Title: Taylor v. McConchie
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 012583
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BRUCE A. TAYLOR, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 012583  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   SEPTEMBER 13, 2002 
RICHARD R. McCONCHIE, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY 
George E. Honts, III, Judge 
 
This appeal arises from an amended bill of complaint 
filed by the appellants, Bruce A. and Karen D. Taylor (the 
Taylors), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief with 
regard to an easement for access to their property located 
in Botetourt County.  Because we conclude that the circuit 
court did not err in finding that the original easement had 
been extinguished and that, under the terms of a new, 
relocated easement, the Taylors’ access to their property 
is now limited to vehicular and pedestrian traffic, we will 
affirm that aspect of the court’s judgment.  However, we 
hold that the court abused its discretion in refusing to 
allow the Taylors to present evidence about their ability 
to access their property in light of a post-trial survey 
changing a small portion of the easement.  Accordingly, we 
will remand for further proceedings. 
I.  FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The easement at issue was first created in 1949 when 
Philip and Kate S. Kohen conveyed a 12-acre parcel to Mary 
Ann Jane Sink; the parcel was subsequently conveyed to 
Charles L. Sink (Sink).  The deed from the Kohens reserved 
an easement (the Kohen easement) over the property being 
conveyed “so that [the Kohens could] get to their remaining 
lands adjoining the land sold by this deed,-from the 
[present Virginia Secondary Route 635].”  The deed 
specified that the “road-way . . . shall be of sufficient 
width to permit the free and convenient passage of motor 
vehicles and farm vehicles with loads of hay and other farm 
products, and with further sufficient width for cuts and 
fills, and to permit the convenient working of said road.” 
In 1997, the Taylors entered into a real estate 
contract to purchase a parcel of property, which is the 
dominant estate served by the easement at issue, from 
Patrick D. and Ann M. McClave (the McClaves).  The contract 
between those parties provided, in pertinent part, that: 
The Sellers herein covenant[] that [they have] a 
legal right-of-way through the lands of the 
adjoining property owners to the State Road for 
the new road [the Sellers have] constructed and 
furthermore that said right-of-way may be used if 
the land subject to this contract is subdivided.  
This covenant shall survive closing. 
 
 
After the execution of this contract with the Taylors 
but prior to closing, the McClaves entered into a “DEED OF  
 
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EASEMENT AND AGREEMENT” with Sink.1  The agreement expressly 
abandoned the Kohen easement (referred to in the agreement 
as the “Original Easement”), but created a new, relocated 
easement across the servient property to Virginia Secondary 
Route 635.  The servient property identified in this 
agreement included not only the 12-acre parcel that was 
originally the servient property with regard to the Kohen 
easement, but also two additional parcels that are adjacent 
to the 12-acre parcel.  The terms of the agreement granted 
the McClaves “a nonexclusive Right-of-Way Easement for 
vehicular and pedestrian access from the southern boundary 
of the [McClave property] across the [Sink property] to 
Virginia Secondary Route 635” (the McClave/Sink easement).  
The McClave/Sink easement was expressly “delimited by the 
existing ‘New Shale Surface Road’, as the same is now 
located, constructed, graded, and drained, as shown to 
scale on a Plat of Survey” recorded with the deed and 
agreement.  It was situated slightly to the east of the 
Kohen easement, except at the southern terminus near the 
state route, where the two easements generally coincided. 
 
In December 1998, the Taylors and the McClaves closed 
on the real estate contract between them.  The deed from 
                     
1 The agreement appears to have been in settlement of a 
suit instituted by Sink against the McClaves.  Sink had 
 
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the McClaves conveyed, along with the property, the right-
of-way described in the “DEED OF EASEMENT AND AGREEMENT” 
between the McClaves and Sink, i.e., the McClave/Sink 
easement, and specified that the conveyance was subject to 
the McClave/Sink easement agreement.  However, the deed 
from the McClaves to the Taylors did not refer to the Kohen 
easement. 
 
In the spring of 1999, Richard R. and Christina G. 
McConchie (the McConchies), who owned property adjacent to 
the “New Shale Surface Road” (the shale road), challenged 
the Taylors’ route of access, claiming that the roadway the 
Taylors were using crossed over the McConchies’ property.  
In July, the Taylors received a “bar notice” from Sink, 
advising that their right of access was limited to the 
shale road as shown on the plat recorded with the 
McClave/Sink easement agreement.  Later, both the 
McConchies and Sink erected fences that, according to the 
Taylors, restricted their access and made it impossible for 
a cattle truck to travel along the road without the prior 
removal of some of the fence posts.  The Taylors then filed 
the present suit, naming as defendants Sink and the 
McConchies. 
                                                             
also named the Taylors as defendants in that suit. 
 
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At trial, the evidence showed that the McClave/Sink 
easement encroached on the McConchies’ property by about 
four feet near the southern end of the shale road.  It was 
also established that, while the stated purpose of the 
McClave/Sink easement was to provide vehicular access “from 
the southern boundary of the [Taylor property] to Virginia 
Secondary Route 635,” the language of the agreement limited 
the location of the easement to the shale road, but that 
road did not extend to the state route.  The evidence 
showed that the Kohen easement also fell short of reaching 
the present location of the state road by approximately 20 
feet. 
The circuit court held that the Kohen easement had 
been “supplanted” by the McClave/Sink easement.  The court 
then found that Sink had breached the special warranty of 
title given in the deed of easement to the McClaves, the 
Taylors’ predecessor in interest, and that the Taylors 
were, therefore, entitled not only to access their property 
via the shale road as specified in the McClave/Sink 
easement, but also to have access across Sink’s property 
from the ending point of the shale road to the state route, 
thereby fulfilling the easement’s intended purpose.  After 
announcing its decision from the bench, the court 
instructed a surveyor on the particulars of that decision 
 
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and directed the surveyor to prepare a plat reflecting the 
court’s ruling. 
After receiving the new survey, the Taylors moved the 
court to reconsider its decision, contending that the 
easement awarded by the court was only 7.05 feet wide at a 
point near the state route and thus too narrow to provide 
vehicular access to their property.  Treating the motion as 
one to introduce newly-discovered evidence, the court 
denied the motion and entered its final decree, attaching a 
copy of the new plat.  The Taylors appeal from that decree. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the Taylors raise three assignments of 
error.  First, they assert that the circuit court erred in 
finding that the Kohen easement had been extinguished and 
argue that it was conveyed to them in addition to the 
McClave/Sink easement.  Next, they contend that the 
easement awarded by the circuit court is insufficient to 
provide vehicular access to their property, as assured by 
both easements.  Finally, the Taylors contend that they 
should have been permitted to present evidence concerning 
the impact of the post-trial survey that was attached by 
the circuit court to its final decree. 
As to their first assignment of error, the Taylors  
contend that, by virtue of their contract to purchase the 
 
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McClaves’ property, they acquired an equitable interest in 
the Kohen easement and that, since they were not parties to 
the agreement establishing the McClave/Sink easement, their 
interest in the Kohen easement was not extinguished by that 
agreement.  The Taylors also point out that, although their 
deed from the McClaves did not mention the Kohen easement, 
it nevertheless included the provision that “[t]his Deed is 
made subject to all easements, restrictions, and conditions 
of record affecting the hereinabove-described property.” 
We agree with the Taylors’ position that an easement 
remains with the dominant estate to which it is appurtenant 
and passes to a subsequent grantee even though not 
specifically mentioned in the deed to that grantee.  See 
Code § 55-50; Corbett v. Ruben, 223 Va. 468, 473-74, 290 
S.E.2d 847, 850 (1982).  Likewise, upon execution of the 
real estate contract with the McClaves, the Taylors became 
vested of an interest in the McClaves’ property, including 
the appurtenant Kohen easement.  See Carmichael v. Snyder, 
209 Va. 451, 454-55, 164 S.E.2d 703, 706 (1968).  
Nevertheless, these principles do not resolve the issue 
raised here. 
The agreement creating the McClave/Sink easement 
specifically stated that the parties were abandoning the 
“Original Easement” (the Kohen easement) and creating a 
 
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new, relocated easement across the servient property.2  That 
new easement was confined to the area where the shale road 
had been constructed.  The McClave/Sink agreement was in 
accord with the McClaves’ covenant, included in their real 
estate contract with the Taylors, that they had a right-of-
way through the lands of the adjoining property owners to 
the state route along the new road that they had 
constructed (the shale road).  Similarly, the deed from the 
McClaves to the Taylors included the right-of-way described 
in the McClave/Sink easement agreement and made the 
conveyance to the Taylors subject to that agreement which, 
as already stated, abandoned the Kohen easement.  Thus, 
when the deed from the McClaves was delivered and accepted 
by the Taylors, any rights to the Kohen easement that the 
Taylors may have acquired by virtue of the real estate 
contract, despite its specific reference to the new road 
constructed by the McClaves, were extinguished under the 
doctrine of merger.3  “The rule is that when a deed is 
                     
2 The term “abandonment” means “[t]he relinquishing of 
a right or interest with the intention of never again 
claiming it.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1 (7th ed. 1999). 
 
3 Notably, in a letter introduced into evidence, the 
Taylors’ attorney advised them that if they closed on the 
contract with the McClaves, they would be waiving the right 
to pursue any cause of action that they might have against 
the McClaves concerning the right-of-way. 
 
 
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executed and accepted in performance of a prior preliminary 
contract, the deed, if unambiguous in its terms, and 
unaffected by fraud or mistake, must be looked to alone as 
the final agreement of the parties.”  Woodson v. Smith, 128 
Va. 652, 656, 104 S.E. 794, 795 (1920); accord Davis v. 
Tazewell Place Assocs., 254 Va. 257, 262, 492 S.E.2d 162, 
165 (1997); Miller v. Reynolds, 216 Va. 852, 854-55, 223 
S.E.2d 883, 885 (1976). 
Nor does the language in the Taylors’ deed stating 
that the conveyance was “subject to all easements, 
restrictions, and conditions of record” affecting the 
property change our conclusion.  That provision serves 
merely to acknowledge that any existing rights are excepted 
from the conveyance and continue to limit the Taylors’ fee 
simple interest.  See Davis v. Henning, 250 Va. 271, 275, 
462 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1995).  Thus, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err in finding that the Taylors no 
longer have any rights under the Kohen easement. 
Consequently, we also conclude that the circuit court 
did not err in construing the Taylors’ easement as one for 
solely vehicular and pedestrian access to their property.  
The Taylors assert that the court erred in limiting the 
width of the easement to 7.05 feet at a point near the 
state route.  According to the Taylors, that limitation in 
 
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the width made the easement too narrow for “vehicular 
access” as assured by the easement conveyed to the Taylors 
in their deed.  Relying on the language in both the 
McClave/Sink easement and the Kohen easement, the Taylors 
argue that, while a passenger automobile may be able to 
“squeeze through” this 7.05-foot “gateway”, a larger 
vehicle or farm equipment cannot do so, especially in light 
of the sharp left turn that must be negotiated after 
passing through the 7.05-foot opening. 
To the extent that the Taylors claim that the 
character of their easement remains as it was under the 
Kohen easement, they are mistaken.  The deed creating the 
Kohen easement specifically stated that the easement was to 
be of sufficient width to allow for the free passage of 
motor vehicles and farm vehicles.  However, when the Kohen 
easement was abandoned in the agreement between the 
McClaves and Sink, not only was the easement relocated, its 
purpose was also changed.  That change is evidenced by the 
language in the “DEED OF EASEMENT AND AGREEMENT” specifying 
“a nonexclusive Right-of-Way Easement for vehicular and 
pedestrian access from the southern boundary of the 
Dominant Property across the Servient Property to Virginia 
Secondary Route 635.”  In other words, the easement no 
longer provided access for farm equipment. 
 
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However, we do agree with the Taylors that the circuit 
court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the 
evidence after the post-trial plat was prepared.  Relying 
on our decisions in Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 301 
S.E.2d 145 (1983) and Fulcher v. Whitlow, 208 Va. 34, 155  
S.E.2d 362 (1967), the court held that the Taylors had not 
satisfied the criteria for granting a new trial on the 
basis of newly-discovered evidence.  While not necessarily 
dispositive of the issue, we note that those cases dealt 
with motions for a new trial, whereas the Taylors merely 
sought to reopen the evidence and did not ask for a new 
trial. 
It is apparent from the plat depicting the 
McClave/Sink easement and from testimony that the easement 
narrows to a width of 7.05 feet at a point where there is a 
sharp left turn in the roadway as one travels along the 
easement from the state route.  That is the same narrow 
“gateway” about which the Taylors complain, but it did not 
come about as a result of the circuit court’s finding that 
a small part of the shale road encroached upon the 
McConchies’ property.  That narrow portion in the easement 
existed when the McClave/Sink easement was created and is 
shown on the plat recorded with that deed of easement.  
However, when the plat was prepared post-trial to reflect 
 
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the circuit court’s ruling, the area in which to negotiate 
the sharp left turn in the easement, and thus the angle of 
that turn, changed because the court shifted a small 
section of the easement eastward in order to correct the 
encroachment upon the McConchies’ property.  Consequently, 
the Taylors asserted in their motion to reopen the evidence 
that their ability to use the easement for vehicular and 
pedestrian access to their property had been adversely 
affected.  Two photographs introduced into evidence depict 
an automobile passing through this 7.05-foot-wide area, but 
those pictures do not demonstrate the extent to which the 
angle of the turn has been affected. 
The plat establishing the location of the Taylors’ 
easement and changing the angle of that turn was not 
available to the parties until after the trial.  While the 
court and the surveyor discussed the court’s decision with 
the parties by making some pencil marks on the plat of the 
McClave/Sink easement, the parties did not know the exact 
change in the location of the easement until the post-trial 
plat was prepared.  More importantly, the Taylors could not 
have understood what impact, if any, the court’s proposed 
ruling would have on the use of their easement for 
vehicular access to their property until they had the plat 
in hand and could actually use the easement with the 
 
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changes effected by the court.  On this basis, we conclude 
that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit 
the Taylors to introduce additional evidence on that point. 
For these reasons, we will affirm in part and reverse 
in part the judgment of the circuit court and remand for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
 
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