Title: Griggs v. Combe, Inc.
Citation: 456 So. 2d 790
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 1984

456 So. 2d 790 (1984)
Jonnie GRIGGS and Glenn Griggs
v.
COMBE, INC.
83-530-CER.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 21, 1984.
Francis H. Hare, Jr. and R. Gordon Pate of Hare, Wynn, Newell &amp; Newton, Birmingham, for appellants.
Frank E. Lankford, Jr. of Huie, Fernambucq &amp; Stewart, Birmingham, for appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
Pursuant to Rule 18, A.R.A.P., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh *791 Circuit has certified the following question to this Court:
The facts as certified show that Jonnie Griggs suffered a systemic illness known as Stevens-Johnson syndrome after using Vagisil, a nonprescription topical analgesic designed to relieve vaginal itch. Her doctor diagnosed her condition as having been caused by an allergic reaction to benzocaine, one of the active ingredients in Vagisil. For purposes of the question to be resolved, Combe, Incorporated, the manufacturer of Vagisil, accepts as true the assertion that the benzocaine in Vagisil caused the Stevens-Johnson syndrome suffered by Griggs.
Discovery in the district court produced references to the Food and Drug Administration proposed rule on external analgesic over-the-counter drugs, 44 Fed.Reg. 69,768 (1979), which included the following remarks on the safety of benzocaine:
Id., at 69,793.
The answer to the certified question may be found from an analysis of the principles of law announced in Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala.1976), and Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 *792 So. 2d 134 (Ala.1976). In these cases, this Court announced the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine. The doctrine was modelled after the product liability concepts of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), with one important difference: this Court rejected the "no-fault" concept of the Restatement.
The fault concept retained in AEMLD cases is the marketing of a "defective" product, "not reasonably safe when applied to its intended use," Casrell, at 132; Atkins, at 139. The Court held that "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" are synonymous; "a `defect' is that which renders a product `unreasonably dangerous,' i.e., not fit for its intended purpose." Casrell, at 133.
The Court noted in Atkins that although the holding "modifies the Restatement's theory of strict liability, the Comment, in large measure, retains its utility." 335 So. 2d  at 143, n. 5. Pertinent among the Comments is the following excerpt from Comment j:
This statement makes it clear that Combe had no duty to warn of a possible allergic reaction which it had no reason to suspect might occur, under the facts as presented to us. Moreover, since the facts certified to us show that Combe could not have known "by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight" that the product presented a danger of injury of the kind suffered by Griggs, we cannot say that the product was "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous." To do so would be to impose strict liability, a position expressly rejected in Casrell and Atkins and following decisions. See, e.g., Stone v. Smith, Kline &amp; French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301 (Ala.1984), and Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991 (Ala.1981). This result is consonant with the holding in Grau v. Procter &amp; Gamble Co., 324 F.2d 309 (5th Cir.1963). See also, Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 298 (1973).
The same analysis shows that Griggs cannot recover under negligence or duty-to-warn theories. If Combe could have no foreknowledge of this type of injury, it was not negligent in marketing the product, nor did it have a duty to warn of such an unforeseeable risk.
The claim under implied warranty of merchantability presents a slightly different problem. Code 1975, § 7-2-3124, defines the implied warranty of merchantability which accompanies sales by merchants such as in the instant case. Among the definitions of "merchantable" is the provision that the goods "[a]re fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." Id., § 7-2-314(2)(c).
Our review of the authorities on this Uniform Commercial Code warranty discloses that most jurisdictions hold that if a drug is fit for use by a normal person, the manufacturer will not be liable for an uncommon allergic reaction.
3 Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service § 7.01[4] (1984) (footnotes omitted).
3 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability § 29.03[1] (1984).
Among the cases which these authorities cite, that which appears to go the farthest in imposing liability is Crotty v. Spartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960). Even this case would require that "an appreciable number of people"rather than the presumably larger group of "normal" personswould be affected.
For all that appears in the question before us, Griggs is the only person who has suffered this kind of injury in the long history of use of the drug in question. We agree with the above authorities that a product must adversely affect at least some significant number of persons before a question of "merchantability" arises. Therefore, Griggs cannot recover under this theory, either.
For the reasons stated above, we answer the certified question in the negative.
QUESTION ANSWERED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, JONES, SHORES and ADAMS, JJ., concur.