Title: Freeburne v. City of Emporia
Citation: 176 Kan. 503, 271 P.2d 298
Docket Number: 39,398
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 1954

176 Kan. 503 (1954)
271 P.2d 298
MARSHALL J. FREEBURNE, Appellee,
v.
THE CITY OF EMPORIA, a Municipal Corporation, Lyon County, Kansas, Appellant.
No. 39,398

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1954.
James W. Putnam and Richard Mankin, both of Emporia, argued the cause and were on the briefs for the appellant.
Everett E. Steerman, of Emporia, George A. Robb and Forrest A. Wilson, both of Newton, all argued the cause, and J.G. Somers, of Newton, was with them on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This was an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in colliding with an alleged defect in a city street. The appeal is from an order overruling a demurrer to the amended petition.
Whether the amended pleading, hereinafter for purposes of brevity referred to as the petition, states facts sufficient to constitute *504 a cause of action is the all decisive appellate issue involved. On that account, because it sets forth all the facts and definitely discloses the legal theory on which plaintiff bases his right to relief, we shall quote such pleading at length, omitting only formal averments, allegations of no consequence to the issue, assertions as to the nature and extent of injuries sustained, and the prayer. After stating the name and residence of the plaintiff and the corporate status of the defendant, a city of the second class, the petition reads:
Before giving consideration to the petition a contention advanced by appellant to the effect its allegations should be strictly construed because a proper motion to make them more definite and certain was resisted and overruled should be noted. Without laboring the point, and conceding there are conditions under which the rule of strict construction is applied, it can be stated that even though it appears certain grounds of such motion had merit we have concluded failure to sustain them does not preclude a liberal construction of that pleading and will proceed on that premise.
At the outset counsel for appellee, with commendable candor, admit the placing of the traffic control box described in the petition on the pole therein mentioned by the appellant was a governmental function and that the same holds true of its continued operation.
It may be stated that ordinarily, under the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction, cities and other municipal corporations in the exercise of their governmental functions are not liable in damages for any neglect, or even wrongdoing, of their officers in the discharge of such duties unless such liability is expressly imposed by law. See, e.g., Harper v. City of Topeka, 92 Kan. 11, 13, 139 Pac. 1018; Butler v. Kansas City, 97 Kan. 239, 241, 155 Pac. 12; Foster v. Capital Gas and Electric Co., 125 Kan. 574, 265 Pac. 81, and decisions therein cited.
However, it must be conceded that under all our decisions, even though there is no statute expressly imposing liability, an exception to the governmental immunity rule, above mentioned, has been made which holds cities liable for damages resulting from defects in their streets and highways. (Linderholm v. Ekblad, 92 Kan. 9, 139 Pac. 1015; Hibbard v. City of Wichita, 98 Kan. 498, 501, 159 Pac. 399; Foster v. Capital Gas and Electric Co., 579, supra.) To further illustrate the rule of exception, which has been repeatedly adhered to, see the early case of Jansen v. City of Atchison, 16 Kan. 358, as originally reported, which holds:
*506 For informative purposes see, also, the first syllabus of the same case as reported in 16 Kan. (Second Edition) 358, which states the rule last above quoted as originally reported and in addition makes reference to numerous Kansas decisions of like import.
From what has been related it becomes apparent the essence of the question before this court on appellate review is whether the placing and continuous maintenance of the involved traffic control box in a position where appellee could and did collide with it, under conditions and circumstances set forth in the petition, is to be regarded as constituting a defect in the city's street for which it is liable in a civil action. It is equally obvious that in approaching consideration of such question it must be kept in mind our determination thereof is limited and restricted to the cold printed pages of that pleading without benefit of photographs, maps, plats or other material, describing the alleged defect. Therefore, without further elucidation or comment, since there is no better way of depicting it, we refer readers of this opinion to the theretofore quoted portion of such pleading for the existing factual situation on which our decision must depend.
We have been unable to find, and resort to the briefs discloses that the respective parties are in the same situation, any cases in this jurisdiction passing upon the precise question here involved. The following cases (City of Eudora v. Miller, 30 Kan. 494, 2 Pac. 685; Gould v. City of Topeka, 32 Kan. 485, 4 Pac. 822; Kansas City v. Siese, 71 Kan. 283, 80 Pac. 626; Williams v. City of Parsons, 87 Kan. 649, 125 Pac. 60; Loftin v. City of Kansas City, 164 Kan. 412, 190 P.2d 378), cited by appellee, all involve entirely different factual situations, hence they are clearly distinguishable and of little if no value as controlling precedents. It may be said the same holds true of the Kansas cases on which the appellant relies. More helpful, but nevertheless inconclusive because they deal with collisions between automobiles and traffic control devices within the intersections of city streets, are cases it cites from foreign jurisdictions. (See Blackburn v. St. Louis, 343 Mo. 301, 121 S.W.2d 727; Prewitt v. St. Joseph, 334 Mo. 1228, 70 S.W.2d 916; Edwards v. City of Shreveport, [La.] 66 So. 2d 373; Parson v. Texas City, [Tex. Civ. App.] 259 S.W.2d 333; Auslander v. St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778; Clain v. City of Burlington, 202 F.2d 532.)
Nothing would be gained by a long or an intricate discussion of the distinguishing features of the foregoing Kansas cases. By the *507 same token, particularly since it does not appear they either recognize or apply the rule of exception to governmental immunity prevailing in this jurisdiction, the same holds true of the cases cited from foreign jurisdictions. It suffices to say that upon an extended review of all such decisions and careful consideration of all arguments advanced by counsel for the parties in support of their respective positions, we have concluded that under the conditions and circumstances set forth in the petition the traffic control box relied upon by appellee as the basis for recovery herein should not be held to constitute a defect in the city's street and that the exception to the rule of governmental immunity recognized by our decisions with respect to cities should not be extended to the point where it includes a traffic control box of its nature or character.
In concluding this opinion it should perhaps be frankly stated that we have taken judicial notice of the fact, although we do not here pass upon their status as defects, that on the streets of all cities throughout the length and breadth of this entire state, there are countless and untold devices, similar to the one here involved, such as fire plugs; fire alarm boxes; parking meters; street blinkers; stationary and permanent automatic stop and go traffic signals; street and street crossing signs; stationary stop signs; stationary no right and no left turn signs; highway marker signs; one-way street markers; traffic guides; traffic speed control signs; divers types of street light poles, including white-way poles; school signs; mail boxes; trash boxes; and even drinking fountains, necessary for the protection, health, welfare and convenience of the public, all of which might well be considered defects in city streets if we were to hold, as appellee contends, that the involved traffic control signal is to be regarded as an actionable defect. We are neither prepared nor disposed, under the confronting facts and circumstances, to here hand down a decision that would warrant citation as setting a controlling precedent for any such conclusion.
Based on what has been heretofore stated we hold the petition fails to state a cause of action. This, of course, makes it unnecessary to treat other matters relied on by appellant as compelling a like conclusion and it follows the case should be reversed and remanded with directions to sustain the demurrer and render judgment for the appellant.
It so ordered.