Title: Tinsley v. Town of Framingham
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12826
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2020

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SJC-12826 
 
MARK S. TINSLEY  vs.  TOWN OF FRAMINGHAM & others.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 9, 2020. - September 17, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ.2 
 
 
Civil Rights, Availability of remedy.  Collateral Estoppel.  
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.  Police Officer.  Arrest.  
Emotional Distress.  Assault and Battery.  Practice, Civil, 
Summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 12, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Bruce R. Henry, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was ordered by 
him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the briefs. 
 
Robert C. Johnson, Jr., for the plaintiff. 
 
Bradford N. Louison for the defendants. 
                                                 
1 Board of selectmen of Framingham; Dinis G. Avila; Joseph 
Godino; James Green; Jason Lurie; and Gregory Reardon. 
 
 
2 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
 
James S. Timmins & Maura E. O'Keefe for Massachusetts 
Municipal Lawyers Association, amicus curiae. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In this disturbing case we must determine the 
extent to which the criminal convictions of the plaintiff, Mark 
S. Tinsley, on charges related to his arrest affect the validity 
of his civil claims against the police officers who arrested 
him.  The incident at issue began with a routine traffic stop of 
the plaintiff, a Black man, by two police officers and ended in 
a physical altercation during which five police officers, none 
of whom were Black, forcibly removed Tinsley from the vehicle 
and wrestled him to the ground.  Following this altercation, he 
was charged with numerous offenses, and a jury ultimately 
convicted him of assault and battery on a police officer, 
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and carrying a dangerous 
weapon.  While the criminal case was pending, Tinsley filed a 
civil action in the Superior Court alleging that the officers 
violated his civil rights and committed a variety of torts 
during the incident.  Tinsley has appealed from the allowance of 
the defendants' motions for summary judgment on his civil 
action. 
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff previously convicted of a 
crime in State court may not use a Federal civil rights suit to 
attack that conviction collaterally in Federal court.  To 
3 
 
 
 
proceed in a civil action for damages based on "harm caused by 
actions whose unlawfulness would render [his] conviction or 
sentence invalid," the plaintiff must demonstrate that his civil 
action, if successful, would not "necessarily imply the 
invalidity of his conviction."3  Id. at 486-487.  We decline to 
adopt the holding in Heck in its entirety;4 instead, we adopt 
only its guiding principle:  a plaintiff may not use a State 
civil action, including one brought under the Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Act (MCRA), G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I, to 
collaterally attack his or her State criminal conviction.  See 
Heck, supra.  Therefore, we conclude that a plaintiff's civil 
action may only proceed where it is based on facts, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, beyond those that 
were necessary to sustain the plaintiff's prior criminal 
conviction, and where the plaintiff demonstrates, in response to 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, that his or her 
claims, should they succeed, would not necessarily challenge the 
                                                 
3 The plaintiff also may proceed by demonstrating that his 
conviction was reversed on direct appeal or otherwise 
invalidated or called into question.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994).  We need not address this circumstance 
here, as the Appeals Court affirmed the plaintiff Mark Tinsley's 
convictions, and Tinsley does not assert that his convictions 
were otherwise invalidated. 
 
4 We do not adopt the holding in Heck in its entirety to 
provide plaintiffs with a greater opportunity to litigate their 
State claims of alleged civil rights violations, as well as any 
attendant claims, than they may have under the Federal doctrine. 
4 
 
 
 
validity of his or her prior criminal conviction.  See Lynch v. 
Crawford, 483 Mass. 631, 641 (2019). 
As to Tinsley's claims, for the reasons set forth infra, 
our conclusion bars his claims only to the extent that they are 
based on the events that occurred while he was still inside his 
vehicle.  His convictions, narrowly construed, were based on his 
conduct only while he was inside his vehicle, and he is 
collaterally estopped from challenging the facts necessary to 
sustain his convictions.  Our conclusion does not, however, bar 
the claims that Tinsley bases on the events that occurred after 
the police officers forcibly removed him from his vehicle.  
Accordingly, we affirm in part, and we vacate and remand in 
part.5 
 
Background.  Because the viability of Tinsley's claims 
directly relates to the facts on which the claims rely, we must 
bifurcate the facts, viewing each set of facts through different 
lenses.  Because we conclude that the events that occurred when 
Tinsley was inside his vehicle could have sustained his criminal 
convictions, and because we conclude that Tinsley is 
collaterally estopped from challenging any facts that the jury 
necessarily found to sustain those convictions, we recite those 
facts as the jury could have found them.  See Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers Association. 
5 
 
 
 
Co. v. Niziolek, 395 Mass. 737, 742 (1985) (former criminal 
defendant may be collaterally estopped from "relitigating an 
issue decided in the criminal prosecution").  However, because 
we conclude that the events that occurred after the police 
officers removed Tinsley from his vehicle –- for the purposes of 
review of the Superior Court judge's allowance of the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment -- did not form the 
basis for Tinsley's criminal convictions, we recite those facts 
in the light most favorable to Tinsley, the nonmoving party.  
See Lynch, 483 Mass. at 641. 
 
1.  Facts.  Around 9:15 P.M. on May 27, 2012, Detective 
Joseph Godino and Officer Greg Reardon observed a black Nissan 
Maxima speeding on a public street.6  After conducting a search 
regarding the vehicle's license plate number, the officers 
learned that the vehicle was registered to Tinsley.  Godino and 
Reardon activated the lights of their unmarked Ford Explorer and 
stopped the vehicle.  Godino approached the vehicle on the 
passenger's side and observed Tinsley moving around in the 
driver's seat and reaching his left hand between his seat and 
the driver's side door.  Godino alerted Reardon, who was 
approaching the driver's side of the vehicle, that he believed 
                                                 
6 The police officers estimated that Tinsley was traveling 
forty to forty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five miles per 
hour zone. 
6 
 
 
 
that Tinsley was hiding something along the seat by the driver's 
side door.  At some point, Tinsley placed his hand in in his 
lap, where both officers observed a cellular telephone and a 
wallet.  Godino then observed Tinsley make a furtive movement 
toward the driver's side door.  Godino did not see anything in 
Tinsley's hands. 
 
Because he was concerned that Tinsley might have a weapon, 
Reardon asked Tinsley to "step out of the vehicle."  Tinsley 
refused and asked why.  Reardon told him that he would explain 
everything after Tinsley got out of the vehicle.  Tinsley 
continued to refuse.  Godino reached into the vehicle from the 
passenger's side, shut it off, and removed the keys.  Tinsley 
then provided his license and registration but continued to 
refuse Reardon's repeated requests that he get out of the 
vehicle. 
 
While Reardon and Tinsley were talking, Officer Dinis Avila 
and Officer Jason Lurie arrived at the scene.  Upon his arrival, 
Lurie heard Tinsley yelling.  These two police officers then 
joined Reardon by the driver's side door of the vehicle where 
Lurie joined Reardon in asking Tinsley to get out of the 
vehicle. 
Godino, while still at the passenger's side door, reached 
into the vehicle and unbuckled Tinsley's seat belt.  Officers 
Reardon and Lurie then reached into the vehicle, grabbed 
7 
 
 
 
Tinsley, and tried to pull him out.  Tinsley actively resisted 
and "scream[ed]" for help, trying to get "someone [to] pay 
attention to what[ was] going on."  Godino came around to the 
driver's side of the vehicle and joined in the effort to remove 
Tinsley from the vehicle.  Avila went around to the passenger's 
side and pushed Tinsley while the other police officers pulled 
him.  Tinsley had his legs wedged under the steering wheel, 
which prevented the police officers from pulling him out. 
During the course of the struggle to remove Tinsley from 
his vehicle, Tinsley struck Avila in the chest, and Lurie struck 
Tinsley in the face.  Godino also retaliated by punching Tinsley 
twice, hitting him in the chin and the chest.  Lurie also used 
knee strikes to try to get Tinsley out of the vehicle.  At some 
point, Lurie cut the seat belt, which had remained wrapped 
around Tinsley.  A fifth officer, James Green, then arrived to 
help.  Green was able to grab hold of Tinsley, and the officers 
dragged him out of the vehicle. 
As stated supra, because the jury did not need to rely on 
the events that transpired thereafter to sustain Tinsley's 
convictions, we view the remaining facts in the light most 
favorable to Tinsley.  See Lynch, 483 Mass. at 641.  After 
Tinsley was dragged from his vehicle, he fell to the ground, and 
several police officers began beating him.  Once on the ground, 
Tinsley did not resist.  He tried to put his hands behind his 
8 
 
 
 
back so that the police officers would handcuff him and thus, he 
thought, stop hitting him.  The police officers did not stop.  
Reardon struck Tinsley's collarbone and upper shoulder, and 
stomped on Tinsley's left hand.  Lurie sprayed Tinsley with 
pepper spray.  Green called Tinsley a "fucking nigger"7 and 
kicked Tinsley in the head.  While Tinsley was on the ground, an 
officer handcuffed him.8  Tinsley suffered a broken nose, a 
broken finger, and a wound on the side of his head that required 
stitches. 
2.  Procedural history.  After trial, a jury convicted 
Tinsley of assault and battery on Avila, disorderly conduct, 
resisting arrest, and carrying a dangerous weapon (a spring 
                                                 
7 At trial, Officer Green denied that he or any other police 
officer swore at Tinsley or called him "any names." 
 
8 As Tinsley recalled at trial:  "I know I was slammed on my 
head.  Um, I hit the ground and . . . on the way down to the 
ground, all I could feel was blows to my body -- my whole body.  
My head - everywhere - coming everywhere. . . . They [were] 
hitting me, . . . they [were] kicking me, they [were] punching 
me, they [were] hitting me with whatever they had. . . . I know 
it was fist blows . . . , feet blows . . . at one point, I was 
on the ground . . . an officer came running -- I could see his 
boot coming to kick me in my face.  That's when I turned my head 
and he kicked me right in the back of my head."  Tinsley 
testified that, once a police officer handcuffed him, the police 
officers continued to hit him, and that one police officer had 
his boot on the side of Tinsley's face and ground his head into 
the ground. 
 
9 
 
 
 
assisted knife).  The jury found Tinsley not guilty of a second 
count of assault and battery on Reardon.9 
 
While the criminal charges against Tinsley were pending, he 
commenced this civil action in the Superior Court against the 
town of Framingham, the board of selectmen of Framingham 
(collectively, the municipal defendants), and the five police 
officers involved in his arrest, asserting a violation of the 
MCRA, as well as a variety of tort claims.10  After the jury 
convicted Tinsley, but while his direct appeal from the 
convictions was pending in the Appeals Court, the defendants 
filed a motion for summary judgment, which a motion judge 
allowed in part and denied in part.  The judge took no action on 
some of the claims and stayed the proceedings pending the 
                                                 
9 The judge found Tinsley not responsible for the civil 
infraction of speeding. 
 
10 The complaint included nine claims:  violation of the 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), G. L. c. 12, §§ 11I & 11H 
against all of the defendants (count I); negligence against the 
municipal defendants (count II); negligent failure to provide 
medical care against all of the defendants (count III); 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against the police 
officers (count IV); assault against the police officers (count 
V); battery against the police officers (count VI); false arrest 
and false imprisonment against the police officers (count VII); 
negligent hiring, training, discipline, and retention against 
the municipal defendants (count VIII); and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress against all of the defendants (count IX). 
 
10 
 
 
 
Appeals Court's decision.11  After the Appeals Court affirmed 
Tinsley's convictions, the defendants filed a renewed motion for 
summary judgment on the remaining claims, which a different 
judge allowed.12  Tinsley appealed, and we transferred the case 
here on our own initiative. 
 
Discussion.  We review a grant of summary judgment de novo 
"to determine 'whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been 
established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.'"  District Attorney for the N. Dist. v. School 
Comm. of Wayland, 455 Mass. 561, 566 (2009), quoting Augat, Inc. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).  Tinsley 
appeals only from the second summary judgment decision, where 
                                                 
11 The judge ordered that judgment enter in favor of the 
municipal defendants on counts I, II, III, and VIII, but denied 
their motion for summary judgment on count IX.  She also ordered 
that judgment enter in favor of the police officers on counts 
III and IX, and on counts I, IV, V, VI, and VII, to the extent 
that the claims were brought against the police officers in 
their official capacities.  The judge took no action on counts 
I, IV, V, VI and VII to the extent the claims were brought 
against the police officers personally. 
 
12 To the extent Tinsley argues that the second motion judge 
erred in failing to adopt the Appeals Court's factual findings, 
the argument is flawed.  The Appeals Court, like all appellate 
courts, does not find facts.  In addition, the Appeals Court 
affirmed Tinsley's convictions in a memorandum and order 
pursuant to its former rule 1:28 (now rule 23.0).  Such a 
decision is not binding precedent, nor does it contain all of 
the relevant facts.  See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 
260 n.4 (2008). 
11 
 
 
 
the judge dismissed his remaining claims against the police 
officers in their personal capacities, including the violation 
of the MCRA (count I), intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (count IV), assault (count V), battery (count VI), and 
false arrest and false imprisonment (count VII).13 
 
1.  Application of Heck to State law claims.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Heck, 512 U.S. at 483, "the common law of 
torts has developed a set of rules to implement the principle 
that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused 
by the violation of his legal rights" (citation omitted).  In 
the interest of "finality and consistency," however, the Court 
adopted "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding 
criminal judgments."  Id. at 485-486.  See id. at 484 (affirming 
"strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting 
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction" 
[citation omitted]).  See generally Cabot v. Lewis, 241 F. Supp. 
3d 239, 257-259 (D. Mass. 2017) (applying reasoning of Heck to 
plaintiff's State law claims, including claim under MCRA and 
                                                 
13 To the extent that Tinsley states that he is seeking 
relief from the dismissal of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress (count IX) against all of the defendants, he does so no 
more than in passing, and thus, he does not present any adequate 
appellate argument on the point.  We therefore do not consider 
it.  Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 
(2019). 
12 
 
 
 
common-law claims for battery, assault, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
We are not bound by Heck, whose holding binds only Federal 
courts; however, we adopt its guiding principle that to protect 
the validity of adjudicated criminal convictions, a plaintiff 
may not use a State civil action, including State tort claims 
and claims advanced under the MCRA, to collaterally attack the 
plaintiff's previous State criminal conviction.  We conclude 
that a plaintiff's civil action may proceed only where the 
action is based on facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, other than those necessary to sustain the 
plaintiff's criminal conviction and where the plaintiff 
demonstrates that the civil action, if successful, would not 
necessarily undermine the validity of the plaintiff's prior 
criminal conviction.  See Heck, supra at 486-487; Cabot, 241 F. 
Supp. 3d at 257.  Our conclusion is not intended to place an 
impregnable barrier between a plaintiff and the civil remedy to 
which the plaintiff is rightfully entitled under the law even 
where the plaintiff has his or her civil rights violated after 
having engaged in criminal conduct.  See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 
U.S. 637, 647 (2004).  Rather, our conclusion is intended to 
prevent plaintiffs from challenging facts and arguments from 
which they are collaterally estopped by virtue of their criminal 
13 
 
 
 
conviction, while also preserving plaintiffs' rights to hold 
accountable those individuals who may have caused them harm. 
 
2.  Application of our conclusion to Tinsley's claims.  To 
determine the validity of Tinsley's claims on appeal, we look to 
the relationship between those claims, the facts on which they 
rely, and the crimes of which the jury convicted him.  See 
VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying 
Heck requires trial court to "analyze the relationship between 
plaintiff's [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim and the charge on which he 
was convicted").  If Tinsley's claims are based on facts other 
than those that the jury needed to have found in order to 
convict him of assault and battery on a police officer, 
disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest,14 his claims do not 
challenge the validity of those convictions, and his action may 
proceed.  If, however, Tinsley's claims are based solely on the 
facts the jury needed to find in order to convict, those claims 
                                                 
14 Tinsley's civil claims are unrelated to his conviction of 
carrying a dangerous weapon. 
 
14 
 
 
 
amount to a collateral attack on his convictions and are thus 
not cognizable.15,16 
 
As an initial matter, in a civil action like the one here, 
we conclude that a plaintiff is collaterally estopped from 
asserting that any force used by the police officers was 
                                                 
15 In support of his false arrest and false imprisonment 
claim, Tinsley asserted that Detective Godino and Officer 
Reardon detained Tinsley without reasonable or probable cause 
and without a warrant.  That claim is barred, because if 
successful, it would necessarily imply the impropriety of all of 
Tinsley's convictions and, thus, would constitute an 
impermissible collateral attack on those convictions. 
 
16 To the extent that Tinsley argues that his claim may 
proceed because he commenced this civil action before he was 
convicted, and thus his claims cannot be viewed as an attempt to 
collaterally attack a conviction, the argument is misplaced.  
The claims at issue in this appeal are the same claims on which 
the first motion judge did not act because Tinsley's convictions 
were not yet final.  Only after the Appeals Court affirmed 
Tinsley's convictions did the second motion judge act on the 
concomitant civil claims.  The point is not whether Tinsley set 
out to collaterally attack a conviction but whether, in light of 
his convictions, his civil claims, if successful, would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of those convictions.  The 
timing of the commencement of the action, under these 
circumstances, is not relevant.  See Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 
379, 383 (5th Cir. 2020), quoting Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 
488, 490 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 910 (2003) ("It is 
irrelevant that [a plaintiff] disclaims any intention of 
challenging his conviction; if he makes allegations that are 
inconsistent with the conviction's having been valid, Heck kicks 
in and bars his civil suit"). 
 
We note, however, that where a plaintiff brings a civil 
action before or during the pendency of a criminal case against 
him, the plaintiff may have to amend his complaint once his 
conviction becomes final to remove his allegations from which he 
has become collaterally estopped. 
15 
 
 
 
excessive because the plaintiff was innocent of any wrongdoing.  
In proclaiming his innocence, the plaintiff challenges the facts 
that the jury necessarily found to sustain his convictions, and 
thereby seeks to impermissibly impugn those convictions.  See 
Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 180 (1st Cir. 2006).  Therefore, to 
the extent that Tinsley argues his complete innocence, the 
argument is impermissible.17  For example, because the jury 
convicted Tinsley of assault and battery of Avila, Tinsley may 
not now assert that he did not strike Avila, as the jury could 
not have convicted Tinsley of that charge without that finding.  
Thus, Tinsley's assertion of innocence would constitute an 
improper collateral attack on his assault and battery 
conviction.  Our conclusion bars such a claim.  See O'Brien v. 
Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 529 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting Thore, 
supra at 179-180 (excessive force claim "'so interrelated 
factually' with [plaintiff's] state convictions arising from 
those events that a judgment in [plaintiff's] favor would 
'necessarily imply' the invalidity of those convictions").  See 
also DeLeon v. Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(Heck barred plaintiff's civil action because plaintiff did not 
                                                 
17 Although this argument cannot form the basis for 
Tinsley's civil action, it properly formed the basis for his 
defense at trial, as well as his argument on appeal from his 
convictions.  Our judicial system relies on the jury to decide 
the truth, and on the direct appellate process and motion for a 
new trial to resolve any errors at trial. 
16 
 
 
 
allege "that his claims of excessive force are separable from 
his aggravated assault on the officer.  Instead, the complaint 
maintains that he did nothing wrong, that he simply defended 
himself . . ."). 
a.  Impermissible claims.  Tinsley's MCRA claim, and his 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
assault, and battery against the police officers individually 
arise largely out of the police officers' use of force against 
him, ostensibly when Tinsley was both inside and outside his 
vehicle.18  We conclude that the jury could have found the facts 
necessary to convict Tinsley of assault and battery on Avila and 
disorderly conduct based on what occurred inside Tinsley's 
vehicle.  Given Tinsley's conviction of resisting arrest, 
determining whether Tinsley's claims would be barred as a 
collateral attack on that conviction requires us to determine 
whether there are any facts on which Tinsley may properly base 
his claims.  That, in turn, requires us to determine the point 
at which Tinsley was arrested. 
                                                 
18 In his complaint, Tinsley raised other arguments in 
support of his MCRA claim, including deprivation of medical care 
and the police officers' failure to intervene to prevent other 
police officers' conduct.  Those arguments relate to two of 
Tinsley's other claims, negligence and negligent failure to 
provide medical care, for which the first motion judge granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  As stated supra, 
Tinsley does not appeal from the first order granting summary 
judgment. 
17 
 
 
 
"An arrest occurs where there is (1) 'an actual or 
constructive seizure or detention of the person, [2] performed 
with the intention to effect an arrest and [3] so understood by 
the person detained.'"  Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 
135, 145 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 419 Mass. 192, 
198 (1994).  There was enough evidence to conclude, as a matter 
of law, that Tinsley was under arrest before the police officers 
pulled him from his vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Willis, 415 
Mass. 814, 820 (1993) (considering length of encounter, nature 
of inquiry, possibility of flight, and danger to safety of 
police officers and public in whether investigatory stop becomes 
arrest); Commonwealth v. Sanderson, 398 Mass. 761, 766-767 
(1986) (arrest occurred when multiple police officers blocked in 
defendant's vehicle and asked him to step out, and he was not 
free to leave, regardless of formal arrest forty minutes later); 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 795 (2018) 
(looking to number of police officers, whether police officers 
blocked defendant's vehicle, and whether police officers' 
actions were proportionate "to the degree of suspicion that 
prompted the intrusion" to determine arrest had occurred 
[citation omitted]).19 
                                                 
19 Tinsley is collaterally estopped only from challenging 
the facts that the jury needed to find to sustain his 
convictions; thus, to determine whether Tinsley's claims, if 
18 
 
 
 
 
"A person commits the crime of resisting arrest if he 
knowingly prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer . . . 
from effecting an arrest . . . by . . . using . . . physical 
force or violence against the police officer."  G. L. c. 268, 
§ 32B.  At Tinsley's trial, the jury heard testimony from both 
Godino and Reardon regarding the amount of force that police 
officers are trained to use in certain circumstances.  
Additionally, the judge instructed the jury on the issue of 
unreasonable or unnecessary force in connection with the charge 
of resisting arrest:  "If a police officer uses unreasonable or 
excessive force to make an arrest, the person who is being 
arrested may defend himself, with as much force as reasonably 
appears necessary. . . .  If there is some evidence that the 
police used unreasonable or excessive force, the Commonwealth 
must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did 
not act in self-defense." 
To convict Tinsley of resisting arrest, then, the jury had 
to find that he used "physical force or violence against the 
police officer[s]," and that in doing so, that he was not acting 
in lawful self-defense.  G. L. c. 268, § 32B.  Because there was 
                                                 
successful, would necessarily challenge the validity of his 
convictions, we need only consider the narrowest version of 
events needed to sustain Tinsley's convictions.  Because Tinsley 
could have been arrested while inside his vehicle, we need not 
determine or comment on whether Tinsley continued to resist 
arrest outside his vehicle. 
19 
 
 
 
enough evidence to conclude that the arrest occurred before the 
police officers removed Tinsley from his vehicle, however, so 
too did Tinsley's actions that sustained his conviction of 
resisting arrest.  In other words, it was Tinsley's actions 
inside his vehicle -- his effort to prevent the police officers 
from removing him from the vehicle -- that sustained that 
conviction.  As such, to the extent that Tinsley contends that 
the police officers used excessive force while he was still 
inside his vehicle, such a claim, if successful, would amount to 
an impermissible collateral attack on his conviction of 
resisting arrest, and it may not proceed. 
 
b.  Permissible claims.  In some circumstances, however, we 
conclude that an "excessive force claim brought against a police 
officer that arises out of the officer's use of force during an 
arrest does not necessarily call into question the validity of 
an underlying state conviction" and that our conclusion would 
not bar such a claim.  Thore, 466 F.3d at 180 (permitting 
plaintiff's "theory . . . that his excessive force claim need 
not impugn his convictions for assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon in order to establish that [the officer] used 
excessive force").  See Havens v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 776, 782 
(10th Cir. 2015), and cases cited (excessive force claim against 
police officer "not necessarily inconsistent with a conviction 
for assaulting the officer [because] the claim may be that the 
20 
 
 
 
officer used too much force to respond to the assault or that 
the officer used force after the need for force had 
disappeared").20  See also Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 382 
(5th Cir. 2020) ("Put simply, there is no Heck bar if the 
alleged violation occurs 'after' the cessation of the 
plaintiff's misconduct that gave rise to his prior conviction"); 
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008) (excessive 
force claim not barred where it is "temporally and conceptually 
distinct" from plaintiff's prior conviction). 
Because we concluded that the jury could have found the 
facts necessary to convict Tinsley of resisting arrest, assault 
and battery on Avila, and disorderly conduct based on what 
occurred inside the vehicle, Tinsley may base his civil claims 
on what he alleges occurred after the police officers forcibly 
removed him from his vehicle -- when the police officers 
allegedly continued to hit him, kicked him, and called him a 
"fucking nigger" -- as those claims, if successful, would not 
amount to a collateral attack on his convictions.  See Bush, 513 
F.3d at 496, 500 (because plaintiff produced evidence that after 
she stopped resisting arrest and after she was handcuffed, 
police officer forced plaintiff's face into vehicle window, 
                                                 
20 Tinsley did not argue the former rationale -- that while 
he resisted arrest, the police officers' use of force went 
beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances. 
21 
 
 
 
"injuring her jaw and breaking two of her teeth," "a favorable 
verdict on her excessive force claims will not undermine her 
criminal conviction").  See also Hardrick v. Bolingbrook, 522 
F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2008) (permitting plaintiff's claim that 
officers used excessive force; that plaintiff resisted arrest by 
struggling while being handcuffed "at one point in time does not 
preclude the possibility" that he was "peaceably waiting" at 
another point in time); Schwind vs. Koste, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 
1:19-cv-05741, slip op. (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2020) (where 
plaintiff pleaded guilty to resisting arrest by one officer, 
plaintiff's excessive force claim not barred where plaintiff 
asserted second officer struck plaintiff in face while plaintiff 
was handcuffed); Bochart vs. Lowell, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 13-
11753-FDS, slip op. (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2016) (court permitted 
plaintiff's claim that police officer's continued use of pepper 
spray after plaintiff stopped resisting constituted excessive 
force because "[a]ccepting that theory would not require 
accepting facts that would invalidate [the plaintiff's] 
conviction[s]"). 
Even where the use of force to effect an arrest is 
reasonable in response to an individual's resistance, the 
continued use of force may well be unreasonable, as an 
individual's conduct prior to arrest or during an arrest does 
not authorize a violation of his or her constitutional rights.  
22 
 
 
 
See Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam) (permitting excessive force claim that police officers 
beat plaintiff "beyond recognition" after he had already been 
arrested and handcuffed).  See also McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 
619, 622-623 (7th Cir. 2006) ("deputy's use of deadly force as a 
response was not reasonable" despite plaintiff's "assaultive and 
obstructive conduct").  In such a case, like the one here, a 
plaintiff's claims that the police officers in question violated 
his rights, whether pursuant to the MCRA or otherwise, may 
proceed because the claims are based on facts other than those 
that the jury needed to find to sustain the plaintiff's 
conviction.  To hold differently would implicitly permit police 
officers, in response to a resisting individual, to exert as 
much force as they so choose "and be shielded from 
accountability under civil law," so long as the prosecutor could 
successfully convict the individual of resisting arrest.  
VanGilder, 435 F.3d at 692.  Thus, to the extent that Tinsley's 
claims against the police officers personally relate to what 
occurred after he was removed from his vehicle, our conclusion 
does not bar those claims. 
 
Conclusion.  Tinsley is not collaterally estopped from 
basing his claims on the events that occurred after he was 
removed from his vehicle.  Accordingly, taking those facts in 
the light most favorable to Tinsley, the nonmoving party, there 
23 
 
 
 
is a genuine issue of material fact whether the police officers 
used excessive force against him after he was removed from his 
vehicle.  Therefore, so much of the judgment dated August 31, 
2018, pertaining to counts I (MCRA), IV (intentional infliction 
of emotional distress), V (assault), and VI (battery) against 
the police officers personally is vacated, and the matter is 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.21  In all other respects, the judgment is 
affirmed.22,23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                 
21 Tinsley may proceed on counts I, IV, V, and VI only to 
the extent he relies on the facts that describe the events that 
occurred after the police officers forcibly removed him from his 
vehicle.  In accordance with this opinion and the motion judge's 
earlier allowance of the defendants' motion for summary 
judgement regarding count I, Tinsley may not proceed on the 
theories that the police officers arrested him without probable 
cause, unreasonably seized him, or denied him medical care. 
 
 
22 This includes count VII, Tinsley's claim for false arrest 
and false imprisonment, which, as addressed supra, is barred. 
 
23 Because the second motion judge concluded that the 
holding in Heck barred all of Tinsley's then-remaining claims 
against the police officers, the judge did not consider the 
police officers' qualified immunity claims.  He also, for the 
same reason, denied Tinsley's motion to amend his complaint on 
the basis that any such amendment would be futile.  In light of 
our decision vacating a portion of the judgment, and our 
conclusion that not all of Tinsley's claims are barred, these 
issues, should they arise, should be addressed in the first 
instance by the trial court.