Title: County of Albemarle v. Camirand
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120711
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2013

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COUNTY OF ALBEMARLE, ET AL. 
 
  
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 120711 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
               February 28, 2013 
CINDY CAMIRAND, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
Cheryl V. Higgins, Judge 
 
Thirteen retired Albemarle County employees (collectively 
"the Retirees") sought relief in the circuit court from a 
decision of the Albemarle County Board of Supervisors 
("Board").  The Board had disallowed payment on a portion of 
the Retirees' promised retirement benefits under the County’s 
Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program ("VERIP") due to a 
miscalculation by a County employee prior to the retirements, 
and Retirees appealed to the circuit court of Albemarle County. 
The County and the Board (hereafter, "the County") 
demurred, arguing that the Retirees failed to comply with Code 
§ 15.2-1246 by not serving written notice of their appeal on 
the clerk of the Board.  The Retirees had served the clerk with 
a single document entitled "Appeal Bond."  The circuit court 
overruled the demurrer. 
 
The County then filed for summary judgment on the ground 
that no contract existed as a matter of law, as the excess 
benefits resulting from the miscalculations had not been 
approved by the Board.  The circuit court denied summary 
 
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judgment, and a jury trial followed.  At trial, the circuit 
court denied the County's motion to strike the Retirees' 
evidence regarding the issue denied in summary judgment.  The 
jury found in favor of plaintiffs, awarding each of the 
thirteen Retirees the amount of the withheld VERIP stipend that 
the County claimed would amount to an overpayment if properly 
calculated under the program.  The County filed this timely 
appeal, alleging that the circuit court erred in finding valid 
written notice and in determining that the existence of a 
contract was a jury issue.  We find the first issue 
determinative and therefore do not reach the second. 
DISCUSSION 
The first issue is whether the circuit court was correct 
in finding that the Retirees complied with Code § 15.2-1246.  
As the content of the document filed is undisputed, this matter 
is a pure question of statutory interpretation and is reviewed 
de novo.  Brown v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 538, 542, 733 S.E.2d 
638, 640 (2012). 
Code § 15.2-1246, at the time of the disallowance of 
claims, read as follows: 
When a claim of any person against a county is 
disallowed in whole or in part by the governing body, 
if such person is present, he may appeal from the 
decision of the governing body within 30 days from the 
date of the decision.  If the claimant is not present, 
the clerk of the governing body shall serve a written 
notice of the disallowance on him or his agent, and he 
 
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may appeal from the decision within 30 days after 
service of such notice.  In no case shall the appeal be 
taken after the lapse of six months from the date of 
the decision.  The appeal shall be filed with the 
circuit court for the county.  No appeal shall be 
allowed unless the amount disallowed exceeds $10.  The 
disallowance may be appealed by serving written notice 
on the clerk of the governing body and executing a bond 
to the county, with sufficient surety to be approved by 
the clerk of the governing body, with condition for the 
faithful prosecution of such appeal, and the payment of 
all costs imposed on the appellant by the court. 
 
Code § 15.2-1246 (2010) (emphasis added).* 
 
Each of the Retirees filed a document entitled "Appeal 
Bond."  Those documents included the following language: 
Whereas, the Albemarle County Board of 
Supervisors on the 2nd day of June, 2010, denied a 
claim made by Principal in the amount of [the 
respective amounts claimed by each of the Retirees]; 
and  
Whereas, it is the intention of the Principal to 
appeal said denial of claim to the Circuit Court of 
Albemarle County. . . . 
 
The Retirees argue that this language substantially complies 
with the statutory requirements for notice and, as it provides 
the relevant information to identify the decision being 
appealed and clearly contemplates an appeal, it should be 
accepted as sufficient for the purposes of notice. 
                     
* An amendment to this statute took effect on July 1, 2010, 
replacing "executing a bond to the county . . . to the clerk of 
the governing body" with "executing a cash or surety bond or 
irrevocable letter of credit to the county in the amount of 
$250."  See 2010 Acts ch. 668.  No party contends that this 
revision has any effect on the outcome of the present appeal.  
As it does not modify the requirement for written notice, the 
amendment does not alter today's analysis. 
 
