Title: People v. Gonzalez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S163643
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FRANK CHRISTOPHER GONZALEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S163643 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
NA071779 
 
 
December 2, 2021 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
S163643 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
A jury found defendant Frank Christopher Gonzalez 
guilty of first degree murder and attempted second degree 
robbery.  (See Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), former §§ 189, 211, 
664.)1  The jury also found true a robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation and an allegation that defendant 
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in committing 
the murder.  (Former §§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 12022.53, subds. 
(b), (c), (d).)  At the penalty phase, the jury returned a death 
verdict, and the trial court entered a judgment of death.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, 
subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. The shooting and initial investigation 
At around 6:00 a.m. on March 28, 2006, Genaro Huizar 
arrived at his home on Eucalyptus Avenue in Long Beach.  After 
parking his car, he observed two men on bicycles ride past him.  
One of the bicycles looked like a “10-speed”; the other bike was 
smaller.  Huizar continued walking and entered his home.  
Moments later he heard between three and five gunshots.     
 
1  
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are 
to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
At around 5:45 a.m. that same day, two men were 
delivering newspapers on Eucalyptus Avenue when they came 
upon a woman lying motionless on the ground lying in front of a 
car with its trunk open.  They attempted to perform CPR on the 
woman, later identified as Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department Deputy Maria Rosa, and called 911.        
Officer Rosa lived in a house on Eucalyptus Avenue with 
her partner, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Detective 
Jenny Martin, and Martin’s nephew.  On the morning of the 
shooting, Martin was awakened by her nephew, who told her 
Rosa was “on the floor outside.”  Martin saw Rosa lying on the 
ground outside the house and called 911.   
Long Beach Police Department Officer Robert Davenport 
responded to the 911 calls.  When Davenport arrived at the 
scene he saw a red BMX-style bicycle near Rosa’s body, which 
appeared to have a gunshot wound.  The body was lying in a 
driveway near a car with its trunk open.  Davenport looked 
inside the trunk and saw several items including a gun, boots 
and a purse.  The purse was partially open.   
Long Beach Police Department Detectives Patrick O’Dowd 
and Bryan McMahon inspected the trunk, which contained a 
black gym bag with a nine-millimeter Heckler and Koch 
handgun next to it, along with a purse and a wallet.  The keys 
to the car were in the keyhole of the trunk.  They also found 
Rosa’s police badge, which was closed, and a firearm holster.  
Detective McMahon testified that the gun had a live round 
jammed into it that obstructed the chamber.  He believed that 
the gun was jammed due to someone having tried to get a round 
into the chamber.  Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
Firearms Identification Expert Edmund Anderson agreed that 
the gun had malfunctioned, jammed, and failed to fire.   
Los Angeles County Medical Examiner Paul Gliniecki 
conducted an autopsy the day after the murder.  He identified 
two gunshot wounds, one to Rosa’s upper right shoulder and a 
fatal wound to her left side abdomen.  Both bullets were .22-
caliber munitions.  Gliniecki concluded that Rosa had died from 
internal bleeding caused by the gunshots.  
Long Beach Police Department Detective David Rios 
secured surveillance video from a Bank of America located near 
the shooting and reviewed footage that had been captured 
between 4:00 and 7:00 a.m. on the day of the murder.  The video 
showed two men riding on bicycles between 5:25 and 5:30 a.m.  
Rios generated still images of the two men, which he turned over 
to investigating officers.  Detective O’Dowd used the images in 
a flier offering a reward for information about the suspects.   
2. The DNA evidence 
Kari Yoshida, a criminalist for the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department, was able to generate a DNA profile from 
samples obtained from the handlebar of the bicycle found at the 
scene of the crime.  The profile was entered into the “Combined 
DNA Index System (CODIS), a nationwide database that 
enables law enforcement to search DNA profiles collected from 
federal, state, and local collection programs.”  (People v. Buza 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 666.)   
In July of 2006, the California Department of Justice 
informed personnel investigating Rosa’s murder that Gonzalez 
was a potential match.  Yoshida’s colleague, Juli Watkins, 
obtained reference samples from Gonzalez and generated a DNA 
profile.  She then compared his profile to the profile Yoshida had 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
generated from the bicycle and concluded Gonzalez was a 
possible contributor.   
At trial, Watkins testified about her and Yoshida’s DNA 
analysis.  She further testified that Gonzalez could not be ruled 
out as a possible contributor to the sample found on the bike. 
Using a conservative estimate, she testified there was a one in 
one billion chance that a random person would share the same 
DNA typing with the sample found on the handlebar.  
3. Undercover operation targeting Gonzalez and Justin 
Flint  
Based on the DNA evidence and information obtained by 
confidential informants, law enforcement personnel began to 
focus their  investigation on Gonzalez and a man named Justin 
Flint.  Detective O’Dowd aided the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department in conducting an undercover operation involving 
the two suspects, who were both incarcerated on charges 
unrelated to Rosa’s shooting.  As part of the operation, a bus 
outfitted with recording devices picked up Gonzalez and Flint at 
their respective prisons along with two groups of undercover 
officers posing as inmates, and then transported them to the Los 
Angeles County jail.  Once the bus arrived at the county jail, 
Gonzalez and Flint were initially placed in separate cells that 
were also outfitted with recording devices.  Undercover officers 
rotated in and out of each cell to create the impression that they 
were being processed. Eventually, Gonzalez and Flint were 
placed in the same cell.   
An undercover agent that participated in the operation 
testified that when Gonzalez entered the bus and saw Flint, he 
became “excited in a bad way” and “almost lost control of his 
emotions.”  Another agent who was on the bus heard Gonzalez 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
talking to Flint about why they were being transported to Los 
Angeles County jail and whether it was related to the “bicycle 
shit.”  In the holding cell, Gonzalez speculated that the arrest 
might be related to a crime involving a car, which one of the 
undercover detectives understood to mean a “carjacking.”  
Gonzalez also speculated whether the police could “squeeze” 
Flint into talking about the crimes.  
Detective Javier Clift initiated a conversation with 
Gonzalez and suggested that he must have been detained 
because evidence was left at the crime scene.  Gonzalez 
responded, “No, I cleaned and wiped and everything.  It’s just 
going to be he say she say.”  When asked about the murder 
weapon, Gonzalez told Clift the gun he used for the crime was 
“swimmin” (sic) and then inquired whether getting rid of the 
evidence was “a plus.”  Gonzalez told Clift there were no 
footprints left at the scene because he had been on concrete.  
Gonzalez then spoke of another incident, which Clift described 
as a “carjacking.”  Gonzalez claimed he had left no evidence 
behind that would connect him to the stolen car.  Gonzalez also 
described himself as a “cappa,” which Clift understood to refer 
to a person who had committed a crime that would subject him 
to capital punishment.  Gonzalez mentioned disfiguring his face 
so that he could not be identified in a lineup, and having “special 
privileges” among the inmates, which Clift understood to be a 
reference to having committed a very serious crime such as 
killing a police officer.   
Detective Miguel Beltran also spoke to Gonzalez.  When 
Beltran asked about a murder that Gonzalez had supposedly 
committed, Gonzalez said “it was a hooda,” which Beltran 
interpreted to be the slang for a police officer, and described the 
victim as a female.  Gonzalez also told Beltran about a bike that 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
he had left at the scene and discussed creating an alibi to make 
the police believe the bike did not belong to him.  
Gonzalez told another undercover agent, Detective 
Noyola, that he shot a female police officer after she had showed 
him her badge.  Noyola also testified that when he was in the 
holding cell, Gonzalez told Flint not to talk to anyone “because 
[they were] going to ride this all the way out.”   While in the 
holding cell with Noyola, Flint said that if the “bitch” had “given 
up her wallet she wouldn’t have been killed,” but Gonzalez “bet 
[the police] d[id]n’t have anything about [the] case.”  
After Gonzalez and Flint were processed and provided 
notice of the charges against them, including murder, they were 
put into a holding cell with Detective Manuel Avina.  Avina 
talked to Gonzalez about the worst sentence for Flint, to which 
Gonzalez responded “life.”  Gonzalez and Flint wondered if 
someone was snitching and if they had to kill any witnesses who 
might testify.  Gonzalez wanted to “keep Justin Flint limited in 
his statements” and told him to “shut up” about the murder. 
They strategized about how to behave during the investigation.  
4. Investigation of Jessica Rowan and Celina Gonzalez 
In addition to conducting the undercover operation, law 
enforcement obtained an order authorizing a wiretap on six 
different phone lines that were affiliated with Gonzalez and his 
acquaintances.  Pursuant to those wiretaps, police intercepted 
conversations between Jessica Rowan, who had been Gonzalez’s 
girlfriend for 12 years and was the mother of his two children, 
and Gonzalez’s sister, Celina Gonzalez.  During a phone call, 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
Rowan and Celina2 discussed fabricating an alibi for Gonzalez.  
They agreed that they would tell police they had been at a 
barbeque with Gonzalez the night before the shooting and that 
Gonzalez then slept at Rowan’s house and stayed with her the 
following morning.    
After 
having 
intercepted 
those 
communications, 
Detectives McMahon and O’Dowd interviewed Rowan, who told 
them she was at a barbeque with Gonzalez the night before the 
shooting and was in bed with him on the morning of the 
shooting.  While in Rowan’s presence, O’Dowd acted as if he had 
received a call on his cell phone and discussed “divers going into 
the ocean.”  After getting off the phone, O’Dowd told his partner 
“it was in pieces,” but did not specify what object he was talking 
about.  Police also interviewed Celina, who likewise passed 
along the alibi that she and Rowan had discussed during their 
call.    
After her police interview, Rowan visited Gonzalez in jail 
and held up a note for him to read explaining the alibi she and 
Celina had created.  The note also stated that divers were 
searching for a gun.  When Gonzalez read the note, he 
exclaimed, “Oh fuck.”  During subsequent phone conversations, 
Gonzalez told Rowan he committed the crime with the “White 
boy” he had purchased a computer from, whom Rowan identified 
as Flint.  Gonzalez also directed Rowan to talk to his friend 
“Psycho” and tell him to deal with any potential snitches.  
Rowan understood this to mean that Psycho should kill any 
potential snitch.  As directed, Rowan called Psycho and told him, 
 
2  
Because Celina Gonzalez has the same last name as the 
defendant, for purposes of clarity and simplicity we refer to her 
by her first name. 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
“If anything happens, you know what to do.”  Psycho responded 
“OK,” and told Rowan not to talk about anything related to the 
murder over the phone.    
Police eventually arrested Rowan and Celina and charged 
them with obstruction of justice for having fabricated a false 
alibi.  Rowan and Celina both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
obstruct justice and their pleas included an agreement to testify 
against Gonzalez.  Though their testimony would be considered 
in determining their sentence, the plea did not promise leniency 
in exchange for testifying.  
At trial, Rowan testified that around the time of the 
shooting, Gonzalez told her he had “done something” in Long 
Beach and had to leave the city.  He explained that he and a 
friend had tried to rob a woman to get money for drugs and a 
gun went off.  He had demanded the victim’s money and tried to 
grab her purse, but a struggle ensued.  During the struggle, the 
woman pulled out a gun and a police badge and a gun 
discharged.  He then ran from the scene.  
Rowan further testified that a day or two after the 
shooting, she went to Celina’s house with Gonzalez.  Rowan 
stated that Gonzalez was acting nervous and strange and had 
said that he wanted to go to Long Beach immediately.  Gonzalez 
then retrieved a newspaper and showed them a story about the 
shooting of Rosa, which included her picture, and stated, “I told 
you I had done something in Long Beach.” A few days later 
Gonzalez asked to borrow Rowan’s car, telling her he was 
driving to the beach to get rid of something.  When he returned, 
Gonzalez told her he had gotten rid of the gun, explaining that 
he had sanded it down and cut it into pieces.    
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
At some point after Gonzalez was taken into custody, 
Celina showed Rowan an article on the internet about the 
murder that included photographs of two men riding bicycles.  
She and Celina were worried that people would be able to 
identify Gonzalez in the picture from his tattoos.    
Rowan also acknowledged during her testimony that she 
had been charged with obstruction of justice and that she and 
Celina had fabricated an alibi that they passed along to the 
police.  She explained that her phone conversations with Celina 
and her jailhouse conversations with Gonzalez had been 
surreptitiously recorded.  She also acknowledged that she had 
cooperated with law enforcement, signed a proffered statement 
attesting to statements Gonzalez had made about the crime and 
entered into an agreement to tell the truth at trial.  
Celina provided testimony that was corroborative of much 
of Rowan’s testimony.  Like Rowan, Celina acknowledged she 
had been charged with obstruction of justice after the police 
intercepted a conversation in which she and Rowan had 
discussed fabricating an alibi.  She also testified about the 
incident involving the newspaper that occurred at her house, 
explaining that Rowan and Gonzalez had been visiting her and 
Gonzalez was “walking around nervous.”  He went outside, 
retrieved a newspaper, and started “flipping out.”  There was a 
picture of Rosa on the front page of the paper.  Gonzalez then 
repeatedly stated, “this is her” and that “it was a robbery that 
went wrong.”   
Celina also testified that she told police Gonzalez had said 
he thought he shot a female police officer.  He also stated that 
the shooting had occurred on “Eucalyptus” and that he 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
approached the woman on his bicycle.  He had tried to rob her 
because he needed money for drugs. 
Gonzalez did not present any evidence at the guilt stage. 
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution’s evidence 
 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence 
of a number of  robberies Gonzalez had allegedly committed in 
1994.  A witness testified about an armed robbery at a 
restaurant in Long Beach during which a young Hispanic male 
had pointed a firearm at her boyfriend and demanded his wallet. 
Another witness testified that he and three others had been in 
a parking lot located in Long Beach when three individuals 
robbed them at gunpoint.  A liquor store owner and his brother 
testified that they were robbed inside their store at gun point by 
three individuals, one of whom fired a shotgun as he was fleeing.  
A man described being robbed at gunpoint by three Latino men 
while waiting in his car to use an ATM.  Two Baskin Robbins 
employees described being robbed inside a Long Beach store by 
three armed men.  A police officer who had investigated the 
string of robberies testified that several of the victims had 
identified Gonzalez as the perpetrator.  A second investigating 
officer testified that Gonzalez admitted he had committed the 
four robberies and that he was “the one that usually holds the 
gun in the robbery.”  A district attorney’s investigator described 
Gonzalez’s admission to additional robberies committed during 
the same time period.  
 
The prosecution also presented evidence of violent crimes 
Gonzalez had allegedly committed in 2006.  A witness described 
an incident outside a restaurant in Downey in which a person 
had fired six or seven gunshots in the direction of a vehicle that 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
was driving away.  Additional testimony indicated that the 
person who was shot at was dating Rowan and that Gonzalez 
had coerced Rowan into luring the man to the restaurant.   
Another witness described suffering five gunshot wounds 
during a separate incident in Long Beach.  The victim was 
sitting on his porch when two Hispanic men came around the 
corner; one of them yelled “motherfucker this is BP,” a reference 
to “Barrio Pobre” street gang, and began shooting.  An 
investigating detective testified that the shooting was part of an 
ongoing gang dispute, and that Gonzalez was a known member 
of Barrio Pobre.  A criminalist testified that shell casings from 
the Downey shooting, the Long Beach shooting, and a third 
shooting had been fired from the same gun.    
An additional witness testified that Gonzalez had pointed 
a gun at him and taken his keys during a carjacking.  Rowan 
testified that Gonzalez had made statements to her about 
stealing a car, which she had seen him drive.  The statements 
that Gonzalez made to Rowan about the car theft and the vehicle 
that she had seen him driving matched the victim’s description 
of the carjacking incident.  
 
The prosecution presented additional testimony about 
several incidents that occurred while Gonzalez was incarcerated  
in 2007.  A deputy testified that when he was doing searches of 
inmates before they came to court, Gonzalez’s cell door was 
mistakenly left open, and he attacked the deputy. Another 
deputy described an incident where a new inmate shouted to 
Gonzalez that he wanted to attack a correctional officer, and 
Gonzalez shouted back that he would like to help “put another 
notch on my belt.”   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
 
The prosecution also presented extensive victim impact 
evidence that included testimony from several of Rosa’s friends 
and colleagues.  An officer who worked with Rosa testified that  
she was a caring person who took pride in her work. Another 
witness described an instance when Rosa helped her after an 
accident as exemplary of Rosa’s willingness to help others.  
Other friends and colleagues testified about Rosa’s dedication to 
her work, her bright and kind personality, and the sense of loss 
they had felt after Rosa’s death.   
 
The prosecution also presented two family members as 
witnesses.  Officer Martin, who was Rosa’s longtime partner, 
described how they had met, their plans for adopting a child and 
Rosa’s early life in Mexico and then the United States.  She 
described the effort Rosa had put in to get a college degree and 
to become a police officer.  She also described her profound sense 
of loss when Rosa died.  Rosa’s sister described their close sibling 
relationship and Rosa’s early life.  She also described a period of 
time when Rosa and Martin took care of the sister’s children so 
that the children might have a better life.  
 
Finally, over an objection from the defense, the 
prosecution played an eight-minute victim impact video.  The 
video included  emotional descriptions of Rosa by family, friends, 
and colleagues, some of whom had also testified.  At certain 
points in the video, individuals were shown standing in a 
cemetery while they described Rosa.  At other times, their 
descriptions were played over photo montages of Rosa.  Soft 
music played in the background throughout. 
2. Defense’s evidence 
Gonzalez’s paternal aunt testified that Gonzalez’s father 
had been in prison since Gonzalez was an infant and was 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
currently incarcerated for murder.  Two of her other brothers 
(Gonzalez’s uncles) died in prison and a third was a gang 
member. When Gonzalez was a child, his mother began a 
relationship with another man who introduced her to heroin and 
his mother eventually became an addict.  The aunt further 
testified that although she had not seen Gonzalez since he was 
a child, she loved him and believed he was a “good kid.”  She also 
showed a picture of Gonzalez’s three children.    
One of Gonzalez’s paternal uncles described his criminal 
and family history.  The uncle had gone to prison as an accessory 
to the murder Gonzalez’s father was incarcerated for.  Like other 
members of the Gonzalez family, the uncle and Gonzalez’s 
father were active gang members for many years.  The uncle saw 
Gonzalez recruited into a gang and was unable to stop it.  He 
believed that Gonzalez had lacked a positive role model and that 
his mother was indifferent to whether her son spent his 
childhood on the street.  
Another paternal aunt testified that Gonzalez’s father had 
a drug problem that led to his incarceration when Gonzalez was 
three years old.  After Gonzalez’s father went to prison and his 
mother had started using heroin, Gonzalez went to live with the 
aunt for about eight months and improved in school.  But after 
that brief period, he returned to living with his mother in a 
roach-infested building controlled by gangs.  Gonzalez was 
sentenced to the California Youth Authority a few years after 
leaving his aunt’s care.  She told the jury that she did not want 
Gonzalez put to death, that she loved him, and that she felt he 
was a part of her. 
Gonzalez’s mother testified about her son’s upbringing.  
His biological father had a drug problem but visited Gonzalez 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
and seemed to love him.  She confirmed that she lived with 
another man after Gonzalez’s father went to prison and had 
started regularly using heroin with the man.  The mother stated 
that Gonzalez had performed well in school as a child but started 
getting into trouble as a teenager and became an active gang 
member around the age of 12 or 13.  She told the jury that she 
loved her son and that he was a good father and a good son.  
Rowan described her history with Gonzalez and his drug 
problem.  They had raised three children together, which 
included two children he had fathered and a third child who had 
a different father; Gonzalez treated all three of the children well.  
Rowan explained that after Gonzalez was released from the 
California Youth Authority he did not know how to get a job or 
how to get around on his own.  He had a serious drug problem 
that he supported through occasional jobs and by committing 
crimes.  On cross-examination, Rowan admitted Gonzalez was 
often violent with her and stole purses as a means of supporting 
himself.  
Gonzalez’s father testified that he had not seen his son 
since he went to prison when Gonzalez was three years old.  
Gonzalez’s father had gone to the California Youth Authority for 
armed robbery at the age of 17, had a drug problem and was 
involved in gangs.  He had communicated occasionally with 
Gonzalez by mail but was never in a position to provide paternal 
guidance.  
 
 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Sufficient evidence supports the attempted robbery 
conviction  
Gonzalez argues that his conviction for attempted robbery 
must be overturned because there was insufficient evidence 
apart from his own out-of-court statements to satisfy the corpus 
delicti rule.  This rule, which “has [its] roots in the common law” 
(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1169 (Alvarez)), 
precludes “convictions for criminal conduct not proven except by 
the uncorroborated extrajudicial statements of the accused.  
[Citations.]  [It] is intended to ensure that one will not be falsely 
convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that 
never happened.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)  “ ‘The amount of 
independent proof of a crime required [to satisfy the corpus 
delicti rule] is quite small.’  [Citation.]  The prosecution need not 
adduce ‘independent evidence of every physical act constituting 
an element of an offense.’  [Citation.]  Instead, it need only make 
‘some indication that the charged crime actually happened,’ so 
as to ensure ‘that the accused is not admitting to a crime that 
never occurred.’ ”  (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 317 
(Krebs).) “The independent proof may be circumstantial and 
need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it 
permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal 
explanation is also plausible.”  (Alvarez, at p. 1171.)  We have 
previously applied the corpus delicti rule to inchoate crimes 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
such as attempted robbery.  (See People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
313, 342 (Ray ).)3   
Gonzalez contends that apart from his own extrajudicial 
statements, there was insufficient evidence to permit an 
inference that there was an attempt to rob Rosa.  Robbery is 
defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the 
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, 
and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”  (§ 
211.)  An attempted robbery consists of two elements: (1) the 
 
3  
Under the common law, the corpus delicti rule had both 
an evidentiary and a substantive component.  As an evidentiary 
matter, 
the 
defendant’s 
extrajudicial 
statements 
were 
inadmissible to show a crime had been committed until some 
additional quantum of evidence was supplied.  As a substantive 
matter, the rule was as stated above, i.e., “every conviction must 
be supported by some proof of the corpus delicti aside from or in 
addition to [the defendant’s own] statements, and that the jury 
must be so instructed.”  (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 
italics omitted; see id. at pp. 1168–1170.)  In Alvarez, we held 
that the “ ‘Right to Truth-in-Evidence’ provision of the 
Constitution[,] [e]nacted as part of Proposition 8 in 1982” 
(People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 677 (Guzman)), 
abrogated the evidentiary aspect of the corpus delicti rule, but 
not its substantive aspect nor its requirement that when the 
prosecution relies on a defendant’s extrajudicial statements, the 
jury must be instructed on the requirement of independent 
proof.  (Alvarez, at p. 1165.)  Thus, even after Proposition 8, the 
corpus delicti rule requires “an instruction to the jury that no 
person may be convicted absent evidence of the crime 
independent of his or her out-of-court statements” and “allows 
the defendant, on appeal, directly to attack the sufficiency of the 
prosecution’s independent showing.”  (Id. at p. 1180.)  There is 
no dispute that the jury in this case received an appropriate 
instruction regarding the rule.  
 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
specific intent to commit the robbery, and (2) a direct, 
unequivocal, overt act (beyond mere preparation) toward its 
commission.  (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 452–453.)   
Given the low quantum of proof that is required, we are 
satisfied that the prosecution provided the “ ‘minimal’ ” amount 
of independent evidence necessary to satisfy the corpus delicti 
rule.  (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301 [“we have 
described [the necessary] quantum of evidence as ‘slight’ 
[citation] or ‘minimal’ ”].)  The evidence at trial showed two men 
were seen riding bicycles in a residential neighborhood early in 
the morning and gunshots were heard shortly thereafter.  
Around that time, surveillance video in the area captured 
images of Gonzalez on a bicycle.  Rosa’s body was found near her 
car, which was parked in the driveway of a residence with the 
trunk open and the keys hanging from the keyhole.  A bicycle 
was lying on the ground nearby.  Several items were inside the 
trunk, including Rosa’s purse, which was partially open, and a 
firearm with a bullet that appeared to have been jammed inside 
it, and Rosa’s police badge.  There was no evidence of any sexual 
or other form of motive for the confrontation that led to Rosa’s 
death, nor was there any evidence that the perpetrators knew 
the victim.  A jury might reasonably conclude this evidence 
provides at least “ ‘ “some indication” ’ ” (Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th 
at p. 317) that the assailants surprised Rosa while she was 
standing near the open trunk of her car, which contained a 
partially open purse, and then forcibly attempted to take her 
property, but killed her in an ensuing struggle and then fled.4       
 
4  
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Flint told 
an undercover agent Rosa would be alive if she had given up her 
 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
Our conclusion finds support in prior cases that addressed 
similar corpus delicti claims.  In Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, for 
example, we considered whether there was sufficient evidence 
independent of defendants’ statements to support the jury’s 
finding that an assault had occurred during an attempted 
robbery.  The evidence showed the two defendants, both armed 
and dressed in fatigues, had approached the victims as they 
exited an entertainment venue.  The defendants then moved the 
victims “to a more obscure area of the parking lot.”  (Id. at p. 
342.)  When one of the victims resisted, he was shot; the second 
victim then attempted to flee and was also shot.  We concluded 
the jury could reasonably infer from such evidence that “the 
perpetrators intended to steal the victims’ property at gunpoint” 
“even though the evidence [did] not eliminate the inference that 
additional or different crimes were intended.”  (Ibid.)   
In People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268 (Valencia), we 
held that testimony showing an “apartment door had been 
broken open, and one of the persons inside was bleeding from a 
. . . head injury” was sufficient to “permit[] an inference of 
robbery.”  (Id. at p. 297.)  We explained, “[a] broken-open 
apartment door and a man inside with a bleeding head wound 
suggest robbery, a very common purpose for a home invasion.  
 
wallet.  Although this statement provides clear corroboration 
that the murder occurred during an attempted robbery, multiple 
courts have held that “the corpus delicti [cannot] be established 
by the extrajudicial statements of a codefendant.”  (Munoz v. 
Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 774, 779; see Jones v. 
Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 390, 397.)  Because we 
conclude there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the corpus 
delicti rule without reliance on Flint’s statement, we need not 
address whether an accomplice or codefendant’s extrajudicial 
statements may satisfy the corpus delicti rule.    
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
Indeed, few other possible explanations for these events come to 
mind, and none so likely as robbery.  These might not be the only 
possible inferences, but they are certainly reasonable 
inferences, which is sufficient.”  (Ibid., italics omitted.)   
The evidence here — that two men with no relation to the 
victim were seen riding bicycles near the crime scene early in 
the morning, a bicycle was abandoned near the victim’s body 
and her belongings, which included a jammed firearm and a 
police badge, were in an open car trunk and her purse was 
partially open — is at least as suggestive of robbery as the 
evidence at issue in Ray and Valencia.5   While the evidence does 
not preclude that the perpetrators may have had a different 
motive, it is nonetheless sufficient to support an inference of 
attempted robbery.6 
 
5  
Gonzalez argues that the fact none of Rosa’s belongings 
were removed from the car trunk weighs against any finding of 
attempted robbery.  However, as in both Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
at pp. 341–342, and Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 297, while 
there was no evidence the perpetrators actually stole any 
property from the victims, there was nonetheless sufficient 
evidence to support the inference that the perpetrators’ motive 
was robbery.   
6  
In his opening brief, Gonzalez also argued that because 
“the prosecution did not prove the corpus delicti of the 
underlying felony of attempted robbery,” it had likewise failed 
to prove “the felony murder charged based on that felony.”  
However, in his reply brief, Gonzalez acknowledges that for 
crimes committed after the adoption of section 190.41 (added by 
Prop. 115, Primary Elec.  (June 5, 1990) § 11), “ ‘the corpus 
delicti of a felony-based special circumstance . . . need not be 
proved 
independently 
of 
a 
defendant’s 
extrajudicial 
statement.’ ”  (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 
1263, fn. 1, quoting § 190.41.)   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
2. The trial court did not err in admitting statements 
obtained during the undercover operation  
Gonzalez argues the trial court erred in admitting all 
statements obtained during the undercover operation that law 
enforcement performed while he and Flint were being 
transported to, and then held at, the Los Angeles County jail.7 
Gonzalez contends the statements were inadmissible because 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at that time.  
Alternatively, he argues the delay in bringing charges against 
him for Rosa’s murder violated his due process rights because 
such conduct delayed appointment of counsel.  Both claims are 
without merit.  
The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
does not attach until “ ‘ “the initiation of adversary judicial 
criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary 
hearing, 
indictment, 
information, 
or 
arraignment.” ’ ”  (Rothgery v. Gillespie County (2008) 554 U.S. 
191, 198; see People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1079.)  At 
that point, “the State’s relationship with the defendant has 
become solidly adversarial” (Rothgery, at p. 202) — “ ‘the 
government has committed itself to prosecute, and . . . the 
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.  
It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the 
prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the 
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.’ ”  
(United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 189 (Gouveia).)  
 
7  
At trial, Gonzalez  filed a motion to suppress any evidence 
obtained during the undercover operation, arguing that law 
enforcement’s conduct violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights.  The trial court denied the motion.   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
After the Sixth Amendment right has attached, government 
agents may not obtain incriminating statements from a 
defendant about the charged crime outside the presence of 
defendant’s counsel absent an explicit waiver.  (See Maine v. 
Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 170–177.) 
Here, Gonzalez made the incriminating statements over a 
month before the complaint was filed against him.  Thus, under 
existing authority, Gonzalez’s Sixth Amendment rights had not 
yet attached (and could not have been violated) when the 
undercover operations were performed.  (Compare People v. 
Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 658 [rejecting claim that use of 
undercover agent violated 6th Amend. right to counsel after the 
defendant had become “focus of the investigation,” but had not 
yet been formally charged], with Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 
U.S. 292, 299 [“the government may not use an undercover 
agent to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel once 
a suspect has been charged with the crime”].) 
Gonzalez does not contend otherwise.  Instead, he appears 
to argue we should adopt the Sixth Amendment test that  
Justice Stevens articulated in his concurring opinion in Gouveia, 
supra, 467 U.S. 180.  Justice Stevens’s concurrence argued that 
“[i]f the authorities take a person into custody in order to 
interrogate him or to otherwise facilitate the process of making 
a case against him, . . . the person is sufficiently ‘accused’ to be 
entitled to the protections of the Sixth Amendment.”  (Id. at p. 
197 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).)  If that concurrence reflected 
controlling law, Gonzalez would likely have a valid claim.  But 
it does not.  To the extent Gonzalez is suggesting we should 
revisit the “well established” (U.S. v. Kourani (2d Cir. 2021) 6 
F.4th 345, 353) rules governing when the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel commences, we decline to do so.  
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
Gonzalez alternatively argues that the delay in bringing 
charges against him violated his due process rights because the 
delay was undertaken to gain a tactical advantage over him.  
“[T]he right of due process protects a criminal defendant’s 
interest in fair adjudication by preventing unjustified delays 
that weaken the defense through the dimming of memories, the 
death or disappearance of witnesses, and the loss or destruction 
of material physical evidence.”  (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 750, 767.)  As our high court has explained, however, 
“Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to 
call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the 
minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of 
evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to 
support a criminal conviction.”  (Hoffa v. United States (1966) 
385 U.S. 293, 310; see United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 
783, 791 [prosecutors have “no duty to file charges as soon as 
probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be 
able to establish the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt”].)  We find no merit in Gonzalez’s contention that law 
enforcement’s attempts to obtain further evidence of guilt after 
having probable cause to arrest him violated the Fifth 
Amendment right to due process. 
3. There was no abuse of discretion in denying defense 
counsel’s request for a second continuance  
Gonzalez argues the court erred in denying his attorney’s 
request for a second continuance of the trial.   
a. Background 
Approximately one year after defense counsel was 
appointed, she filed a continuance motion seeking a four-month 
delay of trial.  The filing included a declaration describing 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
counsel’s efforts in preparing for trial.  The declaration also 
described the need for additional time to investigate recently 
disclosed aggravating factors and DNA discovery.  The trial 
court held a hearing on the motion and learned that Gonzalez 
was not willing to waive time.  Despite Gonzalez’s desires, the 
trial court granted the motion, deciding that his right to effective 
assistance of counsel outweighed his statutory speedy trial 
right.   
One month in advance of the new trial date, defense 
counsel filed a motion to continue the trial for another four 
months.  In the attached declaration, which was filed under seal 
to protect the defense’s trial strategy, counsel explained there 
were three avenues of investigation she had not yet completed.  
First, counsel stated she had not yet received “any feedback from 
her DNA expert.”  The declaration provided no time estimate as 
to when she expected to hear from the expert nor did it describe 
what exculpatory evidence she hoped to obtain (or the likelihood 
that such evidence would be obtained).  Second, counsel stated 
that she needed to “obtain the services of both a psychiatrist and 
psychologist” for the penalty phase.  Again, however, counsel 
provided no details regarding the expected timetable for 
obtaining such services or the nature of the evidence she hoped 
to gain.  Finally, counsel asserted that there “remain[ed] other 
penalty phase witnesses that must be  located and interviewed.”  
No details were provided about the identity of those purported 
witnesses or the type of information they might have that would 
be relevant to the penalty phase.  
At the motion hearing, defense counsel informed the court 
that although she had explained to Gonzalez that a continuance 
was in his best interest, he remained unwilling to waive time 
and had indicated he would seek to represent himself if a second 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
continuance were granted.  In an exchange with the court, 
Gonzalez confirmed that while he understood his attorneys 
believed they needed more time to prepare, he was not willing 
to waive time.  The prosecution did not object to a continuance, 
but noted that because of conflicting schedules, any delay would 
need to be for at least five months.  
The court questioned whether  it could find good cause for 
a second lengthy continuance, explaining:  “[T]he defendant 
appears to be an intelligent young man.  He understands what 
is going on and he understand[s] the serious nature of this case.  
And I found good cause in the past.  I don’t know if I can keep 
doing that in good conscience.  A defendant can waive whatever 
right that he has if he wishes to . . . .  And I don’t know if I can 
keep finding good cause to put it over, especially for the amount 
of time that [we are] talking about. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . . [We are] 
talking about five months. . . .  I find that to be a difficult thing 
for me to do when he refuses to waive time.”  In response, 
defense counsel acknowledged that she “under[stood] the court’s 
concern” but felt an “obligation” to seek a continuance because 
she did not feel she would be prepared on mitigation.  The court 
then denied the motion, explaining, “I cannot find good cause for 
a five-month continuance when the defendant refuses to waive 
time.  All I can say is whatever needs to be done must be done 
expeditiously.”  
b. Discussion 
We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to 
continue for abuse of discretion.  (See People v. Jackson (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 662, 677–678; see also People v. Beames (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 907, 920 [“[A]n order denying a continuance is seldom 
successfully attacked”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.113 [“Motions 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
to continue the trial of a criminal case are disfavored”].)  A trial 
court’s discretion “may not be exercised so as to deprive the 
defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare.”  (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646.)  The 
court “must consider ‘ “ ‘not only the benefit which the moving 
party anticipates but also the likelihood that such benefit will 
result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, 
above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or 
defeated by a granting of the motion.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Doolin 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 (Doolin).)   
Under the unusual circumstances presented here, we 
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that substantial justice would not be accomplished 
by granting the second motion for a continuance.  While a court 
facing a continuance request must normally weigh the 
anticipated benefit to the defendant against the burdens the 
continuance would have on other participants in the trial (see 
Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450), there was another factor to 
consider in this case:  Gonzalez had repeatedly stated that he 
was against a continuance, implicating not only his statutory 
right to a speedy trial but his constitutional rights.  (See U.S. 
Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Townsend v. 
Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 781 (Townsend) [“The right 
to a speedy trial is undeniably ‘as fundamental as any of the 
rights secured by the Sixth Amendment’ [citation], and . . . 
counsel may not waive this constitutional right over his client’s 
objections” (italics omitted)].)   
Further complicating matters, defense counsel informed 
the court that Gonzalez had indicated he would choose to 
represent himself in the event of a second continuance.  The trial 
court might reasonably conclude that whatever benefits could be 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
gained from an additional five-month delay were substantially 
outweighed by the risks associated with self-representation in a 
capital matter.  Moreover, the declaration defense counsel 
provided in support of the continuance motion was vague, failing 
to explain with any specificity the type of exculpatory evidence 
she hoped to gain from her further investigation or the 
likelihood that she would in fact obtain such evidence.  (See 
Doolin, 
supra, 
45 
Cal.4th 
at 
p. 
451 
[“defendant’s 
vague . . . reasons for the continuance failed to support good 
cause”].)  
 On the record presented here, we cannot conclude that 
the trial court abused its discretion in attempting to balance the 
right to effective counsel versus the asserted right to a speedy 
trial by granting one continuance over defendant’s objection, but 
not two.  (See Townsend, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 784 [“counsel 
[does not] possess[] carte blanche under any and all conditions 
to postpone his client’s trial indefinitely”].)  
4. The wiretap application was not facially invalid  
Gonzalez argues the trial court should have suppressed 
any 
evidence 
derived 
from 
communications 
that 
law 
enforcement intercepted pursuant to the wiretap order. As 
discussed in more detail below, John Spillane, the chief deputy 
district attorney for Los Angeles County, signed the wiretap 
application and attested that he was “the person designated to 
act as District Attorney in [District Attorney Steve Cooley’s] 
absence.”  Although California’s wiretap law expressly allows 
for such designation (see § 629.50, subd. (a)), Gonzalez contends 
the application was nonetheless invalid because it failed to 
include information describing the circumstances of District 
Attorney Cooley’s absence.  Gonzalez argues that without such 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
information, there is no way to verify whether Cooley was truly 
absent at the time Spillane filed the application.  We find 
nothing in the wiretap statute that imposes such a requirement.     
a. Background 
(i)  The trial court proceedings 
In August 2006, Chief Deputy District Attorney John 
Spillane filed an application for an order authorizing wiretaps 
on several phones affiliated with Gonzalez. The application 
included a declaration, made under penalty of perjury, from 
Spillane stating, “Steve Cooley is the District Attorney of the 
County of Los Angeles and I am the person designated to act as 
District Attorney in his absence pursuant to Penal Code 
[s]ection 629.50[, subdivision ](a).”  The declaration also stated 
Spillane had reviewed an attached 37-page affidavit from 
detective 
Thomas 
Kerfoot 
that 
provided 
background 
information regarding the investigation and explained the need 
for the wiretaps.  Spillane further attested that he agreed the 
wiretaps were both necessary and likely to intercept 
communications related to Rosa’s murder.  The application also 
included a signed attestation from Long Beach Police 
Department Chief Anthony Betts confirming that he had 
reviewed Kerfoot’s affidavit and had approved the application.     
Prior to trial, Gonzalez filed a motion arguing that any 
evidence derived from the wiretaps should be suppressed 
because Spillane’s application did not include any information 
confirming that District Attorney Cooley was absent when 
Spillane had sought the order.  Gonzalez’s motion contended 
that the district attorney’s office had attempted to “take 
advantage of an ambiguity” in the statutory provision that 
authorizes a person designated to act in the district attorney’s 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
absence to seek a wiretap application.  That provision, set forth 
in section 629.50, subdivision (a) (section 629.50(a)) states, in 
relevant part:  “Each application for an order authorizing the 
interception of a wire or electronic communication shall be made 
in writing upon the personal oath or affirmation of . . . a district 
attorney, or the person designated to act as district attorney in 
the district attorney’s absence.”     
Gonzalez argued the language in section 629.50(a) could 
be construed in one of two ways.  First, it could mean that the 
person designated to act as district attorney in the district 
attorney’s absence can only seek an application when the 
district attorney is actually absent; second, it could mean that if 
a person has been designated to act as the district attorney when 
the district attorney is absent, he or she can seek an application 
even when the district attorney is present.  Gonzalez argued 
that the first interpretation was the correct reading, explaining 
that “[w]hile the urgent nature of criminal investigations may 
explain why the legislature provided for a delegate in the case 
of the district attorney’s absence, there is no justification for 
allowing such delegation when the district attorney is present 
and capable of filing the application.”   
Gonzalez further contended that based on the wording of 
the wiretap application, it was unclear whether District 
Attorney Cooley was truly absent when Spillane had sought the 
order.  According to Gonzalez, Spillane’s declaration stated only 
that he was “ ‘the person designated to act as District Attorney 
in [Steve Cooley’s] absence,’ but ma[de] no assertion whatsoever 
regarding Cooley’s actual absence from his position.”  Gonzalez 
further argued that because the “government ha[d] made no 
showing that Cooley was, in fact, absent when the 
application . . . was approved . . . , that application and the 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
ultimate wiretap authorization are invalid and illegal.”  
Gonzalez did not present any argument as to the meaning of the 
term “absent” nor did he produce any evidence suggesting that 
District Attorney Cooley was not absent when Spillane signed 
the application as the person designated to act in Cooley’s 
absence.8   
 
In its opposition to the motion to suppress, the prosecution 
did not dispute that section 629.50(a) authorizes the designee to 
act only when the district attorney is absent.  Acknowledging 
that few cases had addressed the requirements of section 
629.50(a), the prosecution contended that the designation 
provision “allows a District Attorney, whose responsibilities are 
many, especially in a County the size of Los Angeles, to 
designate someone to act” in his or her absence with respect to 
wiretap applications, and “recognizes the numerous and varied 
duties of a District Attorney . . . [by] allow[ing] for another to 
take on wiretap application responsibilities.”  The prosecution 
then quoted three dictionary definitions of the term “absence,” 
which included “ ‘the state of being away from place or person’ ”; 
“ ‘the duration of being away’ ” and “ ‘not present.’ ”  The 
prosecution further asserted that Spillane’s declaration made 
clear that the “District Attorney was absent and designated his 
responsibility for review [sic]. . . .  The statute could have but 
did not require [District Attorney Cooley] or his designate to 
provide documentation or explanation.  In the absence of such 
 
8  
Gonzalez also argued the application was invalid because 
there were factual inconsistencies regarding the date on which 
Long Beach Police Department Chief Anthony Betts signed his 
affidavit stating that he had reviewed and approved the 
application.  Gonzalez has not raised that claim on appeal.  
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
statutory provision, we must presume the Legislature did not 
intend to require such proof.”  
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued “the 
problem” was that although section 629.50(a) made “clear that 
someone else c[ould] only act if Cooley [wa]s absent,” the 
application contained “nothing to indicate” Cooley was actually 
absent when Spillane sought the order.  Defense counsel 
contended that “everybody knows what absent means,” noting 
that the prosecutor “went through in her opposition papers to 
explain the meaning and so forth.”  Counsel acknowledged that 
the “statute does not specifically” require the applicant to 
include such information in the application, but argued it was 
nonetheless “incumbent upon the prosecution, not the defense, 
to establish that he was absent.  So . . . with that application, it 
would be inappropriate absent showing that Cooley was, in fact 
absent . . . before [Spillane] could provide that application.”  
In response, the prosecution argued defense counsel’s 
contention that the district attorney must “prove [he was 
absent] and . . . need[s] to document why he’s absent” found no 
support “under the statute” or in the “case law.”  The prosecution 
further argued that Spillane’s under-oath statement that he was 
the person designated to act as district attorney when Cooley 
was absent provided “prima facie evidence” that he was properly 
designated; the wiretap statute required nothing more.  
The trial court agreed with the prosecution, concluding 
that section 629.50(a) “provide[d] for” exactly the type of oath 
Spillane had made in his declaration and did not include any  
further “requirement . . . that there be proof that [the district 
attorney was] absent.”  The court further commented that it 
could not “imagine the Legislature” requiring the district 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
attorney or the designee to document the circumstances of the 
absence “each time the chief of any agency is out of town,” 
describing such a requirement as “onerous” and “unnecessary.”   
(ii)  Proceedings on appeal 
On appeal, Gonzalez reiterates his argument that the 
wiretap application was invalid because “there was no proof that 
the elected district attorney of Los Angeles County, Steven 
Cooley, was actually absent from his position when his Chief 
Deputy, John Spillane, made the application.”  His brief 
discusses at length United States v. Perez-Valencia (9th Cir 
2013) 727 F.3d 852 (Perez-Valencia), a Ninth Circuit decision 
interpretating section 629.50(a)’s designation provision that 
was decided several years after Gonzalez’s trial.  Perez-Valencia 
addresses the scope of authority a subordinate must be 
delegated in order to seek a wiretap in the district attorney’s 
absence, an issue Gonzalez did not raise in the trial court.  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the phrase “the person designated 
to act as district attorney in the district attorney’s absence” 
requires that the designee “must be acting in the district 
attorney’s absence not just as an assistant district attorney 
designated with the limited authority to apply for a wiretap 
order, but as an assistant district attorney duly designated to 
act for all purposes as the district attorney of the political 
subdivision in question.”  (Perez-Valencia, at p. 855.)  Noting 
that the prosecution’s opposition to the motion to suppress 
appeared to interpret the requirements of section 629.50(a) 
differently than Perez-Valencia, Gonzalez argues that the 
application here was invalid because “there was no evidence 
presented . . . as to either the nature of District Attorney 
Cooley’s absence or the nature of the authority of Chief Deputy 
Spillane.”   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
At 
oral 
argument, 
Gonzalez’s 
counsel 
confirmed  
defendant’s argument with respect to the wiretap order is that 
the application was facially invalid because it failed to include 
information verifying that the district attorney was absent.9  
Thus, the issue we must decide is whether it is sufficient for a 
wiretap application to state, as here, that it has been submitted 
upon the oath of “the person designated to act as district 
attorney in the district attorney’s absence” (§ 629.50(a)), or 
whether section 629.50 also requires that an application include 
information detailing the specific circumstances of the district 
attorney’s absence.    
b. Discussion 
(i)  Summary of federal and state wiretap laws 
Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520) 
“ ‘provides a “comprehensive scheme for the regulation of 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance.” ’ [Citation.]  As we 
have previously observed, Title III ‘establishes minimum 
standards for the admissibility of evidence procured through 
electronic surveillance; state law cannot be less protective of 
privacy than the federal Act.’ ”  (People v. Leon (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
376, 384 (Leon); see Villa v. Maricopa County (9th Cir. 2017) 865 
F.3d 1224, 1230 (Villa) [“States may choose to enact wiretapping 
 
9  
Appellate counsel acknowledged that if this court did not 
accept the “argument that more had to be said on the face of the 
application itself,” there was no basis for relief.  Counsel also 
confirmed that Gonzalez’s argument was not related to anything 
the prosecution said “in [its] response to the motion to suppress 
or [at the suppression] hearing.”   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
statutes imposing more stringent requirements, or . . . choose to 
forego state-authorized wiretapping altogether”].)  
Title III allows states to authorize only the following 
categories of law enforcement officials to seek a wiretap order:  
“The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the 
principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision 
thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that 
State . . . .”  (18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).)  Pursuant to that provision, 
California’s wiretap law (Pen. Code, § 629.50 et seq.) provides 
that “[e]ach application for an order authorizing the interception 
of a wire or electronic communication shall be made in writing 
upon the personal oath or affirmation of the Attorney 
General . . . or a district attorney, or the person designated to 
act as district attorney in the district attorney’s absence.”  
(§ 629.50(a).)10 
Section 629.50(a) sets forth a detailed description of 
additional categories of information a wiretap application must 
contain, including (among other things) the identity of the 
applicant, the identity of the agency that will carry out the 
wiretap, the facts and circumstances demonstrating the need for 
 
10  
Although 18 United States Code section 2516(2) only 
refers to “the principal prosecuting attorney of any political 
subdivision,” courts have held that this language does not 
preclude states from authorizing a district attorney to delegate 
wiretap authority to a subordinate when absent.  (See U.S. v. 
Fury (2d Cir.1977) 554 F.2d 522, 527, fn. 4 (Fury) [“ ‘Congress 
simply could not have intended that local wiretap activity would 
be completely suspended during the absence or disability of the 
official specifically named [in § 2516(2)]’ ”]; Perez-Valencia, 
supra, 727 F.3d at p. 854.)   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
the warrant and the period of time the wiretap will be used.  (See 
§ 629.50(a)(1)–(4).) 
(ii)  Section 629.50(a) does not require that the 
application describe the circumstances of the 
district attorney’s absence   
Gonzalez argues that the wiretap application filed in this 
case was invalid because it did not include any information 
confirming the circumstances of District Attorney Steve Cooley’s 
absence.  But as defense counsel acknowledged at the 
suppression hearing, there is no language in California’s 
wiretap laws that imposes such a requirement.  Instead, the 
designation provision states only that an application for a 
wiretap order “shall be made in writing upon the personal oath 
or affirmation of . . . a district attorney, or the person designated 
to act as district attorney in the district attorney’s absence.”  (§ 
629.50(a).)   
In contrast to section 629.50(a)’s designation provision, 
other sections of the wiretap statute do require that the 
application include information verifying certain standards 
have been met.  In particular, section 629.50(a)(4) requires that 
the applicant provide a “full and complete statement of the facts 
and circumstances relied upon to justify his or her belief that an 
order should be issued.”  That “full and complete statement” 
must include, among other things, a description of the offense 
that is being investigated, an explanation why conventional 
investigative techniques are insufficient, a description of the 
type of communications that are expected to be intercepted, and 
the identity of the persons whose communications are expected 
to be intercepted.  (Ibid.)   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
Had the Legislature intended to impose a similar 
requirement compelling the application to include a “full and 
complete statement of the facts” confirming the circumstances 
of the district attorney’s absence, it could have directed as much.  
But that is not what the Legislature did.  Instead, it required 
only that the application must “be made in writing upon the 
personal oath or affirmation of . . . a district attorney, or the 
person designated to act as district attorney in the district 
attorney’s absence.”  (§ 629.50(a).)  The application from Chief 
Deputy Spillane includes an oath that incorporates that exact 
statutory language.  The express provisions of the wiretap 
statute require nothing more. 
 Gonzalez has likewise cited no case holding that a wiretap 
applicant who claims to have been lawfully designated to seek 
the application has a sua sponte duty to provide information 
confirming the legality of that designation.  Indeed, the few 
cases we have found addressing similar claims have rejected 
such arguments.  (See U.S. v. Terry (2d Cir. 1983) 702 F.2d 299, 
311 [rejecting claim that application was invalid because it 
failed to include information showing that three assistant 
attorneys general with higher priority than the applicant “were 
absent or otherwise unavailable”]; U.S. v. Ruiz (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 
19, 2010, No. 09 CR. 719 (DAB))  2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 123991, 
pp. *13–*14 [§ 629.50(a) does not “impose a burden on 
investigative agencies or prosecutors to . . . prove they were 
absent when a designee acts on their behalf”]; U.S. v. Mattingly 
(W.D.Ky., July 1, 2016, No. 3:15-CR-99-DJH) 2016 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 86489, pp. *19–*20 [“Because [defendant] has failed to 
present competent and credible evidence, as opposed to mere 
speculation, that [district attorney] was in fact available and 
reachable when [the designated acting district attorney] 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
submitted the application . . ., suppression is not warranted on 
the ground that the wiretaps were improperly authorized”].)  
These cases are in accord with the general principle that, 
“absen[t] . . . evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that official 
duty has been properly performed.”  (Roelfsema v. Department 
of Motor Vehicles (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 871, 879 [relying on 
Evid. Code, § 664]; cf. Terry, supra, 702 F.2d at p. 311 [“a named 
designee whose high office [gives] him statutory power to 
authorize electronic surveillance orders is presumed to have 
properly exercised that power and the condition[s] precedent 
[are] presumed to have been met unless the defendants offer 
evidence, apart from mere conjecture or speculation, to rebut 
this presumption”]; People v. Davis (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 
630 [because the “ ‘ defendant bears the burden of proving that 
a wiretap is invalid once it has been authorized,’ ” “the failure to 
bring a timely challenge to wiretap evidence forfeits the claim”].) 
The primary authority Gonzalez discusses in his appellate 
briefing is Perez-Valencia, supra, 727 F.3d 852, a case decided 
long after his trial was completed.  However, nothing in Perez-
Valencia suggests section 629.50(a) requires that an application 
submitted under the oath of a designated acting district 
attorney must include information verifying the circumstances 
of the district attorney’s absence.  Instead, as explained above, 
Perez-Valencia interpreted the scope of authority that a 
designated subordinate must have in order to seek a wiretap 
order under section 629.50(a), concluding the provision only 
applies when the district attorney has “duly designated [a single 
subordinate] to act for all purposes as the district attorney of the 
political subdivision in question.”  (Perez-Valencia, at p 855, 
italics omitted.)  While that interpretation is consistent with 
both the wording of section 629.50(a) — the “district attorney or 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
the person designated to act as district attorney” (italics 
added) — and the language of Title III, which contemplates that 
only one “principal prosecuting attorney” will have wiretap 
authority at any given time (see 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) [states may 
authorize “the principal prosecuting attorney of any political 
subdivision thereof” (italics added)]; Fury, supra, 554 F.2d at p. 
527, fn. 4 [state law authorizing district attorney to designate 
subordinate to act in his or her absence was permissible under 
Title III because “[t]here is still only one person who has the 
authority [to act]”]), it is not relevant to Gonzalez’s claim that 
the government was required to submit “proof” beyond 
Spillane’s attestation confirming that “the elected district 
attorney . . . was actually absent from his position.”  Perez-
Valencia provides no guidance on that question.11 
 
11   
At the suppression hearing, the trial court commented 
that it did not believe the term “absent” in section 629.50(a) was 
limited to situations where the district attorney was “out [of] 
town [or] out of state,” but could also apply where the district 
attorney was “involved in doing other things” and “not available 
to do this type of work.”  The prosecution agreed, asserting that 
the statute “simply means not present and not available, but it 
doesn’t mean physically in another jurisdiction.”  In its 
opposition to the motion to suppress, the prosecution also 
asserted, among other things, that the statute “recognizes the 
numerous and varied duties of a District Attorney . . . [by] 
allow[ing] for another to take on wiretap application 
responsibilities.”  (See ante, at p. 29.)   
While some of those comments could be construed to 
endorse a broader interpretation of section 629.50(a) than the 
Ninth Circuit articulated in Perez-Valencia, supra, 727 F.3d 
852, their meaning is not entirely clear in context.  In any event, 
defense counsel did not voice any objection to the trial court’s 
statements (or the prosecution’s statements) regarding what 
 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
Gonzalez appears to argue that we should require the 
application to confirm the circumstances of the district 
attorney’s 
absence 
because 
merely 
incorporating 
the 
designation standard set forth in section 629.50(a) leaves 
ambiguity as to whether the district attorney was truly absent.  
As we understand it, Gonzalez’s position is that a statement like 
the one in Spillane’s application (which tracks the statutory 
language) does not attest that the district attorney was actually 
absent; instead, it attests only that the applicant is the person 
designated to act as district attorney when the district attorney 
is absent.  Thus, it leaves open the possibility that the applicant 
is merely stating that he or she is the person who is designated 
to act when the district attorney is absent, not that the district 
attorney was absent when the application was filed.   
We think it clear, however, that when an applicant such 
as Spillane attests,  “Steve Cooley is the District Attorney of the 
County of Los Angeles, and I am the person designated to act as 
District Attorney in his absence pursuant to Penal Code 
[s]ection 629.50(a),” that statement is most reasonably 
construed as a declaration that the district attorney is in fact 
absent.  Indeed, the wording of Spillane’s oath quite logically 
 
“absent” means, nor did counsel offer an alternative 
interpretation.  Instead, counsel argued only that the wiretap 
application was invalid because it did not contain any 
information substantiating that the district attorney was 
absent.  At oral argument, appellate counsel confirmed that 
Gonzalez raises the same challenge before this court.  
Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider the precise 
circumstances under which a district attorney is considered 
“absent” under section 629.50(a) or otherwise address the scope 
of authority that the statute requires the district attorney to 
delegate to a subordinate when absent.   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
tracked the language of section 629.50(a) almost verbatim (see 
§ 629.50(a) [application “shall be made in writing upon the 
personal oath or affirmation of the . . . district attorney, or the 
person designated to act as district attorney in the district 
attorney’s absence” (italics added)].)12  Moreover, in this case, the 
prosecution confirmed to the trial court that the statement was 
intended to convey the “District Attorney was absent and 
designated his responsibility for review.”  Contrary to 
Gonzalez’s suggestion, we do not believe Spillane’s use of the 
very oath that is set forth in the wiretap statute casts doubt 
upon whether the district attorney truly was absent, thereby 
necessitating some further evidentiary showing.  
In sum, we decline to read into section 629.50(a) a 
requirement that when a person designated to act as district 
attorney in the district attorney’s absence seeks a wiretap order, 
the application must include information that explains the 
circumstances of the district attorney’s absence.  (See People ex 
rel. Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 768 [“In 
construing a statute, we do not insert words into it as this would 
‘violate the cardinal rule that courts may not add provisions to 
a statute’ ” (quoting Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 
827)].)  If the Legislature believes these additional safeguards 
would be prudent to ensure that law enforcement is operating 
 
12  
Especially when read against the backdrop of the federal 
law it implements, the language of section 629.50(a) is naturally 
understood to require that the affirmation come from either the 
“principal prosecuting attorney” in the relevant jurisdiction (18 
U.S.C. § 2516(2)) or the person who is acting as principal 
prosecuting attorney during the principal prosecuting attorney’s 
period of absence.  (See Fury, supra, 554 F.2d at p. 527, fn. 4.) 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
within the limitations of section 629.50(a), it is of course free to 
amend the statute accordingly.  
5. Any violation of Gonzalez’s right to confrontation was 
harmless  
Gonzalez argues the trial court’s admission of certain 
testimony related to the DNA evidence violated his rights under 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Although the merits of Gonzalez’s claim 
are difficult to assess given the divided state of the high court’s 
current confrontation clause jurisprudence, we conclude that 
any Sixth Amendment violation that may have occurred in this 
case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See People v. 
Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395 (Bryant) 
[confrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless 
error standard enunciated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 
U.S. 18].) 
a. Background 
Juli Watkins, a criminalist for the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department, obtained genetic samples from the bicycle 
that was left near the scene of the shooting.  She also received a 
reference sample from Rosa.  Watkins was able to generate a 
DNA profile of Rosa, but the samples from the bicycle were 
contaminated and unusable.  Watkins’s colleague, Kari Yoshida, 
collected new samples from the bicycle and was able to generate 
a DNA profile of a contributor to one of those samples.  In July 
2006, Watkins and Yoshida co-authored and signed a report 
describing the analyses they had each performed to date.  
After receiving notification that Gonzalez was a possible 
match to the DNA from the bicycle sample, Watkins obtained a 
reference sample from him and generated a DNA profile.  She 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
then compared that profile to the profile Yoshida had generated 
from the bicycle sample and concluded Gonzalez was a possible 
contributor.  Watkins prepared a supplement report that 
estimated the chances a randomly selected person would be a 
possible contributor to the profile generated from the bicycle 
were one out of three billion Caucasians, one out of 14 billion 
African-Americans and one out of one billion Hispanics.  A copy 
of the supplemental report was introduced at trial.     
Watkins testified at the trial, but Yoshida did not.  
Watkins explained the roles she and Yoshida had each played in 
producing the relevant DNA evidence.  Watkins also testified as 
to her determination that Gonzalez was a possible contributor 
to the bicycle sample.  When asked, “How common would it be 
for a person to have been included as a possible contributor,” 
Watkins answered, “A conservative statistic . . . was estimated 
to be one out of one billion.”    
b. Any confrontation clause violation was harmless          
Gonzalez argues the trial court committed two evidentiary 
errors that violated his rights under the confrontation clause.  
First, it allowed Watkins to testify about the DNA analysis that 
her colleague, Yoshida, had conducted on the bicycle, which 
resulted in the profile that Watkins ultimately determined to be 
a possible match with Gonzalez’s profile.  Second, the court 
admitted into evidence a report that included Yoshida’s 
analysis.  
“The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides 
that, ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ”  
(Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 42.)  “Crawford 
held that the clause bars introduction of ‘testimonial’ hearsay 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
against a defendant unless the witness is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  
(People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 911–912 
(Amezcua).)  The question of whether and when statements in 
technical reports qualify as “testimonial hearsay” remains an 
evolving area of the law.  (See id. at p. 912.)   
In 2012, this court issued three companion cases that 
addressed confrontation clause claims involving testimony 
detailing the results of technical reports that had been prepared 
by a nontestifying witness.  (See People v. Lopez (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 569; People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608 (Dungo); 
People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650 (Rutterschmidt).)  
Those cases generated numerous separate opinions, reflecting 
the fragmented nature of the high court’s reasoning in this area.  
(See Dungo, at p. 616 [“Sixth Amendment confrontation right 
issue [was] far from easy to resolve in light of the widely 
divergent views expressed by the justices of the United States 
Supreme Court in . . . recent . . . cases”]; id. at p. 628 (conc. opn. 
of Chin, J.) [concluding that it is “difficult to determine what to 
make” of high court’s confrontation clause jurisprudence]; 
Lopez, at p. 590 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [the multitude of opinions 
in Lopez, Dungo, and Rutterschmidt reflected “the muddled 
state of current doctrine concerning the Sixth Amendment right 
of criminal defendants to confront the state’s witnesses against 
them”].)  More recently, we have noted that “ ‘considerable flux’ 
[continues to] surround[] the high court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence” (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 660, fn. 
8), and that “[a] comprehensive definition of the term 
‘testimonial’ awaits articulation.”  (Amezcua, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 912.)   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
43 
We need not delve further into the high court’s divided 
confrontation clause jurisprudence because even if a Sixth 
Amendment violation is assumed, “ ‘it [is] clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.’ ”  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 555, 608 [describing the harmless error standard 
applicable to a claim challenging the admission of DNA evidence 
under the confrontation clause]; see Rutterschmidt, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at p. 661 [“Violation of the Sixth Amendment’s 
confrontation right requires reversal of the judgment against a 
criminal defendant unless the prosecution can show ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ that the error was harmless”].)  As we have 
previously observed, DNA analysis is a powerful form of 
evidence that can (and often will) be highly prejudicial to the 
defendant.  (See Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 631 [“ ‘a DNA 
profile may provide powerful incriminating evidence’ ” (quoting 
Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50, 85 (plur. opn. of Alito, 
J.))]; see also U.S. v. Barton (11th Cir. 2018) 909 F.3d 1323, 1338 
[“DNA evidence is powerful and it could be highly prejudicial”].)  
However, even when highly prejudicial, the erroneous 
admission of DNA analysis may still be deemed harmless where 
the remaining evidence is so overwhelming as to leave no 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.  (See Geier, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 608 [“any error in the admission of DNA 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”]; cf. Doolin, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 448 [although admission of DNA evidence 
violated state evidentiary law, the error was harmless “in light 
of the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence of defendant’s 
guilt”].)  We believe this is such a case.   
The prosecution’s case against Gonzalez centered on two 
categories of highly incriminating evidence that were 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
independent of the DNA analysis:  (1) statements that Gonzalez 
and Flint made to law enforcement agents who were posing as 
inmates during a sophisticated undercover operation; and (2) 
admissions that Gonzalez made to his longtime girlfriend and 
sister regarding his commission of the offense.  The quantity and 
quality of that evidence was prodigious.   
During the undercover operation, most of which was 
recorded, Gonzalez informed multiple agents that he had shot a 
female police officer.  Gonzalez also disclosed numerous details 
about the crime, explaining (among other things) that he had 
left a bicycle at the scene, that he had thrown the murder 
weapon into the water and that he had not left any footprints 
because the crime occurred on pavement.  Gonzalez and Flint 
were also heard discussing killing any witnesses to the murder, 
and Flint stated that the victim would not have been killed if 
she had given up her wallet.   
Gonzalez’s girlfriend and sister provided additional, 
highly incriminating testimony.  Rowan and Celina both 
explained they had pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice after 
law enforcement intercepted conversations in which they were 
heard fabricating an alibi for Gonzalez.  They both testified that 
Gonzalez had admitted he shot a female police officer and 
showed them a newspaper with a story about the crime.  Rowan 
also testified that Gonzalez told her he left a bicycle at the scene 
of the crime and had thrown the murder weapon into the ocean.  
Rowan further acknowledged that law enforcement had 
recorded incriminating conversations she had with Gonzalez 
while visiting him in prison.  During those recorded 
conversations, 
Gonzalez 
instructed 
her 
to 
contact 
an 
acquaintance and ask him to take care of any possible snitches; 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
he also exclaimed “oh fuck” after Rowan informed him that 
police divers were searching for the murder weapon.        
Given this highly incriminating additional evidence of 
guilt, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have returned the same verdict even in the absence of the 
DNA evidence.   
6. Gonzalez has failed to establish prosecutorial or judicial 
misconduct  
Gonzalez argues the prosecution violated his due process 
rights by asking two key witnesses — Rowan and Celina — a 
series of leading questions.  He contends the prosecution and the 
trial court committed a second due process violation by coercing 
those witnesses to say what the prosecutor wanted them to say.  
Both claims lack merit.   
a. Background 
Rowan and Celina were both charged with conspiracy to 
obstruct justice for having falsified an alibi for Gonzalez.  Rowan 
entered a guilty plea with an agreed upon sentence of up to three 
years depending on the judge’s assessment of her veracity in 
testifying at Gonzalez’s trial.  Celina likewise pleaded guilty 
with her agreed upon sentence contingent on testifying 
truthfully at trial.  
During 
her 
direct 
examination 
at 
trial, 
Rowan 
acknowledged that she had previously testified in the case and 
was facing sentencing for her obstruction charge.  Through 
much of the examination, the prosecutor asked questions 
consisting of declarative statements followed by, “isn’t that 
correct?”  The prosecutor and the judge also repeatedly 
admonished Rowan that she should answer the questions that 
had been asked, and the judge gave Rowan’s attorney an 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
opportunity to remind her of the importance of testifying 
truthfully.  
Similarly, in questioning Celina, the prosecutor asked a 
series of narrative questions which she answered through “yes” 
or “no” answers.  Among other topics, the prosecutor asked 
Celina about her conversations with police following her arrest 
and repeatedly reminded her that she was under oath and had 
to tell the truth.   When Celina answered one such question with 
a question — “Why do you keep asking me? He didn’t tell me 
directly” — the trial court admonished her not to ask questions 
and invited Celina’s counsel to talk with her.  Outside the 
presence of the jury, the court also reminded Celina that she was 
under oath and then encouraged the prosecutor to refresh 
Celina’s memory.  When defense counsel objected that the court 
was intimidating Celina, the judge replied, “Number one, she 
will not ask questions of anybody.  And number two, she shall 
tell the truth, period.  It’s that simple.  That’s not intimidation.  
That’s doing what’s right.”  Following the exchange, Celina 
repeatedly responded “yes” to a series of questions about what 
she had previously told law enforcement about the crime.   
b. Discussion 
(i)  The prosecution’s use of leading questions 
  Gonzalez first argues that the prosecution’s decision to 
rely on leading questions during the direct examination of 
Rowan and Celina constituted prosecutorial misconduct.  “A 
prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such 
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.  
Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
47 
law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the 
jury.”  (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44 (Morales).)  A 
trial court’s decision to allow leading questions is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  (See People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 
39.)13  
As a general matter, a “leading question may not be asked 
of a witness on direct or redirect examination.”  (Evid. Code, § 
767, subd. (a)(1).)  “ ‘ “A ‘leading question’ is a question that 
suggests to the witness the answer that the examining party 
desires.”  [Citation.]  Questions calling for a “yes” or “no” answer 
are not leading unless they are unduly suggestive under the 
circumstances.’ ”  (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 214.)  
However, “ ‘ “leading questions are not always impermissible on 
direct examination.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  The Evidence Code permits their 
use “under special circumstances where the interests of justice 
otherwise require.”  (Evid. Code, § 767, subd. (a)(1).)  Applying 
that exception, we have previously held that leading questions 
are permissible when they “serve[] ‘to stimulate or revive [the 
witness’s] recollection’ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
635, 672), or when the examining party is faced with a hostile 
witness.  (See People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1319 
[prosecutor’s “use of leading questions, which necessarily 
included stating facts she assumed the witness would affirm or 
 
13  
It is unclear from Gonzalez’s briefing whether he is 
arguing that the use of leading questions constituted a form of 
prosecutorial misconduct or that the trial court erred in 
permitting such questioning or both.  However, as discussed 
below, regardless of the specific nature of his claim, we find no 
error on the part of either the trial court or the prosecution with 
respect to the use of leading questions.    
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
48 
deny, was justified because [the witness] was . . . obviously 
hostile”].)  Trial courts have broad discretion to decide when 
such special circumstances are present.  (See Williams, at p. 
672.) 
While some of the prosecutor’s questions were leading, we 
find that the method of questioning did not constitute 
misconduct nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
allowing the interrogation to proceed in such a manner.  The 
transcript shows that on many occasions, Rowan and Celina 
claimed not to remember (or were willfully refusing to recall) 
details about the prior statements they had made regarding the 
crime.  Indeed, at one point, Gonzalez’s own counsel 
acknowledged Celina appeared to have difficulty remembering 
precise details of events that had happened several years ago.  
The record also supports an inference that Rowan and 
Celina were sufficiently “hostile” to permit leading questioning.  
Indeed, both witnesses acknowledged at the outset that it was 
difficult for them to testify.  Moreover, both witnesses had a 
close relationship with Gonzalez and had previously lied to 
police to protect him.  Given the witnesses’ purported difficulty 
in remembering what had occurred, the obvious inconsistencies 
between their trial testimony and their prior statements to 
police and their close relationship to Gonzalez, we find no error 
in either the trial court’s decision to allow leading questions or 
the prosecution’s use of such questions.    
(ii)  Admonishments to tell the truth 
 
Gonzalez next contends that the trial court and the 
prosecution unlawfully coerced Rowan and Celina into 
providing testimony favorable to the prosecution.  He identifies 
several distinct categories of alleged misconduct, including:  (1) 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
49 
on multiple occasions, both the trial court and the prosecution 
reminded the witnesses they were testifying under oath and 
were required to tell the truth; (2) after the witnesses had 
repeatedly claimed they could not remember an event, the court 
invited their attorneys to speak with them about answering 
questions truthfully;14 (3) the prosecutor reminded Rowan of 
prior statements she had made during the investigation; (4) 
when presented with testimony that was inconsistent with prior 
statements made during the investigation, the prosecution 
asked Rowan if she understood that she was looking at three 
years in prison. 
We first consider whether the trial court engaged in 
unlawful coercion by reminding  the witnesses they were under 
oath and inviting their respective attorneys to talk to them 
about testifying truthfully.  Gonzalez cites no case holding that 
the mere act of reminding a witness she has an obligation to 
testify truthfully, or inviting a witness’s counsel to discuss the 
consequences of perjury with her client, qualifies as a due 
process violation or otherwise constitutes misconduct.  Indeed, 
the case law is to the contrary.  (Cf. People v. Harbolt (1988) 206 
Cal.App.3d 140, 155 [no misconduct where prosecutor’s 
“comments . . . amounted to a ‘mere warning’ about the dangers 
 
14  
The court invited Rowan’s attorney to remind her client 
she was “supposed to be telling the truth and volunteering 
answers without the prosecutor having to constantly remind her 
of what her statements have been in the past.”  After Celina 
repeatedly testified that she could not remember whether 
Gonzalez had said he was carrying a gun at the time of the 
murder, and then asked the prosecutor why he kept asking her 
that question, the trial court directed her not to ask the 
prosecution questions and then asked Celina’s attorney whether 
she would “wish to talk to [her] client.”       
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
50 
of perjury”]; Williams v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2004) 384 F.3d 567, 
603 [“ ‘merely warning a witness of the consequences of perjury’ 
does not unduly pressure the witness’s choice to testify or violate 
the defendant’s right to due process”].)   
The primary authority Gonzalez relies on, Webb v. Texas 
(1972) 409 U.S. 95 (Webb), has little in common with this case.  
In Webb, the trial court, acting in the presence of the jury, told 
the defense’s only witness that he did not have to testify and 
further directed that if he lied under oath, the court would 
“personally see” to it that the grand jury would indict him for 
perjury and that he would likely be convicted and sentenced to 
several years in prison (and also impair his chances for parole).  
(Id. at pp. 95–96.)  After receiving this warning, the witness 
chose not to testify.  The Supreme Court found that such conduct 
violated the defendant’s right to due process, explaining that the 
“lengthy admonition” had gone far beyond merely warning the 
witness of the “necessity to tell the truth,” and had instead used 
“unnecessarily strong terms [that] could well have exerted such 
duress on the witness’ mind as to preclude him from making a 
free and voluntary choice whether or not to testify.”  (Id. at pp. 
97, 98.)  
Nothing similar occurred here.  The trial court in this case 
merely called the witness’s attention to the importance of 
testifying in a truthful manner and, outside the presence of the 
jury, invited each witness’s counsel to consult with their client  
about “telling the truth and volunteering answers without the 
prosecutor having to constantly remind her of what her 
statements have been in the past.”  We see nothing in these 
admonitions that was so extreme as to amount to a due process 
violation.     
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
51 
We likewise find that Gonzalez has failed to establish that 
the prosecution engaged in unlawful coercion by reminding the 
witnesses they were under oath, referencing prior statements 
they had made to law enforcement and, on a single  occasion, 
inquiring whether Rowan was aware that she was facing a 
three-year jail sentence.  Again, Gonzalez cites no authority in 
which similar statements were found to constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The primary authority he cites is United States v. 
Juan (9th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 1137, 1142 (Juan), which held 
that under the “principles of Webb[, supra, 409 U.S. at page 95],” 
a prosecutor’s “substantial and wrongful interference with 
a . . . witness that . . . leads the witness to materially change his 
or her prior trial testimony can . . . violate due process.”  (Ibid.)15  
We find nothing in the prosecution’s conduct that 
amounted to “substantial and wrongful interference” with the 
witnesses’ testimony.  (Juan, supra, 704 F.3d at p. 1142.)  When 
faced with two hostile witnesses who had provided testimony 
that was inconsistent with their prior statements to law 
 
15  
Gonzalez also cites People v. Medina (1974) 41  Cal.App.3d 
438, which held that an immunity agreement requiring the 
cooperating witness to provide testimony that was materially 
identical to the statements he had previously made to police was 
constitutionally impermissible.  We have clarified that the 
principles of Medina are implicated only when “the bargain is 
expressly contingent on the witness sticking to a particular 
version . . . .”  (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 771.)  
Rowan and Celina were not subject to any such requirement.  
Instead, their plea agreements provided only that they would 
testify truthfully.  (See People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 
1252 [“although there is a certain degree of compulsion inherent 
in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, it is clear that an 
agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and 
truthfully is valid”].)  
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
52 
enforcement, or otherwise claimed not to remember key aspects 
of what they had told police, the prosecution reminded them of 
their prior statements or their duty to testify truthfully.  Those 
reminders do not qualify as misconduct.  Likewise, the isolated 
question the prosecution asked Rowan about whether she 
wanted to receive a three-year sentence was not so extreme as 
to substantially interfere with her testimony or otherwise 
“involve[] the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods.”  
(Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44.)  Under “the totality of the 
circumstances” presented here (Juan, supra, 704 F.3d at p. 1142 
[“substantial interference inquiry is [assessed] under the 
totality of the circumstances”]), we find no witness interference 
nor any misconduct in the prosecutor’s limited admonitions to 
the witnesses.16      
 
 
 
16  
It is also unclear what prejudice Gonzalez could have 
suffered from such conduct.  Gonzalez’s central contention 
seems to be that in the absence of the prosecution’s admonitions 
about providing truthful answers, the witnesses might have 
provided testimony that differed from what they had previously 
told the police.  But as the witnesses acknowledged at trial, they 
had made several recorded statements to law enforcement along 
with “a proffer under oath about things that occurred.”  Thus, 
had the witnesses testified in a manner that was inconsistent 
with what they told police, which is apparently what Gonzalez 
contends they would have done had the court and prosecutor not 
“interfered” with them, the prosecution would have been able to 
cross-examine them with their prior conflicting statements, 
many of which were made under oath.  The jury would therefore 
know their current testimony conflicted with prior statements 
they had made to law enforcement. 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
53 
 
7. The court did not improperly restrict cross-examination  
Gonzalez also argues the trial court violated his right to 
confrontation when it sustained objections during the cross-
examinations of Rowan and Celina.  We find no error.   
a. Background 
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Rowan 
if she was concerned “whether or not [she was] going to get a 
deal on [her] case” and if she was afraid of going to prison for 
three years.  She responded yes.  Defense counsel then asked, 
“You don’t want to go to prison for three years, do you?”  Rowan 
responded no. 
Defense counsel then asked Rowan, “So you’re trying to 
make sure that you say everything that the prosecutor wants 
you to say, aren’t you?”   The prosecution objected to the question 
as argumentative, and the trial court sustained the objection.  
Defense counsel attempted to reframe her question several 
times, asking Rowan if she was giving testimony that she 
thought would “be pleasing to the prosecutor”; whether she was 
“trying to make sure [she said] anything that the prosecution 
want[ed] [her] to say”; and whether she was concerned that she 
would spend three years in prison if the prosecution “is not in 
agreement with what [she] said.”  The trial court sustained 
objections to all these questions.  
During a sidebar, defense counsel explained she was 
trying to ask Rowan if the testimony she had provided on direct 
examination was “tainted by the fact that if the prosecutor [is] 
not in agreement, she will get her three years.”  The trial court 
stated, “You can ask her that.  That’s a different question. You 
can certainly ask her that, yes.”  Following the sidebar, defense 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
54 
counsel asked Rowan, “Is your testimony here today given in 
such a way that you feel will cause you not to get three years in 
state prison?”  Rowan answered yes.  Defense counsel then 
asked Rowan, “So you are concerned about what you say here 
today may affect you in terms of getting the three years in state 
prison?”  Again, Rowan answered yes.  
When cross-examining Celina, defense counsel engaged in 
a similar line of questioning, inquiring whether she was 
“concerned about [what] sentence [she] might get.”  Celina 
answered yes.  Defense counsel then asked, “And you want to 
agree with the prosecutor; isn’t that right?”  The prosecution 
objected to the question as argumentative, and the trial court 
sustained the objection.  Defense counsel asked Celina if the 
prosecution “has some control over what kind of sentence you 
get?”  The prosecution objected on relevance grounds and the 
trial court sustained the objection.  Defense counsel then asked 
Celina, “Do you feel that the prosecutor may make an argument 
at your sentencing time with respect to what sentence you may 
get?” Celina responded yes.  Counsel also asked her if she 
“want[ed] to give testimony that will help [her] out at [her] 
sentencing.”  Celina again answered yes.  
b. Discussion 
Gonzalez contends the trial court violated his right to 
confrontation by improperly limiting the cross-examination of 
Rowan and Celina.  (See People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 442, 476 [a defendant “possesses a fundamental right to 
confront the witnesses against [him].  [Citations.]  Cross-
examination is a cornerstone of that fundamental right”].)  To 
establish such a claim, Gonzalez must show he was “prohibited 
from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
55 
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the 
witness.”  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 
(Van Arsdall).)  A trial court maintains “ ‘wide latitude insofar 
as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose limits’ ” on 
cross-examination.  (People v. Mendez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 680, 703)  
“ ‘ “[U]nless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-
examination would have produced ‘a significantly different 
impression of [the witness’s] credibility’ [citation], the trial 
court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate 
the Sixth Amendment.” ’ ”  (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
393, 455–456.)   
Gonzalez argues the trial court improperly prevented 
counsel from asking questions that were intended to show the 
testimony Rowan and Celina provided on direct examination 
was meant to “please the prosecutor” so that the prosecutor 
“would not incarcerate them for three years.”  The record shows, 
however, that the defense was permitted to ask questions that 
elicited that very information.  After a sidebar, defense counsel 
was permitted to ask Rowan whether she was worried that her 
answers to the prosecutor’s questions might affect her “in terms 
of getting three years in state prison” and whether she had 
“given [her testimony] in such a way that . . . [would] cause [her] 
not to get three years in prison.”  She responded affirmatively to 
both questions.  Counsel was permitted to elicit similar 
testimony from Celina, inquiring whether the answers Celina 
had provided on direct examination had been made “to help 
[her]self out at [her] sentencing.”  Counsel was also permitted to 
ask Celina whether she “want[ed] to give testimony that [would] 
help [her] out at [her] sentencing.”  
Thus, the record makes clear defense counsel was allowed 
to ask Rowan and Celina questions that were intended to 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
56 
examine whether the answers they provided on direct 
examination were tainted by their desire to secure a lesser 
sentence.  While the trial court prohibited the defense from 
asking differently phrased questions that were meant to 
examine that same issue, we fail to see how those questions 
would have produced “a significantly different impression” (Van 
Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680) of the witnesses’ credibility. 
8. The trial court did not err in admitting Gonzalez’s 
statements regarding a crime involving a Mercedes  
 
Gonzalez argues the trial court should have excluded a 
video clip in which he and undercover detective Javier Clift were 
shown discussing a crime involving a Mercedes.  In an earlier 
portion of their recorded conversation (the admission of which 
Gonzalez has not contested), Clift and Gonzalez  discussed 
Gonzalez’s participation in a serious, possibly capital, offense 
that appeared to match the circumstances of Rosa’s murder.  In 
the clip Gonzalez challenges here, Clift asks Gonzalez why he 
was transferred from prison.  Gonzalez responded, “I hope it’s 
for the Mercedes.  I’ll be like, I’ll take it Your Honor.  Give it to 
me.  How much 7, 10, 15, 20?  Anything else.”  Clift and another 
detective who also heard Gonzalez discussing this crime both 
described it as a “carjacking.” 
Defense counsel argued the statements Gonzalez made in 
the clip were inadmissible because they referenced another 
crime that was unrelated to Rosa’s murder.  The prosecution, 
however, contended the statements qualified as a “form of 
admission.”  The trial court agreed, concluding that the evidence 
was intended to show “a guilty frame of mind in that he’s hoping 
his current incarceration is not for the murder of the named 
victim in this case, but for a car theft instead.  So that the other 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
57 
crimes evidence can be instructed away in the sense that the 
jury would be advised they are not to consider it, but only 
consider it as to his state of mind with respect to his knowledge 
of this crime.” In response, defense counsel argued the clip 
might be admissible if Gonzalez had referenced the murder, but 
he had only mentioned the carjacking.  The trial court disagreed, 
explaining, “Well its implicit.  It’s an adoptive admission.  Even 
if Gonzalez is not mentioning the murder, it is implicit that that 
is what the discussion is about.”  
On appeal, Gonzalez argues that the clip should have been 
excluded because: (1) it was not relevant to the charged crime; 
(2) the sole purpose of the evidence was to show Gonzalez’s bad 
character (see Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)); (3) Gonzalez’s 
statements did not qualify as adoptive admissions and therefore 
should have been excluded as hearsay; and (4) even if otherwise 
admissible, the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, 
and thus inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352.  We 
review each of these claims under the abuse of discretion 
standard.  (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655 [“On 
appeal, we review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on 
whether evidence is relevant, not unduly prejudicial, and thus 
admissible”]; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864 [“We 
review the admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 
1101 for an abuse of discretion”]; People v. Rogers (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 296, 326 (Rogers) [“ ‘ “Rulings made under [Evidence 
Code sections 1101 and 352, including those made at the guilt 
phase of a capital trial] are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion” ’ ”]; People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 139 
[“we apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
trial court’s decision that evidence falls within a hearsay 
exception”].) 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
58 
“Relevant evidence is evidence ‘having any tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.’ [Citation.] 
‘ “The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends, ‘logically, 
naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material 
facts such as identity, intent, or motive.” ’ ”  (People v. Wilson 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.)  We find no abuse of discretion in 
the trial court’s determination that, understood in context, 
Gonzalez’s statements regarding the carjacking tended to 
establish his identity as a participant in Rosa’s murder.  As 
explained above, the recordings showed that before Gonzalez 
referenced the carjacking, Clift and Gonzalez had been 
discussing a serious crime that matched the circumstances of 
Rosa’s murder.  The fact that Gonzalez subsequently expressed 
hope that he had been transferred to the prison for an unrelated 
carjacking and would be pleased to be facing a sentence of only 
20 years in prison, raises an inference that he committed the 
more serious crime he had been discussing with Clift.   
Moreover, contrary to Gonzalez’s assertions, the record 
makes clear there was a purpose for introducing his statements 
about the carjacking other than to show bad character or 
disposition to commit the charged offense.  As the trial court 
explained, the statements tended to show that Gonzalez 
believed the other crime he had committed, which matched the 
circumstances of Rosa’s shooting, was a more serious crime.  
(See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b) [“Nothing in this section 
prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a 
crime . . . when relevant to prove some fact (such as 
motive, . . . knowledge, [or] identity . . . ) other than his or her 
disposition to commit such an act”].)   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
59 
We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
decision to admit the statement as a form of admission.  While 
perhaps inaccurately described as an adoptive admission (which 
is generally understood to mean a “statement [made] by 
someone other than the defendant . . . if the defendant ‘with 
knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct 
manifested his adoption [of] or his belief in its truth’ ” (People v. 
Davis (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 510, 535)), the statement was clearly 
admissible under Evidence Code section 1220 as a “statement[] 
of a party.”  (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 
(Horning); see ibid. [declining to consider the defendant’s 
assertion that statement did not qualify as a “statement[] 
against interest” because the statement was “clearly” 
admissible as the “statement[] of a party”].)  While “sometimes 
referred to as the exception for admissions of a party,” Evidence 
Code section 1220 “covers all statements of a party, whether or 
not they might otherwise be characterized as admissions.”  
(Horning, at p. 898, fn. 5, italics omitted; see Davis, at p. 535 
[“[a] defendant’s own hearsay statements are admissible”].)  
Because Gonzalez was the declarant of the statement and the 
statement was offered against him, it was not inadmissible 
under the hearsay rules.  (See Horning, at p. 898 [hearsay rule 
does not bar statements when the “ ‘defendant was the 
declarant, the statements were offered against him, and he was 
a party to the action’ ”].) 
Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
determination that the evidence was more probative than 
prejudicial.  (See Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 326.)  
“ ‘Prejudice for purposes of Evidence Code section 352 means 
evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the 
defendant with very little effect on issues, not evidence that is 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
60 
probative of a defendant’s guilt.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 82, 133.)  Our courts have acknowledged that “[a] 
limiting instruction can ameliorate section 352 prejudice by 
eliminating the danger the jury could consider the evidence for 
an improper purpose.”  (People v. Hendrix (2013) 214 
Cal.App.4th 216, 247; see People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 1, 83 [juries are presumed to follow the trial court’s 
instructions].)   
In this case, the trial court acknowledged it would provide 
a limiting instruction directing the jury that evidence of other 
crimes was not relevant for bad character or predisposition.  
Moreover, the “other crime” referenced in the video clip was far 
less inflammatory than the murder Gonzalez was being tried 
for; indeed, Gonzalez’s videotaped statements described the 
incident involving the Mercedes as merely taking someone “for 
a little ride.”  (See People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 41 [“The 
danger of undue prejudice is . . . lessened if evidence of the 
uncharged acts was ‘no more inflammatory than the testimony 
concerning the charged offenses’ ”].)  Gonzalez, in turn, has 
provided no explanation why the probative value of this other 
crimes evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability 
that it would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.  
Instead, he merely states in conclusory fashion that the other 
crimes evidence would be more prejudicial than probative.  (Cf. 
Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 382 [“reject[ing] . . . conclusory” 
arguments raised in defendant’s brief]; People v. Sanghera 
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [“Perhaps the most 
fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment 
challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the 
appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error”].)  For all 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
61 
those reasons, Gonzalez has failed to establish the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting the clip.  
9. Gonzalez has failed to establish any error regarding the 
admission 
of 
oral 
testimony 
describing 
the 
conversations depicted in the video clips  
Gonzalez argues the trial court erred when it allowed 
several of the detectives who participated in the undercover 
operation to testify about the conversations depicted in the video 
clips that were shown to the jury.  The testimony was intended 
to provide context about how the conversations arose, clarify 
what was being discussed, and explain the meaning of certain 
slang terms.  As one example, the prosecution asked a testifying 
detective to identify who he understood Gonzalez to be talking 
about in a video clip where Gonzalez references “the White boy.”  
The detective testified that Gonzalez was referring to Flint and 
then explained his basis for that belief.  In another exchange, a 
detective was asked what he was referring to in a portion of a 
video where the detective was heard saying, “it’s got to come out 
sooner or later.”  The detective responded that he was referring 
to “the murder of Rosa,” and then explained that he had been 
talking about that subject with Gonzalez for the entire day.   The 
detectives also explained the meaning of certain slang terms like 
“hooda” (a police officer (see ante, at p. 5))  and “cappa” (a person 
who has committed a crime that would subject him to capital 
punishment (ibid.)). 
Gonzalez initially contends that the detectives’ testimony 
violated the “secondary evidence rule” (People v. Goldsmith 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 269), which generally prohibits the 
admission of oral testimony to prove the content of writings.  
(See Evid. Code, §§ 1521, 1523; People v. Panah (2005) 35 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
62 
Cal.4th 395, 475 (Panah) [a videotape is a writing for purposes 
of the secondary evidence rules].)  We disagree.   
First, it is undisputed that the jury was shown the 
writings in question (in this case videos), and Gonzalez has cited 
no case in which the secondary evidence rule was applied when 
the writing itself was admitted into evidence.  (See Panah, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 475 [“The purpose of the best evidence 
rule is ‘to minimize the possibilities of misinterpretation of 
writings by requiring the production of the original writings 
themselves, if available’ ”]; People v. Son (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 
689, 696 [“Defendant has not pointed to any case in which the 
secondary evidence rule was applied even though the writing 
itself was admitted into evidence, nor are we aware of any such 
case”].)  Second, as the trial court observed, the purpose of the 
detectives’ testimony was not to prove the actual words that 
were said in the video, but rather to give general context as to 
the subject matter of the conversations that were depicted in the 
recording and explain the meaning of some of the terms the 
speakers used.  (See Son, at p. 1170 [officer’s testimony 
“highlight[ing] important details” of a video were not intended 
to prove the content of the writing and thus did not violate 
secondary evidence rule].)   
Gonzalez separately contends that even if the secondary 
evidence rule is inapplicable, the detectives’ testimony 
describing the nature of the conversations shown on the videos 
“served only to ‘invade the province of the jury,’ which was 
perfectly capable of drawing their own conclusion” about the 
subject matter of those conversations.  Although Gonzalez has 
not identified exactly which statements he believes should have 
been excluded, we understand his claim to challenge those 
portions of the detectives’ testimony in which they conveyed 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
63 
what they understood Gonzalez to be discussing during certain 
parts of the video.17    
We will assume Gonzalez has preserved this claim and 
reject the argument on its merits.18  “A lay witness may testify 
to an opinion if it is rationally based on the witness’s perception 
and if it is helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.”  
(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 153, citing Evid. Code, 
§ 800.)  “A trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of 
[such] evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”   (People v. 
DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 131.)  The detectives’ description 
of what they understood Gonzalez to be discussing was based on 
the prior conversations they had overheard in the holding cell.  
Thus, the testimony was clearly predicated on their personal 
observations.  Moreover, the trial court could reasonably 
conclude such testimony aided the jury in understanding what 
the detectives believed they had observed.  Gonzalez has cited 
no authority finding similar testimony — i.e., witness 
 
17  
Gonzalez’s brief clarifies that he is not challenging the 
portion of the detectives’ testimony explaining “certain gang 
terms that had to be translated so that the jury could 
understand their meaning.”   
18  
Although Gonzalez’s brief cites to numerous pages in the 
trial transcript where defense counsel made objections during 
the detectives’ testimony, the record shows that most of those 
objections are unrelated to the argument he presents 
here (“objection, that’s vague”; “objection, that would be 
speculation”; “[this testimony] is cumulative”; “objection, 
leading”).  In only one instance did Gonzalez object to a 
statement on the basis that the witness had improperly 
conveyed “a conclusion.”  (See People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
197, 228 [“A general objection to the admission . . . of evidence, 
or one based on a different ground from that advanced at trial, 
does not preserve the claim for appeal”].)  
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
64 
statements that merely explain the context of a conversation — 
to be inadmissible.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court’s decision to admit what amounted to lay opinion 
testimony.   
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Gonzalez has failed to establish error with respect to the 
admission of his statements referencing other crimes  
 
Gonzalez challenges the admission at the penalty phase of 
two video clips recorded during the undercover operation.   
a. Background  
Gonzalez sought to exclude a video clip in which he made 
statements “concerning his participation in some otherwise 
unspecified carjacking involving a Mercedes.”  The defense 
objected on the grounds that: (1) the video was cumulative of 
evidence the prosecution had presented during the guilt phase; 
and (2) the evidence only tended to prove a general propensity 
to commit crime.  The prosecution argued the video was 
admissible as evidence of criminal activity involving the use of 
force (see § 190.3, factor (b)).  The trial court overruled the 
objection. 
Gonzalez also challenged the admission of a video clip in 
which he told an undercover officer he had been involved in 27 
armed robberies as a juvenile.  Defense counsel objected that 
although the video contained a statement in which Gonzalez 
referenced having committed 27 robberies, the prosecution only 
intended to introduce corroborating evidence of some of those 
incidents.  Counsel argued that because the prosecution had 
provided no “foundation for these so-called 27 robberies,” and 
could not “prove the corpus on all of these 27 robberies,” it was 
improper to admit a statement referencing that number of 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
65 
robberies.  The trial court agreed it was improper to include the 
portion of the statement referencing 27 robberies since the 
prosecution did not actually intend to prove each of those 
robberies.  The court provided the prosecution the option of 
deleting the reference to the number of robberies or excluding 
the clip altogether.  The prosecution explained that it intended 
to remove the portion of the clip referencing the number of 
robberies and defense counsel posited no further objection.  The 
prosecution thereafter played the two clips and presented 
several witnesses who testified about a carjacking involving 
Gonzalez and numerous robberies that he was believed to have 
committed. 
b.   Discussion 
On appeal, Gonzalez argues that that while evidence of 
criminal activity involving the use of force is generally 
admissible at the penalty phase (see § 190.3, factor (b)), the trial 
court should have excluded the video clips referencing the 
carjacking and the string of robberies under the corpus delicti 
rule, which applies to the use of factor (b) crimes.  (See Valencia, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 296–297; see ante, at pp. 15–16  
[explaining the corpus delicti rule].)  According to Gonzalez, the 
prosecution failed to identify any evidence apart from his own 
statements indicating that the carjacking or the robberies 
actually occurred. 
The Attorney General argues that Gonzalez has forfeited 
any argument that such evidence was inadmissible under the 
corpus delicti rule because he failed to raise any such objection 
at the trial court.  We agree that Gonzalez has forfeited the 
particular claims he raises here.  Regarding the recorded 
statements referencing a carjacking, defense counsel never 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
66 
raised a corpus delicti objection.  (See Horning, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 899 [defendant forfeited argument that “the 
prosecution did not establish the corpus delicti of the [uncharged 
offense]”].)   
Regarding the video referencing the robberies, defense 
counsel made it clear he was objecting to the portion of the video 
in which Gonzalez stated that he had committed 27 robberies.  
Such evidence was improper, defense counsel asserted, because 
the prosecution only intended to present independent evidence 
of some of those robberies, and thus “could not prove the corpus 
on all . . . 27 robberies.”  The trial court agreed and made the 
prosecution remove the reference to the number of robberies.  If 
defense counsel believed this was an insufficient remedy, and 
that the video clip should be excluded even with that 
modification, it had a duty to raise that argument with the court.     
Moreover, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to 
establish the corpus delicti of both a carjacking and multiple 
robberies.  Regarding the carjacking, the prosecution presented 
testimony from a victim who stated that he had been taken to a 
house where he was carjacked.  A detective testified the victim 
of the carjacking had picked Gonzalez out of a photo array.  
When describing the carjacking incident to undercover agents, 
Gonzalez had stated that the carjacking victim had been 
brought to a house, which matched the victim’s description of 
the incident.  Finally, Rowan testified that after Gonzalez had 
told her about the carjacking, she had seen him driving a car 
that was similar in appearance to the one he had described to 
her.   
Regarding Gonzalez’s admission that he had committed 
robberies as a juvenile, the prosecution presented testimony 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
67 
from numerous victims who were robbed at gunpoint along with  
testimony from an investigating officer verifying that several of 
the victims had identified Gonzalez as the perpetrator.  (See 
ante, at p. 10.)  This evidence justified the admission of 
Gonzalez’s statement that he had committed multiple 
robberies.19 
2. The improper aspects of the victim impact video were 
harmless  
Gonzalez challenges the admission of an eight-minute 
video in which Rosa’s friends and colleagues provided emotional 
statements lauding their relationship with her and describing 
the pain and loss they experienced from her death.  Many of the 
participants spoke from a cemetery with music playing in the 
background.  At times, the audio of the participant’s tributes 
was juxtaposed with photos of Rosa.  Several of the participants 
in the video also provided victim impact testimony during the 
penalty phase of the trial.   
 
In assessing Gonzalez’s objection to the video, the trial 
court explained that it did “not find [the video] dramatic or of 
the sort that would cause one to cry,” nor did the video contain 
 
19  
Gonzalez’s contention that his admissions regarding the 
carjacking and his prior robberies should have been excluded 
also appears to rely on an aspect of the corpus delicti rule that 
has been abrogated.  As noted above (see ante, at p. 16, fn. 3), 
we have previously held that article I, section 28, subdivision (d) 
of the California Constitution abrogated the corpus delicti rule 
“insofar as [it] restricts the admissibility of incriminatory 
extrajudicial statements by the accused.”  (Valencia, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 297, italics added.)  Thus, the rule no longer 
operates to exclude evidence of a defendant’s extrajudicial 
statements.  (Ibid. [“the corpus delicti rule no longer prevents 
admission of the confession”].)  
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
68 
“irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverted 
the jury’s attention from its proper role or invite an irrational, 
purely subjective response.”  In the court’s view, the video was 
not “highly emotional in any sense.  None of [the people in the 
video] seemed anything other than smiling and happy 
reminiscing about a lost friend or lost relative depending upon 
who was talking.”  The court also rejected the argument that 
individuals in the video were cumulative of those same 
witnesses testifying in court.   
Although we have not adopted any “bright-line rules” 
(People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1288) “pertaining to the 
admissibility of videotape recordings of victim interviews” 
(ibid.), we have warned that “courts must exercise great caution 
in permitting the prosecution to present victim-impact evidence 
in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the 
victim” (id. at p. 1289).  While it is appropriate to use a video 
“ ‘ “ ‘reminding the sentencer . . . [that] the victim is an 
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society’ ” 
[citation], . . . the prosecution may not introduce irrelevant or 
inflammatory material that “ ‘diverts the jury’s attention from 
its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective 
response.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 794 
(Kelly).)  We have highlighted some characteristics of victim 
impact videos that can be especially problematic:  “Particularly 
if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes 
the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring 
music, the medium itself may assist in creating an emotional 
impact upon the jury that goes beyond what the jury might 
experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or listening 
to the victim’s bereaved parents.”  (Prince, at p. 1289.)  Whether 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
69 
the admission of such evidence constitutes error must be 
considered “under the circumstances” of each case.  (Ibid.)   
While we normally review for ourselves the content of such 
videos, we accord some deference to the trial court’s decision to 
admit the tape when, as here, the record confirms that the court 
viewed the videotape, considered its possible improper 
emotional effects and exercised its discretion to allow it.  (See 
People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 366 (Zamudio).)  
Where the videotape includes impermissible elements, we 
assess whether those elements separated from the permissible 
features of the videotape prejudiced defendant.  (See Kelly, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 798–799.)   
We have viewed the videotape and find that it does contain 
some improper features.  The music in the video has no apparent 
relevance other than to enhance the emotional effect of the 
video.  (See People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 442 
(Sandoval) [“because background music in victim impact 
presentations provides no relevant information and is 
potentially prejudicial, it is never permitted”]; Kelly, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 798.)  Many of the individuals in the video offering 
testimonials are in a cemetery, and the camera moves toward 
them at times to draw attention to their emotional responses.  
(See ibid. [“Trial courts must not permit irrelevant . . . video 
techniques 
that 
enhance 
the 
emotion 
of 
the 
factual 
presentation”; “The videotape must . . . not present a ‘staged 
and contrived presentation’ ”].)  Because these features of the 
video had no apparent purpose other than to increase the 
viewer’s emotional response, the trial court should have ordered 
the prosecution to remove them.   
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
70 
However, “we find ‘no reasonable possibility’ that the jury 
would have reached a different penalty verdict if [these 
objectionable features] had been omitted.”  (Sandoval, supra, 62 
Cal. 4th at p. 442.)  During the penalty phase, the prosecution 
presented 
voluminous 
testimony 
from 
many 
witnesses 
describing numerous violent crimes that Gonzalez had 
perpetrated against them.  Those crimes involved a string of 
armed robberies that occurred in 1994, two shootings that 
occurred in 2006 (one of which left the victim with five bullet 
wounds), an armed carjacking and an attack on a prison guard.  
(See ante, at pp. 10–11.)  Moreover, apart from the victim impact 
video, the jury heard extensive in-person victim impact 
testimony from coworkers, friends and family members, some of 
whom also appeared in the video.  Those witnesses described, 
among other things, Rosa’s strong work ethic, her bright and 
kind personality, her willingness to help other people and their 
profound sense of loss when she was killed.  Rosa’s partner 
described how they met, their life together and their plans for 
adopting a child.  Rosa’s sister described their close relationship 
and Rosa’s early life.  (See ante, at p. 12.)  Accordingly, even 
without the video, the jury would have heard much of the same 
type of emotional testimony.  Given all this evidence, “we see no 
reasonable possibility [that the objectionable] portions of the 
videotape affected the penalty determination.”  (Kelly, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 799.)20 
 
 
20  
Gonzalez also argues that the video impermissibly called 
for vengeance. Because the video contains no explicit calls for 
vengeance, we reject the claim.  (See Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
p. 797 [“the tape expressed no outrage over her death, just 
implied sadness.  It contained no clarion call for vengeance”].) 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
71 
3. Constitutionality of the death penalty  
Gonzalez challenges the constitutionality of California’s 
death penalty statute and implementing statutes on numerous 
grounds that we have previously rejected.  We decline to 
reconsider our previous holdings that:  
(i) “ ‘[T]he California death penalty statute is not 
impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court’ ”  (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
166, 267 (Dalton));  
(ii) “ ‘section 190.3, factor (a), on its face or as interpreted 
and applied, [does not] permit arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of a sentence of death’ ” (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 267);  
(iii) “ ‘[t]he death penalty statute does not lack safeguards 
to avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing . . . or constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment on the ground that it does not 
require either unanimity as to the truth of aggravating 
circumstances or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 
(b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.’  [Citation]  Nothing in Hurst v. Florida 
(2016) 577 U.S. [92] . . . , Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 
U.S. 
270 . . . , Blakely 
v. 
Washington 
(2004) 
542 
U.S. 
296, . . . , Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 . . . ., or Apprendi 
v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 . . . , affects our conclusions in 
this regard” (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 267); 
 (iv) “ ‘[w]ritten findings by the jury during the penalty 
phase are not constitutionally required, and their absence does 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
72 
not deprive defendant of meaningful appellate review’ ” (Dalton, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 268);  
(v) “ ‘[t]he federal constitutional guarantees of due process 
and equal protection, and against cruel and unusual 
punishment [citations], do not require intercase proportionality 
review on appeal’ ” (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 268);  
(vi) “ ‘ “capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly 
situated and therefore may be treated differently without 
violating” a defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws, due 
process of law, or freedom from cruel and unusual punishment’ ” 
(Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 268);  
(vii) “ ‘ “[t]he death penalty as applied in this state is not 
rendered unconstitutional through operation of international 
laws and treaties” ’ ” (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 268);  
(viii) “the trial court [is not] constitutionally required to 
instruct the jury that section 190.3’s mitigating factors [can] be 
considered only as mitigating factors and the absence of 
evidence supporting any one should not be viewed as an 
aggravating factor” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 570). 
C. Cumulative Error  
Gonzalez contends the cumulative effect of errors at the 
guilt and penalty phase requires reversal.  As discussed above, 
for purposes of the guilt phase, we have assumed that the 
admission of portions of Juli Watkins’s testimony regarding the 
DNA evidence was error but conclude that any such error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  There are no other errors 
to cumulate with respect to guilt. 
For purposes of the penalty phase, we have found that 
certain aspects of the victim impact video submitted at the 
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
73 
penalty phase may have been unduly emotional or cumulative 
of other testimony but conclude that any error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  There are no other errors to 
cumulate with respect to penalty.21 
III. DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.  
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
21   
Although Gonzalez’s opening brief asserts that “guilt 
phase errors that may not be prejudicial to the guilt phase may 
nevertheless improperly and adversely impact the jury’s penalty 
determination,” he has provided no argument or explanation 
regarding how any of the purported errors that he contends were 
committed 
in 
the 
guilt 
phase 
impacted 
the 
penalty 
determination.  (See People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 
378 [rejective cumulative error claim where defendant failed to 
show how error that “had no impact on the guilt verdict” “could 
have affected the penalty phase verdict”].)   
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Gonzalez 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S163643 
Date Filed:  December 2, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County: Los Angeles  
Judge: Joan Comparet-Cassani 
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Glen Niemy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. 
Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Jaime L. 
Fuster, Eric J. Kohm and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Glen Niemy 
11 Prescott Street #2 
Salem, MA 01970 
(207) 699-9713 
 
Lindsay Boyd 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6012