Title: Commonwealth v. Vazquez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11695
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 29, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11695 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ALBERTO VAZQUEZ. 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 8, 2017. - November 29, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Cellular 
Telephone.  Evidence, Prior misconduct.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Argument by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury.  Intent. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 17, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J. 
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  In the early morning hours of June 18, 2010, 
Julian Melendez was shot and killed during an exchange with an 
individual later identified as the defendant, Alberto Vazquez.  
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of deliberate premeditation.  On appeal, the defendant 
2 
 
 
claims error on the part of defense counsel, the trial judge, 
and the prosecutor, requiring a new trial.  Alternatively, he 
seeks a reduction in the verdict pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 
33E.  We affirm the defendant's conviction and decline to 
exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for discussion of specific 
issues.  Just prior to 2 A.M. on June 18, 2010, in a Lawrence 
neighborhood, the defendant drove up to a group of people and 
began arguing with some of them.  The victim approached the 
automobile and attempted to defuse the situation, saying, 
"It['s] me, JM, it's me, your brother."  The defendant drove 
away, but returned approximately five minutes later and 
continued to argue with some of those present.  The victim, who 
again approached the automobile and leaned into the driver's 
side window, tried once more to calm down the defendant.  
Suddenly, the defendant reached out, shot the victim at close 
range, and drove away.  When first responders arrived, the 
victim was unresponsive.  He died at the hospital within twenty-
four hours of the shooting. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth did not provide evidence of 
motive; however, the prosecution's theory was that the defendant 
deliberately premeditated the killing of the victim.  It relied 
chiefly on the testimony of two cooperating witnesses:  one 
3 
 
 
testified to having witnessed the shooting and identified the 
defendant as the shooter, and the other testified that the 
defendant confessed to being the shooter.  The Commonwealth also 
presented historical cell site location information (CSLI) 
records of the cellular telephone that the defendant used, which 
indicated he was at the scene of the shooting when it occurred.  
The defense theory focused on reasonable doubt as to the 
identity of the shooter and attacked the credibility of the 
Commonwealth's cooperating witnesses. 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that the Commonwealth's 
use of CSLI records violated his rights under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; that the trial judge erred 
in admitting prior bad act evidence; and that the prosecutor 
argued facts not in evidence in her closing argument.  The 
defendant further claims that, in response to a question the 
jury raised during their deliberations, the judge erred in 
instructing the jurors that the defendant could be convicted of 
murder based on the theory of transferred intent.  We examine 
each issue in turn. 
 
1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to suppress the CSLI records because the Commonwealth 
failed to demonstrate probable cause to procure them.  In 2014, 
we held that a government-induced production of CSLI records is 
4 
 
 
a search in the constitutional sense, requiring a showing of 
probable cause and a warrant under art. 14.  Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 255 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 
Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).  We further held, however, 
that this new rule applies "only to those cases where the 
defendant raised the warrant issue before or during the trial 
and the defendant's conviction was not final at the time that 
Augustine I was decided."  Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 
20, 27, cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W. 3177 (2017).  Because the 
defendant did not raise the issue prior to this appeal, he is 
not entitled to the benefit of Augustine I.  See Commonwealth v. 
Broom, 474 Mass. 486, 492 (2016).  The defendant attempts to 
avoid this result by arguing that his counsel should have 
foreseen the holding in Augustine I and moved to suppress the 
CSLI records due to the lack of probable cause.  We need not 
reach this issue as we conclude that, even if defense counsel 
were ineffective on this count, and even if the CSLI records 
would have been suppressed had the motion been made, there still 
would not be a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
When we review ineffective assistance claims in direct 
appeals from convictions of murder in the first degree, we look 
to see "whether there was an error in the course of the trial 
(by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there 
5 
 
 
was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).1  We will not disturb the verdict if 
we are "substantially confident that, if the error had not been 
made, the jury verdict would have been the same."  Commonwealth 
v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n.3 (1988).  See Commonwealth v. 
Montrond, 477 Mass. 127, 134 (2017).  Here, even if we were to 
assume for the sake of discussion that the CSLI records could 
have been suppressed, we are confident that the records were not 
likely to have influenced the verdict, that the jury would have 
reached the same result even without the records, and that, 
accordingly, there has been no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
The CSLI records were not a significant part of the 
prosecution's case and were both cumulative and corroborative of 
other evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 76 
                     
 
1 Because this is a capital case on direct appeal, the 
defendant is entitled to a more favorable standard than the 
constitutional standard for measuring ineffective assistance 
claims articulated in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 
(1974), i.e., "whether there has been serious incompetency, 
inefficiency, or inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel 
falling measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer -- and, if that is found, then, 
typically, whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an 
otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."  Unlike the 
constitutional standard, under the standard applicable to 
capital cases, which is rooted in G. L. c. 278, § 33E, "we need 
not focus on the adequacy of trial counsel's performance."  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014). 
6 
 
 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353, 364-365 (2000).  
The CSLI evidence corroborated the Commonwealth's other, very 
strong evidence of guilt by confirming, together with eyewitness 
testimony, that the defendant was in fact in the area of the 
crime at the time of the shooting and drove out of the city 
thereafter. 
 
An eyewitness who was present at the shooting positively 
identified the defendant as the shooter; this eyewitness had 
known the defendant since elementary school.  See Commonwealth 
v. Thomas, 476 Mass. 451, 461 (2017) (discussing how witness's 
prior familiarity with defendant is factor in reliability of 
identification).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Burgos, 470 Mass. 
133, 143 (2014) (remanding where "[t]here were no eyewitnesses 
who identified the defendant as a shooter," and only 
identification evidence was evidence admitted in error). 
 
Another witness also identified the automobile that the 
shooter drove, visible in a surveillance video recording of the 
crime scene.  The Commonwealth focused the jury's attention on a 
specific, unique characteristic of the automobile that was 
visible in the recording.  Further, multiple witnesses testified 
that they had seen the defendant driving the same vehicle, which 
belonged to his girl friend, on other occasions. 
 
Several witnesses also testified to admissions and other 
incriminating statements the defendant made in the aftermath of 
7 
 
 
the murder.  Within hours, the defendant telephoned a friend and 
admitted that he had done "something terrible, something bad."  
The defendant sounded "[l]iterally scared" and asked his friend 
for a loan in the amount of $500.  The friend telephoned him 
back to "try to get to the bottom of things," but the defendant 
refused to explain himself, stating only that "he needed to 
leave for [a ]while." 
 
Thereafter, the defendant dropped a gun off in a bag at 
another friend's house.  When the friend found the gun inside 
the bag, the friend telephoned the defendant to ask whether it 
was the gun the defendant used in the murder, and the defendant 
admitted that it was. 
 
The same friend also testified that he was concerned about 
rumors that were circulating, and specifically informed the 
defendant in person that an individual was telling people "he 
kill[ed] somebody on Lowell Street."  The defendant did not deny 
the accusation; he looked worried and shook his head.  The 
friend advised the defendant to leave Massachusetts, because "it 
was only a matter of time until he gets caught." 
 
Considering all the evidence and the overwhelming strength 
of the Commonwealth's case apart from the CSLI records, we are 
substantially confident that the jury's verdict would not have 
been any different had the CSLI records not been admitted.  
"[T]he admission in evidence of those [records] did not so 
8 
 
 
materially strengthen the Commonwealth's case as to create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 416 (2014). 
 
2.  Prior bad act evidence.  At trial, the jury heard 
testimony about the defendant's past possession of and the 
circumstances surrounding his display of a black firearm.  The 
defendant argues that the probative value of this "propensity" 
evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, 
and that its introduction requires a new trial. 
A witness testified that, approximately one month before 
the shooting, the witness observed the defendant engage in a 
verbal argument with a third individual and then leave the area.  
The defendant returned approximately twenty or thirty minutes 
later and displayed what appeared to be the black handle of a 
semiautomatic firearm underneath his shirt when asking for the 
whereabouts of the individual with whom he had argued.  The 
witness also testified that he had seen the defendant with a 
black firearm on one prior occasion, and that the defendant told 
the witness that he always carried a firearm. 
Although prior bad act evidence is generally inadmissible 
to show one's propensity to commit a crime, such evidence may be 
admitted, "if relevant, for some other purpose, such as proving 
common scheme, pattern of operation, preparation, opportunity, 
nature of relationship, knowledge, intent, motive, identity, or 
9 
 
 
absence of accident or mistake."  Commonwealth v. Cheremond, 461 
Mass. 397, 408 (2012).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2017).  
It also may be offered to show that the defendant has the means 
to commit the crime.  Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 322 
(2009), citing Commonwealth v. Anderson, 448 Mass. 548, 560 
(2007). 
However, even if such evidence is offered for one of these 
purposes, it is only properly admitted if its probative value 
outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  The 
analysis whether such evidence should be admitted is "left to 
the sound discretion of the judge, whose decision to admit such 
evidence will be upheld absent clear error."  Commonwealth v. 
Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158–159 (2007), and cases cited.  Here, 
the judge admitted the witness's testimony after finding that it 
was "highly probative as to [the] defendant's familiarity [with] 
firearms, of access to firearms and the fact that he would carry 
a firearm."  As the defendant did not object to this testimony, 
we review any error for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.2  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 463 Mass. 
                     
 
2 The defendant argues that by filing a motion in limine to 
exclude this testimony, he preserved his appellate rights and 
therefore the admission of this testimony should be reviewed for 
prejudicial error rather than for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  In fact, although we recently held that 
filing a motion in limine opposing a witness's testimony is 
10 
 
 
95, 110 (2012). 
The defendant's statement that he always carried a firearm 
was properly admitted as an incriminating admission that was 
relevant to show that he had the means to commit the crime.  See 
Anderson, 448 Mass. at 560 (testimony regarding knife defendant 
was known to carry and proficiency with knives tended to prove 
means and ability to commit crime).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Ashman, 430 Mass. 736, 744 (2000). 
The testimony that the witness had previously observed the 
defendant in possession of a black firearm is a closer call; 
however, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion 
in admitting it.  In general, we "have not . . . viewed the 
tenuous relevancy of evidence of a person's general acquaintance 
with weapons as outweighing the likelihood that such evidence 
will have an impact on the jury unfair to a defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 358 (1985).  Further, 
"[w]here a weapon definitively could not have been used in the 
commission of the crime, we have generally cautioned against 
admission of evidence related to it."  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 
463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  However, "[a] weapon that could have 
been used in the course of a crime is admissible, in the judge's 
discretion, even without direct proof that the particular weapon 
                                                                  
sufficient to preserve appellate rights, see Commonwealth v. 
Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 724-725 (2016), we also held that this 
ruling only applied prospectively, id. 
11 
 
 
was in fact used in the commission of the crime."  Id., and 
cases cited. 
The Commonwealth presented evidence from an eyewitness who 
testified that the firearm used in the shooting was a chrome-
colored revolver, not a black semiautomatic firearm.  
Nevertheless, because there was no definitive (forensic) 
evidence demonstrating that the firearm used to shoot the victim 
was not the same one that the defendant was seen with a month 
earlier, the evidence was admissible at the trial judge's 
discretion.  See Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 123, and cases cited 
(evidence of defendant's access to weapon allegedly dissimilar 
to murder weapon admissible where dissimilarity was either 
asserted without proof or based on eyewitness's memory of 
weapon's color).  There was no error, especially where the judge 
provided limiting instructions.  See Ridge, 455 Mass. at 309, 
322-323. 
However, the admission of testimony regarding a prior 
instance of the defendant's threatening display of a black-
handled firearm was error.  Based on the testimony presented to 
the jury, the defendant took similar actions both prior to his 
display of a black-handled firearm and prior to shooting the 
victim.  In each case, the defendant was said to have argued 
with one or more people, left the area, and then returned.  
Given the similarity of the defendant's actions in each case, 
12 
 
 
the jury could have determined that if he behaved in that 
particular way a month beforehand, he must have been the person 
who shot and killed the victim.  In this instance, the risk of 
prejudice was high and outweighed the probative value of the 
testimony. 
Although it was error to admit the evidence regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant's threatening display of 
a firearm, we conclude that the error did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The judge 
gave a limiting instruction immediately following the witness's 
testimony, explaining that the evidence the witness provided 
could be considered "solely for the limited issues that the 
defendant had the means to obtain a firearm and had access to 
firearms and was familiar with firearms," and directed the jury 
to disregard portions of the testimony that suggested that the 
defendant possessed the murder weapon prior to June of 2010.  
The judge further instructed that the evidence could not be 
considered "on any issue of bad character or criminal 
propensity."3  As such, the judge's instruction forbade the jury 
                     
 
3 The judge instructed the jury as follows: 
 
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, I want to give you a special 
limiting instruction on the testimony of this witness.  
Remember that the defendant here is not charged with 
committing any crime other than the crime of murder of 
Julian Melendez.  That's the only charge here.  That's the 
only thing that you're concerned with.  You have heard 
13 
 
 
from using the evidence in ways that were unduly prejudicial to 
the defendant.  Moreover, the judge again instructed the jury on 
the matter in his final charge.4  We presume that juries follow 
                                                                  
mention here, if you credit this witness -- and, of course, 
you determine whether you believe any witness -- so if you 
do believe [this witness], you've heard evidence that he 
had seen the defendant on previous occasions prior to June 
of 2010, carrying a firearm and displaying the handle of 
what he thought was a firearm in May of 2010 or in that 
area.  Now, ladies and gentlemen, the Commonwealth does not 
claim that the firearm the defendant allegedly possessed 
before June of 2010, was connected with the firearm 
allegedly used in the murder.  That's not what the 
Commonwealth is claiming here.  And, ladies and gentlemen, 
you may use this evidence, that is evidence of prior 
possession of a firearm by the defendant, if you believe 
that evidence, you can't use that evidence as a substitute 
for proof that the defendant committed the crime of murder, 
nor may you consider it as proof that the defendant had a 
criminal propensity of a bad character, you don't use it 
for that.  For example, you may not conclude that because 
the defendant -- if you believe the testimony -- earlier 
displayed a gun or carried a firearm.  Even if you believe 
that, you cannot then conclude that the defendant committed 
the murder, they're just not logically connected.  But 
ladies and gentlemen, you may consider this evidence for a 
limited purpose.  You may consider it solely for the 
limited issues that the defendant had the means to obtain a 
firearm and had access to firearms and was familiar with 
firearms.  You may consider it for those purposes, but you 
may consider [sic] it on any issue of bad character or 
criminal propensity or anything like that.  So that's the 
limitation of this testimony." 
 
 
4 In his final instructions, the judge included the 
following: 
 
 
"You heard some evidence here about what you might 
consider a prior bad act on the part of the defendant, that 
is, possessing guns in the past.  Again, ladies and 
gentlemen, I've already told you, you can consider that, 
but only for a limited purpose and that is not to determine 
that the defendant had some sort of bad character or 
14 
 
 
judges' instructions.  Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 243 
(2017).  We also note that the evidence was not repeated during 
closing argument.  For these reasons, and because the 
Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of the defendant's 
guilt, see part 1, supra, we are substantially confident that 
the jury's verdict would have remained the same even had the 
evidence not been admitted in error.  See Montrond, 477 Mass. at 
135-136.  We therefore conclude that there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See id. 
3.  Closing argument.  The defendant argues that, during 
her closing argument, the prosecutor improperly characterized 
the "side light[s]" of the vehicle allegedly operated by the 
defendant at the time of the shooting as "not a common feature."  
Because defense counsel did not object at the time, the 
defendant must show that the alleged error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 377 (2009).  This he cannot do. 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to 
compare the photographs of the black Mazda owned by the 
defendant's girl friend (and occasionally driven by the 
                                                                  
criminal propensity, that's not it.  Instead, you could 
only consider it for the limited purpose of the defendant's 
familiarity with a weapon, with a handgun and his access to 
such weapons, that is, the means by which one could commit 
the crime.  That's the only purpose you heard that 
testimony." 
15 
 
 
defendant) with still photographs from a surveillance video 
camera, which captured video footage of a dark-colored vehicle 
as it twice approached the group, as well as footage of the 
victim approaching the vehicle each time it arrived, and a 
photograph of the crime scene depicting three other automobiles 
on the street.5  The photographs clearly depicted side lights on 
the girl friend's vehicle as well as side lights on the 
automobile that was captured on the surveillance video.  The 
side lights did not appear on other automobiles in the crime 
scene photograph.6 
"In closing argument, counsel may argue the evidence and 
the fair inferences which can be drawn from the evidence. . . .  
Counsel may also attempt to assist the jury in their task of 
                     
5 The prosecutor said in part: 
 
 
"Look at this Mazda.  It has a side light on both 
sides, just like that car.  Not something you see on a lot 
of cars.  We have some pictures of some other cars.  Here's 
a Maxima where [the victim's] blood was scattered.  There's 
no side light on that car, no side light on the car behind 
it, no side light on the Honda Civic in front of it.  
That's not a common feature." 
 
 
6 The prosecutor concluded: 
 
 
"I'm not going to stand here and tell you, that from 
those photographs and those photographs alone, that you can 
say that this is the car, but it sure does look like it, 
doesn't it?  And when you take all the other evidence that 
you have and you look at these photographs and you look at 
that picture, it's the black Mazda 626 that [the defendant] 
was driving." 
 
16 
 
 
analyzing, evaluating, and applying evidence.  Such assistance 
includes suggestions by counsel as to what conclusion the jury 
should draw from the evidence" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 510 (1992).  
See Commonwealth v. Cook, 419 Mass. 192, 204 (1994) 
(prosecutor's reference to photographs was based on evidence).  
As the other automobiles depicted in the crime scene photograph 
provide a basis in the evidence for pointing out that the 
distinguishing characteristic of the automobile in question was 
unusual, there was no error. 
 
4.  Jury instructions on transferred intent.  During 
deliberations, the jury asked the following question:  "If the 
defendant intended to shoot/kill someone/anyone, but not 
necessarily the victim/Julian, is it considered premeditated?"  
In response, the judge instructed the jury on transferred 
intent.7  The defendant argues that the evidence did not support 
a transferred intent killing, and that the erroneous instruction 
gave rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.8  We disagree. 
                     
 
7 The doctrine of transferred intent holds a defendant 
responsible for harm intended toward person X but inflicted on 
person Y instead.  Whatever intent the defendant had to harm 
person X is transferred to person Y.  See Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 (2012). 
 
 
8 The defendant concedes that he failed to object to the 
transferred intent instruction at trial, and that therefore we 
17 
 
 
 
A jury instruction "is proper if it is supported by any 
hypothesis of the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Colton, 477 Mass. 
1, 11 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 
689 (2001).  Here, although the Commonwealth proceeded on the 
theory that the defendant deliberately premeditated the killing 
of the victim and not someone else at the scene, the evidence 
presented also supported a theory of transferred intent.  That 
evidence included the fact that when he arrived at the scene, 
the defendant engaged in an argument with a number of people 
standing in a group that included the victim.  However, the 
victim was trying to "calm everything down."  He walked toward 
the defendant's automobile and said in a calm voice, "It['s] me, 
JM, it's me, your brother."  The defendant responded, "[J]ust 
get the fuck off my window," and drove away.  Approximately five 
minutes later, the defendant returned to the area and engaged in 
"a little more arguing" with people in a group.  The victim once 
again approached the automobile, "just trying to still de-
escalate the . . . situation."  The victim leaned in toward the 
window and again said, "It's me, JM, it's your brother.  I'm 
your brother."  It was then that the defendant reached out of 
the window and shot the victim. 
 
Based on these facts, the jury could have concluded that 
                                                                  
review any error for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 814-815 
(2017). 
18 
 
 
the defendant intended to shoot someone other than the victim 
because the victim's statements could suggest that the defendant 
did not recognize the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 
Mass. 822, 823, 831-832 (2000) (concluding premeditation existed 
under transferred intent doctrine where defendant misidentified 
victim).9  Indeed, the fact that the jury asked a question about 
transferred intent demonstrates that one or more of the jurors 
thought that the evidence supported this theory of the killing. 
 
In any event, to conclude that a transferred intent 
instruction was proper, we need not attempt to divine the theory 
upon which the jury relied to convict the defendant; we need 
merely conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to 
support a theory of transferred intent, and we do. 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks this court to reduce the degree of guilt pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, based on evidence that he was dependent 
on drugs at the time of the crime.  We have never before 
exercised our considerable power under § 33E to grant relief 
from a verdict of murder in the first degree because of drug 
dependence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 
                     
 
9 Alternatively, the evidence permitted the jury to conclude 
that the defendant intended to shoot anyone in the victim's 
group because the defendant had argued with a number of them, 
and then happened to shoot the victim.  See Taylor, 463 Mass. at 
864 (transferred intent instruction warranted where defendant 
argued with group of people, left, returned, and killed one 
member of group). 
19 
 
 
205, 212 (2010); Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 205, 208 
(2004); Commonwealth v. Blake, 409 Mass. 146, 148, 163-164 
(1991).  We decline to do so here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.