Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Daniel Parks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP000085-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2018

2018 WI 110 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP85-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Daniel Parks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Daniel Parks, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PARKS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 13, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
September 26, 2018 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Peyton B. Engel and Hurley, Burish & Stanton S.C., Madison 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Brenda K. Sunby and the Office of Lawyer Regulation, Wausau 
 
 
2018 WI 110
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP85-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Daniel Parks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel Parks, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 13, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Daniel Parks has appealed a 
report filed by Referee William Eich concluding that Attorney 
Parks committed eight of 14 alleged counts of professional 
misconduct and recommending that Attorney Parks' license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for 14 months, rather 
than the two-year suspension sought by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR).  The referee considered Attorney Parks' 
objection to costs and recommends we impose the full costs of 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
2 
 
this proceeding on Attorney Parks.  The OLR did not seek 
restitution and the referee did not recommend a restitution 
award. 
¶2 
In his appeal, Attorney Parks argues that the evidence 
was insufficient to support many of the referee's factual 
findings and all of the referee's conclusions determining 
misconduct.  Attorney Parks argues further that even if the 
referee's conclusions are upheld, the violations only support a 
license suspension of, at most, less than six months.1   
¶3 
Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold all of 
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
conclude that a 14-month suspension of Attorney Parks' license 
to practice law is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct.  
We also deny Attorney Parks' objection to costs.  We see no 
reason to deviate from our usual custom, which is to require an 
attorney who has committed misconduct to pay the full costs of 
the proceeding, which are $42,226.26 as of July 6, 2018.  The 
OLR did not seek restitution and no restitution is ordered. 
¶4 
Attorney Parks was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1991.  He has not previously been disciplined.  
¶5 
The allegations giving rise to this complaint stem 
from the time Attorney Parks was employed at the firm of 
Zacherl, O'Malley & Endejan (the firm), from 1995 until May 
                                                 
1 A suspension of less than six months does not require the 
lawyer to undergo a formal reinstatement proceeding, which 
includes a character and fitness inquiry.  See SCR 22.28. 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
3 
 
2013.  He worked in the Ripon office.  In April 2013, Attorney 
Parks announced he was leaving the firm.  Following Attorney 
Parks' departure, the firm filed a grievance with the OLR, 
stating, among other things, that it had discovered that 
Attorney Parks had performed unauthorized legal work "on the 
side" ("non-firm work") while employed by the firm.  
¶6 
On January 12, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Parks.  Initially, the OLR alleged 19 counts of 
misconduct.  As the case proceeded, the OLR's complaint was 
twice amended, ultimately alleging 14 counts of misconduct.  The 
first four counts involve allegations of unauthorized fee 
reductions and non-firm work.  Counts five through 13 allege 
misconduct related to Attorney Parks' handling of several 
matters related to C.D. and her relatives.  Count 14 alleged 
noncooperation with the OLR. 
¶7 
Attorney Parks filed an answer refuting most of the 
allegations.  The parties engaged in extensive discovery.  Prior 
to the evidentiary hearing, the parties filed stipulated facts. 
The referee conducted a three day evidentiary hearing in October 
2017 at which some 18 witnesses testified.  The referee issued a 
report on February 7, 2018, concluding that Attorney Parks 
committed eight of the 14 alleged counts of misconduct, that OLR 
had failed to prove six counts, and recommending a 14-month 
license suspension.  Attorney Parks objected to costs.  The 
referee issued a separate ruling, concluding that full costs 
were warranted.  Attorney Parks appeals.  The OLR did not cross-
appeal. 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
4 
 
¶8 
On appeal, we consider whether the referee's findings 
are clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶ 29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 
N.W.2d 718.  We independently review the referee's legal 
conclusions.  Id.  
¶9 
At the onset we note that the partners at his former 
firm and C.D.'s relatives present a very different account of 
what transpired than Attorney Parks recounts.  Attorney Parks 
characterizes the grievances against him as a "vindictive" 
collaboration between a partner at Attorney Parks' former law 
firm, Attorney Z., and Attorney Parks' former client, C.D.'s 
daughter, L.E.  He contends that L.E. "is resentful over her own 
tumultuous relationship with her mother" and that Attorney Z. 
resents that Attorney Parks left the firm to start his own 
competing practice.  This record is replete with accusations of 
lying; many of the issues turn on credibility assessments.   
¶10 Credibility issues are left to the discretion of the 
trial court, or, in the case of a disciplinary proceeding, the 
referee.  Gehr v. City of Sheboygan, 81 Wis. 2d 117, 122, 260 
N.W.2d 30 (1977).  In this matter, the referee's credibility 
determinations 
are 
intertwined 
with 
his 
findings 
of 
fact.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 
Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  Many of the referee's 
conclusions rest on implicit findings about the relative 
credibility of witnesses.  When a court does not make an 
explicit finding, an implicit finding may suffice, but only if 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
5 
 
the facts of record support it.  State v. Echols, 175 
Wis. 2d 653, 672, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993).  
Non-firm work and fee reductions (Counts One-Four) 
¶11 The OLR alleged that that by engaging in self-dealing 
and misappropriating fees from the firm by performing and 
privately billing for non-firm legal work while employed by the 
firm, Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:8.4(c)2  (Count One). 
¶12 The referee concluded that the OLR established this 
allegation.  Attorney Parks admits in the stipulated facts that 
he performed legal work for approximately 30 clients "on the 
side," collected at least $13,875 in fees, and deposited the 
fees into his personal account.  Attorney Parks also admits he 
did not run conflicts of interest checks through the firm's 
client management software.  The referee acknowledged but was 
clearly unpersuaded by Attorney Parks' assertion that one of the 
firm's partners gave him permission to handle some estate work 
"off the books."  The referee noted that "files found on the 
firm's computer involved, among other things, small claims 
cases, contract and traffic cases, and custody disputes in 
addition to wills, that Parks handled and [Attorney Z.] denies 
giving any such permission." 
¶13 Attorney 
Parks 
attacks 
several 
aspects 
of 
the 
referee's findings and his legal conclusion that Attorney Parks 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
6 
 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  As he argued to the referee, Attorney 
Parks maintains that one of the firm's partners, Attorney Z., 
was well aware of Attorney Parks' non-firm work and, indeed, 
approved it.  Attorney Parks claims this practice began in 2005, 
when one of Attorney Z's own clients could not pay a large legal 
bill so an arrangement was made whereby the client did 
remodeling work on Attorney Parks' home and Attorney Parks, in 
turn, paid the firm to reduce the client's outstanding legal 
balance.  Attorney Parks claims this bartering plan went awry, 
and Attorney Parks took out a home equity loan to complete the 
project, which Attorney Z. co-signed.  
¶14 Attorney Parks claims that over time, Attorney Z. 
regretted having co-signed the loan and that Attorney Z. 
encouraged Attorney Parks to conduct non-firm estate planning 
work so that Attorney Parks could earn extra money with which to 
accelerate his efforts to refinance the loan. 
¶15 Attorney Z. flatly denied that he authorized Attorney 
Parks to engage in non-firm work.  The firm's other partner, 
Attorney O., also denied authorizing any non-firm work.  
¶16 Attorney Parks says that the referee's finding that 
files pertaining to outside work were found "on the firm's 
computer" is clearly erroneous.  He maintains that all such 
files were kept on a computer belonging to Attorney Parks' 
acquaintance, C.D., so there would have been no such files on 
the firm's computer. 
¶17 Post-briefing, the referee advised the court and the 
parties in writing that his reference to files on "the firm's 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
7 
 
computer" was indeed a "minor factual error" and that the report 
should be amended to clarify that the documents in question were 
found on C.D.'s computer, not the firm's computer. 
¶18 As corrected, the referee's finding of fact is not 
clearly erroneous.  Moreover, we are of the opinion that in 
making this finding, the referee was focused less on where files 
were found (although that is relevant to other allegations) and 
more on noting that even if Attorney Z. had authorized Attorney 
Parks to engage in some non-firm estate work, Attorney Parks 
clearly engaged in other non-firm work that exceeded the scope 
of any authorization.    
¶19 Attorney Parks also complains that the referee made 
only an "implicit" credibility determination and says the facts 
of record do not support it.  He maintains that Attorney Z. is 
engaged in "serial dissembling" and points to evidence he 
believes supports this claim. 
¶20 For example, Attorney Parks notes that Attorney Z. 
initially told the OLR that Attorney Parks made a deal with a 
client, M.W., to reduce M.W.'s legal fees in exchange for M.W. 
creating a legal website for Attorney Parks.  The OLR's first 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
8 
 
complaint alleged misconduct related to this incident but 
dropped the charge when the complaint was amended.3 
¶21 The referee noted that both partners denied giving 
Attorney Parks permission to engage in non-firm work.  Although 
Attorney Parks argues that the referee failed to give adequate 
weight to his evidence, the referee clearly weighed the 
credibility of Attorney Parks' testimony and found it wanting.  
We will not reassess Attorney Parks' credibility.  We conclude 
that the record supports the referee's findings and conclusion 
pertaining to count one and we accept them.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 
Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  
¶22 Turning to count two, the referee concluded, based 
primarily on Attorney Parks' own stipulated admission, that by 
earning fees from non-firm legal work, Attorney Parks violated a 
standard of conduct set forth in In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
                                                 
3 The website came to the firm's attention when it tried to 
collect outstanding legal fees from M.W.  M.W. indicated that he 
had created a website in an effort to offset his legal fees.  
The website prominently featured Attorney Parks, barely noted 
his affiliation with the firm, and implied Attorney Parks was 
offering financial consulting services at the firm's Ripon 
office.  Although Attorney Parks disavowed any knowledge of the 
website, denied asking M.W. to create it, and took steps to 
remove it, this incident clearly sowed seeds of distrust between 
the partners and Attorney Parks. 
 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
9 
 
Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 527 N.W.2d 314 (1995), actionable 
via SCR 20:8.4(f).4  (Count Two).  
¶23 Attorney Parks disputes the referee's conclusion that 
he violated SCR 20:8.4(f) for the same reasons he disputes that 
he committed the misconduct alleged in count one; he maintains 
that Attorney Z. authorized him to perform non-firm work.  
Again, this turned on a credibility determination, albeit an 
implicit one, that we will not disturb.  It is sufficiently 
supported by the record. 
¶24 Counts three and four of the second amended complaint 
allege that Attorney Parks made unauthorized fee reductions, 
and/or accepted services that benefitted him personally in 
exchange for a reduction of legal fees, at the firm's expense.  
Specifically, the OLR alleged that:  (1) in 2012, Attorney Parks 
reduced client M.W.'s legal fee by $3,122.70 without firm 
approval; (2) Attorney Parks agreed to reduce client R.C.'s 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides:  "It is professional misconduct to 
violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order or 
supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers." 
In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 
Wis. 2d 560, 527 N.W.2d 314 (1995), Attorney Shea sent a client 
for whom he had performed legal work two separate bills, one 
payable to the law firm, the other——for $75,000——payable 
directly to Attorney Shea.  Both were paid.  It appeared to the 
firm that an unbilled balance remained.  Attorney Shea then 
represented to his firm that the (apparently) unbilled fees 
should be discounted, implying that the client was unhappy with 
an associate's performance.  The court concluded that by 
concealing from the firm that he had personally received funds 
from a client while the firm was not being paid in full for 
legal fees, the lawyer violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
10 
 
attorney fees in exchange for R.C. performing remodeling work on 
Attorney Parks' home; and (3) Attorney Parks agreed to credit 
legal fees owed by client H.W. in exchange for H.W. doing body 
work on Attorney Parks' car.5 
¶25 The referee concluded, based specifically on the 
testimony of R.C. and H.W., that Attorney Parks engaged in self-
dealing 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
(Count 
Three) 
by 
collaborating with R.C. and H.W. for them to perform remodeling 
and auto work in exchange for a reduction of legal fees owed to 
the firm.  The referee also concluded that Attorney Parks 
violated the standard of conduct set forth in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, actionable via 
SCR 20:8.4(f) (Count Four).   
¶26 In alleging count four the OLR referenced three 
incidents:  the write down of M.W.'s fee, exchanging fees for 
remodeling services with R.C., and exchanging fees for auto body 
work with H.W.  In reaching his conclusion regarding count four, 
the referee focused only on the write down of M.W.'s fee.  The 
referee acknowledged Attorney Parks' version of events but 
clearly found credible and relied on the testimony of both 
                                                 
5 Attorney Parks notes that unlike Shea, he was not a 
partner, and he was not subject to an employment contract with 
the firm that provided that "all fees, compensation, and other 
things of value received or realized as a result of the 
rendition of professional legal services by [him] in any 
capacity . . . shall belong to the [firm] whether paid directly 
to [him] or to the [firm]." 
 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
11 
 
Attorneys Z. and O., that Attorney Parks did not have authority 
to write down a substantial amount of legal fees, and concluded 
that Attorney Parks thus violated SCR 20:8.4(f).6  
¶27 Attorney Parks refutes these conclusions and says the 
referee's implicit determination that these witnesses are 
credible is belied by other record evidence.  Attorney Parks 
admits that he reduced M.W.'s fee, but maintains he was 
authorized to do so and was transparent about it.  He says the 
fee reduction was recorded in the firm's billing system so there 
was no "concealment."  
¶28 Attorney Parks contends that although he was not a 
partner, the firm was run——to quote Attorney Parks' former legal 
secretary——like "a group of solo practitioners all housed under 
the same roof."  As such, he says that he had discretion over 
the cases he accepted and over fees, and that he had authority 
to authorize fee reductions.  He says there was no firm policy 
prohibiting fee reductions.  He cites corroborating testimony 
from other firm staff members who also reported reducing fees 
without permission.  
¶29 Moreover, he says that, as a factual matter, he did 
not reduce R.C. or H.W.'s fees in exchange for services.  He 
says 
R.C.'s 
affidavit 
is 
"preposterous" 
"incoherent 
and 
incredible" and that the record evidence, namely cancelled 
                                                 
6 The referee did not make a specific finding or conclusion 
as to R.C. and H.W. on count four, but the findings he did make 
are sufficient to establish a violation of SCR 20:8.4(f). 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
12 
 
checks and the testimony of his former wife, shows he paid R.C. 
for the work performed on his home.  He alleges that both R.C. 
and H.W. lied in their affidavits, in exchange for fee 
reductions that were offered by the firm, not by him.  Again, he 
says that his evidence is more credible than the opposition and 
that the referee improperly focused on whether he had permission 
to write down fees rather than the alleged misconduct, which 
turned on whether he traded fee discounts for personal work 
which, again, he asserts he did not. 
¶30 The referee's findings implicitly accept, as credible, 
the testimony of Attorney Z. and Attorney O. and the testimony 
of the two clients, each of whom contradicted Attorney Parks' 
account of what transpired.  The record evidence indicates that 
Attorney Parks was an associate, the firm paid the overhead, he 
was paid a percentage of his billings, and he needed approval to 
authorize a significant fee reduction.  We accept the referee's 
findings and conclusions of law regarding counts three and four. 
Counts Five-13: Interactions with C.D. and her relatives 
¶31  The OLR alleged nine counts of misconduct relating to 
Attorney Parks' interactions with C.D. and her relatives.  The 
referee concluded that Attorney Parks committed the misconduct 
alleged in four of the nine counts.   
¶32 Attorney Parks and C.D. became acquainted in the early 
1990s.  Their lives were interconnected until her death in May 
2013.  Attorney Parks represented C.D. in a divorce in 1996 and 
in a personal injury claim in 2008.  He reviewed documents 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
13 
 
regarding a loan C.D. made to her daughter, and answered her 
legal questions on occasion.  
¶33 Attorney Parks also occasionally used C.D.'s computer 
for his own work and, although he disputes it, there is record 
evidence that C.D. did some secretarial work for Attorney Parks.7  
Attorney Parks was a landlord and rented a home to C.D. 
beginning in 2008 until her death.  In 2010, Attorney Parks and 
his then-wife borrowed $35,000 as an unsecured loan from C.D.  
Attorney Parks says that as C.D. became ill, he served as C.D.'s 
Power of Attorney, took her to medical appointments, and visited 
her at home and after she moved to a nursing home.   
¶34 Attorney Parks was also close friends with C.D's 
daughter, 
L.E., 
and 
her 
husband, 
T.E. 
 
Attorney 
Parks 
represented T.E. in a personal injury case, wrote two wills for 
the couple, and was the best man at their wedding.  Attorney 
Parks says that the relationship between mother (C.D.) and 
daughter (L.E.) was characterized by ongoing conflict and 
tension, in part because of a failed trucking business.  
Attorney Parks was also acquainted with C.D.'s sister, G.S., who 
is L.E.'s aunt.  Attorney Parks represented G.S. in a divorce 
proceeding in 2011 and 2012. 
The $5,000 "Bonus" (Counts Five and Six) 
                                                 
7 C.D.'s medical records indicate that C.D. told three 
healthcare professionals that 
she did work for Attorney Parks until 
she entered a nursing home.  C.D.'s sister, daughter, and son-in-
law also testified that C.D. did legal work for Attorney Parks.   
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
14 
 
¶35 Attorney Parks represented T.E. in a personal injury 
case.  The firm's standard contingency fee agreement provided 
that the firm would receive 33 percent of any recovery for 
attorney fees.  The OLR alleged that at the time of settlement, 
without authorization from the firm, Attorney Parks unilaterally 
reduced the attorney fees from 33 percent to 25 percent, a 
$12,000 fee reduction.  
¶36 T.E. and L.E. claim that thereafter, Attorney Parks 
mentioned, on some three occasions, that clients sometimes gave 
him a bonus.  Then, during the meeting to obtain their 
settlement money, Attorney Parks asked about "his $5,000 bonus."  
There was testimony that the couple had little money at this 
time, but felt compelled to give him the requested bonus.  L.E. 
said that she wrote a $5,000 check and handed it to Attorney 
Parks.  He handed it back and asked that she write "gift" on the 
memo line, which she did.  The fee reduction and "gift" meant 
the firm received $33,000 in legal fees instead of $45,000. 
¶37 The referee concluded that Attorney Parks violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c) by unilaterally and without authorization reducing 
the firm's attorney fees, and by seeking and accepting an 
unauthorized $5,000 "gift" from L.E. and T.E. (Count Five).  The 
referee concluded further that by engaging in self-dealing after 
seeking and accepting a "gift" from L.E. and T.E. in exchange 
for a reduction of legal fees owed to the firm, Attorney Parks 
violated a standard of conduct set forth in Shea, actionable via 
SCR 20:8.4(f) (Count Six). 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
15 
 
¶38 Attorney Parks appeals these findings and conclusions.  
He reiterates that he had authority to unilaterally reduce legal 
fees especially where, as here, he thought it was necessary to 
facilitate the settlement.  He points to an anecdote from a 
legal assistant who once suggested to a partner that Attorney 
Parks should reduce a fee for another client and the partner 
said he would not "force the reduction of fees."  Attorney Parks 
says this confirms that he had fee setting authority.  He 
insists that the check was an unsolicited gift, as evidenced by 
his own testimony and that of his former wife, who thanked the 
couple.   
¶39 With respect to count six, Attorney Parks suggests 
that unlike the lawyer in Shea, he was not a partner at the firm 
and there was no firm policy to violate, so his only duty to the 
firm was a duty of loyalty.  He says he did not violate that 
duty by making a reasonable judgment call to reduce a fee in 
order to facilitate a settlement that might otherwise have 
failed.  Attorney Parks maintains that there is no evidence that 
he arranged the gift in exchange or as a quid pro quo for the 
fee reduction.  So, Attorney Parks contends that the referee's 
conclusion, that he violated SCR 20:8.4(f), is wrong.  
¶40 A review of the record demonstrates that in this 
instance, the referee clearly believed the testimony of L.E. and 
T.E., noting that they were in "dire financial straits" when 
they received their settlement and that both testified that the 
"gift" was not their idea, they did not offer it, and felt they 
needed to pay it to receive their settlement.  Both of the 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
16 
 
firm's partners testified that the fee reduction was not 
authorized.   
¶41 The referee also rejected Attorney Parks' suggestion 
that counts five and six are duplicative, explaining that count 
five addresses Attorney Parks' misconduct vis a vis his client, 
while count six pertains to his misconduct vis a vis his duty of 
loyalty to his firm.   
¶42 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law with respect to these two counts.  Although 
mindful of Attorney Parks' defense, we cannot conclude that the 
referee's findings, particularly since they rely heavily on the 
credibility of the witnesses, are clearly erroneous.  The 
findings indicate that Attorney Parks unilaterally and without 
authority reduced the legal fees that would be paid to the firm 
then essentially recouped his own portion of that reduction by 
persuading the clients to pay him a bonus.  The record is 
sufficient to support the referee's findings and conclusions on 
these counts and we accept them. 
Loan from C.D. (Count Seven) 
¶43 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to establish 
that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.8(a) and (b)8 when he 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless:  
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
17 
 
borrowed $35,000 from C.D. without proper disclosures.  Attorney 
Parks argued that C.D. was not his client when this transaction 
occurred.  The OLR did not demonstrate otherwise and has not 
appealed the referee's conclusion.  We therefore conclude that 
the referee's findings with respect to this count have not been 
shown to be clearly erroneous.  We accept the referee's findings 
and conclusion and dismiss count seven.  
Confidentiality (Count 8) 
¶44 After C.D.'s death, her daughter, L.E., obtained 
C.D.'s computer and discovered that it contained several client 
files and documents that she was able to access without a 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood 
by the client;  
(2) the client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal 
counsel on the transaction; and  
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a 
writing signed by the client, to the essential terms 
of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the 
transaction, 
including 
whether 
the 
lawyer 
is 
representing the client in the transaction. 
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating 
to representation of a client to the disadvantage of 
the client unless the client gives informed consent, 
excepted as permitted or required by these rules. 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
18 
 
password.9  L.E. gave the computer to the firm, which, in turn, 
notified the OLR.  
¶45 The OLR alleged that, by working on client files on 
C.D.'s computer, Attorney Parks allowed C.D. access to client 
files at a time when C.D. was not working for the firm.  The OLR 
further alleged that the clients did not give informed consent 
for non-employees to have access to their files, all in 
violation of SCR 20:1.6(a)10 (Count Eight).  
¶46 The referee concluded that the OLR established by 
clear and convincing evidence that Attorney Parks violated 
SCR 20:1.6(a).  The referee rejected Attorney Parks' suggestion 
that the OLR had not shown that C.D. actually looked at the 
unprotected client files. 
¶47 Attorney Parks appeals.  He acknowledges that leaving 
client 
files 
without 
password 
protection 
on 
a 
non-firm 
employee's computer was not a proper practice to ensure client 
                                                 
9 The complaint alleged that documents on C.D.'s computer 
included a Healthcare Power of Attorney document for a client we 
refer to as C.S., that included C.S.'s name, address, and the 
names of the client's designated health care agents.  It also 
contained a beneficiary designation for a client we refer to 
as B.T., that included the full legal names and social 
security numbers of the client's six designated beneficiaries. 
10 SCR 20:1.6(a) provides:  "A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client unless 
the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that 
are 
impliedly 
authorized 
in 
order 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
representation, and except as stated in pars. (b) and (c)." 
Paragraphs (b) and (c) encompass necessary disclosures that are 
not implicated here. 
 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
19 
 
confidentiality.  However, he reiterates there is no evidence 
that C.D. actually looked at the documents and suggests that the 
fact that L.E. "found" them does not equate with his "revealing 
them."  Therefore, he claims the record does not support the 
claim, as alleged.  We are not persuaded and agree that the 
facts, as alleged and as found by the referee, are sufficient to 
establish that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.6(a).   
Drafting C.D.'s will (Count Nine) 
¶48 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to prove 
that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.7(a)(2)11 by providing C.D. 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) provides: 
(a) Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves 
a 
concurrent 
conflict 
of 
interest. 
A 
concurrent conflict of interest exists if:   
(2) 
there 
is 
a 
significant 
risk 
that 
the 
representation 
of 
one 
or 
more 
clients 
will 
be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or 
by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent 
conflict of interest under par. (a), a lawyer may 
represent a client if:  
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the 
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client;  
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;  
(3) the representation does not involve the 
assertion of a claim by one client against another 
client 
represented 
by 
the 
lawyer 
in 
the 
same 
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and  
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
20 
 
with assistance drafting her will when, knowing he was a 
beneficiary, 
there 
was 
a 
"significant 
risk 
that 
his 
representation 
was 
materially 
limited 
by 
his 
personal 
interests."  The referee found that while Attorney Parks gave 
the firm's will template to C.D., there was no evidence Attorney 
Parks actually assisted C.D. in drafting her will.  This finding 
has not been shown to be clearly erroneous and we accept the 
referee's conclusion.  Count nine is dismissed. 
Purchasing C.D.'s car (Count Ten) 
¶49 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to prove 
that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by using his power of 
attorney to effectuate the transfer of the title of C.D.'s 
vehicle to Attorney Parks, in contravention of the terms of her 
will, while C.D. was allegedly incompetent.  The OLR focused on 
the statement of C.D.'s physician that "it is more likely than 
not that C.D. was not competent" when she signed the vehicle 
title.  The referee, however, observed that this was not "clear 
and convincing" evidence which is needed to establish the 
alleged disciplinary violation.  This finding has not been shown 
to be clearly erroneous.  We accept the referee's conclusion and 
dismiss count ten. 
Rent payment (Count 11) 
                                                                                                                                                             
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in a writing signed by the client.  
There is no assertion that SCR 20:1.7(b) applies 
here. 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
21 
 
¶50 The referee concluded that the OLR also failed to 
prove that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:8.4(c) when, the day 
before C.D. died, Attorney Parks used his power of attorney to 
write himself a $1,500 check from C.D.'s account to pre-pay 
himself for upcoming June and July 2013 rental payments.  
Relying in part on the expert testimony of Attorney Mark Munson 
regarding the appropriate conduct of a power of attorney, the 
referee was persuaded that on this record, although the conduct 
was "questionable," there was no showing that Attorney Parks' 
action adversely affected anyone's interests.  C.D.'s belongings 
remained in the rental property during June and July and T.E. 
and L.E. stayed in the property during that time.  This finding 
has not been shown to be clearly erroneous and we accept the 
referee's conclusion; count 11 is dismissed. 
Release (Count 12) 
¶51 The OLR alleged and the referee agreed that Attorney 
Parks committed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation 
of SCR 20:8.4(c) by the manner in which he obtained the 
signatures of L.E. and G.S. on a "release," and the terms of the 
release he drafted relating to C.D.'s will.   
¶52 C.D. designated her sister, G.S., and Attorney Parks 
as the primary beneficiaries of her will.  C.D.'s will provided 
that Attorney Parks was to receive 40 percent of her payable on 
death accounts and 40 percent forgiveness of the balance of the 
$35,000 loan from C.D.  She also left Attorney Parks her "rifle, 
outdoor furniture, tools, air compressor, John Deere tractor, 
push mower, chain saw, and rototiller."  
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
22 
 
¶53 The will provided that G.S. was to receive 60 percent 
of C.D.'s payable on death accounts, C.D.'s vehicle, and what 
was left on Attorney Parks' loan (after the partial forgiveness) 
which was then about $21,351.  The will forgave a loan to L.E. 
but otherwise excluded her daughter. 
¶54 C.D. died in May 2013.  A few weeks later, G.S. and 
L.E. met with Attorney Parks to discuss C.D.'s estate.  Both 
G.S. and L.E. testified that they thought Attorney Parks 
represented them in connection with the estate.  Attorney Parks 
testified that he told them both, verbally, that he was not 
acting as their attorney, but "regrettably I didn't send them a 
letter." 
¶55 On May 24, 2013, the three met at a bank to finalize 
distribution of C.D.'s bank accounts.  There, Attorney Parks 
asked them each to sign, and both G.S. and L.E. did sign, a 
document entitled "Full and Final Settlement & Release of All 
Claims."  Both testified that they believed the document was 
necessary to close out the bank accounts.  The "release" which 
was drafted by Attorney Parks provided that: 
 G.S. and L.E. both released and discharged all claims and 
liabilities against Attorney Parks that may exist now or in 
the future regarding all sums that he (and his wife, etc.) 
may have owed to C.D. or her estate in any form known or 
unknown, including, but not limited to, contractual or due 
to his role as power of attorney for C.D. 
 They agreed that no probate would be initiated by any of 
them. 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
23 
 
 They agreed that they had divided the personal property and 
that they were satisfied with the division. 
 G.S. would receive Attorney Parks' share of C.D.'s payable-
on-death accounts. 
 G.S. had to pay the funeral bill and any other of C.D.'s 
debts. 
¶56 Essentially, this document released Attorney Parks 
from all liability, permitted him to keep whatever personal 
property he had received from C.D., and excused him from 
repaying the balance of his loan which was at least $21,351.  In 
exchange, G.S. received all of the payable on death money, which 
was some $28,872.19.  
¶57 The OLR alleged that as a result of this document, 
G.S. received $1,261.72 less than she was entitled to receive 
and she did not receive C.D.'s vehicle because that had been 
sold——by Attorney Parks to himself——shortly before C.D. died.12  
¶58 The referee found that Attorney Parks failed to tell 
L.E. that he did not represent her or G.S., and failed to tell 
them that they should seek the advice of another attorney 
because he had an interest in the estate.  The referee concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Parks' 
conduct 
pertaining 
to 
the 
release 
constituted misconduct that violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
                                                 
12 Attorney Parks states that he paid $15,000 for the 
vehicle and deposited those funds into C.D.'s accounts which, in 
turn, went to G.S. 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
24 
 
¶59 Attorney Parks appeals.  He maintains that the release 
reflected the three beneficiaries' agreement among themselves. 
He explained that G.S. wanted a car but did not want C.D.'s car 
so there was no conflict over his purchase of the vehicle.  He 
adds that G.S. wanted a lump sum of cash, not years of modest 
monthly loan payments from Attorney Parks, hence the decision to 
forgive his loan but give G.S. all the payable on death 
accounts.  
¶60 As evidence that G.S. and L.E. acceded to this 
agreement, Attorney Parks notes that L.E. brought a death 
certificate to the bank and that he wrote "per agreement" on a 
check he signed over to G.S.  He says he did not threaten or 
force anyone and says that he did not tell L.E. she had to sign.  
He claims the fact he gave them copies of the release reflects 
his transparency.  He claims that no one suffered any ill effect 
as a result of this document, but concedes that, because he was 
a beneficiary, it was a "poor decision."  However, he says that 
there was no deceit, so there was no violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶61 We are not persuaded.  The referee clearly accepted 
the testimony of the two women that they neither fully 
understood what the "release" provided nor understood why they 
were signing it.  Inducing G.S. and L.E., in the immediate 
aftermath of the death of their sister and mother, to sign a 
patently self-serving document designed to insulate himself from 
liability at the potential expense of G.S. was more than a "poor 
decision."  We wholly agree with the referee's conclusion that 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
25 
 
