Title: DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation
Citation: 2012 WI 94
Docket Number: 2010AP002705
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2012

2012 WI 94 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2705 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Kathleen DeBruin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
St. Patrick Congregation, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
John R. Race 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (Opinion filed).  
PROSSER, J., concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Alan C. Olson and Alan C. Olson & Associates, S.C., New Berlin, 
and oral argument by Alan C. Olson. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Nick G. Kotsonis and Zachary J. Davis and Crivello Carlson, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Nick G. Kotsonis. 
 
 
2012 WI 94
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2705 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV1813) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kathleen DeBruin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
St. Patrick Congregation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
County.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is an appeal from 
a decision of the Circuit Court for Walworth County1 that the 
court of appeals has certified to us pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61 (2009–10).2  We are asked to decide whether, under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, Kathleen DeBruin's 
complaint 
against 
St. Patrick Congregation (St. Patrick), 
                                                 
1 The Honorable John R. Race presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
2 
 
alleging that her employment was terminated for an improper 
reason, states a claim upon which relief may be granted.  We 
conclude that it does not.  Permitting the continuation of this 
type of breach of contract or promissory estoppel claim by a 
ministerial employee,3 who seeks payment based on an allegedly 
improper reason for being terminated from her employment, would 
impermissibly interfere in a religious institution's choice of 
ministerial employees, in violation of the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶2 
Therefore, a court may not review whether St. Patrick 
improperly terminated its ministerial employee because St. 
Patrick's choice of who shall serve as its ministerial employee 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
church 
governance 
protected 
from 
state 
interference by the First Amendment and by Article I, Section 
18.  Accordingly, DeBruin's complaint, which would require a 
state 
court 
to 
evaluate 
why 
St. 
Patrick 
terminated 
its 
ministerial employee, fails to state a claim upon which a court 
                                                 
3 The term "ministerial employee" refers to a certain type 
of 
employee 
of 
a 
religious 
institution 
whose 
work 
is 
fundamentally tied to the institution's religious mission.  See 
Coulee Catholic Sch. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶¶41–49, 320 Wis. 2d 
275, 768 N.W.2d 868.  As discussed below, it is undisputed that 
DeBruin was a ministerial employee. 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
3 
 
may grant relief.  Therefore, the circuit court correctly 
dismissed DeBruin's complaint, and its decision is affirmed.4 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
St. Patrick is a Catholic church in the Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee.  DeBruin began working for St. Patrick in August 
2002.  On July 1, 2009, St. Patrick entered into a written, one-
year employment contract with DeBruin as the Director of Faith 
Formation.  The contract described DeBruin's duties, the annual 
salary and fringe benefits to which DeBruin would be entitled, 
the term of the contract, the facilities to which DeBruin would 
have access as Director of Faith Formation, and the procedures 
for 
employee 
evaluation 
and 
annual 
contract 
renewal.  
Additionally, 
the 
contract 
included 
provisions 
governing 
termination of the employment relationship.  Relevant to this 
appeal, the contract provided: 
 
The PARISH agrees that the DIRECTOR OF FAITH 
FORMATION shall not be discharged during the term of 
this contract, without good and sufficient cause, 
which shall be determined by the PARISH.  The PARISH 
agrees 
that 
the 
Pastor 
of 
the 
PARISH 
will 
be 
responsible for giving the employee notice of any 
dissatisfaction with service or conduct.  Dismissal 
may be immediate or within a time frame determined by 
the PARISH. 
                                                 
4 Five justices affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  
Three justices, Justice Patience Drake Roggensack, Justice 
Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Justice Michael J. Gableman, join 
this lead opinion.  Two justices, Justice N. Patrick Crooks and 
Justice David T. Prosser, base their decisions on the specific 
contract at issue in this case.    
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
4 
 
¶4 
On October 5, 2009, St. Patrick terminated DeBruin's 
employment.  It is undisputed that DeBruin is a ministerial 
employee.5  It is also undisputed that St. Patrick has paid 
DeBruin for all of the services she rendered prior to her 
termination.  
¶5 
In early December 2009, DeBruin filed this lawsuit 
against St. Patrick.  She alleges breach of contract, asserting 
that St. Patrick terminated her employment "without good and 
sufficient cause as that term is defined by the Contract of 
Employment," 
and 
promissory 
estoppel, 
based 
on 
the 
same 
assertion.  She seeks payment of $34,150.27, plus interest on 
that amount.  DeBruin asserts that this amount constitutes 
damages for the period between October 5, 2009, when her 
employment was terminated, and June 30, 2010, the end of the 
term of the written contract.  Therefore, the damages DeBruin 
now seeks comprise payments for salary that would have been due 
if St. Patrick had retained her employment through the full term 
of the contract.   
¶6 
St. 
Patrick 
did 
not 
move 
to 
dismiss 
DeBruin's 
complaint on the basis that St. Patrick terminated DeBruin for 
"good and sufficient cause" within the meaning of the employment 
contract.  Instead, relying on our decision in Coulee Catholic 
Schools v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868, 
                                                 
5 Unlike in Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶¶68–87, where there 
was a dispute between the parties about whether the teacher was 
a ministerial employee, here, DeBruin concedes that her status 
was that of a ministerial employee.   
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
5 
 
St. Patrick moved to dismiss DeBruin's complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6.  St. Patrick asserted that both the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution preclude DeBruin, as a 
ministerial employee, from obtaining court enforcement of her 
claims of breach of contract or promissory estoppel based on the 
allegation that St. Patrick terminated her employment for an 
improper reason.    
¶7 
At the hearing on St. Patrick's motion to dismiss, St. 
Patrick argued that, under Coulee, the court could not review 
St. Patrick's decision to terminate DeBruin.  Specifically, St. 
Patrick noted that DeBruin conceded that she was a ministerial 
employee and that St. Patrick is a religious institution.  With 
these two concessions, St. Patrick argued that, under Coulee, 
state court review of St. Patrick's reason for terminating 
DeBruin would constitute impermissible interference with St. 
Patrick's religious mission, in violation of the First Amendment 
and Article I, Section 18. 
¶8 
DeBruin 
responded 
by 
arguing 
that 
Coulee 
was 
inapposite in the context of her complaint, because the state 
antidiscrimination law at issue in Coulee was distinguishable 
from the neutral principles of law governing contracts and 
promissory estoppel that would be applied in this dispute.  
DeBruin claimed that applying such neutral principles of law 
would not constitute impermissible government action because the 
court could examine DeBruin's complaint and determine the truth 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
6 
 
or falsity of her allegations without interfering with the 
religious institution's mission.  Therefore, notwithstanding 
DeBruin's concessions that she satisfied both parts of the 
Coulee ministerial employee inquiry, she argued that her 
complaint could go forward. 
¶9 
After hearing arguments on St. Patrick's motion, the 
circuit court dismissed DeBruin's complaint.  The court agreed 
with St. Patrick that because St. Patrick is a religious 
institution and because DeBruin was a ministerial employee, 
pursuant to our decision in Coulee, DeBruin's complaint failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  DeBruin 
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the matter to us.  
We accepted the certification. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 We independently review as a question of law whether a 
complaint states a cognizable claim.  John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶12, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827.  
We also independently review St. Patrick's assertion that the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution require dismissal of 
DeBruin's claims.  See Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 852-
53, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998).   
B.  Failure to State a Claim 
¶11 St. Patrick's motion to dismiss DeBruin's complaint 
was granted at the pleading stage.  Such a motion tests the 
legal sufficiency of the complaint.  John Doe 1, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
7 
 
¶12.  For purposes of the motion, we accept as true all facts 
well-pleaded in the complaint and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom.  Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 
111, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.  We will dismiss a 
complaint if it states no legal claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  Id.  
¶12 St. Patrick asserts that the First Amendment and 
Article I, Section 18 preclude court review of its reason for 
terminating DeBruin's employment.  Therefore, a court must 
review the complaint, which incorporates and attaches a copy of 
DeBruin's employment contract, in light of the effect of the 
First Amendment and Article I, Section 18 on St. Patrick's 
decision to terminate DeBruin's employment.   
1.  First Amendment 
¶13 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The First Amendment 
is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  First 
Amendment protections are afforded to institutions, as well as 
to individuals.  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶38.  
¶14 The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply the First 
Amendment to purely private conduct.  Rather, it is when state 
action infringes on constitutionally protected rights that the 
Fourteenth Amendment comes into play.  See Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).  Shelley arose in the context of an equal 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
8 
 
protection challenge to state court enforcement of a private, 
racially discriminatory restrictive covenant.  Id. at 4-8.  
Nonetheless, the constitutional principles that underlie Shelley 
are analogous to other constitutional protections, including 
those afforded by the First Amendment.   
¶15 To explain further, Shelley did not begin with 
governmental 
action; 
but 
rather, 
it 
began 
as 
racial 
discrimination in a restrictive covenant, i.e., in a private 
contract.  Kraemer, who was Caucasian and a party to the 
covenant, sought to enforce the covenant against Shelley, who 
was African-American and had purchased the property encumbered 
by the covenant.  Id. at 4-6.  The participation of the State 
did not become an issue until Kraemer sought court enforcement 
of the restrictive covenant.  Id. at 13.  The Court explained 
that, "restrictions on the right of occupancy of the sort sought 
to be created by the private agreements . . . could not be 
squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if 
imposed by state statute or local ordinance."  Id. at 11.  
However, the court also explained that "[s]o long as the 
purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary 
adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has 
been no action by the State."  Id. at 13.  
¶16 There was more than voluntary adherence to a private 
agreement in Shelley.  Instead, a party to the discriminatory 
restrictive covenant sought enforcement in state court, thereby 
asking the State to participate in the discrimination.  Id.  
With the extra step of judicial intervention, the Supreme Court 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
9 
 
concluded that judicial intervention constituted state action.  
Id. at 14.   
¶17 In reasoning that court enforcement of a private 
discriminatory contract constituted state action, the Court 
said, "[t]hat the action of state courts and judicial officers 
in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the 
State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a 
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this 
Court."  Id. at 14.  The Court pointed out that it was "clear 
that but for the active intervention of the state courts, 
supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would 
have been free to occupy the properties in question without 
restraint."  Id. at 19.  Accordingly, Shelley concluded that 
when constitutionally protected rights were at issue and a 
contravention of those rights could not be accomplished without 
state action, court enforcement constituted state action of the 
type that was proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  
¶18 So, too, in the case before us, DeBruin seeks state 
court enforcement of a provision in a private contract in order 
to 
invalidate 
St. 
Patrick's 
reason 
for 
terminating 
her 
employment.  However, the First Amendment grants religious 
institutions 
"'independence 
from 
secular 
control 
or 
manipulation——in short, power to decide for themselves, free 
from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.'"  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 694, 712 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
10 
 
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 
U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).  Therefore, DeBruin asks the state courts 
to engage in activity that the Constitution prohibits.   
¶19 In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United 
States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976), the Supreme Court reviewed state court action in the 
context of a religious institution's termination of one of its 
ministers.  In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, the Holy Synod 
of Bishops, the Church's highest governing body, applied church 
rules to defrock a church bishop, Dionisije Milivojevich.  Id. 
at 699, 705-07.  Milivojevich brought suit in state court, 
seeking, among other claims, "to have himself declared the true 
Diocesan Bishop."  Id. at 707.  The Illinois Supreme Court held 
that Milivojevich's removal as bishop was "arbitrary," and 
therefore, the court set it aside.  Id. at 708.   
¶20 In reversing the Illinois Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court explained that "[t]he fallacy fatal to the 
judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that it rests upon an 
impermissible 
rejection 
of 
the 
decisions 
of 
the 
highest 
ecclesiastical tribunals . . . and impermissibly substitutes its 
own inquiry into church polity."  Id.  The Court explained: 
For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical 
actions of a church judicatory are in that sense 
"arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the 
procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly 
requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into 
the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly 
to decide the ecclesiastical question.  But this is 
exactly 
the 
inquiry 
that 
the 
First 
Amendment 
prohibits; recognition of such an exception would 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
11 
 
undermine 
the 
general 
rule 
that 
religious 
controversies are not the proper subject of civil 
court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the 
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it 
finds them.   
Id. at 713.  Accordingly, church decisions in matters of faith 
and ministry are so fundamental to the free exercise of 
religious liberty that civil courts are prohibited from delving 
into the reasons for religion-based decisions.6  Id.   
¶21 Although the opinion does not cite Shelley, Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese is consistent with Shelley because, 
like Shelley, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese involved state 
court adjudication of privately created rights.  Specifically, 
                                                 
6 The dissent asserts that this opinion conflates the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in its First 
Amendment analysis.  See, e.g., dissent, ¶135.  In particular, 
the dissent cites the use of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese 
for the United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. 696 (1976), as an example of such conflation, claiming that 
case is "a classic Establishment Clause case."  Dissent, ¶136 
n.11.  However, the dissent is mistaken; Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese is a Free Exercise case.  This interpretation 
is shared by the following opinions, all of which cite Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese as a Free Exercise case:  Petruska v. 
Gannon University, 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006); Minker v. 
Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 
1354, 1359-60 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn v. General Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1985).  
The dissent attempts to set aside the conclusions of 
Petruska, Rayburn and Minker that cite Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Diocese as support for discussion of the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment.  Dissent, ¶136 n.11.  It does so by quoting 
articles that generally discuss First Amendment cases without 
analyzing a case or controversy as court decisions do.  Id.  
Scholarly discussions are always of interest, but they do not 
address First Amendment principles in the context of a case or 
controversy, as judicial opinions do.   
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
12 
 
in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, the complainant asked the 
courts to evaluate the Holy Synod's application of church rules 
to the ecclesiastical decision about whether to defrock a 
bishop.  See id. at 708.  No state or federal statute was 
involved in or cited by the Supreme Court in Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese.    
¶22 Included within the decisions protected by the First 
Amendment are the hiring and firing of ministerial employees, 
regardless of the motivation behind those decisions.  Young v. 
N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186 
(7th Cir. 1994); see also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-
Day 
Adventists, 
772 
F.2d 
1164, 
1169 
(4th 
Cir. 
1985).  
Accordingly, religious institutions may make arbitrary decisions 
regarding 
hiring 
or 
firing 
of 
ministerial 
employees 
and 
nevertheless be free from civil review for having done so.  
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708-09; Young, 21 
F.3d at 187. 
¶23 It has been universally recognized that the First 
Amendment protects religious institutions' decisions about whom 
to hire as ministerial employees and when to terminate their 
employment.  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶39.  Accordingly, a 
terminated ministerial employee's complaint alleging that her 
religious institution employer terminated her for an improper 
reason is not viewed through the lens that we usually apply when 
examining the legal sufficiency of a complaint.  See Hosanna-
Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.  Rather, the allegations in the 
complaint are viewed in the context of the First Amendment's 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
13 
 
proscriptions 
against 
state 
interference 
with 
religious 
institutions' choices of who shall be the voice of their faith.  
Id. at 706-08.  As Justice Alito explained in Hosanna-Tabor, 
"Religious autonomy means that religious authorities must be 
free to determine who is qualified to serve in positions of 
substantial religious importance."  Id. at 712 (Alito, J., 
concurring).   
¶24 When 
a 
ministerial 
employee 
is 
terminated, 
the 
religious institution's decision about who shall teach its faith 
and how that shall be done are intertwined with the decision to 
terminate the employee.  Courts can have no role in affirming or 
overturning such a decision based on the reason why the 
religious institution terminated the employment.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has explained: 
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted 
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, 
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.  
Such action interferes with the internal governance of 
the church, depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.   
Id. at 706.  We voiced the same concept in Coulee when we 
explained, "the real heart of the ministerial exception . . . is 
preventing the state from intruding into the mission of 
religious organizations or houses of worship."  Coulee, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, ¶55.   
2.  DeBruin's complaint 
¶25 Turning to DeBruin's complaint, she seeks court 
participation in enforcing a private contract against St. 
Patrick, as Kraemer did against Shelley.  See Shelley, 334 U.S. 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
14 
 
at 4-6.  DeBruin seeks money damages from St. Patrick, alleging 
that St. Patrick terminated her employment for an improper 
reason. She alleges that her contract with St. Patrick limited 
the reasons for which St. Patrick could terminate her employment 
to "good and sufficient cause," and that her termination was not 
done within that contractual limitation.  As we review her 
complaint, we note that DeBruin is not seeking payment for 
services she has already provided.7    
¶26 It is important to a proper First Amendment analysis 
of DeBruin's complaint to focus on the nature of the protections 
that are afforded to religious institutions and why they are 
afforded.  To examine whether St. Patrick could enter into a 
contract with DeBruin and how that contract may be interpreted, 
frames the issue too broadly and is not required by the issue 
                                                 
7 Were DeBruin seeking contract damages for past services 
provided, her claim would be much like the corner grocer who 
delivers food to a parish, sends a bill and remains unpaid for 
that which he has provided.  Court adjudication of that type of 
breach of contract claim would not run afoul of the First 
Amendment because it would not require a court to examine the 
ecclesiastical decision to terminate a ministerial employee.   
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
15 
 
presented in this case.8  Furthermore, beginning with a contract 
analysis would cause a court to diminish the priority given to 
the policies that drive the First Amendment and would lead a 
court to err.   
¶27 The First Amendment grants St. Patrick free choice in 
deciding that a ministerial employee should be terminated 
because it is that type of employee "who will preach [religious 
institutions'] beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their 
mission."  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, when a ministerial employee sues her 
religious employer to contest the validity of the reason for 
which she was fired, "the First Amendment has struck the balance 
for us.  The church must be free to choose those who will guide 
it on its way."  Id. (Emphasis added.)  Stated otherwise, the 
                                                 
8 We acknowledge there are matters for which a religious 
institution may contract that would be appropriate to enforce in 
the courts.  See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 
(1979) (concluding that courts may dispose of cases involving 
property belonging to religious institutions on the basis of 
"neutral principles of law" if the judicial inquiry can be 
conducted in exclusively secular terms).  However, the Jones 
approach has never been employed in cases where a minister was 
terminated.  Furthermore, Hosanna-Tabor reaffirmed that the 
"neutral 
principles" 
language 
from 
Jones 
applies 
to 
the 
"regulation of only outward physical acts," not to "government 
interference with an internal church decision that affects the 
faith and mission of the church itself."  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. 
Ct. at 707.  That conclusion is consistent with Coulee, which 
concluded that the plaintiff's claim was barred despite the 
contention that neutral and generally applicable employment laws 
could have settled the dispute.  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶¶3, 
39 n.13. 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
16 
 
First Amendment restrains the State from invalidating the 
institution's reasons that underlie its choice.  
¶28 St. Patrick fired DeBruin, a ministerial employee.  If 
DeBruin were not a ministerial employee and made the same claim, 
we might interpret the contract and consider whether St. Patrick 
had "good and sufficient cause" for DeBruin's termination.  
However, the First Amendment gives St. Patrick the absolute 
right to terminate DeBruin for any reason, or for no reason, as 
it freely exercises its religious views.  It is the decision 
itself, i.e., who shall be the voice of St. Patrick, that 
affects the faith and mission of the church.  Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713; Young, 21 F.3d at 186-87; 
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.  
¶29 The dissent relies on Petruska v. Gannon University, 
462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), to support its decision not to 
dismiss DeBruin's contract claim.9  Petruska claimed that 
reducing her pastoral responsibilities was a breach of her 
contract with Gannon University.  Id. at 310.  At one point, the 
court acknowledged that if judicial review of the contract claim 
entailed "ecclesiastical inquiry," the claim could not proceed.  
Id. at 312.  However, any inquiry into the validity of a 
religious institution's reasons for the firing of a ministerial 
employee will involve consideration of ecclesiastical decision-
making.  See Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United 
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating 
                                                 
9 Dissent, ¶122. 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
17 
 
that "we cannot conceive how the federal judiciary could 
determine whether an employment decision concerning a minister 
was 
based 
on 
legitimate 
or 
illegitimate 
grounds 
without 
inserting ourselves into a realm where the Constitution forbids 
us to tread, the internal management of a church").   
¶30 Accordingly, 
a 
court 
cannot 
interpret 
DeBruin's 
contract with St. Patrick to determine whether St. Patrick had 
"good and sufficient cause" to terminate DeBruin because in so 
doing, the court would infringe upon St. Patrick's First 
Amendment right to freely exercise its religious preferences and 
thereby be the sole decision-maker about who will preach its 
beliefs, teach its faith and carry out its mission.  As the 
United States Supreme Court has explained: 
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes 
the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious 
group's right to shape its own faith and mission 
through its appointments.  According the state the 
power to determine which individuals will minister to 
the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, 
which 
prohibits 
government 
involvement 
in 
such 
ecclesiastical decisions. 
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.     
¶31 Where a plaintiff alleges that her termination was 
based on an improper reason, it does not matter whether she 
seeks damages based on a contract theory or a statutory theory.  
In either case, the State is effectively enjoined by the First 
Amendment from interfering with the religious institution's 
right to choose its own ministers.  Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708-09.  The Free Exercise Clause of the 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
18 
 
First Amendment guarantees religious freedom from the State's 
imposition of an unwanted minister on a religious institution.  
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.  
¶32 Stated otherwise, if DeBruin's claim is not dismissed, 
a court will be required to decide whether St. Patrick 
terminated DeBruin without "good and sufficient cause," within 
the meaning of those terms in the contract.  A court may then 
bring to bear legal concepts relative to contract interpretation 
and performance, such as whether St. Patrick proceeded in good 
faith when it terminated DeBruin.  See Chayka v. Santini, 47 
Wis. 2d 102, 107 n.7, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970) (explaining that 
every contract includes the obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing between the parties).  Questioning St. Patrick's good 
faith will permit a challenge to its reasons for terminating 
DeBruin.  The First Amendment does not permit the State to 
interfere with St. Patrick's free exercise of the choice of 
religious minister for its religious beliefs.  Hosanna-Tabor, 
132 S. Ct. at 707.  
¶33 Furthermore, if a court were to award damages on 
DeBruin's claim, which does not relate to services she has 
already provided, St. Patrick would be required, by the State, 
to pay for its decision to terminate an unwanted ministerial 
employee.  See id. at 709.  This, the First Amendment does not 
permit.  See id.  As the United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[a]n award of such relief would operate as a penalty on the 
Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
19 
 
less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning 
the termination."  See id.     
¶34 Furthermore, while Hosanna-Tabor did not arise in a 
contract context, which the Supreme Court noted, id. at 710, the 
First Amendment protections that drove the result in Hosanna-
Tabor are the same protections that bear on DeBruin's claim for 
damages to compensate her for the denial of prospective 
employment.  In addition, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 
which did not arise in a discrimination claim context, and is 
based on the Free Exercise Clause, employs discussions of state 
limitations that are very similar to Hosanna-Tabor and support 
St. Patrick's position.   
¶35 Accordingly, we conclude that DeBruin's complaint, 
viewed through a First Amendment lens, fails to state a claim 
upon which a court may grant relief.  Stated otherwise, the 
State is effectively enjoined by the First Amendment from 
interference with such ecclesiastical decisions.    
3.  Article I, Section 18 
¶36 Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "The right of every person to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience 
shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to 
attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain 
any ministry, without consent . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 18.  Article I, Section 18 applies to religious institutions, 
as well as to individuals.  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶58.   
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
20 
 
¶37 We have concluded that Article I, Section 18 serves 
similar purposes in regard to protecting religious freedoms as 
do the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.  Id., ¶60 (citing State ex rel. Warren v. 
Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 332, 198 N.W.2d 650 (1972)).  Given the 
expansive language employed in Article I, Section 18, the 
protections afforded religious liberties therein are at least as 
broad as those afforded by the First Amendment.  Id., ¶66.  More 
specifically, we have concluded that Article I, Section 18 
precludes 
state 
interference 
with 
religious 
organizations' 
hiring 
and 
firing 
of 
ministerial 
employees. 
 
Id., 
¶67.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Article I, Section 18 provides an 
additional basis, independent of the First Amendment, for 
dismissing DeBruin's complaint.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 Permitting the continuation of this type of breach of 
contract or promissory estoppel claim by a ministerial employee, 
who seeks payment based on an allegedly improper reason for 
being 
terminated from her employment, would impermissibly 
interfere in a religious institution's choice of ministerial 
employee, in violation of the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
¶39 Therefore, a court may not review whether St. Patrick 
improperly terminated its ministerial employee because St. 
Patrick's choice of who shall serve as its ministerial employee 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
church 
governance 
protected 
from 
state 
No. 
2010AP2705   
 
21 
 
interference by the First Amendment and by Article I, Section 
18.  Accordingly, DeBruin's complaint, which would require a 
court to evaluate why St. Patrick terminated its ministerial 
employee, fails to state a claim upon which a court may grant 
relief.  Therefore, the circuit court correctly dismissed 
DeBruin's complaint, and its decision is affirmed.10 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Some cases imply that a religious institution may waive 
its right to challenge civil court determinations of disputes 
for which the First Amendment would otherwise preclude judicial 
intervention.  See Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 
608 A.2d 218, 224 (N.J. 1992).  Although waiver is not at issue 
here, it is important to note that both the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment encompass 
societal interests as well as personal protections.   
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
1 
 
 
¶40 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  This is an 
employment contract dispute that centers on the contract's 
termination clause, and it requires the application of well-
established contract principles.  The analysis in such a case 
starts with the terms of the contract.  The termination clause 
in this case contains a highly unusual and crucial provision:  
it states that the employee "shall not be discharged during the 
term of this contract, without good and sufficient cause, which 
shall be determined by the [employer]."  What is unusual, of 
course, is that the contract explicitly and by agreement leaves 
the 
determination 
of 
"good 
and 
sufficient 
cause" 
to 
be 
determined by one party: the employer.  Those words are the key 
to the proper analysis of this case because, when viewed in 
light of well-established principles of contract law, they 
reveal the termination clause to be a textbook case of an 
illusory 
promise——"words 
in 
promissory 
form 
that 
promise 
nothing."1  Wisconsin precedent on this score is clear: "If a 
party to a purported contract has, in fact, made only illusory 
promises and therefore not constrained him- or herself in any 
way, he or she has given no consideration and therefore no 
contract exists.  Because no contract exists, neither party has 
a cause of action for breach."2  In other words, as described in 
                                                 
1 2 Joseph M. Perillo & Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, Corbin 
on Contracts § 5.28, at 142 (rev. ed. 1995). 
2 Devine v. Notter, 2008 WI App 87, ¶4, 312 Wis. 2d 521, 753 
N.W.2d 557 (internal citations omitted). 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
2 
 
 
one treatise on contracts citing case law, where the contract 
indicates that a party may at its own option decide to 
terminate, termination is not a breach but is "merely the 
exercise of the reserved power to terminate."3    
¶41 To resolve a contract case, we start by looking at the 
contract terms, and we give effect to its terms unless they are 
ambiguous.4  In the purported contract at issue here the parties, 
Kathleen DeBruin and her employer, St. Patrick Congregation (the 
Parish), unambiguously reserved solely to the employer the right 
to determine what is just cause for termination.  For that 
reason, I would affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the 
complaint, but on the grounds that the purported contract is 
based on an illusory promise which cannot serve as consideration 
for a contract, and therefore no enforceable contract exists.  
The promissory estoppel claim fails for an almost identical 
reason: a promissory estoppel claim is based on a promise, and 
                                                 
3 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 4.2, at 556 
(rev. ed. 1993). 
4 The primary goal in contract interpretation is to 
give effect to the parties' intent, as expressed in 
the contractual language.  We interpret the language 
consistent 
with 
what 
a 
reasonable 
person 
would 
understand the words to mean under the circumstances.  
Where 
the 
terms 
of 
a 
contract 
are 
clear 
and 
unambiguous, we construe the contract according to its 
literal terms. 
 
Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶¶22-23, 326 
Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (internal citations omitted). 
 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
3 
 
 
where there is nothing but an illusory promise, there is no 
basis for reliance.5   
¶42 The circuit court granted the Parish's motion to 
dismiss on constitutional grounds, while seeming to conclude 
that the contract of employment was terminable at will and was 
based on an illusory promise.6  The circuit court, in granting 
                                                 
5 Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc., 665 P.2d 414, 416 (Wash. 1983) 
describes its analysis of a similar promissory estoppel claim:  
[The 
plaintiff] 
premises 
his 
arguments 
on 
the 
assumption 
that 
[the 
defendant] 
had 
an 
implied 
obligation to pay the bonus in 1978. Before a promise 
to pay a bonus can be enforced, however, a real 
promise must exist. . . . Action in reliance upon a 
supposed 
promise 
creates 
no 
obligation 
on 
a 
corporation whose promise is illusory. A supposed 
promise may be illusory because it is so indefinite 
that it cannot be enforced, or by reason of provisions 
contained in the promise which make its performance 
optional or entirely discretionary by the promisor.  
 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 
6 In preparing to grant the motion to dismiss, the circuit 
court stated:  
But the Court does note that the contract called for 
gives the parish the right to terminate for cause only 
they -- and they are the ones that can determine 
cause so in effect this makes this a contract at will, 
and therefore even if the Court were to make further 
inquiry it would appear that there was the right of 
the parish anyways but I don't think I get that far. 
 
In attempting to sum up the argument of the parish, the 
circuit court commented:  
So you're stating then that according to the Coulee 
case this Court cannot make any inquiry beyond those 
two steps as to the grounds for the termination or 
whether good cause was found or even if the contract 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
4 
 
 
the motion to dismiss, referred to the constitutionally based 
ministerial employee test discussed in Coulee Catholic Schools 
v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868, as well as 
the contract language reserving to the Parish the right to 
determine good cause for termination:  
It's 
admitted 
that 
the 
Catholic 
church['s]  
. . . mission is to propagate the faith and that 
[DeBruin's] particular job  was to be the – again, 
Director of Faith Promotions [sic] so she fits into 
the 
two 
issues 
[relating 
to 
the 
organization's 
religious mission and the nature of the duties of the 
particular employee] and with that then the Court 
can't make further inquiry.  But the Court does note 
that the contract called for gives the parish the 
right to terminate for cause only they – and they are 
the ones that can determine cause . . . and therefore 
even if the Court were to make further inquiry it 
would appear that there was the right of the parish 
anyways but I don't think I get that far. 
Because we do not normally reach constitutional issues in cases 
that are resolvable on other grounds,7 I would not reach the 
constitutional arguments that are raised by the Parish.  For 
these reasons, as explained herein, I respectfully concur.   
                                                                                                                                                             
is illusory because as you -- as you recite the terms 
of the contract good cause is required for firing the 
teacher but it's up to the church to determine good 
cause.  So that's illusory. 
 
7 Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis.2d 351, 354, 
344 N.W.2d 177 (1984) ("This court does not normally decide 
constitutional questions if the case can be resolved on other 
grounds.").  See also Adams Outdoor Adver., Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803; In 
re Guardianship of James D.K., 2006 WI 68, ¶3 n.3, 291 Wis. 2d 
333, 718 N.W.2d 38; and Jensen v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 
2001 WI 9, ¶16, 241 Wis. 2d 142, 621 N.W.2d 902. 
 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
5 
 
 
¶43 As the employer, the Parish, noted in its brief, 
leaving 
the 
determination 
of 
what 
constitutes 
good 
and 
sufficient cause for termination to the employer has the 
"practical effect" of nullifying the contractual limitation on 
the employer.8  As noted previously, under the applicable 
principles of contract law and our precedent, this contract 
fails because it rests on an illusory promise.  A Wisconsin case 
describes how an illusory promise, under application of contract 
law principles, leads to a conclusion that the contract fails 
for lack of consideration: 
An illusory promise is a promise in form only: one 
that its maker can keep without subjecting him- or 
herself to any detriment or restriction. An archetypal 
example of an illusory promise is the statement that 
"I promise to do as you ask if I please to do so when 
the time arrives."  A promisor can keep that promise 
by either doing as the promisee asks or not, and so 
the promisor maintains total freedom to do as he or 
she wants. Since the maker of an illusory promise 
assumes no detriment or obligation, an illusory 
promise is not regarded as consideration.  If a party 
to a purported contract has, in fact, made only 
illusory promises and therefore not constrained him- 
or herself in any way, he or she has given no 
consideration 
and 
therefore 
no 
contract 
exists. 
Because no contract exists, neither party has a cause 
of action for breach. 
Devine v. Notter, 2008 WI App 87, ¶4, 312 Wis. 2d 521, 753 
N.W.2d 557 (internal citations omitted). 
¶44 In 
another 
Wisconsin 
case 
discussing 
illusory 
promises, Gerruth Realty Co. v. Pire, 17 Wis. 2d 89, 115 N.W.2d 
                                                 
8 Br. of Resp't at 2 n.1. 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
6 
 
 
557 (1962), this court concluded that the purported contract at 
issue was void for indefiniteness, a conclusion tantamount to a 
determination  that the promise involved was illusory.  In that 
case, we stated, "[A]ny interpretation, which allows one party 
to a contract to determine without limitation and in a 
subjective manner the meaning of an ambiguous term, comes 
dangerously close to an illusory or aleatory contract, if it 
does not in fact reach it." Id. at 92. While we are not dealing 
with an ambiguous term here, the result is the same——no 
enforceable contract.  
¶45 These 
cases 
apply 
well-settled 
contract 
law 
principles.  The treatises on contract law describe the concept 
of illusory promise in slightly different terms, but there is 
agreement on the essence of the concept.  The writers of the 
treatise Corbin on Contracts describe such a "promise" as 
follows: 
[A]n illusory promise is not a promise at all as that 
term has been herein defined.  If the expression 
appears to have the form of a promise, this appearance 
is an illusion. . . . The fundamental element of a 
promise is a promisor's expression of intention that 
the promisor's future conduct shall be in accord with 
the present expression, irrespective of what the 
promisor's will may be when the time for performance 
arrives.  In the supposed case [in which C promises to 
forbear from suing P as long as C wishes to forbear] 
[t]he clear meaning of the expression is that C's 
future conduct will be in accord with his or her own 
future will, just as it would have been had nothing at 
all been said. 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
7 
 
 
1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 1.17, at 47 (rev. ed. 
1993) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Another 
well-regarded 
treatise, 
Williston on Contracts, puts it this way: 
Where an illusory promise is made, that is, a promise 
merely in form, but in actuality not promising 
anything, it cannot serve as consideration.  . . . In 
such cases, where the promisor may perform or not, 
solely on the condition of his whim, his promise will 
not serve as consideration. . . . [A] promise to 
employ as long as it suits the employer will not serve 
as consideration for the employee's return promise.  
3 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 7.7, at 111-12, 127-
32 (4th ed. 2008).  The Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 2, 
comment e, focuses on the lack of enforceability in an illusory 
promise:   
e. Illusory promises; mere statements of intention. 
Words of promise which by their terms make performance 
entirely optional with the "promisor" whatever may 
happen, or whatever course of conduct in other 
respects 
he 
may 
pursue, 
do 
not 
constitute 
a 
promise. . . . Even 
if 
a 
present 
intention 
is 
manifested, the reservation of an option to change 
that intention means that there can be no promisee who 
is justified in an expectation of performance. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981). 
¶46 Courts have applied this principle in a variety of 
contexts, relying on the canon of construction under which 
courts give effect to the terms agreed upon by the parties to 
the contract.  In a case that concerned a contract between an 
employer and an employee, the court examined a letter where the 
employer stated, "I propose to employ you to work for me for 15 
months at my option."  Middleton v. Holecraft, 270 S.W.2d 90, 93 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1954).  The court found that "[t]he plaintiff, by 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
8 
 
 
inserting the clause 'at my option,' reserved the right to give 
the defendant work if he saw fit and if he did not, there was no 
obligation on him to do so, and the defendant would be without 
remedy."  Id.  The court concluded, "In other words, the 
defendant could not have enforced the contract."  Id.  In a 
commercial breach of contract case, a Michigan federal district 
court held that where the terms exempted a party from liability 
for breach, the party's "promise to perform is, therefore, 
entirely illusory . . . ." Commercial Movie Rental, Inc. v. 
Larry Eagle, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 227, 230-31 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
The court then reasoned that "the entire contract is void for 
lack of consideration" and the defendant was entitled to 
judgment "because the contract it allegedly breached never 
existed."  Id. at 231. 
¶47 It is difficult to imagine a clause that more 
perfectly illustrates these principles than the one presented by 
the contract between the employee, DeBruin, and the employer, 
the Parish, in this case.  This is made clear from the first 
document filed in this case, the complaint, in which DeBruin 
alleges that the Parish "terminated Ms. DeBruin's employ without 
good and sufficient cause as that term is defined by the 
Contract of Employment."  Compl., ¶5.  There is, however, no 
separate 
clause 
in 
the 
contract 
that 
defines 
"good 
and 
sufficient cause" or, for that matter, any other term in the 
contract.  The term "good and sufficient cause" is, by the terms 
of the contract, defined as having a meaning "which shall be 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
9 
 
 
determined by the Parish."  In this case, the Parish's "promise" 
was no more than that its "future conduct will be in accord with 
[its] own future will, just as it would have been had nothing at 
all been said."  See 1 Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 1.17, at 
47.  For this reason, both of DeBruin's claims, breach of 
contract and promissory estoppel, which are based on an illusory 
promise, must fail.  
¶48 In the purported contract at issue here the parties 
unambiguously reserved solely to the employer the right to 
determine what is just cause for termination.  For that reason, 
I would affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint, 
but on the grounds that the purported contract is based on an 
illusory promise which cannot serve as consideration for a 
contract, and therefore no enforceable contract exists.  The 
Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim fails for an almost 
identical reason: a promissory estoppel claim is based on a 
promise, and where there is nothing but an illusory promise, 
there is no basis for reliance.   
¶49 The circuit court granted the Parish's motion to 
dismiss on constitutional grounds, while seeming to conclude 
that the contract of employment was terminable at will and was 
based on an illusory promise.  The circuit court, in granting 
the motion to dismiss, referred to the constitutionally based 
ministerial employee test discussed in Coulee as well as the 
contract language reserving to the Parish the right to determine 
good cause for termination.  Because we do not normally reach 
No.  2010AP2705.npc 
 
 
10 
 
 
constitutional issues in cases that are resolvable on other 
grounds, I would not reach the constitutional arguments that are 
raised by the Parish.  For these reasons, as explained herein, I 
respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶50 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This case 
implicates important issues in the delicate relationship between 
church and state.  Recognizing this importance, the three other 
justices who have written in the case have made a valuable and 
good faith effort to resolve the present dispute.  I write 
separately to provide some additional perspective. 
I 
¶51 Kathleen DeBruin (DeBruin) began her employment with 
the St. Patrick Congregation (St. Patrick) in Whitewater, 
Wisconsin, in 2002.  On July 1, 2009, she and St. Patrick 
entered into a one-year Contract of Employment.  DeBruin was 
slated to serve as Director of Faith Formation for St. Patrick.  
There is no dispute that DeBruin served a ministerial function 
in a religious organization. 
¶52 Section 8 of the employment contract contained the 
following termination clause: 
8. 
Termination: 
A. 
The PARISH agrees that voluntary termination 
of this contract can be made by the mutual consent of 
both parties within thirty (30) days after written 
notice. 
B. 
The PARISH agrees that the DIRECTOR OF FAITH 
FORMATION shall not be discharged during the term of 
this contract, without good and sufficient cause, 
which shall be determined by the PARISH.  The PARISH 
agrees 
that 
the 
Pastor 
of 
the 
PARISH 
will 
be 
responsible for giving the employee notice of any 
dissatisfaction with service or conduct.  Dismissal 
may be immediate or within a time frame determined by 
the PARISH.   
C. 
In the event that the DIRECTOR OF FAITH 
FORMATION is involuntarily terminated, if requested by 
the Pastor of the PARISH and agreed to by the DIRECTOR 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
2 
 
OF FAITH FORMATION, the DIRECTOR OF FAITH FORMATION 
shall continue to render services and be paid in 
accordance with the terms of this Agreement, for the 
period of time that services are provided. 
¶53 On October 5, 2009, DeBruin was fired.  On December 3, 
2009, she filed suit in Walworth County Circuit Court, alleging 
that "St. Patrick terminated Ms. [DeBruin]'s employ without good 
and sufficient cause as that term is defined by" her contract.  
DeBruin sought damages for breach of contract or promissory 
estoppel.  She did not seek reinstatement. 
¶54 St. Patrick filed its answer on December 21, 2009.  
This answer included one affirmative defense not applicable 
here.  On April 30, 2010, St. Patrick filed an amended answer 
including several additional affirmative defenses including: "As 
and for a second affirmative defense, the plaintiff may have 
failed 
to 
state 
a 
claim 
upon 
which 
relief 
can 
be 
granted. . . . As and for a third affirmative defense, the 
plaintiff's claims, if any, are barred by the Supreme Court 
decision in Coulee Catholic Schools vs. LIRC, 320 Wis. 2d 275 
(2009)." 
¶55 On July 21, 2010, St. Patrick filed a motion to 
dismiss DeBruin's complaint for failure to state a claim.  In 
its brief, St. Patrick relied on the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
language 
in 
the 
termination clause, to support its motion to dismiss. 
¶56 DeBruin responded, arguing that contract claims are 
different from anti-discrimination suits brought by government 
entities and that the case could be decided on neutral 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
3 
 
principles of law, namely, whether DeBruin's alleged failure to 
perform background checks was "good and sufficient cause" for 
termination under her contract with St. Patrick.  
¶57 As discussed by other writers, Walworth County Circuit 
Judge John R. Race held a hearing and granted the motion to 
dismiss.  The circuit court identified several of the critical 
themes that emerge in this opinion. 
¶58 After DeBruin appealed, the court of appeals certified 
the following question to this court:  "In light of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Coulee Catholic Schools v. 
LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868, are religious 
organizations immune from common law breach of contract lawsuits 
brought by ministerial employees?"  
II 
¶59 The court of appeals certified a major constitutional 
question that is not susceptible to a yes or no answer.  We need 
not address this question if the case can be decided on other 
grounds. 
¶60 Kathleen DeBruin cannot win this case because she has 
not stated a claim that a Wisconsin court can decide in her 
favor. 
¶61 First, her case comes to this court in the wake of 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and Coulee Catholic Schools v. 
LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.  Although 
both cases involve the "ministerial exception" to government 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
4 
 
regulations 
affecting 
employment, 
both 
opinions 
contain 
compelling language that could be applied in a broader context.  
¶62 The first paragraph of Hosanna-Tabor stated the issue 
in that case: 
 
Certain employment discrimination laws authorize 
employees who have been wrongfully terminated to sue 
their employers for reinstatement and damages.  The 
question presented is whether the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar such 
an action when the employer is a religious group and 
the employee is one of the group's ministers. 
132 S.Ct. at 699. 
¶63 Coulee 
stated 
its 
question 
as 
"whether 
[the 
plaintiff's] age discrimination claim under the [Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act] is precluded by the First Amendment and/or the 
Freedom of Conscience Clauses in Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution."  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶2. 
¶64 The present case does not involve the "ministerial 
exception" as discussed in Hosanna-Tabor and Coulee because it 
does 
not 
feature 
an 
executive 
branch 
government 
agency 
attempting to enforce government employment discrimination laws 
or regulations.  Instead, this case involves a "ministerial" 
employee of a religious organization attempting to enforce a 
private employment contract. 
¶65 Hosanna-Tabor states that: "We express no view on 
whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types of suits, 
including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or 
tortious conduct by their religious employers."  Hosanna-Tabor, 
132 S. Ct. at 710 (emphasis added).  Coulee, in turn, said that 
"We do not mean to suggest that anything interfering with a 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
5 
 
religious organization is totally prohibited.  General laws 
related to building licensing, taxes, social security, and the 
like are normally acceptable," 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶65 (emphasis 
added), and it heavily relied on Rayburn v. General Conference 
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985), 
where 
the 
court 
said: 
"Like 
any 
other . . . organization 
[churches] may be held liable . . . upon their valid contracts."  
(Emphasis added). 
¶66 Thus, Hosanna-Tabor and Coulee do not explicitly bar a 
ministerial employee's suit to enforce an employment contract.  
¶67 On the other hand, Hosanna-Tabor seemingly alluded to 
our certified question in its reference to "breach of contract," 
and both Hosanna-Tabor and Coulee contain some very broad 
language that would appear to cover a religious organization's 
hiring and termination of "ministerial" employees.  In Hosanna-
Tabor, the Court said: 
The members of a religious group put their faith in 
the hands of their ministers.  Requiring a church to 
accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a 
church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a 
mere employment decision.  Such action interferes with 
the internal governance of the church, depriving the 
church of control over the selection of those who will 
personify its beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted 
minister, 
the 
state infringes the Free Exercise 
Clause, which protects a religious group's right to 
shape 
its 
own 
faith 
and 
mission 
through 
its 
appointments.  According the state the power to 
determine which individuals will minister to the 
faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits 
government 
involvement 
in 
such 
ecclesiastical decisions. 
Id. at 706 (emphasis added). 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
6 
 
 
The interest of society in the enforcement of 
employment 
discrimination 
statutes 
is 
undoubtedly 
important.  But so too is the interest of religious 
groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, 
teach their faith, and carry out their mission.  When 
a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging 
that her termination was discriminatory, the First 
Amendment has struck the balance for us.  The church 
must be free to choose those who will guide it on its 
way. 
Id. at 710. 
¶68 Coulee utilizes not only the First Amendment but also 
Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution: 
 
This court has stated that Article I, Section 18 
serves the same dual purposes as the Establishment 
Clause 
and 
Free 
Exercise 
Clause 
of 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution.  However, we have also recognized that 
these provisions, though sharing some similarities 
with the federal provisions, are not the same.  The 
protections 
and 
prohibitions 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution are far more specific.  And with regard 
to the rights of conscience, this clause contains 
extremely 
strong 
language, 
providing 
expansive 
protections for religious liberty.  Thus, we are not 
limited to current First Amendment jurisprudence when 
interpreting our own constitutional protections for 
religious liberty; rather, we are required to give 
effect to the more explicit guarantees set forth in 
our state constitution. 
Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶60 (citations omitted). 
The state simply has no authority to control or 
interfere with the selection of spiritual leaders of a 
religious organization with a religious mission.  The 
text of our constitution states that the state cannot 
do it——at all.  The main inquiry is not how important 
the right in question is, but whether the law is 
"controlling" or "interfering with" religious freedom. 
Id., ¶63 (emphasis added). 
 
The Wisconsin Constitution, with its specific and 
expansive language, provides much broader protections 
for religious liberty than the First Amendment.  We 
need not explore the outer boundaries of those 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
7 
 
protections here.  But it is clear that the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides 
at 
least 
the 
protections 
contained in the First Amendment. 
Id., ¶66. 
¶69 Wisconsin courts are not executive branch agencies 
like the EEOC and LIRC, but that does not mean that they are not 
government entities engaging in "state action" when they enforce 
contracts.  The Fourteenth Amendment "governs any action of a 
State, 'whether through its legislature, through its courts, or 
through its executive or administrative officers.'"  Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935)(quoting Carter v. Texas, 177 
U.S. 442, 447 (1900))(emphasis added).   
¶70 Justice Roggensack's opinion cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1 (1948), for the proposition that "the action of state 
courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to 
be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  Lead op., ¶17.  Shelley was preceded in 
this respect by such cases as Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 
318 (1879), and Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883), and 
followed by Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 n.1 (1984).  As 
in Shelley, judicial enforcement of a contract can constitute 
state action.  Cf. Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condominium, 
Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989)(vacated in part on other 
grounds Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condominium, Inc., 757 
F.Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).   
¶71 At a minimum, Hosanna-Tabor and Coulee put Wisconsin 
courts on high alert when they are asked to enforce a contract 
by a religious organization in a manner that the religious 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
8 
 
organization contends is a violation of its constitutional 
rights.   
¶72 Second, the contract provision that DeBruin relies 
upon is illusory. 
¶73 In Wisconsin, the employment-at-will doctrine is an 
established tenet of workplace relations.  Hausman v. St. Croix 
Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 663, 571 N.W.2d 393 (1997).  It has 
been recognized in case law since 1871.  Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 
Wis. 131, 133 (1871).  In Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 
WI 23, ¶12, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 623 N.W.2d 739, the court explained 
that the employment-at-will doctrine serves the interests of 
employees as well as employers.  In Batteries Plus, LLC v. Mohr, 
2001 WI 80, ¶15, 244 Wis. 2d 559, 628 N.W.2d 364, the court 
observed that "[t]he antidote for both parties to the potential 
unfairness arising from a party's change of heart is an 
employment contract." 
¶74 Many 
employment 
contracts 
include 
a 
provision 
protecting an employee from discharge without cause.  These 
provisions replace and reverse the employment-at-will rule. 
¶75 In 
this 
case, 
the 
termination 
clause 
contains 
discharge 
"without 
cause" 
protection. 
 
However, 
it 
then 
nullifies that protection by assigning to St. Patrick the right 
to determine what "good and sufficient cause" is.  In short, the 
protection that DeBruin relies on does not exist; it is 
illusory; and DeBruin is basically subject to employment-at-
will. 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶76 In my view, much of Justice Crooks' opinion on this 
subject is spot on.  He writes that the termination clause is "a 
textbook case of an illusory promise——'words in promissory form 
that promise nothing.'"  Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶40 
(quoting 2 Joseph M. Perillo & Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, 
Corbin on Contracts § 5.28, at 142 (1995)). 
¶77 Justice Crooks cites the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 2, comment e, which reads: 
(e) 
Illusory 
promises; 
mere 
statements 
of 
intention.  Words of promise which by their terms make 
performance entirely optional with the "promisor" 
whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in 
other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a 
promise.  Even if a present intention is manifested, 
the reservation of an option to change that intention 
means that there can be no promisee who is justified 
in an expectation of performance. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981). 
¶78 My only difference with Justice Crooks' opinion is 
with his conclusion that because of the illusory "without cause" 
protection in the termination clause, "no contract exists," 
Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶40, or "no enforceable contract 
exists," 
Id., 
¶¶41, 
48. 
 
This 
difference, 
however, 
is 
fundamental.  From St. Patrick's perspective, it did not breach 
the contract; it exercised its rights under the contract.   
¶79 There may well be elements of the contract that could 
be enforced, but not the part of the termination clause that 
DeBruin relies on, because it afforded her no protection, as a 
matter of law. 
¶80 Third, the termination clause does more than confirm 
St. Patrick's rights as an at-will employer with respect to at 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
10 
 
least some of its employees.  It protects St. Patrick's rights 
as a religious organization.  The termination clause as a whole 
specifically reserves to St. Patrick the right to freely 
exercise its religious prerogatives under the First Amendment 
and Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶81 DeBruin 
cannot 
prevail 
in 
this 
case 
because 
a 
religious organization reserved its rights to terminate its 
ministerial employees on grounds of "dissatisfaction," and it 
exercised those rights.  To prevail, DeBruin would have to 
persuade a court to enter into an internal parish conflict and 
second guess the parish's decision.  It would have to deny St. 
Patrick the power to make a decision that it explicitly reserved 
to itself.  This cannot be squared with any reasonable view of 
religious liberty. 
¶82 This conclusion is supported by this court's decision 
in Olston v. Hallock, 55 Wis. 2d 687, 201 N.W.2d 35 (1972), 
where the court reviewed the termination of an Episcopal Rector.  
Although the circumstances were different, the court observed: 
We think it is clear that the plaintiff is seeking a 
civil tribunal review of the merits of the findings 
and 
decisions 
of 
the 
Bishop 
and 
the 
Standing 
Committee, which determined that there was a serious 
disagreement existing between the pastor and the 
congregation 
as 
represented 
by 
its 
Wardens 
and 
Vestrymen, and that for the good of the church there 
must be an immediate dissolution of the pastoral 
relationship between St. Paul's and its pastor.  Under 
both Wisconsin and federal case law, such a review in 
this case is outside the province of judicial review. 
Id. at 698 (emphasis added). 
¶83 This case is like Olston because authority inside the 
religious organization has been vested with the right to 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
11 
 
determine "good and sufficient cause."  As such, this case is 
outside the province of judicial review. 
¶84 For these reasons, DeBruin loses, and there is no 
point in extending her disappointment by remanding this case to 
the circuit court. 
III 
¶85 St. 
Patrick 
carefully 
protected 
its 
religious 
prerogatives in the termination clause of the Contract of 
Employment.  Suppose the clause read differently. 
The term of this Agreement shall begin July 1, 
2009 and shall end on June 30, 2010.  The PARISH 
agrees that the DIRECTOR OF FAITH FORMATION shall not 
be discharged during the term of this contract, 
without good and sufficient cause.    
¶86 This hypothetical clause employs a standard devised by 
the parish, but it appears to open the door to interpretation by 
a court. 
¶87 Suppose the contract provided: 
THIS AGREEMENT is made this first day of July, 
2009 by and between Jane Doe, herein after referred to 
as the DIRECTOR OF FAITH FORMATION, and Saint Patrick 
Congregation of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, herein 
after referred to as PARISH.  The term of this 
Agreement shall begin July 1, 2009 and shall end on 
June 30, 2010. 
¶88 This hypothetical clause contains no explicit "without 
cause" protection for the employee and no identified standard 
for a court to review.  Could a Wisconsin court review a breach 
of contract claim under such a contract?  If it did, what 
standards would it employ?  How would it fill in the blanks? 
¶89 Either of these hypothetical contract clauses would 
pose a much more difficult case than the one before us.  We 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
12 
 
would no longer be able to say that the employee's discharge 
protection in the termination clause was illusory or that the 
clause specifically reserved St. Patrick's religious rights.  We 
would have to grapple with the question of whether by offering a 
contract, St. Patrick waived some of its religious protections.  
¶90 These hypotheticals are not before us, and, in my 
view, it is both unnecessary and dangerous to attempt to 
determine now how these and other cases should be decided. 
IV 
¶91 For more than a century, civil courts in the United 
States have cautiously approached questions involving churches 
and ministers.  The Supreme Court approved the practice of 
courts abstaining from certain cases involving ecclesiastical 
questions, well-before the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and 
applied to the states.  E.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 679 (1872); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952).  The 
Supreme Court has since indicated that the First Amendment is 
implicated in these disputes.  Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116. 
¶92 The Supreme Court has recognized that matters of 
church polity, which includes the selection of ministers, 
generally receive First Amendment protection.  See Serbian E. 
Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).  Cf. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶93 However, Hosanna-Tabor raises the question whether the 
First Amendment bars breach of contract claims involving the 
termination of a ministerial employee, or whether breach of 
contract claims are subject to judicial review applying neutral 
principles of law.  Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution must be considered in this determination.  We also 
have to deal with Wisconsin precedent, which the parties did not 
cite.  Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Congregation v. Hass, 177 
Wis. 23, 187 N.W. 677 (1922)("Action by [church] . . . to 
compel . . . its pastor . . . to deliver up to it all property 
belonging to the organization . . . and perpetually enjoining 
him from . . . interfering with any of the property or functions 
of the congregation or of assuming or exercising the functions 
of its pastor."); Olston, 55 Wis. 2d at 690 (statement of the 
case) ("This appeal concerns the termination of Olston's 
pastoral relationship with St. Paul's Episcopal Church."); Black 
v. St. Bernadette Congregation of Appleton, 121 Wis. 2d 560, 360 
N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984)(reviewing the disposition of a breach 
of contract claim brought against church where termination was 
made for ecclesiastical reason).     
¶94 In recent years courts, often relying on Rayburn, 772 
F.2d at 1171, have struggled to balance First Amendment concerns 
with attempts to enforce breach of contract claims involving a 
church and a minister by applying neutral principles of law, as 
suggested in General Council on Finance & Administration of the 
United Methodist Church v. California Superior Court, County of 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
14 
 
San Diego, 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (1978)(Rehnquist, Circuit 
Justice), and Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979).1  
¶95 In Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United 
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court 
permitted a contract claim to proceed but it repeatedly raised 
caution in doing so.  After dismissing one of the contract 
claims brought by Pastor Minker against his church based on 
documents drafted by the church, the court permitted a second 
claim to survive a motion to dismiss, while providing the 
following warnings: 
It is true, as the Supreme Court noted in another 
context, courts may not consider provisions whose 
enforcement would require "a searching and therefore 
impermissible inquiry" into church doctrine.  Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696, 723 (1976). 
 
. . . .  
                                                 
1 See e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 312 (3rd 
Cir. 2006)("Therefore, the question is whether Petruska's breach 
of contract claim can be decided without wading into doctrinal 
waters. . . .  [If] issues which would result in excessive 
entanglement [arise], the claims may be dismissed on that basis 
on summary judgment.")(citation omitted); Minker v. Baltimore 
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424, 428 (Alaska 
1993)(Courts must dismiss claims that require "the court to 
interpret [the minister's] employment relationship" with his 
church.); Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192, 1205 
(Conn. 2011) (Courts can hear cases involving "particular wrongs 
by the church that are wholly [nonreligious] in character.") 
(quoting Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2nd Cir. 2008)) 
(emphasis added by Dayner); Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological 
Seminary, 608 A.2d 218, 222 (N.J. 1992)("[W]e refuse to adopt a 
per se rule that courts may not entertain" suits by ministers 
against churches.  However, "there are many cases in which court 
intervention 
is 
simply 
inappropriate" 
under 
the 
First 
Amendment.) (citations and quotations omitted). 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
15 
 
The Rayburn court held that entanglements might result 
from a protracted legal procedure which might involve 
subpoenas, discovery, and other tools designed to 
probe the mind of the church.  772 F.2d at 1170-71.  
The Church asserts that simply permitting a court to 
hear Minker's contract claims might distort church 
appointment decisions——causing churches to make only 
those choices that avoid the appearance of legal 
impropriety. 
 
We acknowledge that the contract alleged by 
Minker threatens to touch the core of the rights 
protected by the free exercise clause.  See McClure v. 
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972) 
("The relationship between an organized church and its 
ministers is its lifeblood.  The minister is the chief 
instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its 
purpose.").  We also agree that any inquiry into the 
Church's reasons for asserting that Minker was not 
suited for a particular pastorship would constitute an 
excessive entanglement in its affairs.  See Natal v. 
Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st 
Cir. 
1989)(inquiry 
into 
reasons 
for 
minister's 
discharge would plunge court "into a maelstrom of 
Church 
policy, 
administration, 
and 
governance"); 
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171. 
 
. . . .   
Furthermore, as the remedy would be limited to the 
award of money damages, we see no potential for 
distortion 
of 
church 
appointment 
decisions 
from 
requiring that the Church not make empty, misleading 
promises to its clergy. 
 
It could turn out that in attempting to prove his 
case, appellant will be forced to inquire into matters 
of ecclesiastical policy even as to his contract 
claim.  Of course, in that situation, a court may 
grant summary judgment on the ground that appellant 
has not proved his case and pursuing the matter 
further would create an excessive entanglement with 
religion. . . .  
Once 
evidence 
is 
offered, 
the 
district court will be in a position to control the 
case so as to protect against any impermissible 
entanglements. 
 Thus, while the first amendment 
forecloses any inquiry into the Church's assessment of 
Minker's suitability for a pastorship, even for the 
purpose of showing it to be pretextual, it does not 
No.  2010AP2705.dtp 
 
16 
 
prevent the district court from determining whether 
the contract alleged by Minker in fact exists.  
Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 
1168 (2d Cir. 1985) (first amendment prohibition of 
state board's ability to inquire into nature of 
religious motives does not preclude it from asserting 
jurisdiction).  
Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359-61.  
V 
¶96 In my view, this court should not try to decide 
controversies that are not before us.  Consequently, I join the 
mandate to dismiss the case, which amounts to an affirmance of 
the circuit court.   
¶97 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
1 
 
¶98 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    (dissenting).  There is no 
majority opinion of this court.  Of the five justices who would 
affirm the circuit court, three (Justice Roggensack, Justice 
Ziegler, and Justice Gableman) would decide this case on the 
constitution1 and two (Justice Crooks and Justice Prosser) would 
decide it on the specific contract at issue in this case.  
Accordingly, because no opinion has garnered the vote of four 
justices, nothing set forth in any of the opinions has 
precedential value. 
¶99 When I examine the issue certified by the court of 
appeals, I conclude that DeBruin's common law contract claims do 
not implicate free exercise concerns and therefore do not 
require dismissal for failure to state a claim.  Further, it 
would be premature to determine whether the claims would foster 
an excessive state entanglement with religion.  Because I would 
remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings, I 
respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶100 The court of appeals certified the case to this court, 
asking the following question: "In light of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court's decision in Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 
2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868, are religious 
organizations immune from common law breach of contract lawsuits 
brought by ministerial employees?"  Coulee and other relevant 
cases address state involvement in a church's decision to hire 
or fire its ministers.  These cases do not address state 
                                                 
1 Hereinafter, Justice Roggensack's opinion. 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
2 
 
involvement with other aspects of the employment relationship.  
Accordingly, I conclude that a narrower question should be 
addressed: whether, based on the reasoning of Coulee and similar 
cases, a religious organization is immune from common law 
contract 
claims 
challenging 
its 
basis 
for 
terminating 
a 
ministerial employee. 
¶101 St. Patrick contends that DeBruin failed to state a 
claim for relief because her contract claims are precluded by 
the state and federal constitutions.  The First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution provides, in relevant part: "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."  These two 
clauses provide distinct protections.   
¶102 The 
first 
clause, 
"Congress 
shall 
make 
no 
law 
respecting an establishment of religion," is referred to as the 
Establishment 
Clause. 
 
It 
affords 
protection 
against 
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the 
sovereign in religious activity."  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 612 (1971); see also State ex rel. Wisconsin Health 
Facilities Auth. v. Lindner, 91 Wis. 2d 145, 280 N.W.2d 773 
(1979).  An "excessive entanglement" in violation of the 
Establishment Clause can arise when the state is required to 
interpret and evaluate church doctrine.  See, e.g., Wisconsin 
Conference Bd. of Trustees of United Methodist Church, Inc. v. 
Culver, 2000 WI App 132, ¶15, 237 Wis. 2d 343, 614 N.W.2d 523.   
¶103 The second clause, which declares that "Congress shall 
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof," is 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
3 
 
referred to as the Free Exercise Clause.  It protects the power 
of religious organizations "to decide for themselves, free from 
state interference, matters of church governance as well as 
those of faith and doctrine."  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶37.  
¶104 Additionally, Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides, in relevant part, "The right of every 
person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of 
conscience shall never be infringed; . . . nor shall any control 
of, 
or 
interference 
with, 
the 
rights 
of 
conscience 
be 
permitted . . . ." 
 
This 
court 
has 
explained 
that 
this 
provision, referred to as the Freedom of Conscience Clause, 
"serve[s] 
the 
same 
dual 
purpose 
of 
prohibiting 
the 
'establishment' of religion and protecting the 'free exercise' 
of religion."  State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 
332, 198 N.W.2d 650 (1972).  Nevertheless, it contains more 
explicit language than the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, providing expansive protections for religious 
liberty.  Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶60.      
¶105 The parties' arguments focus on the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Freedom of Conscience Clause.  Accordingly, I 
address the constitutional right to free exercise first.  Then, 
I turn to briefly comment upon the Establishment Clause concerns 
that could potentially be implicated by DeBruin's contract 
claims.    
A 
¶106 St. Patrick asserts that state court adjudication of 
DeBruin's contract claims would violate its right to free 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
4 
 
exercise.  Based on this court's reasoning in Coulee and the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
reasoning 
in 
Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. __, 132 
S. Ct. 694 (2012), St. Patrick contends that DeBruin cannot 
challenge her termination because "[i]t is now crystal clear 
that the legal analysis of the hiring/firing decisions of 
religious organizations begins and ends with the question of 
whether . . . [the] employee was a ministerial employee."   
¶107 The cases upon which St. Patrick relies do not involve 
court enforcement of a contractual promise that was voluntarily 
made by a church.  Rather, they involve challenges to claims 
filed under state and federal anti-discrimination statutes.    
¶108 In these cases, courts have been called upon to 
address employment discrimination claims made against religious 
organizations, and they have drawn a line between ministerial 
and non-ministerial employees.  The court-created "ministerial 
exception" is an affirmative defense available to religious 
organizations that precludes discrimination claims filed by 
their ministerial employees.   
¶109 In 
Coulee, 
320 
Wis. 2d 275, 
¶23, 
a 
ministerial 
employee of a religious school alleged that she was terminated 
on the basis of age, in violation of the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act.  This court characterized the employee's suit as 
"an effort by the state to intrude into the hiring and firing 
decisions of a religious organization," and it concluded that 
such an effort violated both the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Freedom of Conscience Clause.  Id., ¶62.  Regarding the Freedom 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
5 
 
of Conscience Clause, it explained: "The state simply has no 
authority to control or interfere with the selection of 
spiritual leaders of a religious organization with a religious 
mission."  Id., ¶88.     
¶110 The Coulee decision relies heavily on an earlier case 
from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  In Rayburn v. General 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 
1985), an employee argued that she had been passed over to fill 
a ministerial position on the basis of race and sex, and that 
the church's discriminatory hiring decision violated Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Fourth Circuit concluded 
that the "introduction of government standards to the selection 
of spiritual leaders would significantly, and perniciously, 
rearrange the relationship between church and state," and that 
"[a]ny attempt by government to restrict a church's free choice 
of its leaders . . . constitutes a burden on the church's free 
exercise rights."  Id. at 1169, 1168.   
¶111 Finally, 
in 
Hosanna-Tabor, 
132 
S. 
Ct. 
694, 
a 
ministerial employee of a religious school alleged that she had 
been terminated because of a disability in violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  The question before the United 
States Supreme Court was "whether [the] freedom of a religious 
organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit 
alleging discrimination in employment."  Id. at 705.  The Court 
recognized 
the 
ministerial 
exception 
and 
explained 
that 
"[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, 
or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
6 
 
than a mere employment decision.  Such action interferes with 
the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of 
control over the selection of those who will personify its 
beliefs."  Id. at 706.2 
¶112 Not one of these cases involved a contract claim 
brought by a ministerial employee.  To the contrary, all three 
cases either imply or state outright that their reasoning, which 
is applicable to claims made under anti-discrimination statutes, 
does not necessarily extend to claims for breach of contract.   
¶113 In Coulee, this court acknowledged that "a church's 
[constitutional] 
authority 
to 
make 
hiring 
and 
firing 
decisions . . . remove[s] 
the 
church's 
decisions 
in 
these 
matters from the jurisdiction of the courts with respect to 
anti-discrimination laws[.]"3  320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶40 (emphasis 
added).  Nevertheless, it cautioned, "We do not mean to suggest 
that anything interfering with a religious organization is 
totally prohibited.  General laws related to building licensing, 
                                                 
2 See also Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conf. of United 
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the free exercise clause prohibited application of Title 
VII to a church's decision to terminate a minister) ("[I]n 
investigating employment discrimination claims by ministers 
against their church, secular authorities would necessarily 
intrude into church governance in a manner that would be 
inherently coercive, even if the alleged discrimination were 
purely nondoctrinal.") (emphasis added). 
3 The United States Supreme Court later clarified that the 
ministerial exception operates not as a jurisdictional bar, but 
rather, as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable 
claim.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012). 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
7 
 
taxes, social security, and the like are normally acceptable."  
Id., ¶65.  
¶114 In Rayburn, upon which the Coulee court relied, the 
Fourth Circuit was more specific with regard to the question we 
now address.  It expressly stated that its analysis would not 
extend to breach of contract claims: "Of course churches are 
not——and should not be——above the law.  Like any other person or 
organization, they may be held liable for their torts and upon 
their valid contracts."  772 F.2d at 1171 (emphasis added).      
¶115 Most recently, in Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court 
clearly stated that it "express[ed] no view" on whether its 
analysis would apply to a breach of contract claim brought 
against a church by a ministerial employee:   
The case before us is an employment discrimination 
suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her 
church's decision to fire her.  Today we hold only 
that the ministerial exception bars such a suit.  We 
express no view on whether the exception bars other 
types 
of 
suits, 
including 
actions 
by 
employees 
alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by 
their religious employers.  There will be time enough 
to address the applicability of the exception to other 
circumstances if and when they arise.   
132 S. Ct. at 710. 
¶116 I take these courts at their word.  DeBruin's contract 
claims are not precluded by a straightforward application of 
Coulee, Rayburn, or Hosanna-Tabor.   
¶117 Nevertheless, St. Patrick asks the court to break new 
ground and extend the holdings of these cases to DeBruin's 
contract claims.  It argues that "the underpinnings and 
rationale for why the discrimination laws" cannot restrict a 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
8 
 
church's decision to terminate a ministerial employee "apply 
with equal force" to a contract claim.  The implication of this 
argument is that, for the same reason the legislature cannot 
regulate a church's decision to terminate a minister, courts 
must likewise refrain from adjudicating claims alleging that the 
church breached terms of an employment contract by terminating a 
ministerial employee.   
¶118 I disagree with St. Patrick that the underpinnings and 
rationale of Coulee, Rayburn, and Hosanna-Tabor apply with equal 
force to DeBruin's contract claims.  The concern underlying 
these cases is that the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws 
would "intrud[e] into the mission of religious organizations"4 by 
introducing "government standards to the selection of spiritual 
leaders,"5 
"restrict[ing] 
a 
church's 
free 
choice 
of 
its 
leaders,"6 and "depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs."7  There are 
crucial 
differences 
between 
the 
enforcement 
of 
an 
anti-
discrimination statute and the enforcement of a contract, and 
these differences undermine St. Patrick's concerns about state 
intrusion into its free choice of ministerial employees.  
                                                 
4 Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶55, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868. 
5 Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 
772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985). 
6 Id. at 1168.  
7 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
9 
 
¶119 Here, DeBruin's claims do not raise concerns about 
state "regulat[ion of] the hiring and firing" of ministerial 
employees, Coulee, 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶84, because the relevant 
law (contract law) is not a regulatory mandate from the state.  
The state played no role in St. Patrick's selection of a 
minister.  It did not require St. Patrick to enter into a 
written employment contract, and it did not mandate any specific 
contract terms.   
¶120 Instead, 
St. 
Patrick 
voluntarily 
selected 
its 
minister, freely negotiated the terms of employment including 
the circumstances under which the minister could be fired, and 
willingly agreed that both parties would be bound by those 
terms.  Allowing DeBruin's contract claims to survive a motion 
to dismiss would merely recognize that St. Patrick, "like any 
other person or organization," is bound by its contracts.  
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171.  Given that this case does not 
involve the state attempting to restrict the church's choice of 
its leaders, I conclude that this case does not implicate the 
Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution.   
¶121 My conclusion is supported by decisions from other 
jurisdictions.  In Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the 
court determined that permitting a pastor's Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act claim to proceed would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Nevertheless, the court found "compelling" the 
assertion that the Free Exercise Clause could not bar an action 
for a breach of an employment contract, id. at 1359, and it held 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
10 
 
that dismissal of the breach of contract claim was premature, 
id. at 1361.  It explained: "A church is always free to burden 
its activities voluntarily through contracts," and further that 
"[a] church, like any other employer, is bound to perform its 
promissory obligations in accord with contract law."  Id. at 
1359, 1361.  Accordingly, the pastor was "entitled to rely upon 
his employer's representations and to enforce them in a secular 
court."  Id. at 1361.  
¶122 Similarly, in Petruska v. Gannon University, the court 
determined 
that 
even 
though 
a 
minister's 
Title 
VII 
discrimination claim must be dismissed, the "[e]nforcement of a 
promise, willingly made and supported by consideration, in no 
way constitutes a state-imposed limit upon a church's free 
exercise rights."   462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained: "On its face, application of 
state contract law does not involve government-imposed limits on 
[the church's] right to select its ministers: Unlike the duties 
under Title VII and state tort law, contractual obligations are 
entirely voluntary."  Id.  
¶123 For the same reason, I conclude that permitting 
DeBruin to maintain contract claims does not control or 
interfere with St. Patrick's right of conscience in violation of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  I acknowledge that the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides broader free exercise protection than the 
First Amendment.  Nevertheless, as explained above, court 
adjudication of the claims does not "control or interfere with" 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
11 
 
a church's selection of its ministers.  See, Coulee, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, ¶63. 
¶124 Instead, if courts routinely dismissed this variety of 
contract claim, they might create an unnecessary roadblock 
hampering a church's free exercise ability to select its 
ministers.  There is no dispute that a church, like any other 
organization, enjoys the freedom to contract.  Contract law 
"promote[s] and facilitate[s] the reliance on agreements" 
through court enforcement of "reasonable expectations that have 
been induced by the making of a promise."  Joseph M. Perillo, 
Corbin on Contracts § 1.1 at 2 (rev. ed. 1993).8  The 
underpinning of contract law is that competent parties are 
permitted to bind themselves to voluntary agreements, and such 
agreements will be enforced by courts (provided that they are 
not illegal or contrary to public policy).  See, e.g., Jezeski 
v. Jezeski, 2009 WI App 8, ¶11, 316 Wis. 2d 178, 763 N.W.2d 176.      
¶125 If the ministerial exception discussed in Coulee, 
Rayburn, and Hosanna-Tabor were extended to bar contract claims, 
                                                 
8 An 1875 statement by Sir George Jessel, which has been 
described as "perhaps the most famous judicial statement about 
freedom of contract," identifies contract enforcement as a key 
component of the freedom of contract: "[M]en of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and [] their contracts when entered into freely and 
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts 
of justice."  Todd D. Rakoff, Is Freedom From Contract 
Necessarily a Libertarian Freedom?, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 477, 479-
80 (quoting Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 
L.R.-Eq. 462, 465 (V.C. 1875)); see also Harry N. Scheiber, The 
State 
and 
Freedom 
of 
Contract 
1 
(1998) 
(defining 
the 
"institution of contract" as "the legal form in which agreements 
and promises are made, with the purpose of making them 
enforceable by the courts").  
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
12 
 
then termination clauses would not be worth the paper they were 
printed on because no civil authority could hold a religious 
organization to the terms of any such contract it had negotiated 
with a ministerial employee.  Candidates for ministerial 
positions might be less inclined to enter into these types of 
employment arrangements in the first instance.  A church's 
ability to recruit the best and brightest candidates for 
ministerial positions could be undermined because the church 
would be unable to offer desirable candidates any contractual 
assurances regarding job security.9   
¶126 I conclude that DeBruin's contract claims should not 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.  Rather, they should 
be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.   
B 
¶127 I have determined that DeBruin's contract claims do 
not raise free exercise concerns.  Nevertheless, I pause to 
observe 
that 
another 
constitutional 
concern, 
excessive 
entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause, could 
potentially arise if the court proceeded to evaluate St. 
Patrick's reasons for terminating DeBruin.  See Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); State ex rel. Wisconsin Health 
                                                 
9 At oral argument, St. Patrick acknowledged that its 
position was "absolute" and that, "if push comes to shove, . . . 
the First Amendment, it trumps the right to contract . . . ."  
It could not identify any contractual assurances that a church 
could offer a prospective ministerial employee regarding job 
security.  Instead, it could only offer the following advice: "I 
would make sure that [a prospective ministerial employee] is 
very comfortable with the people that she wants to work for.  
That would the first thing.  You would have to meet the people 
and be very comfortable with your employer."    
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
13 
 
Facilities Auth. v. Lindner, 91 Wis. 2d 145, 280 N.W.2d 773 
(1979).   
¶128 In Establishment Clause cases, the question is whether 
the court is interfering with "inherently religious matters."  
Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of 
the Recent Confusion, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 883, 915 (2001).  
"[G]overnment 
does 
not 
exceed 
the 
restraints 
of 
the 
Establishment Clause unless it is acting on, or intruding into, 
such matters or topics."  Id. 
¶129 As stated above, in both Minker and Petruska, the 
court refused to dismiss a minister's contract claim under the 
Free 
Exercise 
Clause 
for 
failure 
to 
state 
a 
claim.  
Nevertheless, both courts cautioned that adjudicating the cases 
might require court evaluation of the validity of religious 
doctrine, and both courts speculated that concerns of "excessive 
entanglement" with religion might ultimately require dismissal 
of the case on summary judgment.   
¶130 In Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360, the court explained the 
potential for entanglement as follows: "It could turn out that 
in attempting to prove his case, [Minker] will be forced to 
inquire into matters of ecclesiastical policy even as to his 
contract claim.  Of course, in that situation, a court may grant 
summary judgment on the ground that [Minker] has not proved his 
case and pursuing the matter further would create an excessive 
entanglement with religion." 
¶131 Similarly, in Petruska, 462 F.3d at 312, the court 
reasoned that maintaining the claim could, but would not 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
14 
 
necessarily, foster entanglement: "Resolution of this claim does 
not turn on an ecclesiastical inquiry——or, at least not at the 
outset.  If [the Church's] response to Petruska's allegations 
raise issues which would result in excessive entanglement, the 
claims may be dismissed on that basis on summary judgment."   
¶132 As the above cases forewarn, it is possible that facts 
would come to light which would require the circuit court to 
"wade[] into doctrinal waters" and make determinations about 
"matters of ecclesiastical policy."  See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 
312; Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360.10  If so, the circuit court could 
be presented with an argument that summary judgment should be 
granted because pursuing the matter further would create an 
excessive entanglement with religion.   
¶133 At this point, however, the case is before this court 
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and there 
is nothing in the record about why DeBruin was terminated or 
whether that decision involved any matters of faith and 
ministry.  Any concerns about excessive entanglement would be 
"speculative," and dismissing DeBruin's claim on this basis 
would be "premature."  See Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360.  The 
circuit court would be well situated to address any entanglement 
                                                 
10 See 
also 
Black 
v. 
St. 
Bernadette 
Congregation 
of 
Appleton, 121 Wis. 2d 560, 564, 360 N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(Wisconsin courts may not "review the merits of a termination 
[of a minister] based on ecclesiastical reasons" but "[t]he 
determination of whether an ecclesiastical question exists must 
be 
made 
by the 
court.") (citing Olston v. Hallock, 55 
Wis. 2d 687, 698, 201 N.W.2d 35 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972)).     
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
15 
 
concerns if the parties were given the opportunity to develop 
the factual record on remand.     
II 
¶134  Justice Roggensack offers a different interpretation 
of the constitutional provisions at issue here.  Unfortunately, 
this interpretation paints with too broad a brush, is too 
absolute, and reaches far beyond contracts governing the 
termination of ministerial employees.  The opinion is flawed in 
three key respects.   
¶135 First, it conflates the principles underlying the Free 
Exercise Clause and the principles underlying the Establishment 
Clause.  It makes no distinction between the two.  Instead, it 
borrows freely from free exercise principles and establishment 
principles alike.   
¶136 For example, Justice Roggensack's sweeping statement 
about the meaning of the First Amendment is based on her 
assessment of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United 
States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976).  The opinion summarizes that case as follows: "[C]hurch 
decisions in matters of faith and ministry are so fundamental to 
the free exercise of religious liberty that civil courts are 
prohibited from delving into the reasons for religion-based 
decisions."  Justice Roggensack's opinion, ¶20.  The opinion 
fails to acknowledge that the Court's analysis in Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese provides a classic example of the 
concern, rooted in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, about the 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
16 
 
entanglements that arise when a civil court is called upon to 
interpret church doctrine to resolve a case.11   
                                                 
11 A plethora of scholars of the First Amendment and church-
state relations identify Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese as a 
classic Establishment Clause case, even though the opinion's 
First Amendment analysis did not specifically identify the 
separate clauses.  An examination of the opinion reveals that 
the Court's analysis was based on the Establishment Clause 
principle of entanglement.  See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The 
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 58 (1998) ("In cases such as Kedroff 
and [Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese], the Establishment Clause 
kept the prerogatives vested in religion from being undermined 
by the government's interference with a church's affairs."); 
Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding, and 
Constitutional Values, 30 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 17, 17 n.79 
(Fall 2002) (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese as an 
example of the "concern" that "the State will become entangled 
in essentially religious controversies"); Constance Frisby Fain, 
Minimizing Liability for Church-Related Counseling Services: 
Clergy Malpractice and First Amendment Religion Clauses, 44 
Akron L. Rev. 221, 244 n.161 (2011) (citing Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese near the top of a list "of cases that have 
addressed or applied the 'excessive entanglement' test [from 
Lemon] or the Establishment Clause in general"); Carl H. Esbeck, 
Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent 
Confusion, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 883, 916 n.106 (2001) (citing 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the proposition that 
"courts 
are 
without 
competence 
to 
adjudicate 
essentially 
doctrinal disputes for, inter alia, avoidance of entanglement"); 
Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid 
Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 Notre Dame J. L. 
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 285, 305-06 & n.61 (1999) (citing Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese at the top of the list of cases 
demonstrating that "the Court has deemed the entanglement 
excessive when the regulation intrudes on inherently religious 
matters"); 
Steven 
K. 
Green, 
Of 
(Un)equal 
Jurisprudential 
Pedigree: 
Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and 
Separationism, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 1111, 1122 (2002); David K. 
DeWolf, State Action Under the Religion Clauses: Neutral in 
Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. Rich. L. Rev. 253, 269 
(1990).     
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
17 
 
¶137 In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, Milivojevich, a 
defrocked bishop, brought a lawsuit in civil court against his 
former employer, the Mother Church.  He alleged that his 
defrocking had to be set aside as "arbitrary" because the 
proceedings against him had not been conducted in accordance 
with the Church's constitution and penal code.12  The Supreme 
Court of Illinois rendered its own interpretation of the 
Church's constitution and penal code, and it concluded that 
Milivojevich's defrocking was invalid because the Mother Church 
has not followed its own laws and procedures.  426 U.S. at 712-
13.   
¶138 The United States Supreme Court explained that "the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious 
organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for 
internal discipline and government," id. at 724, and that civil 
courts are bound to accept the Church's decisions "on matters of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Contrary to Justice Roggensack's assertion, the Minker case 
supports my conclusion that Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese is 
based on the Establishment Clause principle of entanglement.  
The Minker court cites Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the 
proposition that "courts may not consider provisions whose 
enforcement 
would 
require 
'a 
searching 
and 
therefore 
impermissible inquiry' into church doctrine."  Minker v. 
Baltimore Area Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 
F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).           
12 The Mother Church was "governed according to the Holy 
Scriptures, Holy Tradition, Rules of the Ecumenical Councils, 
the Holy Apostles, the Holy Faiths of the Church, the Mother 
Church Constitution adopted in 1931, and a 'penal code' adopted 
in 1961."  Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United 
States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 699 
(1976).  The United States Supreme Court observed that "[t]hese 
sources 
of 
law 
are 
sometimes 
ambiguous 
and 
seemingly 
inconsistent."  Id. 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
18 
 
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical 
rule, custom, or law," id. at 713.  "To permit civil courts to 
probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a 
hierarchical church so as to decide religious law," the Court 
held, "would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner 
as civil determination of religious doctrine."  Id. at 709.  The 
Court reversed out of concern that "the State will become 
entangled in essentially religious controversies."  Id. at 709.  
¶139 By resting her opinion in part on entanglement 
principles borrowed from Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese,13 
Justice Roggensack decides an issue not before the court——the 
application of the Establishment Clause in this case.  St. 
Patrick's motion to dismiss was not based upon the Establishment 
Clause or any concern about excessive entanglement.  Instead, it 
was based on the Free Exercise Clause and the Freedom of 
Conscience Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶140 Likewise, the circuit court's decision, the court of 
appeals' certification, and St. Patrick's argument do not 
present an Establishment Clause issue.  When it dismissed 
DeBruin's claim, the circuit court ruled that it was precluded 
by Coulee (a Free Exercise Clause and Freedom of Conscience 
Clause case) from addressing DeBruin's contract claims.  The 
court of appeals certified the case to this court, asking the 
                                                 
13 Additionally, the opinion finds support in the Petruska 
court's 
discussion 
of 
"ecclesiastical 
inquiry" 
without 
acknowledging 
that 
this 
portion 
of 
the 
Petruska 
opinion 
addressed the Establishment Clause and concerns about the 
potential for entanglement.  Justice Roggensack's opinion, ¶29.   
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
19 
 
following constitutional question: "In light of the Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision 
in 
Coulee . . . , 
are 
religious 
organizations immune from common law breach of contract lawsuits 
brought by ministerial employees?"   
¶141 During St. Patrick's briefing in this court, it 
stridently asserted that the Establishment Clause principle of 
excessive entanglement had nothing to do with the controversy, 
and that it did not matter whether its reason for terminating 
DeBruin was religious or secular.  It explained: 
Ms. DeBruin attempts to avoid the Coulee decision by 
basing her argument on an analysis of federal court 
cases that mainly interpret the application of the 
'Establishment Clause' of the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and its 'excessive entanglement' 
test. . . .  
Ms. DeBruin's analysis of the reason for her firing is 
not relevant to St. Patrick's Motion to Dismiss.  As 
explained above, the Court in Coulee held that the 
"Freedom of Conscience Clauses" or the "Free Exercise 
Clause" 
should 
apply 
to 
the 
hiring 
and 
firing 
decisions of a religious organization.  This analysis 
is based on the two prong test [set forth in 
Coulee]. . . . Ms. 
DeBruin's 
entire 
'excessive 
entanglement' analysis is not on point to this case. 
¶142 Justice Roggensack's opinion should not conflate free 
exercise and establishment principles, particularly when St. 
Patrick has rejected the Establishment Clause as a basis for its 
claim and has declined to brief the issue.  In so doing, the 
opinion confuses the interests that are protected by these two 
clauses, as well as the analyses that are conducted under these 
two clauses.     
¶143 The second flaw in Justice Roggensack's opinion is 
that it unreasonably presumes that all decisions to terminate a 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
20 
 
ministerial employee will implicate "religious controversies" 
regarding "matters of faith and ministry."  Justice Roggensack's 
opinion, ¶20.  It asserts, without reservation: "[I]nquiry into 
the validity of a religious institution's reasons for the firing 
of 
a 
ministerial 
employee 
will 
involve 
consideration 
of 
ecclesiastical decision-making."  Id., ¶29 (emphasis added).   
¶144 Yet, 
many 
decisions 
to 
terminate 
a 
ministerial 
employee are likely to be much more mundane.  In this very case, 
there is not at this point any allegation that DeBruin was 
terminated for an ecclesiastical or religious reason.     
¶145 In making its unsubstantiated assumption that all 
contract claims by ministers challenging their termination will 
involve entanglement in "matters of faith and ministry," Justice 
Roggensack's opinion overlooks Minker and Petruska, two cases 
that are directly on point.  Both cases thoroughly discuss the 
differences between statutory discrimination claims and contract 
claims and provide a reasoned explanation for why a contract 
claim would not violate the Free Exercise Clause but might 
ultimately implicate Establishment Clause concerns.14  Minker, 
894 F.2d at 1359-61; Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310-11.  Both cases 
explain that speculating on a motion to dismiss whether 
entanglements will arise is premature.  Minker, 894 F.2d at 
                                                 
14 By contrast, Justice Roggensack's opinion glosses over 
any distinction between statutory discrimination claims and 
contract claims with the conclusory assertion that "beginning 
with a contract analysis would cause a court to diminish the 
priority given to the policies that drive the First Amendment 
and would lead a court to err."  Justice Roggensack's opinion, 
¶26.    
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
21 
 
1360; Petruska, 462 F.3d at 311-12.  Both cases state that a 
determination about entanglement will depend upon the facts and 
allegations of the specific case, and that the case can be 
dismissed on summary judgment if and when entanglements arise.15  
¶146 Third, Justice Roggensack's opinion makes sweeping 
pronouncements that could extend far beyond the confines of this 
case.  These pronouncements are too absolute because they would 
preclude the enforcement of a mutually agreed upon contract.  
Further, if adopted by a majority of the court, they could have 
implications for a church's ability to contract in other 
settings.   
¶147 The 
opinion proclaims that "church decisions in 
matters of faith and ministry are so fundamental to the free 
exercise of religious liberty that civil courts are prohibited 
from delving into the reasons for religion-based decisions."  
Justice Roggensack's opinion, ¶20.  "Included within the 
decisions protected by the First Amendment," the opinion 
contends, "are the hiring and firing of ministerial employees."  
Id., ¶22.   
¶148 I read Justice Roggensack's bottom line as follows.  
Even if a church voluntarily enters into a contract limiting the 
church's options to terminate a ministerial employee, that 
                                                 
15  Justice Roggensack's opinion does not even attempt to 
distinguish these cases, except to note that they did not 
analyze 
the 
more 
protective 
language 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Id., ¶20 n.6.  Yet the bulk of the Justice 
Roggensack's 
analysis 
is 
based 
not 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, but rather, on federal case law interpreting the 
United States Constitution.    
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
22 
 
contract is unenforceable because it involves a "church decision 
in matters of faith and ministry."  See id., ¶¶20, 27-28.  In 
other words, a church's ability to arbitrarily fire ministers is 
so sacrosanct that the church cannot contract around it. 
¶149 If this rationale were correct, what other kinds of 
contracts involve "matters of faith and ministry" and would 
therefore be unenforceable in civil courts?  Justice Roggensack 
acknowledges that there are "matters for which a religious 
institution may contract that would be appropriate to enforce in 
the courts," but only those that do not involve "internal church 
decision[s] that affect[] the faith and mission of the church 
itself."  Id., ¶26 n.8.  The rule of law offered by Justice 
Roggensack appears to be incredibly broad.       
¶150 Such a broad rule of law would unquestionably harm 
those who enter into contracts with the church.  I conclude that 
it would likewise harm the church itself.  As discussed above, 
it is the certainty that a contract can be enforced in court 
that gives it value, and the freedom to contract rests on the 
assumption that valid contracts will be enforced.  Once that 
assumption is undermined, a contract is worth no more than the 
paper upon which it is printed.    
III 
 ¶151 
Finally, I turn to address the opinions offered 
by Justice Crooks and Justice Prosser.  They would decide this 
case based on an interpretation of the contract.  As a result, 
their 
opinions 
avoid 
making 
determinations 
about 
the 
constitutional issues raised in this appeal.  I appreciate the 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
23 
 
reluctance to unnecessarily decide issues of constitutional 
importance.  However, constitutional avoidance is not a good fit 
here, given that the basis of the motion before the circuit 
court, the circuit court's decision,16 the certification of the 
court of appeals, and the arguments advanced by the parties all 
involve constitutional issues.    
¶152 Nevertheless, both Justice Crooks and Justice Prosser 
avoid the issue before the court and adopt an interpretation of 
the contract.  Justice Crooks contends that the termination 
clause is illusory and therefore the entire contract is 
unenforceable.17  Justice Prosser contends that although the 
employment contract is enforceable as a whole, the termination 
clause is illusory because it promises nothing.   
¶153 I am not persuaded by their interpretations of the 
termination clause.  An important canon of construction is that 
courts should avoid interpretations of a contract term that 
render the promise unenforceable because it is illusory.  
                                                 
16 In 
passing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
commented 
that 
the 
termination clause might be illusory.  Nevertheless, the circuit 
court did not base its dismissal of DeBruin's claims on an 
interpretation of the termination clause.  It expressly stated 
that its decision to dismiss was not based on the contract, and 
that any remarks about the contract would be "just surplusage."  
Under the circuit court's interpretation of Coulee, it could not 
"make further inquiry" into the meaning of the contract.  "I 
don't think I get that far," the court explained. 
17 In Devine v. Notter, 2008 WI App 87, ¶4, 312 Wis. 2d 521, 
753 N.W.2d 557, the court of appeals explained that "[a]n 
illusory promise is a promise in form only: one that its maker 
can keep without subjecting him- or herself to any detriment or 
restriction.  An archetypal example of an illusory promise is 
the statement that 'I promise to do as you ask if I please to do 
so when the time arrives.'" 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
24 
 
Instead, courts bend over backwards to give contract terms 
meaning.  See Variance, Inc. v. Losinske, 71 Wis. 2d 31, 36-37, 
237 N.W.2d 22 (1976) ("This court must assume that the parties 
attempted to enter into a legal and enforceable contract, and an 
interpretation favoring legality and enforceability should be 
adopted.").18 
¶154 I conclude that there is an alternative interpretation 
of the termination clause that would give it meaning.  The 
contract does not provide that DeBruin can be terminated for 
"any cause, as determined by the Parish."  Instead, it provides 
that she "shall not be discharged . . . without good and 
sufficient cause, which shall be determined by the PARISH."   
¶155 In the context of a decision to terminate an employee, 
the phrase "good and sufficient" cause is defined in Wisconsin's 
common law to mean an employee's failure to perform duties under 
                                                 
18 See also Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 455, 
459 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Retail Clerks Local 455 v. NLRB, 510 
F.2d 802, 806 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (referencing the "settled 
rule of contract interpretation that contract language should 
not be interpreted to render the contract promise illusory or 
meaningless."); Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408 (1977) 
("Since a general rule of construction presumes the legality and 
enforceability of contracts, ambiguously worded contracts should 
not be interpreted to render them illegal and unenforceable 
where the wording lends itself to a logically acceptable 
construction that renders them legal and enforceable."); Gibson 
v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th 
Cir. 1997) ("Indiana courts will not find that there was a lack 
of obligation on the part of one party when 'a reasonable and 
logical interpretation will render the contract valid and 
enforceable.'"); Bank of N. Carolina, N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 
570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1978) ("A construction that will 
sustain an instrument will be preferred to one that will defeat 
it.") 
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
25 
 
the contract.  See Millar v. Joint School Dist. No. 2, 2 
Wis. 2d 303, 312, 86 N.W.2d 355 (1957) (holding that a school 
board could dismiss a teacher "before the expiration of his term 
of service for good and sufficient cause.  If a teacher fails to 
perform his duties under his contract, the board may discharge 
him from further service."); see also Kernz v. J.L. French 
Corp., 2003 WI App 140, ¶12, 266 Wis. 2d 124, 667 N.W.2d 751 
(asserting that Millar provided a common law definition of "good 
and sufficient cause."). 
¶156 It should be unsurprising that the contract gives the 
termination decision to St. Patrick.  After all, it always falls 
to the employer, rather than the employee, to decide whether an 
employee will be terminated.  The fact that the termination 
clause gives St. Patrick the right to decide whether there is 
"good and sufficient cause" does not necessarily render that 
clause illusory.   
¶157 Instead, it can be interpreted as an agreement that 
St. Patrick will evaluate the facts to determine whether the 
common law definition of "good and sufficient cause" has been 
met when making a termination decision.  That is, under this 
alternative interpretation, St. Patrick must determine whether 
DeBruin "fail[ed] to perform [her] duties under the contract," 
and it will not terminate her unless the answer is yes.19  
¶158 Both Justice Crooks and Justice Prosser fail to 
address the common law definition of the contract phrase "good 
                                                 
19 Because there is no factual development on this issue at 
this point in the litigation, we cannot know why DeBruin was 
terminated.   
No.  2010AP2705.awb 
 
26 
 
and sufficient cause."  This common law definition presents a 
reasonable alternative interpretation that should be considered, 
particularly in light of the principle that courts should 
"assume that the parties attempted to enter into a legal and 
enforceable contract" and adopt "an interpretation favoring 
legality and enforceability."   See Variance, 71 Wis. 2d at 36-
37. 
¶159 In sum, I would deny the motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim.  At this stage, it is premature to determine 
whether the claims foster excessive entanglement with religion.  
Unlike the several opinions above, I would remand for further 
proceedings.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶160 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
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