Title: In re K.J.L.
Citation: 363 N.C. 343
Docket Number: 37A09
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2009

Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 37A09    
FILED: 18 JUNE 2009
IN THE MATTER OF K.J.L.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the 
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C.
App. ___, 670 S.E.2d 269 (2008), vacating an order terminating
parental rights entered on 15 January 2008 by Judge Mary F.
Covington in District Court, Davidson County.  Heard in the
Supreme Court on 6 May 2009.
Charles E. Frye, III for petitioner-appellant Davidson
County Department of Social Services, and Laura B.
Beck, Attorney Advocate, for appellant Guardian ad
Litem.
Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellee mother.
 
NEWBY, Justice.
This case presents the question of whether a trial
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action when the
summons in the case has not been signed by a statutorily
designated member of the clerk of court’s office and thus has not
been legally issued.  Because we hold that the lack of a proper
summons implicates personal jurisdiction rather than subject
matter jurisdiction, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
On 28 March 2006, the Davidson County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that
the juvenile K.J.L. was neglected and dependent.  The Office of
the Clerk of Superior Court for Davidson County issued a summons
in the matter pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-406(a), which provides in
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pertinent part:  “Immediately after a petition has been filed
alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent, the
clerk shall issue a summons to the parent, guardian, custodian,
or caretaker requiring them to appear for a hearing at the time
and place stated in the summons.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-406(a) (2007). 
The summons was deficient, however, in that it was not “dated and
signed by the clerk, assistant clerk, or deputy clerk of the
court in the county in which the action [was] commenced.”  Id. §
1A-1, Rule 4(b) (2007).  The deputy clerk responsible for the
summons later stated in an affidavit “[t]hat due to an oversight,
[she] inadvertently failed to sign each” copy of the summons. 
Nonetheless, copies of the summons were served on both of
K.J.L.’s parents on 30 March 2006, and both parents were present
in open court when the matter was called for hearing.  Without
raising any objection to the court’s jurisdiction, both parents
knowingly stipulated that K.J.L. was a neglected juvenile.  The
trial court entered an order to that effect on 8 September 2006.
On 12 April 2007, DSS filed a petition for termination
of the parental rights of K.J.L.’s parents.  A properly signed
summons was issued in the termination of parental rights (“TPR”)
proceeding, and copies were served on both parents.  K.J.L.’s
mother (“respondent”) appeared at the TPR hearing without
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, as did K.J.L.’s guardian
ad litem (“GAL”).  K.J.L.’s father failed to respond to the TPR
petition and did not appear at the hearing.  By order filed on 15
January 2008, the trial court terminated both parents’ parental
rights.  Respondent appealed.
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The Court of Appeals majority concluded that the lack
of a signature from an appropriate member of the clerk’s office
on the summons in the neglect and dependency proceeding meant no
summons was “issued” in that case for purposes of Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(a), which provides:  “A summons is issued when, after
being filled out and dated, it is signed by the officer having
authority to do so.”  Id. § 1A-1, Rule 4(a) (2007).  The Court of
Appeals majority further held that the absence of a legally
issued summons deprived the trial court of the subject matter
jurisdiction necessary to enter its initial order adjudicating
K.J.L. a neglected juvenile.  In re K.J.L., ___ N.C. App. ___,
___, 670 S.E.2d 269, 271 (2008).  The court thus vacated the
adjudication order and went on to vacate the TPR order as well
“because the adjudication order was essential to the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction in the proceeding to
terminate respondent’s parental rights.”  Id. at ___, 670 S.E.2d
at 271 (citing, inter alia, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2007)).  The
Court of Appeals majority also vacated the TPR order on
alternative grounds, holding that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the TPR proceeding because “no summons
was issued to the juvenile and no summons was served upon or
accepted by the guardian ad litem for the juvenile.”  Id. at ___,
670 S.E.2d at 272.  The dissenting judge did not challenge the
majority’s holding that, due to the lack of a proper signature,
no summons was legally issued in the neglect and dependency
proceeding.  Id. at ___, 670 S.E.2d at 274 (Hunter, Robert C.,
J., dissenting).  The dissent also did not dispute that the
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summons in the TPR proceeding was not properly issued and served. 
Id. at ___, 670 S.E.2d at 279.  However, the dissent would have
resolved both issues by concluding that defects in the issuance
and service of summons affect personal jurisdiction and can be
waived by general appearance.  Id. at ___, ___, 670 S.E.2d at
274, 279.  We now review the Court of Appeals’ decision on the
basis of the dissenting opinion.
It is clear that the summons in the neglect and
dependency proceeding was not signed in compliance with Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(b).  The summons was thus not “issued” as that
term is used in Rule 4(a), and consequently the issuance
requirement of N.C.G.S. § 7B-406(a) was not satisfied.  We must
determine whether the failure to legally issue a summons
implicates the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action or merely affects jurisdiction over the parties thereto. 
The allegations of a complaint determine a court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action.  Peoples v. Norwood, 94
N.C. 144, 149, 94 N.C. 167, 172 (1886).  In matters arising under
the Juvenile Code, the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is
established by statute.  N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-200, -1101 (2007).  The
existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law and
“‘“ cannot be conferred upon a court by consent.”’”  In re
T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 595, 636 S.E.2d 787, 793 (2006) (quoting In
re Custody of Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 187, 154 S.E.2d 327, 333
(1967)).  Consequently, a court’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is not waivable and can be raised at any time. 
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(3) (2007).  Conversely, a court’s
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jurisdiction over a person is generally achieved through the
issuance and service of a summons.  Peoples, 94 N.C. at 149, 94
N.C. at 172.  Deficiencies regarding the manner in which a court
obtains jurisdiction over a party, including those relating to a
summons, are waivable and must be raised in a timely manner. 
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(1) (2007).  Generally, such
deficiencies can be cured.  Even without a summons, a court may
properly obtain personal jurisdiction over a party who consents
or makes a general appearance, for example, by filing an answer
or appearing at a hearing without objecting to personal
jurisdiction.  Grimsley v. Nelson, 342 N.C. 542, 545, 467 S.E.2d
92, 94 (1996) (“Jurisdiction of the court over the person of a
defendant is obtained by service of process, voluntary
appearance, or consent.” (citation omitted)).
This Court has held that “the absence of the clerk’s
signature on the summons [is] a defect of a formal character
which [is] waived by a general appearance.”  Hooker v. Forbes,
202 N.C. 364, 368, 162 S.E. 903, 905 (1932).  We have recently
reiterated this position, holding that summons-related
deficiencies similar to those at issue here “implicate personal
jurisdiction and thus can be waived by the parties.”  In re J.T.
(I), 363 N.C. 1, 4, 672 S.E.2d 17, 19 (2009) (citing N.C.G.S. §
1A-1, Rule 12(h)(1); Harmon v. Harmon, 245 N.C. 83, 86, 95 S.E.2d
355, 359 (1956)).
These holdings are elaborations on basic principles
long recognized by this Court:  the summons is not the vehicle by
which a court obtains subject matter jurisdiction over a case,
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and failure to follow the preferred procedures with respect to
the summons does not deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The purpose of the summons is to bring the
parties into, and give the [c]ourt
jurisdiction of them, and of the pleadings,
to give jurisdiction of the subject matter of
litigation and the parties in that
connection, and this is orderly and generally
necessary; but when the parties are
voluntarily before the [c]ourt, and . . . a
judgment is entered in favor of one party and
against another, such judgment is valid,
although not granted according to the orderly
course of procedure.
Peoples, 94 N.C. at 149, 94 N.C. at 172 (citations omitted). 
Because the summons affects jurisdiction over the person rather
than the subject matter, this Court has held that a general
appearance by a civil defendant “waive[s] any defect in or
nonexistence of a summons.”  Dellinger v. Bollinger, 242 N.C.
696, 698, 89 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1955) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted); see also Hatch v. Alamance Ry. Co., 183 N.C. 617, 628,
112 S.E. 529, 534 (1922) (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (“[A]ppearance
in an action dispenses with the necessity of process.  Indeed,
there are numerous cases that although there has been no summons
at all issued, a general appearance, by filing an answer or
otherwise, makes service of summons at all unnecessary.”
(citations omitted)).  In the instant case, the failure to issue
a summons in the neglect and dependency action did not affect the
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and the parents’
appearance at the neglect and dependency hearing without
objection to jurisdiction waived any defenses implicating
personal jurisdiction.
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In the recent case In re J.T. (I), a TPR summons had
been issued but failed to name any of the three juveniles in that
case as respondent, and no summons had been served on the
juveniles or their GAL.  We held these deficiencies implicated
personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction.  363 N.C.
at 4, 672 S.E.2d at 19.  In our decision, we quoted the
following:  “‘[T]he issuance and service of process is the means
by which the court obtains jurisdiction, and thus where no
summons is issued, the court acquires jurisdiction over neither
the parties nor the subject matter of the action.’”  Id. at 4,
672 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting In re Poole, 151 N.C. App. 472, 475,
568 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted), rev’d per curiam for reasons stated in
dissenting opinion, 357 N.C. 151, 579 S.E.2d 248 (2003)). 
Understood in context, this language was used to emphasize that a
summons had in fact been issued in In re J.T. (I), as had been
the case in In re Poole.  Id.; In re Poole, 151 N.C. App. at 475,
568 S.E.2d at 202.  Read literally and in isolation, however,
this language could be interpreted to mean the failure to issue a
summons defeats subject matter jurisdiction.  We disavow such an
interpretation.  The summons relates to subject matter
jurisdiction, albeit only insofar as it apprises the necessary
parties that the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction has
been invoked and that the court intends to exercise jurisdiction
over the case.  Thus, although the summons itself does not
establish subject matter jurisdiction, it can be used as some
proof of invocation of the trial court’s subject matter
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jurisdiction.  This invocation is accomplished when a proper
controversy has been brought before the court.  See Peoples, 94
N.C. at 149, 94 N.C. at 172.
Although the preceding analysis provides grounds for
deciding both issues in this case, we now briefly address the
alternate basis for the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the TPR action. 
Because “no summons was issued to the juvenile and no summons was
served upon or accepted by the guardian ad litem for the
juvenile,” the majority below concluded that the trial court did
not have the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.  In re K.J.L., ___ N.C. App. at
___, 670 S.E.2d at 272 (majority).  This issue is directly
controlled by our decision in In re J.T. (I), in which the
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction was based on findings
that “no summons named any of the three juveniles as respondent
and that no summons was ever served on the juveniles or their
GAL.”  363 N.C. at 4, 672 S.E.2d at 19.  We concluded that
“[t]hese errors are examples of insufficiency of process and
insufficiency of service of process, respectively, both of which
are defenses that implicate personal jurisdiction and thus can be
waived by the parties.”  Id. (citing N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule
12(h)(1); Harmon, 245 N.C. at 86, 95 S.E.2d at 359).  Here,
because K.J.L.’s GAL appeared at the TPR hearing without
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, any defenses based on the
failure to issue a summons to K.J.L. or to serve the summons on
the GAL were waived, and the trial court’s exercise of
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jurisdiction was proper.  363 N.C. at 4-5, 672 S.E.2d at 19
(citing Harmon, 245 N.C. at 86, 95 S.E.2d at 359).
Because the purpose of the summons is to obtain
jurisdiction over the parties to an action and not over the
subject matter, summons-related defects implicate personal
jurisdiction and not subject matter jurisdiction.  Any
deficiencies in the issuance and service of the summonses in the
neglect and TPR proceedings at issue in this case did not affect
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and any defenses
implicating personal jurisdiction were waived by the parties. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed and
this case is remanded to that court for consideration of the
parties’ remaining assignments of error.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON concurring in the result only.
I concur in the result only and agree that the trial court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the termination of parental
rights proceeding.  I write separately because I conclude the
trial court’s jurisdiction over the termination proceeding was
not dependent upon the underlying abuse, neglect, or dependency
adjudication.
Termination of parental rights proceedings are independent
from underlying abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings and
have separate jurisdictional requirements.  Compare N.C.G.S. §
7B-200 (stating that “[t]he court has exclusive, original
jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to
be abused, neglected, or dependent”) with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101
(stating that “[t]he court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and determine any petition or motion
relating to termination of parental rights”); see also In re
R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 553, 614 S.E.2d 489, 497 (2005) (“Each
termination order relies upon an independent finding that clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence supports at least one of the
grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111.  Section
7B-1113 affords parents the opportunity to challenge termination
orders on appeal.  Simply put, a termination order rests on its
own merits.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of
Aug. 23, 2005, ch. 398, sec. 12, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455,
1460-61, as recognized in In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 592, 636
S.E.2d 787, 791 (2006).  Indeed, the trial court may entertain a
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petition for termination of parental rights even when there is no
involvement by DSS and thus no underlying abuse, neglect, and
dependency action whatsoever.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(1)
(2007) (allowing a parent to file a petition to terminate the
parental rights of the other parent).  
Section 7B-1101, which governs subject matter jurisdiction
in termination of parental rights cases, states in pertinent
part:
The court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and determine any
petition or motion relating to termination of
parental rights to any juvenile who resides
in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual
custody of a county department of social
services or licensed child-placing agency in
the district at the time of filing of the
petition or motion. 
Id.  Pursuant to the broad language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101, the
trial court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to
determine any petition or motion for termination of parental
rights of any juvenile residing in or merely “found in” the
district at the time of filing.  Id.; see, e.g., In re D.D.J.,
177 N.C. App. 441, 443, 628 S.E.2d 808, 810 (2006) (stating that,
when the children were living in South Carolina at the time of
the filing of the petition for termination, they were not
“residing in” or “found in” North Carolina, and the trial court
therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the termination
proceeding); In re Leonard, 77 N.C. App. 439, 440, 335 S.E.2d 73,
73-74 (1985) (holding that when the juvenile was in Ohio with his
mother when the petition to terminate parental rights was filed,
the juvenile was neither “residing in” nor “found in” the
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district at the time of filing, and the petition failed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction).  Moreover, section 7B-1101 vests
the trial court with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to
determine any petition or motion for termination of parental
rights of any juvenile in the legal or physical custody of DSS at
the time of the filing.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.
As noted by the majority, respondent stipulated that K.J.L.
was a neglected juvenile, and the trial court entered an order to
that effect accordingly.  Respondent did not appeal from the
order adjudicating K.J.L. neglected.  DSS filed its petition for
termination of parental rights on 12 April 2007, a little over a
year after taking custody of K.J.L.  There was no contention that
K.J.L. did not reside or could not be found in the district.  The
petition was properly verified.  See In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at
593, 636 S.E.2d at 792 (“A trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established
when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly
verified petition.”).  A proper summons was issued for the
termination proceeding, and copies were served on both parents. 
Respondent appeared at the hearing, as did the guardian ad litem
for the juvenile.  Further, as the majority correctly determines,
the failure to issue a summons to the juvenile for the
termination proceeding did not implicate the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.  See In re J.T. (I), 363 N.C. 1, 4,
672 S.E.2d 17, 18-19 (2009).  Thus, under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101, the
trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
determine the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 
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The Court of Appeals nonetheless determined that the
termination of parental rights order had to be vacated “because
the adjudication order was essential to the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction in the proceeding to terminate respondent’s
parental rights.”  In re K.J.L., __ N.C. App. __, 670 S.E.2d 269,
271 (2008).  The Court of Appeals cited N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in
support of this proposition.  Section 7B-1110(a) does not address
adjudication orders, however; rather, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110
addresses termination of parental rights proceedings and requires
the trial court to determine that one or more of the grounds for
termination exists.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2007) (“After an
adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent’s
rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the
parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.”).
Here, in compliance with its duty under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a), the trial court made independent findings, separate from
the underlying neglect and dependency adjudication order, that
grounds existed for termination of parental rights. 
Specifically, the trial court found that respondent had: (1)
neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101
and that there was a probability of continuation of such neglect
(ground for termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1));
and (2) willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of care for six months preceding the petition (ground for
termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3)).  The Court of
Appeals, then, clearly erred in determining that the underlying
adjudication order was “essential to the trial court’s subject
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matter jurisdiction in the proceeding to terminate respondent’s
parental rights” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
Respondent argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the termination order because DSS was not authorized to
file the termination action pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a). 
Section 7B-1103 addresses standing to file a petition or motion
to terminate parental rights.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a) (2007). 
Included in the list of those who may file for termination orders
is “[a]ny county department of social services . . . to whom
custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent
jurisdiction.”  Id. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2007).  Respondent argues
that because the underlying juvenile petition was not properly
“issued” pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
trial court did not acquire subject matter jurisdiction and could
not adjudicate the juvenile as neglected.  Thus, contends
respondent, DSS was not granted custody “by a court of competent
jurisdiction” and did not have standing to bring the subsequent
termination proceeding. 
However, the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a) only
requires that DSS be granted “custody . . . by a court of
competent jurisdiction.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals has
previously held, and this Court has affirmed, that N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1103(a) does not limit custody granted to DSS pursuant only to a
dispositional order entered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-905, but that DSS
has standing to file a termination petition pursuant to a
nonsecure custody order issued pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-506 as
well.  See In re T.M., 182 N.C. App. 566, 571, 643 S.E.2d 471,
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475, aff'd per curiam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007).  This
Court has also noted that “DSS’s custody [need not] be legally
unassailable” in order to have standing to file a petition for
termination of parental rights.  See In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. at
551, 614 S.E.2d at 497. 
Here, at the time DSS filed its termination petition on 12
April 2007, DSS had custody of the juvenile pursuant to a
permanency planning order entered 9 April 2007.  The trial court
in its permanency planning order made independent findings and
determined that it was in the best interests of the juvenile to
be in the legal and physical custody of DSS.  Thus, DSS had
proper standing to file the petition for termination of
respondent’s parental rights.  See In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. at 551,
614 S.E.2d at 497 (determining that DSS had standing to seek
termination of the respondent’s parental rights when DSS had
custody of the juvenile pursuant to a court order, although the
validity of the underlying court order was under review).  
Thus I agree that the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the termination proceeding and I therefore
concur in the result.
Justice MARTIN and Justice BRADY join in this separate
opinion.