Title: Cherry v. D.S. Nash Construction Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 951876
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 1996

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LOIS EVONE CHERRY 
 
v.  Record No. 951876 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                    September 13, 1996 
D.S. NASH CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 
 
H. Selwyn Smith, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the admissibility of (1) a state 
trooper's field notes made during his investigation of a motor 
vehicle accident, and (2) a report made by the Virginia 
Department of Transportation (VDOT) evaluating a contractor's 
performance of a highway construction contract. 
 
On October 9, 1991, a vehicle driven by Lois E. Cherry 
collided "head-on" with a pickup truck driven by Larry W. Nash, a 
project superintendent for D.S. Nash Construction Company (Nash 
Construction).  The accident occurred in Campbell County on Route 
501 near its intersection with Route 670.  At the time of the 
accident, Nash Construction was under contract with VDOT to build 
two new lanes of Route 501 parallel to the existing two lanes. 
 
Cherry filed a motion for judgment alleging both gross and 
ordinary negligence against Nash Construction for failing to warn 
drivers of the change in the traffic pattern when it opened the 
two new highway lanes.  Cherry contended that Nash Construction 
failed to remove construction barrels, which were erected along 
the "crossover" area of the median strip at the intersection of 
Routes 501 and 670 (the intersection), when the new lanes were 
opened to traffic.  She asserted that the absence of this and 
other safety measures caused her to conclude that the new portion 
 
 
 
 
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of the roadway was not open for traffic, and that traffic in both 
directions was proceeding on the original portion of the roadway. 
 Cherry sustained severe injuries as a result of the collision. 
 
At trial, the evidence showed that during the afternoon 
hours of October 8, 1991, VDOT and Nash Construction opened the 
two new lanes of Route 501 to northbound traffic and made both 
the original lanes open to southbound traffic.  Larry Nash was 
the project superintendent who directed all aspects of the 
construction, including project safety.  He testified that Nash 
Construction was responsible for removing the construction 
barrels when the new traffic lanes were opened. 
 
The parties presented conflicting evidence on the issue 
whether Nash Construction removed the construction barrels from 
the median crossover before the accident happened.  The evidence 
also was conflicting on the issue whether "wrong way" and "do not 
enter" signs were placed on the original roadway several days 
before the traffic pattern actually changed, causing motorists to 
disregard the signs. 
 
Cherry attempted to introduce in evidence a statement 
contained in the field notes made by State Trooper Colin E. 
Davidson at the accident scene.  The statement, purportedly made 
by State Trooper C. Bruce Stauffer, was recorded by Trooper 
Davidson as follows:  "Do Not Enter [and] Wrong Way signs put up 
over two weeks prior to road being opened (per Bruce Stauffer)." 
 Trooper Stauffer testified by deposition that he could not 
 
 
 
 
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remember when the signs were erected, but stated that he had been 
familiar with the condition of Route 501 during the construction 
period.  The trial court ruled that, under Code § 46.2-379, the 
field notes were inadmissible because they were incorporated into 
the accident report that Trooper Davidson prepared and filed with 
the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). 
 
During the testimony of Vester Clifton, a VDOT construction 
inspector, Nash Construction offered in evidence a VDOT 
"Contractor's Past Performance Report," which Clifton had 
prepared.  The report included Clifton's assessment of Nash 
Construction's attitude and cooperation, equipment, organization 
and management, and use of "disadvantaged/women" business 
enterprises.  The report also noted that Nash Construction had 
not been cited for any safety violations over the course of the 
entire 18-month project. 
 
Cherry objected to the admission of Clifton's report on the 
grounds that it was irrelevant and constituted prejudicial "good 
character" evidence.  The trial court overruled the objection and 
admitted the report in evidence. 
 
The trial court struck the gross negligence claim and 
instructed the jury on ordinary negligence.  The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Nash Construction, and the trial court 
confirmed the verdict.  This appeal followed.  
 
Cherry first argues that the trial court erred in admitting 
in evidence the VDOT report prepared by Clifton.  Cherry asserts 
 
 
 
 
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that the VDOT report contained impermissible evidence of 
collateral facts purporting to show that Nash Construction was 
not negligent on other occasions. 
 
In response, Nash Construction asserts that the information 
in the report concerning its safety record was relevant to the 
claims of both gross and ordinary negligence.  Nash Construction 
also contends that the report was admissible because it provided 
circumstantial evidence corroborating other testimony that the 
barrels had been removed from the construction site on the day 
before the accident occurred.  We disagree with Nash 
Construction. 
 
In a negligence action, evidence is inadmissible to show 
that a defendant was not negligent on other occasions or was in 
the habit of conducting itself in a safe and careful manner.  
Jackson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 179 Va. 642, 648, 20 S.E.2d 
489, 491 (1942).  This rule is designed to ensure that evidence 
is relevant to the issues presented, namely, whether the 
defendant was negligent at the time of the acts complained of and 
whether any such negligence was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injury.  See Jackson at 649, 20 S.E.2d at 492.  
Evidence of collateral facts, from which no fair inferences can 
be drawn, tends to divert the jury from the issues before the 
court, to mislead the jury, and to excite prejudice.  See Spurlin 
v. Richardson, 203 Va. 984, 990, 128 S.E.2d 273, 278 (1962). 
 
Here, the VDOT report was irrelevant to the issue whether 
 
 
 
 
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Nash Construction was negligent on the date the accident 
occurred.  Nash Construction's overall performance record, as 
well as the fact that it had not been cited by VDOT for safety 
violations on the job, had no probative value regarding the 
question whether Nash Construction had removed the barrels prior 
to the accident, or whether Nash Construction should have used 
flagpersons to direct traffic or taken other safety measures on 
the date of the accident.  The admission of the report was also 
prejudicial because it invited the jury to speculate and to 
conclude improperly that Nash Construction could not have been 
negligent in this case, because it was not cited for any safety 
violations over the 18-month duration of the project. 
 
Cherry next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
allow Trooper Davidson to testify about the statement in his 
field notes attributed to Trooper Stauffer.  Cherry contends that 
Code § 46.2-379 only bars use of the actual accident report filed 
with the DMV, not the investigating officer's field notes made at 
the accident scene. 
 
In response, Nash Construction asserts that Trooper 
Davidson's field notes were inadmissible, because they were 
incorporated into the DMV accident report and became a part of 
the report within the meaning of Code § 46.2-379.  We disagree 
with Nash Construction. 
 
Code § 46.2-379 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll 
[motor vehicle] accident reports made by investigating officers 
 
 
 
 
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. . . shall not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or 
criminal, arising out of any accident."  This statute prohibits 
any such use of the report itself, but does not proscribe the use 
of otherwise admissible evidence contained in the report as long 
as the report itself, or a portion thereof, is not the evidence 
sought to be admitted.  See Moore v. Warren, 203 Va. 117, 124, 
122 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1961). 
 
In Moore, we held that admission of a diagram made by the 
investigating officer at the scene of a motor vehicle accident 
was not barred by the predecessor statute to Code § 46.2-379, 
even though the diagram was identical to the one filed in the 
officer's official accident report.  Id.  By contrast, in 
Galbraith v. Fleming, 245 Va. 173, 174-75, 427 S.E.2d 187, 188 
(1993), we held inadmissible a portion of an accident report, 
which contained a diagram of the accident made by the 
investigating officer, although the jury was not informed that 
the exhibit was part of the actual report. 
 
The rationale underlying this distinction is plain.  Code 
§ 46.2-379 bars any use of the accident report itself because 
there is a danger that the jury could attach more weight to it, 
as an official report, than is properly due.  Davis v. Colgin, 
219 Va. 5, 7, 244 S.E.2d 750, 751 (1978).  To prevent such 
improper assessment, no portion of the actual report will be 
admitted, even though any references to its official nature have 
been deleted. 
 
 
 
 
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Here, Cherry did not offer in evidence a portion of the 
report itself.  Rather, she sought to introduce in evidence the 
statement recorded by Trooper Davidson in his field notes.  Thus, 
admission of the statement was not barred by Code § 46.2-379, 
even though the statement later appeared in the accident report.
1 
 See Moore, 203 Va. at 124, 122 S.E.2d at 885. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial consistent with the 
principles expressed in this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.
                     
     
1We do not consider the issue whether the statement was 
admissible under the past recollection recorded exception to the 
hearsay rule, because the trial court did not rule on this 
question.