Title: Gadda v. Gadda
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52228
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2006

FILED: June 8, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
(CC DR0111242; CA A123921; SC S52228)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 6, 2006.
Janet M. Schroer, of Hoffman, Hart &amp; Wagner, LLP, Portland,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the
briefs was Cecil A. Reniche-Smith. 
Thomas A. Bittner, of Schulte, Anderson, Downes, Aronson &amp;
Bittner, PC, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. 
With him on the briefs was Michael J. Fearl.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Patrick D. Gilroy, Judge.

Court of Appeals Order of Dismissal dated December 28,      
 2004.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
This case requires us to determine whether an appellant
"delivered" a notice of appeal, pursuant to ORCP 9 B, sufficient
to provide the Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction.  The
Court of Appeals held that husband, the appellant, failed to
serve the notice of appeal and dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.  For the reasons outlined below, we conclude that
husband timely served the notice of appeal.  We therefore reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the appeal.
The relevant facts are as follows.  In mid-November
2003, attorney Phil Cobb began representing Kathleen Gadda (wife)
in this case.  Following trial, Barbara Aaby, the attorney for
Marc Gadda (husband), prepared a general judgment, which named
Cobb as wife's attorney.  On behalf of wife, Cobb filed
objections to the form of the proposed general judgment.  On
December 30, 2003, attorney Thomas Bittner filed a notice of
substitution of counsel for wife, replacing attorney Cobb.  That
same day, Bittner also sent a copy of the notice of substitution
to husband's attorney, Aaby.  On January 14, 2004, the trial
court entered the general judgment, which listed Cobb as wife's
attorney.  Husband filed a motion for a new trial.  On February
2, 2004, the court denied husband's motion for a new trial.  
Under ORS 19.255, husband had 30 days from February 2,
2004 (until March 3, 2004), within which to serve and file a
notice of appeal of the trial court's judgment.  On February 24,
2004, husband retained attorney Mark Johnson to represent him on
appeal.  Two days later, Johnson filed a notice of appeal and
mailed a service copy to Cobb.  On February 27, 2004, Cobb mailed
a letter to Bittner at his office, enclosing a copy of the notice
of appeal.  Bittner's office date-stamped that letter as
"received" on March 1, 2004, two days prior to the deadline for
husband to serve the notice of appeal on wife. 
After the deadline had passed, wife moved to dismiss
husband's appeal.  Wife argued that husband had failed to serve
wife or her correct attorney within the statutory time limit. 
Wife argued that, because timely service of the notice of appeal
is a jurisdictional requirement, the Court of Appeals was without
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  Husband opposed the motion and
argued that service had been sufficient to apprise wife of the
appeal, despite the error in mailing the notice to Cobb instead
of Bittner.  As noted, the Court of Appeals agreed with wife and
dismissed the appeal. 
Husband petitioned this court for review.  We held that
petition in abeyance pending our decision in McCall v.
Kulongoski, 339 Or 186, 118 P3d 256 (2005).  On August 18, 2005,
the court issued the opinion in McCall, holding as follows:
We begin by setting forth in detail the statutes and
rules applicable to this case.  Civil appeals in this state are
governed by ORS chapter 19.  ORS 19.240 states:

"(1) An appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be
taken in the manner prescribed in this chapter.  

ORS 19.255 requires service and filing of the notice of appeal
within 30 days after entry of judgment or, if a motion for a new
trial is filed, within 30 days after entry of the order disposing
of the motion.  ORS 19.270(2) provides:

"The following requirements of ORS 19.240, 19.250
and 19.255 are jurisdictional and may not be waived or
extended: 

ORS 19.500 dictates how papers must be served:

"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
when any provision of this chapter requires that a
paper be served and filed, the paper shall be served in
the manner provided in ORCP 9 B on all parties who have
appeared in the action, suit or proceeding and who are
not represented by the same counsel as the party
serving the paper, and shall be filed, with proof of
service indorsed thereon, with the trial court
administrator."

ORCP 9 B, in turn, provides that, if a party is represented by an
attorney, service shall be upon the attorney.  That rule also
provides three options for service: 

"Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be
made by delivering a copy to such attorney or party, by
mailing it to such attorney's or party's last known
address or, if the party is represented by an attorney,
by telephonic facsimile communication device as
provided in section F of this rule." 

ORCP 9 B also defines delivery:

"Delivery of a copy within this rule means:
handing it to the person to be served; or leaving it at
such person's office with such person's clerk or person
apparently in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in
charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or,
if the office is closed or the person to be served has
no office, leaving it at such person's dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person over 14 years
of age then residing therein."


Before we can address the merits of husband's argument
in this court, we first must determine whether husband has
preserved the argument that he now advances.  Husband's initial
petition for review framed the legal question as whether service
was timely when a party attempted to serve the notice of appeal
by mail on the responding party's attorney, but mistakenly mailed
the notice to an attorney who had withdrawn, and the current
attorney actually received the notice within the 30-day statutory
time period.  As husband concedes, our decision in McCall has
foreclosed his argument based on service by mail.  


That is not the end of the matter, however.  Following
our decision in McCall, husband filed a supplemental memorandum
in support of his petition for review.  In that supplemental
memorandum, husband reframed the legal question as follows: 

"[W]hether the jurisdictional requirement discussed in
McCall is satisfied if the notice of appeal is actually
delivered to the proper recipient within the statutory
time period, regardless of how that delivery was
initiated."  

(Emphasis added.)  In his brief on the merits in this court,
husband again focuses on whether service is proper when the
notice of appeal is "actually delivered to and received by the
adverse party's current attorney within the statutory 30-day
period in which to file and serve notice of appeal."  (Emphasis
added.)  Wife contends that husband's reliance on service by
delivery is prohibited because husband failed to argue that
service was accomplished via delivery in his initial petition for
review or before the Court of Appeals.  


Wife relies on ORAP 9.17(2)(b)(i), which prohibits a
petitioner from raising additional questions or changing the
substance of the questions presented in the petition for review. 
As we noted above, however, husband's supplemental memorandum
raised the issue of delivery, although his initial petition for
review did not.  We note also that, in both petitions for review,
husband raised the issue of actual receipt of the notice of
appeal.  We therefore conclude that husband's brief on the merits
does not run afoul of ORAP 9.17(2)(b)(i).


Wife also relies on ORAP 5.45(1), which provides, in
part: 

"No matter claimed as error will be considered on
appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the
lower court and is assigned as error in the opening
brief in accordance with this rule, provided that the
appellate court may consider an error of law apparent
on the face of the record."  

Husband contends that, because he argued actual receipt before
the Court of Appeals, he adequately preserved this argument. 
Husband relies on this court's decisions in State v. Hitz, 307 Or
183, 188-89, 766 P2d 373 (1988), and Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72,
77, 948 P2d 722 (1997).  In Hitz, the court distinguished
"between raising an issue at trial, identifying a source for a
claimed position, and making a particular argument," and
explained that "[t]he first ordinarily is essential, the second
less so, the third least."  Hitz, 307 Or at 188 (emphasis in
original).  In deciding to reach the allegedly unpreserved claim
of error in that case, this court noted that the opposing party
"was not ambushed or misled or denied an opportunity to meet
[the] argument."  Id. at 189. 


In Stull, this court applied the holding in Hitz and
allowed a plaintiff to raise an argument for the first time in
this court, where the plaintiff had raised a broader legal issue
below.  Stull, 326 Or at 76-77.  In that case, the defendants had
raised a statute of limitations defense in the trial court.  Id.
at 75-76.  Before the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the
plaintiff had offered one argument in response; before this
court, she offered an additional argument.  Id. at 76-77.  This
court held that plaintiff had raised the broad statute of
limitations issue and further explained that, "[i]n construing a
statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct
interpretation, whether or not asserted by the parties."  Id. at
77.


Here, the broad legal issue is whether husband
accomplished service by a legally sufficient means.  Whether
husband successfully accomplished service of the notice of appeal
by mail or by delivery are alternative arguments encompassed by
that broader legal issue.  Moreover, the same two sources of law
are at issue in both arguments:  ORS 19.240 and ORCP 9 B.  In
addition, with the issue tendered to us, we are obligated to
construe the applicable statute correctly.  Finally, as in Hitz,
wife had an opportunity to meet husband's argument in her
responding brief on the merits.  We conclude that the issue is
preserved sufficiently for our review.

We now turn to the merits of husband's arguments. 
Husband concedes that, under this court's decision in McCall, his
attempt to serve wife by mail was ineffective.  Husband does not
contend that he served the notice of appeal by facsimile. 
Therefore, the only issue presented in this case is whether
husband served the notice of appeal via "delivery" under ORCP 9
B.


As noted above, ORCP 9 B includes a definition of
"delivery."  Of the four delivery options listed in that rule,
husband contends that the notice of appeal was left "at such
person's office with such person's clerk or person apparently in
charge thereof" or "in a conspicuous place therein." 
Specifically, husband argues that Cobb's act of forwarding the
notice of appeal to Bittner and the postal service's timely
delivery of Cobb's letter and accompanying notice to Bittner's
office constituted "leaving it at such person's office."  Husband
further argues that the "received" stamp, dated March 1, 2004, on
Cobb's transmittal letter to Bittner demonstrates that Bittner's
office actually received the notice of appeal within the 30-day
time limit. 
We agree that the date stamp is sufficient to show that
someone left the notice of appeal at Bittner's office within the
required time period. (1)  Because that someone was neither
husband nor husband's agent, we must analyze whether the
applicable statutes or rules require that appellant or
appellant's agent deliver the notice of appeal. 
We begin our analysis with two observations.  First,
ORCP 9 B does not specify who must "leave" the document to be
served at one of the locations listed in the rule.  Second, the 
general provision in ORCP 9 B relating to service is phrased in
the passive voice:  "Service upon the attorney or upon a party
shall be made by delivering a copy to such attorney or party[.]" 
(Emphasis added.) 
Despite those two observations, wife argues that ORCP 9
B required husband or husband's agent to deliver the notice of
appeal.  To determine whether wife's argument is correct, we
apply the usual methodology of statutory construction and first
look to the text and context of ORCP 9 B.  See Stevens v.
Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 400-01, 84 P3d 140 (2004) (applying that
methodology, as described in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P3d 1143 (1993), to
interpretation of rules of civil procedure).  That inquiry
includes an examination of the text and context of the rule,
including other provisions of the same rule, related statutes,
and federal counterparts of the Oregon rules.  Stevens, 336 Or at
401.  In statutory construction, we are not permitted to "insert
what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted."  ORS
174.010.
Husband contends that, because ORCP 9 B mandates many
aspects of service, the absence in the text of ORCP 9 B of any
mandate prescribing who must make delivery demonstrates that the
drafters of that rule did not intend to limit who can act as a
deliverer.  Husband also points out that, if the drafters of ORCP
9 B had wanted to mandate who must deliver (or serve) the
document at issue, then that rule would contain language similar
to that in ORCP 7 E, which outlines who may serve a
summons. (2)  Husband relies on a Court of Appeals decision
that noted that ORCP 9 B is written in the passive voice and
concluded that that rule does not restrict who may deliver the
paper to be served.  McKinney and McKinney, 201 Or App 721, 731,
120 P3d 921 (2005).  That decision also suggested that, where
mail service was defective, a postal service employee could
accomplish "delivery" within the meaning of ORCP 9 B.  Id. 
In response, wife asserts that ORAP 1.35 determines who
must deliver the notice of appeal.  That rule describes filing
and service in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.  As for
service, the rule states that "[a] copy of any thing delivered
for filing under these rules must also be served by the party or
attorney delivering it to the other parties to the cause."  ORAP
1.35(2)(a) (emphasis added).  Husband contends that ORAP 1.35 is
inapplicable because the rule itself applies to things filed
"under these rules," and a notice of appeal is filed pursuant to
statute.  We disagree with husband's contention that the Oregon
Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to notices of appeal. 
The Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure "apply to all proceedings
in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals."  ORAP 1.05.  In fact,
an entire section of those rules is entitled "Notice of Appeal." 
Nevertheless, because the requirements of ORAP 1.35 are not among
the jurisdictional requirements outlined in ORS 19.270(2), ORAP
1.35(2)(a) does not control whether an appellate court must
dismiss an appeal where someone other than the appellant (or the
appellant's agent) delivers the notice of appeal.  
Instead, we look to the statutes governing notices of
appeal, rather than to the Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
As noted earlier, ORS 19.270 provides that service of the notice
of appeal "as provided in ORS 19.240(2)(a)" is a jurisdictional
requirement.  ORS 19.240(2)(a) states that "[t]he appeal shall be
taken by causing a notice of appeal" to be served on all parties
who have appeared in the proceeding.  (Emphasis added.)  That
mandate, like that in ORCP 9 B, is written in the passive voice. 
It is clear, however, that someone must cause the notice of
appeal to be served.  Because the statute applies to the party
taking the appeal, we conclude that an appellant (or an
appellant's agent) must "cause" the notice of appeal to be
served. 
ORS 19.270(2)(a) and ORS 19.240(2)(a) provide that
timely service is a jurisdictional requirement.  ORS 19.500
mandates that service be completed in accordance with ORCP 9 B. 
We construe the requirements of ORCP 9 B to be consistent with
those of ORS 19.240(2)(a).  Therefore, for service by delivery to
be proper, an appellant or an appellant's agent must have acted
to cause the delivery.  The issue in this case becomes, then, did
husband "cause" the notice of appeal to be left at Bittner's
office?
The verb "to cause" is broadly defined: "to serve as
cause or occasion of: bring into existence: make."  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 356 (unabridged ed 2002).  Based on
that broad definition, we conclude that husband did cause the
notice of appeal to be delivered to Bittner's office within the
statutory time frame.  Husband mistakenly mailed the notice of
appeal to wife's former attorney, Cobb.  Cobb then forwarded the
notice of appeal to wife's current attorney, Bittner.  Cobb's
involvement in causing the notice of appeal to arrive at the
proper place within the required time period did not prevent
delivery under ORCP 9 B.  Although husband neither personally
delivered the notice of appeal to Bittner's office nor hired an
agent to deliver it, husband's act of mailing the notice of
appeal to Cobb led directly to the delivery of the notice of
appeal to Bittner's office.  
Nevertheless, wife argues that husband's proof of
service stating that service occurred by mail to Cobb's office
defeats husband's contention that he served Bittner.  Wife relies
on ORAP 1.35 and ORAP 2.05.  Those rules require that a notice of
appeal include a "proof of service on all other parties who
appeared in the trial court," ORAP 2.05(10)(a), and that such
proof be either an "acknowledgment of service by the person
served" or "a statement of the date of personal delivery or
deposit in the mail and the names and addresses of the persons
served, certified by the person who made service," ORAP
1.35(2)(d).  Because Bittner did not sign an acknowledgment of
service, wife contends that "the only way for husband to prove
service is for the person who actually delivered the notice of
appeal to certify when, where and how that delivery
occurred." (3)  We disagree that a proof of service is the only
way to prove that service occurred.  A proof of service is
evidence that service occurred, but other evidence often is
necessary to determine whether and when service occurred.  See,
e.g., Murrieta v. Brewster, 328 Or 434, 438, 981 P3d 330 (1999)
(stating that a certificate of service "is not a verity, but it
is sufficient to put a respondent to its proof that service did
not occur").  In our view, that the proof of service in this case
indicated service by mail to wife's former attorney does not
preclude service by delivery to wife's current attorney,
especially in this case, where the evidence shows that service
was actually accomplished.  We therefore reject wife's argument.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
Petitioner's appeal is reinstated, and the case is remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
1. During oral argument, wife conceded that the "received" date stamp gave rise to a "fair
inference" that the notice of appeal had arrived at Bittner's office within the statutory time period.
2. ORCP 7 E provides, in part:
3. Wife assumes that her proof of service argument, if successful, would defeat jurisdiction. 
We do not share wife's assumption.  Nevertheless, without deciding whether the issue wife raises
is a jurisdictional one, we answer wife's argument on the merits.