Title: State v. Ronell E. Harris
Citation: 2008 WI 15
Docket Number: 2006AP000882-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2008

2008 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP882-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ronell E. Harris, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 736 N.W.2d 542 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 6, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 17, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Terence T. Bourke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Ralph J. Sczygelski and Sczygelski Law Firm, LLC, Manitowoc, and 
oral argument by Ralph J. Sczygelski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Anne 
Murphy, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP882-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF251) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronell E. Harris, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 6, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, Ronell E. 
Harris, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals1 affirming a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Sheboygan County, Terence T. Bourke, Judge.  The circuit court 
convicted the defendant of possession with the intent to deliver 
more than 40 grams of cocaine or cocaine base contrary to Wis. 
                                                 
1 State v. Harris, No. 2006AP882-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 13, 2007).   
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
2 
 
Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)4. (2003-04).2  The circuit court denied 
the defendant's postconviction motion seeking a new trial. 
¶2 
Five issues are presented on review to determine 
whether the circuit court erred in denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial: 
I. 
Did the State violate Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) (the 
criminal 
discovery 
statute) 
or 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional right to due process by failing to 
disclose timely written police reports stating that 
law enforcement officers unsuccessfully attempted to 
obtain identifiable fingerprints from a plastic baggie 
containing 
cocaine 
allegedly 
belonging 
to 
the 
defendant?  If so, was the defendant prejudiced by the 
State's statutory violation and the admission of 
evidence or testimony regarding fingerprint evidence?  
II. Did the State violate Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) (the 
criminal discovery statute) by failing to disclose 
timely the defendant's request to put on a particular 
pair of pants?  If so, was the defendant prejudiced by 
the violation?     
III. Did the circuit court err in failing to strike 
evidence of the defendant's criminal history after the 
State's witness referred to a document as "a court 
bail bond, some kind of court paperwork for [the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
3 
 
defendant]" and then a "recognizance of bond in a 
criminal 
case . . . a 
posting 
of 
$1,000 
by 
the 
defendant"?  If so, was the error prejudicial? 
IV. If the State violated Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) (the 
criminal discovery statute), did the circuit court err 
in failing to sanction the State for the violation? 
V. 
Are the errors, when viewed cumulatively, prejudicial 
errors warranting a new trial? 
¶3 
We conclude as follows: 
I. 
The 
State 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1) 
(the 
criminal discovery statute) by failing to disclose 
timely the police reports.  The defendant's Brady due 
process rights were not violated.3  The State's 
statutory violation and the admission of the evidence 
were not prejudicial.    
II. The 
State 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1) 
(the 
criminal discovery statute) by failing to disclose 
timely the defendant's alleged statement asking for 
the pants that he put on.  The circuit court excluded 
the evidence.  The State's statutory violation was not 
prejudicial.   
III. The circuit court erred in failing to strike evidence 
of the defendant's criminal history.  The admission of 
the evidence was not prejudicial error. 
                                                 
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
4 
 
IV. The circuit court erred in failing to sanction the 
State for violating Wis. Stat. § 971.23 (the criminal 
discovery statute).  The error was not prejudicial.  
V. 
The 
errors, 
when 
viewed 
cumulatively, 
are 
not 
prejudicial errors warranting a new trial.     
¶4 
For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction and the circuit court's order denying the defendant's 
postconviction motion for a new trial.   
¶5 
We briefly summarize the facts relating to the 
defendant's trial, conviction, and postconviction motion for a 
new trial and shall detail the facts further in the parts of the 
opinion discussing the legal issues presented.   
¶6 
The case that the State presented at the defendant's 
jury trial on the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver consisted essentially of the following evidence: 
 
• While law enforcement officers were executing a search 
warrant in a Sheboygan apartment, they discovered the 
defendant on a sofa in the residence; 
 
• The officers discovered a plastic baggie containing a 
substance later determined to be 62 grams of crack 
cocaine (the contraband alleged to be possessed by the 
defendant) in the pocket of a green denim jacket that 
was hanging on a closet door in a bedroom of the 
apartment; 
 
• The officers discovered a duffel bag underneath the 
green denim jacket, and the defendant admitted that the 
duffel bag was his; 
 
• The officers discovered two documents on top of the 
duffel bag that bore the defendant's name; 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
5 
 
 
• The duffel bag contained plastic baggies (although no 
contraband); 
 
• Shortly after the officers entered the apartment, the 
defendant put on a pair of green denim pants without any 
suggestion from the officers to do so; 
 
• The green denim pants that the defendant put on had been 
lying near the defendant before he put them on; 
 
• The green denim pants that the defendant put on matched, 
in color, size, and brand, the jacket containing the 
plastic baggie of cocaine; 
 
• Both the pants and the matching jacket were an 
appropriate size for the defendant; 
 
• Although other persons were known to live in the 
apartment, none was similar in size to the defendant; 
 
• The officers discovered $615.00 inside the green denim 
pants put on by the defendant; and 
 
• Law enforcement officers discovered a wallet in the 
apartment 
containing 
the 
defendant's 
photo 
identification card.   
¶7 
At his trial, the defendant argued that the State's 
case consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence and adduced 
the following evidence in his favor: 
 
• Multiple other persons in the apartment were known to be 
involved in drugs; and 
 
• A document with the name of one of those persons was 
discovered in the same bedroom in which law enforcement 
officers discovered the cocaine alleged to belong to the 
defendant. 
¶8 
After the State filed an information against him, the 
defendant moved for discovery from the State.  The defendant's 
motion demanded that the State disclose, among other items: 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
6 
 
 
• "A written summary of all oral statements of the 
defendant that the state plans to use at trial and the 
names 
of 
witnesses 
to 
the 
defendant's 
oral 
statements";  
 
• "Any and all relevant written or recorded statements 
of a witness" that the State intends to call at trial; 
and  
 
• "Any 
exculpatory 
evidence . . . including 
but 
not 
limited 
to . . . [a]ll 
evidence 
and/or 
other 
information that would tend to negate the guilt of the 
defendant . . . [and] 
[a]ll 
evidence 
and/or 
other 
information that would tend to affect the weight or 
credibility of the evidence against the defendant." 
¶9 
The defendant's trial lasted one day.  The jury found 
the defendant guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to 
deliver.   
¶10 Before sentencing, the defendant moved for a new trial 
based on the State's failure to disclose timely both exculpatory 
evidence and statements made by the defendant that the State 
planned to introduce at trial.   
¶11 The circuit court sentenced the defendant to five 
years' confinement and five years' extended supervision.   
¶12 After 
sentencing, 
the 
defendant 
moved 
for 
postconviction relief, again requesting a new trial, based on 
the prosecutor's withholding relevant information and on co-
actors' being sentenced less harshly.  The circuit court again 
denied the defendant's motion for a new trial.   
I 
¶13 We first consider whether the State violated Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(e) 
and 
(h) 
(or 
the 
defendant's 
Brady 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
7 
 
constitutional right to due process) by failing to disclose 
timely the written police reports stating that law enforcement 
officers 
unsuccessfully 
attempted 
to 
obtain 
identifiable 
fingerprints from a plastic baggie containing cocaine allegedly 
belonging to the defendant.  We then consider whether any 
violation 
of 
the 
discovery 
statute 
or 
admission 
of 
the 
fingerprint evidence resulted in prejudicial error.   
¶14 The Criminal Discovery Statute.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(e) and (h) provide in relevant part that the 
district attorney shall, within a reasonable time before trial, 
disclose to the defendant any relevant written or recorded 
statements of a named witness, the results of any scientific 
test, and any exculpatory evidence.  These provisions state as 
follows: 
Upon demand, the district attorney shall, within a 
reasonable 
time 
before 
trial, 
disclose 
to 
the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it is within the possession, custody 
or control of the state: 
. . . . 
(e) Any relevant written or recorded statements of a 
witness named on a list under par. (d), including any 
videotaped oral statement of a child under s. 908.08, 
any 
reports 
or 
statements 
of 
experts 
made 
in 
connection with the case or, if an expert does not 
prepare a report or statement, a written summary of 
the expert's findings or the subject matter of his or 
her testimony, and the results of any physical or 
mental examination, scientific test, experiment or 
comparison that the district attorney intends to offer 
in evidence at trial. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
8 
 
. . . . 
(h) Any exculpatory evidence. 
¶15 Standard 
of 
Review. 
 
The 
interpretation 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e) and (h) to a given set 
of facts, as in the instant case, presents a question of law 
that we review independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals but benefiting from their analyses.4  If this court 
concludes that the State violated its statutory discovery 
obligation, this court must then determine whether the State has 
shown good cause for the violation and, if not, whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the evidence or testimony.5  These 
issues are also questions of law for this court to review 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.6 
¶16 Facts.  Two reports were disclosed to the defendant on 
the day of trial.  One was disclosed immediately before trial.  
A second was disclosed during the lunch hour during the trial. 
¶17 On the morning of the trial, ten minutes prior to the 
commencement of proceedings, the prosecutor notified defense 
counsel of a written report authored by a Sheboygan police 
officer whom the State planned to call as a witness at trial.  
The report stated, among other things, that during an interview 
conducted at the Sheboygan County Detention Center, a law 
                                                 
4 State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶14, 252 Wis. 2d 289, 643 
N.W.2d 480. 
5 DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶15. 
6 Id. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
9 
 
enforcement officer asked the defendant "if there would be any 
reason why his fingerprints would be on the packing of [the] 
cocaine" at issue.  According to the report, the defendant 
responded that "he could think of no reason why his fingerprints 
would be on any such an item."   
¶18 Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel 
objected to the State's untimely disclosure of this report.  The 
circuit court asked the prosecutor whether he intended "to bring 
in anything about fingerprints."  The prosecutor replied that he 
intended to tell the jury only that law enforcement officers 
"weren't able to get any [fingerprints] from the bag." 
¶19 Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's failure 
to inform defense counsel timely that law enforcement officers 
had attempted to obtain fingerprints from the plastic baggie.  
Defense counsel asked the circuit court to bar the State from 
asking its witnesses whether they tried to obtain fingerprints 
from the baggie containing the cocaine.  
¶20 The defendant's prime argument was (and continues to 
be) that the State's tardy disclosure of the fingerprint reports 
disrupted the defendant's trial strategy.  Defense counsel 
explained that based on the evidence that the State had timely 
disclosed to the defendant, defense counsel intended to ask the 
State's witnesses whether they had sent various items of 
evidence "to the drug crime lab in Madison to have it tested for 
fingerprints."  Defense counsel's strategy was to show that the 
investigation was shoddy. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
10 
 
¶21 After 
extended 
discussion, 
the 
circuit 
court 
instructed the prosecutor not to raise the fingerprint issue on 
direct examination but informed defense counsel that if defense 
counsel brought it up on cross, then defense counsel would open 
the door and the prosecutor could bring it up on redirect.   
¶22 During his opening statement, defense counsel made the 
following claim: "There's not a single witness who's going to 
provide evidence that any piece of evidence inside that 
apartment has any of my client's fingerprints on it.  None of 
that testing took place."   
¶23 During the trial, the State called Investigator Patton 
as a witness.  On cross-examination defense counsel asked the 
investigator the following question: "[Y]ou certainly had the 
drugs tested for fingerprints, didn't you?"  The investigator 
replied, "Yes, sir, I did.  I had the plastic baggie checked for 
fingerprints." 
¶24 Upon hearing this answer, defense counsel immediately 
made a motion to strike and requested that the jury be cleared 
from the courtroom.  Defense counsel had expected the witness to 
answer "no." 
¶25 The circuit court refused to clear the jury from the 
courtroom but agreed to discuss defense counsel's motion in 
chambers outside the jury's presence.  In chambers, defense 
counsel contended that the investigator's answer to the question 
suggested that the baggie had been scientifically tested for 
fingerprints in contrast to the prosecutor's assurance that no 
scientific testing had been performed.  Defense counsel moved 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
11 
 
for a mistrial on the ground that the State had failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence about the lack of identifiable 
fingerprints on the baggie containing cocaine.   
¶26 The circuit court excused the jury for lunch and asked 
the investigator what he meant when he testified that he "had 
the plastic baggie checked for fingerprints."  The investigator 
informed the circuit court that he had attempted but failed to 
locate identifiable fingerprints on the baggie using a "latent 
print processing" technique. 
¶27 In ruling on the prosecutor's tardiness in making the 
first report available to the defendant, the circuit court 
decided that the report on the fingerprints should have been 
disclosed earlier but that the defense was not prejudiced by the 
late disclosure.   
¶28 After the lunch recess, the prosecutor disclosed a 
second report to the defendant.  This report confirmed the 
investigator's testimony that he had attempted but failed to 
obtain 
identifiable 
fingerprints 
from 
the 
plastic 
baggie 
containing the cocaine.  This report was in a co-actor's file in 
the prosecutor's office, not in the defendant's file in the 
prosecutor's office.  The prosecutor had located this second 
report during the lunch recess. 
¶29 The circuit court admitted this second report as an 
exhibit, but at defense counsel's request the circuit court did 
not provide the report to the jury.  Defense counsel renewed his 
motion for a mistrial.  Defense counsel complained that the 
State's untimely disclosures had forced defense counsel to alter 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
12 
 
his strategy three times before and during the trial. The 
circuit court again denied the defendant's motion for mistrial, 
asserting that no prejudice had been shown.  Defense counsel 
asserted at the postconviction hearing that faced with this 
fingerprint evidence at trial, he was not prepared to cross-
examine the State's witness about fingerprinting.  
¶30 The circuit court agreed with defense counsel that the 
State should have disclosed the second report earlier.  The 
circuit court 
concluded, however, that the investigator's 
testimony 
was 
consistent 
with 
the 
prosecutor's 
earlier 
representation 
about the fingerprint information and that 
checking the baggie for fingerprints was not the same as 
conducting scientific testing.  The circuit court further ruled 
that the fingerprint information did not favor either the State 
or the defense and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the 
late disclosure of the fingerprint information. 
¶31 State Violated Criminal Discovery Statute.  We agree 
with the State that the prosecutor had a duty under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(e) and (h) to disclose the two reports regarding the 
State's unsuccessful attempt to obtain identifiable fingerprints 
from the plastic baggie.7 
¶32 The reports at issue clearly fall within the scope of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e).  Each report was authored by one of 
the State's witnesses; the State intended to call the witnesses.  
                                                 
7 See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent (State) at 16 (agreeing 
that the prosecutor had a duty under the discovery statute to 
disclose the reports timely).   
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
13 
 
Each 
report 
therefore 
qualifies 
as 
a 
"relevant 
written . . . statement[] of" a witness whom the district 
attorney intended to call at trial.   
¶33 The 
reports 
also 
fall 
within 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(h).  As the circuit court explained in its decision 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, the information 
contained in the reports "is exculpatory because it could raise 
a question with a juror as to why testing would be attempted if 
law enforcement was certain that the Defendant was the one who 
had possessed the crack cocaine in question."   
¶34 The State argues, however, that the disclosure was 
timely.  The State urges that the prosecutor met his statutory 
obligation by disclosing the reports on the day of trial.  The 
State reasons that the reports were promptly turned over to the 
defense as soon as the prosecutor found them.8  The State 
contends that the discovery statute "obviously contemplates 
situations such as this, where evidence that was not known to 
either party is belatedly found and turned over to the other 
party on the day of trial, in compliance with the discovery 
statute."9   
¶35 We disagree with the State's assertion that the State 
was timely in disclosing the reports.  Section 971.23(1) 
requires the district attorney to disclose, "within a reasonable 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Id.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7) (providing a continuing 
duty on the part of the prosecutor to notify the defendant 
promptly of the existence of additional material). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
14 
 
time before trial," exculpatory evidence if such evidence "is 
within the possession, custody or control of the state."  The 
State does not dispute that long before the defendant's trial, 
the State possessed and controlled the reports in question.  The 
first report, stating that a law enforcement officer asked the 
defendant "if there would be any reason why his fingerprints 
would be on the packing of [the] cocaine," is dated May 13, 
2004.  The second report, stating that Investigator Patton 
attempted but failed to obtain identifiable prints from the 
baggie, is dated July 14, 2004.  The defendant's trial was not 
held until September 17, 2004.  Indeed, the prosecutor conceded 
at trial that the latter of the two reports "was in our office 
apparently for a couple months."   
¶36 The State did not have good cause for failing to 
disclose the two reports.  We understand that many district 
attorneys' offices are short-staffed and the workload is heavy.10  
Nevertheless, accuseds whose lives and liberty are at stake have 
statutory and constitutional rights to information in the 
district attorney's possession to enable them to prepare 
adequately for trial.  "If there is to be pretrial discovery, 
broad or limited, in criminal cases, defense counsel should be 
able to rely upon evidence as disclosed by the state; otherwise, 
                                                 
10 Wis. 
Dep't 
of 
Admin., 
Rpt. 
07-9, 
An 
Evaluation:  
Allocation of Prosecutor Positions at 5, 24, App. 5-2 (2007), 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/07-
9Full.pdf 
(showing 
a 
need 
for 
more 
than 
100 
additional 
prosecutors across the state).  
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
15 
 
the purpose of discovery is frustrated and more injustice is 
done than if no discovery were allowed."11  
¶37 The prosecutor has a special role in the federal and 
Wisconsin criminal justice systems.  The United States Supreme 
Court 
has 
described 
the 
United 
States 
Attorney 
as 
"the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of 
a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."12  Our court 
and the Wisconsin Attorney General have similarly described the 
role of the Wisconsin prosecutor.13  
                                                 
11 Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 351, 204 N.W.2d 482 
(1973). 
12 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (quoted 
with approval in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999)).   
13 State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 662, 546 N.W.2d 115 
(1996) (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88, and concluding that 
"[g]overnment prosecutors in this state hold true to similar 
ideals"); Nelson v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 474, 483, 208 N.W.2d 410 
(1973) (quoting Berger in a case involving a state prosecutor)). 
Wisconsin 
Attorney 
General 
J.B. 
Van 
Hollen 
recently 
portrayed the role of prosecutors as agents of justice as 
follows: "[The work of prosecutors] is more than putting people 
behind 
bars. 
 
It 
includes . . . ensuring 
that 
criminal 
proceedings 
are 
fair . . . . 
Prosecutors 
are 
not 
zealous 
advocates for the state.  They are advocates for justice." 
http://www.thewheelerreport.com/releases/Feb08/feb13/0213vanholl
endas.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
16 
 
¶38 The special status of the prosecutor explains the 
basis for the prosecutor's duty of disclosure and that not every 
violation of the duty results in a reversal of a conviction.14 
¶39 It is of no moment under the criminal discovery 
statute that the State was unaware until the day before the 
trial or during the trial that it possessed the reports in 
question when the information was in the district attorney's 
files and could have been located before trial had the files 
been 
examined 
with 
reasonable diligence. The prosecutor's 
belated discovery of the evidence in his possession did not 
absolve the prosecutor of his duty under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) 
to reveal the evidence within a reasonable time before trial.  
The prosecutor's duty is to seek to know of the existence of 
reports that should be disclosed.15  The test of whether evidence 
"should be disclosed is not whether in fact the prosecutor knows 
of its existence but, rather, whether by the exercise of due 
diligence the prosecutor should have discovered it."16   
¶40 We agree with the court of appeals' observation "that 
the [prosecutor's] office less than carefully handled the 
information that fingerprints could not be lifted from the 
baggie."  The court of appeals was correct in concluding, and we 
emphasize, that "the report should have been maintained [in the 
                                                 
14 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). 
15 Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 350.  
16 DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶22 (citation, brackets, internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
17 
 
district attorney's office] in such a fashion as to be included 
in the State's response to [the defendant's] pretrial discovery 
requests."17 
¶41 Harmless Error.  Having determined that the State 
violated Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e) and (h) without good cause, 
we address the question whether the statutory violation and the 
admission of the fingerprint evidence were prejudicial to the 
defendant's case, requiring a new trial.18  When evidence that 
violates Wis. Stat. § 971.23 is not excluded, the defendant is 
not automatically entitled to a new trial.19   
¶42 This court has formulated the test for harmless or 
prejudicial error in a variety of ways.20  The United States 
Supreme Court set forth a test for harmless error in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 
(1967).  Under Chapman, the error is harmless if the beneficiary 
                                                 
17 State v. Harris, No. 2006AP882-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶12 (Wis. Ct. App. June 13, 2007). 
18 A prosecutor's violation of the criminal discovery 
statute, as well as the admission of any evidence that should 
have 
been 
excluded 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23, 
may 
be 
prejudicial.  State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶39, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 
680 N.W.2d 737 (State's violation of the discovery statute 
results in a serious flaw in the fundamental integrity of a 
judicial proceeding involving a guilty plea, allowing withdrawal 
of the plea); DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶¶59-60 (admission of 
evidence that should have been excluded under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23, if prejudicial, entitles defendant to new trial).  
19 DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶60 (citations omitted). 
20 See, e.g., State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶47, 301 
Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115; State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, 
¶¶114-15, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
18 
 
of the error proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."21  In 
State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶¶27, 30-31, 33, 34, 272 Wis. 2d 
80, 680 N.W.2d 737, a case involving a request to withdraw a 
guilty plea based on the State's violation of the criminal 
discovery statute, the court declared that the standard is 
whether the State's nondisclosure of the evidence sufficiently 
undermines the court's confidence in the outcome of the judicial 
proceeding.22  
¶43 "In recent years, the United States Supreme Court and 
this court, while adhering to the Chapman test, have also 
articulated alternative wording.  See, e.g., Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1999); State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 
                                                 
21 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), reh'g 
denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967); Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶47; 
Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶114. 
22 A reviewing court may consider any adverse effect that 
the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the 
preparation or presentation of a defendant's case.  The 
reviewing court should assess whether any such effect "might 
have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and 
with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-
trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would 
have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's 
incomplete response."  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
683 (1985). 
With regard to Brady disclosure, "[t]he burden rests with 
the defendant to establish that the 'lateness of that disclosure  
so prejudiced [defendant's] preparation or presentation of his 
defense 
that 
he 
was 
prevented 
from 
receiving 
his 
constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.'"  6 Wayne R. LaFave et 
al., 
Criminal 
Procedure 
§ 24.3(b) 
at 
365 
(3d 
ed. 
2007) 
(citations omitted). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
19 
 
263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485; State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶48, n.14, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189."23  The Neder/Harvey 
test for harmless error asks whether it is "clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error."24  
¶44 We apply both harmless error tests in the present 
case.   
¶45 This court has articulated several factors to aid in 
the harmless error analysis, including the frequency of the 
error, the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting 
the erroneously admitted evidence, whether the erroneously 
admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the nature of 
the defense, the nature of the State's case, and the overall 
strength of the State's case.25 
¶46 The defendant contends that the State's untimely 
disclosure of the police reports and the circuit court's 
admission of the fingerprint evidence significantly disrupted 
                                                 
23 Anderson, 
291 
Wis. 2d 673, 
¶115 
(quotation 
marks, 
parallel citation, and footnote omitted).  
24 Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 18 (1999))).  See also Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶47. 
25 Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶48; State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, 
¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 97; State v. Billings, 110 
Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 329 N.W.2d 192 (1983).  
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
20 
 
defense counsel's strategy and performance at trial.26  The 
defendant explains that defense counsel originally intended to 
argue to the jury that law enforcement officers had conducted a 
shoddy investigation.  According to the defendant, defense 
counsel was attempting to further this line of argument when he 
stated in his opening argument that no fingerprint testing had 
been done.  The defendant contends that defense counsel was 
pursuing the same "shoddy investigation" argument when he asked 
a State witness, on the assumption that the answer to counsel's 
question would be "no," whether fingerprint testing had been 
conducted.  The defendant urges that the fingerprint evidence 
disrupted defense counsel's strategy by forcing counsel to 
abandon his "shoddy investigation" argument.   
¶47 The defendant additionally argues that the State's 
untimely disclosure meant that defense counsel did not have time 
to digest and fully understand the fingerprinting that was done, 
thereby leading to confusion, frustration and mistakes on 
defense counsel's part.  The defendant contends that defense 
counsel was led to tell the jury incorrectly that no fingerprint 
testing had been done and was forced to object to a witness's 
statement that defense counsel himself had elicited.  
¶48 We review the totality of the circumstances to 
determine harmless error.  We recognize that it is difficult in 
a post-trial proceeding to reconstruct the course defense 
                                                 
26 A lawyer who has to change tactics in mid-trial through 
no 
fault 
of 
the 
defendant or defense counsel has been 
prejudiced.  DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶61. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
21 
 
counsel and the circuit court would have taken had the State 
fulfilled its discovery obligation.  We agree with the defendant 
that the State's untimely disclosure of the police reports and 
the circuit court's admission of the reports may have required 
defense counsel to adjust to the newly disclosed information as 
the trial progressed.  Nevertheless, upon study of the record we 
conclude that the State's failure to disclose the reports timely 
and the circuit court's admission of the fingerprint evidence 
did not significantly disrupt counsel's strategy and performance 
at trial; defense counsel was able to adjust to the untimely-
disclosed evidence. 
¶49 Defense counsel's opening argument was consistent with 
the information that the prosecutor had provided to him 
immediately before trial.  Defense counsel explained in his 
opening 
argument 
that 
there 
was 
a 
difference 
between 
circumstantial evidence and what defense counsel termed "real 
evidence."  Defense counsel told the jury that the State had no 
"real 
evidence" 
against 
the 
defendant. 
 
Defense 
counsel 
specifically noted that "[t]here's not a single witness who's 
going to provide evidence that any piece of evidence inside that 
apartment has any of my client's fingerprints on it.  None of 
that testing took place."  Defense counsel's prediction that not 
a single witness would provide evidence that any piece of 
evidence inside the apartment had the defendant's fingerprints 
on it was correct.    
¶50 Although defense counsel's statement that fingerprint 
testing did not take place is arguably inconsistent with the 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
22 
 
investigator's attempt to lift fingerprints from the baggie, the 
investigator's 
failure 
to 
obtain 
fingerprints 
corroborated 
defense 
counsel's 
argument 
that 
the 
State 
had 
only 
circumstantial evidence, and no "real evidence," against the 
defendant.  Defense counsel initiated the following exchange 
between himself and Investigator Patton that was favorable to 
the defense: 
Q. Isn't it true that when you requested fingerprint 
testing on that evidence you wanted to see if my 
client's were on that bag? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And isn't it true that you also wanted to see if 
somebody else's fingerprints were on that bag? 
A. If that was the case.  I mean, I'm not just 
focusing on the defendant.  If there were other 
prints, I would look at that as an investigator, yes, 
sir. 
Q. Because as an investigator you didn't learn of any 
information that anyone saw my client wearing that 
coat; isn't that true? 
A. That's correct, sir. 
Q. So you wanted to do everything that you possibly 
could to make sure that you were charging the right 
person with that crime; isn't that true? 
A. I try to. 
Q. Because you didn't know that my client ever touched 
that bag; isn't that true? 
A. I didn't have eyewitness or something, scientific 
fact perhaps that he touched the bag. 
¶51 In sum, we conclude that the State's failure to 
disclose the reports timely and the circuit court's admission of 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
23 
 
the reports did not significantly disrupt counsel's strategy or 
performance at trial.  
¶52 Furthermore, the state had strong evidence (without 
the fingerprint evidence) linking the defendant to the baggie 
with cocaine: the baggie was found in a jacket that matched the 
pants the defendant voluntarily put on, and the jacket and pants 
were the defendant's size.  The circuit court concluded that 
even if the fingerprint information had been disclosed in a 
timely fashion, the defendant would have been convicted. 
¶53 The defendant relies upon State v. DelReal, 225 
Wis. 2d 565, 593 N.W.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1999), in contending that 
the State's failure to disclose fingerprint information timely 
was prejudicial.  The defendant's reliance on DelReal is 
misplaced. 
¶54 In DelReal, law enforcement officers took DelReal into 
custody shortly after he allegedly fired a gun.  Although 
DelReal's hands were swabbed for gunshot residue, the State did 
not disclose to defense counsel that the swabbing had taken 
place and did not test the swabs to determine whether there was 
gunshot residue on DelReal's hands.  
¶55 One of the State's witnesses testified at trial that 
DelReal's hands had been swabbed for gunshot residue.  Other 
testimony was that the swabbing had not been done.27  During the 
trial, defense counsel was unable to determine whether DelReal's 
                                                 
