Title: State Ex Rel. Uhlman v. Melton
Citation: 401 P.2d 631, 66 Wash. 2d 157
Docket Number: 37592
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 1965

66 Wn.2d 157 (1965) 401 P.2d 631 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of Richard L. Uhlman et al., Appellants, v. JOSEPHINE MELTON, Respondent.[*] No. 37592. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. April 29, 1965. Hugo Metzler, Jr., for appellants. Marshall McCormick and Robert R. Hamilton, for respondent. OTT, J. This appeal is presented upon an agreed statement of facts which contains, inter alia, the following: By ordinance No. 17376, the city council increased the business and occupation tax to persons engaged in the telephone business and to persons engaged in the distribution and sale of natural gas within the city of Tacoma. *158 By ordinance No. 17373, the city council increased license fees to persons engaged in certain businesses, trades, and occupations within the city of Tacoma. These ordinances will hereinafter be referred to as the service tax ordinance and the license tax ordinance, respectively. Article 2, § 2.13, of the charter of the city of Tacoma, provides in part: The service tax ordinance was passed June 25, 1963, and published June 26, 1963. This ordinance became effective at midnight, Saturday, July 6, 1963. The license tax ordinance was passed June 25, 1963; it was published June 27, 1963, and became effective at midnight, Sunday, July 7, 1963. The referendum provision of the charter (Art. 2, § 2.21) is as follows: *159 The signatures of 4,257 qualified voters of the city of Tacoma on each of the referendum petitions were required to be filed in the office of the city clerk before the effective dates of the ordinances, in order to invoke the referendum provisions of the charter. On Friday, July 5, 1963, at 4 p.m., Richard L. Uhlman, a resident taxpayer of Tacoma, and the Pierce County Taxpapers Association filed in the office of the city clerk petitions containing the signatures of 4,769 voters for referral of the service tax ordinance, and petitions containing the signatures of 3,382 voters for referral of the license tax ordinance. The city clerk was requested to receive petitions on Saturday, July 6th, between 4 and 5 o'clock, when petitions containing the signatures of additional qualified voters would be presented. The clerk refused to keep the office open on Saturday and, when the petitions containing 1,323 and 1,305 additional signatures for referral of the service tax ordinance and the license tax ordinance, respectively, were delivered for filing before 5 o'clock on Saturday, July 6th, the office was closed. The petitions were filed on Monday, July 8, 1963, at 8:03 a.m. The clerk canvassed the 4,769 signatures for the referral of the service tax ordinance, filed Friday, July 5th. The petitions contained only 4,174 valid signatures. The clerk refused to canvass the petitions filed on Monday, July 8th, and certified to the city council that the signatures on both petitions for referendum, which were timely filed, were insufficient. Richard L. Uhlman and the Pierce County Taxpayers Association sought a writ of mandate to compel the city clerk to canvass the referendum petitions filed on Monday, July 8th. The cause was tried to the court, and, from an order denying the writ and dismissing the cause with prejudice, the relators appeal. Were the petitions for referral timely filed? The charter provisions of the article relating to referral of ordinances require (1) that the petitions contain sufficient signatures *160 of qualified voters, (2) that the petitions be filed in the office of the city clerk, and (3) that the filing date of the petitions be prior to the effective date of the ordinances. RCW 35.21.175 provides: Section 1.06.390 of the official code of the city of Tacoma provides in part: Relators concede that they failed to comply with the time requirement, but contend that, since they attempted to file petitions containing a sufficient number of qualified voters' signatures on a day when the office was not open for business, but before the effective dates of the ordinances, such tender constituted a constructive filing which met the requirements of the charter. The general rule does not support relators' contention. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 456, p. 882, states: In 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.53, p. 249 (3d ed.) it is said: Accord, 28 Am. Jur. Initiative, Referendum and Recall § 28, p. 455; 37 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 215, p. 850. [1] The rule that strict compliance with such statutory requirements is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that failure to so comply is fatal to the referral procedure has been adopted in many jurisdictions. Kochen v. Young, 252 Iowa 389, 107 N.W.2d 81 (1961); In re Loughmiller, 3 Ill. App.2d 146, 120 N.E.2d 683 (1954); State ex rel. Kurtz v. Shaffer, 155 Ohio St. 491, 99 N.E.2d 479 (1951); Pottsville Referendum Case, 363 Pa. 460, 70 A.2d 651 (1950); State ex rel. Griffith v. City of Walnut, 166 Kan. 296, 201 P.2d 635 (1949); State ex rel. Ryers v. Gibson, 183 Ore. 120, 191 P.2d 392 (1948); Kerley v. Wetherell, 61 Idaho 31, 96 P.2d 503 (1939); Carriere v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Fitchburg, 257 Mass. 287, 153 N.E. 564 (1926); Ferle v. Parsons, 210 Mich. 150, 177 N.W. 397 (1920); Aad Temple Bldg. Assn. v. City of Duluth, 135 Minn. 221, 160 N.W. 682 (1916); In re Opinion of the Justices, 114 Me. 557, 95 Atl. 869 (1915); Ralls v. Wyand, 40 Okla. 323, 138 Pac. 158 (1914); Earp v. Riley, 40 Okla. 340, 138 Pac. 164 (1914); Rushton v. Lelander, 15 Cal. App. 448, 115 Pac. 56 (1911). In State ex rel. McQuesten v. Hinkle, 130 Wash. 525, 228 Pac. 299 (1924), the candidate mailed his declaration of candidacy to the office of the Secretary of State. It arrived in Olympia on the last day for filing, but after the office had closed at 12 o'clock noon. The court held that the duty was upon the candidate to file his declaration within the statutory period, and that (p. 530) In State ex rel. Earley v. Batchelor, 15 Wn.2d 149, 130 P.2d 72 (1942), a similar issue was presented and the court again adhered to the principle that the statutory provisions relative to filing were mandatory; hence, fatal if not strictly observed. The relators were fully aware that the clerk's office was not open for business on Saturday, July 6th, and that their request that it be opened for the sole purpose of accepting the additional petitions had been denied. Under the provisions of RCW 35.21.175 and § 1.06.390 of the city code, it was necessary for the relators to present the petitions containing the signatures of a sufficient number of qualified voters in the office of the city clerk for filing by 5 p.m. on Friday, July 5, 1963, in order to accomplish the filings before the effective dates of the ordinances. [2] The fact that the city manager happened to be in the hall in front of the clerk's office on Saturday, July 6th, at approximately 5 p.m., and refused to accept the petitions on behalf of the city clerk did not constitute a constructive filing. It was stipulated that Josephine Melton was the duly qualified and acting clerk of the city of Tacoma, appointed by and responsible to the city manager and to the city council, as provided by law. The mandate of the charter is that the petitions be filed with the city clerk. In this respect, there was no constructive delivery of the petitions to the proper officer. Further, assuming that the city manager is empowered to perform the duties of the city clerk in her absence, the office was legally closed at the time the petitions were presented to him in the hallway, and there was no statutory obligation which required him to open the office for the purpose of filing the proffered petitions. Finally, relators argue that, with reference to the license tax ordinance, the tenth and last day for filing petitions fell on Sunday, July 7th, and that the filing of additional petitions on Monday was timely by virtue of RCW 1.12.040 which provides: [3] There is no act remaining "to be done" for an ordinance to become effective after its publication date. The passage of time alone is all that is required for the ordinance to become effective. RCW 1.12.040 does not purport to extend the effective date of an ordinance for an additional day of grace, should the effective date fall on Sunday. The cited statute is not here apposite. We hold that the provisions of the charter of the city of Tacoma relating to the referral of city ordinances to a vote of the people are mandatory and not directory, and that the city clerk properly refused to canvass the petitions not timely filed. The trial court denied the writ upon the ground that the tax measures enacted by the questioned ordinances were, by virtue of the charter, not subject to referendum. Because of our disposition of this cause as herein expressed, we do not reach this issue. The issue of the timeliness of the filing of the referendum petitions was within the pleadings and agreed statement of facts. Lundgren v. Kieren, 64 Wn.2d 672, 677, 393 P.2d 625 (1964), and cases cited; Peninsula Truck Lines v. Tooker, 63 Wn.2d 724, 726, 388 P.2d 958 (1964); Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 49 Wn.2d 781, 801, 307 P.2d 567 (1957), and case cited. The trial court properly denied the writ of mandate and dismissed the action. The judgment is affirmed. ALL CONCUR. [*] Reported in 401 P.2d 631.