Title: State v. Richard
Citation: 109 Ariz. 65, 505 P.2d 236
Docket Number: 2263
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 1973

109 Ariz. 65 (1973) 505 P.2d 236 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Glen Harlan RICHARD, Appellant. No. 2263. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. January 25, 1973. Rehearing Denied February 27, 1973. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Peter M. Van Orman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by Anne Kappes, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of guilt after a guilty plea to the crime of child molesting, § 13-653 A.R.S., and a sentence thereon of from 15 to 20 years. *66 We are asked to answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. After a preliminary hearing, the defendant was held to answer to the charge of child molesting. On 24 September 1969, the defendant appeared in court to change a previous plea of not guilty to guilty to the information as filed. The following transpired: The court, on 23 October 1969, sentenced the defendant to not less than 15 nor more than 20 years and notified the defendant of his various appeal rights. The day after the sentence, defendant filed a motion for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty or in the alternative a motion for new trial. The court did not become aware of the motion until 5 February 1970 and on 6 February, by minute entry, ordered nunc pro tunc denying the motions. Over eight months later, the defendant, on 23 October 1970, filed a motion for reconsideration of his motion to withdraw his plea, supported by an affidavit. The trial court vacated the minute entry order of 6 February 1970 and set the matter for hearing on 2 November 1970 and on that date, after a hearing, counsel continued to 16 November 1970 for an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, testimony concerning the plea bargain was received. The former Deputy County Attorney testified: Mr. Wolfram, the attorney for the defendant at the time of the sentencing, testified as follows: *68 The defendant testified on cross-examination as follows: The court also asked the defendant: At the conclusion of the hearing to set aside the guilty plea, the Deputy County Attorney stated: EFFECT OF THE PLEA BARGAIN The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the State is bound by a plea bargain which induces a guilty plea: However, the defendant still has the burden of showing that, contrary to his statements in open court at the time of sentencing, there was in fact a plea bargain which the County Attorney's office breached. In the instant case, while there is evidence of a plea bargain, there is no indication that the attorney for the State, though a different one from the one who entered into the plea bargain, failed to abide by that agreement. The Deputy County Attorney recommended to the probation officer that the defendant be given probation. The new deputy did not oppose the motion to set aside the plea of guilty and we do not believe that the facts in this case bring the defendant within the United States Supreme Court case of Santobello v. New York, supra. OTHER DEFECTS IN THE PLEA At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, or in the alternative for a new trial, held more than a year after the plea, the defendant raised only the question of his plea bargain with the County Attorney and the alleged failure of the County Attorney to live up to that bargain. The court at that hearing was not asked to consider, nor was evidence introduced to show any reason why the trial court should set aside the plea based upon the three additional issues raised in this court on appeal, namely, whether at the time of the plea the record affirmatively showed that the defendant knew of (1) his right to confront witnesses, (2) the fact that he would be ineligible for parole until the completion of a minimum term of five years, and (3) whether there was a factual basis for the guilty plea. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court was wrong in failing to consider matters not raised at the hearing. Having failed to do so, we can only assume that the defendant did know the consequences of his plea and that there was a factual basis for the acceptance of that plea. We have, nevertheless, considered the question in light of our statutory obligation to search the record for fundamental error. § 13-1715 A.R.S. As to the questions of the alleged failure to inform the defendant at the time of his plea of the right to confront witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination, we find no error. State v. Campbell, 107 Ariz. 348, 488 P.2d 968 (1971); State v. McCallister, 107 Ariz. 143, 483 P.2d 558 (1971). As to the factual basis for the plea, the reporter's transcript of the preliminary hearing is ample to supply the factual basis of the plea. State v. Williker, 107 Ariz. 611, 491 P.2d 465 (1971); State v. Hooper, 107 Ariz. 327, 487 P.2d 394 (1971). As to the alleged failure to advise of the mandatory minimum sentence, see State v. Ross, 108 Ariz. 245, 495 P.2d 841 (1972). Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and HENRY S. STEVENS, Judge of Court of Appeals, Division One, Department A, concur.