Title: People v. House
Citation: 2021 IL 125124
Docket Number: 125124
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 2021

2021 IL 125124 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
(Docket No. 125124) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTONIO HOUSE, Appellee. 
Opinion filed October 22, 2021. 
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Justices Garman, Theis, and Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke concurred in part and dissented in part, with 
opinion. 
Justice Michael J. Burke concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion, 
joined by Justice Overstreet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
On November 28, 2018, this court issued a supervisory order directing the 
appellate court to vacate its judgment in People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 
110580. We directed the appellate court to consider the effect of this court’s opinion 
in People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, on the issue of whether petitioner’s sentence 
violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, § 11). People v. House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory 
order). 
¶ 2 
Following the issuance of our supervisory order, the appellate court determined 
that petitioner’s sentence was unconstitutional as applied under the proportionate 
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court remanded the cause 
for a new sentencing hearing. 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B. 
¶ 3 
The State appealed as a matter of right (Ill. S. Ct. R. 317, 612(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 
2017)). We now reverse in part and vacate in part the appellate court’s judgment 
and remand the cause to the circuit court for further postconviction proceedings. 
¶ 4 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 5 
Following a Cook County jury trial, petitioner was found guilty of two counts 
of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on his 
participation in the 1993 abductions and shooting deaths of 15-year-old Stanton 
Burch and 18-year-old Michael Purham. Petitioner was allegedly among a group of 
men who kidnapped the victims after the victims attempted to sell drugs in an area 
where petitioner and his fellow gang members typically sold drugs. Petitioner was 
two months past his nineteenth birthday at the time of the crimes. The victims were 
driven to a vacant field, where they were shot and killed. Petitioner provided police 
with a handwritten statement attesting to his involvement in the crimes. He claimed 
that he had no idea of the larger plan when the victims were driven to the deserted 
location and that the victims were killed after he left. The circuit court sentenced 
petitioner to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions (730 ILCS 
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1992)) and 60 years for each aggravated kidnapping 
conviction, to run consecutively to the life term (see 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West 
1992)). 
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¶ 6 
Petitioner filed a direct appeal raising, inter alia, a claim that his consecutive 
and extended-term sentences violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000). The appellate court affirmed petitioner’s convictions, vacated his 
aggravated kidnapping sentences, and remanded for resentencing. People v. House, 
328 Ill. App. 3d 1088 (2001) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme 
Court Rule 23).1 On remand, petitioner’s sentence for the aggravated kidnapping 
convictions was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms. 
¶ 7 
While his direct appeal was pending, petitioner filed a pro se petition under the 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008)), raising, 
inter alia, a claim that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the proportionate 
penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) and a 
claim of actual innocence. The circuit court dismissed petitioner’s postconviction 
petition, finding it lacked jurisdiction while petitioner’s direct appeal remained 
pending. Petitioner appealed the dismissal, and the appellate court vacated the 
dismissal and remanded the case for second-stage postconviction proceedings on 
the State’s confession of error. People v. House, No. 1-02-0346 (Feb. 5, 2003) 
(order). 
¶ 8 
On remand, petitioner’s appointed counsel filed an amended postconviction 
petition raising five issues: (1) actual innocence based on a witness’s recantation of 
her trial testimony; (2) his constitutional rights were violated based on newly 
discovered evidence of police misconduct; (3) the trial court erred in denying his 
postconviction counsel’s request to obtain Office of Professional Standards files on 
the detectives involved in his interrogation; (4) his constitutional rights were 
violated based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (5) his 
mandatory sentence of natural life violated the eighth amendment of the United 
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties 
clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The circuit court 
granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition at the second stage of the 
postconviction proceedings. 
1This Rule 23 order was subsequently vacated and withdrawn pursuant to a supervisory order 
entered by this court (People v. House, 199 Ill. 2d 567 (2002) (supervisory order)). 
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¶ 9 
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s postconviction 
petition on the first four issues, vacated petitioner’s sentence after finding that his 
mandatory natural life sentence violated the Illinois proportionate penalties 
provision as applied, and remanded for resentencing. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 
110580. The appellate court reasoned that applying the mandatory natural life 
sentencing statute to petitioner violated the proportionate penalties provision 
because it precluded consideration of mitigating factors, specifically petitioner’s 
age, level of culpability, and criminal history. Id. ¶ 89. Citing a newspaper opinion, 
a publication from an advocacy organization, and practices of some European 
countries, the appellate court found that the United States Supreme Court’s 
“division between juvenile and adult at [age] 18” did not “create[ ] a bright line 
rule,” the designation of age 18 as an adult “appear[ed] to be somewhat arbitrary,” 
and the characteristics of juvenile offenders also applied to young adult offenders. 
Id. ¶¶ 94-96. 
¶ 10 
The appellate court concluded that petitioner’s mandatory natural life sentence 
shocked the moral sense of the community. Id. ¶ 101. Accordingly, the appellate 
court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id. ¶ 102. Because it 
found the mandatory natural life sentence unconstitutional as applied to petitioner 
under the proportionate penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution, the 
appellate court declined to address petitioner’s remaining constitutional challenges, 
including those under the eighth amendment. Id. ¶ 103. 
¶ 11 
Both parties appealed. In November 2018, this court denied the State’s petition 
for leave to appeal as a matter of right (Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 317, 612(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 
2017)) and issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its 
judgment and to reconsider the effect of this court’s opinion in Harris, 2018 IL 
121932, on the issue of whether petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate 
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) 
(supervisory order). This court also denied petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal 
concerning the appellate court affirming the dismissal of his postconviction petition 
on the first four issues. 
¶ 12 
On remand, the parties filed an agreed motion for summary disposition asking 
the appellate court to remand the case “for further second-stage post-conviction 
proceedings, including compliance with [Illinois Supreme Court] Rule 651(c).” 
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The appellate court denied the agreed motion and again affirmed the dismissal of 
petitioner’s postconviction petition on the first four issues, vacated petitioner’s 
sentence based on its conclusion that his mandatory natural life sentence violated 
the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, and remanded for 
resentencing. 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B. 
¶ 13 
The State appealed as a matter of right. Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 317, 612(b)(2) (eff. July 
1, 2017). We allowed the Children and Family Justice Center; the Juvenile Law 
Center; the Center for Law, Brain and Behavior; the Civitas ChildLaw Clinic; the 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice Project; the Juvenile Justice Initiative of Illinois; the 
Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights; and Marc Kadish to file a joint 
amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 
¶ 14 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 15 
The procedural history of this appeal began with the dismissal of petitioner’s 
postconviction petition at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. The 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008)) 
provides a tool for criminal defendants to assert that their convictions were the 
result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or 
the Illinois Constitution or both. Id. § 122-1(a); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 
378-79 (1998). Postconviction relief is limited to constitutional deprivations that 
occurred during the original trial. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 380. “A proceeding 
brought under the [Act] is not an appeal of a defendant’s underlying judgment. 
Rather, it is a collateral attack on the judgment.” People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 
(1999). The purpose of a proceeding under the Act “is to allow inquiry into 
constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not, and could 
not have been, determined on direct appeal.” People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519 
(2001). 
¶ 16 
A postconviction proceeding contains three stages under the Act. During the 
first stage of the proceeding, the circuit court must independently review the 
postconviction petition, without input from the State, and determine whether it is 
“frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008); 
People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 14. The circuit court may summarily dismiss 
the petition if it meets that standard. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 14. If the 
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postconviction petition is not summarily dismissed at the first stage, the 
proceedings move to the second stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2008); 
Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 14. 
¶ 17 
At the second stage of postconviction proceedings, counsel may be appointed 
to represent the petitioner (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2008)), and the State may file 
responsive pleadings (id. § 122-5). Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 15. The circuit 
court determines at this stage whether the postconviction petition and any 
accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional 
violation. Id. “If no such showing is made, the petition is dismissed. If, however, 
the petition sets forth a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, it is 
advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing 
(725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2010)).” Id. 
¶ 18 
The primary issue in this appeal involves a constitutional challenge to 
petitioner’s mandatory natural life sentence for his murder convictions (730 ILCS 
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1992)). Statutes are presumed constitutional, and 
petitioner must overcome that presumption by clearly establishing that the 
mandatory sentencing statute at issue is invalid when applied to him. People v. 
Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22; People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23. Petitioner’s 
constitutional challenge is reviewed de novo. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. 
¶ 19 
In its appeal, the State argues that the appellate court erroneously considered 
petitioner’s as-applied proportionate penalties claim. Petitioner seeks cross-relief 
on the dismissal of his actual innocence claim. We first address the State’s claim 
that the appellate court erred in ruling on petitioner’s proportionate penalties claim 
and, thereafter, discuss petitioner’s actual innocence claim. 
¶ 20 
A. Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution 
¶ 21 
This case comes to us for review following our court’s issuance of a supervisory 
order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment in House, 2015 IL App 
(1st) 110580. We specifically directed the appellate court to consider the effect of 
this court’s opinion in Harris, 2018 IL 121932, on the issue of whether petitioner’s 
sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. 
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Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory 
order). 
¶ 22 
Following the issuance of our supervisory order, on remand, the parties filed an 
agreed motion for summary disposition asking the appellate court to remand the 
case “for further second-stage post-conviction proceedings, including compliance 
with [Illinois Supreme Court] Rule 651(c).” The parties agreed that, based on 
Harris, 2018 IL 121932, and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, this case should 
be remanded for further postconviction proceedings to give petitioner the 
opportunity to consult with counsel about his constitutional claims and to develop 
and present evidence to the trial court, with assistance of counsel, demonstrating 
how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development applies to an 
emerging adult and to the petitioner’s specific circumstances. 
¶ 23 
The appellate court denied the parties’ agreed motion and again affirmed the 
dismissal of petitioner’s postconviction petition on the first four issues raised in the 
petition. The appellate court also again vacated petitioner’s sentence based on its 
conclusion that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the proportionate 
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and remanded for resentencing. 2019 
IL App (1st) 110580-B. The appellate court relied on the same reasoning as 
contained in its 2015 opinion and added that (1) recent legislative enactments 
supported its conclusion and (2) petitioner’s sentence was disproportionate when 
compared to that of Fred Weatherspoon, who was a juvenile at the time of the 
offenses and had been resentenced under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 62, 76. The appellate court determined that Harris, 
2018 IL 121932, had no effect on petitioner’s claim because he raised it in a 
postconviction petition and was not the principal offender, adding that no further 
record development was necessary. 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 32. 
¶ 24 
The State contends that, under Harris, 2018 IL 121932, and Thompson, 2015 
IL 118151, the appellate court erroneously considered petitioner’s as-applied 
constitutional claim under the Illinois proportionate penalties clause because the 
claim was not developed in the trial court. According to the State, “ ‘[b]y definition, 
an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular circumstances 
and facts of the individual defendant[.]’ Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37.” Thus, 
the State submits, it is “ ‘ “paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in 
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terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” ’ Harris, 
2018 IL 121 932, ¶ 39 (citation omitted).” 
¶ 25 
Petitioner argues that the appellate court properly remanded the case for a new 
sentencing hearing. Contrary to his position in the agreed motion for summary 
disposition filed in the appellate court, petitioner now argues that no further record 
development is necessary to conclude that the mandatory life sentencing statute 
shocks the conscience as applied to him. 
¶ 26 
This court’s supervisory order specifically directed the appellate court to 
consider the effect of this court’s opinion in Harris, 2018 IL 121932, on the issue 
of whether petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the 
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 
2018) (supervisory order). Our analysis, thus, begins with reviewing our decision 
in Harris. 
¶ 27 
In Harris, this court recognized that “[t]he distinction between facial and as-
applied constitutional challenges is critical.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 38. When 
making a facial challenge, the challenging party “must establish that the statute is 
unconstitutional under any possible set of facts.” Id. An as-applied challenge, on 
the other hand, requires the challenging party to establish “that the statute is 
unconstitutional as it applies to the specific facts and circumstances of the 
challenging party.” Id. We explained that, by definition, as-applied constitutional 
challenges are dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the challenging 
party and, “ ‘ “[t]herefore, it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed 
in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” ’ ” Id. 
¶ 39 (quoting People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 2018 IL 121636, 
¶ 31, quoting Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37). We further explained and 
reiterated that 
“ ‘ “ ‘[a] court is not capable of making an “as applied” determination of 
unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings 
of fact. [Citation.] Without an evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is 
unconstitutional “as applied” is premature.’ ” ’ ” Id. (quoting Rizzo, 2016 IL 
118599, ¶ 26, quoting People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 47, quoting In re 
Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 268 (2004)). 
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¶ 28 
In Harris, this court reversed the appellate court’s judgment vacating 
defendant’s sentences and remanding for resentencing based on its determination 
that, as applied to the defendant’s circumstances, his sentence violated the 
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 63. We reasoned 
that, where the defendant did not raise his as-applied constitutional challenge in the 
trial court, an evidentiary hearing was not held on his claim, and the trial court did 
not make any findings of fact on the defendant’s specific circumstances, the 
appellate court made its holding without a developed evidentiary record. Id. ¶ 40. 
¶ 29 
Here, as in Harris, petitioner did not provide or cite any evidence relating to 
how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development applies to his 
specific facts and circumstances. As a result, no evidentiary hearing was held, and 
the trial court made no factual findings critical to determining whether the science 
concerning juvenile maturity and brain development applies equally to young 
adults, or to petitioner specifically, as he argued in the appellate court. Accordingly, 
as in Harris, the appellate court improperly found that petitioner’s sentence violated 
the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution without a developed 
evidentiary record on the as-applied constitutional challenge. Indeed, the appellate 
court’s opinion equating young adult offenders to juvenile offenders relied on 
articles from a newspaper and an advocacy group. As the State points out, no trial 
court has made factual findings concerning the scientific research cited in the 
articles, the limits of that research, or the competing scientific research, let alone 
how that research applies to petitioner’s characteristics and circumstances. 
¶ 30 
The appellate court, nonetheless, concluded that this court’s reasoning in Harris 
and Thompson is limited to cases when a defendant raises an as-applied challenge 
on direct review or when the defendant is guilty as a principal rather than as an 
accomplice. We disagree. 
¶ 31 
In Harris, this court rejected the defendant’s argument that Thompson does not 
apply because Thompson involved a collateral proceeding and Harris involved 
direct review. Id. ¶ 41. We explained that 
“[t]he critical point is not whether the claim is raised on collateral review or 
direct review, but whether the record has been developed sufficiently to address 
the defendant’s constitutional claim. As we have emphasized, a reviewing court 
is not capable of making an as-applied finding of unconstitutionality in the 
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‘factual vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary hearing and findings 
of fact by the trial court.” Id. 
Thus, our analysis in Harris focused on development of the record in the trial court, 
not whether the challenge is raised in a collateral proceeding or on appeal, or 
whether the petitioner was a principal rather than an accomplice in the crime. We 
conclude that the appellate court erroneously held that petitioner’s sentence of 
natural life violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution 
as applied to him without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the 
as-applied constitutional challenge. 
¶ 32 
Because we have determined that the record in this case requires further 
development, we remand the cause to the circuit court for second-stage 
postconviction proceedings. 
¶ 33 
B. Petitioner’s Request for Cross-Relief 
¶ 34 
Petitioner also requests cross-relief, arguing that he has made a substantial 
showing of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. According to 
petitioner, this newly discovered evidence supports his claim of actual innocence, 
as it shows that he was not present when the victims were kidnapped or killed. 
¶ 35 
In addition to his as-applied constitutional claim, petitioner’s amended 
postconviction petition alleged, inter alia, a claim for actual innocence. The claim 
was supported with an affidavit from Eunice Clark, a key state witness, recanting 
her trial testimony. The trial court dismissed petitioner’s postconviction petition at 
the second stage of the postconviction proceedings. In 2015, the appellate court 
affirmed the dismissal of four of petitioner’s claims, including his actual innocence 
claim, but granted postconviction relief on petitioner’s as-applied challenge to the 
mandatory natural life sentencing statute. Petitioner filed a petition for leave to 
appeal asking this court to review the dismissal of his other claims, including the 
second-stage dismissal of his actual innocence claim, and the State sought review 
of the appellate court’s judgment that petitioner’s mandatory natural life sentence 
was unconstitutional. This court denied both petitioner’s and the State’s petitions 
for leave to appeal, but we issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court 
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to vacate its judgment and consider the effect of Harris on petitioner’s sentencing 
claim. 
¶ 36 
On remand, the appellate court again granted postconviction relief on 
petitioner’s as-applied constitutional claim. The appellate court did not revisit its 
prior judgment affirming the dismissal of petitioner’s claim of actual innocence. 
Petitioner now asks this court for cross-relief on his actual innocence claim. He 
asks this court to vacate the appellate court’s judgment as to his actual innocence 
claim and remand to the appellate court for reconsideration of that claim in light of 
People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, or alternatively to remand for a third-stage 
evidentiary hearing. 
¶ 37 
Before the State filed its opening brief in this appeal, this court decided 
Robinson. Robinson clarified the standards that apply when reviewing actual 
innocence claims at the leave-to-file stage for successive postconviction petitions 
(see id. ¶¶ 57-62) and explained aspects of the standards that generally apply to 
review of such claims at any stage (see id. ¶¶ 55-56). 
¶ 38 
The State agrees in part with petitioner, conceding that the cause should be 
remanded to the trial court. The State agrees that this court may review all matters 
that were properly raised and passed on in the course of litigation, even if the court 
previously denied the petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal that raised the issue. 
See Relph v. Board of Education of DePue Unit School District No. 103, 84 Ill. 2d 
436, 442-43 (1981). 
¶ 39 
According to the State, not only did the appellate court issue its initial decision 
prior to Robinson but also prior to People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, which 
reviewed the second-stage dismissal of an actual innocence claim premised, like 
petitioner’s, on recantation. Thus, the courts below did not have the benefit of 
Robinson or Sanders in considering Clark’s recantation, and the appellate court’s 
judgment rests in part on aspects of the actual innocence standard that Robinson 
has since clarified. In light of the intervening decisions, the State agrees that vacatur 
of the appellate court’s judgment relating to actual innocence and remand for 
reconsideration of that claim is warranted. The State asks that, to avoid piecemeal 
litigation, the court vacate that part of the appellate court’s judgment affirming the 
trial court’s second-stage dismissal of petitioner’s actual innocence claim and 
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remand to the trial court to reconsider that claim at the second stage in light of 
Sanders and Robinson. 
¶ 40 
Petitioner counters that, because the State concedes that his actual innocence 
claim was wrongly dismissed, the claim should proceed to a third-stage evidentiary 
hearing and that it would be unfair to remand for second-stage proceedings. We are 
not persuaded by petitioner’s suggestion. 
¶ 41 
Here, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s postconviction petition at the second 
stage of the proceedings after determining that petitioner’s petition and 
accompanying documentation failed to make a substantial showing of a 
constitutional violation. We disagree with petitioner’s suggestion that the cause 
should be remanded to the trial court for third-stage postconviction proceedings 
because there was no prior determination that petitioner made a substantial showing 
on his actual innocence claim. The trial court did not have the benefit of this court’s 
decisions in Sanders and Robinson, and to avoid piecemeal litigation, we now 
vacate that portion of the appellate court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s 
second-stage dismissal of petitioner’s actual innocence claim and remand the cause 
to the trial court to reconsider that claim in second-stage postconviction 
proceedings in light of Sanders and Robinson. We make no judgment on the merits 
of petitioner’s actual innocence claim. 
¶ 42 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 43 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s holding that 
petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 
Constitution as applied to petitioner. We also vacate the appellate court’s holding 
affirming the dismissal of petitioner’s actual innocence claim. We remand the cause 
to the trial court for further second-stage postconviction proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
¶ 44 
Appellate court judgment reversed in part and vacated in part. 
¶ 45 
Cause remanded. 
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¶ 46 
CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
¶ 47 
I agree with the portion of the majority opinion that remands this cause to the 
circuit court for further consideration of petitioner’s postconviction claim of actual 
innocence. I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision to remand this cause 
to consider whether petitioner’s natural life sentence violates the proportionate 
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). 
In my view, remanding on the latter issue is at odds with People v. Harris, 2018 IL 
121932. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part. 
¶ 48 
Petitioner was convicted, inter alia, of two counts of first degree murder arising 
from his participation in the shooting deaths of two victims, Stanton Burch and 
Michael Purham. Petitioner received a mandatory natural life sentence for the 
convictions pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of 
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998)). This provision now states 
that, for first degree murder, “the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of 
natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the 
murder, had attained the age of 18, and *** is found guilty of murdering more than 
one victim.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c) (West 2020). Petitioner was 19 years old at 
the time he committed the murders and, thus, fell within the terms of the statute. 
¶ 49 
Petitioner’s murder convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. 
House, 328 Ill. App. 3d 1088 (2001) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 23). He thereafter filed a postconviction petition that, among 
other claims, asserted that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the 
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The petition was 
dismissed at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. On appeal, the 
appellate court agreed with petitioner that the proportionate penalties clause 
prohibits his mandatory natural life sentence. The court therefore vacated 
petitioner’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 2018 IL App (1st) 
110580-B. This appeal followed. 
