Title: State v. Moore
Citation: 108 Ariz. 215, 495 P.2d 445
Docket Number: 2258
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 1972

108 Ariz. 215 (1972) 495 P.2d 445 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert Bruce MOORE, Jr., Appellant. No. 2258. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. April 7, 1972. *216 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by William P. Dixon and Mary Z. Chandler, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Laber, Morrow &amp; Lovallo by Paul W. Colarich, Jr., Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt and a sentence of not less than ten nor more than twenty years for the crime of robbery in violation of § 13-641 and § 13-643, subsec. B, A.R.S. We are called upon to answer three questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. On 8 April 1969, at approximately 8:00 a.m., defendant entered a convenience market in Tucson, Arizona, called "The Party House." Mrs. Uhde, a part-owner of the store, and Mrs. Torell, an employee, were in the store at that time. About five minutes later, Mrs. Uhde left the store. A few minutes later another man entered the store, and he and the defendant ordered Mrs. Torell to open the cash register and then to lie down on the floor. She stayed there until a customer arrived at the gas pumps outside, at which time she ran outside and asked the customer to call the police. A few minutes later the police arrived. Mrs. Torell, after describing the persons involved in the robbery to the police officers, was taken to the police department where she was shown a group of approximately fifty photographs and asked if she could identify any of them as either of the men who robbed her. She picked out the photograph of the defendant. Detective Angeley then drove Mrs. Torell back to the Party House where he showed the same group of photographs to Mrs. Uhde. Mrs. Uhde also picked out the photograph of the defendant. On at least three other occasions Mrs. Torell was shown the photograph of defendant, and, on at least three other occasions, she picked out defendant's photo. Mrs. Torell also identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing. The first trial of this matter ended in a mistrial. At the trial in question, counsel for the prosecution was allowed to introduce, over objections of the defendant, evidence of a robbery of a service station and attempted murder committed by the defendant and four other persons some 42 days after the crime for which defendant was being tried. During the eight days of the trial in question, the attorney for the State, Mr. Horton Weiss, interposed a continuous barrage of mostly improper objections to questions asked by the defendant's attorney. From the record before this court it is apparent that the objections were excessive in number, inartfully stated (if not ill-founded), and materially impeded the orderly course of the trial. Defendant raises several points on appeal, but we believe it necessary to consider only the three discussed below. EVIDENCE OF THE OTHER ROBBERY Defendant's first assignment of error concerns the admissibility of evidence of an armed robbery of an Enco service station and attempted murder of the station's attendant committed by defendant and four other persons some 42 days after the crime for which defendant was being tried. The general rule in Arizona has long been: See also, Greve v. State, 36 Ariz. 325, 285 P. 274 (1930) and State v. Parker, 106 Ariz. 54, 470 P.2d 461 (1970). This court, however, has recognized exceptions to this rule under which evidence of other crimes or misconduct is admissible to prove the crime charged. Such evidence is admissible when it tends to establish: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes, so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; and (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. Dorsey v. State, supra; State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960); State v. Tisnado, 105 Ariz. 23, 458 P.2d 957 (1969). From a review of the record, we can find no facts which would bring the robbery of the Enco station within the exception recognized by the Arizona cases. The State argues that the evidence of the Enco robbery shows a "common scheme or plan" in that there were similarities in the two crimes. As examples of such similarities, the State points to the fact that the defendant and his participant in the Party House robbery were the only active participants in the Enco robbery, although there were allegedly five participants involved in the Enco robbery. In addition, the State points to the fact that a gun was used in each robbery, both robberies were timed to occur when the business was empty of customers, and both robberies were the "hit and run" type with automobiles used as the escape vehicle in each. The State further contends that there was a "plan" to rob the Enco service station. As to the "common plan or scheme" exception, this court has stated: The areas of similarity pointed to by the State as evidence of a plan common to each robbery are not areas where dissimilarity would be expected. The use of guns and getaway vehicles and the occurrence of the robberies at times when there were no customers can hardly be relied upon to show a common plan or scheme. Furthermore, the allegation by the State that the Enco robbery was planned in no way leads to the conclusion that it was part of an overall plan which also included the Party House robbery, nor does the record lead to such a conclusion. See State v. Little, supra. As to the admissibility of this evidence to prove identity, while it may be true that one of the participants in the Enco robbery also participated in the robbery of the Party House, the connection ends there. The robberies took place 42 days apart; there was nothing in the "modus operandi" of the robberies that would identify the perpetrator of the Enco robbery as the perpetrator of the Party House robbery, nor were the circumstances surrounding the robberies sufficiently similar to prove identity. See Greve v. State, supra: We agree with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals: There is no doubt that the evidence of the Enco robbery was highly prejudicial, especially due to the fact that the prosecution was allowed to go into the details of not only the robbery, but also the attempted murder. We believe it was error to admit the evidence of the other unrelated robbery. THE MUG SHOT The prosecution presented evidence, over objections, that after the robbery and before the arrest of the defendant, the two witnesses who worked at the market identified the defendant from among some 50 photographs. The photograph identified "Exhibit A" below was admitted over objection into evidence. *219 Defendant contends that it was error to have this "mug shot", obviously taken some time before the crime for which he was on trial, admitted in evidence and shown to the jury. The jury was also told that the photograph was taken some two months before the crime for which he was being tried. We have had occasion to rule on the use of the term "mug shot" by a police officer testifying at trial. In that case, even though the mug shot was not shown to the jury, we held that the use of the term by the police officer was reversible error, stating the words "mug shot" could lead the jury to only one conclusion that the defendant had been previously arrested: Our Court of Appeals has more recently reversed a conviction in a case wherein a mug shot was admitted in evidence at trial with tape covering the numbers. The Court of Appeals stated: Although the mug shot admitted in the instant case was scissored to remove the numbers from the photograph, the testimony indicated it was taken before his arrest and we hold that its admission was prejudicial error. State v. Jacobs, supra, and State v. Cumbo, supra. MISCONDUCT OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Defendant's final contention is that the prosecuting attorney so misconducted himself during the trial as to deny the defendant a fair trial. A review of the record discloses that, on several occasions, counsel for the prosecution was admonished for arguing with the judge and interrupting defense counsel with repeated objections, most of which were overruled. For example: "THE COURT: One at a time. He has never had the question answered yet, Mr. Weiss, because you have objected every time, and I overruled it, and then when he asked to have it reread, you objected again. As he asked the officer a question, and in addition thereto said if you need to refresh your mind, look at your report. If the officer doesn't have to look at his report, if he knows the answer without looking at it "MR. MORROW: Your Honor, the only point now, I should be proceeding, but I think counsel said that it's correct he said these things, we have counsel's affirmation that he said this. "MR. WEISS: Who said it? "THE COURT: One at a time. Don't interrupt one another. "MR. MORROW: Maybe could we please have read back what counsel said? "MR. WEISS: He knows what I said. If he wants to go over there and listen to it, that has no materiality or relevancy, and I was explaining my objection to the Court. And that is in the case. "THE COURT: I realize everyone is talking at one time. Don't both of you talk at one time. I told you about 12 times, and the 13th time will be the last time." And: "MR. WEISS: I object to him looking he is inferring actually, what he is doing is looking "MR. MORROW: I never heard the objection yet that I can't look at something. "MR. WEISS: Object to the form of the question, making a statement, and also writing statements. "THE COURT: All right. Ask a question. Don't interrupt him until he asks the question, then we will see if you have a logical objection. If you do, make it. *220 If you don't, don't make it. "Q (By Mr. Morrow): Okay. Let's get a point for the question. On July 16th, you saw Mrs. Torell; is that correct? "MR. WEISS: Well, asked and answered. "THE COURT: We have got to have a starting point again. This is a starting point. He saw her July 16th. Go ahead. "Q (By Mr. Morrow): Then you had mentioned that Bobby had done it; is that correct? You have already said that. Is that correct? "MR. WEISS: I object to this repetitious rephrasing. If he said it, he said it. Why, he already said it. "THE COURT: You are right, he has already said it. He is trying to get the next question off the ground for the last 20 minutes, and you keep objecting. Now he has to go back to the preamble so he can ask a question. Now, ask the question. "Q (By Mr. Morrow): Is that correct? "A That's correct. "Q And it was also correct prior to your saying that she had not been able to identify Bobby Moore "MR. WEISS: I am going to object to that as a misstatement, and it should be stricken. She did not say that, and it would be hearsay. And he said that is not correct before. And it's an improper question. "THE COURT: This is cross examination. I am sure if she did not say that, the officer will say she didn't. "THE WITNESS: That is very much incorrect. "Q (By Mr. Morrow): Please direct your attention to the report which we have been discussing, and do you have your report and the part I am talking about? "MR. WEISS: He doesn't need the report. Just ask the question. "THE COURT: If Mr. Morrow wants him to look at the report for the purpose of possibly refreshing his recollection, he may do so. The officer said "MR. WEISS: May I ask the witness a question on voir dire to find out? "MR. MORROW: We were there a half an hour ago. "THE COURT: All right. If the report will refresh his recollection, you may refer to it and give an answer. "Q (By Mr. Morrow): Please refer to your report. "MR. WEISS: I object. If he needs to. He hasn't indicated he needed to. This is a misleading question, improper question as to form. "THE COURT: He asked him a question; the officer said the question that he asked him was very much incorrect; so now Mr. Morrow has the opportunity to ask the officer to look at his own report made that day to see if it refreshes his recollection to the contrary. It may not. "MR. WEISS: Wait a minute. He didn't say anything about the contrary. "THE COURT: That is what he implied. "MR. WEISS: Let the implication stand." And: "Q You recall that now only because Mr. Weiss let me finish "THE COURT: Mr. Weiss, don't break in; let him ask his question. Your breaking in is purely argumentative. We don't want any more arguments. If you have any objections, make them in the proper manner. But you go ahead, Mr. Morrow. You may ask the question. "Q Incidentally, it is correct that this person we are talking about would be a boy or a young man, but not generally classified as a man? "MR. WEISS: Well, I am going to object to that. That is a conclusion, boy or young man, but he is not a man. "THE COURT: All right. It may call for conclusions. Rephrase the question and let, if you will, *221 "Q (By Mr. Morrow): In which category would you want to put the person that walked into the store: A boy, man or young man? "MR. WEISS: I object, immaterial and irrelevant. "THE COURT: If she has an impression in her mind, she may answer it. Did you form such an impression at that time? "THE WITNESS: Young man. "Q (By Mr. Morrow): If I were to leave out young man and just say boy or man, which of the two categories "MR. WEISS: Objection. That is immaterial and irrelevant, and it is argumentative now. She was asked what category she would put him in, and now she is being asked to put him out of the category. "THE COURT: If she can differentiate now between boy and man, she may do so, if she can form such an impression. "MR. WEISS: Let me show my continuing objection to being immaterial and irrelevant and argumentative, and misleading. "Q (By Mr. Morrow): Is it misleading or confusing to you? "A Yes. "Q I will withdraw it. "MR. WEISS: I will object to the remark of counsel and ask the question and the answer "MR. MORROW: Your Honor, counsel is repeatedly making comments as I go along. "MR. WEISS: I am objecting to it. "THE COURT: Look, gentlemen, from now on, one at a time speak. I don't want more than one at a time speaking. If one of you asks a question that the other disagrees with and feels that it is legal objection, base your objection very distinctly and clearly, and don't argue with one another. So let's go ahead." The court commented to Mr. Weiss at one time: The reporter's transcript shows that in 490 pages in which defendant's counsel was cross-examining the State's witnesses Mr. Weiss interposed over 850 objections, plus over 200 other interruptions. Mr. Horton Weiss was well aware at the time of this trial that his professionally immature conduct was not proper. The Court of Appeals as early as 1965 discussed Mr. Weiss's conduct: The Court of Appeals has also stated: *222 See also Weiss v. Superior Court of Pima County, 106 Ariz. 577, 480 P.2d 3 (1971), in which this court stated, in upholding a finding of the Superior Court that Mr. Horton Weiss was in contempt for misconduct: The citizens of this State may expect that when a person is convicted of a crime the verdict of the jury and judgment of the trial court will be upheld if, under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and law of the State of Arizona, we are allowed to do so. However, the natural reluctance of the appellate courts of this State to reverse criminal convictions should not be considered a license to ignore the rules of evidence and minimum standards of conduct in the courtroom. The record herein indicates that Mr. Horton Weiss was guilty of the most unprofessional and immature conduct which impeded the orderly reception of evidence, restricted the right of cross-examination by the defendant, and measurably extended the time it took to try the case. Misconduct alone will not cause a reversal, as a new trial should not be granted to punish counsel for his misdeeds, but where the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel, we will reverse. In the instant case, the conduct of Mr. Weiss was so outrageous and improper that this court is required to reverse and remand the matter for new trial. In doing so, we wish to quote from two early Arizona cases: As Chief Justice Dunne of the Arizona Territory Supreme Court stated almost one hundred years ago: Reversed and remanded for new trial. STRUCKMEYER and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.