Title: State v. Maready
Citation: 362 N.C. 614
Docket Number: 32A08
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2008

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH WAYNE MAREADY
No. 32A08
FILED: 12 DECEMBER 2008
1.
Search and Seizure--traffic stop--reasonable suspicion
The Court of Appeals erred in a prosecution for second-degree murder arising from a
traffic accident and other offenses by concluding officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct
a traffic stop of defendant because: (1) the overarching inquiry when assessing reasonable
suspicion is always based on the totality of circumstances; (2) the potential indicia of reliability
included all the facts known to the officers from personal observation including those that did
not necessarily corroborate or refute the informant’s statements; (3) an informant’s ability to
provide a firsthand eyewitness report is one indicator of reliability; and (4) the officers had
sufficient grounds to subject defendant to the minimal intrusion of a simple investigatory stop
based on facts including that they observed an intoxicated man stumbling across the roadway to
enter a silver Honda automobile; saw a minivan with its emergency flashers activated driving
unusually slowly, and eventually coming to a halt immediately in front of the Honda; responded
after being flagged down by the minivan driver who seemed to be distressed; and obtained
information in a face-to-face encounter that the driver of the Honda, whom the minivan driver
had apparently been in a position to observe, had been running stop signs and stop lights.
2.
Evidence–-prior crimes or bad acts-–six driving while impaired convictions--malice-
–intent--plain error analysis
The trial court did not commit plain error in a second-degree murder case based on
vehicular homicide by its instructions to the jury regarding the purposes for which they could
consider defendant’s prior driving while impaired convictions because: (1) evidence of a
defendant’s prior traffic-related convictions is admissible to prove the malice element in a
second-degree murder prosecution based on vehicular homicide; (2) irrespective of defendant’s
prior convictions, the State presented such significant evidence of intent with regard to all the
charges against defendant that it cannot be said that the challenged instruction probably affected
the jury’s verdicts; (3) defendant’s own statements to officers on the day of the accident showed
his knowledge and understanding that he was driving illegally and was not going to stop; (4)
regarding the charges of driving while impaired, driving while license revoked, and careless and
reckless driving, the defense conceded the State had presented sufficient evidence for the jury to
find defendant guilty; (5) regarding the larceny and possession of stolen goods charges, the
defense conceded all elements of the State’s case except the value of the stolen vehicle; and (6)
these concessions, in conjunction with the abundance of direct and circumstantial evidence of
defendant’s intent when committing the crimes for which he was convicted, lead to the
conclusion that any purported error in the jury instructions did not have a probable impact on the
jury’s finding of guilt.
3.
Evidence--prior crimes or bad acts--stale convictions--more than sixteen years old--
plain error analysis
The trial court did not commit plain error in a second-degree murder case based on
vehicular homicide by admitting into evidence prior traffic-related convictions against defendant
that were more than sixteen years old because: (1) given that the jury in this case was aware of
defendant’s four DWI convictions in the sixteen years preceding the offenses at issue, it cannot
be said that the jury probably would have reached different verdicts if it had not been informed
of his other two DWI convictions and nine convictions for other traffic-related of offenses; (2)
our Supreme Court rejected the notion that its per curiam opinion in State v. Goodman, 357 N.C.
43 (2003), established a bright-line rule that admission of any traffic-related conviction that
occurred more than sixteen years before the events at issue in a second-degree murder case
amounted to plain error per se; (3) the relevance of a temporally remote traffic-related conviction
to the question of malice does not depend solely upon the amount of time that has passed since
the conviction took place, and instead the extent of its probative value depends largely on
intervening circumstances; (4) the older convictions did not serve only to show that the
defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime
charged, but instead constituted part of a clear and consistent pattern of criminality that was
highly probative of his mental state at the time of his actions in regard to this case; and (5)
remoteness in time generally affects only the weight to be given N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b)
evidence, not its admissibility, and this is especially true when, as here, the prior conduct tended
to show a defendant’s state of mind as opposed to establishing that the present conduct and prior
actions are part of a common scheme or plan.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 188 N.C. App. ___, 654
S.E.2d 769 (2008), reversing judgments entered 24 April 2006 by
Judge Abraham P. Jones in Superior Court, Durham County, and
remanding for a new trial on all charges.  Heard in the Supreme
Court on 8 September 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery, III,
Special Counsel, for the State-appellant.
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Daniel R.
Pollitt, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-
appellee.
NEWBY, Justice.
This case, which involves an investigatory traffic stop
and the subsequent criminal trial, presents three issues.  First,
we determine whether the law enforcement officers who conducted
the traffic stop had reasonable suspicion to justify their
detention of defendant.  Next, we resolve whether the trial court
committed plain error in its instructions to the jury regarding
the purposes for which they could consider defendant’s prior
convictions.  Finally, we decide whether it was error for the
trial court to admit into evidence prior convictions against
defendant that were more than sixteen years old.  Because we hold
the traffic stop was lawful and defendant received a trial free
of plain error, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
As a result of a traffic accident in which a person was
killed, a Durham County grand jury indicted defendant for second-
degree murder; felonious larceny and felonious possession of
stolen goods (based on the theft of an automobile); assault with
a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury; two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon; driving while impaired; driving while
license revoked; careless and reckless driving; felony speeding
to elude arrest; and habitual felon status.  At his trial,
defendant moved to suppress all testimony related to the traffic
stop that gave rise to these charges, arguing the officers who
detained him lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court made
findings of fact based on the voir dire testimony, stating in
essence the following.
On 12 February 2005, two deputies from the Durham
County Sheriff’s Office were on patrol and saw an apparently
intoxicated man walking along Sherron Road in Durham County.  The
man was staggering near the roadway, so the deputies began
driving toward him.  As they did so, the deputies saw in the
opposite lane a minivan being driven at a slow pace with its
hazard lights activated.  Behind the minivan was a silver Honda
Civic.  The officers watched as the intoxicated man ran across
the roadway, crossing two traffic lanes, and got into the Honda. 
After passing the minivan, which had come to a stop, the Honda
continued down Sherron Road.  The deputies turned around, and as
they pulled alongside the minivan, its driver signaled to them to
get their attention.  The minivan driver appeared distraught and
told the deputies they needed to check on the driver of the
silver Honda because he had been driving erratically, running
stop signs and stop lights.  The deputies continued along Sherron
Road and found the Honda stopped at a stop light.  They activated
their blue lights and conducted an investigatory stop of the
Honda, which defendant was found to be driving.
After the trial court denied defendant’s motion to
suppress, one of the deputies repeated his voir dire testimony in
the presence of the jury and then continued recounting the facts. 
He stated that when he approached the Honda after it pulled over
to the side of the road, he detected a strong odor of alcohol and
noticed defendant’s motor skills appeared to be impaired.  When
asked if he had been drinking, defendant admitted that he had. 
The deputies ordered defendant out of the vehicle in order to
perform sobriety tests, but defendant refused.  When the deputies
tried to remove defendant from the vehicle by force, he “said
that he was not going back to the penitentiary, and he put the
vehicle into gear and sped off.”  The deputies got back in their
patrol car and pursued defendant, and despite traveling at
approximately sixty-five to seventy miles per hour (in a forty-
five-mile-per-hour zone), they were unable to gain on the Honda. 
They soon rounded a curve and saw the Honda “flipping
continuously,” as well as a red pickup truck flipping at the same
time.  The deputies found the driver of the truck thrown from her
vehicle, resulting in fatal injuries.  An SBI agent testified
that defendant’s blood, drawn approximately six hours after the
wreck occurred, showed an alcohol concentration of 0.14, well in
excess of the legal limit.  See N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1(a)(2) (2005).
 The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder;
misdemeanor larceny and misdemeanor possession of stolen goods;
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury; two
counts of assault with a deadly weapon; driving while impaired;
driving while license revoked; careless and reckless driving; and
felony eluding arrest.  The jury also found the presence of an
aggravating factor and that defendant had attained habitual felon
status.  A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant; the
trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions; and
it was plain error to admit evidence of prior convictions against
defendant that were more than sixteen years old.  State v.
Maready, __ N.C. App. __, 654 S.E.2d 769 (2008).  The State now
appeals based on the dissent.
II. REASONABLE SUSPICION
[1] We first address defendant’s contention that the
initial traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was not
founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  This Court
has recently confirmed that “reasonable suspicion is the
necessary standard for traffic stops.”  State v. Styles, 362 N.C.
412, 415, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (citations omitted).
Reasonable suspicion is a “less
demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence.”  Only “‘some
minimal level of objective justification’” is
required.  This Court has determined that the
reasonable suspicion standard requires that
“[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and
articulable facts, as well as the rational
inferences from those facts, as viewed
through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious
officer, guided by his experience and
training.”  Moreover, “[a] court must
consider ‘the totality of the circumstances--
the whole picture’ in determining whether a
reasonable suspicion” exists.
State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645
(citations omitted), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 264, __
L. Ed. 2d __ (2008).
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that based
on the totality of the circumstances, the deputies had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity and were thus justified in
stopping the silver Honda.  We agree, as this conclusion is fully
supported by the trial court’s findings of fact.  As noted by the
Court of Appeals majority, finding of fact number eight is not
supported by competent evidence insofar as it states the driver
of the minivan told the deputies that defendant “may be drunk.” 
The trial court’s findings are otherwise supported by the
evidence, however, and they in turn support the conclusion that
the deputies had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant.
We reiterate that the overarching inquiry when
assessing reasonable suspicion is always based on the totality of
the circumstances.  Id.  When police act on the basis of an
informant’s tip, the indicia of the tip’s reliability are
certainly among the circumstances that must be considered in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.  E.g., Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d
301, 309 (1990).  The potential indicia of reliability include
all “the facts known to the officers from personal observation,”
id., including those that do not necessarily corroborate or
refute the informant’s statements.
One such fact in the instant case was that the minivan
was traveling immediately in front of the silver Honda as the
officers approached, and thus the driver apparently would have
been in a position to view the alleged traffic violations she
reported.  An informant’s ability to provide a firsthand
eyewitness report is one indicator of reliability.  We also note
that the minivan driver’s especially cautious driving and her
apparent distress were consistent with what one would expect of a
driver who had witnessed a nearby motorist driving erratically.
Similarly, we give significant weight to the fact that
the minivan driver approached the deputies in person and gave
them information at a time and place near to the scene of the
alleged traffic violations.  She would have had little time to
fabricate her allegations against defendant.  Moreover, in
providing the tip through a face-to-face encounter with the
sheriff’s deputies, the minivan driver was not a completely
anonymous informant.  It is inconsequential to our analysis that
the officers did not actually pause to record her license plate
number or other identifying information.  Not knowing whether the
officers had already noted her tag number or if they would detain
1
If an informant places his anonymity at
risk, a court can consider this factor in
weighing the reliability of the tip.  An
instance where a tip might be considered
anonymous but nevertheless sufficiently
reliable to justify a proportionate police
response may be when an unnamed person
driving a car the police officer later
describes stops for a moment and, face to
face, informs the police that criminal
activity is occurring.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 276, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1381, 146 L.
Ed. 2d 254, 263 (2000) (Kennedy, J. & Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring) (citing United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d
760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 99 S. Ct. 333, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 333 (1978)).
her for further questioning, and aware they could quickly assess
the truth of her statements by stopping the silver Honda, the
minivan driver willingly placed her anonymity at risk.  This
circumstance weighs in favor of deeming her tip reliable.1
These indicia of reliability, together with the rest of
the attendant circumstances, satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standard.  The deputies in this case observed an intoxicated man
stumbling across the roadway to enter the silver Honda; saw the
minivan, with its emergency flashers activated, driving unusually
slowly and eventually coming to a halt immediately in front of
the Honda; responded after being flagged down by the minivan
driver, who seemed to be distressed; and obtained information in
a face-to-face encounter that the driver of the Honda, whom the
minivan driver had apparently been in a position to observe, had
been running stop signs and stop lights.  Under these
circumstances, the officers had sufficient grounds to subject
defendant to the “minimal intrusion” of a simple investigatory
stop.  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126, 120 S. Ct. at
677, 145 L. Ed. at 577.  We therefore hold the traffic stop was
constitutional and that the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion to suppress.
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
[2] We next consider the trial court’s instructions to
the jury with regard to defendant’s prior convictions.  At trial,
the State introduced defendant’s certified driving record from
the Division of Motor Vehicles, which listed, inter alia, six
prior convictions for driving while impaired.  During jury
instructions, the trial court told the jury they could consider
this evidence “for the limited purpose for which it has been
received,” which the court defined as “solely for . . . showing
that the defendant had the requisite malice or intent which is a
necessary element of crimes charged in this case.”
This Court has held evidence of a defendant’s prior
traffic-related convictions admissible to prove the malice
element in a second-degree murder prosecution based on vehicular
homicide.  State v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 400, 527 S.E.2d 299, 307
(2000).  Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that
the trial court exceeded the bounds of this holding by
instructing the jury that defendant’s prior convictions could be
used to prove the intent element of each crime for which he was
tried.
Because defendant failed to object to the jury
instruction at trial, his challenge is subject to plain error
review.  Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362
N.C. 191, 196, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008) (citing State v.
Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 613, 536 S.E.2d 36, 47 (2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 997, 121 S. Ct. 1660, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001);
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660-61, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)). 
Plain error has been defined as “‘fundamental error, something so
basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice
cannot have been done.’”  Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at
378 (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th
Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct.
381, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)).  “In deciding whether a defect in
the jury instruction constitutes ‘plain error,’ the appellate
court must examine the entire record and determine if the
instructional error had a probable impact on the jury’s finding
of guilt.”  Id. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79.
Assuming without deciding that there was error in the
trial court’s instruction, our review of the record in this case
reveals any such error did not amount to plain error. 
Irrespective of defendant’s prior convictions, the State
presented such significant evidence of intent with regard to all
the charges against defendant that we cannot say the challenged
instruction probably affected the jury’s verdicts.  We call
particular attention to the testimony regarding defendant’s own
statements on the day of the incident.  During an earlier
encounter with another deputy several hours before the wreck,
defendant stated he had recently been released from jail, that
his driver’s license was suspended, and that “he didn’t drive.” 
Later, during the investigatory traffic stop, defendant admitted
he had been drinking.  Then, as he fled the scene of the stop,
defendant “said that he was not going back to the penitentiary.” 
These statements strongly demonstrate defendant’s knowledge and
understanding that he was driving illegally and was not going to
stop.
Also, although not dispositive of the State’s burden of
proving all elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt,
see State v. Patterson, 297 N.C. 247, 256, 254 S.E.2d 604, 610
(1979), a number of concessions made by the defense during
closing arguments are relevant in assessing the effect of the
alleged error on the jury’s verdicts.  Regarding the charges of
driving while impaired, driving while license revoked, and
careless and reckless driving, the defense conceded the State had
presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant
guilty.  Regarding the larceny and possession of stolen goods
charges, the defense conceded all elements of the State’s case
except the value of the stolen vehicle.  These concessions, in
conjunction with the abundance of direct and circumstantial
evidence of defendant’s intent when committing the crimes for
which he was convicted, lead us to conclude any purported error
in the jury instructions did not have “a probable impact on the
jury’s finding of guilt.”  Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at
379 (citing United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907, 98 S. Ct. 3096, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1137
(1978)).  We therefore hold the challenged instruction did not
constitute plain error.
IV. PRIOR CONVICTIONS
[3] We lastly consider the trial court’s admission into
evidence of prior traffic-related convictions against defendant
that were more than sixteen years old.  Because defendant failed
to object to the admission of his driving record, we review that
admission for plain error.  Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt., 362 N.C. at
196, 657 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Cummings, 352 N.C. at 613, 536
S.E.2d at 47; Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378).
Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. -- Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake,
entrapment or accident. . . .
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2005).  This Court’s decisions have
interpreted Rule 404(b) as 
a clear general rule of inclusion of relevant
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a
defendant, subject to but one exception requiring
its exclusion if its only probative value is to
show that the defendant has the propensity or
disposition to commit an offense of the nature of
the crime charged.
State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).
Defendant’s driving record contained a number of
convictions that occurred more than sixteen years before the date
of the crimes at issue here.  The question before us is whether
there is a fixed point in time when a prior conviction becomes
too temporally remote to be probative.  The Court of Appeals’
holding that it was plain error to admit the convictions that
were more than sixteen years old was based on our per curiam
opinion in State v. Goodman, 357 N.C. 43, 577 S.E.2d 619 (2003)
(rev’g 149 N.C. App. 57, 560 S.E.2d 196 (2002)), in which this
Court reversed a Court of Appeals majority for the reasons stated
in the dissenting opinion.  In Goodman, another second-degree
murder case based on vehicular homicide, the trial court had
likewise admitted the defendant’s full driving record.  That
record reflected a total of six previous driving while impaired
(“DWI”) convictions.  The Court of Appeals majority held it was
not plain error to admit the entire driving record.  149 N.C.
App. at 70, 560 S.E.2d at 204-05.  The dissent emphasized the
defendant had few convictions in the years immediately preceding
the incident at issue and argued that many of the convictions
reflected in the defendant’s record were too temporally remote to
be admitted under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence.  Id. at 73, 560 S.E.2d at 206 (Greene, J., dissenting). 
On appeal, this Court reversed on the basis of the dissent in a
per curiam opinion.
Defendant’s driving record in the instant case stands
in stark contrast to the record at issue in Goodman.  Like the
Goodman defendant, defendant here had six previous DWI
convictions.  However, whereas only one of the Goodman
defendant’s previous DWI convictions occurred within the sixteen
years preceding the crime at issue in that case, id., defendant
in the case sub judice was convicted of DWI four times in the
sixteen years leading up to the incident at issue.  Moreover,
while the most recent prior DWI conviction in Goodman occurred
more than eight years before the crime at issue there, id.,
defendant in this case was convicted of DWI less than six months
before the incident giving rise to the current charges against
him.  The driving record in this case demonstrates a much more
consistent, and therefore more probative, pattern of criminal
behavior than the record in Goodman.  Given that the jury in this
case was aware of defendant’s four DWI convictions in the sixteen
years preceding the offenses at issue, we do not agree with
defendant’s contention that the jury probably would have reached
different verdicts if it had not been informed of his other two
DWI convictions and nine convictions for other traffic-related
offenses.  See State v. Hammett, 361 N.C. 92, 98, 637 S.E.2d 518,
522 (2006) (appellate court reviewing evidentiary admissions for
plain error must ask “whether the jury would probably have
reached a different verdict if [the challenged evidence] had not
been admitted” (citing State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 213, 362
S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 108 S. Ct.
1598, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988)).  We therefore find no plain error
in the admission of defendant’s whole driving record.
In so doing, we necessarily reject the notion that this
Court’s per curiam opinion in Goodman established a bright-line
rule that admission of any traffic-related conviction that
occurred more than sixteen years before the events at issue in a
second-degree murder case amounts to plain error per se.  The
relevance of a temporally remote traffic-related conviction to
the question of malice does not depend solely upon the amount of
time that has passed since the conviction took place.  Rather,
the extent of its probative value depends largely on intervening
circumstances.  In the instant case, in which defendant was
convicted of DWI four times in the sixteen years preceding the
events now at issue, his older convictions do not serve only “to
show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to
commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.”  Coffey,
326 N.C. at 279, 389 S.E.2d at 54.  Those convictions instead
constitute part of a clear and consistent pattern of criminality
that is highly probative of his mental state at the time of his
actions at issue here.
It remains true that assessments of the probative value
of evidence under Rule 404(b) must be guided by considerations of
“similarity and temporal proximity.”  State v. Lynch, 334 N.C.
402, 412, 432 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1993) (citation omitted). 
However, “‘remoteness in time generally affects only the weight
to be given [404(b)] evidence, not its admissibility.’”  State v.
Parker, 354 N.C. 268, 287, 553 S.E.2d 885, 899 (2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. White, 349 N.C. 535,
553, 508 S.E.2d 253, 265 (1998) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
527 U.S. 1026, 119 S. Ct. 2376, 144 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1999)), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1114, 122 S. Ct. 2332, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002). 
This is especially true when, as here, the prior conduct tends to
show a defendant’s state of mind, as opposed to establishing that
the present conduct and prior actions are part of a common scheme
or plan.  See State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 306-07, 406 S.E.2d
876, 892-93 (1991).
Unlike the instant case, State v. Goodman was an
exception to the general rule:  a case in which the intervening
circumstances between temporally distant convictions and the
2 In adopting “the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion”
in Goodman, see 357 N.C. 43, 577 S.E.2d 619, this Court agreed
with the dissent that in the circumstances of that case it was
plain error to admit the defendant’s traffic-related convictions
dating more than sixteen years from the actions at issue there. 
We did not, however, adopt any purported statements of law that
were unnecessary to the dissent’s reasoning.  As evidenced by its
relegation to a footnote, the statement that “any conviction
dating beyond sixteen years, however slight, runs afoul of the
temporal proximity requirement of Rule 404(b),” Goodman, 149 N.C.
App. at 73 n.1, 560 S.E.2d at 206 n.1 (Greene, J., dissenting),
was unnecessary to the dissent’s reasoning.  That statement is
hereby expressly rejected.
actions at issue militated strongly against admission of the
remote convictions.  Our holding in Goodman was based on the
temporal remoteness of the defendant’s prior convictions combined
with the defendant’s relatively clean driving record in the years
leading up to the crime at issue in that case.  It does not
follow that admission of any conviction greater than sixteen
years old automatically constitutes error, and hence we disavow
any such reading of Goodman.2
The probative value (and thus the admissibility) of
404(b) evidence must be determined on a case-by-case basis rather
than through application of a fixed temporal maximum.  Temporal
proximity is simply one factor for courts to consider in deciding
whether a piece of evidence has probative value beyond “show[ing]
that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an
offense of the nature of the crime charged.”  Coffey, 326 N.C. at
279, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
V. DISPOSITION
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
this case is remanded to that court for consideration of
defendant’s remaining assignments of error.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the trial court properly
denied defendant’s motion to suppress, and I therefore concur
fully with Section II of the majority opinion.  I do not agree,
however, that the trial court’s erroneous instruction and the
admission of defendant’s entire driving record had no probable
effect upon the jury verdict.  Thus I respectfully dissent as to
Sections III and IV.
As to the trial court’s instruction, the Court of
Appeals unanimously agreed that it was erroneous.  See State v.
Maready, __ N.C. App. __, __, __, 654 S.E.2d 769, 779, 783
(2008).  However, the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the instructional
error amounted to plain error.  __ N.C. App. at __, 654 S.E.2d at
783 (Tyson, J., dissenting).  Thus the only question regarding
this issue properly before this Court is whether the instruction
amounted to plain error.  The majority concludes that the
erroneous instruction had no probable effect upon the jury
verdict.  I disagree. 
The State’s case against defendant was not
overwhelming.  Defendant did not confess, and he conducted a
vigorous defense.  Defendant particularly contested the intent
element of the charges of second-degree murder, assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, assault with a deadly
weapon, and fleeing to elude arrest.  Defendant argued that he
-18-
fled from the officers because he feared for his personal safety. 
In support of this argument, defendant presented a neutral
witness, Rhonda Arnold, who worked at a hardware store across the
street from where the deputies stopped defendant.  Ms. Arnold
witnessed the deputies’ interaction with defendant and testified,
in contrast to the deputies’ testimony, that both officers had
their weapons drawn and pointed at defendant, and that they were
yelling at him to get back in his car.  Defense counsel contended
that, as a result of the deputies’ actions, defendant panicked
and fled, which was “clearly a bad decision” but was nevertheless
motivated by his desire for “safety and fear of what might happen
to him.”  Thus, the intent element of the second-degree murder,
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, assault
with a deadly weapon, and fleeing to elude arrest charges was
closely contested.
 
Moreover, the majority omits from its analysis certain
facts that I believe are relevant to the plain error analysis
here.  First, the jury wrote a note inquiring about the intent
element in the assault charges and sought clarification of the
jurors’ interpretation of intent.  The jury asked the trial court
whether the word “intent” could “be interpreted strictly only as
[defendant] absolutely intended to hit the other cars” or whether
“intent” could be “interpreted as the sum total of the actions
caused the collision [and] this implies intent.”  The trial court
informed the jury that intent “can be interpreted as the sum
total of the actions caused the collision and this implies
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intent.”  The jury also specifically requested reinstruction on
the intent element of the fleeing to elude arrest charge. 
Further, the prosecutor emphasized defendant’s lengthy DMV record
during the trial and argued that such records proved defendant
was “acting intentionally.”  
 The jury’s concern with the intent element of the
crimes, combined with the State’s emphasis on defendant’s DMV
records to show intent, demonstrates that the erroneous
instruction probably influenced the jury verdict.  See State v.
Goodman, 357 N.C. 43, 577 S.E.2d 619 (2003) (per curiam)
(reversing the Court of Appeals decision reported at 149 N.C.
App. 57, 560 S.E.2d 196 (2002), for reasons stated in the
dissenting opinion, which found plain error when the jury (1)
requested to have the definition of malice read twice, and (2)
later requested a written definition of malice, along with the
defendant’s driving record, to consider during its deliberations,
id. at 72-73, 560 S.E.2d at 206 (Greene, J., dissenting)).  In
addition, the trial court’s erroneous instruction--that the jury
could use defendant’s past convictions to find intent on all the
charges--was particularly prejudicial because of the similarity
between his past convictions and the charges in the present case. 
See State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 247, 644 S.E.2d 206, 214
(stating that “it is error to admit evidence of the defendant’s
prior conviction when the defendant does not testify”), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 169 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2007); State v.
Wilkerson, 356 N.C. 418, 571 S.E.2d 583 (2002) (per curiam)
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(reversing the Court of Appeals decision reported at 148 N.C.
App. 310, 559 S.E.2d 5 (2002), which opined, inter alia, that
“any similarities between the offense of which defendant was
previously convicted and the current charged offense (as opposed
to similarities in the facts and circumstances underlying such
offenses) manifestly increases the danger of unfair prejudice”,
id. at 327, 559 S.E.2d at 16 (Wynn, J., dissenting)).
I do not agree that defendant’s own statements
constitute such significant evidence of intent on all of the
charges as to render the erroneous instruction harmless.  Nor do
I find defendant’s concessions during closing argument relevant
to whether the State presented substantial evidence of the intent
element of the charges of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury, felony fleeing/eluding arrest with a motor
vehicle, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and
misdemeanor larceny.  I moreover conclude that the admission of
defendant’s entire driving record also had a probable effect upon
the jury verdict.  I would therefore hold that defendant has
demonstrated plain error, and I would affirm the Court of
Appeals.