Title: Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley
Citation: 2012 WI 7
Docket Number: 2010AP002398
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2012

2012 WI 7

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2398 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Loran B. Zwiefelhofer, William J. Schindler, 
Glenn R. Sarauer and Samuel R. La Gesse, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Town of Cooks Valley, a Wisconsin quasi-
municipal  corporation, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 

 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 8, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa 
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Isaacson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs filed by Joe 
Thrasher and Thrasher, Pelish, & Franti, Ltd., Rice Lake, and 
oral argument by Joe Thrasher. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondents there was a brief filed by 
William G. Thiel and Weld, Riley, Prenn, & Ricci, S.C., Eau 
Claire, and oral argument by William G. Thiel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carol B. Nawrocki, 
Shawano, for Wisconsin Towns Association; Thomas D. Larson, 
Madison, for Wisconsin Realtors Association and the Wisconsin 
Builders Association; Charles V. Sweeney, Mitchell R. Olsen and 
Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, for Aggregate Producers of 



Wisconsin, 
Inc 
and 
Wisconsin 
Transportation 
Builders 
Association, Inc; Matthew J. Duchemin, Matthew D. Fortney and 
Quarles & Brady, LLP, Madison, for Preferred Sands of Minnesota, 
LLC; and Daniel M. Olson, Madison, for the League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities.
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2012 WI 7
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.   2010AP2398 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV738) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Loran B. Zwiefelhofer, William J. Schindler, 
Glenn R. Sarauer and Samuel R. La Gesse, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Cooks Valley, a Wisconsin quasi-
municipal corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 8, 2012 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Chippewa 
County, James M. Isaacson, Judge.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   Loran B. Zwiefelhofer, 
William J. Schindler, Glenn R. Sarauer, and Samuel R. La Gesse, 
the plaintiffs, are residents of the Town of Cooks Valley.  They 
brought a declaratory judgment action against the Town of Cooks 
Valley (the Town) in the Circuit Court for Chippewa County, 
James M. Isaacson, Judge, to declare the Town's Nonmetallic 
Mining Ordinance (the Ordinance) invalid.   
No. 
2010AP2398   
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2 
 
¶2 
The complaint alleges that each of the plaintiffs owns 
land in the Town, has engaged in nonmetallic mining in the past, 
and may wish to engage in nonmetallic mining operations on their 
land in the future.  The plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance 
is a zoning ordinance that is invalid because it does not have 
county board approval.  If the Ordinance is not a zoning 
ordinance, county board approval is not required.    
¶3 
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs, and the Town appealed.1  The court of appeals 
certified the appeal to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 809.61 (2009-10).2 
¶4 
The appeal presents a single issue: Is the Town's 
Nonmetallic Mining Ordinance a zoning ordinance?  
¶5 
Zoning ordinances are enacted pursuant to a local 
government's police power.3  "Although zoning ordinances are 
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1 The circuit court concluded that the Ordinance is a zoning 
ordinance because it "covers the immediate use of land" and "is 
a pervasive regulation of the use of land."  The circuit court 
relied largely on Gordie Boucher Lincoln-Mercury Madison, Inc. 
v. City of Madison Plan Commission, 178 Wis. 2d 74, 503 
N.W.2d 265 (1993), which was overruled by Wood v. City of 
Madison, 2003 WI 24, 260 Wis. 2d 71, 659 N.W.2d 31.  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  
3 See 8 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 25.11 (3d ed. 2010) ("Zoning laws in their usual form are an 
exercise 
of 
the 
police 
power . . . . [T]he 
police 
power . . . remains the wellspring from which the power to plan 
and zone flows.").      
No. 
2010AP2398   

3 
 
enacted under a municipality's police power, all ordinances 
enacted under the police power are not zoning ordinances."4  
Zoning ordinances and non-zoning ordinances that are enacted 
pursuant to a local government's police power thus inhabit 
closely related spheres.  The court has declared that a zoning 
ordinance and a building code enacted pursuant to the police 
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Wisconsin's zoning enabling act, Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(a), 
describes the grant of zoning power to the local government as 
follows:  "For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals 
or the general welfare of the community, the council may 
regulate and restrict by ordinance . . . the location and use of 
buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, mining, 
residence or other purposes . . . ." 
Wisconsin Stat. § 61.34(1) prescribes a local government's 
police powers as follows:  
[The local government] . . . shall have power to act 
for the government and good order of the [local 
government], for its commercial benefit and for the 
health, safety, welfare and convenience of the public, 
and may carry its powers into effect by license, 
regulation, suppression, borrowing, taxation, special 
assessment, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, and 
other necessary or convenient means.  The powers 
hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other 
grants and shall be limited only by express language.  
Police power has been described as follows:  "The very 
existence of government renders imperative a power to restrain 
the individual to some extent.  This is called the 'police 
power' . . . .  It may be described, though not defined, as the 
power of the government to regulate conduct and property of some 
for safety and property of all."  State ex rel. Zillmer v. 
Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 533, 90 N.W. 1098 (1902), quoted with 
approval in State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶25, 264 N.W.2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328. 
4 Heitman 
v. 
City 
of 
Mauston 
Common 
Council, 
226 
Wis. 2d 542, 556, 595 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1999) (Dykman, P.J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
2010AP2398   

4 
 
power 
"are 
two 
closely 
related 
facets 
of 
police 
power 
regulation.  Both are designed to promote public safety, health 
and welfare."5   
¶6 
Despite the similarity and potential overlap between 
zoning ordinances and non-zoning police power ordinances, the 
legislature imposes different procedural requirements on these 
two forms of ordinances.6 
¶7 
Although the constitutionality of zoning, as a general 
matter, has long been settled,7 the heightened procedural 
requirements on zoning ordinances are often justified because 
zoning runs the risk of unduly infringing on individuals' 
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5 Village of Wind Point v. Halverson, 38 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 155 
N.W.2d 654 (1968). 
6 See 1 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning 
and Planning, § 1:10 (2011):  
The importance of distinguishing between a restriction 
contained in an ordinance enacted pursuant to general 
or specific authority relating to such type of 
restriction, and between the same restriction enacted 
as part of a zoning ordinance usually involves the 
formalities by which it was enacted.  When contained 
in, and as part of, a zoning ordinance, it must have 
been enacted pursuant to and in accordance with the 
legislatively 
prescribed 
procedures 
for 
enacting 
zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. 
7 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926). 
No. 
2010AP2398   

5 
 
property rights.8  In the present case, the additional procedural 
requirement of county approval may also be justified by the need 
to avoid a conflicting web of county and town zoning ordinances. 
¶8 
In determining whether the Ordinance is a zoning 
ordinance, we do not create or apply a bright-line rule 
governing what constitutes a zoning ordinance and do not 
establish or apply an all-encompassing definition of a zoning 
ordinance.  Rather, we determine whether the Ordinance is a 
zoning ordinance using a functional approach.  We catalogue the 
characteristics 
of 
traditional 
zoning 
ordinances 
and 
the 
commonly accepted purposes of zoning ordinances.  We then 
compare the characteristics and purposes of the Ordinance to the 
characteristics and purposes of traditional zoning ordinances to 
determine whether the Ordinance should be classified as a zoning 
ordinance. 
¶9 
No 
single 
characteristic 
or 
consideration 
is 
dispositive of the question whether the Ordinance is a zoning 
ordinance.  Nor may a court simply add up the number of 
similarities a challenged ordinance has to traditional zoning 
ordinances or the number of differences a challenged ordinance 
has from traditional zoning ordinances to determine whether a 
challenged 
ordinance 
is 
a 
zoning 
ordinance. 
 
Some 
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8 See 1 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:2 ("Zoning at first was 
considered 
one 
of 
the 
most 
radical 
departures 
from 
the 
traditional 
concepts 
of 
private 
property 
because 
it 
was 
perceived as prohibiting a citizen from devoting his property to 
a purpose useful and entirely harmless, in the ordinary sense, 
in certain districts within a community.").  
No. 
2010AP2398   

6 
 
characteristics, under the circumstances of the case, may be 
more significant than others.   
¶10 With that said, we have scrutinized the Ordinance in 
light of the characteristics and purposes of traditional zoning 
ordinances and conclude that, despite having some similarities 
to traditional zoning ordinances, the Ordinance is not to be 
classified as a zoning ordinance.  The Ordinance is a non-zoning 
ordinance adopted under the Town's police power.  Accordingly, 
the ordinance did not need county board approval, and we reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court.  
I 
 
¶11 The facts relevant to this appeal consist primarily of 
the contents of the Ordinance.   
 
¶12 The Town adopted the Ordinance at a public Town Board 
meeting on December 17, 2008, after discussing the Ordinance at 
a series of public meetings beginning on June 20, 2008. 
 
¶13 The Ordinance begins with a preamble, which states the 
purposes of the Ordinance and explains that it is adopted 
pursuant to the Town's village and police powers: 
The purpose of this subchapter is to promote the 
health, safety, prosperity, aesthetics and general 
welfare of the people and communities within the Town 
and set forth the rules and procedures for this 
municipality regarding nonmetallic mines within the 
Town.  This ordinance is adopted pursuant to the 
Town's village and police powers under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 60.10(2)(c) & 61.34. 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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7 
 
¶14 The Ordinance's preamble is followed by a statement of 
the Town Board's intent to regulate nonmetallic mines so as to, 
among other things, protect the health of residents: 
The general intent of this subchapter is to regulate 
the location, construction, installation, alteration, 
design, operation and use of all nonmetallic mines so 
as to protect the health of residents and transients; 
secure safety from disease and pestilence; further the 
appropriate use and conservation of land and water 
resources; preserve and promote the administration and 
enforcement of this subchapter and provide penalties 
for its violations. 
¶15 The definition section of the Ordinance explains that 
"nonmetallic mining" refers to commercial sand and gravel pits, 
also known as open-pit mines, along with their associated 
activities, such as drilling, blasting, excavation, grading, and 
dredging.  Various activities that result in minor or incidental 
removal of nonmetallic minerals are exempt under the Ordinance, 
such as the growing of commercial sod and agricultural crops. 
¶16 The Ordinance then explains that a permit is required 
for the operation of a nonmetallic mine and sets forth the 
application process.  The appendix to the Ordinance contains a 
detailed eight-page application, which the applicant must submit 
to the Town Clerk along with an application fee.  The 
application is first considered by the Town Plan Commission and 
copies are distributed to all residents who own land adjoining 
the proposed site.  The Town Plan Commission then makes a 
recommendation to the Town Board. 
¶17 The Town Board considers the recommendation at a 
public meeting and takes comments from the public.  The Town 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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8 
 
Board determines whether the application is complete; whether 
the "mine is in the best interests of the citizens of the Town, 
and will be consistent with the protection of public health, 
safety and general welfare;" and whether the applicant has 
received any required federal, state, and county permits.  If 
these criteria are satisfied, the Town Board "shall grant the 
permit, either with or without conditions." 
¶18 The Ordinance elaborates on the type of conditions 
that the Town may impose on nonmetallic mining "to protect 
public health and safety and promote the general welfare of the 
Town" as follows: 
Such conditions may include, but are not limited to, 
restrictive provisions and proof of financial security 
for reclamation, restrictive provisions and proof of 
financial security for town road maintenance and 
repair, 
restrictions 
on 
hours 
of 
operation, 
restrictions 
on 
truck 
routes 
on 
town 
roads, 
restrictions on truck and traffic volume into and out 
of the mine site, restrictions to protect groundwater 
quantity and quality, restrictions to safeguard public 
and 
private 
drinking 
and 
agricultural 
wells, 
restrictions to control air emissions and dust from 
the 
mine 
and 
its 
operations, 
and 
any 
other 
restrictions deemed necessary and appropriate . . . .  
¶19 Finally, the Ordinance exempts preexisting mines from 
the application and permit requirements.  The Ordinance applies, 
however, to expansion of preexisting mines. 
II 
¶20 This appeal requires the court to interpret portions 
of chapters 60, 61, and 62 of the Wisconsin Statutes and the 
Ordinance.  Interpretation of a statute and an Ordinance 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
determines 
No. 
2010AP2398   

9 
 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses.9   
III 
 
¶21 We begin by providing background to explain why the 
plaintiffs' claim that the Ordinance is invalid hinges on 
whether the Ordinance is a zoning ordinance.  
 
¶22 Towns in Wisconsin possess those powers granted by 
statute and any powers that are necessarily implied from a power 
expressly provided by statute.10  The powers that may be 
exercised at a town meeting are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 60.10.  
Relevant for our purposes, Wis. Stat. § 60.10(2)(c) provides 
that the town meeting may "[a]uthorize the town board to 
exercise powers of a village board under s. 60.22(3)."  The Town 
adopted village powers in 2001 and the resolution has never been 
rescinded.  
 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 60.22(3), in turn, cross-refers to 
chapter 61, which endows town boards with powers conferred on 
village boards under chapter 61.  "If authorized under s. 
60.10(2)(c), [the town board] may exercise powers relating to 
villages and conferred on village boards under ch. 61, except 
those powers which conflict with statutes relating to towns and 
town boards."   
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9 Wood, 260 Wis. 2d 71, ¶11.  
10 Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 Wis. 2d 10, 20, 440 
N.W.2d 777 (1989).  
No. 
2010AP2398   
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10 
 
¶24 Chapter 61 grants a broad range of powers to villages.  
Its underpinning is the "home rule amendment," Wis. Const. Art. 
XI, § 3, adopted in 1924 to allow cities and villages greater 
control over their local affairs.11  Wisconsin Stat. § 61.34 
lists the powers of the village board, and Wis. Stat. § 61.34(5) 
states that "[f]or the purpose of giving to villages the largest 
measure of self-government in accordance with the spirit of [the 
home rule amendment] it is hereby declared that this chapter 
shall be liberally construed in favor of the rights, powers and 
privileges of villages to promote the general welfare, peace, 
good order and prosperity of such villages and the inhabitants 
thereof." 
¶25 The police power of a village board is governed by 
Wis. Stat. § 61.34(1), which provides as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the village board 
shall have the management and control of the village 
property, 
finances, 
highways, 
streets, 
navigable 
waters, and the public service, and shall have power 
to act for the government and good order of the 
village, for its commercial benefit and for the 
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11 Article XI, Section 3(1) provides: "Cities and villages 
organized pursuant to state law may determine their local 
affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with 
uniformity shall affect every city or every village.  The method 
of such determination shall be prescribed by the legislature."  
The parties agree that the state legislature, if it so 
chose, 
could 
enact 
a 
uniform 
statewide 
law 
regulating 
nonmetallic mines, which might preempt the Town's Ordinance.  
The legislature has enacted Chapter 295 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, entitled "Nonmetallic Mining Reclamation; Oil and 
Gas."  See also Chapter NR 135 of the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code.  No one argues this statute preempts the Ordinance. 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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11 
 
health, safety, welfare and convenience of the public, 
and may carry its powers into effect by license, 
regulation, suppression, borrowing, taxation, special 
assessment, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, and 
other necessary or convenient means.  The powers 
hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other 
grants and shall be limited only by express language.12 
¶26 Also included in ch. 61 is Wis. Stat. § 61.35, 
entitled "village planning," which gives villages the power to 
zone by providing that Wis. Stat. § 62.23 (applicable to cities) 
applies to villages.  
¶27 Finally, Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7) governs zoning.  The 
grant of zoning power overlaps with the police power statute.  
The zoning statute provides in part as follows: 
(a) Grant of power.  For the purpose of promoting 
health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the 
community, the council may regulate and restrict by 
ordinance . . . the height, number of stories and size 
of buildings and other structures, the percentage of 
lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts 
and other open spaces, the density of population, and 
the location and use of buildings, structures and land 
for 
trade, industry, mining, residence or other 
purposes 
if 
there 
is 
no 
discrimination 
against 
temporary 
structures. 
 
This 
subsection 
and 
any 
ordinance, resolution or regulation enacted or adopted 
under this section, shall be liberally construed in 
favor of the city and as minimum requirements adopted 
for the purposes stated.  This subsection may not be 
deemed a limitation of any power granted elsewhere. 
(b) Districts.  For any and all of said purposes the 
council may divide the city into districts of such 
number, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited 
to carry out the purposes of this section; and within 
such districts it may regulate and restrict the 
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration or 
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
12 For a similar provision governing cities, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.11(5). 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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12 
 
use of buildings, structures or land.  All such 
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of 
buildings and for the use of land throughout each 
district, but the regulations in one district may 
differ from those in other districts. . . .  
(c) Purposes in view.  Such regulations shall be made 
in 
accordance 
with 
a 
comprehensive 
plan . . . to 
promote health and the general welfare . . . . Such 
regulations 
shall 
be 
made 
with 
reasonable 
consideration, among other things, of the character of 
the 
district 
and 
its 
peculiar 
suitability 
for 
particular uses, and with a view to conserving the 
value of the buildings and encouraging the most 
appropriate use of land throughout such city. 
¶28 The Town of Cooks Valley adopted village powers in 
2001, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 60.10(2)(c).  Thus, by virtue of 
the statutes and the Wisconsin Constitution, the Town possesses 
the full panoply of powers enjoyed by villages, including police 
power and the more specific zoning power. 
¶29 There is an important limitation on the Town's zoning 
authority.  If a town is located in a county that has enacted 
countywide zoning pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.69, the town may 
not adopt a zoning ordinance of its own unless it is approved by 
the county board.13  The Town is situated in Chippewa County, 
which has enacted a countywide zoning ordinance.  Although the 
Town is located in a county with a countywide zoning ordinance, 
the Town has not adopted the county's zoning ordinance.  Thus, 
the Town may enact zoning ordinances, but the Town's zoning 
ordinances need the approval of the county board.   
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13 "In counties having a county zoning ordinance, no zoning 
ordinance or amendment of a zoning ordinance may be adopted 
under this section unless approved by the county board."  Wis. 
Stat. § 60.62(3). 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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13 
 
