Title: State v. Richardson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124737
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2022

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 124,737 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
MEKA RICHARDSON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
The party alleging an abuse of discretion bears the burden of establishing error.  
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; MICHAEL A. RUSSELL, judge. Opinion filed December 
30, 2022. Affirmed. 
 
Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Francis X. Altomare, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STEGALL, J.:  In 1992, a jury convicted Meka Richardson of first-degree murder 
and aggravated robbery in the shooting death of Brenda Wassink. The jury rendered a 
belt-and-suspenders conviction, finding Richardson guilty of the first-degree murder on 
both theories presented by the State—first, premeditation; and second, felony murder 
committed during an aggravated robbery. During the sentencing phase, the jury  
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unanimously found specific aggravating factors not outweighed by specific mitigating 
factors. The district court sentenced Richardson to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for 40 years.  
 
In December 2021, Richardson filed a one-page letter with the Wyandotte County 
District Court requesting postconviction discovery of the ballistics report from her 
case. Richardson had filed a similar request for the ballistics report in 2020, which the 
district court denied. In denying the 2020 letter request, the district court applied the 
postconviction discovery test articulated by a panel of the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Mundo-Parra, 58 Kan. App. 2d 17, 24, 462 P.3d 1211 (2020). The district court again 
summarily denied Richardson's 2021 postconviction discovery request because she "still 
failed to state good cause and state[d] no statutory authority," though the district court 
also cited no specific standard.  
 
Richardson appeals the district court's denial of her most recent request directly to 
our court. Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3) (appeal must be 
taken directly to Supreme Court when the maximum sentence of life imprisonment has 
been imposed). 
 
Richardson alleges the district court erred by not granting her motion for 
postconviction discovery under the Mundo-Parra framework. But we decline to take up 
that issue in this case. Just as we said in State v. Butler, 315 Kan. 18, 20, 503 P.3d 239 
(2022), "[w]e begin by stating what this opinion does not do. It does not endorse the rule 
established in Mundo-Parra, as [appellant] requests on appeal. Nor does it abrogate that 
holding." This is because here, even if there is a postconviction discovery right as set 
forth in Mundo-Parra, Richardson has not established that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying her motion. We therefore affirm the district court's order.  
 
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This court reviews lower court rulings on postconviction discovery for abuse of 
discretion. A district court abuses its discretion if no reasonable person could agree with 
its decision or if its exercise of discretion is founded on a legal or factual error. 315 Kan. 
at 21. The party alleging an abuse of discretion bears the burden of establishing error. 315 
Kan. at 21. 
 
This court has not articulated a definitive test for when and if postconviction 
discovery is appropriate. We have recognized, however, that postconviction discovery 
may be appropriate in certain limited circumstances. Fifty years ago, in State v. Nirschl, 
208 Kan. 111, 116, 490 P.2d 917 (1971), we said it was "arguable . . . that disclosure and 
post trial discovery may be necessary on certain occasions to insure due process." The 
Court of Appeals has cited Nirschl and ordered postconviction discovery—an in-chamber 
review of the defendant's case to see whether anything related to one of the investigating 
officers seemed improper. State v. Riis, 39 Kan. App. 2d 273, 276-78, 178 P.3d 684 
(2008).  
 
More recently, the Mundo-Parra panel of the Court of Appeals held that in order 
to get discovery, a defendant must (1) make a good-cause showing by identifying the 
specific subject matter for discovery, and (2) then explain why discovery of those matters 
is necessary to protect substantial rights. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 24. The panel provided more 
context to this broad test by stating that a proper request should be targeted, as opposed to 
a "fishing expedition." 58 Kan. App. 2d at 25. Additionally, the defendant must indicate 
how the information would have changed the result of trial or called into question the 
conviction in more than a mere speculative way. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 24-25. 
 
In February of 2022, we considered whether postconviction discovery would 
be appropriate in Butler. 315 Kan. at 20-21. We held Butler was not entitled to 
postconviction discovery, and we expressly declined to endorse or discredit the Mundo- 
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Parra test relied on by the Court of Appeals. We noted that even if Mundo-Parra was the 
correct standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Butler's motion. 
315 Kan. at 21-24.  
 
Just as in Butler, resolving Richardson's claim does not require us to either adopt 
or reject the Mundo-Parra test. Richardson's brief both fails to argue good cause for her 
request and fails to identify how the district court abused its discretion. Richardson does 
not claim any specific legal or factual error and does not allege that no reasonable judge 
would have denied her request. Richardson seems aware of this flaw, and asks us to 
deviate from Butler, though without arguing why Butler was wrongly decided or is 
distinguishable from her case.  
 
Furthermore, Richardson does not allege that any information contained in the 
ballistics report would be exculpatory and she fails to identify any other reason the 
ballistics report may be relevant to a challenge to her conviction. Thus, even under our 
broad language in Nirschl, Richardson has failed to articulate how postconviction 
discovery might be necessary to insure her due process rights. 208 Kan. at 116.  
 
Alternatively, Richardson argues that the right to "pursue a challenge to her 
conviction" should be considered a habeas corpus challenge. And because the writ of 
habeas corpus is a fundamental right, she should be afforded postconviction discovery so 
long as that discovery pertains to that action. Richardson's habeas corpus argument is 
unpreserved as it is raised for the first time on appeal. We decline to utilize a prudential 
exception to our preservation requirements in order to consider her claim. See State v. 
Gutierrez-Fuentes, 315 Kan. 341, 347, 508 P.3d 378 (2022) ("[B]efore invoking one of 
the limited exceptions, an appellate court must also determine whether the unpreserved 
issue is amenable to resolution on appeal. Even then, the decision to review an 
unpreserved claim under an exception is a prudential one; the court necessarily exercises 
discretion. Despite an exception supporting review of a new claim, an appellate court has 
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no obligation to do so. [Citations omitted.]"); State v. Parry, 305 Kan. 1189, 1192, 390 
P.3d 879 (2017) ("[J]ust because an exception may permit review of an unpreserved 
issue, this alone does not obligate an appellate court to exercise its discretion and review 
the issue.").  
 
Finding no error, the district court is affirmed.