Title: El Koussa v. Attorney General
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13559
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13559 
 
MARTIN EL KOUSSA & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 6, 2024. - June 27, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, 
& Wolohojian, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition.  Attorney 
General.  Network Companies.  Employment. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 1, 2024. 
 
The case was reported by Kafker, J. 
 
 
Jennifer Grace Miller for the plaintiffs. 
Anne Sterman, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney 
General & another. 
Thaddeus Heuer (Seth Reiner also present) for the 
interveners. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
1 Yessenia Alfaro; Francis X. Callahan, Jr.; Melody 
Cunningham; Adam Kaszynski; Katie Murphy; Juliet Schor; and 
Alcibiades Vega, Jr. 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth; Charles Ellison, Abigail 
Kennedy Horrigan, Brian Gitschier, Daniel Svirsky, Sean Rogers, 
Caitlin Donovan, Brendan Joyce, Troy McHenry, Kim Ahern, and 
Christina M. Ellis-Hibbett, interveners. 
 
 
 
2 
Stevan E. Johnson, pro se. 
Alfred Gordon O'Connell for United Food and Commercial 
Workers International Union. 
Michael T. Anderson for Economic Policy Institute. 
Joel Fleming for Open Markets Institute. 
Gary J. Lieberman for Chamber of Progress. 
Nicole J. Daro & Travis S. West, of California, Bryan 
Decker, & Jennifer Rubin for National Nurses United. 
Jason Salgado, MaryGrace Menner, & Ilana B. Gelfman for 
Massachusetts Worker Centers. 
Daniel A. Rubens & Eliza A. Lehner, of New York, Eric A. 
Shumsky, of the District of Columbia, & James Anglin Flynn for 
Retailers Association of Massachusetts & others. 
Jonathan B. Miller for Public Rights Project & others. 
Matthew Ginsburg, Raven L. Hall, & Leila Ouchchy, of the 
District of Columbia, for American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations. 
Adam Cederbaum, Corporation Counsel, & Randall Maas, 
Assistant Corporation Counsel, for city of Boston. 
Michael A. Feinberg for International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. 
Shannon Liss-Riordan for Justice at Work. 
Rhonda T. Maloney, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, & 
Jennifer A. Denker for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
Michael Holecek, of California, & Joshua S. Lipshutz for 
Awet Teame & others. 
Jonathan D. Newman & Jacob J. Demree, of the District of 
Columbia, & Thomas R. Landry for North America's Building Trades 
Unions. 
Stacie Sobosik for Massachusetts Coalition for Occupational 
Safety and Health & another. 
Matthew Carrieri for National Employment Law Project. 
Kevin P. Martin, William E. Evans, & Jesse Lempel for 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America & another. 
 
Amira Mattar, of New York, John Bonifaz, Ben Clements, & 
Courtney Hostetler for Free Speech for People. 
 
Lori A. Jodoin, Rebecca Pontikes, & Nafisa Bohra for 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. 
 
 
WOLOHOJIAN, J.  This mandamus action concerns five cognate 
ballot initiative petitions.  All five petitions are designed to 
 
 
3 
ensure that "app-based drivers" (drivers)3 are not classified as 
employees of delivery network companies4 or transportation 
network companies (collectively, companies),5 thereby to exclude 
them from the rights, privileges, and protections that our 
General and Special Laws confer on employees.  Three of the five 
petitions couple this deprivation with "minimum compensation, 
healthcare stipends, earned paid sick time, and occupational 
accident insurance."  The other two do not.  This case calls 
upon us to decide whether the Attorney General properly 
certified the petitions under art. 48 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution and whether the Attorney General's 
summaries of the petitions are fair and concise.  Seeing no 
error, we remand the case to the county court for entry of a 
 
3 An "[a]pp-based driver" is defined as "a person who is a 
[delivery network company] courier, a [transportation network 
company] driver, or both, who has a contract with a network 
company, and for whom" various requirements are met. 
 
4 As defined by the three long-form petitions, a delivery 
network company is "a business entity that (a) maintains an 
online-enabled application or platform used to facilitate 
delivery services within the Commonwealth and (b) maintains a 
record of the amount of engaged time and engaged miles 
accumulated by [its] couriers."  The two short-form petitions 
omit clause (b) from the definition. 
 
5 The petitions incorporate the definition of 
"transportation network company" contained in G. L. c. 159A 1/2, 
§ 1, which is "a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship 
or other entity that uses a digital network to connect riders to 
drivers to pre-arrange and provide transportation." 
 
 
 
4 
declaration that the Attorney General's certifications and 
summaries comply with the requirements of art. 48.6 
Background.  In August 2023, a group of Massachusetts 
voters (proponents) submitted to the Attorney General for 
approval five initiative petitions seeking to establish that 
drivers are not employees of the companies for purposes of the 
General and Special Laws.7  The Attorney General thereafter 
certified that each petition met art. 48's requirements and 
prepared a summary for each initiative.  The plaintiffs, a 
different group of registered voters, then brought this mandamus 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Stevan E. 
Johnson; United Food and Commercial Workers International Union; 
Economic Policy Institute; Open Markets Institute; Chamber of 
Progress; National Nurses United; Massachusetts Worker Centers; 
Retailers Association of Massachusetts, Marketplace Industry 
Association, and United Regional Chamber of Commerce; civil 
rights organizations and legal scholars; American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; city of Boston; 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Justice at Work; 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys; Awet Teame, Dave 
Beyna, Joe Lucacio, Lisa McRobbie, Luis Ramos, Octavio Mejia-
Suarez, and Jacqueline Grappi; North America's Building Trades 
Unions; Massachusetts Coalition for Occupational Safety and 
Health and Workers' Injury Litigation Group; National Employment 
Law Project; Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
and Associated Industries of Massachusetts; Free Speech for 
People; and Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. 
 
7 While the proponents originally put forth nine petitions, 
they later informed the Secretary of the Commonwealth that they 
would not seek voters' signatures on four of the nine.  The 
remaining five are the petitions at issue in this case. 
 
 
 
5 
action to challenge the Attorney General's certifications and 
summaries.8 
The proponents consistently and repeatedly have 
represented, including to this court through their counsel, that 
although they have not yet determined which petition it will be, 
only one of the five petitions will be placed on the November 
ballot -– a representation upon which we rely and upon which 
this decision depends.9  Accordingly, we assess each petition 
singly to determine whether it was properly certified and 
summarized by the Attorney General.  That said, because the 
petitions share certain common salient features that bear on the 
art. 48 analysis, we group them in the same way as the parties:  
the so-called short-form petitions (which do not provide the 
drivers with any benefits) and the so-called long-form petitions 
(which do). 
1.  Short-form petitions.  There are two short-form 
petitions:  petition 23-29, designated Version F by the Attorney 
General (Version F); and petition 23-32, designated Version I by 
the Attorney General (Version I).  The stated purpose of each 
short-form petition is to "clarify that app-based drivers are 
 
8 The complaint was filed in the county court, and a single 
justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court. 
 
9 At oral argument, the Attorney General and counsel for the 
plaintiffs stated that they have no reason to doubt the 
proponents' counsel's representation. 
 
 
6 
not employees, and network companies are not employers, . . . 
guaranteeing app-based drivers the freedom and flexibility to 
choose when, where, how, and for whom they work."  Version F 
seeks to accomplish this aim by declaring as a general 
proposition that drivers are not employees for purposes of G. L. 
cc. 149, 151, 151A, and 152.  Version I seeks to accomplish the 
same goal but does so by amending specific provisions of 
cc. 149, 151A, and 152 so as to take drivers outside the 
definition of employees for purposes of those chapters as well 
as c. 151.  In addition, both short-form petitions would create 
a new proposed law, G. L. c. 159AA, to establish defined terms 
governing the relationship between the drivers and the 
companies. 
Both short-form petitions would exclude drivers from the 
broad protections, rights, and privileges to which employees are 
entitled under G. L. cc. 149, 151, 151A, and 152, including 
those pertaining to fair wages, workers' compensation insurance, 
unemployment insurance, and protections against discrimination 
by employers based on age and gender.  See G. L. cc. 149 ("Labor 
and Industries"), 151 ("Minimum Fair Wages"), 151A 
("Unemployment Insurance"), and 152 ("Workers Compensation"). 
2.  Long-form petitions.  There are three long-form 
petitions:  petition 23-25, designated Version B by the Attorney 
General (Version B); petition 23-30, designated Version G by the 
 
 
7 
Attorney General (Version G); and petition 23-31, designated 
Version H by the Attorney General (Version H).  The stated 
purpose of the three long-form petitions is to "define and 
regulate the relationship between network companies and app-
based drivers."  Like the short-form petitions, the long-form 
petitions would operate to exclude the drivers from the rights, 
protections, and privileges afforded to employees under the 
General and Special Laws, although they do so differently and to 
different degrees: 
▪ Version B would exclude drivers from being deemed employees 
for all purposes under all the General and Special Laws.  
No other version has the same operative breadth and effect 
on existing law as does Version B. 
▪ Version G would declare as a general proposition that 
drivers are not employees for purposes of G. L. cc. 149, 
151, 151A, and 152.  In this sense, Version G is similar in 
operative scope to short-form Version F. 
▪ Version H would amend specific provisions of G. L. cc. 149, 
151A, and 152 so as to take drivers outside the definition 
of employees for purposes of those chapters as well as 
G. L. c. 151.  Version H is similar in this sense to the 
operative scope of short-form Version I.   
Like the short-form petitions, the long-form petitions would 
create a new proposed law, G. L. c. 159AA, to establish defined 
 
 
8 
terms governing the relationship between the drivers and the 
companies. 
Unlike the short-form petitions, however, the long-form 
petitions establish some defined benefits for drivers, such as a 
guaranteed net-earning floor, a healthcare stipend, paid sick 
time, and occupational accident insurance.  The long-form 
petitions would give drivers fewer benefits and protections than 
employees receive under our current laws.  For example, each of 
the petitions excludes drivers from the antidiscrimination 
protections afforded employees under G. L. c. 149 and also, in 
the case of Version B, under G. L. c. 151B, without providing 
any similar protection in exchange. 
Discussion.  The plaintiffs argue that the petitions do not 
meet the related subjects requirement of art. 48 because they 
lack a common purpose.  In addition, they argue that Version B 
"inappropriately asks voters for an exemption from the entirety 
of Massachusetts law."  The plaintiffs also argue that the three 
long-form versions contain prohibited "sweeteners" that are 
misleadingly described.  They also argue that the petitions are 
designed to confuse by using dense and technical language.  
Finally, the plaintiffs challenge the Attorney General's 
summaries of the five petitions on the ground that they do not 
adequately describe the scope and effect of the petitions, 
 
 
9 
including the breadth of the employment rights and protections 
they would displace. 
1.  Certifications; related subjects requirement.  As we 
have already noted, the Attorney General certified that the 
petitions were in proper form for submission to Massachusetts 
voters and, among other things, that they contain only subjects 
that are related or mutually dependent.  See art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  We review the 
Attorney General's certifications de novo.  Anderson v. Attorney 
Gen., 479 Mass. 780, 785 (2018).  In conducting this review, we 
are guided by the "firmly established principle that art. 48 is 
to be construed to support the people's prerogative to initiate 
and adopt laws" (citation omitted), Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 
Mass. 478, 487 (2014), while keeping in mind that we are 
"obligated to safeguard the integrity of the initiative petition 
process by requiring that those seeking to change the law 
strictly comply with art. 48," Anderson, 479 Mass. at 785-786. 
To determine whether an initiative petition contains only 
related subjects, we ask whether "one can identify a common 
purpose to which each subject of an initiative petition can 
reasonably be said to be germane."  Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n 
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 219-220 (1981).  
"At some high level of abstraction, any two laws may be said to 
share a 'common purpose,'" Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 
 
 
10 
218, 226 (2006), S.C., 451 Mass. 803 (2008), but "the related 
subjects requirement is not satisfied by a conceptual or 
abstract bond," Gray v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 638, 648 
(2016).  "There is no bright-line rule to follow in making such 
a determination.  Rather, the question is a matter of degree."  
Colpack v. Attorney Gen., 489 Mass. 810, 814 (2022). 
All five petitions at issue in this case seek to define and 
govern the relationship between drivers and companies.  The 
short-form petitions do so by ensuring that drivers would not be 
considered employees for purposes of G. L. cc. 149, 151, 151A, 
and 152.  This unitary purpose is focused and cohesive, and we 
therefore conclude that each short-form petition has a common 
purpose.  See, e.g., Craney v. Attorney Gen., 494 Mass.     
(2024) (affirming certification of petition proposing 
"integrated scheme by which drivers may organize and 
collectively bargain with companies").  Although the short-form 
petitions would have the effect of excluding drivers from the 
broad panoply of rights, protections, and privileges afforded 
"employees" under cc. 149, 151, 151A, and 152, the effect of the 
petitions is not determinative.  "[W]e have never held that 
relatedness is to be evaluated in terms of an initiative's 
effect on existing law."  Weiner v. Attorney Gen., 484 Mass. 
687, 693 (2020). 
 
 
11 
The long-form petitions are different in the sense that 
they have two major aspects:  the first ensures that drivers 
would not be considered employees for various or all (depending 
on the petition version) of the General and Special Laws; the 
second makes available to the drivers certain limited benefits 
to which they would not otherwise be entitled as nonemployees.  
Although the first excludes drivers from the important and far-
reaching rights, privileges, and protections to which employees 
are entitled under existing law while the second gives limited 
benefits in return, this paired "take and give" serves a common 
purpose:  the regulation of the relationship between the drivers 
and the companies.  "An initiative petition may simultaneously 
broaden and restrict an entitlement," in this case the rights 
and benefits associated with the relationship between drivers 
and companies, and still meet the related subjects requirement.  
Craney, 494 Mass. at    .  See Colpack, 489 Mass. at 819 ("an 
initiative petition need not focus solely on loosening [or 
tightening] restrictions in order to meet the related subjects 
requirement of art. 48"); Weiner, 484 Mass. at 694, quoting 
Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 528-529 (2000) ("[t]he 
provisions of an initiative petition need not be 'drafted with 
strict internal consistency'"). 
"[I]n addition to considering whether the subjects of an 
initiative petition share a common purpose, we . . . examine[] 
 
 
12 
two more specific questions."  Colpack, 489 Mass. at 815.  
First, we consider whether  
"'the similarities of an initiative's provisions dominate 
what each segment provides separately so that the petition 
is sufficiently coherent to be voted on "yes" or "no" by 
the voters,' [and s]econd, we consider whether the proposed 
initiative 'express[es] an operational relatedness among 
its substantive parts that would permit a reasonable voter 
to affirm or reject the entire petition as a unified 
statement of public policy'" (citation omitted). 
  
Id., quoting Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 658 
(2016). 
The provisions of the short-form petitions are clearly 
sufficiently coherent and operationally related because they 
have only a single function:  to prevent drivers from being 
deemed "employees" under G. L. cc. 149, 151, 151A, and 152.  The 
two functions of the long-form petitions are also sufficiently 
coherent and operationally related.  Excluding drivers from the 
benefits employees receive under existing laws is operationally 
related to giving them benefits as nonemployees under the 
proposed law; the two functions have the common purpose of 
establishing the terms of the driver-company relationship.  We 
see no risk that voters would be unable to affirm or reject each 
petition as a whole; each petition is sufficiently coherent to 
be voted on "yes" or "no" by the voters.  See Colpack, 489 Mass. 
at 815; Dunn v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 675, 682 (2016) 
(operational relatedness satisfied where proposed law's 
 
 
13 
"provisions share a common purpose and are related in the 
accomplishment of that purpose"). 
Although the five petitions before us have the same general 
goal as the two petitions examined in El Koussa v. Attorney 
Gen., 489 Mass. 823 (2022) (El Koussa I), they do not contain 
the unrelated provisions seeking to abrogate companies' tort 
liability to third parties that led us to reverse the Attorney 
General's certifications of those earlier petitions. 
The plaintiffs argue that Version B "inappropriately asks 
voters for an exemption from the entirety of Massachusetts law" 
and on that basis violates art. 48.  Although there is no doubt 
that Version B would work a change across the entirety of our 
General and Special Laws, "[a] measure does not fail the 
relatedness requirement just because it affects more than one 
statute, as long as the provisions of the petition are related 
by a common purpose."  Albano v. Attorney Gen., 437 Mass. 156, 
161 (2002).  That is the situation we confront here; Version B 
seeks to ensure that drivers will not be classified as employees 
under any existing law.  Despite the reach of Version B, its 
provisions share a single common purpose:  establishing and 
defining the relationship between the drivers and the companies. 
The plaintiffs also argue that the long-form petitions 
"contain prohibited sweeteners" by pairing unrelated popular 
provisions (benefits) with unpopular ones (depriving drivers of 
 
 
14 
the rights, privileges, and protections enjoyed by employees).  
Logrolling is the prohibited "practice of including popular 
unrelated provisions with unpopular ones to ensure the passage 
of those provisions that would not otherwise garner the 
necessary votes."  Clark v. Attorney Gen., 494 Mass. 187, 196 
(2024).  But even accepting the plaintiffs' contention that 
providing drivers with some benefits is "designed to allay the 
fears of concerned voters and sway support in favor of the more 
objectionable [aspects of the] proposals," that alone is not 
enough to constitute prohibited logrolling.  See id.  "[F]or 
there to be logrolling . . . , the so-called popular and 
unpopular items must be unrelated," and we are particularly 
attentive when the unpopular items are concealed.  Id.  Neither 
concern is present here.  As we have already discussed, the 
benefits are part and parcel of the petitions' purpose of 
defining the relationship between the drivers and the companies.  
And where the description of the details of those benefits 
consumes the bulk of the petitions, it can hardly be said that 
they are concealed. 
Finally, the plaintiffs challenge the "highly technical 
legal language" and long length of the petitions.  It is true 
that the petitions before us now are "dense" in the sense that 
they are detailed -- particularly with respect to the 
description of benefits they seek to create.  But art. 48 does 
 
 
15 
not prohibit dense or detailed language in and of itself; what 
is prohibited is the use of language that obscures from voters 
the meaning or operation of a petition.  See El Koussa I, 489 
Mass. at 829 (controversial unrelated provisions should not be 
concealed "in murky language" as "way of burying" them).  Where, 
as here, a petition seeks to establish a complicated scheme of 
benefits and entitlements, it should be described in as much 
detail as required to permit voters to understand all its 
features.  The fact that the resulting description is dense or 
uses technical or legal language does not alone bar a conclusion 
that the petition satisfies the requirements of art. 48.  
Contrast id. at 828 (holding petitions violated relatedness 
requirement where they buried at least two substantively 
distinct policy decisions in obscure language). 
2.  Summaries.  The plaintiffs argue that the Attorney 
General's summaries are not fair, as required by art. 48, 
because they do not sufficiently detail the implications of 
classifying drivers as nonemployees and do not refer to the 
statutory protections that the petitions would displace.10  
Article 48 requires the Attorney General to prepare a summary of 
 
10 Given the proponents' representation that only one 
petition will be put on the ballot, we do not -- and need 
not -- reach the plaintiffs' additional contention that the 
summaries do not distinguish between the multiple petitions, 
thereby depriving voters of context and of the ability to 
distinguish among the five versions. 
 
 
16 
each ballot measure that is not only fair but also concise.  
Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  In 
reviewing a summary, "we give deference to the Attorney 
General's exercise of discretion . . . and will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the Attorney General's over a matter of 
degree" (quotations and citation omitted).  Anderson v. Attorney 
Gen., 490 Mass. 26, 32 (2022).  For a summary to be fair, it 
"must not be partisan, colored, argumentative, or in any way one 
sided, and it must be complete enough to . . . giv[e] the 
voter . . . a fair and intelligent conception of the main 
outlines of the measure" (citation omitted).  Id. at 31.  A 
summary need not be a "comprehensive legal analysis of the 
measure."  Id., quoting Hensley, 474 Mass. at 660.  Here, the 
Attorney General's summaries "closely track[] the language of 
the proposed [acts and] amendment[s]."  Anderson, 490 Mass. at 
33. 
The long-form summaries follow the substance and 
organization of the long-form petitions, and accurately describe 
them.  As to Version B, the Attorney General's summary gives the 
following overview statement: 
"This proposed law would specify that rideshare and 
delivery drivers who accept requests through an online-
enabled application are not 'employees' and that rideshare 
and delivery companies are not 'employers' for purposes of 
Massachusetts laws.  This proposed law would also specify 
alternative minimum compensation and benefits for rideshare 
and delivery drivers." 
 
 
17 
 
The summary then has two additional pages outlining the 
alternative minimum compensation and benefits the drivers would 
receive.  The summaries of the other long-form petitions state 
that the proposal would modify "certain Massachusetts laws 
regarding workplace conditions, minimum wages, unemployment 
insurance, and workers' compensation."  Like Version B, they 
also contain an additional two-page description of the 
alternative minimum compensation and benefits the drivers would 
receive. 
The short-form summaries likewise follow the substance and 
organization of the short-form petitions.  The summary of 
Version F contains an over-all description that 
"This proposed law would specify that rideshare and 
delivery drivers who accept requests through an online-
enabled application are not 'employees' for purposes of 
certain Massachusetts laws regarding workplace conditions, 
minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and workers' 
compensation.  This proposed law would also specify that 
rideshare and delivery companies are not 'employers' for 
purposes of those laws." 
 
Version I contains an almost identical description but states 
that the proposed law would apply "for purposes of certain 
Massachusetts labor and employments laws, including laws 
regarding workplace conditions, minimum wages, unemployment 
insurance, and workers' compensation."  In addition, the short-
form summaries describe the so-called rights the drivers would 
receive under the proposed new law: 
 
 
18 
"The proposed law would apply to drivers for rideshare and 
delivery companies who use digital applications and who are 
(1) not required to work specific days or hours; (2) not 
required to accept specific requests; (3) not restricted 
from working with multiple rideshare or delivery companies; 
and (4) not restricted from working in any other lawful 
occupation or business." 
 
Although it is true, as the plaintiffs point out, that none 
of the summaries lays out all of the implications of classifying 
drivers as nonemployees nor do they make detailed references to 
the statutory protections being displaced, the summaries are not 
required to explain the full sweep of the potential legal 
ramifications at that level of detail.  See Anderson, 490 Mass. 
at 34.  It is important in this context to remember that art. 48 
requires the Attorney General only to draft a fair and concise 
summary; it does not empower the Attorney General to advocate 
for or against a petition or to intrude into the important 
educational and advocacy role proponents and opponents of the 
petitions have "to the voters in the public discourse leading up 
to election day."  Hensley, 474 Mass. at 663 n.19. 
Conclusion.  We remand the case to the county court for 
entry of a declaration that the Attorney General's 
certifications and summaries comply with the requirements of 
art. 48.  However, we retain jurisdiction to revisit our rulings 
and conclusions and, if appropriate, to withdraw this opinion in 
the event the proponents seek to place more than one petition on 
the November ballot. 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.