Title: Duncan v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 354, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 23, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT L. DUNCAN, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 354, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 0110019152 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 13, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 23, 2013 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 23rd day of August 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the State’s motion to affirm, the parties’ supplemental filings,1 and the record 
on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The appellant, Robert Duncan, appeals from the Superior Court’s order 
sentencing him for his sixth violation of probation (“VOP”).  The sole issue 
Duncan raises on appeal is that the VOP charge should have been dismissed 
because he was held in detention for three days before the administrative warrant 
                                                 
1 The appeal was taken from a Superior Court sentencing order dated June 27, 2013.  On July 31, 
2013, the Superior Court issued a corrected sentencing order.  In response, the Court asked for 
supplemental filings to determine what impact, if any, the corrected sentencing order had on the 
appeal.  Both parties agree that the corrected sentencing order does not impact the issue raised on 
appeal. 
 
2
was filed.  We find no merit to this issue.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
 
(2) On March 4, 2002, Duncan pled guilty to Assault in the First Degree.  
The Superior Court sentenced him to ten years at Level V incarceration to be 
suspended after serving four years in prison for decreasing levels of supervision.  
Between 2007 and 2010, Duncan was charged five separate times with violating 
probation.  On May 4, 2013, police arrested Duncan in Criminal ID No. 
1305002624 on charges of Assault in the Third Degree and Terroristic 
Threatening.  As a result of these new charges, on May 9, 2013, Duncan also was 
charged with his sixth VOP.  On June 12, 2013, Duncan pled guilty to Assault in 
the Third Degree.  The Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to one year at Level 
V incarceration to be suspended for one year at Level III probation.  On June 27, 
2013, the Superior Court held a VOP hearing and subsequently sentenced Duncan 
on his sixth VOP.  This appeal followed. 
 
(3) Duncan’s sole contention on appeal is that his due process rights were 
violated, and thus the VOP charge should have been dismissed, because he was 
held in detention for three days before authorities filed the administrative warrant 
charging him with the VOP.   Duncan, however, cites no legal support for his 
argument.  Indeed, we find there is none. 
 
3
 
(4) In Delaware, a defendant accused of a VOP is not entitled to a formal 
trial.2  Nonetheless, certain minimum requirements of due process must be 
satisfied.3  Those requirements are set forth in Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1.  
Rule 32.1 provides that a defendant accused of a VOP is entitled to:  (i) a bail 
hearing; (ii) written notice of the alleged violation; (iii) disclosure of the evidence 
against the defendant; (iv) an opportunity to appear and present evidence; (v) an 
opportunity to question adverse witnesses; and (vi) notice of the right to retain 
counsel.4 
 
(5) In this case, Duncan was arrested and held on new criminal charges (to 
which he later pled guilty).  The administrative warrant charging him with the 
VOP was filed three days after he was placed in custody on the new charges.  
Contrary to Duncan’s contention, the State was not required to file the 
administrative warrant charging the VOP “immediately” upon Duncan’s arrest.  
Delaware law simply does not impose such a requirement.  Thus, we find no due 
process violation in this case. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Jenkins v. State, 8 A.3d 1147, 1153 (Del. 2010) (citation omitted). 
3 Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)). 
4 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 32.1(a) (2013). 
 
4
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice