Title: Commonwealth v. Gomes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12692
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2019

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SJC-12692 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEAN GOMES. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     May 6, 2019. - September 13, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,  
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Indecent Assault and Battery.  Police Officer.  Practice, 
Criminal, Instructions to jury.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 22, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Raymond P. Veary, Jr., J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case, we must determine whether the 
defendant's conviction of indecent assault and battery on a 
child under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B, was 
aggravated by his status as an alleged mandated reporter at the 
 
2 
time of the offense.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b).  Because 
there was no evidence that the defendant was acting in his 
professional capacity when he committed the offense, we must 
conclude that the judge erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for a required finding of not guilty as to G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13B 1/2 (b).  We also conclude, however, that there was 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the lesser 
included offense.  G. L. c. 265, § 13B. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury 
could have found, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-
677 (1979). 
 
The victim, Jane,1 lived in New Bedford with her mother and 
her grandmother.  Her adult cousin lived in a nearby apartment.  
The defendant met and began dating Jane's mother when Jane was 
approximately eighteen months old.  The two dated "on and off" 
for approximately ten years.  Throughout that period, the 
defendant was a police officer in a K-9 unit.  He was trained as 
a mandated reporter.  The defendant often visited the mother's 
house.  Frequently, he, the mother, and Jane watched television 
together, or Jane and the defendant watched television while the 
mother was upstairs. 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
3 
 
On one occasion when Jane was approximately eight years 
old, she, the mother, and the defendant went to Jane's cousin's 
apartment so that the defendant could repair a broken television 
stand.  The defendant was in plain clothes.  Upon arriving at 
the apartment, he went upstairs to inspect the television stand.  
Jane remained downstairs, where she sat on a couch and watched 
television. 
 
The defendant later came downstairs, and sat on the couch 
near Jane.  He tickled her.  She then "ended up on his lap," 
such that she was "facing out," away from the defendant.  The 
defendant clasped Jane's waist with his hands and repeatedly 
pushed her downward while thrusting his "private area" upward 
into Jane's "butt."  The defendant then told Jane "not to tell 
anybody because he'd get into trouble." 
 
Jane said that, although the defendant's conduct made her 
"uncomfortable," she thought that his actions were normal.  
Later, when Jane was approximately ten years old, she told one 
of her friends about the defendant's conduct.  Several days 
later, the friend informed her mother about what Jane had said.  
The friend's mother then contacted Jane's mother, who apparently 
filed a police report.  By that time, Jane had come to regard 
the defendant's conduct as "weird."  She also was experiencing 
anxiety, nervousness, stomach pain, headaches, and hair loss. 
 
b.  Procedure.  The defendant was indicted on three 
 
4 
separate counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under 
the age of fourteen by a mandated reporter, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b).  At the time of trial, the 
defendant was sixty years old and had retired after 
approximately thirty-two years of employment as a police 
officer. 
 
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion requesting 
the judge to take judicial notice that the defendant, as a 
police officer, was a mandated reporter at all times relevant to 
the three charges.  The defendant objected on due process 
grounds; he argued that the Commonwealth was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had been a mandated reporter 
at the time of the offense.  The judge concluded that "whether 
or not a police officer is a mandated reporter" is "a matter of 
law."  The judge then informed the parties that he would 
instruct the jury that "a police officer is a mandated 
reporter." 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant 
moved for a required finding of not guilty, pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 25 (a), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995); the motion 
was denied.  At the close of all the evidence, the judge denied 
the defendant's renewed motion for a required finding.  In his 
final charge, the judge instructed the jury that a police 
officer is a mandated reporter.  After two days of deliberation, 
 
5 
the jury convicted the defendant of one count of indecent 
assault and battery on a child under fourteen by a mandated 
reporter, pertaining to the events at the cousin's apartment, 
and acquitted him of the other charges. 
 
The defendant moved to set aside the verdict or, in the 
alternative, to set aside so much of the verdict as included the 
mandated reporter element of G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b).  The 
judge denied the motion.  The judge then sentenced the defendant 
to the minimum mandatory term of incarceration in a State prison 
of not less than ten years and not more than ten years and one 
day.  The defendant filed an appeal in the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the judge erred 
in denying his motion for a required finding because the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of indecent 
assault and battery on a child under fourteen, or a 
determination that the defendant was a mandated reporter at the 
time of the offense.2  In deciding whether the Commonwealth met 
its burden to establish each element of the offense charged, we 
                     
 
2 The defendant argues also that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the lesser 
included offense of indecent assault and battery on a child 
under fourteen.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13B.  The defendant's 
argument is unavailing.  When the judge concluded that he was 
"going to instruct that a police officer is a mandated 
reporter," a lesser included instruction was foreclosed. 
 
6 
rely on the familiar Latimore standard.  See Commonwealth v. 
Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 730 (2017); Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-
677. 
 
a.  Indecent touching.  To prove that a defendant is guilty 
of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, the 
Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
(1) the alleged victim was not yet fourteen years of age at the 
time of the alleged offense; (2) the defendant intentionally 
touched the alleged victim without legal justification or 
excuse; and (3) the touching was indecent.  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 151564  v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 
612, 616 (2010) (Doe No. 151564).  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 93 
Mass. App. Ct. 560, 562 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Cruz, 93 
Mass. App. Ct. 136, 138 (2018); G. L. c. 265, § 13B. 
 
The defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence that 
his touching of Jane was "indecent."  Although the type of 
conduct that constitutes an indecent touching is not defined in 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B, an "indecent" touching has been understood 
as one that "offends contemporary standards of decency and moral 
values," Doe, No. 151564, 456 Mass. at 616, to the extent that a 
"reasonable opportunity" is provided "for a person of ordinary 
intelligence to know what is prohibited" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 566 (2002).  
The test is an objective one, Colon, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 562, 
 
7 
and looks to the totality of the circumstances.  Castillo, 
supra. 
 
Here, the defendant's actions of holding Jane by the waist 
and forcing her to move her body such that her "butt" came into 
repeated contact with his genitals clearly met the standard of 
"indecent."  It is well established that "the intentional, 
unjustified touching of private areas such as the breasts, 
abdomen, buttocks, thighs, and pubic area . . . constitutes an 
indecent assault and battery."  See Colon, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 
562, quoting Commonwealth v. Mosby, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 184 
(1991); Cruz, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 138.  See also Commonwealth 
v. Trowbridge, 419 Mass. 750, 757 (1995) (no error in 
instructing jury that "an assault and battery was indecent if it 
involved the touching of the genitals, buttocks or breasts"). 
 
Viewing the facts the jury could have found in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational jury could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching at issue 
was indecent.  See Castillo, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 567.  The 
judge thus properly denied the defendant's motion for a required 
finding as to the charge of indecent assault and battery on a 
child under fourteen.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13B. 
 
b.  Mandated reporter.  In a motion filed after the jury 
returned their verdict, the defendant argued that, because he 
had not been acting in his capacity as a police officer at the 
 
8 
time of the offense, the evidence was insufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was subject to enhanced 
punishment under G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b).  The judge denied 
the motion.  He again concluded that, as a matter of law, a 
defendant who is employed as a police officer is a mandated 
reporter under G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), even if the 
defendant was not acting in a professional capacity at the time 
of the offense. 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth acknowledges that the evidence 
was devoid of any suggestion that the defendant had been acting 
in his professional capacity at the time of the offense.  
Indeed, the only relevant evidence was to the contrary.  Jane 
testified that the defendant had been wearing plain clothes, 
suggesting that the defendant, who worked as a uniformed K-9 
officer, had been off duty when he went to the cousin's house to 
fix a television stand.  Thus, the limited issue before us is 
whether the defendant nonetheless may be convicted under G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), as a mandated reporter. 
 
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 606 (2018), quoting 
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014).  "The starting 
point of our analysis is the language of the statute," which 
serves as our "principal source of insight into [the] 
 
9 
Legislative purpose."  City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 
481 Mass. 784, 788 (2019), quoting Simon v. State Examiners of 
Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985).  "Ordinarily, where the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to legislative intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 
Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  "Where the words of the statute are 
ambiguous," however, "we strive to make it an effectual piece of 
legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason and 
consistent with legislative intent."  Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 
479 Mass. 527, 534, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 276 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 302 (2014). 
 
General Laws c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
"Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery 
on a child under the age of [fourteen] and . . . at 
the time of commission of said indecent assault and 
battery, the defendant was a mandated reporter as is 
defined in [G. L. c. 119, § 21], shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any 
term of years, but not less than [ten] years." 
 
Under the plain language of the statute, the Legislature thus 
restricted application of G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), only to 
those defendants who were mandated reporters "at the time of 
commission" of the offense.  To read the statute otherwise would 
render those words surplusage.  See City Elec. Supply Co., 481 
Mass. at 790, quoting Volin v. Board of Pub. Accountancy, 422 
Mass. 175, 179 (1996) ("[w]e do not interpret a statute so as to 
 
10 
render it or any portion of it meaningless" [quotation 
omitted]).  If a defendant was not a mandated reporter at the 
time of the offense, he or she may not be convicted under G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b). 
 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the defendant was a 
mandated reporter at the time of the offense.  As noted, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), looks to G. L. c. 119, § 21, a provision 
that enumerates qualifying professions, for a definition of the 
term "[m]andated reporter."  A "police officer" is included in 
that list.  Because G. L. c. 119, § 21, offers little additional 
guidance with respect to the proper construction of G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b),3 however, we turn to other provisions of 
                     
 
3 Under G. L. c. 119, § 21, a "[m]andated reporter" is  
 
"a person who is:  (i) a physician, medical intern, 
hospital personnel engaged in the examination, care or 
treatment of persons, medical examiner, psychologist, 
emergency medical technician, dentist, nurse, 
chiropractor, podiatrist, optometrist, osteopath, 
allied mental health and human services 
professional . . . . , drug and alcoholism counselor, 
psychiatrist or clinical social worker; (ii) a public 
or private school teacher, educational administrator, 
guidance or family counselor, child care worker, 
person paid to care for or work with a child in any 
public or private facility, or home or program funded 
by the commonwealth . . . that provides child care or 
residential services to children or that provides the 
services of child care resource and referral agencies, 
voucher management agencies or family child care 
systems or child care food programs, licensor of the 
department of early education and care or school 
attendance officer; (iii) a probation officer, clerk-
magistrate of a district court, parole officer, social 
 
11 
the statute, reading them together to discern the meaning of 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b).  See LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 
328, 333 (1999) ("When the meaning of a statute is brought into 
question, a court properly should read other sections and should 
construe them together" [citation omitted]). 
 
General Laws c. 119, § 51A (a), which defines the duties of 
a mandated reporter, provides relevant guidance.  Under that 
provision, "[a] mandated reporter who, in his professional 
capacity, has reasonable cause to believe that a child is 
suffering physical or emotional injury resulting from . . . 
sexual abuse . . . shall immediately communicate with the 
[Department of Children and Families (department)] orally and, 
within [forty-eight] hours, shall file a written report with the 
department detailing the suspected abuse or neglect."  G. L. 
c. 119, § 51A (a).4  The Legislature thus made clear that a 
                     
worker, foster parent, firefighter, police officer or 
animal control officer; (iv) a priest, rabbi, clergy 
member, ordained or licensed minister, leader of any 
church or religious body, accredited Christian Science 
practitioner, person performing official duties on 
behalf of a church or religious body that are 
recognized as the duties of [the individual] to 
supervise, educate, coach, train or counsel a child on 
a regular basis; (v) in charge of a medical or other 
public or private institution, school or facility or 
that person’s designated agent; or (vi) the child 
advocate." 
 
 
 
4 Pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (c), a mandated reporter 
who violates G. L. c. 119, § 51A, "shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than $1,000."  See Matter of a Grand Jury 
 
12 
mandated reporter's duty arises as to information learned only 
in his or her "professional capacity."  Id.  Indeed, we 
previously recognized this understanding of a mandated 
reporter's duty when reviewing a particular mandated reporter's 
criminal acts.  See, e.g., Garney v. Massachusetts Teachers' 
Retirement Sys., 469 Mass. 384, 396 (2014) ("As [the 
defendant's] criminal conduct was independent of his role as a 
teacher, he was not required under the plain meaning of G. L. 
c. 119, § 51A, to report this conduct"). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that an individual who is employed 
in any of the professions listed in G. L. c. 119, § 21, is a 
mandated reporter for purposes of G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), 
regardless of whether the individual was acting in his or her 
professional capacity at the time of the offense.  Under the 
Commonwealth's reasoning, an animal control officer, G. L. 
c. 119, § 21, for example, could be convicted under G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), for an offense committed during an 
extended vacation that was in no way related to any professional 
duty.  The drafters of G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), could not 
have intended that result.  See Cassidy, 479 Mass. at 534 ("[w]e 
will not adopt [even] a literal construction of a statute if the 
                     
Investigation, 437 Mass. 340, 353 (2000) ("failure to make their 
mandatory reports was a crime").  No such charges are at issue 
here. 
 
13 
consequences of such construction are absurd or unreasonable" 
[citation omitted]).  Moreover, to hold a mandated reporter 
criminally liable under G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), for conduct 
that occurred outside the individual's professional capacity 
would be inconsistent with the plain language of G. L. c. 119, 
§ 51A (a), and G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b). 
 
Reading the statutory provisions together, as we must, we 
conclude that to convict a defendant under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13B 1/2 (b), the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, at the time of the commission of the offense, the 
defendant was a mandated reporter who was acting in his or her 
professional capacity.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilman, 89 
Mass. App. Ct. 752, 753-756 (2016) (middle school music teacher 
convicted as mandated reporter for conduct that took place on 
two school field trips and in school's music room). 
 
The judge's determination that an individual who is 
employed as a police officer necessarily is a mandated reporter 
under G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), at any time, regardless of 
the individual's professional activities at that point, and his 
instruction to the jury to that effect, were error.  The 
question whether a defendant was acting in a professional 
capacity at the time of the commission of an offense prohibited 
by G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), is a question of fact for the 
jury. 
 
14 
 
Here, however, because the Commonwealth presented no 
evidence to suggest that the defendant was acting in his 
capacity as a police officer at the time of the crime, the judge 
should have allowed the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty.  See, e.g., Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (a) 
("The judge . . . shall enter a finding of not guilty . . . if 
the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a 
conviction . . ."). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction under G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), is vacated and set aside.  The matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment of guilty 
of the lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery 
on a child under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B, and 
for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.