Title: Ex parte John Swain.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1140208
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 2015

REL: 02/06/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
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Ex parte John Swain
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: John Swain
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-11-1661;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-12-1389)
STUART, Justice.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
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Bolin, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Parker and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
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MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Because I would grant John Swain's petition for a writ of
certiorari, I respectfully dissent from this Court's 
denial 
of
the petition.
When a babysitter discovered a seven-year-old girl
inappropriately touching the babysitter's two-year-old son,
she confronted the seven-year-old, who told the babysitter
that she had learned the behavior from Swain, who was then
living with the girl's mother. Swain was 
subsequently 
indicted
for sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years old, a Class B
felony. A hung jury resulted in a mistrial. At a second trial,
Swain, representing himself pro se, was convicted and was
sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. See Swain v. State, [Ms.
CR-12-1389, Sept. 5, 2014] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2014). After his conviction, but before sentencing, Swain
filed a pro se motion entitled "Motion for Appointment of
Counsel on Appeal" in which he requested that appellate
counsel be appointed and explained that he did not have the
experience to file an appellate brief.
Rule 6.1(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that a defendant
may waive the right to counsel "after the court has
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ascertained that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily desires to forgo that right." Additionally, if a
defendant refuses counsel, "the court shall inform the
defendant that the waiver may be withdrawn and counsel
appointed or retained at any stage of the proceedings." Id.
(emphasis added). Although the trial court conducted a waiver
colloquy respecting Swain's right to represent himself and
also warned Swain of the hazards of representing himself, the
trial court did not inform Swain, as Rule 6.1(b) requires,
that he could withdraw his waiver of counsel at any time.
"Even if a defendant requests to represent himself or herself
and the trial court permits the defendant to do so, the trial
court's failure to comply with Rule 6.1(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.,
is grounds for reversal." Presley v. City of Attalla, 88 So.
3d 930, 934 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
Under 
the 
totality-of-the-circumstances 
test, 
however, 
an
appellate court may conclude that the defendant was aware of
the right to withdraw a waiver of counsel, if the record so
discloses, even though the trial judge did not so inform the
defendant. See Powers v. State, 38 So. 3d 764 (Ala. Crim. App.
2009) (noting that defendants who asked to withdraw their
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waiver of counsel on the first day of trial were obviously
aware of the right). In this case, the record does not
disclose that Swain was aware, during trial, of his right to
withdraw the waiver of counsel at any time. The Court of
Criminal Appeals relied on Swain's motion for appointment of
appellate counsel as evidence that he knew he could withdraw
his waiver during the trial. However, that request is not
probative of whether Swain was aware that he could withdraw
his waiver during the trial itself. Indeed, given that Swain
had a vested right under Rule 6.1(b) to withdraw his waiver
and to have counsel appointed, his submission of a motion to
appoint counsel is evidence, if anything, that he was not
aware of his right to withdraw the waiver during the trial. 
Because the record contains no persuasive evidence that
Swain was aware that he could withdraw his waiver of counsel
during trial, I believe his petition has merit and his Sixth
Amendment claim validity. As Judge Joiner stated in dissent
below: "Because the record on appeal does not demonstrate that
Swain was either advised or otherwise aware of his right to
withdraw his waiver of counsel, I would reverse the circuit
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court's judgment and remand this case for a new trial." Swain
v. State, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Joiner, J., dissenting).
Accordingly I respectfully dissent from the denial of
Swain's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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