Title: Lazor v. Milne
Citation: 346 Pa. Super. 177, 499 A.2d 369
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 1985

346 Pa. Superior Ct. 177 (1985) 499 A.2d 369 Mary Lou LAZOR and Joseph E. Lazor, Her Husband, Appellants, v. George MILNE, Kenneth F. Andrew, James Earl France, Dean H. Bier, Charles Morgan, Joseph F. Mashione, Thomas J. Palamone, Eugene C. Pupilli, John Mozina, and Robert L. Walters. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued June 19, 1985. Filed October 4, 1985. *178 Daniel M. Berger, Pittsburgh, for appellants. Bernard W. O'Keefe, Pittsburgh, for appellees. Before ROWLEY, OLSZEWSKI and DEL SOLE, JJ. DEL SOLE, Judge: The issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in sustaining Appellee's preliminary objections. The trial court concluded that Appellant's complaint failed to state a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction *179 of emotional distress. We affirm the order of the trial court and conclude that the preliminary objections were properly sustained. When considering preliminary objections in nature of a demurrer, we must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Donnelly v. DeBourke, 421 A.2d 826, 280 Pa.Super. 486 (1980). Viewed in light of the above standard, the facts alleged in Appellants' complaint indicate the following: Appellants, Joseph and Mary Lou Lazor, officers and members of the Board of Directors of the Club, sent Mary Lou Lazor a letter which stated: The complaint avers that the allegations contained in this letter were false, and Appellees, who knew or should have known that the charges were false, refused to withdraw them or answer Appellant's questions concerning these claims. Because of Appellees' conduct Appellants have suffered, and may continue to suffer, severe emotional distress. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is an actionable wrong for conduct which can be characterized as extremely outrageous. Jones v. Nissenbaum, Rudolph &amp; Seidner, 244 Pa.Super. 377, 368 A.2d 770 (1976). It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous so as to permit recovery. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment i. (1965). Comment (d) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 describes the type of conduct which meets the requisites for liability: The conduct which is the basis for Appellant's complaint consists of a letter. This letter was sent by the officers of a private club, while acting within their official capacity. It is clear from the contents of the letter that Appellees actions were in no way beyond the bounds of decency. Mrs. Lazor was merely informed, by means of a private letter, that certain general allegations had been made against her. The Board members advised Mrs. Lazor that it considered conduct such as "harassing employees" and "bringing your own food into the club" to be injurious to the Club's welfare, and that disciplinary action would be taken if Mrs. Lazor conducted herself in such a manner in the future. Even accepting as true Appellant's allegations that the charges set forth in the letter were false, Appellants have failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Major outrage is essential to the tort; and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting or will have his feelings hurt is not enough. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, comment f. This case is not one where Appellants allege a planned program of harassment or threats. Nor, is this a case where the Appellees' reprimand was so demeaning, or their conduct so threatening as to amount to extreme outrage. *181 The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth an example of such conduct. The conduct complained of in the instant case differs greatly from that described in the above illustration. Here, Mrs. Lazor was reprimanded by means of a private letter, and not in the presence of a group of her peers. Further, the language used amounted to no more than a slight insult or indignity which must be tolerated. The only threat made by the Board was to take disciplinary action in the future if Mrs. Lazor committed the acts described by the Board as offensive. The Complaint does not allege that the Board is without the authority to take such action. We can only assume that the Board was acting in a permissible fashion and thereby, enabling a member to adjust her behavior so as to avoid the distress of a formal disciplinary proceeding. An actor is never liable where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even if he is aware that such insistence may cause emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 46, comment g. See also: Thompson v. Sikov, 340 Pa.Super. 382, 490 A.2d 472 (1985). We conclude that Appellant's claim is not cognizable since the facts alleged clearly demonstrate that Appellees' conduct fell far short of being so outrageous in character and *182 so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Appellants further assert that their complaint states a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We disagree. Appellants' complaint fails to aver that there have been physical manifestations of the emotional distress that they have allegedly suffered. In Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa.Super. 122, 437 A.2d 1236 (1981) this Court affirmed that part of a trial court order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, and dismissing the complaint on a count alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Banyas court held that there could be no cause of action for this tort because the plaintiff in his complaint sought recovery for severe mental anguish and emotional stress, but did not aver any physical harm. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A was cited in Banyas as follows: Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, supra, 293 Pa.Super. at 128, 129, 437 A.2d at 1239. See also: Nye v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 331 Pa.Super. 209, 480 A.2d 318 (1984). Finding no allegations of bodily harm in Appellants' complaint, we conclude that Appellants' failed to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Order affirmed.