Title: Curry v. Perney
Citation: 194 Kan. 722, 402 P.2d 316
Docket Number: 44,028
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 1965

194 Kan. 722 (1965)
402 P.2d 316
FLORA M. CURRY; DORIS G. ARMSTRONG; FRANCIS X. PERNEY, JR.; and FRANCIS X. PERNEY, JR., Executor of the Will and of the Estate of Francis X. Perney, Deceased, Appellants,
v.
MARY JUANITA PERNEY, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
No. 44,028

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1965.
E.J. Webber, of Topeka, was on the briefs and argued the cause for the appellants.
Arthur E. Palmer, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Lester M. Goodell; Marlin S. Casey; Raymond Briman; Murray F. Hardesty; Gerald L. Goodell; Wayne T. Stratton, and Robert E. Edmonds, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellee and cross-appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This controversy stems from an action to partition real estate.
Jean Perney, mother of the three individual plaintiffs and the wife of Francis X. Perney, died intestate July 12, 1953. Her estate was administered in the Probate Court of Shawnee County at which time her one-half interest in a house known as 207 Clay Street, Topeka, Kansas, was assigned to her husband and her three children. Francis X. Perney then owned an undivided three-fourths interest and each child owned an undivided one-twelfth interest.
In February, 1959, Francis X. Perney married the defendant, Mary Juanita Perney. Thereafter they resided in California until *723 March, 1962, when they moved to the house at 207 Clay Street. A portion of the property had been rented for $50.00 per month while Francis and his second wife lived in California.
On May 16, 1962, Francis X. Perney died testate, a resident of Topeka, Kansas. His estate is now being probated in the Shawnee County Probate Court with Francis X. Perney, Jr. as executor. The three children of Francis and Jean Perney (his first wife) were named as sole beneficiaries under the will. Defendant, the second wife of Francis, elected to take under the law which gave her one-half of her deceased husband's three-fourths interest.
The defendant has claimed the house as her homestead and resided therein since the death of the decedent. She spent $206.03 for taxes, insurance and improvements on the property after decedent's death and prior to appointment of the executor in September, 1962.
The plaintiffs brought an action for partition of the property. The prayer of their petition reads:
The defendant answered setting up the following claim for relief:
After a hearing on the issues as joined the district court entered judgment in which it decreed partition of the property, allowed the defendant the sum of $206.03 expended as improvements, directed the payment of past due taxes, and denied the plaintiffs' claim for rent.
Thereupon the plaintiffs appealed and the defendant cross-appealed.
The appellants' appeal is from that part of the judgment resulting from the following conclusions made by the trial court:
At the outset we are confronted with appellee's motion to dismiss the original appeal, whereupon appellee contends that the appellants acquiesced in the judgment by the following acts:
After careful consideration of all arguments advanced by the parties on the point now under consideration we are constrained to conclude that the appellants have acquiesced in the judgment, thus barring their right to appeal.
The court entered but one judgment in which it granted partition as requested but adjusted the equities contrary to the contentions of appellants.
In a partition decree the court may adjust all equities of the parties in the property or arising therefrom. (Thresher Co. v. Judd, 104 Kan. 757, 180 Pac. 763.) The right of the court of equity to partition is subject to the power of the court to make equitable partition. (Fry v. Dewees, 151 Kan. 488, 99 P.2d 844.)
The record makes it appear that the appellants have proceeded to enforce the portion of the judgment which decreed partition. Having accepted the benefits of that part of the decree they cannot now appeal from the portion of the judgment they find objectionable. By their action appellants have sought and obtained enforcement of the partition order. This necessarily constitutes acquiescence in the judgment.
Under our repeated decisions anything that savors of acquiescence in a judgment cuts off the right to appellate review. See, e.g., Cohen v. Dresie, 174 Kan. 391, 256 P.2d 845; Hawkins v. Wilson, 174 Kan. 602, 605, 257 P.2d 1110; Peters v. Peters, 175 Kan. 422, 263 P.2d 1019; Rose v. Helstrom, 177 Kan. 209, 277 P.2d 633; *725 In re Estate of Hill, 179 Kan. 536, 297 P.2d 151, and Anstaett v. Christesen, 192 Kan. 572, 389 P.2d 773.
We will next consider the issues raised by the cross-appeal, passing the question, which has not been raised, whether the issues have become moot by a failure to stay the proceedings in the court below.
The first contention raised by the cross-appellant is that she was occupying the property as a homestead and that it was not subject to partition. In making this contention she asks us to overrule our decision in Cole v. Coons, 162 Kan. 624, 178 P.2d 997, where it is held:
We refuse to overrule Cole v. Coons, supra, and continue to adhere to the decision in that case.
Moreover, we conclude that K.S.A. 59-402 which reads: "The homestead shall not be subject to forced partition unless the surviving spouse remarries, nor until all the children arrive at the age of majority" relates to tenancies in common created by death but not before death.
Cross-appellant next contends that the trial court erred in not refusing partition under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1003 (d) which provides:
In connection with the section of the statute just quoted it is suggested that she (cross-appellant) has an income of only $251.60 per month and needs the property for a home. It is also suggested that it is hard to imagine a case where equities cry louder for exercise of the foregoing section of the statute. This appeal is *726 more a matter for consideration of charity than for equitable relief. The statute in question never contemplated that one cotenant, who might be a complete stranger to another, would be required to forego partition and furnish the other with a home because of pecuniary circumstances. The equities to which the statute refers are those which may be enjoyed jointly without partition. Equity would not deny to one cotenant his interest in the use of the property for the benefit of another.
Finally cross-appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding:
and further states:
There is no sound basis for cross-appellant's final contention. She misconstrues the judgment of the trial court. That tribunal simply ordered all of the funds derived from Francis X. Perney's estate paid into the probate court. The probate court is to make the same determinations that it would have made had the partition action not been filed. One of its obligations is to determine whether cross-appellant has a homestead right which follows the proceeds of the sale of the real estate. If cross-appellant is dissatisfied with the action of the probate court she has the right to appeal.
What has been heretofore stated and held requires an affirmance of the judgment  and it is so ordered.