Title: Berry v. Trible
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 051161
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2006

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
TAMARA MOWBRAY BERRY 
 
v.  Record No. 051161   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
March 3, 2006 
ESTHER MADDOX TRIBLE, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 
Burke F. McCahill, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in confirming a jury verdict that a handwritten phrase and 
notation, made on a typewritten draft of a will containing many 
other handwritten entries, constituted a valid holographic will. 
This issue arises out of a will contest between a niece and 
a sister of the decedent, Louise Trible St. Martin (Louise).  
Tamara Mowbray Berry (Tamara), Louise’s niece, claimed that an 
attested document executed in 1993 (the 1993 will), which 
ultimately resulted in Tamara being the executor and sole 
beneficiary of Louise’s estate, was Louise’s last will and 
testament.  Louise’s sister, Esther Maddox Trible (Esther), 
asserted that Louise had executed a holographic will in 1997 
leaving her entire estate to Esther.  The alleged holographic 
will began with a handwritten phrase, “I Give and bequeath all,” 
which appeared near the top of one page of a seven-page 
typewritten draft of a will drawn by Louise’s attorney (the 1997 
document).  This phrase purportedly was connected by an arrow to 
 
2
the handwritten notation “Esther Maddox Trible” near the middle 
of the same page and signed “Louise Trible St. Martin” at the 
bottom of that page.  Esther argued that the combined words, “I 
Give and bequeath all [arrow] Esther Maddox Trible [signed] 
Louise Trible St. Martin,” was Louise’s last will and testament. 
Louise died in March 2002.  A few months later, Tamara 
submitted the 1993 will for probate in the circuit court.  
Esther, in turn, filed a bill of complaint to establish a lost 
will, presenting a facsimile copy of the single page of the 1997 
document described above.  This copy has been reproduced and is 
appended to this opinion. 
By agreement of the parties, the circuit court consolidated 
the probate and lost will issues for trial.  The court granted 
Esther’s request for a jury trial on the issues arising under 
the court’s probate jurisdiction.  The court also ordered that 
the lost will issues would be submitted to the jury as an issue 
out of chancery under the court’s equity jurisdiction.  
Additionally, the court appointed a guardian ad litem to 
represent the interests of Louise’s nephew, Mark Trible, a minor 
child who had a potential interest in the estate. 
Before trial, the circuit court held that the 1993 will was 
executed in compliance with the statute of wills, Code § 64.1-
 
3
49.  The court accordingly awarded Tamara partial summary 
judgment on her probate petition.1 
At trial, the evidence showed that in her 1993 will, Louise 
left her entire estate to her husband, Robert Louis St. Martin 
(Robert), and if he predeceased her, to Tamara.  Robert died in 
June 1997. 
For many years, Louise had enjoyed a close relationship 
with Tamara that began during Tamara’s childhood.  After 
Robert’s death, Tamara visited Louise often, helping her care 
for her pets and delivering groceries and medications to her. 
Tamara grew worried about Louise’s health and became 
concerned about her behavior, which Tamara considered “erratic.”  
Louise and Tamara had several bitter arguments concerning 
Louise’s ability to care for herself, which caused their 
personal relationship to deteriorate.  Louise later confronted 
Tamara and told her to stop involving herself in Louise’s 
affairs. 
In September 1997, Louise became ill and was admitted to a 
hospital.  While in the hospital, Louise telephoned her lawyer, 
Mildred F. Slater, who had prepared Louise’s 1993 will.  Louise 
informed Slater that Robert had passed away and asked Slater to 
draft a new will.  According to Slater, Louise stated that she 
                                                 
1 Esther does not challenge the circuit court’s holding that 
the 1993 document met the requirements for a valid attested 
will. 
 
4
wanted to leave her entire estate to Esther and, if Esther 
predeceased Louise, to have her estate divided among all 
Louise’s nieces and nephews.  Slater also testified that Louise 
said she wanted Tamara stricken from the will.  Slater prepared 
the requested document and sent a facsimile copy of the 
typewritten draft will to Louise’s attending nurse at the 
hospital. 
A few weeks later, Louise’s nurse sent Slater a facsimile 
copy of the typewritten draft that had been altered to include 
several handwritten changes and additions on each page.  The 
facsimile copy Slater received was missing a page from Slater’s 
original draft.  Additionally, section headings were renumbered 
and pages were rearranged. 
The handwritten portions of the document were in both 
printed and cursive form.  The handwritten entries included 
stricken portions of typewritten text, additions, and arrows 
apparently connecting some of the handwritten notations to parts 
of the typewritten draft.  Louise’s living nieces and nephews, 
including Tamara, also were listed in the handwritten entries.  
Additionally, the portion of the document naming Slater as 
Louise’s executor was struck, and Esther’s name was handwritten 
in its place.  Further, at the bottom of each page appeared the 
signature, “Louise Trible St. Martin.” 
 
5
The greatest number of handwritten changes in the 
reorganized document appeared on page seven, which originally 
was the second page of the typewritten draft prepared by Slater.  
At the top of that page were the handwritten words, 
“Article # Two.”  Printed beneath and to the right of that 
notation was the phrase “I Give and bequeath all.”  Under the 
“d” in the word “and” was the tip of an arrow.  The tail of the 
arrow was about an inch lower and ended both next to the 
handwritten words “Esther Maddox Trible” and immediately above 
the first letter of the typed phrase that began “my property, 
real and personal, tangible and intangible . . . .” 
There were other handwritten changes made to this page of 
the document.  A provision leaving tangible personal property to 
Irene Trible, the former wife of one of Louise’s nephews, was 
struck.  The handwritten phrase “want everything sold at 
auction” was written next to a typed sentence of the draft 
describing the disposition of Louise’s estate should Esther 
predecease Louise.  Addresses of nieces and nephews were written 
in the margins and connected to typed portions of the document 
by numerous arrows. 
Because Slater had difficulty reading the handwritten 
entries on the document transmitted to her, she contacted Louise 
by telephone and also wrote her a letter asking for her 
assistance in making the corrections so that the will could be 
 
6
redrafted and executed.  Louise refused to allow Slater to make 
any changes to the document during their conversation and did 
not respond to Slater’s letter.  Slater had no further contact 
with Louise. 
Louise’s relationship with Tamara deteriorated further 
after Louise was released from the hospital.  In September 1999, 
Tamara accepted a job transfer and moved with her family to 
North Carolina.  Tamara and Louise stayed in occasional contact 
but never saw each other again. 
After Louise’s death, some friends and family members, 
including Esther and Tamara, went to Louise’s home to help clean 
the house, which was in complete disarray.  Despite a thorough 
search of the home, they did not find either the 1993 will or 
the 1997 document. 
Because a will could not be located, Esther asked Marshall 
National Bank to serve as the administrator of Louise’s estate.  
The Bank qualified as administrator and sent a trust officer to 
Louise’s home to search for evidence of Louise’s assets.  While 
examining boxes containing Louise’s papers, the trust officer 
found an envelope containing the original 1993 will.  Although 
the original 1997 document was not found, Esther eventually 
obtained the facsimile copy from Slater, who had retained it 
among her records. 
 
7
At the conclusion of the evidence, Tamara moved to strike 
Esther’s evidence arguing, among other things, that the 1997 
document was not a valid will but merely a draft document that 
had been edited by Louise and returned to her attorney.  The 
circuit court denied Tamara’s motion and submitted the case to 
the jury. 
The jury was asked to decide two questions.  First, the 
jury was asked whether the handwritten phrase, “I Give and 
bequeath all [arrow] Esther Maddox Trible [signed] Louise Trible 
St. Martin,” was Louise’s will.  In response, the jury found 
that this handwriting on the 1997 document was Louise’s will.  
Second, the jury was asked to determine whether Louise later 
revoked the 1997 writing.  On this question, the jury found that 
Louise did not revoke the 1997 writing.2 
The circuit court entered a decree in accordance with both 
these verdicts and further held the 1993 will is “revoked to the 
extent that the 1997 will is inconsistent therewith.”  
Additionally, the court concluded that Tamara and Esther should 
                                                 
2 The circuit court previously had ruled that the first 
question would be submitted to the jury for a verdict under the 
court’s probate jurisdiction, while the second question would be 
considered by the jury as an issue out of chancery under the 
court’s equity jurisdiction.  Based on our holding in this 
appeal, however, we do not reach the issue whether the court 
erred in placing the different issues before the jury in this 
manner. 
 
8
each be responsible for paying one-half the fees of the guardian 
ad litem and entered a decree reflecting this determination. 
Tamara filed a motion to set aside the verdict, again 
arguing that the 1997 document was not a valid will but was 
merely an edited document containing handwriting that could not 
be understood apart from the typewritten language.  The circuit 
court denied Tamara’s motion. 
Tamara appeals from the circuit court’s final decree that 
the selected handwriting from the 1997 document was a valid 
will.  Esther assigns cross-error to the court’s holding 
requiring her to pay one-half the fees of the guardian ad litem. 
Tamara argues that the handwritten phrase, “I Give and 
bequeath all [arrow] Esther Maddox Trible [signed] Louise Trible 
St. Martin,” proffered by Esther as Louise’s last will and 
testament, does not meet the requirements for a valid 
holographic will.  Tamara asserts that these handwritten 
notations cannot be fully understood without considering the 
typewritten text and the other substantive handwritten entries 
appearing on the draft. 
Tamara also observes that Louise signed each page of the 
1997 document, not just the page on which the proffered 
handwriting appears, indicating that she intended the contents 
of the entire document to be her will.  Thus, Tamara maintains 
that the face of the 1997 document shows that Louise was merely 
 
9
attempting to edit a typewritten draft, which could not qualify 
as a valid will because it was not wholly in Louise’s 
handwriting and was not attested. 
In response, Esther argues that the proffered handwritten 
phrase and notation, along with Louise’s signature at the bottom 
of the page, constitute a valid will because they are “wholly in 
the handwriting of the testator and [are] complete” without need 
to consider the typewritten portions of the document.  Esther 
also asserts that Louise’s testamentary intent is established by 
the words “[g]ive” and “bequeath.”  Additionally, Esther 
contends that the “surplusage” theory of holographic wills 
permitted the jury and court to disregard the typewritten 
portions of Slater’s draft will and to focus solely on the 
handwritten phrase proffered by Esther.  We disagree with 
Esther’s arguments. 
The requirements for a holographic will are set forth in 
Virginia’s statute of wills, Code § 64.1-49.  A holographic will 
must be made wholly in the testator’s handwriting, and two 
disinterested witnesses must identify the handwriting as that of 
the testator.  Id.  The testator must sign the will or have 
someone in her presence sign the instrument at her direction.  
Id. 
The signed name must appear on the face of the document in 
a manner showing that the name is intended as a signature.  Id.; 
 
10
Kidd v. Gunter, 262 Va. 442, 445, 551 S.E.2d 646, 648 (2001); 
Slate v. Titmus, 238 Va. 557, 560, 385 S.E.2d 590, 591 (1989). 
These statutory requirements are not intended to limit the 
power of a testator but to protect the testator’s exercise of 
that power.  Bell v. Timmins, 190 Va. 648, 657, 58 S.E.2d 55, 60 
(1950); Moon v. Norvell, 184 Va. 842, 849, 36 S.E.2d 632, 634 
(1946).  In establishing these requirements, the statute is 
designed to prevent mistakes, imposition, fraud, and deception.  
Id.  However, the safeguards of the statute are not designed to 
make the execution of wills a trap for the testator.  Robinson 
v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 42, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1990); Bell, 190 
Va. at 657, 58 S.E.2d at 59.  Therefore, we give the statute “a 
sound and fair construction” with uniform insistence on 
“substantial compliance” with the statutory requirements.  
Robinson, 239 Va. at 42, 387 S.E.2d at 738 (quoting Bell, 190 
Va. at 657, 58 S.E.2d at 59-60). 
A holographic will, like any will, must manifest the 
testator’s intent of making a last and final disposition of her 
property.  Moon, 184 Va. at 849-50, 36 S.E.2d at 635.  This 
testamentary intent need not be expressed in formal language in 
the will, provided that the face of the instrument establishes 
such intent.  Id. at 850, 36 S.E.2d at 635. 
In requiring that a holographic will be “wholly in the 
handwriting of the testator,” the General Assembly did not 
 
11
contemplate that the word “wholly” should be applied in its 
absolute sense.  See Bell, 190 Va. at 654, 58 S.E.2d at 58.  We 
illustrated this point in Bell when considering a proffered will 
that was wholly in the testator’s handwriting except for certain 
changes in spelling, punctuation, and phrasing that did not 
affect the content of the document and were made with the 
consent of the testator.  Id. at 652, 58 S.E.2d at 57.  We 
confirmed the will’s validity, holding that alterations to a 
handwritten will that do not affect the substance of the will, 
and have no impact on the will’s testamentary intent, do not 
invalidate a testator’s holograph.  Id. at 662-64, 58 S.E.2d at 
62-63. 
In contrast to the facts in Bell, we are presented here 
with a proffered holographic writing containing only a portion 
of the testator’s handwritten entries, which were made on the 
face of a typewritten document.  In resolving whether this 
selected handwritten phrase and notation constitute a valid 
will, we find that our decision in Moon is particularly 
instructive.  There, the testator wrote a holographic will on 
the reverse side of a typewritten will that had been superseded 
by another duly attested will.  The testator struck through all 
the printed material in the body of the superseded typewritten 
will except for an article dealing with payment of funeral 
expenses and debts.  Moon, 184 Va. at 846-47, 36 S.E.2d at 633-
 
12
34.  On the reverse side of this former will, the testator wrote 
in her own hand another will. 
We held that the presence of typewritten material on paper 
used to draft a holographic instrument does not destroy the 
effect of the holographic instrument as a will, provided that 
the typewritten material is not part of the handwritten 
instrument and is not referenced directly or indirectly in the 
handwritten instrument.  Id. at 850-51, 36 S.E.2d at 635.  We 
confirmed the holographic entries as the testator’s last will 
and disregarded the typewritten material on the other side of 
the document in its entirety.  We noted that in the holographic 
entries, the testator disposed of her entire estate and named 
the parties and the amount of property she wanted each to 
receive.  We held that her writing left no uncertainty 
concerning her “dispositive intentions.”  Id. at 849, 36 S.E.2d 
at 635. 
In further support of our holding, we observed that the 
handwritten manuscript was not interwoven with the typewritten 
language and did not directly follow the typewriting, but 
appeared on the reverse side of the typewritten document.  Id. 
at 851, 36 S.E.2d at 635-36.  We also noted that the content of 
the handwritten instrument did not suggest that it was a 
continuation of any portion of the typewritten document.  Id. at 
852, 36 S.E.2d at 636. 
 
13
In two other decisions, we confirmed the validity of 
holographic instruments that consisted of only a few words 
followed by a signature.  In Grimes v. Crouch, 175 Va. 126, 129, 
7 S.E.2d 115, 116 (1940), the deceased wrote in his own hand, 
“Ever thing left to sister for life times.”  His signature 
appeared immediately below this text. 
In Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 29, 113 S.E. 873, 876 
(1922), we confirmed a decree admitting to probate a codicil 
written in the deceased’s handwriting and signed by him directly 
below the following handwritten words: “My will is made in favor 
of my wife, Loulie M. Gooch . . . .”   This handwritten entry 
appeared on a printed will form provided by the decedent’s 
fraternal organization.3  Id. at 25-27, 113 S.E. at 874-75. 
Although these handwritten entries in Grimes and Gooch were 
very brief, they constituted all the handwriting of the testator 
that appeared on the documents under review.  Further, the 
handwritten language was self-contained and could be understood 
without reference to the typewritten text.  Thus, our holdings 
                                                 
3 We note that the assignments of error in Gooch did not 
challenge the determination made at trial that these printed 
portions of the form could be disregarded.  Thus, the effect of 
that unrelated printed material was not discussed in our 
holding.  See 134 Va. at 29, 113 S.E. at 876.  The assignments 
of error in Gooch also did not challenge the admission at trial 
of an attestation clause to probate that was not wholly in the 
testator’s handwriting.  134 Va. at 30, 113 S.E. at 876.  
Nevertheless, in dictum, we stated that the admission of this 
clause was harmless error because the handwriting of the 
testator was “complete and entire in itself.”  Id. 
 
14
that these holographic entries were valid instruments in and of 
themselves did not result from the exclusion of any other 
handwritten entries made by the testator. 
We also have confirmed the validity of a holographic will 
written on the reverse side of a hardware store receipt.  In 
that case, Bailey v. Kerns, 246 Va. 158, 160-63, 431 S.E.2d 312, 
313-15 (1993), the printed material on the receipt was not a 
factor in our analysis of the proffered will because the content 
of the receipt bore no relationship to the handwritten entries, 
which we considered in their entirety. 
Two fundamental principles characterize our holdings 
regarding the holographic wills approved in the above decisions.  
First, in each of those decisions, we considered all the 
holographic entries made by the testator, rather than only 
selected portions of those writings advanced by the will’s 
proponent.  Second, as exemplified by our analysis in Moon, we 
were not required to consider the printed material on those 
documents as part of the will because the handwritten entries 
were “not interwoven with the typewriting,” and did not continue 
from the typewriting in physical form, by reference, or in 
sequence of thought.  184 Va. at 851-52, 36 S.E.2d at 635-36. 
These distinctions are critical to our analysis of the 
present case.  Here, Esther asks us to disregard many of 
Louise’s substantive handwritten entries that are plainly 
 
15
related to the typewritten text.  At the top of the page on 
which the proffered holograph appears, Louise wrote 
“Article # Two,” thereby suggesting that both the handwritten 
and typewritten material below were part of a larger document.  
On that same page, Louise connected to the typewritten text, by 
lines and arrows, other handwriting supplementing the 
substantive typewritten provisions for contingent beneficiaries, 
as well as a direction that she “want[ed] everything sold at 
auction.” 
We also observe that the three portions of text that form 
the proffered holographic will are selected from three separate 
locations on the one page.  Louise’s signature, however, appears 
at the bottom of that page, which contains other substantive 
portions of handwritten and typewritten text.  Thus, we perceive 
no basis for concluding that Louise intended that her signature 
on this page apply only to the isolated phrase propounded by 
Esther. 
Esther also asks us to disregard the five other pages of 
typewritten text that Louise returned to Mildred Slater.  We are 
unable to do so, however, because Louise signed the bottom of 
each page and made substantive changes to the typewritten text 
on several of those pages.  Louise’s signature at the bottom of 
each page also leaves unresolved whether she intended that her 
signatures validate all the typed and handwritten material 
 
16
appearing above each signature, or whether she intended that the 
signatures merely verify her changes to the document that she 
contemplated her attorney would redraft.  In addition, Louise’s 
signature at the end of the document, which appears immediately 
after a typewritten reference to a will “consisting of seven (7) 
typewritten pages,” is not consistent with Esther’s contention 
that the proffered holograph alone was Louise’s last will. 
Acceptance of Esther’s argument would require us to discard 
the two principles discussed above that have guided so many of 
our decisions on holographic wills.  We are unwilling to do so 
and, instead, take this opportunity to reaffirm those basic 
principles. 
We hold that a holographic will may only be established 
upon consideration of all handwritten entries made by the 
testator on a document, not upon consideration of only portions 
of those handwritten entries selected by the will’s proponent.  
We articulate this principle because a contrary conclusion would 
allow a proponent to select only those portions of handwriting 
favorable to her position, effectively permitting the proponent 
to rewrite the will.  We further hold that a purported 
holographic will is invalid if the handwritten entries are 
interwoven with or joined to the typewritten material on the 
document, or continue from the typewritten material in physical 
 
17
form, by reference, or in sequence of thought.  See Moon, 184 
Va. at 851-52, 36 S.E.2d at 635-36. 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the proffered 
holographic will fails as a matter of law because Louise’s 
handwritten language considered as a whole is not self-contained 
such that it can be understood without reference to the 
typewritten text.  Rather, that handwritten language is 
interwoven with the text, both physically and in sequence of 
thought, throughout the document. 
Our conclusion is not altered by Esther’s contention that 
the entries she did not proffer as part of the will may be 
disregarded as mere “surplusage.”  The “surplusage” theory 
generally is limited to the striking of typewritten material, 
when the remaining portion of an instrument that is handwritten 
has meaning standing alone.  See In re Estate of Teubert, 298 
S.E.2d 456, 459-60 (W. Va. 1982); see also 2 Page on the Law of 
Wills (rev. 2003) § 20.5 at 279-80 (“the surplusage test 
[requires that] the non-holographic material [be] stricken and 
the remainder of the instrument admitted to probate if the 
remaining provisions made sense standing alone”).  Here, 
however, Esther mistakenly asks that we apply this theory to 
numerous handwritten, as well as typewritten, entries.  
Moreover, we are unable to apply the theory to disregard the 
typewritten entries that Esther seeks to exclude from 
 
18
consideration because, in the absence of the typewritten text, 
Louise’s handwritten entries are either ambiguous or fragmented 
and unintelligible. 
Accordingly, we consider the entire document that Louise 
returned to Mildred Slater and conclude that the document was 
not a valid will because it was neither wholly in Louise’s 
handwriting nor duly attested by two competent witnesses.  See 
Code § 64.1-49.  We therefore hold that the circuit court erred 
in confirming the jury verdict that the selected portions of 
Louise’s handwritten entries were a valid will.4 
Finally, we address Esther’s assignment of cross-error that 
the circuit court erred in ordering her to pay one-half the fee 
of the guardian ad litem.  Esther argues that because she 
prevailed on the merits of the case placed before the jury, the 
court abused its discretion in failing to require that Tamara 
pay the guardian ad litem’s entire fee.  We do not consider this 
argument further, however, because Esther’s reliance on her 
former status as a substantially prevailing party now fails in 
light of the different conclusion we have reached regarding the 
merits of the case. 
For these reasons, we will reverse that part of the circuit 
court’s decree holding that the proffered portion of the 1997 
                                                 
4 In view of our holding that the 1997 document was not a 
will, we need not consider Tamara’s remaining assignments of 
error.  
 
19
document was Louise’s last will.  We will affirm that part of 
the circuit court’s decree holding that the 1993 will was a 
valid, attested will, affirm the court’s apportionment of the 
fees of the guardian ad litem, and enter final judgment for 
Tamara admitting the 1993 will to probate. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and final judgment.