Title: Alexander v. Jitney Jungle Stores of America, Inc.
Citation: 673 So. 2d 402
Docket Number: 1931230
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 1995

673 So. 2d 402 (1995)
Stephen O. ALEXANDER
v.
JITNEY JUNGLE STORES OF AMERICA, INC.
1931230.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 20, 1995.
Richard A. Meelheim of Vowell, Meelheim &amp; Alexander, P.C., Birmingham, for Appellant.
Anita T. Lechner, E. Fredrick Preis, Jr. of McGlinchey Stafford Lang, New Orleans, Louisiana, Charles W. Cochran III, Florence, for Appellee.
RICHARD L. JONES, Retired Justice.
Stephen O. Alexander appeals from a summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Jitney Jungle Stores of America, in Alexander's action claiming retaliatory termination in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1. We reverse and remand.
The chronology of significant events preceding the filing of Alexander's claim alleging retaliatory termination follows:
*403 Section 25-5-11.1 provides:
Jitney Jungle contends that the issue here presented is controlled by Hayden v. Bruno's, Inc., 588 So. 2d 874 (Ala.1991), and thus that the judgment is due to be affirmed. We disagree.
The proof required to sustain or defend against an action brought pursuant to § 25-5-11.1 was set out in Twilley v. Daubert Coated Products, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1364 (Ala.1988):
536 So. 2d  at 1369.
In Hayden, the injured employee filed a workers' compensation claim and was later terminated. The employee sued, alleging retaliatory discharge. The employer introduced evidence that the employee had been terminated pursuant to an employment contract that required automatic termination of any employee whose leave of absence exceeded one year. The employer also introduced documents indicating that the employee had received poor performance evaluations. The trial court held, and this Court agreed, that the employee had produced no rebuttal evidence to "prove that the reason [given by the employer] was not true but a pretext." The judgment for the employer was affirmed.
The common thread running through both Hayden and this case is the application of an employer's absentee policy as the basis for the employee's termination. Notwithstanding this common element, however, the two cases are materially dissimilar in one important aspect: In Hayden, the employer offered evidence of legitimate reasons for terminating the employee, and the employee offered no rebuttal evidence. Jitney Jungle acknowledges that its sole reason for terminating Alexander was the application of Jitney Jungle's employee-absentee policy applicable to voluntary leaves of absence. Further, Alexander offered evidence that Jitney Jungle discontinued Alexander's temporary total workers' compensation benefits (which had amounted to $16,101.15) and made "on again off again" decisions to terminate Alexander (see items 4, 5, and 7 in the chronology set out above), in the context of Alexander's pursuit of permanent partial workers' compensation benefits. This rebuttal evidence furnishes a reasonable inference from which the jury, as factfinder, could conclude that Alexander's termination was the direct consequence of his pending workers' compensation claim (which was ultimately settled for a total of $27,451.99).
Jitney Jungle proffered evidence to the effect that it did not discriminate against Alexander in the application of the company's absentee policy. That evidence is admissible at trial on the "legitimate reason" issue, but it is not sufficient to entitle Jitney Jungle to a judgment as a matter of law.
This case is distinguishable from Graham v. Shoals Distributing, Inc., 630 So. 2d 417 (Ala.1993), where the terminated employees "offered no evidence to refute [the employer's] evidence and [did not point] to substantial refuting evidence in [the employer's] submissions." 630 So. 2d  at 420.
This Court stated in Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So. 2d 1120 (Ala.1992):
599 So. 2d  at 1122-23.
The holding in this case is totally consistent with the holding in the recent case of Overton v. Amerex Corp., 642 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 1994), in which this Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the employer because the employee "offered substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons offered by [the employer] for her termination were a pretext for an impermissible termination." 642 So. 2d  at 453. See, also, Gresham v. Schlumberger Industries, Inc., 656 So. 2d 347 (Ala.1995).
Because we conclude that Alexander offered substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason offered by Jitney Jungle for his termination was a pretext for an otherwise impermissible termination, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
This opinion was prepared by retired Justice RICHARD L. JONES, sitting as a Justice of this Court pursuant to § 12-18-10(e), Ala.Code 1975, and it is hereby adopted as that of the Court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and HOUSTON, KENNEDY, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent, because I believe that this case is factually similar to Smith v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 663 So. 2d 914 (Ala.1995), in which the trial court granted the employer's motion for a summary judgment against the employee's claim that he had been terminated because he had filed a workers' compensation claim. In that case, the employee, Smith, was injured in an on-the-job accident while employed as a mold servicer at a tire manufacturing plant operated by Dunlop in Huntsville, Alabama. After the company nurse advised Smith to see a doctor concerning the injury to his arm, Smith's supervisor drove him to a doctor who examines Dunlop's employees who have been injured on the job. The doctor diagnosed Smith's injury as a sprained left wrist and instructed him not to return to work for two *405 days. Smith reported the doctor's diagnosis and order to the company nurse, who in turn told him to report back to work according to the doctor's instructions. When Smith returned to work three days later, he was informed by David Gooch, personnel manager for Dunlop, that he had violated the attendance policy set out in Dunlop's collective bargaining agreement with his union and that his employment was, therefore, terminated.
In Smith, this Court opined:
663 So. 2d  at 917.
In Smith, the employee had relied heavily upon Overton v. Amerex Corp., 642 So. 2d 450 (Ala.1994), claiming that the facts of that case were similar to those of his case and that this Court had held in that case that the employee had offered substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Smith's main argument was that he presented substantial evidence that he had received permission from the plant nurse, a Dunlop employee, to be absent, and that he, therefore, fit within the company policy on absences. In Smith, this Court said:
663 So. 2d  at 918.
This Court further opined:
663 So. 2d  at 918-19. I believe that the summary judgment was appropriate under both Hayden v. Bruno's, Inc., 588 So. 2d 874 (Ala. 1991), and Smith. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
"*In Beaulieu, the Court of Civil Appeals said: