Title: Matsumoto v. Matsumoto
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-81-00
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2002

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LONG, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The sole issue before the Court is whether the fugitive entitlement doctrine (the doctrine) should be applied to bar an appeal in a civil case. The doctrine provides that a fugitive from justice will be barred from seeking relief from the judicial system whose authority he or she evades. Tatsuya Matsumoto and Satoko Matsumoto were married in Japan in 1984. Their only child, Hyugo, was born in New York in 1985. The Matsumotos lived in New Jersey from 1985 to 1997. During that time, they were supported by Tatsuya's mother, Kazuko, who lived in Japan. In March 1997, the Matsumotos traveled to Japan. During their stay, the Matsumotos' marriage fell apart. Satoko claims that Tatsuya and Kazuko began to pressure her to stay in Japan, and that she had been forcibly detained in an effort to coerce her into remaining in Japan. Satoko fled to her mother's house and, thereafter, was prevented from communicating with her son. Satoko returned to America by herself. Tatsuya, on the other hand, claims that Satoko's return to the United States without Hyugo was voluntary. Tatsuya briefly returned to America to liquidate all bank accounts, totaling over $1,000,000; sell the cars; and ship all the furniture to Japan. Satoko claims that Kazuko, who owned the marital residence in Cedar Grove, had someone change the locks and remove Satoko's personal belongings from the house. In April 1997, Satoko filed a complaint for custody and separate maintenance and an ex parte application for an order to show cause. She was awarded sole temporary custody of Hyugo and exclusive possession of the Cedar Grove residence. Tatsuya and Kazuko were ordered to return Hyugo within 48 hours. In addition, the court ordered Tatsuya to account for all personal property he had removed from New Jersey and enjoined him from dissipating assets acquired by the parties during the marriage. Neither Tatsuya nor Kazuko complied with the Order and, on May 2, 1997, a supplemental order to show cause issued, threatening arrest warrants for contempt of court. Tatsuya and Kazuko failed to respond, and on July 3, 1997, the trial court entered a Final Order imposing sanctions against Tatsuya and Kazuko of $1000 per day going back to the date Hyugo was removed to Japan and continuing to accrue until Hyugo was returned. Tatsuya was also found in violation of Satoko's rights for failure to comply with the Order directing him to account for the personal property he removed from the State. In June 1997, Satoko filed an Amended Complaint, alleging additional causes of action, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, international interference with custody, fraud, and conversion. The complaint also sought equitable distribution. In September 1997, Satoko filed a Second Amended Complaint adding claims for divorce and alimony. Neither Tatsuya nor Kazuko responded and, accordingly, a default was entered. A subsequent motion to vacate default was denied. On December 4, 1997, criminal indictments issued against Tatsuya and Kazuko for conspiracy to interfere with child custody, interference with child custody, and child endangerment. Thereafter, bench warrants were issued for Tatsuya's and Kazuko's arrest for failure to appear at the arraignment. In March 1998, Tatsuya and Kazuko sought to waive personal jurisdiction defenses in exchange for a dismissal of the arrest warrants, monetary sanctions, and criminal indictments. Tatsuya also offered to bring Hyugo to New Jersey and set up residence until the custody issues were resolved. Those requests were denied. Hyugo did return to New Jersey briefly. However, his persistent demands to return to school in Japan coupled with his abusive behavior toward his mother, alleged by Satoko to have been caused by Tatsuya and Kazuko, forced Satoko to allow Hyugo to return to Japan. Tatsuya's and Kazuko's motion seeking to participate in the divorce action was denied by the trial court, except for the opportunity to cross-examine Satoko's witnesses. In July 1999, an Amended Judgment of Divorce was entered awarding Satoko, among other things, the marital residence, $944,500 in assets, permanent alimony of $48,000 per year, $54,000 in retoactive alimony, sole custody of Hyugo and $271per week in child support. The trial court also imposed on Tatsuya and Kazuko (jointly and severally) compensatory damages of $179,000 for intentional interference with custody; punitive damages totaling $300,000;and attorneys fees and costs. Tatsuya and Kazuko appealed the judgments against them. The Appellate Division held that, based on the fugitive entitlement doctrine, the refusal of Tatsuya and Kazuko to comply with court orders prevented consideration of their appeals. The court dismissed their appeals without prejudice, allowing for reinstatement if they surrendered to the courts or if the outstanding warrants against them were vacated. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: The fugitive entitlement doctrine can be applied to bar an appeal in a civil matter. 1. Where a defendant is a fugitive from criminal prosecution or conviction, the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to bar him or her from pursuing a criminal appeal is firmly rooted in the criminal law and in New Jersey jurisprudence. For the doctrine to apply, there must be a sufficient connection between defendant's fugitive status and the appellate process in order to make dismissal of the appeal a reasonable sanction. (Pp. 10-14) 2. In 1996, the US Supreme Court first declared the doctrine applicable to a criminal fugitive attempting to contest a related civil matter. Both state and federal precedent demonstrate that the doctrine can be applied in a civil or criminal case so long as the party's fugitive status is sufficiently connected to the litigation in which the doctrine is sought to be invoked and so long as nothing less than dismissal will suffice. What is crucial is the inquiry into whether an alternative short of dismissal will render enforcement of the underlying judgment certain and remove the risk of prejudice to the fugitive's adversary. (Pp. 15-24) 3. Federal and state case law, as well as this State's adherence to the doctrine in criminal cases, leads the Court to conclude that the doctrine is applicable to civil matters. However, the following guidelines apply: the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked must be a fugitive in a civil or criminal proceeding; his or her fugitive status must have a significant connection to the litigation in which the doctrine is sought to be invoked; invocation of the doctrine must be necessary to enforce the judgment of the court or to avoid prejudice to the other party caused by the adversary's fugitive status; and invocation of the doctrine cannot be an excessive response. (Pp. 24-26) 4. Tatsuya's and Kazuko's criminal fugitive status based on their failure to return is clear. There is an intimate connection between Tatsuya's fugitive status and the disposition of the matrimonial estate and the alimony award. In addition, the compensatory and punitive damage judgments and counsel fee award were imposed specifically for Tatsuya's acts of interference with custody and are related directly to the subject of the indictment from which he is a fugitive. He is also a civil fugitive in this matter. Nonetheless, there is a lesser remedy that could satisfy all of the interests involved. Thus, if Tatsuya wishes to appeal the relevant Orders, he may do so if he posts a bond in the full amount of the judgments pending against him to ensure enforcement and to avoid prejudice to Satoko. If he refuses to post the bond, the doctrine will be applied to continue the dismissal of his appeal. Of course, a parent's right to custody of a child is fundamental and cannot be extinguished or limited because of litigant misbehavior. Thus, the doctrine cannot apply in child custody cases, such as Tatsuya's, in which no enforcement issue exists. (Pp. 26-32) 5. The compensatory and punitive damage awards and counsel fee award against Kazuko are fully related to her fugitive status under the indictments. As with Tatsuya, a lesser sanction is sufficient. If Kazuko separately bonds the damages judgments and counsel fee award, thus rendering any order of the court enforceable, she may proceed with her appeal. If not, her appeal will remain dismissed. Kazuko's appeal regarding the Cedar Grove residence cannot be barred because the proceeds of the sale of the home have been held in escrow. (Pp. 32-34) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED to allow Tatsuya and Kazuko to appeal the damages and counsel fee award against them so long as they provide the required security. Tatsuya may appeal the determination of child custody and Kazuko may appeal the award of the house to Satoko. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LAVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE COLEMAN joins. SATOKO MATSUMOTO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TATSUYA MATSUMOTO and KAZUKO MATSUMOTO, Defendants-Appellants. Argued September 24, 2001 -- Decided January 30, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 335 N.J. Super. 174 (2000). Laurence H. Olive argued the cause for appellant Tatsuya Matsumoto. Joan E. Pransky argued the cause for appellant Kazuko Matsumoto. Joseph J. Haskins, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. This case requires us to determine whether the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should be applied to bar an appeal in a civil case and if so, to limn its contours. [Id. at 185 (footnote omitted).] The Appellate Division stated that in these circumstances we believe that defendants should not be able to ask us for relief while refusing to otherwise respond to the lawful orders of our courts. Ibid. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeals of Tatsuya and Kazuko without prejudice to reinstatement upon their surrender or upon vacation of the warrants outstanding against them. The Appellate Division also lifted the stay that it had imposed on the distribution to Satoko of the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. On motions of Kazuko and Satoko, we reimposed the stay but permitted the distribution of $25,000 from the funds held in escrow. We granted the petitions for certification filed by Tatsuya and Kazuko on a single issue: the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to them. 167 N.J. 635 (2001). In essence, both Tatsuya and Kazuko claim the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not be adopted for use in civil cases and, alternatively, that if adopted it should be narrowly applied. Kazuko argues separately that even if the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies to civil cases, it is inapplicable to her because she did nothing to warrant its invocation. We have carefully reviewed the record in light of those contentions. We now affirm but modify the judgment of the Appellate Division. II Fugitive disentitlement is a doctrine that springs out of the inherent power of courts to enforce their judgments and protect their dignity. Martha B. Stolley, Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, 87 J. Crim. L. &amp; Criminology 751, 778-79 (1997). In essence, it provides that a fugitive from justice may not seek relief from the judicial system whose authority he or she evades. Id. at 752 (footnote omitted); see also Molinaro, supra, 396 U.S. at 366, 90 S. Ct. at 498, 24 L. Ed. 2d at 587-88 ( No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. ). The doctrine is rooted in the criminal law, and its most common application has been a nearly automatic bar to the criminal appeal of a defendant who has become or remains a fugitive from justice. The United States Supreme Court approved that application over a century ago. Molinaro, supra, 396 U.S. at 365-66, 90 S. Ct. at 498-99, 24 L. Ed. 2d at 587 (citing Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141, 17 S. Ct. 525, 526, 41 L. Ed. 949, 950 (1897); Bohanan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 8 S. Ct. 1390, 1390-91, 31 L. Ed. 854 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97-98, 24 L. Ed. 32, (1876)); see also Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537, 95 S. Ct. 1173, 1175, 43 L. Ed. 2d 377, 380 (1975) (noting that court has long followed the practice of declining to review the convictions of escaped criminal defendants ). Most federal and state courts have followed suit. See, e.g.,United States v. Morgan, 254 F.3d 424, 427 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1219, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999); Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 877, 119 S. Ct. 179, 142 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1998); United States v. Wright, 902 F.2d 241, 242 (3rd Cir. 1990); United States v. Amado, 754 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1985); People v. Elkins, 55 P. 599 (Cal. 1898); Doren v. State, 104 N.E. 500 (Ind. 1914); Lofton v. State, 115 So. 592 (Miss.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 568, 49 S. Ct. 83, 73 L. Ed. 510 (1928); Arvey v. State, 583 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Nev. 1978); People v. Jones, 632 N.Y.S.2d 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); State v. Dalton, 115 S.E. 881 (N.C. 1923); State v. Bell, 608 N.W.2d 232, 325 (N.D. 2000); Snyder v. State, 210 P.2d 787 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949); State v. Spry, 30 S.E.2d 88, 90 (W. Va. 1944). For fugitive disentitlement purposes, the notion of who is a fugitive includes a person who, having committed a crime, flees from [the] jurisdiction of [the] court where [a] crime was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 604 (5th ed. 1979)). [United States v. Barnette, supra, 129 F.3d at 1184 (alterations in original).] However, a defendant need not leave the jurisdiction after committing a crime to qualify as a fugitive. He may, while legally outside the jurisdiction, constructively flee by deciding not to return. Ibid. (citation omitted). It has consistently been held that the application of the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement requires that a sufficient connection exist between defendant's fugitive status and the appellate process so as to make dismissal a reasonable sanction. United States v. Delgarza-Villarreal, 141 F.3d 133, 137 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. 234, 243-45, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1205-06, 122 L. Ed. 2d 581, 597 (1993)). That connection obviously exists where a defendant who has fled the jurisdiction after conviction seeks to file a criminal appeal while remaining a fugitive from justice. Ibid. However, in Ortega-Rodriguez, supra, where a defendant fled the jurisdiction after conviction but was returned to custody by the time the appeal was heard, the Supreme Court recognized that there was not a sufficient connection between defendant's prior fugitive status and the appellate process to warrant barring his resort to the courts. 507 U.S. at 243-45, 113 S. Ct. at 1205-06, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 597. The nexus required by Ortega-Rodriguez is an integral part of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. New Jersey has long recognized the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in purely criminal settings in accordance with United States Supreme Court practice. For example, in State v. Prince, 140 N.J. Super. 418, 419 (App. Div.), appeal reinstated, 71 N.J. 347 (1976), the defendant escaped and remained at large during the pendency of his appeal. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal. Although we ultimately reinstated it for reasons that are not relevant here, the Appellate Division correctly recognized: [I]t is abundantly clear that a state may constitutionally adopt a policy which deters escapes by prisoners. New Jersey formulated such a policy many years ago. An escape is a contempt of the judgment of the court ordering the confinement. While in such contempt, defendant is not entitled to the consideration of the judiciary or relief at the hands of the court. Similarly, in State v. Rogers, 90 N.J. 187, 189 (1982), the defendant fled the jurisdiction while his appeal was pending. The State moved to dismiss the appeal, and defense counsel argued that the important issue in the case required the Court to decide the case as though defendant were not a fugitive. Ibid. We declined to address the issue, noting that [i]n most jurisdictions, courts will dismiss the appeal of a fugitive. Ibid. Taking a cue from Ortega-Rodriguez, the Appellate Division has refused to apply the doctrine where it considered the connection between defendant's pending criminal appeal and his fugitive status too attenuated. State v. Canty, 278 N.J. Super. 80, 83 (App. Div. 1994) (noting that justifications for dismissing fugitive defendant's appeal are less compelling in context of dismissing motion to suppress). Recently, we obliquely reached a similar conclusion in State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 506-07 (1998), where we held that a defendant's prior fugitive status would not warrant barring his resort to the court once he had been recaptured. Thus, where a defendant is a fugitive from criminal prosecution or conviction, the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to bar him from pursuing a criminal appeal is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence. Although the need to deter flight from criminal prosecution and to redress the indignity visited upon the court by the petitioner's absence from the criminal proceeding are always substantial interests, the Court found that disentitlement is too blunt an instrument for advancing them. Id. at 828, 116 S. Ct. at 1783, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 111. The dignity of a court derives from the respect accorded its judgments. That respect is eroded, not enhanced, by too free a recourse to rules foreclosing consideration of claims on the merits. Ibid. A court's inherent power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise. There was no necessity to justify the rule of disentitlement in this case; to strike [defendant's] filings and grant judgment against him would be an excessive response to the concerns here advanced. Id. at 829, 116 S. Ct. at 1783, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 111-12. Degen has been read to [Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).] [United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997).] Among the federal cases recognizing the theoretical applicability of the doctrine in a purely civil setting are Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue-Casal, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2001) (dismissing appeal of fugitive judgment debtor and his wife from orders of contempt and execution of judgment where fugitives connived at violating the orders, enriched themselves by $4.2 million, and then fled the jurisdiction ; flight was from same proceeding in which contempt orders issued; and appeals themselves were without merit and designed to frustrate and delay enforcement of judgment); Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying doctrine to dismiss appeal by mother of grant of father's Hague Convention petition for child custody where mother had absconded with children and their whereabouts were unknown, continued to defy court orders to return children, continued to evade arrest, and would likely defy any adverse ruling); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (declining to apply doctrine to dismiss father's petition under Hague Convention for return of children from mother who had taken them away with her to United States; practical considerations of doctrine not strong enough to warrant application in case involving parental rights, there was no showing that his status as fugitive impaired rights of mother, and all Hague Convention petitions involve enforcement difficulties because by definition one party lives in foreign jurisdiction); March v. Levine, 136 F. Supp. 2d 831, 856-60 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (refusing to dismiss father's Hague Convention petition for return of children from their grandparents where father held in contempt after lawfully moving to Mexico; application of doctrine far too harsh in case involving parental rights where Degen rationales of enforceability, protecting dignity of court, and preventing risk of delay or frustration would not be advanced), aff'd, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barnette, supra, 129 F.3d at 1184-86 (dismissing appeal from civil contempt order issued against wife of convicted criminal defendant for failing to comply with discovery requests and orders to pay balance of prior forfeiture judgment against husband where wife's fugitive status effected an unauthorized stay of contempt judgment thus making enforcement impossible); Finkelstein, supra, 111 F.3d at 282 (dismissing defendants' appeal of civil judgment where status as fugitives from civil court orders and bench warrants for failure to respond to post-judgment discovery to assist judgment collection affected judgment from which they sought to appeal; fugitivity rendered enforcement of civil judgment impossible and nothing short of dismissal could minimize prejudice to plaintiffs in light of fact that defendants' whereabouts were unknown). Various state courts also have applied the doctrine in purely civil cases. Guerin v. Guerin, 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Nev. 2000) (dismissing appeal of divorce decree by wife evading arrest pursuant to bench warrant and contempt orders issued for failure to transfer real property to husband); Scelba v. Scelba, 535 S.E.2d 668, 671-73 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (barring appeal of divorce decree by wife where she was in contempt for failing to abide by family court orders to account for and return property and willfully failed to appear at deposition, and bench warrant still outstanding for her arrest; nexus between fugitive status and appeal strong, and so long as wife remained fugitive the husband has no practical means of enforcing the final divorce decree ). If the cited cases were to be boiled down to their essence, it would be this: the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is an arrow in the judicial quiver that can be let loose in a criminal or civil case so long as the party's fugitive status is sufficiently connected to the litigation in which the doctrine is sought to be invoked and so long as nothing less than dismissal will suffice. What is crucial is the inquiry into whether an alternative short of dismissal will render enforcement of the underlying judgment certain and remove the risk of prejudice to the fugitive's adversary. If so, the only remaining relevant rationales for application of the doctrine are: (i) redressing the indignities visited upon our courts by the fugitives' absence and refusal to comply with lawful court orders; and (ii) deterring flight from criminal prosecution. Degen, supra, 517 U.S. at 828, 116 S. Ct. at 1783, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 111. Degen instructs us that those goals, while laudable, are insufficient to warrant the rough justice that would be visited upon the fugitive by precluding consideration of his or her appeal on the merits. SATOKO MATSUMOTO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TATSUYA MATSUMOTO and KAZUKO MATSUMOTO, Defendants-Appellants. VERNIERO, J., dissenting. I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Stern's meticulous opinion. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J. Super. 174 (2000). Defendants spurned the civil orders of the trial court, and they remain at large under existing arrest warrants. Consequently, the Appellate Division dismissed their appeals without prejudice to reinstatement upon surrender of the defendants and/or vacation of the warrants now outstanding against them. Id. at 186 (footnote omitted). That disposition is eminently fair under the circumstances. While remaining beyond the reach of New Jersey's law enforcement authorities, each defendant is permitted by the Court to post a bond and, in so doing, to prosecute his or her civil appeal. Like the majority, I favor employing the fugitive disentitlement doctrine fairly and equitably in all cases. However, I disagree with my colleagues in their formulation of the standard to be used when deciding whether to apply the doctrine in these and future circumstances. In a nutshell, I believe that the Court's approach may limit the doctrine so severely that it is rendered useless. As a general rule, the doctrine does not apply [a]bsent some connection between a defendant's fugitive status and his appeal[.] Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 249, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1208, 122 L. Ed. 2d 581, 597 (1993). Such a connection exists in this case. The charges lodged against defendants as contained in the indictment (conspiracy to interfere with custody, interfering with custody, and endangering the welfare of a child) are related directly to one or more aspects of plaintiff's civil action. The criminal indictment also provides the basis to apply the doctrine in respect of any appeal from the trial court's custody order. Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude so readily that defendants would comply with an adverse custody ruling in the absence of their returning to New Jersey with the child and submitting to this State's jurisdiction. Indeed, defendants' conduct to date belies any such prospect of compliance. As indicated in the majority opinion, defendants refused all letters and gifts sent to the child by plaintiff during the initial period when the child remained in Japan. Not surprisingly, mother and child became estranged. Under those circumstances, I do not interpret the child's short-lived stay in New Jersey in July 1998 as a reliable indication of defendants' willingness to comply with the custody order. In my view, then, neither Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001), nor the other cases cited by the majority, require the Court's disposition. The Court's approach in permitting a fugitive to avoid application of the doctrine by posting a bond is attractive on the surface: it provides a mechanism to fund any judgment in favor of plaintiff should she prevail on appeal. Although that disposition may enhance this one plaintiff's ability to collect a monetary award, it diminishes the ability of the system as a whole to bring fugitives to justice. Perhaps this is a hard choice, but the Court should favor strengthening the system over enhancing the collection efforts of any one litigant. That choice, however, is not difficult here because plaintiff has not sought the Court's remedy. She asks only that we affirm the judgment below. One aspect of the procedural history bears repeating. The Appellate Division dismissed defendants' appeal without prejudice. Thus, the harshness feared by post-Degen courts such as Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 2000), in which the Seventh Circuit addressed whether to dismiss a suit with prejudice as a sanction for mistakes, omissions, or misconduct[,] (emphasis added), simply does not exist in this case. The Appellate Division's disposition has not closed the doors to the courthouse; it has left them quite ajar. Defendants need only comply with all existing warrants and return the child to New Jersey to prosecute their civil appeals. In sum, this is not an instance in which a criminal defendant is being denied access to our courts to appeal a wholly unrelated civil judgment. Both civil and criminal warrants remain outstanding against defendants, and the warrants are based essentially on the same conduct. Stated differently, all aspects of plaintiff's civil matter, including child custody issues, are inextricably linked to the outstanding warrants and pending criminal allegations. The record, therefore, justifies application of the doctrine in this case. We should not permit defendants simply to post a bond to gain the benefit of our civil courts while they continue to spurn the civil warrants and avoid answering the criminal indictment. I respectfully dissent. Justice Coleman joins in this opinion. NO. A-81/82 SATOKO MATSUMOTO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TATSUYA MATSUMOTO and KAZUKO MATSUMOTO, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED January 30, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz