Title: STATE v BASSETT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14747
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 25, 1980

No. 14747 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- RONALD LEE BASSETT, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Allen Beck argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Richard Larson argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana James Walen argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana Filed: Submitted: ~ecided: JUL 2 5 1980 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. c his i s an appeal from defendant's convictions of two counts of criminal sale of dangerous drugs. Defendant Ronald Lee Bassett was charged by information f i l e d d i r e c t l y i n t h e Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t Court, on January 19, 1979, with two counts of s e l l i n g cocaine, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n s 45-9-101 and 50-32-101 through 50-32- 313, MCA, and one count of possession of marijuana i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n s 45-9-102 and 50-32-101 through 50-32-313, MCA. The charges stemmed from a wide-ranging i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i l l e g a l drug a c t i v i t y i n t h e B i l l i n g s , Montana, a r e a i n which a Big Horn Deputy S h e r i f f , Atone R. (Tony) C a r r i e r w a s "on loan" t o Yellowstone County a u t h o r i t i e s working a s an undercover i n v e s t i g a t o r . I n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e authori- ties routinely made use of e l e c t r o n i c surveillance and monitoring devices. C a r r i e r was o u t f i t t e d with a concealed microphone and a transmitting device commonly known a s a body monitor. Carrier met with defendant on a t l e a s t s i x occasions. On October 17, 1978, C a r r i e r was introduced t o defendant by Russell Bender. This introduction was made a t Bender's residence. C a r r i e r had purchased an automobile from Bender and had a l s o made arrangements t o buy a q u a n t i t y of cocaine a t Bender's residence. Outside the residence, Bender and defendant c a r r i e d on a b r i e f conversation which C a r r i e r could not overhear. After C a r r i e r gave Bender $80 i n cash, defendant handed Bender a s m a l l packet. The three men proceeded i n t o Bender's l i v i n g q u a r t e r s , where defendant brought a mirror. Bender placed a portion of the substance from t h e packet on t h e mirror and inhaled it. carrier subsequently l e f t , taking t h e packet with him. C a r r i e r proceeded t o t h e Yellowstone County Courthouse where he turned t h e packet over t o a d e t e c t i v e with t h e county's Criminal Investigation Division ( C . I . D . ) . The substance was f i e l d t e s t e d a t the courthouse and showed p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine. Subsequent a n a l y s i s a t the state crime laboratory confirmed the substance purchased w a s cocaine. C a r r i e r met with defendant on October 18, 1978, and again on October 26, 1978. A fourth meeting took place on November 3 , 1978, a t which time defendant informed C a r r i e r t h a t he could g e t a q u a r t e r ounce of cocaine f o r $600. Arrangements were made f o r the s a l e . O n November 7, 1978, C a r r i e r purchased f i v e packets of cocaine a t defendant's residence. This purchase was made from defendant. Carrier delivered t h e packets t o t h e C.I.D. o f f i c e s , and subsequent a n a l y s i s of the s t a t e crime laboratory confirmed t h a t the packets contained cocaine. C a r r i e r made a f i n a l c o n t a c t with defendant on December 4 , 1978. During each of the contacts, C a r r i e r was o u t f i t t e d with a concealed microphone and body monitor. C a r r i e r f r e e l y consented t o the placement and t h e use of these devices. According t o testimony presented a t a suppression hearing, t h e devices w e r e used t o provide protection f o r C a r r i e r and t o enable o f f i c e r s t o prepare accurate r e p o r t s of the events. Court orders permitting t h e monitoring w e r e obtained f o r C a r r i e r ' s l a s t t h r e e contacts with defendant b u t n o t f o r t h e f i r s t three. After pleading n o t g u i l t y t o t h e charges, defendant f i l e d various p r e t r i a l motions, including a "motion t o suppress based on i l l e g a l e l e c t r o n i c surveillance and/or eavesdropping." A hearing on defendant's motions was con- ducted. The t r i a l c o u r t ruled t h a t t h e tape recorded con- versations monitored without p r i o r authorization could n o t be admitted i n t o evidence. However, the c o u r t denied suppression of t h e tape recordings obtained with p r i o r judi- cial authorization. The c o u r t a l s o granted an unrelated motion t o suppress based upon an unlawful search warrant, and t h a t r u l i n g l e d t o a dismissal of Count I11 of t h e information, the misdemeanor possession charge. A t t r i a l t h e S t a t e introduced and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ad- mitted tape recordings of conversations on November 3, 1978, and November 7, 1978. N o attempt w a s made t o introduce any other tape recordings a t t r i a l . The S t a t e a l s o introduced i n t o evidence drugs seized i n the s a l e transactions of October 17 and November 7. The jury returned g u i l t y ver- d i c t s as t o t h e two remaining counts. The t r i a l c o u r t designated defendant a dangerous offender and imposed a twenty-five year sentence. Defendant presents t h e following i s s u e s f o r review by t h i s Court: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly admitted i n t o evidence tape recordings of conversations t h a t were monitored with the consent of one of t h e conversants and p r i o r j u d i c i a l authorization. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly admitted i n t o evidence the drugs t h a t were sold t o the undercover opera- t i v e and t h e r e a f t e r delivered by him t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s . 3. Whether t h e r e was "governmental impropriety" i n t h i s case t h a t would r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l of defendant's convic- tion. Defendant contends t h a t the information acquired during t h e unauthorized e l e c t r o n i c surveillance on October 17, 18 and 26, 1978, w a s i n f a c t used t o support t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e November 3, 1978, a u t h o r i z a t i o n t o conduct e l e c - t r o n i c surveillance. Information acquired during t h e Novem- ber 3, 1978, authorized monitoring was introduced a t t r i a l i n t h e form of both tape recordings a s w e l l a s t r a n s c r i p t s thereof. A s a r e s u l t of t h e i n i t i a l i l l e g a l recording and t h e c o u r t ' s r e l i a n c e thereon, defendant contends a l l subse- quent a p p l i c a t i o n s t o monitor and a l l evidence obtained therefrom w e r e t a i n t e d . W e disagree. Applying t h e p r i n c i p l e s announced i n S t a t e v. Hanley (1980) I - Mont. , 608 P.2d 1 0 4 , 37 St.Rep. 427, and e a r l i e r cases, t o t h e f a c t s of t h e p r e s e n t case, it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s e v i d e n t i a r y r u l i n g s were c o r r e c t . Warrantless monitoring occurred October 17, 18 and 26. I n each i n s t a n c e Carrier met with defendant a t defendant's residence. The t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y granted defendant's motion t o suppress t h e recordings made of conversations t h a t w e r e monitored on t h e s e occasions. This Court held i n S t a t e v. Brackman (1978), Mont. - , 582 P.2d 1216, 1222, 35 St.Rep. 1103, t h a t tape recordings and t r a n s c r i p t s obtained through t h e use of an unauthorized e l e c t r o n i c monitoring device w e r e properly suppressed on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds. The B i l l i n g s criminal i n v e s t i g a t o r s obtained j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r t h e monitoring t h a t occurred November 3, November 7, and December 4 , 1978. The t r i a l c o u r t properly admitted t h e tape recordings of t h e November 3 and November 7 conversations. The recordings of conversations monitored with t h e consent of one of t h e conversants and with j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y a r e n o t s u b j e c t t o suppression. See S t a t e v. Hanley, supra. Further, a s w e noted i n S t a t e v. ~ r u b a k e r (1979) - Mont. , 602 P.2d 974, 36 St.Rep. 1915, t a p e recorded statements may be considered d i r e c t evidence o r corroborative evidence and a r e s u b j e c t t o the same t e s t s f o r a d m i s s i b i l i t y as the d i r e c t evidence of eyewitnesses o r t h e testimony of witnesses t o o r a l statements. The question of a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h i s kind of evidence i s a matter f o r t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l judge. Defendant s p e c i f i c a l l y a s s e r t s t h a t an application f o r t h e authorization t o conduct e l e c t r o n i c surveillance which i s based upon p r i o r i l l e g a l eavesdropping may not s u s t a i n a subsequent lawful application. Defendant argues t h a t t h e l a w enforcement o f f i c i a l s d i r e c t l y r e l i e d upon such informa- t i o n i n making an application f o r the authorization order. The conversations were recorded without defendant's knowl- edge. A l l evidence, therefore, used a g a i n s t him w a s t a i n t e d and should have been suppressed pursuant t o t h e d o c t r i n e of " t h e f r u i t s of t h e poisonous tree." W e f i n d t h i s f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n very similar t o t h a t found i n Hanley. I n Hanley, C a r r i e r recorded a telephone conversation i n which t h e defendant had p a r t i c i p a t e d . N o p r i o r j u d i c i a l authorization f o r t h a t recording had been sought o r received. C a r r i e r learned of an impending drug transaction during t h i s conversation. Argument was made t h a t because t h e conversation w a s recorded without p r i o r authorization, a l l subsequently gathered information and evidence w a s tainted. This Court r e j e c t e d t h a t argument and ruled t h a t the unauthorized recordings of t h e telephone conversations were "wholly i n c i d e n t a l t o and d i d not a f f e c t t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence presented a t t r i a l . " 608 P.2d a t 108. I n t h e present case, C a r r i e r , while wearing a body monitor, conversed with defendant and t h e conversation was recorded. C a r r i e r had not sought o r received p r i o r authori- zation f o r t h a t recording. Here, a s i n Hanley, C a r r i e r ' s own personal observations of the i n i t i a l conversations supplied adequate independent information supporting the application f o r e l e c t r o n i c moni- t o r i n g authorization. The application f o r t h e order authori- zing the monitoring r e s u l t e d i n tape recordings which w e r e admitted a t trial. This application makes no reference t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e a r l i e r conversations w e r e monitored o r recorded. The application r e c i t e s only t h e f a c t s C a r r i e r reported during h i s investigation. There i s no more d e r i - v a t i v e t a i n t i n t h e present case than t h e r e was i n Hanley. The next i s s u e r a i s e d by defendant i s t h a t t h e drugs introduced i n t o evidence w e r e not properly admitted. Defen- dant claims t h a t as a r e s u l t of the i n i t i a l t h r e e i n c i d e n t s of unauthorized e l e c t r o n i c surveillance, and the use thereof t o obtain an order t o continue e l e c t r o n i c surveillance, a l l contraband seized while proceeding under such order should have been suppressed. The drugs introduced a t t r i a l had been bought from defendant by Carrier on two occasions--October 17 and Novem- ber 7. Consentual p a r t i c i p a n t monitoring occurred each t i m e . The monitoring of November 7 was authorized by c o u r t order and, therefore, the drugs seized were n o t t a i n t e d by i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . The consentual p a r t i c i p a n t monitoring t h a t occurred October 17, 1978, w a s n o t authorized by c o u r t order. This f a c t does n o t a f f e c t t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the drugs t h a t defendant sold t h a t day. Those drugs w e r e n o t derived from and do not represent " f r u i t s ' of t h e unauthorized monitoring. This Court addressed precisely t h i s question i n Hanley i n language t h a t i s a s applicable i n the present case a s it w a s there: "The drugs introduced i n t o evidence d i d n o t de- r i v e from t h e monitoring and recording t h a t occurred. The record i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e law enforcement o f f i c i a l s obtained t h e drugs through an informant, n o t through monitoring and record- ing. The monitoring and recording w e r e i n c i - d e n t a l to, n o t the cause o f , the ' s e i z u r e of t h e drugs.' The informant w a s t h e independent source of t h e information concerning t h e t r a n s a c t i o n of t h e drugs themselves, and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e monitoring and recording occurred does n o t a f f e c t t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e evidence. I n a r e c e n t case, S t a t e v. Ribera (1979), Mont. I 597 P.2d 1164, 1169, 36 ~t.~e~.92, 1298-99, t h i s Court recognized and discussed t h e question t h a t must be answered when an i l l e g a l s e i z u r e i s alleged--that is, whether t h e i n i t i a l ille- g a l i t y w a s a cause i n f a c t of t h e discovery of t h e evidence. I n t h a t case, w e c i t e d Wong Sun v. United S t a t e s (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 8 3 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. Here t h e monitoring and recording was n o t a cause of t h e discovery of t h e evidence; t h e r e f o r e , t h e exclusionary r u l e does n o t apply even i f t h e monitoring and recording were t o be deemed unlawful. The drugs w e r e properly admitted by t h e D i s t r i c t Court." S t a t e v. Hanley, supra, 608 P.2d a t 110, 37 St.Rep. a t 435. The f i n a l i s s u e presented i s whether t h e r e w a s govern- mental impropriety i n t h i s case r e q u i r i n g r e v e r s a l of defen- d a n t ' s conviction. Defendant argues t h a t C a r r i e r never m e t t h e s t a t u t o r y o r l e g a l requirements t o be regarded a s a deputy s h e r i f f . Consequently, according t o defendant, C a r r i e r must be t r e a t e d by t h i s Court a s a paid informant f o r h i s p a r t i n t h e inves- t i g a t i o n . I f t h e Court accepts t h i s argument, it i s f u r t h e r argued t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h C a r r i e r ' s reli- a b i l i t y as an informant as required by law, and t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h probable cause f o r issuance of an order. To resolve t h i s i s s u e w e look t o t h e nature of t h e a c t i v i t y i n which C a r r i e r was involved. Criminal drug i n v e s t i g a t i o n s a r e n o t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l a w enforcement a c t i v i t i e s conducted r o u t i n e l y by p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i e s . In many instances, t h i s type of i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e q u i r e s non- t r a d i t i o n a l means within t h e confines of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements. C a r r i e r was engaged i n a s p e c i a l assignment. H i s p o s i t i o n a s an undercover agent was temporary. H e w a s attempting t o p e n e t r a t e t h e c i r c l e s of drug dealing i n t h e community of B i l l i n g s . Undercover a c t i v i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e n a r c o t i c s f i e l d , r e q u i r e s secrecy and i n t e g r i t y of t h e agent i n the eyes of d e a l e r s . The s l i g h t e s t h i n t of p o l i c e a c t i v i t y would immediately terminate t h e criminal i n v e s t i - g a t i o n and possibly place t h e l i v e s of t h e agent and o t h e r o f f i c e r s i n danger. Montana law provides t h a t numerous requirements a r e t o be met before an i n d i v i d u a l can q u a l i f y as a deputy s h e r i f f . Section 7-32-301, MCA. This s t a t u t e speaks t o law enforce- ment o f f i c i a l s who a r e on a permanent b a s i s . To r e q u i r e a l l l a w enforcement o f f i c i a l s t o be f u l l y clothed with t h e s e s t a t u t o r y requirements i n a l l i n s t a n c e s would s e r i o u s l y jeopardize t h e success of law enforcement i n circumstances a s a r e presented here. This s t a t u t e is a r e s t r i c t i o n on a s h e r i f f ' s power of appointment. The record i n d i c a t e s t h a t Carrier had worked a s a deputy s h e r i f f on numerous p r i o r occasions. H e worked i n G a l l a t i n County a s an undercover agent f o r t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e f o r s e v e r a l months. Later he was h i r e d by t h e s h e r i f f of Big Horn County and worked a s a deputy s h e r i f f , and f i n a l l y was l e n t t o t h e Yellowstone County o f f i c i a l s t o work i n t h i s case a s a deputy s h e r i f f . C a r r i e r ' s p r i o r a c t i - v i t i e s i n t h e G a l l a t i n and Big Horn o f f i c e s demonstrate h i s worthiness a s a l a w enforcement o f f i c i a l . This Court f i n d s t h e testimony of Carrier's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , experience and a c t i v i t i e s s u f f i c i e n t t o meet t h e s t a t u s of law enforcement o f f i c i a l . A s w e noted i n an earlier decision, ". . . C a r r i e r was a p u b l i c employee, i f n o t a public o f f i c i a l . . ." S t a t e v. Hanley, 608 P.2d a t 1 1 1 . H i s o f f i c i a l duty involved main- t a i n i n g c o n t a c t with persons involved i n t h e drug scene. The Yellowstone County C.I.D. o f f i c e r s acted reasonably, taking t h e s e f a c t o r s i n t o account, i n s t a t i n g t h a t C a r r i e r was a deputy s h e r i f f when applying f o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r e l e c t r o n i c monitoring. Applications f o r a search warrant a r e t o be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a commonsense fashion. S t a t e v. White (1978), 225 Kan. 87, 587 P.2d 1259. I n t h e common- sense understanding, C a r r i e r was a Big Horn County deputy s h e r i f f even though he may n o t have m e t a l l t h e t e c h n i c a l s t a t u t o r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . I n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r an order authorizing t h e use of e l e c t r o n i c monitoring device, Detective Orval Hendrickson r e l i e d on t h e d e t a i l e d observations of a fellow deputy o f f i c e r , Tony Carrier. These observations included p r i o r drug t r a n s a c t i o n s between defendant and Bender and indica- t i o n s t h a t a drug t r a n s a c t i o n may occur between himself and defendant. I n t h e s e circumstances, t h e "fellow o f f i c e r " r u l e a p p l i e s . A s t h e Supreme Court noted i n United S t a t e s v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 111, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, " [ o l b s e r v a t i o n s of a fellow o f f i c e r of t h e government engaged i n a common i n v e s t i g a t i o n a r e p l a i n l y a r e l i a b l e b a s i s f o r a warrant applied f o r by one of t h e i r number." C a r r i e r was "one of t h e i r number." The C.I.D. o f f i c e r s , t h e r e f o r e , could r e l y on h i s personal observa- t i o n s , a s could t h e judge reviewing t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . See United S t a t e s v. McCormick ( 7 t h C i r . 1962), 309 F.2d 367, 372; Weise v. United S t a t e s (9th C i r . 1958), 251 ~ . 2 d 867, 86 8. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: I S d , j . & , . < . :,- . - J u s t i c e s i i