Title: State v. King
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 105995
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2014

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,995 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
CHRIS KING, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
When multiple acts jury unanimity is an issue on appeal, the threshold question is 
whether jurors heard evidence of multiple acts, each of which could have supported 
conviction on a charged crime.  
 
2.  
 
Criminal acts are multiple if they are factually separate and distinct. Incidents are 
factually separate when independent criminal acts have occurred at different times or 
different locations or when a later criminal act is motivated by a "fresh impulse." 
Factually separate and distinct incidents are not what this court calls "unitary conduct."  
 
3.  
 
When a victim alleges 20 different incidents occurring at three different locations 
and the State offers proof of 11 different opportunities for the defendant to be alone with 
the victim, there is no "unitary conduct." 
 
2 
 
 
 
4.  
 
Even if a victim asserts that a specified act occurred only once, when a prosecutor 
makes statements that encourage jurors to infer multiple acts from the whole of the 
evidence presented, then multiple acts analysis applies.  
 
5.  
 
When there is no indication in the record that the State informed the jury which of 
multiple criminal acts to rely upon to convict on a particular charge and the district judge 
did not sua sponte give the jury a unanimity instruction on the charge, there is multiple 
acts error. 
 
6. 
 
Even if a defendant generally denies criminal conduct, if there is no unified 
defense in a case, and the trial is not merely a credibility contest between the victim and 
the defendant, multiple acts error may be reversible. In this case, reversal is necessary 
under the clearly erroneous standard because the State put on evidence of the unique 
timing of several criminal acts and the defendant put on distinct evidence to defend 
against allegations that he committed those acts on those dates. 
 
7. 
 
If the State seeks to introduce evidence under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-455(d) of 
allegations made against a defendant in an earlier case in which the defendant was 
acquitted, a district judge must analyze whether collateral estoppel should prevent 
introduction of the evidence, i.e., whether the prosecution in which the defendant was 
acquitted had at its heart the same issue to be entrusted to the second jury. 
 
3 
 
 
 
8. 
 
Relevant evidence about a sex crime victim's sexual history may be admissible in 
certain limited circumstances under Kansas' rape shield statute. In this case, specific 
information about the young victim's previous allegations of sexual abuse by persons 
other than the defendant may be admissible on retrial to demonstrate why the victim 
exhibits certain symptoms and behaviors, the possible source of trauma about which a 
psychological expert testifies, or why the victim displays sexual knowledge beyond her 
years. 
 
9. 
 
When a defendant is a first-time offender under Jessica's Law, departure from the 
hard 25 life sentence assigned by the law is permissible.  
 
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; GUNNAR A. SUNDBY, judge. Opinion filed May 16, 
2014. Reversed and remanded.  
 
Reid T. Nelson, Capital and Conflicts Appellate Defender, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Cheryl A. Marquardt, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Todd L. Thompson, county 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.: A jury convicted Chris King of four charges: rape by penile penetration, 
rape by digital penetration, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent 
liberties with a minor. The district court judge sentenced King to four concurrent hard 25 
life sentences under Jessica's Law. King raises seven issues on this direct appeal: (1) 
admission of evidence on a prior charge of sexual abuse for which King was acquitted; 
4 
 
 
 
(2) failure to provide a unanimity instruction; (3) exclusion of evidence of the victim's 
prior sexual history; (4) denial of defense challenges to venire members for cause; (5) 
cumulative error; (6) constitutionality of Jessica's Law; and (7) denial of a sentencing 
departure motion. 
 
Because we hold that King's convictions must be reversed for the lack of a 
unanimity instruction he challenges on his second issue, we need not reach the merits of 
King's fourth, fifth, and sixth issues. We provide limited guidance on his first and third 
issues because of the likelihood they will arise again in the event of a retrial. We also 
provide guidance on the seventh issue, in the event resentencing becomes necessary. We 
take the liberty of reordering King's issues for clarity of discussion. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
R.B. and her brother, M.B., began living with defendant King and the children's 
aunt, King's wife, Roxanne, in fall 2005. While the children lived with the Kings, 
Roxanne was primarily responsible for their care because King worked second shift. 
During weekends and school vacations, the children usually were with either their father 
or their grandparents. 
  
On January 3, 2008, R.B. and M.B. went to their grandparents' home for the end of 
winter break from school. And, on January 7, 2008, R.B. told her grandmother that King 
had been touching her and making her do things to him, the last time on the morning she 
arrived at her grandparents' home. 
 
R.B.'s grandmother took R.B. to the King residence to speak with Roxanne. R.B., 
her grandmother, and Roxanne went into a bedroom to talk about what R.B. had said. 
According to the grandmother's later testimony, when Roxanne learned of R.B.'s 
5 
 
 
 
allegations, "[s]he really didn't seem surprised. She was upset. She was upset, and she 
seemed to feel very bad about [R.B.], but she didn't seem surprised." Roxanne, on the 
other hand, said that, when the three went into the bedroom, "[R.B.] climbed up on the 
middle of my bed and starts giggling and says, 'Uncle Chris touched me.'" Roxanne asked 
R.B. if King had "'put his penis in'" R.B., and R.B. responded, "'What's that?'" 
 
After the discussion in the bedroom, R.B.'s grandmother removed the children 
from the care of the Kings.  
 
R.B.'s mother contacted the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services 
(SRS) hotline the next day. Sharon Griffin, a social worker, scheduled a time 2 days later 
to meet with R.B.  
 
Griffin spoke with R.B., M.B., and their mother. During R.B.'s interview, she 
disclosed that King sexually molested her. According to R.B., on the morning of January 
3, King told her to come into the bathroom with him. Once inside the room, King showed 
R.B. his penis, then pulled down her pants, and, according to R.B., "'touched my 
private.'" King then made her "'sit on his lap and promise not to tell.'" R.B. said that this 
incident was not the first of its kind. At the conclusion of the meeting, Griffin asked the 
children's mother to make a police report and explained that she would be referring R.B. 
to Sunflower House for a forensic interview. As part of the referral, Griffin also requested 
a medical examination of R.B. 
 
Approximately 2 weeks later, Sarah Byall conducted a forensic interview of R.B. 
at Sunflower House. During the Byall interview, R.B. identified three specific areas of 
King's residence where he had sexually abused her: her bedroom, a bathroom, and on a 
couch. R.B. also described King's penis and told Byall that her "pee-pee started hurting." 
6 
 
 
 
It is unclear whether the pain began before or after R.B. was removed from the care of 
the Kings.  
 
A week later, Physician Assistant Stephanie Painter conducted a medical 
examination of R.B. During the examination, R.B.'s mother told Painter that R.B. had 
experienced some bleeding, which, according to Painter, would be consistent with 
allegations of sexual abuse. Painter's examination did not reveal injury to R.B.'s hymen or 
vulva or any sign of infection.  
  
After viewing R.B.'s Sunflower House interview, Deputy Sheriff Robert Smith 
spoke to King less than a week later. King told Smith that "[R.B.] has a vivid imagination 
and we've been trying to get her some type of counseling." 
 
King first went to trial on the charges involving R.B. in November 2009. Mistrial 
followed the revelation of potentially exculpatory evidence, previously unknown to the 
State and the defense. The retrial leading to this appeal began October 25, 2010. 
 
Pretrial, the State moved to admit evidence under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-455(d) 
that King had sexually abused another girl in the past. King argued the evidence was 
inadmissible because he had been acquitted on charges arising out of the allegations. The 
district judge ruled that the State would be allowed to admit the evidence. As a result, 
J.B. testified at King's trial that King had molested her when she was 4 years old and 
staying with her aunt. According to J.B., King touched her "on my vagina and, basically, 
I guess, rubbed" it while she was sleeping. J.B.'s aunt also testified about what J.B. had 
told her on the morning of the alleged abuse.   
 
Pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3525(b), King filed a pretrial motion to admit evidence of 
previous sexual abuse allegations made by R.B. against two juveniles. King argued that 
7 
 
 
 
the evidence was relevant, regardless of whether the allegations against the juveniles 
were true:   
 
"Either these are false accusations and therefore the complaining witness' testimony 
regarding actions by the defendant against her are not believable and trustworthy, or they 
[are] true accusations[,] which could explain how it is that she is able to describe sexual 
activities and body parts that one would normally not believe a small child should be able 
to describe."  
 
The district judge denied King's motion, ruling the evidence was inadmissible 
because "we are not certain if [the allegations] were unfounded or not followed up 
because of just time constraints of law enforcement or lack of interest in pursuing the 
matter." King also sought to admit evidence that R.B.'s mother had been sexually abused, 
information which she disclosed in front of R.B. during joint therapy sessions. The 
district judge's ruling did not specifically address this evidence. King's renewed motion to 
admit the evidence of the allegations against the juveniles also was denied during trial.  
 
The State's evidence at trial included establishment of dates and times when King 
had the opportunity to be alone with R.B. It demonstrated that R.B. had been absent from 
school because of illness on November 5 and 6, 2007, and that school was cancelled on 
December 11 and 12, 2007, because of snow. In addition to those dates, school was not in 
session on September 14 and 17; October 12; November 12 and 21; and December 27 
through January 3, 2008. On the dates that R.B. was not in school, the State established 
that Roxanne generally worked for a few hours each morning and that King generally did 
not begin work until approximately 3 p.m., if at all. It was during these times, when 
Roxanne was working and King was home alone with the children, that the State argued 
King had the opportunity to abuse R.B. 
 
8 
 
 
 
The jury also heard testimony from those who had examined R.B.'s physical and 
mental condition after the report of her abuse. Painter testified that the physical 
examination of R.B. indicated that R.B. was "normal for her stage of development" and 
that she did not show any signs of injury. Painter opined that this could "not exclude or 
confirm a diagnosis of child sexual abuse." Because of the time between the last alleged 
abuse and the examination, she would "expect a child to be totally normal; and if there 
had been injury, for it to have healed by that time."  
 
R.B.'s therapist, Annette Rasmussen, testified that R.B. had "behaviors like 
increased masturbation and dissociating and being depressed, hard time sleeping, being 
scared to get dressed." Rasmussen further testified that there could be a correlation 
between R.B.'s masturbation and sexual abuse and that dissociation happens when people 
have "a traumatic experience happen to them."   
 
After Rasmussen testified, King renewed his pretrial motion to admit evidence of 
prior sexual abuse of R.B. King argued that the connection Rasmussen made between 
some of R.B.'s behaviors and sexual abuse or a trauma meant that evidence of prior abuse 
would provide the jury with an alternative source for R.B.'s behaviors. The district judge 
ruled that "[Rasmussen's] reference during cross-examination was not so specific, to this 
Court's belief, that it would trigger a reversal of prior rulings denying the admissibility of 
that evidence. It was brief and nondescript." 
 
R.B. testified that King touched her "over 20 times." This included King touching 
her "[b]oth inside and out" with his hand and penis, putting his penis in her mouth, and 
making her touch his penis with her hands. The State also played a video of R.B.'s 
Sunflower House interview for the jury.  
 
9 
 
 
 
In addition to R.B.'s testimony about the incidents, M.B. testified that he once saw 
King and R.B. go into another room and shut the door. According to M.B., they had been 
playing the "tickle game" when King said to R.B., "'Want to go into the bedroom and just 
me and you play?'" M.B. listened by the closed door, and he did not hear any tickling or 
laughing. He asked, "'You guys almost done?'" Because M.B. did not hear laughing, he 
said, he "knew they weren't playing [the tickle game]." 
 
With the exception of November 5, one of the snow days, and the morning of 
January 3, King denied that he was supervising or alone with the children. He testified 
that the children were with their parents or grandparents on the remaining dates. On 
November 5, when R.B. was home sick, King said, he took R.B. and his son to Lawrence 
to purchase a video game. King said that they did not return that morning until after 11, 
and his wife arrived home a short time later. King submitted evidence from his bank 
records of a transaction occurring on the morning of November 5 at GameStop in 
Lawrence. During the snow day, King said, he and the children played a game of 
Monopoly all day until Roxanne came home from work. 
 
On the morning of January 3, King testified, R.B. and M.B. were scheduled to go 
to their grandparents' home. Roxanne and King got the children into the car, and King 
drove Roxanne to work. After dropping Roxanne off, King and the children returned 
home because it was not yet time to meet the grandparents. King went into the bathroom 
because he felt ill, and he testified that he remained there until it was time to drive the 
children to meet their grandparents. The children were in the living room while King was 
in the bathroom. 
 
King also denied all of R.B.'s accusations of abuse. 
 
10 
 
 
 
King also presented evidence implying that R.B.'s mother fabricated the 
allegations against him as a way to avoid paying to support the children while they were 
in King's and Roxanne's care. According to Roxanne, SRS had recently learned the 
children's mother was not paying child support and had ordered her to begin doing so. 
 
After the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four charges and before sentencing, 
King filed a "Motion for Durational and Dispositional Departure" in which he sought "a 
downward durational departure pursuant to the provisions set forth in K.S.A. 21-4643." 
The district judge noted that "the legislature has precluded the Court from consideration 
of any mitigating factors" and said, "I cannot find that there is sufficient grounds of 
unconstitutionality to set aside the Sentencing Act" and, "without it being 
unconstitutional, I'm precluded from even considering your arguments . . . today to 
mitigate or to lessen the sentence. The law is quite clear." King received four concurrent 
hard 25 life terms. 
 
UNANIMITY 
 
We treat the question of whether a case presents a multiple acts issue as one of law 
over which we have unlimited review. State v. [Kameron] King, 297 Kan. 955, 979, 305 
P.3d 641 (2013) (citing State v. Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, 244, 160 P.3d 794 [2007]). 
Further, "[w]here an instruction was not requested during the trial, an appellate court 
applies a clearly erroneous standard of review." [Kameron] King, 297 Kan. at 978 (citing 
K.S.A. 22-3414[3]). Whether the failure to give a unanimity instruction in a multiple acts 
case is clearly erroneous involves a de novo review of the entire record. State v. Trujillo, 
296 Kan. 625, Syl. ¶ 3, 294 P.3d 281 (2013). "Whereas the burden to show harmlessness 
generally shifts to the party benefitted by the error, the burden to show clear error under 
K.S.A. 22-3414(3) remains on the defendant." State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 516, 286 
P.3d 195 (2012). 
11 
 
 
 
 
When multiple acts jury unanimity is an issue on appeal, the threshold question is 
whether jurors heard evidence of multiple acts, each of which could have supported 
conviction on a charged crime. See Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, Syl. ¶ 1. This court has 
determined that acts are multiple acts if they are factually separate and distinct. And 
incidents are factually separate when independent criminal acts have occurred at different 
times or different locations or when a later criminal act is motivated by a "fresh impulse." 
State v. Colston, 290 Kan. 952, 962, 235 P.3d 1234 (2010). Factually separate and 
distinct incidents are not what this court calls "unitary conduct." 290 Kan. at 962. The 
factors we have used to determine the existence of unitary conduct are:  "'(1) whether the 
acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur at the same location; (3) 
whether there is a causal relationship between the acts, in particular whether there was an 
intervening event; and (4) whether there is a fresh impulse motivating some of the 
conduct.' [Citation omitted.]" 290 Kan. at 962. 
 
King asserts that there was evidence of multiple acts on each of his charges 
because the State demonstrated that the abuse could have occurred on 11 different days 
from September 2007 to January 2008, and R.B. said King touched her "over 20 times" in 
three different places in the house—her bedroom, the bathroom, and on a living room 
couch. The State's primary argument on this issue is that King categorically and generally 
denied all of R.B.'s abuse allegations. But such a denial affects only whether any multiple 
acts error is reversible—here, clearly erroneous. It does not determine whether we are 
faced with a multiple acts case in the first place. 
 
In Voyles, we recognized that a case in which two victims alleged that the 
defendant's criminal conduct occurred over several months in different locations 
presented us with multiple acts. 284 Kan. at 244. "[P]otentially 20 different acts or 
offenses were committed," and the defendant was charged with only eight counts. 284 
12 
 
 
 
Kan. at 244; see also State v. Rivera, 48 Kan. App. 2d 417, 449, 291 P.3d 512 (2012) 
(allegations of two acts over several days required multiple acts instruction, election).  
 
We agree with King that we are faced with a multiple acts situation in this case. 
R.B.'s allegation of more than 20 different incidents in three different locations and the 
State's proof of 11 different opportunities for King to be alone with the children mean we 
are not dealing with "unitary conduct." See Colston, 290 Kan. at 962. Yet King was 
charged in only four counts, two rape counts, one aggravated criminal sodomy count, and 
one aggravated indecent liberties count.  
 
A particular further note on the sodomy count is necessary.  
 
The State insists that R.B. reported only one instance of oral sex and relies on 
Colston, 290 Kan. at 965, to argue that a jury is not required to agree on a specific date of 
a sodomy if only one act occurred. We acknowledge and reaffirm this holding from 
Colston, but we see a controlling distinction between Colston and this case.  
 
Here, although R.B. testified that King made her put her mouth on his penis only 
one time, the prosecution's proof and later argument on King's 11 chances to be alone 
with the children muddied the evidentiary water on the sodomy charge. When, for 
example, the prosecutor argued in closing that King had plenty of time to molest R.B., 
she posed the rhetorical question:  "How much time does it take for Mr. King to pull 
down his pants and force 8-year-old [R.B.] to perform oral sex on him?" The prosecutor 
followed this question by directing the jury to the State's evidence of the 11 different days 
when King had opportunity to commit the charged offenses. In other words, the State 
asserted that the jury could infer multiple acts of sodomy from the whole of its evidence. 
This statement was essentially equivalent to a reverse election that competed with R.B.'s 
13 
 
 
 
statement about one instance of oral-genital contact. We therefore regard the sodomy 
charge as subject to multiple acts analysis. 
 
Having concluded that evidence of multiple acts was presented on each of the four 
charges against King, we turn to whether the "State . . . inform[ed] the jury which act to 
rely upon in its deliberations or the court . . . instruct[ed] the jury to agree on the specific 
criminal act. The failure to elect or instruct is error." Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, Syl. ¶ 2. 
There is no indication in the record before us that the State informed the jury which act to 
rely upon for any of the charges against King. And the parties agree that King did not 
request and the district judge did not provide sua sponte a jury instruction on unanimity 
for any of the charges. Thus there was a multiple acts error on each charge.  
 
"When a unanimity instruction was not requested or given and no general denial 
was presented by the defendant, an appellate court may conclude that the failure to 
instruct the jury to agree on a specific criminal act warrants reversal under the clearly 
erroneous standard." Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, Syl. ¶ 4. "If there is no unified defense, we do 
not tolerate verdict uncertainty in these cases." 284 Kan. at 253. And, even if the 
defendant has made a general denial, "error may be reversible when the trial is not merely 
a credibility contest between the victim and the defendant." (Emphasis added.) 284 Kan. 
239, Syl. ¶ 5. Inconsistent testimony from a victim, for example, can mean reversal is 
necessary. 284 Kan. 239, Syl. ¶ 5; see [Kameron] King, 297 Kan. at 983 ("presentation of 
a unified defense or a general denial does not foreclose reversible error in a multiple acts 
case"). "[W]hen other evidence presents inconsistencies that distinguish between two or 
more incidents," a review of the entire record is appropriate "to determine if [the 
appellate court] is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict 
had the error not occurred," i.e., whether there was clear error. 297 Kan. at 983-84. 
 
14 
 
 
 
The parties disagree on whether King's defense can be characterized as a general 
denial. On this point, we agree with King that his defense was not "merely" a general 
denial. As he states in his brief, "when the defense puts on different evidence to defend 
different dates of alleged occurrences, it is not a unified defense."  
 
