Title: VEPCO v. Dungee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 982485
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 982485    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
September 17, 1999 
JAMES DUNGEE, A MINOR, ETC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHARLES CITY COUNTY 
Thomas B. Hoover, Judge 
 
 
James A. Dungee, a minor (James or the plaintiff), by his 
next friend, filed a motion for judgment against Virginia 
Electric and Power Company (Virginia Power) seeking damages 
for burns he sustained while he was in a Virginia Power 
substation and came in contact with 13,200 volts of 
electricity.  James alleged that Virginia Power was negligent 
in failing to properly install, maintain, and inspect the 
fence surrounding the substation.  Virginia Power denied that 
it was negligent and asserted the affirmative defenses of 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.  A jury 
returned a verdict in favor of James in the amount of 
$20,000,000.  The trial court denied Virginia Power's motion 
to set aside the verdict or order remittitur and entered 
judgment on the jury's verdict.  Virginia Power filed an 
appeal assigning error to a number of rulings of the trial 
court.  Because we find no error in these rulings, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
I.  Facts and Material Proceedings
 
At the time of the accident, James was a 10-year-old boy 
who had just completed the fourth grade.  According to the 
testimony of Ella Langford, a clinical social worker, and Dr. 
Thomas K. Tsao, a child psychiatrist, James suffered from 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  Langford 
testified that ADHD is characterized by impulsivity, 
inattention, distractibility, and hyperactivity.  She also 
testified that at the time of the accident, James was in the 
childhood development stage commonly referred to as "latency," 
which she described as the stage when children learn to make 
decisions about their safety and cease to need to be watched 
constantly by their parents.  She testified that the latency 
stage is influenced by ADHD because teachers' and parents' 
instructions to the child concerning limitations on what he 
should or should not do often do not register in the child's 
mind. 
Dr. Tsao testified that James had above average 
intelligence but that his intelligence, as well as his 
perception, maturity, and judgment were impaired by ADHD. 
 
James lived in an apartment complex in the City of 
Richmond.  Next to the outdoor common area for the complex was 
an electric substation owned and operated by Virginia Power.  
The substation was surrounded by a chain-link fence 
approximately six-feet high and topped with a one-foot 
 
2
extension of three strands of barbed wire.  The gate to the 
fence was locked at all times.  Signs on the fence stated 
"Danger High Voltage."  Earl Maxwell, a resident of the 
apartment complex, testified that in the year prior to the 
accident, he had observed no warning signs on any of the 
equipment inside the substation.  He testified that, on the 
side of the substation facing the apartment complex, there 
were two or three "gaps" or holes under the fence which were 
large enough for a child to crawl through. 
 
Over a month before the accident, Captain Timothy Zack, 
an officer in the United States Army who lived in an apartment 
overlooking the substation, told a Virginia Power employee 
working at the substation that he had seen children playing in 
the substation.  Captain Zack also showed the Virginia Power 
employee one of the holes or gaps under the fence and warned 
that "somebody is going to get injured."  
 
A Virginia Power substation inspector, Edwin Lee 
Thompson, testified that he inspected the substation two weeks 
before the accident.  He saw "kids and stuff" around the 
substation and gaps between the bottom of the fence and the 
ground on the side of the substation facing the apartment 
complex.  Thompson, however, did not report the holes and 
testified that they were not large enough for a "person" to 
get through. 
 
3
 
On July 21, 1996, James and two of his friends, Ken 
McMickens and Kevin Clayton Adams, Jr., were playing with a 
ball in the common area.  Ken and Kevin were 9 and 11 years 
old, respectively.  While they were playing, the ball went 
over the fence surrounding the substation.  There is 
conflicting testimony as to what occurred after that. 
James testified that he crawled under the fence at one of 
the holes or gaps between the bottom of the fence and the 
ground while Kevin helped him by holding the fence up.  Kevin 
testified that James entered the substation by climbing on top 
of a green cable box near the fence, placing his hands and one 
foot on the fence and "leap[ing]" over the top.  According to 
Ken, James did not use the green cable box, but climbed up the 
fence using his hands and feet, stood on the barbed wire, and 
then jumped down.  Captain Zack was working on his car nearby 
at the time of the accident.  He testified that he saw a boy 
climb under the fence as another boy moved the fence "back and 
forth."  
 
James testified that he does not remember what he did 
once he entered the substation.  Ken testified that James 
"started touching wires and he went over to the power surge 
and he touched — he climbed on something and touched 
something, and we seen a bright light and he was laying on the 
ground."  Kevin testified that James touched some wires that 
 
4
did not affect him but then went and touched another wire, 
whereupon it "started electrocuting him with one hand, and he 
tried to pull it off."  
 
Ken testified that he told James not to enter the 
substation because he could get electrocuted, and that once 
inside the substation James asked, "'You all dare me to touch 
this wire over here[?]'" 
Kevin first testified that he said nothing to James 
before James entered the substation and that James did not 
suggest a dare to anyone.  He testified that the only 
conversation he had with James occurred when he told James 
that he "might get hurt" when James was about to touch "some 
high voltage [wires]," to which James replied, "'No, you're 
lying.'"  Later, after having been read testimony from his 
deposition, Kevin agreed that, prior to James' entering the 
substation, he told James to "'Hurry up and get out'" and 
that, once inside, James said, "'You dare me to touch the 
wires?'"  Kevin further agreed that after James first touched 
the wires and was not hurt, James said, "'I'm going to touch 
that one,'" to which Kevin replied, "'No, James, it's going to 
electrocute you,'" to which James responded, according to 
Kevin, "'No, man, you don't know what you're talking about.'" 
 
Captain Zack testified that he could hear what the 
children were saying, and that he did not hear any of the 
 
5
children give any warnings or any child asking to be dared to 
do anything. 
 
Kevin's father, Kevin Clayton Adams, Sr., testified that 
he heard a loud bang and saw a puff of smoke inside the 
substation.  He climbed the substation's gate and ran to 
James' body.  He testified that James' eyes and hair were 
burnt, that his shoes were just about melted, and that skin 
fell off of James' body onto Mr. Adams' clothes as he carried 
James out of the substation.  He testified that James was 
conscious and began screaming before he set him down. 
 
James received third degree burns over 25% of his body 
including his face, chest, and arms.  He was treated at no 
charge at the Shriners Hospital.  Surgical procedures to 
restore skin lost as a result of the accident have left 
permanent scarring and disfigurement and will require future 
surgical procedures and extensive physical and psychological 
therapy.   
 
In the motion for judgment, James alleged that Virginia 
Power, as a producer of electricity, owed a high degree of 
care for the safety of those persons coming into contact with 
the substation.  The motion for judgment also alleged that 
Virginia Power had actual or constructive knowledge that 
children regularly played in or around the substation, and 
that Virginia Power negligently erected, maintained, and 
 
6
inspected the fence in violation of its duty of care and in 
violation of recognized industry standards.  James sought 
$750,000,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000,000 in 
punitive damages but later dropped the punitive damage claim. 
The motion for judgment was filed in Charles City County.  
Virginia Power filed a motion to transfer venue to the City of 
Richmond, which the trial court denied.  During a five-day 
trial, the jury heard the testimony of twenty witnesses and 
returned a verdict in favor of James.  Virginia Power appealed 
assigning error to a number of the trial court's rulings, 
including the denial of Virginia Power's motion for a change 
of venue, refusal to find the plaintiff contributorially 
negligent as a matter of law, refusal to give Virginia Power's 
offered jury instruction on the duty owed to a trespasser, the 
inclusion of the term "maturity" in jury instructions on 
contributory negligence, refusal to allow certain expert 
testimony, and refusal to set aside the verdict or award 
Virginia Power remittitur.  We consider these issues in order. 
II.  Venue 
 
Virginia Power first assigns error to the trial court's 
denial of its motion to transfer the action from Charles City 
County to the City of Richmond.  Virginia Power contends that 
although Charles City County is a permissible venue under Code 
§ 8.01-262(3) because it conducts business there, application 
 
7
of the principles set out in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. 
Williams, 239 Va. 390, 389 S.E.2d 714 (1990), required that 
the action be transferred because Charles City County has no 
practical nexus with the litigation.  We disagree. 
For negligence cases, among others, the Code of Virginia 
provides a plaintiff with a choice of forums in which an 
action can be brought.  Code § 8.01-262.  However, Code 
§ 8.01-265, the so-called forum non-conveniens statute, allows 
the transfer of any action, even if it was originally filed in 
a proper venue, to "any fair and convenient forum" in the 
Commonwealth upon a motion by the defendant and "for good 
cause shown."  Code § 8.01-265.  "Good cause" under the 
statute includes, but is not limited to, "the avoidance of 
substantial inconvenience to the parties or the witnesses."  
Id.  Whether to grant such a motion is within the discretion 
of the trial court, and the trial court's denial of the motion 
will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.  
Williams, 239 Va. at 392, 389 S.E.2d at 715. 
To secure a change in venue, Virginia Power had the 
burden of showing that there was good cause to transfer the 
case from Charles City County to the City of Richmond.  In 
ruling on Virginia Power's motion, the trial court considered 
the impact on the witnesses and parties of holding the trial 
in Charles City County, as compared with holding it in 
 
8
Richmond.  It concluded that traveling thirty miles to Charles 
City County from Richmond imposed minimal cost and 
inconvenience on those parties and witnesses who lived in 
Richmond, and that holding the trial in Charles City County 
would not impose any material inconvenience on witnesses 
coming from other areas of the country because the Richmond 
airport is located midway between Richmond and Charles City 
County.  The court also concluded that there was no evidence 
that overnight stays in Charles City County would be required 
for those witnesses who lived in Richmond.  Based on these 
factors, the trial court concluded that traveling thirty miles 
imposed minimal inconvenience and that there was no showing of 
substantial inconvenience to the parties or witnesses.  
Virginia Power argues that the test for good cause is not 
exclusively substantial inconvenience.  According to Virginia 
Power, our decision in Williams established that "a trial 
court abuses its discretion under Va. Code § 8.01-265 if it 
declines to transfer venue from a forum with no practical 
nexus to the cause of action to a more convenient forum with a 
strong nexus."  We agree with Virginia Power that Code § 8.01-
265 does not limit the definition of "good cause" to "the 
avoidance of substantial inconvenience to the parties or the 
witnesses;" however, we disagree with Virginia Power's 
characterization of our holding in Williams. 
 
9
The plaintiff in Williams was an employee of a railroad 
company based in Roanoke.  He was injured when he fell from a 
chair in his office in Roanoke.  He filed a personal injury 
action against the railroad company in Portsmouth, a 
permissible venue.  The information before the trial court 
relevant to the question of transfer was that all the 
witnesses were from Roanoke and they all "faced the 
inconvenience of being away from families, homes, and jobs 
while traveling to Portsmouth to testify, . . . ."  239 Va. at 
395, 389 S.E.2d at 717.  Given the location of the parties and 
witnesses as well as the accident itself, we concluded that 
the litigation had "no practical nexus" with Portsmouth but 
had "a strong nexus" with Roanoke.  Id. at 396, 389 S.E.2d at 
717.  However, contrary to Virginia Power's contention, the 
degree of the "nexus" does not alone provide the good cause 
required for transfer under the statute. 
In Williams, we stated that the circumstances to be 
considered when ruling on motions to transfer venue included 
accessibility of sources of proof, compulsory process, cost of 
witness attendance, possibility of a view of the premises, and 
other "practical problems," in addition to the statutory 
ground of avoiding substantial inconvenience to the parties 
and witnesses.  Id. at 393, 389 S.E.2d at 716.  We concluded 
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
 
10
transfer the action to Roanoke, not simply because Portsmouth 
had "no practical nexus" with the action, but because the 
railroad company met its burden of presenting "sufficient 
information to show good cause to transfer, including 
substantial inconvenience to the parties and witnesses" and 
other factors.  Id. at 396, 389 S.E.2d at 718.  This holding 
does not support the construction Virginia Power advocates - 
that transfer is required based solely on the lack of a 
practical nexus of the venue with the litigation.  We thus 
reject Virginia Power's argument on this issue.   
Finding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion, we will affirm the trial court's denial of 
Virginia Power's motion to transfer venue. 
III.  Contributory Negligence 
 
At the close of the evidence and in post-trial motions, 
Virginia Power sought a ruling by the trial court that the 
plaintiff was contributorially negligent as a matter of law.  
Virginia Power assigns error to the trial court's denial of 
these motions. 
Virginia Power's burden to establish contributory 
negligence as a matter of law begins with the requirement that 
it rebut the presumption that a child between the ages of 7 
and 14 does not have the capacity to understand the peril and 
dangers of his acts and is, therefore, legally incapable of 
 
11
committing acts of negligence.  Norfolk & Portsmouth R.R. v. 
Barker, 221 Va. 924, 929-30, 275 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1981).  This 
presumption can be rebutted by showing that the plaintiff did 
have the capacity to understand the peril.  Endicott v. Rich, 
232 Va. 150, 156, 348 S.E.2d 275, 279 (1986).1  Once the 
presumption was rebutted, Virginia Power had the burden to 
make the traditional showing that the plaintiff's conduct 
amounted to contributory negligence.  Id.  This requires 
application of the objective reasonable person test, as 
modified for children.  The evidence must show that the 
plaintiff's conduct did not conform to the standard of what a 
reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience 
would do under the circumstances for his own safety and 
                     
1 The test for rebutting the presumption focuses on the 
individual plaintiff.  While the opinion in Doe v. Dewhirst, 
240 Va. 266, 268, 396 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1990), discusses the 
issue whether a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, 
and experience would understand the danger of his conduct 
under the same or similar circumstances, the holding in 
Dewhirst correctly states the test as whether the minor in the 
pending case had the capacity to understand the danger.  This 
test has been followed in other cases.  See Barker, 221 Va. at 
930, 275 S.E.2d at 616 (stating test whether child plaintiff 
"had the capacity to understand the danger his conduct 
entailed"); Endicott v. Rich, 232 Va. at 156, 348 S.E.2d at 
279 ("In order to rebut the presumption that Endicott was 
incapable of negligence, Rich was required to establish that 
in light of Endicott's age, intelligence, and experience, 
Endicott was capable of understanding and appreciating the 
nature of the danger and the peril associated with his 
conduct.")  In the present case, jury instruction number 11 
set forth the correct test for determining the plaintiff's 
 
12
protection.  Barker, 221 Va. at 929, 275 S.E.2d at 616.  Of 
course, the evidence must also show that the negligent conduct 
by the plaintiff was a proximate cause of his injury.  Wright 
v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 245 Va. 160, 170, 427 S.E.2d 
724, 729 (1993).  Finally, to support the finding as a matter 
of law, the evidence must be such that reasonable persons 
could not disagree that the presumption has been rebutted and 
that the plaintiff was contributorially negligent.  See Loving 
v. Hayden, 245 Va. 441, 444, 429 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1993). 
 
The presumption that a child between the ages of 7 and 14 
is incapable of contributory negligence can be overcome by the 
plaintiff's own testimony showing that he had the capacity to 
understand the perils presented, or in fact understood them, 
Barker, 221 Va. at 929-30, 275 S.E.2d at 616; however, there 
was no such testimony in this case.  While plaintiff testified 
that he knew he was not supposed to go into the substation, he 
testified that the reason he was not supposed to go there was 
because his mother told him not to play in an area where she 
could not see him.  Unlike the testimony in the Barker case, 
the testimony here was insufficient to establish that 
plaintiff was capable of appreciating the danger of this 
conduct.  Therefore, we must look beyond the plaintiff's 
                                                                
capacity to understand the danger for purposes of rebutting 
the presumption.  
 
13
testimony for other evidence of the plaintiff's capacity to 
understand the danger and peril of his conduct to rebut the 
presumption. 
Virginia Power argues that the presumption was rebutted 
as a matter of law by the evidence that the plaintiff asked 
his friends to "dare" him to touch the wires in the substation 
even though his friends warned him of the dangers of his 
conduct.  This statement, Virginia Power asserts, shows that 
the plaintiff had the capacity to understand and, in fact, did 
understand the "danger of his own conduct."  Virginia Power 
also argues that the plaintiff's capacity to understand the 
danger was shown by the evidence that he was of above average 
intelligence, had passed every grade in school, scored at or 
above average on standardized tests, and had been taught the 
dangers of electricity in school.  Furthermore, Virginia Power 
refers to the testimony of the plaintiff's friends that they 
understood the danger of the plaintiff's conduct.  This 
evidence, Virginia Power asserts, both rebuts the presumption 
and supports the proposition that "reasonable minds cannot 
differ that [p]laintiff's conduct was negligent."  We 
disagree. 
First, the evidence of what the plaintiff and his friends 
said and did was not confined to the testimony of Ken, Kevin, 
and the plaintiff.  Captain Timothy Zack testified that, 
 
14
although he could hear the boys, he not only did not hear them 
warn the plaintiff, he also never heard the plaintiff ask his 
friends to dare him to do anything while he was in the 
substation.  Second, the record also shows that the testimony 
of Kevin and Ken conflicted in some areas and was internally 
inconsistent in others.  For these two reasons, their 
testimony cannot be considered uncontradicted.  Finally, the 
record contains evidence that the plaintiff suffered from ADHD 
and that this disorder had a delaying effect on the 
plaintiff's development and maturation process and, thus, that 
James' ability to understand danger may not have been equal to 
that of other boys his age. 
Virginia Power also asserts the principle that a 
plaintiff who has been expressly "warned" and who ignores 
those warnings is barred from recovery by his own contributory 
negligence, citing cases involving adults and cases involving 
children.2  Virginia Power argues that the presumption was 
rebutted and that the plaintiff was shown to have been 
contributorially negligent as a matter of law in this case 
                     
2 Barker, 221 Va. at 924, 275 S.E.2d at 613; Sadler v. 
Lynch, 192 Va. 344, 64 S.E.2d 664 (1951); Brickell v. Shawn, 
175 Va. 373, 9 S.E.2d 330 (1940); Williams v. Virginia 
Electric & Power Co., 173 Va. 179, 3 S.E.2d 365 (1939); 
Templeton's Administrator v. Lynchburg Traction and Light Co., 
110 Va. 853, 67 S.E. 351 (1910); Seaboard & Roanoke Railroad 
Co. v. Hickey, 102 Va. 394, 46 S.E. 392 (1904); McDaniel's 
 
15
because the evidence showed that the plaintiff ignored 
"vigorous and specific danger warnings." 
However, the cases cited by Virginia Power do not support 
the principle that a finding of contributory negligence 
necessarily follows when there is evidence that a warning was 
given.  In each of the cases cited, the plaintiff was warned 
not to engage in a specific act, the warning was understood by 
the plaintiff, and in spite of the specific warning, the 
plaintiff performed the act and was harmed as a result of that 
act. 
The evidence of those elements in this case is, at best, 
in conflict.  The testimony of the plaintiff's friends that 
they warned him when he was in the substation is in conflict 
with Captain Zack's testimony that, while he could hear the 
boys talking, he never heard them warn the plaintiff of any 
danger. 
There also was some conflict in the evidence as to what 
acts proximately caused the injuries the plaintiff sustained.  
Ken testified that the plaintiff was injured when he "touched 
something."  However, Dr. H. D. Peterson, Virginia Power's 
witness, testified that the plaintiff's injuries were 
"flashover" burns, rather than a transmission injury.  
                                                                
Administratrix v. Lynchburg Cotton Mills, 99 Va. 146, 37 S.E. 
781 (1901). 
 
16
According to Dr. Peterson, a flashover burn is a "flame burn 
from an electrical short" that "[s]ometimes it sets your 
clothes on fire" and that at other times "just the heat from 
the ball of fire will do all the burning."  A transmission 
injury, Dr. Peterson explained, involves touching high voltage 
wires, allowing the current to enter the body, go through it, 
and exit the body.  Dr. Peterson testified that the plaintiff 
did not have any such entrance or exit injuries on his body. 
In light of the conflicting evidence in this record, 
particularly regarding the evidence necessary to rebut the 
presumption and establish that the plaintiff had the capacity 
to understand the dangers of the situation, we conclude that 
the issue of contributory negligence was a matter for the 
jury.  We therefore hold that the trial court was correct in 
refusing to find that the plaintiff was contributorially 
negligent as a matter of law. 
Virginia Power's assignments of error also include a 
claim that the trial court erred in not finding that the 
plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter of law.  Virginia 
Power does not make a separate argument on this issue, but in 
a footnote, citing High v. Coleman, 215 Va. 7, 205 S.E.2d 408 
(1974), Virginia Power claims that the evidence relating to 
the warnings plaintiff received and his alleged statement 
 
17
challenging his friends to dare him to touch wires on the 
transformer established assumption of risk as a matter of law.  
In High, however, we stated that the doctrine of 
assumption of risk requires showing:  (1) that the nature and 
extent of the risk are fully appreciated; and (2) that the 
risk is voluntarily incurred.  215 Va. at 8, 206 S.E.2d at 
409-10; see Amusement Slides Corp. v. Lehmann, 217 Va. 815, 
818-19, 232 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1977); see also Young v. Lambert, 
253 Va. 231, 241, 482 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1997); Norfolk & 
Western Rwy. v. Hodges, 248 Va. 254, 263, 448 S.E.2d 592, 596 
(1994); Philip Morris Inc. v. Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 402, 368 
S.E.2d 268, 280 (1988).  In this case, as we have discussed, 
there was conflicting evidence regarding the plaintiff's 
capacity to understand the warnings and thus to know or fully 
appreciate the risk inherent in his conduct.  We therefore 
hold that the trial court correctly denied Virginia Power's 
motion to find that the plaintiff had assumed the risk as a 
matter of law.  
IV.  Jury Instructions 
 
Virginia Power assigns error to the trial court's 
granting of two jury instructions regarding the issue of 
contributory negligence and the trial court's denial of its 
proposed instruction on the duty owed a trespasser by a 
landowner.  We consider these assignments of error in order.  
 
18
1.  Contributory Negligence Instructions
Jury Instruction 11 informed the jury that a child 
between 7 and 14 years of age is presumed incapable of being 
contributorially negligent.  It instructed the jury that 
"[t]his is a rebuttable presumption, and you may find the 
plaintiff contributorially negligent, if you find by the 
greater weight of the evidence, considering the plaintiff's 
age, intelligence, maturity and experience, that the plaintiff 
could understand and appreciate the nature of the danger and 
the peril associated with his conduct."  In Instruction 12, 
the jury was told that the conduct of a minor is to be 
measured by "that degree of care which a reasonable person of 
the same age, experience, maturity and intelligence would 
exercise under the circumstances of this case." 
Virginia Power complains that the trial court erred when 
it included "maturity" as one of the elements in these 
instructions because "this Court's recent, unambiguous 
holdings" in this area have included only three factors – age, 
intelligence, and experience.  In support of this position, 
Virginia Power quotes from Doe v. Dewhirst, 240 Va. 266, 268, 
396 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1990), and cites Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 
Va. 135, 427 S.E.2d 189 (1993); Endicott, 232 Va. 150, 348 
S.E.2d 276; and Barker, 221 Va. 924, 276 S.E.2d 613. 
 
19
The three factors listed above consistently appear in the 
opinions upon which Virginia Power relies.  However, the 
assertion that the language of a specific opinion dictates the 
content of a jury instruction from which no deviation is 
possible is at odds with our often-repeated caution that 
language in an opinion is meant to provide a rationale for a 
decision — and may not translate immutably into jury 
instructions.  See Blondel v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 474, 403 
S.E.2d 340, 344 (1991); Brown v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 213, 
221, 381 S.E.2d 225, 230 (1989); Oak Knolls Realty v. Thomas, 
212 Va. 396, 397-98, 184 S.E.2d 809, 810 (1971). 
The language relied on by Virginia Power referring to  
age, experience, and intelligence was recited by the Court in 
Barker in the context of the objective test for negligence.  
Explaining the operation of that test when applied to 
children, the Court in Barker went on to say: 
Ordinarily, a less degree of care is required of an 
infant than an adult, but his responsibility is 
always to be measured according to his maturity and 
capacity, and determined by the circumstances of the 
case as shown by the evidence.  (Citations omitted)  
Va.-Car. Ry. Co. v. Clawson, 111 Va. 313, 316, 68 
S.E. 1003, 1004-05 (1910).  
 
221 Va. at 929, 275 S.E.2d at 616.  Thus, "maturity" has been 
used to describe the various factors to be considered when 
determining whether conduct of a minor is negligent.  Indeed, 
this Court in Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 577-78, 90 S.E.2d 
 
20
171, 175-76 (1955), specifically approved a jury instruction 
regarding the negligence of a 13-year-old which contained 
"maturity" as one of the elements to be considered.3  See 
Carlton v. Martin, 160 Va. 149, 155, 168 S.E. 348, 349-50 
(1933), and cases cited therein. 
Virginia Power does not discuss any of these cases, 
presumably because its argument is that this Court's "most 
recent" cases do not list "maturity" as a factor to be 
considered.  Based on that omission, Virginia Power concludes 
that the absence of the word "maturity" reflects a considered 
decision to eliminate maturity as a factor in cases such as 
these.  The basis for such omission, Virginia Power surmises, 
is that to include "maturity" transforms the test from an 
objective test to a subjective one.  This is so, Virginia 
Power argues, because unlike age, experience and intelligence, 
which they claim are concretely measurable, maturity is a 
subjective factor.  We disagree. 
                     
3 The jury instruction approved in that case stated: 
 
And if the jury believe from the evidence in this 
case that there was no regular seat provided for him 
upon said motorcycle and that in riding on said 
motorcycle under those circumstances plaintiff's 
decedent, taking into account his age, general 
intelligence, maturity and experience, knew, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care for his own safety 
should have known, of the danger in so doing, then he 
was guilty of negligence.  
  
 
21
First, to adopt Virginia Power's position requires us to 
draw a line between cases "recently" decided and those of more 
ancient vintage and ignore the latter.  Moreover, in the 
absence of a discussion, the omission of a single factor from 
a series of factors alone is insufficient to support the 
conclusion that the omission indicates a change in the law. 
 
Furthermore, we reject Virginia Power's assertion that 
the addition of the word "maturity" transformed the objective 
test for negligence into a subjective test.  The difference 
between an objective and subjective test, in the context of 
negligence, is that, in an objective test, the actor's conduct 
is measured against what a reasonable person would do in 
similar circumstances, regardless of that particular actor's 
individual feelings, thoughts, perceptions, or prejudices.  In 
a subjective test, by contrast, the actor's actual knowledge 
and perception is the ultimate issue. 
 
The test for negligence is always objective.  With 
adults, all of whom are presumed by the law to have adequate 
experience, intelligence, and maturity to act reasonably, the 
objective test is normally stated simply in terms of the 
reasonably prudent person.  With children, however, the law 
recognizes not only that they are not mature, but that not all 
children develop and mature at the same rate.  We, therefore, 
                                                                
197 Va. at 574-75, 90 S.E.2d at 174. 
 
22
have repeatedly stated that a child's actions are to be judged 
in relation to his age, experience, intelligence, and 
maturity.  Barker, 221 Va. at 929, 275 S.E.2d at 616; Grant v. 
Mays, 204 Va. 41, 45, 129 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1963). 
 
While these factors require a greater focus on the 
characteristics of the individual whose actions are in 
question, and while the focus on that individual's 
characteristics becomes greater with the addition of every 
factor to be included, consideration of these factors does not 
transform the test into a question of what the actor actually 
knew and perceived, and thus does not transform the test from 
an objective to a subjective one.  The test remains objective 
because the fact finder still must determine what a reasonable 
person with like characteristics would do in similar 
circumstances. 
 
Having the jury consider plaintiff's maturity in 
determining the reasonableness of his conduct is in line with 
the general proposition that a child's actions are to be 
measured in light of the child's age and experience.  While we 
do not require or suggest that the element of maturity be 
included in jury instructions in all cases, we believe the 
trial court did not err in including that element for 
consideration in the jury instructions in this case. 
 
23
 
Accordingly, we reject Virginia Power's assertion that 
the trial court erred in including the word maturity in the 
instructions on contributory negligence, Instructions 11 and 
12. 
2.  Trespass Instruction
The trial court refused to give a jury instruction 
offered by Virginia Power which stated that if the plaintiff 
was a trespasser, Virginia Power's only duty was "to do him no 
intentional or willful injury" (trespass instruction).  
Virginia Power assigns error to the trial court's denial of 
this trespass instruction, contending that the trial court's 
stated reason for refusing it was erroneous and arguing that  
refusing the trespass instruction "improperly imposed a higher 
duty of care on Virginia Power." 
Virginia Power first argues that the trial court rejected 
the trespass instruction because the trial court erroneously 
believed that it did not apply in cases involving children.  
The source of this argument is the following statement made by 
the trial court in the course of the discussion on whether to 
grant the trespass instruction: 
I'm going to do this, right or wrong, over the 
defendant's objection.  The tendered instruction about 
trespassing is refused because this child — this case 
being a child, that trespass instruction does not apply. 
 
 
24
However, as discussed below, a fair and complete reading of 
the record does not support Virginia Power's assertion that 
the trial court rejected the trespass instruction solely 
because it concluded that such an instruction does not apply 
in cases involving children. 
When the trial court began consideration of the trespass 
instruction, the plaintiff indicated that he intended to offer 
another instruction which he claimed "negated" Virginia 
Power's trespass instruction.  Plaintiff's instruction was 
based on the principle discussed in Daugherty v. Hippchen, 175 
Va. 62, 65-66, 7 S.E.2d 119, 120-21 (1940), that an owner of a 
dangerous instrumentality who knows or should know that 
children would be playing in the area of the instrumentality 
owes a proper degree of care to such children, even if the 
children are trespassers (the dangerous instrumentality 
instruction).  Virginia Power responded that the rule as 
stated in its trespass instruction applies to children as well 
as adults and that Daugherty was distinguishable and does not 
apply in this case.  The trial court rejected Virginia Power's 
arguments attempting to distinguish Daugherty and suggested a 
single instruction that would inform the jury both of the 
general rule of a land owner's duty to a trespasser and of the 
exception to that rule as discussed in Daugherty.  Virginia 
 
25
Power adamantly objected to any changes or additions to its 
trespass instruction. 
Plaintiff and Virginia Power then engaged in a lengthy 
exchange with the trial court regarding the substance of a 
single instruction on these subjects but could not reach any 
agreement.  Virginia Power rejected a "combined instruction" 
offered by the plaintiff which would have included Virginia 
Power's proposed trespass instruction and the dangerous 
instrumentality instruction, steadfastly maintaining that it 
was entitled to its trespass instruction "stand[ing] alone." 
Unable to persuade Virginia Power to alter its proposed 
trespass instruction to conform to the trial court's view of 
the law under the circumstances of this case, the trial court 
denied the trespass instruction as proposed by Virginia Power 
and made the statement quoted above. 
This review of the record shows that the dispute over the 
trespass instruction centered not on whether the trespass 
instruction applied to children per se, but on whether the 
principle set out in Daugherty applied in this case and, if 
so, how to craft an instruction which would accurately reflect 
both that principle and the duty of care owed to a trespasser.  
The trial court determined that, considering the evidence, the 
principle expressed in Daugherty was applicable.  In light of 
Virginia Power's continued objection to adding any language 
 
26
which would incorporate the principles stated in Daugherty, 
the trial court finally rejected the trespass instruction as 
offered.  A complete review of the record thus reveals that 
the trial court did not refuse the trespass instruction on the 
sole ground that it simply did not apply to children, and we 
accordingly reject Virginia Power's argument that it did so.  
Virginia Power next argues that the trespass instruction 
should have been given as offered because it does apply to 
children in general and to the plaintiff in this case.  
Daugherty is distinguishable, Virginia Power contends, and the 
trial court should not have attempted to incorporate it into 
the trespass instruction. 
We agree with Virginia Power that a child trespasser can 
be subject to the general rule for the duty of care by 
landowners to trespassers; however, we also agree with the 
trial court that Daugherty was applicable under the facts of 
this case and that instructing the jury on the duty to 
trespassers as proposed by Virginia Power would have given the 
jury an inaccurate and incomplete instruction on the law. 
In Daugherty, an eight-year-old boy was injured when he 
took some blasting caps from a shed in the back yard of the 
home his family leased from the owner of the shed.  The owner 
knew that children played in the yard.  Neither the box 
holding the blasting caps nor the door to the shed was locked.  
 
27
The defendant asserted, as Virginia Power does here, that he 
was not liable for the child's injuries because the child was 
a trespasser and stole the blasting caps.  The Court in 
Daugherty rejected this position, stating: 
There may be cases of trespassers who are 
not entitled to a recovery for injuries sustained 
from explosives while unlawfully on the premises 
of another unless wantonly inflicted, but this 
rule has no application where children of 
immature years are concerned.  The courts throw a 
safeguard around such children to protect them in 
their childish instincts from the dangerous 
nature of explosives of which they have no proper 
understanding.  This is especially true where the 
keeper of explosives knows, or should know, that 
children of tender years play or are likely to 
play around the storehouse.  Liability may exist 
where a child of tender years is involved and not 
exist in the case of a child of more mature 
years. 
The general rule seems to be that, even if 
an immature child is a trespasser, one who stores 
explosives or has control of other dangerous 
instrumentalities is not relieved of the duty of 
exercising a proper degree of care for his 
protection.  If the one who keeps explosives is 
negligent in leaving them in a place accessible 
to children who he knows or should know are 
accustomed to play nearby, the fact that the 
child is a trespasser will not relieve the owner 
from liability.  The same is true as to other 
dangerous instrumentalities.  
 
175 Va. at 65-66, 75 S.E.2d at 120-21.  The evidence in this 
case implicated the principles quoted above, and, thus, we 
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
rejecting the trespass instruction as it was offered by 
Virginia Power. 
 
28
Virginia Power raises a number of other arguments in 
support of its position that its trespass instruction should 
have been given, none of which, however, require reversal of 
the trial court's ruling.  First, Virginia Power points to the 
fact that plaintiff proposed a combined instruction on 
trespass and the dangerous instrumentality principles and 
asserts that the plaintiff thereby conceded that Virginia 
Power was entitled to the trespass instruction.  However, as 
discussed above, plaintiff's "concession" was qualified by his 
position that the trespass instruction had to be modified to 
take into account the principles expressed in Daugherty. 
Next, Virginia Power argues that the trial court erred 
because it not only refused to give the trespass instruction 
but also gave "instructions that improperly imposed a higher 
duty of care on Virginia Power."  Virginia Power is apparently 
referring to Instruction 4 which instructed the jury that 
Virginia Power, as a producer of electricity, was required to 
"use a high degree of care commensurate with the danger 
involved to prevent injury to others."  According to Virginia 
Power, such "mis-instruction clearly prejudiced" Virginia 
Power by imposing a "greater duty upon Virginia Power than was 
appropriate in this case," requiring, at a minimum, a new 
trial.  We disagree. 
 
29
Virginia Power did not argue in the trial court and does 
not assert now that Instruction 4 was an inaccurate statement 
of the law.  The only objection made to Instruction 4 at trial 
was that it should not be given without the trespass 
instruction.  
However, Virginia Power's claim of prejudice fails by 
virtue of Virginia Power's actions in offering Instruction 6, 
referred to by the parties as "the joint instruction."  
Following the impasse reached on the trial court's request for 
an amended trespass instruction, the plaintiff and Virginia 
Power jointly offered Instruction 6, which told the jury that 
Virginia Power was negligent if it did not comply with the 
National Electrical Safety Code in operating, constructing, or 
maintaining the substation, or if Virginia Power had notice of 
circumstances at the substation making it reasonably 
foreseeable that the plaintiff would enter the substation. 4
                     
4 Instruction 6 stated: 
 
 
To establish that Virginia Power was negligent, 
Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Virginia Power's methods of constructing, operating, 
or maintaining the Q Substation were not in accordance 
with the National Electrical Safety Code, or that 
Virginia Power had notice of circumstances at Q 
Substation such that it was reasonably foreseeable that 
Plaintiff would enter Q Substation. 
 
If you find that Virginia Power met the National 
Electrical Safety Code and that Virginia Power did not 
have notice of circumstances at Q Substation such that it 
was reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiff would enter Q 
 
30
First, this instruction allowed the jury to find Virginia 
Power negligent, without regard to any standard of care, 
simply upon a finding that specific facts existed – non-
compliance with the National Electrical Safety Code or notice 
of certain circumstances, and that these conditions caused 
plaintiff's injuries.  Furthermore, during the debate over 
jury instructions, Virginia Power represented to the trial 
court that the "high degree of care" referred to in 
Instruction 4 was specifically defined in Instruction 6, the 
joint instruction, as the duty to comply with the National 
Electrical Safety Code.  Virginia Power thus will not be heard 
now to complain that Instruction 4 imposed an improperly high 
duty of care and resulted in prejudice to Virginia Power.  
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to 
give Virginia Power's proposed trespass instruction.  
V.  Expert Testimony  
                                                                
Substation, then Virginia Power is not liable to 
Plaintiff. 
 
If, however, you find that Virginia Power did not 
meet the National Electrical Safety Code or that Virginia 
Power did have notice of circumstances at Q Substation 
such that it was reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiff 
would enter Q Substation, you may find Virginia Power 
liable only if you also find that (i) any negligence by 
Virginia Power was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's 
injuries and (ii) the evidence fails to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff's own 
negligence or assumption of the risk was a proximate 
cause of his injuries. 
 
31
Virginia Power sought to elicit testimony from its 
expert, Dr. James Culbert, a child psychologist, that a child 
of similar age, intelligence, and experience to the plaintiff 
would have understood the dangers of an electrical substation.  
The trial court excluded such testimony on the ground that the 
jury did not need the assistance of expert testimony to reach 
a conclusion on that issue.  Virginia Power assigns error to 
this ruling, arguing that its expert testimony was necessary 
to assist the jury in this case because "many of the jurors 
did not have children" and "none of the jurors was from an 
urban environment like Richmond."  
The admission of expert testimony is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will 
reverse a trial court's ruling only where that court has 
abused its discretion.  Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley 
Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995).  An 
expert's opinion is admissible in evidence if it will assist 
the trier of fact on a matter that is not within the range of 
common knowledge.  David A. Parker Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Templeton, 251 Va. 235, 237, 467 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1996); see 
Code § 8.01-401.3(A).  As a corollary, an expert's testimony 
is inadmissible if it relates to matters about which the fact 
finder is equally as capable as the expert of reaching an 
 
32
intelligent and informed opinion.  Kendrick v. Vaz, Inc., 244 
Va. 380, 384, 421 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1992). 
In this case, the plaintiff's experts, Langford and Dr. 
Tsao, testified that plaintiff's ADHD condition and other life 
circumstances affected his developmental and intellectual 
processes to the extent that he acted like a child 
significantly younger and less intelligent than he.  Virginia 
Power attempted to rebut this testimony through its own 
expert, Dr. Culbert, who testified that the plaintiff did not 
have ADHD and was of average intelligence for his age. 
The jury having been so informed by the experts, we 
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
concluding that the jury was capable of drawing its own 
conclusion, from the facts and circumstances of the case, on 
the question whether children of similar age, intelligence, 
and experience to the plaintiff would have understood the 
electrical dangers.  As the trial court pointed out, the 
jurors could draw on their experiences having once been 
children themselves, having children of their own, having 
grandchildren, nieces, nephews, or neighbors and friends with 
children. 
Furthermore, although Virginia Power asserts that "many" 
of the jurors did not have children, the record reflects that 
only five of the 18 members of the venire did not have 
 
33
children, and the record does not indicate how many of those 
five ultimately served on this jury.  Likewise, while the 
record reflects that each of the members of the venire met the 
six-month residency requirement for serving on the jury in 
Charles City County, the record does not support Virginia 
Power's conclusion that "none" of them was "from" an urban 
environment or had no experience in such an environment.  In 
any event, although the jurors may not have had personal 
experience with children suffering from ADHD, or children 
raised in the inner city, they received extensive information 
through the expert testimony as to the effect such 
circumstances have on a child's maturity, intelligence, and 
experience. 
Virginia Power also complains that the trial court 
improperly restricted its cross-examination of plaintiff's 
expert, Dr. Tsao.  As we read the argument, Virginia Power 
first states that the trial court did not allow it to cross-
examine Dr. Tsao on the issue whether a child of like age, 
intelligence, and experience as the plaintiff would have 
understood the danger, "even though the trial court allowed 
[Dr. Tsao] to give opinions on the matter in his direct 
testimony."  Virginia Power continues by asserting that Dr. 
Tsao also testified on direct examination regarding the 
plaintiff's ability to appreciate the danger but was not 
 
34
allowed to be cross-examined on that issue either.  Neither of 
these assertions, however, is supported by the record. 
The trial court specifically ruled that both parties' 
experts could testify about the effects of ADHD and other 
circumstances on a child's maturity, intelligence, and 
experience, but that neither could opine as to whether the 
plaintiff, or a child like him, could understand the peril 
associated with the substation.  The trial court held that 
allowing the experts to give their opinion on this issue would 
invade the province of the jury.  In conformity with the trial 
court's ruling, the plaintiff did not elicit opinions on 
either issue from Dr. Tsao on direct examination.5  
Consequently, asking Dr. Tsao for such opinions on cross-
examination would have been beyond the scope of the direct 
examination and would not have been proper impeachment. 
 
For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court's 
exclusion of this expert testimony.  
VI.  Admission of Photographs 
                     
5 The record is not conclusive as to what Dr. Tsao would 
have said on cross-examination if asked his opinion on this 
subject.  Virginia Power proffered as Dr. Tsao's likely 
response to such a question the response Dr. Tsao gave during 
his deposition; however, the parties' interpretation of that 
response is disputed.  Indeed, the plaintiff objected to the 
form of the proffer, suggesting that Dr. Tsao be allowed to 
explain his answer for the record. 
 
35
Virginia Power asserts that the trial court erred in 
admitting four particular photographs into evidence.  The 
photographs variously showed holes or gaps under the fence in 
two locations other than the one plaintiff alleged he used to 
enter the substation, a slit in the fabric of the fence 
approximately eight inches long and almost ten feet from the 
place at which the plaintiff allegedly entered the substation, 
the condition of the barbed wire on the side opposite where 
the plaintiff entered, and vines growing on the fence.  
Admission of these photographs was error, Virginia Power 
asserts, because the defects in the fence shown in the 
pictures "played no role in [plaintiff's] injuries" and were, 
therefore, irrelevant.  We disagree. 
The fact that the defects depicted in these photographs 
were not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries does not 
preclude their relevance in this case.  Every fact, however 
remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the 
probability or improbability of a fact in issue is relevant.  
Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 56, 419 S.E.2d 
627, 630 (1992). 
 
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that Virginia Power 
negligently failed to properly inspect the fence and failed to 
discover the hazard created by such an improperly maintained 
fence.  Plaintiff alleged that these negligent acts made it 
 
36
easy for children to crawl under the fence and thus 
proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.  
 
In opening statements to the jury, Virginia Power told 
the jury that it would prove that it had no notice of any 
defects in the substation because it had conducted a thorough 
inspection of the substation on July 8 and 9, 1996 and found 
no defects in the fencing.  The condition of the fencing 
surrounding the substation at the time of the purported 
inspection, whether Virginia Power adequately inspected the 
fencing, and whether Virginia Power had notice of the defects 
in the fencing that caused plaintiff's injuries were thus 
disputed issues in the case. 
 
During plaintiff's case in chief, Captain Zack testified 
that the challenged pictures adequately represented the way 
the substation appeared in May and June of 1996, prior to the 
accident.  These images were relevant in that they tended to 
show that the condition of the fence surrounding the 
substation was such that the fence would not have passed 
proper inspection, and that Virginia Power should have known 
that defects in the fencing existed that would allow children 
to enter the substation. 
 
Furthermore, the trial court guarded against the jury's 
potential misunderstanding or misuse of this evidence by 
giving them the following limiting instruction: 
 
37
[the photographs] are introduced not because they're 
the site where the young man went over or under the 
fence, but these are photographs . . . to introduce 
the general appearance of the entire fence line.  
This is from the evidence not where the young man 
went through.  This shows the general condition of 
the fence line.  And for that reason only are you to 
consider the photographs. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's 
admission of these photographs into evidence. 
VII.  Failure to Set Aside the 
Verdict or Order Remittitur
 
Following the jury's verdict of $20,000,000, Virginia 
Power made a motion asking the trial court to set aside the  
verdict or alternatively to order remittitur to "under a 
million dollars."  Virginia Power argued to the trial court 
that the verdict was excessive and should be either vacated or 
reduced because, even though the plaintiff suffered painful 
burns and was scarred for life, he was not injured in such a 
manner that would curtail his life activities.  According to 
Virginia Power, "he's up and about.  He can see.  He's got 
both his arms and legs.  He can play basketball."  
 
Virginia Power attributes the amount of the verdict to a 
misunderstanding by the jury caused by a statement made by 
plaintiff's counsel in closing argument that plaintiff was 
reducing his damage request from $150,000,000 to $75,000,000 
because he "elected" not to introduce any medical bills.  
Virginia Power argues that this statement misled the jury into 
 
38
thinking that the plaintiff in fact had medical bills to pay, 
thus leading the jury to award more damages than were 
supported by the evidence at trial.6
 
The trial court denied Virginia Power's motion, reasoning 
that the verdict was supported by the evidence and was not 
excessive.  The trial court specifically remarked that the 
jury had calmly listened to all of the evidence and had simply 
rejected Virginia Power's evidence.  Virginia Power assigns 
error to this ruling. 
 
A jury verdict fairly rendered on competent evidence 
should not be disturbed by the trial court; however, the trial 
court does have the duty to correct a verdict that plainly 
appears to be unfair or would result in a miscarriage of 
justice.  Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 205 Va. 198, 202, 135 S.E.2d 
777, 780 (1964); Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 
142, 145-46, 122 S.E.2d 872, 875 (1961).  Whether to set aside 
a verdict as excessive is within the discretion of the trial 
court, and, on appeal, the standard of review is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion.  Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 
254, 258-59, 467 S.E.2d 479, 481-82 (1996). 
 
Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion.  Although Shriners Hospital treated the 
                     
6 We note that Virginia Power did not object to this 
statement during plaintiff's closing argument. 
 
39
plaintiff at no charge, and plaintiff offered no evidence of 
special damages, the evidence of the plaintiff's past, 
present, and future pain and suffering was compelling. 
 
Plaintiff sustained third degree burns to his head, face, 
neck, arms, hands, and chest.  While in the hospital after the 
accident, plaintiff endured eight surgical operations in which 
doctors took skin from "donor sites" and grafted it onto the 
burned areas of plaintiff's body.  Nursing procedures to keep 
the wounds clean were so painful and traumatic that the 
plaintiff had to be sedated. 
 
Following his release from the hospital, plaintiff 
returned to the hospital intermittently to have skin grafts 
applied to rips and cracks in the hypertrophic scarring that 
developed over his burns.  Dr. Glenn Donald Warden, the 
reconstructive surgeon specializing in burns who treated the 
plaintiff after the accident, testified that this hypertrophic 
scarring would cause bumpy, hyperpigmented skin that would 
continually shrink as it healed, and that plaintiff would have 
to wear elastic spandex-like garments and gloves for one to 
one and one-half years after the skin graft surgeries in order 
to minimize scarring.  Dr. Warden further testified that the 
hypertrophic scarring causes a loss of range of motion, 
especially in teenagers, requiring extensive exercise and 
physical therapy.  On one occasion, while doing stretching 
 
40
exercises pursuant to his doctor's instructions, plaintiff 
tore scar tissue and had to return to the hospital to have 
skin regrafted onto his elbow.  Dr. Warden testified that, as 
plaintiff continues to grow, he will need at least eight 
additional reconstructive procedures to add skin grafts to the 
scar tissue. 
 
Plaintiff presented evidence that, beyond the physical 
pain, the accident has caused and will continue to cause 
substantial emotional and psychological pain related to his 
permanent disfigurement.  Dr. Tsao testified that James suffers 
from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the accident 
and that he will require professional treatment for at least 
the next 30 years to deal with the depression, anger, and 
frustration caused by his attempts to cope with his permanent 
injuries. 
 
Furthermore, the jury had an opportunity to hear from and 
view the plaintiff when he testified.  Plaintiff testified 
that the children at school tease him and that he is ashamed 
of his appearance.  He testified that on one occasion, when he 
asked someone for directions, that person "looked at me and 
ran."  
 
As this Court has stated before, there is no exact method 
by which to measure and value in monetary terms the degree of 
pain and anguish of a suffering human being, and, unless the 
 
41
jury's verdict is so great as to indicate its judgment was 
actuated by partiality or prejudice, the court should not 
disturb the verdict.  Norfolk Rwy. & Light Co. v. Spratley, 
103 Va. 379, 49 S.E. 502 (1905). 
 
We believe that in view of the evidence in the record, 
including the evidence described above, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the jury's verdict 
was not excessive.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of Virginia Power's motion to set aside the verdict or 
order remittitur.   
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial 
court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
42