Title: Velocity Express v. Hugen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 022877
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2003

Present:  All the Justices 
 
VELOCITY EXPRESS MID-ATLANTIC, INC. 
 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
                   September 12, 2003 
v.  Record No. 022877 
 
BRIAN F. HUGEN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judge 
 
I. 
 
 
In this appeal, the primary issue that we consider is 
whether the plaintiff's closing argument to the jury deprived 
the defendant of its right to a fair and impartial trial. 
II. 
 
Plaintiff, Brian F. Hugen, was seriously injured in an 
automobile accident on August 28, 2000.  The accident occurred 
around 7:00 a.m. on State Route 32 in the City of Suffolk.  
Route 32 is a two lane highway that extends in northern and 
southern directions.  The speed limit is 55 miles per hour. 
 
Michael T. Ross was driving a car in the northern lane of 
travel.  Plaintiff was driving his car in the same direction 
behind Ross' vehicle.  Ross observed a white van approaching 
from the opposite direction.  Defendant, Velocity Express Mid-
Atlantic, owned the white van which was operated by its 
employee, Alvin J. Winston.  The van "drift[ed] over" into 
Ross' lane of travel.  Trying to avoid a collision, Ross 
steered his car "all the way to the shoulder of the road," and 
defendant's van "sideswipe[d]" Ross' car.  Defendant's van 
then collided with plaintiff's car in plaintiff's lane of 
travel. 
 
After the accident occurred, Winston told defendant's 
safety director: "I don't know what happened.  Besides me, 
there were two other vehicles.  The next thing I remember was 
when we got side to side of each other, I heard a mirror go 
off the van.  Then when I went swerving, when I swerved in the 
wrong lane and hit another car and I tried to hit the brakes 
and tried to get over, somehow the van wouldn't get over.  And 
then the van hit on the other car driving straight down the 
lane, other car going the other way."  Winston told a police 
officer at the scene of the accident that Winston "never saw 
the first vehicle that he collided with." 
 
As a result of the accident, plaintiff sustained 
catastrophic injuries, and he suffered permanent physical and 
mental disabilities.  Plaintiff was in a coma for 62 days 
following the accident.  He suffered a compression fracture of 
the thoracic vertebrae, a broken femur, a fractured hip, 
multiple fractures to his right ankle, collapsed lungs, and 
severe brain injuries.  He experienced multi-system organ 
dysfunction, acute renal failure, multiple incidents of deep 
venous thromboses, and pneumonia.  He has developed a rare 
 
2
condition known as heterotopic ossification, which causes 
abnormal new bone formations and ultimately will cause his 
joints to fuse together, thereby preventing him from moving 
his body.  The severe stiffness in the joints caused by the 
heterotopic ossification has almost completely restricted 
plaintiff's use of his arms, hips, legs, and knees.  
Eventually, plaintiff will have a total ankylosis or "frozen 
jaw" that will prohibit him from opening his mouth, and his 
jaw will become "permanently locked."  Plaintiff will lose all 
his teeth, and he will have to be fed through the insertion of 
a surgically-implanted tube into his stomach. 
 
Plaintiff's brain injuries have impaired his memory, 
attention span, and abilities to concentrate, understand, and 
follow instructions.  He ranks in the bottom five percent of 
the population in terms of his mental functions.  As a result 
of his brain injuries, plaintiff eats excessive quantities of 
food because he is unable to discern when he is full.  
Consequently, plaintiff, who weighed approximately 175 pounds 
before the accident, now weighs 282 pounds.  His weight 
impairs his ability to breathe, adversely affects his heart, 
and increases the risk of further blood clots. 
 
During a jury trial, plaintiff and defendant relied upon 
expert witness testimony to establish life care plans that 
plaintiff will require because of his dire medical condition.  
 
3
Plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that plaintiff will 
need the services of a licensed practical nurse 24 hours each 
day for the remainder of his life.  Robert D. Voogt, one of 
plaintiff's expert witnesses, testified that plaintiff needs 
the assistance of a licensed practical nurse because this type 
of nurse can provide the appropriate nursing care that 
plaintiff currently requires and will require in the future.  
Defendant's expert witness, Robert H. Taylor, testified that a 
certified nursing aide, who has less training and is less 
expensive than a licensed practical nurse, can provide the 24- 
hour daily care that plaintiff needs.  Taylor testified that a 
certified nursing aide would cost approximately $96,360 per 
year, which, when added to the other costs, resulted in a life 
care plan that will cost $4,123,193.50.  Plaintiff presented 
evidence, however, that a licensed practical nurse would cost 
$425,955 per year, which, when added to other costs, resulted 
in a life care plan that cost $17,091,000. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the 
amount of $60,000,000.  The circuit court entered a judgment 
confirming the verdict and defendant appeals. 
III. 
 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing 
to instruct the jury on the defense of sudden emergency.  
Defendant claims that the van operated by its employee, 
 
4
Winston, was forced into plaintiff's lane of travel when Ross' 
car collided with defendant's van.  We disagree with 
defendant. 
 
The sudden emergency doctrine relieves a person of 
liability if, without prior negligence on his part, that 
person is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an 
ordinarily prudent person would act under the circumstances.  
See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. 237, 262, 559 
S.E.2d 592, 605 (2002); Bentley v. Felts, 248 Va. 117, 120, 
445 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1994); Carolina Coach Co. v. Starchia, 
219 Va. 135, 141, 244 S.E.2d 788, 792 (1978); Pickett v. 
Cooper, 202 Va. 60, 63, 116 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1960); Southern 
Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53, 60, 46 
S.E.2d 26, 30 (1948). 
 
Additionally, we have stated: 
 
"Ordinarily the question of application of the 
sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.  
When evidence is conflicting or different inferences 
may be drawn from the evidence, it is for the jury 
to say (1) whether [the operator of the automobile] 
was confronted with an emergency; (2) whether the 
emergency, if one existed, was created by [the 
operator's] own negligence; and (3) whether [the 
operator of the vehicle] conducted himself as an 
ordinarily prudent person might have done under the 
same or similar circumstances." 
 
Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746-47, 146 S.E.2d 200, 203 
(1966); accord Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. at 262, 559 S.E.2d at 
605; Starchia, 219 Va. at 141, 244 S.E.2d at 792. 
 
5
 
In the present case, the circuit court correctly 
concluded that defendant was not entitled to a jury 
instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine.  The accident 
was caused by the negligence of defendant's own employee.  For 
example, Ross, the driver of the car that collided with 
defendant's van before that van collided with plaintiff's car, 
testified as follows: 
 
"Q:  Okay.  Now, in your own words tell the 
members of the jury what happened from the time you 
observed the van. 
 
 
"A:  Well, from the time I observed the van I 
noticed that [Velocity's van] was kind of drifting 
over to my lane.  And I went over to the shoulder to 
try to avoid a collision, and it never worked.  You 
know, he got far enough over where he hit me, and I 
went off the road, lost control. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Q:  How much of the van came into your lane, 
from your observation? 
 
 
"A:  From my observation I would say over 
half." 
 
And, contrary to defendant's assertions, the evidence of 
record clearly demonstrates that the accident occurred in the 
lane of travel occupied by Ross and plaintiff.  Simply stated, 
a sudden emergency did not exist. 
IV. 
A. 
 
6
 
Plaintiff's counsel made the following remarks during his 
closing argument to the jury: 
 
"The physical pain and mental anguish 
[plaintiff] suffered in the past and any that he may 
reasonably be expected to suffer in the future.  We 
men are a proud lot at times probably to our 
detriment on occasion and sometimes our pride gets 
in our way.  It is inconceivable to me that a man 
who cared for himself, who cared for his family, who 
on his wedding day to help his wife took her to 
Williamsburg in lieu of a trip to the islands so 
that she could be near her mother who was seriously 
and mentally ill at that point in time, a man who 
has taken care of himself and his family all of his 
life, a man who is basically now reduced to a role 
reversal.  That is what has happened here, a 
complete, unequivocal role reversal. 
 
 
"He can't perform sexually.  Can't imagine what 
that is like.  He can't basically do anything for 
himself.  If you sit there by yourself with your 
arms still seated in a chair and just don't move -
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT]:  Your Honor, I am 
going to object to that argument as being in 
violation of the golden rule, Your Honor. 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]:  I will rephrase it 
to avoid any problem. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  You can't put the jury in that 
position. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]:  [Velocity Express] 
can't find a doctor.  But they don't want a doctor.  
They want a miracle.  Just like the happening of 
this accident.  No amount of witnesses would satisfy 
Velocity Express.  You could have four bishops on 
the side of the road watching what is going on and 
they still could claim somehow it wasn't their 
fault. 
 
 
7
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, it is all well and good 
that Corporate America balances the books and tries 
to make a profit.  That is the American way, isn't 
it?  But you cannot balance the books on the backs 
of the injured.  You can't take a little man like 
this, injure him horribly, and then try to save 
money by a cheap life care plan. 
 
 
"This guy Taylor they bring down here even - he 
can't fuss with the fact that Brian [Hugen] needs 
somebody 24 hours a day.  Yet, what he wants to do 
is he doesn't want to give him a nurse.  He wants to 
give him an aide.  But he has to concede that the 
aide, which costs about [$]100,000 - the numbers are 
here somewhere - a year, if they gave him the nurse, 
the nurse would cost 394-.  So what have you got?  
$500,000 a year. That would be the two combined.  So 
that would save $400,000 a year that Velocity itself 
says would have to be spent. 
 
 
"Well, let me ask you all something.  Suppose 
money were no object in this case and we didn't have 
Brian Hugen here.  Let's say we have a man - a 
wealthy man, a man of means who could afford 
whatever he wants to.  Suppose this had happened to 
them, Howard Hughes, Bill Gates, somebody like that.  
Suppose they were laying up in the condition Brian 
[Hugen] was.  Do you think they would have one 
little aide?  You don't think they wouldn't have an 
aide, a nurse, and whatever else it took to make 
their life as good as it possibly could? 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT]:  Your Honor, I am 
going to object to this argument, as well.  It is 
improper.  The plaintiff in the case is Brian Hugen.  
It is not Bill Gates.  It is not anyone else.  It is 
improper argument.  There has been no evidence about 
what those individuals would expect, not even a 
reasonable inference.
 
 
"THE COURT:  Overruled.
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]:  So we get the 
discount plan.  We are going to balance the books.  
So who is the economic well spring here?  Who is 
providing Velocity Express with this big savings?  I 
don't see her here in the courtroom.  Her name is 
 
8
Florence Hugen.  So you forgive me if I am a bit 
sarcastic, but Mr. Taylor's plan, I don't call that 
the Taylor plan[,] I call that the Flo plan because 
they are going to have Flo do everything that the 
nurse is supposed to do. 
 
 
"Now, they give an aide in there.  And I don't 
know a lot about aides but let me ask you something.  
Suppose something goes south for Brian?  Who would 
you want in the house?  And I am not talking about 
giving pills.  Because Mr. Train wants you to 
believe that the only thing the nurse would do is 
give pills.  Let me ask you.  Suppose your husband 
were choking to death and he couldn't open his 
mouth?  Do you want an aide trying to get your 
husband's throat clear or would you like to have a 
nurse - 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT]:  Again, Your Honor. 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]:  - while you're at 
work? 
 
 
"THE COURT:  I think it is not appropriate to 
ask the jurors to put themselves in the place of the 
party. 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]:  And I apologize.  If 
you can imagine you're responsible for a person.  
Don't imagine your family members.  That was an 
improper question.  And I perhaps in my enthusiasm 
or whatever you want to call it I misspoke.  I do 
apologize to you.  And Mr. Train's objection is well 
taken.  I apologize, Mr. Train, and Velocity.  But 
if you were responsible for someone, who would you 
want there? 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT]:  Same objection, Your 
Honor.  It is the same - I mean, you can't appeal to 
the jury.  You can't place the jury - 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]:  The idea of 
responsibility, Your Honor. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  I hate to interrupt the party when 
they are making their closing argument. 
 
 
9
 
"[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT]:  I do, too. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  The jurors shouldn't be asked to 
be put in the place of the parties. 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]:  You know, [Dr.] 
Kreutzer's plan that he did for Brian, that is no 
Cadillac plan.  I mean, you are not talking about a 
registered nurse.  You are just talking about a 
licensed practical nurse.  He doesn't have any money 
folded in for contingencies.  I mean, there is not a 
nickel in there for any of that.  I mean, it is not 
-- it is not some fluffed-up plan like the defense 
would have you believe.  It is just basically what 
is needed. 
 
 
"If, for example, if - suppose an individual 
were charged with the care of someone's, let's say, 
child or something like, this an eight-year-old 
child.  And you had to pick an attendant for that 
child at the home while you were away.  If the 
attendant was not qualified - and I am - I am 
talking about a child who can go to the kitchen to 
make a sandwich, go [to] the bathroom, run out of 
the house if there is a fire, things Brian can't do.  
If something happened to that child and you were 
responsible for selecting the attendant, social 
services would be coming all out the woodwork on top 
of you.  And that is a big - 
 
 
"[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT]:  Your Honor, I 
object.  I try not to interrupt, as well.  But he 
keeps arguing if you are talking to the jury. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  I think in that case it was not 
[in]appropriate.  I will overrule it." 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's argument to the 
jury, counsel for the defendant made a motion for a mistrial 
based upon plaintiff's cumulative improper and prejudicial 
arguments to the jury.  The court denied the motion. 
 
10
B. 
 
Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying 
the motion for a mistrial.  Defendant contends that the 
circuit court erroneously overruled defendant's objections to 
plaintiff's references in closing argument to Howard Hughes 
and Bill Gates.  Defendant also contends that plaintiff 
improperly and repeatedly requested that the jury place itself 
in plaintiff's position, thus wrongly invoking the "Golden 
Rule" despite the court's repeated instructions to counsel not 
to do so. 
 
Responding, plaintiff asserts that the circuit court 
correctly denied defendant's motion for a mistrial.  Plaintiff 
alleges that his references to Howard Hughes and Bill Gates 
were permissible to illustrate that "defendant's life care 
plan focused on cutting costs and not the plaintiff's medical 
needs."  Plaintiff claims that his closing argument regarding 
the need for a licensed practical nurse did not improperly 
invoke the "Golden Rule."  We disagree with plaintiff. 
 
The principles we apply when considering whether a 
circuit court erred in denying a mistrial based on statements 
made by counsel in closing argument are well established.  
Generally, a new trial is not required if the circuit court 
sustains an objection to improper argument and instructs the 
jury to disregard the improper argument.  However, if "counsel 
 
11
persists in such argument after the admonition of the court, 
or if it appears that the [prejudicial] influence of the 
argument was probably not wholly removed by the court's 
action" a new trial may be appropriate.  Maxey v. Hubble, 238 
Va. 607, 614-15, 385 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1989) (quoting Rinehart 
& Dennis Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 670, 676, 120 S.E. 269, 271 
(1923)); Kitze v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 283, 288, 435 S.E.2d 
583, 585 (1993); Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Harris, 190 
Va. 966, 975, 59 S.E.2d 110, 114 (1950).  If the objection to 
the alleged improper argument is not sustained by the circuit 
court, a new trial is appropriate if that court erred in 
overruling the objection and that error resulted in prejudice 
to the complaining party.  Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 
775, 232 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1977); McLane v. Commonwealth, 202 
Va. 197, 205, 116 S.E.2d 274, 280-81 (1960).  The closing 
argument in this case includes argument to which objections 
were sustained and argument to which an objection was 
overruled. 
 
We will first consider whether the circuit court erred in 
overruling defendant's objection to plaintiff's closing 
argument that, in effect, suggested to the jury that it award 
plaintiff damages that would permit him to procure the 
services of a licensed practical nurse because wealthy persons 
such as Howard Hughes or Bill Gates would procure the services 
 
12
of a licensed practical nurse if they had incurred plaintiff's 
injuries. 
 
In Atlantic Coast Realty Co. v. Robertson's Ex'r, 135 Va. 
247, 263, 116 S.E. 476, 481 (1923), we discussed the wide 
latitude accorded lawyers during closing argument: 
"[An attorney] must be just to opposing litigants 
and witnesses and always respect their rights.  His 
liberties in argument are large but they are not 
unlimited.  He has no right to testify in argument 
nor to assume that there is evidence which has no 
existence, nor to urge a decision which is favorable 
to his client by arousing sympathy, exciting 
prejudice, or upon any ground which is illegal.  
Sometimes the impropriety is so serious in character 
that its evil effect cannot be corrected by the 
trial judge.  If this ethical rule . . . is not 
sufficient to control those who fail to observe it, 
the courts, however reluctant they may be to limit 
the freedom of discussion, or to penalize a litigant 
for the transgression of his attorney, will be 
forced to curb this growing evil." 
 
 
We stated, almost 100 years ago, that counsel in closing 
argument must not appeal to the economic fears and passions of 
a jury and that such argument constitutes reversible error.  
Southern Ry. Co. v. Simmons, 105 Va. 651, 666-67, 55 S.E. 459, 
464 (1906).  In Simmons, counsel for the defendant, in closing 
argument, 
"expressed the fear that the railroad employees who 
had testified against the company would lose their 
places, although there was no evidence on this 
point; that counsel for the railroad company rode in 
private and palace cars when they came to court, 
although there was no evidence on this point; that 
the mind could not grasp the extent of the resources 
and possessions of the Southern Railway Company, 
 
13
while [the plaintiff] was a poor man with nobody but 
his wife and child, and with no one to help him but 
his wife; that the treasury of the railway company 
was so exhaustless that it would hardly feel the 
loss of $50,000, the amount claimed in the 
declaration; and that in estimating damages [the 
jury] should take into consideration the fact that 
exceptions had been taken by the defendant, and that 
it had been stated that if the verdict was against 
it, it would appeal." 
 
Id. at 665-66, 55 S.E. at 464.  We concluded that "[s]uch a 
line of argument, if proper objection be made to it at the 
proper time and the trial court fails to take proper steps to 
correct its ill tendencies, will constitute a sufficient 
ground for reversing a judgment rendered upon a verdict thus 
obtained."  Id. at 666-67, 55 S.E. at 464. 
 
In Baumgardner, counsel for the defendant objected to the 
plaintiff's improper jury argument that asked a jury to award 
a verdict that included as damages $1,000 for each of the 
plaintiff's 28.7 years of life expectancy as established by an 
annuity table.  The circuit court overruled the objection.  
Reversing the judgment of the circuit court, we held: 
 
"The decision of the trial court as to the 
method by which to remove the prejudicial effect of 
improper argument is within its sound discretion, 
and an admonition to the jury to disregard such 
argument is generally deemed to have been sufficient 
and not to have been an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. . . .  However, if the trial court 
refuses to take any corrective action to eliminate 
the adverse effect on the jury of improper argument, 
the probability of prejudice is increased by the 
apparent approval given by the court to the 
argument." 
 
14
 
217 Va. at 774, 232 S.E.2d at 781. 
 
Applying our well-established precedent, we hold that the 
circuit court erred in failing to grant the defendant's motion 
for a mistrial.  As we have already stated, plaintiff's 
counsel made the following argument to the jury: 
"Suppose money were no object in this case and we 
didn't have Brian Hugen here.  Let's say we have a 
man - a wealthy man, a man of means who could afford 
whatever he wants to.  Suppose this had happened to 
them, Howard Hughes, Bill Gates, somebody like that.  
Suppose they were laying up in the condition Brian 
was.  Do you think they would have one little aide?  
You don't think they wouldn't have an aide, a nurse, 
and whatever else it took to make their life as good 
as it possibly could?" 
 
 
Defendant timely objected to this argument, and the 
circuit court overruled the objection.  This argument was 
improper because plaintiff's counsel asked the jury to award 
damages based upon irrelevant economic considerations that are 
not part of the record in this case.  The above-referenced 
portion of plaintiff's closing argument asked the jury to 
award damages to the plaintiff so that he could afford the 
same quality of medical care and treatment that the world's 
richest individuals might purchase for themselves.  The law of 
this Commonwealth, however, only requires that a jury award 
plaintiff compensatory damages that will fairly compensate him 
for his injuries proximately caused by defendant's negligence. 
 
15
 
The probable prejudicial impact of this argument is 
significant because the improper argument focused on the 
central dispute regarding damages in this case.  As we have 
already stated, the defendant presented evidence that the 
plaintiff only required the services of a certified nursing 
aide who would cost approximately $96,360 per year, which, 
when added to other related costs, resulted in a life care 
plan that totaled $4,123,193.50.  In direct conflict, however, 
plaintiff presented evidence that he required the services of 
a licensed practical nurse who would cost $425,955 per year, 
which, when added to the rest of his medical plan, represented 
a total cost of $17,091,000.  Plaintiff's improper jury 
argument was designed to influence the jury's decision 
regarding this choice.  The circuit court refused to take any 
corrective action to eliminate the adverse prejudicial effect 
on the jury of plaintiff's improper argument.  Based upon the 
record before this Court, we conclude that the probability of 
prejudice upon the jury was great and such prejudice was 
increased by the apparent approval given by the circuit court 
because of that court's refusal to take corrective action. 
 
We also consider whether the circuit court erred by 
refusing to grant defendant's motion for a mistrial because 
plaintiff improperly and repeatedly requested that the jury 
place itself in plaintiff's position, thus, invoking the 
 
16
"Golden Rule" despite the court's repeated instructions to 
plaintiff's counsel that he not do so. 
 
We have repeatedly held that counsel may not, in closing 
argument, invoke the so-called "Golden Rule."  "The function 
of the jury is to decide according to the evidence, not 
according to how its members might wish to be treated."  
Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 715, 75 S.E.2d 77, 81 
(1953); accord P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 752, 104 
S.E. 384, 390 (1920).  See also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Keatley, 211 Va. 507, 511, 178 S.E.2d 516, 519 (1971); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Futrell, 209 Va. 266, 272-73, 163 
S.E.2d 181, 186 (1968); Phillips v. Fulghum, 203 Va. 543, 547-
49, 125 S.E.2d 835, 838-40 (1962); Cape Charles Flying Serv., 
Inc. v. Nottingham, 187 Va. 444, 455-56, 47 S.E.2d 540, 545-46 
(1948); Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 486-87, 124 S.E. 
242, 247 (1924). 
 
In Rinehart & Dennis Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 670, 676, 120 
S.E. 269, 271 (1923) (citing Washington & Old Dominion Ry. v. 
Ward, 119 Va. 334, 339, 89 S.E. 140, 142 (1916)), we stated: 
 
"Generally a new trial will be denied [when] 
improper argument has been checked by the court and 
the jury has been instructed to disregard the 
improper statements.  If, however, counsel persists 
in such argument after the admonition of the court, 
or if it appears that the unfavorable influence of 
the argument was probably not wholly removed by the 
court's action, a new trial may be allowed." 
 
 
17
 
In Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Jayne, 151 Va. 694, 144 
S.E. 638 (1928), we reversed a judgment in favor of a 
plaintiff because his counsel continued to make improper 
argument in spite of the circuit court's admonitions.  Counsel 
in Jayne stated to the jury:  "How long will the defendant 
company shed its tears after this trial is over?  Do you 
suppose its tear duct has been hurt any?"  The circuit court 
directed the jury to disregard these remarks and, 
subsequently, counsel stated to the jury:  "That is just a 
figure of speech.  You know corporations haven't any tear 
ducts."  The circuit court instructed the jury to disregard 
this remark as well.  Id. at 703, 144 S.E. at 641. 
 
We concluded that these remarks were improper and 
prejudicial, and we reversed the judgment that confirmed the 
jury's verdict.  We stated: 
 
"Litigants can have no just grounds for 
complaint if verdicts obtained under such 
circumstances are set aside.  To require counsel to 
confine their discussions before the jury to the law 
and the evidence is no hardship, but is in 
furtherance of justice, and of the prompt 
disposition of controversies based upon the law and 
the evidence, subjected of course to any fair 
analysis or criticism, which the ingenuity of 
counsel may devise."  
 
Id. at 704, 144 S.E. at 641. 
 
Applying the aforementioned principles, we must conclude 
that plaintiff's repeated requests to the jury that it apply 
 
18
the "Golden Rule" were prejudicial and constitute reversible 
error.  As we have previously stated, plaintiff argued to the 
jury:  "Suppose your husband were choking to death and he 
couldn't open his mouth?  Do you want an aide trying to get 
your husband's throat clear or would you like to have a nurse 
. . . while you're at work?"  The defendant objected, and the 
circuit court stated:  "I think it is not appropriate to ask 
the jurors to put themselves in the place of the party."  
Plaintiff apologized, but immediately he argued to the jury:  
"But if you were responsible for someone, who would you want 
there?"  The defendant objected, and the circuit court again 
responded:  "The jurors shouldn't be asked to be put in the 
place of the parties." 
 
Even though the circuit court properly sustained most of 
the objections, plaintiff's counsel continued to invoke the 
"Golden Rule" during closing argument.  This argument was 
highly prejudicial because plaintiff repeatedly asked the 
jury, despite the circuit court's admonitions, to assess his 
damages in relation to how the jurors would want to be 
compensated personally had they been injured and sustained the 
same injuries that plaintiff had sustained.  And, even though 
plaintiff's counsel acknowledged to the circuit court that his 
use of the "Golden Rule" was improper, he continued to engage 
in this prejudicial argument.  Moreover, plaintiff's repeated 
 
19
use of the "Golden Rule" was also highly prejudicial because 
this argument was designed to influence the jury's decision 
whether to base its verdict upon plaintiff's proposed life 
care plan that cost $17,091,000 instead of defendant's life 
care plan for plaintiff that cost $4,123,193.50. 
C. 
 
Generally, when a litigant makes a prejudicial closing 
argument to a jury in a non-bifurcated trial, the appropriate 
remedy is to award a new trial on all issues.  In this case, 
however, the evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding of 
liability.  Thus, we hold that the prejudice caused by the 
improper jury argument, which involved the conflicting 
evidence about plaintiff's future medical care, could not have 
affected the jury's findings of negligence.  Therefore, a new 
trial on all issues is not appropriate.  Because this case 
will be remanded for a new trial on damages, we must consider 
certain issues that probably will arise upon remand. 
V. 
 
Defendant argues that the circuit court erred by refusing 
to permit defendant to introduce evidence of plaintiff's 
history of crack cocaine use, depression, and short-term 
memory loss one year before the accident.  Continuing, 
defendant contends that the circuit court erred by refusing to 
permit defendant to cross-examine plaintiff's expert witnesses 
 
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regarding plaintiff's "pre-accident use of crack cocaine and 
its effect on his post-accident condition" and plaintiff's 
"pre-accident bouts of depression and [their] relationship to 
his post-accident claims for depression." 
 
During the trial, plaintiff sought damages for cognitive 
and emotional injuries he sustained as a result of the 
accident, including memory loss and depression.  Dr. William 
M. Bethea described plaintiff's emotional instability and 
depressive condition.  Dr. Bethea also testified that 
plaintiff suffered from short-term memory loss.  Dr. Jeffrey 
S. Kreutzer, a neuropsychologist, described plaintiff's range 
of post-accident cognitive defects, including his loss of 
memory and ability to concentrate. 
 
Dr. Bethea testified, outside the presence of the jury, 
as follows: 
 
"Q:  Doctor, can . . . the habitual use of 
crack cocaine cause memory loss? 
 
 
"A:  [Counselor,] I would like to make it very 
clear that when I answer this question, I think it 
has absolutely nothing to do with this situation 
based upon the circumstances in which I have cared 
for him over the last year - Mr. Hugen over the past 
year.  The answer would be yes. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Q:  Dr. Bethea, if I insinuated that it was my 
position that [plaintiff] had been using drugs since 
the accident, I apologize.  That is certainly not 
what I am trying to say or insinuate in any way, 
shape, or form. 
 
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"A:  I just want to make it very clear that all 
of those things that I have testified to in terms of 
my assessment of the [plaintiff's] present set of 
circumstances would have absolutely nothing to do 
with prior . . . drug use. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Q:  And [plaintiff] has short-term memory 
loss, correct? 
 
 
"A:  Brian Hugen was deficient in a brain-
injury pattern not a drug-injury pattern." 
 
 
This Court has consistently stated that "cross-
examination on a matter relevant to the litigation and put in 
issue by an adversary's witness during a [trial] is not a 
privilege but an absolute right."  Basham v. Terry, 199 Va. 
817, 824, 102 S.E.2d 285, 290 (1958); accord Food Lion, Inc. 
v. Cox, 257 Va. 449, 450, 513 S.E.2d 860, 861 (1999); Miller 
v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 890, 895-96, 149 S.E. 459, 460 
(1929). 
 
However, evidence sought to be elicited during cross-
examination must be relevant.  "Evidence is relevant if it 
tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters in 
issue."  Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 257, 546 S.E.2d 
728, 730 (2001); Boggs v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 478, 486, 100 
S.E.2d 766, 772 (1957).  We have stated that "[e]very fact, 
however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the 
probability or improbability of a fact in issue is relevant."  
 
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Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee, 258 Va. 235, 260, 520 
S.E.2d 164, 179 (1999); Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 
244 Va. 51, 56, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992). 
 
Based upon the record before this Court, we conclude that 
the circuit court properly refused defendant's attempt to 
cross-examine plaintiff's expert witness on plaintiff's prior 
drug use because that evidence was not relevant.  There is no 
evidence that plaintiff's brain injury or depression was 
caused by or related to drug use.  Therefore, evidence of the 
plaintiff's prior use of cocaine or his depression could not 
"prove or disprove" matters in issue.  For example, Dr. 
Bethea's testimony, proffered by defendant, established that 
plaintiff's injuries were not caused by drug use.  Moreover, 
Dr. Kreutzer testified, outside the presence of the jury, that 
"[t]here's no indication in [plaintiff's medical] record that 
this man suffered medically, neurologically, as a consequence 
of drug or alcohol use." 
 
Even though Dr. Bethea agreed, outside the presence of 
the jury, that crack cocaine could cause short-term memory 
loss, Dr. Bethea testified without equivocation that 
plaintiff's condition was not related in any way to drug use.  
Dr. Bethea also testified, outside the presence of the jury, 
that plaintiff's condition was so devastating that any 
emotional instability that occurred in past years would have 
 
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had no effect on his current condition.  Additionally, we note 
that the circuit court permitted defendant to cross-examine 
Dr. Bethea and elicit testimony of complaints that plaintiff 
made about depression one year before the accident.  Simply 
stated, defendant does not have an absolute right to cross-
examine a witness about evidence that is not relevant. 
VI. 
 
Defendant argues that the circuit court improperly 
limited its cross-examination of Dr. Kreutzer regarding 
plaintiff's pre-injury depression.  Defendant contends that 
Dr. Kreutzer's records show that plaintiff had told him of "a 
two-year history of untreated depressive episodes."  Defendant 
states that Dr. Kreutzer testified that plaintiff "had been 
treated successfully for depression and that his depression 
had resolved several years before this accident."  However, 
defendant says that medical records indicate that plaintiff 
experienced symptoms of depression as recently as one year 
before the accident and that Dr. Kreutzer's testimony was 
apparently false. 
 
We hold that the circuit court did not err in limiting 
the scope of the cross-examination.  As plaintiff correctly 
points out, plaintiff objected to defendant's cross-
examination of Dr. Kreutzer on the basis that it was beyond 
the scope of direct examination.  Plaintiff stated, in his 
 
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objection, that "[t]here was not a single question and/or 
answer elicited from this witness with regard to any diagnosis 
of depression."  Dr. Kreutzer did not testify on direct 
examination about a diagnosis or subjective complaint of 
depression made by the plaintiff either before or after the 
accident and, therefore, the circuit court properly sustained 
the objection. 
VII. 
 
In view of our holdings, we do not consider defendant's 
remaining assignments of error.  We will remand this case for 
a new trial solely on the issue of damages. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
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