Title: MARRIAGE OF HERRING v HERRING
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14710
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1979

No. 14710 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BETTE ANN HERRING, Petitioner and Appellant, JOSEPH HERRING, An Incompetent Person, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Randono, Lewis and Donovan, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Richard Ganulin, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: October 4, 1979 Decided : NOV 2 1 1'79 5 , <<".1; Filed: , . \ , : . i .?.,,!k, & s . ' - ' d \ M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from an order of t h e Cascade County D i s t r i c t Court dismissing a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r an equi- t a b l e apportionment of a m a r i t a l estate. Appellant wife and respondent husband w e r e married on August 16, 1956, i n Golden, Colorado- Appellant is 51 y e a r s o l d and respondent i s 80 years old. O n August 11, 1977, a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n with t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o have t h e marriage dissolved. O n March 23, 1978, t h e p e t i t i o n was granted, and t h e marriage of t h e p a r t i e s was dissolved by decree of d i s s o l u t i o n . I n granting t h e d i s s o l u t i o n , t h e c o u r t reserved t h e r i g h t t o equitably apportion t h e assets of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . The c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d both p a r t i e s t h a t they w e r e t o attempt t o reach a property agreement between themselves and t h a t , i f no agreement could be reached, e i t h e r p a r t y could f i l e a p e t i t i o n t o equitably apportion t h e m a r i t a l estate. The only s i g n i f i c a n t a s s e t s of t h e p a r t i e s w e r e some diamond r i n g s , acquired by t h e p a r t i e s during t h e marriage and worth approximately $3000 t o $4000 a t t h e t i m e of purchase, and a p a r c e l of r e a l property and home located a t 307 F i f t h Avenue South i n Great F a l l s , Montana, which respondent had purchased 16 years p r i o r t o t h e marriage. The p a r t i e s being unable t o reach a property s e t t l e - ment, a p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court on October 16, 1978, f o r an e q u i t a b l e apportionment of t h e m a r i t a l estate. I n t h e p e t i t i o n a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e d t h a t she w a s e n t i t l e d t o one-half of t h e i n t e r e s t i n t h e Great F a l l s property on t h e b a s i s of a n o r a l agreement she had made with respondent. Appellant estimated her e q u i t y i n t h e property a s $6500. A hearing w a s held concerning the p e t i t i o n on October 23, 1978, Appellant was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e hearing, having moved her residence t o t h e S t a t e of Colorado. Two a t t o r n e y s t e s t i f i e d on a p p e l l a n t ' s behalf t h a t respondent had attempted t o arrange a s a l e of t h e Great F a l l s property i n s a t i s f a c - t i o n of t h e a l l e g e d o r a l agreement. The sale, however, was never completed. Respondent t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e property w a s purchased s i x t e e n years p r i o r t o t h e marriage and t h a t a p p e l l a n t had made no s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e pur- chase o r maintenance of t h e property. From t h e evidence adduced a t t h e hearing, t h e District Court found t h a t a p p e l l a n t had n o t contributed t o t h e pur- chase o r maintenance of t h e property and t h a t , a s a matter of law, it would be i n e q u i t a b l e t o award a p p e l l a n t an i n t e r e s t i n t h e property. The c o u r t a l s o concluded t h a t t h e o r a l agreement was unenforceable because an i n t e r e s t con- veyed i n r e a l property must be i n writing. Accordingly, t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n be dismissed. From t h a t o r d e r , a p p e l l a n t appeals. Appellant r a i s e s s e v e r a l i s s u e s on appeal. Within t h e context of her b r i e f , however, w e note two i s s u e s which w e t h i n k a r e d i s p o s i t i v e . F i r s t , a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t it w a s e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t n o t t o a s c e r t a i n t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e time of t h e i r divorce. W e have held i n a number of cases t h a t , before t h e r e may be a proper d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a r i t a l property, t h e is- t r i c t Court must f i r s t determine t h e n e t worth of t h e par- ties a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r divorce. G r e n f e l l v. G r e n f e l l (1979) r Mont. , 596 P.2d 205, 207, 36 St.Rep. 1100, 1103; Brown v. Brown (1978), Mont . , 587 P.2d 361, 365, 35 St.Rep. 1733, 1738; Vivian v. Vivian (1978), Mont. , 583 P.2d 1072, 1074, 35 St.Rep. 1359, 1361. H e r e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court made no such finding. While t h e c o u r t d i d i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e only s i g n i f i c a n t assets w e r e t h e diamond r i n g s and t h e l o t and home, t h e r e was no attempt t o p l a c e a present, f a i r market value upon t h e s e i t e m s o r t o determine t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r divorce. One witness t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e diamond r i n g s w e r e worth about $3000 t o $4000 when they w e r e purchased s e v e r a l y e a r s ago. Another witness t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e f a i r market value of t h e home w a s $13,000. Nowhere i n t h e record o r t h e order f o r dismissal, however, i s t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t made a determination of n e t worth. f o r Appellant a l s o a l l e g e s it w a s e r r o r / t h e c o u r t n o t t o permit f u l l inquiry i n t o a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e marriage. While it appears from t h e record t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d admit evidence of a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n i n some i n s t a n c e s , it a l s o appears t h a t t h e c o u r t w a s under t h e impression a t c e r t a i n t i m e s i n t h e hearing t h a t t h e i s s u e of c o n t r i b u t i o n was most properly heard a t t h e t i m e of t h e e n t r y of t h e decree, n o t a t t h e hearing. Where counsel f o r respondent attempted t o go i n t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e following colloquy occurred: "THE COURT: With a l l due regard t o your r i g h t t o examine, I would j u s t a s soon n o t r e t r y t h e divorce case, a l l r i g h t ? "MR. GANULIN: A l l r i g h t . I ' m j u s t t r y i n g t o g e t her c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , i f you're considering d i s t r i b u t i n g them, then her c o n t r i b u t i o n would be one of t h e f a c t o r s . "THE COURT: That should have been heard a t t h e t i m e t h i s decree was entered, s h o u l d n ' t it, Counselor? "MR. GANULIN: Excuse me? "THE COURT: That should have been p a r t and par- cel of t h i s decree, s h o u l d n ' t i t ? "MR. GANULIN: Perhaps. "THE COURT: N o perhaps about it. The c o u r t has g o t t o make an equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of prop- e r t y a t t h e t i m e it e n t e r s t h e decree. " Contribution is, of course, a r e l e v a n t f a c t o r t o be considered i n dividing t h e a s s e t s of t h e m a r i t a l estate, e s p e c i a l l y with r e s p e c t t o property acquired p r i o r t o t h e marriage. Section 40-4-202, MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : ". . . I n disposing of property acquired p r i o r t o t h e marriage . . . t h e c o u r t s h a l l consider those contributions of t h e o t h e r spouse t o t h e marriage, including: " ( a ) t h e nonmonetary contribution of a home- maker; " (b) t h e e x t e n t t o which such contributions have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e maintenance of t h i s property; and " (c) whether o r n o t t h e property d i s p o s i t i o n serves a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance arrangements. " W e f i n d it was e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o f a i l t o determine t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s and permit f u l l inquiry regarding a p p e l l a n t ' s contribution t o the marriage. Accordingly, w e reverse t h e order of t h e c o u r t and remand t h i s case f o r a f u l l and proper hearing upon t h e e q u i t a b l e apportionment of t h e m a r i t a l estate. W e concur: