Title: The Florida Bar v. Gerald John D ambrosio
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-922
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-922 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
GERALD JOHN D’AMBROSIO, 
Respondent. 
 
[October 19, 2006] 
CORRECTED OPNION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by 
Gerald John D’Ambrosio.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For 
the reasons explained herein, we disapprove the referee’s recommendation that 
D’Ambrosio be disbarred.  Instead, we impose a one-year suspension.   
FACTS 
 
The Florida Bar filed a five-count complaint against Gerald John 
D’Ambrosio alleging that he failed to provide notice of his suspension to his 
clients and the courts, failed to execute written contingency fee agreements, failed 
to provide competent representation, charged an excessive fee, and appeared in 
court while suspended from the practice of law.  After holding a hearing, the 
referee issued a report in which he made the following sparse findings and 
recommendations.  
 
Count I.  D’Ambrosio was retained by Karl Bachert to file a corporate 
bankruptcy for Reecie’s Ristorante Italiano (Reecie’s), an Italian restaurant, in 
which Bachert owned a fifty-one percent interest.  There was no written agreement 
concerning the terms and conditions of D’Ambrosio’s employment.  Although 
Bachert paid D’Ambrosio $1450, D’Ambrosio never filed the corporate 
bankruptcy petition.  Bachert discharged D’Ambrosio and retained substitute 
counsel to file the bankruptcy petition.  D’Ambrosio never returned any unearned 
fees or provided Bachert with any accounting. 
 
Bachert later discovered that D’Ambrosio was the registered agent for Kayk 
International Trading, Inc., (Kayk), a Florida corporation.  After Reecie’s closed, 
Kayk operated a restaurant at the premises where Reecie’s was previously located.   
 
Count II.  D’Ambrosio was retained by Randy Dennis in connection with 
Dennis’s arrest.  Again, there was no written agreement concerning the terms and 
conditions of D’Ambrosio’s employment.  D’Ambrosio was paid $3000 in advance 
for the representation.   
 
In January 2002, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a ninety-day suspension 
for D’Ambrosio, effective February 22, 2002.  D’Ambrosio failed to furnish a copy 
 
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of his suspension order to Dennis.  Further, on March 7, 2002, while his 
suspension was in effect, D’Ambrosio “appeared on behalf of Randy Dennis” 
before a Palm Beach County circuit court judge.  Dennis later discharged 
D’Ambrosio and retained other counsel.  D’Ambrosio never returned any unearned 
fee or provided Dennis with an accounting.   
 
Count III.  D’Ambrosio was retained by David Friedman in connection with 
a divorce.  During his ninety-day suspension, D’Ambrosio “appeared on behalf of 
David Friedman” before another Palm Beach County circuit court judge.  
D’Ambrosio failed to furnish Friedman with a copy of his suspension order.  
Friedman retained another lawyer to represent him in connection with the divorce. 1
 
Count IV.  D’Ambrosio was retained by Richard Appelman in connection 
with a mortgage foreclosure.  There was no written agreement concerning the 
terms and conditions of D’Ambrosio’s employment.  D’Ambrosio and Appelman 
understood that D’Ambrosio would be paid an unspecified fee, contingent on the 
success of the foreclosure.  D’Ambrosio filed an answer and affirmative defenses 
to the mortgage foreclosure and a counterclaim for compensatory and punitive 
damages.  D’Ambrosio was not paid any funds in connection with the mortgage 
foreclosure.  Appelman endorsed a $70,000 check, payable to Appelman, over to 
                                          
 
1.  For counts II and III, the referee did not provide any facts describing 
D’Ambrosio’s actions in the circuit courts.  Thus, it is unclear whether 
D’Ambrosio was merely present in the courtrooms or whether he attempted to act 
as an attorney representing Dennis and Friedman. 
 
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D’Ambrosio’s trust account.  The check was deposited but never cleared 
D’Ambrosio’s trust account. 
 
Count V.  D’Ambrosio was retained by Appelman in connection with a 
personal injury claim.  There was no written agreement concerning the terms and 
conditions of D’Ambrosio’s employment.  D’Ambrosio and Appelman understood 
that D’Ambrosio would be paid an unspecified fee, contingent upon the success of 
the personal injury claim.  Appelman discharged D’Ambrosio and settled the claim 
for an unspecified amount.   
 
Without analyzing the facts or discussing any case law, the referee 
recommended disbarment.  In the same abbreviated manner, the referee found that 
D’Ambrosio violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(g) (upon service of 
suspension order, respondent shall furnish a copy of the order to all clients, 
opposing counsel or co-counsel, and all courts); 4-1.1 (a lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client, which requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation); 4-1.5(a) 
(an attorney shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, 
prohibited, or clearly excessive fee or cost); 4-1.5(f)(1) (a contingent fee shall be in 
writing); 4-1.16(d) (upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to 
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest, such as surrendering 
papers and property to which the client is entitled); 4-3.4(c) (a lawyer shall not 
 
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knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal); and 4-8.4(a) (a 
lawyer shall not violate the rules of professional conduct).   
 
D’Ambrosio petitions this Court for review, arguing that the referee’s 
findings of fact are insufficient to support the recommended sanction of 
disbarment.   
ANALYSIS 
 
A referee’s finding of fact carries with it a presumption of correctness that 
should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.  Fla. 
Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Fla. 2005).  Absent a showing that the 
referee’s findings are clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support, this 
Court is precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for 
that of the referee.  Id.
In this case, the crucial issues are intertwined with the events that took place 
before the circuit courts in counts II (Dennis) and III (Friedman), while 
D’Ambrosio was suspended.  Although this Court defers to the referee’s findings 
of fact, the referee did not make adequate findings demonstrating that D’Ambrosio 
engaged in the practice of law at the circuit court proceedings.  Further, the record 
of the disciplinary proceeding indicates that there are extremely different accounts 
of what took place at those circuit court proceedings.  The referee did not discuss 
those differing accounts, make any credibility findings, resolve conflicts in the 
 
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evidence, or present specific factual findings.  Without elaboration, the referee’s 
report simply states that D’Ambrosio “appeared” on behalf of Dennis and 
Friedman.  The report does not provide any findings of fact to clarify the nature of 
the appearances.  The referee’s report does not tell this Court whether D’Ambrosio 
filed papers, presented arguments, counseled Dennis or Friedman, or otherwise 
actively represented either former client before the court.  Thus, there is 
insufficient support for the conclusion that D’Ambrosio’s presence at the 
proceedings was an attempt to continue representing the former clients.  In fact, 
testimony in the disciplinary record suggests that D’Ambrosio may have attended 
those circuit court proceedings solely to ensure a smooth transition of his former 
clients’ cases to their new attorneys.  D’Ambrosio’s mere attendance at a 
courtroom proceeding, without any accompanying activities or misconduct, does 
not necessarily support a conclusion that he continued to engage in the practice of 
law while suspended.   
With regard to the disciplinary sanction, this Court does not hesitate to 
disbar attorneys who continue to engage in the practice of law while suspended.  
See Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 916 So. 2d 647, 654 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Heptner, 887 
So. 2d 1036, 1045 (Fla. 2004); Fla. Bar v. McAtee, 674 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1996).  
Further, in Florida Bar v. Brown, 635 So. 2d 13, 13 (Fla. 1994), this Court stated 
that a “[c]lear violation of any order or disciplinary status that denies an attorney 
 
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the license to practice law generally is punishable by disbarment.”  In this case, the 
referee’s report and the record do not sufficiently establish that D’Ambrosio 
clearly violated this Court’s order of suspension by appearing in court.  In addition 
to the inadequacy of factual findings, the referee’s report also fails to conduct an 
analysis of the facts in light of the case law.  Given these deficiencies in the record 
and the referee’s report, there is an insufficient basis for this Court to disbar 
D’Ambrosio.  See Fla. Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1970) (holding that the 
evidence did not present the proof necessary to warrant the findings of guilt and 
disbarment); see also Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 892 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2004) (stating 
that disbarment is an extreme measure of discipline and should be resorted to only 
in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly 
inconsistent with approved professional standards).  Instead of disbarment, the 
record supports a suspension. 
  In determining the length of the suspension, the record establishes that 
D’Ambrosio demonstrated a complete disrespect for the disciplinary process by 
failing to comply with the disciplinary rules.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(g) 
(respondent is required to furnish a copy of a suspension order to clients, opposing 
counsel, and the courts, and to provide the Bar with an affidavit listing all persons 
and entities that were furnished copies of the order).  D’Ambrosio did not provide 
his clients, the courts, and some opposing counsel with notice of his suspension.  
 
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Further, the testimony establishes that D’Ambrosio never advised Dennis of his 
suspension.  In fact, immediately before the hearing discussed in count II, 
D’Ambrosio informed Dennis that he could not represent Dennis further in the 
case due to a heart or pacemaker problem, not because of a suspension. 
D’Ambrosio’s misconduct is further demonstrated by his failure to comply 
with rule 3-5.1(g), a duty encompassed in this Court’s January 17, 2002, order of 
suspension.  Pursuant to rule 3-5.1(g), within thirty days of service of this order, 
D’Ambrosio was required to file an affidavit with the Bar listing the names and 
addresses of all persons and entities to whom he sent copies of his suspension 
order.  He did do so until approximately a year later.  By this misconduct, 
D’Ambrosio willfully ignored this Court’s January 17, 2002, order of suspension.  
This disrespect for an order of this Court merits the imposition of serious 
discipline. 
With the exception of finding that D’Ambrosio continued to engage in the 
practice of law, the record supports the referee’s remaining recommendations of 
guilt.  For example, with regard to count I, D’Ambrosio is guilty of violating rules 
4-1.1(competence), 4-1.5(a) (excessive fees), and 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not 
violate the rules of professional conduct).  D’Ambrosio failed to return Bachert’s 
phone calls, falsely represented to Bachert that he filed the corporate bankruptcy 
petition, and ultimately failed to file the petition that he was paid to file.  See Fla. 
 
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Bar v. Centurion, 801 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2000) (approving referee’s conclusion 
that respondent was guilty of violating rule 4-1.1 by failing to file all required 
documents, failing to follow up on the filing of the documents, and failing to 
comply with court orders).  Next, rule 4-1.5(a) provides that a fee is clearly 
excessive when “a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and 
firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee for services provided to such 
a degree as to constitute clear overreaching.”  Because D’Ambrosio never filed the 
corporate bankruptcy petition, and never returned any portion of the paid $1450 
fee, the referee’s conclusion is clearly supported.  See Fla. Bar v. Carlon, 820 So. 
2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2002) (approving referee’s conclusions that respondent violated 
the rules regarding excessive fees).   
For counts II and III, the referee found that D’Ambrosio violated rules 3-
5.1(g) (notice to clients, opposing counsel and courts of suspension order) and 4-
3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under a tribunal’s rules).  As 
previously discussed, D’Ambrosio did not give notice of his suspension to his 
clients, the courts, and some opposing counsel.  Therefore, the referee properly 
found that D’Ambrosio violated rules 3-5.1(g) and 4-3.4(c).  See generally Fla. Bar 
v. Heptner, 887 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2004) (lawyer found guilty of violating rule 3-
5.1(g)). 
 
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With regard to counts IV and V, D’Ambrosio violated rule 4-1.5(f)(1) 
(written contingency fee agreement).  Appelman’s testimony reveals that there was 
no written contingency agreement in either the mortgage foreclosure case or the 
personal injury case.  Thus, the referee’s finding that D’Ambrosio violated rule 4-
1.5(f)(1), which requires a contingency fee agreement to be in writing, is 
supported. 
In addition to these rule violations, the referee found four aggravating 
factors:  (1) a pattern of misconduct; (2) multiple offenses; (3) a refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; and (4) previous disciplinary 
offenses.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1999) (recognizing that the 
Court sanctions more harshly for cumulative misconduct than for isolated 
misconduct).  Further, the referee specifically found that there are no mitigating 
factors. 
In light of D’Ambrosio’s disregard of this Court’s order of suspension (as 
evidenced by his failing to timely inform clients and others of his suspension), the 
numerous rule violations, the four aggravating factors, and the lack of any 
mitigating factors, we impose a one-year suspension.  See Fla. Bar v. Golden, 563 
So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1990) (imposing a one-year suspension due to the seriousness of 
respondent’s failure to abide by his suspension, failure to inform the client of his 
suspension, failure to return funds, his lack of remorse, and his past disciplinary 
 
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actions).  Further, for D’Ambrosio to be reinstated to the practice of law in Florida, 
he must establish his rehabilitation, in part, by providing an accounting to The 
Florida Bar as well as to Bachert, Dennis, and Friedman of the funds those clients 
paid D’Ambrosio in advance.  As a condition of reinstatement, D’Ambrosio shall 
refund any unearned amounts to those clients.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s conclusory finding that Gerald 
John D’Ambrosio continued to engage in the practice of law while suspended.  We 
also disapprove the referee’s recommendation of disbarment for D’Ambrosio.  
Instead of disbarment, Gerald John D’Ambrosio is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law for one year.  To be reinstated, he must make an affirmative 
demonstration of rehabilitation in accord with the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 
as well as satisfy the conditions discussed herein. 
 
This suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion 
so that Gerald John D’Ambrosio can close out his practice and protect the interests 
of existing clients.  If D’Ambrosio notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer 
practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court 
will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  D’Ambrosio 
shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is 
reinstated.  
 
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Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Gerald John 
D’Ambrosio in the amount of $3,136.27, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth L. Marvin, Director of Lawyer 
Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, Lorraine C. Hoffman, Bar 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Yvette M. Trelles, Past 
Vice Chair, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant, 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, PLC, Tamarac, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
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