Title: M.C. Machinery Systems, Inc. V. Maher Terminals, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-117-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers the extent of a marine terminal operator's liability for damage caused to a shipper's plastic injection molding machine while it was being stored in a marine terminal following carriage overseas. M.C. Machinery, a shipper, hired Dia International Traffic Co., Ltd. (Dia International), a non-vessel owning common carrier, to transport a forty-one-ton plastic injection molding machine from Japan to Illinois. Dia International arranged with an ocean carrier, Hapag-Lloyd America, Inc. (Hapag) to carry the cargo overseas to the Port of New York New Jersey located at Port Elizabeth, N.J. Hapag issued a bill of lading for the cargo to be shipped aboard its ocean vessel, the California Saturn. Maher Terminals, Inc. (Maher) was hired by Hapag to discharge the cargo from the vessel when it docked at Port Elizabeth, and to store the machine in its terminal until a freight forwarder hired by M.C. Machinery arrived to pick it up. Maher had a terminal operating and stevedoring contract with Hapag pursuant to which Maher agreed to discharge cargo from Hapag's vessels and provide storage for the cargo until the consignee came to retrieve it. On November 7, 1995, the California Saturn docked at Port Elizabeth. Maher discharged the cargo from the vessel by a crane to the stringpiece, a section of the pier extending alongside the vessel. The machinery was then placed onto a low-bed trailer, known as a mafi, and hauled from the stringpiece to a storage area in Maher's terminal where the cargo was stored. Six days after the cargo arrived, one of Maher's crane operators was lifting the molding machine off the mafi to place it on the ground in preparation for M.C. Machinery's trucker's pickup, when a cable slipped, causing the cargo to fall to the ground. Subsequently, M.C. Machinery filed a complaint against Maher terminals in the Law Division for damages to the machinery in the amount of almost $370,000. Maher raised defenses under the bill of lading, including a limitation on liability. M.C. Machinery moved to strike the defense on summary judgment, and Maher made a cross-motion for partial summary judgment to limit its liability to $500 under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 1300 to 15. That Act, which limits a carrier's liability for damage to cargo to $500 per package unless the shipper declares a higher value in the bill of lading, applies from the time of loading the goods until their discharge from the ship, unless the parties contractually extend the coverage of COGSA after discharge until delivery occurs. The bill of lading in this case contained such an extension. The Law Division denied M.C. Machinery's motion for summary judgment and granted Maher's cross-motion limiting its liability to $500. In its written opinion, the Law Division reasoned that the $500 limitation applied because M.C. Machinery did not declare the value of the cargo in the bill of lading. In addition, the court ruled that the Harter Act extended the period by which the bill of lading governs so that any third parties enjoying the protection of the Himalaya clause (which would extend the $500 limitation to non-carriers) would continue to be protected until proper delivery of the goods. The court found that stripping the cargo from the mafi did not constitute proper delivery under the Harter Act. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's decision for essentially the same reasons set forth in the Law Division's opinion. The Supreme Court granted M.C. Machinery's petition for certification. HELD: Because the bill of lading covering the overseas cargo extended the application of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act beyond discharge from the vessel, and proper delivery under the Harter Act had not occurred at the time the subject cargo was damaged, and because the parties did not declare the value of the subject cargo in the bill of lading, the $500 per package limitation of liability provision of COGSA applied to limit the terminal operator's liability. 2. So long as COGSA or the Harter Act applies to the bill of lading, a claim for damage against the carrier or its agent is governed by federal maritime law. (pp. 12-13) 3. COGSA, which governs all contracts (evidenced by a bill of lading or similar document of title) for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States and foreign trade, defines the rights and duties of the parties from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship. Thereafter, the Harter Act obligates the carrier to provide proper delivery, which has been defined to mean discharge of the cargo upon a fit and customary wharf. (pp. 13-14) 4. Although COGSA applicability ends when the ship's loading and unloading equipment is removed from the cargo, a carrier and shipper are allowed to enter into a special agreement to extend COGSA's coverage to the period before loading and after discharge of the goods. Because certain clauses of the bill of lading in this case extended the $500 limitation to the period after discharge of the cargo, the liability limits of Maher are expressly limited by COGSA. (pp. 15-17) 5. The Himalaya clause in Hapag's bill of lading extends all of the benefits of COGSA to Maher as a sub-contractor. (pp. 17-18) 6. COGSA benefits may extend to parties who are unnamed in the bill of lading so long as the terms of the bill of lading are simply expressed to a well-defined class of readily identifiable persons. (pp. 18-20) 7. Although COGSA provides that the parties may enter into a special agreement extending COGSA's benefits to the period before loading and after discharge of the goods, any such special agreement is governed by the Harter Act, which extends the period by which the bill of lading governs so that any third parties enjoying the protection of a Himalaya clause will continue to be protected until proper delivery. Once proper delivery occurs, the Harter Act ceases to apply and the carrier's responsibilities are those of a bailee or warehouseman. (pp. 20-21) 8. The Harter Act requires that risk of loss remain with the carrier until proper delivery of the cargo, which generally has been held to require discharge of the cargo upon a fit and customary wharf. Proper delivery in this case did not occur immediately upon discharge of the goods onto Maher's stringpiece. (pp. 21-23) 9. At the time of the damage to the cargo, delivery had not occurred because Maher had neither loaded the goods onto consignee's vehicles for inland transport nor finished preparing the goods for loading onto consignee's vehicles. Thus, the bill of lading was still in effect, and the COGSA extensions and Himalaya clause applied at the time of the damage, thereby limiting Maher's liability to $500 per package. (pp. 23-25) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LONG joins. Justice Stein believes that proper delivery occurred where the cargo had been discharged onto a fit and proper pier, notice was properly given to the consignee, and the cargo was made available for pickup for six days after discharge from the vessel. Thus, Justice Stein concluded that the Harter Act and COGSA's $500 liability limitation were inapplicable to this matter. He would reverse and remand the case to the Law Division for trial to determine the amount of damages Maher was liable for as bailee of the cargo. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI, COLEMAN, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LONG joins. M.C. MACHINERY SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAHER TERMINALS, INC., Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 18, 2000-- Decided June 29, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Anthony J. Pruzinsky argued the cause for appellant (Hill Rivkins &amp; Hayden, attorneys; Mr. Pruzinsky, John J. Sullivan and Laura R. Landau, of counsel; Mr. Sullivan, on the brief). James M. Kenny argued the cause for respondent (Kenny &amp; Stearns, attorneys; Michael C. Mul , on letter brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'Hern, J. If a strained metaphor may be forgiven, we hesitate to dip our toes into the waters of admiralty law. Fortunately, we need not deal here with such quaint notions as that a ship is a person, The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S. Ct. 483, 47 L. Ed. 760 (1903), or that when cargo and vessel come together, they are married at transport. Farrell Ocean Services, Inc. v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 211, 214 (1981). These subtleties have appealed to ones such as Messrs. Gilbert and Sullivan who described this law as the monarch of the sea. De Sole v. United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1176 n.11 (4th Cir. 1991). And rightly so. The law of the sea, with other institutions of antiquity, helped to shape the civilizations with which we are most familiar. Its unifying principles are as necessary to the world of commerce today as then. The issue in this case is a recurring one -- when ceases the liability of a ship owner for the goods of a merchant consigned to the vessel? A cursory review of history helps to put the issue in perspective. For this purpose, we draw on Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage, and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague Visby, Hamburg, and the Multimodal Rules, 5 J. Transnat'l L. &amp; Pol'y 1 (1995). For convenience, we shall eliminate formal citations to the various laws mentioned therein, referring to the laws or conventions by their familiar names.See footnote 11 B. Are the Liabilities of the Marine Terminal Operator Limited to the Amount of $500 Set Forth as the Value of the Cargo in the Bill of Lading? Clause 6 of the bill of lading, entitled Carrier's Responsibility, Multimodal Transport, states, in relevant part: Carrier undertakes to perform and/or in his own name to procure performance of the Carriage from the Place of Receipt or the Port of Loading, whichever is applicable, to the Port of Discharge or Place of Delivery, whichever is applicable. Clause 6 subsection (2)(b) stated, in relevant part, the liability of the carrier will be determined: In case of shipments to or from North America by the provisions of [COGSA] if the loss or damage is known to have occurred during sea-carriage to or from the USA or during Carrier's custody of the Goods before loading or after discharge in ports of the USA .... The reverse side of the bill of lading also contains a so called Himalaya clause in paragraph 4(2),See footnote 66 extending any of Hapag-Lloyd's defenses to its Sub-Contractors. The bill of lading defined Sub-Contractor to include owners and operators of vessels (other than the Carrier), stevedores, terminal and groupage operators . . . and any independent contractor employed by the Carrier in performance of the Carriage. The plain language of Hapag-Lloyd's bill of lading therefore extends COGSA to the period while the cargo is in the carrier's custody (through its agent, the stevedore) after discharge. The Himalaya clause also extends all the benefits available to Hapag Lloyd to Maher, as a sub-contractor, including the $500 liability limitation. Various courts have upheld the use of a Himalaya clause in a bill of lading to limit the liability of stevedores, terminal operators, and other independent contractors during the period between discharge and delivery. Baretto Peat, Inc. v. Louis Ayala Colon Sucrs., Inc., 896 F.2d 656, 659-60 (1st Cir. 1990); DeLaval Turbine Inc., v. West India Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 1974); Barber Blue, supra. Some courts require that the party seeking COGSA's refuge be expressly enumerated in the Himalaya clause. DeLaval Turbine, supra; Cabot Corp. v. S.S. Mormacscan, 441 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1971). These courts relied on Herd &amp; Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 305, 79 S. Ct. 766, 771, 3 L. Ed 2d 820, 825 (1959), that held that such clauses be strictly construed against the party seeking protection. In Herd, the Court refused to imply an extension of COGSA to limit the liability of a negligent stevedore when the bill of lading contained no indication that the contracting parties had intended to limit liability of stevedores or other agents of carrier for damage caused by their negligence. The clear import of Herd was that a Himalaya clause is enforceable when a bill of lading demonstrates a clear intent to extend benefits to the party seeking protection. Marva Jo Wyatt, Contract Terms in Intermodal Transport: COGSA Comes Ashore, 16 Tul. Mar. L.J. 177, 179-180 (1991). Thus, COGSA benefits may extend to parties who are unnamed in the bill of lading. Baretto Peat, supra, 896 F.2d at 660; Barber Blue, supra, 675 F.2d at 270. The terms must simply be expressed to a well-defined class of readily identifiable persons, for the benefits to be extended. Baretto Peat, supra, 896 F.2d at 660. (quoting Barber Blue, supra, 675 F. 2d at 270). When a bill refers to a class of persons such as 'agents' and 'independent contractors' it is clear that the contract includes all those persons engaged by the carrier to perform the functions and duties of the carrier within the scope of the carriage contract. Barber Blue, supra, 675 F.2d at 270. In this case, the Himalaya clause specifies that all sub contractors of the carrier shall have the carrier's benefits and defenses available to it. Maher, the marine terminal operator, is unequivocally a sub-contractor of Hapag-Lloyd. Both stevedores and terminal operators are expressly named in the bill of lading's definition of Sub-Contractors. Therefore, we are convinced that the parties contemplated in the bill of lading that Hapag-Lloyd's agents would be covered by COGSA's benefit of the $500 liability limitation. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 117 September Term 1998 M.C. MACHINERY SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAHER TERMINALS, INC., Defendant-Respondent. STEIN, J., dissenting. The Court meticulously has described the relevant history of maritime law and the events that led to the enactment of the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C.A. 190 to -96, and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C.A. 1300 to -15. The Court correctly notes that those federal laws should govern a liability dispute between a stevedore hired by an ocean carrier and a shipper of goods damaged by that stevedore before delivery occurs. The Court also concludes that COGSA's limitation on liability provision may be extended to the ocean carrier's sub contractors until delivery occurs. The Court accurately recapitulates the facts that detail the relationship between the parties, correctly concluding that COGSA's limitation on liability provision was extended by the parties to the period covered by the Harter Act. I differ only with the majority's conclusion that proper delivery did not occur. The Harter Act applies to a stevedore responsible for unloading cargo if the unloading function is sufficiently related to the transport of the cargo to the place of delivery. Obviously, that statute does not intend that the stevedore retain COGSA's limited liability protection after unloading is completed and the goods are safely stored awaiting pickup by the consignee. On this record, it appears that unloading was completed and that the stevedore held the goods in its own storage area for six days. The record also indicates that notice that the goods were ready to be picked up had been given to the consignee. The Court holds, however, that proper delivery of the goods had not occurred because the cargo remained on a mafi and therefore was not ready to be picked up by the consignee. Thus, the majority concludes that the applicability of the Harter Act and the limitation of liability provision of COGSA may turn on whether the cargo remains on a mafi. Based on that analysis the majority finds that the Harter Act and COGSA apply to plaintiff's claim and that defendant is liable only for $500 of the approximate $370,000 in damages caused by defendant's mishandling of the cargo. Because it is evident that the goods had been delivered in this case and that stripping cargo from a mafi, ante at __ (slip op. at 25), is not required to effectuate proper delivery under the Harter Act, I respectfully dissent. I Plaintiff is a subrogated underwriter suing in the name of its insured, M.C. Machinery Systems, Inc. (M.C. Machinery). Dia International Traffic Co., Ltd (Dia International), a non-vessel owning common carrier, contracted with M.C. Machinery to transport a 42 kilogram plastic injection molding machine from Japan to Glendale Heights, Illinois. Hapag-Lloyd America, Inc. (Hapag-Lloyd), an ocean carrier, was hired by Dia International to transport the machine overseas from Japan to the Port of New York-New Jersey, located at Port Elizabeth, N.J., before it was to be picked up by plaintiff for transport by truck to Illinois. On arrival of the cargo at Port Elizabeth, defendant Maher Terminals, Inc. (Maher) discharged the machine by crane from the ocean carrier to Maher's stringpiece, part of the pier that extended alongside the ship. The machine was then placed on Maher's mafi and hauled from the stringpiece to a separate storage area. A mafi is a wheeled, non-motorized flatbed trailer on which cargo can be transported from one place to another on terminal premises. The cargo stayed in storage for six days on Maher's mafi until Maher apparently needed the mafi for other cargo. Maher's superintendent of the storage facility stated that Maher lifted the cargo from the mafi and intended to ground the cargo at a place in the terminal so that consignee's trucker, who had not yet come, would have an opportunity to take delivery of the cargo. As one of Maher's crane operators was lifting the machine off the mafi, a cable slipped and the cargo fell to the ground. That event resulted in approximately $370,000 in damages to the machine. Maher had a terminal operating and stevedoring contract with Hapag-Lloyd, pursuant to which it was to discharge cargo from Hapag-Lloyd's vessels and provide storage for the cargo until the consignee arrived to retrieve it. Maher damaged M.C. Machinery's cargo while removing the machine from its own mafi that was then needed for other cargo. Maher now seeks to limit its potential liability for mishandling the cargo to only $500, relying on its contract with Hapag-Lloyd and the limited liability provision afforded to ocean carriers under COGSA. II The Harter Act was enacted in 1893 in response to the practices of ocean carriers that inserted release-from-negligence provisions into their bills of lading in an attempt to limit their liability as carriers of goods. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. California Stevedore &amp; Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 1173, 1175 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977). Under the Harter Act, carriers could no longer relieve themselves from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault or failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery of any and all lawful merchandise or property committed to . . . their charge by adding broad protective language into the carriage contract. 46 U.S.C.A. 190. The Harter Act encompassed the vessel owner's entire period of liability, beginning from the time when the carrier or its agent accepted custody of the goods before loading, through the unloading of the goods from the vessel, and continuing until delivery to a common carrier occurred. Tapco Nigeria, Ltd. v. M/V Westwind, 702 F.2d 1252, 1255 (5th Cir. 1983). The Harter Act was successful in striking a balance between the dominant British merchant marine that sought to avoid responsibility for any claims based on negligent handling of cargo, and shippers that sought to hold ocean carriers liable for all damages resulting from negligence during transport of the goods. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1012, 100 S. Ct. 659, 62 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1980). The Harter Act was for the most part superseded by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) that codified the Hague Rules in 1936. Wemhoener Pressen v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 5 F.3d 734, 741 (4th Cir. 1993). The purpose of the Harter Act, COGSA, and the Hague Rules was to achieve a fair balancing of the interests between ocean carriers and shippers, and also to effectuate a standard and uniform set of provisions for ocean bills of lading. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2nd Cir. 1969). See also 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 10-15 at 75 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that COGSA's goal was to achieve international uniformity and to redress the edge in bargaining power enjoyed by carriers over shipper and cargo interests by setting out certain duties and responsibilities of carriers that cannot be avoided even by express contractual provision ). To effectuate that balance COGSA limits liability for cargo damage to $500 if damage occurs between the time cargo is loaded onto the ship to the time it is discharged. 46 U.S.C.A. 1304(5). That limitation does not apply, however, if the shipper declares the value of the cargo in the bill of lading. Ibid. In contrast, the Harter Act contains no provision limiting the carrier's responsibility for negligence to a specific dollar amount. 46 U.S.C.A. 190 to 96. Further, COGSA defers to the Harter Act in dealing with questions of liability that pertain to post-discharge negligence: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as superseding any part of sections 190 to 196 of this title, or of any other law which would be applicable in the absence of this chapter, insofar as they relate to the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of the ship or carrier prior to the time when the goods are loaded on or after the time they are discharged from the ship. [ 46 U.S.C.A. 1311 (emphasis added).] Notwithstanding those provisions, COGSA allows an ocean carrier and shipper to enter into a special agreement concerning responsibility and liability that extends the coverage of COGSA to the periods before loading and after discharge of the goods. 46 U.S.C.A. 1307. In the absence of such an agreement, the Harter Act applies to damage that occurred prior to loading or after discharge of cargo until proper delivery is made because those periods are not covered by COGSA. Wemhoener Pressen, supra, 5 F.3d at 739; Allied Chemical Int'l Corp. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 775 F.2d 476, 482 (2nd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099, 106 S. Ct. 1502, 89 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1986). Neither the Harter Act nor COGSA apply after proper delivery of the goods by the carrier is effectuated. Wemhoener Pressen, supra, 5 F.3d at 741; B. Elliott (Canada) Ltd. v. John T. Clark &amp; Son, 704 F.2d 1305, 1307 (4th Cir. 1983). Although proper delivery is not defined in the Harter Act, that term has been interpreted to include both actual and constructive delivery: Actual delivery consists [of] completely transferring the possession and control of goods from the vessel to the consignee or his agent. Constructive delivery occurs where the goods are discharged from the ship upon a fit wharf and the consignee receives due and reasonable notice that the goods have been discharged and has a reasonable opportunity to remove the goods to put them under proper care and custody. Upon 'proper delivery' the Harter Act ceases to govern the relationship between the parties, and a sea carrier's strict liability, as such, terminates. Thereafter, the carrier's responsibilities are those of a bailee or warehouseman to take ordinary care of the [Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 365 A.2d 325, 335 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] That interpretation has been adopted in cases that considered whether delivery had occurred prior to the occurrence of damage. Jagenberg, Inc. v. Georgia Ports Auth., 882 F. Supp. 1065, 1076-77 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Wemhoener Pressen, supra, 5 F. 3d at 741-42; B. Elliott, supra, 704 F.2d at 1308. See also Tapco Nigeria, supra, 702 F.2d at 1255 (noting that proper delivery requires discharge of cargo upon a fit and customary wharf ); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Imparca Lines, 646 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Union Steel America Co. v. M/V Sanko Spruce, 14 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that Harter Act imposes a duty on carriers to deliver the goods from wharf to wharf, to notify the consignee of the vessel's arrival, and to protect the cargo until the consignee has a reasonable opportunity to remove it ); Morse Electro Products Corp. v. S.S. Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474, 486 (D.N.J. 1977) (defining proper delivery as the discharge of . . . cargo to a fit and proper pier ). Courts also have distinguished the liability of a carrier from the liability of a warehouser of delivered cargo. In Goya Foods, Inc. v. S.S. Italica, 561 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a federal district court held that III The correctness of the majority's conclusion that COGSA and the Harter Act would govern Maher's liability if the goods had been damaged during discharge but before delivery is not disputed. Maher was a sub-contractor as defined in Hapag-Lloyd's bill of lading, and the bill of lading extended COGSA so that its provisions applied while the Goods are in the custody of the Carrier or his Sub-contractor at the sea-terminal in the United States of America before loading onto the Vessel or after discharge therefrom as the case may be. However, once proper delivery occurs applicability of the Harter Act and COGSA ceases and the stevedore then becomes responsible for the goods under the law of bailments. Goya Foods, supra, 561 F. Supp. at 1086. Several cases have absolved carriers from liability after proper delivery has occurred on the basis that the Harter Act no longer applies to the shipment. Hillcrest Sales, Inc. v. Chilean Line, Inc., 1 998 WL 961894, *5 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that cargo was properly delivered when carrier placed [goods] in the sheds pursuant to normal practice at the port to await . . . pick-up by plaintiff's contractors and/or agents ); J. Kinderman &amp; Sons v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Lines, 322 F. Supp. 939, 941-42 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (concluding that proper delivery occurred with discharge to a fit and customary wharf, reasonable notice given to the consignee, and fair opportunity for removal of goods from the pier). The majority relies on two Fourth Circuit cases to conclude that proper delivery has not occurred even though a consignee had notice of the cargo's arrival and the cargo had been discharged onto a fit and proper pier and later placed in storage. Ante at __ (slip op. at 24). However, in those cases the carrier was required to perform additional duties beyond discharging the cargo properly. Koppers Co., Inc. v. S/S Defiance, 704 F.2d 1309, 1312 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that bill of lading required [carrier] to load the cargo on one or more trucks for delivery ); B. Elliott, supra, 704 F.2d at 1308 (finding that carrier's stevedore was obligated to have the cargo removed from the container and placed in or on the overland truck ). The majority's conclusion that proper delivery under the Harter Act had not occurred until the cargo was stripped from the mafi and prepared for pickup is unpersuasive. Surely a stevedore cannot avoid liability as a bailee simply by refusing to remove goods from a mafi, irrespective of the period of retention. The record reveals that the cargo had been held on a mafi owned by Maher for six days. If that period had been six weeks, the Court would be hard pressed to conclude that proper delivery had not occurred. In my view, retention of the goods on a mafi, while relevant, should not determine time of delivery. The more relevant inquiry is whether, as a practical matter, the unloading process has been completed and the cargo has been placed by the stevedore in storage on a fit pier. That standard clearly has been satisfied here. The majority correctly notes that M.C. Machinery had not assumed actual physical control of the goods when they were damaged. Ante at __ (slip op. at 26). However, assumption of physical control of the machinery by the consignee is not required in determining whether proper delivery had occurred. Orient Overseas Line, supra, 365 A.2d at 335 (stating that proper delivery includes both actual or constructive delivery); Morse, supra, 437 F. Supp. at 486. The Harter Act, whose original purpose was to protect shippers of cargo, should not be construed to apply indefinitely after cargo has been delivered but has not been picked up by the consignee or its agent. Morse, supra, 437 F. Supp. at 487 (finding that [n]o term of the bill of lading extends the application of the Harter Act beyond its statutory reach ). The Court's result is incongruent with the purpose of the Harter Act and of COGSA, and extends the definition of proper delivery unnecessarily beyond the intended scope of those statutes. Proper delivery occurred in this case. Port Elizabeth is without question a fit and customary wharf for purposes of proper delivery under the Harter Act. Pursuant to its contract with Hapag-Lloyd, Maher unloaded the cargo from the ocean carrier on its own stringpiece without incident. Maher then placed the machine on one of its own mafis to transport it to its storage area. The machine remained in storage for almost a full week and was available for pickup by the consignee. Hapag-Lloyd's own Arrival Notice that was issued to M.C. Machinery stated that the cargo would be available for pickup on the date of discharge, and further provided: ALL CARGO WHEN DISCHARGED ON WHARF IS AT OWNER'S RISK AND, IF NOT REMOVED WITHIN THE FREE TIME, BECOMES SUBJECT TO DEMURRAGE CHARGES Therefore, the cargo had been removed safely from the ocean carrier, moved to a storage facility without incident, and proper notice had been given of the cargo's arrival and availability for pickup. Proper delivery, as contemplated by the Harter Act, clearly had occurred because the ocean carrier had fulfilled its obligations to discharge the cargo to a suitable place accessible to the consignee, and to give the consignee notice and a reasonable opportunity to pick up the cargo. IV Because I believe proper delivery had occurred where the cargo had been discharged onto a fit and proper pier, notice was properly given to the consignee, and the cargo was made available for pickup for six days after discharge from the vessel, I conclude that the Harter Act and COGSA's $500 liability limitation are inapplicable to this matter. I would reverse and remand the case to the Law Division for trial to determine the amount of damages defendant is liable for as bailee of the cargo. Justice Long joins in this opinion. NO. A-117 M.C. MACHINERY SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAHER TERMINALS, INC., Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED June 29, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz The Merchant agrees and acknowledges that the Carrier has no knowledge of the value of the Goods, and that higher compensation than that provided herein may not be claimed unless, with the consent of the Carrier, the value of the goods declared by the Shipper prior to the commencement of the Carriage is stated on this Bill of Lading and extra Freight Paid, if required. In that case, the amount of the declared value shall be substituted for the limits laid down in the Bill of Lading. Any partial loss or damage shall be adjusted pro rata on the basis of such declared value. The section on the face of the bill of lading providing for Shipper's Declared Value was left blank. The merchant undertakes that no claim or allegation shall be made against any Person whomsoever by whom the Carriage is performed or undertaken (including all Sub-Contractors of the Carrier) other than the Carrier, which imposes or attempts to impose upon any such Person, or any vessel owned by any such Person, any liability whatsoever in connection with the Goods or the Carriage of the Goods, whether or not arising out of negligence on the part of such Person and, if any such claim or allegation should nevertheless be made, to indemnify the Carrier against all consequences thereof. Without prejudice to the foregoing every such Person shall have the benefit of every right, defence [sic], limitation, and liberty of whatsoever nature herein contained or otherwise available to the Carrier, as if such provisions were expressly for his benefit; and in entering into this contract, the Carrier, to the extent of these provisions, does so not only on his own behalf but also as agent and trustee for such Persons.