Title: New Jersey v. Covil
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 2020

New Jersey v. Covil Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Roger Covil was convicted of first-degree possession with intent to distribute five ounces or more of cocaine. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted cross-petitions for certification filed by the State and defendant. This appeal presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of the opinions of the State’s drug expert witnesses; and (2) defendant’s argument that the trial court violated his constitutional rights and principles of fundamental fairness when it admitted into evidence a notice of motion for a writ of replevin and supporting certification that he served in a civil forfeiture action that had been stayed at his attorney’s request. Two years after defendant’s trial, the Court decided New Jersey v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016), and New Jersey v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016). Those decisions limited the State’s use of hypothetical questions in the presentation of drug expert testimony in criminal trials. Reversing defendant’s conviction in this case, the Appellate Division retroactively applied Cain and Simms, and held that the trial court committed error when it admitted the testimony of the State’s expert witnesses. The Supreme Court determined Cain and Sims were intended to apply prospectively to guide future trials, not retroactively conducted prior to those decisions. At the time of defendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypothetical questions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case. And the Supreme Court concluded there was no error in the trial court’s admission of defendant’s notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Roger Covil (A-35/36-18) (081267)Argued September 9, 2019 -- Decided January 22, 2020PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. This appeal presents two issues. First, the Court considers defendant Roger Covil’s challenge to the admission of the opinions of the State’s drug expert witnesses -- as elicited through hypothetical questions -- in light of State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016), and State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016), which limited the State’s use of hypothetical questions in the presentation of drug expert testimony in criminal trials but which were decided two years after defendant’s trial. Second, the Court addresses defendant’s argument that the trial court violated his constitutional rights and principles of fundamental fairness when it admitted into evidence a notice of motion for a writ of replevin and supporting certification that he served in a civil forfeiture action that had been stayed at his attorney’s request. The Court considers that question against the backdrop of its recent holding in State v. Melendez, ___ N.J. ___ (2020), that an answer filed in a civil forfeiture action is inadmissible in the claimant’s criminal trial. Defendant was arrested when he received a package suspected of containing cocaine. A search of defendant incident to his arrest revealed three cellphones and $656 in cash. Laboratory testing later indicated that the package contained cocaine. The officers searched defendant’s residence pursuant to a warrant and found a vacuum meal storage system, three boxes of heat-sealable bags, a roll of shrink wrap, two bags of rubber bands, $70,863, two cellphones, a cellphone charger, and financial and personal documents bearing defendant’s name. Defendant was indicted on first-degree possession with intent to distribute five or more ounces of cocaine and two other charges. Shortly after defendant was indicted, the State filed a civil forfeiture action seeking forfeiture of the $71,519 in currency seized. Defendant filed an answer to the complaint in the civil forfeiture action, stating a general denial of the allegations in the complaint. And, with the State’s consent, the judge assigned to the civil forfeiture action stayed discovery as to defendant in that action and the forfeiture trial. Notwithstanding the stay, defendant prepared and served on the State a notice of motion for the issuance of a writ of replevin and a supporting certification, in which he asserted that the currency in dispute was his property and demanded its return. 1 In a pretrial proceeding in defendant’s criminal case, the trial court considered the admissibility of the testimony of the State’s expert witnesses, Detective Omar Belgrave and Detective Jeffrey Dockery. The trial court admitted their testimony and authorized the State to pose to each expert a hypothetical question based exclusively on the trial evidence. The trial court later ruled that the notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification were also admissible with minor redactions. Defendant was tried over seven days and was convicted of first-degree possession with intent. Defendant appealed. Citing State v. Green, 447 N.J. Super. 317, 328 (App. Div. 2016), the Appellate Division afforded this Court’s decisions in Cain and Simms pipeline retroactivity and applied the principles of those cases to this appeal. It held that the State’s expert opinion testimony improperly addressed the question of whether defendant possessed cocaine with intent to distribute, thereby usurping the jury’s constitutional role as factfinder, and it reversed defendant’s conviction. The Appellate Division did not reach defendant’s constitutional challenge to the admission of the notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification but stated that, if the State were to retry defendant, the trial court should reexamine its decision with respect to that issue. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification, 236 N.J. 241 (2018), and granted defendant’s cross-petition limited to two issues: “(1) the use of defendant’s answer filed in the civil forfeiture action, and (2) the testimony of the State’s expert and the court’s response thereto,” 236 N.J. 241, 241-42 (2018).HELD: The new rule stated in Cain and Simms was intended to apply prospectively to guide future trials, not retroactively to proceedings conducted prior to those decisions. At the time of defendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypothetical questions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case. And in light of the distinctions between Melendez and the present case, there was no error in the trial court’s admission of defendant’s notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification.1. In State v. Odom, the Court cautioned that a hypothetical question posed to elicit drug expert testimony should be “carefully phrased” and required that it “clearly indicate that it is the witness’ opinion that is being sought and that that opinion was formed assuming the facts and circumstances adduced only at trial”; the Court also required that the expert advise the jury “of the basis for that opinion.” 116 N.J. 65, 81-82 (1989). The Court imposed some restrictions on what experts could say and directed trial courts to instruct jurors on the weight due the expert’s opinion and to “emphasize[] that the determination of ultimate guilt or innocence is to be made only by the jury.” Ibid. The Court applied and refined the principles stated in Odom in several decisions. The Court reviews those decisions and explains that the rule of Odom, as explained in those later decisions, provided the governing standard at the time of defendant’s trial. (pp. 19-22) 2 2. While defendant’s appeal was pending, the Court decided Cain and Simms. The Court reviews Cain and notes that the following principle is stated in that decision to guide courts and counsel in drug prosecutions: “We now join those jurisdictions that limit the scope of expert testimony in drug cases. Going forward, in drug cases, an expert witness may not opine on the defendant’s state of mind.” 224 N.J. at 429. In Simms, the Court reiterated that holding and applied the principles set forth in Cain to exclude expert testimony in response to a lengthy hypothetical question on the existence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs. 224 N.J. at 403-09. Cain and Simms thus restricted the use of hypothetical questions that Odom and its progeny had permitted. (pp. 23-25)3. The Court reviews the principles that guide retroactivity analysis and notes that Cain provided express guidance as to the appropriate application of the new rule it announced through the use of the phrase “going forward.” Cain, 224 N.J. at 429. The Cain Court stressed that it “now join[ed]” jurisdictions that limit the use of hypothetical questions in the presentation of drug expert evidence. Ibid. It stated a new rule for future trials and explained its decision to reverse the conviction in the case before it, notwithstanding the otherwise prospective application of its new rule. Id. at 426-29, 431-33. Thus, in Green - - on which the appellate court here relied -- the Appellate Division misconstrued the language of Cain. The Court reaffirms that the rule stated in Cain and Simms was intended to apply only to the appeals in those two cases and to cases tried after the date of those decisions. (pp. 25-29)4. The Court reviews the testimony of Belgrave and Dockery. Each testified within the parameters of Odom and its progeny, and their testimony was followed by a proper limiting instruction. There was no error in the trial court’s application of the law on drug expert testimony that governed at the time of defendant’s trial. (pp. 29-32)5. To avoid a conflict between a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and right to assert an interest in property, the Court concluded in Melendez that a claimant’s answer filed in a civil forfeiture action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d) should not be admitted in his or her criminal trial. ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 18-20). (pp. 32-34)6. When defendant served his notice of motion and certification, he was not required by any statute to do so. This appeal thus raises none of the Fifth Amendment concerns addressed in Melendez. Moreover, defendant affirmatively used those documents in his own defense at trial. The trial court’s admission of the notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification did not constitute error. (pp. 34-35) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and defendant’s convictions are REINSTATED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-35/ 36 September Term 2018 081267 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. Roger Covil, Defendant-Respondent/Cross-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division . Argued Decided September 9, 2019 January 22, 2020Paul H. Heinzel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Paul H. Heinzel and Alexander C. Mech, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Daniel S. Rockoff, of counsel and on the briefs).Valeria Dominguez, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Valeria Dominguez, of counsel and on the brief). 1 JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Roger Covil was convicted of first-degree possession withintent to distribute five ounces or more of cocaine. The Appellate Divisionreversed defendant’s conviction, and this Court granted cross-petitions forcertification filed by the State and defendant. This appeal presents two issues. First, we consider defendant’schallenge to the trial court’s admission of the opinions of the State’s drugexpert witnesses. Responding to hypothetical questions that tracked theevidence admitted at trial, one expert witness testified about the significance ofpackaging materials and currency in the distribution of cocaine, and the othertestified about the use of cellphones in drug distribution. Two years after defendant’s trial, the Court decided State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016), and State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016). Those decisionslimited the State’s use of hypothetical questions in the presentation of drugexpert testimony in criminal trials. Reversing defendant’s conviction in thiscase, the Appellate Division retroactively applied Cain and Simms, and heldthat the trial court committed error when it admitted the testimony of theState’s expert witnesses. 2 As the language of Cain makes clear, the new rule stated in Cain andSimms was intended to apply prospectively to guide future trials, notretroactively to proceedings conducted prior to those decisions. At the time ofdefendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypotheticalquestions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case . TheCourt accordingly reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment with respect tothat issue. Second, we address defendant’s argument that the trial court violated hisconstitutional rights and principles of fundamental fairness when it admittedinto evidence a notice of motion for a writ of replevin and supportingcertification that he served in a civil forfeiture action that had been stayed athis attorney’s request. In those pleadings, defendant asserted that he owned$71,519 in currency that had been seized from his person and his residence,claimed that he lawfully obtained those funds, and demanded the return ofthose funds. As we just held in State v. Melendez, three provisions of the civilforfeiture statute -- N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d), -3(e), and -3(f) -- could operate tocompel a criminal defendant to choose between asserting his due process rightto claim property subject to forfeiture and invoking his Fifth Amendmentprivilege against self-incrimination, thus implicating the United States 3 Supreme Court’s ruling in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 , 496-500(1967). ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 12-17). To protect the FifthAmendment right of such a claimant, we found that an answer filed in a civilforfeiture action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(f) is inadmissible in theclaimant’s criminal trial. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 17-20). In contrast to the defendant in Melendez, who was required to serve ananswer in the civil forfeiture action in order to defend his interest in thedisputed property, defendant in this case was not compelled to file anypleadings in the civil forfeiture action against him when he served his motionfor a writ of replevin because the forfeiture action had been stayed at hisattorney’s behest. In addition, during defendant’s criminal trial, his counselaffirmatively relied on defendant’s certification in the civil forfeiture action asuncontroverted proof that defendant obtained the seized currency throughlawful means. In light of the distinctions between Melendez and the present case, wefind no error in the trial court’s admission of defendant’s notice of motion fora writ of replevin and certification. We therefore reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstatedefendant’s conviction. 4 I. Based on information obtained in a drug investigation, Detective JohnWalsh of the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office was directed to inspect apackage at a United Parcel Service (UPS) facility.1 The UPS package labelbore the return address of a business in Phoenix, Arizona. The package wasaddressed to “Kathy Land” at 308 Coventry Lane in Somerset, a residence inan apartment complex. Detective Walsh arranged for a K-9 unit to conduct adrug detection sniff of the UPS package. A drug detection dog reacted to thepackage in a manner that, according to the dog’s handler, indicated thepresence of drugs. Police officers obtained a search warrant authorizing them to open thepackage, and examine its contents, and to search 308 Coventry Lane if thepackage, once delivered to that address, was brought into the residence.Pursuant to the warrant, an officer opened the package and field-tested itscontents. The field test indicated the presence of cocaine. The officer then resealed the package and gave it to a UPS driver,accompanied by a police officer posing as a UPS trainee, for delivery to 308Coventry Lane. Prior to the delivery of the package, officers observed1 The facts are summarized based on the trial record. 5 defendant walking around the apartment complex looking at vehicles in theparking lot. The UPS driver and the police officer posing as a UPS trainee deliveredthe package to 308 Coventry Lane. The UPS driver rang the doorbell at thefront door of the residence. The driver and the officer waited for a response,then left the package near the front entrance of the home. Ten minutes later, defendant walked to the front entrance of 308Coventry Lane, picked up the package, and carried it into the residence. Lessthan a minute later, he emerged from the residence, still holding the package.According to officers conducting surveillance in the apartment complex,defendant began to tear the UPS label off the package as he walked away fromthe residence. When officers approached defendant, identified themselves, andinstructed him to stop, defendant threw the package into a line of trees andattempted to run away. After defendant ran about ten yards, officers placedhim under arrest. A search of defendant incident to his arrest revealed threecellphones and $656 in cash. Laboratory testing later indicated that thepackage contained 1006.6 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to the search warrant, officers searched 308 Coventry Lane.They found a “Seal-A-Meal” vacuum storage system and three boxes of “FoodSaver” heat-sealable bags in a hall closet, a roll of shrink wrap in the 6 basement, and two bags of rubber bands in a bedroom. In the same bedroom,officers found $70,863 in United States currency in denominations rangingfrom $100 bills to $5 bills, as well as two cellphones, a cellphone charger, andfinancial and personal documents bearing defendant’s name. Defendant later stipulated that 308 Coventry Lane was his residence andthat the room in which the currency and documents were found was hisbedroom. II. A. Defendant was indicted on three charges: first-degree possession withintent to distribute five ounces or more of cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(1); second-degree conspiracy to distribute cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; and fourth-degree resistingarrest by flight, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a). To convict defendant of the first-degree charge, the State had the burdento prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knowingly or purposely”possessed five ounces or more of cocaine with the intent to distribute it. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(1). 7 B. Shortly after defendant was indicted, the State filed a civil forfeitureaction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3. In that action, the State sought forfeitureof the $71,519 in currency seized in the search incident to defendant’s arrestand the execution of the search warrant at 308 Coventry Lane. In its civilforfeiture complaint, the State alleged that the currency at issue was associatedwith drug transactions. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(c), the State served the summonsand forfeiture complaint on defendant, identifying him as a person “known tohave a property interest” in the currency subject to forfeiture. The summonsadvised defendant that in order to contest the State’s action, he was required tofile a “written answer or motion and proof of service” within thirty-five daysof service. Represented by the attorney who served as his counsel in his criminalmatter, defendant filed an answer to the complaint in the civil forfeiture action,stating a general denial of the allegations in the complaint. He also moved tostay that action pending the resolution of his criminal matter. With the State’sconsent, the judge assigned to the civil forfeiture action stayed discovery as todefendant in that action and the forfeiture trial “until related criminal 8 proceedings against [defendant] have been concluded by the entry of finaljudgment or until further Order of the Court.” Notwithstanding the order staying the civil forfeiture action, defendant,then incarcerated, prepared and served on the State in that action a notice ofmotion for the issuance of a writ of replevin pursuant to Rule 4:61-1, and asupporting certification.2 As his attorney later advised the trial court in thecriminal matter, defendant neither consulted with his counsel regarding hisplan to serve the notice of motion and certification nor informed his counsel ofthat plan. Defense counsel learned of the existence of those pleadings whenthe State sent him a copy of them. In his certification, defendant asserted that the currency in dispute washis property and demanded its return, along with the return of enumerateditems that had been seized by police officers but were not the subject of theState’s civil forfeiture action. Defendant represented that the currency andother property were “derived from a number of legitimate sources, including,but not limited to, gambling winnings, personal loans, business loans and thesale of personal belongings.” Defendant contended that there was “no crediblenexus between the property seized and any unlawful acts alleged by the State.”2 Although defendant served the notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification on the State in the civil forfeiture action, there is no indication in the record that he filed those pleadings with the court in that action . 