Title: Kristi L. M. v. Dennis E. M.
Citation: 2007 WI 85
Docket Number: 2005AP001034
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2007

2007 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1034 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kristi L. M., J. K. M. and J. M., 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
Dennis E. M., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Brian A. Pfitzinger and Elbert & Pfitzinger, Ltd., Juneau, 
and oral argument by Brian A. Pfitzinger. 
 
For the petitioners-respondents there was a brief by 
Kenneth R. Sipsma, Erika L. Bierma, and Sipsma, Hahn & Brophy, 
L.L.C., Madison, and oral argument by Kenneth R. Sipsma. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Zev D. Kianovsky, 
assistant corporation counsel, on behalf of Dodge County 
Corporation Counsel. 
 
 
2007 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1034  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV192) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kristi L.M., J.K.M. and J.M., 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis E.M., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Dennis E.M. seeks review of 
an unpublished summary disposition order of the court of appeals1 
affirming a circuit court order that imposed a child abuse 
injunction against Dennis, restricting his contact with his two 
children, J.K.M. and J.M.  The injunction was imposed after 
Dennis's wife, Kristi2 L.M., filed a petition alleging that she 
                                                 
1 Kristie L.M. v. Dennis E.M., No. 2005AP1034, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. September 14, 2006). 
2 The petitioner-respondent's name is spelled incorrectly in 
the case caption.  The record indicates the petitioner-
respondent's first name is "Kristi."  We use the correct 
spelling in this opinion, and we direct the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court to amend the caption accordingly.     
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
2 
 
found bruises on the head of the couple's 11-month-old boy, 
J.K.M., after the child's visitation with Dennis.  Kristi also 
alleged Dennis had made numerous statements suggesting he posed 
a threat to the safety of Kristi, the children and himself. 
¶2 
Following a hearing, the Dodge County Circuit Court, 
Honorable 
Richard 
Callaway, 
Reserve 
Judge, 
ordered 
the 
injunction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 813.122(5)(a)3. (2005-06).3  
Dennis appealed the decision, arguing that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting the injunction.  
The court of appeals issued a summary order, reversing the 
circuit court's decision as to J.M. and affirming its decision 
as to J.K.M.4  Dennis sought review of the court of appeals' 
order affirming the injunction as to J.K.M. 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court acted within its 
discretion in issuing the injunction as to J.K.M. because 
Dennis's prior conduct, including the bruising of J.K.M., gave 
the circuit court reasonable grounds to believe that Dennis 
engaged in abuse and may engage in abuse of J.K.M.  We therefore 
affirm the summary order of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
On December 13, 2004, Dennis E.M. and Kristi L.M. 
separated after six years of marriage.  Dennis filed a petition 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Kristi L.M. did not seek cross-review of the court of 
appeals' reversal of the circuit court's injunction as to J.M.  
We therefore do not address the court of appeals' order as it 
concerns J.M.   
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
3 
 
for divorce on February 28, 2005.  The couple had two minor 
children, J.K.M., born April 14, 2004, and J.M., born February 
8, 2002.  A temporary order in the divorce proceeding directed 
that Dennis was to have the children Monday through Friday from 
7:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., unless he was off work, in which case 
placement would be from 7:30 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.  Dennis also 
had visitation for one overnight per week and for one four-hour 
period of time each weekend. 
¶5 
On April 4, 2005, Kristi filed a petition for a 
temporary 
child 
abuse 
restraining 
order 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 813.122 alleging Dennis had inflicted physical 
injury on J.K.M. and had caused emotional damage to J.M.  In a 
statement in support of the petition, Kristi averred she found 
bruises on J.K.M's head "consistent with fingerprints" after 
J.K.M. returned from a visitation with Dennis.  Kristi alleged 
that Dennis had a "long history of mental illness."  She stated 
that Dennis had called in December 2004 to tell her that he "had 
made his final goodbyes to the children and told me he wasn't 
coming home after work and I wouldn't see him again."  She 
averred Dennis called her in February 2005 to tell her he was 
going to spend the day at the cemetery.  Kristi stated she did 
not believe the children were safe in Dennis's care.  
¶6 
On April 8, 2005, the circuit court held a hearing on 
the motion.  Kristi gave testimony about several incidents 
involving Dennis.  She recounted a conversation she had with 
Dennis one night in early January 2005 when he called her on his 
way home from work: 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
4 
 
KRISTI:  He asked me if I read the article in the 
newspaper about what happened in Montello and I said I 
was not aware of it, what happened?  And he said that 
there was a man who was served divorce papers by his 
wife, took himself and his 17-month-old son and killed 
him and himself.  He became very quiet—— 
ATTORNEY:  Was he——who's "he" now? 
KRISTI:  Dennis.  He became very quiet, started crying 
and said [he could] relate to that. 
¶7 
Kristi also testified about a conversation she had 
with her three-year-old son, J.M.: 
KRISTI:  [J.M.] said, mommy, can we talk and I said 
yeah. . . . So I sat down next to him on the step and 
he said we're going to die and I said, [J.M.], who 
said that to you and who told you that and he didn't 
say anything.  And I asked him again, [J.M.], who told 
you that and he said daddy.  And I said, well, what 
else did daddy say and he said words and I told him 
that, um, it was okay to say what daddy said and then 
he said mommy's a bitch and I asked him if it was just 
mommy that was going to die.  He said, no, mommy, 
[J.M.], [J.K.M.] and daddy. 
¶8 
Kristi testified that Dennis told her that one day in 
November 2004, he "was downstairs doing laundry and thought 
about hanging himself" while he was supervising the children.  
She said that in June 2000 Dennis "was very depressed and 
threatened to take an overdose of pills."  She said that since 
she and Dennis had separated in December 2004, Dennis had tried 
"several times" to get himself "emergency detained."  
¶9 
In his testimony, Dennis admitted to having a history 
of emotional problems and depression, but disputed most of 
Kristi's allegations.  Dennis denied telling Kristi that he 
thought about hanging himself while the children were in his 
care, and denied telling Kristi he was going to spend the day at 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
5 
 
the cemetery.  He denied telling J.M. that they were all going 
to die.  He admitted mentioning to Kristi the story of the 
Montello man who had killed himself and his son, but "just to 
see if [Kristi] had heard about it."  He stated he told Kristi 
he'd said goodbye to the children and wasn't coming home because 
he was angry about a large fuel bill.  Dennis said he'd talked 
about having himself "emergency detained" in a hospital, but his 
therapist at the time didn't think it was necessary.   
¶10 Kristi also testified about an incident that occurred 
on March 25, 2005, while Dennis was supervising the children at 
his home.  She said Dennis called her to say that J.K.M. had hit 
his head on the entertainment center.  After J.K.M. was returned 
to Kristi's care later that day, she noticed swelling and a 
"fairly long mark" on the left side of the infant's head, a 
laceration on his forehead, a red mark on his chin, and redness 
on his knees and tops of his feet.  Kristi discovered bruises 
three days later when "the swelling had gone down and you could 
see that there were three distinct marks on the side of his head 
that were round like a fingerprint."  Kristi then took J.K.M. to 
the police department, where she was directed to take him to the 
hospital.   
¶11 Dr. Halim Hennes treated J.K.M. in the emergency room 
at Children's Hospital in Milwaukee, and testified about his 
examination of J.K.M.  Dr. Hennes said he discovered two 
circular bruises on the side of J.K.M.'s head.  He ordered a 
head CT (computed tomography) scan, the results of which were 
normal, and a skeletal survey, which showed no evidence of 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
6 
 
fractures.  When asked to give his opinion as to the medical 
probability that the bruises were caused by child abuse, Dr. 
Hennes replied, "very minimal."  Dr. Hennes later added that he 
"did not rule . . . out" child abuse as the cause of the 
bruises, but said its "likelihood" as the reason for the bruises 
"is small."   
¶12 Dr. Virginia Greenbaum, Medical Director at the Child 
Protection Center at Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, testified 
about her examination of police photographs of J.K.M.'s bruises 
and 
relevant 
medical 
records. 
 
Dr. 
Greenbaum 
said 
the 
photographs showed three bruises on the left portion of J.K.M's 
scalp and a bruise on the right side of his forehead.  She 
testified that the bruises were consistent with markings caused 
by fingers or knuckles pressing on the child's skull.  Dr. 
Greenbaum testified the bruises were suspicious for abuse for 
several reasons: 
A child who is not too mobile, who is a pre-cruiser, 
typically has no bruises at all . . . they can't get 
themselves into trouble, can't generate that much 
force and can't move fast.  Once in a while you see 
one bruise or perhaps two but to see four . . . is 
somewhat unusual and it's very unusual to see them 
clustered in one area over the scalp with absolutely 
no explanation from the caretaker. 
 
 . . . . 
I asked the mother about [J.K.M. falling against] the 
entertainment center. . . .  I would expect that the 
child is – would have to either be crawling into it or 
standing and then fall and bump against it, either, 
which it's a very minor trauma, very low velocity.  At 
most, I would expect to see a single bruise, probably 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
7 
 
on the forehead. . . .  Certainly you wouldn't expect 
to see a cluster of three individual bruises. . . . 
Dr. Greenbaum testified that, based on her training and 
experience, she suspected the bruises were caused by abuse.  
However, she said she could not determine who caused the 
bruises, nor could she say whether the bruises occurred at the 
same time.     
¶13 Dennis denied grabbing J.K.M. by the head, and stated 
that he believed his hands were too small to fit around J.K.M.'s 
head to cause the child's bruises.  He testified that J.K.M. 
received the bruises by falling and striking his head on the 
door of the entertainment center while reaching for some toy 
blocks.   
¶14 Dr. Michael Haight, a psychologist Dennis had been 
seeing for about four months, also testified at the hearing.  He 
stated Dennis had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder 
and had been hospitalized in 2000 or 2001.  He reported that 
Dennis was still somewhat depressed but had improved since 
January 2005.  Dr. Haight said Dennis told him that he was 
taking his medication.  He said Dennis had reported that he had 
been suicidal at one time in the past, but that he did not 
believe Dennis was now a suicide risk, and that Dennis had given 
no indication he would be a danger or threat to his children.  
Dr. Haight testified that "there would be greater potential" for 
Dennis to be a threat to his own safety and that of others "if 
he were not on his medication."   
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
8 
 
¶15 When Dennis was asked if he was taking his medication, 
he said that he had been taking it regularly since the middle of 
December.  He said that prior to the middle of December, "I did 
take it sporadically.  If I'd feel good, I'd take myself off the 
medicine."  When asked if he might take himself off his 
medication again in the future, he responded, "I can't answer 
that."   
¶16 Judge Callaway granted the motion for an injunction at 
the conclusion of the hearing, stating his reasons as follows: 
I'm very concerned about the fact that a psychologist 
will say, when I asked him the question that if he 
would not take his medication, that, yes, [failure to 
take 
the 
medication] . . . could 
result 
in 
a——a 
problem for the children.   
. . . . 
If 
[a 
person 
prescribed 
medication 
is] 
on 
the 
medication, it seems to keep them very, very calm and 
less likely to [cause problems]. 
. . . . 
But I am concerned about the fact that we have a[n] 
11-month-old child who ends up with some bruises; that 
they're——they're really not consistent with hitting 
your head against something.  They're——it's an unusual 
marking.  And that's sort of scary. . . .  I agree 
with the guardian ad litem in this case:  It's a very 
close call.  
. . . . 
[T]here 
are 
reasonable 
grounds 
to 
believe 
that 
[Dennis] has engaged in, or threatened to engage in, 
abuse to the child.  That abuse can mean mentally as 
well 
as 
physically 
and 
I'm 
afraid, 
under 
the 
circumstances, we might have both. 
. . . . 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
9 
 
I'm concerned about the cumulative aspect of the 
evidence.  I see no reason why [Dennis] would call his 
wife and ask her if——have you heard about the fellow 
in Montello that killed his child and himself.  
There's no reason to bring that up.  It may be of 
interest in an——in the newspaper but not to call her 
and 
ask 
her 
about 
it. 
 
The 
doctor, 
his 
own 
psychologist, indicated that he was suicidal at one 
time.  That he also testified that if he refused to 
take his medication he could be——could cause danger to 
himself or to others.  That's pretty important. 
¶17 Judge Callaway granted the motion for an injunction as 
to both children.  On April 8, 2005, he signed an injunction 
form, 
marking 
boxes 
that 
ordered 
Dennis 
to 
"avoid 
the 
child[ren]'s residence and/or any premises temporarily occupied 
by the child[ren] now and in the future" and "avoid contacting 
or causing any person other than a party's attorney to contact 
the child[ren] unless [Kristi] consents in writing and the court 
agrees the contact is in the best interest of the child[ren]."  
In an attachment to the injunction, Judge Callaway ordered that 
Dennis's visitation with the children be limited to "supervised 
visitation at times agreed to by [the guardian ad litem]." 
¶18 On April 15, 2005, Dennis filed a notice of appeal.  
The court of appeals disposed of the appeal by a summary 
disposition order dated September 14, 2006.  Kristie L.M. v. 
Dennis E.M., No. 2005AP1034, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. 
September 14, 2006).  The court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court acted within its discretion in granting the 
injunction as to J.K.M because the bruises to J.K.M.'s head were 
either "severe" bruises or a nonenumerated "physical injury" 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
10 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.02(14g)5 constituting "abuse" within the 
meaning of the child abuse restraining orders and injunctions 
statute.  Kristie L.M., No. 2005AP1034, unpublished order, pp. 
3-4.  As to J.M., however, the court of appeals concluded the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by issuing 
the injunction because no evidence was presented to show that 
J.M. 
suffered 
"abuse" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 813.122(5)(a)3., 
as 
demonstrated 
by 
either 
"physical injury" (not alleged in J.M's case) or "emotional 
damage," see Wis. Stat. § 48.02(14g) and (1)(gm).  Id., pp. 5-7.   
¶19 Judge Charles P. Dykman dissented from the court of 
appeals' summary disposition order as to J.K.M. on grounds that 
J.K.M.'s bruises were not "severe" within the meaning of 
§ 48.02(14g) and therefore reasonable grounds did not exist to 
issue the injunction.  Kristie L.M., No. 2005AP1034, unpublished 
order, pp. 7-8 (Dykman, J. dissenting).  Judge Dykman also noted 
that a child abuse injunction creates a rebuttable presumption 
in child custody proceedings that joint legal custody is not in 
the 
best 
interest 
of 
the 
child 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.24(2)(b)2.c. (2003-04),6 and expressed a concern that "some 
                                                 
5 It is unclear from the summary order whether the court of 
appeals 
believed 
that 
the 
bruises 
to 
J.K.M. 
constituted 
"physical injury" because they were "severe" bruises, or whether 
they 
fell 
under 
the 
"not 
limited 
to" 
catch-all 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(14g).  See Kristie L.M., No. 2005AP1034, 
unpublished order, p. 3. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.24(2)(b)2.c. 
was 
renumbered 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 767.41(2)(b)2.c. by 2005 Wis. Act 443. 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
11 
 
child abuse injunctions and domestic abuse injunctions are 
brought on questionable evidence as precursors to divorce 
actions, for the sole purpose of insuring a favorable legal 
custody judgment."  Id., p. 8. 
¶20 Dennis filed a petition asking this court to review 
the court of appeals' order affirming the circuit court's order 
of an injunction to determine whether the injunction infringed 
upon his constitutional right to have a relationship with his 
child.7  We granted review.  We subsequently granted a motion of 
the Dodge County Corporation Counsel to file an amicus brief, 
which has been received.  We now affirm. 
II 
¶21 This is the first time that this court has reviewed an 
order granting a motion for an injunction under the child abuse 
restraining order and injunctions statute, Wis. Stat. § 813.122, 
                                                 
7 Dennis casts the issue presented in this case in 
constitutional terms, but fails to develop the constitutional 
arguments in his appeal.  We note that a petition for an 
injunction under Wis. Stat. § 813.122 enjoining a parent from 
having contact with the parent's child, like a judicial 
proceeding for termination of parental rights (TPR), implicates 
the fundamental rights of the parent.  See T.M.F. v. Children's 
Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 112 Wis. 2d 180, 184-85, 332 N.W.2d 293 
(1983) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) 
("[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest 
protected 
by 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment.")).  Unlike a TPR proceeding, the degree to which 
these rights are implicated may vary from case to case, 
depending upon the duration and terms of the injunction.  We do 
not address further the constitutional issues involved in this 
review.  See Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2005 WI 
93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 (undeveloped 
arguments need not be addressed).   
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
12 
 
to determine whether reasonable grounds existed to issue the 
injunction.8  The question of whether a court or circuit court 
commissioner may grant such an injunction is addressed to the 
discretion of the court or circuit court commissioner that hears 
the petition.  See M.Q. v. Z.Q., 152 Wis. 2d 701, 708, 449 
N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1989).  However, an injunction may not issue 
unless the judge finds reasonable grounds to believe that the 
respondent has engaged in or may engage in abuse of the child 
victim.  Id.   
¶22 We review the question of whether such reasonable 
grounds exist in two parts.  See id.  First, we will affirm the 
court or circuit court commissioner's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Second, we review de novo the 
court or circuit court commissioner's conclusion of law as to 
whether, based on the facts of record, reasonable grounds 
existed to grant the injunction.  See id.  We may independently 
review the record to determine whether sufficient evidentiary 
grounds 
exist 
to 
sustain 
the 
court 
or 
circuit 
court 
commissioner's exercise of discretion.  See State v. Dumler, 
2003 WI 62, ¶11, 262 Wis. 2d 292, 664 N.W.2d 525.  
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 813.122(5)(a) was cited in another case 
before this court in State v. O'Dell, 193 Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 
532 N.W.2d 741 (1995), which concerned the effect of a circuit 
court judge's oral statements on the terms of a written 
injunction 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 813.122(5)(a). 
 
However, 
the 
substantive provisions of § 813.122 were not addressed in 
O'Dell.   
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
13 
 
III 
¶23 The child abuse restraining orders and injunctions 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 813.122, provides that a child victim, or 
a parent, stepparent or legal guardian of the child victim, may 
initiate an action for an injunction restricting a party's 
contact with a child by filing a petition with a court or 
circuit court commissioner.  § 813.122(2) and (6)(a).  A judge 
may grant the injunction "if . . . [a]fter [a] hearing, the 
judge finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent 
has engaged in, or based upon prior conduct of the child victim 
and the respondent may engage in, abuse of the child victim."  
§ 813.122(5)(a)3.9  
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 813.122(5)(a) provides, in full:  
A judge may grant an injunction ordering the 
respondent to avoid the child victim's residence or 
any premises temporarily occupied by the child victim 
or both, and to avoid contacting or causing any person 
other than a party's attorney to contact the child 
victim unless the petitioner consents to that contact 
in writing and the judge agrees that the contact is in 
the best interests of the child victim, if all of the 
following occur: 
1. The petitioner files a petition alleging the 
elements set forth under sub. (6)(a). 
2. The petitioner serves upon the respondent a 
copy of the petition and notice of the time for 
hearing on the issuance of the injunction, or the 
respondent serves upon the petitioner notice of the 
time for hearing on the issuance of the injunction. 
3. After hearing, the judge finds reasonable 
grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in, 
or based upon prior conduct of the child victim and 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
14 
 
 
¶24 For purposes of Wis. Stat. § 813.122, the word "abuse" 
has the meaning given in the Children's Code, Chapter 48 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  Wis. Stat. § 813.122(1)(a).  "Abuse" as 
defined by Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1)(a) includes "[p]hysical injury 
inflicted on a child by other than accidental means."10  Chapter 
48 defines "physical injury" as "includ[ing] but  . . .  not 
limited 
to 
lacerations, 
fractured 
bones, 
burns, 
internal 
injuries, severe or frequent bruising or great bodily harm, as 
defined in s. 939.22(14)."  § 48.02(14g).  The Children's Code 
contains a statement of legislative purpose which directs that 
Chapter 48 "shall be liberally construed to effectuate the 
following express legislative purposes," which include "[t]o 
recognize that children have certain basic needs which must be 
provided 
for, 
including . . . the 
need 
to 
be 
free 
from 
physical . . . injury."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(ag). 
¶25 Dennis contends that reasonable grounds did not exist 
to support the circuit court's order granting the motion for an 
injunction because the bruises on J.K.M.'s head were not, as a 
matter of law, "severe bruis[es]" constituting "abuse" under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1) and (14g).  Dennis argues the court of 
appeals, 
in 
affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
injunction, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the respondent may engage in, abuse of the child 
victim. 
10 Other forms of abuse defined in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1)(a)-
(gm) are not pertinent to this matter and will not be described 
here. 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
15 
 
erroneously construed "severe bruising" to include any bruise, 
no matter its severity.  
¶26 Kristi responds that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion because the bruises were "severe," 
constituting abuse under Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1) and (14g), taking 
into account that the bruises were to the child's head, the 
child's age and vulnerability, and the manner in which the 
bruises were caused.  Likewise, amicus Dodge County Corporation 
Counsel contends that the question of whether a bruise is 
"severe" for purposes of the child abuse injunction statute 
should not be limited to the appearance of the bruise, but may 
include the location of the bruising, the child's stage of 
development, and the means by which the alleged abuser caused 
the bruise.    
¶27 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
record 
demonstrates 
that 
reasonable grounds existed to justify the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion in granting the injunction as to J.K.M. 
on its reasonable belief that Dennis either engaged in abuse or 
may engage in abuse of J.K.M. based on Dennis's prior conduct, 
including but not limited to the severity of J.K.M.'s bruising.  
¶28 Our analysis of the circuit court's decision begins 
with 
the 
court's 
factual 
findings 
and 
credibility 
determinations.  See M.Q., 152 Wis. 2d at 708.  Judge Callaway's 
oral ruling indicates he found Kristi to be a more credible 
witness than Dennis.  The judge disbelieved Dennis's testimony 
that he called Kristi about the murder-suicide in Montello "just 
to see if [Kristi] had heard about it."  The judge concluded:  
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
16 
 
"I see no reason why [Dennis] would call his wife and ask her 
if——have you heard about the fellow in Montello that killed his 
child and himself.  There's no reason to bring that up."   
¶29 The judge was skeptical of Dennis's explanation for 
the cause of J.K.M.'s bruises, stating that the bruises were 
"really 
not 
consistent 
with 
hitting 
your 
head 
against 
something."  This statement also indicates the judge believed 
Dr. Greenbaum's testimony about the suspicious nature of the 
bruising and gave her testimony significant weight.  See Adams 
Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶27, 
294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 ("The weight and credibility to 
be given to the opinions of expert witnesses is 'uniquely within 
the province of the fact finder.'") (citation omitted).  Dr. 
Greenbaum testified that the bruises to J.K.M.'s head were 
suspicious for abuse because they were inconsistent with the 
bruising one would normally see on an 11-month–old child.  She 
noted that a child of that age is a "pre-cruiser" who  
can't get themselves into trouble, can't generate that 
much force and can't move fast.  Once in a while you 
see one bruise or perhaps two but to see four . . . is 
somewhat unusual and it's very unusual to see them 
clustered in one area over the scalp with absolutely 
no explanation from the caretaker.  
I asked the mother about [J.K.M. falling against] the 
entertainment center. . . .  I would expect that the 
child is – would have to either be crawling into it or 
standing and then fall and bump against it, either, 
which it's a very minor trauma, very low velocity.  At 
most, I would expect to see a single bruise, probably 
on the forehead. . . .  Certainly you wouldn't expect 
to see a cluster of three individual bruises. . . . 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
17 
 
Dr. Greenbaum testified that the bruises were consistent with 
markings caused by fingers or knuckles pressing on the child's 
skull.  
¶30 We must determine whether, on these factual findings 
and credibility determinations of the circuit court, reasonable 
grounds exist to conclude that the bruises to J.K.M. were 
"severe" 
constituting 
abuse 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1) and (14g).  We note that the photographic 
evidence contained in the record (the same photographs upon 
which Dr. Greenbaum based her opinion) does not show a high 
degree of discoloration or other visual indicators that the 
bruising 
was 
"severe." 
 
We 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
the 
appearance of the bruising alone does not provide a sufficient 
basis on which to conclude that the bruising was "severe" 
constituting 
"abuse" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
relevant 
statutes.   
¶31 Nevertheless, Kristi and amicus contend that the 
circumstances surrounding the bruise are also relevant to 
whether bruising may be "severe" for purposes of the child abuse 
injunction statute.  The meaning and scope of the phrase "severe 
bruising" is a matter of statutory interpretation subject to our 
independent review.   Landwehr v. Landwehr, 2006 WI 64, ¶9, 291 
Wis. 2d 49, 715 N.W.2d 180. 
¶32 Bruising is the only category of injury enumerated in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(14g) that must be "severe" or "frequent" to 
constitute abuse.  See § 48.02(14g).  The Children's Code does 
not define what may constitute "severe bruising."   
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
18 
 
¶33 We 
conclude 
that 
an 
interpretation 
of 
"severe 
bruising" that includes consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding the physical injury is reasonable and is consistent 
with the legislature's directive to "liberally construe" Chapter 
48 to effectuate its legislative purposes, which include 
"recogniz[ing] that children have [a] . . . basic need to be 
free from physical . . . injury."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(ag).   
¶34 We further conclude on the factual findings of the 
circuit court that J.K.M.'s bruises were "severe" based on the 
combination of the following factors:  (1) the sensitive 
location of the bruising, on the child's skull; (2) the 
vulnerability of a child of J.K.M.'s age; and (3) the means by 
which the court determined the bruises were created, by an adult 
hand pressing on the child's skull.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the bruising to J.K.M.'s head was "severe bruising" 
constituting "abuse" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1) 
and (14g) and providing reasonable grounds for the circuit 
court's injunction order. 
¶35 In addition to the evidence of bruising, Judge 
Callaway explained that he was also "concerned about the 
cumulative aspect of the evidence."  We agree that the 
"cumulative aspect" of a variety of evidence regarding Dennis's 
past conduct provides reasonable grounds to conclude that Dennis 
may engage in abuse of J.K.M.  Dennis admitted calling to tell 
Kristi about the Montello man who killed himself and his son.  
As noted, the circuit court found incredible Dennis's testimony 
that he called just to find out if she had heard about the 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
19 
 
story.  Kristi's testimony indicated Dennis became "very quiet" 
when he told her about it and that he "started crying."         
¶36 Dr. Haight, Dennis's psychologist, testified about 
Dennis's past struggles with suicidal thoughts and the increased 
risk of harm Dennis would pose to himself and others if he were 
to go off of his medication.  Dennis testified that, before 
December 2004, he took his medication only "sporadically," and 
that he would "take [himself] off the medicine" if he started to 
"feel 
good." 
 
Significantly, 
Dennis 
told 
the 
court 
he 
"[couldn't] answer" whether he might take himself off his 
medication again in the future.11   
¶37 Kristi testified that J.M. said Dennis had told him 
that the entire family was "going to die."  Kristi also 
testified that Dennis said he considered hanging himself in the 
basement laundry while he was supervising J.M. and J.K.M.   
¶38 Dennis denied that these events occurred, and Judge 
Callaway did not make explicit findings with regard to these 
allegations.  However, some of Judge Callaway's explicit 
findings indicate that he found Kristi to be a more credible 
                                                 
11 The fact that Dennis has been prescribed medication is 
not relevant to whether reasonable grounds exist for a child 
abuse injunction.  Many persons are prescribed medication to 
address mental health issues, and this reality has no bearing on 
whether they are a threat to engage in abuse of their children.  
What is relevant to the grounds for an injunction in this case 
is Dennis's demonstrated history of "taking himself off" of 
prescribed medication; his near admission that he might do so in 
the future; and expert testimony of his psychologist that, 
without the medication, he would be more likely to harm himself 
and others. 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
20 
 
witness than Dennis.  Kristi's testimony regarding these matters 
therefore supports the circuit court's exercise of discretion, 
although we ascribe less significance to this testimony than to 
the court's explicit findings.  See State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 
91, ¶53, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606 (an appellate court may 
independently review the record to ascertain a reasonable basis 
for a trial court's discretionary decision). 
¶39 We agree with Judge Callaway's observation that this 
is a close case.  And although no such allegation has been made 
in this case, we share Judge Dykman's concerns about child abuse 
injunctions being brought on questionable evidence to gain an 
advantage in subsequent custody proceedings.  However, we 
conclude that the evidence as found by the circuit court in this 
case provided a sufficient basis to grant the motion for an 
injunction on the grounds that Dennis engaged in abuse and may 
engage in abuse of J.K.M. under Wis. Stat. § 813.122(5)(a)3.  We 
therefore affirm the circuit court's injunction order as a 
proper exercise of its discretion.   
IV 
¶40 In summary, we conclude that the circuit court acted 
within its discretion in issuing the injunction as to J.K.M. 
because Dennis's prior conduct, including the bruising of 
J.K.M., gave the circuit court reasonable grounds to believe 
that Dennis engaged in abuse and may engage in abuse of J.K.M.  
We therefore affirm the summary order of the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2005AP1034   
 
 
 
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