Title: IN RE HON JOHN M CHMURA
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 117565
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED MAY 30, 2001  
In re HON. JOHN M. CHMURA (AFTER REMAND), 
Judge of the Thirty-Seventh District Court, 
Warren, Michigan.
 No. 117565  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
This judicial disciplinary matter is before this Court  
after remand to the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) to  
determine whether certain public communications engaged in by  
the respondent during a judicial election campaign violated  
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  In In re  
Chmura, 461 Mich 517; 608 NW2d 31 (2000) (Chmura I), we held  
that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was facially unconstitutional. 
We  
thereupon narrowed the language of Canon 7(B)(1)(d), holding  
that a judicial candidate “should not knowingly, or with  
reckless disregard, use or participate in the use of any form  
of public communication that is false.”  We further held that,  
in determining whether a judicial candidate engaged in a  
public communication with reckless disregard of its truth or  
     
 
 
 
falsity, the communication must be analyzed to determine if  
the 
communication 
was supported by reasonable facts.  Finally,  
we remanded the present matter to the JTC to determine whether  
respondent’s conduct violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d), as narrowed.  
The 
JTC 
subsequently 
determined 
that 
respondent’s  
communications 
violated 
the 
amended 
version 
of 
Canon  
7(B)(1)(d).  Upon review, however, we respectfully disagree  
with the JTC and conclude that such communications were not  
false.  Accordingly, we reject the JTC’s recommendation to  
suspend 
respondent 
from the performance of his judicial duties  
without pay for ninety days. MCR 9.225.  
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
This judicial disciplinary matter concerns certain  
advertising disseminated by respondent’s campaign committee  
during his 1996 election contest for 37th District Court Judge  
in Warren and Center Line.  In this contest, respondent ran  
against, 
and 
defeated, 
37th 
District 
Court  
Administrator/Magistrate James P. Conrad.  
In April 1998, the JTC filed a complaint against  
respondent alleging that four of his campaign communications  
contained “false, fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading”  
statements in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon  
7(B)(1)(d).1  At the time the JTC filed its complaint against  
1  The JTC’s complaint initially alleged six violations 
of Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  However, it eventually concluded that  
two of the six communications did not violate Canon  
7(B)(1)(d).  
2  
  
 
respondent, Canon 7(B)(1)(d) stated in pertinent part:  
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, 
for a judicial office:  
* * *  
(d) should not use or participate in the use  
of any form of public communication that the 
candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, 
fraudulent, 
misleading, 
deceptive, 
or 
which  
contains a material misrepresentation of fact or 
law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading, or 
which 
is 
likely 
to 
create 
an 
unjustified 
expectation 
about 
results 
the 
candidate 
can  
achieve.  
A. FINDINGS  
As a result of the JTC’s complaint against respondent,  
this Court appointed the Honorable John P. Kirwan to serve as  
master.  
Following 
an evidentiary hearing, Judge Kirwan issued  
a two-part report.  In the first part of the report, Judge  
Kirwan 
determined that 
Canon 
7(B)(1)(d) 
was 
facially  
unconstitutional because it was overbroad and vague.  He  
concluded that, although the state has the power to regulate  
a judicial candidate’s speech, the propriety of a regulation  
hinges upon whether a compelling state interest exists and  
whether the regulation is narrowly crafted to avoid the  
infringement of constitutional rights of free speech. Judge  
Kirwan determined that the state had a compelling interest in  
overseeing 
and 
regulating 
judicial 
elections; 
however, 
he 
also  
determined that the text of Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was not  
sufficiently specific to clearly apprise judicial candidates  
3  
 
 
 
regarding the boundaries of what they could and could not  
permissibly say.  He then reasoned that, in cases involving  
restrictions 
upon 
political 
speech, 
the 
judicial 
canons 
should  
restrict only public communications that are false or made  
with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity, i.e., that  
Canon 7(B)(1)(d) should only prohibit public communications  
made with “actual malice,” citing New York Times Co v  
Sullivan, 376 US 254; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964).  
The second part of Judge Kirwan’s report assumed the  
constitutionality of Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  In so assuming, he  
explained that allegedly deceptive or misleading public  
communications must be evaluated in the context of whether a  
voter of average intelligence would have been misled by the  
communication.  Judge Kirwan further asserted that statements  
must be “clearly” untrue and that obvious statements of  
opinion did not violate Canon 7(B)(1)(d). 
After an  
examination of the communications in question, he concluded  
that they did not violate Canon 7(B)(1)(d) because an “average  
intelligent voter would not have been misled by the messages  
conveyed to the electorate.”  
Respondent and the JTC examiner both filed written  
objections to Judge Kirwan’s report with the JTC.  The JTC  
then conducted a hearing and thereafter determined that  
respondent’s campaign communications, viewed individually and  
as a whole, revealed a “conscious effort to use false,  
fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive statements as part and  
parcel of his campaign strategy.” 
The JTC therefore  
recommended 
that 
this 
Court 
suspend 
respondent 
from  
4  
 
 
performance of all judicial duties without pay for a period of  
ninety days.  With regard to Judge Kirwan’s conclusion that  
Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was overbroad, the JTC disagreed and instead  
determined that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was drafted with sufficient  
precision.
 In particular, the JTC asserted that Canon  
7(B)(1)(d) only applied when a judicial candidate “has  
knowledge [that] a communication is false, fraudulent,  
misleading, or deceptive.”  
Moreover, the JTC determined that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was  
not constitutionally vague.  It asserted that there was no  
case 
law 
holding 
unconstitutional 
a 
judicial 
canon 
prohibiting  
“false, 
fraudulent, 
deceptive, 
or 
misleading” 
political 
speech  
by judges, and that states possess the authority to regulate  
misleading statements made in the course of judicial  
campaigns.  The JTC expressed doubt about whether any “actual  
malice” 
standard 
applied 
to 
judicial 
disciplinary 
matters, 
but  
alternatively determined that, in the event such a standard  
applied, respondent nevertheless acted with “actual malice.”  
Respondent filed a petition with this Court to reject the  
JTC’s decision.  
B. CHMURA I  
In Chmura I, we examined whether Canon 7(B)(1)(d)  
violated 
the 
First 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States  
Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth  
Amendment. Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666; 45 S Ct 625;  
69 L Ed 1138 (1925).  
We began our analysis by focusing on whether Canon  
5  
 
 
7(B)(1)(d) was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.  
Chmura I, supra at 530. Upon examination of Canon 7(B)(1)(d),  
we 
determined 
that 
respondent properly challenged the canon on  
overbreadth grounds because the canon potentially authorized  
disciplinary action on the basis of the substantive content of  
a candidate’s speech. Because Canon 7(B)(1)(d) implicated a  
First Amendment issue, we accordingly applied an exacting  
scrutiny analysis to determine if the canon was sufficiently  
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. Id. at  
531-532.  
Although we identified numerous compelling interests in  
support of the canon, especially the state’s interest in  
preserving the integrity of the judiciary and its election  
process, we nevertheless determined that the canon was  
insufficiently 
narrowly drawn.  Id. 
at 534-535. Specifically,  
we noted that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) applied to any statement that  
the candidate “reasonably should know is false, fraudulent,  
misleading, [or] deceptive,” statements that “contain[] a  
material misrepresentation of fact or law,” or that “omit a  
fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not  
materially misleading,” and statements that are “likely to  
create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate  
can achieve.” Id. at 536-537. While such prohibitions were  
equivalent to the types of prohibitions placed on commercial  
speech, such as attorney advertising, Canon 7(B)(1)(d) does  
not 
regulate 
commercial 
speech 
but 
instead 
regulates 
political  
speech.  Political speech is “‘at the core of our electoral  
process and of the First Amendment freedoms’ . . . an area of  
6  
 
  
public policy where protection of robust discussion is at its  
zenith.” Meyer v Grant, 486 US 414, 425; 108 S Ct 1886; 100  
L Ed 2d 425 (1988). Because the central purpose of the First  
Amendment speech clause is to protect core political speech,  
we determined that political speech may not be regulated in  
the same manner that commercial speech is regulated.  
[T]o require a parity of constitutional  
protection for commercial and noncommercial speech 
alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling 
process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee 
with respect to the latter kind of speech. [Chmura  
I, supra at 538.]  
Therefore, more latitude must necessarily be given for  
political speech than for commercial speech. We then turned  
to Canon 7(B)(1)(d) and concluded that it covered “all  
statements, not merely those statements that bear on the  
impartiality of the judiciary.” Id. at 539. In so doing, the  
canon reached too far.  Our concern was that,  under the  
existing canon, judicial candidates, rather than engaging in  
robust political give-and-take, might well conclude that the  
safer course of action was to remain silent on controversial  
issues lest the canon be inadvertently breached.  Id.  This  
concern has been shared by the United States Supreme Court,  
which has remarked in the context of a discussion of political  
speech that the state cannot “‘select which issues are worth  
discussing or debating’ . . . in the course of a political  
campaign.” Brown v Hartlage, 456 US 45, 60; 102 S Ct 1523; 71  
L Ed 2d 732 (1982).  The reason is that free political speech  
is, in effect, a structural protection for democracy.  
Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555, 587; 100 S Ct  
7  
     
2814; 65 L Ed 2d 973 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).  In  
sum, core political speech cannot be chilled by the subtle  
deterrent effects of vague and ambiguous limitations.  
Yet, clearly there is something different about judicial  
campaign speech that all the courts that have dealt with this  
issue have recognized.  There is a tension that exists between  
the regulation of judges as officers of the court, and the  
regulation of judges as candidates in the political process.2  
This Court, for example, is obligated to ensure that a judge  
acts with the “highest standards of personal and professional  
conduct” so that the administration of justice is not  
compromised. In re Bennett, 403 Mich 178, 193; 267 NW2d 914  
(1978) (citing the Code of Judicial Conduct); Const 1963, art  
6, § 30.  At the same time, with regard to a judge who has  
assumed the role of a political candidate (a role that the  
people of Michigan by their constitution have made clear that  
they wish periodically to cast upon members of their  
judiciary), there are demands of the democratic process that  
must also be respected.  The “First Amendment ‘has its fullest  
and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a  
campaign for political office.”  Eu v San Francisco Co  
Democratic Central Comm, 489 US 214, 223; 109 S Ct 1013; 103  
2  The United States Supreme Court, in Chisom v Roemer, 
501 US 380, 400-401; 111 S Ct 2354; 115 L Ed 2d 348 (1991), 
has recognized the tension that arises between the ideals of 
judicial office and the real world of politics, in observing 
that 
the 
“[f]undamental tension between the ideal character of 
the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics 
cannot 
be 
resolved 
by crediting judges with total indifference 
to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run 
for elected office.”  
8  
     
      
 
  
L Ed 2d 271 (1989), quoting Monitor Patriot Co v Roy, 401 US  
265, 272; 91 S Ct 621; 28 L Ed 2d 35 (1971).  Thus, we believe  
that a rule, such as the revised Canon 7(B)(1)(d), prohibiting  
a judicial candidate from only knowingly or recklessly making  
a false communication, strikes a reasonable constitutional  
balance 
between 
the 
candidate’s First Amendment rights and the  
state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial  
system.3  Chmura I, supra at 544. Moreover, First Amendment  
concerns are substantially different in a system in which the  
judiciary is selected in a democratic process by the  
electorate.
 Allowing elected judges relatively unfettered  
breathing room ensures that the electorate acts as the  
primary, although not exclusive, check on judicial integrity  
and fitness for office.4  
With this in mind, and because the existing Canon  
7(B)(1)(d) was not sufficiently narrowly tailored, we revised  
the canon to state that a judicial candidate “should not  
knowingly, or with reckless disregard, use or participate in  
the use of any form of public communication that is false.”  
Chmura I, supra at 541. Limiting the reach of the canon, in  
our judgment, ensured that judicial candidates would have the  
“necessary breathing space for freedom of expression” and  
3  This “balance” must be assessed in light, not only of  
Canon 7(B)(1)(d), but in light of the full range of  
limitations placed upon judicial conduct by the Code of 
Judicial Conduct.  
4  In contrast, appointed and life-tenured federal judges 
have principally self-regulation as the primary effective 
check with regard to their behavior in office.  
9  
 
  
 
ensured that the citizenry ultimately would sit as arbiters of  
undesirable speech that falls short of being false.  Id. at  
542.  
In Chmura I, we further held that in determining whether  
a candidate recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of a  
public communication, the communication is to be analyzed by  
an “objective person” standard. Id. at 542. We opined—that  
application 
of 
a 
subjective 
standard 
was 
inappropriate 
because  
a subjective test “would immunize all accusations, however  
reckless or irresponsible, from censure as long as the  
attorney uttering them did not actually entertain serious  
doubts as to their truth . . .” 
Chmura I, supra at 543.  
Under 
an 
“objective 
person” standard, a judicial candidate may  
make “statements that are supported by a reasonable factual  
basis, even if the candidate turns out to be mistaken.” Id.  
at 544.  We therefore remanded this case to the JTC for a  
determination of whether respondent engaged in misconduct  
under Canon 7(B)(1)(d), as modified. Id. at 545.  
C. AFTER REMAND  
After 
remand, 
the JTC reaffirmed its previous findings of  
fact and concluded that respondent’s conduct violated Canon  
7(B)(1)(d), as narrowed by this Court in Chmura I. The JTC  
began its analysis by asserting that judges are held to the  
“highest standards of personal and professional conduct.”  In  
accordance 
with 
this 
principle, 
Canon 
7(B)(1)(d) 
places 
limits  
on the boundaries of judicial campaign conduct.  
As a threshold matter, the JTC stated that respondent, at  
10  
 
 
  
the time of the campaign, was aware of the obligations imposed  
by Canon 7(B)(1)(d) and was accountable for the contents of  
his campaign literature.  The JTC then reviewed the four  
campaign communications in question and determined that,  
individually and collectively, they revealed a “conscious  
effort [by respondent] to use false statements and to use them  
with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity as part and  
parcel of his campaign strategy.”  According to the JTC,  
respondent’s strategy was to “wage a ‘brass knuckles’  
campaign” to retain judicial office because respondent  
“regard[ed] himself as an outsider faced with a hostile  
environment at the 37th District Court.”  Offended by this, the  
JTC 
concluded 
that 
respondent’s 
conduct 
constituted 
misconduct  
in office, with such conduct being clearly prejudicial to the  
administration of justice.  In so concluding, the JTC  
recommended that this Court suspend respondent from the  
performance of all judicial duties without pay for ninety  
days.  Respondent again petitioned this Court to reject the  
JTC’s decision and recommendation.  
II. APPELLATE STANDARDS  
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review the JTC’s decision and recommendation de novo.  
In re Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 520; 243 NW2d 86 (1976), citing  
In re Somers, 384 Mich 320, 323; 182 NW2d 341 (1971). Thus,  
it is necessary to review the record in the present case in  
its entirety to determine whether respondent’s public  
11  
      
        
 
communications violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d).5  
B. BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF  
The language used in Canon 7(B)(1)(d) has its roots in  
defamation law. New York Times Co, supra. Thus, we examine  
defamation case law for guidance in analyzing whether a  
judicial candidate knowingly, or with reckless disregard, has  
used or participated in the use of any form of public  
communication that is false.  
As a preliminary matter, however, it is necessary to  
identify the applicable burden and standard of proof.  At  
early common law, the defendant bore the burden of proving the  
truthfulness 
of 
an 
allegedly 
defamatory 
statement.  
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v Hepps, 475 US 767, 776; 106 S  
Ct 1558; 89 L Ed 2d 783 (1986).  However, this common-law rule  
came to be viewed as overly restrictive of free speech.  
A rule compelling the critic of official 
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual 
assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments 
virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable 
“self-censorship.”
 Allowance of the defense of  
truth, with the burden of proving it on the 
defendant, does not mean that only false speech 
will be deterred. . . . Under such a rule, would-be 
critics of official conduct may be deterred from  
5  Moreover, a de novo standard of review is in accord 
with United States Supreme Court precedent that holds that in 
cases 
involving 
freedom 
of 
expression 
issues, 
appellate 
courts 
have “an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the 
whole record’ in order to ensure that ‘the [lower court’s] 
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the 
field of free expression.’” Bose Corp v Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc, 466 US 485, 499; 104 S Ct 1949; 80 L Ed 2d 
502 (1984), quoting New York Times Co, supra at 284-286; see 
also Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek Michigan (After 
Remand), 440 Mich 238; 487 NW2d 205 (1992).  
12  
  
 
voicing their criticism, even though it is believed 
to be true and even though it is in fact true, 
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court 
or fear of the expense of having to do so. . . . 
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the 
variety of public debate. [New York Times, supra at  
279.]  
Thus, the common-law rule requiring a defendant to prove the  
truthfulness of his statements was superseded by the  
constitutional rule (of the First Amendment) that the  
plaintiff, in a defamation action, must show the falsity of a  
statement. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc, supra at 776; New  
York Times Co, supra at 279-280. Moreover, the plaintiff was  
required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the  
defendant acted with “actual malice” when he related the  
defamatory falsehood.  See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications,  
Inc v Connaughton, 491 US 657, 686; 109 S Ct 2678; 105 L Ed 2d  
562 (1989); Bose Corp v Consumers Union of United States, Inc,  
466 US 485, 511; 104 S CT 1949; 80 L Ed 2d 502 (1984).  
“Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, have a duty to  
independently decide whether the evidence in the record is  
sufficient 
to 
cross 
the constitutional threshold that bars the  
entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and  
convincing 
proof 
of 
`actual 
malice’.” 
Harte-Hanks  
Communications, Inc, supra at 686, quoting Bose Corp, supra at  
511.  
In light of this, we are persuaded that, in cases  
involving a violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(d), the JTC, as the  
moving party, has the burden of proving, by clear and  
convincing evidence, that the communications in question are  
proscribed by the canon.  Clear and convincing evidence is  
13  
     
  
 
 
  
evidence that “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a  
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations  
sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct, and  
weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come  
to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the  
precise facts in issue.”  In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227; 538  
NW2d 399 (1995), quoting In re Jobes, 108 NJ 394, 407-408; 529  
A2d 434 (1987).  
III. “FALSE” COMMUNICATIONS  
When analyzing whether a judicial candidate has violated  
Canon 7(B)(1)(d), it is necessary that the communication be  
false.6 Chmura, supra at 541. 
However, before a judicial  
candidate’s public communication is tested for falsity, the  
communication at issue must involve objectively factual  
matters. Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1, 18-19; 110  
S Ct 2695; 111 L Ed 2d 1 (1990). Speech that can reasonably  
be interpreted as communicating “rhetorical hyperbole,”  
“parody,” 
or 
“vigorous 
epithet” 
is 
constitutionally 
protected.  
Id. at 17.  Similarly, a statement of opinion is protected as  
long as the opinion “does not contain a provably false factual  
connotation . . . ”  Id. at 20. 
We are mindful that in  
6  It is important to highlight that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) 
proscribes conveying a false “communication.”  Conveying a 
false “communication” may not always be the same thing as 
conveying a false “statement.”  A “communication” implies the 
broader act of imparting ideas or information, while a 
“statement” may be viewed as a more discrete component of such 
communication.  Generally, but not always, a communication 
will be comprised of several statements.  The point of inquiry 
under Canon 7(B)(1)(d) will always be on the “communication.”  
14  
     
     
 
protecting hyperbole, parody, epithet, and expressions of  
opinion, some judicial candidates may inevitably engage in  
“vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks  
on government and public officials.”  New York Times Co, supra  
at 270.  As a result of these attacks, “political speech by  
its nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences.”  
McIntyre v Ohio Elections Comm, 514 US 334, 357; 115 S Ct  
1511; 131 L Ed 2d 426 (1995).  Indeed, as is arguably true in  
the present case, even potentially misleading or distorting  
statements may be protected.7  However, we believe that these  
rules are necessary in light of our “profound national  
commitment to the principle that debate [by judicial  
candidates] on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,  
and wide-open . . . ”  New York Times Co, supra at 270.8  Once  
it has been determined that a communication contains  
objectively 
factual 
matters, those matters must then be tested  
to determine whether they are true or false.  
The concept of falsity was discussed by the United States  
Supreme Court in Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc, 501 US  
7 Requiring candidates to avoid “misleading” the 
electorate would hinder protected speech as candidates sought 
to avoid, perhaps inadvertently, violating this broad rule. 
Butler v Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm, 111 F Supp 2d 1224, 
1237 (MD Ala, 2000).  
8  It is important to note that political candidates who 
are faced with potentially misleading or distorted statements 
from their opponents may always counterbalance any negative 
effect with more speech in order to clarify potentially unfair 
or misleading statements or to demonstrate the nature of their 
opponent’s conduct.  In fact, in this case, the record 
indicates that James Conrad did vigorously respond to  
respondent’s advertisements by asserting that respondent’s 
campaign was “vicious” and “full of lies.”  
15  
  
 
 
496; 111 S Ct 2419; 115 L Ed 2d 447 (1991). 
See also  
Milkovich, supra.  “The common law of libel takes but one  
approach to the question of falsity, regardless of the form of  
the communication. . . .  It overlooks minor inaccuracies and  
concentrates upon substantial truth.” Masson, supra at 516,  
citing Restatement Torts, 2d, § 563, at 163, comment C (1977);  
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 111, at 776.  As long as  
“the substance, the gist, the sting” of the communication is  
true, minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity.  Masson,  
supra at 517. 
In other words, the communication “is not  
considered false unless it would have a different effect on  
the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would  
have produced.”  Id.  This test has been commonly referred to  
as the “substantial truth doctrine.”  Rouch v Enquirer & News  
of Battle Creek Michigan (After Remand), 440 Mich 238, 260;  
487 NW2d 205 (1992).  This Court applied this doctrine in  
Rouch, asserting that the constitutional requirement for  
testing falsity mirrors Michigan’s common law.  Id. As the  
Court held, “The common law has never required defendants to  
prove that a publication is literally and absolutely accurate  
in every minute detail.” Id. at 258.  
The 
“substantial truth doctrine” has in substance, if not  
in name, been applied to cases in which the defendant gets the  
details 
or 
particulars correct but conveys a potentially false  
communication.  See, e.g., Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n 438  
Mich 
84, 
123-127; 
476 NW2d 112 (1991)(discussing defamation by  
implication); Hawkins v Mercy Health Services, Inc 230 Mich  
App 315; 583 NW2d 725 (1998); see also Prosser Torts (5th ed),  
16  
 
 
§ 116, at 117 (1988 supp).  However, we believe that because  
a judicial candidate’s communication could be interpreted in  
“numerous, nuanced ways, a great deal of uncertainty would  
arise as to the message conveyed.”  See, e.g., Auvil v CBS “60  
Minutes,” 67 F3d 816, 822 (CA 9, 1995)(discussing uncertainty  
that can arise regarding messages conveyed by broadcast  
media).  This type of uncertainty would often make it  
difficult for judicial candidates to predict whether their  
communications would be encompassed within the proscriptions  
of Canon 7(B)(1)(d). Such uncertainty, as we have discussed  
earlier in this opinion, “raises the spectre of a chilling  
effect on speech.” Id.  
Accordingly, we conclude that in analyzing whether a  
judicial candidate has violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d), the public  
communication must be analyzed to determine whether the  
statements communicated are literally true.  If so, the  
judicial candidate will not be in violation of Canon  
7(B)(1)(d).
 However, if the communication conveys an  
inaccuracy, the communication as a whole must be analyzed to  
determine whether the “the substance, the gist, the sting” of  
the communication is true despite the inaccuracy.  In other  
words, 
we 
must 
decide 
whether 
the 
communication 
is  
substantially true.  If so, the judicial candidate will not be  
in violation of the canon.  However, if “the substance, the  
gist, the sting” of the communication is false, then it can be  
said that the judicial candidate “used or participated in the  
use of a false communication.”  Once this has been determined,  
17  
the inquiry then turns to whether a judicial candidate’s  
communication was made knowingly or with reckless disregard.  
Chmura I, supra at 544.  If it was, the candidate has acted in  
violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  
IV. APPLICATION  
Although legitimate questions might be raised about the  
seemliness of some of respondent’s communications, it is  
ultimately not our task to pass upon such matters because we  
have no greater competence in this regard than does the  
citizenry as a whole. Neither we, nor the JTC, are arbiters  
of propriety.  Rather, that assignment belongs to “We the  
People.” This Court’s responsibility is the more narrow one  
of determining whether respondent’s campaign communications  
violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d).
 In doing so, we apply the  
aforementioned principles of falsity to determine whether  
respondent’s public communications were clearly shown by the  
JTC to be knowingly false or used with reckless disregard as  
to their truth or falsity.  
Because the four campaign communications at issue were  
sufficiently described by this Court in Chmura I, we quote, in  
turn, their descriptions before our discussion on each.  
A. EXHIBIT 1  
Exhibit 1 is a two-page flier entitled “Robin 
Hood?”  The cover portrays former Detroit Mayor 
Coleman Young as a Robin Hood figure.  The left  
page inside the flier contains a photograph of 
Mayor Young above the following text: “Coleman 
Young wanted your money, but one man stood in the 
way . . . Judge John Chmura.”  The right page 
contains a photograph of respondent.  The text on  
that page states that “Coleman Young and the  
18  
 
 
      
 
 
Lansing crowd cooked up a plan to take your tax 
dollars 
and 
spend 
them 
on 
Detroit’s 
school  
districts.  They called it Robin Hood—they stole 
from our taxpayers, our schools and our children to 
help prop up Coleman Young.” 
It describes  
respondent’s actions as “standing up to Coleman 
Young” and “standing up for your children.”  The  
text characterizes respondent’s role in the lawsuit 
challenging the statutory scheme as taking “the 
state to court, arguing one appeal after another, 
until the state backed down and allowed your kids 
to benefit from your hard-earned tax dollars.” 
Under the subheading “One Tough Judge,” the text 
relates respondent’s involvement in term limits and 
anti-taxation causes before taking the bench.  It  
further states that, as a judge, respondent has 
conducted himself in accordance with his prior 
actions by taking “one criminal after another off 
our streets.” 
The flier then repeats that  
respondent is “always standing up for what’s  
right.”  It also reiterates that respondent is “one 
tough judge.” The back page of the flier contains 
a photograph of respondent with his family and 
lists his professional and civic affiliations. 
[Chmura I, supra at 520].  
In its decision, the JTC asserted that respondent  
inaccurately characterized Detroit Mayor Coleman Young’s role  
in the property tax base sharing (PTBS) legislation9–  
legislation that respondent described as “Robin Hood”  
legislation.  In particular, the JTC stated that there was “no  
credible evidence that Coleman Young, with or without the help  
of others from Lansing, planned, drafted or even actively  
supported the measure.”  However, in citing this lack of  
evidence on the respondent’s part, the JTC improperly shifted  
the burden of proof to respondent on this issue. The burden  
of proof here does not lie with respondent but with the JTC.  
They failed to present clear and convincing evidence that  
9  MCL 380.751 et seq.; MSA 15.4751 et seq., repealed by 
1993 PA 175.  
19  
     
     
 
proved the falsity of the communication. That is, they did  
not make any showing that Young did not support the PTBS  
legislation.10  
See, 
e.g., 
Harte-Hanks 
Communication 
Inc, 
supra  
at 686.  
Next, the JTC determined that exhibit 1 falsely  
communicated that respondent had “prevented Coleman Young and  
others from taking tax . . . [revenue] from Warren and Center  
Line property owners to spend on the Detroit school system.”11  
The JTC again referenced the PTBS legislation and explained  
that, under the provisions of the act, tax revenue from the  
Warren and Center Line School Districts could not be directly  
shifted to the Detroit School District.  
Further, on the basis of these two findings—that Warren  
and Center Line tax revenue could not, in the JTC’s view, be  
directly shifted to the city of Detroit, and that there was no  
proof 
that 
Coleman 
Young was involved with the legislation—the  
10  The propriety of placing the burden of proof upon the 
JTC is not a mere technicality, but rather is underscored by 
the specific matter in controversy here.  It is not at all  
obvious to this Court why the mayor of the largest city in 
Michigan would not have been involved in encouraging the 
enactment of legislation resulting in the transfer of  
substantial amounts of tax revenues into that city in order to 
bolster school finances.  Upon a closer review, it may well be 
shown that neither the mayor nor his representatives or 
lobbyists, either directly or indirectly, communicated the 
views of the city to either the Governor or to members of the 
Legislature; however, it would hardly be surprising if such a 
review demonstrated the contrary.  In any event, this is a 
matter for the JTC to prove, not for the respondent to 
disprove.  
11  The JTC acknowledges that respondent, as a private 
attorney, challenged the constitutionality of the PTBS  
legislation.
 The JTC contends that it is respondent’s 
statements about the means by which the legislation shifted 
money from one school district to another that was false.  
20  
JTC concluded that the brochure was an effort on the part of  
respondent to appeal to “racist attitudes among the  
electorate.”  It noted, however, that the use of the allegedly  
racist advertisement, alone, did not fall within the  
prohibitions of Canon 7(B)(1)(d), but concluded that because  
it was “coupled with the false statements, the ad is  
convincing and clear evidence of the [r]espondent’s reckless  
disregard for the truth.”  
Contrary to the JTC, we find that respondent did not  
“falsely” communicate that he prevented Coleman Young and  
others from taking tax dollars from the cities of Warren and  
Center Line to spend on the Detroit school system. In 1991,  
the PTBS legislation was enacted by the Michigan Legislature  
in an effort to address disparities in school spending that  
resulted from a variance in the property tax base in Michigan  
school districts.  MCL 380.751 et seq.; MSA 15.4751 et seq.  
To accomplish this, subsections 751(1)(h) and (i) classified  
state school districts into two regions, region 1 and region  
2.  Within each region, a school district would be classified  
as an “out-of-formula” or an “in-formula” school district.  
MCL 380.751(1)(e)(f); MSA 15.4751(1)(e)(f).  The “out-of­
formula” 
school 
districts were those that generally had higher  
property 
tax 
revenues, 
while 
the 
“in-formula” 
school 
districts  
were those that generally had lower property tax revenues.  
Because the “out-of-formula” districts typically generated  
more tax revenues, § 752 of the legislation required that such  
school districts share a portion of their tax revenues with  
the “in-formula” school districts in their own regions.  Under  
21  
 
 
the legislation, the Warren and Center Line School Districts  
were located in region 1 and were determined to be “out-of­
formula” school districts.  The Detroit School District, on  
the other hand, was located in region 2 and was an “in­
formula” school district.  Thus, at first blush, it appears  
that Warren’s and Center Line’s tax revenues would be shared  
with “in-formula” school districts within region 1, which did  
not include the Detroit School District. However, subsection  
752(3) further provided that in the event that  
the department determines that the total amount of 
aid per in-formula district pupil paid under  
subsection (2)(a) and (b) in a region in a state 
fiscal year varied by more than 10% from the state 
average amount paid per in-formula district pupil 
paid under subsection (2)(a) and (b) in that state 
fiscal year, the department shall submit a report 
[to the legislature and the governor] . . .  Unless  
the legislature enacts legislation . . . that 
redefines the boundaries of each region to reduce 
the variance to 10% or less . . . each out-of­
formula district shall make payments to the chief 
financial officer . . . and that individual shall  
make payments to each in-formula district as if the 
entire state were a single region . . .  
On the basis of the above provision, it is clear that the  
PTBS legislation clearly contemplated that tax revenue  
potentially could be shifted directly from the Warren and  
Center Line School Districts to the Detroit School District.  
The fact that Warren’s and Center Line’s tax revenues would  
not have initially been transferred directly to the city of  
Detroit does not make respondent’s communication false, given  
the overall legislative scheme of the act.  Accordingly,  
respondent’s claim that he “prevented” Coleman Young and  
others from taking tax revenue from Warren and Center Line  
22  
     
     
 
  
property owners is not false.12  
We further believe that the JTC improperly found, as  
“racist,” the Robin Hood caricature, which had, as its head,  
a photograph of Coleman Young.  Instead, we conclude that the  
mayor’s image was used merely as a well-understood symbol for  
the city of Detroit and its school district.  Further, we  
believe that the use of Coleman Young’s photograph can be seen  
as an effort to convey a“suburban” versus “urban” tension  
implicated by the PTBS legislation.  Even assuming that the  
photograph 
evinced 
some 
form 
of 
subliminal 
racial  
expression—an assumption that we do not necessarily accept—  
such an expression would not fall within the proscription of  
Canon 7(B)(1)(d).13 
Milkovich, supra, at 13.  
12 Because of the specific language of subsection 752(3), 
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
determine 
whether 
respondent’s 
statements 
might still fall outside the scope of Canon 7(B)(1)(d) on the 
ground that the details of the administrative arrangements 
under the PTBS statute should not obscure the larger truth 
that tax revenues are flowing out of district A (Warren and 
Center Line) and into district B (Detroit).  Presumably, if 
this inflow and outflow did not balance in any of the 
legislatively created “regions,” such regions would be  
adjusted in order that this occur.  By this view, the gravamen 
of the statute is that it is essentially a “zero-sum” game in 
which benefits derived from one district must necessarily be 
compensated for by costs incurred by another.  
13  This, of course, does not mean that expressions of  
racial bias are to be tolerated among members of the  
judiciary.
 There can be little doubt that expressions or 
attitudes of racism implicate the “fair administration of 
justice” and are proscribed by Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which, in pertinent part, states:  
(B)  A judge should respect and observe the 
law.  At all times, the conduct and manner of a 
judge should promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Without regard to a person’s race, gender, or other 
protected personal characteristic, a judge should  
23  
     
Lastly, the JTC contends that respondent’s use of the  
word “stole” in exhibit 1 falsely conveyed to the electorate  
criminal behavior on the part of Coleman Young.  Again, we  
respectfully disagree.  The word “stole” in respondent’s  
communication did not reasonably communicate a statement of  
fact concerning criminal activity. Instead, it was merely a  
colloquial 
reference 
unquestionably, 
in 
our 
judgment,  
understood by readers in the context of a political brochure.  
It was, in the language of Milkovich, supra at 17-20,  
“rhetorical hyperbole.”  Viewing the word in context suggests  
that respondent chose the word to summarize the effect of the  
PTBS legislation. The task was obviously to convey the view  
that 
this 
legislation would redistribute school funds from one  
district to another. This is the language of the rough-and­
tumble world of politics.  It is core political speech. It is  
consumed by an often skeptical and wary electorate and it does  
not, in our judgment, fairly implicate the proscriptions set  
forth in Canon 7(B)(1)(d).14  
treat every person fairly, with courtesy and  
respect.  
* * *  
(E) . . . A judge should be particularly 
cautious with regard to membership activities that 
discriminate, or appear to discriminate, on the 
basis of race, gender, or other protected personal 
characteristic.  
14  The dissenting opinion finds that, although the word 
“stole” 
communicated 
mere 
hyperbole, 
“it 
nonetheless 
refers 
to 
a completed act, not a potential act that depended on a chain 
of contingencies . . . .”  Slip Op at 2-3.  For the reasons  
that we have set forth, we respectfully disagree.  We see  
nothing in the tense used by respondent that implicates the  
24  
 
  
 
Because exhibit 1 does not convey a false communication,  
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
determine 
whether 
respondent’s  
communication was supported by reasonable facts.  Chmura I,  
supra at 544.  
B. EXHIBIT 3  
Exhibit 3 is a one-page circular, folded in 
half, entitled “It didn’t have to be this way.” 
The cover contains a photograph of a partially 
obscured police officer in a patrol car.  The  
inside of the flier contains a depiction of a mug 
shot with the caption “Murder . . . Rape . . . 
Dismemberment . . . Innocent Victims . . . Could  
Jim Conrad’s Court have stopped it?” 
The  
accompanying text states that James Craig Cristini 
had appeared at least four times in 37th District  
Court during Conrad’s tenure as court administrator 
and magistrate and had “received only a slap on the 
wrist” each time.  It states that Cristini was “let  
back out for only $100" after being charged with 
assault and battery.  The flier further states that  
“after being released on a second Assault and 
Battery charge, Cristini went on a rampage of 
murder and mayhem,” resulting in “[i]nnocent 
victims, raped, murdered and dismembered.”  The  
text concludes with the following: “That’s what 
happens when you put bureaucrats in charge of a 
court.  Jim Conrad . . . He’s just a bureaucrat.” 
The back of the circular contains the text “End the  
Fear.” [Chmura I, supra at 520-521]  
With regard to exhibit 3, the JTC determined that  
respondent’s communication swept too broadly by falsely  
attaching blame to James Conrad for certain decisions made by  
37th District Court judges—specifically, that Conrad was  
responsible for releasing criminal defendant James Craig  
Cristini 
numerous 
times 
after 
imposing 
only 
minor 
punishments.  
Although we agree with the JTC that this statement could be  
interpreted as communicating that Conrad was specifically  
canon at issue.  
25  
     
responsible (when he was not) for the subsequent crimes  
committed by Cristini, the brochure nevertheless is also  
subject to a more benign interpretation.15  
It is often the case that affiliation is described by a  
possessive construction.  In describing an institution as  
“John Doe’s,” one interpretation might be that John Doe is in  
charge of, and responsible for, that institution; an  
alternative interpretation might be that John Doe is merely  
associated in some manner with the institution.  The JTC  
determined that the rhetorical question “could Jim Conrad’s  
Court have stopped it?” could only mean that Conrad himself  
was 
the 
individual 
responsible for the judicial decisions made  
in the Cristini matter.  We agree that such a reference would  
be false.
 However, an alternative interpretation is that  
respondent’s rhetoric was merely to communicate Conrad’s  
significant association with a court which, in respondent’s  
judgment, had conducted itself irresponsibly in its dealings  
with 
Cristini. 
 
As 
court administrator, Conrad had significant  
administrative duties within the court and was an integral  
part of its day-to-day operations.  Indeed, respondent’s  
political message was, in essence, a response to what was the  
primary 
political 
thrust of the Conrad candidacy, namely, that  
Conrad as court administrator and magistrate, had significant  
15 Whether respondent specifically intended to mislead or 
not when he made this communication is not dispositive to the 
analysis under Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  The canon does not proscribe 
a judicial candidate’s use of a communication that is merely 
misleading. Chmura I, supra at 541. Rather, the canon only 
proscribes a judicial candidate’s use or participation in the 
use of a communication that can only be viewed as false.  
26  
     
administrative and quasi-judicial duties within the 37th  
District Court that would recommend his promotion to judge.16  
By this understanding, it was not altogether inaccurate to  
refer to the court as “Jim Conrad’s Court.”  As it is the  
case, as earlier discussed, when a statement is found to have  
a potentially non-false interpretation, the inquiry under  
Canon 7(B)(1)(d) must end.  
Next, the advertisement stated “James Craig Cristini  
appeared in the 37th District Court at least 4 times while Jim  
Conrad was Court Administrator and Magistrate. Each time, he  
received only a slap on the wrist.”  A review of the evidence  
showed that at the time of the 1996 election, Cristini did  
appear in the 37th District Court numerous times on various  
misdemeanor 
and 
felony 
charges 
including 
disturbing 
the 
public  
peace, disorderly intoxication, and assault and battery  
charges.  When Cristini’s disturbance of the public peace and  
16
 Conrad’s literature primarily focused on the 
substantial length of time that he had been a magistrate, as 
well as on his record in the area of law enforcement.  To  
emphasize this latter record, Conrad highlighted numerous 
cases where a defendant’s bond had been set by him at $50,000 
or higher.  For example, one advertisement identified six 
separate such instances and stated in part “$100,000 cash bond 
on a person arrested for assault with intention to murder;” 
“$250,000 cash bond on a person arrested with intention to rob 
with a firearm;” “$50,000 cash bond on a person arrested for 
assault with intention to murder;” “$100,000 cash bond on a 
person arrested for armed robbery;” “$100,000 cash bond on a 
person arrested for delivery of heroin, assault with deadly 
weapon and fleeing police; “$100,000 cash bond on a person 
arrested for operating under the influence of liquor causing 
death and incapacitation injury.”  On the basis of such  
advertising, it was not altogether unexpected that respondent 
would reply with communications that characterized Conrad’s 
close association with the district court in a less positive 
light.  
27  
 
 
disorderly intoxication charges proceeded to trial, the court  
approved the dismissal of the former charge in exchange for  
Cristini’s plea of guilty to the latter charge.  Cristini was  
sentenced to seventy-five days in jail and $200 in costs and  
fines.  With regard to Cristini’s assault and battery charge,  
his bond was set at $100.  Additionally, the statement  
accurately communicated that James Conrad was a court  
administrator 
and 
magistrate 
when 
Cristini 
appeared 
in 
the 
37th  
District Court; the statement did not indicate that Cristini  
personally appeared before Conrad.  In light of this history,  
we find that the communication did not relate a false  
statement of fact.  
The JTC also found that respondent improperly referenced  
that Cristini was “let back out for only $100" by Conrad after  
Cristini was charged with assault and battery. According to  
the JTC, Conrad did not preside over this case, and Cristini  
was released pursuant to an interim bond.  Unlike the JTC, we  
find that this communication did not contain a false statement  
of fact.  A review of the 37th District Court Criminal Case  
Inquiry revealed that on September 5, 1993, Cristini was  
charged with assault and battery, and a $100 bond was set.  
The fact that the advertisement failed to set forth the  
particulars of the bond is of no consequence as long as the  
statement 
was 
literally true.  Further, the advertisement does  
not specifically name Conrad as the person who released  
Cristini.  Thus, we conclude that this communication does not  
make a false statement of fact. Masson, supra at 496.  
Because exhibit 3 does not convey a false communication,  
28  
 
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
determine 
whether 
respondent’s  
communication was supported by reasonable facts.  Chmura I,  
supra at 544.  
C. EXHIBIT 4  
Exhibit 4 is a two-page flier entitled “We 
shouldn’t have to worry about sexual harassment at 
work or violence at home!” The cover of the flier  
contains a photograph of a young woman sitting at a 
typewriter with a male hand touching her shoulder 
and a photo of a [bruised] young woman with a young 
girl.  The upper half of the inside of the flier is 
captioned “Magistrate Jim Conrad is facing trial 
for sexual harassment of a female court employee!” 
It includes a photograph of Conrad with a woman 
identified as a “former court reporter” leaning on 
his shoulder. The woman’s face is obscured. Also  
included is a reduced image of a pleading described 
as a “Sexual Harassment complaint filed against 
Magistrate Jim Conrad.”  The text states “Conrad  
tries to dodge trial by claiming ‘government 
immunity.’” It explains in smaller type that Conrad 
“is accused of intimidating and firing a female 
court employee because she complained of being 
sexually harassed on the job.  Papers filed with 
the court by Conrad’s lawyers say that he can’t be 
tried because, as Magistrate, he has governmental 
immunity!”  It further states that the complaint  
had 
cost 
Warren 
and 
Center 
Line 
taxpayers 
“thousands of tax $$$ to defend!  Now, he wants 
your vote for District Court judge!”  
The bottom half of the inside of the flier is  
entitled “Judge John Chmura . . . . One Tough 
Judge” and contains two photographs of him on the 
bench, one of which shows him exchanging papers 
with Macomb County Prosecutor Carl Marlinga.  The  
text states “Tough on domestic violence and  
stalkers!”  It explains that respondent is “tough 
on criminals who prey on women” and “won’t stand 
for acts of domestic violence or allow stalkers to  
run wild.” 
It further states that respondent  
“won’t 
tolerate 
sexual 
harassment 
of 
court  
employees,” explaining that respondent “thinks your 
peace of mind comes first!”  The bottom half of the  
flier also includes a favorable quote about  
respondent from Prosecutor Marlinga.  The back of  
the flier contains a photograph of respondent with 
his family, a list of professional and civic  
affiliations, and a list of ten endorsers.  The  
29  
text also describes respondent as “one tough 
judge.” [Chmura I, supra at 521-522]  
With regard to exhibit 4, the JTC concluded that  
respondent falsely communicated that James Conrad was charged  
with sexual harassment.  The JTC noted that at the time the  
communication was disseminated, the sexual harassment charge  
was no longer viable because it was dismissed pursuant to a  
summary disposition hearing.  We respectfully disagree. On  
May 
28, 
1993, 
Carrie 
Meyer, the sexual harassment complainant,  
filed a complaint against James Conrad and others alleging,  
among other things, sex discrimination and sexual harassment.  
And while it is true that the sexual harassment count was  
eventually dismissed pursuant to summary disposition, other  
claims 
remained 
that 
included 
the 
sexual 
harassment  
allegations.  
One 
such claim was Meyer’s retaliatory discharge  
claim.  A review of the complaint revealed that this claim  
incorporated by reference the pertinent paragraphs of the  
sexual harassment claim, in essence, paragraphs 28-32.  
Paragraphs 28-32 asserted that Conrad owed a duty not to  
discriminate against the complainant because of her sex and  
that, despite this duty, Conrad had engaged in numerous  
instances of sex discrimination and harassment.  
Next, 
the 
JTC 
determined 
that 
respondent 
falsely 
conveyed  
the nature of the sexual harassment engaged in by Conrad.  The  
JTC determined that, when one viewed the totality of the  
advertisement, including the pictures and captions, the  
advertisement falsely communicated that Conrad was facing  
potential sexual harassment charges involving unwanted  
30  
physical contact.  We again respectfully disagree.  The front  
page of exhibit 4 stated that the Warren and Center Line  
electorate 
“shouldn’t have to worry about sexual harassment at  
work and violence at home.”  This text was accompanied by two  
photographs.  One photograph shows a young woman sitting at a  
typewriter with a male hand touching her shoulder and the  
other photograph shows a bruised woman with a young child.  We  
believe that the photographs were used as a visual tool to  
convey to a layman respondent’s positions against sexual  
harassment and domestic violence, and could not lead a  
reasonable person to conclude that the circumstances shown in  
the sexual harassment photograph were reflective of the  
circumstances of James Conrad’s particular sexual harassment  
suit.  
The JTC next found that exhibit 4 falsely communicated  
that James Conrad was accused of firing Meyer after she  
complained about the sexual harassment at work.  The JTC found  
that Conrad, as a court administrator and magistrate,  
possessed no authority to fire court personnel and instead  
found that Meyer was fired by the 37th District Court judges.  
Although it is true that Conrad, as a court administrator and  
magistrate, did not have the authority to hire or fire court  
employees, Meyer, in her complaint, asserted that Conrad did  
fire her.  In pertinent part, the complainant asserted that  
defendants, including Conrad, had discriminated against her  
and that, on the basis of this discrimination, she suffered  
numerous injuries including loss of employment.  Therefore,  
respondent did not inaccurately communicate that James Conrad  
31  
  
 
was accused of firing a female court employee.  
Finally, the JTC found that respondent improperly used a  
photograph of Lisa Burgor, a freelance court reporter, to  
falsely represent Meyer.  Moreover, they concluded that the  
caption under Burgor’s photograph falsely stated that she was  
a former court reporter.  The photograph at issue showed  
Conrad with a woman whose face is concealed.  Below the  
photograph, it reads: “Magistrate Jim Conrad with a former  
court reporter.”  This is not false. Lisa Burgor testified  
that she was a free-lance court reporter at the time the  
photograph was taken and that she had appeared in the 37th  
District Court numerous times.  Nowhere does respondent claim  
that the individual in the photo was complainant.  Further, we  
find that the reference to Burgor as a former court reporter  
is not false.  As stated above, Burgor testified that she had  
appeared in the 37th District Court numerous times as a free­
lance court reporter.  Thus, respondent correctly described  
the woman as “former court reporter.”  
Because exhibit 4 does not convey a false communication,  
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
determine 
whether 
respondent’s  
communication was supported by reasonable facts.  Chmura I,  
supra at 544.  
D. EXHIBIT 5  
Exhibit 5 is a one-page circular, folded in 
half, that includes a drawing on its cover of a man 
leaving a courthouse asking the question “Where is 
my Courtroom?” The left half of the inside of the  
flier contains the “answer”: “Jim Conrad is not a  
Judge, he has no courtroom.”  
The right half of the inside of the flier is 
captioned “So what has Jim Conrad been doing as  
32  
 
 
 
Court Administrator for the past 7 years?”  The  
text below the question states “Murders and  
Stalkers . . . , back on the streets . . . commit 
crimes again . . .”  It explains: “In case after 
case . . . Murderer James Craig Cristini . . . 
Stalker Edward Lightfoot . . . Hardened, violent 
criminals appeared in the 37th District Court again 
and again only to be let out to commit more  
crimes.”
 Under the heading “Corruption and  
Inefficiency,” the flier states that federal  
investigators were looking into charges that the 
37th District Court Probation Department “was  
running a scam under which court employees were 
receiving kickbacks, making big money off people’s 
misery.”  
Under 
the 
heading 
“Sued 
for 
Sexual  
Harassment,” the text states that “[w]hen court 
employee Carrie Meyer complained about the way she 
was treated at work, Jim Conrad threatened her job, 
demoted her, and harassed her.” It further states  
that “Conrad’s actions have resulted in a major 
sexual harassment lawsuit which has cost Warren and  
Center Line thousands to defend. 
But what’s  
Conrad’s defense? That he shouldn’t be prosecuted 
because 
of 
government 
immunity.” 
The 
text  
concludes with the statement “That’s what happens 
when you put bureaucrats in charge of a court.  Jim  
Conrad. . . He’s just a bureaucrat.”  The text on  
the back of the flier states “No More Bureaucrats.”  
[Chmura I, supra, at 522-523]  
The JTC concluded that exhibit 5 falsely suggested that  
James Conrad was responsible for felonies committed by  
criminal defendants James Craig Cristini and Edward Lightfoot  
after these two individuals had appeared in the 37th District  
Court on misdemeanor charges, when in fact Conrad had limited  
involvement 
with 
each 
of 
these 
individuals. 
The  
communication, 
in 
pertinent part, stated that “[i]n case after  
case . . . Murderer James Craig Cristini . . . Stalker Edward  
Lightfoot . . . Hardened, violent criminals appeared in the  
37th District Court again and again only to be let out to  
commit more crimes.”  As discussed previously in exhibit 3,  
33  
the evidence demonstrated that Cristini was charged and  
convicted of numerous misdemeanors and felonies and was  
subsequently released after arguably modest penalties were  
imposed upon him.  Court documents then identify that, shortly  
thereafter, 
Cristini 
was 
charged 
with 
open 
murder.  
Additionally, court documents indicate that Edward Lightfoot  
had been charged with making a telephone call with the intent  
to 
“terrorize, 
frighten, 
intimidate, 
threaten, 
harass, 
molest,  
annoy, or disturb the peace and quiet” of a complainant in  
violation of MCL 750.540e(1)(e); MSA 28.808(5). Bond was set  
by James Conrad in the amount of $3,500.  At the time  
Lightfoot’s bond was set for $3,500, he had been previously  
charged with several misdemeanors in the 37th District Court.  
In light of this record, we find that respondent’s statement  
that Cristini and Lightfoot “appeared in the 37th District  
Court again and again only to be let out to commit more  
crimes” was not false.  
The 
JTC 
also 
contends that exhibit 5 falsely communicated  
that numerous 37th District Court probation department  
employees were being investigated for allegedly illegal  
activities.
 Specifically, the JTC determined that the  
investigation extended to only one employee and not to  
numerous employees as stated in the advertisement. 
In  
pertinent part, the communication states that “[f]ederal  
officers are looking into charges that the 37th District Court  
Probation department was running a scam under which court  
employees were receiving kickbacks, making big money off  
people’s misery.”  A review of the record shows that the  
34  
 
  
statement was inaccurate. 
The record reveals that the  
investigation of the 37th District Court Probation Department  
involved a single individual, Orba Underwood. However, this  
inaccuracy 
does 
make 
the substance of the communication false.  
Masson, supra at 517. 
The “substance” or “gist” of the  
statement was to communicate the fact of the investigation of  
the 37th District Court probation department, including the  
allegedly illegal activities that had occurred within the  
department.  The fact that the communication inaccurately  
stated 
that 
the 
investigation 
involved 
multiple 
employees 
does  
not, in our judgment, alter the substance of what respondent  
communicated.  We believe that if the communication had  
correctly identified that the investigation involved only one  
individual, the effect on the mind of the reader would be no  
different—the “gist” of the communication would still be that  
the probation department was being investigated for allegedly  
illegal activities. Thus, the communication is not false for  
purposes of Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  
Finally, the JTC expressed that the statement concerning  
the probation investigation falsely held Conrad responsible  
for the allegedly illegal activities of the probation  
department. We disagree.  Nowhere does the communication cite  
James Conrad as the person responsible for the allegedly  
illegal activity. The advertisement merely highlighted that  
there was an investigation of the department, and set forth  
the 
specific 
allegations, 
in 
essence, 
that 
illegal 
“kickbacks”  
were involved.  
Because exhibit 5 does not convey a false communication,  
35  
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
determine 
whether 
respondent’s  
communication was supported by reasonable facts.  Chmura I,  
supra at 544.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7 (B)(1)(d), states  
that a judicial candidate “should not knowingly, or with  
reckless disregard, use or participate in the use of any form  
of public communication that is false.”  When analyzing  
whether a judicial candidate has violated the canon, we  
conclude that the communication at issue must have conveyed an  
objectively factual matter. 
Thus, speech that can be  
reasonably 
interpreted 
as 
communicating 
hyperbole, 
epithet, 
or  
parody is protected, at least under Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  
Similarly, an expression of opinion is protected under the  
canon as long as it does not contain provably false factual  
connotations.
 If the communication at issue sets forth  
objectively factual matters, the communication must then be  
analyzed to determine whether the statements communicated are  
literally true.  If they are, the judicial candidate will not  
be in violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(d). However, if the public  
communication 
conveys 
an 
inaccurate 
statement, 
the  
communication, as a whole, must be analyzed to determine  
whether the “the substance, the gist, the sting” of the  
communication is true despite such inaccuracy.  Once it has  
been determined that a judicial candidate has, in fact, made  
a false public communication, the inquiry then focuses on  
whether 
such 
communication was made knowingly or with reckless  
disregard.  
36  
 
 
Pursuant 
to 
the 
above 
rules 
regarding 
false  
communications, we conclude that respondent did not violate  
Canon 7(B)(1)(d). A review of the four exhibits reveal that  
the communications were either literally true, substantially  
true despite their inaccuracies, or communicated mere  
rhetorical 
hyperbole. 
Thus, 
we 
reject 
the 
JTC’s  
recommendation to suspend respondent from all judicial  
activities without pay for a period of ninety days.  MCR  
9.225.  
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the Clerk is directed to  
issue the judgment order forthwith.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, 
TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred  
with MARKMAN, J.  
37  
                               
     
________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re JOHN M. CHMURA (AFTER REMAND), 
Judge of the Thirty-Seventh District Court, 
Warren, Michigan. 
No. 117565  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
Though 
I 
do 
not 
disagree with the majority’s articulation  
of the standard for falsity under Canon 7(B)(1)(d) and its  
application of that standard to exhibits 3, 4, and 5, I  
disagree with the application to exhibit 1 in this case.  
Because 
I 
believe 
that 
exhibit 
1 
conveys 
a 
false  
communication, I would impose some level of discipline on  
respondent. I, therefore, must respectfully dissent.  
Among other matters, exhibit 1 advertised respondent’s  
role in challenging property tax base sharing legislation.  
Respondent stated that the legislation “stole from our  
taxpayers, our schools and our children to help prop up  
Coleman Young,” and stated that, in the course of “standing up  
for your children,” he took “the state to court, arguing one  
appeal after another, until the state backed down and allowed  
your kids to benefit from your hard-earned tax dollars.”1  The  
Judicial 
Tenure 
Commission 
concluded 
that 
this 
exhibit 
falsely  
communicated that respondent had “prevented Coleman Young and  
1 See slip op at 22-23 for a full description of exhibit  
one.  
     
others from taking tax dollars from Warren and Center Line  
property owners to spend on the Detroit school system.”  In  
contrast with the majority, I agree.  
As the majority opinion explains, Warren and Center Line  
were placed in region 1 under the tax legislation, and Detroit  
was placed in region 2.  See slip op at 24. 
Because the  
legislation provided that school districts would only share  
revenue with other districts within the same region, tax  
revenue from Warren and Center Line could not actually have  
been directed to Detroit.  The majority concludes that  
respondent’s statement that he prevented Warren and Center  
Line’s tax revenue from being directed to Detroit is  
nevertheless not false because the overall legislative scheme  
provided that if several contingencies had arisen, Warren and  
Center Line’s tax revenues could have been directed to  
Detroit.
 See id. at 24-25; see also MCL 380.752(3); MSA  
15.4752(3), repealed 1993 PA 175.  
That conclusion, however, does not consider what  
respondent actually communicated. Importantly, in exhibit 1  
respondent 
stated 
that Coleman Young and his supporters “stole  
from our taxpayers” to “help prop up Coleman Young.” Though  
I take no issue with respondent’s hyperbolic use of the term  
“stole,” it nonetheless refers to a completed act, not a  
potential act that depended on a chain of contingencies, as  
the majority concludes.2  Here, respondent did not state that  
2 As the majority states, respondent used “stole” to 
colorfully describe the effect of the legislation. See slip 
(continued...)  
2  
     
the legislation “would steal,” “could steal,” or “was going to  
steal” Warren and Center Line’s tax revenue.  Instead, by  
stating that the legislation “stole” from Warren and Center  
Line, respondent communicated that the perceived wrong had  
already been perpetrated. Further, he communicated that the  
lawsuit he handled corrected that wrong when “the state backed  
down.”
 Because of the statutory region classifications,  
though, revenue from Warren and Center Line had not, and could  
not have, gone to Detroit. By communicating that he brought  
a lawsuit that prevented Detroit from receiving tax revenue  
that had been stolen to benefit Detroit, then, respondent  
conveyed an “inaccurate statement,” that is, a false  
communication.  
With that false communication, the analysis must proceed  
to step two, which considers whether the gist, substance, or  
sting of the communication is true despite the factual  
inaccuracy. That is, the analysis must consider whether the  
inaccuracy “alters the complexion of the affair, and would  
have no different effect on the reader than that which the  
literal truth would produce . . . .”  Rouch v Enquirer & News  
of Battle Creek (After Remand), 440 Mich 238, 259; 487 NW2d  
205 (1992), quoting McAllister v Detroit Free Press Co, 85  
2(...continued) 
op at 30. “Colorfully” also euphemistically describes the 
racial overtones this flier intended to convey.  However, had 
respondent used a less inflammatory phrase, perhaps saying 
that 
the 
legislation 
“appropriated 
revenue 
from” 
or  
“redistributed money from” Warren and Center Line to Detroit, 
this point would nevertheless remain true. The focus is not  
the connotation of the term respondent used to describe the 
act, but that the term he used described a completed act 
rather than a pending act.  
3  
 
Mich 453, 461; 48 NW2d 612 (1891); see also slip op at 17-19.  
For largely the same reasons that the communication was  
false, the gist, sting, and substance of the communication is  
also false.  Respondent stated that “Coleman Young and the  
Lansing crowd” completed an act–they “stole” from Warren and  
Center Line–and that respondent handled a lawsuit, the result  
of which was that they “backed down and allowed your kids to  
benefit from your hard-earned tax dollars.”  The literal  
truth, however, is that when respondent was handling the  
lawsuit he referenced, no revenue had been, and no revenue  
could be, directed from Warren and Center Line to Detroit.  
This literal truth would have a different effect on the reader  
than respondent’s inaccurate statement.  The effect of the  
literal truth was that respondent was counsel on a case  
challenging 
legislation that, at most, might have sent revenue  
from Warren and Center Line to Detroit if certain facts had  
come to be, but was not sending any revenue from Warren and  
Center Line to Detroit.  On the other hand, the effect of  
respondent’s inaccurate statement was that the legislation  
“stole” from Warren and Center Line, sent the revenue to  
Detroit to “prop up” its mayor, and that the suit respondent  
handled was necessary to force the state to back down and  
allow school children in Warren and Center Line to benefit  
from those cities’ tax dollars and stop sending those tax  
dollars to Detroit.  Because the pleaded truth would have had  
a different effect on the mind of the reader than the  
inaccurate statement, the statement was not substantially  
true, and therefore violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d).  
4  
 
This violation of the Canon provides a basis for imposing  
discipline on respondent.  Recently, this Court set forth a  
nonexhaustive list of factors that should be applied when  
determining the sanction for judicial misconduct. See In re  
Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-93 (2000).  However, absent a  
majority favoring disciplining respondent, an analysis of  
those factors would have no effect in this case, so I will  
refrain from discussing them.  Suffice it to say that I  
conclude that respondent has violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d). I,  
therefore, respectfully dissent.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
5