine R. Kruse 
 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Marty R. Caban, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
(State) seeks review of a court of appeals’ decision which held 
the police did not have probable cause to search a vehicle 
belonging to Marty R. Caban (Caban).  State v. Caban, 202 Wis. 
2d 417, 551 N.W.2d 24 (1996).  The State argues that even though 
there was probable cause to search Caban’s vehicle, Caban did 
not raise the issue of probable cause to search the vehicle at 
the circuit court and is therefore precluded from raising it on 
appeal.  We agree that Caban waived the issue of probable cause 
to search the vehicle and accordingly reverse the court of 
appeals. 
¶2 
The facts derived from the complaint are as follows: 
On March 31, 1993, Caban drove to the home of his friends, Fred 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
2 
and Denise Hollingsworth.  Upon arriving at the Hollingsworth 
home, Caban parked his car just south of their driveway, on a 
public street. 
¶3 
Unbeknownst to Caban, the Hollingsworth residence was 
under surveillance at the time by the Rock County Metro 
Narcotics Unit (Narcotics Unit) in preparation for the execution 
of a search warrant.  The search warrant specifically targeted 
the Hollingsworth apartment, its residents, Fred and Denise 
Hollingsworth, and any vehicles located on the premises.  
Neither Caban nor his vehicle was named in the search warrant.   
¶4 
A 
surveillance 
officer 
observed 
Caban 
park 
his 
automobile and then enter the Hollingsworth residence.  The 
officer did not observe Caban carrying anything into the 
residence, but the officer noted that Caban was wearing a dark, 
ankle-length coat.  Minutes after Caban entered the apartment, 
members of the Narcotics Unit entered the residence to execute 
the search warrant.  Inside the Hollingsworth home, Narcotics 
Unit officers found Fred and Denise Hollingsworth, their three 
children, and Caban.  They also discovered a ziplock baggie 
containing 29.9 grams of marijuana.  Hollingsworth acknowledged 
that the marijuana belonged to him, but told the police that, 
just prior to the execution of the warrant, Caban had come by 
and asked if he wanted to purchase any marijuana.  Hollingsworth 
further advised the officers that he had purchased marijuana 
from Caban several times in the past. 
¶5 
The officers forced Caban to the floor and placed him 
in hand restraints.  After the occupants of the residence were 
secured, Narcotics Unit Detective Richard J. Mussey commented 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
3 
that he recognized Caban from the scene of a previous Narcotics 
Unit search.  While Caban was secured in hand restraints, 
Detective Mussey searched him to assure the safety of the 
officers.  This search produced no weapons and no contraband.  
However, 
in 
Caban’s 
pockets, 
Detective 
Mussey 
discovered 
$1199.00 in United States currency.   
¶6 
Detective Mussey then ordered Deputy Hoerler of the 
Rock County Sheriff’s Department to search Caban’s vehicle.  The 
officers at the scene made no attempt to obtain a search warrant 
for Caban’s vehicle.  Caban was not asked, nor did he consent to 
the search of his vehicle.  No other vehicles were searched 
pursuant to the search warrant for the Hollingsworth residence. 
¶7 
Acting on the orders of Officer Mussey, Deputy Hoerler 
searched the entire unlocked interior and the locked trunk of 
Caban’s vehicle while it was parked unattended at the curb.  
Deputy Hoerler recovered a black plastic bag from the front 
passenger floor area of the vehicle which she turned over to 
Drug Unit Officer Niman.  Inside the bag were two clear plastic 
bags of marijuana, one weighing 19.6 grams and the other 
weighing 28.4 grams.  Officer Niman seized the marijuana. 
¶8 
After the officers discovered the marijuana in Caban’s 
vehicle, he was placed under arrest.  Subsequently, Caban was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1m)(b)(1993-94).
1  Caban 
filed a pre-trial motion to suppress as evidence the marijuana 
found during the search.  
                     
1 All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
4 
¶9 
The written motion, cited in relevant part below,
2 
asserts a broad Fourth Amendment challenge to the automobile 
search.  However, Caban’s motion did not include a request to 
suppress the evidence on the ground that there was no probable 
cause for the search of his vehicle. 
                     
