Title: Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Mygrant
Citation: 471 N.E.2d 660
Docket Number: 1184S468
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 1984

471 N.E.2d 660 (1984)
INDIANA BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Inc., Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
Darl MYGRANT, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 1184S468.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
November 30, 1984.
Jeffry G. Price, Peru, for appellant.
Edward S. Mahoney, Lacey, O'Mahoney, Mahoney, Angel &amp; Jessup, Kokomo, for appellee.
PRENTICE, Justice.
This cause is before us on the petition of Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. (Appellant/Defendant) to transfer the cause from the Court of Appeals, Third District, following its affirmance (Judge Hoffman, dissenting) on appeal of the interlocutory order of the trial court denying summary judgment in favor of Indiana Bell. Inasmuch as the decision of the Court of Appeals, reported at 441 N.E.2d 481, conflicts with other decisions of that court, as hereinafter set forth, the petition to transfer is now granted, and the decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated. At issue is whether an unambiguous, straightforward release of all claims for personal injuries, untainted by misrepresentation, fraud, overreaching, concealment, or persuasion on the part of the party released, may be avoided by the releasing party, who later discovers injuries of which he was unaware when the release was executed.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts and proceedings in the trial court as follows:
441 N.E.2d  at 481-483.
The Court of Appeals, upon its determination that a genuine issue of fact existed as to the intention of the parties when they executed the release, affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. In its petition to transfer Indiana Bell argues, and we agree, that as a matter of law, the executed release was enforceable on its face and, consequently, summary judgment in Indiana Bell's favor should have been granted.
Mygrant argues that he is entitled to rescind the release and proceed against Indiana Bell because, at the time the release was executed, he and Indiana Bell's representative were unaware that he had sustained any injuries in the accident. Hence, he urges that the release may be avoided because of mutual mistake. He further argues that both parties intended to release only his claim for property damage and not any claim for personal injury.
Two Indiana cases, Gumberts v. Greenberg, (1953) 124 Ind. App. 138, 115 N.E.2d 504, and Crane Co. et al. v. Newman, (1941) 111 Ind. App. 273, 37 N.E.2d 732, are factually similar to the case at bar and discuss the legal effect of having executed a release. In Gumberts, a tenant sued her landlord following a fall on the driveway to her apartment whereby she broke her wrist. Subsequently, relying upon her doctor's statement that she was "all right," she and the landlord entered into a settlement agreement by which the landlord paid the tenant $130.20 and she executed a release "discharging him of and from all claims of any kind whatsoever growing out of any and all known and unknown, forseen and unforseen, bodily and personal injuries and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident in controversy." Gumberts v. Greenberg, 124 Ind. App. at 144, 115 N.E.2d  at 506. The tenant then discovered that her wrist had not healed properly and that corrective surgery was necessary. She filed suit against the landlord, and a jury awarded her $1200. The Court of Appeals reversed the case on other grounds but discussed the effect of the release for purposes of retrial. The tenant argued that at the time the parties executed the release both believed that the fracture to her wrist had been properly treated and had completely healed. Hence, she argued that the mutual mistake of the parties as to the actual condition of her wrist gave her the right to rescind the release. The Court of Appeals determined that only the tenant was acting under a mistaken belief when she signed the release. The court noted:
Id. at 145, 115 N.E.2d  at 507.
In Crane, the plaintiff, Newman, fell in an elevator shaft on defendant's premises. Crane requested that Newman be examined by a particular physician, who informed both Newman and Crane that Newman's injuries were only minor. Based upon this diagnosis, Newman signed a release in return for a settlement of $140. Subsequently, Newman discovered that he had sustained a broken back and injured vertebrae in the fall. He filed suit and alleged that the release was voidable because it was based on mutual mistake. The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Newman stating:
111 Ind. App. at 290, 37 N.E.2d  at 738-739.
Both Gumberts and Crane stand for the proposition that a release may be rescinded if it is executed as a result of a mutual mistake as to a material matter. The Court of Appeals, however, in its review of this case, determined that "mutual versus unilateral mistake is not a very helpful means of analysis in these cases" and employed an analysis set forth in Wecker v. Kilmer, (1973) 260 Ind. 198, 294 N.E.2d 132. In Wecker, this Court responded to a certified question of law from the Seventh Circuit and stated that a release given to one tortfeasor did not as a matter of law bar the releasing party's claim against an alleged subsequent tortfeasor (a treating physician) for aggravating the original injury. The Court determined that two factors, which are ordinarily questions of fact, control the effect of an agreement which purports to operate as a release: "(1) Whether the injured party has received full satisfaction; and (2) Whether the parties intended that the release be in full satisfaction of the injured party's claim, thus releasing all the successive tortfeasors from liability." Id. at 203, 294 N.E.2d  at 135. We do not believe that the analysis employed in Wecker is appropriate under the facts of this case and, in fact, have held that that analysis should be confined to cases involving successive tortfeasors. See Bellew v. Byers, (1979) 272 Ind. 37, 39, 396 N.E.2d 335, 337 ("Wecker ... is limited to the situation where there are independent and successive tortfeasors.") and Rose v. Rose, (1979) 179 Ind. App. 299, 302, 385 N.E.2d 458, 460 ("Wecker is inapplicable where a single tortfeasor is involved[.]")
*664 We are aware of a developing trend in some courts by which a release of personal injury claims may be avoided when the court finds that to uphold it would present an unconscionable result; see 13 A.L.R. 4th 686 (1982) however, in light of the important policy of upholding releases in order to facilitate the orderly settlement of disputes, we decline to join in that trend. Indiana courts have previously employed the traditional unilateral versus mutual mistake means of analysis in cases such as this, and we see no reason to depart from it at this time. Thus, we turn to the question of whether the situation in the case at bar presents us with a mistake such as to vitiate the release.
A mutual mistake is one which involves both parties  a mistake independently made by each party. Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Smith, (1956) 126 Ind. App. 332, 337, 133 N.E.2d 72, 75. In the case at bar, we find that the mistake, if any, was Mygrant's alone, and we hold that such a unilateral mistake of fact is insufficient to avoid the release. We find no evidence to indicate that, at the time the release was executed, Indiana Bell's representative harbored any belief whatsoever regarding Mygrant's injuries or lack thereof. It is clear from the language of the release that the parties agreed that the release was to apply to unknown as well as known injuries, to personal injuries as well as property damage. Both Mygrant and his attorney signed the release and the ensuing settlement check. It seems apparent that Indiana Bell wanted to be released from any and all liability as a consequence of the accident. Parties involved in accidents engage in negotiations because of the incertitude as to the extent of injuries or liability, or both, and because of the uncertainty as to the outcome of any litigation which might ensue. Clearly, Indiana Bell desired an expeditious settlement and, in the terms of the release, intended "to avoid litigation and buy ... peace." As noted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., (1972) Mo., 486 S.W.2d 477, 481-482:
It cannot be said that Bell would not have entered into the agreement if it had known of Mygrant's injuries. Nor has Mygrant alleged any fact from which it may be concluded that the parties executed the release based upon a mutual mistake of material fact.
In that Indiana Bell had no independent knowledge of Mygrant's physical condition, this case is readily distinguishable from Crane. In Crane, both parties had been misinformed as to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries by a doctor chosen by the defendant. The defendant apparently accepted such statement as fact, and a settlement was reached. Here, however, there is no mutual reliance on medical advice.
Because we find no evidence in the record to sustain a finding of mutual mistake, the release may not be avoided. There being no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court erred in denying Indiana Bell's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that judgment. Transfer is granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Indiana Bell.
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents without opinion.