Title: State v. Seward
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 104098
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 22, 2013

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,098 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ROY SEWARD, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
In this case, a defendant's case-specific proportionality challenge does not 
demonstrate that his Jessica's Law hard 25 life sentences for rape and aggravated criminal 
sodomy violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or § 9 of the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
2.  
 
A defendant sentenced for an off-grid crime is ineligible for lifetime postrelease 
supervision and is subject only to parole instead.  
 
Appeal from Saline District Court; RENE S. YOUNG, judge. Opinion filed March 22, 2013. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.   
 
Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Christina Trocheck, assistant county attorney, Ellen Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.   
 
2 
 
 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  Defendant Roy Seward appeals his sentences following his guilty pleas 
to one count of rape and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy for acts committed 
against his stepdaughter. The district court judge sentenced Seward to concurrent hard 25 
life sentences under Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(B) and (D) (now K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 21-6627), and to lifetime postrelease supervision. 
 
 
Seward argues that his hard 25 life sentences are disproportionate and violative of 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Bill of Rights of 
the Kansas Constitution. Both of these challenges are case specific. We reject them. 
Seward does not pursue an Eighth Amendment categorical challenge to his sentences on 
this appeal, and thus any such earlier challenge is deemed abandoned. In addition, we 
note that the district court judge erred in ordering lifetime postrelease supervision, and we 
vacate that portion of her sentencing pronouncement. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Seward originally was charged with two counts of rape and six counts of 
aggravated criminal sodomy based on allegations made by his then 11-year-old 
stepdaughter, R.T. She told investigators that Seward had touched his "private" to her 
"private" and that he had "put it in." She said this happened more than once but less than 
five times. R.T. also said that Seward put his "private" inside her "buttocks" on several 
occasions and that "it hurt." When asked if Seward made her touch him, R.T. nodded her 
head and said that "he made me suck on it," referring to Seward's "private" area. R.T. 
thought this conduct occurred once a week for several weeks. She also said that Seward 
licked her "private" about three times. According to R.T., Seward showed her a movie on 
his computer of people "doing it," and the investigator confirmed with R.T. that people 
3 
 
 
 
were having sex in the movie. R.T. also told investigators that Seward told her not to tell 
anyone. A sexual assault examination of R.T. revealed a healed injury to her hymen. 
  
 
In exchange for Seward's guilty pleas to one count of rape and one count of 
aggravated criminal sodomy, the State dropped the remaining charges.  
 
 
Before sentencing, Seward filed a departure motion in which he argued, inter alia, 
that "[t]he life imprisonment sentence provided for by 'Jessica's Law,' K.S.A. 21-4643, is 
disproportionate and cruel and unusual under the state and federal constitutions." At 
Seward's sentencing hearing, defense counsel made a brief reference to the alleged 
unconstitutionality of Jessica's Law. The district judge did not address Seward's 
constitutional arguments, denied the departure motion, and sentenced Seward to two 
concurrent hard 25 life sentences and lifetime postrelease supervision. On Seward's 
appeal, we remanded the case so that the district judge could enter "sufficient factual 
findings and conclusions of law" on Seward's constitutional claims. State v. Seward, 289 
Kan. 715, 721, 271 P.3d 443 (2009).  
  
 
In his brief submitted to the district judge before the hearing on remand, Seward 
argued that the district judge should consider that Seward had been a victim of childhood 
physical and sexual abuse himself; that both he and his mother suffer from bipolar 
disorders; that he spent 5 years of his youth in a boys' home; that he dropped out of high 
school in the 10th grade; that he has low intelligence; that his guilty pleas saved the 
victim from the trauma of testifying at trial; that he expressed remorse; that he had no 
history of violent or sexual misbehavior; and that a psychological evaluation indicated he 
had a low risk of recidivism. Seward also provided a comparison of sentences in this and 
other jurisdictions.   
 
4 
 
 
 
 
The district judge determined that the imposition of two hard 25 life sentences was 
not disproportionate to the offenses committed and thus did not constitute cruel and/or 
unusual punishment. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Standards of Review 
 
 
When considering a case-specific disproportionality challenge to a sentence under 
the Eighth Amendment and § 9, a district judge must make factual findings and draw 
conclusions of law. See State v. Woodard, 294 Kan. 717, 720, 280 P.3d 203 (2012) 
(citing State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 160-161, 194 P.3d 1195 [2008]). "These 
inquiries invoke a bifurcated standard of review: without reweighing the evidence, the 
appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the district court's findings under a 
substantial competent evidence standard, and the district court's ultimate legal conclusion 
drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. [Citations omitted.]" Woodard, 294 Kan. at 
720. 
 
 
In addition, a statute is presumed constitutional, and all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of its validity. State v. Britt, 295 Kan. 1018, Syl. ¶ 13, 287 P.3d 905 (2012); 
Woodard, 294 Kan. at 720. "If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as 
constitutionally valid, the court has the authority and the duty to do so." Britt, 295 Kan. 
1018, Syl. ¶ 13.   
 
Section 9 Analytical Framework 
 
 
Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides: 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
"All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, 
where proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted." Kan. Const. Bill of 
Rights, § 9. 
 
 
"Under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, a punishment may be 
constitutionally impermissible, although not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so 
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity." State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 9, 
235 P.3d 1203 (2010). Whether a sentence is "cruel or unusual" under § 9 because of its 
length is controlled by a three-part test, first outlined in State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 
367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978). This three-part test weighs the following:  
 
 
"(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be 
examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this 
inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the 
extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the 
prescribed punishment; 
 
 
"(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this 
jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes 
punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent 
suspect; and 
 
 
"(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the 
same offense." 223 Kan. at 367. 
 
No single factor under the Freeman test controls the outcome. State v. Berriozabal, 291 
Kan. 568, 591, 243 P.3d 352 (2010); State v. Mondragon, 289 Kan. 1158, 1163, 220 P.3d 
369 (2009).  
6 
 
 
 
 
Eighth Amendment Analytical Framework 
 
 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." It has been extended to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
667, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962). 
 
 
In Gomez, this court outlined the framework for Eighth Amendment 
disproportionality challenges in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) 
(holding that the concept of proportionality is central to an Eighth Amendment analysis 
of cruel and unusual punishment). Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 862-66. In its discussion of 
Graham, this court explained that the United States Supreme Court recognizes two 
general classifications of Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual" challenges:  (1) case-
specific and (2) categorical. Gomez, 290 Kan. at 863-64.  
 
 
A case-specific claim challenges the length of a term-of-years sentence, given all 
of the relevant circumstances in a particular case. Gomez, 290 Kan. at 863-64. The 
second classification, a categorical challenge, requires the court to implement the 
proportionality standard according to certain categorical restrictions, a classification that 
had historically been reserved for death penalty cases. Gomez, 290 Kan. at 864. The 
"Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require strict 
proportionality between a crime and a sentence; rather, it forbids only an extreme 
sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime." (Emphasis added.) Woodard, 294 
Kan. at 721 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-21, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L. Ed. 
2d 108 [2003]).   
7 
 
 
 
 
The analytical steps for a case-specific challenge, according to Gomez, are as 
follows: 
 
"[A] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the 
sentence. This analysis can consider a particular offender's mental state and motive in 
committing the crime, the actual harm caused to the victim or to society by the offender's 
conduct, any prior criminal history, and a particular offender's propensity for violence. In 
the rare case in which this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality, the court should then compare the [offender's] sentence with the 
sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences 
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. If this comparative analysis validates 
an initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and 
unusual." Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 5. 
 
The first comparison in a case-specific challenge under the Eighth Amendment, 
juxtaposing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence, is a threshold 
determination. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 5. Only in the rare case when this threshold 
comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality does this court move on and 
consider the defendant's sentence against sentences received by other offenders in the 
same jurisdiction and sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 5. 
 
 
Gomez also set out the following steps for a categorical proportionality challenge: 
 
"In considering a categorical challenge, a court first considers objective indicia of 
society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine 
whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Next, 
guided by the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the court's own 
understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and 
8 
 
 
 
purpose, the court must determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment 
whether the punishment in question violates the United States Constitution. The judicial 
exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the category 
of offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of 
the punishment in question. In this inquiry the court also considers whether the 
challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals of retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation." Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 7.   
 
 
Although Seward has abandoned any categorical challenge to his sentence in this 
case, we pause here to clarify our earlier decision in Woodard, whose language could be 
read to conflate the classifications of Eighth Amendment challenges with the step-by-step 
comparisons necessary to a case-specific challenge. 294 Kan. at 721-22. This clarification 
will be of some assistance in resolving this case and will facilitate resolution in future 
cases. 
 
 
The Woodard opinion stated that the first comparison under an Eighth 
Amendment case-specific challenge, i.e., comparing the gravity of the offense and the 
severity of the sentence, is a threshold determination. But the opinion then stated:    
 
 
"Under the first classification, which is a threshold determination, this court is 
asked to determine whether Woodard's sentence is grossly disproportionate given the 
circumstances of his case.   
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"We conclude that Woodard's sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the 
crimes. We therefore do not proceed to the second classification for comparisons under 
Eighth Amendment analysis. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)." (Emphasis added.) Woodard, 294 P.3d at 21-22.  
 
9 
 
 
 
 
The first classification, i.e., a case-specific challenge, is not a threshold 
determination. Our statement in Woodard appears to suggest that, had a claim-specific 
challenge been successful, the court would have moved on to a categorical analysis. This 
is misleading; case-specific and categorical challenges are analytically independent of 
each other. See Berriozabal, 291 Kan. at 594 (remanding so defendant could articulate 
the specific grounds for his Eighth Amendment challenge:  "a case-specific 
proportionality challenge, a categorical challenge, or both"). The defendant in Woodard 
did not raise a categorical challenge; he argued only that his sentence was "cruel and/or 
unusual punishment under the facts of his crimes." Woodard, 294 Kan. at 719.  
 
 
The Woodard opinion later reads:  "The analysis of [the first Freeman] prong 
closely tracks the analysis of the first classification under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution." (Emphasis added.) Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723. More clearly 
stated, the first prong of the Freeman test closely tracks the first comparison under an 
Eighth Amendment claim-specific challenge. Or, as this court explained in State v. Ross, 
295 Kan. 424, 429, 284 P.3d 309 (2012):  "Our analysis under the Freeman factors for 
the Kansas constitutional challenge applies with equal force to the first of the 
classifications for an Eighth Amendment challenge." 
 
 
Later in the Woodard opinion, after addressing the first prong of the Freeman test, 
the court concluded that the defendant's sentence did not violate § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights. Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723. But, again, the first prong of the 
Freeman test is not a threshold determination. See State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 924-
25, 281 P.3d 153 (2012); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 ("Ultimately, one 
consideration may weigh so heavily that it directs the final conclusion. Before that 
conclusion is reached, however, consideration should be given to each prong of the 
test."). The Woodard opinion did consider the two additional prongs of the Freeman test, 
10 
 
 
 
but the apparent finality of the court's conclusion after analyzing the first prong could be 
viewed as inconsistent with the correct holistic approach.   
 
Application of the § 9 Framework to Seward's Case 
 
 
The first prong of the Freeman three-part test requires this court to consider the 
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Britt, 295 Kan. at 1033.  
 
 
Here, the district judge made several factual findings that favored imposition of 
the hard 25 sentences under the first prong of Freeman:  Seward held a position of 
authority and trust over R.T. and told her not to tell anyone about the abuse. He caused 
her physical pain and injury; and rape and aggravated criminal sodomy are violent 
offenses. See K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(2)(A), (E). The district judge also considered R.T.'s age 
at the time of abuse—between 8 and 10—and the fact that Seward had showed her a 
pornographic movie. 
 
 
Regarding the degree of violence attendant to the offenses, Seward argues that the 
"State did not present evidence that [he] used a weapon to commit the crimes, that he 
kidnapped or otherwise terrorized R.T." But this argument does not undercut the sexual 
violence of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. Simply because Seward could have 
committed these acts more violently does not mean they are not violent in their most 
basic form, particularly when committed against an especially vulnerable victim. 
 
 
Seward also argues that his childhood physical and sexual victimization, his 
abandonment by his family, his lack of criminal history, his desire to seek treatment, and 
his low risk to reoffend weighed in his favor on the first prong of § 9 disproportionality 
analysis under Freeman. But the district judge stated during the remand hearing that 
11 
 
 
 
Seward's "troubled childhood" increased the likelihood that he would reoffend, and she 
noted that Seward had not sought treatment on his own. 
 
 
In particular, we note that, during a sex offender evaluation conducted as part of 
Seward's presentence investigation, he "denied having sexual intercourse with the victim" 
and "minimize[d] both the frequency of his sexual offending as well as the sexual acts 
that were allegedly performed." This reaction to his crimes does not bode well for 
Seward's ability to conduct himself appropriately in the future. The legislative intent 
behind Jessica's Law was to remove perpetrators of sexual crimes against children from 
society. State v. Spencer, 291 Kan. 796, 823-24, 248 P.3d 256 (2011). Because of high 
rates of recidivism among such offenders, the State "has a particularly compelling interest 
in using incarceration as a means of protecting its youth." Woodard, 294 Kan. at 722.  
 
 
Our review of the record reveals substantial competent evidence supporting the 
district court's factual findings relevant to the first prong of Freeman. And these facts, in 
turn, support the conclusion that Seward's sentences are not so disproportionate to his 
crimes that they "shock[] the conscience and offend[] fundamental notions of human 
dignity." Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 9.  
 
 
Under the second prong of the Freeman analysis, this court compares Seward's 
sentence for rape and aggravated criminal sodomy with the penalties imposed for "more 
serious crimes" in Kansas. See Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367. 
 
 
Seward argues that he "would have been 'better off,' from a sentencing 
perspective, had he murdered R.T." He further argues that "he would have been 'better 
off' even if he had committed the current crimes, but had then murdered [R.T.] before she 
disclosed them." Seward asserts that his sex crimes cannot be punished more severely 
than certain homicides. 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
This court considered the same arguments in Woodard, where the defendant had 
been convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child: 
 
 
"This argument suffers from several flaws. In the first place, it assumes that 
murderers necessarily receive more lenient sentences in Kansas than violators of Jessica's 
Law. This is not the case. In fact, the Kansas Criminal Code sets out a list of 
transgressions that constitute capital murder, which is an off-grid offense. K.S.A. 21-
3439. Capital murder is subject to punishment by death. K.S.A. 21-4624. The penalty for 
homicide in Kansas may thus be much more severe than the penalties under Jessica's 
Law. See K.S.A. 21-4638; K.S.A. 21-4643. The fact that the penalty for certain 
categories of homicide may be less severe than the penalties for other, nonhomicide 
crimes does not automatically render the penalties for the nonhomicide crimes 
unconstitutional. There is no strict linear order of criminal activity that ranks all 
homicides as the most serious crimes and all nonhomicide crimes as less serious, with the 
corresponding penalties necessarily ranking in diminishing durations of imprisonment. 
 
"Furthermore, as the State points out, Jessica's Law is not the only Kansas statute 
that provides for more severe penalties for nonhomicide crimes than for certain categories 
of homicide. Compare, e.g., rape, K.S.A. 21-3502, and aggravated kidnapping, K.S.A. 
21-3420, which are severity level 1 offenses, with reckless second-degree murder, K.S.A. 
21-3402(b), which is a severity level 2 offense." Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723-24. 
 
 
In Woodard, we concluded that the Jessica's Law penalty for aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child was not disproportionately harsh when compared with the 
punishments imposed for other offenses in Kansas. Woodard, 294 Kan. at 724. This holds 
true for the rape and aggravated criminal sodomy for which Seward pleaded guilty; both 
of these crimes are at least as serious as aggravated indecent liberties. 
  
 
Also on the second Freeman prong, Seward also asks this court to consider the 
2008 and 2009 Kansas Sentencing Commission Proportionality Subcommittee's Report 
13 
 
 
 
on Proposed Improvements and Modifications to Kansas Sentencing Laws. But our 
review of the report reveals nothing to suggest that Seward's sentence is 
disproportionately harsh when compared with other Kansas sentences. Moreover, the 
Kansas Sentencing Commission "consult[s] with and advise[s] the legislature." K.S.A. 
2012 Supp. 74-9101(b)(2). When the legislature fails to adopt a recommendation of the 
Sentencing Commission, it is not for this court to evaluate or criticize. See Woodard, 294 
Kan. at 726 ("[T]he choice of how this State should best respond to criminal conduct is a 
legislative, not a judicial, decision."). 
 
 
Moving to the third prong of the Freeman test, this court compares the penalty 
under Jessica's Law for rape and aggravated criminal sodomy with the penalties for the 
same offenses in other jurisdictions. Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367. 
 
 
At this point, another brief clarification of Woodard is in order. In that case, we 
compared the Jessica's Law penalty for aggravated indecent liberties with a child to 
penalties in other jurisdictions for "similar" offenses rather than the "same" offense. See 
Woodard, 294 Kan. at 725 (citing, e.g., State v. Berniard, 860 So. 2d 66 [La. App. 2003] 
[aggravated rape of adult woman]; comparing penalties for convictions of capital sexual 
battery, sodomy, rape, aggravated rape, and sexual intercourse without consent); see also 
Britt, 295 Kan. at 1035 (relying on Woodard for "similar crimes" standard). This apparent 
broadening of the Freeman requirement of a comparison to other jurisdictions' penalties 
for the "same" offense was not intended, and any drift toward it stops here. See Freeman, 
223 Kan. at 367 (third prong requires comparison to penalties for "same" crime). 
 
 
Seward provides an extensive summary of sentences in other jurisdictions and 
concludes that "the vast majority of states have less severe 'Jessica's Law' provisions than 
does Kansas." He asserts that the Kansas version of Jessica's Law is one of the "harshest 
such laws in the nation," relying principally on the fact that Kansas imposes a mandatory 
14 
 
 
 
life sentence without the possibility for parole for 25 years. Seward does not, however, 
argue specifically that rape and aggravated criminal sodomy committed by an adult 
against a child younger than 14—or the conduct underlying such charges—are handled 
differently in other jurisdictions.   
 
 
The State, for its part, responds that "several of the states" have imposed 
maximum sentences, e.g., 100 years, that are "functionally the equivalent to the statute in 
Kansas." The State does not favor the court with any citations to authority.   
 
 
This court has already examined and rejected Seward's broad-brush attack on the 
entire Kansas Jessica's Law sentencing scheme. In Woodard, we concluded that it was 
"not out of line with other jurisdictions." Woodard, 294 Kan. at 725. Indeed, we note now 
that, by Seward's own count, there are 33 jurisdictions in which a life sentence may be 
imposed for violations of Jessica's Law-type crimes; and Kansas is not the only state 
requiring a mandatory minimum of actual time served for the specific conduct Seward 
committed. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705 (2009) (no parole for 35 years for sexual 
conduct with minor under 13 years old; sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.366 (West 2007) (no parole for 35 years for sexual assault against 
minor under 16 years old; sexual penetration, oral sexual conduct); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2907.02(A)(1) and (B) (West 2008) (no parole for 25 years for rape of minor under 13 
years old; sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:42 
(West 2006) (no parole for aggravated rape; anal, oral, vaginal sexual intercourse). In 
addition, in Montana, where the crimes at issue here are defined as incest, courts impose 
an automatic 100 years imprisonment without the possibility for parole for 25 years. 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-507 (2007). Although medical science continues to advance and 
to lengthen human life, 100 years obviously is still every bit as long as a life sentence for 
all but the extraordinarily hardy offender.  
 
15 
 
 
 
 
We conclude that Kansas does not have the harshest penalties in the nation for the 
crimes of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy committed by an adult against a child 
younger than 14. Seward's challenge fails to meet the third prong of Freeman as well. 
 
 
Because none of the three steps of the Freeman analysis favors a conclusion that 
Seward's sentences violate § 9, his case-specific challenge to his life sentences under this 
state constitutional provision fails.  
 
Application of the Eighth Amendment Case-Specific Framework to Seward's Case 
 
 
Seward combines his § 9 and case-specific Eighth Amendment challenges and 
suggests that their analyses are "virtually identical." As mentioned, we have 
acknowledged that analysis of a § 9 challenge under the Freeman factors "applies with 
equal force" to a case-specific Eighth Amendment challenge. State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 424, 
429, 284 P.3d 309 (2012); Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723; see also State v. Mossman, 294 
Kan. at 922-23 (court proceeds with analysis of Eighth Amendment case-specific 
challenge even though district judge's factual findings made in context of state 
constitutional challenge). 
 
 
In this case, the district judge understood that her task was to "make specific 
findings pursuant to State v[]. Freeman," but she also concluded that Seward's sentences 
did not violate the Eighth Amendment. This superficial disconnect does not give us 
pause, given (1) the similarity between the factors to be evaluated under Freeman and 
those to be evaluated when a case-specific Eighth Amendment challenge is made, and (2) 
Seward's abandonment of any Eighth Amendment categorical challenge. 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
On his Eighth Amendment case-specific challenge Seward urges us to focus on the 
particular facts in the record, but they do not persuade us that he meets his threshold 
burden of demonstrating that his sentences are grossly disproportionate to his crimes. 
 
 
Our decision in Woodard is instructive. In that case, we held that defendant Philip 
Woodard's three hard 25 life sentences under Jessica's Law for aggravated indecent 
liberties with his twin stepchildren were not grossly disproportionate to his crimes. 294 
Kan. at 722. The aggravated indecent liberties charges stemmed from his lewd fondling 
or touching of the children over the course of 5 years. The children were approximately 7 
years old when the activity began. 294 Kan. at 719. 
 
 
As mentioned before, Seward's crimes and the activity that gave rise to his 
convictions are at least as serious as those before us in Woodard. His victim's age was 
similar to the victims' ages in Woodard, and the total duration of the abuse was 
comparable. But rape and aggravated criminal sodomy are substantially more invasive 
than lewd fondling and can cause greater physical injury. See State v. Gideon, 257 Kan. 
591, 614, 894 P.2d 850 (1995) (rape, aggravated criminal sodomy extremely invasive). In 
fact, there was evidence of physical pain and injury to Seward's stepdaughter in this case. 
 
 
Because a threshold comparison of Seward's crimes and sentences does not lead to 
an inference of gross disproportionality, we do not address the remaining elements of an 
Eighth Amendment case-specific analysis. See Mossman, 294 Kan. at 925. 
 
Lifetime Postrelease Supervision 
 
 
Finally, we note that the district judge erred by sentencing Seward to lifetime 
postrelease supervision rather than making him subject only to parole. This portion of 
Seward's sentence is illegal, see State v. Cash, 293 Kan. 326, Syl. ¶ 2, 263 P.3d 786 
17 
 
 
 
(2011) (inmate with off-grid indeterminate life sentence can leave prison only if 
successor to Kansas Parole Board grants parole; sentencing court has no authority to 
order term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with off-grid indeterminate life 
sentence); and it may be corrected by us sua sponte at any time. See K.S.A. 22-3504; 
State v. Gilliland, 294 Kan. 519, 552, 276 P.3d 165 (2012). We therefore vacate the 
lifetime postrelease supervision portion of the district judge's sentencing pronouncement. 
See State v. Summers, 293 Kan. 819, 832, 272 P.3d 1 (2012) (postrelease vacated in 
similar circumstances).   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Because defendant Roy Seward's Jessica's Law hard 25 life sentences for rape and 
aggravated indecent liberties are not disproportionate to his crime under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or § 9 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas 
Constitution, these sentences are affirmed. Seward is, however, entitled to vacation of the 
postrelease supervision term ordered by the district judge.    
 
 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.