Title: Harold Sampson Children's Trust v. The Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2002AP001515
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2004

2004 WI 57 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1515 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Harold Sampson Children's Trust, a trust  
maintained for the benefit of Beth Bauer,  
Jamie L. Sherman, and Kay Yuspeh, and  
each of them individually as Plaintiffs,  
and The Beth Bauer Trust, The Jamie L.  
Sherman Trust and The Kay Yuspeh Trust,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
The Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, The  
Steven J. Sampson 1979 Trust and The  
Scott A. Sampson 1979 Trust, which are  
the successors to the B.J. Sampson  
Children's Trust, a trust maintained for  
the benefit of Linda Gale Sampson, Scott  
Sampson, and Steve Sampson, and Sampson  
Investments, Ann Mandelman, and Nancy  
Simos,  
          Defendants-Third- 
          Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Beth Bauer,  
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 141 
Reported at: 265 Wis. 2d 803, 667 N.W.2d 831 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 25, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 9, 2004 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dominic S. Amato   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
 
2
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Jane C. Schlicht, Steven L. Nelson and Cook & Franke, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jane C. Schlicht. 
 
For the defendants-third-party plaintiffs-appellants there 
was a brief by Paul S. Medved, Scott R. Halloin and Mallery & 
Zimmerman, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Scott R. 
Halloin. 
 
 
2004 WI 57 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  02-1515  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 3834) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Harold Sampson Children's Trust, a trust  
maintained for the benefit of Beth Bauer,  
Jamie L. Sherman, and Kay Yuspeh, and  
each of them individually as Plaintiffs,  
and The Beth Bauer Trust, The Jamie L.  
Sherman Trust and The Kay Yuspeh Trust,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
The Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, The  
Steven J. Sampson 1979 Trust and The  
Scott A. Sampson 1979 Trust, which are  
the successors to the B.J. Sampson  
Children's Trust, a trust maintained for  
the benefit of Linda Gale Sampson, Scott  
Sampson, and Steve Sampson, and Sampson  
Investments, Ann Mandelman, and Nancy  
Simos,  
 
          Defendants-Third- 
          Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Beth Bauer,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 25, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
No. 
02-1515   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of 
the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Dominic S. Amato, Judge.  
The circuit court's order directed The Linda Gale Sampson 1979 
Trust et al., the defendants, to return to Harold Sampson 
Children's Trust et al., the plaintiffs, documents that the 
plaintiffs' 
attorney 
transmitted 
during 
discovery 
to 
the 
defendants' attorney.  We reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.      
¶2 
The question before this court is whether a lawyer's 
voluntary production of documents in response to opposing 
counsel's 
discovery 
request 
constitutes 
a 
waiver 
of 
the 
attorney-client privilege under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11 when 
the lawyer does not recognize that the documents are subject to 
the attorney-client privilege and the documents are produced 
without the consent or knowledge of the client.2 
¶3 
The 
circuit 
court 
answered 
the 
question 
"no," 
concluding that the plaintiffs' attorney in the present case 
could not waive the plaintiffs' attorney-client privilege, 
because only the client can waive the privilege for attorney-
client communications.  In contrast, the court of appeals 
answered the question "yes," concluding that the lawyer's 
                                                 
1 Harold Sampson Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 
Trust, 2003 WI App 141, 265 Wis. 2d 803, 667 N.W.2d 831.   
2 Harold Sampson Children's Trust, 265 Wis. 2d 803, ¶11. 
No. 
02-1515   
 
3 
 
disclosure waived the attorney-client privilege.  It based its 
decision on two precepts: (1) under ordinary attorney-client 
agency principles, compliance with discovery requests is a 
matter that the client delegates to the attorney; and (2) the 
rule that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right does not apply to waiver of evidentiary privileges.3 
¶4 
We agree with the circuit court.  We conclude that a 
lawyer, without the consent or knowledge of a client, cannot 
waive the attorney-client privilege by voluntarily producing 
privileged documents (which the attorney does not recognize as 
privileged) to an opposing attorney in response to a discovery 
request.  We hold that only the client can waive the attorney-
client privilege under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11 regarding 
attorney-client privileged documents.     
I  
¶5 
The underlying dispute is an inter-family disagreement 
arising out of commercial real estate transactions, the details 
of which are not important to this review.  The following 
relevant facts relate to the issue of waiver of the attorney-
client privilege by the release of documents in response to a 
discovery request.     
¶6  The documents in question were prepared by Beth Bauer, 
a plaintiff, for the plaintiffs' attorney's use.  Apparently the 
                                                 
3 Harold Sampson Children's Trust, 265 Wis. 2d 803, ¶11.  
The court of appeals relied on the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §§ 26 (a lawyer's actual authority), 27 (a 
lawyer's apparent authority), 79 (waiver of the privilege by 
disclosure) (2000). 
No. 
02-1515   
 
4 
 
documents explain Ms. Bauer's view of the transactions and the 
valuation and accounting issues; disclose her thoughts and 
analysis 
concerning 
liability, damages, 
and 
strategy; and 
identify supporting evidence for claims against the defendants.   
¶7 
Robert 
Elliott, 
then 
the 
plaintiffs' 
attorney, 
apparently believed that the documents were not privileged and 
disclosed them to the defendants' counsel in response to a 
discovery request on or about July 17, 2001.   
¶8 
For purposes of this review, it is undisputed that the 
documents in question were attorney-client privileged, that the 
documents were released to opposing counsel without the consent 
or knowledge of the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs 
authorized 
their 
attorney 
to 
disclose 
all 
non-privileged 
documents in response to discovery requests. 
¶9 
Elliott withdrew as counsel on October 16, 2001, for 
reasons unrelated to the production of documents, and Cook & 
Franke, S.C., replaced Elliott as the plaintiffs' counsel.  On 
reviewing the files, the plaintiffs' new counsel determined that 
privileged documents had been produced to opposing counsel and, 
on November 15, 2001, requested that the defendants return those 
documents.  The defendants refused to return the documents and, 
on December 7, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the 
return of the privileged documents.   
¶10 The circuit court ordered an evidentiary hearing and 
referred the matter to attorney Theodore Hodan, as referee, 
No. 
02-1515   
 
5 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 805.06 (1999-2000).4  The circuit 
court designated the referee as a "discovery master."   
¶11 After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the referee 
made numerous findings of fact and concluded that the documents 
in question were "confidential communications made by a client 
or an attorney in order to facilitate the performance of 
professional legal services to the 'client.'"  The referee found 
that the plaintiffs did not consent to the production of the 
attorney-client privileged documents.  
¶12 The 
referee 
described 
Elliott 
as 
a 
"prominent, 
experienced, competent, well-respected, board certified civil 
trial lawyer, who is known to have handled many difficult[,] 
complex and high-profile civil lawsuits."  The referee found 
that Elliott "examined the documents in question, made no 
inquiry of his clients as to the reasons for and methods of 
their preparation and, therefore, intentionally and knowingly 
produced them for the [defendants] in response to their document 
request."  Upon viewing the documents at the hearing, Elliott 
indicated that "on their face" the documents did not appear 
privileged.  However, he also testified that he would not have 
produced the documents had he understood their purpose.   
¶13 The referee found that each of the documents "raise[d] 
sufficient indicia or inferences of possible privilege so as to 
                                                 
4 "A reference shall be the exception and not the rule."  
Wis. Stat. § 805.06(2).  All references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes 
are 
to 
the 
1999-2000 
version 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
02-1515   
 
6 
 
require, prior to their production to opposing counsel, that 
inquiry be made by [Elliott] of his clients to ascertain when 
and for what purpose each of the documents in question had been 
prepared."  Further, the referee found as a matter of fact and 
concluded as a matter of law that the documents in question were 
confidential communications as defined by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
905.03.  The referee concluded that by intentionally disclosing 
the documents, Elliott waived the plaintiffs' attorney-client 
privilege with respect to those documents.5 
¶14 The circuit court adopted the referee's findings of 
fact and most of his conclusions of law.  The circuit court 
disagreed, however, with the referee's ultimate conclusion of 
law.  The circuit court held that the attorney could not waive 
the attorney-client privilege because the privilege belonged to 
the client, and ordered the defendants to return the documents 
in question.  The court of appeals reversed the order of the 
circuit court, holding that the privilege had been waived. 
II 
¶15 With regard to the standard of review of factual 
determinations, the circuit court shall accept the referee's 
findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous,6 and this court 
is bound by a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
                                                 
5 The circuit court sealed the referee's decision and it was 
not included in the parties' appendices to their briefs.  The 
decision is, however, available for review by this court.  We 
shall follow the practice of the parties and refer generally to 
the referee's decision. 
6 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 805.06(5)(b). 
No. 
02-1515   
 
7 
 
clearly erroneous.7  This court reviews issues of law, including 
interpretation of statutes or court rules, independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from the 
analyses of those courts.8    
III 
¶16 This case requires us to decide whether an attorney's 
voluntary disclosure to opposing counsel of attorney-client 
privileged documents, without the consent or knowledge of the 
client, constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11.      
¶17 Four 
rules 
govern 
our 
decision 
on 
this 
issue: 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.03 (1)(d) (defining "confidential"); 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.03(2) (general rule of attorney-client 
privilege); Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.03(3) (who may claim the 
privilege); and Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11 (waiver of the 
privilege by voluntary disclosure).  We shall examine each rule 
in turn.   
¶18 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
905.03(1)(d) 
defines 
a 
confidential communication as one that is "not intended to be 
disclosed to 3rd persons other than those to whom disclosure is 
in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission 
of the communication."  For the purpose of this review, the 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 805.17(2). 
8 State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700. 
No. 
02-1515   
 
8 
 
documents were made to facilitate the rendition of legal 
services in the litigation, and the plaintiffs did not intend or 
agree that the documents in question be disclosed to opposing 
counsel.  Thus the documents are confidential under the 
attorney-client privilege rule set forth in § 905.03(1)(d).    
¶19 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
905.03(2) 
codifies 
the 
attorney-client privilege.  It states that a client "has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose 
of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to 
the client . . . ."9  In some circumstances, the privilege does 
not apply because an exception exists10 or the privilege is 
waived under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11.11 
¶20 Section 905.03(2) provides as follows:   
General rule of privilege.  A client has a privilege 
to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made for 
the 
purpose 
of 
facilitating 
the 
rendition 
of 
professional legal services to the client:  between 
the client or the client's representative and the 
client's lawyer or the lawyer's representative; or 
between 
the 
client's 
lawyer 
and 
the 
lawyer's 
representative; or by the client or the client's 
lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of 
common interest; or between representatives of the 
client or between the client and a representative of 
the 
client; or between 
lawyers 
representing the 
client.  
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.03(2). 
10 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.03(4). 
11 Borgwardt v. Redlin, 196 Wis. 2d 342, 353, 538 N.W.2d 581 
(Ct. App. 1995).   
No. 
02-1515   
 
9 
 
¶21 The text of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.03(2) explicitly 
provides that the privilege belongs to the client and that the 
client may refuse to disclose or prevent any other person from 
disclosing the confidential communications. 
¶22 In keeping with the text of the statute, case law has 
declared that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the 
client.  See, e.g., Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 2002 WI 
28, ¶33, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788; State ex rel. Dudek v. 
Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 605, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967); 
Borgwardt v. Redlin, 196 Wis. 2d 342, 355, 538 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. 
App, 1995); Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 
Wis. 2d 16, 31-32, 374 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1985).  
¶23 Those cases, however, present different facts than the 
case at hand.  In those cases, each attorney asserted the 
privilege on behalf of the client, and no attorney disclosed 
confidential attorney-client communications.  In neither of 
those cases nor in any other cases has this court addressed the 
issue 
of 
waiver 
of 
the 
privilege 
when 
counsel 
produced 
privileged documents pursuant to a discovery request without the 
client's consent or knowledge.  
¶24 The third relevant provision, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
905.03(3), reinforces the language in § 905.03(2) that the 
privilege is the client's.  It states that the client may claim 
the privilege personally or by, among others, the attorney at 
the time of the communication.  Section 905.03(3) provides as 
follows: 
No. 
02-1515   
 
10 
 
Who may claim the privilege.  The privilege may be 
claimed by the client, the client's guardian or 
conservator, the personal representative of a deceased 
client, 
or 
the 
successor, 
trustee, 
or 
similar 
representative of a corporation, association, or other 
organization, whether or not in existence.  The person 
who was the lawyer at the time of the communication 
may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the 
client.  The lawyer's authority to do so is presumed 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
¶25 The fourth provision involved in the present case is 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11, governing the waiver of a privilege. 
The attorney-client privilege is waived under § 905.11 when the 
holder of the privileged documents "voluntarily discloses or 
consents to disclosure."12   
¶26 Section 905.11 provides as follows:      
Waiver of privilege by voluntary disclosure.  A person 
upon whom this chapter confers a privilege against 
disclosure of the confidential matter or communication 
waives the privilege if the person or his or her 
predecessor, 
while 
holder 
of 
the 
privilege, 
voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any 
significant part of the matter or communication.  This 
section does not apply if the disclosure is itself a 
privileged communication.13   
                                                 
12 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11. 
13 But see 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 79 (2000) ("The attorney-client privilege is waived if 
the client, the client's lawyer, or another authorized agent of 
the client voluntarily discloses the communication in a non-
privileged communication.").  
According to the Federal Advisory Committee's Note to the 
federal rules upon which Wisconsin based its rules of evidence, 
the privilege should terminate when "the holder by his own act" 
destroys the confidentiality.  The language "by his own act" in 
the Note indicates that a client must act to waive the 
privilege.  Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R151 
(1973).   
No. 
02-1515   
 
11 
 
¶27 To 
determine 
whether 
the 
waiver 
provision 
of 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11 applies to the present case, we must 
first determine whether the disclosure was "voluntarily" made 
because § (Rule) 905.11 applies only to voluntary disclosures.  
Here, the attorney examined the documents, determined that the 
documents were not privileged, and disclosed them.  The referee 
concluded that "[i]f an error was made, the error was made by 
counsel in not first determining the nature of the documents 
prior to their being produced."  According to the court of 
appeals, "[t]he transmission of the documents to the defendants 
was deliberate, intentional and not inadvertent."14  We agree 
with the court of appeals, the circuit court, and the referee 
that the disclosure was voluntary, not inadvertent, within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11.  
¶28 Because the attorney intended to release the documents 
in issue, we agree with the court of appeals that the rules 
applicable 
to 
"inadvertent" 
disclosure 
adopted 
by 
other 
                                                 
14 Harold Sampson Children's Trust, 265 Wis. 2d 803, ¶11. 
No. 
02-1515   
 
12 
 
jurisdictions do not apply to the case at hand.15  The only 
mistake seems to have been the attorney's conclusion that the 
documents were not privileged.   
¶29 The question then is whether an attorney's voluntary 
disclosure of attorney-client privileged documents to opposing 
counsel without the client's consent or knowledge is sufficient 
to waive the privilege under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11.  
¶30 The circuit court declared that no waiver occurred, 
reasoning that a client is the holder of the privilege and the 
clients did not waive the privilege in the present case.  In 
contrast, the court of appeals concluded that because the 
clients delegated management of the discovery procedure to the 
                                                 
15 The referee described three approaches courts have taken 
to 
inadvertent 
disclosure 
of 
attorney 
client 
privileged 
documents: lenient, strict, and intermediate.  Under the 
"lenient" approach, an attorney's inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged documents does not by itself waive the privilege 
because mere negligence by the attorney should not destroy the 
client's privilege.  See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 
531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982).  Under the "strict" 
approach, a lawyer's disclosure destroys the confidentiality 
that was the basis of the privilege.  Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. 
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449-50 (D. Mass. 1988).  
The "intermediate" or "totality of the circumstances" approach 
attempts 
to 
balance 
several 
factors, 
including: 
(1) 
the 
reasonableness of safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure of attorney-client privileged material; (2) the 
extent of the document production request and the attendant 
burdens on the party responding to the request; (3) any 
unreasonable delay in trying to retrieve the inadvertently 
produced documents; (4) the number of times the producing party 
or its lawyers have disclosed protected materials before; and 
(5) an overall interests-of-justice fairness calculus.  See, 
e.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 
174-85 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
No. 
02-1515   
 
13 
 
attorney and because the attorney is the agent of the clients, 
the attorney's voluntary disclosure of the privileged documents 
during pretrial discovery constituted waiver of the attorney-
client privilege under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11.16 
¶31 We agree with the circuit court that the client is the 
holder of the privilege and that under the circumstances of the 
present case only the client may waive the privilege.  We reach 
this conclusion for several reasons.   
¶32 First, according to the text of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 
905.03(2) and (3) and 905.11, the client holds and controls the 
attorney-client privilege and only the client can waive it.17      
¶33 Second, according to Wisconsin case law interpreting 
Wis. Stat. §§ 905.03 and 905.11, the client, not the attorney, 
must waive the privilege.  These prior cases, although arising 
                                                 
16 This holding is similar to the strict rule adopted by 
several courts in inadvertent disclosure cases.  See, e.g., In 
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Int'l 
Digital Systems Corp., 120 F.R.D. at 449-50.  See also Edna S. 
Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privileges and the Work Product 
Doctrine 309-10 (4th ed. 2001).  
The referee suggested a middle ground, the "totality of 
circumstances" rule.  That rule would hold that a voluntary 
disclosure constitutes a waiver of the privilege if, viewing the 
"totality of the circumstances," adequate measures were not 
taken to avoid the disclosure.  This rule too has a counterpart 
in inadvertent disclosure cases.  See Snap-On, Inc. v. Hunter 
Eng'g Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (E.D. Wis. 1998).  This rule 
is difficult to apply.  The referee concluded that if this rule 
applied in the present case the privilege had been waived.   
17 This reading of the text is similar to the lenient rule 
adopted by several courts in inadvertent disclosure cases.  See, 
e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980; Mendenhall, 531 F. 
Supp. at 954.  See also Epstein, supra note 16, at 310.  
No. 
02-1515   
 
14 
 
from fact situations different from the present case, provide 
guidance to this court.  This court stated in Dudek that an 
attorney "may not waive any objections to discovery which are 
based upon the attorney-client privilege.  Only the client can 
waive these objections."18  In Dudek, unlike in this case, the 
privilege was asserted to prevent disclosure.   
¶34 In State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 
N.W.2d 859, which relied on Dudek, this court held that an 
unauthorized disclosure by counsel did not waive the privilege.19  
¶35 In Meeks, a client's former attorney testified, over 
objection, about her opinions, perceptions, and impressions 
relating to the client's competency.20  The court stated that 
"[i]t is well settled that the attorney-client privilege belongs 
to the client," and that the client is the "holder" of the 
privilege.21  The court concluded that the attorney's testimony 
                                                 
18 State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 
605, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).  See State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, 
¶28, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 859 (concluding that the 
attorney-client privilege belongs to the client); Lane v. Sharp 
Packaging Sys., Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶33, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 
N.W.2d 788 (concluding that only the client can waive the 
attorney-client 
privilege); 
Borgwardt 
v. 
Redlin, 
196 
Wis. 2d 342, 355, 538 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1995) (concluding 
that only the client or someone authorized by the client may 
waive the privilege); Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing 
Co., 126 Wis. 2d 16, 31-32, 374 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(stating 
that 
an 
attorney 
can 
only 
waive 
the 
privilege 
"voluntarily at the client's direction."). 
19 Meeks, 263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶28.   
20 Id., ¶8.   
21 Id., ¶28 (citing Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.03(2)); see also 
Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 355. 
No. 
02-1515   
 
15 
 
regarding Meeks' competence was privileged because it was 
"necessarily 
premised 
on 
[the 
attorney's] 
privileged 
and 
confidential relationship with Meeks" and a thorough examination 
of the testimony would "necessarily reveal factual data upon 
which [the conclusions] were based."22  The privilege was not 
waived when the client did not consent to the disclosure.23  The 
court remanded the case to the circuit court to conduct a 
competency hearing without consideration of the attorney's 
testimony.   
¶36 Third, although we acknowledge that under agency law, 
ordinarily a litigant is bound by the acts of counsel during the 
representation,24 the court of appeals' reliance on the agency 
                                                 
22 Meeks, 263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶54.   
23 In Meeks, counsel objected to the previous counsel's 
testimony on "relevance grounds" and on the basis of the 
attorney-client privilege, to a question asked of the previous 
counsel.  Meeks, 263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶7.  The circuit court 
overruled both objections.  Id.   
24 See, e.g., Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 
261, 288, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).   
Comment b. to § 26, 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers (2000) explains that "[l]awyers . . . are 
recognized as agents for their clients in litigation and other 
legal matters."  Section 26 provides that "[a] lawyer's act is 
considered to be that of a client in proceedings before a 
tribunal or in dealings with third persons when: (1) the client 
has expressly or impliedly authorized the act . . . ."   
Section 27 of the Restatement further provides:  "A 
lawyer's act is considered to be that of the client in 
proceedings before a tribunal or in dealings with a third person 
if the tribunal or third person reasonably assumes that the 
lawyer is authorized to do the act on the basis of the client's 
(and not the lawyer's) manifestations of such authorization." 
No. 
02-1515   
 
16 
 
theory and, for example, Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 
Wis. 2d 261, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991), is misplaced here.  In 
Johnson, we concluded that the decision whether to impute the 
attorney's conduct to the client and sanction the client for the 
attorney's conduct was within the circuit court's discretion.  
However, the considerations in Johnson for binding a client by 
the attorney's acts and sanctioning the client are not present 
in cases like the one at bar.25 
¶37 In Johnson, the attorney missed numerous court-ordered 
deadlines, which greatly prolonged discovery.26  The circuit 
court dismissed the case because of the attorney's negligence.27  
This Court concluded that the circuit court had discretion 
whether to impute the conduct of the attorney to the client and 
whether to sanction the client for the attorney's conduct.  The 
court concluded that the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in that case.28   
                                                 
25 See Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 
273, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991). 
Comment b. to § 26, 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers (2000), acknowledges that "[i]n practice, 
however, clients are sometimes unable to control their lawyer's 
conduct and accordingly may sometimes be excused from the 
consequences of their lawyer's behavior when that can be done 
without seriously harming others." 
26 Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 266.   
27 Id. at 284.   
28 Id. at 285, 287. 
No. 
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17 
 
¶38 The Johnson court concluded that even though the 
attorney's negligence harmed the client, the client could not 
separate himself from the acts of his agent.29  In Johnson, the 
court concluded that equity supported placing the adverse 
consequences on the client who chose the non-complying attorney 
rather than burdening the adversary affected by the delay.30  
Thus, Johnson teaches that the attorney-client agency doctrine 
is not always applied to bind a client by the attorney's act.31   
¶39 The policies that supported imputing an attorney's 
conduct to the client in Johnson do not support imputing to a 
client an attorney's voluntary disclosure of attorney-client 
privileged documents in a case like the one at bar.  For that 
reason the agency doctrine does not apply to waiver of attorney-
client privilege as it relates to privileged documents.   
¶40 One reason we applied the agency doctrine in Johnson 
was that the agency doctrine promoted the functioning of the 
justice system.32  The court-ordered dismissal in Johnson would 
                                                 
29 Id. at 284.   
30 Id. at 285.   
31 We do not adopt the discretionary standard set forth in 
Johnson because were we to hold that a circuit court could 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether an attorney waived the 
privilege, 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege 
would 
not 
be 
sufficiently protected.  A privilege must be predictable to have 
its intended effect.  In Berg Electronics., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 
875 F. Supp. 261, 262 (D. Del. 1995), the court stated that 
"[a]n uncertain privilege is a privilege that is little better 
than no privilege at all." 
32 Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 283. 
No. 
02-1515   
 
18 
 
motivate clients to police attorneys and would discourage 
conduct harmful to an adversary and the justice system.  In the 
present case, the clients are already motivated to prevent 
release of attorney-client privileged documents, and protecting 
the attorney-client privilege promotes the functioning of the 
justice system.   
¶41 The defendants argue that recognizing the lawyer's 
waiver in the present case promotes quality legal representation 
and fosters the functioning of the judicial system by holding 
counsel to a reasonable standard of care regarding voluntary 
release of attorney-client privileged documents.  We disagree 
with the defendants.  We would be placing too heavy a burden on 
the attorney-client relationship if an attorney were allowed to 
waive the attorney-client privilege in cases like the present 
case.  
¶42 The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to 
promote "full and frank communication" between client and 
No. 
02-1515   
 
19 
 
attorney.33  Full and frank communication is in turn promoted by 
endowing the communication with confidentiality.34   
¶43 If the privilege did not exist, "everyone would be 
thrown upon his own legal 
resources. 
 Deprived of all 
professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any 
skillful person, or would only dare to tell his counselor half 
his case."35  Attorney-client communication is promoted when a 
client may give documents to an attorney that further the 
representation without fearing that the attorney will release 
the documents to an adversary who will use the documents against 
the client.  Clients aware that an attorney's disclosure waives 
the privilege may keep critical information from their attorney, 
thus thwarting the policy of the free flow of information that 
lies behind the attorney-client privilege.  One way to encourage 
                                                 
33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
See also 1 McCormick on Evidence § 92 at 369 (John William 
Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).  
A "triad of assumptions" underlies the client-communication 
theory: (1) that "complex laws and technically-refined doctrine 
requir[e] the assistance of trained lawyers"; (2) that "sound 
legal advice depend[s] upon a complete knowledge of the facts"; 
and (3) that "clients probably would not divulge factual 
information unless assured of confidentiality."  Daniel D. 
Blinka, Evidence, § 503.1 at 258 n.17 (2d ed. 2001). 
34 Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d at R150.  See Jax 
v. Jax, 73 Wis. 2d 572, 579, 243 N.W.2d 831 (1976); Jacobi v. 
Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 157, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964); Cont'l Cas. 
Co. v. Pogorzelski, 275 Wis. 350, 353, 82 N.W.2d 183 (1957) 
(citing Bruley v. Garvin, 105 Wis. 625, 631, 81 N.W. 1038 
(1900)). 
35 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2291 at 546 (John T. McNaughton 
rev., 1961).   
No. 
02-1515   
 
20 
 
a client to communicate fully with his or her attorney is to 
hold that only the client should be able to waive the attorney-
client privilege. 
¶44 The defendants assert that the purpose of a trial is 
to find the truth and that a holding that an attorney waives the 
attorney-client privilege by disclosure would help bring out the 
truth and promote the functioning of the justice system.  The 
defendants make a good point, but the judicial system has viewed 
confidential communications, in the long run, as the best way of 
arriving at the truth and of promoting the functioning of the 
justice system.   
¶45 Consequently 
the 
significant 
reasons 
for 
the 
application of the attorney-client agency doctrine in Johnson do 
not support applying the agency doctrine to the present case, in 
which 
an 
attorney 
voluntarily 
disclosed 
attorney-client 
privileged 
documents to 
opposing 
counsel during 
discovery 
without the consent or knowledge of the client.  Allowing the 
defendants to keep and use the privileged documents would grant 
them an undeserved windfall.36 
¶46 In sum, the texts of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 905.03 and 
905.11, the case law, and the policies undergirding the 
attorney-client privilege support our conclusion that a lawyer, 
without the consent or knowledge of a client, cannot waive the 
attorney-client privilege by voluntarily producing privileged 
                                                 
36 Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and 
the Litigator, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1605, 1615 (1986). 
No. 
02-1515   
 
21 
 
documents (which the attorney does not recognize as privileged) 
to an opposing attorney in response to a discovery request.  We 
hold that only the client can waive the attorney-client 
privilege under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11 regarding attorney-
client privileged documents.   
¶47 The 
documents remain 
protected by 
the 
privilege 
because the plaintiffs did not waive their attorney-client 
privilege.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order.  
According 
to 
the 
order, 
the 
attorney-client 
privileged 
documents, and all copies thereof, must be returned to the 
plaintiffs and the exhibits listed in the order shall not be 
used for purposes of any discovery deposition and shall not be 
shared with experts.  
¶48 We acknowledge that the information obtained from the 
documents before the plaintiffs made any objection to the 
disclosure cannot easily be erased from the minds of defense 
counsel or the defendants with whom the documents were shared.37  
The defendants argue that it is not reasonable or practical to 
try to "unring the bell."  But a return of the documents and the 
circuit court's prohibition of their use is the only remedy 
available in this proceeding.38   
                                                 
37 According to the defendants' brief, defense counsel 
provided these documents to the defendants and used the 
documents to prepare for pending depositions, to conduct a fact 
investigation, in meetings with the defendants, and in filing a 
summary judgment motion. 
 
Brief 
of 
Defendants-Third-Party 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3-4. 
38 Int'l Digital Sys. Corp., 120 F.R.D. at 449. 
No. 
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22 
 
 ¶49 The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
the order of the circuit court is affirmed.   
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶50 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
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