Title: People v. Guevara
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97070, 97299
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 6, 2005

Docket Nos. 97070, 97299 cons.-Agenda 
13-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. 
ERNESTO GUEVARA, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 
OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. FRANK J. WALTRIP, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 6, 2005.
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
These consolidated appeals present another question about 
the "15/20/25-to-life" sentencing provisions of Public Act 91-404 (Pub. Act 
91-404, eff. January 1, 2000): namely, whether the 15-year sentence enhancement 
that accompanies the offense of home invasion with a firearm (see 720 ILCS 
5/12-11(a)(3), (c) (West 2000)) violates the proportionate penalties clause of 
the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). We conclude that it 
does not. We reverse the trial court in No. 97070 and remand the cause for 
further proceedings; we affirm the appellate court in No. 97299.

BACKGROUND
Before January 1, 2000, section 12-11(a) of the Criminal 
Code of 1961 split home invasion into two categories:
"A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of 
duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the 
dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or 
more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of 
another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason 
to know that one or more persons is present and
(1) While armed with a dangerous weapon uses force or 
threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such 
dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or
(2) Intentionally causes any injury to any person or 
persons within such dwelling place." 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a) (West 1998).
Home invasion under both section 12-11(a)(1) and section 
12-11(a)(2) was a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 1998)), which 
carried a sentence of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) 
(West 2002)).
Effective January 1, 2000, Public Act 91-404 amended 
various felony offenses, including home invasion, to add sentence enhancements 
for firearm use. The amended version of section 12-11 retained the original two 
categories of home invasion, but it also added three new categories related to 
firearm use:
"A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of 
duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the 
dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or 
more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of 
another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason 
to know that one or more persons is present and
* * *
(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or threatens the 
imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place 
whether or not injury occurs, or
(4) Uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon 
any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs 
and during the commission of the offense personally discharges a firearm, or
(5) Personally discharges a firearm that proximately 
causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or 
death to another person within such dwelling place[.]" 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) 
through (a)(5) (West 2000).
Home invasion is still a Class X felony, but these new 
categories of home invasion carry greater sentencing ranges:
"A violation of subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for 
which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. 
A violation of subsection (a)(4) is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be 
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of 
subsection (a)(5) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of 
natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court." 
720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2000).
The defendants here were both charged with violating 
section 12-11(a)(3), home invasion while armed with a firearm. We turn to the 
specifics of their cases.

No. 97070-Ernesto Guevara
On June 18, 2002, Guevara was charged by information with 
two counts of armed robbery for taking a wallet and currency from Ofir Manter 
and Juan Ojeda while carrying a handgun and threatening the imminent use of 
force. See 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000). On June 27, 2002, he was charged by 
indictment on four counts: the two original armed robbery counts and two 
additional home invasion counts. Count III specified that Guevara violated 
section 12-11(a)(3) when he "knowingly and without authority entered the 
dwelling of Juan Ojeda, and while armed with a firearm, *** threatened the 
imminent use of force upon" him. Count IV contained an additional charge of home 
invasion that is not at issue in this appeal.
Guevara filed a motion to dismiss the entire indictment on 
various grounds. He argued, inter alia, that the sentencing range for 
home invasion with a firearm was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the 
sentencing range for the similar offense of armed violence. The State responded 
that the 15-year sentence enhancement that tracks section 12-11(a)(3) survived a 
proportionate penalties clause challenge in People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440 (2002). The circuit court of Du Page County stated that Hill 
"pretty much is dispositive" of the proportionate penalties clause issue, but 
continued the case, so the parties could file supplemental briefs.
Guevara filed an amended motion to dismiss only the home 
invasion counts. He relied upon People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503 (2003), 
where this court purportedly "found that the less serious conduct proscribed in 
Public Act 91-404 offenses involving possession of a firearm and personal 
discharge of a firearm is punished more harshly than is the more serious conduct 
targeted by the statutes for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated 
discharge of a firearm." Defendant further argued that subsection (a)(3) of the 
home invasion statute contains an impermissible double enhancement because the 
presence of a firearm is used both to create the offense and to punish the 
offense more severely. The trial court found Moss dispositive on the 
proportionate penalties clause issue, declared section 12-11(a)(3) 
unconstitutional, and dismissed count III of the indictment.(1) 
In explaining its reasons for dismissing count III, the trial court also stated 
that it agreed with defendant that subsection (a)(3) contained an impermissible 
double enhancement. The trial court believed that the presence of a firearm was 
used once to create the offense of home invasion with a firearm and a second 
time to enhance the offense with an additional 15-year sentencing enhancement. 
The State brought an interlocutory appeal directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 
603.

No. 97299-Frank Waltrip
On September 5, 2002, Waltrip was charged by information 
with home invasion and residential burglary. On September 30, 2002, he was 
charged by indictment with three counts: the original home invasion and 
residential burglary counts, and an additional unlawful use of weapons count. 
Count II specified that Waltrip violated section 12-11(a)(3) when he "knowingly 
and without authority [ ] entered the dwelling place of Carl Lentz *** and while 
armed with a firearm threatened the imminent use of force against" him.
Waltrip entered a guilty plea on the home invasion count 
in exchange for the State's dismissing the other two counts. Waltrip agreed to a 
sentencing cap of 40 years, and he received a 40-year sentence: a 25-year term 
with a mandatory 15-year add-on. The sentence was to run consecutively to "any 
sentence imposed in cause No. 02-CF-1053 pending in Morgan County." Waltrip 
filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that (1) his 
sentence was excessive when compared to the 35-year term received by his 
codefendant, Paul Clark; (2) the consecutive sentence was imposed in violation 
of section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) 
(West 2000)) because he had not been sentenced in Morgan County at the time of 
his sentencing; and (3) his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause 
because it did not reflect his rehabilitative potential. Waltrip did not argue 
that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause when compared to 
the sentence for another offense. The circuit court of Adams County denied 
Waltrip's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but reduced his sentence to 35 
years and vacated the consecutive- sentence provision of its order. Waltrip 
appealed.
On appeal, Waltrip argued that the sentence for home 
invasion with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause of the 
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). Defendant contended that 
aggravated battery with a firearm was a more serious offense that was punished 
as a mere Class X felony, while home invasion while armed with a firearm was 
punished as a Class X felony with a 15-year add-on. The appellate court affirmed 
Waltrip's conviction and sentence. No. 4-03-0164 (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court noted that, in determining the 
legislative purpose of Public Act 91-404 in the course of other proportionate 
penalties clause challenges, this court "has declined to determine the purpose 
of the offense from the underlying offense itself, *** but has focused on the 
purpose in enacting the enhancements themselves." The appellate court decided 
that home invasion with a firearm and aggravated battery with a firearm both 
served to deter the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The 
appellate court turned to the issue of whether home invasion with a firearm is a 
more serious offense than aggravated battery with a firearm, thus warranting 
different sentences:
"Aggravated battery with a firearm requires an injury to 
the victim by means of the discharging of a firearm. [Citation.] Home invasion 
while armed with a firearm requires not only a threat of force, but 
also for the threat to be made in an occupied home. [Citation.] The physical 
injury resulting from a home invasion by an intruder armed with a firearm may be 
minimal, if any injury results at all. The emotional and psychological trauma to 
the victim, however, may in fact be even more severe. The legislature, in 
applying the enhanced penalty to home invasion but not to aggravated battery 
with a firearm, both Class X felonies, represented the legislature's judgment 
that home invasion was the more serious offense based upon the risk of more 
serious harm. We cannot find the legislature's judgment in this regard to be 
wholly unreasonable." (Emphasis in original.)
We granted Waltrip's petition for leave to appeal. See 177 
Ill. 2d R. 315(a). On July 22, 2004, we consolidated these cases. Whether a 
statute is unconstitutional is a question of law, and, accordingly, our review 
proceeds de novo. People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 
(2001).

ANALYSIS
Waltrip's Guilty Plea
Before proceeding to the merits of these cases, we must 
dispose of a threshold issue raised by the State in its response to Waltrip's 
appeal. The State argues that Waltrip's guilty plea bars him from challenging 
his sentence, and his only recourse is to seek to withdraw his plea on the 
grounds that he was sentenced under a purportedly unconstitutional statute. The 
State relies upon People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), and its 
progeny, arguing that a negotiated guilty plea is subject to contract principles 
that preclude Waltrip from challenging "the parameters" of his sentence.
Waltrip answers that the State did not raise this issue 
before the appellate court and, consequently, it is waived. Waiver aside, 
Waltrip argues that his argument is distinguishable from the sentencing 
arguments raised in Evans and the other cases cited by the State. 
Waltrip states that because he attacks his sentence as unconstitutional, not as 
excessive, Evans does not bar this claim.
We agree with Waltrip. Waltrip is not raising a garden 
variety excessive-sentence issue. Instead, Waltrip, like Guevara, contends that 
the 15-year sentence enhancement for home invasion with a firearm violates the 
constitutional guarantee of proportionate penalties. If this provision violates 
the proportionate penalties clause, then it is void ab initio. See 
People v. Scales, 307 Ill. App. 3d 356, 360-61 (1999) (agreeing with State 
that conviction based on a statute held to violate the proportionate penalties 
clause in People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998), was void ab 
initio). A defendant may argue that a criminal statute is unconstitutional, 
and void ab initio, at any time. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2000); People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 176 (1990). 
Further, a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from arguing on appeal that 
he was sentenced under a statute that was facially unconstitutional and void 
ab intitio. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 300-01 (2002). 
Because Waltrip argues that he was sentenced under a statute that was 
unconstitutional and void ab initio, he may raise this claim without 
moving to withdraw his guilty plea.

Proportionate Penalties
We turn now to the merits of defendants' arguments. All 
statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Malchow, 
193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). To overcome this presumption, the party challenging 
the statute must clearly establish its invalidity. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  
at 418. The legislature has broad authority to set criminal penalties, and 
courts may not interfere with the legislature's decisions in this area unless 
the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the general constitutional 
limitations on this authority. People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981).
Article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution 
provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the 
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to 
useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. In analyzing a proportionate 
penalties challenge, our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the 
sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense. See People v. 
Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 473-74 (1998). For the past several years, we 
have recognized three ways in which a penalty can violate the proportionate 
penalties clause. First, a sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause 
if it is so cruel, degrading, or disproportionate to the offense that the 
sentence shocks the moral sense of the community. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  
at 474; People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 236 (1995). Second, a 
sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is greater than the 
sentence for an offense with identical elements. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  
at 474; People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 418 (1996). Third, a sentence 
violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is greater than the sentence 
for a similar offense that poses a greater threat to public safety. Lombardi, 
184 Ill. 2d  at 474; People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (1997).
In People v. Sharpe, No. 97184 (October 6, 2005), 
we held that we would no longer recognize the third type of proportionate 
penalties challenge-the cross-comparison challenge. Sharpe concluded 
that comparing the penalties for offenses with different elements never should 
have been a part of this court's proportionate penalties jurisprudence. 
Sharpe, slip op. at 27. Pursuant to Sharpe, only the first two 
types of proportionate penalties challenges described above will be recognized.
We now consider the merits of the defendants' 
proportionate penalties arguments. Defendants Guevara and Waltrip both argue 
that the sentence for home invasion while in possession of a firearm is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentence for aggravated battery with 
a firearm. Defendants contend that aggravated battery with a firearm, which is 
punished as a mere Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1), (b) (West 2000)), is 
more serious than home invasion while armed with a firearm, which is punished as 
a Class X felony with 15 years added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the 
court (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3), (c) (West 2000)). Defendant Guevara also asks us 
to conduct a cross-comparison analysis between home invasion with a firearm and 
aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2000)). Guevara 
contends that aggravated discharge of a firearm, which is punished as a Class 1 
felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)), is more serious than home 
invasion while armed with a firearm, which is punished as a Class X felony with 
15 years added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court (720 ILCS 
5/12-11(a)(3), (c) (West 2000)). These arguments fail because a defendant may 
not challenge a penalty under the proportionate penalties clause by comparing it 
with the penalty for an offense with different elements. Sharpe, slip 
op. at 31. Defendants do not argue that the penalty for home invasion with a 
firearm is harsher than the penalty for a different offense with identical 
elements, nor do they contend that the penalty for home invasion with a firearm 
is cruel or degrading or so wholly disproportionate to the offense so as to 
shock the moral sense of the community (an argument that this court already 
rejected in Hill (see Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 452-53)). 
Accordingly, their proportionate penalties arguments fail.

Double Enhancement
In addition to the proportionate penalties challenge, 
defendant Guevara alleged that subsection (a)(3) of the home invasion statute 
constituted an impermissible double enhancement. In its oral ruling explaining 
why it was dismissing this charge, the trial court agreed with defendant that 
subsection (a)(3) contains an impermissible double enhancement. According to the 
trial court, the presence of a firearm is used twice in the home invasion 
statute-first as an element of the offense, and then again to enhance the 
offense with a 15-year sentencing add-on. The trial court's analysis is 
incorrect.
A double enhancement occurs when either (1) a single 
factor is used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a 
harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed, or (2) the same factor 
is used twice to elevate the severity of the offense itself. People v. 
Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11-13 (2004). The prohibition against double 
enhancements is a rule of statutory construction, premised on the assumption 
that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in 
fashioning the appropriate range of punishment for that offense. People v. 
Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). However, where the legislature 
clearly intends for there to be a double enhancement, and that intention is 
clearly expressed, there is no prohibition. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d  at 15. 
Whether a statute contains an impermissible double enhancement is an issue that 
we review de novo. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d  at 12.
We explained in Phelps that the textbook example 
of an impermissible double enhancement was in People v. White, 114 Ill. 2d 61 (1986):
"In White, this court held that, although it is a 
statutory aggravating factor, the victim's age cannot form the basis for an 
extended-term sentence where the defendant is convicted of aggravated battery of 
a child. White, 114 Ill. 2d  at 66. As White explained, in 
establishing aggravated battery of a child as a statutory offense separate from 
aggravated battery, the legislature included the victim's age as an element of 
the offense. As importantly, the legislature attached a higher penalty to 
aggravated battery of a child (then a Class 2 felony) than it did to mere 
aggravated battery (a Class 3 felony). Thus, the victim's age formed not only an 
element of the offense but also the basis for an enhanced penalty. By then using 
the victim's age yet again as the basis of an extended-term sentence, 
the trial court did exactly what the double enhancement rule is designed to 
prevent-subjected the defendant to a harsher sentence than might otherwise have 
been imposed." Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d  at 12.
Subsection (a)(3) simply does not contain a double 
enhancement. As this court explained in Hill, when the legislature 
amended the home invasion statute with the 15/20/25-to-life provisions, its 
intent was to create distinct types of home invasions. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 457. As importantly, these distinct offenses carry distinct sentences. The 
type of home invasion with which defendant was charged is home invasion while 
armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2000)), and the sentence for 
this offense is Class X plus 15 years (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2000)). 
Significantly, the firearm factor is used only as an element of the offense and 
is nowhere mentioned in the sentencing provision (see 725 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 
2000)), which simply defines the sentence for the distinct crime with which 
defendant was charged.
Contrast this to the situation in White, in which 
the age of the victim was used once as an element of an enhanced offense and 
then again as an aggravating factor to subject the defendant to an extended-term 
penalty. Subsection (a)(3) does not contain an double-enhancement, permissible 
or otherwise, and the trial court erred in dismissing the charge on this basis.

CONCLUSION
Subsection (a)(3) of the home invasion statute neither 
violates the proportionate penalties clause nor contains an impermissible double 
enhancement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment in No. 97070 and 
remand the cause for further proceedings, and we affirm the appellate court's 
judgment in No. 97299.



No. 97070-Reversed and remanded.
No. 97299-Affirmed.
1. 
The armed robbery counts and the other home invasion count of the indictment 
remain pending.