Title: Regunal Dowell v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 32S01-1003-PC-136
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 2010

APPELLANT PRO SE 
Regunal Dowell 
Carlisle, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Ann L. Goodwin 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 32S01–1003–PC–136 
REGUNAL DOWELL, 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, No. 32D01-0801-PC-1 
The Honorable Robert W. Freese, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 32A01-0810-PC-508 
March 10, 2010 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
A good many jurisdictions employ the “prison mailbox rule” to determine whether court 
filings made by prisoners are timely.  Indiana has regularly used this approach as respects filings 
governed by its appellate rules, recognizing the unique position of pro se prisoners, though we 
apparently have never expressly adopted the prison mailbox rule.  We do so today, still obliging 
the litigant provide reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation.  Appellant Regunal 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Mar 10 2010, 2:09 pm
2 
Dowell‟s timing problem, however, does not center on a tardy filing under the appellate rules but 
rather on his attempt to file a motion to correct error under the trial rules.   
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
Dowell was convicted in 2006 on three counts of rape, one count of criminal deviate 
conduct, and one of confinement.  The Court of Appeals affirmed Dowell‟s convictions and 
sentence on direct appeal.  Dowell v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  We granted 
transfer and issued a per curiam decision to resolve a discrepancy between the trial court‟s 
sentencing order and its oral declarations, but otherwise summarily affirmed in all respects.  
Dowell v. State, 873 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. 2007). 
 
 
Dowell filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 29, 2007.  The post-
conviction court held a hearing on Dowell‟s petition on April 9, 2008.  During the hearing, 
Dowell said that he needed copies of his trial transcript to amend his petition.  The court gave 
him until May 23, 2008, to amend his petition or request more time. Dowell received a copy of 
his trial transcript on April 25, 2008, but he did not amend his petition.   
 
 
On July 7, 2008, the post-conviction court denied Dowell‟s petition without a further 
hearing.  Dowell says he placed a motion to correct error in the Wabash Valley Correctional 
Facility mail system on August 6, 2008, thirty days later.  (App. at 16.)  On August 8, 2008, the 
thirty-second day, Dowell‟s motion to correct error was file–stamped by the Clerk of the 
Hendricks County courts.  (App. 3, 11.)  The post-conviction court denied Dowell‟s motion on 
September 9, 2008.  (App. 3, 6.)   
 
Dowell, still pro se, filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2009.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 1–10.)  
The State cross-appealed on March 27, 2009, asking that Dowell‟s appeal be dismissed because 
his motion to correct error was not timely filed.  The Court of Appeals held that Dowell‟s pro se 
motion to correct error filed while he was incarcerated was timely, invoking the prison mailbox 
rule.  Dowell v. State, 908 N.E.2d 643, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  It therefore examined the 
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merits of Dowell‟s underlying ineffective assistance claim and concluded that the post-
conviction court did not err in denying his petition without a hearing in accordance with Post-
Conviction Rule 1(4)(f).  Id. at 649.  The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the post-conviction 
court. 
 
 
Dowell petitioned for transfer asserting the Court of Appeals failed to properly address 
his claims.  The State likewise petitioned for transfer, asserting the Court of Appeals 
impermissibly expanded the scope of Trial Rule 5(F) and that, “[t]his Court‟s policy appears to 
have disfavored the prison mailbox rule.”  (Appellee‟s Pet. Transfer at 4, 6.)  We grant transfer 
to address the application of the prison mailbox rule. 
 
 
I. Origins of the “Prison Mailbox Rule” 
 
 
The prison mailbox rule was a prominent contribution at the end of Justice William 
Brennan‟s long career.  Interpreting the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a pro se incarcerated litigant who delivers a notice of appeal to prison officials 
for mailing on or before its due date accomplishes a timely filing.  Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 
266 (1988).  Justice Brennan noted that neither the applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107, nor the 
appellate rules, contained a definition of “filing” for purposes of initiating an appeal and 
concluded that multiple policy grounds militated in favor of treating prisoner filings more 
liberally than those of civil litigants generally.  Id. at 272–73.  His opinion for the Court said, for 
example, “Unlike other litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the courthouse to 
see that the notice is stamped „filed‟ or to establish the date on which the court received the 
notice.  Other litigants may choose to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail and the 
clerk‟s process for stamping incoming papers, but only the pro se prisoner is forced to do so by 
his situation.” Id. at 271. 
 
Like the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure at the time of the Houston decision, the 
Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide for the prison mailbox rule.  Compare Fed. 
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Rule App. Proc. 3(a) (1991) (“An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court to a 
court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court”), 
with Indiana App. Rule 9(A) (“A party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the 
trial court clerk . . . .”).  Thus, regarding the Houston Court‟s observations about pro se prisoner 
filings as persuasive, this Court has regularly applied the prison mailbox rule in various orders.  
The Court of Appeals has likewise held that the appellate rules operate to date the filing of a 
notice of appeal by reference to a proven date of mailing.  Marlett v. State, 878 N.E.2d 860, 864 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  We now make explicit the rule as applied in our previous orders. 
 
 
II.  Evidence of Mailing 
 
 
Our practice has required a pro se prisoner to provide reasonable, legitimate, and 
verifiable documentation supporting a claim that a document was timely submitted to prison 
officials for mailing.1  
 
 
For example, in the appeal of one Robert Johnson, we issued an order granting transfer 
and remanding to the Court of Appeals based on the mailbox rule.  Johnson provided copies of a 
“Legal Mail Log,” an affidavit from a person identifying himself as a “law librarian” and the 
prisoner‟s own affidavit.  We concluded that this evidence taken as a whole created a 
presumption that the prisoner functionally filed his documents on time.  Johnson v. State, No. 
02S05-0311-PC-582, order (Ind. Nov. 25, 2003).  The Court of Appeals later issued a 
memorandum decision in his case.  Johnson v. State, No. 02A05-0305-PC-233, memorandum 
op. (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2004). 
 
                                                 
1 After Houston v. Lack, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended to recognize the prison 
mailbox rule and to reflect limits on its application.  See United States v. Craig, 368 F.3d 738, 740 (7th 
Cir. 2004).  The changes required prisoners to utilize the legal mail system, if available, and to provide a 
verified statement setting forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage had been prepaid.  
Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1).  These changes were presumably designed to combat potential abuse. 
5 
 
We took the same approach as regards a different step in the processes governed by the 
appellate rules.  A record of proceedings is considered as having been filed when it is deposited 
in the United States mail.  App. R. 12 (C) (1999).  When appellant Julius C. Scott sent the record 
in his case, its postmark was one day late, and our clerk would not permit it to be filed.  Scott 
thereafter tendered various proofs demonstrating that he had in fact submitted the record of 
proceedings to a prison employee for mailing on the due date for filing but that prison officials 
had not actually mailed the record until the next day.  Scott provided an affidavit from the prison 
employee verifying that Scott presented the record to her on the date it was due but that she did 
not mail the record until the next day.  We concluded that the delay in mailing was not due to 
any lack of diligence on Scott‟s part and that his filing would be considered timely.  Scott v. 
State, No. 36A04-9911-PC-485, order (Ind. Sept. 5, 2000).  
 
Where a prisoner‟s proof is lacking, however, the opposite result obtains. 
 
Appellant Chris Naquin did file his record on time.  He then faced the deadline for filing 
his brief.  He received two extensions of time from the Court of Appeals and then asked for a 
third extension.  He was turned down and sought relief here. 
 
 
In making his argument to us, he claimed that the institution in which he was incarcerated 
was under lockdown conditions for substantial periods during the time allotted for his briefing.  
In particular, he claimed that he was scheduled to go to the prison library to finalize his brief four 
days before it was due but that another lockdown occurred.  Naquin did not produce any 
documentary support for these claims.  We agreed with the Court of Appeals that he had not 
complied with the appellate rules and that his appeal could not go forward.  Naquin v. State, No. 
27A02-0008-PC-557, order (Ind. Jan. 9, 2002). 
 
 
 
A similar result occurred when appellant Antonio Carney sought to file a petition to 
transfer, supplying his own verified motion that he had delivered it to prison officials for mailing 
on the final day.  Carney did not enclose any documentation that tended to support this assertion, 
and we denied his motion.  Carney v. State, No. 49A02-0802-CR-138, order (Ind. Jan. 15, 2009). 
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If the question of Dowell‟s timeliness were covered by the appellate rules, we would 
agree with the State that Dowell has not any verifiable documentation.  Dowell never claims in 
his own affidavit that he deposited his motion to correct error with prison authorities on or before 
August 6, 2008.  Dowell does provide the affidavit of fellow prisoner James Franklin, who 
according to Dowell “volunteered to help keep the law library afloat until the law clerks were off 
lockdown.”  (App. at 15.)  As our examples above suggest, this is not a sufficiently reliable 
ground on which a presumption of timeliness can rest.  
 
 
 
 
III. 
  Timing for Motions to Correct Error Is Different 
 
The State‟s cross-appeal does not take issue with any of Dowell‟s filings governed by the 
appellate rules.  Rather, the State argues that the appeal should be dismissed because Dowell‟s 
motion to correct error was untimely. 
 
The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure require that a motion to correct error be filed within 
thirty days after the entry of a final judgment. Ind. Trial Rule 59(C).  As the Attorney General 
points out, the trial rules define with some particularity what constitutes filing and when filings 
are deemed to have occurred, depending on the mode of delivery: 
 
(F)    Filing With the Court Defined.  The filing of pleadings, 
motions, and other papers with the court as required by these rules 
shall be made by one of the following methods: 
(1) Delivery to the clerk of the court; 
(2) Sending by electronic transmission under the procedure 
adopted pursuant to Administrative Rule 12; 
(3) Mailing to the clerk by registered, certified or express 
mail return receipt requested; 
(4) Depositing with any third-party commercial carrier for 
delivery to the clerk within three (3) calendar days, cost 
prepaid, properly addressed;  
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(5) If the court so permits, filing with the judge, in which 
event the judge shall note thereon the filing date and 
forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk; or  
(6) Electronic filing, as approved by the Division of State 
Court Administration pursuant to Administrative Rule 16.  
 
Filing by registered or certified mail and by third-party 
commercial carrier shall be complete upon mailing or deposit[.] 
 
Any party filing any paper by any method other than 
personal delivery to the clerk shall retain proof of filing. 
 
T.R. 5(F). 
 
The gist of this is that when a party transmits by an independently verifiable means (like 
registered mail or third-party carrier), the filing is deemed to have occurred upon mailing or 
deposit.  When other means are used, filing occurs on the date the filing is in the hands of the 
clerk.  Indianapolis Mach. Co. v. Bollman, 167 Ind. App. 596, 339 N.E.2d 312 (1976).  The 
principle of the mailbox rule has been applied under Rule 5 only when the court is satisfied that 
the prisoner had employed certified mail, return receipt requested, and deposited his mailing in 
the institutional mail pouch by or before the filing deadline, notwithstanding the fact that the 
postmark reflected a date after the deadline.  Cooper v. State, 714 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1999); Baker v. State, 505 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
 
 
Dowell used regular mail, perhaps tendering it on the last possible day.  The trial court 
clerk thus appropriately date-stamped it on the day when it arrived in the clerk‟s office, two days 
after the filing deadline.   
 
When a motion to correct error is not timely filed, the right to appeal is not preserved.  
Goodman v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (appeal dismissed after trial court 
wrongly purported to grant an extension); Dixon v. State, 566 N.E.2d 594, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991) (“if an appellant files a motion to correct error that is not mandatory under the rules, the 
motion must be filed within thirty (30) days after the judgment in order to preserve the 
appellant‟s right to an appeal of all issues”); Corkell v. Corkell, 653 N.E.2d 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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1995) (untimely motion to correct error forfeits opportunity for appeal of issues to which it is 
addressed).     
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The appeal is dismissed.  
 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.