Title: Burrell v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 111297
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2012

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
KHALIQ JOSHUA BURRELL 
 
 
 
 
  
     
 
     OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 111297 
 
 
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     March 2, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
David S. Schell, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a criminal sentencing 
order is void ab initio due to a provision stating that the 
court will reduce the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor 
following the defendant’s incarceration and successful 
completion of probation. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
On May 18, 2009, a grand jury returned a bill of indictment 
charging that Khaliq Joshua Burrell (“Burrell”) feloniously 
committed rape in violation of Code § 18.2-61.  On September 21, 
2009, Burrell and the Commonwealth entered into an Alford plea 
agreement whereby Burrell agreed to plead guilty to the reduced 
charge of attempted rape.  Under the agreement, the sentence to 
be imposed was five years in the penitentiary with four years 
suspended, and five years of active probation.  The agreement 
stated: “The Commonwealth further agrees that at the end of the 
five year probationary period, that if the defendant 
successfully completes probation, that the charge will be 
reduced to the misdemeanor of Sexual Battery.”  Paragraph 8 of 
2 
 
the agreement stated: “I understand that the Court may accept or 
reject the agreement, and may defer its decision as to the 
acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to 
consider the pre-sentence report and other evidence.” 
 
The matter then came before the circuit court.  Pursuant to 
the agreement of the parties, the court amended the indictment 
to attempted rape.  Burrell was arraigned and pled guilty to 
that charge.  In a colloquy with Burrell, the court summarized 
the terms of the plea agreement, including that the court could 
either accept or reject the agreement and that if the court 
rejected the agreement, Burrell would be given an opportunity to 
withdraw his plea of guilty.  Following the Commonwealth’s 
proffer of evidence, the circuit court accepted Burrell’s Alford 
plea, finding him guilty of attempted rape. 
 
The court later sentenced Burrell in accordance with the 
plea agreement and entered a sentencing order.  In the order, 
the court sentenced Burrell to incarceration with the Virginia 
Department of Corrections for the term of five years with four 
years suspended, followed by five years of supervised probation.  
The court further ordered pursuant to Code § 9.1-903 that 
Burrell register with the Department of State Police Sex 
Offender Registry upon his release from confinement.  The order 
stated: “Upon successful completion of probation, the charge in 
this case will be reduced to a misdemeanor, Sexual Battery.”   
3 
 
 
On March 29, 2010, Burrell’s probation and parole officer 
filed a Major Violation Report.  The circuit court issued a 
bench warrant ordering that Burrell show cause why the suspended 
portion of his sentence should not be revoked.  Burrell then 
filed motions to vacate the sentencing order as void ab initio 
and to dismiss the charge of the probation violation.  He argued 
that the circuit court did not have the power to render a 
judgment in accordance with the plea agreement imposing a 
sentence on the felony charge of attempted rape and thereafter 
reducing the conviction to a misdemeanor more than 21 days 
following entry of the sentencing order. 
 
The circuit court denied Burrell’s motions on three 
grounds.  First, it ruled that it retained jurisdiction of the 
case under Code § 19.2-303 because Burrell was not sent to the 
Department of Corrections.  Second, the court ruled that the 
sentencing order was not a final order as contemplated by Rule 
1:1 because it did not dispose of the entire subject matter of 
the case and left matters undone.  Third, it ruled that Burrell 
“is not allowed to invite error by the use of a plea agreement 
and use that error to overturn the sentencing order of the 
court.”  Burrell timely noted his appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Burrell assigns error to the circuit court’s denial of his 
motion to vacate and to each of the three rulings.  The parties 
4 
 
agree that Burrell’s appeal presents questions of law which we 
review de novo.  Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76, 705 
S.E.2d 503, 505 (2011). 
We will first address the circuit court’s ruling that the 
sentencing order was not a final order.  Burrell argues that the 
sentencing order is a final order under Rule 1:1 because it 
adjudicates guilt and imposes a sentence without expressly 
retaining jurisdiction to reconsider the sentencing order.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the sentencing order is not a final 
order because the circuit court’s actions were not complete, as 
it retained the jurisdiction to modify the charge. 
 
In general terms, we have explained that “a final judgment 
is one which disposes of the entire action and leaves nothing to 
be done except the ministerial superintendence of execution of 
the judgment.”  Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin, 
263 Va. 555, 560, 561 S.E.2d 734, 737 (2002).  Furthermore, 
“[t]he running of the twenty-one day time period prescribed by 
Rule 1:1 may be interrupted only by the entry, within the 
twenty-one day time period, of an order modifying, vacating, or 
suspending the final judgment order.”  Id. 
 
In the context of sentencing orders, we have held that when 
trial courts take motions to set aside the verdict under 
advisement, such actions fail to affect the finality of 
sentencing orders because “the trial court did not modify, 
5 
 
vacate, or suspend the judgments.”  In re: Commonwealth of Va. 
Dep’t of Corr., 222 Va. 454, 464, 281 S.E.2d 857, 863 (1981) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We also have rejected the 
argument that sentencing orders were not final appealable 
orders, explaining that “[u]nder this theory, a trial court 
conceivably could keep a motion under advisement for a 
considerable period of time during which the incarcerated 
defendant would have no appealable order to challenge” and that 
“[w]e regard this position as unsound.”  Id. at 466, 281 S.E.2d 
at 864. 
 
The sentencing order in this case adjudicated guilt, 
imposed a sentence, remanded Burrell to the custody of the 
sheriff, and required that Burrell register as a sex offender 
upon his release from incarceration.  As such, we hold that it 
was a final appealable order, and the circuit court erred in 
ruling that it was not so. 
 
Burrell next assigns error to the circuit court’s ruling 
that Code § 19.2-303 confers jurisdiction on the circuit court 
to change the offense of conviction in the sentencing order 
after the court has lost jurisdiction to modify the sentencing 
order pursuant to Rule 1:1.  He argues that the statute 
authorizes the circuit court to modify the period of 
incarceration and not the offense of conviction. 
 
Code § 19.2-303 provides, in relevant part:  
6 
 
If a person has been sentenced for a felony 
to the Department of Corrections but has not 
actually been transferred to a receiving unit of 
the Department, the court which heard the case, 
if it appears compatible with the public interest 
and there are circumstances in mitigation of the 
offense, may, at any time before the person is 
transferred to the Department, suspend or 
otherwise modify the unserved portion of such a 
sentence. The court may place the person on 
probation for such time as the court shall 
determine. 
 
By its plain terms, the statute does not authorize a circuit 
court to reduce a conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor 
after a defendant has served the active portion of a sentence.  
Rather, it authorizes the court to “suspend or otherwise modify 
the unserved portion of such a sentence.”  The circuit court 
therefore erred in ruling that it retained jurisdiction to amend 
the conviction pursuant to Code § 19.2-303 to modify the 
sentencing order by reducing the felony charge to a misdemeanor. 
 
Having established that the sentencing order was a final 
order and that the circuit court did not retain jurisdiction 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-303, it is clear that the circuit court 
did not have the authority to modify Burrell’s felony conviction 
as stated in the sentencing order.  Rule 1:1 (“All final 
judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, 
shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject to 
be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the 
date of entry, and no longer.”). 
7 
 
We now turn to Burrell’s assignment of error regarding the 
circuit court’s denial of his motion to vacate.  Burrell argues 
that under Virginia law, the sentencing order was void ab initio 
because it purported to give the circuit court the power to 
modify a conviction more than five years after the court lost 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 1:1.   
 
Under Virginia law, a sentencing order is void ab initio if 
“ ‘the character of the judgment was not such as the [C]ourt had 
the power to render.’ ”  Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213, 221, 
683 S.E.2d 544, 549 (2009) (quoting  Anthony v. Kasey, 83 Va. 
338, 340, 5 S.E. 176, 177 (1887)) (alteration in original).  In 
Rawls, the parties mistakenly believed that amendments to a 
criminal statute were in effect “and consequently the jury was 
incorrectly instructed that it could impose a specific term of 
imprisonment of not more than 40 years for the murder 
conviction.”  Id. at 215, 683 S.E.2d at 546.  The statutory 
maximum actually was 20 years of incarceration.  Id.  
The jury returned a verdict of 25 years.  Id. at 216, 638 
S.E.2d at 546.  We rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that a 
reduced 20-year sentence would be valid.  We explained that 
would require speculation regarding what would have happened if 
the proper statutory limitations were observed.  Id. at 221, 683 
S.E.2d at 549.  To ensure that “criminal defendants whose 
punishments have been fixed in violation of the statutorily 
8 
 
prescribed ranges are treated uniformly without any 
speculation,” we adopted the rule that a sentence imposed in 
violation of a prescribed statutory range of punishment is void 
ab initio.  Id.  
 
In this case, the circuit court did not have the power to 
render a judgment reducing Burrell’s conviction from a felony to 
a misdemeanor more than five years after its entry of the 
sentencing order.  Applying the rationale from Rawls, we decline 
to engage in speculation as to what would have happened had the 
parties and the court known that the court did not have the 
power to render part of Burrell’s sentence.  Id.  We therefore 
hold that the ultra vires provision in the sentencing order 
results in the entire sentencing order being void ab initio. 
 
Finally, Burrell assigns error to the circuit court’s 
ruling that, under the doctrine of invited error, he was barred 
from seeking to vacate the sentencing order.  Burrell observes 
that the circuit court’s ruling on invited error was conditioned 
on its ruling that it retained jurisdiction under Code § 19.2-
303 and based on the non-finality of the order.  Burrell argues 
that the doctrine of invited error is not properly applied in 
the context of a motion to vacate an order as void ab initio.  
In Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 649 S.E.2d 672 (2007) we 
held: “An order that is void ab initio is a complete nullity 
that may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, 
9 
 
anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.”  Id. at 402, 649 
S.E.2d at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the 
sentencing order in this case is void ab initio, the doctrine of 
invited error does not bar Burrell’s motion to vacate that 
order. 
CONCLUSION 
Burrell asks, as he did below, that the Court vacate the 
sentencing order.  This Court will grant the relief requested.  
See CNH Am. LLC v. Smith, 281 Va. 60, 69, 704 S.E.2d 372, 376 
(2011) (remanding “consistent with [appellant’s] requests for 
relief”).  The circuit court’s judgment denying Burrell’s motion 
to vacate the sentencing order will be reversed, the sentencing 
order vacated, and the case remanded for sentencing. 
Reversed and remanded.