Title: Cordon v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 092592
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2010

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
HUGH LINCOLN CORDON, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 092592 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
    NOVEMBER 4, 2010 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, Hugh Lincoln Cordon, Jr., asks us to 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming his 
conviction for possession of cocaine, arguing that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction.  Because we conclude 
that the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive 
possession of cocaine, we will reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
FACTS 
On November 20, 2007, Detective John Baer of the Hampton 
Police Department executed a search warrant at a house located 
at 169 Finley Square in the City of Hampton.  Cordon was not at 
the house, but Donald Whitmeyer, Cordon’s uncle and owner of the 
house, was present during the execution of the warrant.  Baer 
found a cooler in one of the bedrooms containing two bags of 
suspected powder cocaine, numerous baggies, and drug 
paraphernalia inside.  A Certificate of Analysis subsequently 
showed that one of the bags contained 5.001 grams of powder 
cocaine. 
While in the bedroom Baer also found “some checks and some 
papers and stuff” containing Cordon’s name.  In a nightstand in 
the bedroom, Baer found a box of bullets, a digital scale, a bag 
of white powdery substance, a knife, glass “test-tube type 
things,” a wooden crusher, a torch, and a marijuana pipe.  The 
nightstand drawer also contained Baer’s business card. 
Baer had given Cordon a business card two days prior to 
executing the search warrant while investigating a burglary at 
the house that occurred the previous September.  In the course 
of the burglary investigation, Cordon told Baer and another 
investigating officer that his uncle owned the house, but was 
away and Cordon was living at the house.  Cordon showed the 
officers “his” bedroom but told him that nothing was missing.  
Cordon later told Baer that a lockbox was taken from underneath 
“his bed.”  In his handwritten statement regarding the burglary, 
Cordon listed an address in Newport News as his residence.  The 
bedroom Cordon referred to as “his” during the burglary 
investigation was the bedroom containing the cooler and 
nightstand searched by Baer when executing the search warrant. 
On November 27, 2007, Baer interviewed Cordon and told him 
that he found drugs and drug paraphernalia and Baer’s card in 
the bedroom at the Finley Square house that Cordon had 
previously described as “his” bedroom.  Cordon denied living at 
the house and terminated the conversation. 
 
2
Cordon was indicted for possession of cocaine in violation 
of Code § 18.2-250 and convicted by the Circuit Court of the 
City of Hampton.  He was sentenced to three years imprisonment 
with two years and six months suspended.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed his conviction.  Cordon v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
1724-08-1 (Dec. 1, 2009)(unpublished).  Cordon filed a timely 
appeal with this Court arguing that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that he possessed the cocaine found in 
the cooler of a bedroom in the Finley Square house. 
DISCUSSION 
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine in this 
case, the Commonwealth was required to establish that Cordon 
constructively possessed the cocaine.  Constructive possession 
of cocaine requires a showing that the presence and character of 
the substance was known to the defendant and that the substance 
was subject to his dominion and control.  Lane v. Commonwealth, 
223 Va. 713, 716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1982).  Thus, the 
Commonwealth was required to produce evidence demonstrating 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Cordon knew that cocaine was in 
the cooler in the bedroom and that the cooler was subject to his 
dominion and control.  Furthermore, to establish constructive 
possession of cocaine through circumstantial evidence, all 
necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and 
inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable 
 
3
hypothesis of innocence.  Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 
317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 
217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)).  Finally, under 
well-established principles, when considering the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support a conviction, we review the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  Maxwell v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008).  The 
judgment of conviction will be reversed only when the ruling is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Id. 
The Commonwealth, relying on Rawls v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 
334, 634 S.E.2d 697 (2006), asserts that Cordon’s repeated 
references to the bedroom in which the cocaine was found as 
“his” bedroom and subsequent denial that he was living at the 
house when the police told him that drugs were found in the 
room, allowed the trier of fact to conclude that Cordon was 
lying to conceal his guilt and that this conduct tended to show 
Cordon’s knowledge of the presence and character of the cocaine.  
The Commonwealth argues that such conduct, along with Cordon’s 
personal effects and Baer’s business card found in the room, was 
sufficient to support a finding that Cordon knowingly possessed 
cocaine in that bedroom.  We disagree. 
This Court has recognized that if a defendant’s denial of 
circumstances relating to an illegal act is inconsistent with 
previous statements or facts, it is fair to infer that such 
 
4
denial was for the purposes of concealing guilt.  Covil v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004) (“false 
or evasive account is a circumstance, similar to flight from a 
crime scene, that a fact-finder may properly consider as 
evidence of guilty knowledge”).  In cases involving possession 
of contraband, such an inference qualifies as evidence that 
tends to show that the defendant was aware of the contraband and 
that it was subject to his dominion and control.  Rawls, 272 Va. 
at 349-50, 634 S.E.2d at 705; Lane, 223 Va. at 716-17, 292 
S.E.2d at 360.  For example, in Rawls the defendant was in a 
bedroom with the door closed when the police arrived to arrest 
him for a probation violation.  272 Va. at 341, 634 S.E.2d at 
700.  When Rawls opened the door, he appeared to have been 
sleeping.  Id.  When told of the warrant for his arrest, Rawls 
“[i]mmediately” denied that the bedroom was his.  Id.  The 
police searched the room and found a loaded handgun between the 
mattress and box spring.  Id. at 342, 634 S.E.2d at 700.  The 
facts also showed that articles of clothing found in the room 
belonged to Rawls, Rawls apparently had been sleeping on the bed 
where the handgun was found when the police arrived, he was 
alone in the bedroom with the handgun, and other residents of 
the house testified that the bedroom was Rawls’ bedroom.  Id. at 
341-42, 634 S.E.2d at 700.  In reciting that Rawls’ denial of 
ownership of the room could support a conclusion that Rawls was 
 
5
lying to conceal his guilt, the Court observed that this 
conclusion was “[b]ased on the substantial evidence that the 
room in fact did belong to Rawls.”  Id. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 
705.  Ultimately, this Court concluded that the Commonwealth met 
its burden of proof “by demonstrating Rawls’ presence in his own 
bedroom and the presence of the firearm at the time, along with 
the other circumstances suggesting his possession of the 
firearm.”  Id. at 350-51, 634 S.E.2d at 705. 
In Lane, the defendant owned and occupied the dwelling in 
which the contraband was found.  223 Va. at 715, 292 S.E.2d at 
359.  Lane was present during the execution of the search 
warrant and “became ‘fidgetive’” when an officer approached the 
chair in which she was sitting.  Id. at 716, 292 S.E.2d at 359.  
When a large amount of methaqualone pills were found in a white 
plastic bag behind the chair, Lane denied any knowledge of the 
contraband.  Id. at 716, 292 S.E.2d at 360.  Again, the 
inference of guilt based on the defendant’s denial and its 
tendency to show knowledge and control of the contraband was 
accompanied by significant evidence connecting the defendant to 
the contraband.  Id.  
In this case, Cordon was not in the house or the bedroom 
when the cooler containing the cocaine was discovered.  There 
was no other physical evidence linking Cordon to the cooler or 
the contraband.  The record showed that two days had passed 
 
6
between the time Cordon was known to be at the Finley Square 
house and the seizure of the cooler containing cocaine.  While 
he referred to the bedroom as “his” and stated that he was 
staying there while his uncle was away at the time of the 
September burglary, Cordon listed his address as a location in 
Newport News.  There was no evidence of ownership of the cooler, 
a very portable item, and no evidence placed Cordon at the house 
at any time between the day he received Baer’s business card and 
the day the search warrant was executed.  Although Cordon, like 
Rawls, denied that he “lived” at the Finley Square house when 
informed that cocaine was found in a cooler in “his” bedroom, 
assuming his denial gave rise to an inference that he was lying 
to conceal guilt and thus tended to show his knowledge and 
control of the cocaine, that inference along with the remaining 
evidence falls far short of the evidence considered sufficient 
in Rawls or Lane to support the convictions in those cases.  
While the circumstantial evidence in this case may be sufficient 
to raise a suspicion of guilt, it cannot support a conclusion 
beyond a reasonable doubt, by a rational trier of fact, that 
Cordon knew that cocaine was in the cooler in the bedroom and 
that it was subject to his dominion and control.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate 
the conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
7
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE MILLETTE 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
vacating Cordon's conviction for possession of cocaine, the 
majority holds that "no 'rational trier of fact could have found 
. . . beyond a reasonable doubt' " that Cordon " 'was aware of 
both the presence and character of the substance and that it was 
subject to his dominion and control.' "  Maxwell v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442-43, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502-03 (2008) 
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) and Drew 
v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986), 
respectively).  Upon viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, I am persuaded that the evidence 
was not insufficient as a matter of law to establish Cordon's 
guilt of the charged offense.  Thus, I respectfully dissent. 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 
appeal, the issue is "'whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.' "  Maxwell, 275 Va. at 442, 657 
S.E.2d at 502 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).  This inquiry, 
however, "does not require a court to 'ask itself whether it 
believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.' "  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (quoting 
 
8
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)).  On the contrary, 
" '[i]f there is evidence to support the convictions, the 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, 
even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by 
the finder of fact at the trial.' "  Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 
Va. 636, 641, 691 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2010) (quoting Commonwealth 
v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998)). 
When as here, a defendant waives the right to a jury trial 
and is tried in a bench trial, the trial court's "factual 
findings are entitled to the same weight as that accorded a jury 
verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support them."  Schneider v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1985).  
"This is so because the credibility of witnesses and the weight 
accorded their testimony are matters solely for the fact[-] 
finder who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses."  Id. at 382, 337 S.E.2d at 736-37; accord Young v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 587, 590, 659 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2008) ("On 
appeal, great deference is given to the fact[-]finder who, 
having seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their credibility 
and weighs their testimony.").  And, as this Court reiterates 
today, though not here, "[t]hat deference applies not only to 
findings of fact, but also to any reasonable and justified 
inferences the fact-finder may have drawn from the facts 
 
9
proved."  Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d 
___, ___ (2010) (this day decided). 
As the majority notes, to establish Cordon's guilt of 
cocaine possession, the Commonwealth had to prove "that the 
presence and character of the substance was known to the 
defendant and subject to his dominion and control."  (Citing 
Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 
(1982).)  Knowledge "may be shown by evidence of the acts, 
statements or conduct of the accused."  Young, 275 Va. at 591, 
659 S.E.2d at 310.  "While the Commonwealth does not meet its 
burden of proof simply by showing the defendant's proximity to 
the [drugs] or ownership or occupancy of the premises where the 
[drugs are] found, these are circumstances probative of 
possession and may be considered as factors in determining 
whether the defendant possessed the [drugs]."  Rawls v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334, 350, 634 S.E.2d 697, 705 (2006). 
The majority further states that when the Commonwealth 
relies on circumstantial evidence to carry its burden of proof, 
the circumstances proved "must be consistent with guilt and 
inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence."  (Citing Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 
Va. 307, 317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991).)  "The statement that 
circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of 
innocence is simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth 
 
10
has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  Hudson v. 
Commonwealth, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003) 
(citing Cox v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 513, 517, 125 S.E. 139, 141 
(1924)).  Thus, in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
circumstantial evidence in this appeal, the issue "is not 
whether 'there is some evidence to support' [Cordon's] 
hypotheses" of innocence.  Id.  Instead, "[t]he issue is whether 
a reasonable [trier of fact], upon consideration of all the 
evidence, could have rejected [Cordon's] theories in his defense 
and found him guilty of [cocaine possession] beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Id. 
In this case, the trier of fact had the following evidence 
to consider.  When seeking the assistance of an officer of the 
"Hampton Police Division" regarding a home invasion that 
occurred at 169 Finley Square on September 29, 2007, Cordon 
stated to the responding police officer that the house was his 
"home," where he was residing "at the time."  Cordon had also 
told the responding officer that the room in which the cocaine 
was subsequently found "was his room."  Later, on November 14, 
2007, during a phone interview with Detective John Baer, Cordon 
again referred to the residence as his "home," and reported that 
"a lock box from underneath his bed had been stolen."  (Emphasis 
added.)  And again, on November 18, 2007, Cordon reiterated to 
Detective Baer, who was present at the residence, that "a 
 
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lockbox from underneath his bed" had been stolen, and "advised 
that [the intruders had] pried his bedroom door open," directing 
the detective to the room in which the cocaine was found two 
days later.  Before leaving the residence that day, Detective 
Baer gave Cordon his business card. 
As the majority states, the search of the bedroom claimed 
by Cordon as "his room" revealed cocaine, "checks and some 
papers and stuff with [Cordon's] name on it," and numerous items 
of drug paraphernalia.  The drug paraphernalia was found in a 
drawer of a nightstand abutting Cordon's bed.  In the same 
drawer, Detective Baer's business card was discovered.  
Detective Baer testified that "[w]hen [he] initially opened the 
[nightstand] door, [his] business card was sitting right inside 
the drawer next to all these items" of drug paraphernalia.  In a 
subsequent interview with Cordon, only after Detective Baer 
"advised [Cordon] of what items [had been] located in [Cordon's] 
bedroom" did Cordon "den[y] living at 169 Finley Square."  
According to Detective Baer, Cordon ended the interview when 
Detective Baer told him that the business card was found in the 
nightstand drawer with the drug paraphernalia. 
Upon viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial," Rawls, 272 Va. 
at 349, 634 S.E.2d at 704, and deferring to the trial court's 
factual findings and all reasonable inferences drawn from those 
 
12
facts, Young, 275 Va. at 590, 659 S.E.2d at 310, all of which an 
appellate court must do, I am unable to say that no rational 
trier of fact could have concluded Cordon possessed the cocaine 
recovered from "his room."  Moreover, Cordon's denial that he 
lived at 169 Finley Square after being confronted with the items 
seized during the search of "his room" bolsters the inference 
that Cordon " 'intentionally and consciously possessed [the 
cocaine] with knowledge of its nature and character.' "  Young, 
275 Va. at 591, 659 S.E.2d at 310 (quoting Burton v. 
Commonwealth, 215 Va. 711, 713, 213 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1975)).  As 
the majority acknowledges, "if a defendant's denial of 
circumstances relating to an illegal act is inconsistent with 
previous statements or facts, it is fair to infer that such 
denial was for the purposes of concealing guilt." 
The majority nonetheless concludes, even "assuming 
[Cordon's] denial gave rise to an inference that he was lying to 
conceal . . . his knowledge and control of the cocaine, that 
inference along with the remaining evidence falls far short of 
the evidence considered sufficient in Rawls or Lane."  Presuming 
those cases set the evidentiary floor necessary to sustain a 
conviction for possession of an illegal drug, the majority's 
efforts to show that the evidence here "falls far short" of that 
in Rawls, 272 Va. 334, 634 S.E.2d 697 and Lane, 223 Va. 713, 292 
S.E.2d 358, fails. 
 
13
In discussing both cases, the majority states that the  
"inference of guilt based on the [respective] defendant's denial 
and its tendency to show knowledge and control of the contraband 
was accompanied by significant evidence connecting [that] 
defendant to the contraband."  The "significant evidence" in 
Lane was the defendant's ownership and occupancy of the house 
where the drugs were found, coupled with her occupancy of a 
chair behind which the illegal substances were discovered, and 
the fact that she became "nervous and volunteered . . . that 
there was nothing behind the chair."  223 Va. at 716, 292 S.E.2d 
at 360.  In Rawls, the "significant evidence" consisted of the 
following facts: the defendant was sleeping alone in a room with 
the door closed when the police arrived to serve a warrant for 
the defendant's arrest; a loaded handgun was found between the 
mattress and box spring; the defendant's roommates testified 
that the bedroom belonged to him; and the defendant's clothes 
were found in the room.  Rawls, 272 Va. at 341-42, 350, 634 
S.E.2d at 700, 705. 
The evidence in each case also included a denial by the 
respective defendant.  In Lane, the defendant denied any 
knowledge of the illegal drugs when confronted with them.  223 
Va. at 716, 292 S.E.2d at 360.  Similarly, in Rawls, the 
defendant "disclaimed ownership" of the bedroom when the police 
 
14
told him they had an arrest warrant for a probation violation.  
272 Va. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 705. 
Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the same type of 
evidence is present here.  Cordon reported a burglary of the 
house where he acknowledged he was residing; in the process, he 
claimed that nothing was taken from "his room," only to later 
assert that an item was taken from "underneath his bed"; he 
again claimed the bedroom as his own when interviewed by 
Detective Baer at the residence two days prior to execution of 
the search warrant; and the search of the bedroom revealed 
papers bearing Cordon's name, and, in the nightstand, Detective 
Baer's business card alongside drug paraphernalia.  These facts 
constitute "substantial evidence that the room in fact did 
belong to" Cordon.  Cf. Rawls, 272 Va. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 
705.  And, the cocaine was located inside a cooler that was 
readily observable to anyone entering the bedroom; the cocaine 
as well as the drug paraphernalia were located a short distance 
from where Cordon admitted to sleeping, the paraphernalia being 
found in a drawer with the business card Detective Baer had 
given Cordon two days prior to the search.  Finally, Cordon, 
like the defendants in Lane and Rawls, evinced "guilty 
knowledge" by his denial that he resided at 169 Finley Square 
when confronted with the items seized from "his room" during the 
search. 
 
15
Thus, like the trier of fact in Rawls, the trial court here 
reasonably could have inferred from Cordon's occupancy of the 
bedroom where the contraband was found that Cordon had "dominion 
and control" over the cocaine.  272 Va. at 350, 634 S.E.2d at 
705.  Further, the trial court reasonably could have concluded 
from Cordon's denial of occupancy that he "was lying to conceal 
his guilt," thereby demonstrating that he was aware of the 
cocaine's "presence and character."  Id.  Thus, I conclude that 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's 
conclusion that Cordon "possessed" the cocaine. 
Although Cordon was not present when the search warrant was 
executed, that factor alone does not mean the trial court could 
not reject Cordon's theory of defense.  Certainly, one 
hypothesis of innocence is that another individual placed the 
cocaine in Cordon's bedroom without his knowledge.  But the same 
possibility existed in Rawls, notwithstanding Rawls' presence in 
the bedroom where the firearm was found.  Rawls could not have 
seen the firearm concealed underneath the mattress merely by 
being present in the bedroom.  Acknowledging that evidence was 
adduced that "other individuals had unrestricted access to the 
bedroom" where the firearm was found in Rawls, this Court 
nonetheless concluded that there was sufficient evidence of 
possession because "such access is only a single factor to be 
considered among all of the circumstances."  Id.  As in Rawls, 
 
16
the Commonwealth was not required to prove that Cordon had 
exclusive access to the bedroom. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  I would affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
17