Title: State v. Luther Williams
Citation: 2002 WI 58
Docket Number: 2000AP003065-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2002

2002 WI 58 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3065-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Luther Williams, III,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 16, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Emily S. Mueller   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Diane 
M. Welsh, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 58 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3065-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 793) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Luther Williams, III,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Emily S. Mueller, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The court of appeals certified 
Luther Williams, III's appeal from the judgment convicting him 
of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, gambling, and 
contributing to the delinquency of a child.1  Williams argues 
that his right to confrontation was violated when the circuit 
court admitted into evidence a state crime lab report to prove 
the presence of cocaine and when the court allowed the crime lab 
                                                 
1 Williams appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Racine County, Emily S. Mueller, Judge. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
2 
 
unit leader to testify based on the report in lieu of the 
analyst who performed the tests. 
¶2 
We determine that Williams' right to confrontation was 
not violated when the unit leader, rather than the analyst who 
performed the tests, testified in part based on the report 
containing the lab test results.  In addition, we determine that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
admitted 
the 
report 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6) (1997-98),2 the hearsay exception for a 
record of 
regularly conducted activity 
(business record).  
However, the admission of the report was harmless error in light 
of the unit leader's testimony and other circumstances.  We also 
reject other arguments Williams makes regarding an evidentiary 
ruling, the right to present a defense, and sufficiency of the 
evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court. 
I 
¶3 
While on patrol, police officers found Williams and 
other individuals gambling behind a church.  At least one of the 
individuals, James D., was a minor.  An officer witnessed yet 
another individual fleeing the scene.  A jacket was lying on the 
ground near Williams, and inside the jacket, police found a 
plastic bag containing a substance that appeared to be cocaine.  
Williams was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver, gambling, and contributing to the delinquency of a 
child. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
At the trial on these charges, the State introduced a 
state crime lab report showing that the substance in the jacket 
tested positive for cocaine base.  The analyst who performed the 
tests underlying the report originally was scheduled to testify, 
but after Williams requested an adjournment, the State was 
unable to produce the analyst.  Instead, the State presented the 
testimony of Sandra Koresch, a unit leader in the drug 
identification section of the crime lab who performed the peer 
review on the tests the analyst conducted.  Based in part on the 
contents of the lab report, Koresch testified that the substance 
in the jacket contained cocaine base. 
¶5 
Williams moved to strike Koresch's testimony and asked 
the court to exclude the crime lab report from evidence.  He 
argued that he was being denied his right to cross-examine the 
analyst who performed the tests.  The circuit court disagreed, 
determining 
that 
the 
lab 
report 
fell 
within 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(6), commonly referred to as the "business records" 
exception to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible.3  In 
addition, the court determined that Koresch's presence and 
testimony satisfied Williams' right to confrontation. 
¶6 
The jury convicted Williams on all three charges, and 
he appealed.  The court of appeals certified the case to us 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61, 
noting 
that 
"the 
                                                 
3 As 
indicated 
by 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(6), and as the parties do not dispute, this hearsay 
exception is not limited to business records.  However, for 
shorthand convenience we refer to § 908.03(6) as the business 
records exception throughout this opinion. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
4 
 
proposition proffered by the State proposes a rather broad and 
momentous declaration:  that the State no longer need produce 
the expert or analyst who performs testing in a criminal trial 
where the business records exception comes into play." 
II 
 
¶7 
The central question we address is whether Williams' 
right to confrontation was violated when Koresch, rather than 
the analyst who performed the tests, testified in part based on 
the crime lab report containing the lab test results.  Although 
a circuit court's decision to admit evidence is ordinarily a 
matter for the court's discretion, whether the admission of 
evidence violates a defendant's right to confrontation is a 
question of law subject to independent appellate review.  State 
v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶8 
In addition, we must determine whether the state crime 
lab report was admissible as a business record under the hearsay 
exception in § 908.03(6).  When an evidentiary issue requires 
the construction of a statute, a question of law is presented 
for independent appellate review.  State v. Jagielski, 161 
Wis. 2d 67, 73, 467 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1991).  Finally, we 
address other arguments Williams makes regarding an evidentiary 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
5 
 
ruling, the right to present a defense, and sufficiency of the 
evidence.4 
III 
¶9 
We begin with the central issue before us, whether 
Williams' right to confrontation was violated when Koresch, 
rather than the analyst who performed the tests, testified in 
part based on the crime lab report containing the lab test 
results.  Williams asserts that his right to confrontation 
required that the analyst testify. 
¶10 This assertion presents a question of first impression 
in Wisconsin, and we turn to persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions 
addressing 
identical 
issues 
for 
guidance.  
Consistent with this authority, we conclude that the admission 
                                                 
4 The State moves to strike Williams' appendix to his brief.  
It asserts that the inclusion of excerpts from the BNA Criminal 
Practice Guide and copies of articles pertaining to drug 
analysis and crime labs are outside the scope of what is 
permissible in an appendix.  Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(2) 
indicates that an appellant's brief "shall include a short 
appendix providing" certain enumerated items. 
The State's position assumes that these enumerated items 
are to the exclusion of all others.  We decline to give the rule 
such a restrictive interpretation.  The Judicial Council 
Committee's Note to § (Rule) 809.19 provides that an appendix 
"is designed to be nothing more than a useful tool to the 
members of the court."  Members of the court on occasion find 
materials such as those at issue here to be of some assistance.  
We note that Williams' appendix contains "portions of the record 
essential to an understanding of the issues raised" as required 
by the rule.  Accordingly, we deny the motion to strike. 
Nonetheless, we take this opportunity to remind litigants 
that the rule calls for a "short" appendix.  It is the rare case 
where a lengthy appendix is more boon than bane. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
6 
 
of Koresch's testimony in lieu of that of the analyst did not 
violate Williams' right to confrontation. 
¶11 Various courts have concluded that under certain 
circumstances the right of confrontation may be satisfied by the 
admission of expert testimony based upon lab test results even 
where the actual tester is not also present to testify.  See 
Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986); Adams v. State, 
794 So. 2d 1049 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Kennedy, 7 
S.W.3d 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).  In each case, the testifying 
expert was highly qualified and had a close connection with the 
testing in the case such that the expert's presence at trial 
satisfied the defendant's rights to confront and cross-examine.  
¶12 For example, in Kennedy, a defendant was convicted of 
aggravated rape after expert testimony matched his DNA profile 
to that of semen taken from the rape victim.  7 S.W.3d at 60, 
63.  The testifying witness, an FBI expert in the field of DNA 
analysis and identification, was not the person who prepared the 
DNA samples for evaluation.  Id. at 66.  However, he "checked 
the computations of the technician and verified that the 
technician 
would 
have 
followed 
the 
standard 
laboratory 
procedures."  Id. 
¶13 The Kennedy court concluded that the admission of the 
expert's opinion did not violate the defendant's right to 
confrontation because the expert providing the opinion was 
available for cross-examination.  7 S.W.3d at 67.  Given the 
expert's close connection to the testing, "the defense was able 
to thoroughly cross-examine [him] as to the samples, procedures, 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
7 
 
safeguards, and results reached" in the particular case.  Id. at 
67. 
¶14 Similarly, 
in 
Adams 
the 
testifying 
witness 
was 
"eminently qualified" in molecular biology, and although he did 
not personally perform the DNA tests, he supervised "all 
aspects" of the laboratory technician's work.  794 So. 2d at 
1057.  He testified that the procedures were the same as those 
used by the FBI and that they were generally accepted procedures 
in the scientific community.  Id.  On these facts, the court in 
Adams rejected the defendant's assertion that he was denied his 
right to confrontation because the expert did not perform the 
test.  Id. 
¶15 The analysis in Reardon is also highly persuasive.  
Reardon was a drug identification case on habeas corpus review.  
The illegal nature of the substances seized from the two 
defendants was established through testimony of one of three 
toxicologists, Dr. Reading, who supervised approximately two 
dozen chemists at a state laboratory.  Reardon, 806 F.2d at 41.  
Although the testifying toxicologist did not perform the tests 
on the substances, he oversaw the procedures and promptly 
examined the results.  Id. 
¶16 The court in Reardon disagreed with the district 
court's determination that the admission of the toxicologist's 
testimony violated the defendants' right to confrontation.  806 
F.2d at 40.  The court reasoned as follows: 
In view of the fact that Dr. Reading's laboratory 
performs some 20,000 chemical tests each year, it is 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
8 
 
most unlikely that the chemists who assisted Dr. 
Reading would have any independent recollection of the 
tests they performed.  Their testimony inevitably 
would have been based on their laboratory notes, which 
Dr. Reading was well qualified to interpret. 
Id. at 41.  Thus, the court concluded, "there would have been 
little potential utility in requiring the State to produce the 
assisting chemists for cross-examination."  Id.  The court 
added, "[e]xpert reliance upon the output of others does not 
necessarily violate the confrontation clause where the expert is 
available 
for 
questioning 
concerning 
the 
nature 
and 
reasonableness of his reliance."  Id. at 42. 
¶17 Also relevant to our confrontation inquiry is United 
States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981).  There, a chief 
of psychiatry gave expert testimony for the government against a 
defendant advancing an insanity defense.  Id. at 301.  The 
expert had some contact with the defendant, but based his 
opinion in part on reports he received from two examining 
physicians and other staff.  Id.   
¶18 The court in Lawson agreed with the defendant that 
expert testimony based in part on such hearsay may raise 
confrontation 
problems, 
but 
concluded 
that 
under 
the 
circumstances the defendant had an adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine the expert.  653 F.2d at 301.  At the same time, 
the court recognized that expert testimony based entirely on 
hearsay 
reports 
would 
violate 
a 
defendant's 
right 
to 
confrontation.  Id. at 302.  The right to confrontation is not 
satisfied when the government produces a witness who does 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
9 
 
nothing but summarize out-of-court statements and opinions made 
by others.  Id.   
¶19 The critical point illustrated by Lawson is the 
distinction between an expert who forms an opinion based in part 
on the work of others and an expert who merely summarizes the 
work of others.  In short, one expert cannot act as a mere 
conduit for the opinion of another.5  
¶20 Taken together, these cases teach that the presence 
and availability for cross-examination of a highly qualified 
witness, who is familiar with the procedures at hand, supervises 
or reviews the work of the testing analyst, and renders her own 
expert opinion is sufficient to protect a defendant's right to 
confrontation, despite the fact that the expert was not the 
person who performed the mechanics of the original tests.  Given 
Koresch's qualifications and experience, her close connections 
to the tests and procedures implicating Williams, and her expert 
opinion 
that 
the 
tested 
substance 
contained 
cocaine, 
we 
determine that the admission of her testimony did not violate 
Williams' right to confrontation. 
                                                 
5 Cf. State v. Towne, 453 A.2d 1133 (Vt. 1982).  In Towne, 
also an insanity defense case, the government's expert gave his 
opinion as to the defendant's sanity, then testified that a 
leading expert in the field with whom he had consulted agreed 
with his opinion.  The court determined that this testimony 
violated the defendant's right to confrontation.  Id. at 1136.  
It explained that although an expert may rely on facts or data 
provided by another expert in rendering his own opinion, 
confrontation is offended if one expert is merely "acting as a 
conduit" for the expert opinion of another.  Id. at 1135. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
10 
 
¶21 At trial, Koresch explained that she is a forensic 
scientist in drug identification who has been employed by the 
state crime lab for over nine years.  She analyzes evidence for 
the presence or absence of controlled substances and is unit 
leader of the drug identification section of the lab.  In 
addition, she holds a bachelor's degree in chemistry and has 
taken post-graduate courses at the University of Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee.  She has analyzed samples for the presence of a 
controlled substance between 5,000 and 6,000 times.  Thus, like 
the testifying experts in Kennedy, Adams, and Reardon, Koresch 
was highly qualified to render an expert opinion based on the 
information before her. 
¶22 Also, like the experts in Kennedy, Adams, and Reardon, 
Koresch was closely connected to the tests and procedures 
involved in the case and supervised or reviewed the testing.  
She testified that she was familiar with the various tests 
performed on the substance found in the jacket pocket.  Upon 
cross-examination, Koresch indicated that she performed the peer 
review on the tests of this substance.  Her testimony also 
revealed that the peer review entailed "making sure that all the 
notes coincide with the evidence, that the data coincides with 
[the] conclusion and just basic overall looking at all the data 
that has been collected in the case.  This is done right after 
the report is written."  On redirect, Koresch added that "peer 
review is meant to make sure that conclusions written in a 
report are correct." 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
11 
 
¶23 Explaining an example of how peer review is conducted, 
Koresch testified that she would look at the data the tests 
yielded in the form of graphs and compare those graphs to 
standard graphs.  Such a comparison would, in turn, lead her to 
the conclusion that the sample being tested was a controlled 
substance. 
¶24 In fact, it was some of these circumstances that 
helped lead the circuit court to its conclusion that Williams' 
right to confrontation was not violated.  The court reasoned as 
follows: 
[A]lthough Ms. Koresch was not the lab analyst, she 
performed the peer review as part of her regular 
duties and also testified that she did the peer review 
specifically as to this test that had been done by 
another analyst.  She indeed reviews all of the 
information as I understand it and the procedures that 
were undertaken by Ms. Ronge who's the actual lab 
analyst. 
¶25 Finally, Koresch testified that based on this peer 
review, as well as her review of the relevant records, it was 
her opinion that the substance tested in this case contained 
cocaine base.  Thus, like the expert in Lawson, although she 
based part of her opinion on facts and data gathered by someone 
else, she was not merely a conduit for another expert's opinion. 
¶26 Consistent with the reasoning of the circuit court and 
with the reasoning of the courts in Kennedy, Adams, Reardon, and 
Lawson, we determine that Williams' right to confrontation was 
not violated when Koresch, rather than the analyst who performed 
the tests, testified in part based on the crime lab report 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
12 
 
containing the lab test results.  Because Koresch was a highly 
qualified expert employed by the lab who was familiar with the 
particular lab procedures and performed the peer review in this 
particular case, then gave an independent expert opinion, her 
presence 
was 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
Williams' 
right 
to 
confrontation. 
¶27 Williams nonetheless contends that Koresch's testimony 
was not admissible as an expert opinion because the lab report 
on which it was partly based is inadmissible hearsay.  He argues 
that Koresch had to test the substance herself in order to 
render an expert opinion. 
¶28  An expert opinion may be based on inadmissible 
hearsay.  Wis. Stat. § 907.03; State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 
195, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999).  Section 907.03 provides: 
Bases of opinion testimony by experts.  The facts 
or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived 
by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need 
not be admissible in evidence.  
Here, there is little question that the tests are of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.  Koresch 
testified that all the tests performed were routinely used in 
the identification of controlled substances.  The cobalt 
thiocyanate test is a commonly used color change test useful for 
preliminary screening.  Paul C. Giannelli and Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, 2 Scientific Evidence § 23-2, 352-54 (3d ed. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
13 
 
1999).  The gas chromatography/mass spectrometry and infrared 
spectroscopy tests described by Koresch and utilized in this 
case also are widely used.  Id. at § 23-2, 352, § 23-3(A) and 
(C). 
¶29 Section 907.03 implicitly recognizes that an expert's 
opinion may be based in part on the results of scientific tests 
or studies that are not her own.  It is rare indeed that an 
expert can give an opinion without relying to some extent upon 
information furnished by others.  Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42.  
Thus, contrary to Williams' assertion, Koresch need not have 
performed the tests herself to form an admissible expert opinion 
based upon them, and Williams' characterization of Koresch's 
testimony as something other than an expert opinion lacks merit. 
¶30 Koresch explained that her review of the data for each 
test indicated the presence of cocaine.  The State elicited the 
following testimony from her: 
Q. 
Before coming to court today did you review all 
these records? 
A. 
Yes, I did. 
Q. 
And based on your review do you have an opinion 
as to the contents of Exhibit 2 [the substance 
taken from the jacket pocket]? 
A. 
Yes, I do. 
Q. 
And what is that opinion? 
A. 
State's Exhibit No. 2 contains cocaine base. 
¶31 Considering Koresch's qualifications and the nature of 
her testimony, we agree with the State that she gave expert 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
14 
 
opinion testimony within the meaning of § 907.03.  Her expert 
opinion properly could be based in part on the report of 
another, even if that report was otherwise inadmissible hearsay. 
IV 
¶32 Our determination that the admission of Koresch's 
expert opinion testimony did not violate Williams' right of 
confrontation does not end our inquiry.  Williams asserts that 
the state crime lab report was erroneously admitted hearsay and 
presents its own confrontation problem.  Similarly, the question 
certified by the court of appeals includes an inquiry into 
whether the admission of the lab report into evidence under the 
business records hearsay exception in § 908.03(6) was proper. 
¶33 The 
threshold 
question 
in 
examining 
whether 
a 
defendant's right to confrontation is violated by the admission 
of hearsay evidence is whether that evidence is admissible under 
the rules of evidence.  State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 210, 
325 N.W.2d 857 (1982).  If the evidence does not fit within a 
recognized hearsay exception, it must be excluded.  Id.  Only 
after it is established that the evidence fits within a 
recognized hearsay exception does it become necessary to 
consider confrontation.  Id.  Here, we determine that the lab 
report does not fit within the business records hearsay 
exception as the State asserts and therefore do not reach the 
confrontation question. 
¶34 The parties do not dispute that the state crime lab 
report in this case is hearsay.  As a general rule, hearsay is 
not admissible evidence.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.02; State v. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
15 
 
Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 526, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998).  
However, there are numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule, one 
being the business records exception in § 908.03(6). 
¶35 Section 908.03(6) provides that although hearsay, the 
following are not necessarily inadmissible: 
RECORDS 
OF 
REGULARLY 
CONDUCTED 
ACTIVITY. 
A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in 
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, 
all in the course of a regularly conducted activity, 
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the sources of information 
or 
other 
circumstances 
indicate 
lack 
of 
trustworthiness. 
Williams asserts that the crime lab report does not fall within 
the confines of § 908.03(6).  The State, in contrast, argues 
that it does. 
¶36 The question of whether state crime lab reports that 
incriminate a criminal defendant fall within the business 
records exception is another question of first impression in 
Wisconsin.  Thus, we examine interpretations of the business 
records exception by courts in other jurisdictions.  In 
addition, we turn to secondary authority for guidance.  We also 
find support for our conclusion in the statutes pertaining to 
the state crime labs. 
¶37 Courts in some jurisdictions have held that lab 
reports, including reports like those at issue here, may fall 
within the business records exception.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1359 (8th Cir. 1988); State v. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
16 
 
Cosgrove, 436 A.2d 33, 37 (Conn. 1980); State v. Kreck, 542 P.2d 
782, 785 (Wash. 1975).  Other courts have held that such reports 
do not fall within the business records exception.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977); State v. 
Rivera, 515 A.2d 182, 184, 187 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); People v. 
McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 474 (Ill. 2000); Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d 
at 67 n.8. 
¶38 Although these courts do not all use the same approach 
to the question, we have identified a fundamental underlying 
tension between the fact that crime lab reports may be records 
of regularly conducted activity and the fact that they are also 
records prepared in anticipation of litigation.  Records 
prepared in anticipation of litigation traditionally have been 
deemed outside the reach of the business records exception.  
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943); McLanahan, 729 
N.E.2d at 474; see also United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 
666, 670 (7th Cir. 1993) (adhering to "well-established rule" 
that documents made in anticipation of litigation are not 
admissible under the business records exception).   
¶39 Commentators are in accord.  Professor Blinka explains 
that even where proffered evidence seems to satisfy the 
foundational elements of § 908.03(6), the language of the 
statute makes plain that the evidence is not admissible when 
"sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness."  7 Wisconsin Practice § 803.6, 627 (2d ed. 
2001).  "This consideration will most often come into play where 
there is some question about the motivation behind the making of 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
17 
 
the record.  Documents prepared in 'anticipation of litigation' 
pose special problems."  Id. at 627-28. 
¶40 Likewise, Professors Giannelli and Imwinkelried write 
with regard to the business records exception that "the 
admissibility 
of 
records 
prepared 
in 
anticipation 
of 
litigation[] remains problematic." 
 
1 
Scientific Evidence 
§ 6.2(C), 313 (footnote omitted).  They also criticize the ready 
categorization of lab reports within hearsay exceptions such as 
§ 908.03(6):  "Although business and public records generally 
may bear adequate indicia of reliability, laboratory reports may 
not.  Laboratory reports typically are prepared in anticipation 
of prosecution and, although probably rare, they can be 
falsified."  Id. at § 6.4(C), 329.  
¶41 State crime lab reports like the one at issue here 
reasonably may be characterized as prepared within the regular 
course of the "business" of the state crime lab.  However, such 
reports are prepared primarily to aid in the prosecution of 
criminal suspects. 
¶42 In each of the cases cited by the State in which 
courts have determined that lab reports may fall within the 
business records exception, the courts failed to acknowledge or 
address the rule that records prepared in anticipation of 
litigation ordinarily do not fall under the business records 
exception.  See Baker, 855 F.2d at 1359-60; Cosgrove, 436 A.2d 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
18 
 
at 37; Kreck, 542 P.2d at 785.6  In contrast, we, like the court 
in McLanahan, are mindful of the fact that state crime lab 
reports such as the one at issue here are "prepared during the 
course of criminal investigations and are requested by the State 
in anticipation of prosecutions."  729 N.E.2d at 474. 
¶43 Similarly, we agree with the court in Kennedy.  In 
declining to admit a DNA analysis under the business records 
exception, the court explained "[t]he DNA analysis prepared in 
the present case was for no other purpose but this litigation, 
calling into question the report's reliability as a business 
record."  Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d at 67 n.8.  Here, the state crime 
lab report, like the DNA analysis in Kennedy, was prepared for 
no other purpose but the prosecution of Williams. 
¶44 That state crime lab reports also may be characterized 
as records of regularly conducted activity is only incidental.  
This is underscored by the statute that defines the duties of 
the state crime labs. 
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.75, the primary statute section 
relating to state crime labs, is placed within the chapter of 
                                                 
6 In two Wisconsin cases addressing the admissibility of 
police reports under the business records exception, courts 
determined that the reports at issue were not admissible under 
the exception.  See Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 330, 334, 
267 N.W.2d 349 (1978); State v. Gilles, 173 Wis. 2d 101, 113-14, 
496 N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992).  The courts noted, however that 
police reports may be admissible under some circumstances.  See 
Mitchell, 84 Wis. 2d at 330; Gilles, 173 Wis. 2d at 113.  
Neither Mitchell nor Gilles addressed the significance of 
whether 
such 
reports 
were 
prepared 
in 
anticipation 
of 
litigation. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
19 
 
the 
statutes 
entitled 
"Department 
of 
Justice." 
 
Section 
165.75(3)(a) explains that the primary purpose of the labs is to 
"provide technical assistance to local law enforcement officers 
in the various fields of scientific investigation in the aid of 
law enforcement."7 
¶46 Section 165.75(3)(a) also states that included in the 
duties of the crime lab is to maintain services and employ the 
necessary 
specialists 
"for 
the 
recognition 
and 
proper 
preservation, 
marking and 
scientific 
analysis 
of evidence 
material in the investigation and prosecution of crimes."  
Subsection (d) of the statute adds that "[t]he services of the 
laboratories available . . . shall include appearances in court 
as expert witnesses." 
¶47 Additionally, as the court of appeals forewarned in 
its certification, to allow the admission of such an evaluative 
report under the business records hearsay exception could 
constitute 
a 
"momentous 
declaration." 
 
Indeed, 
once 
an 
evaluative report such as this is deemed to constitute a 
business record under § 908.03(6), a mere custodian of the 
report, who knows nothing about the science underlying the 
report, is sufficient to lay the necessary foundation for 
admission of the report.  Once that door is opened, the specter 
of the State submitting its case by means of unchallenged 
                                                 
7 The letterhead on the crime lab report indicates that the 
lab is part of the Department's "Division of Law Enforcement 
Services." 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
20 
 
documentary evidence appears, and confrontation principles are 
compromised. 
¶48 There can be little question that when state crime 
labs generate reports like those at issue here, they are acting 
as an arm of the State in assisting it to prevail in litigation 
and secure a conviction of the defendant.  The state crime lab 
exists in large part to facilitate the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes. 
¶49 Thus, considering the statutory scheme and the rule 
that records prepared in anticipation of litigation generally do 
not fall within the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule, we determine that the state crime lab report prepared for 
Williams' prosecution was erroneously admitted as a business 
record under § 908.03(6).8 
¶50 At the same time, however, we determine that the 
erroneous admission of the lab report was harmless error.  The 
test for harmless error is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.  State 
v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 668, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998).  A 
reasonable possibility is a possibility sufficient to undermine 
                                                 
8 Our determination does not mean that state crime lab 
reports are inadmissible in every case.  For example, the court 
in Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1986), recognized 
that analysts testifying at trial may in some cases have no 
independent recollection of tests performed.  In such cases, the 
report would be admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(5), the 
hearsay exception for recorded recollection.  See State ex rel. 
Huser v. Rasmussen, 84 Wis. 2d 600, 609-10, 267 N.W.2d 285 
(1978). 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
21 
 
our confidence in the conviction.  State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 
45, 51, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987). 
¶51 The lab report was admitted for the purpose of proving 
that the tested substance was cocaine.  There was ample other 
evidence, however, to support such a conclusion. 
¶52 As we have already determined, Koresch's testimony, 
though based in part on the report, was both an admissible 
expert opinion under § 907.03 and not in violation of Williams' 
confrontation right.  Her testimony was compelling and credible 
evidence from which the jury could conclude that the substance 
in the jacket pocket was cocaine. 
¶53 Other 
evidence 
heard 
by 
the 
jury 
bolsters 
our 
confidence.  Three police officers who were on the scene when 
Williams was gambling testified that they believed that the 
substance they found in the jacket was crack cocaine.  Of these 
officers, two had approximately five years' experience on the 
City of Racine Police Department and received specialized 
training for drug investigation.  These two officers were 
members of the target enforcement unit, which deals with, among 
other crimes, open air drug sales, street-level drug violations, 
and other narcotics violations.  Although Williams' theory of 
defense was that the jacket, and therefore the substance in it, 
did not belong to him, both target enforcement unit officers 
testified they had seen him wearing it on many occasions.  
¶54 In addition, our harmless error analysis is informed 
by the fact that on the morning trial was to begin, Williams 
indicated that he was willing to stipulate that the lab 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
22 
 
analyst's testimony was unnecessary and that "all the proper 
tests were done, et cetera" if the court would adjourn until the 
next morning.9  His willingness to stipulate, combined with 
Koresch's properly admitted testimony and the other evidence, 
preserves our confidence in his conviction and therefore 
convinces us that the admission of the state crime lab report 
was harmless error. 
¶55 In 
sum, 
we 
determine 
that 
Williams' 
right 
to 
confrontation was not violated when Koresch, rather than the 
analyst who performed the tests, testified in part based on the 
crime lab report containing the lab test results.  We further 
determine that, although the circuit court erroneously admitted 
the state crime lab report under the business records exception, 
its admission was harmless error. 
V 
¶56 Having made these determinations, we turn to address 
other arguments that Williams makes in attacking his conviction.  
He asserts that the circuit court incorrectly excluded evidence 
and that the exclusion violated his right to present a defense.  
He also argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to 
sustain a jury finding of guilt on one of the charges.  We first 
address the evidentiary ruling. 
¶57 The circuit court excluded hearsay testimony offered 
by Williams in support of his theory of defense that the jacket 
                                                 
9 After the court denied Williams the full amount of time 
for adjournment that he requested, he withdrew his stipulation. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
23 
 
containing the cocaine did not belong to him.  Specifically, 
Williams offered testimony by Dartavius Shelton that a Robert 
Winston told Shelton that it was his coat that was left at the 
church and that there was some "shit" in it, meaning some kind 
of drugs.  Williams asserts, as he did at trial, that this 
testimony was admissible hearsay because Winston's comment to 
Shelton was a statement against interest. 
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(4) 
contains 
the 
hearsay 
exception for statements against interest.  This exception has 
two basic requirements.  The declarant must be unavailable and 
the declarant's statement must be against the declarant's 
interest as defined by the statute.  Section 908.045(4).  If the 
statement is one tending to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability and offered to exculpate the accused, as here, there 
is a third requirement:  the statement is not admissible "unless 
corroborated."  Section 908.045(4). 
¶59 The 
circuit court 
determined that 
the 
proffered 
hearsay did not meet the requirements of § 908.045(4) because it 
was not sufficiently corroborated.  Williams asserts that this 
was error while the State argues that Williams failed to meet 
all three requirements. 
¶60 As previously noted, the admission of evidence is 
ordinarily a decision left to the discretion of the circuit 
court.  Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d at 504.  However, evidentiary 
determinations involving hearsay frequently implicate questions 
of both fact and law. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
24 
 
¶61 For example, "unavailability" for purposes of the 
hearsay rules is a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. 
Buelow, 122 Wis. 2d 465, 474, 363 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1984).  
"When mixed questions are presented, the court must determine 
two matters:  (1) what happened, and (2) whether those facts 
fulfill a particular legal standard.  The second determination 
is an issue of law."  Id. at 475 (citations omitted). 
¶62 Unavailability 
for 
purposes 
of 
§ 908.045(4) 
is 
determined by Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1)(e), which requires that the 
declarant is "absent from the hearing and the proponent of the 
declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declarant's 
attendance by process or other reasonable means."  In defining 
what is required to show efforts to secure the declarant's 
presence "by process or other reasonable means," this court in 
State v. Zellmer, 100 Wis. 2d 136, 148, 301 N.W.2d 209 (1981), 
adopted the Judicial Council Committee's interpretation of 
§ 908.04(1)(e).  According to that interpretation, the statute 
requires a "good-faith effort" and "due diligence."  Id. 
¶63 In addition, the proponent must "specify the facts 
showing diligence" and not rely on "a mere assertion or 
perfunctory showing of some diligence."  Zellmer, 100 Wis. 2d at 
148; see also La Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 336, 246 
N.W.2d 794 (1976).  Thus, the burden to show unavailability is 
with the proponent of the hearsay. 
¶64 Williams made limited efforts to locate Winston.  
There was conflicting information as to whether Winston was from 
Chicago or lived in Milwaukee.  Accordingly, Williams' trial 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
25 
 
counsel checked with the other defense witnesses to see if they 
knew where to find Winston.  He also checked the Milwaukee and 
Racine County jails.  However, that was the extent of Williams' 
efforts.  The circuit court specifically found that "[t]here's 
not any indication that any attempt has been made to check any 
sort of records in Illinois or in Chicago to determine the 
whereabouts of this person." 
¶65 The crux of Williams' position is that the reasonable 
measures he could take to secure Winston's presence were 
necessarily minimal because he did not know Winston's precise 
whereabouts.  However, this begs the question of whether 
Williams used due diligence to discover Winston's whereabouts. 
¶66 Due diligence is not a standard that lends itself well 
to bright line rules.  Nonetheless, given that there was at 
least some reason to believe that Winston was from Chicago, due 
diligence required that Williams make at least some minimal 
attempt to check in Illinois.  Because Williams did not 
establish that he made any such attempts, he failed to carry his 
burden to establish due diligence. 
¶67 Even 
Williams' 
trial 
counsel recognized this in 
attempting to argue in the circuit court that Winston's 
statement to Shelton was covered by § 908.045(4).  After 
explaining the steps he took to locate Shelton, counsel 
conceded, "Now I know that's kind of, well, weak when asking for 
a declarant to be declared unavailable."  Subsequently counsel 
stated:  "I think I have the corroboration and I have the 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
26 
 
statement against interest.  I'm frankly most worried about 
whether I've met the burden to have him declared unavailable." 
¶68 In short, we determine that Williams failed to meet 
his burden of showing due diligence, and we agree with the State 
that he failed to establish that Winston was unavailable for 
purposes of § 908.045(4).  Accordingly, we uphold the circuit 
court's decision to exclude Winston's statement, although we do 
so based upon the requirement of unavailability. 
¶69 Williams also contends that the exclusion of Shelton's 
testimony violated his right to present a defense.  There may be 
circumstances under which the application of an evidentiary rule 
impermissibly abridges an accused's right to present a defense.  
State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶51, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___; see also State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 647-
48, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).  Whether the application of the 
evidentiary rule deprives a defendant of constitutional rights 
is a question of constitutional fact subject to independent 
appellate review.  St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶16. 
¶70 In St. George, this court articulated a two-part 
framework 
for 
analyzing 
whether 
the 
exclusion 
of 
expert 
testimony violates a defendant's right to present a defense.  
The test is similar to the two-part framework in Pulizzano used 
to analyze whether the exclusion of evidence under the rape 
shield statute violates a defendant's right to present a 
defense.  At a more general level, the test for whether the 
exclusion of evidence violates the right to present a defense 
has been stated as an inquiry into whether the proffered 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
27 
 
evidence was "essential to" the defense, and whether without the 
proffered evidence, the defendant had "no reasonable means of 
defending his case."  State v. Johnson, 118 Wis. 2d 472, 480, 
348 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1984). 
¶71 Williams has not shown that Shelton's statement was 
essential to his defense or that its exclusion left him with no 
other reasonable means of defending his case.  On the contrary, 
the jury heard several other pieces of evidence that supported 
Williams' theory that Winston left behind the jacket with 
cocaine in it after gambling behind the church. 
¶72 Williams' brother testified that Winston was also 
gambling behind the church the day of the offense and that he 
had the jacket on, but then took it off to shoot craps.  
Similarly, Shelton testified that he saw "Rob" wearing the 
jacket.  Williams testified that he sold the jacket to Winston 
earlier in the day before going to gamble.  Also, Williams' 
brother testified that Williams sold the jacket, although he did 
not witness the sale.  Each of three other witnesses, including 
Shelton, testified that he did not see Williams wearing the 
jacket.  Based on all of this testimony, Williams was able to 
argue to the jury during closing argument that it was Winston 
who owned the cocaine and the jacket, which he had left behind 
at the church when the police showed up. 
¶73 Considering all of these circumstances, we determine 
that additional hearsay evidence in the form of testimony by 
Shelton as to what Winston said was not essential to Williams' 
defense.  Despite the exclusion of this hearsay, Williams had a 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
28 
 
reasonable 
means 
of 
presenting 
and 
arguing 
his 
theory.  
Therefore, his right to present a defense was not violated by 
the exclusion of that hearsay. 
¶74 Finally, we turn to Williams' assertion that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for 
contributing to the delinquency of a child.  "[I]n reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an 
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
state and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and 
force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  Additionally, we 
consider the reasonable inferences the jury could make from the 
evidence presented.  State v. Toliver, 104 Wis. 2d 289, 296, 311 
N.W.2d 591 (1981). 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.40(1), provides:  "No person may 
intentionally encourage or contribute to the delinquency of a 
child."  The standard form jury instruction, identical to the 
instruction given the jury here, reads in part: 
The first element requires that the defendant 
intentionally 
encouraged 
or 
contributed 
to 
the 
delinquency of  (name of child).  This element 
requires not only that the defendant encouraged or 
contributed to the delinquency of a child but also 
that the act or failure to act was done intentionally.  
The term "intentionally" means that the defendant 
either had a purpose to encourage or contribute to 
delinquency 
or 
was 
aware 
that 
his 
conduct 
was 
practically certain to cause that result. 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
29 
 
A delinquent child is one who violates any state 
or federal criminal law.   
Wis JI——Criminal 2170 (footnotes omitted). 
¶76 Williams does not dispute that, for purposes of 
§ 948.40(1), James D. was a child and was "delinquent" by 
engaging in gambling.  Instead, Williams asserts that the State 
presented no proof from which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that he had the intent necessary under § 948.40(1).  We 
disagree. 
¶77 Although 
Williams 
cites 
no 
case 
law 
involving 
sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a conviction for 
contributing to the delinquency of a child, Jung v. State, 55 
Wis. 2d 714, 201 N.W.2d 58 (1972), is on point.  In Jung, this 
court 
upheld 
a 
guilty 
verdict 
for 
contributing 
to 
the 
delinquency of a minor against a sufficiency of the evidence 
challenge.  The defendant in Jung housed a truant and wayward 
minor and became sexually involved with her after meeting her at 
a bar.  Id. at 718-19. 
¶78 On appeal, the defendant in Jung argued that the 
evidence was insufficient to convict him for contributing to the 
minor's delinquency because there was no proof before the jury 
that he knew the minor was wayward or a runaway.  55 Wis. 2d at 
721.  This court upheld the conviction, concluding that given 
the circumstances under which the defendant and the girl met, as 
well as her appearance and the defendant's willingness to let 
her stay at his house, the jury could reasonably infer the 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
30 
 
defendant 
knew she 
was 
wayward and 
truant 
and 
that he 
intentionally contributed to her delinquency.  Id. at 722. 
¶79 Juries often must infer intent.  See, e.g., State v. 
Dix, 86 Wis. 2d 474, 484, 273 N.W.2d 250 (1979).  Intent is by 
its very nature rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence.  
Clark v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 194, 197, 214 N.W.2d 450 (1974).   
¶80 As in Jung, here the jury had to make reasonable 
inferences about the defendant's state of mind based on the 
circumstances.  The jury reasonably could infer from the 
evidence that Williams was aware that his participation in 
illegal gambling with James D. was "practically certain" to 
cause James D. to violate the law.  Williams points to no 
evidence in the record that would undermine the reasonableness 
of such an inference.  For these reasons, we determine that the 
evidence before the jury was sufficient to find him guilty of 
contributing to the delinquency of a child. 
VI 
¶81 In 
sum, 
we 
determine 
that 
Williams' 
right 
to 
confrontation was not violated when the state crime lab unit 
leader, rather than the analyst who performed the tests, 
testified in part based on the crime lab report containing the 
lab test results.  In addition, we determine that the circuit 
court erroneously admitted the report under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule, but that the admission of the 
report was harmless error in light of the unit leader's 
testimony and other circumstances.  We also reject the other 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
31 
 
arguments 
Williams 
makes 
in 
attacking 
his 
conviction.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
  
 
 
No. 
00-3065-CR   
 
 
 
1