Title: Doe v. Madison Metro School District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001032
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2022

2022 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1032 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 
4, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
John Doe 5 and Jane Doe 5, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
John Doe 6, Jane Doe 6, John Doe 8 and Jane Doe 
8, 
          Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Madison Metropolitan School District, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Gender Equity Association of James Madison 
Memorial High School, Gender Sexuality Alliance 
of Madison West High School and Gender Sexuality 
Alliance of Robert M. LaFollette High School, 
          Intervenors-Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d, 963 N.W.2d 
PDC No:2021 WI App 60 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 24, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Frank D. Remington   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Richard M. Esenberg, Luke N. Berg, Anthony F. 
 
 
2 
LoCoco, Roger G. Brooks and Wisconsin Institute for Law & 
Liberty, Milwaukee, and Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale. 
There was an oral argument by Luke N. Berg.  
 
For the defendant-respondent and interevenors-defendants-
respondents, there was a brief filed by Emily M. Feinstein, Adam 
R. Prinsen, Sarah A. Zylstra, Sarah J. Horner, and Quarles & 
Brady LLP, Madison, and Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison. There was 
an oral argument for the defendant-respondent by Sarah A. 
Zylstra and an oral argument for the intervenors-defendants-
respondents by Adam R. Prinsen  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Frederick W. Claybrook, 
Jr., Matthew M. Fernholz, and Claybrook LLC, Washington, D.C., 
and Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Waukesha for Wisconsin 
Family Action, Illinois Family Institute, Minnesota Family 
Council, 
Delaware 
Family 
Policy 
Council, 
Nebraska 
Family 
Alliance, Hawaii Family Forum, The Family Foundation, Minnesota-
Wisconsin Baptist Convention, Ethics and Religious Liberty 
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, Concerned Women 
for America, Ethics & Public Policy Center, National Legal 
Foundation, and Pacific Justice Institute.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Tamara B. Packard and 
Pines Bach LLP, Madison, for Madison Teachers Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Eric G. Pearson, Morgan 
J. Tilleman, Megan C. Isom, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee 
for the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and 
the Wisconsin Council of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Victoria L. Davis 
Dávila, Robert Theine Pledl, Shannon Minter, Asaf Orr, and Davis 
 
 
3 
& Pledl, Milwaukee, and National Center for Lesbian Rights, San 
Francisco, for Professors of Psychology & Human Development.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel R. Suhr and 
Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, for the Liberty Justice Center.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 65 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP1032 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV454) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 
4, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
John Doe 5 and Jane Doe 5, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
John Doe 6, Jane Doe 6, John Doe 8 and Jane Doe 
8, 
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Madison Metropolitan School District, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Gender Equity Association of James Madison 
Memorial High School, Gender Sexuality Alliance 
of Madison West High School and Gender 
Sexuality Alliance of Robert M. LaFollette High 
School, 
 
          Intervenors-Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   This 
case 
involves 
a 
constitutional challenge by parents to a school district policy.  
The substantive issues, however, remain pending before the 
circuit court and are not properly before us.  This is an appeal 
contesting the circuit court's decision to seal and protect the 
parents' identities from the public and the school district, but 
not from the attorneys defending the school district's policy.  
Rather than follow our current law governing confidential 
litigation, the parents ask us to modify our approach in 
Wisconsin and adopt new standards modeled after federal law.  We 
decline to do so.  Applying Wisconsin law, we determine the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by 
requiring disclosure of the parents' identities to opposing 
attorneys, while allowing the parents to keep their names sealed 
and confidential as to the public and the district. 
¶2 
The parents further ask this court to issue an 
injunction against the underlying policy.  But a preliminary 
injunction motion on this very issue remains pending in the 
circuit court, has not been decided, and therefore has not been 
appealed.  We are not aware of any procedure by which we could 
properly 
address 
that 
motion 
in 
this 
court 
absent 
an 
extraordinary exercise of our superintending authority, which 
the petitioners did not request.  What remains is an appeal of 
the circuit court's decision to grant in part and deny in part a 
temporary injunction pending appeal, a decision the court of 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
3 
 
appeals affirmed.  However, our decision today ends the appeal 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
regarding 
parent 
confidentiality. 
 
Therefore, 
any 
decision 
addressing 
the 
temporary injunction pending appeal is now moot.  Accordingly, 
we do not opine on the merits of the parents' request for 
temporary injunctive relief.  We affirm the court of appeals' 
decision 
and 
remand 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
further 
adjudication of the parents' claims. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In 
April 
2018, 
the 
Madison 
Metropolitan 
School 
District (the District) adopted a document entitled, "Guidance & 
Policies to Support Transgender, Non-binary & Gender Expansive 
Students" (the Policy).  The Policy contains multiple provisions 
that animate the parents' claims in this case.  We highlight 
several for context. 
 "Students will be called by their affirmed name 
and 
pronouns 
regardless 
of 
parent/guardian 
permission to change their name and gender in 
[District] systems." 
 "All [District] staff will refer to students by 
their affirmed names and pronouns.  Staff will 
also maintain confidentiality and ensure privacy.  
Refusal to respect a student's name and pronouns 
is 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
[District] 
Non-
discrimination policy." 
 "School staff shall not disclose any information 
that may reveal a student's gender identity to 
others, including parents or guardians and other 
school staff, unless legally required to do so or 
unless 
the 
student 
has 
authorized 
such 
disclosure." 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
4 
 
 "All staff correspondence and communication to 
families in regard to students shall reflect the 
name and gender documented in [the District 
system] unless the student has specifically given 
permission to do otherwise.  (This might involve 
using the student's affirmed name and pronouns in 
the school setting and their legal name and 
pronouns with family)." 
 "To avoid harmful misgendering or misnaming, 
teachers 
should 
ensure 
that 
all 
information 
shared with substitute teachers is updated and 
accurate.  For example, make sure attendance 
rosters, shared include accurate student names 
and pronouns, keeping in mind that not all 
students have their affirmed names and genders 
updated in [the District system]." 
¶4 
In February 2020, a group of parents sued the District 
alleging the Policy violated their right to parent their 
children, 
citing 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution,1 and their right to exercise their religious 
beliefs 
under 
Article 
I, 
Section 
18 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.2  Contemporaneous with filing their complaint, the 
                                                 
1 Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "All people are born equally free and independent, 
and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty 
and 
the 
pursuit 
of 
happiness; 
to 
secure 
these 
rights, 
governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed." 
2 Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states: 
The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be 
infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to 
attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any 
control of, or interference with, the rights of 
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by 
law to any religious establishments or modes of 
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
5 
 
parents moved to proceed using pseudonyms.  The parents also 
sought a preliminary injunction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 813.02 
(2019-20).3  They asked the circuit court4 to prohibit the 
District from: 
(1) enabling children to socially transition to a 
different gender identity at school by selecting a new 
"affirmed named and pronouns," without parental notice 
or consent; 
(2) 
preventing 
teachers 
and 
other 
staff 
from 
communicating with parents that their child may be 
dealing with gender dysphoria, or that their child has 
or wants to change gender identity, without the 
child's consent; and 
(3) deceiving parents by using different names and 
pronouns around parents than at school. 
¶5 
The District moved to dismiss the complaint and asked 
the circuit court to postpone the hearing on the injunction 
until the court decided the motion to dismiss.  The circuit 
court agreed.  After hearing argument, the circuit court denied 
the motion to dismiss.5 
                                                                                                                                                             
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or 
religious or theological seminaries. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 The Honorable Frank D. Remington of the Dane County 
Circuit Court presided. 
5 The circuit court also granted intervention to the Gender 
Equity Association of James Madison Memorial High School, the 
Gender Sexuality Alliance of Madison West High School, and the 
Gender Sexuality Alliance of Robert M. La Follette High School. 
We refer to the District and the Intervenors-Defendants 
collectively as the District. 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
6 
 
¶6 
The circuit court also granted in part the parents' 
motion to proceed anonymously.  The court agreed with the risks 
presented by the parents and found "sufficient need to keep the 
Plaintiffs' names sealed and confidential from the public."  The 
court concluded the parents made a "demonstrable factual showing 
that . . . would their names be disclosed, they would likely be 
subject to threats and intimidation, which would be wholly 
inappropriate and frustrate the orderly functioning of the court 
case."  It held, however, that the parents "must disclose their 
identities to the Court and attorneys for the litigants."  The 
circuit court ordered the parents to file, under seal, an 
amended complaint listing the names and addresses of the parents 
accessible to the court and opposing attorneys.  And it 
instructed the parents to circulate a draft protective order, 
the terms of which were to be negotiated.  The parents initially 
circulated a draft protective order which would limit the 
disclosure of their names to attorneys of record, excluding 
their staff and other attorneys at their firms.  However, the 
circuit court concluded this was too narrow and directed the 
preparation of a protective order that other attorneys at the 
respective law firms and their staff would sign as well. 
¶7 
The parents sought an interlocutory appeal challenging 
the order to disclose their identities to the attorneys and 
moved to stay the order to file an amended complaint under seal.  
The circuit court granted the stay, and the court of appeals 
granted the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
7 
 
¶8 
While the petition for interlocutory appeal was 
pending before the court of appeals, the parents sought an 
injunction pending appeal with the circuit court under Wis. 
Stat. § 808.07(2).  This motion asked for the same relief 
requested in the parents' original preliminary injunction 
motion.  Two months after the court of appeals granted 
interlocutory appeal, the circuit court granted in part and 
denied in part the parents' motion for an injunction pending 
appeal.  The circuit court enjoined the District 
from applying or enforcing any policy, guideline, or 
practice reflected or recommended in its document 
entitled "Guidance & Policies to Support Transgender, 
Non-binary & Gender-Expansive Students" in any manner 
that allows or requires District staff to conceal 
information or to answer untruthfully in response to 
any question that parents ask about their child at 
school, including information about the name and 
pronouns being used to address their child at school. 
The circuit court added that its "injunction does not create an 
affirmative 
obligation 
to 
disclose 
information 
if 
that 
obligation does not already exist at law and shall not require 
or allow District staff to disclose any information that they 
are otherwise prohibited from disclosing to parents by any state 
or federal law or regulation."  The circuit court denied the 
other injunctive relief requested by the parents.  It reasoned 
that the parents had not demonstrated they were likely to 
succeed on appeal and, without knowing any specifics about the 
parents 
bringing 
the 
claim, 
the 
parents 
were 
unable 
to 
demonstrate they would suffer irreparable harm. 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
8 
 
¶9 
Having not received all they hoped for from the 
circuit court, the parents turned to the court of appeals.  They 
moved for injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2)(a) and 
cited Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.12, the ordinary authority for 
appealing the denial of a motion for relief pending appeal.  In 
the alternative, they also sought injunctive relief under the 
general temporary injunction statute, Wis. Stat. § 813.02, along 
with Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.14, which specifies how to move an 
appellate court for relief. 
¶10 The court of appeals denied the parents' motion for 
injunctive relief pending appeal, concluding the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion.  The parents then 
sought relief from this court on their motion for relief pending 
appeal while the court of appeals was still considering the 
merits of the confidentiality question.  We denied the petition 
for review.  Several months later, the court of appeals issued a 
decision on the confidentiality issue affirming the circuit 
court.  Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2021 WI App 60, 399 
Wis. 2d 102, 963 N.W.2d 832.  The parents then turned to this 
court again, and we granted their petition for review. 
II.  CONFIDENTIALITY 
¶11 The main question before us is a narrow one:  Did the 
circuit court err in ordering the parents to file a sealed 
complaint with their names and addresses which would be viewed 
by the court and attorneys alone?  The parents' argument rests 
largely on its request that we reexamine, overrule, and 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
9 
 
reformulate the law on anonymous litigation in Wisconsin to more 
closely resemble their description of the approach in federal 
courts.  We decline to do so.  We begin with the relevant law as 
it now exists. 
A.  Legal Standards 
¶12 The ordinary rule in Wisconsin and everywhere is that 
those availing themselves of the legal system should do so 
openly.  See, e.g., State ex rel. La Crosse Trib. v. Cir. Ct. 
for La Crosse Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 241-42, 340 N.W.2d 460 
(1983); Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376-77 (7th 
Cir. 2016); 67A C.J.S. Parties §§ 173-74 (2022).  While we 
protect certain vulnerable legal participants, such as children 
and crime victims, the business of courts is public business, 
and as such is presumed to remain open and available to the 
public.  See Wis. Stat. § 757.14 ("The sittings of every court 
shall be public and every citizen may freely attend the 
same . . . except if otherwise expressly provided by law."); 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.81(8) ("Every notice of appeal or other 
document that is filed in the court and that is required by law 
to be confidential shall refer to individuals only by one or 
more initials or other appropriate pseudonym or designation."); 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.86 (directing that, in certain types of 
cases, the identity of crime victims should not be disclosed).  
Openness is the rule; confidentiality is the exception. 
¶13 This principle plays out from the commencement of a 
lawsuit.  Litigation in Wisconsin begins with the filing of a 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
10 
 
summons and complaint, which must contain "the names and 
addresses 
of 
the 
parties 
to 
the 
action, 
plaintiff 
and 
defendant."  Wis. Stat. § 801.09(1).  These documents are filed 
with the clerk of the circuit court, who is required to "open to 
the examination of any person all books and papers required to 
be kept in his or her office and permit any person so examining 
to take notes and copies of such books, records, papers, or 
minutes therefrom."  Wis. Stat. § 59.20(3)(a).  We have 
described this as "a legislative declaration granting those 
persons who properly come under its umbrella 'an absolute right 
of 
inspection 
subject 
only 
to 
reasonable 
administrative 
regulations.'"  State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of Delavan, 112 
Wis. 2d 539, 553, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983) (quoting State ex rel. 
J. Co. v. Cnty. Ct. for Racine Cnty., 43 Wis. 2d 297, 308, 168 
N.W.2d 836 (1969)) (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 59.14(1) (1979-
80), predecessor to § 59.20(3)(a)).  This reflects "a basic 
tenet of the democratic system that the people have the right to 
know about operations of their government, including the 
judicial branch."  Id. at 553. 
¶14 In Bilder, we identified three exceptions to the right 
codified in Wis. Stat. § 59.20(3)(a).  First, documents may be 
closed to the public when another statute so requires or 
authorizes.  Id. at 554.  Second, the same applies if disclosure 
would infringe on a constitutional right.  Id. at 555.  And 
third, "when the administration of justice requires it," a court 
may employ its inherent power under the constitution "to 
preserve and protect the exercise of its judicial function of 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
11 
 
presiding over the conduct of judicial proceedings."  Id. at 
556. 
¶15 With respect to the court's inherent power, many of 
the cases, including Bilder, focus on the public records nature 
of requests for confidentiality.  See WISC-TV—Channel 3/Madison 
v. Mewis, 151 Wis. 2d 122, 442 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1989); Krier 
v. EOG Env't, Inc., 2005 WI App 256, 288 Wis. 2d 623, 707 
N.W.2d 915.  But the court's ability "to preserve and protect 
the exercise of its judicial function of presiding over the 
conduct of judicial proceedings" is not limited to public 
records requests.  Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 556.  Instead, the 
inherent authority of courts includes those powers "necessary 
for the courts to function as courts."  State v. Schwind, 2019 
WI 48, ¶12, 386 Wis. 2d 526, 926 N.W.2d 742.  We see no reason 
why the inherent authority of courts would not also reach other 
interests implicated by the openness of judicial proceedings, 
including the potential for threats and harassment alleged in 
this case.  These interests go to the core of the judiciary's 
duty to preside over and conduct judicial proceedings, as the 
circuit court recognized. 
¶16 Seven years ago, this court adopted by rule a set of 
procedures governing the redaction and sealing of documents.  
See Wis. Stat. § 801.21; S. Ct. Order 14-04, 2015 WI 89 (issued 
Aug. 27, 2015, eff. July 1, 2016).  While not enacted in the 
same way as other laws, the legislature has prescribed that our 
rules function as statutes.  See Rao v. WMA Sec., Inc., 2008 
WI 73, ¶35, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 220.  The underlying 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
12 
 
assumption of § 801.21 is that court filings are public.  The 
procedures we adopted provide a mechanism for protecting certain 
documents or information in these otherwise public records. 
¶17  The basic procedure we created was to require a 
"party seeking to protect a court record" to "file a motion to 
seal part or all of a document or to redact specific information 
in a document."6  Wis. Stat. § 801.21(2).  Sealing and redacting 
are different.  "'Seal' means to order that a portion of a 
document or an entire document shall not be accessible to the 
public."  § 801.21(1)(b).  "'Redact' means to obscure individual 
items of information within an otherwise publicly accessible 
document."  § 801.21(1)(a).  A party filing a motion under 
§ 801.21 can file the material under temporary seal until a 
court rules on the motion, and the movant is required to 
"specify the authority for asserting that the information should 
be restricted from public access."  § 801.21(2). 
¶18  The circuit court then determines "whether there are 
sufficient grounds to restrict public access according to 
applicable constitutional, statutory, and common law."  Wis. 
Stat. § 801.21(4).  Section 801.21 does not provide substantive 
reasons to protect a document; that law is found elsewhere.  For 
example, Wis. Stat. § 801.19 defines protected information that 
must be omitted or redacted from circuit court records——
including passport and social security numbers.  § 801.19(1)(a).  
                                                 
6 We also specified that the court may act on its own 
initiative to "order sealing or redaction of any part of the 
court record or transcript."  Wis. Stat. § 801.21(6). 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
13 
 
And Wis. Stat. § 801.20(1) requires the director of state courts 
to 
"maintain 
a 
list 
of 
commonly-filed 
documents 
made 
confidential by statutes, court rules and case law."  When the 
law provides grounds for redacting or sealing a document, the 
court must "use the least restrictive means that will achieve 
the purposes of this rule and the needs of the requester."  
§ 801.21(4).  A comment to the rule stresses this "section is 
intended to make it clear that filing parties do not have the 
unilateral right to designate any filing as confidential and 
that permission from the court is required."  S. Ct. Order 14-
04, § 7. 
¶19  In sum, Wisconsin law has a strong presumption in 
favor of openness for judicial proceedings and records.  But it 
can be overcome by specific statutory or constitutional rights, 
and 
in 
some 
circumstances, 
by 
the 
inherent 
power 
the 
constitution vests in the judicial branch.  The general 
procedure this court has adopted involves redacting or sealing 
documents or portions of documents, and any restriction on 
public access must use the least restrictive means possible. 
B.  Analysis 
¶20  Here, the circuit court concluded the parents may 
file their complaint under seal protecting their names and 
identities from the public.  It did so after finding the risks 
to the parents and their children were legitimate.  The court 
also ordered that the sealed, unredacted complaint would be 
accessible only to the circuit court and to defense counsel 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
14 
 
following 
the 
adoption 
of 
a 
signed 
protective 
order.  
Essentially, the narrow question in this case centers on the 
parents' argument that granting defense counsel access to the 
sealed complaint should be reversed.  They assert that they and 
their children face a serious risk of harm, their identities are 
irrelevant 
to 
their 
legal 
claims, 
and 
disclosing 
their 
identities to opposing counsel could result in that information 
being leaked.  At bottom, the parents want to litigate with 
total anonymity, except with respect to the circuit court, or 
alternatively, with respect to the circuit court and a small 
subset of attorneys at one of the firms defending the District's 
policy. 
¶21  Perhaps recognizing the weakness of their argument 
under existing law, the parents come with a bigger ask.  Drawing 
on federal case law, they ask us to adopt a new multifactor 
balancing test.  The parents focus our attention on several 
factors with an established history of relevance in federal 
courts:  the plaintiffs are parents of minor children; the case 
implicates deeply held beliefs likely to provoke an intense 
emotional response; and release of their identities poses 
significant risks of harassment and retaliation.7  They further 
ask us to conduct our review de novo, giving no deference to the 
circuit court.   
                                                 
7 Reference to federal law in this area is not improper.  
Wisconsin courts have looked to federal cases for guidance on 
sealing documents.  See WISC-TV—Channel 3/Madison v. Mewis, 151 
Wis. 2d 122, 134-35, 442 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1989). 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
15 
 
¶22 In response, the District argues that none of these 
concerns would warrant withholding the parents' identities from 
attorneys in the case, each of whom would be duty-bound by court 
order to keep the parents' identities confidential.  Defense 
counsel says their strategy and ability to litigate these claims 
could shift depending on each parent's unique circumstances. 
This would impact, they assert, legal defenses they might 
advance, as well as the scope of any temporary or permanent 
relief ordered.  The parents disagree, and say their identities 
are irrelevant to their claims. 
¶23 We begin with the standard of review.  The court of 
appeals in this case and in prior cases has held that the 
circuit court's order should be reviewed for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Doe 1, 399 Wis. 2d 102, ¶18, (citing 
Krier, 288 Wis. 2d 623, ¶23).  We agree.  Under that standard, a 
court must still determine whether the appropriate standard of 
law was applied.  Thus, a court incorrectly construing a statute 
to support sealing a document could be reversed for applying an 
improper standard of law.  Krier, 288 Wis. 2d 623, ¶23 ("An 
erroneous exercise of discretion occurs if . . . the trial court 
applied the wrong legal standards.").  But once the proper law 
is identified and employed, the judgment call in determining 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
16 
 
whether to keep information confidential is rightly within the 
circuit court's discretion.8  Id. 
¶24 In this case, the circuit court's decision to withhold 
the parents' identities from the public and the District, but 
not the District's attorneys, was well within its discretion.  
As the District identified, resolving the parents' claims 
through the courts could depend on a number of significant legal 
questions which can be evaluated only if the District's 
attorneys know the parents' identities. 
¶25 Of no minor importance, the District's attorneys 
stressed their independent ethical responsibilities under our 
rules.  For example, attorneys must avoid conflicts of interest.  
See, e.g., SCR 20:1.7(a) ("[A] lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of 
interest.").  Among other circumstances, a conflict of interest 
arises if "the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client," or if the representation involves 
"the assertion of a claim by one client against another client 
represented by the lawyer."  SCR 20:1.7(a)(1), (b)(3).  At oral 
argument, the District expressed concern that its attorneys 
cannot know if their representation of the District creates a 
conflict of interest with any of the parents without knowing who 
the parents are.  Already in this case two of the parents 
                                                 
8 We observe that discretionary review appears to be the 
standard approach in federal courts as well.  See, e.g., Doe v. 
Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(reviewing "a motion for leave to proceed anonymously" "for 
abuse of discretion only"). 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
17 
 
voluntarily withdrew from the suit because the parents' counsel 
determined their participation created a conflict of interest 
for the District's attorneys.  The parents suggest they can 
police any potential conflicts, but our rules of ethics place 
that independent responsibility on the attorneys representing 
the District.  See ABA Comment [2] SCR 20:1.7 (noting that 
resolving a conflict of interest problem "requires the lawyer" 
to take certain steps); ABA Comment [4] SCR 20:1.7 ("If a 
conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the 
lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from representation, unless the 
lawyer 
has 
obtained 
the 
informed 
consent 
of 
the 
client . . . .").  At the very least, this is a significant 
consideration regarding the parents' request to proceed without 
revealing their identities to opposing counsel.  The circuit 
court exercised its discretion in this case in a way that 
facilitates the District's attorneys' ability to follow their 
ethical duties. 
¶26 The parents' identities may also have implications for 
the substantive issues in this case.  Although the parents' 
bring a facial challenge against the Policy, arguing it is 
unconstitutional in every circumstance, facts specific to the 
parents or their children could influence the availability and 
scope of judicial relief.  For example, the parents raise a free 
exercise of religion claim under Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  But without knowing the parents' 
identities, how can the District's attorneys inquire whether the 
parents have a sincerely held religious belief regarding this 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
18 
 
aspect of their children's upbringing?  Individual parents in 
this case might also have differing beliefs which could affect 
the evaluation of their claims.  Additionally, it could be that 
various factual wrinkles alter the nature of the alleged 
violation of the right to parent one's child as well as the 
scope of relief the parents could be entitled to.  For example, 
it is unclear if the constitutional right asserted would apply 
in the same way to a parent whose child has turned 18 but is 
still attending District schools.  The same could be true of a 
parent whose parental rights have been terminated by a court or 
a parent who has ceded certain decisions to another parent 
pursuant 
to 
a 
custody 
arrangement. 
 
If 
there 
is 
an 
Individualized Educational Program in place for the child, that 
could again complicate whether a particular parent is entitled 
to relief.  See Wis. Stat. § 115.787.  Finally, the District 
noted other legal defenses——including ripeness, mootness, and 
lack of standing——which it asserts it cannot advance without 
knowing the parents' identities.  Each of these variables may 
influence whether the parents are entitled to judicial relief, 
or how far such relief should extend.9 
¶27 The parents make an earnest plea that the risk of 
harassment and retaliation is real.  The problem with their 
argument is that the circuit court agreed and protected their 
                                                 
9 We do not decide that any of these considerations should 
or will impact the claims.  Rather, based on this briefing, we 
conclude these concerns could impact the arguments the District 
might reasonably make.  And therefore, they weigh in favor of 
affirming the circuit court's exercise of discretion. 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
19 
 
identities.  Therefore, the crux of the parent's continued worry 
is their fear that the attorneys on the other side will 
intentionally or unintentionally violate the court's protective 
order and expose them to the risks they identify.  Attorneys are 
duty-bound to follow court orders, however.  We have no evidence 
that any of the law firms defending the District's policy have 
violated a protective order in the past or that there is any 
risk of them doing so now.  In fact, counsel for the parents 
conceded to the circuit court that there was "no reason to doubt 
that the lawyers in this case will make every effort to preserve 
the 
plaintiffs' 
anonymity 
and 
follow 
a 
court 
order."  
Nevertheless, 
the 
parents 
essentially 
make 
an 
unfounded 
accusation that the attorneys on the other side will risk their 
law licenses, through carelessness or otherwise.  This pure 
speculation lacks merit.  Each attorney is an officer of the 
court subject to strict ethical rules in the maintenance of 
confidential information.  Each would need to agree to a 
protective order——the specifics of which have not yet been 
negotiated.  The parents present no reason to think the order to 
keep their identities private as to the District and the general 
public will not be followed. 
¶28 Furthermore, we observe the circuit court's exercise 
of discretion was a proper application of the statutory test.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 801.21(4) 
directs 
that 
if 
"there 
are 
sufficient grounds to restrict public access" to court records, 
"the court will use the least restrictive means that will 
achieve the purposes of this rule and the needs of the 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
20 
 
requester."  The circuit court concluded some protection for the 
parents' identities was warranted and decided to shield their 
names from public view and the District's view.  But the court 
did not see the same danger in disclosing the parents' names to 
the District's attorneys.  We see no error in this conclusion. 
¶29 Although the parents frame their arguments around 
whether Wisconsin permits totally anonymous litigation, we do 
not decide that question because we need not.  We leave for 
another day whether a future litigant can proceed anonymously in 
a case.  Instead, we conclude that the circuit court's decision 
to allow the parents to proceed pseudonymously, but not to 
prevent opposing attorneys from knowing their identity, was well 
within the circuit court's discretion. 
III.  INJUNCTION 
¶30 Finally, the parents ask us to provide injunctive 
relief on the underlying Policy.  As best we can tell, this 
request stems from two different statutory bases——Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.07(2)(a) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.02——following 
several 
motions the parents filed with the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Given the posture of this case, it is not appropriate 
to grant the parents' requested temporary relief. 
¶31 We first address the request for temporary injunctive 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2)(a).  That statute provides:  
"During the pendency of an appeal" circuit courts and appellate 
courts are permitted to:  "1. Stay execution or enforcement of a 
judgment or order; 2. Suspend, modify, restore or grant an 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
21 
 
injunction; or 3. Make any order appropriate to preserve the 
existing state of affairs or the effectiveness of the judgment 
subsequently to be entered."  § 808.07(2)(a).  Notably, any 
injunctive relief granted under § 808.07(2)(a) lasts only 
"[d]uring the pendency of an appeal."  Once an appeal ends, an 
injunction issued under § 808.07(2)(a) terminates.  In addition, 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.12 requires that any "person seeking 
relief under s. 808.07 shall" file the motion in circuit court 
first unless impractical.  Accordingly, in the ordinary course, 
an appellate court reviews a circuit court's decision on a 
motion seeking relief pending appeal under an erroneous exercise 
of discretion standard.  Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 
80 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977).  The appellate court 
does not conduct the analysis anew; it looks for a reasonable 
basis to sustain a circuit court's discretionary decision.  
State 
v. 
Rhodes, 
2011 
WI 73, 
¶26, 
336 
Wis. 2d 64, 
799 
N.W.2d 850. 
¶32 Here, the circuit court granted in part and denied in 
part the parents' motion for a temporary injunction pending 
appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2)(a).10  The court of appeals 
concluded the circuit court properly exercised its discretion 
and declined to grant any further relief.  Doe 1 v. Madison 
                                                 
10 As previously noted, the court enjoined the district 
"from applying or enforcing" the policy "in any manner that 
allows or requires District staff to conceal information or to 
answer untruthfully in response to any question that parents ask 
about their child at school, including information about the 
name and pronouns being used to address their child at school." 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
22 
 
Metro Sch. Dist., No. 2020AP1032, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 9, 2020).  This is an appeal of the circuit court's 
confidentiality decision, however, which this opinion resolves——
thereby ending the appeal.  Even if we thought the lower courts 
erred, any decision to provide further injunctive relief pending 
appeal would immediately be a dead letter by virtue of this 
decision.  Therefore, the motion for relief pending appeal is 
moot.  See PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 
Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559 ("An issue is moot when its 
resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying 
controversy.").  Addressing these matters now would constitute 
an advisory opinion on an issue that is, albeit in a different 
posture, still pending in the circuit court below.  See State ex 
rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, ¶46, 
397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1 (declining to "depart from our 
general practice that this court will not offer an advisory 
opinion").  Accordingly, we decline to provide any relief under 
§ 808.07(2)(a). 
¶33 The parents also appear to ask us for injunctive 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 813.02.  That section provides in 
relevant part: 
When it appears from a party's pleading that the party 
is entitled to judgment and any part thereof consists 
in restraining some act, the commission or continuance 
of which during the litigation would injure the party, 
or when during the litigation it shall appear that a 
party is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is 
procuring or suffering some act to be done in 
violation of the rights of another party and tending 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
23 
 
to render the judgment ineffectual, a temporary 
injunction may be granted to restrain such act. 
§ 813.02(1)(a).  The parents assert that they can bring such a 
motion directly to an appellate court under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.14, which sets forth the procedure for filing motions in 
appellate courts.  See § (Rule) 809.14(1) ("A party moving the 
appellate court for an order or other relief in a case shall 
file a motion for the order or other relief."). 
¶34 The parents first moved for injunctive relief under 
Wis. Stat. § 813.02 in the circuit court.  That motion remains 
before the circuit court pending resolution of this appeal.  The 
parents now seem to suggest the circuit court erred by failing 
to address their § 813.02 motion.  As best we can tell from the 
record, the circuit court reasoned that it could not address the 
parents' claim for irreparable harm——a central component of the 
temporary injunction standard——without additional information 
gleaned from disclosure of their identities (while still 
concealing that information from the public).  Once the parents 
appealed the circuit court's confidentiality decision, the 
circuit court did not believe it had the necessary information 
to decide the motion. 
¶35 We decline to address whether the circuit court's 
decision to wait to adjudicate this motion was erroneous.  The 
parents have not developed any arguments for how this court 
should determine whether the circuit court erred or whether this 
would be the proper vehicle to address a circuit court's non-
decision.  Beyond complaining that the motion has not been 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
24 
 
decided yet, the parents jump right into the merits of their 
plea for injunctive relief, never developing an argument that 
the circuit court committed procedural error.  As we have said 
many times, "We do not step out of our neutral role to develop 
or construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to make 
their case."  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 
WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  With the appeal 
resolved, we expect the circuit court will address the pending 
motion and all other matters put on hold by virtue of this 
appeal. 
¶36 The parents also sought a temporary injunction under 
Wis. Stat. § 813.02 from the court of appeals.  In that motion, 
the parents stated that they believed there was no meaningful 
difference from the relief they could receive under either 
§ 813.02 or Wis. Stat. § 808.07.  The court of appeals addressed 
this motion in a footnote, stating that its decision to uphold 
the circuit court's injunction and not grant any further relief 
would be the same under either statute.11  Doe 1, No. 2020AP1032, 
unpublished order at 6 n.4.  But the court of appeals also noted 
                                                 
11 The parents' procedural arguments are difficult to track, 
but for the reasons we explain below, it's not clear the court 
of appeals was correct that the analysis would be the same.  We 
understand the parents to be seeking a separate injunction under 
Wis. Stat. § 813.02.  If so, and if that is a new, independent 
motion, it presumably would not come with the same deference the 
court of appeals properly gave to the circuit court's decision 
on the parents motion for relief pending appeal under Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.07(2)(a). 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
25 
 
"the parents do not explain why this court would have authority 
to grant injunctive relief under § 813.02."12  Id. 
¶37 We observe, as the court of appeals did, that the 
parents provide no authority to support the notion that we 
should decide a motion for temporary injunction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.02 in the first instance.  This is especially true when 
such a motion is pending and unresolved before the circuit 
court.  Allowing this procedural leap-frog would render nugatory 
the discretionary review appellate courts apply when reviewing 
any form of temporary injunctive relief granted or denied by the 
circuit court.  A litigant could simply seek the same injunctive 
relief at each level by filing a new motion under § 813.02, and 
thereby sidestep the deferential standard of review appellate 
courts apply in this context.13  While we cannot say such a 
                                                 
12 At oral argument, the parents' counsel stated that the 
circuit court on remand would be bound by the court of appeals' 
decision on the Wis. Stat. § 813.02 motion.  We disagree.  The 
court of appeals declined to address the parents' motion as a de 
novo matter under § 813.02, instead appearing to view its role 
as reviewing the circuit court's exercise of discretion.  On 
remand, the circuit court can, in the first instance, address 
the parents' motion for a temporary injunction filed under 
§ 813.02. 
13 See Wis. Ass'n of Food Dealers v. City of Madison, 97 
Wis. 2d 426, 429, 293 N.W.2d 540 (1980) ("The denial of a 
temporary injunction under [Wis. Stat. § 813.02(1)] is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court, and the sole issue on 
appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion."); 
Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 83 Wis. 2d 316, 336, 265 
N.W.2d 559 (1978) ("The power to grant a temporary injunction 
lies within the discretion of the trial court.  The trial 
court's decision concerning an injunction will not be reversed 
unless the discretion has been abused."); Codept, Inc. v. More-
Way N. Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 165, 171, 127 N.W.2d 29 (1964) ("It is 
an elementary rule of law that the granting or refusal of a 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
26 
 
motion would never be appropriate, we are unable to find any 
support for the proposition that addressing a new motion for 
injunctive relief under § 813.02 would be proper at this 
juncture. 
¶38 The 
original 
preliminary 
injunction 
motion 
under 
§ 813.02 remains pending in circuit court.  Following the 
ordinary rules of litigation and appellate procedure dictates 
allowing the circuit court to address the matter.  If authority 
exists for the procedural process advocated by the parents, they 
have not provided it.  It seems that the only way this court 
could do what we are being asked to do would be a dramatic and 
unprecedented invocation of our superintending authority over 
lower courts.  We were not asked to rely on these extraordinary 
powers, and we will not construct such an argument for the 
parents.  See Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶24. 
¶39 The 
parents 
also 
indicate 
that 
the 
injunction 
arguments would be the same in a subsequent appeal, and propose 
that we should just step in and settle the matter now.  This is 
a troubling suggestion.  As an initial matter, we do not know 
how arguments may develop as this case proceeds or how the 
circuit court's decision could affect them.  But even if the 
                                                                                                                                                             
temporary injunction is a matter lying within the discretion of 
the trial court, and its determination in regard thereto will 
not be upset on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is 
shown."); Gimbel Bros. v. Milwaukee Boston Store, 161 Wis. 489, 
497, 154 N.W. 998 (1915) ("We conclude that it was within the 
sound discretion of the trial court to refuse the injunction 
prayed for."). 
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
27 
 
arguments remained identical, that does not provide a foundation 
for us to opine on legal issues not properly before us.  
Litigation rules and processes matter to the rule of law just as 
much as rendering ultimate decisions based on the law.  Ignoring 
the former to reach the latter portends of favoritism to certain 
litigants and outcomes.  We do not suggest the constitutional 
claims here are inconsequential.  But our adjudication of them 
must be rooted in applying the same rules to everyone.  Our 
rules of judicial process matter, and we will follow them.14 
¶40 In sum, we decline the parents' request for temporary 
injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2)(a) because any 
relief we could grant would immediately become moot.  We also 
decline the request for temporary injunctive relief under Wis. 
Stat. § 813.02.  Such a motion remains pending in the circuit 
court, and the parents have provided no authority to support the 
notion that we can or should grant injunctive relief under 
§ 813.02 in this procedural context.  We do not reach the merits 
of the injunction motion at this preliminary stage of the 
litigation. 
                                                 
14 The dissent does not claim that the parents' temporary 
injunction request is something we can address in the normal 
course.  Instead, it advocates an extraordinary constitutional 
intervention not even argued by the parents, and suggests 
failure to follow its lead constitutes an abdication of the 
court's responsibility.  We reject the dissent's sense of 
judicial duty.   
No. 
2020AP1032   
 
28 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 This is an appeal of a circuit court's decision to 
allow parents challenging the District's Policy to remain 
confidential, but not as to the attorneys for those defending 
the Policy.  We conclude the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in drawing this line.  The parents 
further ask this court to grant temporary injunctive relief on 
the underlying Policy.  But the request for relief pending 
appeal is moot by virtue of this decision, and the underlying 
preliminary injunctive relief sought remains pending before the 
circuit court.  Addressing the parents' request for injunctive 
relief is therefore not proper for a case at this preliminary 
stage.  We affirm the court of appeals and remand to the circuit 
court to proceed with the adjudication of the parents' claims. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶42 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  Today 
the majority opinion abdicates the court's responsibility, once 
again, by choosing not to address the critical issue on which 
this case turns:  the constitutional right of parents to raise 
their children as they see fit.1  Today, parents' constitutional 
rights, the high burden of proof required to intervene in 
parents' parenting decisions, and the presumption that parents 
act in the best interests of their children are all upended by 
the majority opinion's silence.  It fails parents, fails to 
uphold the constitution, and fails to provide parents with due 
process before Madison Metropolitan School District (MMSD), 
acting behind closed doors, overtakes parents' constitutional 
right to parent their own children.  
¶43 The John Doe plaintiffs (hereinafter the parents) have 
children in the MMSD.  They sue on behalf of all parents with 
children in MMSD, not on behalf of any particular parent-child 
                                                 
1 This court, in a series of recent decisions, has shown an 
unwillingness to resolve significant legal issues presented to 
us for decision.  Hawkins v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2020 WI 75, 
¶¶29-83, 
393 
Wis. 2d 
629, 
948 
N.W.2d 
877 
(Ziegler, 
J. 
dissenting); Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, ¶62, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 
951 N.W.2d 568 (Roggensack, C.J. dissenting); Gymfinity, Ltd. v. 
Dane Cnty., No. 2020AP1927-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Dec. 21, 
2020); Trump v. Evers, No. 2020AP1971-OA, unpublished order 
(Wis. Dec. 3, 2020); Wis. Voters All. v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
No. 2020AP1930-OA, (Wis. Dec. 4, 2020); Mueller v. Jacobs, 
No. 2020AP1958-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Dec. 3, 2020); 
Zignego v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2019AP2397, unpublished 
order 
(Wis. 
Jan. 
13, 
2021); 
Stempski 
v. 
Heinrich, 
No. 2021AP1434-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Aug. 27, 2021); Gahl 
v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., No. 2021AP1787, unpublished order 
(Wis. Oct. 25, 2021); State ex rel. Robin Vos v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cnty., No. 2022AP50-W, unpublished order (Wis. Jan. 11, 
2022). 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
2 
 
relationship.  As such, any individual parent's name is 
irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.  They assert that a 
MMSD guidance policy that affirms a child's gender transition to 
a sexual designation different from the child's sex at birth and 
deceives the child's parents about that choice violates their 
fundamental constitutional rights as parents contrary to Article 
I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The parents seek 
to enjoin MMSD from continuing to usurp their constitutional 
right to direct the upbringing and education of their children 
by requiring MMSD to immediately disclose a child's gender-
identity concerns to the parents and by preventing MMSD from 
enabling their children to change gender-identity without 
parental consent.  They also seek to go forward in this case 
using pseudonyms.    
¶44 A majority of this court blocks all relief for parents 
by restructuring the pending dispute.  The majority says:  "The 
main question before us is a narrow one:  Did the circuit court 
err in ordering the parents to file a sealed complaint with 
their names and addresses which would be viewed by the court and 
attorneys alone?"2  We accepted more than the question of using 
pseudonyms when we accepted review.   
¶45 The 
majority 
opinion's 
restructuring 
of 
the 
controversy denies all parents who have children in a MMSD 
school a forum in which to litigate MMSD's usurpation of their 
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children.  
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶11.   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
3 
 
Both 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution support the conclusion that MMSD's Policies cannot 
deprive parents of their constitutional rights without proof 
that parents are unfit, a hearing, and a court order, in other 
words, without according parents due process.  Instead, the 
majority keeps MMSD as the decision-maker of basic healthcare 
choices that may involve gender-identity for children who attend 
a MMSD school.  And finally, the majority's non-decision, 
decision participates in MMSD's ability to hide from parents 
what MMSD actually has been doing behind closed schoolhouse 
doors.   
¶46 The circuit court erred when it concluded that it 
could not permit parents to employ pseudonyms in this lawsuit.  
The court of appeals erred in affirming that decision, even 
while noting that the circuit court did have the power to permit 
the use of pseudonyms, contrary to the circuit court's decision.   
¶47 Furthermore, I conclude that we can and should employ 
our 
constitutional 
supervisory 
authority 
to 
decide 
this 
constitutional 
controversy 
because 
it 
cries 
for 
judicial 
resolution.  This court, as a court of last resort, should act 
to 
affirmatively 
grant 
parents' 
request 
for 
a 
temporary 
injunction that enjoins MMSD from:  (1) enabling children to 
socially transition to a different gender-identity without 
parental consent; (2) preventing teachers and other staff from 
telling parents that their child may have gender-identity 
concerns; and (3) deceiving parents by using different names and 
pronouns in front of parents than are used at school.  For the 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
4 
 
reasons set out below, I conclude that the circuit court erred 
in not granting the temporary injunction that was requested in 
February of 2020.  Because the majority opinion chooses not to 
decide the constitutional controversy that was presented, I 
respectfully dissent.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶48 The parents filed this action for Declaratory Judgment 
in Dane County Circuit Court on February 18, 2020, seeking 
declaration that MMSD violated their constitutional right to 
direct the upbringing of their children through employment of 
MMSD's "Guidance & Policies to Support Transgender, Non-binary & 
Gender-Expansive Students" (hereinafter MMSD Policies).  They 
filed this case anonymously, using pseudonyms due to the 
sensitive nature of their claims.  They sought to protect the 
identity of minor children and to protect parents and their 
children 
from 
retaliation 
or 
harassment 
for 
raising 
a 
controversial issue.   
¶49 The 
parents 
also 
sought 
a 
temporary 
injunction 
prohibiting MMSD from enabling children to socially transition 
to a different gender-identity at school by selecting a new 
"affirmed name and pronouns" without parental notice and 
consent.  MMSD moved to dismiss the complaint because parents 
had not provided their names and addresses.   
¶50 The circuit court did not rule on the parents' request 
for a temporary injunction.  However, the circuit court found: 
[A]s a factual matter, I believe the plaintiffs have 
satisfied the court of the need to preserve their 
confidentiality and, in particular, when analyzed 
against the backdrop of the relevance or irrelevance 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
5 
 
of their identity on their ability to challenge the 
policy in question.  . . .  "[A]s a factual matter, 
would their names be disclosed, they would likely be 
subject to threats and intimidation, which would be 
wholly 
inappropriate 
and 
frustrate 
the 
orderly 
functioning of the [circuit] court case.[3]  
¶51 Although the circuit court denied MMSD's motion to 
dismiss, the circuit court also required the parents to file an 
amended complaint containing their names and addresses, which 
would be accessible to the circuit court and "attorneys for the 
litigants."  Because the circuit court found that the parents 
and their children would be subjected to harassment due to their 
positions on the MMSD gender-identity policy, the circuit court 
ordered that the amended complaint was to be filed under seal.   
¶52 The parents appealed the circuit court's requirement 
of identity disclosure, and the court of appeals affirmed.  The 
parents petitioned us for review, which we granted.  In their 
petition, the parents asked us to review whether they may sue 
anonymously in Wisconsin courts, and they also asked us to 
review 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
by 
declining 
to 
temporarily enjoin MMSD's Policies that infringe parents' 
constitutional right to parent their children, which motion for 
a temporary injunction the parents filed on February 19, 2020, 
the day after they filed this action.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶53 We review the circuit court's decision that it lacked 
authority to permit the parents to use pseudonyms in this 
                                                 
3 Circuit Ct. Decision, May 26, 2020, 22. 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
6 
 
litigation for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. 
Schwind, 2019 WI 48, ¶2, 386 Wis. 2d 526, 926 N.W.2d 742.  
Whether the circuit court actually lacked such authority 
presents as a question of law that is subject to our independent 
review.  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶29, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350.  A court erroneously exercises its discretion when 
it applies an incorrect standard of law to the question 
presented.  Krier v. EOG Env't, Inc., 2005 WI App 256, ¶23, 288 
Wis. 2d 623, 707 N.W.2d 915.   
¶54 We 
review 
independently 
whether 
MMSD's 
Policies 
interfere with the parents' constitutional right to raise their 
children as they see fit such that their request for a temporary 
injunction should have been granted.  State v. Lavelle W., 2005 
WI App 266, ¶2, 288 Wis. 2d 504, 708 N.W.2d 698.  Whether this 
court should employ its superintending authority to address the 
parents' request for a temporary injunction is a discretionary 
decision subject to our independent review.  State v. Green, 
2022 WI 30, ¶3, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770.    
B.  Pseudonyms in Litigation 
¶55 The circuit court was asked to permit parents' use of 
pseudonyms in this litigation.  The parents made their motion 
based on concerns that they and their children would be harassed 
and the litigation disrupted if the parents' names were known.  
The circuit court found that their concerns were valid.  The 
circuit court said:   
I agree with the plaintiff, Mr. Berg, in terms of 
the 
factual 
basis 
they've 
demonstrated 
on 
the 
legitimacy and sincerity of their concern over the 
release of their identities.  And so as a factual 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
7 
 
matter, I believe the plaintiffs have satisfied the 
court of the need to preserve their confidentiality 
and, in particular, when analyzed against the backdrop 
of the relevance or irrelevance of their identity on 
their ability to challenge the policy in question.[4] 
However, the circuit court precluded the use of pseudonyms 
because it concluded that it did not have the authority to 
authorize their use.  The circuit court explained:  
I'm bound by Wisconsin law, both in terms of what the 
statutes set forth and the Wisconsin common law as 
established by the Supreme Court.  There is no 
precedent for what the plaintiff is asking for in the 
current published appellate case law.[5] 
¶56 Here, the circuit required disclosure of the parents' 
names to the court and to all parties' attorneys in the 
litigation.  The parents do not object to filing an amended 
complaint that discloses their names for review by the circuit 
court.  However, they do object to permitting review by the 
parties' attorneys.  They contend that a leak of their 
identities is multiplied by the number of people who have that 
information.  Once the parents' identities are disclosed, there 
is no way of undoing that disclosure, and as the circuit court 
found, harassment of the parents and their children and 
disruption of this litigation likely will follow.   
¶57 The circuit court concluded that allowing the parties' 
attorneys to view the amended complaint was acceptable because 
the attorneys could be expected to keep the parents' identities 
confidential.  The circuit court did not assess whether any 
                                                 
4 Circuit Ct. Hr'g Tr., May 26, 2020, at 22. 
5 Id.   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
8 
 
remedy could be provided to the parents and their children when 
their identities were disclosed.   
¶58 Litigation conducted anonymously has been permitted in 
very similar circumstances in federal district courts.  It has 
been approved by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  
For example, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 
710, 721-24 (7th Cir. 2011), the court concluded that the 
district 
court 
carefully 
considered 
detailed 
affidavits 
supporting the request to proceed anonymously.  Therefore, it 
affirmed the district court's decision.   
¶59 The United States Supreme Court has approved the use 
of pseudonyms in litigation, explaining, "Our decision in Roe v. 
Wade, establishes [] that, despite her pseudonym, we may accept 
as true, for this case, Mary Doe's existence and her pregnant 
state."  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973), abrogated by 
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No. 19-1392, 2022 WL 
2276808 (U.S. June 24, 2022).  However, we do not need to adopt 
federal standards in order to permit litigation by pseudonyms in 
Wisconsin.  As I explain below, Wisconsin courts have that 
authority.   
¶60 When justice has required it, we have approved 
limiting public access to judicial records.  For example, in 
State ex rel. Bilder v. Delavan Twp., 112 Wis. 2d 539, 334 
N.W.2d 252 (1983), we explained: 
The circuit court under its inherent power to preserve 
and protect the exercise of its judicial function of 
presiding over the conduct of judicial proceedings has 
the power to limit public access to judicial records 
when the administration of justice requires it.   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
9 
 
Id. at 556.  We also have recognized that "the inherent power of 
the courts 'in many respects goes beyond those conferred by 
statute.'"  Id.  The party seeking "to close court records bears 
the burden of demonstrating, with particularity, that the 
administration of justice requires that the court records be 
closed."  Id. at 556-57.   
¶61 The command, "when administration of justice so 
requires" is at the core of Wisconsin courts' power to proceed 
as an independent judiciary.  This power may require protection 
of some who are involved in Wisconsin's judicial system.  Gabler 
v. Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶58, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384 (explaining that "a concern about possible re-
traumatization of victims influenced our decision permitting the 
Department of Justice to withhold requested public records" in 
the 
administration 
of 
justice). 
 
In 
Wisconsin, 
the 
administration of justice permits a court to "make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, 
embarrassment, 
oppression, 
or 
undue 
burden 
or 
expense" including closing court records.  State ex rel. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Am., Inc. v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee 
Cnty., 2000 WI 16, ¶40, 233 Wis. 2d 1, 605 N.W.2d 868.     
¶62 The court of appeals, in its review of the circuit 
court's order that permitted review of the parents names by the 
attorneys for all parties to this litigation, disagreed with the 
circuit court's assessment of its own power.  It concluded that 
the circuit court had the power to permit the parents to use 
pseudonyms in this litigation rather than requiring their actual 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
10 
 
names.  Doe v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2021 WI App 60, ¶31 
n.8, 399 Wis. 2d 102, 963 N.W.2d 823.  It said, "Wisconsin 
circuit courts have the power to enter as restrictive a 
protective order as is warranted, taking into account the facts 
and circumstances of a particular case and the public interest 
or the administration of justice."  Id.   
¶63 However, the court of appeals nevertheless "decline[d] 
to adopt" the use of pseudonyms rather than the statutory 
procedure set out in Wis. Stat. § 801.21(2).  Id., ¶31.  The 
court of appeals did not evaluate whether a remedy could be 
provided to the parents and their children when a disclosure of 
their identities occurred.  It seemed to presume that no such 
leak would occur.   
¶64 The circuit court and the court of appeals appear not 
to have realistically considered what likely will occur with 
regard to the parents' identities in today's tell-all world.  
Even the United States Supreme Court, an institution that has 
historically demanded the highest levels of integrity and 
confidentiality, has been subject to unauthorized leaks.  These 
leaks have consequences.  One need look no further than this 
case for examples.  Following the leak of the Supreme Court's 
draft opinion in regard to abortion, Wisconsin Family Action, an 
amicus in this case, had its offices vandalized and attacked 
with Molotov cocktails.6  Here, the circuit court found that the 
                                                 
6 Press 
Release, 
Wisconsin 
Family 
Action, 
Historical 
Mothers' 
Day 
2022 
Attack 
on 
Wisconsin 
Family 
Action, 
https://wifamilyaction.org/mothers-day-attack-wfa. 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
11 
 
parents and their children likely would be subjected to 
harassment if parental identities were disclosed.7 
¶65 The judicial system has no remedy for a violation of 
the confidentiality of an amended complaint that identifies the 
parents when filed under seal as the circuit court ordered.  
Unnecessary harm will be inflicted on parents and minor 
children.  There is no compelling reason to ignore the very real 
possibility of a leak of the parents' identities and the 
inability of the court to fashion a remedy for the disclosure.  
In the interests of the administration of justice, the circuit 
court should have permitted the use of pseudonyms.  Gabler, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶58; Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 556; Mitsubishi Heavy 
Indus. Am., 233 Wis. 2d 1, ¶40.    
¶66 I agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals 
that the circuit court erred when it applied the wrong legal 
standard to the parents' motion to proceed by pseudonyms.  In so 
doing, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  
Krier, 288 Wis. 2d 623, ¶23.  The circuit court had the power to 
permit the use of pseudonyms, as the court of appeals explained.  
Doe 1, 399 Wis. 2d 102, ¶31 n.8.  I conclude the circuit court 
erred, and the court of appeals did so as well, in requiring the 
parents to disclose their identities to the attorneys for the 
other parties to the litigation.  Neither court evaluated or 
appreciated that there is no remedy for leaks of parental 
identities.  Both courts acknowledged that disclosure of 
identities likely would lead to harassment of the parents and 
                                                 
7 Circuit Ct. Decision, May 26, 2020, 22. 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
12 
 
their children and disruption of this litigation, but they 
neglected to recognize or evaluate how that would affect the 
administration of justice.  Stated otherwise, their neglect 
affected 
the 
core 
of 
our 
independence 
as 
courts:  the 
administration of justice.  It was error to fail to evaluate the 
effect on the parents and the minor children were identities 
disclosed.  
C.  Constitutional Right to Parent 
¶67 The constitutional right of parents to direct the 
raising of their children is at the heart of this lawsuit.  It 
is 
that 
constitutional 
right 
that 
the 
majority 
opinion 
intentionally disregards.8  Schools do not have the right to 
parent our children on gender-identity issues.  Yet, a majority 
of this court greets parents' pleas to temporarily enjoin MMSD 
with silence, which silence permits schools to make gender-
identity decisions for children in a MMSD school without 
parental knowledge or consent.   
¶68 Furthermore, as we consider the constitutional right 
to parent that is raised in the Petition for Review, it is 
important to note that a part of the problem we face here is of 
the circuit court's own making.  On February 19, 2020, the 
parents moved for Temporary Injunction to enjoin MMSD's Policies 
while this litigation is pending.  They sought to prohibit MMSD 
from: 
                                                 
8 "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule."  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
13 
 
(1) enabling children to socially transition to a 
different gender identity at school by selecting a new 
"affirmed named and pronouns," without parental notice 
or consent; (2) preventing teachers and other staff 
from communicating with parents that their child may 
be dealing with gender dysphoria, or that their child 
has or wants to change gender identity, without the 
child's consent; and (3) deceiving parents by using 
different names and pronouns around parents than at 
school. 
The parents asserted in their motion that some of the "policies 
violate parents' constitutional rights to direct the upbringing 
of their children."  They asserted that "[w]hether a child with 
gender dysphoria should socially transition to a different 
gender identity is a significant and controversial healthcare 
decision that falls squarely within parental decision-making 
authority."    
¶69 More than two years have passed without a decision by 
the circuit court on the parents' motion for a Temporary 
Injunction.  If the circuit court had addressed the pending 
motion, the losing party could have appealed that decision years 
ago.  The litigation could have returned to the circuit court to 
decide whether the identities of the parents were irrelevant, as 
the parents contend because they sue on behalf of all parents to 
raise their children as they see fit, or relevant identities, as 
MMSD alleges.  The administration of justice is affected by the 
circuit court's non-decision because by not deciding, the 
circuit court has effectively denied the motion for a temporary 
injunction and the circuit court also has denied the parents' 
opportunity to appeal an adverse ruling.   
¶70 The Petition for Review, raised the issue of temporary 
injunction 
standards, 
contending 
that 
"the 
lower 
courts' 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
14 
 
decisions 
are 
directly 
'in 
conflict 
with' 
this 
Court's 
'controlling' precedents as to proper application of the 
temporary injunction standards . . . ."9  The Petition for Review 
did so, recognizing that the circuit court and court of appeals 
had decided motions for injunction pending appeal, and also 
recognizing that the standard for whether to grant a temporary 
injunction, Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 
513, 519, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977), and a stay pending appeal, 
State v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 440, 529 N.W.2d 225 
(1995), employ similar tests.   
¶71 The parents moved for an injunction pending appeal 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2)(a), which the majority 
opinion denied because its decision ends the appeal and 
therefore any injunction pending appeal that it would grant 
would also end with its decision.10  The parents also renewed 
their request for a temporary injunction pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.02.   
¶72 The majority opinion ignores this part of the Petition 
for Review, claiming that the parents have not provided a legal 
theory by which the majority could reach the failure of the 
circuit court to address the motion for a temporary injunction 
that has been pending for more than two years.11  By its 
decision, the majority opinion chooses to duck the significant 
question of constitutional law that was raised in the Petition 
                                                 
9 Petition for Review, Aug. 13, 2021, 3.   
10 Majority op., ¶40.   
11 Id., ¶¶38, 39.  
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
15 
 
for Review, which I address below.  The majority opinion also 
chooses to ignore the circuit court's failure to meet its 
obligations under SCR 70.36(1)(b),12 which required a decision on 
the motion for a temporary injunction within 180 days.  The 
majority opinion does so as it also chooses to ignore our 
obligation to supervise all Wisconsin courts.  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 3.13 
¶73 As I begin, I remind the reader that under our 
constitutional supervisory authority, we have the power to 
decide whether parts of MMSD's Policies should be enjoined, as 
was requested in the Petition for Review.  This court is vested 
with "superintending and administrative authority over all 
courts."  Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶8, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 
913 N.W.2d 878 (quoting Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3).  This 
superintending authority is "as broad and as flexible as 
necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the 
courts of this state."  Id.  (quoting In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 
508, 520, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975)).  Further, this power is not 
                                                 
12 Supreme Court Rule 70.36 requires circuit court judges to 
"decide each matter submitted for decision within 90 days of the 
date on which the matter is submitted to the judge in final 
form."  Judges may file for extensions with the chief judge of 
the judicial administrative district.  However, even this 
extension, which must be requested and granted within five days 
of the overrunning the original 90 day timeline, is available 
for "one additional period of 90 days."  SCR 70.36(1)(a).  Any 
further extension must be granted by the Supreme Court and will 
be done only "for specific matters as exigent circumstances may 
require."  SCR 70.36(1)(b).   
13 Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "The supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts."   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
16 
 
strictly limited to situations in which it was previously used, 
continuing supervision is required in response to changing needs 
and circumstances.  Koschkee, 382 Wis. 2d 666, ¶8.   
¶74 In Koschkee, we considered our authority over the 
practice of law, in and out of court as connected with the 
exercise of judicial power and the administration of justice.  
Id., ¶9.  We employed our supervisory authority because we 
concluded that the "necessities of justice" required us to do 
so.  Id., ¶12.  We used it to conclude that "Evers and DPI are 
entitled to counsel of their choice and are not required to be 
represented by DOJ."  Id.  Here, we should exercise our 
supervisory authority over a circuit court's failure to decide a 
motion that has been pending for more than two years contrary to 
SCR 70.36 and contrary to the administration of justice.   
¶75 The pending motion is for a temporary injunction.  In 
Wisconsin, courts may grant a temporary injunction to restrain a 
party's actions:  
When it appears from a party's pleading that the party 
is entitled to judgment and any part thereof consists 
in restraining some act, the commission or continuance 
of which during the litigation would injure the party, 
or when during the litigation it shall appear that a 
party is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is 
procuring or suffering some act to be done in 
violation of the rights of another party and tending 
to render the judgment ineffectual. 
Wis. Stat. § 813.02(1)(a).  The motion for temporary injunction 
should have been decided years ago.  In its present undecided 
state, there is no decision from which to appeal, and yet the 
circuit court's failure to decide the pending motion for a 
temporary injunction stands in the way of the administration of 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
17 
 
justice in this litigation.  This is so because by failing to 
decide the pending motion, the circuit court effectively denied 
it and also denied the parents the opportunity to appeal an 
unfavorable ruling.   
¶76 In order to fully understand this dissent, it is 
important to appreciate the fundamental constitutional right 
upon which these proceedings are grounded.  Therefore, a review 
of long-standing protections for the relationship of parent and 
child will be helpful.  
¶77 For hundreds of years, parents' right to direct the 
upbringing 
and 
education 
of 
their 
children 
has 
been 
a 
fundamental and protected right under Article I, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶15, 387 
Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486; Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 
879, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998); Wis. Indus. Sch. for Girls v. Clark 
Cnty., 103 Wis. 651, 668-70, 79 N.W. 422 (1899).   
¶78 As many Supreme Court decisions have shown, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution protects parents' right to decide the upbringing of 
their own children.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) 
(concluding that parents possessed the right to direct whether 
their children would study German in elementary school under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the 
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) 
(concluding that the state requirement that children must attend 
public schools was contrary to the parents' Fourteenth Amendment 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
18 
 
liberty interest of directing the upbringing and education of 
their children).  
¶79 The United States 
Supreme Court has continually 
reinforced 
the 
primacy 
of 
parents 
when 
making 
decisions 
concerning the upbringing of their children, considering the 
right as "established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition."  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972); 
see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It 
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder.").  When it comes to a decision on 
"whether to expose their child[] to certain . . . ideas[,]" the 
parents, not the government, "should be the ones to choose."  In 
re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998), aff'd sub 
nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
¶80 Serving 
as 
a 
foundation 
of 
this 
right 
is 
the 
presumption that parents "possess what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for 
making life's difficult decisions."  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 
584, 602 (1979).  Furthermore, natural bonds of affection "lead 
parents to act in the best interests of their children."  Id. 
(citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, at *447.).  Of course, 
this presumption may be rebutted.  However, "[t]he state's power 
to displace parental discretion is limited . . . and must be 
justified on a case-by-case basis."  Schleifer by Schleifer v. 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
19 
 
City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 861 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(Michael, J., dissenting).   
¶81 In Troxel v. Granville, which involved a Washington 
statute that permitted visitation rights "at any time" if 
visitation was in the "best interests of the child[,]" the 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
the 
statute 
was 
an 
unconstitutional 
interference with the fundamental right of parents to rear their 
children.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-78.  The court explained that 
"[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case——the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children——is 
perhaps 
the 
oldest 
of 
the 
fundamental 
liberty 
interests 
recognized by this Court."  Id. at 65.  The court reasoned that 
"there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best 
interests of their children" and providing grandparents greater 
access to grandchildren, despite the decision of the parent, is 
an unconstitutional interference with parental rights.  Id. at 
68.   
¶82 Recently, courts in other jurisdictions have addressed 
the same subject matter as MMSD's incursion on parental rights 
in the matter before us.  In Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall, No. 2:22-
cv-184-LCB, 2022 WL 1521889, at *4 (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2022), the 
District Court for the Northern Division of Alabama decided that 
parents, not the state, are the proper decision-makers for 
medical treatment their child may receive involving gender-
identity and transgender treatment.  Id.  There, the parents of 
transgender children challenged and sought to enjoin enforcement 
of a newly-passed "Vulnerable Child Compassion and Protection 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
20 
 
Act" (the Act), which banned certain medical procedures used for 
the treatment of gender dysphoria in minors.14 
¶83 Parent plaintiffs claimed that the Act violated "their 
constitutional right to direct the medical care of their 
children under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  Id. at *7.  In determining whether enforcement of 
the Act should be enjoined during the lawsuit, the court 
concluded that parents had a high likelihood of success on the 
merits of their constitutional claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id.  The court reiterated that a "parent's right 'to 
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children' is one of 'the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests' recognized by the Supreme Court."  Id. at *7 (quoting 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66).  Furthermore, "[e]ncompassed within 
this right is the more specific right to direct a child's 
medical care."  Eknes-Tucker, 2022 WL 1521889, at *7 (citing 
Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 470 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing "the right of parents to generally make decisions 
concerning the treatment to be given to their children").   
¶84 Against this backdrop, the court reasoned that parents 
likely would succeed on the merits of their claim because the 
Act "prevents Parent Plaintiffs from choosing that course of 
treatment for their children by criminalizing the use of 
                                                 
14 Gender dysphoria "is a clinically diagnosed incongruence 
between 
one's 
gender 
identity 
and 
assigned 
gender. 
 
If 
untreated, gender dysphoria may cause or lead to anxiety, 
depression, eating disorders, substance abuse, self-harm, and 
suicide."  Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall, No. 2:22-cv-184-LCB, 2022 
WL 1521889, at *1 (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2022). 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
21 
 
transitioning medications to treat gender dysphoria in minors, 
even 
at 
the 
independent 
recommendation 
of 
a 
licensed 
pediatrician."  Eknes-Tucker, 2022 WL 1521889, at *7.   
¶85 When a government action "directly and substantially 
implicates a fit parent's fundamental liberty interest in the 
care and upbringing of his or her child, [governmental action] 
is subject to strict scrutiny review."  Michels, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶22. 
 
"Ordinarily, 
where 
a 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest 
protected by the substantive due process component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is involved, the government cannot infringe 
on that right 'unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.'"  Johnson v. City of 
Cincinnati, 
310 
F.3d 
484, 
502 
(6th 
Cir. 
2002) 
(quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).  The MMSD 
has identified no compelling state interest upon which MMSD 
contends the Policies are based.   
¶86 The parents renewed their request for a temporary 
injunction in their Petition for Review, and they ask us to 
grant them relief.  The pending status of the parents' motion 
before 
the 
circuit 
court 
is 
not 
a 
deterrent 
to 
our 
superintending 
authority, 
which 
is 
grounded 
in 
our 
constitutional obligation to supervise all Wisconsin courts.  In 
the exercise of our superintending authority and in order to 
afford the administration of justice in this litigation, we 
should grant the temporary injunction under the undisputed facts 
and the law presented herein.     
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
22 
 
¶87 I begin by noting that the granting of a temporary 
injunction required the parents to show:  "(1) a reasonable 
probability of success on the merits; (2) a lack of an adequate 
remedy at law; (3) that the movant will suffer irreparable harm 
in the absence of an injunction; and (4) that a balancing of the 
equities favors issuing the injunction."  Wisconsin Legislature 
v. Evers, No. 2020AP608-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Apr. 6, 
2020) (order granting leave to commence an original action and 
enjoining Executive Order No. 74); see also Kocken v. Wis. 
Council 40, 2007 WI 72, ¶22, 301 Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828 
(listing requirements for injunctive relief to be a "finding a 
likelihood of success on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable 
harm, and an inadequate remedy at law."); Spheeris Sporting 
Goods, Inc. v. Spheeris on Capitol, 157 Wis. 2d 298, 306, 459 
N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1990) (explaining a movant must show a 
reasonable probability of success on the merits, an inadequate 
remedy at law, and irreparable harm); Grootemaat, 89 Wis. 2d at 
520.   
¶88 The 
administration 
of 
justice 
often 
requires 
significant judicial effort.  But that is what the people of 
Wisconsin elected us to provide.  We are expected not to shirk 
our responsibilities when hard legal disputes are presented.  
This case is grounded in the contention that MMSD has usurped 
fundamental parental rights, some of which relate to healthcare 
decisions for their children.  The administration of justice 
requires that we not ignore the parents' plea for a judicial 
decision, as the majority opinion has done.   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
23 
 
¶89 The parents satisfy each factor necessary to success 
on their motion for a temporary injunction.  First, they have 
shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their 
claim that MMSD's Policies interfere with their constitutional 
right to raise their children as they think best.  The lack of a 
temporary injunction also keeps MMSD in charge of enabling 
healthcare choices without parental consent for children who 
have gender-identity issues.  The constitutional presumption is 
that parents will act in the best interest of their child.  
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.  Allowing a school to reassign a child's 
gender, flips this constitutional presumption on its head by 
assuming that parents will not act in their child's best 
interest.  Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution support the conclusion that MMSD's Policies cannot 
deprive parents of their constitutional rights without proof 
that parents are unfit, a hearing, a court order, and without 
according parents due process.  Instead, under MMSD's explicit 
guidelines, parents are affirmatively excluded from decision-
making unless their child consents.15  
                                                 
15 MMSD's Policies affirmatively hide information from 
parents that relates to their children.  For example, "School 
staff shall not disclose any information that may reveal a 
student's gender identity to others, including parents or 
guardians and other school staff, unless legally required to do 
so or unless the student has authorized such disclosure."  MMSD 
Policies, 9.  "Staff will respect student confidentiality 
throughout the investigation, be careful not to 'out' students 
while communicating with family/peers, and involve the targeted 
student throughout the intervention process."  Id., 11.  "In 
MMSD with the permission of our students, we will strive to 
include families along the journey to support their LGBTQ+ 
youth."  Id., 16.  "Students will be called by their affirmed 
name and pronouns regardless of parent/guardian permission to 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
24 
 
¶90 Parents have the constitutional right to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children.  Article I, Section 
1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides fundamental protection 
for that parental right.  
Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 879 
(explaining that "Wisconsin has traditionally accorded parents 
the primary role in decisions regarding the education and 
upbringing of their children.").  We have interpreted Article I, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution as affording the same 
protections as are provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mayo 
v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶35, 
383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678.  The right of parents to decide 
on the upbringing of their children has been so long established 
as "beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."  Yoder, 
406 U.S. at 232-33.   
¶91 What is occurring in Wisconsin schools has been 
occurring in other schools around the country.  Parents are 
bringing their concerns to court, and courts around the country 
have confirmed that parental constitutional rights are violated 
when they are prevented from being involved in gender-identity 
concerns of their children.  Eknes-Tucker, 2022 WL 1521889, at 
*7.  Accordingly, I conclude that parents have shown a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. 
¶92 Second, parents have no remedy at law.  Without an 
injunction to temporarily enjoin MMSD from implementing its 
policies, MMDS will continue to enforce them.  Parents will not 
be told that their child is socially transitioning to a sex 
                                                                                                                                                             
change their name and gender in MMSD systems."  Id., 18.   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
25 
 
different from that noted at birth without the child's consent, 
yet social transitioning is a healthcare choice for parents to 
make.  Without an injunction, the parents have no way of 
becoming involved in such a fundamental decision.   
¶93 Third, without an injunction the parents will suffer 
irreparable harm.  The MMSD Policies are on-going and continue 
to 
invade 
parents' 
constitutional 
right 
to 
parent 
their 
children.  Many courts consider the on-going infringement of a 
constitutional right enough and require no further showing of 
irreparable injury.  See e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 
1131 (10th Cir. 2012).  We should do so as well.   
¶94 Fourth, the balance of equities favors the parents, 
who are ready, willing and able to parent their children.  The 
public 
interest 
is 
served 
by 
validation 
of 
parental 
constitutional rights and any harm alleged by MMSD from parental 
involvement in decision-making for their children runs directly 
contrary to the presumption that parents act in the best 
interests of their children.  
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.  
Furthermore, because MMSD's Policies are carried out by school 
officials who are state actors, whose conduct described in the 
MMSD Policies infringes on the parents' constitutional right to 
make important choices for their children, the school officials 
must yield to the constitution.  Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 
307 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that "[i]t is not educators, but 
parents who have primary rights in the upbringing of children.  
School officials have only a secondary responsibility and must 
respect these rights.").   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
26 
 
¶95 The 
parents 
brought 
a 
motion 
for 
a 
temporary 
injunction to enjoin MMSD from:  (1) enabling children to 
socially transition to a different gender-identity without 
parental consent; (2) preventing teachers and other staff from 
telling parents that their child may have gender-identity 
concerns; and (3) deceiving parents by using different names and 
pronouns in front of parents than are used at school.  The 
parents have satisfied all the necessary criteria for a 
temporary injunction.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶96 In conclusion, to be clear, although I address the 
question of pseudonym use, the heart of this case is the 
fundamental, constitutional presumption that parents have the 
right to raise their children according to their beliefs of what 
is in the child's best interests.  Parental names are not 
relevant to vindicating that constitutional right.  Here, the 
circuit court erred when it concluded that it could not permit 
the parents to employ pseudonyms in this lawsuit.  The court of 
appeals erred in affirming that decision, even while noting that 
the circuit court did have the power to permit the use of 
pseudonyms.  The majority opinion errs by concluding that there 
is no authority for anonymous litigation in Wisconsin.16   
¶97 Furthermore, I conclude that we can and should employ 
our 
constitutional 
supervisory 
authority 
to 
decide 
this 
constitutional 
controversy 
because 
it 
cries 
for 
judicial 
resolution.  This court, as a court of last resort, should act 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶¶15-20.   
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
27 
 
affirmatively to grant the parents' request for a temporary 
injunction that enjoins MMSD from:  (1) enabling children to 
socially transition to a different gender-identity without 
parental consent; (2) preventing teachers and other staff from 
telling parents that their child may have gender-identity 
concerns; and (3) deceiving parents by using different names and 
pronouns in front of parents than are used at school.   
¶98 The 
majority 
opinion 
defends 
abdication 
of 
its 
responsibility to address parents' constitutional arguments by 
attacking the dissent's support of parental rights.  For the 
reasons set out above, I conclude that the circuit court erred 
in not granting the temporary injunction that was requested in 
February of 2020.  Because the majority opinion chooses not to 
decide the controversy presented, I respectfully dissent.   
¶99 I am authorized to state the Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP1032.pdr 
 
1