Title: Bevel v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC2022-0210
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2023

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-0210 
____________ 
 
THOMAS BEVEL, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
October 26, 2023 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Thomas Bevel appeals his two death sentences, which were 
imposed by the trial court for the second time following this Court’s 
grant of postconviction relief and remand for a new penalty phase.  
See Bevel v. State, 221 So. 3d 1168, 1185 (Fla. 2017).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons we 
explain, we affirm Bevel’s death sentences. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Bevel was convicted in 2005 of the first-degree murders of his 
friend and roommate, Garrick Stringfield, and Stringfield’s thirteen-
 
 
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year-old son, Phillip Sims, and the attempted murder of Feletta 
Smith, whom Bevel and Stringfield knew from childhood.  Bevel v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 505, 513 (Fla. 2008).  This Court summarized the 
facts of Bevel’s crimes in the original direct appeal as follows: 
Thomas Bevel, who was twenty-two years old at the time 
of the crime[s], resided with Garrick Stringfield, who was 
thirty.  The two were close friends, such that Stringfield 
referred to Bevel as “nephew” or “Tom Tom” and Bevel 
referred to Stringfield as “Unc.”  On February 28, 2004, 
both men were at a street parade in Jacksonville where 
they ran into Feletta Smith, whom they both knew from 
their childhood.  Smith exchanged telephone numbers 
with Stringfield and made plans to meet later that 
evening. 
 
After leaving the parade, Bevel and Stringfield 
purchased a bottle of gin and went back to Stringfield’s 
house later in the evening.  Because Stringfield was going 
out, he asked Bevel to wait for his thirteen-year-old son, 
Phillip Sims, who was being dropped off by his mother, 
Sojourner Parker.  Although Parker noticed that 
Stringfield’s car was not in the driveway when she arrived 
at the house, she was unconcerned because Bevel, a 
person she considered Stringfield’s roommate, answered 
the door and let her son inside. 
Around 9 p.m., Stringfield met Smith at a 
Walgreens store and she followed him back to his house.  
When they arrived at Stringfield’s house, Bevel and Sims 
were playing video games in the living room where Smith 
and Stringfield joined them.  Although no illegal drugs 
were being consumed, Smith stated that Bevel and 
Stringfield were drinking gin out of the bottle and she 
had a half cup of gin and grapefruit juice.  At some point, 
Smith and Stringfield went into his bedroom to watch 
television.  Stringfield showed Smith an AK-47 rifle that 
he kept under his bed and, because Smith was scared of 
 
 
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it, he handed the gun to Bevel who removed it from the 
room.  Stringfield and Smith remained in the bedroom 
with the door closed.  Smith said that she last saw Sims 
playing video games in the living room. 
Bevel then drove Stringfield’s car to a BP gas station 
to meet his girlfriend, Rohnicka Dumas, took her to a bar 
where he purchased another bottle of gin, and brought 
her back to the house.  When they returned, Stringfield 
and Bevel went into the backyard, Dumas went inside, 
Smith remained in Stringfield’s bedroom, and Sims 
continued to play video games in the living room.  
Stringfield and Bevel then came back into the house and 
each had a gun in his possession; Stringfield was 
carrying a smaller handgun and Bevel had the AK-47 rifle 
that Stringfield had handed to him earlier in the evening.  
Bevel and Dumas went into the other bedroom, located 
across the hall from Stringfield’s room, and talked. 
Bevel then left the bedroom with the AK-47 rifle in 
his hand.  He went to Stringfield’s bedroom, where Smith 
and Stringfield were lying in bed nearly asleep, knocked 
on the door and said, “Unc, open the door.”  Stringfield 
got up from the bed, unarmed, and opened the door in 
his pajamas.  Bevel immediately shot Stringfield in the 
head and he instantly fell to the floor in the doorway. 
Smith began screaming and Bevel yelled, “Bitch, shut up” 
while he shot her several times as she lay in the bed. 
Smith became quiet and pretended to be dead.  She 
testified that there was “no doubt in [her] mind” that 
Bevel was the shooter.  Rohnicka Dumas corroborated 
Smith’s testimony.  She observed Bevel pick up the rifle, 
go out into the hallway, knock on Stringfield’s bedroom 
door and say, “Unc, look here.”  She testified that 
multiple shots were fired, during which she heard both 
the woman in the other room screaming and Bevel yell, 
“Bitch, shut up.” 
Bevel then went into the living room where Sims 
was still sitting on the sofa with the television remote in 
his hand and shot him twice, once grazing his arm and 
chest and once in the face.  Subsequently, Bevel returned 
 
 
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to the bedroom where Dumas had been and they walked 
out the front door.  Bevel locked the burglar bar door, a 
barred security gate located on the outside of the front 
door to the house, and drove away in Stringfield’s car 
with Dumas sitting in the passenger seat.  While driving 
to Dumas’s house, Bevel held the AK-47 rifle under his 
chin and stated that he did not mean to kill the boy 
(Sims), but had to because he was going to be a witness.  
Bevel abandoned Stringfield’s car near Dumas’s house. 
Smith was eventually able to reach 911 by using 
Stringfield’s cell phone.  Because Smith was unable to 
give the police an exact address, it took some time for the 
police and rescue to find the house.  Ultimately, rescuers 
were able to transport her to the hospital where she 
stayed for almost a month while undergoing multiple 
surgeries for various gunshot wounds to her pelvis and 
upper legs. 
After hiding for almost a month, Bevel was finally 
found by officers from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office on 
March 27, 2004.  Bevel was informed of his 
constitutional rights and indicated his understanding of 
each right by signing the rights form.  The police 
questioned Bevel on two occasions over the course of 
twenty-four hours.  During these two interviews, Bevel 
gave four different versions of the story but ultimately 
confessed to the murders. 
Although Bevel confessed to murdering Stringfield 
and Sims, his version of events was contrary to the 
testimony of both Smith and Dumas.  Bevel stated that 
he and Stringfield had been fighting recently about 
money that Stringfield believed he was owed and that 
Bevel feared that Stringfield was going to try and kill him.  
He said that when he brought Dumas back to the house 
that night, Stringfield began to get angry, saying that he 
should have killed Bevel a long time ago.  While Dumas 
and Smith were in opposite bedrooms, the fight escalated 
until Stringfield was pointing the handgun at Bevel and 
Bevel had picked up the AK-47 rifle.  Then, Stringfield 
went into his bedroom and, when Bevel heard a clicking 
 
 
- 5 - 
noise that sounded like a magazine being loaded into the 
handgun, Bevel moved towards the room and shot 
Stringfield when he reached the door.  Bevel said the gun 
went off several times but he did not mean to shoot 
Smith. 
 
Id. at 510-11 (second alteration in original). 
In 2017, on appeal from the denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, this Court reversed and remanded for a new 
penalty phase after concluding that counsel was ineffective during 
the penalty phase and that Bevel was entitled to relief under Hurst 
v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by State v. 
Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), for the death sentence imposed 
for Stringfield’s murder.  Bevel, 221 So. 3d at 1172, 1177, 1185.  
Both Bevel and the State presented witnesses at the second 
penalty phase.  Particularly relevant to this appeal, Bevel presented 
testimony from three expert witnesses: Steven Gold, Ph.D., a 
psychologist specializing in trauma; Robert Ouaou, Ph.D., a 
psychologist with a specialization in neuropsychology; and Geoffrey 
Negin, M.D., a diagnostic radiologist.  After hearing the evidence, 
the jury unanimously found that the proposed aggravators—prior 
violent felony (based on a prior attempted robbery conviction and 
the contemporaneous murder and attempted murder) as to both 
 
 
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murders and that the murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding arrest as to Sims’s murder—were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt and unanimously voted to sentence Bevel to 
death for each murder.  None of the jurors found that any of the 
mitigating circumstances were established by the greater weight of 
the evidence.  The trial court ultimately agreed with the jury that 
the aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and 
afforded each very great weight.  As to the statutory mitigating 
circumstances, the trial court agreed with the jury that Bevel had 
not established that he committed the murders while under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance1 and that 
Bevel’s age of twenty-two at the time of the offenses was not 
mitigating.  As to the proposed other factors in Bevel’s background 
that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty under 
section 921.141(7)(h), Florida Statutes (2021), the trial court found 
 
 
1.  Although the trial court in its sentencing order and the 
parties in their briefing refer to this mitigator as being under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional distress, the statute 
actually refers to extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  This 
Court believes this to be an inadvertent scrivener’s error and will 
use only the term “disturbance” in discussion of this mitigator.  
 
 
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as follows: IQ of seventy-one (little weight); Bevel’s childhood was 
impacted by the trauma of his mother’s death at age twelve (little 
weight); Bevel’s father did not actively participate in his life and 
subsequently died due to heroin use (no weight); Bevel’s childhood 
and teenage years were plagued by witnessing repeated acts of 
violence and substance abuse within his family (no weight); Bevel 
was essentially raised by his grandmother, who attempted to raise 
multiple grandchildren with very little financial or emotional 
resources (no weight); Bevel grew up in the eastern part of 
downtown Jacksonville, where drug selling, gunshots, violence, and 
substance abuse were common (no weight); Bevel was brought into 
the criminal lifestyle at a young age by his then criminal role 
models (no weight); Bevel was heavily influenced by the much older 
Garrick Stringfield (no weight); Bevel was shot multiple times in 
2001 in front of his grandmother’s house (no weight); Bevel, in spite 
of his traumatic childhood, has repeatedly shown the capacity for 
love and kindness (no weight); Bevel has exhibited good jail conduct 
as well as appropriate courtroom behavior (no weight); Bevel 
responds well in structured environments (no weight); Bevel 
confessed to his crimes and has shown immediate and repeated 
 
 
- 8 - 
remorse (not established/no weight); Bevel continues to impact the 
lives of his family members and has developed a nurturing, caring 
relationship with his daughter (no weight); Bevel suffers from brain 
damage which affects his decision making (little weight); Bevel was 
raised in a strong religious faith (no weight). 
In sentencing Bevel to death, the court gave great weight to 
the jury’s death recommendation and “wholly agree[d] with the 
jury’s verdicts based on an assessment of the aggravating factors 
and mitigating circumstances presented and their respective 
weights.”  The court concluded that “the aggravating factors heavily 
outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances[] and that death is the 
only proper penalty for the murders.”  This appeal followed. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Bevel raises five issues.  First, Bevel argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion in disregarding the “unrefuted” expert 
testimony that he was under extreme mental and emotional 
disturbance at the time of the murders.  In other words, he believes 
that the trial court erred in failing to find that he established the 
applicability of the statutory mitigating circumstance that “[t]he 
capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the 
 
 
- 9 - 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” section 
921.141(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on his diagnoses of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.  Bevel also asserts 
that the trial court’s sentencing order improperly focused on 
causation and dismissed Bevel’s personal and medical history as 
“self-reported” without acknowledging corroboration in the record. 
Dr. Gold, a psychologist specializing in trauma, met with Bevel 
in 2014 and reviewed educational, medical, and legal records.  Dr. 
Gold testified that Bevel suffered from depression and PTSD.  
During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between 
the prosecutor and Dr. Gold: 
Q 
So the bottom line is you did not interview [Bevel] or 
ask him what happened regarding both of these murders 
and attempted murder, correct? 
A 
No, I did not. 
. . . . 
Q 
[S]ince you didn’t focus on interviewing the 
defendant regarding what happened, what I am trying to 
ask and making sure the record is clear is that you are 
not stating -- your opinion is not that he was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
correct? 
A 
He was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.  He had PTSD.  He had 
depression. 
 
 
- 10 - 
Q 
So you believe he -- at the time he committed these 
murders he was under the influence of extreme or 
emotional -- extreme mental or emotional disturbance? 
A 
I believe that throughout his life he was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  
That would include the time of the murders. 
Q 
So how can you make that assessment if you don’t 
even ask him about the murders? 
A 
If someone is diagnosed with cancer and you were 
to ask me did the person have cancer when they 
committed the murders my answer would be, yes, cancer 
doesn’t come and go.  PTSD doesn’t come and go.  The 
type of major depression that Mr. Bevel has had since he 
was a child did not come and go.  He -- he had these 
diagnoses at the time of the murders.  What I am not 
saying is the diagnoses made him do it. 
 . . . . 
Q 
So you are saying that when he shot this 13-year-
old young boy he shot him because he was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
correct? 
A 
You keep restating what I am telling you what I am 
not stating.  I am not saying he committed these offenses 
because he had these diagnoses.  Did these diagnos[e]s 
impair his functioning, yes.  Am I saying we can explain 
away the offense based on these diagnoses?  I am not.  
He was impaired at the time, yes.  There is a difference. 
Q 
Why do you say he was impaired at the time he 
committed both murders and the attempted murder? 
A 
Because you asked me was he impaired at that 
time.  He was impaired through most of his life from 
childhood. 
 
 
- 11 - 
Q 
So he is impaired as he sits here today? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
Okay.  So at any time there can be an outburst you 
are saying? 
A 
I am saying that any time somebody has cancer, if it 
hasn’t resolved they have cancer.  Mr. Bevel -- Mr. Bevel’s 
PTSD is very unlikely to have resolved without treatment.  
His major depression is very unlikely to have resolved 
without treatment.  Within a reasonable degree of 
certainty as a professional I can say as he sits here he is 
impaired by PTSD and major depression. 
The trial court’s analysis and rejection of this mitigator 
spanned nearly four pages of the sentencing order and included a 
summary of the relevant law, a summary of the relevant testimony 
of the three experts on whom Bevel relied in his attempt to establish 
this mitigator, a recounting of Dr. Gold’s diagnoses, and the 
numerous traumatic events in Bevel’s life that he reported to Dr. 
Gold.   
 
In ultimately rejecting the mitigator, the court concluded that 
“[a]though Dr. Gold opined that Defendant suffers from PTSD, no 
evidence exists that Defendant suffered from PTSD at the time of 
the murders or that the PTSD caused Defendant to commit the 
offenses while at that time suffering extreme mental or emotional 
distress [sic].”  The trial court noted that Dr. Gold did not discuss 
 
 
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the murders with Bevel, and that his evaluation of Bevel occurred 
approximately nine years after the murders.  The trial court also 
noted that Bevel engaged in purposeful, thoughtful, and deliberate 
conduct at the time of the murders, admitting that he killed Sims to 
eliminate him as a witness and securing the burglar bar on the door 
of the house after the murders in the hope of delaying discovery of 
the bodies.   
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of 
this mitigator.  We have previously upheld the rejection of the 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator in cases where 
there was expert testimony, even uncontroverted expert testimony, 
of its existence.  For example, in Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 
755 (Fla. 1996), Foster presented expert testimony that he was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
and argued on appeal that since this expert testimony was 
uncontroverted, the trial court should have found the statutory 
mitigator established.  In upholding the rejection of this mitigator, 
this Court wrote: 
The decision as to whether a mitigating 
circumstance has been established is within the trial 
court’s discretion.  Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 
 
 
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1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 999 (1993).  Moreover, 
expert testimony alone does not require a finding of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  See 
Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).  Even uncontroverted 
opinion testimony can be rejected, especially when it is 
hard to reconcile with the other evidence presented in the 
case.  See Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1010 (Fla. 
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1069 (1995).  As long as the 
court considered all of the evidence, the trial judge’s 
determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a 
palpable abuse of discretion.  Provenzano, 497 So. 2d at 
1184. 
679 So. 2d at 755.  This Court found no error in Foster despite 
uncontroverted evidence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance because “the trial court considered all of the evidence 
presented, and it was not a palpable abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to refuse to find the statutory mitigator of extreme emotional 
disturbance.”  Id. at 756. 
 
Here, the trial court also thoroughly considered the evidence 
presented.  The only evidence that Bevel might have been under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of 
the murders was Dr. Gold’s testimony that because Bevel had 
begun suffering with depression and PTSD many years before the 
murders and because those conditions do not “come and go,” he 
was, in Dr. Gold’s opinion, “throughout his life . . . under the 
 
 
- 14 - 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “includ[ing 
at] the time of the murders.”  But Dr. Gold did not explain why 
depression or PTSD might have caused “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” at the time of the murders.  When asked 
what could have triggered a manifestation of PTSD at the time of 
the murders, Dr. Gold responded that he did not know because he 
did not assess Bevel about that.  In sum, Dr. Gold’s opinion that 
Bevel qualified for the extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
mitigator was based on the fact that he had diagnoses of depression 
and PTSD based on events that happened in his childhood and, as 
a result, he is “impaired” every moment of his life.  Under Dr. Gold’s 
theory, any capital defendant who had ever been diagnosed with 
depression or PTSD would qualify for this mitigator.   
 
In Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 529-30 (Fla. 2003), this 
Court discussed the rejection of uncontroverted expert testimony 
regarding the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator: 
This Court has defined the circumstances under 
which a trial court may reject a mitigator: 
Whenever a reasonable quantum of 
competent, uncontroverted evidence of 
mitigation has been presented, the trial court 
must find that the mitigating circumstance 
has been proved.  A trial court may reject a 
 
 
- 15 - 
defendant’s claim that a mitigating 
circumstance has been proved if the record 
contains competent substantial evidence to 
support the trial court’s rejection of the 
mitigating circumstance. 
Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 385 (Fla. 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
We considered the issue of expert opinion testimony 
in Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994), stating: 
Walls contends that the trial court 
improperly rejected expert opinion testimony 
that he was suffering extreme emotional 
disturbance and that his capacity to conform 
his conduct to the law’s requirements was 
substantially impaired.  In Florida as in many 
states, a distinction exists between factual 
evidence or testimony, and opinion 
testimony . . . . 
  
. . . Certain kinds of opinion testimony 
clearly are admissible—and especially qualified 
expert opinion testimony—but they are not 
necessarily binding even if uncontroverted.  
Opinion testimony gains its greatest force to 
the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, 
and its weight diminishes to the degree such 
support is lacking.  A debatable link between 
fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor 
usually means, at most, that a question exists 
for judge and jury to resolve. 
Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted).  Thus, the trial court 
was entitled to evaluate and disregard Dr. Dee’s opinion 
if the trial court felt that the opinion was unsupported by 
facts.  The testimony that Nelson was “seeing things” on 
the day of the murder, that he suffered from 
hallucinations, and that he suffered from depression for 
many years provided perhaps the most relevant evidence 
to support this mitigator.  However, the record reflects 
that the source of this evidence was largely Nelson’s self-
 
 
- 16 - 
reports to Dr. Dee, and that the trial court basically 
rejected Dr. Dee’s uncontroverted expert opinion. 
Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 529-30.  Based on the witnesses’ testimony 
that Nelson was acting normally before and after the murder, this 
Court concluded that “there was competent, substantial evidence 
refuting the allegation that Nelson was under extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” and upheld the trial court’s rejection of the 
mitigator.  Id. at 530. 
 
In Nelson, the evidence offered to support the extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance mitigator was that Nelson suffered from 
depression for many years and he told his mental health expert that 
he was “seeing things” on the day of the murder and that he 
suffered from hallucinations.  Id.  And this evidence was 
controverted by witnesses who testified that Nelson was acting 
normally before and after the murders.  Id.   
Here, Dr. Gold’s opinion that Bevel qualified for the extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance mitigator was based solely on 
Bevel’s longstanding diagnoses of depression and PTSD, but Dr. 
Gold’s opinion is difficult to reconcile with the fact that he did not 
discuss the murders with Bevel or assess his mental or emotional 
 
 
- 17 - 
state at the time of the murders, and that Bevel—as described in 
his confession—engaged in purposeful conduct at the time of the 
murders, including killing Sims to eliminate him as a witness and 
securing the burglar bar on the door of Stringfield’s house after the 
murders.  Further, although Dr. Gold did testify when asked 
directly that Bevel was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance at the time of the murders, Dr. Gold also 
testified several times that Bevel was simply “impaired” at all times, 
including the time of the murders, by his depression and PTSD.  
But mere “impairment” cannot be equated with the “extreme 
disturbance” required to establish the mitigator; thus, Dr. Gold’s 
opinion as to the extent that the depression and PTSD affected 
Bevel’s baseline mental or emotional state and therefore his mental 
or emotional state at the time of the murders is not entirely clear.   
Under the circumstances before us, there is competent, 
substantial evidence in the record to support the rejection of this 
mitigator.  Moreover, the trial court did consider all of the evidence, 
and its determination—which reflected the same conclusion 
reached by the jury—that the extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance mitigator was not established by the greater weight of 
 
 
- 18 - 
the evidence will “stand absent a palpable abuse of discretion,” 
Foster, 679 So. 2d at 755 (quoting Provenzano, 497 So. 2d at 1184), 
which is simply not present here. 
As to Bevel’s complaint that the resentencing order improperly 
focused on causation, we disagree.  The trial court simply 
accurately noted that “Dr. Gold emphasized during his testimony 
that Defendant’s PTSD did not cause him to commit the offenses 
but increased the likelihood Defendant would engage in criminal 
behavior.”  And as to his complaint that the trial court dismissed 
Bevel’s personal and medical history as “self-reported” without 
acknowledging corroboration in the record, even assuming that the 
trial court did overlook corroboration in the record, any 
corroboration of Bevel’s personal and medical history would not 
have undermined the trial court’s conclusion that this mitigator 
was not established by the greater weight of the evidence that Bevel 
was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of 
the murders.  Dr. Gold did not testify that he reviewed any records 
pertaining to Bevel’s mental state at the time of the murders. 
Finally, even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in 
rejecting this mitigator, we would find any error harmless.  In light 
 
 
- 19 - 
of the fact that the mitigation that was established was not 
extensive or weighty, even if the trial court had found this mitigator 
established and afforded it greater weight than any other mitigator, 
the additional mitigation that this circumstance would have 
provided would not have tipped the scale such that the mitigation 
would have outweighed the aggravation, requiring the imposition of 
life sentences for the murders. 
Bevel next argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
requests that the jury be instructed that regardless of its findings 
regarding the aggravators and mitigators, it may always consider 
mercy in determining whether Bevel should be sentenced to death.  
The trial court denied these requests for special instructions and 
instead read Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.11, 
informing jurors that “[r]egardless of the results of each juror’s 
individual weighing process—even if you find that the sufficient 
aggravators outweigh the mitigators—the law neither compels nor 
requires you to determine that the defendant should be sentenced 
to death.”   
“A trial court’s denial of special jury instructions is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.”  Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 255 
 
 
- 20 - 
(Fla. 2012).  Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Bevel’s requested special instructions.  We have repeatedly 
determined that Standard Jury Instruction 7.11 adequately informs 
jurors of the applicable legal standard.  E.g., Woodbury v. State, 320 
So. 3d 631, 656 (Fla. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1135 (2022); 
Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 210 (Fla. 2020).  We have even 
referred to the relevant provision in this instruction as the “mercy 
instruction.”  See Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 656 (quoting Reynolds v. 
State, 251 So. 3d 811, 816 n.5 (Fla. 2018)).  “Thus, the court did 
read an instruction on mercy, and although [the defendant] might 
have preferred the wording of his proposed instruction, Standard 
Jury Instruction 7.11 is not ambiguous when it comes to 
addressing the jurors’ options.”  Id.  Bevel is not entitled to relief on 
this claim. 
Bevel also argues that the trial court erred in precluding any 
argument to the jury about the proportionality of his possible 
sentence.  The trial court did not err in its ruling.  “The jury’s 
responsibility in the process is to make recommendations based on 
the circumstances of the offense and the character and background 
of the defendant.”  Herring v. State, 446 So. 2d 1049, 1056 (Fla. 
 
 
- 21 - 
1984), receded from on other grounds by Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 
526, 533 (Fla. 1987).  It is not to compare the facts of the case 
before it to the facts of other cases or to compare the aggravation 
and mitigation applicable to the defendant before it to the 
aggravation and mitigation applicable to other defendants.  
Bevel’s remaining arguments are similarly without merit.  
Bevel acknowledges that his argument that the jury’s determination 
regarding the sufficiency and weight of aggravating factors should 
be subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is contrary to 
precedent from this Court and states that this issue is being raised 
only to preserve it for federal review.  Bevel is correct that we have 
repeatedly reaffirmed our conclusion that determinations regarding 
the sufficiency and relative weight of the proven aggravators are not 
subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  E.g., McKenzie v. State, 
333 So. 3d 1098, 1105 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 230 (2022); 
Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 227 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 
183 (2022); Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1247-48 (Fla. 
2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1152 (2022).  As to his argument that 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it 
does not limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and 
 
 
- 22 - 
violates the Eighth Amendment due to the elimination of 
comparative proportionality review in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 
544, 549 (Fla. 2020), and an overprovision of aggravating factors, 
we have consistently rejected similar arguments, e.g., Joseph, 336 
So. 3d at 227 n.5 (declining to address claim that Florida’s death 
penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently 
narrow the class of individuals eligible to receive the death penalty 
on the ground that this Court has repeatedly rejected the same 
argument); Covington v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 480 (Fla. 2022) 
(rejecting claim that elimination of proportionality review in 
Lawrence rendered Florida’s capital sentencing scheme 
unconstitutional); Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 15-16 (Fla. 2020) 
(rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does 
not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to 
receive the death penalty), and Bevel makes no novel or compelling 
argument that would warrant reconsideration of the numerous 
recent decisions of this Court. 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Having concluded that none of Bevel’s claims warrant relief 
from his death sentences, we affirm. 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and 
FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
SASSO, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v. 
State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned 
this Court’s decades-long practice of comparative proportionality 
review in the direct appeals of sentences of death, I can only concur 
in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Adrian G. Soud, Judge 
Case No. 162004CF004525AXXXMA 
 
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, 
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris 
Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee