Title: State v. Simpson
Citation: 261 S.E.2d 818
Docket Number: 60
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 1980

261 S.E.2d 818 (1980) STATE of North Carolina v. Herman K. SIMPSON. No. 60. Supreme Court of North Carolina. February 1, 1980. *820 Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten, by Special Deputy Atty. Gen. Lester V. Chalmers, Jr., Raleigh, for the State. Malcolm R. Hunter and Fred J. Williams, Asst. Public Defenders, Fayetteville, Cumberland County, for defendant. BROCK, Justice. Defendant brings forward seven assignments of error which he presents in eight arguments, the first assignment of error being asserted on two legal theories. They are: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence of defendant's inculpatory statement given to the Philadelphia law enforcement officers because (a) the officers failed to take defendant before a proper issuing authority in Pennsylvania for issuance of a warrant and for preliminary arraignment as is required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (b) because defendant's inculpatory statement was involuntary; (2) that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence of defendant's having committed sodomy with a dog; (3) that the trial court erred in the admission of testimony of the rest home attendant that it was her custom to keep the windows and screens closed; (4) that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the first degree murder charge; (5) that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the first degree burglary charge; (6) that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill charge; and (7) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the evidence tended to show that the defendant entered the building by a breaking. We will discuss the assignments of error in the order presented. Should defendant's inculpatory statement have been suppressed because the Philadelphia officers failed to take defendant before a proper issuing official in Philadelphia for issuance of a warrant, and for preliminary arraignment in accordance *821 with the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure? We hold that this is not grounds for suppression of the inculpatory statement in a trial in North Carolina. This same argument was advanced in the first Simpson case (State v. Simpson, 297 N.C. 399, 255 S.E.2d 147 (1979)) and we felt it did not merit discussion. However, with the hope that this argument will not again be asserted we give it a brief treatment. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to trials in North Carolina. Motions to suppress evidence in trials in North Carolina are governed by North Carolina law. Should defendant's inculpatory statement have been suppressed because it was not voluntary? We hold that defendant's inculpatory statement was voluntarily given and, excepting the parts hereinafter held to be inadmissible, was properly admitted into evidence at trial. Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress the evidence of defendant's inculpatory statements given to the Philadelphia police officers. Defendant argues that the statements were coerced and therefore not voluntary. On 10 and 11 January 1979 Judge Canaday, in accordance with proper procedure, conducted a full evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. Judge Canaday made detailed findings of fact, to which no exceptions are taken, finding that all of defendant's statements were freely, voluntarily, understandingly and intentionally made, and that no threat of physical or mental violence of any nature or promise or assurance of help or reward of any nature was made to defendant by said law enforcement officers as an inducement to the defendant to make statements and furnish information to them. Judge Canaday thereafter ordered that defendant's motion to suppress be denied. Defendant having excepted only to the order denying his motion to suppress we are presented with the question of whether the findings of fact by Judge Canaday support his order denying defendant's motion to suppress. Judge Canaday's findings of fact are as follows: Defendant argues that the foregoing facts found by Judge Canaday require suppression of defendant's inculpatory statements under the principles laid down in State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975). We disagree. In holding the inculpatory statement inadmissible in Pruitt, Justice Branch (now Chief Justice) stated: In the case sub judice there is no threat of any kind and there is no inducement generating hope of relief of any kind. It is true that the officer told defendant, before defendant made the inculpatory statements, that the officer thought defendant was a liar and thought that he was guilty, but this standing alone does not render the confession *825 inadmissible. See State v. Thomas, 241 N.C. 337, 85 S.E.2d 300 (1954); State v. Thompson, 227 N.C. 19, 40 S.E.2d 620 (1946); State v. Thompson, 224 N.C. 661, 32 S.E.2d 24 (1944). Defendant's reliance on Pruitt is misplaced. Nor does the principle of Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979) require that defendant's inculpatory statements be suppressed. In the case sub judice there was no "seizure" of defendant until after he confessed. Defendant voluntarily went to the police station to discuss the investigation with the Philadelphia officers. The defendant was accorded every courtesy and every request. Defendant's first assignment of error is overruled. Defendant argues that the trial court committed error in the admission of evidence that defendant committed sodomy with a dog. This evidence was contained in defendant's inculpatory statement and in quite substantial additional testimony offered by the State. For the reasons stated in State v. Simpson, 297 N.C. 399, 405-08, 255 S.E.2d 147, 152-53 (1979) we agree with defendant and order a new trial on these charges. It is appropriate to point out that the present trial was held in January 1979 and the opinion in the other Simpson case was filed 12 June 1979, therefore the trial judge, the district attorney, and defense counsel could not have been aware of our holding in that case at the time this case was tried. Defendant argues that the trial court committed error in admitting testimony of the rest home assistant supervisor that it was her custom to keep the windows and screens of the rest home closed. Defendant concedes that "[evidence of] a person's habit or custom or practice of doing a certain thing in a certain way is admissible as evidence that he did the same thing in the same way on a particular occasion which is in issue in the case." 1 Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence Brandis Rev. § 95 (1973). However, defendant argues that evidence of habit or custom should not be allowed for the purpose of establishing an essential element of a crime. We see no merit in such a distinction. In this prosecution one of the offenses charged against defendant was the felony of common law burglary. A breaking is an essential element of the common law crime of burglary. State v. Madden, 212 N.C. 56, 58, 192 S.E. 859, 860 (1937). In this case the window screen was found lying nearby the window and the window was found raised with a sawhorse standing beneath the window. A removal of the screen or a raising of the window would constitute a breaking within the meaning of the law. State v. Wells, 290 N.C. 485, 226 S.E.2d 325 (1976). The testimony of the assistant supervisor of the rest home that it was her custom to keep the screens and windows of the rest home closed was clearly relevant upon the question of how entry to the rest home was gained. Also the testimony of the assistant supervisor's custom of keeping the screens and windows closed was competent as evidence that on the occasion in question the assistant supervisor followed her custom on the night in question and that the window and screen were closed. It was for the jury to determine from the evidence whether it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the window and screen, or either one, were closed on the night in question. Upon this question of allowing evidence of habit or custom or practice as evidence to establish an essential element of a crime our Court of Appeals affirmed the allowance of such evidence in State v. Lash, 21 N.C.App. 365, 204 S.E.2d 563, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 593 (1974). In Lash the defendant was indicted on charges of felonious larceny and felonious receiving of stolen goods. The jury found her not guilty of felonious larceny and guilty of felonious receiving. An essential element of the State's case against the defendant for felonious receiving was that the defendant was in possession of stolen goods. In holding evidence of the customary inventory *826 procedures of Belk's and Laurie's stores admissible to show that the goods in the defendant's possession were stolen the Court of Appeals stated: This assignment of error is overruled. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of first degree murder at the close of the State's evidence. The first degree murder conviction was based upon the "felony murder" rule of the homicide having been committed in the perpetration of a felony (in this case burglary). Defendant concedes that it would be proper to submit the issue of first degree murder to the jury if it was proper to submit the issue of first degree burglary. The propriety of submitting the issue of first degree burglary to the jury is the subject of defendant's next assignment of error. We will therefore discuss the assignments jointly under defendant's assignment of error No. 5. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of first degree burglary at the close of the State's evidence. By his appraisal of the evidence defendant argues that the State's evidence failed to show a breaking into the rest home. He argues that the State's evidence is susceptible only to a conclusion that entry was gained through a window which was already open. We disagree with such an appraisal. Defendant points to the State's evidence by way of defendant's inculpatory statement which was offered by the State (see summary of facts preceding this opinion). Therein the defendant told the Philadelphia officers: "I got in the rest home through an opened bathroom window on the side near the back of the home." This statement, defendant argues, is evidence that defendant entered through a window which was already open. We disagree with the defendant's contention that this statement clearly indicates that he entered through a previously opened window. Obviously defendant could not have gained entry through a window (unless it was glassless) unless it was open. However his statement is silent as to whether he did or did not open the window. Even if the window were already open, a removal of the screen would constitute a breaking under the law. State v. Wells, supra. It is unreasonable to believe that even if someone inside the rest home had opened the window that they would also have removed the screen and thrown it out on the ground. Added to defendant's inculpatory statement is the State's evidence in explanation and clarification. The State's evidence showed that the investigating officer found the window open, the screen on the ground outside, and a sawhorse under the window. The State's evidence further showed that it was the custom of the assistant supervisor to keep the windows and screens closed as evidence that the window and screen were closed at the time in question. Defendant argues that this evidence of custom of the assistant supervisor has no probative value because the assistant supervisor was not on duty during the early morning hours of March 29, 1976, the time of the alleged offense, and could not have known whether her custom was followed at that time. Apparently defendant misreads the evidence. Mrs. Lillian Campbell, the assistant supervisor, testified, inter alia, as follows: "I worked there [the rest home] for ten years *827 and was working on the early morning hours of March 29, 1976, which was a Sunday." Although we disagree with defendant's argument it is interesting to note that defendant argues he is entitled to dismissal of the burglary charge (for failure to show a breaking) and entitled to a new trial upon a charge of felonious breaking or entering. A conviction of felonious breaking or entering (which does not require a breaking but only an entering) would nevertheless constitute the felony required to bring the homicide within the felony murder rule. Therefore such a conviction would avail defendant nothing since a felonious entry conviction would support (as did the burglary conviction) a conviction of first degree murder under the felony murder rule. A felonious entry conviction would merge (as did the burglary conviction) with the first degree murder conviction and the life imprisonment sentence would be the same. We hold that the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, justified submission of the first degree burglary charge to the jury, and in turn justified submission of the first degree murder charge to the jury. Assignments of error Nos. 4 and 5 are overruled. Defendant abandons assignment of error No. 6. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the evidence tended to show that defendant gained entry to the rest home by climbing on a sawhorse, opening a window, and removing a screen. From a reading of the evidence and from the discussion of the evidence in this opinion it is clear that the evidence tended to show exactly what the trial judge instructed the jury that it tended to show. This assignment of error is overruled. The defendant argues no assignment of error specifically addressing any alleged error in his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon, but the evidence of defendant having committed sodomy with a dog so prejudicially permeated the entire proceeding that justice requires a new trial on the misdemeanor charge also. Obviously defendant cannot again be placed on trial for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill (a felony) in the light of his acquittal of that charge by the verdict of the jury finding him guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon (a misdemeanor). For the error in the admission of evidence of defendant having committed sodomy with a dog there must be, for each of the three charges, a New trial.