Title: Boulden v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 264, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ALLAN L. BOLDEN,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 264, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Sussex County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IS00-01-0120
§                   IS00-03-0378,0379,
§                               0381,0385
§                   IS99-11-0395-0399
Submitted: February 8, 2002
  Decided:   March 19, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 19th day of March 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Allan L. Bolden, filed an appeal from
the Superior Court’s May 9, 2001 order denying his motion for postconviction
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to the
appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2)
In this appeal, Bolden claims that: a) the Superior Court abused
its discretion in not dismissing his postconviction motion without prejudice to
1Bolden v. State, Del. Supr., No. 402, 2000, Walsh, J. (Feb. 26, 2001).
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refile since it was without jurisdiction to decide the motion while his direct
appeal was pending; and b) the Superior Court improperly denied his motion
for postconviction relief on the ground that he had failed to set forth facts
supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
(3)
On May 11, 2000, Bolden was convicted by a Superior Court
jury of one count of Burglary in the Second Degree, one count of Felony
Theft, two counts of Misdemeanor Theft, two counts of Receiving Stolen
Property, one count of Criminal Mischief and several motor vehicle charges.
Bolden was sentenced as an habitual offender to 8 years incarceration at Level
V on the burglary conviction, in addition to receiving probationary sentences
and fines on the remaining convictions.  This Court affirmed Bolden’s
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.1
(4)
After his direct appeal was filed by his trial counsel, Bolden filed
a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the Superior Court.  Because
Bolden’s direct appeal was pending in this Court, the Superior Court informed
him that his postconviction motion would be decided after the decision on his
direct appeal was final.  On May 9, 2001, after the mandate had issued on
2Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
-3-
Bolden’s direct appeal, the Superior Court denied Bolden’s postconviction
motion.
(5)
Bolden’s claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion in not
dismissing his postconviction motion without prejudice to refile is without
merit.  Bolden was advised by the Superior Court in a letter dated September
11, 2000 that it would decide the postconviction motion after the decision on
his direct appeal was final.  Bolden did not object or attempt to voluntarily
dismiss the motion.  Nor did he attempt to amend his postconviction motion
after his direct appeal was decided.  There is no evidence that Bolden has been
prejudiced in any way because the Superior Court deferred its decision on his
postconviction motion until after his direct appeal became final.  
(6)
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Bolden must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different.2  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard
3Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
-4-
is highly demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation
was professionally reasonable.”3
(6)
Bolden’s claim that the Superior Court improperly denied his
motion for postconviction relief on the ground that his claims of ineffective
assistance were factually unsupported is also without merit.  Bolden failed to
demonstrate that any alleged errors by his counsel resulted in prejudice to him
and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was, therefore, properly
denied.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice