Title: Harris v. DiMattina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 941410
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 1995

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting,
1 Lacy, 
Hassell, and Keenan, JJ. 
 
HEATHER HARRIS 
 
v.  Record No. 941410 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                      September 15, 1995 
MICHAEL DIMATTINA, M.D., 
ETC., ET AL. 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
 
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 
 
 
ROBERT E. CUMBERLAND 
 
v.  Record No. 941923 
 
O. RILEY BOONE, M.D., ET AL. 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
 
William Shore Robertson, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals of judgments entered in medical malpractice 
actions, we consider whether the trial courts erred in sustaining 
pleas of the statute of limitations.  The parties in both cases 
agree that the two-year limitation of Code § 8.01-243(A) applies. 
 They disagree regarding the effect of the 1993 amendment to Code 
§ 8.01-581.2, which eliminated the "notice of claim" requirement, 
and the effect of the repeal of former Code § 8.01-581.9, which 
contained certain tolling provisions. 
 
Prior to its amendment in 1993, former Code § 8.01-581.2 
provided, in part: 
 
No action may be brought for malpractice against a 
                     
    
1Justice Whiting participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on August 
12, 1995. 
 
 
 
 
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health care provider unless the claimant notifies the 
health care provider in writing . . . prior to 
commencing the action. . . .  The claimant or health 
care provider may within sixty days of such 
notification file a written request for a review by a 
medical malpractice review panel . . . .  No actions 
based on alleged malpractice shall be brought within 
ninety days of the notification by the claimant to the 
health care provider and if a panel is requested within 
the period of review by the medical review panel. 
 
Effective July 1, 1993, that section was amended to delete the 
requirement that a notice of claim be filed prior to filing a 
malpractice action against a health care provider.  Acts 1993, 
ch. 928. 
 
Before its repeal effective July 1, 1993, Acts 1993, 
ch. 928, former Code § 8.01-581.9 provided, in part: 
 
The giving of notice of a claim pursuant to 
§ 8.01-581.2 shall toll the applicable statute of 
limitations for a period of 120 days from the date such 
notice is given, or for 60 days following the date of 
issuance of any opinion by the medical review panel, 
whichever is later. 
 
 
Although these appeals involve common questions of law, 
their procedural histories differ substantially.  Therefore, we 
describe them separately. 
 
HARRIS v. DIMATTINA 
 
Heather Harris alleged that she suffered damages from 
medical malpractice occurring on July 15, 1991.  On July 13, 
1993, Harris mailed a notice of claim, pursuant to former Code 
§ 8.01-581.2, to Michael DiMattina, M.D., trading as Michael 
DiMattina, M.D., P.C., and his employer, Dominion Fertility and 
Endocrinology Institute (collectively, DiMattina).  In her notice 
 
 
 
 
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of claim, Harris alleged that DiMattina failed to give her proper 
treatment in connection with certain surgical procedures and 
postoperative care.  No party requested a medical malpractice 
review panel. 
 
Harris filed her motion for judgment on October 26, 1993.  
DiMattina then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Harris's 
claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 
 
DiMattina asserted that Harris could not rely on the tolling 
provisions of former Code § 8.01-581.9, because its repeal 
constituted a procedural change in the law.  He argued that, 
under Code § 8.01-1, procedural statutory changes apply to causes 
of action arising before, as well as after, the effective date of 
the changes.  The trial court held that DiMattina was correct and 
granted the motion to dismiss.  The trial court further observed: 
 "Plaintiff filed the notice of claim within the two (2) year 
statute of limitations and after the new law was in effect.  The 
Motion for Judgment could have been filed on time." 
 
CUMBERLAND v. BOONE 
 
Robert E. Cumberland alleged that he was injured during 
surgery performed on November 27, 1990, and during follow-up care 
continuing through January 9, 1991.  He filed a notice of claim 
on December 2, 1992, alleging medical malpractice committed by O. 
Riley Boone, M.D., Thomas J. Gates, M.D., Loudoun Surgical 
Associates, Ltd., John H. Cook, III, M.D., Russell McDow, M.D., 
and Loudoun Hospital Center (collectively, Boone).  Thereafter, 
 
 
 
 
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certain defendants requested a medical malpractice review panel. 
 The review panel hearing was held on September 10, 1993, and the 
panel rendered its opinion on that date. 
 
On November 4, 1993, Cumberland filed a motion for judgment 
against Boone, who filed a special plea asserting that 
Cumberland's action was barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations.  Boone argued that, under Code § 8.01-1, the repeal 
of former Code § 8.01-581.9 (the repeal provision) applied to 
Cumberland's cause of action.  He contended that, once the 
tolling provisions of former Code § 8.01-581.9 were repealed, 
Cumberland was required to file his motion for judgment within 
the unexpired portion of the two-year limitation period.  The 
trial court granted the motion to dismiss for the reasons 
advanced by Boone, concluding that "[w]ith the repeal of . . . 
Code [§] 8.01-581.9[,] plaintiff's Motion for Judgment is barred 
by the statute of limitations."  
 
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
 
To resolve these appeals, we first must determine whether 
the statutory provisions at issue are procedural or substantive 
in nature.  This distinction is central to our inquiry, because 
Code § 1-16 and Code § 8.01-1 limit the applicability of new 
statutes, depending on the category into which they fall. 
 
In Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990), 
we described the notice of claim and the tolling provisions as 
procedural in nature.  We stated that 
 
[t]he Virginia General Assembly has enacted certain 
 
 
 
 
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procedures for the prosecution of [medical malpractice 
claims].  These procedures include the notice of claim, 
a waiting period for filing suit, the right to a 
malpractice review panel prior to a court proceeding, 
use of the opinion of the panel, and extensions of 
statutory filing limitations under certain conditions. 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
All these procedural requirements . . . were 
formulated to provide the defendant with adequate 
notice of the nature of the claim, to assist the 
parties in case preparation, and to encourage 
settlement prior to trial. 
 
Id. at 172-73, 387 S.E.2d at 757.  See also Hewitt v. Virginia 
Health Servs. Corp., 239 Va. 643, 645, 391 S.E.2d 59, 60 (1990). 
 In accord with this explanation, we hold that former Code 
§§ 8.01-581.2 and -581.9, as well as the repeal provision, are 
procedural in nature, since they control only the method of 
obtaining redress or enforcement of rights and do not involve the 
creation of duties, rights, and obligations.  See Shiflet v. 
Eller, 228 Va. 115, 120, 319 S.E.2d 750, 753-54 (1984). 
 
Because Code §§ 8.01-581.2 and -581.9 prescribed only the 
procedural aspects of a remedy, they could, at the will of the 
legislature, be amended or repealed, as long as reasonable 
opportunity and time were provided to preserve substantive or 
vested rights.  Walke v. Dallas, Inc., 209 Va. 32, 36, 161 S.E.2d 
722, 724 (1968); Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 416, 46 S.E.2d 
570, 574 (1948).  Further, since these former statutes were 
procedural, rather than substantive, in nature, neither plaintiff 
acquired any vested right in these statutes at the time their 
causes of action accrued.  See Fletcher v. Tarasidis, 219 Va. 
 
 
 
 
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658, 661, 250 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1979); Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 
134, 139, 235 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1977); Phipps v. Sutherland, 201 
Va. 448, 453, 111 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1959). 
 
HARRIS
 
Harris argues that, pursuant to Code § 1-16, the repeal 
provision and the 1993 amendment to Code § 8.01-581.2 
(collectively, the 1993 enactments) apply only to causes of 
action arising on or after July 1, 1993.  She asserts that Code 
§ 1-16 establishes a statutory presumption that all statutes 
operate prospectively, absent a clearly expressed legislative 
intent to the contrary.  Since neither of the 1993 enactments 
contained any language indicating that it applied to existing 
causes of action, Harris contends that her claim is not subject 
to either provision.  We disagree. 
 
Code § 1-16 provides, in relevant part: 
 
No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, 
as to any offense committed against the former law, or 
as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture, or 
punishment incurred, or any right accrued, or claim 
arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to 
affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or 
any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment so incurred, or 
any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law 
takes effect; save only that the proceedings thereafter 
had shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws 
in force at the time of such proceedings . . . .  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
We apply the above language in the context of our holding 
that the statutory provisions at issue are procedural in nature. 
 Since Harris acquired no vested right in these procedural 
statutes, their repeal or amendment did not operate to repeal or 
 
 
 
 
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in any way affect any act done, any right accrued, or any claim 
arising under the former law.  Moreover, Harris retained her 
substantive right of action against DiMattina after the 1993 
enactments took effect.  Thus, the first part of Code § 1-16, on 
which Harris relies, is inapplicable.  See Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 
Va. at 139, 235 S.E.2d at 357. 
 
Instead, since we are dealing with purely procedural 
provisions, we look to the language highlighted above, which 
addresses the effect that a new law has on the proceedings in a 
case.  This language sets forth the general rule that such 
proceedings shall conform to the law in effect on the date the 
proceedings are conducted.  In Harris's case, the proceedings 
conformed to the terms of the 1993 enactments, which were in 
force at the time the trial court ruled on DiMattina's motion to 
dismiss.  Thus, we conclude that Code § 1-16 offers no support 
for Harris's position,
2 and we turn to consider her alternative 
                     
    
2In reaching this conclusion, we also observe that Harris's 
reliance on Ferguson v. Ferguson, 169 Va. 77, 86-88, 192 S.E. 774, 
777 (1937), is misplaced.  As we explained in Hurdle, Ferguson is 
inapposite to the analysis of a purely procedural statute, because 
the statute at issue in that case conferred both a right of action 
and a remedy.  218 Va. at 138-39, 235 S.E.2d at 356-57.  Unlike 
the statute in Ferguson, both the provision before us and the 
provision before this Court in Hurdle relate solely to procedural 
aspects of a remedy. 
 
 
 
 
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argument that her case falls within an exception to that general 
rule. 
 
This exception is set forth in Code § 8.01-1, which 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
[A]ll provisions of this title shall apply to causes of 
action which arose prior to the effective date of any 
such provisions; provided, however, that the applicable 
law in effect on the day before the effective date of 
the particular provisions shall apply if in the opinion 
of the court any particular provision (i) may 
materially change the substantive rights of a party (as 
distinguished from the procedural aspects of the 
remedy) or (ii) may cause the miscarriage of justice.  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Harris argues that, pursuant to Code § 8.01-1, she was 
entitled to rely on former Code §§ 8.01-581.2 and -581.9, because 
the 1993 enactments materially altered her substantive rights.  
Alternatively, she contends that application of the 1993 
enactments to her claim caused a miscarriage of justice.  In 
support of this argument, she asserts that "express statements" 
of this Court in Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 418 S.E.2d 886 
(1992), and Baker v. Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 307 S.E.2d 234 (1983), 
caused her to rely on the statutes which were in effect on the 
date her cause of action arose.  We disagree with both arguments. 
 
Under Code § 8.01-1, in the limited circumstances set forth 
in the statute, the trial court is vested with discretionary 
authority to apply the law that was in effect on the day before 
the statutory changes occurred.  Thus, in order to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to apply 
the law that was in effect on the day before the 1993 enactments 
 
 
 
 
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took effect, we consider whether either of the statutory 
circumstances which trigger this exception applies.  Since these 
two circumstances are worded in the disjunctive, if either 
circumstance applies, Harris's cause of action is not time 
barred. 
 
We first examine whether application of the 1993 enactments 
materially changed any of Harris's substantive rights.  As used 
in Code § 8.01-1, "materially change" denotes a material 
curtailment.  Here, Harris could have filed a motion for judgment 
instead of a notice of claim on July 13, 1993, pursuant to the 
1993 amendment to Code § 8.01-581.2.  Therefore, her substantive 
right to seek damages for the alleged medical malpractice was not 
materially curtailed.  Since Harris suffered no curtailment of 
rights as a result of the 1993 enactments, we hold that the first 
statutory circumstance set forth in Code § 8.01-1 is inapplicable 
to her claim. 
 
We next consider whether a miscarriage of justice resulted 
from the trial court's failure to apply the law in effect on 
June 30, 1993.  Harris argues that she relied on Turner and Baker 
in following the statutes in effect on the date her cause of 
action arose.  Therefore, she contends that dismissal of her 
action resulted in a miscarriage of justice, because she acted in 
accordance with the law expressed in those cases.  We disagree, 
because the holdings in those cases are inapposite to the issue 
before us. 
 
 
 
 
- 10 - 
 
In Turner, we held that the defendant professional 
corporation was not a "health care provider," as defined by the 
1986 version of former Code § 8.01-581.1 and, thus, that the 
defendant was not subject to the tolling provisions of former 
Code § 8.01-581.9.  We were required to apply the version of 
former Code § 8.01-581.1 in effect at the time the cause of 
action arose because, under its definition of "health care 
provider," the defendant had acquired a vested property right in 
the two-year statute of limitations.  This right had accrued when 
the two-year limitations period expired prior to the date the 
plaintiff's motion for judgment was filed and prior to the 
effective date of the 1989 amendment to Code § 8.01-581.1. 
 
In contrast, Harris did not have a vested right in the 
application of former Code §§ 8.01-581.2 and -581.9, as we have 
stated above.  Therefore, we conclude that Turner provides no 
support for Harris's argument. 
 
Harris's reliance on Baker is based on a footnote in that 
opinion which states, "Because the alleged negligence in this 
case occurred prior to the effective date of the [1982] amendment 
[to Code § 8.01-581.9], the new statutory language is 
inapplicable and will not be the subject of further comment in 
this opinion."  226 Va. at 10 n.1, 307 S.E.2d at 235 n.1.  We 
hold that Harris's reliance on this sentence is misplaced for two 
reasons. 
 
First, neither party in Baker argued that the 1982 amendment 
 
 
 
 
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applied to that case.  The trial court's judgment order was 
entered in September 1981, well before the date of the 
legislative enactment amending the statute.  Id. at 10, 307  
S.E.2d at 235.  Thus, the issue whether the new provisions 
applied was not before the trial court or this Court and was not 
part of our holding in that case. 
 
Second, the holding in Baker is wholly unrelated to the 
present issue.  We addressed only the question whether the words 
"toll the applicable statute of limitations," as used in former 
Code § 8.01-581.9, meant "suspend the running" of the statute of 
limitations.  Id. at 11, 307 S.E.2d at 235.  Answering yes, we 
held that, when the plaintiff's notice of claim was filed, the 
running of the statute of limitations was interrupted and did not 
resume until the termination of the 60-day period after issuance 
of the review panel's decision.  Id. at 13, 307 S.E.2d at 237. 
 
Finally, we agree with the trial court's observation that 
Harris could have filed a motion for judgment instead of a notice 
of claim on July 13, 1993, a date within the original two-year 
limitation period.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing to find that Harris suffered 
a miscarriage of justice, and that the court did not err in 
sustaining DiMattina's plea of the statute of limitations and in 
dismissing Harris's action. 
 
CUMBERLAND
 
We turn now to consider whether Cumberland's case falls 
 
 
 
 
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within the statutory exception of Code § 8.01-1.  We address 
directly the issue whether he has demonstrated a miscarriage of 
justice, because we conclude that it is dispositive of his 
appeal. 
 
Cumberland argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
under Code § 8.01-1 in failing to apply the law that was in 
effect on June 30, 1993.  He emphasizes the fact that, when the 
1993 enactments became effective, his claim was awaiting action 
by the designated review panel.  Thus, Cumberland asserts, if the 
repeal provision applied to his cause of action, his right of 
action was completely foreclosed by lapse of time before the 
review panel rendered its opinion on September 10, 1993. 
 
In support of his argument, Cumberland states that the 
tolling provisions of former Code § 8.01-581.9 provided necessary 
statutory relief from the running of the statute of limitations. 
 This relief was needed, he asserts, because former Code 
§ 8.01-581.2 prohibited plaintiffs from filing a motion for 
judgment until 90 days after they had given notice of claim, and 
after the review panel process, if any, had been completed.  
Since he was subjected to these delays imposed by statute when he 
filed his notice of claim and refrained from filing suit, 
Cumberland argues that a miscarriage of justice will result if he 
is denied the benefit of the tolling provisions. 
 
In response, Boone asserts that Cumberland cannot claim that 
application of the repeal provision left him no opportunity to 
 
 
 
 
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preserve his rights by filing suit.  Boone argues that Cumberland 
could have filed his motion for judgment beginning July 1, 1993, 
within the unexpired time remaining on the statute of 
limitations, and that application of the repeal provision does 
not result in a miscarriage of justice.  Citing Starnes v. 
Cayouette, 244 Va. 202, 211-12, 419 S.E.2d 669, 674-75 (1992), 
Boone contends that he, rather than Cumberland, would suffer a 
miscarriage of justice if Boone is denied his right to rely on 
the repeal provision and its effect on the running of the statute 
of limitations.  We disagree with the conclusion urged by Boone. 
 
At the time Cumberland gave his notice of claim, former Code 
§ 8.01-581.2 prohibited him from filing a motion for judgment 
until after the applicable statutory time period had expired.  As 
we explained in Baker v. Zirkle, the potential adverse effects of 
this requirement on a plaintiff's right to bring suit were 
remedied by the tolling provisions of former Code § 8.01-581.9.  
226 Va. at 13, 307 S.E.2d at 236-37.  Thus, prior to July 1, 
1993, no plaintiff who was subject to the requirements of former 
Code § 8.01-581.2 was denied the tolling benefits of former Code 
§ 8.01-581.9. 
 
We believe that application of the repeal provision to 
Cumberland's case would disrupt this carefully balanced statutory 
scheme and subject Cumberland to the disadvantage of the former 
notice of claim requirement, while denying him the intended 
compensatory benefit of the former tolling provisions.  We 
 
 
 
 
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conclude that such a result would constitute a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
As we stated in Baker, former Code § 8.01-581.9 was enacted 
by the General Assembly "[i]n an obvious effort to compensate for 
[the] restrictions upon a claimant's usual free access to the 
courts and to provide relief from an otherwise harsh application 
of the statute of limitations."  226 Va. at 13, 307 S.E.2d at 
236-37; see also Wertz v. Grubbs, 245 Va. 67, 71-72, 425 S.E.2d 
500, 502 (1993).  Our decision here employs that compensatory 
statute to prevent the imbalance in remedy that would otherwise 
result from application of the repeal provision. 
 
Although the General Assembly could have enacted a saving 
clause in its repeal of the tolling provisions, we do not believe 
that its failure to do so requires a different result.  Code 
§ 8.01-1 imposes a duty on the trial court to prevent a manifest 
injustice in the application of a new provision of law. 
 
This duty is not dependent on the presence of a saving 
clause in the new provision of law; in fact, the need to exercise 
this statutory duty is most plainly manifest in a case such as 
this, when no saving clause was enacted to preserve the original 
statutory balance.  Therefore, we hold that a plaintiff who has 
given a notice of claim prior to July 1, 1993, pursuant to former 
Code § 8.01-581.2, is entitled to the compensatory benefit of the 
tolling provisions of former Code § 8.01-581.9. 
 
We also disagree with Boone's contention that Starnes v. 
 
 
 
 
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Cayouette is contrary to our holding here.  In Starnes, we held 
that the defendant had an enforceable right to rely on a statute 
of limitations which had expired before passage of legislation 
redefining the accrual date of a cause of action for sexual 
misconduct.  244 Va. at 204-05, 212, 419 S.E.2d at 670, 675.  
Unlike the defendant in Starnes, Boone did not acquire any such 
property right prior to the effective date of the repeal 
provision.  Thus, application of former Code § 8.01-581.9 does 
not divest Boone of any property right already accrued before 
July 1, 1993. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's judgment 
in favor of DiMattina, and we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment in favor of Boone and remand that case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Record No. 941410 -- Affirmed. 
Record No. 941923 -- Reversed and remanded.
 
 
JUSTICE LACY, dissenting in part. 
 
 
I agree with the majority's decision that the statutory 
provisions at issue are procedural in nature.  I also agree with 
the majority's conclusion that applying the statutory changes 
that became effective July 1, 1993 to Harris' claim will not 
result in a miscarriage of justice.  I respectfully dissent, 
however, from the conclusion reached by the majority in the 
Cumberland case.  In my opinion, application of the statutory 
changes to Cumberland does not impose a manifest injustice on 
 
 
 
 
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him.  Furthermore, the respective circumstances of Harris and 
Cumberland as of July 1, 1993, do not support the differing 
dispositions the majority imposes. 
 
Although Cumberland was precluded from filing a motion for 
judgment during the effective dates of the repealed provisions, 
that restriction was lifted on July 1, 1993.  No longer was 
Cumberland required to wait until the medical malpractice review 
panel issued its decision before he could file his motion for 
judgment.  After July 1, 1993, the only remaining restriction was 
that Cumberland file his motion for judgment within the two-year 
period allowed by the statute of limitations.  The repealed 
statute had suspended the running of the limitation period.  
Baker v. Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 13, 307 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1983); Dye 
v. Staley, 226 Va. 15, 18, 307 S.E.2d 237, 238-39 (1983).  
Therefore, the period available to Cumberland in which to file a 
motion for judgment was that which remained on his limitation 
period on the date he filed his notice of claim.  Thus, 
Cumberland had 38 days from July 1, 1993 to file a motion for 
judgment against Dr. Cook and three days to file against Dr. 
Boone, Dr. Gates, and Loudoun Surgical Associates, Ltd.  Although 
Cumberland could have filed his motion for judgment within the 
appropriate limitation period, he did not. 
 
The failure of a litigant to institute his lawsuit prior to 
the expiration of the statute of limitations cannot be considered 
a miscarriage of justice.  Nor is it a miscarriage of justice for 
 
 
 
 
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a litigant to be required to comply with a limitation period that 
has been shortened or altered by the legislature, when, as here, 
no substantive rights are affected.  The Constitution of Virginia 
postpones the effective date of all newly enacted legislation for 
several months.  Va. Const. art. IV, § 13.  See also Code § 1-12. 
 "The manifest purpose of the constitutional provision . . . is 
to allow litigants a fair opportunity to acquaint themselves with 
the provisions of the statute enacted at a given session in order 
to institute and prosecute the appropriate proceeding for the 
preservation of their rights in accordance therewith."  Duffy v. 
Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 419, 46 S.E.2d 570, 576 (1948).  See also 
Board of Supervisors v. Brockman, 224 Va. 391, 396, 297 S.E.2d 
805, 808 (1982).  Thus, Cumberland had several months prior to 
the revival of his limitation period to prepare the appropriate 
motions for judgment against the defendants.  This notice period, 
when combined with the days remaining on Cumberland's limitation 
period, provided Cumberland with a reasonable time in which to 
preserve his rights by filing motions for judgment against the 
defendants.  See Phipps v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 454, 111 
S.E.2d 422, 426-27 (1959).  His failure to act does not qualify 
as a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Furthermore, not only was Cumberland able to pursue his 
claim in a timely manner once the "disadvantages of the former 
notice of claim requirement" were removed, he was not deprived of 
the "intended compensatory benefit of the former tolling 
 
 
 
 
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provisions" as the majority concludes.  Cumberland did receive 
the benefit of the tolling provisions from December 2, 1992, the 
date of his notice of claim, until July 1, 1993.  Therefore, I 
cannot agree with the majority's assertion that Cumberland would 
be subjected to manifest injustice if required to comply with the 
current procedural provisions. 
 
Finally, I do not think the circumstances of Harris and 
Cumberland are sufficiently distinguishable to justify the 
disparate treatment the majority has imposed upon them.  The sole 
factual difference between the claimants is that Harris did not 
file a notice of claim before July 1, 1993.  Nevertheless, prior 
to July 1, 1993, both Harris and Cumberland were denied direct 
access to the courts to pursue their tort claims; they were both 
subject "to the disadvantage of the former notice of claim 
requirement."  As of July 1, 1993, however, both were relieved of 
this disadvantage and were free to file a motion for judgment.  
Harris had 12 days to file before the statute of limitation for 
her claim expired.  Cumberland had 38 days left to file against 
Dr. Cook and 3 days left to file against the remaining 
defendants.  Accordingly, both Harris and Cumberland could have 
filed timely motions for judgment after July 1, 1993.  Neither 
did and, therefore, both claims should be barred.