Title: Herman Lindsey v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-1167
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2009

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1167 
____________ 
 
HERMAN LINDSEY,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[July 9, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Herman Lindsey appeals from a conviction of first-degree murder and a 
sentence of death.1  Because we find the evidence presented at trial legally 
insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse and direct that a judgment of 
acquittal be entered.  See Ballard v. State, 923 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2006). 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The felony murder charge against Lindsey resulted from the shooting death 
of Joanne Mazollo, who was killed during the course of a pawn shop robbery on 
April 19, 1994.  Ms. Mazollo‘s body was found in the back room of the Big Dollar 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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pawn shop where she had worked as a clerk.  The medical examiner concluded that 
Ms. Mazollo died from a single gunshot wound to the head and that her death was 
likely instantaneous.  Twelve years later, in 2006, Lindsey was charged with the 
crime, adjudicated guilty, and sentenced to death.   
The evidence presented at Lindsey‘s trial established that, between 8:00 and 
8:30 on the morning of the murder, the owner of the pawn shop, Gerald Singer, 
went to Big Dollar to set up the store for the day.  He spoke to Ms. Mazollo by 
phone around 9:30 a.m. that morning, as was his routine, and she let him know that 
she had arrived and everything was okay.  Thereafter, around 10:30 a.m., Singer 
called the shop several times but Ms. Mazollo did not answer.  Concerned, Singer 
got in his car and drove to Big Dollar, where he discovered her dead body slumped 
in a chair in the back room.  Singer testified that between five and seven firearms 
were missing from the store and that the cash drawer he had filled that morning 
was empty.  Additionally, he stated there were around fifty individual envelopes of 
jewelry and a blue velvet Crown Royal bag containing jewelry missing from the 
safe in the back room.   
In October 1995, Lindsey gave a taped statement to police, which was 
played for the jury, in which he implicated Ronnie LoRay2 for the crime.  He said 
                                          
 
 
2.  LoRay is currently incarcerated for second-degree murder for the death of 
Ms. Mazollo and the robbery of Big Dollar pawn shop.  LoRay was arrested in 
December 2005, a few months before Lindsey was charged.   
 
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that on the day of the robbery, LoRay came over to his house and was very upset.  
He said that LoRay said that ―
they‖ robbed a place and that he heard a shot but did 
not know if the woman was dead or not.  Lindsey said LoRay had gold jewelry in 
his pockets, a few hundred dollars, and a gun.  Lindsey admitted being in the store 
prior to the crime and pawning his Sega under a false name.  He also admitted that 
he sometimes helped LoRay get rid of stolen merchandise.  But he denied being 
involved in the robbery.  
The prosecution also played portions of three separate phone conversations 
Lindsey made from prison.  During one of those conversations, Lindsey claimed 
that he was home with his wife at the time of the crime.  In a subsequent call to his 
mother, Lindsey stated that he was afraid that, because the police had LoRay‘s 
fingerprints, LoRay would try to get a deal with the police by implicating Lindsey.  
Lindsey said he needed to talk to LoRay and assure him that he would not betray 
him and to let him know he was not alone.  He also stated that he believed that his 
ex-wife was going to implicate him for the crime.   
Several witnesses who testified for the State presented evidence by which 
the State sought to establish Lindsey‘s guilt.  First, Demeatres Gause (―
Nikki‖), 
Lindsey‘s ex-wife, testified that a few days before the murder, she went to Big 
Dollar with Lindsey and LoRay and that the clerk in the store greeted Lindsey as if 
she knew him.  She further testified that, on the morning of the murder, Lindsey 
 
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was not in the apartment where she sometimes stayed with him when she awoke 
between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m., although she admitted he could have been 
downstairs.  Then later, sometime before noon, Lindsey and LoRay arrived at the 
apartment together, just before the story of the Big Dollar robbery and Ms. 
Mazollo‘s murder appeared on the twelve o‘clock news.  Nikki noted that Lindsey 
asked her to turn up the volume on the news report.   
At some point later, Nikki discovered a Crown Royal bag containing jewelry 
in a closet in the apartment, and she indicated that it had not been there before.3  
Nikki also admitted that several other people lived at the apartment where she only 
―
sometimes‖ stayed with Lindsey, including Ronnie LoRay, a girl named Marvet, 
and Marvet‘s children.  But she said that Lindsey eventually sold the jewelry at a 
flea market, that she never asked him about the jewelry, and that Lindsey never 
told her anything about it or the murder and robbery of the pawn shop.   
 
Next, Alfonzer Harrold, described as a very close friend of Nikki‘s, testified 
that he occasionally hung out with Lindsey and LoRay and that the three of them 
went to Big Dollar pawn shop the day before the murder.  Harrold said they were 
looking around as if they were going to buy something.  At first, there was a 
                                          
 
 
3.  Although the State contended in its opening argument that Nikki would 
testify that Lindsey and LoRay came into the apartment on the morning of the 
robbery and murder carrying bags of jewelry, her actual testimony at trial was that 
she saw a Crown Royal bag of jewelry in a closet at some later date. 
 
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woman working there alone but then a man came out of the back room so they all 
left a few minutes later.  The next day, LoRay and Lindsey came over to Harrold‘s 
house, and Harrold noticed that LoRay was wearing a new bracelet.  Harrold said 
he later told the police what he knew because he hoped to receive a $1,000 reward 
that he could use to buy cocaine.  
 
 
Mark Simms also testified for the State about some comments Lindsey made 
to him.  Simms stated that he met Lindsey in jail on May 20, 1994, about a month 
after the crime at Big Dollar.  A few days later, the two men had a ―
macho‖ 
conversation about robberies.  Simms admitted to Lindsey that he was involved in 
a robbery where someone got shot but not killed.  Lindsey replied that Simms 
should have handled the situation better and that Simms should have killed the 
person because he saw Simms‘s face.  Lindsey also told Simms that he had to do 
that once.  Lindsey said he had to kill someone.  Simms admitted he had no idea 
what Lindsey was talking about at the time.     
Other evidence revealed that LoRay‘s fingerprint was found on a stun gun 
box that was located in the back room of Big Dollar pawn shop next to the safe.  
And Lindsey‘s thumbprint was recovered from a pawn slip dated March 31, 1994, 
under the name of David Ashley, the name Lindsey used to pawn his Sega.   
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, Lindsey moved for 
judgment of acquittal, contending that the evidence was insufficient for a 
 
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conviction and that the State failed to prove its case.  The trial court denied the 
motion.   
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
On appeal, Lindsey raises eighteen issues:  (1) the trial court erred in 
admitting irrelevant testimony; (2) the trial court erred in denying Lindsey‘s 
motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the trial court erred in allowing a witness to 
testify that the victim knew Lindsey; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the State 
to redact a portion of Lindsey‘s statements; (5) the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence that Lindsey had been in jail; (6) the trial court erred in denying 
Lindsey‘s motion to dismiss the indictment; (7) the trial court erred in admitting an 
autopsy photo into evidence; (8) the trial court erred in sending unrequested  
evidence to the jury; (9) the trial court erred in denying Lindsey‘s request for a new 
trial; (10) the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravator; (11) the trial 
court erred in denying Lindsey‘s request for a special jury instruction; (12) the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury on the avoid arrest aggravator; (13) the death 
sentence is not proportionate to the crime; (14) the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecution to question Lindsey about guilt phase issues during the penalty phase; 
(15) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach Curtis Fox; (16) 
the trial court erred in giving great weight to the jury‘s recommendation of the 
 
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death sentence; (17) Florida‘s death penalty law is unconstitutional; and (18) 
Florida‘s felony murder aggravator is unconstitutional. 
 
Because we find that the trial court erred in denying Lindsey‘s motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, we do not address the other issues. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Preliminarily, we note that this case is based completely on circumstantial 
evidence.  And, ―
where a conviction is based wholly upon circumstantial evidence, 
a special standard of review applies.‖  Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1145 
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla. 2002)).  The 
special standard requires that the circumstances lead ―
to a reasonable and moral 
certainty that the accused and no one else committed the offense charged.  It is not 
sufficient that the facts create a strong probability of, and be consistent with, guilt.  
They must be inconsistent with innocence.‖  Frank v. State, 163 So. 223, 223 (Fla. 
1935).  And, in order for the facts to be ―
consistent with the defendant‘s guilt,‖ the 
State must establish every element of the offense.  Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 
803 (Fla. 2002).  As this Court has explained,  
[e]vidence which furnishes nothing stronger than a suspicion, even 
though it would tend to justify the suspicion that the defendant 
committed the crime, it is not sufficient to sustain conviction.  It is the 
actual exclusion of the hypothesis of innocence which clothes 
circumstantial evidence with the force of proof sufficient to convict. 
Circumstantial evidence which leaves uncertain several hypotheses, 
any one of which may be sound and some of which may be entirely 
consistent with innocence, is not adequate to sustain a verdict of guilt. 
 
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Even though the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to suggest a 
probability of guilt, it is not thereby adequate to support a conviction 
if it is likewise consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
 
Ballard, 923 So. 2d at 482 (quoting Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631-32 (Fla. 
1956)).  And, ―
[a]lthough the jury is the trier of fact, a conviction of guilt must be 
reversed on appeal if it is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.‖  Id. 
(quoting Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 71 (Fla. 2004)). 
 
In Ballard, we held that it is the duty of ―
the courts to ensure that the State is 
held to its burden of proof when someone is charged with a serious crime and 
liberty and life are at risk. . . .  [When a] case is purely circumstantial, we must 
determine whether competent evidence is present to support an inference of guilt 
‗
to the exclusion of all other inferences.‘ ‖  Id. at 485 (quoting Crain, 894 So. 2d at 
71).  In Ballard, investigators determined that one of the four fingerprints found on 
the bed frame near the victim‘s upper torso belonged to the defendant.  Id. at 478.  
In addition, a forensic scientist determined that one of several hairs found in the 
hand of the victim was consistent with the arm hair of Ballard; but he was unable 
to determine whether Ballard‘s arm hair had fallen out naturally or if it had been 
forcibly removed.  Id. at 479-80.  At the close of the State‘s evidence, ―
Ballard 
moved for a judgment of acquittal, contending that there was a reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence in that the only evidence that linked Ballard to the case 
 
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[was] equally consistent with the fact that he was often a guest in [the victims‘] 
apartment.‖  Id. at 481.  This Court agreed.  It stated: 
In capital cases, this Court has recognized that it has a 
fundamental obligation to ascertain whether the State has presented 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction.  Ballard contends that 
although the State proved that [the victims] were robbed and killed, 
and one of his hairs and fingerprints was in the apartment, the State 
failed to prove that Ballard was the perpetrator of those crimes. 
 
Id. at 482.  
 
 
We find that the present case is controlled by Ballard in that the State‘s 
evidence, while perhaps sufficient to create some suspicion, is simply not sufficient 
to support a conviction.  The entire circumstantial case against Lindsey consists of 
the following evidence:  (1) a Crown Royal bag containing jewelry was taken 
during the robbery of Big Dollar pawn shop; (2) Nikki found a Crown Royal bag 
containing jewelry in a closet of an apartment where she sometimes stayed with 
Lindsey and several other individuals, including LoRay; (2) Lindsey eventually 
sold the jewelry from the bag in the closet at a flea market; (3) Lindsey told Simms 
that Simms should always kill witnesses to crimes and that Lindsey had to do that.  
No evidence shows that the bag of jewelry Nikki found in the closet is the same 
bag of jewelry that was missing from the pawn shop safe.  In addition, no evidence 
shows that Lindsey placed the bag in the closet or that he ever had possession of it 
before he sold the items at a flea market.  Furthermore, while we specifically 
decline to address whether Simms‘s testimony was even admissible on relevancy 
 
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grounds, we nevertheless find that there is nothing in Lindsey‘s statements to 
Simms that, when combined with all the other evidence, is sufficient to convict 
him for the murder of Ms. Mazollo.   
 
The State established that Lindsey made several visits to the pawn shop prior 
to the murder and that Ms. Mazollo appeared to know him.  Yet, the State failed to 
produce any evidence in this case placing Lindsey at the scene of the crime at the 
time of the murder.  Even if Lindsey was not home at the time the crime occurred, 
it does not mean that he was out robbing the Big Dollar pawn shop or killing Ms. 
Mazollo.  Indeed, we find that the evidence here is equally consistent with a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  Even if the State had proved that the bag of 
jewelry Nikki discovered was the same bag of jewelry missing from the pawn 
shop, it would not be dispositive here because LoRay, as well as several other 
people, had access to the closet where Nikki discovered the bag containing 
jewelry; and Lindsey admitted that he sometimes helped LoRay get rid of stolen 
merchandise.   
 
Consequently, we find that the evidence presented to support an inference of 
guilt does not exclude all other inferences.  While we agree that the evidence here 
does seem suspicious, even a ―
deep suspicion the appellant committed the crime 
charged is not sufficient to sustain conviction.‖  Williams v. State, 143 So. 2d 484, 
 
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488 (Fla. 1962); see also Ballard, 923 So. 2d at 482 (―
Suspicions alone cannot 
satisfy the State‘s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .‖).   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence here is insufficient to support 
Lindsey‘s conviction.  Therefore, we reverse and vacate the conviction and 
sentence and remand with directions that a judgment of acquittal be entered. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
QUINCE, C.J., concurring. 
 
 
I concur in the majority‘s decision that the evidence is insufficient to support 
Lindsey‘s conviction, but write separately because I find the State‘s line of 
questioning of Lindsey during the penalty phase improperly exceeded the scope of 
cross-examination and that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to 
question Lindsey about guilt phase issues.   
 
During the penalty phase, Lindsey took the stand and testified during direct 
examination solely about his family and childhood.  Then, on cross-examination, 
the prosecution began by asking, ―
Mr. Lindsey, tell me about the first time you met 
 
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the lady at the pawn shop.‖  Defense counsel timely objected, and a sidebar 
conference ensued.   At sidebar, the State argued that the defense brought in the 
guilt phase because it had presented witnesses during the penalty phase to attack 
the credibility of State witness Mark Simms.  The court ruled:  ―
What‘s good, as 
they say, for the gander.  Going to, of course, the aggravating circumstances.  You 
can‘t go into every last thing, but going into the aggravating circumstances, those 
specifically relating to the Simms‘ issues.  Overruled.‖   
 
Thereafter, the prosecution continued to question Lindsey about Joanne 
Mazollo and the pawn shop: 
Prosecutor: Tell me about the first time you met the lady at the pawn shop. 
Lindsey: 
I don‘t remember. 
Prosecutor: Okay.  You don‘t remember going in and pawning something  
 
 
under the name of David Ashley? 
Lindsey: 
Yes, I do remember that. 
Prosecutor: And you don‘t remember the lady who was there? 
Lindsey: 
Not right off hand, no. 
Prosecutor: When we heard your ex-wife Nikki testify that she was in the  
 
 
pawn shop with you a couple of days before the murder, and  
 
 
you and the woman greeted each other, because you knew each  
 
 
other, tell me about that. 
Lindsey: 
She said that when I came in it was like we knew each other.   
 
 
Any place I go, I always show respect for the person that‘s  
 
 
there. 
Prosecutor: So you were there, met the lady that day.  Tell me what you  
 
 
remember about it. 
Lindsey: 
I‘m not saying I was there that particular day.  I‘m just saying,  
 
 
when I go into places, I‘d be respectful of people. 
Prosecutor: Okay.  How about the day before the murder? 
Lindsey: 
I don‘t recall. 
Prosecutor: Do you recall when you went back in there with Ronnie LoRay  
 
 
and Alfonzer Harrold? 
 
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Lindsey: 
I don‘t recall that. 
Prosecutor: You don‘t remember that? 
Lindsey: 
No, I don‘t remember that. 
Prosecutor: She was seated in a chair.  She didn‘t resist you, did she? 
Defense: 
Objection.  Argumentative. 
Court: 
 
Sustained. 
Prosecutor: Why did you put a gun to her head and pull the trigger? 
Lindsey: 
I didn‘t. 
Defense: 
Objection, Your Honor, goes to— 
Prosecutor: Goes to why he did it. 
Defense: 
—what we said at sidebar. 
Court: 
 
Overruled. 
Prosecutor: Why did you do that? 
Lindsey: 
I didn‘t. 
Prosecutor: So the jury is wrong? 
Lindsey: 
I think the jury is mistaken. 
 
 
Section 90.612 (2), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: 
 
Cross-examination of a witness is limited to the subject matter of the 
direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.  
The court may, in its discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters.  
 
―
Thus, as a general rule, the questions on cross-examination must be no more 
broad in scope than those on direct.‖  Green v. State, 688 So. 2d 301, 305 (Fla. 
1996) (holding that it was error to allow questions on cross-examination related to 
a witness‘s prior use of alcohol when questions on direct were limited to use of 
alcohol on the night of the murder); Salas v. State, 972 So. 2d 941, 956 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2007) (―
[C]ross examination must relate to credibility of the witness or be 
germane to the matters brought out on direct examination.‖) (citing Steinhorst v. 
State, 412 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982)).  These rules regarding cross-examination 
 
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apply to all witnesses, including a defendant who takes the witness stand as 
Lindsey did in this case. 
 
This Court has also defined the permissible scope of cross-examination as 
follows: 
When the direct examination opens a general subject, the cross-
examination may go into any phase, and may not be restricted to mere 
parts . . . or to the specific facts developed by the direct examination.  
Cross-examination should always be allowed relative to the details of 
an event or transaction a portion only of which has been testified to on 
direct examination.  As has been stated, cross-examination is not 
confined to the identical details testified to in chief, but extends to its 
entire subject matter, and to all matters that may modify, supplement, 
contradict, rebut or make clearer the facts testified to in chief. 
  
Zerquera v. State, 549 So. 2d 189, 192 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Coxwell v. State, 361 
So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1978)).  And if a party wishes to elicit testimony on cross-
examination that goes beyond what has been testified to in the direct examination, 
he must make the witness his own.  Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 337.  To be clear, a 
party cannot use cross-examination as a vehicle for presenting evidence.  Id.   
 
Here, the prosecution‘s questioning of Lindsey greatly exceeded the 
allowable scope of cross-examination.  Lindsey never broached the subject of 
Mazollo or the pawn shop murder during his direct examination.  Rather, 
Lindsey‘s testimony on direct was limited solely to his childhood and his 
relationship with his family.  The prosecutor‘s entire questioning of Lindsey on 
cross-examination regarding Mazollo (i.e., how Lindsey knew the woman at the 
 
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pawn shop; the fact that the woman was seated and did not resist Lindsey; why 
Lindsey put the gun to the woman‘s head and pulled the trigger) had nothing to do 
with Lindsey‘s relationship with his family or his childhood.  
 
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to 
exceed the scope of direct during its cross-examination of Lindsey during the 
penalty phase.  See Salas, 972 So. 2d at 956 (―
An appellate court reviews a trial 
court‘s ruling concerning the scope of cross-examination for an abuse of 
discretion.‖).  I conclude that this error was not harmless.  The prosecution‘s 
comments were not only improper, but were also prejudicial and made with the 
apparent goal of inflaming the jury.  Therefore, it cannot be concluded that these 
comments did not affect the jury‘s decision to impose the death penalty.  See State 
v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).   
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Eileen M. O‘Connor, Judge – Case No. 06004260CF10A 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa-Marie Lerner, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee