Title: State v. Steven P. Muckerheide
Citation: 2007 WI 5
Docket Number: 2005AP000081-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 17, 2007

2007 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP81-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Steven P. Muckerheide, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 292 Wis. 2d 485, 713 N.W.2d 192 
(Ct. App. 2006—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 17, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 31, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mary M. Kuhnmuench 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, Ltd., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Mark S. Rosen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 5
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP81-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF4103) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Steven P. Muckerheide, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 17, 2007 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Judge Mary 
Kuhnmuench, convicting Steven P. Muckerheide (Muckerheide) of 
homicide by use of a motor vehicle while having a prohibited 
blood 
alcohol 
concentration, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.09(1)(b) and (1c)(b)(2002-04).1  This case 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
2 
 
involves the admissibility of evidence of the victim's prior 
acts (other acts evidence), pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). 
¶2 
In circuit court, Muckerheide offered a defense under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2)(a),2 claiming that the victim, Michael 
Braun (Braun), would have been killed even if Muckerheide had 
been exercising due care and had not been under the influence of 
any drugs or alcohol.  Muckerheide sought to prove that Braun 
had grabbed the steering wheel just prior to the accident, and 
that the accident had occurred when Muckerheide was trying to 
steer the vehicle to counteract Braun's pulling on the wheel. 
¶3 
The other acts evidence in question was the testimony 
of Braun's father.  In support of Muckerheide's defense under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2)(a), 
Muckerheide 
wished 
to 
offer 
the 
testimony of Braun's father that Braun had, on prior occasions, 
gestured as if to grab the steering wheel of his father's 
vehicle and, on one occasion, had actually grabbed the wheel.  
The circuit court held that such other acts evidence was 
inadmissible, and the court of appeals affirmed that ruling and 
the circuit court's judgment of conviction. 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.09(2)(a) states: 
In any action under this section, the defendant has a 
defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the death would have occurred even if he 
or she had been exercising due care and he or she had 
not been under the influence of an intoxicant, did not 
have a detectable amount of a restricted controlled 
substance in his or her blood, or did not have an 
alcohol concentration described under sub. (1)(b), 
(bm), (d) or (e) or (1g)(b) or (d). 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Muckerheide presents three issues for review.  The 
first issue is whether the court of appeals erred when it 
affirmed the circuit court's decision that the other acts 
evidence offered by Muckerheide was inadmissible.  The second 
issue is whether the court of appeals erred when it decided not 
to apply case law from another jurisdiction.  The third issue is 
whether Muckerheide's constitutional right to present a defense 
was violated. 
¶5 
We hold that the court of appeals was not in error in 
affirming the circuit court's decision not to admit the 
testimony of Braun's father offered by Muckerheide.  We hold 
that such testimony was inadmissible.  Muckerheide's argument 
was to the effect that, since Braun had allegedly grabbed the 
steering wheel on one occasion in his father's vehicle, he must 
have grabbed the steering wheel from Muckerheide on the occasion 
of 
the 
accident. 
 
Such 
testimony 
is 
prohibited 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). 
¶6 
Under the analytical framework set forth in State v. 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 771-72, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), such 
other acts evidence was inadmissible, since it lacked relevance.  
The court of appeals therefore properly upheld the circuit 
court's decision to bar the admission of the other acts evidence 
from Braun's father, although the court allowed testimony from 
Muckerheide himself that Braun had grabbed the steering wheel 
and, thus, caused the accident. 
¶7 
We further hold that the court of appeals did not err 
when it decided not to apply case law from another jurisdiction, 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
4 
 
the State of Washington.  Although a Wisconsin court may 
consider case law from such other jurisdictions, obviously such 
case law is not binding precedent in Wisconsin, and a Wisconsin 
court is not required to follow it.  Beecher v. LIRC, 2003 WI 
App 100, ¶16 n.3, 264 Wis. 2d 394, 663 N.W.2d 316. 
¶8 
Finally, we hold that Muckerheide's constitutional 
right to present a defense was not violated by the exclusion of 
the testimony from Braun's father.  For these reasons, the 
decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
I 
¶9 
On July 17, 2003, Muckerheide was driving a vehicle on 
the way to a tavern, and Braun was riding in the front passenger 
seat.  On the way to the tavern, the front passenger side of 
Muckerheide's vehicle hit a parked construction trailer, and 
Braun was killed in the accident.  Muckerheide testified at 
trial that he had been speeding, and also that he had been 
drinking beer and had used cocaine prior to the accident.  Tests 
taken after the accident revealed that Muckerheide's blood 
alcohol concentration was .179.  Muckerheide testified at trial 
that Braun also had been drinking and using cocaine that day. 
¶10 Muckerheide was charged with homicide by use of a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.09(1)(b) 
and 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
5 
 
(1c)(b).3 
 
Muckerheide 
offered 
a 
defense 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2)(a) and, in support of his defense, filed 
a motion before trial to admit the testimony of Braun's father.  
Braun's father was to testify that Braun was a nervous passenger 
who had, on several prior occasions, gestured toward the 
steering wheel of his father's vehicle.  Braun also allegedly 
had grabbed the steering wheel of his father's vehicle on one 
occasion the previous year, when he perceived that his father's 
vehicle was coming too close to a safety island. 
¶11 Muckerheide argued that the testimony of Braun's 
father 
was 
admissible 
as 
evidence 
of 
habit 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 904.06, and as permissible evidence of other acts 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04.  The State of Wisconsin (State) 
objected to the testimony of Braun's father, arguing that the 
offered evidence was not sufficiently similar to the crash 
involving Muckerheide.  The State asserted that Muckerheide 
never alleged that he had lost control of the vehicle while 
trying to prevent Braun from grabbing the steering wheel.  The 
State further argued that the incident in which Braun allegedly 
grabbed 
the 
steering 
wheel 
of 
his 
father's 
vehicle 
was 
inadmissible propensity evidence. 
                                                 
3 Muckerheide was also charged with an additional count of 
homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.09(1)(a) and (1c)(b), and was found guilty on 
the additional count.  However, the circuit court held at 
sentencing that Muckerheide could not be convicted on both of 
the counts for the same conduct.  The circuit court therefore 
dismissed the count of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor 
vehicle.  
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 The circuit court denied Muckerheide's motion, holding 
that the testimony of Braun's father was inadmissible propensity 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), offered solely for the 
purpose of proving that Braun had a tendency to grab steering 
wheels, and that he had acted in conformity therewith when 
Muckerheide's vehicle crashed. 
¶13 At trial, Muckerheide testified that Braun grabbed the 
steering wheel just prior to the crash.  Muckerheide stated that 
he was trying to steer the vehicle to counteract Braun's pulling 
on the wheel, when the vehicle struck the construction trailer.  
According to Muckerheide's testimony, only two or three seconds 
passed between the time when Braun grabbed the steering wheel 
and when the impact with the construction trailer occurred. 
¶14 The circuit court instructed the jury on Muckerheide's 
intervening 
cause 
defense 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2), 
as 
Muckerheide requested.  The jury found Muckerheide guilty, and 
the circuit court sentenced Muckerheide to eight years of 
initial confinement, followed by twelve years of extended 
supervision.  Muckerheide appealed, arguing that the circuit 
court erred in its decision to deny the admission of the 
testimony of Braun's father.   
¶15 The court of appeals rejected Muckerheide's argument 
and affirmed the decision of the circuit court.  The court of 
appeals stated that the admission of evidence is a matter within 
the sound discretion of a circuit court.  The court of appeals 
further stated that, in order for other acts evidence to be 
admissible, it must be probative of some proposition other than 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
7 
 
the proposition that, because the person did prior act X, he or 
she is of such a character to have committed present act Y.  
State v. Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d 324, 336-37, 516 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  The court noted that other acts evidence must be 
evaluated for relevancy, and a relevancy determination requires 
an assessment of probative value.  State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 
39, 49, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999); Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786.  
The court of appeals, relying on Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 787, 
stated 
that 
the 
greater 
the 
similarity, 
complexity, 
and 
distinctiveness of the two events, the stronger is the case for 
admissibility of other acts evidence.  The court did not apply a 
Washington case, State v. Young, 739 P.2d 1170 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1987), as requested by Muckerheide, and instead stated that the 
court was following Wisconsin law. 
¶16 Although Muckerheide argued that Braun's testimony was 
offered to show identity, control, absence of mistake, and modus 
operandi, the court of appeals concluded that Braun's testimony 
was inadmissible propensity evidence.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that there were sufficient dissimilarities between the 
prior occasion on which Braun allegedly grabbed the steering 
wheel, and the occasion of the accident involving Muckerheide, 
to undercut the relevance of the offered testimony of Braun's 
father.  Muckerheide then filed a petition for review with this 
court, which we granted. 
II 
¶17 In reviewing a court's decision to admit or exclude 
other acts evidence, the applicable standard is whether the 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
8 
 
court exercised appropriate discretion.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 
at 780.  As with other discretionary determinations, this court 
will uphold the decision of the circuit court to admit or 
exclude evidence, if the circuit court examined the relevant 
facts, applied a proper legal standard, and reached a reasonable 
conclusion using a demonstrated rational process.  Martindale v. 
Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698. 
¶18 We determine as a matter of constitutional fact 
whether the exclusion of evidence offered by a defendant 
violated the constitutional right to present a defense.  State 
v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶¶16, 49, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 
777.  The review of questions of constitutional fact on the 
basis of established facts is de novo, but with this court 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 
827 (1987). 
III 
¶19 The admissibility of other acts evidence is governed 
by Wis. Stat. §§ 904.04(2), 904.03, and 904.01.  Section 
904.04(2) provides in relevant part: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  
This subsection does not exclude the evidence when 
offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
9 
 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.4 
Section 904.03 provides in relevant part:  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Section 904.01 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
¶20 Both Muckerheide and the State agree that the three-
part analytical framework that this court applied in Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d at 771-72, is the proper framework for determining 
the admissibility of other acts evidence.  This court stated in 
Sullivan that a court must first determine whether the other 
acts evidence is offered for an acceptable purpose under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  Second, a court must determine whether 
the other acts evidence is relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772.  Third, a court must determine 
whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues or misleading the jury, or by 
                                                 
4See State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 236, 341 N.W.2d 
716 (Ct. App. 1983), where it was held "that the listing of 
circumstances under sec. 904.04(2) . . .  is not exclusionary 
but, rather, illustrative."  (Citation omitted.)  See also J.W. 
v. B.B., 2005 WI App 125, ¶22, 284 Wis. 2d 493, 700 N.W.2d 277.  
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
10 
 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
¶21 We agree with the parties in the present case that the 
three-part analytical framework used in Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
771-72, is the proper test for determining the admissibility of 
the other acts evidence at issue here.  The parties disagree, 
however, as to how the Sullivan framework applies in this case. 
¶22 Under the first step of the Sullivan framework, 
Muckerheide argues that the testimony of Braun's father was 
offered for the purpose of providing a complete story or context 
to give a full presentation of the case.  State v. Hereford, 195 
Wis. 2d 1054, 1068, 537 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Bergeron, 162 Wis. 2d 521, 531, 470 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1991).  
Muckerheide asserts that the testimony of Braun's father was 
offered to show proof of the identity of the person who was 
responsible for the accident, proof that Braun was in control of 
the car when the accident occurred, that Braun's intentional 
interference caused the accident, that the accident would have 
occurred regardless of Muckerheide's intoxication, and proof of 
Braun's plan or modus operandi.   
¶23 In its brief, the State agrees with Muckerheide that, 
in a homicide prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 940.09, where the 
statutory 
defense 
set 
forth 
in § 940.09(2)(a) 
is 
raised, 
evidence offered to show how the fatal accident occurred is 
permissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  We agree with the 
parties that a permissible purpose is to provide a "'full 
presentation'" of the case.  State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
11 
 
227, 236, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983)(quoting U.S. v. 
Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted)).  
See also Hereford, 195 Wis. 2d at 1069 ("Testimony of other acts 
for the purpose of providing the background . . . is not 
prohibited by § 904.04(2), Stats.").  However, the State asserts 
that Muckerheide's attempt to offer testimony of Braun's prior 
acts for the purpose of showing modus operandi and for a full 
presentation of the story is repetitive, and simply a way of 
rephrasing the purpose of showing how the accident occurred.  
The State asserted at oral argument that identity is not the 
issue in this case; rather, the issue is how the accident was 
caused.5 
¶24 We conclude that Muckerheide's other acts evidence was 
properly excluded.  The testimony of Braun's father would have 
been admissible for the purpose of showing how the accident 
occurred, but it lacked relevance.      
¶25 Muckerheide's offered other acts testimony fails to 
satisfy the second step of the Sullivan analytical framework, 
relevancy.  Muckerheide contends that the prior act of Braun 
allegedly grabbing the steering wheel is relevant to the issue 
of who, in fact, was operating Muckerheide's vehicle at the time 
at issue and, thus, caused the accident.  He argues that the 
                                                 
5 In State v. Young, 739 P.2d 1170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), 
the Washington appellate court held that testimony from three 
witnesses, stating that the victim of a fatal accident had 
grabbed the steering wheel as a passenger on four prior 
occasions, was admissible to prove identity, control of the 
vehicle by the victim, and proximate cause of the accident. 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
12 
 
incident in which Braun allegedly grabbed the steering wheel of 
his father's car, and the facts of the accident here were 
similar.  Muckerheide argues that the testimony from Braun's 
father and Muckerheide's testimony about the accident both tend 
to show that Braun was a nervous passenger, that he would warn 
the driver when he perceived a traffic hazard, and that he would 
grab the steering wheel.   
¶26 The State argues that Braun's prior alleged acts of 
gesturing toward and, on one occasion, grabbing the steering 
wheel, were not similar to the situation in which Braun 
allegedly grabbed the steering wheel of Muckerheide's vehicle.  
The State contends that Braun's motive or intent for allegedly 
grabbing the steering wheel was not relevant, and that the 
offered 
testimony 
of 
Braun's 
father 
was 
nothing 
but 
impermissible propensity evidence. 
¶27 We agree with the State that the other acts evidence 
offered by Muckerheide was not relevant.  Under Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 785, relevance has two facets.  The first 
consideration is whether the other acts evidence relates to a 
fact or proposition that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action.  Id.  The second consideration is whether the 
other acts evidence has a tendency to make a consequential fact 
more probable or less probable.  Id. at 786.  Similarity between 
the prior events and the event in question relates to this 
second consideration.  In Sullivan, we stated, "The greater the 
similarity, complexity and distinctiveness of the events, the 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
13 
 
stronger is the case for admission of other acts evidence."  Id. 
at 787 (footnote omitted). 
¶28 As the State pointed out in its brief, the one 
occasion on which Braun allegedly grabbed the wheel of his 
father's vehicle was dissimilar in several respects to the 
occasion 
in 
which 
Braun 
allegedly 
grabbed 
the 
wheel 
of 
Muckerheide's vehicle.  There was no evidence that, on the prior 
occasion, Braun had been intoxicated or under the influence of 
drugs, but there was evidence that Braun had been drinking and 
doing cocaine prior to the accident in Muckerheide's vehicle.  
There is no dispute that an individual often acts differently 
when he/she is under the influence of drugs and alcohol.  
Additionally, Braun's father would have testified that Braun had 
gestured toward the steering wheel on several occasions, whereas 
Muckerheide never asserted that Braun had made gestures toward 
the steering wheel in Muckerheide's vehicle prior to the 
accident.  Finally, there is no evidence that Braun had ever 
grabbed the steering wheel when riding with Muckerheide on 
occasions prior to the accident, as Braun had allegedly done 
when riding with his father.   
¶29 Due 
to 
these 
dissimilarities, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Muckerheide's offered other acts evidence does not make a 
consequential fact more probable or less probable.  Id. at 785-
86.  As this court stated in Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 
291-92, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), our seminal case regarding other 
acts evidence, it is universally established that evidence of 
other acts "is not admitted in evidence for the purpose of 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
14 
 
