Title: Bishop v. Nielsen
Citation: 632 P.2d 864
Docket Number: 17082
State: Utah
Issuer: Utah Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 1981

632 P.2d 864 (1981) George O. BISHOP, Jr., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles Hollis NIELSEN, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Genice Gay BISHOP, Third-Party Defendant and Appellant. No. 17082. Supreme Court of Utah. July 8, 1981. *865 R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake City, for third-party defendant and appellant. Thomas A. Duffin, Salt Lake City, for defendant, third-party plaintiff and respondent. HALL, Justice: Plaintiff brought this action to recover the property loss sustained as the result of a collision between automobiles operated by defendant and plaintiff's minor, unemancipated daughter. Defendant joined the minor daughter as a third-party defendant, seeking contribution. Third-party defendant moved for summary judgment of dismissal on the ground that she was not liable in contribution since she had no liability to her father as a joint tort-feasor by virtue of the doctrine of parent-child immunity. From the denial of her motion, and from the subsequent jury verdict which apportioned the negligence 30 percent to her and 70 percent to defendant, she appeals. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the minor is a "joint tort-feasor" as defined by the contribution statute. The right of contribution among joint tort-feasors exists by virtue of legislative enactment,[1] it being unknown at common law which held joint tort-feasors individually liable to the injured person for all of the harm caused. It is a significant right afforded joint tort-feasors inasmuch as it permits an equitable apportionment of fault among them in discharge of their common liability.[2] A "joint tort-feasor" is defined as: In the instant case, third-party defendant does not dispute the fact that her negligence contributed to the property loss sustained by her father. Nevertheless, she seeks to defeat defendant's right of contribution by urging application of the parent-child immunity doctrine so as to shield her from tort liability to her father. It is her contention that without such liability she is not a "joint tort-feasor" within the meaning of the contribution statute,[4] and therefore is not liable to defendant for contribution. Third-party defendant concedes that the doctrine of parent-child immunity has not heretofore been adopted in this jurisdiction, but urges that it now be adopted as a logical extension of the basically similar doctrine of interspousal immunity which has been previously recognized and adopted.[5] However, our disposition of the issue presented does not necessarily hinge upon the existence or nonexistence of the doctrine. Hence, we do not treat the subject. *866 The doctrine of parent-child immunity is generally premised on public policy grounds that suits between parent and child would interfere with parental discipline and disturb domestic harmony. However, no such public policy considerations are present in this case, the only claim presented being that of a third party seeking contribution. The various jurisdictions which have ruled upon the issue presented by this appeal have not done so with unanimity. Some have denied contribution by rigidly applying the doctrine of parent-child immunity,[6] while others have allowed contribution by declining to adopt the doctrine.[7] In contrast with those extreme positions, other courts have allowed contribution, notwithstanding their recognition of the doctrine.[8] We deem the latter to be the better reasoned cases. In Puller v. Puller, supra, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned in favor of contribution as follows: In the case of Zarella v. Miller, supra, the issue presented was whether defendant's immunity from suit by his wife for damages resulting from his tortious conduct extended to an action for contribution under the uniform act. In holding that defendant was a joint tort-feasor within the contemplation of the act and therefore liable in an action for contribution thereunder, the court had this to say: The same result was reached in the case of Walker v. Milton, supra. In that case, the court was called upon to construe a statute which prohibited a suit by an unemancipated minor against a parent. In allowing contribution, the court held that the immunity statute did not destroy substantive causes of action arising between parent and child, but only operated as a procedural bar to such actions. The facts in the case of Shor v. Paoli, supra, are nearly identical to those in the instant case. Shor stands for the proposition that the common law doctrine of immunity does not render the uniform contribution act impotent. In so holding, the court adopted the following reasoning of its District Court of Appeal: Reasoning in much the same manner, the court in Bedell v. Reagan, supra, aptly observed: In the instant case, even if the doctrine of parent-child immunity had been previously adopted in this jurisdiction, we view the equities in favor of contribution as far out-weighing the benefits to be achieved by a strict application of the doctrine. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs awarded. MAUGHAN, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and OAKS, JJ., concur. [1] U.C.A., 1953, 78-27-39 creates a cause of action in a tort-feasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of a common liability. Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 551 P.2d 521 (1976). [2] U.C.A., 1953, 78-27-40(2). [3] U.C.A., 1953, 78-27-40(3). [4] Id. [5] Hull v. Silver, Utah, 577 P.2d 103 (1978); Cannon v. Aviatt, Utah, 520 P.2d 883 (1974); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963). However, compare Stoker v. Stoker, Utah, 616 P.2d 590 (1980), wherein this Court declined to apply the doctrine in an intentional tort case. [6] Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980). [7] Tamashiro v. DeGama, 51 Haw. 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969). Also, those states which have abrogated the doctrine of immunity would allow contribution. See Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). [8] Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955), followed in Restifo v. McDonald, 426 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 199 (1967); Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966); Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972); Shor v. Paoli, Fla., 353 So. 2d 825 (1978); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Maine 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); see also, 52 Cornell L.Q. 407 (1967) on the indiscriminate use of special defenses in contribution cases. [9] 110 A.2d at 177. [10] 217 A.2d at 675, 676. [11] 353 So. 2d at 826. [12] 192 A.2d at 27.