Title: Ex Parte Clanahan
Citation: 72 So. 2d 833
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 1954

72 So. 2d 833 (1954)
Ex parte CLANAHAN et al.
2 Div. 332.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 20, 1954.
*834 Wilkinson &amp; Skinner, Birmingham, for petitioner.
Adams &amp; Gillmore, Grove Hill, McCorvey, Turner, Rogers, Johnstone &amp; Adams, Mobile and Grady W. Hurst, Jr., Chatom, for respondent.
STAKELY, Justice.
Judge Joe M. Pelham, Jr., is the presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of Choctaw County, in Equity. An original bill of complaint was filed in the aforesaid court on April 15, 1950, by C. B. Morgan, Blanche Morgan et al., against Ellen Nix Clanahan et al., and certain lands in Choctaw County, Alabama. Certain phases of this litigation were before the court when it rendered its decision in Ex parte Arrington, 259 Ala. 243, 66 So. 2d 96.
The petitioners in the present proceeding, who are respondents and cross complainants in the lower court, have filed an original application for mandamus in this court, in which they seek to have Judge Pelham certify his alleged disqualification to try the issues of the aforesaid cause. The present proceedings here are submitted on the petition for mandamus, a motion to strike certain allegations therein, a demurrer thereto and the answer of Judge Pelham.
C. B. Morgan and Blanche Morgan are residents of Choctaw County, Alabama. They claim to be in possession of and to own the surface and a mineral interest in 240 acres of land in Choctaw County, Alabama. The other complainants in the bill filed in the lower court, about thirty in number, claim that they own an interest in the minerals in the aforesaid lands, either a fee simple interest, a royalty interest or an oil and gas leasehold interest. All of the complainants in the original bill filed in the lower court are represented by Adams and Gillmore, Attorneys of Grove Hill, and Grady W. Hurst, Jr., an Attorney of Chatom, Alabama.
The bill of complaint is filed pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 32, § 1116 et seq., Title 7, Code of Alabama of 1940, and is a proceeding in rem to quiet title to the land described in the bill of complaint. The procedural requirements of the aforesaid statutes were followed in respect to the aforesaid cause. The bill of complaint seeks to quiet title against a considerable number of persons, who are alleged to claim some title to, interest in, lien or incumbrance upon the respondent land or any part thereof. It is alleged in the bill that one Daniel Nix died intestate in 1862 and that his heirs or devisees are unknown to complainants, except as set out in the bill of complaint. The petitioners before this court and who are respondents and cross complainants in the suit to quiet title in the lower court, are alleged to be the descendants of Daniel Nix.
On November 28, 1951, the respondents and cross complainants in the lower court filed a motion to require Judge Pelham to certify his disqualification to preside as Judge in the aforesaid cause, alleging the *835 following ground as the basis of the motion:
It was agreed between the parties in open court that the aforesaid motion should be submitted and considered on the motion and affidavit of R. R. Rhodes. No evidence in support of or against the motion, other than this affidavit, was presented to Judge Pelham. The affidavit of R. R. Rhodes is as follows:
On November 28, 1951, Judge Pelham made an order overruling the motion, holding that he was not disqualified to try the case.
As stated the cause is submitted here on a motion of the respondent Judge Pelham to strike certain allegations of the petition filed here on the theory that the allegations present matters which were not before Judge Pelham at the time he made his ruling in the lower court. We find it unnecessary, however, to consider this feature of the case because apart from the questions raised by the motion, we do not consider that Judge Pelham is disqualified to try the case.
It affirmatively appears from the record that Grady Hurst, Jr., is a son-in-law of Judge Pelham and one of the solicitors of record for the complainants in the lower court. The Magnolia Petroleum Company is one of many complainants in the bill of complaint. We do not appear to be concerned, however, with the status of the bill in respect to any of them, except Magnolia Petroleum Company. It seeks to have a decree of the court that the oil and gas leasehold estate in certain lands is vested in Magnolia Petroleum Company. An answer has been filed denying that Magnolia Petroleum Company has an oil and gas *836 lease interest in the land. It affirmatively appears from the record that Grady Hurst, Jr., is employed upon a per diem basis and the amount of his fee is in no manner contingent upon the successful outcome of the litigation. He will be paid the same amount whether complainants win or lose the lawsuit.
The mandatory grounds of disqualification set forth in the statute, to which we shall refer, are not exclusive so as to eliminate grounds for disqualification under the common law. Ex parte Benson, 254 Ala. 47, 47 So. 2d 180. Under the common law the mere fact that the trial judge is related to one of the attorneys does not disqualify the judge.
In Fulton v. Longshore, Probate Judge, 156 Ala. 611, 46 So. 989, 990, 19 L.R.A., N.S., 602, this court said:
In 30 Am.Jur. p. 782, § 73, it is observed:
See also 48 C.J.S, Judges, § 86, p. 1074.
Under the evidence it is clear that Judge Pelham has neither a pecuniary nor other personal interest in the result of the litigation. Ex parte State Bar Association, 92 Ala. 113, 8 So. 768, 12 L.R.A. 134; Bryce v. Burke, 172 Ala. 219, 55 So. 635; State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 660, 103 So. 835, 39 A.L.R. 1470; Medlin v. Taylor, 101 Ala. 239, 13 So. 310. The question then arises as to whether his relationship to Grady Hurst, Jr., is such as to disqualify him. The relationship is conceded but does Grady Hurst, Jr., have such an interest as to disqualify the Judge? As we shall see when we come to discuss the statute, Grady Hurst, Jr., does not have an interest in the result of the litigation. He may take pride in the successful outcome of the suit, but he has no interest in that which the suit concerns. Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, 228 Ala. 622, 154 So. 565. Certainly there is nothing in the situation under the common law which causes us to require the judge to disqualify himself for bias or prejudice, when he considers himself qualified to fulfill his oath of office.
This brings us to a consideration of the statute to which we have referred. Section 6, Title 13, Code of 1940, provides as follows:
Since it is conceded that Grady Hurst, Jr., is the son-in-law of Judge Pelham, the question for decision is whether Grady Hurst, Jr., is a party to the cause in the suit filed in the lower court within the meaning of § 6, Title 13, Code of 1940. The word "party" as set out in § 6, Title 13, Code of 1940, is not to be interpreted as referring exclusively to parties of record. Crook v. Newborg &amp; Son, 124 Ala. 479, 27 So. 432. That case, in construing § 2637 (now § 6, Title 13, Code of 1940), held that the fact that a surety on a bond of an administrator was related within the prohibited degree to the probate judge, disqualified the probate judge from holding a settlement of the administration. Accordingly we must consider the question as to whether Grady Hurst, Jr., is a party to the cause within the meaning of the aforesaid statute.
The question of who is a party within the meaning of such a statutory provision was considered in Yazoo &amp; M. V. R. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Miss. 41, 58 So. 710, 834, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 1172. The holding of that case is summarized in the second headnote as follows:
So we have the Mississippi Court construing its constitutional provision, which is practically the same as the Alabama statutory provision, so as to extend the meaning of the word "party" to an attorney within the prohibited degree of relationship, where his employment is on a contingent basis.
In Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 121 Miss. 510, 83 So. 676, 677, 11 A.L.R. 1321, § 995 of the 1906 Mississippi Code, which is substantially the same as the Alabama statute, was considered. The statute is as follows:
The Mississippi Court was considering whether the chancellor was disqualified because his first cousin was employed by the defendant on a contingent basis. The court held that the chancellor was not disqualified. It referred to the Kirk case, supra, and said:
In the aforesaid Georgia case, quoted with approval by the Mississippi case, it was further said:
The court in the Norwich case also observed:
In Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, 228 Ala. 622, 154 So. 565, 567, two firms of lawyers were employed by the plaintiff in a workman's compensation case. In one of the firms was a son of the judge. This court in referring to Young v. Harris, supra, and the Norwich case, supra, said:
In dealing with the same proposition this court in De Moville v. Merchants &amp; Farmers Bank of Greene County, 237 Ala. 347, 186 So. 704, 709, said:
At this point it is well to summarize by saying that to disqualify a judge for and on account of relationship, the relationship must be within the prohibited degree, the employment must be on a contingent basis, the fee must be a lien on the judgment or decree and the amount of the fee must be affected by the amount of the recovery. The amount of the fee to be paid Grady Hurst, Jr., is not on a contingent basis or in any way affected by the amount of the recovery. Does Grady Hurst, Jr., have a lien on the subject matter of the suit? Of course this question is corollary to the main question of whether or not Grady Hurst, Jr., is a "party" within the meaning of § 6, Title 13, Code of 1940.
It must be kept in mind that the only evidence in the case is the affidavit of R. R. Rhodes, which has been set out above. In determining the question, it is necessary to consider § 64, Title 46, Code of 1940. This is the statutory provision creating liens in favor of attorneys. Subsection 1 of this section, that is section 64, relates to a lien on papers or money of clients and is obviously not applicable to the question here under consideration. Subsection 2 of Section 64 is likewise not applicable because subsection 2 gives attorneys a lien upon *839 suits, judgments and decrees but only suits, judgments and decrees for money. We set out subsection 2 as follows:
It is clear that the suit in the lower court is not a suit for money. It is a suit to establish the title to lands which the complainants claim to be in possession of and to own or in which they have a specific interest.
It necessarily follows that if Grady Hurst, Jr., has a lien for his fee, it can only arise out of the provisions of subsection 3 of section 64 of Title 46, which gives an attorney a lien upon all suits for the recovery of land and personal property and upon all judgments or decrees for the recovery of the same. In Hale v. Tyson, 202 Ala. 107, 79 So. 499, 504, although decided before subsection 3 of section 64 appeared in its present form, it was said, "The statutory system now prevails in Alabama, and the attorney's lien is fixed and governed thereby." We set out subsection 3 as follows:
In the case of Owens v. Bolt, 218 Ala. 344, 118 So. 590, 593, Mr. Justice Bouldin noted the distinction between subsections 2 and 3 as follows:
In the case of King v. Acuff, 218 Ala. 619, 119 So. 833, this court held that subsection 3 must not be extended beyond the fair intendment of the statute. In that case the attorney for the plaintiff claimed a lien on the land in a suit filed to quiet title and to clear up all doubts or disputes concerning the same. The court held there was no lien on the land in favor of plaintiff's attorney. In this connection it said:
So, it appears that in the foregoing suit to quiet title this court held that the attorney has no lien for his fee.
In King v. Acuff, supra, the suit was brought under what are known as the in personam statutes to quiet title. § 1109 et seq., Title 7, Code of 1940. Is there any difference in the question under consideration in this case between the statutes providing for proceedings in personam to quiet title to land and the statutes providing for proceedings in rem to quiet title to land? We think not. In the case before us there is no allegation in the original *840 bill that the respondents are in possession of the land. On the contrary it is alleged that C. B. Morgan and Blanche Morgan are in the actual, peaceable possession of the respondent land, holding such possession in recognition of the outstanding title and interest in and to the oil, gas and mineral title in and to the respondent land as tabulated in the bill. This tabulation includes the leasehold interest of the Magnolia Petroleum Corporation referred to in the affidavit of R. R. Rhodes. The bill in the present case is accordingly not a bill to recover land but is simply a suit to quiet title to lands and to clear up disputes regarding such title. Miller v. Gaston, 212 Ala. 519, 102 So. 541. It therefore appears that not having a lien for his fee on the land for his services in the suit, Grady Hurst, Jr., is not a party to the cause within the meaning of the statute.
But it is argued that the respondents have filed a cross bill in which they seek to sell the land for division among the alleged joint owners. The cross bill had not been filed when Judge Pelham made his ruling, but it is not necessary to predicate our opinion on this situation. The cross bill cannot serve to give Grady Hurst, Jr. such an interest in the suit as shall disqualify Judge Pelham under § 6, Title 13, Code of 1940. It cannot serve to create a lien in his favor under § 64, Title 46, Code of 1940. The petitioner's cross bill for sale for division is not a suit by the complainants filed by their attorney Grady Hurst, Jr. for money or for the recovery of real or personal property. The Alabama statute does not give attorneys for defense a lien. It is well to note that the Alabama statute is copied from the Georgia statute and subdivision 5 of the Georgia statute, which purports to give liens to attorneys for defense, is omitted from the Alabama statute. If the legislature had intended that attorneys for the defense be given a lien, then certainly they would have included the omitted subdivision 5 of the Georgia statute. In King v. Acuff, supra, this court said:
To sum up the situation, Grady Hurst, Jr. is not employed on a contingent basis, the amount of his fee is not dependent upon the result of the litigation, he does not have a lien by virtue of the statute and his relationship to Judge Pelham, therefore, does not disqualify Judge Pelham.
Attorneys for Judge Pelham argue that under the proceedings in the present case Judge Pelham could in no event be disqualified, because if there was any right to such disqualification it was waived by the failure to insist upon the right until after certain proceedings had been taken in the case. This court has held that disqualification of a trial judge may be waived. Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, supra. In view of our holding in the case, however, we find it unnecessary to consider this contention.
It results that mandamus will be denied.
Mandamus denied.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.