Title: NOLL v CITY OF BOZEMAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13329
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 1977

No. 13329 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 VIRGINIA NOLL, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, THE CITY OF BOZEMAN, an incorporated municipality and WALTER L. BATES, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: McKinley Anderson, Bozeman, Montana Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana Douglas Dasinger argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents : Brown, Pepper and Kommers, Bozeman, Montana Anderson, Symrnes, Forbes, Peete and Brown, Billings, Montana Richard Cebull argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: April 20, 1977 Decided : JUN -2 19q Filed: Jkgm 8 QS?? M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s appeal from a jury award of damages r e s u l t - ing from an automobile accident. P l a i n t i f f s w e r e injured on August 17, 1973, when a street pavement r o l l e r operated by Bates i n t h e scope of h i s employment by t h e C i t y of Bozeman s t r u c k t h e back of a parked c a r i n which p l a i n t i f f s were s i t t i n g . Defendants admitted l i a b i l i t y . The s o l e i s s u e a t t h e t r i a l w a s t h e amount of dam- ages t o be awarded p l a i n t i f f s . The jury returned a v e r d i c t of $800 f o r No11 and $1,100 f o r Keneady. Both p l a i n t i f f s appeal, claiming t h e awards a r e inadequate. They both claim i n j u r i e s t o t h e i r back and neck. I n a d d i t i o n , No11 claims aggravation of a pre-existing a r t h r i t i c condition and Keneady claims aggravation of a neurotic condition i n a d d i t i o n t o damage t o t h e car owned by her. Two i s s u e s are presented f o r review on appeal: (1) Was r e f u s a l of p l a i n t i f f s ' o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n No. 5 r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r ? ( 2 ) Was t h e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e v e r d i c t ? P l a i n t i f f s ' o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n N o 5 reads: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e negligence of t h e Defendant need not be t h e s o l e cause of t h e i n j u r y , it being s u f f i c i e n t t h a t it was one of t h e e f f i c i e n t causes t h e r e o f , without which t h e i n j u r y would not have r e s u l t e d ; but it must appear t h a t t h e negligence of t h e person sought t o be charged w a s responsible f o r a t least one of t h e causes r e s u l t i n g i n t h e i n j u r y . " For supporting a u t h o r i t y p l a i n t i f f s c i t e F l e t c h e r v. C i t y of Helena, 163 Mont. 337, 344, 517 P.2d 365. They argue it was c r i t i c a l l y important t h e jury understand t h a t i f t h e accident was one of t h e causes of p l a i n t i f f s ' condition, then - defendants would be l i a b l e ; and t h a t it was not necessary de- fendants be t h e s o l e cause. Further, they contend t h a t an apportionment of damages between t h e p r i o r condition and aggravation caused by defendants can only be made where t h e r e i s a l o g i c a l b a s i s f o r such apportionment. Otherwise, where no b a s i s can be found, such a d i v i s i o n would be a r b i t r a r y and t h e only p r a c t i c a l course would be t o hold defendants l i a b l e f o r t h e e n t i r e l o s s notwithstanding t h e f a c t t h a t o t h e r causes may have contributed t o such l o s s . Kegel v. United S t a t e s , 289 F.Supp. 790 (1968). F i n a l l y , they submit t h e jury was misled by t h e f a i l u r e of t h e c o u r t t o allow t h e i r proposed in- s t r u c t i o n No. 5, e s p e c i a l l y i n view of defendants' cross- examination tending t o p o i n t t o o t h e r p o s s i b l e causes of plain- t i f f s ' condition. W e disagree. The p o i n t was adequately covered by plain- t i f f s ' o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n No. 6 given by t h e c o u r t . This in- s t r u c t i o n reads: "In an a c t i o n f o r damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s caused by t h e wrongful a c t o r omission of another, t h e i n j u r e d person is e n t i t l e d t o f u l l compensa- t i o n f o r a l l i n j u r i e s proximately r e s u l t i n g from t h e defendant's a c t even though such i n j u r i e s may have been aggravated by reason of her pre-existing physical condition and w e r e rendered more d i f f i - c u l t t o c u r e by reason of her e x i s t i n g state of h e a l t h , o r because of a l a t e n t d i s e a s e t h e i n j u r i e s were rendered more s e r i o u s t o her than they would have been had she been i n robust health. "The Defendant cannot invoke t h e previous condition of t h e person injured f o r t h e purpose of escaping t h e consequences of h i s own negligence o r reducing t h e damages f o r which he is l i a b l e , b u t of course t h e r e can be no recovery f o r any elements due t o t h e pre-existing condition and i n no way r e s u l t i n g from t h e i n j u r y . The recovery i n such c a s e should include no damages f o r i n j u r i e s which r e s u l t purely from t h e o r i g i n a l condition. It must be confined t o those which a r e due t o i t s enhancement and aggravation. The defendant must respond i n damages f o r such p a r t of t h e diseased condition a s h i s neg- l i g e n c e has caused, and i f t h e r e can be no apportion- ment, o r it cannot be s a i d t h a t t h e d i s e a s e would have e x i s t e d a p a r t from t h e i n j u r y , then he i s responsible f o r t h e diseased condition. But where t h e d i s e a s e i s more than a mere l a t e n t tendency t h e defendant can be held l i a b l e only t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t her negligence proximately aggravated t h e condition. " This i n s t r u c t i o n adequately covers t h e law r e l a t i n g t o p l a i n t i f f s ' theory of damages. Accordingly, r e f u s a l of plain- t i f f s ' o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n No. 5 was not e r r o r . Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evi- dence t o support t h e damage awards, w e note t h a t p l a i n t i f f s argue t h e i r evidence i s e s s e n t i a l l y uncontradicted because de- fendants presented no medical witnesses and t h a t t h e i r evidence proves damages f a r i n excess of t h e amounts awarded by t h e jury. No11 argues t h e evidence shows she had t o r e s i g n her teaching p o s i t i o n on her d o c t o r ' s recommendation because of t h e pain she was s u f f e r i n g i n a r e a s t h a t had never bothered her be- f o r e t h e accident; t h a t she had been making $12,000 p e r year; t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l she had a c t u a l wage l o s s of $7,200; t h a t being 55 years of age she would have a f u t u r e l o s s of wages f o r 1 0 more working y e a r s of a t least $12,000 per year; and t h a t she had medical expenses of $512.87 besides pain and s u f f e r i n g , a l l a s a r e s u l t of t h e accident. Keneady argues t h e evidence shows t h a t she had medical expenses i n excess of $100; t h a t she l o s t 13 weeks work t o t a l i n g $2,067; and t h a t property damage t o her car amounted t o $306.56; besides pain and s u f f e r i n g , a l l as a r e s u l t of t h e accident. This case is very s i m i l a r t o Holenstein v. Andrews, 166 Mont. 60, 530 P.2d 476, where a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f of zero damages w a s affirmed under s i m i l a r contentions. O n appeal w e must review t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . Holen- s t e i n , supra. Further, t h e jury may accept testimony of a w i t - ness i n whole o r i n p a r t o r may r e j e c t it a l t o g e t h e r . I b i d . The jury was so i n s t r u c t e d by t h e usual omnibus i n s t r u c t i o n given by t h e c o u r t without objection: " I n weighing t h e testimony of any witness you should t a k e i n t o account h i s i n t e r e s t o r want of interest in the result of the case, his appearance upon the witness stand, his manner of testifying, his apparent candor or want of candor, and whether he is supported or contradicted by the facts and circumstances as shown by the evidence. You have a right to believe all the testimony of a witness or believe it in part and disbelieve it in part, or you may reject it altogether as you may find the evidence to be. You are to believe as jurors under the instructions of this Court and the evidence what you would believe as men and women, and there is no rule of law which requires you to believe as jurors what you would not believe as men or women." Defendants were able on cross-examination to deflate the thrust of plaintiffs' testimony and thus show plaintiffs' injuries attributable to the accident were perhaps minimal. The cross- examination revealed that perhaps Mrs. Noll's resignation from her teaching position was motivated by her marriage and result- ing move to Arizona. Her medical testimony under cross-examin- ation was equivocal concerning whether her present difficulties were a result of a progression of her prior condition notwith- standing the accident. As to plaintiff Keneady, her testimony under cross ex- amination was similarly equivocal concerning whether her diffi- culties and job loss were attributable to the accident or inde- pendent emotional problems. At the time of the accident she was suffering from continuing emotional problems brought on by con- cern with her home, family and advancing age. She had suffered a nervous breakdown years earlier and her testimony would support a jury finding that her difficulties were the result of a con- tinuing emotional condition. Also several years earlier she had suffered a spinal strain similar to that complained of here. The testimony of the driver of the pavement roller and of the investigating police officer was introduced tending to show the car had not been moved by the impact of the collision. Although this is in conflict with the two plaintiffs' testimony that the car had been jolted forward 2 or 3 feet, the evidence is capable of supporting the conclusion that the occupants could not have suffered a very severe whiplash. In summary the jury weighed the positive statements of the witnesses against the adverse circumstantial evidence and equivocating testimony revealed on cross-examination and found the damages attributable to the admitted negligence of the de- fendants were much less than claimed. We cannot retry factual determinations made at trial. Dyksterhouse v. Doornbos, Mont . - P.2d , 34 St.Rep. 415 , (decided May 25, 1977) , - - quoting Hellickson v. Barrett Mobile Home Transp., 161 Mont. 455, 462, 507 P.2d 523. We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the amount of damages awarded. Judgment affirmed. Justice We con ur: - F /-