Title: Patricia H. Roth v. LaFarge School District Board of Canvassers
Citation: 2004 WI 6
Docket Number: 2002AP000542
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2004

2004 WI 6 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0542 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Patricia H. Roth,  
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
LaFarge School District Board of  
Canvassers,  
          Respondent-Respondent, 
Gail J. Muller,  
          Third Party-Petitioner- 
          Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 309 
Reported at: 259 Wis. 2d 349, 655 N.W.2d 471 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 4, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 8, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. McAlpine   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Christopher J. Blythe and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, and 
oral argument by Christopher J. Blythe. 
 
For the third party-petitioner-appellant there was a brief 
by George C. Wilbur, LaFarge, and oral argument by George C. 
Wilbur. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief (in the 
court of 
appeals) 
by 
David 
L. Jenkins and Jenkins and 
Stittleburg, Viroqua. 
 
2004 WI 6 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0542  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 154) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Patricia H. Roth,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
LaFarge School District Board of  
Canvassers,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Gail J. Muller,  
 
          Third Party-Petitioner- 
          Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 4, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The petitioner, Patricia H. 
Roth (Roth), seeks review of a published court of appeals' 
decision, reversing the order of the Vernon County Circuit 
Court, which had concluded that a "no" vote cast in the LaFarge 
School District referendum should not be counted.  Because we 
conclude that, on the ballot in question consistent with 
No. 
02-0542   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c) (1999-2000),1 there is a qualifying mark 
in a qualifying place, we hold that the court of appeals' 
decision should be affirmed and that, using § 7.50(2)(c), the 
"no" vote should be counted.  We conclude that with proper 
application of § 7.50(2)(c) the intent of the voter becomes 
readily ascertainable in this case.  We further conclude that 
the Board of Canvassers (Board) did not properly apply the 
statute since, on the ballot in question, there is a qualifying 
mark in a qualifying place.  The November 2000 referendum thus 
ended in a tie vote, and the question of funding for school 
improvements was defeated. 
I 
 
¶2 
The November 7, 2000 referendum was held to determine 
whether a project for school improvements should proceed.2  After 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1999-2000 edition. 
2 The referendum ballot presented the voters with the 
following question: 
"Shall the following Initial Resolution be approved?" 
Initial 
Resolution 
Authorizing 
General 
Obligation 
Bonds of the School District of LaFarge in an Amount 
Not to Exceed $2,250,000 
The School Board of the School District of LaFarge 
(the "District") hereby resolves as follows: 
Under and by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 67, 
Wisconsin Statutes, the District shall issue its 
general obligation bonds, in a sum not to exceed the 
amount of $2,250,000, for the following purposes: 
(a) 
Constructing and equipping a locker room and 
fitness room addition totaling approximately 
No. 
02-0542   
 
3 
 
the 
polls 
closed, 
the 
referendum 
ballots 
were 
counted.  
According 
to 
the 
returns, 
392 votes 
were 
cast for the 
referendum, and 392 votes were cast against the referendum.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 5.01(4)(d) 
directs 
that 
when 
the 
voting 
results in a tie, the referendum has been defeated.3    
 
¶3 
Roth, an elector of the LaFarge School District who 
voted in the referendum, requested a recount of the ballots 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 9.01.4  The Board conducted a recount on 
November 11, 2000.  The recount resulted in a tie, as 389 votes 
                                                                                                                                                             
2,100 square feet to an existing Elementary, 
Junior High and Senior High Buildings located at 
301 West Adams Street, LaFarge, Wisconsin; 
(b) 
Major/minor remodeling of existing Elementary, 
Junior and Senior High complex, including roof 
repair, 
asbestos 
removal, 
installation 
of 
elevator, lift and ramps for ADA accessibility, 
boiler replacement, window replacement, HVAC 
modifications, electrical upgrades and other 
general remodelling; 
(c) 
Bus garage flooring, parking and paving, drain 
tile and earth work and other fixed equipment; 
and 
(d) 
Architect, engineering, legal and closing costs 
At the bottom of the ballot, the word "yes" appeared with a box 
to the right of it, indicating the space for voters to mark.  
Similarly, the word "no" appeared with a box to the right of it. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.01(4)(d) provides, in relevant part:  
"If a question is submitted to the electors and an equal number 
of votes are cast for and against adoption, the question fails 
adoption." 
 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 9.01 provides, in relevant part:  "(1) 
Petition; fees; general procedures. (a) Any candidate voted for 
at any election or any elector who voted upon any referendum 
question at any election may request a recount."  
No. 
02-0542   
 
4 
 
were cast for the referendum and 389 votes were cast against the 
referendum.  Thus, the Board declared that the referendum had 
failed.   
¶4 
During the recount, the Board disqualified three "yes" 
votes and three "no" votes.5  Of the three "yes" votes, one was 
disqualified because the initials of only one poll worker were 
on the ballot, as opposed to the two sets of initials that are 
required by Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2).  Of the three "no" votes, one 
was disqualified because the Board determined that the mark had 
been erased and, thus, should not be counted under § 7.50(2)(c).  
Gail Muller (Muller), an elector of the LaFarge School District 
who voted in the referendum, was present at the recount, and 
questioned the Board's assessment that the mark had been erased.6 
¶5 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 9.01(6),7 Roth filed a notice 
of appeal in the Vernon County Circuit Court, asserting that the 
                                                 
5 The record indicates that the Board disqualified three 
absentee ballots due to the electors' failure to comply with the 
directions.  Two votes were disqualified for failure to be 
witnessed, and one was disqualified due to the absence of an 
elector's signature on the absentee envelope.  This resulted in 
the disqualification of one "yes" vote and two "no" votes.  It 
is not specified why the other votes were disqualified. 
6 With respect to the "no" vote, the recount minutes state 
the following:  "One ballot looks erased——3 canvassers cannot 
determine with reasonable certainty what was intended.  Ballot 
set aside. (#0002).  Everyone in audience witnessed ballot——no 
challenges but a question by one (Gayle Muller)." 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 9.01(6) provides, in relevant part: 
No. 
02-0542   
 
5 
 
"yes" vote was improperly disqualified.  Muller filed a motion 
for intervention.  Muller stated that she had an interest in the 
referendum's outcome and, as no other party represented her 
interests, she would be harmed if the circuit court prevented 
her from intervening.  Moreover, Muller attached to her motion a 
proposed counterclaim to the effect that the "no" vote was 
improperly disqualified.  Roth opposed Muller's motion to 
intervene, stating that Muller should not be allowed to oppose 
Roth's claim or raise new legal issues, because she failed to 
comply with the time directives of § 9.01(6)(a). 
¶6 
Vernon 
County 
Circuit 
Judge 
Michael 
Rosborough 
determined that Muller should not be allowed to intervene 
because she was time barred.  The circuit court further held 
that the "yes" vote should have been counted, despite the fact 
that some of the procedural requirements were not followed.  The 
circuit court noted that Wis. Stat. § 5.01(1) emphasizes that 
statutes are to be construed so as to give effect to the intent 
of the voter.  Muller appealed. 
    
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Within 5 business days after completion of 
the recount determination by the board of canvassers 
in all counties concerned, or within 5 business days 
after completion of the recount determination by the 
chairperson of the board or the chairperson's designee 
whenever a determination is made by the chairperson or 
designee, any candidate, or any elector when for a 
referendum, aggrieved by the recount may appeal to 
circuit court.  
No. 
02-0542   
 
6 
 
¶7 
The court of appeals8 concluded that the circuit court 
erred when it prevented Muller from asserting her own claim.  
The court noted that the deadline for filing an appeal is 
applicable to aggrieved parties only.  The court of appeals 
noted that Muller was not an aggrieved party, as she opposed the 
referendum and the recount resulted in its failure.  Thus, 
Muller had no standing to appeal the referendum results.  
Nevertheless, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reasoned 
that 
Muller 
satisfied the necessary requirements to intervene as a matter of 
right, and should be able to raise her own claim.  The court of 
appeals further concluded that the circuit court correctly 
decided that the "yes" vote should have been counted.  However, 
because the "no" vote was not part of the record, the court of 
appeals remanded the cause to the circuit court, for a 
determination of whether the Board's conclusion that voter 
intent could not be ascertained from the ballot, was supported 
by substantial evidence. 
¶8 
Circuit Judge Michael McAlpine9 found that the Board 
did not misinterpret Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c).10  The circuit 
                                                 
8 The decision of this court is later referred to as Roth v. 
LaFarge Sch. Dist. Bd. of Canvassers, 2001 WI App 221, 247 
Wis. 2d 708, 634 N.W.2d 882 (Roth I). 
9 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.58, Muller filed a request 
for substitution of a new judge for Judge Michael Rosborough.  
Judge Michael McAlpine was subsequently assigned to this matter. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 7.50(2)(c) provides, in relevant part: 
No. 
02-0542   
 
7 
 
court noted that determining voter intent is a finding of fact.  
The court determined that there was substantial evidence, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 9.01(8),11 
supporting 
the 
Board's 
decision.  Muller appealed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) Ascertainment of intent. All ballots cast at an 
election which bear the initials of 2 inspectors shall be 
counted for the person or referendum question for whom or 
for which they were intended, so far as the electors' 
intent can be ascertained from the ballots notwithstanding 
informality 
or 
failure 
to 
fully 
comply 
with 
other 
provisions of chs. 5 to 12.   
 . . . . 
(c) If an elector marks a ballot with a cross 
(X), or any other marks, as I, A, V, O, /, √, +, 
within the square to the right of a candidate's name, 
or any place within the space in which the name 
appears, indicating an intent to vote for that 
candidate, it is a vote for the candidate whose name 
it is opposite. 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 9.01(8) provides, in relevant part: 
Unless the court finds a ground for setting aside 
or modifying the determination of the board of 
canvassers 
or 
the 
chairperson 
of 
the 
board 
or 
chairperson's 
designee, 
it 
shall 
affirm 
the 
determination. 
The 
court 
shall 
separately 
treat 
disputed issues of procedure, interpretations of law 
and findings of fact. The court may not receive 
evidence not offered to the board of canvassers or the 
chairperson 
or 
chairperson's 
designee 
except 
for 
evidence that was unavailable to a party exercising 
due diligence at the time of the recount or newly 
discovered evidence that could not with due diligence 
have been obtained during the recount, and except that 
the court may receive evidence not offered at an 
earlier time because a party was not represented by 
counsel in all or part of a recount proceeding. . . .  
The court shall set aside or modify the determination 
if it finds that the board of canvassers or the 
chairperson or chairperson's designee has erroneously 
No. 
02-0542   
 
8 
 
¶9 
The court of appeals12 concluded that the circuit court 
and 
the 
Board 
erroneously 
interpreted 
and 
applied 
Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c).  The court of appeals concluded that 
§ 7.50(2)(c) is ambiguous, as it lends itself to two possible 
interpretations.  It could require both the presence of a mark 
and an intent to vote.  Conversely, § 7.50(2)(c) could be 
interpreted to stand for the proposition that any mark indicates 
an intent to vote.  While attempting to resolve the ambiguity 
within § 7.50(2)(c), the court of appeals noted that the 
legislature prefers to validate ballots and save them from 
invalidity.  The court of appeals reasoned that § 7.50(2)(c) 
provides that there is an intent to vote when there is a mark in 
the appropriate space.  Thus, the court of appeals concluded 
that, since there was a mark in the space designated for a "no" 
vote, the "no" vote should be counted, a decision that resulted 
in a tie vote on the referendum. 
                                                                                                                                                             
interpreted 
a 
provision 
of 
law 
and 
a 
correct 
interpretation compels a particular action. If the 
determination depends on any fact found by the board 
of canvassers or the chairperson or chairperson's 
designee, the court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the board of canvassers or the chairperson 
or designee as to the weight of the evidence on any 
disputed finding of fact. The court shall set aside 
the determination if it finds that the determination 
depends on any finding of fact that is not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
12 The decision of this court is later referred to as Roth 
v. LaFarge Sch. Dist. Bd. of Canvassers, 2002 WI App 309, 259 
Wis. 2d 349, 655 N.W.2d 471 (Roth II). 
 
No. 
02-0542   
 
9 
 
¶10 The LaFarge School District held a referendum in 
November 2003.  At oral argument, it was suggested that the 
question of whether the "no" vote should be counted may be 
rendered moot by the outcome of the November 2003 referendum.13  
Since that referendum has now been conducted, under the 
circumstances that now exist, we will address the issue of 
whether the Board properly applied Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c), in 
regard to the referendum held on November 7, 2000. 
II 
 
¶11 As 
an 
initial 
matter, 
we 
must 
address 
Roth's 
allegation that the court of appeals violated the law of the 
case doctrine.  Roth asserts that the court in Roth v. LaFarge 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Canvassers, 2001 WI App 221, 247 Wis. 2d 708, 
634 N.W.2d 882 (Roth I) concluded that the Board's determination 
was a finding of fact, which the circuit court should review 
using Wis. Stat. § 9.01(8).  Roth further argues that the Roth I 
court stated that Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(cm) does not stand for 
the proposition that an apparent erasure must be counted.  Roth 
claims that the court of appeals ignored its own directives in 
Roth v. LaFarge Sch. Dist. Bd. of Canvassers, 2002 WI App 309, 
259 Wis. 2d 349, 655 N.W.2d 471 (Roth II), when it concluded 
                                                 
13 A newspaper report indicates that the November 2003 
LaFarge School District referendum failed.  With respect to 
whether up to $720,000 in bonds should be issued to make 
improvements 
and 
upgrade 
existing 
buildings 
and 
library 
holdings, 138 votes were cast in favor of the referendum and 265 
votes were cast against the referendum.  LaFarge Referendum, 
Wisconsin State Journal, Nov. 6, 2003, at B3. 
No. 
02-0542   
 
10 
 
that the "no" vote should have been counted as a matter of law.  
Moreover, she claims that in Roth II the court stated that, 
according to 7.50(2)(cm), an apparent erasure signifies an 
intent to vote.  Roth argues that the court of appeals violated 
the law of the case doctrine, as Roth I and Roth II have 
inconsistent holdings.   
 
¶12 We are not bound by the law of the case doctrine.  In 
Univest Corp. v. Gen. Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38-39, 435 
N.W.2d 234 (1989), we noted that "the law of the case doctrine 
is not a rule to which this court is bound by any legislative 
enactment, nor is it a rule to be inexorably followed in every 
case."  We further held that "once the case is before us, it is 
within our discretion under these standards to review any 
substantial and compelling issue which the case presents, 
regardless of whether a prior decision established the law of 
the case."  Id.  at 39.  Thus, we are in no way bound by the 
court of appeals' determination in this matter, but certainly we 
benefit from the decisions of the court of appeals, the circuit 
court, and the Board of Canvassers. 
III 
 
¶13 We now address whether Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c) was 
correctly applied in this case.  As noted previously, during 
oral argument, Muller's attorney stated that the LaFarge School 
District would be holding a new referendum in November 2003.  
Muller's attorney stated that if the new referendum passed, the 
results of the November 2000 referendum would be negated.  Thus, 
he stated, the issue before this court could be rendered moot.  
No. 
02-0542   
 
11 
 
A case is moot if a decision in the matter will not have any 
practical effect upon an existing legal controversy.  Milwaukee 
Police Ass'n v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 2d 175, 183, 285 N.W.2d 133 
(1979).     
 
¶14 Nevertheless, this court may address a moot issue if:  
(1) the issue is of great public importance; (2) the situation 
occurs so frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to 
guide circuit courts; (3) the issue is likely to arise again and 
a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; or (4) the 
issue will likely be repeated, but evades appellate review 
because the appellate review process cannot be completed or even 
undertaken in time to have a practical effect on the parties.  
State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶5, 245 
Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686.  Whether the LaFarge School 
District's referendum passes is an important issue, and this 
court should render a decision in this case, regardless of 
whether the matter is moot or not. 
 
¶15 We review the court of appeals' decision, which 
reviewed the decision of the Board, not the decision of the 
circuit court.  Univ. of Wisconsin v. Dane County, 2000 WI App 
211, ¶10, 238 Wis. 2d 810, 618 N.W.2d 537.  The Board of 
Canvasser's determination was, in this case, a determination as 
a matter of law, since it involved the interpretation and 
application of a statute.  More specifically, we must determine 
whether the Board of Canvassers committed a legal error with 
respect 
to 
its 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
No. 
02-0542   
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c).14 
 
This 
court 
reviews 
the 
legal 
conclusions of such a board de novo.  Bar Admission of 
Vanderperren, 2003 WI 37, ¶20, 261 Wis. 2d 150, 661 N.W.2d 27;  
"K" Care, Inc. v. Town of Lac du Flambeau, 181 Wis. 2d 59, 65, 
510 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 
¶16 To aid in our discussion, a description of the ballot 
in question is warranted.  In the box to the right of the word 
"no" on the ballot, there is a clearly visible slash (\) mark 
written in pencil.  See attached exhibit at page 20.    
 
¶17 Roth asserts that the Roth II court misinterpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c).  Roth contends that there must be both 
a mark and an intent to vote by the voter, in order for a vote 
to 
qualify 
under 
§ 7.50(2)(c). 
 
Roth 
states 
that 
this 
construction 
is 
supported 
by 
the 
language 
in 
§ 7.50(2).  
According to Roth, the legislature intended to provide for the 
Board's subjective analysis when voter intent was not clear.  
Roth further asserts that the interpretation proposed by Roth 
II, that even apparent erasures must be counted, flies in the 
face of Wis. Stat. § 5.01(1).15 Roth argues that, under this 
                                                 
14 Because our focus is on whether the Board correctly 
interpreted and applied Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c), we decline to 
utilize DeBroux v. Bd. of Canvassers for City of Appleton, 206 
Wis. 2d 321, 557 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1996), which focuses on a 
board's findings of fact. 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.01(1) provides, in relevant part:  
"Except as otherwise provided, chs. 5 to 12 shall be construed 
to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be 
ascertained from the proceedings, notwithstanding informality or 
failure to fully comply with some of their provisions." 
No. 
02-0542   
 
13 
 
interpretation, even a flaw in the paper would have to be 
counted as a vote.   
 
¶18 Muller counters that the legislature's intent, by 
enacting Wis. Stat. § 5.01(1), was to give effect to the will of 
voters.  Muller contends that an erasure must actually remove 
the mark.  If there is a mark, Muller asserts that the Board 
must count the mark as a vote, as the legislature did not give 
the Board discretion to declare that a visible mark is an 
erasure.  Muller states that, according to the requirements set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c), the "no" vote should be 
counted.  Section 7.50(2)(c) states, in relevant part, that a 
vote should be counted "(i)f an elector marks a ballot with a 
cross (X), or any other marks, as I, A, V, O, /, √, +, within 
the square to the right of the candidate’s name, . . .  
indicating an intent to vote for that candidate." Muller 
contends that the language of § 7.50(2)(c) is not qualified by 
the clause "unless it is light or looks erased."  Muller asserts 
that the Roth II court's interpretation of § 7.50(2)(c) comports 
with long established Wisconsin precedent to give effect to the 
will of the voter, as exemplified in voter intent cases such as 
State ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 (1875), and Ollmann v. 
Kowalewski, 238 Wis. 574, 300 N.W. 183 (1941). 
 
¶19 Wisconsin courts have consistently noted that they do 
not want to deprive voters of the chance to have their votes 
counted.  In State ex rel. Wood, 38 Wis. at 84, this court was 
confronted with the question of whether a defective voter 
registry should result in the disenfranchisement of voters.  We 
No. 
02-0542   
 
14 
 
stated that a statute provided for voter supervision of the 
process of voter registry, but the fact that the registry was 
defective did not mean that the votes should not be counted.  
Id. at 88.  The statute allowing the voters' voluntary 
supervision of the registry had to be construed, so as to render 
the right of suffrage unencumbered and unimpaired.  Id. 
 
¶20 In State ex rel. Blodgett v. Eagan, 115 Wis. 417, 418, 
91 N.W. 984 (1902), two ballots were originally excluded from an 
election for the office of assessor because the voters wrote in, 
in longhand, the name of one candidate, yet failed to cross out 
the name of the candidate whom they did not intend to elect.  
After discussing Wisconsin's tradition of giving effect to the 
will of the voter, this court stated that the voter's intention 
that can be discerned from the ballot itself should control.  
Id. at 419-20.  We concluded that "the voter shall not be 
disenfranchised because of mere mistake, but his intention shall 
prevail . . . ."  Id. at 421.                                              
 
¶21 In State ex rel. Symmonds v. Barnett, 182 Wis. 114, 
129, 195 N.W. 707 (1923), we concluded that registered voters, 
whose names had been omitted from the voter registry lists 
through the fault of election officials, should not have their 
votes invalidated.  The Barnett opinion noted the State ex rel. 
Wood reasoning, which stated that voters should not be deprived 
of their constitutional right to vote simply because election 
officials have failed to perform their duties.  Id. at 132.  
Although a statutory provision provided that ballots must be 
indorsed with the initials of a ballot clerk in order to be 
No. 
02-0542   
 
15 
 
declared valid, the fact that this provision was not complied 
with did not invalidate the absentee voter ballots at issue.  
Id.  We noted that to disqualify the ballots would deprive the 
voters of their constitutional rights, because of the negligence 
of the election officers.  Id. 
 
¶22 In State ex rel. Graves v. Wiegand, 212 Wis. 286, 288, 
249 N.W. 537 (1933), the inspectors at several election 
precincts failed to comply with a statute that directed the 
appropriate procedures that were to be used when returning 
ballots to the county clerk.  Nevertheless, this court held that 
the votes should be counted.  Id. at 296.  We stated that the 
primary concern was the protection of the rights and interests 
of the voters.  Id. at 292.  Voting statutes are to be construed 
so as to give effect to the intent of the voter, notwithstanding 
the fact that there was a failure to comply with some of the 
provisions governing elections.  Id.  Moreover, we noted, 
significantly, that ballots are the best evidence of the 
intention of voters.  Id. at 293. 
 
¶23 In Ollmann, 238 Wis. at 577-78, this court refused to 
disqualify ballots where two ballot clerks each wrote their own 
initials and the initials of the other clerk on each ballot that 
was cast.  Although this practice violated the statute governing 
the initialing of the ballots, we noted that to construe the 
statute as mandatory would be unconstitutional in this case.  
Id. at 578.  We analogized the situation to the circumstances 
that were present in State ex rel. Wood and stated that the 
failure on the part of the election officials to perform their 
No. 
02-0542   
 
16 
 
duties should not deprive the voters of their constitutional 
right to vote.  Id. at 579.  A ballot legally cast by a voter 
cannot be rejected, if it expresses the will of the voter.  Id. 
at 580.  Moreover, this court stated that a ballot could not be 
randomly withdrawn from consideration simply because the number 
of votes cast could not be reconciled with the number of names 
checked off of the registry.  Id.  The voters would be 
disenfranchised if their ballots were removed from consideration 
through no fault of their own.  Id. 
 
¶24 In Petition of Leuch, 244 Wis. 305, 317, 12 N.W.2d 61 
(1943), we held that the voters who cast their ballots in the 
election for municipal judge should not be disenfranchised, 
because the election commissioners did not have enough time to 
reprint the ballots so as to include the name of a new 
candidate.  Although there was no statutory authority for the 
board's action in printing stickers and pasting them on the 
ballots, the statutory framework for elections should be 
construed so as to give effect to the will of the voters.  Id. 
at 314.  We further noted a relevant statutory provision, which 
stated that ballots should be counted for the persons for whom 
they were intended when voter intent can be ascertained.  Id.   
 
¶25 In 
Hackbarth 
v. 
Erickson, 
147 
Wis. 2d 467, 
433 
N.W.2d 266 (1988), the court of appeals gave effect to the will 
of the voter even when the error was due to the voter's own 
mistake.  In Hackbarth, the court of appeals declined to 
disqualify eight ballots that were marked with an "X" in the box 
after the mayoral candidate's name, yet also contained the 
No. 
02-0542   
 
17 
 
candidate's name as a write-in for the position of alderman.  
Id. at 469.  Noting Wisconsin's longstanding tradition of giving 
effect to the will of the voter, the court rejected the idea 
that the ballot markings could be attributed to the mistake or 
indecision of the voter.  Id. at 473.   
 
¶26  We recognize that many of the abovementioned cases 
involve mistakes committed by election officials, and not 
whether a voter apparently expressed his or her intent, as was 
at issue in this case.  Nevertheless, we think Wisconsin's 
position on recognizing voter intent is clear.  It is evident 
that this court has consistently placed a premium on giving 
effect to the will of the voter.  Thus, we conclude that the 
Board legally erred when it misapplied Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c), 
resulting in the disqualification of the "no" vote.  The Board 
may use its discretion and make findings only when the standards 
of a statute do not apply.  By enacting § 7.50(2)(c), the 
legislature attempted to minimize a board's discretion.  Here, 
§ 7.50(2)(c) applies, as there is a qualifying mark in a 
qualifying place on the ballot at issue.     
 
¶27 We 
conclude 
that 
with 
proper 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c) the intent of the voter becomes readily 
ascertainable in this case.  Section 7.50(2)(c) provides that a 
vote will be counted if a cross, slash, or other mark similar to 
the eight examples listed in the statute is present in a 
qualifying place on the ballot.  An examination of the ballot in 
question reveals that, at the very least, there is a slash 
through the box to the right of the word "no."    Pursuant to 
No. 
02-0542   
 
18 
 
§ 7.50(2)(c), the mark was made in a qualifying place on the 
ballot, as it was placed in the box to the right of the word 
"no."  Because there is a qualifying mark in a qualifying place 
on the ballot, the vote should be counted, so as to give effect 
to the will of the voter. 
 
 
¶28 Roth asserts that the reasoning in Schmidt v. West 
Bend Bd. of Canvassers, 18 Wis. 2d 316, 118 N.W.2d 154 (1962) 
appropriately resolves the question before us.  In Schmidt, we 
were confronted with the question of whether a cancelled voting 
mark should be counted as a vote cast for that candidate.  Id. 
at 321.  The ballot in question contained a cross in the square 
opposite a mayoral candidate, which was rendered barely visible 
by a heavy shading that filled the square entirely.  Id.  In 
contrast, the squares for the three other offices on the ballot 
were marked with a simple "X."  Id.  In Schmidt, we stated that 
the circuit court reasonably concluded that the shading, which 
obliterated the entire square, reflected the voter's effort to 
cancel his or her vote for the mayoral candidate.  Id. 
 
¶29 We disagree that the facts in this case may be likened 
to the circumstances in Schmidt.  In Schmidt, there was an 
attempt to achieve a complete obliteration of the vote.  
Moreover, the ballot in Schmidt contained other marks that 
indicated an intent to vote for candidates running for other 
offices.  In this case, there is a mark that fits within the 
category of those enumerated by Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c).  In 
contrast to Schmidt, there is no indication that the voter in 
this 
case 
attempted 
to 
remove 
his 
or 
her 
vote 
from 
No. 
02-0542   
 
19 
 
consideration.  Moreover, the voter in this case was required to 
vote for only one issue.  Thus, there is no further example of 
the voter's marks for other candidates or issues, rendering a 
comparison between the mark in question and other marks made by 
the voter impossible in this situation.  Due to the significant 
differences between Schmidt and the present circumstances, we 
conclude that Schmidt is distinguishable from the facts of this 
case.  Because the ballot in this case indicates an intent to 
vote "no" on the referendum, we conclude that this vote should 
be counted. 
IV 
 
¶30 We affirm the court of appeals' decision and hold 
that, consistent with Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c), the "no" vote 
should be counted.  We conclude that with proper application of 
§ 7.50(2)(c) 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
voter 
becomes 
readily 
ascertainable in this case.  We further conclude that on the 
ballot in question, there is a qualifying mark in a qualifying 
place.  The Board of Canvassers did not properly apply 
§ 7.50(2)(c); the November 2000 referendum, therefore, resulted 
in a tie vote, and the question of funding for school 
improvements was defeated. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
                                          
No. 
02-0542   
 
20 
 
 
 
 
No.  02-0542.awb 
 
1 
 
¶31 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I, like the 
majority, would count this vote.  However, I reach this 
conclusion in a manner very different from that embraced by my 
colleagues.  We part ways because I believe that the majority 
accurately describes only a part of the picture.  As a result, 
it ignores a standard of review, which requires here that the 
Board of Canvasser's findings of fact be upheld.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶32 We should have learned long ago that by accurately 
describing only a part of the picture, we run the risk of 
distorting the whole.  So it was for those who contested the 
claim that the world was round.  By accurately describing only 
that part which was visible and flat, they distorted the whole. 
¶33 And, so it is with the majority.  By accurately 
describing part of the ballot as containing "a clearly visible 
slash mark (\) written in pencil" (Majority op., ¶16) but 
failing to describe the rest of the picture, the majority runs 
the risk of distorting the whole. 
¶34 The whole, as viewed by the Board of Canvassers, 
depicts an indentation on the ballot of a forward slash mark 
(/), crossing the light backward slash mark described by the 
majority and forming a completed (X).  It is this colorless 
forward slash mark that caused the Board to make its finding of 
fact that the mark constituted an erasure.   
¶35 In fairness to the majority, it is unclear whether the 
indentation on the ballot constituting the colorless (or nearly 
colorless) 
forward 
slash 
mark 
occurred 
because 
of 
a 
No.  02-0542.awb 
 
2 
 
malfunctioning mechanical pencil or because of an erasure.   
What is clear, however, is that the Board is the trier of fact, 
and that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 9.01(8), the court may not 
substitute its own view of the facts for that of the Board of 
Canvassers.  DeBroux v. Bd. of Canvassers for the City of 
Appleton, 206 Wis. 2d 321, 331, 557 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1996).  
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 9.01(8), which details the scope of 
appellate review, provides in relevant part that: 
[T]he court may not substitute its judgment for that 
of the board of canvassers or the chairperson or 
designee as to the weight of the evidence on any 
disputed finding of fact.  The court shall set aside 
the determination if it finds that the determination 
depends on any finding of fact that is not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
¶37 Here, the Board of Canvassers made a factual finding.  
With respect to the ballot in question, the recount minutes 
state the following:  "one ballot looks erased--3 canvassers 
cannot determine with reasonable certainty what was intended.  
Ballot set aside. (#0002) . . . ." 
¶38 In framing the issue in this case, the majority 
opinion ignores this factual finding.  It portrays the case as 
dealing only with an interpretation of law, the statutory 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(c).  Majority op., ¶15.  
In doing so, it contravenes the explicit language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 9.01(8), which mandates that "[t]he court shall separately 
treat disputed issues of procedure, interpretations of law and 
findings of fact." 
¶39 After reviewing the ballot, I would conclude that the 
Board's finding is supported by substantial evidence.  I have 
No.  02-0542.awb 
 
3 
 
attached to this opinion an exhibit from the petitioner's brief, 
which is a dark photocopy of the disputed ballot.  It reveals an 
"X" like figure, with the upper right side of the "X" missing.  
The original mark cannot be seen in the majority's photocopy of 
the ballot.  It can be seen in part, however, in the darker 
photocopy submitted by the petitioner. 
¶40 The fact that the backward slash portion of the "X" is 
very light and the forward slash indentation is partially 
missing provides substantial evidence to support the factual 
finding of an erasure.  Accordingly, I would defer to the 
Board's factual finding. 
¶41 Recognizing that the mark is an erasure, the next step 
is to determine which statute governs.  The only statute that 
specifically addresses erasures in the context of elections is 
Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(cm).16  Admittedly, it is unclear from the 
language of the statute whether it is even applicable to the 
present case.  Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(cm) speaks to ballots 
involving one or more different candidates for the same office, 
not one-issue referendums.   
¶42 If the statute does not apply, the legislature has not 
spoken on the issue and we must look to the principle of 
inclusion (the legislative preference for counting ballots) for 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 7.50(2)(cm) provides: 
 
Any apparent erasure of a mark next to the name of a 
candidate may not be counted as a vote for that 
candidate if the elector makes another mark next to 
the name of one or more different candidates for the 
same office and counting of the mark would result in 
an excess number of votes cast for the office.  
No.  02-0542.awb 
 
4 
 
guidance.  Assuming that Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(cm) does apply, 
however, the statute narrowly circumscribes when erasures are 
not to be counted. 
¶43 Two conditions must be met before the vote is 
disqualified: (1) "the elector makes another mark next to the 
name of one or more candidates for the same office," and (2) 
"counting of the mark would result in an excess number of votes 
cast for the office."  Wis. Stat. § 7.50(2)(cm).  Here, neither 
of those conditions precedent to disqualification is met.  There 
are no other marks on the ballot.  Further, there is no 
indication in the record that counting the vote would result in 
an excess number of votes cast.  Because the conditions 
precedent for disqualifying a vote as an erasure are not met, I 
again return to the principle of inclusion. 
¶44 Wisconsin's general principle of inclusion supports 
the conclusion of counting the vote in this case.  As the 
majority correctly recognizes, this principle is supported by 
our precedent, "Wisconsin courts have consistently noted that 
they do not want to deprive voters of the chance to have their 
votes counted."  Majority op., ¶¶19-25 (citing e.g., State ex. 
rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 (1875), Ollmann v. Kowalewski, 
238 Wis. 574, 300 N.W. 183 (1941), Hackbarth v. Erickson, 147 
Wis. 2d 467, 433 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
¶45 In sum, I believe that the Board's finding of an 
erasure should have been reviewed as a question of fact and not 
law.  I would defer to that finding because an examination of 
the ballot reveals that it is supported by substantial evidence.  
No.  02-0542.awb 
 
5 
 
However, because the conditions precedent to the statute 
governing erasures are not present, and Wisconsin's general 
principle of inclusion controls, I would count the vote. 
No.  02-0542.awb 
 
6 
 
 
 
No.  02-0542.awb 
 
1