Title: State v. Eugene Huntington
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP001775-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1775 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Eugene Huntington,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  209 Wis. 2d 85, 562 N.W.2d 928 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 20, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 6, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn 
 
JUDGE: 
Warren Winton 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
GESKE, J., dissents (0pinion filed) 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BABLITCH, J. join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Jack E. Schairer, first assistant 
state public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Eugene Huntington, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 20, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
defendant, 
Eugene 
Huntington, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals that affirmed his conviction1 on three counts of 
felonious sexual assault of a child under age 13.  The defendant 
challenges testimony concerning the child's statements to others 
as inadmissible hearsay and argues that an expert witness 
improperly testified concerning another witness's credibility.  
Because we determine that the evidence of the child's statements 
to 
others 
falls 
within 
recognized 
hearsay 
exceptions 
or 
constitutes harmless error, and because we conclude that the 
State's expert witness did not offer an impermissible opinion on 
the truthfulness of another witness, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
                     
1 Circuit Court for Washburn County, Warren E. Winton, 
Judge.  
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
2 
¶2 
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on the evening of August 
19, 1994, a hysterical 11-year-old Jeri E. called her mother 
from a friend's home where she had been planning on staying the 
night.  She told her mother that she had been sexually abused by 
her stepfather, Eugene Huntington.  When Jeri's mother arrived 
to pick Jeri up ten minutes later, she observed that "her 
girlfriend's 
mother 
was 
holding 
her, 
Jeri 
was 
sobbing 
hysterically and she came running to my arms." 
¶3 
Shortly after returning home, Jeri's sister, Dawn, 
arrived to find both the mother and child crying and upset.  
Jeri first told her mother and then her sister that on numerous 
occasions,2 while staying overnight with him, the defendant would 
come into her room and rub her "private parts," both above and 
below her underwear, insert one of his fingers into her vagina, 
and make her rub his penis.  Jeri also alleged that on one 
occasion the defendant got on top of her and started moving "up 
and down."  In speaking privately with Dawn, Jeri continued to 
cry and told Dawn how scared she was and that she thought that 
it was her own fault that her stepfather did this to her.  While 
the evidence is inconclusive on the issue, the last instance of 
abuse allegedly occurred two weeks prior to Jeri's disclosure of 
the abuse to her mother and sister. 
¶4 
Within two hours of first revealing the allegations of 
abuse to her mother, Jeri was taken to the Spooner Police 
                     
2 Jeri's statements are inconsistent concerning the number 
of occurrences of sexual abuse.  
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
3 
Department and interviewed by Officer Glau.  While she seemed 
initially shy and fidgeted, Jeri repeated her allegations 
against the defendant.  She remained upset and crying and 
Officer Glau had to stop the interview and wait for Jeri to 
regain her composure on several occasions. 
¶5 
Almost three months later, Jeri was also examined by 
Nurse Diane McCormick to determine the extent of her physical 
abuse, to evaluate the existence of physical injury, and to 
develop an appropriate plan of treatment and counseling.  
McCormick is a pediatric nurse practitioner with a subspecialty 
in child abuse and neglect.  She is on staff with Dr. Carolyn 
Levitt, the State's expert in this case, at the Midwest 
Children's Resource Center.  Jeri was referred to the center by 
Lori Carter Bell, the tribal therapist working with Jeri, and by 
the Washburn County Social Services Department.  As part of her 
initial examination of Jeri, McCormick interviewed both Jeri's 
mother and Bell.  Both women repeated Jeri's allegations to 
McCormick. 
¶6 
Three evidentiary rulings are the focus of the 
defendant's challenge.  First, the defendant filed a pretrial 
motion in limine asking the circuit court to exclude or limit 
the testimony of potential witnesses, including that of Jeri's 
mother, her sister, and Officer Glau.3  The defendant contended 
that the child's statements to the mother, sister, and officer 
constituted 
impermissible 
hearsay 
that 
did 
not 
meet 
the 
                     
3 Bell did not testify in the criminal trial.  
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
4 
requirements of the excited utterance exception as applied to 
child abuse cases and explained in State v. Gerald L.C., 194 
Wis. 2d 548, 535 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1995).  The circuit court 
denied the motion. 
¶7 
Second, 
McCormick 
testified 
at 
trial 
about 
her 
examination 
of 
Jeri. 
 
McCormick 
repeated 
her 
initial 
conversations with Bell and Jeri's mother, which included the 
accusations that Jeri made against the defendant.  The defense 
objected that such statements were double hearsay.  The circuit 
court overruled the objection on the grounds that the testimony 
fell within the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
¶8 
Finally, the jury also heard testimony from the 
State's child sexual abuse accommodation expert, Dr. Carolyn 
Levitt.  The State asked Dr. Levitt to comment concerning 
whether the facts of Jeri's allegations of abuse, such as her 
delay in reporting the abuse and her inability to quantify the 
exact number of instances of abuse, were consistent with the 
behavior of child abuse victims.  Despite defense counsel's 
objection 
that 
the 
questions 
called 
for 
an 
inadmissible 
assessment of Jeri's credibility, the circuit court permitted 
Dr. Levitt to respond. 
¶9 
The jury found the defendant guilty on three of the 
six counts of felonious sexual assault of a child under age 13 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
5 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1).4  The defendant appealed, and 
the court of appeals affirmed the conviction.   
¶10 The court of appeals determined that the circuit court 
properly admitted the statements of the mother, sister, and 
Officer Glau as excited utterances.  The court also rejected the 
defendant's interpretation of Dr. Levitt's testimony, declaring 
that Dr. Levitt did not offer an opinion on Jeri's truthfulness. 
 Finally, the court of appeals found Nurse McCormick's testimony 
admissible. 
 
The 
appellate 
court 
determined 
that 
Jeri's 
statements to her mother were excited utterances and that the 
mother's recital of such statements to McCormick were made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  The court of 
appeals also determined that both Jeri's statements to Bell and 
Bell's recounting of those statements to McCormick fell within 
the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
                     
4 Wis. Stat. § 948.02 states:  
 
Sexual Assault of a child. (1) FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL 
ASSAULT.  Whoever has sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony. 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references 
are to the 1995-96 volumes.  
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
6 
I.  Application of Exceptions to Hearsay Rule. 
¶11 The admission of out-of-court statements pursuant to 
an exception to the hearsay rule is a determination left to the 
discretion of the circuit court.  See State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 
2d 74, 96, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990).  Because the circuit court is 
better 
able 
to 
weigh 
the 
reliability 
of 
circumstances 
surrounding out-of-court statements, "we look not to see if we 
agree with the circuit court's determination, but rather whether 
the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance with 
accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of 
record."  Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 542, 570 N.W.2d 851 
(1997)(internal citations omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 
150 Wis. 2d 62, 71, 440 N.W.2d 783 (1989).  If we can discern a 
reasonable basis for its evidentiary decision, then the circuit 
court has not committed an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
See State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 240, 421 N.W.2d 77 
(1988). 
 
A.  Statements of Mother, Sister, and Officer Glau as 
Excited Utterances. 
¶12 The State contended at trial that Jeri's statements to 
these three parties were admissible either as an excited 
utterance under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2), or under the general 
residual hearsay exception set forth in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24).5 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 908.03 declares: 
Hearsay Exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial.  The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness: 
. . . 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
7 
 The circuit court and court of appeals agreed, and held that 
the statements to Jeri's mother and sister and Officer Glau fell 
within the excited utterance exception. 
¶13 "The excited utterance exception . . . is based upon 
spontaneity and stress" which, like the bases for all exceptions 
to the hearsay rule, "endow such statements with sufficient 
trustworthiness to overcome the reasons for exclusion of 
hearsay."  Martinez, 150 Wis. 2d at 73 (quoting Christensen v. 
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 56-57, 252 N.W.2d 81 
(1977)).  Accordingly, the excited utterance exception has 
three requirements.  First, there must be a "startling event or 
condition."  Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 466, 289 N.W.2d 
570 (1980).  Second, the declarant must make an out-of-court 
statement that relates to the startling event or condition.  
Finally, the related statement must be made while the declarant 
is still "under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition."  Id.  Essentially, "[i]t must be shown that the 
statement was made so spontaneously or under such psychological 
or physical pressure or excitement that the rational mind could 
not interpose itself between the spontaneous statement or 
                                                                  
(2) EXCITED UTTERANCE.   A statement relating to 
a 
startling 
event 
or 
condition 
made 
while 
the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event or condition.  
. . . 
(24) 
OTHER 
EXCEPTIONS. 
 
A 
statement 
not 
specifically 
covered 
by 
any 
of 
the 
foregoing 
exceptions 
but 
having 
comparable 
circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
8 
utterance stimulated by the event and the event itself."  
Martinez, 150 Wis. 2d at 73 (quoting Wilder v. Classified Risk 
Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 286, 292, 177 N.W.2d 109 (1970)). 
¶14 This court has also recognized that "there is a 
compelling need for admission of hearsay arising from young 
sexual assault victims' inability or refusal to verbally express 
themselves in court when the child and the perpetrator are sole 
witnesses to the crime."  Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 243.  
Accordingly, in some cases, where a child has made an allegation 
of sexual abuse that does not immediately follow the incident, 
Wisconsin appellate courts have liberally construed the excited 
utterance 
exception 
to 
hold 
such 
statements 
sufficiently 
contemporaneous and spontaneous to fall within the exception.  
See Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 244-45; Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 97; 
see, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 515, n.21, 326 
N.W.2d 744 (1982); State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 420, 329 
N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1982). 
¶15 This application is consistent with the view that 
"time is measured by the duration of the condition of excitement 
rather than mere time elapse from the event or condition 
described."  Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 97 (quoting Muller, 94 Wis. 
2d at 467).  It is supported by the theory that the immature 
emotional and psychological characteristics of children extend 
the time in which statements are likely not the result of 
"conscious fabrication."  Gerald L.C., 194 Wis. 2d at 556-57 
(citing 2 McCormick on Evidence §272.1, at 224 (John W. Strong 
ed., 4th ed. 1992)). 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
9 
¶16 Allegations of sexual abuse by children are not, 
however, pro forma guaranteed admission as excited utterances in 
proceedings against their abusers.  In Gerald L.C., the court of 
appeals rejected the State's offer of a 14-year-old's statement 
to a police officer that accused the defendant of sexual assault 
as neither an excited utterance nor sufficiently trustworthy to 
invoke the residual hearsay exception.  In surveying the law of 
this state for application of the excited utterance exception to 
child abuse cases, the Gerald L.C. court distilled three common 
factors arguing for its application: (1) the child is under ten 
years old; (2) the child reports the sexual abuse within one 
week of the last abusive incident; and (3) the child first 
reports the abuse to his or her mother.  See Gerald L.C., 194 
Wis. 2d at 557. 
¶17 The defendant points to the failure of the facts of 
this case to comport with the factors enunciated in Gerald L.C., 
and asks us to apply the factors as a bright-line rule.  The 
victim in this case was nine or ten when the abuse allegedly 
occurred, but did not report the abuse to her mother until the 
day after her eleventh birthday.  She reported the abuse within 
two weeks of the last event, not one.  Finally, while the 
victim's hysterical description of the abuse to her mother was 
the factor initiating 
this 
case, 
the 
victim 
had 
at an 
undetermined earlier time mentioned the abuse to a cousin and to 
someone's aunt.  Neither prior instance is developed in the 
record.   
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
10
¶18 Such reliance by the defendant on Gerald L.C. is 
misplaced.  As the Gerald L.C. court explicitly conceded, "[o]f 
course, these factors by themselves are not dispositive, and the 
statements may be admissible if the declarant was still under 
the stress or excitement caused by the event at the time he or 
she made the statement."  Gerald L.C., 194 Wis. 2d at 558-59.  
Factual scenarios may exist that deviate from the Gerald L.C. 
factors, yet which allow a circuit court to reasonably determine 
that a child was still under the stress of excitement of the 
abuse.  See Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 98 (statement of five-year-old 
to mother more than one week after incident admissible); State 
ex rel. Harris v. Schmidt, 69 Wis. 2d 668, 230 N.W.2d 890 
(1975)(statement of five-year-old child to defendant's probation 
officer 15 days after incident admissible).  Accordingly, we 
decline to declare the Gerald L.C. test a bright-line rule.  
Even though Jeri's hearsay statements do not fall within the 
three factors, the statements could still demonstrate sufficient 
trustworthiness to be admitted under the excited utterance 
exception.  
¶19 Jeri first related her allegations of sexual abuse 
against the defendant to her mother and sister approximately two 
weeks after the last alleged incident.  As noted above, we have 
allowed an interim period to exist between the abuse and report 
of abuse in child sexual assault cases.  See Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 
at 97.  At the time of Jeri's statement to her mother and sister 
relating 
the 
abuse, 
Jeri 
was 
alternatively 
described 
as 
"crying," "hysterical," "guilt-ridden," and "scared."  While the 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
11
record is devoid of any information concerning Jeri's conduct in 
the two weeks after the last incident and preceding her report, 
there are indications that she had just discovered that she 
would be spending two weeks alone with the defendant. 
¶20 After acknowledging familiarity with Wisconsin case 
law on applying the excited utterance exception to child sexual 
assault cases, the circuit court found Jeri's statements to her 
mother, sister, and Officer Glau to be an excited utterance 
"under all the facts and circumstances in this case."  Because 
we conclude that the circuit court reached a reasonable 
conclusion concerning the statements to the mother and sister 
after application of the proper standard of law, we do not 
believe that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Because a reasonable basis exists for the admission 
of the mother and sister's testimony about Jeri's statements 
under the excited utterance exception, we determine that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion. 
¶21 The admissibility of Jeri's statement to Officer Glau 
under the excited utterance exception is a closer call.  The 
statements to Officer Glau were made after telling the mother 
and sister of the abuse and were made as part of an abuse 
investigation.  Nevertheless, the facts suggest a child "still 
under the stress or excitement caused by the event at the time 
he or she made the statement."  Gerald L.C., 194 Wis. 2d at 558-
59. 
¶22  Shortly after reporting the abuse to her mother, Jeri 
met with Officer Glau.  During that two-hour period she 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
12
continued to be in a state of emotional distress and was 
described as "crying," "hysterical," and "scared."  Officer Glau 
stated that during his interview she would cry and he repeatedly 
had to stop the interview to allow Jeri to regain her composure. 
 Because Jeri continued to exhibit indications of emotional 
distress relating to her abuse during her interview with Officer 
Glau, her prior rendition of her abuse to her mother and sister 
does not defeat application of the excited utterance exception 
to her statements to Officer Glau.  Accordingly, we determine 
that the circuit court also correctly exercised its discretion 
when holding Jeri's statement to Officer Glau to be an excited 
utterance. 
B.  Residual Hearsay Exception 
¶23 We note that while we determine that Jeri's statements 
constituted excited utterances, the State alternatively asserted 
at trial that the child's statements fell under the residual 
hearsay exception as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24).  
Consistent with the directive in Gerald L.C., we proceed to also 
consider the admissibility of such hearsay statements under the 
residual exception.  See Gerald L.C., 194 Wis. 2d at 560.  
Indeed, as one commentator has suggested, even where we apply 
the excited utterance exception to a child's statements, we may 
also consider the residual hearsay exception.  "[I]n assessing 
the admissibility of hearsay in such situations the trial court 
should consider both avenues of admissibility.  If either one, 
or both, are satisfied, then the statements may be admitted for 
purposes of the hearsay rule." 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
13
Practice: Evidence § 803.2, at 466 (1991); see also Sorenson, 
143 Wis. 2d at 243. 
¶24 The residual hearsay exception is designed as a catch-
all exception that allows hearsay statements that may not 
comport with established exceptions, but which still demonstrate 
sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 908.03(24); Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226. In Sorenson, we 
determined that courts applying the residual hearsay exception 
to a child's statements must consider the following factors: 
 
First, 
the 
attributes 
of 
the 
child 
making 
the 
statement should be examined, including age, ability 
to communicate verbally, to comprehend the statements 
or questions of others, to know the difference between 
 truth and falsehood, and any fear of punishment, 
retribution or other personal interest, such as close 
familial relationship with the defendant, expressed by 
the child which might affect the child's method of 
articulation or motivation to tell the truth. 
 
Second, the court should examine the person to whom 
the statement was made, focusing on the person's 
relationship to the child, whether that relationship 
might 
have 
an 
impact 
upon 
the 
statement's 
trustworthiness, and any motivation of the recipient 
of the statement to fabricate or distort its contents. 
 
Third, the court should review the circumstances under 
which the statement was made, including relation to 
the time of the alleged assault, the availability of a 
person in whom the child might confide, and other 
contextual factors which might enhance or detract from 
the statement's trustworthiness. 
 
Fourth, the content of the statement itself should be 
examined, particularly noting any sign of deceit or 
falsity and whether the statement reveals knowledge of 
matters not ordinarily attributable to a child of 
similar age. 
 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
14
Finally, 
other 
corroborating 
evidence, 
such 
as 
physical evidence of assault, statements made to 
others, and opportunity or motive of the defendant, 
should be examined for consistency with the assertions 
made in the statement. 
Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 245-46.  Using these factors, we turn 
then to examine the reliability of the child's statements to her 
mother and sister and Officer Glau. 
 
¶25 Noteworthy in this examination of reliability is the 
void of evidence supporting a motive for the victim to 
fabricate.  As an 11-year-old child, Jeri demonstrated to the 
circuit court her ability to communicate and her ability to 
differentiate between the truth and a falsehood.  The record 
reflects that the defendant and Jeri maintained essentially a 
father-daughter relationship since she was three years old.  She 
visited him on a weekly basis and stayed at his home overnight. 
 Her mother had no objection to Jeri's overnight stays with the 
defendant.  In fact, it was anticipated that Jeri would soon be 
spending two weeks with the defendant while her mother was out 
of state on vacation. 
¶26 Jeri testified that she loved the defendant and told 
him that she wanted to live with him.  She thought that if she 
lived with him that perhaps the abuse would stop.  She liked 
getting all the gifts, all the "stuff" that he bought for her. 
¶27 The defense was unable to develop a motive for the 
victim to lie.  A reference at trial contained in a one-sentence 
question to Officer Glau suggests the possibility that Jeri 
might have been upset with the defendant because he had a new 
girlfriend.  Yet, Officer Glau testified that when he asked the 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
15
defendant if "he could think of any reason whatsoever why this 
child would falsely accuse him," the defendant's response was 
that "he did not know."  During the defendant's testimony he 
acknowledged that it made no sense for the victim to lie about 
the sexual abuse. 
 
Question:  And wouldn't it seem completely contrary, 
Mr. Huntington, to all common sense and logic that if 
this little girl wanted to come and live with you, she 
would accuse you of sexually molesting her over two 
years? 
 
Defendant:  It doesn't make any sense, that's right. 
Hence, the attributes of the child, her close relationship with 
the defendant, and her lack of motive to fabricate support the 
reliability of the child's statements. 
¶28 The statements at issue are Jeri's comments to her 
mother and sister and her interview with Officer Glau.  Both the 
mother 
and 
sister 
indicated 
at 
trial 
that 
an 
amicable 
relationship existed between them and the defendant.  There is 
no apparent motivation for them to fabricate Jeri's allegations. 
 Likewise, Officer Glau also had no motivation to lie.  He 
interviewed 
Jeri 
in 
his 
official 
capacity 
in 
order 
to 
investigate 
her 
allegations 
of 
sexual 
abuse 
against 
the 
defendant.  Thus, an examination of motives of the recipients of 
Jeri's statements to distort the statements also supports 
admissibility of those statements. 
¶29 As noted above, the circumstances under which the 
statements were made also enhance their reliability.  Jeri made 
her accusations within a three-hour period under conditions 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
16
which 
show 
that 
she 
was 
"hysterical," 
"scared," 
and 
intermittently crying.  The revelation of the statements to the 
mother occurred after she received a hysterical phone call from 
Jeri.  The sister indicated that when she arrived Jeri was still 
crying and that when she spoke with Jeri alone Jeri repeated the 
allegations.  When Jeri repeated the allegations to Officer 
Glau, she continued to cry.  In addition, Officer Glau 
purposefully conducted his interview with Jeri without her 
mother being present in order to ensure that the mother did not 
prompt the responses of the child. 
¶30 In 
further 
assessing 
the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
statements, 
we 
note 
that 
Jeri's 
statements 
were 
made 
approximately two weeks after the last incident of abuse.  While 
the record does not reflect why Jeri waited two weeks before 
telling her story to anyone, it also does not reflect other 
contextual factors which detract from the truthfulness of Jeri's 
statements.  Notably, "[u]se of the residual exception in child 
sexual assault cases is even less reliant upon immediacy of 
statements because other indicia of reliability support its 
trustworthiness."  Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 245 (citing Judicial 
Council Committee Note, 59 Wis. 2d R301 (1974)). 
¶31 Moreover, the content of Jeri's statements reveals no 
indications of falsity.  While the defendant is correct to point 
to inconsistencies in Jeri's statements as to the number of 
occurrences of abuse, in light of Jeri's age and the stressful 
nature of the incidents, we do not find such ambiguities to be 
of sufficient weight to defeat the other indicia of reliability. 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
17
 We also note that while Jeri may have vacillated on the number 
of occurrences, the descriptions of the actual form of the 
sexual abuse and her methods of avoiding further abuse that she 
relayed to her mother and sister and Officer Glau were 
consistent with her testimony and her statements to other 
witnesses.   
¶32 Finally, other corroborating evidence supports the 
reliability of Jeri's statements.  As noted by Officer Glau in 
reference 
to 
Jeri's 
statement, 
Huntington 
corroborated 
"virtually everything except the sexual assault."  Although the 
record reflects no physical evidence corroborating the alleged 
sexual abuse, such a dearth of evidence is of little import 
because the alleged abuse is not of the type that would leave 
tell-tale physical damage. 
¶33 In sum, each of the five Sorenson factors weighs in 
favor of admissibility of the statements.  Each factor enhances 
the reliability of the statements.  Together they support the 
conclusion that the statements demonstrate sufficient indicia of 
reliability to meet the residual hearsay exception.6  
C. Double Hearsay Statements to Nurse McCormick 
¶34 The statements of Nurse Practitioner McCormick require 
a more detailed analysis, since McCormick's challenged testimony 
was not just the result of a personal conversation with Jeri, 
                     
6 Because 
we 
determine 
that 
Jeri's 
statements 
were 
exceptions to the hearsay rule under the excited utterance and 
residual hearsay exceptions, we do not reach the State's "rule 
of completeness" argument. 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
18
but was also based on third-party statements made to McCormick 
by Jeri's mother and Bell.  Such testimony constitutes "double 
hearsay."  To be admissible, each prong of a double hearsay 
statement must conform with an individual exception to the 
hearsay rule.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.05;7 State v. Kreuser, 91 
Wis. 2d 242, 249, 280 N.W.2d 270 (1979). 
¶35 As discussed above, Jeri's statements to her mother 
are admissible under either the excited utterance or the 
residual hearsay exception.  Thus, the first step of the double 
hearsay requirement is met.  Our double hearsay inquiry then 
turns on whether the statements of Jeri's mother to McCormick 
also fit within an established hearsay exception.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 908.05. 
¶36 The State contends, and the court of appeals agreed, 
that the statements of the mother to McCormick fall within the 
medical 
diagnosis 
or 
treatment 
exception, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.03(4).8  This presents us with a question of first 
                     
7 Wis. Stat. § 908.05 provides: 
Hearsay within hearsay.  Hearsay included within 
hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each 
part of the combined statements conforms with an 
exception to the hearsay rule provided in this 
chapter.  
 
8 Wis. Stat. § 908.03 provides in pertinent part: 
Hearsay Exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial.  The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness: 
. . . 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
19
impression.  This court has never considered whether the medical 
diagnosis exception applies only to first parties speaking with 
their health care providers, or whether the exception may also 
be invoked to cover third parties making statements in the 
course of seeking diagnosis and medical treatment for another.  
¶37 As a threshold matter, we note that at trial the 
defendant challenged the application of Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4) 
to McCormick's testimony by claiming McCormick was not consulted 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  However, 
McCormick explicitly testified that Jeri was referred to her 
office by Bell for purposes of diagnosing the extent of the 
abuse she had suffered and determining an appropriate course of 
treatment.  The circuit court accepted McCormick's testimony on 
this issue and determined that the nurse practitioner was 
consulted for medical purposes.  This is a discretionary 
credibility conclusion which binds this court. 
¶38 We are thus squarely confronted with third-party 
application of Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4).  In considering the scope 
of the medical diagnosis exception, we must remain cognizant of 
the 
previously 
stated 
underlying 
basis 
for 
all 
hearsay 
exceptions: 
 
the 
presence 
of 
sufficient 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness.  The primary guarantee of trustworthiness 
                                                                  
(4) STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS 
OR TREATMENT.  Statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, 
or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or 
the inception or general character of the cause or 
external source thereof as reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment.  
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
20
surrounding a declarant's statements offered for purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment is that, because any proposed 
treatment will be based in part on the exactitude and veracity 
of those statements, the declarant has a substantial self-
interest in being truthful.  See State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 
370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 505, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). 
¶39 Young children cannot independently seek out medical 
attention, but must rely on their caretakers to do so.  A 
parent's interest in obtaining necessary medical care for a 
child demonstrates fundamental indicia of reliability.  See 
United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 1995).  
Moreover, as Weinstein notes in relation to parental statements 
to medical professionals, "[t]he relationship between declarant 
and patient will usually determine admissibility.  In the case 
of a child, a court would surely presume the absence of any 
motive to mislead on the part of the parents."  5 Jack B. 
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence, 
§ 803.09[3], at 803-43 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997). 
 Accordingly, because Jeri's statements to her mother are 
admissible under a recognized hearsay exception, and because the 
mother's 
statements 
to 
McCormick 
fall 
within 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
21
§ 908.03(4), the circuit court's discretionary decision to admit 
that portion of McCormick's testimony was reasonable.9 
¶40 The 
circuit 
court 
in 
this 
case 
also 
admitted 
McCormick's testimony that repeated what Jeri had told Bell.  
The circuit court made this ruling relying on its impression 
that Jeri's statements to Bell were also statements made in the 
course of seeking medical diagnosis or treatment.  We disagree. 
¶41 While this court has not confined the scope of Wis. 
Stat. § 908.03(4) solely to medical doctors, we have not 
previously applied the exception to counselors or social 
workers.  We have applied the exception to statements made to 
psychologists.  See State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 424, 406 
N.W.2d 385 (1987).  We have applied the exception to statements 
made to psychiatrists.  See State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 707.  
Our courts have also applied the exception to chiropractors.  
See Klingman v. Kruschke, 115 Wis. 2d 124, 126, 339 N.W.2d 603 
(Ct. App. 1983).  Moreover, in this case we apply the exception 
to statements concerning medical diagnosis or treatment that are 
made to a nurse practitioner on staff with a physician. 
¶42 We decline, however, to apply the hearsay exception 
for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, Wis. 
Stat. § 908.03(4), to statements made to counselors or social 
workers.  Such an expansive application of the doctrine would 
                     
9 While we acknowledge that statements made to medical 
professionals by parents may invoke Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4), we 
reiterate 
that 
such 
statements 
must 
be 
accompanied 
with 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  Absent such guarantees, the 
circuit court may properly exclude third-party statements. 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
22
strain the traditional grounds for the exception.  Receipt of 
proper medical diagnosis and treatment requires doctors to 
obtain basic information about a patient implicating that 
diagnosis and treatment.  The doctor is focused on diagnosis and 
treatment of the individual, "not on the process of providing 
larger social remedies aimed at detecting abuse, identifying and 
punishing abusers, and preventing further mistreatment, which 
involves skills and social intervention lying beyond the 
expertise of doctors."  4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 442, at 464 (2d ed. 1994). 
¶43 Because we decline to extend the medical diagnosis or 
treatment exception to counselors and social workers, the double 
hearsay test cannot be fulfilled.  Admission of the statements 
based on McCormick's conversation with Bell was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  However, we determine that the error 
was harmless because McCormick's rendition of Jeri's abuse was 
also based on her conversations with Jeri and Jeri's mother, who 
repeated essentially the same allegations.  We conclude there is 
"no reasonable probability" that the error contributed to the 
defendant's conviction.  See State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 
543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). 
¶44 We also note that the defendant asserted at oral 
argument, though not in briefs, that the circuit court's 
admission of Jeri's statements to her mother, sister, Officer 
Glau, Bell, and McCormick "was piling on and was cumulative."  
Under Wis. Stat. § 904.03, "needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence" is one factor in the circuit court's discretionary 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
23
consideration of whether evidence is more prejudicial than 
probative. 
¶45 There was no cumulative error in this case.  It is 
significant that at trial the defendant's theory of the case was 
that the defendant did not commit the crimes alleged.  Inherent 
in this position is an assertion that the victim had falsified 
her accusations.  When the State pressed the court on whether 
the defense could attack inconsistencies in Jeri's testimony, 
the defense responded, "[T]hat's our entire defense."  The 
defense repeatedly proved this assertion by attacking perceived 
inconsistencies in Jeri's statements to each of the other 
witnesses.  By attacking Jeri's testimony in such a manner, the 
defendant made the testimony of the individuals to whom Jeri had 
repeated her accusations material to the case.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court's failure to find the repetitive testimony 
cumulative and prejudicial was not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion. 
II.  Expert Testimony of Doctor  
¶46 The defendant also challenges the testimony of the 
State's child abuse expert, in which Dr. Levitt responds to 
questions concerning the victim's delay in reporting the abuse 
and conflicting assertions as to the actual number of instances 
of abuse.  The defendant contends that the witness's testimony 
was offered for the purpose of assessing the credibility of 
statements of another witness—the victim. 
¶47 A witness may not testify that another competent 
witness is telling the truth.  See State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
24
240, 249, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 
92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984).  However, an expert 
witness may offer relevant testimony that a victim's behavior is 
consistent with the behavior of similarly situated victims.  See 
Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 256. 
¶48 The question of whether a witness has improperly 
testified as to the credibility of another witness is a question 
of law which we review independently.  See State v. Davis, 199 
Wis. 2d 513, 519, 545 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1996).  Upon review 
of 
the 
record, 
we 
decline 
to 
adopt 
the 
defendant's 
characterization of Dr. Levitt's testimony. 
¶49 The State asked Dr. Levitt whether Jeri's difficulty 
at school was consistent with behavior of other sexual abuse 
victims.  Dr. Levitt responded in the affirmative.  The State 
then asked if Jeri's failure to report the abuse for a lengthy 
period of time was consistent with other victims of sexual 
abuse.  Dr. Levitt answered that delayed disclosure "would be 
entirely what's expected in child sexual abuse."  The State 
followed up with the inquiry, "Do you have an opinion . . . as 
to whether this child's delayed reporting of this, given that 
the accused is a stepfather or father figure would be consistent 
with the delays that you have observed" in other victims?  Dr. 
Levitt responded in general that "when a child is abused by a 
family member . . . there are inherent behavioral directions in 
. . . not telling, when there is that secrecy." 
¶50 Finally, the State asked Dr. Levitt "whether this 
child's inability to recount the exact number of times that she 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
25
had been sexually abused by her stepfather is consistent 
with . . . that type of behavior which you've noted in your 
experience . . . ."  Dr. Levitt replied that "whenever child 
sexual abuse is happening within a child's family . . . the 
exact number of times becomes very confounded and that is 
entirely consistent with child sexual abuse accommodations 
syndrome." 
¶51 As the testimony highlighted above indicates, this is 
not a case where an expert testifies that there "was no doubt 
whatsoever" that the accuser was a victim of moral turpitude.  
See Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 95.  This is also not a case where 
the expert opined that the victim "was being totally truthful" 
with the authorities.  See State v. Romero, 147 Wis. 2d 264, 
277, 432 N.W.2d 899 (1988).  Rather, Dr. Levitt's testimony, 
viewed in its entirety and in the context of the questions to 
which it was responsive, merely offered her expert opinion that 
the facts of Jeri's case are what would be expected of, or what 
would be consistent with, facts surrounding other victims of 
childhood sexual abuse.  Accordingly, Dr. Levitt did not violate 
the prohibitions of Haseltine or Jensen and the circuit court 
properly overruled the defendant's objection and admitted the 
testimony. 
III.  Conclusion. 
¶52 Because we find that Jeri's statements to her mother 
and sister and Officer Glau constitute excited utterances and 
display sufficient indicia of reliability to invoke the residual 
hearsay exception, the circuit court's admission of such 
No. 96-1775-CR 
 
26
testimony 
was 
not 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  
Similarly, because Jeri's mother's recital of the allegations to 
McCormick fall within the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay 
exception, that testimony was also properly admitted.   The 
circuit 
court 
should 
have 
excluded 
McCormick's 
testimony 
relating to statements made by Bell about Jeri's accusations, 
because the medical diagnosis or treatment exception does not 
extend to social workers.  However, such error was harmless.  
Finally, because Dr. Levitt did not testify as to Jeri's 
truthfulness, her testimony was properly admitted.  Accordingly, 
the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
96-1775-CR.jpg  
 
1 
¶53 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Dissenting).  Although I believe 
the majority accurately analyzes the evidentiary issues under 
current Wisconsin case law, I dissent. 
¶54 Our current case law stretches the excited utterance 
and the general residual hearsay exceptions in child sexual 
assault cases to the point that hearsay statements admitted 
under them no longer possess the inherent trustworthiness 
justifying admissibility. 
¶55 The majority correctly applies the holdings in State 
v. Gerald L.C., 194 Wis. 2d 548, 535 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1995), 
State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990), and other 
prior cases to the issue of admissibility of Jeri's statements 
to her mother, her sister, and the police officer under the 
excited utterance exception, Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2).  Under that 
exception, the majority accurately points out that "the related 
statement must be made while the declarant is still under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."  
Majority op. at 7.  The inherent trustworthiness of a hearsay 
statement under that exception emanates from the temporary 
stress of excitement arising from the event and still existing 
at the time the statement is made.  In Christensen v. Economy 
Fire & Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 58, 252 N.W.2d 81 (1977), 
quoting Cossette v. Lepp, 38 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 157 N.W.2d 629 
(1968), this court stated: "It is the condition of excitement 
that temporarily stills the capacity for reflection which is the 
significant factor assuring trustworthiness, assuring that the 
declarant lacked the capacity to fabricate."  Rather than using 
96-1775-CR.jpg  
 
2 
the traditional analysis for the exception as described in 
Christensen, the majority, consistent with our recent cases, 
applies what has become a looser test of admissibility under 
§ 908.03(2).  
¶56 The looseness occurs because this court no longer 
looks for evidence that the declarant is still under "the 
condition of excitement" from the event when making the 
statement.  The court looks to see only if the declarant is 
upset when making the statement.  I do not for one moment 
question that a sexual assault of a child is an extremely 
stressful event for the child.  Nor do I question that a child 
who has been assaulted may well be under the stress of the event 
for a prolonged period of time.  There is a fundamental 
difference, 
however, 
between 
a 
statement 
"relating 
to 
a 
startling event made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event" and a declarant later becoming 
stressed and upset while describing an earlier event.  The 
latter declaration does not provide the inherent trustworthiness 
envisioned in the excited utterance exception.  Discussing 
Wisconsin 
case 
law, 
Professor 
Blinka 
cautions 
that 
"the 
temporary relationship between the startling event and the 
making of the statement has been most sorely tested in instances 
where children have reported sexual or physical abuse long after 
the event occurred."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice 
(Evidence) § 803.2, at 465 (1991). 
¶57 Here we know that two weeks after the last alleged 
incident, Jeri called her mother on the telephone, crying and 
96-1775-CR.jpg  
 
3 
hysterical.  There is nothing in the record about Jeri's 
emotional condition during the two preceding weeks.  In fact, 
the majority acknowledges that "the record is devoid of any 
information concerning Jeri's conduct in the two weeks after the 
last incident and preceding her report . . . ."  Majority op. at 
10-11.  The circuit court knew only that Jeri was distressed at 
the time she recounted these alleged incidents two weeks after 
the last incident.  The fact that "there are indications that 
she had just discovered that she would be spending two weeks 
alone with the defendant," majority op. at 11, does not 
establish that Jeri was still under the stress of excitement 
from an assaultive event two weeks earlier. 
¶58 After concluding that Jeri's hearsay statements were 
properly admissible under the excited utterance exception, the 
majority also analyzes the admissibility of those statements 
under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24), the general residual exception.  
The majority relies on State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 245-
46, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988), where this court agreed that 
§ 908.03(24) could be used to admit hearsay statements by 
children in sexual abuse cases if the court considered the 
appropriate factors, including the attributes of the child, the 
child's relationship to, and the motivations of, the person to 
whom the statement was made, the circumstances under which the 
statement was made, the content of the statement itself, and 
other corroborating evidence. 
¶59 Unfortunately, this court has created an evidentiary 
quagmire by asking trial judges to decide the admissibility of 
96-1775-CR.jpg  
 
4 
hearsay statements pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24) by using 
the Sorenson factors.  The general residual exception originally 
was applied where the inherent trustworthiness of the statement, 
although not covered by other exceptions, was clear and fairly 
easy to satisfy based on sufficient surrounding circumstances.  
For example, in Wirth v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 11, 197 N.W.2d 731 
(1972), this court concluded that a prepackaged, sealed bottle 
of codeine-type cough syrup was admissible to prove the contents 
of the bottle.  Indicia of inherent trustworthiness were obvious 
and easily satisfied based on the surrounding circumstances 
which included special storage, an unbroken seal, dispensing 
restrictions, and labeling and packaging regulations.  See 
Wirth, 55 Wis. 2d at 15.  In State v. Peters, 166 Wis. 2d 168, 
179-80, 479 N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals 
emphasized that "before otherwise inadmissible statements can be 
admitted under the residual exception, we must be confident that 
there are guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to allow the 
jury to depend on such evidence to make decisions of the utmost 
importance." 
¶60 In Sorenson, this court expanded the circuit court's 
duty to decide hearsay admissibility by looking at and weighing 
a 
myriad 
of 
credibility-related 
factors. 
 
Rather 
than 
considering just the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement, Sorenson tells the circuit court to consider factors 
like the child's fear of punishment and other personal interest, 
the motivations and biases of the person recounting the child's 
statement, contextual factors which might enhance or detract 
96-1775-CR.jpg  
 
5 
from the statements' trustworthiness, etc.  See Sorenson, 143 
Wis. 2d at 245-46.  Many of the factors that the circuit court 
applies under Sorenson are the same type of factors which a 
fact-finder 
would 
ordinarily 
consider 
in 
deciding 
what 
credibility and weight to give a witness's testimony.  Under 
Sorenson, the circuit court makes that assessment in deciding 
whether a hearsay statement is admissible and can be heard by 
the jury. 
¶61 Reading the majority opinion, it becomes apparent that 
what should be a relatively easy admissibility determination on 
the applicability of a well-established hearsay exceptiona 
Sorenson analysis under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24)has turned into 
a complicated credibility determination by the judge.  For 
example, the majority points out that the record shows that Jeri 
"loved the defendant," and that there is no "evidence supporting 
a motive for the victim to fabricate."  Majority op. at 14.  The 
majority also considers that Jeri was emotional during the 
recounting of the incidents (not that she was emotional since 
the alleged incidents), that there are no "other contextual 
factors 
which 
detract 
from 
the 
truthfulness 
of 
Jeri's 
statements," and that "the content of Jeri's statements reveal 
no indications of falsity."  Majority op. at 16.  We have 
traveled a long distance under the general residual exception 
from admitting the label on a bottle of cough syrup to admitting 
hearsay allegations of sexual assault two weeks after the last 
alleged incident. 
96-1775-CR.jpg  
 
6 
¶62 The United States Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment10 right to confront his or her 
accusers is not violated if the hearsay statement is admitted 
under a "firmly rooted exception."  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 66 (1980); State v. Hickman, 182 Wis. 2d 318, 328, 513 
N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1994).  See also White v. Illinois, 502 
U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992).  As this court continues to entertain 
a looser reading of Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2), while also relying 
on Sorenson's very liberal reading of Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24), 
we risk extending our hearsay exceptions well beyond their 
original intent.  We thereby also risk problems under the 
Confrontation Clause.  See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 
823-27 (1990). 
¶63 I dissent based on the majority's loosened application 
of the excited utterance exception and its use of the Sorenson 
factors for the residual hearsay exception.  I would overrule 
our decision in Sorenson and would urge this court to devise a 
way to halt the unnecessary, and dangerous, expansion of these 
two hearsay exceptions. 
                     
10 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor . . . ."  
96-1775-CR.jpg  
 
7 
¶64 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice William A. Bablitch join this opinion.