Title: Saunders v. Industrial Comm'n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86969
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2000

Docket No. 86969-Agenda 32-September 1999.
TIMOTHY R. SAUNDERS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. 
(Beloit Corporation, Appellee).
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
Claimant, Timothy R. Saunders, worked for Beloit Corporation as a dispatcher. 
On May 16, 1994, Saunders was injured when a forklift operated by his coworker, 
Jan Gundry, ran over his left ankle. Saunders filed an application for 
adjustment of claim, and the parties proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator 
denied compensation, finding that Saunders' injury did not arise out of his 
employment. The Industrial Commission (Commission) adopted the arbitrator's 
findings, and the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision. Saunders 
appealed, and the Industrial Commission division of the appellate court affirmed 
the denial of compensation. Two judges of the appellate court filed a statement 
that the case involved a substantial question that warranted review by this 
court, and this court granted Saunders' petition for leave to appeal. See 177 
Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
BACKGROUND
The witnesses disagree as to how Saunders' injury occurred. Saunders 
testified that, at the time of his injury, he was traveling from the shipping 
department to the office to retrieve his lunch. Because he "had a limited time" 
for break, Saunders hitched a ride on a forklift operated by Gundry. Gundry's 
forklift was designed to be operated by one person only and was not large enough 
to seat two passengers. Moments before the accident, Saunders dismounted and 
began walking along the left side of the forklift. After Saunders took four or 
five strides, Gundry began to make a right turn, causing the left rear tire of 
the forklift to run over Saunders' left ankle. From the time he dismounted to 
the time of the injury, 5 to 10 seconds elapsed. Gundry corroborated Saunders' 
version of the accident.
Keith Smithson, a Beloit employee who witnessed Saunders' injury from a 
distance of 15 to 20 feet, gave a different account. While returning from a 
restroom break, Smithson saw Saunders riding double on Gundry's forklift. 
Saunders was riding in "a sidesaddle position," with his left leg hanging off 
the left side of the forklift. As Gundry began to make a right turn, Saunders 
stepped off the forklift and caught his left foot beneath the tire. Saunders 
immediately fell to the ground without taking any steps.
Although the witnesses gave differing accounts of the accident, all of the 
witnesses agreed that Beloit's safety rules strictly prohibited employees from 
riding double on a forklift. Saunders, Gundry, and Smithson had attended 
Beloit's safety training sessions, and they all were aware of Beloit's rule 
against riding double on forklifts. According to Smithson, the rule against 
riding double "is a known rule in the plant." David Kessler, Beloit's safety 
administrator, testified that the rule against riding double on forklifts was 
communicated to employees through training sessions, monthly safety "contacts," 
and an employee handbook that all employees receive. Dean Waters, a union 
representative, likewise confirmed that Beloit conducted training sessions on 
forklift safety and that Beloit's safety rules prohibited employees from riding 
double on forklifts.
As to the enforcement of the rule against riding double on forklifts, the 
witnesses again were more or less in agreement. Saunders testified that, during 
his 17 years at Beloit, the rule was violated "approximately maybe 10 times." 
Gundry testified that he had transported a supervisor on his forklift three or 
four times in the past 14 years and that Saunders was not the first coworker to 
ride on his forklift. Smithson, who has worked for Beloit for 17 years, had 
never before witnessed another coworker riding double on a forklift. When 
Waters, the union representative, was asked how many times he had seen the rule 
violated during his eight years at Beloit, he responded, "I couldn't give you a 
number. There wouldn't be that many times."
The arbitrator denied Saunders' request for compensation, concluding that 
Saunders' ankle injury did not arise out of his employment. In reaching this 
conclusion, the arbitrator specifically found that Saunders and Gundry were not 
credible witnesses, while Smithson, who "had no reason to demonstrate any bias 
in his testimony," was credible. The arbitrator further found that:
The arbitrator held that "the activity of riding double on the forklift was 
not within the scope of the Petitioner's employment" and "created an 
unreasonable risk beyond that to which Petitioner would be exposed during the 
course of his employment."
Saunders appealed to the Commission, and the Commission adopted the 
arbitrator's findings. The circuit court of Winnebago County confirmed the 
Commission's decision, and the Industrial Commission division of the appellate 
court affirmed the circuit court. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Commission's decision denying 
Saunders' claim was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We hold that it 
was not.
To be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the injury complained 
of must be one "arising out of and in the course of the employment." 820 ILCS 
305/2 (West 1998). An injury "arises out of" one's employment if its origin is 
in some risk connected with or incident to the employment, so that there is a 
causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. Parro v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 167 Ill. 2d 385, 393 (1995). An injury is received 
" 'in the course of employment [if] it occurs within a period of 
employment, at a place where the worker may reasonably be in the performance of 
his duties, and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in something 
incidental thereto.' " Parro, 167 Ill. 2d  at 393, quoting 
Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361, 367 
(1977). The occurrence of an accident at the claimant's workplace does not 
automatically establish that the injury arose out of the claimant's employment. 
Parro, 167 Ill. 2d  at 393. The burden of establishing the necessary 
causal relationship between the injury and the employment rests with the 
claimant. Lee v. Industrial Comm'n, 167 Ill. 2d 77, 81 (1995).
As Saunders correctly notes, the particular issue in this case is governed by 
the principles set forth in Republic Iron &amp; Steel Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 302 Ill. 401, 406 (1922):
Three years after Republic Iron, this court decided a case 
remarkably similar to the one presently before us. In Lumaghi Coal Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 318 Ill. 151 (1925), the claimant, Alfred Sudbring, 
worked for Lumaghi as a mine examiner. On the evening of his injury, Sudbring 
was required to travel from one examination site to another, a distance of 
approximately one mile. Instead of traveling by foot or via the cart and mule 
that Lumaghi had provided for him, Sudbring decided to use one of the electric 
motors that hauled coal trains into the mine. Sudbring lost control of the motor 
while attempting to start it, and the motor ran over and severed Sudbring left 
leg. Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 151-52.
Lumaghi's safety rules prohibited the use of motors by anyone other than 
designated motor operators. Sudbring testified that his purpose in taking the 
motor was to hasten his trip from one worksite to another. Prior to his 
accident, Sudbring had used the motor four or five times as a means of travel, 
while another mine examiner had used the motor approximately three times. 
Sudbring denied ever being told not to use the motors. The mine superintendent, 
the mine manager, and the mine electrician all testified that the mine examiners 
were suspected of using the motors at night and that the mine superintendent had 
specifically told the mine examiners, including Sudbring, not to use them.
In reversing the Commission's award of compensation, this court first 
rejected the proposition that use of the motors by the mine examiners had 
developed into a workplace custom. Although management suspected that the mine 
examiners used the motors as a means of travel, no person in authority ever 
actually witnessed the use of a motor by a mine examiner, such use occurred only 
at night, and management specifically prohibited the use of motors by mine 
examiners. In any event, the motors "were not used very frequently by the mine 
examiners." Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 154.
This court then held that, by attempting to operate a motor, Sudbring 
"voluntarily went outside of the reasonable sphere of his employment and put 
himself beyond the protection of the master's implied undertaking." 
Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 155. In reaching this result, this court 
acknowledged that, because contributory negligence is no defense to a workers' 
compensation claim, an employee may violate a safety rule without necessarily 
leaving the sphere of his employment. Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 155. 
Nevertheless, "[t]he employer is not liable for every accidental injury which 
may happen to an employee during his employment." Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 
156. For example,"[t]he employer is not liable where the employee exposes 
himself to a danger which is not one arising from the employee's employment." 
Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 156.
Applying these principles, this court concluded that Sudbring did more than 
simply violate a safety rule:
Because Sudbring "did not attempt to use the motor for any other purpose 
than to enable him to ride to the place where he wanted to go, quicker than he 
could go by driving the mule or on foot," this court concluded that "[t]he 
accident did not arise out of Sudbring's employment." (Emphasis added.) 
Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 157. Accordingly, the Commission's decision to 
award compensation was reversed. Lumaghi, 318 Ill.  at 157.
We see no meaningful distinction between Lumaghi and the case 
presently before us. At the time of his injury, Saunders was traveling from the 
shipping department to the office to retrieve his lunch. Instead of traveling by 
foot (which unquestionably was allowed) or by riding single on a forklift (which 
may have been allowed), Saunders chose a means of travel expressly forbidden by 
Beloit's safety rules. By riding double on a forklift, Saunders engaged in a 
hazardous method of travel, the sole purpose of which was Saunders' personal 
convenience. All of the witnesses, including Saunders, knew of the safety rule 
prohibiting riding double. Indeed, Beloit published the rule in its employee 
handbook and regularly communicated the rule to its employees through training 
sessions and monthly safety "contacts." Moreover, all of the witnesses agreed 
that, although this rule had been breached in the past, breaches were rare.
To be sure, unlike the employee in Lumaghi whose job description in 
no way called for the operation or use of motors, Saunders' job description 
included the operation and use of forklifts. However, we attach no significance 
to this distinction. Saunders' job description included using a forklift, by 
himself, to move machine parts from one part of the plant to another. Saunders' 
job description did not include hitching a ride to the break room on a 
passing forklift. On the contrary, Beloit's safety rules expressly forbade all 
employees-including Saunders-from engaging in such behavior.(1)
CONCLUSION
The Commission in this case reached the same conclusion that this court 
reached in Lumaghi: that the employee's conscious violation of a safety 
rule was purely for his own personal convenience, in no way was required by or 
benefitted his employer, and therefore did not arise out of his employment. The 
facts undeniably support this conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the 
Commission's denial of Saunders' claim was not against the manifest weight of 
the evidence.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
When my colleagues say that Saunders acted as he did solely for his "personal 
convenience" (slip op. at 6), I do not know what they mean. Saunders was hit by 
a forklift at work while on his way to a scheduled break on his employer's 
premises. The break was part of his official workday, and he needed it in order 
to continue working efficiently.
The reason Saunders rode a forklift is that it enabled him to complete this 
portion of his workday in an expeditious and direct way. Had the accident not 
occurred, both Saunders and the employer would have profited. Saunders would 
have been better off because he would have been able to eat lunch sooner. The 
employer would have been better off because the amount of time Saunders was away 
from his regular job duties would have been reduced.
The majority's contention that Saunders' injury did not arise out of his 
employment is not supported by the case law. In situations such as this, where 
an employee sustains injuries while taking his lunch break, our court has held 
that:
While Saunders may have been careless in riding on the forklift as he did, 
negligence on an employee's part is not a bar to recovery under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 
563 (1976). Similarly, Saunders is not disqualified from receiving benefits 
under the Act simply because his conduct violated company safety rules. The 
Illinois General Assembly has never made safety rule violations a defense under 
the Workers' Compensation Act, and no such statutory defense exists.
If an employee is acting within the sphere of his employment, doing the work 
he is employed to do, he is entitled to compensation even if he is guilty of 
violating work rules. Heyman Distributing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 376 Ill. 90, 92-93 (1941). "[I]t does not matter in the slightest degree how many 
orders the employee disobeys or how bad his conduct may have been ***." 
Republic Iron &amp; Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 Ill. 401, 406 
(1922).
Lumaghi Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 318 Ill. 151 (1925), the case 
upon which the majority's decision is founded, is inapposite. There the injured 
employee had gone to an area of the employer's premises where he was not 
permitted to be and used equipment he was not authorized to use. Neither of 
those circumstances is present here. Saunders was allowed to use forklifts and 
was in a place he was allowed to be.
The facts of this case are analogous to those presented in Chadwick v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 179 Ill. App. 3d 715 (1989), where an employee was 
fatally injured when he fell from a scaffold. The employee knew he was supposed 
to tether himself to a lifeline, but failed to do so. Coworkers testified that 
they neglected to use the lifeline because it was "inconvenient." In reversing 
the denial of benefits, the appellate court held that the injury was compensable 
notwithstanding the decedent's obvious negligence because the decedent was where 
he was supposed to be doing what he was hired to do. Chadwick, 179 Ill. 
App. 3d at 717-19.
The Workers' Compensation Act is remedial in nature and should be liberally 
construed to accomplish its purpose. Pathfinder Co., 62 Ill. 2d  at 563. 
Consistent with this view, our court has allowed recovery of workers' 
compensation benefits where an employee was injured while playing softball after 
hours and off premises (Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 304, 312-16 (1955)), died in an automobile accident while driving home from a 
company golf outing (Lybrand, Ross Bros. &amp; Montgomery v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 36 Ill. 2d 410 (1967)), sustained lacerations while sunbathing 
after taking a lunch-hour swim (Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361 (1977)), and got hurt tossing a frisbee on the 
company's parking lot during an authorized lunch break (Eagle Discount 
Supermarket v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 331 (1980)). If those 
claimants were entitled to benefits, as we found them to be, there is no just 
reason for denying benefits to someone like Timothy Saunders. He was doing the 
best he could to get on with the job he was hired to do and he was injured in 
the process. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, he deserves compensation. I 
therefore dissent.
JUSTICES BILANDIC and FREEMAN join in this dissent.
1. 1Saunders' counsel argued strenuously at oral 
argument that forklift operators are uniquely exempt from Beloit's categorical 
prohibition against riding double on forklifts. This argument not only finds no 
support in the record but also is belied by Saunders' admission that riding 
double violated Beloit's safety rules.