Title: Brian L. Buswell v. Tomah Area School District
Citation: 2007 WI 71
Docket Number: 2005AP002998
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 2007

2007 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2998 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Brian L. Buswell, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Tomah Area School District, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 295 Wis. 2d 842, 721 N.W.2d 158 
(Ct. App. 2006—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 13, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. McAlpine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Jack D. Buswell and Arndt, Buswell & Thorn, S.C., Sparta, and 
oral argument by Jack D. Buswell. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Lori M. 
Lubinsky, Brian C. Hough, and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by Lori M. Lubinsky. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas C. Bellavia, 
assistant attorney general, on behalf of Attorney General Peggy 
A. Lautenschlager. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Melissa A. Cherney and 
Christine L. Galinat, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael J. Julka, 
Richard F. Verstegen, and Lathrop & Clark LLP, Madison, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
2007 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2998  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV129) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Brian L. Buswell, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Tomah Area School District, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Rights 
declared.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Brian Buswell, 
seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision 
affirming a judgment that dismissed his claims that the Tomah 
Area School District violated the public notice requirements of 
Wisconsin's open meetings law.1  He asserts that the court of 
                                                 
1 See Buswell v. Tomah Area School Dist., No. 2005AP2998, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2006)(affirming a 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Michael J. 
McAlpine, Judge); Wis. Stat. § 19.84 (2003-04)(all references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless 
otherwise noted). 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
2 
 
appeals erred when it concluded that the Tomah Board of 
Education provided adequate notice that it would be considering 
the Tomah Education Association's master contract at its June 1, 
2004, meeting and a new hiring procedure for coaches at both its 
June 1 and June 15, 2004, meetings. 
¶2 
Buswell advances that the notices violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.84(2) because they were not reasonably likely to apprise 
members of the public of the subject matter of the meetings and 
that the notices are inconsistent with the policies for the open 
meetings law as set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81(1) and (4).  In 
essence, Buswell contends that this court should adopt a 
reasonableness 
standard 
for 
determining 
the 
degree 
of 
specificity required in identifying the subject matter of a 
meeting in order to comply with the notice provision of the open 
meetings law.  
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) sets forth a reasonableness standard, and 
that such a standard strikes the proper balance contemplated in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81(1) and (4) between the public's right to 
information and the government's need to efficiently conduct its 
business. Applying that standard, we determine that the June 1 
notice was insufficient under § 19.84(2) and contrary to the 
policies in §§ 19.81(1) and (4) because it failed to reasonably 
apprise members of the public that it would consider the Tomah 
Education Association's master contract at that meeting.  We 
further determine, however, that the failure to detail the new 
hiring procedure for coaches contained in the new master 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
3 
 
contract renders neither the June 1 nor the June 15 notice 
insufficient because it would not be reasonable to require such 
detail in these circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the court 
of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
I 
¶4 
In June 2004, the Tomah Board of Education ("Board") 
held two meetings regarding a new master contract between the 
Tomah Education Association ("TEA") and the Tomah Area School 
District ("School District") for the 2003-04 and 2004-05 school 
years.  Prior to the June meetings, Tomah community members had 
expressed concerns over a proposal to include a provision giving 
priority to TEA members over other candidates for athletic 
coaching positions in the new TEA master contract.  The record 
reflects that no previous TEA master contract contained a 
procedure for hiring athletic coaches. 
¶5 
Prior to the June 1 meeting, 16 community members, 
including Buswell, sent a letter to the Board regarding the 
School District's policy for hiring coaches.  The letter 
expressed concern about the possibility that the Board would 
adopt a new hiring policy for coaches and objected to including 
any such policy in the new TEA contract.   
¶6 
On June 1, 2004, the School Board held a special 
meeting in closed session to discuss the provisions of the new 
TEA master contract.  The Board had issued a public notice of 
the agenda which stated:  
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
4 
 
Contemplated closed session for consideration and/or 
action 
concerning 
employment/negotiations 
with 
District 
personnel 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(c).2 
¶7 
During 
the 
June 
1 
closed 
session, 
the 
Board 
tentatively approved the TEA master contract subject to TEA 
ratification and ratification by the Board in open session.  The 
new master contract included the preferential hiring procedure 
for coaches given to TEA members over other applicants who were 
not members of TEA.  
¶8 
On June 15, 2004, the Board held a regular meeting 
preceded by a public notice stating, in relevant part:  
New 
Business——Consideration 
and/or 
Action 
on 
the 
Following: 
 . . .  
TEA Employee Contract Approval 
During the open session of the June 15 meeting, the Board 
officially ratified the TEA master contract that had been 
tentatively approved at the June 1 meeting.   
¶9 
Buswell filed suit against the School District, 
alleging it had violated the open meetings law by failing to: 
give adequate notice that (1) the Board would consider the TEA 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1) 
outlines 
the 
procedures 
and 
legitimate 
purposes 
for 
holding 
closed 
meetings. 
Section 
19.85(1)(c) provides that closed sessions may be convened for:  
Considering 
employment, 
promotion, 
compensation 
or 
performance evaluation data of any public employee over 
which the governmental body has jurisdiction or exercises 
responsibility. 
 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
5 
 
master contract at the June 1 meeting; (2) the Board would 
consider the new hiring procedure for coaches contained within 
that contract at the June 1 meeting; and (3) the Board would 
consider ratification of the new hiring procedure for coaches at 
the June 15 meeting.  The circuit court granted the School 
District's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
basing its ruling on the court of appeals decision in State ex 
rel. H.D. Enter. II, LLC v. City of Stoughton, 230 Wis. 2d 480, 
602 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1999).  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court, concluding that notice of the meeting met the 
standard under H.D. Enterprises.  Buswell v. Tomah Area School 
Dist., No. 2005AP2998, unpublished slip op., ¶7 (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 6, 2006).  Buswell petitioned for review. 
II 
¶10 This case comes to the court on review of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.  In such a posture, a 
reviewing court takes as true the facts alleged in the 
complaint.  Methodist Manor of Waukesha, Inc. v. Martin, 2002 WI 
App 130, ¶2, 255 Wis. 2d 707, 647 N.W.2d 409.  
¶11 Our focus here is on the interpretation of Wisconsin's 
open meetings statutes.  We must discern whether the notices 
provided for the two meetings complied with the open meetings 
law.  The interpretation of a statute presents questions of law 
that we review independently of the determinations rendered by 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  Haferman v. St. Clare 
Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, ¶15, 286 Wis. 2d 621, 707 
N.W.2d 853. 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
6 
 
III 
¶12 Although the current version of Wisconsin's open 
meetings law has been in force for over 30 years, this court has 
never addressed the issue of the degree of specificity required 
in identifying the subject matter of a meeting in order to 
comply with the notice provision of the open meetings law. 
Buswell contends that the notices provided by the Board for its 
June 1 and June 15, 2004, meetings were too general and did not 
comply with § 19.84(2).  That section provides in relevant part: 
Every public notice of a meeting of a governmental 
body shall set forth the time, date, place and subject 
matter of the meeting, including that intended for 
consideration at any contemplated closed session, in 
such form as is reasonably likely to apprise members 
of the public and the news media thereof. . . .3   
¶13 With respect to the June 1 meeting, Buswell claims 
that the notice was deficient because it did not indicate that 
the Board would act upon a new master contract with the TEA, and 
it did not state that the Board would act upon the new procedure 
for hiring coaches within the master contract.  He argues that 
the notice would have had to mention both the TEA contract and 
the new hiring provision in order to be "reasonably likely to 
apprise members of the public" of the subject matter of the 
meeting.  With respect to the June 15 meeting, Buswell claims 
                                                 
3 The statute requires that a notice be "reasonably likely 
to apprise members of the public and the news media" of the 
subject matter of the meeting.  However, Buswell does not frame 
his argument in regards to adequate notice to the media.  
Rather, his arguments all address whether the notices reasonably 
apprise members of the public.  Accordingly, this is the 
question we address. 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
7 
 
that the notice was deficient because it did not state that the 
Board would act upon the new hiring provision for coaches. 
¶14 Buswell further argues that the failure to indicate 
that the meetings would consider the TEA contract and new hiring 
provision is contrary to the polices of the open meetings law, 
as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.81(1) and (4). Section 19.81(1) 
provides: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government of the American type is dependent upon an 
informed electorate, it is declared to be the policy 
of this state that the public is entitled to the 
fullest and most complete information regarding the 
affairs of government as is compatible with the 
conduct of governmental business. 
Section 19.81(4) adds that the open meetings subchapter "shall 
be liberally construed to achieve the purposes set forth in this 
section . . . ."  Buswell maintains that these policies require 
more specific notice than that provided in the notices for the 
June 1 and June 15 meetings.  At 
the 
heart 
of 
Buswell's 
argument is his contention that the court of appeals erred in 
failing to adopt and apply a reasonableness standard in 
determining whether the notices complied with Wisconsin's open 
meetings law. 
¶15 The cornerstone of the court of appeals' analysis is 
the interpretation of § 19.84(2) in H.D. Enterprises.  It 
involved a grocery store's application for a liquor license from 
the city of Stoughton.  The city published notice of a council 
meeting at which it would consider the application.  The 
published agenda for the meeting indicated that the council 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
8 
 
would discuss the application by listing the item as "licenses."  
At the meeting, the council denied the license. 230 Wis. 2d at 
482.  The council, however, reconsidered the denial at a second 
meeting.  The notice for the second meeting also listed the item 
as "licenses." At the second meeting, the council granted the 
license.  Id.  
¶16 The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that the city 
had violated § 19.84(2).  It argued that merely listing an 
agenda item as "licenses" does not provide specific enough 
information to reasonably apprise members of the public of the 
subject matter of the meeting, which was the reconsideration of 
the denial of the grocery store's application for a liquor 
license.  Id. at 485.  The court of appeals disagreed with the 
plaintiff.  It determined that the word "licenses" sufficed to 
apprise members of the public of the subject matter of the 
meeting, and that the statute does not require "that the subject 
matter of a meeting be explained with any more specificity."  
Id. at 486.  Rather, it adopted a bright-line rule that "the 
general topic of items to be discussed is sufficient to satisfy 
the statute."  Id. at 487.  
¶17 In the present case, the court of appeals determined 
that H.D. Enterprises compelled the conclusion that the notices 
were sufficient.  Because the terms in the Board's notices——
"employment/negotiations" 
and 
"TEA 
Employment 
Contract 
Approval"——are no more general than "licenses," the court of 
appeals reasoned that the Board provided sufficient subject 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
9 
 
matter notice for its June 1 and June 15 meetings.  Buswell, 
unpublished slip op., ¶7. 
¶18 The court of appeals further indicated that it was 
required to follow H.D. Enterprises, but was sympathetic to 
Buswell's argument.  It stated that "[w]hile we are sympathetic 
to Buswell's policy argument, and might have decided the issue 
differently prior to [H.D. Enterprises], we do not write on a 
clean slate."  Id., ¶6.  Instead, it noted that any arguments 
for changing the standard established in H.D. Enterprises must 
be directed to this court. 
¶19 The School District maintains that very general terms 
such as "employment/negotiations" and "TEA Employment Contract 
Renewal" provided sufficient notice for the meetings.  At oral 
argument the School District contended that under the H.D. 
Enterprises bright-line rule, even broader language, such as 
"District personnel," would have provided sufficiently specific 
notice.  We, however, disagree that such a broad heading is per 
se "reasonably likely to apprise members of the public" that the 
subject of the meeting is a new master contract for teachers. 
¶20 The court of appeals' and the School District's 
interpretation of H.D. Enterprises elevates a very general 
provision 
into 
a 
one-size-fits-all provision. Under their 
approach, a meeting is not required to have notice with any more 
specificity than a very general provision such as "licenses." 
¶21 Allowing 
such 
broad 
language 
as 
"licenses" 
to 
constitute sufficient notice as a matter of law is contrary to 
the plain language of § 19.84(2) and the policies of the open 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
10 
 
meetings law set out in §§ 19.81(1) and (4).  We therefore 
reevaluate the approach of H.D. Enterprises.  Rather than taking 
a bright-line approach, where any notice that is no more general 
than "licenses" is sufficient, we adopt a reasonableness 
approach, according to which notice must be reasonably specific 
under the circumstances.4  It is our view that such a 
                                                 
4 In a concurrence, Justice Roggensack contends that H.D. 
Enterprises did not establish a bright-line rule and accuses the 
majority of attacking a straw man. Concurrence, ¶¶56, 68 (citing 
State ex rel. H.D. Enter. II, LLC v. City of Stoughton, 230 
Wis. 2d 480, 602 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1999)). This "straw man" 
interpretation, 
however, 
is 
the 
generally 
accepted 
interpretation by everyone other than that concurrence.  It is 
the interpretation adopted by the Attorney General, the parties, 
the circuit court, and the court of appeals in this case.  It is 
also the interpretation that comports with the actual language 
of H.D. Enterprises. 
In an amicus brief, the Attorney General states that H.D. 
Enterprises created a "one-size-fits-all standard applicable to 
all notices."  It concludes that the "bright-line standard of 
H.D. Enterprises is inconsistent with the 'reasonably apprise' 
standard 
established 
by 
the 
Legislature 
in 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.84(2)."  
Likewise, 
the 
petitioner concedes that "[a]fter H.D. 
Enterprises, 
if 
general 
notice 
provisions 
like 
'licenses' . . . are acceptable, then all notices that are 
equally as general pass muster."  The respondent also agrees, 
asserting that if the word "licenses" was deemed sufficiently 
specific under H.D. Enterprises, then "'Consideration and/or 
Action Concerning Employment Negotiations' is more than enough 
to apprise members of the public that the School Board may 
consider and/or act concerning the negotiations." 
The circuit court and the court of appeals agree that H.D. 
Enterprises creates a bright-line rule.  The circuit court 
determined that it was bound under H.D. Enterprises to conclude 
that the notice for the meetings was adequate.  The court of 
appeals similarly concluded that notices that are no more 
general than "licenses" suffice under H.D. Enterprises. Buswell, 
unpublished slip op., ¶7. 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
11 
 
reasonableness standard is required by the plain language and 
policies of the open meetings law.  
¶22 To begin, the plain language of § 19.84(2) is not 
amenable to a bright-line rule.  That section requires that 
public notice be "reasonably likely to apprise members of the 
public" (emphasis added).  The use of the word "reasonably" 
suggests a balancing of factors.  Such a balancing requires a 
case-specific analysis.  In other words, whether notice is 
sufficiently specific will depend upon what is reasonable under 
the circumstances. 
¶23 We 
find 
support 
for 
this 
determination 
in 
the 
reasoning of State ex rel. Badke v. Vill. Bd. of the Vill. of 
Greendale, 173 Wis. 2d 553, 494 N.W.2d 408 (1993).  In Badke, a 
village board meeting regarding a controversial special use 
permit was held at a facility that was not quite large enough to 
accommodate the approximately 70 people who attended.  Twenty 
people could enter only a foyer in the building, not the main 
meeting hall, and up to three people were denied entrance 
altogether.  Some attendees testified that they could not 
adequately hear the proceedings from their spot in the foyer.  
Id. at 563. 
¶24 The plaintiffs in Badke contended that because some 
citizens could not gain entrance and others could not hear what 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally the very language of H.D. Enterprises supports the 
interpretation that notices no more general than "licenses" are 
per se adequate.  "There is no requirement in the statute that 
the subject matter of a meeting be explained with any more 
specificity." 230 Wis. 2d at 486.  
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
12 
 
was said at the meeting, the meeting violated the requirement 
that meetings be "held in places reasonably accessible to 
members of the public and shall be open to all citizens at all 
times . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.81(2).  This court determined 
that the words "reasonably accessible" suggests that "open to 
all 
citizens 
at 
all 
times" 
does 
not 
require 
absolute 
accessibility. Rather, it held that "reasonably" implies that 
reviewing courts must evaluate on a case-by-case basis in 
determining whether meetings are sufficiently accessible.  Id. 
at 580.  We determine that the word "reasonably" has similar 
effect in § 19.84(2). 
¶25 The proposition that a statement of the general topic 
of a meeting should per se constitute sufficient notice runs 
contrary to the policies articulated in § 19.81(1).  That 
section states that the "public is entitled to the fullest and 
most complete information regarding the affairs of government as 
is compatible with the conduct of governmental business."  Such 
information 
extends 
to 
public 
notice 
of 
meetings 
under 
§ 19.84(2).  Badke, 173 Wis. 2d at 577-78. 
¶26 We note, too, that § 19.81(1) states that the open 
meetings law is based on the premise that "representative 
government [depends] upon an informed electorate."  We observe 
that government functions best when it is open and when people 
have information about its operations.  It is not, however, 
merely a matter of enhancing the functions of government. 
Rather, the government must be accountable to the governed.  It 
must be accountable to the people who underwrite government 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
13 
 
finances 
and 
provide 
its 
legitimacy. 
 
Having 
access 
to 
information about the workings of government undercuts arguments 
of 
subterfuge 
and 
ultimately 
promotes 
public 
trust 
and 
confidence. Moreover, as this court determined in Badke, the 
notice requirement gives the public information about the 
business to be conducted that will alert them to the importance 
of the meeting, so that they can make an informed decision 
whether to attend.  Badke, 173 Wis. 2d at 573-74 and 577-78. 
¶27 Thus, the language of § 19.84(2) and the policies 
underlying the open meetings law do not abide a bright-line rule 
where the general topic of a meeting constitutes sufficient 
subject matter notice as a matter of law.  Rather, they demand a 
reasonableness standard according to which notice must be 
reasonably specific under the circumstances of the case.  
Because the reasonableness standard is at odds with the 
application of a bright-line rule, we therefore overrule H.D 
Enterprises.5  
¶28 The 
reasonableness 
standard 
requires 
taking 
into 
account the circumstances of the case in determining whether 
                                                 
5 As noted in an amicus brief submitted by the Attorney 
General, this approach comports with the approach consistently 
advocated 
by 
the 
Attorney 
General, 
who 
is 
charged 
with 
interpreting 
the 
state's 
open 
meetings 
law 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.98.  In the compliance guide for open meetings 
law published by the Department of Justice, the Attorney General 
urges that in noticing meetings, officers "should keep in mind 
that the public is entitled to the best notice that can be given 
at the time the notice is prepared."  Wis. Dept. of Justice, 
Wisconsin Open Meetings Law: A Compliance Guide, p. 9 (Aug. 
2005).  
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
14 
 
notice is sufficient.  This includes analyzing such factors as 
the burden of providing more detailed notice, whether the 
subject is of particular public interest, and whether it 
involves non-routine action that the public would be unlikely to 
anticipate.  See H.D. Enter., 230 Wis. 2d at 490 (Vergeront, J., 
dissenting). 
¶29 The first factor, the burden of providing more 
specific information on the body noticing the meeting derives 
from § 19.81(1).  It balances the policy of providing greater 
information with the requirement that providing such information 
be "compatible with the conduct of governmental affairs." 
Wis. Stat. § 19.81(1). 
Whether 
more 
detailed 
notice 
is 
compatible 
with 
the 
conduct 
of 
governmental 
affairs 
is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  Such a determination may 
include, but is not limited to, the time and effort involved in 
assessing what information should be provided in a notice and 
the inherent limitations of citizen boards.  In Badke, this 
court aptly described the demands on public officials:  
In Wisconsin, there are many parttime citizen boards 
that work long hours for relatively little or no pay. 
These 
boards' 
real 
compensation 
comes 
from 
the 
satisfaction of public service.  It is very difficult 
for 
these 
boards 
to 
anticipate 
the 
myriad 
of 
situations that may call into question the parameters 
of the open meeting law.  We recognize that most 
public officials diligently try to abide by the 
law . . . . 
173 Wis. 2d at 570.  The crucial point is that the demands of 
specificity should not thwart the efficient administration of 
governmental business. 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
15 
 
¶30 In considering the second factor, we are persuaded 
that particular public interest in the subject matter of a 
meeting may require greater specificity in the hearing notice. 
Particular public interest may be a matter of both the number of 
people interested and the intensity of that interest.  The level 
of interest, in and of itself, however, is not dispositive. 
Rather, it must be balanced with other factors on a case-by-case 
basis. 
¶31 Third, the degree of specificity of notice may depend 
on whether the subject of the meeting is routine or novel.  
Where the subject of a meeting recurs regularly, there may be 
less need for specificity because members of the public are more 
likely to anticipate that it will be addressed.  However, novel 
issues are more likely to catch the public unaware.  Novel 
issues may therefore require more specific notice. 
¶32 The determination of whether notice is sufficient 
should be based upon what information is available to the 
officer noticing the meeting at the time notice is provided, and 
based upon what it would be reasonable for the officer to know.  
Thus, whether there is particular public interest in the subject 
of a meeting or whether a specific issue within the subject of 
the 
meeting will 
be covered, and how that affects the 
specificity required, cannot be determined from the standpoint 
of when the meeting actually takes place.  Rather, it must be 
gauged from the standpoint of when the meeting is noticed. 
¶33 The School District raises several objections to the 
adoption of a reasonableness standard in determining whether a 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
16 
 
notice complies with Wisconsin's open meetings laws.  None is 
persuasive.  First, quoting H.D. Enterprises, it asserts that a 
case-by-case analysis would "burden municipalities with an 
obligation to detail every issue that will be discussed under 
every agenda item during meetings when that is not mandated by 
statute."  H.D. Enterprises, 230 Wis. 2d at 487.  A notice must 
reasonably apprise members of the public of the subject matter 
of a meeting under the circumstances.  A reasonableness standard 
will not require that every issue on every agenda always be 
enumerated because such a requirement would be unreasonable. 
Rather, general subject headings may suffice in cases where a 
general heading reasonably apprises members of the public of the 
subject matter of the meeting.  In other cases, reasonably 
apprising members of the public may require greater specificity. 
¶34 Second, 
the 
School 
District 
argues 
that 
a 
reasonableness 
standard 
would 
inappropriately 
constrain 
discussion at meetings of governmental bodies because their 
deliberations would be limited to the noticed narrow topics.  We 
disagree.  Under a reasonableness standard, meeting participants 
would be free to discuss any aspect of the noticed subject 
matter, as well as issues that are reasonably related to it. It 
is true that a meeting cannot address topics unrelated to the 
information in the notice.  However, that is because the notice 
requirement functions to assure that members of the public are 
reasonably apprised of what is discussed at such meetings.  The 
objection that other topics may not be freely addressed is 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
17 
 
therefore not an objection to a reasonableness standard, but to 
the notice requirement itself. 
¶35 Third, 
the 
School 
District 
argues 
that 
a 
reasonableness standard would impose an unacceptable burden on 
governmental bodies to predict and gauge public interest in 
every item on a meeting's agenda.  While it is correct that a 
reasonableness standard will at times require that bodies 
anticipate and account for public interest when noticing 
meetings, it will not impose a per se requirement to predict and 
gauge public interest on each subject at every meeting.  Where 
predicting and gauging public interest imposes an unreasonable 
burden, the bodies will not be required to do so. 
¶36 Applying the reasonableness standard, we determine 
that the notice for the June 1 hearing was not sufficiently 
specific to be "reasonably likely to apprise members of the 
public" of the subject matter of the meeting.  The June 1 notice 
stated: "Contemplated closed session for consideration and/or 
action 
concerning 
employment/negotiations 
with 
District 
personnel 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(c)." 
This 
description is vague, for it could cover negotiations with any 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
18 
 
group of district personnel or with any individual employee 
within the district.6  
¶37 Moreover, the June 1 notice was misleading.  It stated 
that 
the 
closed 
session 
was 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(c).7  That section provides for closed sessions for 
                                                 
6 The Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Inc. and the 
Wisconsin Education Association Council submitted amicus briefs 
arguing that the Board was not a "governmental body" within the 
meaning of § 19.82(1) when it discussed the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement at the June 1 meeting.  That 
section excludes from the definition of "governmental body" 
entities "formed for or meeting for the purpose of collective 
bargaining under subch. I, IV or V of ch. 111." Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.82(1).  Because the Board met on June 1 in part to discuss 
provisions of the TEA master contract, the briefs argue that the 
Board was not required to follow the notice requirements of the 
open meetings law.  Neither the School District nor Buswell 
raise this issue in briefs or in oral argument. Further, the 
record does not indicate that the Board met on June 1 for the 
purpose of collective bargaining.  Rather, it indicates that it 
met to consider approval of the terms reached via collective 
bargaining.  We therefore decline to address the issue here. 
7 The School District argues that notice for closed sessions 
may be less specific than notice for open sessions due the fact 
that the public may not attend.  It cites to Olson v. City of 
Baraboo Joint Review Bd. for the view that less detail is 
required where public input is not allowed, as in closed 
session.  2002 WI App 64, ¶15, 252 Wis. 2d 628, 643 N.W.2d 796. 
However, Olson implies only that adequate notice of a closed 
session may not require information about whether a vote on a 
subject will occur, so long as the subject matter of the vote is 
adequately specified.  Id.  We do not see a justification for a 
per se rule that notice for closed sessions may be less specific 
than notice for open sessions.  
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
19 
 
considering matters related to individual employees, not for 
considering collective bargaining agreements.8  As the School 
District conceded at oral argument, the appropriate statute to 
cite would have been § 19.85(1)(e).9  Because the notice was 
vague and misleading, it was not "reasonably likely to apprise 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast, the Attorney General contends in an amicus 
brief that closed sessions may require more specific notice than 
open sessions.  We likewise do not see a justification for a per 
se rule that notice for closed sessions must always be more 
specific than notice for open sessions.  Notice of closed 
sessions must contain enough information for the public to 
discern whether the subject matter is authorized for closed 
session under § 19.85(1).  
8 The minutes for the June 1 meeting show that the Board 
considered 
applications 
for 
the 
position 
of 
high 
school 
principal, which would fall under § 19.85(1)(c).  Thus, citing 
that statute is not misleading insofar as individual personnel 
matters were considered at the meeting.  Rather, it is 
misleading because it suggests that only individual personnel 
matters were to be considered at the meeting. 
9 Section 19.85(1)(e) provides for closed sessions when: 
(e) Deliberating or negotiating the purchasing of 
public properties, the investing of public funds, or 
conducting other specified public business, whenever 
competitive or bargaining reasons require a closed 
session.  
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
20 
 
members of the public" of the subject matter of the meeting——in 
this case the TEA master contract.10 
¶38 Examining the circumstances of this case, we determine 
that those factors support the conclusion that the June 1 notice 
required greater specificity.  First, and most importantly, 
stating that the TEA master contract would be discussed at the 
June 1 meeting would not be a burden to the Board. It requires 
only a few words.  Further, the notice for the June 15 meeting 
actually listed the TEA master contract on the agenda, and there 
is no contention that listing it there was a burden. 
¶39 Second, the TEA master contract included a new hiring 
provision for coaches that was of interest to a number of people 
in the community.  Several citizens had made the effort to 
petition the Board regarding whether to put a provision for 
hiring coaches into the master contract. 
¶40 Third, the TEA master contract was not a routine 
subject insofar as it contained a new hiring provision for 
coaches to which a number of members of the community objected. 
                                                 
10 The School District cites to Olson v. City of Baraboo 
Joint Review Bd. for the proposition that incorrect information 
on a public notice does not render that notice inadequate. 252 
Wis. 2d 628, ¶14. We agree that there is not a per se rule that 
§ 19.84(2) is violated any time there is incorrect information 
on a public notice. Here, however, the notice does not specify 
whether the closed session is to consider individual employment 
matters or collective bargaining agreements, and the cited 
statute misleadingly suggests that the meeting will cover only 
individual employment matters. The mistake therefore compounds 
the inadequacy of the notice rather than being offset by other 
information in the notice. See id., ¶15. 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
21 
 
This suggests that the notice should have mentioned the TEA 
master contract. 
¶41 Thus, analyzing the circumstances of the case, we 
conclude that the Board did not provide sufficient notice for 
the June 1 meeting.  The notice was vague and misleading.  Under 
the circumstances, it was not sufficiently specific to be 
"reasonably likely to apprise members of the public" that the 
meeting concerned the TEA master contract. 
¶42 Although we determine that the notice for the June 1 
meeting required greater specificity than it provided as to the 
TEA master contract, we do not agree with Buswell's contention 
that the notice violated § 19.84(2) by failing to state that the 
Board would act upon the new hiring provision for coaches set 
forth within the master contract.  Again, we apply the factors 
to the circumstances of the case to determine whether providing 
the more specific information would be reasonable. 
¶43 The first of the factors, the burden of providing 
greater information, weighs against requiring that the notice 
for the June 1 meeting state that the Board would address the 
hiring provision.  Admittedly, the second and third factors 
weigh in favor of requiring that the notice state that the Board 
would address the hiring provision.  There was particular public 
interest in the hiring provision, and the hiring provision 
within the contract was novel.  However, we determine that the 
burden 
of 
providing 
notice 
of 
particular 
provisions 
of 
collective bargaining contracts is great enough that requiring 
that information would be unreasonable under the circumstances.  
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
22 
 
¶44 Master contracts may be complex and contain any number 
of provisions.  Requiring that school boards, or other similarly 
situated bodies, anticipate and list all of those provisions in 
a public notice would likely consume a disproportionate amount 
of their limited time and may require a significant effort.  
Moreover, as the School District argues, requiring that public 
notice list which individual provisions of collective bargaining 
agreements will be discussed in closed session could serve to 
undermine governmental bodies' bargaining positions, which would 
place a substantial burden on them.  Thus, considering the 
balance of factors, we determine that the burden of including a 
particular contract provision in its notice for the June 1 
meeting is substantial enough that it is not required under 
§ 19.84(2).11  
¶45 We also reject Buswell's argument that the notice for 
the June 15 meeting was insufficient.  Unlike the notice for the 
June 1 meeting, the notice for the June 15 meeting listed "TEA 
                                                 
11 Justice Butler contends that for the same reason that it 
would not have been burdensome to provide notice that the TEA 
master contract would be under consideration at the June 1 
meeting, it would also not be burdensome to provide notice of 
the new hiring provision for coaches, for in each case "a few 
words in the notice would have sufficed."  Concurrence/dissent, 
¶88.  Admittedly, adding a few words about hiring coaches is not 
burdensome.  However, the number of words required for a 
particular contract provision is not the only consideration. 
Rather, the question is what degree of specificity will be 
required in describing the particular aspects of a contract that 
will be under consideration.  It is our determination that 
providing notice that a contract will be discussed at a meeting 
is not burdensome, but specifying the particular provisions of a 
multifaceted contract is significantly more burdensome. 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
23 
 
Employee Contract Approval."  Thus, a member of the public could 
determine that the TEA master contract would be discussed by 
reading the notice.  As with the notice for the June 1 meeting, 
the notice for the June 15 meeting need not have specified that 
the new hiring provision for coaches would be part of the TEA 
contract.  The burden of specifying particular provisions in a 
multifaceted contract would be too great.  We acknowledge that 
given the level of interest in the subject matter, it may have 
been beneficial to list the new hiring provision that was 
contained in the TEA master contract.  However, we do not 
mandate such specificity here. 
IV 
¶46 As discussed above, whether a public notice is 
sufficient under open meetings law is determined by applying a 
reasonableness standard and analyzing the specifics of the case.  
This is a departure from the bright-line rule announced in H.D. 
Enterprises, according to which a notice stating only the 
general topic to be discussed at the meeting is sufficient.  230 
Wis. 2d at 486-87.  Ordinarily, this court adheres to the 
doctrine that a decision which overrules an earlier decision is 
retrospective in operation.  State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶42, 
261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381 (citing Harmann v. Hadley, 128 
Wis. 2d 371, 377, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986)).  Yet, retroactive 
application of a new rule can be unsettling because of 
justifiable reliance on a contrary view of the law.  This court 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
24 
 
will therefore on occasion prospectively overrule past precedent 
to limit such unsettling effect.  Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 378.12 
¶47 Three factors inform the inquiry of whether our 
judicial 
determination 
should 
have 
retroactive 
versus 
prospective application.  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70-
71, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.  Those three factors are: 
(1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law, 
either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may 
have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose 
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) whether retroactive 
application would further or retard the operation of the new 
rule; and (3) whether retroactive application could produce 
substantial inequitable results.  Id. at ¶71. 
¶48 Applying these factors here, we reach the conclusion 
that the application of the reasonableness standard should be 
                                                 
12 The technique of prospective overruling is often called 
"sunbursting," for Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & 
Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); see Thomas E. Fairchild, 
Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective Effect Only: 
"Prospective Overruling" or "Sunbursting", 51 Marq. L. Rev. 254, 
255 
(1967-68). 
Courts 
may 
apply 
a 
new 
rule 
of 
law 
"prospectively" in different ways. A court may determine that 
the new rule will apply only to future events, and not to the 
case before it or any other case arising from conduct that has 
already occurred, as was the case in Sunburst Oil. Id. at 364;  
Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 378, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986). 
A court may also apply the rule to the case in which the rule is 
announced, and to future events, but not to cases arising from 
conduct that has already occurred, as we are doing in the 
instant case. Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 378. In addition, a court 
may apply the new rule to cases in which the trial has not yet 
begun or in which the time for appeal has not yet expired. Id., 
citing Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 114 N.W.2d 105 
(1962). 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
25 
 
given only prospective effect.  First, our decision establishes 
a standard that is a departure from past precedent.  Second, 
retroactive application would not further the operation of the 
new rule.  The public cannot go back and attend meetings that 
may have been inadequately noticed when such meetings have 
already occurred.  Third, and most importantly, retroactive 
application 
of 
the 
reasonableness 
standard 
may 
produce 
substantial inequitable results.  It could jeopardize the 
legitimacy of past actions taken at all levels of government.  
¶49 In order to reduce the burden on governmental bodies 
and mitigate any hardships that result from a change in the law, 
we will apply the rule announced here only to this case and to 
cases challenging future notices.  Thus, any challenge to the 
specificity of the subject matter of a public notice under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) that was issued prior to the date this 
opinion is mandated will be examined under the requirements of 
H.D. Enterprises.  We apply the new rule to this case because 
Buswell has acted as a relator on behalf of the state, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 19.97(3).  As such, he has worked to vindicate 
his and others' right to open government.  State ex rel. Hodge 
v. Town of Turtle Lake, 180 Wis. 2d 62, 78, 508 N.W.2d 603 
(1993).  Applying the new rule in such a case may serve as an 
incentive for others to act similarly and to deter future 
misconduct.  
V 
¶50 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
June 
1 
notice 
was 
insufficient, and that we will apply the reasonableness standard 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
26 
 
in this case, we turn to the question of remedy.  In his amended 
complaint, Buswell requests voiding the hiring provision for 
coaches in the master contract adopted in the June meetings, 
forfeitures against any member of the board who knowingly 
attended a meeting violating the open meetings law, and 
reasonable attorney fees. 
¶51 Voiding a contract provision is not an available 
remedy here.  The court was advised that the master contract 
that adopted the hiring provision has expired.  The argument 
that a provision in an expired master contract can be voided 
appears incongruous. 
¶52 Similarly, forfeitures are not available as a remedy 
in this case.  Section 19.96 provides for forfeitures by "[a]ny 
member of a governmental body who knowingly attends a meeting of 
such body held in violation" of the open meetings law. Our 
decision overrules the bright-line rule of H.D. Enterprises and 
establishes a reasonableness standard in its place.  Members of 
governmental bodies who complied with the law as it then existed 
cannot be sanctioned for a violation based on an interpretation 
first announced today.  
¶53 With respect to attorney fees, Wis. Stat. § 19.97(4) 
provides that a person bringing an action as relator on behalf 
of the state (as is the case here) for enforcement of the open 
meetings law may receive costs and attorney fees: 
In such actions [i.e., where a person brings a case as 
a relator], the court may award actual and necessary 
costs of prosecution, including reasonable attorney 
fees to the relator if he or she prevails . . . . 
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
27 
 
¶54 Section 19.81(4) requires that the provisions of the 
open meetings law be liberally construed to advance the law's 
purposes.  This court has interpreted that requirement to merit 
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing relator where doing so 
advances the purposes of the open meetings law.  Hodge v. Town 
of Turtle Lake, 180 Wis. 2d at 78.  Such is the case here. 
Awarding attorney fees to Buswell will provide an incentive to 
others to protect the public's right to open meetings and to 
deter governmental bodies from skirting the open meetings law. 
Accordingly, we remand the case to the circuit court to 
determine the appropriate award.13  
VI 
¶55 In sum, we adopt a reasonableness standard for 
determining the degree of specificity required in identifying 
the subject matter of a meeting in order to comply with the 
notice provision of the open meetings law.  We conclude that the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) 
sets 
forth 
a 
reasonableness standard, and that such a standard strikes the 
proper balance contemplated in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81(1) and (4) 
between the public's right to information and the government's 
need to efficiently conduct its business.  Applying that 
standard, we determine that the June 1 notice was insufficient 
under § 19.84(2) and contrary to the policies in §§ 19.81(1) and 
(4) because it failed to reasonably apprise the public that it 
                                                 
13 The appropriate award of attorney fees is determined by 
the "lodestar" methodology.  Anderson v. MSI Preferred Ins. Co., 
2005 WI 62, ¶39, 281 Wis. 2d 66, 697 N.W.2d 73.  
No. 
2005AP2998   
 
28 
 
would consider the TEA's master contract at that meeting.  We 
further determine, however, that the failure to detail the new 
hiring procedure for coaches contained in the new master 
contract renders neither the June 1 nor the June 15 notice 
insufficient because it would not be reasonable to require such 
detail in these circumstances.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
By the Court.—Rights declared.  We reverse the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court.  
 
