Title: In the Matter of K.H.
Citation: 2020 OK 32
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2020

In the Matter of K.H. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Appellants Taylor and Cody Hudson (Hudson/parents) were arrested and charged with felony criminal child abuse in relation to the alleged abuse of one of Cody Hudson's sons. Subsequently, the State sought to terminate the Hudsons' parental rights to the four children they had together. At trial, the parents sought to preclude any evidence of the criminal charges from being presented to the jury. The trial court limited evidence of the criminal charges to only inform the jury that charges had been filed, and nothing else. The jury rendered a verdict terminating parental rights as to both parents. The Hudsons appealed. After its review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the limited admission of evidence of the fact that parents have been charged with criminal felonies for child abuse (but not yet convicted) was made in error but did not warrant reversal; the jury's verdict was supported by the clear and convincing evidence that the abuse was heinous and shocking. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . IN THE MATTER OF K.H. 2020 OK 32 Case Number: 118035; Comp. w/118078 Decided: 05/12/2020 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. IN THE MATTER OF K.H., C.H., E.H., C.H. DEPRIVED CHILD(REN) TAYLOR HUDSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee. CODY HUDSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY JUVENILE DIVISION Honorable Cassandra M. Williams, Trial Judge ¶0 The appellants, Taylor and Cody Hudson (Hudson/parents), were arrested and charged with felony criminal child abuse in relation to the alleged abuse of one of Cody Hudson's sons. Subsequently, the State sought to terminate the Hudsons' parental rights to the four children they had together. At trial, the parents sought to preclude any evidence of the criminal charges from being presented to the jury. The trial court limited evidence of the criminal charges to only inform the jury that charges had been filed ---- nothing else. The jury rendered a verdict terminating parental rights as to both parents. The Hudsons appealed. We retained the cause. We hold that the limited admission of evidence of the fact that parents have been charged with criminal felonies for child abuse (but not yet convicted) was error but does not warrant reversal. The jury's verdict was supported by the clear and convincing evidence that the abuse was heinous and shocking. AFFIRMED. Phillip P. Owens, II., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Taylor Hudson. Stephanie A. Younge, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Cody Hudson. Jaclyn Rivera, Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent, State of Oklahoma. KAUGER, J: ¶1 We retained this cause to address whether the admission of evidence of the fact that the parents have been charged with criminal felonies for child abuse (but not yet convicted) was error which does not warrant reversal. We hold that it does not because the jury's verdict was supported by clear and convincing evidence of heinous and shocking abuse.1 FACTS ¶2 The appellant, Cody Hudson (father/Hudson) lived in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and fathered two boys, R.H. and B.H., with Revona Serber (natural mother/Serber). The boys were born on April 14, 2009, and February 3, 2012, respectively. After Hudson and Serber's relationship ended, no formal custody agreement was made, but the father did see his boys occasionally. Hudson then fathered two more boys and a girl, C.H., E.H., and C.H., on January 28, 2015, December 5, 2015, and November 11, 2017, respectively, with the appellant, Taylor Ainsworth, now Hudson, (hereinafter referred to as "mother," even though she is the step-mother of R.H. and B.H.). ¶3 In October of 2015, the couple moved from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the father stayed home with the children while the mother worked to support the family. In February of 2018, the father and mother took physical custody of R.H. and B.H. because of Serber's drug use. The couple had previously had the boys in December of 2017 for about two weeks as well. ¶4 Serber apparently lived in an apartment with broken windows, occasionally without electricity, with little food, and with drug users and strangers coming into the apartment with weapons, engaging in sex, and using drugs. B.H. moved to live with another relative in July of 2018, due to severe behavioral problems which the couple thought made it unsafe for him to be around their children. According to the mother, B.H., who was six at the time, would hit and cuss at other kids, and bang his head on the ground. He had also asked for knives to cut his own eyes out, attempted to hang himself with a belt, and threatened to kill other people. R.H. also had behavior issues, but not nearly as severe as B.H. ¶5 After a receiving a tip from an unnamed source, on August 27, 2018, police officers and the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) jointly dispatched to the Hudson's home to do a child welfare check for R.H. Police officers searched the home, but were unable to find R.H. The Hudsons told the police that R.H. was with a grandmother. The police left and contacted the grandmother, and she told them that she did not have R.H., and that they were lying. The police returned and this time they found R.H. hiding in the washing machine. R.H. had significant bruising, in different stages of healing, to his upper torso, neck, and face. DHS took R.H. to OU Children's Hospital for examination, and the police took the father to jail. A few days later, the mother was also arrested. ¶6 When R.H. was taken to the hospital, he reported to the DHS worker that he got in trouble for not listening, that the mother grabbed his face and was on top of him, and R.H. hit his head on the floor. However, he was generally reluctant to talk to DHS about what happened in the house. A trained forensic interviewer also interviewed R.H. at the hospital in a recorded interview as well. ¶7 The mother offered an explanation to the DHS worker that just days prior to the incident, she was concerned with R.H.'s behavior toward her children. R.H. had informed them that he had been playing with another kid at his natural mother's apartment in Tulsa when the other kid pulled his pants down and told R.H. to "suck it" or he would hit him in the head. She reported that after her son C.H. tried to insert a bathtub crayon in his anus, R.H. admitted that he had touched C.H. through his pants on the penis. She also said that she saw R.H. playing with himself as her daughter, E.H., watched. She also thought she caught R.H. moving his hand away from E.H.'s undone diaper. It was at this point the father got angry and spanked R.H. all over his body. They hid R.H. in the washer when the police came because they were scared they would get their kids taken away. ¶8 The Oklahoma County District Attorney (DA) filed applications on August 28, 2018, to take the father and mother's three children, C.H, E.H. and C.H., as well as R.H., into emergency custody and place in kinship foster care. Emergency care is allowed when there is an imminent safety threat to the children.2 The trial court granted the DA's request the same day and set a hearing for August 30, 2018. As a result of the August 30th hearing: the trial court granted the father and mother visitation; R.H. went to live with his maternal grandmother; the other three were in a foster home; and the Court set another hearing for September 17, 2018. ¶9 On September 6, 2018, the father and mother married. The next day, on September 7, 2018, apparently as a result of the forensic interview and medical examination of R.H., the DA filed petitions to have C.H., E.H., and C.H., determined to be deprived and to terminate the mother's and father's parental rights due to the shocking and heinous abuse to the half-sibling, R.H. Termination is allowed for many reasons, one of which is when abuse or neglect of a child or a sibling is heinous and shocking.3 The DA alleged both the father and mother failed to provide proper care of their children and that they beat, slapped, hit, and caused R.H. to be covered in bruises. The DA also asserted that the mother tried to choke R.H., tied him up, hit him with a belt, poked him in the eye, stepped on him, and that she psychologically abused him and left him at home alone when the rest of the family went out. ¶10 The DA alleged that the father was unfit because he also hit R.H., and caused him to have a black eye. The children remained in DHS custody while the causes were pending. The DA also filed criminal felony charges on September 11, 2018, against the father and mother. The criminal case has not yet been resolved. ¶11 On December 6, 2018, the mother gave birth to another child, K.H., and the next day DHS also sought emergency custody of K.H. as well. On December 11, 2018, the trial court allowed K.H. to be placed with her siblings in DHS custody. The father's and mother's termination proceedings as to all four of their children proceeded to trial on May 7-10, 2019.4 ¶12 The trial consisted of testimony and other evidence presented by the father, the mother, a police officer, R.H, and the video forensic interview of R.H. made at the hospital. Testimony of B.H., Serber's sister, two child protective services workers, a DHS permanency worker, and a grandmother, was also presented to the jury. By the conclusion of the trial, the trial court had already determined that the children were deprived. The jury returned verdicts to terminate the parental rights of both the father and the mother. ¶13 On June 7, 2019, and June 25, 2019, the mother and the father, respectively, appealed. On July 3, 2019, the Court made the mother's appeal and the father's appeal companion cases with separate records and separate briefing by the parties. We retained the cause on October 14, 2019, and it was assigned on December 9, 2019, for an opinion to address the admission of evidence of the pending criminal charges in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Because both causes involve the same trial and are companion cases, we decide them both in this single opinion. I. EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL CHARGES. ¶14 Both the father and mother argue that the trial court erred in allowing the State and the children to admit evidence of their criminal charges before the jury. Both filed motions in limine to exclude such evidence5 and continued to object to the evidence throughout the trial, after the court denied the motions in limine. While the father and mother admit that criminal convictions may be used generally to impeach witnesses, they point out that neither of them has been convicted.6 Consequently, they argue that the evidence of only being charged with a crime would be irrelevant, and too prejudicial.7 The State and children argue that it was not error to admit the evidence of criminal charges. ¶15 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §26098 addresses the admissibility of a criminal conviction as evidence, but it does not address evidence of criminal charges being filed, which have not yet resulted in conviction. It provides that such evidence of conviction shall be used unless its prejudice outweighs its probative value. Even if the evidence were irrelevant or otherwise inadmissable, the injection of irrelevant or otherwise inadmissable evidence is ordinarily not grounds to reverse a jury verdict unless that error was prejudicial.9 The test of prejudice is the likelihood the verdict would have been different had the error not occurred, measured by the usual criterion of the verdict's support in evidence.10 ¶16 Evidence of prejudice is not clear. The trial court expressly prohibited questions about where the criminal case stood at the time of trial or questions which alluded to a particular result. The court only allowed the suggestion that criminal charges were still pending. No more than that. The rationale behind the trial court's ruling was explained as follows in the trial court's ruling on the motions in limine are found at Volume 1, pages 9-10, of the May 7, 2019, transcript. It provides in pertinent part: . . . I am not able to find any law that directs [t]his Court with respect to whether this is inadmissible evidence or, more importantly, whether or not it is unfairly prejudicial. You know, by the nature of these events that occurred, that leads us to where we are today. It is -- I mean, the facts are what the facts are. In this case, what I recognize is this: I recognize that as it relates to Mr. Cody Wayne Hudson, that he has entered a no contest stipulation to the allegations in the petition. This Court made a judicial finding that there was sufficient evidence to find that the children are deprived as to the father on the grounds of lack of parental care and guardianship, heinous and shocking physical abuse, threat of harm, as well as failure to protect. That's been a determination that's been made by [t]he Court. I say that because, within the descriptors for heinous and shocking physical abuse, it clearly indicates that one of the bases or descriptions for this abuse includes the fact that the father was charged in Oklahoma County case number CF-2018-4283 with child abuse. You know, as I have looked at this and tried my best to make sure that this jury does not walk away with an impression one way or the other, this is a neutral piece of evidence. The fact that the parents were both charged is a fact. The fact that law enforcement was involved in this case is a fact. It is one that leads a jury to conclude that the abuse is heinous and shocking? Well, I don't think that that's the case. Because I think that the jury's instructions, as I look through them, Instruction No. 3.11 that defines heinous and shocking abuse, doesn't list anywhere that there's been a criminal charge. It does give the jury specific direction on what to look at in terms of the level of abuse to determine whether or not it fits within the area of physical abuse versus that higher level of heinous and shocking abuse. So, to the extent that both parents have asked [t]his Court to limit The State of Oklahoma from offering evidence and testimony about the rest, and that [sic] are charging both parents in this case, I'm going to deny that request. To ask the parents questions about where their case stands at this point in time or to elude to a particular result; I am prohibiting both sides from being able to do that. At this point in time, what I'm allowing you all to suggest as this point in time, to the jury, which is true, which in this case, the criminal charges, are still pending against both parents. No more than that. . . Leaving out all references to the police altogether, and what occurred leading up to arrest, would have required the trial court to leave out nearly all of the events which led to the allegations in this cause. The fact that the parents were charged and not yet convicted could likely influence the jury less than if they had already been convicted and were in prison. ¶17 The terminations sought by the State were based on its allegations that the father's and mother's abuse of R.H. was heinous and shocking.11 We cannot say that the verdict would have been different had the arrests been excluded from the jury. Jury instruction #8, which is the statement of the case mentions that the mother and father were charged with child abuse in Oklahoma County CF-2018-4283. ¶18 Jury instructions #1212 and #14,13 defining heinous and shocking does not list a criminal charge as a requirement for a finding of heinous and shocking. Nor does #13, which defines abuse.14 The only mention of the criminal charges during the course of the trial was limited to the fact that an arrest occurred and the parents had been charged -- nothing more.15 No evidence was presented that alluded to the potential outcome of the criminal charges. Yet, there was overwhelming evidence about repetitive abuse to both R.H. and B.H., which we will discuss further herein. ¶19 Title 20 O.S. 2011 §3001.1 provides: No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate court of this state in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the reviewing court that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. Neither parent argues a substantial violation of a constitutional right. The error which occurred, under the circumstances, it is clearly not a cause for reversal of the jury's express findings of heinous and shocking sufficient to terminate parental rights. II. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE WARRANTS TERMINATION. ¶20 The father and step-mother argue that the State failed to meet its burden of proof required to allow immediate termination of their parental rights. The State and children argue that there was clear and convincing evidence presented to support the jury's verdict which terminated their rights based on heinous and shocking abuse, and that termination was in the children's best interest. ¶21 The right of a parent to the care, custody, companionship and management of his or her child is a fundamental right protected by the federal and state constitutions.16 The magnitude of such a right requires, in parental termination cases, that the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interest is served by the termination of parental rights.17 Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegation sought to be established.18 This standard of proof balances the parents' fundamental freedom from family disruption, with the state's duty to protect children within its borders.19 ¶22 Likewise, our review on appeal must find the presence of clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision.20 We must canvass the record to determine whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven.21 Our appellate review does not require a re-weighing of the evidence presented at trial.22 ¶23 The jury heard extensive testimony and received considerable other evidence that would have allowed them to make an informed determination on whether conduct of the parents was heinous, and shocking, and whether termination was in the children's best interest. The evidence was too considerable to repeat all of it. However, we note that the parents' version of events and care of the children differed from the children's version. ¶24 The State presented evidence that the bruises were indicative of physical abuse, choking, and strangling. The boys' aunt testified that she was concerned with the boys' (R.H and B.H.) welfare, that they had lost weight, and looked sickly, and had black under their eyes from lack of sleep. She also had difficulty talking to and seeing the boys. ¶25 R.H. reported that he was made to sleep on the floor without a blanket or pillow, that he was restricted from food and water, that he was often fed oatmeal, and if he threw it up he had to eat it anyway. He was home schooled and told by the mother that his dad didn't want him or care about him. R.H.'s recorded interview was compelling and it provided insight into his injuries as well as to his hesitation to discuss everything that went on in the home. He feared his dad would go to jail. B.H. also reported similar stories and said that he would get hit everywhere, that he was made to put vinegar in his mouth when he was bad. Both boys were concerned for the safety of K.H., C.H., E.H, and C.H. ¶26 The parents had explanations for everything that the boys reported. For instance, according to the mother, on August 24, 2018, R.H. was caught inappropriately touching C.H. and when confronted he threw his laptop and his father grabbed him by the arm and spanked him. She noticed bruises the next day. Two days later, she caught R.H. quickly pulling his hand away from their daughter's undone diaper. Her version is that R.H. lunged at her and his elbow ended up in her mouth, she bit him to get him off of her and the father began hitting R.H. ¶27 The parents claimed that some of R.H.'s injuries came from falling over a chair or from playing with the other children. As far as food goes, the mother said that the boys were overweight. They went from eating only junk food to healthy food and if they refused to eat it, then they were not forced to, they just simply ate at the next meal. The parents insist they never withheld food or water from the boys or restricted their access to the bathroom. The mother was convinced that the boys were just confused between the things they witnessed at their natural mother's house, and what actually occurred in their home. ¶28 While most heinous and shocking cases tend to involve either sexual abuse or death, they also include similar accounts of physical abuse, malnourishment, and physical and psychological injuries.23 We have no doubt that what R.H. and B.H. may have witnessed while in the care of their natural mother left them somewhat unruly or challenging to raise, but we also have no doubt that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to make a determination that met the clear and convincing standard required for termination of parental rights for heinous and shocking abuse, and was in the children's best interest. Accordingly, we must affirm the trial court. CONCLUSION ¶29 Limited evidence of the filing of criminal charges in this cause, was error but does not warrant reversal. While parents have a fundamental right to raise their children, that right may be terminated by the state's duty to protect children from heinous and shocking harm. After examining the record, we have determined that there was more than sufficient evidence for the fact finder to reasonably form a firm belief that the heinous and shocking grounds for termination were proven. Accordingly, the jury verdict must be affirmed. AFFIRMED. DARBY, V.C.J., KAUGER, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, KANE, and ROWE, JJ., concur. GURICH, C.J. (by separate writing), and COLBERT, J., dissent. FOOT