Title: State v. Wood
Citation: 187 So. 2d 820
Docket Number: 44195
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 1966

187 So. 2d 820 (1966) STATE of Mississippi v. Charles WOOD. No. 44195. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 13, 1966. *821 Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul Alexander, Robert G. Nichols, Jr., W.E. Gore, Jr., John R. Countiss, III, Jackson, for appellant. Wise, Smith &amp; Carter, M. Curtiss McKee, Robert C. Travis, Julian P. Alexander, Jr., Jackson, for appellee. BRADY, Justice. This is an appeal by the State of Mississippi from a judgment of the First Circuit Court District of Hinds County, which affirmed a judgment of the County Court of Hinds County sustaining a motion to quash the affidavit and a demurrer to the affidavit charging the appellee with the possession of intoxicating liquors in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 2613 (1956). Under the constitutional question of due process, voluminous testimony was taken in support of the *822 motion to quash and, by agreement, in support of the demurrer. The pertinent facts which were brought out under the motion to quash are tersely as follows: The record discloses that on April 4, 1966, a search warrant was issued by County Judge Charles T. Barber, based upon an affidavit made by Deputy Sheriff Thomas B. Shelton, and a search was made of the premises of the Country Club of Jackson in order to determine whether or not intoxicating beverages were being kept on the premises in violation of section 2613. Proper service of the search warrant was made upon Charles Wood, appellee, Manager of the Country Club of Jackson, and a quantity of intoxicating liquors was found in the Club. Appellee was placed under arrest and the intoxicating liquors were confiscated. An inventory of the same was made and placed upon the back of the search warrant where the return was made and signed by Deputy Sheriff Shelton. When the cause came on for hearing, the appellee filed a motion to quash and a demurrer to the affidavit which were heard ante litem and which were sustained by the Judge of the County Court. From this action, the State of Mississippi appealed with supersedeas to the Second Circuit Court District of Hinds County, where on May 3, 1966, Circuit Judge Russell D. Moore handed down an opinion and entered an order sustaining the action of the County Court. It is from the order of the Circuit Court that this appeal is prosecuted. The basic grounds upon which appellant, State of Mississippi, urges reversal of the order of the circuit court are that both the county court and the circuit court erred in sustaining the motion to quash and the demurrer to the affidavit filed against appellee and committed error in holding that section 2613 had been repealed by implication; that the appellee was denied due process of law; and that the lower courts erred in holding that the appellee was a proper person who could complain of discriminatory application of the prohibition laws of the State of Mississippi, if such discrimination actually exists. The errors are stated by appellant as follows: 1. The Appellate Court, the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, erred in affirming the judgment of the County Court of Hinds County, sustaining a motion to quash and a demurrer to the affidavit filed against Appellee. 2. The Trial Court erred in adjudicating that Section 2613 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 has been repealed by implication, and the Appellate Court erred in affirming this adjudication. 3. The Trial Court erred in adjudicating that the prohibition laws of this state are being unconstitutionally applied by the representatives of the State of Mississippi, and, therefore, the Appellee was denied due process of law and the Appellate Court erred in affirming this judgment. 4. The Appellee has no standing before this Court and had no standing before the Trial Court or the Lower Appellate Court to challenge the validity, constitutionality or discrimination in the application of the prohibition laws of the State of Mississippi, since he has not shown that he is a person affected by the prohibition laws of the State of Mississippi. Considering first the fourth error which is urged by appellant, we do not feel that this assignment is well taken for the reason that it has long been an established rule of law that it is not necessary for a person to wait until he has actually been fined or committed to jail before he can exercise his rights to contest the constitutionality of discrimination which he alleges is being practiced against him. The rule is succinctly stated in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 283, 82 *823 S. Ct. 275, 278, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1961), by the Supreme Court of the United States as follows: It is to be noted that the proof shows that the appellee was actually arrested and that his arrest was predicated upon an affidavit charging a violation of the crime of the possession of liquor, section 2613. First conviction under this statute carries a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500, or not less than one week or more than three months in the county jail. Under our interpretation of the rule, the appellee is not required or expected to wait until convicted before he can raise the question of whether the statute upon which he is to be tried and upon which he has actually been arrested is constitutional. One who faces the certainty that his fine must be not less than $100 or that he must be imprisoned in jail for not less than one week, if convicted, is certainly in imminent danger of sustaining a direct injury from the enforcement of the statute. Therefore, there is no merit in this error assigned by appellant. We next consider appellant's assignment that section 2613 has been impliedly repealed. A detailed and minute analysis of the prohibition laws and tax statutes of the State of Mississippi from 1848 down to the present time is outlined in the brief of appellee, which is interesting but does not have any direct bearing on his contention that there is now a repugnancy or irreconcilable conflict which exists between the prohibition statutes of this state and the laws taxing the sale of intoxicating liquors. In order to dispose of this assignment of error, it is essential that we consider the objections thereto advanced by the appellee, which are (1) that the statutes are repugnant and cannot together have their appropriate application, or (2) that if no repugnancy exists, the latter enactments (tax) cover the whole subject matter and plainly show that it was intended by the legislature not only as a substitute for the earlier act, but to cover the subject and to prescribe the only rules with respect thereto. Intrinsically it is obvious that the states and the federal government have the constitutional right and power as separate sovereigns to tax that which the sovereignty has declared to be illegal. Appellee in his brief concedes that the State of Mississippi has the right to impose a tax upon an illegal activity, and the appellant amply establishes this fact by proof that the United States Government has for a long period of time exercised its power to tax that which is forbidden or which is a violation of the law. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 75 S. Ct. 415, 99 L. Ed. 475 (1955); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S. Ct. 510, 97 L. Ed. 754 (1953); United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 43 S. Ct. 197, 67 L. Ed. 358 (1923); United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450, 41 S. Ct. 551, 65 L. Ed. 1043 (1921). The gravamen of appellee's contention is that because of irreconcilable conflicts, or because of the repugnancy existing between section 2613 and the pertinent tax statutes, particularly Mississippi Code Annotated sections 10112, 10115, 10147-03(b), and 10147-10 (1964), section 2613 by implication has been repealed. Section 10112 reads as follows: Section 10115 of the Code provides: The appellee basically contends that these two statutes, by the use of the word "licensed," clearly indicate an intent on the part of the legislature to grant unto any person selling any tangible property, including intoxicating liquors, the right to do so, and therefore these two sections are completely irreconcilable with section 2613 of the Code, which reads as follows: Appellee urges that since section 10115 does not make any distinction between persons engaged in legal and illegal activities, and that since liquor dealers hold permits pursuant to this section, the State apparently recognizes, approves and ratifies the liquor business. As previously stated, appellee concedes that the State may collect the tax on sales which are unlawful as well as on those which are lawful. However, he contends that the language of the tax statutes, together with the detailed minute operations engaged in by the State Tax Commission in the collection of the tax, the granting of permits, and the revoking of permits for failure to pay the tax or for other infractions of tax regulations committed by those persons engaged in making illegal sales, presents an irreconcilable conflict. It is contended by the appellee that all of the activities of the State Tax Commission necessary and incidental to the collection of the tax on illegal intoxicating liquors are proof of a de facto existence of a legalized liquor business in this State, by this State, and that out of this chaos the de facto repeal of the prohibition law should be recognized by this Court. Appellee urges that since the taxing provisions were enacted subsequent to the prohibition law, section 2613 must fail. We are forced to differ with appellee's contention that section 2613 and the pertinent tax sections are repugnant. While the basic moral ideals may be at odds, these statutes have operated and can operate together without repugnancy. We hold that the regulation under the tax statutes merely provides a more effective and lucrative method for collecting the taxes and that the statutes are not repugnant. Appellee urges many and sundry reasons in support of his contention in the second part of this assignment that section 2613 has been repealed by implication because if no repugnancy exists the latter enactments were intended to cover the whole subject matter. However, we fail to find any merit in this contention. The able and candid *826 brief of the appellee recognizes the importance of legislative intent. He cites 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 286 (1953), which reads in part as follows: We note the following statement in the case of Board of Education of Benton County v. State Educational Finance Commission, 243 Miss. 782, 795-96, 138 So. 2d 912, 917 (1962): These authorities unequivocally show that repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, and where there can be an interpretation which is not violative of the intent and meaning of the preexisting statute, that is the construction which is placed upon it so as not to effect repeal by implication. One cannot by the wildest stretch of the imagination arrive at the conclusion, however greatly desired, that it was the intention of the legislature, by the severe taxing of this illegal commodity, to repeal the prohibitions of section 2613, either directly or by implication. Although there is persuasive argument and authority cited in the impressive brief of appellee, it is apparent to us, from our decisions and the fact that section 2613 has been in force and effect in this State for some fifty-seven years, although repeated efforts have been made to repeal it and the legislature has consistently refused to do so, that it is the intent of the legislature that section 2613 should remain inviolate. The determination of legislative intent was made conclusive by the enactment of House Bill 112 of the Regular Session of 1966, which enactment declared the policy of this State as fostering, encouraging and vigorously enforcing the prohibition laws. Section 1 of this most recent pronouncement of the legislature's intent states categorically as follows: The appellee says that the statutes as they have been amended, particularly by the application of State Tax Commission Rules 48 and 65, clearly establish the fact that the State of Mississippi is now engaged in a multimillion dollar lucrative liquor business. Even if this be true, the appellee overlooks one fundamental rule of our sovereignty, and that is the legislature has the power to enact any law it sees fit, be it sincere or hypocritical, moral or immoral, wise or foolish, beneficial or harmful, provided it does not violate the prohibitions of the State or Federal Constitution. See Moss v. Mississippi Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 154 Miss. 765, 122 So. 776 (1929); State v. J.J. Newman Lbr. Co., 102 Miss. 802, 59 So. 923, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 851, sugg. of error overruled 103 Miss. 263, 60 So. 215, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 858 (1912); 49 Am. Jur. States §§ 33, 36 (1943); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 106 (1956). Although appellee repeatedly asserts that the sales taxes imposed on the sale of liquor are proof of the fact that the State is in the liquor business for revenue only, the fact nevertheless remains that the punitive aspects of the legal statutes are to be reckoned with and the appellee has either overlooked or disregarded them. In Bishop v. Bailey, 209 Miss. 892, 894-895, 48 So. 2d 588, 590 (1950), we stated: We feel that this is as good a statement of the law today as it was when it was announced in that case. Our interpretation of the statutes enacted subsequent to the decision in Bishop v. Bailey, supra, is in harmony with the holding therein for the reason that we still feel that the primary intent of the legislature in the enactment of the tax statutes was to impose a penalty and a tax upon those persons who are deliberately violating section 2613 and the other liquor statutes. The requirements of the statutes and their regulation amount to nothing more than a method to expedite the collection of the tax imposed on the illegal commodity. In termination of this particular error, we point out that the State Tax Commission is not a law enforcement agency and the legislature has not seen fit to vest in it the powers which are now accorded the sheriffs and policemen of this State. See Miss. Const. § 167; Miss.Code Annot. §§ 2467, 2615, 3374 100, 4254 (1956), and 10223 (1952). For the above reasons, we hold that this assignment of error is not well taken. The third error assigned and urged by appellant is that the trial court erred in adjudicating that the prohibition laws of this state are being unconstitutionally applied by the representatives of the State of Mississippi, *828 and therefore the appellee was denied due process of law and the appellate court erred in affirming this judgment. The appellee predicated his assertion that he was denied equal protection of the laws under the 5th and 14th Amendments because there is discrimination in the enforcement of the law in the State of Mississippi and Hinds County. At the outset, it should be recognized that the State has full and complete control over all matters relating to intoxicating liquors within its borders. It also should be recognized that the regulation pertaining to the sale or possession or use of intoxicating liquors does not violate any constitutional rights of the citizens. It is purely within the prerogative of a state to say whether or not a citizen shall possess or use intoxicating liquor, and this right is guaranteed to the states by the 21st Amendment to the United States Constitution. When the 18th Amendment to the United States Constitution was repealed by the enactment of the 21st Amendment, it was expressly stated in section 2 of that Amendment as follows: The Federal Government by the passage of the 21st Amendment specifically recognized the right of the states to regulate completely the delivery or use of intoxicating liquors within their respective boundaries. Section 2, since it allows the states to constitutionally prohibit the use of intoxicating liquor a fortiori, it allows the states also to prohibit the possession of intoxicating liquor since possession is an essential and vital part to the delivery or use of intoxicating liquor. In Joseph E. Seagram &amp; Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 86 S. Ct. 1254, 1259, 1262, 16 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States, when construing Chapter 531, 1964 Session Laws of New York, which worked substantial changes in the State's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, which statute appellants claimed violated, among other rights, the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, found those contentions to be without merit. The United States Supreme Court stated: Appellee belabors extensively his inherent right to possess intoxicating liquors, but this question was decided by this Court in Kelly v. State, 237 Miss. 112, 113 So. 2d 540 (1959), in which case it was held that where, under a statute permitting a county to exclude the transportation, storage, sale, distribution, receipt and/or manufacture of wine or beer of specified alcoholic content from the county, possession for personal consumption was legal, that a subsequently enacted statute providing that in those counties where voters had elected to exclude transportation, storage, sale, distribution, receipt, and/or manufacture of such beverages subsequent to 1934 the possession of same was illegal was a constitutional exercise of the legislature's plenary power to regulate traffic in intoxicating liquors. The Kelly case refers to Mississippi Code Annotated section 10208 (1952), and we quote subsection (b) thereof: The appellee urges that because in certain of the river, coastal and other counties the law is systematically not enforced by the local law enforcement officers, this is substantial proof that this defendant is being denied his constitutional rights of equal protection and due process of law for the reason that there exists a deliberate or intentional pattern or systematic plan of not uniformly enforcing the laws in those respective counties. While it may be conceded that sheriffs and police officers are enforcement officers of the State, it does not follow that the State has control and direction over the sheriffs and police officers without express legislative authority. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite is now true, and this is one of the reasons why law enforcement has been lax in certain counties of this State. The State cannot and does not exercise any law enforcement control over the uniform procedures of a county or city therein except in those limited fields in which the Governor of the State has authority to act with the use of the state militia, or with certain designated officers of the highway patrol. On this point, the Governor of this State recently stated in a message to the legislature: Insofar as the decision of the issues here involved is concerned, it is not necessary for us to resolve the question of improper law enforcement on a statewide *830 basis. The law enforcement in the State of Mississippi is on a county basis and the people of this State elect their chief law enforcement officer, the sheriff, by counties, and this is also true of the municipal police officers of this State who are appointed by elected local officials in the municipalities. While the State requires all duly elected law enforcement officers to take an oath of office binding them to carry out impartially the duties of their office in the enforcement of the laws, Mississippi Constitution section 268, the fact nevertheless remains that the State of Mississippi, without additional legislation, has little means whereby it can compel and require the county and city law enforcement officers to perform their duties in accordance with their oaths. This is true although they may be prosecuted and removed from office for failure to perform their duties. Miss.Code Annot. §§ 2297, 2298, 2308, 4053, 4254 (1956). Moreover, under certain conditions expressed in Mississippi Code Annotated section 4054 (1956), the Governor of Mississippi is required to remove officers from office. There is ample testimony to the effect that in coastal, river and some other counties, because of the autonomy of the local law enforcement officers, there has been a refusal, almost arbitrary, to carry out the requirements of the liquor statutes. On the other hand, the proof is abundant that in a majority of the counties of this State the liquor laws are enforced by the county and municipal law enforcement officers, and that indictments are being returned and convictions obtained. Mississippi Code Annotated sections 2613 and 2614 (1956) lists hundreds of cases, past and present, which conclusively show that in a majority of the counties of this State, Mississippi's liquor laws are respected and enforced. In this connection it might be noted in passing that there is evidence to the effect that many local law enforcement officers have refused to aid officials of the State Tax Commission in the enforcement of the tax provisions, these being the same statutes that appellee contends constitute a repeal of and a substitution for section 2613. From the record we conclude that the element of purposeful or intentional discrimination, which appellee must show in order that he can justly assert that he has been denied equal protection of the laws under the 14th Amendment, is lacking. We conclude that the proof of discrimination is wanting. The record does disclose that Sheriff Shelton with only a few deputies, insofar as law enforcement in Hinds County is concerned, has shown unusual effort to enforce the laws indiscriminately and has been successful in doing so. The fact that he made no attempt to enforce the liquor laws inside the corporate limits of the City of Jackson does not amount to deliberate, purposeful discrimination. The record indicates that it is a uniform custom throughout the State of Mississippi to permit the counties to run their internal affairs, to operate their law enforcement programs, and the cities have their own court procedures which are recognized by this State. Shelton testified that there was an agreement to the effect that he would enforce the laws in the county and leave city law enforcement to the city police. While it is true that Chief Rayfield testified that no agreement relating to exclusive city law enforcement operations was in effect, nevertheless Deputy Sheriff Shelton believed such an agreement to exist. We find the following statement in 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 541: See also Mackay Tel. &amp; Cable Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94, 39 S. Ct. 428, 63 L. Ed. 863 (1919). Though not treated in briefs of counsel, there is nevertheless involved in this case a question of grave importance which transcends all others affecting the basic operations of our State Government. It is the duty of this Court not to shrink from asserting and exercising the power vested in it by the Constitution in the tradition of our common law system of jurisprudence, and this portentous question of whether or not the public policy of the State regulating intoxicating liquors and the enactment of laws relating thereto are within the exclusive province of the legislative branch of our State Government. In this connection, it should be kept in mind that the Constitution of Mississippi is a solemn document, the basic features of which separate and divide the powers of government among the three branches, and enjoin each branch from usurping the power of the other two. Mississippi Constitution section 1 is as follows: Section 2 is in part as follows: It is well to be retrospective and to contemplate the source of our power and duty, and to remind ourselves that this Court has the power to construe the Constitution and thus define the powers of the three branches of our Government. This calls for objective deliberation and for the exercise of self-restraint on the part of this Court not to overstep its proper and rightful power. Therefore, with due caution, we should endeavor to avoid usurping powers that are not rightly ours, in the light of the knowledge that men and their self regulatory institutions often fail to practice self-restraint and that history itself is largely the record of the endless struggle between men and the lust of governments to usurp and wield absolute power. Today is a unique time for the exercise of self-restraint by all courts of last resort. Ours is a time when people generally are impatient and anxious to accomplish by any means available that which they dream to be desirable social ends. Legislative action and the processes of properly amending the Constitution are too laborious and tedious methods for those who would fain rectify the apparent inadequacies in society which have failed of prompt correction by other devious means. An insidious notion, gaining in popularity, that holds capacity for serious mischief to our governmental structure is a view of the judicial function, which is that all the maladjustments, deficiencies, or dissentions in our society which have failed of correction by other means should find a panacea in the courts. Conceding, as is vehemently argued by appellee, that the liquor situation in Mississippi is verily a social problem which may have been poorly managed and fraught with hypocrisies, and that corrective measures may be sorely needed, nevertheless, *832 this Court will not yield to the temptation, however attractive it may appear, to attempt the correction of the problem and do by judicial fiat that which the Constitution as well as the best tradition of our system of jurisprudence sternly forbids this Court to do. We find the following discussion in the case of Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Flora Drug Company, 167 Miss. 1, 19-20, 148 So. 373, 376 (1933): See also Russell Inv. Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 178 So. 815, 182 So. 102 (1938); Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, 115 A.L.R. 1436 (1938). Therefore, we emphatically decline to usurp legislative prerogative and repeal or modify the statutory law of this State relating to liquor. It can be conceded that under a motion to quash challenging the constitutionality of a statute that evidence is admissible and therefore insofar as the case at bar is concerned the lower courts were eminently correct in permitting the testimony to be given in support thereof. It is unnecessary for us to consider the question of admissibility of evidence under the demurrer, and we do not do so, but in passing we point out that counsel cannot by agreement alter or extend the reach or the inherent potential of a pleading, and ordinarily evidence is not admissible under demurrers because the demurrer admits everything well pleaded going to the attendant liability. Since we have determined that there has not been any deliberate or intentional or *833 systematic plan of discrimination against appellee in this case and that the intent of the legislature in enacting the tax statutes was not to modify, alter or repeal the prohibitions in section 2613, with due deference to the opinions of the county and circuit courts, it follows that the motion to quash and the demurrer should not have been sustained and this cause is therefore remanded to the county court for trial on its merits. In conclusion, although unsuccessful in their objective to vitiate or repeal the operation of the law for the discharge of appellee, nevertheless, naught astute counsel could do has been left undone, and they are to be commended for their diligent and adroit presentation of every possible defense in behalf of appellee. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the county court for trial on its merits. Reversed and remanded. All Justices concur.