Title: Larman v. Larman
Citation: 1999 OK 83, 70OBJ3260, 991 P.2d 536
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 1999

Larman v. Larman Annotate this Case Larman v. Larman 1999 OK 83 991 P.2d 536 70 OBJ 3260 Case Number: 89141 Decided: 10/19/1999 Modified: 10/28/1999 Mandate Issued: 11/29/1999 Supreme Court of Oklahoma LESLIE C. LARMAN, Plaintiff/Appellant, [991 P.2d 538] ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. III. ¶0 In a divorce suit brought by the wife, the District Court, McClain County, Noah Ewing, Judge, dissolved the marital bond, awarded to the wife support alimony and custody of the minor children, set aside separate property, and divided spousal property. The wife sought review of the spousal property division and the husband counter-appealed to challenge the trial court's award of real estate to the wife as her separate property. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed in part the property-division award and remanded the cause for further proceedings. On certiorari previously granted upon the wife's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY-DIVISION AWARD IS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, SUBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S AUTHORITY TO RE-EXAMINE - AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL POST-REMAND EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDINGS THAT ARE TO BE CONFINED SOLELY TO THE REMANDED VALUE-ENHANCEMENT ISSUE - THE CERTIORARI-REDUCED INVENTORY OF SPOUSAL ASSETS WITH A VIEW TO ADJUSTING THE DIVISION ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A FAIR AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL MARITAL ESTATE; EACH PARTY IS ORDERED TO BEAR ITS OWN CERTIORARI-RELATED LITIGATION EXPENSES AND THOSE FOR SERVICES OF LEGAL COUNSEL; AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S OPINION. James E. Pence, Pence and Housley, Norman, Oklahoma, for the appellant. Peggy Stockwell, Dave Stockwell, Stockwell Law Offices, Norman, Oklahoma, for the appellee.1 OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issue tendered for corrective relief on certiorari is whether there was error in declaring two tracts of property inherited by the wife as marital assets. We answer in the affirmative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Leslie [wife] and Frankie [husband] Larman were married in 1983. In 1989 they moved into a rental home [Churchill] owned by the wife's mother and took over the payment of $450.00 monthly mortgage installments. Using their joint funds, the husband and the wife expended approximately $3,600 for certain Churchill improvements. They remained at Churchill until the death of the wife's mother in 1993. The wife inherited Churchill together with her mother's residence [Luglena] and $100,000 in liquid assets. Shortly after the mother's death, the wife bought (with inherited funds) a tract of land adjoining Luglena. Without any direction from the wife, the sellers conveyed the lot to the wife and husband as joint tenants. ¶3 Six months after the mother's death, the wife and husband moved from Churchill to Luglena, using spousal funds to make the mortgage payments on the latter property. At this point the wife began making the Churchill mortgage payments out of inherited funds. Not long after the family moved [991 P.2d 539] to Luglena, the wife refinanced the existing mortgages on Churchill and Luglena to secure a lower interest rate and monthly payment. In order to obtain refinancing, she had to place title to the properties in the names of both spouses as joint tenants. The refinancing cost (approximately $7,000) was paid out of the wife's separate funds. ¶4 The husband and wife separated after they took up residence at Luglena. He moved to Churchill and took over the mortgage payments there while she remained at Luglena. The wife filed for divorce and the marital bond was dissolved in 1996. By the terms of the decree the spousal property ¶5 The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] reversed in part the property-division award, holding that spousal property consists of both Churchill and Luglena ¶6 On certiorari granted upon the wife's petition, COCA's opinion is vacated; the trial court's property-division award is affirmed as modified; II THE WIFE'S PRESUMPTIVE INTERSPOUSAL GIFT OF HER SEPARATE PROPERTY TO THE HUSBAND IS REBUTTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF THAT THE DEEDS BY WHICH HE WAS INCLUDED AS A JOINT TENANT-GRANTEE WERE NOT INTENDED AS A GIFT OF THE WIFE'S INTEREST IN THE LANDS ¶7 The wife argues that COCA erred in holding that all her inherited real estate was spousal property. According to the wife, the presumption of joint ownership was clearly rebutted by evidence that title to Churchill and Luglena was placed in the husband's name (as joint tenant with the wife) solely for economic reasons, not for the purpose of effecting a gift. The husband counters that the law presumes an interspousal gift when the wife transfers title of her property to the husband as a joint tenant. ¶8 Gifts of realty are governed by the principles of personal property law. ¶9 Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence allows a rebuttable presumption of a gift where title to separately held real estate is placed by one owner-spouse in both spouses' [991 P.2d 541] names as joint tenants. ¶10 Where, as here, the record shows that title was passed without intent to invest the spousal grantee with an interest in the property, but rather for a purpose that is clearly collateral to any intended change in the existing ownership regime, the conveying marital partner will not be deemed to have made an unconditional, presently effective interspousal gift of separate property. The Luglena and Churchill Properties ¶11 The wife argues she did not intend to make a gift to the husband of a joint interest in her separate real property (in Churchill and Luglena), which she had inherited from her mother. According to the wife, she included the husband's name upon the deeds as a joint tenant for the sole purpose of refinancing the mortgage loans on both properties in an effort to secure a lower interest rate and reduced monthly payments. ¶12 After the family moved from Churchill to Luglena, the wife contacted the bank about refinancing the existing loans at a lower interest rate. She was then paying the Churchill mortgage with her separate funds and the Luglena mortgage with joint funds. According to the bank lending officer, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) ¶13 Before placing title to Luglena and Churchill in the joint tenancy of the spouses, [991 P.2d 542] the wife talked to the lawyer for her mother's estate. The latter advised her against taking this action. According to the wife, she did not understand the legal consequences of changing the ownership regime by transferring title to her and her husband as joint tenants in the land. ¶14 The husband confirmed by his testimony that the wife did not tell him she was making to him a gift of her inherited real estate. He was not aware that the property was in joint tenancy or that he even had a ¶15 In short, where, as here, the ¶16 We hence hold that on this record, absent any contrary proof, the transfer to the husband by a joint tenancy deed clearly was not intended to constitute a gift in praesenti III THE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT FOR THIS COURT'S FINAL DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE ¶17 Divorce suits are of equitable cognizance. A trial court has discretionary power equitably to divide the marital estate. ¶18 If the record is sufficient, this court will ¶19 Because the trial court treated a substantial portion of the wife's separate property as part of the spousal estate, there was no opportunity for a meaningful inquiry into whether the value of her separate land, while in joint possession, came to be enhanced by the labor or skills of either spouse or use of spousal funds. The record is hence far from adequate for this court to enter on certiorari a property division award that the trial judge should have entered. IV THE HUSBAND'S CERTIORARI-RELATED ATTORNEY'S FEE QUEST ¶20 The husband claims in this court a certiorari-related counsel fee. In the class of statutorily authorized litigation, counsel fee incurred in corrective process, much like taxable costs, may be allowed by the court in which the services were performed. ¶21 Based on our review of the record, there are here no compelling or overriding equitable considerations in favor of either litigant. We hence hold that each party shall bear its own counsel-fee obligation and any other litigation-related expenses incurred in the certiorari process. The trial court is not precluded from entertaining the parties' pleas for a counsel-fee award (and for litigation expenses) that will be connected with legal services to be rendered and expenses to be incurred in the post-remand phase of the proceedings. V SUMMARY ¶22 When, as here, the evidence clearly accords with the conclusion that title to one spouse's separate real estate was placed in both names as joint tenants solely to achieve a purpose collateral to making a gift, the presumption of an interspousal gift is deemed rebutted. The burden would then [991 P.2d 544]shift to the donee spouse to prove the factum of a gift that is claimed. The husband's proof falls short of establishing an interspousal gift. ¶23 Because there is in this record no proof of value enhancement, if any there was, in the wife's separate property, produced by the labor or skills of either spouse or use of spousal funds, we must remand the cause to afford the husband an opportunity to tender the value-enhancement issue in a post-remand evidentiary proceeding. ¶24 On certiorari previously granted on the wife's petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated; the trial court's property-division award is affirmed as modified, subject to the trial court's authority to re-examine ¶25 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT