Title: Proctor v. Schomberg
Citation: 63 So. 2d 68
Docket Number: N/A
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1953

63 So. 2d 68 (1953)
PROCTOR
v.
SCHOMBERG.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.
February 6, 1953.
Rehearing Denied February 23, 1953.
*69 John C. Wynn, Miami, for appellant.
J. Lewis Hall, Tallahassee and M. Earl Baum, Miami, for appellee.
MATHEWS, Justice.
This was an action of a patient against a dentist alleging malpractice and breach of contract.
The appeal is from a summary judgment which also contained an order dismissing an amended complaint as amended.
The original complaint contained the following:
The complaint was filed on the 2nd day of August, 1951. The appellee filed motion to dismiss on the ground that "said complaint affirmatively shows that the alleged cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations." The Court granted the motion to dismiss and allowed the appellant to file *70 an amended complaint. In due course an amended complaint was filed which was also amended. A motion to dismiss the amended complaint as amended was then filed which contained the following ground:
After notice and argument, the Court entered its final judgment based upon an order granting the motion to dismiss. In this final judgment and order there appears the following:
This Court has long been committed to the doctrine that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. It cannot be taken advantage of by a motion to dismiss. In our most recent case of Tuggle v. Maddox, Fla., 60 So. 2d 158, 159, this Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Thomas, said:
In this case it was reversible error to dismiss the complaint and the amended complaint as amended on the ground that the same showed on its face that it was barred by the statute of limitations. If the appellee desired to take advantage of the statute of limitations, he should have pleaded the same as an affirmative defense and then if the appellant could show that the statute had been tolled or that there were facts which would constitute an exception to the statute, the appellant was privileged to file additional pleadings raising such questions.
This brings us to the second question presented on this appeal, namely, will the fraudulent concealment of an injury such as the injury in this case toll the running of the statute of limitations or constitute an exception to the statute thereby postponing the commencement of the running of the statute until discovery, or reasonable opportunity of discovery, by the owner of the cause of action? A decision on this question is not absolutely necessary in order to determine whether or not the cause should be affirmed or reversed. However, it was presented in the Court below and was presented in the briefs on appeal and at the bar of this Court at the time of oral argument and it appears certain that if the question is not settled, the case will again find its way to this Court for the settlement of this one question.
In the amended complaint, in attempting to meet the ruling of the trial court in dismissing the original complaint, the appellant presented this very question. In the amended complaint as amended we find the following paragraph:
The appellee filed a motion to strike the whole of the last above quoted paragraph. In its order granting the motion to dismiss the amended complaint as amended the Court denied the motion to strike "for the reason that it becomes unnecessary to rule thereon after the granting of the motion to dismiss filed in said cause by the defendant."
The paragraph in dispute may be considered as surplusage. The appellant was under no duty to plead any facts tolling the statute of limitations until the same had been pleaded as an affirmative defense by the appellee.
In this case the record shows that the appellee held himself out as being a skilled professional man. He was authorized to practice dentistry in the State of Florida. The appellant was a layman and was not supposed to know anything about dentistry or whether or not a tooth had been properly extracted or a piece of the instrument used in extracting the tooth had been left in the cavity unless she was so advised by someone with sufficient skill and knowledge with reference to such matters. The dentist necessarily handled the instruments in extracting the tooth and in cleaning them, examining them, or taking them apart after such extraction. He was the only one in position to know what had been done.
After the extraction, the appellant continued to suffer pain in the region where the tooth had been extracted. She went back to her dentist where X-Rays were made and at that time he was in a better position than anyone else to determine the condition of the cavity and whether or not he had left some foreign substance in it. He did not advise her of any foreign substance in the cavity.
Should the appellee plead the statute of limitations, the appellant may plead such facts as she deems advisable to show that by reason of fraudulent concealment, the statute of limitations was tolled, or that the case presented is an exception to the statute of limitations. The sufficiency of such pleading may be tested in and determined by the trial Court.
In 34 Am.Jur. p. 188, sec. 231, the author states:
In 41 Am.Jur., p. 233, sec. 123, it is stated:
See also 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 206(a), p. 219.
Reversed for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
HOBSON, C.J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.