Title: Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 53S01-1709-PL-612
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2017

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TOWN 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
OF ELLETTSVILLE, INDIANA PLAN COMMISSION  
 
Michael Rabinowitch 
Darla S. Brown  
 
 
 
 
 
Maureen E. Ward 
Sturgeon & Brown, P.C.  
 
 
 
 
Wooden McLaughlin LLP 
Bloomington, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT RICHLAND  
CONVENIENCE STORE PARTNERS, LLC 
Andrew P. Sheff 
Sheff Law Office 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
Carina M. de la Torre 
The de la Torre Law Office LLC  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 53S01-1709-PL-612 
 
TOWN OF ELLETTSVILLE, INDIANA PLAN 
COMMISSION AND RICHLAND CONVENIENCE 
STORE PARTNERS, LLC,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellants (Respondents below),  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    v. 
 
JOSEPH V. DESPIRITO,    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Petitioner below).  
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court, No. 53C01-1509-PL-1714  
The Honorable E. Michael Hoff, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 53A01-1611-PL-2559 
_________________________________ 
 
December 12, 2017 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 12 2017, 12:46 pm
2 
 
 
Richland Convenience Store Partners, LLC asked the Town of Ellettsville’s Plan 
Commission to amend a subdivision plat so Richland could move a utility easement on its property. 
The Commission approved Richland’s request, over the objection of Richland’s neighbor, Joseph 
V. DeSpirito, whose property the easement benefits. DeSpirito then sued for judicial review, 
declaratory relief and associated damages (attorney’s fees and costs), and preliminary and 
permanent injunctive relief. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 17-24. An agreed preliminary injunction 
was entered barring Richland from taking any action in reliance on the Commission’s decision, 
pending further court order. Richland and the Commission answered the complaint.  
 
All parties sought summary judgment. An “Order on Judicial Review” (“Order”) entered 
October 19, 2016, granted DeSpirito’s motion for summary judgment and denied the others’ 
motions. The Order concluded the Commission erred in approving relocation of the easement and 
ordered the case remanded to the Commission with instructions to dismiss Richland’s request for 
plat amendment unless DeSpirito joins it. The Order stated the preliminary injunction remains in 
effect, but the Order was silent on DeSpirito’s request for damages and a permanent injunction. 
Id. at 16. 
    
 
Richland and the Commission (collectively, “Appellants”) filed notices of appeal, 
purporting to appeal from a final judgment. The Court of Appeals rightly questioned whether a 
final judgment has been entered and noted the preliminary nature of the injunction entered. Town 
of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 78 N.E.3d 666, 672 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), vacated. But it added, 
“[B]ecause our supreme court has significantly relaxed procedural requirements in this regard, see 
In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574 (Ind. 2017) (addressing merits of premature 
appeal), we do not consider the issue further.” Id. It went on to reverse the trial court and remand 
with instructions to enter summary judgment for the Appellants, reinstate the Commission’s 
decision, and conduct further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 680.  
 
Having granted transfer and heard oral argument, we address appellate jurisdiction 
differently. Nothing in D.J. eliminated or relaxed the requirements for appellate jurisdiction. It 
reaffirmed that the prerequisites for appellate jurisdiction are (1) entry of an appealable order by 
the trial court and (2) the trial court clerk’s entry of the notice of completion of the clerk’s record 
3 
 
on the chronological case summary (“CCS”). 68 N.E.3d at 578. D.J. explained that in a child in 
need of services (“CHINS”) case, the CHINS determination is not a final judgment and that finality 
does not occur until the court enters a dispositional order. Id. at 576. There, the trial court found 
the children to be CHINS, the parents then filed their separate notices of appeal, the court thereafter 
entered its dispositional order, and the clerk later filed the notice of completion of the clerk’s 
record. Id. at 577. Appellate jurisdiction was secure in D.J. because the trial court entered its 
dispositional order—a final judgment—before the clerk entered the notice of completion of clerk’s 
record on the CCS. Under Appellate Rule 8, the notice of completion of clerk’s record is the 
document having jurisdictional significance, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction and conferring 
jurisdiction in the appellate court. Although the parents had already filed their notices of appeal, 
the trial court still had jurisdiction to enter a final judgment because the clerk had not yet entered 
the notice of completion of clerk’s record on the CCS, and we concluded the parents’ “premature 
notices of appeal did not deprive the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Id. at 
581.  
 
Here, unlike in D.J., the record on appeal shows no final judgment. Indiana Appellate Rule 
2(H) defines a judgment as a “final judgment” if, among other things, it disposes of all claims as 
to all parties or the trial court expressly determines in writing that there is no just reason for delay 
and expressly directs entry of judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 54(B) as to fewer than all the 
claims or parties, or under Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) as to fewer than all the issues, claims, or 
parties. The Order left the preliminary injunction in place, did not rule on DeSpirito’s request for 
damages or a permanent injunction, and did not determine there is no just reason for delay and 
expressly direct entry of judgment on less than all of the issues, claims, or parties.  
 
For judicial economy under this case’s particular circumstances, we elect to stay this 
appeal’s consideration. We remand this case to the trial court to decide, in its discretion but within 
the next 90 days, whether to (1) expressly determine in writing that there is no just reason for delay 
and (2) expressly direct entry of judgment under Trial Rule 54(B) as to fewer than all the claims 
or parties, or under Trial Rule 56(C) as to fewer than all the issues, claims, or parties. See App. R. 
2(H)(2). After that decision, the Appellants shall promptly file a supplemental appendix including 
copies of the updated CCS and any new order(s) entered by the court on remand. We caution, 
4 
 
though, that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the proper course for an appellate court to take 
where it finds appellate jurisdiction lacking is simply to dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., In re Paternity 
of C.J.A., 12 N.E.3d 876 (Ind. 2014); Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 2012).  
 
Notwithstanding Appellate Rule 65(E), this opinion is effective immediately, and the trial 
court need not await a certification of this opinion by the Clerk of Courts before exercising the 
limited jurisdiction this remand allows. Given this remand’s interlocutory nature, no petitions for 
rehearing under Appellate Rule 54(A)(1) shall be filed on this opinion. See App. R. 1 (permitting 
deviation from Appellate Rules on Court’s motion).  
 
All Justices concur.