Title: State v. Bradley Alan St. George
Citation: 2002 WI 50
Docket Number: 2000AP002830-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2002

2002 WI 50 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2830-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Bradley Alan St. George,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 497, 633 N.W.2d 278 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 8, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Eaton   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 50 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  00-2830-CR 
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 163) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Bradley Alan St. George,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 8, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 
affirming the judgment of conviction and an order denying a 
motion for a new trial entered by the Circuit Court for Ashland 
County, Robert E. Eaton, Judge.   
¶2 
This review raises two issues: 
 
                                                 
1 State v. St. George, No. 00-2830-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 5, 2001). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
2 
 
1) 
Was 
the 
circuit 
court's 
exclusion 
of 
the 
defendant's 
proffered 
evidence 
of 
the 
child 
victim's prior sexual contact with another child 
a denial of the defendant's constitutional right 
to present evidence? 
2) 
Was 
the 
circuit 
court's 
exclusion 
of 
the 
testimony of the defendant's expert witness an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion, 
or 
alternatively, a deprivation of the defendant's 
constitutional right to present evidence, as the 
defendant asserted? 
¶3 
The court of appeals concluded that these questions 
should be answered no and affirmed the judgment of conviction 
and the order denying a new trial.   
¶4 
We agree with the court of appeals that the defendant 
was not denied his constitutional right to present evidence when 
the circuit court excluded evidence of the child victim's prior 
sexual contact with another child.  Exclusion of the defendant's 
evidence of the complaining witness's prior sexual conduct was 
appropriate 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2), 
the 
rape 
shield 
statute.  The defendant has failed to meet the requirements set 
forth in our cases for the proffered evidence to fall within the 
judicial exceptions to § 972.11(2).  
¶5 
We further conclude, contrary to the court of appeals, 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
excluding the testimony of the defendant's expert witness.  We 
reach this conclusion because in exercising its discretion to 
exclude the testimony of the defendant's expert witness, the 
circuit court failed to take into account whether the defendant 
was denied his constitutional right to present a defense, as the 
defendant claimed.  For the reasons set forth, we conclude that 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
3 
 
exclusion 
of 
the 
testimony 
of 
the 
expert 
witness 
about 
recantation and interview techniques denied the defendant his 
constitutional right to present a defense.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause to the circuit court for a new trial. 
 
I 
¶6 
The relevant facts are set forth below, and additional 
facts are set forth in the discussion of each legal issue.  
¶7 
In October of 1998, the defendant was living in 
Ashland, Wisconsin, staying most nights with his long-term 
girlfriend, Tracy Harvey.  On the night of October 21-22, 1998, 
the defendant and Ms. Harvey were sleeping together in her bed.  
They were joined by one of Ms. Harvey's children, five-year-old 
Kayla.  Sometime during that night the defendant allegedly 
fondled Kayla's vagina.  
¶8 
The next day Kayla reported the fondling to her 
mother.  Over the course of the next few weeks and months, Kayla 
allegedly also reported the fondling to a doctor and a social 
worker.  The defendant was charged with first-degree sexual 
assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1999-
2000).2   
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) 
provides: 
 
"First 
Degree 
Sexual 
Assault. 
 
Whoever 
has 
sexual 
contact 
or 
sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 
years is guilty of a Class B felony." 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
4 
 
¶9 
The State presented several witnesses who testified 
that Kayla made out-of-court statements claiming the defendant 
had improperly touched her.  At trial, Kayla denied the incident 
had ever occurred and even that she had ever made some of the 
reports.  The defendant denied that he had improperly touched 
the youngster.  Ms. Harvey testified that Kayla told her that 
the defendant had not improperly touched her.  Ms. Harvey also 
stated that she believed the defendant had not improperly 
touched 
Kayla 
and 
that 
Ms. 
Harvey 
was 
continuing 
her 
relationship with him. 
¶10 The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison.  The defendant moved for post-
conviction relief, arguing the same issues as are before this 
court.  The motion was denied.  On appeal to the court of 
appeals, the defendant raised the same two issues.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
II 
¶11 The defendant first challenges his conviction and the 
order denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the 
circuit court violated his constitutional right to present 
evidence when it excluded evidence that Kayla had experienced 
sexual contact with another child.  According to the defendant, 
there is evidence that at least one child, and perhaps two other 
children, previously touched the victim on her private parts. 
¶12 Before trial, the State filed a motion seeking to 
exclude evidence that two other children previously had sexual 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
5 
 
contact 
with 
Kayla. 
 
The 
State 
relied 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), the rape shield statute, as the basis 
for excluding the proffered evidence.  Section 972.11(2)(b) 
provides "a defendant may not offer evidence relating to a 
victim's past sexual history or reputation absent application of 
a statutory or judicially created exception"3 at trial.4  The 
statute reads as follows, in relevant part: 
(b) If the defendant is accused of a crime under 
s. . . . 948.02 . . . any 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
complaining witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions 
of the witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation 
as to prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury . . . .  
¶13 The rape shield statute reflects the "view that 
generally evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct is 
irrelevant or, if relevant, substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect."5  The proffered evidence is explicitly 
barred by the rape shield statute.   
¶14 Our 
inquiry 
does 
not, 
however, 
end 
with 
this 
examination of the statute.  We have recognized, as the 
defendant asserts, that the confrontation and compulsory process 
                                                 
3 State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 657, 575 N.W.2d 475 
(1998). 
4 There are certain enumerated exceptions that are not 
applicable to the present case. 
5 State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 644, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
6 
 
clauses of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution6 and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution7 "grant 
defendants a constitutional right to present evidence."8  Our 
court has stated that "[t]he rights granted by the confrontation 
and compulsory process clauses are fundamental and essential to 
achieving the constitutional objective of a fair trial."9  The 
confrontation clause grants defendants "the right to 'effective' 
cross-examination of witnesses whose testimony is adverse,"10 and 
                                                 
6 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him; [and] 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor . . . ." 
7 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face; [and] to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
behalf . . . ." 
8 Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 645.   
"'Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1973), or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of 
the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 
(1967); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense.'  California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 
479, 485 (1984); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
684-85 (1984) ('The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through 
the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a 
fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment').'"  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 329-30 
n.16 
(1998) (Stevens, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(parallel 
citations 
omitted.). 
9 Pulizzano, 
155 
Wis. 2d at 
645 
(citing 
Chambers 
v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1973)). 
10 Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 645 (citation omitted).   
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
7 
 
the compulsory process clause "grants defendants the right to 
admit favorable testimony."11  
¶15 Despite these constitutional guarantees, a defendant's 
right to present evidence is not absolute.12  "Confrontation and 
compulsory process only grant defendants the constitutional 
right to present relevant evidence not substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect."13  Thus, the rape shield statute 
excluding evidence proffered by the defendant does not on its 
face violate a defendant's constitutional right to present 
evidence.14  However, under some circumstances the evidence of a 
victim's prior sexual conduct "may be so relevant and probative 
that the defendant's right to present it is constitutionally 
protected."15  Thus, the rape shield statute "may in a given case 
impermissibly 
infringe 
upon 
a 
defendant's 
rights 
to 
confrontation and compulsory process."16   
¶16 We must, therefore, determine whether in the present 
case 
the 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11 
deprives 
the 
defendant of his constitutional rights.  This determination is a 
question of "constitutional fact" that this court determines 
                                                 
11 Id. at 645-46 (citations omitted).   
12 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295. 
13 Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 646. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 647. 
16 Id. at 647-48.   
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
8 
 
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.17  
¶17 The defendant contends that his proffered evidence 
shows that Kayla had a source of sexual knowledge apart from her 
alleged experience with him.  He argues that because a child as 
young as Kayla would not possess sufficient knowledge or 
experience to manufacture the accusation, the jurors will infer 
that her knowledge comes from the defendant's assault.  The 
evidence of other sexual contacts would, claims the defendant, 
show an alternate source of the victim's knowledge about sexual 
                                                 
17 State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 69-70, 580 N.W.2d 181 
(1998) (defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense 
is a question of constitutional fact determined independently by 
the appellate court); Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 648 (claimed 
deprivation of confrontation and compulsory process rights is a 
question of constitutional fact reviewed without deference to 
the circuit court and court of appeals); State v. Robinson, 146 
Wis. 2d 315, 331-32, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988) (court independently 
determined relevancy of evidence on constitutional claim of 
violation of right to present a defense in sexual assault case); 
State v. Johnson, 118 Wis. 2d 472, 479, 348 N.W.2d 196 (1984) 
(circuit court's authority to issue a discretionary ruling on a 
procedural issue may not be exercised until it accommodates the 
accused's due process rights to present a defense).   
But see State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶¶44-49, 236 
Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629 (ignoring the usual standard of 
review that questions of constitutional fact are determined 
independently by this court); State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 
192, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990) (same).  
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
9 
 
matters and would show that the victim possessed sufficient 
knowledge to formulate her out-of-court accusation.18    
¶18 For the defendant to establish a constitutional right 
to the admissibility of the proffered evidence that is otherwise 
excluded by the rape shield statute, the defendant must satisfy 
a two-part inquiry.19   
¶19 In the first part of the inquiry, the defendant must 
satisfy each of five factors through an offer of proof that 
states an evidentiary hypothesis bolstered by a statement of 
fact sufficient to justify the conclusion or inference the court 
is asked to accept.20  The five factors are: 
1) 
The prior act clearly occurred. 
2) 
The act closely resembles that in the present 
case. 
                                                 
18 For admission of evidence of prior sexual experiences of 
a child victim to prove a source of the victim's sexual 
knowledge other than the victim's experience with the defendant, 
see, for example, Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 83; Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d at 652-53. 
19 Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 72; Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 648-
49, 654. 
20 Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶44; Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 72. 
The State did not challenge the sufficiency of the offer of 
proof, and we do not address this issue.   
The defendant's brief asserts that if defense counsel's 
failure to file a motion to introduce prior sexual conduct 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11) waived his constitutional 
claim, he was denied effective counsel.  We have addressed the 
defendant's claim on the merits and therefore we need not and do 
not address any ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
10 
 
3) 
The prior act is clearly relevant to a material 
issue. 
4) 
The evidence is necessary to the defendant's 
case. 
5) 
The probative value outweighs the prejudicial 
effect.21 
¶20 After the defendant successfully satisfies the five 
factors to establish a constitutional right to present evidence, 
a court undertakes the second part of the inquiry by determining 
whether the defendant's right to present the proffered evidence 
is nonetheless outweighed by the State's compelling interest to 
exclude the evidence.22   
¶21 In the present case, we conclude, as did the circuit 
court and the court of appeals, that the defendant's offer of 
proof did meet factors one and two of the five factors.  The 
circuit court was satisfied that either Kayla or her mother 
would testify to the fact that at least one other child had 
touched Kayla's vagina in the past.  This offer of proof 
satisfies the first factor's requirement that the prior acts 
clearly occurred.  Furthermore, the defendant's offer of proof 
satisfies the second factor's requirement that the prior acts 
resemble the defendant's alleged conduct. 
¶22 However, we conclude, as did the circuit court and the 
court of appeals, that the defendant's offer of proof fails to 
satisfy the final three factors.   
                                                 
21 Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶44; Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 72. 
22 Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 72-73. 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
11 
 
¶23 The proffered evidence does not satisfy factor three, 
the 
relevancy 
test. 
 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.01, 
relevant 
evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence."  Evidence of Kayla's other sexual experiences is 
relevant in the present case if a jury might infer that Kayla 
acquired sexual knowledge because the defendant committed the 
act charged.23 
¶24 Kayla's 
sexual 
knowledge 
fails 
to 
satisfy 
the 
relevancy requirement of factor three.  There is nothing 
precocious about Kayla's statements that someone touched her 
body.  Kayla's accusation that the defendant touched her vagina 
and "wiggled and jiggled" is not a description of age-
inappropriate knowledge.  Kayla's description is neither graphic 
nor precise enough that a jury would infer that a child Kayla's 
age would be able to make this description only if the conduct 
charged actually occurred.  The sexual knowledge Kayla possessed 
was mere knowledge of her body.  Such knowledge is not so 
unusual as to raise an inference that some sexual contact with 
the defendant must have taken place.   
¶25 The defendant asserts that the jury inference comes 
not from Kayla's knowledge of her body, but from the knowledge 
                                                 
23 Id. at 80; Christopher B. Reid, The Sexual Innocence 
Inference Theory as a Basis for the Admissibility of a Child 
Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 
829-30 (1993). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
12 
 
that someone would have a desire to fondle the private parts of 
another.  Kayla has not expressed knowledge that someone would 
want to touch her body for sexual gratification, which arguably 
would be evidence of sexual precociousness or knowledge beyond 
her years.  Kayla expressed knowledge about the part of her body 
touched, not knowledge about why someone would desire to touch 
her. 
¶26 We conclude that the testimony that Kayla claimed to 
have been touched on the vagina does not show such precocious 
sexual knowledge that a jury would believe that some sexual 
contact with the defendant must necessarily have occurred.  
Without this inference by the jury, there is no reason for the 
defense to show that Kayla could have acquired sexual knowledge 
from prior sexual encounters.  No inference, in this case, 
equals little if any relevance.  Without the reasonable 
possibility that a jury would make the inference the defendant 
asserts, the defendant has not met factor three, relevance.  
¶27 Because we conclude the evidence was not relevant, 
factors four and five cannot be met.  The evidence cannot be 
considered necessary to the defendant's case (factor four), and 
the probative value of the evidence cannot outweigh any 
prejudicial effect (factor five).   
¶28 Because the defendant has not satisfied all five 
factors, we need not continue to the second inquiry, that is, 
whether the defendant's right to present the proffered evidence 
is outweighed by a compelling state interest to exclude the 
evidence. 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
13 
 
¶29 Therefore, we conclude that the exclusion of the 
proffered evidence of Kayla's prior sexual conduct with at least 
one 
other 
child 
does 
not 
infringe 
on 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional right to present evidence and was appropriate 
under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2).  We further conclude, as did the 
court of appeals, that the circuit court appropriately exercised 
its discretion to exclude the proffered evidence. 
 
III 
¶30 The defendant also challenges his conviction and the 
order denying his motion for a new trial by arguing that his 
expert witness, Dr. Stonefeld, was not only qualified as an 
expert witness in the limited topics upon which he was going to 
testify but also that exclusion of the testimony deprived the 
defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.  
¶31 The defendant offered Dr. Stonefeld's testimony to 
rebut the testimony of two of the State's witnesses.  One of the 
State's witnesses was Maureen (Mimi) Rappley, a clinical social 
worker who was experienced in counseling child sexual abuse 
victims.  Ms. Rappley testified about Kayla's recantation.  Ms. 
Rappley stated, among other things, that approximately 20-24% of 
child sexual abuse victims recant their reports of abuse, but 
92% of those recanting later reaffirm the charge of sexual 
abuse.   
¶32 A second witness for the State, Ty Juoni, a child 
protection investigator, testified that he interviewed Kayla and 
that she told him that the defendant touched her with his 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
14 
 
finger.  Mr. Juoni explained that he had used a "cognitive 
graphic interview" technique with Kayla.  He characterized the 
technique as "a nationally accepted process that obtains 
accurate information from children" using non-leading questions.  
He thus apparently vouched for the reliability of the technique 
he had used. 
¶33 According to the defendant, Dr. Stonefeld would make 
two points.  First, in order to rebut Ms. Rappley's testimony 
about recantation, he would testify that it was not possible to 
assign a specific level of scientific probability to the 
truthfulness of Kayla's allegation of sexual assault in the 
present case.  Dr. Stonefeld would testify that no scientific 
basis exists to conclude whether a recanted accusation is 
truthful in a particular case, even though a study claimed that 
92% of the children studied who recanted later reaffirmed their 
original accusation.  
¶34 Second, Dr. Stonefeld would state that the cognitive 
graphic interview technique used with Kayla does not guarantee 
reliable results, thereby rebutting Mr. Juoni's testimony about 
the reliability of his interview technique.  In its opening 
statement 
the 
State 
claimed 
that 
Mr. 
Juoni 
employed 
a 
"nationally-recognized 
system 
for 
questioning 
child 
sexual 
assault victims" that is "designed to elicit answers that are in 
conformity with the truth."  Mr. Juoni testified that the 
cognitive graphic interview is a process that obtains "accurate 
information from children. . . . "  Dr. Stonefeld would also 
testify that the duration and manner in which the interview was 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
15 
 
conducted in the present case raised questions about the 
reliability of the interview process. 
¶35 As court of appeals Chief Judge Thomas Cane wrote in 
his dissent, "[I]n short, Stonefeld was going to testify as to 
the scientific limitations on the inferences that could be 
fairly drawn from the use of a cognitive graphic interview or 
the fact that a child had recanted a prior claim of sexual 
abuse."  
¶36 The State objected to Dr. Stonefeld's testimony on the 
ground that Dr. Stonefeld was not sufficiently qualified to 
testify concerning these issues.  The defendant argued that any 
limitations of Dr. Stonefeld's qualifications regarding actual 
hands-on experience perceived by the circuit court go to the 
weight of his testimony, not its admissibility, and could be 
raised by the State on cross-examination and in argument. 
¶37 The admissibility of expert opinion testimony lies in 
the discretion of the circuit court.24  A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it makes an error of law 
or neglects to base its decision upon facts in the record.25  The 
circuit court in the present case based its decision upon the 
facts in the record.  The question then is whether the circuit 
court applied the correct legal principles to the facts of 
                                                 
24 Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698; 
State 
v. 
Watson, 
227 
Wis. 2d 167, 
186, 
595 
N.W.2d 403 (1999). 
25 King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248, 590 N.W.2d 480 
(1999). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
16 
 
record.26  This court decides any questions of law which may 
arise 
during 
its 
review 
of 
an 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals.27 
¶38  The legal principles applicable to the present case 
are two-fold.  One, the circuit court must adhere to the 
evidentiary rules applicable to expert witnesses, and two, 
because the defendant asserted that the exclusion of the 
evidence would violate his constitutional right to present a 
defense, the circuit court must consider constitutional law 
principles in making its evidentiary ruling. 
¶39 We first consider the applicable evidentiary rules. 
Testimony 
of 
an 
expert 
witness 
is 
governed 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02, 
which 
provides 
that 
if 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, the witness may 
testify.  This provision "continues the tradition of liberally 
admitting 
expert 
testimony" 
in 
Wisconsin.28 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 907.02 states: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
                                                 
26 Martindale, 2001 WI 113, ¶29 (quoting State v. Wollman, 
86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979)).  See also Watson, 
227 Wis. 2d at 186; State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 268, 496 
N.W.2d 74 (1993).  
27 King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999). 
28 7 Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 702.202, at 478 (2d ed. 2001). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
17 
 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
¶40 Whether a witness "is qualified to give an opinion 
depends upon whether he or she has superior knowledge in the 
area in which the precise question lies."29  Having a medical 
license does not automatically qualify a person to offer expert 
testimony on every issue in the field of medicine.  If the 
witness has no scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge about the particular issues in the case then the 
witness's opinion is not reliable enough to be probative.30 
¶41 The circuit court was to apply these legal principles 
to determine whether Dr. Stonefeld was qualified to testify 
about the limited issues for which his testimony was proffered.  
The circuit court heard the following facts relating to Dr. 
Stonefeld's qualifications. 
¶42 Dr. Stonefeld has substantial training and experience 
as a psychiatrist and neurologist.  He has spent approximately 
33 years as a physician specializing in both neurology and 
psychiatry.  He is a diplomate of the American Board of Forensic 
                                                 
29 Tanner v. Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 357, 370, 596 N.W.2d 805 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
30 The admissibility of the testimony of an expert witness 
depends on a combination of the witness's qualifications, the 
relevancy of the testimony, the assistance of the testimony to 
the 
trier 
of 
fact 
and 
considerations 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03, namely, whether the probative value is 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.  7 Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin 
Evidence § 702.202, at 480-81 (2d ed. 2001). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
18 
 
Examiners, with a fellowship at the Royal Society of Medicine 
and the American Academy of Psychosomatic Medicine.  His 
practice is in direct patient care and focuses 80% in psychiatry 
and 20% in neurology.  He has testified as an expert witness 
about 30-40 times. 
¶43 Dr. Stonefeld has counseled 10-15 adults who were 
survivors of child abuse and is familiar with literature 
regarding sexual assault cases.  He has counseled two or three 
children who were victims of child abuse.  Dr. Stonefeld has, 
however, had limited training in and experience with recantation 
and children.   
¶44 Although Dr. Stonefeld has not attended programs on 
the specific issue of recantation and had not read the 
recantation study to which Ms. Rappley referred, he had read 
literature in the areas in which he was to testify in 
preparation 
for 
the 
trial, 
especially 
in 
the 
area 
of 
recantation.   
¶45 Dr. Stonefeld explained that 90% of what he does and 
was trained to do involved interview techniques.  He has, 
however, had limited professional experience in interviewing 
children or in the cognitive graphic interviewing technique. 
¶46 Dr. Stonefeld's testimony was to be limited in scope.  
He was to testify regarding how the statistics about "recanters" 
returning to their original accusation does not help determine 
the truthfulness of a complainant in a particular case.  He was 
to testify about the limited conclusions that could be drawn 
from the statistics on recantation that Ms. Rappley presented to 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
19 
 
the jury.  Furthermore he was to testify regarding interviewing 
techniques. 
¶47 The gist of the circuit court's ruling to exclude the 
testimony of the expert witness was that Dr. Stonefeld had not 
extensively studied and had no experience with recantation or 
child sexual abuse interviewing techniques.  The circuit court 
therefore concluded that Dr. Stonefeld did not meet the standard 
of specialized knowledge in recantation and in the cognitive 
graphic interview technique to testify as an expert on those 
matters.  The circuit court also concluded that the testimony 
Dr. Stonefeld would present was not likely to assist the jury in 
understanding the evidence.   
¶48 In the exercise of its discretion to admit or exclude 
the testimony of the defendant's expert, the circuit court did 
not, however, give consideration to the second issue of law 
presented by the defendant in the case at bar, namely, the 
defendant's constitutional claim that exclusion of the expert 
opinion evidence deprived him of his right to present a defense.  
In considering only Dr. Stonefeld's qualifications to testify on 
the limited issues, the circuit court concluded that it would 
exercise its discretion to exclude the expert witness as not 
being qualified to testify on these limited issues.  The circuit 
court's failure to consider the constitutional claims presented 
by the defendant in exercising its discretion was an error of 
law. 
¶49 This court must therefore determine as a matter of law 
whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
20 
 
present a defense when the circuit court excluded the expert 
testimony.31  If the defendant was denied his constitutional 
right to present a defense, the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
to 
exclude 
the 
expert 
witness 
testimony.   
¶50 The defendant is not attacking the constitutionality 
of Wis. Stat. § 907.02, the rule of evidence relating to 
admission of the testimony of expert witnesses.  Indeed he could 
not.  The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that states have broad 
latitude 
under 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution 
to 
establish 
rules 
excluding evidence from criminal trials.  An accused's right to 
present evidence is subject to reasonable restrictions.32   
¶51 Nevertheless, the application of an evidentiary rule 
may, as we explained previously in our discussion of the 
application of the rape shield statute, impermissibly abridge an 
                                                 
31 Cf. 
State 
v. 
Dodson, 
219 
Wis. 2d 65, 
69-70, 
580 
N.W.2d 181 (1998) (determination of whether Wis. Stat. § 972.11 
deprives the defendant of his constitutional rights is a 
question of constitutional fact to be determined independently 
by this court); State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 648, 456 
N.W.2d 325 (1990) (same) (see additional citations in ¶16, 
n.17.) 
32 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).  
The 
accused's 
right 
to 
present 
evidence 
"may, 
in 
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests 
in the criminal trial process."  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 295 (1973).   
"Chambers therefore does not stand for the proposition that 
the defendant is denied a fair opportunity to defend himself 
whenever a state or federal rule excludes favorable evidence."  
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 316 (1998). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
21 
 
accused's right to present a defense in certain circumstances.  
The constitutional issue in the present case is whether 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02, the rule of evidence upon which the circuit 
court excluded the testimony of Dr. Stonefeld, as applied in the 
present case, impermissibly infringed upon the defendant's right 
to present a defense.  
¶52 The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth the following 
test to determine when a state's rules excluding defense 
evidence abridge an accused's right to present a defense:  There 
is no abridgment of the accused's right to present a defense so 
long 
as 
the 
rules of evidence "are 
not 
'arbitrary' or 
'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.'"33  
The U.S. Supreme Court went on to state that the exclusion of 
evidence is "unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate 
only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the 
accused."34  The weighty interest of the defendant is to present 
"fundamental elements" of his defense.35   
                                                 
33 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 
U.S. 44, 56 (1987), and citing Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 
151 (1991)). 
34 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 58; 
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-
23 (1967)).   
The court of appeals has explained these principles in 
State v. Johnson, 118 Wis. 2d 472, 479, 348 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 
1984) (citations omitted), as follows: 
One of the essential ingredients of due process in a 
criminal trial is the right to a fair opportunity to 
defend against the State's accusations.  . . .  A 
corollary to this principle is the right to present 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
22 
 
¶53 For the defendant to establish a constitutional right 
to the admissibility of the proffered expert witness testimony 
in the present case, the defendant must satisfy a two-part 
inquiry, similar to the inquiry this court has developed in 
determining whether the application of the rape shield statute 
excluding certain evidence deprives an accused of constitutional 
rights to present a defense.  This two-part inquiry enables a 
circuit court to determine the accused's interest in admitting 
the evidence and to determine whether the evidence is clearly 
central to the defense and the exclusion of the evidence is 
arbitrary and disproportionate to the purpose of the rule of 
exclusion, so that exclusion "undermine[s] fundamental elements 
of the defendant's defense."36  
                                                                                                                                                             
relevant and competent evidence.  . . .  Important as 
these rights are, they are not absolute.  They may bow 
to other legitimate state interests in the criminal 
trial process.  These competing state interests, 
however, must be substantial to overcome the claim of 
the accused.  . . .  
Thus a trial court's decision on a procedural issue at 
trial may nominally be labeled discretionary, but the 
court's authority may not be exercised until it 
accommodates the accused's due process rights to 
present a defense.  Without a compelling state 
interest, the court's ruling may not interfere with 
the accused's opportunity to present crucial evidence 
to the jury.  
35 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315. 
36 Id. 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
23 
 
¶54 In the first part of the inquiry, the defendant must 
satisfy each of the following four factors through an offer of 
proof.  The defendant must show: 
1) 
The testimony of the expert witness met the 
standards of Wis. Stat. § 907.02 governing the 
admission of expert testimony.37   
2) 
The 
expert 
witness's 
testimony 
was 
clearly 
relevant to a material issue in this case.38  
3) 
The expert witness's testimony was necessary to 
the defendant's case.39   
4) 
The probative value of the testimony of the 
defendant's 
expert 
witness 
outweighed 
its 
prejudicial effect.40  
¶55 After the defendant successfully satisfies these four 
factors to establish a constitutional right to present the 
expert testimony, a court undertakes the second part of the 
inquiry by determining whether the defendant's right to present 
                                                 
37 This factor is similar to the first and second factors of 
the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶19 above.  Instead of asking 
whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts 
closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is 
whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion 
to admit the testimony. 
38 This factor is similar to the third factor of the 
Pulizzano test set forth in ¶19 above. 
39 This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the 
Pulizzano test set forth in ¶19 above. 
40 This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the 
Pulizzano test set forth in ¶19 above.  
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
24 
 
the proffered evidence is nonetheless outweighed by the State's 
compelling interest to exclude the evidence.41   
¶56 We conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that the 
defendant in the present case has met the four factors of the 
first part of the inquiry and has also met the second part of 
the inquiry.  Accordingly, exclusion of the evidence violated 
the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense.  
¶57 First, the testimony of the expert witness met the 
standards of Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  Because the admissibility of 
the expert witness is discretionary with the circuit court, the 
defendant must show that, regardless of the constitutional 
considerations presented, had the circuit court admitted the 
evidence, the circuit court's exercise of its discretion would 
have been upheld by a reviewing court.  
¶58 It is well settled that judicial discretion is by 
definition an exercise of proper judgment that could reasonably 
permit an opposite conclusion by another judge or by a reviewing 
court.42  The fact the circuit court in the present case 
exercised its discretion to exclude the expert testimony 
evidence does not necessarily mean that the evidence was not 
admissible or that the evidence was irrelevant.    
                                                 
41 This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano 
test set forth in ¶20 above. 
42 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981); State v. Wurtz, 141 Wis. 2d 795, 800-01, 416 N.W.2d 623 
(Ct. App. 1987).   
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
25 
 
¶59 Indeed, we conclude that had the circuit court 
exercised its discretion to admit the expert testimony in the 
present case, that discretionary decision would have been upheld 
by this court.  Dr. Stonefeld has sufficient qualifications to 
testify 
as 
a 
person 
knowledgeable 
about 
the 
meaning 
of 
statistical 
data 
and 
about 
interviewing 
processes 
and 
techniques.  On the basis of his training and knowledge, Dr. 
Stonefeld had expertise in the limited topics upon which he was 
going to testify.  He did not have to match the specific 
credentials of the State's experts.  He did not have to be 
familiar with the recantation paper upon which the State's 
witness relied.  
¶60 Second, Dr. Stonefeld's testimony was relevant to a 
material issue in this case: the credibility of Kayla and the 
defendant.  Indeed credibility was central to both the State's 
prosecution and the defendant's claim of innocence.  Both the 
defendant and Kayla took the stand and denied the alleged sexual 
contact.  In order to succeed in the prosecution, the State had 
to introduce Kayla's contradictory out-of-court statements and 
attempt to show why her statements accusing the defendant were 
more reliable than those denying he assaulted her.  The State 
had to explain why her answers would change depending on the 
circumstances under which the statements were made. 
¶61 Similarly, for a successful defense the defendant had 
to undermine the State's case and to explain why Kayla's 
statements favorable to him were as reliable or more reliable 
than those she gave accusing him of sexual contact with her.   
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
26 
 
¶62 Therefore, 
because 
Dr. 
Stonefeld's 
testimony 
was 
designed to undermine the State's witnesses, it was relevant to 
a material issue in the case, Kayla's and the defendant's 
credibility. 
¶63 Third, Dr. Stonefeld's testimony was necessary to the 
defendant's defense.  The case was shaping up as a battle of 
experts.  The State relied upon its experts.  The defendant had 
none.  
¶64 The State's use of its experts and the defendant's 
inability to produce an expert was especially damaging to the 
defense in this case.  The State's witnesses, without any 
rebuttal witnesses, were able to give the impression that 
Kayla's recantation was either inconsequential or perhaps even 
evidence of the truthfulness of her initial accusation and to 
give the impression that the cognitive graphic interview 
technique was a "nationally recognized system for questioning 
child assault victims" that is "designed to elicit answers that 
are in conformity with the truth" and obtains "accurate 
information from children."  
¶65 Those impressions were further enhanced by the State's 
closing argument, which commented on the defendant's failure to 
rebut the testimony of the State's two expert witnesses.  In 
closing 
argument 
the 
prosecutor 
referred 
twice 
to 
the 
defendant's failure to rebut the State's expert witnesses.  The 
prosecutor stated:  "That common sense is aided in this case by 
the unrebutted testimony of Miss Mimi Rappley . . . ."  The 
prosecutor also stated:  "And Ty [Juoni] was going through the 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
27 
 
very particular questions using, using what is——the unrebutted 
testimony——a nationally recognized system for garnering accurate 
information about sexual assaults."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶66 The 
jury 
did 
not 
know, 
of 
course, 
that 
the 
prosecutor's efforts caused the defendant's inability to rebut 
the testimony of the State's witnesses.  The jury found the 
defendant guilty, apparently believing, with the assistance of 
Ms. Rappley's and Mr. Juoni's testimony, that Kayla's out-of-
court accusations were more reliable than her trial testimony 
recanting the accusations.   
¶67 The jury was not afforded the opportunity to consider 
Dr. 
Stonefeld's 
observations 
concerning 
the 
practical 
limitations to any conclusions that could be fairly drawn from 
the testimony of Ms. Rappley and Mr. Juoni.   
¶68 Fourth, 
the 
probative 
value 
of 
Dr. 
Stonefeld's 
testimony would have outweighed its prejudicial effect.  The 
State argues that Dr. Stonefeld's testimony would have a 
prejudicial effect because it would mislead the jury.  The State 
contends that Dr. Stonefeld's professional title, background, 
and use of a technical vocabulary might create the appearance of 
an expertise and credibility that Dr. Stonefeld did not in fact 
possess, and the jury would give his testimony undue weight.  We 
conclude that the State could have overcome any such problem by 
challenging Dr. Stonefeld on cross-examination and by arguing 
about the probative value of his testimony to the jury. 
¶69 The State further argued that no expert witness, 
whatever his or her qualifications, should have been allowed to 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
28 
 
testify on behalf of the defendant about the recantation 
statistics, because no expert testimony was needed to assist the 
jury in understanding the statistics.  We are not convinced by 
this argument.  Statistics is a subject on which jurors, as well 
as judges, may very well need assistance.  Furthermore, "[t]hat 
a lay witness of ordinary intelligence may also understand the 
subject matter does not mean that the opinion of an expert in 
the field would not be of assistance to the trier of fact in 
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue."43 
¶70 Regarding the second inquiry, the defendant's right to 
present the proffered evidence is not outweighed by any State 
compelling interest to exclude the evidence.  The defendant's 
right and interest in presenting the expert testimony is 
measured by the first four factors set forth above.44  The State 
argues that it has a compelling interest to exclude the 
evidence.  It contends that the circuit court's exercise of its 
discretion to exclude the expert witness testimony, even when 
the 
circuit 
court 
fails 
to 
consider 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional claim, assures both fairness and reliability in 
the ascertainment of guilt or innocence.  The State also asserts 
that the admission of the expert testimony would have misled the 
jury, as we explained above.   
                                                 
43 State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 187, 595 N.W.2d 403 
(1999) (quoting State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 569, 456 
N.W.2d 143 (1990)). 
44 For a similar analysis in admitting evidence as an 
exception to the rape shield statute, see State v. Pulizzano, 
155 Wis. 2d 633, 656-57, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). 
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
29 
 
¶71 Because we conclude 
that 
Dr. Stonefeld's 
expert 
testimony was admissible, that the testimony was relevant and 
necessary to the defendant's case, and that the probative value 
of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect, we determine 
that the State's interest in excluding the evidence on the basis 
of a discretionary decision of the circuit court that failed to 
weigh constitutional considerations was not so compelling that 
it 
outweighed 
the 
defendant's 
constitutionally 
protected 
interest in presenting a defense.    
¶72 After considering the two parts of the inquiry we have 
set forth, we conclude that where, as here, the defendant 
challenges 
the 
circuit 
court's 
evidentiary 
ruling 
on 
constitutional 
grounds, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
exclusion of the defendant's expert witness is disproportionate 
to the purposes the expert witness rule is designed to serve.  
The purpose of the expert witness rule is to ensure that 
relevant evidence is presented to the trier of fact and that 
irrelevant, non-probative evidence is excluded.  In the present 
case, the testimony of the expert witness was admissible as a 
proper exercise of a circuit court's discretion and was 
relevant, material, necessary, reliable, probative, and helpful.  
The circuit court's exclusion of the expert witness testimony 
infringed upon a "weighty interest"45 of the defendant because it 
significantly impaired the defendant's ability to present a 
defense in the present case. 
                                                 
45 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308.  
No. 
00-2830-CR 
 
30 
 
¶73 In summary, we conclude, contrary to the decision of 
the court of appeals, that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in excluding the testimony of the 
defendant's expert witness.  We reach this conclusion because in 
exercising its discretion to exclude the testimony of the 
defendant's expert witness, the circuit court failed to take 
into account, as the defendant requested, whether the defendant 
was denied his constitutional right to present a defense.  In 
applying the two-part inquiry we have set forth, we conclude 
that exclusion of the testimony of the expert witness about 
recantation and interview techniques denied the defendant his 
constitutional right to present evidence clearly central to his 
defense.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
No.  00-2830-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
¶74 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (concurring).  The question in 
this case is whether the trial court's discretionary decisions 
on certain evidentiary issues deprived the defendant of his 
right to present a defense under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  
I agree completely with the majority's resolution of the rape 
shield law issue under State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 
N.W.2d 325 (1990). 
¶75 I also agree generally with the majority's analysis of 
the trial court's decision to exclude the defense expert witness 
under Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  Adaptation of the Pulizzano approach 
for purposes of the expert witness issue in this case provides a 
reasonable enough method by which to balance the defendant's 
right to present a defense against the state's interest in 
controlling the reliability and fairness of the criminal trial 
process through the rules of evidence. 
¶76 I write separately to emphasize my concern about 
constitutionalizing the multitude of discretionary evidentiary 
decisions that occur on a daily basis in criminal trials in the 
circuit courts of this state.  In that sense, I agree with the 
dissent's position that we generally should not require circuit 
court judges to engage in convoluted "mental gymnastics, in 
order to issue decisions on the admissibility of evidence."  
Dissent at ¶90.  But for the constitutional dimension to the 
expert witness issue in this case, the circuit court's refusal 
to 
admit 
the 
defense 
expert's 
testimony 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02 would easily be upheld on the deferential 
"erroneous exercise of discretion" standard of review. 
No.  00-2830-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
¶77 In my view, the constitutional issue comes into play 
here not merely because this is a criminal case and the accused 
has a "right to present a defense" pursuant to the due process, 
confrontation, and compulsory process guarantees of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments.  Otherwise, almost every evidentiary 
ruling in a criminal case could be said to have constitutional 
implications. 
¶78 Rather, the constitutional issue arises because the 
defense expert's testimony, excluded by the circuit court's 
application of the expert witness rule, implicated a "weighty 
interest 
of 
the 
accused" 
and 
significantly 
undermined 
a 
fundamental element of the defense within the meaning of Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58 (1987), Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973), Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 
(1967).  See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 315 
(1998). 
¶79 The defendant's fate in this case depended almost 
entirely on the jury's evaluation of Kayla's recantation.  The 
outcome of the case turned on the believability of Kayla's prior 
out-of-court statement that the defendant had improperly touched 
her, which the jury had to reconcile against her in-court denial 
that any improper touching had occurred.  The State introduced 
the testimony of two experts in an attempt to put the 
recantation issue into a "scientific" context: a social worker 
who testified about certain statistical findings regarding 
recantation in child abuse cases, and the protective services 
investigator who had interviewed Kayla and who vouched for the 
No.  00-2830-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
reliability of the "cognitive graphic" interview technique he 
had used to interview the little girl. 
¶80 The proposed defense expert, while not a specialist in 
the phenomenon of child abuse recantation, was a licensed 
physician with 33 years experience in psychiatry and neurology, 
including at least some experience treating victims of child 
abuse, mostly as adults.  He was generally familiar with 
literature on sexual abuse, and had undertaken some study of the 
recantation issue in preparation for trial.  Ninety percent of 
his clinical practice involved interviewing patients.  He was to 
offer 
rebuttal 
testimony 
to 
the 
State's 
experts 
on 
the 
reliability of interview techniques and the limitations of 
statistical data on recantation.  
¶81 Given the critical importance of the jury's evaluation 
of Kayla's out-of-court 
accusation 
vis-à-vis 
her in-court 
recantation, and because the State had introduced expert 
testimony 
on 
the 
subject, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
otherwise 
discretionary decision to exclude the proffered defense expert 
took on a constitutional dimension.  If it were not so central 
to the defendant's case, the decision whether to qualify the 
defense expert under Wis. Stat. § 907.02 could have gone either 
way and been upheld.  It was a close judgment call.  The 
objections to the expert's qualifications could reasonably be 
characterized as going to the weight of his testimony and not 
its admissibility.  With the constitutional thumb on the scales, 
I agree with the majority that it was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion to exclude his testimony. 
No.  00-2830-CR.dss 
 
4 
 
¶82 The dissent seems to suggest that evidence deemed 
inadmissible by a circuit court applying the rules of evidence 
is by definition 
irrelevant, and 
thus there 
can 
be no 
constitutional violation, because the right to present a defense 
does not include the right to present irrelevant evidence.  
Dissent at ¶¶86, 91.  But evidence that is otherwise relevant 
and admissible is often excluded under the rules for reasons 
completely 
unrelated 
to 
considerations 
of 
actual 
factual 
relevancy——reasons usually related to reliability and fairness 
(e.g., hearsay, character 
evidence, 
evidence 
protected by 
privilege).  That certain evidence is inadmissible by operation 
of the rules does not necessarily make it irrelevant. 
¶83 Here, the defense expert's testimony was highly 
relevant to the jury's evaluation of the core proposition in the 
case——the believability of Kayla's out-of-court accusation in 
light of her in-court recantation of it——and it was offered in 
response to the State's explanatory expert testimony regarding 
that 
proposition. 
Without 
it, 
the 
State's 
experts 
went 
unrebutted——the exclusion of the defense expert occurred in the 
middle of the trial, and the defense request for a continuance 
to secure another expert was denied.  Under these circumstances, 
the circuit court's evidentiary ruling excluding the defense 
expert's testimony under Wis. Stat. § 907.02 was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion because it infringed upon a fundamental 
element of the defense and therefore violated the defendant's 
right to present a defense.  See Rock, 483 U.S. at 58, Chambers, 
410 U.S. at 302-03, and Washington, 388 U.S. at 22-23. 
No.  00-2830-CR.dss 
 
5 
 
¶84 I am not convinced, however, that the multi-factor, 
Pulizzano-based inquiry must be undertaken any time a criminal 
defendant offers an expert witness.  Not all defense experts can 
be said to implicate "weighty" interests of the accused or 
fundamental elements of the defense, and it is only when they do 
that scrutiny beyond the applicable evidentiary rule will be 
necessary.  The standards articulated in Wis. Stat. § 907.02 are 
sufficient to accomplish the appropriate balancing of interests 
in the ordinary case.  See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316 (a 
defendant is not deprived of his right to present a defense 
merely because a state or federal rule excludes evidence 
favorable to him.) 
¶85 I would apply the test set forth in the majority 
opinion only when the proffered expert testimony is so clearly 
relevant to a central disputed issue in the case that its 
exclusion 
can 
reasonably 
be 
seen 
as 
implicating 
the 
constitutional right to present a defense.  Where the proffered 
evidence is so centrally relevant, a constitutional question 
arises, and an evaluation of the relative necessity of the 
expert to the defendant's case as against the other interests at 
stake is appropriate in order to resolve it.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  00-2830-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶86 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority opinion on the first issue presented in this case——
that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to 
present evidence when the circuit court excluded evidence of the 
child victim's prior sexual contact with another child.  I 
respectfully dissent, however, because on the second issue, the 
majority opinion ignores the rule that a defendant does not have 
a constitutional right to present irrelevant or otherwise 
inadmissible evidence.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
stated, recently, the right to present evidence is subject to 
the rules of evidence, in order to ensure "that only reliable 
evidence is introduced at trial."  United States v. Scheffer, 
523 U.S. 303, 308-309 (1998).  I would conclude, therefore, that 
the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to present 
a defense when the circuit court exercised its discretion and 
excluded 
the 
testimony 
of 
the 
defendant's 
witness, 
Dr. 
Stonefield. 
¶87 The majority opinion reverses the court of appeals 
and, thus, also the circuit court's discretionary decision to 
exclude expert testimony from Dr. Stonefield.  The court of 
appeals' majority upheld the circuit court's discretionary 
decision because "the trial court used logical reasoning and 
based its decision on the facts in the record."  State v. St. 
George, No. 00-2830-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶36 (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 5, 2001).  In answering the constitutional questions, the 
majority seems to ignore the circuit court's bases for its 
No.  00-2830-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
decision to preclude the evidence.  The circuit court relied on 
Wis. Stat. §  907.02, in determining that the testimony the 
defendant wished to offer from Dr. Stonefield was inadmissible.  
The circuit court concluded that the evidence was not likely to 
help the jury arrive at a decision, since Dr. Stonefield did not 
have the required experience or education on recantation and on 
the mechanics of interviewing in child sexual assault cases. 
¶88 Unlike the majority, in answering the constitutional 
question of whether the evidentiary decision to exclude Dr. 
Stonefield's testimony denied the defendant his constitutional 
right to present a defense, I would rely on the circuit court's 
discretionary decision, which had a reasonable basis in the 
record for its ruling.  See State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶¶43, 
49, 
236 
Wis. 2d 686, 
613 
N.W.2d 629 
(acknowledging 
that 
questions of constitutional significance are reviewed without 
deference to the circuit court, but answering the constitutional 
questions based on the circuit court's discretionary evidentiary 
decisions);46 State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 330-332, 431 
N.W.2d 165 (1988) (reviewing the circuit court's evidentiary 
decision under the abuse of discretion (now the erroneous 
exercise of discretion) standard, and then answering the 
constitutional question based on the upheld circuit court's 
evidentiary decision); see also Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 
                                                 
46 I disagree with the majority's characterization of State 
v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629, and 
State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990), as 
"ignoring the usual standard of review that questions of 
constitutional fact are determined independently by this court."  
Majority op. at ¶16 n.17. 
No.  00-2830-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
542, 570 N.W.2d 851 (1997) ("If a reasonable basis for the 
circuit court's ruling exists, we will not disturb it."). 
¶89 It is well established that a defendant does not have 
the constitutional right to present any and all evidence in 
support of his claim.  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
302 (1973); Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶42 ("[D]efendants cannot 
present irrelevant evidence."); Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d at 332; 
State v. Johnson, 118 Wis. 2d 472, 479, 348 N.W.2d 196 (1984) 
(the right to present relevant and competent evidence is the 
corollary to the right to present a defense).  Furthermore, we 
have previously recognized that the circuit court is the proper 
arbiter of the admissibility of evidence, see Grube, 213 
Wis. 2d at 
542, 
and 
that 
this 
court 
reviews 
evidentiary 
decisions under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
Id.; Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d at 332.  
¶90 Although the majority opinion correctly notes that an 
evidentiary decision, including the admissibility of expert 
opinion testimony, is reviewed under the erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard, the majority opinion then fails to apply 
that standard here.  See majority op. at ¶37.  The majority 
skirts 
this 
standard 
by 
stating 
that 
in 
exercising 
its 
discretion to admit or exclude Dr. Stonefield's testimony, the 
circuit court did not give consideration to whether exclusion of 
the testimony would deprive St. George of his right to present a 
defense.  Id. at ¶48.  In effect, the majority is asking circuit 
court judges no longer to base evidentiary decisions on the 
rules of evidence.  Rather, the majority now requires circuit 
No.  00-2830-CR.npc 
 
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court judges to engage in nothing less than difficult mental 
gymnastics, in order to issue decisions on the admissibility of 
evidence.  Wisconsin circuit court judges must now not only 
apply the rules of evidence, but then question whether the court 
should actually apply the rules of evidence to exclude otherwise 
inadmissible evidence in light of a defendant's constitutional 
right to present a defense.  Here, the majority reasons that the 
circuit court should have exercised its discretion to admit the 
so-called expert testimony, rather than exclude it, on the basis 
that the defendant is denied his constitutional right to present 
a defense, even though when the rules of evidence were applied, 
the evidence was deemed to be inadmissible by the circuit court 
judge.  Majority op. at ¶73. 
¶91 The majority's complicated approach is not necessary, 
however, 
because 
a 
defendant 
does 
not 
have 
a 
right, 
constitutional or otherwise, to present irrelevant or otherwise 
inadmissible evidence.  State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 192, 
453 N.W.2d 127 (1990); Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 332.  The rules of 
evidence are not "arbitrary or disproportionate" where they are 
applied 
to 
exclude 
irrelevant 
or 
otherwise 
inadmissible 
evidence.  See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308-309 (The right to 
present evidence is subject to the reasonable restrictions of 
evidentiary rules that serve legitimate interests, including 
"ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial."); 
see also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 
(1982) (to establish a Sixth Amendment violation the defendant 
must prove the testimony would have been relevant, material, and 
No.  00-2830-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
vital to the defense).  The majority opinion ignores the reality 
that St. George was not limited to the testimony of Dr. 
Stonefield.  St. George could have hired another expert witness, 
one with sufficient knowledge and experience on the issues 
relevant in this case. 
¶92 Based on the circuit court's reasonable decision that 
Dr. Stonefield's testimony was not likely to assist the jury, 
and that he did not have the specialized knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education on the relevant topics, I 
would affirm the court of appeals' decision in full.  The 
defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to 
present a defense, because, as the court of appeals noted, he 
"do[es] not posses the constitutional right to present any and 
all evidence in support of a claim."  St. George, No. 00-2830-
CR, ¶35 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302); see also Hammer, 
2000 WI 92, ¶42.  I agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in concluding 
that Dr. Stonefield's testimony did not meet the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  The defendant, therefore, is not deprived 
of any constitutional right by the circuit court's conclusion 
that he could not present evidence that does not meet the 
requirements of the evidence code for admissibility.  I would 
come to the same conclusion as the circuit court and the court 
of appeals did in this case, therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this dissent. 
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