9 C. In a pretrial proceeding in defendant’s criminal case, the trial courtconsidered the admissibility of the testimony of the State’s expert witnesses.The State designated Detective Omar Belgrave as an expert witness about thesignificance of the quantity, packaging, and monetary value of the narcotic sseized, the significance of contemporaneous possession of drug paraphernalia,and the significance of the quantity and denomination of the currency seized.The State designated Detective Jeffrey Dockery as an expert witness on thesignificance of defendant’s possession of cellphones. Defendant objected to the proposed testimony of both experts. Atdefendant’s request, the trial court conducted an N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing todetermine the admissibility of Dockery’s testimony. It held oral argument asto the admissibility of the testimony of both experts. Citing State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011), State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280 (2009), and State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 (1989), the trial court admitted thetestimony of Belgrave and Dockery. The court authorized the State to pose toeach expert a hypothetical question based exclusively on the trial evidence andstated that it would give the jury a limiting instruction on the use andsignificance of the expert testimony. 10 In another pretrial proceeding, the State sought to admit into evidencethe notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification. The State soughtleave to redact the certification to remove from the document defendant’scontention that his property was derived from legitimate sources, as well asother portions of the certification. Defendant objected, contending that ifthose documents were to be admitted at all, they should be admitted inunredacted form. The trial court ruled that the notice of motion for a writ ofreplevin and certification were admissible with minor redactions; defendant’sassertion that his property was derived from legitimate sources was included inthe version of the certification that was admitted into evidence at his criminaltrial. D. Defendant was tried before a jury over seven days. Prior to the State’s presentation of Belgrave’s expert testimony, the trialcourt conferred with counsel regarding the hypothetical question to be posed tothe witness. Defendant reiterated his objection to the use of a hypotheticalquestion on the issue of his alleged intent to distribute cocaine. At defendant’srequest, the court amended the hypothetical question. The court qualifiedBelgrave as an expert in narcotics identification, trafficking, and distribution. 11 After a preliminary inquiry to lay a foundation for Belgrave’s opinion,the State posed the following hypothetical question to the expert witness: A package containing 1006.6 grams of cocaine is delivered to a person’s apartment. The person picks up the package, police search the package, the person, and the person’s apartment. The package contains 1006.6 grams of cocaine, wrapped in plastic. Seized from the person is $656, in the following denominations: 32 $20.00 bills, and 16 $1 bills. No personal use drug paraphernalia is seized from the person or his apartment. Two bags of rubber bands are seized in the person’s bedroom. In the person’s bedroom closet is $70,863 in cash, in the following denominations: 330 $100 bills; 147 $50 bills; 1,449 $20.00 bills; 108 $10 bills; 89 $5 bills; and 32 $.25 coins. In the basement is seized one roll of plastic shrink wrap. In the hallway closet is a Seal-a-Meal vacuum storage system, and three boxes of Food Saver heat sealable bags. So my question for you, is based upon these hypothetical facts, do you have an opinion as to whether the cocaine in this hypothetical is possessed with intent to distribute? Belgrave responded, “[m]y opinion is [that] in this hypothetical, is yes,that cocaine was possessed with the intent to distribute.” He then explainedthe basis for his response. On cross-examination, defendant challenged thefoundation and substance of Belgrave’s opinion. Prior to Dockery’s testimony, defendant renewed his objection to the useof a hypothetical question in the State’s inquiry of Dockery, and also objectedto the scope of the State’s proposed question. At the trial court’s direction, 12 counsel for the State and defendant conferred on the wording of thehypothetical question. The court qualified Dockery as an expert on the use ofcellphones in the distribution of drugs. After laying a foundation for Dockery’s expert opinion, the State posedthe following hypothetical question: A package containing 1006.6 grams of cocaine is in a person’s possession; the person has three cell phones on his person; one is a New Jersey area code with a known subscriber, the other two are prepaid phones with no subscriber information, and limited, if any, call history or contact information. The person has two cell phones in his bedroom, they are prepaid phones, they have limited if any call history, or contact information. Based on those hypothetical facts, do you have an opinion as to whether the possession of five cell phones in this hypothetical question is indicative of conduct commonly associated with possession with intent to distribute cocaine? Dockery responded that he considered the conduct described in thehypothetical to be “consistent with how phones would be used in the mann er to. . . distribute narcotics, for several reasons.” He then explained the basis forhis conclusion. Defense counsel cross-examined Dockery about his opinionand the basis for that opinion. The trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury with respect to bothof the State’s expert witnesses. It cautioned the jury that it was not bound byeither expert’s opinion and that it should consider each opinion and give it the 13 weight to which the jury deemed that opinion to be entitled. The court notedthat “whether that weight be great or slight is for you to determine, or you mayreject [the opinion].” The trial court admitted into evidence the notice of motion for a writ ofreplevin and certification that defendant served in the civil forfeiture action ,with minor redactions in accordance with the court’s pretrial ruling. Neitherparty presented testimony regarding that evidence. Defense counsel, however,affirmatively relied on defendant’s notice of motion and certification in hisopening statement, asserting that defendant would not have sought the returnof his money were he a drug dealer, as the State alleged he was. Defensecounsel reiterated that point in summation, and further argued that defendant’scertified statement that he legally earned the money constituted unrebuttedevidence that defendant derived the money not from drug distribution, butfrom legal sources. In its final charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury not toinfer from the fact that evidence was seized that it was associated withcriminal activity. 14 The jury convicted defendant of first-degree possession with intent todistribute five ounces or more of cocaine. 3 After denying defendant’s motionfor a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 3:18-2 and his motion for a newtrial pursuant to Rule 3:20-1, the trial court imposed a discretionary extendedterm of twenty-two years’ incarceration with eighty-eight months’ paroleineligibility in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). E. Defendant appealed his conviction. Relying on Cain and Simms, whichwere decided after briefing in defendant’s appeal but prior to argument beforethe Appellate Division, defendant asserted that the trial court erred when itadmitted the expert testimony of Belgrave and Dockery. He also contendedthat the trial court’s admission of the notice of motion for a writ of replevinand the certification constituted reversible error. Citing the decision of another panel in State v. Green, 447 N.J. Super. 