Title: People v. Gonzales
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S067353
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2012

1 
Filed 8/2/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S067353 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
IVAN JOE GONZALES, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County  
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCD114421 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Defendant Ivan Joe Gonzales was convicted of murdering Genny Rojas.1  
The jury found as a special circumstance that the murder was intentional and 
involved the infliction of torture.2  However, it was unable to reach a penalty 
verdict.  Another jury was impaneled, and the second penalty phase trial resulted 
in a death verdict.3 
 
 
 
                                              
1  
Penal Code, section 187, subdivision (a).  Further statutory references are to 
the Penal Code. 
2  
Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18). 
3  
Following defendant‘s conviction and sentence, his wife Veronica was 
separately tried for Genny‘s murder.  (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 
910, fn. 8.)  We have affirmed her conviction and death sentence.  (Id. at p. 959.) 
 
2 
I.  FACTS 
 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
 
1.  Prosecution 
 
Genny Rojas was four years old when she died in July 1995.  She and her 
siblings had been removed from their mother‘s custody in April 1994, because 
their mother was abusing drugs and neglecting the children.  They were placed 
with their grandmother, Utilia Ortiz.  While in Ortiz‘s care, Genny appeared to the 
social worker to be happy and well cared for.  However, she was a difficult child, 
fearful and prone to tantrums.  Ortiz soon placed Genny in the care of Ortiz‘s 
daughter Anita and her husband Victor Negrette.  After four months, the Negrettes 
decided that Genny had needs they were unable to meet.  They returned her to 
Ortiz toward the end of 1994.  In February 1995, Ortiz sent Genny to live with 
another daughter, Veronica, and her husband Ivan Gonzales, the defendant in this 
case.  The Gonzaleses had six children of their own and lived in a two-bedroom 
apartment in Chula Vista. 
 
On the evening of July 21, 1995, two neighbors were standing outside a 
window of the Gonzales apartment.  They heard a loud bang, or thud, as if 
something had hit a wall inside the apartment, immediately followed by the sound 
of a child crying.  Defendant came to the window, looked out, and shut the 
window forcefully.  He emerged from the apartment, slammed the door, and 
walked off toward a nearby liquor store.  He appeared to be angry and in a hurry.  
Defendant entered the liquor store, where he was a regular customer, at 8:45 p.m.  
He asked for and received credit, purchased some grocery items, and left after five 
or 10 minutes. 
 
Around 9:00 that evening another neighbor, Patty Espinoza, heard Veronica 
Gonzales screaming for help.  Veronica said her niece had been burned in the 
bathtub.  Patty came out of her apartment and asked how anyone could be burned 
 
3 
in the bathtub.  Veronica asked Patty to come with her, and not call the police.  In 
the Gonzales apartment, Patty saw a child lying on the floor.  Defendant was 
nearby.  Patty told them she did not know how to perform cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR), but that her sister Naomi did.  Patty ran to get Naomi, who 
also lived in the building, and told the Gonzaleses to call 911.  Veronica, however, 
repeatedly said not to call the police. 
 
Naomi Espinoza had heard the commotion, and came out of her apartment 
upon hearing that a child was not breathing.  She saw defendant carrying a little 
girl.  Naomi, a nurse‘s assistant, had CPR training.  She asked defendant what 
happened, and he replied that the child had burned herself in the bathtub.  
Questioned further by Naomi, defendant explained that the child did not know 
how to regulate the water.  Naomi told him to take the child into Patty‘s 
apartment.  Defendant did so, and put her down on the rug. 
 
Naomi testified that she knew the child was dead, ―just by looking at her.‖  
Nevertheless, she checked for a pulse and attempted CPR.  The body was cold, the 
lips white.  Naomi noticed scars on the body and a bald spot on the head.  Shortly 
after the first police officers arrived, Naomi left the apartment. 
 
A 911 call was placed around 9:20 p.m.  Sergeant Barry Bennett responded, 
along with other officers.  As he approached the apartment, Veronica met him and 
directed him inside.  Bennett found a little girl lying on the floor.  Checking her 
vital signs, he detected no pulse or breathing.  He did not attempt CPR.  The body 
was very cold and felt rigid, indicating to him that the child had been dead for 
some time.  The shirt she was wearing was dry, as were her skin and hair.  While 
he was examining the body, Veronica told Bennett she had put the child in the tub, 
run the water, and gone to the kitchen to cook dinner.  After about 20 minutes, she 
returned to the bathroom and found the child under the water.  Bennett noted that 
defendant sat nearby, and described his demeanor as ―nonchalant.‖ 
 
4 
 
Bennett called in homicide and child abuse investigators.  It was obvious to 
him that the death was not accidental and the child had been abused.  The entire 
lower part of her body appeared to have been burned, and there were numerous 
other injuries. 
 
Fireman John Miller arrived at the apartment at 9:25 p.m.  He too assessed 
the child, and found her cold and without a pulse.  He prepared to perform CPR, 
but found the jaw clenched and difficult to move.  Miller concluded that rigor 
mortis had set in. 
 
A medical examiner came to the scene around 1:00 a.m.  He performed a 
preliminary external examination of the victim, who was identified as Genevieve 
Rojas.  He noted a second- to third-degree burn from her waist to her feet, and 
other burns on her face, arms, and torso.  Rigor mortis, which begins to develop 
within an hour or two of death, was present.  An autopsy was conducted the next 
morning.  Genny was thin and small, but adequately nourished.  Her body was 
covered with injuries. 
 
A large burned area on top of Genny‘s head had only partially healed.  This 
injury was infected, and at least a week old.  It could have been caused by hot 
liquid, possibly on more than one occasion.  The back of the head was also burned.  
There was hair loss, both in the burned area and elsewhere.  A similar burn 
appeared on the back of the neck and shoulder.  The skin on Genny‘s ears had 
been eroded, exposing the cartilage.  There were also abrasions at the end of her 
eyebrows and on the bridge of her nose.  These injuries could have been caused by 
rough fabric tightly bound around her head. 
 
There was bruising around both eyes, probably inflicted within a day or two 
of death.  Pinpoint hemorrhages in the right eye were typical of strangulation.  The 
cheekbone, shoulder, and neck were bruised.  There were recent burns on both 
cheeks, in a grid pattern matching the grill on a hairdryer found in the Gonzales 
 
5 
apartment.  Similar burns appeared on the shoulders and left bicep.  Genny‘s lip 
was lacerated and torn away from the gum.  Numerous small injuries on her face 
could have been inflicted with a hairbrush.  She had suffered a subdural 
hematoma, the result of a blow or shaking within a day of her death, and an older 
brain hemorrhage that had been caused by a violent blow. 
 
Genny‘s neck bore a ligature mark, extending upward behind her left ear.  
This injury was a week or two old.  A similar scar ran from her jawbone to the 
underside of her chin.  There were triangular scars on top of her left shoulder.  On 
her arms were parallel scars typical of the marks left by handcuffs.  Handcuffs 
matching the marks on Genny‘s arms were recovered from the Gonzales 
apartment.  Her arms and wrists also had abrasions, which could have been caused 
by binding with a cord.  Bruises on the inside of her thighs suggested she had been 
grabbed from behind with a great deal of force.  Ulcerated areas on both heels in 
the area of the Achilles tendon were consistent with erosion from binding. 
 
The most significant injury, and the cause of death, was the burn on the 
lower part of Genny‘s body.  It appeared to be an immersion burn, with spared 
areas behind the knees, in the groin area, and on the buttocks indicating that 
Genny had been held down in a fetal position in the tub, with her arms out of the 
water.  Death would have occurred within two to three hours.  There was no 
evidence of drowning.  Genny‘s thymus gland was atrophied, a sign of prolonged 
stress.  It was clear to the examiner that she had been chronically and repeatedly 
abused. 
 
A pediatric burn expert confirmed that the burn was an immersion injury.  
He estimated the water temperature at 140 degrees or higher.  It would have been 
seven or eight inches deep, and Genny must have been held down firmly, leaning 
forward a little.  The burn injury could have been inflicted in 10 seconds or less; it 
could not have occurred gradually.  With treatment, the chances of survival would 
 
6 
have been around 90 percent.  However, within one to four hours of infliction, 
Genny would have gone into shock.  Death could occur quite rapidly thereafter in 
a child of her age. 
 
The burn on Genny‘s scalp could have been caused by hot water striking 
the top of her head and flowing onto her neck and shoulders.  The expert did not 
believe it was accidentally inflicted, or that it could have been caused by Genny 
tipping over a pot of hot water on the stove. 
 
Officer Bennett went to the Gonzales apartment shortly after he examined 
Genny‘s body in Patty Espinoza‘s apartment.  The bathtub in the Gonzales 
bathroom appeared to be dry, as did the bathroom floor.  Human tissue 
subsequently found in the tub was consistent with Genny‘s DNA, and not with 
defendant‘s or Veronica‘s.  It took 15 minutes to fill the tub with hot water.  When 
full, the water was eight and a half inches deep, and 140 degrees.  At that 
temperature, it would have taken six to eight seconds to cause the burn on Genny‘s 
lower body. 
 
In one bedroom, the area behind the door was cordoned with a string 
fastened to the doorknob at one end, and to the knob of a nightstand placed against 
the wall at the other.  In this triangular area there was an indentation in the 
wallboard, 36 inches from the floor.  There were bloodstains in the indentation, 
and on the wall around and below it.  A blanket behind the door was stained with 
matter consistent with Genny‘s DNA. 
 
The closet in this bedroom yielded a considerable amount of bloodstain 
evidence.  The closet doors were off their tracks, and leaned into the closet.  A 
metal hook was fastened to the closet bar mounting bracket.  On the floor beneath 
the hook was a wooden box, measuring about two feet in all three dimensions.  A 
hole in one of the closet doors afforded a view of the hook.  On the wall of the 
closet, below the hook and above the box, were many bloodstains.  Some were 
 
7 
created by hair wiping against the wall, others were the result of blood being flung 
against the wall.  There was blood on the closet bar, the hook, and the cloth 
fastening the hook to the bar.  There was a bloody footprint on the wall, but no 
handprint.  There was blood on the edge of the box, and both blood and feces in 
the box.  The interior of the closet door was spattered with blood.  
 
The bloodstains were consistent with a scenario in which a bleeding child 
Genny‘s size was suspended from the hook in the closet, rubbing some blood on 
the surfaces around her and casting some off as she swung back and forth, bracing 
herself with her feet on the box and the wall.  Genny‘s DNA was consistent with 
blood samples taken from the closet. 
 
Defendant was interviewed by detectives at 9:45 a.m. on the morning after 
Genny‘s death.  A videotape of the interview was played for the jury.  He said 
Genny had not been toilet trained, and they had problems with her ―goin‘ to the 
bathroom a lot, in her pants and on the floor.‖  The previous evening, he and 
Veronica had put Genny in the bath together, and he had ―set the water on warm.‖  
Only they and their children were in the apartment.  After 10 minutes or so 
Veronica told defendant to check on Genny, but he was distracted by a loud bang 
and checked on the other children instead.  He went to the store and bought milk, 
bread, and beer, returning in about 10 minutes.  Veronica was making dinner.  
After another 10 minutes or so, she went to check on Genny, and screamed for 
defendant.  He found Veronica taking Genny out of the bathtub.  He tried to 
perform CPR, but it wasn‘t helping, so Veronica went to get help from Patty next 
door. 
 
Defendant said Genny had a lot of marks on her body, which he attributed 
to her habit of peeling and picking at her own skin.  The burn on her head had 
happened when she knocked over a pot of boiling water.  They had not gotten a 
Medi-Cal card for Genny from Veronica‘s mother, so they tried to care for the 
 
8 
burn themselves.  Genny would rub her head against the walls.  Defendant said the 
ligature mark on Genny‘s neck was caused by ―neighbor kids‖ pulling on a candy 
necklace.  He had not noticed the hair dryer burns on Genny‘s face. 
 
Defendant admitted that he and Veronica made Genny sleep in the closet 
three or four times.  He also said he put her in the box a couple of times, to scare 
her.  Defendant claimed the hook above the box was also meant to scare Genny, 
but he denied ever tying her to the hook.  The hole in the closet door was used to 
hold a stick on which they would dry clothing, according to defendant.  He said 
they never handcuffed Genny, though Veronica tied her hands with cloth once.  
He insisted they did not hold Genny down in the hot water. 
 
The jury also watched a videotape of preliminary hearing testimony by 
defendant‘s oldest child, Ivan, Jr., who was eight years old when he testified. 4  He 
said Genny did not sleep with the other children, but in his parents‘ room or in the 
bathtub.  Her hands and feet were tied when she was in the tub.  The children‘s 
bedroom had no doorknob, and Ivan, Jr., could look through the hole in the door 
and see into the bathroom.  There was a sliding lock on the outside of the bedroom 
door. 5  On the night Genny died, Ivan, Jr., and the other children were locked in 
their room.  Ivan saw Genny in the bathtub, through the hole in the door.  Then he 
heard her screaming and crying, but he did not look again.  He did not see his 
                                              
4  
In addition to the preliminary hearing videotape, the prosecutor played 
audio- or videotapes of three prior interviews with Ivan, Jr.  These interviews 
included statements both consistent and inconsistent with Ivan, Jr.‘s preliminary 
hearing testimony.  (See People v. Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 908-910.)  
The preliminary hearing testimony is sufficient for purposes of our factual 
synopsis here.  
5  
The physical evidence, and testimony by investigators, confirmed Ivan, 
Jr.‘s statements about the state of the bedroom door and the view through the hole 
in the door. 
 
9 
father put water in the tub.  After his mother screamed, his father came to the door 
and told the children to stay in the room.  His father seemed to be sad.  
 
When Genny came to live with them, she had all her hair and no marks or 
bruises on her face.  Ivan, Jr., said she lost her hair when his mother burned her, 
and pulled out her hair.  He saw both his parents pulling her hair out, many times.  
He added that he had watched through the hole in the door on many occasions 
when his mother and father burned Genny with hot water in the bathtub.  ―They 
would put her in the tub and they would start putting hot water, and then a few of 
her hairs would come off.‖  Genny would lie down in the tub, and his father would 
hold her head down, with his mother helping.  Hot water would come out of the 
spout, and Genny would scream and cry.  Ivan, Jr., never saw her get burned by a 
pot of hot water on the stove.  
 
Genny would scratch her head on the wall, and when she did his parents 
would hit her with a belt.  Ivan, Jr., said that Genny was potty trained and did not 
have accidents going to the bathroom.  He saw Genny in the closet in his parents‘ 
room many times, with her hands tied.  He saw her on the floor of the closet, and 
also in the box.  One time he saw Genny hanging in the closet, ―in a basket,‖ with 
her hands tied and her feet off the ground. 
 
The rest of the children ate in the kitchen, but Genny ate in the parents‘ 
room.  Sometimes Ivan, Jr., would give Genny food, when she was crying for it.  
If his parents discovered this, they would hit him.  Once they made him and his 
siblings throw balls at Genny.  Ivan, Jr., would ―throw it crooked‖ because he did 
not want to hurt her. 
 
Ivan, Jr., said his mother would usually get what she wanted if his parents 
disagreed about something.  He was afraid of his father, but not of his mother.  He 
thought his mother was afraid of his father, who hit her.  However, his mother 
often told his father what to do, and sometimes he would obey. 
 
10 
 
 
2.  Defense 
 
Juan Lozano, a nephew of Patty and Naomi Espinoza, testified that when 
Genny‘s body was brought into Patty‘s apartment he tried to perform CPR, before 
Naomi arrived.  He had no difficulty moving Genny‘s jaw in order to clear an 
airway.  Lozano said Genny was cold, with no pulse or breath.  Her hair was 
damp. 
 
A social worker testified that on July 24, 1995, shortly after Genny‘s death, 
Ivan, Jr., told her that he didn‘t hear Genny cry, but did hear her say ―ow,‖ and 
then his mother had found her in the water.  He said he was afraid of his father, but 
not of his mother.  He told the social worker that he did not see anyone hit Genny 
and did not think his parents would hurt her.  On subsequent meetings before the 
preliminary hearing, he said nothing about Genny being abused.  He did say that 
Genny rarely came out of his parents‘ bedroom. 
 
The rest of the defense case was primarily aimed at establishing that 
Veronica was the dominant spouse in defendant‘s marriage.6  The owner of a 
grocery store near the Gonzales apartment testified that she saw defendant in the 
store on a daily basis, and he was quiet and submissive.  Veronica, on the other 
hand, who came in monthly to cash her check, was assertive and outgoing.  When 
defendant was along he would stay behind Veronica, watching the children, and 
let her do the talking.  Veronica would tell him which brand of cigarettes she 
would buy for him. 
 
Guadalupe Baltazar, defendant‘s sister, testified that she had seen Genny at 
defendant‘s apartment twice.  The first time, about a month after she had come to 
                                              
6 
As noted at the outset, both defendant and Veronica were charged in 
connection with Genny‘s death, but they were tried separately.   
 
11 
live with them, she was playing with the other children and appeared normal.  The 
second time, shortly after the 4th of July, she had a towel wrapped around her 
head.  Baltazar knew Genny had burned her head, because she was present a 
couple of weeks earlier when defendant came to their mother‘s house and asked 
for money to buy ointment.  At the Gonzales apartment, Veronica took the towel 
off and showed Baltazar the burn, which had formed a scab on Genny‘s head and 
shoulder.  There were no cuts or scars on her face, arms, or legs. 
 
The Gonzaleses had lived with Baltazar for a while, and she saw them on 
social occasions.  She never saw defendant verbally or physically abuse Veronica, 
but once, as defendant was working on a car, Veronica angrily slammed the hood 
on his head.  She also pulled some wires out of the car and yelled at defendant, 
who did not respond other than to tell her to ―knock it off.‖  Patricia Andrade, 
another of defendant‘s sisters, testified that Veronica was verbally and physically 
abusive toward him. 
 
Eugene Luna had supervised defendant when he worked as a garbage truck 
driver.  Luna had socialized with the Gonzaleses, and never saw defendant being 
physically aggressive with his wife.  He had seen Veronica on one occasion hit 
defendant in the mouth with her fist, during an argument.  His general impression 
was that Veronica was in charge of the household and made the decisions.  
Defendant once told Luna that Ivan, Jr., had seen Luna‘s son kissing Veronica.  He 
asked Luna to talk to his son about this, but the son denied having an affair with 
Veronica.  Defendant had seemed nervous and embarrassed.  Later, Luna‘s son 
admitted the affair and said a child had been born as a result.  Defendant never 
mentioned the matter again.  About six months later the Gonzaleses moved and 
Luna had no further contact with them. 
 
Eugene Luna, Jr., testified that he had an affair with Veronica for a few 
months when he was 16 or 17.  On one occasion, defendant had challenged him 
 
12 
about the affair, and took a swing at him.  Luna, Jr., swung back, knocked 
defendant down, then helped him up.  That was the end of the confrontation.  
Veronica became pregnant and named Luna, Jr., as the father.  Luna, Jr., once saw 
Veronica become angry with defendant, throw a plate at him, and hit him in the 
mouth.  Another time, after a night of drinking, Veronica had lost her temper when 
defendant tried to help her roll up a car window.  She cursed at defendant and 
kicked the dashboard of the car.  Witnesses called the police, who ended up 
spraying Luna, Jr., and defendant with mace, and arresting Veronica. 
 
Lorena Peevler knew defendant because her ex-husband was defendant‘s 
best friend.  Defendant was quiet and shy as a teenager.  Lorena became friends 
with Veronica, and the Gonzaleses lived with the Peevlers for a few months.  
Veronica picked fights with defendant, yelling at him.  She also hit him and 
scratched him.  Defendant tried to protect himself, but did not hit back.  After one 
fight, he ran away and climbed a utility pole.  The police came to get him down.  
Lorena saw Veronica as the boss in the relationship.  Frank Peevler testified that 
he and defendant grew up together.  Defendant‘s parents were not abusive.  
Defendant was shy and timid around girls.  Frank also viewed Veronica as the 
dominant partner in the Gonzales relationship. 
 
 
3.  Rebuttal 
 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor called Martha Halog, a neighbor of the 
Gonzaleses‘ in the apartment building where Genny came to live.  Halog had 
overheard an argument in which defendant verbally abused Veronica.  Victor 
Negrette, Veronica‘s brother-in-law, testified that defendant was a jealous and 
overprotective husband.  He and Veronica argued a lot, and on one occasion she 
asked Negrette to come get her because defendant had hit her.  Negrette heard 
defendant yell and curse at Veronica many times.  He had also seen defendant 
yanking one of the Gonzales boys by the arm, hitting him with a plastic bat, and 
 
13 
kicking another son.  Negrette once saw defendant angrily punch out the windows 
of a car parked near the Gonzales apartment. 
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
The jury that found defendant guilty of murder was unable to reach a 
penalty verdict, dividing eight to four.  The penalty phase was retried before a new 
jury.  The prosecutor relied on evidence of the crime similar to the showing made 
at the guilt phase.  Defendant recapitulated his guilt phase defense, and also 
provided witnesses testifying to his good behavior in prison, his character when he 
was growing up, his Catholic upbringing, his children‘s love for him, and the 
effect his execution would have on them, his siblings, and his parents. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues 
 
 
1.  Pretrial Motions 
 
Defendant challenges the trial court‘s denial of a series of pretrial motions.  
These rulings require no extended discussion, because they conform with 
established California law and defendant develops no arguments persuading us to 
change our settled views.  Thus: 
 
Individual and sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors in capital cases is 
not required.  (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 632-633; People v. 
Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 956.) 
 
The court properly denied defendant‘s motion for a jury instruction that a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole would mean that he was actually 
ineligible for parole.  (People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 164; People v. 
Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.) 
 
The court‘s denials of defendant‘s motion to set aside the indictment and 
motions on related grounds by Veronica, in which defendant joined, were not error 
on any of the following grounds:  inclusion of inapplicable aggravating factors 
 
14 
(People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 593); failure to designate factors as 
aggravating or mitigating (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 
334); failure to require written findings on aggravating factors (id. at p. 333); 
failure to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to aggravating factors, the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the appropriateness of death as 
the penalty (ibid.); lack of intercase proportionality review (ibid.); 7 use of the 
adjectives ―extreme‖ and ―substantial‖ in section 190.3 factors (Gonzales and 
Soliz, at p. 334); asserted vagueness of the section 190.3 factors (Gonzales and 
Soliz, at p. 334); or prosecutorial discretion over whether to seek the death penalty 
(People v. Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 958.)  Defendant makes no attempt to 
explain how any of these factors may have been a proper ground for setting aside 
the indictment.  He merely relies on general constitutional arguments that have 
consistently been rejected by this court. 
 
The trial court properly denied defendant‘s motion to strike the torture-
murder special-circumstance allegation.  Defendant contends the definition of 
torture murder is unconstitutionally vague and fails to adequately distinguish 
between death-eligible torture-murderers and other torture-murderers.  We have 
held otherwise.  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 394; People v. Barnett 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1161-1163.)  Defendant claims the defects in the special 
circumstance were particularly problematic under the facts of his case and the 
instructions given to the jury.  These matters were beyond the scope of his pretrial 
motion to strike. 
                                              
7  
Defendant also claims that intracase proportionality review is not available.  
However, this court does, when the question is raised, undertake intracase 
proportionality review to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to the 
defendant‘s personal culpability.  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 800.) 
 
15 
 
Defendant moved for the jury venire to be drawn from the South Bay 
Judicial District of San Diego County, where the crime was committed and where 
he claimed there was a higher percentage of Latino residents.  The trial court‘s 
denial of this motion was supported by law.  (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 529, 573-574; O’Hare v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 86, 93-97.)  
Defendant offers no specific argument other than to claim, without reference to the 
record, that it was unfair for defendants charged with homicides occurring in the 
North County Judicial District to have juries drawn from that district, while those 
charged with homicides in the South Bay Judicial District had juries drawn from 
the entire county.  He did not make this argument below, and it is not properly 
before us on appeal. 
 
Defendant also challenges the court‘s denial of Veronica‘s motion to quash 
the jury venire, in which he joined.  The motion was based on the exclusion of 
noncitizen residents and felons, grounds that we have rejected.  (People v. Pride 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 227; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 631-634.) 
 
Finally, defendant claims the court erred by denying his motion for 
supplemental discovery of the charging practices of the district attorney, which 
was aimed at showing racial discrimination in the decision to pursue the death 
penalty.  Defendant concedes that he failed to provide a plausible justification 
under People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171, and People v. Ashmus 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 980, but asks us to reconsider those precedents.  We decline 
to do so.  (See also In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 202-203.) 
 
 
2.  Defendant’s Waiver of His Right to Be Present 
 
Defendant contends he did not validly waive his right to be present on four 
occasions:  the initial meetings with prospective jurors before the guilt phase and 
again before the penalty phase retrial, and two sessions of voir dire exploring 
prospective jurors‘ claims of hardship before the guilt phase. 
 
16 
 
Before trial, the court announced that it would use the jurors‘ lounge to 
meet with the first group of 300 to 400 prospective jurors.  The parties would then 
return to the courtroom to go through the forms filled out by prospective jurors 
claiming hardship.  The court said that defendant might not want to be present for 
the initial meeting in the jurors‘ lounge, and noted that defendants routinely 
waived the right to be present for such proceedings.  The court explained: 
 
―He‘s got a right to be present.  If he wants to be, he will be.  Most 
defendants don‘t want to do that.  He will have to be — he‘ll be in custody.  There 
will be extra marshals around him.  He won‘t be in as secure a setting so there will 
be extra security.  He‘ll be in waist chains and handcuffs which can, to some 
extent, be covered up by clothes.  But the overall picture that‘s presented to the 
jury isn‘t going to be quite the same one that we would be able to do here in the 
courtroom.‖ 
 
Defense counsel said his client would waive the right to be present on that 
day.  The court told defendant what would be happening at the first meeting with 
the venire.  It advised him that he had the right to be present but extra security 
would be required in the jurors‘ lounge, meaning that ―you‘ll be in chains.‖  
Defendant said he was willing to give up his right to attend the proceedings in the 
jurors‘ lounge.  On the court day before the first meeting, defense counsel asked 
the court to be sure the court‘s records reflected that defendant‘s presence was not 
required, ―just so that he doesn‘t end up sitting in a holding tank all day.‖ 
 
At the meeting in the jurors‘ lounge, the court explained the selection 
process, the time commitment that was required, and the bases for obtaining a 
hardship exemption.  Those requesting an exemption filled out a form and were 
told to return in the afternoon.  The remaining prospective jurors were introduced 
to counsel, heard the charges against defendant, received some preliminary 
 
17 
instructions, and were given questionnaires to complete.  The court told them that 
defendant ―is not present today but will be present at every future hearing.‖ 
 
In the afternoon, prospective jurors claiming hardship came to the 
courtroom, and the court questioned some of them individually.  This process 
continued the next court day, which the court began by announcing that defendant 
―is not present, having waived his presence for this initial phase of the jury 
selection.‖  Ten jurors were not granted hardship exemptions.  The court read 
them the charges and gave them preliminary instructions.  The court informed 
them again that while defendant was not present, he would be at all future 
hearings. 
 
Before the penalty phase retrial, defense counsel reported that defendant 
was again willing to waive his right to be present in the jurors‘ lounge for the 
―mass group‖ of prospective jurors, and asked the court to put his waiver on the 
record.  The court again explained, more briefly this time, the nature of the 
proceedings and asked defendant if he was willing to give up his right to be 
present.  Defendant said yes. 
 
Defendant now claims his waivers were invalid, and notes that he never 
waived his right to be present in court when the hardship voir dire was conducted 
before the guilt phase.  He argues that the court improperly required him to choose 
between his right to be present and his right not to be shackled in front of the jury.  
Defendant contends his constitutional rights to be present under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California 
Constitution, were violated, as well as his statutory right to be present under 
section 977, which could only be waived in writing.  (§ 977, subd. (b)(1).) 
 
  ― ‗Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be personally 
present at any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to prevent 
―interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.‖ ‘  
 
18 
[Citation.])  ‗Due process guarantees the right to be present at any ―stage that is 
critical to [the] outcome‖ and where the defendant‘s ―presence would contribute to 
the fairness of the procedure.‖ ‘  [Citation.]   ‗ ―The state constitutional right to be 
present at trial is generally coextensive with the federal due process right. 
[Citations.]‖  [Citation.]  Neither the state nor the federal Constitution, nor the 
statutory requirements of sections 977 and 1043, require the defendant‘s personal 
appearance at proceedings where his presence bears no reasonable, substantial 
relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.  [Citations.]‘  
[Citation.]  ‗Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that his absence 
prejudiced his case or denied him a fair trial.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Blacksher 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 799.) 
 
Here, the trial court was too quick to declare that defendant would be 
subjected to physical restraints if he chose to be present.  It did not make the 
required specific findings of manifest need for restraints.  (See Deck v. Missouri 
(2005) 544 U.S. 622, 633; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291.)  It is 
reasonable to conclude that defendant‘s decision to be absent was influenced, in 
part, by the prospect of being shackled.8  The court should also have secured a 
written waiver, as required by statute.  (§ 977, subd. (b)(1).)  Nevertheless,  we 
have rejected claims of error based on a defendant‘s absence from jury screening 
discussions.  (E.g., People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855-856; People v. 
Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 72–74; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 178.)  In 
any event, defendant fails to bear his burden of showing prejudice. 
                                              
8  
We note, however, that defendant did not object when the court mentioned 
shackling, or propose less rigorous security measures to facilitate his presence at 
the large meeting of prospective jurors. 
 
19 
 
Defendant does not contend he might have provided assistance to his 
counsel during these essentially administrative jury selection proceedings.  His 
only claim of prejudice is that the prospective jurors may have gotten the 
impression that he, charged with a horrible crime, ―callously did not bother to 
show up at his own capital trial.‖  Such a speculative and peripheral consideration 
is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability (People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836) or a reasonable doubt as to the eventuality of a result more 
favorable to defendant had he been present (Chapman v. California (1967) 380 
U.S. 18, 87; Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 953).  Experienced defense counsel 
saw no need for defendant‘s presence.  The prospective jurors were preoccupied 
with the mechanics of filling out questionnaires.  They were well aware of the 
large number of venire members, and the sometimes tedious process of jury 
selection.  At the guilt phase, they were told by the court that defendant would be 
present at all future proceedings, and he was.  It is unlikely that the prospective 
jurors at either phase thought any the less of defendant because he was not 
personally present at this early stage of the proceedings.  
 
 
3.  Exclusion of Evidence That Veronica Was Abused as a Child 
 
Defendant claims the court violated his fundamental right to present a 
complete defense by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence that his wife 
Veronica had witnessed and experienced child abuse in her own family, similar to 
the abuse inflicted on Genny Rojas.9  Defendant contends this was circumstantial 
evidence of third party liability, which did not amount to improper propensity or 
                                              
9  
Defendant asserts violation of his rights to produce witnesses in his defense 
under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of 
the California Constitution, as well as due process violations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the state Constitution. 
 
20 
profile evidence.  He alternatively argues that even if it was proper to bar this 
evidence on state law grounds, the exclusion violated his federal constitutional 
rights.  Defendant further contends that if his murder conviction is upheld, the 
torture-murder special circumstance should be vacated because the evidence of 
Veronica‘s childhood experiences would have negated the intent-to-kill element.10 
 
At trial, defendant made an offer of proof consisting of four documents and 
an expert witness.  He presented a juvenile court petition from August 1980, 
stating that Veronica‘s mother, Utilia Ortiz, had brought her 16-year-old daughter 
Mary (who eventually became Genny‘s mother) to a sheriff‘s station and stated 
she could not control her.  Mary had scratches and bruises on her arms, legs, 
shoulders and back, which she said were the result of her mother‘s beatings with 
sticks and boards.  Mary said the bruises were minor compared to others her 
mother had inflicted. 
 
Defendant also offered reports detailing interviews with a cousin, an uncle, 
and a friend of Veronica‘s.  The cousin recalled that Ortiz drank heavily and was 
―scary‖ when drunk, starting fights with her husband.  Mary was a stubborn and 
difficult child, while Veronica and Anita were the favored daughters.  The cousin 
was unable to recall specific incidents, but in August 1980 a social worker had 
noted the cousin‘s report that Ortiz had hit Mary with a broomstick and lit a pile of 
newspapers at her bare feet, causing Mary to run away.  The cousin said that once, 
when drunk, Ortiz had ―pulled the girls by their hair and pulled them around the 
house.‖ 
                                              
10  
Defendant also contends he should have been allowed to present this 
evidence at the penalty phase, a claim we discuss in part II.B.2., post. 
 
21 
 
Veronica‘s uncle said that Mary had shown him burns Ortiz inflicted on 
her.  Ortiz yelled and cursed at the girls, but Veronica had been spared to some 
degree because she was the favorite of Ortiz‘s husband.  Ortiz fought with various 
family members when drunk.  Veronica‘s friend had heard Veronica and Mary 
describe their abuse in 1986.  Mary remembered that Ortiz would ―tie them back 
to back and set their legs on fire.‖  Veronica said she also remembered that.  When 
asked if Ortiz had tortured them, the girls said ―yes.‖11 
 
Defendant also proffered the testimony of Dr. Patricia Perez-Arce, a 
neuropsychologist with expertise in the social development of Latino children.  At 
a hearing held under Evidence Code section 402, Dr. Perez-Arce testified that 
defendant‘s family exemplified traditional Mexican-American values.  Veronica‘s 
family did not share these values, due to her mother‘s drunkenness and violence.  
Her mother had provided a model of poor impulse control and violent reaction to 
stressful or threatening situations.  Those experiences would have influenced 
Veronica in dealing with her own frustrations as a mother. 
 
Perez-Arce conceded that Veronica‘s biological children were well cared 
for, but opined that Genny‘s arrival in the household created stress that caused 
Veronica to become abusive.  Genny may have become the target of that abuse 
because she had been imposed on Veronica by her mother, because Veronica and 
Mary had an ―adversive‖ relationship, and because, according to defendant, 
Veronica suspected him of having had an affair with Mary and perhaps of 
fathering Genny.  On cross-examination, Perez-Arce said she had no data on how 
                                              
11  
Defendant‘s offer of proof did not specify which, if any, of the witnesses 
mentioned in the documents would be called to testify.  Because we dispose of his 
arguments on other grounds, we need not consider whether there may have been 
foundational or hearsay problems with the proposed evidence. 
 
