Title: Oyola v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-2285
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2285 
____________ 
 
MIGUEL OYOLA,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[September 20, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal to review the convictions of Miguel 
Oyola for the first-degree murder of Michael Lee Gerrard, false imprisonment as a 
lesser included offense of kidnapping, armed robbery with a deadly weapon, and 
grand theft of a motor vehicle.  A jury recommended a sentence of death by a nine-
to-three vote.  The trial court accepted that recommendation and sentenced Oyola 
to death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
Evidence Supporting Murder Conviction 
Gerrard owned and operated C & G Outdoor Services, which was an outdoor 
landscaping business in and around Leon County, Florida.  Gerrard employed 
 
 
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Oyola in his landscaping business.  Wakulla Bank had a long-standing business 
relationship with Gerrard and Gerrard’s company, and had issued Gerrard a debit 
card for his C & G Outdoor Services business account.  On the day of the murder, 
a bank employee at Wakulla Bank, who had a long-term professional relationship 
with Gerrard and his business, received a telephone call from Gerrard.  He inquired 
as to suspicious activities on his business debit card.  She examined the account’s 
banking data and informed Gerrard of a series of suspicious transactions that had 
occurred the day before.  Gerrard was both surprised and angered with regard to 
the transactions.  He advised that he would travel to the bank to see her, but 
Gerrard never arrived.  
The suspicious transactions recorded on the debit card included numerous 
purchases at two different Wal-Mart stores in Tallahassee, Florida, totaling 
approximately $900.  There was also an additional cash withdrawal of $900 on the 
day of Gerrard’s murder.  Wal-Mart’s video surveillance cameras recorded the 
transactions.  The police obtained still shots of the Wal-Mart transactions in 
question.  The still shots depicted the register during the purchase and the 
purchaser as he left the store.  The pictures depict a man who appears to be Oyola.  
Also obtained with the still shots were receipts of the transactions.  Oyola signed 
the receipts for two of the transactions.   
 
 
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During the late morning on the day of Gerrard’s murder, a neighbor of 
Oyola’s saw Gerrard arrive at Oyola’s home in a white truck.  Gerrard stepped out 
of the truck and talked with Oyola for about twenty-five minutes.  The two men 
entered the truck and drove away.  At about 2:30 p.m., Gerrard was seen with one 
of his employees at a Sports Authority store in his white truck with an attached 
white trailer. 
Later that afternoon, a truck driver for a logging company was driving 
equipment out of the woods on a logging road in a wooded area in Jefferson 
County, Florida.  He proceeded around a curve in the road, at which point he 
noticed a white truck with an attached white trailer parked in the road.  The trailer 
started to rock and two men fell out.  The men were engaged in a struggle.   
The struggle became more physical and the truck driver described both of 
the men’s shirts as having turned red.  It appeared to the truck driver as though the 
men were fighting to the death.   At this point, the driver backed his truck around 
the curve and used his Citizens’ Band radio to call to a work crew for help.  He 
informed them that two men were fighting in the middle of the road.  The work 
crew joined the truck driver ten to fifteen minutes later.  They proceeded around 
the curve and to the location of the tussle.  The truck and its attached trailer, as 
well as one of the men, were gone.  The other man was on the side of the road.  He 
was on his hands and knees and was gasping for breath.  He fell face down and 
 
 
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remained still.  The driver and work crew placed a call to the 911 emergency 
number. 
The police dispatcher received the 911 call at 3:06 p.m.  A Jefferson County 
deputy sheriff responded.  When the deputy arrived, he found a man lying face 
down on the side of the road.  The deputy found that the man was deceased and 
later identified him as Gerrard.  Gerrard was also later identified as the owner of 
the white truck and attached trailer that was previously in the logging road before 
the work crew found him. 
In the early evening of that same day, Oyola’s live-in girlfriend arrived 
home to find a white truck parked across the street.  When she proceeded into her 
home, she found Oyola in a bathtub bathing in bleach.  She found this especially 
peculiar because she knew that Oyola did not like the smell of bleach and it made 
him sick.  She also noticed a black plastic trash bag.  Although she did not 
completely open the trash bag, she could see that the bag appeared to contain a pair 
of Oyola’s beige colored pants.  This seemed odd to her and she asked Oyola 
whether those were his pants in the bag.  He informed her that she did not want to 
know what was inside the bag, because if she did know, it would make her ill. 
A few minutes later, Oyola dressed and left the home, driving away in his 
girlfriend’s automobile.  Sometime after he left, Oyola called her and instructed 
her to proceed to the end of the road to pick up her car.  He also told her that he 
 
 
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was going to meet some friends and that he would call her later for a ride.  She 
walked down to the road and found her car in the same place where the white truck 
had been previously parked. The white truck was no longer in the neighborhood.   
Approximately one hour later, Oyola called his girlfriend and instructed her 
to pick him up at a K-Mart on Blairstone Road, across the street from an old 
Embarq office building.  When she arrived at that location, he was wearing a 
jacket.  He was not wearing a jacket when he left their home earlier.  She had never 
seen that jacket before, and after that evening, she never saw the jacket again.   
Later that evening, Oyola received a call from some of Gerrard’s workers 
requesting a ride home because Gerrard had not responded to their calls for 
transportation.  Oyola responded to the workers in his girlfriend’s car.  When one 
of the workers entered the car, he noticed a jacket that he had left in Gerrard’s 
white truck earlier that day.  Over the objections of Oyola, the worker recovered 
his jacket. 
During that same evening, a witness spotted Gerrard’s white trailer on the 
side of a road in Leon County.  The trailer was not attached to anything and the 
ground around the trailer was on fire.  The witness stopped and tried to extinguish 
the fire.  There was an odor of gasoline around the trailer and an empty gasoline 
can at the scene.  The witness noticed that the trailer door was open.  He saw what 
 
 
- 6 - 
appeared to be blood on the door and inside the trailer.  The witness notified law 
enforcement, who responded and searched the trailer.   
There was evidence of a fire on the ground near the trailer and on the interior 
and exterior of the trailer door.  The door of the trailer appeared to have been 
broken or busted open from the inside.  There were multiple breaks on the inside 
paneling of the door indicating that someone, or something, had struck blows 
against the door in an attempt to force the door open from the inside.  There was a 
line of blood and dripping patterns of blood visible on the bottom of the interior 
side of the door.  The bloodstain pattern indicated that blood had sprayed out and 
projected onto the interior surface of the trailer.  There was also a stain pattern on 
the inside of a broken section of the door that was consistent with a bloody 
substance having been pushed or shoved into the door after the door had been 
broken.  There were also bloodstains that appeared at the top of the inside wall of 
the trailer traveling away from the door and toward the rear of the trailer, 
consistent with cast off blood, i.e., blood that was thrown off something and onto 
the wall.    
A large concentration of transfer blood was found on the interior of the door 
frame and something that was soaked with blood had come into contact with the 
surface.  This stain was about shoulder height and consistent with someone 
wearing a blood-soaked garment leaning against the wall in an attempt to force the 
 
 
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door open.  There were bloodstained finger marks on the interior of the door which 
also indicated that someone had tried to force the door open.  In addition, law 
enforcement found aspirated blood at floor level near the door, which was 
indicative of a person lying injured near the doorway while breathing for a period 
of time.  There were also mist-like blood patterns inside the trailer, which were 
indicative of blood having been forced from a human body.   
In the late evening on the day of the murder, Deputy Sally Cole of the 
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office traveled to Oyola’s residence to question him 
about Gerrard’s death.  Oyola voluntarily accompanied Cole to the Sheriff’s 
Office.  Law enforcement interviewed Oyola at the Sheriff’s Office for 
informational purposes.  He claimed he remained home all day until other workers 
called him for transportation because Gerrard had not responded to their calls and 
they needed a ride home.  He claimed to have made several phone calls to Gerrard 
throughout the day and to have exchanged voicemail messages with him.  He 
informed law enforcement that he suspected that two other men had committed the 
crime.  He also said that Gerrard directed him to use the business debit card for up 
to $1500 worth of purchases for Christmas gifts.   
Upon searching the area around Oyola’s residence, Cole located both the 
lower and upper halves of Gerrard’s cellular phone (the phone had been broken in 
two) in the woods one-tenth of a mile from Oyola’s residence.  Officers later 
 
 
- 8 - 
located a car floor mat near that area.  The floor mat was consistent with the type 
of floor mat that was later found missing from the driver’s side of Gerrard’s truck.  
Law enforcement officers also searched the girlfriend’s car and found 
approximately $700 cash in the glove compartment.  Oyola claimed that he told 
her that he placed the money in the glove compartment.  He did not tell his 
girlfriend the source of the money, but informed her that it was money “owed to 
him.”   
The day after the murder, law enforcement located Gerrard’s truck in 
Tallahassee, Florida.  The interior of the truck was searched for fibers, fingerprints, 
and bloodstains.  Reddish-brown stains were found inside the truck that tested 
positive for blood.  There was a floor mat on the passenger’s side, but no floor mat 
on the driver’s side.  A shovel and a gas can filled with fuel were found in the bed 
of the truck along with a reddish-brown substance that tested positive for blood.  
The shovel was bent and curved on its right.  A substance that tested positive for 
blood was found on the end of the shovel. 
After Gerrard’s death, Kevin Dunn, a friend of the Gerrard family, helped 
maintain Gerrard’s business.  Dunn spoke with Oyola because Oyola was a key 
person in the daily operations of the business.  Dunn did not feel entirely 
comfortable conversing with Oyola because there was speculation about Oyola’s 
involvement in the murder of Gerrard.  While Dunn, Oyola, and another individual 
 
 
- 9 - 
had a drink in Gerrard’s honor, Dunn said that Oyola kept trying to proclaim his 
innocence.  Oyola stated that it was odd for Gerrard to have been on the logging 
road because Gerrard always had his cellular phone with him and there is no 
cellular signal on that road.  Oyola said that he had not seen Gerrard on the day of 
the murder but that Gerrard had driven to Oyola’s house to deliver money to him.  
The dollar amount Gerrard delivered to Oyola changed as the conversation 
progressed:  First, Oyola claimed that Gerrard placed $800 in his mailbox; then he 
claimed that the amount was $600; and later he changed the amount to $500.  
Oyola claimed that, other than Gerrard leaving money in his mailbox, he had not 
been in contact with Gerrard that day.    
In November 2008, after his arrest for murder, Oyola spoke with his 
cellmate, James Hendrith, about the murder of Gerrard.  According to Hendrith, 
Oyola bragged to him that he had robbed and killed Gerrard.  Oyola allegedly 
stated that he stabbed Gerrard and hit Gerrard with a shovel multiple times.  He 
said that he stole Gerrard’s white truck and $375.  He claimed that he used a knife 
during the murder, cleaned it after the murder, and subsequently disposed of the 
knife.  Oyola also told Hendrith that he burned his bloody clothes.  He informed 
Hendrith that he planned to plead insanity, and perhaps self-defense, on the basis 
that a truck driver saw him and Gerrard fighting, but did not actually see Oyola kill 
 
 
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Gerrard.  To Hendrith, Oyola did not appear “crazy”; to the contrary, he seemed 
very alert.  
Gerrard’s Injuries 
Gerrard had been struck at least four times in the head, causing injuries and 
bleeding into his brain.  There was also a laceration above his right eyebrow; 
scrape abrasions on his right cheek; and an injury that sliced through his right ear.  
The injury to Gerrard’s right eyebrow appeared to have been caused by a blunt 
object that had a sharp edge, consistent with the edge of a shovel.  This injury was 
also consistent with multiple strikes to that area.   
Gerrard had also sustained eight stab wounds.  One of the eight stab wounds 
was on the top of his right shoulder and two were to the right upper arm, 
proceeding through the soft tissue of the arm and into the soft tissue of the chest.  
The depth of some of his arm injuries was consistent with an attempt by Gerrard to 
interpose his arm between his body and a blade.  Gerrard’s torso had sustained four 
separate stab wounds.  One of these wounds penetrated his abdomen and incised 
his right kidney.  The nature of the wounds indicated that the blade used was sharp 
on one side and blunt on the other.   
Gerrard also suffered several injuries consistent with defensive wounds.  
More specifically, there were superficial linear scrape wounds on his upper 
abdomen; linear, incised injuries on his left and right hands; and abrasions on top 
 
 
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of his right hand.  On the palm of Gerrard’s right hand near the base of the thumb 
were slice-type injuries and there were abrasions on his right wrist.   
It appeared as though the wounds occurred at approximately the same time.  
The relative proximity of the stab wounds indicated that the victim was moving 
very little when they were inflicted and that he could have been lying on the 
ground.  The impacts to Gerrard’s head were sufficient to cause unconsciousness 
and, along with the stab wounds, were ultimately determined to be fatal.  The 
authorities were unable to determine when in the sequence of events Gerrard lost 
consciousness.  However, because of the defensive wounds on his hands and 
forearms, the medical examiner believed that he was conscious and resisting for 
part of the attack.   
Guilty Verdict 
On a general verdict form, the jury found Oyola guilty of the first-degree 
murder of Gerrard, false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of kidnapping, 
armed robbery with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle.   
Penalty Phase 
At the beginning of the penalty phase, Gerrard’s mother, sister, and wife 
read victim impact statements.  In those statements, they expressed sorrow for their 
loss, but requested that the trial court not sentence Oyola to death and, instead, give 
him a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.   
 
 
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The defense then submitted the testimony of Manuel Oyola, the brother of 
Oyola.  Manuel is nine years older than Oyola, and he remembered Oyola at a 
young age while Oyola was living with their parents in Connecticut.  Manuel 
claimed that their parents physically abused Oyola, hitting Oyola and his siblings 
with belts, broomsticks, and pointed shoes.  According to Manuel, this type of 
physical abuse occurred often and was so rampant that it caused Manuel, Oyola, 
and their siblings to leave home around the age of fifteen.  
Miguel believed that their abusive home life affected Oyola’s intellectual 
development during childhood by hindering Oyola’s study habits.  According to 
Miguel, the abuse also affected the way Oyola handled stress and emotional 
situations, heightening his temper.  Miguel also testified that Oyola began using 
drugs when he was approximately twelve years old.   
The defense also submitted the testimony of Dr. Michael Thomas D’Errico, 
PhD, a forensic psychologist, who had performed two court-ordered psychological 
evaluations of Oyola.  The first evaluation was after the murder, on March 4, 2008, 
and concerned Oyola’s legal competency relative to his ability to stand for a 
violation of probation hearing.1  During the evaluation, D’Errico examined Oyola’s 
prison mental health records.  The psychiatrist at the prison assigned Oyola a 
working diagnosis of schizophrenia/paranoid type, which is a form of psychosis 
                                          
 
1.  At the time of the murder, Oyola had been placed on probation for the 
crimes of grand theft of a motor vehicle and grand theft.  
 
 
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that involves hallucinations and delusions.  The prison psychiatrist noted that he 
was treating Oyola for this psychosis with an antipsychotic medication.  D’Errico 
found that Oyola exhibited several symptoms of the psychotic condition, i.e., he 
experienced auditory hallucinations, such as voices telling him negative things 
about himself and encouraging him to hurt himself, as well as visual and olfactory 
hallucinations.   
D’Errico then noted Oyola’s social history and measured Oyola’s long-term 
memory.  D’Errico found that Oyola had a family history of mental illness.  In 
particular, Oyola’s mother had been treated for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, 
and one of his brothers suffered from schizophrenia.  D’Errico also examined 
Oyola’s school records from the Hartford Public School System Special Education 
Department in Connecticut.  According to D’Errico, the records were not detailed, 
but they confirmed that during primary grades, Oyola was enrolled in special 
education classes.  In addition, according to Oyola’s standardized achievement 
tests, his overall reading and math ability scores were no higher than the seventh 
percentile.   
D’Errico found that Oyola had a substance abuse problem (cocaine abuse). 
After he examined Oyola’s records from the Philadelphia Correctional Center 
(Oyola had previously lived in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, during which time he 
was convicted of robbery and possession of cocaine), D’Errico learned that, in 
 
 
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addition to cocaine, Oyola abused heroin and PCP.  The psychiatric documentation 
in those records reflected treatment for a working diagnosis of schizoaffective 
disorder.  Oyola had been placed on the psychotropic medication Zoloft, an 
antidepressant, and Risperdal, an antipsychotic medication.  The records noted that 
the psychotropic medications alleviated the symptoms of the schizoaffective 
disorder, in that they suppressed his hallucinations, paranoid delusions, feelings of 
depression, difficulty modulating emotions, and unjustified anger and nervousness.  
After the first evaluation, D’Errico concluded that Oyola was not legally 
competent to stand for his violation of probation hearing and recommended 
inpatient mental health treatment.  D’Errico was also concerned with Oyola’s 
physical health.  Oyola was an insulin-dependent diabetic and, due to his delusions, 
he refused his insulin shots because he believed that the shots were an attempt to 
inject him with poison.  Due to his refusal to inject his insulin, his blood sugar 
level was three times higher than medically recommended.   
In June 2010, D’Errico conducted his second psychological examination of 
Oyola.  The purpose of the second evaluation was to determine Oyola’s level of 
psychological stability, to make a determination of his competency to proceed to 
trial for the murder of Gerrard, to assess his sanity at the time of the offense, and to 
determine the presence or absence of certain mitigating circumstances in his case.  
D’Errico found that Oyola’s mental status had improved since the March 2008 
 
 
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evaluation.  In particular, D’Errico found that Oyola was alert and aware of place, 
time, and date, and displayed no expression of suicidal ideations.  Oyola stated that 
he was involved in treatment for his hallucinations and was again receiving 
Risperdal and Zoloft (later changed to Wellbutrin) for his mental health issues.    
D’Errico then conducted a psychometric analysis of Oyola’s mental 
condition.  This testing revealed a full-scale IQ score of seventy-four, which falls 
in the borderline range of intellectual functioning (100 demonstrates average 
intelligence).  D’Errico concluded that Oyola had suffered a head injury in the past, 
but he found no evidence of brain damage.  D’Errico noted that Oyola had a fair 
amount of memory capacity and demonstrated the ability to learn as stimuli were 
provided to him.   
Based on this second evaluation, D’Errico found that Oyola was legally 
competent and was able to proceed to trial for the murder of Gerrard.  He also 
determined that at the time of the offense Oyola was generally mentally aware of 
his actions and the ramifications of those actions.  D’Errico found it very 
significant that when the crime occurred, Oyola was not undergoing treatment nor 
was he on any medication.  D’Errico hypothesized that if someone with mental 
health problems like Oyola went without medication and treatment, his or her 
mental health symptoms would return.   
During the evaluation, Oyola provided D’Errico with his account of 
 
 
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Gerrard’s murder.  Oyola stated that he was aware of his behavior and what was 
occurring as it happened.  According to Oyola, Gerrard picked him up in the truck 
and accused Oyola of having an affair with his wife.  Oyola denied this claim and 
subsequently told Gerrard that he needed to pay his workers because they had not 
received all of their money.  At that point, Gerrard allegedly punched Oyola in the 
face, stopped the truck, stepped out, proceeded to the back of the truck, and pulled 
out a knife.  Gerrard then attacked Oyola, who defended himself by punching 
Gerrard, throwing him to the ground, and biting his ear.  When Oyola bit Gerrard’s 
ear, Gerrard released the knife.  Oyola then claimed that he secured the knife and 
stabbed Gerrard multiple times.  Afterwards, Oyola stated that he drove away in 
the truck, at which point Oyola stated that he could see Gerrard standing with the 
knife.   
 
D’Errico believed it was likely that during the murder Oyola experienced 
untreated symptoms of schizoaffective disorder, especially because he was not 
medicated at that time.  In addition to auditory hallucinations and paranoia, 
D’Errico stated that Oyola’s mental health condition caused him to experience 
poor impulse and behavioral control.  He hypothesized that Oyola’s condition 
worsened the situation with Gerrard.  He believed that, due to this paranoia, Oyola 
might have overreacted and continued stabbing Gerrard after he bit Gerrard’s ear, 
even though any threat to Oyola was neutralized when Gerrard dropped the knife.  
 
 
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D’Errico also believed that Oyola’s paranoia might have led him to believe that the 
situation with Gerrard was potentially more dangerous than it was in reality.  More 
specifically, Oyola may have misinterpreted an angry, verbally aggressive Gerrard 
as posing a physical and life-threatening danger when none actually existed.  
Regardless, D’Errico opined that Oyola understood the criminality of his conduct.  
However, he believed that because Oyola was not receiving treatment for his 
schizoaffective disorder at the time of the murder, his mental condition interfered 
with his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.    
During cross-examination, D’Errico testified that, based on Oyola’s IQ, 
Oyola was intelligent enough to plan the destruction of the evidence, which 
included attempting to burn the trailer and breaking Gerrard’s cellular phone and 
throwing it into the woods.  D’Errico also observed that Oyola was intelligent 
enough to know to bathe in bleach to remove Gerrard’s blood and DNA from his 
body.  D’Errico admitted that Oyola’s story had inconsistencies with the evidence 
presented because Oyola never admitted that he hit Gerrard with a shovel (or 
another object), he only stated that he stabbed Gerrard; he never mentioned that 
Gerrard attempted to resist the stabbing (which would have been consistent with 
Gerrard’s defensive injuries); he never admitted that he incapacitated Gerrard; he 
never admitted that he held Gerrard captive in a trailer; and he never admitted to 
stealing cash from Gerrard.   Nevertheless, D’Errico testified during redirect 
 
 
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examination that it is not atypical for an individual with Oyola’s condition to be 
incomplete and inaccurate in a description of an incident.  He also testified that, 
notwithstanding that Oyola was not completely forthright, his opinion did not 
change with regard to Oyola’s mental state at the time the offense occurred.  He 
stated that it was entirely possible for Oyola, due to his mental illness, to translate a 
verbal confrontation between an employer and employee over stolen money into a 
dangerous and life-threatening situation.  
Sentence 
In a nine-to-three vote, the jury recommended a sentence of death.  During 
the Spencer2 hearing, Oyola addressed the trial court, apologized for his actions, 
and expressed remorse for the murder.  
 
In the sentencing order, the trial court found the following aggravating 
circumstances and gave each of them great weight:  (1) the capital felony was 
committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and on community control 
or felony probation; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was 
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit a robbery, and the capital 
felony was committed for financial gain (the trial court found that these two 
aggravators related to a single aspect of the case, and merged them and treated 
them as a single aggravator); and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, 
                                          
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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atrocious, or cruel (HAC).   
 
The trial court found that the defense failed to prove the existence of any 
statutory mitigating circumstances.  More specifically, the trial court concluded 
that the defense failed to establish the mitigator provided in section 921.141(6)(f), 
Florida Statutes (2007), which is that the defendant suffered from a mental illness 
that substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law.  In its analysis section devoted to statutory mitigation, the trial court noted 
that Oyola’s history of mental illness, although insufficient to establish the 
statutory mitigator, was given slight weight in the trial court’s consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Then, in the section of the sentencing 
order devoted to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court gave slight 
weight to “non-statutory mitigation [that] included serious drug abuse, an abusive 
home life as a child [that] created a cycle of violence, and mental disorder.”   
The trial court concluded that the aggravating circumstances in this case far 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  The trial court agreed with the jury’s 
recommendation and imposed a sentence of death upon Oyola for the first-degree 
murder of Gerrard.  For Oyola’s false imprisonment conviction, the trial court 
sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment; for the conviction of armed robbery 
with a deadly weapon, the trial court sentenced Oyola to life imprisonment; and for 
the conviction of grant theft of a motor vehicle, the trial court sentenced him to 
 
 
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five years’ imprisonment.   
This appeal followed.   
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Oyola contends that the trial court erred:  (1) when it assigned 
great weight to the HAC aggravating circumstance; (2) when it rejected the 
statutory mitigator that Oyola’s mental condition at the time of the murder 
substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law; and (3) when it treated Oyola’s mental state as a nonstatutory mitigator and 
assigned it slight weight.  He also challenges:  (4) the trial court’s analysis and 
evaluation of the mitigating circumstances, as provided in the sentencing order on 
the basis that it does not meet the requirements of Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 
415 (Fla. 1990); and (5) whether Florida’s capital punishment scheme is 
unconstitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We affirm the 
findings and underlying judgment of guilty in the trial court, but reverse and 
remand for the limited purpose of requiring the trial court to perform a new 
sentencing evaluation because the analysis of the mitigating circumstances in the 
trial court’s sentencing order does not meet the requirements articulated in 
Campbell.   
HAC Aggravator 
 
 
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To determine whether the trial court properly found an aggravating factor, 
this Court reviews the record to consider whether the trial court applied the correct 
rule of law.  See Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 667 (Fla. 2009).  If the trial 
court has applied the correct rule of law, this Court will affirm the finding of that 
aggravating factor if the trial court has supported that finding with competent, 
substantial evidence.  See id.  “The weight to be given aggravating factors is within 
the discretion of the trial court and is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.”  
Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473, 483 (Fla. 2008).  A trial court abuses its discretion 
“when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another 
way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court.”  Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 
(Fla. 1990) (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)). 
This Court has explained what constitutes the HAC aggravator:  
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or 
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; 
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with 
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. 
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the 
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such 
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital 
felonies—the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim. 
 
Hernandez, 4 So. 3d at 668-69 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 
1973)).   
 
 
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Unlike the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator, whose primary 
focus is on the intent, motivation, and state of mind of the defendant, the HAC 
aggravator focuses on the means and manner a defendant has used to inflict death, 
as well as the immediate circumstances that surround the death from the 
perspective of the victim.  See id. at 669.  In evaluating whether HAC is present, a 
trial court focuses on the victim’s perception of the circumstances—not the 
perpetrator’s viewpoint.  See id.  As a trial court considers the mental state of a 
victim, it may make common-sense inferences from the circumstances.  See id.  
The evidence presented must establish that the victim was conscious and aware of 
his or her impending death.  See id.  For example, defensive wounds on a victim 
evidence awareness of impending death.  See Guardado v. State, 965 So. 2d 108, 
116 (Fla. 2007).  In addition, the fear, emotional strain, and terror of the victim 
during the events leading up to a murder may render the murder especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  See Hernandez, 4 So. 3d at 669.   
 
Oyola contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it assigned 
great weight to the HAC aggravator because the trial court failed to account for his 
mental health status.  However, as previously noted, the focus of this Court when 
reviewing a trial court’s finding of the HAC aggravator is from the perspective of 
the victim—not the viewpoint of the defendant.  Thus, Oyola’s mental health does 
not factor into an assignment of weight to the HAC aggravator; rather, it is a 
 
 
- 23 - 
possible mitigator that a trial court may weigh against the HAC aggravator when 
determining a sentence.  See § 921.141(6)(b), (e), (h), Fla. Stat. (2007).   
 
Oyola further contends that the evidence does not establish that the trial 
court should have given the HAC aggravator great weight because it illustrates 
only one confrontation at one location between Oyola and Gerrard.  However, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning the HAC aggravator great 
weight because, given the evidence, a reasonable person could have taken the 
position adopted by the trial court, and the number of locations is not the sole 
measure of the HAC analysis.  In particular, the evidence supports an inference 
that Gerrard was attacked in two locations and transported to the logging road for 
disposal because the bloodstained trailer interior reflected a dire struggle and the 
bloodstained damage to the interior door evidenced an attempt to escape from the 
trailer.  This permitted a reasonable inference that Gerrard was locked in the trailer 
in a bloody, beaten condition, and, while fearing for his life, attempted to escape 
during transport to the logging road, which, as evidenced by the truck driver’s 
testimony, was where the final confrontation between Gerrard and Oyola occurred.   
The testimony of the truck driver also established that Oyola and Gerrard 
were engaged in a vicious fight to the death.  The truck driver described them as 
tumbling and tussling with red-stained shirts.  This suggests a protracted struggle 
between Gerrard and Oyola during which Gerrard likely feared for his life.  
 
 
- 24 - 
Further, Gerrard’s awareness of his impending death flows from the evidence that 
when the work crew found him, Gerrard was gasping for breath immediately 
before he fell to the ground and died.  This established that Gerrard likely knew of 
his impending death and he continued to struggle for life immediately before he 
died.   
 
In addition, Gerrard’s wounds reflected the heinous nature of his murder.  
Gerrard was attacked with two different weapons: a sharp knife-like object and a 
blunt object consistent with a shovel.   He incurred multiple stab wounds, with one 
stab wound to his arm indicative of the blade entering one side of his arm and 
exiting on the opposing side, along with four more stab wounds to his abdomen, 
one of which incised his right kidney.  Some of his arm wounds reflected a 
defensive posture by Gerrard, illustrating that he attempted to interpose his arm 
between his body and a blade.  Gerrard also suffered defensive wounds to his 
hands, wrists, and abdomen.  It is likely that Gerrard experienced terror and 
inexorable fear while he defended against the wounds inflicted upon him.  
Gerrard also suffered multiple and severe impacts to his head that caused 
bleeding inside his brain.  It is logical to infer that, before he lost consciousness, 
Gerrard feared for his life as he was struck in the head multiple times.  Although 
the medical examiner could not definitively determine whether Gerrard lost 
consciousness before or after the stab wounds, thus calling into question which 
 
 
- 25 - 
occurred first, she did testify that the wounds to his hands and forearms were 
indicative of a conscious resistance during the attack.   
 
Accordingly, the evidence presented reasonably leads to the conclusion 
adopted by the trial court—that this crime warranted the assignment of great 
weight to the HAC aggravator.   
Mental Health Mitigators 
 
A trial court must expressly evaluate all statutory and nonstatutory 
mitigators a defendant has proposed.  See Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 186 (Fla. 
2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 224 (2011).  A trial court must find a proposed 
mitigating circumstance when the defendant has established that mitigator through 
competent, substantial evidence.  See Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1159 
(Fla. 2006).  However, a trial court may reject a mitigator if the defendant fails to 
prove the mitigating circumstance, or if the record contains competent, substantial 
evidence supporting that rejection.  See Ault, 53 So. 3d at 186.  “Even expert 
opinion evidence may be rejected if that evidence cannot be reconciled with other 
evidence in the case.”  Id. (quoting Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1003 (Fla. 
2006)).  A mitigator may also be rejected if the testimony supporting it is not 
substantiated by the actions of the defendant, or if the testimony supporting it 
conflicts with other evidence.  See Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1257 (Fla. 
2004) (holding that although testimony supported a mitigator, the trial court did not 
 
 
- 26 - 
err by not finding it because the actions of the defendant did not substantiate that 
testimony); see also Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1005 (“The expert testimony from the 
defense could be rejected only if it did not square with other evidence in the 
case.”).   
The weight a trial court assigns to a mitigator is within its discretion and will 
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See Douglas, 878 
So. 2d at 1257.  Upon finding a mitigating factor, a trial court may assign it little to 
no weight when the effect of that circumstance has no or only a slight mitigating 
effect given the unique facts of the case.  See id.    
The statutory mitigator at issue is found in section 921.141(6)(f), Florida 
Statutes (2007), which states, “The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired.”  The nonstatutory mitigators at 
issue to which the trial court assigned slight weight were related to the mental 
illness of Oyola (schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder), his family history 
of mental illness, and his abusive home life as a child. 
In this case, the trial court properly rejected the statutory mitigator because 
competent, substantial evidence of record supports that rejection.  During the 
penalty phase, the defense presented the testimony of D’Errico.  After the murder 
of Gerrard, D’Errico conducted two psychological evaluations of Oyola.  Based on 
 
 
- 27 - 
the evaluations, D’Errico concluded that, although Oyola understood the 
criminality of his conduct, his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law was impaired due to his mental illness.  D’Errico, however, did not find or 
testify that Oyola’s mental health condition substantially impaired his ability to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law, as mandated in the express 
language of section 921.141(6)(f).   
Furthermore, the evidence presented supports the rejection of the theory that 
Oyola’s mental condition substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law.  More specifically, the evidence presented established 
that Oyola understood the criminality of his conduct and was intelligent enough to 
destroy evidence in an attempt to exculpate himself from the murder, i.e., he 
burned the trailer and his clothes, broke Gerrard’s cellular phone and discarded it, 
and bathed in bleach to remove Gerrard’s blood and DNA from his body.  D’Errico 
even testified that he believed that Oyola understood the criminality of his conduct, 
and that, based on his intelligence assessment of Oyola and Oyola’s IQ, Oyola was 
intelligent enough to destroy the evidence.  D’Errico’s testimony that Oyola 
understood the criminality of his conduct supports a logical inference that in 
understanding the criminality of his conduct, Oyola was able to conform it to the 
requirements of law.  Oyola even allegedly confessed to his cellmate that he 
robbed and murdered Gerrard, and that he planned to plead insanity or self-defense 
 
 
- 28 - 
in an attempt to exculpate himself.  To his cellmate, Oyola appeared alert and not 
hindered by a mental illness.  Thus, given Oyola’s intelligence, ability to 
understand his criminal conduct, and his actions in attempting to cover up the 
crime, a reasonable judge could have rejected that statutory mitigator.    
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in giving the nonstatutory 
mitigators slight weight because, although those mitigators were established, their 
effect, given the facts of this case, warranted the allocation of slight weight.  As 
shown above, although Oyola had a history of mental illness and drug abuse, and 
an abusive home life as a child, he also displayed the intellectual capacity to 
understand the criminality of his conduct, and thus, conform it to the requirements 
of law.  More specifically, Oyola’s behavior both before and after the murder 
established an intelligent thought process and a malicious intent to exculpate 
himself from the murder, rendering dubious the effect of the mitigating evidence 
given the facts of this case.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it assigned slight weight to the nonstatutory mitigating evidence. 
Campbell Violation 
 
Pursuant to Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419-20 (Fla. 1990), Oyola 
contends that the trial court’s sentencing order discounted the record evidence with 
regard to the mitigating effect of his mental health without providing a basis for 
discounting this evidence through a proper analysis and explanation.  We agree.  
 
 
- 29 - 
 
In Campbell, we articulated the requirements with regard to the manner in 
which a trial court must weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating 
circumstances in its written sentencing order.  See id.  We provided that, when 
addressing mitigating circumstances, a trial court must “expressly evaluate” the 
mitigating circumstances that the defendant has proposed and determine whether 
evidence supports them.  Id. at 419.  In cases of nonstatutory mitigators, trial courts 
must determine whether those mitigators are “truly of a mitigating nature.”  Id.  A 
trial court must then weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating 
circumstances.  See id. at 420.  To enable proper appellate review, a sentencing 
order must expressly consider each proposed mitigating circumstance, determine if 
the circumstance exists, and, if the circumstance does exist, what weight to allocate 
it.  See id.  For this Court to sustain a trial court’s final decision in its sentencing 
order, competent, substantial evidence of record must support the trial court’s 
weighing process.  See id. at 419-20.  Moreover, the trial court’s sentencing order 
must reflect “reasoned judgment” by the trial court as it weighed the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  See Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1990).   
 
In this case, the trial court found that the defense failed to prove the 
existence of any statutory mitigating circumstances.  More specifically, the trial 
court concluded that the defense failed to establish the statutory mitigator provided 
in section 921.141(6)(f), which is that the defendant’s ability to conform his 
 
 
- 30 - 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  In its analysis titled 
“Statutory Mitigating Circumstances,” the trial court, in denying the capacity-to-
conform statutory mitigator, provided the following:  
[Oyola] contends that he suffers from a mental illness impairing his 
ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  He also 
contends that he was raised in an abusive home, which mitigates 
against the imposition of the death penalty.  The evidence did 
establish that the defendant suffered from Schizoaffective Disorder, 
Bipolar type, and that there was a history of mental illness in his 
family, but the evidence was insufficient to show that such mental 
condition impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.  These circumstances were only given slight 
weight in weighing the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating circumstances, but they were considered by the Court.   
 
Then, in the section of the trial court’s sentencing order entitled “Non-Statutory 
Mitigating Circumstances,” the trial court provided the following:   
The alleged non-statutory mitigation included serious drug 
abuse, an abusive home life as a child, created a cycle of violence, and 
mental disorder.  While the evidence did establish such circumstances, 
the Court only gives such circumstances slight weight in weighing the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. 
As shown in the quoted language, the sentencing order violated the 
requirements articulated in Campbell because the trial court did not expressly 
evaluate, in a well-reasoned fashion, how the evidence presented failed to support 
the mitigating evidence presented by Oyola.  Rather, it merely gave a brief 
summary of its findings with regard to the mitigators, and did not expressly and 
specifically articulate why the evidence presented failed to support the proposed 
 
 
- 31 - 
statutory mitigators, and why that same evidence warranted the allocation of slight 
weight to the nonstatutory mitigation evidence presented.  In fact, the trial court’s 
evaluation of the established nonstatutory mitigation evidence grouped three 
separate nonstatutory mitigators into a single sentence, and, in a single subsequent 
sentence, summarily gave them slight weight.  In accordance with Campbell, the 
trial court should have separated and evaluated each nonstatutory mitigator, 
providing an evaluation and analysis as to why it gave each of them slight weight.  
In addition, the trial court’s misplaced and confusing reference to what appears to 
be a finding with regard to nonstatutory mitigation inside the statutory mitigation 
section of the sentencing order further compounds its failure to render a sentencing 
order that reflects a well-reasoned evaluation and determination.   
 
Therefore, we conclude that the sentencing order fails to meet the 
requirements of Campbell.  We accordingly reverse and remand to the trial court 
for the limited purpose of properly evaluating all mitigation and aggravation and 
providing this Court with a revised sentencing order that contains an evaluation 
that complies with the requirements of Campbell.   
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Although not raised by the parties, this Court has a mandatory obligation to 
independently review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a trial 
court imposed a sentence of death.  See Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 850 (Fla. 
 
 
- 32 - 
2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5).  “In determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 
732, 738 (Fla. 2001) (citing Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067 n.5 (Fla. 1999)).  
The jury found Oyola guilty of first-degree murder on a general verdict form.  The 
trial court instructed the jury on both premeditated murder and felony murder with 
an underlying felony of armed robbery with a deadly weapon, or an attempt 
thereof.  “A general guilty verdict rendered by a jury instructed on both first-
degree murder alternatives may be upheld on appeal where the evidence is 
sufficient to establish either felony murder or premeditation.”  Crain v. State, 894 
So. 2d 59, 73 (Fla. 2004).   
 
Sufficient evidence supports Oyola’s conviction for the first-degree 
premeditated and felony murder of Gerrard.  With regard to premeditation, the 
State presented evidence establishing that the day before the murder, Oyola had 
impermissibly used the company credit card for his own pecuniary gain, and that 
Gerrard learned of the transgressions on the day of his murder.  On the day of the 
murder, a neighbor of Oyola’s witnessed Gerrard and Oyola walking and talking 
together at Oyola’s home, followed by them leaving together in Gerrard’s white 
truck.  This testimony established that Gerrard and Oyola were together the day of 
 
 
- 33 - 
the murder and that Gerrard likely confronted Oyola about his credit card 
transgressions.  This evidence supports the reasonable inference that Oyola, in an 
attempt to exculpate himself from his pecuniary crime, decided to kill Gerrard.   
Gerrard’s wounds further support an inference of premeditation.  They 
included multiple stab wounds to Gerrard’s arms and abdomen, as well as several 
blows to Gerrard’s head with an object having an incised edge consistent with that 
of a shovel.  The infliction of these multiple blows and wounds established that 
Oyola consciously, intentionally, and with premeditation killed Gerrard, as it 
reflects a period long enough for Oyola to contemplate his actions before he 
carried them out. 
Further support of premeditation consists of evidence illustrating that Oyola 
held a bloody and beaten Gerrard captive in the trailer while Oyola transported him 
to another location, inflicted additional injuries when Gerrard tried to fight back, 
and then abandoned Gerrard dead or dying on the side of the road.  The specific 
evidence that supports this is the blood inside the trailer, the bloody damage on the 
interior door of the trailer, aspirated bloody spray on the door, and bloody 
fingerprints on the door.  This evidence illustrates that a bloody Gerrard was alive, 
lying close to the door, and thereafter attempted to force the door open from the 
inside.  Further evidence supporting premeditation is the witness testimony 
establishing that Oyola transported Gerrard to a logging road, which Oyola 
 
 
- 34 - 
admitted was an abnormal place for Gerrard to be, where Oyola continued to beat 
Gerrard and left him (Gerrard) for dead.  During that transport time, Oyola had an 
opportunity to contemplate and formulate the intent to kill Gerrard. 
Oyola’s intent to kill is also illustrated by his premeditated design to cover 
up his crime by attempting to dispose of the evidence, i.e., leaving the truck on the 
side of the road, cleaning himself and disposing of the murder weapon, attempting 
to burn the trailer, disposing of his clothes, and admitting to his jail cellmate that 
he burned his clothing.  Further inculpating Oyola in the premeditated murder of 
Gerrard is the missing floor mat from Gerrard’s truck and Gerrard’s broken 
cellular phone found by law enforcement near Oyola’s home.  Oyola’s live-in 
girlfriend also testified that she witnessed Oyola bathing in bleach after Gerrard’s 
murder occurred, and that Oyola had parked Gerrard’s truck outside their home 
that he later drove away and had her meet him at another location.  These facts 
evidence a conscious intent by Oyola to cover up the crime by disposing of the 
evidence.   
Oyola’s confession to his cellmate provides further support for 
premeditation.  Oyola unremorsefully confessed to his cellmate that he 
intentionally robbed and killed Gerrard.  The inmate testified that Oyola bragged to 
him about how he both robbed and killed Gerrard by stabbing him several times 
 
 
- 35 - 
with a knife and hitting him multiple times with a shovel, after which he stole 
Gerrard’s truck and $375.   
The evidence presented below also supports felony murder with an 
underlying felony of armed robbery, as Oyola confessed to his cellmate that he 
murdered Oyola with a knife and shovel while robbing him by stealing his truck 
and money.   
Therefore, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence supporting Oyola’s 
convictions.  
Proportionality 
Although not raised by the parties, this Court, due to the uniqueness and 
finality of death, has a mandatory obligation to independently review and address 
the proportionality of the death sentence.  See Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 
205 (Fla. 2010).  In reviewing for proportionality, this Court should consider the 
totality of the circumstances and compare the matter with other capital cases.  See 
Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 246 (Fla. 1999).  This Court will also make “a 
comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether the crime falls within the 
category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby 
assuring uniformity in the application of the sentence.”  Williams, 37 So. 3d at 205 
(quoting Offord v. State, 959 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007)).  Such a review entails a 
qualitative review of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator; not a 
 
 
- 36 - 
quantitative analysis.  See id.  Thus, this comparison is not between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  See Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 
1064 (Fla. 1990).  Rather, the death penalty is reserved only for the most 
aggravated and least mitigated murders.  See Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 
(Fla. 1993). 
 
In this case, the jury recommended the death penalty for the murder of 
Gerrard by a vote of nine to three.  The trial court found this recommendation 
appropriate after weighing the statutory aggravating circumstances against the 
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  We are requiring the trial 
court to properly evaluate all mitigation and aggravation and provide this Court 
with a revised sentencing order which complies with Campbell.  We therefore 
defer our proportionality analysis until we receive a final sentencing order. 
Ring 
Oyola acknowledges that pursuant to this Court’s prior precedent in 
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002), and 
King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002), this 
claim does not warrant relief, but was raised for the purpose of preservation.  This 
Court has repeatedly rejected the assertion that Ring requires aggravating 
circumstances be found individually by a unanimous jury.  See, e.g., Frances v. 
 
 
- 37 - 
State, 970 So. 2d 806, 822 (Fla. 2007); Hernandez-Alberto v. State, 889 So. 2d 
721, 733 (Fla. 2004). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of guilt.  However, we 
reverse and remand for the limited purpose of requiring the trial court to provide 
this Court with a revised sentencing order that contains a sentencing evaluation in 
compliance with Campbell.   
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, in which CANADY, J., 
concurs. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs as to conviction and concurs in result as to sentence. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm Oyola’s convictions, but I 
disagree with the majority’s decision to remand for revision of the sentencing 
order.   Because the majority fails to apply harmless error analysis in assessing the 
sentencing order, I respectfully dissent. 
The trial court’s failure to strictly comply with Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 
415 (Fla. 1990), was harmless in this case.  See Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 549 
(Fla. 2009) (“Even though the trial court erred in its treatment of this mitigator, we 
 
 
- 38 - 
find the error harmless.”), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 3391 (2010); Taylor v. State, 855 
So. 2d 1, 30 (Fla. 2003) (“[E]ven if the trial judge erred in rejecting this factor as 
nonmitigating or in failing to assign it any weight, any error would be harmless, 
given the minimal amount of mitigation this factor would have provided.”).  In its 
sentencing order, the trial court assigned great weight to each aggravator, slight 
weight to the nonstatutory mitigators, and slight weight to the evidence presented 
in support of the proposed statutory mitigator.  The trial court ultimately concluded 
that “[t]he aggravating circumstances in this case far outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances.”  In light of the strong aggravators established in this case and the 
minimal weight assigned to Oyola’s mitigators, any failure to strictly comply with 
Campbell was harmless.    
Accordingly, I would affirm Oyola’s conviction and sentence. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Jefferson County,  
Louie Ralph Smith, Jr., Judge - Case No. 2008-CF-128 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee