Title: State v. Lopez
Citation: 363 N.C. 535
Docket Number: 95PA08
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 2009

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSE JESUS GARCIA LOPEZ
No. 95PA08
FILED: 28 AUGUST 2009
Sentencing–prosecutor’s argument–sentencing grid and aggravating factor–relevant but
inaccurate
The trial court erred during a sentencing proceeding for involuntary manslaughter
and other offenses arising from drunken driving by allowing the prosecutor’s argument
concerning the sentencing grid, the effect of an aggravating factor, and merger.  A jury’s
understanding that its determination of aggravating factors may have an effect on the sentence is
relevant to its role in a sentencing proceeding, but the prosecutor’s argument here was inaccurate
and misleading.  However, there was no likelihood of a different result without the argument and
no prejudice.
Justice BRADY concurring in the result only.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in the concurring opinion.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 188 N.C. App. 553,
655 S.E.2d 895 (2008), finding no error at trial and no
prejudicial error in a sentencing proceeding which resulted in
judgments entered on 30 May 2006 by Judge Ola M. Lewis in
Superior Court, Columbus County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 31
March 2009.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery, III,
Special Counsel, for the State-appellant/appellee.
Nora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellee/appellant. 
EDMUNDS, Justice.
In this case we consider the extent to which a party in
a criminal case may address the jury as to defendant’s potential
sentence.  We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument detailing
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the effect of the jury’s finding of an aggravating factor on
defendant’s sentence was inaccurate and misleading.  Therefore,
the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to this
argument.  However, because we also find that the error was
harmless, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals.
At trial, the State presented evidence that at
approximately six o’clock p.m. on 19 December 2004, defendant
Jose Jesus Garcia Lopez was driving his Jeep between eighty and
one hundred miles per hour when he crossed the highway center
line and collided with a Mazda being driven by Natalie Housand. 
Housand was killed in the collision and her passenger, Adam
Melton, was injured.  Defendant disappeared into nearby woods,
but later emerged a short distance away and was arrested. 
Retrograde extrapolation indicated that, at the time of the
accident, defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.18.
Defendant was indicted for second-degree murder
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-17, felony death by vehicle pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 20-141.4, and felony hit and run pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 20-166(a), all relating to the death of Housand.  Defendant
also was indicted for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury on Melton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-32(b).  The
court conducted a bifurcated trial consisting of a guilt-
innocence phase followed by a separate sentencing proceeding.
After the parties made their closing arguments at the
conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase, the court submitted to
the jury separate verdict sheets for each offense.  As to the
charge of second-degree murder, the verdict sheet permitted the
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jury to find defendant guilty of second-degree murder,
involuntary manslaughter, or misdemeanor death by motor vehicle,
or to find defendant not guilty.  The jury found defendant guilty
of involuntary manslaughter and guilty of the other three crimes. 
Because involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of
felony death by vehicle, the involuntary manslaughter conviction
merged into the conviction of felony death by vehicle.  See State
v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 474-75, 573 S.E.2d 870, 890 (2002)
(explaining that a lesser conviction will merge into a greater
conviction when all the essential elements of the lesser
conviction are also essential elements included in the greater
conviction).
During the sentencing proceeding that followed, the
State argued to the jury that it should find the aggravating
factor that defendant “knowingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person by means of a weapon or device which would
normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.” 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(d)(8) (2007).  Defendant contends the
trial court abused its discretion by overruling his objections
and allowing the State to make the following jury argument and
accompanying blackboard presentation during the sentencing
proceeding:
Folks, I’m going to write up some
numbers.  These numbers are the — basically,
the sentencing grid for the offenses that you
found the Defendant guilty of.
([Prosecutor] writes on blackboard.)
This is the involuntary manslaughter. 
Presumptive range is 13 to 16 months. 
Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
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serious injury, presumptive range is 20 to 25
months.  This is the hit and run.  The
presumptive range, 5 to 6 months.  Now, there
was a felony death by motor vehicle, and that
merged in because it had a lot of the same
elements of this manslaughter conviction, so
it merges in here.  All right.  So, that’s
kind of already in; that’s why I didn’t put
it up here.
The judge sentences within this
presumptive range, and that’s what I’ve
highlighted for you, unless the State puts up
an aggravating factor.  Okay?  We have to
present to you an aggravating factor, and you
have to find it beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Just like anything else that we present to
you, you have to make a determination, we
have to prove it to you beyond a reasonable
doubt.
If we prove aggravators, which I’ve
submitted one to you, then that gives the
option for the judge to return a sentence in
this range.  Okay?  It doesn’t mean that’s
where it comes from, it just gives her that
option.
Now, the State of North Carolina — I’m
going to put a couple more numbers up here
for you.  We have a minimum and then we have
a maximum.  Okay.  In other words, the
minimum, say if the minimum was 13 months,
there would be a corresponding maximum
sentence that goes with that.  All right.  If
we got up to this range, this aggravator, say
we’re in the aggravated range of 20, there
would be a corresponding maximum that goes
with that.  And this one would be 24.  This
one would be 47.  And this one would be 10. 
And these are all in months.  Okay?
The jury found the aggravating factor to be present
beyond a reasonable doubt.  After hearing additional testimony
and argument from both defendant and the State, the court found
two factors in mitigation, but determined that they were
outweighed by the aggravating factor.  The court imposed
aggravated sentences in each judgment, to be served
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consecutively, resulting in a total of fifty-nine to eighty-one
months incarceration.
Defendant appealed.  The Court of Appeals found that
the trial court erred in allowing the State to explain merger and
sentencing possibilities in its sentencing proceeding argument
but concluded that this error was harmless.  State v. Lopez, 188
N.C. App. 553, 561, 655 S.E.2d 895, 900 (2008).  This Court
granted petitions for discretionary review filed by the State and
by defendant.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s argument
relating to the effect of an aggravating factor on the sentencing
grid was irrelevant to the jury’s decision whether the
aggravating factor was present.  Defendant further asserts that
the argument had the effect of advising the jury that, because
two of the convictions merged, one of its verdicts had no
practical effect.  The State responds that the argument was
proper.  While we find that the jury’s understanding of
aggravating factors is relevant to sentencing, we also find that
the prosecutor’s argument introduced error into the trial.  The
State’s discussion of the application of the sentencing grids was
inaccurate.  In addition, the State’s argument was misleading
because it indicated potential specific sentencing ranges for
defendant when defendant’s sentencing range had not been, and in
this case could not be, determined at the time the argument was
made.  However, because there is no reasonable possibility that
but for the error a different result would have been reached, we
affirm the result of the Court of Appeals.
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The standard under which we review allegedly “improper
closing arguments that provoke timely objection from opposing
counsel is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to sustain the objection.”  State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117,
131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002).  An abuse of discretion occurs
only when a ruling “‘could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Burrus, 344 N.C. 79, 90, 472
S.E.2d 867, 875 (1996)).  The trial court “has broad discretion
to control the scope of closing arguments,” State v. Cummings,
361 N.C. 438, 465, 648 S.E.2d 788, 804 (2007), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 170 L. Ed. 2d 760 (2008), and generally, “counsel’s
argument should not be impaired without good reason,” State v.
Price, 326 N.C. 56, 83, 388 S.E.2d 84, 99, sentence vacated on
other grounds, 498 U.S. 802, 112 L. Ed. 2d 7 (1990), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1124, 131 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1995).  However,
argument that misinforms a jury by purporting to present accurate
information when that information is misleading is just such a
good reason.  State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233, 253, 357 S.E.2d 898,
911, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 959, 98 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1987) (stating
that a jury argument is not improper so long as it does not
“travel into the fields of conjecture or personal opinion”).
“In jury trials the whole case as well of law as of
fact may be argued to the jury.”  N.C.G.S. § 7A-97 (2007).  In
interpreting this statute, we have held that the penalty
prescribed for a criminal offense is part of the law of the case
and that “[i]t is, consequently, permissible for a criminal
defendant in argument to inform the jury of the statutory
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punishment provided for the crime for which he is being tried.” 
State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286, 287-88, 225 S.E.2d 553, 554
(1976) (emphasis added).  Thus, “[c]ounsel may . . . in any case,
read or state to the jury a statute or other rule of law relevant
to such case, including the statutory provision fixing the
punishment for the offense charged.”  State v Britt, 285 N.C.
256, 273, 204 S.E.2d 817, 829 (1974) (emphasis added).
However, sentencing procedure has changed significantly
since this Court decided Britt and McMorris.  See generally
Stevens H. Clarke, Law of Sentencing, Probation, and Parole in
North Carolina 46-52 (Inst. of Gov’t, Chapel Hill, N.C., 2d ed.
1997) (discussing the history and effect of indeterminate
sentencing, Fair Sentencing, and Structured Sentencing).  When
this Court considered Britt and McMorris, the sentencing range
ordinarily could be determined simply by reference to the statute
defining the offense.  See id. at 47.  Now, under Structured
Sentencing, most criminal statutes define an offense as being of
a particular class.  See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2(b) (2007)
(stating that first-degree rape is a Class B1 felony).  Except
for Class A felonies and other offenses for which a particular
punishment is set by statute, the range of sentences that the
trial court may impose becomes known only after a series of
findings and calculations.  After a jury returns its verdict or
verdicts, it must then determine whether any submitted
aggravating factors exist, thereby permitting a defendant’s
sentence to be enhanced.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).  In addition, the court independently
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determines whether any submitted mitigating factors also exist
and, if so, whether the factors in aggravation outweigh the
factors in mitigation, or the factors in mitigation outweigh the
factors in aggravation, or the factors are in equilibrium. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16 (2007).  After weighing aggravating
factors found by the jury and mitigating factors found by the
court, the court decides whether to impose an aggravated,
presumptive, or mitigated sentence.
When a defendant is convicted of more than one offense,
the court has the option to consolidate offenses or to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences.  Id. § 15A-1340.15 (2007). 
The court also calculates a defendant’s criminal history category
based on the number and gravity of any prior convictions.  Only
after all these findings are made and calculations completed does
the court determine the minimum sentencing range by reference to
a statutory grid that takes these factors into account.  Id.
§ 15A-1340.17(c) (2007).  Once the court decides on a minimum
sentence, the corresponding maximum sentence is found in another
grid.  Id. § 15A-1340.17(d), (e) (2007).
Thus, a criminal sentence under Structured Sentencing
is determined through numerous interlocking decisions and
findings made by the trial court after the jury has completed its
work.  As a result, even though a jury has returned its verdict
in the guilt-innocence proceeding, counsels’ jury arguments
forecasting the sentence are usually no better than educated
estimates.
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The perils of attempting to predict a sentence to a
jury are amply demonstrated in the case at bar.  The prosecutor
advised the court before making its sentencing argument that “I’m
just putting the numbers up, and I’ll have the minimum on the
high end, and I’m also going to put up the highest [defendant]
could possibly get on the high end.”  However, while the record
on appeal does not contain a copy of the blackboard presentation
used during the prosecutor’s argument, the transcript indicates
that the numbers the prosecutor quoted to the jury were
misleading.  For instance, the prosecutor told the jury, “This is
the involuntary manslaughter.  Presumptive range is 13-16
months.”  Yet, in the sentencing grid set out in section
15A-1340.17(c), thirteen to sixteen months is the presumptive
range of minimum sentences for a defendant who is convicted of
involuntary manslaughter, a Class F offense, and who has no
criminal history.  A court sentencing such a defendant chooses a
minimum sentence in the thirteen to sixteen month range set out
in the grid found in section 15A-1340.17(c), then locates the
corresponding maximum sentence from the grid found in section
15A-1340.17(d).  Thus, the prosecutor’s statement that thirteen
to sixteen months was the presumptive range for defendant’s
involuntary manslaughter conviction was inaccurate and
misleadingly low.  The ranges represented by the prosecutor for
defendant’s assault and hit and run convictions are similarly
problematic.
The rules of procedure and evidence are meant to assure
that the evidence a jury hears and considers is reliable.  See
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In fact, an arresting number of sentencing permutations
1
arise from defendant’s convictions.  Each felony of conviction
had a different classification and therefore fell within a
different range.  Treating the conviction of involuntary
manslaughter as Count 1, the conviction of felony hit and run as
Count 2, and the conviction of felony assault as Count 3, the
trial court could have:
1.
Consolidated all three counts and imposed a mitigated
sentence;
2.
Consolidated all three counts and imposed a presumptive
sentence;
3.
Consolidated all three counts and imposed an aggravated
sentence;
4.
Imposed consecutive aggravated sentences on each count
(as happened in fact);
5.
Imposed consecutive presumptive sentences on each count;
6.
Imposed consecutive mitigated sentences on each count;
7.
Consolidated Counts 1 and 2 but imposed a consecutive
sentence on Count 3;
8.
Consolidated Counts 1 and 3 but imposed a consecutive
sentence on Count 2;
9.
Consolidated Counts 2 and 3 but imposed a consecutive
sentence on Count 1;  
10.
Found that as to Count 1 the mitigating factors
outweighed the aggravating factor, but not as to Counts 2
and 3;
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 313
(1973) (describing rules of evidence and procedure as “designed
to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of
guilt and innocence”); accord N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 102(a) (2007)
(“These rules [of evidence] shall be construed . . . to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.”).  Jury arguments should be similarly accurate. 
However, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, even a
well-intentioned argument purporting to forecast a sentence under
Structured Sentencing will almost invariably be misleading.  If
the jury believed from the prosecutor’s argument that it
understood the exact effect of the decision it was being called
upon to make, it was mistaken.1
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11.
Found that as to Count 2, the mitigating factors and
aggravating factor were in equilibrium, that the
aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors as
to Count 1, and that the mitigating factors outweighed
the aggravating factor as to Count 3;
12.
Etc.
Nevertheless, while attempts to forecast a sentence are
fraught with risk, a jury’s understanding that its determination
of the existence of any aggravating factors may have an effect on
the sentence imposed is relevant to its role in a sentencing
proceeding.  As a result, consistent with section 7A-97, parties
may explain to a jury the reasons why it is being asked to
consider aggravating factors and may discuss and illustrate the
general effect that finding such factors may have, such as the
fact that a finding of an aggravating factor may allow the court
to impose a more severe sentence or that the court may find
mitigating factors and impose a more lenient sentence.  State v.
Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 372-73, 611 S.E.2d 794, 826 (2005)
(discussing use of hypothetical examples in arguments to the
jury).
Accordingly, while we are aware that the capable trial
judge could not foresee the analysis we undertake today, we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling
defendant’s objection to the State’s argument, which argument
contained misleading information.
Although the trial court erred, nonconstitutional
errors warrant reversal only when “there is a reasonable
possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a
different result would have been reached at the trial out of
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which the appeal arises.”  Id. § 15A-1443(a) (2007).  “The burden
of showing such prejudice under this subsection is upon the
defendant.”  Id.; see, e.g., State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 829,
370 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1988).  Defendant argues that the jury’s
realization that one conviction would merge with another, thereby
reducing defendant’s sentence, may have persuaded jurors to find
the aggravating factor.  Because the impact of the improper
argument cannot be ascertained, defendant contends that a new
sentencing hearing is necessary.
Our review of the record reveals that defendant has not
met his burden of establishing that, but for the error, there is
a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a
different result.  To establish the aggravating factor that
defendant “knowingly created a great risk of death to more than
one person by means of a . . . device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person,” N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1340.16(d)(8), the State must show that defendant used the
device in a way that would normally be hazardous to the lives of
more than one person and that a great risk of death was knowingly
created.  See, e.g., State v. Rose, 327 N.C. 599, 605-06, 398
S.E.2d 314, 317-18 (1990) (discussing use of a weapon, whereas
the case at bar involves a device, i.e., a vehicle).  
As to whether defendant’s Jeep was hazardous to the
lives of more than one person, “[i]t is well settled in North
Carolina that an automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is
driven in a reckless or dangerous manner.”  State v. Jones, 353
N.C. 159, 164, 538 S.E.2d 917, 922 (2000).  The conclusion is
-13-
unavoidable that a vehicle driven at a high rate of speed by an
intoxicated operator is normally hazardous to the lives of more
than one person.  See State v. McBride, 118 N.C. App. 316,
319-20, 454 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1995) (holding that a recklessly
operated vehicle “constituted a device which in its normal use is
hazardous to the lives of more than one person” and “any
reasonable person should know that an automobile operated by a
legally intoxicated driver is reasonably likely to cause death to
any and all persons who may find themselves in the automobile’s
path”).
As to whether defendant knowingly created a great risk
of death, the overwhelming evidence found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt established that defendant was voluntarily
intoxicated and driving between eighty and one hundred miles per
hour when he crossed the center line and collided with Housand’s
Mazda.  No reasonable person could fail to know that such
behavior creates a great risk of death.  Although defendant
testified that he did not remember driving, as a general rule
“the law does not permit a person who commits a crime in a state
of intoxication to use his own vice or weakness as a shelter
against the normal legal consequences of his conduct.”  State v.
Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 457, 196 S.E.2d 777, 786 (1973) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).  Defendant cannot shelter
behind his own claim that he drank himself into a stupor.
Accordingly, we perceive no likelihood that the result
of the trial would have been different if the jury had not heard
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the improper argument.  We affirm the Court of Appeals decision
upholding the judgments of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
Justice BRADY concurring in the result only.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the 
calculation of aggravating factors in a defendant’s sentence is
relevant to the jury’s understanding of the presence of an
aggravating factor.  I would rule that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the State to present to the jury any
information relating to the effect of an aggravating factor on
defendant’s sentence.  However, because overwhelming evidence in
support of the aggravating factor exists, I believe the trial
court’s error was harmless, and I concur in the majority’s result
only.   
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),
the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(a1) in 2005,
which provides that absent an admission from the defendant, “only
a jury may determine if an aggravating factor is present in an
offense.”  This is the trial jury’s sole role under section 15A-
1340.16 in a noncapital case.  This responsibility is
accomplished through a factual evaluation of the evidence
presented at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, unless the
court determines that a separate sentencing proceeding is
required.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(a1) (2007).  Section 15A-
1340.16 further provides that after a jury finds an aggravating
factor, it is the trial court’s responsibility to determine the
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defendant’s sentence.  See also State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584,
597, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983) (stating that a trial judge has
“‘discretion to increase or reduce sentences from the presumptive
term upon findings of aggravating or mitigating factors, the
weighing of which is a matter within [his] sound discretion”
(quoting with approval State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 333, 293
S.E.2d 658, 661, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 745, 295 S.E.2d 482
(1982)(alteration in original))). 
In the case sub judice, the State’s closing argument
was an attempt to circumvent the sentencing process set forth in
section 15A-1340.16.  By discussing the merger doctrine and
displaying the presumptive minimum and maximum ranges of possible
sentences, the State was enticing the jury to contemplate the
duration of defendant’s imprisonment.  This is wholly improper
under the framework of section 15A-1340.16.  
Counsel should be given wide latitude when arguing
before the jury.  See State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 83, 388 S.E.2d
84, 99, sentence vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 802 (1990)
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1124 (1995)(“[C]ounsel’s argument should
not be impaired without good reason. . . .”).  However, if the
arguments counsel advances are irrelevant, they should be limited
by the trial court.  Id. at 83-84, 388 S.E.2d at 99-100 (stating
that a “good reason” to limit the scope of counsel’s closing
argument is irrelevance (citing, inter alia, Watson v. White, 309
N.C. 498, 507, 308 S.E.2d 268, 274 (1983))).  The jury was
charged with answering one question:  Did the evidence presented
support the finding of the aggravating factor?  This is purely a
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factual question, and much like in the guilt-innocence phase of
the trial, the jury is asked to evaluate whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to prove its case.  This Court has
ruled that in the guilt-innocence phase, “[t]he amount of
punishment which a verdict of guilty will empower the judge to
impose is totally irrelevant to the issue of a defendant’s guilt. 
It is, therefore, no concern of the jurors’.”  State v. Rhodes,
275 N.C. 584, 588, 169 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1969) (citations
omitted).  The same logic applies here.  The jury is being asked
solely whether the aggravator is present.  Information regarding
the effect of the aggravating factor on the trial court’s
ultimate sentencing decision is irrelevant to this determination. 
Therefore, I cannot conclude with the majority that “a
jury’s understanding that its determination of the existence of
any aggravating factors may have an effect on the sentence
imposed is relevant to its role in a sentencing proceeding.” 
Furthermore, I disagree that N.C.G.S. § 7A-97 entitles parties to
“explain to a jury the reasons why it is being asked to consider
aggravating factors and . . . discuss and illustrate the general
effect that finding such factors may have, such as the fact that
a finding of an aggravating factor may allow the court to impose
a more severe sentence.”  Under section 7A-97, “[i]n jury trials
the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued to the
jury.”  N.C.G.S. § 7A-97 (2007).  However, even under section 7A-
97, counsel may not argue “principles of law not relevant to the
case.”  See State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 515, 212 S.E.2d 125, 131
(1975) (citations omitted); see also State v. McMorris, 290 N.C.
-17-
286, 287, 225 S.E.2d 553, 554 (1976) (stating that the parties
must argue “the law applicable to the facts of the case” and that
“[t]he whole corpus juris is not fair game”).  As explained
above, the effect of an aggravating factor on a defendant’s
sentence is simply not relevant to the jury’s determination of
the existence of the factor.  I would hold that it is error in
any case for a trial court to allow either party to explain the
effect an aggravating factor could have on a defendant’s
sentence.
While I disagree that the effect of an aggravating
factor is ever relevant to a jury’s determination of the presence
of an aggravating factor, I agree with the majority’s ultimate
result finding that there was overwhelming evidence to support
the existence of the aggravating factor.  From the evidence
presented in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, it is clear
that defendant knowingly operated his vehicle at a dangerously
high rate of speed while he was intoxicated.  Any reasonable jury
would have made such a determination, even without the State’s
inappropriate closing argument.  Therefore, defendant was not
prejudiced by the error of the trial court.  I therefore concur
in the majority’s result only.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this concurring
opinion.