Title: MOLLY MACDONALD V PKT INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 114039
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                   
                                   
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 26, 2001  
MOLLY MACDONALD,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 114039  
PKT, INC, known as PINE KNOB MUSIC 
THEATER, and ARENA ASSOCIATES, 
jointly and severally,  
Defendants-Appellants,  
and  
CAPITAL CITIES/ABC, INC,  
Defendant.  
STEPHEN L. LOWRY,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 115322  
CELLAR DOOR PRODUCTIONS OF MICHIGAN, 
INC, a Michigan corporation, and 
ARENA ASSOCIATES INC, d/b/a PINE 
KNOB MUSIC THEATER, jointly and 
severally,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 
 
In 
these 
consolidated 
premises 
liability 
cases,  
plaintiffs seek to recover for injuries they suffered when  
fellow concertgoers at the Pine Knob Music Theater (Pine  
Knob), an outdoor amphitheater that offered seating on a  
grass-covered hill, began pulling up and throwing pieces of  
sod.  We granted leave to address the duty of premises owners  
concerning the criminal acts of third parties.  
Under Mason v Royal Dequindre, Inc, 455 Mich 391; 566  
NW2d 199 (1997), merchants have a duty to respond reasonably  
to situations occurring on the premises that pose a risk of  
imminent and foreseeable harm to identifiable invitees.  We  
hold today that the duty to respond is limited to reasonably  
expediting the involvement of the police and that there is no  
duty to otherwise anticipate and prevent the criminal acts of  
third 
parties. 
 
Finally, consistent with Williams v Cunningham  
Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495; 418 NW2d 381 (1988), and Scott  
v Harper Recreation, Inc, 444 Mich 441; 506 NW2d 857 (1993),  
we reaffirm that merchants are not required to provide  
security personnel or otherwise resort to self help in order  
to deter or quell such occurrences.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
A.  MACDONALD  
In MacDonald, plaintiff Molly MacDonald attended a  
concert on May 4, 1995, at Pine Knob at which several bands  
were performing.  Pine Knob offers seating on a grass-covered  
hill, as well as seating in a pavilion.  Plaintiff received  
the tickets to the concert as part of a promotional giveaway  
by a local radio station sponsoring the concert.  When  
2  
plaintiff arrived at Pine Knob, she and a friend found a spot  
to sit on the hill.  While a band called Bush was performing,  
some patrons began pulling up sod and throwing it.  
Before the concert, the event coordinator had asked the  
bands to stop performing in the event that the audience  
members began throwing sod, and announce that the sod throwing  
must stop.  There were also flyers posted in the dressing  
rooms of the bands requesting the bands to make an  
announcement to the audience to stop throwing sod. Pursuant  
to that request, the band finished the song and stopped  
performing, making an announcement that unless the sod  
throwing stopped, the concert would not continue. The crowd  
complied 
with 
the 
band’s request, and several individuals were  
ejected from Pine Knob for throwing sod.  
While the next band, the Ramones, was performing, the sod  
throwing resumed.  After that band refused to make an  
announcement to stop throwing sod, the event coordinator  
turned on the house lights.  When the sod throwing continued,  
the band made an additional announcement demanding that it  
stop.  Once again, several individuals who were involved in  
throwing sod were ejected from the theater.  During the second  
incident of sod throwing, plaintiff fractured her ankle when  
she fell while attempting to avoid being struck by a piece of  
sod.  Discovery materials indicated that there had been two  
sod-throwing incidents at previous concerts at Pine Knob, one  
incident in 1991, at a Lollapalooza concert, and another  
3  
 
 
 
 
incident in 1994, at a Metallica concert.1  
Plaintiff filed a complaint against, among others, PKT,  
Inc., also known as Pine Knob Music Theater and Arena  
Associates.2  Plaintiff alleged that Pine Knob was negligent  
in failing to provide proper security, failing to stop the  
performance when it should have known that continuing the  
performance would incite the crowd, failing to screen the  
crowd to eliminate intoxicated individuals, and by selling  
alcoholic 
beverages. 
 Pine Knob moved for summary disposition,  
arguing that it did not have a duty to protect plaintiff from  
the criminal acts of third parties. 
Meanwhile, plaintiff  
moved to amend her complaint to add certain theories including  
design defect, nuisance, and third-party beneficiary claims  
and to more specifically set forth her negligence claim.  
The 
trial 
court 
granted summary disposition for Pine Knob  
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), but the Court of Appeals  
reversed.3  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court  
erred in granting summary disposition in favor of Pine Knob  
because there were fact questions for the jury regarding  
whether the sod throwing incident created a foreseeable risk  
of harm and whether the security measures taken by Pine Knob  
1The 1994 
sod-throwing incident resulted in the lawsuit 
at issue in Lowry.  
2Although not fully explained by the parties, apparently 
Pine Knob Music Theater and Arena Associates is one entity. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the owner of the radio station that 
sponsored the concert, was dismissed as a party defendant from 
the case early on and is not a party to this appeal.  
3233 Mich App 395; 593 NW2d 176 (1999).  
4 
 
 
 
were reasonable.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that plaintiff  
submitted evidence that there had been incidents of sod  
throwing at previous concerts, that Pine Knob was aware of  
those instances, and that it had formulated policies to deal  
with sod throwing incidents before the concert.  Regarding the  
question whether security measures taken by Pine Knob were  
reasonable, the Court of Appeals stated that plaintiff  
presented evidence sufficient to survive summary disposition  
by submitting the affidavit of an expert witness who stated  
that Pine Knob was negligent by (1) failing to have adequately  
trained security personnel properly positioned at the  
concert,4 (2) failing to summon the police to eject or arrest  
those throwing sod, (3) failing to have a clear, written  
policy regarding the sod throwing, (4) allowing the concert to  
continue after the first incident, and (5) serving alcohol.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court  
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend  
her complaint pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(5).  The Court of  
Appeals stated that the proposed claims were legally  
sufficient and were justified by the evidence. This Court  
granted Pine Knob’s application for leave to appeal.5 
 B. LOWRY  
In Lowry, plaintiff and a friend attended a Suicidal  
Tendencies/Danzig/Metallica concert at Pine Knob on June 22,  
4Approximately forty security officers and eleven  
officers from the Oakland County Sheriff’s Department were 
working at the concert.  
5461 Mich 987 (2000). 
5 
1994.  Plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis and uses the  
aid of two canes or a wheelchair.  Plaintiff was seated in the  
handicapped section at Pine Knob, which is located at the rear  
of the pavilion immediately adjacent to the grass seating.  
During the performance of Danzig, patrons seated on the lawn  
of Pine Knob began throwing sod.  Plaintiff was allegedly  
struck with sod on the head and shoulders.  Within a few  
minutes, the band stopped performing and an announcement was  
made requiring individuals to stop or the concert would not  
continue. Alcohol sales were cut off. Deposition testimony  
indicated that the sod throwing stopped within ten to fifteen  
minutes and numerous individuals were ejected from Pine Knob.6  
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Pine Knob,  
as well as Cellar Door Productions of Michigan, Inc., the  
producer of the concert, alleging that defendants failed to  
protect 
plaintiff 
from the foreseeable dangers of sod throwing  
by patrons. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants violated  
his rights under the Michigan Handicapper’s Civil Rights Act  
(MHCRA), (now: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act),  
MCL 37.1101 et seq., by failing to adequately accommodate his  
disability.  
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR  
2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing that they owed no duty to  
protect plaintiff from the criminal acts of third parties, and  
that 
plaintiff’s 
handicap was fully accommodated.  With regard  
6Approximately seventy crowd control personnel, as well 
as 
officers 
from 
the 
Oakland County Sheriff’s Department, were 
present at the concert.  
6  
 
to plaintiff’s premises liability claim, the trial court  
granted summary disposition for defendants on the ground that  
the sod throwing was unforeseeable and that defendants took  
reasonable measures to protect their patrons. The trial court  
also 
granted 
summary 
disposition 
for 
defendants 
on 
plaintiff’s  
handicapper discrimination claim, holding that defendants  
provided plaintiff with full and equal utilization of the  
facilities.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per  
curiam decision.7  As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals  
noted that both the parties and the trial court had failed to  
recognize that because Cellar Door was not the owner of the  
premises, it could not have been negligent under a premises  
liability theory.8  By implication, the Court also held that  
Cellar Door could not have violated plaintiff’s rights under  
the MHCRA.  With regard to Pine Knob, the Court of Appeals  
held that it owed no duty to protect plaintiff because it was  
unforeseeable as a matter of law that the crowd would throw  
sod at plaintiff during the concert.  In that respect, the  
Court of Appeals found that the instant case was factually  
distinguishable from MacDonald because (1) unlike MacDonald,  
in the instant case there was no evidence whatsoever that  
defendants had formulated a specific policy to deal with sod  
throwing incidents, (2) the sod throwing incident in this case  
7Issued June 8, 1999 (Docket No. 206875).  
8Plaintiff does not challenge this aspect of the Court of 
Appeals decision.  Accordingly, we deem plaintiff to have 
abandoned his claims against Cellar Door.  
7  
occurred before the incident in MacDonald, and (3) in  
MacDonald, the plaintiff was injured during the second  
occurrence of sod throwing during the same concert, whereas in  
this case, there were no incidents of sod throwing during the  
prior evening’s performance that involved the same bands. The  
Court of Appeals also held that Pine Knob fully accommodated  
plaintiff’s disability.  
One panel member dissented in part, arguing that  
“[a]lthough plaintiff did not present evidence regarding the  
number of previous sod throwing incidents or the dates and  
circumstances 
surrounding 
those 
previous 
occurrences,  
plaintiff nonetheless established the existence of a genuine  
issue of material fact with respect to whether the sod  
throwing incident at issue in this case was foreseeable.”  The  
dissent further suggested that the reasonableness of Pine  
Knob’s conduct with respect to protecting the patrons with  
disabilities from injuries should have been submitted to a  
jury.  
This Court granted plaintiff’s application for leave to  
appeal.9  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or  
deny summary disposition.  The Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich  
111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).
 A motion for summary  
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency  
of the complaint and allows consideration of only the  
9461 Mich 987 (2000).  
8 
  
 
 
 
pleadings. Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 162;  
483 NW2d 26 (1992).  The motion should be granted only when  
the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that  
no factual development could possibly justify a right of  
recovery. Id. at 163.  
A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116  
(C)(10) tests the factual support of a claim. Smith v Globe  
Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). 
The  
motion should be granted if the evidence demonstrates that no  
genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving  
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 454­
455, quoting Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362­
363; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).  
IV. THE DUTIES OF A MERCHANT  
We recognized in Mason the general rule that merchants  
"do not have a duty to protect their invitees from  
unreasonable risks that are unforeseeable."  Id. at 398.  
Accordingly, we held that a duty arises only on behalf of  
those invitees that are "‘readily identifiable as [being]  
foreseeably 
endangered.’"  Id., quoting Murdock v Higgins, 454  
Mich 46, 58; 559 NW2d 639 (1997).  We further held that the  
measures taken must be reasonable.  Mason at 405. 
In the  
instant cases, we are called upon to further clarify the duty  
that we articulated in Mason.  
Mason and its companion case, Goodman v Fortner, both  
involved altercations that began in bars.  In Mason, one of  
the plaintiff’s friends, Dan Kanka, was involved in an  
altercation with another man, Thomas Geoffrey. The plaintiff  
9  
 
 
 
was in a different area of the bar when the fight began, and  
only 
witnessed 
its 
conclusion.  The bar’s bouncers immediately  
ejected Geoffrey and, in an attempt to avoid more conflict,  
instructed Kanka to remain until Geoffrey left the premises.  
When the plaintiff left the bar some time later, Geoffrey  
assaulted him in the parking lot, breaking his nose and jaw.  
Id. at 393-394.  We upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s  
resulting 
premises 
liability claim on the ground that, because  
the plaintiff was not near the area where the initial fight  
occurred (and the defendant had no knowledge that the  
plaintiff was associated with either Kanka or Geoffrey), the  
defendant had no reason to believe that the plaintiff was in  
danger.
 Even viewed in a light most favorable to the  
plaintiff, we held that the facts did not support a finding  
that the attack on the plaintiff was foreseeable.  Id. at 404.  
In Goodman, the plaintiff’s girlfriend, Theresa Woods,  
was involved in a bar room scuffle with the plaintiff’s former  
girlfriend and mother of his child, Joslynn Lewis.  The fight  
continued in the parking lot and then moved back inside the  
bar, with two of Lewis’ relatives joining the fray. Despite  
repeated requests that they call the police, the bar’s  
bouncers refused, although they did remove Lewis and her group  
from the bar.  When the plaintiff and Woods attempted to leave  
the bar, Lewis and her friends were waiting out in the parking  
lot, yelling at the plaintiff and threatening to kill him.  
There was evidence that the bouncers standing at the door  
could undoubtedly hear the commotion. One of Lewis’ friends  
eventually shot the plaintiff in the chest. Id. at 395-396.  
10  
 
 
 
  
We upheld a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor on the  
ground that a reasonable jury could find that the harm to the  
plaintiff was foreseeable.  We also held that a reasonable  
jury could find that the defendant did not take reasonable  
steps to prevent the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 404-405.  
As we made clear in Williams and Scott, a merchant has no  
obligation generally to anticipate and prevent criminal acts  
against its invitees. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals panel  
in Lowry correctly noted, we have never recognized as  
"foreseeable" a criminal act that did not, as in Goodman,  
arise from a situation occurring on the premises under  
circumstances that would cause a person to recognize a risk of  
imminent and foreseeable harm to an identifiable invitee.  
Consequently, a merchant’s only duty is to respond reasonably  
to such a situation.  To hold otherwise would mean that  
merchants have an obligation to provide what amounts to police  
protection, a proposition that we soundly rejected in both  
Williams and Scott.10 
To the extent that, in Goodman, we  
relied upon evidence of previous shootings at the bar in  
assessing whether a reasonable jury could find that the  
Goodman plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable, we now disavow  
that analysis as being flatly inconsistent with Williams and  
Scott.  
10Mason cited § 344 of 2 Restatement of Torts, 2nd, and 
comment f to § 344, which indicate that a merchant has a duty 
to take precautions against the criminal conduct of third 
persons that may be reasonably anticipated.  We overrule that  
portion of Mason as conflicting with Williams and Scott.  
11  
A premises owner’s duty is limited to responding  
reasonably 
to 
situations occurring on the premises because, as  
a matter of public policy, we should not expect invitors to  
assume that others will disobey the law.  A merchant can  
assume that patrons will obey the criminal law.  See People v  
Stone, 463 Mich 558, 565; 621 NW2d 702 (2001), citing Prosser  
& Keeton, Torts (5th ed) § 33, p 201; Robinson v Detroit, 462  
Mich 439, 457; 613 NW2d 307 (2000); Buzckowski v McKay, 441  
Mich 96, 108, n 16; 490 NW2d 330 (1992); Placek v Sterling  
Hts, 405 Mich 638, 673, n 18; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).  This  
assumption should continue until a specific situation occurs  
on the premises that would cause a reasonable person to  
recognize a risk of imminent harm to an identifiable invitee.  
It is only a present situation on the premises, not any past  
incidents, that creates a duty to respond.  
Subjecting a merchant to liability solely on the basis of  
a foreseeability analysis is misbegotten.  Because criminal  
activity is irrational and unpredictable, it is in this sense  
invariably foreseeable everywhere.  However, even police, who  
are specially trained and equipped to anticipate and deal with  
crime, are unfortunately unable universally to prevent it.  
This is a testament to the arbitrary nature of crime. Given  
these realities, it is unjustifiable to make merchants, who  
not only have much less experience than the police in dealing  
with criminal activity but are also without a community  
deputation to do so, effectively vicariously liable for the  
criminal acts of third parties.  
12  
  
  
 
  
Having established that a merchant’s duty is to respond  
reasonably to criminal acts occurring on the premises, the  
next question is what is a reasonable response?  Ordinarily,  
this would be a question for the factfinder. However, in cases  
in which overriding public policy concerns arise, this Court  
may 
determine 
what 
constitutes reasonable care. See Williams,  
supra at 501, citing Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 438; 254  
NW2d 759 (1977).  Because such overriding public policy  
concerns exist in the instant cases, the question of  
reasonable care is one that we will determine as a matter of  
law. Williams, supra at 501.  We now make clear that, as a  
matter of law, fulfilling the duty to respond requires only  
that a merchant make reasonable efforts to contact the police.  
We believe this limitation is consistent with the public  
policy concerns discussed in Williams.  
In Williams, supra, the plaintiff was shopping in the  
defendant’s store when an armed robbery occurred.  As the  
plaintiff, a store patron, attempted to flee, the robber shot  
him.  The plaintiff sued the defendant store, alleging that it  
breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in part by not  
providing armed and visible security guards for the security  
of the store’s patrons. Id. at 497. This Court held that a  
merchant’s duty of reasonable care does not include providing  
armed, visible security guards to deter criminal acts of third  
parties. Id. at 501.  We reasoned that such a duty is vested  
in the government alone, and that to shift the burden to the  
private sector "would amount to advocating that members of the  
public resort to self-help.  Such a proposition contravenes  
13  
  
 
 
public policy." Id. at 503-504. We further explained that  
[t]o require defendant to provide armed, visible 
security guards to protect invitees from criminal 
acts in a place of business open to the general 
public would require defendant to provide a safer 
environment on its premises than its invitees would 
encounter in the community at large.  Defendant  
simply does not have that degree of control and is 
not an insurer of the safety of its invitees.  [Id.  
at 502.]  
The rationale of this Court in Williams for not requiring  
merchants to provide security guards to protect invitees from  
the criminal acts of third parties is the same rationale for  
not imposing on merchants any greater obligation than to  
reasonably expedite the involvement of the police. That is,  
the duty to provide police protection is vested in the  
government. Williams, supra at 501.  To require a merchant to  
do more than take reasonable efforts to expedite the  
involvement of the police,  would essentially result in the  
duty to provide police protection, a concept that was rejected  
in Williams.11  Merchants do not have effective control over  
situations involving spontaneous and sudden incidents of  
criminal activity.  On the contrary, control is precisely what  
has been lost in such a situation.12  Thus, to impose an  
obligation on the merchant to do more than take reasonable  
efforts to contact the police is at odds with the public  
policy principles of Williams.  
11A merchant may voluntarily do more than reasonably 
attempt to notify the police.  However, we hold today, that a 
merchant is under no legal obligation to do so.  
12In most instances, other than merely being the owner of 
the business being victimized, the merchant and invitee will 
be situated in roughly the same position in terms of their 
vulnerability to the violent criminal predator.  
14  
 
In Scott, supra at 452, we expanded on this theme by  
holding that, even where a merchant voluntarily takes safety  
precautions 
in 
an 
effort to prevent criminal activity, "[s]uit  
may not be maintained on the theory that the safety measures  
are less effective than they could or should have been."  
Consequently, in any case in which a factfinder, be it the  
trial court or a jury, will be assessing the reasonableness of  
the measures taken by a merchant in responding to an  
occurrence on the premises, a plaintiff may not present  
evidence concerning the presence or absence of security  
personnel, or the failure to otherwise resort to self-help, as  
a basis for establishing a breach of the merchant’s duty. A  
jury thus must be specifically instructed in accordance with  
the principles of Williams and Scott as we have outlined them  
here.  
To summarize, under Mason, generally merchants "have a  
duty to use reasonable care to protect their identifiable  
invitees 
from 
the 
foreseeable criminal acts of third parties."  
Id. at 405.  The duty is triggered by specific acts occurring  
on the premises that pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable  
harm to an identifiable invitee.
 Whether an invitee is  
readily identifiable as being foreseeably endangered is a  
question for the factfinder if reasonable minds could differ  
on this point.  See id. at 404-405. 
While a merchant is  
required to take reasonable measures in response to an ongoing  
situation that is taking place on the premises, there is no  
obligation to otherwise anticipate the criminal acts of third  
parties.  Consistent with Williams, a merchant is not  
15  
obligated to do anything more than reasonably expedite the  
involvement of the police.  We also reaffirm that a merchant  
is not required to provide security guards or otherwise resort  
to self help in order to deter or quell such occurrences.  
Williams, supra.  
V. APPLICATION  
A. MACDONALD  
The Court of Appeals in MacDonald held that plaintiff  
presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of  
material fact concerning whether the harm to her was  
foreseeable.  We agree that plaintiff created a jury­
submissible 
issue 
concerning 
whether 
she 
was 
readily  
identifiable as being foreseeably endangered once the sod  
throwing began.  However, we reject the Court of Appeals  
reliance on incidents previous to the day in question as a  
basis for concluding that sod throwing was “foreseeable” in  
this instance.  The Mason duty, as clarified here, is not  
based upon the general question whether a criminal act was  
foreseeable, but, rather, once a disturbance occurs on the  
premises, whether a reasonable person would recognize a risk  
of imminent harm to an identifiable invitee.  As stated, a  
merchant has no obligation to anticipate the criminal acts of  
third parties.  
The Court of Appeals also held that a genuine issue of  
material fact exists concerning whether Pine Knob took  
reasonable measures in response to the sod throwing.  We  
disagree.  Because Pine Knob already had the police present at  
the concert, Pine Knob fully discharged its duty to respond.  
16  
 
Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision denying Pine  
Knob’s motion for summary disposition and reinstate the trial  
court’s decision to grant summary disposition for Pine Knob  
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).  
We also reverse the Court of Appeals decision that the  
trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s  
motion to amend her complaint to add certain theories  
including 
design 
defect, 
nuisance, 
and 
third-party 
beneficiary  
claims and to more specifically set forth her negligence  
claim.  We conclude that plaintiff’s amendment would have been  
futile.  
B. LOWRY  
In contrast with MacDonald, the Court of Appeals panel in  
Lowry relied solely on the absence of evidence concerning  
previous incidents of sod throwing to uphold the trial court’s  
decision granting summary disposition for Pine Knob.  This too  
was error.  Whether Pine Knob could have anticipated that sod  
throwing would be a problem does not answer the legally  
relevant question whether plaintiff Lowry was foreseeably  
endangered once sod throwing began on the day of plaintiff’s  
attendance.  
However, in accordance with this opinion, because  
Pine Knob already had the police at the concert, we hold that  
Pine Knob had no further obligation.  Pine Knob discharged its  
duty to respond by having police present once the sod throwing  
began.  Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals affirmance of the  
trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition in favor  
of Pine Knob.  We also affirm the Court of Appeals decision to  
uphold 
summary 
disposition in Pine Knob’s favor on plaintiff’s  
17  
  
 
 
 
handicapper discrimination claim.  We agree that Pine Knob  
fully accommodated plaintiff’s disability.  
VI. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
The dissent accuses us of “uproot[ing] the entire basis  
for imposing a duty on merchants to protect their invitees  
that we expressed in Mason . . . .” 
Slip op, pp 4-5. 
We  
disagree.  
The principal difference between the dissent and the  
majority lies in our respective attempts to reconcile our  
several premises liability cases and the policies that  
undergird them.  The dissent seeks in effect to limit or  
ignore the holdings of Williams and Scott. The majority  
refuses to do so.  
In its effort to explain away the tort duty policy  
choices this Court adopted in Williams and Scott, the dissent  
reads into Mason rationales and holdings the dissent would  
have liked Mason to have adopted but which that opinion  
plainly did not embrace.  
We believe that the actual policy rationales of Williams  
and Scott must be reconciled with the merchant’s duty set  
forth in Mason.
 In reconciling these cases, we seek to  
establish a clear rule.  We reject the premises liability rule  
that the dissent proposes because (1) it provides little  
guidance to any premises owner concerning its obligations  
under law and (2) despite its claims to the contrary, the  
dissent’s rule would unfairly expose merchants in high-crime  
areas to excessive tort liability and increase the pressure on  
18  
 
 
 
commercial enterprises to remove themselves from our troubled  
urban and high-crime communities. Mason undeniably cites  
2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 344, and comment f.13  However, in  
quoting that section and comment of the restatement, the Mason  
majority did not “recognize” the imposition of a duty on a  
merchant to protect its invitees from criminal conduct of  
third parties as being “contingent upon whether the character  
of his business, or past experience . . . gives the merchant  
knowledge or reason to know that those acts may occur again.”  
Slip op, p 4.  Other than in the text of the restatement, the  
“character of the merchant’s business” is not even discussed  
13The dissent cannot seriously suggest that the mere 
quotation of comment f of the Restatement in Mason constituted  
an adoption of it.  Comment f explicitly provided that a 
premises owner’s duty encompasses the responsibility to 
"provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford 
a reasonable protection" against the criminal acts of third 
parties.
 This proposition was flatly rejected in both 
Williams and Scott. See Williams at 502-503 and Scott, supra.  
Nevertheless, “this Court is not, nor is any other court, 
bound to follow any of the rules set out in the Restatement.” 
Rowe v Montgomery Ward, 437 Mich 627, 652; 473 NW2d 268 
(1991).  “[T]he application of a common-law rule to a 
particular set of facts does not turn on whether those facts 
can be characterized in the language of the Restatement.” 
Smith v Allendale Mutual Ins Co, 410 Mich 685, 712-13; 303 
NW2d 702 (1981).  While the drafters of the Restatements “may 
sometimes strive to choose ‘the better rule’ or to predict or 
shape the development of the law, its influence depends upon 
its persuasiveness.” Id. at 713 (emphasis added).  
Even where a particular Restatement section 
has received specific judicial endorsement, cases 
where that section is invoked must be decided by 
reference to the policies and precedents underlying 
the rule restated. 
Textual analysis of the  
Restatement is useful only to the extent that it 
illuminates these fundamental considerations. [Id.  
(emphasis added).]  
Further, our rejection of § 344, and comment f, is consistent 
with the overriding public policy concerns discussed in this 
opinion.  
19  
 
 
 
 
in Mason. 
Nor did we “implicitly note” in Mason that a  
careful consideration of the facts in each case, namely, the  
nature of the harm, etc., is essential in determining whether  
a § 344 analysis is justified.  Thus, the dissent ingeniously  
injects concepts into Mason that clearly were not adopted by  
the Mason court.  
The dissent attempts to distinguish Williams from Mason  
and the instant cases by explaining that Williams involved  
"random crime” "unrelated to the character of the merchant’s  
business", slip op, p 8, and asserting that the sod-throwing  
incidents in these cases were “related” to Pine Knob’s  
business because the nature of the harm was created by the  
“character” of its business.  We do not agree with the  
dissent’s focus on the “randomness” or spontaneity of a  
criminal act as being a relevant factor in determining whether  
an occurrence was foreseeable.  The key inquiry is not whether  
the criminal act was "random," but rather whether, as stated  
in Mason, the merchant has reason to recognize a risk of  
imminent harm to an identifiable invitee.  In Williams, the  
merchant had no reason to expect the criminal attack.  In  
Mason, we distinguished Williams and Scott by explaining that  
in Williams and Scott "[t]he merchants had had no previous  
contact with the assailants and could not have determined that  
the plaintiffs were in danger."  Mason, supra at 402. 
The  
rule set forth in this opinion is thus consistent with Mason  
as well as Williams and Scott: 
A merchant should not be  
20  
 
 
expected to anticipate any type of criminal activity, whether  
"random" or otherwise, before there is some specific activity  
on the premises creating a foreseeable risk of imminent harm  
to an identifiable invitee.14  The merchant then must make  
efforts to notify those deputized to deal with such  
circumstances: the police.  
Moreover, none should be mistaken that the test of  
“relatedness” proposed by the dissent would apply, if not now,  
then very soon, to virtually all criminal acts in commercial  
establishments.  It cannot be questioned that there can always  
be, given crime’s unfortunate pervasiveness, a plausible  
argument that the criminal being drawn to the business  
enterprise at all makes it “related” in such a way as to  
trigger liability.15  Surely after one crime has occurred on  
the premises, or even in a similar business, with the criminal  
14Mason 
distinguished 
Williams 
by 
analyzing 
the 
merchant's 
ability to foresee imminent harm, i.e., awareness of a 
situation.  However, as articulated in this opinion, we would 
not go so far as to consider specific prior incidents, as that 
would conflict with the general proposition in Williams and  
Scott that merchants are “ordinarily” not legally responsible 
to patrons and others on their premises for the criminal acts 
of third parties, as well as the premise that a merchant can 
assume that others will obey the criminal law until they 
actually do otherwise. See slip op, pp 11-13.  
15The “relatedness” test proposed by the dissent states:  
If the nature of the harm is random and  
spontaneous, and thus unrelated to the character of 
the merchant’s business, the merchant cannot be 
expected to foresee its occurrence, and reference 
to prior similar occurrences is not justified. If  
the nature of the harm was created by the character 
of the merchant’s business, reference to prior 
similar occurrences is justified because a merchant 
can be expected to foresee such harm happening 
again, in light of his prior experience with such 
acts. Slip op, p 8.  
21 
 
  
having 
been 
arguably 
drawn to that business, the “relatedness”  
test will be met.  Indeed, probably even more attenuated  
linkages (the crime rate in the area comes to mind) will  
suffice, as the law develops, to establish “relatedness.”  
This will all mean, and it was this the Williams and Scott  
courts understood, that urban merchants will be exposed to  
crippling tort liability.  
Thus, the dissent’s rule would have its most pernicious  
and devastating effect on the many commercial businesses that  
are located in Michigan’s urban and high-crime areas.  
Avoiding this kind of adverse effect was one of the Court’s  
primary concerns when it adopted the Williams and Scott  
16 
principles. 
It simply cannot be gainsaid that businesses in  
urban and high-crime areas do foresee that criminals may  
attack 
their 
establishments—opportunistically 
or 
with  
premeditation. Indeed, the fact that many businesses in our  
16Imposing liability on the business owner, poses the 
threat that businesses may move away from high crime areas. 
See Homant & Kennedy, Landholder Responsibility for Third 
Party Crimes in Michigan: An Analysis of Underlying Legal 
Values, 27 U Tol L Rev 115, 147 (1995).  See also McNeal v  
Henry, 82 Mich App 88, 90, n 1; 266 NW2d 469 (1978), stating:  
In the majority of urban communities, both 
large and small businesses could not bear the heavy 
insurance burden which would be required to protect 
against this extraordinary kind of liability. Some  
of our big cities have more than their share of 
destructive and violent persons, young and old, who 
roam through downtown department stores and other 
small retail businesses stealing and physically 
abusing legitimate patrons.  Guards are placed in 
the stores but those activities continue. We fear  
that to hold businessmen liable for the clearly 
unforeseeable third-party torts and crimes incident 
to these activities would eventually drive them out 
of business.  
22  
     
 
 
 
urban and high-crime areas erect barriers to protect their  
employees is ample proof that they actually anticipate crime  
occurring in their establishments.  Plainly stated, their  
precautions 
give 
proof that they understand that criminal acts  
in their establishments are not “random” as the dissent would  
understand it, but rather are foreseeable risks related to the  
business.  
For these policy reasons, we, as the courts before us,  
decline to adopt the dissent’s proposed rule.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
Consistent with our decisions in Williams, Scott, and  
Mason, we conclude that merchants have a duty to respond  
reasonably to situations occurring on the premises that pose  
a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to identifiable  
invitees.  We hold that the duty to respond is limited to  
reasonably expediting the involvement of the police, and that  
there is no duty to otherwise anticipate the criminal acts of  
third parties.  Finally, we reaffirm that merchants are not  
required to provide security personnel or otherwise resort to  
self-help in order to deter or quell such occurrences.  
In MacDonald, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision  
denying summary disposition.  In Lowry, the decision of the  
Court of Appeals to grant summary disposition for Pine Knob is  
affirmed.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with YOUNG, J.  
23  
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MOLLY MACDONALD, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 114039 
PKT, INC, known as PINE KNOB MUSIC
THEATER, and ARENA ASSOCIATES,
jointly and severally, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
CAPITAL CITIES/ABC, INC, 
Defendant. 
________________________________ 
STEPHEN L. LOWRY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 115322 
CELLAR DOOR PRODUCTIONS OF MICHIGAN,
INC, a Michigan corporation, and
ARENA ASSOCIATES INC, d/b/a PINE
KNOB MUSIC THEATER, jointly and
severally, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
________________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
The majority holds that under Mason v Royal Dequindre,  
Inc, 455 Mich 391; 566 NW2d 199 (1997), a merchant has a duty  
to 
“respond 
reasonably to situations occurring on the premises  
that pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to  
identifiable invitees,” and the duty to respond entails  
nothing more than the merchant’s attempt to contact the  
 
 
police. Slip op at 2. This artful formulation of the Mason  
duty removes any inquiry into prior similar occurrences as  
part 
of 
the 
foreseeability 
analysis, 
reducing 
the  
foreseeability question to whether a merchant should have  
known that an ongoing occurrence on the premises could have  
harmed an identifiable invitee.  Because the majority created  
this formulation of the Mason duty with brazen disregard for  
the principles that created it, I respectfully dissent.  
I  
In Mason, we had to determine whether merchants have a  
common-law duty to protect their patrons from criminal acts of  
third parties.  To resolve this question, we examined the  
rationale behind imposing a duty on a person to protect  
another person endangered by a third party’s conduct.  
Generally, a person has no duty to protect another person  
endangered by a third party’s conduct unless there is a  
special relationship between those persons.  The reason for  
this exception to the general no-duty rule when a special  
relationship is present is based on control.  As we explained,  
“In each situation one person entrusts himself to the control  
and protection of another, with a consequent loss of control  
to protect himself. The duty to protect is imposed upon the  
person in control because he is best able to provide a place  
of safety.”  Mason at 398. 
Thus, while merchants are not  
insurer’s 
of 
their 
invitees’ safety, we recognized that courts  
will impose a duty on a merchant to protect its invitees, like  
the duty imposed when a special relationship is present, when  
they are “readily identifiable as [being] foreseeably  
2  
  
endangered.” Id. at 398, quoting Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich  
46, 58; 559 NW2d 639 (1997).  
After exploring the basis for imposing a duty on a  
merchant to protect its invitees, we explained that these same  
principles are embodied in 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 344,  
pp 224-225, and comment f to § 344, pp 225-226.  The  
Restatement further explains how control and foreseeability  
govern a landowner’s liability to its invitees. Section 344  
provides:  
A possessor of land who holds it open to the 
public for entry for his business purposes is 
subject to liability to members of the public while 
they are upon the land for such a purpose, for 
physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, 
or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or 
animals, and by the failure of the possessor to 
exercise reasonable care to  
(a) discover that such acts are being done or 
are likely to be done, or  
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the 
visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect 
them against it.  
Comment f to § 344 states:  
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the 
visitor’s safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to 
exercise any care until he knows or has reason to 
know that the acts of the third person are  
occurring, or are about to occur.  He may, however, 
know or have reason to know, from past experience, 
that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part 
of third persons in general which is likely to 
endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he 
has no reason to expect it on the part of any 
particular individual.  If the place or character 
of his business, or his past experience, is such 
that he should reasonably anticipate careless or 
criminal conduct on the part of third persons, 
either generally or at some particular time, he may 
be under a duty to take precautions against it, and 
to provide a reasonably sufficient number of  
servants to afford a reasonable protection.  
3  
 
In quoting § 344 and comment f, we recognized that the  
imposition of a duty on a merchant to protect its invitees  
from criminal conduct of third parties is contingent upon  
whether the character of his business, or past experience  
either in general or at a specific time, gives the merchant  
knowledge or reason to know that those acts may occur again.  
As noted in the quoted sections of the Restatement, this  
analysis includes a consideration of whether such acts had  
occurred in the past.  
Following these premises liability principles, we held  
that “merchants can be liable in tort for failing to take  
reasonable 
measures 
to protect their invitees from harm caused  
by the criminal acts of third parties.  The harm must be  
foreseeable to an identifiable invitee and preventable by the  
exercise of reasonable care.”  Id. at 393. 
Clearly, our  
holding in Mason was premised on tort principles that require  
a look into the character of the merchant’s business and prior  
similar occurrences to determine whether the harm is  
foreseeable.  
The majority introduces a version of the Mason duty that  
ignores the basis of our holding in Mason and instead holds  
that under Mason, a merchant has a duty to respond to ongoing  
frays on the premises, and the duty is only to make an effort  
to contact the police. This formulation essentially uproots  
the entire basis for imposing a duty on merchants to protect  
their invitees that we expressed in Mason by extinguishing the  
consideration of the character of the merchant’s business and  
prior similar occurrences when deciding if the harm was  
4  
foreseeable.  Instead, the majority limits the foreseeability  
question to whether this particular fray would have harmed  
this particular plaintiff, without citing any legal support  
for its decision to alter the duty.  
In reformulating the Mason duty, the majority overrules  
Mason to the extent that it relied on § 344 and comment f of  
the 
Restatement 
which 
clearly 
refutes 
the 
majority’s 
clarified  
version of the Mason duty. Slip op at 13, n 10. The reason  
the majority states for overruling this part of Mason is that  
§ 344 and comment f are contrary to our holding in Williams v  
Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495; 418 NW2d 381  
(1988).
 In Williams, we stated that merchants are not  
ordinarily responsible for criminal acts of third parties  
because it is against public policy to require a merchant to  
anticipate crime in the community that may harm its invitees.  
The majority claims that the only way to reconcile Williams  
with the Mason holding that a merchant may be liable when the  
criminal act that harmed its invitee was foreseeable is to say  
that a merchant only has a duty to “respond reasonably to such  
a situation.”  Slip op at 12-13. Furthermore, the majority  
concludes that the duty entails only making an effort to  
contact 
the 
police 
because Williams prevents the imposition of  
any further act.  The majority fails to recognize, however,  
that a new formulation of the Mason duty is not necessary in  
light of Williams because we distinguished Williams when we  
decided Mason.  
According to the majority, Williams closed the door to  
applying § 344 when deciding whether a merchant has a duty to  
5  
 
 
protect its invitees from criminal acts because merchants  
cannot anticipate crime. 
A close reading of Williams,  
however, reveals that is not true.  In Williams, we recognized  
§ 344, but refused to apply it to the facts because the nature  
of the harm, random crime in the community unrelated to the  
merchant’s business, presented the merchant with no degree of  
control over its prevention.  Williams at 501, n 15.  Thus,  
contrary to the majority’s assertion, we recognized in  
Williams that application of § 344 depends on the facts of a  
case, i.e., the nature of the harm and degree of control a  
merchant had in each case.  
In Mason, we discussed the Williams’ decision and cited  
Justice Levin’s dissent in Alexander v American Multi-Cinema,  
450 Mich 877; 540 NW2d 674 (1995), as support for  
distinguishing the Williams holding. Mason at 401-402, n 5.  
In Alexander, a theater patron was injured in a scuffle with  
another patron who was standing in line for a late night show.  
Justice Levin dissented from the majority’s decision to deny  
leave, stating that he would grant leave to discuss a  
merchant’s duty to protect its invitees from the criminal acts  
of third parties.  Quoting § 344, Justice Levin explained  
that, 
although 
no 
invitor is automatically liable for criminal  
acts of third parties on the invitor’s property, an invitor  
has a duty to act reasonably to protect invitees from  
foreseeable hazards. Alexander at 879-880. 
Distinguishing  
Williams on its facts, Justice Levin explained that the  
merchant in Williams was not faced with a foreseeable  
altercation because the merchant had no control over the  
6  
 
 
random, spontaneous nature of the harm. Thus, Williams  
addressed “the random assault bearing no relation to the  
merchant’s business, and did not address the merchant’s  
liability for risks created by the merchant’s business.” Id.  
at 882.  Noting that this distinction is relevant, Justice  
Levin stated that although we have held that “a merchant is  
not ordinarily 
required to protect customers from the criminal  
acts of third persons, . . . [i]f one assumes that a situation  
created by the defendant will be classified as extraordinary,  
the distinction then becomes relevant.” Id. at 881 (emphasis  
added).  Thus, if the merchant created the situation that led  
to the harm, the situation can be treated as extraordinary and  
a merchant can be liable for the criminal acts that harmed its  
patrons, if the acts were foreseeable. Justice Levin noted  
that the facts in Alexander created such an extraordinary  
situation because the scuffle between the patrons waiting in  
line “was foreseeable in light of the owner’s considerable  
experience with crowd control in general, and handling and  
organizing the pretheater crowd in particular.” Id.  
Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the Mason  
holding is inconsistent with Williams, in Mason we recognized  
Justice Levin’s dissent in Alexander as the method to  
distinguish the Williams holding and created a duty based on  
§ 344 that essentially focused on the nature of the harm, the  
foreseeability of the harm, and the control a merchant has  
over the harm. 
We implicitly noted that a careful  
consideration of the facts in each case is essential to  
determine whether a § 344 analysis is justified.  If the  
7  
 
 
nature of the harm is random and spontaneous, and thus  
unrelated to the character of the merchant’s business, the  
merchant cannot be expected to foresee its occurrence, and  
reference to prior similar occurrences is not justified. If  
the nature of the harm was created by the character of the  
merchant’s 
business, 
reference 
to 
prior 
similar 
occurrences 
is  
justified because a merchant can be expected to foresee such  
harm happening again, in light of his prior experience with  
such acts. Accordingly, we concluded that “merchants have a  
duty to use reasonable care to protect their identifiable  
invitees 
from 
the 
foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.”  
Mason at 405. 
Our decision in Mason was therefore clearly  
based on a careful consideration of the common-law tort  
principles of control and foreseeability, as articulated in  
§ 344, and how they coexist with the holding in Williams.  
Thus, clarification of the Mason duty is not necessary, as  
that decision clearly acknowledged how the control and  
foreseeability origins of § 344 may apply to certain factual  
scenarios without violating our holding in Williams.  
II  
As the preceding discussion illustrates, premises  
liability law contains many nuances that, without complete  
consideration, may appear inconsistent.  The majority has  
seized on this apparent, but vacuous, inconsistency and held  
that a clarification is necessary in this area of law.  
However, read closely, the principles have distinguishing  
characteristics that allow them to exist without conflict in  
three separate categories.  
8  
 
(1) Traditional Premises Liability  
Traditionally, a merchant has had a duty to protect its  
invitees from defects or dangerous conditions on the land of  
which the merchant knew or had reason to know.  
(2) Hybrid Premises Liability  
Under hybrid premises liability, a merchant has a duty to  
protect its invitees from activities involving actors on the  
premises of which a merchant knew or had reason to know.  The  
tricky part, however, is when the activity consists of  
criminal acts by third parties. If the activity on the land  
is a criminal act, it must be determined whether the character  
of the merchant’s business and the nature of the act are of a  
sort that a merchant could be expected to anticipate.  If the  
nature of the criminal act is random, spontaneous, and thus  
unrelated 
to 
the 
merchant’s business and the invitee’s purpose  
for being there, the situation falls into category three,  
discussed below.  If, however, the nature of the criminal act  
is not random or spontaneous, and is related to the merchant’s  
business and the invitee’s purpose on the premises, as  
explained in Mason and Justice Levin’s dissenting opinion in  
Alexander, we 
resort 
to the control and foreseeability origins  
of § 344 to determine whether the merchant has a duty.  See  
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 61, p 428 (stating that a  
possessor of land is required to take action when he has  
reason to believe, from what he has observed or from past  
experience, that the conduct of others on the land will be  
dangerous to other invitees, but not when the landowner cannot  
anticipate the harm).  
9  
(3) The Exception To Hybrid Liability  
The exception to hybrid liability is when there is a  
criminal act by third parties on the premises, but the act is  
random and spontaneous, having no relation to the merchant’s  
business other than that it is a business, the merchant has no  
duty.  In the exception situation, the random, spontaneous  
nature of the act removes any degree of control a merchant has  
over the act occurring, thus making any application of the  
control and foreseeability origins of § 344 improper.  See,  
e.g., Williams.  
III  
The facts of these cases must be examined to determine  
which of the three premises liability categories  governs.  
Because the harm did not result from a physical defect on the  
premises, the act does not fall within the traditional  
premises liability category. Rather, the harm resulted from  
activity on the land, potentially criminal in nature, which  
requires us to decide whether the nature of the act qualifies  
it as a hybrid or exception situation.  The character of  
defendant Pine Knob’s business created the risk of harm to its  
invitees, by subjecting its patrons to view concerts in a  
venue where sod throwing had previously occurred.  The sod  
throwing in these cases was, therefore, not random or  
spontaneous, was related to the invitee’s purpose on the  
premises, qualifying these cases under the hybrid category,  
and thus justifies  applying the control and foreseeability  
origins of § 344.  
Pine Knob charges its patrons to enter its forum to watch  
10  
 
 
concerts, where part of the seating area for patrons is a sod­
covered hill. Once the patron sets foot inside the venue, he  
has entrusted himself to the control and protection of Pine  
Knob, and his ability to protect himself from activities that  
may occur on the premises diminishes. Thus, contrary to the  
majority’s claim, Pine Knob has better control over the  
activities of patrons it has chosen to host than the patrons  
themselves.  The potentially criminal activity in these cases  
that occurred in this controlled environment was patrons  
ripping up sod from the hill and throwing it.  The question  
becomes whether this act arose from the character of Pine  
Knob’s business, or was random or spontaneous. The majority  
has manipulated the class of activity at issue in this case,  
sod throwing, to be strictly criminal.  In so doing, the  
majority ignores the fact that this activity, albeit  
potentially criminal,1 only occurred because of the nature of  
Pine Knob’s business. In other words, a patron at Pine Knob  
would not be subjected to injury from such a concert activity  
like sod throwing if he were not present on Pine Knob’s  
premises; it is unique to Pine Knob’s business.  Because Pine  
Knob charged a fee for entry, subjected its patrons to seating  
on sod-covered ground, sod-throwing acts had occurred before,2  
and the harm suffered was a result of plaintiffs’ purpose on  
1 The record indicates that some 100 sod-throwing patrons 
were ejected from the premises, pursuant to Pine Knob’s 
policy.  
2 In Lowry, the sod throwing occurred once before at the 
same 
festival-type 
music concert, and in MacDonald it occurred  
twice in one night.  
11  
 
 
the premises and the nature of Pine Knob’s business, to watch  
concerts at such a venue, I would find this an “extraordinary”  
situation, unlike that in Williams. 
These factors justify  
imposing a duty on Pine Knob.  Pine Knob not only created the  
risk of harm to its invitees, but it had reason to know that  
such sod throwing may occur again, on the basis of its prior  
experience with such activity. This act is therefore unlike  
the random, spontaneous criminal act that occurred in  
Williams, which had nothing to do with the nature of the store  
owner’s business, and the concerns of applying the control and  
foreseeability concepts do not arise. It thus becomes clear  
that the majority’s overstated concern for subjecting  
merchants in high crime areas to increased liability is  
misplaced. Random crimes in the community are unique to the  
community, not to the businesses present in that community.  
Hence, the initial analysis, as proposed by Justice Levin and  
further explained in § 344, focuses on whether the act that  
injured the patron is unique to the merchant’s business, not  
the location of the merchant’s business.  If the act is unique  
to the merchant’s business, only then is it justifiable to say  
that the merchant has control over such acts and, thus, can  
foresee such future occurrences.  Thus, retaining the control  
and foreseeability origins of § 344 in this situation does not  
vitiate the Williams holding, and Pine Knob should be held  
liable if a jury finds that the sod throwing was a foreseeable  
act and Pine Knob failed to take reasonable measures to  
protect its invitees from such foreseeable harm.  
IV  
12  
 
Today the majority embarks on the unnecessary journey of  
clarifying the duty a merchant has to protect its invitees  
from criminal acts of third parties, as discussed in Mason.  
This clarification takes premises liability into an unfounded  
direction with far-reaching consequences.3  By eradicating the  
two profound tenets behind the Mason duty, control and  
foreseeability, the majority has created an unprecedented  
formulation of the duty providing that if the act that caused  
the harm could be charged as criminal, the merchant can never  
be liable if it attempts to contact the police.  Such a  
conclusion ignores an entire category of criminal acts that  
arise solely because of the character of the merchant’s  
3 The following hypothetical example illustrates the 
fundamental problems with the majority’s reformulation.  
Defendant humane society allows persons interested in 
adopting animals to observe the animals through cages. There 
is a separate “dog wing” in which all the dogs are kept in 
individual cages.  Patrons on the premises interested in 
adopting a dog are allowed access to the dog wing. A patron 
who is visiting the dog wing gets increasingly passionate 
about the dogs being cooped up and breaks open each cage, 
setting the dogs free.  The dogs become scared and attack a 
family who was there adopting their new pet. Unfortunately, 
one of the children is severely injured. The humane society 
is familiar with this “passionate patron” syndrome, and it in 
fact occurred the previous day, killing a patron.  Luckily for 
the 
humane 
society, 
under the majority’s clarified Mason 
duty, 
this previous attack will not be considered, regardless of the 
number of times the attacks have happened, the humane 
society’s experience with controlling the animals on its 
premises, and the experience the humane society has with the 
harm caused by “passionate patrons.”  Rather, in the midst of 
watching the dogs viciously attacking patrons, all the humane 
society must do to avoid liability to the injured patrons is 
to make the effort to call the police.  Thus, even though the 
character of the business created the risk of harm, the humane 
society had past experience with such mishaps, and the degree 
of control the humane society has over its patrons was great, 
there is no duty to protect.  I cannot agree that this is a 
proper formulation of the duty.  
13  
business and the invitee’s purpose on the premises. Because  
this was clearly not intended when we created the Mason duty,  
I dissent.  
In accordance with the original, unclarified Mason duty,  
in both of the instant cases I would deny summary disposition  
so that a jury may determine (1) whether the sod throwing was  
foreseeable, (2) whether the plaintiffs were identifiable  
invitees, and (3) whether defendant Pine Knob took reasonable  
measures to protect its invitees from the harm.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
14