Title: Commercial Asphalt, Inc. v. Smith
Citation: 200 Kan. 362, 436 P.2d 849
Docket Number: 44,917
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 27, 1968

200 Kan. 362 (1968)
436 P.2d 849
COMMERCIAL ASPHALT, INC. Appellant,
v.
MILO G. SMITH and FRANK SMITH d/b/a BIG THREE SAND &amp; GRAVEL COMPANY, Appellees.
No. 44,917

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 27, 1968.
Benjamin C. Langel, of Wichita, argued the cause, and George B. Powers, John F. Eberhardt, Stuart R. Carter, Robert C. Foulston, Malcolm Miller, Robert N. Partridge, Robert M. Siefkin, Richard C. Harris, Gerald Sawatzky, Donald L. Cordes, Robert L. Howard, Charles J. Woodin, Mikel L. Stout, Phillip S. Frick, Jerry G. Elliott, John E. Foulston and Stanley G. Andeel, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Ralph E. Gilchrist and Harry E. Robbins, Jr., both of Wichita, argued the cause, and Carl L. Buck, Stephen K. Lester, Lyndon Gamelson, Kenneth H. Hiebsch and Donald C. Tinker, Jr., all of Wichita, were with them on the briefs for the appellees.
*363 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This was an action to cancel an instrument in the nature of a mineral lease restricted to sand. The plaintiff also sought damages and injunctive relief.
This is the second lawsuit between the same parties. The previous action also involved an attempt to cancel the lease. (See Commercial Asphalt v. Smith, 196 Kan. 164, 409 P.2d 796.) The present action involves alleged improper use of the lease by the defendants subsequent to the trial of the first litigation covering the years 1965 and 1966.
The plaintiff's chief complaint is that the defendants committed waste by removing topsoil which was not necessary to the sand operation and by operating a public dump on the premises.
The instrument under which the controversial operations were conducted will be summarized in part and quoted in part.
Henry Koster and his wife were the owners of 40 acres of land in Sedgwick County, Kansas. In February of 1954, as parties of the first part, they agreed with Frank L. Smith d/b/a The Big Three Sand and Gravel Company, as parties of the second part, that 
The grantors were to receive seven cents per cubic yard or five cents per ton, depending on the method of operation, "for all sand or earth removed from said property." Part of the nonoperative clause should be quoted as follows:
The instrument then extended to the grantee the right to terminate, which is not material here, and then concluded:
The plaintiff purchased the land from the Kosters in 1964.
Following a trial of the issues the trial court concluded that the excessive stripping of topsoil and the operation of a commercial dump on the premises constituted breaches of the agreement. Injunctive relief was granted but other relief was refused.
The plaintiff has appealed.
More detailed facts, and findings and conclusions of the trial court, will be presented as we consider the specific issues.
The appellant first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to award damages after it found that the appellees had wrongfully removed topsoil or overburden from the leased land.
We are inclined to agree.
The trial court concluded on this issue:
The trial court also concluded that the extensive stripping was a breach of the lease. There has been no appeal from the findings and conclusions and they are now controlling in the case. It might be suggested, however, that they are amply supported by the record.
The grant was the right to pump and produce sand. There was no specific grant to produce the silt or overburden. All parties agree that the appellees had the right to produce and remove the overburden necessary and convenient to the production of the sand and was obligated to pay the appellant the same royalty thereon as was paid for the sand. However, the evidence discloses that the topsoil became valuable during the years 1965 and 1966 because of the silt which was used for making asphalt and the removal and sale of the topsoil became the major part of the mining operation. One of the appellees testified:
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. No, it is not absolutely necessary.
"A. This is true.
"A. Yes, sir, I do."
We are forced to conclude that the trial court should reconsider the evidence before it, make a determination of the amount of topsoil which was removed and which was not necessary or incidental to the production of sand and give appellant judgment for the reasonable value thereof less any amount that has already been paid as royalty. If, for any reason, the evidence is insufficient to enable the trial court to make such a determination it should so state.
The nature of the instrument under consideration and the rights and liabilities of the parties thereunder will be given more detailed consideration as we approach appellant's third contention.
We quote appellant's next contention as follows:
We do not agree with this contention. Although the trial court found that "permitting people to commercially dump upon the premises is not either necessary or incidental to the operation of the sand and gravel business" there was evidence that some dumping of heavy material was necessary in creating a land fill and appellant's evidence was far short of any definite damage to the premises as a future commercial recreational center.
Neither is there evidence of any specific amount of income to appellees from dumping operations on which a constructive trust could attach. The testimony was to the effect that the income from *366 dumping operations no more than equaled the cost of maintaining a supervisor to burn the trash and look after the grounds.
We find no error in the trial court's refusal to allow damages for this item.
As a third contention the appellant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff has no right to remove the overburden or topsoil from the land during the term of the lease for sand.
Again we are inclined to agree with appellant's contention. The trial court concluded orally on the immediate question:
..............
"THE COURT: Right."
It would appear that the court misconstrued the nature of the instrument and the rights of the parties thereunder.
The instrument is in form an ordinary mineral or mining lease. The instrument granted the appellees the right to pump and produce sand on the payment of a designated sum per cubic yard or ton for a period of twenty years with the right of ingress and egress.
The instrument grants no estate in the land. It grants no title to the sand until it is produced. The instrument, like a mineral or mining lease, creates a profit a prendre in the nature of an incorporeal right.
In Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 141 Kan. 147, 150, 40 P.2d 463, we stated:
The instrument does not purport to give to the grantee the right to the topsoil. It is conceded, however, that the grantee must remove the topsoil before pumping the sand and that by practice, custom or usage the grantee has the right to sell the sand so removed, but not the right to remove and sell topsoil not necessary to the removal of the sand.
The instrument specifically provides:
This provision clearly reserves in the grantor the use and occupancy of the land not under actual pumping operations. If the topsoil is removed ahead of the pumping operations the grantee can have no complaint. He was not granted the topsoil.
We are forced to conclude that the grantor has the right to use land in any manner so long as he does not interfere with the sand or the right of the grantee to pump.
We find no merit in appellant's contention that the trial court erred in refusing to cancel the agreement after finding the conduct of the appellees to be so wrongful as to justify issuing an injunction against them.
Equity dislikes to enforce forfeitures. It will not do so where less drastic redress will satisfy the demands of justice. (Alford v. Dennis, 102 Kan. 403, 405, 170 Pac. 1005.) It may also be suggested that appellant has accepted payments during the period involved in the controversy.
In Storm v. Barbara Oil Co., 177 Kan. 589, 282 P.2d 417, we stated:
The trial court exercised proper discretion in granting injunctive relief rather than forfeiture.
The appellant contends that it was error for the trial court to dismiss the defendant, Frank L. Smith, from the action.
*368 Insofar as Frank L. Smith was a member of the partnership operating as grantee under the instrument while topsoil was improperly removed, we are inclined to agree. The evidence indicates that Frank L. Smith was a partner in The Big Three Sand and Gravel Company during the year 1965 and part of 1966, the period when topsoil was removed in breach of the agreement and is responsible in damages if the partnership is not able to respond. Each partner is liable for the whole amount of the partnership debts. In Lawson v. Lawrence Oil and Gas Co., 135 Kan. 740, 12 P.2d 711, we held:
Although not a necessary party for the injunctive relief, Frank L. Smith is a proper party defendant if damages are awarded for acts committed during the period he was a partner.
The appellant complains of the trial court's order dividing the costs of the case equally between the parties. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. The appellant, in the court below, received only part of the relief requested. K.S.A. 60-2002 provides in part:
Here the costs were taxed by order of the judge. The taxing of costs in an equitable action will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion by the trial judge. (Middlebrook v. Winterscheidt, 118 Kan. 731, 236 Pac. 825.) It might also be suggested that the chief relief sought by plaintiff  cancellation of the agreement  was denied.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to re-examine the record on the question of damages for improper removal of topsoil as stated in the opinion.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.