Title: State v. Campbell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 252PA14-2
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2017

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 
A
p
p
e
l
l
a
t
e
 
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
. 
 
 
NO. COA13-67 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 20 August 2013 
 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
         v. 
 
Wake County 
No. 12 CRS 200918 
PARIS JUJUAN TODD 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 June 2012 by 
Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 5 June 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Brenda Menard, for the State. 
 
Wait Law, P.L.L.C., by John L. Wait, for defendant 
appellant. 
 
 
McCULLOUGH, Judge. 
 
 
Paris Jujuan Todd (“defendant”) appeals from his conviction 
of robbery with a dangerous weapon on the following grounds: (1) 
the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a 
continuance made on the first day of trial, and alternatively, 
- 2 - 
 
 
 
(2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  For the 
following reasons, we find no error. 
 
I. Background 
Shortly before midnight on 23 December 2011, the Raleigh 
Police Department responded to a report of an armed robbery at 
325 Buck Jones Road. Upon arrival, George Major (the “victim”) 
informed police that, as he was walking home from work, an 
unknown African-American male approached him from behind, placed 
his hand on his shoulder, told him to get on the ground if he 
did not want to be hurt, and then forced him to the ground on 
his stomach.  Once victim was on the ground, a second unknown 
African-American male approached and held victim’s hands while 
the original assailant went through victim’s pockets and felt 
around victim’s clear plastic backpack.  As the assailants 
prepared to flee, they ordered victim to remain facedown on the 
ground until he counted to 200 because they “didn’t want to 
shoot [him].”  Victim complied until he could no longer hear the 
assailants’ footsteps. The assailants took victim’s wallet 
containing an identification card, credit cards, and a small 
velvet drawstring bag containing change.   
During the police investigation, Stacey Sneider of the 
City-County Identification Bureau was dispatched to assist in 
processing the backpack for fingerprints.  During her analysis, 
- 3 - 
 
 
 
Sneider collected two fingerprints from the backpack, one of 
which was later determined to be the defendant’s right middle 
finger. As a result, a warrant was issued for defendant’s 
arrest.   
On 18 January 2012, Officer Potter of the Raleigh Police 
Department stopped defendant for illegal tint on his car’s 
windows near the scene of the robbery. During the stop, Officer 
Potter came across defendant’s outstanding warrant and arrested 
defendant.   
On 30 January 2012, the State served defense counsel with 
the 
forensic 
report, 
which 
indicated 
that 
defendant’s 
fingerprints were located at the scene of the crime. Following 
defendant’s indictment for robbery with a dangerous weapon and 
conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon on 8 April 
2012, defendant’s case was called for trial on 23 April 2012.  
The case was continued and rescheduled to begin on 12 June 2012. 
Pursuant to defendant’s request for voluntary discovery, and 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-901, et seq., the State 
continued to disclose all relevant discovery material up until 
trial.  When the State received a copy of the fingerprints the 
day before trial they provided them to defense counsel that same 
day. While defense counsel stated that she was prepared to go to 
trial, she requested a continuance in order for her to obtain an 
expert to analyze the fingerprints. No affidavit was attached to 
- 4 - 
 
 
 
counsel’s unsigned motion, which neither indicated the expert 
she planned to call nor what testimony the expert would offer. 
In opposing defendant’s motion, the State cited the lack of 
specificity and also the fact that defense counsel was notified 
of the State’s intention to use fingerprint evidence as early as 
18 January 2012. Before ruling on the motion, Judge Stephens 
asked the State how many points of identification there were on 
the fingerprints, to which the State responded that there were 
ten. Judge Stephens then denied the motion.  
During the trial, Agent Rebecca Heinrich, the State’s 
fingerprint 
expert, 
explained 
how 
she 
verified 
that 
the 
fingerprint 
lifted 
from 
the 
scene 
matched 
defendant’s. 
Defendant’s counsel was prepared to rebut the State’s expert’s 
testimony, and she cross-examined Agent Heinrich on various 
weaknesses in the fingerprint identification.    
On 14 June 2012, the jury found defendant guilty of robbery 
with a dangerous weapon. The trial court entered judgment on the 
verdict, sentencing defendant to a term of 84 to 113 months’ 
imprisonment. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open 
court.  
II. Denial of Defendant’s Motion for a Continuance 
 
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error in denying defendant’s motion 
for a continuance after defense counsel was served with 
- 5 - 
 
 
 
essential discovery material on 11 June 2012, the day before 
trial. Our courts have long held that “[c]ontinuances are not 
favored and the party seeking a continuance has the burden of 
showing sufficient grounds for it.” Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 
473, 482, 223 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1976). In deciding whether to 
grant a continuance, the trial court must consider “[w]hether 
the failure to grant a continuance would be likely to result in 
a miscarriage of justice.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-952(g)(1) 
(2011). 
Despite the fact that continuances are disfavored, a 
defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare and 
present his defense. State v. Searles, 304 N.C. 149, 153, 282 
S.E.2d 430, 433 (1981).  No precise amount of time to prepare 
for trial is guaranteed and whether the denial of a motion to 
continue amounts to a due process violation is dependent upon 
the circumstances of each case. Id. at 153-54, 282 S.E.2d at 
433. “To establish a constitutional violation, a defendant must 
show that he did not have ample time to confer with counsel and 
to investigate, prepare and present his defense.” State v. 
Tunstall, 334 N.C. 320, 329, 432 S.E.2d 331, 337 (1993). This 
can be demonstrated by a showing of how a defendant’s case 
“would have been better prepared had the continuance been 
granted or that he was materially prejudiced by the denial of 
- 6 - 
 
 
 
his 
motion.” 
Id. 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
and 
citation 
omitted). 
Additionally, a motion to continue should only be granted 
if the reasons supporting it are fully established and “there is 
a belief that material evidence will come to light and such 
belief is reasonably grounded on known facts[.]” State v. 
Pollock, 56 N.C. App. 692, 694, 289 S.E.2d 588, 589, appeal 
dismissed, disc. review denied, 305 N.C. 590, 292 S.E.2d 573 
(1982) (emphasis omitted). However, “a mere intangible hope that 
something helpful to a litigant may possibly turn up affords no 
sufficient basis for delaying a trial.” Id. at 694, 289 S.E.2d 
at 589. The inclusion of supporting affidavits is not required 
to establish grounds for a continuance, but they are generally 
encouraged. See State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 33, 460 S.E.2d 
163, 171 (1995) (upholding denial of the defendant’s motion to 
continue since it was not supported by affidavits, did not fully 
establish the need to question proposed witnesses, and “did not 
set forth some form of ‘detailed proof indicating sufficient 
grounds for further delay’”) (quoting Searles, 304 N.C. at 155, 
282 S.E.2d at 434). 
When reviewing a denial of a continuance, this Court has 
also considered the following factors: 
(1) the diligence of the defendant in 
preparing 
for 
trial 
and 
requesting 
the 
continuance, (2) the detail and effort with 
- 7 - 
 
 
 
which the defendant communicates to the 
court the expected evidence or testimony, 
(3) the materiality of the expected evidence 
to the defendant’s case, and (4) the gravity 
of the harm defendant might suffer as a 
result of a denial of the continuance. 
State v. Barlowe, 157 N.C. App. 249, 254, 578 S.E.2d 660, 663 
(2003). “Further, before ruling on a motion to continue the 
judge should hear the evidence pro and con, consider it 
judicially and then rule with a view to promoting substantial 
justice.” Shankle, 289 N.C. at 483, 223 S.E.2d at 386.  
Generally, the denial of a motion to continue is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Searles, 304 N.C. at 153, 282 S.E.2d at 
433. However, the right to “adequate time to prepare a defense” 
is “guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States and by sections 19 and 23 of 
Article I of the Constitution of North Carolina[.]” Tunstall, 
334 N.C. at 328, 432 S.E.2d at 336. Since a constitutional basis 
presents a question of law, we review the sufficiency of the 
trial court’s inquiry de novo. Searles, 304 N.C. at 153, 282 
S.E.2d at 433. 
 
Here, defendant claims that a continuance should have been 
granted under the Barlowe test because of the materiality of the 
evidence and the potential gravity of the harm that defendant 
could suffer due to an improper denial. We believe that an 
- 8 - 
 
 
 
analysis of the Barlowe factors and other authority indicates 
the denial was proper.  
First, counsel knew that defendant was linked to the 
robbery only because his fingerprints were found on the victim’s 
backpack. Thus, despite the fact that defense counsel did not 
receive the actual fingerprints until the day before trial, she 
was served with discovery material on 30 January 2012 indicating 
that defendant was linked to the robbery by fingerprint 
evidence. While defense counsel is correct in stating that the 
fingerprints would not have come any earlier had they been 
requested, it is well known that comparison of fingerprint 
information involves a process that requires “a few minutes 
work.” State v. Abernathy, 295 N.C. 147, 160, 244 S.E.2d 373, 
382 (1978).  
 
While we do not question defense counsel’s tactics, the 
record is devoid of any effort by counsel to obtain a forensic 
expert until the first day of trial. In reviewing the denial of 
a continuance, this Court has held that the “defendant’s lack of 
diligence in placing his witnesses under subpoena when he had 
ample opportunity to do so . . . forestalls his belated attempt 
to place responsibility on the trial judge for their absence.” 
State v. Kuplen, 316 N.C. 387, 403, 343 S.E.2d 793, 802 (1986) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly, 
because defense counsel knew the fingerprints would be provided 
- 9 - 
 
 
 
at some point before trial, she had ample opportunity to retain 
a forensic expert for when the fingerprints eventually arrived. 
Despite knowing this, in her motion for a continuance counsel 
only stated that “it does not appear to be clear to me that [the 
latent fingerprint] might be a perfect match, and I’m asking for 
a continuance in the fact I need somebody with more expertise 
than myself to review this.”   
Moreover, the failure to identify an expert witness also 
evidences a lack of specificity regarding the reasons for 
requesting the continuance. Defense counsel failed to show (1) 
which expert would be called; (2) what testimony would be 
elicited by the expert; and (3) how defendant’s case would have 
been stronger with expert testimony. In addition to counsel’s 
aforesaid statement, she went on to state that “[i]f you are 
uninclined to continue the case . . . I would ask that you at 
least give me today to try to find an expert witness that could 
potentially testify in this case.” (Emphasis added.) This vague 
assertion resembles an “intangible hope” that helpful evidence 
may surface. Pollock, 56 N.C. App. at 694, 289 S.E.2d at 589. 
Accordingly, we believe the second factor also weighs against 
defendant.  
Third, as to the materiality of the evidence, while a 
forensic expert may often provide a meaningful defense in 
criminal cases, defendant has not shown that any expected 
- 10 - 
 
 
 
testimony would have strengthened his defense. Indeed, on cross-
examination of the State’s fingerprint expert, defense counsel 
exposed any weaknesses she believed existed in the State’s case.  
Defense counsel elicited testimony on cross-examination that (1) 
there was no way to tell how long the fingerprint had been on 
the backpack; (2) there were other persons’ fingerprints nearly 
matching the defendant’s; and (3) there were distortions in the 
fingerprint that linked defendant to the crime.  
Without delving into what other weaknesses a forensic 
expert could have exposed, we find that the potential gravity of 
harm from an erroneous denial was significantly lessened by 
defense counsel’s thorough cross-examination of the State’s 
forensic expert. We therefore hold that defendant has failed to 
carry its burden of establishing that the continuance was 
erroneous and prejudicial.  
III. Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Defendant’s remaining argument on appeal is that, if the 
motion for a continuance was properly denied, he is entitled to 
a new trial because he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel. We disagree.  
Courts 
have 
consistently 
held 
claims 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel (“IAC”) to a higher standard of proof. 
State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 613, 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974). 
- 11 - 
 
 
 
In order to succeed on an IAC claim, the defendant’s burden 
requires showing the following: 
“First, 
the 
defendant 
must 
show 
that 
counsel’s performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced 
the 
defense. 
This 
requires 
showing 
that 
counsel’s 
errors 
were 
so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair 
trial, 
a 
trial 
whose 
result 
is 
reliable.” 
State v. Quick, 152 N.C. App. 220, 222, 566 S.E.2d 735, 737 
(citation omitted), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 356 
N.C. 311, 570 S.E.2d 896 (2002).  North Carolina Courts have 
consistently held that “[t]he decisions on what witnesses to 
call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination . . . and all 
other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive 
province of the lawyer after consultation with his client. Trial 
counsel are necessarily given wide latitude in these matters.” 
State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 495, 256 S.E.2d 154, 160 (1979) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 
(1983).  
 
In State v. Swann, the defendant brought an IAC claim 
arguing that defense counsel “should have had a chemical 
analysis performed of the mattress on which the alleged incident 
- 12 - 
 
 
 
occurred in order to determine whether there was blood on the 
mattress.”  322 N.C. 666, 681, 370 S.E.2d 533, 542 (1988).  In 
rejecting defendant’s argument, our Supreme Court held, inter 
alia, “the defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable 
possibility that but for the errors of the defendant’s counsel 
in his pretrial investigation the result of the trial would have 
been different.”  Id. at 681-82, 370 S.E.2d at 542.  Thus, the 
Court concluded the defendant “made no showing that his trial 
counsel failed to render effective assistance of counsel, to the 
prejudice of his defense[.]”  Id. at 688, 370 S.E.2d at 546. 
 
Similarly, the defendant in State v. Quick argued that his 
trial counsel erred in not having a doctor testify as to his 
mental capacity because that “might have negated [his] ability 
to form the specific intent necessary to commit the crimes 
charged.”  152 N.C. App. at 222, 566 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis 
added).  Not only did this Court refuse to question defense 
counsel’s tactics, but it also noted how defendant failed to 
demonstrate that any hypothetical testimony would have made the 
case stronger.  Id. at 223, 566 S.E.2d at 737. 
Here, as in Swann and Quick, defendant has failed to show 
that his counsel failed to render effective assistance to his 
prejudice. The vague assertion that defense counsel should have 
called an expert to produce testimony falls well short of 
establishing a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to 
- 13 - 
 
 
 
effective counsel.  By no means does this Court’s determination 
that the denial of the continuance was proper lead to the 
inevitable conclusion that counsel was ineffective.  
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, we hold the trial court 
did not err in denying defendant’s motion to continue and 
defendant did not receive IAC. 
No error. 
Judges HUNTER (Robert C.) and GEER concur. 
Report per Rule 30(e).