proving general character, criminal propensity or general 
disposition on the issue of guilt or innocence because such 
evidence, while having probative value, is not legally or 
logically relevant to the crime charged." 
¶30 Muckerheide argues in his brief that the third step of 
the Sullivan analytical framework should not be applied in cases 
where the other acts evidence is offered by a defendant in a 
criminal case.  The State argues that the third step of the 
Sullivan analysis does apply to this case.  In support of its 
argument, the State cites State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 
303-04, 310-11, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999), wherein this court held 
that, though the offered evidence was not relevant, and 
therefore that the third step——the prejudice prong——need not be 
addressed, we then proceeded to conclude that the balancing of 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03 considerations must occur.   
¶31 In Scheidell, the defendant sought to introduce other 
acts evidence concerning an unknown third party, to raise doubt 
as to the identity of the individual who committed the charged 
crime.  Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 298.  The defendant argued 
that this court should adopt a less stringent standard for other 
acts evidence which is offered by the defense to show mistaken 
identity.  Id.  This court stated, "We recognize that the 
standards of relevancy are stricter when the state seeks to 
introduce other crimes evidence to prove identity because 'the 
prejudice [resulting from such evidence] is apt to be relatively 
greater than the probative value.'"  Id. at 304 (citing Whitty, 
34 Wis. 2d at 294).  However, we concluded that, when a 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
15 
 
defendant offers other acts evidence which is relevant, as 
Muckerheide argues here, the court may exclude such relevant 
evidence under the Whitty/Sullivan approach, if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the dangers set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  Id. at 310-11.   
¶32 The third step of the Sullivan analytical framework 
requires a court to weigh the probative value of the other acts 
evidence to determine if it is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.03; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789.  See also 
Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 310-11 (holding that the probity of 
the evidence must be balanced against the considerations 
contained in § 904.03).  Since we hold that the other acts 
evidence offered by Muckerheide was not relevant, we need not 
address the prejudice prong of the Whitty/Sullivan test.  Id. at 
310.  See also Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789.  We would, however, 
urge circuit courts to discuss and analyze all three steps of 
the Sullivan analytical framework. 
¶33 Offered evidence runs the risk of unfair prejudice 
when it has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper 
means or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its 
sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise 
causes a jury to base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions in the case.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
790. 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
16 
 
¶34 Under the Sullivan analytical framework, we conclude 
that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it 
excluded the other acts evidence offered by Muckerheide because 
the evidence was inadmissible, since it lacked relevance.  
Because we conclude that the evidence was properly excluded, we 
need not undertake a harmless error analysis.  State v. Volk, 
2002 WI App 274, ¶25 n.4, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24. 
IV 
¶35 We turn now to the question of whether the court of 
appeals erred when it decided not to apply case law from another 
jurisdiction, the State of Washington.  We hold that it did not. 
¶36 Muckerheide argues that the circuit court and the 
court of appeals erred by not applying Young, 739 P.2d 1170, a 
Washington appellate decision with facts similar to those in 
Muckerheide's case.  Muckerheide argues that, when Wisconsin law 
is unclear, Wisconsin courts should consider the case law of 
other jurisdictions.  Muckerheide contends that Wisconsin law is 
unclear on the issue of the admissibility of other acts 
evidence, when the prior act involves grabbing a steering wheel. 
¶37 The State asserts that, although case law from other 
jurisdictions may be persuasive or instructive, Wisconsin courts 
are not bound to follow such case law.  Beecher, 264 Wis. 2d 
394, ¶13 n.13; State v. Abramoff, 114 Wis. 2d 206, 210, 338 
N.W.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1983).   
¶38 We agree with the State's assertion that cases from 
other jurisdictions are not binding on Wisconsin courts.  State 
ex rel. E.R. v. Flynn, 88 Wis. 2d 37, 46, 276 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
17 
 
App. 1979).  We recognize that such case law is oftentimes 
helpful, and may be persuasive, but we hold that the circuit 
court and court of appeals did not err in deciding not to follow 
the decision in State v. Young, 739 P.2d 1170, since they were 
not required to do so, and did not find the reasoning 
persuasive. 
V 
¶39 Muckerheide 
also 
argued 
in 
his 
brief 
that 
his 
constitutional right to present a defense was hindered when the 
circuit court excluded the testimony of Braun's father, because 
there 
was 
no 
other 
corroborating 
evidence 
to 
bolster 
Muckerheide's testimony alleging that Braun grabbed the steering 
wheel and caused the accident.6  The State contends that the 
right to present a defense is not absolute, and that a defendant 
must comply with the established rules of procedure and 
evidence.  Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 293-94; U.S. v. Scheffer, 
523 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1998). 
¶40 We agree with the State's position, and conclude that 
there was no violation of Muckerheide's constitutional right to 
present a defense.  As the United States Supreme Court stated in 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988), "The accused does 
                                                 
6 At oral argument, Muckerheide's counsel stated that 
Muckerheide was not going to pursue the claim that he was denied 
a constitutional right to present a defense.  The constitutional 
issue was raised in Muckerheide's brief, however, and we 
therefore address it here, in order to set forth the significant 
cases bearing on such an important claim, in light of the 
vigorous argument in Muckerheide's brief.  
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
18 
 
not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is 
incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under the 
standard rules of evidence."  When evidence is irrelevant or not 
offered for a proper purpose, the exclusion of that evidence 
does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to present a 
defense.  State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 192, 453 N.W.2d 127 
(1990). 
¶41 There is no abridgement on the accused’s right to 
present a defense, so long as the rules of evidence used to 
exclude 
the 
evidence 
offered 
are 
not 
arbitrary 
or 
disproportionate to the purposes for which they are designed.  
St. 
George, 
252 
Wis. 
2d 
499, 
¶52. 
 
The 
exclusion 
of 
Muckerheide’s evidence was not arbitrary or disproportionate.  
The circuit court properly excluded the other acts evidence 
offered by Muckerheide because it was deemed to be impermissible 
character or propensity evidence barred by Wis. Stat. § 904.04. 
¶42 Moreover, Muckerheide had the opportunity to present 
his defense.  The jury heard a full presentation of all the 
facts 
surrounding 
the 
fatal 
accident 
from 
Muckerheide’s 
perspective, including Muckerheide's testimony that the accident 
occurred because Braun grabbed the steering wheel.  The only 
evidence the jury did not hear was the minimally probative 
evidence that, on prior occasions with a different driver, under 
different circumstances, Braun had gestured toward or grabbed 
the steering wheel.  In addition, the circuit court instructed 
the 
jury 
on 
Muckerheide's 
defense 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2)(a), as requested by Muckerheide, and 
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
19 
 
asked the jury to consider the question of whether Braun's death 
would have occurred even if Muckerheide had been exercising due 
care and had not been under the influence of an intoxicant.   
¶43 Considering the fact that Muckerheide testified about 
Braun allegedly grabbing the wheel, and the fact that the jury 
was instructed on Muckerheide's defense, we are satisfied that 
Muckerheide's constitutional right to present a defense was not 
violated, especially since the testimony was inadmissible under 
standard rules of evidence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶44 We hold that the court of appeals was not in error in 
affirming the circuit court's decision not to admit the 
testimony of Braun's father offered by Muckerheide.  We hold 
that said testimony was inadmissible.  Muckerheide's argument 
was to the effect that, since Braun allegedly had grabbed the 
steering wheel on one occasion in his father's vehicle, he must 
have grabbed the steering wheel from Muckerheide on the occasion 
of 
the 
accident. 
 
Such 
testimony 
is 
prohibited 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  
¶45 Under the analytical framework set forth in Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
771-72, 
such 
other 
acts 
evidence 
was 
inadmissible, since it lacked relevance.  The court of appeals 
therefore properly upheld the circuit court's decision to bar 
the admission of the other acts evidence from Braun's father, 
although the court allowed testimony from Muckerheide himself 
that Braun had grabbed the steering wheel and, thus, caused the 
accident.   
No. 
2005AP81-CR   
 
20 
 
¶46 We further hold that the court of appeals did not err 
when it decided not to apply case law from another jurisdiction, 
the State of Washington.  Although a Wisconsin court may 
consider case law from other jurisdictions, such case law 
obviously is not binding precedent in Wisconsin, and a Wisconsin 
court is not required to follow it.  Beecher, 264 Wis. 2d 394, 
¶16 n.3. 
¶47 Finally, we hold that Muckerheide's constitutional 
right to present a defense was not violated by the exclusion of 
the testimony from Braun's father.  For these reasons, the 
decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.     
   
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP81-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶48 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I apply 
the Sullivan test differently than the majority opinion but 
reach the same result.   
¶49 Under the first prong of State v. Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), the proponent of the other 
acts evidence must clearly articulate the legitimate purpose or 
purposes for which the proffered evidence is offered under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2) and must demonstrate that the proffered 
evidence goes to prove the purpose for which it is offered.  In 
other words, the proponent must show (and a court must conclude) 
that the other acts evidence tends to prove the legitimate 
purpose for which it is offered and does not merely show the 
character of the actor and that he or she acted in conformity 
therewith.1 
¶50 A "kitchen sink" litany of legitimate purposes under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) without adequate analysis of the purpose 
and the relation of the proffered evidence to the purpose does 
not satisfy Sullivan.  Sullivan mandates a careful statement of 
a clearly articulated purpose for admission of the proffered 
other acts evidence and a statement setting forth how the 
evidence proves that articulated purpose.2 
                                                 
1 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); 
Wis JI——Criminal 275.1 Comment: Other Act Evidence (Rel. No. 24-
1/90).  
2 State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 100, 252 N.W.2d 94 
(1977). 
No.  2005AP81-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶51 I conclude that the evidence of the other acts of the 
victim in the present case is not admissible because the 
proponent has not shown that the evidence falls within any 
legitimate purpose for admission of other acts evidence.   
¶52 A legitimate purpose in the present case for the 
admissibility of the other acts evidence would be to show how 
the fatal accident occurred, that is, to prove the context of 
the event.  Both parties and the majority opinion, as do I, 
agree that "context" would be a legitimate purpose in the 
present case.   
¶53 Case law and treatises explain that "context" evidence 
shows the res gestae of the crime.  The other act is ordinarily 
close in time to the crime and is integral to the crime such 
that it is not only helpful in understanding what happened but 
is necessary to complete the story by filling in otherwise 
misleading or confusing gaps.  In other words, the fact-finder 
must hear the entire story in order not to be misled.3   
¶54 On analysis, however, it is clear that the other acts 
evidence proffered in the instant case does not fall within this 
concept of context evidence.  The proffered evidence is not 
integral to the crime; it does not put the fatal accident in 
                                                 
3 State v. Hereford, 195 Wis. 2d 1054, 1069, 537 N.W.2d 62 
(Ct. App. 1995); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Evidence 161-62 (2d ed. 2001); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 
660 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999); 3 Clifford S. Fishman, 
Jones on Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 17:9, at 309-10 (7th ed. 
1998); 22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, at 448-449 (1978) 
(Supp. 2006); 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 404.20[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin 
ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
No.  2005AP81-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
context.  The proffered evidence is merely evidence of the 
character of the victim to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. 
¶55 There probably are Wisconsin cases that do not so 
limit context evidence.  Unfortunately several cases are very 
lax in enforcing Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), especially when the 
State is introducing other acts evidence against a criminal 
defendant.4  Nevertheless, I conclude that the proffered evidence 
does not fall within any legitimate purpose under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2).   
¶56 Because the defendant has not met the first Sullivan 
prong I need not go to the second Sullivan prong.  The second 
Sullivan prong is a determination whether the proffered evidence 
                                                 
4 One prominent treatise declares: "There is no question of 
evidence more frequently litigated in the appellate courts than 
the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Yet despite the recurrence of the issues, the opinions are often 
poorly reasoned and provide little guidance to trial judges.  
Even at the theoretical level, the literature is spotty and 
inconsistent in analysis."  22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. 
Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, at 
427 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
No.  2005AP81-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
and the purpose for which it is proffered are relevant to a 
consequential fact in the case.5    
¶57 For the reasons set forth, I write separately and 
concur in the mandate.    
                                                 
5 Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785-86; Wis JI——Criminal 275.1 
Comment: Other Act Evidence (Rel. No. 24-1/90). 
No.  2005AP81-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1