Title: Commonwealth v. Hall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11952
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2020

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SJC-11952 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADAM LEE HALL. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     January 10, 2020. - June 26, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Kidnapping.  Jurisdiction, Of crime.  Grand Jury.  
Evidence, Grand jury proceedings, Photograph, Relevancy and 
materiality, Inflammatory evidence, Prior misconduct.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Request for jury 
instructions, Grand jury proceedings, Trial of indictments 
together, Severance, Conduct of prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned on October 6, 2011, and 
August 7, 2012. 
 
 
A motion to sever the indictments was heard by C. Jeffrey 
Kinder, J., and the cases were tried before him. 
 
 
 
James W. Rosseel for the defendant. 
 
David F. Capeless, Special Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In February 2014, the defendant was found 
guilty by a jury of three counts of murder in the first degree 
for the brutal killings of David Glasser, Edward Frampton, and 
2 
 
Robert Chadwell.1  The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that 
the defendant committed the murders with two coventurers, David 
Chalue and Caius Veiovis, to prevent Glasser from testifying 
against the defendant in two pending criminal cases.  They also 
kidnapped Frampton, Glasser's roommate, and Chadwell, who was 
visiting Glasser and Frampton's apartment at the time.  After 
the three victims were killed, the defendant, Chalue, and 
Veiovis dismembered the victims' bodies and placed the body 
parts in plastic bags, which the defendant arranged to be 
buried.  The defendant, Chalue, and Veiovis were tried 
separately, and all were convicted.  We affirmed Veiovis's 
convictions of murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and 
witness intimidation.  See Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 
472, 490 (2017).2 
 
The defendant presents multiple claims on appeal:  (1) that 
there was insufficient evidence that the murders took place in 
Massachusetts; (2) that the judge erred in denying the 
defendant's request for a special verdict question regarding 
territorial jurisdiction; (3) that the indictments against the 
defendant should have been dismissed due to the prosecutor's 
                                                 
1 The defendant was also convicted of armed robbery, assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, four counts of 
witness intimidation, four counts of kidnapping, possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony, and conspiracy. 
 
2 Chalue's appeal has not yet been heard by this court. 
3 
 
failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the 
presentation of allegedly false testimony to the grand jury 
regarding the accuracy of cell site location information (CSLI), 
or the presentation of arguably impermissible character 
evidence; (4) that the defendant's conviction of kidnapping 
based on a 2010 incident (2010 kidnapping) be vacated because 
the theory of kidnapping was invalid or at least foreclosed by 
the ruling of a Superior Court judge (motion judge) on a 
pretrial motion to dismiss; (5) that photographic evidence of 
codefendant Veiovis's weapons was erroneously admitted against 
the defendant; (6) that anatomical drawings of dismembered human 
bodies found in Veiovis's apartment were erroneously admitted 
against the defendant; (7) that evidence of assorted uncharged 
attempts to frame Glasser for various crimes was erroneously 
admitted; (8) that the joinder of lesser indictments with the 
murder charges prejudiced the defendant and instead required 
severance; and (9) that alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
requiring a reversal of the defendant's convictions or a new 
trial.  We vacate the defendant's conviction for the 2010 
kidnapping, as the kidnapping theory presented at trial had 
already been dismissed by the motion judge, but affirm all other 
convictions and conclude that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
4 
 
 
1.  Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial with regard to territorial 
jurisdiction, we recite the facts the jury could have found, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 57 
(2018).  In July 2009, the defendant beat Glasser with a 
baseball bat in Peru, Massachusetts, because he believed Glasser 
had stolen and sold motor vehicle parts that belonged to the 
defendant.  The defendant then forced Glasser to sign over the 
title to his pickup truck, and the defendant subsequently sold 
the truck.  The police later recovered it, and the defendant was 
criminally charged for beating Glasser and taking the truck.  
The trial was scheduled for September 2010. 
 
Glasser was expected to testify against the defendant as a 
witness at the September 2010 trial.  In August 2010, the 
defendant sought to discredit Glasser as a witness by framing 
him for a false kidnapping charge.  The defendant schemed to 
frame Glasser for the kidnapping and armed robbery of Nicole 
Brooks, the defendant's girlfriend.  The defendant arranged for 
Brooks to falsely accuse Glasser of kidnapping her and shooting 
at her.  To provide support for this story, the defendant drove 
with Brooks to a location in rural upstate New York and shot a 
gun two or three times into a tree to fabricate proof of the 
framed attack.  The gun the defendant used to shoot the tree was 
5 
 
supposed to be planted in Glasser's vehicle by Scott Langdon, 
another acquaintance of the defendant, so the police could later 
trace the bullet holes in the tree to the planted gun.  The 
defendant asked Langdon to offer one hundred dollars to Glasser 
in exchange for a ride to New York, which Langdon did.  During 
that drive, Langdon planted the gun -- as well as Brooks's 
wallet -- in Glasser's truck.  When the defendant had planned 
this scheme, he told Brooks that, if the plan did not work, he 
would have to make Glasser disappear. 
 
Brooks gave a statement to New York police, claiming 
Glasser had robbed her and shot at her.  She provided a 
description of Glasser and the license plate number of his 
truck.  She later identified Glasser in a photographic array.  
Glasser was never arrested by New York authorities, but was 
instead arrested by police in Pittsfield.  Glasser was in 
custody for about one week. 
 
The accomplices to the scheme to frame Glasser eventually 
confessed to the police that they had been a part of the setup, 
and those confessions were corroborated by other evidence.  
Specifically, surveillance footage from a grocery store and a 
gasoline station raised suspicions about the truth of the 
accomplices' original reports to police and the legitimacy of 
Glasser's arrest.  The defendant was charged with kidnapping 
under two theories:  (1) under a theory of inveiglement when the 
6 
 
defendant framed Glasser for a crime that led to his arrest and 
detention, and (2) under a theory that defendant enticed Glasser 
to drive to New York under false pretenses.  The first theory of 
inveiglement was dismissed by the motion judge on August 3, 
2011, who reasoned that "[n]o case law suggests that an arrest 
by police officers, acting in good faith but upon false 
information, can constitute kidnapping by inveiglement by the 
person who furnished the false information.  Otherwise, by 
extension, any case of detention based on a false police report 
could also constitute kidnapping."  The false pretenses theory, 
however, was determined to be valid, and for that reason the 
kidnapping charge was not dismissed in its entirety. 
 
After his plan to frame Glasser failed, the defendant tried 
to bribe Glasser not to testify against him for the pending 
charges for beating Glasser with the baseball bat and the 
kidnapping.  On August 26, 2011, Glasser expressed to a friend 
that he was worried about testifying in an upcoming trial, and 
stated that he was going to "hide out for a couple days" and 
"stay in the house."  Glasser and his roommate, Frampton, lived 
in a first-floor apartment in Pittsfield and were both clients 
of mental health and social services agencies.  Both received 
Federal disability assistance. 
7 
 
 
On Friday, August 26, 2011, the defendant picked up a 
friend, Katelyn Carmin, in a tan Buick.3  With the defendant in 
the car at the time were Chalue and Veiovis.  While driving, the 
defendant spoke about Glasser, saying "I ought to kill that 
motherfucker for ruining my life."  Chalue and Veiovis responded 
to the defendant, saying:  "Don't worry about it.  We will get 
him."  The defendant ultimately drove Carmin, Chalue, and 
Veiovis to the Hells Angels clubhouse in Lee that evening.4  At 
the clubhouse, Carmin drove an all-terrain vehicle around the 
property with Chalue and Veiovis.  The defendant told Carmin to 
be careful, because he needed Chalue and Veiovis to do a job for 
him and did not want them to get hurt. 
 
The next day, Saturday, August 27, the defendant, Chalue, 
and Veiovis went to a Hells Angels party in Springfield.  That 
evening, the three men went to the clubhouse, where they met up 
with two women, Allyson Scace and Kayla Sewell, and then 
proceeded to Veiovis's apartment in Pittsfield.  The defendant 
drove separately to the apartment in his Buick.  Before he went 
to Veiovis's apartment, he went to Steven Hinman's home in 
Lenox.  At Hinman's home, the defendant showed Hinman several 
firearms he had, including a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol in 
                                                 
 
3 At other times during the trial, the same Buick was 
described as gold or brown. 
 
4 The defendant was a sergeant at arms in a local chapter of 
the Hells Angels motorcycle club. 
8 
 
his vest and a "dog food bag" with a .44 caliber magnum revolver 
and a sawed-off M-16-type weapon.  When he arrived at Veiovis's 
apartment, the defendant pulled the firearms out of the dog food 
bag and asked Veiovis where he kept his cleaner and gloves.  
Veiovis directed the defendant to a cabinet, and then the 
defendant and Chalue proceeded to disassemble and clean out the 
firearms. 
 
That same night, on Saturday, August 27, Chadwell -- 
Glasser's neighbor from down the street -- visited Glasser and 
Frampton and stayed into the evening.  The upstairs neighbor 
asked Glasser to move his truck sometime after 10 P.M., which is 
when the victims were last seen.  The three men were last heard 
from around 11:20 P.M. that night.  Shortly after midnight, the 
upstairs neighbor heard banging downstairs on Glasser's front 
door.  The defendant later told a friend, Karen Sutton, that one 
of the victims was fixing a computer and another was playing a 
video game when the defendant arrived at Glasser's apartment 
with Chalue and Veiovis.  He said the man fixing the computer 
"picked a bad night to work on the computer," and was 
"collateral damage." 
 
Early Sunday morning at 1:30 A.M., the defendant was driven 
to the Sutton family residence in Pittsfield, where he met with 
Dawson.  The defendant asked to use Dawson's cell phone, and 
then left with it.  He later returned the cell phone to Dawson, 
9 
 
and instructed her to delete the calls placed on it and not to 
tell anyone that he had ever taken it. 
 
During Saturday night and into Sunday morning, Tropical 
Storm Irene had reached western Massachusetts and brought heavy 
rain.  At 5:30 A.M. Sunday morning, the defendant bought three 
candy bars, Black and Mild cigars, and Marlboro cigarettes with 
wet cash at a convenience store in Pittsfield.  The store clerk 
noticed that the defendant's boots and jeans were wet, and that 
he had mud on his shirt.  The defendant departed from the store 
in his Buick.  The defendant did not smoke, but Veiovis smoked 
Black and Mild cigars, and Chalue smoked Marlboro cigarettes. 
 
Shortly after, the defendant returned to the Sutton 
residence, where he parked his Buick.  Veiovis followed behind 
him in a Jeep.  The defendant got into the Jeep, and left in 
that vehicle with Veiovis. 
 
At approximately 9:30 A.M., the defendant returned to the 
Sutton residence in Veiovis's Jeep with Veiovis and Chalue.  The 
defendant asked Dawson and her friend, Alexandra Ely, who was 
staying there and also dating the defendant, to go buy breakfast 
food and bleach, and gave them wet cash to do so.  Dawson 
described the cash as "wet" and "nasty" when the defendant 
handed it to her.  The defendant instructed the women not to 
touch a bag in the Buick, and to wash their hands after handling 
the money he gave them.  The women drove off in the Buick to get 
10 
 
the food, and subsequently they met the defendant, Chalue, and 
Veiovis at the defendant's house in Peru to eat breakfast.5  
Later, the women returned in the Buick to the Sutton residence.  
The defendant, Chalue, and Veiovis followed behind them, came to 
the Sutton residence in Veiovis's Jeep, and then took the Buick 
with them. 
 
At approximately 2 P.M. that day, the defendant went to the 
home of David Casey in Canaan, New York.  The defendant asked 
Casey if he knew of a place where he could park a car he was 
having trouble with near Becket.  Casey made a call and found a 
place for the defendant to park the car.  The defendant then 
told Casey that he had killed Glasser and two others.  The 
defendant described the other two men as a "fat guy" and a black 
man.  The defendant told Casey that, when he went to kill 
Glasser, his gun misfired, and he had to rechamber another round 
of ammunition.  While he was doing so, Glasser took off running 
into the woods; someone else ran after Glasser, shot him, but 
did not kill him, and returned him to the defendant.  The 
defendant told Casey that Glasser begged not to be killed, 
saying he would not testify against the defendant.  The 
defendant told Glasser he had warned Glasser about what would 
happen if Glasser testified against him.  The defendant told 
                                                 
 
5 The women did not purchase the bleach, as the defendant 
later changed his mind. 
11 
 
Casey that, after he shot Glasser, he stabbed the black man, and 
that, after all three men were dead, they "chopped them all up, 
cut their heads off, arms off, legs off, gutted them."6  The 
defendant told Casey that it was raining at the time, and he 
enjoyed working in the rain. 
 
The defendant asked Casey if he could use Casey's excavator 
to dig a hole and bury the victims.  The defendant told Casey 
that, if Casey helped him, no harm would come to Casey, his 
girlfriend, his sister, or Langdon.7 
 
That evening, the defendant brought his Buick -- containing 
the dismembered remains of the victims -- to Casey's 
acquaintance's property in Becket.  The defendant told the 
property owner he was having mechanical problems and would 
remove the car by the next day.  The defendant then returned to 
the Hells Angels clubhouse in Lee, where he spent the evening 
with Chalue and Veiovis. 
                                                 
 
6 Based on Casey's testimony, the defendant mentioned 
neither Chalue nor Veiovis by name, but did state that one of 
the men he was with enjoyed torturing and cutting up the 
victims. 
 
 
7 Langdon was Casey's sister's live-in boyfriend and also a 
participant in the scheme to frame Glasser for armed robbery in 
2010.  At the time of the killings, Langdon was cooperating with 
the police regarding the pending charges against the defendant.  
It is unclear from the record if the defendant was aware of 
Langdon's cooperation with police. 
12 
 
 
On Monday morning, the defendant and Chalue returned to 
Becket to retrieve the Buick.  Casey met them there.  The 
defendant introduced Chalue to Casey, saying Chalue was "a 
member of the Aryan Brotherhood and in order to get in you have 
to murder someone."  The defendant opened the trunk of the Buick 
and commented that "they're starting to smell."  The defendant 
later drove the Buick to the property where Casey kept the 
excavator, while Chalue stayed at Casey's acquaintance's 
property.  Casey used the excavator to dig a large hole, and the 
defendant opened the trunk and dropped a number of plastic 
garbage bags -- containing the remains of the victims -- into 
the hole. 
 
On Monday afternoon, the defendant and Chalue brought the 
Buick to a salvage yard in Massachusetts and sold it for scrap.  
The interior carpets were wet, the back seat was mostly missing, 
the carpet had been removed from the trunk, and much of the car 
was stripped down to bare metal.  That same afternoon, the 
defendant told two friends that Glasser and two of his friends 
were missing and "probably dead." 
 
On Monday evening, the defendant and Chalue were at the 
Hells Angels clubhouse.  Both were drinking and joking.  At one 
point, the defendant pretended to run away from Chalue, yelling 
"Help me, help me!," while Chalue pretended to point a gun at 
the defendant.  The defendant laughed and said:  "You should 
13 
 
have seen the look on his face," and "you should have seen him 
run and try to get away."  The defendant and Chalue also talked 
about "butch" or "butcher" when they were joking.  The defendant 
referred to Veiovis as "butch," and said he was "crazy," "a 
sadistic psycho," and "sick." 
 
On Sunday and Monday, there was no response to Glasser's 
door or telephone, but Glasser's truck remained in the driveway.  
On Monday, Glasser did not appear to bring a friend to work as 
planned, and Frampton missed a doctor's appointment.  A missing 
person's report was filed on Glasser, Frampton, and Chadwell on 
Wednesday, August 31.  The police entered the apartment that day 
and found all three victims' cell phones and Frampton's wallet.  
The television was on, and a calendar was marked off daily 
through Saturday, August 27. 
 
On Sunday, September 4, 2011, the defendant, Chalue, and 
Veiovis went back to the salvage yard where they left the Buick, 
arguably to see whether the Buick had been crushed.  On Friday, 
September 9, and Saturday, September 10, 2011, the police dug up 
the plastic bags containing the victims' body parts after 
speaking with Casey and learning of their burial .  The victims 
had been shot and stabbed, and their neck, arms, and legs had 
been dismembered.  Two of the bodies had been cut through the 
torso.  Most of the dismemberment took place with chopping or 
hacking with a sharp instrument, such as a butcher knife. 
14 
 
 
Later, the police searched Veiovis's apartment and found a 
machete, a cleaver, hatchets, and knives -- all weapons similar 
to those used to dismember the victims or to inflict the 
victims' wounds.  They also found two spiked baseball bats and a 
collage of anatomical illustrations that depicted dismemberment 
similar to that inflicted on the victims. 
 
Three sets of indictments were returned by three different 
sittings of a Berkshire County grand jury on August 21, 2009, 
November 19, 2010, and October 6, 2011.8  The defendant moved to 
dismiss the indictments, arguing that the prosecution impaired 
the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.  The motion was 
denied.  On November 18, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to 
sever the indictments, which also was denied.  The defendant was 
tried from January 6 through February 7, 2014.  After he was 
convicted, the defendant commenced this appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of evidence of territorial 
jurisdiction.  "It is elementary that it must be shown that 
jurisdiction lodged in the courts of Massachusetts before the 
defendant can be found guilty of the offence charged."  Combs, 
480 Mass. at 60, quoting Commonwealth v. Fleming, 360 Mass. 404, 
406 (1971).  It is our practice in Massachusetts that, when 
there is a genuine factual dispute about whether a crime was 
                                                 
8 New indictments were returned for the same crimes when the 
grand jury reconvened in 2012. 
15 
 
committed in Massachusetts, "that issue is to be submitted to 
the jury in the form of an instruction."  Combs, supra at 61.  
"Where territorial jurisdiction is a triable issue, the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof is the same as it is for the 
substantive elements of the crime(s) charged, that being proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.  However, no jurisdictional 
instruction is required where the evidence makes it neither 
reasonable nor possible to assume that the victim was not killed 
or injured in Massachusetts.  See id., citing Commonwealth v. 
Jaynes, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 308-310 (2002). 
 
General Laws c. 277, § 62, establishes the jurisdiction of 
the Commonwealth to try a defendant for murder: 
"If a mortal wound is given, or if other violence or injury 
is inflicted, or if poison is administered, in any county 
of the commonwealth, by means whereof death ensues without 
the commonwealth, the homicide may be prosecuted and 
punished in the county where the act was committed." 
 
We have interpreted the words "by means whereof death ensues" 
not to simply mean "follows" in a chronological sense.  
Commonwealth v. Lent, 420 Mass. 764, 768 (1995).  Instead, it 
requires "a connection between the Massachusetts violence or 
injury and a victim's out-of-State death," such that the death 
"would not have occurred but for the violence or injury that was 
inflicted in Massachusetts."  Id. 
 
We held in Commonwealth v. Travis, 408 Mass. 1, 7-9 (1990), 
that the evidence presented to the jury of a kidnapping that 
16 
 
took place in Massachusetts was enough to allow the jury to 
reasonably conclude that the defendant inflicted "violence or 
injury" on the victim in the Commonwealth, even though her body 
was found in Rhode Island.  In that case, there was no evidence 
of an injury inflicted in Massachusetts that was a mortal wound 
or that was the proximate cause of the victim's death.  Id.  The 
only eyewitness of the kidnapping in Massachusetts testified 
that the defendant walked the victim to his car, and put his 
hand on her back.  Id. at 4.  The victim jumped back before 
entering the vehicle.  Id.  Despite the lack of any violent 
injury inflicted in Massachusetts, jurisdiction was satisfied.  
See id. at 8-9.  See also Jaynes, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 308-310 
(no jurisdictional instruction required where victim was 
kidnapped in Massachusetts and his body was disposed of in 
Maine, as kidnapping "include[s] the requisite violence to the 
victim to confer jurisdiction on the Commonwealth under G. L. 
c. 277, § 62"). 
 
Similarly, we held in Lent, 420 Mass. at 769-770, that, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 277, § 62, there was jurisdiction over the 
defendant, who kidnapped the victim in Massachusetts, tried to 
rape him in Massachusetts, and then ultimately drove him to New 
York, where the defendant strangled him to death.  We held that 
this level of violence was sufficient to provide jurisdiction.  
Lent, supra at 769.  "A jury could find beyond a reasonable 
17 
 
doubt on the evidence that, if [the defendant] had not committed 
the violence and had not inflicted injuries in Massachusetts, 
the death would not have occurred."  Id. at 770. 
 
We reached a different conclusion in Combs, 480 Mass. at 
65-66.  In that case, the victim drove with the defendant's 
coventurer9 from Hartford, Connecticut, to the defendant's 
apartment in Springfield.  Id. at 57.  When the vehicle arrived 
at the apartment, a neighbor only saw the coventurer in it; the 
neighbor did not see the victim.  Id. at 58.  After spending 
approximately thirty minutes in the Springfield apartment, the 
coventurer and the defendant began driving back toward Hartford.  
Id.  It was not clear from the evidence whether the victim was 
alive at this time.  Id.  There was no evidence presented in the 
case to establish Massachusetts as the location of the killing:  
there was no forensic evidence obtained from the Springfield 
apartment, and no other witness besides the neighbor testified 
as to what happened at the Springfield apartment.  Id. at 66.  
Because the jury were "left to guess whether the victim was 
killed in Springfield, as opposed to in Connecticut," there was 
not sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction under G. L. 
c. 277, § 62.  Id. 
                                                 
 
9 The coventurer's case was tried separately, and no 
territorial jurisdiction argument was made in that case.  See 
Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 66 n.21 (2018); 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705 (2016). 
18 
 
 
We conclude that any rational trier of fact could have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant at least 
inflicted violence or injury on the victims in Massachusetts, 
"by means whereof [their] death[s] ensue[d]."  G. L. c. 277, 
§ 62.  See Combs, 480 Mass. at 62-63.  Evidence presented shows 
that the three victims were at Glasser's apartment in Pittsfield 
when the defendant, Chalue, and Veiovis kidnapped them.  But for 
the kidnappings of the three men at the Pittsfield apartment, 
their deaths would not have occurred.  See Lent, 420 Mass. at 
770; Travis, 408 Mass. at 8-9.  Further, the bodies were found 
in Massachusetts, and the Buick was brought to a salvage yard in 
Massachusetts.  Almost all of the relevant events before 1:30 
A.M. and after 5:30 A.M. took place in Massachusetts.  In fact, 
the record before us only places the defendant in New York on 
Sunday at 2 P.M., hours after the kidnappings and murders took 
place.  Even while the defendant was in New York, the Buick with 
the dismembered bodies was located in or near Becket.  
Jurisdiction under G. L. c. 277, § 62, is satisfied. 
 
b.  Defendant's request for a special verdict question.  At 
trial, over defense counsel's objection, the judge did not pose 
a special jury question as to whether there was territorial 
jurisdiction over the defendant's charged crimes.  "Submission 
of special questions . . . . is rarely resorted to in criminal 
trials, and in any case is discretionary with the judge" 
19 
 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., 
Inc. (No. 1), 389 Mass. 902, 916 (1983).  "'Special questions' 
involve a general verdict from the jury coupled with an answer 
or answers to written interrogatories on one or more issues of 
fact, the decision of which is essential to the verdict."  
Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 675 (1982). 
 
The considerations underlying the need for the submission 
of a special question are not relevant here.  "[N]one of the 
relevant facts as developed during the trial [gives] rise to a 
'reasonable and possible' inference [that the relevant conduct 
took place] outside the confines of Massachusetts."  Jaynes, 55 
Mass. App. Ct. at 309.  No special question was required. 
 
Further, the judge properly instructed the jury on the 
issue of jurisdiction when, upon the defendant's request, he 
said that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that all of the charged offenses occurred in Berkshire County.  
The defendant is "not entitled to any particular instruction as 
long as the charge, as a whole, was adequate" (citation 
omitted).  Dane Entertainment Servs., Inc., 389 Mass. at 916.  
Such was the case here.  We discern no error. 
 
c.  Alleged defects in grand jury proceedings.  
"[G]enerally a court will not inquire into the competency or 
sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 
20 
 
161-162 (1982).  Extraordinary circumstances may warrant a 
judicial inquiry into grand jury proceedings either "when it is 
unclear that sufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury 
to support a finding of probable cause to believe that the 
defendant committed the offense charged in the indictment" or 
"when the defendant contends that the integrity of the grand 
jury proceedings somehow has been impaired."  Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 407 Mass. 279, 282 (1990).  The defendant argues that 
the integrity of the grand jury proceedings were impaired and 
the indictments against him should be dismissed because the 
prosecutor (1) failed to present exculpatory evidence to the 
grand jury; (2)  presented allegedly false testimony to the 
grand jury regarding the accuracy of CSLI; and (3) presented 
arguably impermissible character evidence.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
 
i.  Exculpatory evidence.  The defendant argues that 
statements by Casey's sister, Teresa Casey-Cunagin, were not 
presented to the grand jury, and that such testimony would have 
been exculpatory evidence that calls into question the integrity 
of the grand jury proceedings.  The defendant states Casey-
Cunagin told police that three drug dealers were staying in an 
apartment across the street from Glasser's apartment, and that 
one of those drug dealers, "Joey," also referred to as "Whitey," 
had an altercation with Frampton.  The defendant claims that 
21 
 
Casey-Cunagin told police she lent Whitey her car on August 27, 
2011, and he returned it on August 30, 2011, with blood in it. 
 
The defendant also claims that the prosecution failed to 
tell the grand jury that Casey gave conflicting statements to 
the police on September 9, 10, 16, and 18, 2011.10  More 
specifically, the defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to 
present to the jury that Casey, a major witness in the grand 
jury proceedings, was implicated in the charged crime to a 
greater degree than he initially admitted to the police. 
 
"A prosecutor is not required to present all possibly 
exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.  But a prosecutor cannot 
be permitted to subvert the integrity of grand jury proceedings 
by 'selling' the grand jury 'shoddy merchandise' without 
appropriate disclaimers."  Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 
838, 854 (1984).  Where the prosecutor knows of evidence that 
"would greatly undermine the credibility of an important 
witness, the prosecutor must at least alert the grand jury to 
the existence of that evidence."  Id. 
 
Here, the integrity of the indictments was not impaired.  
First, the Commonwealth elicited testimony about the theory that 
                                                 
 
10 Casey at first only said he allowed the defendant to park 
his car near the excavator, and then subsequently noticed the 
excavator had been moved; he later told police he dug the hole, 
but did no more than that; then, he told police he assisted in 
placing the victims' remains in the hole that he dug, in 
addition to filling in the hole with rocks. 
22 
 
Whitey murdered the victims during the grand jury proceedings.  
Second, the Commonwealth learned early on that the story about 
Whitey was a red herring concocted by the defendant:  the 
defendant told Dawson to tell police that Whitey was the last 
person seen with Glasser.  Testimony regarding Whitey was 
therefore not exculpatory, and the prosecution's failure to 
further develop it did not amount to an impairment of the 
proceedings, particularly because there was more than enough 
evidence to indict the defendant, i.e., that the defendant 
schemed to discredit Glasser as a witness in the pending case 
against the defendant, and that the defendant said he would have 
to have Glasser "disappear" if those plans did not work.  The 
grand jury also heard testimony that the defendant told Casey he 
killed three victims, and that Casey helped the defendant dig a 
hole to dump the bodies where the dismembered bodies of the 
three victims were ultimately found by the police.  There was 
also evidence that the defendant, Chalue, and Veiovis were 
driving the defendant's Buick on the night of the murders, and 
that the Buick was used to transport the victims' remains.  
Dawson testified at the grand jury that, after the murders, the 
defendant was drinking and joking at the Hells Angels clubhouse 
with Chalue, seemingly imitating one or more of his victims when 
he yelled, "Help me, help me!"  There was also testimony by 
Dawson before the grand jury that the defendant knew the three 
23 
 
victims were missing before the police were even seen 
investigating at Glasser's house.  In light of this evidence, 
there was no impairment of the integrity of the grand jury 
proceedings. 
 
Further, the prosecutor was forthcoming about Casey's 
incomplete statements to police.  During the prosecutor's 
questioning, Casey agreed that he at first only told the police 
that the excavator had been moved and that the defendant had 
come to him about parking the car overnight.  Casey also 
admitted to speaking to the police multiple times, and about 
coming forward with more of the story as time went on.  The 
defendant's argument that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory 
evidence and tarnished the integrity of the grand jury 
proceedings is therefore without merit. 
 
ii.  Testimony on accuracy of CSLI data.  The defendant 
contends the Commonwealth knowingly introduced false CSLI 
evidence to the grand jury.  The defendant argues that Officer 
John T. Briggs of the Lee police department testified that CSLI 
evidence pinpointed the defendant's location during the late 
morning and into the early afternoon of August 29, 2011, at the 
top of the driveway of the property where the victims' remains 
were buried.  In his grand jury testimony, Briggs reasoned that 
the defendant's cell phone was transmitting signals with two 
sectors of a certain cell tower; that his location would have to 
24 
 
have been where those two sectors met; and that the location of 
the top of the driveway was in the center of those two sectors.  
During the subsequent trial, testimony by Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Eric Perry clarified that, 
when engaging in call detail analysis, officers "cannot point 
the location of the phone."  However, Perry testified CSLI does 
allow officers to narrow a particular geographic area when a 
cell phone is utilizing an overlapping sector. 
 
The defendant claims that Briggs's grand jury testimony was 
inconsistent with Perry's trial testimony because, according to 
the defendant, Briggs testified to the defendant's precise 
location when he said the location was "right at the top of the 
driveway."  The defendant claims that, given the contradiction 
in testimony, the prosecution knowingly presented false evidence 
to the grand jury about CSLI, as it knew, based on Perry's 
testimony, that CSLI could not give the exact location of the 
cell phone. 
 
The defendant's argument is overstated.  Although Briggs's 
grand jury testimony suggested that the CSLI was more precise 
than it actually was, it correctly placed the defendant in the 
vicinity of where the bodies were buried, as did Perry at trial.  
Even if Briggs had specifically clarified what could be learned 
of the defendant's location based on the CSLI, there is no 
likelihood that the grand jury would not have indicted the 
25 
 
defendant given the evidence against him supporting the 
indictments, as discussed supra.  See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 
398 Mass. 615, 620 (1986).  See also Commonwealth v. Collado, 
426 Mass. 675, 680 (1998) ("In a claim that false testimony was 
presented to a grand jury, the defendant bears the heavy burden 
of proving that (1) the evidence was given to the grand jury 
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth and for the 
purpose of obtaining an indictment, and (2) that the evidence 
probably influenced the grand jury's determination to indict the 
defendant" [quotation and citation omitted]).  This argument is 
therefore without merit. 
 
iii.  Character evidence.  The defendant contends that, 
during the grand jury proceedings, the prosecution presented 
propensity evidence that improperly influenced the grand jury's 
decision to indict.  We agree that some of the prior bad act 
testimony was erroneously admitted, but conclude that this 
evidence would not have influenced the grand jury's decision to 
indict, given the ample other evidence supporting the 
indictments, and thus the admission of the testimony did not 
invalidate the indictments returned against the defendant.  See 
Freeman, 407 Mass. at 283. 
 
The prosecution introduced a 2007 indictment for when the 
defendant beat a victim with an axe handle, as well as an 
uncharged allegation that the defendant had requested that a 
26 
 
woman falsely accuse the victim of rape in order to discredit 
him.  Although prior bad acts, their interrelationship closely 
resembled the defendant's scheme to frame Glasser, and as a 
result were relevant to show the modus operandi of the defendant 
to beat someone and then later frame him for a crime in order to 
discredit his testimony.  Because this evidence was relevant for 
purposes other than propensity, it was not error that it came 
before the grand jury. 
 
The prosecutor also presented a letter from the defendant 
that said:  "The weekend all this happened, me, [Chalue,] and 
[Veiovis] were supposed to do a crime in Springfield. . . . [W]e 
put it off because of the storm.  We stayed at [Veiovis's] place 
and got wasted instead."  The defendant objects to this 
evidence, as the reference to the three men's plans to commit a 
crime in Springfield was evidence of a prior bad act.  However, 
we conclude that the evidence also put the defendant in the 
company of both Chalue and Veiovis at the time the murders took 
place, and was therefore relevant for purposes other than 
propensity evidence. 
 
Similarly, contrary to the defendant's arguments, the prior 
bad act testimony about the defendant's arrest for beating 
Glasser or his attempts to frame Glasser for other crimes was 
not just propensity evidence, as it was relevant to the 
27 
 
defendant's intent and motive to commit the charged crimes of 
witness intimidation, kidnapping, and murder. 
 
The prosecutor did, however, present propensity evidence 
when he read a police statement to the grand jury averring that, 
when the defendant was seventeen, "he and his brother Richie 
held a guy for a couple days, and they tortured him before 
letting him go.  [The defendant] spent a few years in jail for 
the incident."  The prosecutor also read another police 
statement to the grand jury stating that the defendant ran a 
prostitution ring, paid prostitutes in drugs, and sold cocaine.  
The two statements read by the prosecutor had no relevance aside 
from the purpose of establishing that the defendant had a 
propensity for violence and criminal activity. 
 
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that reading the police 
statements to the grand jury impaired the indictment process.  
"[H]ad there been less evidence incriminating [the defendant]," 
the presentation of this evidence "could have led the grand jury 
to indict [the defendant] improperly on the basis of his 
propensity to commit crime, rather than on the crime charged."  
Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 175, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1007 (1998).  However, testimony that is improper must, 
when "viewed in the context of all the evidence presented to the 
grand jury," make a difference in the jury's decision to indict 
the defendant in order to be considered an impairment of the 
28 
 
integrity of the grand jury proceedings.  Id. at 174-175.  In 
this case, as discussed supra, the cumulative evidence presented 
against the defendant during the grand jury proceedings was 
powerful.  See id. at 175.  In light of this evidence, there was 
no impairment of the integrity of the grand jury proceedings. 
 
d.  Dismissal of conviction for the 2010 kidnapping.  The 
defendant next contends that his kidnapping conviction based on 
conduct in 2010 must be reversed, as the theory on which the 
prosecution proceeded at trial had previously been dismissed by 
the court.  We agree and dismiss the conviction for the 2010 
kidnapping. 
 
The conduct providing the basis of the relevant kidnapping 
charge took place in 2010 when the defendant tried to frame 
Glasser for the kidnapping and armed robbery of Brooks.  As 
described supra, the defendant was charged with kidnapping under 
two theories:  (1) under a theory of inveiglement when the 
defendant framed Glasser for a crime that led to his arrest and 
detention, and (2) under a theory that the defendant enticed 
Glasser to drive to New York under false pretenses.  The motion 
judge dismissed the first theory on August 3, 2011.  The only 
theory remaining was the false pretenses theory. 
 
