Title: SCOTT M CAIN V WASTE MANAGEMENT INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125111
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 3, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 3, 2005 
SCOTT M. CAIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125111 
AFTER REMAND 
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
SCOTT M. CAIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125180 
AFTER REMAND 
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFTER REMAND  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR C.J.    
At issue in this worker’s compensation case is whether 
a worker must suffer an actual amputation of a limb or body 
part in order to qualify for either specific loss benefits 
(also described as scheduled loss benefits) or total and 
permanent disability benefits. 
We hold that specific loss 
benefits under MCL 418.361(2) do not require an amputation. 
It is sufficient to qualify for such benefits if the limb 
or body part has lost its usefulness. 
Regarding total and 
permanent disability benefits under MCL 418.361(3)(b), 
which covers the loss of both legs, as with specific loss, 
if the legs have lost their usefulness, even though not 
amputated, the worker qualifies for total and permanent 
disability benefits. 
We therefore affirm the decisions of 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
and 
the 
Worker’s 
Compensation 
Appellate Commission (WCAC). 
BACKGROUND 
This case was previously before us in Cain v Waste 
Mgt, Inc, 465 Mich 509, 513; 638 NW2d 98 (2002) (Cain I), 
where we summarized the facts describing plaintiff’s 
injuries as follows: 
Plaintiff Scott M. Cain worked as a truck 
driver and trash collector for defendant, Waste
Management, Inc. In October 1988, as he was 
2 
 
                                                 
standing behind his vehicle emptying a rubbish
container, he was struck by an automobile that
crashed into the back of the truck. Mr. Cain’s 
legs 
were 
crushed. 
Physicians 
amputated 
Mr. 
Cain’s right leg above the knee. His left leg was
saved with extensive surgery and bracing. 
In February 1990, Mr. Cain was fitted with a
right leg prosthesis, and he was able to begin
walking. He returned to his employment at Waste
Management 
and 
started 
performing 
clerical 
duties. 
Mr. 
Cain’s 
left 
leg 
continued 
to 
deteriorate. In October 1990, he suffered a 
distal tibia fracture. Doctors diagnosed it as a
stress fracture caused by preexisting weakness
from the injury sustained in the accident. After
extensive physical therapy and further surgery on
his left knee, Mr. Cain was able to return to
Waste Management in August 1991, first working as
a dispatcher and then in the sales department. 
Waste Management voluntarily paid Mr. Cain
215 weeks of worker’s compensation benefits for
the 
specific 
loss 
of 
his 
right 
leg. 
MCL 
418.361(2)(k). However, there was disagreement
concerning whether he was entitled to additional
benefits. 
To understand the benefits that are at issue, it is 
necessary to review several sections of the Worker’s 
Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. 
Specific loss benefits are payable under MCL 418.361(2)(k) 
to an employee “for the loss of” a leg.1
 Total and 
1 The full text of MCL 418.361(2) reads: 
In cases included in the following schedule,
the disability in each case shall be considered
to continue for the period specified, and the
compensation paid for the personal injury shall
be 80% of the after-tax average weekly wage 
(continued…)
3 
 
                                                 
(…continued)
subject to the maximum and minimum rates of 
compensation under this act for the loss of the
following: 
(a) Thumb, 65 weeks. 
(b) First finger, 38 weeks. 
(c) Second finger, 33 weeks. 
(d) Third finger, 22 weeks. 
(e) Fourth finger, 16 weeks. 
The loss of the first phalange of the thumb,
or of any finger, shall be considered to be equal
to the loss of ½ of that thumb or finger, and
compensation shall be ½ of the amount above 
specified. 
The loss of more than 1 phalange shall be
considered as the loss of the entire finger or
thumb. The amount received for more than 1 finger
shall not exceed the amount provided in this
schedule for the loss of a hand. 
(f) Great toe, 33 weeks. 
(g) A toe other than the great toe, 11
weeks. 
The loss of the first phalange of any toe
shall be considered to be equal to the loss of ½
of that toe, and compensation shall be ½ of the
amount above specified. 
The loss of more than 1 phalange shall be
considered as the loss of the entire toe. 
(h) Hand, 215 weeks. 
(i) Arm, 269 weeks. 
An amputation between the elbow and wrist
that is 6 or more inches below the elbow shall be 
considered a hand, and an amputation above that
point shall be considered an arm. 
(continued…)
4 
 
                                                 
permanent disability benefits are payable “[w]hile the 
incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is 
total,” MCL 418.351(1), and MCL 418.361(3) defines what 
“total and permanent disability” means.2
 Of particular 
(…continued)
(j) Foot, 162 weeks. 
(k) Leg, 215 weeks. 
An amputation between the knee and foot 7 or
more inches below the tibial table (plateau)
shall be considered a foot, and an amputation
above that point shall be considered a leg. 
(l) Eye, 162 weeks. 
Eighty percent loss of vision of 1 eye shall
constitute the total loss of that eye. 
2 The subsection reads in full: 
Total and permanent disability, compensation
for which is provided in section 351 means: 
(a) Total and permanent loss of sight of
both eyes. 
(b) Loss of both legs or both feet at or
above the ankle. 
(c) Loss of both arms or both hands at or 
above the wrist. 
(d) Loss of any 2 of the members or 
faculties in subdivisions (a), (b), or (c). 
(e) Permanent and complete paralysis of both
legs or both arms or of 1 leg and 1 arm. 
(f) Incurable insanity or imbecility. 
(g) Permanent and total loss of industrial 
use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1
leg 
and 
1 
arm; 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
this 
(continued…)
5 
 
 
                                                 
relevance here are two of the definitions of total and 
permanent disability found in MCL 418.361(3)(b), “Loss of 
both legs or both feet at or above the ankle,” and MCL 
418.361(3)(g), “Permanent and total loss of industrial use 
of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm 
. . . .” 
In Cain I, we determined that because Mr. Cain had a 
brace on his left leg that enabled him to return to work, 
he had not lost industrial use of both legs, as required by 
MCL 418.361(3)(g).3  We noted there is a difference between 
specific loss and loss of industrial use, and we “adopt[ed] 
as our own” the analysis of the WCAC in its April 1997 
opinion. 
Cain I, supra at 521. 
In accord with that 
analysis, we held that the “corrected” standard applies to 
claims for permanent and total loss of industrial use under 
MCL 418.361(3)(g), and we remanded to the WCAC “to consider 
plaintiff’s specific loss claim.” 
Cain I, supra at 524. 
On remand, the WCAC determined actual amputation is 
unnecessary to qualify for specific loss benefits and, 
(…continued)
subdivision such permanency shall be determined
not less than 30 days before the expiration of
500 weeks from the date of injury. 
3 The reader is directed to Cain I for a full 
discussion of the procedural history of the case to that
(continued…) 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
because plaintiff’s leg is essentially useless, his injury 
“equated with anatomical loss.” 
The WCAC cited as 
authority Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, 381 Mich 99; 158 NW2d 874 
(1968), and Tew v Hillsdale Tool & Mfg Co, 142 Mich App 29; 
369 NW2d 254 (1985). Both are cases in which specific loss 
claims were allowed where there had been a loss of use, but 
not an anatomical loss. 
The WCAC then concluded without 
further explanation that “[h]aving shown specific loss of 
each leg, plaintiff is entitled to total and permanent 
disability benefits.” 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
majority, citing Pipe v Leese Tool & Die Co, 410 Mich 510; 
302 NW2d 526 (1981), affirmed the decision of the WCAC. 
259 Mich App 350; 674 NW2d 383 (2003). 
It concluded that 
each of plaintiff’s legs qualified for specific loss 
benefits (one through amputation and one through lost 
industrial use), and that these losses, when considered 
together, 
equaled 
a 
“loss 
of 
both 
legs” 
under 
MCL 
418.361(3)(b), thus entitling plaintiff to total and 
permanent disability benefits. 
Both the defendant employer and the Second Injury Fund 
sought leave to appeal. 
We granted both applications for 
leave, ordering the appeals to be argued and submitted 
(…continued) 
point, including details of the opinions of the magistrate, 
the WCAC, and the Court of Appeals.  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
together. 470 Mich 870 (2004). We directed the parties in 
both appeals to include among the issues to be briefed 
whether the “loss of industrial use” standard may be 
applied to claims of specific loss under MCL 418.361(2) and 
whether Pipe, supra, should be overruled. 
We further 
directed the parties in Docket No. 125180 to address the 
issues whether the WCAC exceeded the scope of this Court’s 
remand order by awarding plaintiff total and permanent 
disability 
benefits 
and 
whether 
total 
and 
permanent 
disability benefits under MCL 418.361(3)(b)(loss of both 
legs) may be awarded on the basis of plaintiff’s specific 
(anatomical) loss of one leg and his specific (industrial 
use) loss of the other leg. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo questions of law in worker’s 
compensation cases. 
Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co, 462 Mich 691, 697 n 3; 614 NW2d 607 (2000). 
Entitlement to worker’s compensation benefits must be 
determined by reference to the statutory language creating 
those benefits. Nulf v Browne-Morse Co, 402 Mich 309, 312; 
262 NW2d 664 (1978). As we have noted in the past, when we 
construe a statute, our primary goal is to give effect to 
the intent of the Legislature and our first step in that 
process is to review the language of the statute itself. 
In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 
8  
 
   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
164 (1999). 
The Legislature has specified the proper 
approach to construing statutory language, saying in MCL 
8.3a: 
All words and phrases shall be construed and
understood according to the common and approved
usage of the language; but technical words and
phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar
and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be
construed 
and 
understood 
according 
to 
such 
peculiar and appropriate meaning.[4] 
ANALYSIS: SPECIFIC LOSS 
We turn first to the question of specific loss and 
therefore focus our analysis on MCL 418.361(2). The loss 
provision of this section repeatedly has been held to be 
intended to compensate workers who have suffered one of the 
losses enumerated in this provision, regardless of the 
effect on the worker’s earning capacity.5 
Cain I, supra at 
524; Redfern v Sparks-Withington Co, 403 Mich 63, 80-81; 
268 NW2d 28 (1978). 
This means if a worker, for example, 
loses an arm, thumb, finger, leg, or so on in a workplace 
4 However, when a statute specifically defines a given
term, that definition alone controls. 
WS Butterfield 
Theatres, Inc v Dep’t of Revenue, 353 Mich 345; 91 NW2d 269
(1958). 
5 We note that MCL 418.354(16), in providing for
coordination 
of 
social 
security 
and 
other 
benefits,
recognizes this principle, stating in part, “It is the
intent of the legislature that, because benefits under
section 361(2) and (3) are benefits which recognize human
factors substantially in addition to the wage loss concept,
coordination 
of 
benefits 
should 
not 
apply 
to 
such 
benefits.” 
9  
 
 
 
 
injury, specific loss benefits, as set forth in the 
schedule, will be awarded even if no time is missed from 
work. 
At issue here is whether a limb (here, a leg), 
crushed but not severed, is to be treated as lost, thus 
entitling the injured worker to specific loss benefits. 
Defendants argue that the word “loss” unambiguously 
means 
“amputation,” 
especially 
in 
the 
context 
of 
§ 
361(2)(k), which expressly mentions amputation.  As they 
argue it, amputation is required because MCL 418.361(2)(k) 
provides benefits for the loss of a leg by stating: 
Leg, 215 weeks. 
An amputation between the knee and foot
7 or more inches below the tibial table 
(plateau) shall be considered a foot, and an
amputation 
above 
that 
point 
shall 
be 
 
considered a leg.  
Thus, defendants assert that the amputation language,  
at least regarding legs, limits the word “loss” in the 
statute to mean that only amputations are compensable. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, while agreeing that the 
statute is unambiguous, argues that defendants’ approach is 
flawed because it disregards the original meaning of the 
specific loss provisions when the WDCA was enacted almost a 
century ago in favor of a modern perception of the word’s 
meaning. 
The original meaning, plaintiff asserts, is 
controlling because, although the statute has been amended 
many times since its enactment in 1912, the word “loss” has 
10  
 
 
 
 
remained unchanged and without express qualifications or 
limitations. 
Plaintiff analogizes our task in determining 
the meaning of “loss” to that which we undertook in Title 
Office, Inc v Van Buren Co Treasurer, 469 Mich 516, 522; 
676 NW2d 207 (2004), where we determined what the plain and 
ordinary meaning of “transcript” was in 1895. 
This 
analytical approach of plaintiff is sound. 
Because the 
statute itself does not define “loss,” we agree with 
plaintiff that we must ascertain the original meaning the 
word “loss” had when the statute was enacted in 1912. 
“When determining the common, ordinary meaning of a 
word or phrase, consulting a dictionary is appropriate.” 
Title Office, Inc, supra at 522. 
In the dictionaries from 
the era of the original legislation, the definition of 
“loss” is fairly broad: “Perdition, ruin, destruction; the 
condition or fact of being ‘lost,’ destroyed, or ruined,” 
New English Dictionary (1908); “State or fact of being lost 
or destroyed; ruin; destruction; perdition; as Loss of a 
vessel at sea,” Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of the 
English Language (1921); “Failure to hold, keep, or 
preserve what one has had in his possession; disappearance 
from possession, use, or knowledge; deprivation of that 
which one has had: as, the loss of money by gaming, loss of 
health or reputation, loss of children: opposed to gain,” 
Century Dictionary and Cylopedia (1911). 
From this we can 
11  
 
 
 
                                                 
see that severance is but one way a loss may occur; loss 
also occurs when something is destroyed, ruined, or when it 
disappears from use. 
We conclude that amputation is not 
required in order for a person to have suffered the loss of 
a specified body part. 
Having ascertained the commonly understood meaning of 
the word “loss,” our substantive analysis of its definition 
is complete. 
Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 
594, 597; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). 
Our conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that the same meaning for the word 
“loss” is found in the cases construing late nineteenth­
century private liability insurance plans for the aid of 
injured workers that were, in part, the models for the 
body-part 
loss 
provisions 
of 
our 
first 
worker’s 
compensation 
act. 
When, 
in 
special 
session, 
the 
Legislature in 1912 passed that first act, known as 
Michigan’s 
“Workmen’s 
Compensation 
Act,”6 
it 
was 
the 
culmination of the efforts of the five-person Employers’ 
Liability and Workmen’s Compensation Commission appointed 
by Governor Chase S. Osborn in 1911.7 The commission had 
been formed because of what was described at the time as 
6 1912 (1st Ex Sess) PA 10.  
7 1911 PA 245.  
12  
 
 
                                                 
 
“wide dissatisfaction” with the employer’s liability at 
common law for injuries suffered by his employees. 
Report 
of the Employers’ Liability and Workmen’s Compensation 
Commission of the State of Michigan, 5 (1911) (Report). 
The commission was directed to “investigate and report a 
plan for legislative action to provide compensation for 
accidental injuries or death arising out of and in the 
course of employment . . . .” 
Id. 
In its report, the 
commission, after concluding that the existing negligence­
based 
system 
(1) 
failed 
to 
sufficiently 
encourage 
prevention of accidents, (2) did not protect employers 
against excessive verdicts, (3) resulted in inadequate 
compensation for injured workers, and (4) engendered 
animosity and strife, recommended a statute based on 
similar 
provisions 
already 
enacted 
in 
Massachusetts, 
Wisconsin, and New Jersey.8  The Legislature, with very few 
8 These in turn were modeled after European laws that
first appeared in the mid-1800s and that were well 
established by the end of that century, swept along by
massive industrialization occurring at the same time 
throughout Europe. 
Harger, Worker’s compensation, a brief
history,  (accessed December
22, 2004). 
In this country, the first constitutional
worker’s compensation law was the 1908 Employer’s Liability
Acts, 45 USC 51-60. 
In 1911, the first states followed,
and by 1913, twenty-three states had comparable laws. 
Harger, supra. 
By 1948, all the states had at least some
form of worker’s compensation, including the territories of
Alaska and Hawaii. Harger, supra. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
changes to the recommended language, briskly enacted this 
proposal as Michigan’s workmen’s compensation act less than 
three weeks after the bill was introduced. 
1912 (1st Ex 
Sess) Journal of the House 13, 149-150. 
In dealing with what today is described as total and 
permanent disability, the 1912 statute stated in § 9: 
While the incapacity for work resulting from
the injury is total, the employer shall pay, or
cause to be paid as hereinafter provided, to the
injured employee a weekly compensation equal to
one-half his average weekly wages, but not more
than ten dollars nor less than four dollars a 
week; and in no case shall the period covered by
such compensation be greater than five hundred
weeks, 
nor 
shall 
the 
total 
amount 
of 
all 
compensation exceed four thousand dollars. [1912
(1st Ex Sess) PA 10, part II, § 9.] 
In dealing with partial incapacity, the statute stated 
at § 10: 
While the incapacity for work resulting from
the injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or
cause to be paid as hereinafter provided, to the
injured employee a weekly compensation equal to
one-half 
the 
difference 
between 
his 
average
weekly wages before the injury and the average 
weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter,
but not more than ten dollars a week; and in no 
case 
shall 
the 
period 
covered 
by 
such 
compensation be greater than three hundred weeks
from the date of the injury. In cases included by
the following schedule the disability in each
such case shall be deemed to continue for the 
period specified, and the compensation so paid
for such injury shall be as specified therein, to
wit: 
* * * 
14  
 
 
     
                                                 
For the loss of a leg, fifty per centum of
average weekly wages during one hundred and 
seventy-five weeks. 
[1912 (1st Ex Sess) PA 10,
part II, § 10.] 
Section 9 allowed wage-based benefits to be paid to 
workers 
who 
were 
totally 
incapacitated 
from 
work, 
regardless of the type of work-related injury that caused 
the incapacity, while § 10 provided for benefits when the 
worker was partially incapacitated. 
Moreover, the latter 
part of § 10, with its schedule of benefits for specific 
losses, allowed a set amount of weeks that benefits would 
be awarded when a worker suffered one of the specific 
injuries described. 
In doing so, it was intentionally 
patterned after the specific loss provisions of the above­
referenced employers’ private liability insurance plans, 
which were designed to provide benefits to workers injured 
on the job. Report, supra.9 
9 The commission’s report even included in its appendix
the text of two plans “typical” at the time. 
Report,
supra, Appendix VII, 143-146. 
The “Benefit and Relief 
Plans of the Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company” provided: 
In addition to the monthly benefit payments, other
amounts are paid for certain serious injuries, as follows: 
Loss of one arm, leg or eye, $166.66. 
Loss of both arms, legs or eyes, $500. 
Similarly, the “Benefit and Relief Plans of the Oliver
Iron Mining Company” provided: 
(continued…)
15 
 
                                                 
The cases construing such insurance policies in that 
era, from Michigan and elsewhere, unmistakably indicate 
that the word “loss,” just as it did in dictionaries of the 
time, meant not just severance or amputation but also the 
destruction of the usefulness of the member. 
In Michigan, 
our Court in Fuller v Locomotive Engineers’ Mut Life & 
Accident Ins Ass’n, 122 Mich 548, 553; 81 NW 326 (1899), 
construing the specific loss provision in an insurance 
policy, said just this, indicating that 
where an insurance policy insures against the
loss of a member, or the loss of an entire
member, the word “loss” should be construed to
mean the destruction of the usefulness of the 
member, or the entire member, for the purposes to
which, 
in 
its 
normal 
condition, 
it 
was 
susceptible of application. 
(…continued) 
The following injuries have specified amounts, and
others in proportion to these injuries: 
(a) For the loss of a hand, twelve months’ wages. 
(b) For the loss of an arm, eighteen months’ wages. 
(c) For the loss of a foot, nine months’ wages. 
(d) For the loss of a leg, twelve months’ wages. 
(e) For the loss of one eye, six months’ wages. 
Sections 9 and 10 of the 1912 act incorporated
language similar to these insurance plans. 
16  
 
 
 
Simply stated, under such a policy in Michigan, no 
amputation was necessary for a loss. The rationale for not 
limiting loss just to amputation was the understanding by 
this Court and, as we will explain, by other American 
courts that the term “loss” in such policies should be 
given its ordinary and popular meaning, which was broad 
enough to include loss of usefulness. 
As the Missouri Supreme Court said on this topic, the 
word “loss” in insurance policies “was used in its ordinary 
and popular sense and [did] not mean that there should be a 
total destruction of the [member], anatomically speaking, 
but that the loss of the use of it for the purposes to 
which [the member] is adapted would be a loss of it 
. . . .” 
Sisson v Supreme Court of Honor, 104 Mo App 54, 
60; 78 SW 297 (1904). 
The Kansas Supreme Court stated it 
similarly: “The loss of a member of the body, as used in an 
accident insurance policy, unless restricted or modified by 
other language, carries the common meaning of the term 
‘loss,’ which is the loss of the beneficial use of the 
member. Obviously this may occur when there is not a 
complete severance of the member from the body.” 
Noel v 
Continental Cas Co, 138 Kan 136, 139; 23 P2d 610 (1933). 
The Kansas court then reinforced its holding by citing 
thirteen cases from ten other states from the late 
17  
 
 
   
  
                                                 
 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, holding to the 
same effect.10 
Also buttressing our analysis is that, in the early 
years of the act’s existence, the decisions of the 
Industrial Accident Board (IAB), the WCAC’s predecessor, 
also construed “loss” as defined in the dictionary. 
That 
is consistent with its commonly understood meaning. 
This 
is consequential because half of the four IAB board members 
had 
served 
on 
Governor 
Osborn’s 
commission 
and 
had 
recommended the very “loss” language we are considering.11 
We find the interpretation these board members gave to the 
statute useful in the same way that the comments of 
10 Travelers’ Ins Co v Richmond, 284 SW 698 (Tex Civ
App, 1926); Continental Cas Co v Linn, 226 Ky 328; 10 SW2d
1079 (1928); Jones v Continental Cas Co, 189 Iowa 678; 179
NW 203 (1920); Locomotive Engineers’ Mut Life & Accident
Ins Co v Meeks, 157 Miss 97; 127 So 699 (1930); Moore v 
Aetna Life Ins Co, 75 Or 47; 146 P 151 (1915); Bowling v 
Life Ins Co of Virginia, 39 Ohio App 491; 177 NE 531
(1930); Citizens’ Mut Life Ass’n v Kennedy, 57 SW2d 265
(Tex Civ App, 1933); Sneck v Travelers’ Ins Co, 88 Hun 94;
34 NYS 545 (1895); Sheanon v Pacific Mut Life Ins Co, 77
Wis 618; 46 NW 799 (1890); Lord v American Mut Accident 
Ass’n, 89 Wis 19; 61 NW 293 (1894); Berset v New York Life 
Ins Co, 175 Minn 210; 220 NW 561 (1928); Sisson v Supreme 
Court of Honor, 104 Mo App 54; 78 SW 297 (1904); Int’l 
Travelers’ Ass’n v Rogers, 163 SW 421 (Tex Civ App, 1914). 
11 Richard L. Drake was its first secretary and Ora E.
Reaves was one of three board commissioners. 
Reaves 
remained on the board until at least 1920. 
Michigan
Official Directory and Legislative Manual, 1913-1914, 1915­
1916, 1917-1918, and 1919-1920. 
18  
 
 
 
                                                 
drafting committees can be “useful interpretive aids” for 
construing statutes. 
See Gladych, supra at 601 n 4. The 
IAB, in Lardie v Grand Rapids Show Case Co, 1916 Workmen’s 
Compensation Cases 17, 19, in discussing loss, stated that 
“courts have uniformly construed provisions of accident 
policies insuring against the loss of a member, to cover 
cases where the usefulness of the member was destroyed by 
accident without resulting in severance or amputation.” 
Id., citing Fuller, supra at 553. 
Similarly, that “loss” 
in the context of worker’s compensation specific loss 
benefits did not mean only amputations, but also included 
loss of usefulness, was indicated by the IAB’s decisions in 
an unnamed case cited in Industrial Accident Bd, Bulletin 
No 3, 13 (1913);12 Rider v C H Little Co, Industrial 
12 The board stated in that case: 
The action of the surgeon in amputating a 
finger, or in failing to amputate it, or in
choosing 
the 
point 
of 
amputation 
is 
not 
controlling in all cases of this kind. Each case 
depends for its decision upon the particular
facts relating to the finger, and these might
relate to the point of amputation, or the fact
that the finger or a portion thereof had been
rendered useless without being amputated. . . .
The Board is further of the opinion that in case
no part of the finger is amputated and the injury
is such as to entirely destroy the usefulness of
the first phalange or the entire finger, in that
event the injured person has lost the first 
phalange or the finger, as the case may be, as
completely as if the same had been amputated. 
19  
 
                                                 
Accident Bd, supra at 27, 29 (1913); Hirschkorn v Fiege 
Desk Co, 184 Mich 239; 150 NW 851 (1915); Purdy v Sault Ste 
Marie, 188 Mich 573, 579; 155 NW 597 (1915); Cline v 
Studebaker Corp, 189 Mich 514; 155 NW 519 (1915); Lardie, 
supra; Carpenter v Detroit Forging Co, 191 Mich 45; 157 NW 
374 (1916); Packer v Olds Motor Works, 195 Mich 497; 162 NW 
80 (1917); Adomites v Royal Furniture Co, 196 Mich 498; 162 
NW 965 (1917). 
The same can be seen in large part 
in this Court’s 
jurisprudence of the time. For example, in Purdy, supra at 
579, the Court affirmed the IAB’s specific loss award for a 
crushed leg.13  In Lovalo v Michigan Stamping Co, 202 Mich 
85, 89; 167 NW 904 (1918), the Court held that the claimant 
had suffered the loss of his hand where four fingers and 
nearly all the palm were amputated, saying that “the loss 
of all the palm and all of the fingers of the hand could 
. . . be reasonably considered the loss of the entire 
hand.” 
Indeed, the only expressly contrary case in this 
era is Wilcox v Clarage Foundry & Mfg Co, 199 Mich 79; 165 
NW 925 (1917), where the Court, in a case with difficult 
facts, determined that the specific loss provision required 
anatomical loss. 
The Wilcox Court made no effort to 
13 The IAB’s decision is at 1916 Workmen’s Compensation
Cases 65. 
20  
 
   
                                                 
reconcile its holding with the IAB’s clearly stated 
understanding of “loss,” nor with Fuller or Purdy, but 
analogized instead to cases where the plaintiffs had 
suffered partial losses and this Court had required proof 
of complete, rather than partial, loss.14  We conclude that, 
given its outlier status, as well as the fact that the 
construction it seeks to give to the term “loss” is 
inconsistent with the original meaning of “loss” in the 
act, Wilcox was incorrectly decided. 
Thus, we overrule 
Wilcox so that its potentially confusing shadow will be 
removed from our case law.15 
To summarize, then, regarding this issue of the 
definition of “loss”: the definition comes from its 
commonly understood meaning at the time of enactment. 
The 
contemporaneous uses of the word are corroborative and 
reinforcing of this definition. 
14 Even if those cases can be read as requiring
amputation, Wilcox was flawed in a broader sense by the
fact that, rather than tracing its rationale to the act
itself, it used as a template, as one might in a common-law
case, the prior cases construing the act. 
15 We are reinforced in our notion that Wilcox is 
aberrant by the fact that the Lovalo Court, in reaching a
holding contrary to Wilcox just one year later, left 
unaddressed the continuing strength of Wilcox, suggesting
that the Court considered it confined to its facts. 
21  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Defendants assert that, even given this conclusion, 
the 1927 amendments forever altered the definition of 
“loss.” In 1927, the Legislature, for the only time in the 
twentieth century, consequentially amended the specific 
loss section of the statute by adding to the provision 
regarding a leg the language: “An amputation between the 
knee and foot six or more inches below the knee shall be 
considered a foot, above this point a leg[.]”16  1927 PA 63. 
Keying off of this amendment, defendants urge that this 
language implicitly was designed to alter any previously 
broad understanding of the word “loss” so that after the 
amendment there could be no specific loss without an 
amputation. 
We think this explanation insufficiently 
appreciates that the amendment came in the wake of a series 
of cases where this Court had made debatable calls on the 
nature of the loss after an amputation.17  That is, at what 
16 Similarly, the amendment added to the provision for
an arm, “An amputation between the elbow and wrist 6 or
more inches below the elbow shall be considered a hand,
above this point an arm.” 
17 Stocin v C R Wilson Body Co, 205 Mich 1; 171 NW 352
(1919) (holding that a claimant had lost his arm, not just
his hand, where it was severed below the elbow and the
upper arm was atrophied), Curtis v Hayes Wheel Co, 211 Mich
260; 178 NW 675 (1920) (holding that the claimant had lost
just a foot where his amputation occurred four to five
inches below the knee), and Reno v Holmes, 238 Mich 572;
214 NW 174 (1927) (holding that a claimant had lost his
(continued…)
22 
 
 
 
                                                 
point on the limb had a loss become not just of a hand but 
of an arm, not just of a foot but of a leg? We believe the 
goal of the amendment was to bring certainty to this 
discrete 
set 
of 
determinations 
once 
there 
was 
an 
amputation. 
It is hard to conclude otherwise, given that 
the Legislature, in its amendment, did not expressly alter 
or redefine the word “loss” itself and especially given 
that word’s quite clear meaning in the dictionaries of the 
time as well as the above-referenced decisions of the IAB 
and 
this 
Court. 
Moreover, 
this 
Court’s 
leading 
postamendment decision in the 1930s on the issue of loss18 
is consistent with this understanding that the 1927 
amendment was not intended to reverse the holdings of the 
IAB and this Court on what is a loss. 
This dominant theme of our case law, that loss does 
not require amputation, can be seen throughout the mid­
century, albeit with some false starts.19
 Later in the 
(…continued) 
leg, not just his foot, where it was severed 5½ inches 
below the knee).  
18 See Rench v Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Co, 286 Mich
314; 282 NW 162 (1938), where the Court allowed an award
for loss of two hands where most of the plaintiff’s fingers
had been severed and he had suffered a total loss of use of 
both his hands. 
19 In the middle of the century, with Hlady v Wolverine
Bolt Co, 325 Mich 23; 37 NW2d 576 (1949), as well as Utter 
(continued…)
23 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
century, in Pipe v Leese Tool & Die Co, 410 Mich 510; 302 
NW2d 526 (1981), the Court correctly determined, consistent 
with the original understanding of the act and the earlier 
cases we have discussed, that amputation was not a 
prerequisite to a “loss.” 
Pipe, however, in a phrase used frequently in these 
cases, described this loss of usefulness as “loss of the 
industrial use . . . .” 
Id. at 527. The phrase “loss of 
industrial use” does not appear anywhere in the specific 
loss provisions, and seems to have been intended as 
judicial shorthand to describe the condition of the injured 
member from the standpoint of its use in employment. 
However, this description causes confusion because it does 
not adequately capture the proper standard, which is that 
specific loss is to be determined without reference to the 
plaintiff’s earning capacity or ability to return to work. 
That is, it is paid if the loss has been incurred and it is 
not relevant whether the worker can work after the loss. 
(…continued)
v Ottawa Metal Co, 326 Mich 450; 40 NW2d 218 (1949), and
Barnett v Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co, 328 Mich 37; 43 NW2d 55
(1950), this Court decided cases contrary to this original
understanding of the specific loss provisions. 
But these 
cases are inconsistent with the proper understanding of the
statute and we note that they were hesitatingly followed,
if at all, and Hlady was expressly overruled. 
Mitchell v 
Metal Assemblies, Inc, 379 Mich 368, 380; 151 NW2d 818
(1967). 
24  
 
  
 
                                                 
Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, 385 Mich 659; 189 
NW2d 304 (1971); Shumate v American Stamping Co, 357 Mich 
689; 99 NW2d 374 (1959). 
We believe it was this concept 
that the Pipe Court was attempting to articulate and we 
clarify by means of this opinion that holding. 
To be clear, we are endeavoring here not to craft a 
new standard, but to articulate clearly the standard 
enacted in 1912. 
We find that the original understanding 
the word “loss” carried when the WDCA was enacted was its 
plain and ordinary meaning, consistent with how it had been 
construed in the context of insurance law. 
Thus, “loss” 
includes not only amputation but also loss of usefulness.20 
It was the intent of the drafters to write into the statute 
a word that was expansive enough to cover both situations 
and the words and language they chose conveyed this. 
Moreover, in our case law, this Court has with considerable 
consistency, 
albeit 
not 
unfailingly, 
upheld 
this 
construction. 
We do so again today, believing as courts 
have before us that the meaning we give to the word “loss” 
in MCL 418.361(2) is the meaning originally intended. 
20 In Pipe, supra at 530, and again in Cain I, supra at 
524, we referred to this as anatomical loss or its 
equivalent. 
25  
 
 
Defendants’ approach would require us to ignore the 
statutory drafters’ and enactors’ turn-of-the-twentieth­
century understanding of the common and approved meaning of 
“loss” in favor of a purportedly different contemporary 
understanding, divorced from its roots. This we cannot do. 
We are not free to substitute any other nonstatutory 
definition 
of 
a 
word 
or 
term 
for 
the 
meaning 
it 
indisputably had in 1912, and has maintained for almost a 
century. This duty traces to the simple notion that we are 
to construe a statute “in the light of the circumstances 
existing at the date of its enactment, not in the light of 
subsequent developments. . . . ‘The words of a statute must 
be taken in the sense in which they were understood at the 
time when the statute was enacted.’” 
Wayne Co Bd of Rd 
Comm’rs v Wayne Co Clerk, 293 Mich 229, 235-236; 291 NW 879 
(1940), quoting 25 RCL, § 215, p 959. We therefore hold to 
the original meaning of the word “loss” in the specific 
loss provisions: it does not require severance and there 
can be a “loss” where the claimant suffers the loss of 
usefulness of the member. 
In addition, we conclude that the WCAC properly 
applied the “uncorrected” standard. 
We discussed in Cain 
I, supra at 521-523, the propriety of applying the 
“uncorrected” standard to specific loss claims and the 
26  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
“corrected” standard to total and permanent disability 
claims. We reaffirm that rule today. 
The WCAC found the damage to Mr. Cain’s left leg 
“equated with anatomical loss and that the limb retains no 
substantial utility.” 
The WCAC’s factual finding is, in 
essence, that he lost the usefulness of his leg. 
Because 
that factual finding is supported by competent evidence in 
the record, it must be affirmed. Mudel, supra at 701. The 
Court of Appeals erred when it grafted a loss of industrial 
use 
standard 
onto 
the 
factual 
findings 
of 
the 
administrative tribunal. 
Nonetheless, it reached the 
correct 
result 
with 
regard 
to 
plaintiff’s 
benefit 
eligibility. 
Accordingly, plaintiff is eligible for 
specific loss benefits for the loss of his left leg. 
ANALYSIS: TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY 
We next turn to analyze whether the WCAC correctly 
allowed plaintiff benefits under the total and permanent 
disability provisions, MCL 418.361(3). 
Our task in 
interpreting the Legislature’s work is, if possible, to 
read the seven eligibility requirements in § 361(3) so as 
to read none of them out or as an unnecessary duplication 
of another. 
In particular, we must endeavor to harmonize 
the three provisions concerning legs and to read them in a 
way that does not make any of the language surplusage. 
Jenkins v Patel, 471 Mich 158, 167; 684 NW2d 346 (2004); 
27  
 
                                                 
State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 
142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002). In short, we read the words 
in a statute together, to harmonize the meaning of the 
clauses and give effect to the whole. 
G C Timmis & Co v 
Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 421; 662 NW2d 710 (2003). 
Defendants argue that we cannot construe “[l]oss” in § 
361(3)(b) to mean less than amputation because then cases 
of lost industrial use would fall under both § 361(3)(b) 
and § 361(3)(g), rendering the latter surplusage. 
We 
disagree. 
We find the proper construction of the word 
“[l]oss” in § 361(3)(b) is that it has the same meaning 
given it in § 361(2).21  This conclusion is unsurprising, we 
believe, given the juxtaposition of §§ 361(2) and 361(3), 
which is itself a compelling reason to give them the same 
meaning. 
See, e.g., Sibley v Smith, 2 Mich 487, 491 
(1853). 
Furthermore, doing so, as we will explain, causes 
no part of § 361(3) to be duplicative or nugatory. Dealing 
with § 361(3)(b) first, we find that using this definition 
of loss means that benefits are payable under this section 
not only when there is anatomical loss, but also when the 
limbs have no practical usefulness. 
Section 361(3)(g), on 
the other hand, as we discussed in Cain I, with its 
21 We note that this meaning would also apply in §§
361(3)(c) and 361(3)(d). 
28  
 
reference to permanent and total loss of industrial use, 
calls the fact-finder to look to wage-earning capacity and 
the injured worker’s ability to function in industry. 
As 
is apparent, these words demand something distinct from 
§ 361(3)(b)’s simple inquiry regarding whether the legs or 
feet are amputated or have no practical usefulness. 
This 
means that what is covered under § 361(3)(b) may not be 
covered 
under 
§ 
361(3)(g). 
Stated 
more 
formally, 
§§ 361(3)(b) and 361(3)(g) cover different things and 
defining loss as we have here does not make either 
provision nugatory. 
An example may make this distinction 
clearer. 
If the legs are rendered useless but can be 
braced so as to make the performance of the job possible, 
there has been loss under § 361(3)(b) but no loss of 
industrial use under § 361(3)(g). This worker, indeed like 
Mr. Cain, would under this reading qualify for total and 
permanent disability benefits under § 361(3)(b) but not 
§ 361(3)(g).  Conversely, a worker whose legs have basic 
function, i.e., are practically useful, but whose legs have 
no industrial use even if braced (such as a ballerina), 
would qualify under § 361(3)(g) but not § 361(3)(b). 
These examples limn that the “corrected” standard does 
not apply to § 361(3)(b), unlike § 361(3)(g). 
The reason 
is, as we explained in Cain I, that § 361(3)(g), with its 
utilization of permanent and total loss language, compels a 
29  
 
     
 
                                                 
 
conclusion that if the condition is correctable, it is not 
permanent and total. 
Cain I, supra at 519-520. 
In fact, 
when this language appears elsewhere in § 361(3), such as 
in 
§§ 
361(3)(a) 
and 
361(3)(e), 
the 
doctrine 
of 
correctability also applies. 
Because there is no such 
permanent 
and 
total 
loss 
triggering 
language 
in 
§ 361(3)(b), it follows that the requirement of looking to 
correctability is absent.22 
In sum, Mr. Cain has clearly suffered the loss of his 
amputated right leg and the WCAC found that his left leg 
has “no substantial utility.” 
That is, his leg has no 
practical usefulness. 
Thus, he has suffered a “loss of 
both legs” and falls within § 361(3)(b), qualifying for an 
award of total and permanent disability benefits under that 
provision.23  Accordingly, the WCAC and the Court of Appeals 
decisions are affirmed.24 
22 Again, §§ 361(3)(c) and 361(3)(d) are similarly
worded. 
23 We have read the concurrence and, to preclude
potential confusion, only note that its conclusion is 
identical to ours. 
24 We also conclude that, although the WCAC made an
error of law in its interpretation of § 361(3)(b), it was
properly within its scope on remand to reach legal
conclusions based on its reassessment of the facts. 
Modreski v Gen Motors Corp, 417 Mich 323; 337 NW2d 231
(1983). 
While the WCAC was precluded from reaching a
(continued…)
30 
 
 
                                                 
CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, we find that Mr. Cain has suffered the 
specific loss of his left leg under MCL 418.361(2) and that 
he qualifies for an award of total and permanent disability 
benefits under MCL 418.361(3)(b). Therefore, we affirm the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the WCAC. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
(…continued)
decision contrary to that of this Court, Cain I did not 
address the question whether plaintiff had suffered total
and permanent disability under § 361(3)(b). 
Although the
WCAC’s determination on remand that he met the requirements
of § 361(3)(b) had the opposite outcome from its initial
determination that he was not qualified under § 361(3)(g),
its finding was based on a different legal theory. 
We 
conclude that it did not err in addressing legal questions
raised by its new factual determination. 
31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
SCOTT M. CAIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125111 
AFTER REMAND 
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
SCOTT M. CAIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125180 
AFTER REMAND 
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
AFTER REMAND 
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion and its 
conclusions that plaintiff suffered a specific loss of his 
left leg under MCL 418.361(2)(k) and that he qualifies for 
an award of total and permanent disability benefits under 
MCL 418.361(3)(b). 
The word “loss,” as used in both 
subsections of the statute, includes not only amputation 
but also those situations in which there is a loss of the 
usefulness of the limb or member.1
 As noted by Chief 
Justice 
Taylor, 
the 
Worker’s 
Compensation 
Appellate 
Commission (WCAC) essentially found that on these facts, 
plaintiff lost the usefulness of his left leg and that he 
accordingly was entitled to specific loss benefits for the 
loss of his left leg under MCL 418.361(2)(k). 
Ante at 27­
28. 
There is competent evidence to support the WCAC’s 
factual finding and we must defer to the WCAC on this 
finding. Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 
691, 703; 614 NW2d 607 (2000). 
Further, plaintiff has 
suffered a “[l]oss of both legs” under MCL 418.361(3)(b) 
because his right leg has been amputated and he has lost 
the usefulness of his left leg. 
Consequently, he is 
entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. 
1 Dictionary definitions of the word “loss” include:
“failure to preserve or maintain” and “destruction, ruin.”
Random House Webster’s New College Dictionary (1997). 
2  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
Therefore, I agree that the decisions of the WCAC and Court 
of Appeals should be affirmed.2 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
2 While I agree with some of the basic conclusions of
the majority, as should be evident from the fact that I am
concurring separately, I do not sign on to all of the
lengthy analysis on which the majority relies to support
its conclusions. 
3