Title: Commonwealth v. Pinto
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12134
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2017

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SJC-12134 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRUNO PINTO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 9, 2016. - January 23, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory 
stop, Reasonable suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Motor 
vehicle, Reasonable suspicion, Threshold police inquiry.  
Threshold Police Inquiry. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Central Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on April 25, 2013, and 
June 6, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Eleanor 
C. Sinnott, J., and the cases were tried before her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Amanda Teo, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Bruno Pinto, on 
two counts of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, G. L. 
2 
 
c. 269, § 10 (n), and one count of possession of a firearm 
without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).1,2 
 
The defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the search 
of his vehicle was illegal because the Commonwealth failed to 
demonstrate the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigatory stop.  We agree, and therefore, we reverse the 
convictions and the order denying the motion to suppress the 
fruits of that search. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts found by the motion 
judge, supplemented by uncontested testimony from the 
suppression hearing.  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 45-
46 (2011). 
 
a.  The stop.  While on uniformed patrol in the South 
Boston section of Boston, Officers Kluziak and Fonseca of the 
Boston police department received a radio broadcast informing 
them to be on the lookout for a white Infiniti motor vehicle 
                                                          
 
 
1 He was also convicted of possession of ammunition without 
a firearms identification (FID) card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).  
That conviction was set aside at the request of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 The defendant was also charged with assault and battery, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13A; and malicious destruction of property 
valued over $250, G. L. c. 266, § 127.  The Commonwealth nol 
prossed these charges.  The defendant also received a civil 
citation for failing to have his motor vehicle inspected, G. L. 
c. 90, §§ 7A, 7V; he was found not responsible. 
 
3 
 
with Massachusetts license plate number "FF720."3  According to 
the broadcast, someone connected with the vehicle was wanted for 
an alleged domestic assault and battery.  The broadcast also 
advised that the person might be in possession of two firearms 
and might be heading towards his mother's house on Orton Marotta 
Way. 
 
Approximately two hours after the broadcast, the officers 
encountered a white Infiniti with license plate number "FF720" 
in the area of Orton Marotta Way and stopped it on St. Casimir 
Street.  Kluziak ordered both individuals in the vehicle to 
place their hands in view for safety reasons.  Both the 
defendant, who was the driver, and the passenger complied.  The 
defendant initially put his hands on the steering wheel, but 
then he moved his left hand downward so that Kluziak could not 
see it.  As a result, Kluziak ordered the defendant to get out 
of the vehicle. 
 
Once the defendant was out of the vehicle, Kluziak 
conducted a patfrisk of him, which revealed no weapon.  The 
officer then conducted a search of the immediate area where the 
defendant had been sitting in the vehicle and found a firearm 
beneath the driver's seat.  The defendant was placed under 
arrest, and the police conducted an inventory search of the 
                                                          
 
 
3 The original broadcast only stated that the license plate 
began with "FF," but the officers received the complete number 
before encountering the defendant. 
4 
 
defendant's entire vehicle.  More incriminating evidence was 
discovered during this search. 
 
b.  The motion hearing.  Kluziak, the only witness at the 
suppression hearing, initially testified that he believed that 
the radio broadcast occurred after the alleged victim of the 
alleged domestic assault mentioned in the broadcast had come 
into a police station and reported the information.  The motion 
judge, crediting this testimony, made oral findings that the 
alleged victim had come into the station.  Immediately after the 
judge concluded her findings, defense counsel requested 
clarification because he did not "believe there was ever any 
testimony that someone came into a police station."  The judge 
then asked Kluziak, who was still in the court room, whether he 
had testified that the victim had come into the police station.  
Kluziak initially responded that he did not believe he had so 
testified and that he was unaware how the crime was reported.  
When pressed by the judge further, he gave an equivocal answer. 
 
In response, the judge decided to "strike all of the 
findings, regarding the two individuals that came to the station 
or that [a domestic assault and battery] was reported that way."  
The judge acknowledged that the lack of information regarding 
the reason for the radio broadcast weakened the Commonwealth's 
case, but nevertheless found that there was reasonable suspicion 
for the stop because the police independently corroborated the 
5 
 
broadcast's prediction that the vehicle would be heading in the 
direction of the defendant's mother's house on Orton Marotta 
Way.  The judge accordingly denied the motion to suppress. 
 
2.  Discussion.  When reviewing the denial of a motion to 
suppress, this court accepts "the judge's subsidiary findings of 
fact absent clear error and leave[s] to the judge the 
responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be 
given oral testimony presented at the motion hearing."  
Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 32 (2001), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Eckert, 431 Mass. 591, 592-593 (2000).  "We 
conduct an independent review of the judge's application of 
constitutional principles to the facts found."  Commonwealth v. 
Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 400 (2014).  With the exception of the 
finding that the vehicle was heading in the direction of the 
defendant's mother's house, discussed infra, we accept the 
motion judge's findings of fact as supported by the record, 
including her decision to strike all testimony related to how 
the domestic assault and battery was reported to the police. 
 
An investigatory stop is only justified if the police have 
reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop.  Commonwealth v. 
Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 626 (2008).  Reasonable suspicion 
exists when an officer, based on specific, articulable facts and 
reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the officer's 
experience, has reasonable grounds to suspect "a person is 
6 
 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511 
(2009). 
 
This court has recognized that police officers can and do 
"rely on flyers, bulletins, or radio information coming from 
dispatchers and fellow officers in conducting a threshold 
inquiry of a suspect."  Commonwealth v. Riggieri, 438 Mass. 613, 
616 (2003).  "When, as here, a police radio broadcast directs 
officers to make an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, the 
stop is lawful only if the Commonwealth establishes both the 
indicia of reliability of the transmitted information and the 
particularity of the description of the motor vehicle."  
Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 155 (2009).  Here, the 
broadcast contained sufficient particularity regarding the 
vehicle, identifying its color and make, as well as the license 
plate number.  See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 622 
(2012). 
 
"To establish that the transmitted information bears 
adequate indicia of reliability, the Commonwealth must show the 
basis of knowledge of the source of the information (the basis 
of knowledge test) and the underlying circumstances 
demonstrating that the source of the information was credible or 
the information reliable (veracity test)."  Lopes, 455 Mass. at 
155-156.  See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 374-375 
7 
 
(1985).  "Because the standard is reasonable suspicion rather 
than probable cause, a less rigorous showing in each of these 
areas is permissible."  Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 
243 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 19 
(1990).  Although independent police corroboration may "make up 
for deficiencies in one or both of these factors" (citation 
omitted), Depina, supra, "each element of the test must be 
separately considered and satisfied or supplemented in some 
way."  Upton, 394 Mass. at 376. 
 
Here, the Commonwealth satisfied neither the basis of 
knowledge test nor the veracity test, and there was not 
sufficient independent corroboration of the information in the 
broadcast concerning a crime having been committed after the 
judge struck the source of the radio broadcast from her 
findings. 
 
As to the basis of knowledge, there was no evidence 
indicating how the individual responsible for the radio 
broadcast came to have the information about the defendant's 
whereabouts.  See Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541, 546 
(1991).  The radio broadcast itself did not contain any details 
that would suggest that the person providing the information had 
firsthand knowledge of the alleged domestic incident.  Cf. 
Depina, 456 Mass. at 243 (holding basis of knowledge test 
8 
 
satisfied where dispatch was based on caller's indication that 
she personally heard gunshots and saw suspect flee). 
 
The Commonwealth similarly failed to establish the veracity 
of the radio broadcast.  To satisfy the veracity test, the 
Commonwealth needs to show the source of information had either 
a demonstrated history of reliability, Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 
456 Mass. 385, 396-397 (2010), or the existence of 
"circumstances assuring trustworthiness on the particular 
occasion of the information's being furnished," 2 W.R. LaFave, 
Search & Seizure § 3.3(c) (5th ed. 2012).  See Anderson, 461 
Mass. at 625. 
 
Here, the record contained no evidence of the source 
providing the information, so there could be "no evidence 
regarding the [source's] past reliability or reputation for 
honesty."  Anderson, 461 Mass. at 622.  See Depina, 456 Mass. at 
243-244.  Nor did the radio broadcast itself provide any 
indications of its veracity.  See Anderson, 461 Mass. at 624-625 
(holding veracity test may be satisfied where anonymous caller 
makes statements "comparable to an excited utterance").  In the 
present case, the content of the radio broadcast was devoid of 
any detail as to whether the information came from a declarant 
in an excited state, whether it came from a percipient witness 
to the abuse, or whether it bore any other similar indications 
of trustworthiness. 
9 
 
 
Finally, the police did not provide adequate independent 
corroboration to remedy the deficiencies under either test.  The 
only police corroboration was that the defendant was in the 
general vicinity of Orton Marotta Way and driving a vehicle that 
matched the description given over the radio.  The motion 
judge's conclusion that the radio broadcast was corroborated by 
the fact that the vehicle was near the house of the defendant's 
mother is not supported by the record.  To the contrary, no 
evidence was presented that the police had information 
independent of the radio broadcast that the mother lived on 
Orton Marotta Way. 
 
Corroboration of purely innocent details that are 
observable by any bystander, such as the description of a 
vehicle and its location, provides only limited enhancement to 
the reasonable suspicion determination.  See Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 
397-398; Lyons, 409 Mass. at 20-21.  Since the motion judge's 
findings were devoid of the source of any information in the 
radio broadcast, police observation of the defendant's vehicle 
in the general area as predicted was not enough independent 
corroboration to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction are reversed and 
the verdicts are set aside.  The order denying the motion to 
suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Boston 
10 
 
Municipal Court Department for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.