Title: In re A.H.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89418
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2001

Docket No. 89418Agenda 20January 2001.
In re A.H., a Minor (Patrick T. Murphy, Cook County Public
Guardian, Appellant, v. D. Jean Ortega-Piron, Appellee).
Opinion filed April 19, 2001.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
This case presents the question of whether the circuit court,
juvenile division (hereinafter, circuit court), has jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for removal of a minor from temporary foster care pursuant to section 210
of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/210 (West 1998)).
The respondent, A.H., by Patrick T. Murphy, Cook County public guardian, his
attorney and guardian ad litem (GAL), presented an oral emergency motion
before the juvenile court seeking the removal of A.H. from his temporary foster
home. Over the objections of D. Jean Ortega-Piron, guardianship administrator of
the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), the Cook County State's
Attorney, and the foster mother's court-appointed attorney, the juvenile court
ordered A.H.'s removal.
The DCFS filed an appeal of the juvenile court's order and
the appellate court reversed. It ruled that the juvenile court's finding that
A.H.'s removal was a matter of "immediate and urgent necessity" was
against the manifest weight of the evidence under section 210(2) of the Act
(705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998)). Since there was no immediate or urgent
necessity, the appellate court reasoned, the juvenile court lacked the authority
to remove A.H. from his temporary foster home. 312 Ill. App. 3d 638.
We allowed A.H.'s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a)). For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the juvenile court had
jurisdiction over the predispositional motion to remove A.H. from his temporary
foster placement. In addition, we hold that the juvenile court's finding that
it was in the best interests of A.H. to be removed from his temporary foster
placement was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or about October 19, 1998, Linda H., the mother of A.H.,
age 9, called the DCFS hotline asking that A.H. be removed from her home before
she killed him. The next day, the Cook County State's Attorney filed a
petition for adjudication of wardship with the juvenile court pursuant to
section 213 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/213 (West 1998)). The petition
alleged child abuse and neglect pursuant to section 23 of the Act. 705 ILCS
405/23(1)(b), (2)(ii) (West 1998). The petition also noted that the minor had
been taken into custody on October 19, 1998, and that a temporary custody
hearing was set before the juvenile court for October 21, 1998. See 705 ILCS
405/29(1) (West 1998).
On October 21, 1998, the juvenile court entered a temporary
custody order pursuant to section 210 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/210 (West
1998)). That order provided that A.H. be removed from Linda H.'s home, and
granted temporary custody of A.H. to DCFS, with the right to place him. The
court further named the Cook County public defender as attorney for Linda H. and
the Cook County public guardian as guardian ad litem for A.H. Later that
month, pursuant to the temporary custody order, DCFS placed A.H. in the foster
home of Margie B. An adjudicatory hearing on A.H.'s wardship was scheduled for
January 19, 1999.
On December 30, 1998, Linda H. again called the DCFS hotline
and reported that A.H. had told her that he was being beaten by Margie B.'s
11-year-old grandson, who occasionally visited the home. Linda H. reported that
she had observed cuts, welts, bruises, and a swollen left eye on her son. The
DCFS recorded the telephone call in a report dated January 5, 1999, and the GAL
received the report on January 6, 1999.
Two weeks later, on January 19, 1999, the parties appeared
before the juvenile court for the previously scheduled adjudicatory hearing. The
hearing began with a "court family conference" in which the juvenile
court reviewed the services to be provided to Linda H. In addition, the GAL made
an oral emergency motion for the removal of A.H. from his foster home based upon
the allegations of physical abuse. The DCFS objected to the GAL's
characterization of the motion as an emergency, noting that the incident had
occurred almost three weeks prior to the hearing and that the GAL knew of the
incident two weeks prior to the hearing. Despite its knowledge of the incident,
DCFS argued, the GAL had not presented a motion to remove A.H. from Margie B.'s
foster home and had not attempted to initiate any proceeding to remove A.H.
under DCFS's service appeal process. DCFS asserted that the court first must
determine that there is an emergency before proceeding with a motion to change
foster placement. It also objected that the foster parent had not been given
notice of the motion as required by the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/15(2)(a), 29(2)
(West 1998). DCFS asked the court to continue the motion to the next day so a
petition could be filed and notice given. The juvenile court agreed and
continued the motion to the next day.