2  
The defendant, Marty R. Caban, by his counsel, 
hereby moves the Court to suppress as evidence certain 
property seized by the Rock County Metro Narcotics 
Unit and Janesville Police Department on the 31st of 
March, 1993, from a 1982 Dodge automobile, titled in 
the name of the defendant herein, for the following 
reasons: 
1.  That on or about the time of the seizure, the 
Rock County Metro Unit was in the process of executing 
a search warrant at 1300 Hamilton Avenue, Janesville, 
Rock County, Wisconsin, which was the residence at 
said time of a Fred Hollingsworth, and whose residence 
and property was the specific subject matter of the 
search warrant, and identified therein.  That the 
defendant, Marty R. Caban, was not identified in the 
search warrant, nor was any property or residence 
belonging to him described therein. 
2.  That the property seized in conjunction with 
the search of the Hollingsworth residence, was not 
done with lawful authority and was in violation of the 
defendant’s 
rights 
as 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution, Article IV, of the Amendments thereto, 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
3.  That the property seized from the automobile 
of the defendant was the result of an unlawful and 
illegal arrest. 
4.  That the vehicle from which the property was 
seized was not occupied by the defendant nor any 
person at the time of the seizure, nor was he in any 
close proximity thereto, and in addition, the vehicle 
did not, in and of itself, pose any threat or danger 
to any law enforcement officers at the scene. 
R:9-1. 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
5 
¶10 On October 25, 1993, a suppression hearing was held on 
the motion in the Rock County Circuit Court, Judge Michael J. 
Byron, presiding.  At the suppression hearing, defense counsel’s 
questioning and argument did not pursue the issue of probable 
cause for the search of the automobile and at various times 
attempted to prevent the prosecution from doing so by raising 
objections to questions from the State going to the issue of 
probable cause to search the vehicle.  The thrust of the 
defendant’s questioning and argument was that the search of 
Caban’s vehicle was not incident to a lawful arrest, nor was it 
within the scope of the search warrant for the Hollingsworth 
residence. 
¶11 The circuit court, finding probable cause for Caban’s 
arrest, denied Caban’s motion to suppress.  Caban pled guilty 
and was convicted.  He appealed. 
¶12 At the court of appeals, Caban argued for the first 
time that the officers lacked the requisite probable cause to 
search his vehicle and, accordingly, evidence of the marijuana 
seized during the search was inadmissible.  The State argued 
that Caban had waived his right to appeal the issue of probable 
cause by failing to raise it at the trial level.  Although two 
members of the court of appeals agreed with the State, a 
different plurality agreed to hear Caban’s appeal.  In his 
dissent, 
Judge 
Dykman 
concluded 
that 
Caban 
had 
neither 
specifically raised probable cause to search the vehicle, nor 
had his broad Fourth Amendment challenge raised the issue.  In 
his concurrence, Judge Gartzke agreed, but concluded that the 
court of appeals could properly use its power of discretionary 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
6 
review in this case because the circuit court raised the issue 
sua sponte and the facts were sufficiently developed to decide 
whether probable cause existed.  Judge Sundby, author of the 
majority opinion, concluded that Caban had preserved his right 
to appeal the issue of probable cause to search the vehicle by 
raising a broad Fourth Amendment challenge before the circuit 
court.  Upon review, the court of appeals concluded that the 
police did not have probable cause to search Caban’s automobile, 
and reversed Caban’s conviction.  We reverse the court of 
appeals and remand for reinstatement of Caban’s conviction. 
¶13 This case presents two issues for review: (1) whether 
Caban raised the issue of probable cause to search his 
automobile before the circuit court, thus preserving his right 
to appeal that issue; and if not, (2) whether this court will 
employ its power of discretionary review to consider the issue 
of probable cause. 
¶14 Both issues involve the scope of appellate review.  
The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit 
court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.  
State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 940-41, 437 N.W.2d 218 (1989).  
This court has frequently stated that even the claim of a 
constitutional right will be deemed waived unless timely raised 
in the circuit court.  Id.  The party raising the issue on 
appeal has the burden of establishing, by reference to the 
record, that the issue was raised before the circuit court.  
Young v. Young, 124 Wis. 2d 306, 316, 369 N.W.2d 178 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
7 
¶15 The reasons for the waiver rule go to the heart of the 
common law tradition and the adversary system.  By limiting the 
scope of appellate review to those issues that were first raised 
before the circuit court, this court gives deference to the 
factual expertise of the trier of fact, encourages litigation of 
all issues at one time, simplifies the appellate task, and 
discourages a flood of appeals.  David L. Walther, Patricia L. 
Grove, Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin, § 3.2 (1995).  Thus, when a party seeks review of an 
issue that it failed to raise before the circuit court, issues 
of fairness and notice, and judicial economy are raised.  
¶16 In examining whether Caban raised the issue of 
probable cause to conduct the automobile search, we look first 
to whether he raised the issue in his written motion.
3  Wisconsin 
law requires movants to “[s]tate with particularity the grounds 
for the motion. . . .”  Wis. Stat. § 971.30(2)(c).  The 
rationale underlying § 971.30’s particularity requirement is 
notice - notice to the nonmoving party and to the court of the 
specific issues being challenged by the movant.  Both the 
opposing party and the circuit court must have notice of the 
issues being raised by the defendant in order to fully argue and 
                     
3 On the morning of oral arguments, Caban circulated a memo to 
this court positing that the distinction drawn between issue and 
argument in State v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 476 N.W.2d 867 
(1991) is significant to this case.  We disagree.  Weber involved 
an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 809.62, the rule governing 
petitions for review to this court.  The issue in Weber was 
whether an issue had been raised in the petition for review.  In 
Weber, the court took a broad view of the term “issue.”  Because 
of the different context, and therefore different interests 
involved, the distinctions in Weber do not apply to the waiver 
rule.  Motions must be stated and argued with particularity. 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
8 
consider those issues.  See Robert J. Martineau, Considering New 
Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 
Vand. L. Rev. 1023, 1029 (1987).  Neither the principle of 
notice, nor Wis. Stat. § 971.30 makes an exception for motions 
raising Fourth Amendment challenges.   
¶17 Therefore, in order to raise the issue of probable 
cause in his written motion, Caban was required to state with 
particularity, i.e., specifically assert, that the police lacked 
probable cause to search his automobile.  This he failed to do. 
 Caban’s motion states several other Fourth Amendment issues 
with varying degrees of particularity, but not the issue of 
probable cause to search the vehicle.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that Caban’s written motion failed to state the issue of 
probable cause with particularity as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.30(2). 
¶18 Our analysis does not end with the written motion.  
Caban did not waive the right to argue the issue of probable 
cause on appeal merely by his failure to raise that specific 
issue in his written motion.  In determining whether an issue 
was raised before the circuit court, we look to both the motion 
and to the suppression hearing.  State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 
3, 25-26, 555 N.W.2d 687 (1996).  Accordingly, we turn our 
attention next to the suppression hearing. 
¶19 A brief review of the law of search and seizure gives 
perspective to our analysis.  The Fourth Amendment protects 
“(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . .”  A warrantless search is unreasonable per se. 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
9 
 State v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994).  
However, the law recognizes an “automobile exception” to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  State v. Weber, 163 Wis. 
2d 116, 471 N.W.2d 187 (1991), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1865 
(1994); State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 423 N.W.2d 823 
(1988).  The warrantless search of an automobile is justified 
when the police have probable cause to believe that an 
automobile, found in a public place, contains evidence of a 
crime; no showing of exigent circumstances is required.  Weber, 
163 Wis. 2d at 137. Thus, the police could conduct a search of 
Caban’s automobile so long as it was in a public place and they 
had probable cause to believe that it held evidence of a crime. 
 Now we turn to the suppression hearing. 
¶20 At 
the 
suppression 
hearing, 
defense 
counsel 
essentially argued only two issues: (1) the police did not have 
a search warrant to search Caban’s automobile for controlled 
substances, 
and 
(2) 
there 
were 
no 
exigent 
circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search.  A careful perusal of the 
testimony at the suppression hearing reveals that at no time 
during cross-examination 
of 
the State’s witnesses, 
direct 
examination of his own witness, or closing arguments to the 
court did Caban raise the issue of probable cause to search the 
vehicle.  Of particular note, showing that Caban’s only 
arguments addressed the issues of lack of a warrant and lack of 
exigent circumstances, is Caban’s closing argument to the 
circuit court, quoted in full: 
 
Obviously the Hollingsworths were the targeted people 
in terms of this search warrant.  It was their 
premises, and the vehicle’s [sic] parked on their 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
10
premises.  Mr. Caban was not mentioned nor his vehicle 
mentioned in the search warrant.  He did not consent 
to the search.  The car, we believe, was parked off 
the premises of the Hollingsworths.  It was not a 
threat to any law enforcement person.  There was no 
exigent circumstances whatever that may or may not be 
these days.  He was not operating or behind the 
vehicle at the time that they went to it and proceeded 
to search it.  It was not pursuant, for example, to a 
traffic arrest or stop.  They could have obtained a 
search warrant.  Telephonic search warrant’s a term 
I’ve just recently heard.  There obviously must be one 
if I’ve heard it somewhere. 
 
In any event, they could have obtained a search 
warrant very easily for the vehicle.  It was not a 
threat to anyone.  They could have waited and done 
their search at that time.  He did not –- he was not 
even present during the search.  He was arrested even 
before anything happened for something.  We’re not 
sure what he was arrested for, except that, as it 
turns out, he was not arrested for any possession of 
controlled substance on the premises. 
 
So the arrest perhaps is somewhat questionable, 
other than he was in the vicinity of what obviously 
were controlled substances that the Hollingsworths 
had.  I think that the state in this instance really 
should have obtained a search warrant before they 
proceeded to look in the vehicle.  He’s on probation. 
 Perhaps even the probation agent could have directed 
that that be done, directed Mr. Caban to consent to 
it.  They have a lot of authority once they’re on 
probation.  But that was not done here either.  And it 
seems to me that this just went too far when they’re 
searching any vehicle parked somewhere on the street. 
R:38 at 59-61.  As can be seen from Caban’s closing arguments, 
he failed to raise the issue of probable cause to search the 
vehicle.  
¶21 We conclude, given the above, that by his silence, 
both in his motion and at the suppression hearing, Caban failed 
to raise the issue of probable cause to search the vehicle 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
11
before the circuit court; therefore, we hold that he waived his 
right to appeal that issue. 
¶22 The rule of waiver is one of judicial administration 
and does not limit the power of an appellate court in a proper 
case to address issues not raised in the circuit court.  Wirth 
v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 444, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980).  This court 
has the power in the exercise of its discretion, to consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal.  Arsand v. City of 
Franklin, 83 Wis. 2d 40, 55, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978).  Our power 
of discretionary reversal is governed by statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 751.06 provides: 
 
Discretionary reversal.  In an appeal in the supreme 
court, if it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, 
the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed 
from, regardless of whether the proper motion or 
objection appears in the record, and may direct the 
entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the 
trial court for the entry of the proper judgment or 
for a new trial, and direct the making of such 
amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
¶23 Thus, a circuit court order may be reversed in either 
of two situations: (1) whenever it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried; or (2) whenever the real controversy 
has not been fully tried.  State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 735, 
370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  
Separate criteria exists for determining each of these two 
distinct situations. 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
12
¶24 We begin our analysis by considering whether it is 
probable that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.  The 
grounds for ordering a discretionary reversal under this 
circumstance have been clearly stated by this court.  In order 
for us to exercise our discretion and order a new hearing on the 
issue of probable cause, we must first determine whether there 
is a “substantial degree of probability that a new [hearing] 
would produce a different result.”  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 734.  
Despite Caban’s failure to raise the issue at the suppression 
hearing, the circuit court found that the officers had probable 
cause to arrest Caban and search his automobile.  Without 
determining the issue of whether the police had probable cause 
to search Caban’s vehicle, a careful review of this entire 
record does not persuade us that a “substantial degree of 
probability” exists that a new hearing would produce a different 
result. 
¶25 Alternatively, there may be a discretionary reversal 
whenever the real controversy has not been fully tried.  In this 
circumstance, the court may reverse even though it cannot 
conclude to a substantial degree of probability that a new 
hearing would produce a different result.  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 
735.  Generally, the real controversy is not fully tried when 
the fact finder did not hear all the relevant evidence.  Id. at 
746. 
¶26 Again without determining the issue of probable cause 
to search the vehicle, a careful review of this entire record 
persuades us that the circuit court did hear all the relevant 
evidence.  We conclude that if the issue of probable cause has 
 
