Title: WILLIAM MILLER V ALLSTATE INS CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 134406
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2008

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 2, 2008 
WILLIAM MILLER, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 134393 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
and 
 
Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellant, 
PT WORKS, INC., 
Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
WILLIAM MILLER, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 134406 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 
and 
Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellee, 
PT WORKS, INC., 
Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider: (1) whether plaintiff corporation 
was improperly incorporated under the Business Corporations Act (BCA), MCL 
450.1101 et seq.; and, if so, (2) whether an improperly incorporated entity 
rendering physical therapy treatment has “lawfully” rendered such treatment under 
MCL 500.3157. However, because defendant insurance company lacks statutory 
standing to challenge plaintiff’s corporate status under MCL 450.1221, which 
grants the power to challenge corporate status solely to the Attorney General, the 
above questions are not properly before us.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals in plaintiff’s favor, albeit on alternative grounds, and we 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
William Miller was injured in separate car accidents on February 27, 2002, 
and September 13, 2002.1  Miller was diagnosed with whiplash; his doctor 
prescribed physical therapy, and referred Miller to plaintiff PT Works, Inc.  Miller 
was treated by PT Works from April 2, 2003, through August 28, 2003, incurring 
a bill for $29,150. 
1 Although William Miller is the named plaintiff in this case, he is no 
longer involved in the litigation; hence, all references to “plaintiff” are to cross­
plaintiff PT Works, Inc., and all references to “defendant” are to cross-defendant 
Allstate Insurance Company. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miller was insured with defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). 
PT Works billed Allstate for $29,150, but Allstate refused to pay.  Miller then 
filed this lawsuit against Allstate for no-fault benefits, and subsequently assigned 
his claim to PT Works, who then filed a claim against Allstate as cross-plaintiff. 
Allstate moved for summary disposition, arguing that PT Works was 
unlawfully incorporated under the BCA, because PT Works was required to 
incorporate under the Professional Services Corporations Act (PSCA), MCL 
450.221 et seq. Allstate argued that, because it was obligated to pay no-fault 
benefits only for treatment “lawfully” rendered, MCL 500.3157, PT Works could 
not recover no-fault benefits if it was unlawfully incorporated.  The trial court 
denied Allstate’s motion, concluding that physical therapy did not constitute 
“professional services” under the PSCA, and hence PT Works could incorporate 
under the BCA. 
Allstate appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Miller v Allstate Ins 
Co, 272 Mich App 284; 726 NW2d 54 (2006).  The Court of Appeals held that, 
regardless of whether PT Works was lawfully incorporated under the BCA, the 
treatment rendered to Miller was “lawful” under MCL 500.3157 because it was 
rendered by properly licensed physical therapists.  Id. at 286-287. 
Allstate then filed an application for leave to appeal with this Court, and, in 
lieu of granting leave, we vacated the initial Court of Appeals judgment and 
remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether PT Works was lawfully 
3  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
incorporated and, if PT Works was unlawfully incorporated, to reconsider whether 
treatment was lawfully rendered.  477 Mich 1062 (2007). 
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
summary disposition.  Miller v Allstate Ins Co (On Remand), 275 Mich App 649; 
739 NW2d 675 (2007).  The Court of Appeals held that PT Works could have 
incorporated under the PSCA, and thus was unlawfully incorporated under the 
BCA, citing MCL 450.1251(1).2 Id. at 654. In particular, the Court of Appeals 
noted that physical therapy constituted a personal service to the public, and 
required a license under Michigan law.  Id. However, the Court of Appeals 
adopted its prior analysis and concluded that the improper incorporation under the 
BCA did not render the treatment “unlawful” under MCL 500.3157.  Id. at 655­
658. 
PT Works appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals that it was 
unlawfully incorporated.  In a separate application, Allstate appealed the decision 
of the Court of Appeals that, despite the unlawful incorporation, the treatment was 
“lawfully rendered.” This Court granted both applications for leave to appeal. 
480 Mich 938 (2007). 
2 MCL 450.1251(1) of the BCA states:  
A corporation may be formed under this act for any lawful 
purpose, except to engage in a business for which a corporation may 
be formed under any other statute of this state unless that statute 
permits formation under this act. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.  Lash v 
Traverse City, 479 Mich 180, 186; 735 NW2d 628 (2007). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Our constitution requires that a plaintiff possess standing before a court can 
exercise jurisdiction over that plaintiff’s claim.  Rohde v Ann Arbor Public 
Schools, 479 Mich 336, 346; 737 NW2d 158 (2007).  This constitutional standing 
doctrine is longstanding and stems from the separation of powers in our 
constitution. Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 
612; 684 NW2d 800 (2004).  Because the constitution limits the judiciary to the 
exercise of “judicial power,” Const 1963, art 6, § 1, the Legislature encroaches on 
the separation of powers by attempting to grant standing to litigants who do not 
meet constitutional standing requirements.3 Rohde, supra at 350. 
3 To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three 
elements: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
“fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third party not 
before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely 
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision.” [Nat’l Wildlife Federation, supra at 628-629 (citations 
omitted).] 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the Legislature cannot expand beyond constitutional limits the 
class of persons who possess standing, the Legislature may permissibly limit the 
class of persons who may challenge a statutory violation.  That is, a party that has 
constitutional standing may be precluded from enforcing a statutory provision, if 
the Legislature so provides.  This doctrine has been referred to as a requirement 
that a party possess “statutory standing.”  See, e.g., Graden v Conexant Systems, 
Inc, 496 F3d 291, 294 (CA 3, 2007).  Statutory standing “simply [entails] statutory 
interpretation: the question it asks is whether [the Legislature] has accorded this 
injured plaintiff the right to sue the defendant to redress his injury.”  Id. at 295 
(emphasis in original). 
In this case, plaintiff asks this Court to conclude that, under the express 
terms of the BCA, defendant may not bring any challenge against plaintiff’s 
corporate status. That is, defendant’s lack of statutory standing would act as a 
jurisdictional bar to defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff was unlawfully 
incorporated. If the BCA categorically bars defendant’s claim, then the lower 
courts should not have considered the substance of defendant’s claim, as they each 
did in different ways; rather, they should have simply determined that defendant 
may not raise the affirmative defense that plaintiff was unlawfully incorporated. 
Accordingly, before considering whether an entity is lawfully incorporated under 
the BCA, a court must consider whether the party challenging corporate status has 
statutory standing to raise that claim. 
6  
 
 
 
 
Statutory standing, which necessitates an inquiry into whether a statute 
authorizes a plaintiff to sue at all, must be distinguished from whether a statute 
permits an individual claim for a particular type of relief.  See Steel Co v Citizens 
for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 92; 118 S Ct 1003; 140 L Ed 2d 210 (1998) 
(distinguishing between “whether [a statute] authorizes this plaintiff to sue” and 
“whether the scope of the [statutory] right of action includes past violations,” and 
stating that the latter “goes to the merits and not to statutory standing”).  The 
statutory standing inquiry is generally jurisdictional; the claim-for-relief inquiry is 
non-jurisdictional.  Lerner v Fleet Bank, NA, 318 F3d 113, 127 (CA 2, 2003); see 
also Steel Co, supra at 92 (stating that the claim for relief inquiry is non­
jurisdictional, and contrasting that inquiry with the statutory standing inquiry); 
Northwest Airlines, Inc v Kent Co, 510 US 355, 365; 114 S Ct 855; 127 L Ed 2d 
183 (1994) (“The question whether a . . . statute creates a claim for relief is not 
jurisdictional.”); but see Canyon Co v Syngenta Seeds, Inc, 519 F3d 969, 975 n 7 
(CA 9, 2008) (rejecting the proposition that statutory standing is jurisdictional). 
We acknowledge that the line dividing these inquiries is not always susceptible to 
easy demarcation; as Steel Co points out, “the merits inquiry and the statutory 
standing inquiry often ‘overlap.’”  Steel Co, supra at 97 n 2, quoting Nat’l R 
Passenger Corp v Nat’l Ass’n of R Passengers, 414 US 453, 456; 94 S Ct 690; 38 
L Ed 2d 646 (1974). 
An example illustrates the distinction. This Court considered during its last 
term whether an individual plaintiff “may maintain a private cause of action for 
7  
 
  
 
  
                                                 
money damages against” a public employer for a violation of MCL 15.602.4 Lash, 
supra at 191. We held that, based on the text of the statute, “the Legislature did 
not intend to create a private cause of action for violation of this particular 
provision.” Id. at 196. We further noted that the plaintiff could seek enforcement 
of the statute through a claim for injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment.  Id. at 
196-197.  Thus, an individual plaintiff could bring some cause of action to enforce 
MCL 15.602, thereby indicating that an individual plaintiff has statutory standing. 
However, an individual plaintiff could not bring every particular type of action, 
namely in that case an action for money damages.  This latter question goes to the 
scope of the cause of action. 
Two conclusions should be drawn from this.  First, a determination that a 
plaintiff lacks statutory standing to assert a cause of action is essentially the 
equivalent of concluding that a plaintiff cannot bring any action in reaction to an 
alleged legal violation. Second, an inquiry regarding statutory standing and an 
inquiry regarding the merits of a particular claim for relief both follow the same 
method: both analyze the statutory language to determine legislative intent. 
However, the two inquiries ask different questions: the former asks whether any 
plaintiff may ever assert a violation of the statute, whereas the latter asks whether 
the plaintiff may assert a particular cause of action for the violation. 
4 This statute restricts a public employer’s ability to impose residency 
restrictions on employees. 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Here, the initial question is whether defendant Allstate may challenge the 
incorporation of PT Works under the BCA.5  Because the relevant question is 
whether the BCA authorizes defendant to make such a challenge, the issue 
presented is properly characterized as one of statutory standing. 
MCL 450.1221 of the BCA states: 
The corporate existence shall begin on the effective date of 
the articles of incorporation as provided in [MCL 450.11316]. Filing 
is conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be 
performed under this act have been fulfilled and that the corporation 
has been formed under this act, except in an action or special 
proceeding by the attorney general. 
This statute indicates that once articles of incorporation under the BCA have been 
filed, such filing constitutes “conclusive evidence” that: (1) all the requirements 
for complying with the BCA have been fulfilled; and (2) the corporation has 
5 Ordinarily, statutory standing questions involve a challenge to a plaintiff’s 
standing. 
Here, however, plaintiff challenges defendant’s ability to assert 
plaintiff’s allegedly unlawful incorporation under the BCA as an affirmative 
defense. If the BCA prevents defendant from bringing an original action against 
plaintiff based on unlawful incorporation, then it would be illogical to permit 
defendant to assert the same grounds as an affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Cinema 
North Corp v Plaza At Latham Assoc, 867 F2d 135, 139 (CA 2, 1989) (stating that 
ordinarily a guarantor who has been sued does not possess standing to assert, as an 
affirmative defense, a claim that inheres in a principal); United States v Dunifer, 
997 F Supp 1235, 1239 (ND Cal, 1998) (“Where the defendant asserts an 
affirmative defense requiring the litigation of issues not encompassed in the 
plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant is in a similar situation on those issues to a 
plaintiff who is invoking the jurisdiction of the court.”).  Accordingly, we must 
inquire into whether defendant has statutory standing to assert this particular 
affirmative defense. 
6 MCL 450.1131 establishes general procedures for filing articles of 
incorporation. 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
actually been formed in compliance with the BCA.  Thus, the statute generally 
creates an irrebuttable presumption of proper incorporation once the articles of 
incorporation have been filed.7  The statute then creates a single exception to this 
general rule by granting the Attorney General the sole authority to challenge 
whether a corporation has been properly incorporated under the BCA.  That is, 
only the Attorney General is not affected by the irrebuttable presumption in favor 
of legality. By naming only the Attorney General in this respect, the Legislature 
has indicated that the Attorney General alone has the authority to challenge 
corporate status, under the principle “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” that is, 
“the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”  Miller v Chapman 
Contracting, 477 Mich 102, 108 n 1; 730 NW2d 462 (2007).  Thus, the filing of 
the articles of incorporation serves as “conclusive evidence” that PT Works has 
been properly formed, and this Court cannot, under the terms of MCL 450.1221, 
conclude otherwise, except as a consequence of a suit brought by the Attorney 
General. 
In essence, MCL 450.1221 prevents any person-- other than the Attorney 
General-- from bringing any challenge to corporate status under the BCA: every 
such challenge would be doomed to failure, because the mere filing of articles of 
7 In contrast with the irrebuttable presumption established in MCL 
450.1221, the Legislature has on other occasions created rebuttable presumptions. 
See, e.g., MCL 333.17031(3) (filing a written statement regarding educational 
history creates a “rebuttable presumption” that statement was filed “in good 
faith”). 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
incorporation constitutes “conclusive evidence” of the corporation’s legality. 
Because the Legislature has expressly forbidden Allstate from raising the 
affirmative defense asserted in this litigation, Allstate lacks statutory standing to 
challenge the corporate status of PT Works.8 
Moreover, MCL 450.1221 presents a jurisdictional bar to defendant’s 
affirmative defense. Because MCL 450.1221 indicates that only the Attorney 
8 This conclusion is bolstered by other provisions of the BCA that limit the 
authority of certain individuals to challenge proper incorporation.  The BCA, 
MCL 450.1821, states: 
(1) The attorney general may bring an action in the circuit 
court of the county in which the principal place of business or 
registered office of the corporation is located for dissolution of a 
corporation upon the ground that the corporation has committed any 
of the following acts: 
(a) Procured its organization through fraud. 
(b) Repeatedly and willfully exceeded the authority conferred 
upon it by law. 
(c) Repeatedly and willfully conducted its business in an 
unlawful manner. 
(2) The enumeration in this section of grounds for dissolution 
does not exclude any other statutory or common law action by the 
attorney general for dissolution of a corporation or revocation or 
forfeiture of its corporate franchises. 
Thus, MCL 450.1821 vests authority in the Attorney General to pursue dissolution 
of a corporation. Similarly, MCL 450.1823 permits the shareholders and directors 
of a corporation to pursue dissolution under certain circumstances.  See also MCL 
450.1488(1)(g) (allowing shareholders to dissolve a corporation by agreement). 
Because the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, Chapman 
Contracting, supra at 108 n 1, these statutes indicate that an outside party may not 
pursue dissolution, and thus reflect a general legislative intent to prevent outside 
parties from challenging an entity’s corporate status under the BCA. 
11  
 
 
 
 
General may pursue a claim that a corporation such as plaintiff is improperly 
incorporated under the BCA, the lower courts should not have considered the 
merits of Allstate’s claim. 
Allstate argues that MCL 450.1221 sets forth a general rule that only the 
Attorney General may challenge corporate status under the BCA, but that the no­
fault act, MCL 500.3157, provides a specific exception to that general rule.  MCL 
500.3157 states in part: 
A physician, hospital, clinic or other person or institution 
lawfully rendering treatment to an injured person for an accidental 
bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance, and a person 
or institution providing rehabilitative occupational training following 
the injury, may charge a reasonable amount for the products, 
services and accommodations rendered.  [Emphasis added.] 
“[S]pecific provisions . . . prevail over any arguable inconsistency with the more 
general rule . . . . ” Jones v Enertel, Inc, 467 Mich 266, 271; 650 NW2d 334 
(2002). The question raised by Allstate is how to ascertain which provision is 
more specific and which is more general. As with any question of statutory 
interpretation, we examine the language of the statutes to discern the Legislature’s 
intent. Fluor Enterprises, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 477 Mich 170, 174; 730 NW2d 
722 (2007).  In order to determine which provision is truly more specific and, 
hence, controlling, we consider which provision applies to the more narrow realm 
of circumstances, and which to the more broad realm.  MCL 500.3157 grants a 
right to insurers to refuse payment for treatment that is unlawfully rendered.  This 
right encompasses all forms of unlawfulness, and hence would seem to apply to 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the challenge made here. However, MCL 450.1221 applies to one specific form of 
unlawfulness-- improper corporate formation.  Because MCL 450.1221 applies to 
one form of unlawfulness, and MCL 500.3157 applies to all forms, MCL 450.1221 
is the more specific provision and, therefore, prevails over MCL 500.3157. 
Contrary to Allstate’s argument, MCL 500.3157 does not specifically grant 
an insurer the right to challenge all forms of lawfulness, regardless of other 
statutes that impose limitations or exceptions upon such an ability.  Rather, MCL 
500.3157 sets up a general ability to challenge lawfulness, but neither states nor 
implies that a right has been established that trumps any other statutory limitation 
on an insurer’s ability to contest the lawfulness of treatment.  Hence, Allstate’s 
argument fails, and we conclude that MCL 450.1221 prevents an insurer from 
challenging the corporate status of a corporation formed under the BCA.9 
Although our analysis rests solely on our interpretation of the relevant 
statutes, we note that MCL 450.1221 encapsulates at least 100 years of common­
law practice in Michigan. In Int’l Harvester Co of America v Eaton Circuit Judge, 
163 Mich 55; 127 NW 695 (1910), this Court stated: 
This brings us to the doctrine, founded in public policy and 
convenience and supported by an almost unanimous consensus of 
judicial opinion, which is that rightfulness of the existence of a body 
claiming to act, and in fact acting in the face of the State, as a 
9 We emphasize that in no way are we passing judgment on the lawfulness 
of plaintiff’s incorporation.  Because a court cannot entertain an individual’s 
challenge to corporate status under MCL 450.1221, plaintiff must be presumed 
lawfully formed until its incorporation has been successfully challenged by the 
Attorney General. 
13  
 
 
 
  
corporation, cannot be litigated in actions between private 
individuals, or between private individuals and the assumed 
corporation, but that the rightfulness of the existence of the 
corporation can be questioned only by the State; in other words, that 
the question of the rightful existence of the corporation cannot be 
raised in a collateral proceeding. [Id. at 67 (quotations and citation 
omitted).] 
Indeed, Michigan courts have long held that the state possesses the sole authority 
to question whether a corporation has been properly incorporated under the 
relevant law. See, e.g., Flueling v Goeringer, 240 Mich 372, 375; 215 NW 294 
(1927) (stating that a particular taxicab company “is a corporation, and its right to 
be such under the provisions of the act authorizing corporations . . . , if questioned, 
must be at the instance of proper State authority”); Allied Supermarkets, Inc v 
Grocer’s Dairy Co, 45 Mich App 310, 317; 206 NW2d 490 (1973) (“Only the 
state may challenge the validity of an incorporation.”); see also OAG, 1981-1982, 
No 5893, pp 167-168 (May 8, 1981) (“The validity of an incorporation can be 
questioned only by the state in a proper proceeding and cannot be questioned 
collaterally.”), citing Besson v Crapo Toll Rd, 150 Mich 655; 114 NW 924 (1908). 
Moreover, a party cannot raise an argument challenging a corporation’s corporate 
status in a collateral proceeding; rather, such an argument may only be brought in 
a direct proceeding to challenge such status.  Attorney General v Lapeer Farmers 
Mut Fire Ins Ass’n, 297 Mich 174, 184; 297 NW 232 (1941); Cahill v Kalamazoo 
Mut Ins Co, 2 Doug 124, 141 (Mich 1845). Thus, in historical context, MCL 
450.1221 codifies Michigan’s longstanding common-law practice of only 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
permitting the state to challenge corporate status, and to do so only in a direct 
proceeding on that issue. 
One need not look far to ascertain the merits of this limitation.  As one 
treatise states: 
It would produce endless confusion and hardship, and 
probably destroy the corporation, if the legality of its existence could 
be drawn in question in every suit to which it was a party . . . .  [18A 
Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 208, p 88.] 
Indeed, if the legality of every Michigan corporation were subject to continual 
assault by any person, it would be difficult to see how a stable economic climate 
could ever exist. Relevant to this case, no insured person could obtain medical 
treatment without undertaking a laborious inquiry into whether the entity 
providing treatment has complied with every applicable corporate statute and 
regulation. Whether an insured person could obtain benefits would largely depend 
on the ingenuity of lawyers in ferreting out aspects of corporate non-compliance 
with applicable statutes. However, the Legislature has deemed it fit that residents 
of Michigan may depend on the corporate status of any corporation formed under 
the BCA and approved by the state, and we do nothing more here than enforce that 
policy decision-- a decision rooted in relevant statutes and in longstanding judicial 
practice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because Allstate lacks statutory standing to assert that PT Works was 
improperly incorporated, the Court of Appeals correctly held that summary 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
disposition should be granted to PT Works, albeit on alternative grounds. 
Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but vacate its 
rationale, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
CAVANAGH, J. I concur in the result only. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
WILLIAM MILLER, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 134393 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
and 
 
Defendant/
 
Cross-Defendant-Appellant, 
PT WORKS, INC., 
Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
WILLIAM MILLER, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 134406 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
and 
 
Defendant/ 
Cross-Defendant-Appellee, 
PT WORKS, INC., 
Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in the result only). 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion because defendant Allstate 
Insurance Company lacks the authority to challenge the corporate status of cross­
plaintiff PT Works, Inc.  Under MCL 450.1221, only the Attorney General is 
authorized to challenge an entity’s corporate status. 
I write separately because I disagree with the opinion’s strained discussion 
of the standing test erroneously created by the majority of four (Chief Justice 
Taylor and Justices Corrigan, Young, and Markman) in Lee v Macomb Co Bd of 
Comm’rs,1 Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,2 Rohde v Ann 
Arbor Pub Schools,3 and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé 
Waters North America Inc.4  In those cases, the majority of four systematically 
dismantled Michigan’s law on standing and replaced years of precedent with its 
own test that denies Michigan citizens access to the courts.5 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
1 Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001). 
2 Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608; 684 
NW2d 800 (2004). 
3 Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 479 Mich 336; 737 NW2d 158 (2007). 
4 Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America 
Inc, 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007). 
5 See my opinions chronicling the majority of four’s assault on standing in 
Lee, 464 Mich at 742; Nat’l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 651; Rohde, 479 Mich at 366; 
and Michigan Citizens, 479 Mich at 310. 
2