22 
frequently abused children became abusers themselves, but thought it occurred 
less than half the time.  She also acknowledged that Latino men, like men in 
general, were more likely to physically abuse their children than Latina women. 
 
The trial court, after extended consideration, decided defendant had 
proffered character evidence that was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 
1101.  The court further ruled that applying this state rule of evidence did not 
violate defendant‘s federal constitutional rights to present a defense, because the 
evidence of Veronica‘s childhood abuse, while probative to some degree, was 
weak and speculative insofar as it reflected on her behavior toward Genny. 
 
We review the court‘s rulings under Evidence Code section 1101 for abuse 
of discretion.  (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1003.)  Defendant 
argues that his proffer did not amount to ―evidence of a person‘s character or a 
trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of 
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) . . . offered to 
prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.‖  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)  
He notes he did not offer evidence that Veronica had committed prior acts of child 
abuse.  However, the prohibition on character evidence is not so limited.  The 
statute is aimed at evidence of a person‘s ―propensity or disposition to engage in a 
certain type of conduct,‖ when ―offered as a basis for an inference that he behaved 
in conformity with that character on a particular occasion.‖  (Cal. Law Revision 
Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West‘s Ann. Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. § 1101, p. 221.)  
This is precisely what defendant sought to establish by offering evidence of 
Veronica‘s childhood experiences.  He wanted the jury to infer that she, not he, 
was responsible for abusing Genny due to a propensity that developed during her 
youth.    
 
Defendant seeks to distinguish People v. Walkey (1986) 177  Cal.App.3d 
268, which the trial court found persuasive.  There, the prosecution called an 
 
23 
expert to testify that Walkey, who had been an abused child himself, fit the profile 
of a battering parent.  The court held that this was impermissible character 
evidence.  (Id. at p. 276.)  Defendant insists he offered no similar ―profile‖ 
evidence.  However, to the extent he sought to establish that Veronica modeled her 
conduct on her mother‘s behavior, he necessarily claimed that Veronica‘s 
childhood experiences had resulted in a character trait predisposing her to abuse 
Genny.  The court properly ruled that this evidence was barred by Evidence Code 
section 1101.  (See People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 372-373 [Evid. 
Code, § 1101 applies to third party culpability evidence]; People v. Abilez (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 472, 502-503 [same]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 501 
[same].) 
 
Defendant contends the evidence showed that Veronica had learned abusive 
methods of discipline as a child by observing her mother.  He compares this case 
to People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 582-583, where the prosecution 
presented evidence that Griffin had learned slaughtering techniques while working 
at a meat company, which he then used on the murder victim.  However, no 
specialized techniques were employed in the abuse of Genny Rojas.  The more 
bizarre forms of abuse she suffered (being hung from a hook in a closet and 
branded with the grill of a hair dryer) required no expertise, nor were they similar 
to the abuse to which Veronica was allegedly exposed.  Likewise, the burns 
inflicted on Genny with hot water were neither technically arcane nor similar to 
what Veronica experienced.  As for the beating, tying, and handcuffing Genny 
suffered, the employment of these forms of abuse takes no training.  Griffin has no 
application here. 
 
24 
 
Defendant further argues that the proffered evidence was admissible under 
two of the exceptions recognized in Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(b).12  He claims Veronica‘s childhood experiences were relevant to establish her 
motive or her identity as Genny‘s killer.  (See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
646, 705-706.)  Defense counsel made this argument below, but the trial court was 
not persuaded.  It reasoned that, at bottom, defendant was trying to prove Veronica 
was likely to have abused Genny because of a character trait that developed from 
Veronica‘s earlier experience.  The court was correct.  A person‘s own prior 
misconduct may be admissible to show that the charged offense is so similar as to 
support an inference that the same person committed both acts, or to show that in 
light of the prior conduct the person must have harbored a similar intent or motive 
during the charged offense.  (See Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 706; People v. 
Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403.)  Here, however, defendant did not offer 
specific acts of misconduct by Veronica as circumstantial evidence of her motive 
or identity.  Rather, he wanted to show that she had internalized the abuse she saw 
and experienced as a child, causing her to become an abusive mother.  This is pure 
character evidence, well beyond the scope of Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b).  
 
The trial court also properly rejected defendant‘s contention that precluding 
him from introducing Veronica‘s family history of child abuse would violate his 
                                              
12  
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that 
evidence of a person‘s past misconduct is admissible ―when relevant to prove 
some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to 
commit such an act.‖ 
 
25 
federal constitutional rights to present a defense.13  As the high court explained in 
Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 (Holmes), a capital case:  ― ‗[S]tate 
and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish 
rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.‘  [Citations.]  This latitude, 
however, has limits.  ‗Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of 
the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ―a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.‖ ‘  [Citation.]  This right is 
abridged by evidence rules that ‗infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused‘ 
and are ‗ ―arbitrary‖ or ―disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to 
serve.‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (Holmes, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 324-325.) 
 
―While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence 
under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends 
that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial 
judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other 
factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the 
jury.  [Citations.]  Plainly referring to rules of this type, we have stated that the 
Constitution permits judges ‗to exclude evidence that is ―repetitive . . . , only 
marginally relevant‖ or poses an undue risk of ―harassment, prejudice,  [or] 
confusion of the issues.‖ ‘  [Citations.]  
 
―A specific application of this principle is found in rules regulating the 
admission of evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that someone else 
                                              
13  
Defendant relies on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  He also cites 
article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution, but offers no authority 
supporting a state constitutional claim of error. 
 
26 
committed the crime with which they are charged.  See, e.g., 41 C.J.S., Homicide 
§ 216, pp. 56-58 (1991) (‗Evidence tending to show the commission by another 
person of the crime charged may be introduced by accused when it is inconsistent 
with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his own guilt; but frequently matters 
offered in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack such connection with 
the crime that they are excluded‘); 40A Am.Jur.2d, Homicide § 286, pp. 136-138 
(1999) (‗[T]he accused may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that 
another person may have committed the crime with which the defendant is 
charged . . . .  [Such evidence] may be excluded where it does not sufficiently 
connect the other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is 
speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue 
at the defendant‘s trial‘ (footnotes omitted)) . . . .‖  (Holmes, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 
326-327; see also People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 503.) 
 
Here, the trial court found that the evidence of Veronica‘s childhood 
experiences was weak and speculative, so much so that it would not be admissible 
against Veronica at her own trial.  That finding was amply supported.  The 
incidents of abuse suffered by Veronica and Genny were distinctly dissimilar.  
Defendant offered to show that Veronica‘s mother, in drunken rages, beat her 
teenage daughter Mary, lit newspapers at Mary‘s feet, pulled her daughters‘ hair, 
and tied Veronica and Mary together back to back and ―set their legs on fire‖ in 
some unspecified manner.  There was scant evidence of the extent of the injuries 
actually inflicted in these incidents, and no indication they were life threatening.  
The trauma suffered by the four-year-old Genny was of another kind entirely.  
Genny was not merely beaten, tied up, and burned.  She sustained hematomae, 
severe hair loss, and extensive bruising and scarring including multiple injuries 
inflicted by restraints.  Her fatal scalding was the culmination of a prolonged and 
persistent course of concerted abuse.  While we do not minimize the seriousness of 
 
27 
the abuse described in defendant‘s offer of proof,  his attempt to causally link the 
systematic torture of a small child with stories about intermittent mistreatment of 
Veronica and her sister when they were teenagers does not withstand scrutiny.  
The exclusion of this evidence was fully consistent with the principles set out in 
Holmes, supra, 547 U.S. 319, and resulted in no error affecting either the murder 
conviction or the torture-murder special circumstance.  
 
 
4.  Exclusion of Evidence That Veronica Disliked Genny’s Mother 
 
Defendant sought to introduce two statements Veronica made about Mary 
Rojas, Genny‘s mother, when Veronica was interviewed by a detective the 
morning after Genny‘s death.  Early in the interview, the detective asked where 
Mary lived.  Veronica said Mary was in a rehabilitation facility, and when asked 
why, replied ―Cause she‘s a little bitch . . . .‖  Veronica then explained, in a 
rambling statement, ―she just don‘t care about nothing . . . .  She would, she was 
losing her kids.  The kids got taken away you know.  Her husband would, they‘re 
very bad you know . . . whatever you know doing drugs. . . .‖  Much later in the 
interview, the detective pressed Veronica about why she did not know Genny was 
being scalded in the bath, asking, ―can you tell me she never screamed?‖  
Veronica replied, ―She does not talk.  Her damn mother.  I‘m not saying . . .  I‘m 
saying her damn mother gets her so goddamn freaked out . . . .  She can be in 
there.  You can ask the kids.  The kids would even go and mess with the water . . . 
and would she talk?  No.‖ 
 
Defendant claimed these statements reflected Veronica‘s animosity toward 
Mary, which would in turn support a conclusion that she acted on those feelings of 
animosity by singling out Genny for abuse.  The court excluded the evidence, on 
the ground that it was too speculative to be relevant.  The court noted there was no 
evidence linking Veronica‘s antipathy for her sister with her feelings toward 
 
28 
Genny.  Again, the court indicated it did not believe the evidence would be 
admissible against Veronica to prove motive at her own trial.   
 
The court‘s ruling was within the broad scope of its discretion to determine 
relevance.  (See People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 727.)  ―Speculative 
inferences are, of course, irrelevant.‖  (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 
549-550; see also, e.g., People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 129-130.)  
Defendant points out that the Gonzales household was already a crowded one 
when Genny arrived, the couple faced economic challenges, and Genny was a 
troubled child who was difficult to handle.  These facts tend to reflect a 
disciplinary motive for the abuse suffered by Genny.  However, Veronica‘s 
statements about Mary included no indication of a desire to harm Genny.  When 
the court made its ruling, no evidence offered by the defense suggested Veronica‘s 
feelings about Mary led her to retaliate against Genny.  Defendant notes that 
subsequently, in her proffered testimony on Veronica‘s family background, Dr. 
Perez-Arce opined that one factor in Veronica‘s behavior toward Genny may have 
been the ―adversive relationship‖ between Mary and Veronica.  That opinion, 
however, appears to be purely speculative.  Dr. Perez-Arce had not interviewed 
Veronica, and offered no factual support for her view.   
 
Defendant argues that the court‘s exclusion of Veronica‘s statements 
violated his federal constitutional rights to present a defense.14  The argument 
fails.  As discussed above in part II.A.3., ante, the exclusion of weak and 
                                              
14  
Defendant relies on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Again, he 
refers to the state Constitution but offers no supporting authority.  Defendant‘s 
claim that the exclusion of this evidence at the penalty phase violated his 
constitutional rights is discussed post, in part II.B.2. 
 
29 
speculative evidence of third party culpability does not infringe on a defendant‘s 
constitutional rights.  (Holmes, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 326-327.) 
 
 
5.  Admission of Ivan, Jr.’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony 
 
Defendant raises a variety of challenges to the admission at trial of Ivan, 
Jr.‘s preliminary hearing testimony.  He claims:  (1) the testimony was barred by 
Evidence Code section 1291; (2) the preliminary hearing court should have 
protected the child by quashing his subpoena; (3) the trial court should have 
protected the child by excluding the videotape of his preliminary hearing 
testimony; (4) the trial court should have found the child incompetent to testify at 
the preliminary hearing; (5) admission of the videotape violated defendant‘s 
confrontation clause rights; (6) the preliminary hearing court denied defendant his 
right to a face-to-face confrontation with Ivan, Jr.; and (7) the preliminary hearing 
court erroneously sustained an objection when defendant‘s attorney questioned the 
child about the consequences of lying.  None of these claims has merit. 
 
 
 
a.  Evidence Code section 1291 
 
Evidence Code section 1291 provides a hearsay exception for former 
testimony when the witness is unavailable and ―[t]he party against whom the 
former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the 
testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.‖  
Defendant does not challenge the trial court‘s ruling that Ivan, Jr., was unavailable 
because of the trauma that he would suffer if made to testify against his parents at 
their capital trials.  Defendant‘s contention is that he did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine Ivan, Jr., at the preliminary hearing because the child 
was placed in foster homes after Genny‘s death, and defense counsel was unable 
to interview him or gain information about his mental condition. 
 
30 
 
Defendant refers to various information coming to light after the 
preliminary hearing to support his argument that there were grounds for 
challenging Ivan, Jr.‘s credibility of which counsel were unaware.  However, 
―Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have concluded that ‗when a 
defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at the time of his or 
her prior testimony, that testimony is deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy the 
confrontation requirement [citation], regardless whether subsequent circumstances 
bring into question the accuracy or the completeness of the earlier testimony.  
[Citation.]‘ ‖  (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 343.)  Here, the trial court 
made it clear that any subsequently developed evidence reflecting on Ivan, Jr.‘s 
credibility could be introduced at trial. 
 
Defendant notes that his counsel gained access to Ivan, Jr.‘s therapy records 
only after the preliminary hearing.  Those records showed that, before the hearing, 
the child‘s therapist had made a note of a report by his foster mother that he and 
his little brother had been ―kicking and hitting each other and also lying.‖  The day 
before the hearing, he told his therapist that he had had an experience of seeing 
double, and ―I thought it was my soul.‖  Beginning around the time of the hearing, 
Ivan, Jr.‘s social worker saw signs of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder.  
At an unspecified time, the children‘s attorney informed the juvenile court that he 
was concerned about the foster mother violating a court order against asking Ivan, 
Jr., about the case.  The court instructed the social worker to tell the foster mother 
not to ask such questions.  After the preliminary hearing, similar evidence 
developed:  reports by Ivan, Jr., to his therapist of hallucinations, illusions, or 
lapses in memory; and a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and depression 
by a doctor who examined him to determine whether testifying at trial would be 
harmful. 
 
31 
 
We are satisfied that defendant‘s lack of access to this evidence did not 
deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Ivan, Jr., at the 
preliminary hearing.  Defense counsel thoroughly questioned the child about the 
differences between his preliminary hearing testimony and the earlier answers he 
gave to the police and the district attorney when they interviewed him about the 
events surrounding Genny‘s death.  This questioning by the authorities was far 
more significant than any questions the foster mother may have asked, and it was 
recorded.  Defendant‘s claim that he could have undermined Ivan, Jr.‘s credibility 
at the preliminary hearing by cross-examining the child about psychological issues 
is unpersuasive.  An eight-year-old child‘s grasp of such issues is necessarily 
limited.  Ivan, Jr., had plainly been through a traumatic experience, and counsel 
was free to explore the effects of that experience on his memory. 
 
 
 
b.  Harm to Ivan, Jr. 
 
Next, defendant claims the court erred by admitting Ivan, Jr.‘s videotaped 
preliminary hearing testimony at trial, despite evidence that this would be 
damaging to the child.  Defendant provides us with no legal authority for this 
argument, or for his standing to raise it.  Neither did he offer any authority on 
these points in his motion papers below.  In any event, there was no error.  The 
trial court addressed defendant‘s claims, finding that there was some risk of 
damage to Ivan, Jr., from the use of his testimony, but that the risk was far 
outweighed by the value of the videotape to the prosecution‘s case.  The court did 
not abuse its discretion.  Ivan, Jr.‘s testimony had already been used against his 
parents at the preliminary hearing.  None of the experts to whom defendant now 
 
32 
refers stated directly that the mere presentation of a videotape of the testimony at 
trial would cause undue harm.15 
 
 
 
c.  Ivan, Jr.’s Competence 
 
Defendant also claims the trial court erred by finding that Ivan, Jr., had 
been competent to testify at the time of the preliminary hearing.  Under Evidence 
Code section 701, subdivision (a), ―[a] person is disqualified to be a witness if he 
or she is:  [¶]  (1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter 
so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can 
understand him; or  [¶]  (2) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell 
the truth.‖  Defendant relies, as he did below, on additional factors set out in a 
dependency case, In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155 (Basilio T.).  There, 
the Court of Appeal stated:  ―In addition to an awareness of the difference between 
truth and falsehood, other prerequisites for competency as a child witness are the 
capacity to observe, sufficient intelligence, adequate memory, the ability to 
                                              
15  
At a hearing on a motion to quash a subpoena for Ivan, Jr., to appear as a 
witness at trial, Dr. Charles Marsh, a psychiatrist, testified that showing the 
videotape at trial would not be a ―major trauma.‖  Ivan, Jr.‘s therapist testified that 
use of the videotape would ―probably,‖ or ―possibly‖ have the same effect as live 
testimony, but then said, ―I‘m not sure of that.‖  The therapist‘s supervisor 
testified that use of the videotape would be ―less traumatic in the short term [than 
testifying] and could potentially . . . give him some psychological cushion to 
rationalize how he thinks about his role in all of this down the road.‖ 
 
All this testimony came in response to the prosecutor‘s questioning, which 
was aimed at establishing that live testimony would be no more harmful than the 
videotape.  When these witnesses testified, defense counsel did not attempt to 
establish that admission of the videotape would be harmful.  Counsel made this 
argument only after the motion to quash was granted, advancing it in opposition to 
the prosecutor‘s motion to admit the videotape. 
 
 We note, as well, the absence of any indication in the record that Ivan, Jr., 
was aware the videotape was presented at trial. 
 
33 
communicate, and an appreciation of the obligation to speak the truth.‖  (Id. at p. 
167, fn. 7.)16 
 
At the hearing on the question of Ivan, Jr.‘s competence, defendant called 
Dr. Yanon Volcani, a child psychologist who had reviewed the documentary 
record and the tapes of Ivan, Jr.‘s preliminary hearing testimony and statements to 
the police.  Dr. Volcani had interviewed the child‘s paternal grandparents, but not 
the child himself or other caretakers.  He testified that Ivan, Jr., had no perceptual 
difficulties or attention deficit disorder, but that there was a ―significant 
probability‖ that his memory of the events about which he testified was ―not 
necessarily accurate,‖ due to the chaotic Gonzales household and the boy‘s stage 
of development. 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Volcani affirmed that Ivan, Jr., was not 
incapable of understanding his duty to tell the truth, or unable to understand 
questions and express himself in an understandable way.  Questioned by the court, 
the doctor declined to state a definite opinion on whether Ivan, Jr.‘s memories 
were accurate.  On redirect examination by defense counsel, Dr. Volcani ―free 
associated‖ a 68 percent likelihood that Ivan, Jr.‘s preliminary hearing testimony 
was ―influenced by other things than the actual events,‖ but said ―it doesn‘t mean 
they‘re not accurate.‖  
                                              
16  
In support of this proposition, the court cited only a treatise.  (Meyers, The 
Testimonial Competence of Children (1986-1987) 25 J. Fam.L. 287, 288.)  We 
express no view on whether the additional factors adduced in Basilio T., supra, 4 
Cal.App.4th 155, are valid.  That question has not been briefed, and as discussed 
above, the trial court‘s finding that the factors were satisfied was supported by the 
evidence.  We note, however, the general rule that the credibility of a witness is an 
issue for the jury, and not a relevant factor in determining competence to testify.  
(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 589-590.) 
 
34 
 
The trial court ruled that defendant had not carried his burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Ivan, Jr., had been incompetent when he 
testified at the preliminary hearing.  Dr. Volcani clearly stated that the statutory 
factors governing the competency determination were satisfied, and the court 
found that opinion amply supported by the videotape of the child‘s testimony.  
Regarding the Basilio T. factor of whether Ivan, Jr., was able to distinguish truth 
from falsehood, the court observed that the doctor‘s testimony was ―less than 
direct.‖  The court concluded that Dr. Volcani‘s views reflected more on Ivan, 
Jr.‘s credibility than on his ―fundamental ability to distinguish truth from fiction.‖  
The court added that the videotape, the testimony of other experts on the motion to 
quash, and the notes of Ivan, Jr.‘s therapist confirmed its conclusion.  It noted that 
defendant was free to present evidence challenging Ivan, Jr.‘s credibility. 
 
We will uphold a trial court‘s ruling on the competence of a witness in the 
absence of a clear abuse of discretion.  (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 
589.)  No such abuse appears here.  Though defendant claims Dr. Volcani‘s 
testimony on the impairment of Ivan, Jr.‘s memory was uncontradicted, the doctor 
expressly declined to say the child‘s memories were inaccurate.  The doctor‘s 
―free association‖ of a likelihood of unspecified influences on Ivan, Jr.‘s testimony 
lacked any basis in fact.  Defendant‘s reliance on cases barring the admission of 
hypnotically aided testimony is misplaced.  Nothing suggests that Ivan, Jr.‘s 
testimony was influenced by any such experience. 
 
 
 
d.  Confrontation Rights 
 
Defendant contends the introduction of Ivan, Jr.‘s videotaped testimony 
violated his rights under the confrontation clauses of the federal and state 
Constitutions in several respects.  First, defendant asserts he could not effectively 
cross-examine Ivan, Jr., at the preliminary hearing.  However, ―the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees only ‗an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
 
35 
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish.‘ ‖  (Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 739; see also People v. 
Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 343; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 
1172-1173.)  As discussed above in part II.A.5.a., defendant had such an 
opportunity.  Defendant‘s constitutional arguments fare no better than his statutory 
arguments under Evidence Code section 1291. 
 
Next, defendant claims the seating arrangement during the preliminary 
hearing violated his confrontation rights when the videotape of Ivan, Jr.‘s 
testimony was played at trial.  At the outset of the preliminary hearing, the 
prosecutor asked the court for ―protective courtroom seating‖ for the juvenile 
witnesses, noting he had filed a written motion that morning and provided copies 
to defense counsel.  In the motion, the prosecutor asserted that both Ivan, Jr., and 
his brother Michael had expressed great fear of defendant and Veronica in 
conversations with the police and members of the prosecutor‘s office.  He asked 
that they be seated facing away from the defendants during the preliminary 
hearing.  The preliminary hearing court granted the motion, ordering that the 
young witnesses be seated at an angle, not directly facing the defendants.  The 
podium for counsel, however, was placed so that the lawyers had eye contact with 
the witnesses during questioning, and the witnesses were free to look around the 
courtroom and make eye contact with defendants, if they desired.  The court noted 
that this arrangement had been discussed in chambers. 
 
Veronica‘s counsel objected on the ground that the arrangement violated 
his client‘s right of confrontation, expressing concern that the children had been 
coached and that the interests of ―a search for the truth‖ called for the normal 
seating arrangement.  Counsel conceded, however, that if the prosecutor‘s motion 
was to be granted, the seating arrangement contemplated by the court was ―the 
least intrusive way of handling it.‖  Defendant‘s counsel adopted these arguments 
 
36 
and recited his reliance on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the 
California Constitution.  The court noted that both defense counsel were 
experienced, and expressed confidence in their ability to get at the truth.  The court 
said it was guarding against the intimidation of children ―of tender age,‖ and noted 
that the defendants would be able to see and hear the witnesses, and would be 
―within eye contact‖ if the witnesses wished to look at them. 
 
Defendant relies on Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, for the 
proposition that ―the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face 
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.‖  As the high court noted 
in Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig), however, that right has never 
been held to be absolute, and Coy itself reserved the question whether exceptions 
may exist.  (Craig, at p. 844.)  The Craig court recognized an exception in child 
abuse cases, upholding a statute permitting the child victim to testify via one-way 
closed circuit television, so long as the court makes a case-specific finding that the 
child would be traumatized by testifying in the defendant‘s presence, and the 
child‘s testimony is subject to adversarial testing through cross-examination.  
(Craig, at pp. 855-857.) 
 
Defendant argues that Craig is no longer viable.  He notes its partial 
reliance on Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, and claims that since the Roberts 
hearsay test was overruled in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S 36, Craig‘s 
relaxation of the right to a face-to-face confrontation must also be deemed 
obsolete.  (See Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at pp. 848-849.)  We disagree.  Crawford 
and its progeny are limited to ―testimonial‖ hearsay statements, and say nothing 
about whether a witness who testifies in person must face the defendant.  
(Crawford, at pp. 61, 68; Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011)  __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 
2705, 2713-2714]; see also People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 303 [Crawford 
did not affect admissibility of prior testimony by unavailable witness].)  Craig 
 
37 
remains good law.  Anticipating that conclusion, defendant claims the preliminary 
hearing court erred by failing to make a case-specific factual finding of necessity 
for an alternative arrangement for Ivan, Jr.‘s testimony, as required under Craig.  
Defendant observes that the prosecution made no factual showing to support its 
claim that Ivan, Jr., and his brother feared their parents, and contends the court‘s 
concerns on this point were not based on any information specific to this case. 
 
It is important to note that at the preliminary hearing, defendant had no 
right to confront Ivan, Jr., personally.  We have made it clear that the right to 
confrontation is a trial right that does not apply with full force at a preliminary 
hearing.  (People v. Miranda (2000) 23 Cal.4th 340, 349.)  Ivan, Jr.‘s description 
of the events on the night of Genny‘s murder could have been presented through 
hearsay testimony by police officers, without offending either the state or federal 
Constitution.  (Miranda, at pp. 348-349.)  Thus, there was no occasion for the 
preliminary hearing court to make Craig findings, and defense counsel did not 
request them.  Defendant, however, claims that when the videotape of the 
preliminary hearing testimony was introduced at trial, the seating arrangement for 
Ivan, Jr., violated his trial right to confront the witnesses against him.  This is a 
particularly artificial argument, insisting on Craig findings even though no context 
for such findings ever arose.  In any event, the claim fails on its merits. 
 
 In People v. Sharp (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772, which involved the same 
seating arrangement at trial as was employed at defendant‘s preliminary 
examination, the court noted that the arrangement ―resulted in only the most 
minimal interference with appellant‘s right to confront his accuser.‖  (Id. at p. 
1783.)  It concluded that this minor interference was justified by the state‘s interest 
in protecting the child witness and obtaining accurate testimony.  While the trial 
court had not made the findings required by Craig, the Sharp court had no 
difficulty ascertaining from the record that the seating arrangement was fully 
 
38 
justified.  (Sharp, at pp. 1783-1784; see also Ellis v. United States (1st Cir. 2002) 
313 F.3d 636, 650 [―the less the intrusion on Sixth Amendment rights, the less 
detail is required in a trial court‘s findings‖].)17  
 
Here, while the preliminary hearing court made no factual findings on the 
need to shield Ivan, Jr., from defendant‘s gaze, the trial court made extensive 
findings that the child would be traumatized if he were made to testify at trial.  
Defendant does not dispute the vulnerability of the young witness, either at the 
time of the preliminary hearing or the time of trial.  Indeed, defendant claims that 
testifying against his father was so traumatic for Ivan, Jr., that even the videotape 
should have been excluded from evidence.  Here, as in Sharp, we conclude that 
the seating arrangement for the child witness‘s testimony was fully justified by the 
record, and defendant‘s confrontation rights were not violated when the videotape 
                                              
17  
Other state courts have approved the use of similar seating arrangements, 
without the findings required by Craig.  (State v. Miller (N.D. 2001) 631 N.W.2d 
587, 594; Smith v. State (Ark. 2000) 8 S.W.3d 534, 537-538; State v. Brockel 
(La.Ct.App. 1999) 733 So.2d 640, 645-646; Brandon v. State (Alaska Ct.App. 
1992) 839 P.2d 400, 409-410; State v. Hoyt (Utah Ct.App. 1991) 806 P.2d 204, 
210; Stanger v. State (Ind.Ct.App. 1989) 545 N.E.2d 1105, 1112-1113; Ortiz v. 
State (Ga.Ct.App. 1988) 374 S.E.2d 92, 95-96.)  The sister-state cases relied on by 
defendant are distinguishable.  (State v. Lipka (Vt. 2002) 817 A.2d 27, 32-33 
[error in failure to make Craig findings conceded]; Commonwealth v. Johnson 
(Mass. 1994) 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1005-1007 [state constitutional provision 
requiring ―face to face‖ confrontation violated when child sat with back to 
defendant; door left open for less drastic alternative seating arrangement upon 
showing of need]; People v. Tuck (N.Y. 1989) 551 N.E.2d 578 [pre-Craig 
memorandum opinion; witness unsworn as well as facing away from defendant; 
error held harmless].)  See also United States v. Kaufman (10th Cir. 2008) 546 
F.3d 1242, 1256-1257 (order that defendants not make eye contact with victim 
witnesses improper absent Craig findings; error held harmless); Ellis v. United 
States, supra, 313 F.3d at pages 649-652 (trial held before Craig; posttrial Craig 
findings held sufficient). 
 
39 
was introduced at trial.  The seating arrangement at the preliminary hearing 
satisfied the central concerns of the confrontation clause:  ―physical presence, 
oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact.‖  
(Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 846.) 
 
Finally, defendant claims he was deprived of his confrontation rights when 
the preliminary hearing court sustained an objection when defense counsel asked 
Ivan, Jr., about the consequences of lying.  This claim borders on the frivolous.  
Defense counsel asked Ivan, Jr., a series of questions on this topic.  The child 
answered ―yes‖ when asked if he would get in trouble if he lied in response to one 
of counsel‘s questions.  The court sustained a prosecutorial objection at this point.  
It proceeded to advise Ivan, Jr., about the importance of telling the truth, the 
consequences of lying in court (―you‘d get in trouble‖), and the unimportance of 
worrying about anything so long as he told the truth.  Ivan, Jr., replied 
affirmatively when the court asked if he was ―comfortable with that,‖ and both the 
court and defense counsel declared that their concerns were satisfied.  No error can 
be conjured from this scenario.  The jury was exposed to a full exploration of Ivan, 
Jr.‘s understanding of the need to be truthful when it watched the videotape.  
 
 
6.  Admission of Defendant’s Statements to Police 
 
Defendant contends he did not validly waive his Miranda rights before he 
spoke with detectives shortly after the murder.  (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 
U.S. 436.)  Defendant received a complete advisement of his rights.  As defense 
counsel agreed when the suppression motion was argued, defendant both nodded 
his head and mouthed the word ―yes‖ when asked if he understood the Miranda 
warnings.  However, he gave an unintelligible answer when a detective asked if he 
wanted to give his ―side of the story.‖  The detective told defendant he had already 
spoken to Veronica, and advised him that her statement would be compared to his 
in court.  The detective asked again if defendant would like to tell him what 
 
40 
happened.  Defendant said, ―Um, well I,‖ and the detective began questioning him.  
Defendant interrupted to ask for a glass of water, and, while another detective 
went to get it for him, proceeded to answer the questions posed to him. 
 
Defense counsel argued that the videotape did not establish a clear and 
unmistakable waiver, and that the mere fact his client had given a statement was 
insufficient.  Counsel conceded that the statement itself was voluntary, telling the 
court, ―We are not arguing that there were improper promises, inducements, or 
any of the other so-called voluntariness issues.‖ 
 
The court denied the suppression motion.  It found that while defendant had 
clearly indicated he understood his rights, he never expressly agreed to waive 
them.  The detective had interrupted defendant just when he seemed to be 
responding to the invitation to give his side of the story.  Nevertheless, the court 
concluded, based on several viewings of the videotape, that defendant had 
voluntarily agreed to give up his Miranda rights, as evidenced by his statements 
freely given with a full understanding of those rights.  The court noted that a 
Miranda waiver may be implied from a defendant‘s behavior, and stated that it 
interpreted defendant‘s behavior as amounting to a waiver in this case. 
 
―On review of a trial court‘s decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the 
trial court‘s determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, 
but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in 
violation of Miranda.‖  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 586.)  Here, the 
videotape provides substantial evidence supporting the trial court‘s finding of an 
implied waiver.  The court‘s ruling was also legally correct.  
 
―No particular manner or form of Miranda waiver is required, and a waiver 
may be implied from a defendant‘s words and actions.  [Citations.]  In determining 
the validity of a Miranda waiver, courts look to whether it was free from coercion 
or deception, and whether it was ‗ ―made with a full awareness of both the nature 
 
41 
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it.‖ ‘  [Citation.]  Both aspects are tested against the totality of circumstances in 
each case, keeping in mind the particular background, experience and conduct of 
the accused.  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 585-586.)  
This court has long recognized that a defendant‘s decision to answer questions 
after indicating that he or she understands the Miranda rights may support a 
finding of implied waiver, under the totality of the circumstances.  (People v. 
Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 247-248, citing cases.) 
 
Defendant briefly argues that no implied waiver should be found here, 
because the detective misled him by saying that Veronica‘s statement would be 
used against him in court.  Defendant did not make this claim below, and in fact 
assured the court that no improper inducements had been employed.  In any event, 
we are satisfied that the waiver here was ―voluntary in the sense that it was the 
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 
deception.‖  (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421.)  Insofar as it was 
inaccurate for the detective to tell defendant that Veronica‘s statement would be 
admissible against him, the practical impact of that statement was neither coercive 
nor deceptive.  It was certainly the case that defendant‘s and Veronica‘s 
statements would be closely compared during the investigation of the crime.  The 
detective‘s point was that it was in defendant‘s interest to give his side of the 
story.  Defendant chose to do so, with a full understanding of the nature of his 
Miranda rights and the consequences of abandoning them. 
 
 
7.  Admission of Veronica’s Hearsay Statement 
 
In response to defendant‘s showing that Veronica had been an abusive 
spouse, the prosecutor called Victor Negrette, Veronica‘s brother-in-law, to testify 
on rebuttal about an incident in which Veronica told him that defendant had hit 
her.  Defendant objected on hearsay grounds, pointing out that Veronica was not 
 
42 
available for cross-examination.  The court overruled the objection based on the 
hearsay exception for spontaneous statements.  (Evid. Code, § 1240.) 
 
Defendant contends the admission of this testimony violated his 
confrontation rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and article 1, 
section 15 of the California Constitution.  However, it is settled that ― ‗[o]nly the 
admission of testimonial hearsay statements violates the confrontation clause . . . .‘  
(People v. Gutierrez [(2009)] 45 Cal.4th [789,] 812 . . . ; see also Michigan v. 
Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. 1143, 1153].)  . . .  ‗The court [in 
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36] explained that the confrontation 
clause addressed the specific concern of ―[a]n accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers‖ because that person ―bears testimony in a sense 
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.‖  
[Citation.]‘ ‖  (People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 66 (Loy), quoting Gutierrez, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 812-813.) 
 
In People v. Gutierrez, we held that a statement made by a three-year-old to 
his aunt was not testimonial.  (Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 813.)  In Loy, we 
reached the same conclusion about a statement the victim made to a friend.  (Loy, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 56, 66.)  Here, Veronica‘s statement to her brother-in-law 
plainly falls in the same category.  Its admission did not violate defendant‘s 
confrontation rights.  (See Cal. Const., art. 1, § 24 [state confrontation right 
affords no greater rights than federal Constitution].) 
 
Defendant also claims the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code 
section 1240 because Veronica‘s statement to Negrette was not ―made 
spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
such perception.‖  (Evid. Code, § 1240, subd. (b).)  Defendant contends there was 
no evidence showing her statement was made ― ‗before there has been time to 
contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still 
 
43 
to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance.‘ ‖  (People v. Thomas 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 495, quoting People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318.)  
However, Negrette testified that Veronica was crying when she telephoned and 
asked him to come and get her, crying when he picked her up from defendant‘s 
parents‘ house, and still upset and crying when she described the fight that day 
during which defendant hit her.  We cannot say the court erred in admitting this 
testimony.  ― ‗[T]he discretion of the trial court is at its broadest‘ when it 
determines whether an utterance was made while the declarant was still in a state 
of nervous excitement.  (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319.)‖  (Thomas, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 496.)  
 
 
8.  Admission of Photographs and a Mannequin 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred by admitting numerous photographs 
of Genny, as well as a mannequin used by an expert to demonstrate how her 
injuries were inflicted.  Defendant refers generally to autopsy photographs and 
crime scene photographs, as well as to a picture of Genny while she was alive.  He 
contends these exhibits were unduly inflammatory and gruesome, and thus should 
have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352.18  We have rejected such 
arguments in the past, and do so again here.  The evidence was highly relevant and 
no more gruesome than the crime. 
 
Defense counsel objected to the admission of the photographic evidence in 
limine.  After a careful review, the court admitted the photographs showing 
Genny‘s injuries, commenting that while particularly gruesome, they were 
                                              
18  
Defendant asserts violation of his rights to a fair trial and reliable capital 
sentencing under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and article 1, 
sections 7, 15, and 17 of the California Constitution. 
 
44 
relevant to show the extent of the injuries and the intent to kill and torture.  
Defendant claims the photographs were unusually graphic, and cumulative to the 
expert testimony.  However, we have reviewed the exhibits, and conclude the 
court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendant‘s constitutional rights. 
 
― ‗The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion 
of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or 
inflammatory.  [Citations.]  The court‘s exercise of that discretion will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is 
outweighed by their prejudicial effect.  [Citations.]‘  (People v. Crittenden 
[(1994)] 9 Cal.4th 83, 133–134.)  ‗[A] court may admit even ―gruesome‖ 
photographs if the evidence is highly relevant to the issues raised by the facts, or if 
the photographs would clarify the testimony of a medical examiner.‘  (People v. 
Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 776.)  ‗We have consistently upheld the 
introduction of autopsy photographs disclosing the manner in which a victim was 
wounded as relevant not only to the question of deliberation and premeditation but 
also aggravation of the crime and the appropriate penalty, all of which were at 
issue here.  [Citations.]‘  (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 666.)‖  (People v. 
Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 453-454.) 
 
Here, as in Ramirez, while ―the photographs certainly are gruesome, . . . 
they were not unduly so.  ‗[V]ictim photographs . . . in murder cases always are 
disturbing.  [Citation.]‘  [(People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 134.)]  . . .  
The photographs at issue here are gruesome because the charged offenses were 
gruesome, but they did no more than accurately portray the shocking nature of the 
crimes.  The jury can, and must, be shielded from depictions that sensationalize an 
alleged crime, or are unnecessarily gruesome, but the jury cannot be shielded from 
an accurate depiction of the charged crimes that does not unnecessarily play upon 
the emotions of the jurors.  The record reflects that the experienced trial judge was 
 
45 
well aware of his duty to weigh the prejudicial effect of the photographs against 
their probative value, and carefully did so.  (People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 
749, 776.)‖  (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 454; see also, e.g., People 
v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973-978, discussing cases.) 
 
Defendant complains that one photograph of Genny in a Halloween 
costume, taken before she came to live with his family, was improper because it 
tended to arouse the jury‘s sympathy.  However, ―the possibility that a photograph 
will generate sympathy does not compel its exclusion if it is otherwise relevant.‖  
(People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 331.)  Here, the photograph was relevant 
to show by comparison the extent of harm suffered by Genny in defendant‘s home.  
(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1198.) 
 
Defendant also briefly, and without citation of authority, argues that the 
court improperly allowed the prosecutor to use a mannequin to assist the medical 
examiner in his testimony about how fingertip bruises had been inflicted on 
Genny‘s thighs.  The mannequin, described in the record as a ―foam doll‖ about 38 
inches tall, was briefly grasped by the examiner during his testimony to show how 
Genny must have been grabbed from behind.  The trial court denied defendant‘s 
motion for a mistrial, at which counsel protested that they were surprised by the 
introduction of the mannequin.  The court did not err.  Use of such demonstrative 
aids is routine.  (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 896; People v. Riel 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1195; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1291.)  
Defendant‘s claim that the deployment of the mannequin here was an improper 
appeal to the juror‘s emotions is unfounded.  
 
 
9.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to show that he was the 
perpetrator, that he aided and abetted the murder, or that he intended to torture or 
kill Genny.  We disagree. 
 
46 
 
―In determining evidentiary sufficiency, the court  reviews the entire 
record, in the light most favorable to the judgment, for the presence of substantial 
evidence.  Substantial evidence is evidence sufficiently reasonable, credible, and 
of such solid value ‗that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‘  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)  The 
same standard of review applies in considering circumstantial evidence and the 
support for special circumstance findings.  ([People v.] Valdez [(2004)] 32 Cal.4th 
[73,] 104–105.)‖  (People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th 344, 389.) 
 
―Murder by torture requires a killing committed with a willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain for the purpose of 
revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose.  It need not be 
proven that the victim actually suffered pain.  However, there must be a causal 
relationship between the torturous act and death.  (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 453, 466–467 . . . .)  The jury may infer the intent to inflict extreme pain 
from the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the killing, and the condition of 
the body.  We have, however, cautioned against giving undue weight to the 
severity of the wounds.  Horrible wounds may be as consistent with a killing in the 
heat of passion or an explosion of violence, as with the intent to inflict cruel 
suffering.  (Id. at p. 467.)‖  (People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 389-390.)  
― ‗To find the torture-murder special circumstance true, the jury had to find that 
―[t]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.‖  (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(18).)‘  (Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 469.)‖  (Chatman, at p. 391.) 
 
The evidence that Genny was extensively tortured over a period of time 
was overwhelming in this case.  Her injuries were such that an intent to inflict 
extreme and prolonged pain for a sadistic purpose was obvious.  The inference that 
the torture began as an effort to discipline Genny was reasonable, and defendant 
admitted that he was the spouse who mainly disciplined the children.  He also 
 
47 
admitted putting Genny in the box in the closet, and wiring the hook above the 
box, to ―scare her.‖  Defendant further admitted running the bath water for Genny 
the night she died, and helping Veronica put her in the bath.  The evidence showed 
that it took 15 minutes to fill the bathtub with water hot enough to inflict the burn 
that caused Genny‘s death.  Defendant could not have been unaware of the 
temperature, or the effect it would have on the child.  After she was forcibly 
scalded to the point where her skin was sloughing off, defendant did nothing to 
seek help for her until rigor mortis was setting in.  These facts were amply 
sufficient for the jury to find that defendant intentionally tortured and killed 
Genny. 
 
 
10.  The Prosecutor’s Closing and Rebuttal Arguments 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct twice during 
closing argument at the guilt phase.  In the first instance, the prosecutor said:  
―You are looking at a murderer of epic proportion.  And just because he‘s five-two 
doesn‘t mean a thing.  His conduct is so egregious that I have no problem 
comparing him to a person like Hitler [objection lodged] or the [objection 
sustained] conduct that was embraced in Bosnia [objection lodged and sustained].‖  
Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor argued, ―He‘s not helpless.  He‘s not crippled.  
Doesn‘t matter what his gender is.  And he wants to be called a victim.  He‘s Ivan 
the Terrible.  He was the camp commandant [objections lodged and overruled] and 
this was a campaign of terror.‖ 
 
The other asserted misconduct came during the prosecutor‘s closing 
rebuttal.  Responding to the defense‘s claims that Ivan, Jr.‘s preliminary hearing 
testimony had been influenced by others, the prosecutor said, referring to the child 
advocate who had accompanied Ivan, Jr., ―Why not call Bruce Campbell, the man 
who‘s at the prelim, the man who is sitting next to Ivan, Jr., when he was 
testifying?  Why not call him?  Why doesn‘t the defense — they put on witnesses.  
 
48 
[Objection lodged and overruled.]  Why don‘t they call the process servers?  Why 
don‘t they call Ivan, Jr.‘s psychologist?  Why don‘t they call whatever?  Why 
don‘t they do something about that?  Because they‘re all going to deny it.‖  At this 
point, the court sustained an objection and admonished the jury not to consider the 
prosecutor‘s speculation about what absent witnesses might have said. 
 
―The standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled.  ‗A 
prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury 
commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal 
Constitution when they infect the trial with such ― ‗unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.‘ ‖  [Citations.]  Under state law, a 
prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions 
do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‘  [Citation.]  ‗In order to preserve a 
claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an 
admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of 
misconduct preserved for review.‘  [Citation.]  When a claim of misconduct is 
based on the prosecutor‘s comments before the jury, ‗ ―the question is whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the 
complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. 
Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.) 
 
Defendant‘s arguments here are meritless.  The court sustained objections 
to the prosecutor‘s Hitler and Bosnia references, and counsel‘s failure to request 
an admonition forfeited the claim of misconduct.  Not to seek an admonition was 
certainly a reasonable strategic decision, as the rhetorical impact of these 
references was minimal.  While the prosecutor was permitted to call defendant 
―Ivan the Terrible‖ and ―the camp commandant,‖ these brief epithets were within 
the permissible range of closing argument.  (See People v. McDermott (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 946, 1002-1003.)  As the court explained when asked to preclude a 
 
49 
repetition of these comments at the penalty retrial, ―where the defense posture is 
that the defendant is ‗Ivan the Meek‘ and ‗Ivan the Submissive,‘ I have no 
problem whatsoever with the prosecutor characterizing him as Ivan the Terrible.  
There is evidence from which the necessary underpinnings could be drawn.‖ 
 
As for the prosecutor‘s reference to witnesses not called, it is neither 
unusual nor improper to comment on the failure to call logical witnesses.  (People 
v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1296, 1333; People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
50, 90.)  The trial court sustained defendant‘s objection to the speculative aspect 
of the prosecutor‘s argument, and admonished the jury.  The admonishment was 
clear, and fully sufficient to cure any harm.  Defendant falls well short of showing 
the sort of deceptive, reprehensible, and prejudicial argument that would constitute 
misconduct. 
 
 
11.  Jury Instructions 
 
Defendant raises a number of claims of guilt phase instructional error.19  
None have merit. 
 
 
 
a.  Denial of Pinpoint Instruction 
 
Defendant contends the court erroneously denied the following instruction 
proposed by his counsel: 
                                              
19  
Defendant asserts violation of his rights to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and article 1, sections 7 and 15 of the California 
Constitution; to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment and article 1, 
section 15 of the California Constitution; to trial by jury under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and article 1, section 16 of the California Constitution; 
and to a reliable penalty determination and to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment and article 1, section 17 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
50 
 
―In general, a person who fails to help another person by preventing a crime 
is not guilty of a crime.  Likewise, a person is not guilty of murder simply because 
he or she failed to stop someone else from committing a murder.  However, the 
law provides that a parent or other adult who has custody of a child may be guilty 
of the crime of neglect under certain circumstances.‖ 
 
The court noted that the subjects of this instruction were covered by the 
standard aiding and abetting and child endangerment instructions.  It reasoned that 
giving two different instructions on the same topics would risk confusing the jury.  
The court did not err.  An instruction highlighting a defense theory may be 
rejected if it is duplicative or potentially confusing.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 1, 30.)  Here, the jury was instructed that ―mere presence at the scene of a 
crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to 
aiding and abetting.  Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and a 
failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.‖  (CALJIC No. 3.01.)  
It was also fully instructed on the elements of and required mental state for the 
crime of child endangerment.  Defendant‘s proposed instruction was duplicative 
and would have required the jury to parse different formulations. 
 
In his reply brief, defendant argues that CALJIC No. 3.01 only instructed 
the jury as to liability for ―one possible crime, aiding and abetting,‖ and did not 
reach defendant‘s culpability of murder.  However, aiding and abetting is not a 
crime in itself, and was not presented as such by the instructions.  It is a theory of 
liability, and the jury would not have failed to understand its application to the 
murder charge in this case. 
 
 
 
b.  Denial of Instruction on Veronica’s Consciousness of  
 
 
 
    Guilt 
 
Defendant requested an instruction on Veronica‘s false statements as 
reflecting her consciousness of guilt.  The court denied the instruction, noting that 
 
51 
it conflicted with the instruction informing the jury it was not to consider 
Veronica‘s prosecution for any purpose.  Defendant contends he was entitled to 
the instruction to support his theory that it was Veronica who harmed Genny.  He 
refers to the evidence that Veronica made false statements about Genny‘s bath on 
the night of the murder. 
 
 The court was properly concerned with an instruction that would have 
invited the jury to consider Veronica‘s guilt ―concerning the crime for which she 
will be tried,‖ as defense counsel framed the instruction.  While counsel indicated 
his openness to ―some limiting language,‖ he never proposed terms that would 
have been specific to defendant‘s third-party liability theory.   The instruction was 
properly denied. 
 
In any event, ―[w]e have noted that similar instructions add little to the 
standard instruction on reasonable doubt.  (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
1126, 1134.)  We have also held that even if such instructions properly pinpoint 
the theory of third party liability, their omission is not prejudicial because the 
reasonable doubt instructions give defendants ample opportunity to impress upon 
the jury that evidence of another party‘s liability must be considered in weighing 
whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 641, 720–721; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887.)‖  (People v. 
Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 504.) 
 
 
 
c.  CALJIC No. 2.04 
 
Over defense objection, the court gave the jury the following version of 
CALJIC No. 2.04:  ―If you find that a defendant attempted to or did persuade a 
witness to testify falsely, such conduct may be considered by you as a 
circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.  However, such conduct is 
not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and . . . its weight and significance, if any, are 
matters for your determination.‖  During its discussion of the instructions with 
 
52 
counsel, the court agreed with the defense that the evidence supporting this 
instruction was weak, but decided that given ―the constellation of behaviors by the 
defendant terrorizing these kids from the outset, there is evidence of that, Ivan, Jr., 
being afraid of him, defendant locking the kids up while this event took place, 
lying to the kids afterwards as to the conduct, I think the jury could conclude that 
that was an effort to persuade the kids not to testify.‖ 
 
The evidentiary support for this instruction was indeed thin.  Defendant‘s 
general behavior toward the children, their fear of him, and the fact that he lied to 
them about what happened to Genny do not readily suggest the kind of calculated 
effort to influence testimony that the instruction contemplates.  Nevertheless, as in 
other cases where the propriety of giving CALJIC No. 2.04 has been challenged, 
―at worst, there was no evidence to support the instruction and . . . it was 
superfluous.  As previously explained, evidence of defendant‘s guilt was strong.  
Under the circumstances, reversal on such a minor, tangential point is not 
warranted.‖  (People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 249; see also People v. 
Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1225; People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 
1223.) 
 
 
 
d.  CALJIC No. 8.81.18 
 
Although he did not object at trial, defendant now contends the court erred 
by giving CALJIC No. 8.81.18 without amending the instruction to require the 
jury to find a nexus between the torture or intent to torture and the homicide.20  
                                              
20  
As given, the instruction required the jury to find the following elements 
for ―the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder involving 
infliction of torture‖:  ―1.  The defendant intended to kill, or with intent to kill, 
aided and abetted in the killing of a human being.  2.  The defendant intended to 
inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering upon the living human being for 
the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose.  
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
53 
We consider this claim insofar as defendant‘s fundamental rights may have been 
affected.  (§ 1259; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247.)  He fails to show 
any such effect. 
 
Defendant argues that the instruction failed to require the jury to find ―some 
proximity in time or space between the murder and torture,‖ quoting People v. 
Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at page 1161, and People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
809, 843.  However, as in Barnett and Bemore, such proximity was obvious on the 
facts of the case.  (Barnett, at p. 1162; Bemore, at pp. 843-844.)  Genny suffered a 
painful death as the result of forcible immersion in a scalding bath.  The verdict 
form reflected the jury‘s finding that the ―murder was intentional and involved the 
infliction of torture.‖  The jury could not have applied CALJIC No. 8.81.18 so as 
to make that finding without also finding a temporal and spatial ―nexus‖ between 
the torture and the murder.  (See Barnett, at p. 1162.) 
 
 
 
e.  CALJIC Nos. 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, and 2.51 
 
Defendant contends that CALJIC Nos. 2.02 (sufficiency of circumstantial 
evidence), 2.21.2 (witness willfully false), 2.22 (weighing conflicting testimony), 
and 2.51 (motive) unconstitutionally undermined the requirement of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  We have consistently rejected these arguments.  We do so 
again here, as defendant offers no persuasive reason to change our views.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Dement (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1, 53-55, citing cases.) 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture in this 
special circumstance.‖ 
 
54 
 
 
12.  Denial of Motion for New Trial 
 
When it returned the guilt verdict, the jury was polled and each juror 
individually affirmed the verdict.  The jury deadlocked, however, during the 
penalty phase.  The court declared a mistrial on June 5, 1997.  It told the jurors 
they were free to talk to the attorneys or to the court itself, but could also decline 
to talk about the case.  At the next appearance of counsel, the court advised them 
that four jurors had asked to speak to the court, for a variety of reasons.  During 
two of those conversations, the court asked about ―how the jury had analyzed the 
intent to kill issue.‖21  The first juror replied that the jury did not believe defendant 
intended to kill, but instead thought Genny‘s death was an unintentional result of 
his acts.  The second juror also said ―pretty much the same thing:  the jury had not 
believed there was an intent to kill.‖  The court said it did not inquire further.  It 
identified the jurors as Jurors No. 6 and No. 7.22 
 
Defendant moved for a new trial on the torture-murder special 
circumstance, arguing that the jury‘s failure to deliberate and reach a conclusion 
on intent to kill, an essential element of the special circumstance, violated his 
rights to due process and a fair trial.  He attached declarations by Jurors No. 2, No. 
4, No. 5, No. 9, and No. 10, stating that the verdict on the special circumstance 
was based only on the evidence of torture.  Jurors No. 4, No. 5, and No. 9 also said 
the jury ―did not separately analyze and find that [defendant] also intended to kill 
                                              
21  
We do not endorse the court‘s decision to delve into the particulars of the 
jury deliberations during informal posttrial conversation. 
22  
Defendant‘s new trial motion below, and the Attorney General‘s brief in 
this court, identify the jurors in question as Jurors No. 6 and No. 12.  While there 
was some confusion at the hearing where the court advised counsel about the 
conversations, the reporter‘s transcript reflects the court‘s affirmative answer to 
defense counsel‘s query ―did the court mean seven and six?‖ 
 
55 
the child‖ and Juror No. 2 said the jury ―did not separately find‖ an intent to kill.  
Juror No. 10 stated that ―the issue of intent to kill was not really discussed or 
emphasized,‖ and that the special circumstance was not based on ―the finding of 
any intent to kill.‖  Jurors No. 4, No. 5, and No. 10 said they did not personally 
believe defendant intended to kill Genny; Juror No. 9 personally believed 
defendant ―may not have intended to kill Genny.‖  The statements of personal 
belief were made in the present tense.  The affidavits were dated in July or August 
of 1997.   
 
Attached to the prosecution‘s opposition were affidavits by Jurors No. 1, 
No. 2, No. 3, No. 5, No. 6, No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9, dated later in August 1997.  
Juror No. 1, the foreperson, said the special circumstance instruction was posted 
on the wall, with the element of intent to kill underlined.  Juror No. 1 said the 
evidence was discussed in terms of the intent to both torture and kill.  Juror No. 1 
had responded in the negative when defense counsel had ―asked me the narrow 
question of whether I believed the defendant intended to kill Genny Rojas when he 
submerged her in the tub on July 21, 1995. . . .  However, I was not questioned as 
to whether I believed the defendant intended to kill Genny Rojas based upon the 
defendant‘s omission to act after he had taken her out of the tub, or based upon the 
defendant‘s overall conduct toward the victim over the period she lived with the 
defendant and his wife, which I did consider in deciding whether the defendant 
intended to kill the victim.‖ 
 
Jurors No. 2 and No. 3 stated, ―During deliberation I considered whether 
the defendant intended to torture and kill Genny Rojas.‖  Juror No. 5 declared that 
the evidence was discussed ―in relationship to the defendant‘s intent to kill and 
torture the victim,‖ and that ―I believe the legal definition of intent to kill and 
torture were satisfied.‖  Juror No. 6 ―personally considered and believed 
[defendant] intended to kill Genny Rojas,‖ and said ―the instructions were 
 
56 
discussed at great length during deliberations.‖  Juror No. 7 said the evidence was 
considered ―in relation to the intent to kill and intent to torture,‖ and stated the 
belief that defendant ―intended to torture and kill Genny Rojas.‖  Juror No. 8 said 
the issue of intent to kill was ―discussed during deliberations.‖  Juror No. 9 said 
the jury had discussed defendant‘s failure to act after removing Genny from the 
bath, and the ―continued abuse and torture she had suffered for at least three 
weeks.‖  Like Juror No. 5, Juror No. 9 believed ―the legal definition of intent to 
kill was proven.‖ 
 
After hearing argument, the court denied the new trial motion.  In a written 
ruling, it reasoned that the affidavits presented by the defense were inadmissible 
under Evidence Code section 1150 because they reflected ―the internal mental 
processes of the individual jurors or their speculations as to the internal mental 
processes of other jurors.‖  Regarding defendant‘s argument that his due process 
and fair trial rights required the declarations to be accepted despite the statutory 
bar, the court noted that the policies underlying Evidence Code section 1150 are 
―weighty and central to the jury system.‖  The court observed that the jury was not 
required to ―separately‖ analyze or find intent to kill, but simply to make a finding 
on the special circumstance.  The court also noted that the jurors‘ personal beliefs 
on the intent to kill question were given more than two months after the verdict 
was reached, during which time they were exposed to outside influences and 
subject to ―personal second-guessing.‖  None of the jurors said they were unaware 
of the intent requirement, and two who declared they were personally doubtful 
about defendant‘s intent had also signed declarations stating they believed the 
―legal definition of intent to kill‖ had been satisfied.  Thus, the court concluded 
that defendant‘s affidavits were ―fraught with substantive weakness and credibility 
concerns,‖ and could not support a finding that their admission was 
constitutionally required. 
 
57 
 
The court‘s ruling was correct.  Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision 
(a), provides:  ―Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise 
admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct,  
conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a 
character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.  No evidence is 
admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon 
a juror either in influencing him to assent to or to dissent from the verdict or 
concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.‖  (Italics added.) 
 
―This statute distinguishes ‗between proof of overt acts, objectively 
ascertainable, and proof of the subjective reasoning processes of the individual 
juror, which can be neither corroborated nor disproved . . . .‘  [Citation.]  ‗This 
limitation prevents one juror from upsetting a verdict of the whole jury by 
impugning his own or his fellow jurors‘ mental processes or reasons for assent or 
dissent.  The only improper influences that may be proved under [Evidence Code] 
section 1150 to impeach a verdict, therefore, are those open to sight, hearing, and 
the other senses and thus subject to corroboration.‘  [Citations.]‖  (People v.  
Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1261.) 
 
Defendant contends the jury‘s failure to deliberate and make a separate 
finding on the intent element of the special circumstance was an objectively 
ascertainable overt act.  The argument fails.  No juror declared there was a failure 
to deliberate.  The jury did make a finding on the issue of intent, returning a 
written verdict form stating that ―the murder was intentional and involved the 
infliction of torture.‖  The jurors‘ statements about the mental processes by which 
that verdict was reached were expressly barred by Evidence Code section 1150.  
Defendant‘s claim that excluding these statements would not serve the policies 
underlying the statute is meritless.  Asking jurors to revisit the process by which 
they reached a verdict plainly opens the door to postverdict jury tampering, 
 
58 
harassment of jurors, and instability of verdicts.  (See People v. Steele, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at pp. 1261-1262.)  We have noted that ―[n]ot all thoughts ‗by all jurors at 
all times will be logical, or even rational, or, strictly speaking, correct.  But such 
[thoughts] cannot impeach a unanimous verdict; a jury verdict is not so fragile.‘ ‖  
(Id. at p. 1262, quoting People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1219.) 
 
Defendant argues that applying Evidence Code section 1150 here would 
deprive him of his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty 
determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and article 1, 
sections 7, 15, and 17 of the state Constitution.  We have soundly rejected the 
claim that the federal Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to impeach a 
verdict with the jurors‘ internal thought processes.  (People v. Steele, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at pp. 1262-1263.)  Our reasoning in Steele applies equally to defendant‘s 
state constitutional claims, which he does not separately analyze.  Even assuming 
there might be circumstances in which constitutional principles would justify an 
exception to the rule of exclusion set out in Evidence Code section 1150, no such 
circumstances appear in this case.  As the trial court observed, there is no 
requirement that a jury ―separately‖ analyze any particular element of a special 
circumstance, and the conflicting affidavits obtained from jurors who had been 
exposed to outside influences, not to mention a divided penalty deliberation, were 
hardly reliable indicators of an unconstitutional guilt verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
B.  Penalty Phase Issues 
 
 
1.  Removal of Prospective Juror for Cause 
 
Defendant claims the court erred by excusing Prospective Juror No. 504 for 
cause.23  This prospective juror disclosed on her questionnaire that she believed an 
uncle of hers had been unjustly convicted of murder.  In response to a question 
about her general feelings on the death penalty, she wrote:  ―The death penalty 
should be abolished!  Killing a human being does not serve as a fitting punishment 
for crimes where the perpetrator needs to reflect on what has been done.‖  She said 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole ―gives criminals time to reflect 
on their crimes,‖ and was a punishment worse than death.  Prospective Juror No. 
504 acknowledged that the death penalty ―serves as a form of satisfaction for the 
victim‘s family,‖ but wrote ―none‖ in answer to a question about which crimes 
deserved capital punishment.  She said she had favored the death penalty, ―until I 
learned how long it took for actual death to occur.‖  Nevertheless, Prospective 
Juror No. 504 said she would not always vote against the death penalty, explaining 
―sometimes the death penalty is the only appropriate punishment.‖  Nor would she 
always vote for the death penalty, because ―I consider implementation of the death 
penalty as a last resort.‖ 
 
On voir dire, the court asked Prospective Juror No. 504 about her uncle‘s 
case.  She still felt that he was wrongly convicted.  He was no longer incarcerated 
and lived in the Virgin Islands.  The court asked if she could fairly sit on a capital 
jury, given her feelings about her uncle.  Prospective Juror No. 504 replied, ―I 
                                              
23  
He asserts violations of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and article 1, sections 7, 15, 16, and 17 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
60 
don‘t know.‖  She explained:  ―It would probably affect me.  But I‘m going to sort 
of jump ahead.  I have very mixed feelings about the death penalty.  Part of me 
says that if somebody commits a crime that‘s really horrible, they deserve to die; 
but a part of me says, is that really just punishment to them?  Are they really 
serving their penalty to society by dying, because they never get to contemplate 
their crime?  I don‘t think they‘re really — if they can commit such a crime, I 
don‘t think they value their own lives, so would losing it be fit punishment, for 
them for whatever they committed?‖ 
 
When the court again mentioned Prospective Juror No. 504‘s uncle, and her 
statement of strong opposition to the death penalty, she said, ―Just in case 
somebody ever makes a mistake, you can‘t bring somebody back, and juries have 
been known to be wrong.‖  Queried about her view that the death penalty should 
be abolished, she answered, ―Yes.  I don‘t think taking a life for a life is, is fair.‖  
Nevertheless, she said, ―I think I could be objective.‖  She told the court she would 
keep an open mind as to the appropriate penalty, and the death penalty ―would be 
a possibility‖ for her.  She also said that because of her views, ―it would be very 
unlikely‖ for her to vote for the death penalty.  The court asked whether her 
uncle‘s experience played a part in her concerns.  Prospective Juror No. 504 
repeated her view that ―juries can make mistakes; and if they execute[] the wrong 
person, you can‘t bring them back.‖  After looking at a picture of Genny Rojas, 
Prospective Juror No. 504 told the court she would be able to keep an analytical, 
open-minded view of the evidence. 
 
Defense counsel questioned Prospective Juror No. 504 about her uncle, 
establishing that the conviction had occurred in the Virgin Islands when the 
prospective juror was a child of nine or 10.  She had learned about it from her 
family.  She agreed that she was not ―adamantly opposed‖ to the death penalty, 
and felt it would be appropriate for certain crimes.  She did not remember writing 
 
61 
on her questionnaire that sometimes it might be the only appropriate penalty.  She 
replied in the affirmative when asked if she could give open and honest 
consideration to both penalty options in this case. 
 
When the prosecutor asked the prospective juror if there would be capital 
punishment if she were running the state, she replied, ―No.  I would subject 
criminals to medical research.  I think that would be a lot better.  Make them 
useful for something.‖  She added that she did not feel capital punishment was 
proper ―at times,‖ because ―I don‘t think . . . they‘re suffering for whatever crime 
they committed.‖  The prosecutor inquired about her use of the phrase ―at times,‖ 
and Prospective Juror No. 504 gave Jeffrey Dahmer as an example of ―somebody 
who . . . deserved to die.‖  The prosecutor noted that this was not a case of serial 
murder, and asked if she could apply capital punishment to torture murder.  
Prospective Juror No. 504 said she did not know, but when pressed said she  could 
vote for the death penalty in such a case.  She could ―compartmentalize‖ her 
general views on capital punishment.  She said her objections were moral, not 
political, but added, ―I‘m not going to be protesting in front of the courthouse to 
abolish capital punishment now.‖ 
 
Asked if she could ―override [her] morals and give the people of the state of 
California a fair trial,‖ Prospective Juror No. 504 said, ―I really don‘t know the 
answer to that question.  I think I would have to hear more to be able to know if I 
would be able to do that.‖  The prosecutor asked if she minded him asking further 
questions.  She said, ―Yes.  I mind.‖  The prosecutor said, ―You do mind?‖  She 
answered, ―Yeah.  But I — at times, it can sound very conflicting on the left, on 
one side, and on the right, on the other side.  But it depends.  Sometimes it 
depends on the day or it depends on the situation or the case that I hear on the 
news.‖  In response to a hypothetical question, Prospective Juror No. 504 said she 
should probably not serve as a juror on a case in which she was morally opposed 
 
62 
to criminalizing the behavior at issue, because ―I don‘t think I would be able to be 
objective.‖  However, asked if the same considerations applied to her beliefs about 
capital punishment, she said, ―I don‘t think that you can make that kind of stretch 
because there are issues that are at hand here.  Child abuse. . . .  [There] are people 
concerned about those issues.  Issues like that can make me change my moral 
outlook.‖ 
 
The prosecutor sought to remove Prospective Juror No. 504 for cause.  
Defense counsel objected, arguing that this prospective juror had consistently said 
she could set aside her views on capital punishment, and impose the death penalty 
in an appropriate case, including this case.  The prosecutor responded that 
Prospective Juror No. 504 had become ―downright hostile‖ at times.  He 
questioned whether she had been truthful, noting the inconsistencies in her 
answers.  The court granted the challenge, observing:  ―She may have been the 
least satisfying of the jurors that I‘ve seen so far in trying to really get to the 
bottom of where she is.  I was struck by her opposition to capital punishment and 
then her explanation . . . .  I think all sides can be left with some real questions 
about exactly what her views are.  My sense of her, after I was through with her 
. . . which has not been shaken by both counsel, is that her views substantially 
impair her ability to perform her duties as a juror. . . .  I don‘t think I‘ve seen 
anybody like that.  I don‘t remember anyone like that in our examination of jurors 
in the first case [either].‖ 
 
The court did not err.  ―Under the applicable state and federal constitutional 
provisions, prospective jurors may be excused for cause if their views would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties.  (Wainwright v. 
Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 558.)‖  
(People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 78 (Lancaster).)  Defendant renews in 
this court his argument that Prospective Juror No. 504 demonstrated her open 
 
63 
mindedness about whether to apply the death penalty in this case.  However, on 
this record we must defer to the trial court‘s assessment of the prospective juror‘s 
suitability. 
  
 
― ‗Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter 
falling within the broad discretion of the trial court.  [Citation.]  The trial court 
must determine whether the prospective juror will be ―unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law in the case.‖  [Citation.]  A juror will often give 
conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to 
serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror‘s responses in deciding whether to 
remove the juror for cause.  The trial court‘s resolution of these factual matters is 
binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]‘ ‖  
(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 416; accord, Lancaster, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at pp. 78-79.)  ―Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a 
position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose 
it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of 
potential jurors.‖  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9; see People v. Thornton 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 414 (Thornton).) 
 
Here, Prospective Juror No. 504 gave conflicting and confusing responses 
both on her written form and during voir dire.  She said that the death penalty 
should be abolished, that no crimes deserved capital punishment, and that taking a 
life for a life was not fair.  Although she professed that she could be ―objective‖ 
and consider the death penalty, she also said she would not be able to be objective 
in a case where she did not believe the defendant‘s conduct should be a crime.  
She effectively admitted that her uncle‘s experience of an unjust murder 
conviction would affect her penalty deliberation.   Thus, as in Lancaster, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at page 80, ― ‗[w]e pay due deference to the trial court, which was in a 
position to actually observe and listen to the prospective jurors.  Voir dire 
 
64 
sometimes fails to elicit an unmistakably clear answer from the juror, and there 
will be times when ―the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a 
prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . .  
[T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the 
juror.‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖  And as in Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at page 414, the fact 
that the prospective juror made some statements that might have warranted 
keeping her as a juror does not change the analysis, in light of other statements 
supporting the trial court‘s finding that her views would substantially impair her 
ability to perform the duties of a juror. 
 
 
2.  Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Veronica’s Family 
 
Before the first penalty phase, defendant sought to introduce the evidence 
of Veronica‘s family background that the court had excluded at the guilt phase.  
(See pt. II.A.3., ante.)  Defendant contended this evidence of the abuse to which 
his wife had been exposed was relevant to establish the mitigating factors set out 
in section 190.3, factors (g) (whether defendant acted under extreme duress or the 
substantial domination of another person) and (j) (whether defendant was an 
accomplice whose participation was relatively minor).  Defendant made the same 
argument regarding the evidence that Veronica was antipathetic toward her sister 
Mary, which he claimed gave Veronica a motive to torture and kill Genny.  This 
evidence, too, had been excluded at the guilt phase.  (See pt. II.A.4., ante.) 
 
The court denied the motion to introduce this evidence at the penalty phase.  
It held that Evidence Code section 1101 barred the evidence of Veronica‘s 
childhood experience of abuse, for the same reasons this evidence was 
inadmissible at the guilt phase.  Similarly, the court adhered to its earlier ruling on 
the evidence of Veronica‘s ill will toward Mary, finding it ―too great a leap 
between Veronica‘s antipathy . . . and her motive to torture and kill Mary‘s child.‖  
These rulings remained in effect at the second penalty phase. 
 
65 
 
On appeal, defendant claims the exclusion of this evidence at the penalty 
phase violated his right to present mitigating evidence under Skipper v. South 
Carolina (1986) 476 U.S 1, and deprived him of his constitutional rights under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and article I, sections 7, 15, and 17 of the 
California Constitution.  We disagree.  Skipper does not hold that a different 
analysis governs questions of admissibility at the guilt and penalty phases.  We 
have held that Evidence Code section 1101 applies to third-party culpability 
evidence at the penalty phase for the same reasons it applies at the guilt phase.  
(People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 921, fn. 5; see People v. Davis, supra, 10 
Cal.4th at p. 501, fn. 1.) 
 
Defendant asserts that a string of United States Supreme Court decisions 
establishes his right to present relevant mitigating evidence.  (Tennard v. Dretke 
(2004) 542 U.S. 274 (Tennard); Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104; Green 
v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586.)  With that 
proposition, of course, we have no quarrel.  But as we have often explained, the 
high court has never held that a defendant‘s right to present mitigating evidence 
overrides the usual rules of evidence.  (E.g., People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
226, 238; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1015; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1133, 1178.)  In the words of the Tennard court, ―the ‗meaning of 
relevance is no different in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in a 
capital sentencing proceeding‘ than in any other context . . . .  ‗ ―Relevant 
mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some 
fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating 
value.‖ ‘ ‖  (Tennard, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 284, quoting McKoy v. North Carolina 
(1990) 494 U.S. 433, 440.) 
 
―[A] State cannot bar ‗the consideration of . . . evidence if the sentencer 
could reasonably find that it warrants a sentence less than death.‘ ‖  (Tennard, 
 
66 
supra, 542 U.S. at p. 285, quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 
441.)  Here, the evidence defendant sought to introduce at his penalty phase did 
not relate to his own circumstances or character.  (Compare Tennard, at p. 285.)  
He offered the evidence for the same purpose as at the guilt phase, to cast blame 
on Veronica.  Because the evidence did not tend to prove Veronica‘s guilt, it 
would not support a finding that a lesser penalty than death was warranted.  It bore 
little relevance to whether defendant acted under duress or substantial domination 
by Veronica (§ 190.3, factor (g)), or whether his participation was relatively minor 
(§ 190.3, factor (j)).  As we have discussed in connection with defendant‘s guilt 
phase arguments, Veronica‘s childhood experiences were not remotely similar to 
the abuse inflicted on Genny, and her feelings toward her sister did not establish a 
motive to torture and kill Genny.  Defendant‘s claims are entirely speculative and 
establish no deprivation of the right to present relevant mitigating evidence. 
 
 
3.  Exclusion of Veronica’s Admissions 
 
At the outset of the guilt phase, the prosecutor indicated that he intended to 
introduce statements Veronica made to police officers in the apartment where 
Genny‘s body had been brought, and another statement made later at the police 
station.  In the apartment, Veronica had said she put Genny in the bathtub, went to 
the kitchen to cook dinner, and returned to the bathroom to find Genny submerged 
in the tub.  At the police station, Veronica told an officer that she was in the 
kitchen cooking when her daughter had drowned.  Defense counsel did not object 
to the statements made at the apartment, but did raise a hearsay objection to the 
statement at the police station. 
 
The trial court was not persuaded by the prosecutor‘s arguments that the 
statement qualified as an excited utterance or a declaration against interest.  
However, the court overruled the hearsay objection.  It reasoned that all the 
statements were admissible not for their truth, but to show Veronica‘s 
 
67 
consciousness of guilt and defendant‘s, as well, to the extent their statements were 
consistent and thus reflected fabrication.  Ultimately, the prosecutor elicited only 
the statements Veronica made at the apartment. 
 
In advance of the penalty retrial, the prosecutor sought to exclude these 
statements, arguing that they were not relevant as evidence of consciousness of 
guilt at the penalty phase.  Defense counsel‘s primary argument in opposition was 
that the statements qualified as excited utterances.  The court reminded counsel 
that its guilt phase ruling had not permitted the statements to be used for their 
truth, but only as evidence of Veronica‘s consciousness of guilt.  Defense counsel 
then argued, alternatively, that Veronica‘s consciousness of guilt was relevant at 
the penalty phase to show the extent of both parents‘ participation in the events on 
the night of the murder.  The court questioned whether Veronica‘s statements 
showed anything about the degree of defendant‘s participation. 
 
Counsel responded that Veronica‘s use of the word ―I‖ rather than ―we‖ 
when she talked about putting Genny in the bath would allow the jury to draw a 
conclusion about defendant‘s role in the incident.  Counsel further contended that 
Veronica‘s degree of participation was relevant to the jury‘s consideration of 
lingering doubt at the penalty phase.  The court viewed these arguments as 
dependent on the truth of Veronica‘s statements, not their function as evidence of 
her consciousness of guilt.  It rejected the claim that the statements were excited 
utterances, reasoning that (1) according to Veronica, she had been excited not by 
the act of putting the child in the bath, but by discovering her floating in the tub 
later, and (2) her statements were so clearly at odds with the physical evidence and 
common sense that they were plainly fabricated. 
 
Defense counsel then argued that the rules of evidence should be relaxed to 
admit the statements, because they were ―dramatically important‖ to the penalty 
phase defense, and important to the jury‘s understanding of the circumstances of 
 
68 
the crime.  The court disagreed, observing that Veronica‘s statements were a 
denial of responsibility and an attempt to portray the events as merely accidental.  
It concluded that this was not the sort of ―dramatic circumstance‖ that might 
justify making an exception to the usual rules of evidence. 
 
Defendant claims the court erred.  He argues that Veronica‘s statements 
were admissible both as spontaneous statements (Evid. Code, § 1240) and 
declarations against her penal interest (Evid. Code, § 1230).  We review the 
court‘s rulings for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 
708; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153.)  None appears here.  To 
qualify as ―spontaneous‖ under Evidence Code section 1240, a statement must 
have been made ― ‗before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., 
while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective 
powers to be yet in abeyance.‘ ‖  (People v. Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 495, 
quoting People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 318.)  Here, Veronica‘s statements 
were not made before she had time to contrive and misrepresent.  A substantial 
period of time had elapsed between Genny‘s death and the arrival of the police.  
Indeed, there was evidence that Veronica sought to prevent the police from being 
summoned.  There was ample support for trial court‘s finding that she used the 
available time to fabricate a story.  The severe scalding on the lower half of 
Genny‘s body was utterly inconsistent with the scenario described by Veronica. 
 
In the trial court, defendant did not urge that the statements were admissible 
as declarations against Veronica‘s penal interest.  Therefore, this claim of error has 
been forfeited.  In any event, it is meritless.  ― ‗With respect to the penal interest 
exception, the proponent of the evidence ―must show that the declarant is 
unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant‘s penal interest when 
made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission 
despite its hearsay character.‖  [Citations.]‘  (People v. Lawley[, supra,] 27 Cal.4th 
 
69 
102, 153.)‖  (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 483.)  Veronica‘s statements 
were exculpatory rather than inculpatory, and therefore were not against her penal 
interest.  (Id. at pp. 483-484.) 
 
Defendant asserts, in passing, that the statements were admissible under the 
―nonstatutory catch-all exception to the hearsay rule,‖ and for the nonhearsay 
purpose of demonstrating Veronica‘s consciousness of guilt.  He offers no 
argument or authority to support a nonstatutory hearsay exception, and we reject 
this claim.24  As to Veronica‘s consciousness of guilt, defense counsel failed to 
make a clear showing of the relevance of this factor in the penalty phase, and 
appeared to have abandoned it as a ground for admission by the time the argument 
below concluded.  We do not fault the trial court for reasoning that defendant‘s 
arguments for admissibility depended on the truth of Veronica‘s statements.  
Nevertheless, Veronica‘s consciousness of guilt had some relevance to establish 
her participation in the crime, and to lend some support to defendant‘s claim that 
his participation was ―relatively minor.‖  (§ 190.3, factor (j).) 
 
Any error was clearly harmless, however.  Veronica‘s guilt, like 
defendant‘s, was strongly suggested by the physical evidence.   Defendant himself 
told the police that he and Veronica both put Genny in the bath.  Veronica‘s 
statements were consistent with defendant‘s; her use of the pronoun ―I‖ did not 
exclude him as a participant.  Defendant speculates the jury might have concluded 
that Genny was placed in the bathtub twice, once by both parents and then again 
                                              
24 
Unlike the federal rules of evidence, our Evidence Code does not include a 
―catchall‖ hearsay exception.  (See Fed. Rules Evid., rule 807, 28 U.S.C.) We 
have recognized that decisional law may provide authority for an exception.  
(People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 268.)  Defendant, however, refers us to no 
such authority. 
 
70 
by Veronica alone, after defendant left the apartment.  Defense counsel below 
offered no such theory, and nothing in Veronica‘s statements supports it.  Her 
statements did not change the story defendant told:  they put Genny in the bath; 
defendant left for about 10 minutes to buy groceries while Veronica was making 
dinner; and after he returned Veronica found Genny in the bath and called him for 
help.  Because her statements did not significantly alter the scenario before the 
jury, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have 
returned a different penalty verdict had they been admitted into evidence.  (People 
v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 641-642.) 
 
Defendant further contends the exclusion of Veronica‘s statements 
infringed his rights to present a penalty defense and to a fair trial and a reliable 
penalty determination, under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as 
well as article I, sections 7, 15, and 17 of the California Constitution.  The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that 
hearsay evidence is inadmissible, which is limited to particularly critical and 
reliable mitigating evidence.  (Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S 95, 97; see 
People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 150.)  ―Exclusion of hearsay testimony 
at a penalty phase may violate a defendant‘s due process rights if the excluded 
testimony is highly relevant to an issue critical to punishment and substantial 
reasons exist to assume the evidence is reliable.‖  (People v. Phillips, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 238.)  Veronica‘s statements do not meet this high standard.  The trial 
court deemed them fabrications, they were entirely consistent with defendant‘s 
own exculpatory statements, and their evidentiary value was limited to reflecting 
Veronica‘s consciousness of guilt.  Thus, they were neither particularly reliable 
nor highly relevant.  Tellingly, defendant places far more weight in his briefs on 
the value of the statements as admissions than on their tendency to establish a 
consciousness of guilt.  As admissions, the statements were entirely unreliable. 
 
71 
 
Defendant claims it was fundamentally unfair to allow Veronica‘s 
statements to come in at the guilt phase, yet exclude them at the penalty retrial.  
He accuses the prosecutor of taking inconsistent positions.  There is no merit in 
these claims.  At the penalty phase the trial court gave defense counsel a fair 
chance to establish the relevance of the evidence for the same purpose it served at 
the guilt phase.  Counsel failed to make a persuasive showing.  Nor did the 
prosecutor take an inconsistent position on any factual theory.  Strategic choices 
about what evidence to present are a routine feature of criminal trials. 
 
 
4.  Denial of Request to Exhibit Defendant’s Children 
 
During the first penalty phase, defense counsel informed the court that they 
intended to bring defendant‘s children to the courtroom for the jury to see them.  
Counsel proposed doing this during the testimony of the grandparents, or of the 
children‘s lawyer, who would be testifying about the effect on the children if their 
father were executed.  In this way, they could avoid hearing ―unpleasant parts‖ of 
the testimony.  The court refused to permit the children to be brought in.  It noted 
that it had ―taken substantial measures to keep the kids away from this case.‖  It 
found that the children‘s physical appearance was irrelevant to the question of 
whether they loved their father and would be hurt by losing him to an execution.  
Only if they testified would their presence materially add to the jury‘s 
deliberations, and the court would not allow that to happen.25 
 
The court was not persuaded by counsel‘s arguments that the children‘s 
appearance would be powerful evidence in mitigation, and that there was no 
                                              
25  
At the guilt phase, the court had refused to allow the prosecutor to 
subpoena the older children, Ivan, Jr., and Michael, based on the psychological 
harm that might result if they testified.  Defendant did not seek to call his children 
as witnesses. 
 
72 
evidence the four younger children would be harmed if they were exposed to the 
proceedings.  It ordered that the children were not to be brought to court, based on 
the irrelevance of their presence to the penalty deliberations.  The court agreed to 
give the jury an instruction informing it that the children‘s absence was due to the 
court‘s ruling. 
 
The matter came up again at the penalty phase retrial, when the prosecutor 
asked the court to make sure the children would not be present.  He noted that they 
had been in the courthouse during the last penalty phase.  A juror had told the 
prosecutor that in an elevator one day, one of the children had asked defendant‘s 
father, ―Are these the people that are going to kill daddy?‖  The court responded 
firmly, advising defense counsel and defendant‘s family members that the children 
were not to be brought to the courthouse while the trial was in progress. 
 
Defendant contends that the exclusion of his children violated his right to 
present relevant mitigating evidence, depriving him of his constitutional rights 
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, including his right to a 
public trial.  We disagree.  Parading defendant‘s children before the jurors would 
have provided no relevant evidence in the penalty phase proceedings.  Defendant 
erroneously asserts that the impact his execution would have on the children was a 
proper consideration. 
 
―The impact of a defendant‘s execution on his or her family may not be 
considered by the jury in mitigation.  (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 366–
367; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1000; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 353, 454–456 . . . .)  In Ochoa, we explained it is a defendant‘s 
background and character, and ‗not the distress of his or her family,‘ that is 
relevant under section 190.3.  (19 Cal.4th at p. 456.)  We distinguished between 
‗evidence that [a defendant] is loved by family members or others, and that these 
individuals want him or her to live . . . . [and evidence about] whether the 
 
73 
defendant‘s family deserves to suffer the pain of having a family member 
executed.‘  (Ibid.)  The former constitutes permissible indirect evidence of a 
defendant‘s character while the latter improperly asks the jury to spare the 
defendant‘s life because it ‗believes that the impact of the execution would be 
devastating to other members of the defendant‘s family.‘  (Ibid.)‖  (People v. 
Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601  (Bennett).)26 
 
Simply seeing defendant‘s small children in the courtroom would not have 
provided the jury with insight into whether they loved him and wanted him to live.  
Their mere physical appearance would not have spoken, even indirectly, to his 
background and character.  There was a great deal of witness testimony about the 
children and their love for defendant.  The court properly excluded the children 
themselves from the trial on relevance grounds, and doing so did not violate 
defendant‘s constitutional rights.27  (See Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 602.) 
 
 
5.  Exclusion of Execution Impact and Family Background Evidence 
 
Defendant claims the court erred by excluding items of mitigating evidence 
relating to the impact of his execution on Ivan, Jr., and to defendant‘s family 
background.  We reject these claims. 
                                              
26  
We note that our decisions clarifying the distinction between ―execution 
impact evidence‖ and the feelings of a defendant‘s family as indirect character 
evidence were issued after this case was tried. 
27  
Defendant did not assert his right to a public trial below, so the trial court 
had no occasion to consider it.  That claim of error was forfeited.  In any event, it 
has no merit.  The right to a public trial is not absolute (Waller v. Georgia (1984) 
467 U.S. 39, 45), and does not extend to a defendant‘s young children.  Trial 
courts have broad power to control their courtrooms, and may exclude ― ‗youth of 
tender years.‘ ‖  (People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 385, quoting People 
v. Hartman (1894) 103 Cal. 242, 245; see also, e.g., McConnaughey v. United 
States (D.C. 2002) 804 A.2d 334, 341; Reed v. United States (8th Cir. 1972) 461 
F.2d 1106.)  
 
74 
 
At the first penalty phase, during in limine discussions about the scope of 
testimony, the court ruled that the prosecutor would be allowed to cross-examine 
the children‘s attorney about whether they had been hurt by Genny‘s death and the 
events that led up to it, as a way of responding to defendant‘s claim that they 
would be harmed by his execution.  Defense counsel proposed asking on redirect 
whether Ivan, Jr., was harmed by having his preliminary hearing testimony 
presented at trial.  The court summarily denied this request.  During the direct 
examination of the children‘s attorney, defense counsel elicited the view that they 
would be devastated by the execution of their father.  He then began to ask:  ―Is 
the fact that Ivan, Jr., was a witness through his videotape and videotaped 
statements —.‖  An objection was sustained at this point. 
 
In advance of the penalty phase retrial, defense counsel asked the court to 
take judicial notice of the fact that Ivan, Jr., had testified against his father.  
Counsel wanted to argue that because the child testified at the preliminary hearing, 
his father‘s execution would be particularly harmful to him.  After hearing 
argument, the court concluded it would be misleading to provide the jury with the 
fact but not the substance of Ivan, Jr.‘s testimony.  The court made it clear that 
either side could introduce the child‘s statements, but declined to take notice of 
them. 
 
Defendant claims the court erred.  However, as discussed above, the impact 
of defendant‘s execution on his children was not a relevant consideration.  
Accordingly, whatever influence Ivan, Jr.‘s testimony may have had on that 
impact was also irrelevant.  Defendant did not seek to use Ivan, Jr.‘s testimony at 
the guilt phase for a relevant purpose, i.e., to show his love for his father and 
desire for him to live.  (See Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 601.)  Defendant fails 
to establish any error on this point. 
 
75 
 
Defendant also argues, briefly, that the court erroneously sustained 
objections to questions exploring his father‘s and uncle‘s family background, and 
his mother‘s disapproval of his relationship with Veronica.  The court did not 
abuse its discretion by excluding such ―marginally relevant testimony,‖ which 
would have diverted the jury‘s attention away from defendant‘s character and 
experience and toward the experiences and views of his parents and uncle.  
(People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 148-149.) 
 
Finally, defendant complains that the trial court discouraged him at the 
penalty phase retrial from presenting testimony that he treated his son Anthony 
evenhandedly, even though he believed Anthony was not his biological child.  
Defendant claims the court permitted the prosecutor to rebut such a showing with 
evidence that the Gonzales apartment was filthy.  However, the court allowed 
defendant to present testimony from his sisters that he treated Anthony the same as 
the other children and did not abuse him, despite believing that he was the product 
of Veronica‘s affair with Eugene Luna.  The court‘s in limine ruling allowing 
evidence of the condition of the apartment was limited to rebuttal of any showing 
by defendant that went beyond evenhanded treatment and tried to paint a ―warm 
and fuzzy‖ positive picture of defendant‘s relationship with Anthony.  Defendant 
did not attempt to make that further showing.  ―The scope of rebuttal evidence is 
within the trial court‘s discretion, and on appeal its ruling will not be disturbed 
absent ‗ ―palpable abuse.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖  (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
1032, 1088.)  No such abuse appears here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
6.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct on various 
occasions during his opening statement and closing arguments at the penalty phase 
retrial.28  We conclude there was no misconduct. 
 
As noted in part II.A.10., ante, ―[t]he standards governing review of 
misconduct claims are settled.  ‗A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require 
reversal under the federal Constitution when they infect the trial with such 
― ‗unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.‘ ‖  
[Citations.]  Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such methods commits 
misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‘  
[Citation.]  ‗In order to preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a 
timely objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not have 
cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for review.‘  [Citation.]  
When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor‘s comments before the 
jury, ‗ ―the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable 
fashion.‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.) 
 
Defendant complains that the prosecutor referred to him as ―the camp 
commandant‖ in the opening statement, and ―Ivan the Terrible‖ in closing 
argument.  Defendant did not object to the ―Ivan the Terrible‖ epithet, however, 
                                              
28  
He asserts violations of his rights to a fair trial and due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California 
Constitution; to a fair and reliable penalty determination under the Eighth 
Amendment and article I, section 17 of the of the California Constitution; and to 
representation by counsel and confrontation of witnesses under the Sixth 
Amendment and article I, section 15 of the of the California Constitution. 
 
77 
and as we have held with respect to the guilt phase arguments, the prosecutor‘s 
characterizations were within the realm of permissible argument.  (Pt. II.A.10., 
ante.)  Nor was the ―camp commandant‖ remark improper in the opening 
statement.  (See People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 518.)  Defendant 
complains that the prosecutor had told the court and opposing counsel he would 
not use that epithet.  However, as the remark was not improper, defendant was not 
prejudiced. 
 
Next, defendant claims it was misconduct for the prosecutor to refer in 
closing argument to an empty chair on which he had placed a ―reserved‖ sign.  
The reference was as follows:  ―You know, folks, I reserved this seat right here; 
that is me.  And I put a ‗reserved‘ sign on it.  Nobody‘s ever sat in this seat during 
this trial.  And there‘s a reason for it:  it serves as an illustration that somebody 
cares about Genny and that Genny does exist in all of our hearts and that a murder 
victim shall exist, until the trial is over, at least.‖  In advance of the argument, the 
court had overruled defendant‘s objection to such comments, although the 
anticipated focus had been that the prosecutor would argue that Genny‘s parents 
did not care for her.  Defendant claims the argument was an improper appeal to the 
jurors‘ emotions.  We disagree; at a penalty phase, an appeal for sympathy with 
the victim is not out of place.  (People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 691.)  
The prosecutor‘s argument here was not inflammatory. 
 
Defendant also takes exception to references by the prosecutor to his 
appearance:  ―Putting him in a purple cardigan, or whatever you call that, that 
doesn‘t make him more of a human.  That‘s not what he wore around the Gonzales 
household.  That‘s not even the way he looked, from what we can tell. . . .  He 
used to have facial hair.  He doesn‘t have that anymore.  Why?‖  Defendant did 
not object at trial, and therefore this claim of misconduct has not been preserved.  
It is also meritless.  (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 298-299.) 
 
78 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he 
asked the jurors to imagine going into the bedroom in the Gonzales apartment 
where Genny was kept, saying, ―and it smells, smells of feces and urine.‖  Again, 
defendant failed to object.  In any event, the jury at the penalty phase retrial heard 
evidence that the box in the closet in this bedroom contained fecal matter, and the 
blanket found on the floor behind the door along with wadded toilet paper was 
very moist. 
 
Defendant claims the prosecutor engaged in inflammatory argument when 
he said:  ―Where else, where else in our history — think through history — where 
else was it condoned that you could burn a child, that you could hang a child, that 
you could stuff a child in a box?  Where else have we had that type of conduct?  In 
concentration camps?  [Objection overruled.]  We‘ve had concentration camps 
throughout history, whether it‘s in Eastern Europe, Rwanda, Bosnia, wherever it 
is, that when you saw this type of conduct.  And the defendant embraced it.  He 
sought it out with zeal and passion.  Yet, once again, we hear the same type of 
defense:  ‗I was just following orders.  I‘m a victim.  I had to.  I‘m a victim.  I was 
just following orders.‘  Not here, folks, not this case, not Genny‘s case, huh-uh.‖ 
 
While the prosecutor trod close to the line with this argument, we conclude 
it was not misconduct.  ― ‗ ―In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing 
defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are 
wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence.‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. 
Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 836-837.)  Here, the prosecutor limited his 
analogy to conduct, not individuals, and the comparison was not inappropriate 
given the extreme forms of torture inflicted on Genny.  Furthermore, the 
prosecutor made a larger point about defendant‘s attempt to avoid responsibility 
by claiming he was dominated by Veronica.  (Cf. Jablonski, at p. 837.) 
 
79 
 
Defendant next claims the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
asked the jurors to picture themselves with a gun in the Gonzales apartment on the 
night Genny died, and asked them at what point they would intervene.  The court 
overruled defense counsel‘s objection.  Defendant compares the prosecutor‘s tactic 
to the argument this court disapproved in People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 375, 
381.  However, in Jackson the prosecutor told the jurors they would have killed 
the defendant to protect the victim, and thus should not be ―squeamish about doing 
it legally.‖  (Ibid.)  Here, the prosecutor was illustrating that Genny‘s death was 
the result of a continuing course of conduct that inevitably resulted in her death.  
Defendant had clearly been aware of the extensive abuse Genny suffered.  Yet he 
failed to intervene, even under his theory of the events.  While the prosecutor‘s 
argument was melodramatic, we cannot say it was a deceptive or reprehensible 
method of persuasion, nor was it likely to lead the jury to abandon its appropriate 
function at the penalty phase.  (People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.) 
 
Defendant claims the prosecutor misstated defense arguments and 
disparaged defense counsel by (1) suggesting that the number of defenses raised 
reflected on their veracity; (2) claiming that ―any efforts by his attorneys to 
humanize him is ridiculous‖; and (3) asserting that any argument by the defense 
that the death was the accidental result of  ―discipline out of control‖ amounted to 
a claim that Genny somehow contributed to the homicidal acts.  These arguments 
were within the prosecutor‘s ―wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in 
opposing counsel‘s tactics and factual account,‖ which includes ―anticipat[ing] the 
flaws likely to appear in counsel‘s closing argument based on evidence that was 
introduced.‖  (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; see also, e.g., People 
v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 735-736.) 
 
Finally, defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask, ―If 
he was such a great father, why did he let his children see this?‖  The court 
 
80 
overruled defense counsel‘s objection to this remark, and properly so.  Defendant 
contends the defense did not make the claim that he was a good father, and there 
was no evidence that the children saw what had happened.  However, defendant 
put on evidence that his children loved him, and that he treated Anthony in an 
evenhanded way though this child was not his biological son.  The injuries 
sustained by Genny, some of which were weeks old, would have been obvious to 
anyone living in the Gonzales apartment.  The prosecutor‘s rhetorical question was 
within the range of permissible argument. 
 
 
7.  Jury Instructions 
 
Defendant raises a number of claims of instructional error, all of which are 
foreclosed under previous decisions of this court.  He fails to offer persuasive 
reasons to change our views.  Thus: 
 
The court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give two instructions 
proposed by defense to replace or supplement CALJIC No. 8.85.  These 
instructions would have told the jury that factor (a) of section 190.3 (the 
circumstances of the offense) could be either aggravating or mitigating, and the 
rest of the statutory factors could only be considered mitigating factors.  Nor did 
the court err in refusing instructions elaborating on factor (k) (any other 
extenuating circumstances) and delineating nonstatutory mitigating factors.29  It is 
settled that CALJIC No. 8.85 properly instructs the jury on aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and the court need not give pinpoint instructions on mitigation.  
(People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 38-39; People v. Lomax, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 593; People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 875.) 
                                              
29  
Defendant does not set out the terms of these instructions in his briefs, and 
confines his argument to general considerations. 
 
81 
 
Defendant claims the court erroneously failed to give an instruction stating:  
―The mitigating circumstances that I have read for your consideration are given to 
you merely as examples of some of the facts that you may take into account as 
reasons for deciding not to impose a death sentence in this case.  [¶]  But you 
should not limit your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific 
factors.  You may also consider any other circumstance relating to the case or to 
the defendant as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death 
penalty.  [¶]  Any one of the mitigating factors, standing alone, may support a 
decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case.‖  We have held 
that such instructions need not be given because they duplicate CALJIC No. 8.85‘s 
explication of section 190.3, factor (k).  (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 
187-188; see also People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 729; People v. Noguera 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 647-648.) 
 
Defendant challenges the court‘s refusal to instruct the jury, ―You may 
spare the defendant‘s life for any reason you deem appropriate and satisfactory, or 
for no reason at all.  If something arouses mercy, sympathy, empathy or 
compassion such as to persuade you that death is not the appropriate penalty, you 
may act in response thereto.‖  Again, we have held such instructions are properly 
denied.  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1420; People v. Ledesma, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 739; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1135.) 
 
The court did not err by instructing the jury that it need not be unanimous 
in finding aggravating circumstances.  (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 
594; People v. Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 875.) 
 
The court was not required to instruct on lingering doubt.  (People v. 
Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 325-326; People v. Howard, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 38.) 
 
82 
 
The court was properly guided by our decision in People v. Noguera, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages 639-641, when it instructed the jury that ―[i]f you 
conclude that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison to 
the mitigating circumstances that they warrant death instead of life without parole, 
you shall return a judgment of death.‖ 
 
The CALJIC instructions allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of 
the crime in aggravation do not result in arbitrary and capricious application of the 
death penalty.  (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 593; People v. Leonard, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1429.) 
 
The instructions were not defective for failing to impose a burden of proof 
on the prosecution, or for failing to inform the jury that there was no burden of 
proof.  (People v. Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 39; People v. Elliot, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 488.) 
 
The court was not required to instruct on a ―presumption of life.‖  (People 
v. Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 39; People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 
594-595.) 
 
The phrase ―so substantial‖ in CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly 
broad.  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 334; People v. 
Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 595.) 
 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not unconstitutional for failing to require a finding that 
death is the ―appropriate‖ punishment.  (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 
594; People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 516.) 
 
The instructions did ―not violate principles of equal protection of the law on 
the ground they provide safeguards different from those found in noncapital cases.  
[Citations.]‖  (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 650; see also People v. 
Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 756.) 
 
 
83 
 
 
8.  Denial of Motion to Modify Sentence 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously denied the automatic motion to 
modify his death sentence.  Section 190.4 requires the trial judge to ―review the 
evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and . . . make a 
determination as to whether the jury‘s findings and verdicts that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the 
evidence presented.  The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his 
findings.‖  (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)  ― ‗On appeal, we independently review the trial 
court‘s ruling after reviewing the record, but we do not determine the penalty de 
novo.‘  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1267.)‖  (People v. Thompson 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 141.) 
 
Here, the trial court performed the required evidentiary review, 
independently weighing the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  
It concluded that the circumstances of the offense were an aggravating factor of 
―simply enormous‖ weight.  The court noted, ―This case involved the murder of a 
four-year-old girl left in the defendant‘s care.  The ongoing, and to my heart and 
my mind, numbing course of torture over a period of weeks which featured 
beating, tying, binding, burning, scalding, hanging, [was] all done within the 
sanctity of the home and apparently in concert with the defendant‘s wife and 
undoubtedly in the presence of his six children, who are now additional victims of 
his conduct.  I have been involved in criminal law for over 26 years at this point, 
and this may be the most aggravated, continued torture of a single victim I have 
ever seen.‖ 
 
Regarding the extent of defendant‘s participation, the court was persuaded 
that ―the defendant was a weaker personality than his wife.‖  However, it did not 
believe his wife ―dominated his decision-making to the point of lessening his 
 
84 
moral obligation or capacity to avoid the torturous and homicidal conduct that 
brings him to judgment today.  In fact, I find it impossible to believe, based on the 
evidence presented to the jury, that this defendant was a passive participant in the 
crime.‖  The court deemed it mitigating that defendant had a nonviolent 
background with a loving family, and was loved by his children.  However, it 
concluded these factors were outweighed by the ―lengthy, extensive, violent, 
sadistic course of conduct‖ that led to Genny‘s death. 
 
Defendant does not take issue with these detailed findings.  He merely 
asserts that the weight of the evidence does not support the death verdict.  We 
disagree.  The record strongly supports the verdict. 
 
Defendant also asked the court to find the death penalty disproportionate, 
relying on People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441.  The court ruled that despite the 
support expressed for defendant from his large family, death was not a 
disproportionate penalty for ―the extended, horrific, intentional torture murder of a 
four-year-old girl entrusted to his care.‖  Defendant argues, briefly, that the denial 
of his Dillon motion was a separate error. 
 
―To determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual under the California 
Constitution as applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing court must examine 
the circumstances of the offense, including motive, the extent of the defendant's 
involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the 
consequences of the defendant‘s acts.  The court must also consider the personal 
characteristics of the defendant, including his or her age, prior criminality, and 
mental capabilities.  (People v. Dillon[, supra,] 34 Cal.3d 441, 479.)  If the penalty 
imposed is ‗grossly disproportionate to the defendant‘s individual culpability‘  
(ibid.), so that the punishment ‗ ― ‗shocks the conscience and offends fundamental 
notions of human dignity‘ ‖ ‘ (People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 690), the court 
 
85 
must invalidate the sentence as unconstitutional.‖  (People v. Lucero, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at pp. 739-740.) 
 
Here, for the reasons given by the trial court, the death penalty cannot be 
said to be disproportionate.  Defendant asserts without elaboration that the 
disproportionality of his punishment also violates the Eighth Amendment.  We are 
not persuaded.  The analysis is the same under the state and federal Constitutions.  
(People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 739.) 
 
 
9.  Cumulative Error 
 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the errors at his trial requires 
reversal.  We conclude that any errors or assumed errors were not prejudicial, 
whether reviewed separately or cumulatively. 
 
 
10.  International Norms 
 
Defendant asks us to reconsider our consistently expressed view that 
California‘s use of the death penalty does not violate international law or ―norms,‖ 
as defendant puts it.  (See, e.g., People v. Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 39; 
People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 595.)  We decline to do so.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gonzales 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S067353 
Date Filed: August 2, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Michael D. Wellington 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Craig Buckser, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala G. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Annie Featherman 
Fraser, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Craig Buckser 
Deputy State Public Defender 
801 K Street, Suite 1100 
Sacramento, CA  95814-3518 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Annie Featherman Fraser 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2427