Title: Renaud v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11762
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2015

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SJC-11762  
 
 
 
 
 
RONALD RENAUD  vs.  COMMONWEALTH.   
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 3, 2015. - April 17, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Erroneous Conviction.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.  
Evidence, Identity. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 16, 2013. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas A. Connors, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey T. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. 
 
Stephanie Roberts Hartung & Drew Glassroth, for New England 
Innocence Project & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury-waived trial in the District Court, 
a judge found the plaintiff, Ronald Renaud, guilty of malicious 
destruction of property, breaking and entering in the daytime, 
2 
 
and larceny over $250.  On appeal, the Appeals Court overturned 
Renaud's convictions, concluding that the evidence was 
insufficient to support them.1  See Commonwealth v. Renaud, 81 
Mass. App. Ct. 261, 263, 265 (2012).  Renaud thereafter filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 258D, the 
erroneous convictions statute, seeking compensation for his 
erroneous convictions.  The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the 
complaint, which a judge denied,2 and the Commonwealth appealed.  
See Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 835 (2013) ("Because 
the erroneous convictions statute provides only a limited waiver 
on the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity, we conclude that the 
doctrine of present execution applies to claims brought under 
that statute, and thus that interlocutory appeal is 
appropriate").  We transferred the case here on our own 
initiative to determine whether, under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B), 
the reversal of Renaud's convictions due to insufficient 
evidence amounts to "grounds which tend to establish" his 
innocence, thus rendering him eligible to obtain relief under 
                     
 
1 The plaintiff had served more than 490 days in a house of 
correction for the sentence he received on these convictions.   
 
 
2 In his denial of the Commonwealth's motion, the Superior 
Court judge inadvertently labeled his decision as one in 
response to the Commonwealth's motion for a judgment on the 
pleadings.   
  
3 
 
the statute.  We conclude that it does.  We therefore affirm the 
denial of the motion to dismiss. 
 
Background and prior proceedings.3  The relevant facts, as 
introduced by the Commonwealth before it closed its case, are 
that a break-in occurred in a Falmouth home.  Renaud, 81 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 262.  Four television sets, a digital video disc 
player, and items of sports memorabilia were missing.  Id.  No 
one was seen perpetrating the break-in or stealing the property 
from the home.  Id.  While examining the living room after being 
called to the scene, a police officer recovered from the floor 
an electronic bank transfer (EBT) card bearing the name of the 
plaintiff.  Id.  The EBT card had been cut into three separate 
pieces and was taped together.  Id.  The owner of the home and 
the residents thereof did not recognize the plaintiff's name.  
Id.  The police officer, however, did recognize the name and was 
aware that the plaintiff recently had resided in Falmouth.  Id. 
at 263.   
 
The next day, a detective telephoned the plaintiff's 
cellular telephone and recognized his voice.  Id.  The detective 
informed the plaintiff that someone had found his EBT card on 
the side of the road.  Id.  The plaintiff stated that he did not 
                     
 
3 The background is derived from the facts set forth in the 
Appeals Court's decision.  See Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 
834, 835 (2013).   
 
4 
 
know that his card was missing and that he would have to go home 
and "check because he had not really looked for it."  Id.  The 
detective informed the plaintiff that if he wanted to pick up 
the card, he would have to come to the police station.  Id.  The 
plaintiff did not do so.  Id.   
 
The Appeals Court reversed the plaintiff's convictions, set 
aside the verdicts, and entered judgments in favor of the 
plaintiff because it determined that the Commonwealth's evidence 
was insufficient to prove that the plaintiff was the person who 
had committed the charged crimes.  Id. at 263, 265.  The Appeals 
Court noted that "[t]he convictions here were based almost 
entirely on the fact that an EBT card bearing [the plaintiff's 
name] was found on the floor of the living room of the 
burglarized house."  Id. at 263.  Although the Appeals Court 
determined that, because the EBT card bore the plaintiff's name, 
that it could reasonably be inferred that he was at one point in 
possession of it, the court concluded that "the Commonwealth has 
presented no evidence that [the plaintiff] possessed, and 
subsequently dropped, his EBT card during the crime[s]."  Id. at 
264.  The Appeals Court went on to state that "the fact that the 
card was found taped together in three pieces evidences that it 
had been discarded by its owner on some prior occasion."  Id.  
In sum, the Appeals Court reasoned, "ownership of an EBT card 
cannot allow a fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
5 
 
that the owner of the card was in possession of it during the 
commission of a crime."  Id.  Concerning the Commonwealth's 
arguments regarding the facts that the plaintiff lived in the 
same town where the crimes were committed and was known to 
police, the Appeals Court concluded that those facts only showed 
that the plaintiff may have had the ability to commit the 
crimes, but were not proof that he did in fact commit them.  Id.  
The Appeals Court did not find significant the fact that the 
plaintiff did not retrieve his EBT card from police where he had 
not been ordered to do so.  Id., citing Commonwealth v. 
Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008) (where detective did not 
order defendant to do anything, consciousness of guilt 
instruction not warranted where detective told defendant about 
criminal charges against him, asked him to call back later, and 
he did not call back). 
 
Statutory overview.  The erroneous convictions statute was 
enacted to ensure that "those erroneously convicted but 
factually innocent be afforded equal opportunities to obtain 
compensation."  Irwin, 465 Mass. at 847.  Notably, the statute 
"waives sovereign immunity 'for an erroneous felony conviction," 
G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (A), then establishes the class of claimants 
'eligible to obtain relief.'  [Id. at § 1 (B)]."  Irwin, supra 
at 841-842.   
6 
 
 
In order to be entitled to compensation under the statute, 
the "threshold matter of eligibility as a member of the class of 
claimants eligible to pursue relief" must be decided.  Id. at 
842.  Then, a claimant must establish at trial, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that he or she did not commit the offense 
charged.  Id. at 839.  
 
As relevant here, concerning eligibility, G. L. c. 258D, 
§ 1 (B) (ii), provides: 
 
"The class of persons eligible to obtain relief under 
this chapter shall be limited to the following:  . . . 
those who have been granted judicial relief by a state 
court of competent jurisdiction, on grounds which tend to 
establish the innocence of the individual as set forth in 
clause (vi) of subsection (C),[4] and if (a) the judicial 
relief vacates or reverses the judgment of a felony 
conviction, and the felony indictment or complaint used to 
charge the individual with such felony has been dismissed . 
. . and (b) at the time of the filing of an action under 
this chapter no criminal proceeding is pending or can be 
brought against the individual by a district attorney or 
the attorney general for any act associated with such 
felony conviction."  
 
"We have interpreted the word 'grounds' in that statute as 
meaning 'basis.'"  Irwin, 465 Mass. at 843.  We concluded that 
"the requirement that judicial relief must have been granted on 
'grounds which tend to establish the innocence' of a claimant 
                     
 
4 General Laws c. 258D, § 1 (C) (vi), provides that a 
claimant must establish that he or she "did not commit the 
crimes or crime charged in the indictment or complaint or any 
other felony arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts 
supporting the indictment or complaint, or any lesser included 
felony." 
  
7 
 
does not limit the threshold question of eligibility for relief 
'to individuals whose convictions were vacated or reversed 
strictly on the basis "of compelling or overwhelming exculpatory 
evidence," that is, on the grounds that they were actually 
innocent.'"  Id. at 844, quoting Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 
Mass. 354, 359 (2010).  "Rather, 'grounds which tend to 
establish' a plaintiff's innocence require that a conviction be 
overturned 'on grounds resting upon facts and circumstances 
probative of the proposition that the claimant did not commit 
the crime.'"  Irwin, supra, quoting Guzman, supra.  Last, "[w]e 
have cautioned, however, that such grounds must 'tend[] to do 
more than merely assist the defendant's chances of acquittal.'"  
Irwin, supra, quoting Guzman, supra at 360. 
 
Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that it was entitled 
to have the plaintiff's complaint dismissed because the 
plaintiff did not meet his threshold burden of proving 
eligibility, specifically, that his convictions were overturned 
"on grounds which tend to establish [his] innocence" under G. L. 
c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii).  The Commonwealth advances separate 
arguments in support of its position.   
 
The Commonwealth first argues that the only claimants 
eligible under the statute are those who are "in fact, 
innocent."  As previously indicated supra, we have expressly 
rejected this interpretation.  See Irwin, 465 Mass. at 844.  
8 
 
Although § 1 (B) (ii) references § 1 (C) (vi), the eligibility 
requirement is "separate and distinct from the merits of the 
claim of relief that a claimant must establish at trial," namely 
that he or she did not commit the charged offense.  Irwin, supra 
at 839, 842.  The Commonwealth improperly conflates the two 
stages set forth in the statute.   
 
Next, the Commonwealth contends that, although the Appeals 
Court's grounds for reversal concerned the Commonwealth's 
ability to prove the plaintiff's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the grounds did not tend to establish his actual 
innocence.  The Commonwealth asserts that, "categorically," 
insufficient evidence of guilt does not necessarily equate to 
actual innocence.5  We do not disagree with this broad statement.  
However, contrary to the Commonwealth's contention, there is no 
need for us to make any "categorical" pronouncement.  Rather, 
the unique facts of this case inform our decision.  Here, the 
                     
 
5 Our cases addressing the erroneous convictions statute 
have not addressed this issue.  Our decision in Irwin, 465 Mass. 
at 835, 855, involved the erroneous admission of evidence of the 
plaintiff's prearrest silence as purportedly probative of his 
innocence.  In Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 359-360, 
363-365 (2010), the underlying convictions were overturned based 
on new evidence of exculpatory testimony from two witnesses whom 
defense counsel failed to call to testify at trial.  In Drumgold 
v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 367, 376-377 (2010), we were faced 
with a new trial that had been granted based on newly discovered 
evidence that would have challenged the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness and the nondisclosure of exculpatory 
evidence relating to the credibility of another prosecution 
witness.   
 
9 
 
Commonwealth's "insufficient evidence" pertained to the identity 
of the defendant.  As such, we conclude that the Commonwealth's 
inability to establish, viewed in a light most favorable to it, 
that the plaintiff was the person who committed the crimes, is 
entirely "probative of the proposition that [the plaintiff] did 
not commit the crime[s]."  See Guzman, 458 Mass. at 362.  This 
case is not one where there exists other evidence offered by the 
Commonwealth implicating the plaintiff in the charged crimes.6  
Cf. Irwin, 465 Mass. at 855 (noting that "exclusion of the 
nonprobative and irrelevant evidence would have had no bearing 
on the weight of the remaining evidence").  We add that the 
grounds on which the plaintiff sought relief "do more than 
merely assist [his] chances of acquittal," Guzman, supra at 360; 
the grounds required his actual acquittal.  In the circumstances 
of this case, a reversal of the plaintiff's convictions based on 
the absence of evidence that he was the person who committed the 
crimes is probative of innocence and the plaintiff has satisfied 
his threshold burden of establishing eligibility under the 
statute.  Our conclusion does not entitle the plaintiff to 
relief.  He is entitled to relief only if he proves at trial by 
                     
 
6 We agree with the reasoning of the Appeals Court 
concerning the significance, or lack thereof, of the facts at 
trial pertaining to the defendant residing in the area where the 
crimes were committed, being known to police, and not retrieving 
his electronic bank transfer card from police.  See Commonwealth 
v. Renaud, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 264-265 (2012). 
10 
 
clear and convincing evidence that he did not commit the 
offenses charged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  dismiss affirmed.