Title: THORNTON v COMMISSIONER OF DEPT O
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-134
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 1980

NO. 80-134 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 W A Y N E THORNTON, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, T H E COMMISSIONER OF T H E DEPARTMENT O F L A B O R AND INDUSTRY, STATE O F M O N T A N A , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f J e f f e r s o n , Montana Honorable Frank B l a i r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: P a t r i c k F. F l a h e r t y argued, Boulder, Montana Fro Respondents: Marra, Wenz, Iwen and Johnson, Great F a l l s , Montana James Gardner argued, Dept. o f Labor, Helena, Montana Submitted: November 2 1 , 1980 Decided: DEC 2 q f$j@($j Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t . On A u g u s t 1 0 , 1 9 7 8 , a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a wage claim w i t h t h e Commissioner o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r and I n d u s t r y . A c o n t e s t e d c a s e h e a r i n g was h e l d i n Great F a l l s o n November 1 4 , 1 9 7 8 . T h e h e a r i n g s o f f i c e r r u l e d i n f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t s . On March 11, 1 9 7 9 , a p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County o f J e f f e r s o n , f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f t h e f i n a l a g e n c y d e c i s i o n . The District C o u r t d i s m i s s e d a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . A p p e l l a n t a p p e a l s . A p p e l l a n t was employed as a t r u c k d r i v e r by r e s p o n d e n t s J o h n and Simone F u r g e r i o n o r a b o u t J u l y 1 7 , 1 9 7 8 . H e t e r m i n a t e d h i s e m p l o y m e n t o n A u g u s t 4 , 1 9 7 8 , d u e t o nonpayment o f wages. A p p e l l a n t was h i r e d f o r $ . 1 3 p e r mile p l u s $3.00 p e r h o u r f o r u n l o a d i n g a n d l o a d i n g . A p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d h e d r o v e 7 , 2 5 0 miles ( $ 9 4 2 . 5 0 ) , worked 62 h o u r s ( $ 1 8 6 . 0 0 ) , and a c c u m u l a t e d $86.39 i n e x p e n s e s , t o t a l i n g $ 1 , 2 1 4 . 8 9 d u e . On November 1 4 , 1 9 7 8 , a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g was h e l d . The h e a r i n g s e x a m i n e r d e t e r m i n e d t h e r e were no e x p e n s e s d u e and t h a t a p p e l l a n t was t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d t o $ 1 , 1 2 8 . 5 0 ( $ 9 4 2 . 5 0 p l u s 1 8 6 . 0 0 ) . The e x a m i n e r a l s o f o u n d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s had p a i d a p p e l l a n t $500.00 on S e p t e m b e r 5 and $281.75 on O c t o b e r 1 3 , 1 9 7 8 , i n b a c k wages. The e x a m i n e r s u b t r a c t e d $ 7 8 1 . 7 5 f r o m $ 1 , 1 2 8 . 5 0 a n d f o u n d a p p e l l a n t was e n t i t l e d t o $346.75. P u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, t h e e x a m i n e r a s s e s s e d a p e n a l t y o n t h i s p o r t i o n o f t h e wages d u e w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n a n e t amount d u e a p p e l l a n t o f $693.50. [Due t o a n a r i t h m e t i c a l e r r o r t h e h e a r i n g s e x a m i n e r f o u n d $492.50 d u e a p p e l l a n t ; h o w e v e r , u s i n g t h e same formula, t h e e r r o r was c o r r e c t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review.] The examiner a l s o denied a p p e l l a n t ' s p r a y e r f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s . On appeal t h e D i s t r i c t Court a f f i r m e d t h e examiner's o r d e r and denied a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r review. There a r e two i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n a f f i r m i n g t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e h e a r i n g s examiner t o a s s e s s a s t a t u t o r y p e n a l t y t o t h e balance due a t t h e time of t h e h e a r i n g r a t h e r t h a n t h e amount due a t t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e proceedings? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n a f f i r m i n g t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e h e a r i n g s examiner r e f u s i n g t o award a t t o r n e y f e e s t o a p p e l l a n t a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g l e v e l ? A p p e l l a n t contends t h a t s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, imposes a mandatory p e n a l t y on an employer who f a i l s t o pay wages t o an employee when t h e wages become due. By imposing a p e n a l t y on $346.75, which was due a t t h e t i m e of t h e h e a r i n g , r a t h e r t h a n on $1,128.50, which was due a t t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e h e a r i n g s examiner and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made a c l e a r e r r o r o f l a w i n d i r e c t c o n t r a v e n t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e . A p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r contends t h a t s e c t i o n 39-3-214, MCA, p r o v i d e s a mandatory award of a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s f o r employees who s u c c e s s f u l l y prove a c l a i m f o r unpaid wages. The h e a r i n g s examiner and t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o award a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s a t e i t h e r s t a g e of t h e proceedings. Respondents' p o s i t i o n is t h a t t h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of two s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s - - s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA (the penalty statute), and section 39-3-211, MCA (the statute giving the commissioner discretion to settle or adjust claims upon assignment). In an attempt to promote settlements and avoid lengthy litigation, the commissioner, pursuant to his section 39-3-211, MCA, authority, compromised the penalty because the employer partially paid the wages due appellant prior to the administrative hearing. Respondents contend there exists a rebuttable presumption in favor of the action of an administrative agency. In the absence of a showing of manifest error by the party challenging the agency action, the agency order is deemed valid and enforceable. Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof; therefore, the District Court's order affirming the agency's decision should be affirmed. Concerning the second issue, respondents contend that, pursuant to section 39-3-214, MCA, an award of attorney fees is provided for only when it is necessary to institute "a suit at law" for the recovery of wages. An administrative hearing is not a suit at law. Therefore, neither the commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry nor the District Court has the authority to award attorney fees for representation in an administrative hearing. The District Court has statutory authority to award attorney fees on a wage claim only for the legal work performed at the District Court level. When reviewing an administrative order, there exists a rebuttable presumption in favor of the decision of the agency, and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it to show that it is erroneous. Partoll v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. (1949), 122 Mont. 305, 311, 203 P.2d 974; Kerns v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 546, 289 P. 563. T h i s Court may n o t s u b s t i t u t e its judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r agency a s t o t h e weight of t h e e v i d e n c e on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t . S e c t i o n 2-4-704 ( 2 ) , MCA; Robins v. Anaconda Aluminum Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 175 Mont. 514, 575 P.2d 67. W e may r e v e r s e o r modify t h e d e c i s i o n i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f t h e a p p e l l a n t h a v e b e e n p r e j u d i c e d b e c a u s e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f i n d i n g s , i n f e r e n c e s , c o n c l u s i o n s , o r d e c i s i o n s a r e c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s i n view o f t h e r e l i a b l e , p r o b a t i v e and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence of t h e whole r e c o r d . S e c t i o n 2 - 4 - 7 0 4 ( 2 ) ( e ) , MCA. I n Brurud v. Judge Moving and S t o r a g e Company, I n c . ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 249, 563 P.2d 558, we determined t h a t a f i n d i n g is " c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s " when, a l t h o u g h t h e r e is e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t it, a review o f t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d l e a v e s t h e c o u r t w i t h t h e d e f i n i t e and f i r m c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a m i s t a k e has been committed. See a l s o United S t a t e s v. United S t a t e s Gypsum Co. ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746, 766. W e f i n d no such p r e j u d i c e h e r e , and t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency and D i s t r i c t Court a r e a f f i r m e d . The r o l e of judges i n c o n s t r u i n g s t a t u t e s is s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA. T h i s Court i n t e r p r e t e d t h a t r o l e i n amm mil! v. Young ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 81, 540 P.2d 971, which h e l d t h a t t h e c o u r t may n o t omit what h a s been i n s e r t e d i n l e g i s l a t i o n nor i n j e c t what h a s been o m i t t e d . The d u t y of t h e c o u r t is simply t o c o n s t r u e t h e law a s it f i n d s it. Dunphy v. Anaconda Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. With t h i s mandate i n mind, w e must now c o n s t r u e t h e two s t a t u t e s which a r e t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . S e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, p r o v i d e s : "Any employer, a s such employer is d e f i n e d i n t h i s p a r t , who f a i l s t o pay any of h i s employees a s provided i n t h i s p a r t o r v i o l a t e s any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n of t h i s p a r t s h a l l be g u i l t y of a misdemeanor. A p e n a l t y s h a l l a l s o be a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t and p a i d by such employer and become due such employee a s f o l l o w s : a sum e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e f i x e d amount of 5% of t h e wages due and unpaid s h a l l be a s s e s s e d f o r each day, e x c e p t Sundays and l e g a l h o l i d a y s , upon which s u c h f a i l u r e c o n t i n u e s a f t e r t h e day upon which such wages were due, e x c e p t t h a t such f a i l u r e s h a l l n o t be deemed t o c o n t i n u e more t h a n 20 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a t e such wages were due." S e c t i o n 39-3-211, MCA, p r o v i d e s : "Whenever t h e commissioner d e t e r m i n e s t h a t one o r more employees have c l a i m s f o r unpaid wages, he s h a l l , upon t h e w r i t t e n r e q u e s t of t h e employee, t a k e an assignment of t h e c l a i m i n t r u s t f o r such employee and may m a i n t a i n any p r o c e e d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e t o e n f o r c e t h e c l a i m , i n c l u d i n g l i q u i d a t e d damages p u r s u a n t t o t h i s p a r t . With t h e w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f t h e a s s i q n o r , t h e commis- s i o n e r may s e t t l e o r a a u s t ally c l a i m a s s i g n e d - - - - - - - p u r s u a n t t o t h i s s e c t i o n . " (Emphasis added.) The wage claim submitted and signed by a p p e l l a n t provided : " I hereby a u t h o r i z e t h e Labor Commissioner t o approve a proposed compromise adjustment o r s e t t l e m e n t of t h e claim. I n pursuance t h e r e o f , I a u t h o r i z e t h e Labor Commissioner t o t r a n s f e r , s e l l or a s s i g n t h i s c l a i m o r any judgment thereon." P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e commissioner by s e c t i o n 39-3-211, MCA, he compromised t h e p e n a l t y on t h e $500.00 and $281.75 p a i d on September 5 and October 13, 1978, r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n t h e l a s t two f i s c a l y e a r s , t h e Labor S t a n d a r d s D i v i s i o n processed an average of over 900 wage c l a i m s per y e a r . T h e r e f o r e , i n an a t t e m p t t o promote s e t t l e m e n t s and avoid l e n g t h y l i t i g a t i o n , t h e commissioner compromised t h e p e n a l t y on wages which were p a i d p r i o r t o h e a r i n g . Such a d e c i s i o n i s w i t h i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r ' s d i s c r e t i o n and f a c i l i t a t e s t h e purpose of t h e Wage Payment Act which is t o c o l l e c t unpaid wages of employees. However, i n each c a s e , t h e u l t i m a t e l i a b i l i t y should f i r s t be determined and, t h e r e a f t e r , a compromise may be worked o u t from t h a t amount. S e c t i o n s 39-1-102 and 39-3-209, MCA. A p p e l l a n t was e n t i t l e d t o $ 1 , 1 2 8 . 5 0 ; h e was p a i d $781.75. T h e r e f o r e , $346.75 remains due f o r unpaid wages. Respondents owe a p p e l l a n t an a d d i t i o n a l $346.75 i n p e n a l t y p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, b r i n g i n g t h e n e t amount due a p p e l l a n t $795.50. A p p e l l a n t h a s r e c e i v e d a p o r t i o n of wages due and is e n t i t l e d t o unpaid wages p l u s a p e n a l t y imposed thereon. No s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of a p p e l l a n t have been p r e j u d i c e d and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r d e r is a f f i r m e d . A p p e l l a n t asked f o r an award of a t t o r n e y f e e s . I t is a w e l l - s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t a t t o r n e y f e e s a r e a l l o w a b l e o n l y when provided f o r by c o n t r a c t o r s t a t u t e . S e c t i o n 39-3-214, MCA, p r o v i d e s : "Court c o s t s and a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s . (1) Whenever it s h a l l become n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e employee t o e n t e r o r m a i n t a i n a s u i t a t law f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o r c o l l e c t i o n of wages due a s provided f o r by t h i s p a r t , a r e s u l t i n g judgment m u s t i n c l u d e a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e i n f a v o r of t h e s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y , t o be taxed a s p a r t of t h e c o s t s i n t h e c a s e . ( 2 ) Any judqment f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a proceeding p u r s u a n t t o t h i s a c t must i n c l u d e a l l c o s t s reasonably i n c u r r e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r o c e e d i n g , i n c l u d i n g a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s . " (Emphasis added.) S e c t i o n 39-3-212, MCA, p r o v i d e s : "A d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e Commissioner of Labor and I n d u s t r y made a f t e r a h e a r i n g may be enforced by a p p l i c a t i o n by t h e Commissioner t o a d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r an o r d e r o r j u d g m e n t e n f o r c i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i f t h e time provided t o i n i t i a t e j u d i c i a l review by t h e employer passed." The p a r t i c u l a r language of t h e s t a t u t e i n d i c a t e s t h a t an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g is n o t a " s u i t a t law." A " d e t e r m i n a t i o n " made by t h e commissioner a s a r e s u l t of t h e h e a r i n g is n o t a "judgment." I n Massa v. Dept. of S o c i a l & R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 6 0 , 560 P.2d 895, t h e a p p e l l a t e procedures used c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l t h o s e used i n t h e c a s e a t bar. I n t h a t c a s e t h i s Court awarded a t t o r n e y f e e s o n l y f o r s e r v i c e s rendered on a p p e a l . I n t h e absence of s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y we m u s t a f f i r m t h e holding of t h e D i s t r i c t Court and t h e Department of Labor and I n d u s t r y denying a p p e l l a n t a t t o r n e 3 Affirmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e