Title: McGehee v. Edwards
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031595
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2004

Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM CHARLES MCGEHEE, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 031595     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 10, 2004 
H. ROBERT EDWARDS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARKE COUNTY 
John R. Prosser, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the term "direct 
lineal descendants" used in certain inter vivos trusts created 
prior to 1978 includes adopted persons. 
In 1929, 1930, and 1931, the seven children of Dr. and 
Mrs. Montfort Jones established eleven inter vivos trusts (the 
Jones Family Trusts).  Each trust created a class of 
beneficiaries described as "direct lineal descendants" of 
either the grantor's parents, the grantor's brothers and 
sisters, or the named sons of the grantor.  There are 
presently approximately 142 beneficiaries of the Jones Family 
Trusts. 
 
On January 11, 2000, H. Robert Edwards and E. E. Laird, 
Jr., the Trustees of the Jones Family Trusts (Trustees), filed 
a bill of complaint requesting that the trial court 
"adjudicate who are, or may be direct lineal descendants under 
each of the above Trusts and specifically whether children 
born out of wedlock constitute direct lineal descendants."  
Defendant-beneficiary Amy P. Davis filed an answer which 
included a request that the court decide whether "direct 
 
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lineal descendants" includes children of direct lineal 
descendants who are legally adopted by direct lineal 
descendants or born to them through "assisted conception" as 
defined in Code § 20-156. 
 
The trial court appointed guardians ad litem for persons 
adopted by lineal descendants, persons born out of wedlock to 
lineal descendants, persons born to lineal descendants through 
assisted conception, and legitimate minor beneficiaries and 
parties unknown.  Davis and the guardians ad litem filed 
memoranda of law addressing one or more aspects of the 
following question:  whether "direct lineal descendants" 
includes illegitimate children, adopted children, or children 
born by means of "assisted conception" as defined in Code 
§ 20-156 et seq.  No other beneficiaries filed answers to the 
bill of complaint, but various beneficiaries, including two of 
the appellants here, filed letters with the court expressing 
their position on the meaning of "direct lineal descendants." 
After considering the pleadings, memoranda, and the 
arguments of counsel and the guardians ad litem, the trial 
court ruled that the term "direct lineal descendants" in the 
Jones Family Trusts included, inter alia, persons legally 
adopted by any direct lineal descendant of an individual 
referred to in the subject trusts. 
 
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Thereafter, six defendant-beneficiaries – Donald B. 
McGehee; Virginia E. McGehee Friend; Harry M. McMillan, 
individually and as guardian for William M. McMillan, an 
incapacitated person; Fitzhugh L. J. Jackson; Bernard B. 
Jones, III; and William C. McGehee (collectively "McGehee") − 
jointly filed a "motion for further consideration" by the 
trial court.  The trial court heard arguments on McGehee's 
motion and issued an order on April 8, 2003 denying further 
consideration and restating the conclusions of its prior 
ruling.  We granted McGehee this appeal. 
I. 
 
Initially, we address McGehee's assertion that the trial 
court's jurisdiction was limited to consideration of whether 
the trusts included children born out of wedlock.  Davis 
raised the issue of adopted children in her answer but did not 
serve her answer on the other defendants or otherwise put them 
on notice of this issue.  McGehee argues that the failure to 
put all defendants on notice deprived these defendants of 
their opportunity to be heard on the issue and prevented the 
trial court from acquiring "in rem jurisdiction of the adopted 
person issue." 
After reviewing the pleadings, we conclude that the trial 
court had jurisdiction to consider the issue of adopted 
children.  The Trustees' pleadings asked the trial court to 
 
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determine "who are . . . or may be direct lineal descendants" 
under the trusts.  Although the pleadings referred to a single 
category of potential beneficiaries, answering the question, 
"who are . . . or may be direct lineal descendants" requires 
the determination of the status of more than just that single 
category and therefore did not limit the trial court's 
determination to that category alone. 
II. 
We now turn to the substantive issue in this appeal:  
whether the trial court erred in finding that adopted persons 
constitute "direct lineal descendants" under the Jones Family 
Trusts. 
We construe the language in inter vivos trusts to 
effectuate the intent of the grantors in light of the 
surrounding circumstances.  NationsBank v. Grandy, 248 Va. 
557, 561, 450 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1994); Horne v. Horne, 181 Va. 
685, 691, 26 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1943); Mills v. Embrey, 166 Va. 
383, 385, 186 S.E. 47, 48 (1936).  As the trial court noted, 
the Jones Family Trusts contain no exclusionary language 
regarding the phrase "direct lineal descendant," and the 
parties introduced no evidence concerning the grantors' intent 
in using that phrase. 
The trial court stated that its decision was guided by a 
presumption purportedly adopted by other jurisdictions that, 
 
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if beneficiaries in a class are to be identified over a period 
of time, the grantor intends that changes in the law 
subsequent to the execution of the trust be grafted onto 
provisions in the trust.  See Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed, 318 
S.W.2d 289, 297-99 (Mo. 1958), Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust 
Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 500-01 (W.Va. 1977).  Because 
the relevant law in Virginia has evolved since the time the 
Jones Family Trusts were executed and Code § 64.1-71.1 now 
provides that adopted children are presumptively included in 
the terms "descendants" or "issue," the trial court concluded 
that the term "direct lineal descendants" in the Jones Family 
Trusts includes adopted persons. 
We disagree with the trial court.  The presumption of a 
grantor's intent that the trial court adopted has not been 
previously considered in this jurisdiction with regard to 
construction of trust language.  Such a presumption, however, 
clearly does not apply when construing language in a will.  We 
construe the language in a will as if the testator executed it 
immediately before death unless the will shows a contrary 
intent.  Code § 64.1-62; Yancey v. Scales, 244 Va. 300, 303, 
421 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1992); Wildberger v. Cheek, 94 Va. 517, 
520, 27 S.E. 441, 442 (1897).  Construing wills in this 
fashion recognizes that the interests of beneficiaries accrue 
at the testator's death and protects those interests. 
 
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Consistent with the rule of construction of wills, unless 
the language shows a contrary intent, the language of an inter 
vivos trust should be construed according to the law in effect 
at the time the trust is executed.  Such a rule recognizes 
that the interests of the trust beneficiaries accrue when the 
trust is executed and protects those interests.  Such a rule 
is also compelled by Code § 1-16, which mandates that "[n]o 
new law shall be construed . . . in any way whatever to affect 
. . . any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law 
takes effect."  Accordingly, because the Jones Family Trusts 
exhibit no contrary intent, we will construe the phrase 
"direct lineal descendants" consistent with the law in effect 
at the time of the execution of the trusts. 
 
At common law, adopted persons were not included within 
the term "issue," because that term was limited to the 
"natural descendants of a common ancestor," Munday v. Munday, 
164 Va. 145, 150, 178 S.E. 917, 919, (1935), was synonymous 
with lineal descendant, and connoted a "common blood stream."  
Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409, 415, 38 S.E.2d 433, 435 
(1946). 
Although the Jones Family Trusts use the phrase "direct 
lineal descendant" rather than "issue," nothing in that phrase 
suggests a meaning other than "descendants" or "issue," that 
is, those who are the natural descendants of a common ancestor 
 
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or who share a common blood stream.  Under the common law, 
then, the grantor did not include adopted persons in the 
phrase "direct lineal descendants" unless such intent is clear 
from other parts of the document.  See Langhorne v. Langhorne, 
212 Va. 577, 578, 186 S.E.2d 50, 51 (1972). 
The General Assembly abrogated the common law when it 
enacted Code § 64.1-71.1.  That statute presumptively includes 
adopted persons in the terms "issue" and "descendants" when 
used in wills and trusts.  By its own terms, however, Code 
§ 64.1-71.1 does not apply to trusts executed before 1978.  
Thus, the statute does not alter the conclusion that, at the 
time of the creation of the Jones Family Trusts, the phrase 
"direct lineal descendants" did not include adopted persons.
 
The guardian ad litem argues,1 however, that at the time 
the Jones Family Trusts were executed, former Code § 5533 
placed adoptees in parity with natural descendants and that, 
absent specific limiting language in the Trusts, adoptees are 
entitled to the same rights as other direct lineal 
descendants.2  This argument was explicitly rejected in 1935.  
                     
1 The guardian ad litem for persons adopted by lineal 
descendants was the only appellee that filed a brief in this 
Court. 
2 Former Code § 5533 provided that an adopted child was 
"to all intents and purposes, the child and heir at law of the 
person so adopting him or her, . . . entitled to all the 
rights, and privileges . . . of a child of such person 
begotten in lawful wedlock."  Code § 5333 (1924)(The 1930 Code 
carried forward the language from the Code of 1924.  The 
 
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Despite the language of former Code § 5333, "an adopted child 
does not inherit from the ancestor of the adopting parent. 
. . .  The only right of inheritance acquired by an adopted 
child . . . is that statutory right to inherit from its 
adopting parent."  Munday, 164 Va. at 149, 178 S.E. at 918-19.  
See also Fletcher, 185 Va. at 414, 38 S.E.2d at 435. While 
former Code § 5333 may have granted an adopted child certain 
rights of inheritance as an "heir at law" of his or her 
adoptive parent, it did not grant that child the status of a 
"descendant" or "issue." 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse that portion 
of the trial court's decree holding that "direct lineal 
descendants" as used in the Jones Family Trusts included 
adopted children. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN joins, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with Part II of the majority opinion and that the 
trial court’s decree should be reversed.  However, I write 
separately because I conclude the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to address whether adopted children are members 
of the class of beneficiaries and would reverse on those 
                                                                
current version of this provision is found in Code § 63.2-
1215.). 
 
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grounds.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part I of the 
majority opinion. 
[A] general prayer will support relief only for 
those matters placed in controversy by the 
pleadings and, thus, any relief granted must be 
supported by allegations of material facts in 
the pleadings that will sustain such relief. 
This rule reflects the principle that although 
the power of an equity court is broad, that 
power does not permit a court to adjudicate 
claims that the parties have not asserted. 
 
Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., L.P., 266 Va. 39, 44-45, 581 
S.E.2d 510, 513 (2003) (citations omitted). 
The Trustees’ bill of complaint exclusively pleads that a 
“question” had “arisen as to whether children who were born 
out of wedlock to the direct lineal descendants . . . also 
constitute direct lineal descendants within the classification 
of the beneficiaries of each of the respective Trusts.”*  The 
Trustees then specifically and solely “petition this Court for 
advice and direction as to whether the children born out of 
wedlock shall be encompassed in that class of beneficiaries 
known as the ‘direct lineal descendants’ of each of the 
respective Trusts.”  No issue regarding adoption is pled, 
mentioned or implied in the bill of complaint and the order of 
                     
* Neither McGehee, or any party below, objected to the 
trial court’s adjudication concerning the rights of children 
born to direct lineal descendants through “assisted 
conception.”  I therefore do not address an issue not raised 
by the parties. 
 
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publication contained no mention of adoption as a possible 
matter for adjudication by the trial court. 
It is clear from the bill of complaint that no assertion 
was made regarding the status of adopted children.  
Accordingly, the generic and general terms of the prayer for 
relief within the bill of complaint cannot and do not open the 
door for matters not otherwise pled, such as the status of 
adopted children.  Id. 
If a defendant-beneficiary wished to pursue an 
adjudication of the status of adopted children under the 
Trusts, chancery procedure required it be raised by cross-bill 
under Rule 2:13 or 2:14, or in a separate action.  The fact 
that Davis raised the issue of adoption in her answer does not 
confer jurisdiction upon the trial court to adjudicate that 
issue unless the trial court enters an order treating the 
answer as a cross-bill and requiring compliance with Rules 
2:13 and 2:14.  Shevel's, Inc. v. Southeastern Assocs., Inc., 
228 Va. 175, 184, 320 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1984).  No such order 
was entered in this case. 
For these reasons, I would hold the trial court did not 
acquire jurisdiction to consider whether children adopted by 
direct lineal descendants are included as beneficiaries under 
the Trusts and I would reverse the trial court’s judgment on 
that basis.