Title: People v. Scheidt
Citation: 526 P.2d 300
Docket Number: 25874
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: September 9, 1974

526 P.2d 300 (1974) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earl W. SCHEIDT, Defendant-Appellant. No. 25874. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. September 9, 1974. Rehearing Denied September 30, 1974. John E. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., David A. Sorenson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee. Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Alvin D. Lichtenstein, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant. GROVES, Justice. The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and assault. We reverse all three convictions. The facts of this case are not in dispute. On the evening of September 10, 1971, the defendant entered a Denver drug store and asked for the pharmacist. The pharmacist identified himself and, noticing the defendant's drunken appearance, assisted the defendant in order that he would not bump into a a liquor display. When the defendant asked for two amphetamines, the pharmacist explained that he would need a prescription. *301 The defendant pulled a gun and said, "This is my prescription." The pharmacist then handed the defendant a cigar box containing some old drugs the store had been unable to sell. The defendant took the box, ran out of the store and across the street, and attempted, unsuccessfully, to start his car. The defendant was still sitting in the car when the police arrived. The defendant testified that he had consumed a large quantity of drugs and alcohol on the day in question and that he had absolutely no recollection of any events concerning the alleged crimes. Two psychiatrists expressed the opinion that at the time in question the defendant had been in a state of toxic delirium induced by drugs and alcohol and that temporary amnesia had accompanied this delirious state. The testimony of a second psychiatrist substantially supported that of the first. We agree with the following statement of counsel for the defendant made in the opening brief: In cross-examination of the defendant, the deputy district attorney first established that the defendant had been confined in mental institutions, including our State Hospital at Pueblo; that he had discussed with others their own court cases; and that, while he was in the county jail in Denver, he was president of the inmate council. From that point on, defense counsel objected to the entire line of questioning. The prosecutor established that as president of the inmate council the defendant discussed defenses with persons awaiting trial and performed research "in the area of how psychiatry fits into the criminal law." He established that the defendant knew the difference between a competency hearing and a trial on the merits. The transcript continues as follows: The court not only did not caution the jury to disregard this questioning and did not grant defendant's motion for mistrial, but in open court ruled that the questioning was proper to test the credibility of the defendant. No authority need be cited to support the proposition that testimony as to places of incarceration are not to be placed before a jury. The defendant had the right to use his mental condition at the time as a defense on the merits of whether or not he had the requisite intent. The prosecution appeared to attempt to show that the exercise of this right was a miscarriage of justice. It further seemed to be an attempt to rebut the anticipated testimony of psychiatrists who were yet to testify. This was clearly another example of overzealous prosecution resulting in an unfair trial. People v. Spencer, Colo., 512 P.2d 260 (1973); People v. Wright, Colo., 511 P.2d 460 (1973); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, § 1.1.(c). Cf. Dunn v. State, 277 Ala. 39, 166 So. 2d 878 (1964); Wise v. State, 251 Ala. 660, 38 So. 2d 553 (1948); Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154 So. 575 (1934); State v. Jordon, 80 Ariz. 193, 294 P.2d 677 (1956); People v. Castro, 182 Cal. App. 2d 255, 5 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1960); State v. Johnson, 267 S.W.2d 642 (Mo.1954); and Smith v. State, 220 So. 2d 313 (Miss.1969). The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions that the court grant the motion for new trial. KELLEY, J., dissents.