Title: Noah v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13200
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2022

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SJC-13200 
 
NOAH N., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 4, 2022. – April 11, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency 
proceeding, Continuance, Judicial discretion. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 9, 2021. 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
Caroline I. Alpert for the juvenile. 
Brooke Hartley, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Sarah Spofford, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The issue before the court is under what 
circumstances, if any, a judge presiding over a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding may grant a continuance sought by the 
Commonwealth for the express purpose of delaying resolution of 
 
 
 
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the case past the juvenile's eighteenth birthday.  The age of a 
juvenile on the date of his or her case's disposition is 
significant:  under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (§ 58), a delinquent 
juvenile who is then seventeen or younger may be committed to 
the custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) only until 
he or she turns eighteen, but a juvenile whose case is disposed 
of after his or her eighteenth birthday can be committed until 
he or she turns nineteen.  In the instant case, where the motion 
judge granted such a continuance, it was potentially the 
difference between twenty days and twelve months in DYS custody. 
 
We conclude that § 58 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1), 378 
Mass. 861 (1979), tightly constrain the allowance of 
continuances for the sole purpose of extending the time of 
commitment.  We further conclude that such continuances are 
authorized only if there is clear and convincing evidence that 
continued commitment is necessary for the rehabilitation of the 
juvenile, and express findings are made to that effect after an 
evidentiary hearing.  Absent such findings, allowance of such a 
continuance is an abuse of discretion.  As we have no such 
findings in the instant case, and the juvenile has now turned 
eighteen, we reverse the judge's order.1 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice, and the Massachusetts Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of the juvenile. 
 
 
 
3 
 
Background.  The facts in this case are undisputed.  On 
March 22, 2021, the juvenile was arraigned in the Juvenile Court 
on the charge of assault and battery on a family or household 
member, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).  The 
complainant alleged that the juvenile, who was seventeen at the 
time, had punched and bit her. 
 
On August 4, 2021, the juvenile filed a tender of plea or 
admission and waiver of rights form and a written request for a 
hearing.  In an August 11 filing, the Commonwealth requested a 
continuance of the change of plea hearing for the express 
purpose of delaying the case's disposition until after the 
juvenile's eighteenth birthday, which was in September.  After a 
hearing and over the juvenile's objection, the Juvenile Court 
judge granted the continuance on August 13 without providing her 
reasons for doing so.2 
Accordingly, the juvenile's eighteenth birthday passed 
without his plea being tendered.  He petitioned for relief 
 
 
2 At the time the continuance was granted, the juvenile had 
pending charges for carrying a firearm without a license, 
possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, 
and possession of a class D substance.  He had also recently 
resolved cases where he was charged with larceny of a motor 
vehicle, larceny over $1,200, trespass, possession of a class D 
substance, receiving a stolen motor vehicle, malicious 
destruction of property under $1,200, and assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon. 
 
 
 
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pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and the single justice reserved 
and reported the petition to the full court. 
Discussion.  In general, we review the decision to grant a 
continuance for abuse of discretion.  See Vazquez Diaz v. 
Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336, 344 (2021).  In deciding whether a 
continuance was properly allowed here to extend the time of 
commitment for a juvenile beyond his eighteenth birthday, we 
must, however, consider both the statutory requirements of G. L. 
c. 119, § 58, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1).  Further 
informing our analysis, in interpreting the juvenile justice 
statutes and rules of procedure, we have also long recognized 
that rehabilitation, not punishment, is the overriding purpose 
of the juvenile justice system.  Commonwealth v. Ulani U., 487 
Mass. 203, 207 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 
Mass. 562, 576 (2013) ("the juvenile justice system 'is 
primarily rehabilitative, cognizant of the inherent differences 
between juvenile and adult offenders, and geared toward "the 
correction and redemption to society of delinquent children"'").  
See generally R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.3 (2d ed. 2006).  
Children brought before the court are to "be treated, not as 
criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and 
guidance."  G. L. c. 119, § 53.  Finally, where the 
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system are served, we have 
been particularly receptive to the exercise of judicial 
 
 
 
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discretion.  See, e.g., Humberto H., supra at 575-576 (allowing 
motion to dismiss delinquency complaint before arraignment to 
avoid creation of criminal record); Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 
461 Mass. 459, 467 (2012) (allowing judge to continue 
delinquency case without finding after jury trial).  With these 
guiding principles in mind, we turn to the relevant specific 
statutory language and the rule of criminal procedure governing 
continuances. 
1.  G. L. c. 119, § 58.  Section 58 states, in pertinent 
part: 
"If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child on a 
complaint, the court . . . may commit him [or her] to the 
custody of the department of youth services, but the . . . 
commitment period shall not be for a period longer than 
until such child attains the age of eighteen, or nineteen 
in the case of a child whose case is disposed of after he 
[or she] has attained his [or her] eighteenth birthday or 
age [twenty] in the case of a child whose case is disposed 
of after he [or she] has attained his [or her] nineteenth 
birthday." 
 
In the juvenile's view, because he sought to tender a plea when 
he was seventeen, he should benefit from the statute's limit 
that any commitment to DYS end by age eighteen.  Thus, he 
contends, the grant of a continuance sought for the purpose of 
committing him until age nineteen was contrary to law. 
By its express terms, the statute reflects the 
Legislature's intention that commitment of a juvenile to the 
custody of DYS will end when the juvenile attains the age of 
 
 
 
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eighteen.  The exception is when the delinquency proceeding is 
not disposed of until after the juvenile's eighteenth birthday.  
In these circumstances, apparently recognizing the requirements 
of an orderly judicial process and the possibility of the need 
for continuing commitment and rehabilitation, the Legislature 
allowed commitment, and thus rehabilitation, to continue until 
the juvenile's nineteenth birthday.3  This provision for the 
extension of the time of commitment was both mindful and 
respectful of the judicial process and the statute's 
rehabilitative purposes. 
The Legislature did not, however, expressly address 
continuances in § 58.  This is understandable, as continuances 
are an ordinary aspect of an orderly judicial process.  If a 
case is continued for reasons related to the judicial process 
and unrelated to extending the time of commitment, then the 
statutory requirements for extending such time of commitment are 
clearly met.  Allowing continuances for the sole purpose of 
extending the commitment period are, however, different.  Such 
continuances, if they do not otherwise serve the purposes of the 
 
3 Section 58 also permits commitment until age twenty in 
cases where a delinquency case is disposed of after a juvenile 
turns nineteen.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58.  Our decision today 
applies with equal force to instances where the Commonwealth 
requests a continuance in delinquency proceedings with a 
nineteen year old, seeking to extend the juvenile's commitment 
until he or she turns twenty. 
 
 
 
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judicial process, intrude on the Legislature's authority to set 
limits on the time of commitment.  Allowing continuances for 
this reason alone raises the question whether the statutory 
language regarding disposal of cases is being manipulated to 
extend the time of commitment beyond what the Legislature 
intended.  Cf. Ulla U. v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 219, 224-225 
(2020) (cautioning that intentionally delaying transfer hearing 
proceedings against juvenile so as to proceed against him or her 
as adult would be improper).  Further complicating matters is 
the difficulty of discerning what the Legislature intended 
regarding continuances when a juvenile's case would ordinarily 
be disposed of shortly before his or her eighteenth birthday, 
but the juvenile's rehabilitation could not be accomplished 
without further need of services requiring an extended 
commitment. 
Before resolving this issue, we address the additional 
requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a), which governs 
continuances. 
2.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a).  The rules of criminal 
procedure permit continuances "only when based upon cause and 
only when necessary to insure that the interests of justice are 
served."4  Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1).  In most cases, "cause" 
 
4 The rules of criminal procedure are applicable to 
delinquency proceedings.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 1 (b), as 
 
 
 
8 
refers to reasons related to the orderly processing of cases.  
See, e.g., Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 861 (1979) 
(contemplating continuances due to attorney scheduling 
conflicts, witness unavailability, and need for additional trial 
preparation).  In the instant case, the cause of the continuance 
does not appear to relate to the orderly disposition of the 
case.  Rather, it relates to delaying the timing of the 
disposition of the case until after the juvenile's eighteenth 
birthday, possibly because of the need for additional 
rehabilitation, although we have no express findings to that 
effect. 
In addition to cause, rule 10 (a) (1) requires us to 
consider whether the continuance is "necessary to insure that 
the interests of justice are served."  Discerning the interests 
of justice here requires us to focus on the difference between 
rehabilitation and punishment.  Rehabilitation, as explained 
above, is the guiding principle of juvenile justice.  Any 
extension of the commitment period beyond what is necessary for 
rehabilitative purposes would therefore be impermissible. 
3.  Requirements for granting a commitment extension 
continuance.  Taking into account both the requirements of rule 
10 and the statute, we reach the following conclusions.  Where a 
 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1501 (2004); Mass. R. Crim. P. 2 (b) (7), 
as amended, 397 Mass. 1226 (1986). 
 
 
 
9 
request for a continuance has nothing to do with the orderly 
disposition of the case, but rather is directed at the timing of 
the juvenile's impending eighteenth birthday, and at extending 
the time of commitment beyond that ordinarily authorized by 
statute, the ample discretion allowed Juvenile Court judges is 
tightly constrained.  A continuance may only be allowed in such 
circumstances if it is necessary to ensure the rehabilitation of 
the juvenile and express findings are made to that effect.  See 
generally Magnus M., 461 Mass. at 466; Jake J. v. Commonwealth, 
433 Mass. 70, 75-76 (2000).  Cf. G. L. c. 119, § 58 (requiring 
written findings before juvenile adjudicated youthful offender 
can be committed to DYS until age twenty-one).  An evidentiary 
hearing must also be held to make such a determination, and the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence the necessity of continued commitment to ensure the 
rehabilitation of the juvenile.  Cf. Matter of G.P., 473 Mass. 
112, 120 (2015) (clear and convincing evidence standard 
appropriate in various civil commitment proceedings); Care & 
Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 570 (2005) (clear and 
convincing evidence standard applies in proceeding to commit 
child to custody of predecessor of Department of Children and 
Families).  These strict requirements ensure that rehabilitative 
purposes necessitate any extension of the commitment period. 
 
 
 
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In the instant case, we have no such findings and the 
juvenile has already turned eighteen.  Absent such findings, it 
was an abuse of discretion to allow a continuance for the sole 
purpose of extending the juvenile's commitment.5,6  We therefore 
conclude that the continuance was improperly allowed.7 
Conclusion.  The order allowing the motion for a 
continuance is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
5 We recognize that the Juvenile Court judge did not have 
the benefit of our decision explicating the standards for 
continuances granted for the sole purpose of extending the time 
of commitment. 
 
6 As we conclude that application of § 58 and rule 10 merit 
reversal, we need not reach the juvenile's argument that the 
grant of the continuance violated his right to due process under 
the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions. 
 
7 Finally, we note that the juvenile had other pending 
charges at the time of the continuance.  Our decision here of 
course does not in any way preclude the Commonwealth from 
proceeding on those charges as it sees fit, should they remain 
unresolved.