Title: Bolt v. Influence, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48510
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2002

Filed: March 28, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ALISHA F. BOLT
and THOMAS BOLT,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs-Relators,
	v.
INFLUENCE, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Adverse Party,
	and
WOMEN'S HEALTHCARE CLINIC OF OREGON, P.C.,
an Oregon corporation;
and GEORGE M. BAILEY, M.D.,
Defendants.
(CC 9911-12433; SC S48510)
	En Banc
	Original proceeding in mandamus.*
	Argued and submitted November 7, 2001.
	John Paul Graff, of Graff &amp; O'Neil, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for plaintiffs-relators.  With him on
the brief was Jeffrey B. Wihtol.
	George S. Pitcher, of Tooze, Duden, Creamer, Frank &amp;
Hutchison, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
defendant-adverse party.  With him on the brief was Eric J.
Neiman.
	Barbara L. Johnston, Hillsboro, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Association of Defense Counsel.
	Jonathan M. Hoffman, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
	Linda K. Eyerman, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
	BALMER, J.
	Peremptory writ to issue.
	*On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Nely L. Johnson, Judge.
		BALMER, J.
		In this original mandamus proceeding, we consider the
legal standards governing a trial court's decision on a motion to
amend a complaint to add a punitive damages claim in a products
liability case.  The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to
amend on the ground that they had not presented evidence
sufficient for a jury to find, by clear and convincing evidence,
that they were entitled to punitive damages.  Because ORS
18.535(3) sets out a less demanding "directed verdict" standard
for evaluating a motion to amend to add a punitive damages claim,
we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to a peremptory writ of
mandamus directing the trial judge to reconsider plaintiffs'
motion.
		The following facts are not contested.  Influence, Inc.
(defendant), manufactures and markets medical devices used to
treat urinary incontinence.  In 1997, a surgeon implanted one of
defendant's devices, a transvaginal synthetic sling system, in
the pelvis of plaintiff Alisha Bolt.  Shortly thereafter, Alisha
Bolt suffered serious postoperative complications and later
underwent multiple surgeries to have the device removed. 
Attributing the cause of various injuries to the design of the
synthetic sling, plaintiffs filed claims against defendant for
negligence, products liability, and loss of consortium. (1)
		After some discovery but before trial, plaintiffs moved
to amend their complaint to add a claim for punitive damages
based on allegations that defendant had marketed its synthetic
sling with reckless and outrageous indifference to the risk of
harm that that device posed to the public.  After considering
plaintiffs' evidence together with opposing evidence that
defendant had submitted, the trial court denied plaintiffs'
motion.  In explaining its ruling, the court stated that it had
used the following standard when examining the evidence:
	"[T]aking the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, could a reasonable jury find, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the truth of the matter
alleged is highly probable -- that the defendant has
shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a
highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with
conscious indifference to the health, safety, and
welfare of others."
(Emphasis added.)  This mandamus proceeding followed. 
ORS 34.110.
		We begin with plaintiffs' contention that the trial
court used the wrong legal standard in reviewing plaintiffs'
motion to amend their complaint.  Plaintiffs had submitted that
motion under ORS 18.535, which provides, in part:
		"(1) A pleading in a civil action may not contain
a request for an award of punitive damages except as
provided in this section.
		"(2) At the time of filing a pleading with the
court, the pleading may not contain a request for an
award of punitive damages.  At any time after the
pleading is filed, a party may move the court to allow
the party to amend the pleading to assert a claim for
punitive damages.  The party making the motion may
submit affidavits and documentation supporting the
claim for punitive damages.  The party or parties
opposing the motion may submit opposing affidavits and
documentation.
		"(3) The court shall deny a motion to amend a
pleading made under the provisions of this section if
the court determines that the affidavits and supporting
documentation submitted by the party seeking punitive
damages fail to set forth specific facts supported by
admissible evidence adequate to avoid the granting of a
motion for a directed verdict to the party opposing the
motion on the issue of punitive damages in a trial of
the matter."
		Plaintiffs argue that, under subsection (3) of that
statute, their motion to amend must be supported only by some
evidence of a prima facie case for punitive damages -- i.e., some
evidence that defendant had "acted with malice or [had] shown a
reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable
risk of harm and [had] acted with conscious indifference to the
health, safety and welfare of others."  ORS 18.537(1). 
Plaintiffs assert, therefore, that the trial court's application
of a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard to their motion
was improper.  They further argue that they produced sufficient
proof to require the court to allow their motion.
		The initial issue presented, then, is one of statutory
interpretation.  We must determine what standard the legislature
intended to require a court to use when determining the
sufficiency of evidence submitted in support of a motion under
ORS 18.535.  As noted, subsection (3) of that statute instructs a
court to deny a motion to amend a pleading to request punitive
damages if a plaintiff fails to produce "specific facts supported
by admissible evidence adequate to avoid the granting of a motion
for a directed verdict * * *."  ORS 18.535(3).  In construing
that provision, we are guided by the familiar methodology
summarized in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and we begin our inquiry with an
examination of the text and context of the statute at issue.
		ORS 18.535(3) directs a trial court to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of a motion seeking to
request punitive damages by applying the standard for reviewing a
motion for a "directed verdict."  The statute does not define
further the term "directed verdict" or the evidentiary standard
that it implies.  However, that term has a well-understood legal
meaning.  When the legislature referred to "evidence adequate to
avoid the granting of a motion for a directed verdict," ORS
18.535(3), we conclude that it intended to invoke the evidentiary
standard that Oregon law associates with such a motion.  See
Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 253, 864 P2d 1319 (1994) (words in
statute with well-defined legal meaning are given that meaning). 
We turn, then, to a discussion of that standard.
		The granting of a directed verdict results in
withdrawing a claim from the jury's consideration.  ORCP 60. 
However, jury participation always has been an important part of
resolving disputes in Oregon, and, as early as 1854, this court
cautioned that, "[w]henever there is any evidence tending to
prove a fact within the issue, the jury must pass on it[.]" 
Latshaw v. Territory, 1 Or 140, 142 (Or Terr 1854) (emphasis in
original).  By the 1920s, this court had declared that the
standard governing the practice of granting a directed verdict
was "definitely settled in this state."  Farrin v. State Indus.
Acc. Comm., 104 Or 452, 461, 205 P 984 (1922).  In Farrin, the
court quoted excerpts from 20 prior decisions, all of which
supported the general rule that a directed verdict was not
appropriate if there was some evidence to support the elements of
a complaint.  Id. at 461-66 (citing, e.g., Tippin v. Ward, 5 Or
450, 453 (1875); Collins v. United Brokers Co., 99 Or 556, 559-60, 194 P 458 (1921)).
		Consistent with those earlier cases, this court has
held more recently that "the jury must be permitted to consider
every claim on which the plaintiff has presented some evidence
tending to establish each element of that claim."  State v.
Brown, 306 Or 599, 602, 761 P2d 1300 (1988) (emphasis in
original).  In other words, "[o]nly when there is no evidence to
support an element may the claim be withdrawn from the jury's
consideration."  Id. at 603. (2)  Moreover, this court consistently
has held that, when deciding a motion for directed verdict, a
court must not weigh the evidence.  Rather, the court must
consider all the evidence, including reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.  See, e.g., Wootten v. Dillard, 286 Or 129, 136, 592 P2d
1021 (1979) (explaining standard).
		It is clear, then, that by referring to the "directed
verdict" standard in ORS 18.535(3), the legislature intended the
trial court to determine the sufficiency of evidence supporting a
claim for punitive damages under the well-established "no
evidence" standard (or, conversely, the "some evidence" standard)
set out in this court's decisions, as discussed above.
		Defendant nevertheless argues that, notwithstanding the
text of ORS 18.535(3) and its incorporation of the "directed
verdict" standard, the context of that statute supports the legal
standard that the trial court applied.  Defendant points to ORS
18.537(1), enacted contemporaneously with ORS 18.535(3), which
provides that a plaintiff must present "clear and convincing"
evidence to recover punitive damages. (3)  Defendant contends that
this court must construe ORS 18.537(1) and ORS 18.535(3) together
to require a trial court to review the sufficiency of plaintiffs'
prima facie evidence to determine whether a reasonable jury could
conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that punitive damages
are warranted.
		Nothing in the text of either ORS 18.535(3) or
18.537(1) supports defendant's position.  Those statutes do not
refer to each other and, in our view, they are directed at
unrelated issues:  the burden of proof required to amend a
complaint to plead punitive damages and, in contrast, the burden
of proof required to recover punitive damages at trial.  In Askay
v. Maloney, 92 Or 566, 179 P 899 (1919), this court explained the
distinction:
		"'The term 'burden of proof' has two distinct
meanings.  By the one is meant the duty of establishing
the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a
quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case in
which the issue arises; by the other is meant the duty
of producing evidence at the beginning or at any
subsequent stage of the trial, in order to make or meet
a prima facie case. * * *'"
Id. at 574 (quoting 10 Ruling Case Law 897, Evidence, § 47
(1915)) (emphasis in original).  Thus, the "clear and convincing"
burden of proof in ORS 18.537(1), which refers to the ultimate
burden of proof that a plaintiff must meet to recover punitive
damages, has no relation to the burden associated with the
"directed verdict" standard used to review the sufficiency of
evidence on a motion under ORS 18.535(3).  A plaintiff satisfies
the latter by producing some evidence in support of a prima facie
case.  Brown, 306 Or at 602.  See also Wootten, 286 Or at 135-36
(in deciding whether to submit case to jury, "we are unconcerned
with the quantum of evidence.  Our concern is only with the
existence of evidence which, if accepted as being true by the
trier of fact, would establish [the fact in question].").
		In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred in
using a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard to review the
sufficiency of evidence submitted under ORS 18.535(3) in support
of plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to request
punitive damages.  That provision requires a court to deny such a
motion only if the evidence submitted is not adequate to overcome
an opposing motion for a directed verdict -- i.e., only if there
is "no evidence" from which the jury could find the facts
necessary to establish an element of plaintiffs' claim.  Brown,
306 Or at 603. (4)
		We turn to plaintiffs' contention that the trial court
improperly considered defendant's evidence in denying plaintiffs'
motion to amend. (5)  According to plaintiffs, a trial court may not
consider any evidence submitted by a defendant in opposition to a
motion to amend a complaint under ORS 18.535(3).  That is
because, they argue, the statute expressly limits the evidence
that a court may consider:
	"The court shall deny a motion to amend a pleading
* * * if the court determines that the affidavits and
supporting documentation submitted by the party seeking
punitive damages fail to set forth specific facts
supported by admissible evidence adequate to avoid the
granting of a motion for directed verdict * * *."
ORS 18.535(3) (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs therefore contend
that ORS 18.535(3) establishes a general rule that it is
irrelevant whether a defendant can produce any evidence that
establishes a factual defense to a punitive damages claim at the
pleading stage of trial.  We disagree.
		We cannot reconcile plaintiffs' restrictive
interpretation of subsection (3) of ORS 18.535 with the
immediately preceding subsection (2), which provides, in part:
	"At any time after the pleading is filed, a party may
move the court to allow the party to amend the pleading
to assert a claim for punitive damages.  The party
making the motion may submit affidavits and
documentation supporting the claim for punitive
damages.  The party or parties opposing the motion may
submit opposing affidavits and documentation."
ORS 18.535(2) (emphasis added).  When construing related
statutory provisions, we are not to omit what has been inserted,
and we are to construe multiple provisions, if possible, in a
manner that will give effect to all.  See ORS 174.010 (stating
principles).  Viewing ORS 18.535 as a whole, the last sentence of
subsection (2) would be rendered meaningless if subsection (3)
prevented the consideration of evidence, the submission of which
subsection (2) expressly had allowed.  In contrast, giving full
effect to subsection (2) does not conflict with the wording in
subsection (3).  Subsection (3) is not directed at what evidence
a court shall consider under ORS 18.535, but at how a court shall
consider such evidence.  In that regard, subsection (3) sets out
the burden a plaintiff must meet to amend a complaint to seek
punitive damages -- namely, the plaintiff must submit "facts
supported by admissible evidence adequate to avoid the granting
of a motion for directed verdict."  The defendant has no such
burden and, thus, the fact that there is no reference to the
defendant's evidence in subsection (3) is both unsurprising and
of no consequence.
		Moreover, plaintiffs concede that a court would have to
consider evidence submitted by the opposing party to determine
whether that party met the requirements of one of the statutory
immunities to punitive damages.  See, e.g., ORS 18.550 (exempting
health practitioners from punitive damage awards under certain
conditions); ORS 30.927 (conditionally exempting drug
manufacturers).  Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature
did not intend ORS 18.535(3) to prohibit a trial court from
considering evidence that a defendant offers in opposition to a
motion brought under that statute.  As noted, however, a court
considers such evidence as it would in ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict -- that is, to the extent that it establishes
that a defendant is immune or enjoys some other exemption or
complete defense to a punitive damages award.
		As a final matter, plaintiffs contend that the trial
court committed various errors in considering other evidence the
parties had presented.  Whether or not that is the case, we
decline to resolve those claims, because to do so would require
this court to conduct its own detailed review of the evidence in
the record and to evaluate on the merits plaintiffs' motion to
amend under ORS 18.535(3).  The trial court will have an
opportunity to reconsider plaintiffs' motion to amend using the
correct evidentiary standard.
		Peremptory writ to issue.


1. 	Plaintiffs also filed other claims against other
defendants.  Those claims are not at issue in this proceeding.

2. 	Defendant suggests that, at least with respect to
punitive damages claims, this court approved of the "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard when reviewing the sufficiency
of evidence in a motion for directed verdict in Oberg v. Honda
Motor Co., 320 Or 544, 888 P2d 8 (1995).  Defendant's reliance on
Oberg is misplaced.  That decision addressed post-verdict review
of punitive damages awards and, to the extent that it discussed
whether the plaintiffs had presented clear and convincing
evidence of a punitive damages claim, it did so as a factual
recounting of what the jury had concluded "at trial."  Id. at
553.

3. 	The entire text of ORS 18.537(1) provides:
	"Punitive damages are not recoverable in a civil action
unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
that the party against whom punitive damages are sought
has acted with malice or has shown a reckless and
outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk
of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference to
the health, safety and welfare of others."

4. 	Because the text of ORS 18.535(3) does not permit a
court to incorporate a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
in its directed verdict review, we need not reach plaintiffs'
claim that doing so otherwise would be impermissible because it
would require a court to weigh the evidence in place of the jury
in violation of Article I, section 17, of the Oregon
Constitution.

5. 	According to defendant, plaintiffs raise for the first
time in this court the issue whether ORS 18.535(3) permitted the
trial court to consider defendant's evidence.  For the purposes
of the discussion that follows, we assume, without deciding, that
defendant is correct in its factual premise, but that plaintiffs
nevertheless may raise the issue for the first time in this
original proceeding.