Title: Heddon v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau
Citation: 189 N.W.2d 634
Docket Number: 8716
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: September 1, 1971

189 N.W.2d 634 (1971) Catherine HEDDON, Respondent, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU and Grafton State School, an agency of the State of North Dakota, Appellants. Civ. No. 8716. Supreme Court of North Dakota. September 1, 1971. *635 Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., and Dale W. Moench and David L. Evans, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., Bismarck, for appellants. Ohnstad, Twichell &amp; Breitling, West Fargo, for respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge (on reassignment). The North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau appeals from a judgment of the district court of Cass County, dated August 17, 1970. The pertinent part of the judgment reads: The issues in this case arise from the amendment made by the 1969 session of the State Legislature to Section 65-05-09, N.D.C.C. The relevant part of Section 65-05-09 which became part of our law in 1969 reads as follows: Prior to that amendment, Section 65-05-07 and Section 65-05-09 provided two *636 independent benefits. This is what the district court of Walsh County held in its memorandum decision dated February 19, 1966, and upon which a judgment was entered and from which judgment there has been no appeal. By way of background information, on October 14, 1961, Mrs. Heddon, then 81 years of age, while in the course of her employment as a night attendant at the Grafton State School at Grafton, North Dakota, fell and sustained a fractured right hip. According to the memorandum decision of the Walsh County district court, Mrs. Heddon was hospitalized and received medical treatment at a Grafton hospital, and upon application for Workmen's Compensation was found to be temporarily totally disabled and was awarded a weekly compensation of $42. While still in the hospital she fell and broke her right forearm, necessitating further medical treatment and further hospitalization. At that time the Bureau paid the entire hospital expense, which was in excess of $500 per month, plus the compensation award of $168 every four weeks. On March 3, 1962, Mrs. Heddon was transferred, with the Bureau's authorization, to a nursing home at Fargo. The nursing home costs were then $250 per month. On March 19, 1964, the Bureau, by resolution, determined that Mrs. Heddon was permanently and totally disabled, and up until March 29, 1965, the Bureau paid the entire nursing home costs plus the compensation award. On the latter date, although concluding that Mrs. Heddon was permanently and totally disabled and that it was necessary for her that she be cared for and live in a nursing home, the Bureau ordered that, commencing with April 1, 1965, and continuing thereafter during her total disability, the Bureau pay to the nursing home only the difference in the amount of $168, which was the amount of the total disability payment for four weeks, and the cost per month of care at the nursing home, which was then $265. It was from that order that Mrs. Heddon appealed to the district court of Walsh County. In reversing the Workmen's Compensation Board, that court in its memorandum opinion said: Whether the Workmen's Compensation Bureau secured the amendment to the statute in 1969 as a result of the district judge's admonition in his memorandum opinion or not, we do not know, but in any case, in 1969, through Section 3 of Senate Bill No. 225 the amendment which we have heretofore referred to became a part of Section 65-05-09, N.D.C.C. Subsequent to the adoption of that amendment, on August 29, 1969, the Bureau adopted the following resolution: When that resolution was appealed to the district court of Cass County, that court ruled against the Bureau and ordered judgment for Mrs. Heddon as indicated earlier in this opinion. We must now determine whether the resolution constitutes a retroactive application of the statute and if so whether such an application of the statute is permissible. We believe that it is a retroactive application of the statute and that this application is not permissible. Guiding us in the determination of this case is a statute on interpretation and case law. The statute reads: In a number of decisions, this court has relied upon the following rule: Notwithstanding the aforementioned statute and rule, the Bureau believes that the amendment to Section 65-05-09, N.D. C.C., effective July 1, 1969, applies to Mrs. Heddon. It asserts that the use of the word "when" in the amendment, which reads: "When a claimant who is permanently and totally disabled, and must be maintained in a nursing home or similar facility, has no dependent parent, spouse, or children, part or all of his weekly compensation may be used by the bureau to help defray the cost of such care", discloses that the legislature contemplated that the amendment apply, notwithstanding that the claimant may have been previously permanently and totally disabled and that the Bureau may have previously so determined. The Bureau further asserts that it is significant that the amendment being questioned here makes no mention of the date of the injury of the claimant and that the only requirements are those set out within the amendment. We do not think that such language clearly discloses that the legislature intended that the amendment adversely affect the rights of persons who had previously had their claims determined. The Bureau's arguments must be viewed in the light of the objectives of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Relative to the objectives of the Act and the construction that should be placed upon the Act, in 1967 we said: We do not believe that the contended construction of the statute by the Bureau is consistent with the objectives stated in the Workmen's Compensation Act or with a liberal construction of the Act. The Bureau argues, however, that there is an additional reason why the amendment should be construed to apply to Mrs. Heddon, and that is that it is a remedial statute and that as such it is not subject to the rule that it should be applied only prospectively unless it is expressly declared to be retroactive. It is asserted by the Bureau that it is remedial in that it attempts to correct what the Bureau considers to be an injustice existing between the benefits that are received by persons who are taken care of in their own homes, and who there must pay for household expenses, and those such as Mrs. Heddon who are taken care of in a nursing home, where household expenses are covered under the nursing home costs. What the Bureau seems to be contending is that this amendment is a purely procedural amendment and that it does not affect substantive rights or impair contract obligations, and thus may have a retroactive effect unless a contrary intent is evidenced in the amendment. This argument was made in Scranton Grain Company v. Lubbock Machine &amp; Supply Company, 186 N.W.2d 449 (1971), but was rejected by this court, the reason being given that Section 1-02-10, N.D.C.C., is absolute and definite. We need not rely on the rule asserted in Scranton Grain, as it is our view that the amendment in this case is not procedural but is substantive in that it definitely reduces the benefits of persons who are in the situation in which Mrs. Heddon is found in this case. In that respect then we conclude that the amendment does not merely change the employee's remedy, but that it substantially changes the rights of the employee in that it reduces the employee's benefits. Having decided as we have, we need not concern ourselves with the contention raised by the respondent, that a statute which would deprive the respondent of her right to continue to receive both nursing home care and her weekly compensation would be unconstitutional as a violation of Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution and Section 16 of Article I of the North Dakota State Constitution, prohibiting laws impairing the obligation of contracts; and Section 1 of Article XIV of the amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 13 of Article I of the North Dakota Constitution, prohibiting the taking of property without due process of law. The Bureau asserts as an additional justification the fact that it has continuing jurisdiction and that therefore it can at any time revise its awards, reduce them or raise them, and that no decision is res judicata. Although this court has as recently as 1969 concluded, in Haggart, Inc. v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 171 N.W.2d 104, that there is nothing in our statute and no case law in our state which limits the Bureau to reopening an award only upon proof of a change in the claimant's condition, we do not think that that conclusion or the fact that continued jurisdiction exists justify the Bureau's resolution in this case. If the Bureau had determined upon proper notice and hearing that Mrs. Heddon was not entitled to medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies, and had the facts substantially supported such a *639 conclusion, the Bureau might have declined to pay for the nursing home care involved in this case. Section 65-05-07, N.D.C.C., requires that the fund furnish to the employee such medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury may require. As we view the record, there is nothing in it which indicates that from the nature of Mrs. Heddon's injuries she does not require the care that she is now receiving in the nursing home. Accordingly, for the reasons herein stated, we affirm the judgment of the district court of Cass County. STRUTZ, C. J., and PAULSON, KNUDSON and TEIGEN, JJ., concur.