Title: STATE v COOPER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14255
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 5, 1979

No. 14255 IN THE S U P = CCUI~T OF THE STATE OF m m m 1978 S T A T E O F ICNIYUA, Plaintiff ax3 Respondent, -VS- WlLLIAM ORIE COOPER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal frm: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , nora able Jack D. Shanstran, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appllant: Michael Sand argued, Bozeman, Mntana For Reqmndent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, mntana Sheri K. Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Mntana Donald White, County Attorney, Bozgnan, mntana Gregory R. Todd argued, Deputy County Attorney, B o z m , mntana Sdmitted: October 23, 1978 Decided: dkf? -- "3 a " , , r--t - . ! 1 I> , _ > - I - Filed: - - I M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. ~ e f e n d a n t was charged by information with one count of aggravated a s s a u l t and one count of a s s a u l t . A jury t r i a l w a s held on January 26 and 27, 1978, t h e Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom presiding. A f t e r t h e jury returned a g u i l t y v e r d i c t on both counts, defendant w a s sentenced t o f i v e years on Count I and s i x months on Count 11, t h e sentences t o run concurrently. One and one-half years were then suspended. Defendant appeals. Between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m. on D e c e m b e r 9, 1977, defen- dant and f i v e f r i e n d s entered the Sacajawea B a r , located i n t h e basement of t h e Sacajawea Motel i n Three Forks, Montana. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r , t h r e e Mexican-American brothers, Paul, David, and Caesar V i l l a r r e a l , entered t h e bar from the u p s t a i r s where they w e r e staying. A f o u r t h Mexican-American, named Tano, entered sometime l a t e r . When defendant saw these men order a six-pack of beer and noticed one w a s not wearing a s h i r t , he remarked: "No s h i r t , no shoes, no service." H e apparently walked over t o t h e men muttering things about "spics" and "wetbacks" and proceeded t o knock t h e six-pack o u t of t h e hands of Paul V i l l a r r e a l . A s c u f f l e ensued and one of t h e Mexican-American brothers had a knife. Soon bar s t o o l s and pool cues w e r e being used as weapons. After a s h o r t time, defendant l e f t the b a r , went t o a c a r , and picked up a gun. H e f i r e d a t least one s h o t while on t h e sidewalk next t o t h e bar entrance. H e then reentered t h e bar pointing t h e gun and helped one of h i s f r i e n d s o u t of t h e bar. Defendant drove t o Bozeman and while enroute threw t h e gun away. I t w a s never recovered. The next afternoon, Detective Bruce LaRue of the Gallatin County s h e r i f f ' s department found a .25 c a l i b e r automatic c o l t p i s t o l car- t r i d g e case near the top of the s t a i r s where a witness had seen defendant f i r e the gun the night before. Defendant presents s i x issues f o r review which can be summarized and s t a t e d i n the following manner: 1. Whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n giving Instruc- t i o n No. 20 concerning the defense of j u s t i f i a b l e use of force. 2. Whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n giving Instruc- t i o n No. 9 concerning i n t e n t . 3 . Whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n excluding the testimony of two defense witnesses. 4. Whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n refusing t o give defendant's offered Instruction No. 1 2 . 5. Whether defendant was denied h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r and impartial t r i a l because of e r r o r s on the p a r t of the D i s t r i c t Court. 6. Whether there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support the verdicts of guilty. Instruction No. 20 read: "You a r e instructed t h a t a defense of justi- f i a b l e use of force is an affirmative defense and t h a t the defendant has the burden of pro- ducing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on the i s s u e t o r a i s e a reasonable doubt of h i s g u i l t . " Defendant contends t h i s instruction places the burden of proving self-defense on him. The S t a t e contends t h i s instruc- t i o n places the "burden of producing evidence" on defendant but not the "burden of persuasion". The Montana County Attorneys Association, appearing a s amicus curiae, argues t h a t "a criminal defendant asserting the affirmative defense of j u s t i f i a b l e use of force [should be] required t o prove t h a t defense by a preponderance of the evidence." The United S t a t e s Supreme Court, i n t h e landmark case of I n re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S . C t . 1068, 1073, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 375, e x p l i c i t l y held t h a t " t h e Due Process Clause p r o t e c t s [an] accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every f a c t necessary - t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime with which he is charged." (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, i n a Maine homicide case, t h e Supreme Court held t h a t "the Due Process Clause requires t h e prosecution t o prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of t h e heat of passion on sudden provocation when t h e i s s u e is properly presented i n a homicide case." (Em- phasis added.) Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 4 2 1 U.S. 684, Defendant relies on Mullaney by analogy and argues the S t a t e should be required t o prove the absence of t h e " j u s t i - f i a b l e use of force" t o convict defendant of aggravated a s s a u l t . Such a contention ignores t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme outlined i n the Mullaney case and the s t a t u t o r y scheme present i n Montana. A s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n was addressed by t h e Supreme Court i n Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S . C t . 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281. I n Patterson t h e i s s u e was " t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under t h e . . . Due Process Clause of burdening t h e defendant i n a New York S t a t e murder t r i a l with proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance a s defined by New York law." Patterson, 432 U.S. a t 198, 97 S . C t . a t 2320, 53 L Ed 2d a t 284. I n finding t h a t requiring the defendant t o prove h i s affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence did not v i o l a t e due process, the Supreme Court stated: "We . . . decline t o adopt a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l imperative, operative countrywide, t h a t a s t a t e must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every f a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g any and a l l affirmative de- fenses r e l a t e d t o the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required t h a t only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t s against those of the accused have been l e f t t o the l e g i s l a t i v e branch. W e there- f o r e w i l l not d i s t u r b the balance struck i n previous cases holding t h a t the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution t o prove beyond a reasonable doubt a l l of the elements included i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of the offense of which the defendant is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of a l l affirmative defenses has never been con- s t i t u t i o n a l l y required; and w e perceive no rea- son t o fashion such a r u l e i n t h i s case and apply it t o t h e statutory defense a t issue here." Patterson, 432 U.S. a t 210, 97 S.Ct. a t 2327, 53 L Ed 2d a t 292. Section 94-3-112, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , provides t h a t " [ a ] defense of j u s t i f i a b l e use of force, based on the provisions of t h i s chapter is an affirmative defense." The accompanying commission comment affords further c l a r i f i c a t i o n : "A defense based upon any of the provisions of t h i s chapter is an affirmative defense, and i f not put i n i s s u e by the prosecution's evidence, the defendant, t o r a i s e it a s an issue, must present some evidence thereon." B y denominating the j u s t i f i a b l e use of force a s an affirmative defense, Montana's statutory scheme does not require the prosecution t o prove the absence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt as though t h e i r absence were an element of the crime charged. This point is even more evident when t h e elements of the crimes charged a r e d i s t i l l e d from the s t a t u t e s defining the offenses. Under section 94-5-201 (1) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947, a person commits the offense of a s s a u l t when he (1) purposely or knowingly, ( 2 ) makes physical contact with an individual, ( 3 ) when the contact is of an insulting o r provoking nature. Under sec- t i o n 94-5-202(1) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947, a person commits t h e offense of aggravated a s s a u l t when he (1) purposely o r knowingly, ( 2 ) causes apprehension of serious bodily injury i n another, (3) by use of a weapon, ( 4 ) when such apprehen- sion is reasonable. Clearly, absence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n is not an element of e i t h e r of these offenses. That being the case, we a r e l e f t with the task of reviewing Instruction No. 20 t o see i f it i s consistent with Montana law. I n S t a t e v. Grady (1975), 166 Mont. 168, 175, 531 P.2d 681, 684, t h i s Court stated: "The law i n Montana is t h a t although the burden of persuasion remains on the S t a t e , i n order t o a v a i l himself of t h e affirmative defense of s e l f - defense, the defendant has the burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on the issue t o r a i s e a rea- sonable doubt of h i s g u i l t . " Clearly then, the D i s t r i c t Court did not e r r i n giving Instruction No. 20. It is a c l e a r statement of the law i n Montana. The Montana County Attorneys Association argues t h a t a greater burden should be placed on a defendant--that is, a defendant should be required t o prove h i s affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In support of t h i s contention the Association points out t h a t t h i s Court has already imposed t h a t burden f o r other affirmative de- fenses. S t a t e v. ~ c K e n z i e (1978), Mont . , 581 P.2d 1205, 1233, 35 St.Rep. 759, 795 (mental disease o r d e f e c t ) ; and S t a t e v. S t u i t (1978), Mont. , 576 P.2d 264, 267, 35 St.Rep. 313, 317 (section 94-3-110, R.C.M. 1947, compulsion). This Court has expressly s t a t e d t h a t the t e s t t o be used when considering the affirmative defense of s e l f - defense i s "the burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e issue t o r a i s e a reasonable doubt of h i s g u i l t . " Grady, 166 Mont. a t 175, 531 P.2d a t 684. W e reaffirm t h a t holding and hold t h a t when a criminal defendant seeks t o a v a i l himself of the affirmative defense of t h e use of force i n defense of a person pursuant t o section 94-3-102, R.C.M. 1947, he has the burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e issue t o r a i s e a reasonable doubt of h i s g u i l t . Defendant's second issue f o r consideration concerns Instruction No. 9: "You a r e instructed t h a t the law presumes t h a t a person intends the ordinary consequences of h i s voluntary acts." Defendant argues t h i s instruction creates a conclusive presumption of criminal i n t e n t and is therefore unconstitu- t i o n a l . The S t a t e responds f i r s t by pointing out t h a t defendant did not object t o the giving of t h i s instruction a t t r i a l ; second by pointing out t h a t t h i s instruction has been approved by t h i s Court on a number of previous occa- sions; and t h i r d by arguing t h a t giving the instruction was not prejudicial. W e have i n t h e p a s t considered t h i s instruction and have decided t h a t it i s a proper instruction i n a criminal case. See S t a t e v. McKenzie, 581 P.2d a t 1 2 2 2 , 35 St.Rep. a t 780. Therefore, w e conclude the D i s t r i c t Court did not e r r i n giving Instruction No. 9 t o the jury. Defendant's t h i r d issue concerns whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n excluding the testimony of two witnesses, Charles Robinson and Mark Davis. Robinson's testimony, t h a t he had been attacked i n the bar by Mexican-Americans three months p r i o r t o the incident involved i n t h i s case, was excluded a s being too remote i n time and because Robinson could not identify t h e persons who attacked him. Addi- t i o n a l l y , there was no proof whatsoever t h a t the p a r t i e s involved i n the a l t e r c a t i o n s were the same. This testimony was properly excluded. Robinson did not witness the f i g h t involved i n t h i s case. H i s testimony, offered i n support of defendant's defense of j u s t i f i a b l e use of force, was i r r e l e - vant under these circumstances. Davis' testimony, that he had seen a man named Tim Van Luchen leave the bar a week before this incident with a broken jaw, was also excluded by the District Court. De- fendant argues that Davis should have been allowed to testify with respect to statements made at that time by Van Luchen concerning how his jaw had been broken under Rule 803, Mont.R.Evid. The portions of that rule cited by defendant read: "The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. "(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. "(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excite- ment caused by the event or condition." The time element is important under either of these exceptions. The fact that Davis did not perceive the event which caused the injury creates a problem with respect to this time element. Thus, the District Court's determination to exclude the testimony was not clearly erroneous. Assuming, for the moment, that the testimony should not have been excluded as hearsay, the testimony was clearly irrelevant. Like Robinson's testimony, Davis' testimony was offered as proof of defendant's state of mind when he entered the bar. But defendant's own testimony indicated that these prior events were either unknown to him or had no effect on his state of mind. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of Davis' testimony. Defendant's fourth issue concerns the District Court's refusal to give defendant's offered instruction number 12: "You a r e hereby instructed t h a t a f t e r considering and weighing t h e evidence and reconciling any discrepancies i n the evidence, i f there is any reasonable hypothesis upon which you can base a v e r d i c t of not g u i l t y it is your duty t o return a v e r d i c t of not guilty." Defendant c i t e s S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick (1974), 163 Mont. 220, 225, 516 P.2d 605, 609, f o r the proposition t h a t " t o j u s t i f y conviction on circumstantial evidence, the f a c t s and circumstances must not only be e n t i r e l y consistent with theory of g u i l t , but must be inconsistent with any other r a t i o n a l e ( i . e . reasonable) conclusion." In t h i s regard, defendant is concerned with the f a c t t h a t the gun he used when he reentered t h e bar was never recovered. H e had argued t h a t the gun was a harmless teargas p i s t o l and not a r e a l gun. However, i n Fitzpatrick the S t a t e proved its case t o t a l l y by circumstantial evidence. In the i n s t a n t case the g r e a t majority of evidence offered a t t r i a l was d i r e c t evidence. Circumstantial evidence instructions a r e only required i n a case which depends e n t i r e l y on circumstantial evidence. S t a t e v. Mah Sam Hing (1931), 89 Mont. 178, 186, 295 P. 1014, 1017. It i s not e r r o r t o refuse circumstantial evidence instructions i f there is d i r e c t evidence introduced against t h e defendant. S t a t e v. White (1965), 1 4 6 Mont. Defendant's f i f t h issue, regarding the e f f e c t of e r r o r s by the D i s t r i c t Court, is merely a summary of arguments we have already addressed i n the previous four issues. W e find no m e r i t i n t h i s contention t h a t defendant was denied a f a i r t r i a l . Finally, defendant contends there was not s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support the verdicts of g u i l t y entered against him. Again, defendant is primarily concerned with t h e evidence supporting h i s contention t h a t he acted i n a j u s t i - f i e d manner. But, "[wlhether t h e circumstances w e r e such a s t o j u s t i f y defendant's a c t i o n s is c l e a r l y a question of f a c t f o r t h e jury." S t a t e v. Larson (1978), Mont. I 574 P.2d 266, 269, 35 St.Rep. 69, 73. Defendant's conviction is affirmed. W e Concur: ~ 4 A 8 %&?Q Chief J u s t i c e