Title: State v. Lemons
Citation: 348 N.C. 335
Docket Number: 377A95
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 377A95
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
EDWARD LEMONS
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
two judgments imposing sentences of death entered by Smith
(W. Osmond, III), J., on 18 August 1995 in Superior Court, Wayne
County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. 
Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to
additional judgments for two counts each of first-degree
kidnapping and robbery with a firearm was allowed 17 July 1997.
Heard in the Supreme Court 11 March 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G.
Barnwell and Teresa L. Harris, Assistant Attorneys
General, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by
Janine C. Fodor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for
defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
This case arises out of the shooting deaths of Margaret
Strickland and Bobby Gene Stroud.  On 5 July 1994, defendant was
indicted for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of
first-degree kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery, and one
count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and murder.  Prior to
trial, the State took a voluntary dismissal of the conspiracy
charge.  Defendant was tried before a jury, and on 11 August
1995, the jury found defendant guilty of all remaining charges. 
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Following a capital sentencing proceeding, based upon the jury’s
finding defendant guilty of both murders on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder theory, the
jury recommended sentences of death for each of the murder
convictions.  In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the
trial court entered two sentences of death.  The trial court
additionally sentenced defendant to forty years’ imprisonment for
each of the first-degree kidnapping convictions and for each of
the armed robbery convictions, to be served consecutively to each
other and concurrently with the sentences of death.
After consideration of the assignments of error brought
forward on appeal by defendant and a thorough review of the
transcript of the proceedings, the record on appeal, the briefs,
and oral arguments, we conclude that defendant received a fair
trial, free from prejudicial error.
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show the
following:  On the night of 21 January 1994, defendant was
playing cards with Edna Raynor at her house.  While at Raynor’s,
defendant’s cousin, James Leggett, phoned defendant and told him
that he and Kwame Teague were on their way to pick defendant up. 
When they arrived, defendant got into the car with Leggett and
Teague, and they drove off.  According to defendant, when he
asked where the car came from, Teague said to “ask the people in
the back.”  When defendant asked “if there was someone in there,”
referring to the trunk, he heard a man moan.
The three men then proceeded to a field near
Rollingwood subdivision in Wayne County.  Upon reaching the
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field, the two victims, Strickland and Stroud, were ordered out
of the trunk at gunpoint and forced to strip.  Stroud was then
shot three times with a .25-caliber pistol, and Strickland was
shot three times with a .32-caliber pistol.  Subsequently,
Leggett, Teague, and defendant went to the home of Bernice
Lemons, defendant’s aunt, where they spent the night.
The next day, the bodies of the victims were discovered
in a field near Rollingwood Drive.  Bobby Ray Kelly, a special
deputy for the Sheriff’s Department, arrived at the scene within
approximately twelve to fifteen minutes of being notified of a
possible shooting.  Once there, Deputy Kelly secured the area and
waited for additional help.
Subsequently, the bodies were identified as those of
Bobby Gene Stroud and Margaret Strickland.  Dr. Debra Radish, an
expert in the field of pathology, performed the autopsy on
Stroud.  Dr. Radish testified that there were three separate
gunshot wounds to Stroud’s body.  In Dr. Radish’s opinion, Stroud
“most likely” died five to ten minutes after suffering from a
gunshot wound that entered his body in the left anterior temple
and exited on the right of the anterior or front midline.  The
wound track was “from left to right through the brain slightly
upward from the front to the back of his head.”  In Dr. Radish’s
opinion, “the cause of death in this case was due to [a] gunshot
wound of the head.”
Dr. Karen Chancellor, also an expert in the field of
forensic pathology, performed the autopsy on Strickland. 
Although Strickland was shot three times, the bullets inflicted
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four wounds because one of them entered through her right forearm
and struck her in the chest.  One gunshot wound was above
Strickland’s left ear.  In Dr. Chancellor’s opinion, the gun was
held no farther than one or two inches from Strickland’s head
when this wound was inflicted.  Dr. Chancellor concluded that
Strickland died from the “gunshot wound to the head and to the
chest.”
Ten days after the murders, on 31 January 1994,
defendant assaulted and shot James Taylor in Taylor’s home. 
Taylor’s wound, however, was not fatal.  Ballistics tests
established that the gun which was used in the Taylor assault was
also used in the Strickland murder.  On the same day as the
Taylor assault, defendant was arrested.
After being informed of his Miranda rights, defendant
made several statements to police.  In his final statement,
defendant told the police that he was at Edna Raynor’s house when
Leggett and Teague phoned and told him that they were on their
way to pick him up.  Defendant stated that once they arrived,
[he] asked where the car came from.  Kwame
said ask the people in the back.  I turned
around and said, yo, is someone in there.  I
heard a man moan.  I said, man, you are bull
shitting me.  I said what’s up.  Kwame said
make sure your prints ain’t in this car.  I
looked and Kwame and Larry both had on white
rubber gloves.  Kwame drove for a little ways
and stopped in a field with hills of dirt and
tall weed.
According to defendant, Kwame then got the victims out of the car
and ordered them to undress.  Defendant stated that
Kwame pulled the man’s pants off.  The man
took his own shirt off.  The woman had pulled
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off, pulled all her clothes off.  She was
squatted on the ground.  The man was lying on
his side.  Kwame grabbed the man and said, I
am fixing to do him.  Kwame shot him in the
back of the head more than once.  The woman
started screaming and started running.  Larry
shot up in the air and ran and caught the
woman.  Larry made her lie, correction, Larry
made her lay on the ground.  She sat on her
butt.  Kwame asked her if she knew him.  She
stuttered.  She hesitated.  Kwame said, do
her, Larry.  Do her.  Larry shot her in the
back of the head.  She started treating [sic]
to get up.  Larry slung her on the ground and
shot her again in the side of the head.  He
shot her again in the stomach.  We got back
in the car.
The defendant also presented evidence during the guilt
phase.  Denio Edwards, a friend of defendant’s, testified that he
was with defendant, Jerry Newsome, and others at James Taylor’s
house on 30 January 1994.  He testified that he heard defendant
say that he had “made a lick against two white people for several
thousand dollars” but that he did not hear defendant say he had
killed two white people.  Defendant testified that on 21 January
1994, Edna Raynor took him to her house, where he played cards
and had one mixed drink.  Defendant’s testimony concerning the
events on the night of 21 January 1994 mirror his statement to
law enforcement officers as set out above.  Defendant admitted
that he lied to law enforcement officers in his first statement
when he said that he did not get into the car with Teague and
Leggett.  He also admitted that he tried to get Raynor to provide
him with an alibi and that she refused.  He denied, however, that
he planned the kidnapping and robbery of Stroud and Strickland
and asserted that the only person he shot was James Taylor.
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During the sentencing phase, defendant presented
several witnesses who testified regarding defendant’s family
background and upbringing.  Defendant also presented the
testimony of James Davis and Antoine Dixon.  The trial court
allowed their testimony after both Leggett and Teague asserted
their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Davis, Leggett’s cellmate in the Wayne County jail, testified
that Leggett told him that he, Teague, and defendant “robbed
somebody in the woods.”  He also stated that Leggett told him
that Teague shot the man and that Leggett shot the woman in the
back of her head.
Dixon testified that during February and March 1994, he
was in jail with Leggett.  According to Dixon, Leggett said that
during the robbery, defendant started “hitting the man with his
fists.”  Dixon further testified that Leggett said that Teague
shot the man, and then he, Leggett, shot the woman in the head
twice.
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of
Sergeant Ken Taylor.  Taylor testified that in Leggett’s first
statement to the police, he denied any involvement in the
kidnappings, robberies, and murders.  In his second statement,
Leggett admitted involvement but stated that it was defendant who
had shot the gun.  Detective George Raecher also testified
concerning a statement that Teague made to the police.  In the
statement, Teague admitted involvement in the crimes but denied
actually firing the gun.  Instead, Teague claimed that defendant
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“shot the man while he was laying [sic] on the ground.”  Teague
further stated that as he ran off, he heard several more shots.
I.
On appeal, defendant first contends that his
constitutional right to be present at every stage of his capital
trial was violated.  Specifically, defendant contends that this
right was violated when (a) the jurors took their oath outside of
defendant’s presence, and (b) the clerk spoke with prospective
jurors outside of defendant’s presence.  Defendant argues that
these incidents violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the
North Carolina Constitution.  We do not agree.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution guarantee the right of a criminal
defendant to be present at every critical stage of his trial. 
State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 208, 410 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1991). 
Our Court has interpreted the North Carolina Constitution as
guaranteeing the accused the right to be present at “all times
during the trial when anything is said or done which materially
affects defendant as to the charge against him.”  State v.
Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 337-38, 464 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1995), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1023, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1996).
First, we will address defendant’s contention that the
trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to
require that prospective jurors take their oath in defendant’s
presence.  Defendant argues that “[t]he swearing in of
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prospective jurors is a critical part of the trial, which the
defendant is constitutionally entitled to view.”
In State v. Workman, 344 N.C. 482, 476 S.E.2d 301
(1996), this Court stated that “[d]efendant’s right to be present
at all stages of his trial does not include the right to be
present during preliminary handling of the jury venires before
defendant’s own case has been called.”  Id. at 498, 476 S.E.2d at
309.  This Court went on to state that
[defendant] had no right to be present when
prospective jurors were preliminarily sworn,
oriented and qualified for jury service in
general, without regard to any particular
case or trial.  Further, because defendant
Workman’s trial had not yet commenced, these
“proceedings” could not have been conducted
during a stage of defendant Workman’s capital
trial.
Id. at 498, 476 S.E.2d at 310.
Similarly, in the present case, defendant had no right
to be present when the prospective jurors were preliminarily
sworn in.  The trial court’s introduction of the parties and
other remarks to the prospective jurors once they were brought
into the courtroom demonstrate that the jurors had been
preliminarily sworn, oriented, and qualified for jury service
generally, without regard to any particular case or trial.
Second, defendant contends that his constitutional
right to be present was violated by the clerk’s ex parte contact
with jurors.  Defendant argues that the selection of the jury is
a stage of a capital trial at which defendant must be present. 
Defendant further argues that because there is no record of the
content of the clerk’s contact with the jurors, and in
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particular, nothing showing that the clerk’s contact was limited
to the juror questionnaire inquiry, the violation of defendant’s
right to be present cannot be held harmless.
In the present case, voir dire was conducted on an
individualized basis.  Prospective jurors awaiting questioning
were located in a room outside the courtroom.  During jury
selection, defense counsel brought to the trial court’s attention
the fact that the clerk had entered the room where prospective
jurors were gathered and communicated with them outside the
presence of defendant.  The following exchange took place between
the trial court and defense counsel:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, we were
just handed another questionnaire indicating
-- by the bailiff -- that there was someone
else who also had not filled out a jury
questionnaire.  I know [the district
attorney] discussed it and had asked that you
bring the jury back in and make inquiry if
there was anyone else who hadn’t filled out a
questionnaire, to go ahead so we do not have
that problem again.  Apparently the clerk
asked that question back there.  I don’t know
if it was verified, I have no idea what was
said.  I would just like to make sure that we
don’t have any other communication that way
again.  And, of course, if there is a need to
check again to see if there’s anyone else who
has not done a questionnaire.
THE COURT:  I don’t think the clerk’s
communication with the jury would be
improper, in that the clerk is responsible
for seeing that the jurors are assembled here
or summoned to be here, so forth.  And one of
the requirements, as I understand, in this
case, was that either an order or agreement
that jury questionnaires would be submitted
to jurors to be filled out [sic].  So it
seems to me the clerk was just carrying out
that duty.  Now, if you have any evidence of
other communication --
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I have no idea what
was communicated, your Honor.  All I know is
I’m handed a questionnaire.  And I’m not
questioning the situation.  I’m just saying
it’s not on the record.  Everything is
supposed to be on the record with this jury
. . . .  But in any event, I have no other
evidence of anything else, your Honor.
In State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (1995), this
Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court erred in
ordering the bailiff to engage in unrecorded communications with
prospective jurors.  Defendant specifically complained of the
trial court’s instructing the bailiff to “have the jurors fill
out the [jury voir dire] questionnaires and then duplicate them.”
Id. at 86, 446 S.E.2d at 551.  Defendant also noted that the
trial court instructed the bailiff to “put the jurors in the jury
room on break” and to “have them to return back to the jury
room.”  Id.  Further, defendant complained of the clerk’s
administrative duties of calling the jury roll and explaining to
the jurors what time they needed to arrive at court.  This Court
noted that the challenged communications “were of an
administrative nature and did not relate to the consideration of
defendant’s guilt or innocence” and concluded that defendant’s
presence would not have had a reasonably substantial relation to
his opportunity to defend.  Id.
The same can be said in the present case.  In
distributing and gathering the questionnaires, the clerk merely
sought to carry out the administrative duties which the trial
court had requested.  As we stated in Bacon, “[d]efendant has
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failed to demonstrate how his presence would have been useful to
his defense in these instances, and we thus conclude that no
constitutional violation has occurred.”  Id. at 86, 446 S.E.2d at
551-52.  For the same reason, we hold that there has been no
violation of defendant’s constitutional rights.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
II.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court violated
the constitutional mandate that courts be open to the public. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, § 18.  Specifically,
defendant argues that the sign posted on the courtroom door
advising members of the public not to enter unless they had
business in the court violated his constitutional rights.  We
disagree.
In the present case, prior to the beginning of jury
selection, the bailiff requested the permission of the trial
court to post a sign on the entrance to the courtroom.  The
following exchange occurred with regard to the posting of the
sign:
THE COURT:  Mr. Hartzog, I believe you
want to bring something to the Court’s
attention on the record?
THE BAILIFF:  Yes sir.  We got a brief
notice, with the Court’s permission, to put
on the door the notice “do not enter
courtroom unless you have business in here. 
All persons entering or opening courtroom
doors will be searched for weapons.”  We’ve
used a very similar notice in murder trials
in the past, and they work very well.
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THE COURT:  And I believe you indicated
to me counsel for the defendant, as well as
the state, have viewed that sign?
THE BAILIFF:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  Let me ask on the record,
then.  Does the defendant have any objection? 
Does the defendant consent to the posting of
that sign?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, we don’t
have a problem to the posting, but we suggest
it be posted at the other superior court
door, as well.  They’d be entering at both
doors.  Maybe that’s the rule of the Court,
in both superior courts.  I would just
contend that would be appropriate for both
doors for this defendant.
THE COURT:  And does the state consent
to such sign?
[THE STATE]:  I really don’t care, your
Honor.  That’s fine.
The North Carolina Constitution requires that “[a]ll
courts shall be open.”  N.C. Const. art. I, § 18.  Additionally,
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
However, as the United States Supreme Court has noted,
“[a]lthough the right of access to criminal trials is of
constitutional stature, it is not absolute.”  Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 606, 73 L. Ed.
2d 248, 257 (1982).  The United States Supreme Court has stated
that a trial judge may “in the interest of the fair
administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on
access to a trial.”  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 581 n.18, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 992 n.18 (1980).  The
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Supreme Court further noted that in determining whether such
limitations are warranted, the focus should be on “‘whether that
control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge
. . . the opportunities for the communication of thought and the
discussion of public questions immemorially associated with
resort to public places.’”  Id. at 581-82, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 992
(quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 85 L. Ed. 1049,
1053 (1941)).
In People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 526
N.Y.S.2d 932, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1239, 101 L. Ed. 2d 943
(1988), the New York Court of Appeals succinctly discussed some
of the limitations which may be placed on a defendant’s right to
a public trial.  In Colon, the New York court stated that
[t]he right to a public trial has always been
recognized as subject to the inherent power
of trial courts to administer the activities
of the courtroom; suitably within the trial
court’s discretion is the power to monitor
admittance to the courtroom, as the
circumstances require, in order to prevent
overcrowding, to accommodate limited seating
capacity, to maintain sanitary or health
conditions, and generally to preserve order
and decorum in the courtroom.
Id. at 416, 521 N.E.2d at 1078, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 935.  Further, it
has been stated that “[w]e should not be hasty to reverse a trial
judge’s actions in establishing order in his courtroom, unless
his actions are not designed to maintain dignity, order, and
decorum, and instead deny or abridge unwarrantedly the
opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion
of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public
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places.”  Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 509 Pa. 118, 132, 501 A.2d
226, 234 (1985).
In North Carolina, the presiding judge is authorized to
“impose reasonable limitations on access to the courtroom when
necessary to ensure the orderliness of courtroom proceedings.” 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1034(a) (1997).  It is apparent from the record
that the posting of the sign was an attempt to ensure the
orderliness of the courtroom proceedings.  Even defense counsel
was a proponent of this device.  In fact, defense counsel
requested that the sign be placed at each entrance to the
courtroom.  As this Court stated in State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C.
321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981), “[w]hile every reasonable presumption
will be indulged against a waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights by a defendant in a criminal prosecution, a defendant may
waive the benefit of constitutional guarantees by express
consent, failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct
inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it.”  Id. at 341-42,
279 S.E.2d at 801 (citation omitted).
Further, in the present case, it is important to note
that we are not dealing with an order of closure, but rather with
the posting of a sign.  This sign indicated that only persons
having business in the courtroom were allowed to enter.  However,
this did not eliminate such persons as defendant’s family, the
press, or others interested in observing the trial.  Defendant
has failed to bring to our attention any person who was prevented
from entering the courtroom.  Further, notifying persons entering
the courtroom that they will be “searched for weapons” is
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certainly a legitimate and permissible measure to maintain the
orderliness of the courtroom.  See Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding that security measures taken at a state
courthouse are so peculiarly within the purview and discretion of
the state judiciary as to be beyond review on a habeas corpus
petition absent a strong showing that the measures taken were
inherently prejudicial and that defendant suffered actual
prejudice), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1125, 127 L. Ed. 2d 403
(1994).
In support of his position, defendant cites to both
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. 596, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, and Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 555, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973.  However, these
cases are not applicable to the present case.  Both Globe and
Richmond assert the public’s right of access to criminal trials
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  As this Court noted in State v. Burney, 302 N.C.
529, 276 S.E.2d 693 (1981), “[d]efendant cannot demand a new
trial upon the assertion of an alleged violation of the
constitutional rights of a third person under these particular
facts.”  Id. at 537, 276 S.E.2d at 698.
Accordingly, we hold that, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, defendant’s constitutional right to a
public trial was not violated.  This assignment of error is
without merit.
III.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence of an unrelated assault allegedly committed by
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defendant.  Defendant argues that the State’s reliance on this
evidence “was so extensive and prejudicial that it rose to the
level of a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment
[to] the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 19 and 23
of the North Carolina Constitution.”  Defendant contends that the
use of this evidence entitles him to a new trial.  We do not
agree.
In the present case, the State attempted to consolidate
the charges against defendant arising out of the Strickland/
Stroud murders with the charges pending against defendant
involving the assault of James Taylor.  The trial court denied
the State’s motion to consolidate these charges.  However, the
trial court subsequently ruled that the evidence regarding the
Taylor assault was admissible under Rule 404(b) for the purposes
of showing identity, motive, and intent.  Defendant concedes that
some limited evidence about the assault was admissible under Rule
404(b) because “it tended to show that the defendant had
possession of one of the guns used in the charged crimes ten days
after the homicides.”  However, defendant maintains that many of
the details admitted into evidence “were entirely unrelated to
this purpose and should have been excluded under Rule 404(b).” 
Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
admitting (1) Taylor’s testimony regarding the assault, (2) the
testimony of three law enforcement officers concerning the
investigation of the Taylor incident, and (3) eight photographs
of Taylor’s injuries and the crime scene.
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The admissibility of specific acts of misconduct by the
defendant is governed by Rule 404(b), which provides that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake, entrapment or accident.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1992).  Rule 404(b) is a “general
rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its
exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the
defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense
of the nature of the crime charged.”  State v. Coffey, 326 N.C.
268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).
In order for evidence of defendant’s prior crimes or
bad acts to be admissible under Rule 404(b) to show identity of
the perpetrator in the crime charged, there must be “‘some
unusual facts present in both crimes or particularly similar acts
which would indicate that the same person committed both
crimes.’”  State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 133, 340 S.E.2d 422,
426 (1986) (quoting State v. Moore, 309 N.C. 102, 106, 305 S.E.2d
542, 545 (1983)).  In the present case, the evidence shows that
both of the victims were taken by surprise, confined in the trunk
of the car, and forced to strip.  They were then robbed, and each
of them was shot in the head.  James Taylor was also taken by
surprise, assaulted, and robbed.  More importantly, Taylor was
shot in the back of the head using the same gun that killed
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Margaret Strickland.  Here, because the evidence was relevant to
show identity, it was properly admitted.
The crux of defendant’s argument appears to be that
even if admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of the prior
assault should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence.  Rule 403 provides that “evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403
(1992).  However, the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403 is
a matter generally left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.  State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 379, 428 S.E.2d 118, 133,
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993).  Abuse will
be found only where the trial court’s ruling is “manifestly
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary it could not have been
the result of a reasoned decision.”  Id.
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting evidence of misconduct otherwise admissible under Rule
404(b).  In fact, the trial court guarded against the possibility
of prejudice to defendant by providing the jury with the
following limiting instruction before Taylor’s testimony
regarding the alleged assault:
Members of the jury, I am reminding you
again, consistent with what I told you about
earlier, let me instruct you that evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, acts or conduct of the
defendant regarding any alleged assault or
robbery of James Taylor is not offered [or]
admissible to prove the character of the
defendant in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith with reference to these
charges for which he is now being tried and
must not be considered by you as such.  It is
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offered and admitted for other purposes such
as proof of motive, intent and identification
of the defendant and may be considered by you
for such other purposes, if you so find.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the testimony concerning Taylor’s assault
and the photographs related to the assault.  This assignment of
error is overruled.
IV.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury on the “friend” exception to the “mere
presence” rule.  Defendant argues that the instruction was
erroneous because there was insufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that defendant’s presence would have encouraged or
aided the two others involved in the criminal enterprise.  We
disagree.
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed
the jury on aiding and abetting, including the “friend” exception
to the “mere presence” rule, as follows:
As to each charge of murder I now charge
that for you to find the defendant guilty of
first degree murder because of aiding and
abetting, the State must prove three things
beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, that the crime of first degree
murder was committed by some other person or
persons.  You will recall my prior charge to
you as to the elements of first degree murder
as they relate to this case both on the basis
of malice, premeditation and deliberation and
under the first degree felony murder rule in
the perpetration of robbery with a firearm.
Second, that the defendant knowingly
advised, instigated, encouraged, procured,
and or aided the other person or persons to
-20-
commit that crime.  However, a person’s not
guilty of a crime merely because he is
present at the scene even though he may
silently approve of the crime or secretly
intend to assist in its commission.  If the
bystander is a friend of the perpetrator and
knows his presence will be regarded by the
perpetrator as an encouragement and
protection, presence alone may be regarded as
an encouragement and in contemplation of the
law, this would be aiding and abetting.  To
be guilty he must aid or actively encourage
the person or persons committing the crime or
in some way communicate to this person or
persons his intention to assist in its
commission.
And, third, that the defendant’s actions
or statements caused or contributed to the
commission of the crime of first degree
murder by that other person.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Rankin, 284 N.C. 219, 200 S.E.2d 182
(1973), this Court discussed the “friend” exception to the “mere
presence” rule and stated:
The mere presence of the defendant at
the scene of a crime, even though he is in
sympathy with the criminal act and does
nothing to prevent its commission, does not
make him guilty of the offense.  To sustain a
conviction of the defendant, . . . the
State’s evidence must be sufficient to
support a finding that the defendant was
present, actually or constructively, with the
intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the offense should his
assistance become necessary and that such
intent was communicated to the actual
perpetrator.  Such communication of intent to
aid, if needed, does not, however, have to be
shown by express words of the defendant, but
may be inferred from his actions and from his
relation to the actual perpetrator.  “When
the bystander is a friend of the perpetrator
and knows that his presence will be regarded
by the perpetrator as an encouragement and
protection, presence alone may be regarded as
-21-
an encouragement.” Wharton, Criminal Law,
12th Ed., § 246.
Rankin, 284 N.C. at 223, 200 S.E.2d at 184-85 (citations
omitted).
Applying these principles to the evidence in the
present case, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to
instruct the jury on the “friend” exception to the “mere
presence” rule.  Here, the evidence showed that defendant and
Leggett were first cousins and that he moved in with Leggett’s
family upon relocating to North Carolina.  Further, while living
with his cousin, he met Teague.  According to defendant’s own
testimony, on the night of the murder, he left Raynor’s house in
a strange car which he knew had been stolen “from some crack
heads.”  He testified that he knew the victims were in the trunk
and that Teague and Leggett were “getting ready to rob some
people.”  After the murders, he went to his aunt’s house with
Leggett and Teague, where he continued to live until he was
arrested.  According to defendant’s own testimony, Teague stayed
in contact with him after the murders and informed defendant when
he sold one of the weapons used in the Strickland/Stroud murders. 
This evidence is sufficient to support an inference that
defendant, by his presence, communicated to Leggett and Teague
his intent to render aid in the commission of the crime should it
become necessary.  See Rankin, 284 N.C. 219, 200 S.E.2d 182.
V.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by
permitting the State to engage in grossly improper arguments
-22-
during both the guilt phase and sentencing proceeding.  Defendant
argues that the improper arguments denied defendant his
constitutional rights to due process and to a fair and reliable
sentencing proceeding.  We do not agree.
Arguments of counsel are left largely to the control
and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel is allowed wide
latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases.  State v.
Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1986). 
Further, the remarks are to be viewed in the context in which
they are made and the overall factual circumstances to which they
refer.  State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 692-93, 473 S.E.2d 291,
306 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1997). 
Where, as here, defendant failed to object to the arguments at
trial, defendant must establish that the remarks were so grossly
improper that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
intervene ex mero motu.  To establish such an abuse, defendant
must show the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with
unfairness that it rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair. 
State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 202, 451 S.E.2d 211, 229 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
First, defendant contends that the prosecutor
improperly argued the general deterrent effect of the death
penalty to the sentencing jury.  Specifically, the prosecutor’s
argument proceeded as follows:
You know that crime is rampant in our society
today and where in any society there is a
lack of discipline and restraint in the
conduct among its members there is a
breakdown to due administration of law and
-23-
order and the people are at risk.  When
members of society don’t show the proper
respect and restraint and discipline then
they encourage crime because the attitude of
the people affects the feelings of its
members that say why not do a certain act.  I
will get away with it or if caught I can
afford the consequences.  The attitude of my
people in my community or in my nation and my
state will not make the consequences too
grave.  Remember the old ditty that we often
jokingly say to one another.  If you can’t do
the time, don’t do the crime.  As jurors you
should seriously consider your obligation
pursuant to your oath to do something about
violent crime in your community and you do
that by fairly and impartially applying the
law to the facts and returning the proper
verdict regardless of the consequences.  It
is your responsibility to fairly and
objectively assess what this defendant
deserves under the law for his lack of
restraint.
In State v. Barrett, 343 N.C. 164, 469 S.E.2d 888,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1996), the
prosecutor made the following argument:
Many times you hear about events like
this, shootings, murders and you say, well
somebody ought to do something about that. 
Well, ladies and gentlemen, you are that
somebody that everybody talks about.  Today
you speak for the people of Northampton
County.  You are Northampton County.  Today
you send a message, a thunderous message, to
those who would even think of coming to this
county and committing acts like the defendant
and his friends did on August the 6th, 1989. 
The buck stops here, ladies and gentlemen,
and you cannot pass it along.  It’s in your
laps.  The police can’t do anymore, the Judge
can do no more.  It’s up to you to decide.
Id. at 180, 469 S.E.2d at 897-98.  This Court, in holding that
the argument was not grossly improper, noted that the prosecutor
“was commenting on the seriousness of the crime and the
importance of the jury’s duty.  We have previously held that the
-24-
prosecutor is allowed to argue the seriousness of the crime.” 
Id.  Similarly, in the present case, the prosecutor focused on
the gravity of the jury’s duty and its responsibility to follow
the law.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
failing to intervene ex mero motu.
Next, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly
repeatedly referred to defendant and a defense witness as
“liars.”  However, the prosecutor did not refer to these
witnesses as liars, but rather characterized portions of their
testimony as being inaccurate and untrue.  On the witness stand,
defendant acknowledged telling numerous lies to mislead
authorities, including lies intended to inculpate Teague and
exculpate himself.  Upon cross-examination by the prosecutor,
defendant acknowledged lying to the police, his aunt, and his
grandmother.  The prosecutor’s remarks were directed at the
credibility of defendant in light of the evidence presented.  The
prosecutor’s comments do not equate to the type of specific,
objectionable language that would require the trial court to
intervene ex mero motu.  See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 294 N.C.
210, 214-18, 241 S.E.2d 65, 68-70 (1978) (prosecutor asserted
defendant was “lying through [his] teeth” and “playing with a
perjury count”); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 657-59, 157
S.E.2d 335, 344-45 (1967) (prosecutor stated that he knew
defendant “was lying the minute he said that” and referred to
defendant as “habitual storebreaker” when nothing in the record
supported such reference).  Rather, the prosecutor’s argument was
“no more than an argument that the jury should reject the
-25-
defendant’s testimony” because “[defendant’s] version of the
events [was] unbelievable.”  State v. Solomon, 340 N.C. 212, 220,
456 S.E.2d 778, 784, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 L. Ed. 2d
438 (1995).  Accordingly, these remarks were not “so prejudicial
and grossly improper as to require corrective action by the trial
court ex mero motu.”  State v. James, 322 N.C. 320, 324, 367
S.E.2d 669, 672 (1988).
Likewise, the prosecutor’s remarks disparaging
defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Brown, were neither prejudicial
nor grossly improper.  In fact, defense counsel, herself, made
the following statement to the jury:
Now I have to claim responsibility for
Dr. Brown.  Edward Lemons [defendant] didn’t
hire him. . . .  I apologize to this jury but
you determine if at all his testimony has any
weight for you. . . .  The Court finds him as
an expert but I submit to you please don’t
hold the credentials or lack thereof or the
attitude or whatever you would determine
Dr. Tom Brown to have against Edward Lemons.
Having reviewed the prosecutor’s remarks, we conclude that they
were neither prejudicial nor grossly improper.  This is
especially true in light of the testimony concerning the
restriction or suspension of Dr. Brown’s license.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly
argued, contrary to the evidence, that the female victim,
Margaret Strickland, had been sexually assaulted.  However, a
review of the record fails to reveal any argument by the
prosecutor that the victim was sexually assaulted.  Rather, the
prosecutor argued as follows:
-26-
I would like for you to consider for
yourselves what human being, male or female,
would enjoy the abuse that these young men
heaped upon their heads for their own, and I
would submit to you in effect, sexual
satisfaction before the ultimate moment of
death.  The climax of the escapade.
This statement merely characterizes the actions of defendant and
his accomplices.  It does not imply that defendant or his
accomplices actually sexually assaulted the victim.  The fact
that Strickland was forced to strip herself, or was stripped
naked, at gunpoint and then shot supports the prosecutor’s
characterization of the dehumanizing acts committed by defendant
and his accomplices.
Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor
improperly compared defendant to the Gestapo and equated his
conduct with the Holocaust.  During the guilt phase of the trial,
the prosecutor argued that
those who agree and unite together are
responsible for whatever any one of them
does.  Illogical extreme and I don’t want you
to, I don’t want, I’m using this as an
illustration only and don’t take it any
further.  The logical extreme is the
Nuremberg trials.  We brought Germany to
task.  The allies did and tried their leaders
and one whole organization on this theory of
crime against humans and adjudicated the SSI. 
Do you know who I am talking about?  The
whole group, the Gestapo, those who wore the
black shirts whether they were at the camps,
whether they were on the front lines in
Russia, whether they opposed our men at
Normandy, we adjudicated them all guilty of
belonging to a criminal organization because
they were an instrumentality of a Natzi [sic]
state, a co-conspiracy against humans. 
That’s that.  You combine together for a
criminal purpose and a criminal act,
everybody who agrees is guilty of the
conspiracy and if they are present and it
-27-
takes place in their presence and they
encourage or they give assistance or anything
like that then they are responsible for the
substantive crime of murder.
Later, the prosecutor once again compared defendant’s conduct to
the Holocaust by stating:  “The attitude of the defendant toward
the victims on the stand, you remember, and toward others, the
choice of language, the attitude about people.  We lost eight
million people on the face of this earth for that same attitude.”
Although the prosecutor’s comparison was extreme, we do
not believe that it required the trial court to intervene ex mero
motu.  The prosecutor was quick to put the comparison in
perspective by stressing to the jury that it was merely “an
illustration.”  In fact, the prosecutor himself characterized the
comparison as “illogical extreme.”  Thus, when taken in context,
the argument was not so grossly improper as to require the trial
court to intervene ex mero motu.  Accordingly, this assignment of
error is without merit.
VI.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the instructions on aiding and abetting constitute error
because they did not require the jury to find that defendant had
the requisite mens rea to commit premeditated and deliberate
first-degree murder.  Defendant argues that the instructions fail
to require the jury to find an essential element of first-degree
murder, thereby violating his due process rights.  We disagree.
Defendant concedes that he did not object to the form
of the instruction at trial.  Accordingly, defendant must show
-28-
plain error.  “In order to rise to the level of plain error, the
error in the trial court’s instructions must be so fundamental
that (i) absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a
different verdict; or (ii) the error would constitute a
miscarriage of justice if not corrected.”  State v. Holden, 346
N.C. 404, 435, 488 S.E.2d 514, 531 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 140 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1998).  
The instructions to which defendant objects are set out
above in Issue IV.  In support of his contention, defendant cites
State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, 453 S.E.2d 150 (1995), overruled in
part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483
S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). 
However, Allen is distinguishable from the present case.  In
Allen, this Court concluded that the phrases “should have known”
or had “reasonable grounds to believe” did not “convey the
concept of specific intent necessary for aiding and abetting a
first-degree murder committed with premeditation and
deliberation.”  Id. at 558, 453 S.E.2d at 157.  However,
construing the instructions contextually, this Court found no
plain error.  Rather, the Court held that the instructions
conveyed the essential principle that the defendant knowingly
aided the perpetrator in committing the crime.
In the present case, the trial court adhered to the
pattern jury instructions on aiding and abetting.  The trial
court never used the phrases “should have known” or had
“reasonable grounds to believe.”  Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court did not commit error, much less plain error, in
-29-
giving the instructions of which defendant now complains.  This
assignment of error is without merit.
VII.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
permitting the State to exercise peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory manner.  Defendant argues that the trial
court’s ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to be
tried by a jury selected without regard to race or gender.  We do
not agree.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 26 of
the North Carolina Constitution prohibit a prosecutor from
peremptorily excusing a prospective juror solely on the basis of
his or her race.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d
69 (1986); State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 106, 468 S.E.2d 46, 50,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996).  A three-
step process has been established for evaluating claims of racial
discrimination in the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges. 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405
(1991).  First, defendant must establish a prima facie case that
the peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race.  Id. 
Second, if such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation to rebut
defendant’s prima facie case.  Id.  Third, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful
discrimination.  Id.
-30-
In the present case, the prosecutor volunteered his
explanations, and the trial court ruled that there was no
purposeful discrimination.  “Once a prosecutor has offered a
race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the
trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant
had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.”  Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405.  Thus, the only issue for us
to determine is whether the trial court correctly concluded that
the prosecutor had not intentionally discriminated.  State v.
Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 430-31, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1991). 
Because the trial court is in the best position to assess the
prosecutor’s credibility, we will not overturn its determination
absent clear error.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 114 L. Ed. 2d at
412.
Applying these principles, we now examine the
prosecutor’s reasons for peremptorily challenging the prospective
jurors.  First, defendant contends Mary Jones, a black female,
was improperly struck for racial reasons.  At trial, the
prosecutor offered the following reasons for exercising this
peremptory challenge:
Her study of psychology and how she
feels about psychology, and how she says that
her experience with psychology would bear in
the trial of this case with the psychiatrist. 
Also, her experience with HIV, talking with
-- in her classes and people who have [] HIV,
telling them how it affects them, the
symptoms that they have.  And I’m sure,
according to their doctor his report would
indicate that one of the issues in this case
is whether, as a result of HIV, this young
-31-
man has dementia.  They’ve already said that
in their report.  So there’s a factual
connection and nexus with this case.  And we
just feel like that we would like to
challenge for that.
Second, defendant contends that the prosecutor
committed purposeful discrimination when the prosecutor exercised
a peremptory challenge on Reynolds Lewis, a black male
prospective juror.  During voir dire, Lewis testified that he had
worked as a health-care technician at Cherry Hospital for
seventeen years.  When the prosecutor asked whether he would
believe the testimony of a psychiatrist, Lewis replied that he
“would have no choice but to accept his testimony, because he’s
supposed to know what he’s doing.”  The prosecutor pursued this
line of questioning as follows:
Q.  And if he said one thing, then you
would be inclined to accept that, and that
would affect your verdict; is that correct?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And you would not be inclined to
look at his testimony and to decide -- and to
say, “well, you know, I just don’t believe
what he’s saying is right.”  You would not be
inclined to do that?
A.  No, I would not.
Q.  Are you firm in that belief, sir?
A.  I am firm.
We hold that the trial court properly overruled
defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory
challenges to excuse each of these jurors.  “Taken singly or in
combination, the State’s excusal of these jurors was based on
race-neutral reasons that were clearly supported by the
-32-
individual jurors’ responses during voir dire.”  State v.
Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 99, 443 S.E.2d 306, 315 (1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995).  Thus, the
excusals of the prospective jurors, as discussed above, were not
racially motivated and are not clearly erroneous.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
VIII.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
admitting the statements of accomplice Kwame Teague during the
sentencing proceeding.  Defendant argues that the confessions
were inadmissible both substantively and for impeachment
purposes.  We disagree.
On 7 July 1995, defense counsel filed a notice of
intent, “in the event that the co-defendants in this case, Kwame
Teague and Larry Leggett, take the 5th Amendment,” to introduce
hearsay evidence through James Davis, Antoine Dixon, and Leshuan
Lathan.  The State responded with a notice of intent to introduce
hearsay testimony in the form of statements of codefendants Larry
Leggett and Kwame Teague if the trial court allowed the hearsay
evidence proffered by the defense.
After extensive voir dire, the trial court ruled that
defendant could offer the hearsay evidence of Antoine Dixon and
James Davis.  The trial court concluded that defendant’s evidence
was relevant to the issue of mitigation of defendant’s
punishment.  The trial court also noted the State’s notice of
intent and indicated that it would be allowed to proceed “if the
evidence so shows and so supports it.”
-33-
Subsequently, defendant called both Leggett and Teague
to the stand.  Each, respectively, claimed his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.  Defendant then offered the
testimony of both Dixon and Davis in support of the (f)(4)
statutory mitigating circumstance that “[t]he defendant was an
accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor,”
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(4) (1997), and the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that “defendant was not the actual shooter of
Margaret Strickland or Bobby Gene Stroud.”
Subsequently, both Dixon and Davis were called to the
stand.  Dixon testified that Leggett stated that he (Leggett),
Teague, and defendant were involved in the Strickland/Stroud
crimes.  Dixon further testified that Leggett told him that
Teague shot the man and that Leggett shot the woman.  Following
Dixon’s testimony, Davis also testified that Leggett told him
that Teague shot the man and that Leggett shot the woman.
In rebuttal, the State offered two statements that
Leggett made to law enforcement officers and two statements that
Teague made to law enforcement officers.  The confessions of both
men allege that defendant personally shot the victims.  While
defendant concedes that Leggett’s confessions to the police are
admissible as prior inconsistent statements of a hearsay
declarant, defendant argues that Teague’s confessions were
inadmissible because they are unreliable and are not inconsistent
with Teague’s own hearsay declaration that he planned to “put
[the crimes] on Ed [defendant].”
-34-
Teague, in his first statement to police, denied any
knowledge of or involvement in the crimes.  However, the next
morning, he implicated himself in the kidnapping and robberies,
but claimed that defendant shot the man and that, at that point,
Teague ran off and then he heard several more shots.
During the sentencing proceeding, the State “must be
permitted to present any competent, relevant evidence relating to
the defendant’s character or record which will substantially
support the imposition of the death penalty.”  State v. Brown,
315 N.C. 40, 61, 337 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).  Further,
“[t]he State may offer evidence tending to rebut the truth of any
mitigating circumstance upon which defendant relies and which is
supported by the evidence.”  State v. Heatwole, 344 N.C. 1, 21,
473 S.E.2d 310, 320 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L.
Ed. 2d 339 (1997).
Here, once defendant offered evidence in support of the
(f)(4) statutory mitigating circumstance and a nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance that defendant was not the actual
shooter, the State was entitled to present evidence rebutting
this claim.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the statements of Teague.  This
assignment of error is without merit.
IX.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury in accordance with the requirements
-35-
of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), and
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1987). 
Defendant argues that new evidence was introduced during the
sentencing proceeding which corroborated defendant’s contention
that he was a passive participant in the murders.  Because of
this new evidence, defendant contends that an instruction on the
Enmund/Tison issue was constitutionally required.  We disagree.
In Enmund, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty
on a defendant “who aids and abets a felony in the course of
which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force will be employed.”  Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, 73
L. Ed. 2d at 1151.  In Tison, the Court expanded on the Enmund
holding and stated that “major participation in the felony
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is
sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” 
Tison, 481 U.S. at 158, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 145.
Defendant notes that our pattern jury instructions
contain an instruction which reflects the requirements of Enmund
and Tison.  If there is evidence suggesting that defendant was
not personally involved in the killing, the following instruction
is to be given:
First, [the jury must unanimously find beyond
a reasonable doubt] that the defendant
himself:
(a) Killed or attempted to kill the victim;
or
-36-
(b) Intended to kill the victim; or
(c) Intended that deadly force would be used
in the course of the felony; or
(d) Was a major participant in the underlying
felony and exhibited reckless indifference to
human life.
N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.10 (1997).  Thus, before the death penalty
can be considered, the jury must make an initial determination
regarding the defendant’s culpability.
In his brief, defendant concedes that this instruction
is not required where the defendant has been found guilty of
premeditated and deliberate murder.  See State v. Robinson, 342
N.C. 74, 88, 463 S.E.2d 218, 226 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1996).  Defendant notes that “[t]he
rationale behind the rule in Robinson is that a finding of 
specific intent to kill at [the] guilt phase ‘carries over’ to
sentencing.”  However, defendant contends that this rationale
does not apply to the facts of this case because of new evidence
introduced during sentencing that was relevant to the question of
defendant’s intent to kill.  The new evidence to which defendant
refers is the confessions that accomplice Larry Leggett made to
two cellmates.
In State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 463 S.E.2d 738 (1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1996), this Court
stated as follows:
Once the jury determines at trial, as it
did here, that defendant is guilty of murder
in the first degree, the sole remaining
consideration, at the “separate sentencing
proceeding,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(1), is
the appropriate punishment, focusing on the
-37-
defendant’s character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense.  As stated,
we do not agree that residual doubt testimony
is admissible during the sentencing
proceeding of a capital case.
Walls, 342 N.C. at 52-53, 463 S.E.2d at 765-66.  Thus,
reconsideration of defendant’s guilt is irrelevant in determining
his appropriate sentence.  Further, defendant could have
presented the confessions of Leggett during the guilt phase if he
had so chosen.
Defendant also contends that because the jury was
instructed on the “friend” exception to the “mere presence” rule,
defendant was entitled to an Enmund/Tison instruction.  However,
as noted above, the State’s evidence demonstrated that defendant
had the mens rea required for conviction of first-degree murder
based on malice, premeditation, and deliberation.  Accordingly,
no Enmund/Tison instruction was required.  Based on our analysis
above, we hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to
instruct the jury on the Enmund/Tison requirements.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is without merit.
X.
Defendant also assigns as error the trial court’s
failure to submit the (f)(6) mitigating circumstance that “the
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of [the]
law was impaired.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6).  Defendant argues
that evidence was introduced during the sentencing proceeding to
support the (f)(6) mitigating circumstance and that the trial
court’s refusal to submit it violated his constitutional rights.
-38-
“A trial court must submit only those mitigating
circumstances which are supported by substantial evidence.” 
State v. Strickland, 346 N.C. 443, 463, 488 S.E.2d 194, 206
(1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1998). 
Further, “defendant bears the burden of producing ‘substantial
evidence’ tending to show the existence of a mitigating
circumstance before that circumstance will be submitted to the
jury.”  State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 100, 451 S.E.2d 543, 566
(1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 832, 133 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995). 
This Court has noted that the (f)(6) statutory mitigating
circumstance
has only been found to be supported in cases
where there was evidence, expert or lay, of
some mental disorder, disease, or defect, or
voluntary intoxication by alcohol or narcotic
drugs, to the degree that it affected the
defendant’s ability to understand and control
his actions.
Syriani, 333 N.C. at 395, 428 S.E.2d at 142-43.
Here, the record does not support submission of the
(f)(6) statutory mitigating circumstance.  Defendant himself
testified that he was not “doing drugs” while living with his
aunt and that there was nothing wrong with his “ability to
comprehend what’s going on and understand.”  He further testified
that there was nothing wrong with him the night of the murders
and that he knew that armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder were
illegal.  Additionally, Dr. Thomas Brown, an expert in the field
of forensic psychiatry, testified that, in his opinion, defendant
knew the difference between right and wrong on the night of the
murders.  He further testified that defendant had no “confusion
-39-
of thinking”; had no bipolar disorder; was in touch with reality;
and was oriented to time, place, and circumstances.
Further, there was no testimony or evidence suggesting
that at the time of the murder, defendant’s capacity to
understand right from wrong or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was impaired as required by the (f)(6)
mitigator.  Thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to
submit this mitigating circumstance to the jury.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is without merit.
XI.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court committed
constitutional error by admitting evidence during the sentencing
proceeding regarding several unrelated robberies.  Defendant
argues that the testimony that was admitted was unreliable and
unrelated to any aggravating circumstance.  We do not agree.
During the sentencing proceeding, defendant sought to
introduce declarations made by his accomplices, Leggett and
Teague, to their cellmates, James Earl Davis and Antoine Dixon. 
As noted above, the trial court subsequently ruled that these
statements were admissible.  The trial court specifically found
that Leggett’s statements to Dixon were “made under and with
corroborating circumstances to clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statements so as to render it admissible
at this sentencing hearing” as evidence in mitigation to the
issue of punishment.
Defendant also proffered a statement by Dixon to
Detective George Raecher regarding what Leggett had told him.  In
-40-
that statement, among other things, Dixon described Leggett’s
statements concerning three robberies unrelated to the murders of
Strickland and Stroud.  However, defendant made a motion to
exclude certain portions of the statement, including the
statements relating to the robberies mentioned above.  The State
then argued that once a statement is admitted into evidence, the
law requires that the entire statement be admitted.  The State
further argued that the evidence concerning the other robberies
was relevant to prove the “course of conduct” aggravating
circumstance.  Subsequently, the trial court denied defendant’s
motion to redact certain portions of the statements.
Defense counsel then called Dixon to the witness stand
and requested that he read to the jury the statement that he gave
to Detective Raecher.  Contained within this statement were
references to “Katlyn’s” robbery; another robbery involving
Leggett, Teague, and defendant; and a robbery of a man who was
walking down a street.  Dixon testified in part as follows:
Larry also talked about the Katlyn’s robbery. 
He said that himself, his brother [James
Leggett], Dontai, Kwame and John Edwards were
with him . . . .  He said they went in the
back door.  Jay Leggett stayed outside. 
Kwame [Teague], John Edwards and Larry went
into the restaurant.  He said they knew there
was a lot of money there.
. . . .
Larry told me about the other two
robberies he was charged with.  He said Kwame
and Edward [defendant] were with him.  They
ran into a house and made everyone lay down
[sic].  He said they got a lot of money.  He
said they robbed a white man walking down
Center Street.
-41-
Defendant now contends that the statement contained the
following inadmissible testimony:  (1) the robbery of Katlyn’s
restaurant in which defendant was not involved, and (2) testimony
involving other unrelated robberies in which defendant may have
been involved.
“Although the Rules of Evidence do not apply in
sentencing proceedings, they may be helpful as a guide to
reliability and relevance.”  State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 31, 478
S.E.2d 163, 179 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 L. Ed. 2d
1022 (1997).  Any evidence the court “deems relevant to sentence”
may be introduced at this stage.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(3).  The
State “must be permitted to present any competent, relevant
evidence relating to the defendant’s character or record which
will substantially support the imposition of the death penalty.” 
Brown, 315 N.C. at 61, 337 S.E.2d at 824.
Here, the State contends that the evidence was relevant
to support the “course of conduct” aggravating circumstance.  “In
determining whether the evidence tends to show that another crime
and the crime for which defendant is being sentenced were part of
a course of conduct, the trial court must consider a number of
factors, including the temporal proximity of the events to one
another, a recurrent modus operandi, and motivation by the same
reasons.”  State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 329, 488 S.E.2d 550,
572 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998).
First, we will address the portion of the statement
relating to the robbery at Katlyn’s.  While this evidence does
not appear to be relevant to defendant’s character or record,
-42-
defendant can show no prejudice in its admission.  In a
stipulation admitted into evidence, it was made clear to the jury
that defendant had no part in this robbery.  Specifically, the
stipulation provided that “the robbery at Katlyn’s occurred
June 7, 1993 which was prior to the defendant coming to the State
of North Carolina.”  Also, while questioning Dixon regarding this
robbery, the prosecutor specifically pointed out that Leggett had
told Dixon that defendant was not with them at that time. 
Indeed, as set out above, Dixon listed five individuals who took
part in the Katlyn robbery, none of whom was defendant.
As to the statements regarding the other two robberies,
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting them because the evidence was relevant to the “course
of conduct” aggravating circumstance.  While the jury did not
hear evidence of the exact date of the robberies, it could
logically infer that the two robberies occurred between 4 or
5 January 1994 and 31 January 1994.  According to Dixon’s
statement, Leggett, Teague, and defendant all participated in the
robberies.  The record establishes that defendant did not meet
Teague until 4 or 5 January 1994.  The murders of Strickland and
Stroud were committed on 21 January 1994.  Defendant was arrested
on 31 January 1994.  Thus, from the evidence presented, the jury
was aware the robberies occurred in a period that was no more
than seventeen days before the murders and no more than ten days
after the murders.  Further, the modus operandi was sufficiently
similar.  The evidence presented showed that defendant, Leggett,
and Teague acted together in each crime and relied on the element
-43-
of surprise.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the portions of the statement involving the two
robberies.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
XII.
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s
instructions on the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance, that the
murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(9), were unconstitutionally vague.  Defendant argues
that the trial court’s instructions impermissibly allowed the
jury to find this circumstance based upon the actions of
defendant’s accomplices.  Thus, defendant contends he is entitled
to a new sentencing hearing.  We disagree.
During the sentencing proceeding, the State sought
submission in the Strickland case of the statutory aggravating
circumstance that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel.”  Defendant objected to submission of this aggravating
circumstance on the grounds that the evidence did not support it. 
However, as defendant concedes in his brief, he did not request a
limiting instruction on this circumstance.  For the first time,
on appeal, defendant contends that the instructions given on this
circumstance are unconstitutionally vague.  Accordingly,
appellate review of this argument may be sought only under the
plain error standard.  See State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 495-96,
461 S.E.2d 664, 676-77 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123, 134
L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996).
As previously noted, “the term ‘plain error’ does not
simply mean obvious or apparent error.”  State v. Collins, 334
-44-
N.C. 54, 62, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993).  “In order to rise to
the level of plain error, the error in the trial court’s
instructions must be so fundamental that (i) absent the error,
the jury probably would have reached a different verdict; or
(ii) the error would constitute a miscarriage of justice if not
corrected.”  Holden, 346 N.C. at 435, 488 S.E.2d at 531.  We
conclude that the trial court’s instructions on the (e)(9)
aggravating circumstance did not constitute error, much less
plain error.
In the present case, the trial court instructed the
jury on the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance as follows:
Fourth, was this murder of Margaret D.
Strickland especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel?
In this context heinous means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil.  Atrocious means
outrageously wicked and vile.  And cruel
means designed to inflict a high degree of
pain with utter indifference to or even
enjoyment of the suffering of others. 
However, it is not enough that this murder be
heinous, atrocious or cruel, as those terms
have just been defined, this murder must have
been especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
and not every murder is especially so.  For
this murder to have been especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel, any brutality which was
involved in it must have exceeded that which
is normally present in any killing or this
murder must have been a conscienceless or
pitiless crime which was unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.
In State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 428 S.E.2d 118, this
Court upheld instructions identical to those set out above.  In
upholding the instructions, this Court stated that “[b]ecause
these jury instructions incorporate narrowing definitions adopted
-45-
by this Court and expressly approved by the United States Supreme
Court, or are of the tenor of the definitions approved, we
reaffirm that these instructions provide constitutionally
sufficient guidance to the jury.”  Id. at 391-92, 428 S.E.2d at
141.
Nevertheless, defendant contends that these
instructions impermissibly allow the jury to find this
circumstance based on the intent and actions of defendant’s
accomplices and that the instruction is therefore
unconstitutionally vague.  However, this argument is meritless. 
As noted in Syriani, the instruction given passes constitutional
muster.  Further, the focus throughout sentencing was on the
conduct of defendant, not his accomplices, and did not permit the
jurors to find aggravating circumstances based on the actions of
defendant’s accomplices.
Here, the evidence showed that Strickland was
kidnapped, confined in the trunk of a car, and driven around
while defendant and his accomplices contemplated her robbery. 
She was then forced to strip naked in front of her kidnappers and
was searched for money and drugs.  Finally, after witnessing the
murder of her companion, she was killed as she begged for her
life.  This evidence certainly supports submission of the (e)(9)
aggravating circumstance.  Further, the jury failed during the
sentencing proceeding to find the existence of the statutory
mitigating circumstance that the “murder of Margaret Strickland
was actually committed by another person and the defendant was
only an accomplice in/or an accessory to the murder and his
-46-
participation in the murder was relatively minor.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000 (f)(4).  Thus, it is apparent that the jurors believed
that defendant played an active part in the murder of Strickland
and was not a “passive accomplice” as defendant argues.  This
assignment of error is without merit.
XIII.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by submitting the aggravating
circumstance that the murder was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(4).  This circumstance was submitted to the jury only
in the case of Margaret Strickland.  Defendant argues that
although there was evidence tending to show that his accomplices
were motivated by this purpose, there was no competent evidence
introduced at trial or sentencing proving that defendant was
similarly motivated.
Defendant’s argument, however, misconstrues the law as
this Court has interpreted it.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4)
provides, in pertinent part, that the murder was committed “for
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.”  As this
Court pointed out in State v. Hunt, 323 N.C. 407, 373 S.E.2d 400
(1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 602 (1990), this circumstance speaks only of “a lawful
arrest.”  The Court then determined that “[i]t need not be the
defendant’s own arrest.”  Id. at 432, 373 S.E.2d at 416.
Having clarified this, we conclude that in the present
case, there was evidence that Strickland’s murder was committed
-47-
for the purpose of “preventing a lawful arrest.”  Although
defendant testified that Leggett shot Strickland, defendant
conceded that she was killed to eliminate her as a witness to the
crimes involved.  On cross-examination, defendant testified as
follows:
Q.  But you specifically remember that
[Margaret Strickland] was shot and killed
because she was a witness and could testify
and identify about what happened?
A.  That she knew Kwame Teague, yes.
Q.  Right, but that she was a witness to the
killing of Bobby Stroud; isn’t that correct.
A.  Yes.
Q.  No question in your mind that’s the
reason she was killed that she was a witness
to what happened?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And eliminated for that reason?
A.  Yes.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the
submission of the (e)(4) aggravating circumstance.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises eight additional issues which he
concedes have been previously decided contrary to his position by
this Court:  (1) the trial court erred by denying defendant’s
motion to examine jurors concerning parole eligibility; (2) the
trial court erred by placing the burden of proof on defendant
with respect to mitigating circumstances and in defining the
burden of proof; (3) the trial court erred by instructing that
-48-
jurors were permitted to reject mitigating circumstances on the
basis that they have no mitigating value; (4) the trial court
erred by failing to instruct that jurors “must” rather than “may”
consider mitigating circumstances at Issues Three and Four;
(5) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that each juror
may consider only mitigating circumstances found by that juror;
(6) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that
unless the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, a life sentence should be imposed; (7) the trial
court erred by failing to clearly instruct the jury that it
should answer “no” to Issues Three and Four unless the jury
unanimously answered these issues “yes”; and (8) the North
Carolina death penalty statute is unconstitutional.
Defendant raises these issues for purposes of
permitting this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and also
for the purpose of preserving them for any possible further
judicial review.  We have considered defendant’s arguments on
these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our
prior holdings.  These assignments of error are overruled.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Having found no error in either the guilt or sentencing
phase, we must determine whether:  (1) the evidence supports the
aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (2) passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor influenced the
imposition of the death sentence; and (3) the sentence is
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
-49-
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).
In the present case, defendant was convicted of two
counts of first-degree murder on the basis of malice,
premeditation, and deliberation and also under the felony murder
rule.  With respect to the murder of Margaret Strickland, the
jury found the aggravating circumstances that the murder was
committed to prevent arrest or effect escape, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(4); that the murder was committed while defendant was
engaged in the commission of first-degree kidnapping, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(5); that the murder was committed while defendant was
engaged in the commission of robbery with a firearm, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(5); that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9); and that the
murder was part of a course of conduct including other violent
crimes, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).  With respect to the murder
of Bobby Stroud, the jury found the aggravating circumstances
that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the
commission of first-degree kidnapping, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5);
that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the
commission of robbery with a firearm, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5);
and that the murder was part of a course of conduct including
other violent crimes, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).
We conclude that the evidence supports each aggravating
circumstance found.  We further conclude, based on a thorough
review of the record, that the sentences of death were not
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
-50-
arbitrary factor.  Thus, the final statutory duty of this Court
is to conduct a proportionality review.
Proportionality review is designed to “eliminate the
possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action
of an aberrant jury.”  State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 164-65, 362
S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed.
2d 935 (1988).  In conducting proportionality review, we
determine whether “the sentence of death in the present case is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases considering both the crime and the defendant.”  State v.
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983).  Whether the death penalty is
disproportionate “ultimately rest[s] upon the ‘experienced
judgments’ of the members of this Court.”  State v. Green, 336
N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046,
130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).
In our proportionality review, it is proper to compare
the present case with other cases in which this Court has
concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate.  State v.
McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161 (1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  It is also
proper for this Court to compare this case with the cases in
which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate.  Id.
at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164.  Although we review all of these cases
when engaging in this statutory duty, we will not undertake to
discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that
duty.  Id.
-51-
This Court has determined that the sentence of death
was disproportionate in seven cases:  State v. Benson, 323 N.C.
318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352
S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713
(1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C.
647, 483 S.E.2d 396, and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373; State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985);
State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v.
Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v.
Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
However, we find that the present case is
distinguishable from each of these seven cases.  First, defendant
was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.  As this
Court has previously noted, we have never found the sentence of
death disproportionate in a case where the defendant was found
guilty of murdering more than one victim.  State v. Goode, 341
N.C. 513, 552, 461 S.E.2d 631, 654 (1995).  Further, the jury
convicted defendant on the theory of malice, premeditation, and
deliberation and also under the felony murder rule.  We have said
that “[t]he finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a
more cold-blooded and calculated crime.”  State v. Artis, 325
N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on
other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).
Finally, this Court has never found a death sentence to
be disproportionate in a witness-elimination case.  “‘Murder can
be motivated by emotions such as greed, jealously, hate, revenge,
or passion.  The motive of witness elimination lacks even the
-52-
excuse of emotion.’”  State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 407, 462
S.E.2d 25, 49 (1995) (quoting State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 375,
307 S.E.2d 304, 335 (1983)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134 L.
Ed. 2d 482 (1996).  Here, defendant conceded at trial that
Strickland was shot because she was a witness to the murder of
Stroud.  Further, the jury found the aggravating circumstance
that Strickland’s murder was committed for the purpose of
avoiding a lawful arrest, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4).
We recognize that juries may have imposed sentences of
life imprisonment in cases which are similar to the present case. 
However, this fact “does not automatically establish that juries
have ‘consistently’ returned life sentences in factually similar
cases.”  Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47.  This Court
has long rejected a mechanical or empirical approach to comparing
cases that are superficially similar.  Robinson, 336 N.C. at 139,
443 S.E.2d at 337.  This Court independently considers “the
individual defendant and the nature of the crime or crimes which
he has committed.”  State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 36, 292 S.E.2d
203, 229, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 74 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1982),
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Rouse, 339 N.C.
59, 451 S.E.2d 543, by State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d
306, and by State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517.
Defendant contends that the sentence of death entered
against him is disproportionate because his two accomplices,
Teague and Leggett, both received life sentences.  Defendant
argues that there is no clear evidence indicating that he was
-53-
more culpable than his alleged accomplices and that there is a
strong possibility that he is less culpable than either of them.
In support of his position, defendant cites State v.
Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (finding death penalty
disproportionate where equally or more culpable accomplice
received life sentence in separate trial).  However, Stokes is
distinguishable from the present case.  First, in Stokes, the
defendant was convicted of only one count of first-degree murder
under the theory of felony murder.  In the present case,
defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder
under both premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder
rules.  Further, in Stokes, Chief Justice Exum noted that
Stokes was only seventeen years old when he
murdered Kauno Lehto; Murray [his accomplice]
was considerably older.  There also is
evidence that Stokes suffered from impaired
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct, and that he was under the influence
of a mental or emotional disturbance at the
time of the murder.  Moreover, because the
jury found the existence of “one or more”
mitigating circumstances without specifying
which ones, we must assume the existence of
each mitigating factor the trial judge
submitted and the evidence supported,
including those involving age, mental or
emotional disturbance, and impaired capacity.
Id. at 21, 352 S.E.2d at 664.
Here, defendant was twenty-six years old at the time
the murders were committed.  Further, there was no evidence
presented that defendant suffered from impaired capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or that he was under
the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance.  Finally, in
the present case, there were five aggravating circumstances found
-54-
in the Strickland case and three found in the Stroud case,
compared to the single aggravator found in Stokes.  Stokes is
thus clearly distinguishable from the present case and does not
support defendant’s contention that the sentences of death
entered against him are disproportionate.
The fact that defendant was not the actual shooter of
the victims does not make his participation in the crime any less
culpable.  Our case law supports this proposition by providing
for the “friend” exception to the “mere presence” rule.  Thus, a
defendant may be guilty of a crime by his mere presence if the
perpetrator knows the friend’s presence will be regarded as
encouragement and protection.  See Gaines, 345 N.C. at 677, 483
S.E.2d at 414.  As Justice Mitchell (now Chief Justice) warned in
his dissent in Stokes, this Court should not substitute its view
over that of the jury as to what the evidence actually
established.  Stokes, 319 N.C. at 33, 352 S.E.2d at 671
(Mitchell, J., dissenting).  Here, the jury could reasonably find
that defendant’s actions warranted the death penalty.  We will
not overturn the jury’s determination simply on the basis that
defendant’s two alleged accomplices received life sentences.
Based on the nature of this crime, and particularly the
distinguishing features noted above, we cannot conclude as a
matter of law that the sentence of death was excessive or
disproportionate.  We hold that defendant received a fair trial
and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.