Title: Cruz v. People
Citation: 441 P.2d 22
Docket Number: 19756
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 1968

441 P.2d 22 (1968) Cornelius Joseph CRUZ, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 19756. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 29, 1968. Rehearing Denied June 10, 1968. *23 Edward H. Sherman, Public Defender in and for the City and County of Denver, Harry L. Hellerstein, Asst. Public Defender, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Chief Justice. This action has already been before this court on two previous occasions. Plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as Cruz, was found guilty of aggravated robbery. The action involved an armed robbery committed on the premises of the Lake Shore Super Market in the City and County of Denver on February 28, 1959. On August 28, 1961, this court affirmed the conviction, Cruz v. People, 147 Colo. 528, 364 P.2d 561. The opinion in that case contains a detailed statement of the facts and no good purpose would be served by repeating them here. Although represented by counsel at the trial, Cruz appeared pro se in the proceedings on writ of error, his application for counsel in that connection having been denied. Three years after the above mentioned opinion, Cruz filed a motion for post conviction relief under Colo.R.Crim.P. 35(b). He relied upon the United States Supreme Court case of Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811. His motion was denied by the trial court. Upon review of that order this court, in Cruz v. People, 157 Colo. 479, 405 P.2d 213, outlined the remedies available to Cruz in the following language: Pursuant to the foregoing quoted language counsel was appointed to represent Cruz; a second review of the record made upon *24 the original trial has been completed; and all the points relied upon by counsel appearing in this court have been evaluated. There is but one point which may be said to require a word in addition to that which was said in Cruz v. People, 147 Colo. 528, 364 P.2d 561. It relates to an instruction given by the trial court concerning the fact that Cruz, when arrested, was found in possession of monies taken in the robbery of the Lake Shore Super Market. We have held repeatedly that it was error to give an identical instruction over an objection which specifically directed the court's attention to the fact that the instruction failed to inform the jury that the circumstances surrounding the possession of recently stolen property by the accused must be such, along with other evidence in the case, as to remove all reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. If there are any circumstances which raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether such recent possession implicates an accused as a participant in a criminal act, he cannot be convicted on such evidence alone. Russell v. People, 125 Colo. 290, 242 P.2d 610; Martinez v. People, Colo., 431 P.2d 765; Stewart v. People, Colo., 426 P.2d 548; Attwood v. People, Colo., 439 P.2d 40 (decided April 1, 1968). In the instant action the only objection made to the giving of the instruction under discussion was the following statement by counsel for Cruz: An objection in such broad coverage giving no basis whatever to point up with some reasonable particularity the nature of any shortcoming, is no objection at all, and does not entitle a person convicted of crime to a consideration of the point on review in this court. In the instant case the only assignment pertaining to the instruction was that the trial court erred: Thus the grounds of objection argued here, namely that the instruction purported to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, and denied him the benefit of requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, were never brought to the attention of the trial court, and no opportunity was afforded to it to correct the error. Colo.R.Crim.P. 33 now makes clear that motion for a new trial "shall be in writing and shall point out with particularity the defects and errors complained of." (Emphasis added.) While it is true that the above mentioned rule had not been adopted at the time of the trial, the principle stated therein was well established by the decisions of this court. In Henry v. People, 72 Colo. 5, 209 P. 511, we find the following pertinent language: In Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41, under a factual situation analogous to that now before us, it was said: See also Winbern v. People, 116 Colo. 136, 180 P.2d 516. We repeat that which we said in Cruz v. People, 147 Colo. 528, 364 P.2d 561: The guilt of the defendant was overwhelmingly established by the evidence. The "justice of the case" before us does not demand a reversal of the judgment because of an error, with reference to which the trial court was not alerted by appropriate objection. The judgment is affirmed. PRINGLE, J., dissents.