Title: Krzykalski v. Tindall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2018

Krzykalski v. Tindall Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary This case arose from a car accident in Florence Township, New Jersey. The car driven by plaintiff Mark Krzykalski was in the left lane traveling north, and the car driven by defendant David Tindall was directly behind plaintiff’s car. As the left-lane traffic proceeded through an intersection, a vehicle in the right lane driven by John Doe unexpectedly made a left turn, cutting off the cars in the left lane. Plaintiff was able to stop his car without striking the vehicle in front of him. Defendant, however, was unable to stop in time and rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. This case was brought under the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8 (CNA), and the question presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration centered on whether a jury should be asked to apportion fault between the named party defendant and a known but unidentified defendant (John Doe). The Court concluded the jury properly apportioned fault between the named party defendant Tindall and the John Doe defendant because plaintiff and defendant acknowledged the role of John Doe in the accident, plaintiff’s Uninsured Motorist (UM) carrier was aware of the litigation, and plaintiff had “fair and timely” notice that defendant would assert that John Doe was the cause of the accident. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) Mark R. Krzykalski v. David T. Tindall (A-55-16) (078744)Argued January 30, 2018 -- Decided April 17, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. In this automobile accident case brought under the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8 (CNA), the Court is called upon to determine whether a jury should be asked to apportion fault between a named party defendant and a known but unidentified defendant (John Doe). This case arises out of a car accident in Florence Township. The car driven by plaintiff Mark Krzykalski was in the left lane traveling north, and the car driven by defendant David Tindall was directly behind plaintiff’s car. As the left-lane traffic proceeded through an intersection, a vehicle in the right lane driven by John Doe unexpectedly made a left turn, cutting off the cars in the left lane. Plaintiff was able to stop his car without striking the vehicle in front of him. Defendant, however, was unable to stop in time and rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries in the accident and filed an uninsured motorist (UM) claim against his automobile insurance carrier. Plaintiff sued defendant and John Doe for negligence. In defendant’s answer, he asserted third-party negligence as a defense, included cross-claims for indemnity and contribution from any co- defendants, and demanded fault allocation against any defendants that might settle before trial. The UM carrier chose not to intervene in the lawsuit. At the conclusion of the trial, over plaintiff’s objection, the trial court included John Doe on the verdict sheet and instructed the jury to allocate fault between defendant and John Doe in the event that both parties were found negligent. The jury found defendant three percent negligent and John Doe ninety-seven percent negligent. Ultimately, the jury awarded plaintiff $107,890 in damages. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that an alleged tortfeasor does not need to be an identified party for his or her negligence and degree of responsibility to be considered by a jury. The Court granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 622 (2017).HELD: The jury properly apportioned fault between defendant and the John Doe defendant because plaintiff and defendant acknowledged the role of John Doe in the accident, plaintiff’s UM carrier was aware of the litigation, and plaintiff had fair and timely notice that defendant would assert that John Doe was the cause of the accident.1. The CNA and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (JTCL), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 to -5, comprise the statutory framework for the allocation of fault when multiple parties are alleged to have contributed to the plaintiff’s harm. Under New Jersey law, “joint tortfeasors” are “two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1. The allocation of damages among joint tortfeasors is prescribed by the CNA. The CNA provides that, when multiple defendants have been found liable, the trier of fact shall determine “[t]he extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party’s negligence or fault.” N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2). (pp. 8-10)2. The CNA requires the jury to make a good-faith allocation of the percentages of negligence among joint tortfeasors based on the evidence—not based on the collectability or non-collectability of the tortfeasors’ respective shares of the damages. That principle applies not only to defendants without the assets necessary to satisfy any judgment against them, but also to defendants who are at fault but would not be required to satisfy judgments for other reasons. For example, fault can be allocated to those defendants who have reached independent settlements with a plaintiff. But allocation to settling defendants is contingent on the plaintiff’s receipt of “fair and timely notice” that the remaining defendants will argue that liability should be attributed to those defendants who have settled. Young v. Latta, 123 N.J. 584, 596-97 (1991). (pp. 10-13) 1 3. In New Jersey, a plaintiff may sue a person or entity as “John Doe” if the plaintiff knows a cause of action exists against the defendant but does not know the defendant’s identity. The rules direct the plaintiff to “amend the complaint to state defendant’s true name” at a time “prior to judgment.” R. 4:26-4. Amendment under Rule 4:26-4 is a prerequisite to recovery: “[n]o final judgment shall be entered against a person designated by a fictitious name.” Sometimes, it may be impossible to learn the identity of a fault-bearing defendant. This is a frequent problem, for example, in hit-and-run accidents. To protect those injured in motor vehicle accidents caused by known but unidentified drivers, New Jersey has required that automobile insurance policies include a UM provision since 1968.N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1; Riccio v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 108 N.J. 493, 499 (1987). UM provisions insure drivers against “damages from the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, or hit and run motor vehicle.” Riccio, 108 N.J. at 499. Under that scheme, accident victims can recover through their own UM carrier—up to the policy limits—for the damages caused by a “phantom vehicle,” or a known, fault-bearing driver who cannot be identified. (pp. 13-15)4. In Riccio, the Court affirmed a judgment in which fifty percent of the fault for the accident had been allocated to a known but unidentified driver. Id. at 496-97. The result in that case suggests that known but unidentified defendants who are not immune from liability may be allocated fault alongside the known defendants in the case. The Appellate Division held as much in Cockerline v. Menendez, 411 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2010). In Cockerline, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death suit against the drivers involved in a multi-vehicle accident that killed her husband. Id. at 605. A number of those drivers were identified, but other drivers involved in the accident, who left the scene and were never identified, appeared in the complaint as John Doe defendants. Id. at 610. The panel noted the “different goals and purposes” served by the law that governs UM coverage and the JTCL and CNA: the former aims “'to make the victim whole, but not provide a windfall or to allow a double recovery’”; the latter laws are designed “'to relieve tortfeasors of an injustice among themselves.’” Id. at 619 (quoting Riccio, 108 N.J. at 504). In accordance with those distinct policy aims, the Appellate Division panel allowed the allocation of fault to the John Doe drivers. Ibid. From Riccio and Cockerline derives the principle that parties known to be at least in part liable should be allocated their share of the fault, even when unidentified. In such cases, known but unidentified parties may be allocated fault even though recovery against those parties will be possible only through the plaintiff’s UM coverage. (pp. 15-17)5. An exception to that general rule can be found in Bencivenga v. J.J.A.M.M., Inc., 258 N.J. Super. 399 (App. Div. 1992). In that case, a nightclub patron sued the club after he was punched in the face by a fellow patron, whose identity he did not know. Id. at 402. The complaint named the assailant as a John Doe defendant. Ibid. The trial court, however, refused to allow the jury to consider the John Doe defendant’s negligence. Ibid. The Appellate Division relied on a policy justification to affirm the trial court—that the nightclub was more likely than the plaintiff to know the assailant’s identity. Id. at 410. (pp. 17-18)6. This case strongly resembles Cockerline. John Doe here is a known but unidentified party. Indeed, plaintiff and defendant acknowledge the role that John Doe played in causing the accident. By requiring that automobile insurance policies include a UM provision, the Legislature has acknowledged and prepared for precisely such circumstances. “Phantom vehicles” driven by known but unidentified motorists that play a part in an accident presumptively may be allocated fault in accordance with the JTCL, the CNA, and the laws requiring UM coverage. The presumptive ability to allocate fault to such defendants may be defeated if the identified defendants do not provide fair and timely notice of their intent to argue that fault should be allocated to the John Doe defendant. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff received fair and timely notice defendant would assert that John Doe was the cause of the accident. Plaintiff’s UM carrier, moreover, received notice of the litigation and had the option to intervene. Additionally, the other grounds upon which allocation has been denied in other cases do not apply here. Under the circumstances of this case and in light of the undisputed evidence that John Doe’s negligence contributed to the accident, the trial court appropriately submitted the question of John Doe’s negligence to the jury for fault allocation. (pp. 18-21)7. John Doe’s party status under the CNA does not mean that the UM carrier who will ultimately cover any damages attributed to John Doe must intervene in the case and formally become a party to the negligence suit. (pp. 21-22) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 55 September Term 2016 078744MARK R. KRZYKALSKI and MICHELE KRZYKALSKI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAVID T. TINDALL, Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 30, 2018 – Decided April 17, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 448 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2016). Kenneth G. Andres, Jr., argued the cause for appellant Mark R. Krzykalski (Andres & Berger, attorneys; Kenneth G. Andres, Jr., of counsel and on the brief, and Abraham Tran, on the brief). Daniel J. Pomeroy argued the cause for respondent (Pomeroy, Heller & Ley, attorneys; Daniel J. Pomeroy and Karen E. Heller, on the brief). Michael J. Epstein argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (The Epstein Law Firm, attorneys; Michael J. Epstein, of counsel and on the brief, and Michael A. Rabasca, on the brief). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 In this automobile accident case brought under theComparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8 (CNA), weare called upon to determine whether a jury should be asked toapportion fault between a named party defendant and a known butunidentified defendant (John Doe). We conclude that the juryproperly apportioned fault between the named party defendantDavid Tindall (defendant) and the John Doe defendant becauseplaintiff Mark Krzykalski (plaintiff) and defendant acknowledgedthe role of John Doe in the accident, plaintiff’s UninsuredMotorist (UM) carrier was aware of the litigation, and plaintiffhad “fair and timely” notice that defendant would assert thatJohn Doe was the cause of the accident. I. According to the appellate record, this case arises out ofa car accident in Florence Township. The car driven byplaintiff was in the left lane traveling north, and the cardriven by defendant was directly behind plaintiff’s car. As theleft-lane traffic proceeded through an intersection, a vehiclein the right lane driven by John Doe unexpectedly made a leftturn, cutting off the cars in the left lane. Plaintiff was ableto stop his car without striking the vehicle in front of him.Defendant, however, was unable to stop in time and rear-endedplaintiff’s vehicle. 2 Plaintiff suffered serious injuries in the accident andfiled a UM claim against his automobile insurance carrier.Plaintiff rejected his insurance company’s offer to settle theUM claim for the policy limits and sued defendant and John Doe1for negligence. In defendant’s answer, he asserted third-partynegligence as a defense, included cross-claims for indemnity andcontribution from any co-defendants, and demanded faultallocation against any defendants that might settle beforetrial. Prior to trial, plaintiff moved for a directed verdictagainst defendant. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion,and the case proceeded to a jury trial. During trial, plaintiffagain refused his UM carrier’s settlement offer for the fullpolicy limits on the UM claim, and the UM carrier chose not tointervene in the lawsuit. At the conclusion of the trial, overplaintiff’s objection, the trial court included John Doe on theverdict sheet and instructed the jury to allocate fault betweendefendant and John Doe in the event that both parties were foundnegligent.1 The complaint names three John Doe defendants. John Doe I is described as the driver of the car that made the improper left turn; John Doe II is described as the owner of that car; and John Doe III is described as the individual or entity on whose behalf that car was being driven. The action was litigated only against defendant and John Doe I. 3 The jury found defendant three percent negligent and JohnDoe ninety-seven percent negligent. Ultimately, the juryawarded plaintiff $107,890 in damages. The trial court deniedplaintiff’s post-verdict motion for a new trial or additur. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding thatan alleged tortfeasor does not need to be an identified partyfor his or her negligence and degree of responsibility to beconsidered by a jury. In the panel’s view, precluding faultallocation to known but unidentified defendants would givelitigants in plaintiff’s position an improper windfall. Theappellate panel reasoned that similarly situated plaintiffscould recover all of their damages from the identified defendantand then also receive compensation from their UM carrier for theknown but unidentified defendant’s share of the fault. A memberof the panel, writing separately, concurred in the opinion,stating that allowing the jury to assess the fault of John Doedefendants is proper for a number of reasons: 1) it preventsplaintiffs from strategically delaying their UM claim untilafter the lawsuit; 2) it allocates fault based on the actualnegligence of the various drivers; and 3) it avoids doublerecovery by plaintiffs. We granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 622 (2017). We also granted amicus curiae status to theNew Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ). 4 II. A. Plaintiff argues that a jury should not be permitted toapportion fault between a named party defendant and anunidentified party who is not represented by counsel. Inplaintiff’s view, John Doe is not a “true party” to the caseunder the CNA, and placing John Doe on the jury verdict sheetand allowing fault allocation to John Doe results in amiscarriage of justice. Plaintiff asserts that the cases relied upon by theAppellate Division are inapposite because they involved nameddefendants who were dismissed before jury deliberations. Here,plaintiff argues that John Doe’s identity was never ascertainedand so he never actually became a party to the lawsuit. Plaintiff raises three additional arguments. First, heargues that allowing fault allocation to John Doe improperlyallows identified defendants to present an “empty chair defense”2by blaming unidentified John Doe defendants. Therefore,according to plaintiff, if this Court allows allocation to JohnDoe defendants, it should require UM carriers to present adefense on behalf of the John Doe defendant. Second, plaintiff2 “The practical effect of a defendant proving that the 'empty chair’ was responsible for the accident is that the plaintiff will receive no recovery.” Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc.,181 N.J. 102, 114 (2004). 5 asserts that if this Court allows allocation, it should requireidentified defendants to advise the court and opposing counselthat they will assert John Doe’s negligence. Finally, plaintiffclaims that allowing allocation to John Doe in this case createsa slippery slope by permitting defendants to assert thenegligence of entities outside the litigation. B. Defendant argues that it was proper to allocate fault toJohn Doe because the legislative purpose of the CNA is topromote the fair sharing of the burden of a judgment. Indefendant’s view, it is the joint tortfeasor status, not theparty status, that determines whether allocation is appropriate,and each tortfeasor should pay damages in accordance with thepercentage of fault attributed to it by the fact-finder. Thus,according to defendant, because the complaint alleged that heand John Doe were joint tortfeasors, it was proper for the juryto allocate fault both to him and to John Doe. Defendantfurther stresses that plaintiff should not have been surprisedthat John Doe was listed on the verdict sheet, given thatplaintiff elected to name John Doe as a defendant in thecomplaint. Defendant adds that there is no “rule prohibiting theallocation of fault to fictitious parties” and that Bencivengav. J.J.A.M.M., Inc., 258 N.J. Super. 399 (App. Div. 1992), from 6 which that proposition stems, is inapposite. Finally, defendantargues that joinder should not be mandatory because UM carriersalready receive notice of litigation and have the option tointervene. Therefore, in defendant’s view, there is no reasonto force carriers to participate in litigation where they wouldnot do so of their own volition. C. The NJAJ argues that the Appellate Division conflated theconcept of fictitious parties with the concept of phantomvehicles3 for which there is mandatory insurance coverage in allmotor vehicle policies issued in New Jersey. It asks that thisCourt “clarify and reaffirm” the “long-standing rule barring thejury’s assessment of a fictitious party’s negligence and theplacement of a fictitious party on the verdict sheet.” The NJAJalso argues that this Court should adopt a bright-line rule“requiring the joinder of a plaintiff’s UM carrier in motorvehicle cases where there is a known and identified defendantdriver and a phantom vehicle.”3 “Phantom vehicle” is a term used for vehicles that were known to be involved in an automobile accident but never sufficiently identified as to permit the owner or operator to be hauled into court. See Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 598-99, 609 (2015) (describing the unidentified vehicle that caused an accident as a “phantom vehicle”); Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 374, 389 (2010) (same). 7 The NJAJ notes that John Doe was never identified duringdiscovery, substituted in as a party to the litigation, orserved with process, and stresses that plaintiff’s UM insurancecarrier never intervened in the case or presented a defense onbehalf of John Doe, even though the UM claim was unresolved andthe carrier had notice of the litigation. The NJAJ argues thatthe Appellate Division’s decision therefore violates the ruleset forth in Bencivenga -- that John Doe defendants are notparties for the purpose of fault allocation under the CNA. Inthe NJAJ’s view, the panel improperly established a “blanket”“empty chair” defense available whenever plaintiff namesfictitious defendants in a complaint. III. A. “The [CNA] and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law[(JTCL), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 to -5,] comprise the statutoryframework for the allocation of fault when multiple parties arealleged to have contributed to the plaintiff’s harm.” Town ofKearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 96 (2013). Under New Jersey law,“joint tortfeasors” are “two or more persons jointly orseverally liable in tort for the same injury to person orproperty, whether or not judgment has been recovered against allor some of them.” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1. “The [JTCL] was enactedto promote the fair sharing of the burden of judgment by joint 8 tortfeasors and to prevent a plaintiff from arbitrarilyselecting his or her victim.” Holloway v. State, 125 N.J. 386,400-01 (1991). The allocation of damages among joint tortfeasors isprescribed by the CNA. The CNA provides that, when multipledefendants have been found liable, the trier of fact shalldetermine “[t]he extent, in the form of a percentage, of eachparty’s negligence or fault.4 The percentage of negligence orfault of each party shall be based on 100% and the total of allpercentages of negligence or fault of all of the parties to asuit shall be 100%.” N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2). A plaintiffordinarily can recover only the percentage of damages attributedto a particular defendant. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(c). However, ifa defendant is found to be sixty percent or more at fault, theplaintiff can recover the full amount of damages from that onedefendant, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a), and that defendant may in turn“recover contribution from the other joint tortfeasor or joint4 The CNA also provides that a plaintiff cannot recover damages if his or her negligence was “greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought or . . . greater than the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought.” N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1. “In other words, a plaintiff who is found to be more than fifty percent at fault is entitled to no recovery,” whereas “[a] plaintiff who is found to be fifty percent or less at fault is entitled to a recovery, but any award of damages is diminished by the percentage of negligence attributed to her.” Brodsky, 181 N.J. at 109. 9 tortfeasors for the excess so paid over his pro rata share.”N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-3. “The [CNA] was designed to further the principle that '[i]tis only fair that each person only pay for injuries he or sheproximately caused.’” Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142, 159 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quotingFernandes v. DAR Dev. Corp., 222 N.J. 390, 407 (2015)). “Thelaw favors apportionment even where the apportionment proofs areimprecise, allowing only for rough apportionment by the trier offact.” Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 384 (App.Div. 2005). Moreover, the CNA requires the “jury to make a good-faithallocation of the percentages of negligence among jointtortfeasors based on the evidence -- not based on thecollectability or non-collectability” of the tortfeasors’respective shares of the damages. Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers,Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 121 (2004); see also Brandt, 214 N.J. at 103(“[A]pportionment of fault under the [CNA] and the [JTCL] doesnot turn on whether the plaintiff is in a position to recoverdamages from the defendant at issue.”). That principle applies not only to defendants without theassets necessary to satisfy any judgment against them, but alsoto defendants who are at fault but would not be required tosatisfy judgments for other reasons. For example, fault can be 10 allocated to those defendants who have reached independentsettlements with a plaintiff and thus will not have to payfurther even if a greater payment would be required based oneventual allocation of fault. See, e.g., Cartel Capital Corp.v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 569 (1980). But allocation tosettling defendants is contingent on the plaintiff’s receipt of“fair and timely notice” that the remaining defendants willargue that liability should be attributed to those defendantswho have settled. Young v. Latta, 123 N.J. 584, 596-97 (1991);see also Higgins v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 282 N.J.Super. 600, 609, 615 (App. Div. 1995) (remanding for new trialbecause trial judge granted defendant’s motion and included onjury verdict sheet additional asbestos manufacturer never namedas defendant that settled with plaintiff). In Morey’s Pier, for example, we allowed the allocation offault to a public entity defendant who had been dismissedbecause the plaintiff had failed to serve it with a timelynotice of claim as required by the Tort Claims Act after notingthat the “parties ha[d] long been on notice of the . . .defendants’ intention to seek the apportionment of a percentageof fault.” 230 N.J. at 165; see also Brodsky, 181 N.J. at 108(allowing allocation of fault to defendant dismissed fromlitigation pursuant to discharge in bankruptcy); Burt v. W.Jersey Health Sys., 339 N.J. Super. 296, 305 (App. Div. 2001) 11 (holding that doctor dismissed from malpractice litigation dueto plaintiff’s failure to properly file affidavit of merit wasstill fault-allocable party under CNA). By contrast, when a named defendant is found to be immunefrom liability -- as opposed to at fault but invulnerable torecovery because a defendant is either unable to satisfy orexcused from satisfying an adverse judgment -- then fault maynot be allocated to that defendant. The Appellate Divisionexplained that distinction in Ramos v. Browning FerrisIndustries of South Jersey, Inc., 194 N.J. Super. 96, 101, 105(App. Div. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 103 N.J. 177 (1986).In Ramos, a worker was injured on the job while wheeling a 400-pound drum of solid waste. 194 N.J. Super. at 100. The juryattributed twenty-five percent of the negligence to the workerand seventy-five percent to defendant Browning Ferris, “a solidwaste hauler that leased the container to plaintiff’s employer.”Ibid. The Appellate Division considered Browning Ferris’sargument that the employer’s negligence should have beenconsidered in assessing the cause of the worker’s injuries, eventhough the employer was immune from suit under a provision ofthe New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. Id.at 102-03. The appellate panel properly held that “our Legislatureexpressed its intent to limit the task of the trier of fact to 12 determining the percentages of negligence of only those persons,necessarily parties, whose percentages must be known in order tomold the judgment.” Id. at 107. Thus, because the employer’simmunity meant it could not be a joint tortfeasor as a matter oflaw or a party to the litigation, it was properly exempt fromthe allocation of fault. Ibid. In sum, the CNA requires the allocation of fault todefendants who may be responsible for the injury without regardto whether those defendants are, for other reasons, invulnerableto recovery by the plaintiff. This case poses the question ofhow those principles apply when a defendant is a known butunidentified “John Doe” defendant. To answer that question, wereview the law of fictitious parties. B. In New Jersey, a plaintiff may sue a person or entity as“John Doe” if the plaintiff knows a cause of action existsagainst the defendant but does not know the defendant’sidentity. See Greczyn v. Colgate-Palmolive, 183 N.J. 5, 11(2005). Our court rules provide that “if the defendant’s truename is unknown to the plaintiff, process may issue against thedefendant under a fictitious name, stating it to be fictitiousand adding an appropriate description sufficient foridentification.” R. 4:26-4. The rules also direct the 13 plaintiff to “amend the complaint to state defendant’s truename” at a time “prior to judgment.” Ibid. Amendment under Rule 4:26-4 is a prerequisite to recovery:“[n]o final judgment shall be entered against a persondesignated by a fictitious name.” Indeed, the fictitious namerule acts to “suspend the running of the statute of limitationsuntil the actual identity of a defendant is discovered.”Lawrence v. Bauer Publ’g & Printing Ltd., 78 N.J. 371, 375-76(1979). Sometimes, it may be impossible to learn the identity of afault-bearing defendant. This is a frequent problem, forexample, in hit-and-run accidents. To protect those injured inmotor vehicle accidents caused by known but unidentifieddrivers, New Jersey has required that automobile insurancepolicies include a UM provision since 1968. N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1;Riccio v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 108 N.J. 493, 499(1987). UM provisions insure drivers against “damages from theoperator of an uninsured motor vehicle, or hit and run motorvehicle.” Riccio, 108 N.J. at 499. “[T]o collect under UMcoverage, the claimant-insured must be able to prove anautomobile liability case against the uninsured.” Ibid. Underthat scheme, accident victims can recover through their own UMcarrier -- up to the policy limits -- for the damages caused bya “phantom vehicle,” or a known, fault-bearing driver who cannot 14 be identified. In other words, the UM coverage schemeanticipates and provides for judgment to be entered in favor ofplaintiffs when the tortfeasor is a known but unidentifiedmotorist. We next consider cases that have harmonized the foregoingprinciples applicable to fictitious parties, particularly in theUM context, with the allocation of fault among tortfeasorspursuant to the JTCL and the CNA. C. In Riccio, this Court considered the damages recoverable bya plaintiff whose daughter was killed when the car in which shewas a passenger was forced off the road by an unidentifiedvehicle. Id. at 495-97. We affirmed a judgment in which fiftypercent of the fault for the accident had been allocated to theknown but unidentified driver. See id. at 496-97 (aftersuccessful Demand for Arbitration,5 “the arbitrator determinedthat the drivers -- [the driver of the vehicle in which theplaintiff’s daughter was a passenger] and the 'phantom’uninsured -- shared responsibility for the accident on an equalbasis”). Although allocation of fault was not the centralquestion in Riccio, the result in that case suggests that known5 A Demand for Arbitration can be filed, in lieu of a lawsuit, under the UM provisions of an insurance contract. See Riccio,108 N.J. at 496. 15 but unidentified defendants who are not immune from liabilitymay be allocated fault alongside the known defendants in thecase. The Appellate Division held as much in Cockerline v.Menendez, 411 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2010). In Cockerline,the plaintiff brought a wrongful death suit against the driversinvolved in a multi-vehicle accident that killed her husband.Id. at 605. A number of those drivers were identified, butother drivers involved in the accident, who left the scene andwere never identified, appeared in the complaint as John Doedefendants. Id. at 610. The plaintiff also initiated a UMclaim with her insurance carrier for the damages caused by theJohn Doe drivers. Ibid. The UM carrier intervened in thelawsuit and then settled with the plaintiff. Ibid. The panel noted the “different goals and purposes” servedby the law that governs UM coverage and the JTCL and CNA: theformer aims “'to make the victim whole, but not provide awindfall or to allow a double recovery’”; the latter laws aredesigned “'to relieve tortfeasors of an injustice amongthemselves.’” Id. at 619 (quoting Riccio, 108 N.J. at 504). In accordance with those distinct policy aims, theAppellate Division panel allowed the allocation of fault to theJohn Doe drivers. Ibid. The panel concluded that “to precludedefendants from seeking an apportionment of liability against 16 the phantom vehicles does not advance the purposes of the UM lawand frustrates the purposes of the joint tortfeasor andcomparative fault law.” Ibid. From Riccio and Cockerline we derive the principle thatparties known to be at least in part liable should be allocatedtheir share of the fault, even when unidentified. In suchcases, known but unidentified parties may be allocated faulteven though recovery against those parties will be possible onlythrough the plaintiff’s UM coverage. An exception to that general rule can be found in the caseon which plaintiff relies here -- Bencivenga. In that case, anightclub patron sued the club after he was punched in the faceby a fellow patron, whose identity he did not know. 258 N.J.Super. at 402. The complaint named the assailant as a John Doedefendant. Ibid. The trial court, however, refused to allowthe jury to consider the John Doe defendant’s negligence. Ibid. On appeal, the nightclub argued that the trial court shouldhave allowed the jury to apportion fault between the nightcluband the John Doe assailant. Id. at 406. The Appellate Divisionrelied on a policy justification to affirm the trial court --that the nightclub was more likely than the plaintiff to knowthe assailant’s identity. 6 Id. at 410. The panel reasoned that6 To the extent that the holding in Bencivenga also rested on the panel’s determination that fault could not be allocated to 17 by keeping the John Doe assailant off the verdict sheet, thetrial court forced the nightclub to either identify him andmitigate its share of the fault, or decline to name him and bearthe cost of his share. Ibid. According to the AppellateDivision, that would create an incentive for the identifieddefendant to name John Doe tortfeasors so that they can, inturn, share in the allocation of fault, reducing the identifieddefendant’s exposure. Ibid. We turn now to the facts of this case and review de novothe legal question of whether fault was properly allocated tothe known but unidentified John Doe defendant under the JTCL andthe CNA. See Brandt, 214 N.J. at 96 (citing Murray v.Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012); ManalapanRealty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378(1995)). IV. Although there were only two defendants here -- theidentified defendant and the John Doe defendant -- this casethe John Doe defendant because “a fictitious person is not a party to a suit,” 258 N.J. Super. at 407, we note that a John Doe defendant’s unavailability for final judgment under the law of fictitious persons affects the ability to recover damages, but does not affect that defendant’s status as a party for purposes of fault allocation. Indeed, in the context of this case, it is necessary that fault be allocated to such known but unidentified defendants because of the existence of UM insurance coverage. 18 strongly resembles Cockerline. In that case, the drivers of the“phantom vehicles” were never identified, but they were knowninasmuch as their roles in that accident were acknowledged.Therefore, just as fault could be allocated to the John Does inthat case, fault was properly allocated to John Doe here. Plaintiff describes John Doe in this case as a “fictitious”person “who was not named and could never be named” and cannever be a “true party under [the CNA].” We disagree. To beginwith, John Doe here is a known but unidentified party. Indeed,plaintiff and defendant acknowledge the role that John Doeplayed in causing the accident -- he improperly made a left turn,cutting off the line of cars in plaintiff’s lane of travel. It is true that John Doe “is not someone against whomrecovery can be sought because the fictitious person rule, R.4:26-4, and due process prevents entry of judgment against aperson designated by a fictitious name.” Bencivenga, 258 N.J.Super. at 406-07. However, John Doe in this case is not a“fictitious person” in the sense that his existence andinvolvement in the accident are not subject to dispute. Rather,John Doe was the operator of a motor vehicle involved inplaintiff’s accident, who cannot be identified. By requiringthat automobile insurance policies include a UM provision, theLegislature has acknowledged and prepared for precisely suchcircumstances. See N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1. Stated simply, “phantom 19 vehicles” driven by known but unidentified motorists that play apart in an accident presumptively may be allocated fault inaccordance with the JTCL, the CNA, and the laws requiring UMcoverage. We agree that the presumptive ability to allocate fault tosuch defendants may be defeated if the identified defendants donot provide “fair and timely” notice of their intent to arguethat fault should be allocated to the John Doe defendant.Young, 123 N.J. at 596. However, here, it is undisputed thatplaintiff received “fair and timely” notice defendant wouldassert that John Doe was the cause of the accident. Indeed,defendant’s third-party negligence defense was set forth in hisanswer to the complaint. Plaintiff’s UM carrier, moreover,received notice of the litigation, offered the policy limits insettlement of the UM claim, and had the option to intervene. Additionally, the other grounds upon which allocation hasbeen denied in other cases do not apply here. In contrast tothe employer in Ramos, there is no statutory bar to finding JohnDoe liable. Unlike the asbestos manufacturer added to theverdict sheet in Higgins, John Doe was properly joined as aparty in this case. Finally, unlike the club owner inBencivenga, defendant in this case was not more likely thanplaintiff to know John Doe’s identity. 20 We agree with defendant that, under the circumstances ofthis case and in light of the undisputed evidence that JohnDoe’s negligence contributed to the accident, the trial courtappropriately submitted the question of John Doe’s negligence tothe jury for fault allocation. For completeness, we add that John Doe’s party status underthe CNA’s fault-allocation provision does not mean that the UMcarrier who will ultimately cover any damages attributed to JohnDoe must intervene in the case and formally become a party tothe negligence suit. Here, plaintiff’s UM carrier receivednotice of the litigation and had the option to intervene andparticipate at trial in an effort to limit its exposure.Because it is plaintiff’s UM carrier that is responsible for thedamages caused by John Doe, there is no reason to require itsparticipation in this litigation where it chose not to do so. Indeed, our courts recognize that under some circumstances“a defendant is allowed to prove that a non-party was the soleproximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm -- the so-called 'emptychair’ defense in which a defendant shifts blame to a jointtortfeasor who is not in the courtroom.” Brodsky, 181 N.J. at 114. To the extent that plaintiff and amicus claim that the“empty chair” defense is being permitted here, this is such acircumstance. 21 In sum, plaintiff and defendant both asserted the existenceof a “phantom vehicle.” Plaintiff and plaintiff’s UM carrierreceived necessary notice that defendant would assert John Doe’sresponsibility for the accident. Cf. R. 4:7-5. Therefore, theCNA mandates the allocation of fault to John Doe, a party tothis action. V. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of theAppellate Division is affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate. 22