Title: State v. Jeramey J. Byrge
Citation: 2000 WI 101
Docket Number: 1997AP003217-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2000

2000 WI 101 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3217-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jeramey J. Byrge,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  225 Wis. 2d 702, 594 N.W.2d 388 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 13, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 1, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Calumet 
 
JUDGE: 
Darryl W. Deets 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was 
argued by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 101 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3217-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeramey J. Byrge,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Jeramey J. Byrge (Byrge) seeks 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d 702, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999), 
affirming a decision of the Circuit Court for Calumet County, 
Darryl W. Deets, Judge.  The circuit court determined that Byrge 
was competent to stand trial for charges stemming from five 
felony offenses, including first-degree intentional homicide and 
hiding a corpse.  After denying Byrge's motion to withdraw his 
no contest pleas but permitting him to withdraw the pleas of not 
guilty by reason of mental defect (NGI), the court found Byrge 
guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a parole 
eligibility date of July 2, 2095. 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
2 
¶2 
Byrge unsuccessfully motioned the circuit court for 
post-conviction relief and subsequently sought review by the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals held that, under the 
deferential standard of review articulated by this court in 
State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997), an 
appellate court will not upset a circuit court's competency 
determination unless it is clearly erroneous.  The court then 
affirmed the finding that Byrge was competent to proceed.  The 
court also held that Byrge's pleas were not defective because a 
sentencing court is not required to inform defendants about 
parole eligibility.  Finally, the court of appeals concluded 
that Byrge had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
¶3 
We frame three issues in this case.  First, we revisit 
our holding in Garfoot and discuss the standard of review that 
applies to competency determinations.  Second, we address the 
related issue, whether Byrge was competent to stand trial.  
Third, we examine Byrge's contention that the sentencing court 
was obligated to inform him about parole eligibility before it 
accepted his plea. 
 
¶4 
We hold that an appellate court reviewing a competency 
determination must use the methodology set forth in Garfoot.  
The findings of a circuit court in a competency to stand trial 
determination will not be upset unless they are clearly 
erroneous because a competency hearing presents a unique 
category of inquiry in which the circuit court is in the best 
position to apply the law to the facts.  We find that the 
circuit court's decision that Byrge was competent to stand trial 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
3 
was not clearly erroneous because testimony at the competency 
hearing indicated Byrge was able to understand the proceedings 
and assist in his defense.  We conclude that when a circuit 
court exercises its statutory option to fix a parole eligibility 
date, that date has a direct and automatic effect on the range 
of punishment.  In this circumstance, parole eligibility 
information is a direct consequence of the plea.  Although the 
circuit court had a duty to inform Byrge about the parole 
eligibility information before it accepted his plea, the State 
has met its burden to prove that Byrge nonetheless entered the 
plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
FACTS 
 
¶5 
On Friday evening, August 19, 1994, Joan Wagner 
(Wagner) called her husband and told him that she would see him 
after her shift ended at 11:00 p.m. at the Mirro Foley Company 
in Chilton, Wisconsin.  Wagner expressed excitement about the 
new home on which the couple had closed that day.  When she did 
not arrive home by 11:30 p.m., her husband retraced Wagner's 
route but was unable to locate her or her vehicle.  
¶6 
A Mirro Foley co-worker observed Wagner leaving the 
facility at 11:15 p.m.  He noticed that a male who had been 
sitting near the parking lot approached Wagner and began talking 
with her.  Wagner and the male walked towards Wagner's blue-
over-gray 
1989 
Pontiac 
Grand 
Am, 
and 
she 
unlocked 
the 
passenger's side for the male.  The two then drove off.  The co-
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
4 
worker later identified Byrge as the person who accompanied 
Wagner.  
¶7 
At about 11:45 p.m., a Town of Rantoul resident, Chris 
Kopecky (Kopecky), heard what he presumed to be screams coming 
from the woods near his home.  He also saw a blue Grand Am near 
the entrance to those woods and remembered the first letter and 
number of the license plates.  Two days later, Kopecky's mother 
realized that his description of the Grand Am matched the 
vehicle discussed in a newspaper article detailing Wagner's 
disappearance.  Kopecky then decided to check the woods.  On 
August 23, 1994, he and two friends saw a puddle of blood just 
off a trail leading into the woods.  The shoes and feet of a 
body rested 500 feet away.  Law enforcement authorities arrived 
and discovered that the clothing on the body matched what Wagner 
had worn.  An autopsy positively identified the body and 
revealed that Wagner had been stabbed four times.   
¶8 
Byrge, a 19-year old who lived next door to Wagner, 
was not seen in the Chilton area after August 19, 1994.  Earlier 
in the week, Byrge had indicated that he planned to take a bus 
trip to Colorado to visit a woman with whom he had a child.  On 
August 23, 1994, Detective Jerry Pagel of the Calumet County 
Sheriff's Department, contacted Colorado authorities.  They 
arrested Byrge in Highlands Ranch, Colorado.  At the time of his 
arrest, Byrge was operating a blue and silver Pontiac Grand Am 
that bore Wisconsin plates.  The vehicle was registered to 
Wagner and her husband.  During a search of the Grand Am, 
Colorado authorities found a hunting knife with a curved, four-
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
5 
inch blade under the front driver's seat.  The knife appeared to 
have blood and body tissue on it.  
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶9 
On August 25, 1994, the Calumet County District 
Attorney filed a complaint alleging that Byrge caused Wagner's 
death.  The complaint stated that Byrge committed the first-
degree intentional homicide of Wagner, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.01(1) (1991-92),1 a felony punishable by life imprisonment. 
 The complaint also alleged that Byrge was responsible for four 
other crimes: (1) hiding a corpse contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.11(2), (2) false imprisonment contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.30, 
(3) 
bail 
jumping 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b), and (4) operating a motor vehicle without the 
owner's consent contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.23(2).  
 
¶10 The Circuit Court for Calumet County conducted a 
preliminary hearing on September 16, 1994, and the court bound 
Byrge over for trial on all counts.  The prosecution filed an 
Information that same day, alleging the same charges as those 
set forth in the criminal complaint.  
 
¶11 Byrge pled not guilty to all charges on September 23, 
1994.  One month later, on October 24, 1994, Byrge amended his 
pleas to include NGI pleas to the charges.  On November 15, 
1994, Byrge entered pleas of no contest to all the charges 
except the false imprisonment charge.  These modifications were 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1991-92 volumes unless indicated otherwise. 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
6 
not the result of a plea agreement.  The NGI pleas remained 
intact as to all five charges.  
 
¶12 Three psychiatrists examined Byrge and filed reports 
with respect to the NGI pleas.2  A court-appointed expert, Dr. 
Ralph K. Baker, examined Byrge on December 16.  Dr. A.A. Lorenz, 
the psychiatrist selected by Byrge, evaluated him on March 3, 
1995.  The state's expert, Dr. Frederick Fosdal, interviewed 
Byrge on March 13.  
 
¶13 On March 20 Byrge's trial counsel, Joseph Norby 
(Norby), filed a motion requesting a competency evaluation.  
Nine days later the circuit court appointed Dr. Baker to examine 
Byrge for competency to stand trial.3  Board certified in both 
psychiatry and neurology, Baker had evaluated more than 1,000 
individuals for competency by the time of Byrge's hearing.  Both 
Byrge and the State had placed Baker on their lists of 
psychiatrists acceptable as experts.  
                     