The State's evidence also complicated the jury's task beyond picking the winner in 
a pure credibility contest. It proved up "a number of factually separate incidents . . . from 
which the jury could have found" King guilty of the charged crimes. See Voyles, 284 
Kan. at 253. The evidence showed that King usually was at work when the children were 
home and awake, and that the children spent most weekends and school holidays away 
from King's home. The State thus focused on opportunity to commit the crimes, and it 
specifically sponsored evidence of 11 discrete dates when King would have been alone 
with the children. In response, King marshaled exculpatory evidence aimed at particular 
days among the 11. In short, the State put on evidence of unique timing of several 
incidents, and King advanced a general denial plus designed to meet the unique timing 
proof.   
 
This court has said that  
 
"youthful victims reporting incidents, giving statements, and testifying cannot provide 
mathematical certainty about events. We also acknowledge, however, the substantial 
prejudice to a defendant when the equivalent of evidence of propensity to commit 
crime—more multiple acts than charges, without an election or instruction—is placed 
before a jury." 284 Kan. at 255. 
 
In this case, we cannot ignore or minimize the prejudice to defendant King from 
the court's failure to instruct on unanimity and the State's failure to elect which of the 
multiple acts underlying each of King's charges was to be relied upon by the jury. We 
15 
 
 
 
have no confidence in the reliability of the guilty verdicts, and we reverse all of King's 
convictions and remand the case for further proceedings.  
 
K.S.A. 2013 SUPP. 60-455 EVIDENCE ON ALLEGATIONS  
FOR WHICH KING WAS ACQUITTED 
 
This court's review of the admission of evidence involves a multistep analysis: 
 
"[T]he first question is relevance. K.S.A. 60-401(b) defines relevant evidence as evidence 
that is probative and material. On appeal, the question of whether evidence is probative is 
judged under an abuse of discretion standard; materiality is judged under a de novo 
standard. See State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 507-09, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). The second step 
is to determine which rules of evidence or other legal principles apply. On appeal, this 
conclusion is reviewed de novo. Boldridge v. State, 289 Kan. 618, Syl. ¶ 10, 215 P.3d 
585 (2009). In the third step of the analysis, a district court must apply the applicable rule 
or principle. The appellate court's standard of review of this third step varies depending 
on the rule or principle that is being applied. Some rules and principles grant the district 
court discretion, while others raise matters of law. State v. Riojas, 288 Kan. 379, 383, 204 
P.3d 578 (2009). Finally, an analysis under K.S.A. 60-445 may be required, depending on 
the issue and parties' arguments. Under that statute, a district judge 'may in his or her 
discretion exclude evidence if he or she finds that its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk that its admission will unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who 
has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence will be offered.' This 
analysis is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Reid, 286 Kan. at 509." 
State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 817-18, 235 P.3d 436 (2010). 
 
Before trial, the State sought permission to admit K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-455 
evidence that King had sexually abused another young girl, J.B. King had been acquitted 
in a prosecution arising out of J.B.'s past allegations of abuse. The State argued that the 
evidence was relevant to show a plan or modus operandi because the facts underlying 
those allegations were strikingly similar to the facts of this case. See State v. Prine, 297 
16 
 
 
 
Kan. 460, 480, 303 P.3d 662 (2013) (confirming "strikingly similar" standard for 
admission of plan evidence under 60-455). 
 
The record before us demonstrates that the State appreciated the governing statute 
had recently been amended to permit admission of other crimes and civil wrongs 
evidence in cases of sexual misconduct "on any matter to which [the evidence] is relevant 
and probative." See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-455(d). The amendment meant that the State 
could have argued with success that subsection (d) permitted it to introduce the evidence 
to demonstrate King's propensity to commit sex crimes against young girls. See Prine, 
297 Kan. at 479. But the State did not do so. 
 
In Prine, even though the evidence in question had been admitted erroneously to 
show intent, absence of mistake or accident, and plan, we determined that the error was 
harmless under K.S.A. 60-261 because the prosecution would be free to introduce the 
same evidence on retrial to prove propensity. 297 Kan. at 479-81. But for one additional 
consideration, we expect the same would be true here, that is, even if J.B.'s earlier 
allegations against King were admitted erroneously to show plan or modus operandi, they 
probably could come into evidence on any retrial under the new subsection (d) of K.S.A. 
2013 Supp. 60-455.  
 
The one additional consideration for the district judge on remand is that King was 
acquitted in the case arising out of J.B.'s allegations. This consideration deserves more 
attention and a more thorough analysis on any retrial than it received the first time 
around.  
 
Our older cases examining the effect of an earlier acquittal on admissibility of 
underlying evidence in a later prosecution on new charges have turned on applicability of 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See State v. Searles, 246 Kan. 567, 579-82, 793 P.2d 
17 
 
 
 
724 (1990); State v. Irons, 230 Kan. 138, 140-45, 630 P.2d 1116 (1981); State v. Darling, 
197 Kan. 471, 478-81, 419 P.2d 836 (1966). 
 
In Irons, this court addressed whether an acquittal precludes the State from 
introducing evidence of the charged conduct as a prior bad act in a subsequent 
proceeding:   
 
"[W]hen an application is made to admit evidence of a prior offense of which defendant 
has been acquitted, an additional consideration presents itself—the possibility of 
collateral estoppel. 
 
"When an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
verdict or judgment that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any 
future lawsuit under the rule of collateral estoppel. [Citations omitted.] 
 
"The rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with a 
hypertechnical approach, but with realism and rationality. Where a previous judgment of 
acquittal is based upon a general verdict this approach requires a court to examine the 
record of the prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge and 
other relevant matter, and if the court concludes a rational jury would have had to base its 
verdict of acquittal on the same issue which the State seeks to prove by introducing 
evidence of a prior offense then collateral estoppel applies. [Citations omitted.]" Irons, 
230 Kan. at 143-44. 
 
In Irons, the defendant had been previously tried and acquitted of robbery. The 
evidence in both cases led to a reasonable inference that both crimes had been committed 
by the same person. 230 Kan. at 144. This court held that in the first case the defendant's 
identity had been in issue and he was acquitted; therefore, "[t]he issue of defendant's 
participation in that case was settled," and collateral estoppel protected him from having 
to retry the prior offense. 230 Kan. at 144.  
18 
 
 
 
 
The Irons court distinguished the case before it from other cases in which 
evidence introduced at trial leading to an earlier acquittal had been held admissible. 230 
Kan. at 142-44; see Darling, 197 Kan. at 480-81 (evidence defendant previously 
performed procedure resulting in abortion; despite acquittal, evidence admissible to show 
same procedure performed knowingly, with intent to commit abortion); Oliphant v. 
Koehler, 594 F.2d 547, 554-55 (6th Cir. 1979) (evidence of prior offenses admissible 
where issue in prior rape trials was consent and evidence in current trial presented to 
show plan).  
 
We addressed collateral estoppel in this context again in Searles. Before trial, the 
district court ruled that the issue in Searles' acquittal was consent, while in the current 
case it was identity. Because the district court determined that the evidence was being 
presented for a different issue in each case, this court found no error in admitting the 
evidence in the second trial. 246 Kan. at 581-82. 
 
Should this case be retried, and should the State again seek to introduce evidence 
of J.B.'s past allegations against King, the district judge will have to analyze whether the 
prosecution in which King was acquitted had at its heart the same issue or issues to be 
entrusted to the second jury in this case. If so, collateral estoppel should prevent 
introduction of the evidence. If not, collateral estoppel will pose no obstacle to 
introduction of the evidence under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-455(d).   
 
APPLICATION OF THE RAPE SHIELD STATUTE 
 
The other evidentiary issue that warrants discussion before remand is the 
admissibility of R.B.'s sexual abuse allegations against the two juveniles. On appeal, 
King argues that admission of the evidence was imperative because it provided an 
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alternate explanation for the symptoms and behaviors R.B. exhibited, including "her 
ability to talk about sexual details." 
 
K.S.A. 21-3525, which limits evidence of a sex crime victim's previous sexual 
conduct with any person including the defendant, is known as the rape shield statute. It is 
designed to protect such victims from unnecessary intrusion into their private lives and 
reads in pertinent part:  
 
"(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), in any prosecution to which this 
section applies, evidence of the complaining witness' previous sexual conduct with any 
person including the defendant shall not be admissible, and no reference shall be made 
thereto in any proceeding before the court, except under the following conditions:  The 
defendant shall make a written motion to the court to admit evidence or testimony 
concerning the previous sexual conduct of the complaining witness. . . . The motion shall 
state the nature of such evidence or testimony and its relevancy and shall be accompanied 
by an affidavit in which an offer of proof of the previous sexual conduct of the 
complaining witness is stated. . . . The defendant, defendant's counsel and prosecutor 
shall be prohibited from disclosing any matters relating to the motion, affidavits and any 
supporting or responding documents of the motion. The court shall conduct a hearing on 
the motion in camera. At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence 
proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the previous sexual conduct of the 
complaining witness is relevant and is not otherwise inadmissible as evidence, the court 
may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and the 
nature of the questions to be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence and 
question witnesses in accordance with the order of the court." K.S.A. 21-3525(b). 
 
The key consideration under the statute is relevance. See K.S.A. 21-3525(a), (b). 
 
"There are two elements of relevance: materiality and probative value. [Citations 
omitted.] In analyzing whether evidence is material, the focus is on whether the fact 
sought to be proved has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case and 
20 
 
 
 
is in dispute. [Citation omitted.] Evidence is probative if it has '"any tendency in reason to 
prove"' a material fact. [Citation omitted.] The materiality of evidence is reviewed de 
novo, and the existence of probative value is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Wells, 297 Kan. 741, 759, 305 P.3d 568 (2013). 
 
See also State v. Gilliland, 294 Kan. 519, 540, 276 P.3d 165 (2012), cert. denied 133 S. 
Ct. 1274 (2013) (relevance key consideration when applying rape shield statute). 
 
 
We need not decide today whether the district judge's exclusion of the evidence in 
the first trial was an abuse of discretion. We merely note that, on remand, it is possible 
that more information about the nature of the allegations and why they did not lead to a 
prosecution may be available. The district judge's expressed concern about vagueness 
may evaporate. Assuming that issue is put to rest, R.B.'s earlier allegations may meet the 
relevance threshold of the statute to the extent Rasmussen again opines that R.B.'s 
dissociation may be related to a traumatic event or the State again argues that R.B. had no 
way of knowing what she did about sex absent King's abuse. See State v. Holman, 295 
Kan. 116, 139, 284 P.3d 251 (2012) (prior sexual conduct evidence may be material if 
relevant to identity of rapist, consent of complaining witness, whether defendant had 
intercourse with complaining witness); State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 587, 243 P.3d 
352 (2010) (evidence that could explain healed vaginal tear material in sex crime 
prosecution). 
 
CONSIDERATION OF DEPARTURE 
 
 
Finally, we briefly address the defense argument on appeal that the district judge 
erred as a matter of law in denying King's departure motion. We do so to ensure that any 
sentencing that occurs on remand avoids such error. 
 
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In response to the motion for departure, the district judge stated:  "[T]he 
legislature has precluded the Court from consideration of any mitigating factors or, as the 
State pointed—attempted to point out, aggravating factors." He also said that, unless 
Jessica's Law was unconstitutional, he was "precluded from even considering your 
arguments . . . today to mitigate or to lessen the sentence. The law is quite clear. The 
Court has no authority to deviate from that." 
 
Subsection (d) of Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643, explicitly permits departures in 
certain circumstances:  
 
"On or after July 1, 2006, for a first time conviction of an offense listed in paragraph 
(a)(1), the sentencing judge shall impose the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 
provided by subsection (a), unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, 
following a review of mitigating circumstances, to impose a departure. If the sentencing 
judge departs from such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, the judge shall state 
on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for the 
departure."   
 
Before his conviction in this case, King had no prior criminal history. Thus the 
district judge was not "precluded" from considering a departure. See State v. Jolly, 291 
Kan. 842, 846, 249 P.3d 421 (2011). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because multiple acts error infects each of defendant King's convictions and 
undermines this court's confidence in the jury's decisions, this case is reversed and 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.