Title: United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. W. CAS. & SURETY CO.
Citation: 195 Kan. 603, 408 P.2d 596
Docket Number: 44,206
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 1965

195 Kan. 603 (1965)
408 P.2d 596
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
WESTERN CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 44,206

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 11, 1965.
A.C. Cooke, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Blake A. Williamson, James K. Cubbison, Donald A. Hardy and Sheldon M. Crossette, all of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Roger D. Stanton, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Lee E. Weeks, Leonard O. Thomas, J.D. Lysaught, Richard Millsap, Robert H. Bingham, Ervin G. Johnston and Miles D. Mustain, all of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This appeal stems from a dispute between an insurer under a general automobile liability policy and an insurer under a general liability policy as to the principal liability for an injury to an employee.
The facts are not in dispute.
The National Compressed Steel Corporation (hereinafter referred to as National) was engaged in the business of collecting and processing scrap metal at its place of business in Kansas City, Kansas. National carried a general liability insurance policy with the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (hereinafter referred to as United).
M. Rogoff and Co., Inc. had its truck loaded with scrap metal which was delivered to National by Rogoff's employee, Milton Thurston. Rogoff carried a general automobile insurance policy with the Western Casualty and Surety Company (hereinafter referred to as Western).
*604 While National's employees were unloading the truck with an electric crane Thurston was injured through the alleged negligence of National's employees. Thurston brought an action against National for damages. Western refused to enter into the defense of the suit. United, National's insurer, settled the claim for $1,800 and brought an action against Western, Rogoff's insurer, for subrogation in the amount of the settlement plus costs and expenses contending that under the term of Western's policy insuring Rogoff any liability arising out of the loading or unloading of the vehicle belonging to Rogoff was covered by the defendant.
The defendant answered claiming that the injury was expressly excluded by the clear and specific provisions of its policy.
The plaintiff and defendant each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that injury to Rogoff's employee was excluded from the terms of Western's policy and sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff has appealed.
Certain provisions of Rogoff's general automobile liability policy issued by Western are material at this point.
..............
"III. Definition of Insured:
..............
..............
"This policy does not apply:
..............
The appellant contends that National and its employees became additional insureds under appellee's policy while National's employees were using Rogoff's truck for unloading purposes and the employee of Rogoff was not National's employee; therefore, the clause excluding Rogoff's employee did not apply to Rogoff's employee injured by National.
The trial court concluded that under the terms of the policy an employee of Rogoff was excluded from its terms and no other questions need be determined. We are constrained to agree.
The question of whether the employees of the appellant's insured were additional unnamed insureds of the appellee is not material to the determination of the present controversy due to the "employee exclusion" clause in the insurance policy issued by appellee to its named insured, Rogoff.
The exclusion clause contained in appellee's policy is stated with clarity and should not be misunderstood by another insurance company.
It reads:
"This policy does not apply:
..............
We find no ambiguity in the language used. We should not seek ambiguity where none exists merely for the purpose of invoking the rule of liberal construction.
In a case involving a dispute between two insurance companies we do not have occasion to apply the rule of liberal or extended interpretation which is sometimes necessary to protect a layman in the coverage which he thought he was receiving.
In Esfeld Trucking, Inc. v. Metropolitan Insurance Co., 193 Kan. 7, 392 P.2d 107, we stated at page 10 of the opinion:
We conclude that if an injured party is an employee of the named insured under an automobile liability policy, he is excluded by a provision which excludes "bodily injury to an employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of employment ... by the insured" even though he may not have been the employee of an unnamed insured under the policy whose employees committed the tort.
The exact question involved is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. There is divided authority in other jurisdictions but the great weight of authority appears to be in harmony with the views expressed herein. The cases from other jurisdictions have become too numerous to justify citation for the purpose of classification. Those wishing to research the cases should see the annotation in 50 A.L.R.2d 78 and A.L.R.2d, Supplemental Service, Vol. 2, p. 3203 and Vol. 4, p. 1138.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.