Title: Ex parte L.R.B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1151096
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2016

rel: 12/16/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1151096
____________________
Ex parte L.R.B.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: L.R.B.
v.
Talladega County Department of Human Resources)
(Talladega Juvenile Court, JU-12-82.04 and JU-12-82.05;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2150042)
BRYAN, Justice.
WRIT QUASHED. NO OPINION.
1151096
Stuart, Murdock, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Parker, J., concurs specially. 
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PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the decision to quash the writ under the
facts of this case because the petitioner failed to raise
below the precise argument he now raises.  Nonetheless, I
write specially because this case presents an 
important issue:
Whether a presumed father persists in his status as the legal
father of a child after he consents to the termination of his
parental rights.
The child's mother was married to M.H. when the child was
born.  However, while M.H. was in prison, the mother had a
relationship with L.R.B.  Shortly after the child was born,
both the mother and M.H. consented to the termination of their
parental rights, and the child was placed in the custody of
the State Department of Human Resources.  Thereafter, L.R.B.
filed a "custody-modification petition" asking the court to
order genetic testing to establish his paternity as to the
child.  L.R.B. argued that, upon termination of M.H.'s
parental rights, M.H. no longer persisted in his status as the
child's father and that L.R.B. should be allowed to establish
his paternity.  The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing
and found that M.H. "persisted in his status as the child's
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father" despite the fact that he had consented to the
termination of his parental rights and, thus, that L.R.B.
lacked standing to bring a paternity action.  The Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgment.   
Under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act ("the AUPA"),
"[a] man is presumed to be the father of a child if ... he and
the mother of the child are married to each other and the
child is born during the marriage."  § 26-17-204(a)(1), Ala.
Code 1975.  This Court has stated that no other man has
standing to bring an action seeking to have himself declared
the father of a child
"as long as there is a presumed father, pursuant to
§ 26–17–5(a)(1),
 who has not disclaimed his status
[1]
as the child's father; consequently, another man,
though he later marries the mother and lives with
the mother and child, has no standing to challenge
the presumed paternity of that child. Put another
way, so long as the presumed father persists in
maintaining his paternal status, not even the
subsequent marriage of the child's mother to another
man can create standing in the other man to
challenge 
the 
presumed 
father's 
parental
relationship."
Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406, 418 (Ala. 1989); § 26-17-
607(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("If the presumed father persists in
his status as the legal father of a child, neither the mother
Now codified at § 26-17-204(a)(1).
1
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1151096
nor any other individual may maintain an action to disprove
paternity."). 
The Alabama Comment to § 26-17-607 indicates that
"[s]ubsection (a) follows Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406
(Ala. 1989)[,] and its progeny that favor maintaining the
integrity of the family unit and the 
father-child 
relationship
that was developed therein."  This Court similarly recognized
in Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d at 412, that the AUPA "espouses
principles that seek to protect the sanctity of family
relationships."  Justice Murdock discussed the common-law
principles behind the presumption of paternity in his dissent
in Ex parte T.J., 89 So. 3d 744, 753 (Ala. 2012):
"The long-standing recognition of 'presumed
fathers' 
in 
our 
law 
finds 
its 
origins 
in
time-honored, 
common-law 
principles 
reflecting
traditional 
values 
and 
concerns 
relating 
to
adultery, 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
family, 
and
protection for both the father and the child in
established 
father-child 
relationships. 
Accordingly,
our law not only adheres to the general rule that a
child with a 'presumed father' may not be declared
illegitimate by our courts, it protects both
children and de facto fathers in preserving
established parent-child relationships."
The United States Supreme Court recognized that one purpose
behind the strong presumption of paternity under the common
law is "the interest in promoting the 'peace and tranquillity
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of States and families,' ... a goal that is obviously impaired
by facilitating suits against husband and wife asserting that
their children are illegitimate."  Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (citing J. Schouler, Law of the
Domestic Relations § 225, p. 304 (3d ed. 1882), and
Boullenois, Traité des Status, bk. 1, p. 62).
In this case, the policy rationales underlying the
presumption of paternity are not applicable.  The presumed
father in this case consented to the termination of his
parental rights, and there is no evidence indicating that he
ever maintained any familial relationship with the child.  The
policy rationale behind preventing alleged biological fathers
from asserting paternity as against presumed fathers is to
protect the sanctity of family relationships.  That goal is
not achieved by forbidding an alleged biological father from
establishing a relationship with a child whose 
presumed 
father
has consented to having his rights to parent the child
terminated.
Judge Moore, in his dissent below recognized as much:
"When a presumed father voluntarily waives his
parental rights to his child and consents to the
entry of a judgment terminating his parental rights,
thereby withdrawing his presence and care from the
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child, 
none 
of 
the 
principled 
justifications
underlying the holding in Ex parte Presse remain to
prevent another man from maintaining an action to
disprove the paternity of the presumed father. The
paternity action would not threaten any stable
custodial situation between the child and the
presumed father because that custodial situation no
longer exists. On the other hand, by allowing the
paternity action, the law would permit another,
willing man to prove his paternity so as to provide
a legal father to the child. Section 26–17–607 was
not intended by the legislature to apply in the
circumstances present in this case." 
L.R.B. v. Talladega Cty. Dep't of Human Res., [Ms. 2150042,
July 8, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)
(Moore, J., dissenting).  I agree with Judge Moore's reasoning
and would similarly find the policy rationale behind §
26–17–607 inapplicable under these facts.  I would find that
a presumed father who consents to the termination of his
parental rights is no longer persisting in his status as the
legal father of a child.
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