Title: City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks County
Citation: 139 N.W.2d 242
Docket Number: 8177
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 1965

139 N.W.2d 242 (1965) CITY OF GRAND FORKS, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff, v. GRAND FORKS COUNTY, a body corporate and politic, Defendant. No. 8177. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 30, 1965. *243 Gordon Caldis, City Atty., Grand Forks, for plaintiff. James L. Hansen, Asst. State's Atty., Grand Forks, for defendant. TEIGEN, Judge (on reassignment). This is a proceeding under Chapter 32-24, N.D.C.C., involving certification to this court of eight questions of law, some of which are in several parts. The City of Grand Forks, a municipal corporation, instituted an action against Grand Forks County within which the city is located to recover from the county certain tax moneys collected by the county to which the city maintains it is entitled under the statutes. The county has answered denying liability. Issue was joined and the matter came on for trial in the district court. In the trial before the district court, the facts were stipulated and it was agreed that the issue will depend principally on the construction of law applicable thereto. The order certifying questions of law to this court states: Section 32-24-02, N.D.C.C., provides: In several decisions we have defined what is requisite to appellate jurisdiction in the consideration of certified questions of *248 law permitted under the statute quoted above. The trial court must first exercise its discretion in determining that the questions to be certified are doubtful and it must be made to appear that the case in which they arise will depend wholly or principally upon the construction of law applicable to the questions certified. School Board of Eagle Public School District No. 16 v. State Board, N.D., 126 N.W.2d 799; Meckle v. Hoffman, N.D., 78 N.W.2d 166; State v. Lohnes, N.D., 69 N.W.2d 508; Minnkota Power Co-op. Inc. v. Kyser, 78 N.D. 102, 48 N.W.2d 34; State v. Elkin, 68 N.D. 93, 277 N.W. 89; Union Insurance Agency of Minot v. Insurance Company of North America, 50 N.D. 606, 197 N.W. 225; Harrington v. Eggen, 50 N.D. 569, 197 N.W. 136; Malherek v. City of Fargo, 48 N.D. 1109, 189 N.W. 245. The questions of law must be clearly and distinctly stated. State v. Elkin, supra; Malherek v. City of Fargo, supra. They should not involve questions of fact or mixed law and fact. In re Holy-Elk-Face, N.D., 104 N.W.2d 308; Minnkota Power Co-op v. Kyser, supra; State v. Elkin, supra; State v. Fahn, 52 N.D. 134, 202 N.W. 130; Stutsman County v. Dakota Trust Company, 45 N.D. 451, 178 N.W. 725. Advisory opinions to the trial court are not contemplated by the statute. Backman v. Guy, N.D., 126 N.W.2d 910; Meckle v. Hoffman, supra; Minnkota Power Co-op Inc. v. Kyser, supra; Ullman v. Campbell, 51 N.D. 198, 199 N.W. 482. We will now consider the questions certified to us in the light of the principles announced in our statute and the prior decisions of this court. The certified questions relate to certain statutes which are correctly quoted in the trial court's order certifying the questions. This case was commenced in March of 1962 and the statutes then in force are the ones we will consider in this opinion. Certified questions number one, two, and three involve Section 24-05-01, N.D.C.C., and will be considered together. It has been suggested by some of the members of this court that certified question number one may be ambiguous in that it does not necessarily restrict the application of the answer to taxes collected and levied under the provisions of Section 24-05-01, N.D.C.C. However, this question was not raised by either of the parties. When we consider the subject matter of all the certified questions, it then becomes clear that it is intended that certified question number one is limited in its scope to the tax which is authorized and levied under Section 24-05-01, supra, and we so construe it. The statute is clear and free from all ambiguity. The words speak for themselves and need no construction. We find that certified questions number one and two must be answered in the affirmative. Counties are within the terms of the statute of limitations. It runs for them as well as against them. Rosedale School District No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212. However, it must be taken by answer as required by Section 28-01-39, N.D.C.C., and Rule 8(c), N.D.R.Civ. P., to be applicable. Section 28-01-16, N.D. C.C., provides that an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has occurred. The state of the record in this case does not disclose that the statute of limitations was pleaded by answer; however, it does appear from the questions certified by the trial court that the affirmative defense was somehow placed in issue. We cannot determine from the record before us how this was done. On the basis of the record before us, our answer may not be determinative of the issue and may be merely advisory. For this reason, we must decline to answer certified question number three. Certified question number four we answer in the negative. The statute, Section 57-15-06.3, supra, without reference to the amendment found in Chapter 382 of the Session Laws of 1963, is also free and clear *249 from ambiguity. It specifically requires a proposed county road construction program, qualified for federal aid as described therein, be adopted by the board of county commissioners. It must then be approved by the bureau of public roads and finally submitted to the electors of the county for approval at an election. The electors of the county at this election also vote on the question of levying a tax to pay the county's share of the cost. If the questions are approved by the electors of the county, the amount of the levy is not controlled by county mill levy limitations "and the proceeds of such tax shall be used only for matching federal aid available for such program which shall be the official county road program." (Emphasis supplied.) This clearly refers to the proposed county road construction program as adopted and approved. Thus the statute clearly limits the use of the tax moneys collected under the levy as matching money to match federal aid available or to be made available for the county road program adopted by the county commissioners, approved by the bureau of public roads and the electors of the county. There is no authority to transfer any of the funds. The statute is restrictive in nature. That this was the legislative intent is crystal clear by Chapter 382 of the Session Laws of 1963. A negative answer to certified question number four eliminates the necessity of answering certified question number five. Certified questions number six, seven, and eight relate to Section 24-08-08, supra. This statute was adopted in 1890 and has never been amended. It has been carried into the various revisions and compilations of our Code without change. It withstood a challenge to its constitutionality in 1911. State ex rel. Hagen v. Anderson, 22 N.D. 65, 132 N.W. 433. The parties to this action stipulated the facts. Insofar as they are material to these questions, it was stipulated that the city is constructing a bridge across a navigable stream; however, it was also stipulated that the county has not heretofore maintained a bridge fund but that the cost of bridges and culverts has been paid by the county directly from its general fund. Nowhere in the stipulation does it state when this may have occurred and we do not know whether this practice is currently being carried out. We cannot determine from the stipulation of facts or the court's order certifying questions to this court whether a levy is currently being made for bridge purposes, nor whether there are taxes being collected or outstanding under such a levy. We note that the stipulation specifically provides that the county has levied and collected tax moneys under Sections 24-05-01 and 57-15-06.3, N.D.C.C., but no mention is made of any levy under Chapter 24-08 or otherwise for bridge purposes. Thus the facts necessary to a determination of this question have not been established by the stipulation and what may develop on a trial of the question is unknown to us. The answer to this question would be merely advisory. For this reason, we must decline to answer questions number six, seven, and eight. The case is remanded for further proceedings conformable to law. ERICKSTAD, J., and EUGENE A. BURDICK, District Judge, concur. BURKE, C. J., did not participate. STRUTZ, J., did not participate, Honorable EUGENE A. BURDICK, District Judge, sitting in his stead. KNUDSON, J., not being a member of this Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.