Title: Hughes v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families/Division of Family Services
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 343, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SAMUEL HUGHES,1 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR 
CHILDREN, YOUTH & THEIR 
FAMILIES/DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 343, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§     
§  File No. 23-03-14TN                     
§  Petition No. 23-06101 (N) 
§                         
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  February 5, 2024 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  March 28, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.  
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
Upon consideration of the brief and the motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the responses, and the 
Family Court record, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
The respondent below-appellant, Samuel Hughes (“Father”), filed this 
appeal from the Family Court’s order, dated September 11, 2023, terminating his 
parental rights to his son (the “Child”).2  On appeal, Father’s counsel (“Counsel”) 
 
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 The Family Court also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s mother (“Mother”), who is 
not a party to this appeal.  We only recite the facts in the record as they relate to Father’s appeal. 
 
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has filed an opening brief and motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 
26.1(c).  Counsel represents that he has made a conscientious review of the record 
and the law and found no meritorious argument in support of the appeal.  Counsel 
also informed Father of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c), provided him with a copy of 
the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief, and advised him of his right to 
submit points for the Court’s consideration.  Father submitted points for the Court’s 
consideration.  The Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their 
Families/Division of Family Services (“DFS”) and the Child’s attorney argue that 
the Family Court’s judgment should be affirmed.  After careful consideration, this 
Court concludes that the Family Court’s judgment should be affirmed. 
(2) 
The Child was born substance-exposed in 2018.  DFS began working 
with both parents in January 2021.  Under safety plans with DFS, the Child was not 
to be left alone with or picked up from daycare by Mother, who suffered from mental 
health and substance abuse problems.  After Father left the Child alone with Mother 
and the Child was found wandering in and out of traffic by himself on May 22, 2022, 
DFS filed an emergency petition for custody on May 23, 2022.  The Family Court 
granted the petition.   
(3) 
At the preliminary protective hearing on June 1, 2022, DFS employees 
testified that the parents had violated multiple safety plans requiring that the Child 
not be left alone with Mother.  Father testified that Mother was addicted to PCP and 
 
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admitted that he made a mistake in leaving the Child alone with Mother on May 22, 
2022.  Father also testified that he lacked support in Delaware, but had family 
support in Pennsylvania and expressed a willingness to move there so his family 
could help him with the Child.  The Family Court found that there was probable 
cause to believe the Child was in substantial imminent risk of physical, mental, or 
emotional danger, it was in the Child’s best interests to remain in DFS custody, and 
DFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of the Child 
from the home.   
(4) 
On June 29, 2022 and July 12, 2022, the Family Court held the 
adjudicatory hearing.  Father claimed that he did not leave the Child with Mother on 
May 22, 2022, but took him to the liquor store where he wandered away from Father.  
The Family Court found this testimony not credible.  Although Father had expressed 
willingness to move to Pennsylvania where he had family, he was still living in 
Delaware with Mother.  The Family Court concluded that the Child was dependent, 
it was in the Child’s best interests to remain in DFS custody, and DFS was making 
reasonable efforts toward reunification. 
(5) 
On August 8, 2022, the Family Court held the dispositional hearing and 
approved Father’s case plan.  The elements of Father’s case plan included obtaining 
and maintaining housing separate from Mother, a parenting class that Father had 
already completed, and identification of friends, family members, and community 
 
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resources that could help him with the Child.  The Family Court concluded that the 
Child was dependent, it was in the Child’s best interests to remain in DFS custody, 
and DFS was making reasonable efforts toward reunification. 
(6) 
The Family Court conducted a paper review in lieu of a review hearing 
on October 17, 2022 and held review hearings on November 28, 2022 and February 
23, 2023.  Throughout this process, the Family Court found that Father was making 
progress on his case plan.  He had obtained housing in Pennsylvania and the 
necessary study under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 
(“ICPC”) was underway.  Father consistently visited the Child, but was observed 
dozing off during several visits.   
(7) 
The Child was doing well in foster care.  Other than a large number of 
cavities discovered at a December 2022 dentist appointment, he was healthy.  The 
Family Court found that the Child continued to be dependent and should remain in 
DFS custody.  On March 13, 2023, DFS filed a motion to change the permanency 
plan.   
(8) 
On May 16, 2023, the Family Court held the permanency hearing.  
Father had moved to a new address in Pennsylvania and a new ICPC study was 
underway.  Father had not missed any visits with the Child, but there were concerns 
that Father failed to correct the Child when he misbehaved and just let him play with 
his phone.  As a result of a domestic violence incident in which Mother was the 
 
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victim, Father had been charged with second-degree assault and strangulation.  He 
consented to a protection-from-abuse (“PFA”) order that included his agreement to 
pay Mother’s rent for six months.  The court granted DFS’s request to modify 
Father’s case plan, requiring him to complete a parenting class for single fathers and 
a class for perpetrators of domestic violence.  The court also granted DFS’s motion 
to change the permanency plan to concurrent goals of reunification and termination 
of parental rights.   
(9) 
The Family Court held the termination of parental rights hearing on 
August 11, 2023 and another hearing to obtain additional information on August 28, 
2023.  Over the course of the hearings, the Family Court heard testimony from both 
parents, the DFS treatment worker who worked with both parents, the DFS adoption 
worker, a Better Chance for Our Children employee who was the child and family 
specialist, Child, Inc. and CORAS Wellness & Behavioral Health employees who 
worked with Mother, and the Child’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”).  
Mother testified that she and Father had a fight in March 2023 that culminated in 
Father hitting her with a flowerpot and strangling her.  As a result of this incident, 
Mother suffered a concussion and broken nose and had to go to the hospital.  Father 
had told DFS he was living in his own apartment in Pennsylvania, but Mother 
testified that he was living with her at the time of the March 2023 incident.  Mother 
 
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also testified that Father had violated the subsequent PFA order by calling her, 
coming to her apartment, and failing to pay her rent.   
(10) The DFS treatment worker testified that even if the ICPC was approved 
for Father’s new apartment in Pennsylvania, DFS would oppose the Child returning 
to Father’s care.  DFS was concerned by the March 2023 domestic violence incident 
and Father’s refusal to do the parenting class for single fathers and the domestic 
violence class required by his amended case plan.  Father was consistent in his 
visitation with the Child, but DFS had concerns regarding the amount of time that 
the Child spent on Father’s phone during visitation.  Father’s relatives in 
Pennsylvania were willing to support Father if the Child was placed with him, but 
they were not placement resources for the Child and had not visited him while he 
was in DFS custody.   
(11) Father had pending charges for second-degree assault, strangulation, 
and other crimes arising from the March 2023 incident with Mother.  After being 
advised of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Father testified and 
disputed much of Mother’s testimony.  Father denied living with Mother in March 
2023 and said Mother initially claimed he hit her with a frying pan, not a flowerpot.  
He claimed that they both fell during the March incident and he did not know how 
Mother suffered a concussion or broken nose.  Father also testified that he had been 
paying Mother’s rent directly to her landlord until recently, but that Mother was 
 
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obligated to get a job and had failed to do so.  He did not think it was necessary for 
him to do another parenting class and claimed he had not understood that he was 
required to complete a domestic violence class.  When shown communications DFS 
sent him regarding his obligation to do those classes, Father said he did not have 
time to do the classes. 
(12) The Child was doing well in foster care, but his foster family was not 
an adoption resource.  The CASA and the Child’s attorney supported termination of 
Father’s parental rights.      
(13) On September 11, 2023, the Family Court issued a decision terminating 
the parental rights of the Child’s parents.  As to Father, the Family Court found by 
clear and convincing evidence that Father had failed to plan adequately for the 
Child’s needs under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5).  Although Father had completed much 
of his case plan, he faced multiple felony charges for domestic violence, refused to 
participate in a parenting class for single fathers and a domestic violence class, and 
was observed sleeping or not appropriately parenting during multiple visits with the 
Child.  The Family Court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
Child had been in DFS custody for at least a year and that DFS had made reasonable 
efforts toward reunification.  
(14) The Family Court next considered the best-interest factors under 13 
Del. C. § 722.  The Family Court found that factors 1 (wishes of the Child’s parents), 
 
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3 (relationship of the Child with his parents, relatives, and others in the household), 
5 (mental and physical health of all individuals involved),3 and 8 (criminal history 
of any party) weighed in favor of denying the petition for termination of Father’s 
parental rights.  The Family Court found that factors 2 (wishes of the Child as 
reflected by the position of the CASA and Child’s attorney), 4 (the Child’s 
adjustment to his home, school, and community), 6 (past and present compliance of 
the parents with their rights and responsibilities to the Child), and 7 (evidence of 
domestic violence) weighed in favor of terminating Father’s parental rights and was 
in the Child’s best interests.  Because the Family Court found statutory grounds 
existed under §1103(a)(5) and that termination would be in the Child’s best interests, 
the court terminated Father’s parental rights. 
(15) On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal 
determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.4  We review legal rulings de 
novo.5  We conduct a limited review of the Family Court’s factual findings to assure 
that they are supported by the record and are not clearly wrong.6  The Court will not 
disturb inferences and deductions supported by the record and the product of an 
 
3 Although the Family Court identified this factor in its conclusion as supportive of granting the 
petition to terminate Father’s parental rights, the Family Court’s analysis of this factor actually 
found that it weighed in favor of denying the petition.  Accordingly, we treat this factor as weighing 
in favor of denial of the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.   
4 Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012). 
5 Id. 
6 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008). 
 
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orderly and logical reasoning process.7  If the Family Court correctly applied the 
law, our review is limited to abuse of discretion.8   
(16) Father’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as follows:  (i) the 
Family Court and DFS lacked jurisdiction because he and the Child are members of 
the Yamassee Creek Nation tribe; (ii) the Family Court erred in relying on 
misleading information, hearsay, and unproven accusations; and (iii) he can provide 
for the safety and security of the Child with his family’s assistance.  As discussed 
below, these arguments are without merit.   
(17) We construe Father’s first claim as an argument that the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (“ICWA”) deprived the Family Court and DFS of jurisdiction.  The 
ICWA governs custody and termination of parental rights proceedings when a child 
is of Native American descent.9  Unless a state court is required to transfer a 
termination of parental rights proceeding, state and tribal courts exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction over such cases when a Native American child does not reside on the 
reservation of the child’s tribe.10   
(18) The ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is 
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1903; Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 263-66 (2023). 
10 Haaland, 599 U.S. at 265-66 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)). 
 
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membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe.”11  An “Indian tribe” is defined as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other 
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services 
provided to Indians by the Secretary [of the Interior] because of their status as 
Indians.”12  The Secretary of the Interior publishes an annual list of the recognized 
tribes.13   
(19) The parties discussed Father’s membership in the Yamassee Creek 
Nation tribe at one of the review hearings and the termination of parental rights 
hearing.  As the Family Court and Father were advised at those hearings, the ICWA 
did not apply to the proceedings because the Yamassee Creek Nation tribe did not 
appear on the annual list of recognized Native American tribes.14  Accordingly, 
Father’s argument that membership in the Yamassee Creek Nation tribe triggered 
the ICWA and deprived the Family Court and DFS of jurisdiction is without merit.    
(20) Father next argues that the Family Court relied on misleading 
information, hearsay, and unproven accusations.  He does not identify any of the 
 
11 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).   
12 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8). 
13 25 U.S.C. § 5131.   
14 See, e.g., Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 89 Fed. Reg. 944-02 (Jan. 8, 2024) (listing recognized tribes); Indian 
Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 88 Fed. Reg. 2112-01 (Jan. 12, 2023) (same); Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible 
to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 87 Fed. Reg. 4636-02 (Jan. 
28, 2022) (same). 
 
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allegedly improper information, but refers to Mother’s mental health and substance 
abuse problems.  We construe this claim as an argument that the Family Court should 
have disregarded Mother’s testimony concerning his behavior toward her.  Both 
Mother and Father testified at the hearings.  Father had the opportunity to cross-
examine Mother and Mother’s mental health and substance abuse issues were 
litigated throughout the proceedings.  Having heard the parents’ live testimony, the 
Family Court found Mother’s description of the March 2023 incident with Father 
and his subsequent violation of the PFA credible.  When the determination of facts 
turns on a question of the credibility and the acceptance or rejection of the testimony 
of witnesses appearing before the Family Court, we will not substitute our opinion 
for that of the Family Court.15           
(21) Finally, Father argues, as he did below, that he can provide for the Child 
with the assistance of his family.  The Family Court did not err in concluding 
otherwise.  Before the Child came into DFS custody, Father violated multiple safety 
plans and the Child was found wandering in traffic by himself.  By the time of the 
termination of parental rights hearing, he faced multiple charges for assaulting 
Mother, had refused to complete a class for domestic violence perpetrators, and had 
refused to complete a parenting class for single fathers.  Father’s family members 
made no effort to visit the Child while he was in DFS custody.  There is sufficient 
 
15 Shimel v. Shimel, 210 A.3d 732, 2019 WL 2142066, at *2 (Del. May 14, 2019) (ORDER). 
 
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evidence supporting the Family Court’s termination of Father’s parental rights based 
on his failure to plan, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s 
best interests, and that DFS made reasonable reunification efforts.  We find no error 
in the Family Court’s application of the law to the facts and no abuse of discretion 
in the Family Court’s factual findings.  Having considered the parties’ briefs and the 
record on appeal, we conclude that Father’s appeal is wholly without merit.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice