Title: In the Matter of K. H.
Citation: 2021 OK 33
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2021

In the Matter of K. H. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Appellants Taylor Hudson (Mother) and Cody Hudson (Father) appealed a trial court's judgments terminating their parental rights to their biological children, K.H., C.H., E.H., and C.H. Both judgments were entered on separate jury verdicts finding that clear and convincing evidence supported each parent's “heinous and shocking physical abuse” on another child of Father. After review on rehearing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: (1) admitting evidence of State's pending criminal child abuse charges against Parents; and (2) giving a jury instruction that listed the criminal charges to support State's amended petition for immediate termination of parental rights was “so inherently prejudicial” that it violated Parents' right to a fair trial. The judgments were reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . IN THE MATTER OF K. H. 2021 OK 33 Case Number: 118035 Decided: 06/08/2021 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. IN THE MATTER OF K. H., C. H., E. H., and C. H., Deprived Children: TAYLOR HUDSON, Respondent/Appellant, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Petitioner/Appellee. CODY HUDSON, Respondent/Appellant, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Petitioner/Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY Honorable Cassandra M. Williams, Trial Judge ¶0 Parents seek reversal of judgments terminating their parental rights for heinous and shocking physical abuse following jury verdicts entered in Oklahoma County. They challenge the admission of evidence of their pending criminal child abuse charges and the inclusion of the charges in a jury instruction. Parents argue the evidence was irrelevant, highly prejudicial and violated their right to a fair trial. We hold the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the evidence, and we remand for a new trial. MATTER PREVIOUSLY RETAINED FOR DISPOSITION; REHEARING GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT ISSUED MAY 12, 2020 IS WITHDRAWN AND THIS OPINION ORDERED SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. Phillip P. Owens II, OWENS LAW OFFICE, PC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Taylor Hudson, Stephanie Marston Younge, YOUNGE LAW FIRM, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Cody Hudson, Jaclyn Rivera, Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent State of Oklahoma, Tracey Jordan Esaw, Assistant Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the Children. ROWE, J.: ¶1 Appellants Taylor Hudson (Mother) and Cody Hudson (Father) appeal the trial court's judgments terminating their parental rights to their biological children, K.H., C.H., E.H., and C.H. Both judgments were entered on separate jury verdicts finding that clear and convincing evidence supported each parent's heinous and shocking physical abuse on another child of Father. After review on rehearing, this Court holds that 1) admitting evidence of State's pending criminal child abuse charges against Parents; and 2) giving a jury instruction that listed the criminal charges to support State's amended petition for immediate termination of parental rights was so inherently prejudicial that it violated Parents' right to a fair trial. The judgments are reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial. BACKGROUND ¶2 Father has two sons, R.H. and B.H., from a prior relationship that ended without a legal custody agreement. Father's relationship with Mother, then Taylor Ainsworth, began in 2012 while they lived in Tulsa. R.H. and B.H. visited with them one or two weekends per month. ¶3 In January 2015, Father and Mother (collectively, Parents) had a son, C.H. Parents moved to Oklahoma City in October 2015, and in December 2015, their daughter, E.H., was born prematurely with heart problems that required surgery. R.H. and B.H. were visiting with Parents during Spring Break when Parents were notified about E.H.'s surgery. Father's calls to the boys' mother were unanswered, so he drove them to stay with their maternal aunt in Tulsa. Upon arriving, Parents were greeted by the boys' mother, who displayed anger with Father in front of the boys. Thereafter, R.H. and B.H.'s visits and communications with Father decreased. ¶4 Parents had a second son, C.H., in November 2017. The following month, R.H. and B.H.'s maternal grandmother called Father to inform him about R.H.'s disclosure of sexual abuse by a friend and that their mother was being evicted from her apartment. ¶5 In February 2018, the maternal aunt contacted Father concerned with the boys' health and safety while living with their mother, who had used money for her electric bill to buy drugs. Parents agreed to let the boys live with them again and leased a house in Midwest City, Oklahoma. ¶6 After the boys' relocation, B.H. began threatening to harm himself and others. During a DHS visit with the boys in June 2018, DHS reported a bruise on B.H.'s side and dark circles under his eyes. A child abuse pediatrician evaluated R.H. and B.H., concluding in her report they had been psychologically abused while living with their mother in Tulsa and that B.H.'s bruising was consistent with the boys' explanations.1 In July 2018, Father discussed B.H.'s continued behavior with the maternal aunt and maternal grandmother, who agreed B.H. should live with them in Tulsa. R.H. remained in Midwest City with Father and Father's other children--the children subject to this action. ¶7 On August 27, 2018, the Midwest City police received a report of possible child abuse to R.H. and went to Parents' house to check on him. The officers were told R.H. was not home. After confirming R.H.'s absence, the officers left and contacted the person who reported the abuse to verify R.H.'s reported location. During a recheck of Parents' house, officers found R.H. wrapped in a blanket in the dryer where Father had placed him when the officers first arrived. Father was arrested and jailed. ¶8 Following R.H.'s forensic evaluation, Mother, then six months pregnant, was arrested and jailed on or about August 28, 2018. The same day, State petitioned for emergency custody of C.H., E.H., and C.H., which the trial court approved after a hearing on August 29, 2018. ¶9 On or about September 6, 2018, Parents were legally married. Six days later, State filed its initial petition against Parents for adjudication of C.H., E.H. and C.H. as deprived children and for immediate termination of parental rights based on shocking and heinous physical abuse to the children's half-sibling, R.H.2 ¶10 Mother gave birth to Parents' fourth child, K.H., on December 6, 2018, after which DHS immediately took the newborn into custody. State filed an amended petition on December 18, 2018, adding K.H. as an alleged deprived child.3 On January 24, 2019, Father entered a no contest stipulation to the amended petition's deprived allegations, and the trial court adjudicated the children deprived as to Father only. ¶11 The jury trial was held May 7-10, 2019, on the issues of the children's deprived status as to Mother and for termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights.4 At the close of State's case-in-chief, the trial court found sufficient evidence to adjudicate the children deprived as to Mother. After the trial court denied Parents' demurrer to the evidence, Mother presented her defense, in which only she and Father testified. Father called no witnesses in his defense, but introduced numerous exhibits that the court admitted into evidence. ¶12 The jury rendered separate verdicts for each child, finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of each parent's parental rights due to heinous and shocking physical abuse to the child or a sibling of the child (R.H.). Two judgments terminating each parent's rights to K.H., C.H., E.H., and C.H. were entered on May 10, 2019. By order of this Court, Parents' separate appeals were consolidated and retained for disposition. ISSUES RAISED BY PARENTS ¶13 On appeal, Parents assert the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of pending criminal charges, which included an exhibit of the State's criminal information for child abuse filed against them.5 They also assert the trial court abused its discretion by giving Jury Instruction No. 8, which refers to the criminal child abuse charges.6 Parents argue the evidence of the criminal charges was irrelevant to the issues to be decided by the jury, highly prejudicial, and prevented their right to a fair trial. Parents also assert insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdicts based on heinous and shocking physical abuse on a sibling. ¶14 Three facts distinguish this parental rights termination proceeding from this Court's prior parental rights termination decisions. First, the challenged criminal child abuse charges arise out of the same facts on which State's amended petition is based -- and was offered against Parents prior to conviction.7 Second, State's petitions seek to adjudicate the children deprived concurrently with termination of parental rights based on heinous and shocking physical abuse against their sibling.8 Third, over Parents' objections, evidence of the pending criminal charges was admitted during the termination jury trial. CHALLENGED EVIDENTIARY RULING ¶15 The hearing for Mother's motion in limine commenced the first day of the trial, May 7, 2019, at which Father joined her motion.9 Parents argued the pending criminal charges against them were not relevant to any of the elements the jury would decide in the parental rights termination case. They further argued that, even if evidence of the charges was relevant, it was highly prejudicial and inadmissible. ¶16 State contended the filing of criminal charges, as alleged in its amended petition was a fact that State needed to prove for deprived adjudication. Parents disagreed, asserting that status is determined by the trial court, not the jury. ¶17 Because almost every witness in the case would testify about Parents' arrest and resulting criminal charges, State argued the evidence was relevant, had probative value, and exclusion of such facts would confuse or mislead the jury. Mother agreed the law enforcement's investigation could be relevant, but argued testimony should stop short of the arrest. Even if evidence of the arrest was allowed, she argued the criminal charges were neither relevant nor probative and could be easily left out. ¶18 The trial judge concluded the criminal charge against each parent "is a neutral piece of evidence" and "just a fact" that, in her opinion, "would not lead the jury to conclude the abuse was heinous and shocking."10 The trial judge denied Parents' motion to limit State from offering evidence about their arrest and criminal charges, finding both sides were prohibited from asking Parents "where their case stands at this point in time or to [allude to] a particular result."11 PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION HEARING ¶19 State commenced its case-in-chief after the trial court's denial of Parents' motion in limine, calling Mother as its first witness. State asked Mother for general background information and about the specific incidents on August 24 and August 26, 2018, that resulted in the bruising to R.H.'s face, neck, trunk, and extremities. Her direct examination continued to the second day of trial, during which State asked if she had been criminally charged because of what happened. She answered "yes," after which her counsel objected, reasserting Parents' in limine objections. The trial court overruled the objection, without further explanation, and granted Parents' request for a continuing objection. ¶20 State next asked Mother questions about whether she had been arrested, when, how long she was in jail, and finally asked her, "What are you charged with?" Mother responded, "Child Abuse." State then asked Mother to identify State's Exhibit No. 1,12 asking if she had ever seen "the document." Mother indicated she did not believe so, confirmed her name was on the document, and again stated she did not recall seeing the document. ¶21 State next asked, "If on looking through the document, did you recognize what it might be?" Mother replied, "I would assume charges against me." After Mother agreed the document "talks about" the criminal case with "the date of August 27, 2018," State moved for admission of State's Exhibit No. 1. After confirming Parents' continuing objection, the trial judge overruled it and admitted State's Exhibit No. 1. ¶22 Referring to State's Exhibit No. 1, State asked, "so in looking at the document, it talks about the date and then . . . the crime of child abuse, correct?" Mother agreed and then confirmed the exhibit identifies the victim, R.H., who was 9 years old on August 27, 2018. State next asked "So looking at the document, does it reflect what you understand you're criminally charged with?" Mother agreed that it did. State then asked, "But this is not resolved? You're not convicted or found guilty?" Mother replied, "I am not." ¶23 State called Father as its second witness in its case-in-chief. Father testified in detail about the two separate incidents between him and R.H. during which R.H. received the bruises over his body. State ultimately examined Father regarding State's Exhibit No. 1. State first asked if he had been criminally charged, upon which the trial court overruled the continuing objection. After Father agreed the exhibit charges child abuse and identified the child and his age, State finally asked, "Your case is not resolved yet either, correct?" STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶24 A ruling to allow or deny the admission of evidence rests in the trial court's sound discretion. Jordan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1979 OK 10, ¶ 12, 590 P.2d 193 , 196. "The trial court is permitted broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence." Mills v. Grotheer, 1998 OK 33, ¶ 3, 957 P.2d 540 , 541. "Decisions regarding relevance of evidence and its alleged prejudice to the other party will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Id. "A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision based on an erroneous conclusion of law or its decision has no rational basis in evidence." Childers v. Childers, 2016 OK 95, ¶ 28, 382 P.3d 1020, 1027. ¶25 "[N]o judgment shall be reversed' because of an 'error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party." 12 O.S.2011 § 78. For reversal of a ruling that admits evidence, a substantial right must be affected and a timely objection must have been made. 12 O.S.2011 § 2104(A)(1). ¶26 Parents have a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in the continuity of the legal bond with their children." In re A.M. & R.W., 2000 OK 82, ¶ 8, 13 P.3d 484 , 487. "The fundamental nature of parental rights requires that the full panoply of procedural safeguards must be applied to child deprivation hearings." Id. (quoting In re Chad, 1978 OK 94, ¶ 12, 580 P.2d 983 , 985). ¶27 "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." Cary v. ONEOK, Inc., 1997 OK 60, ¶ 15 n.33, 940 P.2d 201 , 212 (Opala, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 , 136 (1955)). "An impartial jury is, of course, an indispensable ingredient of a fair trial, which is assured by the fundamental law's due process guarantee." Id. (citing Agee v. Gant, 1966 OK 31, 412 P.2d 155 , 162). "The right to a fair trial is a substantial constitutional right" which a trial court has a duty to ensure. Taliaferro v. Shahsavari, 2006 OK 96, ¶ 32, 154 P.3d 1240 , 1249. ¶28 In a challenge to a trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court reviews for two types of errors. See Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic, 1973 OK 141, ¶ 21, 516 P.2d 534 , 540 (citing Teague v. United Truck Serv., 1972 OK 97, ¶ 14, 499 P.2d 380 , 383-84). For errors that are not inherently prejudicial, the test of prejudice is the "likelihood that the verdict would have been different had [the errors] not occurred, as measured by the usual criterion of the verdict's support in the evidence." Id.13 ¶29 Errors that are inherently prejudicial are "those from which, by their nature, one of the litigants obtains 'beneficial prejudice.'" Teague, 1972 OK 97, ¶ 14, 499 P.2d at 383 (quoting Montgomery v. Murray, 1970 OK 226, ¶ 20, 481 P.2d 755 , 760).14 Where matters of a highly prejudicial nature have been brought before the jury, even when not manifestly motivated by bad faith, we have regarded such procedure as reversible error "unless it can be affirmatively ascertained from the record that no harm resulted therefrom." Roberts v. Lewis, 1968 OK 38, ¶ 19, 441 P.2d 350 , 355.15 ¶30 We may not set aside a verdict for misdirection of the jury unless the error "has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right." 20 O.S.2011 § 3001.1. In a parental rights termination case challenging a jury instruction and a procedural matter,16 the trial court's judgment may be reversed "when error constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right." In re T.T.S., 2015 OK 36, ¶ 15, 373 P.3d 1022, 1028 (citing § 3001.1). ANALYSIS ¶31 Pursuant to the Oklahoma Children's Code, the "adjudicative hearings and hearings for termination of parental rights shall be conducted according to the rules of evidence." 10A O.S.2011 § 1-4-503(A). The Evidence Code defines what evidence is relevant and admissible. See 12 O.S.2011 §§ 2401-2403. Therefore, the issue before us -- the relevancy and admissibility of the pending criminal child abuse charges against Parents at this parental rights termination hearing -- is governed by the Evidence Code. EVIDENCE OF THE PENDING CRIMINAL CHILD ABUSE CHARGES FAILS THE RELEVANCY TEST UNDER 12 O.S.2011 § 2401. ¶32 Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 12 O.S.2011 § 2401. "A fact that is 'of consequence' is material, and evidence that affects the probability that a fact is as a party claims it to be has probative force." 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185 (8th ed. 2020). Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. 12 O.S. 2011 § 2402. ¶33 The trial court instructed the jury that to terminate parental rights based on heinous and shocking abuse State is required to prove the following four elements by clear and convincing evidence:17 1) The child has been adjudicated deprived; 2) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child; 3) The abuse was heinous and shocking; and, 4) Termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. See 10A O.S.Supp.2018 § 1-4-904(A)(1),(B)(9). ¶34 The instruction's first element is a statutory-based mandate -- "A court shall not terminate the rights of a parent to a child unless . . . the child has been adjudicated to be deprived either prior to or concurrently with a proceeding to terminate parental rights." 10A O.S.Supp.2018 § 1-4-904(A)(1) (emphasis added). The trial court adjudicates a child's deprived status in a jury trial, when as here, an initial petition seeks deprived adjudication and termination of parental rights. 10A O.S.Supp.2018 § 1-4-502(A)(1).18 ¶35 Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of § 1-4-904(A)(1) and § 1-4-502(A)(1), evidence relevant to the first element demonstrates the trial court has performed its statutory duty to adjudicate the children deprived as to each parent, either prior to trial or before submitting the parental rights termination determination to the jury.19 Evidence of the criminal child abuse charges against Parents was not relevant to the instruction's first element. ¶36 The instruction's second element -- "the parent abused the child or a sibling of the child" -- is based on § 1-4-904(B)(9).20 Instruction No. 13 defined statutory "abuse" to mean "harm or threatened harm to a child's health, safety or welfare, including but not limited to nonaccidental physical or mental injury . . . ."21 For purposes of applying § 2401, evidence relevant to the second element must have a tendency to make the existence of actions or omissions by Parents that meet the statutory definition of abuse more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. ¶37 State's direct examination of Parents about their criminal child abuse charges--and the admission of Exhibit No. 1--both fail § 2401's relevancy test when applied to the second element. The Exhibit's first page is most problematic, which reads, in pertinent part: BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, COMES NOW DAVID W. PRATER . . . ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN AND FOR OKLAHOMA . . . and on his official oath informs the district court that: Count 1: On or about the 27th day of August 2018, A.D., the crime of child abuse was feloniously committed in Oklahoma County by Cody Wayne Hudson and Taylor Ainsworth, who acting jointly, willfully or maliciously injured, tortured, maimed or used unreasonable force upon a child . . . at the time nine (9) years of age . . . conjointly striking R.H. multiple times about his entire body causing bruises, contrary to the provisions of [§] 843.5 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes. State's Exhibit No. 1, ROA at 242 (emphasis added). Exhibit No. 1 represents to the jury State's legal opinion that Parents committed the crime of child abuse. This evidence has no tendency to make the existence of the fact that Parents abused R.H., as defined by Oklahoma's parental rights termination statutes, more or less probable than it would be without the exhibit. ¶38 As used in the instruction's third element, the phrase "heinous and shocking abuse" is defined by 10A O.S.Supp.2018 § 1-1-105(34) and "includes, but is not limited to, aggravated physical abuse that results in serious bodily, mental or emotional injury." Section 1-1-105(34) further defines "serious bodily injury."22 ¶39 Pursuant to § 1-1-105(34) and § 2401, evidence relevant to the third element is restricted to evidence having a tendency to make the existence of heinous and shocking abuse more or less probable.23 State's specific questions to Parents regarding the criminal child abuse charges and its admission into evidence of State's Exhibit No. 1 are not relevant to the third element. Evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. 12 O.S.2011 § 2402. ADMISSION OF A PENDING CRIMINAL CHARGE IN A JURY TRIAL TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS IS OVERLY PREJUDICIAL AND IS INADMISSIBLE. ¶40 All relevant evidence is admissible, unless the trial court determines that "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise." 12 O.S.2011 § 2403. "Probative value refers to or means the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove." 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185 (8th ed. 2020). Even if the evidence of the criminal child abuse charges could be construed as relevant to the fourth element, the probative value of such evidence in this proceeding for termination of parental rights is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ¶41 State received beneficial prejudice from the evidence of the pending criminal child abuse charges against Parents. State's direct examination of Parents required them to confirm criminal child abuse charges had been filed and were still pending against them. Such testimony served dual purposes -- it harmed Parents' credibility with the jury at the outset of the trial and planted in the jurors' minds Parents' uncertain future with their children. ¶42 State received additional beneficial prejudice from the admission into evidence of the actual criminal child abuse information. Admission of State's Exhibit No. 1 for viewing during deliberations 1) informed the jury that Parents had been charged with felony child abuse; and 2) indirectly achieved what a State prosecutor is prohibited from doing in a criminal trial -- giving personal opinions of the accused's guilt. "The prosecutor's opinions carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." Bechtel v. State, 1987 OK CR 126, ¶ 11, 738 P.2d 559 , 561 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 , 18-19 (1985)). It is impossible to affirmatively ascertain from the record before this Court that no harm resulted from the admission of the evidence of pending criminal charges against Parents. This is inherently prejudicial error. ¶43 The trial judge, as the gatekeeper of the evidentiary process, has the duty to screen evidence to determine its relevance and reliability. Myers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 2002 OK 60, ¶ 36, 52 P.3d 1014 , 1033; Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1999 OK 14, ¶ 32, 980 P.2d 116 , 132. The trial court's ruling to admit evidence of State's criminal child abuse charges against Parents implies that the evidence is both relevant under § 2401 and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury under § 2403. We conclude the trial court misapplied these statutes, and as a result, erroneously concluded the evidence of State's criminal child abuse charges was relevant and admissible in this proceeding for termination of parental rights. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 8 WHICH REFERENCED THE PREJUDICIAL CHILD ABUSE CHARGES AGAINST PARENTS. ¶44 Parents challenge Instruction No. 8's reference to their criminal charges. Instruction No. 8, entitled "Statement of the Case," quotes verbatim the amended petition's allegations against Parents and State's requests to adjudicate the children deprived and to terminate each parent's parental rights for heinous and shocking abuse to a sibling pursuant to 10A O.S.Supp.2018 § 1-4-904(B)(9). The criminal charges are one of four facts supporting the amended petition's separate allegations that Parent's home was unfit based on heinous and shocking physical abuse. Parents argue the jury was misled and reached a different conclusion than it would have without the erroneous instruction. ¶45 State contends Instruction No. 8 complies with Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions (OUJI)-Juvenile No. 2.2's instructions for the "Statement of the Case." To further justify Instruction No. 8, as given, State relies on the trial court's Adjudication Order based on Father's pretrial stipulation to the amended petition's deprived allegations that referenced the criminal charges. ¶46 When OUJI provides an instruction applicable in a civil case and the court determines the jury should be instructed on the subject, the OUJI instruction "shall be used unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law." 12 O.S.2011 § 577.2. To determine the applicability of OUJI to a case, the court gives "due consideration to the facts and the prevailing law." Id. Instruction No. 8 clearly states it is "OUJI Juv-2.2." ¶47 The fact of the pending criminal charges alleged in State's initial and amended petitions to adjudicate the children deprived could arguably be construed as material for purposes of providing due process notice of the statutory conditions on which the State believes the children are deprived and which justify intervention in the family unit.24 However, § 1-4-904(B)(9) defines the material allegations for a petition seeking termination of parental rights -- the parents abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse was heinous and shocking. The filing of criminal charges against Mother and Father are not material allegations of the petitions based on the heinous and shocking ground for termination of parental rights.25 We conclude the trial court erred by failing to delete these allegations from Instruction No. 8. ¶48 State's reliance on Instruction No. 8's concluding sentence -- "[t]hese allegations are not evidence in the case" -- as a limiting instruction fails to consider the potential for jury confusion in this case. Contrary to Instruction No. 8's concluding sentence, Instruction No. 3 explained the jury's duty is "to determine the facts of this case from the evidence produced in open court," and "the evidence which you are to consider consists of the testimony of the witnesses [and] exhibits, if any, admitted into evidence . . . ."26 Confusion and irreconcilable contradiction from these instructions occurred when applied to the evidence in this case, specifically the admission of State's felony child abuse information as an exhibit. ¶49 Based on State's evidence, the trial court performed its statutory duty to adjudicate the children deprived as to Mother before giving Instruction No. 8 and by instructing the jury that "the children . . . have each been adjudicated deprived as to their Mother and Father."27 For purposes of the jury's determination of whether to terminate Parents' parental rights, it was unnecessary to include the prejudicial reference to the criminal child abuse charges in Instruction No. 8. CONCLUSION ¶50 The trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the pending criminal child abuse charges against Parents that arose from the same facts upon which State petitioned for deprived adjudication and for immediate termination of their parental rights. Accordingly, we conclude admission of the evidence was inherently prejudicial, prevented Parents from receiving a fair trial, and constitutes reversible error. We further conclude that it was reversible error to give Instruction No. 8, which also referred to the same criminal charges. The trial court's adjudication of the children deprived as to each parent was not appealed and is undisturbed on appeal. That part of the judgment terminating parental rights is reversed, and this cause is remanded for new trial. MATTER PREVIOUSLY RETAINED FOR DISPOSITION; REHEARING GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT ISSUED MAY 12, 2020 IS WITHDRAWN AND THIS OPINION ORDERED SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. Darby, C.J. (by separate writing), Winchester, Edmondson, Gurich, and Rowe, JJ., concur; Kane, V.C.J., Kauger, and Combs (by separate writing), JJ., dissent. FOOT