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We disagree.  In suits against counties, the Court has 
been clear that the statutory notice and bond requirements must 
be followed.  We recently summarized the law on notice and bond 
requirements in suits against counties in Viking Enterprises, 
Inc. v. County of Chesterfield, 277 Va. 104, 110-11, 670 S.E.2d 
741, 744 (2009): 
 
This Court has held that the requirements of 
former Code §§ 15.1-550 et seq., now Code §§ 15.2-
1243 et seq., provide the exclusive procedure for 
litigating claims against a county and the [f]ailure 
to allege compliance with these statutes is fatal to 
an action against a county. . . . 
 
In other words, the notice and bond requirements 
set forth in Code § 15.2-1246 are the mode prescribed 
for pursuing an appeal from a county's disallowance 
of a monetary claim.  As [previously] stated by this 
Court[]: 
 
The sovereign can be sued only by its own 
consent, and a state granting the right to 
its citizens to bring suit against it can be 
sued only in the mode prescribed.  The same 
principles apply to a county, which is a 
part of the state, which is, as we have 
said, a political subdivision of the state, 
suable only in the mode prescribed in the 
law granting the right to sue. 
 
(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) 
A party can thus perfect an appeal against a county in a 
case such as this only in the manner authorized by the language 
of the statute.  "In interpreting this statute, courts apply 
the plain meaning . . . unless the terms are ambiguous or 
applying the plain language would lead to an absurd result."  
Baker v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 572, 576, 733 S.E.2d 642, 644 
 
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(2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
plain language of Code § 15.2-1246 clearly requires both a 
written notice of appeal and a bond to be filed with the clerk.  
In the instant case, the bond is not titled "Notice of Appeal 
and Appeal Bond" and, notably, does not even include the word 
"notice" except in reference to the requisite notice of failure 
to pay the bond.  The statute requires "written notice" and not 
mere "implied notice," which is what this Appeal Bond amounts 
to.  To rule that the bond satisfies the requirements of the 
notice would be to render the phrase requiring written notice 
superfluous, contrary to basic canons of statutory 
construction.  See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114, 597 
S.E.2d 84, 86 (2004) (stating that "statute[s] should be 
interpreted, if possible, to avoid rendering words 
superfluous."). 
Furthermore, the "Whereas" phrasing traditionally 
signifies prefatory language or a preamble in a legal document, 
as opposed to the subject of the document itself.  A "preamble" 
is "[a]n introductory statement in a constitution, statute, or 
other document explaining the document's basis and 
objective. . . .  A preamble often consists of a series of 
clauses introduced by the conjunction whereas."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1294-95 (9th ed. 2009).  "This Court has stated 
[that t]he preamble to a statute is no part of it and cannot 
 
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enlarge or confer powers or control the words of the act unless 
they are doubtful or ambiguous."  Renkey v. County Bd., 272 Va. 
369, 373, 634 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  Although we have never explicitly 
ruled on the effect of a preamble in a statutorily required 
notice document, we find the same principle applicable.  Here, 
nothing in the remainder of the document outside of the 
preamble is suggestive of an intent to function as a notice 
document.  The document itself is unambiguously an appeal bond, 
and ambiguous language in the preamble cannot alter the 
function of the document.  The clerk's office cannot be 
expected to look to prefatory language concerning an "intent to 
appeal" and divine a supplementary purpose to the document of 
providing actual notice of an appeal. 
The Retirees also assert that the language of the statute 
appears to permit two methods of perfecting an appeal due to 
the repeated use of the word "may" as opposed to "must."  We 
have said, however, that "consideration of the entire statute 
. . . to place its terms in context to ascertain their plain 
meaning does not offend the rule [requiring a plain reading] 
because it is our duty to interpret the several parts of a 
statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to 
effectuate the legislative goal."  Cuccinelli v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 283 Va. 420, 425, 722 S.E.2d 
 
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626, 629 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  A review of the statute that controls here makes it 
clear that the word "may" is used because an appeal is 
permissible but not required; it does not constitute an 
alternative method of perfecting an appeal. 
We therefore conclude that the statutorily required 
written notice of appeal was insufficient according to the 
plain meaning of the statute and, accordingly, the circuit 
court erred in failing to sustain the demurrer.  As a result, 
we do not reach the merits of the issue presented in the second 
assignment of error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reason, we reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court, dismiss the Retirees' appeal with prejudice, 
and enter final judgment in favor of the County and the Board. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, dissenting. 
 
 
In this case, the majority reverses a jury’s award of 
damages to thirteen retired Albemarle County employees because 
it concludes that a document filed with the clerk of the Board 
of Supervisors did not comply with Code § 15.2-1246, despite 
the fact that the County and the Board acknowledge that they 
suffered no prejudice in their defense against the claim.  The 
 
 
 
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majority’s reasoning elevates form over substance and is not 
supported by the statutory text.  I therefore must dissent. 
 
Code § 15.2-1246 requires a party appealing from the 
denial of a claim against a county to serve “written notice” on 
the clerk of the Board of Supervisors.  The party also must 
execute a bond.  While it is undisputed that both notice and 
bond are required, the statute does not require the notice to 
be filed as a separate, discrete document.  It does not contain 
the term “notice of appeal.”  Cf. Code § 8.01-676.1(A) 
(requiring the filing of an appeal bond or irrevocable letter 
of credit “simultaneously” with a notice of appeal in an appeal 
of right to the Court of Appeals). 
 
In reaching its decision in this case, the majority first 
contends that construing the appeal bond to satisfy the 
requirement of notice renders the latter superfluous.  This 
ignores our precedents discussing the purpose of a notice of 
appeal.  Less than one year ago, we stated that “the purpose of 
the notice of appeal is merely to place the opposing party on 
notice and to direct the clerk to prepare the record on 
appeal.”  LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 469 n.*, 722 
S.E.2d 838, 840 n.* (2012).  We specifically restated that 
“ ‘[t]he purpose is not to penalize the 
appellant but to protect the appellee.  If the 
required papers are not filed within the time 
required, the appellee is entitled to assume 
that the litigation is ended, and to act on that 
 
 
 
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assumption.  Litigation is a serious and 
harassing matter, and the right to know when it 
is ended is a valuable right.’ ” 
 
Id. (quoting Avery v. County School Board, 192 Va. 329, 330, 64 
S.E.2d 767, 770 (1951)) (alterations omitted) (emphasis added).  
In this case, the County and the Board expressly acknowledged 
having actual notice of the appeal and conceded that the 
failure to serve written notice as a separate, discrete 
document did not prejudice them.*  Accordingly, the complete 
function of the notice of appeal was fully discharged. 
 
The majority next contends that the content of the appeal 
bond does not adequately inform the County and the Board that 
an appeal actually would follow.  While the majority 
acknowledges that the document states that “[i]t is the 
intention of the Principal to appeal,” it holds that language 
is merely prefatory or a legally ineffectual preamble.  (J.A. 
46.)  However, that construction ignores both the substance of 
the bond and the language of the statute, which require the 
subsequent faithful prosecution of the appeal to avoid default. 
 
In short, there is nothing in the statute to compel the 
majority’s conclusion.  Nothing in its plain language requires 
a party appealing the denial of a claim against a county to 
                     
* We also noted that the notice of appeal directs the clerk 
to prepare the record and transmit it to the appellate 
tribunal.  Id.  Here the record arrived successfully both in 
the circuit court and this Court. 
 
 
 
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file two separate, discrete instruments, and we are precluded 
from construing the statute to include requirements the General 
Assembly did not impose.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005).  To 
the contrary, the plain language of the statute requires two 
functions to be discharged:  (1) notice to the parties and the 
clerk that the matter is not concluded and (2) provision of 
security for the costs of the appellate proceeding.  Those 
statutory requirements may be fulfilled in a single instrument. 
 
The majority therefore has not applied the plain language 
of the statute but rather has adopted an unnecessary and 
unsupported construction.  The result is egregiously harmful to 
the retired employees, who relied to the detriment upon the 
County’s erroneous representations.  For these reasons, I must 
dissent.