Title: State v. Balliette
Citation: 2011 WI 79
Docket Number: 2009AP000472
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2011

2011 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP472 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David J. Balliette, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 19, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 4, 2011   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT COURT   
 
COUNTY: 
WINNEBAGO   
 
JUDGE: 
KAREN L. SEIFERT   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Daniel J. O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, Attorney General. 
For the Defendant-Appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Steven D. Grunder, Assistant State Public Defender. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak, Henak 
Law Office, S.C., for Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
 2011 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP472   
(L.C. No. 
1999CF375) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David J. Balliette, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 19, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing a 
decision and order of the Winnebago County Circuit Court, Karen 
L. Seifert, Judge.  This case requires us to determine whether 
the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the basis 
of his conclusory allegation in a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2007-08)2 
                                                 
1 State v. Balliette, No. 2009AP472, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. March 10, 2010). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
2 
 
motion for a new trial that his postconviction counsel was 
ineffective for not raising in a Wis. Stat. § 974.02 motion and 
on direct appeal additional ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims against his trial counsel. 
¶2 
We conclude that the defendant is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing because the allegations in his § 974.06 
motion do not provide sufficient material facts that, if proven, 
demonstrate an entitlement to the relief sought.   
¶3 
The defendant's motion focused attention on the wrong 
counsel; it was conclusory because it failed to carefully 
address the two elements of ineffective assistance of counsel 
set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); and it 
generally ignored the "five 'w's' and one 'h'" methodology 
outlined in State v. John Allen, 2004 WI 106, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 
682 
N.W.2d 433 
(John 
Allen), 
which 
guide 
the 
court 
in 
meaningfully evaluating the claim.  The motion failed to say who 
would be called as a witness at an evidentiary hearing and what 
their testimony was likely to prove.  In attempting to construct 
a better defense for a retrial, Balliette did not do enough to 
show that a new trial was required.  
¶4 
In 
sum, 
the 
§ 974.06 
motion 
was 
insufficient.  
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
On August 30, 1999, David J. Balliette (Balliette) 
drove his car after consuming six to seven beers and two shots 
of liquor at the Ridgeway Bar in Neenah.  As Balliette was 
driving west on County Highway GG, he came upon a Pontiac 
No. 
  2009AP472 
3 
 
Firebird driven by Michele Thein (Thein).  In the process of 
preparing to turn left into her driveway, Thein slowed down.  
When she slowed down, Balliette attempted to pass her in the 
left lane.  As Thein turned left, Balliette struck the Pontiac, 
driving both vehicles into the ditch.  After the collision, 
Thein was pronounced dead as a result of substantial head 
trauma.   
¶6 
Officer Charles Marousek of the Winnebago County 
Sheriff's Department was the second officer to respond to the 
accident.  He spoke with Balliette and obtained Balliette's 
statement about drinking.  He also noticed a strong odor of 
alcohol on Balliette's breath and observed that his speech was 
slurred.  Officer Marousek then administered three field 
sobriety tests, all of which Balliette failed.  Officer Marousek 
had Balliette perform a preliminary breath test, which resulted 
in a reading of .201 percent breath alcohol.  At this point, 
Balliette was taken into custody and transported to Mercy 
Medical Center.  Approximately two hours after the accident, 
Balliette provided a blood sample at the hospital.  It showed a 
blood alcohol content of .183, which was extrapolated to .21 
blood alcohol content at the time of the crash.   
¶7 
Balliette was subsequently charged with homicide by 
intoxicated use of a motor vehicle in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(a) and homicide by use of a motor vehicle with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(b).  Balliette also was charged with operating after 
revocation, an offense to which he pled guilty before trial. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
4 
 
¶8 
At trial, Balliette claimed that the crash would have 
occurred regardless of his intoxication level.  He asserted that 
Thein braked suddenly and pulled to the right, making room for 
him to pass.  He argued that by attempting to pass on the left, 
he executed a normal passing maneuver.  Balliette claimed that 
after beginning to execute this maneuver, he noticed Thein's 
brake lights when he was about six to seven car lengths behind 
Thein.  He asserted that he applied his brakes and skidded into 
her door as Thein turned into him.3   
¶9 
The State called two accident reconstruction experts 
to dispute Balliette's defense. Both experts concluded that 
Balliette's version of the story was not possible, due to the 
skid marks left by Balliette's vehicle and the lack of skid 
marks from Thein's vehicle. The experts testified that Balliette 
had ample distance, a clear view, and plenty of opportunity to 
decelerate and avoid the collision.  Balliette's trial counsel, 
Attorney Kevin Musolf, retained an accident reconstruction 
expert named Charles Scalia. Attorney Musolf did not, however, 
call the expert at trial. The jury found Balliette guilty, and 
he was sentenced to 40 years in prison.  
¶10 Attorney Edward Hunt was assigned as Balliette's 
postconviction counsel.  Attorney Hunt raised four claims, 
including two for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Attorney Hunt asserted that Attorney Musolf erred (a) by failing 
                                                 
3 Balliette also testified that Thein did not have her turn 
signal on.   
No. 
  2009AP472 
5 
 
to request the insertion of language in a jury instruction that 
would have "explained and clarified" how the victim's "conduct 
and acts" may have provided the defendant with an affirmative 
defense; 
and 
(b) 
by 
failing 
to 
object 
to 
the 
court's 
consideration of victim impact statements at sentencing without 
first 
providing 
Balliette 
the 
opportunity 
to 
review 
the 
statements.  Attorney Hunt did not, however, raise a claim for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for Attorney Musolf's 
failure to present an accident reconstruction expert.  The court 
granted Balliette an evidentiary hearing in which Attorney Hunt 
examined Attorney Musolf on the two issues of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Attorney Musolf also prepared an 
affidavit on sentencing recommendations by two jurors that 
Attorney Hunt moved into evidence.  The trial court ultimately 
denied all four postconviction claims, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.   
¶11 In 2008 Balliette filed a motion pro se under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 asking for a new trial.  He alleged ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel for Attorney Hunt's failure 
to raise certain claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  
¶12 Balliette's motion read in part as follows: 
 
I. 
Postconviction counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge on direct appeal several acts and 
omissions of trial counsel that constitute ineffective 
assistance. 
 
. . . .  
No. 
  2009AP472 
6 
 
 
II. Postconviction counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the court's ruling allowing 
evidence that the defendant's driver's license was 
revoked at the time of the accident. 
¶13 Under I., Balliette wrote in part: 
On direct appeal, Attorney Edward Hunt unsuccessfully 
challenged Attorney Kevin Musolf's failure to request 
more specific jury instructions and failure to object 
to letters submitted to the sentencing judge.  Hunt 
failed to challenge other aspects of Musolf's conduct, 
which 
are 
detailed below.  (Citations omitted.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶14 Balliette attached to his motion a detailed report by 
John DeRosia (DeRosia), a professional engineer and accident 
reconstruction expert.  In his report, DeRosia questioned the 
conclusions of the State's experts and pointed out that one of 
the expert's conclusions was based on an incorrect piece of 
evidence, namely, that Thein's Pontiac did not have an anti-lock 
brake system.  DeRosia's report stated that such a braking 
system was nearly universal in General Motors vehicles at the 
time.  Furthermore, pictures of the Pontiac showed an "ABS" 
label——a common abbreviation for anti-lock braking system.  This 
information allegedly rebutted the State's trial testimony that 
if Thein had braked suddenly, she would have left skid marks.  
Based on these facts and other assertions, DeRosia questioned 
the validity of the conclusions made by the State's accident 
reconstruction experts.   
¶15 Balliette's 16-page motion raised multiple questions 
about the performance of his trial counsel.  His trial counsel 
did not present an accident reconstruction expert at trial to 
rebut the two experts presented by the State; did not correctly 
No. 
  2009AP472 
7 
 
inform the defendant or the court with respect to a lesser-
included offense; and should not have agreed to the wording of a 
stipulation read to the jury about the defendant's revoked 
driver's license.  The motion also asserted that his trial 
counsel should have challenged the circuit court's ruling 
allowing evidence that the defendant's license was revoked at 
the time of the accident.  Balliette's motion did not focus on 
the performance of Attorney Hunt except to assert that he 
"failed to challenge [these] other aspects of Musolf's conduct."  
As a result, the circuit court denied Balliette's claim, ruling 
that Balliette had made merely conclusory allegations and did 
not provide a sufficient reason for raising the claim now rather 
than previously, and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not 
warranted.  The circuit court denied Balliette's motion for 
reconsideration.   
¶16 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing, on the basis that Balliette's motion 
alleged sufficient material facts that, if true, would warrant 
relief.  Balliette, No. 2009AP472, unpublished slip op. at 3-4.  
In addition, the court of appeals concluded that since this was 
a 
motion 
for 
ineffectiveness 
of 
postconviction 
counsel, 
Balliette alleged a sufficient reason for not previously raising 
the claim.  Id. at 3. 
¶17 The State petitioned this court for review of the 
court of appeals' order.  We granted the petition on August 31, 
2010. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 
  2009AP472 
8 
 
¶18 The issue in this case is whether Balliette's Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 motion is sufficient on its face to entitle him 
to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel claim.  Sufficiency of the motion is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  John Allen, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, ¶9.  If the motion raises sufficient facts that, if 
true, show that the defendant is entitled to relief, the circuit 
court must hold an evidentiary hearing.  Id.  However, if the 
motion does not raise such facts, "or presents only conclusory 
allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief," the grant or denial of the 
motion is a matter of discretion entrusted to the circuit court.  
Id. (citing State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 310-11, 548 
N.W.2d 50 (1996); Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 
N.W.2d 629 (1972)).   
¶19 Whether counsel was ineffective is a mixed question of 
fact and law.  State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 
609, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).  The circuit court's findings of 
fact will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous.  
State v. McDowell, 2004 WI 70, ¶31, 272 Wis. 2d 488, 681 
N.W.2d 500.  The ultimate conclusion as to whether there was 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law.  Flores, 
183 Wis. 2d at 609. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶20 An analysis of Balliette's motion for postconviction 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 requires the application of 
several different tests.  To evaluate the sufficiency of the 
No. 
  2009AP472 
9 
 
allegations in his motion, we must consider his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in relation to the established 
pleading requirements for a § 974.06 motion.  We first revisit 
the constitutional test for ineffective assistance of counsel as 
articulated in Strickland.  Second, we review the pleading 
requirements derived from past cases involving § 974.06 motions, 
including "the five 'w's' and one 'h' test" articulated in John 
Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568.  Finally, we apply these tests and 
principles to Balliette's motion. 
A. 
Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
¶21 Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686.  The Supreme Court explained that a convicted 
defendant must show two elements to establish that his counsel's 
assistance 
was 
constitutionally 
ineffective: 
First, 
that 
counsel's performance was deficient; second, that the deficient 
performance resulted in prejudice to the defense.  Id. at 687.   
¶22 The defendant does not show the first element simply 
by demonstrating that his counsel was imperfect or less than 
ideal.  The Supreme Court has made clear that, under the 
constitution, a defendant is entitled to "reasonably effective 
assistance" by a "reasonably competent attorney."  Id. at 687-
88.  Thus, a court looks to whether the attorney's performance 
was reasonably effective considering all the circumstances.  Id. 
at 688.   
No. 
  2009AP472 
10 
 
¶23 The 
reasonableness of counsel's conduct must be 
evaluated "on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the 
time of counsel's conduct."  Id. at 690.  "The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a 
just result."  Id. at 686. 
¶24 The defendant may not presume the second element, 
prejudice to the defense, simply because certain decisions or 
actions of counsel were made in error.  Id. at 692-93.  Rather, 
the defendant must show that "particular errors of counsel were 
unreasonable" and "that they actually had an adverse effect on 
the defense."  Id. at 693 (emphasis added).  This, too, is an 
inquiry that requires a court to consider the surrounding 
circumstances.  Id.  After all, "[A]n act or omission that is 
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another."  Id.  The proper test for prejudice in the context of 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is, therefore, 
whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  
Id. at 694. 
¶25 Importantly, counsel is "strongly presumed to have 
rendered" adequate assistance within the bounds of reasonable 
professional judgment.  Id. at 690; see also State v. Guerard, 
2004 WI 85, ¶43, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 12.  A court must 
No. 
  2009AP472 
11 
 
be vigilant against the skewed perspective that may result from 
hindsight, and it may not second-guess counsel's performance 
solely because the defense proved unsuccessful.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689; see also State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 556-57, 
205 N.W.2d 1 (1973) ("In considering alleged incompetency of 
counsel, one should not by hindsight reconstruct the ideal 
defense."). 
¶26 Counsel's decisions in choosing a trial strategy are 
to be given great deference.  Indeed, the Court in Strickland 
went so far as to say that "strategic choices made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible 
options are virtually unchallengeable."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690. 
 
Even 
decisions 
made 
with 
less 
than 
a 
thorough 
investigation may be sustained if reasonable, given the strong 
presumption of effective assistance and deference to strategic 
decisions.  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶23, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 
782 N.W.2d 695 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). 
¶27 In sum, the law affords counsel the benefit of the 
doubt; there is a presumption that counsel is effective unless 
shown otherwise by the defendant. 
¶28 This presumption is not limited to trial counsel. It 
applies to postconviction and appellate counsel as well.  See 
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000) (applying the 
Strickland analysis to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal); United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 
392 (10th Cir. 1995); see generally Lissa Griffin, The Right to 
Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 1 
No. 
  2009AP472 
12 
 
(1994).  Consequently, a motion for a new trial under § 974.06 
based on ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel must 
lay out the traditional elements of deficient performance and 
prejudice to the defense. 
B. 
Method of Raising Ineffective Assistance of 
Postconviction Counsel 
¶29 The first opportunity after trial to raise the issue 
of counsel's ineffectiveness at trial is in a postconviction 
motion under § 974.02.  Postconviction counsel may move for a 
new trial on grounds that trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective.  The circuit court's denial of this motion is 
subject to direct appeal.  "Claims of ineffective trial 
counsel . . . cannot 
be 
reviewed 
on 
appeal 
absent 
a 
postconviction motion in the trial court."  State ex rel. 
Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 677-78, 556 N.W.2d 136 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
¶30 In State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), a defendant convicted of sexual assault accused 
his trial counsel of ineffective assistance on multiple grounds.  
The trial court heard testimony at a postconviction hearing, but 
trial counsel did not testify.  Id. at 804.  The postconviction 
motion was denied.  Id. 
¶31 In its decision, the court of appeals made several 
observations: 
 
This court is of the opinion that where a 
counsel's conduct at trial is questioned, it is the 
duty and responsibility of subsequent counsel to go 
beyond mere notification and to require counsel's 
No. 
  2009AP472 
13 
 
presence at the hearing in which his conduct is 
challenged.  We hold that it is a prerequisite to a 
claim of ineffective representation on appeal to 
preserve the testimony of trial counsel.  We cannot 
otherwise determine whether trial counsel's actions 
were the result of incompetence or deliberate trial 
strategies.  In such situations, then, it is the 
better rule, and in the client's best interests, to 
require 
trial 
counsel 
to 
explain 
the 
reasons 
underlying his handling of a case. 
 
In the instant case, the record is devoid of any 
testimony from defendant's trial counsel regarding his 
conduct in the defense of his client.  Such an offer 
of proof is necessary and, without more, we decline to 
find that the manner in which counsel defended the 
appellant was of such a nature as to cause us to find 
him incompetent. 
Id. 
 
The 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
evaluate 
counsel's 
effectiveness, which includes counsel's testimony to explain his 
or her handling of the case, is now called a Machner hearing. 
¶32 To bring a postconviction motion alleging ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant is required to file 
a petition for habeas corpus with the appellate court that heard 
the appeal.  State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520, 484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992).  When, however, the conduct alleged to be 
ineffective is postconviction counsel's failure to highlight 
some deficiency of trial counsel in a § 974.02 motion before the 
trial court, the defendant's remedy lies with the circuit court 
under either Wis. Stat. § 974.06 or a petition for habeas 
corpus.  Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 679, 681. 
 
¶33 There is no dispute that Balliette has filed his 
motion for a new trial in the proper court. 
C. 
Motions Under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
No. 
  2009AP472 
14 
 
 
¶34 After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in 
custody  under sentence of a court may bring a motion to vacate, 
set aside, or correct a sentence, utilizing the procedure set 
out in Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  Section 974.06(1) allows such a 
motion where the prisoner is claiming that (1) his sentence was 
imposed in violation of the constitution; (2) the court imposing 
the sentence was without jurisdiction; or (3) the sentence was 
in excess of the maximum or otherwise subject to collateral 
attack.  State v. Aaron Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶22, 328 Wis. 2d 1, 
786 N.W.2d 124 (Aaron Allen).  A claim that trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance is a claim that the defendant's 
sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution.4 
 
¶35 A motion for relief under § 974.06 "may be made at any 
time."  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2).  However, a defendant must meet 
certain requirements.  These requirements are set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06(4): 
 
(4) All grounds for relief available to a person 
under this section must be raised in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that a defendant may raise only 
constitutional or jurisdictional issues in a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion.  State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶33, 273 Wis. 2d 192, 682 
N.W.2d 784 (citing Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381, 195 
N.W.2d 837 (1972); State v. Nicholson, 148 Wis. 2d 353, 369, 435 
N.W.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1988)).  Thus, "a § 974.06 motion may not 
be used to raise challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, jury 
instructions, 
evidentiary 
rulings, 
or 
procedural 
matters."  
Evans, 273 Wis. 2d 192, ¶33. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
15 
 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in 
the 
original, supplemental or amended 
motion. 
¶36 If a defendant did not file a motion for relief under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02 or a direct appeal, he is not subject to the 
"sufficient reason" requirement of § 974.06(4).  State v. Lo, 
2003 WI 107, ¶44 n.11, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756 (citing 
Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974)).  However, 
because the purpose of § 974.06 is to consolidate all claims of 
error into one motion or appeal, claims that could have been 
raised in the defendant's direct appeal or in a previous 
§ 974.06 motion are barred from being raised in a subsequent 
§ 974.06 motion absent a showing of a sufficient reason why the 
claims were not raised on direct appeal or in a previous 
§ 974.06 motion.  Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶44 (citing State v. 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994)). 
¶37 In Rothering, the court of appeals opined that "in 
some circumstances . . . ineffective postconviction counsel" may 
constitute "sufficient reason as to why an issue which could 
have been raised on direct appeal was not."  Rothering, 205 
Wis. 2d at 682.  This observation was noted in State v. Love, 
2005 WI 116, ¶31 n.11, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62, and in 
Aaron Allen, 328 Wis. 2d 1, ¶85.  However, the Aaron Allen court 
indicated that the trial court would be required to engage in 
fact-finding to rule on the sufficiency of the reason.  Id. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
16 
 
¶38 The 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether 
Balliette's 
conclusory 
allegation that his postconviction counsel was 
ineffective for not raising additional challenges to the 
effectiveness of his trial counsel is sufficient to require an 
evidentiary hearing. 
D. 
Test For the Sufficiency of the Reason 
 
¶39 When is a defendant entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
on his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion? 
 
¶40 As a general rule, a motion must "[s]tate with 
particularity the grounds for the motion and the order or relief 
sought."  Wis. Stat. § 971.30.  When the relief sought is a new 
trial 
based 
upon 
the 
alleged 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
postconviction counsel, this statute appears to require some 
particularity of how the defendant intends to show that 
postconviction counsel's performance was objectively deficient 
and how that performance resulted in prejudice to the defense. 
 
¶41 Motions under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, especially motions 
related to ineffective assistance of counsel, have developed 
their own particularized standards. 
¶42 In Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 
(1972), the court considered a defendant's motion to vacate a 
guilty plea under § 974.06 (1970).  Id. at 494.  The defendant 
argued that an evidentiary hearing is required whenever a motion 
is filed to vacate a plea of guilty, unless the motion is 
patently frivolous.  Id. at 495.  After an extensive review of 
precedent from other jurisdictions, the court rejected this 
argument. 
 
Id. 
at 
495-97. 
 
Instead, 
this 
court 
said 
No. 
  2009AP472 
17 
 
specifically: "[I]f a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after 
judgment and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing."  Id. at 497. 
¶43 This language squares with § 974.06(3), which reads in 
part: "(3) Unless the motion and the files and records of the 
action conclusively show that the person is entitled to no 
relief, the court shall: . . . (c) Grant a prompt hearing." 
¶44 But then the Nelson court went on: 
However, if the defendant fails to allege sufficient 
facts in his motion to raise a question of fact, or 
presents only conclusionary allegations, or if the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is 
not entitled to relief, the trial court may in the 
exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion 
without a hearing.  It is incumbent upon the trial 
court to form its independent judgment after a review 
of the record and pleadings and to support its 
decision by written opinion. 
Id. at 497-98. 
 
¶45 With this language, the Nelson court emphasized the 
fact that a § 974.06 motion places the burden of proper pleading 
upon the defendant inasmuch as the motion comes "after judgment 
and sentence."  Id. at 497.  It also gave the circuit court 
three 
grounds 
to 
deny 
the 
motion 
without 
conducting 
an 
evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 497-98. 
 
¶46 The Nelson decision was followed in Smith v. State, 60 
Wis. 2d 373, 378, 210 N.W.2d 678 (1973); Levesque v. State, 63 
Wis. 2d 412, 418-21, 217 N.W.2d 317 (1974); and State v. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
18 
 
Washington, 176 Wis. 2d 205, 215-16, 500 N.W.2d 331 (Ct. App. 
1993), among others.   
¶47 In 1996 this court heard State v. Bentley, in which 
the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 306.   
¶48 Relying on Nelson, the court reiterated that a 
defendant must be afforded an evidentiary hearing if he brings a 
motion alleging facts that, if true, would entitle him to 
relief.  Id. at 309-10.  The court held that in Bentley's case, 
however, the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing because his motion failed to allege "any factual 
assertions which would allow a court to meaningfully assess 
Bentley's claim."  Id. at 316.  Without such facts, his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel was "merely conclusory."  Id. 
at 318. 
¶49 Although the Bentley decision relied on Nelson, it 
somewhat restated the test: 
Nelson sets forth a two-part test which necessitates a 
mixed standard of appellate review.  If the motion on 
its face alleges facts which would entitle the 
defendant 
to 
relief, 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
no 
discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing.  
Whether a motion alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle a defendant to relief is a question of law 
that we review de novo. 
 
However, if the motion fails to allege sufficient 
facts, the circuit court has the discretion to deny a 
postconviction motion without a hearing based on any 
one of the three factors enumerated in Nelson.  When 
reviewing a circuit court's discretionary act, this 
court uses the deferential erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
19 
 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310-11 (citations omitted). 
 
¶50 The apparent inconsistency between the test in Nelson 
and the test in Bentley was discussed extensively by dissents in 
Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶¶67-73 (Prosser, J., dissenting), and 
State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶¶148-153, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 
N.W.2d 48 (Prosser, J., dissenting), prompting a clarification 
from the court.  The majority in Howell stated: "The correct 
interpretation of Nelson/Bentley is that an evidentiary hearing 
is not mandatory if the record as a whole conclusively 
demonstrates that defendant is not entitled to relief, even if 
the motion alleges sufficient nonconclusory facts."  Id., ¶77 
n.51. 
¶51 The court has made overlapping efforts to explain and 
flesh out the pleading requirements of a § 974.06 motion, 
employing the Nelson standards.  One effort is theoretical and 
general.  The other effort is practical and specific. 
¶52 In John Allen, the court contrasted postconviction 
motions with motions before trial, noting that at pretrial, the 
defendant has the whole criminal process before him and may make 
a motion at a later date.  Id., ¶11.  Therefore, even if the 
motion on its face does not allege facts to entitle the 
defendant to relief, a defendant is generally "allowed an 
opportunity to develop the factual record."  Id. (citing State 
v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999)).  "This 
safeguard protects a defendant's due process rights."  John 
Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶11. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
20 
 
¶53 By contrast, a postconviction motion entails more 
demanding standards.  "Not all motions require evidentiary 
hearings."  Id., ¶10.  The policy underlying higher standards 
for postconviction motions is that "once the criminal process 
has been completed and the defendant convicted and sentenced, 
the reasons that support a lesser sufficiency standard for 
pretrial motions are no longer compelling, and instead, we must 
consider the strong policy that favors finality."  Id., ¶11 
(citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)). 
¶54 In State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14, we discussed the difference between Bentley-type 
cases——which spark the normal non-plea colloquy motion under 
§ 974.06——and 
Bangert-type 
cases 
involving 
an 
allegedly 
defective plea colloquy in which a motion homes in on the court 
transcript.  Id., ¶¶50-65.  See also State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
¶55 In a Bangert-type case, the defendant points to a 
specific deficiency in the plea colloquy and asserts that he 
lacked 
the 
requisite 
understanding 
to 
make 
a 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea.  Because evidence to support 
the defendant's motion is contained in the court transcript, the 
State bears the burden of proof in any Bangert hearing. 
¶56 A Bangert-type "allegation that a defendant did not 
understand 
something 
is 
qualitatively 
different 
from 
the 
allegation of a legal conclusion such as 'counsel's performance 
was deficient and resulted in prejudice to the defendant.'"  
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶58.  The latter allegation, the court 
No. 
  2009AP472 
21 
 
said, cries out "for supporting facts, and these supporting 
facts must be alleged to satisfy the defendant's burden for an 
evidentiary hearing."  Id.  The court continued: 
[T]he 
Bentley 
court 
explained 
that 
normally 
a 
defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing only upon a showing of "manifest injustice 
by clear and convincing evidence."  When, for example, 
the basis for this injustice is an allegation that 
defendant involuntarily entered a plea because of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim raises 
questions 
about 
both 
deficient 
performance 
and 
prejudice.  To establish deficient performance, a 
defendant must necessarily provide the factual basis 
for the court to make a legal determination.  To show 
prejudice, a defendant must do more than merely allege 
that he would have pleaded differently but for the 
alleged deficient performance.  He must support that 
allegation with "objective factual assertions." 
Id., ¶60 (citations omitted). 
 
¶57 In addition, the Hampton court observed that: 
Bentley-type allegations will often depend on facts 
outside the record.  To ask the court to examine facts 
outside the record in an evidentiary hearing requires 
a particularized motion with sufficient supporting 
facts to warrant the undertaking. 
 
. . . .  
 
In Bentley-type cases, the defendant has the 
burden of making a prima facie case for an evidentiary 
hearing, and if he succeeds, he still has the burden 
of proving all the elements of the alleged error, such 
as deficient performance and prejudice.  The defendant 
must prove the linkage between his plea and the 
purported defect.  The defendant's proof must add up 
to manifest injustice. 
 
Consequently, the requisite specificity required 
for establishing a prima facie case mirrors the 
defendant's ultimate burden of proof.  It also 
reflects the substantive basis for this court's shift 
of the burden of proof. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
22 
 
Id., ¶¶61, 63-64 (first emphasis added). 
 
¶58 John 
Allen 
and 
Hampton 
provide 
the 
theoretical 
foundation for the specificity required in a § 974.06 motion, 
namely, the policy favoring finality, the pleading and proof 
burdens that have shifted to the defendant in most situations 
after conviction, and the need to minimize time-consuming 
postconviction hearings unless there is a clearly articulated 
justification for them.   
¶59 John Allen also provides a practical and specific 
blueprint for applying this theory: the five "w's" and one "h" 
test, "that is, who, what, where, when, why, and how.  A motion 
that alleges, within the four corners of the document itself, 
the kind of material factual objectivity we describe . . . will 
necessarily include sufficient material facts for reviewing 
courts to meaningfully assess a defendant's claim."  John Allen, 
274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶23 (emphasis added). 
E. 
Applying Wis. Stat. § 974.06 Pleading Principles 
to Balliette's Motion 
 
¶60 A § 974.06 motion for a new trial based on an 
allegation that postconviction counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective must apply the principles set out above. 
 
¶61 Balliette's objective is to win a new trial.  He must 
allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to a new trial.  
An evidentiary hearing is nothing more than an intermediate step 
toward his objective.  It is not an end in itself.  An 
evidentiary hearing would merely provide Balliette with the 
opportunity to prove his pleaded claims that he is entitled to a 
No. 
  2009AP472 
23 
 
new trial.  If the motion contained all the proof necessary to 
show that he was entitled to a new trial, he would not need an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
¶62 Balliette's § 974.06 motion came after his § 974.02 
motion and direct appeal.  The claims raised in his § 974.06 
motion certainly could have been raised in his initial motion 
and direct appeal.  Thus, under our decisions in Escalona-
Naranjo and Lo, Balliette was required to provide "a sufficient 
reason as to why an issue which could have been raised on direct 
appeal was not."  Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 682.  That reason is 
the alleged ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel. 
¶63 However, 
for Balliette to obtain an evidentiary 
hearing based on this reason, he was required to do more than 
assert that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge on direct appeal several acts and omissions 
of trial counsel that he alleges constituted ineffective 
assistance.  He was required to do more than assert that 
postconviction counsel "failed to challenge [these aspects of 
Attorney 
Musolf's] 
conduct." 
 
Because 
the 
viability 
of 
Balliette's § 974.06 motion was entirely dependent upon his 
showing 
that 
postconviction 
counsel 
was 
constitutionally 
ineffective, he was required to allege that Attorney Hunt's 
"performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
¶64 To show that the performance was deficient, Balliette 
was required to set forth allegations that Attorney Hunt made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
No. 
  2009AP472 
24 
 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  
For example, Balliette could have alleged such deficiency by 
showing 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
"objectively 
unreasonable . . . in 
failing 
to 
find 
arguable 
issues 
to 
appeal," as the Supreme Court described it in Smith, 528 U.S. at 
285.   
¶65 Balliette's 
October 
31, 
2008, 
motion 
identifies 
"several acts and omissions" of trial counsel that he believes 
constitute ineffective assistance and should have been raised by 
postconviction counsel.  But this is, at best, only part of what 
is required in a § 974.06 motion.  Balliette was required to 
assert why it was deficient performance for postconviction 
counsel not to raise these issues.  As the Court noted in Smith 
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534 (1986), counsel's "deliberate, 
tactical decision not to pursue a particular claim is the very 
antithesis of the kind of circumstance that would warrant 
excusing a defendant's failure to adhere to a State's legitimate 
rules for the fair and orderly disposition of its criminal 
cases."   
¶66 Moreover, counsel's mistaken perception that a claim 
had little chance of success does not necessarily change the 
result.  Id.  "[T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize 
the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the 
claim despite recognizing it," Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 
486-87 
(1986), 
does 
not 
necessarily 
constitute 
deficient 
performance. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
25 
 
¶67 Thus, Balliette's § 974.06 motion was required to make 
the case of Attorney Hunt's deficient performance.  It is 
undisputed 
that 
Attorney 
Hunt 
did 
raise 
two 
issues 
of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his § 974.02 motion 
after trial and that he succeeded in winning a Machner hearing 
on these claims.  At that hearing, Attorney Hunt questioned 
Attorney Musolf.  To successfully plead ineffective assistance 
of postconviction counsel against this background, Balliette's 
2008 § 974.06 motion needed to do more than point to issues that 
postconviction counsel did not raise.  He needed to show that 
failing to raise those issues fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.  This effort would have required him to 
"overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action 'might be considered sound . . . strategy.'"  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  His legal attack would have required 
facts, presented in a "five 'w's' and one 'h'" format.  
¶68 Balliette also needed to show how he intended to 
establish deficient performance if he was given the chance at an 
evidentiary hearing.  The evidentiary hearing is not a fishing 
expedition to discover ineffective assistance; it is a forum to 
prove ineffective assistance.  Both the court and the State are 
entitled to know what is expected to happen at the hearing, and 
what the defendant intends to prove. 
¶69 Balliette's motion does not assert that the issues 
that Attorney Hunt failed to raise are obvious and very strong, 
and that the failure to raise them cannot be explained or 
No. 
  2009AP472 
26 
 
justified.  Neither does his motion allege facts that would 
support his ultimate objective.  The motion does not set forth 
what Balliette intended to prove at an evidentiary hearing, if 
one were granted. 
¶70 Balliette's motion also fails to assert how Attorney 
Hunt's purported deficient performance resulted in prejudice to 
the defense.  Had Attorney Hunt raised the issues laid out in 
Balliette's motion, he would very likely have been given an 
expanded Machner hearing, but it does not necessarily follow 
that he would have been given a new trial.  Balliette's duty at 
this point was to allege facts, which, if true, would entitle 
him to a new trial. 
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18 is Wisconsin's harmless error 
statute: 
 
Mistakes and omissions; harmless error.  (1) The 
court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard 
any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings 
which shall not affect the substantial rights of the 
adverse party. 
 
(2) No judgment shall be reversed or set aside 
or new trial granted in any action or proceeding on 
the ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, 
or the improper admission of evidence, or for error as 
to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
27 
 
¶72 Two of Balliette's claims with regard to ineffective 
assistance of counsel would have been evaluated under harmless 
error rules, namely, the lesser included offense claim and the 
stipulation-wording claim.  Neither claim is likely to have 
resulted in a new trial, because neither was so prejudicial to 
the defense as to undermine confidence in the outcome of his 
trial. 
¶73 Trial 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
call 
an 
accident 
reconstruction expert appears on the surface to be more meaty.  
On the other hand, Balliette's defense at trial was and his 
defense 
at 
any 
retrial 
would 
be 
an 
attempt 
to 
shift 
responsibility for Michele Thein's death from a person who was 
operating after revocation (with a blood alcohol content of 
.21), to the victim herself, on grounds that the victim's 
driving prevented Balliette, who failed three field sobriety 
tests, from avoiding the collision.  This defense requires real 
persuasion. 
¶74 One jury already heard the argument that Thein's turn 
signal may not have been activated.  Balliette's contention at 
trial was that Thein was "driving erratically."  She allegedly 
pulled to the right of her lane, thereby inviting Balliette to 
pass, then braked so suddenly and turned so sharply that he 
could not help running into her.  He now claims the State's 
testimony, that Thein would have left skid marks had she 
operated her vehicle in that manner, could be rebutted by his 
expert's assertion that Thein's vehicle had an antilock braking 
system that did not leave traditional skid marks. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
28 
 
¶75 The problem with Balliette's account is that evidence 
of skid marks from Thein's vehicle would have benefited his 
defense.  The absence of skid marks from her vehicle may be 
attributed to antilock brakes, but it can also be attributed to 
Thein slowing down so that no braking on her part was necessary.  
The absence of skid marks becomes important only if the fact-
finder accepts the drunk driver's version of the incident. 
¶76 Balliette's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion reads in part: 
He [Balliette] relied on his own testimony that Thein 
had been driving erratically, slowing down and then 
speeding up.  He stated that she had slowed down to 
about 40 mph and pulled over towards the right side of 
the road.  He took this action as a message from her 
that he could pass and, as it was a legal passing 
zone, he pulled out into the left lane.  When he began 
to pass, there was no turn signal and no brake lights.  
He first saw brake lights when he was about 6 or 7 car 
lengths behind her.  She braked real hard and turned 
almost simultaneously, at which point he slammed on 
the brakes, went into a skid, and hit her vehicle.  
Balliette contended that the accident and Thein's 
death occurred because she braked hard and turned left 
in front of his vehicle without warning, not because 
he was intoxicated.  He was the only witness in his 
own behalf.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶77 This account is different from the statement of 
Balliette's counsel in this review: 
Balliette provided a statement to one of the officers 
at 
the 
scene. 
 
In 
the 
statement, 
Balliette 
said . . . that he had been going about 58 miles per 
hour when he came up behind Thein's car.  He was about 
five car lengths behind her when she slowed down to 
about 40 miles per hour, at which point he decided to 
pass her.  Balliette said that Thein did not have a 
turn signal on, and as he tried to pass she "braked 
real hard and turned left," and the vehicles collided.  
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
  2009AP472 
29 
 
¶78 These accounts from Balliette are not consistent.  
Especially coupled with the potential that any evidence about 
the presence or absence of skid marks can cut both ways, this 
inconsistency does not undermine confidence in the outcome of 
the trial.  Rather, it reminds the court that judicial "scrutiny 
of 
counsel's 
performance 
must 
be 
highly 
deferential."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  We presume, as we must, that 
Attorneys Hunt and Musolf rendered adequate assistance within 
the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  See id. at 690.  
Without providing adequate, specific allegations in his § 974.06 
motion, Balliette cannot and does not overcome this presumption. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶79 We conclude that the defendant is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing because the allegations in his § 974.06 
motion do not provide sufficient material facts that, if proven, 
demonstrate an entitlement to the relief sought.  His motion 
focused attention on the wrong counsel; it was conclusory 
because it failed to carefully address the two elements of 
ineffective assistance for postconviction counsel set out in 
Strickland; and it generally ignored the "five 'w's' and one 
'h'" methodology outlined in John Allen, which guide the court 
in meaningfully evaluating the claim.  The motions failed to say 
who would be called as a witness at an evidentiary hearing and 
what this testimony was likely to prove.  In attempting to 
construct a better defense for a retrial, Balliette did not do 
enough to show that a new trial was required. 
No. 
  2009AP472 
30 
 
¶80 For the reasons stated, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶81 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Proceeding pro 
se, Balliette filed a 16-page motion setting forth detailed 
facts in support of his motion alleging that his trial counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective.  He likewise alleged that his 
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
these aspects of trial counsel's performance. 
¶82 It is essential to keep in mind that this case is not 
about whether Balliette's motion is sufficient to entitle him to 
a new trial.  No one asserts that it is.  Rather, the question 
is whether Balliette's motion is sufficient to entitle him to an 
evidentiary hearing, where he would have the opportunity to show 
that his trial and postconviction attorneys rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
¶83 I agree with the majority that a defendant filing a 
postconviction motion must demonstrate with some particularity 
that he is entitled to relief.  I also agree that ineffective 
assistance 
of 
postconviction 
counsel 
can 
constitute 
a 
"sufficient reason" for overcoming the Escalona-Naranjo bar to 
successive postconviction motions.1  See State v. Love, 2005 WI 
116, ¶31 n.11, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62; Rothering v. 
McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 678, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 
1996).  
¶84 I part ways with the majority because, in determining 
that Balliette's motion was insufficient, it appears to set up a 
                                                 
1 State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 
(1994). 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
2 
 
series of uncertain pleading requirements that could ensnare pro 
se petitioners and experienced appellate attorneys alike.  It 
further fails to appreciate the role that an evidentiary hearing 
plays in evaluating whether an attorney's performance was 
deficient.    
¶85 Like the court of appeals, I conclude that Balliette 
has alleged facts sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary 
hearing on his claims of trial counsel and postconviction 
counsel ineffectiveness.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
I 
¶86 The majority acknowledges that the Strickland test 
applies to both claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.2  
Majority op., ¶28.  It does not appear to take issue with the 
sufficiency of the facts Balliette set forth regarding trial 
counsel's performance.  See id., ¶15.  Rather, it contends that 
Balliette's motion "focused attention on the wrong counsel" and 
failed to "carefully address the two elements of ineffective 
assistance of counsel set out in Strickland[.]"  Id., ¶3.   
¶87 Balliette identified several acts and omissions which 
he asserts constitute deficient performance of trial counsel, 
and he asserted that his postconviction counsel was ineffective 
for failing to raise these issues.  Nevertheless, the majority 
contends that "this is, at best, only part of what is 
required[.]"  Id., ¶65. 
¶88 Under the majority's analysis, however, it is unclear 
what, precisely, is required.  At times, the insufficiency 
                                                 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
3 
 
appears to be a failure to properly format his motion.  The 
majority contends: "His legal attack would have required facts 
presented in a 'five 'w's' and one 'h' format."  Id., ¶67.   
¶89 At other times, it appears that the insufficiency 
might be failure to utter heretofore unknown magic words.  For 
example, the majority says that "Balliette's motion does not 
assert that the issues that [postconviction counsel] failed to 
raise are obvious and very strong[.]"  Id., ¶69.      
¶90 At yet other times, the insufficiency appears to be 
substantive.  The majority contends that Balliette was required 
to "show that failing to raise those issues fell below an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness" 
and 
"overcome 
the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
might be considered sound strategy."  Id., ¶67.  
¶91 It is unclear under the majority's analysis what, 
precisely, would be enough to "show" within the four corners of 
a motion that counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.  Is it enough for Balliette to 
assert that he did not discuss the lack of expert testimony with 
his postconviction attorney and that Balliette believes that 
postconviction counsel overlooked it?  Or, can a defendant 
simply make allegations about what he thinks his attorney will 
say at an evidentiary hearing?  Is it enough for the defendant 
to assert that the attorney had no reasonable strategic reason 
for failing to make a claim? 
¶92 The 
uncertain 
pleading 
requirements 
set 
by 
the 
majority are bound to baffle the bench and bar, not to mention 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
4 
 
pro 
se 
defendants, 
who 
are 
the 
typical 
drafters 
of 
postconviction motions.  I would not set so uncertain a bar.   
II 
¶93 To the extent that the majority's new pleading 
requirements are substantive and require movants to identify the 
reasons underlying counsel's acts and omissions, see id., ¶68, 
the majority fails to appreciate the role an evidentiary hearing 
plays in the evaluation of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  As the majority explains, "an act or omission that is 
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another."  Id., ¶24.  The determination of whether the 
attorney's performance was deficient requires the court to 
"focus on counsel's perspective at the time of trial" or 
postconviction.  State v. Foy, 206 Wis. 2d 629, 640, 557 N.W.2d 
494 (Ct. App. 1996).  
¶94 A defendant is typically not privy to the strategic 
decisions made by counsel.  Accordingly, when a defendant makes 
a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
circuit court should hold a Machner hearing.3  The purpose of a 
Machner hearing is for the circuit court to gauge whether 
counsel's alleged deficiency was the result of strategy or 
oversight.   
¶95 This determination often cannot be made without the 
testimony of counsel.  Without counsel's testimony, a court 
cannot "focus on counsel's perspective" and "cannot otherwise 
                                                 
3 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
5 
 
determine whether . . . counsel's actions were the result of 
incompetence 
or 
deliberate 
trial 
strategies." 
 
Foy, 
206 
Wis. 2d at 640; State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 
N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).  
¶96 As 
the 
majority 
acknowledges, 
"[a]n 
evidentiary 
hearing is nothing more than an intermediate step toward[s]" 
Balliette's objective, a new trial.  Majority op., ¶61.  "If the 
motion contained all the proof necessary to show that he was 
entitled to a new trial, he would not need an evidentiary 
hearing."  Id.  Hopefully, the majority opinion will not be read 
to contend that a defendant must supply all of the facts 
necessary to prevail in obtaining a new trial as a prerequisite 
to obtaining an evidentiary hearing.4   
                                                 
4 To the extent that the majority relies on federal habeas 
cases as authority for its new pleading requirements, I conclude 
that the majority errs.   
The majority cites Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) 
and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).  Majority op., ¶¶65-
66.  These cases address the cause and prejudice standards for 
procedural default, a central principle of seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus in a federal court.  Before seeking federal habeas 
relief, a defendant must exhaust all state remedies.  Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).  Federal courts will often decline 
to hear habeas challenges if the issue was not "resolved on the 
merits in the state proceeding due to respondent's failure to 
raise them there as required by state procedure."  Id. at 87.       
The procedural default standard is based in part on 
concerns for finality, a concern shared by state courts.  
However, as importantly, the procedural default standard is 
based on "the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and 
their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."  
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487.  "The principle of comity 
that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill served by a 
rule that allowed a federal district court to upset a state 
court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to 
correct a constitutional violation[.]"  Id. at 489. 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
6 
 
¶97 Such a standard would render a Machner hearing an 
inconsequential formality.  Further, it would be inconsistent 
with Wis. Stat. § 974.06, which provides: "Unless the motion and 
the files and records of the action conclusively show that the 
person is entitled to no relief, the court shall: . . . (c) 
Grant a prompt hearing."  Finally, such a standard is untenable 
because it may bar meritorious claims whenever the defendant is 
unable to secure the cooperation of trial or postconviction 
counsel.  
III 
¶98 When I examine Balliette's 16-page motion, I conclude 
that he set forth sufficient facts to entitle him to an 
evidentiary hearing.  Among other claims, Balliette asserts that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the 
testimony of an accident reconstruction expert, and that his 
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
that omission on direct appeal.   
¶99 The following facts and legal arguments are derived 
from the motion.  At trial, Balliette testified that the 
accident resulted not from his intoxication or lack of care, but 
rather, from Thein's operation of her own vehicle.  He testified 
that Thein slowed down and pulled over toward the right side of 
the road.  As Balliette was about to pass Thein, she abruptly 
                                                                                                                                                             
Borrowing 
from 
federal habeas standards to establish 
procedural rules for state claims would undermine a key 
rationale underlying the federal cause and prejudice standard——
that constitutional questions arising out of state criminal 
proceedings should be resolved, when possible, in state courts. 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
7 
 
braked and turned left in front of his truck.  Balliette 
testified that he slammed on the brakes but was unable to stop 
his truck before impact.5    
¶100 Relying in part on the assumption that Thein's car did 
not have anti-lock brakes, an accident reconstruction expert 
testifying for the State opined that Balliette's version of the 
accident was "not possible," that it "can't physically happen," 
and it could not be reconciled with "the laws of physics."  The 
expert testified: "[Balliette's version is] not possible on any 
day of the week or any year.  It can't physically happen.  We 
have to have the laws of physics.  They don't change."   
¶101 Balliette's trial counsel hired an expert, but he 
rested the defense without presenting any expert testimony.  As 
a result, the jury was left to determine which of two versions 
of events was more credible——the unsupported testimony of the 
defendant, who was intoxicated at the time of the accident and 
clearly had a personal interest in the outcome of the trial, or 
the testimony of the State's reconstruction expert, who said 
that the defendant's version of events was "not possible on any 
day of the week or any year."  Not surprisingly, the jury 
appears to have believed the State's expert. 
¶102 After his conviction, Balliette hired his own accident 
reconstruction expert, who uncovered evidence undermining the 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.09(2)(a) provides that a defendant 
has an absolute defense to homicide by intoxicated use if the 
jury determines by the preponderance of the evidence that the 
death would have occurred even if the defendant had been 
exercising 
due 
care and not under the influence of an 
intoxicant.  Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2)(a).   
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
8 
 
expert opinion offered by the State.  Among other revelations, 
Balliette's expert determined that Thein's car did in fact have 
anti-lock brakes.   
¶103 In his motion for postconviction relief, Balliette 
asserted: "The fact that [Thein's car] had anti-lock brakes 
discredits the trial testimony of [the State's experts], which 
had impeached Balliette's testimony regarding Thein's actions 
moments before the collision, and renders their accident 
reconstructions flawed."   
¶104 Balliette further asserted that his trial attorney's 
failure to present an accident reconstruction expert was 
deficient performance.  He contended that his trial attorney 
"knew months before trial that he could not rely on the State's 
witnesses to present Balliette's theory of defense, and that 
without presenting [his] own accident reconstruction expert, 
Balliette would be left to rely solely on his own testimony to 
support his defense." 
¶105 Balliette 
contended that had his trial attorney 
presented the testimony of an accident reconstruction expert, 
that testimony "would have given the jury a facts-based 
reconstruction of the events prior to the collision that would 
have countered the explanation given by the State."  He asserted 
that this alternative testimony "would have given the jury the 
means to form a reasonable doubt as to Balliette's guilt."  
Accordingly, had trial counsel presented the testimony of an 
reconstruction expert, the jury would not have been presented 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
9 
 
with uncontroverted expert testimony that Balliette's version of 
events was contrary to "the laws of physics." 
¶106 Because no Machner hearing was conducted regarding the 
claims that Balliette now raises, I do not know why Balliette's 
attorney declined to present the testimony of a reconstruction 
expert.  Neither does the majority.  It might be that the trial 
attorney made a reasonable strategic choice, or it may be that 
Balliette's trial attorney was asleep at the switch.  Likewise, 
without the benefit of a Machner hearing regarding these claims, 
no member of this court knows why Balliette's postconviction 
attorney failed to raise the trial attorney's failure to present 
an accident reconstruction expert.   
¶107 If the facts asserted in Balliette's motion are true, 
however, it is difficult to imagine that his trial attorney had 
a sound strategic reason for failing to counter the State's 
accident reconstruction expert.  Rather, it is more likely that 
his trial attorney failed to conduct a reasonable investigation 
and uncover the flaw in the expert opinion offered by the 
State-that it was based on the erroneous conclusion that Thein's 
car did not have anti-lock brakes.   
¶108 It is likewise difficult to have confidence that the 
jury would have reached the same verdict if the flaws in the 
expert opinion offered by the State had been exposed.  If the 
facts asserted in Balliette's motion are true, a court may 
conclude that there is "a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
10 
 
would have been different."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984). 
¶109 Finally, if the facts Balliette asserts are true, then 
it is difficult to imagine that his postconviction counsel made 
a sound strategic decision to forego this claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on appeal.  Like the court of appeals, I 
conclude without reservation that Balliette's 16-page motion is 
sufficient to overcome the Escalona-Naranjo bar and entitle him 
to 
a 
Machner 
hearing 
where 
his 
claims 
can 
be 
tested.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.       
¶110 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2009AP472.awb 
 
 
 
1