Later that day, however, and over the objections of DCFS, the
court recalled the case to hear testimony from Linda H., A.H.'s mother, based
upon the public defender's representation that she was unable to attend the
next day due to a work conflict. The court heard the testimony of Linda H. and
DCFS caseworker Jonester Edwards. Before Edwards' testimony was completed, the
court continued the matter until the next day and ordered DCFS to notify the
foster mother, Margie B., of the next day's proceedings. The next day, the
hearing reconvened with Margie B. present. The court then recalled Edwards and
heard the testimony of the remaining witnesses.

A. The Juvenile Court's Findings
At the close of the testimony, the juvenile court applied the
standards set forth for temporary custody hearings in section 210 of the Act
(705 ILCS 405/210 (West 1998)) and In re R.M., 288 Ill. App. 3d 811
(1997), and found that there was probable cause to believe A.H. was abused or
neglected, that there was immediate and urgent necessity to support the removal
of A.H. from the foster home, and that reasonable efforts could not prevent or
eliminate the necessity of that removal. The court also found that the removal
of A.H. from the foster home was "consistent with [his] health, safety and
best interests."
The juvenile court based its conclusions primarily on its
finding that the foster mother, Margie B., was not a "truth-teller."
The court observed that Margie B. did not "look [the court] in the eye
during her entire testimony," and concluded that Margie B. could not be
trusted to follow any protective plan which might be developed. The court
ordered that DCFS remain the appointed temporary custodian of A.H., but also
ordered that A.H. be removed from Margie B.'s home. DCFS appealed.
 
B. The Holding of the Appellate Court
The parties raised essentially the same arguments before the
appellate court as they raise in this appeal. First, DCFS argued to the
appellate court that, under section 210(2) of the Act, the juvenile court may
order the removal of a child from a foster home only where there is
probable cause to believe the minor is abused or neglected and the matter is of
immediate and urgent necessity. DCFS argued that there was no such emergency in
this case and, therefore, the juvenile court lacked the authority to side-step
the DCFS administrative service appeal process and order A.H. removed from
Margie B.'s home. In response, the GAL argued that the language of section 210(2)
of the Act grants the juvenile court broad authority to select a child's
placement, and that the court acted properly in removing A.H. from Margie B.'s
home.
The appellate court agreed with DCFS and held that in order
for the juvenile court's order to be valid, there must have been probable
cause to believe that A.H. was abused, neglected, or dependent, and it must have
been a matter of immediate and urgent necessity that he be removed from Margie
B.'s foster home. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 650. The court further held that the
juvenile court's finding of immediate and urgent necessity was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, as the record showed that there was little
chance that Margie B.'s grandson would injure A.H. again. The appellate court
noted that Margie B. had entered into a protective plan in which she agreed that
if her grandson visited again, there would be direct adult supervision. In
addition, both the caseworker Edwards and James Boits, the DCFS child protection
investigator, agreed that A.H. was not at risk in the foster home. As a result,
the appellate court reversed the juvenile court's order removing A.H. from
Margie B.'s home.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Justiciable Matter
Before turning to the specific language of section 210 of
the Act, we must first address the source of the juvenile court's subject
matter jurisdiction over children found abused, neglected, or dependent. Subject
matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power both to adjudicate the general
question involved and to grant the particular relief requested. In re Estate
of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 192 (1999); In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64
(1993). With limited exceptions, the circuit courts enjoy "original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9.
