Title: Dennison v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 612, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
BRUCE DENNISON, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 612, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0509002483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  May 23, 2007 
Decided:  June 25, 2007 
 
Before, STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of June, 2007, it appears to the court that: 
(1) 
Bruce Dennison, defendant below, appeals the denial of his motion for 
a new trial following his Superior Court convictions of felony theft, misdemeanor 
theft, and conspiracy second degree.  Dennison contends that the trial judge should 
have granted his motion for a new trial and reduced his two felony charges to 
misdemeanor charges because the jury returned an irrational verdict.  Because 
Dennison sought alternative forms of relief, either a new trial or reduced charges, 
and the trial judge properly reduced his felony charges to misdemeanors, we 
affirm.    
 
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(2) 
Dennison, a former employee of Sears Department Store, conspired 
with two codefendants in July and August of 2005, to use customer “Choice 
Rewards” coupons to purchase items, and then returned some of the items for cash 
refunds.  Sears’s Choice Rewards program gives customers a fractional rebate (less 
than 1 percent) on all purchases made using Sears credit cards.  When a customer 
accrues enough rebates, Sears mails the customer a coupon, which functions as 
cash when making purchases at Sears.  Once a customer uses the coupon, protocol 
requires the cashier to tear it up and place it in the cash register.   
(3) 
Dennison, using a former employee’s register code, used these 
coupons to make purchases.  Instead of tearing up the coupons after their use, 
however, Dennison and his codefendants continued to make purchases with them.  
During the month of July 2005, he used $160 in coupons.  In August, Dennison 
used exactly $1,000 in coupons.  Dennison and his codefendants returned some of 
the items for a cash refund. 
(4) 
A grand jury indicted Dennison in October 2005, for misdemeanor 
theft arising from the July transactions, felony theft for the August transactions, 
and conspiracy second degree, a felony charge.  In the felony theft count, the 
indictment alleged that Dennison stole “in excess of $1,000.”  In Delaware, theft is 
 
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a misdemeanor “unless the value of the property … is $1,000 or greater.”1  The 
words “in excess of” were, the parties agree, surplusage. 
(5) 
The trial evidence showed that Dennison stole exactly $1,000 of 
Choice Rewards in August.  Christopher Cooper, the loss prevention manager at 
the Prices Corner location where the transactions occurred, testified at trial that 
Dennison used exactly $1000 of coupons, “not a penny more, not a penny less.”  
Because Cooper’s statement contradicted the indictment’s precise allegation that 
the defendant stole “in excess of $1000,” the State moved to amend the indictment 
during trial.  The trial judge reserved decision.2  The conspiracy second count 
derived from this felony theft count.  At the conclusion of the State’s case, 
Dennison moved to have the felony theft charge reduced to a misdemeanor.  The 
trial judge denied Dennison’s motion.3  At the conclusion of trial, the judge 
instructed the jury that it must find that Dennison stole “in excess of” $1,000 in 
order to find him guilty of felony theft, as the indictment alleged, (implicitly 
denying the state’s motion to amend) rather than instructing using 11 Del. C. § 
                                                 
1  
11. Del. C. § 841 (2007).  § 841(c)(1) states that “theft is a class A misdemeanor unless 
the value of the property received, retained, or disposed of is $ 1,000 or greater, in which case it 
is a class G felony.”   
 
2  
State v. Dennison, 2006 WL 2728763, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2006). 
 
3  
Id. 
 
 
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841’s precise language “$1,000 or greater.”.4  The jury found Dennison guilty of 
one count of misdemeanor theft, one count of felony theft, and the related 
conspiracy in the second degree.  The evidence did not support a verdict that 
Dennison stole “in excess of $1,000” in August, the felony theft’s cited date. 
(6) 
After the trial, Dennison filed a motion for a new trial and a motion 
for partial judgment of acquittal on the same day.  The motion for partial judgment 
of acquittal asked the trial judge to reduce the felony theft and related felony 
conspiracy charge to misdemeanors.  Both motions were premised on the same 
argument: the evidence demonstrated that the value of the stolen goods was exactly 
$1,000; the trial judge had instructed the jury that they must find the value of the 
stolen property to be “in excess of $1,000,” as alleged in the indictment, in order to 
convict Dennison of felony theft.  Dennison contends the jury irrationally found 
him guilty of stealing “in excess of $1,000” when the evidence showed he had 
stolen a “mere” $1,000 and “not a penny more, not a penny less.”  The State 
conceded that it presented insufficient evidence to support felony theft as alleged 
in the indictment, but argued that the conspiracy second degree charge remained 
appropriate.  On September 26, 2006, the trial judge, understanding their 
relationship, reduced both the felony theft and conspiracy convictions to 
                                                 
4  
The record before us does not reveal a formal ruling on the State’s motion to amend.  It 
can be inferred, however, from the jury instruction, which is consistent with the original 
indictment and inconsistent with the State’s motion to amend which would have stricken the 
surplusage, “in excess of,” that the trial judge denied the motion.   
 
 
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misdemeanors.  As a result, the trial judge declared Dennison’s motion for a new 
trial moot.5 
(7) 
Dennison now appeals the trial judge’s denial of his motion for a new 
trial.  Dennison claims that the trial judge should have granted his motion for a 
new trial for the same reason the judge granted Dennison’s motion for partial 
judgment of acquittal: the evidence did not support the jury’s verdict and, 
therefore, the verdict was irrational.  Apparently, Dennison believes that he is 
entitled to a new trial on two misdemeanors – misdemeanor theft and conspiracy to 
commit misdemeanor theft.  The State responds that Dennison’s post-trial motions 
were alternative requests for relief and that he successfully obtained one of those 
forms of relief.  We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of 
discretion.6   
(8) 
Dennison’s argument is without merit.  By any rational assessment, 
Dennison moved for alternative grounds of relief; he asked the trial judge to either 
reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors or to grant him a new trial.  Dennison 
filed the motions separately, each without reference to the other.  Dennison had no 
reasonable expectation, given the facts at trial, that he would obtain both forms of 
relief in an all or nothing fashion.  The trial judge reduced the felony charges to 
                                                 
5  
Id. 
 
6  
Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Del. 2006). 
 
 
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misdemeanors, in effect granting the relief Dennison requested in his motion for 
partial judgment of acquittal.  The rationale for doing so paralleled the basis for the 
motion for a new trial.  The motions do not contemplate a new trial on the two 
reduced to misdemeanor charges. 
(9) 
Indeed, we find it ironic that Dennison now complains after receiving 
what amounts to a windfall.  The evidence clearly showed that Dennison 
committed felony theft, having used Choice Rewards coupons worth exactly 
$1,000—the minimum amount 11. Del. C. § 841 requires for a felony theft 
conviction.  In fact, had the trial judge granted the State’s motion to amend, 
striking the surplusage, “in excess of,” from the indictment, the evidence clearly 
would have supported the jury’s judgment of conviction on the felony theft.  We 
note that were the trial judge to have granted Dennison the other relief he requested 
– a new trial – the State likely would have sought to amend the indictment before 
retrying him and any jury, if the evidence were the same in the new trial, would no 
doubt convict Dennison of felony theft. 
(10) Dennison does not argue that the evidence does not support 
misdemeanor convictions.  How could he? “[A] criminal defendant is afforded 
protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the 
 
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sufficiency of the evidence by the trial and appellate courts.”7  The controlling 
standard for that review is sufficiency of the evidence.8  Here, a reasonable jury, 
acting as trier of fact, at a minimum, could have found Dennison guilty of 
misdemeanor theft and misdemeanor conspiracy based on the evidence at trial.  
The State presented recordings and videotapes of the transactions that constituted 
sufficient evidence for a jury to find Dennison guilty of theft.  The jury determined 
that Dennison committed theft.  The testimony about the stolen coupons’ monetary 
value determined the amount of the theft – $1,000.  An error, omission, or 
oversight on the part of the jury in determining the stolen coupons’ monetary value 
does not necessarily render its finding of the underlying crime improper or 
irrational, as Dennison argues.  In fact, the jury correctly found him guilty of 
felony theft.  The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he reduced 
Dennison’s felony convictions to misdemeanor convictions and denied his motion 
for a new trial.  Dennison cannot conceivably complain legal error to his detriment 
from that decision. 
                                                 
7  
Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302, 1307 (Del. 1986) (citing United States v. Powell, 469 
U.S. 57, 67 (1984)). 
 
8  
Id. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice