Title: Ashe v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13152
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2022

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SJC-13152 
 
CAROLE A. ASHE, coconservator,1 & another2  vs.  SHAWMUT 
WOODWORKING & SUPPLY, INC., & another3; HAVEN RESTORATION, INC., 
third-party defendant. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 8, 2021. – April 15, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Psychologist.  Rules of Civil Procedure.  Words, "Physician." 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 6, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to compel a neuropsychological 
examination was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J. 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Mary T. Sullivan, J.  The Supreme Judicial Court 
granted an application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
Marsha V. Kazarosian (Shawn P. O'Rourke, Walter A. 
Costello, Jr., & Marc A. Moccia also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
Mark B. Lavoie for Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc. 
 
1 Of Thomas M. Ashe. 
 
 
2 Jessica M. Ashe, as coconservator of Thomas M. Ashe. 
 
 
3 Lanco Scaffolding, Inc. 
2 
 
Matthew C. Welnicki, for Lanco Scaffolding, Inc., was 
present but did not argue. 
Lee Dawn Daniel, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, & Paul 
R. Johnson, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
Kyle E. Bjornlund & Grant D. King, for Massachusetts 
Defense Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  A court may order a party whose mental or 
physical condition is at issue to "submit to a physical or 
mental examination by a physician . . . for good cause shown."  
Mass. R. Civ. P. 35 (a), 365 Mass. 793 (1974).  Here, in 
connection with an appeal of such an order in a negligence suit, 
we are asked whether a neuropsychologist falls within the 
definition of "physician" under rule 35.  We conclude that the 
answer is yes and affirm the motion judge's decision to allow 
the motion for examination.4 
 
Facts and prior proceedings.  Thomas M. Ashe suffered 
serious and permanent injuries as a result of a work-related 
accident that the defendants allegedly caused.  Ashe's 
coconservators, the plaintiffs in the litigation, sued multiple 
parties for negligence, including Shawmut Design & Construction, 
Inc. (Shawmut), the general contractor for the worksite. 
 
During discovery, the plaintiffs produced records 
demonstrating Ashe's physical and cognitive deficiencies based 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and the Massachusetts 
Defense Lawyers Association. 
3 
 
on an examination conducted by Jeffery B. Sheer, Ph.D., a board-
certified clinical neuropsychologist.5  Shawmut sought to have 
Ashe examined by its expert, Karen Postal, Ph.D., also a board-
certified clinical neuropsychologist, because, after a review of 
the records, Postal disagreed with Sheer's conclusions regarding 
Ashe's deficits. 
 
When the plaintiffs declined to make Ashe available, 
Shawmut filed a motion pursuant to rule 35 seeking a court order 
requiring Ashe to submit to a neuropsychological examination.  
The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that rule 35, which 
applies to examinations performed by a "physician," precluded 
examination by Postal.  After a hearing, the motion judge granted 
the order for examination, and the plaintiffs appealed.  We 
allowed the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The plaintiffs argue that the judge's order 
was improper because Postal is not a physician within the plain 
meaning of that term as it appears in rule 35, and because 
 
5 Clinical neuropsychology is a specialty practice of 
psychology that uses unique methods and assessments in 
conjunction with knowledge about the relationship between the 
brain and behavior to evaluate, diagnose, and treat individuals 
with known or suspected neurological disease or injury.  P.M. 
Kaufmann, Admissibility of Expert Opinions based on 
Neuropsychological Evidence 70 (2011). 
 
4 
 
Shawmut did not establish good cause for the examination.6  For 
the reasons that follow, we disagree. 
1.  The meaning of "physician" as it appears in rule 35.  
Although the plaintiffs contend that the definition of 
"physician" does not include neuropsychologists, we are not 
convinced that the term is meant to be read as narrowly as the 
plaintiffs suggest.  Because "physician" is not defined in rule 
35, we may look to its "usual and accepted meaning[], provided 
that [it is] consistent with" the purpose of the rule, as is 
customary when construing statutes.  Seideman v. Newton, 452 
Mass. 472, 477-478 (2008).  The dictionary definition of 
"physician" is a "person skilled in the art of healing" or "a 
doctor of medicine."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1707 (2002).  Thus, we must determine which 
definition of "physician" is most appropriate in the context of 
rule 35.  See Ortiz v. Examworks, Inc., 470 Mass. 784, 788 
(2015).  In Ortiz, we similarly considered the meaning of 
"physician" as it appears in G. L. c. 90, § 34M, the 
Commonwealth's no-fault automobile insurance "personal injury 
 
6 The plaintiffs also contend that Shawmut failed to comply 
with the rule 35 notice requirement.  However, many of the 
details comprising the rule 35 notice, including the date and 
time of the examination, inevitably require collaboration 
between the parties (and perhaps the judge).  As of this date, 
the plaintiffs have been opposed to any such examination, and 
thus have been unwilling to discuss conditions under which one 
might take place. 
5 
 
protection" (PIP) statute.  There, too, we interpreted the term 
broadly in line with the PIP statute's purpose to "provide an 
inexpensive and uncomplicated procedure for obtaining 
compensation for injuries sustained in automobile accidents."  
Id., quoting Dominguez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 112, 
115 (1999). 
Neuropsychologists conduct assessments to "evaluate, 
diagnose, and treat individuals with known or suspected 
neurological disease and/or injury."  P.M. Kaufmann, 
Admissibility of Expert Opinions Based on Neuropsychological 
Evidence 70 (2011).  Thus, although not a medical doctor,7 a 
neuropsychologist is a "person skilled in the art of healing" 
and is, indeed, a "physician" pursuant to that definition of the 
 
7 We note that similar to medical doctors, 
neuropsychologists in the Commonwealth must be certified by a 
board of registration after meeting certain moral, ethical, 
training, and academic requirements to receive a license.  See 
G. L. c. 112, §§ 119, 120 (outlining prerequisites for 
licensure, including receiving doctoral degree in psychology; 
completing two years of supervised work, teaching, or research; 
and achieving passing result for board-designated examination).  
In addition, the American Board of Clinical Neuropsychology, the 
board certification body for clinical neuropsychology, requires 
completion of a minimum of two years in a formal postdoctoral 
residency program dedicated in part to clinical neuropsychology 
and additional examinations before a candidate can be certified 
as a clinical neuropsychologist.  American Board of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, Becoming Certified, Procedures for Obtaining 
Board Certification in Clinical Neuropsychology, https://theabcn 
.org/becoming-certified [https://perma.cc/98UL-WFNB]. 
 
6 
 
word.8  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1707.  See 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 358 (2013) (term with 
multiple meanings may have only one within context of statute). 
Further, in considering the meaning of "physician" as it is 
used in rule 35, we are reminded that it is incumbent on us to 
interpret our rules of civil procedure in a "manner which will 
accomplish their obvious purpose and objective."  Giacobbe v. 
First Coolidge Corp., 367 Mass. 309, 315 (1975).  The 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, like the latter, they are 
meant to be "construed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 1, 
as amended, 474 Mass. 1402 (2016).  See Rollins Envtl. Servs., 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1975) (we 
construe Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure in line with 
Federal rules "absent compelling reasons to the contrary or 
significant differences in content"). 
 
8 The plaintiffs also note that G. L. c. 112, § 8A, provides 
that "[n]o person may, directly or indirectly, use the title 
'physician' . . . to indicate or imply in any way that such 
person offers to engage or engages in the practice of medicine 
or in the provision of health care services to patients within 
the commonwealth who is not registered by the board of 
registration in medicine as a physician under [§] 2."  However, 
G. L. c. 112, § 2, deals with the prerequisite qualifications 
for individuals seeking registration as a physician before the 
Commonwealth's board of registration in medicine.  It does not 
implicate the question whether the term as it is used in a 
discovery rule includes examinations by neuropsychologists.  See 
Ortiz, 470 Mass. at 792. 
7 
 
The purpose of rule 35 in particular is to provide a 
defendant with an equal opportunity to evaluate any injuries the 
defendant is alleged to have caused.  See, e.g., Looney v. 
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 142 F.R.D. 264, 265 (D. Mass. 
1992) ("purpose of Rule 35, Fed. R. Civ. P., [seen] as providing 
a level playing field as between the parties").  Here, after the 
defendants received a report of Ashe's condition from the 
plaintiffs' neuropsychologist, it seems obvious that the 
defendants may invoke rule 35 to give them an opportunity to 
have their own neuropsychologist examine Ashe so as to "level 
[the] playing field."  Id.  We thus conclude that 
neuropsychologists are physicians for the purposes of rule 35. 
2.  Good cause.  The plaintiffs additionally argue that 
Shawmut failed to demonstrate good cause for the rule 35 
examination.  However, during the hearing on the motion, 
Shawmut's counsel explained that the conclusions that the 
plaintiffs' neuropsychologist reached may have been skewed by a 
failure to consider Ashe's visual impairment.  Shawmut thus 
sought to have its own neuropsychologist examine Ashe to provide 
a "level playing field" on which to evaluate the conclusions 
reached by the plaintiffs' expert.  The judge aptly noted that 
as Ashe's cognitive deficits are the central issue in the case, 
she could not "imagine a better cause."  We agree. 
8 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion by allowing Shawmut's motion for an order requiring 
Ashe to submit to an examination by Postal.  See Doe v. 
Senechal, 431 Mass. 78, 84, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 825 (2000) 
(discovery rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion).9  The order 
allowing Shawmut's rule 35 motion is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
9 We ask this court's standing advisory committee on the 
rules of civil procedure to consider whether an amendment or 
other guidance to rule 35 is in order consistent with this 
opinion.