We have long held that the legislature may create a justiciable matter by
creating rights or duties that have no counterpart in common law or equity. Gebis,
186 Ill. 2d  at 192; M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 65; Board of Education of
Warren Township High School District 121 v. Warren Township High School
Federation of Teachers, Local 504, 128 Ill. 2d 155, 165-66 (1989). Removal
of a child from his parents' care based on a finding of abuse, neglect, or
dependency was not known to common law or equity (People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453, 455-56 (1916)) and, therefore, was not a justiciable matter over which
the courts had original jurisdiction (see M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 63-64, 66).
Through the Juvenile Court Act, however, the legislature conferred
jurisdiction on the circuit court over such a matter and thereby created a
"justiciable matter." 705 ILCS 405/21 (West 1998). Section 21 of
the Act states that "[p]roceedings may be instituted under the provisions
of this Article concerning boys and girls who are abused, neglected or dependent
***." 705 ILCS 405/21 (West 1998). This grant of authority by the
legislature is purely statutory and the proceedings and remedies provided by the
Act are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. Piccolo, 275 Ill.  at
455-56.
Because a justiciable matter is statutorily derived, the
legislature may define it in such a way as to limit or preclude the circuit
court's authority. "When a court's power to act is controlled by
statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction" and
the court "must proceed within the strictures of the statute ***." M.M.,
156 Ill. 2d  at 66. The court, therefore, has only the subject matter
jurisdiction accorded to it by the statute and "[a]ny action taken by the
circuit court that exceeds its jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any
time." Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d  at 193. Therefore, we must determine
whether the Act confers jurisdiction on the juvenile court to hear motions to
remove a minor from his temporary foster placement or whether that action would
exceed the jurisdiction of the court and be void.
Both parties agree that the language of the Act confers
jurisdiction, in some way, on the juvenile court to hear such requests. Indeed,
both parties maintain that the juvenile court and DCFS share some kind of
concurrent jurisdiction over such requests pursuant to the Act and the Children
and Family Services Act (see 20 ILCS 505/5(o) (West 1998)). The parties differ,
however, concerning the extent of that jurisdiction. The GAL argues that the
juvenile court has unfettered jurisdiction over all removal and placement
issues. DCFS, however, maintains that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over
requests for removal only when there exists probable cause of abuse, neglect, or
dependency, an immediate and urgent necessity, and where reasonable efforts have
been made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of the removal. We find that the
juvenile court's jurisdiction over requests for removal of a minor from his
temporary foster care derives from the plain language of section 210 of the
Act.
 
B. Statutory Framework of the Temporary Custody Hearing
Section 210 of the Juvenile Court Act governs the
temporary custody hearing, at which the court determines who shall have
temporary custody of the child until further hearings to determine whether the
child should be adjudged a ward of the court and placed in the permanent custody
of someone other than the child's parents. 705 ILCS 405/210, 218, 221
through 228 (West 1998). These later hearings are essentially comprised of
the "adjudicatory hearing," the "dispositional hearing," and
the "permanency hearing." See 705 ILCS 405/218, 221 through 228
(West 1998). Proceedings under the Act are initiated by the filing of a petition
for adjudication of wardship with the court pursuant to section 213. 705 ILCS
405/213 (West 1998).
At the section 210 temporary custody hearing, the juvenile
court must make a number of determinations with regard to the minor and his
temporary custody. First, the court must make a threshold probable cause
determination as to whether the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. 705
ILCS 405/210(1), (2) (West 1998). If the court finds no probable cause of
abuse, neglect, or dependency, it must release the minor and dismiss the
petition. 705 ILCS 405/210(1) (West 1998). If, however, the court does find
probable cause, it may, consistent with the health, safety, and best interests
of the minor, either release the minor to the parents, guardian, or custodian,
or "prescribe shelter care" for the minor. 705 ILCS 405/210(2)
(West 1998). In the event the court decides to prescribe shelter care, it may
enter one of two orders consistent with the health, safety, and best interests
of the minor: (1) that the minor "be kept in a suitable place designated by
the court"; or (2) that the minor be kept "in a shelter care facility
designated by the Department of Children and Family Services or a licensed child
welfare agency." 705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998).
In determining the "health, safety and best interests of
the minor to prescribe shelter care," the court must inquire as to whether
it is both a "matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the
safety and protection of the minor" that he be placed in a shelter care
facility, and whether "reasonable efforts have been made *** to
prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from his or her
home." 705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998). This provision modifies the
earlier provision allowing the court to prescribe shelter care, designated
either by the court or DCFS. In addition, the "reasonable efforts"
determination effectuates the general purpose of the Act to "secure for
each minor *** such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own home, as
will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the
minor." 705 ILCS 405/12(1) (West 1998).
If the court decides to prescribe shelter care, and if it
orders that the minor be placed in a shelter care facility of DCFS, the court
"shall" appoint DCFS the "temporary custodian" of the minor.
705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998). As temporary custodian, DCFS has the
ultimate "responsibility of physical possession of [the] minor and the duty
to protect, train and discipline him and to provide him with food, shelter,
education and ordinary medical care, except as these are limited by residual
parental rights and responsibilities and the rights and responsibilities of the
guardian of the person, if any." 705 ILCS 405/13(9) (West 1998).
Pursuant to that responsibility, DCFS selects a temporary placement for the
minor with his relatives, in foster care, or in an institutional setting. 89
Ill. Adm. Code §301.30 (2000). Finally and most significant to this case,
"[i]f the minor is ordered placed in a shelter care facility of [DCFS] ***
the court may enter such other orders related to the temporary custody as it
deems fit and proper ***." 705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998).
 
C. The Juvenile Court's Authority
It is clear from the plain language of section 210, and
from a reading of the Act as a whole, that the legislature has given authority
to the juvenile court to remove a minor from the custody of his parents
by holding a temporary custody hearing. In this case, however, the court was
asked to remove the minor from his temporary foster placement. We hold
that such a request also falls under section 210 of the Act.
At the outset, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court over the minor is not limited to the entry of the temporary
custody order. The plain language of section 210(2) demonstrates that the
juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the temporary custody, both physical
and legal, of the minor and that jurisdiction extends to the minor's temporary
foster placement. The source of the court's continuing jurisdiction is found
in that portion of section 210 which gives the court authority to enter
orders "related to" the minor's temporary custody. 705 ILCS 405/210(2)
(West 1998).
In particular, section 210(2) authorizes the court to
"enter such other orders related to the temporary custody [of the
minor] as it deems fit and proper, including the provision of services to the
minor or his family to ameliorate the causes contributing to the finding of
probable cause or to the finding of the existence of immediate and urgent
necessity." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998). This
court has held that this provision authorizes the juvenile court "to enter
orders requiring [DCFS] to provide and pay for in-patient drug treatment
services for mothers whose children were removed from their custody due to their
mothers' drug-related neglect of them." In re Lawrence, 172 Ill. 2d 523, 525, 537 (1996). But the term "including" in section 210(2)
means that the court's jurisdiction to enter "such other orders related
to the temporary custody" is not limited to providing ameliorative
services. Admittedly, no provision in the Act specifically addresses the
particular circumstance before us where the shelter care in which the minor was
placed for his protection becomes a threat. We believe, however, that the phrase
"such other orders" contemplates the authority to enter an order to
remove a minor from his temporary foster care because that order is related to
the minor's temporary custody.
 
D. Procedure and Applicable Standard
Once we have concluded that the juvenile court has
jurisdiction to enter orders related to the temporary custody of the minor, we
must determine under what circumstances and standard the court may do so. In
this case, when the GAL made an oral motion to remove A.H. from his temporary
foster placement, the juvenile court conducted what it called a "new form
of T[emporary] C[ustody]" hearing. This new temporary custody hearing,
however, was improper.
Under section 210(2), the court must conduct a temporary
custody hearing to remove the minor from the care of his parents, guardian, or
custodian. 705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998). The court is not directed,
however, to conduct a temporary custody hearing when entering an order related
to the temporary custody. When the court enters such an order, the
determinations of the section 210 temporary custody hearing with regard to
the removal of the minor from the care of his parents have already been made.
The court has already found probable cause of abuse, neglect, or dependency and,
if it has prescribed shelter care, it has found an immediate and urgent
necessity and reasonable efforts. Section 210, therefore, does not direct the
court to conduct an entirely new temporary custody hearing, with the attendant
temporary custody determinations, merely to enter an order related to the
temporary custody.
This raises the question of the standard under which the
court may enter such orders. The Act states that the court may enter orders
related to the temporary custody "as it deems fit and proper." 705
ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998). The GAL argues that the statute prescribes some
type of "suitability" test under which the court does not engage in
the probable cause, immediate and urgent, or reasonable efforts determinations.
DCFS, on the other hand, argues that the juvenile court must make all three
determinations again. The appellate court likewise held that the requirements of
probable cause and immediate and urgent necessity apply to the best interests
determination. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 650. We hold that when the court "enters
such other orders related to the temporary custody [of the minor] as it deems
fit and proper," the court must make a best interests determination, though
not of the kind required at the temporary custody hearing.
The Act sets forth no less than 10 factors to consider
whenever a best interests determination is required. 705 ILCS 405/13(4.05)
(West 1998). In the context of the section 210 temporary custody hearing,
however, that determination takes on two additional considerations:
"In determining the health, safety and best
    interests of the minor to prescribe shelter care, the court must find that
    it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the safety and
    protection of the minor *** that the minor be placed in a shelter care
    facility *** and must further find that reasonable efforts have been made
    *** to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from his
    or her home." 705 ILCS 405/210(2) (West 1998).
In other words, when the juvenile court decides to prescribe
shelter care in the context of the temporary custody hearing, the best
interests determination includes the "immediate and urgent necessity"
and the "reasonable efforts" determinations. Indeed, the very fact
that the legislature saw fit to specify that, when prescribing shelter care,
the best interests determination must include the immediate and urgent and
reasonable efforts determinations demonstrates that the best interests
determination does not automatically contemplate those considerations.
Therefore, when the juvenile court merely enters an order related
to the temporary custody, the court need only engage in the best interests
determination as outlined in section 13(4.05) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/13(4.05)
(West 1998)). Under the general best interests determination, the court is not
required to consider the immediacy and urgency of the situation or whether
reasonable efforts have been made.
The fact that section 210(2) requires the court to engage
in the immediate and urgent and reasonable efforts considerations when holding a
temporary custody hearing, but not when entering other related orders, is
logical as a policy matter. To remove a child from the care of his parents and
grant temporary custody to someone other than his parents, the court must
understandably overcome a higher bar than if the court were merely to remove the
child from his temporary foster placement. Under the fourteenth amendment,
parents have a "fundamental liberty interest *** in the care, custody, and
management of their child[ren]." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753-54, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982); In re Enis,
121 Ill. 2d 124, 128-29 (1988). Foster parents do not share this liberty
interest in the children for whom they care. We conclude, therefore, that in the
context of an order to remove a minor from his temporary foster placement, the
best interests determination does not include considerations of immediate and
urgent necessity or reasonable efforts.
In addition, the best interests determination in the context
of a motion to remove a minor from his temporary foster placement does not
disturb the juvenile court's threshold finding of probable cause. The
appellate court mistakenly held that the best interests determination required a
renewed finding of probable cause. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 650. Since the probable
cause determination is the first finding the juvenile court must make in order
to even exercise jurisdiction over the minor and enter a temporary custody
order, the court need not revisit that determination when it merely enters other
orders related to the temporary custody.
We hold that on a motion to remove the minor from his
temporary foster placement, there is no need to make a new probable cause
finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency by the foster parent or new findings of
immediate and urgent necessity or reasonable efforts. Rather, in entering
"such other orders," the standard is the general best interests
standard as set forth in the definitional section 13(4.05) of the Act (705
ILCS 405/13(4.05) (West 1998)).
 
E. Procedural Objections to the GAL's Motion
DCFS argues that the GAL failed to give proper notice of its
oral motion to the foster mother. DCFS cites In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263 (1994), for the proposition that due process requires that the
"parties" be given notice. That, however, was not our holding in C.R.H.
Rather, we held that the failure to give proper notice of juvenile
proceedings to the parents and "necessary parties" is a due process
violation of the parents' constitutional rights, such that it deprives the
circuit court of jurisdiction. C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d  at 269, 271. Under the
Act, "necessary parties" include the parents or legal guardian, not
the foster parent. C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d  at 271. Any failure to give proper
notice to Margie B., therefore, did not rise to the level of a due process
violation.
Even so, the foster parent is entitled to notice under
section 15(2)(a), which requires that,"[i]n addition to the *** right to
be heard by the court, any current foster parent *** has the right to and shall
be given adequate notice at all stages of any hearing or proceeding under this
Act." 705 ILCS 405/15(2)(a) (West 1998). Proper notice should have been
given to Margie B. This error was harmless, however, for two reasons: first, the
issue was waived when Margie B. never objected to a lack of notice during the
hearing; and, second, DCFS asked only for a continuation of the hearing to the
next day, and Margie B. appeared that day to testify.
In addition, the DCFS complaint that the GAL never bothered
to file a written petition for its motion to remove A.H. from his foster
placement is likewise unavailing. Presumably, DCFS is referring to the section 213
petitions for adjudication of wardship which are required in order to hold
temporary custody hearings. 705 ILCS 405/213 (West 1998). But as that
provision indicates, a petition is required for a temporary custody hearing and
to begin the entire adjudicatory process. It is not required for a motion on the
court's temporary custody order, and was not required here. Therefore, the GAL's
oral motion to remove A.H. from his temporary foster placement was not improper.
 
F. Best Interests Determination of the Juvenile Court
We must finally determine whether the juvenile court's
finding that removing A.H. from his foster placement was in his best interests
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 346 (2000). We hold that the juvenile court's determination was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Though the juvenile court mistakenly engaged in the probable
cause, immediate and urgent, and reasonable efforts determinations, it also
found that removal of A.H. from Margie B.'s home was consistent with his
health, safety, and best interests. The court based its conclusion primarily on
the fact that it did not find the foster mother, Margie B., to be credible. The
court did not believe that she had sufficiently monitored A.H. or that she was
honest about the cause of the red puffiness around his left eye. The court also
did not believe that Margie B. would comply with the protective plan that
investigator Boits had set up so that A.H. would not be subject to abuse by the
grandson again. Based on its disbelief of the foster mother, the court concluded
that A.H.'s physical safety and welfare were in jeopardy. This is one of the
factors the court may consider in making the best interest determination. 705
ILCS 405/13(4.05)(a) (West 1998).
The trial court is vested with wide discretion in its
determination of the best interests of the minor in temporary custody hearings,
which determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion or where the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d 515, 520 (1977). The trial court has the
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses and
its credibility determinations must be given great weight. In re A.P.,
179 Ill. 2d 184, 204 (1997); Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d  at 520.
Here, we are mindful that both experts produced by DCFS,
investigator Boits and caseworker Edwards, concluded that A.H. was not at risk
of physical harm if he continued in the foster care of Margie B. However, the
best interests of the minor is a determination for the juvenile court and it is
apparent that the court took into consideration the testimony of all the
witnesses to reach its conclusion that A.H. should be removed from his foster
placement. The court found that Margie B. did not sufficiently protect A.H. from
the physical abuse and could not be trusted to abide by the protective plan. We
hold, therefore, that the court's conclusion that it was in the health,
safety, and best interests of A.H. to remove him from his foster placement with
Margie B. was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
 
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of
the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
 
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.