Title: Gumma v. White
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97791
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2005

Docket No. 97791-Agenda 16-November 2004.
RYAN D. GUMMA, Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, 
Secretary of State of Illinois, Appellant.
Opinion filed July 21, 2005.
CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
In this appeal we review the Secretary of State's decision 
to deny Ryan Gumma's petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driver's 
license, which was imposed pursuant to section 11-501.8 of the Illinois Vehicle 
Code, commonly known as the zero-tolerance law. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8 (West 1998). 
On administrative review, the circuit court of Cook County held that the 
Secretary of State's denial of Gumma's petition was against the manifest weight 
of the evidence and the appellate court affirmed this ruling. 345 Ill. App. 3d 
610. However, in affirming, the appellate court concluded that an earlier 
judgment, rendered in a related municipal ordinance violation proceeding, 
operated to collaterally estop the Secretary of State from using the results of 
Gumma's breath-analysis test to support his zero-tolerance suspension.
We granted the Secretary of State's petition for leave to 
appeal and now hold that the appellate court erred when it held that the 
Secretary of State was prevented, by collateral estoppel, from using the results 
of the breath-analysis test to support the zero-tolerance suspension of Gumma's 
driver's license. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we affirm the 
appellate court's judgment.


BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2000, Barrington police officer Scott 
Basel stopped a Ford Explorer, which was being driven by 20-year-old Ryan Gumma. 
According to the zero-tolerance sworn report(1) 
prepared by Officer Basel, the stop took place after Officer Basel witnessed 
Gumma drive over a curb and fail to stop at two stop signs. Officer Basel also 
indicated in his report that he "noticed an odor of alcoholic beverage as Gumma 
spoke" and that Gumma "did poorly on field sobriety tests." Gumma was arrested 
and taken to the Barrington police station, where he submitted to a 
breath-analysis test. A "test strip" generated by the breath-analyzing 
instrument indicated that Gumma took a breath-analysis test at the Barrington 
police station at 1:03 a.m. on September 22, 2000, and that his alcohol 
concentration registered 0.099.(2) Gumma was 
ticketed for consumption of alcohol by a minor (complaint number LO-937-576) and 
for disobeying a stop sign (complaint number Y9-128-143), in violation of 
Village of Barrington ordinances. Gumma was also given notice that his driving 
privileges would be summarily suspended pursuant to the zero-tolerance law, 
section 11-501.8 of the Vehicle Code.(3)
On November 9, 2000, Gumma filed a motion in the circuit 
court of Cook County, Municipal Department, Third District (hereafter municipal 
court), entitled "Motion for Production for Discovery Concerning Purported 
Breath Analysis Pursuant to 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(b)(iv) (2000)."(4) 
In the motion, Gumma sought information concerning the police department's 
compliance with Illinois Department of Public Health rules and regulations.(5) In particular, Gumma sought production of the 
logbook(s) for the breath-analysis instrument used by the Barrington police 
department to test his breath, which, pursuant to section 510.100 of the Public 
Health Code, the Barrington police department was required to maintain. Gumma 
requested the logbook entries for the previous 135 days, as well as any and all 
records or documents containing information concerning the instrument's usage, 
repair, maintenance, and certification, for the 45-day period encompassing the 
time that Gumma's breath test was administered.(6)
In response to the motion, the Village of Barrington 
provided Gumma with a copy of the "test strip" and a copy of Officer Basel's 
breath-analyzer operator's license. No logbook or other documentation concerning 
the instrument's certification for the 45-day period encompassing September 22, 
2000, was produced.
On December 8, 2000, Gumma appeared in municipal court 
with regard to the two ordinance violation complaints. The court dismissed the 
two complaints and issued the following order:
"The Village of Barrington failed to comply with 77 Ill. 
Administrative Code, Section 510.100. The arresting officer failed to keep 
appropriate records and, therefore, as a matter of law, the blood-alcohol 
concentration is inadmissible against the Defendant in this or any other 
proceeding against the Defendant, including the summary suspension before the 
Secretary of State."
Thereafter, on June 19, 2001, Gumma filed a petition 
seeking rescission of his zero-tolerance suspension, as permitted by section 
11-501.8(e) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West 1998)).(7) 
An administrative hearing took place before the Secretary of State on August 29, 
2001. Gumma challenged his zero-tolerance suspension on the grounds that he had 
submitted to testing, but that the testing "did not indicate a blood alcohol 
level greater than 0.00." See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e)(5) (West 1998). More 
specifically, Gumma claimed that his breath-analysis test was invalid because 
the Barrington police department failed to comply with Department of Health 
rules and regulation and, thus, the breath-analysis test results were 
inadmissible.
At the administrative hearing, the Secretary of State 
presented the following exhibits: a copy of the zero-tolerance sworn report; a 
copy of Officer Basel's breath-analyzer operator's license; a copy of Gumma's 
breath-analysis "test strip"; and copies of the complaints showing that Gumma 
had been ticketed for consumption of alcohol by a minor and for disobeying stop 
signs, in violation of Village of Barrington ordinances. In addition, the 
Secretary of State submitted a document dated August 24, 2001, entitled "Sworn 
Statement of Breath Test Operator." This document was a preprinted form with 
blank spaces where information had been filled in. In this document "S. Basel" 
averred that, on "9/22/00," he administered a breath-analysis test to "Gumma, 
Ryan D," using the "INTOX EC/IR" instrument, serial number "04128," and that the 
results of the breath-analysis test was a blood-alcohol concentration reading of 
".099." He further averred in paragraph 5:
"This instrument was operating correctly when I 
administered this test, and had most recently been tested and certified accurate 
by M. Rose I.S.P. on 7/13/01, pursuant to standards promulgated by 
the Illinois Department of Public Health."
And in paragraph 8, he averred:
"I made a written record of the above test in the log book 
maintained for the instrument in question. A copy of that written record is 
attached hereto as Addendum #3."
However, beneath paragraph 8 was written "UNABLE TO LOCATE 
RECORD" and no Addendum #3 was attached to the form.
Both the Secretary of State and Gumma submitted to the 
hearing officer copies of Gumma's motion for discovery, which, as noted above, 
Gumma filed in the municipal court proceedings, as well as copies of the 
December 8, 2000, order, which the municipal court issued upon the dismissal of 
the ordinance violation complaints.
Gumma was the only witness to testify at the 
administrative hearing. He testified that on September 22, 2000, when he was 20 
years old, he was arrested and taken to the Barrington police station by 
Barrington police officer Scott Basel after he made a "rolling stop" at a stop 
sign. Gumma denied that he had been drinking any alcoholic beverages that night 
and suggested that any odor of alcohol that might have been detected by the 
officer could have come from his passenger, Matt, who, Gumma admitted, had been 
intoxicated that evening. Gumma also testified that he was not asked to perform, 
and did not perform, any field sobriety tests prior to being arrested. Finally, 
Gumma admitted that he took a breath-analysis test at the Barrington police 
station which gave a reading of 0.09. Gumma stated, however, that he had no idea 
how the machine worked and could not explain why the machine had given that 
reading when he had not been drinking.
In closing argument, Gumma's counsel argued that the 
Barrington police department failed to comply with Department of Public Health 
rules and regulations concerning the certification and maintenance of the 
breath-analysis instrument used to test Gumma's breath. Accordingly, counsel 
argued that the breath test was invalid and the results inadmissible. The 
Secretary of State offered no argument in response.
Subsequently, the hearing officer issued a written report 
containing his findings and recommendation. In this report, the hearing officer 
acknowledged that the breath-analysis test had been "thrown out" in municipal 
court because the arresting agency had not produced the requested "records in 
regard to the authenticity of said reading." Nonetheless, the hearing officer, 
finding that the Secretary of State was not bound by the municipal court's 
ruling, rejected Gumma's argument that the test results were inadmissible. 
Relying on the breath-analysis tape and the officer's sworn report, the hearing 
officer found that Gumma submitted to testing which showed that Gumma had a 
blood-alcohol level greater than 0.00. Thus, the hearing officer found Gumma's 
request for rescission to be without merit and recommended that the petition be 
denied. The Secretary of State adopted the findings and recommendation of the 
hearing officer and, in an order dated October 16, 2001, denied Gumma's petition 
for rescission of the zero-tolerance suspension of his driver's license.
Gumma filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook 
County seeking administrative review of the Secretary of State's decision. On 
August 23, 2002, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order finding 
the Secretary of State's denial of Gumma's petition for rescission against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court held that Gumma had called 
into question the validity of the breath-analysis test and that the sworn 
statement of the breath-test operator "affirmatively stated that the log book 
for the subject machine could not be located." Thus, the court held that the 
State had failed to "show that the machine had been tested as required by the 
Department of Public Health regulations and that those inspections were current 
at the time the breath test was administered to" Gumma. For this reason, the 
court ruled that the test results were inadmissible to support the summary 
suspension. In addition, the circuit court held that the officer's sworn report 
was "devoid of factual content" and, for that reason, insufficient evidence that 
Gumma had consumed alcohol. The circuit court reversed the Secretary of State's 
decision to deny Gumma's petition.
The Secretary of State appealed the circuit court 
decision, and the appellate court affirmed, but on different grounds. 345 Ill. 
App. 3d 610. The appellate court held that the breath-analysis test results were 
inadmissible because they were barred by collateral estoppel. The appellate 
court stated:
"The circuit court's [December 8, 2000] order barring the 
use of evidence concerning plaintiff's blood-alcohol concentration in any 
proceeding including any statutory summary suspension proceeding before the 
Secretary of State was tantamount to an exclusion based on the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel." 345 Ill. App. 3d at 616.
The Secretary of State filed a petition for leave to 
appeal, which this court granted. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
The Secretary of State raises two issues in his appeal: 
(1) whether the appellate court erred when it held that the Secretary of State 
was collaterally estopped from using the results of the breath-analysis test to 
support the zero-tolerance suspension of Gumma's driver's license, and (2) 
whether the Secretary of State's decision to deny Gumma's petition to rescind 
the zero-tolerance suspension of his driver's license was against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. Before addressing these issues, we examine the 
zero-tolerance law under which Ryan Gumma's driver's license was suspended.
The zero-tolerance statute, which came into effect on 
January 1, 1995, is set forth in section 11-501.8 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 
5/11-501.8 (West 1998)). The statute provides in subsection (a) that, if a 
person under the age of 21, while operating a motor vehicle on the public roads 
of this state, is arrested for any traffic violation and the arresting 
officer "has probable cause to believe that the driver has consumed any amount 
of an alcoholic beverage," the driver "shall be deemed to have given consent to 
a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of 
determining the alcohol content of the person's blood." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(a) 
(West 1998). When the conditions in subsection (a) are met and the driver is 
asked to submit to testing, the driver must be warned that his driving 
privileges may be suspended if he refuses to submit to the testing or if he 
submits to the test and the test reveals an alcohol concentration greater that 
0.00. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(c) (West 1998). After being warned, if the driver 
refuses to submit to testing or if he submits to testing and the testing 
establishes an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00, the officer "shall 
immediately submit a sworn report to the Secretary of State" certifying whether 
the driver submitted to testing or refused. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(d) (West 1998). 
The Secretary of State, upon receipt of the officer's sworn report, "shall enter 
the driver's license sanction on the individual's driving record" and suspension 
of the person's driving privileges automatically goes into effect "on the 46th 
day following the date notice of the sanction was given to the person." 625 ILCS 
5/11-501.8(d) (West 1998).
Although the zero-tolerance law is similar in some 
respects to the summary suspension provision for driving while intoxicated (DUI) 
(625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 1998)), it is separate and distinct. See People 
v. McKenna, 328 Ill. App. 3d 396, 402 (2002) (the implied-consent law and 
the zero-tolerance law are independent statutory schemes with distinct hearing 
provisions involving different issues raised in different forums). Unlike a DUI 
summary suspension, which may be imposed when a driver is arrested for driving 
while under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances (625 ILCS 
5/11-501 (West 1998)), the zero-tolerance summary suspension may be imposed if a 
driver under the age of 21 has been arrested for any traffic violation, 
provided the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the driver has 
consumed some amount of alcohol and the driver refuses testing or 
submits to testing which reveals a blood-alcohol concentration greater than 
0.00. As we noted in Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 539 (2004), a 
zero-tolerance summary suspension provides "youthful drivers an incentive-not 
found in the DUI law-to refrain from consuming any amount of alcohol."
The forum in which zero-tolerance suspensions may be 
challenged also differs from DUI summary suspensions. Pursuant to section 
2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, a driver may petition for rescission of 
a DUI statutory summary suspension by making "a written request for a judicial 
hearing in the circuit court of venue." 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 1998). A 
zero-tolerance license suspension, however, must be contested before the 
Secretary of State in an administrative hearing, which is limited in scope to 
seven issues: (1) whether the police officer had probable cause to believe that 
the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle and 
whether police officer had reason to believe that the person was in violation of 
any provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local 
ordinance, (2) whether the person was issued a Uniform Traffic Ticket, (3) 
whether the police officer had probable cause to believe that the driver had 
consumed any amount of an alcoholic beverage, (4) whether the person, after 
receiving the required warnings, refused to submit to or complete the test or 
tests to determine the person's alcohol concentration, (5) whether the person, 
after receiving the required warnings, submitted to and completed the test or 
tests that determined an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00, (6) whether 
the test result of an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00 was based upon the 
person's consumption of alcohol in the performance of a religious service or 
ceremony, or (7) whether the test result of an alcohol concentration of more 
than 0.00 was based upon the person's consumption of alcohol through ingestion 
of the prescribed or recommended dosage of medicine. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) 
(West 1998).
Although the forum in which the challenge is brought 
differs, a driver seeking relief from a zero-tolerance summary suspension, like 
a petitioner under the DUI law, bears the initial burden of proof. 92 Ill. Adm. 
Code §1001.620 (1998) (zero-tolerance petitioner carries the burden of proof). 
See also Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d  at 542 (in both zero-tolerance and DUI 
suspension hearings, person challenging the suspension bears the initial burden 
of proof). Thus, when contesting a zero-tolerance suspension, the driver must 
present a prima facie case for rescission, and only after this burden 
has been met will the Secretary of State be required to come forth with 
additional evidence to support the suspension. See People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 (1988) (in a DUI suspension hearing, State did not have to lay a 
foundation for the admission of the breath-test results until the driver made a 
prima facie case for rescission). Ordinarily, the arresting officer's sworn 
report, which carries a presumption of credibility (see People v. Badoud, 
155 Ill. App. 3d 912, 917 (1987)), may be relied upon as evidence that the 
driver submitted to testing which accurately revealed the driver's blood-alcohol 
concentration, or that he refused. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West 1998). See 
Kalita v. White, 342 Ill. App. 3d 796, 803-04 (2003) (where motorist did 
not subpoena police officer, hearing officer was entitled to rely on the 
arresting officer's official reports to find that motorist refused to submit to 
testing). However, if the driver successfully presents a prima facie 
case attacking the validity of the test, the Secretary of State must grant the 
request for rescission unless he can lay a proper foundation for the admission 
of the test results into evidence. See Orth, 124 Ill. 2d  at 340.
The decision of the Secretary of State to grant or deny 
relief is subject to judicial review in accord with "the provisions of the 
Administrative Review Law [735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.]." See 625 ILCS 
5/11-501.8(h) (West 1998). The Administrative Review Law mandates that the 
"findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact 
shall be held to be prima facie true and correct." 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1998). 
This means that an administrative agency's findings of fact should not be 
disturbed on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273 
(2004). Thus, when the decision of the Secretary of State to deny a petition to 
rescind a zero-tolerance license suspension is based on its factual findings and 
conclusions, we review the determination under the manifest weight standard. See
Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d  at 542.

Collateral Estoppel
As noted earlier, Gumma's zero-tolerance suspension 
stemmed from his September 22, 2000, arrest, when he was ticketed for failure to 
stop at stop signs and for consumption of alcohol by a minor, in violation of 
Barrington village ordinances. The Village of Barrington prosecuted Gumma in 
municipal court on these ordinance violation charges and the court found that 
the Barrington police department failed to comply with Department of Public 
Health rules and regulations. The court entered an order holding that "as a 
matter of law, the blood-alcohol concentration is inadmissible against the 
Defendant [Gumma] in this or any other proceeding against the Defendant, 
including the summary suspension before the Secretary of State." This order was 
admitted into evidence at the administrative hearing when Gumma contested his 
zero-tolerance suspension. The hearing officer held, however, that the municipal 
court's ruling was not binding on the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State 
adopted this position and rejected Gumma's petition for rescission, relying on 
the breath-analysis test results to support Gumma's zero-tolerance summary 
suspension.
The appellate court, when reviewing the Secretary of 
State's decision to deny Gumma's petition for rescission, found it to be against 
the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court concluded that the 
municipal court's order was binding on the Secretary of State. 
Acknowledging that no court had yet considered the issue before it, the 
appellate court looked to decisions where the issue had been whether the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel could apply to preclude the State from 
litigating the validity of a Breathalyzer test in a DUI trial after the results 
of the Breathalyzer had been found inadmissible at a summary suspension hearing. 
See People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162 (1990); People v. Hackman, 
209 Ill. App. 3d 779 (1991); People v. Flynn, 197 Ill. App. 3d 13 
(1990). In these cases, it was held that collateral estoppel did not 
apply because of the nature of the summary proceedings. Distinguishing these 
cases on the facts, the appellate court held that here, where the municipal 
court proceeding occurred first in time, collateral estoppel was 
applicable to prevent the Secretary of State from using the breath-analysis test 
results to support Gumma's zero-tolerance summary suspension. Thus, the 
appellate court held that the breath-analysis test results should not have been 
admitted and, therefore, there was "no basis to uphold the suspension." 345 Ill. 
App. 3d at 619.
We disagree with the appellate court's ruling on the issue 
of first impression. Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine and its 
application is governed by certain general principles. This court has repeatedly 
held that the minimum threshold requirements for the application of collateral 
estoppel are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with 
the one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the 
merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. 
Du Page Forklift Service, Inc. v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 195 Ill. 2d 71, 77 (2001); American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 
193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2000); Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 191 
(1997).
In the case at bar, the parties to the municipal 
proceedings were Gumma and the Village of Barrington. The Secretary of State-the 
party against whom estoppel is now being asserted-was neither a party nor in 
privity with a party in the prior municipal court proceeding. For this reason, 
the municipal court's ruling can have no preclusive effect on the Secretary of 
State in the zero-tolerance proceedings.
The appellate court, when ruling that collateral estoppel 
applied, held:
"At the underage consumption of alcohol trial, the State 
was represented by the State's Attorney's office, and at the statutory summary 
suspension hearing, the State was represented by the Secretary. Consequently, we 
find that all of the elements necessary for the application of collateral 
estoppel existed at the time of the statutory summary suspension hearing and 
that the Secretary was bound by the determination of the circuit court with 
respect to the results of the Breathalyzer test and was thereby precluded by 
that determination from using the results of the Breathalyzer test." 345 Ill. 
App. 3d at 618.
The appellate court, however, was factually incorrect. The 
State did not prosecute the ordinance violation complaints against Gumma. The 
Village of Barrington, represented by its own village attorney, prosecuted the 
matter. Accordingly, we agree with the Secretary of State that the appellate 
court erred by applying collateral estoppel in this matter. For this reason, we 
find that the appellate court erred when it held the Secretary of State was 
barred by collateral estoppel from using the breath-analysis test results to 
support the zero-tolerance suspension of Gumma's driver's license.(8)

Whether the Secretary of State's Denial 
of Gumma's Petition for Recission Was Against the Manifest Weight of the 
Evidence
Although we have determined that the Secretary of State 
was not prevented by collateral estoppel from admitting the 
breath-analysis test results at the summary suspension hearing, we must now 
decide whether the breath-analysis test results were inadmissible for other 
reasons, as Gumma asserts, and, if so, whether the Secretary of State's denial 
of Gumma's petition for rescission was against the manifest weight of the 
evidence.
Gumma petitioned for rescission of his driver's license 
suspension claiming, pursuant to section 11-501.8(e), that he had submitted to 
testing, but that the testing "did not indicate a blood alcohol level greater 
than 0.00." See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e)(5) (West 1998). At the administrative 
hearing, then, Gumma had the initial burden of presenting a prima facie 
case for rescission. See Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d  at 542 (in both 
zero-tolerance and DUI suspension hearings, person challenging the suspension 
bears the initial burden of proof). Because it is undisputed that Gumma had 
submitted to a breath-analysis test which registered a blood-alcohol level 
greater than 0.00, Gumma had the burden of making a prima facie showing 
that the breath-analysis test administered to him at the Barrington police 
station on September 22, 2000, was invalid and, therefore, inadmissible to 
establish his blood-alcohol concentration. The initial question before us, then, 
is whether Gumma met this burden.
The zero-tolerance statute provides in section 
11-501.8(b)(i) that "[c]hemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, 
or other bodily substance, to be considered valid under the provisions of 
this Section, shall have been performed according to standards promulgated 
by the Department of Public Health in consultation with the Department of State 
Police by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by that Department for 
this purpose."(9) (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 
5/11-501.8(b)(i) (West 2000). In People v. Emrich, 113 Ill. 2d 343 
(1986), this court interpreted language in section 11-501.2(a) which is 
identical to the above-quoted language in section 11-501.8(b)(i) and stated that 
the statute "provides that the standards have to be complied with for a blood 
analysis 'to be considered valid.' The obvious corollary is that the analysis 
will not be considered valid, and will be inadmissible, absent such compliance. 
Read as a whole, *** compliance with the standards is a prerequisite to 
admissibility on a DUI charge." Emrich, 113 Ill. 2d  at 350.
In People v. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d 153, 160 
(1987), we extended our holding in Emrich to hold that "compliance with 
section 11-501.2 is mandatory for summary suspension purposes, [and] 
noncompliance will render test results invalid and inadmissible." Although 
Hamilton dealt with a challenge to a statutory summary suspension imposed 
under section 11-501.1, we find that, because the language in section 
11-501.8(b)(i) is identical to the language in section 11-501.2, admissibility 
of blood-alcohol concentration evidence at a zero-tolerance suspension hearing 
is also contingent upon its validity. Thus, a petitioner in a zero-tolerance 
rescission hearing may present a prima facie case for rescission by 
presenting evidence that the test is invalid due to a failure to comply with 
Department of Health rules and regulations.
In the case at bar, Gumma established at the 
administrative hearing that, shortly after submitting to a breath-analysis test 
at the Barrington police station, he requested the logbook for the 
breath-analysis instrument used to test his breath, as well as any other 
documents which would establish that the Barrington police department complied 
with Department of Health rules concerning the certification of breath-analysis 
equipment. The police department did not produce this information. Although 
Gumma did not subpoena these documents or Officer Basel at the administrative 
hearing, Officer Basel's "Sworn Statement of Breath Test Operator" affirmatively 
established that the Barrington police department was "unable to locate [the] 
record."
By establishing that there was no record that the 
instrument used to test his breath had been properly maintained, tested and 
certified accurate, as required by Department of Public Health rules and 
regulations, Gumma made a prima facie showing that the breath-test 
results were invalid. Because Gumma presented a prima facie case, the 
burden shifted to the Secretary of State to produce evidence establishing the 
validity of the breath test. Importantly, the admissibility of the breath-test 
results, as recorded in the officer's sworn report and on the "test strip," 
became contingent upon the Secretary of State's ability to lay a proper 
foundation, by establishing the validity of the breath test. See Orth, 
124 Ill. 2d  at 340 (once motorist made a prima facie case, the 
State can only avoid rescission by moving for the admission of the test into 
evidence and laying the required foundation). Thus, in the case at bar, the 
Secretary of State could avoid rescission only by producing evidence that the 
breath-analysis instrument had been properly maintained, tested and certified 
accurate in accordance with the Department of Public Health rules and 
regulations.
Here, however, the only evidence submitted by the 
Secretary of State in this regard was the sworn statement by Officer Basel dated 
August 24, 2001. In this statement Officer Basel attested that the instrument 
had been "tested and certified accurate on 7/13/01." This date, however, was 
long after any 45-day period which would have included September 22, 2000, the 
date when Gumma's breath test was administered. Thus, the Secretary of State 
produced no evidence that the instrument used to test Gumma's breath was 
functioning properly on September 22, 2000. A proper foundation for the 
admission of the breath-test results was not made. Therefore, the breath-test 
results were inadmissible and could not be relied upon to support the 
zero-tolerance summary suspension.
The Secretary of State argues that, even though Gumma was 
able to show that the Barrington police department violated the Department of 
Public Health rules, he did not make a prima facie showing that the 
breath-test results were unreliable "in light of other evidence that he consumed 
some amount of alcohol." The Secretary of State contends that it is immaterial 
that Gumma was able to show that the breath-analysis instrument may not have 
been accurate because "the precision of the Breathalyzer result is of far less 
consequence in a zero tolerance proceeding" (as opposed to a DUI statutory 
proceeding) since, in a zero-tolerance proceeding, summary suspension may be 
based on the consumption of any amount of alcohol. This argument misses 
the point.
It is clear from the language of the zero-tolerance 
statute that evidence of a driver's submission to testing which 
discloses an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00, or evidence that he 
refused to submit to testing, is a necessary prerequisite for the imposition of 
a summary suspension pursuant to this provision. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(d) (West 
1998). In other words, when a driver under the age of 21 is arrested for 
committing a traffic violation, summary suspension may not be imposed pursuant 
to section 11-501.8 of the Code, even when probable cause exists to believe that 
the driver has consumed some amount of alcohol, unless there is 
evidence that the driver submitted to testing, or that the driver 
refused to submit to testing. The officer's observations, which suggest that the 
driver has consumed some amount of alcohol, while important for the 
establishment of probable cause, are insufficient to support a summary 
suspension pursuant to the zero-tolerance provision.
In the case at bar, Gumma sought rescission of his 
zero-tolerance summary suspension and, at the administrative hearing, made a 
prima facie showing that the breath-analysis test he took was invalid. 
Therefore, the test results were inadmissible unless the Secretary of State was 
able to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the breath-test results. 
The Secretary of State failed to do so. The Secretary of State could not show 
that the instrument used to test Gumma's breath had been maintained in 
compliance with Department of Public Health rules and regulations. For this 
reason, the test results were not admissible and the Secretary of State had no 
valid evidence that Gumma "did submit to and complete the test or tests that 
determined an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00." 625 ILCS 
5/11-501.8(e)(5) (West 1998). Accordingly, Gumma's zero-tolerance summary 
suspension should have been rescinded. The Secretary of State's denial of 
Gumma's petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the appellate court's 
judgment.



Affirmed.
1.  A 
"zero tolerance sworn report" is a form used by law enforcement agencies to 
report zero tolerance violations to the Secretary of State. Information is 
provided on the form by the arresting officer, indicating that the prerequisites 
for a zero-tolerance summary suspension have been met.
2.  Section 
11501.8(b)(v) provides: "Alcohol concentration means grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath." 625 ILCS 
5/11501.8(b)(v) (West 1998).
3.  The 
sworn report indicates that notice was sent to Gumma in the mail. Subsequently, 
the Secretary of State issued an "Order of Zero Tolerance Suspension," informing 
Gumma that his driver's license and driving privileges would be suspended for a 
three-month period beginning November 11, 2000. 
4.  Section 
11501.8(b)(iv) provides: "Upon a request of the person who submits to a 
chemical test or tests at the request of a law enforcement officer, full 
information concerning the test or tests shall be made available to the person 
or that person's attorney." 625 ILCS 5/11501.8(b)(iv) (West 1998).
5.  Section 
11501.8(b)(i) of the zero-tolerance law provides: "Chemical analysis of the 
person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, to be considered 
valid under the provisions of this Section, shall have been performed 
according to standards promulgated by the Department of Public Health in 
consultation with the Department of State Police *** ." (Emphasis added.) 625 
ILCS 5/11501.8(b)(i) (West 1998).
6.  At 
the time of Gumma's arrest, section 510.100(a) of the Public Health Code (77 
Ill. Adm. Code §510.100 (1998)) regulated the use of breath-analysis 
instruments. It provided: "To determine accuracy of instruments, an inspector 
shall perform two analyses on a certified controlled reference sample at least 
once a month at intervals not to exceed 45 days. The inspector shall record test 
results of his certification in the instrument logbook."
7.  Gumma's 
petition was filed well after the three-month suspension of his license had 
terminated. There is no explanation in the record for the delay, but no issue 
has been raised as to the timeliness of the petition.
8.  We 
note that the zero-tolerance statute provides in subsection (f) that "the 
results of any chemical testing performed in accordance with subsection (a) of 
this Section are not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding, 
except that the results may be considered at a[n administrative review] hearing 
held under Section 2118 of this Code." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11501.8(f) 
(West 2000); see also Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d  at 539-40 (unlike the DUI law, 
the zero-tolerance law prohibits evidence of the driver's blood-alcohol 
concentration to be used in any other civil or criminal proceeding). We presume 
that, in the case at bar, Gumma did not invoke this provision at the municipal 
court proceedings because, although the municipal court held the test results 
inadmissible, it did so because it found the Barrington police department failed 
to comply with Department regulationsthe ruling at issue here. The parties have 
not discussed section 11501.8(f) in their briefs before this court. Therefore, 
we do not consider what impact, if any, this provision might have on the 
application of the equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel in similar 
circumstances. 
9.  This 
section was amended, effective January 1, 2001, by Public Act 91828. The 
amendment deleted "Department of Public Health in consultation with" in this 
sentence. The current version of the statute gives the Department of State 
Police, rather than the Department of Public Health, the authority to promulgate 
testing standards, to "approve satisfactory techniques or methods to ascertain 
the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct analyses," as well 
as the authority "to issue permits that shall be subject to termination or 
revocation at the direction of that Department, and to certify the accuracy of 
breath testing equipment."