Title: Reid v. Boyle
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990769
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2000

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,* Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, 
Koontz, and Kinser, JJ. 
 
A. WILLIAM REID AND  
RISING TIDE PRODUCTIONS, INC. 
 
v.  Record No. 990769 
 
JOHN J. BOYLE, ET AL. 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
JOHN J. BOYLE, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 990780 
 
A. WILLIAM REID 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge 
 
I. 
 
In these appeals of judgments entered by the chancellor, 
we consider, among other things:  whether the plaintiff 
established by clear and convincing evidence that he owned an 
interest in a leasehold; whether the plaintiff proved with 
reasonable certainty damages he incurred as a result of the 
defendants' breach of contract; and whether the plaintiff 
proved a cause of action under the Virginia Antitrust Act. 
II.  PROCEEDINGS 
 
Angas William Reid filed an amended bill of complaint 
against John J. Boyle, Cellar Door Venues, Inc. (Cellar Door 
                     
* Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
Venues), and Cellar Door Productions of Virginia, Inc. (Cellar 
Door Productions).  Reid asserted that he owned one-third of 
Cellar Door Venues' leasehold interest in an "[a]mphitheater 
project" in Virginia Beach.  He pled causes of action for 
breach of contract, "unjust enrichment," and fraud.  Reid also 
filed a motion for judgment against Cellar Door Productions.  
Reid alleged that Cellar Door Productions breached its 
employment contract with him. 
 
Rising Tide Productions, Inc., a Virginia corporation 
founded by Reid, and Reid filed a separate bill of complaint 
against Boyle, Kenneth A. MacDonald, Mike Tabor, The Boathouse 
Food Service Company, Cellar Door Productions, and Cellar Door 
Venues.  Reid and Rising Tide Productions alleged in this 
proceeding that these defendants violated the Virginia 
Antitrust Act, Code § 59.1-9.1, et seq.  The chancellor 
transferred the law action to the equity side of the court and 
consolidated the proceedings. 
 
At the conclusion of an ore tenus hearing, the chancellor 
held that Cellar Door Productions breached its contract with 
Reid and that it was indebted to Reid in the amount of 
$333,325.67.  The chancellor held that Reid owned a one-third 
interest in the net value of Cellar Door Venues' leasehold 
interest and that Reid's interest had a value of $3,566,343.  
The chancellor entered a judgment in favor of Reid for that 
 
2
amount against John J. Boyle and Cellar Door Venues, jointly 
and severally.  The chancellor held that Reid and Rising Tide 
Productions failed to prove that the defendants in the 
antitrust proceeding had violated the Virginia Antitrust Act, 
and he entered a judgment in favor of those defendants.  The 
defendants appeal the judgments adverse to them, and Reid and 
Rising Tide Productions appeal the judgment entered in the 
antitrust case. 
III.  FACTS 
A. 
 
When the chancellor hears evidence ore tenus, his decree 
is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict, and we are 
bound by the chancellor's findings of fact unless they are 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.  Prospect 
Development Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 80, 515 S.E.2d 291, 
294 (1999); Rash v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 251 Va. 281, 
283, 464 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1996).  Also, we will review the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
therefrom in the light most favorable to Reid in the two 
appeals of judgments in favor of Reid.  Bershader, 258 Va. at 
80, 515 S.E.2d at 294. 
B. 
 
Reid began to work for Cellar Door Productions in 1981 as 
a "talent middle agent."  He made arrangements for bands to 
 
3
perform at colleges, and he received a commission for his 
services.  In 1982, Reid was promoted to the position of 
president of Cellar Door Productions.  In that capacity, he 
continued to "[sell] talent" to colleges, and he "book[ed]" 
music concerts at facilities such as the Hampton Coliseum and 
the Norfolk Scope, as well as clubs.  He also managed Cellar 
Door Productions' office.  
 
Cellar Door Productions, acting through its sole 
shareholder, John J. Boyle, entered into an oral employment 
contract with Reid in 1983.  Boyle is the majority shareholder 
of numerous entertainment-related companies that form a 
"family of companies" described as the Cellar Door Companies.  
These corporations include Cellar Door Productions and Cellar 
Door Venues.  Boyle exercised virtually absolute control of 
these corporations and directed their offices and employees.  
Boyle conducted the financial affairs of these corporations 
with "an air of informality." 
 
Pursuant to the terms of the oral contract, Reid's 
compensation was calculated by determining Cellar Door 
Productions' annual revenue, deducting expenses and any 
advancements of income to Reid or Boyle, and "split[ting]" the 
profit "50/50" between Reid and Boyle. 
 
In December 1992, Reid signed a written employment 
contract with Cellar Door Productions.  In 1993, Reid signed a 
 
4
subsequent written employment contract with Cellar Door 
Productions.  Even though the 1993 contract contained a 
specific methodology by which Reid would be compensated, Reid 
and Cellar Door Productions ignored the prescribed method of 
compensation.  Reid testified that "[n]othing changed" 
regarding his method of compensation.  In response to the 
question: "[How] [w]ere you paid under [the] contract?", Reid 
stated:   
 
"You know what, I don't know if I was paid 
under a contract.  I know how I was paid. . . . A.J. 
Wasson [Boyle's chief financial officer] would come 
in at the end of the year.  We would take all the 
available cash that was in the account. All the 
expenses were taken out mutually between Jack Boyle 
and myself, and we split the difference.  And we 
split what was there.  So that was — it's not 
exactly how it was calculated in the contract.  If 
you read that contract, it says all kinds of tax 
stuff and deferred this and deferred that. . . .  I 
don't think anyone could explain the computation as 
it exists in that contract. 
 
"We split the profit 50/50, and we did it from 
'83 or '84, and it was done that way every year as 
it relates to Cellar Door Productions." 
 
 
Wasson initially testified that when determining Reid's 
compensation, Wasson adhered to the terms of the written 
contract.  However, during cross-examination, Wasson admitted 
that he had not taken into consideration the various tax 
adjustments contained in the written contract.  Finally, in 
response to the court's question, "[y]ou all had a very 
informal arrangement where they figured out available cash and 
 
5
they split it,"  Wasson responded, "That's right, except for 
the tax adjustment."  David H. Williams, the chief operating 
officer for all of the Cellar Door Companies, testified that 
Reid had a compensation agreement with Cellar Door 
Productions, and he received 50% of the profits generated by 
that corporation. 
 
In the early 1990s, Reid conceived the idea of the 
creation of an amphitheater located in the City of Virginia 
Beach.  The amphitheater would have a capacity of 20,000 
seats.  Reid believed that the amphitheater could attract 
major bands because it would be larger than existing concert 
facilities in Virginia.  Reid testified:  "Bands play where 
they can make the most money.  It's called venue driven.  The 
higher the capacity, the more tickets they can sell, the more 
money they can make, and hence, the more money a promoter 
[such as Cellar Door Productions] can make."  Reid, who had "a 
little bit of experience working on" the development of the 
Classic Amphitheater in Richmond, approached Boyle and said:  
"[W]e need to have an amphitheater here."  Boyle responded:  
"[A]s he said many times . . . Bill Reid, if you pull this 
off, you get half."  Reid did not, however, memorialize this 
agreement in writing. 
 
Reid undertook extensive efforts to develop an 
amphitheater in Virginia Beach.  He had meetings with Virginia 
 
6
Beach city officials, including City Council members.  The 
City retained a consulting company to advise the City about 
the feasibility of construction of an amphitheater.  During 
the ensuing three years, Reid served as president of Cellar 
Door Productions and also pursued the creation of an 
amphitheater in Virginia Beach.  Boyle continued to encourage 
Reid to pursue the development of an amphitheater, and Boyle 
told Reid:  "This is your future.  This is your future.  This 
is your kids' college education." 
 
Subsequently, the City decided to participate in the 
construction of an amphitheater and to invest its financial 
resources in the project.  The City of Virginia Beach 
Development Authority (also referred to as the City) 
ultimately executed an agreement with Cellar Door Venues, a 
Florida corporation which is primarily owned and exclusively 
controlled by Boyle.  Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, 
Cellar Door Venues acquired a leasehold interest in the GTE 
Virginia Beach Amphitheater and served as operator of the 
amphitheater. 
 
Initially, the City agreed to contribute $7,000,000 of 
the construction costs of the amphitheater, and Boyle, through 
companies that he controlled, agreed to contribute $5,000,000.  
After a site for the amphitheater was selected, the City 
learned that there were problems with the soil conditions and, 
 
7
therefore, the cost of construction would be higher than had 
been anticipated.  City officials scheduled a meeting that was 
attended by Reid, Boyle, and Richard Rosenbaum, who was 
described as "Boyle's personal attorney."  During the meeting, 
the City officials informed Boyle that the City expected him 
to increase his contribution to the project to help pay for 
the increased cost of construction associated with the soil 
conditions. 
 
After the meeting with the City officials, Boyle and Reid 
had a conversation in a car, and Rosenbaum was present.  Reid 
described the conversation as follows:  "I remember vividly, 
and I remember when it happened, we were [in the car] 
approaching the airport.  And [Boyle] said, Bill, my 
contribution's going to have to go up from 5 to $7 million.  
Because of that, I'm going to have to cut you down on your 
percentage from 50 percent to 33 percent."  Even though Reid 
was upset that Boyle had decided to decrease Reid's percentage 
of ownership in the project, Reid felt "that it was only fair 
that I take less . . . and [Boyle] take more."  Reid did not 
request that Boyle document this agreement in writing because 
Reid and Boyle had been involved in "other deals" in which 
Reid had an ownership interest that was not memorialized with 
written documentation. 
 
8
 
Cellar Door Productions contributed between $150,000 and 
$200,000 of its profits to fund the initial stages of the 
amphitheater project.  Approximately half of this money 
belonged to Reid as a result of the "50/50" compensation 
arrangement that he had with Cellar Door Productions.  When 
asked why he was not concerned that the money, half of which 
was his, was used to help finance the initial phases of the 
development of the amphitheater, Reid responded:  "Because I 
figured I owned it.  I owned a third.  What difference did it 
make?" 
 
The City required a letter of credit from Cellar Door 
Venues in the amount of $696,000 before the City would proceed 
with site preparation for the construction of the 
amphitheater.  The purpose of the letter of credit was to 
reimburse the City for certain costs it incurred in the event 
that the project was abandoned because of the poor soil 
conditions.  Reid, along with Boyle and his wife, Janet A. 
Boyle, signed the letter of credit as guarantors.  Reid also 
signed a separate guaranty in the amount of $696,000.  Reid 
testified that he signed the guaranty "[b]ecause it was clear 
in my mind and in Jack Boyle's mind that I was a one-third 
owner of the [a]mphitheater."  Reid stated that he would not 
have signed the guaranty had he not had an ownership interest 
in the project.  Reid testified that his house was used as 
 
9
collateral for the letter of credit.  In response to requests 
for admission, Cellar Door Productions admitted that "Reid's 
signing as a personal guarantor went above and beyond his job 
description as President of Cellar Door Productions."  
 
Reid and Boyle's relationship began to deteriorate in 
1997.  Reid and Boyle met for lunch in Virginia Beach, and 
Reid complained about problems that he was experiencing that 
he thought were detrimental to their mutual business 
interests.  During that meeting, Reid reminded Boyle that Reid 
was "a one-third partner with him."  Boyle responded that he 
had a poor memory and requested that Reid "[write] down all of 
the points" that they had discussed and "fax him back the 
points that [they] had discussed."  During the meeting, Boyle 
did not deny that Reid owned an ownership interest in the 
amphitheater project.  
 
Subsequently, Reid forwarded a memorandum to Boyle which 
described the subjects they discussed at the Virginia Beach 
luncheon.  Included among those subjects was Reid's assertion 
that he owned a one-third interest in the amphitheater 
project.  Even though Boyle subsequently discussed the other 
subjects that were contained in the memorandum with Reid, he 
did not discuss Reid's claim of ownership in the amphitheater 
project.  
 
10
 
Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Boyle's friend for over 35 years, 
testified on behalf of Reid.  Lyons and his wife attended a 
concert in July 1996 at the newly constructed Virginia Beach 
Amphitheater as guests of Boyle and his wife.  Lyons 
complimented Boyle for the excellent work and effort that Reid 
had undertaken in making the amphitheater a reality.  
According to Lyons, Boyle stated:  "Well, that's why he's my 
partner. . . . that's why he owns 35 percent in this — in the 
Amphitheater or this project."  After Lyons finished his 
testimony, the chancellor remarked on the record that Boyle 
stood up from his seat and "hugged" Lyons, even though Lyons 
had just provided testimony detrimental to Boyle. 
 
Reid had a conversation with Boyle in October 1997, and 
he requested that Boyle provide Reid with a written agreement 
documenting Reid's interest in the amphitheater project.  
Later, Boyle had a telephone conversation with Reid, and Boyle 
informed Reid "I got the agreement.  I wanted to give it to 
you, but it was too — the lawyers made it too complicated."  
Reid never saw the document.  In November 1997, Reid received 
a letter from Boyle.  Pursuant to the terms of the letter, 
Boyle essentially promised Reid that Boyle would give Reid 10% 
of the profit stream generated by the amphitheater and 10% of 
the proceeds from any sale of Cellar Door Venues.  Reid 
 
11
rejected the terms of the letter, which he described as a 
counteroffer.  
 
Boyle testified that he told Lyons that Reid was his 
partner, but he denied telling Lyons that Reid owned an 
interest in the amphitheater project.  Boyle stated that he 
only promised Reid that Boyle would "split" certain profits 
from the amphitheater project with him.  Furthermore, Boyle 
testified that none of the presidents who worked for him in 
his various corporations owned any interests in any 
corporations with him.  However, Reid testified that he was an 
equity owner in a corporation known as Abyss and that Boyle 
was also an owner of the corporation.  Reid did not receive 
any written documentation of his ownership interest in Abyss 
until he was fired from his position of president of Cellar 
Door Productions in December 1997.  Reid was also a 
shareholder in another corporation with Boyle called BWRM. 
 
Boyle often entered into business ventures with others 
without documenting the nature of the relationships in 
writing.  Boyle testified that his son, along with four other 
persons including Reid, are the owners of a corporation in 
Virginia Beach called Abyss.  Boyle gave the following 
testimony about the ownership of this corporation: 
"Q: Was there anything in writing setting forth 
what understandings there were about how the 
 
12
Abyss was going to get started and who was 
going to own what or do what? 
"A: You'd have to check with them. 
"Q: You don't recall?" 
"A: No. 
"Q: You don't worry about those details?" 
"A: No, I don't." 
 
 
Boyle also testified that he gave the ownership of a 
corporation called the Capital Ballroom to David Williams.  
When asked, "[d]id you put that in writing prior to it 
opening, that you were going to give [Williams] that 
ownership?", Boyle responded, "[n]o."  Even though Boyle was 
in the process of selling most of the corporations within the 
Cellar Door Companies to another corporation, SFX, for 
$106,000,000, he testified that he did not have a definitive 
agreement in place at the time of trial. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the chancellor made a 
specific finding that "Mr. Boyle just was not credible." 
IV.  THE OWNERSHIP CASE 
A. 
 
The defendants, Boyle, MacDonald, Tabor, The Boathouse 
Food Service Company, Cellar Door Productions, and Cellar Door 
Venues, argue that the chancellor erred in holding that Reid 
presented sufficient evidence to establish an enforceable 
contract.  The defendants assert that Reid's purported 
contract was vague and lacked specificity.  The defendants 
also contend that Reid failed to establish the parties to the 
 
13
contract and the type of ownership interest that had been 
promised to Reid.  We disagree with these defendants.  
 
We have stated the following contract principles which 
are equally pertinent here: 
 
"The law does not favor declaring contracts 
void for indefiniteness and uncertainty, and leans 
against a construction which has that tendency.  
While courts cannot make contracts for the parties, 
neither will they permit parties to be released from 
the obligations which they have assumed if this can 
be ascertained with reasonable certainty from 
language used, in the light of all the surrounding 
circumstances.  This is especially true where there 
has been partial performance.  McDaniel v. Daves, 
139 Va. 178, 190, 123 S.E. 663, 666 [1924]; Phillips 
Petroleum Company v. Buster, 241 F.2d 178 [10th Cir. 
1957], cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 . . . . 
 
"We have repeatedly said that in construing a 
contract, '[r]egard should be had to the intention 
of the parties, and such intention should be given 
effect.  To arrive at this intention, regard is to 
be had to the situation of the parties, the subject 
matter of the agreement, the object which the 
parties intended to accomplish.  A construction 
should be avoided if it can be done consistently 
with the tenor of the agreement, which would be 
unreasonable or unequal, and that construction which 
is most obviously just is to be favored as most in 
accordance with the presumed intention of the 
parties.'  Seward v. American Hardware Co., 161 Va. 
610, 625, 626, 171 S.E. 650, 659 [1933]; White v. 
Sayers, 101 Va. 821, 826, 45 S.E. 747, 749 [1903]." 
 
High Knob, Inc. v. Allen, 205 Va. 503, 507-08, 138 S.E.2d 49, 
53 (1964).  Accord W.J. Schafer Assoc. v. Cordant, Inc., 254 
Va. 514, 519-20, 493 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1997); Allen v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety, 222 Va. 361, 363-64, 281 S.E.2d 818, 819-20 
(1981). 
 
14
 
Applying these principles, we hold Reid presented 
evidence which would permit the chancellor to ascertain, with 
reasonable certainty, from the language that the parties used 
and in light of all the surrounding circumstances, that Reid 
entered into an oral contract with Boyle and Cellar Door 
Venues and that pursuant to the terms of this contract, Boyle 
and Cellar Door Venues promised to give Reid a one-third 
interest in the value of Cellar Door Venues' leasehold 
interest in the amphitheater.  Reid presented evidence of the 
following pertinent facts.  Boyle exerted absolute control of 
Cellar Door Venues which owned the leasehold interest, and 
Boyle conducted the corporation's financial affairs with an 
"air of informality."  Boyle promised Reid that he would own 
one-third of the amphitheater project if Reid could bring his 
concept of an amphitheater in Virginia Beach to fruition.  
Boyle repeatedly assured Reid that Reid owned a one-third 
interest in the amphitheater project.  As we have already 
stated, Boyle told Lyons, his friend for 35 years, that Reid 
owned an interest in the amphitheater project. 
 
Reid also partially performed this oral contract.  Reid 
permitted approximately $88,000 of compensation that he 
ultimately received from Cellar Door Productions to fund the 
initial operational costs for Cellar Door Venues.  
Significantly, Reid signed a letter of credit and a guaranty 
 
15
which the City required before it would proceed with the 
construction of the amphitheater.  Boyle and Cellar Door 
Venues admitted in their response to a request for admission 
that Reid's acts of signing the personal guaranty and letter 
of credit were "above and beyond" his job responsibilities as 
president of Cellar Door Productions. 
 
The chancellor was also certainly entitled to consider, 
as a surrounding circumstance, Boyle's history of giving 
employees, including Reid, ownership interests in corporations 
that Boyle controlled.  The chancellor also considered the 
fact that Cellar Door Venues' primary asset was its leasehold 
interest with the City, and Boyle's statement to Reid that 
Boyle had an agreement that would confer an ownership interest 
to Reid in the amphitheater project, but that "the lawyers 
[had] made it too complicated" and that Boyle intended to 
return it to the lawyers for simplification. 
B. 
 
The defendants observe that Reid had a written contract 
with Cellar Door Productions which contained the following 
provision:   
 
"Entire Agreement.  This Agreement constitutes 
the entire agreement between the parties hereto with 
respect to the subject matter hereof and, upon its 
effectiveness, shall supersede all prior agreements, 
understandings and arrangements, both oral and 
written, between the Executive and the Company (or 
any of its affiliates) with respect to such subject 
 
16
matter.  This Agreement may not be modified in any 
way unless by a written instrument signed by both 
the Company and the Executive." 
 
The defendants contend that even though Reid asserts that the 
oral contract for ownership of an interest in the amphitheater 
was a "new deal" between Boyle and Reid which was unrelated to 
the above-referenced provision in the employment agreement, 
"the alleged oral contract addresses precisely the subject 
matter addressed by the [e]mployment [a]greement."  
Continuing, the defendants say that the amphitheater project 
was a business opportunity of the Cellar Door Companies 
pursued locally by Reid as president of Cellar Door 
Productions, that at the time of the alleged oral contract 
Cellar Door Venues "did not yet exist, and any 'new' deal 
between Boyle and Reid necessarily required alteration of 
Reid's [e]mployment [a]greement with [Cellar Door] 
Productions."  Additionally, these defendants contend that the 
chancellor failed to articulate the burden of proof he applied 
in holding that Reid proved his oral contract claim.  We 
disagree with defendants. 
 
We have held that a contract in writing may be modified 
by a new oral contract.  In Zurich General Accident & 
Liability Ins. Co. v. Baum, 159 Va. 404, 409, 165 S.E. 518, 
519 (1932), we stated: 
 
17
 
"A contract in writing, but not required to be 
so by the statute of frauds, may be dissolved or 
varied by a new oral contract, which may or may not 
adopt as part of its terms some or all of the 
provisions of the original written contract. . . .  
Nor does it make any difference that the original 
written contract provided that it should not be 
substantially varied except by writing.  This 
stipulation itself may be rescinded by parol and any 
oral variation of the writing which may be agreed 
upon and which is supported by a sufficient 
consideration is by necessary implication a 
rescission to that extent." 
 
Additionally, modification of a contract must be shown by 
"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, direct or 
implied."  Stanley's Cafeteria, Inc. v. Abramson, 226 Va. 68, 
73, 306 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1983). 
 
We have also held that contracting parties, through a 
course of dealing, may evince a mutual intent to modify the 
terms of their contract.  The circumstances surrounding the 
conduct of the parties must be sufficient to support a finding 
of mutual intention that the modification be effective and 
such intention must be shown by clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing evidence, direct or implied.  Id.  
 
We hold that Reid established with clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence that he and the defendants orally 
modified the written contract, and that they also modified the 
contract by their course of dealing.  The facts contained in 
Part III.A. of this opinion, which we need not repeat, clearly 
demonstrate that Reid established by clear, unequivocal, and 
 
18
convincing evidence that Boyle, acting on behalf of himself 
and Cellar Door Venues, promised Reid that he would have a 
one-third interest in the amphitheater leasehold in return for 
Reid's efforts to bring the project to fruition. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence summarized in Part III.A. of 
this opinion clearly indicates that Reid and Cellar Door 
Productions modified the written contract by their course of 
dealing.  The parties simply ignored the terms of the written 
employment agreement.  For example, Cellar Door Productions 
never followed the terms of the written employment contract 
when determining the amount of compensation owed to Reid.  The 
written contract was misplaced and when the various lawsuits 
were filed, the litigants did not even know which written 
contract was the so-called operative contract. 
 
In Mullins v. Mingo Lime & Lumber Co., 176 Va. 44, 50, 10 
S.E.2d 492, 494 (1940), we stated that "an agreement for 
service must be certain and definite as to the nature and 
extent of service to be performed, the place where and the 
person to whom it is to be rendered, and the compensation to 
be paid, or it will not be enforced."  Here, the terms of the 
oral contract are certain and definite.  Reid was required to 
perform the necessary services to make the amphitheater a 
reality, and the services were to be performed for Boyle and 
the corporations that he controlled in the Cellar Door 
 
19
Companies.  The compensation that Reid was to receive was a 
one-third interest in the value of the amphitheater project, 
in this instance, the value of the leasehold that Cellar Door 
Venues acquired with the City. 
C. 
 
The defendants argue, "[h]ow was Reid to receive [an] 
'ownership interest' and what was it?  [Cellar Door] Venues is 
a stock corporation, yet . . . Boyle and Reid never discussed 
'stock' or 'equity.'  There is no evidence of an agreement by 
Boyle to convey 33% of Venues' shares to Reid, even though 
that was the only [a]mphitheater-related entity in which Boyle 
could have transferred ownership."  The defendants also 
contend that the circuit court "effectively treated Reid as if 
he were a shareholder of Venues who had a right to put his 
shares to the corporation upon his termination, at a price 
measured by the going concern value of the corporation." 
 
We find no merit in the defendants' contentions.  The 
chancellor did not award Reid shares of stock in Cellar Door 
Venues; nor did the chancellor treat "Reid as if he were a 
shareholder of [Cellar Door] Venues."  Additionally, the 
chancellor did not award Reid one-third of the value of Cellar 
Door Venues.  Rather, the chancellor merely enforced the terms 
of the contract that Boyle made with Reid.  The chancellor 
made a finding of fact that Boyle gave Reid a one-third 
 
20
interest in the leasehold, and the chancellor determined the 
value of Reid's leasehold interest.  We also observe that the 
defendants do not assert that Boyle lacked the legal authority 
to convey a corporate asset, in this instance a portion of the 
leasehold interest, to Reid. 
D. 
 
The chancellor, in his judgment order, dismissed Reid's 
claim of unjust enrichment as moot because the chancellor held 
that Reid established that he had an oral contract for a one-
third interest in the amphitheater lease with Boyle and Cellar 
Door Venues.  However, the chancellor at Reid's request held 
in the alternative that the evidence was sufficient to support 
a claim for unjust enrichment.  The defendants assert that the 
chancellor erroneously applied principles of equity.  We need 
not consider the court's alternative holding because Reid 
prevailed on his breach of an oral contract claim.  See Royer 
v. Board of County Supervisors, 176 Va. 268, 279-80, 10 S.E.2d 
876, 881 (1940); accord Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 477, 
429 S.E.2d 201, 207 (1993). 
E. 
 
The defendants contend that the chancellor "adopted a 
measure of damages . . . unsupported by the facts or by the 
testimony of the expert witnesses."  Reid's business valuation 
expert testified that Cellar Door Venues had a value of 
 
21
$20,289,791, and the defendants' expert witnesses testified 
that Cellar Door Venues had a value of $10,567,000.  Each of 
the expert witnesses described the methodologies he used to 
support his valuation.  The defendants contend that the 
chancellor's holding that the value of Cellar Door Venues' 
leasehold interest in the amphitheater was $16,000,000 
constitutes a compromise and is the "functional equivalent of 
a compromise jury verdict."  Reid asserts that the defendants 
may not raise this issue on appeal because they failed to make 
any objection in the circuit court to the methodology that the 
chancellor used in placing a value on the leasehold interest.  
Responding in their reply brief, the defendants state that the 
chancellor's purported error "is not an error that could have 
been addressed as an evidentiary objection, as it is a defect 
in the reasoning process by which the court . . . reached its 
result."  
 
We agree with Reid.  Rule 5:25 states in relevant part: 
 
"Error will not be sustained to any ruling of 
the trial court . . . unless the objection was 
stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the 
ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable 
this Court to attain the ends of justice." 
 
The chancellor's determination that the leasehold interest had 
a value of $16,000,000 is a ruling within the intendment of 
Rule 5:25.  The application of Rule 5:25 is not limited to 
evidentiary rulings.  Rather, Rule 5:25 "exists to protect the 
 
22
trial court from appeals based upon undisclosed grounds, to 
prevent the setting of traps on appeal, to enable the trial 
judge to rule intelligently, and to avoid unnecessary 
reversals and mistrials."  Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 
403, 414, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1028 (1989). 
F. 
 
Gregory F. Lawson, who qualified as an expert witness on 
the subject of business valuation, testified on behalf of Reid 
that the value of Cellar Door Venues' leasehold interest in 
the amphitheater was $20,045,000.  The defendants argue that 
the chancellor erred by admitting Lawson's testimony because 
they claim his testimony was speculative and lacked a "proper 
evidentiary foundation."  We disagree.  We have reviewed 
Lawson's testimony in its entirety, and we hold that the 
chancellor did not abuse its discretion by admitting in 
evidence the challenged testimony. 
V.  THE COMPENSATION CASE 
 
As we have already stated, Reid claimed that Cellar Door 
Productions breached its contract by failing to pay him 
compensation that he was entitled to receive for the 1997 
calendar year.  Reid testified that he was entitled to receive 
50% of all profits realized in each calendar year by Cellar 
Door Productions. 
 
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Willie J. Rountree, a certified public accountant who 
qualified as an expert witness, reviewed certain financial 
documents that had been produced by the defendants and 
information that Reid had provided to him.  Rountree described 
the compensation methodology as follows.  Cellar Door 
Productions "took the cash at the end of the year [and made] 
certain adjustments.  For instance, if there [were] additional 
receivables outstanding for cash that had not been received 
for [concerts] that had already been completed, they would add 
those as additions to cash.  If [there] were accounts payable 
outstanding for bills that had not been paid at the end of the 
year, they would show those as subtractions from cash 
available for the split, and they would also add back any 
advances that [Reid or Boyle] had received during the year to 
come up with a balance they called available cash.  And that 
would be split between the two of them." 
 
Rountree stated, during the defendants' cross-
examination, that information that he relied upon in making 
his calculations had been provided to him by Reid.  The 
defendants asked Rountree to assume that Reid had already 
received certain payments as compensation which Rountree had 
not used in his calculations.  The defendants further asked 
Rountree whether this assumption would affect the amount of 
compensation he believed Reid was entitled to receive from 
 
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Cellar Door Productions.  Rountree replied yes.  In response 
to the chancellor's question, whether, in Rountree's opinion, 
Cellar Door Productions owed Reid $334,665.21, Rountree 
replied in the affirmative.  Rountree also stated in response 
to that same question that even though the defendants' counsel 
raised interesting issues about Rountree's assumptions, 
Rountree had not seen sufficient documentation to opine 
whether the defendants' assumptions were correct. 
 
The defendants contend that the chancellor erred by 
relying upon Rountree's testimony because Rountree did not 
know whether the defendants' assumptions were correct.  
Additionally, the defendants contend that Rountree relied upon 
certain information that had been provided by Reid that 
Wasson, chief financial officer and director of business 
development for the Cellar Door Companies, disputed. 
 
We find no merit in the defendants' contentions.  We have 
reviewed Rountree's testimony in its entirety, along with his 
exhibits that include his calculations.  Rountree testified 
that his opinions and calculations were based upon the 
defendants' audited financial statements, financial documents 
produced during discovery, and information provided by Reid.  
We hold that this information is sufficient to support 
Rountree's opinions. 
VI.  THE ANTITRUST CASE 
 
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After Reid was terminated as president of Cellar Door 
Productions, he founded Rising Tide Productions, Inc., a 
Virginia corporation which is "a promoter of live music 
entertainment."  Reid serves as president of Rising Tide 
Productions. 
 
Reid and Rising Tide Productions contend that defendants 
Boyle, MacDonald, Tabor, The Boathouse Food Service Company, 
Cellar Door Productions, and Cellar Door Venues prevented Reid 
and Rising Tide Productions from booking concerts at "two 
publicly owned, unique, essential concert venues, the GTE 
Virginia Beach Amphitheater and The Boathouse."  The Boathouse 
"is a concert facility with a capacity of approximately 
2,460."  The City of Norfolk owns The Boathouse, which is 
leased by The Boathouse Food Service Company, a corporation 
which is "a part of the Cellar Door family of companies."  
MacDonald is president and general manager of Cellar Door 
Productions.  Tabor is the general manager of the Virginia 
Beach Amphitheater. 
 
Reid and Rising Tide Productions presented evidence that 
their attorneys forwarded a letter to the defendants' 
attorneys and inquired how Reid and Rising Tide Productions 
might rent the Virginia Beach Amphitheater and The Boathouse.  
Reid testified that when he attempted to rent the 
amphitheater, he was denied permission to do so.  
 
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Additionally, William B. Wells, a promoter, testified that an 
employee of the Cellar Door Companies tried to discourage 
Wells from transacting business with Reid and Rising Tide 
Productions.  The Cellar Door Companies employee warned Wells 
that he should not transact business with Reid. 
 
Michael Mitnick, a certified public accountant, testified 
that the ability to rent The Boathouse and the amphitheater is 
essential to a Virginia Beach concert promoter such as Reid.  
He opined that concert bands that perform in large outdoor 
amphitheaters are required to transact business with the 
defendants because they control all the large amphitheaters in 
Virginia and North Carolina. 
 
Reid and Rising Tide Productions sought injunctive relief 
against the defendants for their purported violations of the 
Virginia Antitrust Act.  The chancellor dismissed Reid's 
antitrust claims and entered a judgment on behalf of the 
defendants.  Reid asserts, among other things, that the 
chancellor erred in failing to grant the requested injunctive 
relief.  Responding, the defendants assert that Reid and 
Rising Tide Productions failed to prove that the defendants 
violated the Virginia Antitrust Act.  We agree with the 
defendants. 
 
Code § 59.1-9.2 of the Virginia Antitrust Act states: 
 
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"The purpose of this chapter is to promote the 
free market system in the economy of this 
Commonwealth by prohibiting restraints of trade and 
monopolistic practices that act or tend to act to 
decrease competition.  This chapter shall be 
construed in accordance with the legislative purpose 
to implement fully the Commonwealth's police power 
to regulate commerce." 
 
Code § 59.1-9.5 states:  "Every contract, combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce of this 
Commonwealth is unlawful."  Code § 59.1-9.6 states:  "Every 
conspiracy, combination, or attempt to monopolize, or 
monopolization of, trade or commerce of this Commonwealth is 
unlawful."  Code § 59.1-9.12(a) states: 
 
"Any person threatened with injury or damage to 
his business or property by reason of a violation of 
this chapter may institute an action or proceeding 
for injunctive relief when and under the same 
conditions and principles as injunctive relief is 
granted in other cases." 
 
 
The record is simply devoid of sufficient facts that 
would have permitted the chancellor to conclude that the 
defendants violated any of the aforementioned statutes.  Reid 
and Rising Tide Productions failed to prove the existence of 
any contract or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.  
Additionally, Reid and Rising Tide Productions failed to 
establish the existence of a conspiracy, combination, or 
attempt by the defendants to monopolize trade or commerce in 
this Commonwealth. 
VII. 
 
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For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgments 
entered by the chancellor. 
Record No. 990769 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 990780 — Affirmed. 
 
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