Title: Casey v. Smith
Citation: 2014 WI 20
Docket Number: 2012AP000667
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2014

2014 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP667   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Brian Casey, 
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Ronald Smith, John Zeverino, Taylor Truck Line, 
Inc.,  
Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company, Austin  
Mutual Insurance Company and Health Partners, 
          Defendants, 
Acceptance Casualty Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Great West Casualty Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
346 Wis. 2d 111, 827 N.W.2d 917 
(Ct. App. – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 24  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 18, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 14, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn 
 
JUDGE: 
Rod W. Smeltzer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Charles J. Noel and Charles J. Noel & Associates, P.A., 
Minneapolis, and oral argument by Charles J. Noel. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Tamara L. Novotny with whom on the brief was Michael W. McNee, 
and Cousineau McGuire Chartered, Minneapolis. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP667 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF295) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Brian Casey, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald Smith, John Zeverino, Taylor Truck Line, 
Inc., Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company, Austin Mutual Insurance Company and 
Health Partners, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Acceptance Casualty Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Great West Casualty Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 18, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    Defendant Acceptance Casualty 
Insurance Company (Acceptance) seeks review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Great West Casualty 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
2 
 
Company (Great West).1  Both Acceptance and Great West issued 
liability insurance policies for a semi-tractor that was owned 
by John Zeverino and leased to Taylor Truck Line.  Acceptance 
provided a non-trucking use policy and Great West provided a 
commercial truckers' policy.  
¶2 
Both parties agree that the accident is covered by 
insurance, but disagree as to which of the two policies provides 
the coverage.  Each insurer filed a summary judgment motion 
asserting the other was responsible for coverage.  Both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals concluded that of the two 
policies, the Acceptance policy provided coverage for the multi-
vehicle accident. 
¶3 
Acceptance 
asserts 
that 
its 
policy 
provides 
no 
coverage because it contains two exclusions which preclude 
coverage.  It primarily focuses on 14(b) that excludes coverage 
when a semi-tractor is being used "in the business of" a lessee.  
Acceptance contends that because the accident occurred while the 
semi-tractor's driver, John Zeverino, was on his way to a 
maintenance facility for repairs to the grille and oil filler 
tube, the semi-tractor was being used in the business of Taylor 
Truck Line at the time of the accident.   
¶4 
Alternatively, 
it 
advances 
that 
14(a) 
excludes 
coverage when a semi-tractor is "en route to" a "business 
purpose" and that obtaining maintenance is a business purpose.  
                                                 
1 Casey v. Smith, 2013 WI App 24, 346 Wis. 2d 111, 827 
N.W.2d 917 (affirming judgment of the circuit court for Dunn 
County, Rod W. Smeltzer, Judge). 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
3 
 
Acceptance argues that because obtaining repairs constitutes a 
business purpose, there is no coverage under its non-trucking 
use policy.   
¶5 
We determine that neither of the exclusions in 
Acceptance's policy precludes coverage.  The facts of record do 
not support the application of exclusion 14(b).  Zeverino was 
not using the semi-tractor "in the business of" Taylor Truck 
Line 
because 
the 
repairs 
here 
did 
not 
further 
Taylor's 
commercial interests.  There is nothing in the record that shows 
the repairs were required by the lease.  Additionally, the 
repairs were not done pursuant to orders from Taylor Truck Line, 
and they were not necessary for the semi-tractor to continue its 
service.   
¶6 
Further, 
Acceptance's 
argument 
that 
coverage 
is 
excluded because Zeverino was en route to the business purpose 
of 
obtaining 
maintenance 
reflects 
an 
overly 
expansive 
interpretation of the text of exclusion 14(a).  Like the court 
of appeals, we are concerned that its interpretation may render 
coverage illusory.  Instead, in examining the text of exclusion 
14(a) we determine that it refers to maintenance necessary to 
allow the semi-tractor to carry property.  It is undisputed that 
the semi-tractor could and did carry loads without the repairs 
to the grille and oil filler tube.   
¶7 
Because the exclusions in Acceptance's policy do not 
apply, we conclude that its non-trucking use policy provides 
coverage for the accident.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals.                                                                   
No. 
2012AP667   
 
4 
 
I. 
¶8 
The parties repeatedly asserted that the facts in this 
case are not in dispute.  Zeverino owned a 2003 Freightliner 
semi-tractor which he leased to Taylor Truck Line, Inc.  Under 
the terms of the lease Zeverino agreed to provide a driver and 
use his semi-tractor exclusively for Taylor Truck Line.  The 
lease also provided that Zeverino would "bear all expenses to 
the operation to the equipment, including . . . [r]epairs and 
maintenance" and "[m]aintain[] the equipment in a state of 
repair required by all applicable regulations."2  The lease 
further required Taylor Truck Line to obtain insurance as 
required by federal law3 and Zeverino to obtain "bobtail 
                                                 
 
2 Section 23 of the lease states:  
 
The contractor shall have the responsibility to 
carrier of satisfying various regulatory requirements, 
and safety requirements of carrier and/or insurance 
company, by: 
 
A) Maintaining the equipment in the state of repair 
required by all applicable regulations. 
B)  
 
3 Section 17(A) of the lease provides: 
 
LIABILITY-PROPERTY 
DAMAGE 
INSURANCE. 
 
During 
the 
existence of this agreement, carrier will provide and 
maintain insurance coverage for the protection of the 
public from damage to persons and property, pursuant to 
its statutory obligations under 49 U.S.C. 10927. 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
5 
 
liability insurance"4 to cover the semi-tractor "when not used in 
performance under this agreement."  
¶9 
Pursuant to the lease, Zeverino obtained an insurance 
policy for non-trucking use coverage from Acceptance.  An 
exclusion in section 14(a) of the policy states that it does not 
cover the semi-tractor "[w]hile being operated, maintained or 
used to carry property in any business or en route to or from 
such business purpose."  Section 14(b) of the policy sets forth 
another exclusion that states that it does not cover the semi-
tractor "[w]hile used in the business of anyone to whom the 
'auto' is rented." 
¶10 Taylor Truck Line obtained a commercial truckers' 
insurance policy from Great West.  The policy provides coverage 
for: 
[t]he owner or anyone else from whom you lease, for 
more than 30 consecutive days, a covered "auto" with a 
driver that is not a "trailer" while the covered 
"auto":  
(1) Is being used exclusively in your business as a 
"trucker."  
The policy defines a "trucker" as "any person or organization 
engaged in the business of transporting property by 'auto' for 
hire."  
                                                 
4 "A bobtail is the popular term for a tractor (cab) without 
an attached trailer. Since a trucker who is 'bobtailing' is 
generally not using the vehicle for trucking purposes, non-
trucking-use insurance is often called bobtail insurance."  
Royal Indem. Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 707 N.E.2d 425, 
426 n.1 (N.Y. 1998). 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
6 
 
¶11 In January 2009, Zeverino took the semi-tractor to 
FABCO, a truck maintenance facility in Eau Claire, to have its 
engine control module recalibrated.  While the semi-tractor was 
there, FABCO inadvertently damaged its grille.  FABCO ordered a 
new one and called Zeverino when it arrived.  Instead of making 
an appointment to replace the grille, Zeverino was to return to 
FABCO to have the grille replaced whenever it was convenient for 
him.  In addition, Zeverino had previously ordered a new oil 
filler tube which he had intended to install himself.  FABCO 
offered to install the new tube at the same time it replaced the 
grille. 
¶12 The damaged grille did not put the truck out of 
service or prevent Zeverino from completing or accepting new 
loads to haul.  Zeverino indicated that he was on duty several 
hours from February 20 through February 25, 2009.  He testified 
that having the grille replaced "was not a routine maintenance, 
but it was a repair that they had broken, they had to replace."  
He agreed that he needed to have the repair work done "to have 
[the] tractor the way [he] needed it to . . . operate as an 
owner, operator for Taylor Truck Line."  
¶13 On February 27, 2009, approximately a month after the 
grille was broken, Zeverino left his home in Prescott and headed 
to Eau Claire to have the grille replaced.  Zeverino was off-
duty at the time.  Taylor Truck Line did not know he was going 
to Eau Claire that day and he was not under any order or 
instruction from Taylor Truck Line to do so.  Zeverino stated in 
his deposition that he did not consider himself to be "in the 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
7 
 
business of Taylor Truck Line at the time."  Although he 
indicated that the grille was "starting to fall apart and fall 
off on the highway," Zeverino also testified that he could have 
taken a load that day without service to his grille or oil 
filler tube. 
¶14 While en route to Eau Claire, Zeverino's tractor was 
involved in a multi-vehicle accident that included vehicles 
driven by Ronald Smith and Brian Casey.  Zeverino wrote in his 
Driver's Daily Log that he was "driving" at the time of the 
accident and "on duty" while at the scene of the accident.  
While there, Zeverino filled out an accident report which 
indicated that there was nothing wrong with the semi-tractor 
prior to the accident.  A Wisconsin state trooper who arrived at 
the scene conducted a Level 1 DOT inspection of Zeverino's semi-
tractor, apparently the most comprehensive type of post-accident 
inspection.  The trooper also completed a "Driver/Vehicle 
Examination Report" and noted that no violations were discovered 
during the inspection.  Thereafter, the trooper permitted 
Zeverino to continue on to Eau Claire, where FABCO replaced the 
grille and oil filler tube.  Together the repairs took 
approximately an hour. 
¶15 Casey filed a complaint on June 29, 2010, seeking 
recovery for injuries he sustained in the accident.  He included 
Zeverino, Taylor Truck Line, Acceptance, and Great West as named 
defendants.   
¶16 Both insurance companies filed cross motions for 
summary judgment on April 6, 2011.  Acceptance pointed to two 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
8 
 
relevant exclusions in its non-trucking policy, section 14(a) 
and section 14(b).  It asserted that at the time of the accident 
the semi-tractor was being used "in the business of" Taylor 
Truck Line.  Additionally, it argued that because the accident 
occurred while Zeverino was "en route" to have maintenance done 
on the semi-tractor, it was being used for a "business purpose" 
of the lessee.   Acceptance contended that the exclusions 
precluded coverage.  
¶17  Great West asserted that Zeverino was not using the 
semi-tractor in the business of the lessee because the repairs 
were not needed to make the semi-tractor safe or available for 
Taylor Truck Line's use, and Taylor Truck Line had not directed 
Zeverino to have the repairs done.  Great West argued that it 
was not responsible for providing coverage for the accident 
because its policy afforded coverage only while the semi-tractor 
was "being used exclusively in [Taylor's] business."  
¶18 The circuit court issued an order denying both 
motions.  It determined that there was a triable issue of fact 
as to whether Zeverino was performing in furtherance of the 
business or commercial interests of Taylor Truck Line.   
¶19 Upon a motion for reconsideration, together with 
supplemental memoranda of law and supplemental affidavits, the 
circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Great West.  
It found that Zeverino was having non-essential repairs done on 
his own time.  Accordingly, the circuit court determined that 
Zeverino was not involved in furthering the business of Taylor 
Truck Line at the time of the accident. 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
9 
 
¶20 The court of appeals affirmed.  Casey v. Smith, 2013 
WI App 24, 346 Wis. 2d 111, 827 N.W.2d 917.  It noted the 
parties' agreement that one of their policies afforded coverage 
for the accident and that resolution of which policy applied 
depended on whether Zeverino was operating the semi-tractor "in 
the business of" Taylor Truck Line.  Id., ¶10.   
¶21 The court considered first the exclusion set forth in 
section 14(b) of Acceptance's policy.  Quoting the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court stated that a tractor is 
being operated "in the business of" the lessee when "the truck 
is being used to further the commercial interests of the 
lessee."  Id., ¶17 (quoting Hartford Ins. Co. v. Occidental Fire 
& Cas. Co., 908 F.2d 235, 237 n.5, 239 (7th Cir. 1990)).  The 
court noted Zeverino's testimony that the defects did not 
prevent him from hauling loads and his concession that the semi-
tractor 
was 
never 
taken 
out 
of 
service. 
 
Id., 
¶23.  
Consequently, the court determined that the repairs to the semi-
tractor's grille and oil filler tube were not necessary for 
Zeverino to continue operating in Taylor Truck Line's business.  
Id.  Therefore, it concluded that "the repairs did not further 
Taylor's commercial interests and Zeverino was not acting 'in 
the business of' Taylor at the time of the accident."  Id.   
¶22 Next, the court considered the exclusion set forth in 
section 14(a) of Acceptance's policy.  It recounted Acceptance's 
contention that the exception lists three activities that 
qualify as "business purposes:" (1) operation, (2) maintenance, 
and (3) being used to carry property in any business.  Id., ¶31.  
No. 
2012AP667   
 
10 
 
The court determined that such an interpretation "produces 
absurd results" as it would mean "the mere operation of the 
tractor, for any reason, would be a business purpose."  Id., 
¶32. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
court 
rejected 
Acceptance's 
interpretation of section 14(a).  It concluded that the business 
purposes referred to in section 14(a) were: (1) operation to 
carry property in any business, (2) maintenance to carry 
property in any business, and (3) use to carry property in any 
business.  Id., ¶33.  
II. 
¶23 In this case, we are called upon to review the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment to Great West.  We review 
grants of summary judgment independently of the determinations 
rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals, but we 
apply the same methodology as the circuit court.  Park Bank v. 
Westburg, 2013 WI 57, ¶36, 348 Wis. 2d 409, 832 N.W.2d 539.  
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis.  Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶24 Here, the parties agree that there are no material 
facts 
in 
dispute. 
 
At 
issue 
is 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Acceptance's and Great West's policies.  The interpretation of 
an insurance policy is a question of law that we review 
independently of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and 
the court of appeals.  Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, ¶35, 349 
Wis. 2d 529, 833 N.W.2d 685. 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
11 
 
¶25 This court has a well-established methodology for 
determining insurance coverage.  First, we look to a policy's 
initial grant of coverage.  Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2012 WI 75, ¶14, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 N.W.2d 819.  Second, if 
there is an initial grant of coverage, the court will examine 
whether any exclusions withdraw coverage from a claim.  Id.  
Third, if an exclusion applies, the court will then consider 
whether there are any exceptions to the exclusion that reinstate 
coverage.  Id.   
¶26 Our 
inquiry 
is 
also 
guided 
by 
the 
canons 
of 
construction applicable to insurance policies.  "[W]e interpret 
policy language according to its plain and ordinary meaning as 
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured."  Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶22, 
338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529.   Ambiguities in the policy 
language are construed against the insurer.  Marlowe v. IDS 
Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2013 WI 29, ¶48, 346 Wis. 2d 450, 828 
N.W.2d 812.  Further, polices should be construed to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.  McPhee v. American Motorists 
Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 669, 679, 205 N.W.2d 152 (1973). 
III. 
¶27 We 
turn 
first 
to 
Acceptance's 
policy. 
 
It 
is 
undisputed that Acceptance's non-trucking use policy makes an 
initial grant of coverage for the accident.  Accordingly, we 
look to the policy exclusions to determine if any remove the 
accident from coverage.   
No. 
2012AP667   
 
12 
 
¶28 Central 
to 
this 
inquiry 
is 
exclusion 
14(b) 
of 
Acceptance's policy, which provides: "[t]his insurance does not 
apply to any of the following: . . . [a] covered 'auto' 
 . . . [w]hile used in the business of anyone to whom the 'auto' 
is rented."  The parties disagree about whether Zeverino was 
using the semi-tractor "in the business of" Taylor Truck Line at 
the time of the accident. 
¶29 The Seventh Circuit has articulated how the phrase "in 
the business of" is to be interpreted in the context of a non-
trucking use insurance policy.  Hartford Ins. Co. v. Occidental 
Fire & Casualty Co., 908 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1990).  In Hartford 
a tractor owner leased its truck and a driver to an interstate 
carrier.  Id. at 236.  The carrier dispatched the driver from 
Florida to Indiana to deliver frozen orange juice.  Id.  Before 
the driver left Florida, the owner instructed him to have a 
faulty Freon valve repaired after he delivered his load in 
Indiana.  Id.  The trailer leaked Freon throughout the trip and 
the buyer refused to accept the orange juice because it was too 
warm.  Id.   
¶30 After the driver informed the carrier of the refusal, 
it instructed him to take the juice to a cold-storage facility.  
Id.  Complying with those instructions, the driver placed the 
juice in storage.  Then, the driver took the trailer to have the 
Freon valve repaired.  Id.  The next day the driver got into an 
accident while on his way to pick up the trailer.  Id.  
Thereafter, pursuant to the carrier's instructions, the driver 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
13 
 
made another attempt to deliver the orange juice and returned to 
Florida with it after the juice was refused.  Id. at 236-37. 
¶31 At issue in Hartford was whether the truck's non-
trucking insurer was required to indemnify the other insurer.  
The non-trucking insurance policy contained a clause excluding 
coverage when the truck was "being used in the business of any 
person or organization to whom the automobile is rented."  Id. 
at 237.  Applying Wisconsin law, the court determined that this 
language was unambiguous.  Id. at 238.   
¶32 The Hartford court explained that "'in the business of 
an . . . organization to whom an automobile is rented' clearly 
refers to occasions when the truck is being used to further the 
commercial interests of the lessee."  Id. at 239.  Because the 
truck driver had not completed his delivery for the carrier and 
was on his way to pick up his trailer for delivery, the court 
concluded that the truck was being used to further the business 
interest of the carrier and thus the exclusion in the non-
trucking policy applied.  Id. 
¶33 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the Hartford 
test in Martinez v. Jefferson Ins., 225 Wis. 2d 544, 550, 593 
N.W.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1999).  It determined that a driver was 
acting in furtherance of a lessee when he was on his way to 
return a billing ticket to the office as required by the lessee.  
Id. at 549-50.  Accordingly, the driver was acting in the 
business of the lessee for purposes of insurance coverage.  Id.     
¶34 A number of other jurisdictions also follow the rule 
espoused by Hartford.  See, e.g., Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
14 
 
v. Brantley Trucking, Inc., 220 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2000); 
National Continental Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
157 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1998); Planet Ins. Co. v. Anglo 
American Ins. Co., Ltd., 711 A.2d 899, 902 (N.J. App. Div. 
1998); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
699 A.2d 482, 495 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Lime City Mut. Ins. 
Ass'n v. Mullins, 615 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).  
Likewise, we adopt Hartford's interpretation of the phrase "in 
the business of" as it presents a clear rule that is consistent 
with the plain language of the exclusion.  
¶35  Not all repairs and maintenance to a leased semi-
tractor further the commercial interest of the lessee.  Hartford 
demonstrates that repairs are in furtherance of a lessee's 
commercial interests when they are necessary to allow the semi-
tractor to continue to accept and complete hauls for the lessee.  
In Hartford, the broken Freon valve hampered the trucker's 
ability to deliver the orange juice, causing the buyer to reject 
the orange juice because it was too warm.  Hartford, 908 F.2d at 
240.  Accordingly, the court rejected the argument that the 
repair was not necessary for the lessee's business.  Id. 
 ¶36  The principle that obtaining necessary repairs is in 
furtherance of a lessee's business is also illustrated in Ehlers 
v. Automobile Liability Co., 169 Wis. 494, 173 N.W. 325 (1919).  
In that case, the driver was not on his route, had quit for the 
day and was driving to a repair shop when he was involved in an 
accident.  Id. at 498.  The vehicle was covered by an indemnity 
bond, which provided coverage "while said motor vehicle is being 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
15 
 
