Title: State v. Probst
Citation: 247 Kan. 196, 795 P.2d 393
Docket Number: 64,429
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 1990

247 Kan. 196 (1990)
795 P.2d 393
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
DIANA LEA PROBST, Appellee.
No. 64,429

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 13, 1990.
Kevin C. Fletcher, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Kenneth M. Carpenter, of Carpenter Chartered, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
The State of Kansas appeals from a district court order dismissing criminal charges against the defendant, Diana Lea Probst. Following a combined preliminary hearing and a hearing on a defense motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant, the trial court granted the motion to suppress and then dismissed the charges, as there was no other evidence that a crime had been committed. The State has appealed pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1). We affirm.
The State asserts two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, and (2) whether, if the affidavit filed in support of the issuance of the search warrant lacked probable cause, the search warrant nevertheless meets the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The determination of the issues before the court requires a careful review of the allegations of the affidavit for the issuance of the search warrant and the evidence presented by the State to support the validity of the warrant at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Therefore, it is necessary that the factual background be set forth in some detail.
In the late summer and early fall of 1988, agents of various law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Reno County Sheriff's Office, the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and the Hutchinson Police Department, cooperated in an undercover drug investigation in Hutchinson and Reno County. The principal target of the investigation was Warren Cross, a used car dealer in Hutchinson, who was suspected of the sale of methamphetamine. The defendant, *198 Diana Lea Probst, was an employee and companion of Cross. Both Cross and Probst were charged with various drug violations and their cases were consolidated in the district court. This appeal is concerned only with the charges against the defendant Probst.
The principal officer involved in the investigation of the suspected drug activities of Cross was Special Agent Michael F. Upchurch of the DEA, who solicited the aid of an informant, Thomas R. Shanley. On August 5, 1988, Shanley was arrested by the Kansas Highway Patrol on the Kansas Turnpike. A search of Shanley's car produced over 50 grams of methamphetamine, $10,720 in cash, and two firearms. All of those items, along with the automobile, were confiscated by the federal government and federal criminal charges were filed against Shanley. While Shanley was being held in the Lyon County jail, Agent Upchurch visited him and sought his cooperation in Upchurch's investigation of illegal drug activities. Shanley, in the hope of getting cooperation from the DEA in his pending criminal proceedings, agreed to assist the DEA agents and entered into a "cooperating individual agreement" with Upchurch to provide information and services to the DEA.
Shanley then was enlisted to assist the DEA in the investigation of Cross. Upchurch directed Shanley to make contact with Cross and he did so prior to September 7, 1988. During his initial contacts, Shanley made arrangements to purchase methamphetamine from Cross. The buy was scheduled for September 7, 1988. On that date Upchurch wired Shanley with a hidden recording device, furnished him money to make the purchase, and placed him under surveillance. Shanley met Cross at his used car lot and the two of them drove to 15 West 16th Street in Hutchinson, where Probst lived. At the time, Probst was at work. Shanley and Cross parked near the Probst residence and Cross proceeded to open the trunk of an automobile parked nearby. The evidence is conflicting whether this automobile was parked in the street or in the alley, but it is clear that it was not parked on Probst's property. The car did not belong to Probst. Cross removed a yellow metal ammunition box from the trunk of the parked car and returned with it to the other vehicle; he and Shanley then returned to the Cross used car lot.
*199 Upon their return to the used car lot, Cross opened the ammunition box, removed a quantity of methamphetamine from the box and completed the sale to Shanley. Shanley met with Cross again on September 9, 1988, and rode with him to a warehouse or storage building Cross used in his automobile business. At that location Shanley observed Cross remove methamphetamine from one of the cars stored in the building.
Nothing further appears to have transpired until May 1989 when Upchurch approached the Reno County Attorney seeking prosecution. After reviewing information furnished by Upchurch, the county attorney prepared an affidavit for three search warrants. The affidavit, signed by Upchurch on May 16, 1989, sought search warrants for the residence of Warren Cross, the storage building Cross used in his car business, and the residence of Diane Lea Probst.
The affidavit, consisting of six legal size typewritten pages, related the experience of Agent Upchurch, his knowledge of the general conduct of drug traffickers, and the involvement of Shanley in the investigation of Cross. The facts of the September 7, 1988, buy of methamphetamine by Shanley from Cross and details about the suspected drug activity of Cross were set forth at great length. The only information in the affidavit that related to the defendant Probst was succinctly set forth by the trial judge in his memorandum opinion. The court stated:
Nevertheless, the district judge, sitting as the magistrate for purposes of the search warrants, on May 16, 1989, authorized and issued search warrants for the three requested locations, including the home of the defendant at 15 West 16th Street in Hutchinson. The search warrants were executed the same day and a quantity of methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and *200 related items were recovered from the home of the defendant. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession of illegal drugs, possession of drugs without a tax stamp, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Nothing was included in the affidavit about Shanley's drug activities, his arrest in Lyon County, his "cooperating individual agreement" with the DEA, the lack of any information about his reliability, or the fact he had been convicted in federal court in April of 1989, prior to the execution of the affidavit by Upchurch.
At the hearing, held September 26, 1989, on the motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the home of the defendant, the State presented the testimony of Shanley and Agent Upchurch. Following the hearing, the judge took the matter under advisement so he could review the lengthy affidavit, the search warrant, and the testimony and evidence produced at the hearing. On October 6, 1989, the judge issued his memorandum opinion in which he found that the affidavit lacked probable cause for the search of the defendant's home. He also found that the affidavit did not meet the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as promulgated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405, reh. denied 468 U.S. 1250 (1984).
The State's first argument is that the affidavit of Agent Upchurch to support the issuance of the search warrant meets probable cause standards.
Recently, in State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 769 P.2d 666 (1989), this court stated the scope of appellate review when considering rulings on the issuance of search warrants, and the rules on probable cause determinations. The court held:
In claiming the trial court erred in finding the affidavit did not show probable cause, the State contends the facts in the affidavit show a "fair probability" methamphetamine would be found at Probst's residence and show a protracted and continuing course of drug trafficking. Further, the State contends it does not have to prove the confidential informant's reliability to establish probable cause and the trial court erred in allowing a hearing to attack the contents of the affidavit.
We set forth above the trial court's summary of the allegations of the affidavit which pertain to this defendant. The affidavit goes to great lengths to describe the activities of the defendant Cross and the details of the sale of methamphetamine to Shanley. However, with the exception of Probst's prior conviction, there is no factual information in the affidavit to support that the informant, Upchurch, or any other officer observed Probst at her residence or elsewhere with drugs or observed any activity indicating drug trafficking was occurring at her residence. The fact that Cross and Shanley obtained drugs from the trunk of a car parked on the city streets, or in an alley, near the home of Probst does not indicate drug activity by Probst. It is clear that the defendant was nowhere near her home at the time and the automobile from which the drugs were obtained did not belong to defendant and was not on her property.
While the State relies upon Shanley's statement to Upchurch that the defendant was involved in the sale and distribution of methamphetamine, Shanley testified that he based it solely on a newspaper account of the conviction in February of 1988. The conclusory statement of Shanley, absent any showing of reliability or knowledge by Shanley, cannot be considered as a basis for probable cause without more facts than were contained in the affidavit here.
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317, reh. denied 463 U.S. 1237 (1983), the Court abandoned the earlier two-pronged test which required the affiant to show the informant's basis of knowledge and to provide sufficient facts to establish the veracity of the informant or the reliability of the *202 information. Yet, in reaffirming a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, the Court made it clear that the veracity of the informant, the reliability of the information, and the basis of the informant's knowledge remain factors to be considered. 462 U.S.  at 238. We recently discussed Gates and the totality of the circumstances test in State v. Toler, 246 Kan. 269, 787 P.2d 711 (1990).
Here, Agent Upchurch had no prior experience with or knowledge of Shanley. All that was known was that he was the subject of federal prosecution as a drug violator who wanted to make a deal which might help him in that prosecution. He had not formerly furnished information and, by the time the affidavit was prepared in this case, Shanley had been convicted in federal court. Any reliance upon the statements of Shanley is questionable at best. In State v. Morgan, 222 Kan. 149, 563 P.2d 1056 (1977), this court, in considering the sufficiency of an affidavit for a search warrant, stated:
The State also relies upon the conviction of the defendant in February 1988 in contending the affidavit shows probable cause that drugs might be found at defendant's residence. In Morgan, this court observed:
In State v. Jacques, 225 Kan. 38, 587 P.2d 861 (1978), we reexamined our opinion in Morgan and, in considering the weight to be given an isolated sale or event, the court stated:
While the affidavit here dwells at length upon the alleged continuous drug activity of Cross, the single conviction some fifteen months earlier of this defendant, standing alone, does not constitute grounds to believe the defendant was involved in a protracted or continuous course of drug trafficking. The fifteen-month-old conviction, without more, would undoubtedly be too stale to lead a reasonable person to believe that drugs might still be found at the defendant's home.
In the instant case, the trial court stated:
We agree with the trial court that the affidavit in this case lacked probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for the home of the defendant.
The State next asserts that if the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked probable cause, the evidence still should have been admissible under the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule adopted in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897. We considered and discussed the rule from Leon at some length in the majority and concurring opinions in State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493. In Doile we described the exception embraced in Leon, stating:
In providing guidance for the determination of whether the good faith exception applies, the Leon court stated:
In Leon, the court did not totally abandon the requirement of probable cause and stated the affidavit must contain a substantial basis indicating probable cause. The court said:
As set forth in Doile, the Court in Leon delineated four areas in which the newly adopted exception would not apply. They include: (1) when the judge or magistrate who issued the warrant was deliberately misled by false information; (2) when the judge or magistrate wholly abandons his or her neutral and detached role; (3) when the warrant was so lacking in specificity that the officers could not determine the place to be searched or the things to be seized; and (4) when there was so little indicia of probable cause contained in the affidavit for the warrant that it was entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe the warrant valid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.  at 923; State v. Doile, 244 Kan. at 502.
In the present case we are faced with the unusual, if not unique, fact that the district judge who heard the motion to suppress the evidence was the same judge who approved the issuance of the warrant in the first place. The judge is to be commended for his integrity and candor in acknowledging his earlier error. In his opinion, the trial judge stated:
Thus, it appears that the judge found that the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was not applicable for at least two reasons. First, the judge found that he had "wholly abandoned his judicial role" as a neutral and detached magistrate and second, that no reasonably well-trained officer, which Agent Upchurch was, could have possibly relied upon this affidavit, which was so lacking in probable cause as it related to this defendant's home.
While the trial judge does not go into detail as to the circumstances which convinced him that he had abandoned his judicial role when he issued the warrant, there are several possibilities. It is quite possible that the magistrate, in the press of other duties, did not take sufficient time to actually study the lengthy affidavit aimed primarily at Cross, and failed to winnow out the meager allegations relating to the defendant Probst. An initial reading of the affidavit with its myriad of allegations about the extensive methamphetamine trafficking of Cross could well have misled the magistrate. It may be that the magistrate, having found the allegations sufficient as to Cross, merely assumed the affidavit stated probable cause as to defendant Probst. Agent Upchurch's lack of any knowledge about the reliability of the informant Shanley, and the failure to include the known information about Shanley's drug violations and conviction, may also have been a factor. While Leon only refers to the magistrate being misled "by false information," we have held that "a deliberate omission is often equal to an actual misstatement" in finding that the failure to include material information in an affidavit for a search warrant *207 may invalidate the warrant. State v. Lockett, 232 Kan. 317, 319, 654 P.2d 433 (1982).
Suffice it to say, the issuing magistrate is the only person who can actually know whether he abandoned his duty, and when he acknowledges that he did, it is not for this court to say otherwise.
We conclude that under the unusual circumstances here, the district court did not err in finding that the affidavit for the search warrant lacked probable cause and that the good faith exception as promulgated by Leon did not apply in this case.
The judgment is affirmed.