Title: Champion Ins. Co. v. Wilkins
Citation: 544 So. 2d 965
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 28, 1989

544 So. 2d 965 (1989)
CHAMPION INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
Thomas M. WILKINS.
88-636.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 28, 1989.
Rehearing Denied May 26, 1989.
Thomas M. Galloway and Nicholas Nagrich of Collins, Galloway &amp; Smith, Mobile, for appellant.
Lee L. Hale, Mobile, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Champion Insurance Company ("Champion") filed this declaratory judgment action against Thomas M. Wilkins, seeking a declaration that there was no collision coverage on a 1983 Toyota Cressida automobile, under a particular insurance policy issued by Champion to Wilkins, when the Toyota sustained approximately $10,500 in damage as a result of a collision.
The trial court heard ore tenus evidence and made the following findings of fact, which are not plainly or palpably erroneous:
This amount was not paid. Champion cancelled the coverage on the Toyota, effective October 12, 1986, and filed this action. Champion did not cancel the coverage on the Ford, nor indicate that it intended to cancel it.
In the provision of the insurance policy that provided coverage for collision damage, "Section DAutomobile Physical Damage Insurance," the phrase "covered automobile" was defined:
The 1983 Toyota, at the time it was damaged by a collision, was not designated in the declarations, by description, as a covered automobile. However, the 1983 Toyota had been newly acquired during the policy period by the same entity and from the same entity as the vehicle designated in the declarations, by description.
Wilkins, the insured, notified Champion within 30 days following the purchase and delivery of the Toyota. The Toyota was purchased and delivered on August 20, 1986. Champion was notified, and it added the Toyota to the policy (albeit one day after the collision) on August 25, 1986. It was then designated in the declarations by description, and a premium was charged and paid.
Therefore, whether this vehicle was insured against collision damage depends upon whether it replaced a described covered automobile (which it clearly did not) or whether, "as of the date of [the Toyota's] delivery, this insurance applied to all covered automobiles." Champion cannot and does not argue that the collision coverage does not apply to all "covered automobiles."
We must enforce unambiguous insurance contracts as they are written, and we cannot *967 defeat express provisions in a policy by judicial interpretation. Ranger Insurance Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection &amp; Insurance Co., 410 So. 2d 40 (Ala.1982); Butler v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co., 402 So. 2d 949 (Ala.1981). We must conclude that the Toyota was covered under the provisions of Wilkins's Champion insurance policy, for it had been newly acquired during the policy period by Wilkins, an individual doing business as Wilkins Auto Sales, a sole proprietorship. Wilkins notified Champion of this and added it to the policy within 30 days after the Toyota was delivered to him.
Champion suggests that we look to the definition of "owned automobile" under the liability provisions of the policy to aid in our interpretation of this policy. Under the liability provisions of the policy, for a newly acquired automobile to become an "owned automobile," Champion must insure all automobiles owned by the named insured on the date of the acquisition of the newly acquired automobile. Champion did not insure all automobiles owned by Wilkins on the date he acquired the Toyota.
Only collision coverage is involved. "Covered automobile" is clearly, even if circularly, defined under the provision involving collision insurance. The only way that definition can be read to favor Champion's position here is to read into it an ambiguity, but doing so would not help Champion, because that ambiguity would then be resolved against Champion; ambiguous language in an insurance contract is construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurance company. Ho Brothers Restaurant, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 492 So. 2d 603, 605 (Ala.1986). Champion may resort to circuity in defining "coverage" under its policies; however, we will not take an unnecessarily circuitous route in interpreting them.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  The date August 4, 1986, appears in one place in the order. From the evidence and the declaration of relief granted in the trial court's order, it is uncontroverted that the Toyota was damaged on August 24, 1986.