27 State v. DelReal, 225 Wis. 2d 565, 593 N.W.2d 461 (Ct. 
App. 1999).   
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
24 
 
hands had in fact been swabbed.  The circuit court struck all 
testimony regarding the swabbing on the ground that it was 
irrelevant. 
¶56 After DelReal's conviction, defense counsel learned 
that law enforcement officers had in fact swabbed DelReal's 
hands but that the swabs had never been tested to determine 
whether gunshot residue was present.  After trial the swabs were 
tested and failed to reveal a sufficient amount of gunshot 
residue on DelReal to yield a positive finding.  An expert 
testified that a negative result is inconclusive.  On appeal the 
court of appeals deemed this evidence relevant and exculpatory 
in nature and concluded that the State had failed to disclose 
the evidence. 
¶57 In DelReal, defense counsel was not aware that 
DelReal's hands had been swabbed until after DelReal's trial; 
was unable to determine the results of the swab until after 
DelReal's trial; and was never permitted the opportunity to 
present to the jury the evidence that DelReal's hands did not 
have a significant amount of gunshot residue.  According to the 
court of appeals, the negative test result would have had some 
weight and could have supplied a favorable inference of 
DelReal's innocence.    
¶58 DelReal is significantly different from the present 
case.  In the present case, defense counsel learned of the 
reports about the fingerprints before and during the defendant's 
trial and was able to present to the jury the arguably 
exculpatory evidence that no fingerprints were lifted from the 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
25 
 
baggie.  The absence of identifiable fingerprints does not 
completely or even partially exonerate the defendant.  The 
fingerprint evidence, however, did support defense counsel's 
argument that no scientific evidence linked the defendant to the 
drug operation.     
¶59 In sum, under either statement of the harmless error 
test, the State's failure to provide the defendant in the 
present case with the fingerprint evidence earlier and the 
circuit court's admission of the evidence were not prejudicial. 
We agree, however, with the court of appeals that in an 
appropriate case the prosecutor's failure to disclose the 
reports timely could be held to be prejudicial.28 
¶60 No Brady Violation.  The defendant further argues that 
he is entitled to a new trial as a matter of law because the 
State violated his constitutional right to due process when it 
failed to disclose timely the reports indicating that law 
enforcement 
officers 
unsuccessfully 
attempted 
to 
obtain 
identifiable fingerprints from the plastic baggie containing the 
cocaine allegedly possessed by the defendant. 
¶61 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, (1963), the United 
States Supreme Court held that under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant has a constitutional right 
to evidence favorable to the accused and that a defendant's due 
process right is violated when favorable evidence is suppressed 
                                                 
28 State v. Harris, No. 2006AP882-CR, unpublished slip op. 
¶12 (Wis. Ct. App. June 13, 2007). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
26 
 
by the State either willfully or inadvertently, and when 
prejudice has ensued.29  Prejudice means that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
A 
'reasonable 
probability' 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."30  In other 
words, "strictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady 
violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is 
a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have 
produced a different verdict."31   
¶62 Thus a Brady violation entails prejudice to the 
accused and necessarily entitles the defendant to a new trial.  
When a "prosecutor violates his duty of disclosure under the 
Constitution, he will be 'punished' by having the illegally 
obtained conviction or sentence overturned."32   
                                                 
29 Harris, 272 Wis. 2d 80, ¶15 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. 
at 281-82). 
In Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, the Court stated the Brady rule 
as follows: "[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 
(emphasis added). 
As this court has recognized, Brady's requirement of 
materiality encompasses the concept of prejudice.  Harris, 272 
Wis. 2d 80, ¶15. 
30 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
31 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281. 
32 State v. Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d 177, 195, 347 N.W.2d 352 
(1984). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
27 
 
¶63 Brady 
does 
not 
require 
pretrial 
disclosure 
of 
exculpatory 
evidence.33 
Brady 
instead 
requires 
that 
the 
prosecution disclose evidence to the defendant in time for its 
effective use.34   
¶64 The State argues that the prosecutor's failure in the 
instant case to disclose the fingerprint evidence earlier did 
not violate Brady because the evidence was not "material" to 
guilt or punishment.  We agree with the State.  As we explained 
previously, the defendant was not prejudiced in preparation or 
presentation by the prosecutor's failure to disclose the 
evidence earlier.  Accordingly, under Brady the defendant's due 
process rights were not violated by the State's failure to 
disclose earlier the written reports or by the admission of the 
fingerprint evidence.   
                                                 
33 Harris, 
272 
Wis. 2d 80, 
¶37 
(quotation 
marks 
and 
citations omitted).   
See also 6 LaFave et al., supra note 22, § 24.3(b) at 364 & 
n.63 (concluding that the lower federal courts "agree that the 
Brady rule does not impose a general requirement of pretrial 
disclosure of [material] exculpatory evidence" and that due 
process instead "requires only that disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence be made in sufficient time to permit [the] defendant to 
make effective use of that evidence at trial"; collecting 
cases). 
Professor LaFave explains that "[d]epending upon the nature 
of the evidence, this standard may sometimes require pretrial 
disclosure," although "[f]or most exculpatory evidence, the 
prosecution should be able to satisfy its constitutional 
obligation by disclosure at trial."  6 LaFave et al., supra note 
22, § 24.3(b) at 364-65. 
34 State v. Harris, 272 Wis. 2d 80, ¶37 (quotation marks and 
citations omitted).   
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
28 
 
II 
¶65 The next issue is whether the State violated Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(b) 
by 
failing 
to 
disclose 
timely 
the 
defendant's alleged statement asking for the green pants that he 
put on.35  The circuit court excluded the witness's testimony 
about the defendant's statement.   
¶66 The Criminal Discovery Statute.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(b) provides in relevant part that the district 
attorney shall, within a reasonable time before trial, disclose 
to the defendant a written summary of all oral statements of the 
defendant that the district attorney plans to use in the course 
of the trial and the names of witnesses to the defendant's oral 
statements.  The disclosure statute provides as follows:   
 
Upon demand, the district attorney shall, within a 
reasonable 
time 
before 
trial, 
disclose 
to 
the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it is within the possession, custody 
or control of the state: 
 
. . . . 
(b) A written summary of all oral statements of the 
defendant which the district attorney plans to use in 
the course of the trial and the names of witnesses to 
the defendant's oral statements. 
¶67 Standard 
of 
Review. 
 
The 
interpretation 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b) to a given set of facts 
                                                 
35 The defendant does not argue that a Brady violation 
occurred in this instance.  The Brady rule pertains only to 
evidence that is favorable to the defendant  Harris, 272 
Wis. 2d 80, ¶15 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
29 
 
presents a question of law that we review independent of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from their 
analyses.36 
¶68 Facts. 
 
Defense 
counsel 
did 
not 
learn 
of 
the 
defendant's asking for the green pants until Detective Bloedorn 
was testifying.  Detective Bloedorn testified that when the 
defendant was handcuffed he was clad only in underwear, and that 
before being transported to jail the defendant asked for 
additional clothing.  The detective further testified that 
"[t]here was a pair of, like, green denim jeans that [the 
defendant] asked to have."  The pants were on the floor in front 
of the couch where the defendant was sitting.  The detective 
also testified that the defendant "pointed out, indicated that 
he wanted to have that particular pair of pants."   
¶69 Defense counsel objected to the officer's statements 
about the pants, arguing that defense counsel was not "provided 
any information that [the defendant] made this statement in 
discovery."  Defense counsel stated that "[t]he information that 
[he] received was that [the defendant] of his own volition 
picked up a pair of pants on the floor and put them on."  
Defense counsel further explained that "[m]y client's in his 
underwear when the police come in.  The difference between going 
and grabbing a pair of pants so you're not naked and saying I 
want those particular pants is significant."  
                                                 
36 DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶14. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
30 
 
¶70 The circuit court at first refused to strike Detective 
Bloedorn's reference to the defendant's asking for the green 
pants.  Later the parties stipulated that Bloedorn's statement 
that the defendant "asked to put on" the green pants be stricken 
from the record, and the circuit court instructed the jury to 
disregard Bloedorn's reference to the defendant's asking for the 
green pants.  The circuit court sanctioned the State for its 
untimely disclosure to the defendant by excluding the evidence. 
¶71 Detective Roeseler testified that he also participated 
in the execution of the search warrant.  Detective Roeseler 
testified that the green pants fit the defendant; that the 
defendant was fairly large in size and by far the biggest person 
in the apartment; and that the jacket was triple extra large in 
size.  He testified that no one suggested to the defendant that 
he put on the green pants.  According to Roeseler, the green 
pants contained $615 in cash, and Roeseler testified that in his 
experience the cash and the presence in the residence of drug 
manufacturing and distribution paraphernalia were hallmarks of a 
drug dealing operation. 
¶72 The reference to the defendant's asking for the green 
pants was significant because the implication of the defendant's 
request was that the green pants belonged to the defendant and 
that the green pants tied the defendant to the green jacket that 
held the baggie with cocaine.  The green jacket was found in a 
nearby room and matched the color, size, and manufacturer of the 
pants the defendant put on.  The jacket and pants were of a size 
to fit the defendant.  The police found a duffel bag containing 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
31 
 
clothing and baggies.  Detective Bloedorn further testified that 
when he asked the defendant who owned the duffel bag, the 
defendant stated that it belonged to him. 
¶73 The State entered the green pants as evidence. 
¶74 State 
Violated Criminal Discovery Statute.  The 
parties disagree about whether the State violated the criminal 
discovery statute by failing to disclose timely the defendant's 
statement requesting the green pants.  The State contends that 
the defendant's statement was not one that the district attorney 
"plan[ned] to use in the course of trial" and that the statement 
therefore was not subject to the prosecutor's duties under 
§ 971.23(1)(b). 
¶75 We assume for purposes of this review that the 
prosecutor planned to use the defendant's statement in the 
course of trial37 and that the State violated the criminal 
discovery statute by failing to disclose timely the defendant's 
statement requesting the green pants.  
¶76 Harmless Error.  The defendant's position is that the 
State's violation of its discovery obligation and Bloedorn's 
statement regarding the pants were so prejudicial that a new 
trial is warranted.  
                                                 
37 The test for whether the district attorney planned to use 
a statement in the course of trial is an objective one: "whether 
a reasonable prosecutor, exercising due diligence, should have 
known" of the evidence before trial, "and if so, whether a 
reasonable prosecutor would have planned to use [the evidence] 
in the course of trial."  DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶33. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
32 
 
¶77 We recognize that the prosecution's evidence against 
the defendant is circumstantial and limited: it has the 
defendant's proximity to the drugs, the defendant's matching 
clothing, and the defendant's identifiers in the room.  There 
was no confession, no witness who stated that the cocaine 
belonged to the defendant, no scientific testing (such as for 
fingerprints) that linked the defendant to the cocaine.  Under 
these circumstances evidence of the defendant's ownership of the 
pants is important. 
¶78 Although the defendant has a good point that his 
asking to put on the green pants does not have the same meaning 
as the act of putting on the pants, we conclude that the State's 
untimely disclosure of the defendant's alleged statement asking 
to put on the green pants had practically no effect on the 
defendant's trial.   
¶79 The circuit court instructed the jury to disregard 
Bloedorn's reference to the defendant's statement about the 
pants.  The officer's testimony that the defendant asked to put 
on the green pants was not substantially different from other, 
unchallenged testimony that the defendant put on the green pants 
of his own volition.  A person's request to put on a pair of 
pants does not seem significantly more probative of ownership 
than a person's act of putting on the same pants of his or her 
own volition.  Moreover, there was sufficient other evidence 
that the pants belonged to the defendant, including the 
defendant's proximity to where the pants were found and the fact 
that the pants fit the defendant. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
33 
 
¶80 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
State's 
untimely 
disclosure of the defendant's alleged statement asking to put on 
the green pants and Bloedorn's testimony that was stricken had 
practically no effect on the defendant's trial.  Under either 
statement of the harmless error test, the error was harmless. 
III 
¶81 We next consider whether the circuit court erred in 
failing to strike the evidence of the defendant's criminal 
history.  A State's witness referred to a document naming the 
defendant as "a court bail bond, some kind of court paperwork 
for [the defendant]" and then a "recognizance of bond in a 
criminal case . . . a posting of $1,000 by the defendant." 
¶82 Criminal History Generally Inadmissible.  Ordinarily 
evidence of a defendant's criminal history is not admissible 
because when such evidence is admitted, there can be an 
"overstrong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the 
charge merely because he is a person likely to do such acts" and 
because of "the confusion of issues which might result from 
bringing in evidence of other crimes."38  Evidence of a 
defendant's criminal history may serve as "an invitation to 
focus on an accused's character" and to "magnif[y] the risk that 
jurors will punish the accused for being a bad person regardless 
of his or her guilt of the crime charged."39 
                                                 
38 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 782-83, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998) (citing Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 
(1967)). 
39 Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 783.  
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
34 
 
¶83 Facts.  The State sought to introduce as evidence one 
of 
the 
documents 
bearing 
the 
defendant's 
name 
that 
law 
enforcement officers discovered in the same bedroom in which the 
jacket that contained the baggie with cocaine was found.  The 
prosecutor asked one of the arresting officers to identify the 
document.  The document was presented to show that the defendant 
was entrenched on the premises.  The officer identified the 
document as a "recognizance of bond in a criminal case . . . a 
posting of $1,000 by the defendant."  Shortly before the State 
introduced the bond as evidence, the officer also referred to 
the bond as "a court bail bond, some kind of court paperwork for 
[the defendant]."   
¶84 The defendant objected to the officer's description of 
the document and to admission of the recognizance bond as 
evidence.  The circuit court received the bond as an exhibit but 
did not send the bond to the jury.  The circuit court also 
barred the prosecutor from referring to the bond in the presence 
                                                                                                                                                             
The parties both treat the question whether evidence of the 
defendant's criminal history was admissible as a question 
governed by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 906.09.   
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.04(2) 
bars 
admission 
of 
evidence of other crimes to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith but 
allows such evidence under certain circumstances.   
In addition, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03 permits a circuit 
court to exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is 
substantially 
outweighed 
by 
the 
danger 
of 
unfair 
prejudice . . . ."   
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
35 
 
of the jury except as an "identifier" with the defendant's name 
on it.    
¶85  Standard of Review.  A circuit court's decision 
whether to admit or exclude evidence ordinarily lies within the 
circuit court's discretion.40  This court will not disturb a 
circuit court's discretionary decision so long as the record 
reflects "the circuit court's reasoned application of the 
appropriate legal standard to the relevant facts of the case."41  
Evidence erroneously admitted is subject to the harmless error 
rule.42   
¶86 The Circuit Court Erred in Failing to Strike Evidence 
of Defendant's Criminal History.  The State acknowledges that 
the evidence of the defendant's criminal history that it 
introduced at trial was inadmissible.43  The circuit court 
acknowledged that the State, the defense counsel, and the 
circuit court had "dropped the ball" in the way the recognizance 
bond had been treated at trial.  We agree with the State, 
defense counsel, and the circuit court, concluding that the 
State improperly introduced evidence of the defendant's criminal 
history when the State called the jury's attention to a 
                                                 
40 Leitinger 
v. 
DBart, 
Inc., 
2007 
WI 
84, 
¶18, 
302 
Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1.       
41 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 
(1999). 
42 State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶¶61-62, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 
N.W.2d 637.    
43 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent (State) at 26. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
36 
 
recognizance bond bearing the defendant's name and when a State 
witness referred to the bond as "a court bail bond, some kind of 
court paperwork for [the defendant]" and then a "recognizance of 
bond in a criminal case . . . a posting of $1,000 by the 
defendant." 
¶87 Harmless Error.  The danger of the admission of 
evidence of the defendant's criminal history is clear.  As the 
defendant argues in his brief, "[h]uman nature being what it is, 
most people would more easily find that an individual who has 
previous criminal cases would be more likely to commit yet 
another crime."44  
¶88 The witness's two references to the document as "a 
court bail bond, some kind of court paperwork for [the 
defendant]" 
and 
a 
"recognizance 
of 
bond 
in 
a 
criminal 
case . . . a posting of $1,000 by the defendant" were the only 
evidence of the defendant's criminal history presented to the 
jury.  The bond did not go to the jury.  
¶89 Considering the infrequency of the error, doubt 
whether the jury fully understood the significance of these 
statements, and the State's, the defendant's, and the circuit 
court's attempts to limit any emphasis on the evidence, we 
determine, as did the circuit court, that the admission of 
evidence of the defendant's criminal history as an identifier 
had limited if any effect on the defendant's trial when the 
                                                 
44 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner's Brief at 36. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
37 
 
error is evaluated in the context of the entire circumstances of 
the case. 
¶90 Under either statement of the harmless error test, the 
error in admitting criminal history evidence was harmless.   
IV 
¶91 We concluded that the State violated its discovery 
obligation under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e) and § 971.23(1)(h) by 
failing 
to 
disclose 
timely 
the 
two 
reports 
relating 
to 
fingerprints and by failing to disclose timely the defendant's 
statement 
requesting the green pants.  We turn to the 
defendant's assertion that the circuit court did not adequately 
sanction the State for violating its discovery obligations with 
regard to the fingerprint evidence.45 
¶92 Criminal Discovery Statute Authorizing Sanctions for 
State's Violation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(7m) governs the 
remedies for a discovery violation.  The statute provides 
several remedies. 
¶93 Section 971.23(7m)(a) states that a circuit court 
"shall exclude any witness not listed or evidence not presented 
for inspection or copying required by this section, unless good 
cause is shown for failure to comply."  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23(7m)(a), "[a]bsent a showing of good cause, the evidence 
the State failed to disclose must be excluded."46  Under 
                                                 
45 The defendant does not argue that the circuit court 
failed to sanction the State appropriately for violating its 
discovery obligations with regard to the defendant's statement 
asking for the green pants. 
46 DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶51. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
38 
 
§ 971.23(7m)(a) the circuit court may grant a continuance or a 
recess.   
¶94 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(7m)(b) provides that in lieu 
of or in addition to the sanctions provided in § 971.23(7m)(a), 
a circuit court may "advise the jury of any failure or refusal 
to 
disclose 
material 
or 
information 
required 
to 
be 
disclosed . . . or of any untimely disclosure of material or 
information required to be disclosed . . . ." 
¶95 Section 971.23(7m) provides as follows: 
(a) The court shall exclude any witness not listed or 
evidence not presented for inspection or copying 
required by this section, unless good cause is shown 
for failure to comply.  The court may in appropriate 
cases 
grant 
the 
opposing 
party 
a 
recess 
or 
a 
continuance. 
(b) In addition to or in lieu of any sanction 
specified in par. (a), a court may, subject to sub. 
(3), advise the jury of any failure or refusal to 
disclose 
material or information required to be 
disclosed under sub. (1) or (2m), or of any untimely 
disclosure of material or information required to be 
disclosed under sub. (1) or (2m). 
¶96 Standard of Review.  This court determines whether 
exclusion of evidence is statutorily mandated as a question of 
law to be determined by this court independent of the circuit 
court and court of appeals but benefiting from the analyses of 
these courts.  The circuit court's discretionary decision under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m)(a) regarding granting a continuance or 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
39 
 
recess47 and the circuit court's discretionary decision under 
§ 971.23(7m)(b) whether to advise the jury about the State's 
misconduct, in lieu of or in addition to the sanctions provided 
in § 971.23(7m)(a), is reviewed under the erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard.  We will not disturb a circuit court's 
discretionary decision so long as the record reflects "the 
circuit court's reasoned application of the appropriate legal 
standard to the relevant facts of the case."48  "The penalty for 
the breach of disclosure should fit the nature of the proffered 
evidence and remove any harmful effect on the defendant."49    
¶97 Facts.  When the State made no showing that it had 
good cause to delay the disclosure of the fingerprint evidence, 
the defendant asked the circuit court to exclude any fingerprint 
evidence.  The circuit court refused.  The circuit court 
explained that it had determined that § 971.23(7m)(a) did not 
require exclusion of the evidence when "the evidence in question 
was exculpatory."50  The circuit court also viewed the remedy of 
                                                 
47 The less drastic and more favored remedy than exclusion 
of evidence for the State's violation of the criminal discovery 
statute is for the circuit court to grant a continuance or 
recess.  Tucker v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 630, 640-41, 267 N.W.2d 630 
(1978). 
48 Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 281. 
49 DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶60 (citation omitted).    
50 Although 
the 
fingerprint 
evidence 
was 
arguably 
exculpatory, defense counsel viewed the evidence as prejudicial 
because it adversely affected his trial strategy in defending 
the defendant. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
40 
 
exclusion as too harsh a sanction against the prosecution in the 
present case.   
¶98 In this court the defendant's brief recognizes that 
the circuit court's refusal to exclude the fingerprint evidence 
may have been appropriate inasmuch as exclusion might have 
misled the jury into thinking that law enforcement had not 
undertaken to check the fingerprints.  The defendant asks this 
court to treat his motion for mistrial as a motion for a 
continuance or recess and to declare that the circuit court 
erred in failing to grant a continuance or recess.   
¶99 The defendant further argues here that under the 
circumstances of the present case an alternative remedy was 
available under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m)(b), which he requested, 
and which the circuit court failed to grant.   
¶100 Defense counsel requested that the circuit court give 
the State "a gentle admonishment in front of the jury" informing 
the jury that an issue of discovery relating to the fingerprint 
reports had come up, that the State had failed to notify the 
defendant timely of information in its possession, and that the 
circuit 
court 
had 
ruled 
on 
the 
matter. 
Defense 
counsel 
specifically requested that the circuit court inform the jury 
that defense counsel had received a report during lunch hour and 
that he should have received the report earlier.   
¶101 The 
circuit court informed defense counsel that 
although it would not "say exactly what [defense counsel] 
suggested," the circuit court would explain to the jury "in 
neutral terms" what had happened.  The circuit court stated it 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
41 
 
would explain the delay after defense counsel's objection to the 
fingerprint testimony and would do it in such a way as not to 
prejudice the defendant.  The circuit court refused "to point 
the finger at the State" but agreed to "take [defense counsel] 
off the hook."  
¶102 The circuit court couched its comments to the jury in 
terms of an apology to the jury for taking so long.  The circuit 
court also informed the jury that "[w]hen [defense counsel] 
raised his objections, he was doing the right thing"; that 
"lawyers have an obligation to object"; and that "we've worked 
through that problem, and we've got it resolved . . . ."  The 
circuit court did not address the nature of defense counsel's 
objection or the State's failure to comply timely with its 
discovery obligations.   
¶103 The circuit court merely reminded the jury, as it had 
stated earlier in the preliminary instructions, that counsel had 
an obligation to state objections and that the matter at issue 
(Investigator Patton's testimony) to which defense counsel had 
objected had been resolved.  This reminder was similar not only 
to the preliminary instruction about counsels' objections but 
also to the circuit court's later instruction to the jury about 
counsels' objections.51 
¶104 Circuit Court Erred In Failing to Sanction the State.  
The circuit court explained that it did not impose the 
discretionary sanction of informing the jury that the State 
                                                 
51 See Wis JI——Criminal 148 (2000). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
42 
 
failed to disclose the fingerprint information "because the 
information was immaterial [that is, not prejudicial], and the 
State had inadvertently failed to provide this information in 
discovery." 
¶105 This reasoning is not entirely sufficient.  The State 
erred in not complying with timely disclosure of the reports as 
statutorily required.  Although the effect of the State's 
failure to adhere to the criminal discovery statute on the 
defendant's trial strategy was not great and the admission of 
the evidence was not prejudicial, defense counsel was caught by 
surprise.  A defendant should not be surprised by two unproduced 
reports that were requested, were subject to discovery, and were 
in the prosecutor's possession.  Under the circumstances of the 
present case, we agree with the defendant that the circuit court 
should have exercised its discretion to mitigate the effect, if 
any, of the State's failure to fulfill its statutory discovery 
obligations by advising the jury pursuant to § 971.23(7m)(b).  
¶106 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in failing to 
advise the jury that the State had failed to make timely 
disclosure of the reports to the defendant under the criminal 
discovery statute, even though the State's failure to abide by 
the criminal discovery statute was not prejudicial error.   
¶107 Harmless error.  We have already concluded that the 
State's failure to disclose timely the fingerprint evidence and 
the circuit court's admission of the fingerprint evidence were 
not prejudicial.  In failing to sanction the State for its 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
43 
 
failure to disclose timely the fingerprint evidence, the circuit 
court missed an opportunity to mitigate any effect of the 
State's failure and the court's admission of the evidence.  The 
circuit court's failure to sanction the State did not, however, 
cause additional harm to the defendant.  
¶108 We conclude that the circuit court's failure to advise 
the jury that the State had failed to make timely disclosure to 
the defendant was harmless under either statement of the 
harmless error test. 
V 
¶109 The defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the 
errors is prejudicial and that a new trial must result.  The 
decision whether to grant a new trial generally lies within the 
discretion of the circuit court.52  We will not disturb a circuit 
court's discretionary decision so long as the record reflects 
"the circuit court's reasoned application of the appropriate 
legal standard to the relevant facts of the case."53 
¶110 The cumulative effect of several errors may, in 
certain instances, undermine a reviewing court's confidence in 
                                                 
52 State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶24, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 
N.W.2d 51. 
53 Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 281. 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
44 
 
the outcome of a proceeding.54  We therefore aggregate the 
effects of the multiple errors in determining whether their 
overall impact satisfies the standard for a new trial. 
¶111 Whatever phrasing we use in applying a harmless error 
analysis in the instant case, the errors viewed cumulatively 
were harmless, not prejudicial.   
¶112 We have concluded that the State's untimely disclosure 
of the fingerprint evidence and the admission of the fingerprint 
evidence did not significantly impair defense counsel's ability 
to argue that the State's circumstantial evidence did not 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
guilty 
of 
the 
crime 
charged; 
that 
the 
State's 
untimely 
disclosure of the defendant's statement asking to put on the 
green pants (and the exclusion of the defendant's statement) had 
no prejudicial effect on the defendant's trial; and that 
although the admission of evidence of the defendant's criminal 
history was erroneous, the evidence was not prejudicial.  
                                                 
54 State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶59, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305 (adopting, in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
case, the reasoning of the federal courts holding that prejudice 
should be assessed based on the cumulative effect of counsel's 
deficiencies); Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 
2000) ("Trial errors which in isolation are harmless might, when 
aggregated, alter the course of a trial so as to violate a 
petitioner's right to due process of law.") (citations omitted); 
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) 
("The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless 
errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same 
extent as a single reversible error."); United States v. 
Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Even if each of 
these errors, by itself, is arguably harmless, their cumulative 
effect may well be prejudicial."). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
45 
 
Although the circuit court erred in failing to admonish the 
State for its violations of the discovery statute, this error 
too was harmless.   
¶113 It is the State's burden to prove that the errors are, 
in their cumulative effect, harmless and not prejudicial.  The 
State has carried this burden under the facts of the present 
case.  The State has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggregated errors did not, under the totality of the 
circumstances, contribute to the verdict against the defendant 
or undermine confidence in the verdict.  Using an alternative 
phrasing of the test, the State has demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the State's errors.  Under the facts of 
the present case, the State's errors, viewed cumulatively, do 
not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the defendant's 
trial. 
* * * * 
¶114 We conclude as follows:  
I. 
The 
State 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1) 
(the 
criminal discovery statute) by failing to disclose 
timely the police reports.  The defendant's Brady due 
process rights were not violated.55  The State's 
statutory violation and the admission of the evidence 
were not prejudicial.    
                                                 
55 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
46 
 
II. The State violated Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(the criminal 
discovery statute) by failing to disclose timely the 
defendant's alleged statement asking for the pants 
that he put on.  The circuit court excluded the 
evidence.  The State's statutory violation was not 
prejudicial.   
III. The circuit court erred in failing to strike evidence 
of the defendant's criminal history. The admission of 
the evidence was not prejudicial error. 
IV. The circuit court erred in failing to sanction the 
State for violating Wis. Stat. § 971.23 (the criminal 
discovery statute).  The error was not prejudicial.  
V. 
The 
errors, 
when 
viewed 
cumulatively, 
are 
not 
prejudicial errors warranting a new trial.     
¶115 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction and order denying the defendant's postconviction 
motion for a new trial.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
No. 
2006AP882-CR   
 
 
 
1