Title: Darwin, et al. v. DFS, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 652, 2010, 655, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BRENDA DARWIN,1
 
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Nos. 652, 2010 and
Respondent Below,
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         655, 2010
Appellant,
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 and
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ELLIS DARWIN, VAN SOULE and
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RANDI SOULE-DARWIN,
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Court Below: Family Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for New Castle County
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES,
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File No. 10-03-08TN
Petitioner Below, 
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Case No. 10-10328
Appellee,
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and
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OFFICE OF THE CHILD ADVOCATE,
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Appellee.
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Submitted:  April 20, 2011
Decided:  May 10, 2011
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
1This Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties by Order dated October 12, 2010,
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
This 10th day of May, 2011, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
appears to the Court that:
1) Brenda Darwin, and her three children, Ellis, Van, and Randi, appeal from 
a Family Court decision terminating Darwin’s parental rights in her children.  Darwin
argues that the Family Court:  (1) committed plain error by waiting until a few weeks
before the termination hearing to appoint a Frazer attorney2 for Ellis and Randi, and
by waiting until shortly after the hearing began to appoint a Frazer attorney for Van;
(2) abused its discretion in failing to find that the children’s relationships with each
other and with Darwin favored Darwin; (3) abused its discretion in finding that
termination is in the children’s best interest; and (4) committed plain error by refusing
to speak with the children, directly, before making its decision.  We find no merit to
these arguments and affirm.
(2) The Family Court granted custody of the children to the Division of Family
Services (DFS) in February 2009.  The DFS petition alleged that Darwin had been
hospitalized for substance abuse, and that the non-relative caretakers for Randi and
Van were unwilling to file for guardianship.  Ellis, who had been under his father’s
2In In re Frazer, 721 A.2d 920 (Del. 1998), this Court held that children who are old enough to
express their views on a termination petition are entitled to representation by an attorney who is not
conflicted.  Thus, where the Guardian ad litem’s view as to the child’s best interest is not the same
as the child’s position, a different attorney must be appointed to represent the child.
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 care, had been severely physically abused.  The Family Court appointed a Guardian
ad litem for all three children.
(3) At hearings held in March, April, May and August 2009, the Family Court
continued to find that the children were dependent, and should remain in the custody
of DFS.  The court adopted a concurrent goal of reunification and termination of
parental rights on March 5, 2010.  DFS filed a Petition for Termination on March 26,
2010, and the hearing was scheduled to begin on May 21, 2010.  At a pre-trial
conference held on April 22, 2010, the Family Court addressed the appointment of
a Frazer attorney, and the fact that the court would not interview the children:
All parties stipulated to the appointment of a Frazer attorney for
Ellis and Randi.  The Frazer attorney shall interview the children
to determine if either of them has an opinion regarding the
termination of parental rights.  If the Frazer attorney cannot
discern an opinion for or against the Petition on behalf of the
child, the Frazer attorney may be excused from the proceedings
prior to the start of trial.
Van has remained consistent in his opinion that he does not want
to go home and is therefore not in need of a Frazer attorney. 
Since the Court is appointing a Frazer attorney the Court will not
interview the children.3
(4) On May 14, 2010, the Frazer attorney for Ellis and Randi asked the court
to appoint her as Frazer attorney for Van, as well.  On June 2, 2010, after the first day
3Appellants’ Reply Brief, Exhibit 1.
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of the termination hearing, the court entered the requested order.  The termination
hearing was conducted on May 21, 2010, June 18, 2010, June 30, 2010, and
August 10, 2010.  The Family Court issued its decision on September 13, 2010.
(5) Darwin complains that the Family Court committed plain error by failing
to appoint the Frazer attorney until shortly before the termination hearing (as to Ellis
and Randi) and until after the first day of the hearing (as to Van).  She points out that
the Frazer attorney was unable to access important medical and other records until
the appointment, and she contends that the delay was “serious and fundamental.”4 
(6) Plain error is error that is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”5  The Frazer attorney could
have moved for a continuance if she believed that she had insufficient time to prepare
for the termination hearing and properly represent her clients.  She did not. 
Moreover, since the same attorney was the Frazer attorney for all the children, her
“late” appointment with respect to Van did not mean that she missed the first day of
the hearing.  Finally, there is nothing in this record to suggest that the timing of the
appointment of the Frazer attorney in any way prejudiced Darwin or her children. 
Thus, we find no plain error.
4Appellants’ Opening Brief, p.20.
5Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
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(7) Next, Darwin argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that 
one of the statutory “best interest” factors was neutral.  Under 13 Del. C. § 722(a)(3), 
the court should consider “[t]he interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
or her parents, . . . [and] siblings . . . .”  The Family Court considered that factor and
concluded that it did not favor Darwin or DFS.  In doing so, the court recognized that
Darwin interacted well with her children during visits.  But the court also noted 
Darwin’s therapist’s testimony that Darwin “struggles to acknowledge her role in the
children’s problems and take responsibility in a consistent manner.”6  In addition, the
court noted that Darwin’s denial of her addiction could cause Darwin to repeat her
destructive behavior, which contributed to the children’s problems.  These findings
are supported by the record.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
(8) Darwin also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
it was in the children’s best interest to terminate Darwin’s parental rights.  She notes
that the court recognized two factors in her favor – Darwin’s desire to maintain her
parental rights, and two of her children’s preference to remain with their mother. 
Darwin argues that the court did not give enough weight to these factors.  
6Division of Family Services v.  Darwin, et al., File No. 10-03-08TN, Order at 36 (Del. Fam. Ct.
September 13, 2010).
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(9) The Family Court carefully reviewed all of the statutory factors in
determining the children’s best interest.  In brief, the trial court found that the
children have adjusted well in their foster homes.  They all require medication and/or
therapy for emotional and mental problems, and they are receiving that care at
present.  Darwin has continuing mental health problems, and has not been consistent
in keeping medical appointments.  Darwin has failed to meet the children’s financial
needs.   She has a significant history of domestic violence, and Darwin has a criminal
record.  The record supports the trial court’s findings, which amply demonstrate that
the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination is in the
children’s best interest.
(10) Finally, Darwin argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing
to interview the children.  But she does not explain what additional information the
court would have obtained.  The court knew that they wanted to return to their
mother.  Both the Guardian ad litem and the Frazer attorney confirmed that
information.  In addition, the court heard testimony from therapists, case workers and
others who described the children’s feelings.  The children’s wishes were considered
by the court, but their desire to return to their mother could not overcome the
powerful evidence that it was in their best interest to terminate Darwin’s parental
rights.  In sum, there was no plain error.
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court
be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice
 
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