Title: JEANNE OMELENCHUK V CITY OF WARREN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 117252
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2002

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 9, 2002  
JEANNE and KRISTIN OMELENCHUK, 
Co-Personal Representatives of 
the Estate of George Omelenchuk,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v  
No. 117252  
THE CITY OF WARREN, and the 
WARREN FIRE DEPARTMENT,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CAVANAGH, J.  
Plaintiffs allege that their decedent died as the result  
of gross negligence by employees of defendant, the city of  
Warren.  The circuit court granted summary disposition on the  
basis of governmental immunity. MCR 2.116(C)(7). The Court  
of Appeals reversed, but this Court reinstates the judgment of  
the circuit court because the controlling statutes plainly  
provide immunity to defendant, the city of Warren.  
 
I  
Two years ago, when this case was before us in connection  
with a separate issue, we stated the facts.  Omelenchuk v City  
of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 568-570; 609 NW2d 177 (2000).  
On February 13, 1994, a man named George 
Omelenchuk suffered a heart attack at work.[1]  The  
person who found him lying on the floor called the 
Warren Fire Department, which sent two trucks. 
Emergency personnel at the scene included two 
firefighters, three paramedics, and an emergency 
medical technician.  
Resuscitation efforts included insertion of an  
endotracheal tube.  The defendants say that all 
three paramedics checked to make sure the tube was 
properly placed.  However, when Mr. Omelenchuk 
arrived at the hospital, the tube was found to be 
in his esophagus, rather than his trachea.  
Mr. Omelenchuk was transported to a hospital 
that was located across the street from his place 
of business. 
In the emergency room, further  
efforts were made to save his life. However, these 
were unsuccessful, and he was declared dead.  
The day after Mr. Omelenchuk died, plaintiffs 
Jeanne Omelenchuk and Kristin Omelenchuk were named  
co-personal representatives of the estate.[2]  
* * *  
1In the earlier appeal, as now, we were examining an 
untried case. As we did two years ago, we take the facts as 
presented in plaintiffs’ complaint, though we have also 
examined other pleadings in the record for the purpose of 
providing a factual narrative.  
2As we noted in our first opinion, “[t]he plaintiffs’ 
complaint identifies Jeanne Omelenchuk as the decedent’s 
widow.  However, the defendants dispute that assertion on the 
basis of a 1992 judgment of divorce.  Kristin Omelenchuk is  
the daughter of George and Jeanne Omelenchuk.”  [461 Mich 
569.]  
2  
 
 
[T]he plaintiffs filed suit against the city  
of Warren and the Warren Fire Department on  
July 19, 1996.  
In March 1997, the defendants moved for  
summary disposition. MCR 2.116(C)(7). The motion  
listed several grounds, including governmental 
immunity and the statute of limitations.  
At the motion hearing, defense counsel argued 
that the defendants were immune because there was  
no showing that the emergency personnel had been 
grossly negligent and because the city could not be 
held vicariously liable.[3]
 In presenting these 
arguments, 
counsel 
cited 
MCL 
333.20965 
and  
691.1407.  Without explaining the precise statutory 
basis of its ruling, the circuit court granted 
summary disposition “[o]n the basis of governmental 
immunity.”  
The plaintiffs appealed.  The Court of Appeals  
affirmed,[4] but not on the basis of immunity. 
Instead, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
complaint had not been timely filed.  
We vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, finding  
that plaintiffs had timely filed their complaint.  We also  
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of  
the immunity issue, which had formed the basis of the circuit  
court’s decision to grant summary disposition. 461 Mich 571­
577.  On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of  
the circuit court because “defendants failed to produce any  
3It is agreed that the fire department is not a separate 
entity from which plaintiffs can recover.  Any recovery would  
be from the city of Warren.  
4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 6, 1999 
(Docket No. 204098).  
3  
 
  
 
documentary evidence to establish that the conduct of the  
responding paramedics did not constitute gross negligence.”  
Slip op at 1.5  
We granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal.  
II  
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  
Cardinal Mooney High Sch v Mich High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 437  
Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).  
III  
A  
The issue presented in this case is one of statutory  
interpretation. Therefore, we must apply familiar statutory  
interpretation principles that were recently restated in  
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d  
686 (2001):  
The paramount rule of statutory interpretation  
is that we are to effect the intent of the  
Legislature. Tryc v Mich Veterans’ Facility, 451 
Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).  To do so, we 
begin with the statute’s language. 
If the  
statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we 
assume that the Legislature intended its plain 
meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. 
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 
(2001).  In reviewing the statute’s language, every 
word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a 
construction that would render any part of the 
statute surplusage or nugatory. Altman v Meridian  
Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 (1992).  
5Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued June 23, 2000 
(Docket No. 204098).  
4  
 
 
In this case, a plain reading of the emergency medical  
services 
act 
(EMSA), 
MCL 333.20965, requires a conclusion that  
defendant, the city of Warren, is entitled to a grant of  
summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity.  
The first subsection of the EMSA, MCL 333.20965(1)(f),  
provides that an “authoritative governmental unit,” in this  
case defendant, the city of Warren, is immune from suit on the  
basis of the acts of its emergency medical services workers in  
treating a patient “[u]nless the act or omission is the result  
of gross negligence or wilful misconduct . . . .”6  Stated  
affirmatively, this means that the city can be sued under this  
provision if the plaintiff can prove the city’s emergency  
medical workers were grossly negligent in treating a patient.  
Yet, this ability to sue is subsequently narrowed by MCL  
333.20965(4). This section of the statute states:  
Subsections (1) and (3) do not limit immunity 
from liability otherwise provided by law for any of 
the persons listed in subsections (1) and (3).  
Because MCL 691.1407(1), which is part of the act commonly  
described as the governmental tort liability act (GTLA),  
provides that a governmental entity, including of course  
defendant, the city of Warren, is “immune from tort liability  
if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or  
6That is the language of 1990 PA 179 (in effect at the 
time of these events).  The same phrase is found in 1997 PA 
78, 1999 PA 199, and 2000 PA 375.  
5  
discharge of a governmental function,”7 MCL 333.20965(4) means  
that the city of Warren is immune in the discharge of a  
governmental function.8  
B  
Notwithstanding the clarity that this analysis of the  
statute yields about its meaning, plaintiffs effectively ask  
us to depart from applying the plain language of the statute  
on the ground that the Legislature’s inclusion of any  
governmental entity by use of the phrase an “authoritative  
governmental unit” in MCL 333.20965(1) is rendered pointless  
if MCL 333.20965(4) means that such a governmental entity will  
always be immune from suit under the GTLA anyway.  Thus, they  
argue, to avoid making the statute a futile exercise, or  
7 That is the current language of the statute, as enacted 
in 1999 PA 241 and 2000 PA 318. Throughout this opinion, we 
will discuss the case in terms of the current statutory 
language.  The version enacted in 1986 PA 175 was in effect at  
the time of these events; it and 1996 PA 143 include a 
stylistic difference that does not affect the present issue.  
8 While the plain language of the statute is dispositive,  
we note that the history underlying the adoption of MCL 
333.20965(4) supports the conclusion that it was adopted by 
the Legislature to make clear that MCL 333.20965 does not take 
away any immunity enjoyed by a governmental entity under the 
GTLA.  In construing a predecessor version of the EMSA that 
did not include language like that of MCL 333.20965(4), this 
Court in Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132; 468 NW2d 479 
(1991), affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in that 
case that the prior version of the EMSA created an exception 
to governmental immunity in cases of gross negligence or 
wilful misconduct in the provision of emergency medical 
services.  
6  
 
nullity, we should ignore MCL 333.20965(4) so as to leave MCL  
333.20965(1) with meaning. In other words, plaintiffs would  
have us hold that an authoritative governmental unit, such as  
defendant, the city of Warren, can be sued under the EMSA in  
cases of gross negligence by its emergency medical services  
workers, notwithstanding the immunity shield set forward in  
the same statute.  
We disagree that such an approach to the statute is  
proper.  While plaintiffs are correct to the extent that we  
should strive to prevent any part of a statute from being a  
nullity, a thorough review of the statute at issue leads to  
the conclusion that the reading occasioned by the plain  
meaning analysis does not produce a nullity and, thus, this  
principle is not implicated in this case. No portion of the  
EMSA need be ignored to give the entire legislative enactment  
a coherent meaning.  
As we noted in Malcolm at 141, n 9, the Legislature added  
language to the EMSA substantially the same as the present MCL  
333.20965(4) in providing that the EMSA did not limit  
liability otherwise provided by law, shortly after the Court  
of Appeals issued its opinion in Malcolm.
 Clearly, the  
purpose of adding this language was to make clear that the  
EMSA did not remove the immunity of a governmental entity  
under the GTLA.  
7  
When read carefully, it is apparent that immunity under  
the GTLA for municipalities or other governmental entities is  
only given if they are engaged “in the exercise or discharge  
of a governmental function.”  MCL 691.1407(1). Implicit then,  
and later made explicit in MCL 691.1413, is that the GTLA does  
not 
give 
immunity 
if 
the governmental function is proprietary.  
Thus, to particularize this principle, if a governmental  
agency provides emergency medical services as part of its  
governmental functions, it has immunity, but, if it does so as  
part of a proprietary function, it does not. Thus, when one  
understands that this act outlines with precision when suit  
can 
be 
brought 
against 
governments 
providing 
emergency 
medical  
services, it is clear that there is no nullity effected in the  
Legislature’s handling of this issue.  This approach brings  
harmony to both MCL 333.20965(1) and (4), as well as the GTLA,  
MCL 691.1407(1), and makes clear that they are not in  
conflict.  
In the present case, it is beyond reasonable dispute, and  
thus we take judicial notice, that the relevant activity of  
the city’s fire department was part of its discharge of its  
governmental functions, and not part of any proprietary  
function. Accordingly, the city is immune from suit.  
IV  
The plain language of MCL 333.20965(4) compels the  
8  
 
 
 
conclusion that defendant is entitled to the governmental  
immunity granted in MCL 691.1407(1).  Accordingly, we reverse  
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the  
judgment of the circuit court, MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, 
KELLY, 
TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, and MARKMAN,  
JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
9