Title: Carlisle v. State
Citation: 163 So. 2d 596
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 1964

163 So. 2d 596 (1964)
Harry J. CARLISLE
v.
STATE ex rel. Seymore TRAMMELL, Solicitor.
4 Div. 126.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 16, 1964.
John C. Walters, Troy, for appellant.
Richmond M. Flowers, Atty. Gen., and Winston Huddleston, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal from decree denying a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction.
On December 5, 1959, the solicitor filed in the circuit court, in equity, a bill of complaint praying that the court "grant a fiat for a preliminary injunction enjoining or restraining the Respondent from maintaining and keeping . . . a gambling nuisance as defined by Title 14, Section 293, of the Code of Alabama, and that said nuisance be padlocked and abated"; and that on final hearing the injunction be made permanent.
The court did not grant an ex parte restraining order or injunction, but set the cause for hearing on December 17, 1959.
The respondent, without undertaking to make a detailed answer to the bill, filed a simple, one sentence, general denial of the allegations of the bill of complaint.
On December 17, 1959, hearing was had and the cause submitted on the verified allegations of the petition, the answer of respondent, and testimony of witnesses taken in open court.
*597 On December 29, 1959, temporary injunction was granted.
On April 28, 1961, respondent filed motion to dissolve on the grounds that the allegations of the bill are untrue; that the proof on which the injunction was granted was insufficient to prove the allegations of the bill; that, since the issuing of the injunction, respondent has sold all of his property adjacent to the building in which the gambling allegedly took place; that the remaining part of the property can be used for legitimate purposes; that respondent "would like to rent the same" and "will have no interest or control in any manner of the property that has herein been enjoined, and can be rented."
The court set the motion for hearing on May 22, 1961. The parties stipulated as follows:
Respondent filed a motion to be permitted to place before the court the testimony of a certain witness who, apparently, did not testify on the hearing of the motion to dissolve. Respondent's motion, to place before the court said testimony, appears to have been withdrawn and the parties stipulated as follows:
The court denied the motion to dissolve by decree rendered December 19, 1961. In pertinent part, the decree recites:
From the decree of December 19, 1961, respondent prosecutes this appeal.
On the hearing of December 17, 1959, several witnesses testified that the premises in question bore the reputation of being a gambling house or a place where gambling took place.
Certain officers gave testimony that on November 10, 1959, they had investigated or raided respondent's premises and had found there certain evidence of gambling. As to this evidence, as we understand the *598 transcript, the parties to this suit stipulated that none of the officers, who participated in the raid or investigation, "or any one else," had a search warrant.
Respondent contends that the evidence as to reputation of the premises was not admissible because it was hearsay, and that the evidence obtained in the raid without a warrant was not admissible under the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081.
Respondent further contends that when the illegal and inadmissible evidence is eliminated, there is no evidence in the record to support the averment that respondent maintained a gambling place such as may be enjoined under Title 14, §§ 293, et seq., Code 1940.
The cause being in equity, it was the duty of the trial court, and is the duty of the appellate court, to consider only relevant, competent, and legal testimony under Act No. 101, 1943 Acts of Alabama, page 105; Code of Alabama Recompiled 1958, Title 7, § 372(1).
Respondent argues, we think correctly, that evidence that the premises in question had the reputation of being a gambling place or of being used for gambling was incompetent and illegal.
This court has squarely held that testimony that a house had the reputation of being a house of prostitution was inadmissible. The court said:
See: State ex rel. Davis v. Brown, 211 Ala. 266, 100 So. 224.
We are of opinion that evidence that a house had the reputation of being a gambling house, or of being used for gambling, is inadmissible because such evidence is hearsay.
Act No. 101, supra, provides that the trial court shall not consider testimony which is "incompetent or illegal ... or is hearsay." Under the statute, the evidence of the reputation of the premises, is not to be considered.
Applying the rule that evidence obtained by an illegal search is not competent or legal in a proceeding against the party whose person or property was subjected to the illegal search, which produced the evidence, we will not consider the testimony of the officers or other persons who participated in the search, or raid, which was made without a warrant.
There remains, however, the testimony of George L. Hardin, III, who testified in part as follows:
There is testimony, legal, we think, with reference to the character of the place enjoined against, as follows:
We are of opinion that the quoted evidence is sufficient to support a finding by the trial court, who heard the testimony ore tenus, that respondent was maintaining a place which was resorted to for the purpose of gaming and was a nuisance within the meaning of § 293, Title 14.
We have examined the cases, cited by respondent, which hold that a bedroom, sleeping place, or home is not a public place within the meaning of the statute against gaming in a public place, but are of opinion that we are not concerned with that question and that the cited cases have no application here.
It is established that, where the testimony is taken orally before the court, on appeal the presumption is in favor of the findings of the court which are accorded the same weight as the findings of fact by *600 the register; and such findings have the effect of a jury's verdict and will not be disturbed unless plainly and palpably wrong. Taylor v. Hoffman, 231 Ala. 39, 163 So. 339.
We do not understand respondent to insist on any ground of the motion to dissolve other than the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support the decree granting the injunction. Being of opinion that there is sufficient legal evidence to support the granting of the injunction, we are of opinion that the decree denying the motion to dissolve is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and GOODWYN and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.