operated in the service of a common carrier."  Id. at 495.  The 
court determined that the coverage applied because the vehicle 
was "running to a repair shop to receive the repairs necessary 
to enable it to continue its service as a common carrier."  Id. 
at 498. 
¶37 Repairs may also be in furtherance of a lessee's 
commercial interest when they are being done to comply with the 
lessee's orders or the lessor's contractual duties.5  See Freed 
v. Travelers, 300 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1962) (driver's trip to a 
repair shop was part of the lessee's business when the lease 
required the driver to keep the tractor ready at all times for 
the use of the lessee); National Continental Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 
at 612 ("To the extent that [lessor] was executing his 
contractual duties, he was clearly acting 'in the business of' 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge that not all jurisdictions agree that a 
lessor is acting in the interests of the lessee when it is 
fulfilling its contractual duties.  For example, in Neal v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 250 N.W.2d 648 (Neb. 1977), the 
Nebraska Supreme Court determined that bobtail coverage did not 
apply when the owner was getting maintenance work done on the 
truck pursuant to its contractual duties.  It explained: 
While the carrier derived some benefit from the fact 
that the plaintiff attended to the maintenance of the 
tractor between trips, since that was essential to the 
continued use of the tractor in hauling commodities, 
the servicing and maintenance of the tractor was the 
responsibility of the plaintiff. The maintenance of 
the tractor was the "business" of the plaintiff, not 
that of the carrier. 
Id. at 650.  We find this reasoning unpersuasive as it is based 
on a narrower construction of the term "in the business of" than 
the one we adopt from Hartford. 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
16 
 
[the lessee] and thus outside the scope of [non-trucking 
insurance] coverage."); Carriers Ins. Co. v. Griffie, 357 F. 
Supp. 441, 442 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (truck was being "used in the 
business" of lessee when the lessee requested that lessor get 
equipment inspected at a certain inspection station selected by 
the lessee and an accident occurred while at that station); 
Planet Ins. Co., 711 A.2d at 903 (tractor was being used in 
furtherance of lessee when it was on its way home after 
obtaining "repair[s] pursuant to the terms of the lease so that 
it could be used in [lessee's] business"). 
¶38 In essence, both parties agree that the Hartford test 
applies.  They disagree about how the facts here apply to that 
standard.  As illustrated by the cases discussed above, whether 
a repair is in furtherance of a carrier's commercial interest 
depends on the totality of the circumstances.  It is a fact-
intensive inquiry that will not always be amenable to summary 
judgment.  See, e.g., Martinez, 225 Wis. 2d at 548 (noting that 
the issue of whether the truck was being operated for the 
lessee's business at the time of the accident required a factual 
conclusion).  Relevant considerations include the terms of the 
lease agreement, any instructions from the lessee, and the 
nature and extent of the repairs. 
¶39 Here, the lease required that the lessor "[m]aintain[] 
the equipment in the state of repair required by all applicable 
regulations." 
 
Acceptance 
asserts 
that 
the 
repairs 
were 
necessary to comply with 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(a), which requires 
all parts and accessories to be in a safe and proper operating 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
17 
 
condition, and 49 C.F.R. § 396.7(a), which prohibits commercial 
motor vehicles from being operated in a condition likely to 
cause an accident or breakdown. 
¶40 Contrary to Acceptance's assertions, the undisputed 
facts in the record establish that the repairs to the grille and 
oil filler tube were not required to comply with the federal 
regulations.  The record contains the report of the state 
trooper who inspected the semi-tractor after the accident.  
Federal regulations require the trooper to mark the semi-tractor 
out-of-service if the condition of the vehicle or equipment 
would likely cause an accident or a breakdown.  49 C.F.R. 
§ 396.9(c).  Rather than marking the semi-tractor out-of-
service, the trooper indicated in his inspection report that 
there were no violations and permitted Zeverino to continue on 
to Eau Claire.  Because there is no evidence in the record which 
indicates that the repairs were necessary to comply with federal 
regulations, there is no support for the argument that the 
repairs were necessary to fulfill Zeverino's contractual duties.  
¶41 Acceptance further contends that because the lease 
gave exclusive possession, control, and use of the semi-tractor 
to Taylor Truck Line, that Zeverino's actions were necessarily 
in the business of Taylor Truck Line.  Again, we disagree.   
¶42 That language in the lease is required by federal 
regulations governing motor carriers.  49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c) 
(formerly 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12) (requiring the lease to provide 
that "the authorized carrier lessee shall have exclusive 
possession, control, and use of the equipment for the duration 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
18 
 
of the lease.").  As the Seventh Circuit explained in Hartford, 
the requirement was intended "to safeguard the public by 
preventing authorized carriers from circumventing applicable 
regulations by leasing the equipment and services of independent 
contractors exempt from federal regulation."  908 F.2d at 238.  
However, it does not prevent indemnification of the lessee by 
the lessor.  Id.  (citing Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. 
Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 40 (1975)).   
¶43 When a lease includes a clause requiring the lessor to 
obtain bobtail coverage, it clearly contemplated a situation 
where the vehicle, "though rented, would not be engaged 'in the 
business' of another."  Hartford, 908 F.2d at 231.  Accordingly, 
the fact that the lease gave Taylor Truck Line exclusive 
possession, control, and use of the semi-tractor is not 
dispositive of whether the semi-tractor was operating in Taylor 
Truck Line’s business at the time of the accident.6 
¶44 The facts also demonstrate that Zeverino was not acting 
pursuant to orders from Taylor Truck Line at the time of the 
accident.  Zeverino testified that he was not on duty on the day 
of the accident.  It is undisputed that Taylor Truck Line had 
not ordered him to have the repairs done and that Taylor Truck 
Line was unaware that he was doing so.   
                                                 
 
6 Acceptance also advances the argument that the differing 
amounts which the two insurance companies charged for their 
premiums demonstrate that its policy was intended to have very 
limited coverage.  We decline to consider this argument as the 
record is silent on the methods and considerations employed in 
setting the premiums.  
No. 
2012AP667   
 
19 
 
¶45  Acceptance references the fact that Zeverino had 
indicated in his Daily Trip Log that he was "driving" prior to 
the accident and "on duty" at the scene of the accident, to 
suggest that Zeverino was working on behalf of Taylor Truck Line 
while he was on his way to obtain the repairs.  These references 
are not persuasive.  Federal regulations require drivers to keep 
daily logs of their driving status.  49 C.F.R. § 395.8.  Under 
the regulations, "driving" means "all time spent at the driving 
controls of a commercial motor vehicle in operation."  49 C.F.R. 
§ 395.2.  It does not indicate whether the driving is being done 
for personal or business reasons.   
¶46 Likewise, under the federal regulations the notation 
of "on duty" in a log book is appropriate for "[a]ll time 
inspecting, servicing, or conditioning any commercial motor 
vehicle at any time" and "[a]ll time repairing, obtaining 
assistance, 
or 
remaining 
in 
attendance 
upon 
a 
disabled 
commercial motor vehicle."  49 C.F.R. § 395.2.  It does not 
indicate whether those functions are necessary or being done on 
behalf of a business.  Accordingly, we reject Acceptance's 
argument that the log book indicates that Zeverino was acting in 
the business of Taylor Truck Line at the time of the accident. 
¶47  Finally, we are not persuaded that the repairs were 
necessary to enable the semi-tractor to continue service for 
Taylor Truck Line.  The parts being repaired on the semi-tractor 
were its grille and an oil filler tube.  Both repairs were 
completed in approximately an hour.   
No. 
2012AP667   
 
20 
 
¶48 The damaged grille did not put the semi-tractor out of 
service or prevent Zeverino from accepting or completing hauls 
for Taylor Truck Line.  The record reflects that Zeverino had 
been doing so for over a month during the time between the 
damage to the grille and its repair.  Acceptance asserts that 
Zeverino's testimony that the grille was starting to fall apart 
indicates that it would need to be repaired at some point.  
However, Zeverino's testimony on this point was vague and he did 
not provide further details.  The inspection of the semi-tractor 
after the accident revealed no violations and placed no 
limitations on the continued operation of the vehicle.   
¶49 In sum, because the repairs were not required by the 
lease agreement, were not done pursuant to orders by Taylor 
Truck Line, and were not necessary for the semi-tractor to 
continue its service, we conclude that Zeverino was not acting 
in furtherance of Taylor Truck Line's commercial interest at the 
time of the accident.  Accordingly, the accident does not fall 
within the exclusion in section 14(b) of Acceptance's policy. 
IV. 
¶50 Acceptance also points to section 14(a) of its policy 
as a clause excluding coverage.  That exclusion provides that 
the policy does not cover the semi-tractor "[w]hile being 
operated, maintained or used to carry property in any business 
or en route to or from such business purpose."   
¶51 Acceptance reads section 14(a) as excluding the semi-
tractor from coverage when it is being "operated, maintained, or 
used . . . or en route to or from such business purpose.  
No. 
2012AP667   
 
21 
 
Acceptance contends that the phrase "such business purpose" 
refers back to maintenance, indicating that maintenance is a 
business purpose.   
¶52 However, under Acceptance's interpretation of section 
14(a), 
operation 
and 
use 
would 
also 
constitute 
business 
purposes.  As recognized by the court of appeals, if that were 
the case, Acceptance's policy would not cover any situations in 
which the semi-tractor was being driven.  Casey, 346 Wis. 2d 
111, ¶32.  Indeed, it is unclear that Acceptance's policy would 
ever apply if we were to adopt the interpretation it suggests.  
Wisconsin has a strong public policy against illusory coverage.  
Meyer v. Classified Ins. Co., 192 Wis. 2d 463, 468-69, 531 
N.W.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1995).   
¶53 In contrast, Great West asserts that section 14(a) 
should be read to exclude the semi-tractor from coverage when it 
is being operated to carry property, maintained to carry 
property, or used to carry property, or when it is en route to 
or from those activities.  In other words, 14(a) would exclude 
the semi-tractor from coverage when it is en route to obtain 
maintenance if that maintenance is necessary to allow the semi-
tractor to carry property. 
¶54 We agree with Great West's interpretation of section 
14(a).  It comports with the plain language of the policy and 
affords the insured some coverage.  To the extent that section 
14(a) is ambiguous, we construe ambiguity against the insurer, 
Acceptance.  Marlowe, 346 Wis. 2d 450, ¶48.   
No. 
2012AP667   
 
22 
 
¶55 Applying section 14(a) to the facts of this case, we 
conclude that it does not exclude coverage.  Here, Zeverino was 
on his way to have the grille and oil filler tube on the semi-
tractor replaced when the accident occurred.  It is undisputed 
that the semi-tractor could still carry loads without the 
repairs.  Thus, the repairs were not necessary to allow the 
semi-tractor to carry property and the exclusion in section 
14(a) of Acceptance's policy does not apply. 
¶56 Acceptance has identified no other possible exclusions 
that would apply to preclude coverage.  As it has conceded that 
there was an initial grant of coverage, we conclude that 
Acceptance is responsible for providing coverage for the claims 
resulting from the accident.  
¶57 Finally, we turn to address Great West's insurance 
policy.  The parties agree that the Great West policy provides 
coverage for the accident only if Zeverino was acting in the 
business of Taylor Truck Line at the time that the accident 
occurred.  As discussed above, we have determined that he was 
not.  Therefore, we conclude that the Great West policy provides 
no coverage for the claims resulting from the accident. 
V. 
 ¶58 We determine that neither of the exclusions in 
Acceptance's policy precludes coverage.  The facts of record do 
not support the application of exclusion 14(b).  Zeverino was 
not using the semi-tractor "in the business of" Taylor Truck 
Line 
because 
the 
repairs 
here 
did 
not 
further 
Taylor's 
commercial interests.  There is nothing in the record that shows 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
23 
 
the repairs were required by the lease.  Additionally, the 
repairs were not done pursuant to orders from Taylor Truck Line, 
and they were not necessary for the semi-tractor to continue its 
service.   
¶59 Further, 
Acceptance's 
argument 
that 
coverage 
is 
excluded because Zeverino was en route to the business purpose 
of 
obtaining 
maintenance 
reflects 
an 
overly 
expansive 
interpretation of the text of exclusion 14(a).  Like the court 
of appeals, we are concerned that its interpretation may render 
coverage illusory.  Instead, in examining the text of exclusion 
14(a) we determine that it refers to maintenance necessary to 
allow the semi-tractor to carry property.  It is undisputed that 
the semi-tractor could and did carry loads without the repairs 
to the grille and oil filler tube.   
¶60 Because the exclusions in Acceptance's policy do not 
apply, we conclude that its non-trucking use policy provides 
coverage for the accident.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals.                                                                   
 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2012AP667   
 
 
 
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