However, the prosecution did not proceed on the false 
pretenses theory, but instead proceeded on the dismissed 
inveiglement theory.  The trial judge stated while instructing 
29 
 
the jury that "[t]he defendant is charged with kidnapping David 
Glasser by causing him to be arrested and confined in 
Massachusetts on or about August 14, 2010."  This statement, 
however, only reflects the inveiglement theory of kidnapping 
that had been dismissed by the motion judge, and made no 
reference to the false pretenses theory, which was not pursued 
at trial.  Therefore, we conclude that the defendant's 2010 
kidnapping conviction must be reversed. 
 
e.  Evidentiary issues.  i.  Photographs of weapons.  The 
defendant argues that photographs found in Veiovis's apartment 
of a machete, cleaver, hatchets, knives, and two spiked baseball 
bats were inadmissible against him as they were more prejudicial 
than probative, and were only relevant as evidence of his bad 
character or propensity to commit the crimes charged.  However, 
evidence of weapons that "could have been used in the course of 
a crime [are] admissible, in the judge's discretion, even 
without direct proof that the particular weapon[s] [were] in 
fact used in the commission of the crime."  Veiovis, 477 Mass. 
at 485, quoting Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 
(2012).  That is because "[s]uch evidence is relevant for 
demonstrating that the defendant had the means of committing the 
crime" (quotation omitted).  Veiovis, supra, quoting Barbosa, 
supra.  The determination whether the risk of prejudice 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence is therefore a 
30 
 
decision at the discretion of the trial judge, and we reverse 
only if the trial judge made "a clear error of judgment in 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that 
the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(quotation and citation omitted),  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), and if that error resulted in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, Veiovis, 
supra at 486. 
 
In Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 485-486, we held that photographs 
of the machete, cleaver, hatchets, and knives found in Veiovis's 
apartment were admissible to show that Veiovis had the means to 
dismember the victims' bodies.  The same is true here:  there 
was evidence presented at trial that the injuries inflicted on 
the victims were consistent with those caused by the weapons 
introduced in evidence.  Because the defendant successfully 
enlisted Veiovis to assist him in the venture and Veiovis 
possessed tools consistent with the dismemberment and injuries 
inflicted, evidence of the weapons found in Veiovis's apartment 
was properly admitted to show that the defendant similarly had 
the means of dismembering the victims' bodies.  That the tools 
were found in Veiovis's possession does not change the 
admissibility analysis.  In short, the trial judge could 
reasonably have found that the photographs were admissible 
inasmuch as they were offered to show the defendant's means to 
31 
 
commit the charged crimes, and their admission is not so clearly 
prejudicial as to warrant reversal.  See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 
n.27. 
 
However, as we similarly held in Veiovis, supra, the 
photographs of the spiked baseball bats were inadmissible, as 
there was no evidence that they could have been used in the 
commission of the crimes.  Thus, the photographs "had no 
probative value and posed a needless risk of unfair prejudice."  
Id. at 486.  The Commonwealth concedes this error.  However, 
given the other admissible evidence, particularly the testimony 
regarding the injuries inflicted, the weapons consistent with 
those injuries, and the weapons that were ultimately found at 
Veiovis's apartment, we conclude that this error was not 
prejudicial.  See id.  See also Commonwealth v. Graham, 431 
Mass. 282, 288, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1020 (2000) ("An error is 
nonprejudicial only if we are sure that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" [quotation 
and citation omitted]). 
 
ii.  Anatomical drawings.  The defendant argues that 
anatomical drawings found in Veiovis's home were inadmissible 
against the defendant, and that admitting such drawings in 
evidence created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  The drawings depicted images of human dissections and 
amputation of body parts.  As we explained in Veiovis: 
32 
 
"A critical piece of evidence in this case was the 
statement made by Hall in furtherance of the joint venture 
that 'one of the guys really enjoyed torturing and cutting 
[the victims] up.'  Evidence that the defendant chose to 
put on his wall anatomical drawings showing the dissection 
of the human body and chose to possess drawings depicting 
the amputations of arms and legs tends to identify 
[Veiovis] as the person who likely fit Hall's description 
of the third accomplice as someone who enjoyed 'cutting 
[the victims] up.'" 
 
Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 482.  This connects both Veiovis and the 
defendant to the joint venture.  It also provides confirmation 
of Hall's statement in this regard, further incriminating him.  
Finally, it provides an additional explanation why the victims 
were dismembered in this joint venture.  As we stated in 
Veiovis, "[Veiovis's] apparent fascination with amputation and 
human dismemberment offers an explanation for what would 
otherwise be inexplicable."  Id. at 485.  Thus, for many of the 
same reasons as we found in Veiovis, we discern no abuse of 
discretion by the trial judge in admitting this evidence. 
 
iii.  Prior bad acts.  The defendant also contests the 
admissibility of testimony regarding six uncharged schemes he 
orchestrated -- after the attempted framing of Glasser for 
kidnapping and armed robbery in 2010 -- to either discredit 
Glasser's testimony or influence it.  One of these schemes 
involved an effort to offer Glasser $3,000 to remain silent.  
The others involved soliciting individuals to make false 
criminal allegations against Glasser, including rape, theft, and 
33 
 
kidnapping.  The defendant argues that this testimony 
constituted impermissible bad character or propensity evidence 
the prejudicial effect of which outweighed its probative value.  
We disagree. 
 
To avoid the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, 
evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible when offered solely 
to show the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime.  
Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2020).  However, such evidence is 
admissible when offered for another purpose, such as motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
pattern of operation, so long as its probative value for that 
purpose is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014). 
 
Here, the evidence of the six uncharged schemes was 
relevant to show the defendant's motive to silence Glasser as a 
prospective witness in the defendant's upcoming trial, and the 
great lengths to which he would go to attempt to secure such 
silence.  The defendant's schemes were clearly "sufficiently 
related in time to be logically probative."  See Commonwealth v. 
Gollman, 436 Mass. 111, 115 (2002).  The defendant himself 
explicitly drew the connections when he explained that Glasser 
would have to disappear if the defendant's scheme to frame 
Glasser for kidnapping and armed robbery in 2010 did not work, 
34 
 
and when he said, "I ought to kill that motherfucker [Glasser] 
for ruining my life." 
 
We do not consider the prejudicial effect of this evidence 
to outweigh its great probative value.  Whatever prejudicial 
effect this evidence had, it was mitigated by the judge's 
limiting instructions when evidence of these schemes was 
introduced.  There was no error here.11 
 
f.  Joinder.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
improperly denied his motion to sever the indictments, as he was 
prejudiced by the joinder of the charges of murder in the first 
degree with the lesser offenses, and that this resulted in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We 
disagree. 
 
Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (1), 378 Mass. 859 
(1979), two or more offenses are related and appropriate for 
joinder "if they are based on the same criminal conduct or 
episode or arise out of a course of criminal conduct or series 
of criminal episodes connected together or constituting parts of 
a single scheme or plan."  A defendant may move to sever if 
joinder of the offenses is not in the best interests of justice, 
but the burden is on the defendant to show that he or she is 
                                                 
11 We also reject the defendant's argument that the 
cumulative impact of this evidence resulted in a prejudicial 
effect that outweighed the evidence's probative value. 
35 
 
prejudiced by the joinder.  See Commonwealth v. Zemtsov, 443 
Mass. 36, 45 (2004); Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (d), 378 Mass. 859 
(1979).  We have emphasized that "[s]eparate trials are not 
required merely because offenses occurred on different dates or 
involved different victims" (citation omitted).  Zemtsov, supra 
at 44.  "Prejudice requiring severance does not arise from the 
mere fact that the defendant's chances for acquittal of [one of 
the charges] might have been better had the offenses been tried 
separately" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 469 (2014).  Instead, "[t]he question 
whether failure to sever offenses joined for trial resulted in 
undue prejudice to a defendant turns largely on whether evidence 
of the other offenses would have been admissible at a separate 
trial on each indictment."  Zemtsov, supra at 45.  A showing 
that "joinder tended to show [a defendant's] bad character or 
propensity to commit a crime" does not necessarily suffice to 
create unfair prejudice.  Spray, supra.  Instead, the 
defendant's burden is to show that "the prejudice resulting from 
a joint trial is so compelling that it prevent[ed] [him] from 
obtaining a fair trial" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 595 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1058 
(1998).  Whether severance of indictments is proper "is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the judge [and his or her] 
36 
 
decision will be reversed only if there has been a clear abuse 
of discretion."  Zemtsov, supra at 43. 
 
We discern no error here.  The series of increasingly 
violent crimes committed against Glasser constitute a pattern 
that "escalated to a final attack" on Glasser and the other two 
victims in this case.  See Commonwealth v. White, 60 Mass. App. 
Ct. 193, 195-197 (2003) (joinder of stalking charge with charge 
of armed assault with intent to murder was proper where 
defendant engaged in pattern of threats and acts of violence 
against victim over course of four years and violence escalated 
to final attack).  The three distinct episodes of (1) beating 
Glasser with a baseball bat; (2) conspiring with others to 
falsely accuse Glasser of kidnapping and assaulting Brooks to 
discredit Glasser's testimony; and (3) murdering Glasser and his 
two friends to silence him constitute a "series of criminal 
episodes connected together," and were thus properly joined.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. (9) (a) (1).  As the motion judge found, 
"the alleged 2009 beating of Glasser by Hall, the alleged 2010 
scheme to frame him for armed robbery and . . . Hall's alleged 
murder of Glasser, Frampton and Chadwell, constitute part of [a] 
single scheme or plan to harm, discredit and eliminate Glasser 
as a potential witness against Hall."  Moreover, Hall's beating 
of Glasser to prevent him from testifying and the act of 
conspiring to discredit Glasser's testimony are probative of the 
37 
 
defendant's motive and intent on the murder charges, and 
evidence of those offenses therefore would have been admissible 
at a separate trial of the murders.  See Zemtsov, 443 Mass. at 
45. 
 
In a similar vein, we reject the defendant's argument that 
it was improper for the prosecutor to say in his closing 
argument "what ultimately ends up happening in the third case 
proves the first two" -- i.e., that the murder in the first 
degree of Glasser supported the charges against the defendant 
for beating Glasser with a baseball bat and framing him for the 
armed robbery and kidnapping of Brooks.  This did not, as the 
defendant contends, contradict the court's instruction that the 
jury must come to an independent conclusion regarding each 
charge.  The evidence of the different crimes was interrelated, 
and could properly be so considered.  When the evidence, 
argument, and instructions are considered as a whole, we discern 
no error.  Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 607 (2018). 
 
g.  Alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant 
contends that he did not receive a fair trial due to repeated 
acts of misconduct by the prosecution that rose to the level of 
a constitutional violation and that could not be remedied with 
cautionary instructions.  We address each perceived error in 
turn. 
38 
 
 
i.  Misuse of the grand jury.  The defendant claims that, 
by admitting prior indictments as exhibits in the grand jury 
proceedings, the Commonwealth impermissibly "inject[ed]" a prior 
finding of probable cause into the deliberations, thus 
compromising the integrity of the proceedings.  Further, by 
reconvening the jury when the defendant filed for dismissal, the 
defendant argues, the prosecution used the grand jury as an 
attempted "end run" around the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
 
The defendant's argument has no merit.  To support his 
claim, he cites to Commonwealth v. Cote, 407 Mass. 827 (1990).  
However, we see no parallel between Cote and the present case.  
In Cote, the district attorney obtained business telephone 
message records by use of a grand jury subpoena; those records 
were not presented to the grand jury, but they were presented at 
trial.  Id. at 830.  Although the court held that this was an 
abuse of the grand jury subpoena power by the district attorney, 
it also held that there was no prejudice to the defendant and no 
serious impairment of the grand jury process.  Id. at 831-833. 
 
The defendant does not illustrate how this case is similar 
to Cote, or otherwise cite to case law supporting his argument.  
By introducing the indictments at the grand jury proceedings, 
and by reconvening the grand jury after the motion to dismiss 
was filed, the prosecution did not act improperly, and did not 
engage in any "end run" around the defendant's motion to 
39 
 
dismiss.  Nor did the prosecution use the grand jury to prepare 
an already pending indictment for trial, as no evidence obtained 
during the reconvened grand jury was introduced at trial.  This 
argument lacks merit. 
 
ii.  The defendant's postindictment interviews with police.  
The defendant contends that the prosecution improperly 
"glean[ed]" information from the defendant during interviews 
with the defendant where the defendant's counsel was not 
present.  The defendant does not seek to suppress these 
statements,12 but argues instead that these interviews 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct that resulted in an unfair 
trial, thus warranting reversal.  We reject this argument, in 
particular because it is a mischaracterization of the interviews 
that took place.  Further, we cannot conclude that these 
interviews resulted in an unfair trial when "nothing in the 
Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] prevents a 
suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel from 
voluntarily choosing, on his own, to speak with police in the 
absence of an attorney."  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 448 Mass. 
548, 554, 557 (2007), quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 
352 (1990).  Although art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights requires police officers to inform a suspect of his or 
                                                 
 
12 The defendant moved to suppress these statements before 
trial, but that motion properly was denied. 
40 
 
her attorney's request that the suspect not be interviewed, that 
requirement was met in this case.  Anderson, supra at 556. 
 
Here, the defendant developed a conflict with his former 
counsel, Attorney William Rota, over an interest in cooperating 
with law enforcement to resolve one of his underlying cases.  In 
September 2010, when the defendant was being held on kidnapping 
charges, the defendant indicated he wanted to speak with the 
FBI, and made a request to do the same to an officer at the 
Hampden County house of correction.  A State police detective 
discussed the defendant's request with the district attorney, 
and then notified Rota.  The defendant expressed continuing 
interest in an interview with the FBI, and told Rota that he did 
not want to share with Rota what he wanted to say to the FBI.  
Rota relayed this to the detective, who made arrangements for 
the defendant to meet with the FBI.  The defendant read and 
signed a Sixth Amendment waiver before the interview began.  At 
that first meeting, and at a second, short follow-up meeting, 
the investigators did not discuss the charges pending against 
the defendant, but informed the defendant that he would not be 
used as an informant.  Rota did not have knowledge that the 
meetings took place. 
 
In 2012, after the murder indictments were returned and 
once the defense strategy was developed, the defendant wanted to 
present information related to his defense strategy to the 
41 
 
Commonwealth, believing that -- by providing the Commonwealth 
with his theory of the murders, i.e., that they were committed 
by Casey and Whitey -- he would be exonerated.  Rota told the 
defendant that their theory should not be presented until trial, 
as the Commonwealth would then have time to neutralize the 
defendant's strategy.  However, the defendant went against his 
attorney's advice and disclosed this information to the State 
police in an interview that occurred on August 9, 2012.  Before 
the interview, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights 
and was reminded that he had an attorney who could be present, 
but did not execute a written waiver.  The defendant indicated 
he did not wish to have an attorney present, and told the police 
that he did not trust his attorney, saying he would likely tell 
Rota to "step down" so he could get a new lawyer. 
 
After Rota was informed of the interview, he advised his 
client not to have any further discussions with the police -- 
but to no avail.  The defendant met with State police again on 
August 13, 2012.  During that interview, the defendant told the 
investigators that his "lawyer is not happy that I talked with 
you."  Rota subsequently moved to withdraw from the case given 
the conflict, and a Superior Court judge granted the motion. 
 
In light of these facts, it was the defendant who initiated 
the interviews with law enforcement, even after Rota's repeated 
advice not to do so.  The defendant was advised of his rights 
42 
 
and reminded that he had an attorney.  During the interviews, 
the defendant did most of the talking, with questions by 
investigators only seeking to clarify the information given.  
The defendant even acknowledged that the investigators were 
there at his request.  Disregarding his counsel's advice, as was 
his right, the defendant made a determined choice to engage with 
law enforcement.  There was no prosecutorial misconduct here.13 
 
iii.  Search of the defendant's jail cell.  In a motion to 
dismiss the charges against him, the defendant argued that his 
right to counsel was violated by investigators who conducted a 
search of his jail cell pursuant to a valid warrant on November 
19, 2012, despite the defendant's request to have counsel 
present.  The defendant contends that privileged attorney-client 
communications were seized from his jail cell, which the officer 
in charge of the search disputed.  The trial judge denied the 
motion, finding that the officer "set aside and did not seize 
any writings that he verified were either to or from [the 
defendant's] attorney."  The defendant raises the same issue 
again on appeal.  "Where there has been conflicting testimony as 
                                                 
 
13 Even if we were to find an ethical violation, and we do 
not do so here, the meeting with the defendant in these 
circumstances would not be grounds for reversal.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 435 Mass. 743, 754 (2002) (no prejudice 
resulting from alleged violation of rule of professional conduct 
by prosecutor where police officer informed defendant his 
attorneys did not want polygraph to continue, yet defendant 
nevertheless agreed to polygraph). 
43 
 
to a particular event or series of events, a judge's resolution 
of such conflicting testimony invariably will be accepted," and 
we will not disturb the ruling absent a finding of clear error.  
Commonwealth v. Carr, 458 Mass. 295, 298-299 (2010). 
 
The defendant has presented no case law supporting his 
proposition that the target of a search warrant has a right to 
have counsel present during the execution of a warrant.  The 
officers executed a warrant to search the defendant's cell for 
writings that would show evidence of the murders and witness 
intimidation.  Further, the officer in charge of the search did 
not, as the judge found, seize any writings that he verified 
were either to or from the defendant's attorney.  Such action 
does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct, particularly when 
the defendant has not identified any of the materials seized as 
subject to the attorney-client privilege. 
 
iv.  Improper burden shifting.  The defendant claims the 
prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant when, during his direct examination of a State police 
trooper, he implied the defendant had an obligation to inspect 
evidence by asking whether evidence collected by police was 
"made available for viewing and examination by anyone connected 
with this case."  Likewise, the defendant claims the prosecution 
shifted the burden to the defendant when the prosecutor stated 
during closing argument that, if the defendant "complains about 
44 
 
what wasn't tested based upon the evidence you hear, he's not 
just complaining about the . . . Commonwealth, he's complaining 
about himself."  We disagree in both instances. 
 
First, the prosecutor stated in his closing argument that 
"the Commonwealth is not arguing that the defendant has any 
obligation to do anything in this case."  More importantly, the 
judge also emphasized that "[t]he defendant did not have to 
explain anything.  The burden of proof rests entirely on the 
Commonwealth . . . ."  The defendant also takes the prosecutor's 
closing argument out of context when he argues that the words 
"he's complaining about himself" were supposed to refer to the 
defendant's obligation to inspect the evidence.  Instead, the 
prosecution was referencing the general inability of the 
prosecution and others to engage in the usual forensic methods 
to gather evidence due to the efforts of the defendant, Veiovis, 
and Chalue "to hide the scene and the weapons and thus, whether 
specifically by their intentions or not, deter the usual 
forensic methods to gather evidence."  We conclude that there 
was no error on the part of the prosecutor here.14 
                                                 
14 We similarly reject the defendant's argument that the 
prosecution "trivialized" the reasonable doubt instruction 
during the Commonwealth's closing argument, thus warranting 
reversal of the defendant's convictions.  Nothing in the 
prosecution's closing argument misrepresented the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard.  See Commonwealth v. Daye, 435 Mass. 
463, 475-476 (2001). 
45 
 
 
v.  Reference to statement not in evidence.  The defendant 
argues, and the Commonwealth concedes, that the prosecutor 
erroneously attributed a statement to Dawson during his closing.  
The prosecutor said that Dawson testified the defendant stated:  
"the poor bastard had to watch," and the prosecutor continued to 
explain: "That's why Ed Frampton and Robert Chadwell had those 
horrible slices up their abdomen and David Glasser didn't."15  
However, we do not find this error prejudicial, as it was 
unlikely that the jury were influenced by a narrative regarding 
whether the victims had to watch the killings, see Graham, 431 
Mass. at 288, and the Commonwealth presented compelling evidence 
from numerous witnesses directly identifying the defendant as 
the perpetrator of these crimes, including the defendant's own 
admissions.  For these reasons, we cannot conclude that this 
error is prejudicial or amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
vi.  Disregard of evidentiary rulings.  Finally, the 
defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
"fail[ing] to heed the trial court's evidentiary rulings."  The 
defendant argues that one police officer witness "blurted out" 
inadmissible comments that were highly inflammatory and unfairly 
prejudicial during direct examination by the Commonwealth.  
Specifically, the officer referenced a comment the defendant 
                                                 
15 Based on our review of the record, there is no testimony 
from any witness attributing this statement to the defendant. 
46 
 
made to him that "[i]t ain't my duty to chase down niggers that 
do shit in the city," and that he "didn't like it that they were 
trying to ask fifteen-year-old girls and offer them a hundred 
dollars for a blow job."  The court had previously ruled on a 
motion in limine barring the prosecution from eliciting this 
testimony regarding the defendant's inflammatory statement.  
However, there is nothing in the record to show that the 
prosecutor did not act in good faith when he led the witness and 
asked him not to use offensive words.  We cannot conclude that 
he sought to elicit either the racial epithet or the words "blow 
job" as statements of the defendant.  Further, the trial judge 
immediately gave an instruction to the jury to disregard the use 
of the racial epithet.  In sum, we cannot conclude that the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct here, or that any error 
resulted in prejudice given the overwhelming evidence against 
the defendant, as discussed supra. 
 
h.  Moffett arguments.  The defendant's many Moffett claims 
and the arguments raised in his various subsequent filings do 
not warrant extended discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Moffett, 
383 Mass. 201, 208-209 (1981).  We have given due consideration 
to all the issues raised and reject them as without merit. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Given the foregoing, and upon review of 
the entire record, we conclude that the verdicts of murder in 
the first degree are consonant with justice, and we decline to 
47 
 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or direct the entry of verdicts of a lesser degree of 
guilt.  We reverse the defendant's kidnapping conviction for the 
conduct in 2010, as it was based on an inveiglement theory 
previously dismissed by the motion judge, but affirm all other 
judgments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.