Title: Ex Parte Perkins
Citation: 808 So. 2d 1143
Docket Number: 1991016
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2001

808 So. 2d 1143 (2001)
Ex parte Roy Edward PERKINS.
(Re Roy Edward Perkins v. State).
1991016.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 30, 2001.
Concurring Opinion on Overruling of Rehearing July 13, 2001.
*1144 Andrew A. Smith, Northport; and Tanya Greene, Atlanta, Georgia, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and A. Vernon Barnett IV, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
STUART, Justice.[1]
Roy Edward Perkins was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. The jury, by a vote of 10-2, recommended that Perkins be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Perkins to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence. See Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d 1041 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). We granted certiorari review.
For a recitation of the facts, see Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d  at 1052.
Perkins raises 37 issues for this Court to review. The Court of Criminal Appeals issued an extensive opinion thoroughly addressing the issues raised by Perkins. This Court has also considered all of the issues raised, and it has reviewed the record for plain error that may not have been raised. We find no error, plain or otherwise.
Pursuant to § 13A-5-53, Ala.Code 1975, this Court has reviewed this case for any error in regard to the conviction, and it has considered the propriety of the death sentence.
The trial court found the existence of three statutory aggravating circumstances:
The trial court found the existence of one statutory mitigating circumstance:
The trial court found the existence of seven nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:
(C.R.352-53.)
The record reflects that the trial court weighed the aggravating circumstances against the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and found that the aggravating circumstances greatly outweighed those mitigating circumstances and sentenced Perkins to death.
This Court has carefully searched the entire record for error, plain or otherwise, that would have adversely affected Perkins's substantial rights. It has found none. We have also reviewed the briefs and considered all the issues raised by Perkins, and we have reviewed the record of the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the trial. We conclude that Perkins received a fair trial.
After carefully reviewing the record, this Court has found no evidence to indicate that Perkins's sentence of death "was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." See § 13A-5-53(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975. This Court, pursuant to § 13A-5-53(b)(2), has independently weighed the aggravating circumstances and the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to determine the propriety of Perkins's sentence of death. After that independent weighing, this Court concludes that death is the appropriate sentence in this case. Perkins's sentence is not disproportionate or excessive when compared to the sentences imposed in similar capital cases.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Perkins's conviction and death sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
STUART, Justice.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
JOHNSTONE, J., concurs in the result.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur to overrule the application for rehearing. I would, however, extend the original opinion to address several aspects *1146 of the review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
First, the Court of Criminal Appeals judged certain autopsy photographs of the victim to be admissible without even looking at them. Perkins, in his brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals, objected to the photographs in the following language:
Rule 401, Ala.R.Evid., provides:
Rule 403, Ala.R.Evid., provides:
While Perkins did not object to the photographs at trial, his brief raised the issue; and § 12-22-240, Ala.Code 1975, and Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P., required the Court of Criminal Appeals to determine whether the admission of the photographs constituted plain error.
Part XX of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals relies on the testimony of the pathologist who performed the autopsy and the argument by the State to hold that the admission of the photographs did not constitute "error, plain or otherwise." Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d 1041, 1059 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). What the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals does not reveal is that it disposed of this issue without even getting the photographs or even photocopies of the photographs from the trial court, which, pursuant to some practice or interpretation of Rule 10(c)(1), Ala.R.App.P., kept the photographs and did not even include photocopies of them in the materials transmitted to the Court of Criminal Appeals, even though the photographs were an official part of the record on appeal. The trial court, which had never transmitted these photographs to the Court of Criminal Appeals, transmitted them directly to us at our request when we were conducting our certiorari review.
On the one hand, my personal viewing of these photographs satisfies me that their admission did not constitute plain error. The incision by the emergency care physicians did not affect the visibility of the stab wound at all, did not entirely obscure the visibility of the bullet wound, and did not so mutilate the victim's body as to overpower the probative value of the photographs. The photographs depict only the one incision, a few inches long, made by the emergency care physicians. It was partially sutured. None of the photographs depicts incisions made during the autopsy itself. On the other hand, this sort of evaluation and judgment can be made only by seeing the photographs. When a defendant condemned to death challenges the introduction of a photograph, the appellate courts should get it and view it to judge its admissibility.
Second, the legal analysis by the Court of Criminal Appeals, still in part XX of its opinion, contains this fallacy: "Perpetrators of crimes that result in gruesome scenes have reason to expect that photographs of those gruesome scenes will be taken and admitted into evidence." Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d  at 1108. This Court has condemned this fallacy on at least three occasions. Ex parte Duncan, [Ms. 1990652, March 30, 2001] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2001); Ex parte Loggins, 771 So. 2d 1093 (Ala.2000); and Ex parte Samra, 771 So. 2d 1122, n. 1. (Ala.2000). See also Ex parte McWhorter, 781 So. 2d 330 (Ala.2000) (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part). This fallacy begs the question by assuming the defendant's guilt for the purpose of judging the admissibility of evidence offered to prove the defendant's guilt. Ex parte Duncan, supra; and Ex parte McWhorter, supra.
Finally, in part XVI.B of its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals errs in its analysis of certain hearsay testimony. The *1148 State had introduced evidence that the defendant had not only committed the charged violence against the particular victim in this particular case but also that the defendant had raped two other women, B.P. and D.W., who had testified that he had raped them in a white building in a certain wooded area. The State then introduced the testimony of former Deputy Sheriff J.W. Stough that he had learned the precise location of the white building "from [still] another victim, a rape victim." Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d  at 1097. The Court of Criminal Appeals rationalizes the admission of this testimony as follows:
Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d  at 1097. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.). Former Deputy Stough's testimony to this effect was admitted for the truth of the matter stated. The relevancy of his testimony about the particular building he found depended entirely on its being the location where the defendant raped women, a fact which the "other" rape victim's out-of-court declaration to former Deputy Stough tended to prove. See Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d  at 1097. Moreover, "the reason for action or conduct by the witness," former Deputy Stough, was not an issue in the case. Thus the introduction of this evidence over a proper objection would have constituted a hearsay error. Absent a proper objection at trial, however, the admission of this testimony does not meet the stringent criteria for plain error.
[1]  This case was originally assigned to another Justice; it was reassigned to Justice Stuart on January 16, 2001; although Justice Stuart was not a member of this Court when this case was orally argued, she has listened to an audiotape of the argument.