317, 328 (App. Div. 2016), the Appellate Division afforded this Court’s3 Prior to the jury’s deliberations, the trial court granted defendant’s motion under Rule 3:18-1 and dismissed the charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and resisting arrest by flight. The trial court, as factfinder, convicted defendant of the disorderly persons offense of possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2, and merged that offense with defendant’s first-degree offense for purposes of sentencing. 15 decisions in Cain and Simms pipeline retroactivity.4 In Green, the AppellateDivision determined -- “unless we are instructed to the contrary” -- that thisCourt “intended pipeline retroactivity to apply to the Cain decision.” Ibid.The Green panel acknowledged the use of the term “[g]oing forward” in Cainbut viewed that term to mean only that the Court did not intend to apply Cainto cases in which final judgment had been entered and all appeals had beenexhausted. Id. at 327 (citing Cain, 224 N.J. at 429). Finding Green dispositive as to retroactivity, the Appellate Division inthis case applied the principles of Cain and Simms to this appeal. It held thatthe State’s expert opinion testimony improperly addressed the question ofwhether defendant possessed cocaine with intent to distribute, therebyusurping the jury’s constitutional role as factfinder. The Appellate Divisionconcluded that the trial court’s error deprived defendant of a fair trial andreversed defendant’s conviction. The Appellate Division rejected defendant’s challenge to the trial court’sdenial of his motion to suppress the contents of the UPS package. It did notreach defendant’s constitutional challenge to the trial court’s admission of the4 The term “pipeline retroactivity” denotes the application of a new rule of criminal procedure to “all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any cases still on direct appeal.” State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 249 (1996); accord State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 301-02 (2011); State v. Dock, 205 N.J. 237, 256 (2011). 16 notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification served in the civilforfeiture action. The Appellate Division stated, however, that in the eventthat the State were to retry defendant, the trial court should reexamine itsdecision with respect to that issue. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification, 236 N.J. 241(2018), and granted defendant’s cross-petition limited to two issues: “(1) theuse of defendant’s answer filed in the civil forfeiture action, and (2) thetestimony of the State’s expert and the court’s response thereto,” 236 N.J. 241,241-42 (2018). We also granted the Attorney General’s motion to participateas amicus curiae. III. The State urges the Court to apply Cain prospectively and asserts that,even if the Court affords that decision pipeline retroactivity and finds error inthe trial court’s admission of the expert testimony, that error was harmless.The State contends that the Court should review the trial court’s admission ofdefendant’s notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification under thedoctrine of invited error and should affirm the trial court’s admission of theevidence. Defendant argues that the Court should afford Cain pipeline retroactivityand apply that decision in this appeal. He also contends that the State’s 17 hypothetical questions to its experts violated the case law that governed priorto Cain. Defendant argues that the admission of the notice of motion for a writof replevin and certification violated his constitutional rights, as well asprinciples of fundamental fairness, and deprived him of a fair trial. Amicus curiae the Attorney General views the plain language of Cain toexpress the Court’s intent that the principles of that decision apply onlyprospectively. The Attorney General asserts that the trial court’s admission ofthe notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification did not violatedefendant’s constitutional rights and agrees with the State that if that decisionconstituted error, any such error was harmless. IV. A. We first address whether the trial court erred when it held that the experttestimony of Belgrave and Dockery, elicited by means of hypotheticalquestions based on the trial evidence, met the standard of N.J.R.E. 702. Thatrule authorizes the admission of expert testimony “in the form of an opinion”“[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier offact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Ibid. Tosatisfy N.J.R.E. 702, the expert testimony must “concern[] a subject matterbeyond the ken of an average juror.” Cain, 224 N.J. at 420 (quoting Reeds, 18 197 N.J. at 290). “Although expert testimony may 'embrace[] an ultimateissue to be decided by the trier of fact,’ N.J.R.E. 704, the testimony can beexcluded if 'the risk of . . . undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleadingthe jury’ substantially outweighs its probative value, N.J.R.E. 403.” State v.Sowell, 213 N.J. 89, 100 (2013) (alteration and ellipsis in original). In cases decided over a span of three decades, this Court appliedN.J.R.E. 702 to drug expert testimony elicited by hypothetical questionspremised on the evidence presented at trial. We review those decisions in turn. 1. In Odom, the Court addressed a drug expert’s testimony in response to ahypothetical question. 116 N.J. at 71, 76-82. There, the prosecutorsummarized the evidence against the defendant in the hypothetical questionand inquired whether the facts presented in the question indicated drugpossession for personal use or drug possession with intent to distribute . Id. at69. With no objection from the defendant, the expert stated his opinion thatthe cocaine found “[was] possessed with intent to distribute,” and gave thebasis for his opinion. Ibid. Affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Court held that “as long as theexpert does not express his opinion of [the] defendant’s guilt but simplycharacterizes defendant’s conduct based on the facts in evidence in light of his 19 specialized knowledge, the opinion is not objectionable even though itembraces ultimate issues that the jury must decide.” Id. at 79. The Courtcautioned that the hypothetical question should be “carefully phrased” andlimited to the evidence presented about the manner of packaging and processing for use or distribution, the significance of various quantities and concentrations of narcotics, the roles of various drug paraphernalia, characteristics of the drugs themselves, the import of circumstances surrounding possession, the conduct of the possessor and the manner in which drugs may be secreted or otherwise possessed for personal use or distribution. [Id. at 81-82 (quoting State v. Odom, 225 N.J. Super. 564, 573 (App. Div. 1988)).] The Court approved the use of “a hypothetical question through which[the expert] can advise the jury of the significance of these facts on the issue ofpossession” and authorized the State to ask a drug expert “if, based on theseassumed facts, he or she has an opinion whether the drugs were possessed forpersonal use or for the purpose of distribution.” Odom, 116 N.J. at 82. TheCourt required that the hypothetical question “clearly indicate that it is thewitness’ opinion that is being sought and that that opinion was formedassuming the facts and circumstances adduced only at trial”; it also found itessential that, following the statement of the expert’s opinion, he or she advisethe jury “of the basis for that opinion.” Ibid. The Court prohibited the expert 20 from using “the precise terminology of the statute defining the criminaloffense and its necessary elements,” and from stating the defendant’s name.Ibid. Finally, the Court directed trial courts to instruct juries on the weightthat jurors should give to the expert’s opinion and to “emphasize[] that thedetermination of ultimate guilt or innocence is to be made only by the jury.”Ibid. The Court applied the holding of Odom in several decisions, refining theprinciples stated in that case. In State v. Summers, the Court upheld theadmission of expert testimony elicited by the question of whether an individualdescribed in the hypothetical possessed the drugs in question for purposes ofdistribution. 176 N.J. 306, 312-16 (2003). Then, in State v. Nesbitt, the Courtdeclined to find plain error in the admission of the State’s expert testimony butcautioned against the use of expert testimony “to state that which is obvious”and reiterated that the trial court must act as gatekeeper to determine “whetherthere exists a reasonable need for an expert’s testimony.” 185 N.J. 504, 507-08, 514-15 (2006). Thereafter, in Reeds, the Court reversed the defendant’sconviction because the expert had offered an opinion on the defendant’sconstructive possession of drugs that was “tantamount to a legal conclusion,resulting in a veritable pronouncement of guilt on the two possession crimes,” 21 thus usurping the jury’s exclusive authority to determine guilt or innocence. 197 N.J. at 297-300. Lastly, in McLean, the Court cautioned that courts should not permitexperts to intrude on the province of the jury by offering, in the guise of opinions, views on the meaning of facts that the jury is fully able to sort out without expert assistance and that expert opinions may not be used to express a view on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. [ 205 N.J. at 461.] The distinction between proper and improper drug expert testimony wasillustrated by the Court’s holding in Sowell; there, the Court allowed thepresentation of expert opinion about “the value of heroin, how it is packaged,how drugs are smuggled into prison, [and] whether thirty envelopes of heroinreflect distribution or personal use.” 213 N.J. at 104. The Court barred experttestimony, however, regarding a question within the understanding of theaverage juror: whether a drug transaction has taken place when “one personhanded an object to another, who placed it in a bag of potato chips in whichofficers found heroin moments later.” Ibid. The rule of Odom, as explained in those later decisions, provided thegoverning standard at the time of defendant’s trial. 22 2. While defendant’s appeal in this case was pending, the Court decidedCain and Simms. In Cain, the State posed a protracted hypothetical questionto a drug expert regarding the import of surveillance observations and seizedevidence on the question of intent to distribute. 224 N.J. at 431; accordSimms, 224 N.J. at 406-09. Reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Courtreiterated the admissibility of drug expert opinion so that jurors mayunderstand “the arcana of drug-distribution schemes.” Cain, 224 N.J. at 426;see also Simms, 224 N.J. 407-09. The Court also recognized that hypotheticalquestions may be appropriate in particular settings, such as cases in whichcritical facts are in dispute, Cain, 224 N.J. at 430, but observed that an expert is no better qualified than a juror to determine the defendant’s state of mind after the expert has given testimony on the peculiar characteristics of drug distribution that are beyond the juror’s common understanding. In drug cases, such ultimate-issue testimony may be viewed as an expert’s quasi- pronouncement of guilt that intrudes on the exclusive domain of the jury as factfinder and may result in impermissible bolstering of fact witnesses. The prejudice and potential confusion caused by such testimony substantially outweighs any probative value it may possess. [Id. at 427-28.] 23 The Court stated the following principle to guide courts and counsel indrug prosecutions: We now join those jurisdictions that limit the scope of expert testimony in drug cases. Going forward, in drug cases, an expert witness may not opine on the defendant’s state of mind. Whether a defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute is an ultimate issue of fact to be decided by the jury. [Id. at 429 (first emphasis added).]The Court noted that “[i]n the end, we must rely on the sound discretion of ourtrial judges to follow the guidance given here.” Id. at 430. In Simms, the Court reiterated the holding of Cain and applied theprinciples set forth in that case to exclude expert testimony in response to alengthy hypothetical question on the existence of a conspiracy to distributedrugs. 224 N.J. at 403-09. The Court concluded that “[a] hypotheticalquestion in a drug case should not be used as a prosecutorial tool to sum up anentire case in a single question for the purpose of eliciting an expert’s opinionon a defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 408. The Court held that the expert in Simmshad rendered an “ultimate-issue opinion” on the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 407.Notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to object to the hypothetical question,the Court held that the trial court’s error had been “clearly capable of 24 producing an unjust result,” warranting reversal of the defendant’s conviction.Ibid. (quoting R. 2:10-2). Cain and Simms thus restricted the use of hypothetical questions thatOdom and its progeny had permitted. We now turn to the question of whetherCain and Simms apply retroactively to this appeal. B. In determining the retroactivity of a rule, a court’s thresholdconsideration is whether the holding constitutes a “new rule” in that it “'breaksnew ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or FederalGovernment.’” State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 308 (2008) (quoting State v. Lark, 117 N.J. 331, 339 (1989)). If a new rule has been announced, the court mustchoose among four options with respect to its application: The Court may decide to apply the rule purely prospectively, applying it only to cases in which the operative facts arise after the new rule has been announced. Alternatively, the Court may apply the new rule in future cases and in the case in which the rule is announced, but not in any other litigation that is pending or has reached final judgment at the time the new rule is set forth. A third option is to give the new rule 'pipeline retroactivity,’ rendering it applicable in all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any cases still on direct appeal. Finally, the Court may give the new rule complete retroactive effect, applying it to all cases, including those in which final judgments have been entered and all other avenues of appeal have been exhausted. 25 [State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 249 (1996) (citing State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 402-03 (1981)).] In choosing the appropriate application of a new rule, the court weighsthree factors: “(1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered bya retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule bythose who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application wouldhave on the administration of justice.” State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 97(2005) (quoting Knight, 145 N.J. at 251). In Cain, the Court provided express guidance as to the appropriateapplication of the new rule it announced through the use of the phrase “goingforward,” which clearly reflects the intention that the new principles wouldgovern future trials. Cain, 224 N.J. at 429. In State v. Dock, 205 N.J. 237, 252 (2011), the Court addressed theimport of the phrase “going forward” with respect to the question ofretroactivity. There, the defendant argued that this Court’s presumptive ban onthe use of physical restraints on witnesses, announced eight years earlier inState v. Artwell, 177 N.J. 526, 539 (2003), should apply retroactively to hiscase, in which a witness had appeared before the jury in handcuffs. Dock, 205 N.J. at 251-52. Before determining whether Artwell’s holding as to physicalrestraints on witnesses was intended to be retroactive, the Court in Dock 26 contrasted that holding with a second rule announced in Artwell: a prospectiveprohibition on defense witnesses wearing prison garb before a jury. Id. at 252.It observed: At the outset, it is critical to differentiate between what Artwell holds and what it does not. In Artwell, a defense witness was compelled to testify before the jury in both prison garb and in restraints. 177 N.J. at 530. In respect of the former, the Court concluded that, “going forward, a trial court may not require a defendant’s witness to appear at trial in prison garb.” Id. at 539. Thus, the Court made clear that its ruling proscribing defense witnesses testifying in prison garb was prospective only. [Dock, 205 N.J. at 252.] The Court thus confirmed that when the phrase “going forward” is usedto state a new rule governing criminal trials, that rule applies prospectively tocases other than the appeal before the Court. Ibid.; see also State v. Green, 239 N.J. 88, 106 (2019) (stating that “[t]o guard against the risk of mugshotexposure,” enhanced identification practices would be required “goingforward”); State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 101 (2017) (“[G]oing forward, foroffenses committed after the issuance of this opinion, we hold that the same -elements test will serve as the singular framework for determining wheth er twocharges are in fact the same offense for purposes of double-jeopardyanalysis.”); State v. Lunsford, 226 N.J. 129, 155 (2016) (directing that, “going 27 forward, the State must apply for a court order under N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(e)to obtain telephone billing or toll records”); State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71,89 (2016) (holding that, “going forward,” the trial court, along with counsel,has a duty to follow prescribed procedures when the court observes or isnotified of juror inattentiveness at trial); State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 356(2016) (holding that, “going forward,” when police officers begin to monitor anew telephone facility under a provision of the New Jersey Wiretap Act, they“must notify a wiretap judge within 48 hours of the switch and obtainauthorization to begin monitoring the new facility”); State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 450 (2015) (directing that the rule of law stated in that case was a newrule to be “given prospective application from the date of this opinion” andholding that, “[g]oing forward, searches on the roadway based on probablecause arising from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances arepermissible”). As used in Cain, the term “going forward” clearly conveys the sameintent. The Court stressed that it “now join[ed]” jurisdictions that limit the useof hypothetical questions in the presentation of drug expert evidence . Cain, 224 N.J. at 429. It stated a new rule for future trials and explained its decisionto reverse the conviction in the case before it, notwithstanding the otherwiseprospective application of its new rule. Id. at 426-29, 431-33. Thus, in Green 28 -- on which the appellate court here relied -- the Appellate Divisionmisconstrued the language of Cain on the question of retroactivity. See Green, 447 N.J. Super. at 326-28.5 We reaffirm that the rule stated in Cain and Simms was intended toapply only to the appeals in those two cases and to cases tried after the date ofthose decisions. We now consider whether the trial court’s determination toallow the hypothetical questions and their responses comported with thestandards that applied before the Court decided Cain and Simms. C. When it found that the expert testimony of Belgrave and Dockeryconcerned subjects not within the jury’s common knowledge and experience,and admitted that testimony at defendant’s trial, the trial court properly applied5 At oral argument, counsel appearing on behalf of the Attorney General’s Office informed the Court that the Attorney General is aware of six cases in which the Appellate Division applied Cain and Simms retroactively in accordance with Green and reversed the defendants’ convictions. She indicated that, to the best of her knowledge, two of those cases have been retried. Counsel for the Attorney General stated that if this Court overruled Green, the Attorney General would not take the position that defendants granted new trials pursuant to Green are no longer entitled to that relief. She stated that if any such cases were retried, Cain and Simms would govern the admission of drug expert testimony in those trials. The Court appreciates the Attorney General’s commitment to handle any such cases in accordance with those representations. 29 the principles of Odom and the other case law that governed when this casewas tried. Belgrave, qualified as an expert in narcotics identification, trafficking,and distribution, addressed a subject “within the specialized knowledge of theexpert.” Odom, 116 N.J. at 81. The State questioned the expert to lay afoundation for the hypothetical question, as Odom required. See ibid.; see alsoSowell, 213 N.J. at 99-100; Nesbitt, 185 N.J. at 515. The hypotheticalquestion that the State posed was limited to the evidence adduced at trialregarding the volume and packaging of the cocaine delivered in the UPSpackage, the paraphernalia and currency seized, and the absence of personal-use paraphernalia. See Odom, 116 N.J. at 81; see also Sowell, 213 N.J. at 107;McLean, 205 N.J. at 455; Summers, 176 N.J. at 314-15. The hypotheticalquestion made clear to the jury that Belgrave responded only to the factspresented. See Odom, 116 N.J. at 81; see also Sowell, 213 N.J. at 107;McLean, 205 N.J. at 455; Summers, 176 N.J. at 314-15. After Belgrave’sresponse to the hypothetical question, the State further inquired about the basisof his opinion, as Odom mandated. See Odom, 116 N.J. at 71, 82; see alsoSowell, 213 N.J. at 103, 106; Nesbitt, 185 N.J. at 513; Summers, 176 N.J. at 315. In a limiting instruction, the trial court explained to the jury how itshould evaluate the expert’s testimony. See Odom, 116 N.J. at 82; see also 30 Sowell, 213 N.J. at 103-04; McLean, 205 N.J. at 455; Summers, 176 N.J. at 315.6 Dockery, qualified as an expert on the use of cellphones in thedistribution of controlled dangerous substances, similarly testified within theparameters of Odom and its progeny. The hypothetical question posed toDockery, which was drafted by the State and edited by both counsel, waslimited to the trial evidence regarding defendant’s possession of cocaine andhis use of multiple cellphones; that question made clear that the expert shouldaddress only the evidence identified in the hypothetical. See Odom, 116 N.J.at 79-83; see also Sowell, 213 N.J. at 107; McLean, 205 N.J. at 455; Reeds, 197 N.J. at 293; Summers, 176 N.J. at 314-15. After Dockery stated that theconduct described in the hypothetical was “consistent with how phones wouldbe used in the manner to . . . distribut[e] narcotics, for several reasons,” the6 Defendant asserted for the first time on appeal that the trial court violated N.J.R.E. 404(b) and State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992), when it permitted Belgrave to testify that the currency identified in the State’s hypothetical question “obviously is either proceeds or monies that’s going to be used to purchase more cocaine.” At trial, defendant objected to “the characterization” in the expert witness’s testimony, but did not cite N.J.R.E. 404(b) or Cofield, and accordingly this Court reviews the trial court’s decision for plain error. R. 2:10-2. We view the witness’s testimony about the significance of the currency to be an explanation of his opinion regarding the hypothetical facts in compliance with Odom, not other-crimes evidence against defendant admitted in violation of N.J.R.E. 404(b), and accordingly do not find plain error. 31 State questioned him on the basis for his opinion. See Odom, 116 N.J. at 71,82; see also Sowell, 213 N.J. at 103, 106; Nesbitt, 185 N.J. at 513; Summers, 176 N.J. at 315. Finally, the trial court gave the jury a proper limitinginstruction. See Odom, 116 N.J. at 82; see also Sowell, 213 N.J. at 103-04;McLean, 205 N.J. at 455; Summers, 176 N.J. at 315. In short, we find no error in the trial court’s application of the law ondrug expert testimony that governed at the time of defendant’s trial andtherefore reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment reversing defendant’sconviction and granting him a new trial. V. A. We turn now to defendant’s argument that the trial court violateddefendant’s state and federal constitutional rights and principles offundamental fairness when it admitted into evidence defendant’s notice ofmotion for a writ of replevin and certification. Defendant specifically asserts that the admission of those documentsviolated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to theUnited States Constitution and Article I, Paragraphs 1, 9, and 10 of the NewJersey Constitution. Defendant contends that because a provision of the civilforfeiture statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d), requires a claimant to answer a civil 32 forfeiture complaint before moving to stay the forfeiture action, he wascompelled to waive his privilege against self-incrimination in order to asserthis due process right to that property. In addition, defendant relies on theAppellate Division’s opinion in State v. Melendez, 454 N.J. Super. 445, 475(App. Div. 2018), aff’d and modified, ___ N.J. at ___, in which that courtfound that the admission of the defendant’s answer in his criminal trialviolated principles of fundamental fairness. Defendant contends that his noticeof motion for a writ of replevin and certification are analogous to the answerthat the defendant in Melendez filed in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d). In Melendez, this Court affirmed and modified the Appellate Division’sjudgment. Melendez, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 22). We recognized thatwhen a civil forfeiture action is filed during the pendency of a criminalprosecution of a potential claimant to that property, N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d)requires that the claimant file an answer before moving to stay the forfeitureaction. Id. at ___ (slip. op. at 12-15). We held that, like the defendant policeofficers in Garrity -- who were forced to choose between forfeiting their jobsand incriminating themselves in an investigation of police misconduct -- claimants in a civil forfeiture action who are defendants in a parallel criminal case also face an untenable choice: to forfeit their property or incriminate themselves. To defend against a forfeiture case, claimants who are also criminal defendants must file an 33 answer that states their interest in the property. In other words, to assert their constitutional right not to be deprived of property without due process, they have to link themselves to alleged contraband and give up their constitutional right against self-incrimination. Alternatively, they can refuse to answer and lose their property. [Id. at ___ (slip op. at 17-18).] This Court held in Melendez that “a defendant’s choice to file an answerunder those circumstances is not freely made. It is fraught with coercion.” Id.at ___ (slip op. at 18). To avoid a conflict between a defendant’s privilegeagainst self-incrimination and his or her right to assert an interest in propertythat is the subject of a civil forfeiture complaint, the Court concluded that aclaimant’s answer filed in a civil forfeiture action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d) should not be admitted in his or her criminal trial. Id. at ___ (slip op. at18-20). B. We note a significant distinction between the civil forfeiture answerfiled by the defendant in Melendez and the notice of motion for a writ ofreplevin and certification at issue here. When defendant served his notice ofmotion and certification, he was not required by N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d) or anyother civil forfeiture statute to file a pleading in order to protect his rights tothe disputed property. His attorney had already filed an answer setting forth a 34 general denial and had secured a stay of the civil forfeiture action, thusobviating the need for defendant to file any pleading in that action while hiscriminal case was pending. Nonetheless, defendant sought to reopen theforfeiture action and demanded that the State return the disputed property.This appeal thus raises none of the Fifth Amendment concerns that weaddressed in Melendez. See Melendez, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 17-20). Moreover, defendant affirmatively used the notice of motion for a writof replevin and certification in his own defense at trial. In his opening andsummation, defense counsel relied on those statements, and he stated insummation that they constituted unrebutted evidence that defendant lawfullyobtained the currency found on his person and in his home. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s admission of defendant’snotice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification did not constitute error. VI. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and defendant’sconviction is reinstated. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 35