2 Under Wis. Stat. § 971.16(3), the examiner's report must 
address:  
[T]he ability of the defendant to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform 
the defendant's conduct with the requirements of law 
at the time of the commission of the criminal offense 
charged 
and, . . . whether 
the 
defendant 
needs 
medication or treatment and whether the defendant is 
not competent to refuse medication or treatment for 
the defendant's mental condition. 
 
3 A 
competency 
to 
proceed 
report 
sets 
forth 
"[t]he 
examiner's opinion regarding the defendant's present mental 
capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his or her 
defense."  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(c). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
7 
¶14 Baker evaluated Byrge for competency to proceed on 
April 14.  During this examination, Byrge at first remained 
silent.  Baker concluded that this silence was not the product 
of mental illness because Byrge agreed, albeit reluctantly, to 
speak with Baker after consulting Norby.  Baker later testified 
that his findings from both this examination and the evaluation 
he had conducted with respect to the NGI pleas helped Baker 
determine many factors about Byrge that bore on competency.  
¶15 The circuit court commenced the competency hearing on 
Friday, April 21, but postponed the proceeding until the 
following Monday because Dr. Baker was unavailable.  When the 
hearing reconvened on April 24, the district attorney informed 
the court that Byrge had cut himself with glass earlier in the 
morning and that Byrge still might have glass in his mouth.  
Norby indicated that he and Byrge had had differences that day, 
culminating in a physical and verbal confrontation.  Norby 
informed the court that he "never had been faced with a 
situation like this before," and that he was "at a loss as to 
how to proceed."  The court and the attorneys agreed to bring 
Byrge into the courtroom under restraints and shackled to a 
wheelchair to protect courtroom personnel and Norby.   
¶16 The court first addressed Byrge.  Byrge did not 
respond when Judge Deets inquired whether he was competent or 
incompetent.  Following the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b), the court and the parties agreed that Byrge's 
decision to stand mute would require the court to find Byrge 
incompetent unless the State proved otherwise.   
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
8 
 
¶17 Dr. Baker was the only witness that testified at the 
competency 
hearing. 
 
Baker 
explained 
that 
a 
competency 
evaluation 
determines 
whether 
a 
defendant 
is 
capable 
of 
cooperating with an attorney and assisting with the defense.  
Baker found that Byrge was able to understand the proceedings 
and assist his attorney.  Byrge, Baker observed, "was not 
mentally ill or malingering, he simply was distressed at the 
number of things that occurred in jail and the possibility of 
the trial."  Baker found that Byrge was aware of both the 
charges against him and the many factors involved in the legal 
process.   
¶18 Baker noted that Byrge had suicidal thoughts and that 
his actions indicated he might not care what happened to him.  
He observed that Byrge has a "great deal of anxiety and 
frustration and depression."  But Baker also testified that this 
condition did not affect competency because Byrge was not 
"unable to cooperate with his attorney or in any way function at 
the trial."  
¶19 Following Dr. Baker's testimony, the court asked Norby 
if he wished to present additional evidence.  Norby stated: 
 
I am in a situation where Iif other counsel were 
representing Mr. Byrge, he may have wanted to call me 
as a witness, and I can't call myself and I can't 
testify . . . without violating the privilege that Mr. 
Byrge has with me, I am hamstrung, I really can't say 
anything.  So if the court is asking if there is 
additional evidence I would like to offer, yes.  But 
can I offer it at this point?  I don't think I can. 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
9 
Norby did not ask the court to call Dr. Lorenz or Dr. Fosdal as 
witnesses, and he did not call the court's attention to the 
reports from those two psychiatrists.  The reports of Drs. 
Lorenz and Fosdal were not entered as exhibits at the competency 
hearing, but were later received into evidence on the State's 
motion.   
 
¶20 The court found that Byrge was competent to proceed.  
Thereafter, Byrge sought to withdraw his pleas of no contest to 
four of the offenses, and the court denied the motion.  Byrge 
also sought to withdraw his NGI pleas.  After conducting a 
colloquy with Byrge, the court allowed the withdrawal of the NGI 
pleas.  Four charges thus remained to which Byrge had pled no 
contest, namely first-degree intentional homicide, hiding a 
corpse, bail jumping, and operating a motor vehicle without 
consent.  The court found Byrge guilty on all four counts.  
¶21 On June 21, 1995, the court sentenced Byrge to life 
imprisonment 
on 
the 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
conviction, setting a parole eligibility date of July 2, 2095.4  
The court also imposed a consecutive five-year term on Byrge's 
conviction in the hiding a corpse offense and concurrent five-
year terms on the bail jumping and operating without consent 
convictions.  
¶22 Byrge filed a post-conviction motion, essentially 
presenting four bases of relief.  First, Byrge challenged the 
trial court's finding that he was competent to proceed.  Second, 
                     
4 Byrge was born on July 2, 1975.   
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
10
he claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel with respect to both the competency proceeding and the 
withdrawal of the no contest pleas.  Third, Byrge contended that 
the no contest pleas were not entered knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently.  Fourth, Byrge claimed that the plea colloquy 
was defective because the court never advised Byrge on the 
record that the maximum sentence was life in prison without 
possibility of parole.  The circuit court rejected Byrge's 
claims.  
¶23 Byrge appealed, arguing that an appellate court should 
utilize an independent standard when reviewing a competency 
determination and challenging the circuit court's determination 
that he was competent to stand trial.  He also maintained that a 
sentencing court should be required to inform a defendant about 
parole eligibility before accepting a plea.  Finally, Byrge 
asked the court of appeals to review his contention that his 
trial counsel was ineffective. 
¶24 The court of appeals certified the case to this court, 
Byrge 225 Wis. 2d at 711 n.2, but we declined the certification. 
 The court of appeals then affirmed the decision of the circuit 
court, holding that, under the precedent established by Garfoot, 
207 Wis. 2d 214, a court of appeals is bound to employ the 
clearly erroneous methodology in reviewing a circuit court's 
competency determination.  Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 711-12.  Under 
that deferential standard, the court of appeals confined its 
review to the record of the competency hearing and affirmed the 
finding of the circuit court that Byrge was competent to stand 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
11
trial.  Id. at 713-14.  The court of appeals also held that a 
sentencing court is not obligated to notify a defendant about 
parole eligibility information because parole eligibility is a 
collateral, not a direct, consequence of the plea.  Id. at 716-
17.  Finally, the court held that Byrge had failed to establish 
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 727. 
¶25 In accepting Byrge's petition for review, this court 
declined to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
 Order dated June 15, 1999, at 2. 
COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS IN GENERAL 
¶26 We begin by addressing the purpose of competency 
determinations.  Competence to stand trial is a cornerstone of 
our criminal justice system.  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 
171-72 (1975).  Anglo-American law long has recognized that 
incompetent defendants cannot be compelled to stand trial.5  
"[O]nly where a defendant is mentally competent will he be able 
to exercise effectively the rights which this society extends to 
persons charged with committing a crime."  State ex rel. Matalik 
v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 322, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Criminal prosecutions of incompetent 
defendants impinge on at least two principles of fundamental 
fairness.  First, a person should not be tried in absentia. 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214 at 221 (citation omitted).  Although an 
                     
5 See generally State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 
Wis. 2d 315, 321, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973) (quoting 4 Blackstone, 
Commentaries *24, *25 (1897)); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 
356-57 (1996). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
12
incompetent 
defendant 
physically 
may 
be 
present 
in 
the 
courtroom, in reality he or she may not be able to participate 
in the defense.6  Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.  Second, an incompetent 
person may lack the ability to be informed about the charges and 
to confront the accuser.  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 221; Cooper v. 
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 357 n.8 (1996). 
¶27 Defendants who are tried and convicted while legally 
incompetent are deprived of a due process right to a fair trial. 
 Drope 420 U.S. at 172; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 385 
(1966). Consequently, both federal and state courts permit the 
suspension of a criminal proceeding against an incompetent 
accused person.  Matalik, 57 Wis. 2d at 321-22.  Under federal 
case law, the due process test for determining competency 
considers whether the defendant: (1) "has sufficient present 
ability to consult" with his or her lawyer "with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding;" and (2) "has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings."  Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).  Thus, a 
defendant is incompetent if he or she lacks the capacity to 
understand the nature and object of the proceedings, to consult 
with counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his or her 
defense.  Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. 
                     
6 See also Luke Stephen Vadas, Casenote, Godinez v. Moran:  
An Insane Rule for Competency?, 39 Loy. L. Rev. 903, 906 (1994).  
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
13
¶28 In Wisconsin, the trial of an incompetent defendant 
also violates state law.7  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.13(1) codifies 
the due process test set forth in Dusky, providing that, "No 
person who lacks substantial mental capacity to understand the 
proceedings or assist in his or her defense may be tried, 
convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long 
as the incapacity endures."  See Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 222.  
This two-part "understand-and-assist" test constitutes the core 
of the competency-to-stand-trial analysis.   
 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14 amplifies the basic rule of 
the understand-and-assist test by setting forth the procedures 
for a competency determination.  A court "shall proceed under 
[the provisions of § 971.14] whenever there is reason to doubt a 
defendant's competency to proceed."  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(1).  A 
reason to doubt competency can arise from the defendant's 
demeanor in the courtroom, colloquies with the court, or by a 
motion from either party.  State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 
131, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994); see also State v. Johnson, 133 
Wis. 2d 207, 220, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986) (defense counsel must 
raise issue of competency when reason to doubt competency 
arises). 
¶30 Once 
such 
doubt 
exists, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(2) 
requires the circuit court to appoint one or more examiners to 
                     
7 Because an incompetent defendant's right not to stand 
trial is rooted deeply in constitutional principles, individual 
states may not impose procedural burdens that are incompatible 
with the protections offered by the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  Cooper, 517 U.S. at 367-69.  
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
14
perform a competency examination.  See State v. McKnight, 65 
Wis. 2d 582, 594, 223 N.W.2d 550 (1974).  An examiner reports to 
the court his or her findings "regarding the defendant's present 
mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his 
or her defense."  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3).  If the district 
attorney, 
the 
defendant, 
and 
defense 
counsel 
waive 
the 
opportunity to present evidence beyond the examiner's report, 
the court makes its competency determination.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b).  Absent a waiver, the circuit court conducts a 
competency hearing.  Id.  The court must find the defendant 
incompetent unless the State can prove, by the greater weight of 
the credible evidence, that the defendant is competent.  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14(4)(b); Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 221-22. 
¶31 Competency to stand trial constitutes a judicial 
inquiry, 
not 
a 
medical 
determination. 
 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee's Note, 1981, § 971.13(1), Stats.  "Requiring that a 
criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim:  It seeks to 
ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings 
and to assist counsel."  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 
(1993).  A court must determine whether the defendant can 
understand the proceedings and assist counsel "with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding."  Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 
126.  Although a defendant may have a history of psychiatric 
illness, a medical condition does not necessarily render the 
defendant incompetent to stand trial.  State ex rel. Haskins v. 
County Court of Dodge County, 62 Wis. 2d 250, 264-65, 214 N.W.2d 
575 (1974).  To determine legal competency, the court considers 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
15
a defendant's present mental capacity to understand and assist 
at the time of the proceedings.  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(c); 
McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d at 595. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR COMPETENCY HEARINGS 
 
¶32 Having addressed the purpose of competency to stand 
trial, we now turn to the first issue in this case, namely which 
standard of review an appellate court must employ when reviewing 
the competency determination of a circuit court.  Byrge asks 
this court to adopt the position of the concurrence in Garfoot, 
207 Wis. 2d at 229 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring), arguing that 
the issue of competency is a question of constitutional fact, or 
a mixed question of fact and law, subject at least partially to 
independent 
review. 
 
The 
State 
maintains 
competency 
determinations should be reviewed as questions of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard endorsed by the majority opinion in 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 223-24.  As a threshold matter, we note 
that whether an issue presents a question of fact or a question 
of law is in itself a question of law.  Crowley v. Knapp, 94 
Wis. 2d 421, 429-30, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). 
 
¶33 In Garfoot, a majority of this court held that 
competency to stand trial must be reviewed under the deferential 
clearly erroneous standard.  Garfoot approached competency 
determinations as functionally factual inquiries.  Garfoot, 207 
Wis. 2d at 223, 225.  Findings of fact are not set aside unless 
they are clearly erroneous, and appellate courts give due regard 
to a circuit court's opportunity to assess the credibility of 
witnesses.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  We reasoned that competency 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
16
determinations merit this level of deference because the circuit 
court can balance witness credibility and demeanor: 
 
The trial court is in the best position to decide 
whether the evidence of competence outweighs the 
evidence of incompetence.  Although the court could 
make precise findings of fact about the skills and 
abilities the defendant does and does not possess, the 
court must ultimately determine whether evidence that 
the defendant is competent is more convincing than the 
evidence that he or she is not.  The trial court is in 
the best position to make decisions that require 
conflicting evidence to be weighed.  Although the 
court 
must 
ultimately 
apply 
a 
legal 
test, 
its 
determination is functionally a factual one:  either 
the state has convinced the court that the defendant 
has 
the 
skills 
and 
abilities 
to 
be 
considered 
"competent," or it has not. 
 
The trial court's superior ability to observe the 
defendant and the other evidence presented requires 
deference to the trial court's decision that a 
defendant is or is not competent to stand trial.  Only 
the trial court can judge the credibility of witnesses 
who testify at the competency hearing.  Thus, only the 
trail court can accurately determine whether the state 
presented evidence that was sufficiently convincing to 
meet its burden of proving that the defendant is 
competent to stand trial. 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 222-23. 
 
¶34 Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, joined by Justice 
Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Janine P. Geske, concurred in 
Garfoot.  Emphasizing the constitutional basis of a competency 
hearing, 
the 
concurrence 
maintained 
that 
a 
competency 
determination implicates a question of constitutional fact, a 
mixed question of fact and law, subject to a two-tier standard 
of review.  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 229, 231-32.  (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring).  Under this methodology, an appellate court 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
17
first applies the deferential, clearly erroneous standard in its 
review of the historical, evidentiary facts.  Id. at 234.  The 
reviewing court then independently analyzes the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts.  Id. at 234-35. 
 
¶35 Justice William A. Bablitch concurred separately in 
Garfoot, finding the concurrence authored by Chief Justice 
Abrahamson "fairly persuasive" but concluding that the court 
should await a better briefed case in which the standard of 
review is actually at issue before rejecting the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Id. at 238 (Bablitch, J., concurring).   
¶36 The standard of review is at issue in this case, and 
both parties have briefed the issue thoroughly.  We therefore 
revisit our holding in Garfoot.  We begin by considering how the 
United States Supreme Court treats the standard of review in 
competency 
hearings. 
 
This 
court 
frequently 
has 
sought 
uniformity in the law by following the Supreme Court in 
constitutional interpretation.  See Isiah B. v. State, 176 
Wis. 2d 639, 646, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993). 
¶37 The Garfoot concurrence pointed to our independent 
review of many issues characterized as constitutional facts, 
including the sufficiency of Miranda warnings, voluntariness of 
confessions, voluntariness of consent to search, and whether the 
right to silence has been honored.  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 235 
n.11.  In these areas of inquiry, our constitutional decision 
making has conformed with the interpretations set forth by the 
Supreme 
Court. 
 
The 
Court 
appraises 
similar 
questions 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
18
independently, recognizing the "uniquely legal dimension" of 
those issues.8  Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1995). 
¶38 This court's goal of seeking uniformity leads us to 
consider the manner in which the Supreme Court classifies 
appellate review of competency determinations.  Although the 
Court certainly categorizes some issues as constitutional facts, 
it does not treat all constitutional questions identically.  The 
Court's approach reveals that competency falls within a unique 
sphere of inquiry, a sphere in which the issue turns on more 
than historical facts but nonetheless requires appellate courts 
to grant deference to the findings of a trial court. 
¶39 The difference between constitutional facts, mixed 
questions of fact and law, and historical facts, or simply 
questions of fact, is "often fuzzy at best."9  Container Corp. v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983).  The Supreme Court 
itself acknowledges that it "has not charted an entirely clear 
course" in the elusive arena of distinguishing between legal and 
factual questions.  Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 (1985); 
                     
8 The Supreme Court treats the following as constitutional 
facts, situations in which the Court reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the historical facts independently: 
 Voluntariness of a confession, Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 
(1985); probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations, 
Ornelas 
v. 
United 
States, 
517 
U.S. 
690, 
699 
(1996); 
determination whether suspect was "in custody" for Miranda 
purposes, Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); 
effectiveness of counsel's assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984); application of Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 (1977).  
9 See generally George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 
1986 Duke L.J. 747, 772 (1986). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
19
see also Cooter & Fell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 
(1990).  Whether to label an issue a "question of law," a 
"question of fact," or a "mixed question of law and fact" often 
is more a matter of allocation than analysis, an allocation in 
which the Court recognizes that one judicial actor is better 
positioned than another to decide a matter.  Miller, 474 U.S. at 
113-14. 
 
¶40 Initially, the Supreme Court suggested that reviews of 
competency determinations comprise mixed questions of fact and 
law.  Under that methodology the Court first examined the trial 
court's findings of historical facts deferentially but then 
reviewed independently the ultimate question of competency.  
Because the determination of competency implicates due process 
protections, the Court suggested that it was appropriate for it 
to undertake its own independent review of the application of 
constitutional principles.  Drope, 420 U.S. at 175 n.10; 
Robinson, 383 U.S. at 385-86. 
¶41 The Supreme Court has retooled its approach and now 
treats competency determinations more like questions of fact.  
In Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam), a 
majority of the Court held that its review of a competency 
determination 
must 
be 
confined 
to 
the 
clearly 
erroneous 
standard.10  Fulford was the result of a habeas corpus 
proceeding. 
 
A 
Louisiana 
trial 
court 
refused 
to 
order 
                     
10 In line with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8), the Supreme Court 
used the phrase "not 'fairly supported by the record.'" Maggio 
v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (per curiam).  
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
20
examination by a competency commission after assessing the 
testimony of a psychiatrist who interviewed the defendant for 
about one hour the day before the hearing.  Id. at 113.  In its 
review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the decision of the trial court was not supported by 
the record.  Id.  The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that 
the appellate court "erroneously substituted its own judgment as 
to the credibility of witnesses for that of the Louisiana 
courts."  Id.  In finding that a trial court is better 
positioned to reach the ultimate competency determination, the 
Court reasoned: 
 
Face to face with living witnesses the original trier 
of the facts holds a position of advantage from which 
appellate judges are excluded.  In doubtful cases the 
exercise of his power of observation often proves the 
most 
accurate 
method 
of 
ascertaining 
the 
truth . . . how can we say the judge is wrong?  We 
never saw the witnesses. . . .  
Id. at 118 (citations omitted). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
21
 
¶42 Fulford was the product of a divided Court.11  Since 
Fulford, however, the Court has not departed from its decision 
to allocate the ultimate decision of competency to the trial 
court.  Two years after Fulford, Justice O'Connor, writing for 
the majority in Miller, concluded that certain trial court 
findings, including competency to stand trial, should be 
afforded deference because their resolution hinges on witness 
credibility, and hence, evaluation of demeanor.  474 U.S. 112-
13.  Such areas of inquiry offer compelling justifications "for 
leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial court." 
 Id. at 114.  Subsequently, Justice Ginsburg reiterated this 
view when she authored the majority opinion in Thompson.  She 
noted 
that 
although 
certain 
issues, 
including 
competency 
determinations, embody more than basic, historical facts, they 
                     
11 Four justices suggested that the majority was overruling 
those cases in which the Court had held that the review of a 
competency determination presents a mixed question of fact and 
law:  Justice White concurred in the judgment but disagreed with 
the majority's conclusion "that competency is a question of 
historical fact."  Fulford, 462 U.S. at 119 (1983) (White, J., 
concurring).  Justice Marshall dissented, finding that,  "Our 
decisions clearly establish that whether a competence hearing 
should have been held is a mixed question of law and fact which 
is subject to full federal review."  Id. at 120 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Stevens joined, 
also dissented.  He agreed with Justice Marshall's views on the 
standard of review but disagreed with him about whether the 
Court should schedule the case for oral argument.  Id. (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
22
nonetheless fall within a genre of decisions that the court 
classifies as "factual issues."  516 U.S. at 111.12 
 
¶43 Many 
federal courts 
follow 
Fulford, 
Miller, and 
Thompson in habeas corpus proceedings, treating competency 
determinations as factual issues left to the discretion of state 
                     
12 See also Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735, 737 
(1990) (per curiam) (under Fulford, state court's conclusion 
regarding a defendant's competency is binding on a federal 
habeas court and noting that court of appeals did not personally 
observe the defendant and therefore had no reason to overturn 
what is essentially a factual determination). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
23
trial courts.13  Deference to trial courts is not, however, 
limited to federal habeas corpus reviews of state court 
                     
13 "After Miller, practical considerations govern.  A court 
should 
determine 
whether, 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
the 
sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is in a better 
situation to apply historical facts to a 'pristine' legal 
standard."  Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 
1988).  See also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1341 
(2d Cir. 1990) (citing Fulford for proposition that "[a] 
defendant's competence to stand trial is a question of fact"); 
United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1986); 
Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 1989) (competence 
to stand trial is a question of fact); Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 
1024, 1030-31 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing which questions, after 
Fulford and Miller, Supreme Court treats as questions of fact or 
mixed questions of fact and law, and noting that competency to 
stand trial is a question of fact); United States v. Williams, 
819 F.2d 605, 607 (5th Cir. 1987) (after Fulford, "the question 
of the defendant's competency is a question of fact as opposed 
to a mixed question of law and fact or a question of law"); Ray 
v. Duckworth, 881 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1989) ("we must be 
careful to give due regard to the trial court's superior ability 
to draw the appropriate inferences from its observation of the 
defendant and expert witnesses"); Estock v. Lane, 842 F.2d 184, 
186 (7th Cir. 1988) (reviewing court owes deference to state 
trial court because of its ability to observe the demeanor of 
witnesses); United State ex rel. Mireles v. Greer, 736 F.2d 
1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that Fulford Court 
reshaped what was "heretofore considered at least a mixed 
question of law and fact with respect to the issue of 
competency"); United States v. Johns, 728 F.2d 953, 956 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (overruling previous standard of mixed determination 
of law and fact and holding that "clearly erroneous" standard 
applies on appeal to trial court's findings in a competency 
determination); Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 682 n.8 (9th Cir. 
1999) (distinguishing which determinations under Supreme Court 
precedent are reviewed independently and which are treated 
deferentially); Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 
1986) (finding that after Miller, trial court's competency 
determination should be afforded deference even though it might 
be a mixed question of fact and law); Oats v. Singletary, 141 
F.3d 1018, 1025 (11th Cir. 1998) (observing that under Fulford, 
a state court's determination of competency to stand trial is a 
finding of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard); 
United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1371-72 (11th Cir. 1993) 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
24
decisions.  A number of state courts apply the Fulford line of 
cases to appellate review of competency proceedings.14  These 
courts implicitly acknowledge that the Fulford methodology is 
                                                                  
(noting that "as interpreted in Baal, the Supreme Court's 
[Fulford] decision stands for the proposition that a state 
court's conclusion that a defendant is competent to stand trial 
is a factfinding" and overruling Eleventh Circuit's prior 
treatment of competency as a mixed question of fact and law).  
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not spoken 
with one voice on the issue.  In 1997 the court cited Fulford 
and Miller for the proposition that competency is a question of 
fact.  Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 460 n.13 (5th Cir. 
1997).  One year earlier, the court had treated competency as a 
mixed question of law and fact, in which it suggested that an 
appellate court should take a "hard look" at the ultimate 
competency finding.  Washington v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 945, 951 
(5th Cir. 1996).  See also Coe v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 922, 926 
(M.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting that standard of review in the Sixth 
Circuit remains a mixed question of fact and law, even though 
"[s]ince 
the 
ruling 
in 
[Fulford], 
the 
Supreme 
Court . . . confirmed that it has classified as a factual issue 
the question of competency to stand trial"); Reynolds v. Norris, 
86 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1996) (implementing standard under which 
appellate court gives deference to state trial court's factual 
finding of competence, but presumption of correctness does not 
extend to question whether defendant was denied due process); 
Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1991) (court 
reviews application of due process protections independently). 
14 Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 271 (Tenn. 1999) (citing 
Fulford for proposition that, "Although likely based upon expert 
medical and mental health testimony, the ultimate question as to 
whether the prisoner is competent is a question of fact");  
State v. Cowans, 717 N.E.2d 298, 313 (Ohio 1999) (Fulford 
illustrates principle that competency is a factual determination 
best left to the trial judge's observations of the defendant's 
conduct); State v. Edwards, 572 N.W.2d 113, 117 (S.D. 1997) 
(relying on Fulford and finding that "a trial court is better 
able than we are to judge the demeanor of the accused").  See 
also State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 72 (Wash. 1990) (en banc); 
Brooks v. State, 882 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); People 
v. Morino, 743 P.2d 49, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
25
appropriate 
for 
competency 
determinations 
because 
of 
the 
qualitatively factual nature of the inquiry, not because of the 
particular posture of a federal habeas corpus proceeding.15  Like 
federal courts, these state courts recognize that trial judges 
are better positioned than appellate judges to observe a 
defendant's conduct and to gauge the credibility and demeanor of 
witnesses.16 
                     
15 In a habeas corpus review, other factors, such as the 
interests of comity and federalism, also provide reasons for 
deferring to the factual findings of a state court.  See Estock, 
842 F.2d at 187 n.2.  But federalism concerns, see State v. 
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 237 n.14 (1997) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring), are not what led the Court to review competency 
determinations under a deferential, "question of fact" standard. 
 In Fulford and its successors, the important factor was the 
ability of the trial court to have face-to-face contact with 
witnesses.  Fulford, 462 U.S. at 118.  
16 See Commonwealth v. Robbins, 2000 WL 565218 *2-3 (Mass. 
2000) ("we must give weight to the judge's opportunity to 
observe the defendant's demeanor"); State v. Cowans, 717 N.E.2d 
298, 313 (Ohio 1999) (trial judge's observations of defendant's 
conduct 
provided 
support 
for 
conclusion 
that 
defendant's 
competence did not warrant further inquiry); State v. Edwards, 
572 N.W.2d 113, 117-18 (S.D. 1997) (facts and circumstances 
before the trial court indicated that trial court's decision to 
deny competency hearing did not violate defendant's due process 
rights); State v. Janto, 986 P.2d 306, 315-16 (Haw. 1999) 
(overruling mixed question of law and fact standard and adopting 
"abuse of discretion" standard); State v. Heger, 326 N.W.2d 855, 
858 (N.D. 1982) ("Whether or not a defendant is competent to 
stand trial is a question of fact for the trial judge"); People 
v. Castro, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 
(recognizing "general rule on appeal [ ] that a finding of 
competence to stand trial cannot be disturbed"); Reed v. State, 
2000 WL 233167 *2 (Tex. App. 2000) (issue whether incompetency 
exists is left to the discretion of trial judge).  See also 
State v. Zorzy, 622 A.2d 1217, 1219-20 (N.H. 1993); People v. 
Danielson, 838 P.2d 729, 749 (Cal. 1992); People v. Morino, 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
26
 
¶44 Based on our analysis of the case law since Fulford, 
we conclude that the Supreme Court classifies competency to 
stand trial within a discrete category in which the resolution 
of the legal issue is better left to the trial court.17  
Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111; Miller, 474 U.S. at 112-13.  Although 
more than the "what happened" types of historical facts arise in 
a competency determination, the decision pivots on factors only 
a trial court can appraise.  Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111.  In a 
competency proceeding, the ultimate resolution of the legal 
issue rests on the court's observation of witness credibility 
and demeanor.18  "An issue does not lose its factual character 
                     
17 The Supreme Court has found that the following also 
constitute questions of fact only:  Voluntariness of a guilty 
plea, Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983), and juror 
bias, Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985), and Patton 
v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1034-40 (1984). 
18 The circuit judge has a unique vantage from which to make 
a competency determination because the judge has significant 
personal exposure to the defendant.  The judge is better able to 
assess a defendant's orientation to time, place, and persons 
than an appellate court reviewing a paper record.  Only the 
judge can evaluate whether the defendant answers a question 
quickly or haltingly, thereby showing whether the defendant 
grasps the inquiry.  Only the judge can hear the inflection and 
volume of the defendant's voice and observe the defendant's 
posture, attention span, eye contact, and focus on a witness.  
Only the judge can watch the defendant's reaction, including 
body language, to events in the courtroom.  The judge also can 
determine whether the defendant is performing for the appellate 
record. 
The judge can note whether the defendant confers with 
counsel while seated at the defense table.  Such communication 
is a direct reflection of the defendant's ability to understand 
the proceedings and assist his or her lawyer. 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
27
merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate 
constitutional challenge."  Miller, 474 U.S. at 106.  We 
therefore are persuaded that the circuit court is the judicial 
actor best positioned to apply a legal standard to the facts of 
a competency decision. 
¶45 In the interest of uniformity and consistency in 
constitutional decision making, we follow the interpretation of 
the Supreme Court and allocate the application of law to fact to 
the circuit court in competency proceedings.  Because a 
competency determination depends on the circuit court's ability 
to appraise witness credibility and demeanor, "there are 
compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process 
of applying law to fact to the trial court."  Id. at 114.  We 
therefore do not disturb our holding in Garfoot and adhere to 
the clearly erroneous standard for reviewing circuit court 
determinations in competency proceedings. 
CIRCUIT COURT'S DETERMINATION OF COMPETENCY 
 
¶46 Having examined the threshold issue, standard of 
review, we now turn to the second issue by examining the circuit 
court's determination that Byrge was competent to stand trial.  
Under the standard that applies to competency determinations, we 
will not reverse the circuit court's decision unless it was 
clearly erroneous.  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d  at 223-24. 
¶47 The only witness to testify at Byrge's hearing was Dr. 
Baker, the court-appointed 
psychiatrist 
who 
conducted the 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
28
competency evaluation of Byrge.19  Byrge, however, asks this 
court also to review the reports submitted by Drs. Lorenz and 
Fosdal.  We decline to do so.  Both Drs. Lorenz and Fosdal 
conducted their evaluations for the NGI pleas; they did not 
examine Byrge for the purposes of a competency determination.20  
An examination for purposes of NGI considers the ability of the 
"defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's 
conduct 
or 
to 
conform 
the 
defendant's 
conduct 
with 
the 
requirements of law at the time of the commission of the 
criminal offense."  Wis. Stat. § 971.16(3).  An evaluation for 
competency to stand trial assesses "the defendant's present 
mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his 
or her defense."  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(c).   
¶48 The aims of a competency hearing are modest, seeking 
to verify that the defendant can satisfy the understand-and-
assist test.  See Moran, 509 U.S. at 402.  The hearing need not 
establish 
a psychiatric 
classification 
of 
the 
defendant's 
condition.  Id.  Section 971.13(1) contemplates a judicial, not 
                     
19 The court gave Byrge's attorney the opportunity to call 
other witnesses, but he did not call Drs. Lorenz and Fosdal.  
Drs. Lorenz, Fosdal, and Baker all were scheduled to testify at 
the trial.  The State entered the two exhibits during the 
discussion of Byrge's withdrawal of his NGI pleas. 
20 Moreover, the reports by Drs. Lorenz and Fosdal were not 
entered as exhibits until competency had been determined.  
Hence, the circuit court apparently did not utilize them in 
making its determination.  
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
29
a clinical, inquiry,21 and our courts treat competency to stand 
trial as a legal standard, not a medical determination.  See 
Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 265.  Elaborate psychiatric evaluations 
sometimes introduce a clinical diagnosis that may not speak to 
competency to proceed.  Id. at 264-65.  A history of irrational 
behavior 
and 
prior 
medical 
opinions 
about 
a 
defendant's 
condition, like a defendant's demeanor, can serve as indicia in 
the competency determination.  Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.  But 
clinical 
reports 
occasionally 
state 
that 
a 
defendant 
is 
incompetent "when what really was meant was merely that the 
defendant had some mental illness which required treatment."  
Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 265. 
¶49 Even if a defendant has suffered past psychiatric 
episodes, he or she nonetheless may evince sufficient present 
ability to proceed.  See Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 263 (quoting 
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402).  Consequently, a court looks at the 
defendant's 
"present 
mental 
capacity" 
to 
understand 
the 
proceedings 
and 
to 
assist 
counsel 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
proceedings.  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(c); McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d at 
595; see also Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 222-23. 
 
¶50 In this case Byrge essentially asks this court to 
inject a medical determination into the legal standard.  He 
                     
21 "Competency 
is 
a 
judicial 
rather 
than 
a 
medical 
determination.  Not every mentally disordered defendant is 
incompetent; the court must consider the degree of impairment in 
the defendant's capacity to assist counsel and make decisions 
which counsel cannot make for him or her."  Judicial Council 
Committee Note, 1981, § 971.13(1), Stats. 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
30
argues that the circuit court should have found him incompetent 
to proceed because he suffered from psychological, mental, and 
psychiatric problems.  We decline to do so.  Dr. Baker 
recognized the distinction between the medical classification 
and 
legal 
competency 
to 
proceed. 
 
He 
interviewed 
Byrge 
twiceonce for the NGI evaluation and later for competency to 
stand trial.  He differentiated between the two types of 
evaluations when he noted that his first examination measured 
"mental 
responsibility," 
whereas 
the 
competency 
evaluation 
determined if Byrge could cooperate with counsel and assist with 
his own defense.  
¶51 Baker concluded that Byrge was able to understand the 
proceedings and assist in the defense.  He found Byrge "was not 
mentally ill or malingering, he simply was distressed at the 
number of things that occurred in jail and the possibility of 
the trial."  Baker testified that Byrge was aware of both the 
charges against him and the many factors involved in the legal 
process.  Although Baker agreed Byrge might be suicidal or 
depressed, he testified that the condition did not affect legal 
competency because Byrge was not "unable to cooperate with his 
attorney or in any way function at the trial."   
¶52 The circuit court concluded that the State had proven 
that Byrge was competent because he had "substantial capacity to 
understand the proceedings and assist in his own defense."  The 
court addressed the credibility and demeanor of the witness and 
of the defendant.  Emphasizing its confidence in Baker's 
abilities, his testimony in numerous past cases, and his 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
31
credentials, the circuit court stated that it could listen to 
Baker's telephone testimony and make a determination without 
"look[ing] in his eyes."  Byrge was present at the hearing, 
shackled to a wheelchair.  The court noted the constraints on 
Byrge's physical liberty and did not discount them in its 
competency determination.  The record makes no indication that 
Byrge was agitated or disruptive during the proceeding. 
¶53 The findings of the circuit court are supported by the 
testimony of Dr. Baker and the circuit court's observation of 
Byrge's demeanor.  Based on the record before us, we find that 
the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when 
it found Byrge competent to stand trial.  We therefore decline 
to second-guess the factual determination of the circuit court. 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY INFORMATION 
 
¶54 Having affirmed the circuit court's determination that 
Byrge was competent to stand trial, we next address the third 
issue, namely whether a circuit court, before accepting a plea 
of guilty or no contest, must inform a defendant that it 
possesses the authority to fix the parole eligibility date.  
Byrge 
contends 
that 
his 
pleas 
were 
not 
knowingly 
and 
intelligently entered because the circuit court did not warn him 
that the maximum penalty was not merely a life sentence, but a 
life sentence without the possibility of parole. 
 
¶55 We begin by noting that the standard of review for 
this issue differs from the standard that we have applied thus 
far in this case.  Whether a plea was entered knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
32
constitutional fact.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 283, 
389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) (citing Miller, 474 U.S. 104).  We will not 
disturb a circuit court's findings of historical, evidentiary 
facts unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Bollig, 2000 
WI 6, ¶13, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199.  However, we review 
the 
application 
of 
the 
law 
to 
the 
historical 
facts 
independently.  Id.  Under this standard, an appellate court may 
look to the entire record in the course of its review.  Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 283. 
 
¶56 When a circuit court sentences a defendant to life 
imprisonment, it must make a parole eligibility determination.  
As it applied to Byrge, Wis. Stat. § 973.014 required the 
sentencing court to exercise one of two options by:  1) 
determining that the defendant is eligible for parole under Wis. 
Stat. § 304.06, or 2) setting a parole eligibility date.  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.014(1)-(2).22  In this case the circuit court 
exercised the second alternative under Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) 
and set Byrge's parole eligibility date at July 2, 2095.  The 
court noted that on that date, Byrge would be 120 years old.23  
                     
22 The current version of Wis. Stat. § 973.014 provides the 
court with a third option, namely to determine that the person 
is not eligible for parole.  Although the statute has been 
amended, the change does not affect our analysis.  
23 Judge Deets remarked: 
I am aware that some people live to be 110, and maybe 
with the advances of medical science, that you might 
have the capability of living to 110.  I have my 
doubts.  But to be on the safe side, and for the 
reasons that this court has stated, I believe that the 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
33
Although the circuit court engaged in an extensive colloquy with 
Byrge at the plea hearing, it did not inform Byrge about its 
options regarding the setting of parole eligibility or its 
authority to fix a parole eligibility date. 
 
¶57 It is well established that a criminal defendant must 
enter a plea of guilty or no contest knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently.  Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶15.  When a defendant is not 
aware of the potential punishment, the plea is not entered 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and the result is a 
manifest injustice.  State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 
Wis. 2d 615, 635-36, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).   
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 governs the plea colloquy 
procedure a circuit court must follow to ensure that a plea is 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  The circuit court must 
"[a]ddress the defendant personally and determine that the plea 
is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge and the potential punishment if convicted."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a).   
¶59 The issue here effectively requires us to decide 
whether 
parole 
eligibility 
directly 
reflects 
a 
potential 
punishment under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).  If it does, then 
the circuit court should have addressed parole eligibility in 
                                                                  
parole eligibility date should be set for July 2, 
2095, when you would be 120 years old. 
 
A court may impose a parole eligibility date beyond the 
expected lifetime of a defendant.  State v. Setagord, 211 
Wis. 2d 397, 414, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997). 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
34
its plea colloquy with Byrge.  When a defendant makes a prima 
facie showing that the circuit court did not conform with the 
statutory procedures of § 971.08, and the defendant alleges that 
he or she did not know or understand the information that the 
court should have provided at the plea hearing, the burden 
shifts to the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant nonetheless entered the plea knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
274.   
 
¶60 Defendants have a due process right to be notified 
about the "direct consequences" of their pleas.  See Bollig, 
2000 WI 6, ¶16.  A direct consequence of a plea is one that has 
a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range 
of a defendant's punishment.  Id.  If a defendant is not aware 
of the direct consequences of a plea, he or she is not appraised 
of "the potential punishment" under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). 
¶61 Information about "collateral consequences" of a plea, 
by contrast, is not a prerequisite to entering a knowing and 
intelligent plea.  Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 636.  Collateral 
consequences are indirect and do not flow from the conviction.  
For example, collateral consequences may be contingent on a 
future proceeding in which a defendant's subsequent behavior 
affects the determination.  Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 637-38 
(citing State v. James, 176 Wis. 2d 230, 243-44, 500 N.W.2d 345 
(Ct. App. 1993)).  Sometimes a collateral consequence is one 
that rests not with the sentencing court, but instead with a 
different tribunal or government agency.  State v. Kosina, 226 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
35
Wis. 2d 482, 486, 595 N.W.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Torrey 
v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1988)).  The distinction 
between 
direct 
and 
collateral 
consequences 
essentially 
recognizes that it would be unreasonable and impractical to 
require a circuit court to be cognizant of every conceivable 
consequence before the court accepts a plea.  Warren, 219 
Wis. 2d at 638-39. 
¶62 Byrge contends that his pleas were not knowing or 
intelligent because the information about the parole eligibility 
date affected the range of his punishment and therefore 
constituted a direct consequence of his pleas.  The State 
maintains that the circuit court's power to set the parole 
eligibility date represents only a collateral consequence of the 
plea, and therefore Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) did not obligate 
the circuit court to notify Byrge.   
¶63 In its review of this case, the court of appeals held 
that the circuit court's failure to inform Byrge about parole 
eligibility did not render the plea defective.  Byrge, 225 
Wis. 2d at 718.  The court relied in part on Birts v. State, 68 
Wis. 2d 389, 398-99, 228 N.W.2d 351 (1975), in which we held 
that a circuit court is not required to notify defendants about 
parole rights.  Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 716.  The court also 
turned to a decision by the Supreme Court, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 56 (1985), which concluded that a defendant is not 
constitutionally 
entitled 
to 
be 
forewarned 
about 
parole 
eligibility.  Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 715-16.  The court of 
appeals noted that both Birts and Hill were decided at a time 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
36
when the parole decision was left to the parole board, before 
Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) authorized the sentencing court to 
engage in the threshold parole decision.24  Id. at 716.  
Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the holdings of those cases 
were still efficacious because Wis. Stat. § 973.014 does not 
mandate the sentencing court to fix a parole eligibility date 
but rather allows the court to leave the decision to set the 
eligibility to the parole board.  Id. at 716-17.   
¶64 The court of appeals also dismissed Byrge's reliance 
on State v. Bentley, 195 Wis. 2d 580, 536 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 
1995), rev'd on other grounds, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996).  In that case, the court of appeals suggested that 
parole eligibility constitutes a direct, not a collateral, 
consequence of the sentence.  Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 717 (citing 
Bentley, 195 Wis. 2d at 590).  While noting that this court 
reversed Bentley only on other grounds, the court concluded that 
Bentley does not govern here because it was decided in the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
 
¶65 We agree with the court of appeals that its decision 
in Bentley is not germane to this case.  The core of the parole 
eligibility discussion in Bentley centered on "misadvice" in the 
ineffective assistance context, namely, the defense counsel's 
failure to advise a client about parole eligibility.  Bentley, 
195 Wis. 2d at 589-90.  Bentley did not address whether Wis. 
                     
24 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.014 became effective on July 1, 
1988, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date. 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
37
Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) obligates a sentencing court to inform 
defendants about parole eligibility as a direct consequence of 
the plea.  Moreover, we reversed Bentley on other grounds, and, 
because we do not address an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim in this case, we decline to reassess Bentley here. 
¶66 Like the court of appeals, we also find it significant 
that Birts and Hill were decided before Wis. Stat. § 973.014 
authorized the sentencing court to take part in the threshold 
parole decision.  See Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 716.  Although 
§ 973.014 does not "mandate" the sentencing court to fix the 
parole eligibility date, § 973.014(2) grants the court that 
authority.  If the circuit court declines to exercise the option 
and allows the parole board to set the date, the parole right 
becomes contingent on a future proceeding, subject to a 
determination by a different government agency.  The decision of 
the parole board then may turn on the defendant's future 
behavior, a factor that would be impractical for the circuit 
court to divine.  See Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 638-39.  When a 
parole board makes an eligibility determination at a date after 
the sentencing order, parole eligibility is not an immediate and 
largely automatic result of the conviction.  Hence, if the 
circuit court leaves the decision to another agency, the parole 
eligibility information is a collateral consequence of the plea, 
and failure to notify the defendant about parole eligibility 
does not compromise the plea.  
¶67 We 
find, 
however, 
that 
a 
different 
set 
of 
considerations arises in the limited circumstances in which a 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
38
sentencing court itself sets the parole eligibility date.  If a 
circuit court elects to exercise the statutory option set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2), as it did in this case, the parole 
eligibility 
date 
links 
automatically 
to 
the 
period 
of 
incarceration, which in turn has a direct and automatic effect 
on the range of punishment.  At Byrge's plea hearing, the 
circuit court expressly acknowledged this reality when it 
selected a parole eligibility date that exceeded Byrge's 
anticipated life span.  
¶68 We therefore hold that in the narrow circumstance in 
which a circuit court has statutory authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014(2) to fix the parole eligibility date, the circuit 
court is obligated to provide the defendant with parole 
eligibility information before accepting a plea.  Parole 
eligibility in this discrete situation implicates punishment and 
constitutes a direct consequence of the plea.  Because the 
circuit court did not inform Byrge about a potential direct 
consequence of his conviction, we conclude that Byrge has made a 
prima facie showing that the plea was not knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent according to the requirements outlined in Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). 
¶69 Having found that Byrge has made a threshold showing 
that the plea colloquy was defective, we now examine whether the 
State nonetheless has proven by clear and convincing evidence 
that Byrge nonetheless entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  If we find 
that the State has met this burden by showing that Byrge was 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
39
aware of the parole eligibility possibilities, we will not 
disturb the pleas Byrge entered.  See id. at 274-75. 
¶70 In making its showing, the State may rely on any 
evidence, including testimony from defense counsel, to prove 
that a defendant possessed the requisite information to make the 
plea knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  Id.  In this case the 
State offers the testimony that Byrge's trial counsel, Norby, 
provided at a post-conviction motion hearing.  Although we 
recognize that Norby made his observations in the context of 
defending himself in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
we nonetheless find his testimony pertinent to the State's 
burden.  When reviewing a plea, we do "not focus on 'ritualistic 
litany' of formal elements" but instead consider whether the 
defendant received real notice about the implications of the 
plea.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 282-83 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
¶71 Norby testified that Byrge appeared to understand what 
his options were before the plea was entered, and he explained 
to Byrge that a conviction for first-degree intentional homicide 
carried a mandatory life sentence.  Norby said that Byrge 
understood that the court could set a parole eligibility date 
sufficiently far enough into the future that Byrge would have no 
realistic opportunity of being released during his lifetime.  
According to Norby, Byrge never expressed any confusion or lack 
of knowledge about the plea or the likely penalties.  
 
¶72 Byrge told the court at his change of plea hearing 
that he understood that the charge of first-degree intentional 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
40
homicide carries a punishment of life imprisonment.  He also 
testified at the post-conviction motion hearing.  When asked if 
Norby discussed a parole eligibility date with him, Byrge said, 
"He never talked to me about going to prison at all for that."  
Byrge, however, added that he knew what parole eligibility 
meant.  He also recognized that by entering the plea, the court 
would find him guilty of first-degree intentional homicide.  
Moreover, Byrge stated that he understood that the penalty for 
the crime was a mandatory sentence of life in prison.   
 
¶73 The circuit court issued a written decision denying 
Byrge's motion for post-conviction relief.  The court made the 
following finding: 
 
[T]he Defendant was advised that he faced life 
imprisonment as punishment for his crime and the 
Defendant testified that he understood.  Trial counsel 
discussed with the Defendant that the court could set 
parole eligibility so far into the future that he 
would not be released during his lifetime and that the 
Defendant understood that possibility.  Under these 
circumstances, this court finds that the Defendant was 
advised of the maximum penalty and that he faced life 
without the possibility of parole.  
We do not disturb this finding of fact because we conclude that 
the circuit court's determination was not clearly erroneous.  
The testimony of Norby supported the court's decision that Byrge 
knew and understood the parole eligibility possibilities at the 
time he entered his plea.  We therefore conclude that the State 
has met its burden to prove that Byrge had real notice about the 
implications of the plea. 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
41
 
¶74 We hold that although the circuit court had a duty to 
inform Byrge about the parole eligibility information before it 
accepted his plea, the State has met its burden to prove that, 
despite the deficiency of the plea colloquy, Byrge nonetheless 
entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
CONCLUSION 
 
¶75 We hold that an appellate court reviewing a competency 
determination must utilize the clearly erroneous standard.  Like 
the Supreme Court, we recognize that a competency hearing 
presents a unique category of inquiry in which the circuit court 
is in the best position to appraise witness credibility and 
demeanor and therefore to apply the law to the facts.  Under 
this deferential standard of review, we affirm the circuit 
court's determination that Byrge was competent to stand trial.  
The testimony at the competency hearing supported the finding 
that Byrge was able to understand the proceedings and assist in 
his defense.  We also conclude that when a circuit court 
exercises its statutory option to fix a parole eligibility date, 
the date impacts the potential punishment.  In this limited 
circumstance the parole eligibility information is a direct 
consequence of the plea.  In this case, however, the State has 
met its burden to prove that, despite the deficiency of the plea 
colloquy, 
Byrge 
nonetheless 
entered 
the 
plea 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
97-3217-CR  
 
 
42
 
 
No. 97-3217.ssa 
 
1 
¶76 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  We 
granted review in this case to reconsider the standard of review 
of a circuit court's determination of competency announced in 
State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997).25  On 
reconsideration I conclude, as I did in my concurrence in 
Garfoot, that "a determination of competency, a determination of 
constitutional 
fact, 
should 
be 
decided 
by 
this 
court 
independently of the decisions of a circuit court or court of 
appeals, yet benefiting from the analyses of those courts and 
the observational advantage of the circuit court."  Garfoot, 207 
Wis. 2d at 231-32.  The reasons for my conclusion are set forth 
in my Garfoot concurrence. 
¶77 An issue raised in the petition and briefs in the 
present case, but not reached by the court, is whether the court 
of appeals is bound by the rules announced in its own published 
decision when this court has reversed the published decision on 
unrelated, independent grounds.  Also unclear is the lasting 
effect, if any, of all or part of a court of appeals' decision 
that has been reviewed by this court and affirmed.  A decision 
by this court on these issues will have to await another case or 
a rule-making procedure.  
                     
25 For the reasons that the Garfoot majority opinion was 
viewed as being in jeopardy, see State v. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d 
702, 711 n.2, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999).  
No. 97-3217.ssa 
 
2 
¶78 For the reasons set forth I join the mandate but write 
separately.  
 
97-3217-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶79 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I agree with the 
standard of review set forth in the concurring opinion of Chief 
Justice Abrahamson.  I write separately, however, to express my 
concern with that part of the majority opinion addressing parole 
eligibility information as a direct consequence of a plea.     
¶80 The majority attempts to rein in the reach of its 
holding and asserts that parole eligibility information is a 
direct consequence only in the "limited circumstance" in which 
the circuit court has the statutory authority to fix the parole 
eligibility date under Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2).  Majority op. at 
¶67.  Despite the majority's effort to narrow the reach, it 
nevertheless fails to address the broad implications of its 
holding. 
¶81 I understand why the majority does not address the 
issue of retroactivity.  It was neither briefed nor argued by 
the parties.  Nevertheless, retroactive application is a 
critical concern because circuit courts now may face a number of 
collateral challenges asserting the failure to inform defendants 
of their parole eligibility.  Implications for Truth in 
Sentencing purposes also may arise.  The majority establishes a 
new legal principle yet provides little guidance to courts in 
addressing the ramifications of this newly articulated mandate. 
 Accordingly, I concur. 
 
 
97-3217-CR.awb 
 
1