Title: LÃ¡mar v. State
Citation: 109 N.E.2d 614, 231 Ind. 508
Docket Number: 28,919
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 5, 1953

231 Ind. 508 (1953)
109 N.E.2d 614
LaMAR ET AL.
v.
STATE OF INDIANA
No. 28,919.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 5, 1953.
*509 William S. Spangler, Spangler &amp; Strom, and Herman L. Key, of Gary, for appellants.
J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General and William T. McClain and John Ready O'Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee.
JASPER, J.
Appellants were charged by affidavit with procuring a female as an inmate for a house of prostitution, under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement. A plea of not guilty was entered, trial by jury was waived, there was a finding of guilty, and judgment and sentence followed.
Appellants assign as error the overruling of their motion for new trial.
The motion for new trial asserts that the finding of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. Other grounds have been waived under our Rule No. 2-17 (f).
The pertinent part of the affidavit, filed on June 23, 1951, is as follows:
The evidence of Diane Hamilton, a witness for the State, reveals that she was a prostitute and knew both of appellants, having met appellant LaMar at a restaurant operated by the latter at 1533 Jefferson Street, in Gary, when the witness went there to inquire about a job working as a prostitute. Appellant McCully was not there at that time; she came in September or October. Appellant LaMar lived in the rear of the restaurant with another woman. Arrangements were made between the witness and appellant LaMar that Two Dollars out of every Five Dollars and Four Dollars out of Ten Dollars would go to appellant from each act of prostitution. The witness collected and divided the money. She paid no rent. The witness came there in August, 1950, and stayed until November, 1950. She came back two or three times after that, leaving for good in July, 1951. In June, 1951, other arrangements were made in which the witness was to divide the money equally with appellant LaMar. *511 During June, and up to the time the witness left permanently, in July, 1951, one-half of the money collected by the witness was paid to appellant LaMar. On one of the occasions when the witness returned, appellant McCully was there. The latter waited on customers in the restaurant, and gave appellant LaMar money from acts of prostitution. Appellant McCully and the witness worked five or six months "in the same place." When the witness returned after being gone for a period of time, she had a conversation with appellants  "I went and asked for my job back and I got it back, that's all I can remember." The witness testified that: "She (appellant LaMar) still didn't charge me any rent for my room." The reputation of appellants and the witness was shown to be that of prostitutes.
The above, in substance, is the pertinent testimony.
This court has often said that we cannot weigh the evidence, but will examine it to see if there is substantial evidence of probative value on each material element of the crime charged. Price v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 316, 184 N.E. 181.
The affidavit charges three separate acts under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement  (1) that appellants procured a female to become an inmate for a house of prostitution; (2) by promises, threats, violence, and by a device and scheme, did cause and encourage a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution; and (3) by promises, threats, violence, and by a device and scheme, did cause, induce, persuade and encourage an inmate of a house of prostitution to remain therein.
The affidavit charges conjunctively three forbidden acts, under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement, and the burden was on appellee to prove one of the acts *512 charged. Rosenbarger v. State (1900), 154 Ind. 425, 56 N.E. 914.
There is a complete lack of evidence of substantial and probative value against appellant, Frances McCully, to prove any of the acts charged in the affidavit, under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement. Therefore the finding and judgment is contrary to law as to appellant, Frances McCully. Price v. State, supra.
It is necessary that we look to the evidence most favorable to appellee which would be pertinent to prove the acts charged to have been committed by appellant LaMar.
From the evidence as herein set out, there is no evidence to prove threats or violence; and the only evidence in the record bearing upon "the procuring" and "promises" and "by a device and scheme" appears as follows:
From this evidence we cannot say that any promises were made, or a device and scheme was entered into, to cause Diane Hamilton to become an inmate of a house of prostitution; nor is there any evidence to show any device, scheme, cause, inducement, persuasion, or encouragement of Diane *515 Hamilton to remain as an inmate of a house of prostitution.
In the case of State v. Topham (1912), 41 Utah 39, 45, 123 P. 888, 890, the court said:
The court further said (p. 59 of 41 Utah, p. 896 of 123 P.):
And further (p. 60 of 41 Utah, p. 896 of 123 P.):
In 73 C.J.S., Prostitution, § 7e, p. 236, it is stated:
In the case at bar there is no evidence to show that appellant LaMar made any promises or threats, or committed any acts of violence, to cause and encourage Diane Hamilton to become an inmate of a house of prostitution. Neither is there any evidence to show that, by promises, threats, and violence, and by any device or scheme, appellant LaMar did cause and encourage Diane Hamilton to remain an inmate of a house of prostitution. The evidence shows that the inmate could come and go as she wished; and, as a matter of fact, she left several times and returned of her own volition, and solicited her position in the house.
From the evidence, can we say that appellants procured an inmate, under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement? We believe not. In Rosenbarger v. State (1900), 154 Ind. 425, 56 N.E. 914, supra, the court, in discussing another criminal statute other than the one here in issue, defined the word "procure" in the sense of "cause." Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., p. 1974, defines the word "procure" as follows:
Black's Law Dictionary, 3d ed., p. 1437, defines "procure" as follows:
In the case of State v. Speer (1930), 130 Kan. 226, 227, 285 P. 639, 640, in which the defendant was convicted of enticing and procuring a female to go from one place to another for the purpose of prostitution, the court said:
Here again the same reasoning may apply to the procuring of a female to become an inmate of a house of prostitution.
In the case of People v. VanBever (1911), 248 Ill. 136, 141, 93 N.E. 725, 727, the court said:
In 73 C.J.S., Prostitution, § 7e, p. 235, "Procuring or Inducing Female to Become Inmate of House of Prostitution," it is said:
And further (p. 236):
The evidence reveals that Diane Hamilton initiated the proceedings by going to appellant LaMar and requesting a job with her and making the necessary arrangements. The fact that Diane Hamilton contacted appellant LaMar and made "arrangements" for the payment of monies received by her is not "procuring" within the meaning of the statute. People v. VanBever, supra. Diane Hamilton procured the position  appellant did not procure Diane Hamilton. There is a complete failure of evidence to support the material elements of the charge of pandering as prohibited by § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement. Appellants may have been guilty of another crime, but they are not guilty under this evidence of violating § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement.
The finding of the trial court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law.
*519 It was error for the trial court to overrule appellants' motion for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.
NOTE.  Reported in 109 N.E.2d 614.