Title: Maddox v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 572, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GARY L. MADDOX, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 572, 2008 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 0802028998 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 5, 2009 
Decided: 
July  30, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 30th day of July 2009, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant-appellant, Gary 
L. Maddox (Maddox), of attempted first degree robbery and attempted theft.  
The Superior Court sentenced Maddox to a total period of twenty-six years 
at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after serving eleven years for ten 
years of probation.  This is Maddox’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
Maddox's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Maddox's counsel asserts that, based upon 
 
2 
a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Maddox's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Maddox with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Maddox also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Maddox has raised several 
issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to Maddox’s 
arguments, as well as to the position taken by Maddox's counsel, and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The testimony at trial reflected that Mohamhad Yousef was 
working outside of his son’s store, the Super Soda Center, on February 6, 
2008 when he was approached by a man who placed a gun in his side and 
twice asked, “Where’s the money?”  Yousef ran screaming into an adjoining 
                                                 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3 
business.  Meanwhile, the perpetrator opened the front door of the Super 
Soda Center and yelled to Sean Yousef, who was standing behind the cash 
register, “Where is the money? Give me the money!”  Sean Yousef called 
911, and the man ran away.  The police arrested Maddox for the attempted 
robbery on February 23, 2008 after a citizen identified him from a 
surveillance photograph of the perpetrator that was published in a local 
newspaper.  Upon his arrest, Maddox admitted that he had been at the Super 
Soda Center on February 6, the night of the attempted robbery.  Maddox 
testified at trial, however, that he was there with his then-girlfriend to buy 
lottery tickets, a statement that was rebutted by the testimony of the 
girlfriend at trial.  Sean Yousef identified Maddox as the perpetrator at trial, 
although his father could not.  The jury found Maddox guilty of the 
attempted first degree robbery of Mohamhad Yousef and attempted theft, as 
a lesser included offense of attempted second degree robbery, with respect to 
Sean Yousef.  The jury found Maddox not guilty of two counts of possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony and one count of possession 
of a firearm by a person prohibited. 
(5) 
Maddox has raised six issues in his response to his counsel’s 
motion to withdraw.  First, he contends that the Superior Court erred in only 
admitting part of the statement that Maddox made to police at the time of his 
 
4 
arrest.  Second, he argues that the first count of the indictment was 
constitutionally defective.  Third, he argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain his convictions.  Fourth, he contends that a ruling by 
the Superior Court denied him the effective assistance of legal counsel.  
Fifth, he contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct.  Finally, he 
argues that the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury 
on the “display” element of the attempted robbery charge.  We address these 
claims in order. 
(6) 
Maddox first argues that it was error for the Superior Court to 
admit only the inculpatory part of the statement he made to police upon his 
arrest without admitting the entirety of his statement.  Maddox did not raise 
this objection at trial.  Accordingly, we review it on appeal for plain error.2 
The trial judge admitted Maddox’s statement that he was at the Super Soda 
Center on February 6 because it was a statement against interest by a party-
opponent, which is not hearsay under the Delaware Rules of Evidence.3  The 
exculpatory portion of Maddox’s statement did not fall within any exception 
                                                 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
3 Del. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 
 
5 
to the hearsay rule.4  Accordingly, we find no merit to Maddox’s first 
argument. 
(7) 
Maddox next contends that the indictment charging him with 
attempted first degree robbery was constitutionally defective because it did 
not include the term “displayed” what appeared to be a deadly weapon.5   
The indictment, however, specifically identified 11 Del. C. § 831(a)(2) as 
the crime Maddox was charged with committing and included the name of 
the offense.  This Court previously has held that an indictment containing 
the official citation to the statute and the name of the offense was sufficient 
information to put a defendant on notice of the crime with which he was 
charged even though an element of the crime was omitted from the 
indictment.6  We conclude that the indictment in this case provided full 
notice to Maddox of what he was called upon to defend.  Accordingly, we 
reject Maddox’s second argument on appeal. 
                                                 
4 See Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1995) (defendant has no right to admit self-
serving statements in his defense). 
5 Count I of the indictment charged Attempted Robbery in the First Degree: “Gary L. 
Maddox, on or about the 6th day of February, 2008, in the County of Sussex, State of 
Delaware, did intentionally engage in conduct which, under the circumstances as he 
believed them to be, constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to 
culminate in the commission of Robbery in the First Degree, as defined by 11 Del. C. § 
832(a)(2) to wit: when attempting to commit theft he threatened the use of immediate 
force upon Mohamhad Yousaf [with] what appeared to be a deadly weapon, a handgun, 
in violation of Title 11, §531(2) of the Delaware Code.” 
6 Malloy v. State, 462 A.2d 1088, 1092-93 (Del. 1983). 
 
6 
(8) 
Maddox next argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for attempted first degree robbery of Mohamhad 
Yousef because the State’s evidence only established that the perpetrator 
asked Yousef where the money was but did not demand it.  In reviewing a 
claim of insufficient evidence, this Court, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, must determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.7  In this case, the 
jury was free to consider Mohamhad Yousef’s testimony that the perpetrator 
held a gun to his side while asking him where the money was, and to 
determine that, under the circumstances, the perpetrator was making a 
demand for money, regardless of the actual language he used.  Under the 
circumstances, we find the evidence of attempted first degree robbery to be 
sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we reject Maddox’s 
third claim on appeal. 
(9) 
Maddox’s fourth argument is that the trial judge denied him the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to lift a ban on 
communication between Maddox and his counsel, which the judge imposed 
during a break in Maddox’s testimony. Maddox argues that the continuing 
ban on communication between counsel and client prevented him from 
                                                 
7 Farmer v. State, 844 A.2d 297, 300 (Del. 2004). 
 
7 
pointing out to his counsel that no “demand” for money was ever made to 
Mohamhad Yousef.  We reject this claim for several reasons.  First, it is 
clear from the judge’s statement that the ban on communication between 
Maddox and his counsel was in effect only during the break taken while 
Maddox was in the middle of testifying and was not intended to extend 
beyond Maddox’s time on the stand.8  Moreover, we have already concluded 
that the point Maddox wished to communicate to his counsel had no legal 
merit.  Therefore, to the extent the judge’s ban could have been 
misinterpreted by Maddox to extend beyond his cross-examination, we find 
that Maddox suffered no prejudice.  Accordingly, we reject this fourth claim 
on appeal. 
(10) Maddox next alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
by misrepresenting facts during closing arguments.  Specifically, Maddox 
asserts that, with respect to Mohamhad Yousef’s testimony, the prosecutor 
incorrectly stated that Yousef testified the perpetrator said, “Give me the 
money.”  We review this claim for plain error because Maddox did not raise 
this argument below.9  Under the plain error standard, the error complained 
                                                 
8 The judge told Maddox, “Mr. Maddox, your lawyer is aware of the rules.  You can’t 
communicate with your lawyer at this point during this break because you are in the 
middle of cross-examination and that is not permitted.” 
9 Hardy . State, 962 A.2d 244, 247 (Del. 2008). 
 
8 
of must be so clearly prejudicial as to jeopardize the integrity of the trial.10  
Even if we assume error in the prosecutor’s statement of the facts in this 
case, however, the error did not jeopardize the outcome of the trial for the 
reasons we have already explained.  Regardless of the specific language he 
used, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Maddox made 
a demand for money.  Accordingly, we reject Maddox’s fifth claim on 
appeal. 
(11) Finally, Maddox contends that the Superior Court failed to 
adequately instruct the jury on the “display” element of attempted first 
degree robbery.  We disagree.  The trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 
Count 1 of the indictment alleges attempted robbery in the first 
degree: Gary L. Maddox, on or about the 6th day of February, 2008, in 
the County of Sussex, State of Delaware did intentionally engage in 
conduct, which, under the circumstances as he believed them to be, 
constituted a substantial step in the course of conduct planned to 
culminate in the commission of robbery in the first degree, as defined 
by 11 Del. C. § 832, to wit: When attempting to commit theft, he 
threatened the use of immediate force upon Mohamhad Yousef with 
what appeared to be a deadly weapon, a handgun, in violation of Title 
11, Section 531(2). 
 
The pertinent definition of robbery in the first degree in the Criminal 
Code is as follows: A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree 
when he commits the crime of robbery in the second degree and 
when, in the course of the commission of the crime, he displays what 
appears to be a deadly weapon. 
 
                                                 
10 Id. 
 
9 
In response to a question from the jury during its deliberations, the trial 
judge further instructed the jury that, “On the robbery one, the charge is 
displaying what appeared to be a gun.  It does not have to be a gun.  If it 
looked like a gun and he displays it, and the perception was that it was a gun 
from the complaining witness, he can be found guilty of attempted robbery 
in the first degree.”  Accordingly, Maddox’s assertion that the Superior 
Court “failed to instruct the jury on the ‘display’ element at all” is 
contradicted by the record.  The instruction, as given, sufficiently explained 
the elements of first degree robbery that the victim must subjectively believe 
the defendant had a weapon and that the defendant’s threat was accompanied 
by an objective manifestation of what appeared to a weapon.11  
Consequently, we reject Maddox’s final argument on appeal. 
(12) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Maddox’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Maddox's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Maddox could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
11 See Walton v. State, 821 A.2d 871, 874 (Del. 2003). 
 
10 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice