Title: State v. Obriecht
Citation: 2015 WI 66
Docket Number: 2013AP001345-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2015

2015 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1345-CR    
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andrew M. Obriecht, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 353 Wis. 2d 542, 846 N.W. 2d 479) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 42 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
William E. Hanrahan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., joined by ABRAHAMSON and CROOKS, 
JJ. concur (Opinion filed).  
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Colleen Marion, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Colleen Marion. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Katherine D. Lloyd, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jeff Scott Olson, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
  
 
 
2015 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1345-CR 
(L.C. No. 
1998CF271) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andrew M. Obriecht, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This sentence credit 
case arises from Andrew M. Obriecht's convictions of seven 
misdemeanors and one felony, wherein we review a decision of the 
court of appeals1 that affirmed the circuit court's2 denial of 
                                                 
1 State v. Obriecht, 2014 WI App 42, 353 Wis. 2d 542, 846 
N.W.2d 479. 
2 The 
Honorable 
William 
E. 
Hanrahan 
of 
Dane 
County 
presiding. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
2 
 
Obriecht's motion for sentence credit.3  The circuit court agreed 
that Obriecht was due sentence credit, but the court refused to 
apply the credit to his incarceration, and instead, applied the 
credit to Obriecht's parole following incarceration.   
¶2 
As we explain below, Obriecht was not sentenced for 
the felony conviction until probation for that conviction was 
revoked.  At that time, he was eligible to receive sentence 
credit against the felony sentence the court imposed.  However, 
no sentence credit was given.  Obriecht was paroled from 
incarceration for the felony conviction and subsequently his 
parole was revoked.  It was at the revocation of parole that 
Obriecht first requested the sentence credit that is now before 
us.   
¶3 
We conclude that because Obriecht had completed the 
sentences for his misdemeanor convictions when his parole from 
incarceration for the felony was revoked and he first requested 
sentence credit, the only sentence to which sentence credit 
could be applied was the indeterminate sentence for the felony 
conviction.  We also conclude that not all of the days of 
Obriecht's custody prior to his 2001 incarceration at Dodge 
                                                 
3 Obriecht and the State acknowledge that Obriecht has been 
released from incarceration.  However, we choose to decide the 
questions presented because they are capable of repetition, yet 
may evade review.  G.S., Jr. v. State, 118 Wis. 2d 803, 805, 348 
N.W.2d 181 (1984).  The question of application of sentence 
credit to a revoked probationer may evade review because with 
reincarceration orders, the appellate process frequently cannot 
be completed such that the decision has a practical effect on 
the parties.  Id.   
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
3 
 
Correctional Institution were in connection with the conduct 
that led to the felony sentence.  We further conclude that 
although Obriecht had 105 days of custody for which he had not 
yet received sentence credit when his parole was revoked, as we 
explain below, only 42 days of custody were in connection with 
the course of conduct that led to the felony sentence.  
Therefore, 42 of the 105 days of custody prior to Obriecht's 
2001 incarceration should have been applied to his term of 
reincarceration for the felony conviction.  Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
(2011-12).4  We also conclude that when a convicted defendant's 
parole is revoked, the parolee's indeterminate sentence that was 
issued by the circuit court resumes running so that it is 
available to accept sentence credit.  Wis. Stat. § 304.072(4).  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals decision that 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Obriecht's motion for 
sentence credit.5   
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Obriecht, 353 Wis. 2d 542. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The criminal violations that underlie this dispute all 
occurred before Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) commenced.6  Obriecht 
was charged with and convicted of seven misdemeanors and one 
felony.  Prior to serving his sentences, he was in custody in 
1998, 1999 and 2001.  Upon conviction, he was given some 
sentence credit for these periods of custody.  The parties agree 
that Obriecht accumulated more sentence credit than the court 
awarded.  However, the parties differ on how the court should 
have applied the requested sentence credit because Obriecht 
first requested sentence credit after his parole from the felony 
sentence was revoked.   
¶5 
The periods of confinement are somewhat hard to 
follow, as are their connections with the sentences given.  Two 
circumstances lead to this difficulty.  First, Obriecht was 
arrested and convicted of seven misdemeanors and a felony, but 
he was sentenced initially only on the misdemeanors and given 
probation for the felony.  Second, Obriecht did not request the 
                                                 
6 TIS changed Wisconsin sentencing laws, breaking from the 
indeterminate form of sentencing and creating a bifurcated 
structure for imprisonment:  a term of prison confinement 
followed by a term of extended supervision.  Michael B. Brennan 
et al., Fully Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, Wis. Law., Nov. 
2002, at 11.  Obriecht committed the count one felony before TIS 
went into effect for felonies.  State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, 
¶16, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 Wis. 2d 769 (stating Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(1) was a main feature of TIS); § 973.01(1) (stating TIS 
for felonies went into effect on December 31, 1999).  Obriecht 
also committed the misdemeanors in counts two through seven 
before TIS went into effect for misdemeanors.  Id. (stating TIS 
for misdemeanors went into effect on February 1, 2003).   
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
5 
 
sentence credit that is at issue here until he had completed the 
misdemeanor sentences and parole from incarceration for the 
felony had been revoked.   
¶6 
In an effort to clarify, we begin by setting out the 
periods of Obriecht's custody that was in connection with both 
the misdemeanors and the felony.  We then identify custody that 
was imposed solely in connection with the misdemeanors.  Next, 
we identify the sentence credit given and apply it to the 1998, 
1999, and 2001 custody7 beginning with the 1998 period of 
custody.  In that way, the sentences imposed connect with the 
credit given and the mathematical calculation of the custody for 
which sentence credit was not given.    
¶7 
On February 2, 1998 Obriecht was arrested and charged 
with seven misdemeanors and one felony.  He was released on bail 
pending trial on October 16, 1998, resulting in custody of 257 
days.   
¶8 
On June 30, 1999, Obriecht was convicted by a jury of 
all eight counts, seven misdemeanors and one felony, and he was 
taken into custody.  On November 19, 1999, Obriecht was 
sentenced on the misdemeanor convictions, whereon he received a 
combined indeterminate sentence of seven years.  On the felony 
conviction, the court withheld sentence and placed Obriecht on 
12 years probation.  The custody from June 30 to November 19 
resulted in additional custody of 142 days.     
                                                 
7 The 1998, 1999, and 2001 periods of custody refer to 
Obriecht's custody prior to his incarceration on April 21, 2001 
at Dodge Correctional Institution. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
6 
 
¶9 
Obriecht continued in custody until December 20, 1999, 
when his misdemeanor sentences were stayed pending appeal and he 
was released on bail.  The period of custody from sentencing on 
November 19, 1999 to bail on December 20, 1999 resulted in 
additional custody of 32 days.   
¶10 On March 21, 2001, the stay of Obriecht's misdemeanor 
sentences was lifted and he was held in jail.  Obriecht entered 
Dodge Correctional Institution on April 21, 2001 to begin his 
sentence on the misdemeanor convictions, resulting in additional 
custody of 31 days.  Therefore, Obriecht's total custody prior 
to his April 21, 2001 incarceration was 462 days (257 + 142 + 32 
+ 31 days).8    
¶11 In regard to sentence credit, the circuit court 
initially granted Obriecht 326 days of sentence credit when he 
was sentenced for the misdemeanor convictions.  On March 21, 
2001, when the circuit court lifted the stay pending appeal, the 
court granted an additional 31 days, for a total of 357 days of 
                                                 
8  
 
 
Days in 
 
Period of Custody 
 
Custody 
2/2/1998 to 10/16/1998 
 
 257 
6/30/1999 to 11/19/1999 
 
 142 
11/19/1999 to 12/20/1999 
 
  32 
3/21/01 to 4/21/01 
 
  31 
 
 
TOTAL 
 462 
 
 
 
    Days of 
Date of Credit Award 
Credit Awarded 
 
11/19/1999 
 
326 
3/21/2001 
 
 31 
 
 
TOTAL 
357 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
7 
 
sentence credit.  However, Obriecht had spent a total of 462 
days in custody.  Therefore, Obriecht was due an additional 105 
days of sentence credit at that time.   
¶12 On August 17, 2001, while he was incarcerated at Dodge 
Correctional Institution, Obriecht's probation on the felony 
conviction was revoked.  The circuit court sentenced him to an 
indeterminate seven-year sentence "[c]onsecutive to any other 
sentence."  No additional sentence credit was given.  
¶13 On March 22, 2011, Obriecht was released on parole 
from the indeterminate seven-year sentence for the felony 
conviction.9  Obriecht violated parole, and was returned to 
prison on February 1, 2013. 
¶14 On February 1, 2013, Obriecht, proceeding pro se, 
first requested 107 days of sentence credit.  Initially, the 
State did not object to Obriecht's request.  The circuit court 
agreed and "adjudged that 107 days sentence credit are due 
pursuant to § 973.155, Wisconsin Statutes."  
¶15 However, 
on 
March 21, 
2013, 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections (DOC) wrote to the circuit court asking the court to 
"clarify" Obriecht's amended judgment of conviction.  The DOC 
said that it read Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7) to mean that sentence 
credit awarded to one whose parole has been revoked was not 
applied to reincarceration, but rather, sentence credit should 
reduce parole time that may remain.   
                                                 
9 When Obriecht was released on parole from the consecutive 
felony sentence, he had completed the misdemeanor sentences. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
8 
 
¶16 Obriecht disputed the DOC's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 302.11(7), pro se.  Obriecht argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(5) requires sentence credit be applied to reduce 
incarceration.  Upon reconsideration, the circuit court agreed 
with the DOC, and on April 3, 2013, the court rescinded the 
application of 107 days of sentence credit to Obriecht's term of 
incarceration and applied the credit to any term of subsequent 
parole.10 
¶17 Obriecht appealed.  He argues that the circuit court 
should have applied 107 days of sentence credit to his period of 
reincarceration because all of the 107 days were incurred in 
connection with the crimes for which he was incarcerated prior 
to parole.11   
¶18 The court of appeals concluded that the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7)(am) and (b) required that Obriecht's 
sentence credit be applied to reduce parole rather than 
reincarceration ordered by the Department of Hearings and 
Appeals (DHA).  State v. Obriecht, 2014 WI App 42, ¶13, 353 
Wis. 2d 542, 846 N.W.2d 479.  The court explained that 
§ 302.11(7)(b) provided that a revoked parolee "'shall be 
incarcerated for the entire period of time'" ordered by the DHA.  
                                                 
10 The court did not issue a ruling, but rather noted on 
Obriecht's March 18, 2013 letter:  "DOC interpretation of law in 
correspondence of 3/18/13 is correct."  The notation is signed 
and dated April 3, 2013. 
11 Obriecht's counsel did not itemize the 107 day-tally for 
sentence credit, and we have not been able to determine how that 
number was calculated. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
9 
 
Id. (quoting § 302.11(7)(b)).  Doing as Obriecht requested, the 
court 
concluded 
would 
violate 
the 
express 
terms 
of 
§ 302.11(7)(b).  Id. 
¶19 Obriecht sought review, which we granted.  Before us, 
the State initially acknowledged that Obriecht was due sentence 
credit, but contended that sentence credit applied to any 
remaining time on parole because it could not be applied to 
reduce the length of reincarceration that the DHA ordered when 
Obriecht's parole was revoked.  At oral argument, the State 
shifted its argument and contended that Obriecht's custody was 
not sufficiently connected to the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed to merit sentence credit.  We address this 
argument, as well as those arguments that were briefed.   
II. DISCUSSION 
¶20 Obriecht contends that the circuit court erred in 
failing to grant sentence credit when he was sentenced for the 
felony conviction and he is seeking to correct that error.  The 
State focuses on a later period in time, i.e., when the DHA 
revoked Obriecht's subsequent parole from the felony sentence, 
and contends that Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7)(b) requires Obriecht to 
serve the full term of reincarceration that he was given by the 
DHA.  At oral argument, the State also contended that the 
sentence credit Obriecht requested is not sufficiently connected 
with the course of conduct for which he was sentenced.  They 
present two very different questions, and as we explain below, 
both Obriecht and the State are correct to some extent.     
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
10 
 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 We review whether the circuit court correctly applied 
Obriecht's sentence credit to his parole rather than to his 
incarceration under the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  We 
also 
consider 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 304.072(4) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 302.11(7).  Statutory interpretation and application present 
questions of law that we review independently while benefitting 
from prior decisions of other courts.  Richards v. Badger Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581. 
B.  Sentence Credit 
1.  General principles 
¶22 Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning 
of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Context and structure of the statute are also important to the 
meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.   
¶23 Tallying and awarding sentence credit originated as a 
matter of equal protection.  See Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 
244, 249, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977) (holding that an indigent person 
who could not make bail was denied a liberty interest if not 
given sentence credit for all time spent in custody).  Sentence 
credit is designed to afford fairness so that a person does not 
serve more time than that to which he or she is sentenced.  
State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985). 
¶24 When sentence credit is applied at the time of 
sentencing, in this case either at the sentencing for the 
misdemeanors or at the later sentencing for the felony, the 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
11 
 
circuit court should apply sentence credit to the term of 
incarceration.  See State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 66, ¶1, 242 
Wis. 2d 426, 625 N.W.2d 655 (credit must be applied to 
incarceration term, not consecutive stayed sentence); Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(3) (computing custody as if it were served time in the 
institution to which the defendant has been sentenced). 
¶25 In deciding whether to award sentence credit under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155, a court must make two determinations:  (1) 
whether the defendant was "in custody" for the period under 
consideration, and (2) whether the custody was "in connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  
State v. Marcus Johnson, 2007 WI 107, ¶32, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 
N.W.2d 505.  "Custody" means a detention status for which a 
defendant is subject to an escape charge if he leaves the place 
of detention.  State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶25, 233 Wis. 2d 
40, 606 N.W.2d 536.    
2.  Obriecht's custody 
¶26 Whether Obriecht was "in custody" is not where the 
challenge lies in this case; but rather, whether the custody was 
"in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed" is our focus.  In that regard, we begin with Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a), which provides in relevant part: 
"actual days spent in custody" includes, without 
limitation by enumeration, confinement related to an 
offense 
for 
which 
the 
offender 
is 
ultimately 
sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of 
the same course of conduct, which occurs: 
1. 
While the offender is awaiting trial;  
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
12 
 
2. 
While the offender is being tried; and  
3. 
While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial.  
In order for the sentence to be "in connection with the course 
of conduct for which sentence was imposed," there must be a 
factual connection between the custody and the sentence.  State 
v. Elandis Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶65, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 
207.   
¶27 When custody is at least "in part due to the conduct 
resulting in [a] new conviction," a court must award sentence 
credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(b).  State v. Hintz, 2007 
WI App 113, ¶11, 300 Wis. 2d 583, 731 N.W.2d 646.  Here, the 
sentence for the felony conviction was issued subsequent to the 
sentences for the misdemeanor convictions as a consecutive 
sentence.   
¶28 Because 
all 
of 
Obriecht's 
custody 
was 
not 
in 
connection with both the misdemeanor and felony sentences, it is 
important in our review to identify to which sentences the 
custody relates.  The first period of custody began on 
February 2, 1998 when Obriecht was arrested and charged with 
seven misdemeanors and one felony.  This period of custody ended 
on October 16, 1998, a period of 257 days, when he was released 
on bail.  These 257 days have a factual connection to the 
conduct that led to the sentences issued for both misdemeanors 
and felony; therefore, this period of custody was in connection 
with the course of conduct for which he subsequently was 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
13 
 
sentenced for both misdemeanor and felony convictions.  Elandis 
Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶66.   
¶29 Obriecht was convicted by a jury of all eight counts 
on June 30, 1999, and he was taken into custody.  On 
November 19, 1999, Obriecht was sentenced on the misdemeanor 
convictions, but sentence was withheld on the felony conviction 
and Obriecht was placed on 12 years probation.  This 142-day 
period from conviction to sentencing was in connection with the 
conduct that led to sentencing for misdemeanors and felony.  No 
days in custody subsequent to November 19, 1999 were in 
connection with the felony sentence because probation is not a 
sentence.  State v. Edwards, 2013 WI App 51, ¶7, 347 Wis. 2d 
526, 830 N.W.2d 109; Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  However, 
Obriecht's custody did continue after sentencing on November 19, 
1999, 
until 
he 
was 
released 
on 
bail 
pending 
appeal 
on 
December 20, 1999.  This additional 32 days of custody was 
solely in connection with the misdemeanor sentences.    
¶30 On March 21, 2001, the stay of Obriecht's misdemeanor 
sentences pending appeal was lifted and he was taken into 
custody for transportation to prison to serve the sentences for 
his misdemeanor convictions.  Pre-incarceration custody ended 
when he entered Dodge Correctional Institution on April 21, 
2001, adding custody of 31 days, which is in connection with the 
conduct that led to sentences for his misdemeanor convictions.  
State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 380, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983) 
(concluding that the "clear intent of sec. 973.155, Stats., is 
to grant credit for each day in custody regardless of the basis 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
14 
 
for the confinement as long as it is connected to the offense 
for which sentence is imposed.").   
¶31 When Obriecht reached Dodge Correctional Institution, 
Obriecht had served 462 days in custody in connection with the 
conduct that gave rise to the sentences for his misdemeanor 
convictions.12  The circuit court had granted Obriecht 326 days 
sentence credit when he was sentenced for the misdemeanors and 
the court granted an additional 31 days of sentence credit upon 
transportation to Dodge Correctional Institution, for a total of 
357 days sentence credit.  Therefore, 105 days that Obriecht had 
been in custody were not credited.     
¶32 On August 17, 2001, Obriecht's probation for the 
felony conviction was revoked, and he was sentenced to a seven-
year indeterminate sentence, consecutive to the misdemeanor 
sentences he was then serving.  No additional sentence credit 
was given when he was sentenced for the felony conviction. 
¶33 Obriecht was released from prison on parole from the 
felony sentence March 22, 2011.  On February 1, 2013, he was 
returned to prison for violating the conditions of his parole.  
The State asserts that sentence credit awarded during Obriecht's 
most recent and final period of incarceration, following the 
revocation of parole, can be applied only to time that may 
remain for a subsequent parole.  This argument of the State is 
grounded in its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7).  The 
State also asserts that all of the days of custody in 1998, 
                                                 
12 See supra note 7. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
15 
 
1999, and 2001 for which sentence credit was not awarded did not 
arise from custody that was in connection with the course of 
conduct that resulted in the felony sentence.   
¶34 We note that parole revocation does not involve the 
imposition of an additional criminal sanction.  See State ex 
rel. Flowers v. DHSS, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 384-86, 260 N.W.2d 727 
(1978) (explaining that parole revocation is civil in nature and 
that the sentence a defendant is required to serve on revocation 
is the sentence for the crime of which the defendant previously 
was convicted).  The DHA has limited discretion to return 
revoked parolees to prison up to the remainder of their original 
sentence and not beyond.  Id. at 386 (stating that the element 
of punishment upon revocation is tied to the sentence previously 
imposed).   
¶35 We also consider Wis. Stat. § 304.072(4) to determine 
the effect of parole revocation on a defendant's sentence 
because the statute addresses that circumstance.  Section 
304.072(4) provides: 
The sentence of a revoked parolee or person on 
extended supervision resumes running on the day he or 
she is received at a correctional institution subject 
to sentence credit for the period of custody in a 
jail, correctional institution or any other detention 
facility pending revocation according to the terms of 
s. 973.155.  
The "sentence" to which § 304.072(4) refers is the sentence that 
was issued by the circuit court subsequent to conviction.  We 
come to this conclusion because § 304.072(4) looks back at a 
sentence 
earlier 
commenced, 
i.e., 
the 
sentence 
"resumes 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
16 
 
running."  Therefore, when Obriecht's parole was revoked, the 
seven-year 
indeterminate 
sentence 
for 
Obriecht's 
felony 
conviction caused reincarceration.  Accordingly, the DHA's 
reincarceration order did not establish reincarceration as a new 
"sentence."  Id.  Rather, it was a continuation of the sentence 
meted out by the circuit court judge.  Therefore, if Obriecht 
had not received all the sentence credit that was available to 
apply to the felony sentence when that sentence was imposed, he 
could have received it when his parole was revoked.  
¶36 Stated otherwise, the computation of sentence credit 
is governed by Wis. Stat. § 973.155(3) that provides:  "The 
credit provided in sub. (1) or (1m) shall be computed as if the 
convicted offender had served such time in the institution to 
which he or she has been sentenced."  The plain language of 
§ 973.155(3) demonstrates that Obriecht is entitled to have the 
total amount of time he must spend in prison reduced by the 
amount of time he has spent in custody outside of prison when 
custody is in connection with the conduct for which the sentence 
is imposed.  Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶66.  In addition, 
when sentences are consecutive, sentence credit is not issued to 
more than one sentence so long as the first sentence to be 
served is sufficient to receive the sentence credit at issue.  
State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 93-95, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988) 
(citing Doyle v. Elsea, 658 F.2d 512, 515 (1981) as Doyle 
interprets 18 U.S.C. § 3568 upon which § 973.155 was based).   
¶37 As we explain, the custody first imposed should be 
applied 
to 
the 
sentence 
first 
imposed, 
with 
consecutive 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
17 
 
sentences.  As our discussion in the paragraphs above show, 
Obriecht's first period of custody extended 257 days, with the 
next period of custody extending 142 days.  Of the 399 days in 
custody, the circuit court granted 326 days as sentence credit 
against the misdemeanor sentences.   
¶38 The 
next 
periods 
of 
custody 
occurred 
between 
sentencing and release on bail pending appeal, 32 days, and 
between 
revocation 
of 
bail 
and 
transportation 
to 
Dodge 
Correctional Institution, 31 days.  These periods of custody 
occurred solely in connection with conduct relating to the 
misdemeanor sentences because Obriecht was not being held for 
the felony conviction, on which the court had withheld sentence 
when it placed him on probation.   
¶39 When Obriecht was transported to Dodge Correctional 
Institution, Obriecht had 73 days of custody in connection with 
the course of conduct that resulted in sentences for misdemeanor 
convictions and felony conviction.  He also had 63 days of pre-
incarceration 
custody 
that 
occurred 
after 
sentencing 
for 
misdemeanors and his probation for the felony conviction.  
¶40 The circuit court granted 31 days of additional 
sentence 
credit 
when 
Obriecht 
was 
transported 
to 
Dodge 
Correctional Institution.  Because we apply sentence credit 
granted to the earliest period of custody eligible for the 
credit, we apply the 31 days of credit to the 73 days of custody 
yet remaining that were in connection with both misdemeanor 
sentences and subsequently issued felony sentence, leaving 42 
days that were in connection with the conduct that led to the 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
18 
 
felony sentence.  Stated otherwise, we apply granted sentence 
credit to the longest outstanding days of custody that were in 
connection with the conduct that led to the sentence. 
¶41 As the State pointed out at oral argument, and as we 
have explained above, not all of the custody was in connection 
with the felony.  After all sentence credit was awarded, there 
remained 42 days that was in connection with the course of 
conduct that led to both the misdemeanor and felony sentences 
and 63 days that was in connection with the misdemeanor 
sentences, a period of 105 days.  Therefore, because the felony 
sentence was consecutive to the misdemeanor sentences and 
because 63 of the 105 days of custody that remained were in 
connection 
with 
the 
misdemeanors, 
only 
42 
days 
were 
in 
connection with the felony sentence. 
¶42 Obriecht's continuation of the felony sentence upon 
parole revocation is the seven-year indeterminate, consecutive 
sentence the circuit court imposed on August 17, 2001.  See 
Flowers, 81 Wis. 2d at 386 (stating "punishment in parole 
revocation is attributable to the crime for which the parolee 
was 
originally 
convicted 
and 
sentenced"); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 304.072(4) (stating sentence of a revoked parolee "resumes 
running").  Therefore, we conclude that on February 1, 2013 when 
Obriecht's parole was revoked and he was returned to prison, he 
should have received 42 days credit for custody that was in 
connection with conduct that led to the felony sentence, which 
sentence was available to accept such credit.  To do otherwise, 
would be unfair to Obriecht and cause him to suffer a longer 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
19 
 
period of incarceration for the felony conviction than the 
circuit court ordered. 
¶43  The court of appeals and the State, in part, relied 
on Wis. Stat. § 302.11, titled "Mandatory release," to hold that 
Obriecht's sentence credit applied to reduce his parole rather 
than 
reincarceration. 
 
Obriecht, 
353 
Wis. 2d 
542, 
¶12.  
Specifically, the court of appeals held that the § 302.11(7)(b) 
language that a parolee "shall be incarcerated for the entire 
period of time determined by the reviewing authority" would be 
violated if the court applied the sentence credit to the 
reincarceration period.  Id.; § 302.11(7)(b).   
¶44 We can see where the court of appeals found a conflict 
between Obriecht's request and Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7).  However, 
we have applied the credit to the felony sentence in fairness to 
Obriecht, who should have received this credit on August 17, 
2001 when he was sentenced on the felony conviction.    
¶45 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7) plainly applies to 
mandatory release, as indicated by its structure and statutory 
history.13  Paragraph (7)(b) first states the general rule that 
                                                 
13 Mandatory release. . . .  [(7)](am) The reviewing 
authority may return a parolee released under sub. (1) 
or (1g)(b) or s. 304.02 or 304.06(1) to prison for a 
period up to the remainder of the sentence for a 
violation of the conditions of parole.  The remainder 
of the sentence is the entire sentence, less time 
served in custody prior to parole.  The revocation 
order shall provide the parolee with credit in 
accordance with ss. 304.072 and 973.155. 
(b) A parolee returned to prison for violation of 
the conditions of parole shall be incarcerated for the 
entire period of time determined by the reviewing 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
20 
 
revoked parolees are not subject to early release; the next 
sentence provides a specific example that revoked parolees are 
not subject to mandatory release.  It does not address the 
problem caused by custody incurred before sentencing that was 
not granted at sentencing.   
¶46 Our reading of Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7)(b) is confirmed 
by statutory history.  See Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, 
¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (explaining that statutory 
history is part of a plain meaning analysis).  To explain 
further, the predecessor to § 302.11(7)(b) provided mandatory 
release for revoked parolees.14  The legislature repealed the 
preceding statute and replaced it with language prohibiting 
                                                                                                                                                             
authority unless paroled earlier under par. (c).  The 
parolee is not subject to mandatory release under sub. 
(1) or presumptive mandatory release under sub. (1g).  
The period of time determined under par. (am) may be 
extended in accordance with subs. (1q) and (2). 
Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(7). 
14 Any person on parole under this subsection may be 
returned to prison as provided in section 57.06(3) or 
57.07(2) to serve the remainder of his sentence.  He 
may earn good time on the balance of such sentence 
while so in prison, subject to forfeiture thereof for 
misconduct as herein provided.  He may again be 
released 
on 
parole 
thereafter 
under 
either 
this 
section or section 57.06 or 57.07, whichever is 
applicable.  The remainder of his sentence shall be 
deemed to be the amount by which his original sentence 
was reduced by good time.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 53.11(7)(b) (1951).  In 1984, the legislature 
replaced earning "good time" with "entitlement to mandatory 
release."  See 1983 Wis. Act 528, § 9. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
21 
 
mandatory release for revoked parolees in 1984, which explains 
the specific example in the statute.15   
¶47 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(7)(am) also is not helpful in 
determining sentence credit under the facts before us.  Section 
302.11(7)(am) makes express reference to application of sentence 
credit.  It provides for sentence credit in the context of a 
revocation order, citing both Wis. Stat. § 304.072 and Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155.  Furthermore, the § 302.11(7)(am) reference to 
"the entire sentence" does not affect our analysis.  It refers 
to the reincarceration required in Obriecht's revocation order.  
However, it is Obriecht's sentence imposed by the circuit court 
that is modified by sentence credit.  Additionally, because our 
interpretation of § 973.155 resolves the question of Obriecht's 
sentence credit, we decline to address the issue of whether the 
court of appeals' application of § 302.11(7) violated equal 
protection.   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶48 We conclude that because Obriecht had completed the 
sentences for his misdemeanor convictions when his parole from 
incarceration for the felony was revoked and he first requested 
                                                 
15 A parolee returned to prison for violation of the 
conditions of parole shall be incarcerated for the 
entire period of time determined by the department 
under par. (a), unless paroled earlier under par. (c).  
The parolee is not subject to mandatory release under 
sub. (1).  The period of time determined under par. 
(a) may be extended in accordance with sub. (2).  
Wis. Stat. § 53.11(7)(b) (1984); 1983 Wis. Act 528, § 6. 
No. 
2013AP1345-CR   
 
22 
 
sentence credit, the only sentence to which sentence credit 
could be applied was the indeterminate sentence for the felony 
conviction.  We also conclude that not all of the days of 
Obriecht's custody prior to his 2001 incarceration at Dodge 
Correctional Institution were in connection with the conduct 
that led to the felony sentence.  We further conclude that 
although Obriecht had 105 days of custody for which he had not 
yet received sentence credit when his parole was revoked, as we 
have explained, only 42 days of custody were in connection with 
the course of conduct that led to the felony sentence.  
Therefore, 42 of the 105 days of custody prior to Obriecht's 
2001 incarceration should have been applied to his term of 
reincarceration 
for 
the 
felony 
conviction. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155.  We also conclude that when a convicted defendant's 
parole is revoked, the parolee's indeterminate sentence that was 
issued by the circuit court resumes running so that it is 
available to accept sentence credit.  Wis. Stat. § 304.072(4).  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals decision that 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Obriecht's motion for 
sentence credit.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP1345-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶49 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that when a defendant's parole is revoked, sentence 
credit should be applied to reduce the term of re-incarceration 
and not parole.  
¶50 We accepted review in this case in order to address 
that question so that future litigants would have clarity.  The 
petitioner asked a discreet question: 
Do the sentence credit statute and the constitutional 
protections upon which it is based require time spent 
in "custody" to be credited against time spent in 
prison, as opposed to time spent on supervision?   
Answering that question does not require us to compute the 
number of days of sentence credit Obriecht should receive.   
¶51 Nevertheless, the majority reaches out and endeavors 
to count the actual days of sentence credit due Obriecht in this 
unique case made complex by its multiple time periods, legal 
maneuvers, 
and 
convictions 
involved. 
 
Numerous 
reasons 
illustrate the folly of the majority tackling this unbriefed 
issue.  
¶52 To begin, half of the record is missing or has been 
destroyed.  Notably, for computation purposes, it is the 
important half which covers the time periods at issue in this 
case.  Instead, we are left to cobble together the events based 
on a record with discrepancies between the portions of the 
record available and the parties' descriptions of events.  
¶53 Next, this case is moot and the computation of credit 
due for this defendant is meaningless.  Because Obriecht had 
completed his sentence by the time this case was heard, a 
No.  2013AP1345-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
determination of the exact number of days of credit he should 
have received will have no effect on him. 
¶54 Finally, 
by 
unnecessarily 
wading 
into 
the 
exact 
computation of sentence credit that Obriecht is owed, the 
majority risks unintentionally creating precedent that could be 
at odds with the significant purposes fulfilled by awarding 
sentence credit.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶55 The complexity of the facts in this case is reflected 
in the background provided by the majority.  After Obriecht was 
arrested and charged with seven misdemeanors and a felony, he 
was in and out of custody for various reasons while awaiting 
trial, after sentencing, and again while his convictions were on 
appeal.  Majority op., ¶¶7-10.  During this period he was 
awarded sentence credit on two separate occasions.  Id., ¶11.   
¶56 The parties agree that Obriecht spent more time in 
custody than he was awarded.  This appeal arose from the circuit 
court's decision to apply the outstanding credit to Obriecht’s 
period of parole rather than the in-custody period of his 
sentence. 
¶57 After discussing the sentence credit statute, the 
majority announces that it must examine each period of time 
Obriecht spent in custody and determine which were related to 
his felony conviction, as that is the conviction to which he 
sought to apply sentence credit.  Id., ¶28.  This is followed by 
a detailed description of each of those time periods and a 
No.  2013AP1345-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
computation of the number of days that Obriecht should receive.  
Id., ¶¶28-32, 37-42.   
II 
¶58  The basis for the majority's computation of Obriecht's 
sentence credit is shaky at best.  Less than half of the record 
has been made available for our review.  Out of 272 record 
documents, only numbers 216 through 279 were transferred to this 
court.  Notably, all of the records received by this court post-
date the time periods at issue by several years.  Thus, the 
details of when Obriecht was in custody have been cobbled 
together from various court filings and decisions and the 
representations of the parties. 
¶59 Even the representations of the parties leave doubt 
regarding the exact dates and time periods involved.  For 
example, although the parties stipulated that Obriecht had spent 
an extra 107 days in custody, this court could not reproduce 
that calculation.  Id., ¶17 n.11.  Instead it determines that 
the actual number of days was 105.  Id., ¶41.  Overall, little 
detail is contained in the parties' briefs regarding the time 
periods of Obriecht's custody as they were not disputing the 
calculation of the sentence credit he was owed.   
¶60 The murky record should not have been a problem 
because the question presented to us did not require us to 
compute days of sentence credit owed.  The actual number at this 
point is moot because the defendant has completed his sentence.  
It is further of questionable value given that the crimes 
involved all occurred pre-Truth-in-Sentencing. 
No.  2013AP1345-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶61 Not only is it unnecessary, but computing the exact 
number of days of sentence credit owed to Obriecht runs the risk 
of undermining the significant purposes behind sentence credit.  
As this court has explained, "Wisconsin's sentence credit 
statute has its roots in the constitutional principle of equal 
protection and was an immediate response to this court's call 
for action in Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 
(1977)."  State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶20, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 
N.W.2d 155.    
¶62 In Klimas, the court addressed a defendant's claim for 
sentence credit for the time he spent in pre-trial confinement 
because he could not afford bail.  The court acknowledged that 
this situation raised equal protection concerns, explaining that 
"[t]he failure to credit pre-trial time or pre-sentence time in 
custody as the result of indigency means that persons similarly 
situated except for financial means are subject to different 
periods of confinement for the same crime."  Klimas, 75 Wis. 2d 
at 248.  It then determined that "[t]he obvious method of 
rectifying the inequality is to credit the preconviction time in 
partial fulfillment of the sentence imposed upon conviction."  
Id. at 249. 
¶63 Since 
Klimas, 
courts 
have 
acknowledged 
that 
the 
purpose behind awarding sentence credit extends beyond equal 
protection, encompassing fairness as well.  "[C]onfinement 
credit is designed to afford fairness——that a person not serve 
more time than that for which he is sentenced."  State v. Beets, 
124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985); see also State v. 
No.  2013AP1345-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶31, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207 ("Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155 is designed to prevent a defendant from serving 
more time than his sentence or his sentences call for."); State 
v. Martel, 2003 WI 70, ¶24, 262 Wis. 2d 483, 664 N.W.2d 69 ("the 
remedial purpose of the sentence credit statute was 'to provide 
sentence credit in a wide range of situations' in order to 
'afford fairness' to defendants").   
¶64 The equal protection and fairness concerns underlying 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155 suggest that to the extent possible, a 
defendant should receive sentence credit for each day spent in 
custody.  To do otherwise would permit defendants with enough 
money to pay bail to serve shorter sentences than those that do 
not, and would cause some defendants to spend more time in 
custody than the sentence they received.   
¶65 Here, the parties stipulated that Obriecht is entitled 
to 107 days of sentence credit.  Nevertheless, the majority 
concludes that Obriecht spent an extra 105 days in custody but 
can receive credit for only 42 days.  Neither the record nor the 
arguments present a clear reason for doing so.  This unnecessary 
reduction of sentence credit runs counter to the policies 
underlying sentence credit which provide that credit should be 
awarded for as many days in custody as possible and that a 
person serve no more time than that for which he is sentenced.     
III 
¶66 In contrast to the majority, I would not endeavor to 
compute the exact sentence credit that Obriecht is owed.  Given 
the murky nature of the record and the lack of briefing on the 
No.  2013AP1345-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
subject, any attempted computation is a gamble.  Because there 
is no need to conduct such a computation to answer the question 
at issue in this case, I would not risk creating precedent that 
could be used to diminish the weighty concerns underlying 
sentence credit.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS join this concurrence.