Title: WILLIAM TAYLOR ROBINSON, IV V. DAWN GENTRY, JUDGE, KENTON FAMILY COURT, ET AL.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018-SC-000594-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 2019

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4){C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: JUNE 13, 2019 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 2018-SC-000594-MR WILLIAM TAYLOR ROBINSON, IV APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NO. 2018-CA-000927-OA KENTON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 17-CI-01623 DAWN GENTRY, JUDGE, KENTON APPELLEE FAMILY COURT AND JENNIFER SUE ROBINSON REAL PARTY IN INTEREST MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appe llant William Taylo r “Tay” Ro binso n, IV appe als t he d e c isio n o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co ur t o f Appe als d e nying his pe t it io n fo r a w r it o f pr o hibit io n. Tay file d his pe t it io n fo r w r it aft e r t he t r ial c o ur t gr ant e d a t hir d par ly’s—Sw ind le r Fune r al Ho me (“Sw ind le r ”)—Mo t io n t o Quash a subpo e na d e mand ing info r mat io n r e gar d ing Sw ind le r ’s financ ials. Tay ar gue s o n appe al t hat he is e nt it le d t o a w r it be c ause t he t r ial c o ur t ’s e r r o ne o us r uling o n Sw ind le r ’s unt ime ly mo t io n w ill c ause him ir r e par able har m; he may e nd up o v e r paying fo r spo usal maint e nanc e and c anno t r e c o up any e xc e ss spo usal maint e nanc e if said maint e nanc e is r e v e r se d o n appe al. Find ing no ne o f t he se c laims me r it o r io us, w e affir m t he Co ur t o f Appe als ’ d e nial o f Tay’s w r it pe t it io n. I. Factual and Procedural Background. On Se pt e mbe r 14, 2017, Tay init iat e d a d isso lut io n o f mar r iage pr o c e e d ing in Ke nt o n Family Co ur t . His w ife , Je nnife r Sue Ro binso n, file d he r r e spo nse o n Oc t o be r 16, 2017. Dur ing t he d isso lut io n pr o c e e d ings, t he main issue has be e n t he amo unt o f spo usal maint e nanc e t o w hic h Je nnife r is e nt it le d . Tay ar gue s t hat Je nnife r is und e r e mplo ye d at he r family’s fune r al ho me and he sho uld no t hav e t o pay he r t he maint e nanc e she is r e que st ing. On May 3, 2018, t he t r ial c o ur t quashe d a subpo e na Tay had se r v e d upo n Sw ind le r , r e que st ing t he pe r so nne l file s o f Je nnife r and a t hir d -par t y e mplo ye e , as w e ll as e v id e nc e t hat Sw ind le r paid mo ne y int o Je nnife r and Tay’s He alt h Sav ings Ac c o unt . On May 14, 2018, Tay se r v e d Sw ind le r w it h ano t he r subpo e na, t his t ime r e que st ing v ir t ually all financ ial info r mat io n r e lat e d t o t he busine ss. Sw ind le r file d a Mo t io n fo r Pr o t e c t iv e Or d e r /Mo t io n t o Quash o n May 30, 2018, and t he subpo e na w as quashe d by t he t r ial c o ur t o n June 8, 2018. On June 18, 2018, Tay pr o mpt ly file d his w r it pe t it io n w it h t he Co ur t o f Appe als. The Co ur t o f Appe als d e nie d t he pe t it io n o n Oc t o be r 4, 2018, ho ld ing t hat Tay had an ad e quat e r e me d y t hr o ugh t he t r ad it io nal appe llat e pr o c e ss. This appe al fo llo w e d . 