Title: Wolpert v. Knight
Citation: 330 P.2d 1023
Docket Number: 4108
State: Nevada
Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court
Date: October 24, 1958

330 P.2d 1023 (1958) Eugene B. WOLPERT, Appellant, v. Ralph KNIGHT, Respondent. No. 4108 Supreme Court of Nevada October 24, 1958. Jon R. Collins, of Ely, for Appellant. E.R. Miller, Jr., of Ely, for Respondent. BADT, Chief Justice. Knight recovered a judgment for $2,000 against Wolpert on his complaint based on Wolpert's check for $2,500 issued and delivered by Wolpert to Knight to take up five earlier $500 checks. Wolpert pleaded as a special defense that the check was given in consideration of a gambling debt. The court's finding against this contention is amply supported by the record, which, without contradiction, shows that on each of four occasions at which Knight cashed Wolpert's $500 check, Wolpert was not indebted to Knight. A fifth $500 check was executed by Wolpert at the gambling table and delivered to the dealer for which the dealer gave Wolpert $500 in chips which Wolpert proceeded to play at the table. The contention presented on Wolpert's appeal from the judgment is that the $2,500 check, as well as all of the earlier $500 checks taken up thereby, were nullities by reason of the provision that any such bill, note or security given "for the reimbursing or repaying any money knowingly lent or advanced at the time and place of such play, to any person or persons so gaming or betting as aforesaid, or that shall, during such play, so play or bet, shall be utterly void, frustrate and of none effect * * *." Statute of Anne, Sec. 1, adopted into the law of this state as part of the common law of England. West Indies v. First National Bank, 67 Nev. 13, 214 P.2d 144. Our conclusion is that the contention is not well founded, and we turn to the record to determine the circumstances under which each check was cashed. Respondent operated the Townclub, a cafe, bar and casino, in Ely. On four different occasions, over a period of three days, appellant went to the cashier's desk at the Townclub and asked if they would cash his check. On each occasion he did so. Knight was asked on cross examination: Ann Finley, who was the cashier at the Townclub, testified that Wolpert came to the cashier's window and wanted to cash a check for $500. "I am authorized to cash checks but I also get Mr. Knight's authorization for those checks, so I went and got Mr. Knight and he came to the cashier's cage. He gave him $500. I saw Mr. Wolpert cash checks three times. He would get his money and go to the bar, buy drinks and has given away money, given money to people and gone to the gambling tables and then gone out of the establishment, he moved around, kind of back and forth." Appellant contends that the present appeal is governed by the case of Burke &amp; Co. v. Buck, 31 Nev. 74, 99 P. 1078, 22 L.R.A., N.S., 627. There Buck, after losing about $1,000 at roulette, endorsed a negotiable certificate of deposit at the table and delivered it to the dealer who placed it in the drawer of the roulette table. The dealer gave him $500 in gold coin, with which Buck continued to play, eventually losing it all. The court held that the assignment "was made at a gambling table and during the progress of play" and therefore came squarely within the Statute of Anne, citing Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69. The court repeated and emphasized the fact that the certificate "was transferred during the progress of the play." In Craig v. Harrah, 66 Nev. 1, 201 P.2d 1081, 1084, we find a reasonable guide for the determination of cases like the present *1025 one. There this court said: "In determining the purpose for which the $500 was advanced, the significance and relevancy of the surrounding circumstances and environment are readily apparent. If the advancement was made in a gambling establishment in full operation, by the proprietor or his agent, to one then, or immediately prior thereto, engaged in gambling and who ran short of money, the game still being in progress, or if his conversation or the circumstances indicated he intended to resume playing, the purpose of the advancement becomes clear. On the other hand, if the advancement was at a different place than a gambling establishment, or if same was not made at a time when the recipient had been recently playing, and some other, legitimate, purpose is stated by the recipient, then no presumption or inference that the advancement was for a gambling purpose is justifiable from such circumstances." The trial court was justified in using the foregoing for its guide. This it apparently did, and the evidence supported its findings and judgment. Affirmed. EATHER and MERRILL, JJ., concur.