Title: People v. Santos
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 94620
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 2004

Docket No. 94620-Agenda 8-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JAMES 							
K. SANTOS, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 24, 20004.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	A jury in the circuit court of Winnebago County convicted defendant
James K. Santos of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS
5/12-16(d) (West 1998)) of T.K. The circuit court sentenced him to a
four-year prison term. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction
because of jury instruction error. The court also addressed an issue likely
to recur on remand, and reversed the trial court's ruling that certain
evidence must be excluded pursuant to section 115-7 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-7 (West 1998)),
commonly known as the "rape shield" statute. 333 Ill. App. 3d 1. We
granted the State leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). The State
admits that defendant is entitled to a new trial because of the errors in the
jury instructions; the State's only argument before this court is that the
appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's application of the rape
shield statute. We reverse the appellate court in part and remand for a
new trial.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal. Accordingly, we will summarize the evidence adduced at trial
except where greater specificity is necessary to our resolution of the legal
issues.
	Many of the facts surrounding the charges against defendant are
undisputed. In May 1999 T.K. was 16 years old. She and defendant met
at a party at the home of Angie Enna and Herbert Reaves late on May 8
or in the early morning hours of May 9. At the time Enna and Reaves were
25 and 20 years old, respectively. T. K., who had been drinking since
approximately 9 p.m. on May 8, was already somewhat inebriated when
she arrived at the party that night. When defendant subsequently arrived,
there was no alcohol at the party, and T.K. was among the people who
went with defendant to purchase more. Defendant purchased T.K. a beer
at her request. After returning the other persons to the party, defendant
and T.K. left again in defendant's car.
	Defendant and T.K. testified to different versions of the subsequent
events at trial. Both agreed that after riding around for several hours,
defendant parked the car in a remote area where the two engaged in
sexual intercourse. T.K. testified that she told defendant that she was 16
years old before the two engaged in any sexual activities. She also testified
that all sexual contact between her and defendant occurred without her
consent and against her will. Defendant, by contrast, testified that T.K.
made advances upon him and told him she was 18 years old, only
revealing that she was 16 years of age when the two were already
engaged in sexual intercourse. He testified that when she informed him of
this fact, he immediately ceased all sexual activities with her.
	The State charged defendant with criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/12-13(a) (West 1998)) and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(ii), (d) (West 1998)). The first count of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse alleged that defendant had committed an
act of sexual conduct with T.K. by the use of force or threat of force. 720
ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(ii) (West 1998). The second count alleged that
defendant had committed an act of sexual penetration with T.K., at a time
when T.K. was between the ages of 13 and 17 and defendant was at least
5 years older than she. 720 ILCS 5/ 12-16(d) (West 1998). The jury
acquitted defendant of the charge of criminal sexual assault and the charge
of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving an act of sexual conduct, but
convicted defendant on the charge of criminal sexual abuse involving an
act of sexual penetration. The circuit court sentenced defendant to four
years' imprisonment.
	The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded
for a new trial. The appellate court held that the circuit court committed
reversible error in its issues instruction to the jury. The court determined
that there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to support the defense
theory that defendant had reasonably believed that T.K. was over 16
years of age. Accordingly, the appellate court held, the circuit court was
required to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not reasonably believe the
victim to be of age. The failure to properly instruct the jury on the State's
burden of proof constituted reversible error, entitling defendant to a new
trial. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 8.
	The appellate court also elected to address an additional issue
because it was likely to recur on remand. Before trial, defendant filed a
motion in limine requesting the court's permission to cross-examine T.K.
regarding inconsistent statements she had made to the authorities.
Specifically, on May 9, T.K. told medical personnel who were collecting
rape kit samples that she had not engaged in sexual intercourse with
anyone other than the defendant in the previous 72 hours. However, in
August 1999, when DNA testing revealed that defendant could not have
been the source of semen recovered from the victim, T.K. admitted to the
police that she had in fact engaged in sexual intercourse with someone else
on May 9. The State objected to the introduction of this evidence,
contending it was barred under the rape shield statute. The trial court ruled
in the State's favor and excluded the evidence from consideration.
	The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in excluding the
evidence. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 9. The appellate court noted that the rape
shield statute contains an exception, permitting the introduction of evidence
the statute would otherwise bar where admission of such evidence is
"constitutionally required." Relying on its earlier decision in People v.
Grano, the appellate court held that the circuit court should have allowed
defendant to inquire regarding T.K.'s statements, because "T.K.'s
credibility was at issue." 333 Ill. App. 3d at 9. The court remanded for a
new trial, and directed the circuit court to permit defendant to cross-examine T.K. with her inconsistent statements.
	In partial dissent, Justice O'Malley disagreed with the majority
regarding the evidence the circuit court had excluded under the rape shield
statute. See 333 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11 (O'Malley, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The dissenting justice argued that the appellate
court majority erred in stating that Grano involved "prior inconsistent
statement[s]." 333 Ill. App. 3d at 10 (O'Malley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). She also noted that, regardless, the instant case did
not involve prior inconsistent statements, because the statements in
question were inconsistent only with each other, not with any statement the
victim had made during her in-court testimony. The dissenting justice
concluded that the cross-examination was impermissible regardless of the
rape shield, because inconsistent out-of-court statements were not a
proper basis for impeaching a witness' credibility. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 11
(O'Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
ANALYSIS
	The State concedes that the appellate court acted correctly in
granting defendant a new trial based on the jury instructions. The State's
only argument before this court is that the appellate court erred in
overruling the circuit court order barring defendant from cross-examining
T.K. about her inconsistent statements regarding whether she had engaged
in sexual activities with anyone else during the 72 hours preceding the
assault. The State contends that the trial court acted correctly in excluding
this evidence from the trial.
	Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v.
Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). A trial court abuses its discretion only
when its ruling is " ' "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable" ' or ' "where no
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court." ' "
People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003), quoting People v. M.D.,
101 Ill 2d 73, 90 (1984) (Simon, J., dissenting), quoting Peek v. United
States, 321 F.2d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 1963).
	The rape shield statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
			"In prosecutions for *** criminal sexual assault, [and]
aggravated criminal sexual abuse, *** the prior sexual activity or
the reputation of the alleged victim *** is inadmissible except (1)
as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged
victim *** with the accused when this evidence is offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim ***
consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the
offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be
admitted." 725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) (West 1998).
Thus the statute absolutely bars evidence of the alleged victim's prior
sexual activity or reputation, subject to two exceptions: (1) evidence of
past sexual activities with the accused, offered as evidence of consent; and
(2) where the admission of such evidence is constitutionally required.
	The appellate court determined that the circuit court erred in
excluding the evidence. The court relied exclusively on People v. Grano,
286 Ill. App. 3d 278 (1996). The appellate court stated that in Grano,
the court had
		"determined that the [rape shield] statute was not designed to
preclude the admission of all evidence related to sex. Instead, the
legislative intent of the rape shield statute is to exclude evidence
of actual sexual history or reputation of the victim, not evidence
offered for the purpose of impeachment, even when that
evidence relates to sex." 333 Ill. App. 3d at 9.
After discussing Grano, the appellate court noted that the credibility of the
alleged victim, T.K., was at issue in the instant case, and concluded that
"the trial court misapplied the rape shield statute as a basis for excluding
the evidence of T.K.'s inconsistent statements." We find the appellate
court to have erred.
	Grano does not support the appellate court's holding in this case. In
Grano, the appellate court reviewed a circuit court ruling that the rape
shield statute precluded the defendant from introducing evidence that the
complainant had previously falsely accused three other men of sexual
assault. The court reasoned that the circuit court had erred in determining
that the rape shield statute barred the introduction of this evidence because
a verbal accusation was not "sexual activity." Grano, 286 Ill. App. 3d at
288. This finding meant that the rape shield statute had no bearing on the
case at all, and thus the trial court had erred in excluding the evidence.
	The same is not true of the instant case. Here, although as in Grano
the evidence at issue does consist of statements by the complainant, those
statements clearly reveal the complainant's "prior sexual activity."
Accordingly, the rape shield does come into play. Contrary to the
reasoning of the dissenting justice (see slip op. at 17-18 (McMorrow,
C.J., dissenting)), and the appellate court majority, the statute makes no
exception based on the purpose for which the evidence is offered. It is of
no moment to the statute's application that defendant sought to introduce
the evidence for purposes of impeachment, rather than as an explicit
attack on the victim's character. The rape shield statute absolutely bars the
introduction of the evidence, unless one of the two exceptions listed in the
statute is applicable.
	The first exception relates only to prior sexual activity between the
victim and the accused, offered for purposes of establishing a defense of
consent. This exception is inapplicable in the instant case, as the prior
activity revealed by the evidence in question was not between complainant
and defendant. 725 ILCS 5/115-7(a)(1) (West 1998).
	The second exception permits introduction of evidence which the
statute would otherwise operate to exclude, "when constitutionally
required." 725 ILCS 5/115-7(a)(2) (West 1998). The evidence in
question in this case is two out-of-court statements which were
inconsistent with each other, but not with any statement made by the
witness on direct examination. We find that the constitution did not require
that this evidence be admitted.
	As the dissenting justice in the appellate court noted, what defendant
wished to do by introducing this evidence was to impeach the victim's
credibility with a specific act of untruthfulness. He wished to show the jury
that T.K. had lied on one occasion-when she told medical personnel she
had not had sexual intercourse with anyone else in the previous 72
hours-in order to support his argument that when she testified in court she
was lying about what had occurred between her and the defendant. Far
from being constitutionally required, specific-act impeachment is
prohibited in Illinois.(1) See, e.g., People v. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155, 162
(1994) (upholding trial court ruling prohibiting cross-examination regarding
specific instances of untruthfulness and rejecting contention that evidence
of specific acts of untruthfulness may be brought out even in cases
involving children who are too young to have developed a reputation);
People v. Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d 671, 680 (1999) ("Although the
defendant's credibility was an issue in this case, specific instances of
untruthfulness are not admissible to attack a witness's believability");
Podolsky &amp; Associates L.P. v. Discipio, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1026
(1998) ("In Illinois a witness's credibility may not be impeached by inquiry
into specific acts of misconduct which have not led to a criminal
conviction"); People v. McGee, 286 Ill. App. 3d 786, 796 (1997)
("specific instances of untruthfulness are not admissible to attack a
witness's believability"); M. Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of
Illinois Evidence §608.5, at 390 (8th ed. 2004) ("[t]he credibility of any
witness, including a reputation witness, may not be attacked upon cross-examination by questioning the witness concerning specific instances of her
misconduct not leading to a conviction"). Accordingly, it is clear that the
second exception listed in the rape shield statute is inapplicable, and the
evidence was correctly excluded.
	Defendant argues that the impeachment in this case is more than
ordinary mere-fact impeachment, however. He claims that it is especially
important that the jury hear about T.K.'s untruthfulness because it
occurred at the time she was reporting the crime. He argues that he is
entitled to let the jury know that T.K. lied about something when she was
reporting the crime, because her having done so casts doubt on everything
else she said.
	We reject this argument. Defendant's argument is the same as that
advanced in favor of any particular instance of untruthfulness-if the jury
knew that the witness had lied on a previous occasion, the jury would be
more likely to believe she was lying in her testimony regarding the facts at
issue in the case. Such cross-examination is simply not permitted, because
it is overly prejudicial in relation to its probative value. M. Graham, Cleary
&amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §608.5, at 390 (8th ed.
2004).
	Defendant's argument here is really a contention that he was not
impeaching the witness on a collateral matter. But this contention is
inaccurate. "A matter is collateral if it is not relevant to a material issue of
the case." Esser v. McIntyre, 169 Ill. 2d 292, 304-05 (1996). "The test
to be applied in determining if a matter is collateral is whether the matter
could be introduced for any purpose other than to contradict." People v.
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 269 (1985). Whether T.K had, unbeknownst to
defendant, engaged in sexual relations with someone else is wholly
unrelated to the question of whether defendant reasonably believed that
T.K. was of age when the act of sexual penetration took place, which was
the only controverted issue on this charge. The only reason defendant
sought to inquire of T.K. about her statements to medical personnel was
in order to contradict those statements with her later statements to law
enforcement authorities. Thus it was, indeed, a collateral matter. This
distinguishes the authority on which defendant relies wherein our appellate
court has found the constitution required a defendant to be permitted to
offer certain evidence which was directly relevant to matters at issue in the
case, notwithstanding that it concerned the victim's prior sexual activity.
See People v. Anthony W., 324 Ill. App. 3d 181, 186-87 (2001)
(evidence that complainant had sex a month before alleged assault would
explain physical evidence of cleft hymen); People v. Mason, 219 Ill. App.
3d 76, 78-79 (1991) (child victim's viewing of adult videotapes
admissible to explain her sexual knowledge, which had been submitted as
evidence of abuse).
	The dissent characterizes the victim as having lied about a "critical
fact" (slip op. at 22) at the time she "reported" (slip op. at 12, 22, 23, 24,
26, 27) the crime to the "authorities" (slip op. at 23, 24). We note for
purposes of clarification that the victim lied to an emergency room nurse
about having had sexual relations with her boyfriend. There is no indication
that the victim herself ever repeated this lie to the police, or indeed ever
directly lied to the police. Rather, the evidence is that once the police
inquired of the victim, she immediately admitted to them the truth. This
weakens considerably the dissent's inference that because the victim told
this lie she might also have lied to the police about having told defendant
she was 16. Slip op. at 26. Moreover, the fact that the victim told the
police that she had told defendant she was 16 before they engaged in
sexual activity was not referred to at trial and is thus irrelevant. Thus the
victim's "state of mind" at the time she first reported the crime is also
irrelevant. What matters is whether the victim told the truth in her in-court
testimony, and referring to prior bad acts in order to raise the inference
that a witness is lying at trial is prohibited under Illinois law.
	The dissent's characterization that the victim lied about a fact
"critical" to DNA analysis (slip op. at 23-24) is also difficult to accept.
Nothing in the record establishes that the victim's answer to this question
was critical to the analysis; to the contrary, the analysis discerned that
defendant's genetic markers were not present in the materials recovered
from the victim notwithstanding the victim's untruth.
	This court has specifically held that precluding a defendant in a sexual
assault trial from impeaching a complaining witness on a collateral matter
does not contravene the constitution. In People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 181 (1990), the defendant admitted he had anal sexual intercourse
with the complaining witness, as alleged, but claimed the encounter was
consensual. During the victim's direct examination, she testified that she
had never had anal sex with anyone other than the defendant. The trial
court ruled that the rape shield statute precluded the defendant from
cross-examining the victim regarding the veracity of this statement. This
court affirmed.
	We acknowledged the defendant's argument that the case "boil[ed]
down to the jury's determination of the credibility of the parties and he
was denied the opportunity to confront the witness with what he allege[d]
was a lie." Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d  at 180. Nevertheless, we found that the
allegedly untrue statement the victim had made was collateral to the only
controverted issue in the case-consent on the occasion in question-and
thus there was no constitutional violation in denying defendant the
opportunity to attempt the impeachment. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d  at 181
("Even if this court were to assume that the complainant was not truthful
when she testified that she had not had anal sex with others, we would not
be required to reverse the verdict of the jury based on a denial of
defendant's right of confrontation. Impeachment of a witness is restricted
to relevant matters; a witness may not be impeached on collateral or
irrelevant matters"). Here, as in Sandoval, the defendant seeks to impugn
his accuser's credibility by showing that she lied regarding a matter
collateral to the controverted issues in the case. Here, as in Sandoval, we
conclude that the constitution did not require that the defendant be
permitted to attempt the impeachment in question. We note that the
situation is even less favorable for defendant than it was for defendant
Sandoval, because in that case the false statement was made before the
jury, whereas here the false statement was made outside of court.(2) We
find no constitutional necessity for the impeachment.
	We note finally that the dissent contends that the court's ruling on the
motion in limine under review precluded defendant from informing the
jury that no semen matching his genetic profile had been recovered from
the victim. Slip op. at 24. This is inaccurate. Although the circuit court did
preclude defense counsel from so informing the jury, this was clearly a
separate and independent ruling from the court's ruling that defendant
could not cross-examine the victim with her inconsistent out-of-court
statements. We note that the motion in limine referred only to cross-examination; the other matter was raised separately during oral argument
on the motion. Although both rulings required the circuit court to interpret
and apply the rape shield, we see no logical or legal reason that the two
rulings must either both be upheld or both reversed. Our holding is limited
to the question before us: whether the circuit court was correct in
precluding defendant from cross-examining the victim regarding her
collateral out-of-court statements concerning her sexual history. Our
opinion is not an endorsement of any other pretrial ruling by the circuit
court, including specifically the court's separate ruling barring defendant
from informing the jury that no seminal material matching his genetic profile
was recovered from the victim. That ruling is not before us on this appeal,
the propriety of that ruling was not briefed by the parties before this court
nor before the appellate court, and we accordingly express no opinion
thereon.

CONCLUSION
	The evidence in question revealed the victim's "prior sexual activity."
Accordingly, the rape shield statute rendered it inadmissible. 725 ILCS
5/115-7(a) (West 1998). Neither of the two exceptions listed in the rape
shield statute apply. Accordingly, the circuit court ruling prohibiting
defendant from introducing the evidence in question was correct. We
reverse that portion of the appellate court opinion which reversed this
ruling, and remand for a new trial.
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part and reversed
in part, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
	At issue in this appeal is whether, under the rape shield statute (725
ILCS 5/115-7 (West 1998)), evidence of two prior contradictory
statements made by complainant during the course of this criminal
investigation, regarding whether she had engaged in sexual activities with
anyone other than defendant within 72 hours prior to this alleged sexual
assault, was properly excluded. The majority answers this question in the
affirmative. The majority holds that because the statements at issue reveal
the complainant's prior sexual activity, the rape shield statute precludes the
admission of such evidence. In addition, the majority holds that this
evidence is not admissible under the exception to the rape shield statute,
which allows the introduction of otherwise-barred evidence "when
constitutionally required" (725 ILCS 5/115-7(a)(2) (West 1998)).
According to the majority, admission of this evidence is not
"constitutionally required" for two reasons: (1) specific-act impeachment
is prohibited in Illinois; and (2) the impeachment of the complainant would
be on a matter that is collateral in this case.
	I respectfully, but strongly, dissent from the opinion of the majority.
I would hold that the appellate court below was correct in determining
that, due to the nature of the evidence relating to defendant's affirmative
defense against the sole criminal charge remaining against him, the trial
court misapplied the rape shield statute in denying defendant's motion in
limine seeking permission to cross-examine the complainant, T.K.,
regarding inconsistent statements she made at the time she reported the
alleged crime and during the investigation.
	The motion asserted that, upon submitting to a rape kit shortly after
the alleged assault, T.K. stated to hospital personnel who collected
samples for the kit that she had not had sexual intercourse with anyone
other than defendant within 72 hours of the sample collection. Three
months later, however, it was determined through DNA testing performed
by the Illinois State Police lab that the seminal fluid and pubic hair found
on T.K.'s underwear did not match defendant. In light of these test results
T.K. admitted to police that she had, in fact, engaged in a sexual
encounter with another man within 72 hours of the alleged assault.
Defendant sought to introduce evidence of T.K.'s contradictory
statements to the authorities to support his affirmative defense that he had
reason to believe that T.K. was 18 years of age at the time of the incident.
The evidence would show that T.K. lied at the time she reported the
alleged crime. The evidence of her untruthful statements would also show
that she was untruthful when she also stated to the authorities that she
informed defendant that she was 16 years old, well before any sexual
activity commenced. In addition, the evidence would support defendant's
version of the occurrence and his claim of innocence. For the reasons that
follow, it is my view that the evidence of T.K.'s inconsistent statements to
the emergency room personnel and the police was relevant and necessary
to preserve defendant's constitutional rights.
	The instant cause presents this court not only with the first
opportunity in 14 years, since our decision in People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159 (1990), to address the general parameters of the rape shield
statute, but also with our first opportunity to speak to the scope of the
exception to the rape shield statute which allows for the introduction of
otherwise-barred evidence when such evidence is "constitutionally
required." The matter before us underscores the tension between the
demands of the rape shield statute and of the confrontation clause. We are
vested with the responsibility to strike an appropriate balance between
these demands to assure that the legislature's intent in protecting the
privacy of the victims of sexual crimes is fulfilled, while also ensuring that
a defendant's constitutional rights to confront his accuser and to present
evidence in support of his defense are secured. In arriving at an
appropriate balance, we must assess the nature and quality of the evidence
at issue, as well as the need for that evidence to assure that the charges in
the case are fairly adjudicated. In the matter before us, defendant raises
the affirmative defense, available to him pursuant to 12-17(b) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-17(b) (West 1998)), that he
reasonably believed T.K. to be 17 years of age or older at the time of the
occurrence. It is my view that, under the specific facts presented, the
majority errs in mechanically applying the provisions of the rape shield
statute, thereby excluding evidence which is relevant and necessary to
defendant's ability to defend against the charges brought against him. In
my view, the majority too broadly construes the provisions of the rape
shield statute at the expense of too narrowly construing the constitutional
rights of defendant.
	In order to answer the question presented by this appeal, it is
necessary to briefly review the constitutional principles involved, the
genesis and purpose of the rape shield statute, and the manner in which the
statute has been interpreted by Illinois courts.
	The confrontation clause provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ***." U.S. Const., amend. VI; accord Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §8. The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him is a
fundamental right made obligatory on the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923,
926, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965); People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203,
211 (2003). As a result of the protections found both in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and in the confrontation clause, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants " 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.' " Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636,
645, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 (1986), quoting California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 485, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413, 419, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532
(1984). The Court has further cautioned that "[t]hat opportunity would be
an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable
evidence bearing on *** credibility *** when such evidence is central to
the defendant's claim of innocence." Crane, 476 U.S.  at 690, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 645, 106 S. Ct.  at 2147.
	However, a defendant's rights guaranteed under the Constitution are
not absolute and "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 309, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046
(1973). One such instance is the rape shield statute. Under the rape shield
statute, in a prosecution for the crimes of aggravated criminal sexual
assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse,
			"the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim
*** is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past
sexual conduct of the alleged victim *** with the accused when
this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether
the alleged victim *** consented to the sexual conduct with
respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when
constitutionally required to be admitted." 725 ILCS 5/115-7(a)
(West 1998).
	Prior to the enactment of the rape shield statute in 1978, Illinois had
a long-standing rule that in rape cases, where the accused offered a
defense of consent, it was proper to introduce evidence of the complaining
witness' general reputation for immorality and unchastity. See People v.
Allen, 289 Ill. 218, 220 (1919) ("Where the defense to a charge of
forcible rape is consent and the woman is of the age of consent, evidence
of her bad character for chastity is competent as bearing on the probability
of her consent to the act with which the defendant is charged, because it
is more probable that an unchaste woman assented to such an act than a
virtuous woman"); see also S. Murphy, Rape Shield Statute Upheld by
Illinois Appellate Court, 69 Ill. B.J. 110, 110 (1980) (Traditionally, it
was presumed that "[t]ruthfulness and chastity in women were thought to
be virtues that were found only together"). This rule changed with the
enactment of the rape shield statute. The legislative history of the rape
shield statute reveals that
			"[t]he State policy underlying the rape shield statute *** is to
prevent the defendant from harassing and humiliating the
prosecutrix at trial with evidence of either her reputation for
chastity or specific acts of sexual conduct with persons other
than the defendant, since such evidence has no bearing on
whether she consented to sexual relations with the defendant.
Further, exclusion of such evidence keeps the jury's attention
focused only on issues relevant to the controversy at hand. Last,
but not necessarily least, the exclusion promotes effective law
enforcement because victims can report crimes of rape and
deviate sexual assault without fear of having the intimate details
of their past sexual activity brought before the public." People v.
Ellison, 123 Ill. App. 3d 615, 626 (1984).
See also C. Loftus, Comment, The Illinois Rape Shield Statute: Privacy
at Any Cost, 15 J. Marshall L. Rev. 157, 162-64 (1982).
	This court's first opportunity to interpret and apply the rape shield
statute was presented in People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159 (1990). In
Sandoval, the defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual
assault and one count of battery for repeated acts of nonconsensual
sodomy with his former girlfriend. At trial, the complainant admitted that
she had engaged in sodomy in the past with defendant, but stated that she
had never willingly engaged in that practice with anyone else. The
defendant attempted to impeach that statement with evidence that the
complainant had participated in sodomy with others. Pursuant to the rape
shield statute, the trial court refused to allow the impeachment.
	At the time Sandoval was decided, the rape shield statute did not
contain the exception for admission of otherwise-barred evidence when
"constitutionally required," the provision of the statute that is at issue in the
matter before us. Rather, the statute provided that the prior sexual activity
or the reputation of the complainant was admissible only "as evidence
concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115-7(a). In Sandoval, this court
expressed concern with respect to the then-existing statute's complete
prohibition of admitting evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity
with someone other than the defendant. This court noted that a
defendant's rights under the confrontation clause may require the
admission of a complainant's prior sexual activity where such evidence is
relevant and shows "bias, prejudice or motive." Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d  at
174-75. For example, such evidence may be admissible when it is offered
to establish an ulterior motive for making a false charge against the
defendant, is proffered to show that the complainant had made false
accusations of rape in the past, or is offered to explain a physical fact such
as the presence of semen, pregnancy, or a victim's physical condition
indicating intercourse. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d  at 185-87.
	However, because the defendant in Sandoval did not establish that
the exclusion of the evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity
prevented him from presenting his theory of the case, i.e., that the
complainant, his former girlfriend, consented to engage in sodomy but
thereafter accused him of rape in retaliation for his rejection (Sandoval,
135 Ill. 2d at 175), this court was "not *** confronted with an applicable
situation demanding emphasis of the right of confrontation over the
preclusion of the rape shield statute" (Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 191-92).
Thus, under the specific facts presented in Sandoval, this court concluded
that the application of the rape shield statute did not unconstitutionally
deny the defendant his right to confront the complainant.
	Sandoval, however, made it clear that the protections of the rape
shield statute are not absolute, and that the statute should not be
mechanically applied. Sandoval did not foreclose the possibility that
evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity could be admissible; to
the contrary, this court in Sandoval recognized-even absent the now-existing exception which allows admission of otherwise-barred evidence
if such evidence is "constitutionally required"-that under certain
"extraordinary circumstances" evidence of past sexual activity by the
complainant may be both relevant and its admission necessary to preserve
the defendant's right to confrontation. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d  at 191-92.
As our appellate court has observed, Sandoval did
			"not impose any restriction on the type of circumstances that
requires the statutory protection's subservience to constitutional
imperative. It merely provides a sample of possible situations
where prior sexual conduct would have the probative value
necessary for admission into evidence. *** [N]othing in
Sandoval suggests limitation only to those circumstances where
prior sexual history shows bias, prejudice, or motive. A fair
reading of Sandoval instructs that prior sexual conduct may be
relevant to prove a fact in issue, in which case, it should be
admitted. It calls for a case-by-case examination of the reason
tendered for the introduction of prior sexual conduct to
determine its probative value." People v. Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d
859, 863-64 (1997).
	Subsequent to this court's decision in Sandoval, the General
Assembly in 1994 amended the rape shield statute to expressly provide
that the prior sexual activity of the complainant may be admitted "when
constitutionally required." 725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) (West 1998). This
amendment codified the rationale expressed in Sandoval that a
defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses must, in certain
instances, supersede the statutory exclusion. It is my position that this
exception to the rape shield statute should be construed narrowly, but also
fairly. A defendant should not be afforded license to abuse, harass or
generally attack his accuser; however, neither should a defendant be
deprived of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him
and have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.
	In its opinion, the majority reverses the appellate court below, finding
that the panel improperly held that the trial court erred in excluding the
disputed evidence pursuant to the rape shield statute. The majority
criticizes the appellate court for "rel[ying] exclusively on People v. Grano,
286 Ill. App. 3d 278 (1996)" (slip op. at 4-5) in arriving at its holding.
The majority concludes that Grano does not support the appellate court's
result in the instant case, because Grano is factually distinguishable from
the matter at bar. In Grano, the court held that the circuit court erred in
ruling that the rape shield statute prevented the defendant in that case from
introducing evidence that the complainant had previously accused three
other men of sexual assault. The majority emphasizes that the Grano court
reasoned that because a verbal accusation did not constitute sexual
activity, the rape shield statute had no application to the facts presented
there. The majority then explains that here, although the disputed evidence
also consists of the complainant's statements, those statements, unlike the
statements in Grano, reveal her "prior sexual activity." Therefore, in this
case, the rape shield statute applies. Slip op. at 5.
	Although the majority spends much time explaining that the appellate
court's reliance upon Grano was misplaced because this case and Grano
are factually distinguishable, a close review of the appellate court's opinion
below reveals that the court did not analogize the facts at bar to the facts
in Grano. Rather, the court cited Grano for its "interpret[ation] [of] the
parameters of the rape shield statute." 333 Ill. App. 3d at 9. In Grano,
the court held that the rape shield statute was intended to prohibit
evidence of sexual reputation, but that the statute "clearly was not
designed to preclude the admission of all evidence relating to sex ***
[and] that the legislature intended to exclude the actual sexual history of
the complainant, not prior accusations of the complainant." (Emphases
omitted.) People v. Grano, 286 Ill. App. 3d 278, 288 (1996). Applying
this rationale, the appellate court below found that the disputed evidence
would have shown that the complainant lied when she reported the alleged
offense, a fact which the panel found highly relevant to defendant's
affirmative defense, wherein defendant claimed that complainant similarly
lied when she reported to the police that she informed defendant that she
was 16 years old before they engaged in any sexual activity. The fact that
the evidence would also have shown that complainant actually did have
sex with someone other than defendant was a coincidence and did not
automatically bar the evidence from admission. Thus, the appellate court
below concluded that the evidence of T.K.'s inconsistent statements
should have been admitted in this case, as defendant's affirmative
defense-that he reasonably believed T.K. was 18-rested almost entirely
upon whether defendant or T.K. was more credible. In sum, the
discussion by the appellate court below of Grano is confined to the
analytical principles which apply to the case at bar. Thus, the question is
not, as the majority states, whether the facts in the matter at bar are
analogous to those in Grano. Rather, the inquiry is whether the analytical
framework set forth in Grano, and applied by the appellate court below,
to interpret the provisions of the rape shield statute is correct.
	Indeed, the interpretation of the parameters of the rape shield statute
as set forth by the appellate court below and also in Grano is consistent
with the analysis employed by other districts of the appellate court in cases
involving the application of the rape shield statute. As we stated in
Sandoval, and as the two exceptions contained within the rape shield
statute itself make clear, the preclusion of evidence which suggests prior
sexual conduct by the complainant is not absolute. As the appellate court
explained in People v. Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d 859, 862 (1997), the rape
shield statute
		"should never be mechanically applied to obscure relevant
evidence that bears directly on guilt or innocence. The shield
should be raised in a manner consistent with its purpose. That
purpose is not to preclude relevant evidence. If it were, the
statute could never conform with constitutional imperative under
the sixth amendment's confrontation clause (U.S. Const., amend.
VI) or the fourteenth amendment's due process clause (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV). The rape shield statute is expressly
designed to yield to constitutional protections that assure fair
trials with just outcomes." Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 862, citing
Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159.
	Thus, "[w]henever the rape shield statute's preclusion of prior sexual
conduct is invoked, a question of relevancy arises." Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d
at 863. "Relevant evidence" means evidence having "any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of an action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455-56 (2001); People v. Bolden,
197 Ill. 2d 166, 184 (2001); see also People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 115 (2000) (relevancy is any tendency to make the existence of a fact
that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence in light of logic, experience, and accepted assumptions
concerning human behavior). However, evidence which is relevant may
nevertheless be deemed inadmissible if the prejudicial effect of admitting
such evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. Patterson, 192
Ill. 2d at 114-15; People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 146 (1998). In the
specific context of evidence which is otherwise barred under the rape
shield statute, such evidence may be admitted under the "constitutionally
required" exception to that statute if it is relevant and also "germane to the
accused's right to confront witnesses against him or to present his theory
of the case." (Emphasis added.) People v. Darby, 302 Ill. App. 3d 866,
874 (1999); see also Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 863 ("If the evidence is
probative, the statute's protection yields to constitutional rights that assure
a full and fair defense").
	Applying the above analytical framework, our appellate court has
held that a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and to
present his defense may supersede the protections of the rape shield
statute. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d 859 (1997) (prior
sexual activity of a child victim may be admissible to show age-inappropriate sexual knowledge did not derive from acts with defendant);
People v. Grant, 232 Ill. App. 3d 93 (1992) (instances of prior sexual
activity may be admitted to explain the presence of semen in the
complainant); People v. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d 76 (1991) (due process
precluded the application of the rape shield statute to exclude testimony
that the alleged minor victim had viewed sexually explicit videotapes);
People v. Gray, 209 Ill. App. 3d 407 (1991) (it was error to bar
defendant from cross-examining complainant about her alleged fear of
pregnancy as a possible motive to falsely accuse defendant); People v.
Halcomb, 176 Ill. App. 3d 100, 106 (1988) (the trial court improperly
excluded evidence under the rape shield statute that complaint had
revealed to defendant, immediately prior to the alleged assault, that she
had recently had an abortion; the evidence "was offered not to establish
prior sexual activity, but to prove that defendant and complainant engaged
in intimate conversation immediately before the sexual acts in question
took place. *** [There is a] distinction between evidence offered to prove
sexual conduct and evidence offered to show the occurrence of an
otherwise relevant conversation which revealed sexual conduct"). In each
instance, the court found that the disputed evidence was admissible on the
grounds that it was relevant and necessary to preserve the defendant's
constitutional rights.
	Turning to the matter at bar, it is my view that the information
defendant sought to introduce before the jury was both highly relevant to
a disputed issue in this case and also necessary to preserve defendant's
constitutional rights and guarantee him a meaningful opportunity to present
a complete defense. In this case, there is only one disputed issue with
respect to the lone charge for which defendant was convicted, and, for
which he will now be retried: whether defendant reasonably believed the
complainant to be 17 years of age or older at the time of this incident. As
the majority correctly notes, defendant was originally charged in a three-count indictment: count I charged defendant with criminal sexual assault
(720 ILCS 5/12-13(a) (West 1998)), alleging that defendant committed
an act of sexual penetration with T.K. knowing that T.K. was unable to
give consent; count II charged defendant with aggravated criminal sexual
abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(ii) (West 1998)), alleging that defendant,
who was 17 years of age or older, committed an act of sexual conduct
with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age
when the act was committed and the accused used force or threat of force
to commit the act; and count III charged defendant with aggravated
criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1998)), alleging that
defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was
at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the defendant was
at least five years older than the victim. After a jury trial, defendant was
acquitted of both the aggravated criminal sexual assault charge in count I
and of the aggravated criminal sexual abuse charge in count II. Defendant
was convicted, however, of the aggravated criminal sexual abuse charge
in count III.
	It is of import that defendant has been acquitted of the charges in
which the use of force or the consent of complainant could be at issue.
The only charge which remains pending against defendant is for
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1998)),
which criminalizes an act of sexual conduct on the basis that, at the time
of the incident, the complainant was under the age of 17 and the defendant
was at least five years older. Pursuant to section 12-17(b) of the Criminal
Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-17(b) (West 1998)), it is an affirmative
defense to a charge brought under section 12-16(d) that the accused
reasonably believed the person to be 17 years of age or over. In order to
avail himself of this affirmative defense, a defendant is required to present
evidence at trial to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable belief that
the complainant was at least 17 years old at the time of the occurrence.
People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 131 (1997).
	There is no dispute in this case that, at the time of the incident in the
matter at bar, T.K. was under the age of 17 and defendant was at least
five years older. Thus, absent the affirmative defense available to
defendant under section 12-17(b), defendant would be found guilty of the
charge. However, solely as a result of the affirmative defense available to
defendant under section 12-17(b), a disputed issue arises in this case:
whether defendant was reasonable to believe that T.K. was 17 or over at
the time of the occurrence. Defendant testified that, upon first meeting
T.K., she stated that she was 18 and that he had no reason to believe that
she was younger. According to the testimony of defendant, it was only
during the act of intercourse that T.K. informed him, for the first time, that
she was 16 years of age. Defendant stated that he then immediately
stopped the act upon learning T.K.'s true age. Conversely, T.K. testified
that she informed defendant upon their meeting that she was 16 years old.
The significance of these statements with respect to defendant's affirmative
defense cannot be overstated. If complainant, in fact, told defendant that
she was 16, it certainly would not have been reasonable for him to believe
that she was older. In turn, defendant could not avail himself of the
affirmative defense, and he would be found guilty. If, however, defendant
had reason to believe that complainant was 17 or older, he would be
acquitted of the charge.
	A review of the trial record shows that, absent T.K.'s testimony that
she told defendant that she was 16 before any sexual activity took place,
there was virtually no evidence which tended to rebut his affirmative
defense that it was reasonable for defendant to believe that T.K. was 17
years of age or older. First, as stated, defendant testified that complainant
told him that she was 18 at the time that they first met. In addition, the
record reveals that, at the time of the offense, T.K. was 16 years and 7
months old, less than 5 months away from her seventeenth birthday.
Defendant did not know T.K. prior to this incident, and he first met her
late at night during a social gathering hosted by a 25-year-old woman and
her 20-year-old boyfriend. Nearly all of the people at the gathering were
18 years of age or older, and when defendant first met T.K. she had been
consuming alcohol, an activity which is restricted to adults. Shortly after
defendant arrived at the gathering, a group of people, including T.K.,
accompanied him to a liquor store to buy alcohol for the party, and T.K.
told defendant to buy her a beer. Further, T.K. was apparently free to
stay at the party all night, into the early morning hours, without any curfew.
The totality of the circumstances supports defendant's affirmative defense
that he reasonably believed T.K. to be over 17 years of age.
	I submit that, had the jury been informed that T.K. lied about a
critical fact at the same time she reported that she was sexually assaulted
by defendant, and that she recanted the false statement three months later,
only after being confronted by police with the fact that DNA testing
revealed that defendant could not have been the source of semen
recovered from her, it is very likely that the jurors would have questioned
T.K.'s assertion that she told defendant that she was 16 before the
commencement of any sexual activity. The disputed evidence was not
offered to establish T.K.'s prior sexual activity or to portray her as a
sexually promiscuous person. Rather, it was offered to show that, in
reporting the very crime for which defendant was on trial, the claimant lied
about significant facts, which, incidentally, also revealed her past sexual
conduct.
	Accordingly, I would hold that the application of the rape shield
statute in this case does not serve the statute's legitimate purposes. The
exception for the admission of otherwise-barred evidence when
"constitutionally required" should be interpreted in a manner which
preserves the legitimate purposes of the statute, while also safeguarding a
defendant's constitutional rights. In my view, the facts in the matter at bar
are divorced from the legitimate concerns of the rape shield statute.
Indeed, under the unique facts of this case, it would not behoove
defendant to attempt to admit the disputed evidence in an effort to reveal
complainant's past sexual conduct or to raise an inference of promiscuity
on the part of T.K., because the crime with which defendant is charged is
based solely upon the disparity in the parties' ages, and does not involve
any question or issue with respect to whether T.K. consented to, or was
forced into participating in, the sexual conduct. In addition, defendant's
affirmative defense is not grounded in a theory that claimant consented to
the sexual conduct; rather, his defense revolves around the question of
whether he had a reasonable belief that T.K. was over 17 years of age.
Applying the rape shield statute to block admission of the disputed
evidence in this case renders the statute a mechanical and arbitrary
rule which bars any evidence that touches upon sex, however
relevant or necessary that evidence may be to the defense. In this
case, the application of the rape shield statute improperly limited
defendant's ability to present his defense.
	In sum, the evidence excluded under the rape shield statute in this
case was relevant to the only disputed issue in this matter: whether
defendant had reason to believe that complainant was 17 years of age or
older at the time of the incident. The evidence was relevant in that it
showed that the complainant was untruthful regarding circumstances
surrounding the alleged offense when she initially reported the incident to
the authorities. In order to assess the results obtained from comparison of
the rape kit materials with the defendant's DNA markers, it was critical
for the laboratory personnel to know whether the complainant engaged in
sexual intercourse with anyone other than defendant during the 72-hour
period preceding the sample collection. Had defendant been permitted to
show that T.K. lied when she reported the circumstances surrounding the
alleged offense to the medical personnel on the night she accused
defendant, the jury would have been made aware that T.K. was untruthful
with respect to her account of the events of that evening, and that her
untruthfulness made defendant's guilt appear more likely. In other words,
the evidence would show that T.K. lied when she reported the incident to
the authorities, and would be relevant to defendant's affirmative defense,
in which he maintained that he had reason to believe that complainant was
18 years of age, and that T.K. lied when she testified that she told him she
was 16 years old upon their initial meeting, and well before the start of any
sexual activity. Absent T.K.'s testimony that she told defendant she was
16 prior to the sexual activity, there was ample evidence which could have
supported defendant's claim that he had reason to believe that T.K. was
over 17. The disputed evidence was also relevant in that it supported
defendant's contention that he cooperated with the authorities throughout
the investigation by admitting to the sexual conduct and providing blood
and semen samples for DNA comparison, actions which were consistent
with defendant's claim of innocence. Finally, the court's ruling on
defendant's motion in limine also prevented defendant from informing the
jury that the physical evidence corroborated his account of what
happened: no semen matching defendant's DNA profile was found in T.K.
One shudders to think of the consequences of such a lie in the time before
the advent of DNA analysis. The presence of seminal fluid in the
complainant could have had a devastating impact upon defendant had the
complainant told the same lie.
	The majority, however, rejects the argument that the disputed
evidence is admissible under the "constitutionally required" exception to
the rape shield statute because impeachment of a witness by specific acts
of misconduct is prohibited in Illinois. See People v. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155, 162 (1994). I agree with the majority that it is the general rule that
a witness may not be cross-examined regarding instances of prior criminal
conduct not leading to a conviction, unless that conduct also relates to
some issue in the case other than credibility. The rationale for this general
prohibition has been explained as follows: "The reason for barring
questions about unrelated prior bad acts is to avoid impeachment by
insinuation on such matters and to prevent juries from being distracted by
marginal but inflammatory matters." J. Corkery, Illinois Civil &amp; Criminal
Evidence §608.102, at 293 (2000); see also M. Graham, Cleary &amp;
Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §608.5, at 390 (8th ed. 2004)
("The credibility of any witness *** may not be attacked upon cross-examination by questioning the witness concerning specific instances of her
misconduct not leading to a conviction; inquiry with respect to specific acts
of misconduct is barred on the ground that such examination is regarded
as overly prejudicial in relation to its probative value").
	However, the general rule should not apply to the unique facts
presented in the case at bar for two reasons: first, claimant's so-called
"bad acts" occurred during the reporting and investigation of the very
crime for which defendant is charged; and second, as explained above, the
probative value of this evidence to defendant's affirmative defense is high.
As stated, not only is the crime with which defendant is charged based
solely upon the disparity in the parties' ages and does not involve any
question with respect to whether T.K. consented to, or was forced into
participating in, the sexual conduct, but also defendant's affirmative
defense is grounded in the theory that he had a reasonable belief that T.K.
was over 17 years of age and does not revolve around any contention that
claimant consented to the sexual conduct.
	The cases cited by the majority in support of its conclusion that the
disputed evidence is barred under the general rule prohibiting specific-act
impeachment are all factually distinguishable from the matter at bar: in each
cited case, the general rule was applied where a party sought to impeach
a witness with specific incidents of prior bad acts unrelated to the case
on trial. For example, in West, this court held that it was error when
defense counsel attempted to impeach the credibility of the minor victim
by asking the minor's school teacher if the minor " 'had ever exaggerated
the truth *** before.' " West, 158 Ill. 2d  at 161-62. Similarly, in People
v. Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d 671, 680 (1999), the court held that
evidence of the defendant's past use of aliases was not proper
impeachment of his credibility in an unrelated trial for murder and armed
robbery. In People v. McGee, 286 Ill. App. 3d 786, 796 (1997), the
court found that the defendant's use of an assumed name during a prior
arrest had nothing to do with the first degree murder charge for which the
defendant was then on trial. Finally, in Podolsky &amp; Associates L.P. v.
Discipio, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1024 (1998), the appellate court held
that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence that the defendant
attorney had previously been suspended from the practice of law. In each
of the above cases, the rationale for generally barring specific-act
impeachment was satisfied by excluding the evidence: admitting the prior,
unrelated bad acts of the witnesses would amount to impeachment by
insinuation, distract the jury from the issues in the case, and would be
overly prejudicial in relation to the questionable probative value of the
evidence.
	Here, in contrast, the evidence in dispute did not concern a past
incident of untruthfulness or a past "bad act" on the part of T.K. that was
otherwise unrelated to the instant charge pending against defendant.
Rather, the evidence showed that T.K. lied when she reported the very
offense for which defendant was on trial, and for which he will be retried:
accordingly, her statements are inexorably intertwined with the charge. In
addition, as explained in detail above, the rationale for generally barring
specific-act impeachment would not be furthered by excluding the
disputed evidence in the matter at bar. The fact that T.K. was untruthful
at the time she lodged charges against defendant is relevant to whether she
also lied to the authorities when she stated that she informed defendant
that she was 16 years of age. In addition, the lie she told obscured the fact
that the truth corroborated defendant's versions of events that he
completely cooperated with the investigation and that he stated that he
stopped sex when the complainant informed him that she was 16.
	The majority also rejects the argument that the disputed evidence is
admissible under the "constitutionally required" exception to the rape
shield statute because, in the view of the majority, the evidence would be
used to impeach T.K. on a collateral matter which is not relevant to the
case. According to the majority, whether T.K. had engaged in sexual
relations with someone else is "wholly unrelated to the question of
whether defendant reasonably believed that T.K. was of age when the act
of sexual penetration took place." (Emphasis in original.) Slip op. at 7.
Citing to Sandoval, the majority states "[t]his court has specifically held
that precluding a defendant in a sexual assault trial from impeaching a
complaining witness on a collateral matter does not contravene the
constitution." Slip op. at 9. The majority concludes by stating that "[h]ere,
as in Sandoval, defendant seeks to impugn his accuser's credibility by
showing that she lied regarding a matter collateral to the controverted
issues in the case." Slip op. at 9. I disagree. It is my view that the
proposed impeachment involves a noncollateral matter, and the facts in
Sandoval relating to this issue are distinguishable from those in the instant
cause.
	 "Collateral matters are basically 'side issues' or 'small stuff', matters
unimportant to the principal issues of the case." J. Corkery, Illinois Civil
&amp; Criminal Evidence §608.103, at 294 (2000). The rule precluding
impeachment of a witness on a collateral matter "reflects considerations
of judicial economy and prevents hours and days of a trial being consumed
with taking evidence on the question of whether and under what
circumstances the witness did or did not engage in an act only marginally
relevant to credibility." J. Corkery, Illinois Civil &amp; Criminal Evidence
§608.103, at 295 (2000). The collateral evidence rule, however, is not
absolute. It is well settled that "[a] matter employed to contradict or as
self-contradiction is noncollateral if the subject matter is relevant in the
litigation to establish a fact of consequence, that is, relevant for a purpose
other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness." M.
Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §607.2, at
355 (8th ed. 2004). Stated another way, "[a] matter is non collateral, and
thus important, if it is: 1) relevant to an issue in the case other than
credibility of a witness; or 2) relevant to the credibility of a witness in an
important way." J. Corkery, Illinois Civil &amp; Criminal Evidence §608.105,
at 297 (2000).
	The majority errs in finding that T.K.'s untruthful state of mind at the
time she reported this alleged crime is a collateral matter in this case. In
order to find that the disputed evidence would lead to impeachment on a
collateral issue, the majority mistakenly focuses on the fact that the
evidence in dispute reveals that T.K. engaged in sexual relations with
another person shortly before the alleged crime. Although I agree with the
majority to the extent that complainant's prior sexual conduct is unrelated
and unimportant to the principal issues of this case, the disputed evidence
only coincidentally touched upon sex. The focus on this evidence should
be directed toward the fact that T.K. was in an untruthful state of mind
and lied when she reported this alleged crime to the authorities. This is
relevant to her credibility in a very important way, because it goes to the
only disputed issue in the case: whether defendant was reasonable to
believe that complaint was 18 years of age, or whether his belief was
unreasonable because T.K. informed him that she was 16 years old when
they met. Accordingly, the evidence does not involve a collateral matter.
	Our decision in Sandoval does not change this conclusion. In
Sandoval, this court held that two avenues of impeachment pursued by
the defendant against the complainant were collateral. First, this court held
that impeachment of the complainant's statement that she did not engage
in sodomy with any one other than the defendant was collateral and
irrelevant to the question of whether she had been forced to have sex with
the defendant. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d  at 181. Similarly, this court held that,
although the complainant had stated on cross-examination that she had not
been able to date anyone since the assault, the defense was properly
barred from introducing evidence to show that the witness had been seen
with a man just prior to the beginning of the trial. This court held that
admitting that evidence would have improperly allowed the defendant to
contradict the complainant on a collateral matter. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 
at 181.
	As explained above, unlike the evidence discussed in Sandoval, the
disputed evidence in the matter at bar is not collateral to the sole disputed
issue in the case. To the contrary, the evidence is critical not only to
defendant's affirmative defense, i.e., that he reasonably believed that T.K.
was 18 years of age, but also to the State's burden of showing that
defendant's belief, under the circumstances presented, was unreasonable.
In sum, the disputed evidence was central to defendant's opportunity,
guaranteed him under the Constitution, to present a complete defense.
	As a final matter, I find it necessary to respond to the criticism made
of this dissenting opinion by the majority. The central focus of the
majority's response to my dissent is upon semantics. The majority takes
great pains to point out that this dissent "characterizes" the complainant as
having lied about a critical fact in the reporting of this crime to the
authorities. Slip op. at 8. The majority then explains that, "for purposes of
clarification," the complainant's lie was made to "an emergency room
nurse," and that "there is no indication" that this lie was repeated to the
police. Slip op. at 8. The majority then states that, "[r]ather, the evidence
is that once the police inquired of the victim, she immediately admitted to
them the truth." Slip op. at 8. Thus, it appears that, in the view of the
majority, because the complainant's lie was told to emergency room
personnel, the lie was therefore neither told to the "authorities," nor told
as part of complainant's "reporting" of the alleged crime. Upon this basis,
the majority attempts to minimize the gravity of complainant's
untruthfulness. I strongly disagree with the statements of the majority in this
respect.
	Under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (325 ILCS
5/1 et seq. (West 1998)), "[a]ny physician, resident, intern, hospital,
hospital administrator and personnel engaged in examination, care and
treatment of persons, *** having reasonable cause to believe a child(3)
known to them in their professional or official capacity may be an abused
child *** shall immediately report or cause a report to be made to the
Department [of Children and Family Services]." 325 ILCS 5/4 (West
1998). This statute further provides that "[a]ll reports of suspected child
abuse *** made under this Act shall be made immediately by telephone
to the [DCFS] central register ***. The Department shall within 24 hours
orally notify local law enforcement personnel and the office of the State's
Attorney of the involved county of the receipt of any report alleging ***
serious injury to a child including *** sexual abuse to a child ***." 325
ILCS 5/7 (West 1998). If an individual who is mandated to report such
incidents fails to follow the procedures set forth in this Act, the penalties
for the failure to report are high: "[a]ny physician who willfully fails to
report suspected child abuse *** as required by this Act shall be referred
to the Illinois State Medical Disciplinary Board ***. Any other person
required by this Act to report suspected child abuse *** who willfully fails
to report such shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." 325 ILCS
5/4.02 (West 1998).
	In the matter at bar, the complainant was 16 years of age when she
went to Rockford Memorial Hospital, alleging that she had been forced
to participate in sexual acts by defendant. Under these facts, any hospital
personnel engaged in treating the complainant, as well as the hospital
administrator and the hospital itself, were mandated to report this incident
to DCFS. 325 ILCS 5/4 (West 1998). In turn, DCFS is statutorily
mandated to transmit this report to the local police and the office of the
State's Attorney. 325 ILCS 5/7 (West 1998). Accordingly, in view of this
statutory reporting procedure, it is not a mischaracterization of this record
to state that when complainant lied to emergency room personnel
concerning whether she had sexual contact with someone other than
defendant within 72 hours of submitting to a rape kit, complainant told a
lie during her reporting of this crime to the authorities.
	In cases of sexual assault and/or abuse, very often the first contact an
alleged victim has with individuals apart from her friends and family is with
medical personnel, and not with the police. The same is true here:
complainant testified that after she told her friends that she was raped, they
immediately brought her to the hospital. The record reveals that, at the
hospital, the medical personnel placed complainant in a special room apart
from the emergency area, immediately submitted complainant to a rape kit
and initiated the gathering of information about the alleged crime. The
medical personnel and the hospital are statutorily authorized and mandated
to follow procedure in reporting this information, which is ultimately
transmitted to the local law enforcement agency and the office of the
State's Attorney for investigation and prosecution. In addition, the specific
question asked of complainant to which she responded with a lie was
posed to her as part of the information needed to complete complainant's
submission to the rape kit, which the record indicates was taken by
Rockford police officer Rose Mary Matthews from the hospital to the
police station, and thereafter transported to the Illinois State Police crime
lab for analysis. It was as a result of the information-gathering process that
began at the hospital that defendant was charged with aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. Thus, complainant's untruth permeated the investigation of
this alleged crime from its inception. I emphasize that it was three months
later, only after DNA testing revealed that defendant could not have been
the source of semen found in complainant, that she recanted her previous
statement and admitted to the police that she had in fact engaged in
intercourse with someone else on May 9. Thus, in light of the mandated
statutory reporting procedure in this case, the majority's contention that
complainant's lie to the medical personnel was not a lie to the "authorities"
in the "reporting" of this alleged crime is untenable.
	In addition, the majority criticizes this dissent for, in the words of the
majority, "contend[ing] that the court's ruling on the motion in limine
under review precluded defendant from informing the jury that no semen
matching his genetic profile had been recovered from the victim." Slip op.
at 10. The majority states that this "is inaccurate" because "[a]lthough the
circuit court did preclude defense counsel from so informing the jury, this
was clearly a separate and independent ruling from the court's ruling that
defendant could not cross-examine the victim with her inconsistent out-of-court statements." Slip op. at  10. To the contrary, my reading of the
record reveals that both the issue of whether complainant could be
questioned at trial about her inconsistent statements to the medical
personnel and the police, and the issue of whether defendant could present
any evidence with respect to the fact that no semen matching his DNA
was recovered from the victim, were argued and decided at the same
time. It appears from the trial transcript that the circuit court judge and the
parties operated under the assumption that, pursuant to the protections of
the rape shield statute, any evidence dealing with complainant's prior
sexual conduct-however remote-was precluded from admission.
	The trial transcript reveals that, during a hearing on the parties'
motions in limine, defense counsel requested that he be allowed to
introduce evidence of complainant's inconsistent statements regarding
whether she had sex with anyone other than defendant in the 72 hours
prior to her submission to the rape kit, as well as evidence that
defendant's semen was not found in the complainant. The State objected
to both requests. The court first ruled that the complainant could not be
questioned about her inconsistent statements with respect to whether she
had sexual conduct with another person 72 hours prior to submitting to the
rape kit because "the Rape Shield Act does preclude the defense from
inquiring" into that subject.
	Then, the court turned to defendant's request to introduce evidence
that his DNA was not found in the complainant. The State argued that
such evidence should be excluded under the rape shield statute because
"the information from the rape kit has nothing to do with this defendant, it
has to do with the other party." In agreeing with the State and denying
defendant's request, the circuit court judge stated, "I believe that that
questioning would be directed to exactly what the Rape Shield Statute is
intended to keep out, therefore that would be precluded." When defense
counsel attempted to clarify the scope of the court's ruling and asked
whether he could simply inquire of the police officers during trial whether
defendant voluntarily submitted to DNA testing, the State responded as
follows: "it is a slippery path down to [sic] the Rape Shield statute to allow
any reference to this issue. Because the reason that, that the information
about the rape kit is not coming in is because of this other information [that
someone else's DNA was recovered from complainant], and I just think
it would lead to questions and confusion with the jury." In ruling that
defense counsel could not discuss anything with respect to DNA testing,
the court stated that it was "going to preclude that argument because,
again, of the Rape Shield Statute, and in view of the defense that you are
indicating to the Court that you're going to have in this case."
	The error of the majority's assertion that there was no "logical or
legal" connection between the circuit court's rulings barring reference to
complainant's inconsistent statements and barring the introduction of any
evidence regarding DNA testing is further revealed by a statement made
by the circuit court judge later in the proceedings. After defense counsel
unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial because one of the State's witnesses
had testified that complainant had been subjected to a rape kit at the
hospital, despite the fact that the circuit court had barred all mention of this
event, the circuit court had occasion to set forth the basis of its prior
rulings barring admission of such evidence. The court stated: "the Court's
ruling to exclude mention and any testimony regarding genetic markers or
the results of any rape kit was based in part [sic], and the Court followed
the Rape Shield doctrine in excluding that evidence because, as I
understand it, the results of the rape kit indicate possible sexual conduct
with someone other than this defendant." Therefore, contrary to the
position of the majority, the record supports the conclusion that the two
rulings were linked: both rulings appear to be premised on the reasoning
that allowing such evidence at trial would violate the rape shield statute
because it would touch upon complainant's prior sexual conduct.
	For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully, but strongly, dissent from
the opinion of the majority. I would affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
	 
	 
	 
	 
1.                
          
            
     
Although specific acts evidence can come in under the Federal Rules of Evidence, even there such evidence is not necessarily 
admissible. Rather, its admissibility in any given case rests within the discretion of the trial court. Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)(1).               
          
            
     
               
          
            
     

2.              In Sandoval, the trial court erred in admitting complainant's original statement 
that she had not had anal sex with others, but the court cured this error by instructing the jury to disregard the statement before 
submitting the case to the jury. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d  at 192-93.
3.             For the 
purposes of this statute, a "child" is defined as "any person under the age of 18 years, unless legally emancipated by reason of marriage or 
entry into a branch of the United States armed services." 325 ILCS 5/3 (West 1998). Thus, complainant falls within this definition.