  
 
 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶56 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   Because 
I conclude that the June 1, 2004 notice of the open meeting was 
insufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) (2005-06),1 I join 
the mandate of the court.  However, I write separately because 
in my view the notice for the June 1 meeting does not satisfy 
the requirements of State ex rel. H.D. Enterprises II, LLC v. 
City of Stoughton, 230 Wis. 2d 480, 602 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 
1999), in regard to § 19.84(2).  I also write separately because 
instead of analyzing whether the subject matter of the notice 
given 
for 
the 
June 1 
meeting 
is 
sufficient 
under 
H.D. 
Enterprises and § 19.84(2), the majority opinion sets up a 
straw-man, its "bright line rule," that it says H.D. Enterprises 
creates.  Majority op., ¶¶16, 19, 22.  The majority opinion then 
proceeds to overrule H.D. Enterprises by knocking down the 
straw-man that the majority opinion created.  Majority op., 
¶¶27, 52.  In my view, the public would be better served by 
additional guidance about compliance with § 19.84(2) than is 
given either in H.D. Enterprises or in the majority opinion.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶57 This case arises out of a citizen complaint by Brian 
Buswell (Buswell) that the board of the Tomah Area School 
District (the board) did not comply with the public notice 
                                                 
1 All further references are to the 2005-06 version of the 
Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
2 
 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2), in regard to a June 1 
meeting where both the TEA Employee Contract and the applicants 
for the position of high school principal were discussed.  
Buswell also alleges that the public notice provisions were 
violated for a second meeting held on June 15, 2004.  He alleges 
that the "subject matter" of both meetings was not reasonably 
described in the respective notices because they did not give 
notice that the board would be considering new hiring procedures 
for athletic coaches that would give hiring preference to 
current TEA members.  He also asserts that the notice for the 
June 1 meeting was misleading because that notice included a 
reference to Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c), as the statutory basis 
for conducting part of the meeting in closed session.  He 
asserts, and the City agrees, that § 19.85(1)(c) is not 
applicable to discussing the TEA Employee Contract in closed 
session. 
¶58 The board contends that both notices were sufficient.  
The notice for the June 1 meeting provided:  
Contemplated Closed Session for Consideration and/or 
Action 
Concerning 
Employment/Negotiations 
with 
District 
Personnel 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stats. 
19.85(1)(c).  
The board admits that the statutory reference in the notice 
could have been misleading, but it asserts that State ex rel. 
Olson v. City of Baraboo Joint Review Board, 2002 WI App 64, 252 
Wis. 
2d 
628, 
643 
N.W.2d 
796, 
concludes 
that 
incorrect 
information in a notice of a public meeting is not fatal to the 
sufficiency of the notice.  The board also contends that by 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
3 
 
noticing that it would consider "TEA Employee Contract Approval" 
at the June 15 meeting, it complied with Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2).2  
¶59 Prior to the June 1 board meeting, the community knew 
that there was a proposal for the TEA Employee Contract that 
would give priority to current TEA members in regard to hiring 
for coaching jobs.  Majority op., ¶4.  The question that is 
presented for this review is whether the notice of both meetings 
reasonably apprised the public and the news media of the subject 
matter of those meetings when the hiring of coaches was not 
mentioned, and in regard to the June 1 notice, whether, because 
the TEA Employee Contract was not mentioned, the notice was 
misleading as well.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶60 This review requires us to interpret various statutory 
provisions and to apply them to the facts presented herein.  The 
interpretation and application of statutes are questions of law 
subject to our independent review.  Jackson County v. DNR, 2006 
WI 96, ¶10, 293 Wis. 2d 497, 717 N.W.2d 713. 
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 19.84(2) 
¶61 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.84(2) provides in relevant part: 
Every 
public 
notice 
of 
a 
meeting 
of 
a 
governmental body shall set forth the time, date, 
place and subject matter of the meeting, including 
that intended for consideration at any contemplated 
closed session, in such form as is reasonably likely 
                                                 
2 I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the 
notice for the June 15 meeting is sufficient to satisfy Wis. 
Stat. § 19.84(2), therefore, I do not address that notice 
further in this concurrence. 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
4 
 
to apprise members of the public and the news media 
thereof.    
Buswell does not challenge the sufficiency of the notice of the 
time, date or place of the meeting.  Rather, he challenges the 
sufficiency of the subject matter described in the notice, 
claiming it is incomplete, misleading and does not reasonably 
apprise the public of what the board will discuss.   
1. 
Notice of the June 1 Meeting 
¶62 It is undisputed that the board intended to and did 
discuss two topics at the June 1 meeting under one subject 
matter topic:  the TEA Employee Contract and applications for 
the position of high school principal.  Therefore, the board was 
required to give public notice of both, if there are two 
different subject matters that were to be discussed during the 
meeting.   
¶63 "Subject matter" is not defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.84 
or 
elsewhere 
in 
the 
statutes 
that 
address 
open 
meeting 
requirements.  Black's Law Dictionary describes "subject matter" 
as: 
The issue presented for consideration; the thing in 
which a right or duty has been asserted; the thing in 
dispute. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1466 (8th ed. 2004).  This is a broad 
inclusive definition, but it gives us little guidance about how 
much particularity or in what form one should describe the 
subject matter that will be addressed at a meeting of a public 
body.   
¶64 In H.D. Enterprises, the court of appeals addressed 
"subject matter" in the context of the Stoughton Common 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
5 
 
Council's consideration of Pick 'N Save's application for a 
liquor license.  H.D. Enterprises, 230 Wis. 2d at 482.  Pick 'N 
Save's application had been published in accord with alcohol 
licensing requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 125.04(3).  Id. at 
482.  The meeting agenda was used by the common council as 
public notice that it would consider the liquor license on 
January 27.  Id.  The agenda listed "licenses" as an agenda 
topic.  Id.  This notice was the first of three occasions on 
which the liquor license was discussed, before H.D. Enterprises 
alleged the City violated its public notice obligation.  Id.  
The application for a liquor license was denied after that first 
common council meeting.  Id.  However, H.D. Enterprises did not 
allege that the notice insufficiently described the subject 
matter of the first meeting.  Id. at 487.   
¶65 At the second meeting, "licenses" again was listed on 
the common council's agenda that gave notice of the meeting.  
Id. at 482.  Pick 'N Save's application was granted at that 
meeting.  Id.  H.D. Enterprise had not appeared at the second 
meeting, and it objected to the reconsideration of Pick 'N 
Save's application.  Id.  Therefore, approximately six days 
after the second meeting, the common council convened a third 
meeting that H.D. Enterprises attended and in which the common 
council considered H.D. Enterprises' request that it rescind 
Pick 'N Save's liquor license.  Id. at 482-83.  The common 
council refused to do so.  Id. at 483.  H.D. Enterprises then 
sued the City of Stoughton claiming that the term "licenses" was 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
6 
 
too general a description of the subject matter of the second 
meeting to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2).  Id.    
¶66 The circuit court concluded the notice was sufficient 
and H.D. Enterprises appealed.  In concluding that "licenses" 
was a sufficient description of the subject matter to reasonably 
apprise the public, the court of appeals examined all the 
circumstances 
surrounding consideration of Pick 'N Save's 
application for a liquor license.  Id. at 483-84 and 487.  It 
noted 
that 
the 
notice 
for 
the 
common 
council's 
first 
consideration of the matter used "licenses" to describe the 
subject matter.  Id. at 487.  The court noted that H.D. 
Enterprises had appeared at that council meeting and therefore, 
it had experience with the City's use of that description.  Id.  
The court of appeals noted that H.D. Enterprises did not 
complain about the lack of notice for the first meeting.  Id.  
The court of appeals also balanced the burden to municipalities, 
which would be caused by detailing every facet of a subject 
matter that may be addressed under every agenda item, with the 
sufficiency of the notice to the public.  Id.   
¶67 The court of appeals opinion took guidance from State 
ex rel. Schaeve v. Van Lare, 125 Wis. 2d 40, 370 N.W. 271 (Ct. 
App. 1985), where Schaeve complained that the description of the 
subject matter of the meeting did not have enough particularity 
to comply with the statute.  H.D. Enterprises, 230 Wis. 2d at 
486.  In Schaeve, it was contended that the subject matter set 
out in the notice was insufficient because it said only that the 
possible discipline of a public employee would be considered.  
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
7 
 
Schaeve, 125 Wis. 2d at 47.  The court of appeals concluded 
there was "no requirement in the statute that the subject matter 
of a meeting must be explained with any more specificity."  Id. 
at 47.   
¶68 Contrary to the assertion in the majority opinion, its 
straw-man, the "bright-line rule," is nowhere mentioned or 
"announced" in H.D. Enterprises.  See majority op., ¶46.  
Instead, 
H.D. 
Enterprises 
is 
based 
on 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances that were relevant to the license that would be 
discussed at an upcoming common council meeting, as it had been 
in other meetings.  H.D. Enterprises, 230 Wis. 2d at 482-83 and 
485.  H.D. Enterprises reasoned that "[s]ection 19.84(2), stats. 
requires that a public notice set forth the time, date, place 
and subject matter of a meeting in such form as is likely to 
reasonably apprise members of the public."  Id. at 485.3  It 
established no rule that is applicable without consideration of 
the relevant facts and circumstances.  
¶69 Moving to the case now before the court, upon 
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the notice 
provided by the board of the Tomah Area School District in 
regard to the June 1 meeting, I conclude it was insufficient 
under 
H.D. 
Enterprises's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.84(2).  I conclude that the board's notice of the June 1 
meeting was insufficient based on three facts that are present 
                                                 
3 The City of Stoughton used entire meeting agendas as the 
public notices for its meetings.  State ex rel. H.D. Enterprises 
v. City of Stoughton, 230 Wis. 2d 480, 482, 602 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. 
App. 1999). 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
8 
 
here and for which countervailing facts were present in and 
important to the decision in H.D. Enterprises.   
¶70 First, two very different topics were addressed under 
one heading in the notice for the board's June 1 meeting, e.g., 
the consideration of the applicants for the position of high 
school principal and the provisions for a new TEA Employee 
Contract.  In H.D. Enterprises, the liquor license was the 
subject matter noticed and discussed at both meetings.  Id. at 
487.  
¶71 Second, the provisions of the master TEA Employee 
Contract were going to be presented at the June 1 meeting, i.e., 
this was a brand-new contract for the board to consider.  In 
H.D. Enterprises, the second notice given was the same as the 
first.  Id. at 487.  Because the liquor license was discussed by 
the common council under that topic previously, the public and 
the news media had experience in the subject matter as described 
in the notice.  Id.  H.D. Enterprises had attended a previous 
common council meeting that was noticed in the same form, by 
using the meeting agenda with the topic "licenses" as a subject 
matter.  Id.   
¶72 And, third, the notice for the June 1 meeting was 
misleading in regard to the TEA Employee Contract because the 
notice referenced Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c) as the basis for the 
board's taking up the subject matter in closed session.  Section 
19.85(1)(c) is the appropriate cite for the consideration of 
applicants for the position of high school principal, but it 
does not apply to collective bargaining agreements such as the 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
9 
 
TEA Employee Contract.  Section 19.85(1)(e) is the section of 
the statutes that permits a public body to consider collective 
bargaining agreements in closed session.  By failing to include 
both § 19.85(1)(c) and (e) in the notice, the board misled the 
public about both the subject matter of the closed meeting and 
the number of topics that would be discussed.  In H.D. 
Enterprises, there was no allegation that the notice was 
misleading.  Accordingly, I conclude that the notice of the 
June 1 meeting of the board did not set forth the subject matter 
in a form that reasonably apprised the public and the news media 
that the TEA Employee Contract would be discussed in the closed 
session portion of that meeting.  Therefore, the notice for the 
June 1 meeting did not comply with the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.84(2), as interpreted in H.D. Enterprises.   
¶73 However, even though I conclude that the notice for 
the June 1 meeting was not sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.84(2), as interpreted in H.D. Enterprises, it appears that 
the guidance given by H.D. Enterprises is not sufficient to 
assist in achieving compliance by those public bodies that are 
required to give public notice of the subject matter of 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
10 
 
meetings.4  The statute requires that notice of the subject 
matter be set out "in such form as is reasonably likely to 
apprise" the public and the news media.  I would advise, but not 
require, that public bodies adopt a standard format for their 
meeting agendas.  The entire agenda for the meeting should then 
be used as the § 19.84(2) notice.  This would give the public 
and the news media experience in what issues are apt to be 
addressed under recurring topics.  I suggest that the agendas 
contain subtopics when more than one matter is to be discussed 
under one agenda topic.  I also recommend including in the 
notice a statement that questions about the agenda can be 
addressed to a representative of the public body, whose name, 
phone number and an appropriate time to call would be listed.  
If the public body has described a subject matter in a way that 
generates questions or confusion about what is to be discussed, 
I suggest a more detailed agenda topic be employed for future 
meeting agendas.  In that way, the public body will learn both 
                                                 
4 There are times when one authors an opinion and believes 
that the issues presented were sufficiently addressed, but in 
hindsight, they were not.  As the author of H.D. Enterprises, I 
now find myself in a position similar to that of Justice Robert 
Jackson.  When faced with a similar problem, he remarked, "The 
matter does not appear to me now as it appears to have appeared 
to me then."  McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950) 
(Jackson, J. concurring) (further citations omitted).  H.D. 
Enterprises appears to me now a bit differently than it appears 
to have appeared to me in 1999.  When it was written, the court 
of appeals decision in H.D. Enterprises appeared to provide 
sufficient guidance on the form in which the subject matter in a 
public notice should be provided in order to reasonably apprise 
the public and the news media of what would be discussed.  
However, now it appears more guidance was needed. 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
11 
 
what specificity is required to describe the subject matter of 
the meeting and what form best assists the public and the news 
media in understanding what will transpire at meetings. 
2. 
Other Concerns 
¶74 I also part company with the majority opinion's use of 
State ex rel. Badke v. Village Board of the Village of 
Greendale, 173 Wis. 2d 553, 494 N.W.2d 408 (1993), as support 
for its contentions about the specificity with which the subject 
matter in a Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) public notice is to be given.  
Majority op., ¶¶23-26.  Badke never addresses or refers to the 
specificity of the subject matter in a public notice.  And this 
is for good reason.  In Badke, there was no notice of any type 
given that the village board was going to meet.  Badke, 173 
Wis. 2d at 569. 
¶75 Furthermore, in regard to the specificity with which 
the subject matter of a meeting must be described in the notice, 
the majority opinion asserts that if the topic is of "particular 
public interest," "greater specificity" may be required in the 
notice.  Majority op., ¶¶29-30.  I see no qualifier in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.84(2).  The public and the news media are those to 
whom reasonable notice is due.  In my view, the majority 
opinion's requirement is an invitation for additional litigation 
claiming the notice was insufficient.  For example, how is the 
public servant who prepares the notice to know that there is a 
"particular public interest?"  Will the notice be insufficient 
if he or she should have known of a "particular public interest" 
but did not?  Does he or she have a duty to learn of a 
No.  2005AP2998.pdr 
 
12 
 
"particular public interest" in the subject matters that will be 
considered?  Furthermore, does a member of the public who has an 
interest in the subject matter of the meeting but who has never 
expressed that interest to others deserve less complete notice?   
¶76 I would not venture into these subjective woods.  
Rather, I conclude that the standard set by Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.84(2) 
is 
an 
objective standard.  Notice is to be 
reasonable.  And, the persons to be noticed are simply the 
public, interested or not, and the news media, interested or 
not.    
¶77 And finally, I disagree with the majority opinion's 
broad assertion that "[i]t is true that a meeting cannot address 
topics unrelated to the information in the notice."  Majority 
op., ¶34.  The majority opinion cites no authority for this 
conclusion.  Does the majority opinion mean that the typical 
agenda item of "such other matters as may come before the body" 
can never provide sufficient notice under Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) 
for a matter that unexpectedly is presented to the board and 
requires immediate attention?  At least one attorney general did 
not believe that to be the case.  66 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 70 
(1977).  Notice based on the facts and circumstances of the case 
affect when the notice given is sufficient to reasonably apprise 
the public and the news media.   
¶78 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
concur, joining only the mandate of the majority opinion.  
 
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶79 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I join those portions of the majority 
opinion which conclude that (a) Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) (2003-04)1 
sets forth a reasonableness standard; (b) such a standard 
strikes the proper balance contemplated in Wis. Stat. § 19.81(1) 
and (4) between the public's right to information and the 
government's need to efficiently conduct its business; (c) 
applying the reasonableness standard, the June 1, 2004, notice 
was insufficient under § 19.84(2) and contrary to the policies 
in § 19.81(1) and (4) because it failed to reasonably apprise 
members of the public that the master contract of the Tomah 
Education Association ("TEA") would be considered at that 
meeting; (d) State ex rel. H.D. Enterprises II, LLC v. City of 
Stoughton, 230 Wis. 2d 480, 602 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1999), 
should be overruled; (e) this decision should be applied 
prospectively; and (f) this matter should be remanded to the 
circuit court to determine the appropriate award as to costs and 
attorney fees.   
¶80 I write separately because I conclude that the 
majority fails to apply the reasonableness standard it adopts in 
this case to the question of whether the June 1 posting provided 
sufficient notice regarding the Tomah Board of Education's 
("Board") consideration of a new hiring procedure for athletic 
coaches.  Applying the majority's standard, I conclude that the 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted.  
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
2 
 
June 1 notice was insufficient because it failed to reasonably 
apprise members of 
the public that the Board would be 
considering a proposal that was a matter of particular interest 
to the community, involved a non-routine action that the public 
was unlikely to anticipate, and could have easily been included 
in the notice.  
¶81 The facts are accurately set forth in the majority 
opinion,2 and will not be repeated in full here.  Of import is 
the fact that in June 2004 the Board held two meetings regarding 
a new master contract between TEA and the Tomah Area School 
District ("School District") for the 2003-04 and 2004-05 school 
years.  Prior to those meetings, a number of community members 
had expressed concerns over a proposed new procedure for hiring 
athletic coaches.3  No prior TEA master contract contained a 
procedure for hiring athletic coaches. 
¶82 The public notice issued by the Board setting forth 
the agenda of the June 1 meeting stated, in relevant part: 
Contemplated Closed Session for Consideration and/or 
Action 
Concerning 
Employment/Negotiations 
with 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶¶4-9.   
3 The broad community interest exhibited in this case prior 
to the June 2004 meetings establishes that the public was aware 
that a proposal was under consideration for a new hiring policy 
giving priority to TEA members over other candidates for 
athletic coaching positions in the new TEA master contract.  
Majority op., ¶4.  Consequently, I accept the majority's 
conclusion that the notice for the June 15 meeting, which listed 
TEA contract approval, was legally sufficient.  See majority 
op., ¶45.  Nevertheless, the better practice, given the level of 
public interest that was shown here, would have been to give 
notice that the procedures for hiring coaches would be discussed 
at the June 15 meeting.   
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
3 
 
District 
Personnel 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stats. 
19.85(1)(c). 
Section 19.85(1)(c) provides that closed sessions may be 
convened for considering employment, promotion, compensation or 
performance of any public employee.  The notice did not contain 
any information referencing the TEA master contract or any 
proposed hiring procedures for athletic coaches. 
¶83 At issue is whether the notice provided for the June 
1, 2004, meeting was too general and not in compliance with 
Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2).  That section provides, in relevant part: 
Every public notice of a meeting of a governmental 
body shall set forth the . . . subject matter of the 
meeting, including that intended for consideration at 
any contemplated closed session, in such form as is 
reasonably 
likely 
to 
apprise 
members 
of 
the 
public. . . .  
¶84 Brian Buswell ("Buswell") contends that the June 1 
notice was deficient because it did not indicate that the Board 
would act upon a new master contract with the TEA, and it did 
not indicate that the Board would act upon the new hiring 
provision for athletic coaches.  The majority concludes, and I 
agree, that the notice failed to apprise the public that the TEA 
master contract would be under consideration at the June 1 
meeting.  Majority op., ¶36.  I respectfully disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that the notice was sufficient with 
respect to the new hiring provision for athletic coaches.  
Majority op., ¶42.   
¶85 The majority notes that with respect to the TEA master 
contract, the notice given was vague because it could cover any 
negotiations with any group of district personnel or with any 
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
4 
 
individual employee within the district.  Id., ¶36.  Moreover, 
it was misleading, as the statute referenced4 in the notice 
provides for closed sessions for individual employees, not for 
considering collective bargaining agreements.  Id., ¶37. 
¶86 The reasonableness standard adopted by the court takes 
into account such factors as the burden of providing more 
detailed notice, whether the subject is of particular interest, 
and whether it involves non-routine action that the public would 
be unlikely to anticipate.  Id., ¶28.  The majority first points 
out that it would not unduly burden the Board to include a few 
words in the notice about the fact that the TEA master contract 
would be discussed at the June 1 meeting.  Id., ¶38.  Second, 
the majority notes the TEA master contract included a hiring 
provision that was of interest to a number of people in the 
community, as several citizens had made an effort to petition 
the Board regarding whether to put a provision for the hiring of 
coaches into the master contract.  Id., ¶39.  Third, the 
majority recognizes that the TEA master contract was not a 
routine subject, as it contained a new provision for the hiring 
of coaches to which members of the community objected, the 
subject of which had never before been included in a TEA 
contract.  Id., ¶¶4, 40.   
¶87 For the very reasons the majority concludes the June 1 
notice was insufficient with respect to the TEA master contract, 
I conclude the notice was insufficient with respect to the new 
provision regarding the hiring of athletic coaches.  Thus, it is 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c). 
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
5 
 
incomprehensible that the majority would reject its own analysis 
when discussing the June 1 notice as it relates to the new 
provision for the hiring of coaches that is set forth in the TEA 
master contract.  As to the coaches provision, the June 1 notice 
is still vague because it fails to discuss coaches or procedures 
to hire coaches at all, and could cover any negotiations with 
any group of district personnel or with any individual employee 
within the district.  Moreover, the June 1 notice was still 
misleading 
as 
to 
the 
coaches 
provision, 
as 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(c) once again provides for closed sessions for 
individual employees, and not for considering new hiring 
provisions for athletic coaches in general.  The majority 
inadequately explains how an insufficient notice as to a public 
meeting regarding the TEA master contract is sufficient with 
respect 
to 
an 
item 
buried 
within 
that 
very 
contract, 
particularly when the item in question has never before been the 
subject of contract negotiations and was of special interest to 
the public. 
¶88 When 
applying 
the 
factors 
associated 
with 
the 
reasonableness standard, the majority concedes that the second 
and third factors5 weigh in favor of requiring notice that the 
Board would address the coaches provision.  Majority op., ¶43.  
                                                 
5 These factors, again, include whether the subject is of 
particular interest, and whether it involves non-routine action 
that the public would be unlikely to anticipate.  The public had 
already shown great interest in the athletic coach hiring 
provision, and the June 1 notice contemplated employment 
negotiations for any of the individual employees within the 
district, but did not provide for general hiring procedures for 
athletic coaches.  
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
6 
 
Thus, the majority's analysis stands on the first factor, the 
burden of providing greater information.  Yet, just what was the 
burden?  Once again, a few words in the notice would have 
sufficed, simply by indicating that the procedure for hiring 
athletic 
coaches would be discussed.  For a matter of 
considerable public concern, this was no "burden." 
¶89 If, as the majority concludes, the June 1 notice was 
insufficient to apprise members of the public that the TEA 
master contract would be considered at the June 1 meeting, then 
it was necessarily insufficient to apprise members of the public 
that a new provision regarding the hiring of athletic coaches 
contained within the TEA master contract would be considered. 
¶90 "[T]he notice requirement gives the public information 
about the business to be conducted that will alert them to the 
importance of the meeting, so that they can make an informed 
decision whether to attend."  Majority op., ¶26 (citing State ex 
rel. Badke v. Village Bd. of the Village of Greendale, 173 
Wis. 2d 553, 
573-74, 
577-78, 
494 
N.W.2d 408 
(1993)). 
 
I 
wholeheartedly concur.  Yet, no informed decision to attend was 
possible here, as the notice failed to give the public any idea 
of what would be discussed at the meeting.  The June 1 notice 
(1) fails to inform the public that the TEA master contract will 
be considered, and (2) fails to inform the public that a new 
hiring procedure for athletic coaches will be discussed.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals as to both of 
these issues. 
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
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¶91 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part from the court's decision and mandate. 
 
 
No.  2005AP2998.lbb 
 
 
 
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