Title: Ahern v. OPEU
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46306
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 1999

FILED:  October 15, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MICHAEL AHERN,

		Respondent,

	v.

OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 	
UNION,

Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

JANET BROWN
d.b.a. Coach Works,

Respondent,

     v.

OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
UNION,

Appellant.

(CC 99-CV-0007, 99-CV-0008; SC S46306, S46307)

          (Cases Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)

	En Banc

	On appeal from an order of an injunction issued by the
Jefferson County Circuit Court.

	Argued and submitted September 10, 1999.

	B. Carlton Grew, of Oregon Public Employees Union, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

	Gregory P. Lynch, of Hurley, Lynch &amp; Re, P.C., Bend, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondents.

	LEESON, J.

	The injunctions ordered by the circuit court are vacated. 
The cases are remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

		LEESON, J.

		In this case, a trial court issued a preliminary
injunction against defendant Oregon Public Employees Union
(OPEU), enjoining it from performing acts that the court
concluded constituted an unfair labor practice under ORS
243.672(2)(g).(1)  OPEU appealed under ORS 662.120, which provides
for appeal to the Supreme Court when any court or judge thereof
"issues or denies any temporary injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute."  Plaintiff(2) filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, arguing that ORS 662.120 is not applicable to
this case because this is a tort action, not a matter involving
or growing out of a labor dispute.  This court determined that,
at least for the purposes of inquiring into our appellate
jurisdiction, the order was appealable, because it appeared that
this case involved or grew out of a labor dispute.  Accordingly,
this court denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss.  This court also
issued an order to show cause why the trial court's order should
not be vacated and the case dismissed on the ground that, under
ORS 243.650 et seq., the Employment Relations Board (ERB) has
exclusive jurisdiction of the matter and the trial court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.  

		The parties have responded both in writing and through
oral argument to this court's show cause order.  We now hold
that, under ORS 243.676, ERB has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether OPEU committed an unfair labor practice. 
Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
injunction that it entered in this case.  We therefore vacate the
injunction and remand the case to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

		The facts are not in dispute.  Plaintiff is an elected
Jefferson County Commissioner.  In 1995, Jefferson County and
OPEU entered into a collective bargaining agreement.  Before that
agreement expired in June 1998, OPEU and Jefferson County began
negotiating for a new collective bargaining agreement.  On
October 1, 1998, OPEU notified ERB that those negotiations had
reached an impasse.  See ORS 243.712 (prescribing notification
requirement and assignment of mediator when bargaining reaches
impasse).  After mediation failed to resolve the differences
between the county and OPEU, OPEU gave ERB notice of its intent
to strike, ORS 243.726(2)(c), and the bargaining unit went on
strike against Jefferson County in February 1998.  

		As part of the strike, OPEU members picketed and
distributed leaflets at plaintiff's business.  Although the
leaflets identified several labor-related complaints, they
stated:

	"This leaflet is for informational purposes only.  We
have no labor dispute with Ahern Grocery and Deli.  We
are not asking people to withhold services from Ahern
Grocery and Deli.  Continue to conduct business with
Ahern Grocery and Deli."

		On February 23, 1999, plaintiff filed this action
against OPEU in Jefferson County Circuit Court, alleging a tort
claim for intentional interference with economic relations.(3)  To
state a claim for that tort, a plaintiff must allege six
elements, one of which is that the interference was "accomplished
through improper means or for an improper purpose."  McGanty v.
Staudenraus, 321 Or 532, 535, 901 P2d 841 (1995).  Regarding that
element, plaintiff's complaint alleges, in part:

		"[OPEU] has intentionally and unlawfully
interfered with plaintiff's business and business
relations in willful violation of ORS 243.672(2)(g),
without a proper business purpose, and with the
improper objective of causing harm to plaintiff." 

(Emphasis added.)  Plaintiff's complaint also seeks a permanent
injunction preventing OPEU members from picketing in front of his
business, asserting that such picketing violates ORS
243.672(2)(g).  Additionally, plaintiff filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction against OPEU, asserting a violation of ORS
243.672(2)(g).

	OPEU opposed plaintiff's motion for a temporary
injunction, arguing that ERB has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether OPEU was engaging in an unfair labor practice. 
After a hearing on plaintiff's motion, the trial court concluded
that it had jurisdiction and stated:

	"there has been a violation of the statute, * * * [ORS]
243.672, in that the effect of the picketing is to
induce other persons to cease doing business with the
governing body member's business, or cease handling
transportation in dealing in goods or services."  

Accordingly, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction.

	As noted, OPEU appealed from that order and this court
determined that, for the purposes of resolving the jurisdictional 
issue, the order was appealable under ORS 662.120.  However,
because it appeared that this dispute involves public employees
subject to ORS 243.650 et seq., this court ordered plaintiff to
show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be vacated
and the case dismissed on the ground that the trial court lacks
jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice alleged in the
complaint.  We turn to the parties' arguments in response to the
show cause order.

	Plaintiff argues that the trial court had jurisdiction
to enter the injunction because this case is not a labor dispute
subject to ERB's jurisdiction.  Plaintiff characterizes this case
as a tort action between two private parties, namely, plaintiff
as a business owner and OPEU.  Because the matter is not a labor
dispute, plaintiff reasons, "ORS 243.650 et seq., does not
prohibit [plaintiff] from seeking damages in civil court for the
tortious actions of [OPEU]."  Plaintiff also argues that a
determination that ERB has exclusive jurisdiction over the tort
of intentional interference with economic relations would violate
three provisions of the Oregon Constitution, namely, Article I,
section 10 (right to remedy), Article I, section 17 (right to
jury trial), Article I, section 20 (no privileges to any class of
citizens not available on same terms to all citizens); and would
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

	OPEU responds that the trial court entered the
temporary injunction based on its finding that OPEU had violated
ORS 243.672(2)(g).  It argues that, under ORS 243.676, ERB has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether its conduct
constitutes an unfair labor practice and, if there is, to fashion
the appropriate remedy.  OPEU also argues that plaintiff's
constitutional arguments lack merit.    

	Plaintiff does not dispute that, under ORS 243.676, ERB
has jurisdiction over unfair labor practice complaints that occur
in the context of labor disputes.  Indeed, plaintiff concedes
that "ERB has exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes."  
(Emphasis added.)  As the following discussion reveals, we agree
with plaintiff's concession.  The question is whether plaintiff
nonetheless can avoid ERB's jurisdiction under ORS 243.676 to
determine whether an unfair labor practice has been committed by
alleging the unfair labor practice under ORS 243.672 as an
element of his tort claim.  Answering that question requires us
to discern the legislature's intent regarding the adjudication of
unfair labor practice complaints under ORS 243.676.  We do so
using the familiar methodology summarized in PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-612, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). 
We look first to the text and context of the statute.  If the
legislature's intent is clear at that level of analysis, our
inquiry is at an end.  Id. at 611.

	ORS 243.676(1) provides that, whenever a written
complaint is filed alleging that any person has engaged in or is
engaging in an unfair labor practice as defined by ORS 243.672 or
ORS 243.752, ERB must investigate the complaint, conduct a
hearing if it determines that a question of law or fact exists,
and make factual findings.  See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313
Or 414, 419-20, 837 P2d 505 (1992) (explaining statutorily
required process).  ORS 243.676 also gives ERB authority to
impose remedies for an unfair labor practice that include cease
and desist orders, ORS 243.676 (2)(b), civil penalties, ORS
243.676(4), and "such affirmative action * * * as necessary to
effectuate the purposes of [among other things, PECBA]."  ORS
243.676(2)(c).  

	We turn to statutory context.  One of the purposes of
PECBA is to

	"obligate public employers, public employees and their
representatives to enter into collective negotiations
with willingness to resolve grievances and disputes
relating to employment relations and to enter into
written agreements and signed contracts resulting from
such negotiations."  

ORS 243.656(5).  To achieve the goals of PECBA, ORS 243.672(3) 
provides that "an injured party" -- that is, anyone who has been
injured by an unfair labor practice -- may file a complaint with
ERB.  That statute does not limit ERB's authority over unfair 
labor practices to complaints brought by employers and employees.
ORS 243.650(24) defines an unfair labor practice as "the
commission of an act designated an unfair labor practice in ORS
243.672."  ORS 243.672(1), in turn, describes acts by a public
employer or its designated representative that are unfair labor
practices, and ORS 243.672(2) describes acts by a public
employee, or a labor organization or its designee, that are
unfair labor practices.  ERB is the administrative agency vested
with responsibility for implementing PECBA.

	PECBA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
resolving public sector labor disputes.  Unfair labor practice
complaints arise in the context of such labor disputes.  Viewed
in the context of PECBA's comprehensive regulatory structure,
which includes judicial review of final ERB orders, ORS 183.482,
we have no doubt that the legislature intended ERB to have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an unfair labor
practice has been committed.  Accordingly, the trial court lacks
jurisdiction to make such a determination.

	The reasoning in Tracy v. Lane County, 305 Or 378, 752
P2d 300 (1988), supports our conclusion that the trial court
lacks jurisdiction to decide plaintiff's unfair labor practice
allegation.  See Davis v. O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 741, 891 P2d 1307
(1995) (court's prior interpretation of related statute part of
context).  Tracy required this court to construe ORS 243.752,
which, in addition to ORS 243.672(1) and (2), describes conduct
that constitutes an unfair labor practice.  ORS 243.752 provides,
in part:

	"A majority decision of the arbitration panel, * * * if
supported by competent, material and substantial
evidence on the whole record, * * * shall be final and
binding upon the parties.  Refusal or failure to comply
with any provision of a final and binding arbitration
award is an unfair labor practice.  Any order issued by
the Employment Relations Board pursuant to this section
may be enforced at the instance of either party or the
board in the circuit court for the county in which the
dispute arose."

(Emphasis added.)  In Tracy, the plaintiffs were county employees
who filed a claim in circuit court under the wage claim statute
for retroactive pay under an interest arbitration award.  Id. at
380.  The question on review was whether the circuit court should
have withheld its judgment in the case until ERB had the
opportunity to exercise its statutory responsibility with respect
to the arbitration award.  Id.  This court held that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration
award is final and binding.  Id. at 382.  The court reasoned
that, under ORS 243.752(1), the decision whether an arbitration
award is final and binding is entrusted to ERB and that, because
the statute "does not accommodate inconsistent rulings," the
trial court lacked jurisdiction.  Id.  

	The reasoning in Tracy applies with equal force here. 
PECBA does not accommodate inconsistent rulings about what acts
may constitute an unfair labor practice.  Indeed, in PECBA, the
legislature has specified the particular disputes over which
circuit courts have jurisdiction.  See ORS 243.726(3)(a), (c) 
(providing for equitable relief in circuit court in certain
strike situations).  With respect to adjudication of whether an
unfair labor practice has been committed, the statute makes no
provision for circuit court jurisdiction.(4) 

	In this case, plaintiff's complaint alleges that the
improper means by which OPEU intentionally interfered with his
economic relations was by engaging in picketing activities in
violation ORS 243.672(2)(g).  Despite its tort label, the
gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that OPEU has committed an
unfair labor practice.  In determining whether it has authority
to decide a matter, a court must consider the nature of the
matter, not the label that a party has placed on it.  See
Shockey, 313 Or at 418-19 (prescribing methodology for
determining whether statutory scheme abrogates common-law
remedy).  For the reasons explained above, whether OPEU violated
ORS 243.672(2)(g) is a matter for ERB to decide.  Permitting the
trial court to determine, in the course of a tort proceeding,
whether an unfair labor practice has occurred would create the
danger of inconsistent rulings that this court warned against in
Tracy.  We hold that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate, in the proceeding before it, whether OPEU has
committed an unfair labor practice under ORS 243.672(2)(g).  

	We turn to plaintiff's constitutional claims.  As
noted, plaintiff argues that "a finding by this court that * * *
ERB has exclusive jurisdiction over [plaintiff's] common law tort
claim * * * would create significant constitutional
difficulties."  As we have explained, the gravamen of plaintiff's
complaint is that OPEU has committed an unfair labor practice. 
If plaintiff is asserting that his common law right to seek a
remedy for tortious interference with economic relations includes
the right to litigate the unfair labor practice allegation in
circuit court, he is wrong.  Plaintiff's claims of deprivation of
various constitutional rights because he cannot plead and prove
the unfair labor practice in circuit court thus are not well
taken.

	The injunctions ordered by the circuit court are
vacated.  The cases are remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

1. 	ORS 243.672 is part of the Public Employee Collective
Bargaining Act (PECBA), ORS 243.650 et seq., and provides, in
part:

		"(2) Subject to the limitations set forth in this
subsection, it is an unfair labor practice for a public
employee or for a labor organization or its designated
representative to do any of the following:

		"* * * * *

		"(g) For a labor organization or its agents to picket
or cause, induce, or encourage to be picketed, or threaten
to engage in such activity, at the residence or business
premises of any individual who is a member of the governing
body of a public employer, with respect to a dispute over a
collective bargaining agreement or negotiations over
employment relations, if an objective or effect of such
picketing is to induce another person to cease doing
business with the governing body member's business or to
cease handling, transporting or dealing in goods or services
produced at the governing body's business."

(Emphasis added.)

2. 	There are two plaintiffs in these proceedings.  Both
are Jefferson County Commissioners, and both sought and received
temporary restraining orders and injunctions against defendant
OPEU.  The facts in the two cases differ in ways that are not
legally significant.  For convenience, this opinion refers to
plaintiff in the singular and, where relevant, describes the
facts only in plaintiff Ahern's case.  

3. 	On February 17, 1999, Jefferson County filed an unfair
labor practice complaint with ERB, alleging that OPEU members
violated ORS 243.672(2)(g) by picketing at plaintiff's business
premises.

4. 	Our holding that ERB has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether an unfair labor practice has been committed is
not inconsistent with Tracy.  In that case, the court explained
that, "[p]arties may have statutory or common law remedies
outside the scope of what ERB may order in an unfair labor
practice."  Tracy, 305 Or at 382.  Under ORS 243.752(1), the
refusal or failure to comply with a final and binding arbitration
award is an unfair labor practice, and an arbitration award
issued by ERB may be enforced in circuit court.  In the context
of that statute, and the enforcement remedies available to
parties, the court referred to ERB's jurisdiction as "primary,
even if not exclusive."  Id.  Under ORS 243.672, the
determination whether an unfair labor practice has occurred rests
exclusively with ERB.