Title: J. H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP003452-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2000

2000 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3452-W 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. J. H. Findorff  
& Son, Inc.,  
 
Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the 
Honorable Patrick T. Sheedy, presiding, John 
Trenhaile (d/b/a) Trenko Electric, Inc., St. 
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cite) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 6, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick Sheedy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J. concurs (opinion filed);  
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins BRADLEY concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-petitioner there were briefs 
by Michael B. Van Sicklen, Michael S. Heffernan and Foley & 
Lardner, Madison, and oral argument by Michael B. Van Sicklen. 
 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by James 
 
H. McDermott, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing     
      and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3452-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. J. H. Findorff  
& Son, Inc.,  
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the  
Honorable Patrick T. Sheedy, presiding,  
John Trenhaile (d/b/a), Trenko Electric,  
Inc., St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance  
Company and Milwaukee Metropolitan  
Sewerage District,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. 
(Findorff), the petitioner, seeks review of an unpublished court 
of appeals decision,1 which ruled against Findorff on its request 
for substitution, after remand from an appeal in an earlier 
action. 
¶2 
In the earlier action, the court of appeals reversed 
and remanded a circuit court decision against Findorff relating 
                     
1 State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. March 5, 
1999).  
FILED 
 
APR 06, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark, Acting  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
2 
to breach of contract during a construction project.  Findorff 
requested a judicial substitution on remand.  Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court Judge William J. Haese, the judge assigned in this 
action, granted the substitution request, but Chief Judge 
Patrick T. Sheedy denied the request upon review.  Findorff then 
petitioned the court of appeals for a supervisory writ of 
mandamus.  The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the 
court of appeals’ original directives on remand required 
“specific action,” and therefore, the right of substitution did 
not attach.   
¶3 
We conclude that the directives on remand in the 
original action required "further proceedings" to which the 
right of substitution does attach.  The directives were for 
"further proceedings" because they required the circuit court to 
exercise its discretion, instead of merely discharging a 
ministerial duty.  We also conclude that the chief judge was 
without authority to review and reverse the circuit court 
judge’s 
decision 
granting 
Findorff's 
substitution 
request.  
Under both the Wisconsin statutes and the Supreme Court Rules, a 
chief judge may only review orders denying substitution, not 
those granting a substitution request.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the court of appeals' decision and grant the petition for 
supervisory writ. 
I. 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
3 
¶4 
The facts in this case are not disputed.  John 
Trenhaile, doing business as Trenko Electric, Inc. (Trenko),2 
worked as an electrical subcontractor for Findorff, the general 
contractor in a large sewer construction project.  After Trenko 
completed most of its work on the project, three of Trenko's 
unsecured 
creditors 
petitioned 
to 
have 
Trenko 
placed 
in 
involuntary bankruptcy.  Two months later, Trenko halted its 
work, forcing Findorff to hire another electrical contractor and 
subcontractor to finish the project.  Trenko then brought an 
action against Findorff, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage 
District (MMSD), and Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company, Findorff's surety, as the bankruptcy assignee.  Trenko 
made claims against Findorff, inter alia, for breach of 
contract, 
restitution, 
and 
unjust 
enrichment. 
 
Findorff 
counterclaimed 
that 
Trenko 
breached 
the 
contract 
by 
not 
finishing its work. 
¶5 
The case was tried in a bench trial before the 
Honorable William J. Haese of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court.  The circuit court found that Trenko lost profits 
resulting from a breach of contract.  He awarded Trenko 
approximately $350,000.00 in damages against Findorff, but 
reduced the damage award by 50% for contributory fault.  Trenko 
further recovered $5,000.00 from Findorff under a theory of 
unjust enrichment.  The circuit court also denied Findorff’s 
                     
2 John Trenhaile did not file a brief in this case, but 
joined the position and arguments of the Respondent, the city of 
Milwaukee.    
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
4 
claim for offsets and dismissed the Saint Paul Fire and Marine 
Insurance Company from the lawsuit. 
¶6 
Findorff appealed, and Trenko cross-appealed from the 
judgment.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s 
judgment.  Findorff v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 
unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. September 16, 1997).  It found 
that the circuit court had not made factual findings to entitle 
Trenko to recovery for future lost profits, had used incorrect 
damage figures, and had failed to explain why it dismissed 
Findorff’s surety or denied Findorff’s offsets.  Slip op. at 2-
3.  The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court 
with directives stating: 
 
On remand, the trial court shall:  (1) make detailed 
factual findings and determine whether the facts 
support 
an 
award 
of 
consequential 
damages, 
foreseeability and reasonable certainty; (2) either 
utilize the damage figures introduced into evidence or 
make specific findings and conclusions as to why 
another damage figure is being used; (3) reinstate the 
surety, Saint Paul, and determine what damage, if any, 
the surety must pay; and (4) determine whether and on 
what legal basis Findorff’s offsets and defenses 
should be denied.  Finally, the trial court should 
determine any damage amounts without resorting to tort 
principles. 
Slip op. at 13. 
¶7 
Upon remand, Findorff moved to substitute Judge Haese 
under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7)(1995-96).3  Judge Haese granted the 
request, and the case was temporarily reassigned to Judge Lee E. 
                     
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 text unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
5 
Wells.4  However, after a hearing on the substitution request 
conducted by telephone conference on November 7, 1997, the chief 
judge denied the substitution and reassigned the case to Judge 
Haese.  The chief judge noted that Judge Wells took over Judge 
Haese's calendar on rotation when Judge Haese transferred to the 
family division.  He stated that he was reassigning the case to 
Judge Haese because Judge Wells had objected to being assigned a 
case on remand, and "that to assign this to Judge Wells, I am 
basically ordering a completely new trial."  (Pet. App. at 148.) 
 He concluded that the right of substitution did not attach 
since the court of appeals gave directives that were "very 
specific" and did not call for a new trial. 
                     
4 The Clerk of the Circuit Court issued a notice on October 
24, 1997, that the case had been rotated to Judge Wells.  (Pet. 
App. at 137.)  However, on October 27, the Clerk sent another 
notice stating that the file had been returned to Judge Haese 
"per the Court of Appeals [sic] remand."  (Pet. App. at 138.)   
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
6 
¶8 
Findorff then filed a Petition for Supervisory Relief5 
with the court of appeals.  In the petition Findorff requested 
that the court of appeals order the circuit court to grant the 
substitution request.  On November 20, 1997, Judge Haese first 
informed the parties that he had originally granted the 
substitution request.  (Pet. App. at 166.)  Until that moment, 
the parties believed that Judge Wells had been assigned the case 
on rotation.  On that basis, Findorff filed a supplement to its 
petition arguing that a chief judge may only review substitution 
in a case in which a circuit court judge already has denied a 
substitution request.  Findorff therefore claimed that Judge 
Sheedy erred by returning the case to Judge Haese.  Judge Haese 
ordered that "further proceedings" be stayed pending resolution 
of the substitution issue. 
                     
5 This petition for supervisory writ could be characterized 
as one asking for a writ of mandamus.  A writ of mandamus is a 
type of supervisory writ.  Eau Claire Leader-Telegram v. 
Barrett, 146 Wis. 2d 647, 651, 431 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1988).  
"Mandamus is a writ that grants a higher court supervisory 
authority to compel a private or municipal corporation or an 
inferior court to perform a particular act."  Id. at 650 (citing 
 Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 129, 135, 260 
N.W.2d 
36, 
38-39 
(1977)). 
 
Petitions 
simply 
requesting 
"supervisory" relief recognize the similarity in substance 
between a 
writ of mandamus 
and 
a 
writ 
of 
prohibition.  
Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin, § 10.2 
(2d. ed. 1995)(citing Petition of Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., 
143 Wis. 282, 285, 127 N.W. 998, 999 (1910).  In fact, a 
supervisory writ is a combination of the writs of mandamus and 
prohibition.  State ex rel. Dressler v. Racine County Cir. Ct., 
163 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.51 provides the grounds for petitioning and 
granting a supervisory writ.  Wisconsin Ch. 783 provides for 
writs of mandamus and prohibition.  
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
7 
¶9 
The court of appeals denied the petition on March 5, 
1999.  It first concluded that Findorff’s substitution request 
was timely because it was filed within twenty days after the 
clerk of the circuit court received the court of appeals’ 
remittitur, and it “clearly sought judicial substitution.”  Slip 
op. at 4.   
¶10 It then held that according to Cuccio v. Rusilowski, 
171 Wis. 2d 648, 492 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1992), the right of 
substitution did not attach in this case.  "[T]he right to 
substitution exists when the remand is for a new trial or for 
proceedings other than specific action," it noted.  Slip op. at 
4.  Rusilowski states that a mandate that does not require 
further development of the record is a mandate for "specific 
action."  Slip op. at 4-5 (citing Rusilowski, 171 Wis. 2d at 
654, 492 N.W.2d at 348).  Based on this reasoning, the court of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
directives 
at 
issue 
required 
“specific action” because “no new facts need be garnered, no 
added record need be made; rather, the trial court is left with 
the same record and need not add to it.”  Slip op. at 5.  
Therefore, it held that the right of substitution does not exist 
here.  Slip op. at 5. 
II. 
¶11 In this case we must determine whether to grant 
Findorff’s petition for a supervisory writ.  A petition for a 
supervisory writ is granted only if an appeal does not offer an 
adequate remedy, grave hardship will result from a circuit 
court's actions, and a party makes a prompt request for relief. 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
8 
 State ex rel. Oman v. Hunkins, 120 Wis. 2d 86, 91, 352 N.W.2d 
220 (Ct. App. 1984). 
¶12 The first issue we address in determining whether to 
grant the writ is what constitutes a remand for “further 
proceedings” pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), entitling the 
parties in a case to substitution of a judge.  This issue 
presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review 
de novo.  Cemetery Serv., Inc. v. Department of Reg. & Licens., 
221 Wis. 2d 817, 823, 568 N.W.2d 191 (1998). 
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58(7)6 “creates an unqualified 
right to substitution when further trial court proceedings are 
necessary after remand from an appellate court.”  Oman, 120 
Wis. 2d at 91.  It provides: 
 
If upon an appeal from a judgment or order or upon a 
writ of error the appellate court orders a new trial 
or reverses or modifies the judgment or order as to 
any or all of the parties in a manner such that 
further proceedings in the trial court are necessary, 
any party may file a request under sub. (1) [for 
substitution of judge] within 20 days after the filing 
of the remittitur in the trial court whether or not 
another request was filed prior to the time the appeal 
or writ of error was taken. 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7).    
¶14 Following remand and remittitur, a circuit court may 
conduct three types of proceedings: 1) a proceeding in which a 
circuit 
court 
takes 
"specific 
action" 
as 
ordered; 
2) 
a 
proceeding in which a circuit court conducts a new trial; or 3) 
                     
6 The enactment and subsequent amendments of this statute by 
the legislature and the Supreme Court Rules exemplify the shared 
powers of the legislature and this court.  Wis. Stat. § 801.58.  
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
9 
any further proceedings other than those mentioned above.  Wis. 
Stat. § 808.08(1)-(3).7 
¶15 These two statutes have been read together to provide 
that no right of substitution exists if a mandate only requires 
a circuit court to take "specific action" in accordance with 
Wis. Stat. § 808.08(1).  Rusilowski, 171 Wis. 2d at 653.  See 
also State ex rel. Ondrasek v. Circuit Court for Calumet County, 
133 Wis. 2d 177, 182-83, 394 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1986).  If a 
mandate calls for "further proceedings" as contemplated by 
§ 808.08(3), the parties have a right to substitution upon 
request.  Id.  The significant question in this case therefore 
pertains to the difference in definition between a "specific 
action" and "further proceedings." 
                     
7 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 808.08(1)-(3) states: 
Further proceedings in trial court.  When the record 
and remittitur are received in the trial court: 
(1) If the trial judge is ordered to take specific 
action, the judge shall do so as soon as 
possible. 
(2) If a new trial is ordered, the trial court, upon 
receipt of the remitted record shall place the 
matter on the trial calendar. 
(3) If 
action 
or 
proceedings 
other 
than 
those 
mentioned in sub. (1) or (2) is ordered, any 
party may, within one year after receipt of the 
remitted record by the clerk of the trial court, 
make appropriate motion for further proceedings. 
 If further proceedings are not so initiated, the 
action 
shall 
be 
dismissed 
except 
that 
an 
extension of the one-year period may be granted, 
on notice, by the trial court, if the order for 
extension is entered during the one-year period. 
  
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
10
¶16 The two most recent court of appeals cases addressing 
this issue appear to conflict because they define "further 
proceedings" differently.  In Ondrasek, the court of appeals 
defined "further proceedings" by examining the definition of 
"specific action."  The court stated that "the use of the word 
'specific' contemplates something more precise and definite" 
than the use of the phrase "further proceedings."  Ondrasek, 133 
Wis. 2d at 183.  It concluded that its remand in the Ondrasek 
case did not direct any "specific action" because the directives 
pertained to property division and family support in a divorce 
action.  Id.  The court aptly stated that "recognizing the 
discretion accorded to trial courts in matters concerning 
property division and family support, a specific directive would 
have been wholly inappropriate."  Id. (emphasis added).  From 
this statement it appears that the court differentiated between 
"specific action" and "further proceedings" by examining whether 
a circuit court is able to exercise discretion after a remand.  
The court also noted that Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3), relating to 
"further proceedings," "is written in 'catch-all' terms."  Id. 
at 183.  The court held by implication that the right of 
substitution would not attach to a mandate only requiring 
"specific action" by a circuit court.  See id. at 184 n.3. 
¶17 In Rusilowski, a later case, the court of appeals 
characterized the remand at issue in Ondrasek as one that 
"required the trial court to add to the record and make further 
fact-finding after revaluing and recalculating."  Rusilowski, 
171 Wis. 2d at 653-54.  By this the court implied that if a 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
11
circuit court must add to the record and make further fact-
finding, then it is engaged in "further proceedings" and is 
subject to substitution.  The court held that the directives on 
remand at issue in Rusilowski required "specific action" 
"[b]ecause this mandate did not order extensive action on the 
part of the probate court . . . . No new facts need be garnered; 
no added record need be made.  Rather, the trial court is left 
with the same record and need not add to it."  Id. at 654. 
¶18 Judge Snyder dissented from the majority in Rusilowski 
for three reasons.  Judge Snyder believed that the mandate in 
the original appeal "was sufficiently open-ended to justify the 
trial court's honoring the substitution request."  Rusilowski, 
171 Wis. 2d at 655 (Snyder, J., dissenting).  He also criticized 
the majority's interpretation of Ondrasek as "inferential" and 
"unnecessarily limit[ing] the discretion vested in the circuit 
court upon remand."8  Id.  Finally, he concluded that Rusilowski 
is distinguishable from Ondrasek on its facts. 
                     
8 The concurrence authored by Justice Bradley alleges that 
the Rusilowski dissent focused on the above-stated issue, and 
argues that the "dissent did not hinge its determination on 
whether a ‘specific action’ for substitution purposes was the 
equivalent of a governmental ministerial duty."  Concurrence 
authored by Justice Bradley at ¶¶ 50-54.  We again draw the 
reader's attention, as we do in ¶ 19, to the dissent's precise 
language:  "I believe that the mandate from the appellate court 
must unequivocally restrict the action to be taken on remand to 
the purely ministerial; if the remand leaves any room for doubt 
about the scope, then the trial judge has discretion to act 
within the boundaries circumscribed by that remand."  Cuccio v. 
Rusilowski, 171 Wis. 2d 648, 656, 492 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 
1992)(Snyder, J., dissenting).  We find this language to 
establish clearly that the dissent did indeed equate a specific 
action with a ministerial duty. 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
12
¶19 In his dissent, Judge Snyder explained the difference 
between "specific action" and "further proceedings" by examining 
the nature of a circuit court's discretion on remand.  Judge 
Snyder first examined Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 
478, 483-84, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957), which stands for the 
proposition that a circuit court must abide by the directives 
stated in a mandate, but may resolve any issues left unanswered 
by the decision.  He stated: 
 
Because Fullerton allows a trial court some leeway to 
act, even where the appellate court 'directs the entry 
of a particular judgment,' id., I believe that the 
mandate from the appellate court must unequivocally 
restrict the action to be taken on remand to the 
purely ministerial; if the remand leaves any room for 
doubt about the scope, then the trial judge has 
discretion to act within the boundaries circumscribed 
by that remand. 
Rusilowski, 171 Wis. 2d at 656 (citing Fullerton, 274 Wis. at 
483-84).  He therefore appeared to define "specific action" as 
"purely ministerial," and to draw the line between "specific 
action" and "further proceedings" at the point where a circuit 
court has any discretion to act.    
¶20 We agree with the court in Ondrasek and the Rusilowski 
dissent that the distinction between a "specific action" and 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
13
"further proceedings" lies with a judge's discretion on remand.9 
 This decision resolves the conflict that existed between 
Ondrasek and Rusilowski.  We narrowly define a "specific action" 
as a purely ministerial duty.  In other words, a ministerial 
duty is an action that requires no exercise of discretion on the 
circuit court's part.10  We find the definition of a public 
officer’s ministerial duties useful in this context also.  
Ministerial duties are those that are “absolute, certain and 
                     
9 Although we hold today that a circuit court must 
distinguish between "specific action" and "further proceedings" 
by examining whether directives require the circuit court to 
exercise discretion, we recognize that the court of appeals 
could indeed state in its mandate that it anticipates further 
proceedings on remand, or that only the specific action, as 
outlined, is required.  The concurrence authored by Justice 
Bradley suggests that this could be done in each and every case 
upon remand by this court and by the court of appeals.  
Concurrence authored by Justice Bradley at ¶ 65.  Our decision 
certainly does not prohibit such an approach. 
It is difficult to understand why the concurrences authored 
by Justice Wilcox and Justice Bradley engage throughout in dire 
predictions.  The right to substitution in a civil case where, 
upon remand, further proceedings are necessary is not a blow to 
efficient judicial administration.  Rather, it should be 
recognized that the distinction adopted herein is consistent 
with Wisconsin's long history of honoring substitution requests 
in civil cases, and will not, we believe, result in a 
significant increase in the number of substitution requests.  
10 The following are examples of ministerial duties a 
circuit court may encounter on remand: 1) a remand with 
instructions 
to 
dismiss 
a 
complaint, 
cross-claim, 
or 
counterclaim; 2) a remand requiring a remittitur, or requiring a 
circuit court to remand to an administrative agency; 3) a remand 
with instructions to impose statutory costs; 4) a remand with 
instructions to impose statutory attorney's fees; or 5) a remand 
with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with a prior 
jury verdict.  
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
14
imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task 
when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion.”  Lister v. Board of 
Regents, 73 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). 
¶21 If 
a 
circuit 
court 
may 
exercise 
discretion 
in 
discharging its duties on remand, however, then those duties 
comprise "further proceedings."11  While the subject was one of 
sentencing discretion, the following statement by this court is 
helpful in understanding the term "discretion":  "Discretion is 
not 
synonymous 
with 
decision-making. 
 
Rather, 
the 
term 
contemplates a process of reasoning.  This process must depend 
on facts that are of record or that are reasonably derived by 
inference from the record and a conclusion based on a logical 
rationale founded upon proper legal standards."  McCleary v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)(describing 
sentencing as a discretionary judicial act).  
¶22 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 801.58 supports the 
distinction we draw between "specific action" and "further 
proceedings."  Sections 801.58(1) and (7) do not place any 
                     
11 We disagree with the state that whether additional fact-
finding is required is the key to defining further proceedings. 
 (Resp. Br. at 21-22.)  If a judge must conduct further fact-
finding, that fact-finding will often require an exercise of 
discretion.  However, that may not always be the case.  A judge 
may allow additions to the record without then exercising 
discretion, or conversely, he or she may exercise discretion 
without needing to add any more facts to the record.  
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
15
conditions on filing except timeliness.12  That a party may 
request substitution for any reason demonstrates the statute's 
wide purview and suggests that § 801.58(7) should be liberally 
construed 
to 
permit 
substitutions. 
By 
defining 
"further 
proceedings" broadly, we are therefore consistent with the plain 
language of § 801.58(7). 
¶23 This distinction also is consistent with our notion of 
a fair trial.  The United States Supreme Court has articulated 
the importance of a fair trial by stating: 
 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 
of due process.  Fairness of course requires an 
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.  But our 
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even 
the probability of unfairness.  To this end no man can 
                     
12 Under Wis. Stat. § 801.58, a party does not need to file 
an affidavit of prejudice, or state that a belief that a judge 
will not conduct a fair trial.  Grenig & Harvey, 3 Wisconsin 
Practice, § 158.1, p. 173 (1994)(citing Seaburg, The Civil 
Peremptory Substitution Statute, 59 Wis. Bar Bull. 8, 9 (Jan. 
1986)).   
We also note that In the Matter of the Civil Contempt of 
Kroll, 101 Wis. 2d 296, 304 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1981), does not 
pertain to this case.  In Kroll, the circuit court ordered Kroll 
not to withdraw funds from a certain bank account.  Id. at 299. 
 When the court learned that Kroll had withdrawn those funds, it 
ordered Kroll to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt for disobeying the order.  Id.  Kroll petitioned the 
court of appeals for a supervisory writ to dismiss the order to 
show cause.  Id.  The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.58(7) was inapplicable to the case and granted the 
requested assignment.  Id. at 305.  The court of appeals' 
statement that § 801.58(7) "does not apply to petitions in the 
nature of supervisory writs," id. at 304, only concerns the 
facts of that case where the petition for supervisory writ came 
before the appeal on the merits.  In this case, the petition for 
supervisory 
writ 
came 
after 
the 
appeal 
and 
remand, 
and 
therefore, § 801.58(7) does apply. 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
16
be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to 
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.  
That 
interest 
cannot 
be 
defined 
with 
precision.  
Circumstances and relationships must be considered . . 
. . Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by 
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their 
very best to weigh the scales of justice equally 
between contending parties.  But to perform its high 
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.'   
In the Matters of Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)(citations 
omitted).  The Supreme Court and this court have both recognized 
that to ensure fairness, not only must actual bias be absent 
from a case, but the appearance of bias.  State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 46, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  See also State ex rel. 
Mitchell v. Bowman, 54 Wis. 2d 5, 7, 194 N.W.2d 297 (1972).  
When a case is reversed and remanded to a circuit court, no 
actual bias may exist toward either party on the part of the 
circuit court judge who presided over the initial case.  
However, to avoid the appearance or threat of bias, § 801.58(7) 
ensures that any party may request a substitution for any 
reason.13  Defining "further proceedings" to encompass any 
proceeding in which a judge will exercise discretion guarantees 
that the right of substitution may attach to the greatest number 
of cases.  By this definition we intend to uphold a party's 
right to a fair disposition of its case. 
¶24 Moreover, the history of the unqualified right to 
substitution in Wisconsin supports the distinction we draw 
                     
13 A judge's potential bias after a case has been reversed 
and remanded was recognized in Disqualification of Judges for 
Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1452 (1966).  
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
17
between "specific action" and "further proceedings."14  Wisconsin 
has a long heritage of upholding the right to substitution.  The 
peremptory substitution statutes, Wis. Stat. § 801.58 being but 
one example, were preceded by the affidavit of prejudice 
statutes.  Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 49, 55.  The first statute 
permitting substitution on the basis of an affidavit without 
proof of prejudice and without a factual determination of 
prejudice was enacted in 1853.  Id. at 49.  The legislative 
objective of the peremptory substitution statutes "is the same 
as that of the earlier affidavit of prejudice statutes, namely, 
to ensure the right to a fair trial by permitting parties to 
strike a judge who is prejudiced or gives the appearance of 
being prejudiced."  Id. at 55 (discussing Wis. Stat. § 971.20, 
                     
14 If there is an increase in the number of substitution 
requests 
after 
remand, 
it 
is 
more 
appropriate 
for 
the 
legislature, rather than this court, to act.  The legislative 
history of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) supports our position.  Even 
though § 801.58 resulted from the exercise of shared powers of 
the legislature and this court, subsection (7) was actually 
created by an assembly amendment to 1975 Senate Bill 769, and 
was therefore included in 1977 Wisconsin Chapter 135.  A letter 
by Richard Malmgren to the members of the Judicial Council 
states that "the 1977-78 session of the Wisconsin Legislature 
without any involvement by the Judicial Council adopted language 
allowing a party who achieved reversal of a trial court decision 
by an appellate court to request a substitution of a new judge 
for the retrial of the matter."  Judicial Council Memorandum, 
March 8, 1979 (citing § 801.58(7)).  As such, we invite the 
legislature, if it becomes necessary, to revise this provision, 
in order to restrict the right to substitute a judge on remand 
where "further proceedings" are required.   
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
18
the 
right 
of 
substitution 
in 
a 
criminal 
case).15 
 
The 
legislature's 
intent 
to 
create 
an 
unqualified 
right 
to 
substitution 
is 
represented 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.58(7).  
Ondrasek, 133 Wis. 2d at 184; State ex rel. Oman, 120 Wis. 2d at 
91.   
¶25 Finally, 
our 
decision 
today 
comports 
with 
the 
traditional view that a circuit court often has some discretion 
on remand to resolve matters not addressed by a mandate in a 
manner consistent with that mandate.16  Fullerton, 274 Wis. at 
483.  In Fullerton, this court specifically stated that: 
 
Where a mandate directs the entry of a particular 
judgment, it is the duty of the trial court to proceed 
as directed.  The trial court may, however, determine 
any matters left open, and in the absence of specific 
directions, 
is 
generally 
vested 
with 
a 
legal 
discretion to take such action, not inconsistent with 
the order of the upper court, as seems wise and proper 
under the circumstances. 
                     
15 The right to substitution in civil cases has not been as 
controversial as the right in criminal cases, especially in 
felony actions.  A number of bills have been introduced in the 
legislature in an attempt to curb the unqualified right to 
substitution in criminal cases.  See e.g., 1999 Assembly Bill 
201 as amended by Assembly Amendment 1. 
16 The Respondent argues that Fullerton is inapplicable on 
the facts because it deals with a situation where "specific 
action" is mandated, but some matters are left "'open.'"  (Resp. 
Br. at 19)(citing Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 
483, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957)).  That scenario, the Respondent 
contends, is not present in this case.  While we agree with the 
Respondent on this point, we still cite this case for the 
general proposition that a circuit court is often vested with 
some discretion on remand.  Fullerton, 274 Wis. at 483. 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
19
Id.  "Specific action" is limited to purely ministerial duties 
to reflect this court's preference for providing a circuit court 
with discretion on remand. 
¶26 We now examine the mandate at issue in this case.  The 
Respondent contends that all five directives were for "specific 
action" only.  (Resp. Br. at 11-15.)  We disagree.  The court of 
appeals directed the circuit court to undertake "further 
proceedings," as we have defined that term.  The circuit court 
is to make factual findings and various determinations that 
generally involve a judge's exercise of discretionan evaluation 
of the facts. 
¶27 The first directive requires the circuit court to 
"make detailed factual findings and determine whether the facts 
support an award . . . ."  Findorff, slip op. at 13.  This 
directive requires the circuit court to use discretion because 
the court must make an evaluation.  The directive does not 
merely order the court to enter an award of damages; the court 
must ascertain whether damages are necessary. 
¶28 The second directive requires the court to "either 
utilize the damage figures introduced into evidence or make 
specific findings and conclusions as to why another damage 
figure is being used."  Slip op. at 13.  Again, this directive 
forces the court to make a choice, which calls for the court's 
exercise of discretion. 
¶29 The third directive commands the court to "reinstate 
the surety, Saint Paul, and determine what damage, if any, the 
surety must pay."  Slip op. at 13.  In this directive, the court 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
20
is to choose if St. Paul must pay any damages as surety.  This 
too is clearly an evaluative process. 
¶30 The fourth directive requires the court to "determine 
whether and on what legal basis Findorff's offsets and defenses 
should be denied."  Slip op. at 13.  Because the court must make 
a choice, discretion is similarly involved. 
¶31 Finally, the fifth directive requires the circuit 
court to "determine any damage amounts without resorting to tort 
principles."  Slip op. at 13.  This too requires the exercise of 
discretion because the court must evaluate how to determine the 
damage amount, a task that is not always straightforward.  We 
conclude that since the remand requires "further proceedings," 
the right of substitution attaches.      
¶32 The second issue we address is whether a chief judge 
has authority to review and reverse a circuit court judge's 
decision to honor a request for judicial substitution.  This 
issue similarly presents a question of statutory interpretation, 
which we will review de novo.  Cemetery Serv., 221 Wis. 2d at 
823 (reviewing a question of statutory interpretation de novo). 
¶33 The 
applicable 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.58(2), 
provides that a chief judge may only review orders denying 
substitution.  The statute states in part: 
 
When the clerk receives a request for substitution, 
the clerk shall immediately contact the judge whose 
substitution has been requested for a determination of 
whether the request was timely made and in proper 
form.  If the request is found to be timely and in 
proper form, the judge named in the request has no 
further jurisdiction and the clerk shall request the 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
21
assignment of another judge under s. 751.03.  If the 
judge named in the substitution request finds that the 
request was not timely and in proper form, that 
determination may be reviewed by the chief judge of 
the judicial administrative district . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(2).  According to the plain meaning of the 
statute, the only time that a chief judge may become involved in 
the substitution process under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(2) is if a 
circuit court judge denies a substitution request for not being 
timely or properly filed. 
 
¶34 A chief judge also lacks authority under the Supreme 
Court Rules to review a circuit court's decision to grant a 
substitution request.  Supreme Court Rules 70.19-70.265 set 
forth the duties and authority of a chief judge.  Nowhere in 
those sections is there a provision that gives a chief judge the 
right to review independently and reverse a substitution request 
once it has been granted.  Moreover, SCR 70.21(26), the rule 
that specifies a chief judge's responsibility and authority, 
expressly refers to Wis. Stat. § 801.58(2).  The Supreme Court 
Rule's reference to this statutory provision indicates that the 
statute is to guide a chief judge's review of such requests.  
See also State ex rel. James L.J. v. Walworth Cir. Ct., 200 
Wis. 2d 496, 504, 546 N.W.2d 460 (1996)(stating that "[a]lthough 
the subject of judicial substitution affects the administration 
of the 
courts, the exercise of 
the 
statutory 
right to 
substitution in any particular case raises a question of law 
rather than a question of court administration.") 
 
¶35 Here, Findorff's substitution request was timely and 
properly filed in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1), 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
22
because it was filed within twenty days of the circuit court 
clerk's receipt of the court of appeals' remittitur.  The 
request 
required 
"further 
proceedings," 
and 
Judge 
Haese 
therefore correctly granted substitution.  Since the request was 
granted, the chief judge lacked the authority to review and 
reverse it. 
III. 
¶36 We conclude that the directives on remand in this case 
required 
"further 
proceedings" 
to 
which 
the 
right 
of 
substitution does attach.  "Further proceedings" were required 
since the circuit court would necessarily have to exercise 
discretion to execute the directives.  The directives did not 
call for the completion of ministerial tasks.   
¶37 We also conclude that the chief judge was without 
authority to review and reverse the circuit court judge's 
decision to honor the substitution request.  A chief judge may 
only review and reverse orders denying substitution.  The 
conditions for granting a petition for supervisory writ have 
been met in this case.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals' decision and grant the petition for supervisory writ 
requiring substitution for the circuit court judge originally 
assigned. 
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No. 
97-3452-W 
 
 
23
 
No. 97-3452-W.ssa 
 
1 
¶38 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I agree with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence and join 
it.  The only difference in approach I have with that opinion is 
that I would require the court of appeals and this court to 
state in any decision mandating a remand whether the parties are 
entitled to seek substitution.  I do not think that the parties 
should be disputing this issue on remand or that the circuit 
court 
should 
expend 
resources 
deciding 
the 
issue 
of 
substitution.  Thus I concur. 
 
No. 97-3452-W.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶39 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).  I agree that in this 
case Findorff was entitled to substitution of judge under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.58(7) because the directions on remand required 
"further proceedings."  I write separately because, like Justice 
Bradley, I am fearful that equating "specific action" with 
purely 
ministerial 
duties 
may 
result 
in 
more 
liberal 
substitution of judges in civil actions on remand.  Wisconsin is 
one of only a handful of states in which a litigant may obtain 
peremptory 
substitution 
on 
remand 
in 
civil 
proceedings.17  
Increasing substitution of judges on remand would surely be 
detrimental to the efficient administration of Wisconsin circuit 
courts, inasmuch as nearly one half of the circuit judges sit in 
single 
judge 
counties. 
 
Because 
I 
would 
not 
interpret 
§ 801.58(7) to provide such a broad right to substitution, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶40 To begin with, I believe that Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) 
must be read in light of the fact that it is a purely 
legislative enactment that directly and substantially impacts 
the administration of Wisconsin courts.  Under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, such administrative matters are expressly vested 
                     
17 The petitioner's brief notes that very few states, 
including Wisconsin, California, Montana, and Indiana, have 
statutes that permit peremptory substitution on remand in civil 
proceedings.  Br. of Pet'r at 20-21.  Many states find it 
unnecessary 
to 
permit 
substitution 
on 
remand 
in 
civil 
proceedings in the absence of a showing of bias or prejudice.  
Id. at 20-21 and n.5. 
No. 97-3452-W.jpw 
 
2 
in this court; our authority to supervise and administer the 
Wisconsin court system is not created or circumscribed by the 
legislature.  Wis. Const. Art. VII, sec. 3; John F. Jelke Co. v. 
Beck, 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 N.W. 576 (1932).   
¶41 In considering the constitutionality of a legislative 
enactment that on its face directed this court to create the 
State Bar of Wisconsin, this court observed: 
 
Throughout the history of the state this court in 
dealing with matters which lie in the zone between the 
legislative 
and 
judicial 
departments, 
has 
always 
exercised great care to avoid any controversy with the 
legislature.  While the power to make procedural rules 
is undoubtedly a judicial power, and may be exercised 
by 
the 
court 
without 
legislative 
sanction, 
nevertheless the court over a long period of time 
accepted the procedural rules made by the legislature 
largely because they related to substantive as well as 
procedural matters. . . .  
Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 47, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943).  
Rather than reading the statute in question as a legislative 
directive to the court to consolidate the state bar, this court 
interpreted the statute as an expression of the legislature's 
belief that creating a unified state bar would be good for the 
general welfare.  Id. at 52-53.  The court explained: 
 
We do not regard the enactment [of the statute] as an 
attempt by the legislature to invade the province of 
the court or to dictate to it, but as a declaration 
that the integration of the bar will promote the 
general 
welfare. 
 
If 
in 
thus 
expressing 
its 
determination the legislature has employed language 
which might be construed as mandatory or coercive, we 
do not so regard it.  It is as much the duty of the 
legislature as it is the duty of the court to stay 
within its constitutional field and we shall presume 
that it intended to do so in this case.   
No. 97-3452-W.jpw 
 
3 
¶42 Similarly, I believe this court should view Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.58(7) as an expression of the legislature's determination 
that judicial substitution on remand for further proceedings 
would be good for the general welfare.  In the interest of 
comity between co-equal branches of government, this legislative 
determination should be given effect to the extent it is 
consistent with effective and efficient administration of the 
courts.18  However, this court has not only the authority but the 
duty to ensure that this statute does not interfere with proper 
administration of the courts.19 
                     
18 Although I believe that this court should attempt to 
accommodate Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), I wholeheartedly join the 
majority's invitation to the legislature to revise § 801.58(7). 
 See majority opinion at ¶24 n.14.  Indeed, I would encourage 
the legislature to consider repealing this provision in the 
interest of comity to this court.  See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 
2d 31, 75-76, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (Coffey, J., concurring). 
19 This court considered the constitutionality of the 
criminal peremptory substitution statute in Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 
31.  I am not convinced that Holmes adequately resolved the 
issue of whether the legislature's enactment of judicial 
substitution statutes impermissibly invades the constitutional 
authority of this court.   
 
In any case, Holmes did not involve a statute requiring 
substitution after remand.  Peremptory substitution after remand 
is even more wasteful of judicial resources than peremptory 
substitution before trial, because the trial judge who has 
already become familiar with the case is obviously best prepared 
to efficiently resolve the case on remand.  In the case at hand, 
substitution will in effect result in a new trial.   
 
Nearly identical concerns are addressed in the Bacon-Bahr 
line of cases, which hold that no right to substitution arises 
in proceedings to modify divorce judgments, even under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.58(7).  See Parrish v. Kenosha County Circuit Court, 
148 Wis. 2d 700, 703-05, 436 N.W.2d 608 (1989).   
No. 97-3452-W.jpw 
 
4 
¶43 The record in this case demonstrates that both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals were striving to give 
effect to Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) without creating an unqualified 
right to substitution of judge after remand.  Chief Judge Sheedy 
emphasized that reassigning the case to a new judge would be 
tantamount to ordering a new trial.  Because the court of 
appeals' mandate did not order a new trial but merely directed 
the court to perform certain specific tasks, the chief judge 
concluded that no right to substitution had attached. Similarly, 
the court of appeals reasoned that Findorff had no right to 
substitution because the mandate only called for reexamination 
of the existing record and application of proper legal standards 
and principles. 
¶44 I agree with the majority that the test for deciding 
whether a mandate calls for "specific action" or "further 
proceedings" does not depend only on whether new evidence must 
be added to the record.  Focusing on that single factor does not 
take into account the circuit court's great discretion to 
resolve matters on remand in any manner consistent with the 
mandate.  See majority at ¶25, discussing Fullerton Lumber Co. 
v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957).  In this case, 
for example, although the mandate does not require that facts be 
added to the record, the circuit court certainly has the 
discretion to do so.  
¶45 Although I agree with the majority that the mandate in 
this case calls for further proceedings, I agree with Justice 
Bradley that the definition of "specific action" need not be 
No. 97-3452-W.jpw 
 
5 
quite as narrow as the majority determines.  Equating "specific 
action" with purely ministerial duties means that the right to 
substitution will always attach unless the mandate requires only 
actions that are "absolute, certain and imperative, involving 
merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its 
performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 
282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976) (cited in majority opinion at   
¶ 20).   
¶46 No mandate ties the circuit court's hands in such a 
manner that even the "time, mode and occasion" of performance is 
certain.  I would therefore read a bit more "wiggle room" into 
the language of § 801.58(7).  I believe that the circuit court 
may exercise a limited degree of discretion in carrying out a 
mandate without engaging in "further proceedings."   
¶47 I would hold that appellate courts must expressly 
state whether a mandate on remand should be interpreted as 
permitting "specific action" or "further proceedings."  This 
practice would unequivocally inform the circuit court and the 
parties whether the right of substitution had attached without 
creating a virtually unqualified right to substitution on 
remand. 
¶48 In short, I believe that as long as Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.58(7) is in existence, this court should attempt to 
accommodate the legislature's determination that substitution on 
remand for further proceedings serves the general welfare.  
No. 97-3452-W.jpw 
 
6 
However, this court need not and should not recognize a right to 
substitution that is inconsistent with our constitutional duty 
to supervise and administer Wisconsin courts.  For these 
reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No. 97-3452-W.jpw 
 
7 
 
 
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
1 
 
¶49 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).  The majority 
implicitly acknowledges that its interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.58(7) is unsatisfactory.  It has the potential to increase 
significantly the number of judicial substitutions on remand.  
Yet, 
rather 
than 
endeavoring 
to 
arrive 
at 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation, the majority throws up its collective judicial 
hands and instead invites the legislature to enact a new statute 
to correct the majority’s erroneous conclusion.  Because the 
majority misconstrues and misapplies prior cases, and precludes 
the 
circuit 
court 
from 
exercising 
even 
a 
scintilla 
of 
discretion, I respectfully concur. 
¶50 In determining when the right to judicial substitution 
attaches under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), the majority reasons 
first that a circuit court’s exercise of discretion on remand 
forms the crux of the right to substitution.    Accordingly, it 
adopts a definition of "specific action" that is informed by the 
dissent in Cuccio v. Rusilowski, 171 Wis. 2d 648, 492 N.W.2d 345 
(Ct. App. 1992), and that is tied to the concept of a 
ministerial duty.  
¶51 Further amplifying specific action as the "purely 
ministerial," 
the 
majority 
transports 
the 
definition 
of 
ministerial duty from the arena of public officer immunity to 
the context of judicial substitution.  At the end of this 
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
2 
process, the majority concludes that the right to substitution 
attaches when the remand requires any exercise of discretion on 
the circuit court’s part and declares that its construction of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) comports with the liberal view of 
substitution.  
¶52 In its interpretation of the right to substitution 
under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), the majority misconstrues the 
dissent in Rusilowski, resulting in the improvident comparison 
to a public officer’s ministerial duty. Referring with approval 
to the dissent, the majority narrowly defines "specific action" 
for substitution purposes as "a purely ministerial duty" that is 
absolute and that leaves no room for discretion.  Majority op. 
at ¶ 20.  A closer examination reveals, however, that the 
dissent did not hinge its determination on whether a "specific 
action" for substitution purposes was the equivalent of a 
governmental ministerial duty.   
¶53 The main concern expressed by the Rusilowski dissent 
centered on the majority’s failure to give deference to the 
circuit court’s exercise of discretion.  177 Wis. 2d at 654.  
The dissent disapproved of the majority's reversal of the 
substitution order because the circuit court had acted well 
within the bounds of its discretion in reading the court of 
appeals mandate expansively.  Id. at 658.   Had the circuit 
court denied substitution by "implicitly conceding the 'specific 
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
3 
action' scope of the remand," the dissent made clear that it 
would nevertheless 
uphold 
the circuit 
court’s 
discretion, 
although it viewed the remand as non-ministerial in nature.  Id. 
     
¶54 The dissent’s bone of contention, therefore, lay with 
the usurpation of circuit court discretion, not with the 
characterization of the remand as a specific action.  As the 
Rusilowski dissent states in the first paragraph, "[t]he issue 
before us is whether or not the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting the request for substitution under sec. 
801.58(7)."  Id. at 654. Thus, the majority misconstrues the 
focus of the  Rusilowski dissent. 
¶55 The 
majority 
then 
misapplies 
the 
definition 
of 
ministerial duty from the context of public officer immunity to 
the definition of specific action in the context of judicial 
substitution.  In essence, it transplants a definition that is 
ill suited for its new purpose.  Public officer immunity is 
founded upon policy considerations aimed towards "protect[ing] 
public officers from being unduly hampered or intimidated in the 
discharge of their functions by threat of lawsuit or personal 
liability."  Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 682, 
292 N.W.2d 816 (1980).20  As such, liability must be limited to 
                     
20 These policy considerations include: 
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
4 
tasks so narrowly circumscribed that officers may perform a wide 
range of functions freely.    
¶56 The narrowly drawn parameters of a public officer’s  
liability include the discharge of duties that are "absolute, 
certain and imperative, involving merely the performance of a 
specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the 
time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty 
that nothing remains for judgment or discretion."  Lister v. 
Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).   
 In the realm of judicial substitution, specific action need not 
be constricted in such a manner.  The concerns of perceived bias 
addressed by substitution do not parallel the concerns of 
potential paralysis attendant to the performance of a wide range 
of public duties.  
¶57 In restricting specific action on remand to purely 
ministerial duties, the majority sacrifices judicial economy and 
                                                                  
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of 
lawsuit; 2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; 3) the drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
4) 
the 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and 5) 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are 
more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in 
public office.  
 
Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 
(1976). 
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
5 
efficient 
judicial 
administration 
by 
allowing 
for 
the 
substitution of judges in an increasing number of remand 
situations.  Under today’s interpretation, judges who have 
become well-versed in the complexities of a particular case may 
be substituted even when the remand calls for only a de minimus 
exercise of discretion.  
¶58 The trial in this case spanned eight days and required 
extensive post-trial briefing on several intricate issues.  When 
reviewing the substitution order granted by the trial judge, 
Chief Judge Sheedy declined to honor the substitution, observing 
that by doing so he would be "basically ordering a new trial."  
The majority’s interpretation in essence provides litigants a 
renewed opportunity to get through the back door what they did 
not get through the front: a new trial.   
¶59 Instructions on remand are not always of the black and 
white variety, but often fall into an expanse of gray.   The 
majority’s failure to allow for even a de minimus exercise of 
discretion upon remand foreshadows protests from courts that 
must 
grapple 
with, 
and 
be 
impeded 
by, 
the 
majority’s 
unreasonable interpretation.   
¶60 An interpretation that allows for substitution upon 
remand even in cases requiring only a de minimus exercise of 
discretion and no further involvement of the parties places an 
unwarranted 
demand 
on 
a 
system 
with 
limited 
resources.  
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
6 
Efficient judicial administration serves not only the interests 
of those within the judicial system, but also serves the 
interests of those litigants and witnesses who use that system. 
 Judicial economy requires a more reasonable reading of the 
substitution statute than the one proffered by the majority. 
¶61 The majority implicitly acknowledges the limitations 
of its statutory interpretation and calls forth the legislature 
"to revise [Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7)], in order to restrict the 
right 
to 
substitute 
a 
judge 
on 
remand 
where 
'further 
proceedings' are required."  Majority op. at n. 14.  Yet the 
legislature has already done so by the very words contained in 
Section 801.58(7).   
¶62 The 
legislature 
could 
not 
have 
intended 
the 
unreasonable construction given to the substitution statute by 
the majority, a construction that too narrowly restricts the 
scope of specific action.  Under the majority’s construction, 
substitution upon remand is allowed in every case except where 
the appellate court mandate so "prescribes and defines the time, 
mode and occasion" for the performance of a specific act "that 
nothing remains for judgment or discretion." 
¶63 This 
highly 
circumscribed 
definition 
of 
specific 
action is more rigid and impractical than the definition 
formulated by the Rusilowski court or the court of appeals in 
the present case.  Neither court foreclosed the exercise of de 
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
7 
minimus discretion, but rather limited the discretion to the 
existing record.  Invoking the Rusilowski court’s definition of 
specific 
action, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
here 
stated: 
"Consequently, we conclude that the right of substitution does 
not attach because this court’s mandate requires [that] . . . no 
new facts need be garnered, no added record be made; rather, the 
trial court is left with the same record and need not add to 
it."  State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, unpublished slip op. at 5 (Ct. App. March 
5, 1999). 
¶64 The 
majority 
rejects 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation and cloaks specific action with a more narrow 
meaning than the one advanced even by Findorff at oral argument. 
 A review of that argument reveals Findorff’s recognition that 
defining specific action as the "purely ministerial" is too 
restrictive.  The majority could have chosen to adopt Findorff’s 
suggested 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.58(7), 
one 
permitting judicial substitution only when the remand requires 
further involvement of the parties. 
¶65 Perhaps the majority could have borrowed and refined 
the statutory construction from the context of remand in divorce 
proceedings that delimits substitution when a remand calls for 
the clarification of judgment on an existing record.  See State 
ex rel. Parrish v. Kenosha County Circuit Court, 148 Wis. 2d 
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
8 
700, 704-05, 436 N.W.2d 608 (1989); State ex rel. Hubert v. 
Winnebago County Circuit Court, 163 Wis. 2d 517, 523, 471 N.W.2d 
615 (Ct. App. 1991).  The majority could have also considered a 
suggested interpretation of the statute that requires the court 
of appeals and this court to state on every remand whether the 
remand directs specific action or further proceedings.   
¶66 I 
urge 
the 
majority 
to 
consider 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) that would allow the 
circuit court to exercise de minimus discretion upon remand at 
least in some cases without triggering judicial substitution.  
In addition to the above proffered alternatives, I commend an 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) in large part borrowed 
from the Rusilowski dissent, which the majority cites with 
favor.  171 Wis. 2d at 656. 
¶67 Under this suggested interpretation, the appellate 
mandate must unequivocally define the directed action as 
constituting specific action pursuant to the statute if the 
mandate is to be construed as requiring specific action.  The 
appellate court may then define an action that requires only de 
miniumus discretion as constituting specific action.  In the 
absence of such an unequivocal declaration, that is, if any 
doubt remains as to the scope of the action, the circuit court 
has discretion to act, and the mandate allows for further 
proceedings under the statute.  
No. 97-3452-W.awb 
 
9 
¶68 Instead 
of 
considering 
any 
of 
the 
above 
interpretations, 
however, 
the 
majority 
settles 
on 
an 
unreasonable construction of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7).  Its 
reading allows for substitution upon remand in all cases 
involving only de minimus discretion.  
¶69 In sum, the majority misconstrues the dissent in 
Rusilowski and misapplies a definition of ministerial duty 
borrowed 
from 
the 
context 
of 
public 
officer 
immunity.  
Additionally, it errs by advancing a bright-line interpretation 
for facile application 
that 
undermines 
efficient judicial 
administration.  Accordingly, I concur.  
 
¶70 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.