Title: People v. Hall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86194
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2000

Docket No. 86194-Agenda 6-March 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								FELIPE HALL, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 26, 2000.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Madison County,
defendant, Felipe Hall, was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)). The same jury found
that defendant was eligible for the death penalty and that there
were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death penalty.
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to death.
Defendant's execution has been stayed pending direct review by
this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603,
609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's
conviction and death sentence.
BACKGROUND
I. Trial Evidence
	On October 4, 1994, Frank Crook, a farmer in rural Madison
County, was awakened by the sound of two or three gunshots.
Crook looked at his alarm clock; it was 1:30 a.m. The gunshots
were followed by four shotgun blasts. Later that morning, David
Mueller, a farmer whose property adjoins Crook's property,
discovered two piles of clothing on a dirt field road, and observed
in his field what appeared to be a body. Mueller contacted
authorities. An officer from the Madison County sheriff's office
who was dispatched to the scene found the nude bodies of two
young women-a blond-haired Caucasian and an African-American. The women were later identified as Christina Masters
and Samantha Beasley, respectively.
	An autopsy of Masters revealed that she had suffered two
shotgun wounds, one to the middle of the forehead, and one to the
right breast. Either shot would have been fatal. Masters also
suffered a traumatic amputation of the middle and ring fingers on
her right hand, which the pathologist testified are defensive
wounds. An autopsy of Beasley revealed that she, like Masters,
suffered two shotgun wounds, one to the lower back and one to the
right breast. In addition, Beasley suffered two gunshot wounds-a
through-and-through wound in the left buttocks and thigh, and the
fatal wound, in which the bullet traveled through the right
shoulder, into the lung and heart, ultimately entering the left arm.
According to the pathologist, blood spatters on the soles of
Beasley's feet indicate that she was not standing at the time she
was shot.
	Illinois State Police, who processed the crime scene,
recovered two discharged Norinco brand 9-millimeter shell
casings, a live 9-millimeter cartridge, and four discharged
Remington brand shotgun shells. Police testified that the proximity
of the shotgun shells is consistent with a single shooter, and that
the barrel of the shotgun which was used in the murders was
probably cut off.
	Prosecution witnesses testified that on the evening of October
3, 1994, the victims, along with Tiffany Edwards and Ernestine
Renee Rankins, went to Juanita Lane's apartment at the Colony
North Apartments in Jennings, Missouri, a community outside St.
Louis. Masters was driving a red Merkur Scorpio. At about 11:30
p.m., Masters drove Beasley, Lane and Edwards to Rally's, a local
eatery, for hamburgers. A receipt from Rally's, which was
recovered from the Merkur, shows a purchase on October 3 at
11:51 p.m. According to Lane, Masters was not her normal self
that evening. Lane testified that Masters was quiet, nervous, and
kept looking in her rearview mirror.
	Upon their return to the Colony North Apartments from
Rally's, Edwards and Lane went inside. Beasley and Masters
stayed in the car, which Masters parked in the lot for the apartment
complex. A short time later, Masters moved the Merkur to a
different spot in the parking lot. According to a statement Edwards
gave to police, the Merkur was parked just a few spaces away from
a burgundy Oldsmobile Eighty Eight or Buick Park Avenue. Inside
the burgundy car were three black males. Edwards later observed
that the burgundy car was gone, and Masters' car was empty.
	Various prosecution witnesses testified regarding incidents
involving the Merkur, Masters, and defendant just prior to the
murders. David Fiedler, a loan officer at General Finance,
identified defendant as the man who was with Masters on
September 26, 1994, when Masters applied for an auto loan in
connection with the purchase of the Merkur. Fiedler remembered
the transaction because the Merkur Scorpio is an unusual car.
Fiedler described defendant as "controlling." A week after the
purchase, Fiedler received a telephone call from defendant, who
identified himself as "Jonathan." Defendant indicated that he
would like to resell the Merkur.
	Kimberly Woolridge testified that she met defendant through
a friend, Michelle Smith, in the summer of 1993, and knew
defendant under various names, including Felipe Hall, Lamont
Hall, and Jonathan Scales. At defendant's request, Woolridge
verified employment for Masters in connection with the auto loan,
although Woolridge's company did not, in fact, employ Masters.
Woolridge further testified that one evening, as she, Smith and
defendant were leaving A.J.'s, a restaurant and lounge in St. Louis,
defendant discovered that his car, the Merkur, was gone.
Defendant was extremely upset.
	Defendant's cousin, Damie Brown, also testified regarding an
incident outside A.J.'s in which defendant's car, the Merkur, was
missing. According to Brown, as they drove around looking for the
vehicle, Masters drove up in her station wagon, told defendant that
the Merkur was stolen, but that she knew where to find it. They
followed Masters to the Colony North Apartments, where the
Merkur was parked. Defendant told Brown that it was funny how
the car kept disappearing.
	Juanita Lane testified that three or four days prior to the
shootings, Masters asked Lane to accompany her to pick up her
new car. The two women drove to a Motel 6 in the St. Louis area
where the Merkur was parked. Records from the Motel 6 establish
that Masters rented a room in her name on September 25, 1994,
which was paid through October 3, 1994. Motel employees
identified defendant as the man seen in that room on a regular
basis. Lane also testified that on the day following their trip to the
Motel 6, Masters again asked Lane to accompany her to pick up
the Merkur, which Lane did. This time the vehicle was parked
outside A.J.'s.
	Andre Franklin, who at the time of trial was serving a
sentence at the Colorado State Penitentiary, testified that defendant
told him the Merkur was his car, but that it was registered in the
name of some female who was "tripping a little bit." Franklin
explained to investigators that "tripping" meant that the woman
was "fucking with [the car]." According to Franklin, defendant did
not appear unhappy or emotional when defendant talked to him
about the Merkur.
	Michelle Smith testified that she knew defendant through
Brown, with whom Smith had grown up. On the evening of
October 3, 1994, Smith rented a green Chevy Aerostar van for
defendant. Defendant explained that he was moving and would
need the van for a day. Smith picked up defendant at the Motel 6
and went to the car rental agency. Smith recalled that defendant
was wearing construction boots.
	Smith and defendant met the next day, October 4, at
approximately 5 p.m. to return the van. With defendant were
"Dre" and "Rico." Smith testified that defendant seemed
frustrated, "hyper," and rushed. As Smith settled the paperwork,
she saw defendant wiping down the door and the interior of the
van. When Rico asked defendant what he was doing, defendant
responded, "[E]vidence, fingerprints." Smith noticed that
defendant's upper lip was cut all the way through. Defendant said
he had been lifting weights and was hurt while spotting for
someone. Defendant reimbursed Smith for the cost of the rental
van.
	Defendant asked Smith to rent him another vehicle to go to
Colorado, but Smith refused. Defendant told Smith he needed to
move again because the motel room was in Masters' name. When
Smith inquired further, defendant told her to watch the news and
that Masters "was not living." Smith watched the news, saw
Masters' photograph and thought that she was someone Woolridge
had met. Smith called Woolridge, who confirmed that Masters was
the girl for whom Woolridge had verified employment.
	 Sherry Harris testified that at 10:30 or 11 p.m. on October 3,
1994, she left her sister's house in St. Louis and was going to take
a bus to her boyfriend's house in Jennings. As she walked to the
bus stop, a green van pulled up. The driver of the van, whom
Harris identified as defendant, offered her a ride. Harris accepted.
Defendant introduced himself as Lamont. They proceeded first to
Allen Street in St. Louis, where defendant had a brief conversation
with a male. In this conversation, defendant said he would be back
to pick him up that night. Defendant and Harris then proceeded to
the Colony North Apartments in Jennings to see if defendant's car
was there. Defendant explained that the prior evening his
girlfriend had stolen a set of extra car keys and that she had later
stolen his vehicle.
	When Harris and defendant arrived at the Colony North
Apartments, Harris saw a red car, which she identified in court
from a photograph of the Merkur. Harris saw the back of the heads
of the two occupants of the vehicle. The female driver was blonde
and light-skinned; the female passenger was dark-skinned.
Defendant parked close to the Merkur and said, "[S]he got a
nigger in my shit." Defendant was angry. Defendant then exited
the van, removed a two- to three-foot-long shotgun from under the
seat, and went over to the Merkur. Defendant pointed the shotgun
at the driver and said, "[Y]ou got to three to get out." At this point,
Harris exited the van and ran to her boyfriend's house, which was
not far away.
	The following evening, October 4, 1994, defendant went to
the airport and purchased two tickets to Denver in the names of
Rico Hall and Tracy Clay. The ticket agent testified that defendant,
who was with two other men, did most of the talking. Although
defendant indicated that he wanted to fly out that evening, the last
flight to Denver had already departed. The ticket agent described
defendant as smooth, polite, educated, and "kind of a con[-man]."
According to testimony from Andre Franklin, the two tickets were
for defendant and himself, who flew out the next morning as
scheduled. Franklin also testified that he and defendant had
discussed going to Colorado on numerous occasions. On October
3, 1994, between 11 p.m. and midnight, defendant found Franklin
on Allen Street in St. Louis. Defendant was driving a van. With
defendant was an African-American female. Defendant told
Franklin that he was leaving for Colorado that evening, that
Franklin should get his things together, and that defendant would
pick him up after he dropped off his passenger. Franklin estimated
that defendant would be back within an hour. Franklin, however,
did not see defendant again until late the following morning.
	Based on information received from Kimberly Woolridge,
Madison County sheriffs learned that defendant maintained a
storage locker at a facility in St. Louis. The rental agreement for
the locker, dated August 26, 1994, was in the name of Suzanne
Eckler, defendant's wife. In a search of the locker, sheriffs seized
a Jennings 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, three 9-millimeter
clips, a box of 9-millimeter shells and one Remington brand
shotgun shell. The 9-millimeter ammunition was of a different
brand than the 9-millimeter shell casings found at the crime scene.
Sheriffs also seized a type of arrow gun which resembles a
shotgun. Harris, however, testified that the arrow gun was not the
weapon she saw defendant take from the van on the night of
October 3.
	A forensic examination of the pistol seized from the storage
locker disclosed that while it was not the weapon involved in the
murder of Beasley, it was its "twin." St. Louis police recovered the
other twin weapon in November 1994. Police officer David
Dietzel testified that they were monitoring an area of known gang
activity and illuminated their lights on a large group of people. An
individual later identified as Monaco McNeil dropped a gun.
McNeil denied the gun was his, but provided no information on
how he obtained it. Forensic tests established that the gun McNeil
dropped was the one used in Beasley's murder.
	Suzanne Eckler, defendant's wife, testified that in the summer
of 1994, at defendant's request, she purchased two brand new guns
for him. Eckler purchased the weapons in Colorado where she was
living, and mailed them to defendant in St. Louis under a different
name. Eckler identified the handgun seized from the storage locker
and the weapon recovered from McNeil as the two guns that she
purchased for defendant. Eckler also identified a receipt that was
made out in her name, dated July 16, 1994, in connection with her
purchase of the second gun.
	A housekeeper at the Mary Kay Inn in Hazlewood, Missouri,
where defendant stayed for approximately six to eight weeks
during the summer of 1994, told police that sometime in August
she saw two similar black handguns in defendant's possession.
	Tammy Brown, who was also employed as a housekeeper at
the Mary Kay Inn, testified that in mid-summer 1994, she
developed a relationship with defendant. Brown recalled seeing a
handgun and a shotgun in his room. According to the statement
she gave to police, Brown saw what looked like a sawed-off
shotgun, approximately two feet long, which defendant said he
was holding for somebody. At trial, Brown's testimony was
equivocal as to whether the shotgun she saw could have been the
arrow gun found in defendant's storage locker. Brown testified
that she still had feelings for defendant, who had helped her
financially.
	Brown further testified that on one occasion, as she was
leaving defendant's motel room, she saw a young, blonde-haired
girl entering his room. When Brown asked defendant about the
girl, defendant said that she was just somebody he needed to help
him rent cars and hotel rooms and get identification for him.
	Dawn Meyers also saw a handgun on the nightstand in a St.
Louis hotel room occupied by defendant during the summer of
1994, as well as a shotgun. Meyers had gone to defendant's hotel
room to pick up a friend, Tammy Witt, who was dating defendant.
Meyers testified that she was "positive" that the arrow gun seized
from defendant's storage locker was not the shotgun she saw in
defendant's room. Witt, however, testified that the only gun she
saw was a black handgun.
	 Glen Shubert, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State
Police, compared hair samples taken from the victims with hair
found in the Aerostar van driven by defendant. Of the several
Caucasian and Negroid hairs found in the van, one Caucasian hair
was microscopically similar to Masters' head hair, and one
Negroid hair fragment was microscopically consistent with
Beasley's head hair.
	Thomas Gamboe of the Madison County sheriff's department
testified that tire tracks at the crime scene did not match the tires
on the Aerostar van, but were similar to the tire treads on one of
the police vehicles. Although investigators found a footwear
impression at the crime scene, they were unable to find a match.
Eckler testified that when defendant returned to Colorado in
October 1994, he purchased a new pair of steel-toed hiking boots.
Defendant told Eckler that he threw his other boots into a
dumpster because he thought a print could be matched to those
boots.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant admitted to
multiple felony convictions in Colorado. He denied killing Beasley
and Masters. Defendant testified that he obtained two handguns,
but that he sold one of them in the summer of 1994 because he
needed money. Defendant also testified that he never fought with
Masters over the Merkur.
	Although defendant initially testified that the arrow gun was
not in the van on October 3, 1994, defendant later testified that this
was the gun he held as he approached the Merkur in the parking
lot of the Colony North Apartments. Defendant did not recall
telling Masters and Beasley that they had to the count of three to
exit the car. Rather, he said the gist of his conversation with
Masters was that he wanted the car back and that they agreed to
meet at the motel.
	Defendant explained that he wiped down the steering wheel
and the driver's side door of the van that Smith had rented for him
in order to remove the blood from a cut lip which had dripped on
the van. Defendant remembered buying new boots in Colorado,
but denied telling his wife that he got rid of the other pair because
of a possible footprint match. Finally, defendant testified that on
October 4, 1994, at 1:30 a.m., he placed a telephone call to his
mother to let her know he was alright.
	Eliza Madison, defendant's mother, testified consistently
about the October 4 telephone call. She also said defendant
sounded calm and normal.
	William Hoffman, Masters' stepfather, testified that on the
evening of October 4, 1994, he answered a telephone call at his
mother-in-law's house from a man who identified himself as
Lamont. The caller asked for Masters.
	Tequila Green, Beasley's cousin, testified that she could have
told Madison County sheriffs that Beasley was dating a black man
named Reggie, and that she had seen Reggie drop off Beasley in
a dark Oldsmobile Eighty Eight. Green, however, did not recall
providing that information to authorities. Daarino Musoddiq also
testified that she may have told Madison County sheriffs that
Beasley had dated Reggie and that she had seen Reggie drop off
Beasley in an older model vehicle, possibly an Oldsmobile Cutlass
or Eighty Eight.
	In rebuttal, Detective Leonard Suhre, of the Madison County
sheriff's department, testified that the department's investigation
revealed that "Reggie" was Reginald Stewart. According to Suhre,
on the night of October 3, 1994, Stewart was in the St. Clair
County jail.
	The jury found that defendant was guilty of the murders of
Beasley and Masters.

II. Sentencing Hearing
	At the first phase of the capital sentencing hearing, the same
jury found that defendant was eligible for the death penalty in that
he was convicted of murdering two or more persons (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994)), and that the murders were committed in
a "cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a
preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by
unlawful means" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)).
	At the second phase of the capital sentencing hearing, the
State presented evidence in aggravation that defendant was
involved in the drug trade; that defendant had made threats to
Masters and others; and that defendant had an extensive criminal
record, with a history of assaults. The State also supplemented the
record with victim impact statements from four family members,
as well as the testimony of one family member. In mitigation,
defendant presented the testimony of his mother concerning his
potential for rehabilitation and her belief in his innocence.
	The jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient
to preclude a sentence of death. Accordingly, the court sentenced
defendant to death.
I. Speedy-Trial Issue
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a
violation of his right to a speedy trial. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a)
(West 1994). Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
	An accused possesses both statutory and constitutional rights
to a speedy trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1994); U.S. Const.,
amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8. Although the
statutory and constitutional provisions address similar concerns,
the rights established by each are not necessarily coextensive.
People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 114 (1998); People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 286 (1984). Defendant here asserts only a violation of
his statutory right to a speedy trial.
	Under the speedy-trial statute, a defendant in custody for an
alleged offense must be tried within 120 days from the date he or
she was taken into custody, "unless delay is occasioned by the
defendant." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1994); People v.
Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 137 (1990). Similarly, a defendant on
bail or recognizance must be tried within 160 days from the date
the defendant demands trial "unless delay is occasioned by the
defendant." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 1994).
	A delay is "occasioned by the defendant" when the
defendant's acts caused or contributed to a delay resulting in the
postponement of trial. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 114; People v.
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 438 (1995). Any period of delay found
to be occasioned by the defendant tolls the applicable statutory
period. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(f) (West 1994); McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 
at 438-39. A defendant not tried within the statutory period must
be released from custody and is entitled to have the charges
dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 1994); 725 ILCS
5/114-1(a)(1) (West 1994); Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 114-15. The
defendant bears the burden of establishing facts which
demonstrate a violation of the speedy-trial statute. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 114. Only where a defendant's speedy-trial motion, and any
answer filed by the State, present an issue of fact not of record
must a trial court conduct a hearing on the defendant's motion.
725 ILCS 5/114-1(c), (d) (West 1994). On review, a trial court's
determination as to whether a delay is attributable to the defendant
is entitled to much deference and should be sustained absent a
clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 115; McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 438; Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 
at 137.
	In the present case, the trial court permitted argument on
defendant's speedy-trial motion, but did not set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing. The court determined that, based on its review
of the record and Illinois law, only 98 days under the speedy-trial
statute had elapsed and, therefore, that no violation of defendant's
statutory speedy-trial right occurred. Defendant argues that the
trial court should not have ruled on his motion without first
conducting a hearing to determine the truthfulness of defendant's
allegation that his appointed counsel failed to consult with him
prior to requesting several continuances. Defendant maintains that
the trial court improperly attributed delay to him on the basis of a
"silent record."
	We agree with defendant that where the record is silent, a
delay in trial will not be presumed to be attributable to a
defendant. See People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1982).
Here, however, the record is not silent. To the contrary, the record
discloses that several continuances were requested "upon [m]otion
of [d]efendant." In each instance, the order granting the
continuance states that the delay "is ruled attributable to the
[d]efendant." Each order is acknowledged by defense counsel.
	Generally, for purposes of tolling the speedy-trial period, a
defendant is charged with delay caused by defense motions.
People v. Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d 602, 608 (1999). Further, this court has
held that where a defense attorney requests a continuance on
behalf of a defendant, the resulting delay is attributable to the
defendant. See Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 141-42. This result
naturally flows from the law governing attorney-client relations.
As we explained in the Bowman case:
		"The general rule in Illinois is that a client is bound by the
acts or omissions of his lawyer-agent. While not an
ironclad rule, it is necessary in order for a representative
system of litigation to function. [Citation.] In criminal
proceedings, an attorney is authorized to act for his client
and determine for him procedural matters and decisions
involving trial strategy and tactics. [Citations.] Thus, the
affirmative acts of a defendant's counsel cannot be
separated from the defendant's own acts." Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 141.
	The record need not affirmatively show that, in conjunction
with a request for a continuance, the attorney has consulted with
the defendant. Such a rule would "intolerably burden" the trial
courts. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 142. Moreover, "an ordinary,
uncontested motion for a continuance does not involve rights of
the accused of such a substantial nature as to invalidate the actions
that occur without the accused's express consent." Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 142. Thus, defendant cannot claim that the delay in trial
should not have been attributed to him.
	Finally, where a defendant does not promptly repudiate an
attorney's unauthorized act upon receiving knowledge of the same,
the defendant effectively ratifies the act. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at
143. A contrary rule "would force every trial court to inquire into
every chargeable delay to determine whether an accused
personally agreed to a continuance, or at least whether the accused
waived his right to appear at the hearing." Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at
144.
	Defendant did not allege in his motion to dismiss that he had
made any attempt to repudiate the allegedly unauthorized acts of
appointed counsel in seeking several continuances. Even after
defendant retained private counsel, defendant did not file his
motion to dismiss based on the speedy-trial statute for over five
months. Thus, defendant effectively ratified the acts of appointed
counsel.
	Because defendant's speedy-trial motion did not present an
issue of fact outside the record material to the court's disposition
of the motion, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing
the motion without an evidentiary hearing. See 725 ILCS
5/114-1(d) (West 1994).


II. Trial Issues


Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant maintains that the State's
case consisted of weak, circumstantial evidence, i.e., that no
physical evidence established that he was at the crime scene; that
the gun used to murder Beasley was found in the possession of
another man, who was not charged with a crime; that the forensic
hair evidence did not establish that the victims were in the van
used by defendant; that the evidence of motive was conflicting;
and that there was evidence that someone other than defendant
could have committed the murders.
	When considering a challenge to a criminal conviction based
upon the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of this
court to retry the defendant. People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24,
43 (1997). Rather, the relevant question on appeal is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 49
(1989). Only where the evidence is so improbable or
unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt will a conviction be set aside. People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 247 (1998); McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 444.
	Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal
conviction, provided that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged. McDonald,
168 Ill. 2d  at 444; People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515 (1996).
The trier of fact need not, however, be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. It
is sufficient if all of the evidence taken together satisfies the trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People
v. Jones, 105 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (1985).
	Based on our examination of the evidence in light of the
foregoing principles, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could
have found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Masters
and Beasley beyond a reasonable doubt. There was credible
evidence that the 9-millimeter handgun, which delivered the fatal
shot to Beasley, was purchased by defendant's wife and delivered
to defendant in St. Louis shortly before the murders. Although
defendant testified that he sold the gun prior to the murders, the
jury was free to disregard such testimony as not credible. Further,
the fact that Monaco McNeil, from whom the gun was eventually
recovered, was not charged with a crime does not diminish the fact
that one of the murder weapons was traced directly to defendant.
	In addition, Sherry Harris unequivocally testified that on the
evening of October 3, 1994, defendant, upon seeing the Merkur in
the parking lot of the Colony North Apartments, took a shotgun
from the van in which they were riding, pointed it at the light-skinned driver of the Merkur, and angrily ordered the two women
out of the vehicle. These events occurred within two hours of the
murders. Significantly, Harris is a neutral third party. She met
defendant once and has no relationship with the other witnesses or
the victims. Harris' testimony is also consistent with the other
prosecution witnesses who testified that they had seen a shotgun
in defendant's possession during the months immediately prior to
the murders.
	Furthermore, there exists credible evidence that defendant
made inculpatory statements shortly after the murders. At the car
rental agency, defendant explained that he was wiping down the
rental van because of "evidence, fingerprints." Defendant also told
Michelle Smith that Masters was dead, and that he needed to move
because the motel room was registered in Masters' name.
	Defendant argues that the evidence of motive was conflicting.
The State presented evidence that defendant was a controlling
person, that he regarded Masters as merely someone he needed to
help him rent cars and hotel rooms, and that the Merkur became
the object of a tug-of-war between defendant and Masters. To the
extent there exists a conflict in the evidence as to defendant's
reaction to Masters' use of the Merkur, such a conflict is for the
trier of fact to resolve. See Digiloramo, 179 Ill. 2d  at 46;
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 448-49.
	Defendant also challenges the State's forensic hair evidence,
arguing that such evidence does not establish that the victims were
ever in the rental van. Defendant cites to testimony from the
State's forensic scientist that the hairs recovered from the van
could have been innocently transferred, and that no DNA testing
was performed on the Caucasian hair, although certain DNA
testing was available in 1994. Defendant also argues that no
witness was able to testify conclusively that the hairs recovered
from the van matched the hair samples taken from Masters and
Beasley. Any infirmities in the testimony of the State's expert
witness merely go to the weight of the evidence and the expert's
credibility as a witness. These determinations were for the jury, as
the finder of fact, to make. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 448-49;
Young, 128 Ill. 2d  at 51.
	Defendant further argues that there was evidence that
someone other than defendant could have committed the murders.
Defendant relies upon testimony that a burgundy vehicle with
three black males was observed in the parking lot of the Colony
North Apartments, just a few spaces away from where the Merkur
was parked, and that Masters was seen with a large amount of
cash. Defendant's theory is that after he confronted Masters and
Beasley in the parking lot, the three men in the burgundy car
accosted the women, and then abducted and murdered the women,
perhaps for the money, coincidentally using the very handgun
which defendant's wife purchased for defendant and sent to him
in St. Louis.
	Where circumstantial evidence relied upon to support the
defense that someone other than the defendant committed the
crime is unsatisfactory, based upon mere surmise or possibility, a
hypothesis of innocence may be rejected by the trier of fact.
People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 533 (1995). We conclude that
such is the case here, and that the jury could properly reject
defendant's theory of innocence. Moreover, the trier of fact is not
required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the
evidence and to search out all possible explanations consistent
with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 447.
	Finally, defendant argues that reversal of defendant's
conviction is warranted under People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532
(1999). We disagree. In Smith, the victim was shot and killed
outside a bar by a gunman wearing dark clothing. This court
reversed the defendant's murder conviction where the testimony
of the State's key witness, the only witness who identified the
defendant as the gunman, was repeatedly impeached and contained
serious inconsistencies with the testimony of other witnesses. The
record in Smith also indicated that the State's key witness had a
motive to falsely implicate the defendant. Further, the only
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's involvement in the
crime was his presence in the bar and the dark clothing that he
wore. We concluded that the evidence merely narrowed the class
of individuals who may have killed the victim, but that it did not
point specifically to the defendant, as there were two other men
with the defendant on the night of the shooting, both of whom also
wore dark clothing.
	In contrast to the Smith case, the testimony of the State's key
witness in this case, Sherry Harris, stands unimpeached and is
consistent with the testimony of other witnesses as to defendant's
possession of a shotgun. There is nothing in the record suggesting
a reason for Harris to implicate defendant falsely. As noted earlier,
Harris has no relationship with defendant, with the victims, or
with the other witnesses. Further, unlike the Smith case, the
circumstantial evidence in this case, i.e., defendant's angry
confrontation with the victims, his possession of one of the murder
weapons, and his inculpatory statements, points specifically to
defendant.
	We conclude that the evidence is not so unreasonable,
improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt.
Marital Privilege
	Defendant next argues that the admission of certain testimony
by Suzanne Eckler, defendant's wife, constitutes reversible error.
	On direct examination of Eckler, the prosecutor elicited
testimony concerning four conversations Eckler had with
defendant. With respect to the first two conversations, Eckler
testified that during the summer of 1994, defendant asked her on
two occasions to purchase a gun for him. According to Eckler,
defendant told her what kind of gun to buy, that she should send
the guns to him in St. Louis via Federal Express so that the
package is not scanned, and that she should use a fictitious name
on the package.
	With respect to the third conversation, Eckler testified that
defendant told her to advise the storage rental company that the
rental payment would be sent and that no one should enter the
storage locker.
	As to the fourth conversation, Eckler initially testified that she
found it unusual that defendant purchased hiking boots when he
returned to Denver in October 1994 because she had just bought
him a similar pair. Eckler further testified that defendant told her
that he thought a print could be matched to his boot, so he
purchased a new pair and threw the first pair of boots into a
Dumpster.
	Defendant argues that the introduction of the foregoing
testimony was in violation of the marital privilege applicable to
criminal proceedings. See 725 ILCS 125/6 (West 1994). The
marital privilege provides that, in criminal cases, husband and
wife may testify for or against each other, but may not testify as to
"any communication or admission made by either of them to the
other or as to any conversation between them during marriage."
725 ILCS 125/6 (West 1994).
	The statute creates a privilege which may be waived by the
holder of the privilege, in this case, the husband. We agree with
the State that defendant's failure to invoke the privilege during his
wife's testimony waived the privilege. See People v. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d 364, 384 (1988); People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 272
(1983). Moreover, defendant's failure to object at trial and to raise
this issue in his post-trial motion has resulted in waiver of this
issue on appeal. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).
	Defendant, however, argues that the admission of Eckler's
testimony amounts to plain error. Under the plain error rule, issues
not properly preserved may be considered by a reviewing court
under two limited circumstances: (1) where the evidence is closely
balanced, so as to preclude argument that an innocent person was
wrongfully convicted; or (2) where the alleged error is so
substantial that it affected the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process.134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v.
Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 297 (1999); People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 58 (1998). Neither circumstance is present here.
	The marital privilege applies only to communications and
admissions made by either spouse to the other, and to
conversations between spouses during marriage. 725 ILCS 125/6
(West 1994). Eckler's testimony, therefore, describing her own
conduct in purchasing the guns and sending them to defendant was
not subject to the privilege. Accordingly, even if defendant had
invoked the privilege and Eckler's testimony as to defendant's
instructions to her concerning the gun purchases had been
excluded, there still would have been substantial evidence
establishing defendant's possession of one of the murder weapons.
We thus conclude that any error in the admission of Eckler's
testimony as to the first two conversations with defendant is not so
substantial as to deny defendant a fair trial.
	We reach the same conclusion as to the third conversation.
Eckler's testimony implied that defendant had control over the
storage locker. However, the jury could draw the same inference
from the testimony of Kimberly Woolridge and defendant.
Woolridge testified that she accompanied defendant to the storage
locker facility on one occasion. Defendant testified that he kept the
code for the storage locker and that his wife used the locker only
a couple of times to put his gear and belongings into the locker.
	Eckler's testimony relating the fourth conversation with
defendant revealed his concern about a possible bootprint match.
Unlike the first two conversations, Eckler's testimony does not
relate to her own conduct. In addition, unlike the third
conversation, the same inference cannot be drawn from other
testimony. Nonetheless, we do not find plain error.
	The marital privilege does not result from a policy of
safeguarding the quality of evidence presented at trial as does, for
example, the bar against the admission of polygraph evidence.
Indeed, evidence withheld under the marital privilege is relevant
and often highly reliable. Rather, the marital privilege stems from
a policy of promoting family harmony. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d  at 270,
273-74. In light of the policy underlying the marital privilege, the
admission of Eckler's testimony does not call into question the
fundamental fairness of defendant's trial.
	In addition, as already discussed, the State presented a strong
circumstantial case. There was eyewitness testimony by an
impartial third person that less than two hours prior to the victims'
murders, defendant, armed with a shotgun, ordered the victims out
of their vehicle. Defendant does not deny that he was present in
the parking lot at that time. There was testimony as to inculpatory
statements defendant made at the car rental agency regarding his
desire to rid the rental van, which he was driving on the evening
of the murders, of evidence and fingerprints. Defendant admitted
that he wiped down the van. There was evidence establishing
defendant's possession of one of the murder weapons-a fact, as
noted above, that would not have been altered had defendant's
conversations with Eckler on this subject been excluded. There
was also evidence detailing defendant's relationship with Masters,
as well as the events surrounding the purchase and use of the
Merkur. The State further presented evidence refuting defendant's
theory that an acquaintance of Beasley was involved in the
victims' murders. The evidence, therefore, was not closely
balanced.
	In the alternative, defendant argues that trial counsel's failure
to object to Eckler's testimony constitutes ineffective assistance.
Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are evaluated
under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). First, a
defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was
deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Second, a defendant must show prejudice
by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome;
namely, that counsel's deficient performance rendered the result
of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068; People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). A court may
resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by reaching
only the prejudice prong, as a lack of prejudice renders irrelevant
the issue of counsel's alleged deficient performance. See
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at
2069; Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 94.
	Defendant here has failed to establish the requisite prejudice.
As discussed above, the exclusion of Eckler's testimony regarding
the first two conversations would not have diminished in any
appreciable way the evidence establishing defendant's possession
of one of the murder weapons. Also as discussed above, the
admission of Eckler's testimony as to the third conversation
concerning the storage locker was inconsequential in light of other
testimony from which the same inference could be drawn. As to
the fourth conversation, we find that there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different
had this testimony been excluded. Without evidence that
defendant was concerned about a bootprint match, there was still
compelling circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt.
Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel.


Evidence of Spousal Abuse


	Defendant argues that testimony of spousal abuse, elicited by
the prosecutor on direct examination of defendant's wife, denied
defendant a fair trial.
	Suzanne Eckler, defendant's wife, testified that when
defendant returned to Colorado, she stayed with him for
approximately 2½ weeks at a Denver hotel. During the second
week, defendant physically abused her. At the time, Eckler was
pregnant with defendant's child. Eckler testified that "it started out
with a little push here, a little push there. By the time I got home,
I had a fat lip, big old bump on my head. I had a concussion. ***
[H]e stepped on my face. Thrown [sic] things at me." Eckler also
testified about an incident in which, during an argument between
them, defendant threw a footstool at the wall, choked her, and
threatened her. Eckler said she was "scared to death."
	Generally, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if relevant
only to establish the defendant's propensity to commit crime.
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 146; People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 385
(1998). Such other-crimes evidence is objectionable because it
carries the risk that a jury will convict a defendant merely because
it believes the defendant is a bad person who deserves punishment.
Placek, 184 Ill. 2d  at 385. Although the erroneous admission of
other-crimes evidence ordinarily calls for reversal, the evidence
must have been a material factor in the defendant's conviction
such that, without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been
different. If it is unlikely that the error influenced the jury, reversal
is not warranted. People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 285 (1998).
	Defendant did not object at trial to the testimony regarding
spousal abuse, and defendant did not raise the issue in his post-trial motion. Accordingly, any error is waived. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Defendant, however, argues that defense counsel's
failure to object was a fundamental error and, given the closeness
of the evidence, constitutes plain error. Defendant further argues
that counsel's failure to object denied him the effective assistance
of trial counsel.
	We agree with defendant that the admission of Eckler's
testimony regarding incidents of abuse was not proper, and note
that the State offers no ground justifying the admission of this
testimony. There was, however, no plain error. As we already
discussed, the evidence of defendant's guilt was not closely
balanced. In addition, we hold that the asserted error is not of such
magnitude as to have denied defendant a fair trial.
	Defendant argues that the other-crimes evidence was similar
in character to the allegations contained in the offenses for which
defendant was on trial. We do not agree. Defendant was not on
trial for abusing his spouse. He was on trial for first degree
murder. That the victims happened to be women does not persuade
us that the jury was unduly influenced by Eckler's testimony of
spousal abuse. In light of the State's strong case against defendant,
this evidence was simply not a material factor in defendant's
conviction.
	We note that on cross-examination, defense counsel
challenged Eckler's credibility as to the claimed incidents of
abuse. Defense counsel also challenged Eckler's overall
credibility, suggesting motives for Eckler to testify falsely about
her husband's conduct. Defense counsel questioned Eckler about
her feelings regarding defendant's extramarital affairs, and her
feelings about the significant sums of money she sent to defendant
during the summer of 1994 which, according to Eckler's direct
testimony, played a part in her ultimately declaring bankruptcy.
	We further conclude that there is no reasonable probability
that the outcome at trial would have been different had Eckler's
testimony of spousal abuse not been admitted. Accordingly, we
reject defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to object. See Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069; Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 94.
Motion in Limine Violations	 
	Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because
the prosecutor deliberately violated two in limine orders by
introducing evidence of defendant's prior felony convictions and
alleged drug activities.
	Prior to trial, defendant moved to preclude evidence of
defendant's prior convictions in Colorado. The trial court ruled
that, for impeachment purposes, the State was allowed to
introduce evidence that defendant has prior felony convictions, but
that the State was not allowed to introduce evidence indicating the
nature of the felonies.(1) During the State's redirect examination of
Tammy Brown, the hotel housekeeper who had a relationship with
defendant, the State inquired about defendant's prior criminal
conduct:
			"Q. You say you thought he was joking when he said if
he, if he told you anything that you knew he would kill
you?
			A. Well, I mean, I was in love with him. So, you know,
I didn't take anything he said seriously. You know how
some people may say that they have a past, you know, and
I have heard people say it before. I didn't think of it as,
you know, anything seriously.
			Q. Well, he told you, what did he tell you about his
past?
			A. He didn't tell me too much about his past. I don't
remember conversation, I don't remember too much. I just
remember what was in my heart, what I felt about him.
That's all I remember.
			Q. Did you tell the police in '94, Lamont told me he
was out over an assault charge, where a girl was shot?"
Defense counsel objected. Before the trial court could rule, Brown
answered, "I don't remember." The trial court sustained the
objection and admonished the jury to disregard the last question
and answer. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant
moved for a mistrial based on the State's question to Brown
regarding the assault charge. Defendant maintains that the trial
court erred in subsequently denying his motion for a mistrial.
	A trial court has broad discretion to determine the propriety
of declaring a mistrial. People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 323
(1990); People v. Jones, 123 Ill. 2d 387, 410 (1988). "A mistrial
should generally be declared only as the result of some occurrence
at trial of such character and magnitude that the party seeking it is
deprived of his right to a fair trial." Redd, 135 Ill. 2d  at 323.
Accordingly, the violation of a motion in limine will constitute a
ground for mistrial only where the violation deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.
	The State's question regarding defendant's "assault charge,
where a girl was shot" violated the trial court's in limine order. We
do not find, however, that defendant was deprived of a fair trial.
Generally, if a timely objection is made at trial to improper
interrogation, the court can, by sustaining the objection or
instructing the jury to disregard the question and answer, usually
correct the error. People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 577 (1980).
Although situations exist where the improper question is so
damaging that a trial court cannot cure the prejudicial effect (see
Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d at 577), this is not such a situation. The State
asked a single question regarding defendant's prior conviction
which violated the in limine order. The trial court, however,
immediately sustained defendant's objection and admonished the
jury to disregard the question and answer. Brown's answer, which
the jury heard before the objection could be sustained, indicated
only that she did not recall telling police in 1994 about a prior
assault. The trial court also instructed the jury at the end of the
trial to disregard questions to which objections were sustained.
Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial.
	Defendant argues that the State also violated the trial court's
in limine order barring the introduction of evidence concerning
defendant's alleged drug-related activities.
	During the State's redirect examination of Damie Brown,
defendant's cousin, the State questioned Brown about an October
3, 1994, telephone call she received from defendant in which
defendant told Brown that his car, the Merkur, was missing:
			"Q. You are saying that he, Lamont, wasn't upset when
he called you in the morning about the missing car?
			A. No.
			Q. Did he tell you what was in the car?
			A. Yes.
			Q. What was in the car?
			A. Some marijuana."
Defendant objected. The trial court sustained the objection and,
following a side-bar conference, the trial court instructed the jury
to disregard the witness' last statement.
	Defendant argued in his post-trial motion for a new trial that
Brown's marijuana testimony violated the court's in limine order
and that the court's admonishment to the jury could not cure the
prejudice. During argument on defendant's motion, the State
maintained, as it does before this court, that the prosecutor
expected Brown to testify that defendant had a 9-millimeter gun
in the car, and that Brown gave an unexpected response. The trial
court subsequently denied defendant's post-trial motion for a new
trial.
	The denial of a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on
review in the absence of a showing that the trial court abused its
discretion. See People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1991);
People v. Miller, 79 Ill. 2d 454, 464 (1980). We find no abuse of
discretion here. The trial court apparently accepted the State's
explanation that Brown's response was unexpected and
unintended, and defendant points to nothing in the record to
suggest otherwise. Any error arising out of Brown's unexpected
testimony was cured when the trial court sustained defendant's
objection and instructed the jury to disregard the testimony.
Defendant does, however, cite to testimony, elicited by the State,
indicating that defendant was unemployed and that he used a
pager. According to defendant, the State was attempting to
establish, through such testimony, as well as Brown's testimony,
that defendant was employed as a drug dealer. Defendant,
however, never objected to the State's inquiries regarding his
employment or use of a pager. Defendant has thus waived review
of these issues on appeal. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186.
Other Trial Errors
	Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial by (1) the
prosecutor's improper examination of Tammy Brown; (2) the
prosecutor's questioning of Andre Franklin concerning gang
membership; and (3) the prosecutor's closing argument. Defendant
failed to preserve these issues for review by failing to object at
trial or by failing to raise the issues in his post-trial motion. See
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Defendant, however, argues that we
should review these issues under the plain error doctrine.
	As already discussed, the evidence here is not closely
balanced. Thus, one of the two limited circumstances under which
we apply the plain error doctrine is not present. We, therefore,
consider only whether the second limited circumstance justifying
application of the plain error doctrine is present, i.e., whether
defendant's claimed errors are of such magnitude that defendant
was denied a fair trial, and remedying such errors is necessary to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process. See Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d  at 297; Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 58.
	During the State's direct examination of Tammy Brown, she
testified that defendant told her that he did not use his real name
to register at the hotel because "he had trouble in Colorado."
Brown also testified that when she asked defendant about his past,
defendant responded, jokingly, "[I]f I tell you, I would have to kill
you." The State continued its direct examination of Brown as
follows:
			"Q. And did he tell you that if he ever, if you ever told
anyone the things-
			A. Just the same as what I, that is the, just, he used to
say it all the time. But never told me anything that would
cause me any trouble. He never told me anything I didn't
need to-
			Q. Well, did he say that if you ever told anyone the
things that he was telling you, he had killed before and he
wouldn't think twice about doing it again?
			A. Something like that."
	Defendant argues that the prosecutor, through this leading
question, "testified" and deliberately misled the jury concerning
the nature of the conversation between Brown and defendant.
Although the prosecutor's question was not in proper form, the
witness clearly testified that defendant did, in fact, say
"[s]omething like that." Further, on cross-examination, defense
counsel asked Brown if she had any reason to believe that
defendant was serious when he said that he had killed before and
would not hesitate to kill again. Brown replied, "No," explaining
that defendant was joking. The nature of the conversation between
Brown and defendant was thus brought out on cross-examination.
To the extent the State's leading question may nonetheless be
deemed error, it does not rise to the level of plain error, i.e., it is
not so fundamental an error that defendant was denied a fair trial.
See People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 530-31 (1992) (holding that
prosecutor's leading questions of prosecution witness, which
defendant argued amounted to unsworn testimony, did not amount
to plain error where evidence was not closely balanced and the
alleged error was not so fundamental and prejudicial that
defendant was denied a fair trial).
	Defendant also argues that the State impermissibly attempted
to lead the jury to speculate that defendant was a gang member.
During the State's redirect examination of Andre Franklin, the
prosecutor asked him if he belonged to a gang in 1994. Defense
counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. The
witness never answered the question. Any error in asking this
question was cured when the trial court sustained the objection and
instructed the jury at the end of the trial to disregard questions to
which objections were sustained. See People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 343 (1994) (holding that any error in prosecutor's gang-related questioning of defense witness was cured where trial court
sustained objection, instructed jury to disregard the testimony, and
instructed the jury at the end of trial to disregard questions to
which objections were sustained); People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479,
550 (1992) (holding that trial court's immediate ruling on defense
objection to improper question was sufficient to cure any error).
	Finally, defendant cites to various comments by the
prosecutor in the State's rebuttal argument that defendant claims
denied him a fair trial. We consider each comment in turn.
	Defendant first cites to the State's comment that investigators
"eliminated a lot of people" as suspects. Defendant argues that the
trial evidence showed only that Reggie Stewart was eliminated as
a suspect.
	In closing argument, defense counsel attacked the
thoroughness of the State's investigation, stating that police
immediately focused their investigation on defendant, were not
open to any other possibility, and looked only for evidence of
guilt, not innocence. In response, the prosecutor commented that
Detective Suhre could be proud of the investigation he conducted,
citing to the sheer size of the police investigatory file, including
hundreds of photographs. The prosecutor concluded that police
"eliminated a lot of people."
	Prosecutors are allowed considerable latitude in closing
argument (People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 244 (1999)), and may
respond to comments that clearly invite a response (People v.
Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 146 (1998)). Defense counsel's
comments attacking the thoroughness of the police investigation
invited a response. Accordingly, we do not find that the State's
comment implicates the integrity of defendant's trial.
	Defendant next cites to the prosecutor's comment regarding
scientific testing of gunpowder. Defense counsel stated in closing
argument that, according to the State's firearms expert, Thomas
Gamboe, a test could have been performed to determine if the
gunpowder in the discharged shotgun shells found at the crime
scene was from the same manufacturing lot as the gunpowder in
the shotgun shell recovered from defendant's storage locker. The
State, however, failed to order such a test. Defense counsel also
focused on the absence of any comparison testing by the State on
the lead shot removed from the victims and the lead shot in the
shell recovered from the storage locker. In rebuttal, the prosecutor
commented that there is no scientific test that could match burnt
gunpowder and fresh gunpowder.
	Contrary to the prosecutor's comment, Gamboe testified that
it is possible, through certain testing, to determine if the
gunpowder in a fired round was from the same manufacturing lot
as the gunpowder in a live round. However, Gamboe also later
testified that he has never performed tests on "shotgun shot" to
determine if the lead shot expended or found in a person was
similar to the shot in an unfired shell. Gamboe explained that this
was not his area of expertise and that he did not know the
specificity and accuracy of such test results.
	The State's comment regarding the gunpowder testing
erroneously misstated the evidence. We conclude, however, that
this error did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or otherwise
result in substantial prejudice such that absent this remark, the
result of the trial would have been different. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 
at 244-45 (applying substantial prejudice test to claim that
improper argument by prosecution constituted plain error);
Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d  at 348-49 (same). During closing, defense
counsel suggested that without a match on the gunpowder, the
State had "no case," and that the State thus avoided testing the
gunpowder. However, as defense counsel also admitted, and as the
evidence established, the shotgun shells recovered from the crime
scene and the single shell recovered from defendant's storage
locker were all Remington brand shells. Gamboe testified that
Remington is a major brand and that he would not have been
surprised if millions of Remington shells had been sold. While a
match in the gunpowder would have been helpful to the State's
case, the absence of a match would not have been fatal to the
State's case. Thus, defendant was not substantially prejudiced by
the prosecutor's misstatement.
	The defendant next cites to the prosecutor's comment that
defendant could have hired a DNA expert to examine the hair
fragments recovered from the van. During closing argument,
defense counsel questioned the reliability of the testimony of the
State's hair and fiber expert and questioned why the State did not
order DNA testing on the hair fragments. In rebuttal, the
prosecutor commented:
			"[Defense counsel] [t]alked about the DNA. Well, on
the one hand it is a crucial piece of evidence, and they
think it will show that it is someone else[']s hair. But gee,
we don't have a couple of experts, we don't have the
bucks for an expert, so we can't disprove.
			On the contrary. They examined the weapons involved,
why wouldn't they examine the hair if they thought that
would disprove anything?"
	Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment was
reprehensible because the prosecutor knew that defendant was
without funds to hire a DNA expert and that the trial court denied
his motion for appointment of a DNA expert. We note, however,
that defendant's pretrial "Motion for Forensic DNA Expert" only
requested the appointment of a DNA expert for the purpose of
examining seminal material from one of the victims, not for the
purpose of conducting DNA testing on the hairs recovered from
the van and the hair samples taken from the victims. We note
further that the trial court granted defendant's "Motion for
Forensic Hair Expert," but that defendant never called such an
expert at trial. Based on this record, the State's comment was
reasonable, and no error occurred. See People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 151 (1984) (noting that Illinois courts have consistently
held that comment on the failure of a potential defense witness to
testify is permitted when made in response to defense counsel's
own reference to State's failure to call the witness to the stand).
	Finally, defendant takes issue with the prosecutor's comment
concerning certain telephone records. At trial, the State established
the time of the shootings as 1:30 a.m. on October 4, 1994.
Defendant's mother testified, however, that defendant placed a
telephone call to her at 1:30 a.m. on October 4. Defendant testified
consistently with his mother. The obvious import of this testimony
is that defendant could not be in two places at the same time. In
rebuttal, Detective Suhre testified that there are telephones at a
gasoline station two to three miles from the crime scene. In other
words, defendant could have committed the crimes, and called his
mother shortly thereafter, giving himself an alibi.
	Defense counsel commented during closing argument that
there was no evidence that a telephone call had been placed to
defendant's mother from the telephones suggested by the State.
Defense counsel pointed out that any call made from a telephone
near the Illinois crime scene to the St. Louis, Missouri, home of
defendant's mother would be a toll call and that there would have
been a record of the call. No records were placed into evidence. In
response, the prosecutor commented that to avoid a toll call,
defendant merely had to go across the river, less than two miles
away, to a rest stop and place the telephone call at that location.
The prosecutor also commented that "everything was checked"
and that there are no telephone records. The trial court overruled
defendant's objection, indicating that the State may respond to
defense counsel's argument.
	A prosecutor's comments must be considered in the context
of the parties' arguments as a whole and their relationship to the
evidence. See, e.g., People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 161 (1997).
In the present case, the prosecutor's comment went beyond the
evidence, as there was nothing in the record to support his
comment that "everything was checked" and that there were no
records for the telephone at the rest stop. Nonetheless, the
prosecutor's argument as a whole properly focused on the
evidence and the facts of the case. Further, the trial court properly
instructed the jury on the purpose of closing argument, and that
any statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not
based on the evidence should be disregarded. We do not believe,
therefore, that any error is of such magnitude that defendant was
denied a fair trial.
Cumulative Error
	Defendant argues that even if no individual error warrants
reversal of his conviction, the cumulative effect of error deprived
him of due process and a fair trial.
	Individual trial errors may have the cumulative effect of
denying a defendant a fair trial. People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365,
376 (1992). This court's recent decision in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000), which defendant cites as additional authority in
support of his argument, illustrates this proposition of law.
However, the extreme circumstances present in Blue, which
compelled this court to reverse the defendant's conviction and to
order a new trial, are not present here.
	As discussed above, we have rejected many of defendant's
claims of error. We held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant's motions for a new trial. We held
that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to
evidence of spousal abuse. We held that any error in the State's
examination of Andre Franklin was cured by the trial court's
action in immediately sustaining defendant's objection. We found
no error in certain of the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal
closing. Finally, we found that the balance of the errors claimed by
defendant were not plain error. Accordingly, defendant is not
entitled to a new trial on the basis of cumulative error.
	 
III. Sentencing Issues
Hearsay Evidence in Aggravation
	Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair sentencing
hearing because the State improperly introduced unreliable hearsay
evidence during the aggravation and mitigation phase of his death
penalty hearing that portrayed defendant as a drug dealer.
Defendant cites to the testimony of Detective Suhre, in which
Suhre read from statements given by Cortez Starks, David
Anthony Turner and Tammy Witt to officers investigating the
Masters-Beasley murders.
	Suhre testified that Starks' statement was taken by Detectives
Staicoff and Hoolihan. The record indicates that the statement was
taken on October 13, 1994. According to Starks' statement,
defendant and Andre Franklin "hooked up," and Franklin started
selling crack cocaine for defendant. Turner's statement, which was
taken by Detectives Wells and Suhre on October 10, 1994,
indicates that Turner met defendant through his sister-in-law,
Tammy Brown. Defendant told Brown that defendant had been
selling drugs all his life, including cocaine and marijuana. Finally,
Witt's statement, which was taken by Detectives Sandidge and
Staicoff on October 28, 1994, indicates that defendant told Witt
that defendant was selling crack cocaine. On a couple of
occasions, Witt delivered cocaine to one of defendant's customers,
and agreed to sell marijuana for defendant. Defendant contends
that absent sufficient indicia of reliability, these statements should
not have been admitted.
	In order to preserve this issue for appeal, defendant was
required to make a contemporaneous objection at the sentencing
hearing and to raise the issue in a post-sentencing motion. See
People v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1995). Defendant did
neither. Accordingly, we agree with the State that the issue is
waived. Defendant, however, urges this court to apply the plain
error doctrine.
	A defendant's waiver of a capital sentencing issue will be
excused under the plain error doctrine where the evidence is
closely balanced or where the error is of such magnitude that the
defendant was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d  at 289; People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 170 (1991). We
consider first whether error occurred and, if so, whether it amounts
to plain error.
	During the aggravation and mitigation phase of a capital
sentencing hearing, the rules of evidence are relaxed. See 720
ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1994); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467,
504-05 (1998). Evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant and
reliable. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 74 (1998); People v.
Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d 444, 472 (1997). Hearsay evidence, including
hearsay evidence of crimes which did not result in prosecution or
conviction, is admissible as long as the evidence satisfies the
relevancy and reliability requirement. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 331 (1998); People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 115 (1991).
The determination of whether evidence is relevant and reliable is
left to the discretion of the sentencing judge. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 
at 115.
	Defendant challenges only the reliability, and not the
relevance, of Detective Suhre's testimony. As to the issue of
reliability, defendant acknowledges that there was other evidence
presented at the hearing which corroborated some of defendant's
alleged drug activities. Prior to the introduction of the three
hearsay statements, Detective Suhre identified certain items seized
from defendant's storage locker: a tri-beam scale, which Suhre
testified is the type of scale commonly used in the drug trade, and
a plastic bag, bearing defendant's fingerprint, that contained 300
grams of marijuana. In addition, Annette Tahcsa, who spent two
weeks with defendant during the summer of 1994, testified that
she witnessed defendant engaging in drug transactions. In a couple
of instances, the buyers came to his motel room. A couple of
times, Tahsca drove defendant in her vehicle so that he could
make the sale. On one occasion, defendant left some marijuana
and crack cocaine in her vehicle. This corroborating evidence,
coupled with the fact that the hearsay statements at issue were
taken during the course of an official investigation, lead us to
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Suhre's testimony. See People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 158 (1997) (holding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting hearsay testimony of other crimes in light
of corroborating testimony of other witnesses); People v. Foster,
119 Ill. 2d 69, 98-99 (1987) (holding that trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding officer's hearsay testimony reliable,
notwithstanding lack of corroboration, where information was
compiled during an official investigation and evidence was never
directly challenged). We recognize that some of Suhre's testimony
constitutes double hearsay. Nonetheless, because at least part of
the double hearsay was corroborated, we find no error in its
admission. See People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 300 (1987)
(noting that where this court has sanctioned the admission of
double hearsay at least some parts of the double hearsay have been
corroborated by other evidence).
	In the alternative, defendant argues that counsel's failure to
object to Suhre's testimony denied him the effective assistance of
counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital
sentencing hearing are reviewed under the two-pronged Strickland
standard. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 403 (1998); People
v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 145 (1996). Defendant must show
that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that absent counsel's errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the sentencer would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not
warrant the death penalty. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 403; Henderson,
171 Ill. 2d  at 145. Defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of
the Strickland standard.
	We have already concluded that no error occurred in the trial
court's admission of Detective Suhre's testimony. Counsel's
failure to object to such testimony cannot, therefore, be deemed
deficient. Moreover, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice.
	The State presented extensive evidence in aggravation. In
addition to Detective Suhre's testimony concerning the drug-related items seized from defendant's storage locker, and Annette
Tahcsa's testimony concerning defendant's drug sales, the State
presented evidence that defendant had made threats to Masters and
others. Juanita Lane testified that Masters said that she had learned
a lot about defendant, and that defendant had told Masters that if
she ever told anyone about him, he would kill her. Tracy Hite
Hughes testified that she overheard a portion of a telephone
conversation between Masters and defendant. Masters told Hughes
that defendant said he would kill Masters if she ever told anyone
about him. Tahcsa further testified that defendant told her that if
her boyfriend did not stop calling at the motel where defendant
and Tahcsa were staying, he was going to get "popped." Tahcsa
understood that "popped" meant "shot." Tahcsa also testified that
defendant threatened "Dre" over some unpaid money, and that
defendant told her something would happen to her if she did not
return the drugs he had left in her vehicle. Tahsca stated that, out
of fear, she checked herself into a drug rehabilitation center the
day following defendant's threat.
	The State also introduced into evidence defendant's prior
convictions in the State of Colorado. In July 1990, defendant was
convicted of second degree assault, a misdemeanor, stemming
from an April 1990 incident in which defendant fired a handgun
twice, in rapid succession, at a group of people, including a former
girlfriend, who were standing outside a night club. Two persons
were injured. The former girlfriend told police that defendant
aimed the gun directly at her and pulled the trigger, but the gum
jammed. Defendant was sentenced to one year of imprisonment on
each of two counts, to run concurrently.
	In November 1991, defendant pled guilty to tampering with
evidence. The charge arose out of an incident in July 1991, in
which defendant's handgun was used in the course of a suicide.
Defendant took the weapon from the scene. Defendant was
sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The presentence
investigation report indicates that defendant is a "high risk person
to re-offend and/or to fail to comply with his conditions of
probation."
	In February 1992, defendant pled guilty to vehicular eluding.
Defendant was sentenced to 2½ years' imprisonment.
	 In June 1992, defendant was convicted by a Colorado jury of
second degree assault, "crime of violence," criminal mischief, and
reckless endangerment. The charges arose out of a November 1991
incident in which several shots were fired from a vehicle, driven
by defendant, at another vehicle in which two women and a small
child were riding. The presentence investigation report notes that
defendant has "an extensive history of assaultive behavior, as well
as a reputation for possession of firearms," and that defendant "is
a definite threat to the safety of others." The report recommended
that defendant receive the maximum aggravated sentence.
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 12 years on
each of two counts of second degree assault, 8 years for criminal
mischief to run concurrently, and 6 months for reckless
endangerment, also to run concurrently. The judgment in that case
was affirmed on appeal. Defendant was released on bond, and in
October 1992, defendant became a fugitive from bond.
	The State also offered victim impact statements from Patricia
Hoffman, Masters' mother; Tequila Green, Beasley's cousin;
Ramon Beasley, Beasley's brother; and Chelsea Beasley,
Beasley's seven-year-old sister. Beasley's aunt, Patricia Green,
testified as to the profound effect Beasley's death has had on the
family.
	In mitigation, defendant's mother, Eliza Madison, testified
that defendant was a high school graduate who had a college
scholarship. Because defendant was tired of school, he enlisted in
the army, in which he served for eight years. Madison believed
that her son could be rehabilitated, but that he is not guilty of the
murders of Beasley and Masters. She also testified that the trial
has taken its toll on the family, in particular, defendant's 16-year-old brother.
	In light of the extensive evidence in aggravation and the scant
evidence in mitigation, even if Detective Suhre's hearsay
testimony had been excluded, no reasonable probability exists that
the jury would have found that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Because defendant
cannot demonstrate prejudice from counsel's failure to object to
Suhre's hearsay testimony, we reject defendant's claim that
counsel was ineffective.
Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
	As a final matter, defendant argues that the Illinois death
penalty statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1994)) is unconstitutional.
Defendant first contends that inadequate procedural safeguards
create a risk that irreparable punishment will be applied to
innocent persons. Defendant seeks to distinguish this argument
from that raised by the defendant, and rejected by this court, in
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998).
	In Bull, defendant argued that the death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because of the inevitability that innocent persons
will be wrongly convicted, and that no amount of procedural due
process can prevent all of the errors which can result in an
innocent person being convicted of a capital crime. Although
defendant here does not mount a wholesale attack on the criminal
justice system, as did the defendant in Bull, both arguments
concern, to some extent, the adequacy of procedural safeguards.
Where the defendants' arguments differ is in whether the present
system is capable of being fixed. The defendant in Bull maintained
that no amount of process can remedy the inherent fallibility of the
system. Here, defendant suggests that with more procedural
safeguards, the death penalty statute could pass constitutional
muster. This difference does not persuade us that the reasoning we
employed in Bull for rejecting the defendant's constitutional
challenge does not also apply here. As we noted in Bull, the
American criminal justice system "provides the maximum
protection necessary to guard against mistakes being made." Bull,
185 Ill. 2d  at 215. We further observed that much in the way of
efficiency is sacrificed in order to protect the individual and that
the legislature, as well as this court, have included additional
safeguards with the many protections that a criminal defendant
enjoys. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 215-16.
	Our conclusion that Bull is dispositive of defendant's
argument finds additional support in People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229 (1998). In Brown, defendant argued that because it was
inevitable that innocent persons may be put to death, and that
because no sentencing scheme could be devised that would always
prevent the execution of innocent persons, the present sentencing
scheme must be considered unconstitutional. In rejecting this
argument, we relied on our decision in Bull, in which we
"concluded that the sentencing system possesses sufficient
safeguards to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 
at 260. We see no reason to reach a different result in this case.
	Defendant raises additional challenges to the constitutionality
of the death penalty statute, all of which have been previously
rejected by this court. We have held that the death eligibility factor
for murder committed in a "cold, calculated and premeditated
manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design" (see
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)) is not unconstitutionally
vague. People v. Williams, No. 82807, slip op. at 20-29 (July 6,
2000); People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1998); People v.
Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356, 372-73 (1993). We have also held that
the death penalty statute does not place an unconstitutional burden
of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration
of mitigating circumstances. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 522; People v.
Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 95 (1994). We have held that the death
penalty statute is not unconstitutional for allowing the sentencer to
consider "any other reason" the defendant should be sentenced to
death. People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112-13 (1998); People v.
Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439 (1995). Further, we have repeatedly
rejected claims that the statute is unconstitutional because it does
not sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrarily and capriciously
imposed death sentences. See Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 113. Because
defendant offers no compelling reason for reconsidering these
holdings, we adhere to our prior decisions. We also reject
defendant's contention that individual features of the death penalty
statute, which this court has found constitutional, when considered
in their totality, render the statute unconstitutional. "If all of the
individual aspects are constitutional, we stand by the conclusion
that the whole is also constitutional." People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 542-43 (1989).
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
Madison County is affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to
enter an order setting Thursday, January 18, 2001, as the date on
which the sentence of death, entered by the circuit court of
Madison County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed
in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998).
The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate
in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where
defendant is confined.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring:
	I concur in the majority's affirmance of defendant's murder
convictions and death sentence. I write separately, however,
because one of the two factors upon which defendant was found
eligible for the death penalty cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
	A jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty on two
separate grounds: defendant was convicted of murdering two or
more persons (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994)), and defendant
committed the murders in a "cold, calculated and premeditated
manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design" (720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)). The majority rejects defendant's
constitutional challenge to this second eligibility factor, holding
section 9-1(b)(11) is not unconstitutionally vague. I disagree. As
I wrote recently in People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 1, ___ (2000)
(Heiple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the phrase
"preconceived plan, scheme or design" defies explicit definition.
A finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme, or
design to take a human life does little more than describe the mens
rea of any intentional murder. It is difficult to imagine a case of
intentional murder in which the evidence would not be sufficient
for such a finding. Indeed, if premeditation did not in fact exist to
some extent, it might be argued that the killing was accidental or
inadvertent. I fail to see how the phrase "preconceived plan,
scheme or design" provides any greater limitation upon a
sentencer's discretion.
			"It is unclear from the language of the statute whether
a defendant must have harbored the plan to kill for a
second, a minute, an hour, or some other undefined
period. Where the language of the statute is so vague that
this court is incapable of formulating a standard for its
application, such a statute necessarily provides
insufficient guidance to a sentencer charged with
determining whether a defendant is eligible to be put to
death." Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at ___ (Heiple, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Thus, as I concluded in Williams, the statute fails to provide
sufficient guidance to a sentencer and is unconstitutionally vague.
	I would affirm defendant's eligibility for the death penalty
based solely on the fact that defendant committed two or more
murders. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994).
	Although I am not as impressed by the magnitude of the
evidence against Hall as my colleagues are, I agree that we should
not disturb the jury's guilty verdicts. I dissent only from that
portion of the majority's opinion dealing with the validity of this
state's death penalty statute. Contrary to my colleagues, I believe
that Hall's challenge to the statute is meritorious. For the reasons
set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates
the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section
2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Hall's
sentence of death should therefore be vacated and he should be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West
1994). Because Hall was found guilty of murdering more than one
victim, the term of his imprisonment must be natural life. 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994).
1.      1The propriety of the trial court's in limine order, in light of our
decision in People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450 (1999), which rejected
the "mere-fact" method of impeachment, is not before this court.