Title: State v. Peter R. Martel
Citation: 2003 WI 70
Docket Number: 2002AP001599-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2003

2003 WI 70 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1599-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Peter R. Martel,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 29, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia   
 
JUDGE: 
Hon. Richard Rehm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Steven W. 
Zaleski and The Zaleski Law Firm, Janesville, and oral argument 
by Steven Zaleski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 70 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1599-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 61) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Peter R. Martel,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Columbia 
County, Richard Rehm, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.  
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This case is before the court on 
certification from the court of appeals on the question of 
whether a circuit court may order sex-offender registration as a 
condition of probation for a defendant who has not been 
convicted and sentenced for one of the crimes enumerated in the 
sex-offender registration statute or its counterpart in the 
sentencing code, Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 973.048(2001-2002),1 
respectively. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-2002 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.048 limits the 
circuit court's discretion to order sex-offender registration to 
those persons who are sentenced or placed on probation for an 
offense enumerated in the statute.  Because the defendant in 
this case was not sentenced or placed on probation for an 
offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. §§ 973.048 or 301.45, the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
of 
sex-offender 
registration 
as 
a 
condition of probation was error.    
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
Peter R. Martel was charged in Columbia County Circuit 
Court with repeated sexual assault of the same child, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.025.  He was released on a 
signature bond with the condition that he was to have no contact 
with the child.  Martel was later charged with felony bail 
jumping, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b), after being 
found with the child and several other adults, including the 
child's mother, in his home in the Town of Lodi.  The repeated 
sexual assault charge was dismissed at the preliminary hearing 
when the alleged victim failed to cooperate.   
 
¶4 
The State later refiled the case, charging Martel with 
six counts of sexual assault of a child under 16, in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2), instead of the original single count 
of repeated sexual assault of a child.  Martel was also charged 
with physical abuse of a different child, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.03(2)(b), and two additional counts of felony bail 
jumping for violating the condition of his release that 
prohibited drinking alcohol.   
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
The 
State 
again 
had 
difficulty 
securing 
the 
cooperation of the alleged victim, and eventually reached a plea 
agreement with Martel.  On September 28, 2001, Martel pled no 
contest to bail jumping, and the remaining charges were 
dismissed and "read in."  The State and Martel agreed to a joint 
sentence recommendation of a withheld sentence and 36 months of 
probation, including 60 days in jail and sex-offender treatment 
as conditions of probation.   
 
¶6 
At sentencing, the Honorable Richard L. Rehm generally 
followed the parties' joint sentencing recommendation, with one 
notable exception that precipitated this review.  The circuit 
court withheld sentence and placed Martel on probation for 36 
months, with the following conditions: 60 days in jail, 
alcohol/drug assessment and treatment, sex-offender evaluation 
and treatment, sex-offender registration, provision of a DNA 
sample, and steady employment. 
 
¶7 
Martel filed a postconviction motion seeking removal 
of the sex-offender registration condition of probation.  The 
circuit court denied the motion.  Martel appealed, and the court 
of appeals certified the case to us, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.61, on the following question: "whether a circuit 
court may order a defendant to register as a sex offender when 
the defendant is convicted of bail jumping, with a sex offense 
dismissed and read in."  We conclude that the circuit court's 
order of sex-offender registration as a condition of probation 
in this case was error, and reverse and remand for removal of 
the sex-offender registration condition of probation. 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
4 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶8 
The pertinent facts in this case are undisputed.  The 
sole issue before the court involves the interpretation and 
application of statutes pertaining to conditions of probation 
and sex-offender registration, which is a question of law that 
we review de novo.  State v. Oakley, 2000 WI 37, ¶6, 234 Wis. 2d 
528, 609 N.W.2d 786.  A circuit court's imposition of conditions 
of probation is discretionary, but a discretionary decision that 
is based upon an error of law is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Id., ¶3.    
III. ANALYSIS 
¶9  A circuit court's authority to impose sex-offender 
registration as a condition of probation is governed by the 
language of three statutes: 1) Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the sex-
offender registration statute; 2) Wis. Stat. § 973.048, which 
specifies when a circuit court may or must order sex-offender 
registration pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.45; and 3) the general 
probation statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.09. 
A.  Wis. Stat. § 301.45 
¶10 The sex-offender registration statute, Wis. Stat. § 
301.45, 
establishes 
a 
sex-offender 
registry 
and 
imposes 
registration and reporting requirements upon persons who meet 
certain statutory criteria.  Generally, persons required to 
register and report under the statute include those who have 
been 
convicted, adjudicated 
delinquent, 
committed after a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or 
are 
in 
prison, 
on 
probation, 
parole 
or 
other 
community 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
5 
 
supervision, or in a juvenile institution "for a sex offense."  
See generally, Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1g)(a)-(g). 
¶11 
"Sex 
offense" 
is 
defined 
in 
the 
sex-offender 
registration statute as: 
[A] violation, or the solicitation, conspiracy, or 
attempt to commit a violation, of s. 940.22(2), 
940.225(1), (2) or (3), 944.06, 948.02(1) or (2), 
948.025, 948.05, 948.055, 948.06, 948.07, 948.075, 
948.08, 948.095, 948.11(2)(a) or (am), 948.12, 948.13, 
or 948.30, or of s. 940.30 or 940.31 if the victim was 
a minor and the person who committed the violation was 
not the victim's parent. 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b).  These enumerated offenses encompass 
sex crimes against adults and children, as well as certain child 
abduction crimes. 
¶12 If required to register under the terms of the 
statute, the subject individual must provide and annually update 
an array of personal identifying information, including: name 
and any aliases, a detailed physical description, address, 
employer, any school in which the person is enrolled, the 
statute violated, the county or state of conviction, date of 
release from confinement or placement on supervision, the name 
of the person's supervising agency, and certain treatment 
information.  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a), (3) and (4). 
 
¶13  In addition to the initial registration and annual 
update 
requirements, 
the 
sex-offender 
registration 
statute 
requires registrants to notify the registry of any changes in 
required information within ten days of the change, or, in 
certain circumstances, within 24 hours of the change.  Wis. 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
6 
 
Stat. § 301.45(4)(a) and (b).  The statutory registration and 
reporting requirements are generally applicable for a period of 
15 years following discharge from supervision, and in certain 
cases never expire.  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5). 
¶14  Violation of the requirements of the sex-offender 
registration statute is punishable by up to nine months 
imprisonment for a first offense; second and subsequent offenses 
are Class H felonies, carrying a penalty of up to six years 
imprisonment.  Wis. Stat. §§ 301.46(6), 939.50(3)(h). 
¶15  The sex-offender registration statute specifies who is 
subject to its terms automatically, as a matter of law.  The 
parties agree that Martel is not subject to sex-offender 
registration under the terms of Wis. Stat. § 301.45 itself.  
Bail jumping is not one of the offenses enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(1d)(b). 
B.  Wis. Stat. § 973.048         
¶16 A separate statute——Wis. Stat. § 973.048——permits, and 
in some cases requires, a circuit court to order sex-offender 
registration pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.45.  Wisconsin Statute 
§ 973.048 specifies when a circuit court must order sex-offender 
registration at sentencing, and when a court may do so in the 
exercise of sentencing discretion:  
(1m) Except as provided in sub. (2m), if a court 
imposes a sentence or places a person on probation for 
any violation, or for the solicitation, conspiracy or 
attempt to commit any violation, under ch. 940, 944 or 
948 or ss. 943.01 to 943.15, the court may require the 
person to comply with the reporting requirements under 
s. 301.45 if the court determines that the underlying 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
7 
 
conduct was sexually motivated, as defined in s. 
980.01 (5), and that it would be in the interest of 
public protection to have the person report under s. 
301.45. 
(2m) If a court imposes a sentence or places a person 
on probation for a violation, or for the solicitation, 
conspiracy or attempt to commit a violation, of s. 
940.22(2), 940.225(1), (2), or (3), 944.06, 948.02(1) 
or (2), 948.025, 948.05, 948.055, 948.06, 948.07, 
948.075, 
948.08, 
948.095, 
948.11(2)(a) 
or 
(am), 
948.12, 948.13, or 948.30, or of s. 940.30 or 940.31 
if the victim was a minor and the person was not the 
victim's parent, the court shall require the person to 
comply with the reporting requirements under s. 301.45 
unless the court determines, after a hearing on a 
motion made by the person, that the person is not 
required to comply under s. 301.45(1m). 
Wis. Stat. § 973.048(1m) and (2m).  Under each of these 
subsections, the circuit court's authority to order sex-offender 
registration arises only "if a court imposes a sentence or 
places a person on probation for a [or any] violation, or for 
the solicitation, conspiracy or attempt to commit a [or any] 
violation" of one of the enumerated statutes.  Accordingly, 
neither mandatory nor discretionary court-ordered sex-offender 
registration under Wis. Stat. § 973.048 comes into play unless 
the court "imposes a sentence or places a person on probation 
for a violation" of one of the enumerated statutes. 
¶17  The offenses enumerated in the mandatory subsection of 
the statute, subsection (2m), parallel the offenses enumerated 
in 
the 
definition 
of 
"sex 
offense" 
in 
the 
sex-offender 
registration statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b).  The 
offenses enumerated in the discretionary subsection of the 
statute, subsection (1m), expand that list to include certain 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
8 
 
non-sex crimes "if the court determines that the underlying 
conduct was sexually motivated" and "that it would be in the 
interest of public protection to have the person report under s. 
301.45."  Wis. Stat. § 973.048(1m).      
¶18 Bail jumping is not one of the offenses enumerated in 
either subsection (1m) or (2m) of Wis. Stat. § 973.048.  As 
such, the statute does not apply to Martel's bail-jumping 
conviction. 
¶19  The State argues that the six counts of sexual assault 
of a child that were dismissed and read in pursuant to Martel's 
plea agreement are sufficient to bring this case within the 
purview of Wis. Stat. § 973.048.  We disagree. 
 
¶20 In State v. Austin, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 
(1971), we addressed the nature and operation of read-in 
offenses in Wisconsin: 
Under our read-in procedure, the defendant does 
not plead to any charges and therefore is not 
sentenced on any of the read-in charges but such 
admitted 
uncharged 
offenses 
are 
considered 
in 
sentencing him on the charged offense.  Thus under the 
read-in procedure, the defendant does not run the risk 
of consecutive sentences or even concurrent sentences.  
His only risk is a longer sentence for the crime 
charged but this sentence cannot exceed the maximum. 
Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 732.  
 
¶21 As this passage from Austin makes clear, offenses that 
are dismissed and read in are admitted by the defendant for 
purposes of consideration at sentencing on the crime or crimes 
for which the defendant is convicted.  But a defendant is not 
"sentenced" on read-in offenses, nor can he be "placed on 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
9 
 
probation" for read-in offenses.  Needless to say, there is no 
conviction for an offense that is dismissed and read in, and a 
sentence or a period of probation can only be imposed if there 
is a conviction.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(a)("the court may 
impose as many sentences as there are convictions") and 
§ 973.09(1)(a)("[I]f a person is convicted of a crime, the 
court, by order, may withhold sentence or impose sentence under 
s. 973.15 and stay its execution, and in either case place the 
person on probation.").  Read-ins cannot increase the maximum 
sentence for the crime of conviction.  Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 
732.  
 
¶22 Martel has not been convicted of——and therefore has 
not been sentenced or placed on probation for——any of the 
offenses enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 973.048(1m) or (2m).  The 
statute's mandatory and discretionary provisions for court-
ordered sex-offender registration are applicable only when "a 
court imposes a sentence or places a person on probation" for 
one or more of the statutorily-enumerated offenses.  A circuit 
court does not impose a sentence or place an offender on 
probation 
for 
offenses 
that 
are 
dismissed 
and 
read 
in.  
Accordingly, the sexual assault read-ins do not bring this case 
within the terms of Wis. Stat. § 973.048. 
 
¶23 State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W. 
2d 155, and State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 751-754, 460 
N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 1990), do not dictate a contrary result.  
In Floyd, we held that a defendant is entitled to sentence 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
10 
 
credit for time spent in pretrial custody on read-in offenses.  
Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶1, 32. 
¶24  The statute at issue in Floyd specified that a 
defendant "shall be given credit" for "actual days spent in 
custody," 
including, 
"without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
confinement related to an offense for which the offender is 
ultimately sentenced."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a)(emphasis 
added).  We noted in Floyd that the remedial purpose of the 
sentence credit statute was "to provide sentence credit in a 
wide range of situations" in order to "afford fairness" to 
defendants.   Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶23  (quoting State v. 
Beets, 
124 
Wis. 
2d 
372, 
379, 
369 
N.W.2d 
382 
(1985)).  
Accordingly, we concluded that "pre-trial confinement on a 
dismissed charge that is read in at sentencing relates to 'an 
offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced'" within 
the meaning of the sentence credit statute.  Id., ¶32 (emphasis 
added.) 
 
¶25 The statute at issue here does not contain the same 
sort of expansive language as the sentence credit statute at 
issue in Floyd; Wis. Stat. § 973.048 does not authorize court-
ordered sex-offender registration for qualifying offenses that 
merely relate to the offense for which the offender is actually 
sentenced.  Rather, the statute authorizes (and in some cases 
mandates) court-ordered sex-offender registration only when the 
court actually imposes sentence or places a person on probation 
for a qualifying offense.  Floyd is not analogous. 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
11 
 
 
¶26 In Szarkowitz, the court of appeals held that the 
restitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1)(1989-1990), allowed 
the circuit court to impose restitution for read-in offenses.  
Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753-54.  The restitution statute 
authorized the circuit court, when imposing sentence or ordering 
probation, to order the defendant to make full or partial 
restitution "to any victim of the crime."  Id. at 746.  The 
court of appeals concluded that this language was ambiguous, 
because it could be read narrowly to encompass only the crime of 
conviction, 
or 
more 
broadly 
to 
include 
crimes 
admitted, 
dismissed, 
and 
read-in 
at 
sentencing 
for 
the 
crime 
of 
conviction.  Id. at 751.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the 
broader 
interpretation 
was 
more 
consistent 
with 
the 
statute's purposes, and held that "the language 'any victim of 
the crime' in sec. 973.20(1), Stats., includes victims of any 
crimes to which the defendant admits as part of the read-in 
procedure as well as victims of the particular crime for which 
he is convicted."  Id. at 754.2 
 
¶27 Unlike the restitution statute at issue in Szarkowitz, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.048 is not ambiguous.  By its terms, it applies 
only when "a court imposes a sentence or places a person on 
probation for a [or any] violation" of a statutorily-enumerated 
offense.  Wis. Stat. § 973.048(1m) and (2m).  Szarkowitz, like 
Floyd, is not analogous. 
                                                 
2 The legislature has since amended the restitution statute 
to 
expressly 
include 
"read-in" 
offenses. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
973.20(1g)(b). 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
12 
 
C. Wis. Stat. § 973.09 
¶28 The State has a fallback argument, based on the 
language of the general probation statute, which was invoked by 
the circuit court in the denial of Martel's postconviction 
motion.  The State argues that the circuit court's broad 
discretion in ordering conditions of probation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09 authorizes the circuit court to order sex-offender 
registration as a condition of probation, even if the statutes 
that more specifically govern sex-offender registration do not 
apply. 
¶29  This cannot be correct.  True, the language of the 
general probation statute is very broad: "The court may impose 
any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  Sex-offender registration seems 
quite 
reasonable 
and 
appropriate 
where 
sex 
offenses 
are 
admitted, dismissed, and read in for purposes of sentencing on a 
non-sex offense. 
¶30 However, the broad statutory grant of discretion over 
conditions of probation cannot be interpreted as vesting the 
circuit court with the authority to invoke and apply statutes 
that are otherwise plainly inapplicable.  The circuit court 
cannot, under the auspices of the general probation statute, 
dispense 
with 
the 
statutory 
standards 
that 
govern 
the 
applicability of the sex-offender registration statute.  This 
argument, if accepted, would render the specific terms and 
limitations of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.048 and 301.45 meaningless. 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
13 
 
¶31 The State argues that our decision in State v. Heyn, 
155 Wis. 2d 621, 456 N.W.2d 157 (1990), as interpreted in 
Oakley, 
permits 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
order 
sex-offender 
registration under the general probation statute even where the 
sex-offender registration statutes do not apply.  In Heyn, the 
defendant was convicted of burglary and was ordered as a 
condition of probation to pay restitution for the installation 
of a burglar alarm at the victim's home.  Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d at 
625.  This item of restitution, however, did not constitute 
"pecuniary 
loss" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
973.09(1)(b)(1985-86), specifying mandatory restitution. 
¶32  We concluded in Heyn that the mandatory victim 
restitution provision in section 973.09(1)(b) did not "inhibit 
or restrict the authority of a trial court to impose 'reasonable 
and appropriate' conditions of probation" under Wis. Stat. § 
973.09(1)(a).  Id. at 628 (quoting State v. Connelly, 143 Wis. 
2d 500, 505, 421 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1988)).  Because the 
provisions of § 973.09(1)(a) and (1)(b) were "cumulative and 
concurrent," we held that "the latter section neither usurps nor 
abridges the former."  Id.  Thus, we concluded that the 
mandatory restitution provision in Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b) did 
not operate as a limitation on the circuit court's discretion to 
order other "reasonable and appropriate" conditions of probation 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a). 
¶33  We discussed Heyn in Oakley, but the statutes at issue 
in the latter case led us to a different conclusion.  Oakley, 
234 Wis. 2d 528, ¶¶22-27.  In Oakley, the circuit court had 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
14 
 
ordered the defendant to pay an old, unpaid fine as a condition 
of probation on an unrelated felony case.  Id., ¶¶1-2.  We noted 
that the penalty for nonpayment of a fine was statutorily fixed 
at a maximum of six months, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.07.  
Id., ¶15.  Ordering payment of the old, unrelated fine as a 
condition of probation on the defendant's felony conviction 
exposed the defendant to a prison term of up to ten years if 
revoked for noncompliance.  Id., ¶¶13-14. 
¶34  We distinguished the mandatory restitution statute at 
issue in Heyn, which did not operate as a limitation on the 
circuit 
court's 
discretion 
to 
order 
additional 
items 
of 
restitution under the general probation statute.  Id., ¶25.  In 
contrast to Heyn, we concluded in Oakley that the circuit 
court's order of payment of the old fine as a condition of 
probation on the ten-year felony "conflicts with the clear 
statutory mandate in Wis. Stat. § 973.07 that incarceration for 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
15 
 
failure to pay a fine is limited to incarceration in county jail 
for no more than six months."3  Id., ¶27.  
 
¶35 This case is closer to Oakley than to Heyn.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.048, the circuit court is authorized to order 
sex-offender registration only when it "imposes a sentence or 
places a person on probation for a [or any] violation" of one of 
the statutorily-enumerated offenses.  Wis. Stat. § 974.048(1m) 
and (2m).  Like the unpaid fine penalty statute at issue in 
Oakley, Wis. Stat. § 973.048 limits the circuit court's 
authority 
to 
order 
sex-offender 
registration 
to 
the 
circumstances specified in the statute.  The probation statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a), does not expand the application of 
the sex-offender registration statute to persons not otherwise 
covered. 
¶36  Here, as in Oakley, the circuit court's order of sex-
offender registration as a condition of probation under Wis. 
                                                 
3 The State has asked us to consider overruling State v. 
Torpen, 2001 WI App 273, 248 Wis. 2d 951, 637 N.W.2d 481, as 
inconsistent with State v. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d 621, 456 N.W.2d 157 
(1990), and State v. Oakley, 2000 WI 37, ¶6, 234 Wis. 2d 528, 
609 N.W.2d 786.  The court of appeals also noted in its 
certification that its analysis in Torpen may not have been 
consistent with Heyn or Oakley.  Torpen involved a circuit court 
order of payment of outstanding restitution obligations as a 
condition of probation on an unrelated case.  Torpen, 248 Wis. 
2d 951, ¶5.  The court of appeals concluded that the general 
probation statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.09, did not authorize the 
circuit court to order payment of restitution on unrelated 
cases.  Id., ¶¶18-19.  We decline to address any inconsistencies 
between Torpen, Heyn, and Oakley in the context of this case, 
which does not involve the interpretation of statutes pertaining 
to restitution in light of the probation statute.   
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
16 
 
Stat. § 973.09 operates to increase the defendant's potential 
criminal liability beyond that which would apply for revocation 
of probation.  In Oakley, the circuit court's order of payment 
of the old fine as a condition of felony probation increased the 
potential penalty for nonpayment from six months to ten years.  
Here, the sex-offender registration condition of probation 
increases Martel's potential criminal liability in a different 
way: he is on probation for bail jumping for three years, and if 
that probation is revoked, he faces a penalty of up to ten years 
imprisonment.  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(d).  The sex-offender 
registration requirement continues to apply for 15 years after 
discharge from supervision, and subjects Martel to imprisonment 
of nine months for a first violation and six years for any 
second or subsequent violation.  Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45(6)(a)2. 
and 939.50(3)(h). 
 
¶37  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court's 
order of sex-offender registration as a condition of Martel's 
bail-jumping probation is not authorized by Wis. Stat. § 
973.09(1)(a).  Bail jumping is not one of the offenses 
enumerated in the sex-offender registration statutes, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.048 or 301.45, and the sexual assault read-ins do not 
bring Martel's case within the purview of Wis. Stat. § 973.048.  
The circuit court's order of sex-offender registration as a 
condition of Martel's probation for bail jumping was error.  We 
remand to the circuit court for an appropriate amendment to the 
judgment of conviction removing sex-offender registration as a 
condition of probation. 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
17 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
No. 
02-1599-CR   
 
 
 
1