¶30 The Town did not obtain the Chippewa County Board's 
approval in enacting the Ordinance. 
¶31 Zoning power and police power are obviously closely 
related.  Both serve the same overarching purpose of protecting 
the health, safety, and welfare of the community.  Zoning power 
is a subset of the police power.14  The question before us is 
whether the Town could adopt the Ordinance as a non-zoning 
police power ordinance.   
IV 
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14 See Wis. Stat. §§ 62.23(7)(a) (zoning), 61.34(1) (police 
power). 
The parties seem to agree that the Town could have 
accomplished the goals of the Ordinance by adopting a zoning 
ordinance, because the zoning power allows the Town to "regulate 
and 
restrict 
by 
ordinance . . . the 
location 
and 
use 
of 
buildings, structures and land for . . . mining . . . ."  The 
court has stated that simply because an ordinance could qualify 
as a zoning ordinance does not mean it must be adopted as a 
zoning ordinance.  See Halverson, 38 Wis. 2d at 9. 
In determining whether an ordinance governing building 
setback requirements was a zoning ordinance, the court explained 
that "[t]here is no doubt that an ordinance requiring setback 
lines can be validly enacted by a city or village as a zoning 
ordinance pursuant to sec. 62.73(7)."  Halverson, 38 Wis. 2d at 
9.  Nonetheless, the court concluded "that a setback ordinance 
may also be adopted by a city or village other than by adopting 
a zoning ordinance, as a building restriction or part of a 
building code, pursuant to the general grant of power in sec. 
61.34(1)."  Halverson, 38 Wis. 2d at 9.   
Simply because an ordinance could be validly enacted as a 
zoning ordinance does not mean that zoning is necessarily the 
only avenue available for a local government to enact the 
regulation.  We need not and do not address whether the 
Ordinance would qualify as a valid zoning regulation. 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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14 
 
 
¶32 Various attempts have been made to distinguish between 
zoning ordinances and non-zoning police power ordinances.    
¶33 A review of the case law and secondary sources 
purporting to distinguish between zoning ordinances and non-
zoning police power ordinances reveals that identifying an 
ordinance as a zoning ordinance is not necessarily a simple 
task.15 
 
"[T]he 
line 
distinguishing 
general 
police 
power 
regulation from zoning ordinances is far from clear."16     
 
¶34 The Wisconsin Attorney General has opined that "the 
question of whether a particular enactment constitutes a zoning 
ordinance is often a matter of degree."17   
A 
¶35 To 
identify 
a 
zoning 
ordinance, 
we 
begin 
by 
considering characteristics that are traditionally present in a 
zoning ordinance.  
¶36 First, zoning ordinances typically divide a geographic 
area into multiple zones or districts.  "'Zoning ordinances 
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
15 See Halverson, 38 Wis. at 8 ("The dividing line between a 
zoning regulation and a building code regulation is not easily 
drawn.  These are two closely related facets of police power 
regulation.  Both are designed to promote public safety, health 
and welfare.").     
16 See 1 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:10.  See also 8 
McQuillin, supra note 3, § 25.11 (citing Piper v. Meredith, 266 
A.2d 103 (N.H. 1970)) ("Whether . . . a particular law is a 
zoning measure or an expression of some other phase of the 
police power usually must be determined by the nature and 
purpose of the ordinance, its relation to the general plan of 
zoning in the city, its provisions and the terms used."). 
17 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 60, 68 (1987). 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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15 
 
comprehensively assign compatible land uses to zoning districts 
throughout the community.' . . . The municipality is generally 
divided 
into 
different 
districts, 
such 
as 
residential, 
commercial, 
and 
industrial."18 
 
Because 
zoning 
ordinances 
typically carve a geographic area into multiple districts, they 
often consist of both the text of the ordinance and a map 
showing the districts.19  
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18 Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶17, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 
751 N.W.2d 780 (citing Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 1.04 
(5th ed. 2003)).  See also Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 
Wis. 2d 10, 19, 440 N.W.2d 777 (1989) (quoting 8 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations § 25.01 (3d ed. 1983)) ("'Zoning is 
governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings 
according to districts or zones.'"); Heitman v. City of Mauston 
Common Council, 226 Wis. 2d 542, 550, 595 N.W.2d 450 (Wis. App. 
1999) ("Zoning has been described as the division of a given 
jurisdiction's 
land 
into 
districts 
or 
'zones' 
and 
the 
establishment of regulations within those zones to control both 
the use to which property may be placed and the construction of 
structures.").  
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) uses permissive language, 
stating that a local government may divide the jurisdiction into 
districts.  Because we conclude that the Ordinance is not a 
zoning ordinance, we need not address the legality of an entire 
jurisdiction being zoned for a single-purpose use.  The 
plaintiffs rely on a dissenting opinion from Town of Hobart v. 
Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958), for the assertion 
that an entire town may be a single zoning district.  The 
dissent in Hobart wrote, "We do not construe the majority 
opinion as holding that a zoning . . . ordinance which zones an 
entire town or municipality in a single residence use district 
is per se unconstitutional and void." 3 Wis. 2d at 191 (Currie, 
J., dissenting). 
19 See Lynn Markham & Rebecca Roberts, Zoning Board Handbook 
for Wisconsin Zoning Boards of Adjustment & Appeals 6 (2d ed. 
2006) ("A zoning ordinance consists of two legally adopted 
elements: 
the 
zoning 
map 
and 
the 
text 
of 
the 
zoning 
ordinance.").  
No. 
2010AP2398   

16 
 
¶37 The statute governing zoning, however, provides that a 
municipality "may divide [the community] into districts . . . 
and within such districts it may regulate and restrict the 
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration or use of 
buildings, structures, or land."20        
 
¶38 Second, within the established districts or zones, 
certain uses are typically allowed as of right and certain uses 
are prohibited by virtue of not being included in the list of 
permissive uses for a district.  "In general, zoning ordinances 
provide landowners with permitted uses, which allow a landowner 
to use his or her land, in said manner, as of right."21   
 
¶39 Third, and closely related, zoning ordinances are 
traditionally aimed at directly controlling where a use takes 
place, as opposed to how it takes place.  A distinction between 
a zoning ordinance and other regulations is whether the 
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
20 Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) (emphasis added). 
21 Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19 (citing Daniel R. Mandelker, 
Land Use Law § 6.39 (5th ed. 2003)).  See also 3 Ziegler, supra 
note 6, § 61:9 ("Most zoning ordinances set forth, either as 
part of the text or, more frequently, in a schedule incorporated 
therein by reference, the uses permitted as of right in each 
district, those permitted as accessory to the listed permitted 
uses, and those permitted under the heading of 'special 
exceptions.'"). 
As the above quote suggests, some zoning ordinances include 
"special exceptions," also known as "conditional uses," which 
are allowed in a zone only with the approval of local 
authorities.  The existence of conditional uses does not change 
the fact that most zoning ordinances allow some uses as of right 
and prohibit some uses in all circumstances.   
No. 
2010AP2398   
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17 
 
ordinance is addressed to location or activity.22  As one 
treatise explains, a licensing ordinance that "is intended to 
regulate a particular occupation, rather than the general uses 
of land" is generally not considered a zoning ordinance.23 
 
¶40 Fourth, zoning ordinances traditionally classify uses 
in general terms and attempt to comprehensively address all 
possible uses in the geographic area.  A treatise concludes that 
"zoning regulations . . . must be expressive of a comprehensive 
plan . . . to control and direct the use and development of 
property in a municipality, or a large part thereof, by dividing 
it into districts according to the present and potential use of 
the property."24  As the Wisconsin Attorney General opined, "the 
more comprehensive the ordinance, the more likely it will be 
characterized by a court as a zoning ordinance."25 
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
22 For examples of the difficulty of applying the "where" 
and "how" dichotomy to regulations of trailer camps, see David 
A. Ulrich, Inc. v. Town of Saukville, 7 Wis. 2d 173, 178, 96 
N.W.2d 612 (1959) (zoning provisions governed where a trailer 
camp could be maintained but a town may regulate "how a trailer 
camp 
is 
to 
be 
maintained" 
without 
invoking 
its 
zoning 
authority); Edelbeck v. Town of Theresa, 57 Wis. 2d 172, 178, 
203 N.W.2d 694 (1972) (ordinance requiring, among other things, 
submission of plans and specifications for the physical siting 
of a trailer park was a zoning ordinance); Town of Clearfield v. 
Cushman, 150 Wis. 2d 10, 20, 440 N.W.2d 777 (1989) (ordinance 
that focused on the "how" of living in a trailer——e.g., 
connecting to sanitary sewer and water systems and requiring 
minimum size and compliance with a uniform building code——was 
not a zoning ordinance).    
23 See 8 McQuillin, supra note 3, § 25.14. 
24 See 1 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 2-3 (4th ed. 
1978) (2000 revision by Douglas Scott MacGregor). 
25 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 60, 68 (1987).  
No. 
2010AP2398   
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18 
 
 
¶41 Fifth, 
traditionally, 
though 
not 
always, 
zoning 
ordinances make a fixed, forward-looking determination about 
what uses will be permitted, as opposed to case-by-case, ad hoc 
determinations of what individual landowners will be allowed to 
do.26  It has become increasingly common for zoning ordinances to 
allow for uses that are conditionally permitted, which gives 
local officials the power to make decisions on an individual, ad 
hoc basis.27  Today, most zoning ordinances contain a combination 
of permitted uses and conditionally permitted uses.28  
 
¶42 Sixth, traditional zoning ordinances allow certain 
landowners whose land use was legal prior to the adoption of the 
zoning ordinance to maintain their land use despite its failure 
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
26 See 1 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:5 ("The term 'Euclidean' 
zoning 
describes 
the 
early 
zoning 
concept 
of 
separating 
incompatible land uses through the establishment of fixed 
legislative 
rules 
that 
would 
be 
largely 
self-
administering. . . . Euclidean zoning envisioned a land use 
system where discretionary review of individual proposed uses 
would be the 'exception' rather than the rule and zoning 
restrictions would be uniform for each class or kind of building 
in each district."). 
"Euclidean zoning" refers to classic conceptions of zoning.  
The phrase comes from Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
27 See 1 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:14. 
28 See 3 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 61:9 ("Most zoning 
ordinances set forth, either as part of the text or, more 
frequently, in a schedule incorporated therein by reference, the 
uses permitted as of right in each district, those permitted as 
accessory to the listed permitted uses, and those permitted 
under the heading 'special exceptions.'"). 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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19 
 
to conform to the zoning ordinance.  This practice is motivated 
by constitutional considerations.29  
 
¶43 This list is not exhaustive.  Many jurisdictions, 
including Wisconsin, have certainly recognized the possibility 
that an ordinance need not fit the traditional mold perfectly in 
order to constitute zoning.30  Nonetheless, the list attempts to 
catalogue those characteristics that are at the heart of 
traditional zoning ordinances.  
B 
 
¶44 The "purposes" of zoning can be articulated in many 
ways, with varying levels of generality.  
 
¶45 On the broad, unspecific end of the spectrum, one 
treatise asserts that the purpose of zoning is "to promote the 
welfare of the community as a whole."31  Another treatise states 
that "[t]he ultimate and general purposes of zoning are those 
traditionally associated with the police power."32  Needless to 
say, defining the purpose of zoning this broadly does nothing to 
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
29 See County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 169-
70 & n.9, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980) (describing the protection 
granted to preexisting, "non-conforming" uses); 4 Ziegler, supra 
note 6, § 72:2 (describing the "doctrine of vested nonconforming 
uses").   
30 See, e.g., Heitman, 226 Wis. 2d at 553 (holding that a 
proposed initiative that would forbid a treatment facility for 
sexually violent persons from being located anywhere within a 
city was an invalid initiative because such regulation could 
only occur via zoning).  
31 See 1 Yokley, supra note 24, § 2-2. 
32 See 8 McQuillin, supra note 3, § 25.19. 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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20 
 
help us distinguish a zoning ordinance from a non-zoning police 
power ordinance.  Relying on such broad formulations of the 
purpose of zoning would lead us to label far too many ordinances 
as zoning ordinances.    
 
¶46 Perhaps a less broad purpose of zoning is "'to 
regulate the growth and development of the city in an orderly 
manner.'"33  The proper purpose of zoning has also been described 
as "'conserving the value of property and encouraging the most 
appropriate use of the land.'"34  These statements too are broad 
and could apply to a far-reaching range of planning and 
regulation undertaken by local governments. 
 
¶47 A number of sources, including some of the same 
treatises, provide more specific statements of the purpose of 
zoning.  For example, "[i]ts ultimate purpose is to confine 
certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities;"35 
"the purposes of zoning usually are to restrict certain classes 
of buildings or uses to particular localities,"36 or "[z]oning 
ordinances 
comprehensively 
assign 
compatible 
land 
uses 
to . . . districts throughout the community."37 
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
33 See 1 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:3 (quoting Naylor v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 410 P.2d 764, 765 (Utah 1966)). 
34 State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 
Wis. 262, 269, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1948) (quoting Gabrielson v. Glen 
Ridge, 176 A.2d 676, 679 (N.J. 1935)).  
35 See 1 Yokley, supra note 24, § 2-2. 
36 See 8 McQuillin, supra note 3, § 25.19. 
37 Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17 (quoting Daniel R. Mandelker, 
Land Use Law § 1.04 (5th ed. 2003)).  
No. 
2010AP2398   
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21 
 
 
¶48 The League of Wisconsin Municipalities asserts in its 
nonparty brief that "[t]he separation of incompatible land uses 
is the central purpose of zoning."38  The League argues that this 
predominant purpose provides a genuine and effective basis for 
distinguishing the exercise of zoning power from the exercise of 
non-zoning power.  Separating incompatible land uses has been 
emphasized as a central purpose of zoning since zoning was first 
recognized as constitutional by the United States Supreme 
Court.39   
¶49 Zoning is a flexible tool utilized in many different 
ways by local governments across the nation.  The central 
characteristics of traditional zoning ordinances and the various 
statements of the purposes of zoning provide an analytically 
helpful framework for determining whether a challenged ordinance 
is a zoning ordinance.   
C 
¶50 We now turn to the Ordinance itself, first comparing 
and 
contrasting 
its 
characteristics 
to 
the 
traditional 
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
38 As support for its preferred formulation, the League 
cites State v. Huntington, 143 A.2d 444, 446 (Conn. 1958); 
Ragucci v. Metro Dev. Comm'n of Marion County, 702 N.E.2d 677, 
679 (Ind. 1998); and In re Sardi, 751 A.2d 772, 774 (Vt. 2000). 
In Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶17, 311 
Wis. 2d 1, 
751 
N.W.2d 780, 
the 
court, 
quoting 
Daniel 
R. 
Mandelker, Land Use Law § 1.04 at 1-4 (5th ed. 2003), wrote: 
"[z]oning ordinances comprehensively assign compatible land uses 
to zoning districts throughout the community." 
39 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 
394 (1926).  See 1 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:5 (describing 
classic concepts of Euclidean zoning). 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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22 
 
characteristics of zoning ordinances and then comparing its 
purposes to the purposes of zoning ordinances. 
¶51 First, 
unlike 
traditional 
zoning 
ordinances 
that 
create districts, the Ordinance does not create districts or 
zones in the Town.  Rather, it applies universally to all land 
in the Town. 
¶52 Second, unlike traditional zoning ordinances that list 
uses permitted as of right in each district and prohibit those 
not listed, the Ordinance permits nothing as of right, nor does 
it automatically prohibit anything.  Rather, nonmetallic mining 
has the potential to be permitted or conditionally permitted in 
all parts of the Town. 
¶53 Third, 
unlike 
traditional 
zoning 
ordinances 
that 
directly control the location of activities, the Ordinance 
licenses nonmetallic mining on the basis of the nature of the 
activity.  "While zoning regulates use based on location, 
licensing regulates the type of activity conducted wherever it 
might be located."40  The Ordinance does not directly create 
areas where nonmetallic mining is allowed and others where it is 
not allowed.  It regulates nonmetallic mining wherever it might 
be located.      
¶54 The plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance does not 
simply tell the applicant the manner in which a mining operation 
is to be carried out.  Rather, they assert that the Ordinance is 
intrinsically and inseparably connected with where a mine will 
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
40 See 1 Yokley, supra note 24, § 2-1. 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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23 
 
be operated.  The nonparty brief of Aggregate Producers of 
Wisconsin, 
Inc., 
and 
Wisconsin 
Transportation 
Builders 
Association, Inc., asserts that the Ordinance's stated intent is 
to "regulate the location" of nonmetallic mines.  The nonparty 
brief 
also 
notes 
that 
"construction," 
"installation," 
"alteration," and "design" are all intrinsically linked to and 
dependent on the location of the mine.41  
¶55 The Ordinance does affect the location where mines may 
operate.  It may be that there are certain locations in the Town 
where a nonmetallic mine would not be allowed, even with 
conditions attached, but the Ordinance's impact on the location 
of nonmetallic mines is an incidental consequence of the 
Ordinance's general goal of ensuring that nonmetallic mines are 
"in the best interests of the citizens of the Town, and will be 
consistent with the protection of public health, safety and the 
general welfare," no matter where they are located.42  
¶56 Fourth, unlike traditional zoning ordinances that 
endeavor to address and organize comprehensively all potential 
land 
uses 
in 
the 
geographic area in order to separate 
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
41 For the Ordinance's statement of intent, see ¶14, supra. 
42 General police power ordinances with similar potential to 
incidentally affect the location where a land use may occur have 
been upheld by this court in the past.  For example, in 
Halverson, 38 Wis. 2d at 9, the court held that a building code 
including setback requirements was validly enacted under the 
general police power.  A setback requirement could render it 
impossible for a landowner to use his or her land for a desired 
use. 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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24 
 
incompatible land uses, the Ordinance applies only to one 
particular activity——nonmetallic mining.  
¶57 The plaintiffs urge that the Ordinance comprehensively 
regulates nonmetallic mining and thus resembles a zoning 
ordinance.  This argument misunderstands the meaning of the word 
"comprehensive" as it is typically used in the context of 
zoning.43  The word "comprehensive" as used in the zoning statute 
and the literature does not ordinarily refer to an ordinance 
that thoroughly, that is, comprehensively, regulates a single 
activity.  The phrase ordinarily refers to an ordinance that 
addresses what classes of activities might be pursued in 
geographic areas. 
¶58 In a similar vein, the plaintiffs and some amici 
curiae urge that an ordinance is a zoning ordinance when it 
"pervasively" regulates the use of land. 
¶59 The plaintiffs urge us to hold that an ordinance that 
"constitutes a pervasive regulation of the use of land" must be 
classified as a zoning ordinance.  They argue the Ordinance is a 
pervasive regulation because it significantly regulates all 
aspects of nonmetallic mining and is permeated with site-
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
43 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(c) ("Such regulations 
shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan . . . ."); 
Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning, § 5.3 (5th ed. 2011) 
(discussing various definitions of "comprehensive plan" and 
endorsing a definition that includes the following: "a plan of 
the division of the land between public and private uses, 
specifying the general location and extent of new public 
improvements . . . and, in the case of private developments, the 
general distribution among various classes of uses, such as 
residential business and industrial uses"). 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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25 
 
specific references and regulations.   The plaintiffs assert 
that the Town may condition the nonmetallic mining permit, for 
example, by limiting the size and location of the active mining 
area in relationship to the boundaries and highways, by limiting 
the location, size and height of structures, and by imposing 
setbacks.  According to the plaintiffs, these elements control 
the use of the land, and the Ordinance fits the purpose of 
zoning ordinances set forth in State ex rel. Schleck v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals, 254 Wis. 42, 51, 35 N.W.2d 312 (1948), which 
states as follows: "The very purpose of a zoning law is to 
establish limitations upon the use of private property and 
prescribe how it may be used.  A zoning law necessarily, at 
least in many cases, limits the use which might otherwise be 
made of the property." 
¶60 The nonparty briefs of Preferred Sands of Minnesota, 
LLC, and Wisconsin Realtors Association and Wisconsin Builders 
Association also argue that the distinction between a zoning 
ordinance and a non-zoning police power ordinance rests on how 
pervasive or substantial the regulation is.44  Preferred Sands 
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
44 The nonparty brief of the Wisconsin Realtors Association 
and Wisconsin Builders Association cites the following cases for 
this proposition: Heitman, 226 Wis. 2d at 552-53; State ex rel. 
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 
N.W.2d 217 (1955); Halverson, 38 Wis. 2d at 9; and Cushman, 150 
Wis. 2d 10. 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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26 
 
urges the following test:  "[A]n ordinance is a zoning ordinance 
if 
it 
constitutes, 
or 
would 
constitute, 
a 
substantial 
interference with land use."45  
¶61 In relying on the concepts of "pervasive regulation of 
land 
use" 
and 
"substantial 
interference 
with 
land 
use"46 
(concepts which seem to be used interchangeably in case law and 
in 
the 
literature) 
to 
identify 
a 
zoning 
ordinance, 
the 
plaintiffs and the amici curiae draw upon a feature that our 
case law and some authorities consider relevant. 
¶62 The court has stated that when a "proposed initiative 
constitutes a pervasive prohibition on the use of land within a 
jurisdiction, it is either a zoning ordinance or an amendment to 
a zoning ordinance."47   
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This nonparty brief also takes the position that even if 
the local ordinance regulates land use in a pervasive manner, 
Wisconsin courts will uphold the regulation as a non-zoning 
regulation only if independent statutory authority exists for 
such regulation.  We reject the contention that any ordinance 
that could be construed as pervasively affecting the use of land 
must be supported by independent statutory authority beyond the 
police power or zoning authority to avoid being classified as a 
zoning ordinance. 
45 Preferred Sands draws on 1 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., 
Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 1:10 (2011), for 
this formulation. 
46 See 
1 
Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:10 ("Where the 
particular restriction constitutes, or would constitute, a 
substantial 
interference 
with 
land 
use, 
the 
municipality 
ordinarily must treat it as a zoning regulation . . . ."). 
47 Heitman, 226 Wis. 2d at 553.  
No. 
2010AP2398   
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27 
 
¶63 The Attorney General has declared that when "an 
ordinance constitutes a pervasive regulation of, and in many 
instances a prohibition on the use of, land, I . . . conclude 
that such an ordinance is a zoning ordinance which requires 
county board approval."48 
¶64 Unfortunately, the phrases "pervasive regulation" of 
the use of land or "substantial interference" with the use of 
land are not effective bright-line rules to guide local 
governments or courts.  These phrases turn out to be woefully 
dim when applied to varying facts and may be over-inclusive in 
application.   
¶65 As pointed out by the dissent in Heitman v. City of 
Mauston Common Council, 226 Wis. 2d 542, 556-59, 595 N.W.2d 450 
(Ct. App. 1999), the words "pervasive regulation of land use" 
are overly broad and bring within the classification of zoning 
many ordinances that have been considered non-zoning exercises 
of the police power. 
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
48 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 60, 68 (1987).   
In Gordie Boucher, 178 Wis. 2d at 94 (overruled by Wood, 
260 Wis. 2d 71), the court of appeals adopted the Attorney 
General's view: 
We believe that the attorney general has stated the 
proper test to determine when a local regulation may 
be 
imposed 
under 
the 
locality's 
general 
police 
power . . . and when the regulation is zoning . . . . 
The essence of the attorney general's opinion is that 
some land use controls are so pervasive that their 
imposition must be surrounded with the substantive and 
procedural safeguards which zoning requires.  
No. 
2010AP2398   
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¶66 Fifth, 
unlike 
traditional 
zoning 
ordinances 
that 
feature fixed, self-administering rules and do not allow for 
case-by-case, 
ad 
hoc 
assessments 
of 
individual 
uses 
in 
particular locations, the Ordinance features no permitted uses.  
The Ordinance operates exclusively on a case-by-case basis, 
where each would-be land user must apply for a permit to engage 
in nonmetallic mining.  Although there has been an increase in 
"conditional uses" in zoning ordinances, zoning ordinances still 
generally include certain categories of uses that are permitted 
as of right and do not require case-by-case assessment.49     
¶67 The plaintiffs urge that the Ordinance must be a 
zoning ordinance because mines are granted "conditional use 
permits," 
a phrase 
commonly associated with conditionally 
allowed uses in the zoning context.   
¶68 This argument makes too much of the Ordinance's 
terminology.  Regulations and licensing regimes adopted under 
the 
police 
power 
commonly 
require 
permits 
or 
licenses.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 61.34(1) allows localities great flexibility 
in their use of the police power.  Towns may utilize "license, 
regulation, 
suppression, 
borrowing, 
taxation, 
special 
assessment, 
appropriation, 
fine, 
imprisonment, 
and 
other 
necessary or convenient means" in order to implement ordinances.  
If one is not persuaded that granting conditional permits is 
allowed as a method of "license" or "regulation," it is 
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
49 See Markham & Roberts, supra note 19, at 7 ("Generally, 
two categories of allowable uses are listed for each zoning 
district: permitted uses and conditional uses."). 
No. 
2010AP2398   
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29 
 
comfortably a "necessary or convenient means" to implement an 
ordinance. 
¶69 Just as the Ordinance's use of the phrase "conditional 
use permit" does not render it a zoning ordinance, the Town's 
statement that the Ordinance was adopted pursuant to its general 
police powers is not determinative of the classification of the 
ordinance.  "[A] municipality cannot evade the . . . legislative 
limitations imposed on the zoning power . . . by labeling what 
is actually a zoning ordinance a 'police power' ordinance."50    
¶70 Sixth, like traditional zoning ordinances that allow 
certain preexisting uses to remain although they do not conform 
to 
the 
ordinance, 
the 
Ordinance 
"grandfathers" 
existing 
nonmetallic mines.  However, no rule exists that a non-zoning 
police power ordinance cannot exempt preexisting uses.   
¶71 In this instance, the Town apparently determined that 
preexisting mines had proven themselves to be harmless enough 
that the owners would not be required to undergo the application 
process and obtain permits unless the activities were expanded.  
That the Town chose to make the Ordinance less far-reaching than 
it might have does not transform it into a zoning ordinance. 
¶72 In sum, many traditional characteristics of zoning 
ordinances are absent from the Ordinance.  The Ordinance does 
not create multiple districts; it applies with equal force to 
any location in the Town.  The Ordinance does not confine 
nonmetallic mining to any particular area in the Town; no parts 
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
50 See 1 Ziegler, supra note 6, § 1:10.   
No. 
2010AP2398   
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30 
 
of the Town are foreclosed to nonmetallic mining.  The Ordinance 
does not directly affect where an activity may take place; it 
governs how an activity must be conducted and incidentally 
limits where it may be conducted.  The Ordinance does not 
automatically permit or prohibit any land use; it operates 
entirely on a case-by-case basis.  The Ordinance does not 
comprehensively address a wide range of potential classes of 
land use; it speaks only to a single, specific land use.     
¶73 Nevertheless, the Ordinance has similarities to a 
zoning ordinance.  Conditional allowance of a land use and 
exemption of preexisting land uses are features associated with 
zoning ordinances.  The Ordinance clearly regulates the use of 
land in a potentially dramatic way. It regulates nonmetallic 
mining in many respects and in great detail.  A landowner might 
be barred from engaging in nonmetallic mining in a certain 
location or in the entire Town because of the terms of the 
Ordinance.  The extent to which an ordinance affects the use of 
land is a relevant consideration in determining whether the 
regulation is a zoning ordinance, but this consideration is not 
dispositive.  Many non-zoning ordinances affect the use of 
land.51 
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51 In its nonparty brief, Preferred Sands of Minnesota, LLC, 
argues that a reference to "mining" in the zoning statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(7), and references to "zoning" in the nonmetallic 
mining reclamation statute, Wis. Stat. § 295.20, "reveal the 
Wisconsin Legislature's intent and expectation that nonmetallic 
mining will be addressed through zoning." 
No. 
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¶74 An examination of the similarities and differences 
points to the conclusion that this Ordinance is not a zoning 
ordinance.       
¶75 Finally, we compare the purposes of the Ordinance with 
the purposes of zoning.   
¶76 As is the case with the Ordinance's characteristics, 
the Ordinance's purpose overlaps with the purposes of zoning to 
some extent.  Recall that the "purpose" of zoning could be 
stated as broadly as "[t]o promote the welfare of the community 
as a whole."  In that sense, the Ordinance and zoning have 
identical purposes.  The Ordinance's self-proclaimed "purpose" 
is "to promote the health, safety, prosperity, aesthetics and 
general welfare of the people and communities within the 
Town . . . ." As one of the nonparty briefs points out, the 
Ordinance is consistent with a broad statement of the general 
purposes of zoning law in that it establishes limitations on the 
use of private property.           
¶77 Such broad statements of the purposes of zoning and 
the purposes of the Ordinance are not helpful in distinguishing 
a zoning ordinance from an ordinance enacted pursuant to non-
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As we have stated, zoning is a subset of the police power 
and simply because a regulation could be achieved through zoning 
does not necessarily mean that zoning is the only permissible 
way to achieve the regulation.  The brief's argument regarding 
the references to zoning in Wis. Stat. § 295.20 does not 
persuade us that regulation of nonmetallic mines may be achieved 
only through a zoning ordinance.  
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32 
 
zoning police power.  The statutorily enumerated purposes of 
zoning are not the exclusive domain of zoning regulation.52      
¶78 A more specific and analytically helpful formulation 
of the "purpose" of zoning, at least in the present case, is "to 
separate incompatible land uses."  In this sense, the Ordinance 
does not seem even loosely similar to zoning.  The Ordinance 
does not explicitly separate different land uses, nor does it 
explicitly declare any land uses incompatible with any others.  
The Town's "intent" appears to be to regulate in detail 
nonmetallic mines. 
¶79 The present case is not a case in which the Town is 
evading the procedural requirements of zoning by adopting a 
plethora of ordinances that, taken together, achieve results so 
similar to a traditional zoning ordinance that they must be 
treated as such. 
* * * * 
¶80 A comparison of the traditional characteristics of 
zoning ordinances to the characteristics and purposes of the 
Ordinance at issue reveals that the fundamental differences 
between the Ordinance and the traditional characteristics and 
purposes of zoning ordinances overwhelm the similarities.  The 
Town's Ordinance lacks many of the fundamental, traditional 
indicia of a zoning ordinance.  Its purpose is the same as that 
of a traditional zoning ordinance only if we define the purpose 
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52 Wood, 260 Wis. 2d 71 (rejecting the argument that only 
zoning regulations may consider use of land and holding that 
zoning and platting are not mutually exclusive). 
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33 
 
with a sweeping level of generality.  Thus, we hold that the 
Ordinance is a valid exercise of the Town's non-zoning police 
power; no county board approval was required.   
¶81 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court.   
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed. 
¶82 Justice DAVID T. PROSSER did not participate. 
 
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