Title: New Jersey v. Patel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 2019

New Jersey v. Patel Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In 2015, defendant Charudutt Patel was charged in two separate instances with DWI. Patel had twice before been convicted of DWI. Because of the passage of more than ten years between the first and second convictions, Patel was sentenced as a first-time offender. The two 2015 DWI charges exposed Patel to potential third and fourth DWI convictions. Patel claimed that his 1994 conviction in the Piscataway Municipal Court was uncounseled and therefore could not be used for custodial enhancement purposes pursuant to New Jersey v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 16-17 (1990). Thus, for Laurick purposes, Patel contended that he stood before the court as a second-time offender, and he moved to bar the use of his allegedly uncounseled 1994 DWI guilty plea to enhance any custodial sentence in the pending DWI cases. The court denied Patel’s Laurick motion. Patel filed a motion for reconsideration and a third certification to clarify his earlier certifications. He asserted that in 1994, “the judge never advised me that I had a right to retain an attorney nor did he advise me that I had a right to an appointed attorney at no charge. Therefore, I simply pled guilty.” The court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that in the absence of municipal court records, Patel’s certifications were insufficient to prove that he was denied notice of his right to counsel twenty-two years earlier and that, in any event, he should have filed his Laurick motion in 2010 when he was charged with his second DWI. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed: "Although his certifications were far from ideal, Patel carried his burden of presenting sufficient proof -- unrebutted by the State -- that his 1994 guilty plea was uncounseled, whether he was indigent or non-indigent. Patel had no obligation to establish that he would not have pled guilty or been convicted at trial had he been represented by counsel." The matter was remanded for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Charudutt J. Patel (A-13-18) (081069)Argued April 23, 2019 -- August 7, 2019ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. In State v. Laurick, the Court held that a defendant is not subject to an enhanced custodial sentence for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction if he was not advised of his right to counsel in an earlier DWI proceeding and entered an uncounseled guilty plea or went to trial without counsel. 120 N.J. 1, 16-17 (1990). Here, the Court considers the applicable standards for both indigent and non-indigent defendants who seek relief from an enhanced custodial sentence for a second or subsequent DWI based on a claimed denial of notice of the right to counsel in an earlier DWI case. In 2015, defendant Charudutt Patel was charged in two separate instances with DWI. Patel had twice before been convicted of DWI. In 1994, he pled guilty to DWI in the Piscataway Municipal Court. In 2010, Patel pled guilty to DWI in the North Brunswick Municipal Court. Because of the passage of more than ten years between the first and second convictions, Patel was sentenced as a first-time offender. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). The two 2015 DWI charges exposed Patel to potential third and fourth DWI convictions. Patel claimed that his 1994 conviction in the Piscataway Municipal Court was uncounseled and therefore could not be used for custodial enhancement purposes pursuant to Laurick. Thus, for Laurick purposes, Patel contended that he stood before the court as a second-time offender, and he moved to bar the use of his allegedly uncounseled 1994 DWI guilty plea to enhance any custodial sentence in the pending DWI cases. In support of his Laurick motion, Patel filed two certifications averring that he was indigent at the time of his 1994 DWI guilty plea, that he appeared in the Piscataway Municipal Court without an attorney, and that the municipal court judge did not advise him of his right to retain one. Patel did retain an attorney in 2010 to represent him on the DWI charge in North Brunswick. In 2016, no documents remained in the Piscataway Municipal Court to disprove Patel’s certifications. The court denied Patel’s Laurick motion. Patel filed a motion for reconsideration and a third certification to clarify his earlier certifications. He asserted that in 1994, “the Judge never advised me that I had a right to retain an attorney nor did he advise me that I 1 had a right to an appointed attorney at no charge. Therefore, I simply pled guilty.” The court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that in the absence of municipal court records, Patel’s certifications were insufficient to prove that he was denied notice of his right to counsel twenty-two years earlier and that, in any event, he should have filed his Laurick motion in 2010 when he was charged with his second DWI in North Brunswick. The Law Division denied Patel’s appeal. He then pled guilty to the third DWI incident, in exchange for which other charges, including the fourth DWI charge, were dropped. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted Patel’s petition for certification. 235 N.J. 337 (2018).HELD: To secure relief from an enhanced custodial sentence for a subsequent DWI conviction, a non-indigent defendant must establish that in the earlier uncounseled DWI proceeding, (1) he was not advised or did not know of his right to counsel and (2) had he known of his right to counsel, he would have retained a lawyer. A defendant contending he was indigent must establish that in the earlier uncounseled DWI proceeding (1) he was not advised and did not know of his right to appointed counsel, (2) he was entitled to the appointment of counsel under the applicable financial means test, R. 7:3-2(b), and (3) had he been properly informed of his rights, he would have accepted appointed counsel. Because denial of counsel is a structural defect in the proceeding, to secure relief from an enhanced custodial sentence, neither an indigent nor a non-indigent defendant must show that the outcome would have been different had he been represented. The Court removes the five-year limitation in Laurick petitions and amends Rule 7:10-2(g)(2), effective immediately, to provide the following: “(2) Time Limitations. A petition seeking relief under this Rule may be filed at any time.” Here, Patel’s unrebutted certifications established that his 1994 plea was uncounseled, and he had no obligation to establish that he would not have pled guilty or been convicted at trial had he been represented by counsel. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.1. The right to the assistance of counsel is guaranteed to all defendants charged with DWI. Knowledge of one’s right to counsel is indispensable to the exercise of that right. For that reason, all municipal court judges must “inform the defendant of the right to retain counsel or, if indigent, to have counsel assigned pursuant to [Rule 7:3-2(b)].” R. 7:3-2(a). The court also must ask the defendant “whether legal representation is desired” and record the response “on the complaint.” Ibid. Because of the singular importance of the right to counsel, the denial of counsel is deemed a structural defect in the framework of the proceedings -- a defect that cannot be quantitatively assessed and therefore defies a harmless error analysis. A defendant denied the right to counsel does not have to establish prejudice on direct appeal; prejudice is presumed. (pp. 13-16)2. In Laurick, the Court held that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction could “not be used to increase a defendant’s loss of liberty,” but made clear that there was no impediment to 2 the use of other collateral consequences of the uncounseled conviction, such as a period of license suspension or financial penalties. 120 N.J. at 4. The Court set different standards of proof for indigent and non-indigent DWI defendants who sought to bar the use of the prior uncounseled DWI conviction for custodial sentence enhancement purposes. See id. at 11. The non-indigent defendant must show, like indigent defendants, a “lack of notice as well as the absence of knowledge of the right to be represented by counsel of one’s choosing,” but must also show “that the lack of notice otherwise affected the outcome.” Id. at 11, 17. The Court did not explain its reasons for placing a higher burden on non-indigent defendants. In State v. Hrycak, the Court “reaffirm[ed] [its] holding in Laurick that an uncounseled DWI conviction may not be used to enhance the period of incarceration for a subsequent offense,” restated the Laurick formula, and again set different standards for indigent and non-indigent defendants as to whether prior uncounseled DWI convictions could be used for custodial sentence enhancement purposes. 184 N.J. 351, 354, 362-63 (2005). (pp. 16-21)3. In State v. Schadewald, the Appellate Division altered the tests for indigent and non- indigent defendants challenging prior uncounseled DWI convictions articulated in Laurick and Hrycak. See 400 N.J. Super. 350, 354-55 (App. Div. 2007). In that case, the Appellate Division held that both indigent and non-indigent defendants must “demonstrate that if they had been represented by counsel, they had a defense to the DWI charge and the outcome would, in all likelihood, have been different.” Id. at 354. The Appellate Division in this case followed the Schadewald paradigm. (pp. 21-22)4. Schadewald treats equally two classes of similarly situated defendants. That being said, Schadewald is in clear conflict with the holdings in both Laurick and Hrycak and arguably imposes an unduly burdensome standard by requiring that indigent and non- indigent defendants prove that the outcome would have been different had they been represented by counsel. Denial of counsel -- here the denial of the opportunity to retain counsel or secure appointed counsel -- is a structural defect in the proceedings, not quantifiable by any traditional measurement and therefore not typically susceptible to a harmless-error analysis. And when notice of the right to counsel is not given in DWI cases, to obtain the special form of relief recognized in Laurick, neither indigent nor non- indigent defendants should be required to establish that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had they been given the opportunity to retain counsel or secure appointed counsel. (pp. 22-24)5. The Court adopts the standards reprinted in the HELD paragraph above and notes that the defendant has the burden of proving that his prior uncounseled DWI conviction was based on the municipal court’s failure to advise him of his right to counsel. If municipal courts retain the records mandated by New Jersey court rules and jurisprudence, determining whether there was compliance with the notice requirements should not be difficult. The defendant must secure the relevant documents to establish a violation of the notice requirement. In the absence of documentary evidence or witnesses with a 3 recollection, the defendant is in a position to do no more than file an affidavit averring that he was not advised of his right to counsel and did not know that he could retain counsel. The defendant who claims he was indigent at the time of the prior proceeding should attest that he was not advised and did not know of his right to appointed counsel, and was unable to afford an attorney. In future cases, he also should attach to his affidavit or certification documents that would establish his indigence. (pp. 24-25)6. In the present case, the Piscataway Municipal Court has indicated that no record remains of whether Patel’s 1994 DWI guilty plea was uncounseled or whether Patel was given notice of his right to counsel and, if indigent, the right to appointed counsel. Patel filed three certifications in the Piscataway Municipal Court in support of his application to bar the use of his 1994 DWI conviction to enhance his custodial term. Patel has made clear in his certifications that had he been advised of his right to counsel, he would have sought the assistance of counsel -- preferably appointed counsel -- and, if he had resources, retained counsel. Patel’s assertions -- like those of the defendant in Laurick -- have gone unrebutted. See Laurick, 120 N.J. at 6. Patel has satisfied his burden of showing that his prior uncounseled DWI conviction was caused by the municipal court’s failure to advise him of his right to counsel. (pp. 26-27)7. The current court rules provide that a petition for Laurick relief “shall not be accepted for filing more than five years after entry of the judgment of conviction or imposition of the sentence sought to be attacked, unless it alleges facts showing that the delay in filing was due to defendant’s excusable neglect.” R. 7:10-2(g)(2); R. 7:10-2(b)(2). In the present case, Patel submits that he sought relief from his prior uncounseled conviction at the only time that it made sense to do so and that therefore any “delay” should be deemed excusable. State v. Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 2008), supports this point. The Bringhurst court reasoned that because “a second or subsequent [DWI] conviction may occur at any time in the future, it would be illogical to apply the Rule’s five-year time limit mechanistically to deny all [Laurick] applications.” Id. at 433. That logic accords with recommendations by the Municipal Court Practice Committee to allow a Laurick petition to be filed at any time. The Court now adopts the language proposed by the Committee and amends in part Rule 7:10-2(g), effective immediately, to provide: “(2) Time Limitations. A petition seeking relief under this Rule may be filed at any time.” (pp. 27-31) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 13 September Term 2018 081069 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charudutt J. Patel, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided April 23, 2019 August 7, 2019Victor A. Rotolo argued the cause for appellant (Rotolo Karch Law, attorneys; Victor A. Rotolo, E. Carr Cornog, III, William E. Reutelhuber, and Matthew R. Marotta, on the briefs).Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of counsel and on the briefs).Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on the brief). 1 JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Every defendant charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A.39:4-50, is guaranteed the right to retain counsel or, if indigent, the right toappointed counsel in municipal court.1 State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351, 362(2005). In a DWI case, the guiding hand of counsel is essential to safeguardfundamental rights in our adversarial system of justice, such as the right to afair plea or trial proceeding. To ensure the efficient administration of justice in our municipal courts ,judges are directed to “inform the defendant of the right to retain counsel or, ifindigent, to have counsel assigned.” R. 7:3-2(a); see also Hrycak, 184 N.J. at 362. Judges are also required to ask the defendant “whether legalrepresentation is desired” and to have the response “recorded on thecomplaint.” R. 7:3-2(a). Repeat DWI offenders are subject to enhanced custodial sentences,license suspensions, and financial penalties. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2)-(3). Weheld in State v. Laurick that a defendant is not subject to an enhanced custodialsentence for a second or subsequent DWI conviction if he was not advised of1 “'Indigent defendant’ means a person who is entitled to be represented by a municipal public defender . . . and does not have the present financial ability to secure competent legal representation . . . .” N.J.S.A. 2B:24-2. 2 his right to counsel in an earlier DWI proceeding and entered an uncounseledguilty plea or went to trial without counsel. 120 N.J. 1, 16-17 (1990). Underthis special form of relief, the defendant is not relieved of enhanced financialand administrative penalties. Id. at 16. Since Laurick, our courts have struggled to establish clear standards forboth indigent and non-indigent defendants who seek relief from an enhancedcustodial sentence for a second or subsequent DWI based on a claimed denialof notice of the right to counsel in an earlier DWI case. To receive this specialform of relief from an uncounseled prior DWI conviction, we have imposeddifferent standards on indigent and non-indigent DWI defendants. See Hrycak, 184 N.J. at 363. Only uncounseled non-indigent defendants are required toshow that the outcome would have been different if counsel had been retained.Ibid. We can find no justification for such an asymmetrical approach. The present case provides us with the opportunity to give clearerguidance to indigent and non-indigent DWI defendants who face an enhancedcustodial sentence based on an earlier uncounseled DWI conviction. We nowhold that to secure relief from an enhanced custodial sentence for a subsequentDWI conviction, a non-indigent defendant must establish that in the earlieruncounseled DWI proceeding, (1) he was not advised or did not know of hisright to counsel and (2) had he known of his right to counsel, he would have 3 retained a lawyer. A defendant contending he was indigent must establishthat in the earlier uncounseled DWI proceeding (1) he was not advised and didnot know of his right to appointed counsel, (2) he was entitled to theappointment of counsel under the applicable financial means test, R. 7:3-2(b),and (3) had he been properly informed of his rights, he would have acceptedappointed counsel. Because denial of counsel is a structural defect in theproceeding, to secure relief from an enhanced custodial sentence, neither anindigent nor a non-indigent defendant must show that the outcome would havebeen different had he been represented. I. A. In 2015, defendant Charudutt Patel was charged in two separateinstances with DWI -- in Tewksbury Township in January and in HillsboroughTownship five months later. The assignment judge of the vicinageconsolidated both cases for disposition in the Tewksbury Municipal Court. Patel had twice before been convicted of DWI. In 1994, he pled guiltyto DWI in the Piscataway Municipal Court.2 As a consequence of his guilty2 According to a police report, a Piscataway Township patrol officer found Patel asleep in his car with the engine running in a restaurant parking lot located within 100 feet of a police department drunk-driving checkpoint. In Patel’s car were two bags containing four beers. Patel was transported to police headquarters, where a breathalyzer test was administered. Two tests 4 plea, his license was suspended for six months, and he was fined $495. In2010, Patel pled guilty to DWI in the North Brunswick Municipal Court.Because of the passage of more than ten years between the first and secondconvictions, Patel was sentenced as a first-time offender to serve twelve hoursat an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and fined $764. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) (providing that, for sentencing purposes, a second DWI conviction istreated as a first DWI conviction if more than ten years have passed betweenthe first and second offenses). Additionally, Patel received a three-monthlicense suspension. The two 2015 DWI charges exposed Patel to potential third and fourthDWI convictions. For a third and subsequent DWI conviction, Patel faced a180-day term of imprisonment, a ten-year license suspension, and significantfinancial and administrative penalties. Patel claimed that his 1994 convictionin the Piscataway Municipal Court was uncounseled and therefore could not beused for custodial enhancement purposes pursuant to Laurick, 120 N.J. at 4(holding that “a prior DWI conviction that was uncounseled in violation ofcourt policy may not be used to increase a defendant’s loss of liberty”). Thus,revealed that Patel’s blood alcohol content (BAC) measured at .13 percent and .12 percent. 5 for Laurick purposes, Patel contended that he stood before the TewksburyMunicipal Court as a second-time offender. In 2016, Patel filed a Laurick motion in the Piscataway Municipal Courtto bar the use of his allegedly uncounseled 1994 DWI guilty plea to enhanceany custodial sentence in the pending DWI cases in the Tewksbury MunicipalCourt. See R. 7:10-2(g)(1) (“A post-conviction petition to obtain relief froman enhanced custodial term based on a prior conviction shall be brought in thecourt where the prior conviction was entered.”). In support of his Laurickmotion, Patel filed two certifications in which he made the followingaverments. At the time of his 1994 DWI guilty plea, Patel was a twenty-eight-year-old recent immigrant from India, having moved to the United States fouryears earlier. He lived with his wife in an apartment, was unemployed, “andhad no money to . . . hire an attorney.” His wife paid the rent, and they “werebarely scraping by.” He appeared in the Piscataway Municipal Court withoutan attorney, and the municipal court judge did not advise him of his right toretain one. Patel did retain an attorney in 2010 to represent him on the DWIcharge in North Brunswick. In 2016, no documents remained in the Piscataway Municipal Court todisprove Patel’s certifications. In a handwritten note, the municipal courtadministrator advised that “[a]fter 15 years all DWI files are sent for 6 destruction. No transcripts are available.” Through counsel, Patel asserted tothe present Piscataway Municipal Court judge that in 1994, without the adviceof counsel, he “just assumed that he had to plead guilty” to the DWI charge. The court denied Patel’s Laurick motion. In doing so, it explained thatnot only had Patel failed to present a claim of innocence to the 1994 DWIcharge, but also that the State would suffer undue prejudice because of the ageof the case and the destruction of documents. The court added that thereremained several unknowns: whether Patel consulted with an attorney andwhether the 1994 municipal court judge advised him of his right to counsel. Patel filed a motion for reconsideration and a third certification to clarifyhis earlier certifications. He asserted that in 1994, “the Judge never advisedme that I had a right to retain an attorney nor did he advise me that I had aright to an appointed attorney at no charge. Therefore, I simply pled guilty.”Patel added, “Had I known that I could have had an attorney appointed for meat no charge I would have taken advantage of that option.” The court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that in theabsence of municipal court records, Patel’s certifications were insufficient toprove that he was denied notice of his right to counsel twenty-two years earlierand that, in any event, he should have filed his Laurick motion in 2010 whenhe was charged with his second DWI in North Brunswick. 7 B. Patel appealed to the Middlesex County, Law Division. In denying theappeal, the court stated that Patel was not entitled to relief because hiscertifications did not assert that he had a viable defense to the 1994 DWIcharge and because he did not establish that the outcome would have beendifferent if he had the benefit of counsel. C. In December 2016, Patel pled guilty in Tewksbury Municipal Court tothe Tewksbury DWI charge. The court sentenced Patel, as a third-timeoffender, to 180 days in the county jail, suspended his license for ten years,and imposed the requisite fines and administrative penalties. See N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3). The remaining charges, including the Hillsborough DWIcharge, were dismissed. The court stayed the custodial portion of the sentencepending Patel’s appeal. D. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the Law Division“correctly determined [that Patel] failed to sustain his burden of establishingentitlement to Laurick relief.” The court held that Patel had the obligation of“showing he had a defense to the DWI charge or in all likelihood the result 8 would have been different if he had counsel for his 1994 DWI proceeding,”citing State v. Schadewald, 400 N.J. Super. 350, 354-55 (App. Div. 2007). Itconcluded that Patel’s certifications were “bereft of any evidence”demonstrating “that the result of the 1994 DWI proceeding would have beendifferent if he had received proper notice of his right to counsel.” Havingrejected Patel’s appeal on that basis, the Appellate Division, relying on Rule7:10-2(g)(2)’s five-year bar, declined to address “whether [Patel’s]certifications [were] sufficient to establish he was indigent at the time of the1994 DWI proceeding, or whether [Patel] sufficiently demonstrated excusableneglect under Rule 7:10-2(b)(2) to permit the filing of his petition more thansixteen years after the Rule’s five-year time limit.” E. We granted Patel’s petition for certification. 235 N.J. 337 (2018). Wealso granted the New Jersey Attorney General’s motion to participate asamicus curiae. II. A. Patel contends that, under Laurick and Hrycak, a defendant challengingan enhanced custodial sentence to a DWI conviction based on a prioruncounseled DWI conviction, secured while he was indigent, need prove only 9 that he was not given notice of his right to counsel and to the assignment ofcounsel if unable to afford an attorney. He submits that an indigent defendantis not required to establish that “he had a defense to the DWI charge, and thatthe outcome would have in all likelihood been different,” citing Laurick andHrycak. Given the precedents of this Court, he argues that the decisions by theAppellate Division and Law Division in this case, and the Appellate Divisiondecisions in Schadewald, 400 N.J. Super. at 354-55, and State v. Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421, 435 (App. Div. 2008), are in error. Patel submits, moreover, that he had no reason to pursue a Laurickpetition in 2010 -- the time of his second DWI conviction -- because thepassage of more than ten years between his first and second DWI convictionsallowed him to be sentenced as a first-time offender. He also notes that by2010, the Piscataway Municipal Court’s records had already been destroyedpursuant to the judiciary’s retention policy. Last, he argues that the five-yeartime bar of Rule 7:10-2(g)(2) -- a rule adopted in 2009 -- should not applyretroactively to his uncounseled 1994 DWI conviction because Laurick,decided in 1990, placed no time constraints on relief from an impropersentence enhancement. B. 10 The State acknowledges that, under Laurick, the standard for obtainingrelief is less onerous for indigent defendants than non-indigent defendantsbecause the indigent defendant need only prove that he did not receive noticeof the right to assignment of counsel, he was not appointed assigned counsel,and he did not waive the right to counsel, citing Hrycak, 184 N.J. at 363.Nevertheless, the State maintains that Patel did not make a sufficient showingto the Piscataway Municipal Court that he was indigent when he entered his1994 guilty plea. The State points out that an “indigent defendant” entitled tothe representation by a municipal public defender is one who “does not havethe present financial ability to secure competent legal representation,” quoting N.J.S.A. 2B:24-2. According to the State, Patel’s claims of indigence were“self-serving, unsubstantiated, and conclusory” because he did not submitrelevant financial documents, such as “tax returns, unemployment records, andbank statements.” The State contends that the absence of adequate proof of indigencerequired Patel to satisfy the additional burden of showing that “his 1994 guiltyplea wrought a miscarriage of justice,” and that he failed to do so. In theState’s view, “[t]he police records demonstrate that even if [Patel] wererepresented by counsel, he still would have been found guilty of DWI.” 11 Last, the State argues that Patel failed to demonstrate excusable neglector some other justifiable reason for relaxing the five-year time bar of Rules7:10-2(g)(2) and (b)(2), and therefore he is foreclosed from attacking a twenty-two-year-old municipal court conviction. C. Disagreeing with both Patel and the State, the Attorney General claimsthat Laurick did not impose different requirements for relief for indigent andnon-indigent defendants. The Attorney General posits that Laurick“recognized that both indigent and non-indigent defendants must show that thelack of notice of their respective rights resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”(emphasis added). In the Attorney General’s view, relieving indigentdefendants but not non-indigent defendants of the requirement of showing amiscarriage of justice “would deprive non-indigent defendants of equalprotection of the law, and would thus be untenable.” Otherwise, the AttorneyGeneral concurs with the arguments advanced by the State that Patel is notentitled to Laurick relief. III. A. The parties and courts in this case have varied interpretations of thegoverning case law. We review issues of law de novo and owe no deference to 12 the interpretive conclusions of either the Appellate Division or Law Division.State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 55 (2018). Factual findingsmade by the trial court are entitled to deference provided they are supported by“sufficient credible evidence in the record.” Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242Franklin Ave., LLC, 215 N.J. 242, 253 (2013) (quoting Brunson v. AffinityFed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 397 (2009)). Only when those findings are“clearly mistaken” will we intervene in the interests of justice. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014)). B. The right to the assistance of counsel is guaranteed to all defendantscharged with DWI. State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 594 (2016); R. 7:3-2(a).Indigent defendants facing imprisonment or other consequences of magnitudeare also guaranteed the appointment of counsel without cost “as a matter ofsimple justice.” Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971); see also R.7:3-2(b). We granted that right to indigent defendants through “the exercise of[our] supervisory jurisdiction over procedures in New Jersey courts .” Laurick, 120 N.J. at 8 (citing Rodriguez, 58 N.J. at 294); see also N.J. Const. art. VI, §2, ¶ 3 (“The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration ofall courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in allsuch courts.”). In doing so, we recognized that “considerations of fairness 13 dictate that appropriate steps be taken to protect unrepresented indigentdefendants against injustices which may result from their inability to copefairly with municipal court charges against them.” Rodriguez, 58 N.J. at 294. Knowledge of one’s right to counsel is indispensable to the exercise ofthat right. For that reason, all municipal court judges must “inform thedefendant of the right to retain counsel or, if indigent, to have counsel assignedpursuant to [Rule 7:3-2(b)].” R. 7:3-2(a). The court also must ask thedefendant “whether legal representation is desired” and record the response“on the complaint.” Ibid. The assistance of counsel is essential to a fair proceeding in ouradversarial system of justice. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 , 147 (2006) (“[R]epresentation by counsel 'is critical to the ability of theadversarial system to produce just results.’” (quoting Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 685 (1984))). “[T]he untrained defendant is in noposition to defend himself . . . even where there are no complexities,”Rodriguez, 58 N.J. at 295, and “[w]ithout the guiding hand of counsel, aninnocent defendant may lose his freedom because he does not know how toestablish his innocence,” State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 16 (1980). Because of thesingular importance of the right to counsel, the denial of counsel is deemed astructural defect in the framework of the proceedings -- a defect that cannot be 14 quantitatively assessed and therefore defies a harmless error analysis.Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148-49; see also State v. Gonzalez, 114 N.J. 592,608 (1989) (holding on direct appeal that the defendant’s “conviction must bereversed . . . because the defendant was not adequately advised of his right tocounsel”). A defendant denied the right to counsel does not have to establishprejudice on direct appeal; prejudice is presumed. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148-49; see also State v. McCombs, 81 N.J. 373, 375 (1979). C. Defendants charged with DWI are guaranteed the right to counselbecause the penalties for a DWI conviction constitute consequences ofmagnitude. See Rodriguez, 58 N.J. at 295. Progressive penalties apply todefendants convicted of a second and subsequent DWI violation. See N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(1)-(3). A first-time offender is subject to a period of licensesuspension of up to a year depending in part on his BAC level, a potential termof imprisonment of thirty days, a fine between $250 and $500, and otherpenalties. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(1). A second-time offender is subject to aperiod of license suspension of two years, a term of imprisonment of two toninety days, a fine between $500 and $1000, and other penalties. N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(2). A third-time or subsequent offender is subject to a period oflicense suspension of ten years, a mandatory term of imprisonment of 180 days 15 (which may be lowered by as many as 90 days served in an inpatient drug oralcohol rehabilitation program), a fine of $1000, and other penalties. N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3). D. In light of our discussion of the importance of the right to counsel andthe severity of progressive DWI penalties, we turn to the central cases --Laurick and Hrycak -- that govern enhanced custodial sentences based on prioruncounseled convictions. In Laurick, the issue was whether a defendant convicted of a second orsubsequent DWI could have his sentence enhanced by an earlier uncounseledDWI conviction. 120 N.J. at 4. In that case, we provided a limited form ofpost-conviction relief to those defendants who had not waived their right tocounsel and who were not informed by the court of their right to retain counselor, if indigent, of their right to assigned counsel without cost. Id. at 4, 16. Weheld that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction could “not be used to increase adefendant’s loss of liberty.” Id. at 4. We made clear, however, that under thisspecial form of post-conviction relief there was no impediment to the use ofother collateral consequences of the uncounseled conviction, such as a periodof license suspension or financial penalties. Ibid. The remedy for those othercollateral consequences, we stated, “should follow our usual principles for 16 affording post-conviction relief” -- the “showing of a denial of fundamentaljustice or other miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 4-5. In Laurick, the defendant pled guilty to a second DWI in municipalcourt. Id. at 6. He claimed, however, that five years earlier, during theproceeding when he pled guilty to the first DWI, “he had been unrepresentedby counsel, unaware of his right to counsel, and uninformed of that right bythe previous judge.” Ibid. No proofs were presented to rebut defendant’sclaim that the earlier “court had failed to advise him of the right to appointedor retained counsel.” Ibid. We held that, on the record before us, thedefendant could only be sentenced to a custodial term as a first-time offenderbut was subject to all other collateral consequences as a second-time offender. 3 Id. at 17. 3 The 2007-2009 Report of the Municipal Court Practice Committee explained the distinction between Laurick collateral relief and traditional post-conviction relief: The nature of the relief sought in a Laurick application is qualitatively different than the relief sought in a conventional post-conviction relief proceeding. In the latter category of applications, the relief sought is a vacating of the conviction. In a Laurick application, the conviction is left in place, however it may not be used to enhance the custodial component of a sentence related to a future conviction for a violation of the same statute. 17 In reaching that determination, the Court set different standards of prooffor indigent and non-indigent DWI defendants who sought to bar the use of theprior uncounseled DWI conviction for custodial sentence enhancementpurposes. See id. at 11. The indigent defendant need only show that hisearlier DWI guilty plea “was a product of an absence of notice of the right toassignment of counsel and non-assignment of such counsel without waiver.”Ibid. In contrast, the non-indigent defendant must show “lack of notice as wellas the absence of knowledge of the right to be represented by counsel of one’schoosing” and “show in addition that the lack of notice otherwise affected theoutcome.” Id. at 11, 17. The Court did not explain its reasons for placing ahigher burden on non-indigent defendants. Importantly, going forward, to ensure that evidence of right-to-counselnotices would be retained by municipal courts, the Court directed that “thehard-copy judgment of conviction in DWI cases should contain a notation bythe municipal court that the Rodriguez notice has been given and counselwaived.” Id. at 12. The Court, moreover, indicated that the “notation will [Mun. Ct. Practice Comm., 2007-2 009 Report 27 (2009).]In Laurick, we did not bar the defendant from seeking full post-conviction relief from the court of original jurisdiction in the earlier DWI case. 120 N.J. at 17. 18 have presumptive correctness.”4 Ibid. Last, the Court noted that “post-conviction relief from the effect of prior convictions should normally besought in the court of original jurisdiction.” Id. at 17. The right-to-counsel principles articulated in Laurick were essentiallygrounded in state law, particularly the landmark decision in Rodriguez. Id. at7-8. We discoursed, however, on the plurality decision in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), in which four members of the United States SupremeCourt held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used toenhance punishment by “convert[ing] a subsequent misdemeanor into a felonywith a prison term.” Laurick, 120 N.J. at 14 (alteration in original) (quotingBaldasar, 446 U.S. at 222 (1980)). We expressed “genuine doubt” about thefuture course that the United States Supreme Court might take in this area, butdecided to adopt the “core value” of the Baldasar plurality opinion -- “that anuncounseled conviction without waiver of the right to counsel is invalid for thepurpose of increasing a defendant’s loss of liberty.” Id. at 16. In Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), the United StatesSupreme Court overruled the plurality opinion in Baldasar and “held that an4 The Court also expressed hope that, in the future, the judiciary’s computerized records would “permit storage of daily docket information for longer periods of time without space or storage problems” and that those records could be readily retrieved. Ibid. 19 uncounseled prior conviction 'may be relied upon to enhance the sentence fora subsequent offense, even though that sentence entails imprisonment.’” SeeHrycak, 184 N.J. at 354 (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746-47). In light of theNichols decision, we granted certification in Hrycak “to reconsider ourdecision in Laurick.” Ibid. In Hrycak, we “reaffirm[ed] our holding in Laurick that an uncounseledDWI conviction may not be used to enhance the period of incarceration for asubsequent offense.” Ibid. (citing Laurick, 120 N.J. at 16). We explained that-- “wholly apart from the rationale in Baldasar” -- our decision in Laurickrelied on Rodriguez, which “emphasized our long held view that criminaldefendants have a right to counsel.” Id. at 360 (citing Rodriguez, 58 N.J. at 285). We restated the Laurick formula in Hrycak and again set differentstandards for indigent and non-indigent defendants when determining whetherprior uncounseled DWI convictions could be used for custodial sentenceenhancement purposes. Id. at 363. According to Hrycak, the threshold issuefor both indigent and non-indigent defendants is whether they satisfied theirburden of proving that they were not advised of their right to counsel in theprior DWI proceeding. Ibid. The defendant who was indigent at the time ofthe prior proceeding must establish that the uncounseled “DWI conviction was 20 a product of an absence of notice of the right to assignment of counsel andnon-assignment of such counsel without waiver.” Ibid. (quoting Laurick, 120 N.J. at 11). In contrast, the defendant who was non-indigent must show notonly that his prior uncounseled DWI conviction was based on a “lack of noticeas well as the absence of knowledge of the right to be represented by counselof one’s choosing,” but also “that the absence of such counsel had an impacton the guilt or innocence of the accused or otherwise 'wrought a miscarriageof justice for the individual defendant.’” Ibid. (quoting Laurick, 120 N.J. at 11). E. In Schadewald, the Appellate Division altered the tests for indigent andnon-indigent defendants challenging prior uncounseled DWI convictionsarticulated in Laurick and Hrycak. See 400 N.J. Super. at 354-55. In thatcase, the Appellate Division held that both indigent and non-indigentdefendants must “demonstrate that if they had been represented by counsel,they had a defense to the DWI charge and the outcome would, in alllikelihood, have been different.” Id. at 354; accord Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super.at 435. To prove “that the outcome would have been different if the defendanthad the benefit of counsel before pleading guilty,” the Appellate Divisionsuggested that the defendant could submit “[p]olice reports, witness 21 statements, insurance investigations and the like.” Schadewald, 400 N.J.Super. at 354-55. The Appellate Division in this case followed theSchadewald paradigm. Schadewald treats equally two classes of similarly situated defendants.That being said, Schadewald is in clear conflict with the holdings in bothLaurick and Hrycak. The Attorney General has questioned whether treating indigentdefendants differently from non-indigent defendants raises equal protectionconcerns. That is a legitimate question when there is no justifiable basis forthe different classifications. The Attorney General urges us to followSchadewald. But Schadewald arguably imposes an unduly burdensomestandard by requiring that indigent and non-indigent defendants prove that theoutcome would have been different had they been represented by counsel. As discussed earlier, the denial of counsel -- here the denial of theopportunity to retain counsel or secure appointed counsel -- is a structuraldefect in the proceedings, not quantifiable by any traditional measurement andtherefore not typically susceptible to a harmless-error analysis. The role ofcounsel is to ensure the reliability of the proceedings and a just outcome . SeeHrycak, 184 N.J. at 363 (“We are convinced that a prior uncounseled DWIconviction of an indigent is not sufficiently reliable to permit increased jail 22 sanctions under the enhancement statute.”); see also State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 541 (2011) (“Where a defendant in practice has been denied the right tobe represented by counsel . . . we can have no confidence in the uncounseledproceedings below.”). Additionally, attempting to determine whether the defendant could havepresented a viable defense had he been represented by counsel cannot bediscerned merely by reviewing police reports or witness statements. In thetypical DWI case, an attorney will consider whether the police officer hadreasonable suspicion to conduct the motor vehicle stop, see State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 210-11 (2008); whether the officer had probable cause to obtaina breath sample, see State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 79 (2008); whether thebreathalyzer result was reliable, see State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 384-85(2015); and whether a video or audio recording of the stop differs from theofficer’s police report, see Stein, 225 N.J. at 596. What defense might have been mounted had Patel been represented in1994 is a matter of sheer speculation at this point. Our jurisprudence,however, tells us that the assistance of counsel is vital to an adversarialproceeding and the reliability of the outcome. See Hayes, 205 N.J. at 541;Hrycak, 184 N.J. at 363. 23 For these reasons, when notice of the right to counsel is not given inDWI cases, to obtain the special form of relief recognized in Laurick, neitherindigent nor non-indigent defendants should be required to establish that theoutcome of the proceeding would have been different had they been given theopportunity to retain counsel or secure appointed counsel. IV. A. We now clarify the standard for indigent and non-indigent defendantswho challenge a custodial enhancement from a prior uncounseled DWIconviction. A defendant who was non-indigent at the time of the earlieruncounseled DWI proceeding must establish that (1) he was not advised or didnot know of his right to counsel and (2) had he known of his right to counsel,he would have retained a lawyer. A defendant contending he was indigent inthe earlier uncounseled DWI proceeding must establish that (1) he was notadvised and did not know of his right to appointed counsel, (2) he was entitledto the appointment of counsel under the applicable financial means test, R. 7:3-2(b), and (3) had he been properly informed of his rights, he would haveaccepted appointed counsel. The defendant has the burden of proving that his prior uncounseled DWIconviction was based on the municipal court’s failure to advise him of his rig ht 24 to counsel. If municipal courts retain the records mandated by our rules andjurisprudence, determining whether there was compliance with the noticerequirements should not be difficult. See R. 7:3-2(a) (“The defendant shall bespecifically asked whether legal representation is desired and defendant’sresponse shall be recorded on the complaint.”); Laurick, 120 N.J. at 12 (“[T]hehard-copy judgment of conviction in DWI cases should contain a notation bythe municipal court that the Rodriguez notice has been given and counselwaived.”). The defendant must secure the relevant court documents or theelectronic recording or transcript of the proceeding to establish a violation ofthe notice requirement. In the absence of documentary evidence or witnesseswith a recollection, the defendant is in a position to do no more than file anaffidavit or certification averring that he was not advised of his right tocounsel and did not know that he could retain counsel. The defendant whoclaims he was indigent at the time of the prior proceeding should attest that hewas not advised and did not know of his right to appointed counsel, and wasunable to afford an attorney. In future cases, he also should attach to hisaffidavit or certification relevant documents -- bank statements or otherfinancial documents that would establish his indigence in accordance with thestandards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-14 and N.J.S.A. 2B:24-9. 25 B. In the present case, the Piscataway Municipal Court has indicated that norecord remains of whether Patel’s 1994 DWI guilty plea was uncounseled orwhether Patel was given notice of his right to counsel and, if indigent, the rightto appointed counsel. Patel filed three certifications in the PiscatawayMunicipal Court in support of his application to bar the use of his 1994 DWIconviction to enhance his custodial term. He attested that the court neveradvised him of his right to retain an attorney or, if indigent, his right to anappointed attorney at no charge; that had he known that he had the right to anappointed attorney, he “would have taken advantage of that option”; that at thetime he appeared in court he was unemployed, “barely scraping by,” and hadno money to hire a lawyer; and that he entered his guilty plea without theassistance of counsel. Patel has made clear in his certifications that had he been advised of hisright to counsel, he would have sought the assistance of counsel -- preferablyappointed counsel -- and, if he had resources, retained counsel. Patel’sassertions -- like those of the defendant in Laurick -- have gone unrebutted.See Laurick, 120 N.J. at 6. Patel has satisfied his burden of showing that hisprior uncounseled DWI conviction was caused by the municipal court’s failureto advise him of his right to counsel. 26 Still, Patel must vault the five-year time bar imposed by Rules 7:10-2(g)(2) and (b)(2) for a “Petition to Obtain Relief from an Enhanced CustodialTerm Based on a Prior Conviction.” See R. 7:10-2(g). V. Our current court rules provide that a petition for Laurick relief “shallnot be accepted for filing more than five years after entry of the judgment ofconviction or imposition of the sentence sought to be attacked, unless it allegesfacts showing that the delay in filing was due to defendant’s excusableneglect.” R. 7:10-2(g)(2); R. 7:10-2(b)(2). In the present case, Patel submits that he sought relief from his prioruncounseled conviction at the only time that it made sense to do so. WhenPatel pled guilty to DWI in 2010 in the North Brunswick Municipal Court -- asecond DWI conviction -- he was sentenced as a first-time offender becausehis first DWI conviction occurred more than ten years earlier. See N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a). Patel would not have received any benefit then by challenging his1994 uncounseled conviction in the Piscataway Municipal Court. Even ifsuccessful, he still would have been sentenced as a first-time offender in theNorth Brunswick Municipal Court. Indeed, the Piscataway Municipal Courtmight have wondered why Patel was wasting his time and the court’s resourcesby bringing a meaningless challenge. Additionally, had Patel sought 27 information about his uncounseled conviction, he probably would have learnedthat relevant information had already had been purged from the municipalcourt records due to the judiciary’s retention policy. See State of New JerseyJudiciary, Recs. Retention Schedule (Mar. 16, 2001). In short, Patel filed his petition for Laurick relief when it mattered andtherefore any “delay” should be deemed excusable. Bringhurst supports this point. There the Appellate Division observedthat “given the nature of a Laurick petition, a defendant may routinelydemonstrate that any petition filed beyond the five-year limit was not theproduct of neglect or some other disqualifying reason, and thus, should not beautomatically time-barred.” 401 N.J. Super. at 424. As the Bringhurst courtrecognized, “[t]he fact that a prior DWI conviction may have beenuncounseled would, in and of itself, be of no moment unless and until therewas a subsequent DWI conviction.” Id. at 432-33. It reasoned that because “asecond or subsequent [DWI] conviction may occur at any time in the future, itwould be illogical to apply the Rule’s five-year time limit mechanistically todeny all [Laurick] applications.” Id. at 433. The Appellate Divisionconcluded that it could “discern no reason why the Supreme Court would haveexplicitly recognized the Laurick-styled PCR petition on the one hand, and at 28 the same time deny its relief where 'the extent and cause of the delay’ was notoccasioned by the defendant.” Ibid. Importantly, the Bringhurst court referenced the 2004-2007 Report ofthe Supreme Court’s Committee on Municipal Court Practice, whichrecommended a rule that would have allowed a Laurick petition to be filed atany time. Id. at 430. In its 2007-2009 Report, the Municipal Court Practice Committee againrecommended a rule without a five-year time limit for Laurick petitions, citingBringhurst. Mun. Ct. Practice Comm., 2007-2 009 Report 27 (2009). As theCommittee explained, a defendant has “no grounds for filing [a Laurick]petition . . . unless or until [he] has been arrested for a [second or subsequent]violation of the [DWI] statute.” Ibid. We are persuaded that there is wisdom to the previous recommendationsof the Municipal Court Practice Committee, as well as the reasoning ofBringhurst, for the removal of the five-year limitation on Laurick petitions.We therefore accept the recommendation in the Committee’s 2007-2009Report for a rule eliminating any time limitation for filing a Laurick petition.We adopt the language originally proposed by the Committee and now amendin part Rule 7:10-2(g) to provide the following: “(2) Time Limitations. Apetition seeking relief under this Rule may be filed at any time.” Typically, 29 we would refer a proposed rule change to the appropriate Court committee.State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 74 (2017). Here, however, the MunicipalCourt Practice Committee has twice recommended this rule change, andtherefore a referral is unnecessary. Accordingly, our adoption of the new ruleis effective immediately pursuant to “the Court’s authority under Article VI,Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution to make rules that govern theadministration of the court system.” See ibid. To be clear, a defendant who seeks traditional post-conviction relief tovacate a DWI conviction -- as opposed to Laurick relief -- must abide by thegeneral principles governing post-conviction relief and the five-year time barin the absence of excusable neglect. R. 7:10-2(b)(2). The five-year time bar isappropriate for traditional post-conviction relief because, if a defendantreasonably believes that he has been wrongly convicted as a result of thedenial of counsel, he should challenge that conviction as early as possiblerather than sit on his rights “until it is too late for a court to render justice.”See State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 576 (1992). As we have explained, courts“should consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State,and the importance of the petitioner’s claim in determining whether there hasbeen an 'injustice’ sufficient to relax the time limits.” State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492 (2004) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997)). 30 VI. In summary, when facing a second or subsequent DWI conviction, anindigent or non-indigent defendant may file a petition for post-convictionrelief to bar the use of a prior uncounseled DWI conviction as a predicateconviction for increasing a term of incarceration. This form of post-convictionrelief does not prohibit the imposition of enhanced financial or administrativepenalties, such as a period of license suspension. By “uncounseled” we meanan unrepresented defendant who was not advised by the municipal court of hisright to retain counsel or, if indigent, of his right to appointed counsel withoutcost; who otherwise did not know of his right to counsel in the proceeding anddid not waive that right; and who, if properly advised of his rights, would havesecured counsel or accepted appointed counsel. The defendant has the burdenof proving he was uncounseled, but is not required to establish that theoutcome would have been different had he been represented. Although his certifications were far from ideal, Patel carried his burdenof presenting sufficient proof -- unrebutted by the State -- that his 1994 guiltyplea was uncounseled, whether he was indigent or non-indigent. Patel had noobligation to establish that he would not have pled guilty or been convicted attrial had he been represented by counsel. 31 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division andremand this matter to the Tewksbury Municipal Court for proceedingsconsistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 32