Title: ELLINGSON v CRICK CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12824
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 1975

No. 12824 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1975 STEVEN G. ELLINGSON, Claimant and Respondent, -vs - CRICK C O M P A N Y , Employer, and A R G O N A U T N O R T H W E S T INSURANCE C O M P A N Y , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Harris, Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana For Respoddent: Harrison, Loendorf and Poston, Helena, Montana Jerome T. Loendorf argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: January 15, 1975 Decided : APR 10 1975 fip2 1 l $ i b Filed : M r . J u s t i c e Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from the order of the d i s t r i c t court, Powell County, affirming an award of workmen's compensation benefits t o claimant, Steven G. Ellingson. The f a c t s giving rise t o the claim a r e not disputed. On June 7, 1972, claimant was injured i n a two vehicle accident on U.S. Highway 12, near Avon, Montana. A t the t i m e of the accident, he was enroute t o h i s place of employment i n h i s private vehicle. H i s employer Crick Company was then engaged i n a highway construction project j u s t west of Garrison, Montana. Claimant was l i v i n g i n Helena and commuted the forty-,five miles every day. The p a r t i e s stipulated t h a t claimant was not a union member, but was working under the terms of the 1971-1974 Heavy Highway Construc- t i o n Agreement between the Montana Contractors' Association, Inc. and the Laborers' International Union of North America. Consistent with the terms of t h a t agreement, claimant was paid f i v e d o l l a r s per day a s "travel allowance". The amount of the allowance was determined by a contractual schedule computed on the b a s i s of mileage between the center of the job s i t e and the nearest county courthouse. The amount thus computed w a s paid t o a l l employees, independently of the mileage a c t u a l l y traveled by any p a r t i c u l a r employee. It i s c l e a r t h i s allowance was not intended t o be compensation f o r t h e time spent i n t r a v e l . Not only was it computed without consideration of time and distance a c t u a l l y inolved i n each employee's case, but the contract c l e a r l y provided: " ~ m ~ l o ~ e e s s h a l l t r a v e l t o and from t h e i r d a i l v i n i t i a i reporting place on t h e i r own time and by means of t h e i r own transportation."(Emphasis supplied). A l l these f a c t s were before the hearing examiner of the Workmen's Compensation Division when he entered findings of f a c t and conclusions of law favoring claimant. The decision was appealed t o the d i s t r i c t court of Powell County on the record of the e a r l i e r hearing, without the introduction of additional evidence. The d i s t r i c t court adopted a l l of the findings of f a c t and conclu- sions of law entered by the ~ i v i s i o n ' s hearing examiner. That judgment is now appealed, alleging t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t court erred i n allowing the claim. Before discussing t h e single issue raised, we note t h a t the decisions of the hearing examiner and t h e d i s t r i c t court were made M o n t . p r i o r t o our decision i n McMillen v. McKee & Co., 2 P.2d , 32 St. Rep. 319. A s recognized by the p a r t i e s i n t h e i r arguments before t h i s Court, t h e McMillen decision i s per- t i n e n t t o t h i s appeal, although the question remains whether it i s controlling under the s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n here. In McMillen and the i n s t a n t case, claimants were injured i n t r a f f i c accidents while enroute t o t h e i r jobs. Claimants i n both cases were receiving an allowance f o r t r a v e l under the terms of a union contract. I n both cases, we a r e c a l l e d upon t o determine I 1 whether the i n j u r i e s sustained arose out of and i n the course of1' the claimants' employment. Section 92-614, R.C.M. 1947. In McMillen the Court adopted the general r u l e t h a t : 'I* * * a workman i s usually e n t i t l e d t o compensation when injured during t r a v e l t o o r from h i s employment where he receives a specific allowance t o get t o and from h i s job. I* Appellant would have us e i t h e r distinguish o r overrule McMillen here. The argument advanced f o r distinguishing t h i s case from McMillen is the acknowledged differences i n the contractual methods of computing the respective t r a v e l allowances. I n McMillen, the computation was predicated upon the miles actually traveled by the individual employee, while hxe it i s based on the distance from the job site to the nearest county courthouse. The disparity results in McMillen employees receiving Varying amounts of compensa- tion depending on the distance traveled, while the employees here all received a uniform amount. We cannot see where that distinction varies the applicability of the test enunciated in McMillen . The fact that the travel allowance here was based on a distance other than mileage between residence and job site is not important. The union contract singled out transportation as the subject of a specific allowance. When transportation is thus singled out in the employment contract, the travel to and from work is brought within the course of employment. Injuries sustained enroute are therefore compensable. McMillen, supra; 1 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 16.30. Although McMillen was expressly limited to the facts therein presented, the facts presented here are so similar as to mandate a similar result. No new arguments were advanced which would require a reconsideration of our position in McMillen, neither as to its facts nor the legal theories there involved. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Justice We Concur: .................................... Justices. M r . Justice Wesley Castles dissenting: I dissent as I did in McMillen, relied on here i n the majority opinion. Chief J u s t i c e James 'I1. Harrison took no p a r t i n t h i s Opinion.