Title: Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2021

Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Under New Jersey’s Worker’s Compensation Act, an employee injured during a social or recreational activity generally cannot receive compensation for those injuries unless a two-part exception is met. Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the injuries sustained by claimant Kim Goulding at an event hosted by her employer were compensable. The workers’ compensation court dismissed Goulding’s claim, determining that "Family Fun Day" was a social or recreational event and that the two-part test of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was not satisfied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the injury Goulding sustained while volunteering at her employer-sponsored event was compensable because, as to Goulding, the event was not a social or recreational activity. Even if N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was applicable here, Goulding would still have satisfied the two-part exception set forth in that statute. Her role at the event, which was planned to be held annually, was the same as her role as an employee, and but for her employment at Friendship House, Goulding would not have been asked to volunteer and would not have been injured. Thus, Goulding’s injury was “a regular incident of employment.” Furthermore, the Court found Friendship House received a benefit from Family Fun Day “beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” The event was not a closed event for the Friendship House team. Rather, it was an outreach event to celebrate and benefit Friendship House’s clients, creating goodwill in the community. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Kim Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc. (A-48-19) (083726)Argued October 13, 2020 -- Decided February 8, 2021FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. Under New Jersey’s Worker’s Compensation Act, an employee injured during a social or recreational activity generally cannot receive compensation for those injuries unless a two-part exception is met. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. In this case, the Court considers whether the injuries sustained by claimant Kim Goulding at an event hosted by her employer are compensable. Goulding was an employee of North Jersey Friendship House, Inc. (Friendship House), a non-profit organization that assists individuals with developmental disabilities. She worked Monday through Friday as a chef/cook, and her responsibilities included cooking meals for, and teaching vocational classes to, Friendship House’s clients. On a Saturday in September 2017, Friendship House hosted its first ever “Family Fun Day,” which it planned to hold as an annual event moving forward. The event was designed to provide a safe and fun environment with recreational activities for the clients of Friendship House and their families. Friendship House employees were asked to volunteer to work the event, but there were no consequences for those who did not. Goulding volunteered to work the event as a cook, her normal job at Friendship House. On the day of the event, Goulding set up breakfast. While later preparing for lunch, she stepped in a pothole and fell down, injuring her ankle. Goulding continued to help the other cooks prepare lunch while keeping her foot iced and elevated. She left in the afternoon and did not participate in any of the games or activities at the event. Goulding filed a claim for worker’s compensation and benefits. Friendship House maintained that Goulding was not entitled to relief because she was not working for Friendship House when the injury occurred. The workers’ compensation court dismissed Goulding’s claim, determining that Family Fun Day was a social or recreational event and that the two-part test of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was not satisfied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court granted certification. 241 N.J. 66 (2020). 1 HELD: The injury sustained by Kim Goulding while volunteering at her employer- sponsored event is compensable because, as to Goulding, the event was not a social or recreational activity. Even if N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was applicable here, Goulding would still have satisfied the two-part exception set forth in that statute. Her role at the event, which was planned to be held annually, was the same as her role as an employee, and but for her employment at Friendship House, Goulding would not have been asked to volunteer and would not have been injured. Thus, Goulding’s injury was “a regular incident of employment.” See ibid. Additionally, Friendship House received a benefit from Family Fun Day “beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” See ibid. The event was not a closed event for the Friendship House team. Rather, it was an outreach event to celebrate and benefit Friendship House’s clients, creating goodwill in the community.1. The Worker’s Compensation Act is humane social legislation that is liberally construed to implement the legislative policy of affording coverage to as many workers as possible. Originally, the Act did not mention “recreational or social activities,” and compensability depended instead on whether accidents arose “out of and in the course of employment.” In Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., the Court found that injuries sustained during a lunchtime softball game were compensable because the employer “approved and encouraged” the game, which quickly “became a customary” activity and “was thereafter as incidental to the employment” as lunch, coffee or cigarette breaks. 28 N.J. 582, 593 (1959). And in Complitano v. Steel & Alloy Tank Co., , the Court found compensable an injury sustained in an after-hours, off-premises softball game, where the employer’s sponsorship of the team was “substantially motivated” by the “intangible benefit[s]” the company received such as “promotion of the company’s good name before the general public” and “heightened prestige and civic status” in the community. See 34 N.J. 300 (adopting 63 N.J. Super. 444, 467, 469 (Conford, J.A.D., dissenting)). (pp. 11-15)2. Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, added to the Act in 1979, an injury “arising out of and in the course of employment” is not compensable if it is sustained during “recreational or social activities” unless a two-part exception applies. Accordingly, when an employer defends against a claim by asserting that the employee was injured during a “recreational or social activit[y,]” a court must first consider whether the activity was, in fact, “recreational or social” within the meaning of the statute. If the activity was not recreational or social in nature, then the employer may not invoke that exception to compensation. (pp. 15-17)3. The Act does not define “social or recreational activity.” The Court has underscored the ambiguity of that label, noting that “from the perspective of an employee, the meaning of the phrase 'recreational or social activities’ is not self-evident.” Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr. 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004). In Lozano, the Court held that “when an employer compels an employee’s participation in an activity generally viewed as recreational or social in nature, the employer thereby renders that activity work-related as a matter of law.” Id. at 518. Significantly, however, the Lozano Court did not find that non-compulsory activities are always “recreational or social activities.” Determination of 2 whether a non-compulsory activity is a recreational or social activity within the meaning of the statute thus remains a fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry. (pp. 17-20)4. Here, the Court disagrees that Goulding’s volunteering at Family Fun Day was a social or recreational activity. If an employer-sponsored event is designed with the purpose of benefitting the employer’s clients, and an employee volunteers to help facilitate the event, the event cannot be deemed a social or recreational activity as to that employee. N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 applies to “recreational or social activities” -- not “recreational or social events.” It is the nature of Goulding’s activities at the event that determine compensability, just as employee compulsion -- not the character of the event -- determined compensability in Lozano. Family Fun Day, as to Goulding, was not a social or recreational activity. And, because Friendship House has advanced no other applicable exception under the Act, Goulding’s injuries are compensable. (pp. 20-22)5. The Court adds that Goulding would be entitled to compensation under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7’s two-part test even if her volunteer work at Family Fun Day could be deemed a recreational or social activity: her injury was sustained during an activity that (1) was a “regular incident of employment” and (2) “produce[d] a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” (p. 22)6. As to the first prong, the Court distinguishes Sarzillo v. Turner Construction Co., where the Court rejected a claim for injuries sustained during a lunchtime game the employer did not “contribute to, participate in, or encourage.” 101 N.J. 114, 121-22 (1985). Here, Goulding would not have attended the event and been injured but for Friendship House’s request for volunteers. Moreover, the event took place on the Friendship House property, and it was organized and sponsored by Friendship House and advertised by Friendship House to its clients. Further, Family Fun Day -- designed to be a recurring “annual” event -- can be considered “customary” and was sufficiently related to the employment, see Tocci, 28 N.J. at 593, particularly for Goulding, who volunteered to cook at the event in keeping with her regular role at Friendship House. (pp. 22-25)7. As to the second prong, any benefit the event had to employee health and morale was incidental to the event, not the driving force behind it. Through Family Fun Day, with its stated purpose of celebrating clients, their families, and the community, Friendship House received “intangible benefits” including fostering goodwill in the community, like the employer in Complitano. And the experience enjoyed at Family Fun Day by the clients and their families -- the very people Friendship House has made it its mission to serve -- is a separate benefit in and of itself. (pp. 25-27) REVERSED and REMANDED to the worker’s compensation court.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 48 September Term 2019 083726 Kim Goulding, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NJ Friendship House, Inc., Respondent-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division . Argued Decided October 13, 2020 February 8, 2021 Richard A. Grodeck argued the cause on behalf of appellant (Piro, Zinna, Cifelli, Paris & Genitempo, attorneys; Richard A. Grodeck, on the brief). James E. Santomauro argued the cause on behalf of respondent (Biancamano & DiStefano, attorneys; James E. Santomauro, on the brief). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. Under New Jersey’s Worker’s Compensation Act, an employee injuredduring a social or recreational activity generally cannot receive compensationfor those injuries. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. However, the Act provides an 1 exception to that general rule and expressly permits compensation “when suchrecreational or social activities [(1)] are a regular incident of employment and[(2)] produce a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employeehealth and morale.” Ibid. In this case, the Court considers whether theinjuries sustained by claimant Kim Goulding at an event hosted by heremployer are compensable. Goulding was an employee of North Jersey Friendship House, Inc.(Friendship House), a non-profit organization that assists individuals withdevelopmental disabilities. She worked for Friendship House as a cook, andshe taught cooking classes to Friendship House’s clients. Goulding wasinjured when she fell while volunteering as a cook at “Family Fun Day,” anevent Friendship House held for its clients. The workers’ compensation court here focused on Family Fun Day as awhole, concluded it was a social or recreational activity, and found thatGoulding was not entitled to compensation under the two-part test of N.J.S.A.34:15-7. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision. We disagree. Whether an activity is social or recreational should turn onthe employee’s role in the activity -- whether she is participating as a guest orproviding services for her employer at the event. If the employee is helping tofacilitate the activity in the manner that occurred here, the event cannot be 2 deemed a social or recreational activity as to that employee, and any injuriessustained by the employee while acting in that capacity should becompensated. That result accords with the liberal construction due the Act as“humane social legislation.” See Hersh v. County of Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 243(2014) (quotation omitted). We also disagree with the determination that Goulding does not meet thetwo-prong exception established in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. Her role at the event,which was planned to be held annually, was the same as her role as anemployee; but for her employment at Friendship House, she would not havebeen asked to volunteer and would not have been injured. Viewed in thatlight, Goulding’s injury was “a regular incident of employment.”Additionally, Friendship House received a benefit from Family Fun Daybeyond an improvement to employee health and morale. The event was not aclosed, internal event for the Friendship House team. Rather, it was anoutreach event designed to celebrate and benefit Friendship House’s clients,thereby creating goodwill for Friendship House in the community that couldexpand its fundraising opportunities in the future. Goulding was thereforeeligible for compensation for her injuries under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. 3 Because we conclude that Goulding’s injuries were compensable, wereverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter to theworker’s compensation court for further proceedings. I. A. We begin by summarizing the pertinent facts and procedural history.Friendship House is a non-profit organization whose mission is “to build theskills of individuals with varying abilities and developmental needs byproviding, within a safe haven, comprehensive clinical treatment, vocationaltraining and work opportunities in order to achieve meaningful and productivelives.” In November 2016, Goulding started working for Friendship House. InSeptember 2017, she was a chef/cook for Friendship House, working Mondaythrough Friday from 10:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Goulding was paid hourly. Herresponsibilities included cooking and preparing meals for Friendship House’sclients and teaching vocational classes to clients so that they could learn howto cook certain dishes. During lunch hours, Goulding ran the grill and workedclosely with Friendship House’s clients, including individuals on the autismspectrum. 4 On September 23, 2017, Friendship House hosted its first ever “FamilyFun Day,” which it planned to hold as an annual event moving forward. Theevent was designed to provide a safe and fun environment with recreationalactivities, including games and music, for the clients of Friendship House andtheir families. Friendship House employees were asked to volunteer to workthe event, but there were no consequences for those who chose not tovolunteer. Goulding volunteered to work the event as a cook, her normal jobat Friendship House. On the day of the event, Goulding arrived between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00a.m. and began setting up for breakfast. After breakfast, she began preparingfor lunch. Sometime between 11:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m., Goulding stepped ina small pothole in the parking lot and fell down, injuring her ankle. Severalpeople at the event assisted her after she fell, getting her ice and advising herto remain seated with her foot elevated. Goulding continued to help the othercooks prepare lunch while keeping her foot elevated. She left the event ataround 2:30 p.m. Goulding did not participate in any of the games or activitiesat the event. B. Goulding filed a claim with the State of New Jersey, Department ofLabor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ Compensation 5 against Friendship House asserting she suffered a work-related injury to herright foot and ankle at Family Fun Day. Friendship House filed an answerdenying that Goulding was employed when she was injured. Goulding filed a Notice of Motion for Temporary and/or MedicalBenefits for surgery to repair the injuries to her ankle. She also soughttemporary disability benefits as of the date of her injury. In support of herclaim, Goulding provided a certification from counsel and medical records.Friendship House filed a statement denying Goulding was entitled to anymedical treatment or temporary disability benefits because she was notworking for Friendship House when the injury occurred. The motion was heard in May 2018. The judge issued a decision on therecord, determining that Goulding’s accident did not occur in the course of heremployment. The workers’ compensation court determined Family Fun Daywas a social or recreational event. The compensation court then turned to thetwo-part exception found in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 to determine compensability foran injury sustained during a “recreational or social activity.” The court held that Family Fun Day was not a regular incident ofGoulding’s employment as required by the first part of the N.J.S.A 34:15-7test because this was the “first and only” Family Fun Day Friendship Househad sponsored, and the incident in question was not the cooking activity 6 Goulding volunteered for, but her attendance at the event generally. Thecompensation court added that Goulding volunteered to help at the event, wasnot compelled to do so, and could have volunteered for a position other thanthe one she held at her job. The compensation court also held that Family FunDay did not produce a benefit to Friendship House beyond an improvement toemployee health and morale as required by the second part of the statutory testbecause there was no fundraising or marketing associated with the event.Thus, the court dismissed Goulding’s claim with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision. The appellate court firstagreed that the test set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 governed the inquiry becauseFamily Fun Day was a recreational or social activity: the event was designedto celebrate the clients; it included food, games, and music; Gouldingvolunteered to attend or help; and it was held on a Saturday, not a regularworkday. The Appellate Division then concluded that Goulding did not meet herburden on the first prong of the statutory exception because Family Fun Daywas not a regular incident of her employment. The Appellate Divisionreasoned: “[t]his was the first Family Fun Day;” it was held outside normalworking hours; employees were not required to volunteer or attend; if anemployee did volunteer, she could do so in any capacity; and Goulding could 7 have chosen to help with games or prizes, she did not have to cook. Thus,Family Fun Day could not be deemed “as customary as a lunch or coffeebreak.” Because the Appellate Division concluded that Goulding did not satisfythe first prong, it did not address the second prong of the N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 testbut did note there was a “lack of support in the record [to show] that there wasany benefit to [Friendship House] in the form of positive public relations.” We granted Goulding’s petition for certification. 241 N.J. 66 (2020). II. A. Goulding first argues that she was not engaged in a recreational or socialactivity when she was injured because, although the event itself may haveinvolved games and social activities for the clients of Friendship House, shetook no part in those activities and was instead there to work. Alternatively, Goulding argues that if her involvement with Family FunDay was social or recreational, then she is entitled to compensation under thetwo-part test of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. Goulding contends Family Fun Day shouldbe deemed a “regular incident of employment” under the first part of that testbecause it was created as an “annual” event. Turning to the second part of thetest, Goulding contends the workers’ compensation court and Appellate 8 Division took too narrow a view of what constitutes a benefit in the context ofa non-profit organization like Friendship House, which is defined by itsmission, not by profit or loss. Goulding argues that Family Fun Day didproduce a benefit for Friendship House by furthering its mission of providingservices to clients and their families. Goulding adds that affirming the Appellate Division’s decision herewould create a disincentive for employees of non-profits to volunteer theirtime to work at sponsored events. B. Friendship House argues that the workers’ compensation court andAppellate Division properly focused on the social and recreational nature ofthe event at which Goulding was injured instead of on the cooking Gouldingdid for Family Fun Day. Friendship House further argues that reducingGoulding’s job duties to cooking is misleading, because she also providesvocational training for the clients and teaches them how to cook. FriendshipHouse submits that because Goulding was not engaged in either of those otherduties, she was not engaged in her normal job duties at Family Fun Day. Friendship House also contends the Act covers only employees whoperform services for an employer for financial consideration; it does not coverinjuries sustained while volunteering. Friendship House acknowledges there 9 are exceptions for specific classes of public officials, such as volunteerfirefighters, but Goulding does not fit within those exceptions. FriendshipHouse adds that because the events occurred on a Saturday -- outside of herregular work hours -- and because she chose to volunteer, Goulding was notworking for Friendship House when she was injured and is therefore notentitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Relying on our decisions in Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Construction, 178 N.J. 513 (2004), and Sarzillo v. Turner Construction Co., 101 N.J. 114 (1985),Friendship House argues Goulding has not satisfied the two-part exception of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. On the first prong, Friendship House submits that for arecreational or social activity to be a regular incident of employment, theemployee must show that participation was compelled by the employer, whichGoulding has admitted was not the case. Friendship House further argues thatGoulding fails to satisfy the second prong because Family Fun Day was not afundraising event, nor did it have marketing purposes; thus, there was nobenefit to Friendship House beyond an improvement to employee health andmorale. 10 III. A. Appellate courts approach the factual findings made by a workers’compensation court with “substantial deference” in recognition of thecompensation judge’s expertise and opportunity to hear witnesses and assesstheir credibility. Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 594 (1998).Thus, review “is limited to 'whether the findings made could reasonably havebeen reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, consideringthe proofs as a whole.’” Sager v. O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 182 N.J. 156,163-64 (2004) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). “An agency’s interpretation of a statute, however, although entitled tosome weight, is not binding on the reviewing court.” Brock v. PSE&G, 149 N.J. 378, 383 (1997). Rather, “courts remain the 'final authorities’ on issuesof statutory construction and [need not] 'stamp’ their approval of theadministrative interpretation.” Koch v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 157 N.J. 1, 8(1999) (alteration in original). In applying provisions of the Act, this Court has long stressed that it “ishumane social legislation designed to place the cost of work-connected injuryupon the employer who may readily provide for it as an operating expense.”Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 28 N.J. 582, 586 (1959). Indeed, New Jersey 11 courts “liberally constru[e] the Act to implement the legislative policy ofaffording coverage to as many workers as possible.” Brower v. ICT Grp., 164 N.J. 367, 373 (2000). B. N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, which contains the exception for “recreational orsocial activities” at issue in this appeal, was added to the Act in 1979. L.1979, c. 283, § 1. As enacted in 1911, the Act did not mention “recreational orsocial activities,” but rather “simply provided that compensation would beawarded for injuries or death from accidents 'arising out of and in the courseof employment.’” Lozano, 178 N.J. at 523 (quoting L. 1911, c. 95, § 7). Courts were left to determine whether accidents arose “out of and in thecourse of employment” and were thus compensable. See ibid. To make thatdetermination, they adopted a series of factors: (a) the customary nature of the activity; (b) the employer’s encouragement or subsidization of the activity; (c) the extent to which the employer managed or directed the recreational enterprise; (d) the presence of substantial influence or actual compulsion exerted upon the employee to attend and participate; and (e) the fact that the employer expects or receives a benefit from the employee’s participation in the activity. [Ibid. (quoting Harrison v. Stanton, 26 N.J. Super. 194, 199 (App. Div. 1953), aff’d o.b., 14 N.J. 172 (1954)).] 12 Those factors were assessed “based on the totality of the circumstances” --“[t]he absence or presence of a particular factor was not dispositive.” Ibid. In early cases in which courts considered whether non-work activitycould be deemed to “aris[e] out of and in the course of employment,”compensation was denied “for injuries sustained during employer-sponsoredrecreational and social activities at which attendance was not required andfrom which the employer did not receive a clear business benefit.” Ibid.; see,e.g., Stevens v. Essex Fells Country Club, 136 N.J.L. 656, 658-59 (Sup. Ct.1948) (denying compensation to a caddy for an injury suffered during a weeklygolf tournament sponsored by the employer exclusively for employees).However, beginning with Tocci in 1959, the Act’s application was expanded inlight of its “prescribed liberal construction.” 28 N.J. at 593. In Tocci, this Court addressed whether injuries sustained during alunchtime softball game were compensable. 28 N.J. at 589-90. Theemployees’ game took place on a field on company property, and the employersupplied bats and balls. Id. at 584-85. In finding the claimant employee’sinjuries compensable, this Court reasoned that the employer “approved andencouraged [the game’s] continuance” and was “fully aware” of the game’sbenefits to itself, which included improved employee morale; having the“employees close by so that they could readily resume their work on time;” 13 and having the ability “to exercise such supervision as it might considerappropriate.” Id. at 593. The Court also observed that the softball game“quickly became a customary” activity and “was thereafter as incidental to theemployment” as lunch, coffee, or cigarette breaks during the workday. Ibid.We concluded that those facts revealed a sufficient relationship between thegame and the employment that the claimant’s injury could “fairly and justly begrouped with those occurrences which may be said to have had some workconnection.” Id. at 593-94. In Complitano v. Steel & Alloy Tank Co., 34 N.J. 300 (1961), we foundcompensable an injury sustained in an after-hours softball game held awayfrom the employer’s premises based on the employer’s ties and the event.There, the claimant employee was injured playing on a team that representedhis employer. Complitano v. Steel & Alloy Tank Co., 63 N.J. Super. 444, 445-46 (App. Div. 1960). The team was formed by the employees, and theemployer did not exercise control over the team or coerce or influence theemployees to play. Id. at 446-47. However, the employer paid the leagueentrance fee and helped cover the cost of bats, balls, and uniforms, which borethe company name. Id. at 446. Further, the local newspaper occasionallypublished the league standings, and when the team won the league title all 14 three years they played; the company received a large trophy that was“displayed in the entrance hall of the company office.” Ibid. Based on those facts, we reversed the Appellate Division’s denial ofcompensation relying on the dissent, Complitano, 34 N.J. 300. The dissentconcluded the claimant employee should be compensated for his injuriesbecause “the activity came within the scope of employment” under the Act ,Complitano, 63 N.J. Super. at 469 (Conford, J.A.D., dissenting). Thedissenting judge determined the employer’s sponsorship of the team was notmotivated by “altruism alone,” but instead was “substantially motivated” bythe “intangible benefit[s]” the company received such as “promotion of thecompany’s good name before the general public” and “its heightened prestigeand civic status” in the community. Id. at 467, 469. In 1979, the Legislature made several amendments to the Act, with the“dominant purpose” of “'mak[ing] available additional dollars for benefits toseriously disabled workers while eliminating, clarifying or tightening awardsof compensation based upon minor permanent partial disabilities not related tothe employment,’ as well as . . . contain[ing] the overall cost of workers’compensation.” Sarzillo, 101 N.J. at 119 (quoting S. Labor, Indus., and Pros.Comm., Joint Statement to S. Comm. Sub. for S. 802/Assemb. Comm. Sub. forA. 840 (Nov. 13, 1979)). N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was added to the Act as part of 15 those amendments, and that statute and the carve-outs from coverage itcontains -- including the carve-out for injuries sustained in the course ofrecreational and social activities at the center of this appeal -- have beeninterpreted as a legislative attempt to reverse the judicial trend towardexpansive interpretation that began in Tocci and Complitano. See Lozano, 178 N.J. at 529-30. In addition to other defenses against compensation claims, N.J.S.A.34:15-7 provides, as relevant here, that [w]hen employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied . . . accept the provisions of this article compensation for personal injuries to . . . such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer . . . in all cases except . . . when recreational or social activities, unless such recreational or social activities are a regular incident of employment and produce a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale, are the natural and proximate cause of the injury. Under the plain language of that provision, an injury “arising out of andin the course of employment” is not compensable if it is sustained during“recreational or social activities.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. Accordingly, when aclaim is pressed and an employer defends against the claim by asserting thatthe employee was injured during a “recreational or social activit[y,]” a courtmust first consider whether the activity was, in fact, “recreational or social” 16 within the meaning of the statute. If the activity was not recreational or socialin nature, then the employer may not invoke that exception to compensation. If, on the other hand, the activity during which the injury is sustainedwas recreational or social in nature, N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 provides that the injurywill only be covered if “such recreational or social activities are a regularincident of employment and produce a benefit to the employer beyondimprovement in employee health and morale.” Put differently, “an employeeinjured during a recreational or social activity must satisfy a two-prong test toqualify for compensation under the [A]ct -- the activity (1) must be a 'regularincident of employment,’ and (2) must 'produce a benefit to the employerbeyond improvement in employee health and morale.’” Lozano, 178 N.J. at 521 (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:15-7). IV. A. To decide whether Kim Goulding’s injuries are compensable, we beginwith the threshold determination of whether Family Fun Day constitutes arecreational or social activity within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. 1. The Act does not define “social or recreational activity,” and this Courthas underscored the ambiguity of that label; we have noted, for example, that 17 [a]n employer-sponsored company picnic held off- premises and after work hours that employees voluntarily attend for their own personal pleasure certainly falls within the definition of “recreational or social activities.” But, there is a question whether employees would describe a company event as “recreational or social” and consider it noncompensable if the employer required attendance. That is, from the perspective of an employee, the meaning of the phrase “recreational or social activities” is not self-evident. The act’s silence on the meaning of the disputed phrase requires our inquiry to extend beyond the plain language of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. [Lozano, 178 N.J. at 522.] In Lozano, this Court was faced with whether an employee who wasinjured while driving a go-cart was participating in a recreational or socialactivity. Id. at 518-19. The employee worked for a mason contractor and didnot have a driver’s license. Id. at 518. The employee and his supervisor hadbeen working at a property with a go-cart track on the day of the injury. Id. at519. After the supervisor drove around the track, he instructed the employeeto “get in” and drive. Ibid. The employee initially refused because he did notknow how to drive, but the supervisor assured him it was easy and told him to“get in.” Ibid. The employee crashed and sustained injuries. Ibid. The compensation court dismissed the employee’s claim because hisinjury occurred when he was “off the clock” and “engaged in a 'recreationalactivity’ . . . outside the scope of his employment,” and he had fun. Id. at 520. 18 We disagreed with the dismissal, holding that “when an employer compels anemployee’s participation in an activity generally viewed as recreational orsocial in nature, the employer thereby renders that activity work-related as amatter of law.” Id. at 518. “[W]e construe[d] the phrase 'recreational orsocial activities’ as it appears in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 to encompass only thoseactivities in which participation is not compulsory.” Id. at 531. Significantly, however, we did not find the converse to be true. We didnot find that non-compulsory activities are always “recreational or socialactivities.” Determination of whether a non-compulsory activity is arecreational or social activity within the meaning of the statute thus remains afact-intensive and case-specific inquiry. Compare, e.g., Quinones v. P.C.Richard & Son, 310 N.J. Super. 63, 65-69 (App. Div. 1998) (arm-wrestlingmatches that were not approved by the employer, but that took place regularlyat work and during work hours, were social or recreational activities forpurposes of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7), with Valdez v. Tri-State Furniture, 374 N.J.Super. 223, 239-40 (App. Div. 2005) (the claimant employee’s “driving [of a]forklift[] in an unorthodox manner” at his worksite did not constitute a “pur elysocial or recreational activity, entirely unrelated to work” because the“curiosity” that led the employee to use machinery that he was not licensed or 19 required to use as part of his job “was the direct result of his observation thatthe equipment was used in the course of his business”). Here, we consider whether, under the facts of this case, the specific non-compulsory activity in which Goulding participated is a recreational or socialactivity within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. In doing so, we are mindfulof “the legislative policy of affording coverage to as many workers aspossible.” Brower, 164 N.J. at 373. 2. We disagree with the Appellate Division’s view that Goulding’svolunteering at Family Fun Day was a social or recreational activity becauseshe was not compelled to volunteer and because the event celebrated clients,had food, music, and games, and was held outside of working hours. Thatview implies that whenever an employee volunteers at an employer-sponsoredevent, she cannot be compensated if injured simply because the event has asocial or recreational purpose. Such a view ignores that the Act is supposed tobe construed liberally in favor of compensation, and it fails to consider theemployee’s role in the activity. See Lozano, 178 N.J. at 522 (“[F]rom theperspective of an employee, the meaning of the phrase 'recreational or socialactivities’ is not self-evident.” (emphasis added)). 20 It is undisputed that Goulding, unlike the employee in Lozano, was notcompelled to volunteer for Family Fun Day. However, compulsion is not theonly instance in which an activity can be removed from the social orrecreational activity label. The facts here are distinct from prior cases inwhich we addressed social and recreational activities. Goulding was notplaying softball on her lunch break; she was volunteering to cook (her regularjob) for an event her employer was hosting, and which it planned to holdannually. If an employer-sponsored event is designed with the purpose ofbenefitting the employer’s clients, members, or customers, and an employeevolunteers to help facilitate the event, the event cannot be deemed a social orrecreational activity as to that employee. Moreover, although Family Fun Dayas a whole may have been a social or recreational event, Goulding did notparticipate in that event in a social or recreational role because she was thereto help facilitate it. The statute applies to “recreational or social activities” --not “recreational or social events.” See N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. Had the Legislatureintended to limit compensation based on the broad category of event involved,rather than on the employee’s role within that event, it could have done so . Itis the nature of Goulding’s activities at the event that determine 21 compensability, just as employee compulsion -- not the character of the event-- was held to determine compensability in Lozano, 178 N.J. at 531. In contrast to prior cases where the employees were participating in thesocial or recreational activity -- playing softball, golfing, or attending a picnic-- Goulding was facilitating Family Fun Day by cooking and preparing mealsfor clients of Friendship House, just as she does in her regular employment.Accordingly, Family Fun Day, as to Goulding, was not a social or recreationalactivity. And, because Friendship House has advanced no other applicableexception under the Act, Goulding’s injuries are compensable. B. Although our analysis could end there, we add that Goulding would alsobe entitled to compensation under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 if her volunteer work atFamily Fun Day could be deemed a recreational or social activity. N.J.S.A.34:15-7 contains an exception to the general rule of no recovery for injuriessustained during a recreational or social activity that is (1) a “regular incidentof employment,” and that (2) “produce[s] a benefit to the employer beyondimprovement in employee health and morale.” Both prongs of that test are methere. 22 1. The first prong of the exception requires a court to determine if theactivity is a regular incident of employment. Friendship House relies on Sarzillo in arguing that Family Fun Day wasnot a regular incident of Goulding’s employment. In that case, the claimantwas a journeyman-carpenter who was injured while playing “Ka-nocka,” apaddle game similar to tennis, during lunch with other employees. 101 N.J. at 115-16. The employer was aware the employees played the game and hadnever attempted to object or stop it. Id. at 116. As to the claimant employee, we determined playing “Ka-nocka” wasnot a “regular incident of employment” -- even under a liberal construction ofthe Act -- because he chose to play the game of his own accord, when he couldhave spent his lunch break doing whatever he liked. Id. at 121. Additionally,the employer did not “contribute to, participate in, or encourage the activity,much less compel employees to engage in it”; it was not a “recognizedcustomary lunchtime recreational activity”; and it was essentially just anactivity periodically engaged in by employees. Ibid. There was no evidenceof sponsorship, and there was no “work-connection, incidence andconditioning, let alone compulsion” to make this a regular incident ofemployment. Id. at 121-22. 23 The vast disparities between the Ka-nocka game in Sarzillo and FamilyFun Day here highlight precisely why Goulding’s volunteer work at that eventwas a regular incident of her employment even though the event was non-compulsory and was held outside of her standard working hours. First, regardless of the voluntariness of her participation and that shewas not being paid, Goulding would not have attended the event and would nothave been injured but for Friendship House’s request for volunteers at theevent. Moreover, the event took place on the Friendship House property andwas organized and sponsored by Friendship House and advertised byFriendship House to its clients. Friendship House’s active involvement in andcomplete control over Family Fun Day is the polar opposite of the employer’slaissez-faire approach to the employee-initiated Ka-nocka game in Sarzillo. Further, unlike the spontaneous and sporadic Ka-nocka games in thatcase, Family Fun Day was designed to be a recurring “annual” event. Indeed,Family Fun Day can be considered “customary” just like a lunch, coffee, orcigarette break and was sufficiently related to the employment. See Tocci, 28 N.J. at 593 (finding that a daily softball game played between employees“quickly became customary” and “was thereafter incidental to employment”).This is particularly true for Goulding, who volunteered to cook at the event inkeeping with her regular employment position at Friendship House. 24 It is significant that Friendship House needed volunteers for Family FunDay. Given the Act’s liberal construction in favor of compensation, it isdifficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to preclude compensation forinjuries sustained by an employee who was volunteering at the employer’sbehest to assist in facilitating an employer-sponsored event designed tocelebrate the employer’s clients. Against this specific factual backdrop, we conclude that Goulding hassatisfied the first prong of the exception set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. 2. The second prong of the test set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 requires acourt to determine whether the social or recreational activity “produce[d] abenefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale.”Sarzillo, 101 N.J. at 115 (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:15-7). As with the first prong, we find guidance in Sarzillo about whatcircumstances fail to satisfy the second part of the test -- guidance that quicklyreveals Goulding has satisfied the exception. Notably, we concluded inSarzillo that there was no “benefit to the employer beyond improvement inemployee health and morale” because there was “no advertising, no uniformswith company logo, no publicity through newspaper listings of leaguestandings, no admission to the general public -- in short, there was no benefit 25 to the company from improved public relations and consumer good will.” Id.at 122 (distinguishing Complitano, where the employer derived a benefit bothto morale and through advertising). As to the benefits derived from Family Fun Day, we first note there islittle evidence to suggest Family Fun Day improved employee health andmorale, especially considering there is nothing in the record suggestingemployees and their families were invited to attend as guests. Any benefit theevent had to employee health and morale was incidental to the event, not thedriving force behind it. We would be hard-pressed to conclude that an eventdesigned for the employer’s clients, and not for its employees, has the primaryand sole purpose of improving employee health and morale. Moreover, even though Family Fun Day was not a fundraiser, FriendshipHouse still received a benefit. The event had the stated purpose of celebratingclients or members, their families, and the community. An obvious side effectof that is there will be those who rightfully think that Friendship House isdoing good work and will be more inclined to help out in whatever way theycan as a result of that favorable impression. Thus, just as the employer inComplitano, Friendship House received the “intangible benefits” of promotingitself and fostering goodwill in the community. Last, the experience enjoyedat Family Fun Day by the clients and their families -- the very people 26 Friendship House has made it its mission to serve -- is a separate benefit in andof itself. We therefore conclude this second prong has been satisfied. C. In sum, we hold that the injury sustained by Kim Goulding whilevolunteering at her employer-sponsored event is compensable because, as toGoulding, the event was not a social or recreational activity. We further holdthat, even if her volunteering for Family Fun Day were social or recreational asthose terms are used in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, she would still have satisfied thetwo-part exception set forth in that statute because her participation was aregular incident to her employment and it produced a benefit to FriendshipHouse beyond improvement to employee health and morale. Her injury wouldthus have been eligible for compensation even if the statutory carve-out forsocial or recreational activity was applicable here. V. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand thismatter to the compensation court for further proceedings. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 27