Title: New Jersey v. Hagans
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2018

New Jersey v. Hagans Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate 295. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had changed lanes without signaling. There were passengers in Chandler’s car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back seat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front passenger seat. Faust smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle. Faust ultimately arrested defendant, handcuffed him, called for back-up, and administered Miranda warnings. Faust also handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandler denied knowing defendant had marijuana on him and denied that she had been smoking marijuana in the car. Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her vehicle. Faust asked whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.” Faust then discussed his next steps: “I know, but at this time . . . we are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just like it to be easier.” Chandler replied, “Go ahead.” Faust then inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated “Go ahead.” Faust asked, “Are you sure?” Chandler answered, “Yeah.” Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?” Chandler responded, “Yes.” The issue that exchange presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether Chandler’s consent was valid after she initially denied the officer’s request to search it. The Supreme Court found that because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Malcom C. Hagans (A-37-16) (078014)Argued January 16, 2018 -- Decided April 23, 2018TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. In this case, the Court considers the validity of a driver’s consent to search her automobile after she initially denied a police officer’s request to search it. In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate 295 in Burlington County. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had changed lanes without signaling. There were passengers in Chandler’s car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back seat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front passenger seat. Faust approached the passenger side of the vehicle and smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle. Faust asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, arrested him, handcuffed him, called for back-up, and administered Miranda warnings. Faust then asked Chandler to step out of the vehicle, administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about the presence of marijuana in the vehicle. Faust handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandler denied knowing defendant had marijuana on him and denied that she had been smoking marijuana in the car. Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her vehicle. Before reading the consent form to her, Faust told Chandler that “it would be a lot easier if you would just make things easy.” Faust read the consent form aloud. He advised Chandler of her right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring any other reason to detain her, she could leave. He also explained if she consented, she had a right to be present during the search and could withdraw her consent at any time. Faust asked whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.” Faust then discussed his next steps. “I know, but at this time . . . we are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just like it to be easier.” Chandler replied, “Go ahead.” Faust then inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated “Go ahead.” Faust asked, “Are you sure?” Chandler answered, “Yeah.” Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?” Chandler responded, “Yes.” To confirm Chandler’s decision, Faust re-read her the consent-to-search form in its entirety. Faust then again asked Chandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; she responded “yes.” Faust repeated for the Mobile Video Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle that Chandler had initially denied consent but changed her mind and consented because she “did not want to wait any longer.” The search produced a bag of marijuana and a loaded .22 caliber pistol. Defendant admitted to ownership of the marijuana and the pistol. He was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, fourth-degree child abuse, and a disorderly persons offense for possession of marijuana. At a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Faust had probable cause to pull the vehicle over and for a search. Although the court found that several of the factors set forth in State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965), militated against a finding of Chandler’s voluntary consent, it determined the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent to search was valid and not coerced. The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality of the evidence. The Court granted certification, limited to the issue of whether Chandler’s “consent to search the motor vehicle was freely and voluntarily given.” 229 N.J. 161 (2017).HELD: Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 1 1. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court will uphold the trial court’s factual findings underlying that decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). The panel’s decision here predated the Court’s opinion in S.S. and included findings based on the panel’s own de novo review of the MVR. The Court adheres to the principle enunciated in S.S. (pp. 7-8)2. Consent to search is a long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Consent searches of motor vehicles that are pulled over by police are valid only if: (1) there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop; and (2) the consent is given knowingly and voluntarily. (pp. 8-10)3. In State v. King, the Court delineated factors for use in considering the voluntariness of consent. 44 N.J. at 352-53. Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include: “(1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed.” Ibid. Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include: “(1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers.” Id. at 353. The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion.” Ibid. Voluntariness depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each case “necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.” Ibid. (pp. 10-11)4. After determining the automobile stop was valid, the trial court acknowledged and evaluated the King factors but found that Chandler consented to the search voluntarily even though a majority of those factors cut against a finding of voluntariness. Notably, the court stressed the officer’s lack of insistence, the short period between the initial refusal and the consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request for clarification, and Chandler’s repeated affirmations that she did, in fact, give her consent to search. In the trial court’s view, the video evidence was more compelling than the results suggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to the facts of the case. Over fifty years ago, when King was decided, MVRs did not exist. Because of rapid developments in technology, MVRs are increasingly mounted in police vehicles, having become another important tool with the capacity to aid in the search for the truth. The MVR aided the trial court here because it permitted visual and audial evaluation of the police and driver’s interaction on the issue of consent. Specifically, the MVR footage helped the trial court determine that Chandler voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle. Sufficient credible evidence supports that determination. (pp. 11-13)5. Defendant contends that Faust’s statement—“We are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is just kinda going to prolong the inevitable”—coerced Chandler’s consent. Although the use of the term “inevitable” was somewhat anticipatory as to what might follow, the manner in which it was used here was not coercive. As a best practice, police officers should tell a suspect only the measures they intend to take—apply for a search warrant—and should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant will issue. Here, Faust had probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant given the odor of burnt marijuana. Faust’s statement was a candid assessment of the likelihood that a judge would grant his application for a search warrant. (p. 14)6. Sufficient credible evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Chandler’s consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, despite the presence of several of the potentially coercive King factors. Here, technological advancements permitted the trial court to better evaluate the manner in which Faust obtained consent. Such possibilities—which are increasingly common today—are precisely why the King Court factors are guideposts rather than rigid absolute authority. (p. 15) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 37 September Term 2016 078014STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.MALCOLM C. HAGANS, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 16, 2018 – Decided April 23, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Rebecca Gindi, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Rebecca Gindi, of counsel, and Susan Brody, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs). Jane C. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, of counsel and on the briefs). JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, the Court considers the validity of adriver’s consent to search her automobile after she initiallydenied a police officer’s request to search it. Because thetrial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowinglyand voluntarily gave consent to search is supported bysufficient credible evidence, we find that the trial court 1 properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidenceseized during the search. I. We garner these undisputed facts from the record, includingthe dash-cam videos taken at the scene by the Mobile VideoRecorder (MVR) in the police vehicle. The parties stipulated tothe admission of the MVR recording and agreed it containedsufficient facts for a hearing on defendant’s motion tosuppress. No witnesses testified, and the parties agreed to relysolely on the MVR recording to support their arguments. We havereviewed that video. In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulledover a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate295 in Burlington County. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, hadchanged lanes without signaling. There were passengers inChandler’s car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the backseat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the frontpassenger seat. Faust approached the passenger side of thevehicle and asked Chandler for her driving documents. While waiting, Faust smelled the odor of burnt marijuana inthe vehicle. He asked defendant, who was on his cell phone, tohang up. When defendant objected, Faust asked him to step outof the vehicle, arrested him, handcuffed him, called for back- 2 up, and administered Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Faust then asked Chandler to step out of the vehicle,administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about thepresence of marijuana in the vehicle. Faust handcuffed Chandlerand placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandlerdenied knowing defendant had marijuana on him and denied thatshe had been smoking marijuana in the car. Upon request, Faustbrought Chandler’s daughter to the police car to be with hermother. Officers at the scene placed defendant in anotherpolice vehicle. Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of hervehicle. Before reading the consent form to her, Faust toldChandler that “it would be a lot easier if you would just makethings easy.” Faust read the consent form aloud. He advised Chandler ofher right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring anyother reason to detain her, she could leave. He also explainedif she consented, she had a right to be present during thesearch and could withdraw her consent at any time. Faust askedwhether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.” Faust then discussed his next steps. “I know, but at thistime . . . we are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, andthat is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just 3 like it to be easier.” Chandler replied, “Go ahead.” Faustthen inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated“Go ahead.” Faust asked, “Are you sure?” Chandler answered,“Yeah.” Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?” Chandlerresponded, “Yes.” To confirm Chandler’s decision, Faust re-read her theconsent-to-search form in its entirety. Faust then again askedChandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; sheresponded “yes.” Faust repeated for the MVR that Chandler hadinitially denied consent but changed her mind and consentedbecause she “did not want to wait any longer.” The search produced a bag of marijuana and a loaded .22caliber pistol. Chandler denied knowledge of the pistol, whichpolice found behind the front passenger seat, near Chandler’sdaughter. Faust explained to Chandler that the Division ofYouth and Family Services -- now the Division of ChildProtection and Permanency -- would be notified given theproximity of the pistol to her young daughter. Defendant ultimately admitted to ownership of the marijuanaand the pistol. He was charged with unlawful possession of aweapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), fourth-degree childabuse, in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, and a disorderly personsoffense for possession of marijuana. Chandler was not charged. 4 At a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Fausthad probable cause to pull the vehicle over for changing laneswithout a signal and probable cause for a search upon smellingburnt marijuana. Although the court found that several of thefactors set forth in State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965),militated against a finding of Chandler’s voluntary consent, itdetermined the totality of the circumstances indicated that theconsent to search was valid and not coerced. The court found notaint in Chandler’s consent, determining Faust did not badgerher or attempt to further persuade her to consent. Defendant pleaded guilty to gun possession, preserving hisright to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Theremaining charges against him were dismissed. The trial courtsentenced defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment with aone-year period of parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality ofthe evidence, finding that the initial stop was justified byFaust’s reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle infraction andfound valid the subsequent search because the driver’s consentto search was not coerced. This Court granted certification, limited to the issue ofwhether Chandler’s “consent to search the motor vehicle wasfreely and voluntarily given.” 229 N.J. 161 (2017). 5 II. A. Defendant urges this Court to reverse the AppellateDivision’s finding that Chandler voluntarily consented to thesearch of her vehicle. Defendant insists the circumstances surrounding Chandler’sconsent were steeped in coercion leading to her involuntarilyconsenting to the search. Defendant maintains the AppellateDivision misapplied the five factors delineated by the Court inKing. Defendant argues the following circumstances establishChandler’s coerced consent: (1) Chandler consented while underarrest; (2) Faust had physically restrained Chandler byhandcuffing and placing her in a police vehicle; (3) Chandlerdenied knowledge of contraband in the car and knew that a searchwould result in the discovery of marijuana; and (4) Faustattempted to persuade Chandler to consent after she initiallyrefused. Lastly, defendant contends that Faust’s statementconcerning the inevitability of a search warrant renderedChandler’s consent involuntary. Defendant asserts that thecircumstances facing Chandler were substantially more coercivethan those facing the defendant in State v. Cancel, in which anofficer made a similar statement but the court nevertheless 6 found the consent voluntary. 256 N.J. Super. 430, 433-34 (App.Div. 1992). B. The State argues that Chandler’s consent was knowing andvoluntary under the totality of the circumstances and urges thisCourt to affirm the Appellate Division. The State asserts theMVR conveyed Faust’s professionalism in dealing with Chandlerthroughout their exchanges. The State also notes that the factors in King merely guidethe voluntariness analysis and are not dispositive. ConcerningFaust’s statement about the inevitability of a search warrant,the State argues the Appellate Division correctly appliedCancel, holding that police may constitutionally provide a fairprediction of events to follow a denial of consent. III. A. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress,we uphold the trial court’s factual findings underlying thatdecision “so long as those findings are supported by sufficientcredible evidence in the record.” State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243(2007)). We “reverse only when the trial court’s determinationis 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand 7 intervention and correction.’” Id. at 425 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the samestandard. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017) (concludingthat a trial court’s fact-finding based solely on a videorecording is disturbed only “when factual findings are soclearly mistaken -- so wide of the mark -- that the interests ofjustice demand intervention”). The panel’s decision here predated our opinion in S.S. andincluded findings based on the panel’s own de novo review of theMVR. We adhere to the principles we enunciated in S.S. We review the legal determinations of the trial court denovo. Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425 (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)). Those determinations are not entitled to anyspecial deference. Ibid. (citing Gandhi, 201 N.J. at 176). Defendant has automatic standing to challenge theautomobile search because the marijuana and gun recovered as aresult of the search constitute essential elements of the crimewith which he was charged. State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313(2014) (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960),overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)). B. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution andArticle I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution prohibit 8 “'unreasonable searches and seizures’ by government officials.”State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 513 (2015). “'Warrantlesssearches are presumptively unreasonable,’” and “the State bearsthe burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence notonly that the [warrantless] search or seizure was premised onprobable cause, but also that it 'f[ell] within one of the fewwell-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” Statev. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016) (third alteration inoriginal) (quoting State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008)).Consent to search is a “long-recognized” exception to thewarrant requirement. State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 337 (2014). Consent searches of motor vehicles that are pulled over bypolice are valid only if: (1) “there is a reasonable andarticulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop tocontinue the detention after completion of the valid trafficstop,” State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002); and (2) theconsent is “given knowingly and voluntarily,” id. at 639. Thelynchpin to voluntary consent “is whether a person has knowinglywaived [her] right to refuse to consent to the search.” Statev. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 308 (2006) (citing State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975)). The burden is on the State to prove“that the individual giving consent knew that he or she 'had achoice in the matter.’” Carty, 170 N.J. at 639 (quotingJohnson, 68 N.J. at 354). Specifically, the consenting 9 individual must have been aware of her right to refuse, beforegiving consent. Johnson, 68 N.J. at 354. In the 1965 case of State v. King, this Court delineatedfactors for use by our courts in considering the voluntarinessof consent. 44 N.J. at 352-53. Factors potentially indicatingcoerced consent include: (1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed. [Ibid. (citations omitted).]Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include: (1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers. [Id. at 353 (citations omitted).] The Court emphasized that those factors were notcommandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arrivingat his conclusion.” Ibid. The Court cautioned that “theexistence or absence of one or more of the factors mentionedabove may be of great significance in the circumstances of onecase, yet be of slight significance in another.” Ibid. Indeed, 10 the Court explained, “many decisions have sustained a findingthat consent was voluntarily given even though the consent wasobtained under the authority of the badge or after the accusedhad been arrested.” Ibid. Voluntariness depends on “thetotality of the particular circumstances of the case” with eachcase “necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.” Ibid. C. Against that backdrop, we now consider driver Chandler’sconsent to the search of her motor vehicle. The heart of our voluntariness analysis hinges on whetheran individual has knowingly waived his or her right to refuseconsent. After determining the automobile stop was valid, the trialcourt acknowledged and evaluated the King factors but found thatChandler consented to the search voluntarily even though amajority of those factors cut against a finding ofvoluntariness. Notably, the court stressed the officer’s lackof insistence, the short period between the initial refusal andthe consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request forclarification, and Chandler’s repeated affirmations that shedid, in fact, give her consent to search. In the trial court’sview, the video evidence was more compelling than the resultssuggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to thefacts of the case. 11 Over fifty years ago, when King was decided, MVRs did notexist. Because of rapid developments in technology, MVRs areincreasingly mounted in police vehicles, having become anotherimportant tool with the capacity to aid in the search for thetruth. As we recently noted in North Jersey Media Group, Inc.v. Township of Lyndhurst, “[MVR] recordings, made while an eventunfolds, protect the public and police alike in that the videoscan expose misconduct and debunk false accusations.” 229 N.J. 541, 575-76 (2017). The MVR aided the trial court here because it permittedvisual and audial evaluation of the police and driver’sinteraction on the issue of consent. Specifically, the MVRfootage helped the trial court determine that Chandlervoluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle. We findsufficient credible evidence supports that determination. After Trooper Faust read driver Chandler the consent form,she initially refused to consent. Trooper Faust told Chandlerthat his next step would be to obtain a search warrant and thatshe was simply postponing the “inevitable.” Chandler told himto “Go ahead.” Faust then asked several different questions toensure she understood and consented, to which Chandler respondedaffirmatively. He re-read the entire consent form aloud to her,reminding her of the right to refuse consent, to depart afterrefusing if there existed no other reason to detain her, to 12 withdraw consent at any time, and to be present during thesearch. Faust even repeated for the MVR that Chandler initiallydenied consent but had subsequently changed her mind. Observing the time frame of the stop, the trial courtconcluded “[t]his is not a situation where you have an officerbadgering . . . the driver trying to get consent. The officermade one statement [and had] no further discussions with thedriver. The driver voluntarily without any type of coercion ortaint did give consent.” Based on its own review, the Appellate Division observedthat Chandler appeared at ease throughout the entire interactionand listened to and calmly considered her options. Faust’sactions, in the panel’s view, were not menacing, harassing, ordeceptive. The panel’s observations underscored those of thetrial court. Defendant points to the King guideposts as dispositive infinding Chandler to have been coerced. We disagree. Theobjective of a court undertaking a voluntariness analysis is toscrutinize “the totality of the particular circumstances of thecase.” King, 44 N.J. at 353 (emphasis added). And, in S.S. westressed the capacity of video to bring clarity to a challengedproceeding, stating that “reading a cold transcript is nosubstitute for viewing the video in evaluating the circumstancesof an interrogation.” 229 N.J. at 385. 13 Defendant further contends that Faust’s statement -- “Weare going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is justkinda going to prolong the inevitable” -- coerced Chandler’sconsent. Although the use of the term “inevitable” was somewhatanticipatory as to what might follow, the manner in which it wasused here was not coercive. An officer’s comment regarding the inevitability of asearch warrant does not indicate coercion if it is “a fairprediction of events that would follow” rather than “a deceptivethreat made to deprive [an individual] of the ability to make aninformed consent.” Cancel, 256 N.J. Super. at 434. As a bestpractice, police officers should tell a suspect only themeasures they intend to take –- apply for a search warrant -–and should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant willissue. Here, Faust had probable cause to support the issuanceof a search warrant given the odor of burnt marijuana. State v.Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) (“New Jersey courts haverecognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitutesprobable cause that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed andthat additional contraband might be present.” (alteration inoriginal) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 516-17(2003))). Faust’s statement was nothing more than a candidassessment of the likelihood that a judge would grant hisapplication for a search warrant. 14 In sum, we find sufficient credible evidence supports thetrial court’s determination that Chandler’s consent wasvoluntary under the totality of the circumstances, despite thepresence of several of the potentially coercive King factors.Here, technological advancements permitted the trial court tobetter evaluate the manner in which Faust obtained consent.Such possibilities -- which are increasingly common today -- areprecisely why the King Court factors are guideposts rather thanrigid absolute authority. We find sufficient evidentiary support for the trialcourt’s conclusion that Chandler knowingly and voluntarilyconsented to Faust’s search of her vehicle. We hold that thetrial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. IV. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division upholdingthe trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 15