 
No.  16907.rtf-CR 
 
 
13
not been fully tried, it is only because of defense counsel’s 
objections to the admission of probable cause evidence, and 
defense counsel’s failure to introduce evidence contrary to a 
finding of probable cause.  Accordingly, we conclude that this 
is not an appropriate case in which to use our power of 
discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  
¶27 In sum, we hold that, in order to challenge the 
constitutionality of the automobile search on probable cause 
grounds, Caban has the burden of establishing, by reference to 
the record, that he raised the issue before the circuit court.  
In making this determination, we consider both the written 
motion and the motion hearing.  We conclude that, by his 
silence, Caban failed to raise the issue of probable cause to 
search the vehicle before the circuit court; therefore, we hold 
that he waived his right to appeal that issue.  We further 
conclude that justice does not warrant discretionary review of 
the issue of probable cause.  Accordingly, we reverse the court 
of appeals and remand for reinstatement of Caban’s conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded. 
 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
1 
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting). The 
problem with this case, as the State's brief explains, is that 
"[a]t the suppression hearing, the defense and the prosecution 
could have been two ships passing in the night." Brief for State 
at 11. I agree with the State's characterization of the 
suppression hearing. Apparently so did the court of appeals. 
This record produced three opinions in the court of appeals: the 
"lead opinion" by Judge Sundby; a concurrence by Judge Gartzke; 
and a dissent by Judge Dykman. State v. Caban, 202 Wis. 2d 417, 
551 N.W.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1996).  
¶29 I 
would 
dismiss 
this 
petition 
as 
improvidently 
granted. I believe the court of appeals did not erroneously 
exercise its appellate discretion in reviewing the merits of the 
defendant's probable cause challenge despite its finding that 
the defendant had waived the issue of probable cause.  
¶30 Furthermore, I do not think this court can, on this 
record, add anything to the body of law about probable cause, so 
I would not review the court of appeals' decision on this issue, 
regardless of whether I agreed or disagreed with it.  
¶31 I will first discuss how this court should review the 
court of appeals' discretionary decision to address the issue of 
probable cause to search the defendant's car. I will then 
discuss various approaches the court might take to determine 
whether the defendant in this case "waived" or "conceded" the 
probable cause issue, were it appropriate to reach this issue.  
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
2 
I. 
¶32 The State presented the following issue in its 
petition for review: "When a defendant concedes probable cause 
in the trial court, challenging a search solely on the ground 
that a warrant was required because there were neither exigent 
circumstances nor consent, may the defendant challenge probable 
cause in his appeal?"  
¶33 As a general matter, when a party fails to raise an 
issue in the circuit court, the issue will not be considered as 
a matter of right for the first time on appeal. Binder v. 
Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 613, 618, 241 N.W.2d 613 (1976). The rule of 
waiver is, however, a rule of administration and the rule does 
not limit an appellate court's power to address the issued 
waived. Majority op. at 11; Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 444, 
287 N.W.2d 140 (1980). 
¶34 The State prevailed on the issue of concession or 
waiver in the court of appeals. Two judges of the court of 
appeals, Judge Gartzke in concurrence and Judge Dykman in 
dissent, found that the defendant had waived his challenge to 
the existence of probable cause to support the search and thus 
lost his right to appeal. These two judges agreed that the court 
of appeals could nevertheless address the issue as a matter of 
discretion, but they disagreed whether the court of appeals 
should reach the issue. A different pair of judges, however, 
concluded that the court of appeals should review the merits of 
the issue, Judge Sundby in the lead opinion recognizing the 
defendant's right of appeal, and Judge Gartzke in concurrence 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
3 
recognizing that the court could review the issue as a matter of 
appellate discretion. Thus, in effect, the court of appeals 
addressed the issue of probable cause as a matter of discretion. 
Neither the parties nor the majority opinion suggests that the 
court of appeals had no such discretion. 
¶35 The supreme court has emphatically stated that it is 
reluctant to interfere with a court of appeals' exercise of 
discretion 
and 
will 
ordinarily 
refrain 
from 
reviewing 
a 
discretionary determination of the court of appeals. State v. 
McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 369-72, 334 N.W.2d 903 (1983). Were 
this court to review a discretionary decision of the court of 
appeals, the standard of review would be whether the court of 
appeals had erroneously exercised its discretion. Id. at 368. 
¶36 Thus in order to reverse the court of appeals decision 
in this case on the ground that the defendant waived or conceded 
the issue of probable cause, the court must first find that the 
court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion in 
addressing the issue of probable cause, and only then should it 
decide whether the defendant failed to preserve his right to 
appeal that issue.  
¶37 The majority opinion, however, fails to review the 
court of appeals' discretionary decision to reach the issue of 
probable cause. I can find no erroneous exercise of discretion 
by the court of appeals in deciding to reach that issue. I 
believe that waiver has ceased to be an issue in this case 
because the court of appeals properly exercised its discretion 
to look beyond the waiver to the merits of the defendant's 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
4 
constitutional claim. I therefore conclude that the majority 
opinion errs in deciding whether the defendant waived or 
conceded the issue of probable cause.  
¶38 Under 
these circumstances, 
I 
believe 
the 
proper 
disposition is to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted. 
Because waiver has ceased to be an issue absent erroneous 
exercise of appellate discretion, all that remains is the issue 
of probable cause. Were we to review the court of appeals' 
disposition of the probable cause issue, we would be acting 
outside our principal function as a law defining and law 
developing court. Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188-89, 560 
N.W.2d 246 (1997). The law on probable cause is clear; the task 
of the circuit court and court of appeals is to apply the rules 
of law to specific fact situations. Were we to rule on probable 
cause we would be performing merely an error correcting function 
which, we have said numerous times, is not the function of this 
court but is the principal function of the court of appeals. 
State v. Minued, 141 Wis. 2d 325, 327-28, 415 N.W.2d 515 (1987) 
(per curiam) (dismissing as improvidently granted; "Review in 
the present case by this court [of the issue of sufficiency of 
the evidence to warrant a jury instruction] is inappropriate 
because 
it 
would 
amount 
to 
a 
review 
for 
correctness"); 
McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d at 370-71.  
II. 
¶39 Although I believe we should not address probable 
cause and we may not address waiver absent a finding that the 
court of appeals erroneously exercised its appellate discretion, 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
5 
I add some thoughts on the application of waiver principles to 
the somewhat confused record in this case.  
¶40 I begin by stating what I believe distinguishes this 
purported waiver from most. In this case the defendant does not 
simply claim for the first time on appeal that there was no 
probable cause. Rather, the defendant objects to the dispositive 
holding of the circuit court that there was probable cause. 
Although the defendant did not raise the issue of probable cause 
in the circuit court, it appears that it was both raised and 
ruled upon by the circuit court.
4 Indeed, it became the sole 
dispositive legal issue in the case.  
¶41 Both the court of appeals (except for Judge Sundby) 
and the majority opinion conclude that the defendant has lost 
his right to appeal the issue of probable cause under these 
circumstances. I do not believe that either the court of appeals 
or the majority opinion has fully analyzed the waiver question. 
¶42 To explain my concern, I turn to the record and 
examine the positions of the State, the defendant and the 
circuit court. I then discuss the legal issues of waiver and 
concession. 
A.  
¶43 At the suppression hearing before the circuit court, 
neither the State's nor the defendant's position rested on 
                     
4 It is arguable that the State raised the issue of probable 
cause in the circuit court. The key, in any event, is that 
probable cause was the only dispositive legal issue on which the 
circuit court ruled. 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
6 
probable cause. Both the State and the defendant relied on 
arguments other than probable cause to support their positions 
on the validity of the search of the defendant's car.  
¶44 In the circuit court the State advanced two chief 
theories to justify the search of the defendant's car. First, 
the State argued that because the defendant's car was on the 
Hollingsworth premises it was within the ambit of the search 
warrant. Second, the State argued that the search of the 
defendant's car was a valid search incident to the defendant's 
arrest. In addition, the State put forth evidence which might 
show the existence of probable cause either to arrest the 
defendant or to search his car.  
¶45 In his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his 
car the defendant raised a general claim that the seizure of the 
marijuana found in the search of his car "was not done with 
lawful authority and was in violation of the defendant's rights 
as set forth in the U.S. Constitution, Article IV" and article 
I, section 11 of the Wisconsin constitution.
5 Both in his motion 
to suppress and in his arguments before the circuit court, the 
                     
5 The burden is on the State to prove that its officers 
complied with the Fourth Amendment when a defendant alleges 
otherwise. The question is what degree of specificity should the 
courts require of the defendant in asserting objections to the 
introduction of the evidence when the defendant cannot depose 
the State's witnesses. 
This court has held that raising the issue of the Fourth 
Amendment in a petition for review in an automobile search case 
preserves for purposes of review any argument addressing the 
issue. State v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 789-91, 476 N.W.2d 867 
(1991).  
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
7 
defendant contended that the car was not included in the search 
warrant and further asserted the following: the car was not 
occupied at the time of seizure; the defendant was not in close 
proximity to the car; the car did not pose any threat. At the 
suppression hearing the defendant further argued that the police 
could have easily obtained a search warrant for the car. 
¶46 The circuit court concluded that the warrant the 
police were executing did not authorize a search of the 
defendant's car but that the search of the car was valid, 
apparently as incident to the defendant's valid arrest. On 
appeal, however, the State conceded that the defendant's car was 
not covered by the search warrant and that the defendant had not 
been placed under arrest until after his car had been searched. 
Apparently the court of appeals agreed, nor does the State now 
argue that the search was authorized by the warrant or incident 
to a valid arrest.  
¶47 While not entirely clear, it appears that independent 
of its mistaken view of the timing of the defendant's arrest and 
the search of the car, the circuit court found the search valid 
as supported by probable cause and therefore justified as within 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The State 
so interprets the circuit court's holding, brief for State at 4, 
and so did Judge Gartzke.  Accordingly, the circuit court's sole 
extant legal basis for denying the motion to suppress the 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
8 
evidence found in the car was that there was probable cause to 
search the car.
6  
¶48 Neither the State nor the defendant argued in the 
circuit court whether the search was valid because it was 
supported by probable cause. But the record makes clear that the 
circuit court viewed probable cause as an issue. According to 
the State, the prosecutor knew that probable cause was a 
significant issue and introduced some evidence relevant to 
probable cause. The State further asserts that the prosecutor 
was prevented from introducing additional evidence relating to 
probable cause because the defendant objected. Brief for State 
at 11-13.  
B. 
¶49 With this background of the events in the circuit 
court, I turn now to the waiver of the issue of probable cause 
and the right to appellate review of this issue. Because the 
positions of the parties at the circuit court were unclear and 
the circuit court's rulings were in part erroneous, the waiver 
issue is itself clouded. The record is sufficiently clear, 
however, to suggest the following observations.  
¶50 Had neither party raised in the circuit court the 
issue of probable cause to search the car and had the circuit 
court not ruled on the issue, this case would present the 
                     
6 The defendant does not contend that the automobile 
exception is inapplicable and the State does not contend that 
the automobile exception obviates the requirement that there be 
probable cause for an automobile search. 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
9 
traditional circumstances of waiver. See, e.g., State v. Gove, 
148 Wis. 2d 936, 940-41, 437 N.W.2d 218 (1989). The losing party 
(the defendant here) would have waived the issue of probable 
cause and could not, as a matter of right, raise the issue on 
appeal.  
¶51 Yet the present case does not present the traditional 
circumstances of waiver because the circuit court ruled on the 
issue of probable cause.  
¶52 While the defendant did not raise the issue of 
probable cause, and the State may or may not have, the circuit 
court ruled as the sole dispositive legal ruling in the case 
that there was probable cause to search the defendant's car. 
Under such circumstances, the losing party (the defendant here) 
should be able to argue on appeal against the circuit court's 
dispositive probable cause ruling because the issue was one 
raised by the circuit court and the losing party had no 
meaningful opportunity to address it after the circuit court 
raised it and ruled on it. A party should not be found to have 
lost its right to appeal when there otherwise would be no avenue 
for review of the circuit court's sole legal ruling. 
¶53 The state argues that the defendant not only failed to 
raise the issue of probable cause but conceded the issue at the 
suppression hearing. The State further suggests that the circuit 
court accepted the defendant's concession and so should the 
appellate courts.  
¶54 I question the majority opinion's conclusion that 
under this interpretation of the record, the defendant has lost 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
10
his right to appeal the issue. The majority opinion's conclusion 
seems to contravene precedent. Our case law is that a party who 
has conceded a legal question
7 which is then the sole legal basis 
for the circuit court's ruling can argue that legal question on 
appeal.  
¶55 The court has concluded that a concession with respect 
to a matter of law "is binding upon neither the parties nor upon 
any court. . . . Conclusions of law may not be reached by the 
process 
of 
judicial 
admissions. . . . 'To 
be 
binding 
the 
admission must be one of fact, rather than a conclusion of 
law.'" Fletcher v. Eagle River Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 
165, 168, 178, 456 N.W.2d 788 (1990) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added in Fletcher).
8  
                     
7 Whether a set of facts rises to the level of probable 
cause is a question of law. See, e.g., State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 
2d 74, 84, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990) (whether there is probable 
cause to support bindover is matter of law); State v. Tompkins, 
144 Wis. 2d 116, 121-22, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988) ("existence of 
probable cause and the propriety of the search conducted present 
questions of law"). 
8 The circuit court in Fletcher concluded that the defendant 
made a judicial admission that it was a state actor. The court 
of appeals found that the state action issue had been waived by 
virtue of this concession. Fletcher v. Eagle River Mem'l Hosp., 
Inc., 150 Wis. 2d 145, 153, 441 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1989). 
In the supreme court the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant, by conceding a dispositive issue, had foregone its 
right to appeal that issue. Brief for plaintiff in Fletcher at 
4-5. The supreme court did not discuss waiver or the defendant's 
right to appeal but ruled on the merits of the purportedly 
conceded issue. The court concluded that the defendant was not 
barred from arguing a position contrary to its concession on the 
issue of law.  
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
11
¶56 On this record it is unclear whether this case 
presents a concession of law. Any concession by the defendant 
would be by implication; no concession about probable cause was 
expressed. It may be that the defendant's argument that the 
police could easily have obtained a search warrant implicitly 
conceded that the police had probable cause to search his car.
9  
¶57 In the lead opinion in the court of appeals Judge 
Sundby took yet another position on the issue of waiver and the 
right to appeal. I believe his position merits consideration. 
Judge Sundby understood the facts to be as follows: the 
defendant moved to suppress evidence on both general and 
specific grounds (but not specifically stating probable cause), 
including that a warrant was needed for the search and none 
authorized this particular search; the State put on evidence 
probative of probable cause at the suppression hearing; the 
defendant objected to some of the evidence relating to probable 
                     
9 On the other hand, one could read this argument as 
claiming that the police had the obligation to seek a search 
warrant under these circumstances and that the police could 
easily have sought one.  
There may be instances in which an accused's concession 
puts the State on notice but at the same time effectively bars 
the State from putting forth evidence to support its position. 
If the State can show that it was likely prejudiced by such a 
concession it should be given the opportunity to put on 
additional evidence to support its position on the issue. 
Although the State argues that had probable cause not been 
conceded by the defendant it would have been able to elicit more 
evidence of probable cause, the State does not seek an 
opportunity to put on additional evidence. 
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
12
cause; and the circuit court ruled that there was probable 
cause.  
¶58 The 
lead 
opinion 
concluded 
that 
under 
such 
circumstances there was no waiver by the defendant because the 
State had the burden of proving probable cause and the defendant 
had no obligation to raise or to contest the issue in order to 
preserve it for appeal. The reasoning of the lead opinion 
appears to be that because the search was without a warrant, as 
the circuit court held, it is per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment and the burden of proving that the search and 
subsequent seizure were constitutional is on the State. The 
defendant need do no more, urges the lead opinion, than make a 
colorable showing that the search is not supported by a warrant. 
The burden of proving probable cause then shifts to the State, 
according to Judge Sundby, without any further showing in order 
to give effect to the presumption against warrantless searches. 
Caban, 202 Wis. 2d at 420-21 (citing State v. Pozo, 198 Wis. 2d 
705, 710 n.2, 544 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1995)).  
¶59 Because the court of appeals in effect exercised its 
discretion to review the merits of the defendant's claim of 
probable cause, it is not necessary to determine whether this 
case presents traditional circumstances of waiver and, if not, 
what legal rules control.  
¶60 I conclude that this record does not lend itself to a 
decision by the court on the issues for which the court took the 
case. I would therefore dismiss the petition as improvidently 
granted.  
 
 
No. 94-1015-CR.ssa   
 
13
¶61 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this opinion.