Title: Kristine Neiman v. American National Property and Casualty Company
Citation: 2000 WI 83
Docket Number: 1999AP002554
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2000

2000 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2554 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Kristine Neiman, individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Jared Neiman, 
and Steven Neiman,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
American National Property and Casualty  
Company,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 4, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Mary Kay Wagner-Malloy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
James W. Mohr, Jr., and Mohr & Anderson, S.C., Hartford, and oral 
argument by James W. Mohr, Jr. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by Eugene A. Gasiorkiewicz, Alice A. Rudebusch and Hanson & 
Gasiorkiewicz, S.C., Racine, and oral argument by Eugene A. 
Gasiorkiewicz. 
 
2 
 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed John S. Greene, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. 
Doyle, attorney general, on behalf of the State of Wisconsin. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert L. 
Jaskulski and Domnitz, Mawicke & Goisman, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
William C. Gleisner, III, and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, 
III, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Noreen J. 
Parrett, James A. Friedman and La Follette Godfrey & Kahn, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Insurance Aliance, Wisconsin 
Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Civil Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin, Professional Insurance Agents of Wisconsin, Inc., 
Independent Insurance Agents of Wisconsin, Inc., and the State 
Medical Society of Wisconsin. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark E. 
Larson and Gutglass, Erickson & Bonville, S.C., Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John S. 
Skilton, Michael B. Van Sicklen, Roberta F. Howell, and Foley & 
Lardner, Madison, on behalf of Physicians Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Howard R. 
Orenstein, Terry L. Wade and Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, 
L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Barbara, Roger, Mitchell 
and Russell Schultz. 
 
2000 WI 83 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-2554 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kristine Neiman, individually and as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Jared Neiman, and Steven Neiman, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
 
v. 
 
American National Property and Casualty 
Company, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Mary Wagner-Malloy, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Kristine Neiman was injured, 
and her child stillborn, as the result of an accident occurring 
in September 1995.  At the time of the accident, Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(4) (1995-96)1 provided that in a wrongful death action 
                     
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 (1995-96) states: 
 Plaintiff in wrongful death action. 
 . . .  
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-2554 
 
2 
damages up to $150,000 could be awarded for the loss of society 
and companionship.  Subsequently the legislature increased the 
amount of damages that could be awarded under this statute and 
applied the increase retroactively.  1997 Wis. Act 89.2  The 
American National Property and Casualty Company (ANPAC) appeals 
from a judgment of the circuit court declaring as constitutional 
the retroactive increase in wrongful death damages available 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) (1997-98).3  Application of 
the higher statutory damage limit to an event occurring before 
the amendment to § 895.04(4) was enacted, ANPAC contends, 
violates 
the 
due 
process 
protections 
guaranteed 
by 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well 
as art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
                                                                  
(4) Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional damages 
not to exceed $150,000 for loss of society and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased. 
 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(4) as amended by 1997 Wis. Act 89 
provides:   
Judgment 
for 
damages 
for 
pecuniary 
injury 
from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional damages 
not to exceed $500,000 per occurrence in the case of a 
deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of 
a 
deceased 
adult, 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased, or to the siblings of the 
deceased, if the siblings were minors at the time of 
the death.  
 
3 All subsequent statutory references are to the 1997-98 
volume of the Wisconsin Statutes, unless noted otherwise.  
No. 99-2554 
 
3 
¶2 
We conclude that a retroactive increase in damages 
available pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) unfairly alters 
settled property rights without achieving a broad public 
benefit.  As a result, the retroactive element of the statute is 
unconstitutional under our test set forth in Martin v. Richards, 
192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995).  Accordingly, we reverse 
the circuit court. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Kristine and 
Steve Neiman (the Neimans) purchased underinsured motorist 
insurance coverage from ANPAC.  On September 5, 1995, Kristine 
Neiman was in an automobile accident.  As a result of the 
accident Kristine, eight-months pregnant, sustained personal 
injuries, and her child was stillborn.   
¶4 
Subsequently, 
the 
Neimans 
settled 
with 
the 
underinsured driver and received $100,000 for Kristine Neiman's 
personal injuries and $100,000 as damages for the loss of 
society and companionship of Jared Neiman.  
¶5 
On the date the accident occurred, the maximum 
statutory damage limit for a wrongful death claim was $150,000. 
 On April 28, 1998, an amendment to the wrongful death statute 
went into effect, retroactively increasing the limit for 
recovery for loss of society and companionship from $150,000 to 
$500,000 in the case of a deceased minor and $350,000 in the 
case of a deceased adult.  1997 Wis. Act 89, § 3.  In August 
1998 the Neimans brought a claim against ANPAC, asserting that 
additional payments for the wrongful death of Jared Neiman were 
due pursuant to their underinsured motorist coverage.   
No. 99-2554 
 
4 
¶6 
Before the circuit court, ANPAC moved for a judgment 
declaring that the retroactive application of increased wrongful 
death damage limits was unconstitutional.  The Kenosha County 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Mary Wagner-Malloy presiding, 
denied ANPAC's motion and upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute as amended by 1997 Wis. Act. 89.   
¶7 
The parties subsequently entered into a settlement 
agreement.  Under this agreement, ANPAC paid the Neimans an 
additional $50,000 as wrongful death damages.  This amount 
represented the balance between the $100,000 collected from the 
underinsured motorist and the $150,000 limit for loss of society 
and companionship under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) (1995-96).  The 
Neimans retained a claim against ANPAC for additional wrongful 
death damages, pursuant to the increase in the statutory limits 
established by 1997 Wis. Act 89.  ANPAC retained the right to 
appeal the circuit court's judgment, finding the retroactive 
increase in wrongful death damage limits to be constitutional.  
Subsequently, ANPAC filed a petition to bypass the court of 
appeals, which we granted.   
¶8 
The sole issue presented for review is whether 
retroactive application of the increase in wrongful death 
damages as provided in 1997 Wis. Act 89 violates ANPAC's due 
process rights guaranteed by art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin 
No. 99-2554 
 
5 
Constitution4 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.5  We have found the due process clause in our state 
constitution to be the substantial equivalent to its counterpart 
in the federal constitution.  Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 
299, 307, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995).  Whether or not a legislative 
act that applies retroactively violates due process is a 
question of law, which this court reviews de novo.  Chappy v. 
LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 184, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987). 
¶9 
A rational basis test is applied when the court 
reviews 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
retroactive 
economic 
legislation.  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 
467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984).  Further, this court has held that to 
determine whether a retroactive statute is supported by a 
rational basis, the public interest served by the statute is 
weighed 
against 
the 
private 
interest 
that 
it 
overturns, 
including any unfairness caused by the retroactivity.  Martin, 
192 Wis. 2d at 201.  "'Every presumption must be indulged to 
sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as 
to a legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be 
                     
4 Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  
"All people are born equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed."  
5 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in relevant part that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . ."  
No. 99-2554 
 
6 
resolved in favor of constitutionality.'"  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d 
at 185 (quoting State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 
58 Wis. 2d 32, 46, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973)).  
¶10 There is no dispute on the issue of whether the 
plaintiffs' cause of action actually accrued prior to the 
effective date of the change in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  
Kristine Neiman was involved in an accident on September 5, 
1995.  In April 1998 the legislature amended the wrongful death 
statute and increased damages available for the loss of society 
and companionship.  1997 Wis. Act 89, § 3 (enacted April 13, 
1998; published April 27, 1998).  Therefore, the cause of action 
accrued before the amendment to the statute. 
¶11 There is also no dispute on the issue of whether the 
amendment to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4), implemented by 1997 Wis. 
Act 89, is indeed retroactive.  It is. The legislature provided 
that Act 89 "first applies to actions commenced on the effective 
date of this subsection." 1997 Wis. Act 89, § 4.  This language 
indicates that the legislature intended to include within the 
scope of the amendment those claims in which the events giving 
rise to a cause of action had already occurred.  See Martin, 192 
Wis. 2d at 200. (phrase "filed on or after" in a legislative act 
indicated the legislature's intention to apply the new law 
retroactively).  Thus, in this case we need not look further to 
conclude that the legislature intended § 895.04(4) to apply 
retroactively. 
¶12 We must 
first 
determine 
whether 
the 
retroactive 
statute "is remedial or procedural rather than substantive."  
No. 99-2554 
 
7 
Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 294, 588 N.W.2d 
19 (1999).  Statutes that are remedial or procedural are 
generally given retroactive application.  Gutter v. Seamandel, 
103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981).   
¶13 When the limit of damages that can be recovered is set 
by statute, the amount that can be recovered is fixed on the 
date of injury.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 206-07 (citing State ex 
rel. Briggs & Stratton v. Noll, 100 Wis. 2d 650, 655-56, 302 
N.W.2d 487 (1981); Bradley v. Knutson, 62 Wis. 2d 432, 436-37, 
215 N.W.2d 369 (1974)).  The retroactive increase in damages 
available under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) for loss of society and 
companionship is a change in substantive rights.  Bradley, 62 
Wis. 2d at 436. Therefore, the retroactive application of the 
increase in wrongful death damage limits affects a substantive 
right fixed on the date that the auto accident occurred. 
¶14 Retroactive legislation must meet the test of due 
process and merely identifying a substantive, or vested, 
property right is not dispositive for due process purposes. The 
concept of vested rights is "conclusory – a right is vested when 
it has been so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by 
statute." Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the 
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 
692, 
696 
(1960). 
 
Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
statute 
retroactively affects a substantive right that accrued before 
the passage of the legislation, we then proceed to apply the 
balancing test set forth in Martin.  To the extent the language 
in prior holdings implies that identifying a "vested" right is 
No. 99-2554 
 
8 
dispositive in determining whether a clearly retroactive statute 
is constitutional, that language is overruled.  See Noll, 100 
Wis. 2d at 656 (acts of the legislature may not constitutionally 
impair 
vested 
rights 
acquired 
under 
prior 
law). 
 
When 
considering the constitutionality of expressly retroactive laws, 
the Martin test is applied. 
¶15 The balancing test we set forth in Martin and employed 
here is not an opinion poll.  "[W]e must balance the public 
interest served by the retroactive application of the [statute] 
against the private interests that are overturned by it, 
including any unfairness inherent in such application."  Id. at 
211.  The test occurs within an established legal framework.   
¶16 This framework includes the principle that, like 
prospective acts, retroactive legislative enjoys a presumption 
of constitutionality.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201.  However, 
retroactive legislation "often unsettles important rights" and 
"is viewed with some degree of suspicion."  Id.  We stated in 
Snopek: 
 
"Strong common-law tradition defines the legislature's 
primary function as declaring law to regulate future 
behavior.  Thus, as a matter of justice, no law should 
be enforced before people can learn of its existence 
and 
conduct 
themselves 
accordingly. 
 
In 
short, 
retroactivity 
disturbs 
the 
stability 
of 
past 
transactions." 
Snopek, 223 Wis. 2d at 293-94 (quoting Employers Ins. v. Smith, 
154 Wis. 2d 199, 453 N.W.2d 856 (1990)).   
¶17 An additional part of our framework of analysis is the 
principle that the justification for prospective legislation may 
No. 99-2554 
 
9 
not suffice for retroactive legislation.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 
201 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 
(1976)).  The increase in damages at issue in this case applies 
to the "loss of society and companionship."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(4). 
 
This 
recovery 
protects 
"the 
emotional 
or 
sentimental aspects" in family relationships that is lost due to 
another's negligence.  Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 
508, 519, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).   The record illustrates that 
the legislature heard persuasive testimony about the need for 
this amendment to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) from the family members 
of children killed through the negligent actions of another 
person.  This testimony presented compelling arguments for 
increasing the wrongful death liability limits prospectively.  
In our analysis of the legal question presented in this case, we 
do not and cannot dispute the suffering that these families have 
experienced or the gravity of their loss.  However, the role of 
the judicial branch here is to apply established rules of law to 
the constitutional issue presented.  As illustrated by prior 
judicial decisions that reviewed retroactive statutes, many 
legislative ideas may be implemented only prospectively. See 
Bradley, 62 Wis. 2d 432; Hunter v. School Dist. of Gale-Ettrick-
Trempeleau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 293 N.W.2d 515 (1980); Noll, 100 
Wis. 2d 650; Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 212. 
¶18 We turn then to apply the balancing test set forth in 
Martin.  First, we consider the private interests overturned by 
this retroactive legislation, including any unfairness inherent 
in its application.  ANPAC contends that its private rights are 
No. 99-2554 
 
10
analogous to those protected from retroactive legislation in 
Martin.  We agree. 
¶19 In Martin, we held that at the time of the injury the 
plaintiffs had a right pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 655 (1986) to 
unlimited damages and that this right could not be abrogated by 
retroactive legislation.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 206.  We cited 
our prior holdings in Noll and Bradley for the proposition that 
the right to recover a particular measure of damages is fixed on 
the date of injury.  Id.   
¶20 ANPAC contends that it, too, possessed a substantive 
right to have its liability fixed on the date of injury.  ANPAC 
asserts that at the time of the injury the Neimans accrued a 
right to recover up to $150,000 under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4); 
ANPAC's exposure to liability for damages accrued at that same 
maximum level.  These accrued rights are unsettled by the 
retroactive aspect of § 895.04(4).  We agree. 
¶21 ANPAC further points out that this court rejected 
retroactive application of amendments to the wrongful death 
statute in Bradley, Quinn v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul 
Railway Co., 141 Wis. 497, 500, 124 N.W.2d 653 (1910), and 
Keeley v. Great Northern Railway Co., 139 Wis. 448, 121 N.W.2d 
167 (1909).  In our 1995 decision in Martin, this court rejected 
retroactive application of a cap on noneconomic damages in a 
medical malpractice action created by 1985 Wis. Act 340. The 
United States Supreme Court has stated that one of the concerns 
about 
retroactive 
statutes 
is 
that 
"[t]he 
Legislature's 
unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations 
No. 99-2554 
 
11
suddenly and without individualized consideration."  Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994).  Defendants such as 
ANPAC, as well as individuals who have purchased a specific 
level of insurance, would reasonably rely upon the law as set 
forth by the courts and the legislature. The retroactive 
application of 1997 Wis. Act 89 deprived ANPAC, as well as other 
defendants in tort actions, of a meaningful notice of the 
potential increase in exposure to claims or an opportunity to 
increase premiums to pay the expense of this increased exposure. 
¶22 An individual who purchased insurance in reliance upon 
the terms of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) and this court's decisions 
regarding the constitutionality of retroactive legislation, may 
not have sufficient coverage for liability in wrongful death 
claims if the amendment to the statute is applied retroactively. 
 For example, an individual insured for $250,000 could now face 
a $500,000 judgment in an action based upon the wrongful death 
of a minor.  Had the defendants anticipated that a greater 
liability could be imposed, he or she may have altered their 
conduct accordingly and purchased greater insurance coverage.  
The result for ANPAC, and other insurers and insureds, is that 
the retroactive change in law unfairly overturns settled 
expectations.   
¶23 We turn then to the second prong of the Martin test 
and examine whether the public purpose for this retroactive 
application of the statute outweighs the private interests it 
overturns.  In Martin we noted that the balancing test being 
employed in our due process analysis was similar to that test 
No. 99-2554 
 
12
used in Chappy.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201 n.8 (citing Chappy, 
136 Wis. 2d at 192-94).  In Chappy, the litigants challenged a 
statute as unconstitutional under the contract clause of the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d 
at 185-86.  The balancing test employed in Chappy included an 
examination of the public purpose behind the statute.  Id.  We 
stated that the public purpose must be "significant and 
legitimate" and "directed towards remedying a broad and general 
social or economic problem."  Id. at 187-88.  As in the Chappy 
analysis, the public purpose supporting retroactivity under a 
due process analysis must also be substantial, valid and 
intended to remedy a general economic or social issue.   
¶24 ANPAC contends that there is no public purpose that 
supports the retroactive increase in wrongful death limits for 
loss of society and companionship.  The Neimans argue that the 
legislative history identifies several public purposes for the 
retroactive change, including full compensation for loss of 
society and companionship, deterrence of negligent conduct, and 
adequate legal representation.  We consider each of these in 
turn. 
¶25 First, the Neimans correctly point out that it is the 
policy of tort law in Wisconsin to provide full compensation to 
those who are injured by the negligent conduct of another.  
Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 600, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).  
However, a wrongful death claim is a cause of action created by 
statute, and the right to recover damages as well as the total 
amount of recovery is restricted to what is enumerated in the 
No. 99-2554 
 
13
statute.  Chang v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 
549, 560-61, 514 N.W.2d 399 (1994). 
¶26 Prior to the passage of 1997 Wis. Act 89, the 
legislature had made a deliberate judgment regarding what 
maximum amount could be awarded by statute for the loss of 
society and companionship in such an action.  The legislature 
has made this type of assessment many times over the past 
decades.6  Each time the legislature amended the wrongful death 
statute, it made a determination as to what amount of damages 
would be appropriate for loss of society and companionship.  
Thus, wrongful death damages for the loss of society and 
companionship was not a new type of injury being provided a 
remedy, nor was the extent of the loss experienced by the 
plaintiffs unforseeable prior to the legislature acting in 1997 
Wis. Act 89.  The remedy fixed by statute before the amendment 
was enacted was the legislature's best judgment at the time as 
to what maximum amount of damages fully compensates for loss of 
society and companionship.  As a cause of action created by 
statute, and expressing the legislature's judgment as to what 
remedy 
should 
be 
available 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship, the terms of the statute at the time of the 
accident define full compensation. 
                     
6 For example, prior to the enactment of 1997 Wis. Act 89, 
the legislature increased statutory damage limits for the loss 
of society and companionship in a wrongful death claim in § 1, 
ch. 548, Wis. Laws 1949; ch. 194, Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 436, Wis. 
Laws 1969; ch. 287, Wis. Laws 1975; ch. 166, Wis. Laws 1979; 
1983 Wis. Act 315; 1991 Wis. Act 308. 
No. 99-2554 
 
14
¶27 Next, 
the 
Neimans 
assert 
that 
the 
retroactive 
application of the increase in damages will deter negligence.  
The prospect of liability for tort damages is an incentive for 
individuals to act with the level of due care that the law 
demands.  However, retroactive application of an increase in 
damage limits for loss of society and companionship cannot 
impact negligence that has already occurred.  Increasing the 
potential 
penalties 
for 
negligently 
causing 
injury 
might 
prospectively change future behavior, but not past behavior.  
Arguably these results may be suited to supporting a prospective 
change in wrongful death damages, but we find it unpersuasive 
here. 
¶28 Finally, we agree with the Neimans that access to the 
courts and legal counsel is essential to curb negligence and 
assure that those who negligently injure another are made to be 
responsible for the damages they cause.  Tort litigation 
involves complex legal and factual issues and the record 
indicates that the litigants may incur significant costs.  This 
again, however, is a persuasive rationale for prospectively 
increasing the amount of damages for a wrongful death claim, not 
retroactive application. 
¶29 Retroactive application will not expand access to 
justice by making it easier for individuals to obtain legal 
representation where, as here and in other pending claims, the 
plaintiffs already have retained legal counsel.  Claims arising, 
but not filed, before the 1998 amendment to the wrongful death 
statute fall in numbers as the statute of limitation tolls for 
No. 99-2554 
 
15
bringing such an action.  As a result, this public purpose is 
important, but does not support a broad public policy purpose 
for retroactivity. 
¶30 All of the public interests identified would arguably 
support prospective application of an increase in damages for 
loss of society and companionship; however, these reasons 
provide weak support for retroactive increases in damages.  In 
Noll, a majority of this court concluded that a retroactive 
increase in worker's compensation benefits was unconstitutional. 
 Noll, 100 Wis. 2d at 653-54.  The dissent in Noll argued that 
inflationary 
pressures 
justified 
retroactive 
increase 
in 
worker's compensation.  Id. at 667 ("[T]he public purpose to be 
served by the statute is to protect disabled workers in an 
inflationary 
economy.") 
 
No 
such 
pressure, 
economic 
or 
otherwise, appears to support the retroactive increase in 
damages for loss of society and companionship.  The litigants do 
not argue that the limits in effect prior to enactment of 1997 
Wis. Act 89 were so low as to be unconscionable.   
¶31 In sum, the public interests served by retroactive 
application of the increase of wrongful death limitations do not 
support abrogation of the settled expectations that accrued at 
the time of the accident. We conclude, therefore, that ANPAC has 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the retroactive 
application of the statute violates due process. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed. 
 
No. 99-2554 
 
16
 
 
No. 99-2554 
 
1 
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
1 
¶32 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The majority 
acknowledges the presumption of constitutionality but fails to 
apply it to the retroactivity provision of 1997 Wis. Act 89.  
Had it applied the presumption, the legislation would pass 
constitutional muster.  Even under the Martin test that the 
majority purports to apply, the retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.04(4) must be upheld. 
¶33 Retroactive legislation is presumed constitutional.  
Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 200, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995). 
Challengers bear a heavy burden to "prove the law to be 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."  Jackson v. Benson, 
218 Wis. 2d 835, 853, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998); State ex rel. 
Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 46-47, 205 
N.W.2d 784 (1973).  Despite the continued validity of these 
principles, the majority pays only lip service to the existence 
of the presumption and fails to demonstrate the application of 
the burden of proof.  
¶34 Instead, 
the 
majority 
attempts 
to 
undercut 
the 
presumption of constitutionality by implying that the unsettling 
effect of retroactive legislation and the suspicion with which 
it is viewed in some way diminish the import of the presumption. 
 Majority op. at ¶16.  However, this misses the mark.   
¶35 The 
unsettling 
effect 
and 
suspicion 
surrounding 
retroactive legislation explain the existence and application of 
the balancing test.  Although retroactive legislation may be 
viewed with suspicion, constitutional restrictions on such 
legislation "are of limited scope."  Landgraf v. USI Film 
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
2 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 267 (1994).  Thus, the presumption of 
constitutionality and the burden of proof remain unaffected as 
part of the "established legal framework" within which the 
Martin balancing test occurs.  Majority op. at ¶15.  Had the 
majority applied the presumption, the retroactive application of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.04(4) 
would 
have 
survived 
the 
present 
constitutional challenge.  
¶36 Having 
failed 
to 
apply 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality, the majority even fails to pass the Martin 
test it chooses to apply.  In Martin, this court set forth the 
balancing test we must undertake in an analysis of retroactive 
legislation:  "[W]e must weigh the public interest served by the 
retroactive statute against the private interests that are 
overturned by it."  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201. 
¶37 Applying 
the 
balancing 
test, 
the 
Martin 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
private 
interests 
abrogated 
by 
the 
retroactive statute that placed a cap on non-economic damages 
far outweighed the public interests served by the statute.  As 
to the first part of its analysis, the court noted the "minimal, 
if any, public interest served by applying the retroactive cap" 
to limit a tort victim's recovery for damages.  Id. at 211.  The 
court concluded that aside from the "generic comments" offered 
in favor of caps on non-economic damages, there was a dearth of 
evidence supporting the assertion that the cap would lower 
medical malpractice costs or ensure health care in the future.  
 Id.      
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
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¶38 The Martin court then examined the private interests 
at stake, including considerations of fundamental fairness, and 
observed the significant interest in preserving the substantive 
right of a tort victim to collect unlimited damages.  Id. at 
198.  Retroactive application of the cap on damages would impair 
a fixed right to unlimited damages that had previously vested to 
the most severely injured of tort victims.  Id. at 209.  
Balancing the two competing interests, the Martin court held the 
statute unconstitutional.     
¶39 In the present case, the inverse situation exists: a 
dubious private interest balanced against significant public 
interests.  The majority first considers the private interests 
affected by the retroactive legislation.  It recognizes the 
private interests of ANPAC but primarily focuses its discussion 
on the private interests of the individual who may purchase 
insurance in reliance upon the cap on damages under the prior 
statute.  Majority op. at ¶22.   
¶40 At first blush, the majority's discussion holds some 
appeal.  Upon closer examination, however, the discussion evades 
the reality that loss of society and companionship represents 
only one of several items of damages that may be attributable to 
the tortfeasor.  More often than not, loss of society and 
companionship is coupled with other items of damages, including 
past and future pain and suffering, past and future wage loss, 
or past and future medical expenses.  Generally, the exposure to 
financial liability under these types of damages far outweighs 
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
4 
the financial exposure attributable to loss of society and 
companionship.   
¶41 The suggestion is simplistic that insureds rely on 
reduced coverage because of the existence of the $150,000 cap on 
loss of society and companionship claims.  There is no evidence 
that the amount of the damage cap for loss of society and 
companionship in and of itself was, or likely would have been, a 
consideration in determining the level of underinsured motorist 
coverage purchased. 
¶42 Likewise, 
there 
is 
no 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
majority's 
suggestion 
that 
the 
retroactive 
legislation 
frustrates an insurer's reasonable expectations of its exposure 
to liability.  Majority op. at ¶21.  Insurers like ANPAC sell 
policies with varying levels of coverage and charge premiums 
accordingly.  When an insurer sells a certain level of coverage, 
be it $500,000 or $250,000 per person, its limit of liability is 
fixed at that amount.   
¶43 This limit does not parse claims for loss of society 
and companionship from claims for past and future medical 
expenses or from claims for past and future wage loss.  The 
exposure to liability is not increased beyond the level for 
which the insurer contracted and retained a premium.  Here the 
record reflects that the limit of liability was $250,000 and the 
premium charged was $33.  Nothing in the record suggests that 
the premium was in any way affected to account for the $150,000 
cap on loss of society and companionship.  Thus, any assertion 
of ANPAC's reliance to its detriment is tenuous.   
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
5 
¶44 In the absence of evidence in the record, the 
majority's claim is unpersuasive that the increase in caps will 
invade substantive vested rights of individual insureds or the 
insurers.  However, it is against this unpersuasive premise that 
the majority then examines the public interests at stake. 
¶45 The majority next identifies the public interests 
potentially served by this legislation, each of which it then  
dismisses.  First, the majority concedes that tort law is 
intended to provide full compensation to injured parties.  
Majority op. at ¶25.  However, the majority then attempts to 
reconcile its concession by deferring to the legislature's 
imposed limits on recovery in various re-formulations of the 
wrongful death statute.  Majority op. at ¶25-26.  According to 
the majority, since the legislature set the maximum damage 
amount at $150,000 at the time of the plaintiff's injury, that 
amount is necessarily full compensation.   
¶46 The majority's deference to the policy choices of the 
legislature 
is 
at 
odds 
with 
the 
majority's 
simultaneous 
disapproval of the legislature's choice to enact retroactive 
legislation affording tort victims a greater measure of damages. 
A determination that the legislature is the final arbiter of 
determining 
compensation 
cannot 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
legislature has no power to modify the amount of compensation as 
it sees fit. 
¶47 Another public interest, access to the courts and 
legal counsel, is acknowledged by the majority.  Yet, the 
majority misses its significance.  The majority suggests that 
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
6 
increasing the potential value of a wrongful death cause of 
action, so as to make representation by counsel more likely, is 
an interest served only by prospective legislation.  Majority 
op. at ¶28. 
¶48 The legislation at issue in this case was enacted in 
April 1998.  Assuming a three-year statute of limitations, there 
still exist causes of action that can be brought, but that might 
not be litigated, because the potential for recovery remains so 
limited.  As in the present case, if the wrongful death damages 
are sought in a complex automobile accident case or a medical 
malpractice case, and no other damages such as wage loss or pain 
and suffering are available, it may be difficult to find an 
attorney willing to undertake incurring the enormous costs of 
trial preparation when faced with such a limited potential for 
recovery.  Such litigation often requires the hiring of expert 
witnesses, deposition costs, and days of preparation for a 
lengthy trial.  The costs and attorneys fees alone could easily 
exceed the cap.   
¶49 Given their proper due, the public interests served by 
the retroactive legislation at issue far outweigh the private 
interests.  Unlike in Martin, where this court found the  
"minimal public interest" to be outweighed by a significant 
private interest, 192 Wis. 2d at 211, this case presents us with 
private interests of a dubious nature outweighed by legitimate 
and significant public interests.  Adding the presumption of 
constitutionality to this analysis tips the scales even farther 
from the majority's conclusion.   
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
7 
¶50 The 
majority neither 
applies the 
presumption of 
constitutionality nor properly applies the Martin test to uphold 
this retroactive legislation.  I conclude that ANPAC has failed 
to meet its burden of proving the challenged legislation 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
¶51 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
No. 99-2554.awb 
 
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