Title: Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Construction, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12352
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2018

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SJC-12352 
 
TERRY BRIDGWOOD  vs.  A.J. WOOD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,1 & others.2 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 8, 2018. - August 29, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Home Improvement Contractors.  Consumer Protection Act, Unfair 
or deceptive act.  Repose, Statute of.  Practice, Civil, 
Consumer protection case, Claim barred by statute of 
repose. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 22, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by James F. Lang, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Roy D. Toulan, Jr., for the plaintiff. 
 
Lili K. Geller for A.J. Wood Construction, Inc., & another. 
 
Mark C. Darling for Anthony Caggiano. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Martin J. Rooney for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association. 
                     
 
1 Also known as A.J. Wood Construction. 
 
 
2 Richard Smith and Anthony Caggiano. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Ryan D. Sullivan for Eastern Massachusetts Chapter of the 
National Association of the Remodeling Industry. 
 
John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  At issue in this case is whether a claim 
alleging that a building contractor committed an unfair or 
deceptive act under G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 9, by violating G. L. 
c. 142A, § 17 (10), is subject to the six-year statute of repose 
set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B.  The plaintiff, Terry 
Bridgwood, commenced this action in 2016, alleging that 
renovations performed in 2000 and 2001 by the defendants, A.J. 
Wood Construction, Inc. (A.J. Wood); its principal, Richard 
Smith; and its subcontractor, Anthony Caggiano, caused a fire in 
her home in 2012.  On the defendants' motions, a judge in the 
Superior Court dismissed the complaint as untimely under the 
statute of repose.  Bridgwood appeals, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion.3  Because we agree that 
this case is within the ambit of the statute of repose, we 
affirm.4 
                     
 
3 Terry Bridgwood filed a notice of appeal as to Caggiano 
and a separate notice of appeal as to A.J. Wood Construction, 
Inc., and Smith.  We consolidated the two appeals when we 
transferred them. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge amicus briefs submitted by Massachusetts 
Defense Lawyers Association, Eastern Massachusetts Chapter of 
the National Association of the Remodeling Industry, and New 
England Legal Foundation. 
3 
 
 
 
 
Facts.  The defendants filed what was styled a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974) and Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1975).  
Under either rule, we accept as true all facts pleaded by 
Bridgwood in her amended complaint.  See Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 
Mass. 526, 530 (2002);  Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 
427 Mass. 46, 47 (1998).   See Jarosz, supra at 529, quoting 
J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 12.16 (1974) (motion 
pursuant to rule 12 [c] is "actually a motion to dismiss . . . 
[that] argues that the complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted"). 
 
On October 30, 2000, the city of Newburyport, through its 
housing rehabilitation program, awarded A.J. Wood and Smith a 
contract for the rehabilitation of Bridgwood's home in 
Newburyport.  Smith and A.J. Wood retained Caggiano as the 
electrical subcontractor for the rehabilitation of the premises.  
Newburyport's contractor agreement for the housing program 
provided that Smith and A.J. Wood were to be responsible for the 
performance of the specified rehabilitation work in accordance 
with certain standards, including that all rehabilitation, 
alterations, repairs, or extensions be in compliance with all 
applicable Federal, State, and local codes; before commencing 
work, contractors or subcontractors obtain all necessary 
permits; the contractor and subcontractor must personally 
4 
 
 
 
inspect the premises and give full attention to any and all 
areas of their involvement; the contractor certify compliance 
with all Federal, State, and local regulations including G. L. 
c. 142A, the home improvement contractor law; the contractor 
take all responsibility for the work done under the contract, 
for the protection of the work, and for preventing injuries to 
persons and damage to property and utilities on or about the 
work; and all work performed meet or exceed all building and 
fire codes of Newburyport.  Bridgwood relied on these specific 
covenants promised by the defendants in authorizing the work to 
be performed in her premises. 
 
None of the defendants obtained a permit to replace or 
repair certain ceiling light fixtures in the premises.  None of 
the defendants gave proper notice to the Newburyport inspector, 
or arranged or provided for an inspection by the inspector, of 
the electrical wires used by Caggiano to replace or repair the 
ceiling light fixtures before the wires were concealed.  The 
electrical rehabilitation work with respect to the ceiling light 
fixtures was not performed in compliance with any applicable 
Federal, State, or local codes with respect to such work, as 
required by the contractor agreement.  Bridgwood was not aware 
of this compliance failure until the concealed wiring work done 
by Caggiano caused a substantial fire in and damage to her home 
on January 31, 2012, causing in excess of $40,000 in damage and 
5 
 
 
 
significant emotional and physical distress to Bridgwood.  The 
amended complaint does not state when the work was performed, 
but Bridgwood concedes that it was completed in January, 2001.  
This action was commenced in January, 2016, about fifteen years 
later. 
 
Discussion.  Bridgwood alleges that the defendants violated 
G. L. c. 93A by violating G. L. c. 142A, § 17 (10).  General 
Laws c. 142A, § 17 (10), prohibits contractors and 
subcontractors from "violat[ing] the building laws of the 
commonwealth or of any political subdivision thereof."  Section 
17 also provides that "[v]iolations of any of the provisions of 
this chapter shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act under 
the provision of [G. L. c. 93A]."  Bridgwood claims that the 
defendants failed to perform the electrical work in compliance 
with those standards and, therefore, committed unfair or 
deceptive acts.  The defendants argue that the claim is barred 
by the statute of repose set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B.  
According to Bridgwood, however, the statute of repose does not 
apply to consumer protection claims under G. L. c. 93A. 
Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are 
different kinds of limitations on actions.  A statute of 
limitations specifies the time limit for commencing an action 
after the cause of action has accrued, but a statute of repose 
is an absolute limitation which prevents a cause of action from 
6 
 
 
 
accruing after a certain period which begins to run upon 
occurrence of a specified event.  See Rudenauer v. Zafiropoulos, 
445 Mass. 353, 358 (2005).  A statute of repose eliminates a 
cause of action at a specified time, regardless of whether an 
injury has occurred or a cause of action has accrued as of that 
date.  See id.  Statutes of limitations have been described as a 
"procedural defense" to a legal claim, whereas statutes of 
repose have been described as providing a "substantive right to 
be free from liability after a given period of time has elapsed 
from a defined event."  Bain, Determining the Preemptive Effect 
of Federal Law on State Statutes of Repose, 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 
119, 125 (2014).  The statutes are independent of one another 
and they do not affect each other directly as they are triggered 
by entirely distinct events.  Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. 
Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001), quoting First United 
Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 
F.2d 862, 865-866 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 
(1990).  See Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199 (1972) 
("The function of [a] statute [of repose] is thus rather to 
define substantive rights than to alter or modify a remedy"); 
Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995) ("[The] 
distinction has prompted courts to hold that statutes of repose 
are substantive and extinguish both the right and the remedy, 
7 
 
 
 
while statutes of limitation are merely procedural, 
extinguishing only the remedy").  See Bain, supra. 
General Laws c. 260, § 5A, which establishes the 
limitations period for G. L. c. 93A claims, provides that 
"[a]ctions arising on account of violations of any law intended 
for the protection of consumers, including but not limited to 
. . . [G. L. c. 93A] . . . whether for damages, penalties or 
other relief and brought by any person, including the attorney 
general, shall be commenced only within four years next after 
the cause of action accrues."  Section 5A is solely a statute of 
limitation; it contains no statute of repose. 
The statute of repose contained in G. L. c. 260, § 2B, 
provides in relevant part: 
"Actions of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency 
or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general 
administration of an improvement to real property . . . 
shall be commenced only within three years next after the 
cause of action accrues; provided, however, that in no 
event shall such actions be commenced more than six years 
after the earlier of the dates of:  (1) the opening of the 
improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the 
improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by 
the owner" (emphasis added). 
 
"Like all statutes of repose, '[t]he effect . . . is to place an 
absolute time limit on the liability of those within [its] 
protection and to abolish a plaintiff's cause of action 
thereafter, even if the plaintiff's injury does not occur, or is 
not discovered, until after the statute's time limit has 
8 
 
 
 
expired.'"  Nett v. Bellucci, 437 Mass. 630, 635 (2002), quoting 
McGuinness v. Cotter, 412 Mass. 617, 622 (1992). 
 
As we discussed in Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 708 
(1982), the repose statute at issue there "was enacted in 
response to case law abolishing the rule that once an architect 
or builder had completed his work and it had been accepted by 
the owner, absent privity with the owner, there was no liability 
as a matter of law."  The abolition of that rule exposed "those 
involved in construction . . . to possible liability throughout 
their professional lives and into retirement."  Id. at 708-709.  
The Legislature therefore "placed an absolute outer limit on the 
duration of this liability."5  Id. at 709.  The statute thus 
protects contractors from claims arising long after the 
completion of their work.  We recognized in Klein that limiting 
the duration of liability is a legitimate public purpose, and we 
                     
 
5 Statutes of repose were a legislative response to the 
expanded liability faced by the building industry.  One such 
change involved the concept of privity.  Daugherty & Flora, 
Survey of Recent Developments in Real Property Law, 46 Ind. L. 
Rev. 1199, 1231-1232 (2013).  The liability of building 
professionals had been strictly limited based on English common-
law rules of privity, which were based on contract and 
terminated upon completion of the improvements.  Id. at 1231.  
In the early Twentieth Century, courts began to abolish the 
privity requirement.  Id.  Another change was the adoption of 
the discovery rule of accrual in numerous jurisdictions.  Bain, 
Determining the Preemptive Effect of Federal Law on State 
Statutes of Repose, 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 119, 126 (2014).  As a 
result, statutes of repose were adopted in forty-seven States 
and the District of Columbia.  Daugherty & Flora, supra at 1231-
1232. 
9 
 
 
 
upheld G. L. c. 260, § 2B, over a constitutional challenge, even 
though it abolishes a plaintiff's cause of action without 
providing any alternative remedy.  Klein, supra at 709-713. 
 
Since deciding Klein, we have consistently enforced 
statutes of repose according to their plain terms, despite the 
hardship they may impose on plaintiffs.  "Unlike statutes of 
limitation, statutes of repose cannot be 'tolled' for any 
reason."  Nett, 437 Mass. at 635.  For example, although G. L. 
c. 260, § 7, tolls any applicable statute of limitations until a 
minor plaintiff reaches majority, it does not toll the statute 
of repose.  Tindol v. Boston Hous. Auth., 396 Mass. 515, 517-518 
(1986).  The statute of repose eliminates a plaintiff's cause of 
action even in cases of fraudulent concealment.  Sullivan v. 
Iantosca, 409 Mass. 796, 798 (1991).  See Joslyn v. Chang, 445 
Mass. 344, 350-351 (2005) (statute of repose for medical 
malpractice, G. L. c. 260, § 4, not subject to equitable 
estoppel or tolling due to fraudulent concealment).  In 
addition, the statute of repose is not subject to the "relation 
back" concept that permits adding a defendant by amending the 
complaint after the expiration of the repose period.  Tindol, 
supra at 518-519.  "Simply put, after six years, [G. L. c. 260, 
§ 2B,] completely eliminates a cause of action against certain 
persons in the construction industry."  Klein, 386 Mass. at 702. 
10 
 
 
 
Where a claim does not obviously sound in tort, we have 
examined the nature of the underlying action to determine 
whether a statute of repose applies.  See Anthony's Pier Four, 
Inc. v Crandall Dry Dock Eng'rs, Inc., 396 Mass. 818, 823 (1986) 
(court must look to "gist of the action" to determine whether 
claim is based in contract or tort [citation omitted]); 
McDonough v. Marr Scaffolding Co., 412 Mass. 636, 639 (1992) 
(breach of warranty claims that sound in tort, not contract, are 
barred by statute of repose); Dighton v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 
399 Mass. 687, 691 n.6, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987) (claim 
for breach of warranty states cause of action which sounds, like 
negligence, in tort and not in contract); Klein, 386 Mass. at 
719 (warranty claim alleged only that defendant promised to 
"exercise [the] standard of reasonable care required of members 
of his profession" therefore negligence and warranty claims 
essentially alleged same elements); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Cape Cod v. Weston & Sampson Eng'rs, Inc., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 
120, 124 (1998) (statute of repose applies where implied 
warranty claim based in tort). 
Bridgwood argues, relying on Kattar v. Demoulas, 433 Mass. 
1 (2000), that because the relief available under G. L. c. 93A 
is "sui generis," neither wholly tortious nor wholly contractual 
in nature, the statute of repose does not apply.  Id. at 17, 
quoting Greenfield Country Estates Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Deep, 
11 
 
 
 
423 Mass. 81, 88 (1996).  Bridgwood also argues that a violation 
of G. L. c. 142A, § 17 (10), constitutes a per se violation of 
G. L. c. 93A and, as such, it is not precluded by the statue of 
repose.  Thus, according to Bridgwood, we need not be concerned 
with whether the underlying action sounds in tort because G. L. 
c. 93A takes us out of that orbit. 
 
The language relied on by Bridgwood from Kattar, a case 
which did not concern the statute of repose, does not prevent a 
court from looking to the substance of the action to determine 
whether it sounds in tort.  Stated another way, it does not 
permit a plaintiff to avoid the statute of repose by relabeling 
what is essentially a tort claim as a claim under G. L. c. 93A.  
Cf. Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., 396 Mass. at 823, quoting 
Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 63, 85 (1974) ("A plaintiff may 
not . . . escape the consequences of a statute of repose . . . 
on tort actions merely by labelling the claim as contractual.  
The court must look to the 'gist of the action'"). 
Recognizing that G. L. c. 260, § 2B, applies only to 
actions in tort, the motion judge analogized the claim to an 
action for an alleged breach of implied warranty.  Although an 
untimely action for breach of an implied warranty is barred 
where the "breach of warranty claims essentially allege the same 
elements as the negligence claims," McDonough, 412 Mass. at 642, 
this is not the case with an action for breach of an express 
12 
 
 
 
warranty, which is an action in contract.  Anthony's Pier Four, 
Inc., 396 Mass. at 822.  In determining whether a given case is 
an action in tort governed by the statute of repose, we "look to 
the 'gist of the action.'"  Id. at 823, quoting Hendrickson, 365 
Mass. at 85.  A key difference between an action in tort and an 
action in contract is that in the latter, "the standard of 
performance is set by the defendants' promises, rather than 
imposed by law."  Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., supra at 822, 
citing W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 92, at 656, 657 (5th 
ed. 1984).  Because a claim for breach of express warranty, 
unlike a negligence claim, requires a plaintiff to prove "that 
the defendant promised a specific result," we held that § 2B did 
not apply to such a claim.  Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., supra at 
823. 
Similarly, there are a number of Appeals Court cases where 
a plaintiff has alleged that a contractor has violated G. L. 
c. 93A, that use "gist of the action" to determine whether the 
statute of repose applies.  For example, in Kelley v. Iantosca, 
78 Mass. App. Ct. 147 (2010), the Appeals Court held that, to 
the extent the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated 
G. L. c. 93A through their acts and omissions during the 
construction of his house, the claim was barred by the statute 
of repose, for "those allegations are sufficiently tort-like to 
13 
 
 
 
bring them within the statute's ambit."6  Id. at 154, citing 
Beaconsfield Townhouse Condominium Trust v. Zussman, 49 Mass. 
App. Ct. 757, 761 n.12 (2000).  See Fine v. Huygens, DiMella, 
Shaffer & Assocs., 57 Mass. App. Ct. 397, 404 (2003) (statute of 
repose applies to G. L. c. 93A claims that are "tort-like in 
nature"); Rosario v. M.D. Knowlton Co., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 
802-803 (2002), quoting McDonough, 412 Mass. at 642 ("[A]ctions 
for breach of implied warranty are also barred . . . when the 
warranty claims 'essentially allege the same elements as the 
negligence claims'"). 
 
Applying these principles here, we conclude that 
Bridgwood's claim is likewise barred by the statute of repose.  
Bridgwood's claim is essentially that the defendants failed to 
perform the electrical work in compliance with the standards set 
forth in G. L. c. 142A, § 17 (10).  It is indistinguishable from 
a claim of negligence.  Therefore, it sounds in tort and, having 
been commenced well beyond the six-year deadline, is barred by 
                     
 
6 Bridgwood's G. L. c. 93A claims arising out of the 
defendants' alleged misrepresentations, however, are not barred.  
Kelley v. Iantosca, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 154-155 (2010), 
discussing Sullivan v. Iantosca, 409 Mass. 796, 799-800 (1991).  
"'Section 2B [of G. L. c. 260] grants protection to designers, 
planners, builders, and the like. . . .  It does not do so for 
people who sell real estate.' . . .  Thus, while G. L. c. 260, 
§ 2B, bars any claim arising out of what [the defendants] did 
when they built the house, it does not bar claims under G. L. 
c. 93A arising out of misrepresentations they made about what 
they did."  Kelley, supra at 154-155, quoting Sullivan, supra at 
799. 
14 
 
 
 
G. L. c. 260, § 2B.  Were we to hold otherwise, no contractor 
would ever be able to "put a project to rest." 
 
We also have followed this analytic framework when 
determining whether G. L. c. 228, § 1, which states that a tort 
survives a plaintiff's death, applied to claims presented under 
G. L. c. 93A.  In Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc., 465 
Mass. 165, 178-179 (2013), we concluded that a G. L. c. 93A 
claim survived the plaintiff's death because it was, in 
substance, an action in tort.  Thus, even though G. L. c. 93A is 
not referenced in G. L. c. 228, § 1, the statute applied to the 
plaintiff's claim and the estate could continue the action. 
It is not apparent that, by enacting G. L. c. 142A, § 17,7 
and making the building laws enforceable through G. L. c. 93A, 
the Legislature intended to deprive contractors of the 
protection of the statute of repose.  General Laws c. 260, § 2B, 
the statute of repose applicable to building professionals, was 
enacted by the Legislature in 1968 and amended in 1973 and 1984. 
See St. 1968, c. 612; St. 1973, c. 777, § 2; St. 1984, c. 484, 
§ 53.  As recently as 2018, the Legislature had proposed 
amendments to the statute to specifically include condominiums.8  
                     
 
7 General Laws c. 142A, § 17, was enacted in 1991, and 
amended in 1998 and 2009.  See St. 1991, c. 453; St. 1998, 
c. 161, § 507; St. 2009, c. 4, §§ 20, 21. 
  
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 38 Mass. 
App. Ct. 600, 601 (1995), the Appeals Court held that the 
15 
 
 
 
See 2018 House Doc. No. 4236.  The consumer protection act, 
G. L. c. 93A, was passed by the Legislature in 1967, see 
St. 1967, c. 813, § 1, and various sections have been amended 
throughout the years.  Section 2 was last amended in 1978.  See 
St. 1978, c. 459, § 2.  Section 9 was amended in 1970, 1971, 
1973, 1978, 1979 (twice), 1986, 1987, 1989, and 2004.  See 
St. 1970, c. 736, §§ 1, 2; St. 1971, c. 241; St. 1973, c. 939; 
St. 1978, c. 478, §§ 45, 46; St. 1979, c. 72, § 1; St. 1979, 
c. 406, §§ 1, 2; St. 1986, c. 557, § 90; St. 1987, c. 664, § 3; 
St. 1989, c. 580, § 1; St. 2004, c. 252, § 1. 
 
As we have already discussed, G. L. c. 260, § 2B, was 
enacted to shield contractors from the burden of liability 
                                                                  
asbestos revival statute, which established time periods during 
which the Commonwealth and its subdivisions could bring actions 
which would otherwise be time barred by the statute of repose, 
revived claims against installers of asbestos notwithstanding 
that the revival statute did not mention the statute of repose.  
The court reasoned that the phrase is "[s]o foreign to 
legislative usage" that the Legislature is not expected "to use 
it or refer to it when enacting [statutes] specially designed to 
breathe new life . . . into liability that would otherwise have 
been extinguished by passage of time."  Id. at 603.  The court 
noted that "[i]t is also worth bearing in mind that the 
Commonwealth is not bound by a statute of limitations unless it 
expressly consents to be bound by such a statute.  Id., citing 
United States v. Commissioner of Banks, 254 Mass. 173, 176 
(1925), and Boston v. Nielsen, 305 Mass. 429, 430 (1940).  The 
statutory expression of that principle appears in G. L. c. 260, 
§ 18, which provides that "[t]he limitations of the preceding 
sections of this chapter . . . shall apply to actions brought by 
or for the [C]ommonwealth."  In thus making itself subject to 
the bars of c. 260, the consent section does not distinguish 
between the conventional statutes of limitations that appear in 
other sections of c. 260 and the statute of repose, which 
appears in § 2B. 
16 
 
 
 
throughout their careers and into retirement for work that had 
long since been completed.  "There comes a time when [a 
defendant] ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that 
the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he 
ought not to be called on to resist a claim 'when evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared.'"  Klein, 386 Mass. at 709, quoting Rosenberg, 61 
N.J. at 201.  Had the Legislature intended to remove this shield 
and expose contractors to indefinite liability for claims 
arising long after the completion of their work, it would have 
said so explicitly.9 
 
Conclusion.  In sum, Bridgwood's G. L. c. 93A claim is 
sufficiently tort-like to bring it within the ambit of the 
statute of repose.  Because this action was commenced more than 
six years after the work was completed, it is barred by G. L. 
c. 260, § 2B, and the complaint was properly dismissed. 
                     
 
9 If the Legislature desires to narrow the applicability of 
the repose period -- for instance, by amending G. L. c. 260, 
§ 2B, to state that it does not apply to construction claims 
brought under G. L. c. 142A, § 17 (10), or G. L. c. 93A -- it 
may do so.  Such is the province of the Legislature, not the 
courts.  We decline to hold that the § 2B statute of repose has 
been superseded "in the absence of express words to that 
effect."  Registrar of Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on 
Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 382 Mass. 580, 585 (1981).  
Likewise, "[i]mplied repeal of a statute is disfavored," and we 
avoid doing so "unless [that statute] 'is so repugnant to, and 
inconsistent with, the later enactment that both cannot stand.'"  
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 725 (2005), quoting 
LaBranche v. A.J. Lane & Co., 404 Mass. 725, 728 (1989).  This 
is not the case with the statutes at issue. 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk and Budd, JJ., 
join).  General Laws c. 260, § 5A, provides that "[a]ctions 
arising on account of violations of any law intended for the 
protection of consumers, including but not limited to . . . 
[G. L. c. 93A (c. 93A)] . . . whether for damages, penalties or 
other relief and brought by any person, including the attorney 
general shall be commenced only within four years next after the 
cause of action accrues."  Section 5A is solely a statute of 
limitations -- it contains no statute of repose.  In contrast, 
G. L. c. 260, § 2B, which governs actions "of tort for damages 
arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, 
planning, construction or general administration of an 
improvement to real property," and G. L. c. 260, § 4, which 
governs actions "of contract or tort for malpractice" against 
physicians, contain both a statute of limitations and a statute 
of repose.  Because a statute of repose is, after all, a 
creature of statute and not of the common law, and because the 
Legislature did not choose in G. L. c. 260, § 5A, to bar 
consumers through a statute of repose from bringing c. 93A 
claims that are timely under the statute of limitations, I 
dissent. 
 
A statute of limitations limits the time in which a 
plaintiff may bring an action "after the cause of action 
accrues."  See G. L. c. 260, §§ 2B, 5A.  A cause of action does 
2 
 
 
 
not accrue until a plaintiff "knows or reasonably should know 
that he or she has suffered harm and that the harm was caused by 
the [defendant's] conduct."  Parr v. Rosenthal, 475 Mass. 368, 
378 (2016).  Consequently, the statute of limitations clock does 
not begin to run until a plaintiff knows, or should know, that 
he or she has suffered an injury arising from the defendant's 
conduct.  See id.  See also Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 
91 (1974).  If that knowledge is delayed because the defendant 
has fraudulently concealed the injury, or otherwise misled the 
plaintiff regarding the cause of his or her injury, the clock is 
tolled until the plaintiff is put on reasonable notice of the 
defendant's responsibility for his or her injury.  See Hays v. 
Ellrich, 471 Mass. 592, 603, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 503 
(2015).  The statute of limitations for actions of tort for 
damages arising out of any negligence in the design, planning, 
improvement, or construction of real property is three years.  
See G. L. c. 260, § 2B.  The statute of limitations for actions 
arising from a violation of a law intended for the protection of 
consumers, including c. 93A, is four years.  See G. L. c. 260, 
§ 5A.  Where the same conduct constitutes both a common-law tort 
under G. L. c. 260, § 2B, and a violation of a consumer law such 
as c. 93A under G. L. c. 260, § 5A, the plaintiff is entitled to 
the four-year statute of limitations under § 5A, regarding the 
cause of action arising from the violation of c. 93A.  See 
3 
 
 
 
Passatempo v. McMenimen, 461 Mass. 279, 297 (2012) ("the mere 
fact that the G. L. c. 93A violations alleged would also support 
a common-law tort claim does not make them subject to the 
shorter, three-year limitation period").  See also Fine v. 
Huygens, DiMella, Shaffer & Assocs., 57 Mass. App. Ct. 397, 404-
405 (2003) ("We reject the contention that a c. 93A claim 
necessarily fails because the underlying claim upon which it 
depends has been dismissed as not timely filed. . . .  The 
c. 93A claim need only be dismissed if, under c. 93A's four-year 
limitations period . . . , it was not timely filed" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
Under a statute of repose, however, the repose clock starts 
to run, not at the time the cause of action accrues, but at a 
time established by statute.  For common-law tort actions under 
G. L. c. 260, § 2B, the clock starts to run from the earlier of 
the date of "the opening of the improvement to use" or the date 
the owner takes possession of the improvement for occupancy 
after its "substantial completion."  Consequently, under G. L. 
c. 260, § 2B, even if the limitations clock has yet to accrue 
because the injury from a contractor's misconduct is not yet 
apparent, or because the contractor has concealed the misconduct 
from the property owner, the property owner is barred from 
bringing any tort claim after the six-year statute of repose 
period.  See Sullivan v. Iantosca, 409 Mass. 796, 798 (1991) 
4 
 
 
 
("Section 2B, in its statute of repose aspect, forbids us from 
considering the fact that a plaintiff did not discover or 
reasonably could not have discovered the harm before the six-
year period of the statute of repose expired," and "[w]e 
similarly reject the plaintiff's claim that the fraudulent 
concealment provisions of G. L. c. 260, § 12 . . . [and any 
common law estoppel] prevent [the statute of repose in G. L. 
c. 260, § 2B,] from applying here" [citations omitted]).  In 
short, as is alleged in this case, the property owner may be 
barred by the statute of repose from bringing a claim before he 
or she knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she even has 
a claim -- even where the defendant has fraudulently concealed 
the claim from the plaintiff.  Consequently, a statute of repose 
reflects a legislative decision that it is more important to 
protect certain defendants from old claims than it is to protect 
the right of plaintiffs to enforce otherwise valid and timely 
claims. 
 
The statute of repose was added to G. L. c. 260, § 2B, in 
1968.  See St. 1968, c. 612.  At that time, it could not have 
been intended to cover claims under c. 93A, because there was no 
private right of action for consumers under c. 93A, § 9, until 
1969.  See St. 1969, c. 690. 
 
General Laws, c. 260, § 5A, which established a four-year 
statute of limitations for actions claiming a violation of 
5 
 
 
 
c. 93A, was enacted in 1975.  See St. 1975, c. 432, § 2.  By 
1975, it was well established that new home construction claims 
may fall within the rubric of G. L. c. 93A, § 9, because in 
1971, § 9 was amended to protect any person injured through an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice who "purchases or leases 
goods, services or property, real or personal" (emphasis added).  
See St. 1971, c. 241, amending St. 1970, c. 736, § 1.1  This 
revision of § 9 was meant specifically to extend the scope of 
c. 93A private causes of action to the sale of real estate, 
which is made apparent by the act's title:  "An Act extending 
certain equitable remedies under the consumer protection law to 
certain aggrieved persons who purchased real estate for personal 
or family use."  See St. 1971, c. 241.  At the time, then 
Governor Francis W. Sargent submitted official remarks, stating 
that the "bill will help answer complaints of those who have 
been victimized by the few fly-by-night builders who try to 
leave expensive corrective repairs to the hapless new 
homeowner."  See 1971 House Doc. No. 5221.  Even though c. 93A 
                     
 
1 The language of G. L. c. 93A, § 9, has since been amended, 
and now § 9 affords a remedy to "[a]ny person . . . who has been 
injured by another person's use or employment of any method, act 
or practice declared to be unlawful by section two or any rule 
or regulation issued thereunder . . . ."  See St. 1979, c. 406, 
§ 1.  This amendment broadens even further the protection 
afforded to persons injured through an unfair or deceptive act 
or practice, insofar as § 9 "may no longer contain limits based 
on the nature of the transaction."  Murphy v. Charlestown Sav. 
Bank, 380 Mass. 738, 743 (1980).  See id. at 743 n.7. 
6 
 
 
 
claims were recognized as potentially including actions alleging 
deficiency or neglect in the design and construction of new 
homes, no statute of repose was included in G. L. c. 260, § 5A, 
to protect those responsible for the design or construction of 
defective homes. 
 
In 1991, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 142A.  See St. 
1991, c. 453.  Section 17 protects consumers from unsavory 
contractors and subcontractors by identifying seventeen types of 
prohibited acts by contractors and subcontractors, including 
violating the building laws of the Commonwealth or of any 
political subdivision, and sets forth three separate and 
distinct avenues to enforce these prohibitions.  See G. L. 
c. 142A, § 17.  First, the statute provides that any violation 
of § 17 "shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act under the 
provisions of [c. 93A]," and thus creates a private right of 
action under c. 93A, § 9, for such violations.  See G. L. 
c. 142A, § 17.  Second, the statute provides that "[v]iolations 
of this section shall subject the violator to the administrative 
sanctions of [G. L. c. 142A, § 18]," which include revocation or 
suspension of the contractor's or subcontractor's certificate of 
registration, and administrative penalties of up to $2,000 for 
each violation.  See G. L. c. 142A, §§ 17, 18.  Third, the 
statute provides that "[v]iolations of this section shall 
subject the violator to . . . criminal prosecution as prescribed 
7 
 
 
 
in [G. L. c. 142A, § 19]," which authorizes the Attorney General 
or any district attorney to prosecute any person who knowingly 
and wilfully violates any provision of § 17 and, unless another 
statute provides for a greater penalty, subjects the violator 
upon conviction to imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of 
up to $2,000, or both, in addition to any administrative 
penalty.  See G. L. c. 142A, §§ 17, 19. 
 
There is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended 
to limit the private right of action to remedy violations of 
G. L. c. 142A, § 17, through civil actions under c. 93A by 
imposing a statute of repose.  Not only did the Legislature fail 
to include any statute of repose in G. L. c. 260, § 5A, but it 
deemed the conduct in G. L. c. 142A, § 17, so serious that it 
provided three separate and distinct means to enforce any 
violation, including criminal prosecution.  Why would the 
Legislature seek to protect those who engaged in such unfair and 
deceptive acts from c. 93A actions brought within the statute of 
limitations by granting them a statute of repose that could 
potentially shield such violations from any private cause of 
action by injured consumers?  And why would the Legislature 
provide an incentive to those who engage in such unfair and 
deceptive acts to conceal those acts from the consumer until six 
years have passed, so that the statute of repose could thwart a 
8 
 
 
 
consumer from obtaining a remedy for his or her injury under 
c. 93A? 
 
The court's opinion appears to rest on four Appeals Court 
opinions for its conclusion that we look "to the gist of the 
action to determine whether the statute of repose applies."  
Ante at    .  But a closer look at these cases demonstrates that 
they offer scant support for this conclusion.  In the earliest 
of the four cases, Beaconsfield Townhouse Condominium Trust v. 
Zussman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 757 (2000), the Appeals Court ordered 
all the claims, including the c. 93A claim, dismissed not 
because of the statute of repose, but because of the statute of 
limitations.  See id. at 757 ("We decide that the grounds for 
the causes of action against the defendants were knowable by the 
trust as early as February, 1978, and were barred by the 
applicable statutes of limitations by the time the complaint was 
filed in 1986 against the residual defendants.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment").  Although the Appeals Court declared 
that all the claims against the relevant defendants, including 
the c. 93A claims, were "in the nature of tort" in that they all 
relied on alleged misrepresentations regarding the quality of 
the roof that was delivered, the court recognized that the c. 
93A claims were subject to the four-year statute of limitations 
under G. L. c. 260, § 5A, not the three-year statute of 
9 
 
 
 
limitations under G. L. c. 260, § 2B.  See id. at 760-761 & 
n.12.  The term "repose" was never used in the opinion. 
 
In the second opinion, Rosario v. M.D. Knowlton Co., 54 
Mass. App. Ct. 796, 797 (2002), the plaintiff was injured by a 
hydraulic lift that had been installed a decade earlier in a 
manufacturing facility, and brought claims against the 
manufacturer and distributor of the hydraulic lift alleging 
negligence, breach of the express and implied warranty, and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, in violation of c. 93A.  
The motion judge granted summary judgment for the defendants on 
all claims, finding that the claims were barred under the 
statute of repose because the lift was "an improvement to real 
property" and, therefore, the claims were governed by the 
statute of repose in G. L. c. 260, § 2B.  See id. at 797, 800.  
The issues on appeal were whether the lift (which was 
permanently installed at the manufacturing facility) constituted 
"an improvement to real property," and whether the defendants 
were "protected actors" under § 2B.  See id. at 799-800.  The 
Appeals Court ruled that the lift was an improvement to real 
property, and that the defendants were protected actors, 
accordingly affirming the grant of summary judgment.  See id. at 
800-802.  There is no indication from the opinion that the 
plaintiff challenged the application of the statute of repose in 
G. L. c. 260, § 2B, to his c. 93A claim.  As a result, all that 
10 
 
 
 
the Appeals Court said as to that claim was that the plaintiff's 
"c. 93A count is premised on claims dismissed on summary 
judgment.  This count falls with them."  Id. at 803. 
 
In the third opinion, Fine, 57 Mass. App. Ct. at 404, the 
Appeals Court determined that each of the c. 93A claims was 
based on an alleged breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, and were therefore "tort-like in nature."  But 
the Appeals Court nonetheless declared that the claims asserting 
unfair and deceptive trade practices under c. 93A were governed 
by the four-year statute of limitations period in § 5A, not the 
three-year limitations period for torts, and expressly rejected 
"the contention that a c. 93A claim necessarily fails because 
the underlying claim upon which it depends has been dismissed as 
not timely filed."  Id. at 404-405.  The court provided no 
explanation as to why it determined that the statute of repose 
in G. L. c. 260, § 2B, applied to claims under c. 93A that are 
"tort-like in nature," when the statute of limitations in G. L. 
c. 260, § 5A, not the limitations period in G. L. c. 260, § 2B, 
applied to these same claims.  See id. at 404. 
 
The fourth opinion, Kelley v. Iantosca, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 
147 (2010), cites both Beaconsfield Townhouse Condominium Trust 
and Fine for its conclusory declaration that the c. 93A "claim 
is barred by the statute of repose, for although focusing on 
c. 93A, those allegations are sufficiently tort-like to bring 
11 
 
 
 
them within [G. L. c. 260, § 2B's] ambit."  Kelley, supra at 
154.2 
 
These cases have led the court to conclude that, if a 
c. 93A claim is "tort-like" in nature, the statute of repose in 
§ 2B applies.  But we only look to the nature of the underlying 
claim where the claim arises under the common law.  Thus, where 
a plaintiff frames what is essentially a common-law claim 
sounding in tort as a contract claim in an attempt to obtain the 
benefit of the six-year statute of limitations under G. L. 
c. 260, § 2 -- rather than the three-year statute of limitations 
under G. L. c. 260, § 2A (for actions in tort or contract to 
recover for personal injuries, and actions in replevin) or § 2B 
-- we "look to the 'gist of the action'" and apply the three-
year statute of limitations applicable to torts.  See Anthony's 
                     
 
2 The court's opinion also looks for support from Klairmont 
v. Gainsboro Rest., Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 178-179 (2013), where 
we held that a c. 93A claim survived the death of the plaintiff 
under the Massachusetts survival statute, G. L. c. 228, § 1.  
Section 1 makes no reference to c. 93A claims, but did provide 
for the survival of "'[a]ctions of tort for . . . other damage 
to the person."  Klairmont, supra at 179.  We held that the 
c. 93A claim, which rested on persistent and knowing violations 
of the building code that created hazardous conditions in a bar 
and restaurant, "is substantively akin to the types of torts 
within the scope of G. L. c. 228, § 1, and that, therefore, the 
claim survives."  Id.  In Klairmont, we interpreted a statute 
(G. L. c. 228, § 1) that we described as "flexible" and 
"dynamic," see id., quoting Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life 
Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 215 (1979), to permit the survival of a 
c. 93A claim after the death of the plaintiff.  Our ruling in 
that case does not provide support for this court's attempt to 
deprive the plaintiff of her ability to bring a c. 93A claim 
that is timely under the statute of limitations. 
12 
 
 
 
Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Eng'rs, Inc., 396 Mass. 
818, 823 (1986), quoting Hendrickson, 365 Mass. at 85 ("A 
plaintiff may not . . . escape the consequences of a statute of 
repose or statute of limitations on tort actions merely by 
labelling the claim as contractual.  The court must look to the 
'gist of the action'").  But where the underlying claim is a 
"tort-like" statutory claim brought under c. 93A, our case law 
makes clear that we apply the four-year statute of limitations 
specified in G. L. c. 260, § 5A, see supra, not the three-year 
statute of limitations in G. L. c. 260, § 2A or 2B.  See 
Passatempo, 461 Mass. at 297; Beaconsfield Townhouse Condominium 
Trust, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 761.  In doing so, we not only 
respect the statutory mandate in G. L. c. 260, § 5A, but also  
recognize that a c. 93A claim "is neither wholly tortious nor 
wholly contractual in nature, and is not subject to the 
traditional limitations of preexisting causes of action."  
Kattar v. Demoulas, 433 Mass. 1, 12 (2000), quoting Slaney v. 
Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 704 (1975). 
 
In addition, where we apply the statute of limitations in 
G. L. c. 260, § 2B, we also apply the statute of repose in § 2B.  
See Kelley, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 150; Fine, 57 Mass. App. Ct. at 
401-404.  It does not make sense to exempt c. 93A claims from 
the statute of limitations in § 2B and yet still subject such 
claims to the statute of repose in § 2B.  Where the Legislature 
13 
 
 
 
did not choose to include a statute of repose under G. L. 
c. 260, § 5A, to shield those who engaged in unfair and 
deceptive acts in violation of c. 93A from six-year old claims 
that are timely brought under the statute of limitations, it is 
not the appropriate role of this court to do it ourselves.  
Because this opinion, in effect, adds a statute of repose to 
G. L. c. 260, § 5A, for c. 93A claims to protect contractors and 
subcontractors from liability for unfair and deceptive acts that 
arise out of deficiency or neglect in their design, planning, or 
construction, and because this is a usurpation of a distinctly 
legislative prerogative, I dissent.