Title: The Florida Bar v. Albert A. Rapoport
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-73
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-73
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
ALBERT A. RAPOPORT,
Respondent.
[February 20, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee's report finding as a matter of law that
respondent, Albert A. Rapoport, engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
Rapoport is licensed to practice law in Washington, D.C.  He is a member in
good standing of the bars of the Supreme Court of the United States and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.  He is not a member of The Florida Bar.
The Bar filed its petition for an injunction in January 2001, claiming that
Rapoport was engaged in the unlicensed practice of law (UPL) because he (1)
1. The petition also included an allegation that Rapoport formerly advertised
as an attorney in Florida on the American Association of Retired Persons website.
However, because the Bar did not include that claim in its motion for summary
judgment and the referee made no findings as to that claim, we deem it abandoned
and have not considered that allegation in our disposition of this case.
2. As "Appendix A" to its motion, the Bar attached this Court's unpublished
order dated April 15, 1999, approving a stipulation for permanent injunction in case
no. 94,049, Florida Bar v. Rapoport, 732 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1999).  According to the
stipulation, Rapoport agreed not to practice law in Florida unless "authorized to do
so by state or federal law, statute, rule, regulation, or decision." 
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represents parties in Florida in securities arbitration proceedings by entities such as
the American Arbitration Association, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, and the New York Stock Exchange; and (2) advertises his securities
arbitration services in the Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel.1  The Court issued an
order to show cause on January 29, 2001.  Rapoport responded to the order to
show cause.  Although it appeared to the Court at that time that Rapoport admitted
the material allegations in The Florida Bar's petition, the Court referred the matter to
a referee for determination of any questions of fact.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-
7.1(b)(6).
After discovery was propounded by both parties, including the Bar's request
for admissions, the Bar filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there
were no material facts in dispute.2  The referee granted summary judgment, making
the following findings of undisputed facts: Rapoport (1) is not a licensed Florida
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attorney; (2) operates a law practice in Florida and represents persons in securities
arbitration matters; (3) advises clients about the legal merits of their securities
arbitration claims; (4) prepares, signs, and files securities arbitration claims for his
clients; (5) represents his clients in securities arbitration proceedings; (6) offers
advice and representation to stockbrokers defending claims in securities arbitration;
and (7) has, in the past, advertised in the Sun-Sentinel his availability to represent
persons in securities arbitration proceedings.
Based on these findings of fact, the referee concluded that (1) Rapoport is a
nonlawyer in Florida and cannot operate a law practice or engage in the general
practice of law in Florida; (2) Rapoport has engaged in the practice of law by
giving legal advice and consultation to clients, by drafting, signing, and filing
securities arbitration claims for clients, and by representing clients in securities
arbitration proceedings; (3) no federal or state law authorizes Rapoport as a
nonlawyer to provide legal services and advice in securities arbitration matters; (4)
Florida maintains its substantial interest and authority to prohibit UPL to protect the
public; (5) Rapoport has advertised his availability to represent parties in securities
arbitration proceedings; and (6) Rapoport has engaged in UPL and is subject to
injunction.
Rapoport does not contend that any of these material facts are in dispute. 
3. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 307 (2000), was enacted in
1925.  See Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).  "The Act was designed 'to
overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate,' and
place such agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts.'"  Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)
(citations omitted).  Securities arbitration agreements are subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act.  See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987).  
4. See Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998); Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142
F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 1998); Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202 (3d Cir.
1993); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992);
David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245 (2d
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Rather, Rapoport claims that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 307
(2000), (FAA) preempts state law3 and that Florida has no authority to forbid an
attorney from acting in Florida for parties in federal securities matters. 
In Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the United
States Supreme Court, although acknowledging Florida's substantial interest in
regulating the practice of law within the state, held that Florida could not enjoin a
nonlawyer registered to practice before the U.S. Patent Office from preparing and
prosecuting patent applications in Florida because a federal statute and Patent
Office regulations authorized the practice.  Rapoport provides a long list of federal
cases concerning securities arbitration that involve preemption of state law by the
FAA.4  None of the cases, however, concerns the authorization of the practice of
Cir. 1991); Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990);
Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989); Cohen v.
Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled by Ticknor
v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931(9th Cir. 2001); Cent. Jersey Freightliner,
Inc. v. Freightliner Corp., 987 F. Supp. 289 (D. N.J. 1997); Morrison v. Colo.
Permanente Med. Group, P.C., 983 F. Supp. 937 (D. Colo. 1997); Johnson v.
Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996); Haluska v. RAF Fin.
Corp., 875 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Medika Int'l, Inc. v. Scanlan Int'l, Inc.,
830 F. Supp. 81 (D. P.R. 1993); Matter of Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc. and
Nebel, 765 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Seymour v. Gloria Jean’s Coffee Bean
Franchising Corp., 732 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1990); Reed v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., 698 F. Supp. 835 (D. Kan. 1988); Russolillo v. Thomson McKinnon
Securities, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn. 1988); In re Pate, 198 B.R. 841
(Bankr. S.D. Ga 1996).
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law in securities arbitration proceedings.
Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer Representation in Securities
Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1997), is directly on point.  In that case, this
Court held that it was unlicensed practice of law for nonlawyers in securities
arbitration proceedings to give specific legal advice and perform the traditional
tasks of the lawyer at arbitration proceedings.  Rapoport admittedly has engaged in
the traditional tasks of the lawyer—giving of legal advice, preparing and submitting
claims, representing clients in proceedings, advertising his ability to represent
clients—in securities arbitration proceedings in Florida.  He is a nonlawyer in
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Florida under Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 10-2.1(c), which provides in pertinent
part:
For purposes of this chapter, a nonlawyer or nonattorney is an
individual who is not a member of The Florida Bar. This includes, but
is not limited to, lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions, law students,
law graduates, applicants to The Florida Bar, disbarred lawyers, and
lawyers who have resigned from The Florida Bar.
As a nonlawyer, Rapoport is not authorized to practice law in Florida.
Although Rapoport does not point to any material issues that are in dispute,
he claims that the referee erred in entering summary judgment without holding a
hearing.  He points to the language of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c),
which provides that a motion for summary judgment "shall be served at least 20
days before the time fixed for hearing."
We previously have held that a referee in a UPL case has the authority to
enter summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Florida Bar v.
Miravalle, 761 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 2000).  Furthermore, the standard of review
on summary judgment orders is de novo.  See Florida Bar v. Cosnow, 797 So. 2d
1255, 1258 (Fla. 2001).  Lastly, we are aware that rule 1.510(c) has been interpreted
to require hearings on motions for summary judgments.  See Kozich v. Hartford
Ins. Co. of Midwest, 609 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). 
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We deem it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether rule 1.510(c) mandates
a hearing before summary judgment may be entered in a civil proceeding if there
has been adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the party opposing
the summary judgment has failed to show that there are any material issues in
dispute.  Unlike other proceedings, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
against the unlicensed practice of law.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-1.1.  The
Court does not automatically refer UPL petitions to referees.  Referral to a referee
is made only if the respondent raises issues of disputed fact after we have issued an
order to show cause.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-7.1(b)(6) ("The court may,
upon its motion or upon motion of any party, enter a judgment on the pleadings or
refer questions of fact to a referee for determination."). 
In this case, as noted above, referral to a referee was made after a response
was filed because it appeared that Rapoport may have been asserting some
disputed issues of fact.  However, in the proceedings before the referee, and in the
multiple pleadings filed with this Court, including Rapoport's initial brief and reply
brief, Rapoport has failed to demonstrate the existence of even a single disputed
fact—much less a material one.  Accordingly, Rapoport had no right to even have a
referee hear The Florida Bar's petition against the unlicensed practice of law unless
there were disputed issues of material fact.  Once Rapoport filed his response to
5.  The dissent asserts that Rapoport's due process rights were violated
when the referee refused to continue the proceedings, even though Rapoport
recently underwent heart surgery.  The dissent further asserts that there were
disputed issues of fact that Rapoport never had an opportunity to present to the
referee.  However, a review of the record demonstrates that Rapoport had multiple
opportunities to raise factual disputes.  The Bar's motion for summary judgment
was served by mail on August 17, 2001.  Rapoport's motion to halt proceedings
was signed by him on August 30, raising his recent heart surgery as a basis for the
request. Despite the fact that the motion for summary judgment had already been
served, he did not raise any issues of fact in dispute that would have provided the
referee cause to continue the proceedings. Further, after the referee denied this
motion, Rapoport filed a motion to reconsider on September 10, 2001, that only
made a bare assertion that there were material issues of fact in dispute, without
naming a single specific fact that was in dispute to give the referee a basis to
reconsider.  Perhaps most significantly, in his numerous pleadings before this Court
Rapoport still does not assert that there are material issues of fact in dispute that the
referee must resolve.  Therefore, Rapoport has had ample opportunity to be heard. 
His challenge to the Bar's proceedings is one that involves issues of law and not
disputed issues of fact.  Hence, his due process rights have not been violated. 
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our order to show cause, this Court had the discretion to enter judgment on the
pleadings or to refer questions of fact to a referee.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-
7.1(b)(6).  Because there are no disputed issues of material fact raised by
Rapoport, the referee's decision not to hold a hearing before entering summary
judgment in this case was proper.5 
Rapoport received both notice and an opportunity to be heard before this
Court.  There are no material issues of disputed fact, and based on Rapoport's
admissions that he is engaged in representing parties in securities arbitration in this
state we conclude that, as a matter of law, Rapoport is engaged in the unlicensed
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practice of law. 
Rapoport also objects to the referee's recommended assessment of costs in
the amount of $530.40.  Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 10-7.1(d)(2) gives the
referee discretion to recommend the assessment of costs, including the investigative
costs and court reporter's fees requested in this action.  Rapoport has
demonstrated no abuse of discretion by the referee.  Therefore, we approve the
assessment of costs as recommended.
Accordingly, respondent, Albert A. Rapoport, is hereby enjoined from
engaging in the practice of law in Florida, including specifically the representation
of parties in securities arbitration proceedings in this state, until he is duly licensed
to practice law in Florida.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee
Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Albert A.
Rapoport, in the amount of $530.40, for which sum let execution issue. 
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and CANTERO, JJ.,
concur.
SHAW, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
SHAW, Senior Justice, dissenting. 
6.  See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 1999)
("Accordingly, because Fredericks was made aware of the conduct alleged by the
Bar to be unethical and had the opportunity to be heard as to this conduct, there
was no violation of due process."); Florida Bar v. Rubin, 709 So. 2d 1361, 1363
(Fla. 1998) ("Prior to being found guilty of the charges at issue here, Rubin was
afforded appropriate notice and a full opportunity to be heard during the final
hearing before the referee.  This was sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process."); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655
(1985) (holding that where appellant was put on notice of disciplinary charges
against him and was afforded opportunity to respond to board's recommendation,
demands of due process were satisfied); In re McKay, 191 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 1966)
("An attorney must be accorded due process in . . . disciplinary proceedings, and
the requirements of due process are met when the attorney is served with charges
or specifications reasonably informing him of the charges against him and the
attorney is thereafter accorded a hearing with an opportunity to defend.").  
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I respectfully dissent because I believe that there was a violation of
Rapoport's constitutional right to due process.  As Florida courts have consistently
recognized, due process entitles a litigant to notice and an opportunity to be heard.6 
While representing himself, Rapoport requested that the referee continue his
case since he had undergone three-vessel coronary artery bypass surgery, was still
suffering from cardiac arrhythmias, and was under instructions from his doctor to
avoid all undue stress.  A copy of his doctor's instructions was attached to the
motion.  When his request for a continuance was denied, Rapoport asked that the
referee reconsider his decision and permit him an opportunity to recover from his
surgery so that he could "fully and properly prepare his response" to the Bar's
motion for summary judgment.  He asserted that there were material issues of fact
7.  The majority opinion seems to suggest that Rapoport, who was
proceeding pro se at the time, should have spelled out the disputed issues of fact in
his request for a continuance.  I find this reasoning disingenuous for if Rapoport
was able to formulate his research and submit his issues of disputed fact, then he
would not need a motion for continuance at all. 
8.  Interestingly, after the referee denied both of Rapoport's requests for a
continuance, the referee requested an extension from this Court based on
Rapoport's illness.  This Court granted the request and extended the time to file the
referee's report until November 28, 2001. 
9.  Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1167-68 (Fla. 1986) ("It is within
the sound discretion of the referee, assigned by this Court to preside over a
disciplinary proceeding such as this, to grant or deny a motion for continuance. 
Such a ruling will not be disturbed by this Court absent a clear abuse of
discretion.").  
10.  See Greene v. Seigle, 745 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that
plaintiff's due process rights were violated when the trial court granted a summary
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in dispute and that he should be available in approximately one month.7  The referee
denied this motion and five days later issued an order granting summary judgment
in favor of the Bar.8  
The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is a matter of
discretion that will normally not be disturbed.9  In this instance, however, where it
was asserted that there were material issues of fact to be resolved and a
continuance was requested because of serious medical problems, I feel that it was
an abuse of discretion to deny the continuance and grant summary judgment
without giving Rapoport a meaningful opportunity to respond.10 
judgment motion eight days after it was filed without providing the plaintiff with a
sufficient opportunity to be heard); Mondestin v. Duval Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
500 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (holding that a party against whom a motion
for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to
be heard).
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The majority opinion concludes that Rapoport is not entitled to relief
because he received "both notice and an opportunity to heard before this Court."  I
do not believe that this constitutes a sufficient remedy.  As noted above, Rapoport
was not given an opportunity to submit disputed factual issues before the referee,
and there are no provisions which permit him to present such disputed factual
issues before this Court.  
The majority opinion relies heavily on the fact that the referee's findings of
fact were based on Rapoport's own admissions.  A litigant's right to due process is
not forfeited, however, because the most damaging evidence comes from his own
confession or admissions.  The right to be heard is fundamental, and Rapoport has
been denied this right.  For the above reasons, I dissent.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; R.
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Lee Bennett, Chair, Standing Committee on Unlicensed Practice of Law,
Tallahassee, Florida; Lori S. Holcomb, Unlicensed Practice of Law Director, The
Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; and Janet Bradford Morgan, Bar Counsel, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
for Complainant
Ainslee R. Ferdie of the Law Offices of Ainslee R. Ferdie, Coral Gables, Florida,
for Respondent