Title: Columbia Plaza Associates v. Northeastern University
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13405
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 29, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13405 
 
COLUMBIA PLAZA ASSOCIATES  vs.  NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 2, 2023. - February 29, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.1 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Redevelopment Authority.  Practice, 
Civil, Motion to dismiss, Summary judgment, Retroactivity 
of judicial holding, Fraud, Attorney's fees.  Contract, 
Construction contract, Performance and breach, Implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Unjust enrichment, 
Promissory estoppel.  Constitutional Law, Right to petition 
government.  Unlawful Interference.  Unjust Enrichment.  
Declaratory Relief.  Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or 
deceptive act.  Fraud.  Frauds, Statute of. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 15, 2020. 
 
 
A special motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a 
motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment were heard 
by Rosemary Connolly, J.; a motion for attorney's fees was heard 
by Jackie A. Cowin, J., and entry of judgment was ordered by 
her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
Henry F. Owens, III (Richard K. Latimer & Robert Patrick 
Cooper also present) for the plaintiff. 
Daryl J. Lapp (Elizabeth H. Kelly also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Robert S. Mantell, Audrey Richardson, & Emma Hornsby for 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others. 
 
Robert C. Ross for NAIOP Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
Jeffrey J. Pyle for New England First Amendment Coalition. 
 
Mark S. Furman & Emily C. Shanahan for JACE Boston, LLC, 
& another. 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case is before us after a judge in the 
Superior Court allowed Northeastern University's 
(Northeastern's) special motion to dismiss various claims, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, and otherwise dismissed or 
entered summary judgment in favor of Northeastern on the 
plaintiff's remaining claims arising out of plans to develop a 
disputed parcel of land.  We conclude that all the claims were 
properly dismissed.  We also analyze the judge's ruling on the 
special motion to dismiss using a revised framework for 
assessing such motions under § 59H, known more commonly as the 
anti-SLAPP statute.  That revised framework, and the reasons 
necessitating such revision, have been set out in detail in a 
companion opinion issued today.  See Bristol Asphalt Co. v. 
Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc., 493 Mass.     (2024) (Bristol 
Asphalt).  Applying this framework, and upon consideration of 
the remaining issues before us on appeal, we affirm. 
3 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.2  i.  Linkage program.  In the 
late 1980s, the city of Boston (city), through the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority (BRA), created a "Parcel-to-Parcel 
Linkage Program" (linkage program) to develop land in its 
Roxbury section.  The linkage program sought to promote urban 
revitalization and to increase opportunities for minority 
participation in development by "linking" two parcels of 
property -- i.e., development of a profitable downtown property 
was linked to the development of property in Roxbury considered 
to be less commercially attractive.  A development team, with a 
required minority partner, was to be selected by the BRA.  An 
area identified for development in Roxbury, designated as parcel 
18 and consisting of five subparcels (18-1A, 18-1B, 18-2, 18-3A, 
and 18-3B), is at the heart of the instant dispute. 
ii.  1991 agreement and foreclosure.  The plaintiff, 
Columbia Plaza Associates (CPA), was formed for the purpose of 
participating in the linkage program and developing parcel 18.  
In 1991, CPA entered into a sale and construction agreement with 
 
2 On appeal from a grant of a special motion to dismiss, we 
state the facts as set forth in the pleadings and affidavits 
before the trial court.  See North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. 
Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 854 & n.5 (2009).  Here, 
because the plaintiff moved for summary judgment in response to 
the defendant's special motion to dismiss, and the court 
considered all the parties' pleadings and documentary evidence 
in ruling on both the special motion to dismiss and the motions 
for summary judgment, we do the same on appeal. 
4 
 
the BRA (1991 agreement) in which the BRA agreed to sell and CPA 
agreed to buy parcel 18 or certain subparcels thereof as 
designated by CPA and approved by the BRA, and CPA agreed to 
develop the land according to a master development plan approved 
by the BRA and the city's zoning commission.3  Specifically, 
under the 1991 agreement, CPA was to inform the BRA of its 
desire to develop and purchase a particular subparcel.  After 
providing notice, CPA was then supposed to "proceed in good 
faith and with all reasonable efforts" to satisfy the various 
conditions imposed on the sale and development under the 1991 
agreement, including submission and approval of a development 
plan.   
Under the 1991 agreement, CPA was allowed to mortgage the 
subparcels to secure debt related to their acquisition and 
development.  A party acquiring parcel 18 in foreclosure was 
limited to the three following options:  (1) complete 
construction on the subparcels in compliance with the 
requirements of the 1991 agreement, (2) sell title to the 
subparcels to a purchaser who would assume all "covenants, 
agreements and obligations of [CPA]" under the 1991 agreement, 
 
3 CPA formed a joint venture with another entity for the 
purpose of developing the subparcels.  CPA is the successor in 
interest to this joint venture, and for simplicity, we shall 
refer to actions or obligations undertaken by the joint venture 
as being undertaken by CPA. 
5 
 
or (3) reconvey fee simple title to the subparcels to the BRA.  
CPA obtained a mortgage on parcel 18 and built an office 
building on subparcel 18-1B.  For a short time, this building 
housed the registry of motor vehicles.  However, by the mid-
1990s, the registry had vacated this location and the building 
was condemned.  CPA's mortgage was foreclosed upon, and an 
affiliate of CPA's lender acquired parcel 18 in a foreclosure 
sale.  Northeastern subsequently purchased the land from this 
affiliate in November 1997.  The quitclaim deed conveying parcel 
18 to Northeastern also conveyed the affiliate's "rights arising 
under [the 1991 agreement], between [the BRA] and [CPA]," and 
provided that Northeastern would "assume the obligations set 
forth in [the 1991 agreement]."   
iii.  1999 agreement.  On June 30, 1999, the BRA, CPA, and 
Northeastern executed a "Second Amended and Restated Sale and 
Construction Agreement" (1999 agreement).  The 1999 agreement 
expressly rendered the 1991 agreement "null and void and of no 
further force and effect."  The 1999 agreement also stated that 
Northeastern intended "individually and/or through an affiliated 
entity of Northeastern meeting the definition of 'Developer'" to 
develop parcel 18.  The 1999 agreement defined "Developer" to 
mean "Northeastern or an affiliated entity of Northeastern, 
specifically including coventures with CPA, designated by 
Northeastern to develop the applicable phase."  The subparcels, 
6 
 
referred to as "Phase Parcels," were designated for separate 
development from one another, with subparcel 18-2 selected for 
the construction of a parking garage (garage parcel), and the 
remaining subparcels intended for the construction of buildings. 
Additionally, the parties agreed in 1999 to enter into a 
joint venture to acquire the garage parcel (second 1999 
agreement).  The second 1999 agreement also contained a 
provision whereby the parties agreed to enter into a joint 
venture agreement to develop a new building on subparcel 18-3A.  
Any such joint venture agreement was to be executed by the 
parties no later than six months after the closing date of the 
second 1999 agreement or a later date if the parties mutually 
agreed on an extension.  However, the parties never executed any 
such joint venture agreement within the six-month period and did 
not agree to extend the deadline.  
iv.  2007 development plan.  Over the next six years 
following the 1999 agreement, the parties explored the 
possibility of developing together a hotel on subparcel 18-3A, 
including hiring an outside firm to assess its economic 
feasibility.  However, the parties never entered into any formal 
agreement and, in 2007, Northeastern, in consultation with CPA 
and the BRA, abandoned plans to develop a hotel or other 
commercial building on subparcel 18-3A.  CPA agreed to the 
removal of subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B from the development plans 
7 
 
so that Northeastern could build a dormitory on those 
subparcels.  In turn, Northeastern agreed to seek to develop a 
hotel on subparcel 18-1A "in partnership" with CPA.  Thereafter, 
Northeastern and the BRA executed a new development plan (2007 
development plan).  The 2007 development plan stated that 
"Northeastern University in partnership with [CPA] . . . intends 
to proceed with construction on [subparcel 18-1A] (currently 
anticipated for use as a hotel)."  The 2007 development plan 
also formalized the removal of subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B from 
the master development plan and the linkage program. 
Between 2006 and 2008, the parties discussed development of 
a hotel on subparcel 18-1A.  After several months of silence 
from CPA in 2008, Northeastern sent a letter to CPA on March 26, 
2008, seeking to reinitiate discussions.  CPA responded on April 
2, 2008, stating that it intended to review the appropriate 
documents in order to foster an "informed dialogue."  On May 14, 
2008, Northeastern sent a letter to follow up with CPA, noting 
that while CPA's previous correspondence had indicated readiness 
to discuss the project in "two to three weeks," CPA had yet to 
respond to Northeastern's request to meet, and that, "despite 
repeated attempts," Northeastern had had "no substantive 
discussions" with anyone from CPA in the preceding five months.   
Nearly one year later, in March 2009, Northeastern 
communicated to CPA that while the economic situation had 
8 
 
deteriorated, raising concerns about the financial viability of 
the hotel project, Northeastern remained "dedicated to following 
through on its commitment to . . . proceed with the development 
of a hotel on Parcel 18."  Northeastern also noted the 
possibility of obtaining funding for the hotel project and 
requested a meeting to discuss financing.  Afterward, 
communications between Northeastern and CPA fell silent.   
v.  Subsequent court proceedings.  In 2013, CPA filed suit 
against Northeastern, raising various contractual and other 
claims arising out of allegations that Northeastern was 
contractually required to work with CPA in any development of 
subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B and that Northeastern's decision to 
build a dormitory on those parcels wrongfully deprived CPA of 
its development rights (2013 litigation).  CPA asserted that 
Northeastern had concealed its intentions and falsely 
represented to the BRA that it remained in partnership with CPA 
in order to obtain the necessary BRA approvals for construction 
of the dormitory.  After a trial, a judge in the Superior Court 
entered judgment for Northeastern.  On appeal, the Appeals Court 
affirmed the decision of the trial judge, and this court denied 
CPA's application for further appellate review.  See Columbia 
Plaza Assocs. v. Northeastern Univ., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 
(2018). 
9 
 
On May 9, 2017, CPA sent a letter to the BRA's successor, 
the Boston Planning and Development Administration (BPDA), 
demanding that it "compel Northeastern to present CPA with a 
joint venture for [subparcel 18-1A, i.e., the proposed hotel 
project], to provide a significant return to CPA, as 
Northeastern . . . clearly will not do [so] on its own 
initiative."  On May 25, 2017, Northeastern sent a letter to the 
BPDA denying CPA's claims.  Northeastern asserted that it owned 
all of parcel 18, including "all of the development rights" and 
that CPA did not own any "development rights in Parcel 18 or any 
of its sub-parcels."  In support, Northeastern pointed to the 
trial judge's decision in the 2013 litigation, arguing that she 
had ruled that "CPA does not have -- and never had -- any actual 
'development rights' in relation to" subparcel 18-3A or 18-1A.  
In June 2019, CPA contacted Northeastern about developing a 
hotel on subparcel 18-1A, but Northeastern rejected CPA's 
outreach, again claiming CPA had no interest of any kind in 
subparcel 18-1A.  In November 2019, Northeastern notified the 
BPDA of its intent to develop subparcel 18-1A for its own use.   
b.  Procedural history.  In December 2020, CPA commenced 
the instant suit against Northeastern, alleging breach of 
contract (counts I and II), breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing (count III), interference with 
advantageous economic relations (count IV), unjust enrichment 
10 
 
(count V), commercial fraud (count VI), and unfair or deceptive 
acts in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11 (counts VII and VIII), 
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (counts IX and X, 
respectively).  Northeastern filed a special motion to dismiss 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, or, in the alternative, a 
motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 
754 (1974).  CPA in turn moved for partial summary judgment on 
counts I, II, III, VII, and VIII.  A judge in the Superior Court 
(motion judge) allowed Northeastern's special motion to dismiss 
under § 59H, with respect to CPA's claims of fraud, as well as 
CPA's claims of unfair or deceptive acts in violation of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11, insofar as those counts were based on allegations 
of misrepresentations by Northeastern to the BPDA.  The motion 
judge denied the special motion to dismiss as to all remaining 
counts, but allowed Northeastern's motion to dismiss, pursuant 
to rule 12 (b) (6), as to CPA's claims for interference with 
advantageous economic relations, unjust enrichment, declaratory 
judgment, and injunctive relief.  The motion judge granted 
summary judgment in favor of Northeastern on all remaining 
claims.4  CPA appealed, and we accepted this case on direct 
appellate review. 
 
4 In its opposition to CPA's motion for partial summary 
judgment, Northeastern requested that the court enter summary 
judgment in favor of Northeastern on the counts at issue.  With 
 
11 
 
2.  Special motion to dismiss.  a.  Simplified anti-SLAPP 
framework.  In Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at    , also issued 
today, we have simplified and clarified the existing framework 
for assessing special motions to dismiss filed under G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute, and explained 
in detail our reasons for doing so. 
Under the first stage of this revised framework, the 
special motion proponent has a threshold burden to show that the 
challenged claim is based solely on the proponent's exercise of 
its right to petition, with no "substantial basis other than or 
in addition to the petitioning activities implicated."  
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167 
(1998).  As we clarify today in Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. 
at    , we no longer parse the factual basis for a claim to 
determine if some portion of the claim could independently 
support the asserted cause of action, so as to permit partial 
dismissal of the claim under Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., 
Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 155-156 (2017) (Blanchard I), S.C., 483 
Mass. 200 (2019).  Rather, if the special motion proponent 
cannot demonstrate that the claim is based solely on the 
 
the parties' agreement, the motion judge ruled on these counts 
using a summary judgment standard. 
12 
 
proponent's own petitioning activity, the special motion must be 
denied.5  
If, however, the claim is based solely on the special 
motion proponent's petitioning activity, the burden shifts to 
the special motion opponent.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H, first 
par.  To defeat the motion at this second stage, the special 
motion opponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the special motion proponent's petitioning activity (1) was 
devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable legal 
basis; and (2) caused the special motion opponent actual injury.  
See id.  If the special motion opponent makes both showings, the 
special motion is denied.  Otherwise, the special motion is 
allowed.  
As we explain in Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at   , we 
abandon the "second path" for defeating the special motion, 
which allowed a special motion opponent to prevail by 
demonstrating that its claims were "colorable" and had not been 
raised for the primary purpose of chilling the special motion 
proponent's legitimate petitioning activity.  See Blanchard I, 
477 Mass. at 159-161.  Additionally, as we also clarify in our 
 
5 This revision to the existing anti-SLAPP framework is 
particularly relevant in the instant case as the motion judge 
employed such analysis to dismiss the portion of the G. L. 
c. 93A claims that were based solely on petitioning activity. 
13 
 
companion opinion, a ruling on a special motion to dismiss is 
subject to de novo review on appeal. 
b.  Applicability of simplified anti-SLAPP framework to  
instant case.  As an initial matter, we address whether the 
simplified anti-SLAPP framework that we set forth today applies 
to the instant case.  When this court construes a statute, our 
holding is presumptively given retroactive application, although 
we retain discretion to apply the rule prospectively in limited 
circumstances.  See McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. 257, 261 
(2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011) ("Where a decision 
does not announce new common-law rules or rights but rather 
construes a statute, no analysis of retroactive or prospective 
effect is required because at issue is the meaning of the 
statute since its enactment"); Mouradian v. General Elec. Co., 
23 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 542 n.3 (1987), quoting 1 K.C. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 5.09 (1958) (Davis) ("If an 
interpretative rule is merely an interpretation of a statute, 
and if the meaning of the statute has been there from the time 
of its original enactment, then no problem of a retroactive 
interpretative rule can arise, for either the interpretative 
rule expresses the true meaning of the statute or it does not; 
if it does, then that is what the statute has always meant and 
the rule has not changed the law").  See also Eaton v. Federal 
Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 587-588 (2012) (explaining 
14 
 
presumption of retroactive application, with prospective-only 
application being reserved for exceptional circumstances). 
Our holding today is intended to "give effect to the clear 
meaning of a statute," a meaning that has not changed for these 
purposes since its original enactment.  Dellorusso v. PNC Bank, 
N.A., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 87 (2020).  See Davis, supra.  This 
"purpose is best accomplished through retroactive application."  
Dellorusso, supra at 87-88.  In today's decision, we also return 
to the framework that governed special motions to dismiss for 
twenty years, until our holding in Blanchard I.  Thus we are 
returning to an earlier interpretation, rather than developing a 
brand new one, limiting any possible disruptive effect of 
imposing the change at issue.  Accordingly, the simplifications 
to our existing anti-SLAPP framework, set forth in Bristol 
Asphalt, 493 Mass. at    , also issued today, are applicable to 
cases in which an anti-SLAPP motion or appeal remains pending as 
of this court's issuance of the rescript in Bristol Asphalt.   
i.  Stage one:  Northeastern's threshold burden.  Applying 
the simplified anti-SLAPP framework, Northeastern had a 
threshold burden to show that the claims at issue were based 
solely on Northeastern's exercise of its right of petition, as 
defined in G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Northeastern contended that all 
of CPA's claims were based solely on Northeastern petitioning 
the BPDA to unilaterally develop subparcel 18-1A.  However, the 
15 
 
alleged factual basis for most of CPA's claims was not solely 
Northeastern's petitioning of the BPDA, but the existence of 
contractual agreements between the parties.  That is, the 
alleged conduct that gave rise to CPA's claims sounding in 
contract was Northeastern's decision to enter into agreements 
with CPA, and then act in violation of CPA's alleged rights 
under those agreements.  See Duracraft Corp., 427 Mass. at 165 
("Many preexisting legal relationships may properly limit a 
party's right to petition, including enforceable contracts in 
which parties waive rights to otherwise legitimate 
petitioning").  Accordingly, the motion judge properly found 
that Northeastern failed to meet its threshold burden as to the 
claims for breach of contract (counts I and II), breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count III), 
interference with advantageous economic relations (count IV), 
unjust enrichment (count V), and declaratory and injunctive 
relief (counts IX and X), as each of these claims was based on 
preexisting contractual agreements, not solely communications 
with the BPDA.  See id. at 168 (nondisclosure agreement 
constituted substantial basis other than defendant's petitioning 
activity to support breach of contract claims). 
The motion judge, however, distinguished CPA's claims for 
unfair or deceptive acts in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, 
which are based upon both the allegation that Northeastern 
16 
 
petitioned the BPDA in violation of CPA's alleged contractual 
rights, as well as the allegation that Northeastern 
"misrepresent[ed] to the BPDA that CPA's rights on [subparcel] 
18-1A were extinguished."  The motion judge analyzed the c. 93A 
claims under each theory of liability, in order to determine 
whether a portion of either claim was based solely on 
Northeastern's petitioning activity, in accord with the 
augmented framework set forth in Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 143 
(holding that defendant may meet threshold burden as to portion 
of claim that is based solely on petitioning activity). 
Applying this augmented framework, the motion judge 
determined that Northeastern was entitled to dismissal of these 
claims in part.  However, under the simplified anti-SLAPP 
framework we adopt today, such parsing analysis is not 
appropriate.  Because a substantial factual basis for the c. 93A 
claims was the allegation that Northeastern acted in violation 
of its contractual agreements with CPA, Northeastern failed to 
meet its threshold burden of showing that these claims are based 
solely on its petitioning activity.  Accordingly, the special 
motion to dismiss should have been denied as to both c. 93A 
claims.6 
 
6 Although we do not join in the conclusion reached by the 
motion judge that Northeastern was entitled to dismissal under 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, as to a portion of the c. 93A claims, we 
 
17 
 
Finally, we address CPA's remaining claim for "commercial 
fraud."  Unlike the counts described above, this claim appears 
to be based entirely on the allegation that Northeastern 
"false[ly] represent[ed] to the BPDA that a Superior Court judge 
found that CPA has no remaining development rights on Parcel 
18," in reference to the outcome of the 2013 litigation 
concerning subparcel 18-3A.  Because this allegation relied on a 
written statement that Northeastern submitted to a governmental 
agency, the BPDA, it constituted petitioning activity.  See 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, sixth par. (defining petitioning activity 
to include "any written or oral statement made before or 
submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any 
other governmental proceeding").  See also North Am. Expositions 
Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 862 (2009), and 
cases cited (statements made to governmental bodies need not be 
made within context of formal government proceedings to 
constitute petitioning activity).  Thus, Northeastern met its 
threshold burden, as the special motion proponent, with respect 
to count VI of CPA's complaint. 
ii.  Stage two:  CPA's burden.  For count VI, the burden 
then shifted to CPA, the party opposing the special motion, to 
show that Northeastern's petitioning activity (1) was devoid of 
 
nonetheless affirm the entry of judgment in favor of 
Northeastern on these claims, for reasons detailed infra. 
18 
 
any reasonable factual support or any arguable legal basis; and 
(2) caused CPA actual injury.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Here, 
CPA focused on a passage toward the end of Northeastern's 
letter, which, after summarizing the 2013 litigation, stated 
that, "as the Superior Court has ruled, CPA does not have -- and 
never had -- any actual 'development rights' in relation to 
[subparcel] 18-3A or 18-1A."   
Far from being "devoid" of reasonable support, 
Northeastern's statement was squarely supported by the judge's 
ruling in the 2013 litigation.  Although the 2013 litigation 
concerned whether CPA's "rights" to parcel 18 had been 
extinguished in subparcel 18-3A specifically, and not 18-1A, the 
judge defined the nature of CPA's "rights" as follows:  "they 
were not much better than a fishing license:  they essentially 
gave CPA the opportunity to become a developer on a project 
provided that it met the BRA's rigorous prerequisites, which 
included a demonstration that it had a specific and economically 
feasible development plan" (emphasis in original).  
Northeastern's letter stated that CPA did not have "any actual 
'development rights'" to subparcel 18-1A because its "rights" 
amounted to no more than an opportunity to participate as a 
developer in the event that certain prerequisites were met, 
effectively paraphrasing the above-quoted language from the 
19 
 
judge's decision.  Accordingly, we affirm the allowance of the 
special motion to dismiss count VI of CPA's complaint. 
3.  Adjudication of remaining claims.  The motion judge 
disposed of CPA's remaining claims by ruling on Northeastern's 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the parties' 
cross motions for summary judgment.  On appeal, both types of 
motions are subject to de novo review.  See Santos v. U.S. Bank 
Nat'l Ass'n, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 691 (2016).  Where, as here, 
both parties have moved for summary judgment, see note 4, supra, 
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom judgment was entered -- here, CPA -- to determine 
whether all material facts have been established such that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Twomey 
v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267 (2014).  See Abrahamson v. 
Estate of LeBold, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 225 (2016) (applying 
standard of review applicable to summary judgment where motion 
to dismiss was converted to motion for summary judgment). 
a.  Count I -- breach of 1999 agreement.  CPA's first 
breach of contract claim is based upon its contention that 
Northeastern committed a breach of the 1999 agreement by 
rejecting CPA's request to develop subparcel 18-1A in June 2019 
and notifying the BPDA of Northeastern's intent to develop that 
subparcel for its sole institutional use.  We review the record 
in the light most favorable to CPA.  That record nonetheless 
20 
 
reveals that after the 1999 agreement, CPA lost development 
rights in all the subparcels, except for the right to develop 
the garage parcel.  
To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff 
is required to demonstrate that "there was an agreement between 
the parties; the agreement was supported by consideration; the 
plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform his or her 
part of the contract; the defendant committed a breach of the 
contract; and the plaintiff suffered harm as a result."  Bulwer 
v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 690 (2016).  To determine 
the intent of contracting parties, we consider the "words used 
by the parties, the agreement taken as a whole and the 
surrounding facts and circumstances."  MCI WorldCom 
Communications, Inc. v. Department of Telecomm. & Energy, 442 
Mass. 103, 112 (2004).  If the words of a contract are clear, 
they are dispositive as to the meaning of the contract.  See 
EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness, 473 Mass. 540, 549 (2016).   
Section 102(r) of the 1999 agreement states that "for every 
Phase, the Developer shall be Northeastern or an affiliated 
entity of Northeastern, specifically including coventures with 
CPA, designated by Northeastern to develop the applicable Phase 
. . . .  It is hereby agreed that the Developer of the Garage 
Parcel shall be the Northeastern/CPA Venture."  While this 
language provides CPA with the right to develop the garage 
21 
 
parcel with Northeastern, it does not grant CPA development 
rights in any of the other subparcels.  Rather, the 1999 
agreement specifies that Northeastern "shall be" the developer 
for every subparcel and that Northeastern may designate an 
affiliated entity, specifically including CPA, as a developer 
for the other subparcels.   
If the parties intended to make CPA a codeveloper for every 
subparcel, the language in § 102(r) allowing Northeastern to 
"designate" CPA as a developer and agreeing that Northeastern 
and CPA "shall be" the garage parcel developers would be 
superfluous.  Gibraltar Fin. Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
400 Mass. 870, 872 (1987) ("It is a standard rule of 
construction that interpretations which result in meaningless 
words are to be avoided"). 
Moreover, the 1999 agreement extinguished any remaining 
rights in parcel 18 that CPA might have had under the 1991 
agreement.  Section 101 of the 1999 agreement states that the 
1991 agreement is "null and void and of no further force and 
effect."  The intent of § 101 is unambiguous:  the 1991 
agreement is no longer in force and the parties' rights and 
obligations are now governed by the 1999 agreement.   
CPA nonetheless argues that language in the preamble 
reveals an intent to amend and restate the 1991 agreement, thus 
incorporating CPA's development rights under the 1991 agreement 
22 
 
into the 1999 agreement:  "the [BRA], Northeastern and CPA wish 
to further amend and restate the terms of the Original Sale 
Agreement and Original Amended Sale Agreement as set forth 
herein."  While recitals may assist us in interpreting the body 
of the 1999 agreement, they do not create enforceable rights in 
and of themselves.  See Cullinet Software, Inc. v. McCormack & 
Dodge Corp., 400 Mass. 775, 776 n.1 (1987).  Here, the general 
language contained in the preamble is undercut by the more 
specific statement in § 101 that the 1991 agreement is null and 
void.   
CPA also posits that § 302 of the 1999 agreement gave it 
veto rights over development on all of parcel 18.  Section 302 
refers to the "Master Plan and the . . . Development Plan for 
each Phase [(i.e., the development plans for each subparcel)], 
as they may be amended and revised by the agreement of the 
parties thereto."  CPA reads this as requiring that Northeastern 
obtain agreement of all the parties to the 1999 agreement (i.e., 
both CPA and the BRA) before making changes to the development 
plans for any of the subparcels.  Thus, CPA would have a veto 
right over the development of subparcel 18-1A, even if the 1999 
agreement extinguished its development rights.  A more sensible 
reading is that Northeastern must get agreement from the parties 
to each individual development plan for any modifications to 
that development plan.  As CPA was only designated as a 
23 
 
"Developer" for the garage parcel, Northeastern only needed 
CPA's permission to make changes to the development plan for the 
garage parcel.  CPA's position is further undermined by the fact 
that the 1999 agreement reserves Northeastern's right to amend 
the master development plan and submit a new development plan, 
subject to approval by the BRA and the city's zoning commission.  
Nowhere in this section is CPA's approval required or discussed.      
"[A]n unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to 
its terms."  Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 412 Mass. 703, 
706 (1992).  By its terms, the 1999 agreement states that (1) 
the 1991 agreement, including any development rights conferred 
to CPA, was rendered "null and void," and (2) except for the 
garage parcel, CPA did not have any development rights in parcel 
18.  Therefore, Northeastern did not commit a breach of the 1999 
agreement by seeking to unilaterally develop subparcel 18-1A and 
the Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment on count I 
in Northeastern's favor.  
 
b.  Count II -- breach of 2007 agreement.  CPA's second 
breach of contract claim centers around its assertion that 
Northeastern's attempt to unilaterally develop subparcel 18-1A 
violated an unwritten agreement between the parties in 2007 
(2007 agreement), in which CPA surrendered its rights in 
subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B in exchange for development rights on 
subparcel 18-1A.  CPA appears to find proof of the 2007 
24 
 
agreement in the 2007 development plan, in which Northeastern 
removed subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B from the original development 
plan and stated its intent to develop a hotel on subparcel 18-1A 
"in partnership" with CPA.  CPA's second breach of contract 
claim also fails. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to CPA, CPA had no 
contractual rights in subparcel 18-1A.  The parties had 
previously discussed possible projects on various subparcels, 
including subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B, but none of these 
discussions ever ripened into a final, written agreement.  As of 
2007, the parties had conducted some preliminary discussions 
around developing a hotel on subparcel 18-3A.  When Northeastern 
decided to develop a dormitory on subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B, it 
appears the parties agreed to shift the possible hotel 
development to subparcel 18-1A.  Again, the record indicates 
that, for a time, both parties engaged in some discussions 
around developing a hotel but failed to reach an agreement that 
would give CPA enforceable rights.  Nothing in the record 
indicates that Northeastern ever agreed to a binding commitment 
to build a hotel on subparcel 18-1A.  Cf. Mendel Kern, Inc. v. 
Workshop, Inc., 400 Mass. 277, 280-281 (1987) (letter of intent 
to enter into lease was not binding promise because it merely 
expressed "intention to do something" at future date).  
Therefore, CPA had no contractual rights to subparcel 18-1A and 
25 
 
Northeastern was under no binding obligation to build a hotel 
with CPA on subparcel 18-1A.   
Moreover, any oral agreement would be unenforceable under 
the Statute of Frauds.  See G. L. c. 259, § 1.  Nor could the 
2007 development plan render a verbal agreement enforceable, as 
it was not signed by either Northeastern or CPA.  See id. 
(agreement must be "in writing and signed by the party to be 
charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully 
authorized").   
The 2007 development plan similarly does not "contain 
directly, or by implication, all of the essential terms of the 
parties' agreement."  See Simon v. Simon, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 
709 (1994) (holding lease agreement did not satisfy Statute of 
Frauds where it failed to define lease duration).  It states 
that Northeastern, in partnership with CPA,  
"intends to proceed with construction on [subparcel 18-1A] 
(currently anticipated for use as a hotel) as contemplated 
by the [2007] Development Plan, continuing the 
revitalization of the development now known as Renaissance 
Park.  The purpose of this Development Plan is to remove 
[subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B] . . . from the Development 
Area and to rescind the Master Plan, prior to proceeding 
with development on [subparcel 18-1A]." 
  
While this suggests the outline of a possible agreement, the 
2007 development plan itself is at most a statement of intent.  
See Schwanbeck, 412 Mass. at 706-707 ("[a] promise made with an 
understood intention that it is not to be legally binding, but 
26 
 
only expressive of a present intention, is not a contract" 
[citation omitted]).   
 
Indeed, the references to "proposed" actions and 
"anticipated uses," and the use of the future tense throughout, 
suggest an intent to set forth preliminary terms that were to be 
finalized at a later date.  Mendel Kern, Inc., 400 Mass. at 279 
(statements in future tense of actions to be taken indicative of 
future contractual intent, not existence of current agreement).  
While a valid contract may be "contingent on future events," the 
contract must "provide mechanisms to narrow present 
uncertainties to rights and obligations."  Lafayette Place 
Assocs. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 427 Mass. 509, 518 (1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999).  Here, many aspects of the 
development are merely proposed and thus subject to change until 
approved by the BRA.  Accordingly, it does not create a binding 
contract.  Contrast id. (holding that agreement was enforceable, 
despite lack of firm purchase price, because agreement provided 
for pricing formula and "most of the information needed to 
complete that formula was available").   
Nor can the 2007 agreement be enforced against Northeastern 
under the theory of promissory estoppel.7  Promissory estoppel 
 
7 CPA also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the 
2007 agreement can be enforced under the theory of judicial 
estoppel.  By failing to raise this argument below, CPA has 
 
27 
 
requires "(1) a representation intended to induce reliance on 
the part of a person to whom the representation is made; (2) an 
act or omission by that person in reasonable reliance on the 
representation; and (3) detriment as a consequence of the act or 
omission."  Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the 
Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 27-28 (2006), quoting Bongaards v. 
Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 15 (2003).  A promissory estoppel claim 
"is equivalent to a contract action, and the party bringing such 
an action must prove all the necessary elements of a contract 
other than consideration."  Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank 
v. Varadian, 419 Mass. 841, 850 (1995).  However, as discussed 
above, both the 2007 agreement and the 2007 development plan are 
statements of intent or agreements to negotiate, not unambiguous 
promises to develop property with CPA.  See id. (rejecting 
promissory estoppel claim where evidence failed to support 
finding that "'promise' in the contractual sense had been 
made").8  Nor does CPA point to facts in the record demonstrating 
 
waived it.  See Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 
285 (2006). 
 
8 To the extent CPA seeks to base its theory of promissory 
estoppel on Northeastern's position as articulated in the 2013 
litigation, it must also fail.  The trial judge's decision in 
that case referenced Northeastern's position that CPA "has 
certain rights in connection with development of [subparcel 18-
1A] and does not seek any order that would extinguish them."  As 
discussed supra, the trial judge characterized the nature of 
CPA's rights as "not much better than a fishing license."  
 
28 
 
actions that it took in reliance on Northeastern's alleged 
promise to develop a hotel with CPA on subparcel 18-1A, or any 
detriment suffered as a result.  Contrast Sullivan, 448 Mass. at 
28-29 (plaintiffs stated claim for promissory estoppel where 
they alleged that they had refrained from suing defendant in 
reliance on defendant's promises to address safety concerns in 
office building). 
c.  Count III -- breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.  We turn next to CPA's claim that 
Northeastern committed a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.  "Every contract implies good faith and 
fair dealing between the parties to it" (citation omitted).  
Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 471 
(1991).  However, the covenant does not create new rights and 
duties not already provided for in the contract.  Ayash v. Dana-
Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 385, cert. denied sub nom. 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 546 U.S. 927 (2005) ("The scope of 
the covenant is only as broad as the contract that governs the 
particular relationship").  Accordingly, because the 1999 and 
 
Acknowledging these rights in relation to subparcel 18-1A, 
without more, is not an unambiguous promise by Northeastern to 
develop a hotel on that parcel.  Cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 
425 Mass. 756, 760 (1997) (rejecting plaintiff's estoppel 
argument on basis that no enforceable promise existed, where 
plaintiff asked about regular work hours, and was so informed, 
but ultimately worked much later hours).   
29 
 
2007 agreements did not create any contractual obligation for 
Northeastern to involve CPA in the development of subparcel 18-
1A, Northeastern's failure to do so cannot constitute a breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Contrast 
Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., supra at 471-473 (refusal to approve 
changes to developer's plan constituted breach of implied 
covenant where developer had already spent years working on 
development and approval was unreasonably withheld in order to 
extract more favorable concessions).   
d.  Counts VII and VIII -- unfair or deceptive business 
practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A.  We turn to CPA's claims 
that Northeastern violated G. L. c. 93A by unilaterally 
petitioning the BPDA to develop subparcel 18-1A for its own use 
and repudiating CPA's rights in that subparcel.  General Laws 
c. 93A, § 2 (a), makes unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 
trade or commerce."  To determine whether conduct rises to the 
level of an unfair act or practice, courts look to the following 
factors:  "(1) whether the conduct is within at least the 
penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established 
concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers or other businesses" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington 
30 
 
St., LLC, 489 Mass. 1, 14 (2022).  Business conduct "in 
disregard of known contractual arrangements" and aimed at 
securing benefits for the breaching party is an unfair act or 
practice under G. L. c. 93A.  Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., 411 
Mass. at 474, quoting Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, 
Inc., 398 Mass. 854, 857 (1986).  However, a mere refusal to 
deal, without more, is not an unfair trade practice.  See PMP 
Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to CPA, the facts show 
no conduct by Northeastern that rises to the level of an unfair 
or deceptive practice.  The record before us only establishes 
that Northeastern refused to deal with CPA after multiple 
unsuccessful attempts to advance the hotel project.  See PMP 
Assocs., Inc., 366 Mass. at 596.  And contrary to CPA's 
contention, this case is markedly dissimilar to Anthony's Pier 
Four, Inc., 411 Mass. at 453 n.3, 467-468, where the underlying 
contract clearly required that the landowner work with the 
developer on the development of the property.  Here, 
Northeastern had no contractual obligation to involve CPA and 
thus did not act unfairly or deceptively in repudiating CPA's 
claims.  Nor did Northeastern use its refusal to deal to extract 
some sort of benefit from CPA.  Contrast H1 Lincoln, Inc., 489 
Mass. at 15 (unfair trade practice where defendant provided 
"pretextual and unreasonable grounds" for terminating lease and 
31 
 
then offered to reinstate lease to extract financial concessions 
from plaintiff); Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., supra at 473. 
Lastly, we consider whether Northeastern's characterization 
of the 2013 litigation in its letter to the BPDA constitutes a 
deceptive business act or practice.  As discussed supra in our 
discussion of the special motion to dismiss, Northeastern's 
characterization was essentially accurate, and not a 
misrepresentation constituting deception in violation of G. L. 
c. 93A.  See generally Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 
381, 394 (2004) (act or practice is deceptive if it possesses 
tendency to deceive).  See also Nissan Autos. of Marlborough, 
Inc. v. Glick, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 312 (2004) (lawyer's 
refusal to convey property under lease's purchase option was not 
"unfair or deceptive act" because "it was a prophylactic action 
taken in accordance with his earnestly held interpretation of 
the document and the law"). 
e.  Count IV -- intentional interference with advantageous 
economic relationship.  To succeed on a claim for intentional 
interference with advantageous relations, a plaintiff must prove 
that  
"(1) [it] had an advantageous relationship with a third 
party (e.g., a present or prospective contract or 
employment relationship); (2) the defendant knowingly 
induced a breaking of the relationship; (3) the defendant's 
interference with the relationship, in addition to being 
intentional, was improper in motive or means; and (4) the 
plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions." 
32 
 
   
Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255, 260 (2007).   
 
The improper means or motive required to support a claim 
for intentional interference is "actual malice" or "a spiteful, 
malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate corporate 
interest" (citations omitted).  King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 
587 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1 (1996).  "The motivation of 
personal gain, including financial gain, however, generally is 
not enough" to constitute improper motive.  Id. 
Here, the requirements are not satisfied.  In particular, 
CPA has identified no improper motive or means as required by 
our case law.  Viewed in the light most favorable to CPA, the 
record establishes only that Northeastern acted in its own 
corporate self-interest when it sought to develop subparcel 18-
1A for its own institutional use after multiple unsuccessful 
attempts to advance the hotel project.  This, without more, is 
not an improper means or motive.  See King, 418 Mass. at 587.  
See also Pembroke Country Club, Inc. v. Regency Sav. Bank, 
F.S.B., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 39 (2004) (defendant's "legitimate 
advancement of its own economic interest" was not improper 
motive or means for purposes of tortious interference claim).  
Accordingly, CPA was not entitled to relief on this claim as a 
matter of law. 
33 
 
f.  Count V -- unjust enrichment.  CPA's claim for unjust 
enrichment similarly fails as a matter of law.  Unjust 
enrichment is the "retention of money or property of another 
against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good 
conscience" (citation omitted).  Sacks v. Dissinger, 488 Mass. 
780, 789 (2021).  A plaintiff must show that (1) he or she 
conferred a measurable benefit on the defendant, (2) he or she 
reasonably expected compensation from the defendant, and (3) the 
defendant accepted the benefit with knowledge of the plaintiff's 
reasonable expectation.  Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Kelly, 97 
Mass. App. Ct. 325, 335 (2020).   
CPA's unjust enrichment claim fails because the record does 
not establish a monetary or property benefit that CPA conferred 
on Northeastern.  See Tedeschi-Freij v. Percy Law Group, P.C., 
99 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 780 (2021) (attorney's unjust enrichment 
claim, based on law firm's continued use of her name after she 
had departed firm, failed as matter of law where record 
contained no evidence that firm derived quantifiable benefit 
from continued use of name).  Contrast Liss v. Studeny, 450 
Mass. 473, 479 (2008) (lawyer's competent representation of 
client in course of lawsuit conferred "measurable benefit" to 
client, notwithstanding fact that lawsuit was ultimately 
unsuccessful). 
34 
 
g.  Counts IX and X -- declaratory and injunctive relief.  
CPA's complaint also requested entry of a judgment declaring 
that Northeastern must include CPA on any development of 
subparcel 18-1A or otherwise compensate CPA for the value of 
such development, as well as an injunction mandating that 
Northeastern negotiate in good faith with CPA for payment of the 
"fair and reasonable value" of CPA's alleged development rights 
in subparcel 18-1A as a condition precedent to proceeding with 
its development application before the BPDA.  Both counts fail 
as a matter of law because CPA has no development rights for 
which Northeastern must provide compensation.  See School Comm. 
of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Sch. of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 
516, 518 (1946) (declaratory judgment available if party 
demonstrates it has "definite interest" in legal right denied by 
another).  See also Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 
349, 353 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that injunctive relief is 
not stand-alone cause of action under Massachusetts law).  
4.  Attorney's fees.  Finally, we address the issue of 
attorney's fees in light of CPA's contention that Northeastern 
should not have been awarded attorney's fees under G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H, because this is not a "SLAPP suit."  Where, as here, a 
judge allows a special motion to dismiss a plaintiff's claim, 
"[t]he judge has no discretion in deciding whether to award 
costs and fees."  McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 349–350 
35 
 
(2000).  Such an award is mandatory under the statute.  See 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.   
Because Northeastern was entitled to attorney's fees under 
the statute, and because CPA does not argue that the amount 
awarded was unreasonable, we do not consider the reasonableness 
of the award on appeal.  See McLarnon, 431 Mass. at 349–350.  In 
its brief, Northeastern has requested an award of appellate 
attorney's fees and costs as well.  Because we affirm the ruling 
of the motion judge allowing the special motion to dismiss as to 
count VI, Northeastern is entitled to such an award.  See Benoit 
v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 154 (2009).  Accordingly, within 
fourteen days of issuance of the rescript in this matter, 
Northeastern may file a petition for reasonable appellate 
attorney's fees and costs in accordance with the procedure set 
forth in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10–11 (2004).  See O'Gara 
v. St. Germain, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 501 (2017). 
5.  Conclusion.  We affirm the allowance of Northeastern's 
special motion to dismiss count VI of CPA's complaint.  We also 
affirm the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of 
Northeastern on counts I, II, III, VII, and VIII, as well as the 
36 
 
allowance of Northeastern's motion to dismiss counts IV, V, VI, 
IX, and X.9 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
9 Northeastern has moved to strike a letter that CPA filed 
after oral argument in this case.  Because our decision does not 
rest on the contents of CPA's letter, we need not consider the 
motion.  See Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 442 Mass. 
660, 674 n.29 (2004).