2 II. Standard of Review. Whe n r e v ie w ing an appe al o f a w r it ac t io n, w e fo llo w t he st and ar d o f r e v ie w se t fo r t h in Appalachian Racing, LLC. v. Commonwealth: We e mplo y a t hr e e -par t analysis in r e v ie w ing t he appe al o f a w r it ac t io n. We r e v ie w t he Co ur t o f Appe als ’ fac t ual find ings fo r c le ar e r r o r . Le gal c o nc lusio ns w e r e v ie w und e r t he d e no v o st and ar d . But ult imat e ly, t he d e c isio n w he t he r o r no t t o issue a w r it o f pr o hibit io n is a que st io n o f jud ic ial d isc r e t io n. So r e v ie w o f a c o ur t ’s d e c isio n t o issue a w r it is c o nd uc t e d und e r t he abuse -o f- d isc r e t io n st and ar d . That is, w e w ill no t r e v e r se t he lo w e r c o ur t ’s r uling abse nt a find ing t hat t he d e t e r minat io n w as ar bit r ar y, unr e aso nable , unfair , o r unsuppo r t e d by so und le gal pr inc iple s. 504 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2016) (c it at io ns and quo t at io ns o mit t e d ). III. Analysis. We fir st no t e t hat t he “issuanc e o f a w r it is an e xt r ao r d inar y r e me d y t hat is d isfav o r e d by o ur jur ispr ud e nc e .” Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 144 (Ky. 2015) (c it at io n o mit t e d ). Fur t he r , “t he issuanc e o f a w r it is inhe r e nt ly d isc r e t io nar y ” and e v e n upo n a sho w ing t hat t he “r e quir e me nt s ar e me t and e r r o r fo und , t he gr ant o f a w r it r e mains w it hin t he so le d isc r e t io n o f t he Co ur t .” Id. at 145-46 (c it at io n o mit t e d ). A w r it o f pr o hibit io n may be gr ant e d upo n a sho w ing t hat (1) t he lo w e r c o ur t is pr o c e e d ing o r is abo ut t o pr o c e e d o ut sid e o f it s jur isd ic t io n and t he r e is no r e me d y t hr o ugh an applic at io n t o an int e r me d iat e c o ur t ; o r (2) t hat t he lo w e r c o ur t is ac t ing o r is abo ut t o ac t e r r o ne o usly, alt ho ugh w it hin it s jur isd ic t io n, and t he r e e xist s no ad e quat e r e me d y by appe al o r o t he r w ise and gr e at injust ic e and ir r e par able injur y w ill r e sult if t he pe t it io n is no t gr ant e d . Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). 3 Alt ho ugh Tay’s ar gume nt se c t io n d o e s no t st at e w hic h c lass o f e xt r ao r d inar y w r it he asks r e lie f fr o m, w e c an pr e sume —base d o n his le gal c it at io ns—t hat he is at t e mpt ing t o o bt ain r e lie f t hr o ugh t he se c o nd c lass o f w r it s, i.e., t hat t he lo w e r c o ur t is ac t ing o r is abo ut t o ac t e r r o ne o usly w it hin it s jur isd ic t io n. The se minal c ase Tay c it e s t o suppo r t his ar gume nt , Hodge v. Coleman, gr ant e d a w r it in an e xt r ao r d inar y c ase r e gar d ing po st -c o nv ic t io n e xpe r t w it ne ss fund ing w he r e t he “t r ad it io nal po st ho c appe llat e pr o c e d ur e s [d id ] no t pr o v id e him . . . w it h an ad e quat e r e me d y.” 244 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Ky. 2008) (c it at io ns and quo t at io ns o mit t e d ). In t hat c ase w e no t e d : [A] find ing t hat Ho d ge and Eppe r so n sho uld me r e ly r aise t he se issue s o n a d ir e c t appe al se e ms an unr e aso nable bur d e n o n t he pr o pe r ad minist r at io n o f just ic e in t hat d e nying t he w r it w o uld pr e v e nt Ho d ge and Eppe r so n fr o m pr e se nt ing w it ne sse s o n t he ir be half at t he po st -c o nv ic t io n he ar ing t hat w e hav e alr e ad y o r d e r e d . In t ur n, Ho d ge and Eppe r so n w o uld like ly t he n appe al, me aning t hat w e w o uld in t hat fut ur e appe al r e v e r se t he t r ial c o ur t ’s d e c isio n t o d e ny fund ing, st ar t ing t he pr o c e ss ane w . Suc h ne e d le ss d e lay is impr o pe r and unne c e ssar y be c ause bo t h t he Co mmo nw e alt h and t he pe t it io ne r s he r e in ar e e nt it le d t o finalit y. 244 S.W.3d at 110. Ho w e v e r , abse nt t he e xt r ao r d inar y c ir c umst anc e s o f t he Hodge po st -c o nv ic t io n pr o c e e d ing, a pe t it io ne r in a no r mal d isc o v e r y d isput e must fir st sho w t hat no ad e quat e r e me d y e xist s o n appe al t o pr e v ail und e r a w r it o f t he se c o nd c lass. See Inverultra, S.A. v. Wilson, 449 S.W.3d 339, 344 (Ky. 2014). “No ad e quat e r e me d y by appe al me ans t hat any injur y t o Appe llant [] c o uld no t t he r e aft e r be r e c t ifie d in subse que nt pr o c e e d ings in t he c ase . Lac k o f an ad e quat e r e me d y by appe al is an abso lut e pr e r e quisit e t o t he issuanc e o f a 4 w r it und e r t his se c o nd c at e go r y.” Indep. Order of Foresters v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610, 614-15 (Ky. 2005) (c it at io n and quo t at io ns o mit t e d ). Init ially, in a d isc o v e r y d isput e , w e hav e “r e c o gnize d a d ist inc t io n be t w e e n t r ial c o ur t o r d e r s allo w ing d isc o v e r y and o r d e r s d e nying d isc o v e r y, t he fo r me r o ft e n fr ust r at ing appe llat e r e v ie w , but t he lat t e r ad e quat e ly ‘r e me d ie d ] by w ay o f appe al.”’ Inverultra, 449 S.W.3d at 345 (quo t ing Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Ky. 2000) (c it at io n o mit t e d )). Tay ar gue s t hat if he is no t gr ant e d ac c e ss t o t hir d -par t y Sw ind le r ’s financ ials —a c o mpany Je nnife r has no o w ne r ship int e r e st in—he may be o r d e r e d t o pay e xc e ssiv e spo usal maint e nanc e payme nt s, w it ho ut t he o ppo r t unit y fo r r e c o upme nt , in t he e v e nt he lo se s at t r ial. In suppo r t o f t his ar gume nt , Tay c it e s a Co ur t o f Appe als ’ d e c isio n find ing t hat r e c o upme nt o f e xc e ss c hild suppo r t is inappr o pr iat e unle ss t he r e e xist s an ac c umulat io n o f be ne fit s no t c o nsume d fo r suppo r t . Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Ky. App. 1986). Ho w e v e r , Tay has faile d t o ad d r e ss t he ho ld ing in Wheeler v. Wheeler, 579 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Ky. App. 1979), a c ase t hat d e alt d ir e c t ly w it h t he o v e r payme nt o f spo usal maint e nanc e . In Wheeler, t he t r ial c o ur t d e nie d a mo t io n by t he husband fo r r e c o upme nt o f o v e r payme nt s he mad e d ur ing t he pe nd e nc y o f an appe al. Id. at 379. The Co ur t o f Appe als he ld t hat t he d e nial o f r e payme nt w as e r r o ne o us, and ad v ise d t he t r ial c o ur t t hat appe lle e must ac c o unt t o appe llant fo r t he o v e r payme nt . This d o e s no t me an, ho w e v e r , t hat appe llant c an be e xc use d fr o m paying any maint e nanc e unt il he has r e c e iv e d full c r e d it fo r t he o v e r payme nt . The t r ial c o ur t c an appo r t io n t he c r e d it o v e r a r e aso nable pe r io d o f t ime , and appe llant ’s mo nt hly payme nt s c an be r e d uc e d in t he 5 r e aso nable d isc r e t io n o f t he t r ial jud ge o v e r a pe r io d o f mo nt hs t o insur e t hat appe llant will receive full credit for the overpayment. Id. at 380 (e mphasis ad d e d ). This ho ld ing d ir e c t ly c o nt r ad ic t s Tay’s t he o r y t hat he has no r e me d y o n appe al, as Wheeler e xplic it ly giv e s him o ne . Fur t he r , Tay pr o v id e s no aut ho r it y as t o w hy t he t r ial c o ur t e r r e d in quashing his subpo e na r e que st ing c o mple t e ac c e ss t o t he financ ial r e c o r d s o f a t hir d par t y. Tay appe ar s t o ar gue t hat t he t r ial c o ur t mad e an unt ime ly r uling o n Sw ind le r ’s Mo t io n fo r Pr o t e c t iv e Or d e r /Mo t io n t o Quash. Ho w e v e r , CR1 45.02 st at e s t hat a mo t io n t o quash may be mad e any t ime “be fo r e t he t ime spe c ifie d in t he subpo e na fo r c o mplianc e t he r e w it h[.]” Sw ind le r ’s mo t io n w as file d o n May 30, 2018, t w o w e e ks be fo r e t he June 13, 2018, c o mplianc e d at e list e d o n t he subpo e na. Due t o Tay’s ad e quat e r e me d y o n appe al, and lac k o f fo und at io n fo r his pr o c e d ur al ar gume nt , w e affir m t he Co ur t o f Appe als d e c isio n t o d e ny t he w r it und e r t he se c o nd c lass. Last ly, Je nnife r ar gue s t hat t his appe al is fr iv o lo us and r e que st s d amage s and c o st s und e r CR 73.02(4). Je nnife r base s he r c laim fo r d amage s and c o st s o n Tay’s lac k o f c it at io n t o Wheeler in e it he r his Co ur t o f Appe als o r Supr e me Co ur t br ie fs, and Tay’s v io lat io n o f t he t r ial c o ur t ’s o r d e r se aling t w o affid av it s w hic h Tay has at t ac he d t o his appe llat e br ie fs. Gr ant e d , t he ho ld ing in Wheeler und e r c ut s Tay’s t he o r y c o nc e r ning an inad e quat e r e me d y; ho w e v e r , Je nnife r d id no t r aise Wheeler in t he Co ur t o f Appe als, and it w as c it e d fo r t he 1 1 Ke nt uc ky Rule s o f Civ il Pr o c e d ur e . 6 fir st t ime in he r r e spo nse br ie f in t his Co ur t . The r e fo r e , w e ar e unable t o d e t e r mine w he t he r t he failur e t o ad d r e ss d ir e c t ly ad v e r se aut ho r it y w as w illful o r simply inad v e r t e nt . Fur t he r mo r e , Tay’s c o mpar iso n o f spo usal maint e nanc e t o t he c hild suppo r t payme nt s in Clay is no t fac ially illo gic al abse nt t he ho ld ing in Wheeler. Thus, no d amage s o r c o st s shall be aw ar d e d und e r CR 73.02(4) fo r Tay’s failur e t o d ist inguish Wheeler in his br ie fs be fo r e t his Co ur t and t he Co ur t o f Appe als. Fur t he r , t he v io lat io n o f a t r ial c o ur t o r d e r d o e s no t r e nd e r an appe al fr iv o lo us, but it may be gr o und s fo r an aw ar d o f at t o r ne y’s fe e s. No ne t he le ss, “an aw ar d o f at t o r ne y’s fe e s is c o mmit t e d t o t he so und d isc r e t io n o f t he t r ial c o ur t .... That c o ur t is in t he be st po sit io n t o o bse r v e c o nd uc t and t ac t ic s w hic h w ast e t he c o ur t ’s and at t o r ne ys ’ t ime and must be giv e n w id e lat it ud e t o sanc t io n o r d isc o ur age suc h c o nd uc t .” Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 938 (Ky. 1990). Ac c o r d ingly, w e le av e t he que st io n o f w he t he r a po t e nt ial v io lat io n o f a t r ial c o ur t o r d e r e nt it le s Je nnife r t o at t o r ne y’s fe e s t o t he so und d isc r e t io n o f t he Ke nt o n Family Co ur t in fur t he r pr o c e e d ings o n t his mat t e r . IV. Conclusion. Find ing no abuse o f d isc r e t io n by t he Co ur t o f Appe als, w e affir m t he d e nial o f Tay’s w r it pe t it io n. Mint o n, C.J.; Buc kingham, Hughe s, Ke lle r , VanMe t e r , and Wr ight , JJ., sit t ing. Mint o n, C.J.; Buc kingham, Hughe s, VanMe t e r and Wr ight , JJ., c o nc ur . Ke lle r , J., c o nc ur s in r e sult o nly. Lambe r t , J., no t sit t ing. 7 KELLER, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: I c o nc ur in t he majo r it y’s ho ld ing t hat Ro binso n has an ad e quat e r e me d y by appe al and is, t he r e fo r e , bar r e d fr o m o bt aining his r e que st e d w r it . Ho w e v e r , I w r it e se par at e ly t o e mphasize t he br o ad sc o pe o f d isc o v e r y in Ke nt uc ky. Und e r Ke nt uc ky Rule o f Civ il Pr o c e d ur e (“CR”) 26.02(1), “[p]ar t ie s may o bt ain d isc o v e r y r e gar d ing any mat t e r , no t pr iv ile ge d , w hic h is r e le v ant t o t he subje c t mat t e r inv o lv e d in t he pe nd ing ac t io n.” The r e que st e d info r mat io n ne e d no t be ad missible at t r ial; it is e no ugh t hat it “appe ar s r e aso nably c alc ulat e d t o le ad t o t he d isc o v e r y o f ad missible e v id e nc e .” Id. This br o ad sc o pe r e info r c e s t he “impo r t anc e o f sat isfying t he ‘ne e d ’ fo r d isc o v e r y info r mat io n if a law suit is t o be d e c id e d as a se ar c h fo r t he t r ut h, and t he po lic y o f t he law t o ac c o mmo d at e suc h ne e d if t he c o ur t s c an d o so c o nsist e nt w it h a le gal pr iv ile ge .” Riggs v. Schroering, 822 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Ky. 1991). Tho ugh so me info r mat io n may be pr iv ile ge d and no t subje c t t o d isc lo sur e , suc h “pr iv ile ge s c o nt r av e ne t he fund ame nt al pr inc iple t hat t he public has a r ight t o e v e r y man’s e v id e nc e ” and t hat “ind iv id uals po sse ss no r ight s t o r e fuse t e st imo ny o r d e ny ac c e ss t o info r mat io n t hat is ne e d e d by lit igant s.” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 5.00[2][a] (5t h e d . 2013) (int e r nal quo t at io n mar ks o mit t e d ) (quo t ing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)) (d isc ussing Ke nt uc ky Rule o f Ev id e nc e 501). In t his c ase , Ro binso n r e que st e d info r mat io n r e lat e d t o t he financ e s o f a fune r al ho me o w ne d by his e x-w ife ’s family. Dur ing t he pe nd e nc y o f t he c ase she w as e mplo ye d par t t ime at t he fune r al ho me . Ro binso n, ho w e v e r , alle ge d t hat she had t ur ne d d o w n a full-t ime po sit io n t he r e pr e v io usly. Thus, he so ught 8 t his info r mat io n t o d e t e r mine w he t he r she is v o lunt ar ily und e r e mplo ye d and w hat inc o me w o uld o t he r w ise be av ailable t o he r . The r e que st e d info r mat io n may hav e be e n br o ad and so me o f t he info r mat io n may hav e be e n pr iv ile ge d o r o f suc h a pr iv at e nat ur e t hat a pr o t e c t iv e o r d e r w as w ar r ant e d . Ho w e v e r , t he info r mat io n is c le ar ly r e le v ant t o t he alle gat io n o f v o lunt ar y und e r e mplo yme nt and t he und e r lying mo t io ns fo r t e mpo r ar y maint e nanc e , and it “appe ar s r e aso nably c alc ulat e d t o le ad t o t he d isc o v e r y o f ad missible e v id e nc e .” The family c o ur t o r d e r lac ks any find ing t hat t he info r mat io n is pr iv ile ge d , no r d o e s it c o nt ain any d isc ussio n o f w hy a pr o t e c t iv e o r d e r w o uld fail t o pr o t e c t any pr iv ile ge d o r se nsit iv e info r mat io n. Und e r CR 26.02, t he n, it appe ar s t hat Ro binso n w as e nt it le d t o t he r e que st e d d o c ume nt s. Ne v e r t he le ss, t he family c o ur t quashe d his d isc o v e r y r e que st . As a r e sult , Ro binso n w as fo r c e d t o pur sue t his w r it , t he r e by inc ur r ing ad d it io nal lit igat io n c o st s and w ast ing no t o nly his o w n t ime , but o ur v aluable jud ic ial r e so ur c e s as w e ll. I, t he r e fo r e , w r it e se par at e ly t o no t e t hat , w hile Ro binso n’s r e que st fo r a w r it is bar r e d by t he av ailabilit y o f an appe al, t his mat t e r c o uld hav e be e n hand le d mo r e e ffe c t iv e ly in t he family c o ur t . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Jame s Wald e n Mo r gan, Jr . MORGAN, SMITH, PORTER, GUIDUGLI, PLLC Be v e r ly Rut h St o r m ARNZEN, STORM & TURNER, P.S.C. COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE HON. DAWN GENTRY: No t Re pr e se nt e d by Co unse l 9 COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: Rut h Be mille r Jac kso n JACKSON FAMILY LAW 10