Title: Commonwealth v. Epps
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11921
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2016

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SJC-11921 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DERICK EPPS. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 7, 2015. - July 14, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Child Abuse.  Constitutional Law, 
Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, Assistance of 
counsel.  Evidence, Expert opinion.  Practice, Criminal, 
New trial, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 17, 2004. 
 
 
The case was tried before David A. Lowy, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on October 17, 2011, was heard by him. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
David Hirsch for the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Seth Miller, of Florida, Katherine H. Judson, of Wisconsin, 
Adam W. Deitch & Lindsay A. Olson, of New York, & Mark W. Batten 
for The Innocence Network. 
 
Heather Kirkwood, of Washington, & David E. Meier for David 
Ayoub & others. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Matthew R. Segal, Dennis Shedd, & Chauncey B. Wood for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury of assault and battery on a child causing substantial 
bodily injury, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b).  The 
prosecution contended that the defendant violently shook the two 
year old child in his care based on medical testimony that the 
child was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury, and scans of 
her brain that showed retinal hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, 
and brain swelling, the three symptoms known as "the triad" 
associated with shaken baby syndrome.  The defendant, when 
interviewed by the police, denied having injured the child and 
reported that, hours before the child's grievous injuries became 
manifest, she had fallen down the wooden stairs in her home and 
had later fallen off a kitchen stool, leaving a bump on her 
forehead.  The Commonwealth's medical expert offered the opinion 
that injuries of the type and severity suffered by the child 
could not have been caused by the short falls described by the 
defendant.  The defendant called no expert to offer an opinion 
to the contrary. 
In Commonwealth v. Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 418 (2016), we 
noted that "[t]here is a heated debate in the medical community 
as to whether a violent shaking of a baby alone can generate 
enough force to cause the triad of symptoms of traumatic brain 
3 
 
 
 
injury, and as to whether these symptoms can sometimes be caused 
by a short accidental fall."  We conclude that, in the unusual 
circumstances of this case, the absence of expert testimony that 
the child's injuries might have been caused by her accidental 
falls deprived the defendant of an available, substantial ground 
of defense, and thereby created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  We therefore reverse the judge's denial 
of the defendant's motion for a new trial, vacate the 
conviction, and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new 
trial.1 
 
Background.  1.  Evidence at trial.  We summarize the 
evidence presented at trial in July, 2007.  On October 9, 2004, 
Sara Comeau left for work early in the morning, leaving her two 
children, Veronica, age two, and Delilah, age four, in the care 
of the defendant, who was her live-in boy friend.2  The two girls 
were still asleep in their bedroom; the defendant was awake but 
still in bed. 
 
The defendant told the police during two interviews on 
October 10 that, after Comeau left for work, Veronica woke up 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by The 
Innocence Network and "concerned physicians and scientists," and 
the amicus brief jointly submitted by the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2 Sara Comeau worked as a certified nurse assistant at a 
nearby nursing home. 
4 
 
 
 
and he brought her into the bed with him.  After one to two 
hours both woke up and the defendant sent Veronica downstairs by 
herself while he went to use the bathroom.  He then heard 
Veronica cry and found her at the bottom of the stairs; based on 
what he saw and heard, it seemed that she had fallen down two or 
three wooden stairs.  Veronica told him that she was all right.  
Veronica then sat on a stool in the kitchen eating cereal while 
the defendant played a video game.  Veronica tried to get down 
from the stool by herself and fell.3  He found her on the floor, 
picked her up, and saw a small red mark on the left side of her 
forehead.  She cried briefly but then said that she was okay.  
The defendant gave her juice and sat her on the couch, where she 
then started coughing and vomited.  The defendant cleaned up the 
vomit and gave her a bath.  Later, Veronica vomited again when 
she was upstairs.4 
 
The defendant's friend, Jason Fletcher, arrived later that 
morning.  When he arrived, the defendant told Fletcher that 
Veronica had fallen off the stool and Fletcher saw "a bump" 
                                                          
 
 
3 Chemist Cailin Lally of the State police crime laboratory 
measured the stool and determined that it was thirty inches 
tall.  Lally also performed an orthotolodine test, a presumptive 
test for the presence of blood, on a stain found on the kitchen 
floor near the stool, and the result came back positive. 
 
 
4 Lally found a pair of children's jeans with chunky, 
strong-smelling material in the hallway upstairs, and brown 
chunky material with a "vomit-like" odor in the bathroom sink 
upstairs. 
5 
 
 
 
above her left eye.  The defendant and Fletcher played a 
football video game downstairs while the children played 
upstairs.  At around noon, Comeau returned home on her lunch 
break and found the defendant in the living room with Fletcher, 
sitting on the couch and playing the football video game.  
Veronica was wearing pull-up underpants and a T-shirt, which was 
the same T-shirt Comeau had dressed her in when Comeau put her 
to bed the night before.  Comeau saw that Veronica had a red, 
dime-sized mark on her forehead.  Comeau asked the defendant 
what had happened, and he told her that Veronica had fallen off 
the stool while she was eating breakfast.  She and the defendant 
then got into an argument about neither child being fully 
dressed.  Before returning to work, Comeau went upstairs and 
dressed Veronica in pants and a T-shirt.  During this time, 
Veronica said to her, "Mommy, I hit my head."  According to 
Comeau, Veronica was not acting unusual at this time. 
 
After Comeau returned to work, the defendant and Fletcher 
continued playing the video game downstairs while the girls were 
playing upstairs.  The defendant told the police during his 
interviews that, shortly after Comeau left, while he and 
Fletcher were playing the video game, he heard a "boom" from 
upstairs.  He initially thought that it was the children jumping 
around to music, but then Delilah ran to the top of the stairs 
and yelled to the defendant that Veronica had fallen.  The 
6 
 
 
 
defendant stated that he went upstairs and found Veronica lying 
on her back with "her eyes . . . almost going in the back of her 
head."  He began to give her cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR).  She was limp and gurgling, and her stomach expanded and 
her arms flared up each time he breathed into her mouth.  Her 
fingers were "like knots," and her body stiffened as if she were 
having a seizure.  He panicked and yelled for Fletcher.  
Fletcher came upstairs, and the defendant sent him to get Comeau 
from her work.  The defendant told the police that, when his 
attempts at CPR failed, he tried to put a toothbrush in her 
mouth to create an airway. 
 
At trial, Fletcher testified that, while he was playing the 
football video game downstairs with the defendant, Delilah 
yelled from upstairs that Veronica had fallen.  The defendant 
went upstairs while Fletcher played four downs of the football 
video game.5  While the defendant was upstairs, Fletcher did not 
hear any "bangs," "shouts," or "noises."  Because the defendant 
had not returned, Fletcher went upstairs "to see what was going 
on."6  He then saw Veronica lying unconscious on a mattress in 
                                                          
 
 
5 Jason Fletcher testified that the defendant was winning 
the football video game when Delilah called for him. 
 
 
6 There was a dispute at trial as to how much time elapsed 
before Fletcher went upstairs after the defendant left; Fletcher 
estimated that it was approximately two minutes.  The defendant 
told the police that he called for Fletcher after about thirty 
seconds. 
7 
 
 
 
the girls' bedroom and the defendant giving her mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation.  The defendant sent him to get Comeau, and he 
drove to the nursing home where she worked. 
 
Comeau drove home immediately when she learned about 
Veronica's condition and saw Veronica on the couch in the living 
room with the defendant leaning over her.  Veronica had a large 
lump on her head, which Comeau testified was "red and 
purple/black" in color.  The defendant was attempting to 
administer CPR, but Comeau screamed and told him to stop because 
Veronica's stomach was raised and "she had too much air in her."  
Comeau asked the defendant what had happened, and he told her 
that Veronica had fallen down the stairs.  Comeau telephoned 
911, and the emergency medical technicians arrived.  Fire 
fighter and emergency medical technician Robert Irvin said that 
Veronica was having difficulty breathing, her eyes were rolling 
back, and she was sweating profusely.  According to Irvin, she 
had a "bang" on her head, a black eye, a small bang on her nose, 
and a red line across her chest, which, he said, looked "as if 
the child had leaned up against a chair or a table." 
 
A neighbor, Karen Grober, saw the fire trucks and ambulance 
and went outside to see what was going on.  Grober testified 
that the defendant appeared "upset" and "worried."  Grober asked 
him what had happened, and he said that he did not know, that he 
8 
 
 
 
heard a big thump from upstairs, and that when he went upstairs 
Veronica was on the floor, with her eyes rolling back. 
 
Comeau followed Veronica to Lawrence General Hospital in a 
separate ambulance.  When they arrived, Comeau saw a red mark 
under Veronica's ribs that had not been there when Comeau had 
dressed her at lunchtime.  Comeau also saw red marks on the 
inside of both of her knees.  Once the defendant arrived at the 
hospital, he told Comeau that Veronica had fallen down the 
stairs and had fallen off the breakfast stool, and that Delilah 
had yelled at the top of the stairs that Veronica had fallen a 
third time. 
 
At Lawrence General Hospital, medical professionals 
intubated Veronica to assist her breathing and took several X-
rays, including a head computerized tomography (CT) scan.  She 
was eventually "med-flighted" to Boston Children's Hospital, 
where she arrived unresponsive and was displaying "posturing," 
which is an upper motor neuron sign signaling injury to the 
brain.  She was placed in the pediatric intensive care unit.  
The head CT scan revealed a significant amount of swelling on 
the left side of Veronica's brain, as well as bleeding in the 
subdural space and the subarachnoid space.  The swelling was 
such that the left side of the brain was extending over and 
encroaching into the right side of the brain, a condition known 
in the medical community as a midline shift.  A craniotomy 
9 
 
 
 
surgery was performed to help relieve the swelling and to help 
drain some of the blood that had collected. 
 
Dr. Celeste Wilson, a board-certified pediatrician and 
child abuse specialist, examined Veronica and found that her 
left pupil was fixed and dilated, and her right pupil was very 
sluggishly reactive to light.  Although she was not an 
ophthalmologist, Dr. Wilson examined Veronica's eyes and found 
bleeding in the back of both eyes.  An ophthalmologist 
subsequently examined Veronica and found bleeding, known as 
retinal hemorrhages, in both eyes, with approximately twelve 
hemorrhages on the right side and five hemorrhages on the left 
side.  Dr. Wilson also found bruising over Veronica's right eye, 
as well as increased redness under the nostril and a bruise 
under her chin.  Dr. Wilson observed additional areas of 
bruising or increased redness over Veronica's mid-chest, a 
bruise on her right upper back, a bruise on her left lower back, 
and bruising or increased redness on her right leg at the level 
of the knee on the outer side and on her left leg on the inner 
side.7  Veronica was given an electroencephalogram, a test that 
measures seizure activity in the brain, as well as a magnetic 
resonance imaging test and repeat head CT scans.  The CT scans 
revealed that a portion of Veronica's brain had infarcted, the 
                                                          
 
 
7 At trial, Dr. Celeste Wilson testified that it is not 
possible to determine how long bruises have been present. 
10 
 
 
 
medical term for the loss of function in part of the brain, as a 
result of the nerve injury.  Tests did not reveal any spinal 
cord damage; neck injury, aside from some swelling in the 
tissues around the neck; or skull fracture. 
 
Dr. Wilson offered her opinion that these injuries were 
"consistent with non-accidental trauma."  Specifically, she 
testified that Veronica's injuries were consistent with shaken 
baby syndrome,8 which she described as a clinical diagnosis based 
on a constellation of findings that include subdural hemorrhage, 
retinal hemorrhages, and possibly bruises or fractures.  She 
explained that shaken baby syndrome "is thought to occur as a 
result of significant acceleration/deceleration forces . . . 
when a caretaker vigorously shakes an infant such that the head 
moves back and forth."  This shaking leads to strain and tension 
on the blood vessels in the brain, causing them to tear and 
release blood.  When a blood vessel tears in the subdural space, 
it causes bleeding in the subdural space, i.e., a subdural 
hemorrhage.  The shaking forces also cause shearing and tearing 
                                                          
 
 
8 In 2009, the American Academy of Pediatrics in a policy 
statement recommended that pediatricians "use the term 'abusive 
head trauma' rather than a term that implies a single injury 
mechanism, such as shaken baby syndrome, in their diagnosis and 
medical communications."  Christian, Block, and the Committee on 
Child Abuse and Neglect, Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and 
Children, 123 Pediatrics 1409, 1411 (2009).  See Commonwealth v. 
Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 423 n.7 (2016).  In this opinion, we 
refer to "shaken baby syndrome" (the term used at trial) and 
"abusive head trauma" interchangeably. 
11 
 
 
 
on the nerves of the brain such that they release a substance 
called cytokines, which then results in brain swelling. 
 
Dr. Wilson testified that the normal activities of a 
toddler, even one who is clumsy, would not account for the type 
of injuries she described.  She also testified that blood 
testing was performed and did not reveal any sign that Veronica 
was suffering from a blood disease or blood disorder.  Finally, 
she opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that a 
fall of three feet could not cause Veronica's injuries and that 
a fall down multiple stairs would be "extremely unlikely" to 
cause them.  She stated that, apart from shaking, the 
circumstances that might cause a child to sustain these types of 
injuries would be a high speed motor vehicle accident or a fall 
from a building or from a height of "more than [ten] feet, more 
. . . on the order of [seventy] feet."  On cross-examination, 
Dr. Wilson acknowledged that Dr. John Plunkett has conducted 
research indicating that the same types of symptoms as occur in 
shaken baby syndrome could occur from falls as low as three 
feet, but she stated that such findings are not widely accepted 
within the national community of pediatricians or recognized by 
the American Academy of Pediatrics.  She also admitted on cross-
examination that she could not say when Veronica's injuries were 
inflicted, and that it was possible for Veronica to have 
12 
 
 
 
remained conscious for some period of time after their 
infliction. 
 
Comeau testified that Veronica was a clumsy child and fell 
down often, that she bruised easily, and that she was being 
treated for a blood disorder.9  She said that Veronica and 
Delilah would jump off the couch and bed, and fight with each 
other.  She gave Veronica a bicycle in June, 2004, and Veronica 
fell off and broke her arm several days later.  The cast did not 
come off until the week before the incident.  The defendant also 
described Veronica as "clumsy" and "accident prone" in his 
interview to the police, and described specific instances when 
Veronica had fallen, including three or four days prior when she 
ran into a door and sustained a bump on her head and a slight 
black eye.  Grober similarly testified that she saw the girls 
outside every day and that Veronica was often falling down and 
"had a lot of accidents."10 
 
Comeau also testified that in August or September, 2004, 
the defendant told her he had slapped Veronica.  Comeau saw a 
"big red welt and a handprint" between Veronica's legs and 
buttocks.  During the police interviews the defendant admitted 
that he and Comeau "occasionally" gave the children a "slap on 
                                                          
 
 
9 The type of blood disorder was not identified at trial. 
 
 
10 Veronica was known as "Tonka" by her family because she 
was clumsy and always banging into things and getting bruised. 
13 
 
 
 
the butt" as a disciplinary measure.  Nika Fontaine, Comeau's 
best friend and Delilah's godmother, testified that, when she 
approached Comeau's home on an unknown date, she saw through the 
screen door that the defendant put his hands on Veronica's arm 
and shook her while Veronica was on the ground standing. 
 
On the evening of October 10, the defendant waived the 
Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed by Trooper Robert 
LaBarge of the State police and Detective Carl Rogers of the 
Haverhill police department.  He also agreed to be interviewed 
later that evening by Trooper Brandon Arakelian of the State 
police.  Throughout the recorded interviews the defendant denied 
causing Veronica's injuries, even after his interrogators told 
him that the doctors at Children's Hospital had determined that 
Veronica's injuries were intentionally inflicted and that they 
could not have been caused by an accidental fall.11  The 
defendant also stated that he did not think Comeau had caused 
the injuries.12 
                                                          
 
 
11 Trooper Brandon Arakelian of the State police told the 
defendant that Arakelian knew the "who" but was asking the 
defendant "to answer the why, and tell [him] what happened, and 
. . . how it happened."  The defendant insisted, "I am answering 
the why for you."  Arakelian told the defendant that he did not 
think the defendant was "a mean guy who did it on purpose," but 
the defendant did not waiver in his insistence that he "didn't 
do anything." 
 
 
12 On October 13, Comeau was arrested and charged with child 
endangerment.  She spent three days in custody before she was 
released on bail.  During the time she was in custody, the 
14 
 
 
 
 
As a result of the events on October 9, Veronica is 
paralyzed on the right side of her body and cannot walk.  
According to Comeau, Veronica's cognitive abilities are 
seriously limited and she "can't comprehend." 
 
2.  Closing arguments.  Defense counsel informed the judge 
on the first day of trial that he would not be pursuing a third-
party culprit defense and during his opening statement asked the 
jury to consider "whether or not those injuries were caused by 
the blows of [the defendant] or . . . by some other non-
intentional source."  But defense counsel in closing argument 
abandoned the argument that Veronica's injuries were accidental 
and invited the jury instead to consider whether Comeau "struck 
the blow that injured Veronica" when she came home from work on 
her lunch break.  He noted that Comeau was "angry and upset" 
when she came home, and was alone upstairs with the children.  
In contrast, he argued that the defendant was in a good mood 
because he was winning in the football video game, and did not 
have the state of mind necessary to injure Veronica.  As to the 
timing of the blow, defense counsel noted that Dr. Wilson had 
testified that "although the child suffered a very severe, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Department of Children and Families (then the Department of 
Social Services) removed Delilah from her home and placed her in 
foster care, and initiated a care and protection proceeding to 
remove custody of both children.  The prosecutor later offered 
to dismiss the charges against Comeau if she testified 
truthfully against the defendant; Comeau accepted the offer. 
15 
 
 
 
traumatic shaking, . . . the child would not have been 
immediately comatose." 
 
The prosecutor in closing argument argued that the 
defendant violently shook Veronica during the time that he was 
upstairs and Fletcher was downstairs.  She claimed that "two-
year olds get banged up and bruised, but they don't break like 
this," arguing that "even the clumsiest two year old, even one 
who's fallen off a [thirty-]inch stool or a couple of steps is 
not left with parts of her brain that have literally died-off."  
Rather, she said, only a fall from seventy feet or an automobile 
crash where the child is ejected from the automobile could cause 
these injuries.  She argued that, because there was no evidence 
of a fall or crash of this magnitude, the only possible cause of 
Veronica's injuries is that the defendant shook "her so 
violently that it inflict[ed] those rotational forces on her 
brain and in her brain." 
 
2.  Motion for a new trial.  The defendant, represented by 
new counsel, filed a postconviction motion for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), 
claiming first, that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to retain a medical expert to question whether 
Veronica's injuries were caused by shaken baby syndrome and to 
acknowledge the possibility that her injuries could have been 
caused by an accidental short-distance fall, and second, that 
16 
 
 
 
newly available evidence, specifically new scientific advances 
on shaken baby syndrome and short falls, warranted a new trial. 
 
The motion judge, who was the trial judge, conducted a 
three-day evidentiary hearing that concluded on May 15, 2013.  
The defendant's trial counsel testified that he was aware prior 
to the start of the trial that the Commonwealth was intending to 
call Dr. Wilson as a witness, and that Dr. Wilson had diagnosed 
Veronica with shaken baby syndrome.  Although he was aware that 
CT scans and other radiological images had been taken of 
Veronica's brain, he did not attempt to obtain copies of the 
scans.  He conducted research into shaken baby syndrome and was 
aware of the controversies around it, and contacted two experts 
for assistance.  The first expert originally agreed to be 
retained but then was unable to do so.  Counsel then contacted 
Dr. Edward Sussman, a pathologist whose services he had used in 
prior cases and in whom he had confidence.  Before counsel 
retained Dr. Sussman, he learned that Dr. Sussman believed in 
the validity of shaken baby syndrome as a diagnosis.  Without 
viewing the CT and other radiological scans, Dr. Sussman advised 
that Veronica's injuries were compatible with impact to the left 
temporal lobe of the brain, and that the tearing of veins in her 
brain and bilateral retinal hemorrhaging were "some evidence of 
shaking."  He also advised that the multiple sites of Veronica's 
injuries were not compatible with a single fall.  He said it was 
17 
 
 
 
possible that her injuries were caused by three separate falls 
on the day of the incident, but unlikely because he did not 
believe that the falls were of a great enough distance.  Thus, 
counsel chose not to call Dr. Sussman as a witness because 
counsel "did not believe that he would be of value." 
 
Trial counsel also contacted other attorneys who had worked 
on shaken baby cases to find out which experts they had used.  
At the time of the motion hearing, he could recall that he had 
spoken with only one attorney and that the attorney had 
consulted with Dr. Plunkett, but had not called him to testify 
at trial.  Counsel said that the attorney expressed an opinion 
about Dr. Plunkett that led him to decide that Dr. Sussman was 
"best."  Counsel spoke with Dr. Sussman about Dr. Plunkett's 
research regarding short falls, and Dr. Sussman told him that 
Dr. Plunkett was an opponent of shaken baby syndrome but that 
his opinions "had been refuted in several peer review articles." 
 
Although trial counsel read literature critical of shaken 
baby syndrome, he did not contact any of the authors of that 
literature and did not seek to retain any other critics who 
could be helpful as expert witnesses.  He testified that he did 
not choose to call an expert because he believed, based on his 
conversations with other attorneys, that doctors who questioned 
the validity of shaken baby syndrome were subject to attack by 
their peers, which would render them more vulnerable to cross-
18 
 
 
 
examination and might lead to a counter-expert being called by 
the Commonwealth.  He said, however, that if he had found an 
expert from out-of-State who had solid credentials and could 
assist the defense, he would have "brought in" that witness to 
testify. 
 
Regarding the strategy he ultimately did pursue, trial 
counsel stated that "[his] preference was to blame [Comeau] for 
the event" but "the problem that [he] had was that gap in time 
between [Comeau] leaving and the child being found."  He 
explained that he did not pursue a third-party culprit defense 
until the closing argument because of that concern, but once Dr. 
Wilson testified that Veronica could have sustained the blow and 
remained conscious after Comeau had left, he had the opportunity 
to pursue this defense. 
 
Dr. Joseph Scheller, a pediatrician and child neurologist, 
testified regarding the scientific evidence that could have been 
presented at trial on behalf of the defense.  First, Dr. 
Scheller described what he considered the questionable 
foundation of shaken baby syndrome as a valid and scientifically 
supported medical diagnosis.  He explained that, although in 
theory a violent shaking of a baby can cause injury, there is no 
scientific evidence based on biomechanical models or animal 
studies, or from video cameras or witnesses, to support the 
claims made by proponents of shaken baby syndrome.  He stated, 
19 
 
 
 
"[W]e don't really have scientific proof that [shaken baby 
syndrome] happens like doctors say it happens and that [it] can 
cause the injuries that are credited to it or connected with 
it."  Dr. Scheller further testified that scientific studies on 
shaken baby syndrome that rely on perpetrator confessions are 
flawed because the confessions are unreliable.  He stated that 
in the cases he has seen, the confession is one that is "either 
exaggerated or coerced."13  Moreover, he stated, even if the 
confession was assumed valid, he has "never once seen a 
confession that explains every injury."  He explained that, 
although there are video recordings that exist of people 
intentionally shaking babies, the babies in those video 
recordings were not harmed in the way predicted by proponents of 
shaken baby syndrome, and in fact all of those babies had normal 
CT scans and eye exams and "turned out fine."  Dr. Scheller also 
testified that a child over three months old who is shaken is 
unlikely to suffer any kind of head injury because the neck 
would prevent the head from moving back and forth; however, "it 
                                                          
 
 
13 Dr. Joseph Scheller offered as an example one case in 
which the child did not wake up, the parents admitted to shaking 
the baby a little bit to awaken him or her, and such an 
admission was reported as an admission of violent shaking. 
14 
Defense counsel has no duty to investigate a theoretically 
possible defense that is not potentially substantial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 807, cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 947 (2008). 
20 
 
 
 
is very easy to imagine that these youngsters will have rib 
injury, skin injury and limb injury." 
 
Second, Dr. Scheller called into question Dr. Wilson's 
diagnosis of Veronica.  Specifically, Dr. Scheller testified 
that the presence and extent of Veronica's retinal hemorrhages  
do not prove that she was violently shaken.  He stated that 
while child abuse pediatricians and some ophthalmologists 
believe one can actually shake the eyeball and cause a retinal 
hemorrhage, it has never been done in a model and it has not 
occurred in people known to have been shaken.  In contrast, he 
stated, "we absolutely do know that you can get retinal 
hemorrhages from too much pressure."  He opined, "[I]n a two-
year-old who has this type of head injury, the retinal 
hemorrhage is absolutely zero evidence of any kind of shaking, 
even [to] those who believe in the shaking theory[;] because 
this child has so much pressure going on we have got to believe 
that it was the pressure that caused the retinal hemorrhage."  
He stated that he could not give an opinion to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty whether the amount and type of 
retinal hemorrhages Veronica suffered would be more consistent 
with abuse or falling down three stairs because "it could happen 
with either" and the probability is "fifty/fifty." 
 
Based on his review of Veronica's medical records, Dr. 
Scheller offered an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical 
21 
 
 
 
certainty that Veronica suffered a subdural hemorrhage that 
"could have easily been from an accidental injury, just as it 
could have been from an inflicted injury[;] there was no way to 
tell from what actually happened to Veronica that it was 
accidental or inflicted."  He further stated that Veronica's 
injuries could have been caused by a short distance fall of two 
and one-half to three feet onto her head, and there is no way to 
tell from the medical records whether the brain swelling was 
more likely to have been caused by a fall or by abuse.  He 
stated unequivocally, however, that, given the location of 
Veronica's subdural hemorrhage, her injuries "did not come from 
a shake" because it is impossible to cause a subdural hemorrhage 
in only one side of the brain by shaking back and forth.  He 
concluded that "without any question [Veronica] received a blow 
to the left side of the head and that caused bleeding 
underneath, that caused the brain to swell underneath the 
bleeding and all the other problems, but that blow could have 
been an accidental blow or an intentional blow.  There is just 
no way to tell from looking at [the CT scan]." 
 
Finally, Dr. Scheller testified that shaken baby syndrome 
is the subject of heated debate and widespread disagreement 
among forensic pathologists, radiologists, pediatricians, 
ophthalmologists, and physicists and biomedical engineers.  He 
stated that, although in 2006 every pediatrician and child abuse 
22 
 
 
 
specialist he met believed strongly that shaken baby syndrome 
was a valid diagnosis, in the more recent past a "significant 
minority" has recognized that the science behind shaken baby 
syndrome is questionable and has instead adopted the term 
"abusive head trauma" or "abusive head injury" as a more general 
term for inflicted injury.  He stated that ophthalmologists 
disagree on whether retinal hemorrhages prove shaken baby 
syndrome; although the majority agree that retinal hemorrhages 
provide some evidence in support of a shaken baby syndrome 
diagnosis, a minority of ophthalmologists believe that their 
presence does not point to a specific diagnosis.  Dr. Scheller 
testified that, among radiologists, pathologists, and 
pediatricians, the majority supporting the shaken baby syndrome 
theory has shrunk.  He stated that nothing has changed in his 
view or in the literature since 2007, and that he would have 
come to the same conclusions about the cause of Veronica's 
injuries in 2007.  Dr. Scheller stated that the only change in 
the debate since 2007 has been in the increased acceptance of 
the views critical of shaken baby syndrome. 
 
The judge denied the motion for a new trial, concluding 
that trial counsel's decision not to call an expert was a 
strategic judgment that was not manifestly unreasonable.  The 
judge reasoned that, had counsel called a scientific expert to 
testify, he would have had to "address the expert's 
23 
 
 
 
vulnerabilities on cross-examination."  The judge found that 
counsel instead "used his agile and compelling cross-examination 
of Dr. Wilson to make all the essential points he needed" to 
suggest the possibility that Comeau, not the defendant, had 
struck the blows that injured Veronica, which was a reasonable 
defense strategy.  The judge also rejected the defendant's newly 
discovered evidence claim, determining that the defendant's 
proffered evidence regarding shaken baby syndrome and accidental 
short falls was not newly discovered because five of the seven 
articles that Dr. Scheller relied upon were published before 
trial and, even if it were newly discovered, the defendant's 
evidence that the views of Drs. Plunkett and Scheller were "now 
widely accepted is not credible."  The judge also found that the 
conclusion that the medical evidence in this case was consistent 
with shaken baby syndrome or abusive head trauma rather than 
with multiple short falls "is supported by overwhelming medical 
evidence." 
 
The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the 
denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial and the 
defendant's conviction in an unpublished memorandum and order 
issued pursuant to its rule 1:28.  See Commonwealth v. Epps, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2015).  The Appeals Court held that trial 
counsel was not ineffective because his failure to call an 
expert to testify was a strategic decision, and that decision 
24 
 
 
 
was not "manifestly unreasonable" because, as the motion judge 
reasoned, counsel made all of the essential points he needed to 
make on cross-examination, and "[a]ny further exploration into 
this area . . . would have undermined the defendant's ultimate 
defense that someone other than the defendant, i.e., the 
victim's mother, inflicted the victim's injuries."  The Appeals 
Court further reasoned that counsel's decision not to call an 
expert was not unreasonable because the research proffered by 
the defendant at the motion for a new trial "remains in the 
significant minority and subject to sizeable attack."  The court 
also agreed with the judge's ruling on the newly discovered 
evidence claim.  We granted the defendant's motion for further 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  To 
prevail on a motion for a new trial claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that there has been 
a "serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel 
-- behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might 
be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer," and that 
counsel's poor performance "likely deprived the defendant of an 
otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."  
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  Where 
defense counsel makes a strategic decision not to present a 
potentially substantial defense, we "ask whether the decision 
25 
 
 
 
was manifestly unreasonable when made."  Commonwealth v. LaBrie, 
473 Mass. 754, 771 (2016).  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 
Mass. 664, 674-675 (2015) ("The manifestly unreasonable test, 
therefore, is essentially a search for rationality in counsel's 
strategic decisions, taking into account all the circumstances 
known or that should have been known to counsel in the exercise 
of his duty to provide effective representation to the client 
and not whether counsel could have made alternative choices").  
Where that strategic decision is made after conducting a 
complete investigation of the possible defense, we give 
deference to defense counsel's decision and determine whether it 
was manifestly unreasonable for counsel to forgo that defense 
based on the information available to counsel at the relevant 
time.  See Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 807, cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 947 (2008); Commonwealth v. Candelario, 446 
Mass. 847, 854-858 (2006) (counsel's failure to pursue lack of 
criminal responsibility defense was not manifestly unreasonable 
where "[counsel] took appropriate steps to investigate such 
defenses and, after doing so, made a tactical decision that the 
defenses were unlikely to succeed").  But where a strategic 
decision is made to conduct something less than a complete 
investigation of a potentially substantial defense, either 
because defense counsel decided to forgo that defense or to 
present it at trial without complete investigation, we ask 
26 
 
 
 
whether it was manifestly unreasonable to conduct so limited an 
investigation.  See Labrie, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Lang, 
473 Mass. 1, 14 (2015) (Hines, J., concurring) ("Strategic 
choices made before a complete investigation are reasonable 
'[only] to the extent that reasonable professional judgments 
support the limitation on investigation'"); Kolenovic, supra at 
670, 675 (counsel's decision to forgo further evaluation of 
defendant for posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD] after 
consulting with one expert not manifestly unreasonable where 
"counsel had done what was necessary to identify the defense 
options based on PTSD" and "made the strategic decision that a 
lack of criminal responsibility or diminished capacity defense 
was unlikely to succeed and that further investigation was 
unnecessary"). 
 
Defense counsel has a professional obligation to 
investigate all potentially substantial defenses.14  See 
Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass. 150, 160 (2015); Commonwealth 
v. Haggerty, 400 Mass. 437, 441-442 (1987).  The extent of 
investigation required to explore each potential defense depends 
on the strength of that defense relative to the availability and 
strength of other potential defenses.  See Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
14 Defense counsel has no duty to investigate a 
theoretically possible defense that is not potentially 
substantial.  See Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 807, 
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 947 (2008). 
27 
 
 
 
at 676 ("choice between a [lack of criminal responsibility] 
defense that . . . would require riding 'two horses,' and a 
viable alternative defense based on the factually unassailable 
intoxication defense developed by counsel" justified lack of 
investigation into lack of criminal responsibility defense); 
Haggerty, supra at 442 ("[f]ailure to investigate the only 
defense a defendant has, if facts known to or with minimal 
diligence accessible to counsel support that defense, falls 
beneath the level of competency expected").  See also Lang, 473 
Mass. at 15 (Hines, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 
Mass. 519, 529 (2003). 
 
Here, the defendant's trial counsel chose not to consult 
with any further experts after speaking with one expert who he 
knew did not question the validity of shaken baby syndrome and 
who, without having viewed the medical records, offered the 
opinion that Veronica's injuries could not possibly have been 
caused by the accidental falls described by the defendant.  We 
consider whether, in the circumstances of this case, it was 
manifestly unreasonable for counsel to have decided to confer 
with no other expert who might challenge the diagnosis of shaken 
baby syndrome or who might challenge the opinion that Veronica's 
symptoms could not possibly have been caused by the accidental 
falls described by the defendant. 
28 
 
 
 
 
As became apparent at trial, defense counsel reasonably had 
two alternative lines of defense:  he could argue that there was 
a reasonable doubt whether the defendant caused Veronica's 
injuries because of the possibility that her injuries were 
caused by the accidental falls she sustained earlier that 
morning -- falling down the stairs, falling off the stool, or 
the cumulative effect of both falls; or that there was a 
reasonable doubt whether the defendant caused Veronica's 
injuries because of the possibility that Comeau intentionally 
inflicted the injury.  The accidental defense had significant 
evidentiary support in that the defendant had consistently 
reported that Veronica fell down the stairs earlier that morning 
and had fallen off the stool at breakfast.  The defendant's 
report that Veronica fell from the stool was strongly 
corroborated: 
 The defendant told Fletcher about it when he arrived at the 
home, and Fletcher saw a "bump" over Veronica's left eye; 
 When Comeau came home during her lunch break, the "bump" 
was now "dime-sized," and the defendant told her that 
Veronica had fallen from the stool; and 
 Veronica herself told Comeau that she had hit her head. 
Moreover, although the prosecution theory was that the defendant 
violently shook Veronica after Delilah had reported that 
Veronica had fallen, defense counsel reasonably could have 
29 
 
 
 
argued that Veronica was already unconscious when Delilah called 
(as the defendant reported to police) because a four year old is 
unlikely to report to his or her caretaker an ordinary fall by a 
two year old sibling, especially when, as here, the sibling fell 
so often that she earned the nickname of "Tonka."  When Comeau 
returned to her home after Veronica had become unconscious, she 
reported that she saw a big "red and purple/black" lump on 
Veronica's forehead, which permitted the inference that the bump 
from the fall had grown into this discolored lump. 
 
At the time of trial, there was substantial scientific and 
medical literature that recognized the possibility that 
accidental short falls can cause serious head injuries in young 
children of the type generally associated with shaken baby 
syndrome.15  Numerous studies had also been published at the time 
                                                          
 
 
15 See, e.g., Roth, Raul, Ludes, & Willinger, Finite Element 
Analysis of Impact and Shaking Inflicted to a Child, 121 Int'l 
J. Legal Med. 223, 225 (2007) (based on computer simulation, 
eighteen inch fall as likely to cause subdural hemorrhage as 
shaking); Prange, Coats, Duhaime, & Margulies, Anthropomorphic 
Simulations of Falls, Shakes, and Inflicted Impacts in Infants, 
99 J. Neurosurgery 143 (2003) (shaking and minor falls produce 
similar rotational responses, with falls of only twelve inches 
with head impact producing accelerations in excess of those 
produced during shaking); Hymel, Jenny, & Block, Intracranial 
Hemorrhage and Rebleeding in Suspected Victims of Abusive Head 
Trauma:  Addressing the Forensic Controversies, 7 Child 
Maltreatment 329 (2002) (describing two cases of serious head 
trauma from accidental short falls); Jenny, Shams, Rangarajan, & 
Fukuda, Development of a Biofidelic 2.5 kg Infant Dummy and Its 
Application to Assessing Infant Head Trauma During Violent 
Shaking, Injury Biomechanics Research, Proceedings of the 
Thirtieth International Workshop, at 138 (Nov. 10, 2002) (based 
30 
 
 
 
of trial challenging the view that shaking alone can produce the 
types of injuries associated with shaken baby syndrome.16 
Although these issues were hotly contested in the relevant 
medical and scientific fields, see People v. Ackley, 497 Mich. 
381, 385 (2015); State v. Edmunds, 308 Wis. 2d 374, 385-386 
(2008), and although the experts who would support the positions 
beneficial to the defense were in the minority in this debate, 
there was significant medical and scientific support for these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on biomechanical experiment, maximum head center of gravity 
acceleration produced by shaking less than one-third of that 
produced by rolling off sofa); Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head 
Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls, 22 Am. J. Forensic Med. 
& Pathology 1, 7-9 (2001) (symptoms attributed to shaken baby 
syndrome also found in fatal short falls); Christian, Taylor, 
Hertle, & Duhaime, Retinal Hemorrhages Caused by Accidental 
Household Trauma, 135 J. Pediatrics 125, 127 (1999) (reporting 
three cases of infants between seven months and thirteen months 
of age who had retinal hemorrhages after short falls); Hall, 
Reyes, Horvat, Meller, & Stein, The Mortality of Childhood 
Falls, 29 J. Trauma 1273-74 (1989) (of fatal falls by children 
in Cook County, Illinois, during four-year period, forty-one per 
cent were minor falls from less than three feet). 
 
 
16 See, e.g., Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome:  A Biomechanics 
Analysis of Injury Mechanisms, 151 Forensic Sci. Int'l 71, 78 
(2005) (infant shaking cannot cause serious injuries without 
also resulting in neck injury); Ommaya, Goldsmith, & Thibault, 
Biomechanics and Neuropathology of Adult and Pediatric Head 
Injury, 16(3) Brit. J. of Neurosurgery 220, 233 (2002) (based on 
standard biomechanical principles, shaken baby syndrome 
hypothesis requires forces that are biomechanically improbable 
and increased intracranial pressure is more likely to cause 
retinal bleeding than shaking); Duhaime, Gennarelli, Thibault, 
Bruce, Margulies, & Wiser, The Shaken Baby Syndrome:  A 
Clinical, Pathological, and Biomechanical Study, 66 J. 
Neurosurgery 409, 413-414 (1987) (subjecting biomechanical model 
to repetitive violent shaking demonstrated that shaking fell 
below established injury thresholds). 
 
31 
 
 
 
minority positions.  See notes 15 and 16, supra; note 17, infra; 
Millien, 474 Mass. at 435 n.16, 438 n.20.  There were also 
published articles that identified the methodological 
shortcomings of the research supporting the majority view on 
shaken baby syndrome,17 and that highlighted the difficulties 
faced by physicians in accurately diagnosing the cause of 
injuries that appear to have been caused by child abuse.18 
                                                          
 
 
17 See, e.g., Vinchon, Defoort-Dhellemmes, Desurmont, & 
Dhellemmes, Accidental and Nonaccidental Head Injuries in 
Infants:  A Prospective Study, 102 J. Neurosurgery:  Pediatrics 
380, 383 (2005) ("[T]he evaluation of the incidence of [retinal 
hemorrhages] in child abuse remains a self-fulfilling prophecy" 
because children are diagnosed as being abused "in great part 
based on the presence of [retinal hemorrhage]"); Donohoe, 
Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby Syndrome, 24 Am. J. 
Forensic Med. & Pathology 239, 240-241 (2003) (performing review 
of shaken baby syndrome literature from 1966 through 1998 and 
concluding that "there existed serious data gaps, flaws of 
logic, inconsistency of case definition, and a serious lack of 
tests capable of discriminating [non-accidental injury] cases 
from natural injuries. . . .  [By 1999] the commonly held 
opinion that the finding of [subdural hematoma] and [retinal 
hemorrhages] in an infant was strong evidence of [shaken baby 
syndrome] was unsustainable").  For example, in one study 
seeking to determine whether short falls of children cause 
death, after finding an unexpectedly large number of deaths 
after reported short falls, the author excluded those deaths 
because they assumed those reports to be false.  See Chadwick, 
Chin, Salerno, Landsverk, & Kitchen, Deaths from Falls in 
Children:  How Far Is Fatal?, 31 J. Trauma 1353, 1355 (1991). 
 
 
18 See, e.g., Christian, Taylor, Hertle, & Duhaime, Retinal 
Hemorrhages Caused by Accidental Household Trauma, 135 J. 
Pediatrics 125, 127 (1999) (recognizing overlap between 
accidental and abusive head injury and cautioning against 
presumption of abuse when infants under one year present with 
traumatic retinal hemorrhages); Sirotnak, Medical Disorders that 
Mimic Abusive Head Trauma, in Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and 
Children 191 (2006) (many conditions mimic abusive head trauma); 
32 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, the alternative defense that Comeau had shaken 
Veronica would have required a jury to accept as a reasonable 
possibility that the natural mother of Veronica, rather than the 
boy friend with no biological connection to Veronica, violently 
shook Veronica when she came home during her lunch break.  Apart 
from the inherent difficulty in persuading a jury to accept such 
a possibility, this defense suffered from two additional 
challenges:  Veronica appeared normal and continued to play 
after Comeau returned to work, and the defendant told the police 
that he did not believe Comeau had inflicted the injury.19  In 
light of these difficulties, it is not surprising that defense 
counsel told the judge on the first day of trial that he did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Barnes, Ethical Issues in Imaging Nonaccidental Injury:  Child 
Abuse, 13(2) Topics in Magnetic Resonance Imaging 85, 86-87, 91 
(2002) (applying standard of evidence-based medicine to shaking 
mechanism and concluding that no scientific basis exists 
indicating force required to produce traumatic brain injury and 
that many conditions mimic child abuse); Case, Graham, Handy, 
Jentzen, & Monteleone, Position Paper on Fatal Abusive Head 
Injuries in Infants and Young Children, 22 Am. J. Forensic Med. 
& Pathology 112, 116-117 (2001) (acknowledging that retinal 
hemorrhages have many nontraumatic causes, including increased 
intracranial pressure, bleeding disorders, sepsis, meningitis, 
and vasculopathies, and that pathogenesis of retinal hemorrhages 
is not precisely understood). 
 
 
19 Based on the information in the record, counsel made no 
effort to locate a medical expert who would support the 
contention that a child who suffered Veronica's injuries from a 
violent shaking could have a lucid interval between the shaking 
and the manifestation of symptoms. 
 
33 
 
 
 
intend to offer a defense of third-party culprit,20 and that he 
invited the jury in opening statement to consider whether 
Veronica's injuries were accidental rather than inflicted. 
Without an expert to testify to the possibility that 
Veronica's injuries might have been caused by her accidental 
falls, all that trial counsel was able to do to advance the 
theory of accident was to ask Dr. Wilson to acknowledge the 
existence of Dr. Plunkett's findings regarding short falls, 
which Dr. Wilson did and then noted that Dr. Plunkett's findings 
were not widely accepted within the national community of 
pediatricians and were not recognized by the American Academy of 
Pediatrics (AAP).  It should have been entirely foreseeable 
that, when defense counsel invites a prosecution expert to 
acknowledge findings in support of a minority position in the 
field of science or medicine, the expert will diminish the 
significance of those findings by testifying that they are not 
credited by the majority of experts in the field.  And without 
an expert to testify in support of the minority position, or 
vigorous cross-examination prepared with the assistance of such 
an expert, there is no reason to believe that a jury will be 
persuaded by a view rejected by the majority of experts in a 
                                                          
 
 
20 Defense counsel was able to resurrect the Comeau defense 
in closing argument only because the prosecutor elicited 
testimony from Dr. Wilson that a child after having been shaken 
may not immediately be unconscious or comatose, but would not 
likely be playful or eating normally. 
34 
 
 
 
learned field.  Defense counsel apparently recognized the 
futility of an accident defense without the testimony or aid of 
such an expert, because, in closing argument, he effectively 
abandoned the accident defense entirely, and asked the jury 
simply to consider who "struck the blow."21 
Having informed the judge at the beginning of trial that he 
did not plan to pursue a third-party culprit defense, defense 
counsel's failure to consult with any expert other than Dr. 
Sussman effectively meant that the defendant commenced trial 
without any substantial defense, even though further 
investigation would have supported a potentially substantial 
defense of accident.22  Trial counsel testified that he would 
have retained an expert to testify if he could have found one 
with "solid credentials" who could assist the defense.  But when 
asked if he made "any inquiries into whether any experts other 
than Dr. Plunkett would be helpful as witnesses in this case," 
he answered, "No."  He also testified that he never contacted 
                                                          
 
 
21 Defense counsel in closing argument went so far as to 
tell the jury, mistakenly, that the defendant during his 
interviews with the police admitted that the falls he described 
could not have caused Veronica's injuries. 
 
 
22 Apart from the substantial evidence that Veronica had 
suffered some head injury from her fall off the stool, the 
medical evidence revealed that Veronica suffered no neck injury.  
There was medical literature published at the time of trial that 
concluded that neck injury would be inevitable in a shaking so 
violent as to have caused the symptoms associated with shaken 
baby syndrome.  See note 16, supra; Millien, 474 Mass. at 433 
n.15. 
35 
 
 
 
any of the authors of the scholarly articles that questioned the 
validity of shaken baby syndrome or that recognized the 
possibility that short falls could cause the type of injuries 
usually associated with shaken baby syndrome.  Where there was 
strong, corroborated evidence that Veronica had suffered a head 
injury from at least one short accidental fall, where accident 
was the defense that counsel presented to the jury in opening 
statement, and where this defense was tenable only with the aid 
of an expert to challenge the majority views on short falls and 
shaken baby syndrome, it would have been manifestly unreasonable 
for counsel to have made so little effort to find and retain 
such an expert if there were experts available with "solid 
credentials," that is, experts who could have been found 
credible by a reasonable jury, and who challenged these views. 
Whether counsel's representation in this case was 
ineffective, therefore, rests on whether, at the time of trial 
in July, 2007, there were credible experts available who 
challenged the majority views on short falls and shaken baby 
syndrome.  The record, however, is sparse on this issue; the 
existence of scientific and medical studies would certainly 
provide the factual basis for an expert to offer a minority 
opinion on these subjects, but that does not mean that experts 
were readily available in 2007 who were prepared and willing to 
offer such opinions in a criminal case.  Dr. Scheller testified 
36 
 
 
 
that credible experts were available to testify in 2007, but we 
note that the judge did not find Dr. Scheller credible as an 
expert himself in part because of his assertions that ventured 
well beyond what was necessary to his opinion that the injuries 
suffered by Veronica reasonably could have been caused by her 
accidental falls.23  For reasons that will soon become clear, 
however, we need not determine whether it was manifestly 
unreasonable in 2007 for counsel to have failed to find a 
credible expert who shared the minority view in this scientific 
controversy. 
2.  Newly discovered evidence.  We now consider whether 
there was newly discovered evidence in the form of new 
scientific or medical findings.  Newly discovered evidence 
warrants a new trial where that evidence "would probably have 
been a real factor in the jury's deliberations" and where its 
absence at trial "casts real doubt on the justice of the 
conviction."  Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 616, 617 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305, 306 
(1986).  Evidence is newly discovered where it was "unknown to 
the defendant or his counsel and not reasonably discoverable" 
through "reasonable pretrial diligence."  Grace, supra at 306. 
                                                          
 
 
23 For instance, the judge found "absurd" Dr. Scheller's 
testimony that people generally do not shake babies out of 
frustration and that the perception that they do is the result 
of "public relation campaigns launched by child abuse 
pediatricians." 
37 
 
 
 
Since the defendant's trial, several additional studies 
have been published that provide further support for the view 
that subdural hematomas, retinal hemorrhages, and other forms of 
significant head injury can result from accidental short falls.24  
More research has also been conducted that casts doubt on the 
view that shaking alone can cause serious head injury.25  And 
more articles have been published in medical and scholarly 
journals questioning the diagnostic significance of the symptoms 
previously thought indicative of shaken baby syndrome.26   
                                                          
 
 
24 See Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury and the 
Mimics:  Issues and Controversies in the Era of Evidence-Based 
Medicine, 49 Radiologic Clinics of N. Am. 205, 217 (2011) (based 
on clinical, biomechanical, neuropathological, and neuro-
radiological evidence, significant head injury, including 
subdural and retinal hemorrhages, may result from low level 
falls); Squier, The "Shaken Baby" Syndrome:  Pathology and 
Mechanisms, 122 Acta Neuropathologica 519 (2011) (same); 
Cummings, Trelka, & Springer, Atlas of Forensic Histopathology, 
Cambridge Univ. Press (2011) (skull fractures, subdural 
hematomas, and retinal hemorrhages have all been found after 
short falls); Lantz & Couture, Fatal Acute Intracranial Injury, 
Subdural Hematoma, and Retinal Hemorrhages Caused by Stairway 
Fall, 56(6) J. Forensic Sciences 1648 (2011) (case study of 
infant who fell from short height and had subdural hemorrhage, 
midline shift, mild edema, and severe retinal hemorrhages). 
 
 
25 See, e.g., Jones, Martin, Williams, Kemp, & Theobald, 
Development of a Computational Biomechanical Infant Model for 
the Investigation of Infant Head Injury by Shaking, 55 Med., 
Sci., & Law 291 (2015) (biomechanical study using computational 
model suggests shaking cannot generate levels of force necessary 
to produce injuries associated with abusive head trauma). 
 
 
26 See Anderst, Carpenter, Abshire, Bleeding Disorders in 
Suspected Child Abuse, 131 Pediatrics 1314, 1320-1321 (2013) 
(demonstrating that bleeding disorders can cause or aggravate 
findings that can be attributed to abuse and recommending more 
38 
 
 
 
 
This research appears to have influenced the position of  
the AAP regarding the diagnosis of child abuse in head injuries.  
In July, 2001, the Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect of the 
AAP declared, "Although physical abuse in the past has been a 
diagnosis of exclusion, data regarding the nature and frequency 
of head trauma consistently support the need for a presumption 
of child abuse when a child younger than [one] year has suffered 
an intracranial injury."  Shaken Baby Syndrome:  Rotational 
Cranial Injuries -- Technical Report, 108 Pediatrics 206, 206 
(2001).  In 2009, however, the AAP acknowledged in a policy 
statement that "[f]ew pediatric diagnoses engender as much 
debate as [abusive head trauma]."  Christian, Block, & Committee 
on Child Abuse and Neglect of American Academy of Pediatrics, 
Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children, 123 Pediatrics 
1409, 1410 (2009).  The AAP recognized that the "[c]ontroversy 
is fueled because the mechanisms and resultant injuries of 
accidental and abusive head injury overlap, the abuse is rarely 
witnessed, an accurate history of trauma is rarely offered by 
the perpetrator, there is no single or simple test to determine 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
extensive evaluations to test for presence of these disorders); 
Guthkelch, Problems of Infant Retino-Dural Hemorrhage with 
Minimal External Injury, 12 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 201 
(2012) (due to the complexity of infant brain, "we should not 
expect to find an exact or constant relationship between the 
existence or extent of retino-dural hemorrhage and the amount of 
force involved, let alone the state of mind of the perpetrator.  
Nor should we assume that these findings are caused by trauma, 
rather than natural causes"). 
39 
 
 
 
the accuracy of the diagnosis, and the legal consequences of the 
diagnosis can be so significant."  Id.  The 2009 policy 
statement no longer spoke of a presumption of child abuse, and 
instead declared, "A medical diagnosis of [abusive head trauma] 
is made only after consideration of all clinical data," noting 
that pediatricians "have a responsibility to consider 
alternative hypotheses when presented with a patient with 
findings suggestive of [abusive head trauma]."  Id. 
 
If defense counsel had offered expert testimony at trial 
questioning the validity of the scientific foundation of the 
diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome, and discussing the 
possibility that accidental short falls can cause injuries 
generally associated with shaken baby syndrome, the studies 
published after July, 2007, and the changes in the AAP policy 
statement might have lent more credibility to that expert 
testimony, but this generally would not be enough alone to 
justify a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 
275-276 (2005) (where defendant offered expert testimony at 
trial, proffer of new scientific evidence that constitutes 
"mere[] . . . broadening of the research . . . already present 
in legal and scientific circles" or "mere addition of further 
information to the preexisting debate" would not be "significant 
enough to create a substantial risk that the jury would have 
reached a different conclusion had the evidence been admitted at 
40 
 
 
 
trial"); Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 181 (1999).  
But, here, defense counsel did not present any expert testimony 
because he claimed he could not find an expert with "solid 
credentials" who could assist the defense.  Consequently, apart 
from the brief reference to Dr. Plunkett's research on 
accidental falls referenced on cross-examination, the jury heard 
nothing that would allow them to have a reasonable doubt whether 
Veronica's injuries had been caused by her accidental falls.  
Yet, in view of the new research published after trial and the 
number of published court cases where such experts have 
testified, competent counsel today would, with diligent effort, 
have been able to retain such an expert and offer the jury an 
alternative interpretation of the evidence.  See, e.g., In re 
Fero, 192 Wash. App. 138, 156-157 (2016) ("the medical community 
now recognizes that [the constellation of injuries associated 
with shaken baby syndrome], which was once believed could only 
be inflicted by car accidents, long falls, or child abuse, can 
actually be caused by short falls and other low-impact 
accidents, in addition to various natural causes"); Ackley, 497 
Mich. at 391-392 (noting "prominent controversy within the 
medical community regarding the reliability of [shaken baby 
syndrome]/[abusive head trauma] diagnoses"); Edmunds, 308 Wis. 
2d 385-386 ("a significant and legitimate debate in the medical 
community has developed in the past ten years over whether 
41 
 
 
 
infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone, whether an 
infant may suffer head trauma and yet experience a significant 
lucid interval prior to death, and whether other causes may 
mimic the symptoms traditionally viewed as indicating shaken 
baby or shaken impact syndrome"). 
 
Therefore, we confront this dilemma:  if the defendant were 
deprived of an available defense because counsel was 
ineffective, we would determine whether there was a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice and, if there was, we would 
conclude that the interests of justice require a new trial.  See 
Millien, 474 Mass. at 432 ("substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice" standard is same as prejudice standard under second 
prong of ineffective assistance of counsel test).  But what do 
we do if we determine that the defendant was deprived of a 
substantial defense only because, if the trial were conducted 
today, it would be manifestly unreasonable for counsel to fail 
to find and retain a credible expert given the evolution of the 
scientific and medical research?27 
                                                          
 
 
27 We emphasize that our focus on the search for a credible 
expert is framed by the unusual circumstances of this case.  
Where the medical and scientific community is less divided or 
where the minority position has less medical or scientific 
support, or alternatively, where the defense is weaker relative 
to other reasonably available defenses, it is generally not 
manifestly unreasonable to consult only with one expert when 
that expert offers an opinion that a defense is not viable.  
This is especially true where the defense rarely succeeds, such 
as a defense of lack of criminal responsibility.  See 
42 
 
 
 
 
We conclude that our touchstone must be to do justice, and 
that requires us to order a new trial where there is a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because a defendant 
was deprived of a substantial defense, regardless whether the 
source of the deprivation is counsel's performance alone, or the 
inability to make use of relevant new research findings alone, 
or the confluence of the two.  See Commonwealth v. Brescia, 471 
Mass. 381, 388 (2015) ("if it appears that justice may not have 
been done, the valuable finality of judicial proceedings must 
yield to our system's reluctance to countenance significant 
individual injustices"). 
   
Therefore, we need not determine whether it was manifestly 
unreasonable in July, 2007, for trial counsel to have failed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 675 (2015) (noting 
"extreme difficulty in successfully defending a murder case 
based on a lack of criminal responsibility defense").  But the 
research regarding cases where the prosecutor contends that a 
young child was injured by a violent shaking suggests that "the 
most important predictor of an acquittal is the defense 
presentation of nationally prominent experts who challenge the 
science."  Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project:  Shaken Baby 
Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 37-38 
(2009).  In cases such as these, where there is strong evidence 
that a young child hit his or her head after an accidental fall 
shortly before the child's devastating head injuries became 
manifest, defense counsel might reasonably choose not to present 
an expert at trial to testify to the possibility that a short 
fall could have caused the injuries, and might reasonably 
decline to pursue a short fall defense at trial, but it is 
manifestly unreasonable for counsel to make such a strategic 
decision without making a diligent effort to consult with an 
expert with "solid credentials" who recognizes the possibility 
that short falls can cause severe injuries in young children. 
43 
 
 
 
make the additional effort needed to find an appropriate expert.  
It suffices that we conclude that the defendant was deprived of 
a defense from the confluence of counsel's failure to find such 
an expert and the evolving scientific research that demonstrates 
that a credible expert could offer important evidence in support 
of this defense.28 
 
3.  Prejudice.  In evaluating whether there is a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arising from the 
deprivation of this defense, we conduct a prejudice analysis 
comparable to the analysis we conduct after finding that defense 
counsel was ineffective or that newly discovered evidence has 
emerged.  See Millien, 474 Mass. at 432 (where it was manifestly 
unreasonable for counsel to fail to present defense, we 
determine whether "we have a serious doubt whether the jury 
verdict would have been the same had the defense been 
presented"); Grace, 397 Mass. at 305-306 (newly discovered 
evidence warrants new trial where that evidence "would probably 
have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations" and its 
absence at trial "casts real doubt on the justice of the 
conviction").  We have a serious doubt in this case whether the 
                                                          
 
 
28 Although we conclude that the judge erred in failing to 
evaluate under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), whether "justice may not have been done" 
because of the confluence of counsel's performance and the 
evolving scientific research, we recognize that we can cite no 
case presenting the unusual circumstances found here that would 
justify such an analysis. 
44 
 
 
 
jury verdict would have been the same had the jury heard expert 
testimony regarding the possibility that short falls can cause 
severe head injuries in young children. 
 
Here, the prosecution was able to persuade the jury that it 
had eliminated the alternative explanation of accidental short 
falls because the only medical expert who testified offered the 
opinion that injuries of the type and severity suffered by 
Veronica could not have been caused by the short falls described 
by the defendant, and the only evidence to the contrary was the 
brief reference to Dr. Plunkett's study on short falls, the 
findings of which the jury learned from Dr. Wilson were not 
widely accepted within the national community of pediatricians 
and had not been recognized by the AAP.  If the jury had learned 
that injuries of the type and severity suffered by Veronica 
could have been caused by short falls of the type described by 
the defendant, they might have had reasonable doubt whether the 
defendant violently shook Veronica after he left Fletcher to go 
upstairs.  A reasonable jury could have found that Veronica fell 
down the stairs and later fell off the kitchen stool, and that 
one (or the combination) of these falls caused the bump on her 
forehead that had grown to the size of a dime when Comeau came 
home on her lunch break and grew into a discolored lump by the 
time she returned home.  Based on Dr. Wilson's testimony, a 
reasonable jury could have found that Veronica could have 
45 
 
 
 
remained conscious after even a severe fall, and lost 
consciousness after a lucid interval.  A reasonable jury could 
also have inferred that Delilah called the defendant to tell him 
that Veronica had fallen, not because of any routine fall, but 
because Veronica had fallen after losing consciousness, and that 
the defendant found her unconscious when he went upstairs.  The 
missing link in the defendant's accident defense was any 
credible expert evidence that one or both of these accidental 
falls could have caused Veronica's injuries. 
 
Were an expert such as Dr. Scheller to testify at such a 
trial today, the expert could offer the opinion that it is 
possible for a child to suffer serious head injuries from an 
accidental short fall.  See notes 15 and 24, supra; Millien, 474 
Mass. at 435 n.16; In re Fero, 192 Wash. App. at 156-157.  Once 
the expert's opinion is challenged on cross-examination, the 
expert on redirect examination could cite and explain the 
numerous studies published in peer-reviewed journals that 
support this proposition.  Such an expert witness on redirect 
examination also could cite and explain the numerous studies 
challenging the view that shaking alone can produce injuries of 
the type and severity suffered by Veronica.  See notes 16 and 
25, supra; Millien, 474 Mass. at 433 n.15.  See also Cavazos v. 
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 10 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), 
quoting Edmunds, 308 Wis. 2d at 385 ("[d]oubt has increased in 
46 
 
 
 
the medical community 'over whether infants can be fatally 
injured through shaking alone'").  If such an expert were to 
cause the jury to doubt whether violent shaking alone could have 
caused Veronica's severe injuries, they may ask whether there is 
any evidence that Veronica was not only shaken, but perhaps 
slammed against the wall or thrown to the floor.  But Fletcher 
heard nothing unusual while the defendant was upstairs, and 
Veronica did not suffer any skull fracture or neck injuries.  
And if such an expert were to cause the jury to question whether 
Veronica's injuries were caused by impact trauma rather than 
violent shaking, they might more carefully consider whether the 
impact trauma described by the defendant -- Veronica's fall down 
the stairs and off the kitchen stool -- could have caused her 
head injuries. 
 
Such expert opinion testimony likely would be challenged on 
cross-examination or by a prosecution expert called in rebuttal, 
where the studies in peer-reviewed journals that support the 
prosecution theory of shaken baby syndrome could be cited and 
discussed.  We need not determine who would prevail in this 
battle of the experts, or whether the defendant would be found 
not guilty were it presented.  We need only determine, in the 
circumstances of this case, whether there is a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice where the jury heard no scientific 
or medical expert challenging the majority views on shaken baby 
47 
 
 
 
syndrome and short falls, and where new research has emerged 
since the time of trial that would lend credibility to the 
opinion of such an expert.  Because we conclude that there is a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice here, we cannot 
allow this conviction to stand. 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that, in the circumstances of this 
case, there was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, 
and we therefore reverse the denial of the defendant's motion 
for a new trial, vacate the conviction, and remand the case to 
the Superior Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.