Title: J. Don Gordon Construction, Inc. v. Brown
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1131129
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2015

Rel: 6/5/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
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J. Don Gordon Construction, Inc., and Western Surety Company
v.
Ann Rankin Brown et al.
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-10-901832)
BRYAN, Justice.
The defendants below, J. Don Gordon Construction, Inc.
("Gordon Construction"), and Western Surety Company ("Western
Surety"), appeal from the Baldwin Circuit Court's judgment on
an arbitration award entered against them.  The defendants
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argue that the award should be vacated for various reasons
under § 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq. ("the FAA").  We affirm.
Dr. Ann Rankin Brown is a veterinarian who has been
practicing in Baldwin County for several years.  Around 2006,
Brown decided to open her own veterinarian practice, and she
and her husband purchased property on which to build a clinic. 
Brown testified that she and her husband formed Gone to the
Dogs, LLC, to take ownership of the property and that she
formed Rankin Animal Clinic, PC, as the veterinary entity that
would rent the clinic from Gone to the Dogs.  Other testimony
indicates that Gone to the Dogs did in fact own the property
and that Rankin Animal Center rented the property.  In
November 2007, Brown contracted with Gordon Construction to
build a clinic on the property.  Western Surety later issued
a performance bond on the building project.  Construction on
the clinic began in January 2008.  During construction,
disputes 
arose 
between 
Brown 
and 
Gordon 
Construction 
regarding
the quality of the work, and the project lagged.  Eventually
construction was completed, and the clinic opened in December
2008.
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In October 2010, Brown sued Gordon Construction and
Western Surety in the circuit court, alleging breach of
contract.  Gordon Construction and Western Surety moved to
compel arbitration, and the circuit court granted their
motion, 
apparently without opposition from Brown.  The 
parties
chose local attorney Marion E. Wynne to decide the case ("the
arbitrator").  The parties also adopted a letter agreement
written by the arbitrator in which they agreed to certain
arbitration terms. 
In March 2012, an amended complaint was filed naming as
additional plaintiffs Gone to the Dogs and Rankin Animal
Clinic, the two entities formed by Brown.  Gordon Construction
and Western Surety later filed an answer and counterclaim. 
The answer alleged, as an affirmative defense, that Gone to
the Dogs and Rankin Animal Clinic were not parties to the
construction contract and thus were not proper parties in the
arbitration.  Although Brown apparently remained a nominal
plaintiff, comments made by the arbitrator during the
proceedings indicated that he viewed Gone to the Dogs and
Rankin Animal Clinic to be the real parties in interest.  (For
ease of discussion, we will sometimes refer to Brown, Gone to
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the Dogs, and Rankin Animal Clinic as "the plaintiffs.")  The
arbitrator held hearings for 10 days over an extended period
in 2012 and 2013.  
In May 2013, the arbitrator issued a partial award
determining liability and awarding damages (primarily against
Gordon Construction); the award also stated that the
arbitrator would later consider an additional award of legal
fees.  In July 2013, Gordon Construction and Western Surety
filed a motion with the arbitrator seeking his recusal, which
the arbitrator promptly denied; that motion will be discussed
in more detail below.  In November 2013, the arbitrator issued
a final award (1) awarding $157,750.80 to Gone to the Dogs and
Rankin 
Animal 
Clinic 
against 
Gordon 
Construction; 
(2) 
awarding
$91,272.40 to Gordon Construction against Gone to the Dogs and
Rankin Animal Clinic (for a net award of $66,478.40 to Gone to
the Dogs Rankin Animal Clinic against Gordon Construction);
and (3) awarding $362,287 in legal fees, including attorney
fees and expenses, to Gone to the Dogs and Rankin Animal
Clinic against Western Surety. 
The defendants appealed the arbitration award to the
circuit court, and the circuit court entered a judgment on the
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award.  See Rule 71B, Ala. R. Civ. P. (outlining the procedure
for appealing an arbitration award).  The defendants filed a
postjudgment motion to vacate the award, which the circuit
court denied.  See id.  The defendants then appealed to this
Court.
"'Where parties, as in this case, have agreed
that disputes should go to arbitration, the role of
the courts in reviewing the arbitration award is
limited.  On motions to confirm or to vacate an
award, it is not the function of courts to agree or
disagree with the reasoning of the arbitrators. 
Courts are only to ascertain whether there exists
one of the specific grounds for vacation of an
award.  A court cannot set aside the arbitration
award just because it disagrees with it; a policy
allowing it to do so would undermine the federal
policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes by
arbitration.  An award should be vacated only where
the party attacking the award clearly establishes
one of the grounds specified [in 9 U.S.C. § 10].'"
R.P. Indus., Inc. v. S & M Equip. Co., 896 So. 2d 460, 464
(Ala. 2004) (quoting  Maxus, Inc. v. Sciacca, 598 So. 2d 1376,
1380–81 (Ala. 1992) (citations omitted)).
"Under 
the 
FAA, 
courts 
may 
vacate 
an
arbitrator's 
decision 
'only 
in 
very 
unusual
circumstances.'  First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).  That limited
judicial review, we have explained, 'maintain[s]
arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.'  Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). ..."
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Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.
Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013).  "The [FAA] does not provide a dispute
settlement 
mechanism; 
it 
facilitates 
private 
dispute
settlement. The standards for judicial intervention are
therefore narrowly drawn to assure the basic integrity of the
arbitration process without meddling in it."  Merit Ins. Co.
v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983). 
Section 10(a) of the FAA establishes very limited grounds
upon which a court may vacate an arbitration award.  Tucker v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 159 So. 3d 1263 (Ala. 2014).  The
defendants first argue that the award should be vacated under
§ 10(a)(4), which allows a court to vacate an arbitration
award "where the 
arbitrators exceeded 
their 
powers." 
"'Section 10(a)(4) ... applies narrowly and only if the
arbitrators decide an issue not submitted by the parties or
grant relief not authorized in the arbitration agreement.'" 
Gower v. Turquoise Props. Gulf, Inc., [Ms. 1120045, Dec. 20,
2013] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2013) (quoting Morgan Stanley
& Co. v. Core Fund, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1231 (M.D. Fla.
2012) (emphasis omitted)).  "[A]s long as the arbitrator is
even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
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within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced
he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision."  United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).   
The defendants argue that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers because, they say, he entered an award as to two
entities, i.e., Gone to the Dogs and Rankin Animal Clinic,
that were not parties to the construction contract containing
the arbitration agreement. However, the record does not
indicate that the defendants presented this argument during
the arbitration proceedings, despite the fact that the two
entities participated in the proceedings.  As noted, Brown,
who signed the contract, sued the defendants, who then
compelled arbitration.  An amended complaint was later filed
naming as plaintiffs the two entities formed by Brown –– Gone
to the Dogs and Rankin Animal Clinic.  After the amended
complaint was filed, the defendants did file an answer
summarily alleging, as an affirmative defense, that Gone to
the Dogs and Rankin Animal Clinic were not parties to the
contract and thus were not proper parties to the arbitration. 
However, after that assertion, the record does not indicate
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that the defendants ever presented a legal argument to the
arbitrator that he lacked authority to determine the rights
and obligations of the two entities formed by Brown.   Only
after the defendants received an unfavorable award did they
present their legal argument in any meaningful way, first
arguing it to the circuit court in their motion to vacate the
judgment entered on the arbitration award.  The record does
not indicate that the arbitrator had a fair chance to consider
this argument; thus, the defendants cannot now rely on it in
seeking to have the award vacated.  Cf. Tucker, 159 So. 3d at
1277 (declining to consider an argument regarding the
arbitrability of an issue when the party failed to raise it 
to the arbitrator); and Environmental Barrier Co. v. Slurry
Sys., Inc., 540 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
Regardless, the defendants' argument is unpersuasive.  In
arguing that the arbitrator lacked the authority to issue an
award as to Gone to the Dogs and Rankin Animal Clinic, the
defendants cite the general rule that an arbitrator may not
determine the rights or obligations of nonsignatories to the
arbitration agreement.  See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute
Resolution § 60 (2007).  However, that is only the general
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rule; 
nonsignatories 
sometimes 
may 
properly 
participate 
in 
the
arbitration. See id. (discussing exceptions to the general
rule); and Ex parte Stamey, 776 So. 2d 85, 89 (Ala. 2000)
(same).  The arbitrator's comments during the proceedings
indicate that he understood the two entities formed by Brown
–– Gone to the Dogs and Rankin Animal Clinic –– to be the real
parties in interest.  The defendants essentially argue that
the arbitrator misapplied the law by allowing those two
entities into the arbitration.  However, whether the
arbitrator correctly made that decision 
is not properly before
us; rather, our review is limited to whether the arbitrator
had the authority to make that decision in the first place. 
Underlying legal error is not a ground for vacating an award. 
Gower, ___ So. 3d at ___ ("The fact that the arbitrator
appears to have misapplied the law in denying Gower's claims,
however, does not authorize this Court to vacate the
arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10.  Federal authorities
are abundantly clear that an arbitrator does not exceed his or
her powers when the arbitrator misapplies the law."); and
Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Gant, 143 So. 3d 762, 770 (Ala. 2013). 
If the parties submitted the issue, or the arbitration
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agreement authorized the arbitrator to decide the issue, then
the arbitrator did not exceed his or her authority in deciding
the issue.  Gower, ___ So. 3d at ___ (stating that § 10(a)(4)
applies narrowly and only if the arbitrator decides an issue
not submitted by the parties or grants relief not authorized
in the arbitration agreement).  The defendants do not address
the key question whether the arbitrator had the authority to
make the decision to allow Gone to the Dogs and Rankin Animal
Clinic into the arbitration.  Thus, we decline to consider
this argument further.   
The defendants next argue that the arbitrator exceeded
his powers because, they say, he failed to comply with the
requirements of the letter agreement, which was written by the
arbitrator.  In the letter agreement, the parties agreed to
certain arbitration terms.  The defendants contend that the
letter agreement indicates that the arbitrator agreed 
to 
issue
an award consistent with the "appropriate" law.  The
defendants further contend that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers because, they say, his award is inconsistent with
Alabama contract law, which, the defendants say, is the
"appropriate" law.   
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First, this argument was not made in the defendants'
motion to vacate the arbitration award filed in the circuit
court.  We will not reverse a lower court's judgment based on
an argument that was never presented to that court.  Taylor v.
Stevenson, 820 So. 2d 810, 814 (Ala. 2001).  Moreover, the
defendants read too much into the relevant provision of the
letter agreement.  That provision simply states that the
arbitrator shall be compensated at a certain rate for "any
time spent ... researching and reading legal opinions,
appropriate cases, statutory case law and statu[t]es."  The
provision does not specify any standard the arbitrator was to
apply. 
The defendants next make three arguments alleging
"evident partiality" by the arbitrator.  Section 10(a)(2) of
the FAA provides that a court may vacate an arbitration award
if there is "evident partiality" by the arbitrator.   We first
address 
the 
defendants' 
argument 
that 
the 
arbitrator's 
failure
to disclose information about his legal work in two other
cases shows his evident partiality.  During the arbitration
proceedings, 
attorney 
A. Clay 
Rankin 
represented the
plaintiffs.  At the time, Rankin was employed with Hand
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Arendall, a large firm in Mobile.  When the arbitration was
initiated, 
another 
attorney 
with 
Hand 
Arendall 
was
representing the City of Fairhope and its mayor in a case in
the circuit court.  The arbitrator served as cocounsel in that
case, representing Fairhope and the mayor.  Eventually a
second Hand Arendall attorney joined that case as cocounsel. 
During 
the 
arbitration 
proceedings, 
another 
case 
was 
initiated
in the circuit court involving Fairhope.  The arbitrator and
two Hand Arendall attorneys served as cocounsel for Fairhope
in that case as well.  Based on the arbitrator's nondisclosure
of his involvement in the two circuit court cases, the
defendants argued in their motion to vacate that there was
evident partiality by the arbitrator. In response, the
plaintiffs submitted, among other things, the arbitrator's
affidavit.  In his affidavit, the arbitrator testified that he
has represented Fairhope for a number of years, that he served
as cocounsel with some Hand Arendall attorneys when Rankin was
with the firm, that he did not retain Hand Arendall and the
firm did not retain him, that he did not work with or
communicate with Rankin regarding the two circuit court cases
in which he served as cocounsel with Hand Arendall attorneys,
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that he had never worked with Rankin on a legal matter other
than the present arbitration proceeding, and that he awarded
in the arbitration award a "significantly less" amount in
legal fees than those claimed by the plaintiffs.
In alleging evident partiality based on the arbitrator's
nondisclosure of information, the defendants apply and argue
the wrong standard.  The defendants, citing the plurality
opinion 
in 
Commonwealth 
Coatings 
Corp. 
v. 
Continental 
Casualty
Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), seem to argue that an arbitrator is
evidently partial under § 10 if there is even "the appearance
of bias."  However, a majority of federal circuit courts ––
and this Court in Waverlee Homes, Inc. v. Michael, 855 So. 2d
493 (Ala. 2003) ––  have not read Commonwealth Coatings as
imposing the less-stringent "appearance of bias" standard. 
See Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg.
Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2007), and cases cited
therein; and Crouch Constr. Co. v. Causey, 405 S.C. 155, 167,
747 S.E.2d 482, 488 (2013).  The correct standard under
Waverlee Homes is whether there is a "reasonable impression of
partiality," and the defendants have not met that standard.  
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In Waverlee Homes, this Court, citing several federal
cases, concluded that evident partiality exists if there is a
"reasonable impression of partiality."  855 So. 2d at 508.
That is, "'[t]o demonstrate evident partiality under the FAA,
the party seeking vacation has the burden of proving "that 'a
reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator
was partial' to the other party to the arbitration."'"  855
So. 2d at 507 (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643,
United Mine Workers of America, 48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir.
1995)).  The alleged partiality must be "direct, definite, and
capable of demonstration, as 
distinct 
from a 'mere appearance'
of bias that is remote, uncertain, and speculative."  855 So.
2d at 508.  "'Furthermore, the party asserting evident
partiality "must establish specific facts that indicate
improper motives on the part of the arbitrator."'"  855 So. 2d
at 507 (quoting Consolidation Coal, 48 F.3d at 129).  "An
arbitrator's failure to disclose must involve a significant
compromising connection to the parties."  Positive Software,
476 F.3d at 283.   This is strong language, and it sets the
bar high for a party alleging evident partiality of an
arbitrator.
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In this case, the undisclosed facts do not establish a
reasonable impression of partiality.  The defendants cite no
case finding the existence of evident partiality under facts
similar to those here.  On the other hand, courts have failed
to find evident partiality on similar facts.  For example, in
Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., 512 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2008), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded
there was no evident partiality where an arbitrator failed to
disclose 
that the arbitrator and one party's attorney 
"several
years [before the arbitration] ... were co-counsel on two
cases and ... on six other cases [the arbitrator] represented
the 
plaintiff 
while 
[the 
attorney] 
represented 
the 
intervening
plaintiff."  512 F.3d at 307.  The court described that
relationship as "insignificant."  Id.  In this case, the fact
that the subject relationship occurred while the arbitration
was pending does make for a closer relationship in that regard
than the relationship in Uhl.  However, importantly, in Uhl
the arbitrator worked directly with an arbitration party's
attorney, while 
the arbitrator 
here simply served as cocounsel
with other attorneys employed at the law firm where the
plaintiffs' attorney was employed.  In this case, the
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arbitrator never worked with the attorney representing the
plaintiffs in the arbitration.  The relationship here appears
to be no closer than the one found to be "insignificant" in
Uhl.
Similarly, in Ormsbee Development Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d
1140, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1982), an arbitrator did consulting
work for companies that were represented by the law firm
representing one of the parties in the arbitration.  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the arbitrator's nondisclosure of that information did
not establish evident partiality.  The court noted that the
core of the movant's argument was that the arbitrator and the
law firm had "similar clients," which is also true in this
case of the arbitrator and Hand Arendall.  668 F.2d at 1150. 
The court further observed that arbitrators are not required
to "'sever all their ties with the business world.'"  Id.
(quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148).
In this case, any relationship between the arbitrator and
the plaintiffs was indirect and remote.  "An arbitrator's
failure to disclose must involve a significant compromising
connection to the parties,"  Positive Software, 476 F.3d at
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282-83, and such a connection is absent here.  In the two
circuit court cases, the arbitrator served as cocounsel with
attorneys employed by the same law firm that employed the
attorney representing the plaintiffs.  The arbitrator had no
direct 
relationship with the plaintiffs or their attorney, and
there is no indication that the arbitrator had a financial
interest related to the plaintiffs or Hand Arendall.  Compare
with Municipal Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan &
Co., [Ms. 1120532, April 3, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2015)
(finding evident partiality when an arbitrator failed to
disclose substantial financial dealings involving a party);
and Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146 (finding evident
partiality when a business relationship between an arbitrator
and a party was "repeated and significant").  The facts here
simply do not demonstrate evident partiality with respect to
the nondisclosures.  In short, a reasonable person would not
have to conclude, based on these facts, that the arbitrator
was partial to the plaintiffs.  Waverlee.  
The defendants also argue that the arbitrator displayed
evident partiality by providing the affidavit in which he
addressed the allegations that he was biased.  The arbitrator
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furnished the affidavit at the request of the plaintiffs, who
submitted it in response to the defendants' motion to vacate
the award.  The defendants argue that the arbitrator, by
providing the affidavit, violated provisions of a code of
ethics for arbitrators prohibiting arbitrators from assisting
in the enforcement of the award and prohibiting arbitrators
from communicating with a party ex parte.  We do not need to
decide whether the arbitrator violated the code of ethics. 
Insofar as the defendants perhaps argue that the alleged
violations require the award to be vacated, that argument is
misplaced.  Such codes "do not have the force of law" and "are
not the proper starting point for an inquiry into an award's
validity under [the FAA]."  Merit Ins., 714 F.2d at 680.  See
also Positive Software, 476 F.3d at 285 n. 5; Montez v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2001); and
ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d
493, 499 (4th Cir. 1999).  Insofar as the defendants argue
that the content of the affidavit somehow indicates evident
partiality, that argument also fails.  Nothing in the
affidavit suggests that the high threshold of evident
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partiality has been met.  The arbitrator was simply defending
himself against the defendants' allegations of bias. 
The defendants also argue that the award of legal fees
against Western Surety should be vacated because, they say,
the 
arbitrator showed evident partiality by refusing to 
recuse
himself and then levying the legal fees.  In this final
argument 
alleging 
evident 
partiality, 
the 
defendants 
challenge
only that part of the award awarding legal fees. 
In making their argument, the defendants emphasize two
things: the arbitrator's denial of their motion seeking his
recusal and the arbitrator's later award of legal fees.  In
May 2013, the arbitrator issued a partial award determining
liability and awarding damages and indicating that he would
later consider an additional award of legal fees.  Two months
later, the defendants filed a motion with the arbitrator
seeking his recusal, which the arbitrator promptly denied. 
The recusal motion was supported by the affidavit of Vince
Boothe.  In the affidavit, Boothe alleged that he owns 95% of
Gordon Construction; this fact apparently was not revealed
during the hearings.  Boothe then referenced a recent trial in
another case in which the arbitrator's daughter had accused
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her ex-husband of domestic violence.  Boothe testified that,
on May 3, 2013 (about two weeks before the arbitrator issued
the 
partial 
award), 
Boothe's 
son-in-law 
testified 
adversely 
to
the position of the arbitrator's daughter in the trial of that
case.  Following the trial, the current husband of the
arbitrator's 
daughter 
sent 
text 
messages 
to 
Boothe's 
daughter,
accusing Boothe's son-in-law of lying under oath.  The
arbitrator's 
daughter's 
ex-husband 
then 
filed 
a 
motion 
seeking
to have held in contempt the daughter's current husband,
claiming that the text messages were inappropriate and
tantamount to witness intimidation; that motion was attached
to the motion seeking the arbitrator's recusal in this case. 
Based on those facts, the defendants unsuccessfully argued to
the arbitrator that he should have recused himself instead of
proceeding to determine the award of legal fees.
The defendants also note certain testimony presented in
the September 2013 hearing regarding legal fees, two months
after the recusal motion was filed and denied.  In that
hearing, there was testimony presented that Boothe, among
others, was an indemnitor to Western Surety regarding Western
Surety's performance bond on the construction project.  The
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arbitrator then levied $362,287 in legal fees against Western
Surety.
The gist of the defendants' argument seems to be as
follows.   No later than July 2013, when the recusal motion
was filed, the arbitrator was made aware of both (1) the
situation involving his daughter, her husband, and members of
Boothe's family and (2) evidence indicating that Boothe owned
95% of Gordon Construction, one of the parties to the
arbitration 
proceeding.  When the hearing regarding legal 
fees
was held in September 2013, there was testimony presented
indicating that Boothe, among others, was an indemnitor to
Western Surety regarding Western Surety's performance bond. 
Then, in November 2013, the arbitrator levied $362,287 in
legal fees against Western Surety, a total the defendants note
is much greater than the damages awarded either to Brown's two
entities ($157,75.80) or to Gordon Construction ($91,272.40). 
Thus, say the defendants, the arbitrator must have been
partial in refusing to recuse himself and in awarding the
legal fees.
We are unpersuaded by the defendants' argument.  The
arbitrator's failure to recuse himself upon learning the
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information 
about 
the 
domestic-violence 
case 
does 
not 
indicate
evident partiality.  The large award of legal fees against
Western Surety –– an award the arbitrator testified was
"significantly less" than the amount claimed 
by 
the plaintiffs
–– does not indicate evident partiality, either.  The
defendants basically ask us to assume that the arbitrator was
partial based on evidence indicating that members of Boothe's
family and members of the arbitrator's family did not see eye-
to-eye.  The standard announced in Waverlee is too demanding
for such an assumption; to prevail, the defendants must
establish specific facts that indicate 
improper motives on the
part of the arbitrator.  The facts here fall short.  The
alleged partiality at most suggests a "'mere appearance' of
bias that is remote, uncertain, and speculative" rather than
"direct, definite, and capable of demonstration."  Waverlee,
855 So. 2d at 508, 507.  A reasonable person would not have to
conclude that the arbitrator was partial given these facts.  
In closing, we emphasize that, under the FAA, our review
of an arbitration award is very limited.  The defendants have
not established any of the limited grounds for vacating an
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award under § 10(a) of the FAA.  Accordingly, we affirm the
circuit court's judgment affirming the arbitration award.
AFFIRMED.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., concur in the result.
Stuart, J., recuses herself.
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