Title: OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. McCRADY
Citation: 176 P.3d 1194, 2007 OK 39
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 2007

OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. McCRADY Annotate this Case OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. McCRADY 2007 OK 39 176 P.3d 1194 Case Number: 101210 Decided: 05/22/2007 As Corrected: September 17, 2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. RODNEY McCRADY AND THE OKLAHOMA MERIT PROTECTION COMMISSION, Respondents/Appellees. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. III ¶0 An Oklahoma highway patrol trooper appealed from his second discharge by the Department of Public Safety. The Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (OMPC) hearing officer ruled 1) the trooper's earlier reinstatement on "disciplinary probation" did not deprive him of his position as a permanent classified employee and of the rights afforded him by that status and 2) the discipline imposed upon the trooper was too severe for the offense when compared to that levied on other troopers who committed similar infractions. The OMPC denied reconsideration of this order and the Oklahoma County District Court affirmed it. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, vacated the OMPC order and directed that the trooper-instituted OMPC proceeding be dismissed. THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED. THE DISTRICT COURT ORDER AFFIRMING THE OKLAHOMA MERIT PROTECTION COMMISSION ORDER IS REINSTATED. Kevin L. McClure, Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant, James R. Moore, Chanda R. Graham, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee. OPALA, J ¶1 The question presented on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it vacated the district court decision that affirmed the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission's order? We answer in the affirmative. I. THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Today's certiorari deals with the second dismissal of Oklahoma highway patrol trooper Rodney McCrady (McCrady or petitioner) from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety (DPS or respondent).2 ¶3 McCrady, a first lieutenant, had been employed by DPS for approximately seventeen years when he was first discharged from the agency in 1995.3 In June 2001 a hearing officer (administrative law judge or ALJ) for the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (OMPC) issued an order reinstating McCrady "to his prior position of Second Lieutenant with full back pay and benefits."4 That order permitted DPS to impose upon him "a 60-day suspension without pay and a twelve-month probationary period . . . during which time he may not violate any rules, policies or procedures of DPS or State law."5 McCrady returned to work on 10 September 2001. DPS alleges that during this one-year period McCrady violated the terms of his probation.6 He received a pre-termination hearing and was dismissed on 2 October 2002.7 ¶4 McCrady lodged an appeal from his discharge to the OMPC.8 DPS urged the hearing officer was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because McCrady, a probationary employee, has no right to appeal from this decision and is subject to discharge without cause.9 The ALJ disagreed and ruled (1) the twelve-month "disciplinary probation" provision of the 2001 order did not strip McCrady of the rights that were granted him by the reinstatement - i.e., his permanent classified employee status and the cluster of protections this position affords - and (2) McCrady violated the provisions of his probation, but the discipline visited upon him for these infractions was excessive when compared to that levied in similar cases.10 The hearing officer ordered McCrady to be reinstated to his prior position of first lieutenant with full back pay and benefits less a five (5) day suspension without pay.11 DPS appealed. The commissioners (of OMPC) denied the request for reconsideration and the Oklahoma County district court affirmed the order.12 ¶5 The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) vacated the district court's order with directions that the OMPC proceeding, instituted by McCrady, be dismissed. Its opinion held McCrady is a probationary employee whose employment is subject to termination with no right of appeal in accordance with the terms of the Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAC) by Merit System of Personnel Administration.13 Before COCA's opinion was released, McCrady v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety14 (to be known here as McCrady I) was decided. That cause, which was based upon the same facts as those in today's certiorari, was brought by McCrady as a tort action and filed after the last OMPC hearing. McCrady I teaches McCrady is a classified employee, not an at-will employee, and hence may not bring a tort claim for wrongful discharge based on the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.15 McCrady petitioned COCA for rehearing, urging its opinion conflicts with the teaching of McCrady I. Upon rehearing COCA's opinion remained unchanged but this time it provided there was no conflict with the terms of McCrady I.16 He sought certiorari. II. McCRADY'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS AS A PERMANENT CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEE STANDS SETTLED AND PROTECTED FROM RELITIGATION BY THE DOCTRINE OF ISSUE PRECLUSION ¶6 Although DPS now abandons its earlier argument - that McCrady is a probationary employee - we address this issue to provide more clarity by adding a pedagogical perspective to today's pronouncement. COCA's opinion - declaring its ruling does not conflict with the teaching of McCrady I - is incorrect. We accord conclusive significance, not so much to DPS's change in advocacy, but to our own obedience to the legal doctrine of issue preclusion.17 COCA did not in this case give due effect to McCrady's adjudicated status in McCrady I. ¶7 In accordance with the doctrine of issue preclusion (previously known as collateral estoppel),18 once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same parties or their privies may not relitigate that issue in a suit brought upon a different claim.19 The principle of issue preclusion operates to bar from relitigation both correct and erroneous resolutions of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional challenges.20 An issue is actually litigated and necessarily determined if it is properly raised in the pleadings, or otherwise submitted for determination, and judgment would not have been rendered but for the determination of that issue.21 The doctrine may not be invoked if the party against whom the earlier decision is interposed did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the critical issue in the previous case.22 For invocation of issue preclusion there need not be a prior adjudication on the merits (as is often the case with res judicata) but only a final determination of a material issue common to both cases.23 ¶8 The elements of issue preclusion have been met here. The court's decision in McCrady I dealt with the same parties and unfolded in the framework of a legal claim different from that pressed here. McCrady's employment classification was a critical issue in the consideration of the question presented in that cause. The court's recitation of the facts there reveals that McCrady's status as a permanent classified employee at the time of his second discharge went unchallenged by DPS. III. DPS's Remaining Arguments on Certiorari ¶9 DPS continues to urge that McCrady's conduct merits discharge and the OMPC order should be reversed based on its remaining arguments, none of which was addressed either by the district court or COCA. Among these assertions is that the evidence does not support the hearing officer's decision and that she erred (1) by failing to address each of DPS's requested findings of fact and conclusions of law; 2) in her application of the terms of 74 O.S. 2001 § 840-6.3 A. Standard of Review ¶10 The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), B. The Administrative Hearing Officer's Order Contains Sufficient Information For Judicial Review ¶11 Before addressing DPS's other contentions, we turn to its assertion that the hearing officer erred when she failed to address each of DPS-proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. ¶12 An ALJ's findings need not follow any prescribed form. C. The ALJ Did Not Err When She Reduced the Quantum of Discipline Imposed on McCrady ¶13 The terms of the order impose on McCrady a five-day suspension without pay - a less severe penalty than that which was imposed upon him for his earlier offense. This, according to DPS, is reversible error because the discipline imposed was not "progressive," in accordance with the terms of § 840-6.3,38 but was rather "regressive" in nature. For two previous offenses McCrady received a letter of reprimand and then suspension.39 The next higher level of discipline, according to DPS, should have been discharge.40 ¶14 This court has held that neither OPA nor OMPC rules inflexibly mandate the imposition of progressive discipline in all causes.41 Although discipline that is progressive is to be the norm, the statute provides for and permits flexibility.42 A review of the §840-6.3 terms reveals progressive discipline is not a rigid program but rather forms a "system,"43 whose design is to be conformable to a variety of circumstances. The flexibility incorporated into its terms is not limited solely to the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The discipline to be imposed is also to be "equitable" and "appropriate for the offense."44 In short, discharge is not a mandatory next step in McCrady's case. The hearing officer committed no error when she ordered a reduction of McCrady's discipline from that of a discharge to that of a five-day suspension. ¶15 DPS further urges the ALJ erred when she admitted into evidence disciplinary records of lower-ranking troopers and compared the discipline imposed on them with that sought to be imposed on McCrady.45 According to DPS, the terms of OAC 455: 10-9-2(f)(C)46 limit the comparison of discipline received by others to those who are "similarly situated" and who have committed similar infractions.47 For support of its position, DPS cites to Watts v. City of Norman.48 That case teaches that in disciplinary matters the comparison of employees that are not "similarly situated" is not legally relevant, and nonsupervisory and supervisory employees cannot be deemed to be similarly situated.49 ¶16 The teaching of Watts is inapplicable to today's cause. It dealt with a Title VII action where the comparison of similarly-situated employees is but one method a plaintiff may use to prove the third element of a prima facie case of disparate treatment. ¶17 Lastly, DPS asserts the ALJ's decision is tainted by error of law and is arbitrary, capricious, and clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence. This is so because the terms of § 840-6.3 and OAC 455:10-9-2(f)(C) require an ALJ to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the seriousness of the conduct as it relates to the employee's duties and responsibilities, and the employee's previous disciplinary records. ¶18 It is not our province to substitute this court's judgment for that of the administrative hearing officer's. Rather, we review the record and affirm the order if the record contains substantial evidence in support of the facts upon which the decision is based. DPS presented testimony dealing with the circumstances of this cause as well as the high standard of conduct expected of a first lieutenant. That McCrady had been previously disciplined lies at the base of this cause. Evidence submitted by McCrady revealed several instances where DPS dealt to other troopers a much less severe discipline than discharge for unlawful operation or improper use of a patrol vehicle. D. An Administrative Hearing Officer's Adjudicative Authority is Co-extensive with that of the Board ¶19 Lastly, DPS objects to the ALJ's award to McCrady of postjudgment interest. IV. SUMMARY ¶20 McCrady's employment status was pertinent to the substantive issue in an earlier dispute between today's parties. In that cause it stood uncontested by DPS. That status - consisting of a permanent classified employment in accordance with the terms of the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission rules - stands settled and is now protected from further relitigation by the legal doctrine of issue preclusion. As a permanent classified employee, McCrady is entitled to the full protection of the Commission rules. He cannot be discharged without cause. We further hold the administrative hearing officer in this cause committed no error in the order under review. ¶21 On certiorari previously granted, the Court of Civil Appeals' pronouncement is vacated and the decision of the district court that affirms the administrative hearing officer's decision is reinstated. ¶22 Winchester, C.J., Edmondson, V.C.J. and Lavender, Hargrave, Opala, Kauger, Watt, Taylor and Colbert, JJ., concur. FOOT