Title: Fred Lorenzo Brooks v. State of Florida Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-011
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2000

1 The trial court also adjudicated Brooks guilty of aggravated battery and sentenced him to
thirty years in prison for that offense, but the validity of such judgment and sentence is not
challenged in this appeal.
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC92011
____________
FRED LORENZO BROOKS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[May 25, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court adjudicating
Fred Lorenzo Brooks guilty of first-degree murder and imposing the death penalty.1 
We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  As explained below, we
affirm Brooks’ conviction but reverse his sentence of death and remand for a new
penalty phase hearing before a new jury because the prosecutor made numerous
2 The State either nol prossed or severed all but the first-degree murder and aggravated
battery charges pending against Brooks and Brown.
3 Tony Carr testified that on August 27, 1996, between the hours of 4 and 6 p.m., he
“rented”, for $50, his candy-apple red 1995 Toyota Camry LE Sports Coupe to Brown, whom he
had known for about four years, and Brooks, whom he did not know.  The Camry was not
returned that evening as agreed, however, and law enforcement officials found the vehicle
abandoned approximately one week later.
-2-
improper comments during closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial.
I. FACTS
A Duval County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Fred Lorenzo
Brooks with first-degree murder; aggravated battery; armed robbery; armed
trafficking in cocaine; conspiracy to traffic in cocaine; and possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon.  The grand jury also returned an indictment charging Foster
Brown with the same offenses as Brooks,2 and the defendants were tried jointly
before the same jury.  The evidence presented at trial reflects the following facts.
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on the evening of August 28, 1996, Jacqueline
Thompson and Tyrone Simmons were positioned at the corner of 23rd Street and
Myrtle Avenue in Jacksonville, Florida--where Thompson was selling drugs--when
Fred Brooks and Foster Brown drove up in a red Toyota Camry (the Camry).3  Both
Thompson and Simmons knew Brooks and Brown.  Brown was driving the Camry
as it approached, and Brooks asked where he and Brown could find some “juggler
action,” which, according to Thompson, is street slang for big rocks of crack
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cocaine.  Thompson asked if they had any money, and Brooks produced five one-
hundred-dollar bills.  Thompson then inquired how much she would receive from
the deal, and they replied with four “jugglers.”  After agreeing to accompany
Brooks and Brown, Thompson entered the back seat of the Camry along with
Brooks, while Simmons replaced Brown in the driver’s seat, with Brown moving to
the front passenger seat before the group drove away.
In the same time frame in which the above-described events were transpiring,
Michael Johnson drove his 1973 Chevrolet Impala (the Impala) to the home of
Darryl Jenkins, his long-time friend, which was located at 2022 West 13th Street in
Jacksonville, Florida.  Johnson traveled to the home to meet Lashan Mahone, his
girlfriend, so that he and Mahone could go to a club later that night.  Mahone had
not yet arrived at Jenkins’ home when Johnson drove up, so Johnson backed his
Impala into the driveway, opened the driver’s side door, and sat in the car listening
to music.  Mahone arrived several minutes later, positioned her vehicle next to the
Impala, and went over to Johnson.  Johnson and Mahone began talking and listening
to music, while Darryl Jenkins and another man, Jessie Bracelet, sat in chairs in the
driveway near the front of Mahone’s car.
During this time period, the passengers in the Camry were traveling to
4 Thompson testified that she had never bought drugs directly from Jenkins, and during the
drug buy that took place at Jenkins’ house earlier in the evening, she had made the purchase from
either an individual named “Mall” or an individual named “Shack.”
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Jenkins’ house, where Thompson had already purchased drugs earlier that evening.4 
Though not a drug user like Jenkins, Michael Johnson often sold drugs from
Jenkins’ home, and Thompson had known Johnson for at least five years and had
regularly purchased crack cocaine from him.  Thompson testified that she
accompanied Brooks and Brown to Jenkins’ house because they had never
conducted a drug transaction with Johnson, and therefore he would not have
“served” them without her assistance.  On the way to Jenkins’ house, Brooks and
Brown specifically stated that they wanted to buy fifty rocks, or $500 worth of
crack cocaine.  As the group proceeded to the destination, neither Thompson nor
Simmons saw any weapons or heard any mention of a robbery.  Also during the
drive to Jenkins’ house, Thompson stated that she would first buy a $10 “dime
rock” of crack cocaine from Johnson to provide Brooks and Brown with a sample of
the drug they would be obtaining.
The Camry and its passengers arrived at Jenkins’ home several minutes after
Mahone had arrived at that location.  Simmons parked the Camry approximately ten
to twenty-five feet from Jenkins’ driveway.  Thompson exited the vehicle and
proceeded towards Jenkins’ house, at which point Johnson called her over. 
5 Three eyewitnesses--Michael Johnson, Lashan Mahone, and Jessie Bracelet--testified 
that the transaction took place near the trunk area on the passenger side of Johnson’s Impala. 
Jacqueline Thompson testified at trial that the transaction took place between the Camry and the
Impala.  Tyrone Simmons did not specifically indicate where the transaction took place, but he did
indicate that Brooks and Brown walked towards the driveway to conduct the transaction.
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Thompson bought a dime rock from Johnson and indicated that she had two “dogs”
(meaning friends) who wanted to spend $500.  Thompson then returned to the
Camry with the dime rock and spoke with Brooks and Brown.  After examining the
rock purchased by Thompson, Brown stated that the rock was “decent,” but Brooks
expressed his view that the rock was “too flat.”  Brooks changed his mind as to
purchasing fifty rocks and stated that he only wanted to purchase thirty.  Thompson
returned to the back seat of the Camry, and a chain of events related to the drugs
subsequently ensued among Johnson, Brooks, and Brown, which occurred near the
trunk area on the passenger side of Johnson’s Impala.5  As the transaction began,
Simmons and Thompson were sitting in the Camry, Mahone was sitting in the
driver’s seat of Johnson’s Impala, and Jenkins, along with Jessie Bracelet, were still
sitting in chairs in the driveway near the front of Mahone’s car.
According to Johnson, who testified that he had been selling crack cocaine
almost every day for approximately two years, after he sold the dime rock of crack
to Thompson, he walked over to Jenkins and obtained a sandwich bag containing
what, in his opinion, was crack cocaine.  Johnson did not know exactly how many
6 Jacqueline Thompson testified that she saw Brown give $300 to Johnson.
-6-
rocks were in the bag, but he testified that he knew there were “enough to sell 50
rocks,” each identical in shape and weighing approximately one gram.  Through
Johnson’s extensive experience in dealing with crack cocaine, he knew that a
“juggler,” or rock of crack cocaine, weighs one gram.  After retrieving the sandwich
bag from Jenkins, Johnson moved to the trunk area on the passenger side of his
Impala, and he recognized the two men approaching him as Brooks and Brown.  He
inquired if they were the individuals who wanted to purchase fifty rocks, and Brown
replied that they only wanted thirty rocks.
Johnson testified that he was standing in the middle of Brooks and Brown,
with Brown on his left and Brooks on his right, closest to the back seat of the
Impala.  Johnson observed Brown holding several one hundred dollar bills in his
hand, but Johnson testified that he never received money from anyone other than
Thompson, who had previously given him $10 to purchase the initial dime rock.6
Johnson untied the sandwich bag, reached in, and started to count the rocks.  At
about the time this occurred, Johnson observed Brooks reaching into his pocket, and
Johnson thought Brooks was merely retrieving money.  However, Johnson then
observed that Brooks was actually pulling a gun from his pocket, which he noticed
when it hit the side of the Impala.  Johnson dropped the sandwich bag of crack
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cocaine on the trunk of the car and heard Jenkins make a statement in the nature of,
“Hey, man, what's up?  He got a gun or something.”  Johnson then saw Brooks
point the gun at Jenkins and shoot one time.  Johnson turned and ran in fear past
Brown, who stepped back as though he was reaching for something in his pocket as
Johnson ran toward the gate in front of Jenkins’ home.  Johnson then heard ten to
twelve more gunshots as he ran through the yard; it sounded as though two guns had
fired because one sounded louder than the other.  While Johnson was running away,
a bullet struck him in the back, exited through his chest and hit him in the arm. 
Johnson made it to safety around the back of Jenkins’ home, where someone helped
him in through the back door.  Shortly thereafter, Lashan Mahone transported
Johnson to the hospital, and he never again saw the sandwich bag containing crack.
Johnson’s testimony concerning the shooting was consistent with other
testimony elicited at trial.  Jacqueline Thompson remembered a voice calling,
yelling, or screaming something from the driveway, and she then heard gunfire.  She
turned and looked out of the back window of the Camry, and saw Brooks firing a
weapon over the top of Johnson’s Impala.  After lowering her head, she heard ten to
fifteen more gunshots.  Similarly, Tyrone Simmons heard a loud voice and gunshots
coming from the rear of the Camry.  When Simmons turned and looked through the
rear window, he also saw Brooks firing a weapon and a person running through a
-8-
gate towards Jenkins’ home.  Simmons also heard more shots after he lowered his
head.
Jessie Bracelet, who had been seated next to Jenkins, testified that he had
gotten up from his chair and taken two to three steps when he heard Jenkins scream,
“He’s got a gun.”  Bracelet looked back and saw the man on Johnson’s right
(Brooks) extend his arm and fire at Jenkins, who was standing by that time.  The
gunman was approximately fifteen feet away from Bracelet when Jenkins was shot. 
At trial, Bracelet identified Brooks as the gunman.  Upon being shot, Jenkins
slumped, reached for his chest, and then began to run for safety across the street. 
Bracelet also ran away and heard ten to fifteen more gunshots, several of which
were fired at him.  It sounded as though the gunshots were coming from two
different weapons because some shots were louder than others.
Finally, Lashan Mahone testified that she saw one man on Johnson’s left side
and one on his right during the drug transaction at the rear of the Impala.  She heard
Jenkins scream and then heard a shot.  She then turned and saw Johnson running
through the fence near Jenkins’ house.  She saw one of the men standing with a gun
in his hand, and it looked like the man who had been on Johnson’s right, closest to
her.  She stated that she saw the man shooting at Johnson as Johnson ran down the
side of Jenkins’ house.  Mahone heard more gunshots emanating from the rear of the
7 Mahone further testified that the gunman backed up alongside the Impala and stopped
for ten to fifteen seconds next to the window, close enough to touch.  She saw his right profile
but did not recognize him that night.  Later, the police showed her photographs on three separate
occasions, and although she recognized Brooks’ front-profile picture the first two times, she
could not say he was the gunman.  After being shown a side-profile picture of Brooks during the
third interview, she indicated that Brooks looked like the gunman.  At trial, Mahone could not say
with certainty that Brooks was the gunman, but she did state that the gunman “looked just like”
Brooks.
8 Thompson testified that on the morning after the shooting, Brooks came to her house
and, after indicating that Jenkins was dead, said “Bitch, you didn’t see nothing.”  Thompson also
testified that she saw Brown three or four days after the shooting, at which time he said, “Tell
them we from Georgia.”
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Impala after she ducked down in the seat of that vehicle.7
After the gunshots ceased, Brooks and Brown ran back to the Camry and
jumped in the front passenger seat, Brooks on top of Brown.  Thompson saw
Brooks holding a “big silver automatic gun” in his hand, and she saw Brown holding
a dark-colored gun in his hand.  Similarly, Simmons saw Brooks holding a “chrome-
plated 9 millimeter” gun in his hand, but he did not see Brown holding a gun.  At the
direction of Brooks and Brown, Simmons drove the Camry away from Jenkins’
house, ultimately arriving at a location on 14th Street, where Simmons and
Thompson exited the vehicle.8
Back at Jenkins’ house, Lashan Mahone exited the Impala as soon as the
Camry drove away, and she started walking towards Jenkins’ house.  She stopped
and looked around, having a clear opportunity to see both the trunk of the Impala
and the surrounding areas.  As she surveyed the area, Mahone did not see anyone
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else near the Impala, nor did she see any drugs on either the trunk or sides of that
vehicle.  A young lady named Kathy then exited Jenkins’ house and said, “Don't
panic.  You need to take Michael to the hospital.”  Mahone helped Johnson into her
car and transported him to the hospital.
Darryl Jenkins’ body was found lying in a neighbor’s driveway at 2023 West
13th Street, across the street from his home.  Officer Robyn Pierce of the
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office was on duty at 10:57 p.m. on August 28, 1996, and
was dispatched to that location.  When Officer Pierce arrived, rescue personnel
were already there working on Jenkins, but Jenkins expired while Pierce was on the
scene; he died from a single gunshot wound to the middle of the chest, with the
bullet passing through his heart and left lung, exiting from the lower left side of his
chest beneath the armpit.  The wound suffered by Jenkins would not have caused
instantaneous death, but he would have died within seconds, not minutes.  There
was a blood trail leading from Jenkins’ body and crossing the street, but no weapon
was found at Jenkins’ house or near his body.  Finally, ten shell casings from a nine
millimeter pistol were found on the trunk of the Impala and on the ground beside
that vehicle.
After considering the evidence presented at trial, the jury returned separate
general verdicts finding both Brooks and Brown guilty of first-degree murder in the
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death of Darryl Jenkins, and also finding both defendants guilty of the aggravated
battery of Michael Johnson.  The trial court then conducted a penalty phase hearing
during which Brooks and Brown were tried jointly before the same jury that had
served during the guilt phase of the trial.  Following the presentation of evidence by
the State, Brooks and Brown, the jury returned a verdict recommending life for
Brown and, by a vote of seven to five, death for Brooks.  After conducting a hearing
pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1993), the trial court
sentenced Brooks to death on the first-degree murder charge and thirty years in
prison as a habitual felony offender on the aggravated battery charge.  In its
sentencing order, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1)
Brooks had been previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person; (2) the capital felony occurred during the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, robbery and trafficking in cocaine; and (3)
the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.  The court merged the second
and third aggravating circumstances and considered them as one.  The court rejected
the following statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Jenkins was a participant in
Brooks’ conduct or consented to the act; and (2) the capital felony was committed
while Brooks was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
Finally, the court considered Brooks’ family background, including the death of his
9 According to testimony adduced during the penalty phase, Brooks’ mother died on June
28, 1996.  Although the sentencing order correctly reflects this date, it then states that Brooks’
mother died “seven weeks after the defendant murdered Darryl Jenkins, and while the defendant
was in jail awaiting trial.”  However, because the offense at issue here occurred on August 28,
1996, such statement in the sentencing order must be in error.
10 The court noted that prior to an amendment passed by the Legislature in 1996, see
chapter 96-302, section 1, at 1355, Laws of Florida, Brooks’ family background would have been
considered as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.  Compare § 921.141, Fla Stat. (1995)
(listing statutory mitigating circumstances), with Allen v. State, 662 So. 2d 323, 329 (Fla. 1995)
(noting trial court’s proper consideration of family background as nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance).  While it is clear that Brooks committed his offense before the 1996 amendment
took effect, see id., section 2, at 1355 (effective October 1, 1996), the trial court did not err in
considering Brooks’ family background as a statutory mitigating circumstance.  Cf., e.g., Trotter
v. State, 690 So. 2d 1234, 1236-37 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876 (1997).
11 The issues raised by Brooks are set forth in an initial brief filed by his appellate counsel
and a pro se supplemental brief filed by Brooks, with this Court’s permission, on his own behalf.
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mother9 and father, as a statutory mitigating circumstance under section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996),10 and the court afforded slight weight
to that mitigating circumstance.  Brooks’ direct appeal from his first-degree murder
conviction and death sentence now follows.
II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In this appeal, Brooks presents twelve issues for our consideration.11  Two of
the issues raised by Brooks relate to his legal representation at trial: (1) whether the
trial court abused its discretion concerning attempts by Brooks to retain counsel of
choice; and (2) whether the trial court made an erroneous ruling regarding defense
counsel Nichols’ motion to withdraw from representation.  Next, Brooks raises five
12 Both the initial brief filed by Brooks’ appellate counsel and Brooks’ pro se supplemental
brief address the admissibility of certain portions of Michael Johnson’s testimony and the
sufficiency of the evidence.  We consider the various arguments presented in both briefs
concerning those issues in conjunction with one another.
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issues concerning the guilt phase of the trial and his conviction: (1) whether the trial
court erred in granting the State’s motion to consolidate the codefendants’ trials; (2)
whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Tony Carr to testify that his
Camry was not returned as agreed and was found abandoned approximately one
week later; (3) whether the trial court clearly erred in allowing Michael Johnson to
express his opinion regarding the identity and weight of the rocky substance
contained in the sandwich bag obtained from Darryl Jenkins; (4) whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to convict Brooks for either first-degree premeditated
or felony murder;12 and (5) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
both first-degree premeditated and felony murder.  Finally, Brooks raises five issues
related to the penalty phase of the trial and his sentence: (1) whether the
prosecutor’s closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial deprived Brooks
of a fair sentencing proceeding; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding the
merged robbery/pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance; (3) whether the trial court
erred in finding that Darryl Jenkins’ conduct did not constitute a mitigating
circumstance under section 921.141(6)(c), Florida Statutes; (4) whether Brooks’
13 In his pro se supplemental brief, Brooks actually combines the issues involving
consolidation of his case with Brown’s and bifurcation of the penalty phase hearing.  However,
because those issues actually touch upon different phases of his trial, we have separated them for
consideration here.
14 Because we reverse Brooks’ death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase hearing
before a new jury, we do not address the remaining four claims raised by Brooks concerning his
sentence and the original penalty phase hearing.
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death sentence is disproportionate; and (5) whether the trial court erred in denying
Brooks’ request to bifurcate the penalty phase of the trial. 13   We first consider
Brooks’ claims concerning his legal representation at trial, then turn our attention to
the claims touching upon the guilt phase of the trial and the conviction.  Finally, we
address the dispositive claim raised by Brooks regarding the penalty phase of the
trial: the prosecutor’s improper comments during closing argument.14
A. LEGAL REPRESENTATION ISSUES
1. BROOKS’ ATTEMPTS TO RETAIN
COUNSEL OF CHOICE
The first claim presented by Brooks regarding his legal representation at trial
focuses on his attempts to retain counsel of his choice.  Brooks asserts that
approximately one week prior to trial, the trial court denied his request for a
continuance to enable him to retain private counsel.  Based on this alleged denial of
a continuance, Brooks argues that the trial court did not afford him a sufficient
opportunity to retain counsel of his choice as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of
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the United States Constitution.  The record in this case, however, refutes Brooks’
claim.
Brooks was arrested in connection with this case on September 20, 1996, and
the trial court appointed the public defender to represent him.  On September 24,
1996, following certification of conflict by the public defender’s office, the trial
court appointed attorney Jeff Morrow to represent Brooks.  Thereafter, on
November 21, 1996, the trial court granted Brooks’ first motion for continuance.
On February 3, 1997, after being advised by Brooks that he was not satisfied
with Mr. Morrow’s representation, the trial court appointed attorney Richard
Nichols to represent him.  During a hearing held on February 7, 1997, Brooks
informed the trial court that his family was “supposed to have a lawyer by the 21st,”
but the court had already scheduled jury selection in the trial to begin on February
24.  At that point, the trial court explained that it had (1) previously appointed able
defense counsel, Mr. Morrow, but Brooks could not get along with him; (2) there
had been no showing that Mr. Morrow was incompetent, but, in an abundance of
caution, the court appointed Mr. Nichols to represent Brooks; and (3) if Brooks
intended to retain private counsel, he needed to do so soon because the trial would
begin on February 24, 1997.
On February 24, the trial court again granted Brooks a continuance to enable
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him to retain private counsel, Wade Rolle, and to give Mr. Rolle an opportunity to
prepare for trial.  The following day, Mr. Rolle was present in court, and the trial
court agreed to pass the case for one week to determine if Mr. Rolle would, in fact,
represent Brooks, and to set a new trial date.  On March 3, 1997, Mr. Nichols was
present in court, but Mr. Rolle did not appear.  Instead, the prosecutor informed the
court that Mr. Rolle had left a phone message that “he had not been retained yet.” 
One of Brooks’ family members present in the courtroom replied, “We’re supposed
to take care of it today.”  The trial court agreed to pass Brooks’ case once again. 
Apparently, satisfactory arrangements could not be reached with Mr. Rolle, and
another attorney, Butch Berry, informed the prosecutor that he might represent
Brooks; Mr. Berry never entered an appearance in the case.
Thereafter, on March 11, 1997, another attorney, Donald Mathews, appeared
in court and announced that Brooks’ family had approached him to retain his legal
services.  The trial court stated that the next pretrial conference was to be held on
March 18, and Mr. Mathews would need to inform the court at that time whether or
not he would actually represent Brooks.  At this point, Mr. Nichols still continued to
represent Brooks.  On March 18, Brooks’ case again was passed, with Mr. Nichols
still representing Brooks; Mr. Matthews never entered an appearance in the case.
On April 9, 1997, the name of another defense attorney, Janine Sasser, was
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mentioned in open court.  Mr. Nichols stated that he had been advised that Ms.
Sasser had been retained and was going to make an appearance on Brooks’ behalf. 
The trial judge announced that jury selection was set for April 21, 1997, and Mr.
Nichols agreed that he was ready to try the case as scheduled.
On April 15, 1997, Ms. Sasser was present in court and stated that she
wished to enter the case, but because she could not try the case on April 21, she
would need a continuance.  The trial court recognized Brooks’ right to retain
counsel of choice, but noted that Brooks remained indigent and “at a certain point
the court cannot be manipulated further.”  The court required Mr. Nichols to
continue representing Brooks, but also asked the attorneys, including Ms. Sasser, if
they had any case law indicating that Brooks had the right to a continuance under
the given circumstances.  The court continued the case to enable the parties to
research whether Brooks was entitled to have Ms. Sasser represent him.  Two days
later, it was made known in open court that Ms. Sasser was unable to represent
Brooks due to a conflict of interest.  Therefore, Mr. Nichols remained Brooks’
counsel, and he represented Brooks throughout the trial below.
Based on the facts set forth above, it is clear that Brooks’ claim here lacks
merit.  The trial court clearly afforded Brooks numerous opportunities to retain
counsel of choice, and contrary to Brooks’ assertions in this Court, the trial court
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here actually granted a continuance in consideration of Ms. Sasser’s possible
representation to ascertain whether another continuance should be granted so that
Ms. Sasser could prepare to represent Brooks at trial.  Moreover, Ms. Sasser
ultimately could not represent Brooks due to a conflict of interest.  Accordingly, we
reject Brooks’ claim here.  Cf. Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 249-50 (Fla. 1995)
(finding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying second motion for
continuance where case had been pending for at least ten months, defense counsel
still had over three weeks to prepare for trial, and no was prejudice shown);
Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 836 (Fla. 1988) (finding trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant’s third request for a continuance filed four days
prior to trial).
2. DEFENSE COUNSEL NICHOLS’ MOTION
TO WITHDRAW FROM REPRESENTATION
Brooks’ second claim regarding his legal representation at trial focuses on
whether it was proper for Mr. Nichols to provide representation.  Mr. Nichols filed
a motion to withdraw from representation of Brooks, citing both Brooks’ indications
of dissatisfaction with the representation and Brooks’ increasing hostility directed to
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him.  The trial court conducted an in-camera hearing to address the motion to
withdraw, and after full consideration entered a denial.  The substance of the claim
presented to this Court is centered upon the basis that the trial failed to conduct a
sufficient inquiry during the in-camera hearing.  Brooks further argues that even if
the trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry, it erred in its conclusion that
insufficient cause for discharge of Mr. Nichols had been presented.  Finally, Brooks
asserts that the trial court failed to properly advise him during the in-camera hearing
of the right to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975).  For several reasons, we find all of these claims to be without merit.
First, the record clearly shows that during the in-camera hearing, both Mr.
Nichols and Brooks agreed that their prior difficulties had been based on a
misunderstanding that no longer existed.  Mr. Nichols specifically requested during
the hearing to rescind his motion to withdraw, and although Brooks initially opposed
rescission of the motion, he later acquiesced to such rescission after the trial court
had fully considered the detailed factual circumstances surrounding the prior
difficulties between Brooks and Mr. Nichols.  Thus, Brooks waived the first two
arguments that he now presents to this Court regarding the motion to withdraw.
Second, the record clearly reflects that Brooks did not make an unequivocal
assertion of the right to self-representation during the in-camera hearing.  Therefore,
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the trial court was not required to conduct a Faretta inquiry.  See, e.g., State v.
Craft, 685 So. 2d 1292, 1295 (Fla. 1996) (“This Court has repeatedly held that only
an unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation will trigger the need for a
Faretta inquiry.”).  For the above-stated reasons, we reject the claim now asserted
by Brooks.
B. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
1. CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
During a pretrial hearing, the State expressed its intention to file a motion to
consolidate the cases of Brooks and Brown.  In response, counsel for Brooks voiced
no objection to the consolidation, stating, “I don’t see any reason [why] the court
would not consolidate.”  Three days after this hearing, the State filed a written
motion to consolidate, which the trial court granted.  Thereafter, neither Brooks nor
Brown filed a motion for severance, and they were tried jointly before the same
jury.  Brooks now claims that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to
consolidate.  We reject his claim because it was waived in the trial court.  See Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.153(a) (providing, in pertinent part, that a motion for severance of
defendants is waived if not timely made); cf. State v. Mateen, 678 So. 2d 449, 450-
51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that codefendants waived the right to consolidate
criminal charges under rule 3.151 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
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because they failed to move for consolidation); Sharif v. State, 436 So. 2d 420, 422
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (finding that defendant waived his right to appeal joinder of
misdemeanor and felony offenses because he failed to challenge the joinder of such
offenses in the trial court).  Moreover, even if Brooks had moved for severance in
the trial court, it is clear that the facts and legal positions involved in this case would
not have required the court to grant such a motion.  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 720
So. 2d 232, 236 (Fla. 1998); Coleman v. State, 610 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 1992).
2. ADMISSION OF TONY CARR’S TESTIMONY
CONCERNING THE CAMRY
Prior to trial, the State filed a written notice of its intent to introduce evidence
that Brooks and Brown had unlawfully used the Camry owned by Tony Carr. 
Shortly before jury selection commenced, Brown’s counsel objected to the
admission of such evidence, and the trial court ordered that the prosecutor not
mention such factors during jury selection.  Following jury selection, the trial court
considered Carr’s expected testimony that Brooks and Brown paid $50 for the use
of the Camry on the day before Jenkins was shot and that the vehicle was not
returned that night as agreed, but was found abandoned approximately one week
later.  After entertaining argument from all counsel, the court determined that Carr’s
expected testimony was relevant to placing the defendants with the Camry and to
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Carr’s credibility, and, after weighing such testimony under section 90.403, Florida
Statutes (1995), the court determined that such testimony would be admissible.
The State presented Carr in its case and he testified that Brooks and Brown
paid $50 for the use of his Camry on the day before Jenkins was shot.  Thereafter,
the vehicle was not returned that night as agreed but was found abandoned
approximately one week later.  See supra note 3.  Neither counsel for Brooks or
Brown renewed the prior objections to Carr’s testimony, either before he took the
stand or during his testimony, and both counsel proceeded to cross-examine him. 
Brooks now asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Carr to
testify that the Camry was not returned as agreed but was found abandoned
approximately one week later.  The State argues that this claim was not preserved
for appellate review and, even if properly preserved, such claim is without merit. 
We agree with the State.
First, by not contemporaneously objecting to Carr’s testimony when it was
elicited during the State’s case, the challenge regarding such testimony has been
waived for appellate review.  See, e.g., Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465, 470
(Fla. 1997) (“Failure to object to collateral crime evidence at the time it is
introduced violates the contemporaneous objection rule and waives the issue for
appellate review.”); Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562, 566 (Fla. 1988) (“Even when a
15 The present case is distinguishable from Thompson v. State, 615 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1993), because in that case, after the trial court denied the defendant’s motion in limine
seeking to bar admission of collateral crime evidence, defense counsel later renewed an objection
before both witnesses introducing such evidence took the stand.  See id. at 744; see also Cox v.
State, 563 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (finding collateral crime evidence issue
preserved for appellate review because defense counsel objected to admission of such evidence
during side-bar conference); Donaldson v. State, 369 So. 2d 691, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
(finding that even though defense counsel did not object “at the time of each and every offer” of
bad character evidence, issue concerning admission of such evidence was properly preserved for
appellate review by defense counsel’s general objection).
-23-
prior motion in limine has been denied, the failure to object at the time collateral
crime evidence is introduced waives the issue for appellate review.”).15  Moreover,
even if this challenge had been properly preserved for appellate review, we would
find it to be without substantive merit.  See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966,
968-69 (Fla. 1994).  Therefore, we reject this claim as presented by Brooks.
3. ADMISSION OF MICHAEL JOHNSON’S OPINION TESTIMONY
Michael Johnson testified as the State’s first witness.  During direct
examination, he testified that his long-time friend, Darryl Jenkins, used crack
cocaine and often sold that drug from the Jenkins home.  Johnson indicated that he
did not use crack cocaine, but he had been selling that drug almost every day for
approximately two years.  Johnson stated that he often sold crack cocaine from the
Jenkins home, with Jacqueline Thompson being one of his regular customers.
Regarding the night in question, Johnson testified that he observed the Camry
arrive at the Jenkins home, whereupon Jacqueline Thompson exited the vehicle. 
-24-
Thompson walked over to Johnson’s Impala and purchased a $10 rock of crack
cocaine, and after Thompson indicated that there were two men in the Camry who
wanted to buy fifty rocks, Johnson agreed to “serve” them.  Johnson testified that
after Thompson returned to the Camry, he obtained a sandwich bag containing crack
cocaine from Darryl Jenkins.  Johnson observed the contents of the bag and found
them to be “about a gram in size and identical in shape.”  Further, although Johnson
did not know the exact number of rocks that were in the bag, he knew the bag
contained enough to sell fifty rocks.  Finally, Johnson confirmed that he was
intimately familiar with the appearance of crack cocaine and had never received any
complaints that the crack cocaine he sold was bad, defective, or fake.  After several
defense objections, the trial court conducted a voir dire examination to determine
whether Johnson would be permitted to express opinions regarding the identity and
weight of the rocky substance contained in the sandwich bag obtained from Darryl
Jenkins, which was the center of the transaction that night.
During the voir dire examination, Johnson stated that he had sold drugs
earlier in the evening prior to the transaction with Brooks and Brown.  He had
previously seen a quantity of fifty or more rocks of crack cocaine on more than five
occasions, and he had, on a prior occasion, weighed more than fifty rocks of cocaine
on a digital, triple-beam scale.  Regarding the sandwich bag of rocks obtained from
16 We address Brooks’ claim on the merits because we disagree with the State’s argument
that the claim has not been preserve for appellate review.  While defense counsel did not
immediately object to Johnson’s initial testimony concerning the identity and weight of the rocky
substance in the sandwich bag, counsel did raise several objections regarding such testimony
shortly after it was offered and during the same line of questioning. Based on these objections, a
voir dire examination was conducted to ascertain the admissibility of Johnson’s opinion testimony. 
Under these circumstances, we find that the claim has been preserved for appellate review.  See
Jackson v. State, 451 So. 2d 458, 460, 460 n.1 (Fla. 1984) (finding defense counsel’s objection
-25-
Darryl Jenkins, Johnson stated that he had not previously engaged in sales of the
specific rocks from that bag earlier in the evening.  He did confirm, however, that he
had examined the contents of the bag and knew that there was enough to “serve” at
least fifty rocks.  Further, Johnson stated that he knew the weight of the rocks based
on experience because a “juggler,” or rock of crack cocaine, weighs one gram. 
Finally, while being questioned by defense counsel concerning “cornbread,” which
is allegedly a form of crack cocaine weighing less than regular crack cocaine,
Johnson reiterated that neither he nor Jenkins ever sold “bad dope” from the Jenkins
home.  After hearing  Johnson’s proffered testimony and considering argument
submitted by both prosecution and defense, the trial court determined that Johnson
would be permitted to express his opinion, in the form of expert testimony,
regarding the identity and weight of the rocky substance contained in the sandwich
bag which he had obtained from Darryl Jenkins.  On appeal, Brooks claims that the
trial court clearly erred in making this determination.  We reject Brooks’ claim on
the merits.16
timely when made during line of questioning eliciting impermissible and prejudicial testimony); see
also Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863, 868-69 (Fla. 1986); Roban v. State, 384 So. 2d 683, 685
(Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
-26-
Section 90.702, Florida Statutes (1999), provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the
evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify about it in the form of an
opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can
be applied to evidence at trial.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine a witness’s qualifications to
express an opinion as an expert, and the court’s determination in this regard will not
be reversed absent a clear showing of error.  See, e.g., Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d
96, 100 (Fla. 1996); Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1989); Johnson v.
State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983); see generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida
Evidence § 702.1, at 552-53 (1999 ed.).  After considering these standards, case
law from this State and other jurisdictions, as well as the facts of this case, we
conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in allowing Michael Johnson, an
experienced crack cocaine dealer, to express opinion testimony regarding the
identity and approximate weight of the rocky substance contained in the sandwich
bag obtained from Darryl Jenkins.
a. IDENTITY OF THE ROCKY SUBSTANCE
-27-
In A.A. v. State, 461 So. 2d 165, 165-66 & n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), the trial
court allowed a police officer to testify as an expert with “specialized knowledge”
that, in his opinion, the substance possessed by the defendant was marijuana.  The
officer had been with the police department for nine years and had worked four
years in a special narcotics unit; he had participated in numerous courses relating to
narcotics investigation; he had seen and smelled “tons” of marijuana during his
career; and his prior substance identifications had always been corroborated by lab
tests.  See id. at 166.  The officer formed his opinion regarding the particular
substance possessed by the defendant based upon sight, smell, the packaging of the
substance, and the fact that the defendant possessed “rolling papers.”  See id.  On
appeal, the Third District approved the admission of the officer’s testimony, holding
that the trial court did not “abuse its discretion by finding that the officer qualified,
through his training and extensive work experience, as an ‘expert’ in marijuana
identification.”  Id.  (citing, among other authorities, section 90.702, Florida Statutes
(1983)); cf., e.g., Pama v. State, 552 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
(determining that the State adequately proved substance was marijuana based on
experienced law enforcement officer’s examination and identification of the
substance); Dean v. State, 406 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (finding that
jury could properly find defendant guilty of marijuana possession based on
-28-
testimony of experienced narcotics officer that he saw occupants of car smoking
cigarette in manner commonly used in smoking marijuana, and he smelled strong
odor of marijuana emanating from the car immediately thereafter).
Although the Third District’s decision in A.A. addressed whether an
experienced law enforcement officer could properly express an opinion, as an
expert, regarding the identity of marijuana, it appears that no Florida appellate
decision has addressed whether a person who is experienced with marijuana or
another controlled substance as either a dealer, user, or both, may similarly be
qualified to express such an opinion.  Courts in many other jurisdictions have,
however, allowed such persons to express opinion testimony regarding the identity
of alleged controlled substances.  See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 992 F.2d
678, 681 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that circumstantial evidence establishing identity of
an alleged controlled substance may include, among other things, “lay-experience
based on familiarity through prior use, trading, or law enforcement,” citing United
States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 1988)); United States v. Paiva,
892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that witness may express opinion
regarding identity of an alleged controlled substance “based on past experience and
personal knowledge and observation”); State v. Saez, 845 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a majority of jurisdictions “have held that drug abusers
-29-
or addicts may possess sufficient qualifications to testify about matters at issue in a
narcotics prosecution”); Copeland v. State, 430 N.E. 2d 393, 396 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982) (finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing experienced
drug addict to testify as an expert witness regarding identity of dilaudid);
Commonwealth v. Dawson, 504 N.E. 2d 1056, 1057 (Mass. 1987) (stating that
“[t]he great weight of authority in this country permits . . . an experienced user of a
controlled substance to testify that a substance that he saw and used was a particular
drug”); State v. Rubio, 798 P.2d 206, 208 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (determining that
witness’s “experience as a successful cocaine dealer qualified him to give his
opinion that the substance was cocaine”); Hill v. Commonwealth, 379 S.E. 2d 134,
136 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (“Users and addicts, if they have gained a familiarity or
experience with a drug, may identify it.  Numerous courts have permitted lay
purchasers of drugs to testify as to the identification of drugs after previous use has
been demonstrated.”); State v. Hernandez, 935 P.2d 623, 625 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997) (stating that “a witness who demonstrates an expertise ‘acquired either by
education or experience’ in this area may give an opinion as to the identity of a
substance”); see generally Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the
Enemy in the War on Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual
Identification of Indescript White Powder in Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 Am. U. L.
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Rev. 557 (1998); J. Allison DeFoor, II, Consumer Testimony as Proof of Identity of
the Controlled Substance in a Narcotics Case, 33 U. Fla. L. Rev. 682 (1981); W.A.
Harrington, Annotation, Competency of Drug Addict or User to Identify Suspect
Material as Narcotic or Controlled Substance, 95 A.L.R. 3d 978 (1979 & 1999
Supp.).  It is our view that, upon establishment of a proper predicate, a drug dealer
under these circumstances may express an opinion, in the form of expert testimony,
regarding the identity of crack cocaine.  We do not reach the issue as to any other
possible controlled substance.
In the present case, the State presented evidence that (1) Michael Johnson
was an experienced crack cocaine dealer, having sold that drug almost every day for
approximately two years; (2) Johnson never sold bad, defective, or fake crack; (3)
Johnson obtained the sandwich bag which contained the substance from his long-
time friend and associate, Darryl Jenkins, who was a crack cocaine user and dealer
who did not sell bad, defective, or fake crack; (4) Johnson had sold drugs earlier
that evening; (5) Jacqueline Thompson, who brought Brooks and Brown to the
location for the purchase of rocks of crack cocaine, regularly purchased that
substance from Johnson at the Jenkins home; and (6) Johnson had an opportunity to
examine and inspect the rocky substance contained in the sandwich bag that he
obtained from Darryl Jenkins.  Under these circumstances, we find that the trial
17 We agree with Brooks that the trial court clearly erred in allowing Johnson to express
his opinion that each rock in the sandwich bag weighed exactly one gram, as there was not a
sufficient predicate establishing that Johnson was qualified as an expert in determining the exact
weight of crack cocaine rocks by visual inspection.  However, we find that this error was harmless
because, as explained below, there was sufficient evidence to support Brooks’ first-degree murder
conviction on a felony murder theory with robbery, attempted robbery, or attempted trafficking in
28 or more grams of cocaine as the possible underlying felony offenses; proof of such offenses did
not depend upon Johnson’s testimony regarding the exact weight of the rocks in the sandwich
bag.
-31-
court did not clearly err in allowing Michael Johnson to express his opinion, in the
form of expert testimony, that the sandwich bag contained crack cocaine.  Cf.
United States v. Marsalla, 164 F.3d 1178, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that in
making sentencing determination, district court justifiably relied upon experienced
crack cocaine dealer’s opinion that the substance she had purchased, visually
inspected, and then sold to defendant was crack cocaine).
b. WEIGHT OF THE ROCKY SUBSTANCE
In a similar manner, Brooks asserts that the trial court clearly erred in
allowing Johnson to express an opinion that the rocks in the sandwich bag each
weighed one gram.  We disagree with the position that Johnson was not qualified to
express an opinion regarding the approximate weight of the rocks in the sandwich
bag.17  The State presented evidence that (1) Johnson was an experienced crack
cocaine dealer; (2) he had previously seen a quantity of fifty or more rocks of crack
cocaine on more than five occasions, and he had, on a prior occasion, weighed more
-32-
than fifty rocks of cocaine on a digital, triple-beam scale; (3) in the drug trade, a
“juggler,” or rock of crack cocaine, is traded in one-gram increments; and (4)
Johnson had the opportunity to examine and inspect the rocks in the sandwich bag,
and he determined that the bag contained enough to sell fifty rocks that were “about
a gram in size and identical in shape.”  Under these circumstances, the trial court
properly allowed Johnson to give opinion testimony regarding the approximate
weight of the rocks in the sandwich bag.  See, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 507 So. 2d 637,
638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (finding that trial court erred in precluding narcotics
officer from testifying about approximate weight of bag containing cocaine that was
dumped by defendant in pond, stating “[a]n experienced narcotics officer (as well as
a lay witness) can testify to the approximate weight of a given matter”); Madruga v.
State, 434 So. 2d 331, 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (finding that experienced drug
enforcement officer could properly testify to the approximate weight of the
marijuana at issue).
4. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In this claim, Brooks argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder.  In so arguing, Brooks
asserts that the trial court erred in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal
presented by his trial counsel at the close of the State’s case and renewed at the
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close of all the evidence.  The State responds, however, that the motions as
presented by trial counsel were inadequate to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence
claim for appellate review.  Under the specific factual circumstances of this case, we
agree with the State.
At the close of the State’s case during the guilt phase of the trial below, trial
counsel for Brooks moved for a judgment of acquittal on his client’s behalf. 
Specifically, his counsel stated, “I think we may technically have to offer our
motions for directed judgment of acquittal, which I do without any further
argument.”  Immediately thereafter, trial counsel for Foster Brown  moved for
judgment of acquittal on his client’s behalf.  Unlike the purely technical and
superficial motion voiced on behalf of Brooks, Brown’s counsel made specific
arguments challenging the State’s evidentiary proof of both first-degree
premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder, with the possible underlying
felonies of robbery and trafficking in cocaine.  After noting that the alternative
theories of attempted robbery or attempted trafficking in cocaine could also support
a first-degree felony murder conviction, the trial court denied both motions.  In a
similar manner, the trial court denied all renewed defense motions for judgment of
acquittal made after the defendants rested their cases without presenting any
18 In renewing the motion for judgment of acquittal, Brown’s counsel stated, “I know we
made our motion for judgment of acquittal.  I didn’t know if we had actually renewed our motion
for judgment of acquittal.  If we have not, I would do that at this time.”  Immediately thereafter,
Brooks’ counsel stated, “I don’t think we did and I would join in that.”  We note that renewing a
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence is no longer necessary to preserve
a sufficiency of the evidence claim for appellate review.  See Morris v. State, 721 So. 2d 725, 726
(Fla. 1998); see also Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380(b), 745 So. 2d 319
(Fla. 1998) (amending rule 3.380(b) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to reflect holding
in Morris).
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evidence.18
Under these factual circumstances, we conclude that the limited, boilerplate
motions for judgment of acquittal which were of a technical and pro-forma nature as
voiced by counsel for Brooks were totally inadequate to preserve a sufficiency of
the evidence claim for appellate review.  In so concluding, we are mindful that the
trial court had previously permitted counsel for Brooks and Brown to adopt each
others objections during trial, but such permission did not address or extend to
substantive motions.  Additionally, at the close of the State’s case, counsel for
Brooks merely adopted his earlier boilerplate motion.  Accordingly, we find that the
purely technical and pro-forma boilerplate motions for judgment of acquittal offered
by Brooks were inadequate to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence claim for
appellate review.  See, e.g., Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380(b) (stating, in pertinent part, that
a motion for judgment of acquittal “must fully set forth the grounds on which it is
based”); Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 984-85 (Fla. 1999); Archer v. State, 613
19 Premeditation, as an element of first-degree murder, is defined as
more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully formed conscious
purpose to  kill.  This purpose may be formed a moment before the
act but must exist for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection
as to the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result
of that act.
Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019,
1021 (Fla. 1986)).  Brooks primarily argues that, like the situations in Mungin v. State, 689 So.
2d 1026 (Fla. 1995), and Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1991), the evidence presented by
the State in this case did not exclude the hypothesis that Jenkins’ death resulted from a reflexive
shooting, not by premeditated design.  Unlike Mungin and Jackson, however, the State presented
eyewitness testimony in this case (1) identifying Brooks as the gunman; (2) showing that the
shooting was unprovoked; and (3) showing that there was a continuing attack.  Based on the
evidence that Brooks shot Jenkins immediately after Jenkins questioned what was wrong, the
present case appears similar to Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1988), where this
Court determined that even though the defendant’s conduct “was more akin to a spontaneous act
without reflection,” such conduct “unquestionably” demonstrated premeditation.
20 The State attempted to establish at trial that Brooks committed the offense of trafficking
in 28 or more grams, but less than 150 kilograms, of cocaine or a mixture of cocaine, in violation
-35-
So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993).  Nevertheless, we will proceed to make an independent
determination of whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
Brooks’ first-degree murder conviction.  See, e.g., § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. (1999);
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(h) ; Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998).
Brooks argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his first-degree
murder conviction on either a theory of premeditation or felony murder with
robbery, attempted robbery, trafficking in cocaine, or attempted trafficking in
cocaine as the possible underlying felonies.  We need not address his arguments
regarding premeditation19 or trafficking in cocaine,20 however, because, in our view,
of section 893.135(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1995).  To establish guilt on this offense, the State
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brooks knowingly actually or
constructively possessed, or aided and abetted Brown in the actual or constructive possession of,
the requisite amount of a substance that was, in fact, crack cocaine.  While we do not determine
the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State to establish this offense, we note that the
State did present evidence, including Michael Johnson’s testimony regarding the identity and
weight of the rocks in the sandwich bag, directed to the establishment of the trafficking offense.
-36-
there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support a jury verdict
finding Brooks guilty of first-degree felony murder with robbery, attempted robbery,
or attempted trafficking in cocaine as the possible underlying felonies.  See Brown
v. State, 644 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1994) (“Brown first claims that insufficient
evidence was adduced showing premeditation.  We need not reach this issue,
however, because there was ample evidence supporting first-degree murder under a
felony-murder theory . . . .”).
Robbery is defined as
the taking of money or other property which may be the
subject of larceny from the person or custody of another,
with the intent to either permanently or temporarily
deprive the person or the owner of the money or other
property, when in the course of the taking there is the use
of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
§ 812.13, Fla. Stat. (1995).  In the present case, Michael Johnson testified that he
did not receive money from either Brooks or Brown for the purchase of the crack
cocaine.  He further testified that when he started to count the rocks out, Brooks
drew a weapon and fired at Jenkins when Jenkins questioned whether there was a
21 Brooks argues that the testimony of Jacqueline Thompson, Tyrone Simmons, and Jessie
Bracelet established that Johnson had been paid for the crack rocks in the sandwich bag and that
Brooks drew his gun to “persuade” Johnson to hand over what had been paid for.  We note that
Johnson’s testimony directly conflicted with the version of events favorable to Brooks, and the
jury was not required to believe the version of events favorable to Brooks where the State had
produced conflicting evidence.  See, e.g., Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 986 (Fla. 1999).
-37-
problem.  Moreover, Johnson testified that the sandwich bag containing the crack
cocaine was on the trunk of his Impala when he began to run away once the
shooting started, and he never saw the sandwich bag containing the rocks again. 
Finally, Lashan Mahone testified that (1) she exited the Impala immediately after the
shooting stopped and Brooks and Brown had left; (2) she stopped, looked around,
and had an opportunity to observe both the trunk of the Impala and the surrounding
areas; and (3) as she surveyed the area, she did not see anyone else near the Impala,
nor did she see any drugs on either the trunk or sides of that vehicle.  We find that
this direct and circumstantial evidence presented by the State amounts to competent,
substantial evidence supporting a jury verdict finding Brooks guilty of first-degree
felony murder with robbery as the underlying predicate offense.21  Cf. Mungin, 689
So. 2d at 1029 (finding circumstantial evidence supported first-degree felony murder
conviction for robbery or attempted robbery where evidence showed that defendant
entered the store carrying a gun, money was missing from the store, money from the
cash box was gone, someone tried to open cash register without knowing how, and
22 We find this theory to be unreasonable in light of Lashan Mahone’s testimony.
-38-
defendant left the store carrying a paper bag).
We also conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence to support a
jury verdict finding Brooks guilty of first-degree felony murder with attempted
robbery as the underlying predicate offense.  To prove attempted robbery, the State
was required to present evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that
Brooks intended to commit a robbery and committed an overt act toward completion
of that offense.  See  § 777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).  Even if we accepted the theory
asserted by Brooks that someone other than Brooks or Brown removed the
sandwich bag containing the crack cocaine after the shooting occurred,22 there is
competent, substantial evidence showing that Brooks intended to commit a robbery
and made an overt act directed toward the completion of that crime.
Finally, in our view, there is competent, substantial evidence to support a jury
verdict finding Brooks guilty of first-degree felony murder with attempted
trafficking in 28 or more grams, but less than 150 kilograms, of cocaine or a mix of
cocaine, as the underlying offense.  To establish attempted trafficking in cocaine,
the State was required to present evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt
that Brooks intended to commit the offense and committed an overt act toward its
completion.  See  § 777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).  The State was not required to
23 The fact that Kocol involved conspiracy, rather than attempt, does not render that case
inapplicable here.
-39-
prove that the substance involved was actually cocaine or a mixture thereof.  See,
e.g., Tibbetts v. State, 583 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Louissaint v.
State, 576 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).  In accord with the reasoning of
both Kocol v. State, 546 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), and Spera v. State, 656
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), there is competent, substantial evidence in this case
to support a jury verdict finding Brooks guilty of first-degree felony murder with
attempted trafficking in cocaine as the underlying predicate offense.
In Kocol, the defendant agreed to supply his employee with an ounce of
cocaine (which is slightly greater than 28 grams) for sale to a third party at a fixed
price.  See 546 So. 2d at 1159.  The employee met with the third party, collected
$1300 from him, and delivered the money to the defendant.  See id. at 1160.  In
return, the defendant gave the cocaine to the employee for delivery to the third
party.  See id. Based on this transaction, the defendant was charged and convicted
of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, sale of cocaine, and possession of cocaine.23  See
id. at 1159.
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his conviction on the conspiracy to traffic count because the cocaine that was sold
-40-
actually weighed 27.58 grams, slightly less than the requisite trafficking amount of
28 grams.  See id. at 1160.  In upholding the conspiracy to traffic conviction, the
Fifth District stated, “The fact that the cocaine ultimately delivered was short of an
ounce by less than a gram does not refute the intent of the parties at the time of the
initial agreement.”  Id.  This conclusion in Kocol was followed by the Second
District in Spera, which involved similar facts.  See 656 So. 2d at 552.
Brooks relies on the First District’s decision in  Williams v. State, 592 So. 2d
737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), to support his contention that the evidence in this case
was insufficient to find him guilty of attempted trafficking in cocaine.  In Williams,
the First District distinguished Kocol because the defendant in Williams, unlike the
defendant in Kocol, had not reached an agreement on a specific amount of cocaine
for the transaction.  See id. at 739.  Instead, the only agreement evidenced in
Williams was that the defendant was willing to do a “big deal.”  See id.  Under
those circumstances, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
permit the jury to consider the charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.  See id.;
see also Spivey v. State, 731 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Rodriguez v. State,
719 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). 
After reviewing the evidence presented in this case, it appears that this case is
more similar to the situations in Kocol and Spera than it is to the situations in
24 Brooks correctly does not argue that there was no “overt act” in this case.
-41-
Williams, Spivey, or Rodriguez.  Specifically, in this case, Michael Johnson testified
that “jugglers,” or rocks of crack cocaine, are traded in one-gram increments. 
Further, Jacqueline Thompson testified that Brooks and Brown were seeking to buy
“jugglers” of crack cocaine.  Finally, both Johnson and Thompson testified that
Brooks and Brown sought fifty rocks but ultimately specifically expressed that they
wished to obtain thirty rocks of crack cocaine.  We find that this evidence was
sufficient to establish that Brooks intended to obtain a specific amount of crack
cocaine--28 or more grams--that was above the requisite amount to prove
trafficking,24 and we therefore determine that there is competent, substantial
evidence to support a jury verdict finding Brooks guilty of first-degree felony
murder with attempted trafficking in cocaine as the underlying offense.
5. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST-DEGREE PREMEDITATED
AND FELONY MURDER
In his final challenge relating to the guilt phase, Brooks argues that the trial
court erred in instructing the jury on both first-degree premeditated murder and first-
degree felony murder.  The State correctly responds that defense counsel did not
object to the jury instructions during trial, and therefore this claim was not preserved
for appellate review.  See, e.g., Gunsby v. State, 574 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 1991);
-42-
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.390(d).  Furthermore, even if this claim had been preserved for
appellate review, we would find it to be without merit:
While a general guilty verdict must be set aside
where the conviction may have rested on an
unconstitutional ground or a legally inadequate theory,
reversal is not warranted where the general verdict could
have rested upon a theory of liability without adequate
evidentiary support when there was an alternative theory
of guilt for which the evidence was sufficient.
San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462, 470 (Fla. 1998) (footnotes omitted).  We again
reject the claim as presented by Brooks.
C. THE PENALTY PHASE: COMMENTS MADE BY THE
PROSECUTOR DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT
Brooks contends that the prosecutor made numerous improper comments
during closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial, and, based on such
comments, Brooks reasons that he is entitled to a new penalty phase hearing before
a new jury.  In making this argument, Brooks highlights that defense counsel
contemporaneously objected to several of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper
comments, but he also candidly acknowledges that his trial counsel did not object to
other such comments.  As a general rule, this Court has determined that failing to
raise a contemporaneous objection when improper closing argument comments are
made waives any claim concerning such comments for appellate review.  See, e.g.,
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McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1999); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d
411, 418 n.8 (Fla. 1998); Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1997);
Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 989 (Fla. 1996).  The sole exception to the general
rule is where the unobjected-to comments rise to the level of fundamental error,
which has been defined as error that “reaches down into the validity of the trial itself
to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the
assistance of the alleged error.”  McDonald, 743 So. 2d at 505 (quoting Urbin, 714
So. 2d at 418 n.8, which, in turn, quoted Kilgore, 688 So. 2d at 898).  After
carefully reviewing the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing argument in this case,
and considering the jury’s close seven-to-five recommendation that Brooks be
sentenced to death, we determine that the objected-to comments, when viewed in
conjunction with the unobjected-to comments, deprived Brooks of a fair penalty
phase hearing.  Cf. Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
(“Taken individually, in a different case, the prosecutor’s comments may not have
been so egregious as to warrant reversal.  However, the remarks must be viewed
cumulatively in light of the record in this case.  Here, the improprieties in the
prosecutor’s closing argument reached the critical mass of fundamental error . . . .”). 
We discuss in detail the improper comments made by the prosecutor in this case so
that, hopefully, similar comments will not be repeated in future cases.
25 Unfortunately, this type of repetitive, overzealous advocacy is not confined to the
prosecutor in Urbin and in this case.  See, e.g, Fonticoba v. State, 725 So. 2d 1244, 1245 n.1
(Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (fourth case before the court featuring a certain prosecutor’s
“‘unprofessional and unethical’ behavior”); Izquierdo v. State, 724 So. 2d 124, 125 n.1 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1998) (referring same prosecutor to The Florida Bar).  Additionally, the problem seemingly
is not limited to individual prosecutors.  See Palazon v. State, 711 So. 2d 1176, 1178 n.2 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998) (Blue, J., concurring) (commenting, “Although actual data is not available, it is the
impression of this writer and other members of this court that an unusually high proportion of
these cases originate” in a certain judicial circuit).
26 Brooks points out that even the trial court found it necessary to make a sua sponte
interruption during closing argument and issue a curative instruction after the prosecutor made a
biblical reference to “thou shalt not kill.”  Brooks does not challenge the trial court’s action in this
regard, and we find that the trial court appropriately dealt with this improper comment.  See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068, 1074 n.8 (Fla. 1997) (cautioning prosecutors “that
arguments invoking religion can easily cross the boundary of proper argument and become
prejudicial”); Ferrell v. State, 686 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1996).
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Initially, we note that the comments made by the prosecutor in this case are
strikingly similar to comments made by the same prosecutor which were condemned
in Urbin.25  Indeed, as appellant notes in his brief, it appears that many of the
comments in this case are the same as those made in Urbin, “with only the names of
the victims and the defendants changed.”  Appellant’s Initial Brief at 70-71 n.13. 
With this in mind, we now analyze the portions of the prosecutor’s penalty phase
closing argument now challenged by Brooks in this Court.26
At the beginning of closing argument, the prosecutor presented a narrative
describing the death of Darryl Jenkins.  During this narrative, the prosecutor made
statements such as “[Jenkins] did nothing, nothing to deserve being shot like a rabid
dog on the driveway in front of his own home”; “[Jenkins] fell down to this cold
27 We also reject Brooks’ argument regarding comments made by the prosecutor
concerning victim impact evidence that was admitted during the penalty phase.
28  During this extended portion of the argument, the defense eventually twice objected to
the repetitive comments made by the prosecutor.  Transcript at 1537-38.
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cement, life flowed out of him”; “blood flowed onto that cold concrete”;  “life
flowed out of him, flowed out of him”; and “[Jenkins] died there on that cold
 slab of cement.”  Brooks argues that the prosecutor’s comments were an improper
“emotional portrayal of the victim’s agony,” Appellant’s Initial Brief at 76, and
constituted a type of “Golden Rule” argument denounced by this Court in Urbin. 
While we agree with Brooks that the prosecutor’s description of the death in this
case was an “emotional portrayal,” we do not find that such description was
improper, as was the description of the victim’s death in Urbin, where the
prosecutor “went far beyond the evidence in emotionally creating an imaginary
script that the victim was shot while ‘pleading for his life.’”  Urbin, 714 So. 2d at
421.  The prosecutor’s description here had a slight emotional flow but was properly
confined to inferences based on record evidence and was therefore proper.27
Brooks next argues that the prosecutor impermissibly inflamed the passions
and prejudices of the jury with elements of emotion and fear.28  We agree.  
For example, in this case, the prosecutor used the word “executed” or “executing”
at least six times; in Urbin, the prosecutor impermissibly used those terms at least
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nine times.  See 714 So. 2d at 420 n. 9.  Additionally, in this case, the prosecutor
characterized Brooks and Brown as persons of “true deep-seated, violent
character”; “people of longstanding violence”; “they commit violent, brutal crimes
of violence”; “it’s a character of violence”; “both of these defendants are men of
longstanding violence, deep-seated violence, vicious violence, brutal violence, hard
violence . . . those defendants are violent to the core, violent in every atom of their
body.”  In Urbin, the prosecutor cast the defendant as showing his “true, violent,
and brutal and vicious character”, as a “cold-blooded killer, a ruthless killer”:
exhibiting “deepseeded [sic] violence.  It’s vicious violence.  It’s brutal violence”;
and that Urbin was “violent to the core, violent in every atom of his body.”  714 So.
2d at 420 n.9.  Regarding the comments in Urbin, we stated, “Plainly, these are not
isolated comments of the type we have deemed harmless in other cases, but rather
are akin to the dehumanizing comments we found improper in Bonifay v. State, 680
So. 2d 413, 418 n.10 (Fla. 1996).”  714 So. 2d at 420 n.9.  Indeed, the almost
verbatim incantation of these comments in both Urbin and this case is remarkable
given this Court’s unambiguous pronouncements over the last 50 years.  See, e.g.,
Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1998) (“It is clearly improper for the
prosecutor to engage in vituperative or pejorative characterizations of a defendant or
witness.”); King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1993) (stating that closing
29  Although this sampling of the caselaw is by no means exhaustive, it demonstrates that
this Court has clearly and consistently condemned improper prosecutorial argument through the
generations.  For that reason, the State’s argument that “to the extent that Urbin arguably sets
forth a new rule of law, unless this Court explicitly states otherwise, a rule of law which is to be
given prospective application does not apply to those cases which have been tried before the rule
is announced,” Appellee’s Answer Brief at 60, is meritless on its face.  Urbin simply reiterated
what this Court’s decisions have declared time and time again.  Clearly, the State ignores the
extensive case law citations throughout the opinion in Urbin, as well as the penultimate paragraph
which begins, “The fact that so many of these instances of misconduct are literally verbatim
examples of conduct we have unambiguously prohibited in Bertolotti, Garron, and their progeny .
. . .”  Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 422.  The State also overlooks the statement, “This Court has so many
times condemned pronouncements of this character in the prosecution of criminal cases that the
law against it would seem to be so commonplace that any layman would be familiar with and
observe it,” commentary found in a 1951 opinion.  Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494, 494 (Fla.
1951).
-47-
argument “must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that
their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant”); Garron
v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988) (“When comments in closing argument are
intended to and do inject elements of emotion and fear into the jury’s deliberations,
a prosecutor has ventured far outside the scope of proper argument.”); Bertolotti v.
State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985) (stating that closing argument “must not be
used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an
emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of
the evidence in light of the applicable law”); Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762, 763
(Fla. 1966) (quoting from Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 1951): “The
trial of one charged with crime is the last place to parade prejudicial emotions or
exhibit punitive or vindictive exhibitions of temperament.”).29
30 Defense counsel did not object to these closing comments made by the prosecutor.
31  Defense counsel objected to this line of argument, which the trial court overruled.
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Similarly, the prosecutor’s “mercy” argument in this case tracks almost word
for word the argument in Urbin which was classified as “blatantly impermissible” by
this Court.  714 So. 2d at 421.  In Urbin, the prosecutor concluded his argument by
stating: “If you are tempted to show this defendant mercy, if you are tempted to
show him pity, I’m going to ask you to do this, to show him the same amount of
mercy, the same amount of pity that he showed Jason Hicks on September 1, 1995,
and that was none.”  Id.  Here, the prosecutor concluded his argument as follows:
“I’m going to ask you not to show mercy or pity to these defendants.  What mercy
or pity did they show Darryl Jenkins that night?  But if you are tempted to show the
defendants mercy or pity, I’m going to ask you to show them the same mercy, the
same pity that they showed Darryl Jenkins on August 28, 1996, and that is none.”30 
Again, long before the issuance of Urbin, this precise line of argument was
specifically denounced by this Court.  See Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107,
1109 (Fla. 1992); Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1989).
Brooks also submits that the prosecutor impermissibly argued “prosecutorial
expertise.”31  The challenged comments began with the prosecutor’s description of
the mechanics of the penalty phase.  The prosecutor then described the “death
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penalty weighing test,” stating, “I would submit now that the State does not seek the
death penalty in all first-degree murders because it’s not always proper, not always
appropriate.”  The prosecutor then posited facts of a first-degree murder involving a
16-year-old getaway driver and a 30-year-old, ex-convict triggerman, where “it
wouldn’t be just, it wouldn’t meet the law of Florida to impose the death penalty
against the 16-year-old.”  The prosecutor then stated:
Where, under the facts of the case in the law of Florida,
that death penalty weighing test is met, it is proper to seek
a death penalty.  And I would submit to you, when you
look at all the facts of this case and look at the law of
Florida, it is clear that this is a case that demands the
death penalty for both of those defendants for what they
have done.
Brooks argues that these and similar comments by the prosecutor “undermine the
jury’s discretion in determining the proper punishment by implying he, or another
authority, has already made the careful decision required.”  Appellant’s Initial Brief
at 70.  As support, Brooks primarily relies on Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla.
1959).
In Pait, a death penalty case, the prosecutor stated during closing argument:
Before each murder trial that is prosecuted in this circuit,
where I’m the State Attorney, a conference is held
between me and my assistants to determine whether or not
the facts in the case justify the State’s giving maximum
punishment under the law.  I told you at the outset of this
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trial that if the facts in this case warranted this defendant
being sent to the electric chair . . . . 
Id. at 383-84.  On appeal, this Court found the error harmful, reasoning as follows:
In his argument, [the prosecutor] conveyed to the jury the
fact that he and his staff had considered the matter before
trial and had concluded that the death penalty should be
requested.  It is certainly appropriate for the prosecuting
attorney to urge the jury to prescribe the supreme penalty
on the basis of the evidence which the jury hears.  It is not
appropriate to undertake to give the jury the benefit of the
composite judgment of the State Attorney’s staff allegedly
reached on the basis of investigations and discussions
taking place before the trial.
Id. at 384-85. 
In this case, the prosecutor’s comments clearly are not as blatant as those in
Pait, as the prosecutor here was undoubtedly correct in stating that the State does
not seek the death penalty in all first-degree murder cases.  However, while that
certainly is a true statement, it is also irrelevant and tends to cloak the State’s case
with legitimacy as a bona-fide death penalty prosecution, much like an improper
“vouching” argument.  See Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1993)
(explaining that “[i]t is improper to bolster a witness’ testimony by vouching for his
or her credibility”).  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
32 We do not condemn the prosecutor’s use of hypothetical example to explain the death
penalty weighing process; the example was improper only to the extent that it connected with the
State’s decision of when to seek the death penalty.  Tangentially, we note that in light of this
Court’s decision in Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S495, S497 (Fla. Oct. 21, 1999), the
prosecutor’s specific hypothetical example involving a sixteen-year-old defendant would be
improper and misleading because, in Florida, the death penalty may not be constitutionally
imposed on a defendant who was under the age of seventeen at the time the murder was
committed.
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in overruling defense counsel’s objection regarding this line of argument.32
Brooks next argues that the prosecutor in this case, as in Urbin, see 714 So.
2d at 421 n.12, misstated the law regarding the jury’s recommendation of a death
sentence.  Specifically, in this case, the prosecutor stated: “And if sufficient
aggravating factors are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must recommend a
death sentence, unless those aggravating circumstances are outweighed, outweighed
by the mitigating circumstances.”  This was an improper statement by the
prosecutor, as “a jury is neither compelled nor required to recommend death where
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.”  Heynard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239,
249-50 (Fla. 1996); cf. Garron, 528 So. 2d at 359 & n.7 (finding that it was a
misstatement of the law to argue that “when the aggravating factors outnumber the
mitigating factors, then death is an appropriate penalty”).  Defense counsel objected
to this misstatement, and in response the trial court correctly informed the jury
concerning the law relating to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.  Thus, if the prosecutor’s initial misstatement of the law were viewed
33 Defense counsel did not object to this line of argument.
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in isolation, we would find that such misstatement was harmless error.  See
Heynard, 689 So. 2d at 249.
Brooks also argues that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the
merged robbery and pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances.33  We agree.  After
summarizing the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances of prior violent
felony, armed robbery, and pecuniary gain, the prosecutor stated:
Now the Judge – those are the three aggravating
circumstances.  And I submit to you, when you consider
them together – individually they’re all powerful
aggravating circumstances that support a recommendation
of death, but together, they present a powerful,
overwhelming case for a recommendation of death.
Two of those aggravators merge, number[s] two
and three, felony murder, robbery and financial gain,
merge under the law because they’re involving the same
aspects of the crime.  But I submit to you that, because
they merge, that makes them even more powerful, even
more weighty, even more demanding.  Demanding that the
defendants be held fully accountable, to the full extent of
the law.
Transcript. at 1543-44.  Unlike Jackson v. State, 704 So. 2d 500, 507 (Fla. 1997),
where we held that the prosecutor’s comments regarding merged aggravating
circumstances were permissible, the prosecutor here clearly argued that because the
armed robbery and pecuniary gain circumstances merged, “that makes them even
-53-
more powerful, even more weighty, even more demanding.”  This type of argument
violates the principles set forth in Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla.
1976):
The State argues the existence of two aggravating
circumstances, that the murder occurred in the
commission of the robbery (subsection (d)) and that the
crime was committed for pecuniary gain (subsection (f)). 
While we would agree that in some cases, such as where a
larceny is committed in the course of a rape-murder,
subsections (d) and (f) refer to separate analytical
concepts and can validly be considered to constitute two
circumstances, here, as in all robbery-murders, both
subsections refer to the same aspect of the defendant’s
crime.  Consequently, one who commits a capital crime in
the course of a robbery will always begin with two
aggravating circumstances against him while those who
commit such a crime in the course of any other
enumerated felony will not be similarly disadvantaged. 
Mindful that our decision in death penalty cases must
result from more than a simple summing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d
1, 10 (Fla. 1973), we believe that Provence’s pecuniary
motive at the time of the murder constitutes only one
factor which we must consider in this case.
If we were to allow the type of argument made by the prosecutor here, then an
individual who commits a capital crime in the course of robbery would always begin
with a “more weighty” aggravating circumstance than those who commit a capital
crime in the course of any other enumerated felony.  The prosecutor’s comments in
this regard were improper.
34  Defense counsel did not object to this line of argument, which immediately preceded
the improper “mercy” argument discussed above.
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Next, we find that the prosecutor clearly overstepped the bounds of proper
argument by stating:
I’m concerned about the temptation some of you may
have, and that is that you may want to take the easy way
out and not weigh out all the aggravating circumstances,
not analyze the law or the facts, take the easy way out and
just quickly vote for life.
I submit to you, don’t do that; follow the law, do
your duty.  Weigh everything all out.  When you do, you
will see that the aggravating circumstances create a
powerful case for a recommendation of life [sic].  They
are not outweighed by those flimsy, I would submit to
you, phantom, mitigating circumstances.
Transcript at 1555.34  Again, these comments are similar to comments made in
Urbin:
[M]y concern is that some of you may be tempted to take
the easy way out, to not weigh the aggravating
circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and not
want to fully carry out your responsibility and just vote for
life. . . . I’m going to ask you not be swayed by pity or
sympathy. . . . I’m going to ask you to follow the law. 
I’m going to ask you to do your duty.
714 So. 2d at 421; cf. Garron, 528 So. 2d at 359 & n.10 (determining prosecutor
misstated law in arguing to jury it “is your sworn duty as you come in and become
jurors to come back with a determination that the defendant should die”).  These
35  Although defense counsel did not object to the actual terms used by the prosecutor in
describing the case in mitigation, counsel did object to the prosecutor’s continued references to
the weight of  the mitigating circumstances; the trial court overruled that objection.
-55-
comments made by the prosecutor were egregiously improper. Further, the
prosecutor’s characterization of the mitigating circumstances as “flimsy,”
“phantom,” and repeatedly characterizing such circumstances as “excuses,” was
clearly an improper denigration of the case offered by Brooks and Brown in
mitigation.35  See Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 422 n.14.
Finally, Brooks argues that the prosecutor’s references to both Brooks’
counsel and Brown’s counsel constituted an attack on them personally and on their
credibility, with the import of the comments being that “criminal defense lawyers,”
and these lawyers in particular, are unworthy of belief.  Brooks argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in overruling the defense objection that the prosecutor’s
statement was a personal attack.  We agree.
As a precursor to discussing the mitigating circumstances to be considered,
the prosecutor stated the following:
I’d like to make this comment to you: During opening
statement of the guilt part of the trial, and during the
closing arguments of the guilt part of the trial, about a
week and a half ago, those two criminal defense lawyers
got up here and they told you that the evidence would
show you that the defendants were not guilty of murder
and aggravated battery, and they looked you straight in
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the eye when they told you that.  And I would submit to
you that the evidence that came out during the trial proved
to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
were guilty of first-degree murder and aggravated battery.
The evidence produced at trial disproved what
those two criminal defense lawyers argued to you.
Transcript at 1544-45.  Defense counsel objected to these comments, claiming that
they constituted a personal attack on defense counsel.  After admonishing defense
counsel not to make speaking objections, the trial court overruled the objection,
stating that the prosecutor’s comments were not a personal attack, but merely a
proper comment on the evidence.  Thereafter, the prosecutor continued:
I submit to you that the evidence that you heard
during the guilt part of the trial did not support what the
defense lawyers argued to you.  They argued to you that
the defendants were not guilty, and that’s what the
evidence, they claim, supported a verdict of.  The
evidence did not support what they argued to you, and I
would submit to you that I expect them to get up here and
argue to you that the law and the evidence that you’ve
heard will support a recommendation of life.
I’m going to submit to you that, if you look at all
the evidence that’s been presented to you in this case and
you listen carefully to the law, that, once again, the
evidence and the law will not support  –  is not going to
support what those two criminal defense lawyers are
going to argue to you.
Transcript at 1546-47.  While certainly not as egregious as comments discussed in
other appellate decisions, see, e.g., Del Rio v. State, 732 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 3d
-57-
DCA 1999) (prosecutor stated, “See this man here who claims to be a lawyer in
good standing in Miami, Florida,” and “[t]hat is the same guy who is going to get up
when I sit down and try to tell you what the evidence showed.”); Redish v. State,
525 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (finding prosecutor’s reference to defense
counsel’s alleged “cheap tricks” constituted an improper personal attack on defense
counsel), we find that the prosecutor’s references to defense counsel in this case
transcended the bounds of legitimate comment on the evidence and implied that the
jury could not believe defense counsel or the arguments asserted by them.  See
Fryer v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (finding prosecutor’s
statement that “he knows that his client is guilty,” which was made shortly after
defense counsel concluded arguing that the evidence had failed to prove his client
guilty, “constituted a direct attack on the defense attorney’s character, essentially
calling him a liar”); cf. Lewis v. State, 711 So. 2d 205, (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding
prosecutor’s statement that manner in which defense  questioned the evidence was
“lame” constituted an improper attack on defense counsel).  Therefore, we conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel’s objections to
these improper comments.
In recently reversing a first-degree murder conviction and vacating a death
sentence, this Court concluded:
36 Although not objected to below, challenged by Brooks here, or considered by us in
reversing his sentence, it is clear that the prosecutor’s repeated comments regarding the
defendants’ “early release” from various prison sentences were marginally relevant and, in several
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The prosecutor in this case exceeded the bounds of
proper conduct and professionalism and provided a
“textbook” example of overzealous advocacy.  This type
of excess is especially egregious in this, a death case,
where both the prosecutors and courts are charged with an
extra obligation to ensure that the trial is fundamentally
fair in all respects.
Gore, 719 So. 2d at 1202.  Viewed in totality, we reach the same conclusion in this
case, especially considering the seven-to-five jury recommendation for the death
sentence.  Moreover, in light of this prosecutor’s “track record,” we must repeat the
following observation made by this Court almost forty years ago:
It should be noted that the remarks of the
prosecutor were not provoked by irritations or proddings
by the defense counsel.  They were not mere casual
innocuous observations made during an impassioned
appeal.  The record here suggests that the objectionable
arguments were tendered calmly and in a fashion
calculated to forestall a mercy recommendation.
Pait, 112 So. 2d at 385 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Accordingly, after
considering the cumulative effect of the numerous, overlapping improprieties in the
prosecutor’s penalty phase closing argument, as well as the jury’s seven-to-five vote
for a death sentence, we vacate the sentence imposed upon Brooks and remand for a
new penalty phase hearing before a new jury.36
instances, misleading.  The comments were marginally relevant because the only sentencing
options in this case were death or life without possibility of parole, see section 775.082(1),
Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994) (making life without possibility of parole applicable sentencing
option for capital offenses committed on or after May 25, 1994), and therefore the “early release”
comments would have been relevant only to show lack of rehabilitation.  Moreover, several of the
prosecutor’s “early release” comments were misleading because those comments were coupled
with statements that Brooks or Brown were released early out of “mercy.”  This position
overlooks the fact that many prisoners were released early due to legislative attempts at reducing
prison overcrowding.  See Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1998).  On remand,
counsel for the State must be mindful of these facts.
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III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Brooks’ first-degree murder conviction,
reverse his death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase hearing before a
new jury.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which SHAW, ANSTEAD and
PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, C.J., concurs as to conviction and dissents as to sentence.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which QUINCE,
J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
LEWIS, J., specially concurring.
I concur in affirming Brooks’ conviction, reversing his sentence, and
remanding for a new penalty phase hearing before a new jury.  I write specially to
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address the penalty-phase closing argument made by the prosecutor during the trial
below.  In my view, this Court’s recent decision in Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411
(Fla. 1998), leads to the inescapable conclusion that the prosecutor’s argument
constituted inappropriate advocacy and requires reversal for a new penalty phase
hearing.  
Upon analysis, this Court in Urbin considered virtually identical not objected
to but inappropriate argument to be of such importance to the fair administration of
justice and the constitutional application of capital punishment that it specifically
stated that any failure to acknowledge and disapprove such argument would amount
to neglect of this Court’s judicial duty.  If the decisions of this Court are to have
meaning, particularly in the context of argument in connection with the imposition of
capital punishment, we must have uniform application of the standards announced
by this Court and not random application which, in my view, leads to confusion and
destabilizes the law.  I must respectfully but pointedly disagree with the dissenting
view that Urbin should not be followed here.  I conclude that we must either follow
and give meaning to the standards announced in Urbin, or reject its pronouncements
and articulate the standard 
we deem appropriate that should be applied on a uniform basis.   
In Urbin, after reversing the defendant’s death sentence on proportionality
37 As noted by the majority, the prosecutor in both Urbin and this case are same person. 
Majority op. at 44-45.
38 In Urbin, the prosecutor cast the defendant as showing his “true, violent, and brutal and
vicious character”; as a “cold-blooded killer, a ruthless killer;” exhibiting “deepseeded [sic]
violence.  It’s vicious violence.  It’s brutal violence”; and that Urbin was “violent to the core,
violent in every atom of his body.”  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 420 n.9 (Fla. 1998).  This
Court stated that such comments were “not isolated comments of the type we have deemed
harmless in other cases, but rather are akin to the dehumanizing comments we found improper in
Bonifay v. State, 680 So. 2d 413, 418 n. 10 (Fla.1996).”  Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 420 n.9.  In
dissenting on the closing argument issue here, Justice Wells relies on Bonifay for the well-
recognized general proposition that attorneys should be afforded “wide latitude” in presenting
argument to the jury.  However, this Court’s analysis in Urbin finding the prosecutor’s
aforementioned comments to be improper clearly indicates that such comments were outside the
scope of the “wide latitude” standard.  See also Bonifay, 680 So. 2d at 418 n.10.  Indeed, it
would be inconsistent (and perplexing) to hold such comments to be improper in Urbin--where
the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance was established based on the defendant’s
convictions for armed robbery, armed burglary, and armed kidnapping, see 714 So. 2d at 414--
and hold similar comments made by the prosecutor in this case to be proper because Brooks and
Brown had both been previously convicted of violent felonies, as suggested by Justice Wells.
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grounds, this Court proceeded to discuss the prosecutor’s37 penalty-phase closing
argument, stating that “we would be remiss in our supervisory responsibility if we
did not acknowledge and disapprove of a number of improprieties in the
prosecutor’s closing penalty-phase argument.”  Id. at 419.  The Court then
delineated the specific arguments it found to be improper, including, but not limited
to, (1) the repeated use of the word “executed” or “executing,” id. at 420 n.9; (2)
the repeated description of the defendant as a person of violence, id.;38 (3) urging
the jury to afford the defendant the same mercy that the defendant displayed
towards the victim, see id. at 421; (4) asserting that any juror’s vote for a life
sentence would be irresponsible and a violation of the juror’s lawful duty, see id.;
39 The majority opinion also discusses other arguments made by the prosecutor in this case
that were improper in light of decisions other than Urbin.  See Majority. op. at 49-51, 53-55, 56-
58 (discussing improper “prosecutorial expertise” comments; misstatement of the law regarding
the merged robbery and pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances; and improper personal attack
on defense counsel).
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and (5) misstating the law regarding the jury’s obligation to recommend death. See
id. at 421 n.12.  As thoroughly discussed in the majority opinion, many of the same
arguments condemned in Urbin were repeated  by the prosecutor in this case.  See
Majority. op. at 46-55.39  Urbin and the present case simply cannot be distinguished
on the basis of degrees of violence because the defendant in Urbin was involved in
no less violent conduct than Brooks here.  The victim in Urbin was forced to the
ground and had sustained additional injuries consistent with having been beaten in
the face with a pistol before being shot.  The court also found an aggravating
circumstance for imposition of the death penalty to be a second felony involving a
home invasion armed robbery and kidnapping.
Although not the direct holding, the analysis of the prosecutor’s penalty-
phase closing argument set forth in Urbin clearly delineated specific arguments that
this Court found to be not simply improper but “blatantly” impermissible.  It would
be inconsistent for this Court to determine specific arguments to be improper in
Urbin--a case where such a determination did not affect the outcome of the case--
and then reach an opposite conclusion in this case where such a determination
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actually impacts the outcome of the case resulting in an execution.  Perhaps more
importantly, if the Court performed such an “about-face” it would not only suggest
that the death penalty is being imposed in this state in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, but also generate additional constitutional arguments.  As the entity charged
with ensuring that the death penalty in Florida is constitutionally applied, this Court
must be mindful not to create such circumstances, but instead strive for uniformity.
Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in the majority’s analysis regarding
the penalty-phase closing argument issue.
SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to the affirmance of the conviction.
I dissent from the reversal of the death sentence in this case on the basis of
what the majority perceives as the prosecutor’s improper closing argument.  I have
carefully reviewed that argument and conclude that not only was it in its totality
within the bounds of what the Court’s prior case law has recognized as appropriate
advocacy, it certainly did not rise to a level of fundamental error.
This case was tried in 1997.  Therefore, what this Court said in its 1996
opinion in Bonifay v. State, 680 So. 2d 413 (Fla 1996), is applicable:
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Wide latitude is permitted in arguing to a jury. 
Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1975); Spencer v.
State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
880 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 904 (1963).  Logical
inferences may be drawn, and counsel is allowed to
advance all legitimate arguments.  Spencer.  The control
of comments is within the trial court’s discretion, and an
appellate court will not interfere unless an abuse of such
discretion is shown.  Thomas; Paramore v. State, 229 So.
2d 855 (Fla. 1969), modified, 408 U.S. 935 (1972).  A
new trial should be granted when it is “reasonably evident
that the remarks might have influenced the jury to reach a
more severe verdict of guilt than it would have otherwise
done.”  Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 704 (1977).  Each case must be
considered on its own merits, however, and within the
circumstances surrounding the complained of remarks.  Id. 
Compare Paramore with Wilson v. State, 294 So. 2d 327
(Fla. 1974).
Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882
(1982).
680 So. 2d at 418 (parallel citations omitted).
I conclude that in the instant case the majority does not give “wide latitude”
or respect the discretion of the trial court.  Nor do I believe this case is controlled by
Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998).  The majority’s comments in Urbin
concerning argument were dicta and should not be read as receding from this
Court’s longstanding case law giving the State latitude in making its argument.  The
Urbin majority specifically noted that what was said in respect to the prosecutor’s
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argument was advisory and did not deal with the issue of whether the argument was
objected to or was fundamental error.
I am particularly troubled that the majority holds that it was fundamental error
to allow a prosecutor to argue defendants to be persons of “true deep-seated violent
character”; that they are “people of longstanding violence”; that they “commit
violent, brutal crimes of violence”; and that they have a “character of violence.” 
This was penalty-phase argument.  The jury was evaluating aggravating
circumstances for purposes of the evaluation of defendant’s character.  Section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes, provides:  “[e]vidence may be presented as to any
matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of
the defendant . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  In the trial judge’s sentencing order he
found established as an aggravator that defendant Brooks had been previously
convicted of five felonies, including the use or threat of violence.  These felonies
included a robbery of a grocery store using a sawed-off shotgun.  These felonies
included a kidnapping and armed robbery.  To hold that it was improper for the
State to argue that this defendant has a character of violence is contrary to this
Court’s long-standing case law and unduly restricts the State from being able to
argue the evidence.  I do not find that to be error, but clearly it was not fundamental
error.
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I am very concerned about what appears to me to be an aggressive expansion
by this Court of the doctrine of fundamental error as applied to a prosecutor’s
closing argument.  In this argument defendant’s counsel did make several
objections.  A couple of objections were sustained.  There were no motions for
mistrial.
The expressions concerning the defendant’s violent character and the use of
the word “executed” were not the subject of objections.  It appears to me that the
majority is approaching a doctrine of fundamental error which encompasses a
correctness of speech which has never been part of our advocacy system–especially
at the appellate level.
I see two major problems with the majority’s approach.  First, an appellate
majority analysis from a cold record of “correct speech” will boil down to what
Judge Griffin noted in her dissent in Henry v. State, 743 So. 2d 52, 58 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999), as “attempting to measure the effect the prosecutor’s statement has on
the collective sensibilities of the reviewing court.”  Correctness will shift from panel
to panel.  Certainly there are words and expressions which are and should be out of
bounds, but appellate initiation of a limitation on a particular word use must be
tightly reined or the Court will be quickly overwhelmed with censorship disputes.
Second, word and expression limitations fit precisely within the reason for
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our contemporaneous objection rule.  The trial court is seeing the use of words and
expression in the flesh and in context.  If a word such as “executed” is so out of
bounds in the context of what is developing in the case before the trial judge, the
trial judge must be provided an opportunity to correct it so that another word may be
substituted.  It has to be left to defense counsel to make an objection because a trial
judge who steps in on his or her own runs the risk of stepping in to the detriment of
a defense counsel’s strategy.  It often is the case that counsel believes that the other
counsel’s argument is overbearing and has an adverse effect on the jury.  Leaving
strategic decisions, especially closing argument decisions, to trial counsel is how
advocacy works.  In actuality, the use of the word “executed” in the context of the
way it was argued does not even read that badly, and I have to conclude it must not
have sounded out of bounds since no objection was made to it.
I voted with the majority in Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), because
of the prosecutor’s personal discussion of her father’s heroism.  However, Ruiz was
not intended, at least by me, to pave the way for an expansion of the application of
the doctrine of fundamental error and certainly not a spawning of a doctrine which
would be routinely analyzing at the appellate level the correctness of speech.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Hon. Brad Stetson, Circuit Judge - Case No. 96-11057 CFA
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Nada M. Carey, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee