Title: Lacey v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 447, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RHONDA D. LACEY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 447, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0710028678 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                      Submitted: March 11, 2011 
Decided: April 19, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 19th day of April 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Rhonda D. Lacey, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s July 6, 2010 order accepting the Commissioner’s 
June 15, 2010 report, which recommended that Lacey’s first motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be 
denied.1  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62.  Because this was Lacey’s first 
postconviction motion, the Commissioner requested Lacey’s counsel to submit an 
affidavit pursuant to Rule 61(g)(2).  Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2005). 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in May 2008, Lacey pleaded 
guilty to one count of Robbery in the First Degree and two counts of 
Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree.  On each of the two convictions 
of attempted second degree robbery, the Superior Court sentenced Lacey as 
a habitual offender to 5 years at Level V.2  On the first degree robbery 
conviction, the Superior Court sentenced Lacey to 10 years at Level V, to be 
suspended after 3 years for 7 years at Level IV Halfway House or Home 
Confinement, in turn to be suspended after 6 months for 2 years at Level III 
probation.  Lacey did not file a direct appeal of her convictions.  Lacey’s 
subsequent motion for sentence modification was denied by the Superior 
Court.  
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of her first 
postconviction motion, Lacey claims that a) her counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in connection with her guilty plea because he failed to negotiate a 
favorable plea agreement and failed to advise her of the consequences of her 
plea; b) her guilty plea was involuntary because of her counsel’s ineffective 
assistance; c) the Superior Court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessively harsh sentence; and d) the Superior Court erred by declaring her 
a habitual offender because the Oklahoma felonies used to establish her 
                                                 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4214(a). 
 
3
habitual offender status would have been misdemeanors if they had been 
committed in Delaware.   
 
(4) 
Lacey’s first two claims implicate the standards applicable to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim within the context of a guilty plea.  In 
order to prevail on such a claim, the defendant must demonstrate that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for his or her counsel’s professional errors, 
he or she would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial.3   
 
(5) 
The record before us reflects that Lacey’s counsel negotiated a 
plea agreement for his client that resulted in the reduction of two attempted 
first degree robbery charges to the second degree and in a non-habitual 
sentence for a conviction of first degree robbery.  While Lacey’s sentences 
were significant, she was facing the possibility of life in prison had she gone 
to trial.  As such, the record does not support Lacey’s contention that her 
counsel was ineffective for failing to negotiate a favorable plea agreement 
on her behalf.  Moreover, given the benefit to Lacey as a result of the plea 
agreement, there is no support for a contention that, but for her counsel’s 
professional errors, she would have insisted on proceeding to trial. 
                                                 
3 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988). 
 
4
 
(6) 
The transcript of the plea colloquy belies Lacey’s claim that her 
counsel failed to advise her of the consequences of her plea as well her claim 
that her plea was involuntary.  During the plea colloquy, Lacey 
acknowledged signing both the plea agreement and the TIS guilty plea form.  
The judge reviewed the charges with her and she acknowledged that she had 
committed the offenses.  The judge also reviewed with her the recommended 
sentences, including the factual basis for her status as a habitual offender.  
Lacey stated that her plea was voluntary and that she was satisfied with her 
counsel’s representation.  In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary, Lacey is bound by the statements she made during the plea 
colloquy.4  Moreover, her knowing and voluntary plea waives any claim of 
an error or defect occurring prior to the entry of the plea.5     
 
(7) 
Lacey’s third claim is that the Superior Court imposed an 
excessively harsh sentence.  As discussed above, she faced the possibility of 
life in prison had she gone to trial rather than accepting the State’s plea 
offer.  There is, moreover, no evidence that Lacey’s sentences exceed the 
statutory limits6 or that the Superior Court was motivated by impermissible 
                                                 
4 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
5 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 
6 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
 
5
factors in sentencing her.7  As such, there are no grounds to support Lacey’s 
claim of an excessive sentence. 
 
(8) 
Lacey’s final claim is that her Oklahoma felony convictions do 
not properly support her status as a habitual offender because they would 
constitute misdemeanors if committed in Delaware.  Under §4214(a), a 
predicate offense is defined as “a felony . . . under the laws of this State, 
and/or any other state, United States or any territory of the United States . . . 
.”  Because Lacey’s Oklahoma convictions constituted felonies in that state, 
the Superior Court properly relied upon them to support Lacey’s status as a 
habitual offender.8  Moreover, Lacey admitted in her plea agreement that she 
was subject to sentencing as a habitual offender as a result of her previous 
felony convictions.  As such, she has waived any challenge to her habitual 
offender status.9    
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
7 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Del. 1992). 
8 Lacey’s reliance on Fletcher v. State, 409 A.2d 1254 (Del. 1979) is misplaced because 
the subsection at issue in that case was §4214(b), not §4214(a), and because the foreign 
predicate felony in that case would have resulted only in a finding of delinquency if 
committed in Delaware, and not a criminal conviction. 
9 Loncki v. State, Del. Supr., No. 320, 2006, Berger, J. (Jan. 9, 2007).