Title: STATE v MUSGROVE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-032
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 1982

No. 82-32 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, THURMAN J. MUSGROVE, Defendant, INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY, BONDING COMPANY, Petitioner and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Mineral Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: C. J. Tornabene argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Sarah Powers argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, Superior, Montana submitted : FTovembei- 26, 1982 Decided: December 29, 1982 Filed: DEC & 8 I % % ! ! M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendant a p p e a l s a Mineral County judgment f i n d i n g him g u i l t y , f o r a second t i m e , of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The judgment i n t h i s c a s e arises from a retrial t h i s Court ordered i n S t a t e v. Musgrove ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 162, 582 P.2d 1246. T h i s t i m e , d e f e n d a n t p r e s e n t s f o u r i s s u e s to t h i s Court. F i r s t , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by d i s c u s s i n g i s s u e s of t h e c a s e w i t h p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s , i n t h e absence of d e f e n d a n t and h i s c o u n s e l , w i t h o u t r e c o r d i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Second, d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by a l l o w i n g r e f e r e n c e s to d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r t r i a l . T h i r d , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e of a crime d e f e n d a n t was n o t charged w i t h . F o u r t h , d e f e n d a n t claims t h e t r i a l c o u r t v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t s t o due p r o c e s s by g i v i n g t h e j u r y t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n : "The law also presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of any v o l u n t a r y act committed by him." W e need o n l y a n a l y z e t h e f o u r t h i s s u e , and because we f i n d error, we must r e v e r s e and remand f o r a new t r i a l . I n view o f o u r r e v e r s a l i n t h i s case, comment w i l l also be d i r e c t e d to i s s u e s t w o and t h r e e . The i n s t r u c t i o n complained of was j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n number s e v e n ; i n f u l l it states: " I n e v e r y crime or p u b l i c o f f e n s e t h e S t a t e must e s t a b l i s h each element d e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e and t h e S t a t e must f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e Defendant a c t e d w h i l e having t h e mental state r e q u i r e d b y t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e . " I n t h i s a c t i o n t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e Defendant performed t h e acts knowingly o r pur- p o s e l y . A p e r s o n acts knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o conduct or to a c i r c u m s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when he is aware o f h i s conduct or t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e e x i s t s . When knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t is an element of t h e o f f e n s e , s u c h knowledge is e s t a b l i s h e d i f a person is aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of its e x i s t e n c e . "A person acts p u r p o s e l y w i t h respect to a r e s u l t or to conduct d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e i f it is h i s c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t t o engage i n t h a t conduct or to cause t h a t r e s u l t . When a p a r t i c u l a r purpose is an e l e m e n t of an o f f e n s e t h e element is e s t a b l i s h e d , a1 though such purpose is con- d i t i o n a l u n l e s s t h e c o n d i t i o n n e g a t e s t h e harm o r e v i l s o u g h t t o be prevented by t h e l a w d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e . "Any r e q u i r e d mental state need n o t be proved by d i r e c t e v i d e n c e b u t may be i n f e r r e d from acts, conduct and c i r c u m s t a n c e s appearing i n t h e e v i d e n c e . The law also presumes t h a t a - - - - - p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of - - any v o l u n t a r y act committed by him. T h i s p r K - - - - - - - sumption, however, is termed a d i s p u t a b l e pre- sumption and may be c o n t r o v e r t e d by o t h e r e v i d e n c e . " (Emphasis added. ) The u n d e r l i n e d p o r t i o n , which may be r e f e r r e d t o as t h e "Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n ," is t h e f o c u s of a p p e l l a n t ' s argument. A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h e g i v i n g of t h a t p o r t i o n of i n s t r u c t i o n number seven is c l e a r l y r e v e r s i b l e error i n view of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n Sandstrom v. Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 494 4 - 5 5 2 - U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. I n t h a t case, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t r u c k down as u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n i n s t r u c t i o n almost i d e n t i c a l to t h e language emphasized above " [ b l e c a u s e David Sandstrom's j u r y may have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e judge I s i n s t r u c t i o n as c o n s t i t u t i n g e i t h e r a burden s h i f t i n g pre- sumption . . . or a c o n c l u s i v e presumption . . . " 422 U.S. a t 524. On remand t o t h i s Court, t h e q u e s t i o n was "whether t h e erro- neous i n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d h a r m l e s s error as a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . " S t a t e v. Sandstrom (1979) - . - Mont . 603 P.2d 244, 245, 36 St.Rep. 2099, 2100. W e found r e v e r s i b l e error. W e r e v e r s e d because " [ t ] h e e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n [went] t o a v i t a l element of t h e proof of t h e crime, namely t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t Sandstrom i n committing t h e homicide. I f t h e j u r y followed t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , it could have presumed t h e i n t e n t w i t h o u t proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt." Mont. a t I 603 P.2d a t 245, 36 St.Rep. a t 2101. I n t h e c a s e now b e f o r e us, t h e q u e s t i o n is t h e same, was t h e g i v i n g of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n h a r m l e s s error? W e must answer i n t h e n e g a t i v e . I n t h i s c a s e , as i n Sandstrom, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n o b v i o u s l y per- m i t t e d t h e j u r y to presume i n t e n t w i t h o u t proof beyond a reason- a b l e d o u b t . The d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t was a h o t l y c o n t e s t e d i s s u e o f f a c t i n t h e case and i n t e n t is an i m p o r t a n t element of t h e crime t h e S t a t e charged. Because of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e j u r y c o u l d d i s r e g a r d t h e d e f e n d a n t s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he intended o n l y t o f i r e a warning s h o t ; t h e n w i t h t h e presumption of i n t e n t , t h e j u r y could have concluded t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t used d e a d l y f o r c e to i n t e n t i o n a l l y k i l l t h e v i c t i m . T h e r e f o r e , because of t h e Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e S t a t e c o u l d o b t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n w i t h o u t having to i n t r o d u c e any e v i d e n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t . Respondent a r g u e s t h a t t h e i s s u e h e r e w a s n o t i n t e n t b u t j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n t h e use of f o r c e by t h e d e f e n d a n t , and s i n c e i n t e n t was n o t an i s s u e , t h e g i v i n g of t h e Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n was h a r m l e s s e r r o r . Respondent cites S t a t e v. Sunday ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - - - - Mon t . , 609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561, t o s u p p o r t its argument. I n Sunday t h e j u r y was g i v e n t h e Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n ; " t h e l a w presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i - n a r y consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . " W e found t h e g i v i n g of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n to b e , a t most, h a r m l e s s e r r o r . Such w a s o u r h o l d i n g because by Sunday's own a d m i s s i o n , h i s o b j e c t was "to s h o o t t h e McLeans or to cause t h a t r e s u l t . " Consequently, it was n e v e r a n i s s u e whether Sunday p u r p o s e l y or knowingly s h o t t h e v i c t i m s . I n o t h e r words, overwhelming e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d t h e presumption of t h e Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n . Sunday's j u r y d i d n o t have t o presume t h a t he intended t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y acts; t h a t he s h o t a t t h e McLeans i n t e n d i n g to k i l l or s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e . Sunday admitted t h a t . The o n l y i s s u e was w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e s h o o t i n g w a s done i n s e l f d e f e n s e . T h i s c a s e is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from Sunday. Here, t h e defen- d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he o n l y intended to f i r e a warning s h o t . However, t h e Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n allowed t h e j u r y to presume t h a t because Musgrove p u l l e d t h e t r i g g e r , he intended to k i l l t h e v i c t i m . The r e s p o n d e n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was per- m i s s i v e i n n a t u r e r a t h e r t h a n mandatory; c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e p r i n - c i p l e s of Sandstrom were n o t v i o l a t e d . W e have recognized t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n S t a t e v. Bad Horse ( 1 9 8 0 ) , --- - Mont. I 605 P.2d 1113, 37 St.Rep. 45, and S t a t e v. Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mon t . -- , 605 P.2d 1051, 36 St.Rep. 2237. However, i n t h i s case, af ter a r e a d i n g of a l l of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , espe- c i a l l y t h e f u l l t e x t of i n s t r u c t i o n no. 7 , we cannot be c e r t a i n beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t members of t h e j u r y d i d n o t m i s c o n s t r u e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . A s t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d i n Sandstrom v. Montana: "We do n o t reject t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some j u r o r s may have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n as p e r m i s s i v e , or, i f mandatory, as r e q u i r i n g o n l y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t come f o r - ward w i t h 'some1 e v i d e n c e i n r e b u t t a l . However, t h e f a c t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r c o u l d have g i v e n t h e presumption c o n c l u s i v e or p e r s u a s i o n - s h i f t i n g e f f e c t means t h a t we can- n o t d i s c o u n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y . . ." 442 U.S. a t 519. Accordingly, we must r e v e r s e . The matter of r e f e r e n c e s to p r e v i o u s t r i a l s should n o t o c c u r i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o l l o w s o u r recommendation t h a t a change of venue t a k e p l a c e . However, i n r e g a r d to t h i s i s s u e , o u r s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 46-16-701, MCA, p r o v i d e s : " a Inew t r i a l is a reexamina- t i o n of t h e i s s u e i n t h e same c o u r t b e f o r e a n o t h e r j u r y a f t e r a v e r d i c t or a f i n d i n g h a s been rendered. The g r a n t i n g of a new t r i a l p l a c e s t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e same p o s i t i o n as i f t h e r e had been no t r i a l ." A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e compels a n a u t o m a t i c r e v e r s a l i f anyone ( o t h e r t h a n d e f e n d a n t o r h i s w i t n e s s e s ) men- t i o n s t h a t t h e r e h a s been a n o t h e r t r i a l . W e d e c l i n e t o so s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e t h i s s t a t u t e . W e can e n v i s i o n many s i t u a t i o n s where it may be n e c e s s a r y to mention t h e f a c t t h e r e h a s been a n o t h e r t r i a l . W e d i r e c t t h e t r i a l c o u r t and c o u n s e l f o r t h e S t a t e and d e f e n s e to c a r e f u l l y guard t h e record to see t h a t none o f t h e p a r t i e s involved l o s e o r g a i n any r i g h t s because of t h e r e s u l t of t h e p r e v i o u s t r i a l . The f a i r t r i a l i s s u e must predomi- n a t e i n t h e new t r i a l . Concerning i s s u e t h r e e , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t have a gun p e r m i t , we n o t e t h a t t h i s i s s u e was c r e a t e d by t h e opening argument of a p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l and s u g g e s t t h a t on r e t r i a l t h e c o u r t admonish counsel n o t to r e p e a t t h i s argument. I f c o u n s e l , on r e t r i a l , a r g u e s a p p e l l a n t s r i g h t to c a r r y a loaded p i s t o l , t h e n t h e S t a t e may c o u n t e r as it d i d i n t h i s t r i a l . F i n a l l y , we d i r e c t t h e District Court g r a n t a change of venue f o r r e t r i a l i n t h i s case. I n Montana, t h e r u l e p e r t a i n i n g to a change of venue is: ". . . an accused is e n t i t l e d to a change of venue when it a p p e a r s t h e r e are r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e a l l e g e d a c t u a l l y e x i s t s and t h a t by r e a s o n of t h e pre- j u d i c e t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t t h e accused cannot r e c e i v e a f a i r and impar- t i a l t r i a l . " S t a t e v. Austad ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - - - - - . -- Mont . , 6 4 1 P.2d 1373, 1381, 39 St.Rep. 356, 364; S t a t e v. Link ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. --- I 640 P.2d 366, 38 St.Rep. 982. In looking a t t h e r e c o r d , and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Mineral County, we t h i n k t h e r e are a number of r e a s o n s t o s u p p o r t a change of venue i n t h i s c a s e . F i r s t , it is o b v i o u s t h a t Mineral County is a v e r y small county c o n t a i n i n g o n l y a b o u t 993 r e s i d e n t s . T h i s a l o n e s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t p u b l i c i t y concerning t h e case could be p e r v a s i v e i n t h e county and a f f e c t t h e o p i n i o n s of p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s . A s a s t r o n g e r r e a s o n , however, we n o t e t h a t t h e r e have a l r e a d y been t w o t r i a l s i n t h i s county. Each of t h e s e t r i a l s were h o t l y con- t e s t e d and a t t e n d e d by many r e s i d e n t s of t h e county. Consequently, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e s u l t s and c o n t e n t of t h e p r i o r t r i a l s have been widely d i s s e m i n a t e d is much h i g h e r t h a n i f no p r e v i o u s t r i a l s had o c c u r r e d . T h e r e f o r e , t h e c r i t e r i a f o r a change of venue a r t i c u l a t e d i n Link and Austad are to be - - f u l f i l l e d . Reversed. Xe concur: "fi&&! C h i e f f Justice .?%i-Jq Ilk. Justice Daniel J . Shea, specially concurring: I join the majority in ruling that defendant is entitled to a new trial &cause the unconstitutional Sandstrom instruction was qiven . Although the first issue--discussion of the case by the District Court with prospective jurors i n the absence of defendant and his counsel--need not be decided, for future guidance, this Court should have provided a detailed analysis of what happened and why the procedure should be condemned. And the same is true of the second issue--defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by references to his first trial. This Court should have set forth some quidelines in an effort to eliminate potential prejudice arising from mentioning that a defendant is being tried for a second or even. third time. On the third issue, I agree with the Court that defendant opened the door by defense counsel's statement i n the opening statement and therefore no preiudice occurred because the State went into the concealed weapon issue during its case i n chief. H"