Title: Walker v. Superior Court
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S263588
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JEFFREY WALKER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF 
SAN FRANCISCO, 
Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S263588 
 
First Appellate District, Division Four 
A159563 
 
San Francisco City and County Superior Court 
2219428, 195198 
 
 
August 30, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
1 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S263588 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
The Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6600 et seq. (SVPA or the Act))1 allows the state to petition 
superior courts for the involuntary civil commitment of certain 
convicted sex offenders whose diagnosed mental disorders make 
them a significant danger to others and likely to reoffend after 
release from prison.  The purpose of the SVPA is to protect the 
public from a select group of criminal offenders (sexually violent 
predators, or SVPs), and to provide these offenders with the 
necessary treatment for their mental disorders.  (Hubbart v. 
Superior Ct. (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143–1144 (Hubbart).)  
Consistent with this goal, the Act relies on a number of 
procedural safeguards to ensure that only those offenders 
predisposed to criminal sexual violence can be committed, and 
only for as long as they need treatment.  Section 6602, 
subdivision (a) of the Act provides one such safeguard:  It 
requires the superior court to hold a “probable cause hearing” as 
an initial step in the judicial process for commitment.  (§ 6602, 
subd. (a).)  If the court determines that probable cause supports 
the state’s petition, it must then hold an offender over for trial.  
(Ibid.)  Otherwise, the court must dismiss the petition.  (Ibid.) 
What concerns us in this case is what kind of evidence the 
trial court may consider in making its initial SVPA probable 
 
1  
Further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Welfare and Institutions Code. 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
cause determination.  Specifically, we must resolve whether 
superior courts can admit certain hearsay evidence in 
psychological evaluation reports in finding probable cause to 
commit individuals under the SVPA.  Petitioner Jeffrey Walker 
challenges the Court of Appeal’s denial of his writ petition, 
arguing that the trial court admitted inadmissible hearsay in 
two evaluations in finding probable cause:  factual details 
underlying two rape offenses that he had been charged with, but 
not convicted of, and resulted in convictions that did not qualify 
as predicate offenses for commitment under the SVPA.  He 
contends that the trial court’s decision to admit this hearsay 
concerning nonpredicate offenses represented prejudicial error. 
We agree.  Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, 
section 6602, subdivision (a) does not create an exception that 
allows hearsay regarding nonpredicate offenses to be introduced 
via evaluation reports.  What we hold is that nothing in the 
statutory language, its legislative history, its place in the 
broader SVPA statutory scheme, or comparisons to other 
statutory provisions indicates the existence of a hearsay 
exception for such hearsay in expert evaluations.  Nor does 
anything in the SVPA or our case law indicate that the 
Legislature — in creating the hearing as a safeguard for SVP 
candidates to test the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
state’s petition and prevent meritless ones from proceeding to 
trial — must have created an exception for hearsay on 
nonpredicate offenses to be introduced via evaluations.  Under 
these circumstances, we decline to find that the Legislature 
explicitly or implicitly created a hearsay exception in section 
6602, subdivision (a), for this evidence. 
Because the inadmissible hearsay was foundational to the 
trial court’s probable cause determination, we must reverse and 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
remand to the Court of Appeal, with instructions for it to 
remand the matter to the trial court so it can conduct a new 
probable cause hearing consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
 
In June 2015, the District Attorney of the City and County 
of San Francisco filed a petition to commit Walker as an SVP.2  
At the time, Walker was nearing the end of a state prison term 
for a pandering conviction.  (Pen. Code, § 266i.) 
 
Two mental health evaluations supported the petition.  
Thomas MacSpeiden and Roger Karlsson, psychologists 
appointed by the Director of the State Department of State 
Hospitals (DSH), evaluated Walker shortly before the district 
attorney filed the petition.  MacSpeiden and Karlsson were 
appointed pursuant to section 6601, subdivision (e), after the 
first two appointed psychologists disagreed whether Walker 
satisfied the statutory criteria to be an SVP.  Both concluded 
that Walker satisfied the statutory criteria.  MacSpeiden 
diagnosed Walker with “Borderline Personality Disorder” and 
“Other Specified Paraphilia, Sexual Activity with Non-
consenting Persons”; Karlsson diagnosed him with “Antisocial 
Personality Disorder, augmented by a severe level of 
psychopathy.” 
 
In their evaluation reports, the psychologists discussed 
Walker’s 1990 conviction for rape, a predicate “ ‘[s]exually 
violent offense’ ” under the SVPA.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, 
 
2  
We grant Walker’s request that we take judicial notice of 
the SVPA petition, the docket and the People’s writ petition in 
People v. Superior Court (Couthren) (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1001 
(Couthren), and Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
forms.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (d), (h).)  
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
subd. (b).)  They also discussed the alleged facts regarding two 
charged sex crimes that did not result in convictions qualifying 
as sexually violent offenses.  First, Walker was charged in 1989 
with raping a 16-year-old victim.  The trial court dismissed the 
rape charge prior to trial, but it convicted Walker of unwanted 
sexual intercourse with a minor.  (Pen. Code, § 261.5.)  Second, 
Walker was charged with rape in 2005.  A jury acquitted Walker 
of this charge (apparently, during the trial, it was determined 
the victim had lied), but it convicted him of pandering.   
 
MacSpeiden and Karlsson obtained the details underlying 
the 1990 rape conviction from a September 1991 report from 
Walker’s probation officer.  The evaluations related the 
following details regarding the offense:  Walker unsuccessfully 
approached the victim at a nightclub.  He eventually pulled her 
onto the dance floor and danced with her, though she attempted 
to push him away when he tried to pull her closer.  He then 
pulled her to the club’s parking lot.  She believed she could get 
in her car to drive away.  When they arrived at her car, she 
pushed him away as he tried to pull her closer.  She reluctantly 
agreed to give him a ride to his house.  When they arrived at the 
location that he had directed them to, Walker reached across her 
and turned off the ignition.  She rejected his attempts to kiss her 
and attempted to fight him off, but he raped her. 
 
The psychologists obtained the details underlying the 
1989 rape allegation from the 1991 probation report, and they 
obtained the details underlying the 2005 rape allegation from a 
police inspector’s affidavit in support of an arrest warrant.  In 
his evaluation, MacSpeiden quoted the documents’ description 
of events, which in turn summarized and quoted the victims’ 
account of Walker’s conduct and statements leading up to, 
during, and after the alleged rapes.  Karlsson also quoted the 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
police affidavit, and he summarized the probation report’s 
description of events.   
 
In particular, the evaluations conveyed the following 
about the 1989 rape allegation:  Walker met the victim at a car 
show, and he told her he was a photographer for a company 
hiring models.  They met up five nights later, and Walker drove 
her to a park and took photographs of her.  He then asked her 
to change into a swimsuit she had brought along.  When she 
went into the bathroom to change clothes, Walker followed her, 
refused to leave, pushed her against the wall face first, groped 
her, and called her a “ ‘bitch.’ ”  While repeatedly pushing her 
face into the wall, he forcibly had sex with her; he then forced 
her onto the floor facedown and continued to rape her.  
Afterward, Walker drove the victim to her car, and he grabbed 
her and forcibly kissed her before she left. 
Regarding the 2005 rape allegation, the evaluations 
indicated that Walker introduced himself to the 2005 alleged 
rape victim as the employee of a local radio station that was 
looking for help promoting the station at clubs.  She readily 
conveyed her interest.  They met a few days later, after he 
contacted her and informed her that he had some promotions at 
a few San Francisco clubs.  He drove her up to San Francisco, 
and during the drive he instructed her on the procedures for 
working in a strip club and the prices to charge for certain sex 
acts.  The victim had never worked at a strip club or as a 
prostitute.  Once they arrived in San Francisco, Walker parked 
the car and told her he needed to show her “ ‘the game.’ ”  He 
went around to the passenger door, entered the car, and placed 
his hands between her legs.  The victim told him to stop and 
kept her legs closed, but Walker refused.  He attempted to take 
her underwear off, and he digitally penetrated her.  She 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
continued to tell Walker to stop and was very upset, but Walker 
persisted and eventually forcibly had sex with her.  He then took 
her to various strip clubs in an attempt to employ her.  The 
victim went along out of fear.  She turned over the money she 
made at the clubs to Walker.  When they returned to his car, he 
forced her to orally copulate him.  He then drove her home. 
 
In February and March 2016, the trial court held a 
probable cause hearing spanning five sessions.  At the hearing, 
the prosecution moved to admit the psychologists’ reports into 
evidence.  Walker objected, arguing that the reports contained 
inadmissible hearsay regarding the 1989 and 2005 rape 
allegations, and that their admission would violate due process 
because of the unreliability of the hearsay evidence.  He moved 
to exclude the reports entirely, or in the alternative to strike the 
portions of the reports containing inadmissible hearsay.  The 
trial court overruled Walker’s objections and admitted the 
reports into evidence.   
 
During the probable cause hearing, Walker’s attorney 
cross-examined the psychologists about their evaluations, 
including their reliance on the 1989 and 2005 rape allegations. 
 
MacSpeiden testified that the two rape allegations 
constituted key rationales for his evaluation, even though he 
knew neither resulted in a rape conviction.  According to 
MacSpeiden, the two allegations and Walker’s 1990 rape 
conviction all had “essentially the same” “modus operandi.”  
Because of this modus operandi, and because the rape 
allegations resulted in charges, he determined it was important 
to describe them in his report, and he believed in reaching his 
evaluation and continued to believe during his testimony that 
the allegations were true and the documents relaying them were 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
reliable and appropriate evidence for him to rely on.  He did 
contend that he would have still arrived at the same evaluation 
even without the rape allegations, because Walker had 11 sex 
offense charges between 1988 and 2007 — a pattern of illegal 
sexual conduct.  But he admitted that charges do not carry the 
same weight as convictions for purposes of his evaluation, and 
that he had none of the factual details underlying the charges 
besides the rape allegations. 
 
Karlsson also testified that his evaluation was informed 
by the 1989 and 2005 rape allegations.  He explained that he 
relied on the probation report and police affidavit relaying these 
allegations because the documents were from sworn officers, 
and he therefore had no reason to believe the records had untrue 
information.  But he indicated that he had not considered 
whether the 1989 allegation involved force, stating, “I would 
need to read my report and recalibrate my opinion of that.”  And 
he stated that had he not been able to factor either the 1989 or 
2005 rape allegation into his evaluation, his overall opinion 
could have been different. 
 
After cross-examining the psychologists, the defense 
called four witnesses at the probable cause hearing:  (1) the 2005 
victim’s ex-boyfriend, who testified that the victim admitted she 
had falsely accused Walker of rape; (2) Bruce Yanofsky, one of 
the initial psychologists to evaluate Walker, who testified that 
Walker did not qualify as an SVP; (3) the police officer 
investigating the 2005 rape allegation, who very briefly testified 
about producing the affidavit at issue; and (4) Walker, who 
testified that, as he had explained in his evaluation interviews, 
the 1989 and 2005 rape allegations were untrue. 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
 
Following the hearing, the trial court determined that 
probable cause existed to commit Walker as an SVP.   
 
Walker then repeatedly but unsuccessfully sought to 
dismiss the petition.  He first moved to dismiss the petition in 
September 2016, arguing that the psychological evaluations 
contained inadmissible hearsay in violation of our recent 
decision in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez).  
The trial court denied the motion.  In March 2017, Walker 
unsuccessfully moved to have the trial court reconsider the 
denial of his motion to dismiss.  Walker filed another motion to 
dismiss in October 2019, this time citing Bennett v. Superior 
Court (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 862 (Bennett), a decision holding 
that facts regarding two dismissed rape allegations against the 
defendant, relayed by psychologists in their SVPA evaluation 
reports and probable cause testimony, were inadmissible 
hearsay under Sanchez.  The trial court denied Walker’s motion.  
Walker filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of 
Appeal, but it summarily denied the petition.  In January 2020, 
Walker filed yet another motion to dismiss, citing Bennett as 
well as Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 1001, a decision that 
also applied Sanchez at an SVPA probable cause hearing to bar 
the admission of hearsay in psychological evaluations.  But the 
trial court again denied Walker’s motion to dismiss.   
 
Walker challenged the denial of his last motion to dismiss 
by filing another petition for writ of mandate in the Court of 
Appeal.  After issuing an order to show cause, the court denied 
Walker’s writ petition.  (Walker v. Superior Court (2020) 51 
Cal.App.5th 682, 686 (Walker).)  In reaching this holding, it 
disagreed with Bennett and Couthren:  It created a split of 
authority over whether the SVPA permits the trial court at an 
SVPA probable cause hearing to admit hearsay regarding 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
nonpredicate offenses contained in expert evaluations.  (Walker, 
at pp. 694, 701–702.)  We granted review to resolve the split. 
II. 
 
To determine whether trial courts conducting SVPA 
probable cause hearings may admit hearsay concerning 
nonpredicate offenses in evaluation reports, we must apply the 
SVPA’s general requirements, including those governing 
probable cause hearings; and the SVPA’s hearsay rules, as 
established by the statute and decisional law.  We examine these 
threads individually before proceeding to weave them together. 
A. 
 
The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil commitment 
of certain sex offenders before the end of their prison or parole 
revocation terms.  (§ 6601.)  “In describing the underlying 
purpose” of the SVPA, “the Legislature expressed concern over 
a select group of criminal offenders who are extremely 
dangerous as the result of mental impairment, and who are 
likely to continue committing acts of sexual violence even after 
they have been punished for such crimes.”  (Hubbart, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at pp. 1143–1144.)  “[T]o the extent such persons are 
currently incarcerated and readily identifiable,” the Legislature 
has indicated that “commitment under the SVPA is warranted 
immediately upon their release from prison.”  (Hubbart, at p. 
1144.)  The Act provides these individuals with “treatment for 
mental disorders from which they currently suffer and reduces 
the threat of harm otherwise posed to the public.”  (Hubbart, at 
p. 1144.)  SVPs are committed “for an indeterminate term to the 
custody of [DSH] for appropriate treatment and confinement in 
a secure facility.”  (§ 6604.) 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
 
In order to commit someone under the Act, the state must 
establish four conditions:  (1) the person has previously been 
convicted of at least one qualifying “sexually violent offense” 
listed in section 6600, subdivision (b) (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1)); (2) 
the person has “a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the 
person a danger to the health and safety of others” (ibid.); (3) 
the mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in 
future acts of sexually violent criminal behavior if released from 
custody (ibid.); and (4) those acts will be predatory in nature 
(Cooley v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 228, 243 (Cooley)).  
Civil commitment can commence only if, after a trial, the trier 
of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that each of these four 
requirements is met.  (Ibid., citing §§ 6600, 6601, 6603, 6604.) 
 
The trial represents the final step in the “complex 
administrative and judicial process” required to civilly commit 
an individual as an SVP.  (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 244.)  
The process leading up to a trial begins when the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation screens inmates at least six 
months before their release date (§ 6601, subd. (a)), and refers 
any potential SVP to DSH for a “full evaluation” (id., subd. (b)).  
DSH 
then 
designates 
two 
practicing 
psychologists 
or 
psychiatrists to evaluate the inmate in accordance with a 
“standardized 
assessment 
protocol,” 
which 
requires 
“assessment of diagnosable mental disorders, as well as various 
factors known to be associated with the risk of reoffense among 
sex offenders.”  (Id., subd. (c).)  If the two mental health 
professionals agree that the inmate qualifies as an SVP (or if 
only one reaches this conclusion and two subsequently 
appointed professionals concur), the DSH Director forwards a 
request for a commitment petition, along with copies of the 
evaluation reports and other supporting documents, to the 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
county in which the inmate was last convicted.  (Id., subds. (d)–
(f), (h).)  If the county’s designated counsel agrees, the petition 
for commitment is filed in superior court.  (Id., subd. (i).) 
 
The superior court must review the petition once it’s 
received to determine whether probable cause exists to commit 
the individual as an SVP.  As an interim step, the SVPA allows 
a potential SVP to request a review of the petition under section 
6601.5.  If the superior court determines from the face of the 
petition that probable cause exists, it shall order a probable 
cause hearing under section 6602.  (§ 6601.5.)  Regardless of 
whether alleged SVPs request a paper review of the petition 
under section 6601.5, they are entitled to a probable cause 
hearing under section 6602. 
 
They are entitled to specific procedures at the hearing, too.  
The trial court “shall review the petition and shall determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual 
named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent 
predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.”  (§ 6602, 
subd. (a).)  The alleged SVP is entitled to assistance of counsel 
at the hearing.  (Ibid.)  If the court determines that there is not 
probable cause, it must dismiss the petition; but if it determines 
that probable cause does exist, the court must order a trial to be 
conducted.  (Ibid.)    
 
Section 6602, subdivision (a) provides instructions — but 
only spare ones — for conducting the probable cause hearing.  It 
does not delineate the “specific procedural requirements” 
governing the presentation and admission of evidence at the 
probable cause hearing.  (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 
8.)  Following In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453 (Parker), 
lower courts have generally construed the subdivision as 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
requiring “something more than a facial review of the petition” 
(Parker, at p. 1464):  that is, that it allows for the admission of 
both oral and written evidence (id. at p. 1469; see People v. 
Hayes (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 34, 43 (Hayes)).  In a few cases, 
we have briefly noted the procedural requirements that Parker 
developed, without resolving whether section 6602, subdivision 
(a) mandates them.  (See, e.g., Cooley, at p. 248, fn. 8; People v. 
Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 899–900 (Cheek).) 
 
The parties must comply with the rules of evidence.  (Evid. 
Code, § 300 [“Except as otherwise provided by statute,” the Evid. 
Code applies in all actions other than those before a grand jury]; 
In re Kirk (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1071–1073 (Kirk).)  That 
the hearsay rule applies at SVPA probable cause proceedings is 
the crux of the issue we resolve in this case.   
  
A core premise of evidence law is that not all statements 
are created equal.  The hearsay label applies to an out-of-court 
statement offered to prove that its assertion is true.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1200, subd. (a).)  A familiar feature of the law of evidence, in 
California and beyond its borders, is that hearsay is generally 
inadmissible unless it falls under a specific exception that 
justifies its admission.  (Id., subd. (b).)  Documents like reports 
and records are generally hearsay if they are offered for their 
truth, and indeed, may contain further instances of hearsay, 
each of which is inadmissible unless also covered by an 
exception.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 674–675; see also 
Evid. Code, § 1201.) 
 
No one disputes that the evaluation reports at issue here 
are hearsay and contain hearsay.  As with many SVPA 
evaluation reports, and as the People concede, the MacSpeiden 
and Karlsson reports were offered for their truth.  The People 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
sought their admission as competent evidence of the experts’ 
opinions and the facts on which they relied.  (See Couthren, 
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010.)  The experts expressly drew 
upon secondary sources — most relevantly, a probation report 
and police affidavit — for their contents, including the truth of 
out-of-court statements like victim statements.  (See id. at pp. 
1010–1011.)  Each level of out-of-court statement, from the 
evaluation reports to the probation and police reports to the 
victim statements, ordinarily must fall under a hearsay 
exception to be admitted into evidence.  (Id. at p. 1011.) 
 
Trial courts have conducted many probable cause hearings 
since Parker was decided.  They’ve generally understood 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602, subdivision (a) as 
permitting the state to introduce into evidence the evaluation 
reports, despite their hearsay nature.  (See, e.g., Parker, supra, 
60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1469–1470; Hayes, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 43.)  Under the Parker procedure, which the trial court here 
followed, the state may present the reports as evidence — in 
support of or in lieu of the experts’ testimony on direct 
examination — subject to the alleged SVP’s right to cross-
examine the experts.  (Parker, at pp. 1469–1470; see also Kirk, 
supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1071–1073 [the evaluations must 
be properly certified under Evid. Code, §§ 1530–1531].)  The 
working assumption appears to be that the subdivision’s 
command to “review the petition” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602, 
subd. (a)) also allows for the review of “the facts on which the 
petition was filed, i.e., the underlying . . . experts’ evaluations” 
(Parker, at p. 1468).  This assumption does not strike us as an 
unreasonable inference to draw from the subdivision’s language.  
The subdivision directs courts to review the petition and 
determine “whether there is probable cause.”  (Welf. & Inst. 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
Code, § 6602, subd. (a).)  The separate command to determine 
probable cause contrasts with the language of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 6601.5, which simply directs courts to 
engage in a prehearing, facial review of the petition for its 
adequacy.  This contrast suggests that Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 6602, subdivision (a) does not limit the probable 
cause inquiry to consideration of the four corners of the petition, 
and instead also contemplates review of other evidence such as 
the evaluations that necessarily support the petition. 
 
Parker’s hearsay rule permits the admission of the 
evaluations.  Although the rule plausibly effectuates section 
6602’s sparse language, we need not definitively resolve its legal 
validity.  (Cf. Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 248, fn. 8 [noting 
Parker’s hearsay rule in passing].)  Walker does not challenge 
the admissibility of the reports; nor does he challenge the 
admissibility of hearsay in the reports writ large, including 
content otherwise admissible via hearsay exceptions outside the 
SVPA.  (See Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 695–696 
[similar].)3  The dispositive question here concerns a narrower 
question:  the admissibility of particular hearsay content in the 
 
3  
Though the parties agree that the Parker rule properly 
allows for the admission of the expert reports, they disagree on 
its second step:  the SVP’s right to cross-examine the report 
authors.  On the one hand, this step, like Parker’s first step, 
strikes us as a potentially reasonable extrapolation to make 
regarding the conduct of the probable cause hearing — 
particularly since (a) the hearing requires more than section 
6601.5’s “paper review,” and (b) cross-examination enables 
defendants to easily test the basis of the experts’ reports, 
regardless of whether the People have introduced this basis into 
evidence in the first instance via the reports.  But we need not 
decide this particular issue, since this case turns on the first-
order question of the admissibility of specific report content. 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
reports.  (Cf. Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 883 [the issue 
is not “whether the prosecution may present an expert’s 
conclusions at the probable cause hearing through the 
introduction of the expert’s report,” but instead experts relating 
particular inadmissible hearsay].)  More specifically, we must 
determine whether hearsay about nonpredicate offenses — 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay — may be admitted through 
expert reports under section 6602.  
 
When the appellate courts decided the cases that led us to 
grant review here, they understood their disagreement to be 
about the implications of Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 686 
(an expert may not testify to case-specific hearsay facts, about 
which the expert has no personal knowledge, “unless they are 
independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by 
a hearsay exception”).  (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 
694–695; Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1006, 1019–
1021; Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 878–880.)  Though 
the parties’ briefing emphasized Sanchez, we don’t need to 
further parse that case to decide this one.   
 
We can instead resolve this case as a straightforward 
question of statutory interpretation:  whether the SVPA or 
decisional law on the statute create a hearsay exception 
covering expert report content like what’s at issue here.  (Evid. 
Code, § 1200, subds. (a), (b); People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 
207 (Otto) [“ ‘[E]xceptions to the hearsay rule [in Evidence Code 
section 1200] . . . may . . . be found in other codes and decisional 
law’ ”]; Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.)  The parties agree 
that this case turns on whether either source creates a hearsay 
exception for content in an expert report concerning offenses 
that are not predicate offenses. 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
 
Bennett and Couthren answered this question in the 
negative.  But the Court of Appeal here disagreed.  It held that 
section 6602 and prior interpretations of the SVPA establish a 
hearsay exception that permits trial courts at probable cause 
hearings to broadly admit any hearsay in evaluations.  What we 
conclude from our analysis of the SVPA and cases interpreting 
the Act is that, as Bennett and Couthren reasoned and Walker 
argues, no hearsay exception allows for the wholesale admission 
of SVPA evaluations, with any hearsay that they may contain.  
More specifically, neither the Legislature nor our case law has 
created a hearsay exception allowing admission of hearsay 
accounts involving prior, nonpredicate allegations or convictions 
at SVPA probable cause hearings. 
For the reasons that follow, the Court of Appeal erred in 
determining otherwise. 
B. 
1. 
We interpret the SVPA de novo.  (Kirby v. Immoos Fire 
Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.)  As with any 
question of statutory construction, our core task here is to 
determine and give effect to the Legislature’s underlying 
purpose in enacting the SVPA and any particular provisions at 
issue.  (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community 
College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698; Calatayud v. State of 
California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1065; Goodman v. Lozano 
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.)  We first consider the words of 
the statute, as statutory language is generally the most reliable 
indicator of legislation’s intended purpose.  (In re H.W. (2019) 6 
Cal.5th 1068, 1073.)  We consider the ordinary meaning of the 
relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.  (Larkin 
v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157.)  If 
the relevant statutory language is ambiguous, we look to 
appropriate extrinsic sources, including the legislative history, 
for further insights.  (In re H.W., at p. 1073.)   
Nothing in the language of the SVPA indicates the 
Legislature created an explicit hearsay exception to allow 
hearsay in evaluation reports, regarding an SVP candidate’s 
prior nonqualifying offenses, to be admitted at a probable cause 
hearing.  In describing the requirements for the hearing, 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602, subdivision (a) 
states simply that the trial court “shall review the petition and 
shall determine whether there is probable cause,” and that the 
defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel.  We find in 
this limited language no indication that the Legislature created 
an express exception for evaluation reports that covers hearsay 
content regarding nonpredicate offenses.  (Couthren, supra, 41 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1012; cf. Kirk, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1071–1072 [SVPA is silent as to whether documentary evidence 
must comply with the certification requirements of Evid. Code, 
§§ 1530–1531, and therefore does not create an exception to 
these requirements].)  What the subdivision focuses on is the 
petition:  It directs the superior court to make its determination 
based on its review of the petition, with no mention of the 
experts, their psychological evaluation reports, or any 
documentary evidence those evaluations relied upon.  (See 
Couthren, at p. 1014.)   
Even assuming section 6602, subdivision (a)’s spare 
language allows consideration of experts’ opinions and 
conclusions contained in their reports (see ante, at p. 14), the 
Court of Appeal’s elaboration on this premise — that the 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
language creates a broad hearsay exception for all instances of 
hearsay contained in those reports, including facts regarding 
nonpredicate offenses — goes too far.   
The Court of Appeal’s reading of the subdivision relied on 
a chain of dubious inferences.  First, it determined that courts 
must consider the psychological evaluations because the SVPA 
requires the evaluation reports as the basis for the petition.  
(Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 686, 694–695.)  Based on 
this “necessary” role, the court inferred that the reports’ facts 
are “ ‘impliedly intended to be pleaded by averments or proper 
attachment to the petition’ ” and the reports “must be deemed 
incorporated into the petition” (id. at p. 695) — meaning “section 
6602’s directive for a trial court to ‘review the petition’ at a 
probable cause hearing necessarily requires the court to review 
the evaluations, as well” (Walker, at p. 696).  Second, it reasoned 
that trial courts may, as part of their review of the evaluations, 
consider hearsay contained therein.  (Id. at pp. 686, 688; see also 
id. at p. 696 [§ 6602, subd. (a)’s directive to review the petition 
includes review of the evaluations in their entirety, and even if 
the subdivision’s language is ambiguous, the SVPA’s “structure 
and purpose [citation] confirms that section 6602[, subdivision 
](a) excepts the evaluations and any information contained 
within them from the hearsay rule”].)  We’re not persuaded.   
To begin, the SVPA does not appear to require 
consideration of the evaluation reports.  It requires only that 
these reports be prepared as a predicate to filing an SVPA 
petition and then be made available to the county’s designated 
counsel, who then decides whether to file a petition and what to 
include in it.  (§ 6601, subds. (d), (h)(1), (i).)  Although the 
evaluations are often attached as exhibits to the petition (see 
Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1149; Walker, supra, 51 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
Cal.App.5th at p. 695; cf. People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 913 (Ghilotti) [in describing the process  
for how a party can challenge an expert evaluation for material 
legal error, we advised that the evaluations “should . . . be 
attached to the petition”]), the statutory provisions governing 
the evaluations do not dictate how the county’s counsel should 
present them to the court or even require the attorney to do so.  
The People may choose to establish the facts underlying the 
petition by other means.  In view of these considerations, which 
tend to suggest that the evaluation reports largely play a 
“discrete and preliminary” gatekeeping role in the SVPA 
commitment process (People v. Superior Court (Preciado) (2001) 
87 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130; see also In re Wright (2005) 128 
Cal.App.4th 663, 672), the Court of Appeal likely went too far in 
reasoning that the reports must be deemed incorporated into the 
petition 
and 
therefore 
considered — 
along 
with 
any 
hearsay tucked inside — in the trial court’s probable cause 
determination. 
Even if the petition does incorporate the underlying 
reports, that doesn’t mean that courts “review[ing] the petition” 
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602, subdivision 
(a) have carte blanche to admit and consider any hearsay the 
experts include.  (See Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 
1012.)  The logical extension of this argument:  Anything the 
experts put in their reports can come in too.  All of the other 
rules of evidence, like foundation (Evid. Code, § 402), relevance 
(id., § 350), or undue prejudice (id., § 352) wouldn’t apply 
either — essentially removing the trial court from any role in 
discerning what is admissible from inadmissible in the 
evaluations.  That cannot be correct.   
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
The legislative history also fails to buttress the Court of 
Appeal’s interpretation.  Legislators have left unchanged the 
relevant language in the subdivision since the first version of 
the SVPA bill.  (See Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465, 
citing Assem. Bill No. 888 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) § 3, as 
introduced Feb. 22, 1995; § 6602, subd. (a).)  The legislative 
history is silent on what procedural requirements govern the 
probable cause determination.  (Parker, at p. 1465 [the 
legislative history lends “little assistance”].)  Instead, it simply 
emphasizes that the probable cause hearing serves as one 
important safeguard for defendants’ liberty interests, including 
by preventing unfair or arbitrary involuntary confinements.  
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 888 
(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 17, 1995, p. 7.)  Nothing 
else from the legislative history has material bearing on the 
hearsay question before us. 
Nor have our prior interpretations determined that the 
Legislature, in enacting section 6602, explicitly or implicitly 
created a hearsay exception covering the evidence at issue here.  
Our case law has explained that subdivision (a)’s limited 
language, legislative history, and place in the broader structure 
of the SVPA all establish that the probable cause hearing 
functions much like a criminal preliminary hearing.  It serves to 
“ ‘ “ ‘weed out groundless or unsupported charges.’ ” ’ ”  (Cooley, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 247 [explaining this in the context of 
holding that a court must test the sufficiency of the evidence of 
all four elements required for commitment, and not just a single 
element]; see also id. at p. 252 [adopting the same burden of 
proof as in the criminal context].)  Nothing about this evidence-
screening function indicates that the Legislature necessarily 
meant for its limited instructions — “review the petition” and 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
“determine probable cause” (§ 6602, subd. (a)) — to create a 
hearsay exception covering facts about nonqualifying offenses 
contained in an evaluation report.   
This conclusion comes into sharper focus when we 
compare 
Welfare 
and 
Institutions 
Code 
section 
6602, 
subdivision (a) to rules governing an analogous context:  
probable cause hearings involving criminal charges.  The 
comparison is not a perfect one.  As the Court of Appeal and the 
People identify, the governing statutes for the two hearings 
appear different in a number of ways.  (Walker, supra, 51 
Cal.App.5th at p. 700 [unlike Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602, subd. 
(a), the statutes governing criminal preliminary hearings 
explicitly “contemplate that the prosecution will present its case 
by examining witnesses in the presence of the defendant” (citing 
Pen. Code, § 865)].)  But we can still compare the two hearings 
because of their similar evidence-screening functions, and 
because the Evidence Code similarly governs how this screening 
occurs for both hearings, absent specified exceptions.  (Evid. 
Code, § 300.)   
It’s telling that an explicit exception to the Evidence 
Code’s hearsay rule does exist for criminal preliminary 
hearings.  Proposition 115, adopted by the voters in 1990,  
amended Penal Code section 872, subdivision (b) to create a 
“limited” hearsay exception (Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 1063, 1074 (Whitman)), allowing “a properly qualified 
investigating officer to relate out-of-court statements by crime 
victims or witnesses” (id. at p. 1072).  As we explained in 
Whitman, the subdivision clearly contemplates that the 
testifying officer has sufficient experience, expertise (id. at pp. 
1073–1074 [at least five years in law enforcement or special 
training]), and “knowledge of the crime or the circumstances 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
under which the out-of-court statement was made so as to 
meaningfully assist the magistrate in assessing the reliability of 
the statement” (id. at p. 1072).  In view of this clear and carefully 
delineated hearsay exception in a relatively analogous context, 
we are not persuaded by the People’s interpretation.  The People 
ask us to read section 6602, subdivision (a)’s spare language as 
an indication that the Legislature created an even broader 
hearsay exception than what Proposition 115 created:  one that, 
in the absence of any apparent legislative determination of, or 
requirements for, their expertise or knowledge to do so, allows 
any psychologist to relate hearsay as true accounts of 
nonpredicate offenses from investigating officers’ reports, 
including any victim and witness statements to these officers.  
(Cf. Whitman, at pp. 1072, 1074 [declining to read the limited 
exception the voters enacted as embracing “ ‘reader’ ” testimony:  
“whereby a noninvestigating officer, lacking any personal 
knowledge of the matter, nonetheless . . . relate[s] not only what 
the investigating officer” described in his or her investigatory 
report, “but also what the other witnesses told the investigating 
officer”].)  
Other SVPA provisions reinforce our qualms about 
reading into section 6602, subdivision (a) an exception for 
hearsay about nonpredicate offenses contained in expert 
reports.  Section 6600, subdivision (a)(3) and section 6605, 
neither of which apply to the evidence in dispute here, both 
contain hearsay exceptions — in stark contrast to section 6602.   
Consider what section 6600, subdivision (a)(3) allows.  It 
permits the prosecution to show the existence of and details 
underlying the first element of the SVP determination — a 
predicate sex-offense conviction — “by documentary evidence, 
including, but not limited to, preliminary hearing transcripts, 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
trial transcripts, probation and sentencing reports, and 
evaluations by the [DSH].”  (Ibid.)  As originally enacted, the 
subdivision did not provide for the admission of documentary 
evidence.  But for understandable reasons, the Legislature 
amended it to relieve victims of the burden and trauma of 
testifying about the details of the predicate convictions.  (Otto, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 208; see also ibid. [Legislature acted in 
response to prosecutors’ complaints about having to “ ‘bring 
victims back to court to re-litigate proof of prior convictions’ ”]; 
Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1070, 1072 [comparable 
reasoning for Proposition 115 context].)  In light of its purpose, 
we have interpreted the provision as allowing the prosecution to 
prove the facts of a defendant’s prior qualifying convictions not 
just with certain documents (like evaluations) but also with 
multiple-level-hearsay statements contained therein (like police 
and probation reports, and victim and witness statements they 
include).  (Otto, at pp. 207–208.) 
But the Legislature carefully limited the scope of this 
hearsay exception to one category of proof:  establishing 
predicate convictions.  (See, e.g., Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 877; see Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 211 [hearsay under 
§ 6600, subd. (a)(3) is sufficiently reliable for this purpose, 
because “some portion, if not all, of the alleged conduct will have 
been already either admitted in a plea or found true by a trier 
of fact after trial”].)  Courts agree that section 6600, subdivision 
(a) does not broadly permit the wholesale admission of an 
evaluation report:  Any hearsay to prove the details of 
nonpredicate convictions, like Walker’s 1989 and 2005 offenses, 
would be inadmissible under the subdivision.  (See, e.g., 
Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012; Burroughs, supra, 
6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 410–411.)  As we commented in People v. 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 338, the subdivision shows that 
“the Legislature knows how to adopt special rules of evidence to 
govern commitment proceedings.”  It clearly has not elected to 
do so under section 6602 for hearsay evidence regarding 
nonpredicate offenses.  (Couthren, at pp. 1012–1013.)  And if 
section 6602 already permitted courts at probable cause 
hearings to broadly admit hearsay like this via evaluation 
reports, the need to amend section 6600, subdivision (a)(3) is, for 
the probable cause context, not immediately obvious, and 
potentially surplusage.  (Cf. Couthren, at p. 1015.)  
The Court of Appeal’s argument that section 6600, 
subdivision (a)(3) represents an inappropriate comparison point 
fails to persuade.  The court pointed to two apparent differences 
between the “function and purpose” of the hearsay exception in 
the subdivision and its counterpart in section 6602.  (Walker, 
supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 701.)  As it explained, section 6600, 
subdivision (a)(3) “functions as a hearsay exception that not only 
applies at SVP probable cause hearings, but also extends to SVP 
trials” and was intended to “ ‘relieve victims of the burden and 
trauma of testifying about the details of the crimes underlying 
the prior convictions.’ ”  (Walker, at p. 701.)  By contrast, the 
court reasoned, the section 6602 hearsay exception applies only 
at probable cause hearings, and it serves to allow the People to 
make an initial showing without putting on a mini trial.  
(Walker, at p. 701 [victims and witnesses may be spared from 
testifying at the hearing, but that does not represent the 
hearsay exception’s rationale].)  Despite these considerations, 
Couthren’s point still stands:  If section 6602, subdivision (a) 
already provided a broad hearsay exception for probable cause 
hearings, the Legislature could have aimed section 6600, 
subdivision (a)(3) specifically at the trial context, instead of 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
covering the probable cause context as well.  And in any event, 
it is notable that the Legislature has created a hearsay 
exception that permits “[t]he details underlying the commission 
of an offense that led to a prior [predicate] conviction” to be 
established through documentary evidence (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3)), 
but has not done the same for the details underlying the 
commission of nonpredicate offenses, despite the similar 
potential burden on victims who are called to testify. 
A reading of section 6605 in context also offers a telling 
comparison to section 6600, subdivision (a)(3).  That section 
provides that when a committed SVP defendant petitions for 
unconditional release, the court must order “a show cause 
hearing.”  (§ 6605, subd. (a)(1).)  In Cheek, we explained that 
section 6605 “resembles” section 6602 because the provisions 
use “parallel language” and both provide hearings that are 
pretrial in nature and afford a defendant the right to be present 
and represented by an attorney.  (Cheek, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
pp. 899–900.)  After Cheek, Proposition 83 amended section 6605 
to provide that “the court . . . can consider the petition and any 
accompanying documentation provided by the medical director, 
the prosecuting attorney, or the committed person” at the show 
cause hearing.  (§ 6605, subd. (b) [now subd. (a)(1)] as amended 
by Prop. 83, § 29, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 
2006); see § 6604.9, subd. (f).)  This amendment, like the section 
6600, subdivision (a)(3) amendment, shows it is possible to 
adopt special hearsay rules for SVPA proceedings, but that we 
have no comparable indication that such rules operate in 
probable cause hearings.  (Cf. Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1016, fn. 6.)     
That the Legislature can suspend evidence rules in 
analogous contexts — but chose not to do so in SVPA probable 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
cause hearings for hearsay concerning nonpredicate offenses — 
is reinforced by provisions in the Welfare and Institutions Code.  
Consider, for example, the Lanterman–Petris–Short Act (LPS 
Act; § 5000 et seq.), the general civil commitment statute 
governing the treatment of mentally ill persons in California.  
(Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008 (Susan 
T.).)  The LPS Act provides that an appointed hearing officer 
must conduct a “certification hearing” in order for the state to 
commit an individual beyond the initial 72-hour evaluation and 
treatment period (unless the detainee has already filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus).  (Susan T., at p. 1009.)  The 
certification hearing, similar to the section 6602 hearing, 
determines whether probable cause exists to detain individuals 
because they remain a danger to themselves or others.  (Susan 
T., at p. 1009; § 5256.4.)  But unlike the section 6602 hearing, 
the certification hearing “shall be conducted in an impartial and 
informal manner in order to encourage free and open discussion 
by participants. The person conducting the hearing shall not be 
bound by rules of procedure or evidence applicable in judicial 
proceedings.”  (§ 5256.4, subd. (b), italics added.)   
The People raise a variety of arguments that largely track 
the Court of Appeal’s reasoning (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 695–699) and fail to persuade.  They first argue that the 
subdivision establishes an implied hearsay exception — 
covering any hearsay in evaluation reports — by mandating 
that courts “review the petition” and thereafter assess probable 
cause.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602, subd. (a).)  This argument 
fails not only because it relies on the same dubious chain of 
inferences the Court of Appeal relied on, but also by comparison 
to the chief authority the People rely on, In re Malinda S. (1990) 
51 Cal.3d 368 (Malinda).  There, we interpreted Welfare and 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
Institutions Code section 281’s language directing juvenile 
courts to, in reaching a jurisdictional determination, “ ‘receive 
and consider’ ” social studies prepared by probation officers or 
social workers.  (Malinda, at p. 376, italics added by Malinda.)  
We concluded this language created an implied hearsay 
exception reaching multiple-level hearsay in the reports.  (Id. at 
pp. 376–379; see id. at p. 379 [“Because the reports must 
include, inter alia, a statement of the minor’s feelings and 
thoughts concerning the pending action (Civ. Code, § 233, subd. 
(b)), these reports necessarily contain hearsay and even multiple 
hearsay”].)  Section 6602, subdivision (a) lacks comparable 
language:  There’s no direction that the courts consider expert 
evaluations.  But even assuming the Legislature contemplated 
that courts would consider such evaluations, nothing in the 
SVPA definitively indicates that the subdivision permits courts 
to consider all of the multi-level hearsay contained in such 
reports, including hearsay concerning nonpredicate offenses. 
 
The People also contend that the Legislature specifically 
contemplated that the evaluations would contain hearsay like 
accounts 
regarding 
nonpredicate 
offenses, 
because 
the 
“standardized assessment protocol” in Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 6601, subdivision (c) requires consideration of a 
broad array of historical information in hearsay sources.  
Quoting the court below (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 
696–697), the People urge that the Legislature “ ‘clearly 
intended’ ” for evaluators to rely on these hearsay sources in 
their evaluations, “ ‘as the alternative would be to require’ ” 
evaluators to embark on the “ ‘near-impossible task’ ” of 
“ ‘reinvestigat[ing] a lifetime worth of historical information 
comprising the person’s “criminal and psychosexual history.” ’ ”   
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
But both strands of this argument fail.  The standardized 
protocol merely assures that the experts offer their professional 
medical judgments within the “specified legal framework” 
establishing statutory criteria for committing an individual as 
an SVP.  (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 910, italics added by 
Ghilotti.)  In no way does it allow or direct admission of hearsay 
in expert reports regarding the facts associated with offenses 
that didn’t lead to predicate convictions.  And the absence of a 
hearsay exception for such evidence at probable cause hearings 
does not necessarily impose a near-impossible burden on experts 
or the People.  First, the facts that certain offenses are alleged 
might be admissible for nonhearsay purposes.  Also, at least 
some of the hearsay documents identified by the People and 
Court of Appeal — e.g., probation reports, as well as court, 
prison, and medical records — may still come in without too 
much 
difficulty, 
provided 
they 
don’t 
include 
further 
inadmissible hearsay material.  (See, e.g., Evid. Code, §§ 1271 
[business records], 1280 [official records], 452.5, subd. (b)(1) 
[properly certified records of conviction].)  Moreover, nothing 
precludes the experts from, in forming their opinions, relying on 
inadmissible hearsay “that is of a type that reasonably may be 
relied upon by” those experts.  (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b); see 
Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 685.)4  And, of course, the 
Legislature can also enact reforms to address any further 
practical concerns. 
 
4  
Under these circumstances, the SVP might still challenge 
the basis of the experts’ evaluation, including by cross-
examination (under the Parker procedure).  (See People v. 
Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 838, fn. 16; but see ante, at pp. 
11–12, 14 [this case does not require us to review the Parker 
procedure].) 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
We’re also not persuaded that the experts’ role justifies 
admitting every single line in their reports.  The People contend 
that because the experts are “neutral” evaluators applying the 
standardized protocol, the evaluation reports have a degree of 
reliability and trustworthiness that supports an implied 
hearsay exception for their full admission, including any 
hearsay they contain regarding nonpredicate offenses.  As 
support, the People analogize to Malinda, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
pages 375–378, 385.  Setting aside the markedly different 
statutory language in that case (ante, at p. 27), Malinda also 
critically differs in terms of the nature of the hearsay evidence 
and expertise at issue.  There, we did agree with similar 
arguments that the Legislature implicitly created a hearsay 
exception, but we did so in part based on a judgment about the 
reliability of the hearsay evidence:  The relevant experts, social 
workers, would bring knowledge and expertise to bear in the use 
of the hearsay information in the social study reports they 
authored.  (Id. at p. 377.)  In particular, the social workers 
prepared the social studies on the basis of direct interviews with 
the minor and her parents (id. at pp. 373–374), and they related 
the contents of these interviews as part of their statutory role:  
as “ ‘a special arm of the court to investigate the status of the 
children and report’ ” back (id. at p. 377, fn. 8; see also id. at pp. 
377–379). 
Here, no similar justification exists for concluding the 
Legislature has implicitly allowed psychologists to relate, via 
their reports, hearsay accounts of nonpredicate criminal 
offenses.  Yes, these experts offer diagnoses that fall within a 
properly qualified mental health professional’s expertise, and in 
doing so they often do draw insight from a comprehensive array 
of sources.  (Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1010–1011.)  
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
But these circumstances surrounding the validity of the experts’ 
medical diagnoses, and the experts’ apparent objectivity and 
neutrality, are beside the point.  Nothing about these 
circumstances 
indicates 
the 
Legislature 
has 
impliedly 
determined the experts have relevant expertise to be able to 
relate the reliability either of (a) hearsay accounts in law 
enforcement documents like police or probation reports, which 
may have been prepared years or even decades ago, or (b) 
further levels of hearsay, like victim statements, contained 
therein.  (Malinda, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 377; see Couthren, at 
p. 1018, fn. 7; Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 884, fn. 6; cf. 
Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1072–1074.)   
To begin with, this evidence presents some inherent 
reliability concerns.  As the People admit, “the reliability of 
victim hearsay statements in [police and probation reports] is 
lessened where, as here, the defendant has not been convicted 
of the crimes to which the statements relate.”  (Cf. Otto, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 211.)  And, more importantly, we have no 
particular reason to believe it would be consistent with the 
legislative design to conclude the mental health evaluators 
bring any professional judgment to bear in assessing the 
veracity of these hearsay statements — as the facts of this case 
underscore.  As we’d expect for any psychological expert, it 
doesn’t appear that either MacSpeiden or Karlsson had any 
meaningful basis to assess the reliability of the two dismissed 
rape allegations in the probation and police reports, including 
what the alleged victims told investigating officers.  The experts 
readily admitted that they simply assumed these documents 
had accurate information, and they presented the information 
as accurate in their reports.  Given the reliability concerns, we 
think it implausible that it was within the ambit of the 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
legislative purpose to allow the admission of this information as 
evidence merely because experts chose to include it in their 
evaluation reports. 
 
Finally, the People’s analogy to Conservatorship of 
Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645 fails, too.  Manton addressed an 
LPS Act provision relating to conservatorship proceedings for 
gravely disabled persons.  That provision, section 5354, 
subdivision (a), directs a county officer to investigate 
alternatives to conservatorship and render a written report to 
the court prior to the initial conservatorship hearing; and it 
provides that the court “may receive the report into evidence” at 
the hearing “and may read and consider the contents thereof in 
rendering its judgment.”  We held that this section does not 
permit the subsequent use of the report at trial, explaining in 
part:  “If the report were admissible at both the initial hearing 
and a subsequent court trial, the two proceedings would be 
essentially identical in terms of the acceptable range of evidence 
to be considered.  We believe that the better interpretation is 
one avoiding such redundancy in the absence of clear legislative 
intent to the contrary.”  (Manton, at p. 651.)  The People focus 
on this reasoning, arguing that, as in Manton, the language and 
structure of the SVPA indicate that it does not require 
duplicative evidence at the probable cause hearing and trial.   
Neither the language nor the structure of the SVPA 
compels us to apply Manton’s reasoning here.  In contrast to 
section 5354 of the LPS Act, Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 6602 does not mention the reports.  Without legislative 
guidance to the contrary, the same evidentiary rules, i.e., the 
Evidence Code, govern the probable cause hearing and trial — 
which therefore expectedly leads to the potential for some 
duplicative evidence at the proceedings.  The same holds true 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
for criminal preliminary hearings, for example.  (See LaFave et 
al., 4 Criminal Procedure (4th ed. 2015) § 14.3(a), p. 365, fn. 35 
(LaFave) [California’s criminal preliminary hearing is relatively 
akin to a “mini-trial hearing,” even in the wake of Prop. 115, in 
that its rules potentially increase the rigor of its screening 
function by generally limiting the prosecution to the use of 
evidence that would be admissible at trial]; but cf. LaFave, § 
14.4(b) at p. 383 [unlike California, “perhaps a majority” of 
jurisdictions “start from the premise that the rules of evidence,” 
including hearsay rules, do not apply to the preliminary 
hearing, and they entrust magistrates to take appropriate 
account of the reliability and weaknesses of such evidence].)   
The Legislature can, of course, create a hearsay exception 
that prevents any duplication of evidence.  (Cf. Parker, supra, 
60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1469 [noting that the Legislature can “fill 
the procedural gap in section 6602”].)  It can choose to permit 
hearsay involving prior nonpredicate crimes to come in through 
evaluation reports.  Nothing in our analysis should be 
understood as taking a position on whether such an exception 
ought to exist.  That is a distinct question from what we must 
resolve:  whether a hearsay exception does, in fact, exist in 
section 6602.  The Court of Appeal blurred the distinction 
between the two inquiries.  It concluded that a hearsay 
exception supports the practical role of the probable cause 
hearing, and then reasoned backward, without any statutory 
basis, to conclude that such an exception must therefore be 
implied.  If we embraced this reasoning, we’d risk imposing an 
arrangement that essentially requires consideration of hearsay 
statements in the reports — a result unmoored from the SVPA’s 
language, its legislative history, and other indicia of statutory 
purpose.   
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
True:  Allowing experts to relate hearsay accounts of 
nonpredicate offenses would “streamline the People’s ability to 
make [its] initial showing without having to duplicate” trial 
evidence and track down victims and witnesses.  (Walker, supra, 
51 Cal.App.5th at p. 701; see conc. opn., post, at p. 4.)  But 
Walker raises countervailing considerations:  defendants’ 
interest in especially rigorous evidence testing to bar any 
potentially unreliable hearsay from being used to prop up a 
weak petition.  (See Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 
1014, 1020.)  Reasonable minds can certainly disagree on 
whether hearsay like this, which would be inadmissible at the 
eventual SVP trial, should come in at a preliminary hearing.  
(Cf. LaFave, supra, § 14.4(b) at pp. 387–389.)  But setting aside 
these policy judgments, the Legislature’s decision to not carve 
out an exception for the evidence in dispute in this case — 
hearsay accounts of nonpredicate offenses introduced via expert 
reports — reasonably aligns with the hearing’s evidence-testing 
function, as the Legislature has presently designed it and our 
prior cases have interpreted it.     
2. 
 
We separately address one argument the Court of Appeal 
presented, and to which the People briefly allude.  The Court of 
Appeal argued that two prior decisions have, consistent with 
section 6602, already recognized a hearsay exception covering 
the hearsay report content at issue:  Parker, supra, 60 
Cal.App.4th at pages 1469–1470, and Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th 
at page 245, footnote 8.  (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 
691–694, 699–700.)  Although exceptions to the hearsay rule 
may be found in decisional law (Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 
207), courts rarely exercise their power to create these 
exceptions, and for good reason (see In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
34 
Cal.4th 15, 27; see also ibid. [“The general rule that hearsay 
evidence is inadmissible because it is inherently unreliable is of 
venerable common law pedigree”]).  Courts exercise this power 
only “for classes of evidence for which there is a substantial 
need, and which possess an intrinsic reliability that enable them 
to surmount constitutional and other objections that generally 
apply to hearsay evidence.”  (Id. at p. 28.)  But nothing in Parker 
or Cooley can be applied to this case and taken to mean that 
hearsay accounts of nonpredicate offenses, relayed by expert 
evaluations, meet these stringent requirements (see ante, at pp. 
17–19, 29–31), or that the cases even sought to recognize a 
relevant hearsay exception.   
Parker addressed, as a matter of first impression, “the 
nature” of the probable cause hearing under section 6602.  
(Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455; see id. at pp. 1461–
1462.)  It determined from its statutory analysis that section 
6602 affords defendants “a hearing at which [they] could be 
heard, not merely by counsel pointing out legal deficiencies on 
the face of the petition, but also by being able to effectively 
challenge the facts on which the petition was filed, i.e., the 
underlying attached experts’ evaluations.”  (Parker, at p. 1468.)  
The court explained that the probable cause hearing 
consequently should allow for the admission of oral and written 
evidence.  (Id. at p. 1469.)  It then made the following passing 
reference to hearsay:  “While we believe the prosecutor may 
present the opinions of the experts through the hearsay reports 
of such persons, the prospective SVP should have the ability to 
challenge the accuracy of such reports by calling such experts 
for cross-examination.”  (Id. at pp. 1469–1470.) 
Then in Cooley, where we addressed “the scope and 
substance of the probable cause determination” under section 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
35 
6602 (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 235), we remarked on 
Parker’s hearsay reference in passing.  Citing Parker, supra, 60 
Cal.App.4th at pages 1469–1470, as part of a footnote in our 
general overview of the SVPA, we stated:  “Although the 
petitioner is allowed, despite their hearsay nature, to present 
the contents of any reports that form the basis of the petition as 
evidence, the alleged sexual predator is allowed to cross-
examine the expert concerning the evaluation and can call the 
expert to the stand for that purpose.”  (Cooley, at p. 245, fn. 8.) 
 
The Court of Appeal seized on the two cases’ brief 
references to hearsay, urging that the “Parker/Cooley rule” 
allows evaluation reports to be fully admitted at a probable 
cause hearing, despite their hearsay contents.  (Walker, supra, 
51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 693, 700.)  But neither Parker nor Cooley 
establish a judicially created exception that would cover hearsay 
content regarding nonpredicate offenses. 
Parker turned on whether due process requires something 
more than a facial review of the petition under section 6602.  In 
answering this question, it briefly observed that prosecutors 
should be allowed to present the opinions of the experts through 
their hearsay reports.  Its focus, though, was not on the 
admission of the reports’ hearsay contents, but instead on 
fleshing out what due process requires at the hearing to allow 
defendants a meaningful opportunity to challenge the basis of 
the petition.  Parker therefore “contains no discussion regarding 
the competency of the multiple hearsay necessarily contained 
within . . . expert evaluations.”  (Couthren, supra, 41 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1017.) 
Although Cooley did cite to Parker’s statement on the 
admission of hearsay reports, it did so in a single dictum 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
36 
footnote.  Moreover, Cooley addressed the subject “in the context 
of describing matters which were not disputed by the parties 
and therefore not analyzed by the court.”  (Couthren, supra, 41 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1017.)  As in Parker, Cooley provided no 
analysis supporting the admission of the reports or their 
hearsay contents as competent evidence, or concerning the 
application of the Evidence Code to SVPA probable cause 
hearings more generally.  Consistent with the opinion as a 
whole, its focus in the footnote was generally laying out the 
procedural requirements that protect defendants at SVPA 
hearings.  
C. 
 
The admission of the contested hearsay in the MacSpeiden 
and Karlsson evaluation reports represented prejudicial error 
under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836 (for a statutory error, we must determine 
whether it is reasonably probable the result would have been 
more favorable to appellant absent the error).  As described in 
Cooley, “a determination of probable cause by a superior court 
judge under the SVPA entails a decision whether a reasonable 
person could entertain a strong suspicion that the offender is an 
SVP.”  (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 252, italics added by 
Cooley.)  We believe it is reasonably probable that, absent the 
erroneously admitted hearsay, the trial judge would not have 
entertained a strong suspicion that Walker qualified as an SVP. 
 
On the one hand, some of the properly admitted evidence 
supports the existence of probable cause.  Walker’s qualifying 
offense was a forcible rape of a stranger.  MacSpeiden and 
Karlsson diagnosed him with particular mental disorders 
predisposing him to commit sex offenses — with MacSpeiden 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
37 
diagnosing him with “Other Specified Paraphilia, Sexual 
Activity with Non-consenting Persons” and “Borderline 
Personality Disorder,” and Karlsson concluding he had 
“Antisocial Personality Disorder, augmented by a severe level of 
psychopathy.”  And both experts scored him as having a high 
risk of sexual reoffense under various diagnostic tools. 
 
On the other hand, some of the properly admitted evidence 
cut against the existence of probable cause.  Yanofsky, one of the 
initial psychologists appointed by DSH to evaluate Walker, 
concluded that Walker did not qualify as an SVP.  In his 
evaluation report, which the trial court admitted into evidence, 
he diagnosed Walker as suffering from “Other Specified 
Personality Disorder (Mixed Features),” i.e., antisocial and 
narcissistic personality traits.  Yanofsky determined these traits 
did not affect Walker’s “emotional and volitional capacity to 
such a degree” that it predisposed him to commit criminal 
sexual acts that would endanger the health and safety of others.  
He ruled out paraphilia as a differential diagnosis, explaining 
that Walker’s criminal sexual history, although reflecting a 
“sexual preoccupation,” did not necessarily appear driven by 
“deviance” or “to be a sustained pattern” of inappropriate 
conduct.  Although he did score Walker as having a moderate-
to-high risk of sexual reoffense under various diagnostic tools, 
he determined the absence of a predisposing mental health 
condition was dispositive.  His testimony at the probable cause 
hearing aligned with the conclusions in his report. 
Nothing in the record tells us exactly how the trial court 
settled on its probable cause determination by weighing the 
competing evidence.  But the nature and role of the inadmissible 
hearsay make it likely that this evidence prejudicially affected 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
38 
the trial court’s determination.  (See Bennett, supra, 39 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 884–885.) 
First, the lurid hearsay details regarding the 1989 and 
2005 rape allegations depicted Walker as an individual with a 
strong propensity and modus operandi for violent sex offenses.  
(See ante, at pp. 5–6.)  In particular, they portrayed him as 
someone who preyed on women by falsely promising them 
entertainment and promotion employment; coerced and lured 
them to isolated locations; suddenly groped them; and ignored 
their pleas to stop and raped them.  The resulting impression 
enhanced the experts’ credibility and materially supported their 
conclusions that Walker’s mental health predisposed him to 
sexual criminal acts and made it likely he would reoffend with 
predatory behavior.  (Cf. Burroughs, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 
412.)  We cannot discount the possibility that the nature of the 
rape allegation evidence impermissibly factored into the trial 
court’s probable cause determination.  Similarly, even though 
Walker could (and did) cross-examine the experts regarding 
particular deficiencies of the rape allegation evidence, that did 
not adequately protect against the error here:  the full admission 
of the reports, and the chance that the trial court would rely on 
this substantive evidence in its probable cause analysis. 
Moreover, as in Bennett, the inadmissible hearsay that the 
court admitted critically supported the evaluation reports’ 
conclusions.  (Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 884–885.)  
Had that content been excluded, the state’s case would have 
been materially weakened. 
MacSpeiden emphasized the hearsay in his report.  He 
indicated in the diagnosis section of his report — which 
contained the hearsay accounts of the 1989 and 2005 rape 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
39 
allegations — that Walker’s “history amply demonstrates that 
he is sexually disordered with recurrent, intense sexually 
arousing fantasies and urges which he is unable to exclude from 
overt sexual behavior with non-consenting persons.”  According 
to MacSpeiden, this “history” included a long track record of 
illegal sexual behavior, as shown in Walker’s numerous arrests 
and charges between 1988 and 2007.  But the facts and 
circumstances underlying the two alleged rapes were the only 
two offenses in this track record, outside of Walker’s predicate 
conviction, that MacSpeiden had any real details to support his 
diagnosis.  Moreover, as part of the diagnostic scoring to 
determine Walker’s risk of reoffense, MacSpeiden discussed how 
the 1989 and 2005 prior rape allegations helped show Walker 
was “inclined to engage in sexually violent predatory behavior 
directed toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance . . . 
or an individual with whom a relationship has been established 
or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.”   
MacSpeiden’s cross-examination testimony aligned with 
his report.  He testified that the 1989 and 2005 rape allegations, 
which he assumed were true, constituted a central part of his 
evaluation.  He explained that the allegations, along with 
Walker’s predicate offense, showed Walker had a modus 
operandi of telling the victims “ ‘I’m going to make you an 
important person,’ ” suddenly attacking them, and degrading 
them and acting with anger toward them.  And relatedly, at 
several points MacSpeiden invoked the allegations as part of a 
“where there is smoke there is fire” type of logic for why he 
believed Walker qualified as an SVP. 
Karlsson similarly indicated in his report that the hearsay 
details regarding the 1989 and 2005 rape allegations shaped his 
evaluation.  He described these allegations as two of the three 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
40 
rapes Walker committed, the other being the rape underlying 
Walker’s predicate conviction.  In diagnosing Walker with 
“Antisocial Personality Disorder,” Karlsson explained that the 
most prominent feature of these sex offenses was “a pattern of 
pandering/pimping, involving introducing women to the world 
of prostitution and strip teasing by acting as an adult 
entertainment promoter,” and the use of “manipulation and 
coercion to make . . . victims compliant” — all things clearly 
drawing on the hearsay accounts of the dismissed rape 
allegations.  On cross-examination, he confirmed that the 1989 
and 2005 rape allegations informed his report, and without 
these allegations his opinion could have been different. 
In other words, without the inadmissible hearsay, the trial 
court would have lacked critical evidence to establish the 
diagnosis and reoffense elements of the SVP determination.  
(Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 885; cf. People v. Yates 
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474, 487.)  For that reason, and because 
of the inflammatory nature of the hearsay evidence, its 
admission prejudiced Walker.5 
III. 
When the Legislature enacted the SVPA, it provided 
safeguards to ensure that only a select group of dangerous sex 
offenders may be involuntarily committed — safeguards 
reflecting the Legislature’s judgment with regard to balancing 
 
5  
We decline to reach the second issue briefed by the parties: 
whether defendants in SVPA proceedings have a due process 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses presenting 
contested hearsay evidence.  Based on our state law holding, we 
need not further consider what due process requires.  (People v. 
Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667.)   
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
41 
risks to community safety and the liberty interests of 
individuals facing the prospect of long-term confinement.  The 
probable cause hearing serves as a critical safeguard in this 
scheme.  The provision governing the probable cause hearing, 
section 6602, subdivision (a), provides for an adversarial 
hearing and clearly establishes that the superior court must 
review the petition to determine whether the state has met its 
evidentiary burden to proceed to trial.  What it does not provide, 
however, is a hearsay exception allowing the prosecution to 
introduce hearsay regarding nonpredicate offenses via expert 
evaluations.  Nothing in the language of the subdivision, its 
legislative history, its place in the broader SVPA statutory 
scheme and relationship with other provisions, or comparisons 
to other analogous Welfare and Institution Code provisions 
indicates the existence of a hearsay exception for such hearsay 
in expert evaluations.  The introduction of this hearsay 
prejudicially affected Walker’s ability to challenge the basis of 
the state’s petition and the sufficiency of the evidence to proceed 
to trial. 
We reverse and remand with instruction to the Court of 
Appeal to, in turn, remand the matter to the superior court for 
a new probable cause hearing consistent with this opinion. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J.
1 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S263588 
 
Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 
 
I concur in Justice Cuéllar’s majority opinion, which holds 
that the lack of an express hearsay exception in the statute 
governing sexually violent predator (SVP) probable cause 
hearings precludes the admission of hearsay regarding 
nonpredicate crimes contained in expert evaluation reports.  
I am concerned, however, that our ruling will complicate, if not 
frustrate, the intended screening function of SVP probable cause 
hearings, and I write separately to urge the Legislature to 
provide additional guidance addressing the proper conduct of 
such hearings. 
A hearsay exception is not the only provision missing from 
Welfare & Institutions Code section 6602 (section 6602), the 
statute governing SVP probable cause hearings under the 
Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 
et seq.).  The majority is generous in characterizing the guidance 
provided by that statute regarding the conduct of such hearings 
as “spare.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11, 17, 22.)  Section 6602 
instructs the trial judge tasked with conducting a probable 
cause hearing merely to “review the petition” in order to 
“determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually 
violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.”  
(Id., subd. (a).)  Taken on its own terms, this instruction is 
problematic.  A trial judge can no more discern probable cause 
to believe a person may be an SVP from reviewing the 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring 
 
2 
commitment petition than a judge conducting a preliminary 
examination hearing can determine whether there is probable 
cause to believe a crime was committed by reviewing the 
criminal complaint.  Both pleadings presumably contain the 
allegations necessary to support a claim of criminality or SVP 
status, but neither provides the evidentiary foundation 
necessary to a finding of probable cause.  Additional proceedings 
are required. 
Although section 6602 anticipates that a probable cause 
hearing will occur (id., subd. (a)), it provides no guidance about 
the nature of the hearing, as we recognized in Cooley v. Superior 
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 245, fn. 8 [“The SVPA does not 
provide any specific procedural requirements for the probable 
cause hearing”].  Applying constitutional principles in an early 
decision, the Court of Appeal in In re Parker (1998) 
60 Cal.App.4th 1453 (Parker) formulated an outline for the 
conduct of SVP probable cause hearings that has stood 
unchallenged, at least by this court, until our decision today.  
Other recent developments in the law, however, had already 
threatened to undermine the Parker procedures.  Parker, 
ratified by our subsequent decision in Cooley, assumed that an 
SVP probable cause hearing would focus on the evaluation 
reports prepared by the two psychiatric professionals whose 
concurrence is required before an SVP commitment petition can 
be filed.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (d).)  It permitted 
introduction of such reports at the probable cause hearing, 
notwithstanding their status as hearsay, as well as any hearsay 
they might contain.  (Parker, at pp. 1469–1470 [“the prosecutor 
may present the opinions of the experts through the hearsay 
reports of such persons”]; see also Cooley, at p. 245, fn. 8 [“the 
petitioner is allowed, despite their hearsay nature, to present 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring 
 
3 
the contents of any reports that form the basis of the petition as 
evidence”].) 
At the time of Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 
admission of the contents of the evaluation reports was 
uncontroversial because expert witnesses were permitted to 
testify concerning the basis for their opinions, even if those 
opinions were premised on hearsay.  (E.g., People v. Montiel 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 918.)  Parker therefore had no reason to 
opine separately on the admission of the type of hearsay 
considered today and, as the majority notes, did not do so.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 34–35.)  That practice came to an end with 
People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, which held that case-
specific hearsay on which an expert relies is offered for its truth 
and must be supported by admissible evidence.  (Id. at pp. 682–
683.)  Relying in part on Sanchez, one Court of Appeal has 
already ruled that the absence of a hearsay exception in section 
6602 requires the exclusion of all otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay at an SVP probable cause hearing, including any such 
hearsay in the expert evaluation reports.  (People v. Superior 
Court (Couthren) 41 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1010 [“We conclude that 
the rules of evidence apply in an SVP probable cause proceeding 
and therefore the admissibility of documentary evidence such as 
expert evaluations will be governed by the hearsay rule and any 
applicable exceptions”].)  That would also appear to be the 
logical consequence of the rationale employed in our decision 
today, although the opinion disavows ruling on the issue.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 14.)  At a minimum, our decision requires the 
redaction from the evaluation reports of any accounts of prior 
nonpredicate crimes committed by the alleged SVP, assuming 
no admissible evidence is presented at the hearing to support 
that hearsay.  But if the absence of an express hearsay exception 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring 
 
4 
requires exclusion of this type of hearsay, consistency likely 
implicates the exclusion of all other inadmissible hearsay as 
well. 
I am concerned that these rulings will prevent the SVP 
probable cause hearing from serving its intended purpose, which 
I understand to be an efficient screening function to determine 
whether a trial is required.  Like a probable cause hearing before 
a criminal trial, the purpose of a section 6602 hearing is, in 
general terms, to permit the court to ensure that there is an 
adequate evidentiary foundation for an SVP finding.  By 
requiring the county to present admissible evidence of any 
nonpredicate offenses that form a part of that foundation, and 
potentially of any other hearsay found in the evaluation reports, 
our decision will convert the probable cause hearing into a 
proceeding barely distinguishable from a subsequent trial on the 
merits.  Although such a hearing can, of course, serve the 
screening function, it will do so at the cost of time consuming 
and unnecessary efforts, imposing a potentially sizable burden 
on counsel and courts that will likely be duplicated at trial. 
It was this concern for the efficient conduct of SVP 
probable cause hearings that led the Court of Appeal below to 
imply a hearsay exception into section 6602.  Although I agree 
with my colleagues that we lack legal authority to recognize 
such an exception in these circumstances, I am otherwise wholly 
sympathetic to the Court of Appeal’s well-articulated concerns.  
Our present decision appears to be the beginning of the end for 
the time-tested Parker procedures. 
The only solution for this problem is a legislative one.  The 
Parker procedures have served as a fair and efficient guide to 
the conduct of SVP probable cause hearings for more than 
WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring 
 
5 
20 years.  I encourage the Legislature to make the statutory 
amendments necessary to preserve those procedures, beginning 
with an exception for hearsay contained in the expert evaluation 
reports.  Even better, I hope the Legislature will reexamine SVP 
probable cause hearing procedures and formulate clear 
statutory guidelines for the conduct of such hearings.  Our 
polestar is to implement our Legislature’s intent, but reliable 
implementation is difficult when, as in section 6602, there is 
little statutory indication of that intent. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Walker v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 51 Cal.App.5th 682 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S263588 
Date Filed: August 30, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: San Francisco  
Judge: Charles S. Crompton  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Erwin F. Fredrich for Petitioner. 
 
Benjamin Salorio, Public Defender (Imperial), and Darren Bean, 
Deputy Public Defender, for William Morse as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant 
Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, René A. Chacón and Moona Nandi, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.  
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Erwin F. Fredrich 
P.O. Box 471313 
San Francisco, CA 94147 
(415) 563-8870 
 
Moona Nandi 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3829