Title: John Chamberlain v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1150
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 2004

1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC02-1150
____________
JOHN CHAMBERLAIN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[June 17, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
Chamberlain appeals his convictions and sentences of death after a jury
found him guilty of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of armed
robbery for participating in a 1998 West Palm Beach triple homicide.1 
FACTS
Four persons—Chamberlain, Thomas Thibault, Jason Dascott, and Amanda
Ingman—took part in this triple homicide.  Thibault, the admitted triggerman, pled
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guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to death.  Dascott pled guilty to
second-degree murder.  Ingman was not charged.  Thibault, Dascott, and Ingman
all testified against Chamberlain at trial.  The relevant facts are as follows.
Sometime in October or November of 1998, Ingman began trying to locate
Thibault, her drug supplier and "occasional pimp," to purchase some cocaine. 
After hearing that Ingman was looking for him, Thibault telephoned Ingman at a
house on Norton Avenue in West Palm Beach, where she lived with the victims in
this case—Bryan Harrison, Charlotte Kenyan, and Daniel Ketchum.  Harrison,
who was Ingman's boyfriend, became angry at Thibault for calling Ingman.  In the
early morning hours of November 26, 1998, which was Thanksgiving Day,
Thibault enlisted Dascott and Chamberlain to go with him to the Norton Avenue
house to deliver some cocaine to Ingman and to attempt to resolve the argument
with Harrison.  Thibault told Chamberlain that there might be a confrontation. 
Although Chamberlain did not personally know anyone at the Norton Avenue
house, Thibault testified that Chamberlain responded that he "had [Thibault's]
back and he was down to go."  Chamberlain drove Thibault and Dascott in a car
belonging to Chamberlain's father.  A .45 caliber handgun and ammunition
belonging to Chamberlain's father were in the trunk of the car.  En route, the men
stopped at a gas station, where Chamberlain showed Thibault the gun.
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The argument between Thibault and Harrison was resolved quickly after
Thibault, Chamberlain, and Dascott arrived at the Norton Avenue house. 
Chamberlain, Thibault, Dascott, Ingman, and Harrison then snorted cocaine
together in Ingman's bedroom.  At some point, Ketchum, another resident of the
Norton Avenue house, entered the room and mentioned to Thibault that he had
some electronic equipment to sell for cocaine.  Harrison and Ingman also said they
wanted more cocaine.  Thereafter, Chamberlain, Thibault, Dascott, Ingman, and
Harrison drove to the house of a drug dealer for more cocaine and to offer to sell
Ketchum's electronic equipment.  Thibault went inside alone and obtained more
cocaine.  Thibault testified that the supplier was not interested in buying the
electronic equipment, and at that point Thibault began thinking about just "taking"
the equipment.
Upon returning to the Norton Avenue house, Harrison and Ingman went
inside while Thibault, Chamberlain, and Dascott remained outside and discussed
robbing the residents of the house.  The three then went inside.  At some point,
while in Ingman's bedroom, Thibault, Chamberlain, Dascott, and Ingman devised
a robbery plan in which either Ingman or Dascott would persuade Ketchum to
open a safe that was located in the living room.  Thibault testified that
Chamberlain then suggested that Thibault use the gun to announce the robbery and
2.  The medical examiner, Jacquelin Martin, testified that Harrison had a
bruise on his knee consistent with being struck by a blunt object.
3.  The asp was described at trial as an extendable police baton.
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put Harrison and Ketchum in the bathroom because Thibault was physically the
largest.  Ingman, Dascott, and Chamberlain would then loot the house.  
Either Ingman or Dascott persuaded Ketchum to open the safe.  Thibault
then ordered Ketchum and Harrison into the bathroom.  Chamberlain helped move
Ketchum and Harrison into the bathroom by striking Ketchum on the leg2 with a
baton-like weapon, later identified as an asp.3  While Thibault held Ketchum and
Harrison at gunpoint in the bathroom, Ingman, Dascott, and Chamberlain began
removing electronic items such as televisions and radios from the house and
putting the items in Chamberlain's car.  Meanwhile in the bathroom, Ketchum
rushed Thibault.  Thibault shot and killed Ketchum during the ensuing struggle.
Thibault left the bathroom and told the others that he had killed Ketchum. 
Thibault and Ingman testified that Chamberlain then said "no more witnesses,"
and encouraged Thibault to kill Harrison or else they were "all going to die," and
were "all going to the electric chair."  Thibault also testified that he left the
decision up to Ingman, who said to "go ahead and get rid of the other witnesses." 
Ingman and Thibault then awakened Charlotte Kenyan, who had been sleeping in
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a back bedroom, and placed her in the bathroom with Harrison.  Thibault testified
that he "emptied the gun" into Harrison and Kenyan while Chamberlain stood by
his side.  Chamberlain then picked up the shell casings because they had his
fingerprints on them.  Chamberlain and Thibault noticed that Harrison was not
dead, so Chamberlain went to the car, retrieved more bullets, and reloaded the gun. 
Thibault again "emptied the gun" into Harrison and Kenyan.
After the killings, Chamberlain drove Ingman and Dascott to Chamberlain's
parents' house.  The three unloaded the car, and went into the house. 
Subsequently, Thibault arrived at Chamberlain's house in a taxi.  Chamberlain,
Thibault, and Dascott then took the stolen items to the house of Donna Garrett. 
Shortly thereafter, Chamberlain and Dascott separated from Thibault.  
Ingman testified that she sneaked out of a window of Chamberlain's house,
went to the house of Harrison's father, and told him of the murders.  She returned
with Harrison's father to the Norton Avenue house, where they called the police. 
Alerted to Chamberlain's involvement by Ingman, the police searched
Chamberlain's house in the early evening of November 26 pursuant to a search
warrant.  Chamberlain was not present at that time.  He later surrendered to the
police on Sunday, November 29, 1998.
At trial, the theory of the State's case was that Chamberlain was
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instrumental in instigating the murders.  The State specifically relied on
Chamberlain's use of the asp to push the victims into the bathroom and his
statement, "no more witnesses," to support its theory of Chamberlain's
involvement.  Chamberlain's defense was that the other participants conspired to
place the blame on Chamberlain, and their motive to blame Chamberlain increased
when the State offered them plea agreements.  The jury found Chamberlain guilty
of three counts of first-degree murder.  
Chamberlain waived a penalty phase jury prior to trial.  The penalty phase
hearing was therefore held in front of the trial judge.  In the sentencing order, the
trial judge found six aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed while
Chamberlain was under the supervision of the Department of Corrections; (2)
Chamberlain had prior violent felony convictions (the contemporaneous murders
and robbery); (3) the murders were committed while Chamberlain was engaged in
a robbery; (4) the murders were committed to avoid arrest; (5) the murders were
committed for pecuniary gain; and (6) the murders were cold, calculated, and
premeditated (CCP).  The trial judge found in mitigation that Chamberlain had the
ability to form loving relationships and other factors in the defendant's past,
including the fact that Chamberlain had some parental neglect and he was teased
4.  The trial judge rejected the following mitigating circumstances: (1) that
Chamberlain was an accomplice in a capital felony committed by another person;
(2) that he acted under extreme duress or substantial domination; (3) that he had
no significant criminal history; (4) that his ability to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantialy
impaired; and (5) the age of the defendant.
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by older cousins who lived with Chamberlain's family for a while.4  The trial court
gave the mitigators slight weight.  Determining that the aggravators outweighed
the mitigators, the trial judge sentenced Chamberlain to death for each murder.
In this appeal, Chamberlain raises eleven issues for review:  (1) death
qualification of the jury; (2) denial of Chamberlain's motion to disqualify the trial
judge; (3) comments on Chamberlain's credibility; (4) an out-of-court
identification of Chamberlain; (5) an alleged violation of the rule of sequestration;
(6) use of prior consistent statements; (7) use of a demonstrative aid; (8)
constitutionality of the felony-murder jury instruction; (9) sufficiency of the
evidence of first-degree murder; (10) constitutionality of the murder in the course
of a felony aggravator; and (11) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding
of aggravating factors and the rejection of mitigating factors.  We address each of
these issues, and also address whether the death penalty is proportional in this
case. 
GUILT PHASE
5.  Chamberlain does not allege error in the trial court granting the
challenges for cause.  Rather, as noted above, Chamberlain's argument on this
issue is the trial judge's decision to allow any questioning on the death penalty. 
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Death Qualified Jury Voir Dire
The first issue arises from Chamberlain's waiver of the penalty-phase jury. 
Unlike Thibault v. State, 850 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2003), in which we reversed the
death sentence of Chamberlain's codefendant because of the absence of an
affirmative waiver of a penalty-phase jury, see id. at 487, Chamberlain does not
contest the validity of the waiver itself.  Rather, Chamberlain argues that because
he waived his right to a penalty-phase jury before the guilt phase of the trial, the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to question the potential
jurors regarding their feelings on the death penalty.  
During jury selection, the jurors were informed over defense objection that
although the judge alone would decide on the sentence, death was an option.  The
questioning permitted by the trial court was more limited than if the voir dire had
been conducted to death qualify the jury to participate in both the guilt and penalty
phases.  The trial court then granted nine challenges for cause against jurors who
stated that they would have difficulty finding a defendant guilty of first-degree
murder if their verdict might lead to the death penalty.5  
This Court has repeatedly held that "[t]he scope of voir dire questioning
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rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be interfered with unless that
discretion is clearly abused."  Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 160 (Fla. 2002)
(quoting Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312, 1322 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 848 (2002)).  In Darling, a capital case, this Court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in precluding questioning of jurors concerning the death
penalty.  The trial court did not allow the defense to ask potential jurors whether
they had seen stories of prisoners released from death row, and whether their
"drive" to impose death would be lessened by the availability of an alternative of
life without parole.  However, the court permitted defense counsel to explore
jurors' concerns over the length of capital proceedings and their understanding of
alternative penalties that applied.  This Court found no error.  See 808 So. 2d at
160.  
On the other hand, in Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1986),
this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding defense
counsel from questioning potential jurors about their willingness to accept the
defense of voluntary intoxication.  The Court adopted the dissenting opinion
below, in which Judge Pearson stated that "where a juror's attitude about a
particular legal doctrine (in the words of the trial court, 'the law') is essential to a
determination of whether challenges for cause or peremptory challenges are to be
-10-
made, it is well settled that the scope of the voir dire properly includes questions
about and references to that legal doctrine."  Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917, 919-
20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a) provides in pertinent part that
"[e]xcept in capital cases, the judge shall not instruct the jury on the sentence that
may be imposed for the offense for which the accused is on trial."  (Emphasis
supplied.)  The United States Supreme Court has held that in capital cases, if a
juror's views of the death penalty will prevent or substantially impair the
performance of the juror's duties at the sentencing phase, the juror may be excused
for cause.  See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985).  This Court has similarly recognized that there is
no constitutional infirmity in the "death qualification" of a jury in a capital case. 
See San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997).  Thus, the question is
whether, in a first-degree murder case in which the State is seeking the death
penalty and the defendant has waived a penalty-phase jury, the jury should be told
that a conviction may result in imposition of the death penalty.
On this issue as on many others, death is different.  The transcript of voir
dire in this case illustrates that at least some potential jurors were aware before
6.  If the State has affirmatively waived the death penalty, potential jurors
may be told that death is not an option.  See, e.g., Sirianni v. State, 411 So. 2d 198,
200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).  Like the limited death qualification in this case,
instructing jurors  that death is not an option prevents the impaneling of jurors
whose views on the death penalty would improperly influence their verdicts as to
guilt.  In all other first-degree murder cases, death remains a potential penalty.  See
§ 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (capital felony is punishable by death or by life
imprisonment); § 782.04(1)(a) (first-degree murder constitutes capital felony). 
Under rule 3.390(a), jurors in such cases are instructed that death may be imposed.
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voir dire that death was a potential penalty for first-degree murder.6  For example,
when defense counsel asked potential juror Williams whether she could serve in a
criminal case if she did not know the potential penalties, she stated she would
know the death penalty was possible once she was told it was a first-degree
murder case.  Juror Williams' response demonstrates that some persons called for
jury duty are generally aware that their decision in a first-degree murder case may
result in a sentence of death.  In contrast to the available penalties of either life
imprisonment or death for first-degree murder, the array of sentencing laws for
noncapital crimes in Florida Statutes, including several different recidivist
schemes, makes general awareness of the potential penalty for another particular
crime far less likely. 
In recognition of the fact that at least some potential jurors know that a
verdict of guilty in a first-degree murder case may lead to the defendant's
execution, we decline to impose a per se rule preventing any questioning of jurors
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on the death penalty when death remains a potential sentence.  To conclude
otherwise would create an unacceptable risk that jurors who cannot fulfill their
oaths will serve in the guilt phase of capital proceedings.  An additional concern is
that in this case, it is Chamberlain's position that he could have withdrawn his
waiver after the return of the guilty verdict.  Had this happened, the jurors would
not have been death qualified and the trial court would have been placed in a
position of either refusing to allow Chamberlain to withdraw his waiver or having
to impanel a different death-qualified jury to hear the penalty phase.  Nevertheless,
we urge the cautious exercise of judicial discretion in allowing questioning on this
sensitive subject in cases in which jurors will not actually render an advisory
sentence.  
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court struck a proper balance
between the rights of the accused and the State.  In light of the limited nature of
the questioning, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting the voir dire concerning the death penalty.  Chamberlain is not entitled
to reversal on this issue.
Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge
The next issue involves the denial by Judge Mounts, the trial judge, of a
request that he disqualify himself from Chamberlain's sentencing.  Although
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Thibault pled guilty before Chamberlain's trial, Judge Mounts deferred sentencing
of Thibault until after he testified at Chamberlain's trial.  Thibault was sentenced
before Chamberlain.  After the trial court entered its order sentencing Thibault to
death, Chamberlain filed a motion to disqualify Judge Mounts pursuant to section
38.10, Florida Statutes (2001).  Chamberlain alleged that, based on factual
findings in Thibault's sentencing order concerning Chamberlain's level of
culpability, Chamberlain had a "well grounded fear that he [would] not receive a
fair sentencing hearing at the hands of the judge."  Judge Mounts denied
Chamberlain's motion to disqualify.  It is Chamberlain's position on appeal that
this denial created reversible error.  We disagree.
The test a trial court must use in determining "whether a motion to
disqualify is legally sufficient is 'whether the facts alleged would place a
reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.'" 
Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 2002) (quoting MacKenzie v. Super
Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1990)), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 2281 (2003).  The motion to disqualify "must be well-founded and contain
facts germane to the judge's undue bias, prejudice, or sympathy."  Wright v. State,
857 So. 2d 861, 873 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Jackson v. State, 599 So. 2d 103, 107
(Fla.1992)), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1715 (2004).  Whether the motion is "legally
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sufficient" is a question of law, and the proper standard of review is de novo.  See
Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 843.  
In this case, Chamberlain alleged that the statements Judge Mounts made in
Thibault's sentencing order concerning Chamberlain's culpability caused
Chamberlain to fear that he could not receive a fair and impartial sentencing by
Judge Mounts.  However, "[t]he fact that the judge has made adverse rulings in the
past against the defendant, or that the judge has previously heard the evidence, or
'allegations that the trial judge had formed a fixed opinion of the defendant's guilt,
even where it is alleged that the judge discussed his opinion with others,' are
generally considered legally insufficient reasons to warrant the judge's
disqualification."  Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477, 481 (Fla. 1998) (quoting
Jackson, 599 So. 2d at 107).
We conclude that the findings made by Judge Mounts in sentencing
Thibault were necessary to support Thibault's death sentence and did not indicate a
fixed intention to sentence Chamberlain to death.  Relative culpability is one of
the factors the court must evaluate in deciding whether to impose the death penalty
in any case involving multiple perpetrators.  See Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92,
108 (Fla. 2001) (recognizing that a death sentence may be disproportionate if an
equally culpable codefendant is sentenced to life imprisonment).  In this case, all
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the trial court's findings in Thibault's sentencing order concerning Chamberlain
were supported by Thibault's statement in anticipation of his guilty plea.  The
same facts were also elicited from Thibault when he testified at Chamberlain's
trial, which took place seven months before Thibault was sentenced.  Judge
Mounts' conclusions in Thibault's sentencing order as to Chamberlain's
participation in the murders were consistent with Thibault's statement and the facts
heard by Judge Mounts during Chamberlain's trial.
Thus, because the statements by Judge Mounts relied on by Chamberlain in
his motion to disqualify were neither germane to nor indicative of any bias or
prejudice, Judge Mounts did not err in denying the motion to recuse.  Chamberlain
is not entitled to reversal on this issue.
Credibility Comments
The next issue concerns comments made by one of the detectives in this
case regarding Chamberlain's credibility.  During the direct examination of
Detective Fraser, the State played a tape of Chamberlain's police interview in
which Chamberlain could be heard crying.  Asked by the State for his opinion on
Chamberlain's crying, Detective Fraser indicated that he did not think it was
genuine.  Chamberlain objected and moved for a mistrial.  The trial court denied
the motion for mistrial, but sustained the objection and instructed the jury to
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disregard "the conclusion of the officer as to his observation."  Chamberlain
argues that the instruction to disregard was insufficient to ameliorate the prejudice
caused by the improper opinion testimony. 
A ruling on a motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and should be granted only when necessary to ensure that the defendant
receives a fair trial.  See Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495, 512 (Fla. 2003).  "The
use of a harmless error analysis under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.
1986), is not necessary where the trial court recognized the error, sustained the
objection and gave a curative instruction.  Instead, the correct appellate standard
of review is abuse of discretion."  Id. (quoting Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916,
930 (Fla. 2002)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Although "there [is no] legal principle more firmly established in our system
of jurisprudence than that which makes the jury the sole arbiter of the credibility
of the witnesses," Barnes v. State, 93 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1957), we are not
persuaded by Chamberlain's argument that the instruction to disregard was
insufficient in this case.  First, defense counsel cut off Detective Fraser's statement
with an objection, so that the comments regarding Chamberlain's credibility heard
7.  Specifically, Detective Fraser stated that he did not "go along with it"
and did not "believe that his –", referring to the crying.