"Parks' conduct in this regard involved 'dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation' within the meaning of the Rule."  
Conflict (Count 13)  
¶62 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to prove 
that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) based on the 
theory that he was representing G.S. and L.E. in May 2013 when 
they were finalizing C.D.'s estate.  While the two women may 
have thought Attorney Parks was representing their interests as 
related to C.D.'s estate, the referee found that there was no 
evidence that Attorney Parks was providing legal services to 
G.S. at that time, and L.E.'s own testimony indicated she did 
not consider him her lawyer at that time.  These findings have 
not been shown to be clearly erroneous and we accept the 
referee's conclusion.  Count 13 is dismissed. 
Non-cooperation (Count 14) 
¶63 The referee also concluded that the OLR failed to 
prove 
that 
Attorney 
Parks 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2)13 
and 
                                                 
13 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation.   
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
26 
 
SCR 22.03(6),14 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h)15 by failing to 
cooperate with the OLR (Count 14).  The OLR pointed to certain 
issues, such as Attorney Parks' failure to provide certain 
client names or a list of non-firm files on which he worked.  
The referee disagreed, finding that at most "Parks was guilty of 
some inconsistencies in his responses to the committee's 
inquiries . . .."  This finding has not been shown to be clearly 
erroneous and we accept the referee's conclusion.  Count 14 is 
dismissed. 
¶64 We 
accept 
the 
referee's 
factual 
findings 
and 
conclusions of law and agree that Attorney Parks committed the 
professional misconduct alleged in counts one through six, 
eight, and 12 of the OLR's second amended complaint.  We dismiss 
counts seven, nine, 10-11, and 13-14.   
Recommended Discipline 
¶65 Attorney 
Parks 
contends 
that 
the 
recommended 
discipline——a 14-month license suspension——is excessive, even if 
the referee's conclusions relating to misconduct are upheld. 
                                                 
14 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
15 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
27 
 
Attorney Parks argues that his misconduct is not so serious that 
he should be required to petition for reinstatement and prove 
his moral character and fitness to practice law.  Attorney Parks 
argues that a license suspension of less than six months is 
sufficient. 
 
The 
OLR 
maintains 
that 
"Parks' 
pervasively 
dishonest conduct merits a lengthy suspension, whether that be 
the two-year suspension it had recommended, [or] the 14 month 
suspension recommended by the referee." 
¶66 Ultimately, it is this court's responsibility to 
determine appropriate discipline.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 WI 39, ¶74, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 
N.W.2d 894.  This court considers the seriousness, the effect on 
the legal system of repetition of misconduct, the need to 
impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and 
to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct. 
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 
¶78, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910. 
¶67 Although no two disciplinary cases are exactly alike, 
cases in which lawyers collect fees from clients that they did 
not report to their firm, and multiple violations of SCR 20:8.4 
(Misconduct) typically result in lengthy license suspensions.  
¶68 Recently, we agreed that a one-year suspension was 
appropriate discipline for a lawyer, with no prior discipline, 
who 
committed 
two 
counts 
of 
misconduct 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) and 20:8.4(f), for directly accepting compensation 
for consulting services, without notice to her firm.  In re 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
28 
 
Disciplinary 
Proceeding 
Against 
Trupke, 
2018 
WI 
43, 
381 
Wis. 2d 136, 911 N.W.2d 361.  
¶69 We 
also 
deem 
instructive 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Brown, 2005 WI 49, 280 Wis. 2d 44, 695 
N.W.2d 295.  Attorney Brown was suspended 18 months for, inter 
alia, accepting fees from clients totaling some $16,000 while 
advising his firm that he was acting pro bono.  See also In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koenig, 2015 WI 16, 361 
Wis. 2d 16, 859 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year suspension for 
taking $39,920 in client fees that were owed to his firm); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman, 2008 WI 28, 308 
Wis. 2d 524, 746 N.W.2d 793 (imposing nine-month suspension on 
attorney for failing to report substantial co-trustee fees to 
his firm); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schaller, 2006 
WI 40, 290 Wis. 2d 65, 713 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year 
suspension for converting $4,290.85 from firm and failing to 
report income on tax returns).  None of these cases resulted in 
discipline less than six months.  There is more than sufficient 
support for the imposition of a 14-month license suspension 
here. 
¶70 We are not persuaded by Attorney Parks' reference to 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Curtis, 2018 WI 13, 379 
Wis. 2d 521, 907 N.W.2d 91.  In that case, the OLR initially 
alleged seven counts of misconduct.  We concluded that the 
lawyer committed only four counts of misconduct involving trust 
account violations and tax evasion.  Attorney Curtis was 
suspended for four months.  The facts were quite different; it 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
29 
 
is not a compelling example.  There, in imposing discipline the 
court was mindful that Attorney Curtis had served prison time 
for tax evasion during which he was unable to practice law.  
Also, the court determined that the trust account violations 
were not intentional, did not involve misrepresentation or 
dishonesty, and he did not personally benefit from them.  By 
contrast, here Attorney Parks was determined to have committed 
four separate counts of misconduct involving fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
a 
14-month 
license 
suspension is appropriate.  No restitution will be ordered. 
Objection to Costs 
¶71 Attorney Parks filed an objection to the OLR's pre-
appellate statement of costs and also objected to the OLR's 
appellate costs.  Attorney Parks reasons that he was exonerated 
on six of the 14 counts alleged against him and contends that 
the OLR "overcharged" the case.  He asks the court to impose 
only 25 percent of the costs upon him.  He argues that he should 
not have to "foot the bill" for the OLR's prosecution of conduct 
that didn't violate the supreme court rules.  Attorney Parks 
points to In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arellano, 2013 
WI 24, ¶52, 346 Wis. 2d 340, 827 N.W.2d 877, for the proposition 
that when the OLR drops charges prior to the evidentiary 
hearing, some reduction in costs is warranted. 
¶72 It is true that Attorney Parks prevailed on six of the 
14 counts alleged, but this court generally does not apportion 
costs based on the number of counts charged and/or proven.  In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, 279 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
30 
 
Wis. 2d 266, 694 N.W.2d 367 (declining to reduce costs where the 
respondent prevailed on five of the seven counts brought against 
him).  
¶73 While there are exceptions, such as Arellano, this is 
not one of them.  Attorney Arellano was charged with 14 counts 
of misconduct and the OLR sought revocation of his law license.  
Before the hearing the OLR dismissed nine counts.  Attorney 
Arellano was ultimately determined to have committed only two 
counts of misconduct and received a public reprimand.  The OLR 
agreed that a cost reduction was appropriate in that case.  
¶74 In exercising our discretion regarding the assessment 
of costs, we consider the submissions of the parties and the 
following factors:  (a) the number of counts charged, contested, 
and proven; (b) the nature of the misconduct; (c) the level of 
discipline sought by the parties and recommended by the referee; 
(d) the respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary process; 
(e) prior discipline, if any; (f) other relevant circumstances.  
See SCR 22.24(1m).  
¶75 Applying these factors, we are not persuaded that a 
reduction in fees is warranted here.  We acknowledge that, after 
more than 25 years in practice, Attorney Parks has no prior 
discipline.  We consider that the OLR alleged but failed to 
prove that Attorney Parks was uncooperative with the OLR. 
¶76 The other factors do not weigh in support of a cost 
reduction.  The OLR alleged 14 counts of misconduct.  Attorney 
Parks contested them all.  The referee ultimately concluded, and 
we agree, that Attorney Parks committed eight counts of 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
31 
 
misconduct.  The OLR sought a two-year suspension while Attorney 
Parks argued that a suspension of less than six months was 
appropriate.  The referee recommended and we accept a 14-month 
license suspension.  
¶77 In the Arellano case, we observed that the ultimate 
misconduct found and discipline imposed were not only much less 
than initially sought, but were also of a materially different 
nature.  Here, although Attorney Parks was exonerated on a 
number of claims pertaining to his dealings with C.D., he was 
nonetheless deemed to have committed four separate violations of 
SCR 20:8.4(c), involving fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
¶78 Attorney Parks litigated this case vigorously as is 
his right.  That, more than any strategy on the part of the OLR, 
is the reason for the high costs.  The referee concluded and we 
agree that Attorney Parks has not established that the amounts 
included for counsel and referee fees, reporting and transcript 
costs, 
copying, 
and 
medical 
records 
fees, 
were 
either 
"unreasonable," or "unnecessary."16  We thus find no reason to 
                                                 
16 Attorney Parks specifically objects to the $3,014 in 
expert witness fees paid to the OLR's witness, Attorney Mark 
Munson.  He points out that while Attorney Munson testified as 
to eight counts of the original complaint, much of his testimony 
was that he had reached no relevant conclusions on the points at 
issue.  Attorney Munson was not called to testify at the 
hearing.  The OLR says that its retention of Attorney Munson, 
whether he served as a "testimonial expert" or a "consulting 
expert," was "part and parcel of OLR's overall litigation of 
this case."  Supreme Court Rule 22.001(3) specifies that the 
costs 
of 
proceedings 
include 
"expert 
witness 
fees," 
and 
"compensation and reasonable expenses of experts."  The OLR adds 
that it found Attorney Munson's opinions valuable. 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
32 
 
depart from our general practice of imposing full costs on 
attorneys deemed to have committed misconduct.  See SCR 22.24.  
¶79 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Daniel Parks to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 14 
months, effective January 24, 2019.  
¶80 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Daniel Parks shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $42,226.26, 
as of July 6, 2018. 
¶81 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Daniel Parks shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
 
No. 
2016AP85-D 
 
 
 
1