Title: James S. Scott v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR05-351
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: February 9, 2006

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 05-351 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION JAMES S. SCOTT Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered February 9, 2006 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, CR 2001-2417, HON. WILLARD PROCTOR, JR., JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM James S. Scott was found guilty of first degree sexual abuse and sentenced to four months' imprisonment in the county jail and 120 months' probation. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Scott v. State, CACR 03-269 (Ark. App. March 10, 2004). Mr. Scott then filed a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, which was dismissed by order entered December 30, 2004. In that order, the trial court found that Mr. Scott was in custody at the time of the filing of the petition, but had completed the jail time imposed in his sentence and had been released on probation. The petition was dismissed because Mr. Scott was no longer in custody. Appellant Scott acknowledges that our precedent requires physical incarceration to pursue a petition under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The rule is accessible to a "petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court." This court has held that "in custody" for purposes of Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 is limited to physical incarceration. Bohanan v. State, 336 Ark. 367, 985 S.W.2d 708 (1999). Appellant now asks that we overturn Bohanan. Appellant urges us to adopt the a definition of custody similar to that used in federal habeas corpus cases. We have addressed the federal habeas corpus cases in Bohanan, 336 Ark. at 372, 985 S.W.2d at 710, and Kemp v. State, 330 Ark. 757, 956 S.W.2d 860 (1997), and declined to adopt that definition. This court does not lightly overrule cases and applies a strong presumption in favor of the validity of prior decisions. Echols v. State, 354 Ark. 414, 125 S.W.3d 153 (2003). It is necessary to uphold prior decisions unless a great injury or injustice would result. Id. at 418, 125 S.W.3d at 157. We break with precedent when the result is patently wrong and so manifestly unjust that a break becomes unavoidable. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004). Appellant simply does not present an argument so compelling as to require this court to reverse Bohanan. Appellant raises a number of other arguments in his invitation to overturn Bohanan. They are also arguments that we have previously considered, including those raised by the dissenting opinion in Duke v. State, 354 Ark. 619, 127 S.W.3d 477 (2003) (Imber, J., dissenting). Appellant asserts our holding in Bohanan violates his rights of due process and equal protection, and denies him access to the courts. Appellant's arguments, however, ignore the limited purpose of a petition under Rule 37.1 to provide a remedy only to those unjustly incarcerated, and fail to provide sufficient evidence of such great injury or injustice so as to warrant a break with precedent. Equal protection does not require that persons be dealt with identically, only that the classifications rest on real and not feigned differences, that the distinctions have some relevance to the purpose for which the classifications are made, and that their treatment be not so disparate as to be arbitrary. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 6 S.W.3d 74 (1999). Those incarcerated are not similarly situated with those who are not incarcerated, and it is not unfair to differentiate between the two classifications. As we noted in Bohanan, the purpose of Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 is to provide a narrow remedy designed to prevent wrongful incarceration. Bohanan, 336 Ark. at 369, 985 S.W.2d at 709. Our postconviction remedy is intended to avoid persons being unjustly imprisoned, and the distinction between those physically incarcerated and those at liberty, even if that liberty is restricted, is real, relevant and not arbitrary. Appellant asserts he is denied access to the courts to protect his constitutional right to effective counsel at trial. He argues that this violates his right to due process. Yet, appellant concedes that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised on direct appeal or in a motion for new trial. He urges that such arguments cannot be efficiently raised on direct appeal. Because appellant could raise the issue at trial or on appeal, and did have a remedy on appeal, although perhaps not as effective or convenient a remedy as that provided by a petition under Rule 37.1, those concerns are simply not sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity of our prior decisions. There is no constitutional right to a postconviction proceeding. Robinson v. State, 295 Ark. 693, 751 S.W.2d 335 (1988). Where one is provided, due process requires that the proceeding be fundamentally fair. Id. at 699, 751 S.W.2d at 339. In Robinson, this court determined that a requirement that a petition must meet certain threshold requirements was fundamentally fair. That a petitioner be in physical custody is exactly such a threshold requirement, and fulfills the intention of the rule to provide the remedy only to those unjustly incarcerated. Appellant asserts that the requirement of the statute should be satisfied because appellant was incarcerated when he filed the petition. Yet, the holding in Bohanan was that where the petitioner has been released prior to relief being granted, the relief has no practical effect and the petition is rendered moot by his release from custody. Bohanan, 336 Ark. at 372-373, 985 S.W.2d at 710. For the reasons already noted, we must decline appellant's invitation to overrule Bohanan and our well-established precedent on this point. Affirmed.