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by the jury were limited.7  Second, the brief comments were not repeated by other
witnesses or in closing argument.  Under these circumstances, the trial court's
actions of sustaining the objection and giving the instruction to disregard were
sufficient.  No abuse of discretion has been demonstrated and therefore
Chamberlain is not entitled to relief. 
Out of Court Identification
This issue concerns an out-of-court photographic lineup identification of
Chamberlain made by State witness Donna Garrett.  At trial, Garrett testified that
on Thanksgiving morning, November 26, 1998, three men came to her house
carrying electronic equipment.  Without objection, the State introduced into
evidence a photopack from which, two years after the incident, Garrett had
identified with eighty percent certainty a picture of Chamberlain as depicting one
of the men at her house on Thanksgiving morning.  However, when asked at trial
to identify which picture she had previously selected, Garrett misidentified the
picture of Chamberlain.
Chamberlain alleges that the photopack identification was unreliable and
unduly prejudicial and should not have been admitted because Garrett was only
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eighty percent certain of her identification of Chamberlain.  This Court has set
forth a two-pronged test to determine whether suppression of an out-of-court
identification is warranted: "(1) did the police use an unnecessarily suggestive
procedure to obtain the out-of-court identification; (2) and if so, considering all
the circumstances, did the suggestive procedure give rise to a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification."  Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741, 760
(Fla. 2002) (quoting Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 981 (Fla. 1999)).  Not only
was this issue not preserved for appeal but, other than generally asserting that the
photopack was prejudicial, Chamberlain fails to advance any argument regarding
the two-pronged test or address the factors to be considered when determining
whether suppression of an out-of-court identification is warranted.  We conclude
that Chamberlain is not entitled to reversal on this issue both because it was not
preserved and because the argument on appeal is insufficiently pled. 
Also regarding Garrett's identification, Chamberlain alleges that the trial
court erred in subsequently allowing Detective Fraser to testify as to the
identification Garrett made of Chamberlain when she observed the photopack. 
Chamberlain argues that Detective Fraser's testimony was inadmissible hearsay. 
We do not reach the issue of whether it was error to allow Fraser to testify to the
identification because we conclude that if error occurred, it was harmless beyond a
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reasonable doubt for several reasons.  
First, the identification did not involve Chamberlain's actions or
involvement in the murder.  Rather, the identification related to Chamberlain's
whereabouts the morning after the murder.  Second, Garrett was only one of four
witnesses who identified Chamberlain as being at her house the morning of
November 26, 1998.  Garrett's mother, her brother, and her boyfriend all identified
Chamberlain with 100 percent certainty as one of the men at Garrett's house that
morning.  These witnesses all testified at trial and confirmed their previous
identifications.  Thus, Chamberlain's presence at Garrett's house on the morning of
the killings was collateral to Chamberlain's culpability, several witnesses other
than Garrett identified him as being present, and Garrett herself testified to, and
was cross-examined on, her identification.  Chamberlain is not entitled to reversal
on this issue. 
Rule of Sequestration
In this issue, Chamberlain argues that the State violated the rule of
sequestration by speaking with Detective Fraser during a break in his testimony. 
Detective Fraser testified after defense counsel invoked the rule of sequestration. 
At the conclusion of his testimony, the court excused the jury, but asked Detective
Fraser to remain in the courtroom during a bench conference.  Thereafter, the
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prosecutor briefly discussed with Detective Fraser that he was going to be recalled
to testify about a July 26, 1999, bond hearing in which Chamberlain was a
witness.  Defense counsel objected to Fraser being recalled on the grounds that the
State had violated the rule by discussing with Fraser his potential testimony on
recall during a break in the proceedings and while the he was still under oath.  The
court overruled the objection.  Chamberlain argues that this ruling was reversible
error.  We disagree.
The rule of sequestration provides:
At the request of a party the court shall order, or upon its own motion
the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding so that
they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses . . . .
§ 90.616(1), Fla. Stat. (2003).  The rule is designed to aid in ensuring a fair trial
"by avoiding 'the coloring of a witness's testimony by that which he has heard
from other witnesses who have preceded him on the stand,'" Gore v. State, 599 So.
2d 978, 986 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla.
1961)), thereby discouraging "fabrication, inaccuracy and collusion."  Knight v.
State, 746 So. 2d 423, 430 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida
Evidence § 616.1, at 506 (1998 ed.)).  
In this case, there is no indication or allegation that Detective Fraser
remained in the courtroom during the testimony of another witness, or that
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Detective Fraser discussed his testimony with another witness.  Cf. Lott v. State,
695 So. 2d 1239, 1243 (Fla. 1997) (violation of rule for three state crime-scene
witnesses, two of whom had yet to testify, to discuss certain aspects of a murder
investigation while they were in witness room during presentation of State's case). 
Chamberlain has not demonstrated error and therefore is not entitled to relief on
this issue.  
Prior Consistent Statements
This issue concerns the State's attempt to rehabilitate Thibault through prior
consistent statements after he was cross-examined.  At trial, the State recalled and
questioned Thibault about a taped telephone conversation that he had with his
mother while he was at the police station on November 30, 1998, four days after
the murders.  Thibault's statements during the phone conversation corroborated his
testimony at trial.  Chamberlain argues that the trial court committed reversible
error in allowing the State to recall Thibault to testify about the conversation
because the statements did not fall within the hearsay exception for prior
consistent statements.  We conclude that Chamberlain is not entitled to reversal on
this issue.
First, this issue is not preserved for appeal.  At trial, Chamberlain objected
to the tape being introduced at trial on grounds that it was hearsay on hearsay and
8.  The hearsay on hearsay objection presumably stemmed from the fact
that, before recalling Thibault, the State initially tried to introduce the tape through
Detective Fraser.
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cumulative.8  Chamberlain's counsel never argued to the trial court that the tape
did not fall within the evidentiary rule providing that prior consistent statements
are not hearsay.  It is well-settled in Florida that "[t]o be preserved for appeal, 'the
specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a
claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.'"  Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d
845, 852 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 499 (Fla.
1992)).
Second, even if Chamberlain had properly preserved this issue, it has no
merit.  One of the defense theories at trial was that Thibault had conspired to
portray Chamberlain as the instigator in the murders either to secure a favorable
plea and merciful sentence or out of loyalty to Dascott.  During cross-examination,
defense counsel elicited testimony from Thibault regarding his initial plea, his
decision to reject the plea and request mercy from the court in exchange for
testifying, and the letters he exchanged with Dascott in jail.  The State's purpose in
introducing Thibault's conversation with his mother, which was recorded four days
after the murders and presumably before any motive to lie arose, was to
rehabilitate Thibault through prior consistent statements.
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Section 90.801, Florida Statutes (2003), which excludes some prior
consistent statements from the definition of hearsay, provides in pertinent part:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is:
. . . .
(b) Consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of improper
influence, motive, or recent fabrication . . . .
Chamberlain does not challenge the State's assertion that Thibault's conversation
with his mother was consistent with his trial testimony.  Nor does he contest the
fact that one of the defense strategies was to argue that Thibault was fabricating
Chamberlain's role in the murders.  Chamberlain's sole argument against the
admissibility of the tape under section 90.801(2)(b) is that Thibault's motive to lie
arose before the conversation with his mother.  According to Chamberlain,
Thibault and Dascott began conspiring late on Thanksgiving Day 1998, the day of
the murders.  Thus, Chamberlain argues that the tape was useless to rebut the
charge of fabrication.  
Regardless of the veracity of Chamberlain's timeline of when Thibault and
Dascott allegedly began conspiring, it is clear from the record that the taped
conversation occurred before plea negotiations or the State's requests for
testimony.  Thus, we are guided by this Court's decision in Chandler v. State, 702
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So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1997).  In that case, a witness testified that the defendant admitted
the murder to her in November 1989.  On cross-examination, defense counsel
elicited two motives for the witness to lie, one arising in October 1990 and one
arising in 1994.  On redirect, the State rehabilitated the witness with a prior
consistent statement given in October 1992, before the 1994 motive to lie arose. 
Despite the fact that the prior consistent statement was made after the first motive
to lie advanced by defense counsel arose, this Court concluded that the statement
was nonetheless properly admitted.  See id. at 197-98.  We stated that 
[t]he October 1992 statement was undisputedly made after the
October 1990 . . . incident.  However, by directly suggesting that the
[1994 incident] motivated [the witness's] testimony, Chandler could
not thereafter prevent the State from rehabilitating her testimony by
urging that another motive to fabricate existed earlier.  That was a
choice that the defendant made in urging more than one reason to
fabricate at trial.  Having made this choice, he must suffer its natural
consequences.
Id. at 198.  Similarly, in this case, having advanced the plea negotiations and
requests for testimony as a motive for Thibault to fabricate testimony,
Chamberlain cannot thereafter prevent the State from rehabilitating Thibault with
statements made before the negotiations and requests by urging that the alleged
conspiracy with Dascott existed earlier.  The trial court did not err in admitting the
prior consistent statement and we therefore reject Chamberlain's claim of error on
-25-
this issue.
Use of Demonstrative Aid
In this next issue, Chamberlain attacks the State's use of a demonstrative aid
during Amanda Ingman's direct examination.  At trial, Ingman testified that on the
night of the murders she witnessed the defendant holding a weapon with a flat
black handle.  At the State's request and over defense objection, the trial court
allowed a plainclothes police officer to display an asp to Ingman to aid her in
describing the weapon she had seen to the jury.  Ingman testified that the weapon
she saw the defendant hold on the evening of the murders was smaller than the one
displayed to her by the police officer.
The standard for allowing demonstrative evidence at trial was recently
reiterated by this Court in Harris v. State, 843 So. 2d 856, 863 (Fla. 2003),
wherein we stated:
Demonstrative evidence is admissible only when it is relevant
to the issues in the case. . . . [I]t is essential, in every case where
demonstrative evidence is offered, that the object or thing offered for
the jury to see be first shown to be the object in issue and that it is in
substantially the same condition as at the pertinent time, or that it is
such a reasonably exact reproduction or replica of the object involved
that when viewed by the jury it causes them to see substantially the
same object as the original.  
The person offering such evidence should be required to give a
good reason for its acceptance into evidence, and this is particularly
true if the object be not the original, but only a replica or a facsimile.
-26-
Id. (quoting Alston v. Shiver, 105 So. 2d 785, 791 (Fla. 1958)).  "The
determination as to whether to allow the use of a demonstrative exhibit is a matter
within the trial court's discretion."  Brown v. State, 550 So. 2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989); see also Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660, 664 (Fla. 1994) (stating that
trial court has broad discretion to determine relevance of evidence). 
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
demonstration in this case.  Chamberlain's possession of a weapon on the evening
of the murders was relevant, as it tended to show his level of involvement in the
crimes.  Moreover, the demonstrative aid was not admitted into evidence, and the
the State did not claim that it was the same weapon used in the murders.  The State
claimed only that it was similar.  See Wade v. State, 204 So. 2d 235, 238-39 (Fla.
2d DCA 1967) (approving admission of object similar but not identical to object
used in crime).  Further, Ingman was subject to cross-examination on the extent to
which the weapon resembled the object she had seen in Chamberlain's possession
the night of the murders.   
However, Chamberlain points out that later in the trial, the State actually
introduced into evidence a seven-and-a-half-inch friction-lock baton, or asp, that
was recovered three days after the murder.  At a bench conference, defense
counsel renewed his objection to the prior demonstration, arguing:
-27-
Apparently, it's going to be the State's position now that if Mr.
Chamberlain had a baton or anything in his hand that Exhibit 154 is
going to be the item that he had.
Based on that and that this exhibit has been placed into
evidence and based on the demonstration that I objected to yesterday
and the demonstration which was performed, which is an item
substantially larger than this Exhibit 154, I renew my objection at this
time and am moving for a mistrial. 
. . . .
It's substantially smaller in width, length, and weight than what
was shown yesterday and looks substantially less ominous than
what—
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial.  Chamberlain argues on appeal that
the trial court's ruling was erroneous because, by comparison with the smaller asp,
the larger asp used as a demonstrative aid had a shocking impact on the jury which
prejudiced him.  We disagree. 
"A ruling on a motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the
defendant receives a fair trial."  Rivera, 859 So. 2d at 512 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  Although we question the State's approach in using the larger
sized asp as a demonstrative aid instead of the original weapon that was available
during Ingman's testimony, the fact that the jury saw the larger weapon in this case
did not deprive Chamberlain of a fair trial.  We reach this conclusion because,
notwithstanding the fact that the weapon introduced into evidence was actually
9.  The standard felony murder jury instruction reads in pertinent part:
To prove the crime of First Degree Felony Murder, the State
must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.  (Victim) is dead.
2.  a. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while
(defendant) was engaged in the commission of (crime alleged).]
b. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while
(defendant) was attempting to commit (crime alleged).]
-28-
smaller than the demonstrative aid, the jury was not misled or confused in any
way.  See Robinson v. State, 145 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (finding no
error in admission of model of murder weapon that did not appear to confuse or
mislead the jury).  Ingman had previously testified that the asp used as the
demonstrative aid was larger than what she had seen Chamberlain holding, and
both Thibault and Dascott subsequently identified the smaller weapon as identical
to what Chamberlain had possessed.  Moreover, the State never made use of the
demonstrative aid other than during Ingman's testimony.  Thus, in this case, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 
Felony Murder Jury Instruction
Chamberlain's specific argument on this issue is unclear.  In his brief,
Chamberlain quotes portions of the trial transcript in which he argued
unsuccessfully that two portions of the felony murder jury instruction should not
be given.9  However, he fails to advance any argument in this Court as to how the
c. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while
(defendant), or an accomplice, was escaping from the immediate
scene of (crime alleged).]
3.  a. [(Defendant) was the person who actually killed (victim).]
b. [(Victim) was killed by a person other than (defendant); but
both (defendant) and the person who killed (victim) were principals
in the commission of (crime alleged).]
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) 7.3.
-29-
instruction was in error.  Instead, Chamberlain urges this Court to recede from
Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201, 204 (Fla. 1976), and "hold that it is improper, as
in the case at bar, for the State to pursue conviction through felony murder when
the indictment charges only [premeditated murder]."  We conclude that
Chamberlain is not entitled to relief on his challenge to the jury instruction or his
request that we recede from precedent.
First, because Chamberlain fails to advance any argument to this Court
regarding the jury instruction issue he raised at trial, we conclude that he has
abandoned that issue.  See Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 217 n. 6 (Fla. 1999)
(finding that issues raised in appellate brief which contain no argument are 
deemed abandoned).  Second, Chamberlain's argument that it is error to pursue
conviction through felony murder when the indictment charges only premeditation
is not preserved for appeal.  See Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852 ("To be preserved for
appeal, the specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at
-30-
trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.").  Finally, even if
the issue were preserved, we are not inclined to recede from this well-established
precedent.  See Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 404 (Fla.), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 408 (2003); Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1995); Knight, 338 So.
2d at 204. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Chamberlain argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal based on legal insufficiency of the evidence.  This issue is
wholly without merit.  
This Court recently reaffirmed the standard for ruling on a motion for
judgment of acquittal.  In Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla.), cert denied,
537 U.S. 848 (2002), we stated:
In moving for a judgment of acquittal, a defendant "admits not
only the facts stated in the evidence adduced, but also admits every
conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury might fairly and
reasonably infer from the evidence."  Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44,
45 (Fla. 1974).  As explained in Lynch: 
The courts should not grant a motion for judgment of
acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which
the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite
party can be sustained under the law.  Where there is
room for a difference of opinion between reasonable men
as to the proof of facts from which the ultimate fact is
sought to be established, or where there is room for such
differences as to the inference which might be drawn
-31-
from conceded facts, the Court should submit the case to
the jury for their finding, as it is their conclusion, in such
cases, that should prevail and not primarily the views of 
the judge. 
Id.  "The trial court's finding denying a motion for judgment of acquittal will not
be reversed on appeal if there is competent substantial evidence to support the
jury's verdict."  Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla. 2001).  Because the jury
was instructed on both premeditated and felony murder and found Chamberlain
guilty on a general verdict form, the evidence must support either premeditated or
felony murder.  See Jones v. State, 748 So. 2d 1012, 1024 (Fla. 1999) (citing
Mungin v. State, 689 So. 2d 1026, 1029-30 (Fla. 1995)).  
Here, there is sufficient evidence of both theories of first-degree murder. 
Three witnesses testified against Chamberlain regarding his involvement in the
triple homicide and robbery.  Dascott and Thibault both testified that Chamberlain
supplied the gun to Thibault.  Dascott, Thibault, and Ingman testified that
Chamberlain participated in the planning of the robbery.  Thibault testified that it
was Chamberlain's idea to use the gun and that Chamberlain gave the gun to
Thibault only because Thibault was physically larger.  Dascott, Thibault, and
Ingman all verified that Chamberlain had an asp with him the night of the murders,
and Thibault stated that Chamberlain used the asp on Harrison.  The medical
-32-
examiner testified that Harrison had a bruise on his knee consistent with being
struck by a blunt object.
Once Ketchum and Harrison were in the bathroom, Chamberlain actively
began looting the house and putting items in his car.  After Thibault killed
Ketchum, testimony from Ingman and Thibault revealed that it was Chamberlain
who first encouraged Thibault to kill the other witnesses.  Thibault stated that
Chamberlain stood beside him while Thibault emptied the gun into Kenyan and
Harrison.  Chamberlain then picked up the bullet casings to avoid leaving
incriminating evidence.  Thibault testified that after Chamberlain and Thibault
discovered Harrison was still alive, it was Chamberlain who went to the car,
retrieved more bullets, and reloaded the gun.  Dascott's testimony supported
Thibault's version of the killings. 
Thus, in this case there is competent, substantial evidence to support the
jury's verdict on either theory of first-degree murder, as well as armed robbery. 
First, all three murders indisputably occurred in the course of a robbery for which
Chamberlain both possessed and supplied a weapon.  Therefore, the evidence
supports verdicts of guilt of armed robbery and felony murder.  Second, regarding
premeditated murder, "[p]remeditation is defined as 'more than a mere intent to
kill; it is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill.'"  Green v. State, 715 So. 2d
10.  Chamberlain does not specifically question whether the evidence
supports premeditated murder regarding Ketchum.  The State argues that
Chamberlain is guilty as a principal.  However, prior to Ketchum's murder, which
occurred when Ketchum rushed Thibault in the bathroom, it does not appear that
there was a preconceived plan to murder the occupants of the house.  Nonetheless
any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was sufficient evidence
to convict Chamberlain of the first-degree felony murder of all three victims.  
-33-
940, 943 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 1997)). 
This purpose to kill must exist for a sufficient time before the homicide "to permit
reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result of that
act."  Id. at 944, (quoting Coolen, 696 So. 2d at 741).  At a minimum, ample
evidence supports the jury's verdict of guilt of the premeditated murders of
Harrison and Kenyan.10  The testimony of Ingman, Thibault, and Dascott
established that Chamberlain encouraged Thibault to eliminate the witnesses,
stood beside Thibault while he executed the witnesses, calmly picked up the shell
casings, and finally went to the car to retrieve more bullets after it was discovered
that Harrison was not dead.  Although Chamberlain did not actually pull the
trigger, the evidence supports the conclusion that he played an integral part in the
executions of Harrison and Kenyan, and is guilty as a principal.  See Ferrell v.
State, 686 So. 2d 1324, 1329 (Fla. 1996) ("While [the defendant] may not have
actually pulled the trigger, the evidence establishes that he played a[n] integral
part in these crimes and in actually luring the victim to his death. Thus, at a
11.  Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2003), provides:
Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state,
whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or
otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is
committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first
degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether
he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the
commission of such offense. 
-34-
minimum, he is guilty as a principal under the statute."); Hall v. State, 403 So. 2d
1319, 1320 (Fla. 1981) (evidence, including fact that defendant and his companion
planned robbery of victim together and were together at site of victim's assault and
death, supported conclusion that, even if defendant did not pull trigger, he was a
principal to crime of murder).11  Therefore, the trial court properly denied the
motion for judgment of acquittal.  There is sufficient evidence of the first-degree
murder of all three victims and Chamberlain is not entitled to relief on this issue. 
PENALTY PHASE 
Course of a Felony Aggravtor
Chamberlain argues that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator in
section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes, violates the Florida and United States
Constitutions because it neither performs a narrowing function nor reasonably
justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence.  This Court has repeatedly
-35-
rejected this claim.  See, e.g., Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687, 704 (Fla. 2003),
petition for cert. filed, No. 03-9345 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2004); Johnson v. Moore, 837
So. 2d 343, 348 (Fla. 2002); Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997). 
Further, as noted below, the course of a felony aggravator is merged with, and
subsumed within, the pecuniary gain aggravator.
Sufficient Evidence of Aggravation and Mitigation
In this issue, Chamberlain attacks the trial court's findings on aggravation
and mitigation.  Regarding the aggravators, Chamberlain generally alleges that
"the evidence submitted in the instant case did not support any of the aggravating
factors found by the trial court."  However, he specifically challenges only the
finding of CCP.  
Although not raised by Chamberlain, we first address the improper doubling
of aggravators.  We note that the trial court found that Chamberlain committed the
murder both (1) for pecuniary gain, and (2) during the course of a felony
(robbery).  Generally, when a homicide occurs during the course of a robbery, it is
improper for the trial court to find as aggravation both that the homicide was
committed during the course of a robbery and that the homicide was committed for
pecuniary gain.  See Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 836, 851; Provence v. State, 337 So.
2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976).  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in
-36-
finding both commission for pecuniary gain and commission during the course of
a robbery as aggravating factors.  Accordingly, we merge these aggravators.
We next address CCP.  "[T]he trial judge's ruling on an aggravating
circumstance will be sustained on review as long as the court applied the right rule
of law and its ruling is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the
record."  Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 850-51.  For the trial court to find CCP, four
factors must be established by the evidence:
[T]he jury must first determine that the killing was the product of cool
and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy,
panic, or a fit of rage (cold); and that the defendant had a careful plan
or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident
(calculated); and that the defendant exhibited heightened
premeditation (premeditated); and that the defendant had no pretense
of moral or legal justification.
Id. at 851 (quoting Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994)).   
It is clear that Chamberlain's claim that the evidence does not support the
trial court's finding of the CCP aggravator for the murders of Harrison and Kenyan
is without merit.  The trial court stated in its sentencing order:
The final two homicides are remarkable because they are
methodical.  They are performed in a systematic way.  The decision to
take life is clearly present in the minds of all three (Thibault,
Chamberlain, and Ingman) at the time of the killings.
. . . What is revealed here is a calculated plan to eliminate that
begins with debate, consumes appreciable time and is conducted with
the two men (Thibault and Chamberlain) acting in concert.  It is
-37-
concrete and heightened, and it all takes place during a continuing
robbery that is a virtual marathon of taking.
. . . .
Chamberlain provides transportation and the gun.  He initiates
the idea of witness elimination, and it is he who directs, prods and
encourages Thibault in the final executions.
These findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
Regarding the applicability of the criteria for CCP to these facts, we also conclude
that the execution-style nature of the killings is particularly compelling in this
case.  These wholly unnecessary, execution-style murders are prime examples of
the "deliberate ruthlessness" for which application of the CCP aggravating factor
is reserved.  See Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 21 (Fla. 2000); see also McCoy v.
State, 853 So. 2d 396, 408 (Fla. 2003) (affirming CCP where evidence established
that there were no signs of physical struggle at the crime scene, the appellant had
ample opportunity to leave after completing the robbery, and he unnecessarily
executed a compliant hostage execution style); Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656,
678 (Fla. 2001) (applying CCP where "the defendants had ample opportunity to
reflect upon their actions, following which they mutually decided to shoot the
victims execution-style"), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 966 (2002); Alston v. State, 723
So. 2d 148, 162 (Fla. 1998) (sustaining the CCP aggravator where the "appellant
had ample opportunity to release [the victim] after the robbery," but chose to kill
-38-
him); Eutzy v. State, 458 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 1984) (sustaining CCP where there
was no sign of struggle, and the victim was shot execution-style).  
However, we agree with Chamberlain that the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court's finding that the murder of Ketchum was cold, calculated,
and premeditated.  There is no evidence that before they placed Ketchum and
Harrison in the bathroom, Thibault and Chamberlain formulated a calculated plan
to murder the victims.  Moreover, it is undisputed that Ketchum's death occurred
during a struggle in the bathroom after Ketchum rushed Thibault.  Although
Thibault may have formulated an intent to kill Ketchum during the attack, the
totality of the circumstances indicate an absence of the heightened premeditation
by Chamberlain necessary for application of this aggravator.  However, as four
other valid aggravators exist in this case—(1) previously convicted of a felony and
on probation; (2) previous violent felony conviction (the contemporaneous murder
convictions); (3) murder committed while engaged in a robbery/pecuniary gain
(merged); and (4) murder committed to avoid arrest—any error is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.  This Court has determined that errors in finding aggravators
were harmless in analogous cases.  See, e.g., Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 887
(Fla. 2002) (even assuming that insufficient evidence existed to support the trial
court's finding of CCP, any error was harmless because four other valid
-39-
aggravators existed); Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 2000) (finding wrongful
application of the avoiding a lawful arrest aggravator harmless error where four
other valid aggravators—prior violent felonies, pecuniary gain, HAC, and
CCP—existed); Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1162 (Fla. 1998) (upholding
imposition of the death penalty where the CCP aggravator was overturned but the
remaining four other aggravators—prior violent felony, committed in the course of
a robbery, HAC, and avoiding arrest—existed).
Finally, we address the trial court's findings regarding mitigation. 
 As mitigation Chamberlain presented the testimony of six witnesses, including
two mental health counselors.  The trial court stated in its sentencing order: 
There are some factors in the defendant's background that are
mitigating in nature.  There was some abuse by his cousins and the
testimony is that they introduced him to criminal conduct.  On the
other hand he sought their company.  He wanted to be with them and
did not appear to have other friends.  At some point their relationship
became brotherly and currently it is described as loving and
affectionate.  This is mitigation of some weight which I rank as slight. 
And he was neglected by his parents . . . .
The parental neglect in this case, while serious, is not as
devastating as many within my experience.
Dr. Eugene Herman testified that Mr. Chamberlain's full scale
IQ was in the high average range . . . .
[His employers] reported that he was a good employee, a good
kid, always respectful; never showed any signs of behavioral
problems . . . . He had started to turn his life around.  He obtained his
GED and enrolled in the community college.
The turbulence and trauma in his life took place for a few years
-40-
starting when he was 8 years old.
Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that these findings on
mitigation are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
Proportionality
This Court has an independent obligation to perform a proportionality
review of all death sentences.  To this end, we have stated:
Due to the uniqueness and finality of death, this Court addresses the
propriety of all death sentences in a proportionality review.  This
review is a unique and highly serious function of this Court, the
purpose of which is to foster uniformity in death-penalty law.  It is
not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances; rather, it is a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality
review to consider the totality of the circumstances in a case, and to
compare it with other capital cases.
 
McCoy, 853 So. 2d at 408 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  We conclude
that the death sentence is proportionate in this case.  
We have previously affirmed death sentences where the defendant is a
principal in a felony or premeditated murder.  See Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d
747, 760 (Fla. 2001) (finding death sentence proportionate in case where
defendant did not actually commit murder, but personally committed crimes of
burglary and robbery and actions displayed reckless disregard for human life); Van
Poyck v. State, 564 So. 2d 1066, 1070-71 (Fla. 1990) (finding the death sentence
12.  Although Chamberlain does not specifically raise the issue that the trial
court failed to make a factual determination concerning his participation in the
murders as prescribed by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), our
independent obligation to perform a proportionality review compels us to address
this issue in this case.  In Enmund and Tison, the United States Supreme Court
held that a sentence of death must be proportional to the defendant's culpability. 
Thus, in Enmund the Supreme Court indicated that in the felony murder context a
sentence of death is not permissible if the defendant only aids and abets a felony
during the course of which a murder is committed by another and defendant
himself did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal
force be used.  See 458 U.S. at 797.  Later, in Tison the Court said a sentence of
death in the felony murder context can be proportional if the defendant is a major
participant in the felony and the defendant's state of mind amounts to a reckless
indifference to human life.  See 481 U.S. at 157 
In the present case, Chamberlain was not merely an aider or abetter in a
felony where a murder was committed by others; Chamberlain personally
committed the crime of robbery.  He also supplied the gun, instigated the witness
elimination, retrieved more bullets and reloaded the gun.  This record
demonstrates that Chamberlain was not only recklessly indifferent to the taking of
human life, but actively pursued and encouraged it.  Under these circumstances the
death penalty is proportionate.  See Stephens, 787 So. 2d at 759-60; Van Poyck,
564 So. 2d at 1070.
-41-
proportionate where the defendant was the instigator and primary participant in the
underlying crimes, came to the scene "armed to the teeth," and knew lethal force
could be used).12  Moreover, CCP and prior violent felony conviction are
considered among the more serious aggravating circumstances.  See Anderson v.
State, 863 So. 2d 169, 188 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1662 (2004). 
Finally, we have affirmed death sentences under circumstances similar to those in
-42-
this case.  See Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 940 (Fla.) (affirming death
sentence where trial court found five aggravating circumstances including prior
violent felony, CCP, and pecuniary gain, no statutory mitigators, and eight
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 895 (2002); Franqui
v. State, 804 So. 2d 1185, 1198 (Fla. 2001) (affirming death sentence where
defendant murdered a law enforcement officer during a bank robbery and trial
court found three aggravators—pecuniary gain, prior violent felony, and avoid
arrest—and minor nonstatutory mitigation); Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 56
(Fla. 2001) (holding death penalty was proportionate where defendant was a major
participant in an armed robbery, had cold, calculated, and premeditated plan to
eliminate any witnesses, but did not have a significant prior criminal history), cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 910 (2002).  
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Chamberlain's convictions and sentences
of death.  
It is so ordered. 
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL,
JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs as to the conviction, and concurs in result only as to the
sentence.
-43-
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, 
Marvin Mounts, Judge - Case No. 98-012923CF B02
Gregg S. Lerman, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Debra Rescigno, Assistant Attorney
General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee