Title: In re Inquiry of Badgett
Citation: 362 N.C. 202
Docket Number: 173A07
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2008

Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
IN RE: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NOS. 05-226, 06-005, 06-073,
06-086, 06-087, and 06-105 - MARK H. BADGETT, Respondent
No. 173A07  
FILED: 7 MARCH 2008
Judges--censure--suspension--willful misconduct--gross misconduct
A district court judge was censured and suspended from office as a judge for sixty
days from entry of this order for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(2), 3A(3), 3A(4),
and 3D of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, willful misconduct, and
willful and persistent failure to perform his duties in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376 based upon
his participation in the preparation of a remittal of disqualification in cases involving an attorney
with whom he had a business relationship, despite provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
the contrary; his untruthful statements under oath regarding his attempts to procure the remittal
of disqualification; and his pressure on the district attorney to sign the remittal of disqualification
by using threats and the power of his office.
This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
7A-376 upon a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission
entered 19 March 2007 that respondent Mark H. Badgett, a Judge of
the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, State of
North Carolina Judicial District Seventeen-B, be censured for
conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(2), 3A(3), 3A(4),
and 3D of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, willful
misconduct, and willful and persistent failure to perform his
duties in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376.  Calendered for
argument in the Supreme Court on 17 October 2007, but determined
on the record without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 2(c) of the
Rules for Supreme Court Review of Recommendations of the Judicial
Standards Commission.
Robert C. Montgomery, Special Counsel, for the Judicial
Standards Commission.
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Randolph and Fischer, by J. Clark Fischer; and Melvin
and Powell, by Edward L. Powell, for respondent.
ORDER OF SUSPENSION AND CENSURE
On 19 March 2007, the Judicial Standards Commission
(Commission) recommended that this Court censure respondent, a
Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division,
Judicial District Seventeen-B, for conduct inappropriate to his
judicial office.
On 2 October 2006, the Commission filed a complaint
alleging, inter alia, that respondent: (1) had a business
relationship with attorney Ernest Clark Dummit;  (2) neither
disclosed this relationship to parties or counsel appearing
before him nor disqualified himself from matters involving
Dummit;  (3) subsequently attempted to coerce District Attorney
C. Ricky Bowman into signing a remittal of disqualification;  (4)
engaged in retaliatory conduct against the district attorney’s
office after the district attorney refused to sign the remittal;  
(5) made comments and ruled in a manner that created the
impression that attorney Dummit was in a position to influence
respondent, thereby calling into question his impartiality;  (6)
coerced a guilty plea from criminal defendant Dale William
Walker;  (7) attempted to coerce a guilty plea from criminal
defendant Eric Wayne Potts;  and (8) was habitually rude and
condescending to those who appeared before him and demonstrated
an arrogant and contemptuous demeanor while presiding over court.
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Respondent filed his answer on 20 October 2006. The
Commission conducted hearings on the matter on 30 November 2006,
1 December 2006, 18 and 19 January 2007, and 9 February 2007.  It 
subsequently entered findings of fact as follows:
2. Prior to respondent’s
election as a district court judge,
he was a practicing attorney in
King, North Carolina and maintained
his office in a building owned by
him and located at 210 E. Dalton
Street, King, North Carolina. After
his election in November 2004,
respondent entered into discussions
with E. Clarke Dummit, an attorney
with his primary office in Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, concerning
an arrangement by which Mr. Dummit
would lease respondent’s building
and purchase his files. On or about
1 December 2004, respondent entered
into a lease of the premises to
American Law Offices, PC doing
business as “The Dummit Law Firm,’
which lease was executed by
respondent and Mr. Dummit as
President of American Law Offices,
PC. Thereafter, Mr. Dummit sent out
letters soliciting respondent’s
former clients, and others, and
representing that his offices would
be located in respondent’s former
offices and that he would, as a
courtesy to respondent, maintain
respondent’s legal files.
3. After respondent executed
the lease to Mr. Dummit’s law firm,
Mr. Dummit appeared on behalf of
clients on multiple occasions
before respondent. At no time did
respondent disclose to opposing
counsel, including members of the
staff of the district attorney for
the 17-B Prosecutorial District,
the business relationship existing
between respondent and Mr. Dummit. 
4. After members of the
district attorney’s staff
complained concerning what they
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perceived to be favorable treatment
accorded Mr. Dummit by respondent,
respondent was advised by letter
dated 10 January 2006 from Paul R.
Ross, Executive Secretary of the
Judicial Standards Commission, that
his business relationship with Mr.
Dummit was potentially grounds for
disqualification in matters in
which Mr. Dummit was involved.
Respondent, as well as members of
the district attorney’s office,
also received information from Mr.
Ross with respect to the provisions
of Canon 3D of the Code of Judicial
Conduct regarding remittal of
disqualification.
5. At respondent’s direction,
Mr. Dummit prepared a document
entitled “In re Remittal of
Disqualification” disclosing the
landlord-tenant relationship
existing between respondent and Mr.
Dummit and deeming it
“insubstantial and immaterial
pursuant to the opinion rendered by
the Judicial Standards Commission.”
No such opinion was ever rendered
by the Commission or Mr. Ross. Mr.
Dummit signed the document and sent
it to respondent, who signed it,
and to District Attorney C. Ricky
Bowman, who declined to sign it.
Notwithstanding the provisions of
Canon 3D of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requiring that a remittal
of disqualification be reached
independently of the judge’s
participation, respondent contacted
Mr. Bowman on more than one
occasion in efforts to obtain his
signature on the document,
including one occasion in open
court in which he requested Mr.
Bowman to come to the bench and
told him that Mr. Ross had said Mr.
Bowman needed to sign the document
and that the Judicial Standards
investigation was over. Neither of
those statements was true. Upon Mr.
Bowman’s refusal to sign the
document, respondent became angry
and threatened to “give everyone
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the maximum sentence” and “clog up
superior court.” The Commission
specifically finds that the
respondent’s testimony concerning
his conversation at the bench with
Mr. Bowman was not credible.
(emphasis added)
6. After receiving notice
dated 27 December 2005 of the
Commission’s preliminary
investigation . . . respondent
inquired of Mr. Ross as to the
identity of the complainants.
Citing Commission Rules 4, 7, and
9, Mr. Ross advised respondent that
the “identity of the complainant is
confidential until the Commission
concludes whether formal
proceedings should be filed.”
Notwithstanding, respondent told
Assistant District Attorney Angela
Puckett that he knew who had
complained, they were a “burr in
his side” and that he was going to
“unload on them.” He created a
hostile work environment to members
of the district attorneys [sic]
staff and told one of them, Mr.
Langan, “you don’t represent the
State, the officer does” or words
to that effect, and urged Mr.
Bowman to fire Mr. Langan.
7. After respondent was served
with the NOTICE OF COMPLAINT AND
COMPLAINT in this matter,
respondent threatened to sue
Assistant District Attorney Tim
Watson and “everyone in the
district attorney’s office.” In
response to a motion that
respondent be recused from hearing
matters in which the district
attorney’s office was involved,
respondent agreed to recuse himself
from hearing criminal matters, but
ordered that the motion be sealed.
8. Respondent has been
habitually rude and condescending
to those who appear before him in
court. On 14 March 2006, while
hearing evidence in the case of
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State v. Potts, . . . respondent
expressed displeasure at having to
begin a contested trial late in the
day, turned his back to the witness
who was testifying, engaged in
conversation with a courtroom clerk
during the witness’s testimony, and
stated to defense counsel Karen
Adams that he had “quit taking
notes -- I’m drawing arrows to who
is related to who and what
boyfriends and girlfriends go
together.” On 22 March 2006,
respondent belittled courtroom
clerk Hope Brim in open court by
speaking to her in a sarcastic
manner and suggesting that she had
been late coming to court when, in
fact, she arrived before the usual
time for the opening of court. In
his testimony before the
Commission, respondent acknowledged
that he has, on occasion, been loud
and arrogant while in court and
that he needs to work on his
judicial temperament.
9. On 28 March 2006, Patsy
Royal was present in the courtroom
where respondent was presiding.
Virginia Smith was also present in
the courtroom and observed Ms.
Royal carve or scratch an obscenity
into the wooden bench upon which
she was seated. Ms. Smith reported
the action to a deputy sheriff. As
a result, Ms. Royal was taken into
custody and taken before a
magistrate and charged with injury
to property, a Class 1 misdemeanor.
She was then taken before
respondent for the purpose of a
first appearance and the setting of
bond. Respondent asked the deputy
if Ms. Royal was the one who had
carved on a bench, which was
indicative of his having received
ex parte information concerning the
underlying facts of the matter in
addition to that contained in the
warrant, since a description of the
offense was not contained in the
warrant. He became very angry and
loud, telling Ms. Royal that her
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1 Five members voted to censure respondent; one favored
removing him from office.
actions were akin to “burning a
church” and that she was “going to
pay” for her conduct and that “she
would begin paying now”,
notwithstanding the fact that Ms.
Royal had not been convicted of any
crime at that time. When Ms. Royal
attempted to speak, respondent
would not allow her to do so and
told her that she was going to
listen. Respondent asked Assistant
District Attorney Langan for a bond
recommendation, telling him that
whatever recommendation he made
would not be enough. After Mr.
Langen [sic] recommended a $5,000
bond, respondent set bond at
$10,000 without making any inquiry
into the circumstances required by
N.C.G.S. [§] 15A-534(c). 
From these findings, the Commission concluded as a
matter of law that respondent should be censured and recommended
that sanction to this Court on 19 March 2007.1 This Court “may
adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are supported by
clear and convincing evidence, or it may make its own findings.”
In re Hayes, 353 N.C. 511, 514, 546 S.E.2d 376, 378 (2001)
(citing In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 98, 240 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978))
cause dismissed, 356 N.C. 389, 584 S.E.2d 260 (2002). Moreover,
the Commission’s recommendations are not binding on this Court.
In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 244, 237 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1977).
In reviewing the Commission’s recommendations, “this
Court acts as a court of original jurisdiction, rather than in
its typical capacity as an appellate court.”  In re Daisy, 359
N.C. 622, 623, 614 S.E.2d 529, 530 (2005) (citing In re Peoples,
296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978) cert. denied, 442
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U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979)).  Consequently, this Court
exercises its independent judgment with respect to the
disciplinary measures to be imposed on a judge.  In re
Stephenson, 354 N.C. 201, 205, 552 S.E.2d 137, 139 (2001) (citing
Nowell, 293 N.C. at 244, 237 S.E.2d at 252).  We have previously
noted that rigid structure and rules in this area are not
appropriate, since each case presents its own wrinkles and
nuances and should therefore be decided on its own facts.  See In
re Martin, 302 N.C. 299, 316, 275 S.E.2d 412, 421 (1981).   
Therefore, in reviewing the Commission’s
recommendations, this Court must first determine if the
Commission’s findings of fact are adequately supported by clear
and convincing evidence, and in turn, whether those findings
support its conclusions of law.  Finally, we determine if the
sanctions proposed by the Commission are appropriate in light of
the circumstances of the case.
After carefully reviewing the record and transcript, we
conclude that the Commission’s findings are supported by clear
and convincing evidence.  We also agree with the Commission’s
conclusions that respondent’s actions violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B,
3A(2), 3A(3), 3A(4), and 3D of the North Carolina Code of
Judicial Conduct and constitute conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute, willful misconduct, and willful and persistent failure
to perform his duties in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376.  We must
now decide whether to accept the Commission’s recommendation of
censure or impose a different penalty.
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2 The recent amendments to N.C.G.S. § 7A-376 explicitly
codify the option of “suspension” as a potential course of action
in addition to the two other sanctions of “censure” or “removal”.
See Act of July 20, 2006, Ch. 187, Sec. 11, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws
689, 692 (effective January 1, 2007).
Since this Court’s adjudication is unfettered by the
Commission’s recommendations, the Court may remove a judge even
if the Commission has suggested a lesser sanction, such as
censure.  Hardy,  294 N.C. at 97-98, 240 S.E.2d at 373 (1978)
(holding that “G.S. 7A-376 and -377 authorize and empower the
Court . . . to make the final judgment whether to censure,
remove, remand for further proceedings or dismiss the
proceeding”).  Thus, this Court’s options in the instant case are
not constrained by the Commission’s recommendation.2  Having
reviewed and evaluated the record in this case in its entirety,
we conclude that respondent’s course of conduct is sufficiently
egregious to warrant measures stronger than the censure proposed
by the Commission.  
Respondent’s misconduct here is of a significantly
greater magnitude than that present in other recent cases where
we have held censure to be appropriate.  See, e.g., In re Hill,
357 N.C. 559, 591 S.E.2d 859 (2003) (censuring judge for verbally
abusing an attorney and for sexual comments and horseplay);  In
re Brown, 356 N.C. 278, 570 S.E.2d 102 (2002) (censuring judge
when on two occasions, the judge caused his signature to be
stamped on orders for which he did not ascertain the contents and
effect);  Stephenson, 354 N.C. 201, 552 S.E.2d 137 (2001)
(censure imposed when the judge solicited votes for his
reelection from the bench);  In re Brown, 351 N.C. 601, 527
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S.E.2d 651 (2000) (censure appropriate when the judge
consistently issued improper verdicts).  Here, respondent’s
conduct has crossed the threshold from conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, which would typically warrant a
censure, to willful misconduct. Willful misconduct is more
serious than conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
and thus merits greater sanctions. In re Royster, 361 N.C. 560,
563, 648 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2007) (citing Peoples, 296 N.C. at 157,
250 S.E.2d at 918 (1978)).
We have previously outlined what constitutes willful
misconduct in office:  
Willful misconduct in office
denotes “improper and wrong conduct
of a judge acting in his official
capacity done intentionally,
knowingly and, generally, in bad
faith. It is more than a mere error
of judgment or an act of
negligence. While the term would
encompass conduct involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty, or
corruption, these elements need not
necessarily be present.” 
In re Stuhl, 292 N.C. 379, 389, 233 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1977)
(citing In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976)); see also
Nowell, 293 N.C. at 248, 237 S.E.2d at 255.  In the instant case,
our attention is particularly drawn to respondent’s testimony
under oath regarding his attempts to procure a remittal of
disqualification with respect to attorney Dummit.  The Commission
found that respondent directed Dummit to prepare a remittal of
disqualification “disclosing the landlord-tenant relationship
existing between respondent and Mr. Dummit and deeming it
‘insubstantial and immaterial pursuant to the opinion rendered by
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the Judicial Standards Commission.’”  The Commission found that 
no such opinion had been rendered by the Commission or its
Executive Secretary, Mr. Ross.
In addition, although respondent testified under oath 
that he did not direct Dummit to prepare the remittal, plenary
evidence contradicted him.  Respondent’s own testimony indicated
that he communicated with Paul Ross of the Commission regarding
the remittal and yet it was Dummit who drafted the document.  We
also note that Tom Langan testified that he was present when
respondent told an associate from Dummit’s law firm to have
Dummit draft the remittal.
Further, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that
agreements to a remittal of disqualification be reached
independently of the judge’s participation.  Yet the Commission
found that respondent contacted Mr. Bowman on multiple occasions
in an effort to obtain his consent to the document.  The
Commission also found that respondent told Mr. Bowman that Paul
Ross had said that Bowman needed to sign the document and the
Commission’s investigation was over.  Neither of these statements
was true.  In addition, the Commission also determined that
respondent became angry and threatened Mr. Bowman upon his
refusal to sign the form.  The Commission made an explicit
determination that respondent’s “testimony concerning his
conversation at the bench with Mr. Bowman was not credible.”
This course of events is especially troubling because
respondent was under oath and sworn to tell the truth.  We
highlight, in this vein, at least three inappropriate actions by
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respondent: (1) his participation in the preparation of a
remittal of disqualification, despite provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct to the contrary;  (2) his untruthful statements
concerning the state of the investigation and the opinions
purportedly tendered by the Commission and Paul Ross;  and (3)
his pressure on Mr. Bowman to sign the remittal, using threats
and the power of his office. 
The last issue is of particular concern, since at the
time of the exchange, respondent was presiding over a courtroom. 
Ensconced on the bench and surrounded by the accouterments and
trappings of his office, the tenor of his demands carried an air
of menace which gave rise to the unavoidable inference that he
sought to use the powers of his position to obtain a personal
favor which was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority. 
The use of the office to threaten and coerce Mr. Bowman was
particularly inappropriate and is an issue of the gravest concern
for this Court.
We hold that these actions constitute an improper or
wrongful use of the power of his office acting intentionally or
with gross disregard for his conduct and in bad faith.  This
being so, we further hold that respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct.  See Stuhl, 292 N.C. at 389, 233 S.E.2d at 568. 
At a time when the requirements of the Rule of Law subject the
judiciary to intense and ever greater scrutiny by our citizens,
the demands of respondent’s judicial office required him to
comport himself with dignity, reserve, and probity.  The
integrity of the office requires that its holder project nothing
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less than the high standards of character and rectitude citizens
should expect from their judges.  Respondent has singularly
failed to live up to these standards.
Now, therefore, it is ordered by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in conference that respondent Mark H. Badgett be,
and is hereby, CENSURED and SUSPENDED from office as a Judge of
the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Judicial
District Seventeen-B, for SIXTY days from entry of this order for
conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(2), 3A(3), 3A(4),
and 3D of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute, willful misconduct, and
willful and persistent failure to perform his duties in violation
of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376.
By order of the Court in Conference, this 6th day of
March, 2008.                        
                            Hudson, J.
                            For the Court