Title: Buzia v. State; Buzia v. Tucker, etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-31, SC10-1645
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-31 
____________ 
 
JOHN M. BUZIA, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1645 
____________ 
 
JOHN M. BUZIA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNETH S. TUCKER, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[December 8, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John M. Buzia, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order of the 
circuit court denying his initial motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851 to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death and 
 
- 2 - 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the 
postconviction court‘s order denying relief, and we deny the habeas petition. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Buzia was indicted, tried, and found guilty of the first-degree murder of 
Charles Kersch, the attempted first-degree murder of Thea Kersch, armed burglary 
of a dwelling with an assault or battery, and robbery with a deadly weapon.   Buzia 
v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006).  The jury in an eight-to-four vote 
recommended a sentence of death for the murder, and the trial court so sentenced 
him. 
 
The evidence at trial showed that on the afternoon of March 14, 2000, Buzia 
took a bus to the home of Charles and Thea Kersch, a retired couple for whom he 
had been doing handyman work.   Id. at 1206.  Later, when Mrs. Kersch pulled into 
the driveway, she directed him to wait outside on the patio until her husband 
arrived.  Soon, however, Buzia used the artifice of returning to her a tray from the 
patio to get her to open the door.  He then attacked her, hitting and kicking her 
until she was unconscious.  After taking money from her purse, he dragged her into 
a back bedroom.  Buzia began searching through the house for money and took a 
credit card from Mrs. Kersch‘s purse.  Upon hearing Mr. Kersch arrive in the 
garage, Buzia decided to assault him also.  He waited and then struck Mr. Kersch 
 
- 3 - 
as he entered the door into the kitchen.  Mr. Kersch fell to the floor, bleeding 
profusely, and Buzia hit him again when he tried to rise.  Buzia went twice to the 
garage, each time returning with an axe, and he hit each of the victims with the 
axe.  As Mr. Kersch lay on the floor, Buzia took money from Mr. Kersch‘s wallet.  
Id. at 1207.  Then, after trying to clean up the house and changing his shirt, Buzia 
took Mr. Kersch‘s car keys and drove away in his car.  The next morning, Buzia 
was arrested at a bank where he was attempting to cash a check drawn from the 
Kersches‘ account.  Id. 
 
In determining the sentence, the trial court found the following with regard 
to mitigation: 
[T]he court assigned little weight to two factors under the statutory 
catchall provision, section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2003), 
specifically Buzia‘s interaction with the community and his work 
record.  The court also found seven nonstatutory mitigating factors 
and ascribed weight as follows: (1) influence of a mental or emotional 
disturbance, not extreme in nature (substantial weight); (2) Buzia‘s 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was impaired, but not substantially 
(substantial weight); (3) gainful employment (little weight); (4) 
appropriate courtroom behavior during the guilt and penalty phases of 
the trial and during the Spencer hearing (little weight); (5) cooperation 
with law enforcement (little weight); (6) difficult childhood (little 
weight); and (7) remorse (little weight). 
Buzia, 926 So. 2d at 1208.  The trial court also found six aggravating 
circumstances, ascribing four of them great weight and two no weight: 
(1) that Buzia was previously convicted of another capital offense or 
of a felony involving the use of violence to some person [great 
 
- 4 - 
weight]; (2) that the murder was committed while he was engaged in 
the commission of or flight after committing or attempting to commit 
the crime of kidnapping [no weight]; (3) that the murder was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from custody [great weight]; (4) that the murder 
was committed for financial gain [no weight]; (5) that the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (―HAC‖) [great weight]; and 
(6) that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner, and without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (―CCP‖) [great weight]. 
Buzia, 926 So. 2d at 1207-08.  Concluding that the aggravators outweighed the 
mitigation, the trial court sentenced Buzia to death for the first-degree murder of 
Charles Kersch. 
 
After rejecting Buzia‘s challenges to four of the aggravating circumstances 
found in this case and determining the proportionality of the death sentence and 
that competent, substantial evidence supported the murder conviction, this Court 
affirmed the judgment and sentence in Buzia‘s direct appeal.  Id. at 1218.  
Subsequently, Buzia filed an initial motion for postconviction relief.  The 
postconviction court denied the motion after holding an evidentiary hearing on 
some of his claims and summarily denied the others.  Buzia then filed this appeal 
of the denial of his postconviction motion and filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
II.  POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS 
 
In this appeal, Buzia raises the following claims:  (A) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to develop and present mitigation; (B) trial counsel was 
 
- 5 - 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his confession; (C) trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to have the jury view the entire confession tape; (D) trial 
counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase; (E) the postconviction court violated 
Buzia‘s right to due process by summarily denying several claims; (F) the 
postconviction court erred in denying claims regarding the testimony of the 
fingerprint examiner; (G) the postconviction court erred in denying Buzia‘s claim 
that the State committed a Brady1 violation by not conducting promised blood 
testing; (H) cumulative error deprived Buzia of a fair trial; and (I) Buzia may be 
incompetent to be executed.  Each of these claims will be addressed in turn. 
A.  Presentation of Mitigation 
 
Buzia argues that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 
assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigation in the penalty phase.  To 
demonstrate ineffective assistance, the defendant must establish both deficient 
performance and prejudice under the following standard: (1) that ―counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment‖; and (2) that ―counsel‘s errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.‖  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To meet the first prong, ―the 
defendant must show that counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard 
                                          
 
 
1.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
- 6 - 
of reasonableness.‖  Id. at 688.  As to the second prong, the appropriate test for 
prejudice is whether ―there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Thus, as to this mitigation claim, the 
defendant must show that counsel‘s error deprived him of a reliable penalty phase 
proceeding.  See Henry v. State, 937 So. 2d 563, 569 (Fla. 2006).  Because the 
postconviction court denied this claim after an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
reviews that court‘s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  We review questions of law de novo. 
 
Buzia raises three subclaims regarding the presentation of mitigation in the 
penalty phase.  Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to develop and present 
evidence of brain damage and of Buzia‘s ―genetic predisposition‖ to substance 
abuse.  Further, he claims that counsel failed to prepare witnesses and present a 
―persuasive narrative‖ of Buzia‘s life. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Buzia presented experts who testified that he 
suffered a temporal lobe injury when his cheekbone was broken in a 1994 incident.  
They opined that the effect of the mild impairment coupled with Buzia‘s drug 
addiction resulted in extreme mental disturbance and the inability to conform his 
 
- 7 - 
conduct to the requirements of law, the two statutory mitigators.  § 921.141(6)(b), 
(f), Fla. Stat. (1999).  The postconviction court denied the claim, and we affirm. 
 
Buzia has failed to meet either prong of the Strickland test.  Competent, 
substantial evidence demonstrates that prior to trial, Dr. Riebsame, a forensic 
psychologist, interviewed and tested Buzia, and was aware of Buzia‘s 1994 injury.  
An MRI showed only a venous angioma—a brain abnormality related to 
seizures—but Buzia did not suffer from seizures.  Moreover, Buzia‘s history 
indicated no patterns of academic failure, poor impulse control, or violence, and 
Buzia was steadily employed, including holding positions with management 
responsibilities.  Dr. Riebsame informed trial counsel that Buzia had no indication 
or history of cognitive impairment and did not recommend any further neurological 
testing.  Accordingly, trial counsel reasonably relied on this expert‘s conclusion.  
See Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007) (―Even if the evaluation by [a 
mental-health expert], which found no indication of brain damage to warrant a 
neuropsychological workup, was somehow incomplete or deficient in the opinion 
of others, trial counsel would not be rendered ineffective for relying on [the 
expert‘s] qualified . . . evaluation.‖).  ―This Court has repeatedly held that 
counsel‘s entire investigation and presentation will not be rendered deficient 
simply because a defendant has now found a more favorable expert.‖  Card v. 
State, 992 So. 2d 810, 818 (Fla. 2008).   Finally, Buzia has not established 
 
- 8 - 
prejudice.  First, contrary to Buzia‘s claims, the conclusions of his witnesses at the 
evidentiary hearing were disputed by the State‘s witnesses.  Moreover, Buzia‘s 
post-1994 life did not reflect a history of violence and impulsivity, and no expert 
testified that the mild impairment, standing alone, substantially affected Buzia‘s 
life or ability to function.  Finally, the trial court found and gave great weight to 
four aggravators applicable to the murder:  the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC); the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner and without any pretense of moral or legal justification 
(CCP); Buzia had a prior violent felony conviction; and the murder was committed 
to avoid lawful arrest. 
 
Buzia next contends that counsel was ineffective because he should have 
pursued a ―bad is good‖ strategy and presented more evidence of the substance 
abuse within Buzia‘s own family to demonstrate a predisposition to drug and 
alcohol abuse.  At the penalty phase, defense counsel‘s strategy was to show that 
Buzia was a good guy whose life fell apart as his addiction to drugs grew and that 
the violent murder was an uncharacteristic act.   To support this theme, counsel 
presented fourteen lay witnesses, including family members, friends, employers, 
and coworkers, who knew Buzia at various stages in his life and whose testimony 
supported this strategy.  Further, Dr. Riebsame testified at length about his testing, 
examination, and diagnosis of Buzia and about Buzia‘s history of alcohol and drug 
 
- 9 - 
abuse.  All told, the testimony showed that Buzia was a popular student athlete and 
then a young adult who held managerial level positions.  As his addiction to drugs 
increased, however, his life became more uncertain, and he resorted to working 
short-term jobs in lawn maintenance and as a handyman to support his habit.  
Based on his interviews with Buzia and members of his family, Dr. Riebsame 
opined that Buzia‘s family was ―a classic dysfunctional family‖ and alcoholism 
was a major factor in the family‘s life.  Accordingly, Buzia has not established that 
counsel was deficient, and we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of this 
claim. 
 
Finally, Buzia argues that counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
adequately prepare and present witnesses.  The evidence shows counsel and an 
investigator worked with Buzia to locate potential witnesses.  Although there were 
few face-to-face meetings between counsel and witnesses, counsel spoke to most 
of them by phone or they were deposed.  Moreover, in preparing Buzia‘s mother to 
testify, counsel discussed with her the various issues of dysfunction within the 
family, especially regarding substance abuse, and relied on her to present such 
testimony.  On the stand, however, Buzia‘s mother apparently became embarrassed 
and resisted all efforts by trial counsel to develop any of this unflattering family 
history, except as to Buzia‘s father.  Counsel cannot be found deficient because a 
witness ―choked‖ on the stand.  Moreover, much of Buzia‘s argument regarding 
 
- 10 - 
presentation of testimony is based on his view that counsel should have presented 
more witnesses.  However, the evidence shows that some of the witnesses Buzia 
presented at the evidentiary hearing either had expressed a reluctance to testify—
and thus counsel reasonably chose not to use them—or had provided conflicting 
representations.  In addition, much of the testimony was cumulative of the 
testimony given at the penalty phase.  As stated above, counsel presented 
numerous witnesses to paint a picture of Buzia‘s life that was consistent with his 
strategy.  Buzia‘s claims of ineffectiveness are based largely on the idea that more 
is better.  However, this is not the standard for determining ineffectiveness.   See 
Barnhill v. State, 971 So. 2d 106, 116 (Fla. 2007) (―The fact that there were other 
witnesses available who could have testified . . . does not demonstrate that counsel 
was ineffective in choosing the theory and strategy that was presented at the 
penalty phase.‖).  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of 
relief on this claim.  
B.  Failure to File Motion to Suppress 
 
Buzia argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim that 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress his 
confession on the ground that the waiver of his constitutional rights was neither 
knowing nor voluntary due to his intoxication from drugs and alcohol.  As stated 
previously, to establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must meet both prongs 
 
- 11 - 
of the Strickland test:  deficient performance and prejudice.  466 U.S. at 694.  
Buzia has not established either prong. 
 
The evidence shows that Buzia was arrested the morning after the crime 
while he was trying to cash a check on his victims‘ account.  He was compliant 
with police throughout the morning, and he was interviewed at approximately 
10:30 a.m.  Buzia responded ―yes, sir,‖ indicating that he understood the rights that 
he waived and proceeded to give a detailed account of the crime.  At trial, one of 
the interrogating officers testified that he was trained to recognize when people are 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and he saw no such indications with Buzia.  
According to the officer, Buzia appeared to understand the questions asked and 
was responsive to them.  At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, defense 
counsel testified that he did not file a motion to suppress the confession because he 
did not know of a sufficient basis to support it.  In fact, no evidence was presented 
showing that Buzia was intoxicated at the time of his confession.  Dr. Morton, 
Buzia‘s expert, testified that he understood from Buzia that Buzia used cocaine 
before and soon after committing the crime.  However, Dr. Morton stated that in 
the confession video, Buzia demonstrated only ―mild‖ symptoms of withdrawal.  
He did not conclude that Buzia was under the influence of drugs or that Buzia‘s 
confession and waiver of rights were coerced or involuntary.  See Davis v. State, 
990 So. 2d 459, 464 (Fla. 2008) (―Because Davis has not demonstrated that he was 
 
- 12 - 
under the effects of LSD at his confession, he did not establish that LSD had a 
coercive impact on his confession or that counsel was deficient in declining to call 
an expert to so testify.‖). 
C.  The Complete Interview Tape 
 
Buzia argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim that 
defense counsel provided deficient performance by moving to exclude from 
evidence the final twenty minutes of the interview tape, a motion that the trial court 
granted.  The videotape contained post-interview interaction between the 
interrogating officers and Buzia.  Buzia claims that he was prejudiced because the 
jury did not have the opportunity to see and hear Buzia express remorse and 
compassion for his victims, which gave the State the ability to argue that Buzia 
showed no remorse.  We conclude that Buzia did not establish either prong of 
Strickland. 
 
The evidence shows that when defense counsel moved to exclude the 
conclusion of the confession videotape, he represented that Buzia concurred in this 
decision.  Moreover, at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, defense counsel 
testified that although Buzia expressed remorse in that part of the tape, another 
exchange contained therein was more harmful.  Stating that he did not want to 
spend time in prison, Buzia asked one the officers to give him a gun.  Defense 
counsel feared that a jury hearing this would be more apt to vote for the death 
 
- 13 - 
penalty.  In addition, defense counsel did not want the jury to hear references to 
Buzia‘s criminal record.  Thus, counsel‘s decision to move to exclude the 
conclusion of the tape was strategic.  ―[S]trategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and 
rejected and counsel‘s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct.‖  Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 553 (Fla. 2010) (quoting 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)).2 
D.  Guilt Phase Ineffectiveness 
 
In this issue, Buzia contends that the postconviction court erred in denying 
his claims that defense counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase of trial (1) 
for failing timely to preserve and test blood samples taken from him when he was 
arrested; (2) for failing to present evidence of Buzia‘s brain damage to negate 
premeditation; and (3) for failing to present an effective closing argument.  Each 
argument is addressed separately below. 
1.  Preservation of Blood Samples 
 
Buzia argues that defense counsel provided deficient performance when he 
failed to ensure that Buzia‘s blood was tested promptly for the presence of alcohol 
                                          
 
 
2.  Buzia briefly argues that the State‘s reference to this part of the tape 
during closing argument in the penalty phase was prejudicial.  However, the record 
shows that defense counsel objected to the reference and pointed out that this part 
of the tape was not in evidence.  The trial court sustained defense counsel‘s 
objection and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor‘s remark.  
 
- 14 - 
and drugs at the time of the offense.  He claims a positive test result for the 
presence of cocaine would have supported a motion to suppress his confession and 
provided evidence to negate premeditation.  Buzia has not demonstrated either 
prong of Strickland. 
 
Competent, substantial evidence shows that that Buzia committed the 
offense in the afternoon of March 14, 2000; he was arrested on the morning of 
March 15; and the State took hair and blood samples at about 7 p.m.  Soon after his 
appointment, counsel interviewed Buzia and then filed a motion to preserve these 
samples for testing.  The court granted the motion upon the prosecutor‘s 
representation that the State would test the samples and preserve them for the 
defense.  Defense counsel subsequently discovered that the State did not have the 
blood tested for drugs and ordered independent testing.  The samples tested 
negative for cocaine.  Accordingly, Buzia has not demonstrated that defense 
counsel unreasonably relied on the prosecutor‘s representation that testing would 
be conducted.  Moreover, Buzia did not demonstrate that if the blood had been 
tested sooner, cocaine would have been detected.  Experts testified that cocaine is 
rapidly eliminated from the body and that cocaine metabolites usually remain for 
only twelve to eighteen hours, and at most twenty-six hours.  By the time the blood 
sample was drawn in this case, the sample would not have shown the presence of 
cocaine at the time of the murder. 
 
- 15 - 
 
Buzia claims he was prejudiced because the delay in testing deprived him of 
a defense to premeditated murder.  Voluntary intoxication, however, is not a valid 
defense to the crime.  See § 775.051, Fla. Stat. (1999) (―Voluntary intoxication 
resulting from the consumption, injection, or other use of alcohol or other 
controlled substance as described in chapter 893 is not a defense to any offense 
proscribed by law.‖).  Buzia also claims that timely testing would have provided 
some evidence to support a motion to suppress the confession.  As discussed 
previously, none of the testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing 
supports a determination that Buzia‘s confession was involuntary.  One of the 
interrogating officers familiar with the signs of drug use testified that he saw no 
indication that Buzia was under the influence and that Buzia expressly denied 
using drugs.  In addition, Dr. Morton, Buzia‘s expert witness, testified that Buzia 
showed ―mild symptoms‖ of withdrawal, but he did not testify that Buzia was 
under the influence and could not understand his rights. 
2.  Brain Damage and Premeditation 
 
In this claim Buzia urges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
discover and present evidence that an incident in which Buzia was struck with a 
pipe resulted in brain damage that negated the element of premeditation.  We 
concluded previously that defense counsel was not ineffective in the penalty phase 
because he was entitled to rely on his mental health expert, who found no evidence 
 
- 16 - 
of brain damage resulting from the 1994 incident.  See Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 
at 377.  For this same reason we conclude he was not ineffective for failing to 
present evidence of brain damage in the guilt phase.  In addition, although Buzia‘s 
expert testified at the postconviction hearing that Buzia‘s brain damage along with 
his drug addiction made him more impulsive, no one testified that the brain 
damage alone negated premeditation.  Moreover, we previously concluded 
competent, substantial evidence demonstrates not only that Buzia was capable of 
forming premeditation but that the evidence supported the trial court‘s finding that 
the CCP aggravator applied to this murder.  Buzia, 926 So. 2d at 1214.  Finally, to 
the extent Buzia may be claiming again that his drug use negated premeditation, 
we have previously stated that voluntary intoxication does not negate 
premeditation. 
3.  Closing Argument 
 
Finally, Buzia contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to present an effective closing argument.  We affirm the postconviction 
court‘s denial of this claim.  The evidence shows that defense counsel planned to 
use the strategy of giving the more substantive closing argument in rebuttal so that 
the State would not have an opportunity to respond.  Accordingly, counsel gave the 
initial closing in which he generally discussed burden of proof and reasonable 
doubt so that co-counsel could argue the rebuttal.  However, the State 
 
- 17 - 
unexpectedly waived closing argument, thus precluding any rebuttal argument by 
the defense.  We have stated that ―an attorney is not ineffective for decisions that 
are a part of a trial strategy that, in hindsight, did not work out to the defendant‘s 
advantage.‖  Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1174 (Fla. 2005) (concluding 
counsel not ineffective where strategy to give substantive argument in rebuttal was 
thwarted when the State opted not to make a closing argument). 
E.  Summary Denial of Claims 
 
Buzia argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying four 
of his claims.  As explained below, we disagree and affirm their denial. 
1.  Drug and Alcohol Use 
 
Buzia contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present evidence of his addiction to drugs and alcohol in the guilt phase to 
demonstrate that the murder was spontaneous, not planned.  This evidence was, 
however, presented during the penalty phase.  As we stated previously, voluntary 
intoxication cannot provide a legal defense to a crime.  See § 775.051, Fla. Stat.  
Moreover, on direct appeal, we not only found competent, substantial evidence 
supporting the conviction, but we also affirmed the finding of the CCP aggravator, 
which requires a finding of heightened premeditation.  Buzia, 926 So. 2d at 1214-
15.  Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err in summarily denying this 
claim. 
 
- 18 - 
2.  Preservation of Error 
 
Buzia alleged that counsel was deficient for failing to object when the 
prosecutor once referred to Buzia as an ―axe murderer‖ in penalty phase closing 
argument.  Because Buzia‘s claim is conclusively refuted by the record, we affirm 
the trial court‘s summary denial of this claim.  See Kimbrough v. State, 886 So. 2d 
965, 981-82 (Fla. 2004) (stating standard for reviewing summary denial of 
postconviction claim).  The indictment charged Buzia with premeditated murder 
―by hitting and/or striking Charles Kersch with his hands and/or an axe,‖ and the 
evidence showed that the victim died after Buzia struck him with an axe.  Thus, the 
prosecutor‘s singular characterization of Buzia constituted fair comment on the 
evidence.  See Spann v. State, 985 So. 2d 1059, 1068 (Fla. 2008) (―Because the 
prosecutor was making a fair comment based on the evidence presented at trial, 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object.‖). 
3.  Special Verdict Form 
 
We affirm the postconviction court‘s summary denial of Buzia‘s claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request a special verdict form requiring the 
jurors to specify each aggravator found and the vote on each.  We have held that it 
is error to use such forms.  State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005) (―Our 
current system fosters independence because the trial court alone must make 
detailed findings about the existence and weight of aggravating circumstances; it 
 
- 19 - 
has no jury findings on which to rely.  Individual jury findings on aggravating 
factors would contradict this settled practice.‖); see Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 
649, 664 (Fla. 2008) (stating that use of such a verdict form may constitute 
harmless error). 
4.  Mental Health Exam 
 
Buzia argued in his postconviction motion that he was deprived of his due 
process right to a competent mental health evaluation under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68 (1985).  Buzia correctly acknowledges here that this claim is procedurally 
barred.  Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1248 (Fla. 2003) (holding claim of 
deprivation of right to competent mental health evaluation was ―procedurally 
barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal‖) (citing Cherry v. State, 
781 So. 2d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2000) (―Moreover, the claim of incompetent mental 
health evaluation is procedurally barred for failure to raise it on direct appeal.‖)). 
F.  Testimony of the Fingerprint Examiner 
 
At Buzia‘s 2003 trial, Donna Birks, then a latent print examiner of the 
Seminole County Sheriff‘s Office, testified that a bloody palm print found on a 
cabinet in the Kersches‘ garage near where the axes were kept matched Buzia‘s.  In 
2007, as a result of an internal investigation into Birks‘ work, Buzia‘s counsel was 
sent notice of investigatory findings regarding the unreliability of her 
identifications that resulted in Birks‘dismissal.  Accordingly, postconviction 
 
- 20 - 
counsel hired a latent print expert, who reported that the print did not match 
Buzia‘s.  However, the print was insufficient to match it to anyone; thus, Buzia 
could not be excluded as the person who made it.  Another expert confirmed this 
opinion.  Accordingly, with regard to this evidentiary development, Buzia alleged 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, and newly 
discovered evidence.  The postconviction court denied the claims, and Buzia 
reasserts them here.  As explained below, we affirm the denials of these claims. 
1.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
 
Buzia urges that had trial counsel hired an independent expert to examine 
the bloody palm print, the expert would have testified the print did not match 
Buzia‘s and such testimony would have negated premeditation.  Buzia has failed to 
meet either prong of Strickland.  Regardless of Birks‘ stellar reputation as a 
fingerprint expert at the time of the trial, defense counsel had no basis for 
questioning whether the palm print was Buzia‘s.  Mrs. Kersch identified Buzia, 
whom she knew, and Buzia confessed to the crime, including admitting that he 
obtained two axes from the garage.  There was no reasonable basis for questioning 
whose palm print it was.  Moreover, Buzia‘s expert testified at the postconviction 
hearing that Buzia could not be excluded as having left the print.  Such testimony 
would have no effect on the ample evidence of premeditation presented at trial. 
2.  Brady Claim 
 
- 21 - 
 
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) that favorable 
exculpatory or impeaching evidence (2) was suppressed by the State, either 
willfully or inadvertently, and (3) that the evidence was material.  See Guzman v. 
State, 868 So.2d 498, 508 (Fla. 2003).  Evidence is material or prejudicial if there 
is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See Byrd v. State, 14 So. 3d 921, 925 (Fla. 
2009).  That is, the undisclosed favorable evidence, reasonably ―considered in the 
context of the entire record,‖ must undermine confidence in the verdict.   Carroll v. 
State, 815 So. 2d 601, 619 (Fla. 2002).  Buzia has not met this test. 
 
To the extent that favorable evidence that the print was not a match was 
suppressed, there is no prejudice.  Buzia‘s expert established only that Buzia could 
not be excluded.  In light of Buzia‘s confession and the other evidence presented at 
trial, the evidence regarding the print does not undermine our confidence in the 
verdict. 
3.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
Finally, this Court established a two-part test for determining whether a 
defendant is entitled to relief for a newly discovered evidence claim.  First, the 
evidence must have been unknown at the time of trial, and it must appear that the 
defendant and his counsel could not have known the facts by the use of due 
diligence.  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  ―Second, the newly 
 
- 22 - 
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial.‖  Id. (citing Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991)).  Buzia 
has not met the second prong.  As previously stated, evidence that the print is not 
an exact match but does not exclude Buzia would not negate the evidence of 
premeditation presented at trial.  Thus, the evidence regarding the palm print 
would not probably result in acquittal on retrial.  See Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 
So. 3d 593, 603 (Fla. 2009) (affirming denial of newly discovered evidence claim 
based on expert‘s faulty palm print identification where ―vast amount of evidence‖ 
linked defendant to murders). 
G.  Alleged Brady Violation 
 
Previously, we concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective regarding 
the State‘s failure timely to test Buzia‘s blood sample for drugs.  Here, Buzia 
contends that the State‘s failure constituted a Brady violation.  He claims in 
conclusory fashion that timely testing would have provided evidence that he was 
under the influence of cocaine at the time of the murders, supported a finding of 
the mental health mitigators, and bolstered a motion to suppress his confession.  To 
establish his claim, Buzia must show that the State willfully or inadvertently 
suppressed favorable exculpatory or impeaching evidence that was material.  Thus, 
he must demonstrate that had the evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable 
probability that the result would have been different.  See Carroll, 815 So. 2d 601.  
 
- 23 - 
―In other words, the favorable evidence must place ‗the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.‘‖  Jones v. State, 998 So. 
2d 573, 581 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006)). 
 
Clearly, the evidence shows that the State did not timely test the sample of 
Buzia‘s blood drawn at the time of his arrest.  The evidence shows, however, that 
timely testing of the sample would not have shown that Buzia was under the 
influence of cocaine at the time of the crime.  Thus, as to his first two claims, no 
favorable evidence was suppressed.  Testimony at the evidentiary hearing, 
however, indicates that a timely test might have shown the presence of cocaine at 
the time of Buzia‘s confession.  As discussed previously, however, Buzia‘s own 
expert did not testify that Buzia‘s confession was involuntary, and the interrogating 
officer testified that Buzia was responsive to the questions asked.  Moreover, 
Buzia‘s detailed confession matched the established facts of the crime.  
Accordingly, evidence that Buzia may have had cocaine present in his system 
during his police interview would not have resulted in suppression of the 
confession, and there is no reasonable probability that such evidence would result 
in a different outcome.  Thus, our confidence in the verdict is not undermined. 
H.  Cumulative Error 
 
- 24 - 
 
Buzia alleges that the cumulative effect of errors in this case warrants relief.  
However, because each of Buzia‘s claims of error fails individually, he is entitled 
to no relief for cumulative error.  Shoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 562. 
I.  Incompetence to Be Executed 
 
Finally, Buzia alleges that he may be incompetent at the time of execution 
but concedes that this claim is not ripe for consideration.  See Anderson v. State, 
18 So. 3d 501, 522 (Fla. 2009).  ―This Court has repeatedly found that no relief is 
warranted on similar claims.‖  Id.  Accordingly, we deny this claim. 
III.  HABEAS CLAIMS 
 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Buzia raises two claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  To establish that appellate counsel 
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, a petitioner must demonstrate that 
(1) counsel committed a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance; and (2) that this 
deficiency in performance so compromised the appellate process that confidence in 
the correctness of the result is undermined.  Cox v. State, 966 So. 2d 337, 365 (Fla. 
2007) (citing Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986)).  We apply this 
standard to each of Buzia‘s claims below. 
A.  Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
 
- 25 - 
 
Buzia argues that in his direct appeal, counsel should have raised the trial 
court‘s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of armed 
burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery.  He claims that if appellate 
counsel had raised these issues, this Court would have reversed his convictions for 
burglary and felony murder and granted him a new trial. 
 
Under the pertinent statute, burglary is defined as the ―entering or remaining 
in a dwelling . . . with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises 
are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or 
remain.‖  § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  In moving for judgment of acquittal in the 
trial court, Buzia argued that under Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), 
the burglary conviction cannot stand because he was an invitee. 
 
In Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 61 (Fla. 2008), we summarized our holding in 
Delgado as follows: 
In Delgado, we held that the rule of lenity (codified in section 
775.021(1), Florida Statutes) required that the ―remaining in‖ element 
of burglary be limited to situations where the defendant surreptitiously 
remains after having received consent to enter; otherwise, the State 
could charge that a burglary had occurred in any situation in which an 
individual entered a dwelling with consent and later committed an 
offense therein.  
(Emphasis added.)  ―[T]he essence of Delgado is that evidence of a crime 
committed inside the dwelling, structure, or conveyance of another cannot, in and 
of itself, establish the crime of burglary.  Stated differently, the State cannot use 
 
- 26 - 
‗the criminal act to prove both intent and revocation‘ of the consent to enter.‖  
State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d 1205, 1211 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 
238).  As a result, consensual entry remained an affirmative defense to the charge 
of burglary, and the burden remained on the defendant ―to establish that there was 
consent to enter.‖  Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 240. 
 
When Thea Kersch first encountered Buzia in her driveway, she instructed 
Buzia to wait for her husband in the screened patio and pool area behind the house.  
Buzia was never permitted inside the house unless Mr. Kersch was present.  She 
then drove into the garage and entered her kitchen through a door leading directly 
from the garage.  Meanwhile, Buzia walked around the outside of the house and 
entered the attached screened area.  After sitting at the patio table a short while, 
Buzia approached the closed sliding glass door of the house, offering a tray that his 
lunch had been served on the day before.  Mrs. Kersch opened the door and took 
the tray.  She specifically testified that she was inside; he was outside; and she did 
not invite him in.  After she took the tray, Buzia launched his attack on her. 
 
Buzia contends that he was an invitee because Mrs. Kersch gave him 
consent to enter the ―dwelling‖3 by authorizing him to sit in the screened area  
attached to the house and that his ―remaining in‖ was not done surreptitiously.  We 
                                          
 
 
3.  The burglary statute provides that a ―dwelling‖ includes ―a building or 
conveyance of any kind, including an attached porch . . . [and] the curtilage 
thereof.‖  § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat (1999). 
 
- 27 - 
disagree.  This is not a case like Delgado, in which the consent to enter was 
presumed withdrawn by the fact of the attack by the defendant.  In this case, Mrs. 
Kersch gave Buzia limited consent to enter only the porch area and specifically 
told him to await her husband there.  Accordingly, Buzia did not have consent to 
enter the house when he attacked Mrs. Kersch.  Cf. Johnson v. State, 737 So. 2d 
555, 556-57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (affirming conviction of causing bodily injury 
during the commission of a burglary where, although convenience store was open 
to the public, the owner clearly told defendant he was not allowed in the area 
behind the cash register before he entered the prohibited area), approved, 786 So. 
2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 2001) (―[T]he question of whether the area behind the counter 
was open to the public is a question of fact for the jury to decide.‖).  The motion 
for judgment of acquittal was without merit, and appellate counsel was not 
deficient in failing to raise the issue on appeal. 
 
Moreover, even if the burglary conviction and attendant sentence were 
reversed, the felony murder conviction would remain valid, and Buzia would not 
be entitled to a new trial.  Buzia was convicted of premeditated and felony murder.  
The latter conviction would not be invalidated because it rests on the valid felony 
robbery conviction.  In addition, no new penalty phase would be required.  The 
trial court gave no weight to the aggravator that the capital felony was committed 
in the course of a robbery, burglary, or kidnapping.  The court, however, found and 
 
- 28 - 
gave great weight to four aggravating factors, including CCP, HAC, and prior 
violent felony conviction, which are among the most serious aggravators.  See 
Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016, 1035 (Fla. 2009) (stating HAC and CCP are ―two 
of the most serious aggravators‖), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1144 (2010); 
Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087, 1109 (Fla. 2004) (―CCP and prior violent 
felony conviction are considered among the more serious aggravating 
circumstances.‖). 
B.  Jury Instruction on Kidnapping 
 
In his second claim, Buzia contends that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in giving an instruction 
on kidnapping—an uncharged crime—during the penalty phase.  The court gave 
the instruction to support the aggravating circumstance of capital felony committed 
in the commission of or attempt to commit any robbery, kidnapping, or burglary.  
This was done to avoid an improper doubling problem with another aggravator. 
 
In Turner v. State, 530 So. 2d 45, 50-51 (Fla. 1987), we addressed this same 
claim and held that the relevant statute ―does not require that a defendant be 
charged or convicted of the enumerated felonies[;] it requires only that the 
aggravating circumstances be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Thus, giving 
the instruction was not error.  Nor is there any prejudice.  As stated previously, the 
trial court expressly gave the aggravator no weight but did find and give great 
 
- 29 - 
weight to four aggravators in this case, three of which we have deemed to be 
among the more serious aggravating factors. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm the denial of Buzia‘s motion for 
postconviction relief and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,  
Kenneth Russell Lester, Jr., Judge - Case No. 522000CF000923A 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Maria E. Deliberato and Marie-
Louise Samuels Parmer, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent