Title: Fields v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 53, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 28, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DOUGLAS W. FIELDS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 053, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN03-08-0207; 0208; 
§                                    0210; 0210; 
§                                    0211; 1811 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 9, 2005 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: November 28, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of November 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Douglas W. Fields, was found guilty 
by a Superior Court jury of the lesser-included charge of Assault in the First 
Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 
Burglary in the Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person 
Prohibited, and Resisting Arrest.  He was sentenced as an habitual offender 
 
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to a total of 64 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 61 years 
for probation.  This is Fields’ direct appeal.1 
 
(2) 
Fields raises seven issues for this Court’s consideration, which 
may fairly be summarized as follows.  He claims that: a) he should not have 
been sentenced as a habitual offender because there was no hearing to 
determine his status as a habitual offender; b) there was insufficient evidence 
to support his firearm and burglary convictions; c) he was denied his right to 
a trial by a jury of his peers; d) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
leading the witnesses, misstating the evidence in closing argument, 
introducing false evidence and engaging in unprofessional conduct; and e) 
the jury should not have been instructed on first degree assault as a lesser-
included offense of first degree attempted murder.   
 
(3) 
The evidence presented at trial was as follows.  At 
approximately 10:30 a.m. on Sunday, July 13, 2003, William Brown was 
riding a bicycle along East 23rd Street in Wilmington, Delaware.  Two 
women, Neshe Jones and Vanessa Newman, stopped him and began arguing 
with him over ownership of the bicycle.  Newman eventually went to her 
mother’s house, which was nearby, but Jones continued to argue with 
                                                 
1 On January 10, 2005, following an evidentiary hearing in the Superior Court, this Court 
granted Fields’ motion to proceed pro se in his direct appeal.  Supr. Ct. R. 26(d) (3). 
 
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Brown.  The argument escalated, with Jones throwing a bottle at Brown and 
Brown throwing one at Jones. 
 
(4) 
Without warning, a man, later identified as Fields, emerged 
from the residence at 3 East 23rd Street, took a handgun out of a bag he was 
carrying, walked up to Brown and started shooting.  He shot Brown twice in 
the leg and then, as Brown lay on the ground, shot him a third time in the 
lower back.  Fields was identified as the shooter by neighborhood residents 
William Caudle and Robert Jones.   
 
(5) 
  City of Wilmington police were patrolling the neighborhood 
in a marked police car at the time of the shooting.  As the police approached 
the scene, Brown told them he had been shot by Fields, who by then was 
running back into the residence at 3 East 23rd Street.  As Officer Michael 
Carnevale chased Fields into the house, Fields fled out the back.  Officer 
Robert Cassidy ran to the back of the house and saw Fields running through 
the back yards down the street.  Officer Carnevale began running parallel to 
23rd Street to try to intercept Fields.  Fields turned into an alley and back out 
onto 23rd Street.  He then ran into the residence at 22 East 23rd Street with 
Officer Carnevale behind him.  Officer Carnevale captured Fields as he 
attempted to open a locked back door, to exit from the kitchen.  Vanessa 
 
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Newman testified at trial that she and her mother lived at that address and 
that Fields entered her house without her permission.     
 
(6) 
A later search by City of Wilmington police of the portion of 
East 23rd Street where Fields was running yielded a black knit hat containing 
a .38 revolver with black electrical tape around the handle.  The gun 
contained three casings and three live rounds, indicating that three shots had 
been fired.  Police were unable to obtain any fingerprints from the gun.  
 
(7) 
Both during and after jury deliberations, the prosecutor 
informed the Superior Court and defense counsel that he intended to file a 
motion to have Fields declared an habitual offender.  Defense counsel 
discussed this issue with Fields.  After the jury’s verdict, defense counsel 
informed the trial judge in the presence of Fields that “we have reviewed the 
three certified copies of Mr. Fields’ record” and that “[a]s far as the issue of 
does he qualify as an habitual offender, under (a) section, there will be no 
argument about that, no contest about that.”  Later, at sentencing, the trial 
judge noted that defense counsel had sent a letter in response to the State’s 
habitual offender motion conceding that the facts recited in the motion were 
correct.  Neither Fields nor his counsel voiced any objection to his status as 
an habitual offender and the judge proceeded to sentence Fields accordingly.     
 
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(8) 
Fields’ first claim is that, because there was no hearing to 
determine his status as an habitual offender, he had no notice that he would 
be sentenced as one.  To the contrary, the record reflects that Fields had 
actual notice of the State’s intention to move to have him declared a habitual 
offender.  Moreover, the factual basis for the State’s habitual offender 
motion was conceded by the defense at the time of sentencing.  Based upon 
the concessions made by defense counsel, there was no need for a hearing to 
determine Fields’ status as an habitual offender and the judge properly 
proceeded to the sentencing phase of the hearing.  Fields’ first claim is, thus, 
without merit. 
 
(9) 
Fields’ second claim is that there was insufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support his burglary and firearm convictions.  Because 
Fields did not move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s 
evidence,2 our standard of review is plain error.3  In reviewing a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.4  In doing so, we make no distinction between direct and 
                                                 
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 29. 
3 Liket v. State, 719 A.2d 935, 939 (Del. 1998). 
4 Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 618 (Del. 1997). 
 
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circumstantial evidence.5  Moreover, it is for the jury to weigh the relative 
credibility of the witnesses and reconcile any conflicting testimony.6   
 
(10) The trial transcript reflects that Fields stipulated to the fact that 
he was guilty of the charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon By a Person 
Prohibited.7  The trial transcript also reflects that more than sufficient 
evidence was presented to support Fields’ convictions of Burglary in the 
Second Degree8 and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony9.  We, thus, find no plain error and no merit to this claim. 
 
(11) Fields’ next claim is that he was denied his right to trial by a 
jury of his peers because there were no African Americans on the jury panel 
and no individuals approximately the same age as he.  As the appellant, it 
was Fields’ burden to provide those portions of the transcript necessary to 
give this Court a fair and accurate account of the context in which the claim 
of error occurred.10  Fields failure to comply with the rule of this Court 
precludes our appellate review of this claim.11 
 
(12) Fields next claims that the prosecutor acted improperly by 
leading the witnesses, misstating the evidence in closing argument, 
                                                 
5 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del. 1990).    
6 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448 (2001). 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 825 (2001). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A(a) (2001). 
10 Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987); Supr. Ct. R. 9 (e)(ii) and 14 (e). 
11 Slater v. State, 606 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Del. 1992). 
 
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introducing false evidence and engaging in unprofessional conduct.  To the 
extent the prosecutor asked leading questions, the number of such questions 
was minimal and no objection to any such questions was raised by defense 
counsel.  Moreover, Fields has failed to articulate how he was prejudiced by 
any of the questions.  Fields complains that the prosecutor noted in his 
closing statement that there was agreement among the witnesses concerning 
the events leading up to the shooting.  We find no impropriety in the remarks 
of the prosecutor because they were squarely based upon the evidence 
presented at the trial.   
 
(13) To the extent Fields argues that there was no physical or 
scientific evidence linking him to the weapon found by the police, the record 
does support that claim.  However, there was more than sufficient evidence 
in the record from which the jury could infer that the gun found by the police 
belonged to Fields.12  We find no basis for Fields’ next argument that the 
prosecutor presented “false” evidence at the trial.  Fields next argues that it 
was improper for the prosecutor and defense counsel to pick up the weapon 
during a trial recess.  Assuming that happened, Fields does not explain how 
he was prejudiced, since the jury was not present in the courtroom.  We, 
thus, find Fields’ claims of prosecutorial misconduct to be without merit.   
                                                 
12 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
 
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(14) Fields’ final claim is that the jury should not have been 
instructed on first degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first degree 
attempted murder.  A defendant is on notice that evidence presented with 
respect to a particular offense in an indictment may result in a conviction of 
any lesser-included offenses.13  Because the record in this case supports the 
trial judge’s decision to instruct the jury on first degree assault,14 we find 
this claim to be without merit.   
 
(15) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Fields’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
      
                                                 
13 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(b) (2001); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 31(c). 
14 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 613 (2001).