Title: Mills v. People
Citation: 339 P.2d 998
Docket Number: 18869
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 1959

339 P.2d 998 (1959) Ernest Joseph MILLS, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 18869. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. June 1, 1959. Joseph A. Myers, V. G. Seavy, Jr., Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Norman H. Comstock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. Plaintiff in error, to whom we will refer as defendant, was convicted of the crime of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. He seeks review on writ of error. We find it unnecessary to set forth in this opinion the sordid details of the crime of which defendant was convicted. Suffice it to say that the evidence offered by the people was all circumstantial and for that reason the jury was not permitted to consider the death penalty. The record before us raises a clear-cut question, the answer to which requires a reversal of the judgment. The testimony pertinent to the controlling question, which was admitted over objection of counsel for defendant, related to defendant's refusal to submit to a lie detector test. The witness Brooks testified that he arrested defendant in the State of Missouri. In the course of conversation the witness asked defendant if he would take a "lie detector test." Defendant replied that he would not. This evidence was offered and admitted on the theory that the refusal tended to show a "consciousness of guilt." The question is answered in the negative. The attorney general with commendable frankness makes the following statement in his brief in connection with the pertinent issue: *999 Numerous decisions of courts of last resort throughout the nation have rejected evidence of this kind. Typical of the opinions which, without exception, have held that admission of such testimony requires reversal, is the case of State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465, from which we quote the following: See also 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 for additional citations. As shown by the brief of the attorney general, it is quite apparent to him that no authority sustaining the use of such testimony can be found. It should have been equally apparent to the district attorney at the trial court level that insistence upon the introduction of this testimony would result in a reversal of the judgment in case of a conviction. All too frequently this court is compelled to reverse judgments of guilt in important criminal cases because of overzealous prosecution. It is the duty of prosecuting officers to guard against the introduction of incompetent evidence. Overprosecution of an accused should not be permitted by the trial court. In the instant case the district attorney insisted *1000 at great length upon introduction into evidence of testimony which is uniformly held to be incompetent, in an unbroken line of authorities throughout the nation. The trial court erred in department from the wellestablished rule. We are afforded no alternative and must reverse the judgment. Where overzealous prosecution results in the introduction of prejudicial, incompetent evidence, "this Court will be compelled to reverse judgments of guilt; the taxpayers of the several counties will continue to bear the heavy costs of second trials in murder cases; and ultimate justice will continue to be delayed." Becksted v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189, 195. The judgment is reversed. SUTTON, J., not participating.