Title: People v. Young
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S148462
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 25, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JEFFREY SCOTT YOUNG, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S148462 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD173300 
 
 
July 25, 2019 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
S148462 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Defendant Jeffrey Scott Young was convicted of the first 
degree murders of Teresa Perez and Jack Reynolds (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a)), the attempted murder of Daniel Maman (id., 
§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and the carjacking of Jim Gagarin (id., 
§ 215, subd. (a)).  The jury found true allegations that 
defendant had personally used a firearm (all counts; id., 
§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), (a)(2), 12022.53, subd. (b)); that 
defendant had personally and intentionally discharged a 
firearm (the first degree murders and attempted murder; id., 
§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and that the firearm discharge caused 
death (the first degree murders; id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)).  The 
jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that 
the murders were committed during a robbery (id., §§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17), 211), and that defendant had been convicted of 
multiple murders in the same proceeding (id., § 190.2, subd. 
(a)(3)).  The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to penalty, 
and the trial court declared a mistrial.  After a penalty retrial, 
the jury fixed the penalty at death, and the trial court entered 
a judgment of death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)   
We affirm the judgment as to guilt.  But we find the trial 
court erred at the penalty retrial by permitting the prosecution 
to make improper use of inflammatory character evidence for 
purposes unrelated to any legitimate issue in the proceeding.  
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
 
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the error 
was prejudicial.  We therefore reverse the judgment as to the 
sentence of death and remand the matter for a new penalty 
determination. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
On July 18, 1999, defendant and two other men robbed a 
Five Star Park, Shuttle & Fly (“Five Star”) parking lot near 
the San Diego International Airport.  The three robbers were 
aided by a former Five Star employee, James Torkelson, who 
planned the robbery and assisted in it by pretending to be on 
duty.  During the robbery, the robbers shot and killed Five 
Star employees Teresa Perez and Jack Reynolds.  Then, while 
fleeing the scene, the robbers shot at bystander Daniel Maman 
and stole the car of a second bystander, Jim Gagarin, at 
gunpoint. 
Although the case initially went cold, subsequent 
investigation revealed the identities of the perpetrators.  In 
2003, defendant was jointly charged with one of the other 
robbers, David Raynoha, but defendant was tried alone.  
Defendant did not contest his participation in the robbery or 
the carjacking, but argued that he did not fire the shots that 
killed Perez and Reynolds. 
1.  Prosecution Case 
 
Around 12:30 a.m. on July 18, 1999, Kendrick Bowman 
began a shift in the toll booth at the Five Star parking lot, 
which was located at the intersection of Sassafras Street and 
Pacific Highway.  Bowman relieved fellow employee Perez, 
whom he saw empty the cash drawer and head to the Five Star 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
 
 
temporary office in a nearby trailer.  Shortly after he began his 
shift, Bowman encountered Torkelson.  Bowman was surprised 
by Torkelson’s presence; he thought Torkelson, who had 
worked as a security guard at the parking lot, had been fired, 
and Torkelson was atypically early for his shift.  Bowman also 
noticed Torkelson heading for a remote side of the parking lot, 
which differed from the usual starting point for Torkelson’s 
rounds.   
 
Immediately after Torkelson disappeared from Bowman’s 
line of sight, someone approached Bowman from behind and 
said, “Hey, you.”  Bowman turned around and found a man 
pointing a gun at him.  Although the gunman wore nylon 
stockings over his head, Bowman observed that the gunman 
was a White man in his twenties with a fair complexion and 
short, reddish-blonde hair.  The gunman ordered Bowman to 
lay facedown on the floor of the toll booth.  Bowman used his 
hand-held radio to send a covert distress signal to the security 
guard, but received no response.  Unbeknownst to Bowman, all 
of the security guards had left after Torkelson told each guard 
that he was there to relieve him or her.  Bowman then 
complied with the gunman’s demand.  The gunman stepped 
down on Bowman’s back, emptied the cash drawer, and 
expressed disappointment at its contents.  The gunman 
remained in the toll booth and Bowman asked him why he did 
not leave.  The gunman responded, “I can’t leave.  I’m waiting 
for my ride.”  
 
Bowman heard the door to the bathroom near the trailer 
open, and the gunman yelled at someone to go into the trailer.  
Bowman assumed the gunman was yelling at Perez, since she 
had been heading to the trailer.  Bowman then heard one 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
 
gunshot, followed by a series of shots after a brief pause.  The 
gunman standing over him then fled toward Pacific Highway.  
Bowman stood up and saw the gunman clearly; he also saw 
two other men running in the same direction.  Bowman then 
called 911.   
 
Maman, who had plans to spend the night with Perez, 
arrived at the Five Star parking lot a few minutes after 12:30 
a.m. to pick her up.  Maman was driving a green van.  As 
Maman was parking the van near the trailer, he saw two men 
come out of the trailer.  One of the men aimed a revolver at 
him and started firing.  Maman immediately drove away.  
Maman described the gunman as being approximately five feet 
seven inches tall, and wearing a stocking over his head.   
 
Around the same time, Gagarin was retrieving his car 
from Park & Ride, a parking lot across Pacific Highway from 
the Five Star parking lot.  He stopped at the Park & Ride exit 
booth, which was manned by Michael Mackey.  Gagarin and 
Mackey first heard noises coming from the Five Star parking 
lot that Mackey dismissed as firecrackers, followed by noises 
that sounded more like gunshots.  Gagarin and Mackey then 
saw a dark van leave the Five Star parking lot, followed by 
three men running towards the Park & Ride parking lot from 
the Five Star parking lot.  The first man to arrive at the Park 
& Ride parking lot was armed and ran past the exit booth.  The 
second and third men fired shots behind them before running 
up to the exit booth.  Gagarin and Mackey both testified that 
the men were White and wore dark clothing, dark caps and 
nylon stockings over their faces.  The shorter of the two men 
pointed a gun at Mackey and demanded the car, while the 
taller man pointed a silver-colored gun at Gagarin.  Both 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
 
Gagarin and Mackey raised their hands in surrender, and 
Gagarin told the assailants to take his car.  The assailants 
then exited the lot, heading east on Sassafras Street.  Just as 
they left, the dark van that Gagarin and Mackey had seen 
driving away from the Five Star parking lot pulled into the 
Park & Ride parking lot.  The driver asked if they were all 
right and told them that there had been shots fired at the Five 
Star parking lot and he believed that the shots were aimed at 
him.  Mackey then called 911.  At the preliminary hearing, 
Mackey “felt 75 percent sure” that defendant was the shorter 
gunman.1 
 
San Diego Police Department officers arrived within 
minutes of Bowman’s call.  Before they arrived, Bowman had 
entered the trailer and discovered the bodies of Perez and 
Reynolds facedown on the ground with multiple gunshot 
wounds to the back of their heads.  Bowman did not touch 
anything, having recognized that Perez and Reynolds were 
dead.  When the officers arrived, they checked both victims for 
signs of life but found none. 
 
A homicide investigation team from the San Diego Police 
Department also responded to the scene.  Members of the team 
discovered that the telephone lines and computer power cord in 
                                        
1 
At trial, the prosecution presented the evidence of the 
following physical characteristics of defendant and the other 
robbers:  (1) defendant is five feet six inches or five feet seven 
inches, weighs 160 pounds, and has brown hair; (2) Max 
Anderson is six feet two inches, weighs 175 pounds, and has 
brown hair; and (3) David Raynoha is six feet, weighs 175 
pounds, and has red hair. 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
 
the trailer had been cut.  They found two bullet casings fired 
by a Glock nine-millimeter semiautomatic firearm:  one near 
Perez’s arms and another by Reynolds’s head.  They also 
recovered four fired bullets:  (1) a .38-caliber revolver round 
fired from inside the trailer, leaving a bullet hole in the trailer 
wall; (2) a .38-caliber revolver round near Perez’s body, and 
(3) two Glock rounds near Reynolds’s body.  They also found 
bullet holes in the carpet under the victims’ heads, which 
indicated that the victims had been shot while lying facedown.  
There were no signs of a struggle, and the safe was open.  
Perez’s car was found inside the Five Star parking lot.  A nine-
millimeter Glock cartridge was found on the ground outside 
the car, and a Glock bullet, which was used to shatter the 
passenger window, was found lodged in the driver’s seat.  A 
bank deposit bag containing $1,512 in cash and a deposit slip 
for a $2,457 deposit were recovered in the front seat.  A roll of 
duct tape was also found.  A strand of hair found on the tape 
was later tested; testing revealed the DNA belonged to Max 
Anderson, who would later be identified as one of the robbers.   
 
Gagarin’s car was discovered less than a mile from the 
Five Star parking lot.  A nine-millimeter bullet casing was 
found on the ground outside the car, and a Glock containing 12 
live nine-millimeter cartridges was found on the front 
passenger seat.  Ballistics testing confirmed that all of the 
nine-millimeter casings from the trailer matched the magazine 
in Gagarin’s car.  Dr. Christopher Swalwell examined the 
bodies at the scene on the night of the robbery and performed 
autopsies the next morning.  Dr. Swalwell concluded that both 
victims died from gunshot wounds to the back of the head.  
Perez had two gunshot wounds, one on each side of her head, 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
 
caused by a .357 magnum or a .38-caliber revolver.  Reynolds 
had three gunshot wounds, one in his right arm and two to his 
head, caused by a nine-millimeter Glock handgun.  Based on 
the nature of the wounds and position of the bodies, 
Dr. Swalwell concluded that both Perez and Reynolds had been 
shot in the back of the head while lying facedown with their 
arms over their heads.  And based on a distinct star-shaped 
tearing around the entry point of each gunshot wound and the 
presence of soot within each wound, Dr. Swalwell also 
concluded that the gunshot wounds were contact wounds, 
meaning that the barrel of the gun was pressed against the 
victims’ skin at the time of discharge.   Steve Simmonds, the 
operations manager of the Five Star parking lot, testified that 
he initially believed that approximately $3,400 was taken in 
the robbery.  But with the bank deposit bag recovered from 
Perez’s car, Simmonds estimated that the total monetary loss 
was approximately $2,000.  Simmonds also testified that it was 
company policy that all employees were to comply and not 
resist in the event of a robbery.  
 
Detective Stephen McDonald testified that the case went 
cold for three years until he contacted Paula Daleo, Torkelson’s 
girlfriend at the time of the robbery.  Daleo disclosed two 
incidents that connected defendant to the robbery.  First, the 
night before the robbery, Torkelson brought four men back to 
their home:  a man known to her as “Li’l Jeff,” Raynoha, and 
two others.  Daleo did not know Li’l Jeff’s last name, but 
recognized him from frequent hangouts with Torkelson.  Li’l 
Jeff also had two distinct tattoos:  one on his arm that said 
“Nigger Thrasher” and another on his neck that depicted the 
hammer of the Norse god Thor.  After the robbery, Torkelson 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
 
and Li’l Jeff went to Tempe, Arizona to stay with a man named 
Jason Getscher.  At trial, Daleo identified defendant as Li’l 
Jeff.   
 
The second incident occurred about a year after the 
robbery, when Daleo attended a party in Li’l Jeff’s home in 
June 2000.  Daleo recalled a general discussion of the robbery, 
in which Torkelson was described as the organizer of the 
robbery, and Li’l Jeff and Raynoha were described as 
participants.  Someone said the killings during the robbery 
took place because “Jeff got trigger happy.”  Li’l Jeff responded, 
“No, I did not,” but did not deny involvement with the robbery. 
 
Based on the information obtained from Daleo, Detective 
McDonald contacted Getscher.  At the time, Getscher was 
serving a term in Arizona state prison for forgery.  Getscher 
explained that he met defendant during an earlier prison term 
in 1996.  Because he was 10 years defendant’s senior, Getscher 
sought to protect defendant inside prison and keep him out of 
trouble after they were released.  Defendant, Anderson, and 
Torkelson stayed in Getscher’s house immediately before the 
robbery.  During their stay, defendant, Anderson, and 
Torkelson discussed robbing a business where Torkelson 
worked as a security guard.  Getscher was present when the 
three men discussed their plans and left to commit the robbery 
and when they all returned to Getscher’s home.  Torkelson 
repeatedly warned defendant not to say anything.   
 
On a subsequent occasion, defendant told Getscher that 
the robbery had not gone well and that defendant had shot 
someone.  Getscher also saw defendant attempting to lace his 
boots with red laces.  Getscher explained that he and 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
 
defendant were skinheads in prison, and that in skinhead 
culture “red laces would indicate that you have drawn the 
blood of an enemy.”  Defendant insisted that he had earned the 
laces, but Getscher disagreed because defendant had “killed an 
innocent victim and that he didn’t kill an enemy that was 
trying to get him.”  Getscher also noticed a cut on defendant’s 
hand, which defendant explained was a burn from putting his 
hand over the barrel of the gun to silence the gunshots. 
 
Getscher agreed to call defendant from prison and get 
him to talk about the robbery while Detective McDonald 
recorded the conversation.  This arrangement resulted in two 
recorded conversations.  In the first conversation, which took 
place on October 28, 2002, Getscher referred to the “stupid 
little stunt” and “escapade” that defendant, “James,” and 
“Max” had participated in two to three years earlier.  
Defendant did not deny his involvement.  In the second 
conversation, which took place on November 26, 2002, 
Getscher told defendant that he was building a small team for 
a bank heist and would allow defendant to join so long as 
defendant told him “what happened before,” so he could be 
sure “it ain’t happenin’ again.”  Getscher also indicated that 
whoever “did it” on the last job would not be participating in 
the bank heist.  Defendant identified the participants in the 
Five Star parking lot robbery as himself, Torkelson, and 
Anderson.  Defendant described the robbery as poorly planned 
by Torkelson, but defendant also admitted that he had been 
affected by nerves and adrenaline.  Defendant explained that 
the three men had “covered up” to hide their identities, but 
forgot to bring materials to tie up the victims.  As the robbery 
got out of hand, “it happened.”  Getscher asked who started the 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
 
 
gunfire, and defendant responded, “I, I was the first one that 
fired.”  Defendant explained that panic and adrenaline led him 
to open fire and he was “thinkin’ they’re gonna get away, fuck, 
I don’t want to go down.”  Getscher asked if Anderson had shot 
the woman during the robbery.  Defendant responded, “Nah, 
that was me.”  Defendant explained that “everything was just 
going wrong [and] the next thing I know I just did it.  I don’t 
know.  It just kind of happened.”  Anderson fired his weapon 
after defendant fired his.  As defendant and Anderson left the 
trailer, defendant also fired at someone in a car and at some 
man in a “box thing” in the parking lot because he thought one 
of them had seen him.  Defendant explained that the escape 
plan fell apart when the key broke in the ignition of the 
getaway vehicle, and everyone scattered.  The robbery yielded 
very little because “most of the stuff got left behind.”  Getscher 
and defendant also discussed the red laces:  Defendant told 
Getscher that he understood why he did not earn the laces 
during the robbery and assured Getscher that he would not 
overreact in a subsequent heist.   
 
After these recorded calls, defendant was arrested.  
While in custody, Detective McDonald played a portion of the 
second recorded call for defendant.  When asked if he wanted 
to tell his side of the story, defendant responded, “You heard it 
all,” and “I ain’t gonna talk about it no more.” 
2.  Defense Case 
 
Defendant did not call any witnesses and rested on the 
record.  In closing argument, defense counsel conceded that 
defendant was in the trailer during the robbery and 
participated in carjacking Gagarin.  Defense counsel argued 
that defendant did not shoot Perez and that Anderson instead 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
 
shot both Perez and Reynolds.  Defense counsel acknowledged 
that defendant had claimed responsibility for shooting Perez in 
his second recorded conversation with Getscher, but argued 
that defendant was merely posturing to impress Getscher.  
Further, counsel argued, this conversation revealed that 
defendant acted out of panic, nerves, and adrenaline, and that 
he lacked the intent to kill.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
At the first penalty phase trial, the jury had been unable 
to reach a verdict and the trial court declared a mistrial on 
November 10, 2005.  The penalty phase retrial began several 
months later, on June 19, 2006.   
1.  Prosecution’s Case in Aggravation 
 
The prosecution called witnesses from the guilt phase to 
describe the robbery, defendant’s role in the robbery murders, 
and the forensic evidence.  The prosecution also presented 
evidence of defendant’s attitude following the robbery murders.  
Getscher testified about defendant’s attempt to put red laces in 
his boots as a mark of having “dr[awn] the blood of an enemy.”  
Getscher took the laces away, telling defendant that he had not 
earned them because the laces were only for killing non-White 
“enem[ies].”  Defendant responded, “Oh, I earned them. . . .  It 
was a Mexican.”   
 
The prosecution presented victim impact evidence from 
family, friends, and coworkers of Perez and Reynolds, who 
described how the victims’ deaths affected them.  The 
prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s participation in 
three prior crimes:  (1) an attempted theft at an Arizona bank 
in July 1999; (2) an attack on inmate Robert Harger while 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
 
defendant was incarcerated during trial; and (3) an assault on 
Lee Alvin committed during a robbery of an Arizona 
convenience store in 1992.   
2.  Defense’s Case in Mitigation  
 
Members 
of 
defendant’s 
family, 
including 
his 
grandmother, aunts, uncle, and parents, testified about 
hardships defendant had encountered growing up.  Defendant’s 
parents separated when he was one year old, and defendant 
had no contact with his father until he was around 12 years 
old.  Defendant struggled with learning and was placed in 
special education classes.  When defendant was nine years old, 
he was sexually abused by his older cousin.  Defendant’s father 
began giving him alcohol as an infant and later introduced him 
to drugs as an adolescent.  Defendant spent some time in an 
adolescent psychiatric hospital and a drug rehabilitation 
center.  Defendant was a nonviolent person and a loving and 
attentive father to his son and stepdaughter.  Defendant 
accepted responsibility for the crimes he committed in Arizona.  
After the trial court ruled that this evidence of defendant’s 
good character opened the door for the prosecution to introduce 
evidence of defendant’s racist tattoos and affiliations in 
rebuttal, some family members testified they were “confused” 
by his racist tattoos because, to their knowledge, he was “never 
really racist.”  Defendant obtained a GED while in prison in 
Arizona and subsequently learned welding to support his 
family.  Defendant called two acquaintances who knew him in 
a professional capacity; they testified that defendant was a 
hard worker who had no problems with coworkers of other 
races.  The founding director of the Center for Children of 
Incarcerated Parents testified about the ability of parents who 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
 
are incarcerated to have a meaningful role in their children’s 
lives.   
 
Aaron Beek, an inmate who participated in the attack on 
inmate Harger when defendant was awaiting trial, attested to 
being the only one who physically attacked Harger; defendant, 
Beek testified, was not present during the assault.  But Beek 
acknowledged authoring a letter in which he said he pleaded 
guilty to the assault to “take the charges off . . . [his] comrade 
Jeff.”  At trial Beek explained, “I don’t feel comfortable letting 
[defendant] get charged with something I did.”  On cross-
examination, the prosecution presented Beek with another 
letter confiscated by jail officials and signed in defendant’s 
name that bragged about being a member of the “American 
Front” and the “shot-caller” for the Caucasian prisoners in jail.  
Beek claimed to have authored this letter as well.   
 
An officer who investigated the attack on Harger testified 
that although Harger identified defendant as being present 
during his assault, Harger misidentified defendant’s hair color 
and name.  A family therapist characterized defendant as a 
“follower” who is “highly susceptible to the influence of others.”  
The therapist noted that the sexual molestation that defendant 
suffered, as well as his early exposure to alcohol, may have 
affected his development and led to later alcohol and drug 
abuse problems.  The therapist testified that defendant became 
a skinhead for two reasons:  (1) to achieve a sense of belonging 
as he felt like an outsider in his family, and (2) as a means of 
self-preservation in prison.  In response to questioning about 
what values might have attracted defendant to “the skinhead 
philosophy,” 
the 
therapist 
testified 
that 
the 
values 
“incorporat[e] not only the negative ones that we associate with 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
 
it, but also ones that have to do with honor, respect, loyalty, 
fidelity to one’s group, a sort of misguided protection of the 
common man . . . and a lot of pride.” 
3.  The Prosecution’s Rebuttal 
 
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence in 
accordance with the trial court’s ruling that testimony by 
defendant’s grandmother supporting his good character could 
be rebutted with evidence of defendant’s racist tattoos and 
affiliations.  Deputies investigating the assault on Harger 
testified that the day after the assault they found a Celtic rune 
above defendant’s cell door and a swastika outside his cell, 
both apparently drawn in blood.  Police officers who had 
interacted with defendant in 1999 testified about defendant’s 
tattoos, which included the phrase “Nigger Thrasher,” a 
swastika, and the number “88.”  Joanna Mendelson, the 
director of investigative research at the Southern California 
branch of the Anti-Defamation League, testified about the 
origins and ideology of skinheads generally and the American 
Front and Aryan Nations groups specifically.  Mendelson 
explained that skinheads adhere to a religion known as 
Odinism, which provides skinheads in prison the “opportunity 
to congregate” in order to “conduct criminal activity and 
violence.”  Mendelson reviewed defendant’s tattoos and 
symbols on letters he had written and explained their meaning 
within skinhead culture, identifying several as “inherently 
racist symbol[s].”   
4.  The Defense’s Surrebuttal 
 
Two Hispanic inmates housed in the same jail as 
defendant testified that defendant never expressed any 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
 
support for racial violence and got along with inmates of other 
races.  A sheriff’s department sergeant who investigated the 
assault on Harger testified that an informant identified Beek 
and an inmate named Britain as the “shot-caller[s]” for the 
Caucasian inmates.  The informant witnessed Britain 
sharpening the shanks later recovered from the attack on 
Harger, Beek looking nervous outside his own jail cell when 
the attack occurred, and Beek washing his hands after the 
attack.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Claims 
1.  Admission of Statement Given in Response to 
Police Questioning 
After defendant was arrested, he was interviewed by 
Detective McDonald.  Deferring defendant’s repeated requests 
for “his rights,” Detective McDonald instead began the 
interrogation by playing the tape of defendant’s conversation 
with Getscher, in which defendant described the circumstances 
of the robbery and admitted to fatally shooting Perez.  Then, 
after reading defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), Detective McDonald asked if 
defendant wished to tell his side of the story.  Defendant 
responded, “You heard it all,” before asking for an attorney and 
terminating the interrogation.  Defendant argues this 
statement should have been excluded under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well as 
under state evidence law, and that the failure to exclude the 
statement calls for reversal.  We find no reversible error. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
 
a.  Background 
Detective McDonald interviewed defendant on March 20, 
2003.  After confirming defendant’s name and address, 
Detective McDonald explained that defendant was in custody 
“regarding a 1999 murder case we revisited” and asked if 
defendant knew “James Torkelson.”  Defendant expressed 
uncertainty, 
and 
Detective 
McDonald 
responded 
that 
“[Torkelson]’s up in prison right now.  He’s looking at thirty 
years and he’s looking for deals and he gave us some 
information regarding a murder case in 1999.  It happened at 
[a] Park and Ride, Airport Park and Ride.”  Defendant 
confirmed he knew Torkelson as “Woody.”  
Detective McDonald explained that Torkelson and 
another 
individual 
had 
given 
law 
enforcement 
“some 
information,” and so “things are starting to fall apart on this 
whole operation you guys were . . . involved in.”  Detective 
McDonald further explained that Torkelson was “doing thirty 
years” and “wants a deal,” but that “[w]e’re not sure we want to 
deal with him.”  The conversation then continued as follows: 
“MCDONALD:  . . . But we want to hear, this would 
be your opportunity to tell us your side of the story.  We 
do have other evidence too.  We have a tape here that I 
could play for you if you want to hear that.  But I just 
want to know would you like to tell us your side of the 
story what happened at this lot?   
“YOUNG:  After I get my rights.  
“MCDONALD:  But only if this, yeah, I’m just 
letting you know if you, I can read your rights. 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
 
 
“YOUNG:  (Unintelligible), that’s, one step at a 
time. 
“MCDONALD:  Okay.  Like to go that route? 
“YOUNG:  It’s getting kind of weird.  Cause, yeah, I 
know about that.  Woody told me about it, you know, 
cause he’s working security there.   
“MCDONALD:  Okay. 
“YOUNG:  Yeah, I’d like my rights. 
“MCDONALD:  Okay.  Let me uh 
“YOUNG:  If you don’t mind.  I don’t want to be, 
make like a dick or anything or make anything 
“MCDONALD:  No, but would you like to listen to a 
tape first? 
“YOUNG:  Uh 
“MCDONALD:  I won’t say nothing.  I won’t ask 
you any questions.  Would you like to listen after?  
“YOUNG:  Yeah. 
“MCDONALD:  Okay.  And then after we’re done, 
I’m not gonna ask you any questions, I’ll play a tape and 
then uh, after the tape, I’ll advise you of your rights and 
we can go on.   
“YOUNG:  Okay.”   
 
Detective McDonald then attempted to play the 
tape but encountered technical difficulties.  After twice 
leaving to retrieve new batteries, Detective McDonald 
successfully played defendant a portion of the second 
recorded call between defendant and Getscher, which 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
 
took place on November 26, 2002.  In the recording, 
defendant admitted to participating in the robbery and to 
shooting Perez.  Detective McDonald asked defendant if 
he wanted to hear the remainder of the recorded call, but 
defendant stated, “Nah, I heard about enough.”  
 
Detective 
McDonald 
then 
spoke 
about 
the 
importance 
of 
teaching 
one’s 
children 
to 
take 
responsibility for mistakes.  Defendant agreed that he 
wanted his son to be raised that way.  Detective 
McDonald reiterated that “sometimes we have to face up 
to our responsibilities of things that happen.”  The 
conversation then continued as follows: 
“MCDONALD:  . . . A lot of people like want favors.  
But, uhm, so, let me, you know.   
“YOUNG:  So you’re sure those guys don’t like 
Woody.  So you 
“MCDONALD:  No, there’s, there’s people that 
don’t like Woody at all.   
“YOUNG:  Yeah. 
“MCDONALD:  No, he doesn’t, there’s not too many 
friends.  I don’t know why, uh . . . no one likes, I can’t 
find anyone that really likes him.  But uh, now you can 
hear the tape in front of you. 
“YOUNG:  Nah-hu.  He’s basically my, he’s 
basically my bitch boy.   
“MCDONALD:  Yeah. 
“YOUNG:  Fucken be driving to go see girls.  Cause 
I don’t have a car. 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
 
“MCDONALD:  Yeah.  Let me advise you of your 
rights and see if you’d like to continue on.  Cause 
basically we got everything on, on tape but we’d just like 
some details from you.  Okay.  And I appreciate your 
honestly [sic] and it’d be something at least you can tell 
your son, that hey, I made a mistake and I faced up to it 
and you should too.  If you do something wrong, you 
should tell your mother or something or just face up to 
your responsibilities.  I mean, that’s something you got to 
think of as an adult, as a parent.  Uhm, all right?  
“YOUNG:  What am I looking at?  Death?  
“MCDONALD:  Let me, let me advise you of your 
rights okay.  My job, my job is 
“YOUNG:  (Unintelligible). 
“MCDONALD:  Get evidence 
“YOUNG:  (Unintelligible).” 
 
Detective McDonald then read defendant his Miranda 
rights, and defendant indicated that he understood each one.  
Immediately after, Detective McDonald asked defendant, “Do 
you want to tell us your side of the story on this?”  Defendant 
responded, “You heard it all.”  Detective McDonald explained 
that “there’s a lot of holes” because “it wasn’t me asking you 
these questions” in the recording.  Defendant then responded, 
“I ain’t gonna talk about it no more.”   
Detective McDonald expressed “respect” for defendant’s 
decision not to speak further about the incident, but noted that 
“there’s other people that are spilling names out left and 
right.”  Detective McDonald encouraged defendant to “[j]ust 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
 
say, I did this, I did that.  That’s that all you have to do 
through it, okay.”  Defendant acknowledged that others were 
disclosing information, but responded, “I’m gonna have to ask 
for an attorney.”  Defendant explained his decision to request 
an attorney, and Detective McDonald responded, “We’re, we’re 
done.”  Detective McDonald asked no further questions, and 
the conversation ended shortly thereafter.  Before trial, the 
parties disputed whether the prosecution was entitled to use 
defendant’s statement “You heard it all.”  In a written 
suppression motion, defendant argued that he “had asserted 
his rights and this statement comes in violation of his Miranda 
rights and 5th Amendment rights.”  He also argued the 
statement was irrelevant, unduly confusing, and cumulative 
under Evidence Code section 352.  At a hearing on the motion, 
defense counsel further contended that Detective McDonald:  
(1) deliberately pressured defendant into listening to the tape 
of the second recorded conversation despite defendant’s 
invocation of his rights, and (2) improperly held out the 
possibility of a deal for defendant.  The prosecutor responded 
that defendant had expressed a willingness to speak with 
detectives when Detective McDonald asked, “[W]ould you like 
to tell us your side of the story, what happened?” and 
defendant responded, “After I get my rights.”  The prosecutor 
acknowledged that “there’s some concern with using pre-
Miranda statements,” but explained that “[i]t’s not the People’s 
intention to use any of [those] statements . . . .”  The prosecutor 
argued that the single statement at issue “came after a full 
advisal of the Miranda advisements,” and that there was no 
“heavy-handedness” in defendant’s interrogation.   
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
 
The trial court denied the motion.  The trial court 
explained that “[t]here are a series of statements in [the 
interrogation] that would have made this a far more 
interesting and esoteric hearing, but the People’s decision not 
to use those obviates the need for that.”  The court “d[id] not 
see a Miranda problem” with using the statement “You’ve 
heard it all.”   
b.  Discussion 
“To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination from the ‘inherently compelling 
pressures’ of custodial interrogation (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 
at p. 467), the high court adopted a set of prophylactic 
measures requiring law enforcement officers to advise an 
accused of his right to remain silent and to have counsel 
present prior to any custodial interrogation.”  (People v. 
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 338–339.)  “Failure to administer 
Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion.  
Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise 
voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must 
nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda.”  
(Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 307 (Elstad).)  “Miranda 
safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is 
subjected to either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent.  That is to say, the term ‘interrogation’ under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any 
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those 
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response . . . .”  (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 
300–301.) 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
 
After Miranda warnings are administered, “ ‘if the 
suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the 
interrogation must cease.  [Citation.]  Similarly, if the suspect 
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease 
until an attorney is present.  [Citation.]  Critically, however, a 
suspect can waive these rights.  [Citation.]  To establish a valid 
waiver, the State must show that the waiver was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary under the “high standar[d] of proof 
for the waiver of constitutional rights [set forth in] Johnson v. 
Zerbst [1938] 304 U.S. 458 . . . .” ’ ”  (People v. Williams (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 405, 425.)  “On review of the trial court’s ruling, ‘we 
accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and 
inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by 
substantial evidence. We independently determine from the 
undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court 
whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ ”  
(People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 20.) 
Defendant argues, and the Attorney General concedes, 
that Detective McDonald violated Miranda by failing to advise 
defendant of his rights at the outset of the interrogation.  But 
none of defendant’s unwarned statements was admitted at 
trial.  Our inquiry here instead focuses on the prosecution’s use 
of a statement elicited after defendant received the required 
advisements.  Case law makes clear that an initial Miranda 
violation does not necessarily require the exclusion of 
statements following proper advisements.  Indeed, we have 
explained, “[e]ven when a first statement is taken in the 
absence of proper advisements and is incriminating,” a 
subsequent 
voluntary 
confession 
made 
after 
proper 
advisements “is not tainted simply because it was procured 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
 
after a Miranda violation.”  (People v. Williams, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 448.)  “ ‘The relevant inquiry’ ” is whether the 
statement 
was 
“ ‘voluntarily 
made’ ” 
following 
proper 
warnings.  (Ibid., quoting Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318.) 
Defendant 
makes 
essentially 
two 
arguments 
for 
excluding his postwarning statement.  As an initial matter, he 
argues that the statement was involuntary because Detective 
McDonald employed improper psychological tactics to induce 
him to waive his right to remain silent.  In particular, 
defendant argues that after deferring defendant’s request for 
“his rights,” Detective McDonald impermissibly attempted to 
soften him up by suggesting that he might be able to make a 
deal and by playing on his responsibility as a father.   
Defendant relies on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 
150, 160 for this “softening-up” argument, but Honeycutt does 
not help him.  In Honeycutt, we held that a Miranda waiver 
obtained “from a clever softening-up of a defendant through 
disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation” 
was involuntary, and the subsequent confession was therefore 
inadmissible.  (Ibid.)  But this case lacks what we have 
described as “the two salient features of Honeycutt.”  (People v. 
Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 478.)  In Honeycutt, the 
interrogating officer had a long-standing acquaintance with 
the suspect and sought to ingratiate himself by engaging in a 
“half-hour unrecorded discussion” of “unrelated past events 
and former acquaintances” before turning to the topic at hand.  
(Honeycutt, at p. 158.)  The record in this case, which does not 
reveal any past relationship between Detective McDonald and 
defendant, also does not reveal any similarly improper efforts 
at “ingratiating conversation” concerning unrelated topics or 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
 
“disparagement of the victim[s].”  (Id. at p. 160; accord, People 
v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 602; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 931, 954.)   
Nor do we otherwise perceive any impropriety in 
Detective McDonald’s supposed suggestion that defendant 
might obtain a deal or the exhortation that defendant set a 
good example for his son.  Detective McDonald informed 
defendant that Torkelson and another individual were seeking 
deals in exchange for their cooperation, but Detective 
McDonald neither expressly nor impliedly promised defendant 
a deal should he confess before Torkelson or the other 
individual.  (See People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115 
[“ ‘mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be 
better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by 
either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent 
confession involuntary’ ”].)  Nor can we say that Detective 
McDonald’s reference to setting a good example for his son was 
designed to overbear defendant’s free will by exploiting a 
particular psychological vulnerability; certainly the reference 
appeared to have no such effect.  (See People v. Kelly, supra, 51 
Cal.3d at p. 952 [asking the suspect whether he was aware 
that he had violated his “ ‘Christian upbringing’ ” and asking 
how his mother was going to feel were not impermissibly 
coercive].) 
 
Defendant’s second and more substantial argument 
concerns Detective McDonald’s delay in giving the required 
Miranda advisements.  Defendant focuses on the fact that 
Detective McDonald put off defendant’s request for “his rights.”  
Defendant argues the delay requires suppression of his 
statement because it constituted part of an impermissible “two-
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
 
step” or “question-first” tactic of the sort disapproved in 
Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600.  In Seibert, the 
defendant was arrested and “questioned . . . without Miranda 
warnings for 30 to 40 minutes,” which resulted in the 
defendant’s confession.  (Id. at pp. 604–605 (plur. opn.).)  The 
defendant was then given a 20-minute break, after which the 
interrogating officer “turned on a tape recorder, gave 
[defendant] the Miranda warnings, and obtained a signed 
waiver of rights from her.”  (Id. at p. 605.)  The interrogating 
officer then confronted the defendant with her prewarning 
statements, and the defendant reaffirmed the substance of 
those statements.  (Id. at p. 606.)  At a later suppression 
hearing, the interrogating officer “testified that he made a 
‘conscious decision’ to withhold Miranda warnings, thus 
resorting to an interrogation technique he had been taught:  
question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the 
question ‘until I get the answer that she’s already provided 
once.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 605–606.)  The high court concluded in 
Seibert that the statements so procured were inadmissible, 
though no single rationale commanded a majority of the court.  
“A plurality of the Court reasoned that ‘[u]pon hearing 
warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation and just after 
making a confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a 
genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing 
once the police began to lead him over the same ground again.’  
[Citation.]  JUSTICE KENNEDY concurred in the judgment, 
noting he ‘would apply a narrower test applicable only in the 
infrequent case . . . in which the two-step interrogation 
technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
 
Miranda warning.’ ”  (Bobby v. Dixon (2011) 565 U.S. 23, 30–31 
(per curiam).)   
 
The Attorney General argues that the interrogation 
technique at issue here differs in relevant ways from the one 
condemned in Seibert:  Rather than engage in sustained 
prewarning 
interrogation, 
Detective 
McDonald 
advised 
defendant he would read him his rights after he played the 
tape of his conversation with Getscher.  Whether this 
distinction makes a difference—and more to the point, whether 
this or any other part of the exchange preceding the giving of 
Miranda warnings affected the voluntariness of defendant’s 
later, postwarning statement—is an issue we need not decide 
because any error in introducing the challenged statement 
would be harmless in any event. 
 
The prosecution argued the statement in question—“You 
heard it all”—was an adoptive admission of the contents of the 
second recorded conversation between defendant and Getscher.  
Its probative value was thus to bolster the veracity of 
defendant’s confessions made therein, including his confession 
that he shot Perez in the course of the robbery.  But the 
veracity of the tape itself, which was properly admitted at trial, 
was never contested.  The substance of this recorded 
conversation provided decisive evidence of defendant’s guilt:  
Defendant identified himself as one of the participants in the 
robbery, admitted that he shot Perez and fired at two other 
witnesses in the parking lot, and discussed the red laces he 
had donned to take credit for the murder.   
 
Defense counsel did argue that defendant was merely 
“posturing” in this conversation.  But no reasonable juror 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
 
would have believed this explanation.  Getscher had initiated 
the conversation under the guise of recruiting defendant for a 
bank heist and demanded that defendant explain how the Five 
Star parking lot robbery had gone so poorly.  Defendant 
admitted to Getscher that the robbery had been botched and 
described the many mistakes that he and his accomplices 
made.  These mistakes included forgetting materials to tie up 
the victims, shooting Perez and Reynolds out of panic, and 
leaving behind most of the money.  No reasonable juror could 
conclude from defendant’s candid description of his own errors 
that defendant was “trying to put himself in the best light” in 
this conversation.  Thus, if there was any constitutional error 
in admitting the statement “You heard it all,” the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)   
 
There is no merit in defendant’s alternative argument 
that the statement should have been excluded under state 
evidence law.  (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350, 352.)  Defendant 
contends that the challenged statement was inadmissible 
because it was “ambiguous and equivocal” and “only an 
acknowledgment of the prosecution’s evidence.”   Defendant is 
correct that the statement is ambiguous, but the ambiguity 
does not render it inadmissible; it is enough that a reasonable 
juror could understand it, as the prosecution argued, to suggest 
that the contents of the second recorded conversation between 
defendant and Getscher were accurate.  Defendant’s contention 
that the challenged statement was ambiguous and equivocal 
“concerns only the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility, 
which does not require complete unambiguity.”  (People v. 
Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 438.) 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
 
 
Defendant asserts that the challenged statement was 
also unduly prejudicial, and therefore should have been 
excluded under Evidence Code section 352, because the 
statement 
“severely 
compromised” 
his 
argument 
that 
defendant was posturing in the conversation with Getscher 
and that Getscher was lying or confabulating.  But 
“ ‘prejudice’ ” for purposes of Evidence Code section 352 “does 
not mean damage to a party’s case that flows from relevant, 
probative evidence.”  (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 
128.)  “Rather, it means the tendency of evidence to evoke an 
emotional bias against a party because of extraneous factors 
unrelated to the issues.”  (Ibid.)  The introduction of 
defendant’s statement created no risk of evoking such a bias.  
The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to exclude the challenged statement as unduly 
prejudicial.  Of course, even if the trial court had erred, the 
admission of the statement was harmless for the reasons 
already explained. 
2.  Admission of Evidence of Racist Tattoos and 
Association with White Supremacist Groups 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by admitting evidence during the guilt phase 
that defendant had tattoos suggesting racist beliefs and that 
he was affiliated with White supremacist groups.  We find no 
reversible error. 
a.  Background 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude 
all references to defendant’s “affiliation/membership with any 
White supremacy organization” as well as his “distinctive, 
racially identified/offensive tattoos.”  Defendant argued that 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
 
this evidence was both irrelevant and improper character 
evidence with “highly inflammatory impact.”  The prosecution 
responded that two of defendant’s tattoos—one featuring the 
phrase “Nigger Thrasher” and another depicting Thor’s 
hammer—were relevant to identification, because Daleo, who 
had observed defendant making admissions about the Five 
Star parking lot robbery and killings at a party in June 2000, 
identified defendant by those tattoos.2  The prosecution also 
argued that defendant’s use of red laces, and its meaning 
within skinhead culture, was relevant to demonstrate 
defendant’s consciousness of guilt.  The prosecution contended 
that the prejudice from both categories of evidence did not 
outweigh their probative value.   
At a hearing on the motion, the trial court tentatively 
granted defendant’s motion as to evidence of defendant’s 
membership in White supremacist groups.  The prosecution 
reiterated that the red laces were relevant as an admission of 
guilt, and pointed out that some evidence of defendant’s White 
supremacist beliefs would be necessary to explain the “very 
significant meaning” that red laces had to him.  The trial court 
opined that the red laces “create[] a tremendous [Evidence 
Code section] 352 argument for the defense.”  Because the 
prosecution had “a lot of evidence that [defendant] is the 
shooter,” the trial court found there was “not much” probative 
                                        
2  
The prosecution’s opposition to defendant’s motion in 
limine identified a second witness who observed defendant’s 
admissions and identified defendant by his tattoos, but that 
witness ultimately did not testify at trial.   
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
 
value to this evidence.  The trial court clarified, however, that 
it was not ruling on the admissibility of the red laces and 
would do so closer to trial.   
With respect to the tattoos, the trial court found that 
their offensive nature was “not enough” to outweigh their 
relevance “to bolster the credibility of the witnesses” who 
identified defendant by those tattoos.  The trial court offered 
defense counsel two options:  stipulating that defendant had 
the tattoos, or allowing the prosecution witnesses to use 
photographs of the tattoos to identify defendant.  Defense 
counsel asked the trial court if it would entertain a stipulation 
that defendant “has certain tattoos which the witnesses have 
recognized, . . . without specification of the tattoos and without 
showing them to the jury.”  The trial court indicated that it 
would entertain any stipulation agreed upon by the parties as 
well as any proposed curative instructions from the defense.   
Before trial, defense counsel reiterated its objection to 
photographs of defendant’s “Nigger Thrasher” and Thor’s 
hammer tattoos prepared by the prosecution as a trial exhibit.  
Defense counsel offered to stipulate that defendant had 
distinctive tattoos through which Daleo identified him, but the 
prosecution did not respond to this offer.  The trial court ruled 
that the photographs were admissible.   
On direct examination, Daleo testified that the man she 
knew as “Li’l Jeff” had a tattoo reading “Nigger Thrasher” on 
his upper arm and a tattoo depicting Thor’s hammer on his 
Adam’s apple.  Daleo identified defendant as “Li’l Jeff,” and 
also identified the photographs as accurate depictions of 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
 
defendant’s tattoos.  The photographs were admitted and 
published to the jury over defendant’s continued objection.   
During a break in Daleo’s testimony, the prosecution 
asked for “clarification” of the trial court’s ruling on evidence of 
defendant’s membership in White supremacist groups.  The 
trial court expressed the view that this evidence was still 
irrelevant.  Defense counsel responded that the relevance of 
this evidence would depend on Daleo’s testimony, particularly 
if Daleo mentioned the red laces.  The prosecution indicated 
that it did not plan to elicit any testimony about the red laces 
from Daleo, although that evidence “may become relevant 
later.”  The trial court responded that the red laces were “likely 
going to become relevant in a number of ways,” and stated, “I 
believe we have already resolved [t]hat was going to come in.”  
The trial court also noted (without further elaboration) that 
defendant’s “alleged status as a skinhead . . . may become 
pertinent” if defendant suggested that his statements in the 
second recorded conversation with Getscher had been mere 
posturing.  Defense counsel then requested permission to 
question Daleo about defendant’s use of red laces, even if the 
prosecution did not, to “find out exactly what her particular 
biases are, how she knew this particular group.”  The trial 
court granted this request.   
When direct examination resumed, Daleo testified that 
both Torkelson and defendant were skinheads.  Torkelson was 
involved with “several groups that would talk about activism 
for the White power movement; rallying things together, 
sometimes political; getting involved to make a difference for 
the movement.”  Daleo, defendant, and Raynoha would often 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
 
 
attend meetings for these groups with Torkelson.  The 
prosecution did not ask Daleo about the red laces. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Daleo if she 
wore red laces to the party in June 2000 where defendant 
admitted his involvement in the Five Star parking lot robbery 
and killings.  Daleo denied doing so, but admitted that she and 
other skinheads occasionally wore red laces for fashion 
reasons.  On redirect examination, the prosecution asked Daleo 
if red laces had a specific meaning for defendant’s skinhead 
group.  Daleo responded that it could mean “hav[ing] shed 
blood for the cause.”  Daleo also confirmed that “earning your 
laces” was a type of “initiation” for skinhead groups that 
“might mean you have spilled the blood of somebody.”   
 
Getscher testified that he and defendant were “both 
skinheads, good buddies, [who] kind of looked after each other” 
while in prison together in 1996.  Getscher explained that 
“[r]ed laces would indicate that you have drawn the blood of an 
enemy.  I guess a proud standing in the skinhead culture.”  
Getscher testified that after the Five Star parking lot robbery, 
defendant told him that “things went really bad” and that 
defendant had shot someone.  Defendant purchased red laces 
on his way back to Getscher’s house from the Five Star parking 
lot robbery and tried to lace his boots with them.  Getscher 
took the red laces from defendant and “explained to him that 
he did not earn his red laces” because “he killed an innocent 
victim and . . . he didn’t kill an enemy that was trying to get 
him.”   
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
 
 
b.  Discussion 
On appeal, defendant renews his argument that evidence 
of his racist tattoos and his use of red laces should have been 
excluded because they were irrelevant and because their 
prejudicial impact substantially outweighed their probative 
value.  Defendant argues that introduction of evidence of his 
“Nigger Thrasher” tattoo, in particular, was unnecessary for 
Daleo’s identification because Daleo was acquainted with 
defendant and could have identified him by his face alone.  
Defendant also contends that the red laces had little probative 
value in light of the prosecution’s other evidence establishing 
that defendant shot Perez.  Given that neither the robbery nor 
the killings were motivated by racial animus, defendant 
argues, the primary effect of admitting this evidence was 
simply to call the jury’s attention to his inflammatory White 
supremacist views in violation of Evidence Code section 352.    
Under the Evidence Code, all relevant evidence is 
admissible unless prohibited by statute.  (Evid. Code, § 351.)  
“ ‘Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as 
evidence “having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove 
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action.”  The test of relevance is whether the evidence 
tends “logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to 
establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.’ ”  
(People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 116–117.)  But under 
Evidence Code section 352, the trial court retains the 
discretion to exclude relevant evidence if “its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will” either “necessitate undue consumption of time” or “create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
 
or of misleading the jury.”  “We review a trial court’s decision 
to admit or exclude evidence ‘for abuse of discretion, and [the 
ruling] will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the 
trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner 
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’  [Citation.]  When 
evidence is erroneously admitted, we do not reverse a 
conviction unless it is reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the 
error.”  (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 951.) 
Although defendant contends otherwise, his tattoos were 
clearly relevant because the tattoos had a tendency in reason 
to prove defendant’s identity as “Li’l Jeff,” the man Daleo 
heard discussing his involvement in the robbery murders at a 
party in June 2000.  (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 
694, 749.)  The red laces were likewise relevant because 
defendant’s efforts to claim what he understood to be a badge 
of honor for the killing tended to demonstrate consciousness of 
guilt.  (See People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 437–438.)  
But as the trial court recognized, the evidence did carry with it 
the potential to evoke an emotional response against the 
defendant unrelated to the issues before the jury.  We need not 
address the propriety of the trial court’s ultimate decision to 
admit the evidence under Evidence Code section 352, however, 
because any error in its admission at the guilt phase was 
harmless in any event.  The evidence of defendant’s guilt was 
overwhelming.  The jury at trial heard recordings in which 
defendant himself confessed to planning and committing the 
robbery with Torkelson and Anderson, shooting the female 
victim so that she would not be able to identify him, and 
shooting at a male victim in the parking lot.  There is no 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
 
 
reasonable probability that the jurors’ negative reaction to 
defendant’s racist tattoos, associations, and beliefs would have 
affected their evaluation of this evidence.  (People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837.)  Here, as in Powell, “[c]oncerns 
about the possible ‘inflammatory impact’ of this type of 
evidence [citation] were . . . alleviated by the nature of the 
evidence of defendant’s guilt.”  (People v. Powell, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 952.) 
 
Defendant also claims for the first time on appeal that 
the admission of evidence of his racist tattoos, affiliations, and 
beliefs at the guilt phase violated the First Amendment to the 
federal Constitution.  Defendant did not object on this ground 
before the trial court, and the claim is therefore forfeited.  
(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 689.)  But even if the 
claim had been preserved, “the relevance of the challenged 
evidence defeats his constitutional objection.”  (People v. 
Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 773; accord, People v. 
Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 629; see Dawson v. 
Delaware (1992) 503 U.S. 159, 164 (Dawson) [“evidence of 
racial intolerance” has been held admissible “where such 
evidence [i]s relevant to the issues involved”].)  And even if we 
were to assume constitutional error, the overwhelming 
evidence of defendant’s guilt would render the error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California, supra, 
386 U.S. at p. 24.) 
3.  Prosecutor’s Closing Argument  
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in closing argument by vouching for the victims’ 
feelings and urging the jury to view the crime through the eyes 
of the victims.  We find no grounds for reversal in the 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
 
 
prosecutor’s 
closing 
argument. 
 
Defendant’s 
claim 
of 
misconduct concerns the following portion of the prosecutor’s 
closing argument to the jury:  “We know that Teresa Perez and 
Jack Reynolds were completely compliant with the robbers’ 
demands [and that] they laid down with their faces to the 
carpet, ultimately, I’m certain, very fearful . . . .”  Defense 
counsel objected to the phrase “I’m certain” as “a form of 
vouching.” In response, the trial court opined that counsel 
“should at no time ever use the word ‘I’ in a closing argument,” 
but explained that this was “more of a personal preference of 
the Court than it is some rule of law which says that you can’t 
do that.”  The trial court concluded that the prosecutor’s use of 
the first person “wasn’t in terms of vouching” and was instead 
conveying “what [the prosecutor] believed the inferences would 
have shown.”  The trial court found no misconduct.   
“A 
prosecutor’s 
conduct 
violates 
a 
defendant’s 
constitutional rights when the behavior comprises a pattern of 
conduct so egregious that it infects ‘ “the trial with unfairness 
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”  
[Citation.]’  [Citation.]  The focus of the inquiry is on the effect 
of the prosecutor’s action on the defendant, not on the intent or 
bad faith of the prosecutor.  [Citation.]  Conduct that does not 
render a trial fundamentally unfair is error under state law 
only when it involves ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the 
jury.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 700.)  “ ‘A 
defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial 
misconduct, however, unless it is reasonably probable that a 
result more favorable to the defendant would have been 
reached without the misconduct.  [Citation.]  Also, a claim of 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
 
 
prosecutorial misconduct is not preserved for appeal if 
defendant fails to object and seek an admonition if an objection 
and jury admonition would have cured the injury.’ ”  (People v. 
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1010.) 
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to facts not in 
evidence.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 828.)  It is also 
misconduct for the prosecutor at the guilt phase of a criminal 
trial to “appeal to the jury to view the crime through the eyes 
of the victim.”  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 704.)  
Here, we agree with the trial court that the prosecutor did not 
improperly refer to facts not in evidence by arguing the victims 
were, “I’m certain, very fearful” before they were fatally shot.  
The prosecution presented uncontroverted evidence that Perez 
and Reynolds were shot while lying facedown on the ground 
with their hands behind their heads, that the barrel of the gun 
was pressed against their heads when the shots were fired and 
that there were no signs of a struggle.  Despite the prosecutor’s 
use of the first person, the prosecutor cited this evidence to ask 
the jury to draw the logical inference that Perez and Reynolds 
felt fear.  (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 283 [explaining 
that a prosecutor “has the right to fully state his views as to 
what the evidence shows and to urge whatever conclusions he 
deems proper”].)  Nor do we discern prejudicial misconduct in 
the prosecutor’s invitation to draw this limited inference.  The 
prosecutor did not ask the jury to reach this conclusion by 
putting themselves in the victims’ shoes, nor did the prosecutor 
otherwise make an improper appeal to the jurors’ sympathy for 
the victims.  (See People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 
1344 [“ ‘an appeal for sympathy for the victim is out of place 
during an objective determination of guilt’ ”].)  There is, in any 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
 
 
event, no reasonable probability that the prosecutor’s fleeting 
remark had any effect on the jury, particularly given the 
overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.  (See, e.g., ibid.; 
People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1189–1190.) 
4.  Use of Courtroom Restraints During Trial 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his rights 
under the federal Constitution’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments by ordering him restrained with a leg chain at 
trial.  The claim lacks merit. 
a.  Background 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion requesting 
permission to appear in court without any physical restraints 
attached to his person.  The prosecution filed a response 
agreeing with defendant that there was currently no manifest 
need for physical restraints.  At a hearing, however, the trial 
court stated it was “vehemently opposed” to defendant’s 
motion.  The trial court explained that defendant and 
Raynoha, who at the time was still a codefendant, “had 
numerous problems while in custody involving other inmates 
and threats and weapons in other cases.  To me, they are—
they pose a security threat.  They have a problem with 
authority.”  Defense counsel argued that defendant “ha[d] not 
been involved in any real altercations” and downplayed the 
allegations as “not that serious.”  Defense counsel conceded 
that a shiv was found in defendant’s possession, but argued 
that defendant used it to run a piercing and tattoo business in 
jail.  The trial court conceded that “there’s nothing to indicate 
that [defendant] ha[s] acted in any way except respectfully to 
the court proceedings.”  But the trial court reiterated that its 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
 
 
“ruling is based upon what I perceive to be conduct that’s 
taken place, allegations of conduct, some I think that can 
easily be proven, that would lead me to the conclusion that 
they are a potential danger with regard to authority.”  The 
trial court thus ordered that defendant be restrained with a leg 
chain attached to the floor that would leave defendant’s hands 
free and permit him to stand and sit.  The trial court also had 
the defense table draped so the jury would not see the leg 
chain. 
b.  Discussion 
“Under California law, ‘a defendant cannot be subjected 
to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the 
jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need 
for such restraints.’  [Citation.]  Similarly, the federal 
‘Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles . . . unless that 
use is “justified by an essential state interest”—such as the 
interest in courtroom security—specific to the defendant on 
trial.’ ”  (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1270.)  We 
have held that a showing of manifest need can be made with 
“ ‘evidence that the defendant has threatened jail deputies, 
possessed weapons in custody, threatened or assaulted other 
inmates, and/or engaged in violent outbursts in court.  
[Citations.]  [¶]  The trial court’s decision to physically restrain 
a defendant cannot be based on rumor or innuendo.  [Citation.]  
However, a formal evidentiary hearing is not required.  
[Citation.]’  [Citation.]  The trial court’s determination is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  (People v. Williams (2015) 61 
Cal.4th 1244, 1259.) 
 
The record does not reveal the specific basis for the trial 
court’s conclusion that defendant had “numerous problems 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
 
 
while in custody involving other inmates and threats and 
weapons in other cases.”  The trial court did not provide any 
identifying details about these incidents nor indicate the 
source of this knowledge.  But the Attorney General cites 
evidence supporting the trial court’s assessment:  (1) defendant 
had been found with multiple weapons while in custody 
awaiting trial; (2) defendant was required to wear green 
clothing in custody, which denotes a “high risk” inmate who 
requires more supervision; (3) defendant was placed in 
administrative segregation multiple times for disruptive 
behavior; and (4) defendant participated in an attack on fellow 
inmate Robert Harger.  As defendant correctly points out, 
much of the evidence the Attorney General cites was presented 
during the second penalty phase trial, and it is not clear how 
much of this evidence was before the trial court at the time it 
issued its ruling.  But the trial court’s reference to defendant’s 
“numerous problems” demonstrates the trial court was aware 
of at least some of the incidents the Attorney General 
describes, and defense counsel, too, acknowledged that 
defendant was found in possession of a shiv while in custody 
awaiting trial.  Based on the record before us, we cannot say 
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding there was a 
manifest need for restraints.   
But even if the trial court had abused its discretion in 
ordering that defendant be restrained by a hidden leg chain, 
defendant 
cannot 
demonstrate 
prejudice. 
“ ‘[W]e 
have 
consistently held that courtroom shackling, even if error, [is] 
harmless if there is no evidence that the jury saw the 
restraints, or that the shackles impaired or prejudiced the 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
 
 
defendant’s right to testify or participate in his defense.’ ”  
(People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1259.) 
There is no evidence that the jury saw defendant’s leg 
chain in the courtroom.  Defendant argues that the jurors were 
nevertheless aware that defendant was restrained in the 
courtroom because they were instructed with CALJIC No. 1.04, 
which states:  “The fact that physical restraints have been 
placed on defendant [] must not be considered by you for any 
purpose.  They are not evidence of guilt, and must not be 
considered by you as any evidence that [he] is more likely to be 
guilty than not guilty.  You must not speculate as to why the 
restraints have been used.  In determining the issues in this 
case, disregard that matter entirely.”  The prosecution initially 
requested CALJIC No. 1.04 as a precautionary measure in case 
any juror had seen defendant’s restraints.  The trial court then 
expressed an “inclination [] not to give” CALJIC No. 1.04 
because it didn’t “think there’s anything that indicated that 
[defendant]’s been restrained to [the jury].”  In response, 
defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant “tells 
me that some of the jurors did see him when he was brought 
up one day” in restraints, apparently outside the courtroom.  
The trial court then decided that “in an abundance of caution,” 
the jury would be instructed with CALJIC No. 1.04.  The trial 
court explained that “it’s probably a good idea to give it” in 
light of defense counsel’s disclosure, and the jurors “certainly 
must conclude that Mr. Young is in custody considering the 
type of charges he’s facing.”  Defense counsel responded, 
“Right.”  Because he did not object, defendant has forfeited any 
challenge to the instruction on appeal.  And even if we assume 
one or more jurors saw defendant in shackles outside the 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
 
 
courtroom, “ ‘[s]uch brief observations have generally been 
recognized as not constituting prejudicial error.’ ”  (People v. 
Rich (1998) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1084. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s decision to 
impose a leg restraint prejudiced him by “coerc[ing]” him into 
waiving his presence for jury selection, thereby impairing his 
ability to participate in his defense.  Defendant’s claim does 
not accurately reflect the record.  Defendant waived his 
presence only for an initial stage of jury selection during which 
the juror questionnaire was handed out and prospective jurors 
were excused for hardship.  Because of the large jury pool 
needed for this case, this initial stage of jury selection was 
scheduled to take place in the jury lounge.  The trial court 
explained that it would have limited means of concealing 
defendant’s leg restraint in the jury lounge, and the sheriff’s 
department was also likely to assign “an inordinate number” of 
officers to the jury lounge.  The trial court suggested that 
defendant consider waiving his presence because these 
circumstances “may leave an impression [with the prospective 
jurors] that your clients don’t want to start out with in this 
trial.”  But the trial court expressly stated that it would 
“adhere to [defendant’s] wishes” and presume defendant’s 
attendance unless informed otherwise.  Defendant chose not to 
attend.  The trial court indicated that defendant would be 
present for the questioning of individual jurors, and there is 
nothing in the record that suggests that defendant did not 
attend this subsequent stage of jury selection.  Defendant does 
not explain how his absence at an initial, nonsubstantive stage 
of jury selection impaired his ability to participate in his 
defense.   
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
 
 
5.  Exclusion of Third Party Culpability Evidence  
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by barring 
him from presenting evidence suggesting that victim Reynolds 
himself had participated in the Five Star parking lot robbery.  
Defendant contends the trial court’s ruling violated his rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution.  The claim lacks merit.   
a.  Background 
 
Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine to 
exclude evidence of Reynolds’s criminal history, including facts 
and charges relating to three cases in the 1970’s and 1980, as 
well as his alleged attendance at Aryan Nations (or similar) 
meetings.  The prosecution argued that evidence of the former 
was irrelevant and improper character evidence, and that 
evidence of the latter was irrelevant and speculative.  
Defendant opposed the motion in limine on the ground that 
this evidence was relevant to the possibility that the Five Star 
parking lot robbery was “an inside job.”  Without further 
elaboration, the trial court granted the “motion to exclude the 
victim’s criminal record.”  
 
Defendant later requested clarification as to whether the 
trial court’s ruling excluded all evidence suggesting that 
Reynolds was a participant in the Five Star parking lot 
robbery.  At a hearing on the motion, defendant made the 
following offer of proof:  (1) at the time of his death, Reynolds 
had only $6 in his bank account and a number of pawn tickets; 
(2) Reynolds promised his mother that he would send her to 
the Cayman Islands; (3) Reynolds had racist beliefs and had a 
skinhead tattoo; (4) Reynolds was seen talking to Torkelson 
the evening of the robbery; (5) Reynolds instructed Five Star 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
 
 
employees not to resist in the event of a robbery; and 
(6) sometime in the 1970’s or in 1980, Reynolds had been 
convicted of a crime involving “a male and female being put on 
the ground, bound, and held.”  The trial court found this 
proffer to be “not nearly enough to make [the] suggestion” that 
Reynolds was a participant in the robbery, and ruled that, 
“absent something more,” the evidence was inadmissible. 
b.  Discussion  
 
“ ‘[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third 
party offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable 
doubt exists concerning his or her guilt, must link the third 
person either directly or circumstantially to the actual 
perpetration of the crime.  In assessing an offer of proof 
relating to such evidence, the court must decide whether the 
evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt 
and whether it is substantially more prejudicial than probative 
under Evidence Code section 352.’ ”  (People v. McWhorter 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 367–368.)  In other words, courts treat 
third party culpability evidence “ ‘like any other evidence:  if 
relevant it is admissible,’ ” provided it is not otherwise 
rendered inadmissible by statute, and “ ‘unless its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, 
prejudice, or confusion.’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
334, 372.)  We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1242.)   
 
We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
decision to exclude evidence that one of the victims of the 
robbery murders may have started out as a participant in the 
crime.  The parties dispute whether some of the proffered 
evidence—specifically, Reynolds’s criminal history, alleged 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
 
 
affiliation with racist organizations, and alleged racist 
beliefs—was inadmissible character evidence under Evidence 
Code section 1101, subdivision (a), which generally renders 
such evidence inadmissible to prove a person’s conduct on a 
particular occasion.  But even assuming this evidence was not 
barred by any other statutory provision, the trial court 
reasonably concluded that any probative value was outweighed 
by the prejudicial impact, the consumption of time, and 
potential for confusing the issues.  (See Evid. Code, § 352; 
People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 372.) 
 
Defendant’s proffered evidence could lead only to 
speculative inferences concerning Reynolds’s participation in 
the crime.  Reynolds’s prior convictions were remote in time, 
and defendant offered scant basis for concluding that the Five 
Star robbery fit a “pattern” established by Reynolds’s past 
misconduct.  (See People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 373.)  
Defendant offered no evidence connecting Reynolds to the 
perpetrators of the Five Star robbery, other than the conjecture 
that they must have been acquainted by virtue of shared racist 
affiliations and beliefs.  Reynolds’s actions on the day of the 
robbery had little, if any, probative value.  Although Reynolds 
had instructed Five Star employees not to resist in the event of 
a robbery, the evidence established that it was, in fact, Five 
Star company policy for employees to comply in the event of a 
robbery.  And although Reynolds was seen speaking with 
Torkelson on the night of the crime, the evidence showed that 
Torkelson interacted with many individuals that night while 
pretending to be an on-duty security guard.  Finally, evidence 
that Reynolds had spoken of taking his mother on a vacation 
does little to suggest that Reynolds intended to finance the 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
 
 
vacation by means of the armed robbery that resulted in his 
death. 
 
What is more, the inferences defendant would draw from 
this evidence are unsupported by any other evidence in the 
record.  Reynolds was a victim of the robbery murders; like 
Perez, he was shot in the back of the head while lying 
facedown with his arms over his head.  The circumstances of 
the shooting do not suggest willing participation in the crime.  
Neither Daleo nor Getscher, who initially identified the 
perpetrators 
during 
Detective 
McDonald’s 
investigation, 
identified Reynolds as a participant in the robbery.  Nor did 
defendant identify Reynolds as a participant in the robbery in 
either of the two recorded calls with Getscher, including the 
one in which he admitted to personally shooting Perez.  Having 
concluded this speculative third party culpability evidence was 
properly excluded, we also reject defendant’s claim that his 
constitutional rights were violated by the exclusion.  (See 
People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 373–374.) 
6.  Cumulative Error  
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the 
guilt phase errors requires reversal of his convictions.  (See 
People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 844.)  We have assumed 
two unrelated errors—the admission of defendant’s statement 
“You heard it all” and the admission of certain evidence of his 
racist tattoos, affiliations, and beliefs—and concluded that 
neither error was prejudicial, given the strength of the 
evidence of defendant’s guilt.  We reach the same conclusion 
after considering the errors together.  We accordingly reject 
defendant’s claim of guilt phase cumulative error. 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
 
 
B.  Penalty Phase Claims 
1.  Retrial of the Penalty Phase  
 
Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (b) directs a trial 
court to empanel a second jury to decide the penalty in a 
capital case if the first jury deadlocks, as it had in defendant’s 
case.  (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (b).)  Defendant argues that 
mandatory retrial of the penalty phase violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution because such a retrial 
violates evolving standards of decency, as demonstrated by the 
differing practices of other states, and “sends a message to the 
community that the individual moral judgment of each juror is 
not trusted or valued.”  Defendant also raises several more 
specific challenges to the conduct of the penalty retrial. 
 
We have repeatedly rejected the Eighth Amendment 
claim defendant now raises, holding that “a penalty retrial 
following jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional 
proscription against double jeopardy or cruel and unusual 
punishment.”  (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 356, 
citing People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 634; accord, 
People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 751; People v. Gonzales 
and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 311; see also People v. Trinh 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 237–238 [reaching the same conclusion 
as to a second penalty retrial held pursuant to Pen. Code, 
§ 190, subd. (b), which provides trial courts with the discretion 
to empanel additional juries in the event of additional 
deadlocks].)  In so holding, we have responded to arguments 
that California is out of step with other jurisdictions that 
mandate a sentence of life without parole if the penalty jury 
deadlocks, reasoning that the fact that California stands 
“among the ‘handful’ of states that allows a penalty retrial 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
 
 
following jury deadlock on penalty does not, in and of itself, 
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment or ‘evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’ ”  (Taylor, supra, at p. 634.) 
 
Defendant argues we should reconsider this precedent 
because our prior cases have failed to acknowledge just how 
unique California’s practices are; California, he notes, is one of 
only two states that requires, rather than merely permitting, 
an initial retrial of the penalty phase when the first jury 
deadlocks.  (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (b); see also Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. § 13–752(J).)  Defendant does not, however, attempt to 
explain why the difference between mandatory retrial and 
permissive retrial is constitutionally significant, and identifies 
no authority that has so held.  Defendant’s argument does not 
persuade us to revisit the holdings of our prior cases. 
 
We also find no merit to defendant’s argument that 
permitting a second jury to impose the death penalty after the 
first jury deadlocks devalues the decisionmaking autonomy of 
the first jury.  The cases cited by defendant require only that 
“ ‘the individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the 
death penalty [be] a moral inquiry into the culpability of the 
defendant, and not an emotional response to the mitigating 
evidence.’ ”  (Saffle v. Parks (1990) 494 U.S. 484, 492–493.)  
That different juries may disagree on the answer to that moral 
inquiry does not disrespect the first jury’s opportunity to 
undertake the moral inquiry in the first instance.   
 
Finally, defendant claims that the retrial of the penalty 
phase 
unfairly 
conferred 
several 
advantages 
on 
the 
prosecution.  Specifically, defendant contends that:  (1) many of 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
 
 
the 
prosecution 
witnesses 
added 
“flourishes 
and 
amplifications” to their retrial testimony; (2) witnesses 
impermissibly testified as to the emotional stress caused by a 
second penalty phase; and (3) the prosecution referenced 
evidence in her closing statement that was presented during 
the first penalty phase but not the second phase.  None of these 
claims has merit.  First, defendant does not identify any 
misrepresentations in the retrial testimony, and both parties 
had the opportunity to elicit additional testimony from 
witnesses who testified at the initial trial.  Second, the trial 
court instructed the jury to disregard “[t]he impact of the 
judicial process” on the witnesses, and we may “assume that 
the jurors followed the trial court’s instructions” (People v. 
Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1413).  Finally, there is no 
reasonable probability that the prosecutor’s brief erroneous 
reference to evidence that was only presented during the first 
penalty phase—specifically, that a detective had become 
emotional when describing the crime scene—had any impact 
on the jury’s penalty verdict.  (See, e.g., People v. Brady (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 547, 578.) 
2.  Admission of White Supremacist Beliefs 
At the guilt phase of the trial, as discussed above, the 
trial court admitted (over defense objection) limited evidence 
relating to defendant’s association with White supremacist 
groups and two tattoos, used for purposes of identification, that 
reflected this association.  At the penalty retrial, the jury 
heard considerably greater detail about the nature and content 
of defendant’s White supremacist beliefs, his multiple White 
supremacist tattoos, and the beliefs of the groups to which he 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
 
 
belonged.  The central issue in this appeal concerns the 
admission and use of this evidence. 
Defendant argues that the evidence of his racist beliefs 
was both inflammatory and irrelevant to any legitimate issue 
before the jury at the penalty phase and that the prosecution’s 
improper use of the evidence undermined the fairness and 
reliability of the proceedings.  Although we conclude some of 
the evidence of defendant’s racist beliefs was relevant to the 
jury’s determination of the appropriate penalty for defendant’s 
crime, we agree with defendant that much of this evidence was 
admitted and used for an improper purpose.  On close review of 
the record, we conclude this error was prejudicial. 
a.  Background 
 
At the first penalty trial, the trial court had admitted, 
over 
defense 
objection, 
extensive 
evidence 
concerning 
defendant’s skinhead beliefs and his tattoos, including expert 
testimony expounding on each subject.  Before the penalty 
retrial, defendant again objected to the admission of this 
evidence, filing a motion in limine to exclude all references to 
“affiliation/membership 
with 
any 
White 
supremacy 
organization, in whatever form as well as reference to 
distinctive, racially identified/offensive tattoos” worn by 
defendant.  Opposing the motion, the prosecution argued that 
the “Nigger Thrasher” and “Thor’s hammer” tattoos and 
defendant’s use of red laces were admissible as circumstances 
of the crime.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a).)  The 
prosecution also argued that additional evidence of defendant’s 
White supremacist beliefs might become relevant if defendant 
introduced evidence of his good character.  (Id., factor (k).)   
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
 
 
 
Ruling on the motion in limine, the trial court 
determined that the prosecution could use the following 
evidence in its case-in-chief:  (1) defendant’s association with 
White supremacist groups to explain the basis of his affiliation 
with the other perpetrators of the Five Star parking lot 
robbery, (2) defendant’s use of the red laces, and (3) the “Thor’s 
hammer” tattoo.  Although evidence of the “Nigger Thrasher” 
tattoo had been admitted at the guilt phase, the trial court 
excluded it for purposes of the penalty retrial; evidently 
concerned about its inflammatory impact, the trial court ruled 
it could be referred to only as a “unique tattoo.”  But the trial 
court also agreed with the prosecution that other evidence of 
defendant’s 
White 
supremacist 
tattoos, 
beliefs, 
and 
associations would become admissible as rebuttal evidence if 
defendant chose to present evidence of his good character.  The 
court explained that once defendant “do[es] anything to 
suggest that” he has a good character and sympathetic family 
life, “that to me opens the door under the they-get-to-see-the-
whole-person theory.” 
 
During the prosecution’s case in aggravation, Daleo 
testified that she had seen defendant at Aryan Nations 
meetings.  Daleo testified that the Aryan Nations group had a 
religious component based on the belief that “God’s chosen 
people were white people,” and that the meetings also served 
as social gatherings.  Daleo also testified that she had 
identified defendant to law enforcement as having two tattoos:  
one of “Thor’s hammer,” which she described as a reference to 
“the Aryan Nations Christianity thing,” and another “unique 
tattoo.” 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
 
 
 
The jury also heard the testimony of Getscher, who 
explained that he and defendant became friends in prison 
because they “were both skinheads” who had a shared belief in 
“[w]hite supremacy.”  Shortly after the Five Star parking lot 
robbery, Getscher saw defendant trying to put red laces in his 
boots.  Getscher explained that in skinhead culture, red laces 
“means you drew the blood of an enemy.”   
 
Defendant began his case in mitigation by calling his 
grandmother Fern Vinatieri as his first witness.  Vinatieri 
testified that defendant was devoted to his family, had 
completed a GED and learned a trade to support his family, 
and accepted full responsibility for the robbery and assault 
committed in Arizona in 1999. 
 
After Vinatieri concluded her testimony and before the 
next witness was called, the trial court notified the parties 
that, consistent with its earlier ruling on defendant’s motion in 
limine, the court would permit the prosecution to introduce 
evidence of defendant’s racist beliefs, tattoos, and associations.  
The trial court explained that Vinatieri’s testimony had “put 
[defendant]’s overall character” at issue, thereby opening the 
door for the prosecution to introduce this evidence.  
 
Following the trial court’s ruling, defendant called 
additional witnesses who testified that he was a good father, 
“kind,” and “not a violent person.”  Defendant also called fellow 
inmate Beek to rebut the prosecution’s evidence that defendant 
participated in an assault on inmate Robert Harger; Beek 
testified that defendant was not involved in the assault.  
During cross-examination, Beek admitted that he was a 
skinhead and described the American Front group, to which 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
 
 
defendant purportedly belonged, as “a group of working-class 
individuals” with White supremacy being a nonexclusive focus 
of the group.  Defendant also called a family therapist who 
testified that defendant became a skinhead for two reasons:  
(1) to achieve a sense of belonging as he felt like an outsider in 
his family, and (2) as a means of self-preservation in prison.  
The therapist acknowledged that skinhead philosophy had 
negative values, but explained that it also had positive ones 
such as “honor, respect, loyalty, fidelity to one’s group, [and] a 
sort of misguided protection of the common man.”   
 
On rebuttal, the prosecution introduced substantial 
additional evidence of defendant’s White supremacist beliefs, 
tattoos, and associations.  Prison deputies testified that shortly 
after the assault of Harger, they discovered a rune above 
defendant’s cell door and a swastika in a common area near 
defendant’s cell, both painted with what appeared to be blood.  
Police officers who interacted with defendant in 1999 testified 
about the White supremacist tattoos they had seen on 
defendant in 1999 and identified new tattoos that defendant 
had acquired by the time of his arrest in 2003.  One officer had 
encountered defendant in September 1999 and observed that 
defendant was wearing “typical gang attire for a skinhead,” 
consisting of a shaved head, red suspenders, and red laces in 
his boots.  On the basis of this attire, the officer opined that 
defendant was still involved with skinheads at the time.   
 
Finally, the prosecution called Joanna Mendelson, the 
director of investigative research at the Southern California 
branch of the Anti-Defamation League, as an expert witness to 
testify about the origins and ideology of skinheads.  Mendelson 
explained that neo-Nazis believed that “what Hitler had 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
 
 
achieved . . . was a good start” and sought to “carry out Hitler’s 
vision.”  Skinheads are a subset of neo-Nazis, so “all skinheads 
are neo-Nazis.”  Mendelson described the Aryan Nations 
organization as “a Christian identity organization that has 
some elements of neo-Nazi beliefs.”  Their beliefs included:  
(1) “white Europeans, not the Jews, [] can draw their descent 
from the lost tribes of Israel”; (2) “Abel and his offspring are 
actually the white race” and “Cain and his offspring,” the Jews, 
“are the spawns of the Devil”; and (3) “everyone else who is a 
minority who is not” a descendant of either Cain or Abel are 
“mud people.”  Mendelson described the American Front group 
as a “racist” and “neo-Nazi, white supremacist organization.”  
Mendelson explained that skinheads adhere to a religion 
known as Odinism, which provides skinheads in prison the 
“opportunity to congregate” in order to “conduct criminal 
activity and violence.” 
 
Mendelson identified and explained the meaning of the 
following symbols that appeared on letters that defendant had 
written:  (1) “14” refers to a 14-word mantra about 
perpetuating the White race; (2) “88” signifies “Heil Hitler”; 
and (3) a Celtic cross is the “most common white supremacist 
and neo-nazi symbol[].”  Mendelson similarly identified and 
explained the meaning of the following symbols found on 
defendant’s tattoos:  (1) a swastika; (2) a variation of the Nazi 
flag; (3) a Confederate flag; (4) the Celtic cross and runic 
symbols; (5) Thor’s hammer, a symbol significant in Odinism; 
(6) “Blood and Honor,” the name of a White supremacist 
organization started by Ian Donaldson; (7) an eagle with a 
stylized “S,” which refers to a White power band founded by 
Donaldson called Skrewdriver; (8) “Farewell, Ian,” a tribute to 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
 
 
Donaldson after his death; (9) a Totenkopf, a symbol worn by a 
division of the SS in Nazi Germany; (10) a skinhead crucified 
on a cross; (11) a Nazi eagle clutching a schutzstaffel, which 
was worn by Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler and the SS; 
(12) “California Skinhead,” in red and black ink, the colors of 
the flag of Nazi Germany; (13) Dr. Martens boots, a popular 
type of boot among skinheads; (14) a caricature of Nazi general 
Joseph Dietrich; (15) “SWP,” an acronym for supreme White 
power; (16) a Viking warrior; (17) “14 Words”; (18) “Nigger 
Thrasher”; (19) faceless skinheads wielding bats and machetes; 
(20) a triskele, “a takeoff of the swastika”; (21) a tree with a 
noose hanging from it; (22) “Waffen SS,” the weapons division 
of the SS; (23) a wolfsangel, a Celtic image worn on SS 
uniforms in Nazi Germany; and (24) “Weiss Macht,” which 
means “White power” in German.  In response to the 
prosecution’s questions about the racist content of these 
tattoos, Mendelson identified most of the tattoos as “inherently 
racist.”  Photographs of these symbols and tattoos were 
published to the jury. 
 
Before deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury as 
follows:  “Certain evidence was admitted during the course of 
the trial with regard to the defendant’s beliefs, allegiance, and 
tattoos.  This was done in rebuttal to the presentation by the 
defense of evidence of the defendant’s good character.  Such 
beliefs, allegiance, and tattoos are constitutionally protected by 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Such 
evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose 
of evaluating the credibility or strength of witnesses who were 
asked about the defendant’s character.  Such evidence cannot 
be considered by you as an aggravating circumstance.”   
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
 
 
 
In her closing argument, the prosecutor argued that 
defendant’s racist beliefs, tattoos, and associations rebutted 
defendant’s mitigating character evidence.  The prosecutor 
argued that instead of making good choices, defendant chose to 
become a skinhead who “very, very strongly embraced this 
White supremacy ideology”; that he chose to get racist tattoos 
in prison rather than “renounc[ing] his views”; and that 
defendant’s evidence of being a good family member was 
refuted by evidence that his letters to his grandmother 
contained “offensive racial symbols” and that he was conveying 
his racist beliefs to his children. 
b.  Discussion 
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in permitting the 
prosecution to use what he describes as a “mountain” of 
irrelevant evidence of his racist beliefs, tattoos, and 
associations at the penalty retrial.  The Constitution, 
defendant emphasizes, protects even deeply offensive and 
hateful beliefs.  (See, e.g., National Socialist Party v. Skokie 
(1977) 432 U.S. 43 (per curiam); see also, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps 
(2011) 562 U.S. 443, 458 [“ ‘If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’  
[Citation.]  Indeed, ‘the point of all speech protection . . . is to 
shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are 
misguided, or even hurtful.’ ”].)  Defendant argues the trial 
court erred in permitting the jury to weigh the offensiveness of 
his beliefs in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. 
 
Defendant likens his case to Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. 
159, in which the United States Supreme Court confronted 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
 
 
questions concerning the use of evidence of racist beliefs and 
associations in capital sentencing.  Dawson was a prison 
escapee who, during his flight, invaded a stranger’s home and 
brutally murdered her before stealing her money and car.  At 
the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the prosecution 
introduced evidence that Dawson had tattooed the words 
“Aryan Brotherhood” on his hand.  The prosecution also read 
into the record a stipulation explaining that the reference was 
to “ ‘a White racist prison gang that began in the 1960’s in 
California in response to other gangs of racial minorities.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 162; see id. at pp. 160–161.)  The court held this was 
error.  (Id. at p. 167.) 
 
The high court explained that while “the Constitution 
does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence 
concerning one’s beliefs and associations at sentencing simply 
because those beliefs and associations are protected by the 
First Amendment” (Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. at p. 165), it also 
does not permit the prosecution to ask the jury to return a 
particular penalty judgment because the defendant holds 
offensive beliefs or associates with others who hold the same 
beliefs (id. at p. 167).  Rather, the beliefs and associations must 
have some “bearing on the issue being tried.”  (Id. at p. 168.)  
For example, evidence of the defendant’s racist beliefs and 
associations may be admitted to show the defendant’s racial 
motives for committing the crime.  (Id. at pp. 164, 166, 
discussing Barclay v. Florida (1983) 463 U.S. 939.)  Similarly, 
evidence that a prison gang is associated with drugs and 
violent escape attempts at prisons, or advocates the murder of 
fellow inmates, might be relevant to show the defendant’s 
future dangerousness.  (Dawson, at p. 165; see id. at p. 166 [“A 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
58 
 
 
defendant’s membership in an organization that endorses the 
killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be 
relevant to a jury’s inquiry into whether the defendant will be 
dangerous in the future.”].) 
 
In Dawson’s case, however, there was no argument that 
the crime was motivated by racial hatred, and the narrowness 
of the Aryan Brotherhood stipulation meant that the only 
possible relevance of the evidence was simply to demonstrate 
that Dawson associated with persons holding racist beliefs.  
(Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. at pp. 165–166.)  The state argued 
that the very fact Dawson held racist beliefs was admissible at 
the penalty phase because it was relevant to show Dawson’s 
“character”—a legitimate sentencing consideration under state 
law—as well as to rebut Dawson’s own mitigating character 
evidence.  (Id. at pp. 167–168.)  The high court rejected the 
argument, explaining that evidence that goes to show “nothing 
more than [a defendant’s] abstract beliefs” is irrelevant even if 
labeled “character” evidence (id. at p. 167):  Evidence of 
abstract beliefs “cannot be viewed as relevant ‘bad’ character 
evidence in its own right” (id. at p. 168). 
 
As relevant here, Dawson stands for two central 
propositions.  First, “[e]vidence of a defendant’s racist beliefs is 
inadmissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial if it is not 
relevant to an issue in the case.”  (People v. Powell, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 960.)  This is because “a defendant’s abstract 
beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken 
into consideration by a sentencing judge” or jury.  (Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476, 485.)  Second, evidence of a 
defendant’s racist beliefs is not relevant if offered merely to 
show the moral reprehensibility of the beliefs themselves—
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
59 
 
 
which is to say, evidence of the defendant’s abstract beliefs is 
not competent general character evidence.  (Dawson, supra, 
503 U.S. at pp. 167–168; accord, e.g., Flanagan v. State (Nev. 
1993) 846 P.2d 1053, 1056 [evidence of a defendant’s racist or 
antisocial beliefs “is admissible only if it is used for something 
more than general character evidence”].)   
 
This case, unlike Dawson, does not involve a bare 
stipulation that the defendant has been associated with White 
supremacist groups.  Far from it.  But defendant argues that 
the same result should obtain because the evidence of his 
White supremacist beliefs and associations was nonetheless 
irrelevant to any legitimate issue in the case.  As in Dawson, 
no one argues that defendant’s racist beliefs were relevant to 
explain his motive for the robbery murders.  (Cf., e.g., People v. 
Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 960–961 [trial court reasonably 
ruled that the defendant’s tattoos and gang membership were 
relevant to explain the racial motivation for his attack on 
victim].)  Defendant argues that the evidence of his beliefs and 
associations therefore should have been excluded. 
 
This argument is too broad.  It is true that the challenged 
evidence shed no light on defendant’s motivation for his crime 
(and the People have not argued otherwise), but some of the 
evidence 
was 
clearly 
relevant 
to 
other 
legitimate 
considerations for the jury at the penalty phase.  For example, 
as the trial court ruled at the outset of the penalty retrial, 
defendant’s use of the red laces and the meaning of the red 
laces in skinhead culture were relevant to establish the 
circumstances of the crime under Penal Code section 190.3, 
factor (a), inasmuch as they tended to demonstrate defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt.  (See People v. Jackson (2014) 58 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
60 
 
 
Cal.4th 724, 753–754 [postcrime evidence of a defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt is admissible as a circumstance of the 
crime].)  As such, there was no bar to admission of the 
evidence. 
 
Evidence of a rune and swastika appearing somewhere 
near defendant’s cell shortly after the attack on Harger was 
also relevant, and therefore admissible, to connect defendant to 
the assault.  This evidence tended to corroborate Harger’s 
testimony that the assault was committed by a White inmate 
group and that defendant was in some way involved in this act 
of violence.  This evidence concerning the circumstances of 
defendant’s unadjudicated violent conduct was relevant 
evidence under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), and it was 
therefore admissible.  (Accord, People v. Merriman (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 1, 104 [evidence of White prison gang participation 
relevant to show circumstances of prior violent criminal 
activity]; People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 653–654 
[evidence of prison gang activity]; see also Dawson, supra, 503 
U.S. at p. 166.) 
 
But the central difficulty here is that the trial court also 
permitted the prosecution on rebuttal to introduce a large 
quantity of additional evidence concerning defendant’s racist 
beliefs—not for purposes of illuminating the circumstances of 
his crime or past acts of violence, but simply for the light the 
offensiveness of those beliefs shed on his character.  The trial 
court ruled that because defendant chose to present evidence of 
his good character—that he was a good family man, kind, and 
so on—the prosecution was entitled to rebut that evidence with 
testimony regarding defendant’s racial ideology.  The court 
explained:  “Can’t [a] general member of society make a 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
61 
 
 
determination that, you know what, if someone is a White 
supremacist, has been engaged in these type of activities, has 
those types of tattoos, those are not things of good character[?]  
I’m not going to walk away saying that’s a good person.”  
Defense counsel argued against the constitutionality of this 
approach, stating, “The People are trying to demonize 
[defendant’s] beliefs that are protected under our constitution 
in such a way that the jury will be inflamed to the point of 
giving him the death penalty.”  The court responded:  “Without 
using the pejorative sounding rhetoric you used in your last 
statement, I think it’s absolutely and wholly accurate,” and “I 
think [the prosecutor is] entitled to do that.  [¶]  Motion is 
denied.” 
 
In this the trial court was mistaken.  When a defendant 
chooses to present mitigating evidence of his good character 
during the penalty phase, the prosecution is certainly entitled 
to present rebuttal evidence and argument of the defendant’s 
bad character.  (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 709.)  
But we have “firmly rejected the notion that ‘any evidence 
introduced by defendant of his “good character” will open the 
door to any and all “bad character” evidence the prosecution 
can dredge up.  As in other cases, the scope of rebuttal must be 
specific, and evidence presented or argued as rebuttal must 
relate directly to a particular incident or character trait 
defendant offers in his own behalf.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Even when the 
defendant’s good character evidence is not limited to “ ‘any 
singular incident, personality trait, or aspect of [his] 
background,’ ” the scope of proper rebuttal is limited by the 
scope of good character evidence offered.  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
62 
 
 
 
Here, the mitigating evidence that prompted the trial 
court’s ruling was the testimony of defendant’s grandmother, 
who spoke to his commitment to his family and children, his 
academic achievement in earning his GED, and his personal 
accountability for previous crimes.  As Dawson makes clear, 
evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs is not relevant to 
rebut this variety of good character mitigation.  (Dawson, 
supra, 503 U.S. at pp. 167–168.)  In the face of similar 
mitigating character evidence, including testimony about the 
defendant’s “kindness to family members,” the high court held 
that evidence of racist beliefs, without more, is not admissible 
to show the defendant’s bad character for purposes of 
sentencing.  (Id. at p. 167; see id. at p. 168.)  “Whatever label is 
given to the evidence presented,” the court explained, the state 
may not ask the jury to render a penalty judgment based on 
the expression of an abstract belief—even one that is deeply 
offensive or morally repugnant.  (Id. at p. 167.)   
 
We do not suggest that evidence of a defendant’s racist 
beliefs is never relevant to rebut a defendant’s evidence of his 
own good character.  A defendant who seeks to portray an 
image of racial tolerance during his case in mitigation, for 
example, might well open the door to contrary evidence of his 
racist beliefs and associations.  In such a case, such evidence 
would tend to show more than the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s abstract beliefs; it would tend to show that the 
defendant lacks a specific positive character trait that he 
claims to have.  (Cf. People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 
576–578 [the defendant was not entitled to elicit testimony 
suggesting that he was honest and simultaneously preclude 
the prosecution from introducing contrary evidence].)  But that 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
63 
 
 
case is quite different from the one before us, in which the 
reprehensibility of defendant’s beliefs was treated as probative 
in its own right.3   
 
The Attorney General asks us to uphold the trial court’s 
evidentiary ruling on other grounds, arguing the challenged 
evidence could instead have been admitted to show defendant’s 
violent tendencies.  As already noted, the jury in this case was 
not merely presented with a bare stipulation that the 
defendant was a member of a racist group, as in Dawson.  The 
jury also heard evidence that defendant had claimed credit for 
the killing of Perez, claiming a badge of honor with particular 
significance in skinhead culture.  It heard evidence that 
defendant was a member of a White prison gang that had, at 
least on one occasion, orchestrated violence against a fellow 
White inmate.4  And it heard a reference from a prosecution 
expert to the propensity of White supremacist groups to 
                                        
3   
After the trial court had already ruled (over his objection) 
that his grandmother’s testimony opened the door to the 
challenged evidence, defendant did present testimony seeking 
to show his racially tolerant nature and to downplay his White 
supremacist beliefs.  But this testimony, which appears to have 
been presented in an attempt to blunt the force of the 
prosecution’s anticipated rebuttal evidence, could not have 
justified the trial court’s initial ruling, nor did it render 
otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible. 
4  
The Attorney General also argues in its briefing that the 
jury heard evidence that defendant tattooed his body with the 
phrase “Nigger Thrasher” after beating an African-American 
man.  The record contains no evidence to support the 
argument. 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
64 
 
 
“conduct criminal activity and violence” in prison.  According to 
the Attorney General, this evidence laid the foundation 
necessary to permit the jury to consider the challenged 
rebuttal evidence for purposes of evaluating defendant’s 
violent character and the danger he represents to society, 
which is a relevant consideration in the penalty phase.  (See 
Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. at pp. 165–166.) 
 
We agree that at least some of the challenged evidence 
might have been admitted for the purpose of showing the 
connection between defendant’s prior violent acts and his 
propensity for violence.  Had the trial court admitted the 
evidence for this purpose, it would be a different case.  But the 
great bulk of the challenged evidence was neither admitted nor 
used for any such limited purpose.  Had the trial court 
admitted the evidence solely to show defendant’s propensity for 
violence, it would then have considered whether to tailor the 
evidence to address the nature of defendant’s participation in 
prison gangs, for example, or the connection between the 
gangs’ shared beliefs and the attack on Harger, a fellow White 
inmate.  No such consideration was given to that issue, 
however, because the trial court had ruled defendant’s abstract 
beliefs and associations admissible in their own right as 
general character evidence. 
 
The consequence of this ruling was an evidentiary 
presentation and set of arguments that focused on the nature 
of defendant’s offensive racist beliefs for the very sake of 
highlighting their offensiveness, rather than what they showed 
about defendant’s propensity for violence or any other matter 
relevant to the jury’s penalty judgment.  With the trial court’s 
permission, the prosecution detailed, at some length, the 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
65 
 
 
controversial tenets of defendant’s religious views and racial 
ideology. Mendelson, the prosecution’s expert, testified that 
neo-Nazis believe that Jews “are the spawns of the Devil”; that 
other minorities are “mud people”; and that one “must be of 
pure descent in order to directly communicate with the Gods.”  
Mendelson proceeded to meticulously catalog and decode the 
symbols defendant had employed in his personal writings and 
contained in each of defendant’s multiple tattoos.  Although 
some of the tattoos contained violent themes (e.g., the image of 
a noose), the expert was not asked to testify about whether 
defendant’s tattoos reflected a commitment to violent action.  
She was, however, asked whether they reflected a belief in 
White supremacy.  She responded that they did.  The central 
theme of Mendelson’s extensive testimony was not that 
defendant’s tattoos endorsed violence, but that they were 
“inherently racist.”   
 
The prosecutor returned to this theme in her closing 
argument, arguing at great length that defendant’s racist 
beliefs and his decision to cover his body in racist tattoos, in 
and of themselves, showed he was not the good person he 
claimed to be in his case in mitigation and was therefore 
undeserving of the jury’s mercy.  She described defendant as “a 
walking billboard of hate” who has “very, very strongly 
embraced this White supremacy ideology.”  She emphasized 
that defendant “continued having all of these White supremacy 
beliefs” after he committed the murders.  And she told the jury 
that defendant’s “very offensive” tattoos “go[] to who he is.”  
“[W]hat you permanently put on your body,” she argued, “says 
a whole lot about what you are thinking and about who you 
are.”  The prosecutor made no effort to connect defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
66 
 
 
beliefs to his past acts of violence or even his propensity for 
violence.  Much as in Dawson, the record leaves little doubt 
that the “evidence was employed simply because the jury 
would find these beliefs morally reprehensible,” and not 
because of the light the evidence shed on defendant’s moral 
culpability for his crime or the dangers he poses to his fellow 
inmates or other members of society.  (Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. 
at p. 167.)   
 
The Attorney General also argues on appeal that the 
evidence of defendant’s beliefs could have been admitted to 
refute defense witness Beek’s misleading answers on cross-
examination, in which he described the neo-Nazi group he and 
defendant belonged to as a “White club” and a “group of 
working-class individuals that band together [and] have 
barbecues.”  But Beek also testified that White supremacy was 
a “focus” of the group, if not its “main” focus.  The trial court 
did not admit the evidence concerning defendant’s beliefs and 
tattoos for the purpose of setting the record straight on this 
particular point, and the detailed explication of skinhead 
beliefs and the racist content of defendant’s writings and 
tattoos certainly went far beyond whatever might have been 
necessary to accomplish that goal.  It is, moreover, unclear why 
it would have been important to the prosecution to clarify as it 
did, other than to invite the jury to infer defendant’s bad 
character from a more precise understanding of the nature of 
the group’s highly offensive racist beliefs. 
 
The Attorney General concedes that “[t]he simple fact 
that Young believed Caucasians to be superior to all other 
races” was “arguably inadmissible” for any purpose other than 
to reveal his violent propensities or to refute Beek’s 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
67 
 
 
characterizations, but contends that the trial court correctly so 
instructed the jury.  But the jury would not have gleaned this 
message from the instruction it was given.  Once again, it was 
instructed:  “Certain evidence was admitted during the course 
of the trial with regard to the defendant’s beliefs, allegiance, 
and tattoos.  This was done in rebuttal to the presentation by 
the defense of evidence of the defendant’s good character.  Such 
beliefs, allegiance, and tattoos are constitutionally protected by 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Such 
evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose 
of evaluating the credibility or strength of witnesses who were 
asked about the defendant’s character.  Such evidence cannot 
be considered by you as an aggravating circumstance.”  The 
instruction did inform the jury that defendant’s beliefs, 
allegiance, and tattoos are entitled to First Amendment 
protection.  But it did not inform the jury that it was permitted 
to consider the evidence for certain purposes (for example, to 
evaluate defendant’s violent propensities) and not others (to 
conclude defendant has bad character because he holds 
morally reprehensible beliefs).  This omission is unsurprising, 
given the trial court’s ruling that the prosecution was entitled 
to argue that defendant’s White supremacist beliefs in 
themselves undermined his claim to be “a good person”—which 
is precisely what the prosecution argued to the jury in its 
closing.  There was nothing, in short, that would have alerted 
the jury that it was forbidden from considering evidence of 
defendant’s beliefs for this very purpose.5 
                                        
5  
The Attorney General argues defendant failed to object to 
 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
68 
 
 
 
Because the First Amendment prohibits the introduction 
of this evidence for the purpose for which it was used at the 
penalty retrial, we find error.  And because we cannot say the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must 
reverse the penalty judgment.  (Chapman v. California, supra, 
386 U.S. at p. 24.) 
 
It is true, as the Attorney General emphasizes, that the 
People presented a substantial case in aggravation—both at 
the original penalty phase trial, which had resulted in a hung 
jury, and the penalty retrial.  This case included the tragic 
circumstances of the robbery murders, which involved the 
needless close-range shooting of two defenseless employees 
who appeared to be complying with the robbers’ demands; 
evidence that defendant sought to claim credit for the murder 
of his victim; evidence of prior felony convictions, including a 
conviction for assault of an elderly man; and evidence that 
                                                                                                           
 
the instruction at trial and therefore forfeited any claim the 
instruction was inadequate.  But defendant had fully aired his 
First Amendment objection to the admission of the evidence 
concerning his beliefs, and in response the trial court ruled the 
evidence of his beliefs was admissible for the purpose of 
rebutting his evidence of good character.  Defendant was not 
further required to seek a limiting instruction that would have 
prohibited the jury from considering the evidence for the very 
purpose for which the court had admitted it.  (See, e.g., Warner 
Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 298 
[party does not forfeit objection by failing to seek limiting 
instruction contrary to the basis on which trial court admitted 
the evidence]; People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 166 
[counsel is not required to proffer futile objections to preserve 
claim of error].)   
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
69 
 
 
defendant played a leadership role in a prison gang that was 
responsible for an attack on a fellow inmate in prison. 
 
But for whatever reason, the prosecution chose not to 
rely on this evidence alone.  Instead, in response to defendant’s 
general character evidence, the prosecution adduced testimony 
from seven different witnesses concerning his racist beliefs, 
tattoos, and associations, including an expert who testified at 
length about the nature of the beliefs and decoded the racist 
content of defendant’s writings to his family members and his 
tattoos—including his “Nigger Thrasher” tattoo, which the 
trial court had earlier ruled inadmissible during the 
prosecution’s case in aggravation precisely because of its 
potential to inflame the jury.   
 
In her closing argument, the prosecutor then repeatedly 
raised defendant’s decision to “espous[e] [White supremacist] 
views and this ideology,” and his “ch[oice] to put all these 
[tattoos] on his body,” explaining, “It goes to who he is.”  Other 
representative excerpts from the prosecutor’s extensive 
emphasis on defendant’s racist beliefs include: 
• “He chose to become a skinhead.  He chose to become a 
skinhead before he ever went to Arizona prison.  We saw 
from the Thunder Road records that he was even having 
some racist beliefs while he was fairly young.  Those 
continued to grow until he very, very strongly embraced 
this White supremacy ideology.” 
• “When you look at what he did after he committed these 
murders, what did he do?  He continued having all of these 
White supremacy beliefs.” 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
70 
 
 
• “We know [two months after the murders] he had a number 
of tattoos on him.  But there were a number he got after 
this.  During this period of time where he’s supposedly 
raising a family and being a good father, what’s he doing?  
He’s adding additional tattoos to his body, and very 
offensive ones at that.  Adding a big German soldier on his 
side.  Adding a tree with a noose on it on his side.  That’s 
what he’s doing.” 
• “How does he talk to his grandmother in these letters?  
Well, he signs off with the ‘love, Jeff, 14,’ celtic cross, ‘88.’  
We know what that is.  He’s writing to his grandma, and 
he’s putting these offensive racial symbols in his letters to 
her.  [¶]  Is he a good family man?  Good grandson?  This is 
what he’s doing.  He’s saying ‘heil Hitler’ to his grandma.”   
• “You heard from his own mother that he is raising his son 
in a racist household, that he has not abandoned these 
beliefs.  [¶]  It was of some interest that he even named his 
child Odin.  You heard from the mother that the kids are 
being raised in a home where a Nazi flag is being flown.” 
• “But what kind of a role model does he serve?  [¶] . . .  [¶]  
He espouses all kinds of hateful views on his own body.  He 
continues to add to those.  Many of these tattoos came after 
September of 1999.  He is a walking billboard of hate.”   
• “They want you to believe somehow that he has renounced 
his views.  We know some of these tattoos that he got in 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
71 
 
 
prison.  That’s clear.  But we know that many of them he 
did not.  Many of them he got after September of 1999.  
This is two months after he’s committed the homicide.  He 
adds this crucified skinhead to his arm, this crucified 
skinhead with the red suspenders.”  
• “What about the German soldier on his side?  He got that—
and this is a professional tattoo.  As offensive as it is, this 
was an expensive and professional tattoo.  This is 
something that he chose to add to his body well after.”   
• “We know, too, that he adds this Nazi eagle with the 
Schutzstaffel on his chest again sometime after September 
of 1999.  [¶]  Is this somebody who has somehow renounced 
his views?  [¶]  There was a clear impression that was 
intended to be given to you by the defense that somehow 
the only reason he became a White supremacist was for 
protection in prison.  That was absolutely not true.  You 
know from the evidence that he is clearly espousing these 
views and this ideology after he gets out of prison.  That’s 
how he meets James Torkelson, going to Aryan Nations 
meetings.  This has nothing to do with protection in prison.  
Nothing at all.  It goes to who he is.” 
• “What you put on your body, what you permanently put on 
your body, says a whole lot about what you are thinking 
and about who you are.  These were things—again, choices.  
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
72 
 
 
He chose to put all these on his body.  He chose to do many 
of these things well after he got out of prison.” 
• “Again, that German soldier, that cost a lot of money.  
Instead of spending the money on his kids, that’s how he’s 
spending it.  That’s the kind of choices he makes.” 
 
 
 
In sum, the prosecutor openly and repeatedly invited the 
jury to do precisely what the law does not allow:  to weigh the 
offensive and reprehensible nature of defendant’s abstract 
beliefs in determining whether to impose the death penalty.  
We cannot ignore the possibility that the jury accepted that 
invitation in returning its verdict on the penalty retrial.  (Cf. 
Dawson v. State (Del. 1992) 608 A.2d 1201, 1205 [concluding, 
on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, that where state had 
woven evidence of Dawson’s Aryan Brotherhood membership 
into a “central theme that Dawson had an incorrigible 
character with his entire life showing repeated decisions to 
reject any redeeming paths,” it would be “impossible” to 
conclude that the error in admitting the evidence did not 
contribute to the death sentences].)  The trial court’s error in 
allowing the prosecution to use evidence of defendant’s 
abstract beliefs in this fashion was prejudicial, and the 
resulting penalty judgment must therefore be reversed. 
PEOPLE v. YOUNG 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
73 
 
 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment as to guilt, reverse the judgment 
as to the sentence of death, and remand the matter for a new 
penalty determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Young 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S148462 
Date Filed: July 25, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: John M. Thompson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kathy R. Moreno, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Arlene 
Aquintey Sevidal, Ronald A. Jakob, Stacy Tyler and Michael T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kathy R. Moreno 
Law Office of Kathy R. Moreno 
P.O. Box 9006 
Berkeley, CA  94709-0006 
(510) 717-2097 
 
Michael T. Murphy 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92186-5266 
(619) 738-9211