Title: Thomas v. Dept. of Services for Children, Youth & Families
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 25, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2009

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
OWEN THOMAS,1  
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 
THEIR FAMILIES, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 25, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. 08-09-09TN 
§  CPI No. 08-30803 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 12, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 6, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 6th day of July 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26.1, his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the responses of the Department of Services for Children, 
Youth & Their Families (“DSCYF”), and the Guardian Ad Litem, it appears 
to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Counsel 
for 
the 
respondent-appellant, 
Owen 
Thomas 
(“Father”), filed an appeal from the Family Court’s December 17, 2008 
                                                 
1 By Order dated January 20, 2009, the Court sua sponte assigned a pseudonym to the 
appellant.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d).  In this Order, we also assign pseudonyms to the mother of 
the minor child and the minor child. 
 
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decision and final order terminating his parental rights in his minor child, 
Daisy.  Father’s counsel has filed an opening brief and a motion to 
withdraw.  Father has filed a statement of appeal points for consideration by 
this Court.  Both DSCYF and the guardian ad litem have moved to affirm 
the Family Court’s judgment.  We agree and AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that the Family Court granted emergency ex 
parte custody of Daisy to the Division of Family Services (“DFS”), a 
division of DSCYF, on March 20, 2008, eight days after she was born.  
Daisy had been born premature and remained in the hospital on a monitor 
for the first few days of her life.   
 
(3) 
Both Father and Karen V. Bell (“Mother”) appeared at a 
preliminary protective hearing in the Family Court on March 26, 2008.  Both 
were serving criminal sentences at that time.  Mother anticipated being 
placed in a substance abuse treatment facility in connection with her 
Superior Court sentence.  Father had been sentenced to the Key Program, a 
substance abuse program for prisoners, and anticipated release later that year 
to Level III probation.  The Family Court ordered paternity testing.  Finding 
probable cause to believe that Daisy was dependent,2 the Family Court 
ordered her to remain in the custody of DFS.  At that point, DFS’s goal was 
                                                 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 901(8). 
 
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reunification of Daisy with her family.  Subsequently, Mother and Father 
were each appointed counsel and a guardian ad litem was appointed for 
Daisy.    
 
(4) 
An adjudicatory hearing was held in the Family Court on April 
22, 2008.  Mother and Father both appeared.  Father was in the Key Program 
at that time.  Mother was still incarcerated in connection with her drug 
sentence.  Daisy was adjudicated dependent and remained in foster care.   
 
(5) 
A dispositional hearing was held on May 22, 2008.  Father 
remained in the Key Program and Mother had entered Gateway, a substance 
abuse program.  Neither Mother nor Father had provided DFS with contact 
information for relatives who might be able to care for Daisy.  The Family 
Court stressed to the parents the importance of providing contact 
information for relatives who could care for Daisy.  DFS advised that it was 
in the process of reconsidering whether reunification with her family was the 
proper goal for Daisy, given the parents’ incarcerations and histories of 
substance abuse.  Because reunification remained the goal at the time of the 
hearing, however, the Family Court ordered DFS to provide Father with a 
case plan. 
 
(6) 
On July 8, 2008, DFS filed a motion to suspend visitation based 
upon the fact that Mother had absconded from Gateway and had incurred 
 
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new criminal charges.  On July 9, 2008, DFS filed motions requesting the 
Family Court to permit the goal for Daisy to be changed from reunification 
to termination of parental rights.   
 
(7) 
On August 11, 2008, a hearing was held on DFS’ motions.  
Mother and Father, who remained incarcerated, both appeared for the 
hearing.  The Family Court issued an order adjudicating Father to be the 
biological father of Daisy, based on the previous paternity testing, granted 
DFS’ request to change the goal for Daisy from reunification to termination 
of parental rights, and granted DFS’ motion to suspend visitation.  A 
permanency hearing was scheduled.        
 
(8) 
On September 10, 2008, the permanency hearing took place.  
Mother had previously consented to the termination of her parental rights 
and was not present.  Father, who was still incarcerated, appeared at the 
hearing.  Father testified that he intended to begin an anger management 
class.  The Family Court scheduled the termination of parental rights hearing 
for December 2, 2008. 
 
(9) 
The termination of parental rights hearing took place on 
December 2, 2008, as scheduled.  Mother was present at the hearing as an 
observer, pursuant to her request.  The following individuals testified: 
Danielle Stevenson, the DFS investigator; Christy Diffendall, the DFS 
 
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treatment worker; Jennifer Uebelher, the DFS permanency worker; Joyce 
Williams, Father’s paternal aunt; Father; and Daisy’s foster father.  The 
testimony of the DFS workers established the following.  DFS received a 
hotline referral regarding Daisy six days after she was born.  Because Daisy 
was scheduled to be released from the hospital and both of her parents were 
incarcerated, DFS placed her in a foster home, where she remains to this 
day.  Despite repeated requests, neither Mother nor Father provided DFS 
with names of relatives who could provide assistance with Daisy.   
 
(10) In June 2008, Father signed a case plan, which required him to, 
among other things, obtain employment, find appropriate caregivers for 
Daisy, complete a parenting class, complete the Key Program, undergo a 
mental health evaluation, and find safe and stable housing.  Father failed to 
complete his case plan.  Father completed a parenting class through Child, 
Inc., while he was incarcerated.  However, once released from incarceration, 
he quickly violated his probation and was re-incarcerated.  He did not 
remain in the community long enough to find appropriate caregivers for 
Daisy or find appropriate housing.  He did not undergo a mental health 
evaluation.  He also did not request visitation with Daisy during the period 
of his release.  Father has never seen Daisy.     
 
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(11) Evidence was presented at the hearing concerning the 
termination of Father’s parental rights with respect to another child, born on 
April 11, 2004.  The Family Court file on that child reflected that the Family 
Court entered an order on September 16, 2005 terminating Father’s parental 
rights on the ground of failure to plan.  Evidence also was presented 
concerning DFS’ efforts to communicate with Joyce Williams, Father’s 
paternal aunt, who had expressed an interest in caring for Daisy.  In spite of 
the late notice of Ms. Williams’ interest, the DFS permanency worker met 
with her to discuss her options with respect to Daisy.  Ms. Williams also 
testified at the hearing.  She had never met Daisy and had not spoken with 
Father for about a year.  While she stated that she would be willing to adopt 
Daisy, she still had not filed a petition for guardianship as of the date of the 
Family Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.  Finally, evidence 
was presented at the hearing concerning Daisy’s current situation with her 
foster family.  The DFS workers testified that she is doing well in her 
placement and has bonded with her foster parents.          
 
(12) Father testified on his own behalf.  His testimony was 
contradictory in several respects.  He stated, on the one hand, that Ms. 
Williams would be the best caretaker for Daisy, and yet also stated that he 
wanted custody of Daisy and did not want his parental rights to be 
 
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terminated.  Father admitted to being arrested for a violation of probation, 
but stated that his probation officer was trying to help him because he had no 
place to stay and that his probation officer intended to recommend home 
confinement and work release to the judge at his violation of probation 
hearing.  Father admitted to a lengthy history of incarceration.  He also 
admitted to having two other children for whom he does not provide support.  
Father, finally, testified that, prior to his probation violation, he was able to 
find employment at Wal-Mart and that he had completed an anger 
management course at the prison, which was taught by the inmates.    
 
(13) The guardian ad litem presented the testimony of Daisy’s foster 
father.  He and his wife are residents of Delaware.  He is an attorney.  His 
wife left her employment to care for Daisy full-time.  According to the foster 
father, Daisy is in very good physical and emotional health.  The foster 
father and mother are very involved with their church and Daisy attends 
church regularly with them.  Daisy also is very involved with their extended 
families.  The foster father’s testimony reflected an intimate knowledge of 
Daisy and a loving attachment to her.   
 
(14) Father has submitted several points for consideration by this 
Court, which may fairly be summarized as follows:  a) there was insufficient 
evidence presented at the hearing to support the termination of his parental 
 
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rights; and b) he was not given a reasonable opportunity to comply with the 
case plan. 
 
(15) The Family Court may terminate parental rights if DSCYF 
proves by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a statutory basis 
for termination, and that termination is in the best interests of the child.3  
Where, as here, termination is based upon a failure to plan, DSCYF also 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one 
additional statutory element,4 and that DSCYF made bona fide, reasonable 
efforts to reunite the family.5  In this case, DSCYF also sought termination 
of Father’s parental rights based on the ground of a previous involuntary 
termination.6 
 
(16) On appeal from the Family Court’s termination of parental 
rights, this Court will uphold the Family Court’s factual findings if they are 
sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly wrong.7  To the 
extent that the Family Court’s rulings implicate questions of law, this 
Court’s standard of review is de novo.8  This Court will not disturb 
                                                 
3 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722. 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (5).   
5 In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (6). 
7 In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995). 
8 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
 
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inferences and deductions that are supported by the record and that are the 
product of an orderly and logical deductive process.9 
 
(17) We have reviewed the record, including the transcript of the 
Family Court hearing, in detail and conclude that there is clear and 
convincing evidence in the record supporting the Family Court’s finding that 
Father failed to plan for Daisy’s physical needs or mental and emotional 
health and development.10  Moreover, there is clear and convincing evidence 
in the record supporting the Family Court’s finding of at least one other 
required statutory factor for termination of parental rights.11  We also 
conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record supporting 
the Family Court’s finding of a previous involuntary termination.12  We 
further conclude that the record supports the Family Court’s finding that 
DSCYF made bona fide, reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Daisy.13  
Finally, we conclude that the Family Court properly determined, based upon 
a detailed weighing of the statutory best interests factors, that termination of 
Father’s parental rights was in Daisy’s best interests.14  In light of the above, 
                                                 
9 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (5). 
11 Id.. 
12 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (6). 
13 In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989). 
14 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722. 
 
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we find that Father’s claims of insufficiency of the evidence and inadequate 
opportunity to comply with the case plan to be without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motions of the 
guardian ad litem and DSCYF are GRANTED.  The judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice