Title: Miller v. Carroll
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP002132
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2020

2020 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2132 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the Paternity of B. J. M.: 
 
Timothy W. Miller, 
          Joint-Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Angela L. Carroll, 
          Joint-Petitioner-Respondent-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 386 Wis. 2d 267,925 N.W.2d 580 
PDC No:2019 WI App 10 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Barron   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Bitney   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and ZIEGLER, J., joined; and in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined except for footnote 18.  ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a 
concurring opinion.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in 
which HAGEDORN, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined 
except for footnote 1 and ¶¶120-24, but do join footnote 3. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the joint-petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were 
briefs filed by Brandon M. Schwartz, Michael D. Schwartz, and 
Schwartz Law Firm, Oakdale, Minnesota. There was an oral 
argument by Brandon M. Schwartz. 
 
 
 
2 
For the joint-petitioner-appellant, there was a brief filed 
by Stephanie L. Finn, David J. Rice, Terry L. Moore, and Herrick 
& Hart, S.C., Eau Claire. There was an oral argument by Terry L. 
Moore. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Chapter of American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers by Daniel P. 
Bestul and Duxstad & Bestul, S.C., Monroe; with whom on the 
brief was Jennifer Van Kirk and Peckerman, Klein & Van Kirk LLP, 
Milwaukee.  
 
 
2020 WI 56 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2132 
(L.C. No. 
2011PA46PJ) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Paternity of B.J.M.: 
 
Timothy W. Miller, 
 
          Joint-Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Angela L. Carroll, 
 
          Joint-Petitioner-Respondent-
Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and ZIEGLER, J., joined; and in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined except for footnote 18.  ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a 
concurring opinion.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in 
which HAGEDORN, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined 
except for footnote 1 and ¶¶120-24, but do join footnote 3. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   This case presents an issue 
of first impression:  an allegation of judicial bias arising 
from a circuit court judge's undisclosed social media connection 
with a litigant. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In this case, a circuit court judge accepted a 
Facebook "friend request" from the mother in a custody dispute 
after a contested hearing, but before rendering a decision.1  In 
the course of their 25-day Facebook "friendship," the mother 
"liked" 16 of the judge's Facebook posts, "loved" two of his 
posts, commented on two of his posts, and "shared" and "liked" 
several third-party posts related to an issue that was contested 
at the hearing.  The judge never disclosed the Facebook 
friendship or the communications, and he ultimately ruled 
entirely in the mother's favor. 
¶3 
After discovering the Facebook friendship, the father 
moved the circuit court for reconsideration, requesting judicial 
disqualification and a new hearing.  At the reconsideration 
hearing, the judge admitted to the Facebook interactions between 
himself and the mother.  However, he denied the motion and 
claimed that he was impartial because he had already decided on 
his ruling prior to accepting her friend request. 
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
denial of the motion for reconsideration and remanded the case 
with directions that it proceed before a different circuit court 
judge.2 
                                                 
1 Judge Michael Bitney of the Barron County Circuit Court 
presided. 
2 Miller v. Carroll, 2019 WI App 10, 386 Wis. 2d 267, 925 
N.W.2d 580. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
3 
 
¶5 
We conclude that the extreme facts of this case rebut 
the presumption of judicial impartiality and establish a due 
process violation.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
Timothy Miller and Angela Carroll stipulated to joint 
legal custody and shared physical placement of their minor son, 
Bruce, in August 2011.3  Five years later, Carroll filed a motion 
to modify the order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.451 (2017-18).4  
Carroll sought sole legal custody, primary physical placement, 
child support payments, and a change in residence.  Carroll's 
motion and supporting affidavits alleged that Miller engaged in 
acts of domestic violence against Carroll, and included a copy 
of a domestic abuse injunction that Carroll obtained that same 
month.  Carroll also alleged that Miller failed to adequately 
parent and discipline Bruce.  Miller vigorously opposed the 
motion and disputed the allegations of domestic violence.  The 
case was assigned to Judge Michael Bitney. 
¶7 
Judge Bitney conducted a highly contested two-day 
evidentiary hearing over June 7-8, 2017, that included the 
testimony of 15 witnesses.  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
Judge Bitney took the matter under advisement and gave the 
parties time to submit briefs, which they filed on June 16, 
                                                 
3 For consistency, we will use the same pseudonym for the 
parties' minor son as utilized by the court of appeals.  Miller, 
386 Wis. 2d 267, ¶1 n.1. 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
4 
 
2017.  Three days after the briefs were filed, unbeknownst to 
Miller, Carroll sent Judge Bitney a "friend request" on 
Facebook.  Judge Bitney affirmatively "accepted" Carroll's 
request.5  At the time Judge Bitney accepted the request, he had 
not yet rendered a decision on Carroll's motion.  Judge Bitney 
never disclosed Carroll's request or his acceptance of the 
request. 
¶8 
During the 25 days between Judge Bitney's acceptance 
of Carroll's friend request and his issuance of a written 
decision entirely in her favor, Carroll engaged with and 
"reacted to" at least 20 of Judge Bitney's Facebook posts.6  The 
bulk of Carroll's "reactions" to Judge Bitney's posts were 
"likes" 
to 
prayers 
and 
Bible 
verses 
that 
he 
posted.7  
                                                 
5 Facebook friendship is established by the acceptance of a 
previously sent "friend" request.  See Law Offices of Herssein & 
Herssein, P.A. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 271 So. 3d 889, 895 
(Fla. 2018). 
6 Facebook users can click a "like" button, which is 
represented by a thumbs-up icon, to "like" a Facebook page or 
post.  See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013).  
In 2016, Facebook also included other "reactions" in addition to 
the 
"like" 
button: 
 
Love, 
Haha, 
Wow, 
Sad, 
or 
Angry.  
https://about.fb.com/news/2016/02/reactions-now-available-
globally/. 
As the parties admit, the record may not include all of 
Carroll's Facebook activity with Judge Bitney. 
7 Some of the posts that Carroll "liked" include: 
 Dear Lord, give me this day the grace to be charitable 
in thought, kind in deed and loving in speech toward 
all.  Amen. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
5 
 
Additionally, Carroll "loved" one of Judge Bitney's posts 
reciting a Bible verse and another post regarding "advice" to 
children and grandchildren.8  Carroll also commented on two of 
Judge Bitney's posts related to his knee surgery:  "Prayers on a 
healthy recovery Judge!!" and "Hope u get some rest and feel 
better as the days go on."  Judge Bitney would have received a 
notification from Facebook each time Carroll reacted to one of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Whoever sows sparingly shall reap sparingly, whoever 
sows generously will reap generously.  God loves a 
cheerful giver! 
 Lord, may I be a doer of your word and not a hearer 
only. 
 Dear Lord, restore us by the repose of sleep after our 
day's work is done so that renewed by your help I may 
serve you in body and soul through Christ our Lord.  
Amen. 
 May the Gospel transform our lives that we may witness 
it to those around us.  Amen 
 Come to me all you who labor and are burdened, and I 
will give you rest.  Matthew 11:28. 
 Lord Jesus you have chosen me to be your disciple.  
Take & use what I can offer, however meager it may be 
for the greater glory of your name. 
8 Carroll "loved" the following Bible verse that Judge 
Bitney posted:  "Fear no one.  Matthew 10:26." 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
6 
 
his posts.9  Judge Bitney also would have received a notification 
from Facebook each time Carroll commented on one of his posts. 
¶9 
In addition to "reacting" to and engaging with at 
least 20 of Judge Bitney's posts, Carroll posted on her Facebook 
page about the topic of domestic violence, which was at issue in 
the contested hearing.  Carroll posted that she was "interested 
in" attending the "Stop the Silence Domestic violence awareness 
bike/car Run."10  Carroll "liked" a third-party post related to 
domestic violence and reacted "angry" to a third-party post 
entitled "Woman dies two years after being set on fire by ex-
boyfriend."  Finally, Carroll "shared" a third-party post 
related to domestic violence.11  Carroll's Facebook friends, 
including Judge Bitney, could see these "reactions" to, and 
"shares" of, third-party posts in their respective Facebook 
                                                 
9 A Facebook user who posts content will receive a 
notification from each user who likes the post.  See Olivia 
League, Whether You Like it or Not Your "Likes" are Out:  An 
Analysis of Nonverbal Conduct in the Hearsay Context, 68 S.C. L. 
Rev. 939, 948 (2017); https://www.facebook.com/help/166890600000
6551?helpref=popular_topics. 
10 Facebook allows a user's friends to see public events 
that 
a 
user 
has 
selected 
"interested 
in."  
See https://www.facebook.com/help/151154081619755?helpref=uf_per
malink. 
11 "Sharing" a Facebook post means that it will show up on 
your 
friends' 
News 
Feeds 
and 
on 
your 
profile.  
See https://www.facebook.com/help/333140160100643. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
7 
 
"News Feed."12  As a Facebook friend, Judge Bitney could also see 
Carroll's posts, photographs, and other information that she 
provided on her profile.13  Judge Bitney never disclosed the 
friendship, Carroll's reactions or comments to his posts, or 
Carroll's Facebook activity on his News Feed. 
¶10 On July 14, 2017, Judge Bitney issued a written 
decision in favor of Carroll.  In relevant part, he found that 
Carroll had shown "by the greater weight of credible evidence 
that Mr. Miller has engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse 
against . . . Carroll," which constituted a "substantial change" 
in the parties' circumstances since the 2011 stipulation.14  
Consequently, he granted Carroll sole legal custody and primary 
physical placement of Bruce, which he decided was in Bruce's 
best interest.  Judge Bitney also approved Carroll's request to 
move from Rice Lake, Wisconsin to Durand, Wisconsin and ordered 
Miller to pay child support. 
                                                 
12 The News Feed is a "constantly updating list of stories 
in the middle of [the user's] home page.  News Feed includes 
status updates, photos, videos, links, app activity and likes 
from 
people, 
Pages 
and 
groups."  
https://www.facebook.com/help/1155510281178725. 
13 See Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 685 (Del. 2014) ("[A] 
user will post content——which can include text, pictures, or 
videos——to that user's profile page delivering it to the 
author's subscribers."). 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.451(1)(b) requires a "substantial 
change of circumstances since the entry of the last order 
affecting legal custody" in order for a court to modify a 
custody or physical placement order "where the modification 
would substantially alter the time a parent may spend with his 
or her child." 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
8 
 
¶11 The same day that Judge Bitney issued his decision, 
the guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed to the case was alerted to 
a Facebook post that Carroll had authored regarding Judge 
Bitney's favorable ruling.15  Carroll's post read: 
My boys and a [sic] I have been given a chance at 
greatness, peace, and safety. 
The 
Honorable 
Judge 
has 
granted 
everything 
we 
requested.  I'm overwhelmed with emotions and as 
bitter sweet as this is, we will have better from here 
on out. 
. . . 
I'll be bouncing off [Facebook] to focus all my 
attention on [Bruce] and helping him through these 
tough changes. 
While viewing Carroll's post, the GAL inadvertently discovered 
that Carroll was Facebook friends with Judge Bitney.16  The GAL 
indicated that she "felt a duty" to immediately alert Miller's 
counsel of the Facebook friendship and Carroll's recent Facebook 
post. 
¶12 Miller filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging 
that his due process right to an impartial judge was violated.17  
In denying the motion, Judge Bitney confirmed his Facebook 
friendship with Carroll, but asserted that he had no bias and 
                                                 
15 A GAL was appointed to the case pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.481(2)(c)3. 
16 A Facebook user's "friend" list appears on her profile 
page.  See Strunk v. State, 44 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
17 Miller 
did 
not 
bring 
a 
claim 
for 
judicial 
disqualification pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19, or file an 
ethics complaint with the Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
9 
 
that no "reasonable person in the circumstances of Mr. Miller or 
others . . . would seriously call into question the Court's 
objectivity or impartiality."  Judge Bitney based his ruling on 
the fact that he "did not respond, other than to accept the 
Facebook friendship request . . . [and] did not like any posts, 
respond to any posts, or conduct any communication ex parte or 
otherwise with Ms. Carroll, other than simply accepting the 
Facebook friendship request."  He further claimed that on the 
Monday he accepted Carroll's friend request he "had decided how 
[he] was going to rule, even though it hadn't been reduced to 
writing," despite the fact that the parties' briefs were only 
filed the previous Friday.  Judge Bitney did not deny seeing 
Carroll's reactions, comments, or posts on Facebook.  He 
admitted that the parties "presented accurately the substance of 
the interaction between Miss Carroll and the Court on Facebook."  
The record lacked any further clarification of the Facebook 
interactions between Carroll and Bitney. 
¶13 Miller appealed the merits of Judge Bitney's decision 
and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.  On the motion 
for reconsideration, the court of appeals concluded that Judge 
Bitney's actions "created a great risk of actual bias, resulting 
in the appearance of partiality."  Miller v. Carroll, 2019 WI 
App 10, ¶2, 386 Wis. 2d 267, 925 N.W.2d 580.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court of appeals relied upon the timing of the 
Facebook friendship, the lack of disclosure of the friendship 
and 
Carroll's 
Facebook 
activity, 
ex 
parte 
communication 
concerns, and a consideration of this court's ethical rules.  
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
10 
 
Id., ¶¶21-27.  The case was remanded for further proceedings 
before a different circuit court judge. 
¶14 Carroll petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 "The right to an impartial judge is fundamental to our 
notion of due process."  State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶8, 
320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385; see also Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) ("It is axiomatic that 
'[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due 
process.'" (alteration in original) (quoted source omitted)); 
U.S Const. amends. V, XIV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.  Whether 
Judge Bitney's partiality can reasonably be questioned is a 
matter of law that we review de novo.  Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 
¶7. 
¶16 We presume that a judge has acted fairly, impartially, 
and without bias.  State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶24, 364 
Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772; Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶8.  To 
overcome that presumption, the burden is on the party asserting 
judicial bias to show bias by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶24.  If a party rebuts this 
presumption and shows a due process violation, the error is 
structural and not subject to a harmless error analysis.  See 
Williams v. Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 
(2016) ("[A]n unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes 
structural error . . . ."). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
11 
 
¶17 We begin with background information on what a 
Facebook "friendship" entails.  We next articulate the standard 
for resolving when the probability of actual bias rises to the 
level of a due process violation, and apply that analysis to the 
facts of this case. 
A.  Facebook "Friendships" 
¶18 Facebook is a social media and social networking 
service with approximately 2.5 billion monthly active users.  
See Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and 
Full Year 2019 Results (Jan. 29, 2020).  A user creates a 
Facebook profile by entering the user's name, date of birth, and 
e-mail address, and registering a password with the site.  See 
Smith v. State, 136 So. 3d 424, 432 (Miss. 2014).  After 
creating a profile, a user establishes connections by sending 
other users a "friend" request.  See Law Offices of Herssein & 
Herssein, P.A. v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 271 So. 3d 889, 895 
(Fla. 2018).  The "friended" user must affirmatively accept the 
request for the two users to become Facebook "friends."  See id.  
"Friends" have the ability to view and interact with each 
other's Facebook profiles.  See State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 820 
n.1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
¶19 When a Facebook user logs onto her Facebook page, she 
is automatically presented with updated activity from her 
Facebook "friends" on the Facebook News Feed.  See Rembrandt 
Soc. Media, LP v. Facebook Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 585, 590 (E.D. 
Va. 2013).  The News Feed is a "constantly updating list of 
stories from people and Pages that [the User] follow[s] on 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
12 
 
Facebook."  Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(alterations in original) (quoted source omitted).  Through this 
News Feed and access to other user's pages, Facebook allows its 
users to "track friends' interests, affiliations, 'likes,' and 
general progression through life."  Daniel Smith, When Everyone 
is the Judge's Pal:  Facebook Friendship and the Appearance of 
Impropriety Standard, 3 Case W. Res. J.L. Tech. & Internet 66, 
97 (2012).  A user can interact with Facebook friends on the 
site, including "posting and reading comments, events, news, 
and, in general, communicating with . . . others."  United 
States v. Jordan, 678 Fed. Appx. 759, 761 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(unpublished). 
¶20 Facebook categorizes every social connection of a user 
as a "friend."  "Some [Facebook users] may be friends in the 
traditional sense, but others are no more than acquaintances or 
contacts or in some cases may even be complete strangers."  
United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 67 n.16 (D. Mass. 
2016); see also Chace v. Loisel, 170 So. 3d 802, 803 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014) ("The word 'friend' on Facebook is a term of 
art.").  But, the Facebook user "typically knows massive amounts 
of information about each of his Facebook friends——far more than 
what he knows about the average 'real-life' acquaintance."  
Smith, supra ¶19, at 97.  The accessibility of personal 
information on popular social media platforms such as Facebook 
presents 
unique 
concerns 
and 
implications 
regarding 
the 
potential for judicial bias. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
13 
 
B.  Judicial Bias and the Due Process Clause 
¶21 "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process."  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955).  We presume that a judge has acted fairly, impartially, 
and without bias.  Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶24.  To overcome 
that presumption, the burden is on the party asserting judicial 
bias to show bias by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  In 
evaluating whether a party has rebutted the presumption, 
Wisconsin courts have taken both a subjective and objective 
approach.  Id., ¶26.  A judge must disqualify himself from a 
case if he subjectively determines that he is unable to remain 
impartial.  State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 105-06, 325 
N.W.2d 867 (1982).  Judge Bitney indicated that he believed 
himself to be fair and impartial, and therefore subjective bias 
is not at issue in this case.  We focus on Miller's assertion 
that Judge Bitney was objectively biased due to the probability 
of actual bias. 
¶22 The United States Supreme Court has established that a 
serious risk of actual bias can objectively rise to the level of 
a due process violation.  See, e.g., Caperton, 556 U.S. 868.  In 
Caperton, the Court reviewed its judicial bias jurisprudence and 
identified the previous instances where it had concluded, "as an 
objective matter," that recusal was required because "the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."  
Id. at 877.  Applying existing principles to a new fact pattern, 
the Court reaffirmed that a court must assess whether "under a 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
14 
 
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human 
weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee 
of due process is to be adequately implemented."  Id. at 883-84 
(quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).  The Court 
defined the "risk of actual bias" as a "serious risk of actual 
bias——based 
on 
objective 
and 
reasonable 
perceptions" 
and 
clarified 
that 
"[a]pplication 
of 
the 
constitutional 
standard . . . will thus be confined to rare instances."  Id. at 
884, 890. 
¶23 Since Caperton, this court has decided one case 
involving 
judicial 
bias, 
Herrmann, 
364 
Wis. 2d 336. 
 
In 
Herrmann, the defendant claimed the circuit court's statements 
at sentencing reflected an objective bias.  Id., ¶¶21-22.  All 
members of the court agreed that the defendant had failed to 
rebut the presumption of impartiality and cited to Caperton.  
However, the Herrmann decision consisted of three separate 
writings, none of which garnered the vote of a majority of the 
court. 
¶24 To assess whether the probability of actual bias rises 
to the level of a due process violation, we apply, verbatim, the 
standard from Caperton.  We ask whether there is "a serious risk 
of actual bias——based on objective and reasonable perceptions."  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.  "Due process requires an objective 
inquiry" into whether the circumstances "would offer a possible 
temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to 
hold the balance nice, clear and true."  Id. at 885 (omissions 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
15 
 
in original) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).  
We acknowledge that it is the exceptional case with "extreme 
facts" which rises to the level of a "serious risk of actual 
bias."  Id. at 886-87; id. at 876 ("[M]ost matters relating to 
judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional 
level." (quoted source omitted)). 
C.  Application 
¶25 We 
presume 
that 
Judge 
Bitney 
acted 
fairly, 
impartially, 
and 
without 
prejudice. 
 
See 
Herrmann, 
364 
Wis. 2d 336, ¶24.  We consider the totality of the circumstances 
and conclude that Miller has rebutted this presumption by 
showing "a serious risk of actual bias."  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
884.18  These circumstances include:  (1) the timing of the 
Facebook 
friend 
request 
and 
Judge 
Bitney's 
affirmative 
acceptance; (2) the volume of Carroll's Facebook activity and 
likelihood Judge Bitney viewed her posts and comments; (3) the 
content of the Facebook activity as it related to the context 
and nature of the pending proceeding; and (4) Judge Bitney's 
lack of disclosure. 
¶26 We 
first 
consider 
the 
timing 
of 
the 
Facebook 
friendship:  both when Carroll sent the friend request and when 
                                                 
18 In her concurrence, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley advocates 
for an "appearance of bias" framework, relying on language from 
pre-Caperton court of appeals decisions, as well as her lead 
opinion in State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 
N.W.2d 772.  Rather than use the phrase "appearance of bias," 
this opinion relies on the exact language used by the United 
States Supreme Court in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 
U.S. 868 (2009). 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
16 
 
Judge Bitney affirmatively accepted it.  Although Judge Bitney 
had "thousands" of Facebook friends, Carroll was not an 
established "friend."  Instead, she was a current litigant who 
requested to be Judge Bitney's friend only after she testified 
at a contested evidentiary hearing in which he was the sole 
decision-maker.  Judge Bitney had presided over the case since 
August of 2016; yet, Carroll friended him after he heard the 
evidence and the final briefs were submitted, but before he 
rendered a decision.  The timing of the friend request implied 
that Carroll wanted to influence Judge Bitney's decision on her 
motion to modify legal custody, physical placement, and child 
support. 
¶27 It 
is 
significant 
that 
Judge 
Bitney 
took 
the 
affirmative step of accepting Carroll's "friend request" prior 
to issuing a written decision on her motion.  Sending a Facebook 
friend request does not automatically mean that the users become 
"friends."  A user can decline a friend request or simply ignore 
it.  See Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, 271 So. 3d at 895 
(noting that the "friended" user must affirmatively accept the 
request for the two users to become Facebook "friends").  By 
accepting Carroll's request, Judge Bitney accepted access to 
off-the-record facts that were relevant to the dispute, namely 
information regarding Carroll's character and parental fitness.19  
                                                 
19 In 
an 
affidavit 
filed 
with 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, Miller's sister asserted that Carroll made a 
"purposeful switch in [her] Facebook persona to support her 
position in the custody dispute," including changing her 
pictures and posts "from party type pictures and posts to family 
pictures and posts about children and family." 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
17 
 
Acceptance of Carroll's friend request enabled Judge Bitney to 
view Carroll's Facebook profile and see her posts, "reactions," 
comments, and "shares" on his constantly refreshing News Feed.  
Carroll's request, and Judge Bitney's acceptance, put Carroll in 
a different position than Miller and caused an improper 
asymmetry of access. 
¶28 The likelihood Judge Bitney would have seen Carroll's 
Facebook activity is another important factor we consider in 
assessing whether there was a "serious risk of actual bias."  
Carroll engaged with and "reacted to" a significant number of 
Judge Bitney's Facebook posts.  Carroll "liked" at least 16 of 
Judge Bitney's posts, primarily related to prayers and Bible 
verses, "loved" two other posts, and commented on two posts 
regarding his knee surgery, including sending him "prayers."  
Judge Bitney would have received a Facebook notification for 
each of Carroll's reactions and comments.  See League, supra ¶8 
n.9, at 948 (explaining that when a Facebook user likes another 
user's post, "the person who posted the content will get a 
notification that [the] user 'liked' his or her post" (footnotes 
omitted)).  Carroll's Facebook activity also included "liking" 
and "sharing" posts and articles related to domestic violence 
awareness, and showing she was "interested in" an event 
promoting domestic violence awareness. 
¶29 At the reconsideration hearing, Judge Bitney never 
denied seeing Carroll's reactions or comments to his posts, or 
her "shares," reactions, or "interest in" third-party posts and 
events related to domestic violence awareness, despite having an 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
18 
 
opportunity to do so.  Moreover, Judge Bitney was very active on 
Facebook during this time period, thus increasing the likelihood 
of him seeing Carroll's "likes," "loves," and "shares" on 
Facebook.20  The significant number of undisclosed contacts 
between Judge Bitney and Carroll in the 25 days before Judge 
Bitney rendered a decision entirely in Carroll's favor increased 
the likelihood of a serious risk of actual bias. 
¶30 We further consider the context and nature of the 
pending litigation when assessing the serious risk of actual 
bias.  This was a custody dispute in which Judge Bitney was the 
sole factfinder regarding the character and parental fitness of 
Miller and Carroll.  His decision on the placement and custody 
of Bruce was necessarily driven by his personal evaluation of 
both parties, as their personal lives were relevant and the 
subject of extensive testimony from 15 witnesses.  Carroll and 
Miller had an opportunity at the hearing to portray themselves 
in the best light.  However, Carroll was provided with 
additional opportunities to do this for 25 days through her 
access to Judge Bitney via Facebook. 
                                                 
20 The record does not provide conclusive evidence that 
Judge Bitney read any of Carroll's posts, but any evidence to 
the contrary is notably absent.  Facebook uses an algorithm to 
determine which posts are most relevant and engaging to each 
user and then presents them at the top of the user's News Feed.  
A user will not see posts from each and every Facebook friend, 
so it is not guaranteed that Judge Bitney would have seen the 
posts by simply scrolling through his feed.  The converse is 
also true; it cannot be guaranteed that Judge Bitney did not see 
Carroll's posts.  See generally https://buffer.com/library/faceb
ook-news-feed-algorithm. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
19 
 
¶31 The Facebook activity, including 18 "reactions" and 
two comments, was relevant to the decision-making process in a 
proceeding like this one, where Carroll's character, fitness, 
and credibility were paramount.  Carroll was allowed the 
opportunity to give Judge Bitney additional information about 
herself and an extra "remember me" almost 25 different times 
during the time period when the matter was under advisement, all 
unbeknownst to Miller.  By reacting to and engaging with Judge 
Bitney's posts, Carroll was effectively signaling to Judge 
Bitney that they were like-minded and, for that reason, she was 
trustworthy. 
 
She 
was 
conveying 
to 
him 
off-the-record 
information about her values, character, and parental fitness——
additional evidence Miller did not have the opportunity to 
rebut.  Under a "realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies 
and human weaknesses," this off-the-record information about 
Carroll, created a serious risk of actual bias.  Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 883 (quoted source omitted). 
¶32 It is also striking that a portion of Carroll's 
Facebook activity was related to her main allegation against 
Miller at the contested hearing:  domestic violence.  Carroll 
"shared" 
third-party 
posts 
related 
to 
domestic 
violence, 
"reacted" to articles about the effects of domestic violence,21 
and showed herself as "interested in" a domestic violence 
                                                 
21 Had Carroll sent Judge Bitney a letter containing a 
domestic violence article, which he then read, he undoubtedly 
would have had to disclose that information to the parties.  
Carroll fails to distinguish that situation from the case at 
hand. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
20 
 
awareness event.  Allegations of domestic violence formed the 
basis 
for 
Carroll's 
motion 
to 
modify 
child 
custody 
and 
placement, and a finding of domestic violence formed the basis 
for Judge Bitney's decision.  Carroll's Facebook activity 
supported her allegation that Miller had committed domestic 
violence against her and that she should therefore be awarded 
custody.  But unlike the information presented at the hearing, 
Miller was unaware that Judge Bitney had access to this off-the-
record information. 
¶33 Finally, 
we 
consider 
Judge 
Bitney's 
lack 
of 
disclosure, at any point, in any way or form, as an important 
factor in assessing the serious risk of actual bias.  Youkers v. 
State, 400 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2013), provides guidance as to 
how a judge should respond to communications from a social media 
connection.  In Youkers, a Texas court of appeals considered a 
judicial bias claim based on a trial judge's designation as a 
Facebook friend of the victim's father.  Id. at 204-07.  The 
victim's father had sent the judge a private message on Facebook 
asking for leniency for the defendant.  Id. at 204.  The judge 
responded to the message, advising the father that the message 
was in violation of rules precluding ex parte communications, 
stating that he stopped reading the message once he realized the 
message was improper, and warning that any further messages 
about the case would result in the two no longer being Facebook 
friends.  Id.  The judge also advised the father that he was 
placing the communication in the court's file, disclosing the 
message to the lawyers on the case, and contacting the judicial 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
21 
 
conduct commission to determine if further steps were required.  
Id. 
¶34 Unlike in Youkers, where the judge took affirmative 
steps following the communications, Judge Bitney failed to 
disclose the friendship and the subsequent communications.22  
Judge Bitney could have initially ignored or denied Carroll's 
friend request and disclosed the request to the parties.  He 
could have also disclosed the Facebook friendship when he 
received notification of Carroll's reactions to his posts, 
unfriended Carroll on Facebook, or changed his security settings 
to hide her posts from appearing on his News Feed.23  Instead, 
Judge Bitney failed to disclose the friendship or other Facebook 
activity, and the friendship was discovered only after Judge 
                                                 
22 Judges should be cautious when using social media and 
appreciate the risk of ex parte communications being sent 
through 
social 
media 
sites. 
 
According 
to 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary, an "ex parte communication" is a "communication 
between counsel or a party and the court when opposing counsel 
or party is not present."  Ex parte communication, Black's Law 
Dictionary 337 (10th ed. 2014).  The court of appeals concluded 
that "[t]he Facebook connection between Carroll and Judge Bitney 
involved ex parte communications" because Carroll sent, and 
Judge Bitney accepted, the Facebook friend request without 
Miller's knowledge.  Miller, 386 Wis. 2d 267, ¶24.  Further, the 
court noted that "ex parte communication occurred to the extent 
Judge Bitney and Carroll viewed each other's Facebook posts."  
Id.  Although we do not explicitly focus on "ex parte 
communication concerns" as one of the factors in our analysis, 
see id., ¶¶24-26, we do consider the undisclosed nature of the 
communications as an important factor in assessing the serious 
risk of actual bias. 
23 Facebook allows its users to control what content appears 
on 
their 
respective 
News 
Feed. 
 
See 
https://www.facebook.com/help/964154640320617/?helpref=hc_fnav 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
22 
 
Bitney issued his decision.  Because of Judge Bitney's lack of 
any means of disclosure, Miller was unable to review the 
interactions between Judge Bitney and Carroll and have an 
opportunity to refute what Judge Bitney might have seen Carroll 
post or share. 
¶35 The totality of the circumstances and the extreme 
facts of this case, viewed objectively, rise to the level of a 
serious risk of actual bias, which rebuts the presumption of 
Judge Bitney's impartiality.  The serious risk of actual bias is 
a structural error, which is "different from regular trial 
errors because they 'are structural defects in the constitution 
of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by "harmless-error" 
standards.'"  State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶49, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 
850 N.W.2d 207 (quoted source omitted).  Accordingly, this 
matter must be reversed to proceed before a different circuit 
court judge since it is difficult to determine "how the error 
affected the trial."24  Id.; see also Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 
1909 ("The Court has little trouble concluding that a due 
process 
violation 
arising 
from 
the 
participation 
of 
an 
interested judge is a defect 'not amenable' to harmless-error 
review, regardless of whether the judge's vote was dispositive." 
(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141 (2009))); 
see also Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶50 (noting that a "biased 
judge" is a structural error). 
                                                 
24 We 
need 
not 
reach 
the 
merits 
of 
Judge 
Bitney's 
determination 
as 
it 
relates 
to 
legal 
custody, 
physical 
placement, and child support. 
No. 
2017AP2132   
 
23 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We conclude that the extreme facts of this case rebut 
the presumption of judicial impartiality and establish a due 
process violation.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
1 
 
¶37 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  In a unanimous 
opinion, the court of appeals concluded that "the circuit 
court's undisclosed [electronic social media] connection with a 
current litigant in this case created a great risk of actual 
bias, resulting in the appearance of partiality.  Accordingly, 
Miller has demonstrated the judge was objectively biased."  
Miller v. Carroll, 2019 WI App 10, ¶2, 386 Wis. 2d 267, 925 
N.W.2d 580.  I agree. 
¶38 Although I join the majority opinion1, I write 
separately because its analysis fails to discuss the role that 
appearance of bias can play in the due process analysis.  
Additionally, it neglects to inform the reader that its analysis 
is at odds with this court's "hands-off" approach in certain due 
process challenges.  The following provides the rest of the 
story. 
I 
¶39 There is no need to repeat the facts, as the majority 
opinion has aptly set them forth.  Suffice it to say that on the 
motion for reconsideration and relief from the prior order,2 
Miller argued that Judge Bitney's Facebook friendship with the 
opposing party, Carroll, gave rise to the appearance of 
partiality.  Differentiating between subjective and objective 
bias, Judge Bitney opined that he was not subjectively biased 
and that the facts here did not support a conclusion that he was 
objectively biased.  Id., ¶11.  
                                                 
1 I join the majority opinion with the exception of footnote 
18. 
2 See Wis. Stat. §§ 805.17(3), 806.07. 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
2 
 
 
¶40 The analysis in this case is best understood in light 
of a short preface detailing the development of the case law in 
this area.  In determining whether a defendant's due process 
right to trial by an impartial and unbiased judge3 has been 
violated, Wisconsin courts have examined both subjective bias 
and objective bias.  State v. Rochelt, 165 Wis. 2d 373, 378, 477 
N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1991).  The subjective test is based on the 
judge's own determination of his or her impartiality and the 
objective test is premised on whether a reasonable person could 
question the judge's impartiality.  State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI 
App 143, ¶¶20-21, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114. 
¶41 Objective bias can exist in two situations:  (1) where 
objective facts create a serious risk of actual bias; or (2) 
where objective facts demonstrate that a judge actually treated 
a party unfairly.  State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶9, 320 
Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385; Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).  The Gudgeon court recognized 
that the appearance of partiality violated due process "only 
where the apparent bias revealed a great risk of actual bias."  
Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶23. 
¶42 It continued that "the appearance of bias offends 
constitutional due process principles whenever a reasonable 
person——taking into consideration human psychological tendencies 
and weaknesses——concludes that the average judge could not be 
trusted to 'hold the balance nice, clear and true' under all the 
                                                 
3 Although I use the term "judge," such term encompasses 
municipal court judges, circuit court judges, judges of the 
court of appeals, and justices of this court. 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
3 
 
circumstances."  Id., ¶24.  Further, the court emphasized that 
the appearance of bias is to be examined "based on what a 
reasonable person would conclude[,] . . . not what a reasonable 
trial judge, a reasonable appellate judge, or even a reasonable 
legal practitioner would conclude."  Id., ¶26.  Importantly, 
these statements recognize that the right to an impartial 
decisionmaker encompasses the appearance of bias and not simply 
the absence of actual bias. 
¶43 Less than a month after the court of appeals applied 
the above-cited Gudgeon framework in Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 
the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Caperton, 
556 U.S. 868.  The Caperton court determined that actual bias 
need not be shown to establish a violation of a party's right to 
a fair tribunal, reaffirming its previous declaration that "to 
perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy 
the appearance of justice.'"  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 
(1954)).   
¶44 The Caperton court embraced a "probability of actual 
bias" standard ("the probability of actual bias on the part of 
the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally 
tolerable").  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877 (quoting Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).  Ultimately, it set forth the 
essential inquiry into judicial bias, when there is no actual 
bias, as whether there is "a serious risk of actual bias——based 
on objective and reasonable perceptions . . . ."  Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 884 (emphasis added).    
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
4 
 
¶45 Indeed, the Caperton court specified that it was not 
addressing whether there was actual bias present: 
We 
do 
not 
question 
his 
subjective 
findings 
of 
impartiality and propriety.  Nor do we determine 
whether there was actual bias. . . .  
[T]he Due Process Clause has been implemented by 
objective standards that do not require proof of 
actual bias.  In defining these standards the Court 
has asked whether, "under a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness," the 
interest "poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the 
guarantee 
of 
due 
process 
is 
to 
be 
adequately 
implemented." 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882-84 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).  
It further made clear that "[d]ue process 'may sometimes bar 
trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their 
very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between 
contending parties.'"  Id. at 886 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. 
at 136). 
¶46 If under Caperton, something less than actual bias can 
be held to violate due process, then what is it? 
¶47 The Caperton court relied upon basic principles from 
its precedent to inform the discussion.  It employed terms such 
as "probability" and "perception" in framing a standard and 
inquiry.  Scholars and commentators differ on what role the 
Murchison "appearance of bias" plays in the Caperton due process 
analysis.  See, e.g., Comments, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co.:  Due Process Limitations on the Appearance of Judicial 
Bias, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 73, 78-79 (2009) (collecting three 
disparate views). 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
5 
 
¶48 Some insight can be gleaned from a review of the 
transcript of the oral argument in Caperton.  Two of the 
justices in the five justice majority opinion indicated that 
they viewed standards set by prior cases——"appearance of bias" 
and "probability of bias"——as synonymous.  So do I.  To the mix, 
the Caperton opinion added the synonymous term "perception." 
¶49 At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg commented that past 
cases used the terms "appearance [of bias]," "probability of 
bias," and "likelihood of bias" interchangeably.  Referring to 
one of those past cases she stated: 
I think of Justice Marshall's decision in Peters and 
Kiff, involving a grand jury, and he said that due 
process is denied in circumstances creating the 
likelihood or the appearance of bias.  And there are 
other 
decisions, 
too, 
that 
use 
those 
terms 
interchangeably.  So I don't know that probability of 
bias, likelihood of bias, appearance——that——those seem 
to me synonyms.   
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-35, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 
(No. 08-22).4   
¶50 In response to counsel's answer that appearance of 
bias was not part of the due process inquiry, Justice Stevens 
responded, "You don't think the community's confidence in the 
way judges behave is an important part of due process?"  Id. at 
36.  Justice Kennedy subsequently interjected, "But our whole 
system is designed to ensure confidence in our judgments."  Id. 
at 37.   
                                                 
4 See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) ("Moreover, 
even if there is no showing of actual bias in the tribunal, this 
Court has held that due process is denied by circumstances that 
create the likelihood or the appearance of bias."). 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
6 
 
¶51 The upshot of the analysis is that when appearance of 
bias is part of a due process challenge, it comes with an 
exacting standard.  A defendant may rebut the presumption of 
impartiality by demonstrating that the appearance of bias 
reveals a serious risk of actual bias.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
884-85; Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶14; Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 
¶23.5  This "appearance of bias" framework has been reliably 
applied in the courts of this state.  See, e.g., State v. Dylan 
S., 2012 WI App 25, ¶30, 339 Wis. 2d 442, 813 N.W.2d 229; State 
v. Marcotte, 2020 WI App 28, ¶17, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
¶52 Caperton emphasizes, as does the majority here, that 
it is only the "exceptional case" with "extreme facts" that will 
rise to the level of a due process violation on account of the 
serious risk of actual bias.  Majority op., ¶24 (citing 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876, 886-87).  As the Caperton court 
further observed, because almost every state has a code of 
conduct with more rigorous recusal standards than due process 
requires, most recusal disputes will be resolved without resort 
to the Constitution, making the constitutional standard's 
application rare.   
"The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer 
boundaries of judicial disqualifications.  Congress 
and the states, of course, remain free to impose more 
rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than 
those we find mandated here today."  Because the codes 
of judicial conduct provide more protection than due 
process requires, most disputes over disqualification 
will be resolved without resort to the Constitution.  
                                                 
5 See also State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶3, 364 
Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., lead op.).   
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
7 
 
Application of the constitutional standard implicated 
in this case will thus be confined to rare instances. 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889-90 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)). 
II 
¶53 As the present case demonstrates, review is available 
to a litigant who advances a due process challenge when a judge 
decides to remain on a case after a motion for recusal.  This is 
a subject with which this court has some familiarity.  See State 
v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (per 
curiam); State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 
N.W.2d 175 (per curiam). 
¶54 In furtherance of the "rest of the story" referenced 
above, I observe that the majority opinion here is at odds with 
Henley, 338 Wis. 2d 610.  In Henley, the majority determined 
that when this court is faced with a motion to disqualify a 
single justice from a case, it is powerless to overturn that 
justice's determination:  "determining whether to recuse is the 
sole 
responsibility 
of 
the 
individual 
justice 
for 
whom 
disqualification from participation is sought . . . ."  Id., 
¶39.   
¶55 The majority in Henley made this determination without 
benefit of briefs or argument on the issue.  Claiming a 
powerlessness to act, the majority in essence treated the due 
process claim challenging the participation of a justice as 
nonjusticiable. 
 
Thus, 
Henley's 
circle-the-wagons 
response 
cannot peacefully coexist with the majority's due process 
analysis. 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
8 
 
¶56 Although, as here, a judge against whom bias is 
asserted may determine that no bias exists, reviewing courts, at 
whatever level, still have a role to play.  When called upon to 
review an asserted due process violation for the failure to 
recuse, a reviewing court objectively determines whether the 
failure to recuse is consistent with due process principles. 
¶57 Caperton announced the need for objective review of 
recusal challenges, regardless of the level of the court.  
Indeed, the Caperton court, which involved a review of the 
recusal decision of a justice on the West Virginia Supreme 
Court, declared: 
[O]bjective standards may also require recusal whether 
or not actual bias exists or can be proved.  Due 
process "may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no 
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh 
the scales of justice equally between contending 
parties."  The failure to consider objective standards 
requiring 
recusal 
is 
not 
consistent 
with 
the 
imperatives of due process. 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136). 
¶58 The majority opinion in the present case follows 
Caperton, and explicitly adopts the "objective inquiry" it 
mandates in a due process analysis addressing the failure to 
recuse.  Majority op., ¶24.  It is thus fundamentally 
inconsistent with the approach taken by the Henley majority.  
The Henley court ignored the Caperton mandate referenced above 
that "[t]he failure to consider objective standards requiring 
recusal is not consistent with the imperatives of due process."  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886.   
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
9 
 
¶59 When the  motion for recusal is made only to the judge 
against whom bias is asserted, and no review is requested, then 
Henley gets it half right:  the decision regarding recusal 
begins and ends with the decision of that judge.  But when a 
court is called upon to review a recusal decision, whether by 
appellate review or motion to this court, such a determination 
is no longer solely up to the judge against whom bias is 
asserted.   
¶60 If a constitutional due process challenge is asserted, 
it is up to the reviewing court to address the issue.  Any 
language to the contrary does not pass constitutional muster as 
framed by Caperton and should be withdrawn.  See also Polsky v. 
Virnich, 2011 WI 69, ¶4, 335 Wis. 2d 555, 804 N.W.2d 80 (per 
curiam) (opining that "this court does not have the power to 
remove a justice from participating in an individual proceeding, 
on a case-by-case basis" and that "due process is provided by 
the 
decisions 
of 
the 
individual 
justices 
who 
decide 
to 
participate in the cases presented to the court"); Wis. S. Ct. 
IOP III.L.1 (Sept. 12, 2019) ("The decision of a justice to 
recuse or disqualify himself or herself is that of the justice 
alone."). 
¶61 It would be incongruous for the Caperton due process 
standard to apply to our review of a circuit court or court of 
appeals judge's determination to recuse, yet leave the decision 
to a single justice's determination when such a due process 
issue is presented in this court.  Due process is due process.  
The right to a fair tribunal exists no matter the level of the 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
10 
 
court.  As uncomfortable as it may be, our internal operating 
procedure cited above does not take precedence over the United 
States Supreme Court's statements in Caperton. 
¶62 What 
is 
at 
stake 
is 
nothing 
less 
than 
the 
institutional legitimacy of our courts: 
Appearances matter because the judiciary's reputation 
is essential to its institutional legitimacy——that is, 
to the public's respect for and willingness to abide 
by judicial decisionmaking.  Indeed, scholars of the 
federal 
court 
system 
suggest 
that 
the 
public's 
perception 
of 
the 
judiciary's 
independence 
and 
integrity is the primary source of its legitimacy, and 
ultimately its power. 
Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances:  A Process-Oriented 
Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 531, 532 
(2005); see also Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 
445 (2015) (explaining that the United States Supreme Court has 
"recognized the vital state interest in safeguarding public 
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's elected 
judges") (internal quotations omitted).6  
¶63 In sum, I write separately to call attention to the 
critical role the appearance of bias can play in the due process 
analysis.  I further write to address the impact of the present 
case on recusal practice in this court and statewide. 
                                                 
6 See also Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 985 (7th Cir. 
2010) ("Due process requires both fairness and the appearance of 
fairness in the tribunal."); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural 
Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 484 (1986) ("Indeed, if there 
exists any reasonable doubt about the adjudicator's impartiality 
at the outset of a case, provision of the most elaborate 
procedural safeguards will not avail to create [the] appearance 
of justice."). 
No.  2017AP2132.awb 
 
11 
 
¶64 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
1 
 
¶65 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority because it does not adopt the standard suggested in 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence.  Rather, the majority 
opinion is consistent with the language of the United States 
Supreme Court in Caperton, my writing (joined by two other 
justices) in Herrmann, and my writing in Allen.  See Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); State v. Herrmann, 
2015 WI 84, ¶¶112-62, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, 
J., concurring); and State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, ¶¶259-72, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  Here, 
"the extreme facts of this case rebut the presumption of 
judicial impartiality and establish a due process violation."  
Majority op., ¶36.  I conclude, consistently with Caperton, that 
there is a serious risk that Judge Bitney was actually biased, 
in violation of the Due Process Clause.1   
¶66 I also agree with much of Justice Hagedorn's writing 
(see dissent, ¶¶104-127) because recusal must not be used as a 
strategic weapon to judge-shop.  I write separately to again 
                                                 
1 In her concurrence, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley advocates 
for a different standard from the one in the majority opinion; a 
different standard from the one announced in Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).  She advocates for an 
appearance of bias standard.  To be clear, I join the majority 
opinion only because it specifically disavows that standard and 
adopts the precise standard set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Caperton——a serious risk of actual bias.  See majority op., ¶25 
n.18. 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley also apparently invites future 
litigants to challenge our decision in State v. Henley, 2011 
WI 67, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 175.  The parties did not 
brief or argue that Henley is inconsistent with Caperton.  In 
this case, that assertion comes from Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
alone. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
2 
 
emphasize that Caperton due process violations are rare and 
limited to the most extraordinary and extreme cases.  But the 
facts presented here are indeed extraordinary.  To be clear, our 
decision in this case is not an expansion of Caperton, but, 
rather, a faithful application of it to the facts of this case——
which, in many ways, are even more extreme than those of 
Caperton itself.   
¶67 I also write separately, in light of this case, to 
caution the Wisconsin bench about the hazards of electronic 
social media, and Facebook in particular.  I caution judges to 
avoid using social media such as Facebook unless significant 
safeguards are in place to avoid a situation like that present 
here.  If a judge chooses to participate in social media, then 
additional——not fewer——precautions must be taken.  An appearance 
of impropriety is not itself sufficient to constitute a due 
process violation.  But more is present here.  As a result, I 
respectfully concur. 
 
I.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Due Process And Caperton 
¶68 Whether due process requires a judge's recusal is a 
question of law this court reviews de novo.  State v. Pinno, 
2014 WI 74, ¶39, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207.  "A fair trial 
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."  In 
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).  An impartial judge is 
crucial to a fair trial and, therefore, "'[d]ue process requires 
a neutral and detached judge.'"  State v. Rochelt, 165 
Wis. 2d 373, 378, 477 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
3 
 
v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 833, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978)).  "We 
presume that judges are impartial," neutral, and detached, and 
the burden is on the party challenging that presumption to rebut 
it.  Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶103. 
¶69 In Caperton, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
judge's failure to recuse violates due process if there is 
"objective proof of actual bias" or "a serious risk of actual 
bias." 
 
Herrmann, 
364 
Wis. 2d 336, 
¶158 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring) (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84).  A mere 
appearance or allegation of bias alone will not rebut the 
presumption that a judge is impartial and will not constitute a 
due process violation.2  Id., ¶160.  Rather, under Caperton, the 
standard is whether  
a 
reasonable, 
well-informed 
person, 
knowledgeable 
about judicial ethical standards and the justice 
system and aware of the facts and circumstances the 
judge 
knows 
or 
reasonably 
should 
know, 
would 
reasonably 
question 
the 
judge's 
ability 
to 
be 
impartial because of actual bias or the probability of 
a serious risk of actual bias.  Such circumstances are 
exceedingly rare. 
Id.  The Supreme Court addressed one such rare and extraordinary 
set of circumstances in Caperton, 556 U.S. 868. 
¶70 I have previously summarized the facts of that case: 
The "extreme facts" that amounted to a due 
process violation in Caperton began with a $50 million 
jury verdict that was entered in favor of Caperton and 
against A.T. Massey.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872.  
                                                 
2 An appearance of impropriety, while perhaps disqualifying 
by rule (as I discuss below), is not the standard we apply in a 
due process analysis under Caperton, 556 U.S. 868.  It is rare 
indeed that we would determine that a judge who has determined 
they can sit on a case, should not have. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
4 
 
"After the verdict but before the appeal, West 
Virginia held its 2004 judicial elections."  Id. at 
873.  Five justices sit on the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals.  Id. at 874–75.  Whoever won the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' 2004 election 
would most certainly be on the court when it decided 
whether to sustain or overturn this $50 million 
verdict against A.T. Massey. Id. at 873. 
Donald 
Blankenship, 
who 
was 
A.T. 
Massey's 
chairman, chief executive officer, and president, 
"[knew] that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia would consider the appeal in the case."  Id.  
Blankenship spent $3 million to support the election 
of Brent Benjamin, an attorney who was running against 
Justice Warren McGraw for a seat on the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals.  Id. . . .  
Blankenship's 
$3 
million 
of 
expenditures 
supporting the election of Benjamin, who if elected 
would be on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
when 
it 
decided 
the 
pending 
case 
involving 
Blankenship's company, dwarfed all other spending in 
the election. . . . Id. . . .  
In addition, the United States Supreme Court 
noted that the election results were not a landslide 
victory.  Id.  A total of 716,337 people voted in the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals race.  See id.  
Benjamin was elected with a narrow margin of 53.3% of 
the votes.  Id.  Benjamin defeated his opponent by 
fewer than 50,000 votes (Benjamin received 382,036 
votes and Justice McGraw received 334,301).  Id. 
Approximately 11 months after Justice Benjamin 
won the election, and shortly before A.T. Massey filed 
its petition for appeal, Caperton moved to disqualify 
Justice Benjamin in the particular case that was 
pending the entire election between A.T. Massey and 
Caperton.  Id. at 873–74.  Caperton argued that the 
due process clause required Justice Benjamin's recusal 
"based 
on 
the 
conflict 
caused 
by 
Blankenship's 
campaign involvement."  Id. at 874.  Justice Benjamin 
denied the recusal motion.  Id.  The West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals, by a 3–to–2 vote, reversed 
the $50 million verdict against A.T. Massey.  Id.  
Justice Benjamin joined the majority opinion.  Id. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
5 
 
"Caperton sought rehearing, and the parties moved 
for disqualification of three of the five justices who 
decided the appeal."  Id.  In particular, Caperton 
again moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin.  Id. at 
875.  Justice Benjamin denied the motion.  Id.  
Justice Elliot Maynard, who joined the three-justice 
majority opinion, granted Caperton's recusal motion 
because "[p]hotos had surfaced of Justice Maynard 
vacationing with Blankenship in the French Riviera 
while the case was pending."  Id. at 874.  Justice 
Larry Starcher, one of the two dissenting justices, 
"granted [A.T.] Massey's recusal motion, apparently 
based on his public criticism of Blankenship's role in 
the 2004 elections."  Id. at 874–75.  The West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals subsequently granted 
rehearing.  Id. at 875.  Justice Benjamin, then 
serving as acting chief justice, selected two West 
Virginia circuit judges to replace the two recused 
justices on the case between Caperton and A.T. Massey.  
Id. . . . The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
again voted 3–to–2 to reverse the $50 million verdict 
against A.T. Massey.  Id. at 875.  Justice Benjamin 
again joined the majority.  Id.  Caperton petitioned 
the United States Supreme Court to review Justice 
Benjamin's denial of its recusal motions. 
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
granted 
certiorari to determine "whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when 
[Justice Benjamin] denied a recusal motion."  Id. at 
872.  The Supreme Court determined "that, in all the 
circumstances of [that] case, due process require[d] 
recusal."  Id. 
The United States Supreme Court concluded that 
there was a serious risk of Justice Benjamin's actual 
bias in sitting on Caperton because: (1) the case had 
been 
pending 
since 
before 
Justice 
Benjamin 
was 
elected; (2) the jury verdict in that case was $50 
million; (3) if elected, Justice Benjamin would be 
sitting on the court that would review this $50 
million verdict; (4) Blankenship's extraordinary $3 
million expenditures supporting Benjamin dwarfed the 
amount spent by both campaign committees combined; (5) 
Blankenship's $3 million expenditures exceeded the 
expenditures 
of 
all 
other 
Benjamin 
supporters 
combined; 
and 
(6) 
Blankenship's 
$3 
million 
expenditures had a "significant and disproportionate 
influence" in helping Benjamin win a close election.  
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
6 
 
See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883–86.  The Supreme Court 
emphasized that "[t]he temporal relationship between 
the campaign contributions, the justice's election, 
and the pendency of the case [was] also critical."  
Id. at 886. 
Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶¶129-36 (Ziegler, J., concurring); 
see 
also 
Allen, 
322 
Wis. 2d 372, 
¶¶263-69 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring).  I note that the extreme facts of Caperton largely 
centered around Blankenship's conduct as a party to the 
litigation, not that of the judge. 
¶71 "'[N]owhere in Caperton does the majority state that 
anything less than this "perfect storm," created by those 
extreme and extraordinary facts coupled with the timing of the 
election and the parties' pending case, would be sufficient to 
constitute 
a 
due 
process 
violation.'" 
 
Herrmann, 
364 
Wis. 2d 336, ¶138 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (quoting Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶269 (Ziegler, J., concurring)). 
¶72 Here, this case has nothing to do with campaign 
spending or a requested recusal based upon a financial interest 
in any respect.  Rather, this case involves a judge's choice to 
create a Facebook account and to personally and affirmatively 
accept and maintain a Facebook friendship with a litigant, 
during 
a 
pending 
proceeding, 
giving 
that 
litigant 
the 
opportunity to communicate with the judge, and without any 
safeguards to ensure the integrity of the pending proceeding.  
In this case, the judge made the Facebook account——the judge 
chose to allow that exposure.  The judge personally managed the 
account and failed to protect against litigants influencing the 
judge through communications on Facebook.  Unsurprisingly, the 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
7 
 
litigant seized upon that opportunity by trying to correspond 
with and influence the judge through the unprotected Facebook 
account created, maintained, and monitored by the judge.3  Here, 
it is this objectively demonstrated attempt by a litigant to 
influence a judge through that judge's Facebook account during a 
pending proceeding that is at issue.  Furthermore, while not 
required here, the judge decided to hold a hearing on the motion 
for recusal and render a decision on the record.  The record 
supporting the motion is ample, but the decision denying the 
motion for recusal is exceedingly lean.  See infra, ¶¶15-17. 
¶73 As I explain below, we have nothing less than a 
"perfect storm" of "extreme and extraordinary facts" here.  
Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶138 (Ziegler, J., concurring) 
(quoting 
Allen, 
322 
Wis. 2d 372, 
¶269 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring)).  The majority opinion aptly summarizes those 
facts, and I will assume the reader's familiarity with them.  
See majority op., ¶¶6-12.  But I will describe some of the facts 
of this case separately to demonstrate that they are not only 
analogous to those in Caperton, but, in some aspects, even more 
extreme and extraordinary. 
B.  Caperton And This Case 
¶74 Here, 
a 
judge 
affirmatively 
created 
a 
Facebook 
account; instead of making it private, he made it available to 
the public; he accepted a party as a "friend" during pending 
litigation in which the judge was the sole decision-maker and 
                                                 
3 Judges may of course wish to have a social media account 
for campaign purposes, but those are often monitored by a 
campaign and need not necessarily exist beyond the campaign. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
8 
 
fact-finder; and, he had no safeguards in place to avoid 
inappropriate communication with the party.  While Judge Bitney 
could have done any number of things differently, he set himself 
up for a Caperton violation by allowing Carroll to engage in 
activity that indeed met the Caperton standard.  Unbeknownst to 
the other litigant (Miller), Carroll was objectively attempting 
to influence Judge Bitney during pending litigation.  Carroll 
had this opportunity because of Judge Bitney's creation of, 
personal management of, and activity in his Facebook account, 
which lacked safeguards to protect against a party's influence 
during pending litigation.  It is the convergence of the judge's 
unprotected Facebook account, to which he gave asymmetric access 
to one party, unbeknownst to the other, to communicate with the 
judge on relevant issues, during pending and highly contested 
litigation, in which the judge was the sole decision-maker, that 
causes the violation in this case.  The facts of this case are 
in 
many 
ways 
even 
more 
connected, 
direct, 
extreme, 
and 
extraordinary than those in Caperton, where a third party 
monetarily and openly supported a judge in an election believing 
that the judge would eventually, if elected, rule on that 
party's case that was proceeding through the appellate process. 
¶75 In 2009, in Caperton, the Supreme Court took special 
note of the timing of the election and Blankenship's support of 
Justice Benjamin, knowing that, if he won the election, he would 
be a judge on A.T. Massey's case on appeal.  See Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 873 (noting, "[a]fter the verdict but before the appeal, 
West Virginia held its 2004 judicial elections.  Knowing the 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
9 
 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia would consider the 
appeal in the case, Blankenship decided to support an attorney 
who sought to replace Justice McGraw") (emphasis added).  The 
Supreme Court stated, "The temporal relationship between the 
campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the pendency 
of the case is . . . critical.  It was reasonably foreseeable, 
when the campaign contributions were made, that the pending case 
would be before the newly elected justice."  Id. at 886.  Hence, 
the fact that there was a pending case that would be before the 
judge was of great significance.  
¶76 In this case, Carroll's friendship request, Judge 
Bitney's personal and affirmative acceptance of it, and the many 
Facebook activities thereafter occurred during the pendency of 
this litigation before Judge Bitney.  In the 25 days between 
Judge Bitney's acceptance of Carroll's Facebook friendship and 
his final decision, Carroll reacted to or commented on Judge 
Bitney's Facebook posts at least 20 times.  Those interactions 
included information relevant to the issues to be decided——
Carroll's credibility, character, and parental fitness.  In that 
same 25-day period, Carroll also posted on her Facebook account 
about domestic violence, showed that she was "interested in" 
attending a domestic violence-related event, and reacted to or 
shared other third-party content related to domestic violence, 
an issue which was highly relevant to the custody dispute.  Even 
worse, all this occurred after a highly contested hearing, but 
before Judge Bitney issued his final decision.  Carroll 
requested, 
and 
Judge 
Bitney 
personally 
and 
affirmatively 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
10 
 
accepted, ex parte access to him during the drafting of his 
decision.  Carroll offered, and Judge Bitney personally and 
affirmatively accepted, access to off-record facts relevant to 
the litigation during the time when he was deciding whether she 
was the more fit parent. 
¶77 Here, the timing of the conduct is even more direct 
than in 
Caperton.  In 
Caperton, there was a "temporal 
relationship" between the court's decision and the campaign 
support because Blankenship's campaign support occurred before 
the case came to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.  
556 U.S. at 886.  Here, unlike Caperton, the Facebook friendship 
and the judge's decision were not just temporally related.  They 
occurred at the same time.  The commencement of the friendship 
and the many Facebook communications occurred during the 
decision-making phase of the proceedings where the judge, not a 
jury, was the sole decision-maker.  In Caperton, the Supreme 
Court concluded that at the time of Blankenship's campaign 
support, it was "reasonably foreseeable" that Justice Benjamin 
would hear the case if he won the election.  Id.  Here, Judge 
Bitney was currently presiding over the case; he had yet to 
render his decision in a pending, highly contested case.  The 
Facebook communications were directly related to Carroll's 
credibility as a witness and fitness as a parent.  Moreover, the 
content of the Facebook communications was objectively poised to 
evidence to the judge that one party, Carroll, had the same 
values and beliefs as the judge and was, therefore, the better 
parent.  Thus, the timing of the conduct in this case is even 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
11 
 
more extraordinary than in Caperton, as it was not just a 
probability, but a certainty, that Judge Bitney would hear 
Carroll's case; indeed, he was currently presiding over and 
deciding it.  Carroll and Judge Bitney became Facebook friends 
and Carroll communicated with Judge Bitney on Facebook during 
the exact same time period when he was deciding her highly 
contested child custody case. 
¶78 In Caperton, the parties and the public at large were 
all well aware of Blankenship's attempt to influence the 
election. Unlike here, where Miller knew nothing of Carroll's 
actions, 
Caperton 
knew 
all 
along 
that 
A.T. 
Massey 
and 
Blankenship were attempting to influence the outcome of the 
appeal 
by 
supporting 
Justice 
Benjamin's 
candidacy. 
 
See 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873-74 (stating, "[B]efore [A.T.] Massey 
filed its petition for appeal in West Virginia's highest court, 
Caperton moved to disqualify now-Justice Benjamin . . . based on 
the conflict caused by Blankenship's campaign involvement").  
Blankenship's campaign support was public knowledge.  But in 
this 
case, 
Judge 
Bitney 
gave 
Carroll 
an 
opportunity 
to 
communicate with him and try to influence him through their 
Facebook friendship while the other party, Miller, had no 
knowledge at all.  The fact that Judge Bitney allowed Carroll to 
be in a position to objectively influence him, and she seized 
that opportunity, unbeknownst to Miller until after Judge Bitney 
issued his decision, is a fact even more extraordinary than 
Caperton. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
12 
 
¶79 Furthermore, in Caperton, there was a full record of 
the controversy and Justice Benjamin thoroughly considered and 
analyzed his ability to remain impartial.  The Supreme Court 
noted, "Justice Benjamin was careful to address the recusal 
motions and explain his reasons why, on his view of the 
controlling standard, disqualification was not in order.  In 
four separate opinions issued during the course of the appeal, 
he 
explained 
why 
no 
actual 
bias 
had 
been 
established."  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882.  "In other words, based on the facts 
presented by Caperton, Justice Benjamin conducted a probing 
search into his actual motives and inclinations" and made a 
thorough record.  Id.  In this case, the same cannot be said of 
Judge Bitney.  Here, the record is lean at best.  While there is 
objective evidence of communication from one party to the judge 
over and over at the same time the judge was deciding the case, 
there is hardly anything in the record to refute it or 
demonstrate that the contact was of no moment. 
¶80 Judge Bitney did rule on Miller's motion for recusal, 
but the ruling is exceedingly lean in light of what appears to 
be ex parte communication.  Judge Bitney could have denied 
seeing Carroll's various reactions to and comments on his 
Facebook posts.  But he did not.  Nor did he deny seeing 
Carroll's Facebook posts relating to domestic violence.  Nor did 
he deny viewing her Facebook profile.  He could have explained 
the safeguards he has in place.  He could have explained how he 
manages his Facebook account.  But he did not.  Rather, Judge 
Bitney admitted that the parties "presented accurately the 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
13 
 
substance of the interaction between Miss Carroll and the Court 
on Facebook" and that, on the day he and Carroll became Facebook 
friends, his decision had not yet been "reduced to writing."  
Judge Bitney's statement that the evidence presented in the 
motion was an accurate reflection of his "interaction" with 
Carroll is consistent with the remainder of the record, which is 
void of any denial that he saw Carroll's comments, posts, or 
reactions on Facebook.4  This record is far from adequate to 
overcome the objective evidence that one party was communicating 
with the judge on a Facebook account developed and maintained by 
the judge during the pendency of a case where the judge, not a 
jury, is the decision-maker. 
¶81 It is worth noting that, in a case tried before a 
jury, 
if 
the 
court 
had 
any 
question 
regarding 
improper 
communication between a party and a member of the jury, we would 
expect a full record to be made.  While judges need not detail 
all that goes into their decision-making as to whether to stay 
on a case, when a challenge is made as was made here, it is 
somewhat akin to that of a party or witness attempting to unduly 
influence a juror in a pending case.  Yet, even though this 
judge chose to hold a hearing and render a decision on the 
record, we are left with an ample record of evidence in support 
                                                 
4 An "interaction" is defined as a "mutual or reciprocal 
action 
or 
influence"; 
it 
is 
inherently 
interpersonal.  
"Interaction."  Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interaction. Accessed 
4 Jun. 2020. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
14 
 
of the motion for recusal and little else.  This case is indeed 
extraordinary. 
¶82 In Caperton, the Supreme Court stated: 
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual  
bias——based on objective and reasonable perceptions——
when a person with a personal stake in a particular 
case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge's election campaign when the case 
was pending or imminent. 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.  In this case, Carroll was "a person 
with a personal stake" in the proceedings.  Id.  Indeed, she had 
the ultimate stake in the case as a mother seeking custody of 
her child.  Carroll also had the opportunity to "significant[ly] 
and disproportionate[ly] influence" the case.  Id.  She had a 
Facebook friendship with Judge Bitney in which she could 
introduce off-record facts relevant to Judge Bitney's decision, 
facts which Miller had no opportunity to rebut.  And all this 
occurred "when the case was pending" and Judge Bitney's decision 
was "imminent."  Id.  In Caperton, it was not the judge's 
actions, but the party's actions and their "significant and 
disproportionate influence" on the case that caused the Caperton 
violation.  Id.  Similarly, while Judge Bitney could have, and 
should have, more prudently managed his Facebook account, it is 
Carroll's conduct during the pendency of the litigation that is 
of particular concern.   
¶83 Finally, in Caperton, the extraordinary conduct was 
attributed only to Blankenship; Blankenship paid the $3 million 
in support of Justice Benjamin during his campaign.  Justice 
Benjamin concluded that no one could "point to any actual 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
15 
 
conduct or activity on [his] part which could be termed 
'improper.'"  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882 (quoting Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 293 (W. Va. 2008)).  The 
Supreme Court agreed that Justice Benjamin's conduct was not 
"improper."  See id. ("We do not question [Justice Benjamin's] 
subjective findings of impartiality and propriety.").  Here, the 
facts are different.  It was the judge who established and 
personally managed his Facebook account, allowed public access 
(even personally accepting a friendship with a litigant in a 
pending case wherein the judge was the sole decision-maker), and 
had no protection in place against attempted influence. 
¶84 I note that even those who would find no Caperton 
violation in this case agree that Judge Bitney's management of 
his Facebook account evidenced significant shortfalls with the 
lack of protections afforded.  See dissent, ¶124 ("Every member 
of this court would agree that Judge Bitney should have been 
more careful.").  Indeed, we can easily "point to . . . actual 
conduct or activity on [Judge Bitney's] part which could be 
termed 'improper.'"  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882 (quoting 
Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 293).  Put simply, Carroll would not 
have had ex parte access to Judge Bitney if he had not given it 
to her.  Judge Bitney affirmatively chose to let Carroll, a 
party to a highly contested child custody hearing over which he 
presided, become his Facebook friend.  Judge Bitney personally 
and affirmatively accepted her friendship request.  Even worse, 
since Carroll's personal life, character, and parental fitness 
were relevant to the custody dispute, Judge Bitney affirmatively 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
16 
 
accepted access to off-record and relevant facts about Carroll 
when he accepted her friend request.  Judge Bitney did not 
disclose his Facebook friendship with Carroll.  He did not 
disclose any of their Facebook interactions.  Judge Bitney's 
conduct in allowing a party such access in this case was not 
just improper.  It was extraordinary.   
¶85 There is a serious risk that Judge Bitney was actually 
biased, in violation of the Due Process Clause.  Here, as in 
Caperton, the violation occurs in part because of the party's 
actions, and in part because of the judge's actions.  Certainly, 
Judge Bitney set up Carroll's ex parte access by choosing to be 
on social media and not having sufficient safeguards in place.  
But Caperton and this case both flow from the party's actions 
attempting to influence a judge or court during pending and 
existing proceedings——here, while the highly contested case was 
actually pending before Judge Bitney, the sole decision-maker. 
¶86 The extreme facts of this case are as follows:  (1) 
Judge Bitney personally managed his Facebook account; (2) Judge 
Bitney was the decision-maker and fact-finder in a pending 
custody dispute; (3) the custody dispute was highly contested 
and included the testimony of 15 witnesses; (4) the guardian ad 
litem's recommendation was contrary to the judge's decision; (5) 
Carroll requested a Facebook friendship with Judge Bitney 
immediately after final briefs in the case were submitted; (6) 
Judge 
Bitney 
personally 
and 
affirmatively 
accepted 
that 
friendship request; (7) in the 25 days between accepting the 
Facebook friendship and Judge Bitney's final decision, Carroll 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
17 
 
reacted to or commented on Judge Bitney's Facebook posts at 
least 20 times; (8) those interactions included information 
relevant to the issues to be decided——Carroll's character and 
parental fitness; (9) in that same 25-day period, Carroll also 
posted on her account about domestic violence, showed that she 
was "interested in" attending a domestic violence-related event, 
and reacted to or shared other third-party content related to 
domestic violence, an issue which was highly relevant to the 
custody dispute; (10) Judge Bitney did not unfriend Carroll, 
disclose the Facebook friendship, or disclose the interactions; 
(11) Judge Bitney did not deny seeing any of Carroll's Facebook 
posts, comments, or reactions, or her profile page; and (12) 
Judge Bitney's decision was grounded in a conclusion that Miller 
had 
engaged 
in 
domestic 
violence 
against 
Carroll, 
was 
overwhelmingly in favor of Carroll, and uprooted the pre-
existing physical placement of the child.5  
¶87 Under Caperton, this perfect storm of extreme and 
extraordinary 
facts, 
viewed 
objectively, 
undoubtedly 
demonstrates a serious risk of actual bias. 
C.  Judges And Facebook 
¶88 The Preamble to the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 
setting forth the Code of Judicial Conduct ("the Code") states: 
Our legal system is based on the principle that 
an independent, fair and competent judiciary will 
                                                 
5 In his dissent, Justice Hagedorn describes the facts of 
this case as "ordinary."  See dissent, ¶¶104, 106, 114, 117, 
125, 126.  I most certainly hope they are not.  Indeed, this 
concurrence demonstrates why the facts of this case are not (and 
should not be) ordinary. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
18 
 
interpret and apply the laws that govern us.  The role 
of the judiciary is central to American concepts of 
justice and the rule of law.  Intrinsic to all 
provisions of this Code are the precepts that judges, 
individually and collectively, must respect and honor 
the judicial office as a public trust and strive to 
enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system.  
The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the 
resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of 
government under rule of law.  
SCR ch. 60 Preamble.  The Code then sets forth a series of 
ethical rules that judges must follow.  A judgeship carries with 
it profound responsibilities to the people, the bench, the bar, 
and to justice. 
¶89 First, let me make clear that a violation of the Code 
does not automatically constitute a violation of due process.  
Whereas due process violations address serious risks of actual 
bias, the Code addresses the appearance of bias even if there is 
no actual bias.  See Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 366, ¶151 (Ziegler, 
J., concurring) ("'Where only the appearance of bias is at 
issue, a litigant's recourse is to seek disqualification under 
state disqualification statutes[.]") (quoting People v. Freeman, 
222 P.3d 177, 178 (Cal. 2010); see id. ("'Less extreme cases——
including those that involve the mere appearance, but not the 
probability, of bias——should be resolved under more expansive 
disqualification statutes and codes of judicial conduct.'") 
(quoting Freeman, 222 P.3d at 185 (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
889-90)).  In this case, Miller brought a claim grounded in the 
Due Process Clause, not the Code.  Accordingly, we do not 
analyze whether Judge Bitney's conduct constituted a violation 
of the Code.  However, social media, while something judges are 
permitted to use as citizens and community members, should be 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
19 
 
used with caution.  Indeed, judges must always be mindful of how 
their actions as private citizens can impact their ability to 
preside over certain cases. 
¶90 By way of example, under SCR 60.05(3)(c)2.d., a judge 
may not ask lawyers or those likely to appear before the judge 
to buy tickets to a pancake breakfast for a local neighborhood 
center.  Comment, SCR 60.05(3)(c)2.d.  "[A] judge may pass the 
collection basket during services at church, may ask friends and 
neighbors to buy tickets to a pancake breakfast for a local 
neighborhood center and may cook the pancakes at the event but 
may not personally ask attorneys and others who are likely to 
appear before the judge to buy tickets to it."  Id.  A judge is 
supposed to take precautions with in-person interactions with 
those who appear in front of the judge.  Should that not be 
equally applicable for judges on social media? 
¶91 Judicial use of Facebook has spawned vigorous debate 
regarding whether and to what extent judges ought to use 
Facebook, and the ethical issues Facebook poses for judges.  
See, e.g., Hon. Richard L. Gabriel & Nina Varsava, Friending, 
Following, and Liking  Law., 
July 2019, at 9; Hon. M. Sue Kurita, Electronic Social Media: 
Friend or Foe for Judges, 7 St. Mary's J. Legal Malpractice & 
Ethics 184 (2017); Shaziah Singh, Friend Request Denied: 
Judicial Ethics &  Reserve J.L. Tech. & 
Internet 153 (2016); John G. Browning, Why Can't We Be Friends? 
Judges' Use of  Miami L. Rev. 487 (2014); 
Hon. Craig Estlinbaum, Social Networking & Judicial Ethics, 2 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
20 
 
St. Mary's J. Legal Malpractice & Ethics 2 (2012); Samuel 
Vincent Jones, Judges, Friends, and Facebook: The Ethics of 
Prohibition, 24 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 281 (2011). 
¶92 This debate continues, and various jurisdictions have 
taken different approaches to the intersection between judicial 
use of social media and ethical rules.   Singh, supra ¶91, at 
158-71 (summarizing approaches and stating that: Florida, 
Oklahoma, 
and 
Massachusetts 
take 
a 
"strict 
approach"; 
California, Arizona, Utah, Texas, North Carolina, and Florida 
take a "moderate approach"; and Maryland, New York, Kentucky, 
Ohio, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and the American Bar 
Association take a "liberal approach"). 
¶93 Judge Bitney was not the first judge to have chosen to 
use electronic social media.  Indeed, there have been many 
troubling cases involving judicial use of electronic social 
media in recent years.  See Browning, supra ¶91, at 497-502 
(collecting cases), describing, for example: 
 In re Dempsey, 29 So. 3d 1030 (Fla. 2010), in which a 
judge's conduct violated a canon of judicial conduct 
when her campaign video on YouTube misrepresented her 
qualifications; and 
 Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 959 N.E.2d 990 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012), in which a hearing officer 
posted "inappropriate" comments on Facebook relating 
to Doe's appeal of his classification as a sex 
offender. 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
21 
 
See also Kurita, supra ¶91, at 211-33 (collecting cases), 
describing, for example: 
 Kiniti-Wairimu v. Holder, 312 F. App'x 907 (9th Cir. 
2009), in which an immigration judge independently 
researched a Kenyan citizen's family online when his 
application for withholding of removal and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture was pending, 
violating due process; and 
 State v. Thomas, 376 P.3d 184 (N.M. 2016), in which a 
judge posted twice on his campaign Facebook account 
regarding a trial in his courtroom, including a post 
saying, "In the trial I presided over, the jury 
returned guilty verdicts for first-degree murder and 
kidnapping just after lunch. Justice was served.  
Thank you for your prayers."  Id. at 189. 
¶94 I note that this case, and many others, involve use of 
electronic social media by a third party, not just the judge.  A 
judge who uses electronic social media subjects himself or 
herself to the risk of misuse of a social media relationship by 
a third party.  I am concerned that no matter how cautious and 
attentive the judge may be, a judge who uses electronic social 
media may expose both the judge and the judiciary as a whole to 
an appearance of bias or impropriety. 
¶95 Accordingly, I strongly urge my colleagues on the 
bench to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of using 
electronic social media like Facebook.  See Jones, supra ¶91, at 
302 (concluding that, "[t]o avoid the perils that emanate from 
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
22 
 
current and future [electronic social networking] capacities——
including, but not limited to, 'friending'——the Judicial Code 
should be viewed as a restrictive juridical construct").  And if 
a judge chooses to use a social media platform like Facebook, 
then that judge must proceed with the utmost diligence and 
caution.  See Gabriel & Varsava, supra ¶91, at 12 (concluding 
that "judges who wish to participate in social media should 
proceed with caution, asking themselves before acting whether 
their social media activities could be deemed by a reasonable 
person to undermine the judges' independence, integrity, or 
impartiality; place the judiciary in disrepute; or interfere 
with their ability to carry out the substantial duties that have 
been entrusted to them"). 
 
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶96 I join the majority because it does not adopt the 
standard suggested in Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence.  
Rather, the majority opinion is consistent with the language of 
the United States Supreme Court in Caperton, my writing (joined 
by two other justices) in Herrmann, and my writing in Allen.  
See Caperton, 556 U.S. 868; Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶¶112-62 
(Ziegler, J., concurring); and Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶259-72 
(Ziegler, J., concurring).  Here, "the extreme facts of this 
case 
rebut 
the 
presumption 
of 
judicial 
impartiality 
and 
establish a due process violation."  Majority op., ¶36.  I 
conclude, consistently with Caperton, that there is a serious 
risk that Judge Bitney was actually biased, in violation of the 
Due Process Clause.   
No.  2017AP2132.akz 
 
23 
 
¶97 I also agree with much of Justice Hagedorn's writing 
(see dissent, ¶¶104-127) because recusal must not be used as a 
strategic weapon to judge-shop.  I write separately to again 
emphasize that Caperton due process violations are rare and 
limited to the most extraordinary and extreme cases.  But the 
facts presented here are indeed extraordinary.  To be clear, our 
decision in this case is not an expansion of Caperton, but, 
rather, a faithful application of it to the facts of this case——
which, in many ways, are even more extreme than those of 
Caperton itself.   
¶98 I also write separately, in light of this case, to 
caution the Wisconsin bench about the hazards of electronic 
social media, and Facebook in particular.  I caution judges to 
avoid using social media such as Facebook unless significant 
safeguards are in place to avoid a situation like that present 
here.  If a judge chooses to participate in social media, then 
additional——not fewer——precautions must be taken.  An appearance 
of impropriety is not itself sufficient to constitute a due 
process violation.  But more is present here.   
¶99 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No.  2017AP2132.rfd 
1 
 
¶100 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately to provide additional guidance and clarification for 
the bench and bar.  There is nothing inherently inappropriate 
about a judge's use of social media platforms like Facebook.  
There is no rule or judicial ethics opinion in Wisconsin 
prohibiting or limiting a judge's use of social media.  In fact, 
the use of social media platforms "can benefit judges in both 
their personal and professional lives."  ABA Comm'n on Ethics & 
Prof'l 
Responsibility, 
Formal 
Op. 
13-462 
at 
4 
(2013).  
Participation in social media is one way for judges to remain 
active in the community and "can prevent [judges] from being 
thought of as isolated or out of touch."  Id. at 1.  
Additionally, Facebook and other social media platforms have 
become important campaign tools for judges to deliver campaign 
messages to the voters in Wisconsin.  See Susan Criss, Use of 
Social Media by Judges, The, 60 Advocate (Texas) 18 ("Few 
judicial campaigns can realistically afford to refrain from 
using social media to deliver their message to the voting 
public."). 
¶101 A judge's Facebook connection to a party or an 
attorney, without more, does not rebut the presumption of 
impartiality.  Requiring automatic disqualification in every 
case involving a Facebook acquaintance would not reflect the 
true nature of a Facebook friendship and "casts a large net in 
an effort to catch a minnow."  Chace v. Loisel, 170 So. 3d 802, 
804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also Law Offices of Herssein 
& Herssein, P.A. v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 271 So. 3d 889, 
No.  2017AP2132.rfd 
2 
 
897 (Fla. 2018)) ("No reasonably prudent person would fear that 
she could not receive a fair and impartial trial based solely on 
the fact that a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge 
are Facebook 'friends' with a relationship of an indeterminate 
nature."); ABA Formal Op. 13-462 at 2-3 ("Simple designation as 
an [electronic social media] connection does not, in and of 
itself, 
indicate 
the 
degree 
or 
intensity 
of 
a 
judge's 
relationship with a person.").  If a mere acquaintance on 
Facebook 
required 
judicial 
recusal, 
it 
would 
promote 
gamesmanship among parties and weaponize social media.   
¶102 However, judges must be cautious in their use of 
social media.  As the American Bar Association (ABA) has 
reasoned, "[a] judge may participate in electronic social 
networking, but as with all social relationships and contacts, a 
judge must . . . avoid any conduct that would undermine the 
judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality . . . ."  ABA 
Formal Op. 13-462 at 1.  Public confidence in the administration 
of justice demands that members of the judiciary perform their 
duties impartially and free from any sort of bias.  See ABA 
Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 19-488 at 2 
(2019); see also Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 
445 
(2015)(reaffirming 
the 
"'vital 
state 
interest' 
in 
safeguarding 'public confidence in the fairness and integrity in 
the nation's elected judges'" (quoted source omitted)).  A 
judge's online "friendships," just like a judge's real life 
friendships, must be approached with care and caution. 
No.  2017AP2132.rfd 
3 
 
¶103 I am authorized to state that Justice BRIAN HAGEDORN 
joins this concurrence. 
 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
1 
 
¶104 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  For most of 
American history, the United States Constitution was understood 
to say close to nothing about judicial recusal.  This area of 
law, with a few extremely narrow exceptions, was left to state 
regulation and oversight.  But as it has in many areas, the 
judiciary began to expand the constitutional footprint, inch by 
inch, and lately, step by step.  Today's decision continues the 
march away from the original public meaning of our Constitution, 
and greatly risks merging ordinary judicial recusal questions 
with the narrow proscriptions of the Due Process Clause. 
¶105 The question in this case is not whether, under an 
objective standard, Judge Bitney would be able to hold the 
balance nice, clear, and true in light of the circumstances.  
The question is likewise not whether Judge Bitney may have 
transgressed the recusal standards in the Wisconsin Statutes or 
Code of Judicial Conduct.  Rather, the question presented is 
whether the record in this case demonstrates that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause required Judge Bitney's recusal, 
and therefore whether Miller's due process right to an impartial 
tribunal was violated.  Under the governing United States 
Supreme Court precedent, recusal is constitutionally required 
only when actual bias is present or when the facts of a case are 
so extreme as to constitute a serious risk of actual bias. 
¶106 Miller claims this constitutes one of the rare cases 
where the risk of actual bias is constitutionally intolerable.  
I disagree.  This is a relatively normal appearance of bias 
case.  Granted, given its intersection with modern social media, 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
2 
 
an area comparatively unexplored in judicial ethics circles, 
this fact pattern carries with it a sense of novelty.  But 
outside of its medium, the facts before us are rather ordinary 
in the types of risks and potential conflicts at issue.  I 
conclude the circumstances here are not so extreme as to violate 
Miller's due process right to an impartial tribunal.  I 
respectfully dissent.1 
 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION AND RECUSAL 
¶107 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 
§ 1.  The touchstone for a claim based on this constitutional 
protection is the "settled usages and modes of proceeding 
existing in the common and statute law of England."  Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Murray's Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 
(1856); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). 
¶108 Under the common law, the grounds for judicial 
disqualification were simple and narrow:  a man could not act as 
the judge in his own case.  See generally Williams v. 
                                                 
1 I 
also 
join 
Justice 
Dallet's 
concurrence 
regarding 
judicial use of social media.  Judges must be careful, but we 
are elected officials and members of civil society.  Social 
media can be an important platform to inform citizens of who 
judges are as people, to educate the citizenry regarding the 
judicial role, and to promote candidacy for public office.  The 
dangers are not significantly greater than those attendant to 
judicial involvement in non-profit work, participation in 
community-wide justice initiatives, and shaking hands at the 
town Fourth of July parade. 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
3 
 
Pennsylvania, 
136 
S. Ct. 1899, 
1917 
(2016) 
(Thomas, 
J., 
dissenting).  In practice, this prohibition was limited to cases 
where the judge had a direct and personal financial stake in the 
outcome, or where the judge was a party in the action.  Id.  
Neither personal bias nor an appearance of bias was enough.  
Personal interest, not potential bias, was the only concern 
sufficient to trigger judicial disqualification.  Id.  One 
scholar summarized it this way:  "English common law practice at 
the time of the establishment of the American court system was 
simple in the extreme.  Judges disqualified for financial 
interest.  No other disqualifications were permitted, and bias, 
today the most controversial ground for disqualification, was 
rejected entirely."  John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 
56 Yale L.J. 605, 611–12 (1947). 
¶109 Early American federal and state laws expanded the 
narrow common law rule in limited ways, notably to instances 
where the judge previously served as an attorney in the same 
case.  Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1918-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
But the narrowness of this limitation cannot be overstated.  By 
way of illustration, one of the most famous cases in American 
legal history, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), 
was presided over by Chief Justice John Marshall.  But it was 
then-Secretary of State John Marshall who failed to deliver the 
commissions that led to the mandamus action before the high 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
4 
 
court in the first place.2  See Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1919 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  None of that violated the common law 
or 
constitutional 
rules 
for 
judicial 
disqualification 
as 
understood at the time. 
¶110 The United States Supreme Court has recognized a 
constitutionally protected due process right to an impartial 
tribunal.  See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A 
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due 
process.").  But it has also been crystal clear that the "Due 
Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial 
disqualifications."  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 
U.S. 813, 
828 
(1986). 
 
The 
vast 
majority 
of 
judicial 
disqualification issues are matters for state law and policy, 
not the Constitution.  Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. 
¶111 Until recently, the Supreme Court's due process 
precedent was consonant with the narrow common law rule.  Cases 
in the 20th century made clear that due process disqualified 
judges when they had "a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary 
interest" in the outcome of a case.  See id. (explaining recusal 
required of a judge who would profit from a case only upon a 
conviction of the defendant); see also Aetna Life Ins., 475 
U.S. at 823-24 (explaining recusal required of a judge whose 
                                                 
2 In fact, Secretary Marshall tasked his younger brother, 
James Markham Marshall, to deliver the commissions——including 
the commission intended for Marbury.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146 (1803) (referring to James Marshall's 
affidavit); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury 
v. Madison:  Making Defeat Look Like Victory, in Constitutional 
Law Stories 17-18 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) (discussing 
the circumstances that gave rise to Marbury). 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
5 
 
decision in a case would have a "clear and immediate effect of 
enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of" the 
judge's own cases against the same defendant).  Around the 
middle of the 20th century, the Supreme Court also found that 
due process is violated by a "judge who was at the same time the 
complainant, indicter and prosecutor."  Murchison, 349 U.S. at 
135.  Thus, for most of its history, the Supreme Court applied 
due process only to variants of the common law rules——where a 
judge had a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest, 
and where a judge served as counsel in the case below.  These 
standards were based on the notion of a direct conflict and 
personal interest, what might be labeled actual bias.  Moreover, 
because the constitutional proscriptions remained narrow, states 
had considerable room to enact stricter recusal rules based on 
policy and prudence, not constitutional command. 
¶112 In 2009, the Supreme Court entertained a case with 
extreme facts, and responded with a limited expansion of the 
protections afforded by the Constitution.  Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).  In Caperton, West 
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin declined to recuse 
on a case reviewing a $50 million verdict.  Id. at 873-74.  
During the three years between entry of that verdict and the 
appeal to Justice Benjamin's court, one of the parties in the 
case spent $3 million to help elect Justice Benjamin to his 
position.  Id. at 872-73.  Those expenditures, which were more 
than all other supporters combined, had a "significant and 
disproportionate influence" in helping elect Justice Benjamin in 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
6 
 
a close race.  Id. at 873, 884.  This was, as it were, a perfect 
storm 
of 
facts——extraordinarily 
disproportionate 
campaign 
contributions in a close election from a party in a pending 
case. 
¶113 Facing this, the Court indicated for the first time 
that something less than actual bias may be of constitutional 
import.  But its application was limited to cases where, under 
an objective inquiry, "a serious risk of actual bias" is 
present.  Id. at 884-86.  "Serious risk" does not mean simply a 
meaningful risk, but one far outside the norm, one right next to 
the line of actual bias.  The Court went out of its way to 
stress this was no ordinary situation, stating for example:   
 "On these extreme facts the probability of actual 
bias rises to an unconstitutional level." 
 "[T]his is an exceptional case." 
 "The facts now before us are extreme by any 
measure.  The parties point to no other instance 
involving judicial campaign contributions that 
presents a potential for bias comparable to the 
circumstances in this case." 
 "Our decision today addresses an extraordinary 
situation 
where 
the 
Constitution 
requires 
recusal." 
Id. at 
884, 
886-87. 
 
The 
unmistakable 
message 
was 
that 
"[a]pplication of the constitutional standard implicated in this 
case will thus be confined to rare instances."  Id. at 890.  
Under Caperton, appearance of bias is not enough to trigger a 
constitutional problem.  Rather, recusal is required under the 
Constitution only in the extreme, exceptional, and extraordinary 
case where the risk of actual bias is so unusually high that it 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
7 
 
cannot be tolerated.  Id. at 877 (recusal required where "the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable" 
(quoted source omitted)). 
 
II.  APPLICATION 
¶114 Two problems plague the majority's analysis.  First, 
most of the court's opinion reads like an ordinary discussion on 
recusal, but Caperton limits application of the Due Process 
Clause to extreme situations.  Second, the majority functionally 
finds facts by embracing every negative inference from a record 
that is, at best, ambiguous. 
¶115 When the Supreme Court decided Caperton, Chief Justice 
Roberts warned in dissent that some might use this open door to 
turn routine judicial recusal questions into due process claims.  
Id. at 899-900 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice 
stressed——with no disagreement from the majority——that recusal 
is generally not an issue of constitutional concern.  Id. at 
892-93.  The Supreme Court had previously said that "[m]atters 
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, 
would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative 
discretion."  Id. at 892 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).  And 
given this, the Chief Justice reasoned, so too are common 
recusal issues like "friendship with a party or lawyer, prior 
employment experience, membership in clubs or associations, 
prior 
speeches 
and 
writings, 
religious 
affiliation, 
and 
countless other considerations."  Id. at 892. 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
8 
 
¶116 It 
is 
true 
that 
Caperton 
opened 
the 
door 
to 
constitutional claims alleging something less than actual bias.  
But the opening was more crevice than canyon.  It is easy to 
recite the standard that any constitutional claim based on a 
serious risk of bias must be an "extreme case," but that cannot 
operate as a license to neglect its import.  That is what the 
majority does here.  It recites Caperton's repeated admonition 
that only extreme cases implicate the Constitution.  Yet, its 
analysis would look almost no different if this were a case 
based on the recusal standards in our statutes or judicial 
ethics rules. 
¶117 The record before us doesn't tell us much, but what it 
does tell suggests this is not a needle-in-the-haystack judicial 
recusal case; it is quite ordinary.  The thrust of the recusal 
argument rests on the fact that Judge Bitney accepted a Facebook 
friend request from a party while a case was pending, and did 
not disclose it.  But that's rather sparse evidence from which 
to conclude a certain ethics violation occurred, much less a due 
process problem. 
¶118 Broadly speaking, Facebook, like other social media, 
can be something one interacts with much or little.  Settings 
may be adjusted so that one never sees notifications regarding 
comments or likes on one's posts.  A Facebook user can have 
thousands of friends, but only follow the updates of a far 
smaller circle.  And though we do know Judge Bitney was an 
active Facebook user, the record does not tell us anything about 
his interactions with Carroll herself. 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
9 
 
¶119 For instance, we do not know, and therefore cannot 
conclude, whether Judge Bitney ever saw Carroll's domestic 
violence-related posts.  Thus, even if those could be seen as 
"ex parte communications concerning a pending . . . proceeding," 
as the majority construes them, we have no factual findings from 
which we could definitively say anything like that occurred.  
SCR 60.04(g) (prohibiting most ex parte communications regarding 
a pending matter).  We also cannot say, for that matter, whether 
Judge Bitney viewed any of Carroll's posts or Facebook activity 
while the case was pending. 
¶120 It is also difficult, without more facts, to know what 
to read into Judge Bitney's decision to accept Carroll's 
Facebook friend request.  Judge Bitney undoubtedly has thousands 
of parties before him each year.  It could be he was not aware 
her case was pending at the time he accepted the request.  It 
could be he routinely accepts all Facebook friend requests he 
receives without paying much attention to who they are from.  
While the record could support more problematic inferences, the 
record as we have it supports more innocent ones as well. 
¶121 Further, we do not know if Judge Bitney was even aware 
that Carroll had liked his posts or whether he saw the two "get 
well soon" comments she left on his posts.  Again, many people 
do not follow every comment or like on a Facebook post.  
Moreover, there's nothing particularly sinister about a party 
wishing a judge a speedy recovery from knee surgery.  A similar 
greeting from parties or counsel while passing in the halls of 
the courthouse would raise no one's eyebrows.  Nor would "Merry 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
10 
 
Christmas!" or "The pastor preached a wonderful sermon on 
Sunday, didn't he?"  These benign interactions are a routine 
part of being a person in a finite community. 
¶122 To that point, these kinds of interactions between a 
judicial officer and members in the community are not that 
unique.  Suppose Carroll and Judge Bitney were already friends 
on Facebook.  Would liking Bible verses in his Facebook feed and 
wishing him a speedy recovery from knee surgery be cause to 
invoke the Due Process Clause?  I think not.  Suppose Carroll 
came to a "Re-Elect Judge Bitney" rally during the last election 
cycle and wrote a Facebook post supporting him.  This would not 
constitute constitutional grounds for recusal either.  Nor would 
a large campaign contribution trigger due process concerns apart 
from the uniquely problematic confluence of events that Caperton 
occasioned.  556 U.S. at 887 ("The parties point to no other 
instance involving judicial campaign contributions that presents 
a potential for bias comparable to the circumstances in this 
case."). 
¶123 It is important to remember that judges are not 
isolated members of the community.  They read the news.  They 
receive unsolicited and stray comments about cases or parties.  
Judges may, particularly in smaller communities, know a party's 
family history from another case, or have heard stories from 
judicial colleagues about a party before them.  Judges may go to 
church with parties before them, volunteer with the local Rotary 
chapter, or be former high school football teammates with a 
party's father.  Judges are people too.  And it is precisely 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
11 
 
these sorts of ordinary, and generally unproblematic, life 
interactions that undergird the strong presumption that judges 
are impartial.  The very concept of an impartial judiciary 
depends upon the belief that judges can manage through their 
biases, news feeds, political supporters, former co-workers, and 
neighbors to render decisions without fear or favor to any 
party. 
¶124 Every member of this court would agree that Judge 
Bitney should have been more careful.  Knowingly or not, 
accepting a Facebook friend request from a party while a case is 
pending raises an appearance of bias that judges should strive 
to avoid.  But the claim here is that, far beyond an appearance 
of 
bias, 
this 
miscue 
was 
extreme, 
exceptional, 
and 
extraordinary, raising a serious risk of actual bias.  Despite 
the majority's confident assertions, this record tells us far 
too little to conclude the Constitution is implicated.  We as a 
court must not deploy the Constitution as a means to right all 
recusal wrongs.3  See Caperton 556 U.S. at 903 (Scalia, J., 
                                                 
3 The concurrence of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley tries to take 
Caperton even further.  She would seemingly transform many 
appearance of bias questions into constitutional claims.  And 
separately, she also argues that Caperton is inconsistent with 
our decision in State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 
802 N.W.2d 175 (per curiam), confirming this court's long-
standing rule leaving recusal decisions to the individual 
justice.  In particular, she argues that the recusal decisions 
of justices must likewise be subject to the same objective due 
process review——but by the other members of this court.  Henley 
is settled law, and there are good reasons to keep it that way. 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
12 
 
dissenting) ("Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to 
all earthly questions, but the Due Process Clause most assuredly 
does not.  The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right 
all 
wrongs 
and 
repair 
all 
imperfections 
through 
the 
Constitution.").  We should therefore default to the strong 
presumption that Judge Bitney can withstand a hearty breeze——
even what could have been attempted influence in this case by 
Carroll——and still not blow over. 
¶125 Blurring this standard leads to the very dangers Chief 
Justice Roberts cautioned against in his Caperton dissent.  All 
future litigants, he warned, "will assert that their case is 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, our recusal procedures come from good stock; they 
follow the United States Supreme Court's model for courts of 
last resort.  See Henley, 338 Wis. 2d 610, ¶¶28-31 (noting the 
United States Supreme Court's procedure, which this court has 
followed for more than 150 years, was unchanged by Caperton).   
Therefore, any problem that allegedly exists here is no more 
acute than it is for the Supreme Court itself. 
Second, the recusal decisions of individual justices on 
this court are reviewable in the exact same way the recusal 
decision here was——by a higher court.  That is, litigants may 
appeal the recusal decisions of members of this court to the 
United States Supreme Court.  That, of course, is exactly what 
happened in Caperton.  In short, there is nothing incongruous 
about the existence of a due process claim and our rule allowing 
justices 
to 
decide 
for 
themselves 
whether 
recusal 
is 
appropriate. 
The recusal wars that plagued this court for several years 
have concluded; I bid them good riddance.  Nothing since Henley, 
which was decided after Caperton, demands another round of 
squabbling over these issues.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley is 
right about one thing——the integrity of our courts is at stake.  
Encouraging litigants to use recusal as a weapon, turning 
justices against one another, and casting more public doubt on 
the integrity of our colleagues is the only thing that will come 
from Justice Bradley's invitation.  These zombies are best kept 
entombed. 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
13 
 
really the most extreme thus far."  Id. at 899 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  And each new allegedly extreme case will entice 
the judiciary "to correct the extreme case, rather than adhering 
to the legal principle."  Id.  Sometimes, the Chief Justice 
reminded us, the cure is worse than the disease.  Id. at 902.  
While trying to protect the integrity of the judiciary, the 
invitation to dress ordinary judicial disqualification claims as 
constitutional cases "will itself bring our judicial system into 
undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the 
American people in the fairness and integrity of their courts."  
Id. 
¶126 Although this court must follow Caperton, it has no 
constitutional warrant to expand it.  The more this court takes 
ordinary recusal questions and turns them into constitutional 
questions, the more we will see these claims.  And the more we 
see these claims, the more recusal will become a litigation 
weapon (after all, a due process violation is structural error).  
And the more recusal becomes a litigation weapon, the more 
damage it does to the judiciary as a whole.  The presumption 
that judges will follow the law regardless of their personal 
views and regardless of their associations is quickly being 
replaced 
by 
the 
presumption 
that 
judges 
are 
frail, 
impressionable, and not to be trusted.  Make no mistake, today's 
decision will invite ever more Constitution-based recusal 
claims.  And with it, faith in the judiciary will be undermined, 
not strengthened.  With each new blessing of a new "just as bad 
as 
Caperton" 
recusal 
claim, 
the 
judiciary 
continues 
its 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
14 
 
constitutional takeover of new areas of law that the people, 
through their written Constitution, left to themselves. 
¶127 Nothing 
in 
the 
original 
public 
meaning 
of 
our 
Constitution nor in Supreme Court precedent requires us to 
transform 
Judge 
Bitney's 
social 
media 
misstep 
into 
a 
constitutional controversy.  I respectfully dissent. 
¶128 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and DANIEL KELLY join this dissent except for footnote 1 
and ¶¶120-24, but they do join footnote 3. 
No. 2017AP2132.bh 
 
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