Title: Fletcher v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 425, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 7, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARVIN E. FLETCHER, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 425, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0307022941A 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 14, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
December 7, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.   
 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of December 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Marvin E. Fletcher, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s July 6, 2009 summary dismissal of his second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to various subsections of Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61(i).1  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the 
Superior Court judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
                                          
 
1 See Del. Super. Cr. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to relief). 
 
2
Fletcher’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) 
In 2003, Fletcher and Toshiro Priest were arrested after police 
found cocaine, a digital scale, and a loaded handgun in a vehicle in which 
the two men were riding.  Both Fletcher and Priest were charged with 
numerous offenses and were tried together.  
 
(3) 
A Superior Court jury convicted Fletcher of three counts of 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF) and 
one count each of Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Cocaine, Maintaining a Vehicle, Tampering with Physical Evidence, 
Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 
and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  The jury convicted Priest of three 
counts of PFDCF and one count each of Receiving a Stolen Firearm, 
Maintaining a Vehicle, Tampering with Physical Evidence, Carrying a 
Concealed Deadly Weapon, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
 
                                          
 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
3
 
(4) 
After sentencing, both Fletcher and Priest filed a direct appeal.  
On appeal, the Court affirmed all of Fletcher’s convictions3 but vacated 
Priest’s convictions for Maintaining a Vehicle and PFDCF.4 
 
 
 
(5) 
Fletcher, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion for 
postconviction relief in 2007.  In the motion, Fletcher challenged the stop 
and search of the vehicle and the admission of certain evidence.  He also 
argued that he was entitled to a reversal of the same convictions that Priest 
had received. 
 
 
(6) 
By order dated January 31, 2008, the Superior Court denied 
Fletcher’s first postconviction motion.  Fletcher filed an appeal from that 
decision but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal.5 
 
 
(7) 
In June 2009, Fletcher filed a second motion for postconviction 
relief.  The Superior Court summarily dismissed the motion as untimely,6 
repetitive,7 procedurally defaulted,8 and formerly adjudicated.9  This appeal 
followed. 
                                          
 
3 Fletcher v. State, 2005 WL 646841 (Del. Supr.).   
4 Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005). 
5 Fletcher v. State, Del. Supr., No. 102, 2008.  
6 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
7 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 
8 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
9 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
 
4
 
(8) 
In his second postconviction motion and in his opening brief on 
appeal, Fletcher argues that there was no probable cause for his arrest, that 
the vehicle’s stop and search were illegal, and that the reversal of Priest’s 
convictions entitled him to a similar reversal.  Fletcher also argues that his 
convictions for PFDCF were invalidated by this Court’s 2009 decision in 
Allen v. State.10   
 
(9) 
The Court can discern no apparent application of the Allen 
decision to Fletcher’s convictions for PFDCF.  In Allen, we held that when a 
charged offense is divided into degrees, a defendant convicted of the offense 
on the basis of accomplice liability is entitled to an instruction requiring that 
the jury make an individualized determination of the degree of the 
defendant’s culpability.11  In Fletcher’s case, only the conspiracy charge was 
a crime divisible into degrees.  With respect to the conspiracy charge it 
appears that the jury was properly instructed on accomplice liability.  
 
(10) The Court has determined that the Superior Court’s summary 
dismissal of Fletcher’s second postconviction motion as procedurally barred 
should be affirmed.    The motion is untimely,12 repetitive13 and, for the most 
                                          
 
10Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203 (Del. 2009). 
11 Id. 
12 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
 
5
part, formerly adjudicated.14  To the extent Fletcher attempts to raise a new 
claim in the motion, that previously unasserted claim also is procedurally 
defaulted.15  Finally, Fletcher has not demonstrated that an exception to any 
of the procedural bars is warranted.16     
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                                                                                             
 
13 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 
14 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
15 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
16 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1), (4), (5).