Title: Commonwealth v. Herring
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13083
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 28, 2022

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SJC-13083 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEITH HERRING. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 4, 2021. – April 28, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Pretrial Detention.  Bail. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 5, 2021. 
 
 
The case was heard by Georges, J. 
 
 
Vivianne Jeruchim (Joshua M. Daniels also present) for the 
defendant. 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Anthony D. Mirenda, Emily J. Nash, & Matthew F. Casassa, 
for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, the Commonwealth 
petitioned a single justice of this court for review of a 
Superior Court judge's decision to grant pretrial release to the 
2 
 
 
defendant, Keith Herring.1  A single justice of this court held 
an evidentiary hearing and, after de novo consideration, vacated 
the release order and ordered that the defendant instead remain 
in custody.  Because the single justice acted pursuant to his 
broad powers and within his considerable discretion, we affirm.2 
Background.  The defendant was arraigned in 2017 on various 
charges, including murder in the first degree, and subsequently 
was held without bail.  Following this court's decision in 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431 (2020) (CPCS), the defendant filed 
a series of motions for release based on the risk to his health 
posed by the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and 
exacerbated by his serious heart condition.3  The first four of 
these motions, filed between April and December of 2020, did not 
 
1 For convenience, we refer to Herring as "the defendant" 
instead of "the respondent." 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus letter submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support 
of the defendant. 
 
3 The defendant suffers from a heart condition.  As a result 
of his heart condition, the defendant experiences arrythmia or 
atrial fibrillation (i.e., irregular heartbeat).  Untreated 
atrial fibrillation results in an increased risk of heart 
attack, stroke, and heart failure.  The defendant's heart 
condition also increases his risk of developing serious to fatal 
illness if he contracts COVID-19.  Moreover, the defendant is at 
heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 because, following the 
recommendation of his treating cardiologist, he has not received 
the COVID-19 vaccine due to concerns about how it may interact 
with his heart medication. 
3 
 
 
result in the defendant's release.  However, as a result of the 
fourth motion, the defendant was transferred from the Suffolk 
County house of correction to the Middlesex County house of 
correction in Billerica (BHOC), which was found to have 
"superior measures in place . . . to reduce the risk of COVID-19 
transmission." 
On February 3, 2021, the defendant filed yet another motion 
for release.  Filed with the motion was an unsworn letter from 
the defendant's treating cardiologist at Massachusetts General 
Hospital (MGH), Dr. Doreen Defaria Yeh, and affidavits from the 
defendant and his counsel.  The letter from Dr. Yeh identified 
several concerns with the defendant's care at BHOC, including 
delays in ordering medication and a heart monitor for the 
defendant, resulting in the postponement of a scheduled heart 
surgery.  Dr. Yeh also identified concerns with how the 
defendant was monitored and when and how he was transferred from 
his cell to BHOC's medical unit or to MGH. 
The judge "adopt[ed] as facts" the information in Dr. Yeh's 
letter and concluded that BHOC's "abject failure to address the 
[defendant's] most basic medical needs for his cardiac condition 
in the midst of a pandemic and without vaccination" had created 
a "risk level . . . so serious in and of itself that it 
warrant[ed] release to home confinement."  Accordingly, the 
judge granted the defendant's motion the day after it was filed, 
4 
 
 
without holding an evidentiary hearing.  The judge ordered that 
the defendant be released temporarily from pretrial custody 
subject to conditions including home confinement and global 
positioning system (GPS) monitoring. 
In response, the Commonwealth filed with the single justice 
of this court an emergency motion to stay execution of the 
release order and an emergency petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
seeking reversal of the order.  The single justice stayed the 
order for one week, until the parties could convene for an 
evidentiary hearing via video conference.   At that hearing, 
health services administrator of the Middlesex County sheriff's 
office, Kathleen Shultz, and a nurse practitioner on staff at 
BHOC with a subspecialty in cardiology, Kathleen Waterhouse, 
testified for the Commonwealth.  No one testified for the 
defendant.4 
According to the Commonwealth's witnesses, BHOC followed 
the COVID-19 transmission mitigation measures recommended 
pursuant to Department of Public Health guidance and met 
biweekly with an infectious disease specialist and 
epidemiologist to update best practices.  As for the defendant's 
 
4 It appears that defense counsel initially had intended to 
call Dr. Yeh to testify, and that the single justice had offered 
to hold an additional hearing at a separate time to accommodate 
Dr. Yeh's schedule.  Ultimately, however, Dr. Yeh did not 
testify. 
5 
 
 
specific medical needs and COVID-19 exposure risk, he was housed 
in an isolation cell within the BHOC's health services unit, 
which contained a call button the defendant could use to speak 
with nurses.  The defendant was monitored continuously by BHOC 
staff.  If the defendant reported and testing confirmed an 
episode of irregular heartbeat, the defendant would be 
transported immediately by ambulance to the hospital. 
After witness testimony concluded, the Commonwealth argued 
to the single justice that the concerns reflected in Dr. Yeh's 
letters were rebutted by the sworn testimony from its witnesses.  
It argued that the defendant was receiving appropriate medical 
care and that BHOC had in place appropriate measures to mitigate 
the COVID-19 transmission risk at BHOC.  The Commonwealth 
pointed to the defendant's lengthy criminal record,5 and 
emphasized that the defendant "is alleged to have committed this 
murder . . . while subject to GPS monitoring" as a condition of 
release for an "unrelated case involving a kidnapping and an 
attempted murder."  The Commonwealth argued that its case 
against the defendant for these charges was strong,6 and 
 
5 The Commonwealth appended the defendant's criminal record 
to its supplement to its initial placeholder petition submitted 
to the single justice. 
 
6 The Commonwealth asserted that the alleged victim's 
girlfriend would testify that she witnessed "the defendant 
 
6 
 
 
contended that the risk the defendant would flee was high given 
the potential sentence of life without parole. 
Defense counsel argued that the defendant had a plausible 
self-defense claim to the charges.7  She insisted that the risk 
of COVID-19 transmission in BHOC remained high -- which, for the 
defendant, amounted to a risk of serious to fatal illness given 
the defendant's heart condition -- and opined that Dr. Yeh's 
medical opinion ought to be respected. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the single justice reviewed 
the defendant's request for relief de novo.  The single justice 
found: 
"[A]lthough the defendant may have some COVID-19 exposure 
risk, particularly in light of his uncontroverted pre-
existing medical condition, the staff and medical providers 
at the [BHOC] are following Centers for Disease Control 
[(CDC)] guidelines and protocols and utilizing their best 
medical judgment to minimize the risk to the defendant.  
When these efforts are weighed against the totality of the 
 
pull[] out a gun, demand[] drugs and sho[o]t the victim when he 
resisted."  The Commonwealth further claimed that it could 
locate the defendant at the crime scene because of a GPS monitor 
he was wearing at the time (a condition of release for an 
unrelated case), and that it could prove through telephone 
records and cell site location information (CSLI) that the 
defendant had coordinated with a codefendant.  Although the 
defendant's girlfriend had told police that she had witnessed 
the shooting and that the defendant had acted in self-defense, 
the Commonwealth claimed that the defendant's girlfriend was 
nowhere near the crime scene based on her social media activity 
and CSLI. 
 
7 Defense counsel noted that, at the time of the shooting, 
the alleged victim undisputedly was armed, had been using 
cocaine, and had no money.  Defense counsel suggested that the 
defendant "is the one that was set up." 
7 
 
 
circumstances, the defendant's medical condition does not 
militate in favor of release. . . .  While the Court does 
not take lightly the defendant's medical condition, the 
Commonwealth has demonstrated that the staff and facilities 
at the BHOC can appropriately manage the defendant's . . . 
treatment . . . ." 
 
In light of these findings, the single justice vacated the 
Superior Court judge's order and ordered that the defendant 
continue to be held without bail at BHOC.8  The defendant 
appealed from the single justice's judgment to the full session 
of this court. 
Discussion.  "[W]e review decisions of the single justice 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, for clear error of law or abuse of 
discretion."  Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 747, 751 
(2019).  A decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where it 
results from "a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors" 
and consequently "falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
8 We do not discuss factual developments mentioned in the 
defendant's brief that postdate the single justice's decision.  
See Ernest E. v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 183, 191 (2020) 
(rejecting evidence outside record as "the Commonwealth did not 
have the opportunity to challenge the information or to present 
any evidence or testimony disputing" it).  See also Love v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 413 Mass. 766, 768 (1992), citing 
Mass. R. A. P. 16 (e), as amended, 378 Mass. 940 (1979); Mass. 
R. A. P. 8 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019).  However 
we note, as did the single justice in his judgment, that the 
defendant is free to again petition the Superior Court for bail 
if the material facts have changed. 
8 
 
 
The defendant argues that the single justice abused his 
discretion in two ways:  first, procedurally -- by holding an 
evidentiary hearing and then deciding de novo whether to release 
the defendant on bail based on the evidence newly adduced at 
that hearing; and second, substantively -- by deciding not to 
release the defendant on bail despite his medical condition and 
attendant heightened vulnerability to COVID-19.9  We conclude 
that there was no abuse of discretion. 
1.  Procedure.  "[B]ail decisions concerning defendants 
charged with murder in the first degree are subject to the 
discretion of the bail judge."  Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 750.  
Consequently, a single justice ordinarily reviews a "bail 
judge's decision . . . for abuse of discretion or error of law."  
 
9 The defendant argues in passing that the single justice 
abused his discretion by even reaching the merits of the 
Commonwealth's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition because the bail 
determination did not present any "novel, systemic, or case-
determinative issues," Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 
26 (2019), but rather presented fact-bound issues collateral to 
the merits of the defendant's criminal case. 
 
A single justice reviews the merits of a G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition where the subject matter is "sufficiently important and 
extraordinary as to require general superintendence 
intervention."  Fontanez, 482 Mass. at 24-25.  We have not 
previously limned which circumstances might render an order 
granting bail so extraordinary as to warrant this intervention.  
Nor do we have occasion to do so here, for the defendant waived 
the argument that his bail determination did not present such 
circumstances by failing to raise it before the single justice.  
See Leo v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1025, 1026 n.2 (2004).  See 
also Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 698 n.12 (2017). 
9 
 
 
Id.  Nonetheless, a single justice "has the discretionary power 
to make de novo bail decisions in certain circumstances."  Id. 
at 751 n.4, citing Commesso v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 373 
(1975).  Here, the single justice exercised this discretion and 
the defendant challenges that exercise as improper.  We reject 
the challenge. 
In Commesso, 369 Mass. at 372, we "uph[e]ld the 
jurisdiction of the single justice to review bail 
determinations" and then addressed the appropriate scope of that 
review.  We explained: 
"Bail determinations must often be done in haste, 'without 
that full inquiry and consideration which the matter 
deserves.'  [Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 11 (1951) (opinion 
by Jackson, J.).]  We therefore think that the single 
justice has the power to consider the matter anew, taking 
into account facts newly presented, and to exercise his own 
judgment and discretion without remanding the matter for 
reconsideration by the Superior Court judge.  Ordinarily, 
however, where two judges, acting independently of each 
other, have determined that bail is required and have set 
bail in an amount which is not plainly excessive, a third 
exercise of independent discretion on the same facts will 
not contribute to the effective administration of justice.  
In the ordinary case, therefore, it is the practice of the 
single justice to review the matter only with reference to 
errors of law." 
 
Id. at 373-374.  This passage makes clear that the single 
justice has the power to hold fact-finding hearings and review 
bail decisions de novo, and that whether to do so is a matter 
for the single justice's discretion.  See Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 
751 n.4.  However, it also emphasizes that this discretionary 
10 
 
 
power rarely will be exercised because where a defendant already 
twice has obtained de novo consideration of bail (by the 
District Court and then the Superior Court),10 the marginal 
benefit of a third layer of de novo consideration would not 
justify its burden on the single justice.  See Commesso, supra.  
However, where the bail decision previously has received de novo 
consideration only once,11 and was made quickly, "without that 
full inquiry and consideration which the matter deserves," de 
novo review by the single justice may be appropriate.  Id. at 
373, quoting Stack, supra.  Circumstances rendering such review 
appropriate will be exceptional. 
 
Here, the single justice exercised his discretion to hold a 
fact-finding hearing and render a de novo bail decision.  We 
 
10 Where an initial bail decision was made in the District 
Court, a defendant may seek de novo review in the Superior 
Court.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58; Commesso, 369 Mass. at 373.  The 
defendant may seek review of the Superior Court's decision under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, before a single justice of this court.  See 
Commesso, supra at 372.  But see Supreme Judicial Court, Order 
Regarding Transfer of Certain Single Justice Matters During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, No. OE-144 (June 8, 2020) (permitting 
defendants to seek review of District Court bail decisions 
directly with single justice). 
 
11 This will be the case where the initial bail decision was 
made in the Superior Court or if the Commonwealth is the party 
seeking review, in which case a petition under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, is the sole means of obtaining review.  See Brangan v. 
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 696-697 (2017), citing Commesso, 
369 Mass. at 372.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ray, 435 Mass. 
249, 250-251 (2001) (Commonwealth filed petition under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, for review of Superior Court bail decision). 
11 
 
 
reject the defendant's contention that this was an abuse of 
discretion.  The defendant argues that the single justice ought 
to have deferred to the bail judge's decision because the bail 
judge was familiar with the defendant's criminal case and 
medical condition, having handled multiple motions for the 
defendant's release.  However, the facts concerning the 
defendant's medical situation and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic 
constantly were evolving, and the bail judge resolved the 
instant motion "in haste" and without an evidentiary hearing.  
Commesso, 369 Mass. at 373.  In these circumstances, the single 
justice's decision to hold a fact-finding hearing and decide the 
matter de novo did not "fall[] outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives."  L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27. 
Our decision in Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. 
851 (1980), is not to the contrary.  There, we discussed the 
standard of review for a single justice faced with a petition by 
the Commonwealth for review of an order staying a sentence 
pending appeal.  Id. at 854-856.  We determined that the single 
justice acted within his discretion when he declined to consider 
de novo whether the defendant was likely to succeed on the 
merits of his appeal.  Id. at 856.  We noted that, "[b]y 
releasing the defendant on bail, the trial judge has necessarily 
determined, on the basis of firsthand and complete information 
concerning the conduct of the trial, that the appeal is worthy 
12 
 
 
of presentation to an appellate court."  Id.  And we explained 
that, comparatively, the single justice was in a poor position 
to determine the likelihood that the defendant would succeed on 
appeal, for he did not even have a transcript of the trial or of 
the hearing on the motion to stay.  Id. at 856 n.2. 
By contrast, here, the bail judge ordered the defendant 
released on bail without complete or firsthand information on 
the conditions at BHOC, and the single justice had the 
opportunity to supplement that information and thereby to make a 
more informed decision whether to release the defendant on bail.  
We discern no abuse of discretion in the single justice's 
decision to take that opportunity. 
2.  Substance.  When a judge is "deciding whether to admit 
a defendant charged with murder in the first degree to bail, the 
judge's exercise of discretion . . . should be based on a 
careful review of the specific details of the case and the 
defendant's history."  Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 756.  The main 
considerations are "the nature and circumstances of the offense" 
and "the defendant's risk of flight."  Id.  The defendant's 
flight risk is evaluated with reference to, among other things, 
"the strength or weakness of the Commonwealth's case," "the 
potential penalty," and "any [past] failure to appear at any 
court proceedings."  Id.  Although the severity of the potential 
penalty faced by defendants charged with murder in the first 
13 
 
 
degree always weighs against their release, this generic 
contribution to flight risk "should not be treated as 
automatically dispositive."  Id. at 755.  Rather, defendants 
charged with murder in the first degree, like all defendants, 
are entitled to "an individualized bail decision based upon 
[their] specific circumstances."  Id. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic specifically, we have 
instructed judges to additionally assess, as relevant here: 
"the totality of the circumstances, including (1) the risk 
of the individual's exposure to COVID-19 in custody; (2) 
whether the defendant . . . would pose a safety risk to the 
victim and the victim's family members, witnesses, the 
community, or him- or herself if released; (3) whether the 
defendant is particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 due to a 
preexisting medical condition or advanced age; . . . and 
[(4)] the defendant's release plan."12 
 
CPCS, 484 Mass. at 448. 
The defendant argues that the single justice's 
determination that he should continue to be held pending trial 
was an abuse of discretion because the single justice failed to 
consider that the defendant faces COVID-19 exposure risk both 
generally as an inmate at BHOC and specifically as a person with 
a serious heart condition.  But the single justice's decision 
 
12 Although pretrial detainees charged with murder, like the 
defendant, are not entitled to the rebuttable presumption of 
release established by CPCS, they still may move for release 
based on their COVID-19 exposure risk, and a judge considering 
that motion will assess these same factors.  See CPCS, 484 Mass. 
at 447 & n.18, 454. 
14 
 
 
clearly reflects his understanding that the defendant, like any 
inmate at BHOC, faced "some COVID-19 exposure risk," and that 
this risk was particularly heightened for the defendant because 
of his serious heart condition. 
Second, the defendant argues that, in denying the defendant 
bail, the single justice improperly treated the defendant's 
murder charge as "automatically dispositive."  Vasquez, 481 
Mass. at 755.  However, this contention is belied by the single 
justice's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing and by the 
attention reflected in the judgment to the defendant's medical 
condition and treatment. 
Ultimately, the defendant suggests that the single justice 
made "a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors" 
relevant to the defendant's bail determination (quotation and 
citation omitted), L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27, because his 
flight risk is minimal given that he has plausible defenses to 
the charges, see Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 755-756, and needs 
constant medical attention, whereas his risk of COVID-19 related 
death if he remains confined at BHOC is substantial.  The 
defendant suggests that the risk to his health posed by 
continued confinement must outweigh the risk that he might flee 
if he is released. 
We disagree that the single justice's contrary 
determination amounts to an abuse of discretion.  Although the 
15 
 
 
defendant's underlying medical condition exacerbates his risk of 
serious illness if he contracts COVID-19, the single justice 
supportably found that BHOC was following CDC guidance to reduce 
COVID-19 transmission in its facility and was prepared to 
respond should the defendant experience a medical emergency.  
Moreover, given the potential life sentence that the defendant 
faces, the strength of the Commonwealth's case against him, and 
the defendant's imperfect history with conditions of release, 
the single justice's implicit determination that the defendant's 
flight risk was considerable was a reasonable one.13  Considering 
the totality of the circumstances, see CPCS, 484 Mass. at 448, 
the single justice's decision to deny bail falls within "the 
range of reasonable alternatives," L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27. 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
judgment of the single justice denying the defendant release on 
bail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
13 The reasonableness of the single justice's determination 
that the defendant posed a considerable flight risk additionally 
is supported by the fact that the defendant initially was placed 
in pretrial confinement and then four times denied 
reconsideration of bail by two different motion judges.