Title: Victor Tony Jones v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-726
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-726 
____________ 
 
VICTOR TONY JONES,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 24, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Victor Tony Jones, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, 
appeals an order denying his successive motion to vacate the judgment and 
sentence and an order concluding that he is not mentally retarded.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art.V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Jones raises two claims:  (1) that the 
court erred in concluding that the second prong of the definition of mental 
retardation requires a current assessment of adaptive functioning; and (2) that the 
trial court erred in concluding that Jones is not mentally retarded.  We affirm the 
circuit court’s orders. 
I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
On December 19, 1990, Jones, on his second day of work, killed his two 
employers, Matilda and Jacob Nestor, in their office.  Jones v. State, 652 So. 2d 
346 (Fla.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875 (1995).  Before he died, Jacob Nestor shot 
Jones in the head.  Jones needed surgery to remove the bullet.  He was convicted of 
two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery. 
A. Competency, Mitigation, and the Penalty Phase 
 
At a competency hearing held before the penalty phase, several doctors 
testified: two psychiatrists and two neuropsychologists.  During the penalty phase, 
Dr. Jethro Toomer, a psychologist who evaluated Jones, testified for the defense 
that Jones was abandoned by his mother, that the statutory mitigator of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance applied, and that Jones suffered from borderline 
personality disorder.  Dr. Charles Mutter, a forensic psychiatrist, testified for the 
State to rebut this testimony.  At the Spencer1 hearing, Dr. Hyman Eisenstein 
testified for the defense that as a result of the gunshot wound, Jones was not 
competent.  No one testified that Jones was mentally retarded.  Laura Long, an 
aunt of Jones who raised him, testified that he performed well in elementary school 
and was well behaved until about age 11 when he became a runaway and used 
                                          
 
 
1.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993) (requiring trial court to 
hold a hearing after the penalty phase to afford the defendant and the State an 
opportunity to present additional evidence). 
 
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drugs.  The court found three aggravators, but no mitigation, and sentenced Jones 
to death for both murders.  We affirmed.  Jones, 652 So. 2d at 349. 
B. Mitigation and the Postconviction Motion 
 
Jones subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 
3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, raising almost two dozen claims.  
Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 614-15 & 615 n.1 (Fla. 2003).  The circuit court 
limited the evidentiary hearing to Jones’s “claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel related to a voluntary intoxication defense, mitigation, and appellant’s 
pretrial competency.”  Id. at 615.  At that hearing, Jones presented the testimony of 
two relatives: his sister Pamela Mills and his cousin Carl Leon Miller.  They 
testified to physical childhood abuse Jones suffered when they all lived with their 
aunt, Laura Long.  Jones’s trial counsel testified that he was successful only in 
contacting Jones’s aunt, grandmother, and third-grade teacher, who largely 
provided a positive early childhood history for Jones.  Jones’s third-grade teacher, 
Mrs. Vera Edwards, testified at the evidentiary hearing that Jones was “well 
prepared for school every day,” well behaved, and of “a little above average” 
intelligence, and he demonstrated no signs of being physically abused.  School 
records indicated that in later years, when Jones began using drugs and skipping 
school, his grades drastically slipped.  Several experts who had examined him 
testified on his behalf.  Again, no one testified that he was mentally retarded.  The 
 
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circuit court found some of the testimony not credible and held that defense 
counsel’s decision regarding which experts would testify at trial was strategic and 
reasonable.  Jones, 855 So. 2d at 618.  This Court affirmed the circuit court’s 
denial of relief.  Id. at 615-16. 
C. The Hearing on Mental Retardation 
 
Jones next filed a successive postconviction motion, alleging that he is 
mentally retarded.  At the time, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, which 
governs this issue, was not final, and the circuit court summarily denied Jones’s 
motion.  Jones appealed the order, arguing that he was entitled to a hearing under 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and rule 3.203.  We relinquished 
jurisdiction for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
 
At the hearing, three witnesses testified: one (Dr. Eisenstein) on behalf of 
Jones, and two (Dr. Enrique Suarez and Lisa Wiley, a psychological specialist with 
the Department of Corrections) on behalf of the State.  The parties stipulated that 
evidence from the evidentiary hearing would be considered cumulatively with the 
evidence from prior proceedings. 
 
The evidence established the following: Jones was born in 1961.  At a young 
age, he and his siblings were taken from his alcoholic mother and sent to live with 
different relatives.  Jones and his sister Pamela lived with their aunt Laura Long in 
Miami.  Jones ran away a few times, and at age 11 stowed away on an airplane and 
 
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flew to New York City, where he lived for a time with his alcoholic mother.  At 
age 13, he overdosed and was admitted to intensive care in Miami, and in 1975, at 
age 14, at the request of the juvenile court he was admitted to Jackson Memorial 
Hospital for psychiatric evaluation.  With the observation that Jones had a 
“completely normal mental status” during his stay, he was discharged with a 
diagnosis of “unsocialized aggressive reaction of adolescence,” with no psychiatric 
treatment needed.  A hospital document indicated that Jones previously had been 
labeled at a juvenile facility as having borderline mental retardation, but no 
documentation supported the statement. 
 
School records indicated that Jones was in regular classes.  He earned mostly 
Cs in grades one and two, with some As and Bs in English and writing.  His third- 
grade teacher reported that he was of “a little above average intelligence” and did 
well in school.  In seventh grade he again earned Cs with Bs in English.  In eighth 
grade as he began using drugs, skipping school, and having disciplinary problems, 
his grades dropped precipitously.  Jones dropped out of high school at age 16.  
During his teenage years, he was in several juvenile placements over various 
periods of time. 
 
After discharge from the State juvenile system in 1978, Jones stayed in 
Miami a short time, working as a waiter.  Then he hitchhiked alone to Texas, 
supporting himself by working various jobs and selling drugs.  Then, he flew to 
 
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San Francisco, where he supported himself mostly through robberies.  Jones 
returned to Miami in 1979 for a short time, and then traveled to Atlanta, where he 
lived for several years, working various jobs over time, including bouncer and 
waiter.  During that time, he had several girlfriends, and lived for a time with a 
“common law wife.”  He returned to Miami in 1986, where he supported himself 
by cutting lawns and selling drugs.  Then, in 1989 he was arrested for armed 
robbery, and he was under sentence of imprisonment in 1990 when, at the age of 
29, he committed the murders of the Nestors and was shot in the head. 
 
Various doctors administered either the WAIS-R (Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scales) or WAIS-III intelligence tests between 1991 and 2005, and 
Jones’s IQ scores were as follows:  72, 70, 67, 72, and 75.  The doctors also 
administered other tests, including the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory) and the WRAT (Wide Range Achievement Test). 
 
Dr. Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist, had been involved in Jones’s case 
beginning with the trial and during those fifteen years had tested and interviewed 
Jones on various occasions.  Admitting that he had not previously diagnosed Jones 
as mentally retarded, he nevertheless opined that he was.  Eisenstein testified that 
the criteria for diagnosing mental retardation are an IQ score of below 70, two 
areas of deficiency in adaptive skills, and onset before age 18.  Acknowledging 
that Jones’s scores were higher than that, the expert stated that the applicable 
 
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diagnostic manual allowed for a mental retardation diagnosis when the IQ fell in 
the 70 to 75 range if the other two criteria are met.  Accordingly, Eisenstein 
conducted a “retrospective diagnosis” to assess Jones’s adaptive levels before age 
18.  He concluded that Jones’s adaptive skill levels as an adult were not part of the 
criteria defining mental retardation. 
   
Eisenstein determined that before age 18 Jones had significant deficits in 
adaptive functioning in the areas of (1) communication—family members said 
Jones was not articulate and was a slow learner; (2) academic function—family 
members said he was mentally slow and needed special schooling, and some 
school records showed failing grades; (3) self-direction—Jones’s sister said Jones 
needed her help when he was young and Eisenstein opined that Jones’s older, 
common law wife served as a “mother figure or a caregiver to take care of him”; 
(4) social interpersonal skills—family members said Jones was a loner; and (5) 
health and safety—family members said Jones did not take care of himself as a 
child, and he had numerous medical concerns that no one addressed.  Accordingly, 
Eisenstein concluded that because Jones met two prongs of the definition (onset 
before age 18 and deficiencies in adaptive skills), Jones’s borderline IQ scores did 
not invalidate his diagnosis of mental retardation.  
 
Lisa Wiley, a Department of Corrections psychological specialist with a 
masters degree in clinical psychology, knew Jones from 1993 to 2005 when she 
 
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conducted death row evaluations and counseling.  She testified that Jones always 
kept a neat cell and demonstrated polite and appropriate behavior.  He spoke 
rationally, coherently, and logically, and she never thought he was mentally 
retarded.  She regularly met with inmates such as Jones who were on psychotropic 
medications, and she helped process death row inmates’ requests for assistance.  
Jones filed written requests for assistance, such as a request to have his television 
repaired, and filed written grievances.  In 2004, Jones wrote the following 
grievance complaining that money sent from someone in Europe had not been 
credited to his inmate account: 
Dear Sir, This is regarding I’ve had money transferred through a bank 
in Belgium and back on the Fri th13-04 I received a bank receipt from 
them — where as I have never had my money put in my account or 
received a deposit receipt from Tallahassee and I’ve tried to get a 
copy of the receipt made, but could not, so I’m sending you my 
receipt.  So if you could please help me maybe after you see it you 
could make a copy and fax it to the bank, But according to the date, 
there is no reason why my money shouldn’t be in my account, would 
appreciate your help. 
 
Dr. Suarez, a psychologist, examined Jones for the State.  He also defined 
the criteria for mental retardation as significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning, concurrent deficits in present adaptive functioning, and onset before 
age 18.  He disagreed with Dr. Eisenstein, however, that the test for mental 
retardation limits the inquiry into adaptive functioning to the years before age 18.  
Dr. Suarez stated that according to the applicable diagnostic manual, the inquiry 
 
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into adaptive functioning must consider present circumstances because true mental 
retardation is lifelong.  A child deemed mentally retarded actually may be 
experiencing a developmental delay.  With appropriate training and skill 
development, that individual may, as an adult, no longer have the level of 
impairment required for the diagnosis.  Thus, a diagnosis of an adult, based solely 
on the person’s adaptive functioning as a child, is invalid.  Dr. Suarez stated that 
the purpose of the onset-before-age-18 requirement is to account for other causes.  
For example, an adult who suffered a head injury may test as mentally retarded, 
but without onset before age 18, that would not be the clinical diagnosis.  
 
Suarez interviewed Jones about his life history to the present, administered 
several tests, including achievement tests, nonverbal intelligence tests, memory 
tests, and the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (ABAS).  Dr. Suarez found 
Jones’s test scores on several tests indicated that he was purposely not performing 
his best, and on the MMPI he found that Jones was malingering.  On the ABAS 
administered to DOC staffers familiar with Jones’s current abilities, Jones’s 
adaptive functioning scores reflected a score of average, although all three staffers 
rated Jones’s social skills as borderline or below average.  Dr. Suarez also 
examined and considered the medical, school, prison, and testing records related to 
Jones, including those of the experts who previously examined Jones from the trial 
to the time of the hearing.  Suarez concluded that Jones is not mentally retarded.  
 
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Jones functions at least in the borderline to low average intelligence range, but 
borderline does not equal mental retardation.  Dr. Suarez further opined that it was 
highly probable that Jones has mild to moderate cognitive deficits due to brain 
injury from being shot in the head in 1990.  This suggested that Jones’s pre-injury 
level of intelligence was higher than his present level.  
 
Regarding his interview with Jones, Suarez found Jones to be articulate and 
noted Jones’s vocabulary, internally consistent sentences, detailed and insightful 
narration, and his understanding of concepts.  For example, as Jones recounted 
abuse he suffered as a child, Dr. Suarez asked him if the abuse was ever reported to 
the authorities.  Jones responded, “They had a family code thing.  They kept it 
secret like my cousin making my sister pregnant.”  In prison, Jones understood his 
own medical conditions, e.g., diabetes, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol, 
knew his medications, and was allowed to keep the medications in his cell and self-
administer them on schedule.  Jones recognized when he had medical problems, 
and requested help.2  As to the onset before age 18 prong, Dr. Suarez testified that 
Jones’s grades were good in school until junior high when his failing grades 
matched his poor conduct and effort.  He also noted that for an eleven-year-old to 
stowaway on an airline “takes a tremendous amount of sophistication.”  In short, 
                                          
 
 
2.  In one request, Jones wrote:  “I’m especially now very weak and 
constantly weak and sick on my stomach, and dizzy from blood sugar too high, and 
have not enough food which left me in coma like state, and I need to see the doctor 
ASAP.” 
 
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Jones’s demonstrated abilities, communication skills, and evident high degree of 
thought and daily functioning did not support a diagnosis of mental retardation. 
 
 Finding “no credible evidence” to support Jones’s claim, the circuit court 
held Jones did not meet even one of the three statutory requirements for mental 
retardation.  Jones appealed, raising the issues discussed below. 
II.  DETERMINING ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING 
 
Jones first argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his expert’s opinion 
that the second prong of the mental retardation definition requires a “retrospective” 
determination of his adaptive functioning before age 18, instead of an assessment 
of Jones’s adaptive functioning as an adult.  He also contends that the trial court 
erred in finding that Jones did not meet this prong of the definition.  We disagree. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to execute a person 
with mental retardation; however, it left to the States the task of defining that term.  
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).  Florida defines mental retardation in 
pertinent part as follows: 
 
(1)  As used in this section, the term "mental retardation" means 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing 
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during 
the period from conception to age 18. The term "significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning," for the purpose of this 
section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations 
from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in 
the rules of the Department of Children and Family Services.  The 
term “adaptive behavior,” for the purpose of this definition, means the 
 
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effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards 
of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or 
her age, cultural group, and community. 
§ 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added); accord Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(b) 
(containing the same definition).  Thus, we have stated that diagnosis of mental 
retardation requires three findings: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) onset of the 
condition before age 18.  See Burns v. State, 944 So. 2d 234, 245 (Fla. 2006). 
 
At the hearing in this case, both Drs. Eisenstein and Suarez agreed that these 
three prongs must be met.  Dr. Eisenstein testified, however, that the third prong—
onset before age 18—limits the inquiry into the second—deficient adaptive 
functioning.  He stated that in determining whether a person experiences deficits in 
adaptive functioning, only the person’s childhood behavior is considered.3  
 
To the extent that Jones argues that the statute and our rule require only a 
determination of a person’s adaptive skills before age 18, we review the issue de 
novo.  See Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006) (“The interpretation 
of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of 
review.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1268 (2007); Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. 
                                          
 
 
3.  Dr. Eisenstein stated that “adaptive functioning has to address the issue of 
the individual before age 18” and that “at age 44, [Jones’s] adaptive functioning, 
albeit important, . . . is not the criteria for defining and assessing mental 
retardation.” 
 
 
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Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 2006) (“The certified conflict issue involves the 
interpretation of the Court's rules and is a question of law subject to de novo 
review.”).  As explained below, we find that the plain language of the statute 
precludes the defense expert’s interpretation. 
 
The first step in determining the meaning of a statute is to examine its plain 
language.  Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (Fla. 2006).  When the language 
is clear and unambiguous, as it is here, we have no need to resort to rules of 
statutory construction to determine the legislature’s intent.  Id. at 1230-31(citing 
Lee County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So.2d 297, 303 (Fla. 2002)).  Further, 
words must be given their plain meaning and statutes should be construed to give 
them their full effect.  Id.  
 
Both Florida law and our rule state that the exception to the death penalty 
applies to a defendant who “is mentally retarded” or “has mental retardation.”  § 
921.137(2), Fla. Stat. (stating no person may be sentenced to death “if it is 
determined in accordance with this section that the defendant has mental 
retardation”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(e) (providing for an evidentiary hearing to 
consider “the issue of whether the defendant is mentally retarded”).  Thus, the 
question is whether a defendant “is” mentally retarded, not whether he was.  Both 
the statute and our rule define mental retardation as “significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive 
 
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behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.”  § 
921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(b).  Jones 
does not dispute that the intellectual functioning component must be based on 
current testing.  Moreover, his own expert based his determination of this prong 
largely on testing administered between 1991 and 2005, from the time Jones was 
29 to the time of the rule 3.203 hearing.  What Jones argues is that the second 
prong is concerned solely with an individual’s adaptive behavior as a child under 
age 18.  The legal definition, however, states that the intellectual functioning 
component must “exist[] concurrently with” the deficient adaptive behavior.  The 
word “concurrent” means “operating or occurring at the same time.”  Merriam 
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 239 (10th ed. 2001).  Jones’s analysis would 
require us to ignore the plain meaning of the phrase “existing concurrently with” 
that links the first two components of the definition.  The third prong—“and 
manifested during the period from conception to age 18”— specifies that the 
present condition of “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” and 
concurrent “deficits in adaptive behavior” must have first become evident during 
childhood. 
 
Further, as Jones admits, Florida’s definition of mental retardation is 
consistent with the definition of the American Psychiatric Association, which 
provides the following diagnostic criteria for mental retardation: 
 
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A.  Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning:  an IQ of 
approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ test 
(for infants, a clinical judgment of significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning). 
B.  Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning 
(i.e., the person’s effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for 
his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the 
following areas:  communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety. 
C.  The onset is before age 18 years. 
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 49 (4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV).  Thus, to the extent that Jones argues that 
the issue is not one of statutory construction but of an expert’s interpretation of the 
DSM-IV, the argument fails as well.  The DSM-IV states that the second criterion 
for mental retardation is “[c]oncurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive 
functioning.”  (Emphasis added.)  Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony that in this phrase the 
word “present” actually refers to past, or childhood, adaptive functioning would 
impose an Alice-in-Wonderland definition of the word “present.”  See Lewis 
Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (1872) (“When I use a word, it means just 
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”), quoted in Hartford Ins. Co. of 
the Midwest v. Minagorri, 675 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).  
 
First, we note that the circuit court’s task in this case was to apply the law, 
which is contained in the statute and rule cited above.  With regard to expert 
opinion, however, the court has discretion to accept or reject such testimony.  See 
 
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Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 2001) (applying an abuse of discretion 
standard to the trial court’s determination of competency made after hearing 
conflicting expert testimony).  The court rejected Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony and 
accepted Dr. Suarez’s testimony that the word “present” means “now.”  Dr. Suarez 
testified that the second prong of Florida’s definition of mental retardation and the 
second criterion of the DSM-IV mean the same thing.  As we explained above, we 
agree.  Further, on cross-examination Jones asked the State’s expert to explain the 
following passage from the DSM-IV: 
Mental Retardation is not necessarily a lifelong disorder.  Individuals 
who had Mild Mental Retardation earlier in their lives manifested by 
failure in academic learning tasks may, with appropriate training and 
opportunities, develop good adaptive skills in other domains and may 
no longer have the level of impairment required for a diagnosis of 
Mental Retardation. 
DSM-IV at 47.  Dr. Suarez explained that this statement illustrates that, because  
mental retardation is lifelong, a child may meet the criteria for the diagnosis 
because of developmental delays without being mentally retarded.  Unless the 
person also meets the criteria as an adult, the individual is not mentally retarded.  
Thus, diagnosis of mental retardation in an adult must be based on present or 
current intellectual functioning and adaptive skills and information that the 
condition also existed in childhood.  Accordingly, the trial court accepted Dr. 
Suarez’s interpretation of the DSM-IV, which was consistent with Florida law, and 
did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Dr. Eisenstein’s contrary opinion. 
 
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Next, Jones argues that Atkins essentially prohibits a determination of an 
individual’s current adaptive skills if that person, like Jones, is in prison.  He 
claims that adaptive functioning has to be determined from an individual’s 
adaptive functioning in the “outside world.”  To the contrary, as we stated above, 
the Court in Atkins left the definition and determination of mental retardation to 
the States.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399, 416-17 (1986)).  Moreover, the State’s expert did not base his opinion solely 
on his interviews with prison guards.  In determining that Jones was not deficient 
in adaptive behavior, Dr. Suarez relied on his interview with and testing of Jones, 
his examination of records regarding Jones’s life from his childhood to the time of 
the rule 3.203 hearing, and interviews and testing of DOC staffers who observed 
Smith on a regular basis. Thus, as Dr. Suarez admitted, while the adaptive skills 
test administered to DOC staff regarding Jones’s adaptive functioning is not ideally 
suited to a prison environment, the test was not his sole source of information.  
Further, the evidence demonstrates that both in and out of prison, Jones 
understands and manages his own life. 
 
In prison, Jones follows a daily exercise regimen of his own devising and 
uses improvised equipment to gain, according to Jones, the benefits of health and 
stress relief.  He understands his various medical problems, the related medication, 
and self-administers it on schedule.  He writes requests to see doctors, specifically 
 
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defining his medical problems, and suggests changes in diet or medication.  He 
manages the finances of his inmate account, including obtaining appropriate 
documentation, following up on money transfers from foreign countries, and filing 
grievances when he finds a discrepancy in the account. He keeps himself and his 
cell clean and orderly and visits the prison library twice a week.  His language 
skills in writing, speaking, and other intellectual skills are strong in light of his 
dropping out of school at an early age.  In addition, in the “outside world” as a 
young adult from age 18 to 29 (before he committed the murders), Jones traveled 
alone, lived in several states, and supported himself through various jobs.  He had 
girlfriends at various times and for several years lived with a “common law wife,” 
as he correctly termed her. 
 
Jones insists that the statements his relatives gave Dr. Eisenstein about his 
childhood are the only valid evidence regarding his adaptive functioning.  First, as 
we explained above, the adaptive functioning criterion is not limited to childhood, 
and, second, the validity of his relatives’ statements is questionable.  The 
statements Jones’s Aunt Laura apparently gave Dr. Eisenstein directly contradicted 
her prior testimony at Jones’s penalty phase, and the court in Jones’s prior 
postconviction hearing found his sister Pamela’s and his cousin Carl’s testimony 
not credible.  Further, these statements by relatives are contradicted by the record.  
For example, Jones’s relatives said he was a slow learner who was placed in 
 
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special classes.  However, his elementary school teacher testified previously that 
Jones was a good student, who was in regular classes and earned good grades.  
Jones’s school records support her statement.  The record shows that Jones’s 
failing grades in junior high coincide with his disciplinary problems and lack of 
effort.  In addition, Jones’s own detailed statements about his childhood contradict 
his relatives’ statements.   
 
Finally, Jones argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Jones “does 
not suffer from deficiencies in adaptive functioning.”  As illustrated by the 
foregoing discussion, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
determination.  See Trotter v. State, 932 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (Fla. 2006) (finding 
that “competent, substantial evidence support[ed]” circuit court’s determination 
that Trotter was not mentally retarded). 
III.  THE MENTAL RETARDATION DETERMINATION 
 
Jones next argues that the circuit court erred in determining that he also did 
not meet the other two prongs of the mental retardation definition—significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning and onset before age 18—and appears to 
contend that the court applied an incorrect standard of proof.  We affirm the trial 
court’s order. 
 
Jones first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that because his IQ 
was consistently above 70, he did not meet the first prong of the mental retardation 
 
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definition.  Jones claims that mental retardation may be diagnosed in individuals 
with IQs between 70 and 75 when they exhibit significant deficits in adaptive 
behavior.  First, we already have found the trial court’s determination that Jones is 
not deficient in adaptive functioning to be supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  Insofar as this involves the application of Florida’s statute, we find this 
claim also fails under the plain language of the statute. 
 
Under Florida law, the first prong of a mental retardation determination 
requires that the person exhibit “significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning," and further defines that term as “performance that is two or more 
standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test” 
specified by the Department of Children and Family Services.  § 921.137(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2005).  The Department in turn has designated the WAIS, the test 
administered to Jones, as an approved test.  Fla. Admin. Code R. 65B-4.032.  On 
the WAIS, a score of 70 is two standard deviations from the mean.  Accordingly, 
under the plain language of the statute, “significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning” correlates with an IQ of 70 or below.  See Zack v. State, 
911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005) (“Under Florida law, one of the criteria to 
determine if a person is mentally retarded is that he or she has an IQ of 70 or 
below.”).  Jones’s scores on the WAIS were as follows: 72 (1991), 70 (1993), 67 
(1999), 72 (2003), and 75 (2005).  In other words, the scores did not indicate 
 
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“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.”  Further, each of these 
tests was administered after Jones was shot in the head when he murdered the 
Nestors.  Dr. Suarez testified that his examination of the records and his testing of 
Jones indicated Jones’s intelligence was probably higher before the head injury.    
Dr. Eisenstein, Jones’s expert, testified that the head injury was a “major trauma” 
resulting in impairment of Jones’s ability to concentrate and remain focused, and 
negatively affecting his perceptual processes.  Further, none of the many doctors 
who examined Jones at trial and during prior postconviction proceedings, including 
Dr. Eisenstein, considered Jones to be mentally retarded.  Thus, competent, 
substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that Jones did not meet the 
first prong of the mental retardation definition. 
 
Next, Jones contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to 
meet the remaining prong of the mental retardation definition: manifestation or 
onset before age 18.  Much of Dr. Eisenstein’s “retrospective” diagnosis was 
focused on this prong.  The expert’s findings on this prong were based on 
statements from Jones’s Aunt Laura that contradicted her trial testimony,  
information garnered from Jones’s cousin and sister—witnesses whom the circuit 
court previously found not credible—and information selectively drawn from 
Jones’s records.  As explained in our discussion of the previous issue, valid record 
 
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evidence refuted claims that Jones was a slow learner in special classes who was 
unable to take care of himself. 
 
Finally, Jones appears to claim that the circuit court should not have applied 
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.  We need not address this claim.  In 
this case, the circuit court found that “[t]here is no credible evidence to suggest that 
Jones is mentally retarded.” (Emphasis added.)  Thus, Jones did not present 
evidence sufficient to meet even the lesser standard of preponderance of the 
evidence.  See Trotter, 932 So. 2d at 1049 n.5 (finding it unnecessary to address 
claim that clear and convincing standard was unconstitutional “because the trial 
court concluded that Trotter was not mentally retarded [under] either” standard).  
 
In his reply brief, Jones raises for the first time a claim that that the trial 
court abused its discretion by appointing Dr. Eisenstein as an expert at defendant’s 
request because the court was not “open to hearing and considering his testimony.”  
First, this claim was not preserved for review.  Further, because it was first raised 
in the reply brief, we need not address it.  See Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757, 763 
(Fla. 2002) (“Hall made no argument regarding equal protection in his initial brief; 
thus, he is procedurally barred from making this argument in his reply brief.”); Fla. 
R. App. P. 9.210(d) (“The reply brief shall contain argument in response and 
rebuttal to argument presented in the answer brief.”).  In any event, the claim is 
meritless.  Judgments of credibility are within the trial court’s purview.  The record 
 
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indicates that the circuit court considered all the testimony, and its determination 
that Jones is not mentally retarded is not an indication otherwise.  Accordingly, the 
court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Eisenstein.  See Porter v. State, 788 
So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001) (stating that regarding a trial court’s decisions on 
questions of fact, credibility of witnesses, and evidentiary weight, “this Court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court”). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the circuit court’s orders denying 
Jones’s successive motion for postconviction relief and determining that Jones is 
not mentally retarded. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Victoria Platzer, Judge - Case No. 90-50143 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Southern Region, and 
William M. Hennis, III, Litigation Director CCRC-South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
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