Title: New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. A.R.G.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-29-03
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2004

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). After the 1998 death of their mother, C.R.G., R.L.G., and A.J.G., ages 16, 10, and 9, went to live with their father and paternal grandmother (N.G.) in New Jersey. In May 2002, a school nurse received an anonymous telephone call contending that R.L.G. had been physically abused by his father. The nurse examined R.L.G. and found numerous bruises that he contended were from a beating by his father. The nurse reported the matter to DYFS. A caseworker met with the nurse and R.L.G. The caseworker observed approximately twenty bruises of varied hues and sizes on R.L.G.'s body. R.L.G. stated that his father began hitting him in September 2001 and that the latest beating, using a belt, occurred after he received a negative school progress report. The caseworker also spoke with N.G. and the other two siblings, who confirmed the beatings. Two physicians examined R.L.G. and also confirmed the beatings. Based on A.R.G.'s physical abuse and N.G.'s awareness of and failure to prevent the abuse, DYFS effected an emergency removal of the children and placed them in foster care. A.R.G. was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, endangering the welfare of a child, and child abuse. DYFS sought custody of the three children pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to 8.73, and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. With A.R.G. present, the trial court set a return date on which A.R.G. would show cause why custody, care and supervision of the children should not be continued in DYFS. A.R.G. met with the caseworker and asked to be reunited with his children. He also reported that he had sought counseling and skills in anger management and parenting. DYFS faxed a copy of its court report to A.R.G.'s attorney on June 20, 2002, in preparation for the fact-finding hearing set for June 26th. On June 24th, DYFS hand-delivered a letter and attached evidence packet that included, among other things, DYFS records and R.L.G.'s certified medical records. The letter confirmed that DYFS would apply at the hearing for a "finding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(a)," and that one witness would be called. At the hearing, DYFS asked the court to relieve the agency of its statutorily mandated duty to provide reasonable efforts toward family reunification. In support, DYFS cited the existence of aggravating circumstances, i.e., the abuse inflicted on the children by A.R.G. The only witness at the hearing was the DYFS caseworker, who testified about the investigation and produced the DYFS records, including photographs of the bruises. The defense did not produce any witnesses but rather relied on A.R.G.'s remedial efforts. The court ruled that DYFS had shown by clear and convincing evidence that R.L.G. had been subjected to aggravated circumstances of abuse and cruelty, and that the other two children were at risk. The court ordered, in part, that reasonable efforts to reunite the family need not be provided and that a permanency hearing would take place on July 17, 2002. On July 15th, A.R.G. moved for a rehearing or reconsideration of the court's determination and sought further an order requiring DYFS to provide him with services and to adjourn the permanency hearing. On July 17th, the court denied A.R.G.'s motion and conducted the permanency hearing, the goal of which was the termination of A.R.G.'s parental rights and adoption. The court approved that plan but directed that DYFS at least consider other options. The court reminded DYFS that it was statutorily required to establish each of the four prongs of the best interests test for termination of parental rights. On June 5, 2003, the Appellate Division affirmed with one judge dissenting. The panel defined the term "aggravating circumstances" as embodying the concept that the nature of the abuse or neglect must have been "so severe or repetitive that to attempt reunification would jeopardize and compromise the safety of the child, and would place the child in a position of an unreasonable risk to be reabused." The panel explained that "any circumstances that increase the severity of the abuse or neglect, or add to its injurious consequences, equate to 'aggravated circumstances.' Whether couched as 'severe child abuse or neglect,' 'serious child abuse or neglect,' or 'severe physical injury' of a singular, chronic, recurrent, or repetitive nature, where the circumstances created by the parent's conduct create an unacceptably high risk to the health, safety and welfare of the child, they are 'aggravated' to the extent that [DYFS] may bypass reasonable efforts of reunification." The panel rejected A.R.G.'s claim that he was denied due process. The dissenting judge questioned whether A.R.G's due process rights were adequately protected and whether the evidence presented rose to the level of aggravated circumstances. In part, the dissent questioned the lack of medical testimony on the extent and nature of R.L.G.'s injuries and the lack of psychological examinations of the children. HELD : The Court affirms New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v. A.R.G., 361 N.J. Super. 46 (App. Div. 2003), in respect of the definition of "aggravating circumstances" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3, and it remands the matter to the trial court for consideration de novo whether defendant's conduct satisfies the definition, thereby permitting DYFS to forego reasonable efforts to reunify the defendant with his children. 1. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3 states, in part, that DYFS shall not be required to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a child with a parent if the court determines that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment. The statute states further that the health and safety of the child and the need for permanency shall be paramount. The statute was enacted to enable New Jersey to qualify for the continued federal funding of its child protection system after the Adoption and Safe Families Act (AFSA) became law. ASFA provides that in determining whether to reunify children and their parents, health and safety are paramount concerns and that reunification efforts will not be required if a court has found aggravating circumstances, "which definition may include but need to be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse." (Pp. 20 22). 2. The Appellate Division's definition of the term "aggravated circumstances" carries out the aims of the law and describes the circumstances that can be deemed sufficiently aggravated to make family reunification efforts unnecessary. The standard is affirmed. (Pp. 22 23). 3. The standard is not rigid, however, and each case must be decided on its facts. Likewise, each determination must involve separate lines of inquiry. The first line of inquiry is whether the alleged conduct took place. If the conduct did occur, the next issue is whether it was severe or repetitive. If the answer is no, family reunification efforts are required. If the answer is yes, the court then must determine whether reunification would jeopardize and compromise the safety and welfare of the child. That inquiry, in turn, has two prongs the first is whether the abuse was of such a nature that standing alone, it compels the conclusion that reunification should not be required. Such is the case where the conduct is particularly heinous or abhorrent, involving savage, brutal or repetitive beatings, torture, or sexual abuse. In that situation, the abusive parent's future remedial efforts would be of no consequence. The acts complained of are so unnatural or depraved that the fundamental bond that is the basis of the reunification notion is deemed to be irremediably undermined. (Pp. 23 24). 4. Some cases, however, require inquiry beyond the conduct of the parent. Examples are abandonment, corporal punishment that does not result in permanent injury, and serious neglect and mental abuse, which may or may not have irremediably undermined the parent-child relationship and may or may not support the conclusion that reuniting the family will place the child at risk. In those cases, the court may consider whether to admit expert testimony about the conduct and its relationship to the parent-child bond along with an assessment of whether the parents' remedial efforts are sufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of re-abuse. Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the Appellate Division's standard or this Court's elucidation of it, the matter is remanded to the trial court for consideration of the issue of aggravated circumstances, de novo. (Pp. 24 25). 5. In light of the remand, the Court does not decide whether A.R.G. was afforded due process. The Court observes, however, that due process in these proceedings usually requires more than a few days notice of what the State intends. When, as here, the State seeks to obtain a waiver of the duty to attempt reunification, the parent should be given sufficient notice of that intention to obtain representation and prepare a meaningful defense. That notice should be more than a statutory citation, and should outline the underlying facts and theory on which the state intends to rely to prove aggravating circumstances. If the case is based solely on the parent's depraved conduct, the parent should be advised of that fact. If the case is a combination of conduct and its effect on the parent-child bond, the parent should be notified of that fact as well. Although expert testimony would be useless in a depraved-conduct case, in a case involving serious neglect or repeated corporal punishment with no permanent physical consequences, expert testimony regarding the conduct, its effect on the parent-child bond, the parent's remedial efforts, and the avoidance of re-abuse might be critical to the outcome. (Pp. 25 27). The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED in part, and MODIFIED in part, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring, joined by JUSTICE VERNIERO, agrees with the Court's opinion but adds that she does not find in the circumstances of this matter a constitutional violation in respect of defendant's notice and opportunity to be heard. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE join in JUSTICE LONG's opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate concurring opinion, joined by JUSTICE VERNIERO. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. A.R.G., Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ IN THE MATTER OF: C.R.G., R.L.G. and A.J.G., Minors. Argued January 20, 2004 Decided March 17, 2004 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 361 N.J. Super. 46 (2003). Aglaia Papadopoulos-Vlantes argued the cause for appellant (Papadopoulos-Vlantes &amp; Moehring, attorneys). Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Pamela A. Redd, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Maria Emilia Borges, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondents C.R.G., R.L.G., and A.J.G., (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Joseph F. Suozzo and Edward B. Marable, Jr., Deputy Public Defenders, of counsel). Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Mr. Miller, attorney; Mr. Miller and Nancy Goldhill, on the brief). Mary E. Coogan argued the cause for amicus curiae Association for Children of New Jersey (Cecilia M. Zalkind, attorney; Ms. Coogan and Ms. Zalkind, on the brief). JUSTICE LONG delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal, which is before us as of right based on a dissent in the Appellate Division, Rule 2:2-1(a)(2), involves the meaning of the term aggravated circumstances in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(a), the existence of which excuses the Division of Youth and Family Services ( DYFS ) from providing statutorily required reasonable efforts at family reunification. Also implicated is the question of what process is due a parent prior to the entry of a trial court s initial finding of aggravated circumstances. The court cautioned however that a finding of aggravating circumstances does not preclude the rendering of services. Ibid. Turning to the record, the court concluded that the statements of the children, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt, confirmed by expert medical evaluations and photographs, demonstrated that A.R.G. repeatedly subjected R.L.G. to beatings and abuse, contrary to his argument that the beating he inflicted was an isolated incident. Id. at 78. The panel noted that the lack of broken bones or protracted medical treatment was not dispositive of whether there were aggravated circumstances of abuse. Id. at 79. Similarly, the panel noted that the trial court was free to discount the statements of the swim coach and the children s principal, as recorded in the DYFS report. Ibid. The panel emphasized that termination of parental rights still requires DYFS to establish each of the four prongs of the best interests test by clear and convincing evidence during the Guardianship trial. Id. at 80. Regarding due process, the court expressed the view that the evidence and circumstances forming the basis of the DYFS application for waiver were well known to A.R.G. and his counsel prior to the June 26 hearing and underscored A.R.G. s failure to proffer any proofs to challenge the finding of aggravated circumstances. Id. at 81. The dissenting judge, Judge Eichen, agreed that the finding that R.L.G. was subjected to abuse by his father was supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record and further acknowledged that the evidence demonstrated A.R.G. s repeated abuse of R.L.G., prior abuse of C.R.G., and abusive and controlling conduct toward other family members, including his deceased wife, his mother and his sister. A.R.G., supra, 361 N.J. Super. at 82-83, (Eichen, J., dissenting). However, the dissent noted its reservations about whether A.R.G. s due process rights adequately were protected by the procedures followed. Id. at 83. More particularly, it pointed to the May 29, 2002, Order to Show Cause that did not contain a checkmark in the appropriate box to show what type of hearing was scheduled and to the belated notice that DYFS was seeking relief from its obligation to provide reasonable efforts toward reunification, delivered only two days before the fact-finding hearing. Ibid. The dissent also objected to the failure by DYFS to explain the meaning of the reference to a finding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(a)[.], in the letter. Id. at 84. In addition, the dissent expressed concern over whether the evidence presented actually rose to the level of aggravated circumstances of abuse. Id. at 88. The dissent questioned the lack of medical testimony concerning the full extent and nature of R.L.G. s injuries, and the lack of a psychological evaluation of R.L.G. or the other children to determine the emotional effects of the abuse. Id. at 87-88. Judge Eichen explained: In the absence of such evidence, I have no confidence that a just result was reached in this case. . . . Unlike the circumstances in In re Guardianship of B.L.A., 332 N.J.Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 2000), this family had no prior history of intervention by the Division. Fundamental fairness required expert testimony and testimony of the adverse family witnesses before the court could properly conclude that DYFS had proved "aggravated circumstances of abuse" by clear and convincing evidence excusing it from making any efforts toward reunification. [Id. at 88.] Finally, the dissent observed: [T]he majority has not articulated a useful standard for determining when "serious abuse" or "aggravated circumstances of abuse" has occurred. For instance, it is not clear whether conduct alone is sufficient to establish a case of "aggravated circumstances of abuse" or whether the effect of that conduct must be factored into the equation. If the "effect" is a vital component, then expert evidence must be presented to aid the fact-finder to reach a just result. [Ibid.] It is that dissent that brings this case before us as of right. We granted amicus status to the Association for Children of New Jersey and Legal Services of New Jersey. Since the time of the Appellate Division decision, we have been advised that A.R.G. s children have been removed from the care of their grandparents due to the grandparents declining health and inability to care for them. They are now together in foster care and their future with the grandparents or the foster family is as yet undetermined. [A.R.G., supra, 361 N.J. Super. at 77.] In that situation, the abusive parent s future remedial efforts would be of no consequence. The acts complained of, by their very nature are, so unnatural or depraved that the fundamental bond that is the basis of the reunification notion is deemed to be irremediably undermined. However, there is another class of cases adverted to both by Judge Fall and Judge Eichen, that requires inquiry beyond the mere conduct of the parent. Examples are abandonment, corporal punishment that does not result in permanent injury, serious neglect and mental abuse, to name a few, which may or may not have irremediably undermined the parent-child relationship and may or may not support the conclusion that reuniting the family will place the child at risk. In those cases, the court may consider whether to admit expert testimony about the conduct and its relationship to the parent-child bond along with an assessment of whether the parents remedial efforts are sufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of re-abuse. It is the result of all of those inquiries that will determine whether reunification efforts are required. In light of the fact that the trial court did not have the benefit of the Appellate Division s standard or our further elucidation of it, we remand the case to that court for consideration of the issue of aggravated circumstances, de novo. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. A.R.G., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF: C.R.G., R.L.G. and A.J.G., Minors. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring. I concur fully in Justice Long s opinion. I write only to add the following. This matter comes to us on a dissent in the Appellate Division that concluded that the absence of appropriate due process safeguards requires a reversal of the trial court. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 361 N.J. Super. 46, 87 (App. Div. 2003) (Eichen, J.A.D., dissenting). I cannot agree with the dissent s characterization of the proceedings below. This Court has recognized on numerous occasions that [d]ue process is a flexible [concept]. H.E.S. v. C.J.S., 175 N.J. 309, 321 (2003) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). I do not find in the circumstances of this matter a constitutional violation in respect of defendant s notice and opportunity to be heard. Briefly, this case concerns DYFS s prompt response to undisputed evidence of a child s beating. DYFS effected an emergency removal of defendant s three children and filed a complaint for custody, accompanied by an order to show cause. The order to show cause detailed the abuse that supported the children s removal and the reason that efforts to prevent placement by DYFS were not reasonably available, namely, an imminent danger to the children s life, safety or health. The court set a hearing date one month later on the order to show cause. Defendant, who had been charged criminally concerning the abuse and was incarcerated, was brought to court and served personally with the complaint and order to show cause. When defendant stated that he would be representing himself, the trial court urged otherwise because of the seriousness of [plaintiff s] allegations and the possibility that [defendant] could lose his children. Ante at __ (slip op. at 5). Accordingly, defendant retained counsel for the criminal proceedings and this matter. Two days prior to the return date, defendant received a letter in which DYFS elaborated on the specifics of its request to the court. DYFS asked to be relieved under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(a) of the obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with defendant because of the risk of harm to the children described by the order to show cause. Based on the timing of that letter, defendant contended at oral argument before the Appellate Division that DYFS provided him with inadequate two-day notice in violation of his right to due process. In my view, that does not fairly describe all that took place. Defendant had notice of what would be at stake at the hearing on the order to show cause. He was told in writing and by the judge in open court that his custody rights could be affected substantially based on the assertion of imminent danger to the children. Nonetheless, at the hearing defendant chose to put on no defense other than to rely upon his penitence. A.R.G., supra, 361 N.J. Super. at 80. The trial court repeatedly asked defendant s counsel if she would prefer to have an adjournment. She denied those offers. See footnote 2 Counsel acknowledged on the record that she understood that DYFS was requesting a determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(a) that reasonable efforts to reunify defendant with the children would not be required. Only after she made those acknowledgments did the court proceed. Following the court s determination in favor of DYFS, defendant sought reconsideration. However, counsel did not argue that there was evidence that she was prevented from presenting, nor did she tell us, when asked to do so, how she would have defended differently. In sum, this record does not suggest a denial of due process, but rather reflects a calculated decision by counsel about how to represent defendant in this matter. See footnote 3 I agree with the Appellate Division majority that there was no constitutional due process deprivation in these circumstances. Justice Verniero joins in this opinion. NO. A-29 SEPTEMBER TERM 2003 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. A.R.G., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF: C.R.G., R.L.G. and A.J.G., Minors. DECIDED March 17, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia DISSENTING OPINION BY