Title: State v. Beaver Dam Area Development Corporation
Citation: 2008 WI 90
Docket Number: 2006AP000662
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2008

2008 WI 90 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP662 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Beaver Dam Area Development Corporation, Eric 
Becker, Jeff Kitchen, Al Schwab, Les Frinak, 
Jr., John Landdeck, Doug Mathison, Tom Olson, 
Greg Steil, Ron Thompson, Steven Baldwin, Nancy 
Zieman, Gina Staskal, Brian Busler, and Jack  
Hankes, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Myrtle Clifton, Laine Meyer, Duane Foulkes, and 
Philip Fritsche, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard O. Wright   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Monica 
Burkert-Brist, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Michael 
J. Cieslewicz, Patti J. Kurth, and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument was by Michael J. Cieslewicz. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Edward R. Garvey, 
Christa Westerberg, and Garvey McNeil & McGillivray, S.C., 
Madison, on behalf of the Citizens for Open Government and Jack 
 
 
2 
Domann, the Wisconsin Newspaper Association, the Wisconsin 
Broadcasters 
Association, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Freedom 
of 
Information Council. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Eric M. McLeod, Paul D. 
Barbato, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Economic Development Association, the Wisconsin 
REALTORS® Association, the National Association of Industrial 
and Office Properties, the Wisconsin Chapter, and the Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 90
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP662  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV341) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Beaver Dam Area Development Corporation, Eric 
Becker, Jeff Kitchen, Al Schwab, Les Frinak, 
Jr., John Landdeck, Doug Mathison, Tom Olson, 
Greg Steil, Ron Thompson, Steven Baldwin, Nancy 
Zieman, Gina Staskal, Brian Busler, and Jack 
Hankes, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Myrtle Clifton, Laine Meyer, Duane Foulkes, and 
Philip Fritsche, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dodge County, 
Richard O. Wright, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Preserving an open government 
and 
promoting 
economic development represent two defining 
principles which we value as a people and strive to accomplish 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
2 
 
as a state. This case represents the intersection of these two 
principles. 
¶2 
The legislature has declared that we are dedicated to 
preserving an open and transparent government. "[I]t is declared 
to be the policy of this state that the public is entitled to 
the fullest and most complete information regarding the affairs 
of government as is compatible with the conduct of governmental 
business."1 Additionally, the legislature has declared that we 
are committed to promoting economic development. We must "foster 
the growth and diversification of the economy of the state"2 so 
that Wisconsin is "an attractive place to live and work . . . ."3 
¶3 
We are presented with the question of whether the 
Beaver Dam Area Development Corporation (BDADC) is a "quasi-
governmental corporation" which is subject to Wisconsin's open 
meetings and public records laws. In addressing the question, we 
must interpret provisions of the state's open meetings and 
public records statutes and apply those provisions so that the 
legislative directives can be fulfilled and the two principles 
may best coexist.  
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 19.81(1)(2005-06). See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31 (declaring open government purpose of public records 
laws).  
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 
version unless otherwise noted. 
2 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 560.01(1)(purposes 
of 
establishment 
of 
Department of Commerce).  
3 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 560.08(1)(providing 
for 
economic 
and 
community development planning and research programs). 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
3 
 
¶4 
On one hand we cannot countenance a government body 
circumventing 
the 
legislative 
directive 
for 
an 
open 
and 
transparent government by paying an entity to perform a 
governmental function.  On the other hand, we have to be 
cognizant of the realities of economic development and the need, 
at times, for flexibility and confidentiality.  
¶5 
This opinion should not be read as disfavoring the 
desire to engage in economic development without being subject 
to open meetings and public records law. Indeed many private 
entities operate throughout this state without being subject to 
those laws and successfully promote economic development to the 
benefit of us all. 
¶6 
Likewise, 
there 
are 
many 
governmental 
economic 
development 
corporations 
that 
have 
for 
years 
operated 
successfully while being subject to the open meetings and public 
records laws.  We take no position as to what is the best 
structure for the enhancement of economic development in a 
particular area.   
¶7 
Rather, this opinion should be read as setting forth 
the circumstances when an entity so resembles a governmental 
corporation, 
that 
it 
is 
treated 
as 
a 
quasi-governmental 
corporation for purposes of open meetings and public records 
laws. If an entity does not want to be subject to the open 
meetings and public records laws, then it should change the 
circumstances under which it operates. 
¶8 
Each case has to be decided on the particular facts 
presented. We must examine the totality of circumstances. There 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
4 
 
is no one factor which is outcome determinative. Today we set 
forth some of the factors to be examined in determining what 
constitutes a "quasi-governmental corporation" subject to open 
meetings and public records laws. 
¶9 
We determine that an entity is a quasi-governmental 
corporation within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.82(1) and 
19.32(1) if, based on the totality of circumstances, it 
resembles a governmental corporation in function, effect, or 
status. Such a determination requires a case-by-case analysis. 
Considering the facts of this case we conclude that BDADC is a 
quasi-governmental corporation subject to open meetings and 
public records laws. 
¶10 A primary consideration in reaching our conclusion is 
that BDADC is funded exclusively by public tax dollars or 
interest on those tax dollars. Additionally, we consider that at 
the time the complaint was filed, its office was located in the 
City of Beaver Dam ("City") municipal building and it was listed 
on 
the 
City 
website, 
with 
a 
web 
address 
of 
http://www.cityofbeaverdam.com/EconomicDept/index.cfm. The City 
provided BDADC with clerical support and all of its office 
supplies, including paper, pencils, and postage. 
¶11 Under the terms of an agreement, all of BDADC's assets 
revert to the City if it ceased to exist. It is obligated to 
open its books for City inspection and it has to submit its 
annual management plan to the City. The mayor and another City 
official serve on its board of directors. BDADC has no clients 
other than the City. Its exclusive function is to promote 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
5 
 
economic development in and around the City, a function that 
prior to its creation had been performed by the City. 
¶12 We apply our determination prospectively such that the 
defendants in the present case are not subject to forfeitures 
for past violations of the open meetings laws4 and we decline to 
void any actions taken at past meetings not open to the public. 
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and remand to the 
circuit court to address the remaining request for attorney fees 
and costs and to enter judgment consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶13 This case is before the court on certification from 
the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06).  
The plaintiff, State of Wisconsin, asserts that the circuit 
court erred in dismissing the State's complaint.5 The State seeks 
declaratory judgment that the Beaver Dam Area Development 
Corporation 
(BDADC) 
is 
a 
"quasi-governmental 
corporation" 
subject to Wisconsin's open meetings and public records laws. 
The 
complaint 
also 
seeks 
forfeitures 
against 
BDADC 
and 
individual defendants for violations of open meetings laws, and 
requests that we void action taken at past BDADC meetings and 
                                                 
4 Upon a motion by the State, the claims against the 
individual defendants were dismissed without prejudice. Because 
the 
dismissal 
was 
without 
prejudice, 
the 
claims 
may 
be 
reasserted. Therefore we reference the forfeiture claim in our 
prospective application. 
5 The State appeals an order of the circuit court for Dodge 
County, Judge Richard O. Wright presiding. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
6 
 
award attorney fees and costs. The case involves no specific 
requests for records. 
¶14 The background facts of this case are not in dispute. 
The circuit court set forth most of these facts in its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment. We reference 
additional facts as necessary.  
¶15 BDADC is a nonprofit corporation organized under 
Wisconsin law in January 1997. It was not created by any 
constitution, statute, or ordinance, and the City did not 
through any of its officers incorporate BDADC. The bylaws of 
BDADC state that its exclusive purpose is to engage in economic 
development and business retention within the corporate limits 
and lands that could become part of the corporate limits of the 
City.  
¶16 The officers of BDADC are private individuals who are 
elected by the BDADC board of directors. Under BDADC bylaws, the 
president of the City's chamber of commerce is a non-voting 
member of the board of directors. The mayor of the City and 
chairperson of the City Community Development Committee serve on 
the BDADC board by virtue of their positions as City officials 
and not in their capacity as private citizens. The other ten 
members of the board of directors are private citizens.  
¶17 When a director's term at BDADC ends, the board of 
directors elects a replacement. The City does not direct this 
process, except insofar as the mayor and chair of the City 
Community Development Committee serve as ex officio members of 
the board of directors. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
7 
 
¶18 Up to the time this litigation commenced, BDADC has 
had only one paid employee, the executive vice president, who is 
appointed by the BDADC board of directors. Trent Campbell served 
in this position from April 1997 to January 2005. Prior to 
BDADC's incorporation, the City had an economic development 
office, which Campbell directed. He left his job as director of 
the economic development office and became executive vice 
president of BDADC.  
¶19 Until May 2005, BDADC's offices were in the City's 
municipal building, though it conducted no meetings in City 
facilities. From the time of BDADC's inception until the start 
of this litigation, the City included BDADC on the City's 
website 
at 
the 
web 
address 
of 
http://www.cityofbeaverdam.com/EconomicDept/index.cfm.  
¶20 BDADC and the City entered into cooperation agreements 
in April 1997 and January 2004. The City agreed that it will 
provide BDADC with office space, clerical support, copy and fax 
machine use, telephone use, and postage. The agreements provided 
that City representatives may examine BDADC's accounting records 
and finances, and that the City may make funds available to 
BDADC for economic development.  
¶21 Under the first cooperation agreement, the City agreed 
to pay BDADC an annual contribution and to allocate a large 
percentage of the proceeds from its room tax to BDADC. Under the 
second cooperation agreement, the City agreed to pay BDADC 90 
percent of the City's room tax proceeds and no annual 
contribution. BDADC's income for the relevant time period 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
8 
 
consisted entirely of the room tax money or interest on the room 
tax money. In the first half of 2005, for example, the room tax 
contribution accounted for about 84 percent of BDADC's income. 
The rest of its income was from interest. 
¶22 The 2004 agreement provides that BDADC must submit its 
annual management plan to the City. The 2005 plan allows that 
BDADC may negotiate financial incentives for businesses and work 
on dealing with infrastructure and government approval issues 
related to attracting business to the area.  
¶23 Under BDADC's articles of incorporation, upon BDADC's 
dissolution or liquidation, any remaining assets shall be 
distributed to the City and used for economic development and 
business retention. BDADC cannot bind the City to contracts, and 
recommendations by BDADC are considered and acted upon by the 
City under the requirements of state open meetings and public 
records law. The City has been BDADC's sole client for the time 
relevant to the case, and BDADC does not have other ongoing 
business relationships with other clients. 
¶24 In 2004 and 2005, BDADC negotiated on the City's 
behalf 
regarding 
potential 
developments 
by 
a 
variety 
of 
businesses. BDADC entered into a memorandum of understanding 
with 
the 
Wal-mart 
corporation 
regarding 
developing 
a 
distribution center in the area. The topics of discussion 
included utilities and fire protection, and the memorandum 
provided that the City would make site improvements. While the 
mayor is the signatory of the agreement, BDADC was the 
negotiator.  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
9 
 
¶25 In late 2004, the State filed a complaint seeking 
declaratory 
judgment 
that 
BDADC 
is 
a 
quasi-governmental 
corporation and subject to the State's open meetings laws and 
public records laws, and alleging that BDADC convened on various 
occasions in violation of the open meetings laws. It further 
alleged violations of open meetings laws by several individuals. 
¶26 The circuit court determined that the BDADC is not a 
quasi-governmental corporation and entered judgment in favor of 
BDADC, dismissing the State's complaint. The State appealed and 
the court of appeals requested certification. 
II 
¶27 This is a case of first impression. The central issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether 
BDADC 
is 
a 
quasi-governmental 
corporation within the meaning of Wisconsin's open meetings and 
public records statutes. 
¶28 Determining whether BDADC is a quasi-governmental 
corporation requires that we interpret provisions of the state's 
open meetings and public records statutes and apply our 
interpretation to undisputed facts. Statutory interpretation 
presents questions of law that we review independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court. State ex rel. 
Buswell v. Tomah Area School District, 2007 WI 71, ¶10, 301 
Wis. 2d 178, 732 N.W.2d 804. 
III 
¶29 In determining whether BDADC is a quasi-governmental 
corporation, we examine first the language of the statutes. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
10 
 
Wisconsin's open meetings laws apply to governmental bodies,6  
defined as follows: 
(1) "Governmental body" means a state or local agency, 
board, commission, committee, council, department or 
public 
body 
corporate 
and 
politic 
created 
by 
constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or order; a 
governmental or quasi-governmental corporation except 
for 
the 
Bradley center sports and entertainment 
corporation; a local exposition district under subch. 
II of ch. 229; a family care district under s. 
46.2895; a nonprofit corporation operating the Olympic 
ice training center under s. 42.11 (3); or a formally 
constituted subunit of any of the foregoing . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) (emphasis added). 
¶30 The state public records laws apply to authorities.7 
Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(1) defines "authority" to include quasi-
governmental corporations:  
As used in ss. 19.33 to 19.39: 
(1) "Authority" means any of the following having 
custody of a record: a state or local office, elected 
official, 
agency, 
board, 
commission, 
committee, 
council, department or public body corporate and 
politic created by constitution, law, ordinance, rule 
or 
order; 
a 
governmental 
or 
quasi-governmental 
corporation except for the Bradley center sports and 
entertainment corporation . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶31 "Quasi-governmental corporation" is defined in neither 
the statutes nor the case law interpreting the statutes. 
However, 
focusing 
strictly 
on 
the 
words 
chosen 
by 
the 
legislature, it is clear that "quasi-governmental corporation" 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 19.83. 
7 Wis. Stat. §§ 19.33-19.39.  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
11 
 
means 
something 
other 
than 
a 
governmental 
corporation. 
Interpreting quasi-governmental corporation to include only 
governmental 
entities 
would 
render 
the 
term 
superfluous, 
contrary to the basic principle that we interpret statutes so as 
to avoid rendering language superfluous. State v. Harenda 
Enterprises, 
Inc., 
2008 
WI 
16, 
¶54, 
__ 
Wis. 2d __, 
746 
N.W.2d 25; Hutson v. State Pers. Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶49, 263 
Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212. 
¶32  Examining the vernacular understanding of "quasi" 
aids our analysis: "Having a likeness to something; resembling." 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1482 (3rd 
ed. 
1992). 
Employing 
such 
understanding 
here, 
a 
quasi-
governmental corporation would refer to an entity that has a 
likeness to or resembles a governmental corporation, but which 
is not a governmental corporation. 
¶33 The history of the open meetings and public records 
statutes provides further guidance. The term "quasi-governmental 
corporation" was introduced into Wisconsin's open meetings law 
in 1976, when Wis. Stat. § 66.77 (1973-74) was repealed and 
replaced by §§ 19.81-19.98.8 Section 66.77 provided that open 
meetings laws applied to a "governmental body" and included 
"municipal 
or 
quasi-municipal 
corporation[s]" 
within 
the 
definition of governmental body. Wis. Stat. § 66.77(2)(c)(1973-
74). When the statute was replaced, the legislature discarded 
                                                 
8 The public records provisions at issue here, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-19.39, were added as of January 1, 1983. Chapter 335, 
Laws of 1981.  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
12 
 
"municipal 
or 
quasi-municipal 
corporation" 
in 
favor 
of 
"governmental or quasi-governmental corporation." Chapter 476, 
Law of Wisconsin 1975. 
¶34 By changing the language, the legislature expanded the 
reach of the open meetings law. The import of this expansion is 
described by a leading treatise on municipal law. It explains 
that quasi-municipal corporations are those corporations that 
resemble a municipal corporation in some respect and which are 
public:  
["Quasi-municipal corporation"] denotes a corporation 
created or authorized by the legislature that is 
merely a public agency endowed with such of the 
attributes of a municipality as may be necessary in 
the performance of its limited objective. In other 
words, a quasi-municipal corporation is a public 
agency created or authorized by the legislature to aid 
the state . . . . 
"Quasi-municipal" corporations are public in nature, 
but not, strictly speaking, municipal corporations. 
Eugene McQuillen, Municipal Corporations § 2.13 (3rd ed. Rev. 
1987 & Supp. 1990).  
¶35 In contrast, the treatise explains that "quasi-public 
corporation" refers to an entity that "is not per se public or 
governmental. . . . But 'quasi' indicates that the private 
corporation has some resemblance to a public corporation in 
function, effect or status." Id. Likewise, a quasi-governmental 
corporation is one that is not per se governmental, but 
resembles a governmental corporation in function, effect, or 
status.  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
13 
 
¶36 Thus, 
prior 
to 
the 
creation 
of 
§§ 19.82-19.98, 
Wisconsin's open meetings law applied only to entities that 
were, strictly speaking, public. However, by changing the 
language of the open meetings statutes, the legislature expanded 
the law to apply to entities that are not per se public. 
¶37 As noted, neither this court nor the court of appeals 
has interpreted "quasi-governmental corporation" within the 
meaning of §§ 19.82(1) and 19.32(1). However, the state attorney 
general has written several opinions on the issue.9 Opinions of 
the attorney general are not binding as precedent, but they may 
be persuasive as to the meaning of statutes. State v. Wachsmuth, 
73 Wis. 2d 318, 323, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976). The legislature has 
expressly charged the state attorney general with interpreting 
the open meetings and public records statutes, and provided that 
"[a]ny person may request advice from the attorney general as to 
the applicability" of the laws. Wis. Stat. §§ 19.98 and 19.39. 
Thus the interpretation advanced by the attorney general is of 
particular importance here. 
                                                 
9 See 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 53 (1984)(concluding that a 
historical sites organization was not a quasi-governmental 
corporation 
because 
it 
did 
not 
possess 
any 
governmental 
attributes and therefore did not resemble a governmental 
organization); 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 113 (1977)(advising that a 
volunteer 
fire 
department 
was 
not 
a 
quasi-governmental 
corporation 
because 
it 
was 
not 
directly 
created 
by 
a 
governmental body); 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 38 (1985)(determining that 
"friends" groups supporting public television and radio stations 
were not quasi-governmental corporations because they were not 
directly created by government entities).  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
14 
 
¶38 The most extensive analysis of the issue is found in a 
1991 
opinion 
regarding 
whether 
the 
Milwaukee 
Economic 
Development Corporation ("Development Corporation") and the 
Metropolitan 
Milwaukee 
Enterprise 
Corporation 
("Enterprise 
Corporation") were quasi-governmental corporations within the 
meaning of § 19.82(1) of the open meetings statutes. 80 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 129 (1991). The Development Corporation articles of 
incorporation stated that its purpose was to "further the 
economic development" and "to promote job creation" in the 
Milwaukee area. Under the Development Corporation's bylaws, four 
of its nine directors were filled by specified city officials 
and four of its six officers "may be selected by the city."  
¶39 The 
Enterprise 
Corporation 
provided 
economic 
development loans with money received from the city via federal 
small business loans. Its articles of incorporation provided for 
fourteen directors, none of which were reserved for city 
officials or personnel. Two directors, however, were members of 
the city council and one was a city employee. 
¶40 Both the Development Corporation and the Enterprise 
Corporation listed the Department of City Development as their 
principal address, located all of their offices in city-owned 
buildings, and received from the city office space, equipment, 
and 
supplies. 
As 
with 
the 
Development 
Corporation, 
the 
Enterprise Corporation's bylaws allow that the city could select 
four officers pursuant to a contract between it and the city.  
 
¶41 In analyzing whether the two entities were quasi-
governmental corporations, the attorney general opined that a 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
15 
 
quasi-governmental corporation must resemble a governmental 
corporation. It found support for its view in the treatise cited 
above, explaining that a "'quasi-public [or quasi-governmental] 
corporation' is not per se public or governmental . . . . [and] 
has some resemblance to a public corporation in function, effect 
or status." 80 Op. Att'y Gen. at 135 (quoting McQuillian, § 2.13 
(3rd ed. Rev. 1987 & Supp. 1990)(brackets in 80 Op. Att'y Gen. 
129)). The attorney general explained that determining whether 
an entity closely enough resembles a public corporation to be 
considered quasi-governmental requires a case-by-case analysis 
made in light of the totality of circumstances. 80 Op. Att'y 
Gen. at 136. 
¶42 Applying 
such an analysis, the attorney general 
considered the facts that both corporations served the public 
purpose of promoting economic development, received most of 
their funding from public sources, used the city's development 
department as their principal places of business, were housed in 
city-owned buildings, and used city equipment and supplies. In 
addition, it reasoned that the corporations were subject to 
control by the city insofar as four of the Development 
Corporation's nine directors served by virtue of being city 
officials, and the city selected four officers in both of the 
corporations.  
¶43 In 
light 
of 
these 
facts, 
the 
attorney 
general 
determined 
that 
the 
corporations 
were 
quasi-governmental 
corporations because they resembled a governmental corporation. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
16 
 
Thus, it concluded that they were subject to state open meetings 
laws. 
¶44 Based upon the statutory language, principles of 
statutory construction, the history of Wisconsin's open meetings 
and public records laws, and the interpretations of the Attorney 
General, we determine that quasi-governmental corporations are 
not limited to corporations created by acts of the government. 
Rather, a quasi-governmental corporation is a corporation that 
resembles a governmental corporation.  
¶45 However, 
merely 
superficial 
resemblance 
to 
governmental corporations in a single respect is insufficient 
for an entity to be subject to open meetings and public records 
laws. Rather, a determination that an entity resembles a 
governmental corporation such that it is subject to state open 
meetings and public records laws requires an examination of the 
totality of facts about the entity. Thus, determining whether 
any particular entity resembles a governmental corporation must 
be done on a case-by-case basis.10 
IV 
¶46 Although the parties essentially agree that analyzing 
the totality of circumstances is a proper approach, they 
                                                 
10 This approach also comports with the approach taken in 
several other jurisdictions. See Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the 
Public's Right to Know: The Debate Over Privatization and Access 
to Government Information Under State Law, 27 Fla. St. L. Rev. 
825, 837-44 (2000)(collecting cases from jurisdictions employing 
a "totality of factors" approach to determining applicability of 
public records laws to private entities). 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
17 
 
disagree on the application of the approach to the present 
case.11 
BDADC 
contends 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances approach set forth in 80 Op. Att'y Gen. 129 it 
does not resemble a governmental corporation. It concedes that, 
like the Milwaukee Economic Development Corporation and the 
Metropolitan Milwaukee Enterprise Corporation, BDADC receives 
the vast majority of its funding from public sources. However, 
it maintains that public funding is the only way in which BDADC 
is similar to the corporations in 80 Att'y Gen. 129.  
¶47 It notes that, unlike the Development Corporation and 
the Enterprise Corporation, all of BDADC's officers are private 
individuals, and that most of its directors are private 
citizens. Further, BDADC's only full-time employee is appointed 
by the board and is not an employee of the City. It also points 
to the fact that although the BDADC had offices in the City 
municipal building, and although the City was obligated to 
                                                 
11 Although the parties agree that analyzing the totality of 
circumstances is a proper approach, the dissent objects to the 
approach on the ground that it fosters uncertainty. Dissent, 
¶146. We apply totality of circumstances tests, along with the 
attendant uncertainty, in cases involving our most basic rights. 
See State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶75, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 729 (Fourth Amendment); State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶62, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel); State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶41, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 
629 N.W.2d 223 (right to an unbiased jury); State v. Secrist, 
224 Wis. 2d 201, 218, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999) (right that arrest 
be made only with probable cause). Applying a totality of 
circumstances test in this context is no more problematic than 
doing so in cases involving such basic rights.  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
18 
 
provide office space under the cooperation agreement, its 
meetings were not held at municipal facilities.  
¶48 Finally, BDADC argues that unlike the Development 
Corporation and Enterprise Corporation, its relationship with 
the City was cooperative, and not controlled by the City. For 
example, both cooperation agreements between the City and BDADC 
state that BDADC is not a governmental body. Further, BDADC 
cannot bind the City or enter into a contract on behalf of the 
City. 
¶49 The question before us, however, is not whether BDADC 
resembles the corporations in 80 Att'y Gen. 129. Rather, it is 
whether BDADC resembles a governmental corporation based on the 
totality of the circumstances. In answering that question, we 
draw on several sources in addition to the attorney general 
opinion discussed above. 
¶50 Although the determination of whether an entity is 
subject to open meetings and public records laws depends on the 
respective statutory language of each state, the interpretations 
rendered by courts in other jurisdictions are instructive. We 
initially examine the determinations rendered by the highest 
No. 
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19 
 
state court in three jurisdictions, Maryland, New York, and 
Florida.12 
¶51 The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently addressed 
whether state open meetings and public records laws applied to 
an economic development corporation in City of Baltimore Dev. 
Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 910 A.2d 406 (Md. 2006). The 
development corporation held meetings and voted to recommend for 
final approval by the mayor a primary developer for a large city 
project. The realtors filed suit, alleging that the development 
corporation was a public body subject to open meetings laws and 
an instrumentality of the City of Baltimore subject to public 
records laws. Id. at 415.  
¶52 In considering the nature of public bodies, the court 
divided the development corporation's functions into three 
categories: purely public functions, mixed public and private 
functions, and purely private functions. It considered purely 
public the corporation's purposes of working toward city 
                                                 
12 The dissent complains about our use of cases from other 
states interpreting different statutory language. It appears to 
believe that we are using these cases to determine the meaning 
of "quasi-governmental corporation," and calls our discussion of 
other cases a "leap of logic" and "results-oriented." Dissent, 
¶159. The dissent misinterprets our approach. We have determined 
the meaning of quasi-governmental corporation based upon the 
language of the statute, its history, and the interpretations 
rendered by the attorney general. Whether a particular entity 
resembles a governmental corporation requires an analysis of the 
traits of governmental corporations. We use the cases from other 
jurisdictions to examine what characteristics are relevant in 
determining 
whether 
an 
entity 
resembles 
a 
governmental 
corporation, not to discern the meaning of "quasi-governmental 
corporation." 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
20 
 
development strategies; activities to achieve strong business 
climate 
and 
urban 
renewal; 
implementing, 
overseeing, 
and 
encouraging private and public development projects; attracting 
new businesses; and carrying out contracts with the city to 
coordinate planning. Id. at 424. Further, the court noted that 
the development corporation was purely public insofar as the 
mayor had the power to appoint, nominate, and remove members of 
the corporation, 80 percent of its budget was provided by the 
city, and its property would revert to the city if the 
corporation ceased to exist. Id. 
¶53 The court saw other of the corporation's functions as 
mixed public and private functions. These included coordinating 
development 
efforts 
between 
public 
and 
private 
sectors, 
providing financial assistance and advice to create a stronger 
business climate, enhancing the city's image, and receiving 
funds from public and private sources other than the city. Id. 
Significantly, 
the 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
development 
corporation had no functions that were purely private. Id.  
¶54 In assessing the totality of the circumstances, the 
court determined that because the development corporation had no 
purely private functions, the open meetings law required that 
the corporation's deliberations be as open as the proceedings of 
the mayor and city council. Id. at 425. Similarly, because the 
corporation was established with no purely private function, the 
court determined that it was "an agent or tool" of the city and 
subject to state public records law. Id. at 427. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
21 
 
¶55 The approach taken in Carmel Realty is similar to the 
approach taken by the New York Court of Appeals in determining 
whether the Buffalo Enterprise Development Corporation was 
required to comply with state public records laws. Buffalo News 
v. Buffalo Enter. Dev. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1994). The 
corporation's 
purposes 
included 
reducing 
unemployment, 
maintaining 
and 
creating 
job 
opportunities, 
encouraging 
development, and lessening government burdens, which the court 
determined were "undeniably governmental." Id. at 278-79.  
¶56 The funding for Buffalo Enterprise derived entirely 
from public sources. Id. at 278. Two city officials served as 
permanent directors of Buffalo Enterprise, and at the time of 
the action another city official served as an appointed member 
of its board. Other members were not city officials. Further, it 
described itself in financial statements and public brochures as 
an "agent" of the city, and it was required to disclose its 
annual budget. Id. at 279. Based on these factors, the court 
concluded that Buffalo Enterprise was subject to the public 
records laws. 
¶57 In News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty, & 
Hanser Arch. Group, 596 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992), the Florida 
Supreme Court determined that the records of an architectural 
firm that contracted with a school board to provide services on 
a construction project were not subject to state public records 
law. In making its determination, the court examined a variety 
of factors. Among the factors examined were the level of public 
funding, whether the entity performed a governmental function, 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
22 
 
whether services contracted for are an integral part of a public 
agency's decision-making process, and the extent of a public 
agency's control over the entity. Id. at 1031.  
¶58 The court determined that the firm did not function as 
part of a public body's decision process. Rather, the services 
provided by the firm "were not an integral part of the school 
board's decision-making process. . . . There was no delegation 
of or participation in any aspect of the school board's 
decision-making process." Id. at 1032. Further, the court 
determined that the firm's funding indicated that it was not 
subject to public records laws. The firm was paid by public 
funds, but it did not receive the money in order to put the 
money to a public use. Instead, "the firm's motivation for 
rendering professional services . . . was clearly to receive 
compensation, not to provide a public service." Id. at 1032-33. 
¶59 Although this court and the court of appeals have not 
interpreted "quasi-governmental corporation" within the meaning 
of open meetings and public records laws, we recently examined 
whether the University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority 
("Authority") was a "political corporation" under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.80(1)(a) and (1m).  Rouse v. Theda Clark Medical Center, 
Inc., 2007 WI 87, ¶17, 302 Wis.2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30. We 
determined that "[g]iven the power and structure" of the 
Authority, it is a political corporation, id., ¶31, which is 
"synonymous with the term 'public corporation.'"  Id., ¶22 
(citing Black's Law Dictionary 344 (7th ed. 1999)).  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
23 
 
¶60 In reaching that conclusion, we considered a variety 
of factors, including the creation of the Authority by the 
legislature and the fact that its directors were public 
officials or appointed by public officials. We noted that the 
Authority had duties to engage in collective bargaining and to 
enter into agreements and leases with the state. Id. ¶31.   
¶61 The court paid particular attention to the Authority's 
financial and reporting requirements. We explained that failure 
to extend or renew agreements or leases would result in the 
transfer of facilities to the board of regents. Further, we 
noted that the "state is ensured of access to the [Authority's] 
financial statements" and that the Authority "must update the 
state 
on 
a 
consistent 
basis." 
Id. 
The 
court 
made 
the 
determination that the Authority is a political corporation 
despite the Authority's dissimilarities with public entities, 
including the fact that the Authority does "not receive general 
purpose revenue from the state." Id., ¶32. While Rouse does not 
directly address whether an entity is a quasi-governmental 
corporation, it is instructive here insofar as it sets forth 
factors relevant in classifying an entity with characteristics 
of both public and private corporations. Id., ¶22.  
¶62 From these cases we can discern a number of factors 
that are important in determining whether an entity is subject 
to open meetings and public records laws. First among these is 
finances. In determining whether entities are subject to freedom 
of information laws a "key factor in bringing such bodies within 
the coverage of a state [freedom of information] law nearly 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
24 
 
always is state funding of the entity." Burt A. Braverman and 
Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State Open Records 
Laws, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 720, 731 (1981). This view is echoed 
is many jurisdictions.13 Additional factors include whether it 
serves a public function, whether it appears to the public to be 
a government entity, whether the entity is subject to government 
control, and the degree of access that government bodies have to 
the entity's records.  
¶63 As 
we 
conclude 
above, 
an 
entity 
is 
a 
quasi-
governmental corporation if, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, 
it 
resembles a governmental corporation in 
                                                 
13 The Nebraska Supreme Court has determined that the power 
to receive tax revenue suffices to render an agricultural 
society, formed by voluntary association pursuant to a statute, 
a "public body" subject to state open meetings law. Nixon v. 
Madison County Agricultural Society, 348 N.W.2d 119, 119-20 
(Neb. 1984). 
Other courts have determined that funding is an important, 
though not dispositive, factor in whether an entity is subject 
to open meetings and public records laws. In State ex rel. 
Toledo Blade Co. v. University of Toledo Foundation, 602 N.E.2d 
1159 (Ohio 1992), the Ohio Supreme Court determined that a 
private nonprofit foundation that received and solicited gifts 
on behalf of a public university was subject to open meetings 
and public records laws. The court based its decision on the 
fact that the foundation received tax revenues, had free office 
space from the university, had its employees' wages paid by 
university funds, and performed a public function. Id. at 1162-
63. See also Weston v. Carolina Research & Dev. Found., 401 
S.E.2d 161 (S.C. 1991)(foundation operated for benefit of public 
university which receives and expends public funds subject to 
open records law); Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Ret. Bd. v. 
State Ethics Comm'n, 608 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (Mass. 1993); Adams 
County Record v. Greater North Dakota Ass'n, 529 N.W.2d 830, 
834-38 (N.D. 1995).  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
25 
 
function, 
effect, 
or 
status. 
In 
light 
of 
the 
foregoing 
authorities, and based on the factors set forth, we conclude 
that BDADC does resemble a governmental corporation.14 
¶64 To begin, we emphasize the fact that BDADC is almost 
entirely taxpayer funded. While BDADC minimizes the importance 
                                                 
14 The 
factors 
set forth here are not exclusive in 
determining whether entities are subject to open meetings and 
public records laws. Rather, they are the factors relevant to 
the present case. In News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, 
Twitty, & Hanser Arch. Group, 596 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 1992), for 
example, the Florida Supreme Court established a nine-factor 
test for determining whether a private corporation acted on the 
behalf of a public agency. Among those nine factors were the 
level of public funding, whether public and private funds were 
commingled, whether a public agency had a substantial financial 
interest in the entity, for whose benefit the private entity was 
acting, and whether the private entity's services were an 
integral part of the public agency's decision-making process. 
Id. at 1031. The Colorado Court of Appeals adopted the same 
nine-factor test in Denver Post Corp. v. Stapleton Dev. Corp., 
19 P.3d 36, 41 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). 
A leading treatise on open meetings laws sets forth 14 
factors used by courts in determining whether private entities 
are subject to such laws. Ann Taylor Schwing, Open Meetings Laws 
(2d ed. 2000), § 4.100. Among the factors included are whether 
the entity is exempt from taxes, whether it is a for-profit or 
nonprofit entity, whether it is subject to government audits, 
and whether it is entitled to assert governmental immunities. 
Id. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
26 
 
of its source of funding, it is a significant factor.15 Under 
both the 1997 and 2004 cooperative agreements the City gave 
substantial funding to BDADC. The first agreement stated that 
the City would include an annual contribution to BDADC in its 
budget. It further provided that the City would allocate a large 
portion of its room tax to BDADC. The 2004 agreement stated that 
the City would allocate to BDADC 90 percent of the proceeds of 
its room tax, with no annual contribution written into its 
budget. BDADC's income consists entirely of the room tax money 
and interest on the room tax money. In the first half of 2005, 
for example, the proceeds from the room tax constituted about 84 
percent of BDADC's income and the rest was interest income. 
Further, the City provided BDADC with office space, supplies, 
and clerical support.  
                                                 
15 The dissent similarly minimizes the importance of BDADC's 
funding by claiming that the persons upon whom the room tax is 
levied do not actually pay the tax. Dissent, ¶115 n.3. Its view 
directly contradicts the language of the ordinance, which states 
that the "tax is imposed upon the retailers" furnishing lodging. 
City of Beaver Dam, Wisconsin Municipal Code § 2-124(b). In 
addition, the dissent's claim that "transients, not residents, 
pay the room tax," id., makes an assumption about who foots the 
bill for lodging in Beaver Dam. The dissent has provided no 
information regarding whether such bills are paid by Beaver Dam 
businesses and residents for their guests, by people who live 
elsewhere, or by someone else altogether. It appears to have 
simply made up facts.  
More important, though, is the dissent's implication that 
the residents of Beaver Dam are not entitled to information 
about how their government spends its money based upon the 
source of the money. The dissent's view is unsupported, novel, 
and wrong. Regardless of who pays the tax money, it is for the 
use of the residents of Beaver Dam, and their claim to know how 
it is used is undiminished.  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
27 
 
¶65 Like a governmental corporation, BDADC receives the 
vast majority of its funds from taxes borne by the public and 
receives basic support from government sources. In this respect, 
BDADC more closely resembles a governmental corporation in 
status than the corporation we examined in Rouse. There, we 
determined that the University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics 
Authority was a political corporation despite it receiving no 
"general purpose revenue from the state." 302 Wis. 2d 358, ¶32. 
¶66 With respect to finances, BDADC is akin to the 
development corporation subject to open meetings and public 
records laws in Carmel Realty, and akin to the development 
corporation considered in Buffalo News. It is also similar to 
the corporations that the attorney general examined in 80 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 129. Moreover, unlike the architecture firm in News 
and Sun-Sentinel, 596 So. 2d 1029, BDADC received tax money in 
order 
to 
provide 
public 
service, 
not 
merely 
to 
receive 
compensation. Thus, BDADC resembles a governmental corporation 
insofar as it is a tax-funded organization which receives funds 
to achieve a public purpose.  
¶67 The degree to which BDADC's funding comes from the 
City is not the only way in which its finances are like the 
finances of a governmental corporation. Under its articles of 
incorporation, if BDADC is dissolved or liquidated, any of its 
remaining assets are to be distributed to the City. In effect, 
the City provides assets for the BDADC to use, but retains an 
interest in those assets.  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
28 
 
¶68 This 
parallels 
the 
Maryland 
Court 
of 
Appeals' 
reasoning in Carmel Realty, which considered the fact that a 
development 
corporation's 
assets 
would 
revert 
to 
a 
city 
important in its determination that the corporation was subject 
to state open meetings and public records laws. 910 A.2d at 415. 
It also parallels our reasoning in Rouse, where we considered 
significant the fact that property would transfer to the 
University of Wisconsin Board of Regents in the event that the 
Authority failed to extend or renew an agreement or lease. 302 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶31.  
¶69 In 
addition, 
BDADC 
resembles 
a 
governmental 
corporation with respect to the function it serves, both in 
terms of its purpose and its actions. BDADC's bylaws state that 
its exclusive purpose is to engage in economic development and 
business retention within the corporate limits and lands that 
could become part of the corporate limits of the City. Prior to 
BDADC's incorporation, the City had an economic development 
office that served that function. Moreover, BDADC has no other 
clients. Thus, with respect to the function it serves, BDADC is 
indistinguishable from the City office that preceded BDADC's 
incorporation. That resemblance is all the stronger insofar as 
the executive vice president of BDADC from 1997 until early 2005 
had previously served as director of the City's economic 
development office. 
¶70 While BDADC cannot bind the City or enter contracts on 
behalf of the City, it does resemble a governmental corporation 
insofar as it negotiates on behalf of the City. In its 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
29 
 
negotiations with Wal-Mart regarding the development of a 
building site, BDADC discussed utilities and fire protection. It 
also negotiated a memorandum of understanding that provided that 
the City would make improvements to the site. These are 
functions that the City would perform in BDADC's absence. 
¶71 BDADC's 
functions 
are 
similar 
to 
those 
of 
the 
corporation in Buffalo News. Both BDADC and Buffalo Enterprises 
work to encourage development and economic opportunity, which 
the New York Court of Appeals determined to be "undeniably 
governmental." 644 N.E.2d at 278-79.  
¶72 The functions BDADC performs are precisely those that 
led the Carmel Realty court to determine that a development 
corporation was a public body and instrument of a city subject 
to open meetings and public records laws. 910 A.2d at 410. Also 
like the corporation in Carmel Realty, BDADC does not appear to 
have any purely private function. The fact that final approval 
for contracts must come from the City does not diminish BDADC's 
public function. As the Carmel Realty court made clear, an 
entity may serve a public function even if it merely makes 
recommendations subject to final approval by a city official. 
910 A.2d at 425. 
¶73 BDADC's status also resembles that of a governmental 
corporation from the perspective of the public. Until after the 
start of this litigation, BDADC's offices were located in the 
City's municipal building, and the City included BDADC on its 
website. Two of BDADC's directors were City officials. The 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
30 
 
effect of such close ties is to make it difficult for the public 
to discern where the City ends and BDADC begins.  
¶74 In this respect BDADC is similar to the corporation in 
Buffalo News, which stated in its public brochures and financial 
statements that it was an agent of a city. 644 N.E.2d at 279. It 
is also similar to the corporations examined in 80 Op. Att'y 
Gen. 129, which were housed in municipal buildings and listed 
the Department of City Development as their principal addresses. 
Thus, BDADC resembles a governmental corporation in its public 
appearance. 
¶75 BDADC also resembles a governmental corporation to the 
extent that the City maintains a degree of control over BDADC's 
actions. An aspect of that control is the composition of BDADC's 
board of directors. Although a majority of BDADC's directors are 
private citizens, two are City officials that serve as ex 
officio members. This contrasts with Rouse, where all of the 
voting members of the board of directors were either public 
officials or appointed by public officials. It also contrasts 
with Carmel Realty. 
¶76 However, in Buffalo News only three members of the 
corporation's board were city officials, 644 N.E.2d at 278, and 
one of the corporations considered in 80 Op. Att'y Gen. 129 
reserved no positions on its board for city officials. Further, 
having a board composed of or appointed by public officials is 
not a requirement for an entity to be subject to open meetings 
and public records laws. Rather, it is part of a totality of 
circumstances test. Finally, the fact that some City officials 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
31 
 
serve as ex officio members of BDADC's board evinces some degree 
of City control.  
¶77 The degree of access that the City has to BDADC's 
information is also important in determining whether BDADC is a 
quasi-governmental 
corporation. 
The 
cooperative 
agreements 
between the City and BDADC allow that City representatives may 
examine BDADC's accounting records. Additionally, the 2004 
agreement provides that BDADC must submit its annual management 
plan to the City.  
¶78 In Rouse, the facts that the Authority was required to 
"update the state on a consistent basis" and that the state was 
"ensured access to the [Authority's] financial statements" were 
important 
to 
our 
determination 
that 
it 
was 
a 
political 
corporation. 302 Wis. 2d 358, ¶32. Similarly, in Buffalo News, 
the fact that Buffalo Enterprises had to disclose its annual 
budget weighed in favor of the determination that it was subject 
to public records laws. 644 N.E.2d at 279. Accordingly, insofar 
as BDADC must provide the City with access to information, it 
resembles a governmental corporation. 
¶79 Thus, BDADC resembles a governmental corporation in  
several important respects: (1) other than interest income, its 
sole source of funds is public tax dollars, (2) it serves a 
public function and has no purely private function, (3) it 
appears in its presentation to the public that it is part of the 
City, (4) the City maintains a degree of control over BDADC, and 
(5) the City has access to BDADC's financial information and 
management plan. No one of these ways is sufficient to conclude 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
32 
 
that 
BDADC 
is 
a 
quasi-governmental 
corporation. 
However, 
considering them in totality, we determine that BDADC resembles 
a governmental corporation in function, effect, or status. Thus, 
it is a quasi-governmental corporation within the meaning of 
§§ 19.82(1) and 19.32(1).16 
V 
¶80 Having determined that BDADC is a quasi-governmental 
corporation does not mean that all of its meetings are 
automatically open or that all of its records are immediately 
disclosed to the public.  There are several ways in which 
economically important information could be protected from 
disclosure for the purposes of open meetings and public records 
laws.17  
¶81 For example, § 19.85(1)(e) allows for closed sessions 
regarding purchases of public property, investing public funds, 
or 
doing 
other 
public 
business 
"whenever 
competitive 
or 
                                                 
16 The dissent at once complains of the lack of a bright 
line rule and the stringency of the test set forth in this 
opinion. Dissent, ¶¶198-99, 215. It cites to an unadopted 
legislative proposal to define economic development corporation 
as evidence of the need for a bright-line rule. Id., ¶195. Both 
of the bright-line proposals cited by the dissent are more 
stringent than the test set forth here, and both would include 
BDADC. Id., ¶¶196-97. Thus, contrary to the dissent's assertion, 
either proposal would dictate the result that BDADC is a quasi-
governmental corporation. See id., ¶197-98. Moreover, the 
apparent need for such proposals is evidence that a bright-line 
rule is not inherent in the words of the statute. 
17 See Sands v. Whitnall School District for discovery rules 
applicable to meetings in closed session pursuant to chapter 19, 
Wisconsin Statutes. 2008 WI 89, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
33 
 
bargaining reasons require a closed session."18 Similarly, 
§ 19.85(1)(i) allows closed sessions for matters related to the 
economic adjustment program pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 560.1519 
where discussing such matters in open session "could adversely 
affect the business, its employees or former employees." Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(i). Additionally, at oral argument BDADC 
conceded that much of its work is done by its executive vice 
president, and that informal meetings between companies and the 
executive vice president would not constitute meetings under 
§ 19.82(2).20  
¶82 The public records statutes also contain provisions 
which may prevent disclosure of information important to 
economic development. Recognizing the relation between open 
                                                 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.85(1)(e) provides that a closed 
session may be held:  
(e) Deliberating or negotiating the purchasing of 
public properties, the investing of public funds, or 
conducting other specified public business, whenever 
competitive or bargaining reasons require a closed 
session. 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 560.15 provides for communities to 
assist businesses considering ceasing operations or laying off 
employees in the state. 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.82(2) provides in relevant part: 
"Meeting" 
means 
the 
convening 
of 
members 
of 
a 
governmental body for the purpose of exercising the 
responsibilities, authority, power or duties delegated 
to or vested in the body. If one−half or more of the 
members of a governmental body are present, the 
meeting is rebuttably presumed to be for the purpose 
of exercising the responsibilities, authority, power 
or duties delegated to or vested in the body. . . .  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
34 
 
meetings and public records laws, § 19.35(1)(a) allows that 
under some circumstances exemptions to open session requirements 
under § 19.85 can serve as a basis for denying public access to 
a record.  
The exemptions to the requirement of a governmental 
body to meet in open session under s. 19.85 are 
indicative of public policy, but may be used as 
grounds for denying public access to a record only if 
the authority or legal custodian under s. 19.33 makes 
a specific demonstration that there is a need to 
restrict public access at the time that the request to 
inspect or copy the record is made.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a); see Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 
2007 WI 53, ¶49, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240.  
¶83 Another important consideration is § 19.36(5), which 
allows that authorities "may withhold access to any record or 
portion of a record containing information qualifying as a trade 
secret" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c). "Trade secrets" 
are defined as follows: 
(c) "Trade secret" means information, including a 
formula, 
pattern, 
compilation, 
program, 
device, 
method, technique or process to which all of the 
following apply: 
1. The information derives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use. 
2. The information is the subject of efforts to 
maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
35 
 
Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c). 21 
¶84 In addition to the express statutory provisions 
limiting disclosure under public records law, Wisconsin courts 
have recognized other limitations to disclosure, including the 
requirement that the harm to the public from disclosure should 
be balanced against the benefit of disclosure to the public. One 
must be balanced against the other in determining whether to 
permit 
disclosure. 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Youmans 
v. 
Owens, 
28 
Wis. 2d 672, 681, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965); see also Melanie R. 
Swank, The Wisconsin Public Records and Open Meetings Handbook, 
2nd ed., § 4.9.  
¶85 Accordingly, in  Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811, once this court determined that the 
open records law applied to a report regarding potential teacher 
misconduct, this court examined whether a public policy interest 
in keeping the record confidential overcame the presumption 
                                                 
21  The federal Freedom of Information Act specifically 
exempts "trade secrets and commercial or financial information 
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(4)(2007). Several states follow the federal statute and 
expressly 
provide 
exemptions for commercial and financial 
information other than trade secrets. See Theresa M. Costonis, 
What Constitutes Commercial or Financial Information, Exclusive 
of Trade Secrets, Exempt From Disclosure Under State Freedom of 
Information Acts——General Rules of Construction, 5 A.L.R. 6th 
327, § 2 (2005). The Wisconsin legislature, however, has 
expressly exempted only trade secrets. The determination of 
whether information other than trade secrets should be exempt 
from public records disclosures in order to further the policy 
of economic development is a question best addressed by the 
legislature. 
 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
36 
 
favoring disclosure. Id., ¶11. In so determining, it applied a 
balancing test "weigh[ing] the public policies not in favor of 
release against the strong public policy that public records 
should be open for review." Id., ¶12 (citing Woznicki v. 
Erickson, 
202 
Wis. 2d 178, 
549 
N.W.2d 699 
(1996), 
and 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 
(1979)). The court determined that disclosure was favored in 
part because the investigation into the misconduct had been 
closed and no further proceedings were pending. Thus, releasing 
records could not be expected to interfere with ongoing 
proceedings. Id., ¶39. 
¶86 Likewise, in Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School Dist. 
of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis. 2d 768, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996), this 
court determined that an important factor in determining whether 
to release a letter to a school district employee regarding a 
disciplinary action was the fact that the disciplinary action 
had already taken place. Id. at 788. Thus, the harm that could 
result from premature release (creating a false impression) was 
no longer present. Id.  
¶87 Similarly, 
in 
a 
case 
involving 
disclosure 
of 
information relating to economic development, the balance may 
tip in different directions depending on the timing of the 
request. Where premature disclosure of records could undermine 
an important public policy objective in the context of economic 
development, the balance may tip in favor of nondisclosure. 
However, when releasing the records could not be expected to 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
37 
 
interfere with ongoing negotiations, the public interest in 
disclosure may outweigh the public interest in nondisclosure. 
¶88 Although BDADC argues that its ability to properly 
function will be impaired if it is determined to be a quasi-
governmental 
corporation, 
we 
note 
that 
other 
economic 
development 
corporations 
appear 
to 
function 
well 
despite 
operating as quasi-governmental organizations. As we discuss 
above, in 80 Op. Att'y Gen. 129 the attorney general advised two 
economic development corporations that they would be considered 
quasi-governmental corporations under §§ 19.82(1) and 19.32(1). 
At oral argument, the State indicated that the corporations 
considered in that opinion have continued to fulfill their 
purpose despite being subject to open meetings and public 
records laws. In addition, the Wisconsin Housing and Economic 
Development Authority operates under the express requirement 
that its records are open to the public with only limited 
exception. Wis. Stat. § 234.265.22 
¶89 Finally, 
we 
emphasize 
that 
not 
all 
economic 
development 
entities 
are 
quasi-governmental 
corporations  
subject to the open meetings and public records laws. We have 
                                                 
22 The dissent overstates the consequences of our decision 
with its "sky is falling" discourse. It describes the open 
meetings and public records laws as "minefield[s]," dissent, 
¶141, and forewarns of doom, id., ¶127. As noted above, many 
economic development entities have been operating successfully 
as a part of local government. Indeed the sky remains intact 
above those communities throughout the state. 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
38 
 
determined 
that BDADC is a quasi-governmental corporation 
because it resembles a governmental corporation.  
¶90 However, BDADC could be organized differently. BDADC 
does not have to receive all of its income from public funds and 
interest on those funds, its assets do not have to revert to the 
City in case of dissolution or liquidation, it did not have to 
be housed in the City municipal building, it did not have to be 
included on the City website. It does not have to open its 
records to the City, it does not have to submit its annual 
management plan to the City, it does not have to have City 
officials serving as ex officio members of its board, and the 
City does not have to be BDADC's only client. These are choices 
that BDADC has made.23  
¶91 The determination that BDADC is a quasi-governmental 
corporation subject to open meetings and public records laws is 
further supported by the policies of the open meetings and 
public records laws. The open meetings statutes are to be 
construed "liberally" to achieve the purpose of "complete 
information regarding the affairs of government as is compatible 
with the conduct of governmental business,"24 and the public 
                                                 
23 The dissent states that "the majority attacks the 
legitimacy" of the desire to engage in economic development 
without being subject to open meetings and public records laws. 
Dissent, ¶¶127-28. The dissent misstates our position. We 
question the legitimacy of doing so via a quasi-governmental 
corporation funded exclusively with public money and interest 
thereon and which further resembles a governmental corporation 
in function, effect, or status as set forth in the text. 
24 Wis. Stat. § 19.81 provides in relevant part: 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
39 
 
records statutes are to be "construed in every instance with a 
presumption of complete public access, consistent with the 
conduct of governmental business."25 
¶92 As we have noted, fostering economic development is 
also an important legislative directive. We must "foster the 
growth and diversification of the economy of the state"26 so that 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government of the American type is dependent upon an 
informed electorate, it is declared to be the policy 
of this state that the public is entitled to the 
fullest and most complete information regarding the 
affairs of government as is compatible with the 
conduct of governmental business. . . .  
(4) This subchapter shall be liberally construed to 
achieve the purposes set forth in this section . . . . 
 
25 Wis. Stat. § 19.31 provides:  
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them. Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information. To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business. The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied. 
26 Wis. Stat. 
§ 560.01(1)(purposes of establishment of 
Department of Commerce).  
No. 
2006AP662   
 
40 
 
Wisconsin is "an attractive place to live and work . . . ."27 
However, for the reasons set forth above, we are not convinced 
that determining that BDADC is subject to state open meetings 
and public records laws undermines this policy. 
VI 
¶93 In this declaratory judgment action the State of 
Wisconsin seeks a declaration that BDADC is a quasi-governmental 
corporation and is subject to both the open meetings and public 
records laws, and had requested forfeitures against the members 
of the board for each violation of the open meetings law. As 
noted above, there is no specific request for public records 
involved in the current action. The State also seeks an order 
voiding actions taken at past meetings which were not open to 
the public and an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
¶94 BDADC contends that if this court decides that it is 
subject to open meetings and public records laws, such ruling 
should be made prospectively only. We agree.  
¶95 As we discuss above, neither this court nor the court 
of appeals has previously interpreted the meaning of "quasi-
governmental corporation" within the meaning of §§ 19.82(1) and 
19.32(1). Normally a new rule applies retrospectively. However, 
applying a new rule to circumstances in which actors reasonably 
rely on contrary views may be unsettling. This court will 
therefore occasionally apply a new rule prospectively to limit 
                                                 
27 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 560.08(1)(providing 
for 
economic 
and 
community development planning and research programs). 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
41 
 
such an effect. Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 377-78, 382 
N.W.2d 673 (1986). 
¶96 We examine three factors in deciding whether our 
determination is to apply retroactively or prospectively: 
(1) whether the decision establishes a new principle 
of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on 
which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an 
issue of first impression whose resolution was not 
clearly 
foreshadowed; 
(2) 
whether 
retroactive 
application would further or retard the operation of 
the new rule; and (3) whether retroactive application 
could produce substantial inequitable results.  
Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶71, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 
405. 
¶97 In light of these factors, we conclude that the test 
for whether an entity is a quasi-governmental corporation 
subject to open meetings and public records laws should apply 
prospectively only. First, this is a case of first impression, 
and we have established a new standard that was not clearly 
foreshadowed. Second, applying the standard set forth here 
retroactively would not advance the rule with respect to open 
meetings. As we noted in Buswell, "[t]he public cannot go back 
and attend meetings [that violate open meetings law] when such 
meetings have already occurred." 301 Wis. 2d 178, ¶48. 
¶98 Most important in the present case, though, is the 
third factor. Applying the approach established in this case 
retroactively 
may 
produce 
substantial 
inequitable 
results. 
Exposing BDADC and individual members to forfeitures on the 
basis of a reasonable interpretation of the statute where no 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
42 
 
appellate 
court 
had 
yet 
provided 
an 
interpretation 
is 
inequitable here. Additionally, issuing an order voiding any 
actions taken at past meetings not open to the public would be 
unduly unsettling to the persons and businesses involved with or 
relying on the actions. 
VI 
¶99 In sum, we determine that an entity is a quasi-
governmental corporation within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.82(1) 
and 
19.32(1) 
if, 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances, 
it 
resembles a governmental corporation in 
function, effect, or status. Such a determination requires a 
case-by-case analysis. Considering the facts of this case we 
conclude that BDADC is a quasi-governmental corporation subject 
to open meetings and public records laws.  
¶100 The test for determining whether an entity is a quasi-
governmental corporation applies to both open meetings law and 
public records law. However, our test is not to be applied to 
past violations, that is, for violations prior to the date of 
the release of this opinion. Because we today announce a new 
test, applying that test to past violations would be inequitable 
and unduly unsettling.   
¶101 We apply our determination prospectively such that the 
defendants in the present case are not subject to forfeitures 
for past violations of the open meetings laws and we decline to 
void any actions taken at past meetings not open to the public. 
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and remand to the 
No. 
2006AP662   
 
43 
 
circuit court to address the remaining request for attorney fees 
and costs and to enter judgment consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded.   
¶102 Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶103 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
concludes that the Beaver Dam Area Development Corporation 
(BDADC) is a "governmental body" within the definition of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.82(1) (2005-06),1 whose meetings are subject to 
Wisconsin's open meetings laws, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.83 to 19.98.  
It also concludes that BDADC is an "authority" within the 
definition of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1) that must comply with the 
state's public records laws, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.33 to 19.39. 
¶104 Recognizing the importance and sensitivity of economic 
development in the state, the majority attempts to ameliorate 
its far-reaching decision by affirming its devotion to economic 
development and declining to award some of the relief the State 
requested.  See majority op., ¶¶93-98.  However, the majority 
fails to provide realistic guidance on how a non-profit economic 
development corporation can avoid conducting business in the 
fishbowl of the open meetings and public records statutes 
without severing its cooperative relationship with its municipal 
beneficiary 
and 
paying 
for 
all 
its 
economic 
development 
initiatives with private money.  For multiple reasons, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶105 In 2004 the State filed a complaint and amended 
complaint against BDADC seeking declaratory judgment that BDADC 
is a "quasi-governmental corporation" within the statutory 
definitions of "governmental body" and "authority" and, thus, 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
subject to Wisconsin's open meetings and public records laws.  
As a result, this case involves BDADC during the time period 
leading up to the filing of the State's complaint and amended 
complaint.  The circuit court found that BDADC is not a "quasi-
governmental corporation" under either Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) or 
19.82(1) and denied declaratory judgment. 
¶106 The following background facts are derived from the 
circuit court's findings of fact and are supplemented by facts 
in the record.   
¶107 BDADC is a private, non-profit corporation that was 
organized under Wis. Stat. ch. 181 on January 31, 1997.  The 
City of Beaver Dam (City) did not incorporate BDADC, and BDADC 
was not created pursuant to any constitution, statute, or 
ordinance.  The exclusive purpose of BDADC, as stated in its 
bylaws, is "to engage in economic development and business 
retention within the corporate limits and lands which could 
become part of the corporate limits of the City of Beaver Dam 
and for all lawful purposes incident thereto."  In conjunction 
with this stated purpose, BDADC does not provide services 
related 
to 
public 
health 
or 
safety 
to 
any 
county 
or 
municipality, including the City. 
¶108 BDADC's Board of Directors (Board) has consisted of as 
many as 13 individuals,2 12 of whom have voting powers.  These 
individuals, all residents of Beaver Dam, are selected for their 
                                                 
2 We note that the Board's bylaws provide for 12 directors, 
but the record reflects that there were 13 directors serving 
during some of the pendency of this case.  Only 12 BDADC 
directors have voting rights. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
"knowledge of economic development and business retention, 
cultural, civic, moral, public and other needs of the Beaver Dam 
area, and for general representation of varied elements or 
organizations of the area."  The Board is therefore comprised of 
local industrialists, educational leaders, bankers, business 
leaders, and attorneys.  The Board generally meets once each 
month over the lunch hour at the private places of employment of 
Board members.  The mayor of Beaver Dam and the chairperson of 
Beaver Dam's community development committee both serve as ex 
officio voting members of the Board.  The executive vice 
president of the Beaver Dam Area Chamber of Commerce serves as a 
non-voting member of the Board. 
¶109 Board directors are nominated and elected solely by 
existing members of the Board.  They serve without compensation.  
When a director's 3-year term expires, the Board elects a 
replacement.  Except for the ex officio directors, a director 
may be removed from office by an affirmative vote of the 
majority of the Board.  The electors of the City are the only 
persons who may remove the two ex officio directors.  A director 
may also resign by filing his or her written resignation with 
the secretary of the Board. 
¶110 BDADC's bylaws also provide for several officer 
positions.  The bylaws state:   
The officers of [BDADC], except for the Executive Vice 
President, shall be elected from among the Board of 
Directors 
and 
shall 
consist 
of 
a 
President, 
a 
Treasurer, a Secretary, and such other Vice-Presidents 
as the Board of Directors may choose to elect.  An 
Executive 
Vice 
President 
shall 
be 
appointed 
by 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
majority vote of the Board of Directors and need not 
be a member of the Board of Directors. 
Under this arrangement, the Executive Vice President is the only 
compensated, full-time employee of BDADC and manages the day-to-
day operations of the corporation. 
¶111 Since its incorporation, BDADC has had a single paid 
employee. 
 
Trent 
Campbell 
(Campbell), 
former 
Economic 
Development Director of the City, was the Executive Vice 
President of BDADC from approximately April 1, 1997, until his 
resignation, effective January 1, 2005.  The City did not 
control Campbell's day-to-day activities as Executive Vice 
President; he served at the pleasure of the Board and did not 
have any authority to enter into contracts on BDADC's behalf.  
The authority to contract for BDADC was reserved with the Board.  
While clerical assistance was available from the City, Campbell 
did virtually all his own typing, faxing, and e-mailing.  He had 
his own computer, which was not connected to a City network.  
Campbell never consulted with a City attorney for legal advice 
regarding BDADC business; the Board solicited independent legal 
counsel on an as-needed basis.  Campbell left BDADC in early 
2005, and neither he nor his replacement were or are City 
employees during their service as Executive Vice President of 
BDADC. 
¶112 From its inception until this suit, BDADC leased an 
office from the City on the lower level of a municipal building.  
However, the Board did not hold its meetings in municipal 
buildings. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
¶113 BDADC and the City entered into cooperation agreements 
on April 1, 1997, and January 1, 2004.  The 2004 agreement, 
effective 
through 
December 
31, 
2023, 
replaced 
the 
1997 
agreement, which was originally to last until the end of 2006.  
Both agreements recognized that BDADC was "created for the 
purpose of encouraging and stimulating economic development 
within the City and lands which could become part of the 
corporate limits of the City." 
¶114 The agreements provided that the City would furnish, 
upon request, office space, clerical support, copy and fax 
machine use, telephone use, and postage.  In addition, the City 
was privy to BDADC's accounting records and finances at BDADC's 
office upon 10 days' prior written notice.  The City also made 
funds raised through Tax Increment Financing (TIF) districts in 
the City's Tax Increment Financing Project Plan available to 
BDADC for economic development.  TIF funds were granted under 
both the 1997 and 2004 agreements with the caveat that "[s]uch 
funds may be subject to program conditions as may be established 
and approved by the City at the time of approval of the Project 
Plan or at the time of contribution of such funds to [BDADC]." 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
¶115 BDADC is funded primarily by allocations of the City's 
room tax3 and interest on these allocations.  The 1997 
cooperation agreement provided that, under a City ordinance, 90 
percent of all room tax proceeds would be deposited in an 
economic development fund.  Seventy-five percent of this 
economic development fund was to be allocated and disbursed 
quarterly to BDADC to "be used to provide economic incentives 
(including related expenses) to encourage businesses to locate 
and/or expand within the City."  The 2004 cooperation agreement 
                                                 
3 A room tax is levied upon those businesses providing 
temporary lodging within the borders of the taxing municipality.  
The 1997 cooperation agreement between BDADC and the City 
referenced Wis. Stat. § 66.75, which provided: "The governing 
body of a municipality may enact an ordinance . . . imposing a 
tax on the privilege of furnishing, at retail . . . rooms or 
lodging to transients by hotelkeepers, motel operators and other 
persons furnishing accommodations that are available to the 
public[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 66.75(1m)(a)(1995-96) (emphasis added).   
In effect, transients, not residents, pay the room tax.  
The City of Beaver Dam's current room tax ordinance is 
illustrative:   
Pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 66.0615, for the privilege 
of furnishing at retail rooms or lodging to transients 
by hotel keepers, motel operators and other persons 
furnishing accommodations that are available to the 
public, irrespective of whether membership is required 
for use of the accommodations, a tax is imposed upon 
the retailers at the rate of five percent of the gross 
receipts 
for 
the 
lease 
or 
rental 
of 
such 
accommodations, rooms or lodging within the city, 
effective January 1, 1989.   
City of Beaver Dam, Wisconsin Municipal Code § 2-124(b), 
available 
at 
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=12550&sid=49 
(last visited June 27, 2008). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
increased this allocation to 90 percent of the City's economic 
development fund. 
¶116 The 1997 and 2004 cooperation agreements included 
several clauses to protect the interests of BDADC and the City.  
Both agreements stated that BDADC was to submit a "management 
plan" and budget to the City for the succeeding calendar year.  
The management plan was to include "a description of the 
programs and activities [BDADC] intends to undertake during the 
calendar 
year." 
 
The 
agreements 
provided 
for 
voluntary 
termination by either party upon "gross misconduct" of the 
other, or termination by the City "upon structural change of 
[BDADC] 
by 
amendment 
of 
its 
Articles 
of 
Incorporation."  
Pursuant to the cooperation agreements, BDADC was required to 
obtain 
public 
liability 
insurance, 
automobile 
liability 
insurance, and employers liability insurance.  The City was 
entitled 
to 
the 
following 
protections 
pursuant 
to 
the 
agreements:   
Indemnity 
[BDADC] shall indemnify and hold City harmless 
from and against any claims, demands, actions, causes 
of 
action, 
proceedings, 
actions 
and 
liabilities, 
together with all costs, expenses and disbursements 
(including 
reasonable 
attorneys 
fees 
and 
costs) 
incurred by the City as a result of the [BDADC]'s acts 
or omissions hereunder. 
The agreements provided that "under no circumstances shall any 
alderperson, officer, official, director, member or employee of 
the City or [BDADC] have any personal liability arising out of 
this Cooperation Agreement, and no party shall seek or claim any 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
such personal liability."  Nothing in the cooperation agreements 
limited BDADC to having the City as its only client. 
¶117 Pursuant 
to 
BDADC's 
original 
articles 
of 
incorporation, upon voluntary or involuntary dissolution or 
liquidation of BDADC, any remaining assets, after payment of its 
liabilities, were to be distributed to or for the benefit of 
non-profit organizations located in Beaver Dam and used for 
economic development and business retention.  BDADC's articles 
of incorporation were amended on February 25, 1997, to provide 
that 
upon 
dissolution 
any 
such 
assets 
would 
instead 
be 
transferred to the City. 
¶118 BDADC cannot bind the City to any obligation or 
contract.  Recommendations or proposals brought to the City by 
BDADC are considered or acted upon by the City under Wisconsin's 
public records and open meetings laws.  As a result, the public 
is able to monitor the support provided by the City to BDADC, as 
well as the work of the BDADC that requires City action. 
¶119 On July 15, 2004, the State filed a complaint against 
BDADC seeking declaratory judgment that BDADC is a "quasi-
governmental corporation" subject to Wisconsin's open meetings 
and public records laws.  The State's complaint sought a court 
order requiring BDADC to conduct its affairs in compliance with 
such laws. 
¶120 On December 20, 2004, the State filed an amended 
complaint that reiterated its initial claims and added a claim 
of relief against individual members of the Board for violating 
open meetings and public records law by participating in several 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
closed-session meetings.  The State's amended complaint sought 
forfeitures between $25 and $300 from all members of the Board 
for each violation. 
¶121 In 2005 BDADC negotiated with several businesses to 
attract new or expanded development to the Beaver Dam community.  
BDADC negotiated, but did not itself sign, a memorandum of 
understanding between Wal-Mart Stores East, LP and the City, to 
bring a large distribution center to the area.  Beaver Dam Mayor 
John Hankes signed the agreement. 
¶122 On February 2, 2006, the circuit court found that 
BDADC is not a "quasi-governmental corporation" as that term is 
used in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) and 19.82(1).  Accordingly, the 
circuit court held that BDADC was not subject to open meetings 
and public records laws.  The State's amended complaint against 
BDADC was dismissed with prejudice and the State appealed. 
¶123 The court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  The court of 
appeals asked this court to provide guidance regarding the 
meaning of the term "quasi-governmental corporation," as it is 
used in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) and 19.82(1).  The court of 
appeals noted that "any set of factors used to determine whether 
a corporation is 'quasi-governmental' should flow from a 
developed discussion of legislative intent."  The court of 
appeals requested this court to develop a test for determining 
whether a private economic development corporation is a "quasi-
governmental corporation" and to apply that test to BDADC. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶124 I have four primary concerns with the majority's 
conclusion and analysis.  The importance of these concerns 
cannot be appreciated without understanding the impact of the 
majority's interpretation of Wisconsin's open meetings and 
public records laws on private non-profit economic development 
corporations. 
 
Consequently, 
my 
analysis 
begins 
with 
a 
discussion of these laws.4  I will then set forth each of my four 
concerns with the majority's conclusion and analysis. 
A 
¶125 Wisconsin's open meetings and public records laws are 
founded on the premise that an informed electorate will produce 
the most effective representative government.  Our legislature 
has enacted these statutes to provide for the broadest practical 
access to government.  See Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 
120, ¶22, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551.  Declarations of 
policy in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31 and 19.81, respectively, proclaim 
                                                 
4 The analysis of Wisconsin's open meetings and public 
records laws in section A. of this dissent is aided by reference 
to two compliance guides published by the Wisconsin Department 
of Justice in 2007.   
These compliance guides are entitled Wisconsin Public 
Records 
Law 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31–19.39, 
Compliance 
Outline, 
August 2007, and Wisconsin Open Meetings Law: A Compliance Guide 
(2007).  They can be retrieved on the Internet at the following 
website 
addresses, 
respectively: 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/AWP/2007OMCG-PRO/2007_PR_Outline.pdf 
(last 
visited 
June 
27, 
2008); 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/AWP/2007OMCG-
PRO/2007_OML_Compliance_Guide.pdf (last visited June 27, 2008). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
that 
the 
public 
is 
entitled 
to 
"the 
greatest 
possible 
information" and "the fullest and most complete information" 
regarding the affairs of government.  At the same time, however, 
these declarations also qualify access to information with 
limiting phrases such as "consistent with the conduct of 
governmental business" and "compatible with the conduct of 
governmental business."  Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31, 19.81.  Thus, 
there is a strong, but not absolute, presumption in favor of 
disclosure 
of 
information relating to government affairs.  
Hempel, 284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶28. 
¶126 When 
municipalities 
directly 
engage 
in 
economic 
development, their activities are subject to relevant open 
meetings and public records statutes.  Accordingly, one motive 
for 
the 
proliferation 
of 
separate 
economic 
development 
corporations has been a desire to avoid the application of these 
laws.  There are some people who believe that some facets of 
successful economic development are not compatible with the sort 
of real-time disclosure these laws require. 
¶127 The majority attacks the legitimacy of this motivation 
when it declares that "we cannot countenance a government body 
circumventing 
the 
legislative 
directive 
for 
an 
open 
and 
transparent government by paying an entity to perform a 
governmental function."  Majority op., ¶4.  It construes the 
statutory term "quasi-governmental corporation" so broadly that 
it is likely to close off the option of a non-profit economic 
development corporation that is beyond the reach of these 
statutes.  It will mean little to persons involved in economic 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
development to be assured that a majority of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court is "cognizant of the realities of economic 
development and the need, at times, for flexibility and 
confidentiality," id., if the majority has made that flexibility 
and confidentiality nearly impossible. 
¶128 Compliance with Wisconsin's public records and open 
meetings laws requires subject entities to establish various 
notices, 
procedures, 
and 
policies. 
 
Satisfying 
these 
requirements will not be easy.  The majority tries to soften its 
holding by pointing to a few exceptions to open meetings and 
public 
records 
laws, 
see 
majority 
op., 
¶¶81-87, 
and 
by 
acknowledging that some circumstances might require "that the 
harm to the public from disclosure should be balanced against 
the benefit of disclosure to the public."  Majority op., ¶84.  
Nonetheless, many of the requirements that will likely become 
applicable to private economic development corporations after 
this decision will create significant administrative burdens 
that 
will 
necessitate 
time 
and 
substantial 
expense, 
and 
compromise the confidentiality of subject materials.   
¶129 For example, the public records laws require an 
impacted entity (an "authority" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1)) to 
establish many policies and procedures to grant public access to 
"records."5  "Records" can include items like e-mail messages and 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) states:   
"Record" means any material on which written, 
drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic 
information is recorded or preserved, regardless of 
physical form or characteristics, which has been 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
telephone call logs that are created or kept by an "authority" 
and are not purely personal.6   
¶130 Entities subject to public records laws must establish 
public records policies.  An "authority," including a "quasi-
governmental corporation," "shall adopt, prominently display and 
make available for inspection and copying at its offices . . . a 
notice containing a description of its organization and the 
established times and places at which" the public may obtain and 
access records and the costs thereof.  Wis. Stat. § 19.34(1).  
This notice must also "separately identify each position of the 
authority that constitutes a local public office or a state 
public office."  Id.   
                                                                                                                                                             
created or is being kept by an authority.  "Record" 
includes, but is not limited to, handwritten, typed or 
printed 
pages, 
maps, 
charts, 
photographs, 
films, 
recordings, tapes (including computer tapes), computer 
printouts and optical disks.  "Record" does not 
include drafts, notes, preliminary computations and 
like materials prepared for the originator's personal 
use or prepared by the originator in the name of a 
person for whom the originator is working; materials 
which 
are 
purely 
the 
personal 
property 
of 
the 
custodian and have no relation to his or her office; 
materials to which access is limited by copyright, 
patent or bequest; and published materials in the 
possession of an authority other than a public library 
which are available for sale, or which are available 
for inspection at a public library. 
6 Access to covered records is broad, but necessarily 
limited by considerations of privacy and security.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1.-3. (listing examples of items to 
which the right to inspect, copy, or record a "record" does not 
apply). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
¶131 Entities subject to public records laws must also 
establish designated office hours for access to public records.  
An authority that maintains regular office hours where records 
in the custody of the entity are kept "shall permit access to 
the records . . . at all times during those office hours, unless 
otherwise specifically authorized by law."  § 19.34(2).  If no 
regular office hours are kept, the authority must either provide 
access to the records upon 48 hours written or oral notice of 
intent to inspect or copy a record, or establish a period of at 
least two consecutive hours per week during which access to 
records 
of 
the 
authority 
is 
permitted.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.34(2)(b)1.-2.   
¶132 In addition to availability requirements, an authority 
must provide facilities "comparable to those used by its 
employees to inspect, copy and abstract" the record or records 
during 
established 
office 
hours. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(2).  
However, an authority is not required to purchase or lease 
photocopying or similar equipment or provide a separate room for 
public use to satisfy this requirement.  Id. 
¶133 A custodian of a record subject to public records laws 
must 
respond 
to 
a 
public 
records 
request.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4).  The custodian must state specific, 
reasons for denying a public records request.  Osborn v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2002 WI 83, ¶16, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 
647 N.W.2d 158. This requirement creates an administrative 
burden even if access to records is not warranted.  The court of 
appeals addressed the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4) in 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
15 
 
ECO, Inc. v. City of Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, 259 Wis.2d 276, 
655 N.W.2d 510: 
Open records law mandates action once a request 
is received; Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4) addresses time for 
compliance and states, in relevant part:  
(a) Each authority, upon request for 
any record, shall, as soon as practicable 
and without delay, either fill the request 
or notify the requester of the authority's 
determination to deny the request in whole 
or 
in 
part 
and 
the 
reasons 
therefor. 
(Emphasis added.)   
Thus, under § 19.35(4)(a), receipt of an open 
records request triggers either a duty to respond to 
the request or a duty to produce the requested 
records.  Here, the City neither responded to the 
April 24, 1996 request nor produced the requested 
documents.  It is incumbent upon the custodian of the 
public record who refused the demand of inspection to 
"state specifically the reasons for this refusal."  
Hathaway [v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, City of Green 
Bay], 116 Wis. 2d [388,] 396[, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984)] 
(citation omitted).  A custodian's denial of access to 
a public record must be accompanied by a statement of 
the specific public policy reasons for the refusal.  
Chvala v. Bubolz, 204 Wis. 2d 82, 86-87, 552 N.W.2d 
892 (Ct. App. 1996).  The City did not provide any 
response whatsoever and therefore did not comply with 
open records law. 
ECO, Inc., 259 Wis. 2d 276, ¶24. 
¶134 Even if an authority need not make requested records 
available for inspection or copying, it will still be burdened 
with the duty to respond to a request "as soon as practicable 
and without delay" and to state its reasons for refusal.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).  If the request for records is in 
writing, a denial or partial denial of access to records must 
also be in writing.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(b).  Thus, an 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
16 
 
authority's statutory choices are twofold: comply or deny.  
WTMJ, Inc. v. Sullivan, 204 Wis. 2d 452, 457, 555 N.W.2d 140 
(Ct. App. 1996).  "[C]ompliance at some unidentified time in the 
future[] is not authorized by the open records law."  Id. at 
458.  If an authority withholds a record or delays granting 
access to a record after a written request is made, a requester 
may immediately bring a mandamus action asking a court to order 
release of the record.  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1); WTMJ, 204 
Wis. 2d at 
461. 
 
Any 
authority 
that 
"arbitrarily 
and 
capriciously denies or delays response to a request" may expose 
itself to punitive damages and a forfeiture of not more than 
$1,000.  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(3)-(4). 
¶135 Wisconsin's 
open 
meetings 
laws 
create 
additional 
responsibilities for a "governmental body," including a "quasi-
governmental corporation."  Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1).  The two 
basic requirements of the open meetings laws are: (1) public 
notice of meetings; and (2) meetings must be held in open 
session.  Wis. Stat. § 19.83(1).  The chief presiding officer of 
a governmental body or such person's designee must give notice 
of meetings to (1) the public; (2) "those news media who have 
filed a written request for such notice;" and (3) "the official 
newspaper designated under [state statute] or, if none exists, 
to a news medium likely to give notice in the area."  
Wis. Stat. § 19.84(1)(b).   
¶136 The statute specifies how public notice must be given.  
The public notice "shall set forth the time, date, place and 
subject matter of the meeting, including that intended for 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
17 
 
consideration at any contemplated closed session, in such form 
as is reasonably likely to apprise members of the public and the 
news media thereof."  Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2).  The public notice 
of a meeting of a governmental body may also provide for a 
period of public comment.  Id.  Public notice of a meeting of a 
governmental body "shall be given at least 24 hours prior to" 
its 
commencement 
"unless 
for 
good 
cause 
such 
notice 
is 
impossible or impractical, in which case shorter notice may be 
given, but in no case may the notice be provided less than 2 
hours in advance of the meeting."  Wis. Stat. § 19.84(3).  
"Separate public notice shall be given for each meeting of a 
governmental body at a time and date reasonably proximate to the 
time and date of the meeting."  Wis. Stat. § 19.84(4). 
¶137 The 
specificity necessary to satisfy the notice 
requirement was recently addressed by this court.  See State ex 
rel. Buswell v. Tomah Area School Dist., 2007 WI 71, ¶¶28-32, 
301 Wis. 2d 178, 732 N.W.2d 804 (establishing a three-factor 
reasonableness test to determine whether subject-matter in a 
meeting 
notice 
was 
specific 
enough 
to 
satisfy 
Wis. Stat. § 19.84).  As a result, it may not be satisfactory 
for a non-profit economic development corporation to list 
"discussion of economic development prospects" month after month 
without identifying the prospects. 
¶138 The "open session" requirement of Wis. Stat. § 19.83 
is also a mandate.  All "governmental body" business of any 
kind, formal or informal, must be initiated, discussed and acted 
upon in "open session," unless one of the exemptions set forth 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
18 
 
in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1) applies.  Wis. Stat. § 19.83(1).  An 
"open session" is defined as "a meeting which is held in a place 
reasonably accessible to members of the public and open to all 
citizens at all times."  Wis. Stat. § 19.82(3).   
¶139 BDADC's current arrangement of meeting at the private 
business places of Board members over the lunch hour is likely 
deficient.  The policy of openness favors governmental bodies 
holding their meetings in public places, such as a municipal 
hall or school, rather than on private premises.  See 67 Wis. 
Op. Att'y Gen. 125, 127 (1978).  BDADC made a point of holding 
its meetings away from the municipal building in which it once 
had its office. 
¶140 Our decision in Sands v. Whitnall School District, 
2008 WI 89, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, this term, is 
likely to affect any "governmental body" that is authorized by 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1) to discuss certain business in closed 
session.  The gist of the Sands decision is that the discussion 
in a properly-conducted closed meeting is no longer off limits 
to discovery in proper litigation.    
¶141 In 
sum, 
compliance 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wisconsin's public records and open meetings laws will be not be 
a cakewalk.  The requirements set forth above touch only part of 
the regulatory minefield that many private economic development 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
19 
 
corporations will now be forced to travel.7  These requirements 
could place significant administrative and practical burdens on 
a non-profit economic development corporation like BDADC that 
has only one paid employee.  Responding to requests for access 
to records that may be confidential, privileged, or time-
sensitive could be a great hindrance to the work product of a 
single individual.8  Furthermore, the potential expense of lost 
productivity from complying and taking steps to avoid the 
necessity of complying, and additional costs of legal counsel to 
assure compliance, could be burdensome. 
¶142 To 
sum 
up, 
open 
meetings 
and 
public 
records 
requirements established by the majority's holding will likely 
present burdens and obstacles for many economic development 
corporations in Wisconsin. 
B 
¶143 Applying the requirements of the open meetings and 
public records laws to a non-profit economic development 
corporation 
with 
a 
single 
employee 
should 
raise 
serious 
questions without additional analysis.  But I have four 
additional concerns with the majority opinion:  
                                                 
7 It may be more accurate to observe that nearly all private 
economic 
development 
corporations 
in 
Wisconsin 
should 
be 
prepared to address these new compliance concerns, as the 
majority opinion provides such scant guidance regarding the 
definition of "quasi-governmental corporation" as to leave all 
current EDCs naked to compliance issues.  
8 The law appears to require a Board member to come over to 
the office and work on a public records request if BDADC's 
single paid employee is out of the office on work, vacation, or 
illness. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
20 
 
(1) The majority opinion provides virtually no guidance to 
the public regarding how to determine whether an entity is a 
"quasi-governmental corporation."  The majority's use of a 
"totality of circumstances" test, without specifying a list of 
factors to be considered or identifying what factors are 
critical or dispositive, is extraordinarily unhelpful;  
(2) The 
majority 
opinion 
relies 
on 
precedents 
from 
Maryland, New York, and Florida that interpret and apply unique 
statutory language in those states.  It is a mistake to try to 
interpret the meaning of an undefined statutory term in 
Wisconsin based on the interpretation of different terms in 
other states;  
(3) The majority opinion fails to analyze the statutory 
and legislative history behind the legislature's choice of the 
term 
"quasi-governmental 
corporation" 
in 
a 
serious 
and 
convincing manner; and  
(4) The majority opinion misapplies the law to the facts, 
even under the "test" it has chosen, and relies upon irrelevant 
facts that occurred after the filing of this suit. 
1. 
Guidance 
¶144 This case involves a pure question of statutory 
interpretation——namely, 
determining 
the 
meaning 
of 
"quasi-
governmental corporation"——so that certain private entities will 
know whether their actions are subject to Wisconsin's open 
meetings and public records laws.  It is deeply troubling that 
the majority opinion offers no clear test, no determinative 
factor (or even a set of enumerated factors), for interested 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
21 
 
parties and courts to apply to determine whether a particular 
entity is a "quasi-governmental corporation."  Instead, the 
majority advises that "[i]f an entity does not want to be 
subject to the open meetings and public records laws, then it 
should change the circumstances under which it operates."  
Majority op., ¶7.  This phantom guidance is bound to have a 
chilling effect on entities who seek lawfully to avoid the 
constraining requirements of these statutes.9     
¶145 The 
majority 
opinion 
claims 
to 
recognize 
"the 
need . . . for flexibility and confidentiality" in the conduct 
of municipal economic development initiatives.  Majority op., 
¶4.  However, it does not provide crucial guidance required by 
those engaged in the development, management, and day-to-day 
operation of entities created to serve such policy goals.  
Instead, the majority cryptically sets forth only "some of the 
factors to be examined in determining what constitutes a 'quasi-
governmental corporation' subject to open meetings and public 
records laws," majority op., ¶8 (emphasis added), leaving no 
usable test with which one might determine what is meant by this 
term in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) and 19.82(1). 
                                                 
9 The majority seeks to justify its "totality of the 
circumstances" test by pointing to four of this writer's 
decisions in which a "totality of the circumstances" test was 
employed in constitutional determinations in criminal law.  
Majority op., ¶46 n.11.  The test for determining "reasonable 
suspicion" to make a Terry stop or "probable cause" to conduct a 
search strikes this writer as different from the proper test for 
determining when uncompensated citizens seeking to promote 
economic development in their community must comply with open 
meetings and public records laws or face prosecution by the 
State of Wisconsin. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
22 
 
¶146 Although it might be easier to ask the legislature to 
clarify 
the 
scope 
and 
meaning 
of 
"quasi-governmental 
corporation," this course is not available in the instant 
litigation.  Hence, it is our duty to make our best judgment of 
what the term means.  The majority's answer fosters uncertainty 
by empowering judges to impose penalties on people, on a case-
by-case basis, with virtually no guidance of who will get 
whacked. 
¶147 The majority was given options, and it has attempted 
to meld different tests together to reach a desired outcome.  
The briefs of the parties and amici set forth several choices to 
give meaning to "quasi-governmental corporation."  Two primary 
options (based on formal Attorney General opinions) were 
suggested.  A third vaguer option (based on a noted treatise) 
was also submitted, and the majority seems at least partially to 
embrace it.10  See majority op., ¶¶9, 35, 79 (discussing 
"function, effect, or status").  In essence, however, the 
majority chose "none of the above."  Any of the suggested 
options would be preferable to the majority's open-ended, non-
specific "test": "In sum, we determine that an entity is a 
quasi-governmental corporation within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.82(1) 
and 
19.32(1) 
if, 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
                                                 
10 The 
majority 
opinion 
recognizes 
that 
foreign 
jurisdictions and scholars have suggested enumerated multi-
factor tests to determine whether entities are subject to open 
meetings and public records laws.  See majority op., ¶63 n.14.  
The majority inexplicably chooses to leave Wisconsin law 
confused while recognizing that scholars and other jurisdictions 
establish enumerated guidelines to aid practitioners. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
23 
 
circumstances, 
it 
resembles 
a 
governmental 
corporation."  
Majority op., ¶99.  This "test" requires the public to traverse 
dense fog without any fog lines. 
¶148 One option the majority could have selected would 
limit 
"quasi-governmental 
corporations" 
to 
those 
entities 
created expressly by government under statutory authority.  A 
1977 Attorney General opinion discussing whether the Palmyra 
Volunteer Fire Department was subject to the open meetings law 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) and concluded that "[e]ven 
though a corporation may serve some public purpose, it is not a 
'governmental or quasi-governmental corporation' under [Wis. 
Stat. § 19.82(1)] unless it also is created directly by the 
Legislature or by some governmental body pursuant to specific 
statutory authorization or direction."  66 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 
113, 115 (1977) (emphasis added).  The Attorney General opined 
that the volunteer fire department in question did not meet the 
definition in Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) because it was not created 
directly by the legislature or another governmental body.  Id. 
at 114-15. 
¶149 The "created-directly-by-government" test may be too 
easy to skirt, but it is clear.  BDADC could not be classified 
as a quasi-governmental corporation if this test were applied. 
¶150 The second potential option comes from a 1991 Attorney 
General opinion, 80 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 129 (1991).  The 
majority opinion tries to utilize this opinion, but it fails to 
explicitly enumerate the factors that are important or worthy of 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
24 
 
consideration.  By embracing an open-ended "totality" test, the 
majority aggravates the ambiguity in the 1991 opinion. 
¶151 The 1991 Attorney General opinion focused on several 
factors to determine whether two private corporations resembled 
a governmental corporation enough to be a "quasi-governmental 
corporation."  Id. at 136.  It favored an analysis on a "case by 
case basis, in light of all the relevant circumstances."  Id.  
The opinion was candid "that adopting a fact-based test to 
determine 
whether 
a 
corporation 
is 
a 
'quasi-governmental 
corporation' . . . creates 
some 
uncertainty 
as 
to 
the 
applicability of the open meetings law in particular cases."  
Id. at 137.   
¶152 Using the 1991 opinion, the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice (DOJ) subsequently compiled the following non-exclusive 
list of six factors: 
(1) whether the corporation serves a public purpose; 
(2) the extent to which the corporation receives 
public funding for its operation; (3) whether the 
bylaws of the corporation either reserve positions on 
the board of directors for government officials or 
employees, or give a government actor the power to 
appoint government officials and employees to the 
board of directors; (4) whether the government in fact 
appointed government employees or officials to the 
corporation’s 
board 
of 
directors; 
(5) 
whether 
government 
employees 
served 
as 
officers 
of 
the 
corporation; 
and 
(6) 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
the 
corporation was housed in government offices, used 
government equipment and was staffed by government 
employees.  
Wisconsin Open Meetings Law: A Compliance Guide (2007) 4 (citing 
80 
Wis. 
Op. 
Att’y Gen. 129, 136 (1991)), available at 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
25 
 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/AWP/2007OMCG-
PRO/2007_OML_Compliance_Guide.pdf (last visited June 27, 2008). 
¶153 It should be noted that the DOJ list does not include 
the factor that was dispositive in the 1977 opinion: namely, the 
corporation's creation by government.11  Moreover, it begins with 
the elusive question "whether the corporation serves a public 
purpose," a question that could be debated at length in a class 
on political philosophy.  
¶154 The State's brief recognizes that the 1991 Attorney 
General opinion is "not free from ambiguity" and that "the 
multitude of factors applied make it cumbersome as the basis for 
a general standard that yields a predictable result."  This 
evaluation of the 1991 Attorney General opinion is consistent 
with the DOJ's prior commentary on the guidance in that opinion.  
In 1996 the DOJ's open meetings compliance guide stated, with 
regard to 80 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 129 (1991): "There is no clear-
cut test for determining whether a particular corporation 
resembles a governmental corporation closely enough to be 
considered 'quasi-governmental.'"  Wisconsin Open Meetings Law: 
                                                 
11 The language in the open meetings law——with respect to a 
"quasi-governmental corporation"——has not changed since 1976.  
The "quasi-governmental corporation" language in the public 
records 
statute 
has 
been 
in 
place 
since 
1981. 
 
The 
interpretation of this language keeps evolving, however, so that 
the dispositive factor in the 1977 Attorney General opinion no 
longer even appears on the Department of Justice's list of 
factors to be considered.  
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
26 
 
A Compliance Guide (1996) 2.12  It is ironic that the 1996 DOJ 
open meetings law compliance guide——a guide that someone in the 
position 
of 
organizing 
a 
private, 
non-profit 
economic 
development corporation in early 1997 might reference——concluded 
that there was "no clear-cut test" to determine whether a 
particular 
entity 
was 
subject 
to 
Wisconsin 
freedom 
of 
information laws. 
¶155 The 1991 Attorney General opinion dealt with two 
private corporations whose boards, employees, and day-to-day 
operations were effectively controlled by the City of Milwaukee.  
Thus, the result of the opinion is understandable.  However, the 
analysis is murky, and is based far more on policy than 
legislative intent. 
¶156 The 
third 
option 
presented 
to 
define 
"quasi-
governmental 
corporation" 
is 
that 
found 
in 
1 
McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations § 2.13 (3d rev. 1999).  The McQuillin 
treatise discusses "quasi-public corporations," which could be 
viewed as similar, although not identical, to quasi-governmental 
corporations.  Id.  The 1991 Attorney General opinion quoted the 
1990 version of the McQuillin treatise: "The term 'quasi-public 
[or quasi-governmental] corporation' is not per se public or 
governmental.  On its face, the term connotes that it is not a 
                                                 
12 The Department of Justice's 2003 open meetings law 
compliance guide included this same language, which has been 
removed from its 2007 guide during the pendency of this 
litigation.  Compare Wisconsin Open Meetings Law: A Compliance 
Guide (2003) 3, with Wisconsin Open Meetings Law: A Compliance 
Guide (2007) 3-4. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
27 
 
public corporation but a private one.  But 'quasi' indicates 
that the private corporation has some resemblance to a public 
corporation in function, effect or status."  80 Wis. Op. Att'y 
Gen. at 135 (quoting McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 2.13 
(3rd ed. rev. 1987 & Supp. 1990)). 
¶157 The "function, effect or status" test in McQuillin 
presents an enumerated list of three factors to consider to 
determine whether an entity is a quasi-governmental corporation 
subject to open meetings and public records laws.  These three 
factors, although rather vague, present a clearer starting point 
than 
the 
"totality 
of 
circumstances" 
and 
"resembles 
a 
governmental corporation" standards provided by the majority.  
Majority op., ¶99.  However, the "function, effect or status" 
test is easily manipulated based on what one characterizes as a 
governmental function, an entity's effect, or an entity's 
status. 
¶158 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that BDADC 
is a "quasi-governmental corporation" for purposes of Wisconsin 
open meetings and public records laws.  However, the majority's 
conclusion is less troubling than the lasting negative impact of 
the imprecision in the majority's holding.  Had the majority 
chosen to enumerate specific factors to direct the public, 
today's decision might contain some redeeming value as a guide.  
In my view, it does not.   
2. 
Foreign Precedents 
¶159 The majority's reliance on foreign precedents for 
guidance may be creative, but it is fundamentally unsound.  The 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
28 
 
case before this court involves the interpretation of Wisconsin 
statutes.  The term "quasi-governmental corporation" is not 
found in the Maryland, New York, or Florida cases cited by the 
majority.  The majority tacitly recognizes its leap of logic,13 
but still plows through a result-oriented analysis, disregarding 
the language of these states' open meetings and public records 
laws.  The majority treats the interpretation of out-of-state 
statutes by out-of-state courts as if we were collectively 
developing the common law of freedom of information. 
¶160 City of Baltimore Development Corporation v. Carmel 
Realty Associates, 910 A.2d 406 (Md. 2006), involved two 
questions of statutory interpretation: (1) whether the City of 
Baltimore Development Corporation (BDC) was a "public body" 
within the meaning of Maryland's Open Meetings Act (Md. Code 
Ann., State Gov't §§ 10-501——10-512 (LexisNexis 2004); and (2) 
whether the BDC was an "instrumentality" of the City of 
Baltimore for purposes of Maryland's Public Information Act (Md. 
Code Ann., State Gov't §§ 10-601——10-628 (LexisNexis 2004)).  
Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 410.   
¶161 The Maryland Court of Appeals found that BDC performed 
many purely public functions and was inextricably linked to the 
City of Baltimore.  Id. at 424-25.  BDC's bylaws gave the mayor 
of Baltimore the power to appoint or nominate members of BDC's 
                                                 
13 "Although the determination of whether an entity is 
subject to open meetings and public records laws depends on the 
respective statutory language of each state, the interpretations 
rendered by courts in other jurisdictions are instructive."  
Majority op., ¶50. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
29 
 
board of directors, remove members of the board, including the 
Chairman of the Board, and to appoint directors when positions 
on the board were vacated.  Id. at 422, 425.  BDC could 
implement, oversee, and encourage public and private development 
and rehabilitation projects to increase the city's tax base.  
Id. at 424.  BDC was tasked with the attraction of new 
businesses, 
retention 
of 
existing 
businesses, 
and 
the 
stimulation and encouragement of growth and expansion of 
commercial 
office 
uses, 
manufacturing, 
warehousing, 
distribution, research, and development.  Id. at 425.  If BDC 
ceased to exist, tangible property purchased with funds attached 
to that contract would revert to the city.  Id.  Over 80 percent 
of BDC's budget was provided by the city.  Id.  
¶162 The Maryland Court of Appeals set forth its analysis 
under the heading "Statutory Interpretation."  Id. at 417.  In 
Maryland, a "public body" is subject to notice provisions of the 
Open Meetings Act.  See id. at 419-20; Md. Code Ann., State 
Gov't § 10-501(c) (LexisNexis 2004).  "Public body" is defined 
in the Maryland Code.14 
                                                 
14 "Public body" in the Maryland Code means an entity that: 
"(i) consists of at least 2 individuals" and "(ii) is created 
by: 1. the Maryland Constitution; 2. a State statute; 3. a 
county charter; 4. an ordinance; 5. a rule, resolution, or 
bylaw; 6. an executive order of the Governor; or 7. an executive 
order 
of 
the 
chief 
executive 
authority 
of 
a 
political 
subdivision of the State."  Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 10-
502(h)(1) (LexisNexis 2004). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
30 
 
¶163 In interpreting and applying the defined term "public 
body" to BDC, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that Md. 
Code Ann., State Gov't § 10-502(h)(2) introduced a new concept 
and was an alternative to § 10-502(h)(1) because it set forth a 
different set of public bodies from those described in § 10-
502(h)(1).  Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 420.  The court further 
explained that if § 10-502(h)(2) had been a subsidiary clause, 
it would have been designated as "§ 10-502(h)(1) . . . (iii)."  
Id.  The court further held that because there was no evidence 
that BDC was created by a specific act or order under § 10-
502(h)(1), the court would have to consider whether BDC fell 
under § 10-502(h)(2).  Id. at 421. 
¶164 The court held that BDC was a public body under § 10-
502(h)(2) because the parties did not dispute that BDC’s bylaws 
required it to be a multimember board, that its board of 
directors consisted of at least two individuals not employed by 
the city, and that the board was nominated or appointed by the 
mayor.  Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 421.  The court concluded 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Public 
body" 
includes: 
"(i) 
any 
multimember 
board, 
commission, or committee appointed by the Governor or the chief 
executive authority of a political subdivision of the State, or 
appointed by an official who is subject to the policy direction 
of the Governor or chief executive authority of the political 
subdivision, if the entity includes in its membership at least 2 
individuals 
not 
employed 
by 
the 
State 
or 
the 
political 
subdivision; and (ii) the Maryland School for the Blind."  Md. 
Code Ann., State Gov't § 10-502(h)(2) (LexisNexis 2004).  
The Maryland Code also excludes certain entities from the 
definition of "public body."  Md. Ann. Code., State Gov't § 10-
502(h)(3) (LexisNexis 2004) (excluding, for example, "any single 
member entity" and "any grand jury."). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
31 
 
that since there were no purely private functions of the BDC, it 
was consistent with the intent of the Maryland Open Meetings Act 
that the deliberations of the BDC be open to the public.  Id. at 
425. 
¶165 The majority characterizes the Maryland Court of 
Appeals' analysis as applying a "totality of the circumstances" 
approach to the defined term "public body."  Majority op., ¶54.  
This is not accurate.  The Maryland court instead interpreted a 
defined statutory term to ascertain whether BDC was subject to 
Maryland's open meetings laws pursuant to that definition.  
Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 419-25.  The analysis of a defined 
statutory term ("public body") in Maryland is not much use to 
interpretation 
of 
an 
undefined 
statutory 
term 
("quasi-
governmental corporation") in two Wisconsin statutes.   
¶166 The Maryland Court of Appeals next turned to the 
second 
question 
presented, 
namely 
whether 
BDC 
was 
an 
"instrumentality" for purposes of Maryland's Public Information 
Act.  Id. at 425-26.  In Maryland, a "public record" is subject 
to the state's public records laws.  See id. at 426; Md. Code 
Ann., State Gov't § 10-611(g)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2004).  "Public 
record" is a defined term and means "the original or any copy of 
any documentary material that: (i) is made by a unit or 
instrumentality of the State government or of a political 
subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in 
connection with the transaction of public business."  Id., § 10-
611(g)(1)(i).  
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
32 
 
¶167 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that BDC was an 
"instrumentality" of the city.  Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 426.  
The court stressed that the holding was consistent with the 
purpose of the Maryland Public Information Act and with the 
Maryland General Assembly’s intent when it enacted the act.  Id.  
The court looked to a standard dictionary for the definition of 
"instrumentality" and noted that "[i]nstrumentality is defined 
as 'the quality or state of being instrumental' and instrumental 
is defined as 'serving as a means, agent, or tool.'"  Id. at 427 
(quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 607 (10th ed. 
1998)). 
 
The 
court 
also 
examined 
a 
number 
of 
BDC’s 
characteristics 
to 
conclude 
it 
was 
an 
"instrumentality," 
including the following:   
The BDC's Board of Directors, to include the Chairman 
of the Board, are nominated or appointed by the Mayor 
of Baltimore;  he has the power to remove members of 
the Board before their four year terms are up;  the 
Mayor also has the power to fill vacancies;  the 
City's Commissioner of the Department of Housing and 
Community Development and the City's Director of 
Finance are permanent members of the Board;  the BDC 
receives a substantial portion of its budget from the 
City; the BDC has a tax exempt status under the 
Internal Revenue Code;  pursuant to the City's 
contract with the BDC, if it should cease to exist, 
the City would control the disposition of the BDC's 
assets;  BDC is also authorized to prepare and adopt 
Urban Renewal Plans, Unit Development, Industrial 
Retention Zones, and Free Enterprise Zones which are 
traditionally governmental functions.  We also note 
that the City Solicitor represented the BDC in this 
matter.  
Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 428 (footnotes omitted).   
¶168 The statutory interpretation problem in the instant 
case is similar to the problem faced by the Maryland Court of 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
33 
 
Appeals in interpreting the undefined term "instrumentality."  
Hence, the majority opinion turns to some of the same methods to 
construe "quasi-governmental corporation," such as using the 
dictionary.  See majority op., ¶32.  However, the majority's 
description of the Maryland case blends the Maryland court's 
separate analyses of defined and undefined statutory terms into 
an evaluation of the "totality of circumstances."  See majority 
op., ¶54.  This allows the majority to analogize Carmel Realty 
to the instant case.  Majority op., ¶¶66, 68, 72. 
¶169 Buffalo News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enterprise Development 
Corp., 644 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1994), involved the question of 
whether the Buffalo Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDC), a 
non-profit corporation administering government loan programs, 
was an "agency" within the meaning of New York's Freedom of 
Information Law (FOIL).  Id. at 278.  "Agency" was defined by 
statute as "any state or municipal department, board, bureau, 
division, 
commission, 
committee, 
public 
authority, 
public 
corporation, council, office or other governmental entity 
performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state 
or any one or more municipalities thereof, except the judiciary 
or the state legislature."  N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 86, subd. 3 
(McKinney 1990) (emphasis added).   
¶170 The New York Court of Appeals concluded that BEDC was 
an "agency" under FOIL, constituting a "governmental entity."  
Buffalo News, 644 N.E.2d at 279-80.  BEDC's stated purposes were 
"to relieve and reduce unemployment, to promote and to provide 
for additional and maximum employment . . . [to] encourag[e] [ ] 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
34 
 
development . . . in 
the 
community . . . and 
to 
lessen 
the 
burdens of government and to act in the public interest."  Id. 
at 278 (brackets in original).  The court observed that BEDC's 
purposes were undeniably governmental.  Id. at 279.  BEDC was 
"created exclusively by and for the City of Buffalo to attract 
investment and stimulate growth in Buffalo's downtown and 
neighborhoods. . . .  Moreover, the BEDC describes itself in its 
financial reports and public brochure as an 'agent' of the City 
of Buffalo."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶171 The New York statute's definition of "agency" included 
a "governmental entity," not a quasi-governmental entity.  N.Y. 
Pub. Off. Law § 86, subd. 3 (McKinney 1990).  The Buffalo News 
court held that BEDC was, in effect, an arm of government.  See 
Buffalo News, 644 N.E.2d at 279.  By avoiding any discussion of 
the statute at play in Buffalo News, the majority here buries 
this crucial distinction.  See majority op., ¶¶55-56.  BEDC was 
viewed as a governmental entity, not something resembling a 
governmental entity.  Compare Buffalo News, 644 N.E.2d at 279 
with majority op., ¶63.  Furthermore, the New York court's 
decision was premised upon its determination that BEDC was 
"created exclusively by and for the City of Buffalo."  Buffalo 
News, 644 N.E.2d at 279.  The City of Beaver Dam did not create 
BDADC. 
¶172 Finally, the majority discusses News and Sun-Sentinel 
Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., 596 
So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992), which involved the following question: 
"Does a corporation act on behalf of a public agency when hired 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
35 
 
by a county to perform professional architectural services for 
the construction of a school so as to be subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes?"  Id. at 
1030.  "Agency" is defined broadly in the Florida Statutes:   
"Agency" means any state, county, district, authority, 
or municipal officer, department, division, board, 
bureau, 
commission, 
or 
other 
separate 
unit 
of 
government created or established by law and any other 
public 
or 
private 
agency, 
person, 
partnership, 
corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of 
any public agency. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.011(2) (West 1989) (emphasis added).15 
¶173 In News and Sun-Sentinel, an architectural firm, 
Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., a private 
corporation, 
contracted 
with 
a 
school 
board 
to 
provide 
architectural services in relation to the construction of school 
building facilities.  News and Sun-Sentinel, 596 So. 2d at 1030.  
A reporter, pursuant to Florida Statutes ch. 119, requested that 
he be allowed to inspect the files in the corporation's 
possession related to the projects.  Id.  The firm refused and 
argued that it was not an agency as set forth in Fla. Stat. § 
119.011(2).  Id. 
                                                 
15 The Tennessee Supreme Court has observed that Florida's 
public records disclosure scheme should be distinguished from 
other jurisdictions because "the terms of its public records 
statute explicitly extend to private entities 'acting on behalf 
of a[ny] public agency.'"  Memphis Publ'g Co., v. Cherokee 
Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 78 n.12 (Tenn. 
2002)(citing News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & 
Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 
1992) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 119.011(2))). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
36 
 
¶174 In siding with the architectural firm, the Florida 
Supreme Court noted that courts interpreting "agency" under Fla. 
Stat. § 119.011(2) make a determination based on the "totality 
of the factors."  Id. at 1031 (citations omitted).  The court 
provided a non-exclusive list of factors considered in its 
analysis.16  The court emphasized the fact that the term "agency" 
is defined broadly under Florida’s Public Records Act to include 
private entities "acting on behalf of any public agency."  Id. 
(quoting Fla. Stat. § 119.011(2)).  The court concluded that, 
after reviewing the totality of the factors, the firm was not 
acting on behalf of a public agency so as to fall under Chapter 
119's definition of "agency."  Id. at 1033. 
¶175 Unlike Florida's public records laws, Wisconsin's 
public records laws do not extend to private entities acting "on 
behalf of a public agency."  Compare Fla. Stat. § 119.011(2) 
                                                 
16 These factors were:   
(1) the level of public funding; (2) commingling of 
funds; (3) whether the activity was conducted on 
publicly 
owned 
property; 
(4) 
whether 
services 
contracted for are an integral part of the public 
agency's chosen decision-making process; (5) whether 
the 
private entity is performing a governmental 
function or a function which the public agency 
otherwise would perform; (6) the extent of the public 
agency's involvement with, regulation of, or control 
over the private entity; (7) whether the private 
entity was created by the public agency; (8) whether 
the public agency has a substantial financial interest 
in the private entity; and (9) for [whose] benefit the 
private entity is functioning.   
News 
and 
Sun-Sentinel 
Co. 
v. 
Schwab, 
Twitty 
& 
Hanser 
Architectural Group, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992) 
(citations omitted). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
37 
 
with Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1).  Therefore, it is difficult to 
swallow the majority's extension of the analysis in News and 
Sun-Sentinel to distinguish the case at hand.  Majority op., ¶66 
("Moreover, unlike the architecture firm in News and Sun-
Sentinel, 596 So. 2d 1029, BDADC received tax money in order to 
provide public service, not merely to receive compensation."). 
¶176 The majority's analysis of the foreign precedents 
discussed above eschews discussion of the unique statutory 
language analyzed by courts in Maryland, New York, and Florida 
to determine whether these states' public records and open 
meetings laws applied to a particular entity.  Instead of 
discussing the real statutory issues in these precedents, the 
majority instead draws broad conclusions regarding these cases 
to suit its result-oriented approach.17  The majority's analysis 
of these foreign precedents is not a satisfactory technique for 
interpreting differently worded Wisconsin statutes. 
3. 
Statutory History, Legislative History, Intent 
¶177 The court of appeals' certification to this court 
indicated a problem with the methodology of the 1991 Attorney 
General opinion.  It stated that the 1991 opinion "does not 
address the legislative intent behind the inclusion of 'quasi-
                                                 
17 See, e.g., majority op., ¶66 ("With respect to finances, 
BDADC is akin to the development corporation subject to open 
meetings and public records laws in Carmel Realty, and akin to 
the development corporation considered in Buffalo News."); 
majority op., ¶74 ("In this respect BDADC is similar to the 
corporation in Buffalo News, which stated in its public 
brochures and financial statements that it was an agent of a 
city."). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
38 
 
governmental' corporations in the scope of the open meetings and 
public records laws."  Unfortunately, this problem essentially 
persists in the majority opinion, even after the court of 
appeals' plea to this court that "any set of factors used to 
determine whether a corporation is 'quasi-governmental' should 
flow from a developed discussion of legislative intent."  
(Emphasis added.)18   
¶178 Because key terms in the statutes are not defined and 
are capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons in different senses, a court interpreting these terms 
needs to employ all the tools of statutory interpretation. 
¶179 The analysis should begin with the text in the 
sections embodying the term "quasi-governmental corporation."   
¶180 For example, Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1) reads:   
"Authority" means any of the following having custody 
of a record: a state or local office, elected 
official, 
agency, 
board, 
commission, 
committee, 
council, department or public body corporate and 
politic created by constitution, law, ordinance, rule 
or 
order; 
a 
governmental 
or 
quasi-governmental 
corporation except for the Bradley center sports and 
entertainment corporation; a local exposition district 
under subch. II of ch. 229; a family care district 
under s. 46.2895; any court of law; the assembly or 
senate; a nonprofit corporation which receives more 
than 50% of its funds from a county or a municipality, 
                                                 
18 The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently addressed its 
duty under similar circumstances: "In some cases, the statutory 
text reveals ambiguity, and then the job of this Court is to 
resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using 
all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our 
disposal."  City of Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty 
Assocs., 910 A.2d 406, 418 (Md. 2006) (quoting Chow v. State, 
903 A.2d 388, 395 (Md. 2006)). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
39 
 
as defined in s. 59.001(3), and which provides 
services related to public health or safety to the 
county 
or 
municipality; 
a 
nonprofit 
corporation 
operating the Olympic ice training center under s. 
42.11(3); or a formally constituted subunit of any of 
the foregoing. 
¶181 There is a common characteristic to most of the 
entities listed in the definition of "Authority": they are 
indisputably government entities, including elected officials, 
or they are entities "created by constitution, law, ordinance, 
rule or order."  Id.  Local exposition districts are authorized 
by statute and created by a sponsoring municipality.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 229.42.  Family care districts are authorized by statute and 
created by a county board.  Wis. Stat. § 46.2895(1).  By 
contrast, BDADC is not a local office or local agency or public 
body corporate and politic created by a government entity. 
¶182 BDADC is a non-profit corporation.  The legislature 
applied the public records law to "a nonprofit corporation which 
receives more than 50% of its funds from a county or a 
municipality . . . and which provides services related to public 
health or safety to the county or municipality."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1) (emphasis added).  BDADC is not covered by this 
language.  The legislature went out of its way to reach another 
non-profit corporation: the non-profit corporation operating the 
Olympic ice training center.  But BDADC is obviously not covered 
by that provision either. 
¶183 There is a familiar canon of statutory construction 
that the enumeration or expression of certain things implies the 
exclusion of other things.  See C.A.K v. State, 154 Wis. 2d 612, 
621, 453 N.W.2d 897 (1990).  While this canon is not infallible, 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
40 
 
it may be used "as a means of discovering legislative intent."  
State ex rel. Sielen v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee County, 176 
Wis. 2d 101, 112, 499 N.W.2d 657 (1993).  Implicit in the 
majority opinion is the principle that an entity's status as a 
non-profit corporation, even when the corporation is not created 
by government, does not exempt the corporation from public 
records law.  The majority has failed to demonstrate that the 
legislature intended this result. 
¶184 The only phrase left in the definition of "authority" 
is "a governmental or quasi-governmental corporation except for 
the Bradley center sports and entertainment corporation."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(1). 
 
Reference 
to 
the 
Bradley 
Center 
is 
significant.  The Bradley Center corporation is "a public body 
corporate and politic."  It is the subject of an entire chapter 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 232.  It was 
authorized by the legislature. 
¶185 Admittedly, the Bradley Center corporation is a non-
profit corporation, Wis. Stat. § 232.03(1), but six of its nine 
board members are appointed by the governor, Wis. Stat. 
§ 232.03(2)(a), implying a significant degree of state influence 
on the Bradley Center's statutorily defined mission. 
¶186 The 
phrase 
"a 
governmental 
or 
quasi-governmental 
corporation" has legislative history.  Wisconsin's current open 
meetings laws have their origin in the Anti-Secrecy Law of 1959.  
See ch. 289, Laws of 1959, creating Wis. Stat. § 14.90. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
41 
 
 
¶187 Wisconsin Stat. § 14.90 (1959) reads in part:   
Open meetings of governmental bodies.  (1) In 
recognition 
of 
the 
fact 
that 
a 
representative 
government of the American type is dependent upon an 
informed electorate, it is declared to be the policy 
of the state that the public is entitled to the 
fullest and most complete information regarding the 
affairs of government as is compatible with the 
conduct of governmental affairs and the transaction of 
governmental business.   
(2) To implement and insure the public policy 
herein expressed, all meetings of all state and local 
governing 
and 
administrative 
bodies, 
boards, 
commissions, 
committees 
and 
agencies, 
including 
municipal and quasi-municipal corporations, unless 
otherwise expressly provided by law, shall be publicly 
held and open to all citizens at all times, except as 
hereinafter provided.  No formal action of any kind 
shall be introduced, deliberated upon or adopted at 
any closed executive session or closed meeting of any 
such body.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶188 Wisconsin Stat. § 14.90 was amended and renumbered in 
1969 to Wis. Stat. § 66.77.  § 62, ch. 276, Laws of 1969.  The 
"municipal 
or 
quasi-municipal 
corporation" 
language 
was 
continued in this new statute.   
¶189 Consequently, we may be able to discern the meaning of 
"municipal corporation" and "quasi-municipal corporation" by 
examining the cases and statutes in place at the time the Anti-
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
42 
 
Secrecy 
Law 
was 
adopted, 
as 
well 
as 
contemporary 
interpretation.19 
¶190 In Iverson v. Union Free High School District, 186 
Wis. 342, 353, 202 N.W. 788 (1925), this court stated:   
[The Union Free High School District of the Towns 
of 
Springfield 
and 
Curran] 
is 
not 
a 
municipal 
corporation.  It is very grudgingly accorded the rank 
of a quasi-municipal corporation.  1 McQuillin, Mun. 
Corp. § 113. . . .  It is but the agent of the state 
for the sole purpose of administering the state's 
system of public education and has only such powers as 
are conferred expressly or by necessary implication. 
This ruling was affirmed in Schaut v. Joint School District No. 
6, Towns of Lena and Little River, 191 Wis. 104, 107, 210 
N.W. 270 
(1926). 
 
These 
decisions 
show 
quasi-municipal 
corporations performing essential governmental functions. 
¶191 More than 60 years later, the court of appeals 
described the Metropolitan Milwaukee Sewerage District (MMSD) as 
a quasi-municipal corporation:   
MMSD 
is 
a 
quasi-municipal 
corporation 
which 
provides sewerage treatment and disposal services to 
approximately 
twenty-eight 
Milwaukee 
area 
municipalities.  MMSD is currently engaged in a 
fifteen-year 
water 
pollution 
abatement 
program 
designed to upgrade and rehabilitate the district's 
                                                 
19 On December 30, 1960, Attorney General John Reynolds 
issued a "Synopsis of Opinions Involving Anti-Secrecy Law," 
which focused on the activities of "public agencies" and 
concluded that meetings of the Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin, a city council, a joint sewerage district, a county 
bureau of personnel, and school boards and committees were 
required to be conducted in open session.  John W. Reynolds, 
Synopsis of Opinions Involving Anti-Secrecy Law, Wisconsin 
Counties, Dec. 1961, at 12, 13, 22.  The Attorney General 
repeatedly characterized those entities subject to open meetings 
laws as "public agencies."  Id. at 12, 13. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
43 
 
sewerage system.  In an effort to recover the capital 
cost for the project, MMSD sought to levy property 
value-based capital charges against Mequon and the 
other 
municipalities 
which 
MMSD 
services 
outside 
Milwaukee county. 
State ex rel. Lank v. Rzentkowski, 141 Wis. 2d 846, 849, 416 
N.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1987).  In 2000 the court of appeals 
observed 
in 
another 
decision 
that 
"[a]gencies, 
municipal 
corporations and quasi-municipal corporations are all creatures 
of the state and their powers are only those ascribed to them by 
the state."  Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. DNR, 2000 WI App 19, 
¶8, 232 Wis. 2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50 (footnote omitted).  All 
these 
decisions 
portray 
quasi-municipal 
corporations 
as 
essentially government entities. 
¶192 The 
legislature revised and renumbered the open 
meetings laws in 1976.  See ch. 426, Laws of 1975.  This 
enactment saw "a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation" 
changed to "a governmental or quasi-governmental corporation."  
The majority has produced no legislative history showing an 
intent to seriously expand the scope of the law with the 
substituted language.  This is why Attorney General La Follette 
said in 1977, the year after the law was passed, that "[e]ven 
though a corporation may serve some public purpose, it is not a 
'governmental or quasi-governmental corporation' under sec. 
19.82(1), Stats., unless it also is created directly by the 
Legislature or by some governmental body pursuant to specific 
statutory authorization or direction."  66 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 
113, 115 (1977).  This is why he added in a 1985 opinion that 
"the 
term 
'quasi-governmental 
corporation' 
is 
limited 
to 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
44 
 
nonstock body politic corporations created by the Legislature to 
perform essentially governmental functions."  74 Wis. Op. Att'y 
Gen. 38, 43 (1985).  Inasmuch as the relevant portion of the law 
has not been changed since 1976, it is hard to fathom how a 
"quasi-governmental 
corporation" 
now 
includes 
a 
non-profit 
economic development corporation, not created by the government 
and completely without power to bind the government, that has a 
cooperation agreement to perform services for the government 
through a voluntary board and a single employee.20 
¶193 There is authority for citizens to gain information 
about 
the 
work submitted to the City by BDADC without 
denominating this small non-profit corporation as a quasi-
governmental corporation.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3). 
¶194 A Special Committee on Applicability of Open Meetings 
Law to Quasi-Governmental Bodies (Special Committee) recently 
studied the issue before this court, and, although making no 
recommendation to the Wisconsin Legislature, the committee's 
proposed report indicated that a "bright-line test, such as 
requiring compliance with the Open Meetings Law for an economic 
development corporation that uses public funds for a specific 
percentage of its budget or that has a specific number of public 
                                                 
20 The majority opinion discusses the modification of 
language in the open meetings statute in 1976.  Majority op., 
¶33.  Then it states: "By changing the language, the legislature 
expanded the reach of the open meetings law. . . .  [B]y 
changing the language of the open meetings statutes, the 
legislature expanded the law to apply to entities that are not 
per se public."  Id., ¶¶34, 36.  The majority fails to provide a 
shred of legislative history to support this newly minted 
principle of law. 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
45 
 
officials on its board," might be favorable.  Wisconsin 
Legislative Council Proposed Report to the Legislature, PRL 
2007-01, 
Feb. 
22, 
2007, 
at 
5, 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/publications/prl/PRL2007-01.pdf 
(last visited June 27, 2008).21 
¶195 The 
Special 
Committee 
reviewed 
several 
proposed 
amendments to Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) and 19.82(1) that would 
have included or excluded an "economic development corporation" 
from or within the reach of Wisconsin's open meetings and public 
records laws.  These proposals were based on bright-line 
criteria.   
¶196 One Wisconsin Legislative Council proposal would have 
defined "economic development corporation" and excluded such an 
entity if both of the following were satisfied: "(a) The 
corporation receives less than 50% of its funds in cash or 
through in−kind contributions, such as the use of governmental 
buildings, equipment, or staff, from the state or from a county, 
city, village, or town"; and "(b) Less than one−half of the 
corporation’s board and less than one−half of the corporation’s 
officers consist of public officials or public employees."  
                                                 
21 A December 12, 2006, letter from then Attorney General 
Peggy Lautenschlager to State Senator Scott Fitzgerald also 
indicated that "[a]dopting a bright line test based on source of 
funding would serve the public well.  It gives the entity notice 
of when it must comply with the open meetings and public records 
laws."  Letter from Peggy Lautenschlager, Wisconsin Attorney 
General, to Scott Fitzgerald, Wisconsin State Senator (Dec. 12, 
2006) 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2006/QGOV/files
/lautenschlagerltr.pdf (last visited June 27, 2008). 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
46 
 
Special Committee on Applicability of Open Meetings Law to 
Quasi-Governmental 
Bodies, 
WLC 
0047/01, 
4 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2006/QGOV/files
/0047_1.pdf (last visited June 27, 2008).   
¶197 Another 
proposal 
would 
have 
defined 
"economic 
development corporation" and included such an entity in the 
definition of "governmental body" in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) and 
19.82(1) if either of the following criteria were satisfied: 
"(a) The corporation receives at least 50% of its funds in cash 
or 
through 
in−kind 
contributions, 
such 
as 
the 
use 
of 
governmental buildings, equipment, or staff, from the state or 
from a county, city, village, or town"; or "(b) At least 
one−half of the corporation’s board or at least one−half of the 
corporation’s officers consists of public officials or public 
employees."  Special Committee on Applicability of Open Meetings 
Law to Quasi-Governmental Bodies, WLC 0048/01, 2 available at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2006/QGOV/files
/0048_1.pdf (last visited June 27, 2008). 
¶198 The fact that the Special Committee signaled that 
bright-line criteria are needed to determine the treatment of 
economic development corporations for purposes of Wisconsin open 
meetings and public records laws is evidence that the present 
statutes do not dictate the result announced by the majority. 
¶199 The 
majority has failed to convincingly utilize 
statutory history, legislative history, or other evidence of the 
intent behind use of the phrase "quasi-governmental corporation" 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
47 
 
in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) and 19.82(1).  The majority has left 
the public with a "test" that provides no definitive guidance. 
4. 
Application 
¶200 The majority's application of the "test" it creates is 
deficient for two reasons: (1) The majority relies on certain 
facts that occurred after the State filed its amended complaint 
in December 2004 when those facts strengthen the State's case, 
but it disregards facts that changed after December 2004 if 
those facts weaken the State's case; and (2) BDADC is not a 
"quasi-governmental corporation," even based on the "totality of 
circumstances" test of the 1991 Attorney General opinion.   
¶201 First, the relevant adjudicative facts regarding the 
nature of BDADC are those in existence at and before the time 
the State's amended complaint was filed on December 20, 2004.  
To consider facts regarding BDADC that occurred after this date 
is to analyze a different entity from the one the State's 
amended complaint asserts violated open meetings and public 
records laws.   
¶202 The majority does not recognize this distinction and 
instead relies on the following irrelevant facts in evaluating 
BDADC: (1) "In the first half of 2005, for example, the room tax 
contribution accounted for about 84 percent of BDADC's income."  
Majority op., ¶21 (emphasis added); (2) BDADC's "2005 plan 
allows that BDADC may negotiate financial incentives for 
businesses 
and 
work 
on 
dealing 
with 
infrastructure 
and 
government approval issues related to attracting business to the 
area."  Majority op., ¶22 (emphasis added); and (3) "In 2004 and 
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48 
 
2005, BDADC negotiated on the City's behalf regarding potential 
developments by a variety of businesses."  Majority op., ¶24 
(emphasis added).  None of these facts has bearing on whether 
BDADC, as it existed when the State's amended complaint was 
filed, constituted a "quasi-governmental corporation." 
¶203 At the same time, even though this ruling has been 
made prospective, the fact that BDADC no longer has an office in 
a Beaver Dam municipal building is given no significance. 
¶204 Second, if this court were properly to apply a fact-
based test like the one used in the 1991 Attorney General 
opinion, 
BDADC 
would not constitute a "quasi-governmental 
corporation."   
¶205 In 80 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 129 (1991), the Attorney 
General analyzed whether the Milwaukee Economic Development 
Corporation 
(MEDC) 
and 
Metropolitan 
Milwaukee 
Enterprise 
Corporation (MMEC) were quasi-governmental corporations under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) subject to open meetings laws.  The 
Attorney General concluded that both of these entities were 
quasi-governmental corporations under the statute under facts 
distinct from those in this case.  80 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. at 
136.   
¶206 With regard to MEDC, the Attorney General relied upon 
the following facts to reach his conclusion: all MEDC offices 
were located in city-owned buildings; under MEDC's contract with 
the City of Milwaukee, the Commissioner of the Department of 
City 
Development 
selected 
the 
president, 
vice 
president, 
secretary, and treasurer of MEDC; all MEDC's officers were city 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
49 
 
employees and some of MEDC's staff were city employees; the city 
provided MEDC with all its office space, equipment, and supplies 
(although MEDC was required to reimburse the city, and that 
obligation was offset against grants MEDC received from the 
city); and four of MEDC's nine directors were City of Milwaukee 
officials.  Id. at 130-31.   
¶207 With regard to MMEC, the Attorney General relied upon 
the following facts to reach his conclusion: the corporation 
provided economic development loans with funds the city obtained 
under the federal Small Business Administration program; two of 
MMEC's directors were city council members and one was a city 
employee; the principal office of MMEC was the Department of 
City Development; all MMEC offices were located in city-owned 
buildings; the city selected the officers for MMEC, and a city 
official selected all of MMEC's current officers; all MMEC 
officers and some of its staff members were city employees; the 
city provided all office space, equipment, and supplies needed 
by MMEC; and the cost the city incurred in supplying staff and 
other resources to MMEC was offset against grants MMEC received 
from the city.  Id. at 131-32. 
¶208 The Attorney General concluded as follows with regard 
to MEDC and MMEC:   
The fact that MEDC and MMEC serve a public 
purpose by promoting economic development in the City 
of Milwaukee is not, in itself, sufficient to make the 
corporations "quasi-governmental." . . .  Nor is the 
fact that MEDC and MMEC receive most of their funding 
from public sources. . . . However, in addition to 
these facts, four of MEDC's nine directors are city 
officials.  They serve as directors by virtue of their 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
50 
 
positions as city officials, not as private citizens.  
The city selected the president, vice president, 
secretary and treasurer of MEDC and MMEC.  All of 
those officers are city employe[e]s.  The day-to-day 
operations 
of 
both 
corporations 
are, 
therefore, 
subject to the control of city employe[e]s.  Further, 
the Department of City Development is the principal 
place of business for both MEDC and MMEC. Both 
corporations enjoy the privilege of being housed in 
city-owned 
buildings, 
using 
city 
equipment 
and 
supplies and having corporate officers and staff 
included 
on 
the 
city 
payroll 
and 
in 
the 
city 
employe[e] benefit plan.  In light of all these facts, 
I conclude that MEDC and MMEC resemble a governmental 
corporation in purpose, effect or status closely 
enough 
to 
constitute 
a 
"quasi-governmental 
corporation" within the meaning of section 19.82(1).   
80 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. at 136 (citation omitted). 
¶209 Like MEDC and MMEC, BDADC receives most of its funding 
from a public source——in this case the city of Beaver Dam's room 
tax and interest on allocations of that tax.  However, this is 
only one factor to consider in weighing the totality of all 
facts and circumstances. 
¶210 BDADC is controlled by its Board of Directors, which 
consists of 12 voting members.  Only two of these members are 
public officials of the City, unlike four of the nine board 
members of MEDC and MMEC.  Id.  BDADC's Board elects BDADC's 
officers, manages and controls the assets of BDADC, and 
formulates all corporate policies and programs.  The Board, not 
the 
city 
of 
Beaver 
Dam, 
elects 
replacement 
members.  
Furthermore, Board meetings have never taken place at any City 
facility. 
¶211 BDADC has a single compensated, full-time employee, 
its Executive Vice President, who is hired, supervised, and paid 
No.  2006AP662.dtp 
 
 
51 
 
solely by the Board, not the City.  The Executive Vice President 
of BDADC is not a City employee, unlike the officers of MEDC and 
MMEC, all of whom were City of Milwaukee employees selected by 
the City of Milwaukee.  Id. at 136-37.  The activities of 
BDADC's Executive Vice President were carried out with little or 
no use of City resources.  Trent Campbell did virtually all his 
own work, had his own computer, was not on a network with the 
City, and never consulted the City's attorney for legal advice.  
Campbell enjoyed no governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  The City does not represent BDADC in this lawsuit. 
¶212 BDADC's 1997 and 2004 cooperation agreements included 
provisions requiring BDADC to indemnify the city of Beaver Dam 
and hold it harmless for "any claims, demands, actions, causes 
of action, proceedings, actions and liabilities, together with 
all costs, expenses and disbursements (including reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs) incurred by the City as a result of 
the [BDADC]'s acts or omissions."  The fact that BDADC is 
obligated to indemnify the City for any wrongs committed in the 
course of their relationship suggests that BDADC and the City 
are independent entities that make independent decisions. 
¶213 Most important, BDADC has no authority to bind the 
city of Beaver Dam in contract or to create obligations on the 
City's behalf.  No municipal action can be taken by BDADC, and 
any agreements it negotiates with other corporations and 
entities 
are 
subject 
to 
the 
normal 
legislative 
process 
(including open meetings and public records laws) before being 
officially approved and adopted by the City as policy.   
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52 
 
¶214 The majority errs in concluding that BDADC is a quasi-
governmental corporation.  BDADC does not constitute a quasi-
governmental corporation, i.e., an entity that "resembles a 
governmental corporation," majority op., ¶99, under the totality 
of all facts and circumstances.   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶215 The majority has chosen to impose new and significant 
burdens 
on 
some 
private 
non-profit 
economic 
development 
corporations in Wisconsin while simultaneously leaving the reach 
of its holding a mystery.  In doing so, it has failed to provide 
guidance to the public regarding the definition of "quasi-
governmental corporation" in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1) and 19.82(1) 
and to reach a satisfactory conclusion regarding the application 
of that language to BDADC.  Accordingly, I must respectfully 
dissent. 
¶216 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
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