Title: SCOTT M CAIN V WASTE MANAGEMENT INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116389
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2002

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 23, 2002  
SCOTT M. CAIN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 116389  
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. and 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
SCOTT M. CAIN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116945  
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. and 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Defendants-Appellees, 
and  
SECOND INJURY FUND (TOTAL AND 
PERMANENT DISABILITY PROVISION).  
Defendant-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee.  
 
________________________________ 
v 
SCOTT M. CAIN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 116953  
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. and 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Defendants-Appellants, 
and  
SECOND INJURY FUND (TOTAL AND 
PERMANENT DISABILITY PROVISION).  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
The issue in this case concerns the proper standard for  
determining 
whether 
an injured employee is entitled to collect  
worker’s compensation benefits for total and permanent  
disability pursuant to MCL 418.361(3)(g).1  Specifically, the  
question is whether such a person’s injured limb or member  
should 
be 
evaluated 
in its “corrected” or “uncorrected” state.  
The Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) held  
1 We also are satisfied that the WCAC should have  
considered plaintiff’s specific loss claim regarding his left 
leg.
 While this claim may not have been pleaded as 
specifically as it should have been, we discern no prejudice 
or surprise.  Accordingly, we remand this claim to the WCAC 
for resolution.  As for the remaining issues in this case, we 
are no longer persuaded that they should be reviewed by this 
Court.  Therefore, we vacate our order granting leave to 
appeal regarding all other issues and deny leave to appeal 
regarding those issues.  
2  
 
that a “corrected standard” should be applied, whereas the  
Court of Appeals held that an “uncorrected standard” was  
applicable.  
In keeping with prior decisions of this Court, and for  
the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals and hold that § 361(3)(g) envisions  
that a “corrected” standard be applied.  
I  
We begin by noting that this case involves a fairly  
uncommon kind of claim for worker’s compensation benefits.  
The worker’s compensation act provides, if certain conditions  
are met, for payments to workers who are injured or become  
disabled on the job.  MCL 418.101 et seq. 
The most common  
situation is controlled by the general disability provision.  
MCL 418.301(1) provides that an employee, who receives a  
personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment  
for an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the  
injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act.  
If such a showing is made, one must then determine if the  
disability is total or partial. Payment formulas are set by  
statute.  
In addition to these more common claims for disability  
benefits, the act provides compensation for the loss of  
certain body parts. 
These are known as “scheduled”  
3  
disabilities.  MCL 418.361(2). For example, if a worker loses  
his foot at work he is given payments for 162 weeks.  Loss of  
an arm results in payments for 269 weeks.  These are known as  
“specific loss” benefits.  
If a worker suffers from certain enumerated injuries,  
such as loss of both hands or both feet, he may be entitled to  
benefits for total and permanent disability, as defined by MCL  
418.361(3). As explained more fully hereinafter, such total  
and permanent disability benefits are a type of scheduled  
benefit, but they are distinct from the scheduled specific  
loss benefits.  Total and permanent disability benefits are  
intended for those who sustain the more catastrophic loss of  
more than one member.  
“Loss of industrial use” is a special category of total  
and permanent disability benefits found in MCL 418.361(3)(g).  
This category allows recovery for total and permanent  
disability where there is no anatomical loss, but where there  
is a loss of industrial use. Hence, for example, even if an  
employee does not suffer actual amputation of one or both legs  
so as to qualify for specific loss benefits, he may  
nevertheless be entitled to scheduled benefits for injury to  
both legs if he has lost the “industrial use” of his legs.  In  
this way the “loss of industrial use” category of total and  
permanent benefits differs from other total and permanent  
4  
 
categories.2  
The case at bar involves this distinctive “loss of  
industrial use” kind of total and permanent disability claim.  
II  
Plaintiff Scott M. Cain worked as a truck driver and  
trash collector for defendant, Waste Management, Inc.  In  
October 1988, as he was standing behind his vehicle emptying  
a rubbish container, he was struck by an automobile that  
crashed into the back of the truck.  Mr. Cain’s legs were  
crushed.  Physicians amputated Mr. Cain’s right leg above the  
knee.
 His left leg was saved with extensive surgery and  
bracing.  
In February 1990, Mr. Cain was fitted with a right leg  
prosthesis, and he was able to begin walking.  He returned to  
his employment at Waste Management and started performing  
clerical duties.  
Mr. Cain’s left leg continued to deteriorate.  In October  
1990, he suffered a distal tibia fracture.  Doctors diagnosed  
it as a stress fracture caused by preexisting weakness from  
the injury sustained in the accident.  After extensive  
physical therapy and further surgery on his left knee, Mr.  
2 Total and permanent benefits are payable without regard 
to loss of wage earning capacity except for the distinctive 
industrial 
use 
loss 
category.  Redfern v Sparks-Withington Co, 
403 Mich 63, 80; 268 NW2d 28 (1978).  
5  
 
 
Cain was able to return to Waste Management in August 1991,  
first working as a dispatcher and then in the sales  
department.  
Waste Management voluntarily paid Mr. Cain 215 weeks of  
worker’s compensation benefits for the specific loss of his  
right leg. 
MCL 418.361(2)(k). 
However, there was  
disagreement concerning whether he was entitled to additional  
benefits.  
III  
In August 1992, Cain filed a petition with the Bureau of  
Worker’s Compensation, seeking total and permanent disability  
benefits, which stated:  
My legs were crushed in a motor vehicle 
accident resulting in an amputation above the knee 
of my right leg.  The severity of my injuries to my 
left leg result [sic] in the industrial loss of use 
of both legs.  I am, therefore, entitled to 
permanent and total disability benefits.  
At the end of the second day of the hearing, Mr. Cain  
moved to amend his petition to include a claim for the  
specific loss of his left leg.  The magistrate denied the  
motion.  Less than a week later, Mr. Cain filed a petition  
requesting benefits for the specific loss of the left leg:  
In addition to my initial application, I am 
claiming specific loss of my left lower extremity 
for dates of injury of 10/25/88 and 10/21/90.  On  
10/21/90, while walking down a ramp at home, I 
refractured my left tibia causing it to become 
necessary for me to wear a permanent brace on my 
left leg.  
6  
In December 1993, the magistrate awarded specific loss  
benefits (to be paid consecutively) for the loss of both legs.  
Although he had denied the motion to add a claim for the  
specific loss of the left leg, the magistrate nonetheless  
awarded the benefits, reasoning that Mr. Cain’s assertion of  
the loss of the industrial use of both legs implicitly  
included a claim for the specific loss of the left leg.  
The magistrate found that the left leg had been  
effectively lost in October 1990, when the stress fracture  
occurred and “any hope of restoring the member was abandoned.”  
The condition of the Plaintiff’s left leg 
subsequent to 10/21/90 appears to be tantamount to 
amputation. He cannot support himself without the 
brace which was fashioned for him.  The Plaintiff  
is in effect wearing a prosthetic device on the 
left leg.  
Thus, he ruled that the Second Injury Fund would be obligated  
to pay benefits for total and permanent disability because  
Mr. Cain had lost the industrial use of both legs.3  
Waste Management and its insurer appealed to the WCAC,  
which reversed the judgment of the magistrate in April 1997.  
3 Total and permanent disability, compensation for which 
is provided in MCL 418.351, means:  
(g) Permanent and total loss of industrial use 
of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg 
and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subdivision such 
permanency shall be determined not less than 30 
days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the 
date of injury. [MCL 418.361(3)]  
7  
The WCAC ruled that, in light of the phrasing of Mr. Cain’s  
initial petition to the bureau, the magistrate had erred in  
awarding benefits for the specific loss of the left leg. The  
WCAC also held that the magistrate had committed legal error  
in his analysis of the total and permanent disability claim,  
since he had failed to use a “corrected” standard to examine  
the remaining usefulness of Mr. Cain’s braced leg. Applying  
such a standard, the WCAC concluded that Mr. Cain is not  
totally and permanently disabled.  
In May 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part,  
reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further  
proceedings.4  The Court of Appeals affirmed the WCAC’s denial  
of specific loss benefits, agreeing that Mr. Cain’s petition  
did not state a claim for such benefits. However, the Court  
of Appeals reversed and vacated with regard to the finding of  
total and permanent disability, stating:  
We reverse that portion of the WCAC’s decision 
which holds that a claim for [total and permanent] 
disability benefits must be analyzed under the 
corrected test.  While use of the corrected test is  
mandated in vision cases, [Hakala v Burroughs Corp  
(After Remand), 417 Mich 359; 338 NW2d 165 (1983)], 
and has been expanded to cases involving implants,  
4 When Mr. Cain first applied for leave to appeal, his 
application was denied by the Court of Appeals. Unpublished 
order, entered August 7, 1997 (Docket No. 203539). However, 
this Court remanded the case for consideration as on leave  
granted.  459 Mich 863 (1998).  The Court of Appeals decision 
was by unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 2, 2000 
(Docket No. 214445).  
8  
 
 
[O’Connor v Binney Auto Parts, 203 Mich App 522; 
513 NW2d 818 (1994)], its use has not been extended 
to cases involving prosthetics or braces.  In the  
instant case, plaintiff wears a prosthetic right 
leg and a brace on his left leg. The brace is not  
permanently attached to plaintiff’s leg. 
In  
holding that use of the corrected test was required 
in this case, the WCAC read Hakala, supra, and 
O’Connor, supra, too broadly.  
The issue whether a claimant has suffered loss  
of industrial use is one of fact.  Pipe v Leese  
Tool & Die Co, 410 Mich 510, 527; 302 NW2d 526 
(1981).
 We hold that the WCAC exceeded its  
authority by applying the corrected test to make 
initial 
findings 
of 
fact 
regarding 
whether  
plaintiff had suffered the loss of industrial use 
of his legs. Such initial findings are within the 
exclusive province of the magistrate.  [Layman v  
Newkirk Electric Associates, Inc, 458 Mich 494; 581  
NW2d 244 (1998)].[5]  We vacate that portion of the  
WCAC’s decision denying plaintiff’s claim for  
[total and permanent] disability benefits and  
remand with instructions that the WCAC apply the 
uncorrected 
test 
to 
plaintiff’s 
claim. 
If  
necessary, the WCAC may further remand the case to 
the magistrate for additional findings of fact. 
Id.; MCL 418.861a(12); MSA 17.237(861a)(12).  
Applications for leave to appeal were filed by Waste  
Management, Inc., and the Second Injury Fund.  Mr. Cain  
responded with an application for leave to appeal as cross­
appellant.  We granted all three applications and invited  
amicus curiae participation.6  
5 We overruled Layman to the extent that it clearly 
misstated the law with regard to the WCAC's authority to make 
independent factual findings in Mudel v Great Atlantic &  
Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 697; 614 NW2d 607 (2000). Our  
opinion in Mudel was issued approximately two months after the 
Court of Appeals issued its opinion.  
6 463 Mich 995-996 (2001).  
9  
 
IV  
We address only one issue: whether the “corrected”  
standard of Hakala, applied to a vision claim pursuant to MCL  
418.361, should be applied to a permanent and total loss of  
industrial 
use 
of 
both 
legs 
claim 
pursuant 
to 
MCL  
418.361(3)(g).  
In Hakala, a worker with a preexisting vision disability7  
suffered the loss of a hand.  This second loss gave rise to  
the issue whether he was totally and permanently disabled  
under the predecessor of MCL 418.521(1). The parties turned  
to the predecessor of MCL 418.361(2)(l) for the rule that  
eighty percent loss of vision in an eye constitutes total loss  
of that eye.  As it happened, Mr. Hakala’s uncorrected vision  
loss was greater than eighty percent, but his corrected vision  
did not constitute an eighty-percent loss.8  
The question whether to gauge Mr. Hakala’s vision in its  
corrected or uncorrected state had led to a division in the  
Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board panel that decided the  
7 The vision disability was not work-related.  417 Mich  
361.  See also 399 Mich 162, 176, n 1; 249 NW2d 20 (1976), and 
393 Mich 153, 157, n 1; 224 NW2d 27 (1974).  
8 The “correction” at issue in Hakala was evidently the 
product of ordinary corrective-lens glasses.  See Hakala v  
Burroughs Corp, 393 Mich 153, 160; 224 NW2d 27 (1974) (opinion 
of SWAINSON, J.), on rehearing 399 Mich 162; 249 NW2d 20 
(1976).  
10  
 
 
case.  In our Hakala opinion,9 we resolved the matter in this  
fashion:  
In Nulf [v Browne-Morse Co, 402 Mich 309; 262 
NW2d 664 (1978)], we refused to extend the  
“uncorrected” vision test to total and permanent 
claims, although we had adopted such a test for 
specific 
loss 
claims 
in 
Lindsay 
v 
Glennie  
Industries, Inc, 379 Mich 573; 153 NW2d 642 (1967).  
We observed:  
“In Hakala v Burroughs Corp (On Rehearing) 
[399 Mich 162; 249 NW2d 20 (1976)], this Court 
recognized that the question of Second Injury Fund 
benefits in situations involving the loss of an eye 
could not be adequately resolved by the universal 
adoption of either the “uncorrected vision” test or 
the “corrected vision” test.  The Court held that  
the question of entitlement to Second Injury Fund 
benefits must be determined by reference to the 
statutory language creating those benefits found in 
MCL 418.521; MSA 17.237(521), which requires a 
determination of whether the employee has suffered 
a “permanent disability in the form of the loss of 
a[n] . . . eye.”  The determination of whether a  
loss is a permanent disability within the meaning 
of that section must be evaluated in terms of the  
underlying legislative purpose of aiding the  
handicapped 
in 
obtaining 
and 
maintaining 
employment.” [Nulf] 402 Mich 312-313.  
We are persuaded that the Legislature intended 
compensation for a specific loss without regard to 
whether the vision could be "corrected" or restored  
after the injury. Lindsay, supra.  
We are now persuaded that the Legislature 
intended that a different standard be used in  
determining total and permanent disability inasmuch 
as it provided that only "total and permanent loss 
of sight" would constitute the qualifying eye loss 
for such benefits. We are satisfied that to carry  
9 As indicated in footnote 7, this actually was our third 
opinion in Hakala.  
11  
   
   
 
 
out the legislative intent a "corrected" vision 
standard should hereafter be used in assaying 
claims for total and permanent disability involving 
the loss of sight.  
We conclude that in this connection that is  
the sense in which the term "permanently disabled" 
is used for the purposes of the Second Injury Fund. 
[417 Mich 363-364.]  
We have not had occasion subsequently to elaborate upon  
or clarify the rule of Hakala.  As noted in its opinion in the  
present case, the Court of Appeals has extended the principle  
only so far as cases involving “implants,” such as the knee  
replacement surgery discussed in 
O’Connor.10  203 Mich App 522.  
10 In O’Connor, supra at 534, the Court of Appeals 
approved a distinction offered by an earlier panel in Tew v  
Hillsdale Tool & Mfg Co, 142 Mich App 29, 35-37; 369 NW2d 254 
(1985), where an employee was forced to wear a special 
orthopedic boot following an injury that resulted in  
amputation of a great toe:  
If by some medical procedure an object or 
device is attached to or implanted in the injured 
member, it has become part of the body. . . .  In  
contrast, plaintiff's boot is not part of the foot 
on which he wears it. Medical science has done to  
better the condition of the foot itself. An arm or  
leg which contains a surgically inserted pin is, 
nevertheless, an arm usable in industry without an 
external aid.  
* 
* 
*  
[A] similar distinction can and should be made 
between artificial devices or objects which are 
made part of the body, and external aids which 
merely enable a person to accomplish what the limb 
or member cannot do on its own.  
12  
 
 
V  
The 
question 
whether 
MCL 
418.361(3)(g) 
requires  
application of a “corrected” or “uncorrected” standard in the  
present case is a legal question, which we review de novo.  
Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 697, n  
3; 614 NW2d 607 (2000).  
Ultimately, 
entitlement 
to 
worker’s 
compensation 
benefits  
must be determined by reference to the statutory language  
creating those benefits. Nulf at 312.  
As previously indicated, total and permanent disability,  
compensation for which is provided in MCL 418.351, means:  
(g) Permanent and total loss of industrial use 
of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg 
and 1 arm . . . . [MCL 418.361(3).]  
We conclude that the words “permanent” and “total”  
indicate the Legislature intended a “corrected” test.
 We  
agree with the O’Connor Court, supra at 533, that  
[t]he concept of permanence is necessarily one of 
status, 
involving 
an 
assessment 
of 
medical  
deterioration, stabilization, or improvement, and 
consideration of medical treatment options.[11]  
Moreover, as indicated in Hakala and Nulf, the ordinary  
meaning of the word “permanent” suggests a condition or injury  
that cannot be improved or made functional.  
The word “total” similarly suggests a situation that  
cannot be corrected.  Further, the use of the phrase  
“industrial use” in this section itself implies the kind of  
13  
functional analysis that is implicit in the “corrected”  
standard of MCL 418.351.  This phrase modifies “permanent and  
total loss” and effectively limits the coverage of this  
provision to only certain kinds of permanent and total losses,  
to wit, those that have adverse implications for the ability  
of an employee to carry out his industrial responsibilities.  
Different forms of serious injury may carry altogether  
different consequences in terms of the ability of an employee  
to perform his “industrial” responsibilities.  The express  
language of MCL 418.351, in particular the phrase “industrial  
use,” makes these different consequences relevant.  
There certainly exist conditions that can be overcome,  
and we have previously held that the Legislature intended that  
poor vision, correctable with glasses, be evaluated in its  
corrected state. 
No sound distinction would lead to a  
different result in the case of a limb that, like vision  
corrected by glasses, can function with the aid of an external  
device.  Where the legal inquiry is the effect of the work  
injury on a worker’s use of members in industry, that effect  
can only be reasonably measured by use of the members as aided  
and corrected, whether by the devices listed in MCL  
418.315(1)11 or otherwise.  
11 We note that pursuant to MCL 418.315(1), employers 
subject to the act must provide injured employees  
14  
 
 
  
The Court of Appeals opined that the WCAC had read Hakala  
and O’Connor too broadly.  However, in actuality, and as  
indicated above, it is the Court of Appeals that read Hakala  
too narrowly.12  
In considering the present issue, we have remained  
cognizant of the distinction between specific loss benefits  
and total and permanent disability benefits. As mentioned at  
the beginning of the opinion, they are unique categories with  
substantial differences.  In its April 1997 decision, the WCAC  
included this analysis, which we adopt as our own:  
We believe that the historical distinction  
repeatedly recognized by the appellate courts  
throughout the long interpretational history of the 
two statutory provisions continues to provide an 
important 
divider 
between 
the 
specific 
loss  
entitlements and the total and permanent disability 
entitlements established under the statute.  
crutches, 
artificial 
limbs, 
eyes, 
teeth, 
eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances 
necessary to cure, so far as is reasonably 
possible, and relieve from the effects of injury.  
12 
As indicated in n 10, both Tew and O’Conner  
distinguished between artificial devices or objects that are 
made part of the body and external aids that merely enable a 
person to accomplish what the limb or member cannot do on its 
own. O’Conner at 534, citing Tew at 36-37. We cannot agree 
with this distinction because it has no basis in the language 
of the statute. The distinction is also contrary to Hakala, 
which required consideration of glasses that clearly are an 
external device. Whether a corrective device is external or  
internal is of no importance in determining whether a claimant 
has suffered a permanent and total loss of the industrial use 
of a limb.  
15  
 
 
 
 
An even more significant contrast between the 
two entitlements concerns the question of whether 
loss is measured with the help of prosthetics or 
without. The test for specific loss is clearly an 
uncorrected test. In Lindsay v Glennie Industries  
Inc, 379 Mich [573] (1967), the plaintiff suffered 
an injury that compelled surgical removal of his 
cataract, but even though he had virtually no sight 
in that eye, the subsequent use of contact lenses 
enabled him to enjoy virtually full vision.  The  
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s finding 
that no specific loss could be found because  
plaintiff’s vision had been restored, and stated 
that the proper analysis should take place without 
the corrective procedure. 
The Lindsay Court  
stated:  
“We recognize that substituting an artificial 
lens has ‘restored’ vision to the otherwise  
sightless eye.  We point out that a specific loss 
award is not made as compensation for diminution of 
the use of the involved organ or member.  It is not  
awarded to compensate for loss of earnings or 
earning capacity.  It is awarded irrespective of 
either fact or both.” Id. at 578.  
The Court noted that a plain reading of the 
statutory wording  put forth a loss regardless of 
the correctability of the problem.  Because the  
Court placed emphasis on the actual loss of the 
member or organ when determining specific loss, it 
viewed the loss in its uncorrected state.  
Likewise, in Tew v Hillsdale Tool & Mfg, 142 
Mich App 29 (1985), plaintiff caught his right foot 
in a conveyor, and suffered the amputation of his 
great toe. There was also loss of tissue from the  
second toe which decreased stability of the foot. 
Plaintiff wore a special shoe to aid in his walking 
ability.  The Court held that prosthetic devices  
are not taken into account when determining 
specific loss in an industrial use analysis.  The  
Tew court stated “We do not hold that anyone who 
wears any sort of prosthetic device has a valid 
specific loss claim, but only that the device 
should 
not 
be 
considered 
in 
measuring 
the  
disability.” Id. at 35.  
16  
 
On the other hand, the test for total and 
permanent disability is a corrected test.  In  
Hakala v Burroughs Corp (After Remand), 417 Mich 
359 (1983), plaintiff claimed total and permanent 
loss 
by 
bringing 
forth 
a 
pre-existing 
non­
occupational impairment of vision with the work­
related loss of his right hand. The Supreme Court 
denied total and permanent loss benefits due to the 
fact that the “corrected” standard had to be used.  
“We 
are 
persuaded 
that 
the 
Legislature 
intended compensation for a specific loss without 
regard to whether the vision could be ‘corrected’ 
or restored after the injury. Lindsay, supra.  
“We are now persuaded that the Legislature 
intended that a different standard be used in  
determining total and permanent disability inasmuch 
as it provided that only ‘total and permanent loss 
of sight’ would constitute the qualifying eye loss 
for such benefits. We are satisfied that to carry 
out the legislative intent a ‘corrected’ vision 
standard should hereafter be used in assaying 
claims for total and permanent disability involving 
the loss of sight.” Id. at 364.  
With this statement a clear distinction was  
established for total and permanent disability 
benefits, using the corrected status of the member 
or organ.  A closer look at why this distinction 
was made reveals a logic that leads back to the 
main 
purpose 
of 
having 
separate 
statutory 
provisions.  The courts allow correction in the  
total and permanent setting because the focus is on 
the function of the member or organ that enables 
the claimant to earn a living. On the other hand, 
specific loss awards the claimant for the loss of 
the anatomical member, . . . and thus the  
uncorrected test is more appropriate.  
In O’Connor v Binney Auto Parts, 203 Mich App 
522 (1994), the Court determined that the corrected 
test applies beyond the special category of vision. 
In O’Connor, an amputee with a prosthesis below the 
left knee sought total and permanent loss benefits 
for his legs because the right leg was aggravated. 
The Court held that any corrective surgery to the 
right knee that would improve the claimant’s  
17  
 
condition should be included in the evaluation as  
to whether claimant suffered industrial loss of use  
of his legs. . . . Essentially, O’Connor confirms  
the distinction that for determining specific loss 
benefits, prostheses are not considered, while when 
determining total and permanent loss, prosthetic 
devices 
and 
implants 
must 
be 
taken 
into  
consideration.  
In summary, the specific loss and total and 
permanent disability entitlements in the statute 
are unique categories with substantial differences. 
They are separately identified in their own  
subsections.
 The focus of specific loss is on 
anatomical loss or its equivalent, irrespective of 
wage earning ability.  In contrast, the focus of 
total and permanent disability is on the loss of 
wage earning capacity.  While the test for specific 
loss is an uncorrected test, the test for total and 
permanent disability is a corrected test.  
We conclude that the “corrected” standard applied in  
Hakala accords with the intent of the Legislature as expressed  
in the language of MCL 418.361(3)(g) and is properly applied  
in the present case.13  In sum, total and permanent disability  
is not demonstrated where the proofs indicate that a braced  
limb is functional and can support “industrial use.”  MCL  
418.361(3)(g).  
13 We note that our holding today, while not required by, 
is consistent with our holding in Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 
457 Mich 593, 609; 580 NW2d 817 (1998) (whether a person is 
disabled 
under 
the 
Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act, 
MCL 37.1101 et seq., is generally determined considering 
mitigating measures), and with Sutton v United Airlines, Inc, 
527 US 471, 475; 119 S Ct 2139; 144 L Ed 2d 450 (1999) 
(whether a person is disabled under the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 40 USC 12101 et seq., should be made with 
reference 
to 
measures 
that 
mitigate 
the 
individual’s  
impairment).  
18  
 
 
 
 
 
VI  
For these reasons, we reverse in part the May 2000  
judgment of the Court of Appeals.  We remand to the WCAC to  
consider plaintiff’s specific loss claim. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, 
WEAVER, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ.,  
concurred with TAYLOR, J.  
KELLY, J., concurred in the result only.  
19