Title: DUNHAM v SOUTHSIDE NATIONAL BANK
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13203
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 1976

No. 133.03 TN THE SUPREME COlJRT O F T H E STA'I'E i)E' MONTANA 1976 MYRA A . DUNHAM, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, SOUTHSIDE NATIONAL BANK OF MISSOULA, and J I M O'HOYT AND T E D D Y JOHNSON d/b/a JOHNSON BROTHERS, Defendants and Respondents. A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Boone, Karlberg, and Haddon, Missoula, Montana Sam Haddon argued, Missoula , Montana %or Sespondents: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Sherman V. Lohn argued and Larry E. Riley argued, Missoula , Montana Vor Amicus Curiae : Marra, Wenz and Iwen, Great F a l l s , Montana Joseph R. Marra argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Poore, McKenzie, Roth, Robischon and Robinson, Butte, Montana David Wing argued and James A . Poore, 1 1 1 argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: March 10, 1976 - - - Decided : *t- h 1 , 2 r'fx; , b ;:j",'%- / yg b ' i l e d : M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from an order granting summary judgment entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula County. P l a i n t i f f , Myra R. Dunham, went t o Southside National Bank on January 4 , 1972, f o r t h e purpose of making a loan pay- ment. While walking through t h e bank parking l o t , toward a customer entrance t o t h e bank, she slipped and f e l l on an accumu- l a t i o n of i c e and snow. It had been snowing i n Missoula t h e n i g h t before t h e accident and continued t o snow throughout t h e next day. The park- ing l o t had been c l e a r e d before business hours by defendants Johnson Brothers under a maintenance agreement with t h e bank. The area where p l a i n t i f f f e l l was n o t c l e a r e d of ice o r snow, as n e i t h e r of t h e defendants considered t h i s a r e a a sidewalk o r p a r t of t h e parking l o t . P l a i n t i f f brought t h i s a c t i o n f o r personal i n j u r i e s on May 15, 1974. Defendants' motion f o r summary judgment w a s granted on September 16, 1975, on t h e grounds (1) p l a i n t i f f w a s contribu- t o r i l y negligent as a matter of l a w , and ( 2 ) t h e Montana compara- t i v e negligence s t a t u t e d i d n o t apply t o a c c i d e n t s occurring p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e act. P l a i n t i f f appeals t h e granting of summary judgment. Two i s s u e s are presented f o r review: (1) Does a genuine i s s u e of material f a c t e x i s t on t h e question of whether p l a i n t i f f w a s negligent thereby precluding summary judgment? ( 2 ) Does t h e Montana comparative negligence s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, apply t o claims which a r o s e p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e a c t , J u l y 1, 1975? Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., states a summary judgment s h a l l be rendered only i f : " * * * t h e pleadings, depositions, answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e show t h a t t h e r e is no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y is e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a matter of l a w . * * *" The moving p a r t y has t h e burden of showing t h e absence of any genuine f a c t u a l i s s u e . A s s t a t e d i n 6 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e , 1156.15[31, p. 56-463: "The c o u r t s a r e i n e n t i r e agreement t h a t t h e moving p a r t y f o r summary judgment has t h e burden of showing t h e absence of any genuine i s s u e as t o a l l t h e material f a c t s , which, under a p p l i c a b l e p r i n c i p l e s of s u b s t a n t i v e law, e n t i t l e him t o judgment a s a matter of law." See Kober & Kyriss v. B i l l i n g s Deaconess Hospital, 148 Mont. 117, I n her deposition p l a i n t i f f admitted t h e s l i p p e r y cond- i t i o n of t h e parking l o t was "obvious" and t h a t she believed t h e accumulation of ice and snow on t h e walkway was a n a t u r a l accurnu- l a t i o n due t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g conditions. She s t a t e d t h e condition was not hidden and agreed she must have stepped on a n i c y s p o t t h e wrong way. This Court r e c e n t l y s t a t e d t h e l a w regarding s l i p and f a l l under s i m i l a r conditions i n Uhl v. Abrahams, 160 Mont. 426, 429, 430, 503 P.2d 26, t h e language t h e r e a p p l i e s equally w e l l here : "Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e substan- t i v e l a w , a possessor of land owes a duty t o an i n v i t e e t o use ordinary care t o keep t h e premises i n a reasonably s a f e condition and t o warn t h e i n v i t e e of any hidden o r lurking dangers t h e r e i n , but he is not a n i n s u r e r a g a i n s t a l l a c c i d e n t s and i n j u r i e s t o i n v i t e e s on t h e premises. Cassady v. C i t y of B i l l i n g s , 135 Mont. 390, 340 P.2d 509; Luebeck v. Safeway S t o r e s , Inc., 152 Mont. 88, 446 P.2d 921; and a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . " I n Luebeck w e d i r e c t l y held t h a t '* * * where danger created by t h e elements such a s t h e forming of ice and f a l l i n g of snow are u n i v e r s a l l y known, o r as here, a c t u a l l y known, t h e r e i s n o t l i a b i l i t y . * * * ' W e based t h i s holding on a l i n e of c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s s o holding, p a r t i c u l a r l y quoting with approval t h e following statement from Crawford v. Soennichsen, 175 Neb. 87, 120 N.W.2d " ' * * * However, t h e general r u l e s e e m s c l e a r l y t o be t h a t a s t o r e owner cannot be charged with negligence by reason of n a t u r a l accumulation of ice and snow where t h e condition i s a s well known t o t h e p l a i n t i f f a s t h e defendant.' * * * " * * * I n s h o r t , nothing b u t a n a t u r a l i c i n g condition due t o t h e elements was involved and such condition prevailed throughout t h e c i t y . Accordingly, Luebeck c o n t r o l s t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t case; t h e r e is no breach of duty, no negligence, and no l i a b i l i t y as a matter of law." Appellant cites W i l l i s v. S t . P e t e r ' s Hospital, 157 Mont. 4 1 7 , 486 P.2d 593. W i l l i s can be r e a d i l y distinguished i n t h e i n s t a n t case, a s it w a s i n Uhl. - I n W i l l i s t h e r e w a s a jury ques- t i o n as t o whether t h e h o s p i t a l contributed t o t h e s l i p p e r y con- d i t i o n by attempting t o m e l t t h e ice and whether t h e p l a i n t i f f had knowledge of t h e condition. Neither of t h e s e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t i n t h e i n s t a n t case. W e f i n d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t properly granted respondents' motion f o r a summary judgment. O n appeal a p p e l l a n t a s k s t h i s Court t o give t h e new Montana comparative negligence l a w r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t . I n o t h e r words, a p p e l l a n t argues comparative negligence should apply t o a n accident occurring p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n but not t r i e d u n t i l a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e . P r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1975, t h e l a w of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence i n Montana was s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947: "Every one is responsible, n o t only f o r t h e r e s u l t of h i s w i l l f u l a c t s , but a l s o f o r an i n j u r y occasioned t o another by h i s want of ordinary care o r s k i l l i n t h e management of h i s property o r person, except s o f a r a s t h e latter has, w i l l f u l l y o r by want of ordinary c a r e , brought t h e i n j u r y upon himself. The e x t e n t of l i a b i l i t y i n such c a s e s i s defined by t h e t i t l e on compensatory r e l i e f . " O n J u l y 1, 1975, Montana's comparative negligence s t a t - u t e , s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, (Chap. 60, Laws of 1975) became e f f e c t i v e . It reads: "Contributory negligence s h a l l n o t bar recovery i n an a c t i o n by any person o r h i s l e g a l represen- t a t i v e t o recover damages f o r negligence r e s u l t - ing i n d e a t h o r i n j u r y t o person o r property, i f such negligence was not g r e a t e r than t h e negligence of t h e person a g a i n s t whom recovery is sought, b u t any damages allowed s h a l l be d i s - missed i n t h e proportion t o t h e amount of negli- gence a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e person recovering." Section 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, d i d not amend o r r e p e a l s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947. Section 58-607.1 modifies t h e t o t a l defense of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence by apportioning damages, i f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s negligence i s n o t g r e a t e r than t h a t of t h e defendant. There i s no l e g i s l a t i v e d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t s e c t i o n 58-607.1 s h a l l be only prospective i n o p e r a t i o n , nor i s t h e r e d e c l a r a t i o n t h e s t a t u t e s h a l l have r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t . There is a presumption i n Montana a g a i n s t construing a s t a t u t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y , u n l e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y declared r e t r o a c t i v e . Section 12-201, R.C.M. 1947,provides: "No l a w contained i n any of t h e codes o r o t h e r s t a t u t e s of Montana i s r e t r o a c t i v e unless expressly SO declared." The foundation f o r t h i s presumption w a s set f o r t h i n Sullivan v. C i t y of Butte, 65 Mont. 495, 498, 211 P. 301, wherein t h e Court said: "While our C o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t f o r b i d t h e enact- ment of r e t r o s p e c t i v e laws g e n e r a l l y , it i s a r u l e recognized by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s everywhere t h a t r e t r o s p e c t i v e l a w s a r e looked upon with d i s - favor. It is a maxim s a i d t o be a s o l d a s t h e l a w i t s e l f t h a t a new s t a t u t e ought t o be prospec- t i v e , not r e t r o s p e c t i v e , i n its operation. * * * The maxim has i t s foundation i n t h e presumption t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e does n o t intend t o make a new r u l e f o r p a s t t r a n s a c t i o n s and every reason- a b l e doubt w i l l be resolved a g a i n s t a r e t r o s p e c t i v e operation. " See S t a t e ex rel. M i l l s v. Dixon, 68 Mont. 526, 219 P. 637; S t a t e ex rel. C i t y of B i l l i n g s v. Osten, 91 Mont. 76, 5 P.2d 562; S t a t e ex rel. Whitlock v. S t a t e Board of Equalization, 100 Mont. 72, 45 P.2d 684; S t a t e v. J. C. Maguire Const. Co., 113 Mont. 324, 125 P.2d 433; 82 C.J.S. S t a t u t e s 8414; Anno. 37 ALR3d 1438, 1440; Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, S8.4. I n C i t y of Harlem v. S t a t e Highway Comm'n, 149 Mont. 281, 284, 425 P.2d 718, t h i s Court i n t e r p r e t e d s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t i n g : " * * * This s e c t i o n provides a r u l e of construc- t i o n which r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e intenti of t h e l e g i s - l a t u r e i s t o be gained from t h e a c t i t s e l f and from no o t h e r source. I' W e f i n d nothing i n s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, ( o r Chap. 60, Laws of 1975), which expressly d e c l a r e s a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o apply t h e law r e t r o a c t i v e l y . Appellant argues t h e comparative negligence l a w i s procedural i n nature, thus it may be applied r e t r o a c t i v e l y . Respondents r e p l y t h a t t h e l a w i s s u b s t a n t i v e i n nature. A substantive law may be defined as t h a t law which c r e a t e s d u t i e s , r i g h t s , o b l i g a t i o n s , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . S t a t e ex rel. Johnson v. D i s t r i c t Court, 148 Mont. 22, 417 P.2d 109. This Court has held on more than one occasion, t h a t pro- cedural laws may be given r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t , notwithstanding t h e presumption a g a i n s t r e t r o a c t i v i t y i n s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1947. S t a t e ex rel. Johnson v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra; S t a t e Department of Highways v. Olsen, 166 Mont. 139, 531 P.2d 1330, 32 St.Rep. 110. The Oregon Supreme Court i n Joseph v. Lowery, 261 O r e . 545, 495 P.2d 273, 275, 276, faced t h e question of r e t r o a c t i v i t y of its comparative negligence law, which i s i d e n t i c a l t o Montana's i n a l l r e l e v a n t a r e a s . It s t a t e d : "Under t h e comparative negligence s t a t u t e , a p l a i n t i f f whose negligence is less than t h a t of t h e defendant i s n o t barred from recovery by v i r t u e of h i s c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence, but i s allowed recovery reduced by t h e degree of h i s f a u l t . here fore, i f applied r e t r o a c t i v e l y , t h e a c t would a f f e c t l e g a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g o u t of p a s t a c t i o n s . A s a r e s u l t , s t r i c t l y f o r t h e purposes under consideration here, t h e provisions of t h e act a r e ' s u b s t a n t i v e 1 and not 'procedural o r remedial' i n nature. I f applied r e t r o a c t i v e l y , t h e s t a t u t e could c r e a t e a duty t o pay which d i d n o t e x i s t a t t h e t i m e t h e damage was i n £ l i c t e d . * * * " * * * W e b e l i e v e t h e r e is m e r i t i n t h e p r i o r view of t h i s c o u r t * * * t h a t , i n t h e absence of an i n d i c a t i o n t o t h e contrary, l e g i s l a t i v e a c t s should n o t be constructed i n a manner which changes l e g a l r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a r i s i n g o u t of t r a n s a c t i o n s which occur p r i o r t o t h e passage of such a c t s . " W e agree with t h e reasoning of t h e Oregon c o u r t , and f i n d t h e Montana comparative negligence law s u b s t a n t i v e i n n a t u r e with a presumption a g a i n s t r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t . The Montana and Oregon comparative negligence laws a r e n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l . These l a w s were copied from t h e Wisconsin s t a t u t e f i r s t passed i n 1931 and amended t o i t s p r e s e n t form (copied by Montana and Oregon) i n 1971. Montana follows t h e r u l e of s t a t u t o r y construction t h a t i n borrowing a s t a t u t e from another s t a t e , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e presumably borrows t h e construction placed upon it by t h e highest c o u r t of t h e state from which it i s borrowed. S t a d l e r v. F i r s t National Bank, 22 Mont. 190, 56 P. 111; E s t e r l y v. Broadway Garage Co., 87 Mont. 64, 285 P. 172; Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Mont. 149, 338 P.2d 719; Lowe v. Root, 166 ~ o n t . 1 5 0 , 531 P.2d 674, 32 St.Rep. 122. I n 1931 Wisconsin became t h e f i r s t state t o enact a modified comparative negligence l a w ( t h e type enacted i n Montana i n 1975). Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 53.5(A). I n 1933 t h e Wisconsin Supreme Court held t h e s t a t u t e d i d n o t apply r e t r o - a c t i v e l y . B r e w s t e r v. Ludtke, 211 Wisc. 344, 247 N.W. 449; Crane v. Weber, 2 1 1 Wisc. 294, 247 N.W. 882. Both cases simply s t a t e d t h e accident occurred p r i o r t o t h e enactment of t h e comparative negligence a c t , t h u s c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence w a s a t o t a l defense. These holdings w e r e reaffirmed i n 1935 by P e t e r s v, Milwaukee E l e c t r i c Ry. & Light Co., 217 Wisc. 481, 259 N.W. 724. In 1971 Wisconsin followed t h e lead of New Hampshire and adopted t h e 50% system of comparative negligence. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, §3.5(B). I n 1972 t h e Wisconsin Supreme Court held t h e 1971 modification could n o t operate r e t r o a c t i v e l y , c i t i n g B r e w s t e r and Crane a s precedent. Lupie v. Hartzheim, 54 Wisc.2d 415, 195 N.W.2d 461; Holzem v. Mueller, 54 Wisc.2d 388, 195 N.W.2d 635. These holdings were reaffirmed i n Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wisc.2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279. See Jones v. Jones, 113 N.H. 553, 311 A.2d 522, holding t h e New Hampshire law not r e t r o a c t i v e . I n Joseph v. Lowery, supra, t h e Oregon Supreme Court c i t e d t h e Wisconsin holdings a s being highly persuasive on t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e Oregon s t a t u t e . W e f e e l e q u a l l y persuaded i n t h e construction of t h e Montana s t a t u t e . Amicus on behalf of a p p e l l a n t , d i r e c t s t h e Court t o t h e many holdings of t h i s Court t h a t w e w i l l n o t b l i n d l y follow t h e construction given a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e by t h e c o u r t of another state from which t h e Montana 1 , e g i s l a t u r e borrowed t h e s t a t u t e , when such c o u r t d e c i s i o n does not appear t o be founded on r i g h t reasoning o r when such d e c i s i o n would n o t be i n harmony with t h e s p i r i t and policy of t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e and d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court, e.g. Grady v. C i t y of Livingston, 115 Mont. 47, 1 4 1 P.2d 346; I n re Kay's E s t a t e , 127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d 391; Cahill- Mooney Const. Co. v. Ayres, 140 Mont. 464, 373 P.2d 703. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, we do n o t f e e l t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s a r e r e l e v a n t , there- f o r e we follow Wisconsin, New Hampshire and Oregon c o u r t s i n deny- ing r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t t o Montana's comparative negligence l a w . Appellant d i r e c t s u s t o t h e leading cases g i v i n g compara- t i v e negligence s t a t u t e s r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t : Peterson v. C i t y of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353, 355, 37 ALR3d 1431; Godfrey v . S t a t e , 84 Wash.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630, 633. Peterson is based on t h e Minnesota comparative negligence l a w which s t a t e s t h e s t a t u t e " s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e i n any a c t i o n t h e t r i a l of which is commenced a f t e r J u l y 1, 1969." Minnesota recognized t h e precedent value of t h e Wisconsin d e c i s i o n s , b u t parted from those d e c i s i o n s due t o t h e d i f f e r e n t wording of t h e s t a t u t e s . This wording d i s t i n c t i o n a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s Peterson from t h e i n s t a n t case. Godfrey, a s d i d Peterson, d e a l t with l e g i s l a t i v e abrogation of t h e common law r u l e of contributory negligence. The Washington c o u r t r e f e r r e d t o t h e common law s t a t u s of its contributory neg- ligence r u l e on more than one occasion i n i t s opinion. I n Montana t h e contributory negligence r u l e i s s t a t u t o r y i n nature, i n e f f e c t u n t i l J u l y 1, 1975, and remaining i n e f f e c t a f t e r t h a t d a t e , although modified by t h e comparative negligence s t a t u t e . The Washington l e g i s l a t u r e , although n o t providing a s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n as t o r e t r o a c t i v e o r prospective e f f e c t of t h e s t a t u t e , d i d e n t i t l e t h e s t a t u t e : "An A c t r e l a t i n g t o c i v i l procedure." A s s t a t e d above, t h e Montana comparative negligence l a w is sub- s t a n t i v e i n n a t u r e and e n t i t l e d t o t h e presumption t h a t it was meant t o be prospective i n e f f e c t . Appellant a l s o r e f e r s t o c o u r t d e c i s i o n s i n F l o r i d a and C a l i f o r n i a adopting comparative negligence as a p a r t of t h e developing common law p r i n c i p l e s : Hoffman v. Jones, (Fla. 1973) 280 So.2d 431; Nga L i v. Yellow Cab Company of C a l i f o r n i a , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226. These d e c i s i o n s d e a l t with judge- made law modifying judge-made l a w . The c o u r t s were f r e e t o determine what e f f e c t t h e i r d e c i s i o n s would have on causes of a c t i o n a r i s i n g p r i o r t o t h e decisions. I f t h i s Court w e r e t o d e c l a r e t h a t t h e Montana comparative negligence law has r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t , we would be l e g i s l a t i n g r e t r o a c t i v e l y and hastening t h e modification of t h e c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence law without s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i v e d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r a r y t o t h e common law r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y construction and s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1947. This Court r e c e n t l y s a i d i n Wilson v. Swanson, Mont . P. 2d , 33 St.Rep. 216, 221, f - regarding a r e q u e s t t o d e c l a r e t h e Montana g u e s t s t a t u t e , repealed e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1975, r e t r o a c t i v e l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l : "Under t h e s e circumstances [ r e p e a l of t h e law] w e d e c l i n e t o hasten i t s demise by j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n . W e d e c l i n e t o l e g i s l a t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y a s condemned i n Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P.2d 919; Sunburst 0 . & R. Co. v. Great North. Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.2d 927, a££ 'd 28'7 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L ed 360, 85 A L R 254; 10 ALR3d 1371, Sec. 7 ( a ) . " Neither w i l l w e l e g i s l a t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y i n t h i s m a t t e r . The order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t i n g summary judgment i s affirmed, a s is t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t t h e Montana comparative negligence law s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, s h a l l n o t apply t o a cause of a c t i o n a r i s i n g p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1975. I ; J u s t i c e W e concur: Hon. h r t h u r Martin, d i s t r i c t judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . Chief Jus- tice James T. Harrison. M r . Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: I respectfully dissent. As I view t h i s case t h i s Court had an opportunity t o decide the case i n such a manner a s t o provide f o r uniformity i n the t r i a l of a l l pending negligence cases. Admittedly the arguments of a l l p a r t i e s t o the case a r e l e g a l i s t i c a l l y sound. The issue, a s I view it, i s which argument i s morally sound and j u s t , To me, there can be but one choice. The majority, c i t i n g cases from t h i s and other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , namely Oregon, Wisconsin and N e w Hampshire, found t h a t nothing i n section 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, o r Chapter 60, Laws of 1975, expressly declares a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o apply the law r e t r o - actively, on the basis t h a t such a change would be a change i n our substantive law. I believe t h e change i s a procedural, not substantive change. State v. Olsen, 166 Mont. 139, 531 P.2d 1330, 32 St.Rep. 110; S t a t e ex r e l . Johnson v. D i s t r i c t Court, 148 Mont. 22, 417 P.2d 109; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 422. As I view i t , under ~ o n t a n a ' s Rule 8 (b) , M.R.Civ. P., the defense of contributory negligence i s a procedural matter which the defense must plead and prove. It a f f e c t s the lai in tiff's remedy r a t h e r than the defendant's substantive obligation t o the p l a i n t i f f . The adoption of ~ o n t a n a ' s c i v i l r u l e s of procedure, years a f t e r the enactment of section 58-607, R.C.M. 1947, t o m e c l e a r l y indicates t h a t contributory negligence i s a procedural matter affecting the remedy only. Recognizing t h a t here we have a c o n f l i c t of philosophies a s s e t f o r t h i n the c i t e d supporting cases of the majority, I believe the b e t t e r reasoned and more desirable i s s e t forth i n the recent case of the Supreme Court of Washington holding t h a t t h a t s t a t e ' s s t a t u t e on comparative negligence was applicable t o pending cases. In Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630, 634, t h a t Court said : 'It ~r~ouid be incongruous i-ncieed t o frustrate i n i s dbvious l e g i s l a t i v e change i n policy by adopting = i position t h a t would permit t h e r e j e c t e d b a r t o recovery t o continue i n operation f o r years t o come , ; * * i f we were t o accept respondent's areument t h a t rhe s t a t u t e i s prospective i n operation t h l s s t a t e would, for many years, face t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of having l i t i g a n t s 2nd our courts subjected t o a dual system of recovery a s these types of cases come t o l i g h t . Such could hardly have been t h e i n t e n t or purpose of a l e g i s l a t u r e t h a t c l e a r l y abolished contributory negligence a s a b a r t o I-ec overy . " W e hold 9 : 9 ~ 9 : t h a t t h e s t a t u t e was intended t o be ~ p e r a t i v e on t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e s e t f o r t h t h e r e i n ; and, rhat t h e s t a t u t e was designed t o apply t o a l l causes of action having a r i s e n during t h e applicable period of limitation p r i o r t o t h a t d a t e though t r i a l s may have been <ommenced i ' : ik 9 : . " W e hold * * -i'c t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended RCW &.22.310 and 4.22.020 t o operate r e t r o a c t i v e l y . Accordingly, the s t a t u t e a p p l i e s t o a l l causes of a c t i o n having a r i s e n during t h e applicable period of l i m i t a t i o n p r i o r t o i t s e f f e c t i v e d a t e though t r i a l s based thereon may have been commenced t h e r e a f t e r . 9 : 9 : ik" >ee aisv !A v. Yellow Cab Company of C a l i f o r n i a , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226; Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353; Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, $8.5, pp. 149-151. In finding t h a t t h e comparative negligence s t a t u t e r e c e n t l y adopted by t h e 1975 l e g i s l a t u r e i s not r e t r o a c t i v e , t h e majority, I f e e l , may well have created a s t a t e of confusion i n ~ o n t a n a ' s law t h a t w i l l take years t o overcome. To m e it i s not i n t h e s p i r i t o f immediate s o c i a l reform, so long i n coming t o t h i s s t a t e , a s was intended by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . I would reverse t h e d i s t r i c t court. M r . J u s t i c e Sene R. Daly: / I I concur i n the Zonway Harrison. foregoipg dihsent of M r . J u s t i c e John Yr. !uscice 'ia~well, specially ~ o l l c u r r i n g : I concur i n a l l t h a t i s said i n the majority 3pinior1, S u t would add a short response t o t h e dissenting opinion. The issue i s not Itwhich argument i s morally sound and just" as s t a t e d i n the d i s s e n t . Neither party nor amicus con- tends t h i s i s the issue. I f ~ o n t a n a ' s comparative negligence s t a t u t e i-s not substantive a s the d i s s e n t concludes, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o follow j u s t how a mere procedural r u l e can be . j u s t i f i e d on moral The i s s u e i s whether the Montana l e g i s l a t u r e intended co g i v e our comparative negligence s t a t u t e r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t . The dissenting opinion does not c i t e a s i n g l e r u l e of s t a t u t o r y construction t o support such an i n t e n t i o n by the Montana l e g i s l a t u r e . L l r only s t a t e s t h a t "the b e t t e r reasoned and more desirable" ~ h i l o s o p h y of r e t r o a c t i v i t y i s s e t f o r t h i n the Washington case of Jodfrey v. S t a t e , 84 Wash.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630; the California :dse of Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226; and t h e Minnesota case of Peterson v. City of ~ l n n e a p o l i s , 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353. A l l t h r e e cases a r e distinguished from t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Montana i n the majority 2pinion. Additionally t h e supposed confusion t h a t would r e s u l t from !Jrospective r a t h e r than r e t r o a c t i v e operation does not square with Montana experience. For decades Montana t r i a l c o u r t s and i u r i e s have been hearing accident cases involving comparative ilegligence under FELA during t h e same jury term a s other accident cases involving contributory negligence p r i n c i p l e s without incident. !.'his b a s i s i s nothing but a puff of smoke. I f the Montana l e g i s l a t u r e r e a l l y intended t o a l t e r t h e l i a b i l i t y >f p a r t i e s t o accidents t h a t occurred p r i o r t o the odssage of our comparative negligence s t a t u t e , i t : would have been 2 simple matter t o say so. This Court's function i s t o construe the L a w as it finds it, not t o i n s e r t what has been omitted. Section 93-401-15, X.C.M. 1947; Dunphy v. The Anaconda Company, 151 Mont. 76, t 3 d 1 . 2 d 660, and cases c i t e d therein.