Title: People v. Thomas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S161781
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JUSTIN HEATH THOMAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S161781 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIF086792 
 
 
January 26, 2023 
 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye* authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
S161781 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
Defendant Justin Heath Thomas shot and killed Rafael 
Noriega in Riverside County in September 1992.  Defendant was 
not immediately apprehended.  He moved to Texas in 1994 and, 
less than one year later, stabbed and killed Regina Hartwell.  He 
was convicted in a Texas court of Hartwell’s murder and 
sentenced to life in prison.  California law enforcement officials 
later identified defendant as a suspect in Noriega’s death.  In 
2001, the Riverside County District Attorney filed an 
information charging defendant with Noriega’s murder.    
A 
Riverside 
County 
jury 
subsequently 
convicted 
defendant of the first degree murder of Noriega (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a)),1 and found true the special circumstance 
allegation that the murder was committed while defendant was 
engaged in the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(17)(A)).  In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found true 
the special circumstance allegation that defendant was 
previously convicted of Hartwell’s murder.  (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(2).)  The jury returned a verdict of death.  Defendant moved 
for modification of his sentence to life without the possibility of 
parole.  (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)  The trial court denied the motion 
 
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated.   
 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
2 
and sentenced him to death.  Defendant’s appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase Evidence 
1. Prosecution evidence 
a. The killing of Rafael Noriega 
In 1992, defendant was involved in distributing crystal 
methamphetamine in Moreno Valley, California.  He obtained 
the narcotics from Rafael Noriega and supplied them to Dorothy 
Lee Brown, who in turn sold the drugs.2  Defendant’s uncle, 
Andy Anchondo, managed a ranch outside Moreno Valley.  
Defendant kept his methamphetamine supply at the ranch and 
stayed there on occasion. 
On September 14, 1992, Noriega received a call on his 
pager when he was at home.  After Noriega responded to the 
page, he had a discussion with his roommates Robert Manzano 
and Michelle Barajas.  Both warned Noriega not to deal with the 
person who paged him; Manzano suggested that Noriega bring 
a revolver for protection.  Barajas tried to stop defendant from 
leaving.  Noriega said he would return, and left. 
Defendant planned to meet Noriega in the foothills of 
Moreno Valley early the following morning.  Defendant drove in 
 
2  
Brown testified during defendant’s Texas trial for 
Hartwell’s murder.  Brown was later shot and killed by police 
during a vehicle pursuit in 2004.  Brown’s testimony from the 
Texas trial was read into the record during defendant’s 
California trial. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
3 
a truck with Kelly Smith to the foothills around 3:00 a.m.3  
Brown, driving her own car, met defendant there.  Defendant 
told Brown they were going to meet Noriega.  He asked Brown 
to follow defendant in her car to make sure defendant was not 
ambushed.  On a trail near Anchondo’s ranch, defendant told 
Brown to park and wait; defendant drove further into the 
foothills.  As Brown was waiting, an older couple approached her 
and told her it was dangerous for her to be there alone.  Brown 
informed the couple she was waiting for her boyfriend and that 
she would be leaving soon. 
After the couple left, Brown exited her car and ran to 
where defendant had stopped his truck.  Brown saw defendant’s 
truck parked behind Noriega’s car, with the truck’s headlights 
illuminating the rear of Noriega’s car.  Brown watched as 
defendant got out of his truck and yelled something in Spanish.  
Noriega walked to the back of his car, opened his trunk, and 
removed a green duffel bag.  Defendant picked up a handgun 
from the seat of his truck and shot at Noriega several times in 
rapid succession.  Brown saw that Noriega had been shot and 
had fallen to the ground, but she could not tell how many times 
he had been shot.  Brown ran back to her car. 
Defendant approached Brown and asked if she heard the 
gunshots.  Brown said she had.  Defendant instructed Brown to 
get out of her car and to follow him back to Noriega’s car.  Brown 
saw Noriega lying on the ground and saw Smith drive Noriega’s 
car away.  Defendant told Brown to get into his truck, and he 
 
3  
An investigator asserted Smith was the individual with 
defendant, although no independent evidence was presented at 
trial identifying Smith. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
4 
threw Noriega’s body into the back of the truck.  Brown also saw 
the green duffel bag in the back of the truck.  Defendant ordered 
Brown to drive.  To Brown, it seemed that he was directing her 
to drive in a large circle.  When she stopped, defendant told her 
she was close to her car.  Brown got out of defendant’s truck, ran 
to her own car, and drove home. 
About two hours later, defendant arrived at Brown’s 
home, showered and clean-shaven.  He returned a broken shovel 
that he had taken from Brown without her knowledge.  He also 
gave Brown a large amount of methamphetamine and told her 
that he was going to leave town. 
Later that day, three individuals driving in the foothills 
discovered Noriega’s car near Anchondo’s ranch.  There was a 
pile of burned debris on the driver’s side floorboard and a loaded 
.22-caliber handgun under the driver’s seat.4 
In mid-October 1992, a group of individuals horseback 
riding in the foothills discovered Noriega’s body near where 
Noriega’s car had been found.  The body was positioned 
facedown in the dirt under a wooden pallet and was in a state of 
decomposition.  Law enforcement officials who responded to the 
scene believed the pallet had been moved onto the body from a 
pile of dirt nearby.5 
 
4  
Authorities destroyed the gun in August 1996 because it 
had not been claimed and they were not aware it was connected 
to the investigation regarding Noriega’s killing. 
5  
Officers discovered a .45-caliber bullet casing under 
Noriega’s body, although an investigator opined that the casing 
did not appear connected to Noriega’s death and that it was 
common for people to fire guns in the area. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
5 
Officials at the coroner’s office searched Noriega’s body 
and found jewelry, a watch, and a jacket containing four small 
baggies of methamphetamine.  Dr. Robert Ditraglia, the forensic 
pathologist who performed an autopsy on Noriega’s body, 
described the body as “[s]everely decomposed” and “partially 
skeletonized.”  The autopsy revealed a hole in the center of 
Noriega’s sternum, multiple holes in his chest, two fractured 
ribs, and fractures to his sacrum and coccyx.  Ditraglia opined 
these injuries were consistent with gunshot wounds.  Bullet 
fragments collected from Noriega’s body were consistent with 
medium caliber ammunition such as a nine-millimeter, .32-
caliber, or .38-caliber bullets.  Although the trajectory of the 
bullets could not be determined, the injuries were consistent 
with Noriega being shot from the front.  The wound to Noriega’s 
sternum would have been potentially fatal on its own. 
Defendant left town within weeks of Noriega’s killing.  In 
January 1993, law enforcement suspended the investigation 
into Noriega’s death because they had no leads.  Defendant 
enlisted in the Army in February 1993.  He was discharged in 
September 1994 and returned to California.  He then moved to 
Austin, Texas, in late 1994, where he started dating Kimberley 
Reeder.  In May or June 1995, defendant told Reeder he had 
killed a man in California named “Rafa” because Rafa was a 
“narc.”  Defendant told Reeder that he put the body in the back 
of his truck and then hid it in or near some caves.6  He told 
Reeder that when coworkers asked him about blood in the back 
 
6  
Three caves were located less than a mile from where 
Noriega’s body was found. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
6 
of his truck, he told them it came from deer hunting.  Defendant 
never told Reeder that he killed Rafa in self-defense. 
John Sams, an acquaintance of Reeder’s, testified that he 
overheard defendant stating that he shot someone in California 
for drugs and took a bag of speed from the person.  Sams heard 
defendant say he was from California, where “we kill people for 
things like” “[g]etting out of line, money, drugs, things of that 
nature.”  Sams believed defendant was bragging or trying to 
impress people.  Sams did not hear defendant assert he shot 
anyone in self-defense.7 
Investigator Martin Silva interviewed defendant in Texas 
in January 2000.8  Silva told defendant that he believed 
defendant killed Noriega.  Silva confronted defendant with 
statements from Brown and Reeder implicating defendant.  He 
said (apparently as a ruse) that Smith and defendant’s ex-wife 
had implicated him as well.  Silva suggested that defendant may 
have shot Noriega in self-defense, and that the shooting 
occurred after a drug transaction went poorly.  Defendant 
admitted to engaging in methamphetamine and firearm 
transactions with Noriega but denied killing him.  He also 
claimed that he was not living in Moreno Valley when the killing 
 
7  
It was introduced at trial that Sams had been convicted of 
two misdemeanor assaults in Texas and was previously arrested 
for aggravated robbery but later released without being 
charged.  Sams’s brother supplied Regina Hartwell with cocaine 
for drug transactions. 
8  
Defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 and waived them prior to the 
interview. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
7 
took place.  Defendant referred to Noriega as “Rafa” and said 
they spoke Spanish to each other. 
As the interview progressed, defendant told Silva that he 
was getting nervous.  He stated, “[W]hen I had left I thought 
that shit was dead,” and he asked “how involved” Silva believed 
that defendant was.  Defendant claimed he was in Texas when 
Noriega was killed, and that his family and former boss could 
verify his alibi.  Silva told defendant the District Attorney’s 
Office was seeking to extradite defendant to California.  
Defendant said, “See and in order for that, that means . . . you 
guys pretty much know that I did this.”  Defendant also asked 
whether the others involved would be charged and whether 
Smith “ever sa[id] he got something out of it.” 
Silva again suggested that defendant killed Noriega in 
self-defense or because defendant was high.  Defendant 
maintained that he knew nothing about Noriega’s killing, and 
he claimed that Brown and Smith were lying about his 
involvement. 
b. Evidence of other acts 
i. Threat to kill Mike Aguon and “Christine” 
In 1991, defendant was living in California with 
Maximillian Garcia, Mike Aguon, and a woman named 
Christine.  One day, defendant became paranoid that Aguon and 
Christine were going to turn him in to the police.  Defendant 
placed a shotgun behind the front door and told Garcia he was 
going to shoot Aguon and Christine when they returned.  Garcia 
warned Aguon and Christine to stay away from the residence 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
8 
until defendant calmed down.  Defendant eventually did calm 
down, and no violence occurred.9 
ii. Threat to shoot police officers 
In 1992, defendant was living with his ex-wife in Norco, 
California.  The two argued when defendant came home drunk, 
and she said she was going to call the police.  Defendant said, “I 
got something for them,” and went to his bedroom to retrieve 
and load a shotgun.  Defendant’s cousin tried to wrestle the gun 
away from defendant, and the gun discharged into the wall.  
Defendant eventually left the residence when police arrived.  He 
was not charged with any offense. 
iii. Murder of Regina Hartwell 
Defendant moved from California to Texas in late 1994, 
and began dating Reeder in 1995.  Through Reeder, defendant 
met Hartwell; Hartwell and Reeder had previously dated.  
Defendant and Hartwell had a contentious relationship. 
In June 1995, Hartwell threatened to tell police that 
defendant was selling drugs.  In response, defendant stabbed 
and killed Hartwell.  He then placed Hartwell’s body in the back 
of her car and drove it to a rural area, doused it in gasoline, and 
set it on fire.  Additional details regarding Hartwell’s murder 
are discussed in section II.B.1., post. 
2. Defense evidence 
Defendant recalled Investigator Silva as a witness.  Silva 
had interviewed Reeder approximately three years after 
 
9  
At trial, Garcia claimed not to recall the incident, which 
he had previously described to an investigator.  Garcia had 
informed another investigator that he was reluctant to testify 
because he did not want to be labeled a snitch. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
9 
defendant’s 1996 trial in Texas and had interviewed Brown 
when she was in prison in 1998.  Silva testified that Reeder had 
said that her statement to the Texas authorities had been taped, 
and that defendant had told her he had hidden “Rafa” in some 
caves.  Reeder never told Silva that defendant threatened her, 
hit her, or forced her to do anything. 
Silva also recounted that Brown told him she was addicted 
to methamphetamine at the time Noriega was killed and that 
she was heavily intoxicated on methamphetamine at the time of 
the shooting.  Brown also told Silva that she and defendant had 
used speed prior to the shooting, that defendant did not need 
money, that defendant and Noriega were arguing in Spanish 
prior to the shooting, that she was not certain what was in the 
green duffel bag, that defendant used a 9-millimeter Glock to 
shoot Noriega,10 and that she lied to another detective about the 
shooting because she was on drugs. 
B. Penalty Phase Evidence 
1. Prosecution’s case in aggravation 
The prosecution’s case in aggravation included evidence 
presented during the guilt phase regarding the killing of 
Noriega, the evidence underlying defendant’s conviction for 
Hartwell’s murder, and the 1992 incident when defendant 
threatened to shoot police.   
The prosecution also presented victim impact evidence 
from Armida R., Noriega’s sister who was approximately 13 
 
10 
Silva clarified that Brown told him that defendant brought 
a Glock to Brown’s apartment on the morning of the shooting, 
but that she never expressly said the Glock was used to shoot 
Noriega. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
10 
years old when Noriega was killed.  She described her warm and 
affectionate relationship with Noriega and that he had taken 
care of her.  She recounted the suffering she and her parents 
experienced when they learned of Noriega’s death. 
The prosecution presented additional evidence regarding 
several prior acts.  A correctional officer testified that in 
September 2005 he searched defendant’s cell and found a four-
inch metal shank.  The officer testified the shank was capable of 
cutting people in a “pretty brutal” way, and that he had seen 
people seriously injured with similar weapons.  Although he was 
unaware of defendant stabbing anyone in prison, he knew of two 
incidents when defendant had been stabbed. 
Another correctional officer testified that he removed 
defendant from his cell in December 2006, conducted a pat-down 
search, and felt a hard object in defendant’s boxer shorts.  The 
officer found a broken plastic toothbrush with two razor blades 
attached to the tip.  He opined that the toothbrush was designed 
to be a weapon. 
Dawn Bothof, defendant’s ex-wife, testified concerning a 
number of incidents with defendant, describing their marriage 
as “on and off,” “volatile,” and “violent.”  They often argued about 
defendant’s drinking and drug use.  Bothof described the 
incident involving defendant’s threat to shoot police officers.  
She stated that defendant had pushed her against the wall, 
slapped her in the face, brandished a rifle, and told her that he 
was going to make her “pay.”  When Bothof called the police, 
defendant pulled the phone cord from the wall. 
Bothof described another incident several months later 
when defendant confronted a bouncer who kicked him out of a 
bar.  Later that night when he was highly intoxicated, defendant 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
11 
told Bothof that he was going to kill the bouncer and he left their 
home with a gun.  When defendant returned home the following 
morning, he was still drunk and began arguing with Bothof 
while she was in bed.  Defendant got on top of Bothof and started 
choking her.  Bothof struggled with defendant and tried to kick 
him away; she felt she was blacking out and was going to die.  
Bothof’s sister came into the bedroom and yelled at defendant to 
stop.  Defendant released Bothof, who fled to a friend’s house.  
When she returned, defendant was sitting on a toilet with a gun 
to his own head.  Bothof and her sister took the gun from 
defendant and drove him to his uncle’s house.  On the way there, 
defendant jumped out of the car and ran, saying people were 
watching him. 
Bothof testified that defendant left California suddenly in 
1992 and went to Texas.  When defendant returned about one 
month later, he told Bothof that he knew how to kill people and 
where to dump bodies so they would not be found.  He said he 
would show her, that he had killed before, and that he could kill 
her.  He would tell Bothof he was just trying to scare her, and 
he alternated between telling Bothof that a man named Kelly 
murdered someone and that defendant had murdered someone. 
Bothof and defendant separated in late 1992 because of 
defendant’s drug use and erratic behavior.  After defendant 
joined the Army in 1993 his behavior improved, and Bothof 
moved with him to Hawaii.  However, defendant eventually 
resumed using drugs and becoming violent again. 
On one occasion in Hawaii, defendant took Bothof’s keys 
and drove her car while he was intoxicated.  Bothof was able to 
get defendant to stop and tried to take the keys from the car.  
Defendant grabbed the keys from her hand, threw her to the 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
12 
ground, and drove away.  Bothof’s neck and back hurt for several 
days.   
On another occasion, defendant became “hysterical” and 
picked up a knife after Bothof told defendant she was going to 
leave him.  Bothof locked herself and their child inside a 
bathroom.  Defendant stabbed the door until the door broke.  
Defendant forced Bothof to stay in their home for three days, 
making her sit on the couch while he held her at knife point.  
When Bothof asked to leave or got up, he pushed her down, 
threatened to kill her, and ordered her not to move.  On the third 
day, defendant’s father called and defendant explained what 
was happening.  Defendant allowed Bothof to speak with his 
father, who told Bothof to call the police.  Bothof did so.  When 
she told defendant she had called the police, he came toward her 
with the knife but began stabbing his own foot, which was in a 
cast.  Officers eventually arrived and the incident ended. 
Bothof also testified that when she was pregnant with 
their second child, defendant kicked her in the stomach and 
threw her to the ground. 
2. Defense case in mitigation 
The defense case in mitigation included testimony from 
defendant, defendant’s family members, and a drug and alcohol 
addiction specialist. 
Defendant testified about his upbringing.  His parents 
separated when he was three years old, but his extended family 
took good care of him.  He reported that he first drank alcohol 
when he was three years old, and he was allowed to drink during 
fishing trips and family get-togethers.  When defendant was 
seven years old, his father taught him how to smoke marijuana.  
This led to defendant’s father showing him how to snort and 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
13 
inject methamphetamine.  Defendant’s father would supply him 
with drugs.  When defendant was 13 years old, his drug use 
included cocaine and LSD. 
Defendant testified that he was not addicted to drugs and 
that he stopped using them for a time when he was 16 years old, 
although he continued to sell drugs to classmates.  Defendant 
did well in school but he did not go to college because Bothof was 
pregnant.  He played semi-professional football after high school 
and began using methamphetamine.  By the time he was 20 
years old, he was addicted to methamphetamine and stopped 
playing football. 
Defendant testified that he would fight with Bothof when 
he was high.  He admitted that he “man-handled” Bothof during 
arguments to get her off of him, and he admitted that he may 
have slapped her once or twice.  He denied harming her 
otherwise, saying he was able to control himself even when 
under the influence.  He acknowledged that he had retrieved a 
shotgun and threatened to shoot police after a fight with Bothof. 
Defendant stated he met Noriega when selling drugs in 
Riverside; he declined to say whether Noriega was a drug dealer.  
Defendant denied any involvement in Noriega’s death, and he 
clarified that he did not “physically commit” the killing.  He said 
he had agreed to facilitate one more drug transaction for Brown 
before leaving Moreno Valley, although he later denied setting 
up any transaction between Brown and Noriega. 
Defendant acknowledged that he had previously claimed 
he was enlisted in the Army and in Hawaii at the time Noriega 
was killed.  He admitted that his “recollection was misplaced,” 
that he had received a traffic citation in Texas three days after 
Noriega disappeared, and that he actually began serving in the 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
14 
Army in February 1993.  He was discharged from the Army for 
failure to rehabilitate and moved back to Southern California 
where he resumed selling drugs before eventually moving to 
Austin, Texas. 
Defendant admitted that he was involved in Hartwell’s 
murder but maintained that he did not kill her.  He claimed 
other individuals were involved but that he did not know who 
killed Hartwell because he was not present when she died.  
Defendant admitted that Hartwell had threatened to turn him 
in to the police the night before she was killed, and that he told 
Hartwell to leave him and Reeder alone.  Defendant also 
admitted that he had burned Hartwell’s body in the back of her 
car.  He denied telling Reeder, Sams, or Bothof that he had 
killed someone in California. 
Defendant conceded that he possessed shanks in prison, 
but he asserted they were for protection only and that he had 
never stabbed anyone while in custody.  He stated that other 
inmates paid him for protection, and that although he was 
involved in many fights, some of which he instigated, he was 
always acting in self-defense. 
Defendant read a statement to the jury that he had chosen 
a path for himself while in custody as that of a warrior who 
“embraces death as part of the struggle.”  He stated he made his 
own life choices, and they had nothing to do with drugs, alcohol, 
or any predisposition.  He asserted he was no longer addicted to 
drugs, and that he could have stopped his drug use at any point 
except when he was about 20 years old.  He also told the jury 
that he refused his attorney’s requests that defendant submit to 
an MRI or a mental health evaluation.  Defendant did not 
believe he suffered from brain damage or from any learning 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
15 
deficiencies, and he disagreed with a doctor who had opined that 
he had an addictive personality and a predisposition to use 
drugs.  He said, “I chose the path that I lived and I’m here 
because of it.” 
Defendant further stated that his strategy during the guilt 
phase was to be acquitted, but that at the penalty stage he 
wanted to receive a death verdict, although he did not want to 
be put to death.  He said a death verdict would be in his best 
interest because it “enriches and enhances certain areas of post-
conviction remedies that I’m definitely seeking.”  He complained 
about the court’s rulings, a lack of funds, and his attorney’s 
refusal to follow defendant’s strategy. 
Defendant maintained that he was framed for the 
murders of Noriega and Hartwell.  He said that he was reluctant 
to answer certain questions about his drug use because it might 
make the jury believe he deserved a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole.  He told the jury he did not want any 
mitigation evidence presented on his behalf, and that he had 
insisted on testifying during the penalty phase against his 
attorney’s advice. 
Defendant’s uncle, Anchondo, also testified during the 
penalty phase.  He said that defendant’s mother drank wine 
when she was pregnant with defendant, although she was never 
“falling down” drunk.  He related that defendant’s mother told 
him she used drugs while pregnant.  Anchondo stated that 
defendant’s mother had boyfriends who were physically abusive 
and that defendant’s mother attempted suicide four times, 
although Anchondo did not believe defendant was aware of 
those attempts.  Anchondo surmised that defendant had a 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
16 
difficult childhood because of his parents’ drug and alcohol use 
and his mother’s suicide attempts. 
Anchondo’s wife, Cynthia, also testified.  She stated she 
never saw defendant engage in violence or drug use, and she 
thought he was a very happy person.  She believed his 
relationship with his grandparents was a positive one. 
Finally, Dr. Alex Stalcup, a drug and alcohol addiction 
specialist, testified regarding addiction and its effect on an 
individual’s behavior and ability to make decisions.  He stated 
that methamphetamine use can alter decision-making and 
permanently damage the brain, and that alcohol use as a child 
can also harm the brain’s development.  Stalcup interviewed 
defendant for about two hours and reviewed materials related 
to the case (but not any materials related to Hartwell’s murder).  
Defendant had denied killing Noriega or being present when 
Noriega was killed, but he refused to discuss the incident 
further.  Defendant told Stalcup about his drug and alcohol use 
as a child.  Stalcup testified that defendant presented one of the 
worst cases for genetic predisposition to addiction that he had 
ever seen. 
Stalcup 
opined 
that, 
based 
on 
defendant’s 
methamphetamine use, defendant was a “late-stage addict” by 
the age of 14.  Stalcup also believed defendant suffered damage 
to his brain that inhibited his ability to make decisions.  He 
stated that defendant faced significant risk factors for fetal 
alcohol syndrome and brain damage.  He testified that it was 
common for addicts to sell drugs to support their habit; he called 
this “[p]art of the disease process driven by craving” rather than 
a choice by the individual. 
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3. Prosecution rebuttal evidence 
A law enforcement deputy testified regarding an incident 
that took place in March 2004 when he was delivering mail to 
defendant’s cell.  Defendant asked the deputy where some of his 
magazines were.  The deputy said they were being scanned for 
offensive content.  Defendant replied, “Don’t you know who I 
am?  I’m running things.”  He added, “I’m running things here, 
and that’s no secret.” 
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A. Adequacy of Court Funding 
Defendant asserts the trial court effectively denied his 
right to self-representation by denying him adequate funding 
during the period of time when he represented himself.  He 
contends that, as a result of the court’s rulings, he was forced to 
request appointed counsel.  He alleges this amounted to a 
violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his 
rights under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.  
We conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling on 
defendant’s funding requests, and thus it did not deny 
defendant his right to represent himself. 
1. Factual background 
In February 2007, defendant was represented by 
appointed counsel Darryl Exum and Peter Scalisi.  That month, 
defendant filed a motion to represent himself pursuant to 
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.  During the Faretta 
hearing, defendant explained that one reason he wanted to 
represent himself was because he did not believe appointed 
counsel had obtained sufficient funding to investigate his case.  
Defendant stated he believed he would be more successful than 
counsel at obtaining those funds.  The trial court granted 
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defendant’s motion and appointed Exum as stand-by counsel.  
As of February 28, 2007, defendant (through appointed counsel) 
had received approval for $57,290 in investigation funds; 
$1,647.95 of that remained available and the remainder had 
been spent. 
Following the grant of his Faretta motion, defendant 
immediately filed a request for $2,500 in additional 
investigation funds.11  The request stated the funds were 
required for investigator services such as contacting witnesses, 
reviewing discovery, preparing reports, and other general 
investigation.  Defendant did not list the witnesses or explain 
their relevance to his case, nor did he explain the nature of the 
investigation required.  The court approved the request but 
noted the funds could not be used to pay for a phone card, as 
defendant had also requested. 
In March 2007, defendant submitted a request for $6,000 
in investigation funds to locate, interview, and subpoena 50 
witnesses and for other investigation.  Defendant did not list the 
witnesses or explain their relevance to his case, nor did he 
explain the nature of the investigation required.  The court 
denied the request, noting it was vague and that defendant’s 
investigator needed to provide additional details. 
Defendant filed another request in April 2007, seeking 
$18,000 for general investigation funds.  The request did not 
refer to any witnesses or describe any areas of potential 
investigation.  At a hearing on the request, the court informed 
defendant, “[Y]ou need to write a specific request . . . to us, to 
 
11  
The Riverside County Superior Court refers funding 
requests made in capital cases to a panel of three judicial officers 
to independently review and rule on the requests. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
19 
this panel, identifying who these people are and why they’re 
necessary to the defense of your case, whether it be guilt phase 
or penalty phase.”  The court further said that before funds 
would be provided for the investigator to locate witnesses, “you 
need to convince us that they’re relevant and important enough 
that we’re going to expend the money to have him go track them 
down.”  Defendant’s investigator, Jerry Monahan, informed the 
court he had approximately $700 of existing funds remaining at 
the time of the hearing.  The court approved $2,000 for 
investigation expenses and informed defendant it would 
reconsider his request if he submitted additional information. 
Defendant’s next request, filed in May 2007, sought 
$48,600, nearly $35,500 of which was related to investigation 
expenses for Monahan.  The request listed 54 potential 
witnesses but did not describe their relevance beyond classifying 
them as civilian or military.  Monahan included a memorandum 
with the request that provided some details regarding these 
witnesses.  The memorandum listed 30 potential witnesses — 
including former teachers, coaches, coworkers, and correctional 
staff — who “would be used in penalty phase litigation” or 
“penalty phase mitigation.”  The memorandum also listed 14 
military personnel who “were all affiliated with [defendant] in 
the Army at various locations and would be used in the penalty 
phase mitigation.  Also some of these same individuals might be 
used in the guilt[] phase to confirm [defendant’s] whereabouts 
during the years 1992 through 1994.”  The request stated, “[I]t 
is unknown what they might testify to.” 
At a hearing, the court asked whether defendant had 
obtained his military records “to prove where you were on a 
certain date.”  Defendant indicated he had obtained part of those 
records, but he needed “specific information on the witnesses 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
20 
that are involved in that.”  The court stated, “you may want 
other people to add to that [the records], and I understand that.”  
The court noted, however, that “we have to know specifically 
who [the investigator] is going to contact and what the relevance 
is, what you expect them to testify to help or assist you in the 
defense of your case.” 
At the close of the hearing, defendant stated, “Is it my 
understanding that we’re going to come back another day and 
time with clarity on specific defense strategy for the witnesses.”  
The court replied:  “Right.  We told you exactly what to do, and 
it depends on how long it takes you to do that.  [¶]  It depends 
on [the investigator] making a lot of calls and tracking down 
people.  [¶]  Get started and as you find you need more, then you 
can come back to us.”  At the time the trial court denied the 
motion, there were approximately $2,000 remaining in 
investigator funds.   
In June 2007, defendant filed a request for $4,200 to cover 
additional investigator funds.  The request noted that Monahan 
had attempted to contact military personnel to support 
defendant’s alibi defense and was informed “it might not be 
possible to locate these soldiers.”  Defendant also requested 
funds to review and redact audiotapes provided by the 
prosecution.  The court did not hold a hearing regarding the 
request.  Two judges on the panel noted they did not wish to 
approve the request, stating, “[I]t appears [the district attorney] 
will redact the tapes” and “it seems that the defendant’s military 
records can establish exactly where he was stationed in 1992–
1993, [and] so you don’t need any witnesses.”   
Defendant did not subsequently seek additional funds or 
provide the court any additional information regarding the 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
21 
witnesses he intended to contact and what the relevance of their 
testimony would be.  Instead, in July 2007, he moved to 
withdraw his self-representation and the court subsequently 
reappointed Exum and Scalisi as counsel.  It is not apparent 
whether the court formally denied the June 2007 request for 
funds before defendant withdrew his request to represent 
himself, but it is clear the court did not grant the request. 
2. Analysis 
“ ‘[T]he right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal 
and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the 
right to effective counsel [citations], and thus also includes the 
right to reasonably necessary defense services.  [Citations.]’ ”  
(People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 732; see also People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 630.)  “But ‘the right to ancillary 
services arises only when a defendant demonstrates such funds 
are “reasonably necessary” for his or her defense by reference to 
the general lines of inquiry that he or she wishes to pursue.’ ”  
(People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 630.)  “[T]he crucial 
question . . . is whether [defendant] had reasonable access to the 
ancillary services that were reasonably necessary for his 
defense.”  (People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 734.)   
Requests for funds for an indigent defendant in a capital 
case are governed by section 987.9.  “ ‘ “Section 987.9 commits to 
the sound discretion of the trial court the determination of the 
reasonableness of an application for funds for ancillary 
services.” . . . .’ ”  (People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 630–
631.)  A court “should view a motion for assistance with 
considerable liberality, but it should also order the requested 
services only upon a showing they are reasonably necessary.”  
(People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1085.)  Further, 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
22 
defendant “has the burden of demonstrating the need for the 
requested services.”  (Ibid.; see also People v. Hajek and Vo 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1256; People v. Gonzales and Soliz 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 286; § 987.9.)  Defendant also must 
establish a likelihood that the evidence sought to be procured by 
the funds would be admissible, as “ ‘there is no point in spending 
money to obtain inadmissible evidence.’ ”  (People v. Clark, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 631.)  “ ‘An appellate court reviews a trial 
court’s ruling on an application for authorization to incur 
expenses to prepare or present a defense for abuse of 
discretion.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it determined defendant had not established a reasonable 
necessity for the requested funds.  Defendant broadly asserts 
that the trial court’s funding decisions hampered his ability to:  
“(1) secure exhibits; (2) obtain the attendance of witnesses at 
trial; (3) dress properly during the trial; (4) obtain assistance 
during the trial itself; (5) transcribe witness testimony during 
the trial; and (6) assist with diagrams and exhibits during the 
trial.”  Beyond these general assertions, defendant focuses on 
the denial of funds related to two issues:  his alibi defense (that 
he was serving in the Army in Hawaii at the time of Noriega’s 
murder); and his preparation of mitigation evidence for the 
penalty phase (through contacting former teachers and 
coaches).  He further contends that the denial of funds for his 
investigator “was exacerbated by the trial court’s refusal to fund 
phone card privileges so [he] could communicate with his 
investigator.” 
These contentions are unavailing.  Despite several 
directives from the court that defendant’s requests must include 
specific information regarding the purpose of contacting the 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
23 
listed witnesses and conducting the requested investigation, 
defendant’s requests were vague and only generally identified 
how the expenditures might contribute to the preparation of his 
defense.  For example, in listing more than 50 witnesses and 
requesting nearly $35,000 for investigation, travel, and trial 
preparation related to those witnesses, defendant conceded “it 
is unknown what they might testify to.”  Although defendant 
identified several military personnel as potential witnesses, he 
never identified which of those witnesses would serve as alibi 
witnesses.  Defendant’s June 2007 request for funds related to 
his alibi defense asserted additional funds would be needed “if a 
response is received” from the Army providing additional 
information regarding those individuals.12  And, as defendant 
conceded when he testified during the penalty phase, any such 
additional investigation would have been fruitless because he 
did not enter the Army until several months after Noriega’s 
killing.  Further, although defendant listed a number of 
witnesses he stated would be used during the penalty phase, he 
failed to describe their anticipated testimony in any detail. 
These general assertions are not sufficient to meet the 
statutory requirement for a showing of reasonable necessity 
before funds are disbursed.  The sparse nature of defendant’s 
descriptions provided no basis for the court to determine 
whether the 
potential 
testimony 
would 
be 
irrelevant, 
 
12  
Defendant emphasizes that the court denied his request 
because it believed his military records obviated the need for any 
witnesses.  It is true one judge on the panel reviewing 
defendant’s funding requests made that observation.  But the 
court also observed that it would be appropriate for defendant 
to obtain witnesses to corroborate those records — and it simply 
asked for more information regarding those alleged witnesses.   
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
24 
cumulative, or otherwise inadmissible.  (See People v. Clark, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 631.)  And, as the court noted, there was 
potential for duplicating earlier investigative efforts given that 
defendant indicated he wanted the investigator to “reinterview” 
certain witnesses.  (See People v. Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 
Cal.4th at p. 1256 [upholding denial of funds for counsel’s 
request to “ ‘reinterview every witness’ ” for the penalty phase 
when counsel’s stated reason was simply that “ ‘it’s a death 
penalty case’ ”]; People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1085–
1086.)  The trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring 
a more detailed showing from defendant before providing funds.   
Because the court did not err, we also reject defendant’s 
claim that the court’s “refusal to fund phone card privileges” 
exacerbated the alleged error.  Notably, the court ordered the 
sheriff to allow defendant to call his investigator, and defendant 
has provided no evidence that his ability to direct his case was 
otherwise hampered. 
Finally, as defendant acknowledges, the court did not 
withhold all requested funds.  Before the court granted 
defendant’s Faretta motion, the court had approved more than 
$57,000 in funds for investigative purposes.  During the time 
defendant represented himself, he had access to $6,147.95 for 
investigation:  $1,647.95 that remained available when he 
began representing himself, and $4,500 the court approved 
when defendant was representing himself.  Additionally, the 
court granted defendant’s funding request for legal materials 
and advisory counsel to investigate the validity of his Texas 
conviction.  Given the totality of the circumstances, the court’s 
actions did not constitute an abuse of discretion, did not 
effectively force defendant to withdraw his self-represented 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
25 
status, and did not violate defendant’s state or federal 
constitutional rights. 
B. Claims Regarding Admission of Evidence 
1. Hartwell’s murder  
Defendant asserts the trial court erred by admitting 
evidence of Hartwell’s murder.  He asserts doing so ran afoul of 
Evidence Code sections 350, 352, and 1101.  Although we find 
the question somewhat close, we conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. 
a. Factual background 
As discussed in section I.A.1.b.iii, ante, the prosecution 
introduced evidence of defendant’s murder of Hartwell.  
Additional facts regarding Hartwell’s murder are relevant to 
defendant’s claim of error. 
In May 1995, defendant met Reeder and they soon began 
dating and using drugs together.  When dating defendant, 
Reeder continued to socialize with Hartwell, with whom Reeder 
had a prior romantic relationship.  Defendant was selling drugs 
at the time, and Hartwell convinced defendant that he could sell 
drugs through her at clubs.  Reeder believed that Hartwell and 
defendant did not like each other; she testified that the two 
occasionally argued, that Hartwell was jealous of defendant, 
and that the relationship between Hartwell and defendant was 
“[o]dd” and “different.” 
On June 28, 1995, Hartwell and Reeder argued at 
Hartwell’s apartment over Reeder’s plan to move in with her 
parents.  Reeder eventually left, and Hartwell talked with her 
friend, Jeremy Barnes, at his apartment.  Hartwell told Barnes 
that she still loved Reeder and asked Barnes whether she should 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
26 
report defendant to the police so that defendant would be out of 
their lives. 
Later that evening, Hartwell called Reeder.  Defendant 
was sitting near Reeder during the call.  Hartwell asked Reeder 
to come back to Hartwell’s apartment.  Reeder refused, which 
made Hartwell angry.  Hartwell asked to speak with defendant, 
and Reeder gave him the phone.  Defendant listened to Hartwell 
for a few minutes; Reeder could hear that Hartwell’s voice 
sounded upset. 
Defendant “seemed very seriously upset” after the call.  
Defendant said Hartwell had threatened to turn him in to the 
police for selling drugs and told him that she had a contact with 
the police.  He told Reeder that he “wasn’t going to let anybody 
send him to prison.”  Reeder believed defendant was planning to 
kill Hartwell. 
Reeder drove defendant to a restaurant to meet a few 
friends.  Over dinner, defendant told his friends, including 
Michael Mihills, that Hartwell was going to turn him in to the 
police for selling drugs.  Reeder picked defendant up at the 
restaurant after about an hour, and the two returned to Reeder’s 
apartment.  Reeder took Valium and fell asleep.  She stated she 
did not know what defendant did or whether he got into bed with 
her.13 
Meanwhile, Hartwell called her friend Sylvia Leal.  Leal 
testified that Hartwell sounded furious and frightened.  
Hartwell told Leal that defendant had been involved in a 
 
13 
Reeder had previously testified that she and defendant 
both awoke the next morning, she saw defendant getting 
dressed, and she fell back asleep. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
27 
murder and that he dealt firearms.  Hartwell wanted to “bust” 
defendant, explained that defendant would be receiving a 
methamphetamine shipment, and she asked Leal to contact a 
narcotics investigator.  Leal told Hartwell she would get a phone 
number for Hartwell. 
The next morning, Reeder was awakened by defendant 
knocking on her door.  He “seemed upset, disturbed, anxious” 
and was bleeding from a serious cut between the thumb and 
index finger of his hand.  Defendant undressed, put his clothes 
in a garbage bag, and took a shower.  Reeder noticed that 
Hartwell’s wallet was in the apartment.  Defendant told Reeder 
that he was cut during a struggle with Hartwell, who he said 
was much stronger than he had anticipated.  Defendant said the 
fight occurred when he walked into Hartwell’s apartment.  He 
told Reeder that he stabbed Hartwell when she was on her 
couch, that he dragged Hartwell to the bathtub, and that he 
wrapped her in a bed comforter.  He then carried her downstairs 
to the back of her jeep, which he drove to Reeder’s apartment. 
Defendant discussed cutting Hartwell’s body into pieces 
and buying cement, chains, and garbage cans to sink the body 
parts into a river.  Reeder and defendant drove to a hardware 
store, where they purchased a garbage can, cement, a chain, and 
a padlock using Hartwell’s ATM card.  Defendant then drove to 
his house in Hartwell’s jeep; Reeder followed in her own car.  
Eventually, defendant told Reeder he could not cut up 
Hartwell’s body because there were people who might see him. 
Defendant’s father came home and told defendant to take 
Hartwell’s jeep off the property.  Defendant drove the jeep to a 
rural area and parked it off the road in a wooded location; 
Reeder again followed in her car.  Reeder and defendant drove 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
28 
to a gas station in Reeder’s car, filled a container with gasoline, 
and returned to Hartwell’s jeep.  Reeder parked her car some 
distance away from the jeep and waited while defendant poured 
gasoline on the jeep and lit it on fire.  Defendant ran back to 
Reeder’s car, and the two drove to a hotel in Austin, where 
Reeder checked in using a former name.  There, defendant dyed 
and cut his hair.  He told Reeder that he was going back to 
California. 
About 9:45 p.m., fire officials responded to the vehicle fire, 
which they described as “[v]ery hot and very intense.”  The jeep 
was completely burned and the area smelled strongly of 
gasoline.  Hartwell’s remains were found in the back seat, 
burned beyond recognition.  She was identified using dental 
records.  A folding knife wrapped in a blue cloth was discovered 
near the body. 
Dr. Robert Bayardo, the medical examiner who performed 
the autopsy on Hartwell’s body, described the body as “partially 
cremated” with large portions burned to ash.  Bayardo located a 
stab wound above Hartwell’s collarbone, which perforated her 
lung, extended into her back, and severed a large vein and 
artery.  He opined the wound would have been fatal, that the 
knife found near Hartwell’s body was capable of inflicting such 
a wound, and that there was an 80 percent chance that Hartwell 
was in a seated position when she was stabbed.  Because there 
was no soot or smoke in Hartwell’s airways or carbon monoxide 
in her blood, Bayardo concluded Hartwell was already dead 
prior to being burned.  He noted that he would not expect the 
stab wound to cause extensive external bleeding. 
Several days after the killing, Barnes and Leal filed a 
missing person report regarding Hartwell.  Reeder and 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
29 
defendant were contacted by police and taken to the police 
station.  An officer observed the cut on defendant’s hand, which 
was healing but still looked “[f]airly serious.”  Officers took 
photographs of the wound.  Defendant was subsequently 
arrested. 
Reeder gave a sworn statement to police.  At the time she 
gave the statement she had used drugs about 12 hours earlier 
and was either high or experiencing withdrawals.  She 
implicated herself in Hartwell’s killing but withheld some 
details to protect defendant.  Reeder was later charged with 
Hartwell’s murder but the charges were dropped due to a 
violation of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 
U.S. 436.  Reeder later agreed to testify at defendant’s trial for 
Hartwell’s murder under a grant of immunity. 
Law enforcement searched defendant’s home and 
Hartwell’s apartment.  At defendant’s home, officers found the 
receipt from the hardware store, the hotel receipt, Hartwell’s 
ATM card, a chain, and a trash can.  DNA from blood samples 
taken at Hartwell’s apartment matched Hartwell and 
defendant.  Defendant was eventually convicted of Hartwell’s 
murder. 
b. Analysis 
Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 350.)  “Relevant evidence is broadly defined as that having a 
‘tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that 
is of consequence’ to resolving the case.”  (People v. Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 405 (Bryant), quoting 
Evid. Code, § 210.)  Evidence Code section 1101 states that 
although evidence of a person’s character is inadmissible when 
offered to prove conduct on a specific occasion, “evidence that a 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
30 
person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act [is 
admissible] when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake or accident . . . ) other than his or her 
disposition to commit such an act.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. 
(b).)  In other words, the statute allows the admission of 
evidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense 
“ ‘when such evidence is relevant to establish some fact other 
than the person’s character or disposition.’ ”  (People v. Johnson 
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 610.) 
“When reviewing the admission of other crimes evidence 
to show motive, ‘ “a court must consider:  (1) the materiality of 
the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative value of the 
other crime evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the 
existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the 
evidence is relevant.” ’ ”  (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th 
at p. 610.)  We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence 
under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 610; see 
also People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 667–668.)  We do 
not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it was arbitrary, 
capricious, or made in a “ ‘patently absurd manner that resulted 
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ”  (People v. Powell (2018) 
6 Cal.5th 136, 162.)14 
 
14 
Defendant asserts de novo review is appropriate because 
“this Court can review the prosecutor’s offer of proof regarding 
Hartwell’s death, and assess its relevance as well as the trial 
court,” citing In re Jenkins (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1167.  Jenkins 
concerned the validity of a regulation from California’s 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation governing work 
 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
31 
Addressing the merits of defendant’s claim, we must 
consider two issues.  First, defendant asserts the trial court 
admitted the challenged evidence only to demonstrate intent, 
and therefore that our review should be limited to whether the 
other acts evidence was properly admitted on that basis.  
Second, defendant asserts that, regardless of the purpose for 
which the trial court admitted the evidence, doing so was error 
under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352.   
As discussed below, our analysis here relates to 
defendant’s blanket challenge to the admission of any evidence 
related to Hartwell’s murder.  Because defendant did not raise 
objections to specific pieces of evidence (with certain narrow 
exceptions also discussed below) neither the trial court nor this 
court is in a position to parse the record independently and 
examine each piece of evidence under Evidence Code section 
352.  Undertaking an analysis of defendant’s blanket challenge, 
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under 
either Evidence Code sections 1101 or 352 by admitting the 
evidence related to Hartwell’s murder.     
i. Purpose of admission 
The prosecution filed a pretrial motion seeking to admit 
evidence of Hartwell’s murder “to demonstrate intent, 
 
credits and is inapposite.  (Id. at pp. 1171–1172.)  We stated that 
“we have ‘allowed parties to “ ‘advance new theories on appeal 
when the issue posed is purely a question of law based on 
undisputed facts, and involves important questions of public 
policy.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1180.)  Defendant provides no compelling 
reason why Jenkins, which is entirely unrelated to the 
admission of evidence under Evidence Code sections 352 and 
1101, should override our consistent application of the abuse of 
discretion standard to the evidentiary issues raised here. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
32 
premeditation and deliberation, motive, common plan or 
scheme, and lack of self-defense.”  In that motion, the 
prosecution asserted the evidence was admissible because, 
among other reasons, it supported the conclusion that defendant 
had killed Noriega and Hartwell for the same motive — to avoid 
going to prison because defendant thought Noriega was “a 
snitch” and because Hartwell had threatened to report 
defendant to police.  Judge Luebs granted the motion when 
defendant was representing himself.  Judge Boren revisited the 
motion when defendant was represented by counsel.  At the 
later hearing, defense counsel objected to the admission of 
evidence regarding Hartwell’s murder.  The court granted the 
prosecution’s motion over defendant’s objection, finding “a 
sufficient basis under 1101(b) for that to come in.  It . . . seems 
to me it has relevance to, and is probative on, the issue of the 
defendant’s state of mind, his intent, and that . . . under 352 the 
negative factors simply do not outweigh that probative value.  
So I would allow the 1101(b) evidence in.” 
Defendant asserts that the trial court’s ruling admitted 
the evidence solely to prove intent, and that this court cannot 
consider other reasons for admitting the evidence under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).  He contends that 
“[t]he prosecutor’s failure to cite the theories of admissibility 
now offered by [the People] deprived [defendant] of the 
opportunity to argue to the trial court why the evidence was 
either not admissible under those theories or should be excluded 
under section 352.”  This position is unavailing.   
As described above, the prosecution expressly relied on 
motive as one basis for admissibility in the trial court.  Although 
the trial court stated it found the evidence relevant to 
defendant’s “state of mind” and “his intent,” the record does not 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
33 
support defendant’s assertion that the trial court admitted the 
evidence solely to show intent without any reference to motive.  
Rather, the court’s discussion of the issue with counsel, 
including its discussion of the jury instructions relevant to this 
evidence, indicates the court understood its ruling to be more 
broad than defendant contends.  When Judge Boren considered 
the prosecution’s motion to admit the evidence, defense counsel 
requested clarification concerning the purpose for which the 
evidence would be offered.  The court asked the prosecution if it 
wished to clarify, stating, “I think you did lay it out previously.”  
The prosecution agreed that it had done so, and further stated, 
“What I’d be happy to do is confer with counsel and let them 
know precisely what I intend to use it for and answer any 
questions they may have about what theories I intend to offer.”  
Defense counsel agreed to that approach.   
Later, after Reeder testified, the jury was instructed that 
it could consider evidence of Hartwell’s murder for the limited 
purpose of deciding, as relevant here, whether defendant 
intended to kill Noriega, had a motive to kill Noriega, or killed 
Noriega in self-defense or as the result of an accident.  Although 
defendant objected generally at that point to the admission of 
the testimony under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(b), he did not assert the instruction should be narrowed to refer 
only to intent but agreed with the instruction as written.  The 
court stated it would admit the evidence “for the reasons as 
previously stated.”  The court also read the instruction to the 
jury at the close of trial.  The instruction informed the jury that 
it could not consider evidence of uncharged conduct unless it 
found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had 
committed that conduct.  It further instructed, “If you decide 
that the defendant committed the uncharged act or acts, you 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
34 
may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the 
limited purpose of deciding whether or not the defendant acted 
with the intent to kill Rafael Noriega in this case, or the 
defendant acted with the intent to permanently deprive Rafael 
Noriega of property of some value in this case, or the defendant 
had a motive to commit the offense alleged in this case, or the 
defendant’s alleged actions were not the result of accident in this 
case, or the defendant had a plan or scheme to commit the 
offense alleged in this case, or the defendant’s alleged actions 
were not the result of self-defense in this case, or the defendant 
acted with premeditation and deliberation in this case.”   
When discussing jury instructions, defendant did not 
object to the instruction on the basis he now raises; that is, he 
did not assert that the instruction should be limited to refer only 
to intent.  Thus, the combination of the colloquy between the 
court and counsel regarding this evidence and the jury 
instructions provided make clear that the court did not admit 
the evidence of Hartwell’s murder solely to establish intent.  
Rather, the jury was clearly told it could consider the other acts 
evidence on the issue of motive.     
Further, the prosecution relied on evidence of defendant’s 
motive for killing Hartwell in order to establish defendant’s 
motive and intent to kill Noriega.  In this way, the evidence of 
motive was offered to prove the ultimate fact of defendant’s 
intent.  (See People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 14 
[“Motive, though not itself an ultimate fact put at issue by the 
charges or the defense in this case, was probative of two 
ultimate facts, intent and lack of justification”].)  We therefore 
decline to limit our consideration of the admission of the 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
35 
evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to 
the issue of intent, as defendant asserts we must.15   
ii. Abuse of discretion 
As stated, we review a trial court’s decision to admit 
evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 for abuse 
of discretion.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 610.)  
We find there was no abuse of discretion.  The prosecution’s 
theory of the case was, in relevant part, that defendant killed 
Noriega because defendant believed Noriega was a “narc” — i.e., 
that defendant believed Noriega was going to report him to the 
police.  The prosecution sought to introduce evidence that 
defendant killed Hartwell because Hartwell threatened to have 
 
15  
The current instruction regarding uncharged offenses 
directs the trial court to “select specific grounds of relevance and 
delete all other options.”  (CALCRIM No. 375.)  The parties here 
primarily focus on the role of intent and motive, but they do not 
discuss the portion of the jury instruction referring to common 
plan.  Although the Attorney General does not assert the other 
acts evidence was admissible to establish a common plan, 
defendant does not challenge this portion of the instruction (and 
in fact agreed at trial to the instruction as provided) and thus 
has forfeited any such claim.  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 469, 503.)  Even if we were to consider the issue, we 
would find any error harmless because, as we have concluded, 
there existed an independent basis to admit the evidence under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), and there is no 
indication the jury relied on a common plan theory in reaching 
the verdict here.  It is thus not reasonably probable that the 
outcome would have been different absent any error.  (People v. 
Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 [applying test for harmless 
error articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — 
that the error is harmless unless it is reasonably probable the 
outcome would have been different in the absence of the error — 
to incorrect jury instructions that do not amount to federal 
constitutional error].)      
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
36 
defendant arrested for selling drugs.  This is a sufficient basis 
to support the admission of the evidence under Evidence Code 
section 1101, subdivision (b).   
People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1 is instructive.  
There, we stated that “the probativeness of other-crimes 
evidence on the issue of motive does not necessarily depend on 
similarities between the charged and uncharged crimes, so long 
as the offenses have a direct logical nexus.”  (Id. at p. 15; see also 
People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 857, People v. Pertsoni 
(1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)  Thus, in Demetrulias we 
upheld the admission of evidence of the defendant’s motives for 
robbing and assaulting one individual in order to support the 
prosecution’s theory that the defendant had the same motive 
when he stabbed and killed the victim in the charged offense.  
(People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 15.)  Similarly, 
we have held that evidence that a defendant had previously 
“stalked, bound, and assaulted” women and admitted that he 
“found his attacks sexually stimulating” was “relevant and 
admissible to prove his motive to sexually assault” a later 
victim.  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 604–605; see also 
People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1381 [one theory 
that supports admission is when “ ‘the uncharged act evidences 
the existence of a motive, but the act does not supply the 
motive . . . .  [T]he motive is the cause, and both the charged and 
uncharged acts are effects.  Both crimes are explainable as a 
result of the same motive’ ”], quoting 1 Imwinkelried, Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence (2009) § 3:18, pp. 128–129.)    
Here, too, the prosecution offered evidence of Hartwell’s 
murder based on the theory that her murder and the killing of 
Noriega were explainable as a result of the same motive:  
defendant killed Hartwell because she threatened to report him 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
37 
to police, and defendant killed Noriega because he believed 
Noriega was a “narc.”  This conclusion was further supported by 
additional evidence of other crimes presented at trial.  The 
prosecution introduced evidence that defendant planned to kill 
Aguon and Christine because he believed they were going to 
report him to police for dealing drugs.  And the prosecution 
introduced evidence that defendant armed himself with a 
shotgun when he believed police had been called following an 
incident of domestic violence.  Each of these incidents involved 
defendant reacting to a belief that he had been or would be 
reported to police, and his committing or preparing to commit 
violence in order to avoid arrest.  As the prosecution argued in 
its motion in limine, defendant “repeatedly planned to kill 
people to avoid arrest, over a period of a few years, and under 
the similar circumstances that the defendant believed his 
targeted victims were going to turn him in to police for his 
criminal behavior.”  The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting the evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b) based on this theory.   
We next turn to whether the trial court abused its 
discretion when concluding that the probative value of evidence 
related to Hartwell’s murder was not outweighed by any 
potential for prejudice under Evidence Code section 352.  
Although this presents a closer question, we conclude the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion.   
Prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 refers to 
“ ‘ “evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias 
against the defendant as an individual and which has very little 
effect on the issues.” ’ ”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 
197, 270.)  In this context, “ ‘ “ ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous 
with ‘damaging.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
38 
1249.)  “ ‘Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a 
section 352 context, merely because it undermines the 
opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent.  The 
ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant.  The code 
speaks in terms of undue prejudice.  Unless the dangers of 
undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption “ ‘substantially 
outweigh’ ” the probative value of relevant evidence, a section 
352 objection should fail.’ ”  (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
390, 438–439.)   
Defendant raises several arguments in support of his 
claim that the evidence regarding Hartwell’s killing was unduly 
prejudicial.  First, he asserts the evidence “simply portrayed 
[defendant] as an evil and out of control person” because “[t]here 
was no relationship between the incidents.”  Not so.  As 
explained above, Hartwell’s murder demonstrated defendant’s 
motive to kill in order to avoid being arrested or “snitched” on.  
It was directly connected to the prosecution’s theory of the case.  
Further, any potential for undue prejudice was mitigated by the 
instruction provided to the jury that specifically prohibited the 
jury from concluding based on the other acts evidence that “the 
defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime.”  
Additionally, the jury was informed that defendant had been 
convicted of Hartwell’s murder.  As the trial court here observed, 
this reduced the potential for undue prejudice because it 
ensured that “the jury was not tempted to convict defendant of 
the charged offenses, regardless of his guilt, in order to assure 
that he would be punished for” Hartwell’s murder.  (People v. 
Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 427.)   
Second, defendant contends the main issue with regard to 
the killing of Noriega was the identity of the perpetrator, not the 
perpetrator’s motive or intent.  Thus, he claims, the Hartwell 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
39 
evidence was irrelevant.  Again, Hartwell’s murder was relevant 
to establish motive under Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b).  Defendant pleaded not guilty, placing all 
elements of the offense at issue.  Defendant cannot now claim 
that, because he did not contest intent or premeditation, the 
prosecution was barred from introducing this evidence.  (People 
v. Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 407; see also People v. Scott 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 470–471.)    
Third, defendant asserts the evidence of Hartwell’s 
murder “required lengthy and prejudicial testimony.”  The 
Attorney General concedes that the testimony regarding 
Hartwell’s murder “consumed a considerable amount of time.”  
Indeed, the record demonstrates that a substantial portion of 
the prosecution’s opening argument and about half of the trial 
testimony related to Hartwell’s murder.  And the details of 
Hartwell’s murder included disturbing photographs and 
testimony regarding her stabbing and the gruesome condition of 
her body.16  The extent of evidence presented regarding the 
uncharged offense, coupled with the graphic nature of some of 
the evidence, is what makes this a close case.  We nonetheless 
conclude that defendant has not established error under the 
highly deferential standard applicable here.  (See People v. Miles 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587 [trial court’s decision to admit evidence 
under Evidence Code section 352 will not be disturbed unless 
the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or 
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage 
of justice].)    
 
16  
We 
discuss 
defendant’s 
specific 
objection 
to 
the 
photographs and testimony related to Hartwell’s body in section 
II.B.3, post.   
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
40 
The prosecution was required to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that defendant murdered Hartwell in order for 
that act to be considered under Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b).  (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1346.) 
The prosecution’s testimony thus focused on defendant’s 
behavior in Texas, including his statements made to other 
individuals relevant to Noriega’s murder (i.e., statements to 
Reeder that he had killed a “narc,” and statements overheard by 
Sams that he killed someone in California for drugs), 
defendant’s relationship with Hartwell that led to their falling 
out, and defendant’s decision to kill Hartwell after she told 
defendant she would report him to police.   
The prosecution’s main witness implicating defendant in 
Hartwell’s killing was Reeder.  Reeder provided evidence that 
defendant killed Noriega because he was a “narc,” and she 
provided 
additional 
testimony 
regarding 
defendant’s 
statements about killing Noriega (that he put Noriega’s body in 
the back of a truck and hid the body in or near some caves).  She 
described defendant’s plan to kill Hartwell because Hartwell 
had threatened to turn defendant in to the police, defendant’s 
statements to Reeder about killing Hartwell, and their disposal 
of Hartwell’s body.  Reeder’s testimony thus not only supported 
the prosecution’s state of mind argument but also was central to 
its assertion that defendant killed Noriega. 
Defendant 
vigorously 
cross-examined 
Reeder 
and 
attacked her credibility.  During closing arguments, defense 
counsel pointed to alleged inconsistencies in Reeder’s testimony 
and emphasized to the jury that Reeder had been given 
immunity for her testimony.  Counsel stated that Reeder “told 
you she would be admitting to the murder, the murder of Regina 
Hartwell without immunity.  And why did she walk?  Why did 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
41 
she skate?  Some technical loophole, some technicality and she 
walks. . . .  Meanwhile she’s buying the gasoline to burn the 
body.”  At one point, defense counsel asserted Reeder’s 
testimony that defendant had killed Noriega because he was a 
“narc” was not supported by any other evidence.  At another 
point, counsel questioned whether it was Reeder who killed 
Hartwell, saying, “Do I know if she killed Regina Hartwell?  I 
don’t know.  She certainly had motive.  She had way more 
motive than Justin Thomas.”17   
The 
prosecution 
bolstered 
Reeder’s 
credibility 
by 
providing testimony from other witnesses.  Leal, Barnes, and 
Mihills all corroborated Reeder’s statement that Hartwell 
planned to report defendant to the police.  Law enforcement 
officials described the chain of custody regarding relevant 
evidence (including a knife consistent with the wound to 
Hartwell’s body) and corroborated other details from Reeder’s 
story including, for example, the cut to defendant’s hand and 
that he had purchased a chain and a trash can when planning 
to dispose of Hartwell’s body.  The medical examiner described 
the knife wound found during Hartwell’s autopsy as being 
consistent with Reeder’s reported account that defendant had 
stabbed Hartwell when she was in a seated position.  The 
prosecution emphasized to the jury that these other witnesses 
corroborated Reeder’s testimony:  “The real issue in the case is 
the credibility of the People’s witnesses, right; Dorothy Brown, 
 
17  
When considering an objection to testimony from the 
medical examiner during trial, the court observed that, “there 
has been some cross-examination of some evidence that suggests 
perhaps that someone other than Mr. Thomas did it [killed 
Hartwell], or that Ms. Reeder had a greater role in it, perhaps, 
than she announced.”   
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
42 
Kim [Reeder], Michael Mihills, John Sams, right. . . .  [¶]  Rather 
than just saying, you know what, I choose to believe Kim 
[Reeder], which you can do, you don’t have to, though.  Because 
you can look at all the other witnesses and all the other 
evidence, and you’ll see that it corroborates them.” 
Understood in this context, we cannot say that it was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the extensive 
evidence regarding Hartwell’s murder, that the amount of time 
necessary to present it was excessive, or that the nature of the 
evidence was unduly prejudicial.  Although another trial court 
might have reasonably reached a different conclusion, that is 
insufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  (See Mercer 
v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 114 [abuse of discretion cannot be 
found simply because a different decision “could have been 
reached”].)    
Next, defendant contends the strength of the evidence 
implicating him in Hartwell’s murder improperly bolstered the 
comparatively weak evidence connecting him to Noriega’s 
murder.  We cannot agree with defendant’s characterization of 
the evidence implicating him in Noriega’s killing as “weak.”  The 
jury heard testimony from Brown, who was an eyewitness to the 
killing.  Reeder’s testimony corroborated Brown’s by providing 
details defendant conveyed to Reeder regarding his shooting of 
“Rafa,” and that defendant put the body in the back of his truck 
and then hid it in or near some caves.  Sams also testified that 
defendant admitted to killing someone in California.  Although 
defendant attacks the credibility of these witnesses and the 
reliability of the evidence generally, it was for the jury to 
determine whether they found the testimony credible and 
reliable.  Given this evidence, it was not an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to determine that the probative value of the 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
43 
evidence related to Hartwell’s murder would outweigh the 
potential for undue prejudice.  (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 
7 Cal.4th 380, 406.)   
Finally, defendant asserts that other evidence used by the 
prosecution to connect him with Noriega’s death was unreliable.  
He focuses on testimony from Barajas and her sister, Brown’s 
testimony from the Texas trial, and defendant’s statements to 
third parties that he had killed someone in California.  Other 
than the objections to Brown’s testimony discussed in section 
II.B.4, post, defendant does not challenge the admission of this 
other testimony.  It was for the jury to evaluate the evidence and 
to reach a conclusion regarding defendant’s guilt.  To the extent 
defendant asserts the admission of evidence related to 
Hartwell’s murder was prejudicial given this other allegedly 
unreliable evidence, that assertion is not compelling in light of 
our above evaluation of the claim under Evidence Code section 
352. 
We find it significant that defendant’s challenges under 
Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 352 are to the 
admission of any evidence related to Hartwell’s murder; both in 
the trial court and in this court, he did not raise any specific 
objection to particular testimony or pieces of evidence (aside 
from certain photographs and related testimony discussed in 
section II.B.3, post).  Thus, the trial court generally ruled that 
evidence related to Hartwell’s murder was admissible.  It did 
not, however, parse the proffered testimony to determine the 
potential for undue prejudice nor did it consider how particular 
testimony might be tailored to avoid alleged undue prejudice. 
Although a more nuanced analysis of the proffered 
evidence might have been beneficial, it was not incumbent on 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
44 
the trial court to undertake such an endeavor absent a specific 
objection and request from counsel.  Evidence Code section 353, 
subdivision (a) requires counsel to “make clear the specific 
ground of the objection or motion.”  Specific objections serve the 
important purpose of “fairly inform[ing] the trial court, as well 
as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or 
reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be 
excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond 
appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.”  
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435).  “A party cannot 
argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not 
asked to conduct.”  (Ibid.)   
We have previously held the type of general objection 
defendant made here is not sufficient to preserve a claim as to 
specific pieces of evidence.  (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
401, 477.)  In Cowan, the defendant objected before trial to the 
introduction of any postmortem photographs of the victim.  (Id. 
at p. 476.)  The court overruled the objection, but “left open the 
possibility that, upon proper objection, it might later conclude 
that any particular photograph was irrelevant.”  (Id. at p. 477.)  
The defendant did not later renew his objection as to specific 
photographs and we held that this failure to object “forfeited any 
claim that the trial court erred by failing to weigh each 
photograph’s individual probative value against its individual 
prejudicial effect.”  (Ibid.)  For the same reason, we decline to 
attempt to parse the evidence here given defendant’s lack of a 
specific objection in the trial court or in this court to any 
particular evidence related to Hartwell’s murder. 
At oral argument in this court, defense counsel asserted 
that objections to specific portions of the evidence at trial once 
the trial court had made its initial ruling to admit evidence of 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
45 
Hartwell’s murder were not required and would have served 
only to annoy the trial court.  To the extent this might be 
understood as an assertion that specific objections would have 
been futile, such an assertion is inconsistent with the record.  
When ruling on the prosecution’s motion to admit the evidence, 
the court stated, “I think that that very probative value as I 
understand it from the offer of proof and the information 
available is not substantially outweighed by any undue 
prejudicial effect or any other negative aspect of [Evidence Code 
section 352].”  (Italics added.)  As in Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th 
at page 477, this indicated that the court’s ruling was based on 
a preview of the evidentiary representations made by counsel at 
the time it ruled on the pretrial motion and that the court was 
not foreclosing further rulings as the evidence developed.  
Indeed, the trial court did consider and rule on later objections 
to specific evidence, including evidence related to Hartwell’s 
murder.  For example, after the trial court generally admitted 
evidence of Hartwell’s murder it considered the prosecution’s 
motion to admit photographs of Hartwell’s autopsy and 
defendant’s related objections.  The trial court conducted an 
evaluation of the evidence in light of that specific objection and 
admitted, excluded, or deferred ruling on photographs of 
Hartwell’s autopsy.  When defense counsel raised the objection 
to the autopsy photographs and the pathologist’s testimony 
again during trial, the trial court conducted another analysis of 
the relevance and potential for prejudice before admitting the 
evidence.  This is precisely the process the Evidence Code calls 
for in order to fairly present and preserve a challenge to 
proffered evidence. 
Considering, then, defendant’s objection to the admission 
of any evidence related to Hartwell’s murder, we conclude that 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
46 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code 
sections 1101, subdivision (b) or 352.  Because there was no 
statutory error, defendant’s constitutional claims likewise fail.  
(See People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 670; People v. 
Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1335.) 
2. Defendant’s alleged plan to kill Aguon and 
Christine 
Defendant asserts the admission of evidence regarding his 
alleged plan to kill Aguon and Christine also violated Evidence 
Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352.  The Attorney 
General contends the claim is forfeited and without merit.  Even 
if we were to find the claim was not forfeited, we agree with the 
Attorney General that the trial court did not err in admitting 
this evidence. 
a. Forfeiture 
The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited any 
claim related to the admission of evidence of a plan to kill Aguon 
and Christine by failing to object at trial.  The prosecution 
moved before trial to admit the evidence under Evidence Code 
section 1101.  The trial court considered the prosecution’s 
motion on two occasions.  First, Judge Luebs granted the 
prosecution’s motion to admit the evidence at a hearing in April 
2007 when defendant was representing himself.  In October 
2007, when defendant was represented by counsel, Judge Boren 
allowed defendant to reargue motions that Judge Luebs had 
previously ruled on, including the admission of other acts 
evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). 
Defendant acknowledges that although defense counsel 
objected at the October 2007 hearing to the introduction of 
evidence regarding Hartwell’s murder,  counsel did not raise any 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
47 
objection regarding the plan to kill Aguon and Christine.  
Defendant maintains, however, that he preserved the issue 
when he was representing himself at the April 2007 hearing by 
stating:  “I believe that would be prejudicial because there is no 
police reports [sic] indicating threats were made in that 
manner.”  The transcript of the hearing, however, reveals that 
defendant did not raise a proper objection to preserve his claim.   
During the April 2007 hearing, the court initially raised 
the prosecution’s motion to admit evidence under Evidence Code 
section 1101, subdivision (b) and asked defendant if he objected 
to the motion.  Defendant stated, “At this time no, your Honor.”  
The prosecution and the court then discussed several incidents 
that the prosecution sought to introduce at trial:  the murder of 
Hartwell; defendant’s threat to kill police officers; and 
defendant’s plan to kill Aguon and Christine.  Regarding the 
threat to police, the prosecution stated that defendant told 
Investigator Silva that “he got the gun because he thought the 
police were coming and he was ready to use it with the police.”  
Regarding the threat to Aguon and Christine, the prosecution 
stated it would rely on testimony from Maximilian Garcia.  After 
further discussion, the court inquired again of defendant 
whether he had any objections.  The following exchange then 
occurred: 
 
“[Defendant]:  Your Honor, I wasn’t aware.  I haven’t 
had a chance to review the tapes of the Silva 
interview.  I was not aware. 
“[Court]:  It was in the moving papers, essentially 
the description of it.  But do you want to — you 
heard what he said, right? 
“[Defendant]:  Yes, sir. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
48 
“[Prosecution]:  It is also in the transcripts that were 
turned over. 
“[Court]:  Okay. 
“[Defendant]:  I believe that would be prejudicial 
because there is no police reports [sic] indicating 
threats were made in that manner. 
“[Court]:  This case — you apparently said it 
yourself.  You told Mr. Silva.  He has it on tape, 
apparently. 
“[Defendant]:  I haven’t agreed to that evidence. 
“[Court]:  So your only objection is you haven’t 
reviewed the evidence.  [¶]  Assuming it is there, sir, 
is there some reason I should not grant the motion 
under 1101 of the Evidence Code?  You have to give 
me legal basis, because [the prosecution] made a 
compelling argument. 
“[Defendant]:  I cannot, your Honor.”   
 
This exchange makes clear that defendant’s objection was 
related to his statements to Silva regarding the alleged threat 
to police officers, and in any event was not made under Evidence 
Code section 1101.  Defendant’s objection thus was not sufficient 
to preserve a challenge under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 
352 to the evidence of a plan to kill Aguon and Christine.  (People 
v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130 [objection must fairly inform 
the court and the party offering the evidence of the specific 
reasons the evidence should be excluded so the party offering 
the evidence can respond and the court can make an informed 
ruling]; Evid. Code, § 353 [verdict may not be set aside based on 
erroneous admission of evidence absent a timely and specific 
objection on the record, or the error resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice].)   
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
49 
b. Analysis 
Even assuming defendant preserved his claim regarding 
the admission of evidence related to his threat to kill Aguon and 
Christine, we conclude there was no error in admitting that 
evidence. 
As stated above, we review the trial court’s decision to 
admit evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 for 
abuse of discretion.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 
p. 610.)  We find no abuse of discretion.   
The evidence regarding the threat to kill Aguon and 
Christine was admissible to establish motive under Evidence 
Code section 1101, section (b).  Like the evidence regarding 
Hartwell’s murder, the threat to Aguon and Christine bolstered 
the prosecution’s theory of the case by providing an additional 
example of a situation when defendant planned lethal violence 
when he believed he would be reported to police by Aguon and 
Christine.   
Neither did the admission of this evidence constitute an 
abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.  Defendant 
makes similar assertions regarding undue prejudice as he does 
regarding the evidence of Hartwell’s murder, including that the 
evidence of his threats to Aguon and Christine was irrelevant 
and portrayed him as “an evil and out of control person.”  Those 
claims are no more availing in this context.  Indeed, the 
testimony regarding the threat to Aguon and Christine was 
relatively brief and defendant points to no aspect of that 
testimony that contained potentially inflammatory information 
such that the evidence was more prejudicial than it was 
probative.  And, as with the evidence of Hartwell’s murder, the 
relevant jury instruction specifically prohibited the jury from 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
50 
considering the incident as evidence of defendant’s “bad 
character.”  We hold there was no statutory or constitutional 
error.  (See People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 670; People 
v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1335.) 
3. Photographs of Hartwell and Noriega and related 
testimony 
Defendant challenges the admission of testimony related 
to Hartwell’s autopsy as well as photographs of Noriega and 
Hartwell as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 
352.  He contends that the admission of this evidence deprived 
him of his federal right to due process and a fair trial, and that 
the admission of the photographs prejudiced him at the guilt 
and penalty phases.  We conclude that the trial court did not err 
by admitting some of the challenged evidence.  As to the 
remaining evidence, we find that any error was harmless. 
The prosecution sought to introduce a number of 
photographs related to Noriega.  The court admitted seven 
photographs of the field where Noriega’s body was found; five of 
those showed (entirely or in part) Noriega’s decomposed body.  
The court also admitted two photographs of Noriega’s 
decomposed body lying on a body bag in a laboratory setting.  
The court excluded as cumulative two other similar 
photographs.  The court deferred a final ruling regarding a 
photograph showing the sternum of Noriega’s body with an 
apparent bullet hole, but it ultimately admitted the photo.  The 
prosecution also sought to introduce three photographs of 
Noriega taken while he was alive.  The court indicated it would 
allow the prosecution to use one of those photographs for 
witnesses to identify Noriega, and the prosecution selected a 
photograph of Noriega taken at a restaurant where he worked.   
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
51 
The prosecution also moved to admit various photographs 
related to Hartwell’s murder.  The court admitted one 
photograph of Hartwell talking on the telephone to be used for 
witnesses to identify her.  The prosecution also sought to admit 
photographs of the burned car inside which Hartwell’s body was 
found.  The court admitted five such photographs (two of which 
showed the area where the car was found, but not the car or 
Hartwell’s body) and excluded another that depicted Hartwell’s 
burned remains inside the car.  Finally, the prosecution sought 
to admit five photographs from Hartwell’s autopsy.  The court 
admitted two of those, both of which showed a probe pointing to 
a stab wound in Hartwell’s torso.  Bayardo, who performed the 
autopsy of Hartwell’s body, testified that it had been “partially 
cremated” and described the stab wound depicted in the 
photographs.    
Defendant objects to the admission of the photographs of 
Noriega and Hartwell depicting them when they were alive, 
asserting these photographs were irrelevant and evoked undue 
emotional sympathy.  We review the trial court’s decision to 
admit the photographs for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Scully 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 590.)  “ ‘To determine whether there was 
an abuse of discretion, we address two factors:  (1) whether the 
photographs were relevant, and (2) whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in finding that the probative value of each 
photograph outweighed its prejudicial effect.’ ”  (People v. Lewis 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1282.)  Although we have “repeatedly 
cautioned against the admission of photographs of murder 
victims while alive unless the prosecution can establish the 
relevance of such items,” we have also held that such 
photographs can be relevant “to establish the witnesses’ ability 
to identify the victims as the people about whom they were 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
52 
testifying.”  (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230; see 
also People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1020; People v. 
Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 692.)  Here, the photographs of 
Noriega and Hartwell were used in this permissible manner.  
Moreover, the photographs were sufficiently neutral and 
detached such that they were not likely to produce any 
prejudicial impact.  (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1072–
1073.)  The trial court did not err by admitting these 
photographs. 
Defendant also objects to the admission of photographs of 
Noriega’s decomposed body and the field where Noriega’s body 
was found.  He asserts the photographs were unduly prejudicial, 
irrelevant, and “unnecessary” because the prosecution could 
have introduced details regarding Noriega’s autopsy by way of 
testimony rather than photographic evidence.  He notes, for 
example, that it was not disputed at trial that Noriega was shot 
and that the prosecution’s witness could have expressed an 
opinion regarding the cause of death without showing the 
photographs.   
“ ‘This court is often asked to rule on the propriety of the 
admission of allegedly gruesome photographs.  [Citations.]  At 
base, the applicable rule is simply one of relevance, and the trial 
court has broad discretion in determining such relevance.  
[Citation.]  “ ‘ [M]urder is seldom pretty, and pictures, testimony 
and physical evidence in such a case are always unpleasant’ ” 
[citation], and we rely on our trial courts to ensure that relevant, 
otherwise admissible evidence is not more prejudicial than 
probative [citation].  A trial court’s decision to admit 
photographs under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on 
appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly 
outweighs their probative value.’ ”  (People v. Scully, supra, 11 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
53 
Cal.5th at p. 590.)  “In a prosecution for murder, photographs of 
the murder victim and the crime scene are always relevant to 
prove how the charged crime occurred . . . .”  (People v. Pollock 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1170.)  “The prosecution is not obliged 
to prove its case solely from the testimony of live witnesses; ‘the 
jury is entitled to see details of the victims’ bodies to determine 
if the evidence supports the prosecution’s theory of the case.’ ”  
(People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 590.) 
The photographs of the field where Noriega’s body was 
found were relevant to corroborate and illustrate the testimony 
of the witnesses who discovered and recovered the body.  (See 
People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 590–591; People v. 
Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973–974.)  The manner in which 
defendant disposed of Noriega’s body — leaving it in a field 
under a pallet where he would decompose over time — was 
certainly callous.  But it cannot be said that the photographs of 
the field (one of which shows Noriega’s body in its entirety) were 
unduly prejudicial.    
We likewise conclude that the photographs of Noriega’s 
decomposed body were not unduly prejudicial.  We have stated 
that “the absence of a defense challenge to particular aspects of 
the prosecution’s case or its witnesses does not render victim 
photographs irrelevant.”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 
641.)  Defendant’s assertion that a witness could have testified 
regarding Noriega’s cause of death without the photographs 
does not alter our analysis.  “That the challenged photographs 
may not have been strictly necessary to prove the People’s case 
does not require that we find the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting them.”  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 191; 
see also People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 104; People v. 
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54 
Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 [prosecution need not “accept 
antiseptic stipulations in lieu of photographic evidence”].) 
The photographs of Noriega’s remains were relevant to 
prove the circumstances of his death and to support the 
prosecution’s case.  Further, the photographs assisted the jury 
in understanding the testimony regarding the manner of death.  
Ditraglia testified that the hole in Noriega’s sternum was 
consistent with a gunshot wound, corroborating Brown’s 
testimony that defendant shot Noriega.  It is true that these 
photographs and the related testimony are unpleasant and 
gruesome.  But, as we have often said, such photographs are 
“ ‘ “ ‘seldom pretty’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘ “ ‘always unpleasant’ ” ’ ” (People 
v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 590.)  In light of their relevance 
to the issues here, we cannot say that the photographs were so 
unduly gruesome or inflammatory such that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting them.  (Id. at pp. 591–592; see 
also People v. Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 103; People v. 
Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 862; People v. Howard (2010) 51 
Cal.4th 15, 33.)   
Finally, defendant objects to the admission of photographs 
of Hartwell’s burned car, photographs of Hartwell’s body, and 
Bayardo’s testimony regarding Hartwell’s autopsy.  We 
acknowledge that this evidence, perhaps even more than the 
photographs of Noriega’s body, was unpleasant and gruesome.  
However, even assuming the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting the photographs and related testimony, we find any 
error harmless under People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818.  
(See People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1170 [applying 
Watson to alleged error under Evidence Code section 352 in 
admitting photographs of victim].)  “Under the Watson 
standard, the erroneous admission of a photograph warrants 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
55 
reversal of a conviction only if the appellate court concludes that 
it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different 
result had the photograph been excluded.”  (People v. Scheid 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 21.)  We find no such reasonable probability 
here.  Evidence and testimony — including Reeder’s testimony 
and defendant’s DNA found in Hartwell’s apartment — directly 
implicated defendant in Hartwell’s murder.  And, although the 
challenged 
photographs 
corroborated 
the 
incriminating 
evidence, the photographs were not central to the prosecution’s 
case or the jury’s ultimate determination of the issues.  Thus, 
even were we to assume there was error in admitting the 
autopsy photographs and related testimony, we would conclude 
that there is no reasonable probability that the exclusion of this 
evidence would have led to a different result at either the guilt 
or penalty stage.     
4. Brown’s testimony from defendant’s Texas trial 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it admitted 
into evidence Brown’s testimony from defendant’s Texas trial for 
Hartwell’s murder.  He maintains the testimony was not 
admissible under Evidence Code section 1291 because his 
interest and motive in cross-examining Brown at the Texas trial 
was not similar to that which he had at his California trial, and 
that the admission of the testimony violated his rights to 
confront witnesses, to due process, to an accurate jury 
determination, and to the protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  We conclude the trial court did not err, and that 
defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. 
a. Factual background 
Before defendant’s trial for the killing of Noriega, the 
prosecution moved to admit Brown’s testimony from defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
56 
Texas trial for Hartwell’s murder, citing Evidence Code section 
1291.  The Texas trial consisted of a guilt phase and a penalty 
phase; during the penalty phase a jury considered evidence and 
made a sentencing recommendation to the court.  Brown 
testified under oath first outside the presence of the jury at a 
hearing to determine whether her testimony would be 
admissible during the penalty phase and later in front of the 
jury during the penalty phase.  Defendant’s Texas counsel cross-
examined Brown during those proceedings, questioning her 
about her criminal history, drug use, and prior inconsistent 
statements to law enforcement about Noriega’s death.  The 
prosecution in the Texas case relied on Brown’s testimony as a 
factor in aggravation that warranted a life sentence.  Brown 
died in 2004, before defendant’s trial in California. 
Defendant objected at his California trial to the admission 
of Brown’s testimony on hearsay and constitutional grounds, 
asserting that defense counsel in the Texas trial did not have a 
similar interest and motive to cross-examine Brown.  The trial 
court admitted Brown’s testimony, finding that “the motive was 
actually more than similar.  It seemed to me it was darn near 
identical to what is at issue here, that is, proving that — or at 
least indicating to the trier of fact there that this witness was 
not believable.”  A transcript of Brown’s testimony from the 
Texas case was read to the California jury.  Defendant asserts 
this was error. 
b. Analysis 
Evidence Code section 1291 provides an exception to the 
hearsay rule and permits the admission of evidence of former 
testimony if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and, as 
relevant here, “[t]he party against whom the former testimony 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
57 
is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the 
testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to 
that which he has at the hearing.”  (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. 
(a)(2).)  The interest and motive for cross-examining the witness 
required under the Evidence Code “ ‘ “need not be identical, only 
‘similar.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 333.)18  We 
review the trial court’s decision to admit Brown’s prior 
testimony for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 
Cal. 4th 475, 525.)19 
Defendant does not contest that Brown was unavailable 
as required by the statute.  His sole contention is that the 
motives and interests concerning cross-examination at the 
Texas trial and the California trial were not sufficiently similar.  
He bases his claim on two points, neither of which is persuasive.   
First, defendant asserts that counsel in his Texas case did 
not vigorously cross-examine Brown because defendant had 
already been convicted of Hartwell’s murder, and Brown’s 
testimony likely would have had a “minimal” impact on 
defendant’s sentence.  This assertion is unavailing.  We have 
described a defendant’s interest and motive in cross-examining 
 
18 
We recently considered the scope of the interest and 
motive exception in the civil context.  (Berroteran v. Superior 
Court (2022) 12 Cal.5th 867.)  That decision, however, expressly 
notes that it has no application to criminal cases.  (Id. at p. 897, 
fn. 25.) 
19 
Defendant asserts de novo review is appropriate because 
we are applying the law to undisputed facts.  However, 
defendant acknowledges our precedent requires application of 
an abuse of discretion standard in this context and he provides 
no reason for us to revisit that determination. 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
58 
a witness during a preliminary hearing to discredit the witness’s 
testimony establishing the defendant’s guilt as “identical” to 
that which he would have had to cross-examine the witness 
during trial.  (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 975; see 
also People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1173; People v. 
Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 590.)  Here, too, defendant had 
an interest at both proceedings in discrediting Brown’s 
testimony because it implicated him in Noriega’s death.  In the 
Texas proceeding, Noriega’s death was used as a factor in 
aggravation during sentencing; the prosecution in the Texas 
case urged the jury to impose a life sentence, whereas 
defendant’s counsel sought probation.  Thus, defendant had a 
sufficiently similar interest and motive in cross-examining 
Brown during the Texas trial:  to discredit her testimony in 
order to avoid a life sentence.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in reaching this conclusion. 
Second, defendant contends counsel likely wanted to avoid 
a lengthy cross-examination of Brown in the Texas proceeding 
to avoid inflaming the jury, and that the alleged brevity of cross-
examination supports that position.  But the requirement that 
a defendant have a similar interest and motive to cross-examine 
is satisfied even when the cross-examination that actually 
occurred “might have been more effective.”  (People v. Samayoa 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 851; People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1173–1174.)  As explained below, the cross-examination 
that took place in defendant’s Texas prosecution further 
supports the conclusion that there was no error here.   
In an attempt to avoid a term of life in prison, defendant’s 
counsel in Texas cross-examined Brown by attacking her 
credibility and seeking to impeach her testimony.  Counsel 
probed Brown’s criminal history, her admitted involvement in 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
59 
selling narcotics, and her status on parole.  Counsel elicited 
testimony from Brown that she had made prior inconsistent 
statements about Noriega’s death, and that she was likely under 
the influence of methamphetamine when Noriega was killed.  
Counsel attempted to impeach Brown by asking whether she 
received any promises of leniency from law enforcement in 
exchange for her testimony, and elicited an admission from 
Brown that she lied to one detective to “beef up the story 
enough” to avoid jail and that she “conjured up some of” her prior 
statements.  Although defendant contends the amount of time 
counsel spent cross-examining Brown was “meager,” counsel’s 
areas of inquiry illustrate that the interest and motive in cross-
examining Brown was sufficiently similar to support the 
admission of Brown’s testimony at the California trial.     
Defendant’s constitutional claims fare no better.  He 
asserts the admission of Brown’s testimony violated his state 
and federal right to due process and rendered his trial 
fundamentally unfair, violated his right to an accurate jury 
determination under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
resulted in cruel and unusual punishment, and violated his 
right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Having concluded that the trial court properly 
admitted Brown’s testimony, we cannot say there was any 
violation of defendant’s constitutional rights.  (See People v. 
Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 670 [proper admission of 
evidence under state law does not violate constitutional right to 
fair trial]; People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 26 [application 
of rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on 
a defendant’s constitutional rights]; People v. Wilson (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 309, 340 [Evidence Code section 1291 codifies the 
traditional exception to the Sixth Amendment regarding 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
60 
unavailable witnesses when the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine]; People v. Carter, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 1172, citing United States v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 
554, 559.) 
C. Claims Regarding Special Circumstance 
Allegations 
1. Robbery-murder special circumstance 
Defendant 
contends 
the 
robbery-murder 
special 
circumstance, and therefore the guilt and penalty phase 
judgments, must be reversed because there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant harbored 
an independent felonious purpose to rob Noriega.  We conclude 
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding.   
“ ‘To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a 
jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the 
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it 
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value 
such that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 
56, 89.)  “ ‘This standard of review applies when the evidence is 
largely circumstantial and to review of special circumstance 
findings.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
“When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
special circumstance, the relevant inquiry is ‘ “whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’  [Citation.]  We 
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact 
the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.”  
(People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.)  “ ‘ “ ‘If the 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
61 
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the 
opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also 
be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not 
warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Valdez (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 73, 104.)  “A reviewing court neither reweighs the 
evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.”  (People v. 
Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.)  Reversal is not warranted 
“unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there 
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction.]’ ”  
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) 
A robbery-murder special circumstance requires a finding 
that the “murder was committed while the defendant was 
engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, 
attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after 
committing, or attempting to commit” a “[r]obbery in violation 
of Section 211 or 212.5.”  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), (a)(17)(A).)  “[I]f 
the murder furthers the robbery or attempted robbery, the 
special circumstance is satisfied.  But, if the robbery or 
attempted robbery simply furthers or facilitates the murder, it 
is not, because the robbery’s ‘sole object is to facilitate or conceal 
the primary crime.’ ”  (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 442, 490–491.)  “[T]he special circumstance . . . requires 
that the murder be committed ‘in order to advance [the] 
independent felonious purpose’ of robbery . . . .”  (People v. 
Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 253.)  In other words, “[t]he 
robbery must not be ‘merely incidental’ to the commission of the 
murder.”  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 947.)  A 
concurrent intent to rob and to kill will support the special 
circumstance allegation:  “The question is ‘whether the 
defendant had a “purpose for the [robbery] apart from 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
62 
murder.” ’ ”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 89; see also 
People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 609.)   
“ ‘ “[W]hen one kills another and takes substantial 
property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume 
the killing was for purposes of robbery.” [Citation.]  And, 
significantly, we have observed that “[i]f a person commits a 
murder, and after doing so takes the victim’s wallet, the jury may 
reasonably infer that the murder was committed for the purpose 
of obtaining the wallet, because murders are commonly 
committed to obtain money.” ’ ”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 91; see also People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 
79, 126 [upholding robbery murder special circumstance when 
defendant planned to rob victim “as part of a larger plan to 
obtain his possessions after killing him”].)   
Applying these principles here, we conclude that sufficient 
evidence supports the jury’s true finding concerning the 
robbery-murder special circumstance.  Brown’s testimony 
revealed that defendant and Noriega exchanged words in 
Spanish, Noriega retrieved a green bag from the trunk of his car, 
and defendant shot Noriega.  Defendant retrieved the green bag, 
and then he hid Noriega’s body.  Sams testified that, when 
defendant lived in Texas years later, defendant bragged that he 
had shot someone in California “[f]or drugs,” and that he had 
taken a “bag” of speed. 
In short, defendant and Noriega spoke before Noriega 
retrieved the drugs from his trunk; defendant then shot him and 
took the drugs.  The jury could reasonably infer from this series 
of events that defendant intended to rob Noriega independent of 
any intent to kill him.  Unlike in People v. Green, when the 
defendant “took his victim’s clothing for the purpose of burning 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
63 
it later to prevent identification,” and we held the “sole object [of 
the robbery was] to facilitate or conceal the primary crime” 
(People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61), there is no evidence here 
that defendant took the drugs to facilitate or conceal Noriega’s 
murder.    
Defendant asserts that sufficient evidence does not 
support the robbery-murder special circumstance because the 
prosecutor argued, and the evidence supported, that defendant 
killed Noriega because he believed Noriega was a “narc, a 
snitch.”  Defendant emphasizes that Brown denied that the 
purpose of meeting Noriega was to rob and kill him, and that 
Reeder testified that defendant said he killed Noriega because 
Noriega was a “narc.”  Thus, defendant contends, “[t]he 
overwhelming weight of the evidence established that 
[defendant] shot Noriega to silence him.  The motive for the 
crime was clearly not robbery.” 
As defendant acknowledges, the prosecution argued both 
that defendant killed Noriega because defendant believed 
Noriega was a “narc” and that defendant had “dual motives, 
murder and robbery, pain and profit, freedom and financial 
gain.”  If defendant harbored a concurrent intent to rob Noriega 
and to kill him because he was a narc, that is sufficient to 
support the robbery-murder special circumstance.  (People v. 
Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 947–948 [“evidence that 
defendant harbored concurrent intents to rape and kill [does 
not] render the robbery merely incidental to the murder”]; 
People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 518 [upholding 
robbery-murder special circumstance when defendant killed 
victim to protect defendant’s girlfriend from abuse and for 
independent purpose of stealing victim’s property].)  It is true 
that Brown denied that the purpose of meeting Noriega was to 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
64 
rob and kill him.  But the jury could have concluded from the 
evidence that defendant intended to rob and kill Noriega even if 
the jury concluded Brown did not intend to do so.  And, in any 
event, the jury was free to evaluate Brown’s testimony and to 
deem it credible or not.  As a reviewing court, our role is not to 
reweigh the evidence.  (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 27.)  And although defendant asserts the motive “was clearly 
not robbery,” Brown’s description of the murder — including 
that defendant waited to shoot Noriega until after Noriega had 
produced the bag of drugs, and then defendant took the drugs — 
and defendant’s later statements recounted by Sams that he 
shot someone “for drugs” provided ample evidence to support the 
jury’s verdict.  We therefore conclude sufficient evidence 
supported the jury’s true finding. 
2. Use of Texas conviction to support prior murder 
conviction special circumstance 
Defendant contends the special circumstance finding 
based on his prior murder conviction must be reversed because 
the Texas conviction did not meet the requirements of section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(2).  That statute requires a defendant to 
have been “convicted previously of murder in the first or second 
degree.”  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2).)  A conviction from another 
jurisdiction meets the requirements for the prior murder 
conviction special circumstance if the offense would be 
punishable in California as first or second degree murder.  
(Ibid.)  Defendant was convicted of murder in Texas.  The jury 
in that case returned a general verdict of guilty on an indictment 
charging defendant with murder under a theory that he either 
“intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death of an individual” 
or “intend[ed] to cause serious bodily injury and commit[ted] an 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
65 
act clearly dangerous to human life that cause[d] the death of 
an individual.”  (Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (b)(2).) 
Defendant asserts that because the Texas jury was 
instructed on both theories, the California special circumstance 
statute demands that the least adjudicated elements of the 
Texas conviction required a showing equal to California’s 
implied malice second degree murder.  He claims that burden 
has not been met here because he could have been convicted 
under the Texas murder statute if the jury believed he had 
intended to cause serious bodily injury without also finding he 
subjectively knew he was committing an act dangerous to 
human life, whereas under California law implied malice 
requires a showing that a defendant acted with conscious 
disregard of the danger to human life.  Although we have held 
that a conviction under Texas Penal Code section 19.02(b)(1) 
constitutes at least implied malice second degree murder under 
California law and thus satisfies the prior murder special 
circumstance (People v. Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 687–
688), we have not previously addressed Texas Penal Code 
section 19.02(b)(2).     
We decline to address the merits of defendant’s claim 
because it is apparent that any error was undoubtedly 
harmless.20  Defendant asserts that the California jury would 
not have returned a death verdict absent evidence he had been 
 
20 
One Court of Appeal has held that a conviction under 
Texas Penal Code section 19.02(b)(2) does not necessarily 
require a subjective awareness of the risk of death, whereas a 
conviction under California law for implied malice murder does.  
(People v. Carothers (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 459, 467–468.)  We 
express no view regarding whether Carothers was correctly 
decided. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
66 
convicted of murder in Texas.  But defendant’s prior murder 
conviction would have been admissible during the penalty phase 
as a factor in aggravation, even if the prior conviction could not 
support a prior murder special circumstance.  (§ 190.3, factor (b) 
[“criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence”].)  That is because defendant 
does not challenge the admissibility of his prior conviction 
generally, nor does he challenge the fact that he was convicted 
of murder under Texas law.  Rather, he contends that the Texas 
conviction would not have amounted to first or second degree 
murder in California, and therefore it could not support the 
prior murder conviction special circumstance.  “As the United 
State Supreme Court recognized in Brown v. Sanders (2006) 546 
U.S. 212, the invalidation of a special circumstance does not 
require reversal of the death sentence under California’s 
statutory scheme if ‘one of the other sentencing factors enables 
the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and 
circumstances.’ ”  (People v. Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 1186.)   
The prosecution here relied on the prior murder conviction 
during the penalty phase not simply to show that defendant had 
been convicted of a murder that would have been classified as a 
murder in California, but also to explain and give context to the 
underlying nature of defendant’s behavior when he stabbed 
Hartwell.  “Because the [allegedly] invalid [prior murder] 
special circumstances ‘did not alter the universe of facts and 
circumstances to which the jury could accord . . . weight’ 
[citation], and because ‘[t]here is no likelihood that the jury’s 
consideration of the mere existence of the [prior murder] special 
circumstance tipped the balance toward death’ [citation], the 
invalidity of the [prior murder] special circumstances does not 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
67 
warrant reversal of the death sentence.”  (People v. Hajek and 
Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1186–1187, fn. omitted.)     
Further, even if we were to set aside the prior murder 
conviction special circumstance finding, the error would not 
require reversal of defendant’s guilt verdict or penalty 
determination.  The jury also found true the robbery-murder 
special circumstance, which (as discussed in section II.C.1, ante) 
was supported by sufficient evidence and provides an 
independent basis to support defendant’s guilt verdict and death 
judgment.  (See People v. Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 1186 [reversal of lying-in-wait special circumstance did not 
require reversal of judgment when, as relevant here, a valid 
special circumstance for torture murder remained].) 
D. Claims Regarding Jury Instructions 
1. Instruction regarding second degree murder 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when instructing 
the jury by failing to adequately define second degree murder.  
He asserts the provided instructions did not tell the jury that an 
intentional killing committed with express malice could 
constitute second degree murder, and that the provided 
instructions thus were “the functional equivalent of failing to 
instruct at all on second degree murder.”  We conclude there was 
no error.     
As an initial matter, the Attorney General asserts 
defendant’s claim is forfeited because he did not object to the 
instructions at trial nor did he request that the instructions be 
modified.  (See People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 503 
[“A party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in 
law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, 
without first requesting such clarification at trial”].)  A failure 
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68 
to object, however, does not prevent a defendant from 
challenging an instruction on appeal if the asserted error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.  (People v. Ramirez 
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1000, citing § 1259.)  Assuming the claim 
was preserved, we conclude that it fails on its merits.     
We review a claim of instructional error de novo.  (People 
v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)  Defendant’s claim requires 
an evaluation of “ ‘ “the entire charge of the court, not from a 
consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular 
instruction.” ’ [Citations.]”  (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 
792, 822.)  “ ‘A defendant challenging an instruction as being 
subject to erroneous interpretation by the jury must 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood 
the instruction in the way asserted by the defendant.  
[Citations.]’ ”  (Ibid.)  “Jurors are presumed able to understand 
and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have 
followed the court’s instructions.”  (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 834, 852.)  Applying these principles, we hold that the 
instructions provided an adequate instruction concerning 
second degree murder and that there was no error.   
The prosecution did not pursue a theory of implied malice 
murder.  Accordingly, the jury was instructed on only express 
malice and felony murder theories.  The instruction defining 
murder provided that defendant was guilty of murder if he acted 
with “express malice aforethought,” requiring that defendant 
“unlawfully intended to kill.”  The jury thus was told that 
defendant committed murder if he acted with express malice — 
an unlawful intent to kill.  The instructions further defined the 
degrees of murder, stating that first degree murder required 
“that [defendant] acted willfully, deliberately, and with 
premeditation.”  And, crucially, the jury was instructed that 
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“[a]ll other murders except felony murder are of the second 
degree.” 
Defendant’s position — that the jury would not have 
understood that if defendant acted with express malice and 
intended to kill Noriega he could be guilty of second degree 
murder as well as first degree murder — is unavailing in light 
of the instructions provided.  The jury was told that express 
malice and intent to kill were required to support a murder 
conviction, and if the jury concluded murder had occurred it 
must also consider whether the murder was first or second 
degree.  This was sufficient to inform the jury that if it found 
defendant acted with express malice it could convict him of first 
degree murder (if it also concluded he acted willfully, 
deliberately, and with premeditation) or second degree murder 
(if the jury concluded he did not act willfully, deliberately, and 
with premeditation). 
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
826 is misplaced.  In Rogers, the jury was instructed on first 
degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary 
manslaughter.  (Id. at p. 866.)  The instructions explained that 
murder could be supported by express or implied malice, that 
first degree murder required the defendant to act willfully, 
deliberately, and with premeditation, and that murder with 
implied malice could “also” constitute second degree murder.  
(Ibid.; see id. at pp. 866–867.)  The trial court did not, however, 
explain that a murder committed with express malice could 
constitute second degree murder.  (Id. at p. 867.)  We held this 
to be error because it “created an obvious gap in the instructions 
that was not filled by any of the other instructions given.”  (Ibid.)   
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No such gap exists here.  Unlike Rogers, the jury in 
defendant’s case was not instructed on implied malice as a 
theory of murder generally, or on implied malice as a theory of 
second degree murder specifically.  The jury was therefore not 
presented with instructions that explained one theory of 
liability for second degree murder but not another.  Considering 
the instructions as a whole, there is no basis to conclude that 
the jury misunderstood or misapplied these instructions, let 
alone a reasonable likelihood that any error occurred.  We 
conclude that the trial court did not err in providing the given 
instructions. 
2. Instruction on provocation 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to 
instruct the jury, on its own motion, that provocation is relevant 
to determine whether a murder is committed willfully, 
deliberately, and with premeditation.  He asserts that Brown’s 
testimony that defendant and Noriega had a “heated argument” 
preceding the shooting would support a finding of provocation 
here that would reduce defendant’s culpability from first degree 
murder to second degree murder. 
Defendant is correct that provocation may reduce murder 
from first degree to second degree.  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 306, 328.)  As we have stated, however, “an instruction 
that provocation may be sufficient to raise reasonable doubt 
about premeditation or deliberation, such as CALJIC No.  8.73 
or CALCRIM No. 522, is a pinpoint instruction to which a 
defendant is entitled only upon request where evidence supports 
the theory.”  (People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 328.)  
Crucially, a “trial court is not required to give such an 
instruction sua sponte.”  (Ibid.)  Here, as defendant 
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acknowledges, he did not request such an instruction.  Thus, like 
in Rivera, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the 
jury concerning provocation.  (Id. at p. 329.) 
Defendant acknowledges our precedent on this point but 
asserts we should overrule Rogers and hold that there is a duty 
to instruct on provocation because the absence of provocation is 
effectively an element of first degree murder.  He contends 
Rogers is inconsistent with the high court’s decision in Mullaney 
v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684, a case that he characterizes as 
holding that one element of first degree murder is a lack of 
provocation. 
Defendant misreads Mullaney.  That decision held that a 
defendant’s due process rights are violated when the jury is 
instructed that, if the prosecution established a homicide was 
intentional and unlawful, malice would be implied unless the 
defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he or 
she “acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.”  
(Mullaney, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 686, fn. omitted.)  But Mullaney 
did not hold that there is a duty to instruct on provocation in all 
cases.  Rather, the high court held the error in that case occurred 
because the jury instructions shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant to prove that the killing occurred in the heat of 
passion.  (Id. at p. 701; see also Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 
U.S. 307, 317 [Mullaney “held unconstitutional a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption that shifted to the defendant a burden 
of persuasion on the question of intent”]; Patterson v. New York 
(1977) 432 U.S. 197, 215 [“Mullaney surely held that a State 
must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other 
elements of the offense”].) 
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Mullaney thus is not inconsistent with Rogers or our 
subsequent cases holding that instructions on issues such as 
provocation or accident amount to pinpoint instructions that are 
“ ‘required to be given upon request when there is evidence 
supportive of the theory, but they are not required to be given 
sua sponte.’ ”  (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 675.)  
We therefore hold, consistent with Rogers and Rivera, that the 
trial court here did not err by failing to provide an instruction 
on provocation when one was not requested by defendant at 
trial. 
3. Instruction on self-defense, heat of passion, and 
unreasonable self-defense 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his 
requests to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense, imperfect 
self-defense, and voluntary manslaughter based on heat of 
passion.  He asserts this error violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, as well as the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  We conclude the trial court did not 
err by refusing to give the requested instructions because there 
was not substantial evidence to support a theory of self-defense 
or heat of passion. 
Defendant 
requested 
instructions 
on 
self-defense, 
imperfect self-defense, and voluntary manslaughter based on 
heat of passion.  He asserted:  “One possible interpretation in 
Dorothy Brown’s testimony could be sort of that there was some 
provocation, there was . . . either a drug deal gone bad, or 
[Noriega] pulled a firearm, something like that.  There’s an 
insinuation of the statements of [defendant] and Mr. Silva.  
They’re primarily from Mr. Silva, obviously.”  The court declined 
to give the instructions, noting that the evidence in the record 
did not support them.  The court also stated that it would 
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reconsider its ruling if defendant presented additional evidence 
to support his theory. 
“[A] trial court must instruct on general principles of law 
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for 
the jury’s understanding of the case.”  (People v. Martinez (2010) 
47 Cal.4th 911, 953.)  “ ‘To justify a lesser included offense 
instruction, the evidence supporting the instruction must be 
substantial — that is, it must be evidence from which a jury 
composed of reasonable persons could conclude that the facts 
underlying the particular instruction exist.’ ”  (People v. Burney, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 250.)  “Speculative, minimal, or 
insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction 
on a lesser included offense.”  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
98, 132.)  “We review independently whether the trial court 
erred in rejecting an instruction on a lesser included offense.”  
(People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 345.)       
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with 
malice aforethought.  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  A killing in perfect self-
defense is justifiable homicide.  (People v. Randle (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 987, 994, disapproved on another ground in People v. 
Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201.)  Perfect self-defense 
requires that “one must actually and reasonably believe in the 
necessity of defending oneself from imminent danger of death or 
great bodily injury.”  (People v. Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 994; see also People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132.)  “To 
satisfy the imminence requirement, ‘[f]ear of future harm — no 
matter how great the fear and no matter how great the 
likelihood of the harm — will not suffice.  The defendant’s fear 
must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.’ ”  
(People v. Trujeque (2005) 61 Cal.4th 227, 270.)  “ ‘ “[T]he peril 
must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
74 
prospective or even in the near future.  An imminent peril is one 
that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.” ’ ”  (In re 
Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783.) 
Imperfect self-defense, on the other hand, “occurs when a 
defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or 
she is in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.”  
(People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132.)  Imperfect self-
defense reduces an intentional, unlawful killing to voluntary 
manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder, by negating 
a defendant’s malice.  (Ibid.) 
Finally, “ ‘[h]eat of passion is a mental state that precludes 
the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from 
murder to manslaughter.’  [Citation.]  Heat of passion killing is 
distinct from malice murder because thought in some form is 
necessary ‘to form either an intent to kill or a conscious 
disregard for human life.’    [Citation.]  A heat of passion killing, 
we have explained, is one caused by an unconsidered reaction to 
provocation rather than the result of rational thought.  If reason 
‘ “ ‘was obscured or disturbed by passion’ ” ’ to so great a degree 
that an ordinary person would ‘ “ ‘act rashly and without 
deliberation and reflection,’ ” ’ we have concluded that killing 
arose from ‘ “ ‘passion rather than from judgment.’ ” ’ ”  (People 
v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 827–828.) 
Defendant focuses on three facts to support his position 
that self-defense and manslaughter instructions were required:  
a loaded gun was found in Noriega’s vehicle; Noriega was a drug 
dealer known to be armed; and Investigator Silva testified that 
Brown told him there was a “heated argument” between Noriega 
and defendant before the shooting.  None of these circumstances 
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75 
nor any others in the record amount to substantial evidence 
requiring the instructions. 
As an initial matter, defendant errs in relying on Brown’s 
statement to Silva that there was a heated argument between 
Noriega and defendant prior to the shooting.  As discussed in 
section II.D.6, post, the jury was instructed that it could use 
Brown’s statements to Silva only “in deciding whether to believe 
the testimony of Dorothy Brown that was read here at trial.”  
The jury was instructed it “may not use those other statements 
as proof that the information contained in them is true, nor may 
you use them for any other reason.”  Defendant therefore cannot 
rely on Brown’s statements to Silva to establish the requisite 
substantial evidence to support the requested instructions.  
Further, Brown’s testimony in the Texas trial did not describe 
any argument between defendant and Noriega.  Rather, she 
testified at various points that: defendant got out of his truck 
and “yelled something over to” Noriega; that defendant “said 
something to him”; that “[Noriega] got out and moved to the 
back of the vehicle and opened the trunk”; and that defendant 
and Noriega were “speaking in Spanish” and “exchanged words 
in Spanish.” 
There was no evidence defendant actually believed — 
reasonably or unreasonably — that he was in imminent fear of 
death or great bodily injury.  Although Noriega carried a loaded 
firearm in his car, there is no evidence Noriega reached for the 
gun at any point or that defendant knew about the gun or 
believed Noriega had a gun on his person.  Nor is there evidence 
defendant believed Noriega was an imminent threat that he 
needed instantly to deal with.  Defendant did not testify and 
“there is no evidence he ever told anyone that he had acted out 
of fear.”  (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 134; see also 
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People v. Steskal, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 346.)  Simply put, there 
was not substantial evidence to support instructions on self-
defense.   
Nor is there evidence that defendant shot Noriega in the 
heat of passion.  Again, defendant relies on Brown’s statement 
to Silva that a “heated argument” preceded the shooting.  But 
Brown’s statements, at most, established that after the verbal 
exchange Noriega went to the trunk of his car and produced a 
duffel bag of narcotics.  Only then did defendant retrieve his 
firearm and shoot Noriega.  This does not constitute substantial 
evidence that defendant acted in the heat of passion when he 
shot Noriega.   
We rejected a similar claim in People v. Landry (2016) 
2 Cal.5th 52.  There, the defendant stabbed and killed another 
inmate at a prison.  (Id. at p. 63.)  The trial court denied the 
defendant’s request for instructions on imperfect self-defense 
and heat of passion.  (Id. at p. 97.)  In support of the instructions, 
the defendant pointed to a witness’s testimony that the 
defendant and victim were “ ‘having words’ just before” the 
attack.  (Id. at p. 98.)  We noted, however, that the witness’s 
belief that the defendant and victim were arguing was “based 
solely on the tone of defendant’s voice, which ‘sounded angry.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  The witness “did not hear what the two men were saying 
to each other.”  (Ibid.)  And although the defendant relied on a 
letter he had written stating the victim had threatened him, 
that letter “did not identify when the alleged threat occurred.”  
(Ibid.)  We held that “[t]his evidence, even if credited, does not 
begin to demonstrate either provocation for purposes of heat of 
passion voluntary manslaughter or imminence of danger of 
death for purposes of imperfect self-defense voluntary 
manslaughter.”  (Ibid.)    
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Like in Landry, the only evidence supporting a self-
defense or heat of passion theory was Brown’s statement that 
an argument occurred between defendant and Noriega.  But 
that evidence was inadmissible for the truth of the matter.  
Further, Brown’s characterization of the exchange was based 
solely on the tone of voices involved; Brown did not testify that 
she understood Spanish, and she did not testify further about 
the content of the exchange.  Although the verbal exchange in 
Landry occurred “just before” the attack (People v. Landry, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 98), the conversation and the shooting in 
this case were separated somewhat by Noriega retrieving the 
bag from his trunk.  The evidence of provocation here is thus 
even weaker than the facts we considered in Landry.    
We therefore conclude the trial court did not err when it 
denied defendant’s requests to instruct the jury on self-defense, 
imperfect self-defense, or voluntary manslaughter in heat of 
passion. 
4. Failure to instruct on theft as a lesser included 
offense of robbery 
Defendant 
contends 
the 
robbery-murder 
special 
circumstance allegation and his murder conviction based on a 
theory of felony murder must be reversed because the trial court 
failed to instruct the jury that theft was a lesser included offense 
of robbery.  He asserts the trial court had a duty to instruct the 
jury on theft as a lesser included offense even though robbery 
was not charged as a separate offense.  We have repeatedly 
rejected similar claims, and we do so again here. 
Defendant was charged with first degree murder.  A 
robbery-murder special circumstance was alleged.  The 
prosecution argued that the murder was premeditated and that 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
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it also constituted felony murder.  Although both the felony 
murder theory and the robbery-murder special circumstance 
were based on the theory that defendant robbed Noriega, 
robbery was not charged as a separate felony offense.  Defendant 
did not request any instruction at trial related to theft.  He 
contends on appeal that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to 
instruct the jury that theft was a lesser included offense of 
robbery. 
As defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly rejected 
his position.  A trial court has a duty to instruct on lesser 
included offenses that “find substantial support in the 
evidence.”  (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.)  
However, we have held that a court’s duty to instruct on lesser 
included offenses “does not extend to uncharged offenses 
relevant only as predicate offenses under the felony-murder 
doctrine.”  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371.)  In 
Valdez, we stated that “when robbery is not a charged offense 
but merely forms the basis for a felony-murder charge and a 
special circumstance allegation, a trial court does not have a sua 
sponte duty to instruct the jury on theft.”  (People v. Valdez, 
supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 110–111; see also People v. Gonzalez 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 204–205 [same]; People v. Brooks (2017) 3 
Cal.5th 1, 77 [same]; People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 792 
[same].)   
Defendant acknowledges these precedents but asserts 
that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Beck v. 
Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625 requires a different result.  At 
issue in Beck was Alabama’s death penalty statute, which 
prohibited a trial court from providing an instruction regarding 
a lesser included offense, thus allowing a jury only to impose the 
death penalty or to acquit the defendant.  (Beck, supra, 477 U.S. 
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at pp. 627–628.)  The high court held that instructing the jury 
on a lesser included offense is required if the failure to do so 
would leave the jury without a third option (i.e., to convict the 
defendant of a lesser offense), enhancing the risk of an 
unwarranted conviction as a result.  (Id. at p. 645.)  The Court 
explained that “if the unavailability of a lesser included offense 
instruction enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction, 
Alabama is constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing that 
option from the jury in a capital case.”  (Id. at p. 638, fn. 
omitted.)   
We have previously held that Beck does not require the 
instruction defendant now seeks.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 
Cal.4th at pp. 118–119.)  Unlike the Alabama statute at issue in 
Beck, “California does not preclude a trial court from giving 
instructions on lesser included offenses in capital cases.”  (Ibid.)  
Thus, Beck is not implicated “because the ‘jury was not forced 
into an all-or-nothing choice between a conviction of murder 
that would legally compel it to fix the penalty at death, on the 
one side, and innocence, on the other:  Even if it found [the 
defendant] guilty of [felony murder under the special 
circumstance allegations], it was not legally compelled to fix the 
penalty at death, but could fix it instead at a term of 
imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.’ ”  (People v. 
Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 119; see also People v. Cash 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 738.)  Defendant presents no compelling 
reason to revisit these decisions.   
Defendant further alleges that a lesser included offense 
instruction for an uncharged felony used as the basis for a 
felony-murder charge and a special circumstance allegation is 
required by Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99, 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, and related cases.  
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In Alleyne, the high court stated that “[w]hen a finding of fact 
alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, 
the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense 
and must be submitted to the jury.”  (Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at 
pp. 114–115.)  Essentially, defendant asserts that these cases 
stand for the proposition that facts which increase a defendant’s 
punishment must be found by a jury, that special circumstance 
allegations which make a defendant eligible for the death 
penalty are elements of a capital murder charge, and therefore 
that a special circumstance allegation should be treated as the 
“functional equivalent” of an aggravating factor.  Thus, 
defendant asserts, because a court is required to provide a lesser 
included offense instruction on a charged offense it should also 
be required to provide a lesser included offense instruction on 
an uncharged offense supporting a felony murder charge or 
special circumstance allegation.  Stated differently, defendant’s 
position is that:  (1) charged offenses require the provision of 
lesser included offense instructions; (2) Alleyne held that a fact 
which aggravates punishment forms “a constituent part of a new 
offense”; (3) a special circumstance aggravates punishment and 
thus forms a constituent part of a charged offense (even if the 
offense itself is uncharged); and (4) therefore a special 
circumstance allegation requires the provision of a lesser 
included offense instruction. 
Defendant overreads the high court’s decisions in this 
area.  The court explained in Alleyne that the Sixth Amendment 
“provides that those ‘accused’ of a crime have the right to a trial 
‘by an impartial jury,’ ” and “[t]his right, in conjunction with the 
Due Process Clause, requires that each element of a crime be 
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Alleyne, supra, 
570 U.S. at p. 104.)  “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
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any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum” constitutes an element of the 
crime that “must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.)  
Alleyne went further, holding that any fact which increases a 
mandatory minimum also “constitutes an ‘element’ or 
‘ingredient’ of the charged offense” and thus must be submitted 
to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Alleyne, 
supra, 570 U.S. at p. 107.)   
Consistent with Alleyne, the question of whether 
defendant committed robbery was submitted to the jury and 
found true by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  But neither 
Apprendi, Alleyne, nor any of the cases defendant cites require 
a trial court to instruct on a lesser included offense in these 
circumstances.  Nor does such a conclusion logically follow from 
Alleyne.  Defendant cites to no authority that has extended or 
applied Alleyne in this manner, and we decline to do so in the 
first instance.   
Finally, defendant contends the equal protection clause 
required the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of theft.  He asserts that a trial court has a sua sponte 
duty to instruct on a lesser included offense in a non-capital 
prosecution, and therefore that the same requirement should 
extend to defendants in capital trials.  He is mistaken.  As we 
stated in Cash, “California requires a sua sponte instruction on 
lesser included charged offenses regardless of whether the case 
is a capital, or a noncapital, one.”  (People v. Cash, supra, 
28 Cal.4th at p. 738.)  Similarly, there is no equal protection 
violation resulting from the rule that a lesser included offense 
instruction need not be provided when an uncharged offense 
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forms the basis for a felony-murder charge and a special 
circumstance allegation.  (Id. at pp. 737–738.) 
5. Instruction regarding corroboration of accomplice 
testimony 
Defendant contends the instruction regarding accomplice 
testimony (a modified version of CALCRIM No. 334) improperly 
lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of his right 
to due process and a fair jury trial.  The instruction directed the 
jury that if it determined Brown was an accomplice, her 
testimony could be used to convict defendant only if: it was 
“supported by other evidence that you believe”; that the 
“supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s 
testimony”; and the “supporting evidence tends to connect the 
defendant to the commission of the crime.”  The instruction 
further provided: 
Supporting evidence, however, may be slight.  It 
does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that 
the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, and it 
does not need to support every fact about which the 
accomplice testified.  On the other hand, it is not 
enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that 
a crime was committed or the circumstances of its 
commission.  The supporting evidence must tend to 
connect the defendant to the commission of the 
crime. 
Defendant contends the language in the instruction 
indicating that “slight” evidence which “tend[s] to connect the 
defendant to the commission of the crime” impermissibly 
undermined the general reasonable doubt instruction and 
allowed for the jury to convict him based on a standard lower 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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As defendant acknowledges, we have consistently rejected 
his position.  In Bryant, we stated that a similar instruction “did 
not convey to the jury that it ‘could convict if there was slight 
corroboration.’  Instead, the instruction properly explained the 
corroboration requirement as it related to the jury’s 
consideration of accomplice testimony.  The challenged 
instruction in no way lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.”  
(People v. Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 434; see also People v. 
Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 968.)  Here, too, the jury was 
instructed that it was required to find defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The accomplice testimony instruction 
described for the jury how it was to evaluate Brown’s testimony 
but it did not address, modify, or undermine the general 
instruction regarding reasonable doubt.  Defendant presents no 
compelling reason for us to revisit the issue. 
6. Instructions regarding Brown’s extrajudicial 
statements 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when instructing 
the jury regarding how to evaluate Brown’s prior testimony and 
her statements to Silva.  He asserts CALCRIM No. 318, which 
instructed the jury it could use a witness’s prior statements to 
evaluate their subsequent testimony, failed to tell the jury it was 
free to disbelieve Brown’s prior testimony.  He further asserts 
CALCRIM No. 319, which instructed the jury it could consider 
Brown’s statements to Silva only to evaluate Brown’s prior 
testimony, improperly precluded the jury from considering 
Brown’s statements to Silva as true.  We conclude there was no 
error in providing the instructions.  
As an initial matter, the Attorney General asserts 
defendant’s claim is forfeited because he did not object to either 
instruction at trial nor did he request the instructions be 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
84 
modified.  As observed above, however, failure to object does not 
prevent a defendant from challenging an instruction on appeal 
if the asserted error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.  
(People v. Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1000; § 1259.)  
Assuming the claim was preserved, we conclude that it fails on 
its merits.     
As previously noted, Brown was deceased at the time of 
defendant’s trial.  Her testimony from defendant’s Texas murder 
trial was read into the record during defendant’s trial in 
California.  Defendant also introduced testimony from Silva 
regarding statements Brown made to him during a custodial 
interview in 1998. 
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 318 
and No. 319.  As modified by the court with agreement of the 
parties, CALCRIM No. 318 provided: 
“You have heard evidence of statements that a 
witness made before trial.  Except as otherwise 
instructed, if you decide that the witness made those 
statements, you may use those statements in two 
ways: 
 
1. 
To evaluate whether the witness’s testimony 
in court is believable; 
 
AND 
 
2. 
As evidence that the information in those 
earlier statements is true.”21     
 
21  
The agreed upon modification added the phrase “except as 
otherwise instructed.” 
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The trial court also instructed the jury with a modified 
version of CALCRIM No. 319.  As modified and agreed upon by 
the parties, the instruction stated: 
“Dorothy Brown did not testify in this trial, but her 
testimony, taken at another time, was read for you.  
In addition to this testimony, you have heard 
evidence 
that 
Dorothy 
Brown 
made 
other 
statements.  I am referring to the statements about 
which Martin Silva testified. 
 
“If you conclude that Dorothy Brown made those 
other statements, you may only consider them in a 
limited way.  You may only use them in deciding 
whether to believe the testimony of Dorothy Brown 
that was read here at trial.  
 
“You may not use those other statements as proof 
that the information contained in them is true, nor 
may you use them for any other reason.” 
Defendant asserts there is a reasonable likelihood the jury 
interpreted these instructions to mean that it was compelled to 
accept Brown’s out-of-court statements as true.  He maintains 
that CALCRIM No. 318 was “one sided” and effectively deprived 
him of a fair trial because it directed the jury to accept Brown’s 
testimony from the Texas trial as fact.  At the same time, he 
contends the instructions were confusing and contradictory 
because CALCRIM No. 318 allowed the jury to consider Brown’s 
statements to Silva for their truth, but CALCRIM No. 319 told 
the jury it could not consider Brown’s statements to Silva for 
their truth.  Further, defendant claims the instructions 
prevented the jury from considering Brown’s statements to Silva 
that defendant and Noriega were arguing in Spanish before the 
shooting occurred.  This limitation, he insists, prevented the 
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jury from fairly considering defendant’s claim that the killing 
occurred out of provocation and thus constituted second degree 
murder. 
Defendant’s contentions are unpersuasive.  As a 
preliminary matter, CALCRIM No. 318 did not pertain to 
Brown’s statements to Silva.  As the prosecutor noted, the 
language “[e]xcept as otherwise instructed” was added to 
CALCRIM No. 318 to avoid implying that the instruction 
referred to Brown’s statements to Silva:  “The only thing I might 
suggest is adding at the very beginning, ‘except as otherwise 
instructed,’ because the next instruction is going to give 
different information concerning Dorothy Brown.”  CALCRIM 
No. 319 was specific to Brown’s statements to Silva, and it 
instructed the jury how it was to consider those statements; 
CALCRIM No. 318 dealt with prior statements given by other 
witnesses, and the court instructed the jury that Brown’s 
testimony from the Texas trial was to be evaluated by the same 
standards applied to other witnesses.  CALCRIM No. 317 
provided:  “The testimony that Dorothy Brown has given under 
oath was read to you because she is not available.  You must 
evaluate this testimony by the same standards that you apply 
to a witness who testified here in court.”   
We have previously rejected claims that an instruction 
informing the jury it may consider whether testimony is true is 
improper if it does not also tell the jury it may consider whether 
the testimony is false.  (See People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
1, 41–42.)  This is equally true in the context of CALCRIM No. 
318, and particularly so when the jury was instructed, as it was 
here with CALCRIM No. 226, to consider factors indicating that 
testimony was not trustworthy and instructed that it could 
“believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony.”  Moreover, 
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as previously noted, the jury was instructed in CALCRIM No. 
317 to consider Brown’s prior testimony from Texas “by the 
same standards” applicable to other witnesses.  We evaluate the 
jury instructions as a whole, “not from a consideration of parts 
of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”  (People v. 
Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538, disapproved on another 
ground in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753–756.)  
Considering the totality of the instructions provided to the jury, 
we conclude that defendant has not established error or a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied CALCRIM No. 318 
in an improper manner.   
We further hold that CALCRIM No. 319 properly limited 
the jury’s consideration of Brown’s statements to Silva.  That 
instruction informed the jury that it could consider those 
statements to evaluate Brown’s testimony at the Texas trial but 
it could not consider those statements for their truth.  Defendant 
asserts Brown’s statements to Silva should have been 
considered for their truth.  He acknowledges, however, that 
defense counsel indicated to the court that Silva would testify 
“on some impeachment issues.”  This makes sense, given that 
Brown’s statements to Silva amounted to hearsay and were thus 
governed by Evidence Code section 1202.  That statute states:  
“Evidence of a statement or other conduct by a declarant that is 
inconsistent with a statement by such declarant received in 
evidence as hearsay evidence is not inadmissible for the purpose 
of attacking the credibility of the declarant though he is not 
given and has not had an opportunity to explain or to deny such 
inconsistent statement or other conduct.”  (Evid. Code, § 1202.)  
Accordingly, Brown’s hearsay statements to Silva could not be 
considered for their truth.   
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Defendant identifies no plausible basis for admitting 
Brown’s statements for their truth.  He simply asserts, quoting 
People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1305:  “ ‘Unless 
evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, or against a specific 
party, evidence admitted at trial may generally be considered 
for any purpose.’ ”  As noted, however, counsel stated Silva’s 
testimony would serve as impeachment.  As such, defendant 
cannot now assert it was admitted for its truth, particularly in 
light of the rules limiting hearsay.  CALCRIM No. 319 was 
therefore a correct instruction. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A. Defendant’s Request to Represent Himself 
During the Penalty Phase 
One day before the penalty phase was scheduled to 
proceed, defendant filed a Faretta motion seeking to represent 
himself.  The trial court found the motion to be untimely, 
reviewed it using the factors articulated in People v. Hardy 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, and denied the motion.  Defendant contends 
this amounted to reversible error.  We hold the trial court’s 
ruling was a proper exercise of its discretion to deny an untimely 
Faretta motion. 
1. Factual background 
The Faretta motion at issue was the culmination of a long 
history of defendant’s attempts to replace his attorneys.  In 
November 2006, well before trial began in October 2007, 
defendant submitted a document the court deemed a motion to 
appoint new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 
Cal.3d 118.  Defendant ultimately withdrew the motion, and he 
instead moved to be appointed as co-counsel for purposes of 
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challenging the validity of his Texas conviction if advisory 
counsel was appointed for that issue. 
In February 2007, defendant filed a Marsden motion and 
a Faretta motion.  As discussed in section II.A, ante, the court 
granted defendant’s Faretta motion and appointed Exum as 
stand-by counsel.  Defendant withdrew his Marsden motion. 
In May 2007, defendant requested advisory counsel for 
purposes of assisting him in attacking the validity of his Texas 
murder conviction.  In considering the motion, the court stated, 
“this all looks like just an effort of delay.” 
In July 2007, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
waiver of counsel and asked the court to reappoint counsel.  The 
court granted defendant’s motion and reappointed Scalisi and 
Exum as counsel. 
In September 2007, defendant filed another Marsden 
motion.  During a closed proceeding, defendant asserted he 
needed the assistance of an attorney barred in Texas; counsel 
also 
noted 
that 
defendant 
and 
counsel 
were 
having 
disagreements regarding trial strategy.  The court denied the 
Marsden motion. 
In October 2007, defendant filed a fourth Marsden motion.  
He asserted irreconcilable differences with counsel and asked 
the court to replace Scalisi.  At the Marsden hearing, Scalisi and 
Exum asked to withdraw as counsel, stating defendant insisted 
they present an alibi defense that “would be a subordination of 
perjury and at a minimum fraud.”  The trial court denied the 
Marsden motion as well counsel’s requests to withdraw. 
In November 2007, counsel informed the court (and 
defendant confirmed) that defendant was instructing counsel 
not to argue for life without the possibility of parole during the 
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penalty phase.  Instead, defendant wished to testify that he 
sought a death verdict in order to obtain additional resources on 
appeal. 
Later that month, and prior to the closing arguments in 
the guilt phase, defendant filed another Marsden motion — his 
fifth.  Defendant asserted that trial counsel had failed to 
interview alibi witnesses and had not sufficiently attacked his 
Texas conviction.  The court denied the Marsden motion, noting 
that counsel’s representation had been “more than adequate.” 
In December 2007, after the guilt phase had concluded and 
on the date of the bifurcated hearing on the prior-murder special 
circumstance, defendant indicated that he intended to file 
Marsden and Faretta motions if counsel did not move for a new 
trial following the penalty phase.  Defense counsel also 
discussed with the court defendant’s request that counsel not 
present any evidence in mitigation during the penalty phase.  
Defendant again stated that he intended to request that the jury 
impose the death penalty.  Earlier that day, defendant had, 
despite counsel’s advice, refused to dress in civilian clothes when 
appearing in front of the jury. 
After the jury returned its verdict in the bifurcated 
hearing — and one day before the penalty phase was scheduled 
to begin — defendant asserted he wanted to represent himself.  
The court directed defendant to complete a standard form 
describing the disadvantages of representing himself, his 
understanding of the charges against him, and the court’s advice 
against self-representation.  The court then held a hearing to 
consider defendant’s request. 
Defendant informed the court he wished to represent 
himself for “the enrichment of appellate resources.  I do not 
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agree with the defense counsel’s strategy in the penalty phase, 
as I did not agree with them in the [guilt] trial phase.  I feel that 
what I’m seeking to do in the penalty phase is in my best 
interest.  I’m not seeking any delays or continuances.  If this is 
granted we can move forward as scheduled.”  The trial court 
concluded the motion was untimely, considered the relevant 
factors, and denied the motion.   
2. Analysis 
A defendant has a federal constitutional right to self-
representation if he or she voluntarily and intelligently so 
chooses.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835–836.)  When a 
defendant makes a timely and unequivocal request for self-
representation, and does so knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently, a trial court must grant the defendant’s request.  
(People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127–128.)  When a 
defendant’s motion is untimely, the motion is “based on 
nonconstitutional grounds” (id. at p. 129, fn. 6) and it is “within 
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether such 
a defendant may dismiss counsel and proceed pro se” (id. at 
p. 124; see also People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1220 
[stating a “midtrial motion for self-representation did not have 
a constitutional basis”].)   
“We have long held that a Faretta motion is timely if it is 
made ‘within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of 
trial.’ ”  (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499.)  In 
evaluating whether a Faretta motion is timely, we have 
contrasted motions “made long before trial” with motions 
“ ‘made on the eve of trial.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The former are timely; the 
latter are not.  (See id. at pp. 499–500.)  When a motion falls 
“outside these two extreme time periods,” a trial court must 
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evaluate whether it is timely based on “pertinent considerations 
[that] may extend beyond a mere counting of the days between 
the motion and the scheduled trial date.”  (People v. Lynch 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 723.)  In the context of a capital case, we 
have held that a Faretta motion made after the guilt phase 
verdicts have been returned is untimely.  (People v. Hardy, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 193–195 [motion made seven days prior 
to commencement of penalty phase]; see People v. Bradford 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1365 [“a motion made between trial of 
the two phases [of a capital trial] is untimely”]; People v. 
Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 369 [“the penalty phase has no 
separate formal existence but is merely a stage in a unitary 
capital trial”].) 
Here, defendant filed his Faretta motion after the guilt 
phase verdicts had been returned and the day before the penalty 
phase was scheduled to begin.  The motion falls squarely into 
the category of motions we have deemed to be untimely.  (People 
v. Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722; People v. Hardy, supra, 
2 Cal.4th at pp. 193–194.)22 
Nevertheless, defendant asserts his motion was timely 
because he did not request a continuance and was prepared to 
 
22 
The parties do not address what standard a reviewing 
court should apply in evaluating a trial court’s determination 
that a defendant’s Faretta motion was untimely.  We have not 
directly addressed the issue.  (See People v. Johnson, supra, 8 
Cal.5th at p. 501.)  As was the case in Johnson, “[w]e need not 
decide whether de novo review or a more deferential standard is 
appropriate, however, because defendant’s claim fails under 
either standard.”  (Ibid.) 
 
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proceed with the penalty phase as scheduled.  He contends that 
we have never explicitly held that a Faretta motion filed 
between the guilt and penalty phases is necessarily untimely, 
and he asks us to adopt a rule that a self-representation request 
is assumed to be timely if the defendant does not request a 
continuance or cause future delay. 
We do not agree.  The mere fact that a defendant does not 
request a continuance when filing a Faretta motion does not 
render the motion timely.  We recently rejected the assertion 
that “even a belated [Faretta] request must be granted unless it 
would entail undue delay or interfere with the orderly 
administration of justice.”  (People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 
1008, 1057.)  We have repeatedly held that a Faretta motion 
made on the eve of trial or after commencement of the guilt 
phase is untimely, without regard to whether the defendant 
requested a continuance.  (See, e.g., People v. Wright (2021) 12 
Cal.5th 419, 280; People v. Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 499; 
People v. Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722; People v. Valdez, 
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 
1068, 1110; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 99–100; People 
v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 742.)23 
 
23 
Defendant cites People v. Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 
584 for the proposition that his motion was timely.  The Court 
of Appeal stated in Nicholson that it had found “only two 
reported decisions in which the trial courts denied Faretta 
motions when the defendants were ready to proceed without a 
continuance,” and that in both cases “the denials resulted in 
reversals.”  (People v. Nicholson, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 593.)  Nicholson is readily distinguishable.  There, the 
appellate court concluded that the Faretta motion in that case 
 
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Having concluded that defendant’s Faretta motion was 
untimely, we evaluate the trial court’s decision to deny 
defendant’s motion for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Buenrostro 
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 427; see People v. Hamilton, supra, 
45 Cal.3d at p. 369.)  In exercising its discretion, “the trial court 
should inquire into the defendant’s reasons for the requests” and 
should consider factors including “ ‘the quality of counsel’s 
representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity 
to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and 
stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which 
might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a 
motion.’ ”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 195.)  “A court 
abuses its discretion if it acts ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
patently absurd manner’ ” (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 
672, 687) or “when its ruling ‘falls outside the bounds of reason’ ” 
(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 622, 666). 
The trial court here properly considered the relevant 
factors when it denied defendant’s untimely Faretta motion.  
The court found defendant’s reasons for wanting to represent 
himself — to ask the jury to impose the death penalty in order 
to gain additional resources for his appeal — were not 
“compelling[,] . . . overwhelming or clearly pivotal.”  The court 
further found that counsel’s representation of defendant was 
“excellent” and “well above the norm.”  It noted regarding 
 
was untimely but that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the untimely motion because the defendants had not 
“asked for a continuance or otherwise suggested or expressed an 
intent to delay the proceedings . . . .”  (People v. Nicholson, 
supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 592.)  Nicholson thus does not 
support defendant’s assertion that a Faretta motion is timely so 
long as a defendant does not request a continuance. 
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defendant’s “prior proclivity to substitute counsel” that he had 
represented himself during the proceeding “only one time 
previous, but it did last for quite some time.”24  It also found that 
the stage of the proceeding weighed against self-representation 
because although it was “not an overwhelming length, it’s 
certainly a pivotal stage of the proceedings as far as, obviously, 
the penalty that the jury will impose.”  Finally, the court stated 
that it was “not a huge concern” but that if defendant needed to 
move or use exhibits there would be a “minor disruption” of the 
proceedings because defendant was restrained.  The court 
acknowledged defendant’s claim that there would be no 
disruption to the proceedings because he would not offer 
witnesses or exhibits or cross-examine any prosecution 
witnesses.  Still, the court found there was “the portent of some 
disruption simply because of where we are in the nature of the 
proceedings.”  Taking all of these factors into account, the court 
denied defendant’s Faretta motion. 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant’s untimely Faretta motion.  The court 
considered the pertinent factors and reasonably concluded that 
they weighed against granting defendant’s request.  Defendant 
again asserts that the court abused its discretion because he did 
not request a continuance when he moved to represent himself.  
 
24 
As the Attorney General points out, and as described 
above, defendant had filed Marsden motions on five prior 
occasions, and he threatened to do so on another.  Defendant’s 
“proclivity to substitute counsel” was thus an even stronger 
factor in support of denying his Faretta motion than the trial 
court appears to have believed.  (See People v. Hardy, supra, 
2 Cal.4th at p. 195.)   
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But although “the potential for delay and disruption is an 
important factor in the analysis,” it is not “the only factor the 
court may consider.  We see no reason why a court may not also 
consider, for example, whether the potential disruption is likely 
to be aggravated, mitigated, or justified by the surrounding 
circumstances, including the quality of counsel’s representation 
to that point, the reasons the defendant gives for his request, 
and the defendant’s proclivity for substituting counsel.”  (People 
v. Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 426; see also People v. Smith 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1182–1183.)  Those are the precise factors 
the trial court considered here.   
Although the court acknowledged defendant was not 
requesting a continuance, it also observed that defendant’s 
counsel was “excellent,” that defendant had some proclivity to 
substitute counsel (indeed, more of a proclivity than the trial 
court expressly acknowledged), that defendant’s stated reason 
for representing himself — to seek the death penalty — was not 
“overwhelming,” and that defendant’s self-representation 
carried with it some potential for disruption based on the stage 
of the proceedings.  We therefore conclude that the trial court’s 
determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or so outside the 
bounds of reason as to render its ruling an abuse of discretion. 
B. Claims Regarding Jury Deliberations 
1. Trial court’s direction to jury to continue 
deliberations 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred when it instructed 
the jury to continue deliberating during the penalty phase after 
the jury indicated it was deadlocked.  Defendant contends the 
court’s actions coerced a death verdict and violated section 1140 
and his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a 
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fair trial, and against cruel and unusual punishment.  We hold 
the trial court did not err. 
a. Factual background 
The jury retired to begin penalty phase deliberations on 
December 19, 2007, at about 2:30 p.m.  Shortly after 3:00 p.m., 
the jury requested that Stalcup’s direct examination and 
defendant’s personal statement be read back.  The jury was 
dismissed for the remainder of the day.  The reading was 
provided the following day from 10:10 a.m. until shortly after 
11:00 a.m.  The jury resumed deliberations but recessed for the 
day at 12:05 p.m. due to a juror’s illness.  The next day, the jury 
deliberated from 9:30 a.m. until noon, at which time it broke for 
lunch and submitted a note stating, “We are deadlocked 11 to 1.  
What do we do from here?”   
Outside of the jury’s presence, the trial court stated it 
intended to bring the jury into the courtroom and inquire as to 
the number of ballots taken and the numerical breakdown of 
each ballot without referring to the verdicts represented.  
Defense counsel asked the court if it would inquire of the jurors 
whether they believed further deliberations would be 
productive.  The court agreed, noting the jury had not 
deliberated very long. 
The jury was brought into the courtroom and the judge 
inquired about the reported deadlock.  The foreperson stated the 
jury had taken four ballots with splits of six-to-six, eight-to-four, 
ten-to-two, and eleven-to-one.  The foreperson also reported that 
deliberations were “thick and heated.”  The court asked each 
juror whether further deliberations would be productive.   The 
foreperson said, “I really don’t think so.”  Six jurors responded 
“no.”  Another said “absolutely not.”  Three stated “probably 
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not.”  One juror answered “maybe.”  The court then excused the 
jury from the courtroom. 
Defense counsel requested a mistrial, arguing the jury was 
deadlocked.  The prosecutor requested that deliberations 
continue because the jury had not been deliberating long, and 
because some jurors indicated they believed that continued 
deliberations would “maybe” (or “probably not”) be productive.  
The court denied defense counsel’s mistrial motion, stating the 
jury had not spent sufficient time deliberating, especially 
compared to the one week it took the jury to reach a verdict in 
the guilt phase.  Accordingly, the court ordered the jury to 
return on January 3, 2008. 
The jury resumed deliberations on January 3.  After 
deliberating for about two hours, the jury returned a verdict of 
death. 
b. Analysis 
Defendant asserts the trial court violated section 1140 and 
coerced the jury into returning a death verdict when it directed 
the jury to continue deliberating.  Neither contention has merit. 
i. Section 1140 
Section 1140 states: “Except as provided by law, the jury 
cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until 
they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open 
court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the 
minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court 
may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no 
reasonable probability that the jury can agree.”  Defendant 
contends the trial court violated section 1140 by instructing the 
jury to continue deliberations after the jury reported a deadlock, 
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by ignoring the poll of the jurors indicating a deadlock, and by 
inquiring into the numerical division of the jury. 
Whether there is reasonable probability under section 
1140 that the jury can agree upon a verdict is left to the 
discretion of the trial court, which may consider the length of 
the trial, the amount of evidence, and the complexity of the 
issues.  (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 730, 775; see 
People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 540, 546.)  A trial court “abuses 
its discretion if it acts ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 
absurd manner’ ” (People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal. 4th at p. 687) 
or “when its ruling ‘falls outside the bounds of reason’ ” (People 
v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal. 4th at p. 666).   
None of the factors defendant relies on indicate the trial 
court abused its discretion here.  In People v. Sandoval (1992) 
4 Cal.4th 155, the jury spent “about three full days” deliberating 
before indicating that it believed it was deadlocked.  (Id. at 
p. 195.)  When the trial court asked whether it was possible for 
the jury to reach a verdict, each juror replied “no.”  (Ibid.)  The 
jury also informed the trial court, at the court’s request, that it 
had divided six-to-six on two counts and five-to-seven on a third 
count.  (Ibid.)  The court directed the jury to continue 
deliberating, noting that “a little more time would not be 
unreasonable in light of the fact that the trial had lasted five 
months.”  (Ibid.)  The defendant argued on appeal that the trial 
court had abused its discretion when it instructed the jury to 
continue deliberations.  (Id. at p. 197.)  We rejected that 
contention in light of the amount of time the jury had spent 
deliberating.  (Id. at p. 198.)   
Here, the trial court directed the jury to continue 
deliberating, noting that the jury had “not put in sufficient 
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time.”  Indeed, the record indicates the jury had deliberated for 
only about four hours over three days before it indicated it 
believed it was deadlocked.  In light of the circumstances of this 
case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the 
jury to continue deliberating after such a brief period.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 194–197 [no abuse of 
discretion after jury deliberated for about three days]; People v. 
Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 958–959 [no abuse of discretion 
after jury deliberated for about two days]; People v. Rodriguez, 
supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 774–777 [no abuse of discretion after jury 
deliberated for about 18 days].) 
Nor do the jurors’ responses to the trial court’s inquiry 
about the utility of additional deliberations indicate the court 
abused its discretion.  When asked whether they believed 
further deliberations could help to reach a verdict, six jurors 
answered “no,” one said “probably not,” one said “I really don’t 
think so,” three answered “probably not,” and one answered 
“maybe.”  These responses did not foreclose the possibility of 
reaching a verdict, which was sufficient under section 1140 to 
support the trial court’s direction to the jury that it continue 
deliberating.  (People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 89 [seven 
jurors indicating additional assistance from the court regarding 
deliberations “would, or might, be helpful” provided “an ample 
basis” to support court’s determination under section 1140]; 
People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 959 [no abuse of 
discretion under section 1140 when “several” jurors “expressed 
the hope that further instructions from the court might assist in 
bringing about a verdict”].)  Indeed, we have held that a trial 
court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in directing 
further deliberations even when all of the jurors believed further 
deliberations would not be productive.  (People v. Sandoval, 
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supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 196; People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal. 4th at 
pp. 317–320.)  Considering the circumstances here, we cannot 
say the trial court abused its discretion under section 1140 when 
it directed the jury to continue deliberations. 
Defendant’s additional assertion — that the trial court ran 
afoul of section 1140 by inquiring into the numerical division of 
the jury — similarly fails.  A trial court does not violate section 
1140 by inquiring of the jury as to its numerical division.  (People 
v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815.) 
ii. Coercion 
Apart from his claim under section 1140, defendant 
contends the trial court coerced a verdict by requiring 
deliberations to continue.  He points to the length of time the 
jury deliberated, the trial court having required the jury to 
return to deliberate after the Christmas and New Year holidays, 
the jurors’ responses concerning whether they believed 
additional deliberations would be productive, and the court’s 
inquiry into the numerical division of the jury deadlock.  Such 
coercion, defendant alleges, violated his state and federal 
constitutional right to due process, right to a fair trial, and the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
Whether a trial court has improperly coerced a jury is a 
separate, albeit related inquiry from whether the court abused 
its discretion under section 1140.  A court must exercise its 
power without coercion of the jury so as to avoid displacing the 
jury’s independent judgment “ ‘in favor of considerations of 
compromise and expediency.’ ”  (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 
42 Cal. 3d at p. 775; see People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal. 2d at 
p. 817.)  Whether coercion occurred depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.  (People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal. 4th 
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at p. 320.)  Coercion involves “ ‘a judicial attempt to inject 
illegitimate considerations into the jury debates [and] . . . appeal 
to dissenting jurors to abandon their own independent judgment 
of the case against the accused,’ ” by exerting “ ‘excessive 
pressure on the dissenting jurors to acquiesce in a verdict.’ ”  
(People v. Bryant, supra, 60 Cal. 4th at p. 462.) 
There was no coercion here.  The court did not exert undue 
pressure on the jurors to reach a verdict or make any remarks 
that could be interpreted as coercive.  Rather, the court properly 
inquired of the jurors concerning their numerical division 
(People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 92; People v. Carter, 
supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 815) and whether further deliberations 
would be productive (People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 89).  
The court determined the deliberations should continue given 
the amount of time that had elapsed and the individual jurors’ 
responses regarding the potential that further deliberations 
would be productive.  As noted above, the jury had deliberated 
for the equivalent of only about four hours before declaring it 
was deadlocked.  It was not coercive for the trial court to require 
additional deliberations after such a brief period.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 194–197; People v. 
Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 958–959; People v. Rodriguez, 
supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 774–777.) 
Defendant asserts the trial court’s direction to the jury to 
continue deliberating effectively told the jury the court would 
compel it to deliberate until a unanimous verdict was reached.  
Relying on a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, Jiminez v. Meyers (9th Cir. 1993) 40 F.3d 976, 
defendant contends the jury would have been pressured to reach 
a verdict in light of the trial court’s directions.  He argues it was 
“especially coercive” for the court to continue deliberations, thus 
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forcing the jury to return after the Christmas and New Year 
holidays. 
Federal appellate court decisions are not binding on this 
court, although we may consider them for any persuasive value.  
(People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 90–91.)  In any event, 
Jiminez is distinguishable from the facts of this case.  In 
Jiminez, the Ninth Circuit held the trial court had 
impermissibly coerced the jury “by expressing approval of the 
‘ “movement” ’ toward juror unanimity.”  (People v. Brooks, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 91, quoting Jiminez, supra, 40 F.3d at 
pp. 980–981.)  The trial court below did not communicate to the 
jury any approval of the jury’s progression toward unanimity.   
Nor was there anything inherently coercive about the trial 
court’s decision to adjourn deliberations over the holidays and 
have the jury return on January 3.  The court advised the jury 
during voir dire that the case would recess over the holidays if 
it had not concluded — and counsel agreed with this approach.  
If anything, the court’s decision to have the jury return rather 
than pressuring it to reach a verdict immediately likely reduced 
the potential for any coercion.  (Cf. People v. Anderson (1990) 52 
Cal.3d 453, 469.)  Finally, as defendant acknowledges, we have 
held it is not improperly coercive for a trial court to inquire into 
the numerical division of a jury.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 
55 Cal.4th at p. 160; People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 815.)   
We therefore conclude that the court’s directive to the jury 
that it continue deliberations did not coerce the jury’s verdict.  
For the same reasons, we also reject defendant’s claim that the 
trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for a mistrial 
when the jury declared it was deadlocked.  (People v. Clark, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 990 [motion for mistrial should be 
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granted “ ‘only when a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial 
have been irreparably damaged’ ”]; People v. Valdez, supra, 
32 Cal.4th at p. 128 [trial court’s denial of mistrial motion is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion].) 
2. Trial court’s inquiry into jury’s numerical division 
during deliberations 
In addition to asserting that the trial court’s inquiry into 
the numerical division of the jury amounted to improper 
coercion and violated section 1140, addressed above, defendant 
further contends the court’s inquiry itself requires reversal of 
the death judgment.   
As described, after a few hours of deliberations the jury 
sent the court a note that it was deadlocked; the note indicated 
the division was 11 to 1.  The trial court stated that it intended 
to bring the jurors into the courtroom to “[f]ind out how many 
ballots they’ve taken over what time, and perhaps what the 
numbers are without asking them, of course, what number 
represents which side of the possible verdicts.”  Defense counsel 
asked whether the court would also ask the jurors if they 
thought further deliberation would be beneficial, stating, “We 
were just wondering if it’s a hopeless situation, if they’re 
hopelessly deadlocked, if we can, kind of, get a read on that.”  
After an exchange with the prosecutor, the court stated, “[W]hy 
don’t I plan on getting the information, and then I’ll tell them to 
go back while I discuss it with the attorneys, and then we’ll have 
them come back in for whatever direction I give them.  Is that 
agreeable?”  Defense counsel responded, “Yeah.  That’s fine.”  As 
described above, the jury then entered the courtroom and the 
trial court asked the foreperson how many ballots the jury had 
taken and for the number of votes at each ballot. 
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105 
Defendant acknowledges that we have approved of a trial 
court’s inquiry into the numerical division of a jury.  (People v. 
Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 100, People v. Carter, supra, 
68 Cal.2d at p. 815.)  He asserts, however, that we should 
reconsider our precedent in light of the high court’s decision to 
forbid the practice in federal courts pursuant to its supervisory 
powers, citing Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231 at pages 
239 to 240 and Brasfield v. United States (1926) 272 U.S. 448 at 
page 450. 
The Attorney General asserts the claim is forfeited 
because defense counsel failed to object.  Defendant contends an 
objection was not required because it would have been futile 
given the case authority approving an inquiry into the 
numerical division of a deliberating jury.  (People v. Hill (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  The claim does appear to have been 
forfeited.  Defense counsel not only failed to object to the trial 
court’s inquiry of the jury, but affirmatively agreed with the 
court’s approach.  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 970, 1038 [finding defendant’s state and federal claims 
related to trial court’s scheduling of jury deliberations were 
forfeited because “[c]ounsel did not object to the court’s 
approach.  Counsel on both sides said they had ‘no problem’ with 
it”].)   
Even assuming the claim was preserved, however, we 
reject it on the merits.  As noted, we have previously considered 
and rejected the argument that it is error for a trial court to 
inquire into a jury’s numerical split during deliberations.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th 335, 462–463; People v. 
Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 100; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 1183, 1254; People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 319; 
People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 815.)  Indeed, our 
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decisions have squarely addressed and rejected the federal cases 
on which defendant now relies.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at p. 100 [discussing and rejecting similar claim in light 
of Brasfield v. United States, supra, 272 U.S. 448]; People v. 
Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1254 [discussing and rejecting 
similar claim in light of Brasfield and Lowenfield v. Phelps, 
supra, 484 U.S. 231].)  Defendant provides no compelling reason 
for this court to revisit the issue. 
C. Instructions on Mercy and Lingering Doubt 
Defendant asserts his state and federal rights to due 
process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment were violated when the trial court denied defense 
counsel’s request to instruct the jury on the role of mercy and 
lingering doubt in its penalty phase deliberations.  We find no 
error. 
The requested mercy instruction stated, “In deciding the 
appropriate punishment, the jury may consider mercy for the 
defendant in weighing the factors in aggravation and 
mitigation.”  The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 763, 
which incorporates section 190.3, factor (k) and directs the jury 
to consider “[a]ny other circumstance, whether related to these 
charges or not, that lessens the gravity of the crime even though 
the circumstance is not a legal excuse or justification.  These 
circumstances include sympathy or compassion for the 
defendant or anything you consider to be a mitigating factor, 
regardless of whether it is one of the factors listed above.” 
No additional instruction was required.  Defendant’s 
assertion that “mercy” is a distinct concept from “sympathy” or 
“compassion” is unavailing.  (See People v. Boyce, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 707.)  “ ‘[W]e have repeatedly rejected the claim 
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107 
that omission of “mercy” from the jury instructions constitutes 
error.’ ”  (People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 609; see also 
People v. Silveria (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 301.)  The instruction 
allowing for consideration of sympathy and compassion 
permitted the jury to consider mercy.  (People v. Brown (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 518, 570; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 840 
[“a jury told it may sympathetically consider all mitigating 
evidence need not also be expressly instructed it may exercise 
‘mercy’ ”].)  Defendant asks us to reconsider our prior decisions 
on this point.  He offers no persuasive reason for doing so.   
We also hold that the trial court did not err in declining to 
give defendant’s requested instruction concerning lingering 
doubt.  The proposed instruction stated: 
 
“Each individual juror may consider as a mitigating 
factor residual or lingering doubt as to whether the 
defendant killed the victim.  Lingering or residual 
doubt is defined as the state of mind between beyond 
a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubts. 
 
“Thus if any individual juror has a lingering or 
residual doubt about whether the defendant killed 
the victim, he or she must consider this as a 
mitigating factor and assign it to the weight you 
deem appropriate.” 
We have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required 
under state or federal law to give such an instruction.  (People 
v. Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1030.)  And “no such 
instruction is necessary when — as here — the court instructed 
the jury on section 190.3, factors (a) and (k) and defense counsel 
urged the jury to consider residual doubt in closing argument.”  
(Ibid.) 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
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Defendant’s assertion that People v. Gay (2008) 42 Cal.4th 
1195 compels a contrary result is unavailing.  In that case, this 
court reversed a death judgment when the trial court instructed 
the penalty phase jury on lingering doubt but limited evidence 
the defense could offer during the penalty phase.  (Id. at 
p. 1224.)  We held that “[t]he combination of the evidentiary and 
instructional errors present[ed] an intolerable risk that the jury 
did not consider all or a substantial portion of the penalty phase 
defense, which was lingering doubt.”  (Id. at p. 1226.)   
Here, the trial court refused to instruct the jury 
specifically on lingering doubt but allowed counsel to argue 
lingering doubt.  We have previously found no error occurred on 
similar facts.  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at p. 326 [“In Gay, the trial court instructed the jury on lingering 
doubt, but precluded the defendant from presenting that 
defense; in the present case, the trial court allowed defendants 
to present and argue their lingering doubt defenses, but refused 
to specifically instruct on lingering doubt.  As we stated in Gay, 
our holding there was not based on any state or federal 
constitutional right to a lingering doubt instruction; rather, it 
was based on California’s death penalty statute, which 
authorizes the admission of evidence of innocence at a penalty 
retrial”].)  Consistent with our prior approach, we find no error 
here. 
D. Whether the Jury was Required to Find 
Aggravating Factors Outweighed Mitigating 
Factors Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Defendant asserts his state and federal right to due 
process, right to an accurate jury determination, and the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment were violated 
when the trial court denied defense counsel’s request to instruct 
PEOPLE v. THOMAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
109 
the jury that it had to find the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In support, he relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 
530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584. 
As defendant acknowledges, we have consistently rejected 
the argument that Apprendi and its progeny require the jury to 
find that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See, e.g., People v. Merriman (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 1, 106; People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 569; 
People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 595.)  Defendant offers 
no persuasive reason for us to reconsider these precedents, and 
we decline to do so. 
E. Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Law 
Defendant 
advances 
several 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty law that, he 
acknowledges, this court has previously considered and rejected.  
We decline his request to reconsider our prior precedent 
regarding the following holdings.   
“Section 190.2 provides a list of the special circumstances 
. . . which render a defendant eligible for the death penalty.  
These factors are not so numerous and broadly interpreted that 
they fail to narrow the class of death-eligible first degree 
murders 
as 
required 
by 
the 
Eighth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments.”  (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 682.) 
“Section 190.3, factor (a), directs the jury to consider as 
evidence in aggravation the circumstances of the capital crime.  
This has not resulted in the wanton imposition of the death 
penalty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments by permitting prosecutors to argue that the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
110 
various features of the murder, even features that are the 
converse of those in other cases, are aggravating factors.”  
(People v. Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 683.) 
Instructing the jury that a death verdict is “warrant[ed]” 
if the aggravating factors are “ ‘so substantial’ ” in comparison 
with the mitigating factors is not impermissibly broad or vague.  
(People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 611.) 
“Use of adjectives such as ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in 
section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), respectively, does not create a 
constitutionally 
impermissible 
barrier 
to 
the 
jury’s 
consideration of a defendant’s mitigating evidence.”  (People v. 
Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 656.) 
“Directing the jury to consider ‘ “whether or not” ’ certain 
mitigating factors were present does not invite the jury to use 
the absence of such factors as a factor in aggravation.”  (People 
v. Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 684.) 
“There is no federal constitutional requirement, either 
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments, that 
the jury make unanimous findings regarding the aggravating 
factors . . . .”  (People v. Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 683; see 
also People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 611.) 
The trial court need not instruct the jury during the 
penalty phase that it must impose life without the possibility of 
parole if it determines that mitigating factors outweigh 
aggravating factors.  (People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 611; People v. Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1027; 
People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4h at p. 78.) 
“Jurors need not make written findings on the 
aggravating factors found.”  (People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th 
at p. 612.) 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
111 
“Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial 
or appellate courts is not constitutionally required.”  (People v. 
Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126.) 
“The imposition of the death penalty under California’s 
law does not violate international law or prevailing norms of 
decency.”  (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 351.) 
Defendant acknowledges that this court has previously 
rejected the challenges to California’s death penalty scheme 
that he presents here.  He asserts, however, that our analysis of 
these issues is constitutionally defective because we have failed 
to consider their cumulative impact or to address the capital 
sentencing scheme as a whole.  We have considered and rejected 
this identical cumulative impact argument in prior cases, and 
we do again here.  (See, e.g., People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 
6 Cal. 5th 886, 928; People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
pp. 657–658.) 
 
 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J. 
 
112 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 We affirm the judgment in its entirety.  
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.* 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Thomas 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S161781 
Date Filed:  January 26, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Riverside 
Judge:  Terrance R. Boren 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant 
Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Robin Urbanski, Ronald A. Jakob 
and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
John L. Staley 
Attorney at Law 
12463 Rancho Bernardo Road, No. 372 
San Diego, CA 92128 
(858) 613-1047 
 
Michael D. Butera 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9054