Title: In the Matter of Corbett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12305
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 25, 2017

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SJC-12305 
 
IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM P. CORBETT, JR. 
 
 
October 25, 2017. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Disbarment, 
Commingling of funds.  Conversion. 
 
 
 
 
A single justice of this court ordered that the respondent, 
William P. Corbett, Jr., be disbarred from the practice of law 
for conduct including intentional conversion of funds belonging 
to two clients, causing deprivation for both.  The respondent 
concedes that his conduct violated the rules of professional 
conduct applicable to attorneys; he appeals only the sanction 
imposed as being too harsh.1  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  Bar counsel filed a five-count petition for 
discipline with the Board of Bar Overseers (board).  Three 
counts concerned the most serious allegations, charging that the 
respondent intentionally misused client funds, with deprivation 
resulting, and that he made various misrepresentations to the 
clients.  One count alleged that the respondent failed to comply 
with the rules of professional conduct regarding client trust 
accounts.  The final count charged that the respondent failed to 
cooperate and made misrepresentations during bar counsel's 
investigation of the respondent's conduct, and that he violated 
the terms of the resulting suspension from the practice of law.  
The respondent answered the petition, and the matter was 
                                                          
 
 
1 We have reviewed the respondent's preliminary memorandum 
and record appendix, as well as the record that was before the 
single justice.  Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 
(2015), governing appeals in bar discipline cases, we dispense 
with oral argument. 
2 
 
 
 
referred to a hearing committee of the board.  After a hearing, 
the hearing committee issued its report and recommended that the 
respondent be disbarred.  The board voted to accept the report 
and recommendation. 
 
 
Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 
Mass. 1310 (2009), bar counsel filed an information in the 
county court.  After a hearing, the single justice concluded 
that the hearing committee's factual findings, all of which were 
adopted by the board, were supported by substantial evidence, 
accepted the recommended sanction, and entered a judgment of 
disbarment. 
 
 
Discussion.  The respondent has acknowledged the most 
serious allegations of misconduct, i.e., those involving 
misappropriation of client funds, and it is unnecessary to our 
decision to consider other evidence of misconduct.  Instead, we 
focus on the question of sanction.  While each case is unique, 
and every offending attorney must receive the sanction most 
appropriate in the circumstances, the common, overarching factor 
for our consideration in all cases "is the effect upon, and 
perception of, the public and the bar."  Matter of Alter, 389 
Mass. 153, 156 (1983).  That factor is promoted by "even-handed 
results in such cases."  Id.  For that reason, we review the 
single justice's determination of the appropriate sanction de 
novo, focusing on whether the sanction imposed is "markedly 
disparate from those ordinarily entered by the various single 
justices in similar cases," id., "tempered with substantial 
deference to the board's recommendation."  Matter of Foley, 439 
Mass. 324, 333 (2003).  See Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. 453, 
464 (2006). 
 
 
In this case, the ethical violations to which the 
respondent has admitted were serious.  Among other things, he 
admitted to three counts of intentional misappropriation of 
client funds with temporary deprivation resulting.  First, he 
misused approximately $36,085.93 belonging to one client, which 
had been withheld from the settlement of a portion of her claims 
for the purpose of covering anticipated future litigation 
expenses.  The respondent instead spent the money on matters 
unrelated to the client. 
 
 
Second, after settling a second portion of the same 
client's claims, the respondent deposited a $50,000 settlement 
check into his trust account, withdrew his fee without notifying 
the client or providing her with an accounting, and then 
misappropriated nearly all of the remaining balance.  After 
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giving false explanations for his delay in sending her the 
settlement proceeds, the respondent sent the client a check, 
which was dishonored by the bank because of insufficient funds.  
It was not until after the client filed a complaint with bar 
counsel, and six months after bar counsel filed her petition for 
discipline, that the respondent repaid the client the funds due 
to her, plus interest. 
 
 
Third, the respondent intentionally misused, for personal 
purposes, not less than $5,800 from the proceeds of a second 
client's settlement to repay the funds he misappropriated from 
the first client.  About two months before his disciplinary 
hearing, the respondent repaid the second client.  At the time 
of the hearing, he had not complied with the second client's 
request that his files be returned to him. 
 
 
The single justice correctly observed that the ordinary and 
presumptive sanction for attorneys who have intentionally 
misused and deprived their clients of funds is disbarment or 
indefinite suspension.  Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 187 
(1997).  See Matter of Haese, 468 Mass. 1002, 1008 (2014).  A 
respondent has a heavy burden to justify any departure from that 
presumption, and for the reasons that follow, we conclude he has 
not done so.  See Matter of Schoepfer, supra at 187-188. 
 
 
1.  As stated, the respondent made restitution to both 
clients after the petition for discipline was filed, but before 
the disciplinary hearing commenced.  See Matter of Watt, 430 
Mass. 232, 233 (1999).  Although payment of restitution may tip 
the balance toward imposition of an indefinite suspension rather 
than disbarment, see id. at 236, that is so because restitution 
often evinces an "outward sign of the recognition of one's 
wrongdoing and the awareness of a moral duty to make amends to 
the best of one's ability."  Matter of McCarthy, 23 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 469, 470 (2007).  Here, not only was there was 
no finding of "sincere remorse for and embarrassment about his 
misconduct," Matter of Watt, supra, but, to the contrary, the 
hearing committee rejected the respondent's testimony that he 
accepted full responsibility for his misconduct, finding instead 
that he "adopted an intentionally false affectation of remorse 
that was belied by his efforts to blame others, to elicit 
favorable testimony from his former clients that was not based 
in fact, and to portray himself as remorseful at the very times 
he attempted to misled his clients and to mislead and obstruct 
bar counsel."  The hearing committee is "the sole judge of the 
credibility of the testimony presented at the hearing," Matter 
of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 83-84 (2009), quoting S.J.C. Rule 
4 
 
 
 
4:01, § 8 (5), and there is nothing to suggest clear error in 
its findings.  See, e.g., Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503 (2008); 
Matter of Hoicka, 442 Mass. 1004, 1006 (2004).  Giving due 
deference to the board's recommendation, we conclude that 
disbarment rather than indefinite suspension is the appropriate 
presumptive sanction in the circumstances. 
 
 
2.  There are no "special mitigating facts that justify 
less severe discipline" in this case.  Matter of Schoepfer, 426 
Mass. at 187.  See Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. at 156-157.  
Indeed, the hearing committee's findings concerning insincerity 
of the  respondent's assertions of remorse and acceptance of 
responsibility support weighing those facts in aggravation, 
rather than mitigation.  See Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 
448, 456-457, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 919 (1998) (lack of candor, 
remorse, or awareness of wrongdoing weighed in aggravation).  
See also Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 480 (2005).  Likewise, 
the board properly declined to weigh in mitigation the 
respondent's claims concerning the desirable results he obtained 
for his clients.  Even assuming that the results were to the 
clients' advantage, good work is to be expected of attorneys; it 
is not a factor ordinarily considered in mitigation.  The same 
is true of the absence of a prior record of discipline.  Matter 
of Alter, supra at 157. 
 
 
The respondent additionally argues that certain 
psychological conditions contributed to his misconduct and 
therefore should be weighed in mitigation.  See Matter of 
Schoepfer, 426 Mass. at 188 ("If a disability caused a lawyer's 
conduct, the discipline should be moderated, and, if that 
disability can be treated, special terms and considerations may 
be appropriate").  See also Matter of Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 562 
(2011); Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 191 (1998) (attorney's 
depression causally related to misconduct).  The hearing 
committee, however, declined to credit evidence supporting the 
requisite causal nexus between respondent's intentional 
misconduct and any psychological condition.  Not only did the 
credible evidence fail to establish that his psychological 
condition was a "substantial contributing cause" of the 
misconduct, Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. at 88, but it supports 
the hearing committee's observation that 
 
"various forms of the respondent's intentional misconduct -
- including his serial misuse of client funds, his 
misrepresentations to his clients, and his 
misrepresentations in response to bar counsel's 
inquiries -- were too calculated and deliberate for the 
5 
 
 
 
[psychological] disabilities . . . to have had a 
substantially contributing role.  That misconduct instead 
demonstrates a relatively clear and calculating respondent, 
aware of his misdeeds, attempting to disguise his 
wrongdoing." 
 
The hearing committee was entitled to reject the respondent's 
proffered justification of his intentional misconduct.  See 
Matter of Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2008) ("The special 
hearing officer's observation is well taken that 'methodical and 
systematic' misuse of funds for personal purposes is 
inconsistent with any conclusion that the respondent was 
operating under a cognitive disability").  It was the 
respondent's obligation to demonstrate a causal connection 
between the psychological issues and the charged misconduct, see 
Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 311 (1993), and there is no 
basis for disturbing the board's conclusion that he failed to do 
so. 
 
 
3.  In short, there are no factors in this record to be 
weighed in mitigation of sanction.  However, aggravating factors 
are present.  The respondent was admitted to the bar of the 
Commonwealth in 1992, and has substantial experience in the 
practice of law.  Further, he engaged in multiple ethical 
violations over an extended period.  Particularly when 
considered in the context of the hearing committee's findings 
concerning the respondent's lack of remorse and insincerity with 
regard to acceptance of responsibility, these factors are 
properly evaluated in aggravation of sanction.  See Matter of 
Haese, 468 Mass. at 1007; Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 327-328 
(1989). 
 
 
Conclusion.  Considering the respondent's multiple acts of 
misconduct and the facts found by the board in aggravation, the 
record of this case amply supports the single justice's 
conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment of disbarment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  affirmed. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
 
William P. Corbett, Jr., pro se.