¶ 50 
Before this court, petitioner repeats his claim that his mandatory sentence of 
natural life in prison violates the proportionate penalties clause. Petitioner’s claim 
rests largely on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460 (2012). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, because of the 
characteristics of youth, the eighth amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that 
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mandates life in prison without possibility of parole” for defendants who were 
under the age of 18 at the time the crimes were committed. Id. at 479. Miller did 
not categorically prohibit natural life sentences without possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders. Rather, the Court held only that the eighth amendment requires 
“that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and 
attendant characteristics—before imposing” that penalty. Id. at 483. 
¶ 51 
Petitioner contends that, under the proportionate penalties clause, the rule 
announced in Miller should be extended to adult offenders between the ages of 18 
and 21 in Illinois. In support of this contention, petitioner asserts that “there has 
been endorsement within the scientific community” of research showing “that the 
brains of young adults continue to develop into their mid-20s.” Further, according 
to petitioner, “scientific advances in brain research” demonstrate that the 
characteristics of juvenile offenders, such as immaturity and poor impulse control, 
exist equally in adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 21. Thus, petitioner 
maintains that, just as the Supreme Court held in Miller that the eighth amendment 
“forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of 
parole” for juvenile offenders, this court should hold that the proportionate 
penalties clause forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without 
possibility of parole for adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 21. 
¶ 52 
The majority declines to reach the merits of petitioner’s argument. Citing 
Harris, the majority concludes that petitioner’s proportionate penalties clause 
argument based on extending Miller is an as-applied challenge to the 
constitutionality of his sentence. Noting the rule that an as-applied constitutional 
challenge requires the development of an adequate factual record, the majority finds 
that one is lacking here. The majority observes that no evidentiary hearing was held 
in the circuit court and that petitioner did not provide any evidence to the court 
relating to brain development and research. As a result, the circuit court made no 
factual findings as to whether the science concerning juvenile maturity and brain 
development applies equally to adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 21. 
Accordingly, the majority holds that the appellate court improperly found that 
petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause in the absence of a 
sufficient evidentiary record. The majority concludes that the cause must be 
remanded to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction proceedings and the 
development of an adequate record. I disagree. 
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¶ 53 
I wrote separately in Harris. There, I noted that a proportionate penalties clause 
challenge based on Miller is a facial challenge, not an as-applied one. Harris, 2018 
IL 121932, ¶¶ 65-76 (Burke, J., specially concurring). I continue to believe this is 
true. Here, as in Harris, petitioner’s primary objection is that, pursuant to the 
statutory scheme enacted by the legislature in section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii), the 
sentencing court was precluded from considering any potentially mitigating 
circumstances when imposing sentence on petitioner. This is constitutionally 
impermissible, according to petitioner, because adult offenders between the ages of 
18 and 21 are essentially no different than juvenile offenders and, therefore, cannot 
be subject to mandatory natural life sentences. Stated otherwise, the constitutional 
flaw alleged by petitioner is that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of 
Corrections requires a mandatory life sentence for defendants who have “attained 
the age of 18,” when it should read “attained the age of 21.” The alleged 
constitutional flaw is—quite literally—apparent on the face of the statute. 
Petitioner’s proportionate penalties clause argument based on Miller is clearly a 
facial challenge. See e.g., People v. One 1998 GMC, 2011 IL 110236, ¶ 86 
(Karmeier, J., specially concurring) (a facial challenge is one in which the 
constitutional flaw is inherent “in the terms of the statute itself”). 
¶ 54 
Moreover, any question as to whether a constitutional challenge based on Miller 
is a facial challenge is eliminated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones 
v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021). There, the Court expressly 
noted that a constitutional challenge to a natural life sentence without possibility of 
parole imposed under a discretionary sentencing scheme—that is, a scheme where 
the sentencing court has the discretion to consider factual circumstances and not 
impose a natural life sentence—is an “as-applied” challenge to the sentencing 
court’s decision. Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1322. In contrast, a constitutional challenge 
brought to a mandatory sentencing scheme created by the legislature, such as the 
one at issue here, is a facial challenge. 
¶ 55 
Because petitioner’s constitutional challenge is facial, the rule relied upon by 
the majority for as-applied challenges is inapplicable. There is no per se bar to 
considering petitioner’s claim now. Further, based on this court’s reasoning in 
Harris, petitioner’s claim must be rejected. 
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¶ 56 
In Harris, the defendant raised the same claim that petitioner raises here, 
arguing that the reasoning of Miller should be extended to adult offenders between 
the ages of 18 and 21 under both the eighth amendment and the proportionate 
penalties clause based on recent scientific research on brain development. This 
court rejected the defendant’s eighth amendment argument, noting that the 
Supreme Court had determined that the traditional line between juveniles and adults 
was set at age 18 and that scientific studies were not relevant in making this 
determination. We stated: 
“[T]he line drawn by the Supreme Court at age 18 was not based primarily on 
scientific research. The Supreme Court acknowledged its line at age 18 was an 
imprecise ‘categorical rule[ ]’ but emphasized that ‘a line must be 
drawn.’ [Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)]. The Court drew the line 
at age 18 because that ‘is the point where society draws the line for many 
purposes between childhood and adulthood.’ Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. New 
research findings do not necessarily alter that traditional line between adults 
and juveniles.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 60. 
¶ 57 
There is no reason why this rationale would not apply with equal force under 
the proportionate penalties clause. Further, there is a fundamental contradiction 
here. The majority is remanding the cause to the circuit court to provide petitioner 
the opportunity to produce scientific evidence regarding brain development, even 
though this court has already determined that new research findings “do not 
necessarily alter” the traditional line—18 years of age—between adults and 
juveniles. The remand, therefore, appears to provide petitioner with nothing more 
than the opportunity to present irrelevant evidence. This makes little sense. 
¶ 58 
In my view, in light of this court’s reasoning in Harris, petitioner’s 
proportionate penalties clause challenge fails. Accordingly, I dissent from the 
portion of the majority opinion that remands this cause to consider whether 
petitioner’s natural life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause. 
¶ 59 
JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
¶ 60 
I agree with the majority’s decision to remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further consideration of defendant’s postconviction claim of actual innocence. 
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However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the cause must be 
remanded for second stage postconviction proceedings to consider whether 
defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 
Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), in accordance with directives 
from People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
¶ 61 
I would hold that the appellate court’s judgment declaring the statute 
unconstitutional as applied on proportionate-penalties grounds (based on the notion 
that the brains of young adults are still undergoing development) should be reversed 
outright without any remand. I would also hold that the postconviction court’s 
second-stage dismissal of defendant’s penalties-clause claim should be affirmed. I 
do not believe that a remand is required per Harris. 
¶ 62 
At the second stage of a postconviction proceeding, the circuit court determines 
whether defendant’s petition and any accompanying documentation make a 
substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 
122227, ¶ 15. If the requisite showing is not made, the petition should be dismissed. 
Id.; 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2010). Nonfactual and nonspecific assertions and 
mere conclusions are insufficient to require a hearing under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)). People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 
175, 205 (2010). Statutes are presumed constitutional, and defendant in this case 
had to overcome that presumption by clearly showing that the sentencing scheme 
he challenged was unconstitutional as applied to him. People v. Coty, 2020 IL 
123972, ¶ 22. 
¶ 63 
Here, defendant did not cite any evidence in support of his postconviction 
petition, nor did he even mention the science concerning young adult brain 
development that he now argues supports his claim. Thus, defendant failed to make 
the requisite showing and should not be given another bite at the apple. I read Harris 
to say that a direct appeal is not the appropriate forum to raise such an issue but that 
it should instead be raised in a postconviction proceeding. See Harris, 2018 IL 
121932, ¶ 48 (on direct appeal, the court declined to remand the matter to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing but noted that defendant’s as-applied proportionate 
penalties clause claim was more appropriately raised in a postconviction 
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proceeding). Again, defendant had his opportunity to raise the science of brain 
development before the postconviction court in this case but failed to do so. 
¶ 64 
But beyond defendant’s failure to raise the science of brain development before 
the postconviction court, I would resolve this case on the basis that, even 
considering such evidence, the determination of a sentencing line between juveniles 
and adults for mandatory life sentencing is best set as a matter of policy by the 
legislative branch. 
¶ 65 
In that regard, I agree with the point made by Chief Justice Burke in her special 
concurrence in Harris: 
“although scientific studies regarding brain development may help in 
determining where the line between juveniles and adults should be drawn for 
purposes of criminal sentencing, the issue is not one that can be resolved with 
scientific certainty based ‘primarily on scientific research.’ [Citation.] Rather, 
determining the age at which human beings should be held fully responsible for 
their criminal conduct is ultimately a matter of social policy that rests on the 
community’s moral sense. Traditionally, 18 is the age at which the line is drawn 
between juveniles and adults.” Id. ¶ 77 (Burke, J., specially concurring). 
¶ 66 
When enacting the statute under which defendant was sentenced in the present 
case, the legislature considered both the possibility of rehabilitation and the 
seriousness of the offense of committing multiple murders and determined that, in 
the public interest, there must be a mandatory minimum sentence of natural life 
imprisonment for an adult who commits such crimes. People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 
201, 206 (1984). I believe that the legislative judgment itself expresses the moral 
sense of the community relative to the penalty available for the commission of 
multiple murders. See Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 43 (The legislative judgment 
“ ‘itself says something about the “general moral ideas of the people.” ’ ” 
(Emphasis in original.) (quoting People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 37, quoting 
People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 339 (2002), quoting People ex rel. Bradley v. 
Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 421-22 (1894))). The legislature has further 
clearly determined that this mandatory minimum applies to 19-year-olds. In fact, 
recent legislative enactments confirm that for the purposes of criminal punishment 
a person is an adult when he turns 18 years old. In my view, these enactments 
indicate without a doubt that defendant’s mandatory life sentence is a legislative 
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policy determination, and one which easily passes constitutional muster under the 
proportionate penalties clause. In 2013, the legislature amended the Juvenile Court 
Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2012)) to adjust the age to be 
considered a juvenile from 17 to 18 but did not go further than that. See People v. 
Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶¶ 1, 3 (comparing 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (2012), with 
705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West Supp. 2013)). In 2015, it passed a sentencing provision 
requiring sentencing courts to consider youth-related mitigating factors for those 
under 18. See Pub. Act 99-69, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5­
105). And most telling, in 2019, it provided parole review for certain crimes 
committed by those under 21 but excluded parole review for those like defendant 
who were subject to mandatory life sentences. See Pub. Act 100-1182, § 5 (eff. 
June 1, 2019) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115). 
¶ 67 
I would further find that, while the courts have the ultimate responsibility to 
determine what is a constitutional sentence, nothing in this case rebuts the high 
standard of constitutionality enjoyed by the legislative determination. 
¶ 68 
Defendant asserted that his sentence should be declared invalid as applied to 
him because of his age and minimal involvement in the commission of the crimes. 
This argument should be soundly rejected. 
¶ 69 
For defendant’s argument to succeed, he would have to satisfy the “ ‘cruel and 
degrading’ ” standard. See Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 28. This standard would 
require him to establish that the challenged penalty is “ ‘so wholly disproportionate 
to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Coty, 
2020 IL 123972, ¶ 31 (quoting People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 130 (2004)). 
This court has never found a mandatory prison term cruel and degrading, or a shock 
to the moral sense of the community, when applied to an adult homicide offender. 
Moreover, the parties acknowledge that this court has found the maximum penalty 
for murder cruel and degrading just one time but that it was in respect to a 15-year­
old juvenile with a minimal degree of participation in the crime, who had less than 
one minute to contemplate his decision to act as a lookout. See Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 
at 340. 
¶ 70 
Here, in contrast to Miller, defendant was a 19-year-old adult and had a motive 
to promote commission of the offenses. He distributed cocaine for the gang to 
which he belonged for most of his life, and the purpose of the murder-kidnapping 
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plot was to preserve his gang’s drug territory. In furtherance of that objective, he 
held the victims at gunpoint to facilitate the kidnapping, knew the victims in fact 
were going to be harmed, acted as a decoy, then threatened a witness with violence 
after the offenses. 
¶ 71 
All the cases defendant cites in support of his argument apply to juveniles. See, 
e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 
(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). He cites no cases applying his 
argument to adults. Indeed, there is a paucity of authority nationwide holding that 
a young adult offender could ever be exempted from a mandatory life without 
parole sentencing scheme based on a proportionate-penalties argument. See In re 
Monschke, 482 P.3d 276, 289 (Wash. 2021) (Owen, J., dissenting, joined by 
Johnson, Madsen, and Stephens, JJ.) (“no legislatures or courts in the other 49 states 
have ever recognized such a protection”). 
¶ 72 
For the above reasons, I dissent from the portion of the majority’s judgment that 
remands the cause to the circuit court for consideration of defendant’s proportionate 
penalties clause claim. Instead, I would find that defendant’s sentence does not 
violate this clause of our state constitution. 
¶ 73 
JUSTICE OVERSTREET joins in this partial concurrence, partial dissent. 
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