Title: State v. Haug
Citation: 237 Kan. 390, 699 P.2d 535
Docket Number: 57,394
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 1985

237 Kan. 390 (1985)
699 P.2d 535
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant
v.
LEROY C. HAUG, Appellee.
No. 57,394

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 10, 1985.
Gene M. Olander, district attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, and C. William Ossmann, assistant district attorney, were with him on the brief for appellant.
No appearance by appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of expungement issued by the district court in connection with criminal charges dismissed following defendant's successful completion of a diversion agreement. The State brings this appeal as a question reserved by the prosecution under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3). The defendant has made no appearance and no brief was filed on his behalf.
On May 28, 1980, defendant Leroy C. Haug was charged with selling liquor without a license in violation of K.S.A. 41-901. Haug entered into a one-year diversion agreement (K.S.A. 22-2907) with the district attorney which he successfully completed and the complaint was dismissed July 9, 1981. On June 22, 1983, Haug filed with the district court a motion requesting an order sealing and expunging all proceedings and records in the matter *391 including, but not limited to, the arrest record, complaint, and the diversion agreement. At a hearing on the motion the sole issue was whether the court was empowered to "expunge a diversion." Defense counsel contended such an order was permissible under K.S.A. 21-4619 (which allows persons convicted of a crime to have their convictions expunged after meeting certain criteria) because otherwise, an accused person who successfully completed a diversion agreement would be in a worse position than convicted misdemeanants and felons. The State responded the language of 21-4619 was clear and that, absent a conviction, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain Haug's motion. The district court judge expressed his opinion that under principles of equity and logic, the authority to expunge the records of a convicted person included the ability to expunge the records of an accused who successfully completed a diversion agreement. The court granted the motion to expunge the records, stating that it was acting both under the provisions of K.S.A. 21-4619 and the court's inherent powers. In its order of expungement the court stated:
Nowhere in K.S.A. 21-4619 is there any reference to the expungement of anything other than records of convictions. The statute is clear and unambiguous in this regard and is not open to construction or speculation as to the legislative intent behind it. It has long been the rule in Kansas that in determining whether a statute is open to construction, or in construing a statute, ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning and courts are not justified in disregarding the unambiguous language. State v. Gibson, 8 Kan. App.2d 135, 137, 651 P.2d 949 (1982); State v. *392 Howard, 221 Kan. 51, 54, 557 P.2d 1280 (1976). Even a penal statute subject to strict construction should not be read so as to add that which is not readily found therein, or to read out what, as a matter of ordinary language, is in it. State v. Logan, 198 Kan. 211, 213, 424 P.2d 565 (1967). In 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 194, it is stated:
We conclude that in view of the clear wording of the statute, records of diversion pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2907 are not within the purview of K.S.A. 21-4619, which applies only to convictions.
The trial court also ruled that it had the equitable and inherent power to expunge the records of the defendant. We do not agree. In Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan. 450, 548 P.2d 1223 (1976), the plaintiff, in an action against the City of Olathe, Kansas, and one of its police officers, sought damages for alleged libelous statements in a police arrest report and correction or expungement of the statements. In Bradford we stated:
In the instant case we are not faced with such extreme circumstances that the intervention of the courts is necessary or justified to protect basic legal rights. The trial court exceeded its authority in ordering the records expunged.
*393 We recognize there are substantial philosophical arguments supporting the position of the defendant and that perhaps expungement of diversion records would serve a valid public purpose. However, that decision must be left to the legislature which has not, as yet, authorized such action.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to set aside the order of expungement.