Title: Kenneth Brown v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 11S04-0911-CR-537
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2010

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Kimberly A. Jackson 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ian McLean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monika Prekopa Talbot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 11S04-0911-CR-537 
 
KENNETH BROWN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant Below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Clay Circuit Court, No. 11C01-0507-FB-00200 
The Honorable Joseph D. Trout, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 11A04-0904-CR-213 
_________________________________ 
 
June 29, 2010 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
 
We hold that a claimed error in admitting unlawfully seized evidence at trial is not 
preserved for appeal unless an objection was lodged at the time the evidence was offered.  We 
also hold that such a claim, without more, does not assert fundamental error. 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 29 2010, 1:37 pm
2  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Linton police received an anonymous report that one Mark Green, the subject of a federal 
firearms warrant, had acquired methamphetamine from defendant Kenneth Brown.  After Green 
was arrested, three Linton officers and a Clay County sheriff agreed to conduct a “knock and 
talk” investigation of Brown.  The four officers arrived at Brown’s home between 2:00 and 3:00 
a.m. on the morning of July 8, 2005.  When Brown answered the door, the officers asked 
permission to search the home.  Brown granted access to one of the four, who found drugs and 
paraphernalia in the home.  Brown was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 
methamphetamine, a Class B felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Class C felony; 
possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of marijuana, a Class A 
misdemeanor.  This appeal challenges the admission of the items from his home into evidence at 
his jury trial.1  As explained below, we conclude that this issue was not preserved for appeal. 
 
Brown filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence collected at his home, claiming 
that the officers’ search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.  That motion was denied, and the case was tried 
to a jury.  Brown did not seek a continuing objection to the admission of the seized items, and 
when each of the items of evidence was presented to the jury, his attorney stated, “No objection.”  
After these exhibits were admitted, and the jury was released for lunch, Brown’s attorney 
referred to his pretrial motion to suppress and stated: 
[I]t’s my understanding the court was going to overrule objections that we would 
make concerning the admissibility of evidence. . . . Just to make sure that the 
record is clear and to preserve the record for Mr. Brown’s benefit, we would 
restate those objections that we previously wrote in our motion to suppress that 
we previously litigated for the court.   
The judge responded, “I make no representation myself about how you’ve done this.  But it will 
be noted in the record.”   
                                                 
1 We note at the outset that Brown’s Notice of Appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained from his home.  Because Brown appeals from a completed trial, however, the issue is “more 
appropriately framed” as whether the evidence was admissible at trial.  Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003).   
3  
 
 
The Court of Appeals held that Brown had not preserved his challenge to the admission 
of the evidence, but concluded that the issue was reviewable as fundamental error.  Ultimately 
the Court of Appeals majority found the search of Brown’s residence did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment or the Indiana Constitution.  Brown v. State, 913 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  
Judge Mathias dissented, finding a state constitutional violation.  Id. at 1265 (Mathias, J., 
dissenting).  We granted transfer. 
Availability of the Issue on Appeal 
 
The State argues that Brown waived any objection to the admission of the evidence found 
in the search by failing to object to its admission at trial.  Brown responds that his belated 
statement outside the presence of the jury combined with his pretrial motion to suppress 
preserved the issue, and also contends that the admission of the evidence was fundamental error 
and therefore could be challenged on appeal despite his failure to object at trial.   
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that Brown failed to preserve his challenge to the 
admissibility of the evidence.  Brown, 913 N.E.2d at 1258.  A contemporaneous objection at the 
time the evidence is introduced at trial is required to preserve the issue for appeal, whether or not 
the appellant has filed a pretrial motion to suppress.  Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 
(Ind. 2000) (“The failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence at 
trial results in waiver of the error on appeal.”); Wagner v. State, 474 N.E.2d 476, 484 (Ind. 1985) 
(“When a motion to suppress has been overruled and the evidence sought to be suppressed is 
later offered at trial, no error will be preserved unless there is an objection at that time.”).  The 
purpose of this rule is to allow the trial judge to consider the issue in light of any fresh 
developments and also to correct any errors.  Jackson, 735 N.E.2d at 1152.  Here, Brown did not 
object when the evidence was introduced and affirmatively stated that he had no objection to its 
admission.  His attempt to lodge a continuing objection was made only after the jury was 
presented with all of this evidence.  The only practical means of granting relief at that point 
would be to declare a mistrial given that the jury was already exposed to virtually conclusive 
evidence of guilt on at least the possession counts.  We therefore do not find persuasive Brown’s 
contention that a party may resurrect an objection after the evidence has been admitted, at least 
without the trial court’s recognizing a continuing objection which did not occur here.   
4  
 
 
A claim that has been waived by a defendant’s failure to raise a contemporaneous 
objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that a fundamental error 
occurred.  See, e.g., Trice v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ind. 2002); Hayworth v. State, 904 
N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, 
and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or 
potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due 
process.”  Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006).  The error claimed must either 
“make a fair trial impossible” or constitute “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary 
principles of due process.”  Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009).  This exception is 
available only in “egregious circumstances.”  Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 
2003).   
 
This doctrine has been applied, for example, to review a conviction without proof of an 
element of the crime despite the lack of objection.  Smith v. State, 459 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Ind. 
1984).  But an error in ruling on a motion to exclude improperly seized evidence is not per se 
fundamental error.  Indeed, because improperly seized evidence is frequently highly relevant, its 
admission ordinarily does not cause us to question guilt.  That is the case here.  The only basis 
for questioning Brown’s conviction lies not in doubt as to whether Brown committed these 
crimes, but rather in a challenge to the integrity of the judicial process.  We do not consider that 
admission of unlawfully seized evidence ipso facto requires reversal.  Here, there is no claim of 
fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance on the part of the investigating officers and no 
contention that the evidence is not what it appears to be.  In short, the claimed error does not rise 
to the level of fundamental error. 
 
Two of the three judges in the Court of Appeals concluded that the search of Brown’s 
home was lawful and there was no error, fundamental or otherwise, in admitting the evidence.  
Brown, 913 N.E.2d at 1262–63.  Judge Mathias found the search unreasonable based on the lack 
of reliable information that Brown had committed any crime (an anonymous uncorroborated 
report), show of force (four officers), the hour of the day (2:35 a.m.), and the manner of 
announcing themselves (apparently very loud knocking).  Id. at 1263–64.  We do not need to 
resolve that issue because it was not preserved and there was no fundamental error here.   
5  
 
 
The Court of Appeals cited Hayworth, 904 N.E.2d at 694, in determining that even 
though Brown waived his challenge to the admissibility of the evidence the issue could be 
reviewed for fundamental error.  In Hayworth, the court found that the defendant had waived her 
challenge to the admissibility of evidence because her attorney affirmatively stated “no 
objection” when the challenged evidence was admitted.  As in the instant case, Hayworth had 
lost a pretrial motion to suppress.  Id. at 691.  However, unlike Brown, Hayworth also attempted 
to lodge a continuing objection before the evidence was presented.  Id.  Moreover, the detective 
in Hayworth included misleading statements in the application for a search warrant.  It was on 
that ground that the Hayworth court found a fair trial impossible.  Id. at 699.  Brown makes no 
similar contention that he did not receive a fair trial, other than his assertion that the evidence 
was the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure.   
Conclusion 
 
The convictions and sentence are affirmed. 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.