Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL ROBERT CUSTER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 117390
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
_ 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 30, 2001  
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee,  
v  
No. 117390  
MICHAEL ROBERT CUSTER,  
Defendant-Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
After arresting defendant’s companion for possessing  
marijuana, a police officer conducted a patdown search of  
defendant.  The officer removed what he believed to be blotter  
acid from defendant’s pocket and placed it on the roof of the  
vehicle.  When the officer finished searching defendant, he  
 
retrieved the object from the roof of the vehicle and observed  
what appeared to be three photographs facing down.  He turned  
them over to examine the fronts of them.  The photographs  
depicted defendant’s companion posed in a house containing  
large quantities of marijuana.  The police went to defendant’s  
house and observed furnishings similar to those in the  
photographs. They obtained a search warrant for defendant’s  
house and seized marijuana therein.  
Defendant 
was 
charged 
with 
several 
drug-related 
offenses.  
The district court dismissed the charges on the ground that  
the patdown search of defendant had been illegal.  The circuit  
court affirmed the district court’s decision.  The Court of  
Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision on the ground  
that, even though the patdown search of defendant had been  
legal, the police officer should not have turned the  
photographs over to examine the fronts of them.  We granted  
leave to consider whether it was proper for the police officer  
to: (1) briefly detain defendant, (2) patdown defendant, (3)  
seize the photographs from defendant, and (4) turn the  
photographs over to examine the fronts of them. We conclude  
that it was.  Accordingly, we would affirm the decision of the  
Court of Appeals that the brief detention of defendant, the  
patdown search of defendant, and the initial seizure of the  
photographs from defendant were proper, and we would reverse  
2  
  
the decision of the Court of Appeals that the police officer’s  
turning over and examining the photographs was improper.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Two police officers were dispatched to a residence in Bay  
City to investigate a possible trespass.  When they arrived at  
the location, the officers observed a parked vehicle occupied  
by Billy Holder and defendant.  One of the officers approached  
Holder, the driver of the vehicle, and asked him to get out of  
the vehicle.  Because the officer believed that Holder was  
intoxicated, the officer advised Holder that he could not  
drive, and thus his vehicle would have to be towed at his own  
expense.  When the officer asked Holder to demonstrate that he  
had enough money to pay for the towing, Holder removed  
approximately $500, mostly in ten and twenty dollar bills,  
from his pants pocket, along with a plastic baggie that  
contained marijuana. The officer arrested Holder and placed  
him in the patrol car. Once Holder was placed in the patrol  
car, Holder yelled to defendant, “don’t tell them a f———  
thing.” The officer then asked defendant to step out of the  
vehicle, and conducted a patdown search of defendant.  At this  
point, the officer anticipated finding weapons and drugs on  
defendant.  During the patdown, the officer felt what he  
believed to be a two-by-three-inch card of blotter acid in  
defendant’s front pants pocket.  The officer’s belief was  
3  
 
based on his knowledge that blotter acid is often contained on  
sheets of cardboard. The object was actually three Polaroid  
photographs that showed Holder posed with large quantities of  
marijuana in the living room of defendant’s house.  The  
officer removed the photographs from defendant’s pocket and  
placed them on the roof of Holder’s vehicle face down.  It was  
only after finishing the patdown of defendant moments later,  
that the officer picked the photographs up and turned them  
over to examine their fronts.  
After the photographs were seized from defendant by the  
police, a Bay City detective contacted a Mount Pleasant  
detective and provided him with three addresses, including  
defendant’s address, to determine if any of the houses  
contained furnishings similar to those found in the  
photographs.
 The Mount Pleasant detective peered into  
defendant’s 
house 
through the front window using a flashlight.  
His observation of furnishings similar to those in the  
photographs was used to obtain a search warrant for  
defendant’s house, from which marijuana was seized.  
Defendant was charged with delivery and manufacture of 5  
to 45 kilograms of marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(ii),  
maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(d), and conspiring to  
deliver 5 to 45 kilograms of marijuana, MCL 750.157a.  The  
district 
court 
suppressed 
the 
photographs 
taken 
from 
defendant  
4  
  
  
 
and the evidence obtained from the search warrant executed at  
defendant’s home on the basis that the patdown search of  
defendant had been illegal.  As a result of such suppression,  
the district court dismissed the charges against defendant.  
The circuit court then affirmed the decision of the district  
court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the  
circuit court.  242 Mich App 59; 618 NW2d 75 (2000). However,  
the Court of Appeals concluded that the patdown search of  
defendant had been legal, but that the officer should not have  
turned the photographs over to look at their fronts.  
Additionally, the circuit court found the search of  
defendant’s home to be improper, but the Court of Appeals  
never reached that issue.1
 This Court granted the  
prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal and defendant’s  
application for leave to cross-appeal. 463 Mich 907 (2000).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court reviews a trial court's factual findings in a  
suppression hearing for clear error. People v Stevens (After  
Remand), 460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (2000); People v  
Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).  However,  
“[a]pplication of constitutional standards by the trial court  
1 
 We do not address whether the search of defendant’s  
home was proper because that issue is not properly before us. 
We remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for their 
consideration.  
5  
  
 
 
is not entitled to the same deference as factual findings.”  
People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 631, n 7; 505 NW2d 266 (1993).  
The application of the exclusionary rule to a violation of the  
Fourth Amendment is a question of law.  Stevens, supra at 631.  
Questions of law relevant to the suppression issue are  
reviewed de novo.  
NW2d 219 (1998). 
Id.; People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. DETENTION 
The first issue is whether the initial detention of  
defendant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment of the United  
States Constitution and Const 1963, art 1, § 11, which  
guarantee the right of persons to be secure against  
unreasonable searches and seizures.  US Const, Am IV; Const  
1963, art 1, § 11.2  “[A] police officer may in appropriate  
2 
Michigan’s 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures “is to be construed to  
provide the same protection as that secured by the Fourth 
Amendment [of the federal constitution], absent, ‘compelling 
reason’ to impose a different interpretation.”  People v  
Collins, 438 Mich 8, 25; 475 NW2d 684 (1991).  However, if the 
item seized is a “narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace 
officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this 
state,” 
Michigan’s 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures is not applicable. Const  
1963, art 1, § 11. Since marijuana is considered a narcotic 
drug for purposes of art 1, § 11, if the marijuana had been 
seized outside the curtilage of a dwelling house,  Michigan’s 
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures would not be applicable, although the Fourth  
Amendment’s would be. Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1044, n 
10; 103 S Ct 3469; 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983).  However, in the  
6  
 
 
 
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person  
for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even  
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Terry  
v Ohio, 392 US 1, 22; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).  A  
brief, on-the-scene detention of an individual is not a  
violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer can  
articulate 
a 
reasonable suspicion for the detention.  Michigan  
v Summers, 452 US 692, 699-700; 101 S Ct 2587; 69 L Ed 2d 340  
(1981); People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 56-57; 378 NW2d 451  
(1985).  “Police officers may make a valid investigatory stop  
if they possess ‘reasonable suspicion’ that crime is afoot.”  
People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996).  
In this case, the police were dispatched to a residence  
to investigate a complaint regarding a possible trespass.  
When they arrived at the scene, they found Holder and  
defendant in a parked vehicle, and very briefly questioned  
them about their presence in the area. They determined that  
Holder, the driver of the vehicle, was too intoxicated to be  
driving.
 Therefore, they began to make arrangements for  
Holder’s car to be towed so that defendant and others on the  
road would not be jeopardized. 
While making these  
present case, the marijuana was found in the curtilage of 
defendant’s dwelling house, and thus both the Fourth  
Amendment’s and Michigan’s constitutional prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures are applicable.  
7  
 
 
   
  
arrangements, Holder (presumably inadvertently) pulled a  
baggie of marijuana out of his pocket, and was arrested.  
Immediately after this arrest, the police conducted a patdown  
search of defendant.  
In summary, before the marijuana was found, the police,  
upon a complaint of criminal conduct, properly detained  
defendant in a public place, for the purpose of determining  
whether a crime had been committed.  See Shabaz, supra at 56.  
Further, after the marijuana was found, the police properly  
detained defendant for the purpose of conducting a limited  
search for weapons on the basis of reasonable suspicion.  See  
Champion, supra at 99. Therefore, we conclude that the brief  
detention of defendant in this case was valid under the Fourth  
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Const 1963,  
art 1, § 11.  
B. 
PATDOWN SEARCH  
The next issue is whether the patdown search of defendant  
was invalid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States  
Constitution 
and 
its 
counterpart 
in 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution.  
US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  A police officer  
may perform a limited patdown search for weapons if the  
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is  
armed, and thus poses a danger to the officer or to other  
persons. 
Terry, supra at 27; Champion, supra at 99.  “The  
8  
 
officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is  
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the  
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety  
or that of others was in danger.”  Terry, supra at 27.  
“Reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate  
or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the  
level of suspicion required for probable cause.”  Champion,  
supra at 98. In order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, an  
officer must have “specific and articulable facts, which,  
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,  
reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Terry, supra at 21.  
It is the totality of the circumstances in a given case  
that determine whether a patdown search is constitutional.  
Champion, supra at 112. 
In this case, defendant was a  
passenger in a vehicle in which criminal activity was  
discovered.  The driver of the vehicle, Holder, was found with  
a large amount of cash in small denominations and a baggie of  
marijuana, which led the officer to believe that Holder was  
selling drugs.  The officer was told that defendant and Holder  
had been together all evening.  After Holder was arrested and  
placed in the patrol car, he yelled to defendant not to tell  
the police anything. The officer testified that, because of  
his twenty-three years of experience and training as an  
officer, he knew that when drugs are involved, weapons are  
9  
 
  
 
also often involved.  Therefore, the basis for his decision to  
conduct a patdown search of defendant was that defendant might  
be in the possession of a weapon, thereby posing a threat to  
himself or his partner. 
Under the totality of the  
circumstances before us, we find that the police had  
reasonable suspicion to warrant a patdown search of  
defendant.3  
Furthermore, the fact that the officer did not fear for  
his safety before the marijuana was found does not change our  
conclusion that the patdown search of defendant was proper.  
The relevant inquiry when determining whether the police have  
properly conducted a patdown search is “whether the officer’s  
action was justified at its inception . . . .” Terry, supra  
at 20.  Therefore, the fact that the officer did not fear for  
his safety before the marijuana was found is irrelevant; what  
is relevant is that, after it was found, the officer was  
concerned for his safety, and this was when the officer  
conducted the patdown search of defendant. Additionally, the  
3 We agree with the dissent that “defendant could not be 
stopped and frisked merely on the basis that he was associated 
with Holder. Rather, the circumstances had to indicate that 
the 
defendant 
himself 
was 
articulably 
and 
reasonably 
suspected 
of criminal wrongdoing, and suspected of being armed and 
dangerous.” Post at 11. We further agree with the dissent 
that the fact that defendant was associated with Holder, along  
with the other circumstances in this case, did indicate that  
defendant himself was, articulably and reasonably, suspected 
of being armed. Thus, the police officers were justified in 
conducting a patdown search of defendant.  
10  
 
  
fact that the officer anticipated finding drugs on defendant  
as a result of this search does not change our conclusion that  
the patdown search of defendant was proper.  The United States  
Supreme Court has held that  
evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the 
application of objective standards of conduct, 
rather 
than 
standards 
that 
depend 
upon 
the  
subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact  
that an officer is interested in an item of  
evidence and fully expects to find it in the course 
of a search should not invalidate its seizure if  
the search is confined in area and duration by 
. . . a valid exception to the warrant requirement. 
[Horton v California, 496 US 128, 138; 110 S Ct 
2301; 110 L Ed 2d 112 (1990).]  
The proper focus is on the actions of the officer, not his  
thoughts.  In the present case, it is irrelevant that the  
officer was secondarily looking for drugs because the  
principal purpose of the patdown search of defendant was to  
ensure that he did not have any weapons.  Accordingly, we find  
that the objective facts that prompted the officer to  
determine that his safety, and that of his partner, might be  
at risk, were sufficient to warrant the patdown search of  
defendant.  Therefore, we conclude that the patdown search of  
defendant was valid under the Fourth Amendment of the United  
States Constitution and Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  
C. SEIZURE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS  
The third issue is whether the seizure of the photographs  
from defendant during the patdown search of defendant was  
11  
 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States  
Constitution 
and 
its 
counterpart 
in 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution.  
US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  This Court has  
previously held:  
The plain feel exception to the warrant  
requirement  adopted by the United States Supreme  
Court in Minnesota v Dickerson, . . . allows the 
seizure without a warrant of an object felt during 
a legitimate patdown search for weapons when the 
identity of the object is immediately apparent and  
the officer has probable cause to believe that the  
object is contraband.  [Champion, supra at 100-101  
(emphasis in the original).]  
In conducting a patdown search, an officer may seize items  
that the officer has probable cause to believe are contraband  
from the plain feel. “[A]n object felt during an authorized  
patdown search may be seized without a warrant if the item’s  
incriminating character is immediately apparent . . . .”  Id.  
at 105.  Patdown searches are designed to discover weapons or  
other instruments that might injure an officer.  However, when  
conducting a patdown search, police officers may also seize  
noncontraband 
objects that they have probable cause to believe  
feels like contraband.  Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US 366,  
373; 113 S Ct 2130; 124 L Ed 2d 334 (1993); Champion, supra at  
105-106.  
In this case, while conducting the patdown search of  
defendant, the officer felt a two-by-three-inch object in  
defendant’s pocket that he believed was a card of blotter  
12  
acid.  His belief was based on his knowledge that blotter acid  
was often contained on sheets of cardboard; his awareness that  
cards of blotter acid were capable of fitting into a pants  
pocket like that he felt on defendant; the antecedent  
discovery of marijuana and a large amount of money on Holder,  
the driver of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger;  
Holder’s shout to defendant not to tell the police anything;  
the fact that defendant was with Holder during the entire  
evening; and the officer’s training and twenty-three years of  
experience as a police officer.  Under these circumstances,  
the officer had probable cause to believe that the object he  
felt in defendant’s pocket was contraband. Accordingly, the  
officer was justified in removing the photographs from  
defendant’s pocket pursuant to the plain feel exception to the  
warrant requirement.  
Furthermore, it is irrelevant that what was ultimately  
retrieved from defendant’s pocket was not, in fact, blotter  
acid.  What is relevant is that the officer had probable cause  
to believe that the photographs were blotter acid from his  
plain feel.  The probable cause requirement does not demand  
“that a police officer ‘know’ that certain items are  
contraband . . . .”  Texas v Brown, 460 US 730, 741; 103 S Ct  
1535; 75 L Ed2d 502 (1983).  Rather, “probable cause is a  
flexible, common-sense standard.  It merely requires that the  
13  
  
  
facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of  
reasonable caution in the belief,’ Carroll v United States,  
267 US 132, 162; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed 543 (1925), that certain  
items may be contraband . . . ; it does not demand any showing  
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.”  
Id. at 742.  Once an officer has probable cause to believe  
that an object is contraband, he may lawfully seize the  
object. Champion, supra at 105. The fact that the officer is  
ultimately wrong in his assessment of the object does not  
render the seizure unlawful.  As discussed above, the officer  
had probable cause to believe that the photographs were  
blotter acid, and thus he lawfully seized them from defendant,  
regardless of the fact that they subsequently proved instead  
to be photographs.  Therefore, we conclude that the seizure of  
the photographs from defendant was valid under the Fourth  
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Const 1963,  
art 1, § 11.  
D. SEARCH OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS  
The final issue is whether the turning over and examining  
of the fronts of the photographs that were validly seized was  
invalid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States  
Constitution 
and 
its 
counterpart 
in 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution.  
US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  A search for Fourth  
Amendment 
purposes 
occurs only when “an expectation of privacy  
14  
 
 
 
that 
society 
is 
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”  
United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109, 113; 104 S Ct 1652; 80  
L Ed 2d 85 (1984).  “If the inspection by police does not  
intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no  
‘search’ subject to the Warrant Clause.” Illinois v Andreas,  
463 US 765, 771; 103 S Ct 3319; 77 L Ed 2d 1003 (1983).  If a  
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in an object,  
a search of that object for purposes of the Fourth Amendment  
cannot occur. Dickerson, supra at 375; People v Brooks, 405  
Mich 225, 242; 274 NW2d 430 (1979).  
In this case, when the officer turned the lawfully seized  
photographs over to examine their fronts, this was not a  
constitutional “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  
At this point, defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy  
in the outer surfaces of the photographs had already been  
significantly 
diminished, 
at 
least 
sufficiently 
to 
justify 
the  
officer’s turning over and looking at the photographs.4  The  
4 
By 
a 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
being 
“significantly diminished,” we describe a situation in which 
an object, once lawfully seized, is subject at least to some  
type of manipulation.  However, it does not mean that the 
object is subject to any type of manipulation. Once an object 
has 
been 
validly 
seized, 
an 
individual’s 
reasonable  
expectation of privacy is not necessarily lost altogether, 
allowing the police to manipulate the object any way they see 
fit; 
rather, 
one’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy is merely 
diminished, allowing the police to manipulate the object only 
in a manner consistent with the individual’s remaining 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy.  
A 
permissible 
manipulation 
may well be different for different types of objects and for  
15  
 
 
 
photographs were already lawfully seized by the officer.  Once  
an object is lawfully seized, a cursory examination of the  
exterior of that object, like that which occurred here, is  
not, in our judgment, a constitutional “search” for purposes  
of the Fourth Amendment.5  See Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321,  
325-326; 107 S Ct 1149; 94 L Ed 2d 347 (1987). This is true  
because a cursory examination of the exterior of an object  
that has already been lawfully seized by the police will  
produce no additional invasion of the individual’s privacy  
interest.6  “It would be absurd to say that an object could be  
different circumstances.  The dissent asserts that “[i]f an 
individual 
has 
a 
diminished expectation of privacy, as opposed 
to no expectation of privacy, then necessarily he must have 
some expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.” 
Post at 35. We agree. However, in this case, the officer’s 
turning over and viewing the other side of the photographs did 
not, in our judgment, offend defendant’s remaining reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  
5 We conclude that once an object has been lawfully 
seized, the police may move the object and look at its outer 
surface or exterior. However, we do not address whether the 
police may manipulate an object in any other sort of way, 
i.e., open an object, once it has been lawfully seized because 
that question is not before us.  Such a search is not  
implicated by this case.  
6 We use the terms “outer surfaces” and “exterior” to  
mean essentially the same thing, i.e., the outside of an 
object.  We use the phrase “outer surfaces” when referring to 
the photographs because photographs do not typically have an 
exterior and an interior.  We use the term “exterior” when  
referring to objects in general to make the point that our 
holding addresses whether the police can look at the exterior 
of 
an 
object, 
not 
whether, under different circumstances, they 
can look at their interior.  
16  
 
 
seized and taken from the premises, but could not be moved for  
closer examination.” Id. at 326. 
Once the police have  
lawfully seized an item from a person, that person’s  
reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of that item  
has, at the least, been significantly diminished.7  “Once an  
item has been seized in connection with a lawful search . . .  
any expectation of privacy by a person claiming ownership is  
significantly reduced.  MacLaird v Wyoming, 718 P2d 41, 44  
(Wy, 1986).  For example, in United States v Bonfiglio, 713  
F2d 932, 937 (CA 2, 1983), the Court held that the police, who  
had lawfully seized a tape cassette, were not required to  
obtain a search warrant before playing the cassette because,  
once it had been lawfully seized, defendant no longer had a  
reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded statement.  
Similarly, in this case, the police, who had lawfully seized  
three photographs, were not required to obtain a search  
warrant before turning the photographs over to examine their  
outer surfaces because, once they had been lawfully seized,  
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in these  
7 We conclude that once the police lawfully seized the 
photographs, defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the outer surfaces of those photographs was, at the least, 
significantly reduced.  However, we do not address whether one 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in items inside a 
container, i.e., purse, wallet, or luggage, once the police 
have lawfully seized the container because, again, that 
question is not before us.  
17  
surfaces 
had 
been 
significantly diminished, at least enough to  
justify the cursory examination that occurred here.  
Again, we emphasize that the turning over of the  
photographs occurred only after the police had already  
lawfully seized them from defendant.  The reason that the  
police, in this case, were allowed to turn the photographs  
over was because they already had valid possession of them.  
In Hicks, supra at 326, the United States Supreme Court held  
that the police could not move stereo equipment to see the  
serial numbers on it because the police lacked probable cause  
to believe it was contraband before they moved it. However,  
in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that  
the photographs had already been lawfully seized by the  
police.  Where Hicks involved a preseizure movement or action  
by the police, the present case involves a postseizure  
movement or action.  The police cannot manipulate an object in  
order to determine whether it is contraband; it must be  
immediately apparent from plain view or plain feel that the  
object is contraband.  Id. In the present case, the police  
did not move the object to examine it more closely in order to  
determine whether it was, in fact, contraband; rather, the  
police already had probable cause to believe that it was  
contraband upon plain feel, and only after the object was  
validly seized did they move the object to examine it more  
18  
 
carefully.  Because the officer had already lawfully seized  
the photographs when he turned them over to examine their  
fronts, and because defendant’s reasonable expectation of  
privacy in the outer surfaces of those photographs had, at the  
least, 
been 
significantly 
diminished, 
there 
was 
no  
constitutional “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  
As discussed above, it is irrelevant that the officer  
originally suspected that the seized object was blotter acid  
when it was actually photographs. What is again relevant is  
that the officer had probable cause to believe that the object  
was contraband from plain feel, and thus he lawfully seized  
it.  Once the object was lawfully seized, the officer could  
look at its outer surfaces without obtaining a warrant. See  
Hicks, supra at 325-326. In Brooks, supra at 250-251, this  
Court held that it was not a search for Fourth Amendment  
purposes 
when 
the 
police 
more 
carefully 
examined 
a  
noncontraband item that was seized from the defendant and that  
the police by then lawfully possessed.
 Once the police  
lawfully have possession of an object, there is no need for  
the police to obtain a search warrant to look at or scrutinize  
the exterior of that object.  People v Rivard, 59 Mich App  
530, 533-534; 230 NW2d 6 (1975).  This is true because once  
the police lawfully take possession of an object, one’s  
expectation of privacy with respect to that object has “at  
19  
  
 
 
least partially dissipated  . . . .” Id. For these reasons,  
we conclude that the exterior of an item that is validly  
seized during a patdown search may be examined without a  
search warrant, even if the officer subsequently learns that  
the item is not the contraband the officer initially thought  
that it was before the seizure.  
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined  
that the police officer had lawfully seized the photographs  
and that the officer had lawfully placed the photographs face  
down on the roof of the vehicle.  However, the Court of  
Appeals held that the officer should not have turned the  
photographs over to examine their fronts. 
Apparently, the  
Court of Appeals decision would have been different if the  
photographs had been placed on the car face up, rather than  
face down, because then the officer would not have had to turn  
the photographs over to see their face; instead, they would  
have been in plain view.  We cannot agree with that kind of  
logic.  The law should not turn on the serendipity of which  
side of the photographs were facing up when the officer  
removed them from defendant’s pocket. Rather, the law turns  
on whether the officer’s actions violated any of defendant’s  
constitutional rights.  We do not believe that they did.  
Regardless of which side of the photographs came out facing up  
or down, the officer could look at all the sides of the  
20  
  
  
 
  
photographs 
without 
violating 
any 
of 
defendant’s  
constitutional rights.  Therefore, we conclude that the  
turning over and examining of the other side of the  
photographs by the police, under the circumstances of this  
case, did not deprive defendant of his constitutional rights  
under the Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution or  
Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  
IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
The dissent agrees with our conclusion that the brief  
detention of defendant was proper and that the patdown search  
of defendant was proper.  However, it disagrees with our  
conclusion that the seizure of the photographs from defendant  
was proper and that the officer’s turning over and examining  
of the photographs was proper.  
A. SEIZURE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS  
The 
dissent 
concludes that the seizure of the photographs  
from defendant was improper.  We, of course, disagree. The  
dissent contends that “[i]n Champion, the majority extended  
the United States Supreme Court decision in Dickerson to  
encompass plain feel seizures of items that might contain  
contraband.” Post at 21 (emphasis added). First, this Court  
did not extend anything in Champion; rather, it merely adopted  
21  
 
 
 
 
the plain feel exception as articulated by Dickerson.8  
Second, Champion did not conclude that under the plain feel  
exception the police may seize objects that might be  
contraband.  
Rather, 
Champion, supra at 105-106, concluded, as  
did Dickerson, that under the plain feel exception the police  
may seize an object from an individual only if they “develop[]  
probable cause to believe that the item felt is contraband  
. . . .”  
The dissent asserts that the fact that the officer  
thought that the object was blotter acid before he seized it  
when, in fact, the object was actually photographs is  
“certainly relevant to our determination whether probable  
cause existed.” Post at 23. However, even assuming that it  
is relevant, it is certainly not dispositive.  The United  
States Supreme Court has said “probable cause . . . does not  
demand any showing that such a belief be correct.”  Brown,  
8 The dissent asserts that Champion did extend Dickerson  
because “the very type of additional search prohibited by 
Dickerson occurred in Champion” as evidenced by the fact that  
“before the officer in Champion could determine a pill bottle 
could be classified as contraband, he had to determine somehow 
that it was in fact used for an illegal purpose.”  Post at 27, 
n 11. However, in our judgment, no such “additional search” 
occurred in Champion. Rather, the officer had probable cause 
to believe that the pill bottle was contraband without having 
to move, squeeze, or otherwise manipulate the pill bottle. 
Contrary to the dissent, the officer did not have “to 
determine somehow that it was in fact used for an illegal 
purpose”; rather the officer merely had to have probable cause 
to believe that it was contraband.  
22  
 
supra at 742. Accordingly, in order to demonstrate probable  
cause, it is not necessary to show that the officer knew that  
the object was contraband before he seized it.  Rather, it is  
only necessary, as was done in this case, to show that a  
reasonably cautious person in the circumstances would have  
been warranted in the belief that the object was contraband.  
Brown, supra at 742.  
The dissent next asserts that the officer “would have had  
to manipulate the object in order to determine that it was in  
fact contraband.” Post at 27. However, the officer did not  
move, squeeze, or otherwise manipulate the contents of  
defendant’s pocket in order to determine that the object was  
contraband.  Rather, the officer merely patted down defendant  
and, when his hand came upon the object, he had probable cause  
to believe that this object was contraband, and thus he  
lawfully seized it from defendant’s pocket.  
The dissent further contends that we rely on the same  
factors to conclude that there was probable cause to believe  
that the object was contraband as we do to conclude that there  
was reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was armed.  
Even if this were correct, we question its relevancy.  We, of  
course, recognize that probable cause requires a higher level  
of justification than does reasonable suspicion. However, it  
is hardly improper to rely on the same factors to justify  
23  
  
 
each. This is true because reasonable suspicion is merely a  
lower threshold of justification than probable cause.  If,  
therefore, an officer has probable cause, he necessarily also  
has reasonable suspicion.  Although it is then possible to  
rely on the same factors to justify each, we do not do so in  
this case. 
Rather, there are two relevant factors that  
support our finding of probable cause that do not support our  
finding 
of 
reasonable 
suspicion, 
i.e., 
the 
officer’s 
knowledge  
that blotter acid is often contained on sheets of cardboard  
and his knowledge that such cards of blotter acid could fit  
into a pocket like that of defendant’s.  
B. SEARCH OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS  
The 
dissent 
concludes that, even assuming that the police  
lawfully seized the photographs from defendant’s pocket, the  
officer’s turning over and examining of the photographs was  
improper. We again disagree.  
The dissent contends that Champion “did not allow a  
subsequent search merely because the item had been seized.  
Rather, it required the additional justification that the  
search occur incident to arrest.” Post at 21, n 7 (emphasis  
added).
 First, the Champion Court did not require the  
additional justification; it merely concluded that, under the  
facts, which included a search incident to arrest, the search  
was lawful.  Second, and more importantly, the search in  
24  
 
  
Champion involved the opening of a container, whereas in this  
case, the police merely turned photographs over and viewed  
their other side.  We merely hold that, once an object has  
been lawfully seized, the police may shift the object and look  
at its exterior; we do not address here whether the police may  
open an object and look at its interior.9  
The dissent next contends that “once the officer removed  
the photographs from the defendant’s pocket, it became clear  
that the object removed was not in fact cardboard . . .  
[t]hus, . . . the police no longer had justification for  
infringing upon the defendant’s right to possess private  
photographs.”10 
Post at 30-31. 
However, given that the  
officer had already lawfully removed the photographs from  
9 The dissent asserts that “[t]he majority seems to argue 
that the result might be different were the officer required 
to open a container and look inside.  Yet, how can this be 
true considering that the majority places primary reliance on 
Champion, a case in which the officer did just that?”  Post at  
32, n 16.  The dissent answers its own question: Champion “did  
not allow a subsequent search merely because the item had been 
seized.  
Rather, 
it 
required the additional justification that 
the search occur incident to arrest.” Post at 21, n 7.  
10 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we do not, by 
failing to reference certain language contained in the 
dissent, post at 31, n 14, fail to appreciate “that a search 
or seizure without a warrant is circumscribed by the warrant 
exception justifying it.”  Rather, we conclude that no 
“search” occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment where 
the 
officer 
merely 
turned the lawfully seized photographs over 
and viewed their other side, and thus no “search” without a 
warrant occurred, requiring the application of a warrant 
exception.  
25  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
defendant’s pocket, the additional action on the part of the  
police officers in turning them over did not constitute an  
invasion of the defendant’s privacy.  
The dissent asserts that “[u]nder the majority view, an  
individual’s expectation of privacy in a personal possession  
would evaporate at the moment an officer removes the item from  
the individual’s control, even when the officer’s belief is  
wrong.” Post at 32 (emphasis added). This is not an accurate  
statement of our holding.  First, we make it quite clear that  
we do not conclude that, once the police lawfully seize an  
object from an individual, that individual’s reasonable  
expectation of privacy in that object is altogether lost.  
Instead, we merely conclude that defendant’s reasonable  
expectation of privacy in the outer surfaces of the  
photographs had been diminished, at least sufficiently to  
justify the officer’s merely turning over and looking at the  
other side of the photographs.11 
Second, we do not even  
11 
The 
dissent 
asks 
“[w]hen 
would 
a 
legitimate 
expectation 
of privacy preclude a further search under the majority’s 
rationale?” Post at 32, n 16.  The answer is that it would  
always preclude a further search. However, a further search 
would not necessarily be precluded where there is a warrant or 
an applicable exception to the warrant requirement.  If an  
officer improperly seizes an object from an individual’s 
pocket, 
that 
individual would have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy that would preclude any further “search” of that 
object.  If, on the other hand, an officer properly seizes an  
object 
from 
an 
individual’s pocket, that individual would also 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy, but, under the 
specific circumstances of the instant case, such expectation  
26  
 
 
 
conclude that one’s reasonable expectation of privacy is  
diminished whenever an officer removes an object from one’s  
control, as the dissent implies.  Rather, we conclude that  
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished only  
when an officer lawfully seizes an object from an individual.  
In order for an officer to lawfully seize an object from an  
individual, 
he 
must 
satisfy 
certain 
constitutional 
safeguards.  
Only after these safeguards have been satisfied can a police  
officer lawfully seize an object from an individual and view  
its exterior.  
The 
dissent 
further 
asserts 
that 
“the 
majority  
effectively creates an exception to the warrant requirement  
that permits a search incident to seizure.”  Post at 34.  
However, our opinion in no way, permits a Fourth Amendment  
“search” incident to seizure.  Instead, we conclude that there  
was no “search” in this case when the police turned the  
photographs over to examine their other side because, in order  
for there to be a “search,” one must have a reasonable  
expectation of privacy in the object being “searched.”  In  
this case, the police had already lawfully seized the  
would not arise until some time after the officer had merely 
turned over the photographs to view their other side. As we  
have already made clear, we are not addressing whether the 
police may manipulate a lawfully seized object in some manner 
beyond what has specifically occurred here because that 
question is not before us.  
27  
 
photographs, 
and, 
therefore, 
defendant’s 
reasonable  
expectation of privacy in the photographs already had been  
significantly 
diminished, 
at 
least 
sufficiently 
to 
justify 
the  
officer’s cursory examination of the other side of the  
photographs.12  
CONCLUSION  
We conclude that the brief detention of defendant, the  
patdown search of defendant, the seizure of the photographs  
from defendant, and the examination of the photographs were  
each proper.  First, because the officer had reasonable  
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, the brief  
detention of defendant was proper. 
Second, because the  
officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant might be  
armed, and thus pose a danger to him and to other persons, the  
patdown search of defendant was proper.  Third, because the  
officer had probable cause to believe that the object he felt  
in defendant’s pocket was contraband, the seizure of the  
photographs from defendant was proper under the plain feel  
exception to the warrant requirement.  Finally, because  
12 The dissent 
of Justice Young presents in more undiluted 
form the argument that the turning over of the photographs to 
view their other side constituted a Fourth Amendment  
violation. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we do 
not believe that the constitutional underpinnings of the 
officer’s conduct here rest upon whether the lawfully seized 
photographs were seized facing up or facing down, or adjusted 
from one position to the other.  
28  
 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the outer  
surfaces of the lawfully seized photographs had, at the least,  
been 
significantly 
diminished, no “search” for purposes of the  
Fourth Amendment took place when the officer turned the  
photographs over and examined their other side.  Accordingly,  
we would reverse the Court of Appeals decision that the  
officer’s turning over and examining of the photographs was  
improper. We would remand this case to the Court of Appeals  
for a determination whether the subsequent search of  
defendant’s home was proper.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
29  
 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee, 
v 
No. 117390 
MICHAEL ROBERT CUSTER, 
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant. 
____________________________________ 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion. I write 
separately to emphasize that the dissenting opinions are  
inconsistent with the reasoning in Arizona v Hicks, 480 US  
321; 107 S Ct 1149; 94 L Ed 2d 347 (1987), and this Court’s  
opinion in People v Champion, 452 Mich 92; 549 NW2d 849  
(1996).
 If one believes that the initial seizure of the  
photographs was valid under the plain feel exception, then the  
subsequent examination of those photographs was also valid.  
Hicks, supra at 326; Champion, supra at 105-106, 117.  
However, I caution that if Champion is construed too broadly,  
it would be appropriate to revisit the proper limits of that  
decision in the future.  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee,  
v 
No. 117390  
MICHAEL ROBERT CUSTER,  
Defendant-Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant.  
YOUNG, J. (dissenting).  
I agree with Justice Cavanagh that Officer Greenleaf’s  
actions in examining the photographs he removed from  
defendant’s 
pocket 
did 
not 
meet 
Fourth 
Amendment 
requirements.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
As Justice Cavanagh explains in his dissent, ante at 31,  
“once 
the 
officer 
removed the photographs from the defendant’s  
pocket, it became clear that the object removed was not in  
fact cardboard.  At that moment, the justification supporting  
the seizure, that the object was immediately identifiable as  
contraband, no longer existed.”  In my view, under the Supreme  
Court’s decision in Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321; 107 S Ct  
1149; 94 L Ed 2d 347 (1987), any continued examination of the  
photographs, 
however 
cursory, 
required 
additional  
justification that simply is not present here.  
Because I believe that the trial court properly  
suppressed the photographs as well as the evidence obtained  
during 
the 
subsequent search of defendant’s residence, I would  
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
2  
 
____________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee,  
No. 117390  
MICHAEL ROBERT CUSTER,  
Defendant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I cannot join in the majority’s decision to chip away at  
the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment of our United  
States Constitution.  In this case, the probable cause  
supporting the defendant’s ultimate arrest stemmed from the  
officer’s decision to remove and inspect photographs that the  
defendant was carrying in his front pocket.  I cannot support  
the majority’s conclusion that the photographs were validly  
seized and inspected.  I am unconvinced that the requirements  
of the Fourth Amendment were satisfied.1
 Therefore, I  
1 The question before us has not been directly addressed 
by our state courts.  The closest case to being on point is 
People v Champion, 452 Mich 92; 549 NW2d 849 (1996).  However, 
Champion did not involve the type of postseizure search that 
occurred in this case. 
To the extent that our state  
constitution is involved, it provides rights coextensive with 
(continued...)  
respectfully dissent.  
I  
In this case, the defendant was ultimately charged with  
three drug-related offenses. 
The evidence linking the  
defendant to the crimes was discovered only after a series of  
searches and seizures.  This appeal involves examination of  
several of the incidents occurring between the time the  
defendant was initially detained and the time that he was  
charged.  
The majority adequately discusses the key facts of the  
case.  In brief, the majority correctly points out that (1)  
the police initially came into contact with the defendant  
while investigating a trespass violation, (2) the patdown of  
the defendant occurred only after a baggie of marijuana and  
wad of money were found on his counterpart, (3) the officer  
testified that he removed photographs from the defendant’s  
pocket on suspicion that they were blotter acid, (4) the  
officer first placed the photographs face down on the roof of  
the car and later flipped them over and examined them, (5) the  
photographs were later used to obtain a search warrant, and  
1(...continued) 
the 
federal 
constitution 
and 
need 
not 
be 
addressed  
independently from our resolution of the Fourth Amendment 
issues presented.  Thus, this case hinges on the applicability 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and  United States Supreme 
Court precedent.  
2  
 
(6) the fruits of the search made pursuant to the warrant  
formed the basis for arresting and charging the defendant.  
Next, the majority adequately identifies the issues  
presented on appeal.  We are faced with determining whether  
the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from  
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when: (1) the  
defendant was stopped by the officers, (2) the defendant was  
frisked, 
(3) 
the 
defendant’s photographs were removed from his  
front pocket, or (4) the officer flipped the photographs over  
and examined them.2  This case involves a series of searches  
and seizures subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  First the  
defendant was stopped for the purpose of investigating  
possible criminal activity. Next, the defendant was frisked  
under the auspices of protecting the investigating police  
officer.  Third, an item was seized from the defendant’s front  
pocket.  Fourth, the item seized was searched. 
Fifth, the  
defendant was detained and taken to the police station.  
Sixth, the defendant’s home was searched.  Seventh, marijuana  
was seized from the defendant’s home. 
Thereafter, the  
2 
 The defendant also raises the additional Fourth  
Amendment questions.  The majority concludes that we need not 
address the defendant’s issues. Likewise, this opinion will 
not address the defendant’s additional issues because I would  
grant relief to the defendant even without reaching the 
question.  
3  
 
defendant was charged with the offenses forming the basis of  
the instant trial.  
It is crucial at the outset to understand the basic  
premises guiding search and seizure law because Fourth  
Amendment 
jurisprudence 
provides 
that 
a 
criminal 
defendant 
has  
a claim for the suppression of evidence that has been gathered  
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  Wong Sun v  
United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).  
First, it is important to understand that searches and  
seizures may raise distinct concerns. A “search” for Fourth  
Amendment purposes hinges on a person’s privacy interest.  The  
touchstone test for examining a search is whether a person has  
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place to be  
searched. Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19  
L Ed 2d 576 (1967).  A seizure, on the other hand, deprives  
the individual of dominion over his person or property.  
United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109; 104 S Ct 1652; 80 L Ed  
2d 85 (1984); Horton v California, 496 US 128; 110 S Ct 2301;  
110 L Ed 2d 112 (1990).  A seizure occurs when some meaningful  
governmental interference with an individual’s possessory  
interest in property has occurred. Jacobsen, supra. In the  
context of an investigatory stop, a seizure occurs when an  
officer, by means of force or authority, restricts a person’s  
4  
  
  
liberty of movement.  Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 27; 88 S Ct  
1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).  
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that  
searches without warrants are unreasonable per se, subject to  
a 
few 
“specifically 
established 
and 
well-delineated  
exceptions.” Katz at 357. Similarly, the Court has stated  
that seizures must be circumscribed “in area and duration by  
the terms of the warrant or valid exception to the warrant  
requirement.” Horton at 139.  In the context of searches that  
result in the seizure of an item suspected to be contraband,  
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a  
government agent’s exercise of dominion and control over the  
item may be a “reasonable” seizure for Fourth Amendment  
purposes when the effect seized cannot be supported by a  
reasonable expectation of privacy, and when the agent can show  
that he had probable cause to believe that the effect  
contained 
contraband.  Jacobsen, supra. Otherwise, the search  
will be constitutionally unreasonable.  
In this case, the people place reliance on two doctrines  
that 
sometimes 
provide 
justification 
for 
searches 
and 
seizures  
without warrants.  The first of these doctrines, the “stop and  
frisk” doctrine, pertains to the ability of law enforcement  
officials 
to 
institute 
investigatory 
stops 
and 
conduct 
weapons  
5  
patdowns.  The second doctrine, the “plain feel” doctrine,  
relates to an officer’s ability to seize items detected  
through tactile perception during a patdown without a warrant  
when the officer perceives the items to be contraband. Each  
of these doctrines will be discussed.  
A. The Stop and Frisk Doctrine  
1. Guiding Legal Principles  
The “stop and frisk doctrine” has roots in the United  
States Supreme Court decision in Terry v Ohio, which held that  
a reasonable investigatory stop of criminal defendants is  
permissible when an officer “observes unusual conduct which  
leads him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience  
that criminal activity may be afoot . . . .” 
Id. at 30.  
Further, the officer may conduct a “patdown” search for  
weapons when the “officer is justified in believing that the  
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at  
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or  
to others . . . .” Id. at 24.  
In the event of a Terry stop, courts should take into  
account the whole picture, and determine whether the stop was  
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. United  
States v Cortez, 449 US 411, 418; 101 S Ct 690; 66 L Ed 2d 621  
(1981).  Under the totality of the circumstances, a stop will  
6  
  
 
be considered valid only when the detaining officer can  
reasonably 
articulate 
a 
particularized 
and 
objective 
basis 
for  
suspecting that the individual stopped had been engaged in or  
was about to engage in criminal activity.  Terry, supra at 27.  
A hunch unsupported by particularized suspicion will not  
justify the seizure of a person. Id.  
When the seizure of a defendant does not comport with  
Terry, it will be deemed unreasonable and the evidence flowing  
from the seizure may be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous  
tree. Wong Sun; Shabaz, supra. Pursuant to Wong Sun, “the  
fruits of the officers' illegal action are not to be admitted  
as evidence unless an intervening independent act of free will  
purges the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.”  People v  
Shabaz 424 Mich 42, 66; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).  
2. Application to the facts  
In the present case, the defendant was stopped and  
frisked on the following grounds: he and Holder were spotted  
in the area where a trespass violation had been reported, the  
individuals were detained because Holder was too intoxicated  
to drive away, Holder was found to be in possession of  
marijuana, and there was a clear relationship between Holder  
and the defendant. The detaining officer testified that his  
twenty-three years of experience taught him that persons in  
7  
 
possession of drugs also frequently possess weapons.  As such,  
the officer felt that the defendant might pose a safety threat  
to himself or to his partner.  
The majority opines that, under the totality of the  
circumstances, 
the 
detaining 
officer 
was 
reasonably 
suspicious  
of the defendant because the defendant was initially detained  
for questioning in an area where a suspected trespass had been  
reported.
 Similarly, the majority concludes that the  
defendant was reasonably detained after the officers found  
marijuana and money on the defendant’s companion, Holder.  
a. The initial detention of the defendant  
I agree with the majority that the police did not violate  
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by approaching the  
automobile he shared with Holder.  The constitution permits  
law enforcement officers to approach an individual in a public  
place for the purpose of asking him if he is willing to answer  
some questions.  Shabaz, supra at 56, relying on Florida v  
Royer, 460 US 491; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983)  
(opinion of White, J.).  Where there is no involuntary  
detention of a defendant, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure  
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
In his  
brief, the defendant acknowledges that the police did not  
question or approach him until after they found marijuana on  
8  
Holder.  Thus, I would not find a violation of the defendant’s  
rights stemming from the officers’ decision to approach and  
question Holder while the defendant was a passenger in his  
car.  
b. The continued detention of the defendant after marijuana 
was found on Holder  
The majority next presents the question whether the  
defendant was further properly stopped after marijuana was  
found on Holder.  After Holder was searched and detained, the  
police asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle.  At  
that point, he was clearly detained. The officers testified  
that the defendant was asked to get out of the car so that a  
patdown search for drugs and weapons could be conducted.  
Thus, once the officers asked the defendant to leave the car  
so that he could be searched, their inquiry moved beyond the  
realm of merely stopping a person to inquire whether the  
person is willing to answer questions and into the realm of  
searches and seizures subject to the constraints of Terry.  
An 
officer 
may 
initiate an investigatory stop pursuant to  
Terry when he can articulate a reasonable basis for suspecting  
that the particular individual detained has committed, or is  
about to commit, a crime. Further, an officer may conduct a  
“frisk,” a form of limited weapons search, when he has reason  
9  
to believe that the person suspected of a crime is presently  
armed and dangerous.  However, the officer’s ability to  
investigate the circumstances of a crime on the basis of  
reasonable suspicion are limited.  Full blown searches and  
seizures must be based on probable cause.  Dickerson, supra at  
378.  
According to the majority, “after the marijuana was  
found, the police properly detained defendant for the purpose  
of conducting a limited search for weapons on the basis of  
reasonable suspicion.”  Slip op at 8.  In the majority’s view,  
there was suspicion because the defendant was the passenger in  
a vehicle in which criminal activity was discovered, drugs  
were found on Holder, the officer was told that Holder and the  
defendant had been together all evening, and Holder yelled to  
the defendant not to say anything. Thus, under the totality  
of the circumstances and in light of the fact that the officer  
testified that experience taught him that people with drugs  
often have weapons, the majority finds the requisite level of  
reasonable suspicion for a patdown.  
Ultimately, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that  
the patdown in this case is sustainable under Terry. Thus, I  
join the majority’s holding that the stop and frisk were  
constitutionally 
permissible. 
 
However, 
because 
I 
believe 
that  
10  
 
 
the majority jumps too readily from an officer’s ability to  
make investigative inquiries to his ability to stop and frisk,  
I feel compelled to offer a somewhat more extended analysis  
than that offered by the majority.  The majority bolsters its  
finding 
of 
reasonable suspicion primarily by pointing out that  
the defendant was and had been in the company of Holder, that  
Holder was in possession of marijuana, that Holder yelled to  
the defendant upon being arrested, and that the detaining  
officer testified that weapons often accompany drugs.  Yet,  
the majority fails to clarify that the defendant could not be  
stopped and frisked merely on the basis that he was associated  
with Holder. Rather, the circumstances had to indicate that  
the 
defendant 
himself 
was 
articulably 
and 
reasonably 
suspected  
of criminal wrongdoing, and suspected of being armed and  
dangerous.  
In Ybarra v Illinois, 444 US 85; 100 S Ct 338; 62 L Ed 2d  
238 (1979), the United States Supreme Court specifically  
rejected an argument that a person may be stopped and frisked  
simply for being in an area where drugs are found.  There, the  
police had a warrant to search a bar and bartender for heroin.  
Ybarra was one of the patrons in the bar when the police  
arrived to perform the search.  They conducted a protective  
patdown of Ybarra and the other patrons in the bar.  In the  
11  
 
 
 
process, the police seized a cigarette pack from Ybarra and  
found packets of heroin inside.  The Court held that the  
evidence was subject to suppression on the grounds that the  
police 
lacked 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a patdown search  
of Ybarra simply because he was in an area where a drug search  
was occurring pursuant to a warrant.3  
In the instant case, the defendant was patted down on the  
basis of the officer’s testimony that his experience taught  
him that people who have drugs often also have weapons.  When  
the defendant was patted down, the police knew that Holder was  
in possession of an illegal substance, not that the defendant  
was in possession of an illegal substance.4  The majority’s  
analysis comes dangerously close to doing exactly what Ybarra  
prohibits–allowing a frisk of a person simply because that  
person is in propinquity with another reasonably suspected of  
3 This Court has also recognized that a defendant will 
not 
be 
considered 
individually suspicious simply because he is 
in a high crime area or in an area where drugs are known to 
be. Shabaz, supra.  
4 In fact, the officer testified that part of the purpose 
of the frisk was to search for weapons on the defendant.  The  
majority finds the officer’s motivation to be irrelevant; 
however, the law makes it clear that a search exceeding Terry 
must be based on probable cause.  Thus, to the degree that the 
officer’s knowledge relates to the extent of the search and to 
his belief that the defendant possessed drugs, it is plainly 
relevant.  
12  
 
 
engaging in criminal activity.  
While I agree that the police officers were justified in  
conducting a patdown under the specific facts of this case, I  
believe that we must take great care not to cross the  
threshold established in Ybarra. 
It cannot be summarily  
concluded that the defendant himself could reasonably be  
suspected 
of 
engaging in criminal wrongdoing simply because of  
his association with Holder. 
In order to meet the  
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, it must be shown not  
only that the officers had reason to suspect criminal  
wrongdoing, it must also be established that the officers had  
a reasonably articulable basis for suspecting that the  
defendant perpetuated the wrongdoing. Terry, supra. To the  
extent that the majority opinion could be read as overlooking  
the particularity requirement inherent in a reasonable  
suspicion inquiry, I disagree with it.5  
There is no bright-line test for determining whether  
articulable and particularized reasonable suspicion exists  
under the circumstances of an individual case.  However, this  
Court has discussed the concept in some detail.  In Shabaz,  
the Court held that no reasonable suspicion existed where a  
5  I believe a similar mistake was made in People v  
Oliver, 464 Mich 184; 627 NW2d 297 (2001).  
13  
  
defendant was stopped because he was observed stuffing a paper  
bag under his clothing while leaving an apartment complex in  
a high crime area, and because he “took off running” when  
officers observing him slowed their unmarked police car to a  
stop. Id. at 60. In reaching the conclusion that reasonable  
suspicion was lacking under the circumstances, Justice Ryan,  
now judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, stated for  
the Court,  
The police were not investigating a recently 
committed crime in the area which may have been 
linked to the defendant, nor was he known to the 
officers as a suspect in a crime.  There was no  
visible contraband on the defendant’s person; the 
officers could only guess at the contents of the 
paper bag.  The defendant’s flight from plain­
clothes pursuers in an unmarked car was at most 
ambiguous and at least understandable. [Id. at 64­
65.]  
While this quotation from Shabaz certainly makes it clear that  
Terry searches must be carefully scrutinized, I believe that  
in 
applying 
Terry, 
Shabaz also implicitly raised a distinction  
between situations in which an officer comes upon a person  
unknown to him and situations in which an officer is detaining  
specific individuals in association with the investigation of  
a particular crime.  
The officers in this case were in the area investigating  
a trespass.  Further, once marijuana was found on Holder, the  
14  
officers were validly investigating another crime.  Once  
Holder yelled to the defendant not to tell the officers a  
“f—ing thing,” the officers had a basis for suspecting that  
the defendant had information pertaining to the crime  
presently being investigated.  Though it is true that the  
defendant had done nothing to indicate that he himself was in  
possession of drugs, the officers had an objective reason for  
suspecting that the defendant might have been involved in  
criminal wrongdoing. 
Moreover, the detaining officer’s  
testimony that he feared for his safety when taken together  
with the fact that the tension in the situation had escalated  
when marijuana was found on Holder, objectively justified the  
officer’s belief that the defendant posed a threat of being  
presently armed and dangerous.  Thus, I believe that this case  
can more closely be analogized to Terry than to Ybarra. The  
circumstances of this case reveal a situation where the  
particular individuals were being investigated in association  
with 
the 
suspected 
commission 
of 
particular 
violations, 
rather  
than merely a situation where the defendant happened to be in  
an area where other crimes were suspected of being committed.  
Therefore, I would conclude that this case meets the threshold  
established by Terry and justified a limited weapons patdown.  
II  
15  
 
Despite my agreement with the majority that reasonable  
suspicion for a stop and frisk existed under the totality of  
the circumstances, I would affirm on the grounds that the  
seizure of photographs from Custer’s front pocket was  
constitutionally impermissible. I would hold that the scope  
of Terry was exceeded when the officer seized the photographs,  
and would further hold that the officer lacked probable cause.  
The 
majority 
concludes that the seizure without a warrant  
of the photographs from defendant during the patdown search  
was valid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States  
Constitution 
and 
its 
counterpart 
in 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution.  
According to the majority, the seizure was justified by the  
“plain feel exception” to the warrant requirement, citing  
Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US 366, 373; 113 S Ct 2130; 124 L  
Ed 2d 334 (1993); People v Champion, 452 Mich 92; 549 NW2d 849  
(1996). I disagree.  
In a nutshell, the plain feel doctrine provides that  
police may seize nonthreatening contraband detected through  
the sense of touch during a patdown search, as long as the  
search remains within the bounds of Terry and as long as the  
search 
would 
be 
“justified 
by 
the 
same 
practical  
considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.”  
Dickerson at 375-376. 
Thus, courts considering whether an  
16  
 
 
 
item may be seized under the plain feel doctrine must consider  
both the Terry doctrine and the plain view doctrine.  
In Dickerson, the officer patted down the defendant, and  
in the process examined a lump in the defendant’s pocket that  
he believed to be cocaine. The Court held that the seizure  
was invalid because the incriminating character of the lump  
was not immediately apparent, and because the officer needed  
to conduct further examination in order to determine whether  
the lump was contraband.  Though Dickerson itself invalidated  
the seizure of contraband made during a patdown search, the  
Court nonetheless stated that not all plain feel seizures are  
invalid per se.  Still, the Court made clear that seizures  
stemming from a patdown must be carefully scrutinized:  
Under the State Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the record before it, it is clear that the court 
was correct in holding that the police officer in 
this case overstepped the bounds of the “strictly 
circumscribed” search for weapons allowed under 
Terry.
 Where, as here, “an officer who is  
executing a valid search for one item seizes a 
different item,” this Court rightly “has been 
sensitive to the danger . . . that officers will 
enlarge a specific authorization furnished by a 
warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a 
warrant to rummage and seize at will.  Here, the 
officer’s continued exploration of the respondent’s 
pocket after having concluded that it contained no 
weapon was unrelated to . . . the protection of the 
police officer and others nearby.” It, therefore, 
amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that 
Terry expressly refused to authorize, and that we 
have condemned in subsequent cases. [Id. at 378  
17  
(citations omitted).]  
Thus, although Dickerson clearly refused to impose a  
categorical ban on the plain feel seizure of objects “whose  
identity is already known” because of their immediately  
apparent characteristics, the Court in no way implied that any  
and every object that may potentially have characteristics  
similar to certain types of contraband would be seizable.  Id.  
at 377.  
Dickerson also stated that the “plain feel” concept has  
roots in the “plain view” doctrine, and the competing concerns  
expressed in plain view cases can be analogized to the plain  
feel context. Thus, it is important to understand the basic  
principles 
underlying 
the 
plain 
view 
doctrine 
when 
determining  
whether a particular plain feel seizure is valid. Under the  
plain view doctrine: (1) the seizure without a warrant of  
evidence in plain view is permissible as long as the police  
did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving in a place  
from which the evidence could be plainly viewed, (2) an item  
of immediately apparent incriminating character must be in  
plain view in order to be seizable, and (3) the police must  
have a lawful right of access to the item being seized. Horton  
v California, supra; Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443; 91  
S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971); Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321;  
18  
107 S Ct 1149; 94 L Ed 2d 347 (1987).  The ability of a police  
officer to seize an item without a warrant pursuant to the  
plain view doctrine is thus circumscribed by the exigencies  
justifying the initiation of the search. Horton at 139-140.  
Further, “[i]f the scope of the search exceeds that permitted  
by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of  
the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the  
subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.”  Horton  
at 140.  
It is in light of these principles that the Dickerson  
Court 
enunciated 
its 
holding.  The Court explicitly recognized  
that while Terry may authorize an officer to place his hands  
on 
a 
criminal 
defendant’s outer clothing, the Fourth Amendment  
is violated when the officer must conduct a further search in  
order to determine whether an object is contraband. In such  
instances, a seizure will be invalidated for lack of probable  
cause.  
Thus, in plain feel seizure cases, courts must determine  
whether the scope of the patdown search remained within the  
bounds of Terry. If not, then the seizure made pursuant to  
the search would exceed the exigency justifying the search in  
the first instance.  Additionally, courts must determine  
whether the object felt by an officer is immediately apparent  
19  
as being contraband. The determination must be supported by  
probable cause.  Where the mass and contours of the object do  
not make it immediately identifiable as contraband, seizure  
without a warrant is not justified.  
In this case, I would hold that the photographs were  
invalidly seized from the defendant both because the officer  
exceeded the scope of the Terry search, and because the  
officer lacked probable cause to remove them.  First, it must  
be remembered that the patdown search of the defendant was  
purportedly initiated to protect the officer from a person  
suspected of being armed and dangerous.  During the course of  
the patdown, the officer testified that he felt what he  
believed to be a piece of cardboard used as blotter paper for  
an illegal narcotic known as acid.  
A. The Scope of Terry  
Clearly, the cardboard seized by the officer was not  
seized in order to advance the interest of protecting the  
officer.  The officer did not remove the photographs on belief  
that they were a dangerous instrumentality, but on suspicion  
that they were cardboard.  The officer further suspected that  
the item he felt was used to blot acid.  
In my view, the majority’s opinion in this case is the  
first evil escaping the Pandora’s box opened in People v  
20  
 
Champion.6
 In Champion, the majority extended the United  
States Supreme Court decision in Dickerson to encompass plain  
feel seizures of items that might contain contraband.7  
Justice Brickley dissented, explaining why seizures of items  
not appearing to be contraband themselves is illegal.  Though  
Justice Brickley’s opinion did not win the day, I continue to  
believe that it was correctly decided.  I would adhere to his  
view, that when the officer patted the objects in the  
defendant’s pocket and knew that they were not a weapon, the  
removal of those objects was unrelated to the protection of  
the officer’s safety.  Thus, the exigencies supporting the  
patdown were unrelated to the subsequent seizure.  
Regardless of the view of Champion to which one  
subscribes, it is clear that the exigencies purportedly  
6 See Champion at 143 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting)(“The 
majority justifies its expansive reading of Dickerson by 
pointing out that it limited its holding to the facts  
presently before the Court. . . . Yet, it would be naive to 
conclude that this state’s lower courts will not read the  
majority opinion in a way that will allow evidence . . . 
against those whose Fourth Amendment rights have been  
violated, indeed, opening Pandora’s box.”).  
7 Importantly, though Champion supported the plain feel 
seizure of an item that might contain contraband, it did not 
allow a subsequent search merely because the item had been 
seized.  
Rather, 
it 
required the additional justification that 
the search occur incident to arrest.  This cuts against the 
majority’s 
rationale 
for 
searching 
the 
photographs 
seized 
from 
the defendant pursuant to the plain feel doctrine.  
21  
justifying the patdown search of the defendant in this case  
did not justify the seizure.8  Even the majority recognizes  
the patdown in this case occurred as part of a protective  
sweep, but that the seizure was justified pursuant to the  
plain feel doctrine.  Thus, we must turn to Dickerson’s  
requirement that a plain feel seizure be supported by probable  
cause.  
B. The Absence of Probable Cause  
Dickerson made it clear that an object is seizable only  
where its incriminating identity is immediately apparent  
8There 
is 
a 
fundamental 
difference 
between 
the  
justification supporting a patdown search for weapons and the 
justification for seizing something that is clearly not a 
weapon.  In order to determine whether a search or seizure  
remains within the confines of an exception to the warrant 
requirement, 
one 
must 
necessarily 
understand 
the 
justification 
circumscribing the otherwise constitutionally impermissible 
search or seizure without a warrant. Whereas the potential 
presence of a weapon may justify an officer’s access to the 
outer surfaces of a defendant’s clothing during a patdown 
search, the fact that an officer may lawfully be in a position 
to search a defendant does not in and of itself justify the 
officer in seizing anything that he believes is contraband. 
Rather, a seizure of contraband made during a patdown search 
requires its own constitutional justification.  
In the instant case, if the officer had justification for 
the seizure, it was because of the plain feel doctrine, not 
because of the Terry doctrine. Though the plain feel doctrine 
permits a seizure that would not have had justification but 
for the officer’s decision to patdown the defendant, the 
exigencies supporting the search (fear for the safety of the 
officers or others) clearly would not support a seizure of 
blotter 
acid 
cardboard because blotter acid cardboard does not  
pose a threat to the officer’s safety.  
22  
 
because of the mass and contour of the object.  As an initial  
matter, the majority too readily assumes that a limited  
patdown could clearly reveal the identity of objects in the  
defendant’s front pocket so that manipulation would not be  
required to support probable cause for a seizure.  Obviously,  
the contours and mass of the objects in the defendant’s pocket  
were not unique.  This is evidenced by the fact that the  
officer believed the defendant was carrying cardboard, though  
he was actually carrying photographs.  The majority glosses  
over the officer’s factual mistake and deems it irrelevant.  
Though perhaps not dispositive in every case, I believe that  
a factual mistake about the identity of an object must be  
“immediately 
apparent,” 
because 
contraband 
tends 
to 
reduce 
the  
likelihood that a particular seizure is supported by probable  
cause.  And because the existence of probable cause is made  
less likely by the mistake, I believe such factual errors are  
certainly 
relevant 
to 
our 
determination 
whether 
probable 
cause  
existed.9  
9  Again, I turn to Justice Brickley’s Champion opinion 
to illustrate why the seizure of noncontraband items is 
constitutionally problematic. He wrote:  
I would hold that Terry specifically forbids 
the type of seizure conducted in this case and 
thereby eliminate the incentive to expand patdowns 
(continued...)  
23  
 
  
Probable cause will be found to exist where the facts and  
circumstances, within the knowledge of the authorities and of  
which the authorities had reasonably trustworthy information  
“were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable  
caution in the belief that [a crime has been committed].”  
Carroll v United States, 267 US 132, 162; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed  
543 (1925).  A very important distinction must be drawn  
between the basis for an officer’s ability to stop and frisk  
and his ability to seize an item pursuant to the plain feel  
doctrine.  The stop and frisk must be predicated upon only  
reasonable suspicion. 
The plain feel doctrine allows an  
officer 
to 
seize 
immediately apparent contraband that he feels  
during the patdown on the ground that the officer has probable  
cause for the seizure.  In other words, if an officer feels  
something that he only reasonably suspects to be contraband,  
he cannot seize it.  
9(...continued) 
into general searches for contraband.  To the  
extent that Dickerson departs from Terry's strict  
prohibitions, it allows admission of nonweapons 
evidence found during a patdown if, but only if, 
the officers conducting the patdown have probable 
cause to believe that the item they feel is  
contraband. The item felt in this case, the pill 
bottle, while containing contraband, was not, in 
and of itself, contraband.  Accordingly, it was 
impossible for Officer Todd to have probable cause 
to believe otherwise. 
His seizure of it, 
therefore, was illegal. [Id. at 143.]  
24  
In the present case, I am not convinced that the officer  
acted upon probable cause, though he may have subjectively  
suspected that the defendant was carrying blotter acid on  
cardboard.
 While the stop and frisk could potentially be  
justified on reasonable suspicion grounds, that justification  
would lie largely in the fact that the interest in protecting  
officers and innocent bystanders from the harm an armed  
suspect 
may 
cause 
outweighs 
a 
suspicious 
individual’s 
interest  
in being free from a limited search.  A seizure made pursuant  
to a frisk requires a higher level of justification than a  
frisk 
itself, 
however, because the officers have gained access  
to the defendant’s person pursuant to a limited Fourth  
Amendment exception.  When the seizure occurs, the balance to  
be considered is whether the officer’s ability to seize an  
item to which he gained access on the basis of reasonable  
suspicion 
that 
an 
individual was armed and dangerous outweighs  
an individual’s interest in possessing items and the  
individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy.  
Were there no concern for the officer’s safety, an  
officer could not randomly frisk a defendant.  Rather, the  
search must be limited to a weapons search. Here, we have a  
defendant who was essentially deemed guilty by association.  
The 
officers 
observed that Holder was intoxicated, found money  
25  
  
  
 
on Holder, and found drugs on Holder. When they patted down  
the defendant, they felt no weapons and no contraband. Yet,  
the majority stretches to the conclusion that the officer had  
probable cause to believe that the defendant was in possession  
of blotter acid simply because his friend had been found in  
possession of marijuana and because he had an object in his  
pocket that felt like cardboard, which could have been used to  
blot acid.10  
Further, Dickerson would support a conclusion that the  
seizure here was unjustified because the officer conducted a  
search under the auspices of the plain feel doctrine.  
Dickerson plainly stated that where a further search is  
required in order to determine that an object is contraband,  
it is not seizable under the plain feel doctrine.11  Here, even  
if it had been cardboard that the officer felt, he would have  
10 
Under the majority’s view, almost any object felt 
during a patdown could be seized.  Could a pen be mistaken as 
a syringe?  A marble as cocaine? A cigarette as marijuana?  
A letter as blotter paper?  
11 I, therefore, disagree with the majority that Champion  
in no way extended Dickerson. 
Obviously, an ordinary pill  
bottle is not illegal to possess.  Thus, before the officer in 
Champion could determine a pill bottle could be classified as 
contraband, he had to determine somehow that it was in fact 
used for an illegal purpose. 
Thus, the very type of 
additional search prohibited by Dickerson occurred in  
Champion.  
26  
 
 
had to manipulate the object in order to determine that it was  
in fact contraband. Cardboard itself is not contraband, and  
may lawfully be carried. Only a further search would reveal  
whether the cardboard somehow contained contraband.  
In any event, the factors cited in the majority opinion  
do not support the conclusion that the detaining officer had  
probable cause to believe that the defendant was carrying  
drug-laced cardboard in his front pocket.  According to the  
majority,  
In this case, while conducting the patdown 
search of defendant, the officer felt a two-by­
three-inch object in defendant’s pocket that he 
believed was a card of blotter acid.  His belief  
was based on his knowledge that blotter acid was 
often contained on sheets of cardboard; his  
awareness that cards of blotter acid were capable 
of fitting into a pants pocket like that he felt on 
defendant; the antecedent discovery of marijuana 
and a large amount of money on Holder, the driver 
of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger; 
Holder’s shout to defendant not to tell the police 
anything; the fact that defendant was with Holder 
during the entire evening; and the officer’s  
training and twenty-three years of experience as a 
police officer.  Under these circumstances, the 
officer had probable cause to believe that the 
object 
he 
felt 
in 
defendant’s 
pocket 
was  
contraband. [Slip op at 12-13.]  
Interestingly, none of these factors indicates that the  
officer had reason to suspect that the defendant would be  
carrying contraband.  The officer’s knowledge that blotter  
acid is often carried on cardboard and that such pieces of  
27  
cardboard would fit into a pocket do not support a conclusion  
that this defendant, a person previously unknown to the  
officers, would be carrying blotter acid in his pants.  
Additionally, the officer pointed to nothing specific that  
would distinguish a piece of cardboard used to blot acid from  
a photograph or any other piece of paper.  He had no  
articulable basis for concluding that whatever piece of paper  
the defendant was carrying was used for acid blotter.12  
Moreover, the fact that the police knew Holder was carrying  
marijuana does not support an implication that the defendant  
would be in possession of acid.  In fact, at the point at  
which he was frisked, the defendant himself had nothing to  
alert the police that he was engaged in criminal activity.  
Under the facts and circumstances, a man of reasonable  
prudence and caution would have no basis for concluding that  
the defendant had committed the offense of possessing  
narcotics.
 Unless it is now an offense to choose one’s  
associates poorly, I see no reasonable ground for believing  
12 In fact, the officer’s testimony that blotter acid 
paper is generally paper that can be divided easily into small 
sections and have acid dropped on it so that it may be sucked 
off by a recipient tends to imply that a photograph that is 
thicker and slipperier than paper would not have the  
characteristics of normal acid blotter.  
28  
 
that the defendant could be charged with any illegality.13  
Accordingly, I do not believe a finding of probable cause is  
supportable.  
IV  
Finally, because the majority concludes that the seizure  
of the photographs in the defendant’s pocket was valid, it  
reaches the issue whether the photographs were validly  
examined.  I will also address this argument because I believe  
the majority’s argument is supported neither by logic nor by  
law.  
According to the majority, “the exterior of an item that  
is validly seized during a patdown search may be examined  
without a search warrant, even if the officer subsequently  
13 Interestingly, the majority’s probable cause rationale 
is barely distinguishable from its reasonable suspicion 
rationale.
 The only factor that separates the reasonable 
suspicion supporting a patdown search and the probable cause 
required for a seizure are that the officer knew cards of 
blotter acid could fit in a pocket.  As emphasized herein, the 
officer had no articulable reason to believe that the  
defendant possessed blotter acid paper or other drugs.  
Contrary to the majority’s implication, I do not suggest  
that the same factors that would support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion cannot factor into the probable cause 
analysis.  Rather, I believe it is important to recognize that 
the minimal factors justifying a patdown weapons search do not 
rise to the level of probable cause.  Also the officer’s  
additional indication that a piece of cardboard could fit in 
someone’s front pocket, and his knowledge that some people 
blot acid on cardboard hardly move the degree of suspicion 
possessed in this case into the category of probable cause.  
29  
 
 
 
learns that the item is not the contraband the officer  
initially thought that it was before the seizure.” 
Slip op  
at 20.  However, the majority’s argument is premised on the  
assumption that the police validly possessed the photographs  
removed 
from 
the 
defendant’s pockets when the search occurred.  
If a Fourth Amendment infringement is unsupported by a  
warrant or other exception to the warrant requirement, the  
seizure is invalid.  In other words, a search or seizure  
without a warrant is circumscribed by the exigencies  
justifying it. See, e.g., Horton, supra. Here, the officer  
removed the photographs from the defendant’s possession and  
control on belief that they were blotter acid cardboard.  The  
purported justification was plain feel. Yet, once the officer  
removed 
the 
photographs from the defendant’s pocket, it became  
clear that the object removed was not in fact cardboard. At  
that moment, the justification supporting the seizure, that  
the object was immediately identifiable as contraband, no  
longer existed.14  Thus, the scope of the plain feel exception  
was exceeded and the police no longer had justification for  
14 In criticizing my approach, the majority conveniently 
omits 
this 
sentence. 
 Such omission illustrates the majority’s 
lack of appreciation of one of the most important aspects of 
this case–that a search or seizure without a warrant is  
circumscribed by the warrant exception justifying it.  
30  
 
infringing 
the 
defendant’s 
right 
to 
possess 
private 
photographs. 
Additionally, I cannot agree with the majority’s 
conclusion that the search of the photographs taken from the  
defendant was supportable.  The majority opines that the  
defendant’s expectation of privacy in items he was carrying in  
his front pocket was “significantly diminished” because an  
officer removed them during a patdown search under the  
mistaken belief that they were blotter acid cardboard.15  
Certainly, 
a 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy  
in his front pocket.  I would contend that he continued to  
have 
a 
legitimate 
expectation of privacy after the photographs  
were removed. 
Under the majority view, an individual’s  
expectation of privacy in a personal possession would  
evaporate at the moment an officer removes the item from the  
individual’s 
control, even when the officer’s belief is wrong.  
I cannot agree.16  
15 Ironically, the majority cites Arizona v Hicks, in 
support of its position.  In Hicks, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the plain view doctrine would not support a 
seizure where the officers exceeded the scope of the exigency 
allowing them to be in a place to see what was suspected to be 
contraband, and also where the police had to move an item in 
order to determine whether it was in fact contraband.  
16 The majority takes pains to try to explain why rights 
(continued...)  
31  
 
 
 
Though the officer’s correctness in his belief that an  
item is probably contraband might not ultimately invalidate a  
seizure,17 
a 
mistake 
on the officer’s part would most certainly  
undermine the validity of a subsequent search.  Subsequent  
searches of items seized by police under a Fourth Amendment  
exception allowing a seizure without a warrant, must  
16(...continued) 
are only “ diminished” under its approach.  While the majority 
admittedly 
uses 
the 
phrase 
“significantly 
diminished”  
throughout its opinion, I am not persuaded that the label 
accurately fits the approach.  When would a legitimate 
expectation of privacy preclude a further search under the 
majority’s rationale?  
The majority seems to argue that the result might be 
different were the officer required to open a container and 
look inside. Yet, how can this be true considering that the 
majority places primary reliance on Champion, a case in which 
the officer did just that?  Further, the law does not support 
a conclusion that an officer somehow has justification to 
manipulate an object and search parts of its exterior that are 
not in the officer’s view.  Our Supreme Court has said that 
plain view seizures are not justified where the officer moves 
an object even minimally in order to determine whether the 
object is illegally possessed. Hicks, supra. Similarly, an 
object that must be manipulated in order to determine whether 
it is contraband is not subject to seizure under the plain 
feel doctrine.  Dickerson, supra. The same rationale applies 
in the context of the present case.  I see no meaningful or 
outcome-determinative 
distinction 
between 
a 
situation 
where 
an  
officer has to manipulate an object’s exterior in order to 
determine whether the object contains contraband and a 
situation in which the officer must open the object and look 
inside to determine whether it contains contraband.  In either  
situation, the officer is conducting a search of an object in 
order to convert his suspicion that an object contains 
contraband into confirmation that it does.  
17 It would, however, be relevant to a determination 
whether probable cause existed.  
32  
 
necessarily be subjected to a determination whether the  
individual defendant retains a privacy interest though his  
possessory interest has been infringed. 
Surely, society is  
less likely to recognize an expectation of privacy in illegal  
materials as being legitimate than in legal materials.  The  
legitimacy concerns associated with contraband simply do not  
attach to noncontraband items.  Thus, if an officer mistakenly  
seizes a noncontraband item and then searches that item,  
despite the fact that the item seized is not the contraband he  
suspected it to be, the officer is necessarily infringing on  
a privacy interest. 
Dickerson itself recognized that  
contraband may be seized during a plain feel or plain view  
search because the police should not be forced to ignore an  
apparent illegality.  Where the item “felt” is not illegal,  
the same concerns are not present and the exigency is no  
longer present.  
Moreover, the majority effectively creates an exception  
to the warrant requirement that permits a search incident to  
seizure. No such exception exists. Even if I were to agree  
with the majority that there was a valid basis for seizing the  
defendant’s photographs, I would not support a rule that  
eliminates an individual’s expectation of privacy in an item  
lawfully possessed, but nonetheless seized.  
33  
 
The majority protests that it cannot have created a  
search incident to seizure exception because it found no  
search.  However, the basis for its conclusion that no search  
occurred is that a defendant has a “significantly diminished”  
legitimate expectation of privacy in something seized.  The  
majority approach adds weight to my point that the majority’s  
“significantly diminished expectation of privacy” conclusion  
is distinguishable from a “no legitimate expectation  of  
privacy” conclusion in words only.  The majority itself admits  
that “in order for there to be a ‘search,’ one must have a  
reasonable expectation of privacy in the object being  
“searched.’”  Slip op at 27. 
To conclude that no search  
occurred, then, one must conclude that an individual has no  
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.  
If an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy, as  
opposed to no expectation of privacy, then necessarily he must  
have some expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.  
If the majority is unwilling to conclude that the defendant  
had no expectation of privacy, then it cannot also satisfy the  
test it enunciates as a basis for concluding that no search  
occurred.  
Further, the reason that no “search” occurred in the  
majority’s view, is that the defendant’s expectation of  
34  
 
privacy had been significantly diminished by virtue of the  
prior seizure.  Under this view, the police’s subsequent  
search was justified by its own prior conduct.  Were it not  
for the seizure, there could have been no subsequent  
examination because the defendant would have had a reasonable  
expectation of privacy in his pants pockets.  Thus, the  
majority effectively allows the police to search something  
seized, and then allows the police to conduct an examination  
of an object they have seized, by concluding that such an  
examination would not be a search. Such logic is contrary to  
search jurisprudence, which focuses on whether a legitimate  
expectation of privacy has been relinquished.  
Also, I find it significant that the majority relies on  
Champion, supra, to support its conclusion that the officer  
could seize an item from the defendant, but then ignores  
Champion’s recognition that  
[t]he search of a container preceding a formal  
arrest can qualify as a search incident to arrest 
if probable cause for the arrest existed before the 
container was searched. . . .  However, a search of 
a container cannot be justified as being incident 
to 
an 
arrest 
if 
probable 
cause 
for 
the  
contemporaneous arrest was provided by the fruits 
of the search. [Id. at 116.]  
Perhaps the majority would conclude that because no container  
was opened in this case, the search of the photographs in an  
35  
 
attempt to develop probable cause to arrest was permissible.  
However, 
as 
explained above, such a distinction cannot validly  
be drawn.  Here, 
the defendant was not arrested until after  
the photographs were removed from his pocket and examined. The  
probable cause for the defendant’s arrest grew largely from  
the search of the photographs.18  
Despite the majority’s conclusion to the contrary, not  
every item seized by police officers is automatically subject  
to search without a warrant.  In fact, the United States  
18 
 There was some discussion at trial about when the  
defendant was actually placed under arrest. 
The trial  
transcript indicates that the defendant was not formally 
arrested at the time he was transported to the police station 
for questioning after the police examined the photos seized 
from his front pocket; however, the detaining officer also 
testified that the defendant was not free to leave after the  
photographs were seized.  What is clear, though, is that this 
“arrest” of the defendant is not the same arrest upon which 
the charges of delivery and manufacture, maintaining a drug 
house, and conspiring to deliver or manufacture were  
predicated.
 Those charges were brought on the basis of 
evidence seized during a search of the defendant’s home that 
occurred after officers decided to investigate the defendant 
because of what they had seen when examining the photographs.  
Following 
the 
chain of events backward reveals the number 
of steps that were taken in order to develop probable cause 
for the defendant’s ultimate arrest for the drug offenses that 
form the basis of the instant appeal: the arrest grew from the 
seizure of drugs, which grew from the search of the  
defendant’s house, which grew from the search of the  
photographs, which grew from the seizure of the photographs, 
which grew from the patdown search of the defendant, which 
grew from reasonable suspicion that he was armed, which was 
inferred from the conduct of Holder.  
36  
 
 
 
Supreme Court has explicitly held otherwise. In United States  
v Jacobsen, for example, the United States Supreme Court  
wrote,  
Letters and other sealed packages are in the 
general class of effects in which the public at 
large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; 
warrantless 
searches 
of 
such 
packages 
are  
presumptively unreasonable.  Even when government 
agents may lawfully seize such a package to prevent 
loss or destruction of suspected contraband, the 
Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a  
warrant before examining the contents of such a 
package. [Id. at 114, citing United States v Place, 
462 US 696, 700-701; 103 S Ct 2637; 77 L Ed 2d 110 
(1983); United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 809-812; 
102 S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982); Robbins v  
California, 453 US 420, 426; 101 S Ct 2841; 69 L Ed  
2d 744 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v  
Sanders, 442 US 753, 762; 99 S Ct 2586; 61 L Ed 2d 
235 (1979); United States v 
Chadwick, 433 US 1, 
13, n 8; 97 S Ct 2476; 53 L Ed 2d 538 (1977); 
United States v Van Leeuwen, 397 US 249; 90 S Ct 
1029; 25 L Ed 2d 282 (1970).]  
Using Jacobsen as an analogy, the majority’s approach would  
yield the result that a person’s private package could be  
opened and searched because the individual expectation of  
privacy in the item was lost at the time it was seized. The  
United 
States 
Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion, and  
so do I.  
CONCLUSION  
In this case, the officer impermissibly infringed upon  
both the defendant’s possessory interest and his privacy  
37  
interest.  The photographs were impermissibly seized from the  
defendant in the first instance, impermissibly retained, and  
impermissibly searched. 
Therefore, I would affirm the  
decisions below and hold that the fruit growing from the  
seizure of the photographs must be suppressed.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
38