Title: Bartolomucci v. Federal Ins. Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140275, 140297
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 2015

Present: All the Justices 
 
CHRISTOPHER BARTOLOMUCCI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 140275 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                   April 16, 2015 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. 
 
VU VO 
 
v. 
Record No. 140297 
 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
Thomas D. Horne, Judge 
 
In these appeals we consider the scope and application of 
an insurance policy that provides coverage for a law firm 
partner's vehicle only when that vehicle is "used in" a law 
firm's business or personal affairs. 
I. 
Facts And Proceedings 
Vu Vo and Christopher Bartolomucci were involved in a 
vehicle collision.  Based on his injuries, Vo filed a lawsuit 
against Bartolomucci seeking $1,000,000 in damages.  The 
vehicle which Bartolomucci was driving was insured under an 
Allstate Insurance Company insurance policy with a $100,000 
liability limit (the "Allstate Policy").  Vo is unwilling to 
settle his suit within the Allstate Policy's limit. 
Because his potential liability exceeds the Allstate 
Policy's limit, Bartolomucci filed a declaratory judgment 
action in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County.  Bartolomucci 
 
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sought to establish that his vehicle fell within the scope of 
Federal Insurance Company's insurance policy issued to 
Bartolomucci's law firm, Hogan Lovells US, LLC (the "Federal 
Policy").1  During the course of these proceedings, the circuit 
court ruled on the demurrer to the amended complaint filed by 
Federal Insurance and Hogan Lovells.  The circuit court 
sustained that demurrer in part, overruled it in part, and 
allowed Bartolomucci's suit to continue on the theory that he 
was covered by the Federal Policy. 
The case went to trial.  The matter was submitted to the 
jury on a special interrogatory asking the question whether 
Bartolomucci was using his vehicle in Hogan Lovells's business 
or personal affairs at the time of the collision.  The jury 
responded "yes."  However, the circuit court then granted 
Federal Insurance's and Hogan Lovells's motion to strike, and 
set aside the jury's finding as not being supported by the 
evidence.  The court entered final judgment in favor of Federal 
Insurance and held that the Federal Policy did not cover 
Bartolomucci's use of the vehicle at the time of the collision. 
Bartolomucci and Vo timely filed separate petitions for 
appeal with this Court, and we granted all six assignments of 
error.  These assignments require us to address four issues: 
                     
1 At the time of the collision, Hogan Lovells US, LLC was 
Hogan Hartson, LLC.  All instances of Hogan Hartson are 
referred to as Hogan Lovells. 
 
3 
1. 
Whether the Federal Policy automatically 
provided excess liability coverage unrestricted 
by any other requirements of the policy? 
2. 
Whether the Federal Policy provided coverage 
because Bartolomucci is a "Named Insured"? 
3. 
Whether the Federal Policy provided coverage 
because it is ambiguous? 
4. 
Whether the Federal Policy provided coverage 
because Bartolomucci's use of the vehicle fell 
within the scope of the policy? 
II. Discussion 
A. 
The Role Of The Jury In A Declaratory Judgment Action 
The parties dispute the preliminary issue of whether the 
jury's answer of "yes" to the special interrogatory was binding 
or advisory.  Throughout the proceedings, the circuit court 
treated the jury's answer as arising under Code § 8.01-188, and 
as binding subject to being set aside only in the limited 
circumstances set forth in Code § 8.01-680.  Federal Insurance 
argues that this was error because no constitutional, 
statutory, or consent basis allowed the court to employ a 
binding jury, and therefore the jury's answer was only advisory 
under Code § 8.01-336(E).  See Angstadt v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. 
Co., 254 Va. 286, 291-92, 492 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1997); Wright 
v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 222, 349 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1986).  This 
argument impacts our review of the circuit court's treatment of 
the jury answer.  If the jury's answer was binding rather than 
advisory, the court's setting aside that answer is analyzed 
 
4 
under a more stringent standard.  Compare DeJarnette v. Thomas 
M. Brooks Lumber Co., 199 Va. 18, 21, 97 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1957) 
(standard of review applicable to the rejection of an advisory 
determination), with Wooldridge v. Echelon Service Co., 243 Va. 
458, 461, 416 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1992) (standard of review 
applicable to the setting aside of a binding verdict). 
We decline to resolve this issue because we need not do so 
to decide this appeal.  See Woodard v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 
276, 280-81, 754 S.E.2d 309, 312 (2014).  For the reasons set 
forth in this opinion, the circuit court's action was without 
error even under the more stringent standard of review.  For 
purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the 
jury's answer to the special interrogatory was binding. 
B. 
The Federal Policy And Final Judgment 
1. 
Standard Of Review 
Because we treat the jury's answer to the special 
interrogatory as binding rather than advisory, "the jury 
verdict must be reinstated and judgment entered on the verdict 
if there is any credible evidence in the record to support the 
jury verdict."  Wooldridge, 243 Va. at 461, 416 S.E.2d at 443. 
To the extent we interpret and apply the terms of an 
insurance contract, we address those issues of law de novo.  
Doctors Co. v. Women's Healthcare Assocs., 285 Va. 566, 571, 
740 S.E.2d 523, 525 (2013). 
 
5 
2. 
The Federal Policy 
The Federal Policy is comprised of two documents:  the 
Business Auto Declarations and the Business Auto Coverage Form.  
The Business Auto Declarations instrument sets forth the basics 
of the Federal Policy, such as the Named Insured, endorsements, 
and a schedule of coverages.  The Business Auto Coverage Form 
instrument sets forth the terms of the policy and resembles a 
traditional contract.  We review these documents "as if their 
several provisions were in one and the same instrument."  
Bailey v. Town of Saltville, 279 Va. 627, 633, 691 S.E.2d 491, 
493 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
a. 
The Excess Coverage Provision Does Not Provide An 
Independent Basis To Establish Excess Coverage 
In provision IV.B.5.a., the Business Auto Coverage Form 
provides:  "For any covered 'auto' you don't own, the insurance 
provided by this Coverage Form is excess over any other 
collectible insurance."  Bartolomucci assigns error to the 
circuit court's failure to hold that he fell within this 
language, as in his view the Federal Policy operates as excess 
insurance for vehicles not owned by Hogan Lovells.  
Bartolomucci's argument is that the Federal Policy applied to 
Bartolomucci's vehicle because, in the absence of "business or 
personal affairs" language in this excess coverage provision, 
the Federal Policy operates as excess insurance in addition to 
 
6 
Bartolomucci's Allstate Policy independent of any other 
provision in the Federal Policy and without any need to show 
that his vehicle was used in Hogan Lovells's business or 
personal affairs.  The circuit court did not err in rejecting 
this argument. 
Bartolomucci argues that the Federal Policy is a "follow 
form" policy for all vehicles not owned by Hogan Lovells.  "The 
phrase 'follow form' refers to the practice, common in excess 
policies, of having the second-layer coverage follow 
substantively the primary layer provided by the main insurer."  
Insituform Techs., Inc. v. American Home Assur. Co., 566 F.3d 
274, 278 (1st Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Providence Wash. Ins. 
Co. v. Gheen, 247 Va. 73, 76-77, 439 S.E.2d 333, 334-35 (1994) 
(addressing a "follow form" provision).  However, Bartolomucci 
ignores the language in the Federal Policy directing excess 
coverage to apply only to "any covered 'auto' you don't own." 
Therefore, this provision applies to a vehicle not owned 
by Hogan Lovells only if that non-owned vehicle is a "covered 
auto," as defined by the Federal Policy, instead of applying as 
excess coverage to non-owned vehicles as a matter of course.  
This language which the parties' contracted to "cannot simply 
be ignored."  First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 227 Va. 379, 386, 315 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1984). 
 
7 
The Federal Policy covers non-owned vehicles that fall 
within the terms of symbol 8, which governs "Hired 'Autos' 
Only," and symbol 9, which governs "Nonowned 'Autos' Only." 
These "symbols" are descriptive categories of vehicles listed 
in the Business Auto Coverage Form.  For example, symbol 8 
describes vehicles that are "lease[d], hire[d], rent[ed,] or 
borrow[ed]."  And symbol 9 describes vehicles that are "not 
own[ed], lease[d], hire[d], rent[ed,] or borrow[ed]" but that 
are nonetheless still used "in connection with" the Named 
Insured's business or personal affairs.  Thus, the circuit 
court properly decided whether Bartolomucci's vehicle fell 
within coverage described by those symbols instead of holding 
that the Federal Policy automatically covered Bartolomucci's 
vehicle by operation of provision IV.B.5.a. 
b. 
The Named Insured Was Hogan Lovells 
In describing the scope of the Federal Policy's coverage, 
the Business Auto Coverage Form refers to "you" and "your."  
For example, under the terms of symbol 9, potential coverage 
includes "those 'autos' you do not own . . . that are used in 
connection with your business."  Bartolomucci assigns error to 
the circuit court's holding that these instances of "you" and 
"your" refer to the law firm Hogan Lovells, rather than to that 
law firm's partners, such as Bartolomucci himself.  The circuit 
court did not err in its holding. 
 
8 
The Business Auto Coverage Form states:  "Throughout this 
policy the words 'you' and 'your' refer to the Named Insured 
shown in the Declarations."  The first page of the Business 
Auto Declarations includes a line reading "NAMED INSURED" that 
names only Hogan Lovells.  Additional sections of the Business 
Auto Declarations that identify the Named Insured also name 
only Hogan Lovells.  Thus, throughout the Federal Policy, the 
terms "you" and "your" are pronouns operating as a substitute 
for the stated name of the Named Insured, Hogan Lovells. 
Moreover, Hogan Lovells is a limited liability partnership 
law firm.  "A partnership is an entity distinct from its 
partners."  Code § 50-73.87; see also Jimenez v. Corr, __ Va. 
__, __, 764 S.E.2d 115, 122 (2014) (observing that a "legal 
entity" has a "separate legal status" from its owners, 
shareholders, agents, or members).  A partner of the Named 
Insured law firm such as Bartolomucci is not also a Named 
Insured simply because of his partner status. 
Acknowledging this, Bartolomucci argues that he is a Named 
Insured because of other portions of the Business Auto Coverage 
Form.  Specifically, in the Definitions section the term 
"Insured" includes "any person . . . qualifying as an insured 
in the Who Is An Insured provision of the applicable coverage."  
In turn, a portion of the relevant Who Is An Insured provision 
 
9 
includes "[a] partner . . . for a covered 'auto' owned by him 
or her."  Bartolomucci argues that he is therefore an Insured. 
Assuming Bartolomucci's argument is correct, however, only 
means that Bartolomucci is an "Insured" under the policy.2  The 
words "you" and "your" do not refer to the parties who are an 
"Insured," but only to the "Named Insured [as] shown in the 
Declarations."  This distinction based upon the word choice 
utilized in the instrument must be recognized because "all 
words used in [the written instrument] must be given effect if 
reasonably possible."  Barrett v. Vaughan & Co., Bankers, 163 
Va. 811, 817, 178 S.E. 64, 66 (1935) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  Different terms given special meanings 
by the parties are reasonably understood to mean different 
things.  Bartolomucci may be an "Insured," but he is not a 
"Named Insured [as] shown in the Declarations." 
c. 
Coverage For "Autos . . . While Used In Your Business Or 
Your Personal Affairs" Is Not Ambiguous 
In the Business Auto Declarations, the Federal Policy's 
$1,000,000 liability coverage extends to "Covered Autos" 
falling within symbols 8 and 9.  Only symbol 9 is relevant to 
whether the Federal Policy covered Bartolomucci's vehicle at 
the time of the collision.  Symbol 9, describing "Nonowned 
'Autos' Only," extends coverage, in part, to "'autos' owned by 
                     
 
2 We do not rule on whether a partner of the Named Insured 
is actually an "Insured" for purposes of the Federal Policy. 
 
10 
your . . . partners . . . but only while used in your business 
or your personal affairs."  Bartolomucci and Vo assign error to 
the circuit court's failure to hold that this provision is 
ambiguous.  If this phrase is ambiguous, then the language must 
be construed "in favor of coverage and against the insurer."  
Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 278 Va. 75, 81, 
677 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2009). 
"Contract language is ambiguous when it may be understood 
in more than one way or when it refers to two or more things at 
the same time."  Robinson-Huntley v. George Washington Carver 
Mut. Homes Ass'n, 287 Va. 425, 429, 756 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2014) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Contract 
language is not ambiguous simply because the parties or courts 
in different jurisdictions disagree about how to understand the 
language.  Id.; Floyd v. Northern Neck Ins. Co., 245 Va. 153, 
158, 427 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1993).  Pursuant to these principles, 
symbol 9 is not ambiguous and the circuit court did not err. 
Bartolomucci and Vo argue that the phrase "your business 
or your personal affairs" is ambiguous, if "your" refers to 
Hogan Lovells, because a legal entity cannot have truly 
"personal" affairs.  See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, __, 
131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) ("[We] far more readily think of 
corporations as having 'privileged or confidential' documents 
than personally private ones.").  We reject this narrow 
 
11 
construction of this undefined contract language because it 
ignores the context in which the language is used. 
We give undefined contract terms "their ordinary meaning" 
in light of "the contract as a whole."  Schuiling v. Harris, 
286 Va. 187, 193, 747 S.E.2d 833, 836 (2013).  The Federal 
Policy is an insurance contract executed by a legal entity to 
provide coverage in specific, limited circumstances for its 
employees and partners.  When used in this type of contract, 
the understanding of the ordinary meaning of "business affairs" 
refers to a legal entity's income-producing activities, and 
"personal affairs" refers to a legal entity's non-income-
producing activities that benefit the business. 
Consequently, symbol 9 is not ambiguous just because it 
refers to the "personal affairs" of Hogan Lovells, a law firm.  
In light of this "plain reading of the disputed provision 
[that] effectuat[es] the intention of the parties," our holding 
is not altered by the fact that courts in other jurisdictions 
disagree as to whether this contract language is ambiguous.  
Floyd, 245 Va. at 158, 427 S.E.2d at 196. 
d. 
Symbol 9 Does Not Cover Bartolomucci's Vehicle 
Symbol 9 reads in its entirety: 
[1] Only those "autos" you do not own, lease, hire, 
rent or borrow that are used in connection with your 
 
12 
business.  [2] This includes "autos" owned by your 
"employees," partners (if you are a partnership), 
members (if you are a limited liability company), or 
members of their households but only while used in 
your business or your personal affairs. 
(Bracketed numbers added.)  Bartolomucci and Vo assign error to 
the circuit court's failure to consider the first sentence, 
Sentence [1], as an independent basis for holding that the 
Federal Policy covers Bartolomucci's vehicle.  Bartolomucci and 
Vo also assign error to the circuit court's entry of final 
judgment in favor of Federal Insurance, because some evidence 
supported the jury's answer that Bartolomucci used his vehicle 
within the scope of the second sentence, Sentence [2].  The 
circuit court did not err on either basis. 
Sentence [1] applies, generally, to vehicles not owned by 
Hogan Lovells.  But Sentence [2] applies to a specific subset 
of non-owned vehicles, that is, vehicles that are not owned by 
Hogan Lovells but that are owned by a Hogan Lovells's employee, 
partner, member, or members of an employee's, partner's, or 
member's household.  Thus, vehicles governed by Sentence [2]'s 
specific provision are carved out from the scope of 
Sentence [1]'s general provision.  See Jimenez, __ Va. at __, 
764 S.E.2d at 121.  Because Bartolomucci was a Hogan Lovells 
partner and was driving a vehicle he owned, Bartolomucci's 
vehicle is governed by Sentence [2] rather than Sentence [1]. 
 
13 
Further, Bartolomucci's use of the vehicle did not satisfy 
all of the requirements of Sentence [2], which covers non-owned 
vehicles that are "used in [Hogan Lovells's] business or [Hogan 
Lovells's] personal affairs."3  At the time of the collision, 
Bartolomucci was using his vehicle to commute from his home to 
Hogan Lovells's office, which was not a "use[] in" Hogan 
Lovells's business or personal affairs.  To avoid this 
conclusion, Bartolomucci and Vo emphasize two aspects of this 
commute. 
First, Bartolomucci and Vo argue that Bartolomucci's home 
operated as a Hogan Lovells work location because Bartolomucci 
did not have set work hours, and Bartolomucci was allowed and 
encouraged to work at his home office where he would engage in 
Hogan Lovells's business "[q]uite a lot."  Bartolomucci thus 
contends that he was not commuting from home to work, but was 
instead traveling between work locations.  Second, Bartolomucci 
and Vo argue that the trip itself was more than a typical 
commute to work so that the drive was actually "in" Hogan 
Lovells's business.  Bartolomucci had a Blackberry electronic 
device, issued and paid for by Hogan Lovells, turned on and 
                     
 
3 Federal Insurance argues that the phrase "used in your 
business or your personal affairs" requires a "course of 
employment" or "scope of employment" test.  But we evaluate 
contracts based on what the instruments actually say, not on 
what may have been intended.  Jimenez, __ Va. at __, 764 S.E.2d 
at 124.  As the instruments before us do not include those 
phrases, the Federal Policy does not utilize such tests. 
 
14 
within Bartolomucci's physical reach.  Also, although 
Bartolomucci could not recall what he was thinking at the time 
of the collision, Bartolomucci testified that he habitually 
thought about work related issues on his commute to work. 
Contrary to these arguments, the facts of this case do not 
amount to anything more than a typical commute from home to 
work, which was not covered under the terms of the Federal 
Policy.  The only work related activity that Bartolomucci 
accomplished before leaving home was to check his work email 
and call his office voicemail.  But the record does not 
indicate that Bartolomucci read or responded to any work 
related emails, that the voicemail itself was work related, or 
that Bartolomucci billed his time for these activities.  In 
addition, beyond the fact that Bartolomucci occasionally worked 
at home, the record fails to show any relationship between 
Hogan Lovells and Bartolomucci's home to establish that place 
as a Hogan Lovells work location. 
Moreover, Bartolomucci's use of his vehicle to commute 
from home to work was not a "use[] in" Hogan Lovells's business 
or personal affairs.  Bartolomucci did not use his Blackberry 
during the commute.  Merely having access to modern technology 
such as a Blackberry, which would allow Bartolomucci to conduct 
work activity if that device was used, "does not transform" an 
employee's "private activity into company business."  Le Elder 
 
15 
v. Rice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749, 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  And 
merely thinking about work does not make a commute "in" the 
business, as contemplated by the policy language.  The record 
does not indicate that Bartolomucci billed for any activity or 
otherwise performed any work during his commute.  Also, 
Bartolomucci was not reimbursed by Hogan Lovells for his 
commute. 
In sum, Bartolomucci's use of his vehicle to drive from 
home to work did not fall within the coverage described in 
symbol 9.  "When the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence is 
challenged upon a motion to strike the evidence at the 
conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the trial court 
should in every case overrule the motion where there is any 
doubt on the question."  Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524, 531, 
331 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1985).  But based on this record, no 
evidence supported Bartolomucci's claim that the Federal Policy 
covered his vehicle at the time of the collision, and it was 
"conclusively apparent" that Bartolomucci had proven no cause 
of action against Federal Insurance.  Id.  The circuit court 
should have granted the motion to strike made at the conclusion 
of Bartolomucci's case-in-chief.  As the jury finding was 
contrary to the evidence, the court properly set aside the jury 
finding and entered final judgment in favor of Federal 
Insurance.  Code § 8.01-680. 
 
16 
III. Conclusion 
The Federal Policy did not cover Bartolomucci's use of the 
vehicle at the time of the collision.  A morning commute by a 
law firm partner from home to work does not constitute "use[]" 
of the partner's vehicle "in" a law firm's business or personal 
affairs.  We affirm the circuit court's entry of final 
judgment. 
Affirmed.