Title: Commonwealth v. Fan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13207
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 2022

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SJC-13207 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PINGXIA FAN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 9, 2022. - August 9, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Trafficking.  Prostitution.  Deriving Support from Prostitution.  
Money Laundering.  Practice, Criminal, Severance, Trial of 
defendants together, Instructions to jury.  Grand Jury.  
Evidence, Inflammatory evidence, Exculpatory, Testimony 
before grand jury. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 29 and September 12, 2017. 
 
The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
David M. Osborne for the defendant. 
Susanne G. Reardon, Assistant Attorney General (Nancy O. 
Rothstein & Gretchen Pallas Brodigan, Assistant Attorneys 
General, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Megan A. Siddall for Timothy Hayes. 
Rebecca E.S. Pritzker, Cynthia D. Vreeland, Felicia H. 
Ellsworth, Eliza R. Green, & Makenzi G. Herbst for Amirah, Inc., 
& another. 
2 
 
Michael W. Morrissey, District Attorney, & Tracey Cusick, 
Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the 
Norfolk district. 
Andrea Harrington, District Attorney, & Patrick Sadlon, 
Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the 
Berkshire district. 
Ian Stone, pro se. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant and one of her codefendants were 
convicted of multiple counts of human trafficking, deriving 
support from prostitution, keeping a house of ill fame, and 
money laundering for their roles in operating multiple brothels 
in the greater Boston area.  The defendant maintains that the 
trial judge erred in denying her motion to sever her trial from 
that of her codefendant, permitting the introduction of unduly 
prejudicial testimony, and declining to allow the admission of 
exculpatory grand jury testimony.  The defendant also challenges 
asserted errors in particular jury instructions, which she 
argues alone warrant a new trial. 
 
This case requires us to consider certain elements of the 
offense of human trafficking under G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), a 
relatively new provision intended to combat sex trafficking in 
the Commonwealth.  In the defendant's view, the identity of a 
trafficking victim is an essential element of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 50 (a), and therefore the trial judge erred by declining to 
instruct the jury to that effect.  We conclude, as a matter of 
first impression, that a defendant may be convicted of human 
3 
 
trafficking under G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), so long as the jury 
find that the defendant knowingly trafficked another person, 
regardless of whether that person is specifically identified.  
The defendant also argues that, to ensure juror unanimity, the 
jury must be instructed that they must all agree on the identity 
of a specific victim where, as here, there is evidence of 
multiple potential victims.  Because the trafficking offenses at 
issue here were charged as ongoing criminal schemes, rather than 
as discrete instances of trafficking, we conclude that such an 
instruction was not warranted, and the trial judge did not err 
in declining to provide one. 
 
Discerning no error in any of the other challenged 
decisions by the trial judge, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain facts for later discussion.  
The defendant was involved in a romantic relationship with one 
of her codefendants, Timothy Hayes, and was friends with the 
other codefendant, Simon Lin.  Witnesses described both men as 
being "in love" with her.  Following a joint investigation by 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Timothy Hayes 
in support of the defendant, as well as the amicus briefs 
submitted by Amirah, Inc., and My Life My Choice; Ian Stone; the 
district attorney for the Norfolk district; and the district 
attorney for the Berkshire district, in support of the 
Commonwealth. 
4 
 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, 
investigators began to suspect that the defendant, Hayes, and 
Lin were working together to operate five brothels located in 
North Reading, Boston, Quincy, and Cambridge. 
 
Over the course of several months, police conducted 
surveillance of each of the suspected brothels.  The defendant 
was observed at each location, often carrying trash or groceries 
and occasionally driving women to or from the suspected 
brothels.  Police also frequently observed men waiting outside 
each location.  The men often were admitted to the apartments by 
young "Asian women," many of whom came to the door wearing only 
a bathrobe. 
 
Police interviewed several of the men after they left the 
apartments; the men conceded that, while inside, they had 
exchanged money for sexual services.  The men each reported that 
they went to the apartments after having seen an advertisement 
for a massage on the website Backpage.com (Backpage).2  When they 
 
2 "Backpage.com (Backpage) [was] a website that allow[ed] 
individuals to advertise a variety of products and services 
through user-generated posts."  Commonwealth v. Lowery, 487 
Mass. 851, 853 n.1 (2021).  Although Backpage was used to 
advertise many legal goods and services, it became well known 
for hosting "80 percent of the online advertising for illegal 
commercial sex in the United States."  See Citron & Wittes, The 
Problem Isn't Just Backpage:  Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 
Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 453, 453 (2018).  See also Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017); Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 
5 
 
called the telephone number listed in the advertisement, an 
unknown woman with what the men described as an "Asian accent" 
would answer and would direct the men to one of the five 
locations.  The men would arrive at the designated apartment and 
would pay between $130 and $320 in cash to the individual woman 
they met, who then would provide a brief massage before 
initiating sexual contact. 
 
Police subsequently secured and simultaneously executed 
warrants to search each of the apartments under investigation.  
When the search warrant was executed at the location in Boston, 
police found the defendant, her son, and two women.  In one of 
the Quincy locations, police found two women and one male, later 
identified as the husband of one of the other occupants.  The 
other locations each were occupied by two women.  The apartments 
were sparsely furnished; they each had at least two bedrooms 
containing little more than a mattress on the floor.  At each 
location, police discovered cash hidden in various places, a 
substantial number of used and unused condoms, and handwritten 
documents that appeared to be ledgers listing various amounts of 
money. 
 
Police learned that the defendant leased two of the 
apartments and held another lease jointly with Hayes for one of 
 
F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 46 
(2016). 
6 
 
the apartments.  Hayes individually leased the remaining two 
apartments.  Investigators obtained several Backpage 
advertisements appearing to reference the apartments by 
location, one of which included the defendant's cellular 
telephone number, and two of which were posted using an 
electronic mail address registered in the defendant's name.  The 
defendant's telephone records showed that she had been in 
communication with two of the men who admitted to having paid 
for and received sexual services at the apartments. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  After the execution of the search 
warrants, the defendant was arrested and charged with one count 
each of human trafficking, deriving support from prostitution, 
keeping a house of ill fame, and conspiracy, separately for each 
of the five alleged brothels, as well as three counts of money 
laundering.  She subsequently was indicted by the grand jury on 
these charges.  The defendant's case was joined for trial with 
that of both of her codefendants; the three codefendants' motion 
for relief from prejudicial joinder was denied after a hearing.3 
 
At trial, the prosecutor introduced testimony from a number 
of law enforcement officers, as well as from several men who 
testified that they had received sexual services in exchange for 
 
 
3 In opposition to the motion for relief from prejudicial 
joinder, the Commonwealth offered to omit Hayes's incriminating 
statement to police involving his codefendants, so long as the 
three codefendants' cases remained joined for trial. 
7 
 
cash payments at the suspect locations.  The prosecutor was 
unable to locate the majority of the suspected trafficking 
victims, but introduced photographs of each of the women who had 
been found in the apartments, and provided names for each. 
 
Two of the victims, BX and CWQ,4 testified at trial.  BX 
testified that she came to Massachusetts to perform massage work 
after having connected with the defendant through an Internet 
messaging service.  Upon arriving in Boston, the defendant told 
her that, in addition to massage services, she was expected to 
provide sexual services, and BX complied.  BX testified that the 
defendant, whom she referred to as "the boss," would drive her 
between the apartments in Boston, Quincy, and North Reading, 
where she would engage in sexual contact with men in exchange 
for a fee.  BX said that she would use condoms provided by the 
defendant, and kept a ledger of her customers, as the defendant 
required.  BX testified that, on average, she would see three to 
five customers per day, and would give the defendant between 
thirty-eight and forty-four percent of her earnings.  BX also 
testified that there were other women in the apartments who 
worked for the defendant and who provided sexual services in 
exchange for cash. 
 
4 All of the victims are referenced by pseudonyms.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 24C. 
8 
 
 
CWQ testified that she came to Boston in order to perform 
massage work after hearing about an available job from a friend.  
CWQ said that a Chinese woman picked her up from the bus station 
and brought her to the apartment in Boston, where she engaged in 
sexual contact with male customers for a fee.  CWQ explained 
that she would give some of the money she earned to the woman 
who met her at the bus stop, whom she described as "older 
sister," but did not identify by name.5 
 
Before beginning deliberations, the jury were provided with 
verdict slips for each offense charged, separately for each of 
the five different locations.  The jury found the defendant 
guilty of five counts of human trafficking, G. L. c. 265, § 50; 
five counts of deriving support from prostitution, G. L. c. 272, 
§ 7; four counts of keeping a house of ill fame, G. L. c. 272, 
§ 24; and three counts of money laundering, G. L. c. 267A, § 2.6  
 
5 CWQ testified that, in Chinese culture, "older sister" is 
a "polite expression" used to refer to someone older than 
oneself. 
 
6 Hayes was convicted of those same charges.  Prior to jury 
deliberations, the Commonwealth dismissed the conspiracy charges 
against both the defendant and Hayes, and the jury acquitted 
them of one count of keeping a house of ill fame.  At 
sentencing, the defendant also pleaded guilty to a sixth charge 
of human trafficking, arising from her role in operating a 
brothel in a Quincy hotel while she was on bail in August 2017.  
Lin, who was charged with only one count of human trafficking, 
was acquitted. 
9 
 
The defendant timely appealed, and we transferred the case to 
this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
committed multiple errors that, individually and collectively, 
require a new trial.  The asserted errors include the denial of 
the defendant's motion to sever on the ground of mutually 
antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses, evidentiary rulings on 
the admissibility or exclusion of specific testimony, and 
inaccuracies in the jury instructions.  In particular, the 
defendant maintains that the judge should have allowed her 
motion to introduce grand jury testimony by two alleged 
trafficking victims who did not testify at trial, and should 
have excluded testimony by a witness who saw an "extremely 
frightened" woman not far from one of the apartments.  The 
defendant also contends that the instructions did not apprise 
the jury of each of the elements of the offense of human 
trafficking, invited a nonunanimous verdict, and improperly 
lowered the Commonwealth's burden of proof. 
 
a.  Severance.  Prior to trial, the defendant moved to 
sever her trial from that of her codefendants; she argued that 
joinder was prejudicial because the codefendants would be 
presenting mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses.  
The codefendants joined the motion.  At a hearing on the motion, 
counsel for Hayes stated that he would be arguing "that [Hayes] 
10 
 
didn't really understand what was going on," but, rather, "was 
being used by [the defendant] and she ran the whole thing."  The 
defendant's attorney confirmed that he, too, would be "pointing 
fingers" at Hayes.  The judge concluded that the defendant did 
not adequately demonstrate that she would suffer undue prejudice 
from the joinder. 
 
"It is presumed that '[w]hen criminal charges against two 
or more individuals "arise out of the same criminal conduct,"' 
those two individuals will be tried together."  Commonwealth v. 
Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 167 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Siny 
Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 542 (2011).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 9, 
378 Mass. 859 (1979).  Nonetheless, a judge may sever a case, 
thereby granting each defendant his or her own trial, if "it 
appears that a joinder . . . is not in the best interests of 
justice."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (d) (1).  Joinder is not in the 
best interests of justice if (1) the defenses are "mutually 
antagonistic (or mutually exclusive) and irreconcilable," 
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 836 (2012), or (2) "the 
prejudice resulting from a joint trial is so compelling that it 
prevents a defendant from obtaining a fair trial," Siny Van 
Tran, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 
(1982).  See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 391 
(2015).  Defenses are considered mutually antagonistic and 
irreconcilable if "[t]he sole defense of each was the guilt of 
11 
 
the other" or "the acceptance of one party's defense will 
preclude the acquittal of the other," Vasquez, supra at 836-837, 
quoting Moran, supra at 656-657; "it is not enough that the 
defendants are hostile to one another or that one defendant 
would have a better chance of acquittal if tried alone," 
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 486 (1999).  We review 
the denial of a motion for severance for an abuse of discretion.  
See id. 
 
The defendant contends that severance was required because 
her defense and Hayes's defense were mutually antagonistic and 
irreconcilable.  The defendant asserts that she and Hayes 
"largely did not challenge the allegation that someone had 
trafficked women for prostitution, but instead argued that, 
whatever was done, it was done by the other." 
 
The defendant's characterization of these arguments, 
however, is belied by the record.  See Commonwealth v. Vallejo, 
455 Mass. 72, 88 (2009), quoting K.B. Smith, Criminal Practice 
and Procedure § 20:31, at 188 & n.5 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2008) 
("The true level of alleged antagonism between the defenses is 
measured, on appeal, by the evidence actually at trial").  See 
also McAfee, 430 Mass. at 486 & n.1 (examining closing arguments 
in determining whether severance was required); Moran, 387 Mass. 
at 654 (examining opening statements in determining whether 
severance was required).  The record indicates that the 
12 
 
defendant's primary defense at trial was that she and the other 
women at the apartments were prostitutes, but that no one was 
trafficked.  In closing, trial counsel for the defendant thrice 
asserted that this case is about prostitution, and not human 
trafficking.  He emphasized that there was no evidence that the 
women at the apartments were being held against their will and, 
at one point, criticized law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors for aggressively pursuing crimes of prostitution 
rather than devoting scarce resources to more serious crimes.  
The defendant's counsel only briefly implicated Hayes, in a 
comment that "Hayes has a lot of evidence against him," as well 
as suggesting that some of the evidence against the defendant 
ultimately was attributable to Hayes. 
 
Hayes's primary theory of defense at trial was that the 
Commonwealth failed to satisfy its burden of proof to establish 
that he knowingly participated in the trafficking scheme.  In 
opening, counsel for Hayes said, "[T]he reason your verdict 
should be not guilty is that nobody, nobody is going to get on 
this witness stand and testify as to the essential facts that 
the Commonwealth is asking you to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Hayes's counsel continued to follow this strategy in 
closing, where he emphasized that the jury should "look at the 
things that the Commonwealth did not prove, the witnesses they 
did not put on, the evidence you did not hear from."  Counsel 
13 
 
for Hayes argued that any evidence against Hayes "ultimately 
[was] attributable to [the defendant]," whom Hayes asserted had 
manipulated him into unwittingly becoming involved in the 
defendant's trafficking scheme.  Nonetheless, casting blame on 
the defendant constituted only a small part of Hayes's argument; 
the majority of the argument focused on what counsel contended 
the Commonwealth had not proved. 
 
Although they were no doubt hostile, the two defenses did 
not rise to the level of being mutually antagonistic and 
irreconcilable, as the jury could have accepted either 
codefendant's argument while at the same time acquitting the 
other.  See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 749 (2015), 
quoting Moran, 387 Mass. at 657 ("'mutual antagonism' only 
exists where the acceptance of one party's defense will preclude 
the acquittal of the other").  Had the jury believed the 
defendant's assertion that the women at the apartments were 
prostitutes but not victims of trafficking, both she and Hayes 
could have been acquitted.  See Ramos, supra (severance was not 
required where "[a]cceptance of [the codefendant's] 
defense . . . would not have precluded acquittal of the 
defendant," but rather "could have led to the conclusion that 
the defendant, too, should be acquitted").  Similarly, the jury 
could have believed that the Commonwealth did not satisfy its 
burden of proof with regard to Hayes, without finding the 
14 
 
defendant guilty, if they discredited or otherwise found 
insufficient the evidence Hayes attributed to the defendant's 
actions.  See Hernandez, 473 Mass. at 391 (defenses were not 
mutually antagonistic where "the defendant did not need the jury 
to believe that [his codefendants] were guilty in order to 
obtain an acquittal").  Although each codefendant tried to 
attribute some of the incriminating evidence to the actions of 
the other, that, alone, did not require severance, given that 
the primary defenses were not mutually antagonistic.  Compare 
Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. at 543 (severance was not required 
where each defendant attributed incriminating statement to 
codefendant, but "[n]either defendant presented a 'sole defense' 
based on the guilt of the other"); Vallejo, 455 Mass. at 87 
(severance was not required where defendant argued that evidence 
tending to incriminate him was attributable to codefendant's 
guilt). 
 
b.  Grand jury testimony.  The defendant sought to 
introduce at trial testimony by two women, QB and XYC, before 
the grand jury, under the prior recorded testimony exception to 
the rule against hearsay.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(1) 
(2022).  Both women had testified before the grand jury that 
they had provided massages at the apartments, but denied having 
engaged in any sort of sexual contact for money.  At the time of 
trial, neither woman could be located.  After concluding that 
15 
 
the statements constituted hearsay that did not fall within any 
exception, the judge denied the defendant's motion to introduce 
the prior recorded grand jury testimony.  The defendant argues 
that it was prejudicial error for the judge to exclude this 
exculpatory testimony. 
 
Hearsay "is generally inadmissible unless it falls within 
an exception to the hearsay rule."  Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 
Mass. 291, 305 (2004).  One such exception, concerning prior 
recorded testimony, permits the introduction of hearsay where 
the statement was "[(1)] given by a person, now unavailable, 
[(2)] in a proceeding addressed to substantially the same issues 
as in the current proceeding, [(3)] with reasonable opportunity 
and similar motivation on the prior occasion for cross-
examination of the declarant by the party against whom the 
testimony is now being offered."  Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 
Mass. 340, 355 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Trigones, 397 
Mass. 633, 638 (1986).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(1).  Grand 
jury testimony may be admissible under this exception, although 
"[i]t is likely to be very difficult for defendants offering 
grand jury testimony to satisfy the 'opportunity and similar 
motive' test," given that "by its very nature, the testimony 
provided to a grand jury is limited."  Commonwealth v. Clemente, 
452 Mass. 295, 315 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009), 
quoting United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 
16 
 
1997).  "A determination whether there was opportunity and 
similar motive is fact specific and dependent on the particular 
circumstances."  Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 Mass. 731, 746 n.18 
(2012). 
 
Here, the questioning of QB and XYC demonstrates that the 
prosecutor's motive at the grand jury was "to present enough 
evidence to obtain an indictment, and not to develop [the 
Commonwealth's] case as fully as possible."  Clemente, 452 Mass. 
at 314.  For instance, for reasons that are not clear on the 
record, when QB and XYC denied having engaged in prostitution, 
the prosecutor did not make any effort to challenge or otherwise 
discredit that testimony.  See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 
909, 914 (2d Cir. 1993).  Because several other witnesses 
apparently testified for the Commonwealth,7 the prosecutor might 
have discerned little if any reason to attempt to extract 
additional inculpatory testimony from QB and XYC.  See 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 384 Mass. 377, 385 (1981).  In 
addition, at the time of the grand jury proceedings, the 
Commonwealth might not have had a meaningful opportunity to 
challenge the testimony because the investigation was still 
ongoing at that stage.  See Clemente, supra at 315 (no 
meaningful opportunity to develop testimony if Commonwealth does 
 
 
7 The record includes grand jury testimony only by specific 
witnesses and not the entire transcript of the proceedings. 
17 
 
"not yet possess evidence with which to confront and contradict 
an adverse witness").  Indeed, the proceedings before the grand 
jury were conducted only one day after the execution of the 
search warrants, whereas the Commonwealth continued to compile 
evidence for two years after the grand jury returned the 
indictments.  This later-obtained evidence included evidence of 
commercial sexual activity that, if it had been available,8 could 
have been used to call into question QB's and XYC's denials of 
having engaged in sex for money.  See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523 
(government had no meaningful opportunity to discredit witness 
at grand jury where record did not show that government had any 
evidence available with which to confront or contradict 
witness).  Accordingly, the judge did not err in declining to 
allow the introduction of the grand jury testimony. 
 
c.  Unduly prejudicial testimony concerning unknown woman.  
The defendant argues that the judge erred in allowing the 
introduction of testimony about a witness's interactions with an 
unknown woman near one of the alleged brothels.  The witness 
testified that, in early April 2017, she had been driving past 
the apartment complex in North Reading, where the alleged 
 
8 Although the parties contest whether the witnesses were 
truly unavailable, in light of our conclusion that the defendant 
did not demonstrate that the Commonwealth had the same 
opportunity and motive to develop the witnesses' testimony at 
the grand jury proceedings, we need not consider this issue.  
See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 355 (2001). 
18 
 
brothel was located, when she saw an "extremely frightened" 
young woman waving her arms in the nearby woods.  The witness 
described the woman as Asian, approximately fifteen to twenty 
years old, wearing a short bathrobe but with bare legs and bare 
feet.  When the driver (the witness's husband) stopped the 
vehicle, the woman ran to and attempted to enter it, while 
hurriedly asking to be driven to "Chinatown."  The witness did 
not allow the woman to enter, but indicated that she would 
summon help and called the police.  At some point during the 
call, the woman left the area.  The woman was not located or 
identified. 
 
The judge permitted the witness, over the defendant's 
objection, to testify about having seen the woman.  The judge 
limited the testimony to what the witness had observed and 
excluded any statements by the witness about her own feelings 
regarding the incident, or any speculation about the unknown 
woman's mindset. 
 
Evidence is not admissible if "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."  Gray, 463 
Mass. at 751, quoting Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 192 
(2010).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403.  "In weighing the probative 
value of evidence against any prejudicial effect it might have 
on a jury, we afford trial judges great latitude and discretion" 
and will uphold a judge's decision unless it constitutes an 
19 
 
abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 
752 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002). 
 
Although the evidence bore only a tenuous connection to the 
charged crimes, we cannot say that the judge abused her 
discretion in concluding that it was probative; it tended to 
support the Commonwealth's contention that human trafficking 
activity was taking place at or near the North Reading apartment 
complex.  See Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 613 (1982) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring), quoting P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts 
Evidence 408 (5th ed. 1981) ("To have probative worth the 
evidence offered must tend to show, with a fair degree of 
probability, the fact for which it is offered as proof").  In 
conjunction with other evidence before them, the jury could have 
inferred that the woman was one of the individuals engaged, 
perhaps unwillingly, in commercial sexual activity at the 
apartment.  Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's conclusion that the evidence had some probative value, 
even though the woman was not definitively linked to the 
defendant's trafficking activity.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 744-745 (1990) (evidence of blood in 
car of defendant charged with murder was admissible, even though 
expert "was unable to determine whether the blood was human or 
animal in origin," and therefore bore only inconclusive 
connection to crime). 
20 
 
 
Nonetheless, we recognize that the evidence was, as the 
defendant contends, highly prejudicial.  The testimony about the 
woman's frightened demeanor, in particular, risked "appeal[ing] 
to the jury's sympathies, arous[ing] [their] sense of horror, 
[and] provok[ing] [their] instinct to punish."  See Carter v. 
Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980), quoting 1 J. Weinstein 
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 403(03), at 403-15 to 403-17 
(1978).  See also Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 646 
(2017).  Although the judge attempted to minimize the risk of 
prejudice by limiting the scope of the witness's testimony, the 
permitted testimony nonetheless was inflammatory.  See 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 190 (2017). 
 
A determination whether the risk of prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence is for the trial 
judge, who is in the best position to evaluate the effect of the 
evidence and therefore enjoys broad discretion in the matter.  
See Commonwealth v. Lewin (No. 2), 407 Mass. 629, 631 (1990).  
"While it is a close call, and we might have reached a different 
result had the question been de novo before us, we are unable to 
conclude that the judge abused [her] discretion . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131, 145 (2015), cert. denied, 
579 U.S. 906 (2016). 
 
d.  Jury instructions.  The defendant asked the judge to 
instruct the jury in her final charge that, for each count of 
21 
 
human trafficking, they must "be unanimous as to at least one 
human person" that the defendant had trafficked at the specific 
location set forth on the verdict slip.  The request was denied, 
and the judge instead instructed the jury, sua sponte, that 
"[t]he Commonwealth need not prove the identity of the person or 
persons engaged in prostitution, so long as it proves that one 
or more persons were engaged in commercial sexual activity at 
the location identified by the verdict slip."  The defendant 
objected when the judge issued the denial, but did not object to 
the instruction subsequently provided. 
 
The defendant argues that, by declining to instruct the 
jury as she requested, the judge did not inform them of an 
essential element of the offense of human trafficking, and that 
this, in turn, created a risk that the jury would convict the 
defendant without unanimously agreeing on the underlying 
criminal act, thereby depriving her of her right to a unanimous 
jury.  The defendant also argues that the instruction the judge 
gave sua sponte "wrongly suggested that the jury could convict 
even if the defendants were not connected to acts of 
prostitution that occurred at the apartments." 
 
i.  Specific victim.  It is axiomatic that a "jury verdict 
in a criminal trial must be unanimous."  Commonwealth v. Cyr, 
433 Mass. 617, 621 (2001).  Thus, in order to convict, a jury 
must find unanimously that the Commonwealth proved each of the 
22 
 
required elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 Mass. 741, 752 (2010), 
quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Due process 
requires that the government prove 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt . . . every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which [the defendant] is charged'").  In addition, the jury must 
be "unanimous as to which specific act constitutes the offense 
charged."  Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 Mass. 508, 512 (1995), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 566-567 (1987).  
Accordingly, an instruction that jurors unanimously must agree 
on a particular victim is warranted if the identity of the 
victim is an element of the offense, see Commonwealth v. Reyes, 
464 Mass. 245, 259 (2013), or if it is necessary to prevent the 
possibility of the jury convicting the defendant without 
agreeing on the particular criminal act, see Conefrey, supra 
at 513.  The defendant's argument invokes both possibilities. 
 
General Laws c. 265, § 50 (a), the human trafficking 
statute, provides, in relevant part: 
"Whoever knowingly . . . subjects . . . recruits, entices, 
harbors, transports, provides or obtains by any means . . . 
another person to engage in commercial sexual 
activity . . . or causes a person to engage in commercial 
sexual activity . . . shall be guilty of the crime of 
trafficking of persons for sexual servitude . . . ."9 
 
 
9 "Commercial sexual activity" is defined as "any sexual act 
on account of which anything of value is given, promised to or 
received by any person."  G. L. c. 265, § 49. 
23 
 
The defendant argues that the identity of the particular 
trafficking victim is an essential element of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 50 (a), and therefore the jury unanimously must agree "on a 
person who was trafficked for each count."  In her view, such an 
element can be inferred from the Legislature's use of the words 
"another person" and "a person" in this provision.  The 
defendant also maintains that, because the clear legislative 
intent in adopting G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), was to protect 
victims of human trafficking, the Legislature must have intended 
to require the Commonwealth to prove the existence of a specific 
victim. 
"To ascertain the elements of a crime we ordinarily look to 
the statutory language."  Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 
483 (1983).  We interpret the statutory language "according to 
the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 
(2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  "Ordinarily, we do 
not look to extrinsic sources to vary the plain meaning of a 
clear, unambiguous statute unless a literal construction would 
24 
 
yield an absurd or unworkable result."  Commonwealth v. 
Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 300-301 (2007).  "We will not 'read 
into [a] statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there.'"  Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 (2015), 
quoting Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of 
the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 
(2006).  "Any reformulation of the statutory crime . . . is a 
matter for the Legislature."  Commonwealth v. Bell, 455 Mass. 
408, 414 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. 
LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754 (2016). 
We begin with the plain meaning of what the defendant 
identifies as the operative statutory language:  "another 
person" and "a person."  See G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a) (prohibiting 
certain activities enabling "another person to engage in 
commercial sexual activity" or "caus[ing] a person to engage in 
commercial sexual activity").  In common usage, "another" is 
defined as "other than oneself or the one specified."  See 
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 85 (1996).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497, 501 (2017) 
(relying on dictionary definitions to interpret statute).  
"Person," in ordinary use, means "a human being."  See Webster's 
New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, supra at 1445.  Therefore, 
as ordinarily understood, the phrases "another person" and "a 
person" appear to indicate that (1) the trafficking must be of a 
25 
 
human being, compare G. L. c. 272, § 77C (prohibiting 
"obtain[ing] an animal with the intent that the animal be used 
for sexual contact"); and (2) one cannot be convicted of 
trafficking him- or herself,10 compare G. L. c. 272, § 53A 
(prohibiting "engag[ing] in sexual conduct with another person 
in return for a fee").  This plain reading of the language 
comports with the Legislature's intent to "change the focus of 
police and prosecutors from targeting prostitutes to going 
after . . . the pimps who profit from the transactions" by 
ensuring that traffickers, and not only the individuals solely 
engaged in commercial sexual activity, are prosecuted.  
Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 Mass. 839, 853, cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 127 (2018), quoting Gov. Patrick Signs Bill Against Human 
Trafficking, Associated Press, Nov. 21, 2011.  Thus, these 
 
 
10 Our decision in Lowery, 487 Mass. at 864, where we 
concluded that a trafficking victim participated in a joint 
venture with the defendant, her trafficker, "to engage in 
commercial sexual activity," id. at 861, is not to the contrary.  
There, we considered whether a victim of human trafficking could 
be deemed to have engaged in a joint venture with her trafficker 
within the meaning of Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E), which 
permits the introduction of out-of-court statements made by 
coventurers in furtherance of a joint venture.  See Lowery, 
supra at 860.  It does not follow, however, that the victim was 
involved in a joint venture to traffic herself -- as opposed to, 
for example, the separate crime of aiding and abetting 
prostitution -- nor does it follow that she could be charged 
with as much under G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a).  See Commonwealth v. 
Dabney, 478 Mass. 839, 855, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 127 (2018) 
(noting that crime of aiding and abetting prostitution is 
distinct from human trafficking). 
26 
 
phrases do not, as the defendant contends, require proof of a 
victim's identity.  Compare United States vs. Jones, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 1:05-cr-617-WSD (N.D. Ga. July 18, 2007) ("[t]he 
identity of a particular victim is not an element" of Federal 
antihuman trafficking statute, notwithstanding statute's use of 
phrases "another person" and "a person"). 
Accordingly, to establish a violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 50 (a), the Commonwealth need only prove that a defendant 
(1) knowingly (2) "enabled or caused," by one of the statutorily 
enumerated means, (3) another person (4) to engage in commercial 
sexual activity.  See Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 418 
(2015) (G. L. c. 265, § 50 [a], prohibits "individuals or 
entities from knowingly undertaking specified activities that 
will enable or cause another person to engage in commercial 
sexual activity").  See also Dabney, 478 Mass. at 857 
(references to "enabling" or "causing" prostitution are "a 
short-hand means of describing the various ways in which a 
person may violate the human trafficking statute," as enumerated 
in G. L. c. 265, § 50 [a]).  Although the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a victim, i.e., 
someone whom the defendant enabled or caused to engage in 
commercial sexual activity, it need not prove the identity of 
that person as an element of the offense. 
27 
 
To be sure, the Commonwealth may, and often will, elect to 
prove a victim's identity in order to demonstrate that the 
defendant enabled or caused that individual's commercial sexual 
activity.  See, e.g., Dabney, 478 Mass. at 840.  But the 
Commonwealth need not do so as part of its burden of proof.  See 
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999) 
(distinguishing element of crime and facts that may be used to 
establish that element). 
The defendant argues that interpreting the statute not to 
require a specifically identified victim does not give effect to 
the Legislature's intent to protect victims of trafficking.  We 
agree that the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), 
because it wanted to protect victims from the harms of human 
trafficking.  See McGhee, 472 Mass. at 420 (recognizing "the 
Legislature's intent to protect victims of sex trafficking").  
It sought to do so by filling a gap in Massachusetts law and 
permitting prosecution of traffickers in the Commonwealth rather 
than being forced to rely upon prosecution by Federal 
authorities under the Federal statute.  See Dabney, 478 Mass. 
at 853; Office of the Governor, Press Release, Governor Patrick 
Signs Anti-Human Trafficking Legislation, (Nov. 21, 2011)  
(Legislature intended to protect victims by providing law 
enforcement with "modern and effective tools to confront the 
28 
 
people who profit from enslaving others").11  See also Weekly 
Roundup -- From the State House to the Courthouse, State House 
News Service, May 27, 2011 (human trafficking legislation will 
"secure the safety of folks across the Commonwealth . . . by 
helping our law enforcement officials combat the horrific 
practice of human trafficking").  Our conclusion does nothing to 
undermine these related purposes; to the contrary, requiring 
proof of a victim's identity potentially could result in less 
protection for victims, by making it more difficult to prosecute 
offenders.12 
 
11 Available at https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream 
/handle/2452/125841/ocn795183245-2011-11-21b.PDF?sequence=1 
[https://perma.cc/SB6F-MDEG]. 
 
12 Victims of human trafficking often suffer significant 
emotional and physical trauma, which may manifest in persistent 
mistrust of individuals and their motives, including those 
attempting to offer assistance.  See United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, Human Trafficking into and within the 
United States:  A Review of the Literature 14 (Aug. 29, 2009), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_legacy_files//
43241/index.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2PR-WR7P].  Moreover, victims 
of human trafficking often may be homeless or otherwise 
transient, and frequently may be foreign nationals.  See id. at 
7-8.  The confluence of these circumstances may result in 
difficulty in maintaining contact with and ensuring the 
cooperation of victims throughout the course of a prosecution, 
as could be necessary to prove a victim's identity beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial.  See Farrell, Owens, & McDevitt, New 
Laws but Few Cases:  Understanding the Challenges to the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Human Trafficking Cases, 61 
Crime, L. & Soc. Change 139, 158 (2014) (in multijurisdictional 
study, "more than half of the [trafficking] victims who 
initially cooperated with prosecutors refused to cooperate or 
went missing as the case progressed"). 
29 
 
The defendant also argues that proof of a victim's identity 
is necessary to preclude a violation of the protections against 
double jeopardy.  "The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and protections 
recognized in Massachusetts statutory and common law, prevent a 
defendant from being tried more than once for the same offense."  
Commonwealth v. Love, 452 Mass. 498, 502 (2008).  The defendant 
argues that, if a jury do not identify and agree unanimously on 
a particular victim, there would be no way to discern which 
particular act a defendant was found to have committed, and thus 
no way to prevent duplicative convictions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 523 (2005).  We attempt to preclude 
duplicative convictions, however, by discerning "what 'unit of 
prosecution' was intended by the Legislature as the punishable 
act," and by barring subsequent prosecution for the same act, 
rather than by grafting additional elements onto an offense.  
See Commonwealth v. Traylor, 472 Mass. 260, 268 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Botev, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 281, 286 (2011). 
In addition, the defendant contends that, even if in some 
circumstances the jury need not agree on a particular 
trafficking victim for each conviction of trafficking, they 
nonetheless should be required to do so where, as here, there 
are multiple possible victims for each charge.  Absent such a 
requirement, the defendant maintains, there would be no way to 
30 
 
ensure that the jurors agreed on what prohibited act she 
committed, because the jury could convict her while disagreeing 
as to which individual she trafficked. 
 
"A specific unanimity instruction 'indicates to the jury 
that they must be unanimous as to which specific act constitutes 
the offense charged.'"  Commonwealth v. Palermo, 482 Mass. 620, 
629 (2019), quoting Keevan, 400 Mass. at 566-567.  Such an 
instruction is necessary where "the evidence raises the 
possibility" that "the jury might mistakenly believe that they 
could convict the defendant even if they disagreed as to which 
of the alleged criminal acts he [or she] had committed."  See 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 285 (2003), overruled on 
other grounds by Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012).  This possibility arises most 
frequently "when, 'on a single charged offense, the prosecutor 
presents evidence of separate, discrete incidents, any one of 
which would suffice by itself to make out the crime charged.'"  
Palermo, supra, quoting Santos, supra at 284-285.  Accordingly, 
where the Commonwealth presents evidence of two or more acts 
against different victims on a single charge, we have required 
the jury unanimously to agree on a particular victim.  See, 
e.g., Palermo, supra at 629-631 (specific unanimity instruction 
was required where Commonwealth presented evidence that 
defendant threatened two individuals within short period of 
31 
 
time, but was charged with only one count of threatening to 
commit crime). 
 
Where the Commonwealth proceeds on a theory that the 
criminal act was "a continuing course of conduct," however, or 
"a single criminal scheme or plan carried out consistently 
overtime," a specific unanimity instruction is not required.  
See Santos, 440 Mass. at 285-286, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Thatch, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 905 (1995) (no specific unanimity 
instruction required to sustain conviction of armed robbery 
based on "a single criminal episode, with multiple applications 
of force and threats of force inflicted on the occupants of the 
apartment during that episode").  In such circumstances, the 
Commonwealth alleges only one criminal act, consisting of a 
continuing course of conduct or a single criminal scheme.  See 
Santos, supra.  Thus, the "jury will either believe that [the 
course of conduct or criminal scheme] has occurred, of necessity 
encompassing a number of discrete acts, or they will disbelieve 
it" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 423 Mass. 591, 
600 (1996).  Because, in those circumstances, "a jury are not 
offered a choice between discrete incidents . . . to support a 
single charge, the risk of a lack of unanimity . . . does not 
exist."  Id. 
 
To determine whether an act was charged as a continuing 
course of conduct or as a single criminal scheme, we look to the 
32 
 
evidence and arguments as they were presented to the jury.  
Compare Conefrey, 420 Mass. at 514 (specific unanimity 
instruction was required in prosecution for indecent assault and 
battery where Commonwealth presented evidence of several 
discrete instances of abuse), with Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, 
423 Mass. 436, 443, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1015 (1996), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 
217 (2005) (no risk of nonunanimous verdict in prosecution for 
indecent assault and battery where Commonwealth introduced 
evidence of continuing course of abuse, consisting of multiple 
undifferentiated acts). 
 
The defendant's argument presupposes that each victim 
represents a separate and distinct criminal act.  Although 
trafficking offenses frequently may be prosecuted under such a 
theory, see, e.g., McGhee, 472 Mass. at 408-409, in this case 
they were not.  Rather, the charges were based on the theory 
that the actions at each alleged brothel constituted a distinct 
criminal scheme to traffic multiple women.  The Commonwealth's 
case relied upon evidence of a criminal scheme to sell the 
sexual services of various women at each of the alleged 
brothels, carried out consistently over time.  See Conefrey, 420 
Mass. at 513-514 (analyzing evidence at trial to determine 
whether specific unanimity instruction was required); 
Commonwealth v. Steed, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 463, 469-470 (2019) (no 
33 
 
specific unanimity instruction was required where "the 
Commonwealth based its prosecution for human trafficking on but 
one theory of guilt -- an ongoing course of conduct by the 
defendant offering sexual services of various women"). 
 
Here, the evidence was presented largely in generalities 
concerning all of the victims; there was scant evidence of 
particular actions against specific victims.  Compare 
Kirkpatrick, 423 Mass. at 442-443 (no risk of nonunanimous jury 
where evidence was presented in generalities such that jury 
would have had no basis to differentiate between different 
incidents).  Indeed, many of the actions alleged to have 
established trafficking here involved a pattern of behavior 
directed at multiple victims, rather than at individual victims, 
and thus provided no basis upon which the jury could have 
differentiated between the victims.13  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Pimental, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 328-329 (2002) (no specific 
unanimity instruction was required where Commonwealth based 
 
13 For example, the Commonwealth alleged that the defendant 
posted Backpage advertisements offering sexual services.  The 
advertisements did not offer the services of any particular 
victim, but, rather, apparently relied upon generic pictures of 
women, such that any given photograph could not be used to link 
a particular woman to a specific advertisement.  Similarly, the 
Commonwealth alleged that the defendant provided the women with 
supplies such as condoms and personal lubricant.  Because, under 
the Commonwealth's theory, all of the women working at the 
apartments would use these supplies, there would have been no 
basis for the jury to conclude that this action was taken 
against one victim, but not another. 
34 
 
larceny prosecution on "a single theory of culpability, directed 
to a single larcenous plan, involving multiple stolen items"). 
 
In her opening statement and closing argument, the 
prosecutor did not rely upon any particular instances of 
trafficking, but, rather, discussed evidence of the 
codefendants' general pattern of behavior.  See Commonwealth v. 
Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 139-140 (2001) (analyzing 
Commonwealth's opening and closing statements to determine 
whether specific unanimity instruction was warranted).  Indeed, 
the prosecutor noted on multiple occasions that this case was 
about an unlawful "business" that was "selling sex," thus 
underscoring that its theory turned on a general scheme to 
traffic women, rather than on distinct acts of trafficking. 
 
In sum, the trafficking and associated offenses were 
charged and tried as distinct criminal schemes, rather than as 
"a succession of clearly detached incidents."  See Santos, 440 
Mass. at 285.  For each charge, there was only one theory of 
culpability, based on an ongoing trafficking scheme involving 
multiple victims.  Accordingly, there was no realistic 
possibility that the jurors would convict the defendant while 
disagreeing as to what she had done, and a specific unanimity 
instruction thus was not required. 
 
ii.  Jury instructions.  In lieu of the defendant's 
requested instruction, the judge instructed the jury that "[t]he 
35 
 
Commonwealth need not prove the identity of the person or 
persons engaged in prostitution, so long as it proves that one 
or more persons were engaged in commercial sexual activity at 
the location identified by the verdict slip sometime between 
January 1, 2017 and May 4, 2017."  In the defendant's view, this 
instruction erroneously suggested that the defendant could be 
convicted of trafficking so long as the jury found that someone 
engaged in prostitution at the apartments, regardless of the 
defendant's connection, or lack thereof, to such conduct. 
 
"When reviewing jury instructions, we 'evaluate the 
instruction as a whole, looking for the interpretation a 
reasonable juror would place on the judge's words.'"  
Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 46 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 349 (2016).  "We do not 
consider bits and pieces of the instruction in isolation."  
Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 207 (2012).  Rather, we 
evaluate "the adequacy of instructions . . . in light of their 
over-all impact on the jury."  Commonwealth v. Galford, 413 
Mass. 364, 372 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1065 (1993), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 231-232 (1980). 
 
The defendant is certainly correct that the Commonwealth 
must establish an appropriate connection between the defendant's 
trafficking behavior and the victim's commercial sexual 
activity.  As we have previously stated, to be found guilty of 
36 
 
human trafficking under G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), a defendant must 
"enable or cause another person to engage in commercial sexual 
activity" via one of the statutorily enumerated means.  See 
McGhee, 472 Mass. at 418. 
 
Nonetheless, the judge's instructions, when viewed as a 
whole, adequately conveyed this standard.  Before providing the 
challenged instruction, the judge clearly explained the elements 
of G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a),14 employing language substantially 
similar to both the statute and the instruction approved in 
Dabney, 478 Mass. at 856.  The challenged instruction did 
nothing to rescind or to alter these elements but, rather, 
clarified that the Commonwealth need not identify any particular 
victim, so long as it proved that there were one or more victims 
for each charge, that is, someone the defendant caused or 
enabled to engage in commercial sexual activity.  In light of 
 
14 The judge's instructions on the elements were as follows: 
 
"In order to prove any one of these defendants guilty of 
[human trafficking], the Commonwealth must prove 
essentially two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
first element can be divided into two subparts.  That is, 
the Commonwealth satisfies this first element if it proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant:  A) 
subjected, recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, 
provided, or obtained by any means a person or persons to 
engage in commercial sexual activity at the particular 
location identified by the verdict slip; or B) caused a 
person or persons to engage in commercial sexual activity 
at the location identified in the verdict slip.  The second 
element that the Commonwealth must prove is that the 
defendant engaged in this conduct knowingly." 
37 
 
this, no reasonable juror would have concluded that the 
defendant could have been convicted solely on a finding that 
someone had engaged in prostitution at the indicated location.  
See Commonwealth v. Lynch, 439 Mass. 532, 543, cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 1059 (2003) (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of 
justice where "the judge's charge, read as a whole, could not 
have been understood to relieve the Commonwealth of its burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.