Title: Rawlings v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 030085
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

VIRGINIA: 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 16th day of 
January, 2004. 
 
 
Christy Rawlings, 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
  Against  
Record No. 030085 
 
 
 
Circuit Court No. CL00-4694 
 
Pablo Lopez,  
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
Crystal Crayton, 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
  Against  
Record No. 030086 
 
 
 
Circuit Court No. CL00-4693 
 
Pablo Lopez,  
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit 
Court of Greensville County. 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court is of opinion there is error in the judgment of 
the Circuit Court of Greensville County. 
 
The appellants were passengers in an automobile that was 
involved in an accident.  The appellants and the driver of the 
automobile filed separate motions for judgment against Lopez, the 
appellee, alleging negligence.  Neither of the appellants were 
parties to the driver's suit and did not appear of record in that 
proceeding.  The driver's suit was the first to be tried and 
resulted in a jury verdict for Lopez. 
 
Lopez then filed pleas in bar alleging that appellants' suits 
were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel.  The circuit court sustained the pleas in bar and 
 
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dismissed the appellants' motions for judgment by final order 
entered October 10, 2002. 
 
Appellants have assigned error to the circuit court's judgment 
that their claims are barred by either collateral estoppel or res 
judicata.  We agree with the appellants and will reverse the circuit 
court's judgment. 
 
"Under the concept of collateral estoppel, 'the parties to the 
first action and their privies are precluded from litigating [in a 
subsequent suit] any issue of fact actually litigated and essential 
to a valid and final personal judgment in the first action.' "  
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 640, 272 
S.E.2d 217, 218 (1980) (quoting Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671, 
202 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1974)).  In Bailey, this Court reaffirmed 
Virginia's adherence to the principle of mutuality which holds that 
"a litigant is generally prevented from invoking the preclusive 
force of a judgment unless he would have been bound had the prior 
litigation of the issue reached the opposite result." Id. (citing 
Bates, 214 Va. at 671 n.7, 202 S.E.2d at 921 n.7).  There was no 
mutuality in the case at bar because, had the jury in the first 
action found against Lopez, he would not have been bound by that 
verdict in the subsequent suits brought by the appellants.  See 
Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178, 182, 196 S.E. 688, 689 (1938). 
Moreover, as noted below, the record does not reflect any relation 
of privity between the appellants and the driver of the car who was 
the plaintiff in the first suit. 
 
Lopez's claim of res judicata also fails because in order "[t]o 
establish the defense of res judicata, the proponent of the doctrine 
 
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must establish identity of the remedies sought, identity of the 
cause of action, identity of the parties, and identity of the 
quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made."  
State Water Control Board v. Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. 209, 214, 542 
S.E.2d 766, 769 (2001) (citing Balbir Brar Assocs. v. Consol. 
Trading & Servs. Corp., 252 Va. 341, 346, 477 S.E.2d 743, 746 
(1996)) (emphasis added).  The appellants in the case at bar were 
not parties to the first suit brought by the driver.  Therefore, the 
preclusive effect of res judicata cannot be sustained unless, as 
Lopez argues, there was privity between the driver and the 
appellants. 
 
The record reflects no relationship existing between appellants 
and the driver that would have permitted the driver to assert the 
appellants' legal rights during the first suit.  Thus, no privity 
existed between the parties and res judicata did not bar the 
appellants' suits.  See Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. at 214, 542 S.E.2d 
at 769 (2001) ("The touchstone of privity for purposes of res 
judicata is that a party's interest is so identical with another 
that representation by one party is representation of the other's 
legal right."). 
 
For these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court of 
Greensville County is reversed and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
This order shall be certified to the Circuit Court of 
Greensville County and shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
A Copy, 
 
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Teste: 
Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk