Title: State v. Sanchez-Llamas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51289
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 2005

FILED:  March 10, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
MOISES SANCHEZ-LLAMAS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 996212FE; CA A114418; SC S51289)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 4, 2004.
Susan Fair Drake, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With her on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director,
and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense
Services.
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause
and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on the
brief was Hardy Myers, Attorney General.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed. 
*Appeal from Jackson County Circuit Court, Raymond B. White, Judge. 191 Or App 399, 84 P3d 1133 (2004). 
GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal case, defendant contends that the
trial court committed reversible error by refusing to suppress
his post-arrest statements to the police.  The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 191 Or App 399, 84 P3d 1133 (2004).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review to consider his contention that
the police violated his right to consular notification and
communication, as guaranteed by Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), (1)
 and that
suppression of his post-arrest statements is the necessary and
appropriate remedy for that violation. (2)
  As we explain
below, we conclude that Article 36 of the VCCR does not create
rights that individual foreign nationals may assert in a criminal
proceeding.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court and the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Defendant is a Mexican national.  He was arrested in
December 1999 after an incident in which he exchanged gunfire
with police officers and wounded one officer in the leg.  Shortly
after defendant's arrest, the police read him Miranda warnings in
English and Spanish.  The police did not inform defendant at that
time, or at any time thereafter, that he had any "right" under
Article 36 of the VCCR to communicate with the Mexican consulate
and to have the consulate informed of his arrest.  Neither did
the police inform the Mexican consulate of defendant's arrest. 
The police proceeded to interrogate defendant, who
eventually made a number of incriminating statements.  Later,
defendant was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated
murder, and various other crimes.  Before his trial on those
charges, defendant moved to suppress his post-arrest statements
to the police on the ground, inter alia, that the police had
failed to inform him of his "rights" under the VCCR to consular
access and notification.  The trial court denied the motion,
ruling, with respect to defendant's argument under the VCCR, that
"any violation of the Vienna Convention that may have occurred * * * [did] not require suppression of defendant's statements." 
Defendant subsequently was convicted of 11 felony counts and
sentenced to a total of 246 months in prison.  As noted, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences on
defendant's direct appeal.
Before this court, defendant continues to assert that
his post-arrest statements should have been suppressed in order
to vindicate his rights under Article 36 of the VCCR.
The state responds that that claim fails for at least two
reasons:  (1) Article 36 of the VCCR does not confer individual
rights that a detained foreign national may assert in a criminal
proceeding; and (2) even if Article 36 did confer such rights,
suppression of post-arrest statements to the police would not be
the appropriate or required remedy for their violation.  We
focus, in this opinion, on the first argument.
We begin with the VCCR itself –- a multilateral treaty
that the United Nations adopted in 1963 and that the United
States Senate ratified in 1969.  Among its 79 articles is Article
36, which provides, in part: 
"(1) With a view to facilitating the exercise of
consular functions relating to nationals of the sending
State: 
"(a) consular officers shall be free to
communicate with nationals of the sending State and to
have access to them.  Nationals of the sending State
shall have the same freedom with respect to
communication with and access to consular officers of
the sending State; 
"(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities
of the receiving state shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending state if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested
or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or
is detained in any other manner.  Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,
in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded
by the said authorities without delay.  The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights under this subparagraph; 
"* * * * *
"(2) The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this article are
intended."  
VCCR, Art 36, 21 UST 77, 100-01.
Defendant contends that subparagraph (1)(b) above
clearly creates an individual right of consular access and
notification, including a personal and enforceable right to be
advised "without delay" of those rights.  Defendant notes, in
that regard, that the provision expressly makes consular
notification a matter of personal election by the foreign
national who is detained:  It requires authorities to notify the
detainee's consulate only "if [the detainee] so requests." (3) Defendant points out, also, that subparagraph (1)(b) explicitly
refers to "rights" of consular notification and access, and
describes those rights as belonging to the detained individual
("[t]he said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph" (emphasis
added)).
Defendant further contends that, as a ratified treaty,
the VCCR is a part of the "supreme law of the land" and, as such,
stands on equal footing with laws that the national legislature
has enacted. (4)
  In defendant's view, that means that Article
36 is enforceable by affected individuals in the same way and to
the same extent as any federal statute would be.  With respect to
that latter point, defendant appeals to the "doctrine of self-execution" –- the idea that certain international treaties are
"self-executing," that is, immediately effective and enforceable
by individuals without additional implementing legislation. 
However, that is an issue of federal law, and the
federal cases suggest that treaties are "self-executing," in the
sense of permitting enforcement by an individual right of action,
only when a specific intent to create such individual rights can
be discerned from the treaty as a whole.  See, e.g., Edye v.
Robertson, 112 US 580, 598-99, 5 S Ct 247, 28 L Ed 798 (1894)
("Head Money Cases") ("A treaty * * * is a law of the land as an
act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined." (emphasis added)); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. U.S.,
967 F2d 965, 968 (4th Cir 1992) ("Courts will only find a treaty
to be self-executing if the document, as a whole, evidences an
intent to provide a private right of action."). (5)
  In fact,
the general rule, widely recognized in the federal courts, is
that rights created by international treaties belong to the
signatory state and are not enforceable in American courts by
private individuals.  Thus, the United States Supreme Court has
stated:
"A treaty is primarily a compact between
independent nations.  It depends for the enforcement of
its provisions on the interest and the honor of the
governments which are parties to it.  If these fail,
its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamation, so far as the injured
parties choose to seek redress. * * * It is obvious
that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to
do and can give no redress."
Edye, 112 US at 598.  See also Foster v. Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet)
253, 306, 7 L Ed 415 (1829) overruled in part on different
grounds, U.S. v. Percheman, 32 US 51 (1833) ("The judiciary is
not that department of the government, to which the assertion of
its interests against foreign powers is confided.");  Goldstar
(Panama) S.A., 967 F2d at 968 ("International treaties are not
presumed to create rights that are privately enforceable.").  
The rationale for the foregoing general rule (which in
substance amounts to a presumption against the creation of
individual, judicially enforceable rights) is obvious.  The
United States Constitution separates the various functions of
government among the three branches, generally placing the powers
that relate to foreign relations in the Executive Branch (with
certain oversight powers, including the power to ratify treaties,
in the Legislative Branch).  The necessary and beneficial
corollary of that constitutional arrangement is that, in matters
of international relations, the nation speaks through a single
authoritative voice –- the president.  That beneficial effect,
and the separation of powers principle itself, would be
undermined if the Judicial Branch were to presume to enforce
treaty provisions on behalf of individuals when its authority to
do so is less than clear. (6)
 
In acknowledging the foregoing general rule, we do not
mean to say that a court never can read a treaty to create
privately enforceable rights.  Certainly, the noted presumption
can be overcome by explicit wording and even by provisions that
necessarily imply a private right of judicial enforcement.  For
example, courts have allowed individuals judicially to enforce
treaties that govern the rights of foreign nationals to inherit
property, despite the absence of explicit treaty wording
providing for such individual enforcement, most likely because
the right-granting wording in those treaties makes sense only if
it is read to confer an individually enforceable right.  See,
e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 US 503, 507-08, 67 S Ct 1431, 91 L Ed
1633 (1947) (dealing with such a treaty).  On the other hand, an
individual right of judicial enforcement will not be inferred
from the mere fact that a treaty sets out substantive rules of
conduct that, if honored, would benefit individuals.  See, e.g.,
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 US 428, 442, 109
S Ct 683, 102 L Ed 2d 818 (1989) (holding that Geneva Convention
on the High Seas, which provides that illegally boarded merchant
ship "shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have
been sustained," does not create private right of action for
foreign corporations to recover compensation in United States
courts); United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F2d 62, 67
(1975) cert den, 421 US 1001 (1975) ("[E]ven where a treaty
provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular
[signatory] state -- such as fishing rights –- it is
traditionally held that 'any rights arising from such provisions
are, under international law, those of the [signatory] states and
* * * individual rights are only derivative through the
[signatory] states.'") (quoting Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 115, comment e
(1965)).  
With those considerations in mind, we turn to
defendant's proposed interpretation of Article 36 of the VCCR. 
Although defendant is correct that Article 36 expressly refers to
the detained foreign national's "rights" to consular access and
notification, the mere use of the term "rights" cannot, by
itself, support an intent to require signatory states to allow
individual detainees to enforce those "rights" in a criminal
proceeding against them -- particularly when the treaty does not
specify the nature of the declared "rights" or any remedy that is
required for their breach.  In fact, it seems likely that the
treaty refers to a detainee's "rights" to consular access and
notification purely because that is the most convenient and
comprehensible way of describing what a receiving signatory state
must tell a foreign detainee in order to meet the signatory
state's obligations under the treaty.  See U.S. v. Li, 206 F3d
56, 66 (1st Cir 2000) (Selya and Boudin, JJ., concurring) (making
that point). 
Neither does any other wording in the treaty suggest an
intent to create individual rights that are enforceable in a
judicial proceeding.  In fact, the purposes stated in the
preamble (to "contribute to the development of friendly relations
among nations") and in the initial clause of Article 36 ("with a
view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nations of the sending state") both suggest that the treaty
and Article 36 are concerned with relationships and obligations
among nations, not with individual rights. (7)
   
Finally, there is nothing about the subject matter of
the VCCR that would compel an inference that a private right of
action was intended.  In that regard, we think it is perfectly
reasonable to read the treaty as leaving enforcement of Article
36 entirely to the signatory states.  
We have described a general presumption that
international treaties speak only to the rights and obligations
of signatory states and do not confer individual rights that are
enforceable in judicial proceedings.  We also have noted that,
although Article 36 of the VCCR loosely refers to a foreign
detainee's "rights" to consular access and notification, it
contains no explicit statement or clear implication of an intent
to depart from that general rule.  In the absence of any such
clear indication to the contrary, we must conclude that the
obligations that Article 36 describes are enforceable only by the
affected signatory states and not by individual detainees.
That conclusion is confirmed by the fact that, since at
least 1970, the State Department has maintained that the VCCR
does not create enforceable individual rights and that "the only
remedies for failures of consular notification under the [VCCR]
are diplomatic, political, or exist between [signatory] states
under international law."  Li, 206 F3d at 63-64 (emphasis
supplied); U.S. v. Emuegbunam, 268 F3d 377, 392 (6th Cir 2001)
(citing Li). (8)
  The State Department's interpretation of any
international treaty is entitled to substantial weight, because
that department of the federal Executive Branch is responsible
for negotiating and administering treaties, and also because it
generally is the "single authoritative voice" through which the
Executive Branch speaks.  Li, 206 F3d at 67 (Selya and Boudin,
JJ., concurring). (9)
 
We conclude that Article 36 of the VCCR does not create
rights to consular access or notification that are enforceable by
detained individuals in a judicial proceeding.  It follows that,
defendant's suppression motion in the present case, grounded in
the theory that the police had violated his rights under Article
36 of the VCCR, was not well taken, and the trial court did not
err in denying it.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed. (10)

1. As we explain more fully later in this opinion, the
VCCR is a multilateral treaty that purports to define the
functions of a consulate and govern the establishment of consular
relations between the signatory nations.  See United States v.
Emuegbunam, 268 F3d 377, 388 (6th Cir 2001) cert den, 535 US 977
(2002) (describing treaty).  As we explain elsewhere, defendant
is a Mexican national.  The United States and Mexico both are
signatories.  Generally, Article 36 of the VCCR requires
"competent authorities" to inform the relevant consulate when a
foreign national is arrested and to allow the consulate to
communicate with the detained foreign national and vice-versa. 
Article 36 also requires authorities to advise  detained foreign
nationals "without delay" of those "rights."    
2. Defendant asserts an alternate theory for suppression,
viz., that the circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention
show that his post-arrest statements, including his purported
waiver of his Miranda rights, were not made voluntarily. 
However, we elect to limit our review to the issue that defendant
raises under the VCCR.  See ORAP 9.20(2)(court's opinion on
review need not address all questions raised by petition).
3. Defendant notes that another subparagraph of Article 36 that
is not included in the quoted material above also makes consular
assistance a matter of personal election by the person detained: 
Under subparagraph (1)(c) of Article 36 consular officers must
refrain from acting on behalf of a detained national "if he
expressly opposes such action."
4. So far as it goes, defendant's point in that regard is
unassailable.  Article VI of the United States Constitution
provides, in part:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States * * * and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, as a ratified treaty, the VCCR is a part
of the "supreme law of the land."  But this case is not about the
status of the VCCR; it is about defendant's status as an arrested
national of a signatory state under the VCCR.
5. In fact, it is at least arguable that the question whether a
treaty is "self-executing" –- enforceable without additional
legislation -- is different from the question whether it is
individually enforceable in a judicial proceeding.  See  U.S. v.
Li, 206 F3d 56, 67 (1st Cir 2000) (Selya and Boudin, JJ.,
concurring) (asserting that the two questions are different).     
6. The concurring judges in Li aptly described the
"mischief" that could result from allowing individuals to seek
redress through the courts when the Executive Branch has not
intended or contemplated that result:
"There is an elaborate regime of practices and
institutions by which the United States and other
nations enforce commitments inter sese or decide that,
in the national interest, promises given by or to
another sovereign should not be enforced in a specific
case.  Sometimes this is done purely for reasons of
prudence, sometimes for convenience, or sometimes to
secure advantage in unrelated matters.  Incalculable
mischief can be wrought by gratuitously introducing
into this often delicate process court enforcement at
the instigation of private parties."
206 F3d at 68 (Selya and Boudin, JJ., concurring.)  Those
comments would apply with even more force to the prospect of
uneven enforcement in the various state courts. 
7. At the same time, we note in passing that we are unimpressed
by the state's contention that the Preamble to the VCCR contains
a clear denial of an intent to create individual rights.  The
state focuses on the following wording:
"Believing that an international convention on
consular relations, privileges and immunities would
also contribute to the development of friendly
relations among nations, irrespective of their
differing constitutional and social systems, [and
r]ealizing that the purpose of such privileges and
immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of functions by consular
posts on behalf of their respective states." 
VCCR, 21 UST at 79 (emphasis added).  It is at least arguable
that the emphasized clause refers to privileges and immunities of
individual consular officials and that, as such, it says nothing
about the rights of individual foreign detainees. 
8. It also is confirmed by the fact that, of the one hundred
plus nations that have signed the VCCR, none apparently provides
an individual remedy through its criminal justice system for
violations of the sort that is at issue here.  Emuegbunam, 268
F3d at 393.
9. Defendant contends that the State Department's position
deserves little weight because it only has taken that position
for purposes of litigation.  It appears, however, that the State
Department's announced position has been consistent since at
least 1970.  Emuegbunam, 268 F3d at 392.   
Defendant also contends that the State Department's
nonlitigation position is quite different.  In so arguing,
defendant relies primarily on the fact that various internal
State Department documents and publications refer to an arrested
foreigner's "right" to consular access without delay.  However,
as we have noted above, __ Or at __ (slip op at 9-10), the mere
use of the term "rights" does not necessarily convey acceptance
of an individual right enforceable in judicial proceedings.
10. Our legal conclusion in this case is consonant with
every other state and federal case of which we are aware that has
addressed the issue.  See, e.g., Emeugbunam, 268 F3d at 390-94;
U.S. v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F3d 192, 192, 195-98 (5th Cir 2001),
cert den, 533 US 962 (2001); State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 131 NM
47, 54, 33 P3d 267, 271-74 (2001), cert den, 535 US 937 (2002);
Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va 407, 419, 508 SE2d 57, 63-64 (1998),
cert den, 527 US 1038 (1999); State v. Navarro, 260 Wis 2d 861,
865-74, 659 NW2d 487, 489-94 (2003), rev den, 661 NW2d 101
(2003); see also Li, 206 F3d at 66-68 (Selya and Boudin, JJ.,
concurring).  We also note that the Supreme Court of the United
States on December 10, 2004, granted certiorari in Medellin v.
Dretke, 371 F3d 270 (5th Cir 2004).  That case, which is set for
argument on March 28, 2005, involves certain of the issues that
we decide today.