Title: Shellman v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120261
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2012

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, McClanahan, 
and Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
REGINALD SHELLMAN 
 
 
                             OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 120261 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
November 1, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Marcus D. Williams, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 37.2-910(A), 
which permits the annual hearing to assess the need for secure 
inpatient treatment for a respondent previously determined to 
be a sexually violent predator to "be conducted using a two-
way electronic video and audio communication system," 
conflicts with the respondent's due process and statutory 
rights.  We also consider whether in this particular case the 
order determining that the respondent remained a sexually 
violent predator in need of secure inpatient treatment 
accurately reflects the findings of the circuit court. 
BACKGROUND 
Reginald Shellman was convicted of aggravated sexual 
battery in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County on February 21, 
2001.  Prior to his scheduled release from his term of 
incarceration for this offense on July 15, 2009, the 
Department of Corrections determined that Shellman qualified 
for review as a potential sexually violent predator and 
 
2 
referred these findings to the Commitment Review Committee, 
which subsequently referred the matter to the Office of the 
Attorney General.  Code §§ 37.2-903 to 37.2-905. 
On June 1, 2009, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County seeking to have Shellman 
civilly committed as a sexually violent predator.  Following 
the mandated procedures of Code §§ 37.2-906 to 37.2-908, a 
probable cause hearing and trial were conducted, following 
which the circuit court, in an order dated March 23, 2010, 
determined that Shellman met the criteria for being a sexually 
violent predator.  The court further determined that there was 
no suitable alternative to secure inpatient treatment and 
ordered that Shellman be committed to the custody of the 
Department of Behavioral Health and Development Services.  In 
the commitment order, the court scheduled an annual assessment 
hearing of Shellman's status, pursuant to Code § 37.2-910, for 
March 7, 2011. 
For procedural reasons, including the court-approved 
withdrawal from the case of Shellman's original counsel, the 
assessment hearing was delayed from its initial date multiple 
times.  In an order dated June 21, 2011, the circuit court, 
noting Shellman's objection, indicated that when held, "in 
accordance with Code § 37.2-910(A)" the assessment review 
hearing would "if practicable, be conducted by two-way 
 
3 
electronic video and audio communications."  The order further 
stated that Shellman's new counsel could file a further 
objection to conducting the hearing by video conference, if 
desired. 
On September 20, 2011, Shellman's counsel filed a motion 
requesting that Shellman be permitted to attend the assessment 
hearing in person.  Shellman contended that appearing by video 
conference rather than being physically present in the same 
room during the hearing "stifles [private] communication 
between the client and counsel," because the procedure for 
permitting such communication was cumbersome.  Shellman 
further contended that "[w]hen there is not adequate 
communication between the client and counsel during the 
hearing [a respondent] is denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel, his right to be heard, [and] his right 
to cross-examine and present evidence."  Thus, Shellman 
asserted that the "whenever practicable" standard of Code 
§ 37.2-910(A) is unconstitutional because it is never 
practicable to conduct a hearing by video conference without 
violating a respondent's due process rights. 
The Commonwealth opposed Shellman's motion to attend the 
hearing, contending that "[a]ll the process due to Shellman at 
his annual review hearing can be adequately provided while he 
participates by video[ ]conference.  He can see, hear, and 
 
4 
confront the witnesses against him, participate in person to 
an appropriate extent, and confer privately with counsel upon 
simple request." 
Shellman's assessment hearing was held on October 26, 
2011.  Present in the circuit courtroom along with the trial 
judge were counsel for the Commonwealth, Shellman's counsel, 
and Shellman's mother.  Shellman appeared by video conference 
from the Virginia Center for Behavioral Rehabilitation in 
Burkeville (Burkeville Center), where Dr. Mario Dennis, a 
clinical psychologist and Director of Forensic Services at 
Burkeville Center, was also present as a witness for the 
Commonwealth.  At the outset of the hearing, Shellman's 
counsel noted that the circuit court had denied the motion for 
Shellman to be physically present at the hearing and noted an 
objection to that ruling.1 
During the course of the hearing, minor issues occurred 
with the video conference system in regard to sound quality.  
At one point, the video feed was lost both in the courtroom 
and at Burkeville Center, and the hearing had to be suspended 
for a short time while the connection was reestablished.  
However, at no time during the hearing did Shellman or his 
                     
1 The record does not indicate in what manner the circuit 
court initially communicated the denial of the motion to 
Shellman's counsel; however, this ruling was subsequently 
memorialized in an order entered November 2, 2011. 
 
5 
counsel indicate that they could not follow the proceedings, 
nor was any request made for a private communication to be 
made between them. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found 
that Shellman remained a sexually violent predator, and 
further ruled that he should remain in secure inpatient 
treatment.  The court confirmed this ruling in an order dated 
November 1, 2011, finding that Shellman's "mental 
abnormalities and personality disorder have not so changed 
that he no longer presents an undue risk to public safety, and 
he thus remains a sexually violent predator."  Shellman's 
counsel endorsed the order as "[s]een and exceptions noted as 
stated in the record."  This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
With specific application to the Sexually Violent 
Predator Act (SVPA), Code §§ 37.2-900 et seq., we have held 
that "involuntary civil commitment is a significant 
deprivation of liberty to which federal and state procedural 
due process protections apply."  Jenkins v. Director, Va. Ctr. 
for Behav. Rehab., 271 Va. 4, 15, 624 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2006).  
Accordingly, we have recognized that there are "certain 
minimal standards" to which the Commonwealth is required to 
adhere in order to afford the "due process guarantee[d] to a 
respondent in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding."  
 
6 
Id.  Chief among these minimal standards is the right to a 
"hearing at which evidence is presented and the respondent is 
provided a chance to be heard and to present documentary 
evidence as well as witnesses."  Id.  We have further held 
that "the due process protections embodied in the federal and 
Virginia Constitutions mandate that the subject of the 
involuntary civil commitment process has the right to counsel 
at all significant stages of the judicial proceedings."  Id. 
at 16, 624 S.E.2d at 460.  Without question, the mandatory 
annual assessment to determine a respondent's continued need 
for secure inpatient treatment is a significant stage of the 
judicial proceedings relevant to the respondent's liberty 
interests. 
Likewise, the SVPA contains statutory requirements for 
the conduct of such hearings.  As relevant to this appeal, 
Code § 37.2-901 provides that  
[i]n hearings . . . held pursuant to [the SVPA], 
respondents shall have the following rights: 
 
. . . . 
 
2. To be represented by counsel.  
. . . . 
4. To be present during the hearing or trial.  
5. To present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.  
 
7 
Code § 37.2-910(A) further provides that "[w]henever 
practicable, the [annual assessment] hearing . . . shall be 
conducted using a two-way electronic video and audio 
communication system that meets the standards set forth in 
subsection B of [Code] § 19.2-3.1."  Code § 19.2-3.1(B) 
provides, in relevant part, that when any two-way electronic 
video and audio communication system is used "[t]he persons 
communicating must [be able to] simultaneously see and speak 
to one another." 
With respect to the standard of review we should apply in 
this appeal, Shellman contends that by not allowing him to be 
physically present at the hearing along with counsel, the 
circuit court created a "structural error" in the proceedings.  
Thus, Shellman asserts that he need not show actual prejudice 
resulting from the court's decision that it was practicable 
for him to appear by video conference, as a structural error 
in a proceeding "defies harmless error review." 
The Commonwealth contends that Shellman does not assert a 
structural error because he does not allege a complete denial 
of the right to be present or a complete deprivation of the 
assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, the Commonwealth asserts 
that Shellman must establish that he was actually prejudiced 
by not being physically present at the assessment review 
 
8 
hearing such that the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In Morrisette v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 270 
Va. 188, 613 S.E.2d 551 (2005), we explained that "[a] 
'structural error' is a 'defect affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the 
trial process itself.' "  Id. at 192, 613 S.E.2d at 556 
(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).  
Based on the record in this case, we hold that Shellman's not 
being physically present at the hearing did not constitute a 
structural error in the proceedings.  Rather, the use of the 
video conference was authorized by statute as a proper 
procedure for conducting the assessment hearing if 
practicable.  Accordingly, we hold that Shellman must show 
actual prejudice arising from the circuit court's decision to 
have him appear at the assessment review hearing by video 
conference. 
Shellman further contends that the court's application of 
Code § 37.2-910(A) would be subject to a de novo review in 
this Court as a question of statutory construction.  However, 
the language of the statute is in no way ambiguous.  A plain 
reading of the statute makes it clear that the determination 
of whether it was practicable for Shellman to appear by video 
conference was a matter committed to the court's sound 
 
9 
discretion.  Accordingly, we will review Shellman's 
constitutional claims de novo and the court's decision to 
conduct the hearing by video conference under an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
On the merits, Shellman contends that by conducting the 
assessment hearing by video conference rather than permitting 
Shellman to be physically present in the courtroom, the 
circuit court violated his due process rights, as well as his 
statutory rights under Code § 37.2-901,2 because there was no 
adequate means for Shellman and his counsel to confer 
privately during the hearing.  Thus, Shellman maintains that 
he was deprived of his right to competent representation by 
counsel. 
The record indicates that at no point during the hearing 
did Shellman or his counsel express a desire or need to 
communicate privately with the other.  Shellman recognized in 
                     
2 On brief of this appeal, the Commonwealth asserted that 
Shellman's claim that his statutory rights were violated had 
been procedurally defaulted because the motion requesting that 
he be permitted to attend the hearing did not expressly 
reference the application of Code § 37.2-901.  However, with 
respect to the arguments raised by Shellman in this appeal, 
the statutory rights he relies upon – the right to be present 
at the hearing, the right to effective assistance of counsel, 
and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses – are 
concomitant to and subsumed within identical considerations of 
due process.  Thus, for purposes of this appeal, the 
determination whether the use of the video conference 
satisfied due process would apply equally to whether it 
comported with Code § 37.2-901. 
 
10 
his motion that any such request would be honored, maintaining 
only that the manner in which such private communications 
would occur "stifles communication between the client and 
counsel."  Thus, he contended that "[t]here is no effective 
way for [a respondent] and his counsel to interact during the 
course of the proceedings if they are not in the same room."  
However, Shellman's counsel conceded during oral argument of 
this appeal that nothing in Code § 19.2-3.1 or Code § 37.2-910 
would prohibit a respondent's counsel from joining his client 
in the video conference facility at Burkeville Center, opining 
only that it might be inconvenient for counsel to do so or 
that by not being present in the courtroom, it might inhibit 
counsel's ability to interact with the judge and the 
witnesses. 
The mere fact that an authorized manner for conducting a 
proceeding under the SVPA may not provide for optimal 
circumstances for the respondent and his counsel to 
communicate privately does not mean that the respondent has 
been deprived of due process.  Rather, the Court must consider 
whether the limitations of the authorized procedure constitute 
a fair balance between the rights of the respondent and the 
interest of the government in conducting the proceeding in an 
efficient and effective manner. 
 
11 
Previously, we have not been called upon to consider what 
factors should be used in determining whether conducting a 
hearing by video conference is "practicable" under Code 
§ 37.2-910(A) or under any similar statutorily authorized 
proceeding.  See, e.g., Code § 19.2-82(A) (providing for an 
accused to be brought before a magistrate by video 
conference).  However, in United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837 
(4th Cir. 1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit addressed the issue in the context of a 
competency commitment hearing of a prisoner by video 
conference.  The federal court's discussion of the factors to 
be considered in balancing the interests of the respondent and 
the government is instructive for the similar circumstances of 
this case.  The court first noted that  
[t]he Supreme Court has identified . . . three 
factors to consider in determining those procedural 
safeguards due a person whose interests are to be 
adversely affected by government actions: 
 
First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirements would 
entail. 
 
 
12 
Id. at 843 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335 (1976)). 
In Baker, the court recognized with regard to the first 
element of the Mathews balancing test that because the 
potential "deprivation [of the respondent's liberty] is great 
. . . the government's interest in conducting the hearings by 
means of video conferencing technology must be great, and the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty small for the 
government to prevail."  Id. at 844.  Contrasting a commitment 
hearing with a criminal trial, where observation of the 
demeanor of the defendant and the witnesses by the trier of 
fact is a major concern, the court observed that 
the goal of a commitment hearing is far different: 
[to determine] whether the respondent is mentally 
competent.  This determination is made by the court 
and is based primarily upon the opinions of experts 
proffered by the government and the respondent.  The 
expert opinions will not differ factually but only 
in their theoretical premises.  As a result, to 
whatever extent the opinions are delivered by way of 
oral testimony, the court will determine which 
experts' opinions it finds more persuasive based not 
upon the demeanor of the experts while testifying, 
but upon the qualifications of the experts, and the 
substance and thoroughness of the opinions offered. 
 
Id. at 844-45 (internal citation omitted) 
 
Thus, the court opined that in a civil commitment hearing 
"[t]he aim of cross-examination is changed accordingly: its 
goal is not to 'poke holes' in the testimony of a witness, but 
to test the expert opinion given and determine its basis and 
 
13 
its limits."  Id. at 845.  The court concluded that under the 
second element of the Mathews test use of video conferencing 
technology "runs far less risk of erroneous deprivation of 
liberty [to the respondent in a commitment hearing] than would 
affording similarly limited rights to criminal defendants."  
Id.   
Applying the third element of the Mathews balancing test 
that "fiscal and administrative concerns [of the government] 
are properly taken into account," the court concluded that 
given the expense and security concerns related to the 
transportation of respondents to court, "the government 
interests in the use of the video conference technology at 
civil commitment hearings are both apparent and substantial."  
Id. at 847.  Thus, the court held that "in light of the slight 
risk of erroneous committal and the substantial government 
interests," conducting a commitment hearing by video 
conference did not violate considerations of constitutional 
due process.  Id. 
We find the reasoning of Baker to be persuasive and 
applicable to the present case.  Unlike the initial trial in 
which a respondent is determined to be a sexually violent 
predator, the purpose of the annual assessment hearing is to 
determine whether, in light of the treatment received in the 
preceding year, the respondent remains a sexually violent 
 
14 
predator and, if so, whether there is a less restrictive 
alternative to continued secure inpatient treatment.  These 
matters are almost entirely to be determined by the court 
through consideration of expert opinion.  To the extent that 
the circumstances of a community-based treatment plan must be 
evaluated in part through lay witness testimony, the 
credibility of the witnesses would not be a significant factor 
in determining the appropriateness of the plan.  Accordingly, 
we hold that the provision in Code § 37.2-910(A) for 
conducting annual assessment hearings under the SVPA by video 
conference is neither unconstitutional facially nor 
unconstitutional as applied in Shellman's case. 
Shellman further contends that even if conducting an 
assessment hearing by video conference is constitutionally 
permissible, the manner in which his hearing was conducted 
interfered with the ability of his counsel to provide 
effective representation and that "technical problems [with 
the video conference] made the situation even worse."  While 
conceding that the circuit court "[made] a good[]faith effort" 
to provide a consistent quality of audio and video reception 
and transmission, he contends that the record shows that 
technical problems effectively negated the requirement of Code 
§ 19.2-3.1 of the parties "seeing and speaking to one 
another[] from being fully implemented," impairing his right 
 
15 
to counsel and to confront the Commonwealth's witness in 
violation of his rights afforded by Code § 37.2-901. 
The "technical problems" which Shellman alludes to in 
almost every instance did not involve problems with the video 
conferencing equipment itself.  Rather, as the record plainly 
demonstrates, it was merely a question of whether the 
participants were sufficiently close to the microphones so 
that their voices would register on the audio feed, and that 
the inability of the parties to hear one another was 
immediately rectified.  In the one instance where the video 
feed actually failed, the record shows that the problem was 
immediately noted and that the proceedings were suspended 
until the problem was corrected.  Thus, at no point material 
to the proceedings were the parties prevented from seeing and 
speaking to one another. 
The record in this case amply demonstrates that Shellman 
and his counsel were able to participate fully in the 
proceedings, including the ability to see and hear the judge, 
opposing counsel, and the witnesses and to cross-examine Dr. 
Dennis.  Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that 
Shellman and his counsel sought to communicate privately or 
that such a request would not have been honored, we conclude 
that use of the video conference procedure resulted in no 
detrimental effect on the ability of counsel to provide 
 
16 
Shellman with competent representation.  Thus, we hold that 
Shellman has not demonstrated he was deprived of any statutory 
right afforded him under the SVPA. 
Shellman further contends that even if the use of the 
video conference did not violate his statutory and due process 
rights, it was nonetheless not "practicable" for him to appear 
by video conference where he had made an express request to be 
physically present.  In effect, he contends that the right to 
be present at the hearing cannot be satisfied by an appearance 
through a video conference if the respondent objects to that 
process and asserts the right to "be present during the 
hearing," provided by Code § 37.2-901(4), because that right 
is in conflict with the "practicability" of conducting the 
hearing by video conference permitted by Code § 37.2-910(A).  
Thus, Shellman contends that the circuit court abused its 
discretion as a matter of law in denying his motion to be 
physically present at the assessment hearing.  There is no 
merit to this contention. 
"[W]hen two statutes seemingly conflict, they should be 
harmonized, if at all possible, to give effect to both." 
Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 
(1998); see also Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222, 230, 657 
S.E.2d 474, 477 (2008).  A plain reading of the two statutes 
at issue here, however, shows that Code § 37.2-901(4) and Code 
 
17 
§ 37.2-910(A) are not in conflict.  Rather, it is apparent 
that by providing for the conduct of an assessment hearing by 
video conference "[w]henever practicable," the General 
Assembly intended for this procedure to satisfy the 
requirement of Code § 37.2-901(4) because the respondent would 
"be present during the hearing" by video conference.  There 
being no conflict in the two statutes, and no evidence in the 
record that the conduct of the hearing by video conference was 
impracticable, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Shellman's motion to be physically 
present at the hearing.3 
Finally, Shellman contends that the recommitment order 
entered by the circuit court on November 1, 2011 was erroneous 
in that it recited that Shellman suffered from "mental 
abnormalities and [a] personality disorder" (emphasis added), 
whereas Dr. Dennis opined that Shellman's status as a sexually 
violent predator was based solely on the "mental abnormality" 
of pedophilia and not that Shellman suffered from any 
"personality disorder."  On brief, the Commonwealth concedes 
that no evidence was offered to show that Shellman suffers 
                     
3 Because we find the circuit court did not commit error 
in conducting the assessment hearing by video conference, it 
is unnecessary for us to address the Commonwealth's argument 
that Shellman has not demonstrated prejudice arising from the 
manner in which the hearing was conducted. 
 
 
18 
from a "personality disorder" that contributes to his 
inability to control his predatory behavior.  However, the 
Commonwealth contends that the court's summation of the 
evidence clearly shows that it relied solely on Dr. Dennis' 
testimony concerning Shellman's pedophilia in concluding that 
Shellman met the criteria of a sexually violent predator.  In 
sum, the Commonwealth contends that the additional language of 
the recommitment order may be viewed as surplusage or a 
scrivener's error, and its mistaken inclusion does not 
constitute a reversible error as the record as a whole shows 
that Shellman received a fair hearing on the merits and 
substantial justice has been reached.  Code § 8.01-678.  We 
agree. 
The language of the November 1, 2011 order essentially 
tracks statutory criteria for determining whether a respondent 
is a sexually violent predator.  However, it is not necessary 
for the trier of fact in an SVPA proceeding to find that the 
respondent suffers from both a mental abnormality and a 
personality disorder which makes it difficult for him to 
control his predatory behavior.  As the record in this case 
demonstrates that the circuit court limited its consideration 
of Shellman's status as a sexually violent predator to Dr. 
Dennis' testimony concerning Shellman's mental abnormality as 
a pedophile, we hold that the mistaken inclusion of the 
 
19 
additional language in the final order does not constitute 
reversible error.  However, in order that the record may 
"speak the truth," see Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 136, 
140, 607 S.E.2d 107, 110 (2005), we will remand the case so 
that the surplus language, "and a personality disorder," may 
be struck from the order nunc pro tunc.  Code § 8.01-428(B). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court that Shellman remains a sexually violent 
predator in need of secure inpatient treatment, and we will 
remand the case for correction of the final order as indicated 
herein. 
Affirmed and remanded.