Title: In re A.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 446A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-91 
No. 446A20 
Filed 27 August 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.C. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 13 July 
2020 by Judge Marion M. Boone in District Court, Stokes County.  This matter was 
calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 21 June 2021, but was determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Jennifer Oakley Michaud for petitioner-appellee Stokes County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
James N. Freeman, Jr., for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant mother.  
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother Krissy M. appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating 
her parental rights in A.C.1  After careful review of the trial court’s termination orders 
in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that those orders should be 
affirmed. 
                                            
1 A.C. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as “Arty,” which is 
a pseudonym used for ease of reading and to protect the juvenile’s privacy. 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 2 
 
On 13 July 2018, the Stokes County Department of Social Services filed a 
petition alleging that Arty was a neglected juvenile.  In its petition, DSS alleged that 
it had received a child protective services report on 29 June 2018 stating that Arty, 
who had just been born, was in the neonatal intensive care unit as the result of 
possible drug exposure and respiratory distress.  According to DSS, respondent-
mother had admitted to having taken Subutex, which she purchased “off the street,” 
and was suffering from withdrawal symptoms that included being “jittery[,] [s]haky, 
[and] sweaty.”  After expressing concern that respondent-mother “may be using 
something else now,” DSS stated that she was “taking Subutex in the hospital and 
it[’]s now prescribed by a doctor.”  Although a drug test that respondent-mother had 
taken while hospitalized had produced negative results, DSS asserted that Arty’s 
umbilical cord had tested positive for the presence of amphetamines and Subutex at 
the time of his birth.  DSS further alleged that respondent-mother had told social 
workers “that she had been getting Subutex off the street for the last four years due 
to her ‘getting hooked’ on pain medication after a car accident” and that she had been 
taking Adderall to help with her depression despite the fact that she did not have a 
prescription authorizing her to use that substance.  On the same date upon which the 
petition was filed, DSS obtained the entry of an order providing that Arty should be 
taken into nonsecure custody. 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 3 
 
After a hearing held on 27 September 2018, Judge Gretchen H. Kirkman, with 
respondent-mother’s consent, entered an order on 30 October 2018 determining that 
Arty was a neglected juvenile.  On 30 October 2018, Judge Kirkman entered a 
separate dispositional order providing that Arty would remain in DSS custody and 
establishing a primary permanent plan for Arty of reunification with a parent and a 
concurrent permanent plan of guardianship.  In addition, Judge Kirkman ordered 
that respondent-mother enter into a Family Services Case Plan and comply with its 
provisions.  Finally, Judge Kirkman authorized respondent-mother to have four 
hours of supervised visitation with Arty each week on the condition that she provide 
negative drug screens. 
¶ 4 
 
After a review hearing held on 28 March 2019, Judge Thomas Langan entered 
an order on 10 May 2019 in which he found that respondent-mother was living with 
her own mother, that she was struggling with anxiety and depression, that these 
mental health difficulties were interfering with her efforts to satisfy the requirements 
of her case plan, that she had not been attending parenting classes or receiving 
mental health treatment since December 2018, and that she had not had a domestic 
violence assessment.  As a result, Judge Langan ordered respondent-mother to 
comply with the requirements of her case plan and to cooperate with the drug 
screening process. 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 5 
 
In the aftermath of a review hearing held on 8 August 2019, the trial court 
entered a permanency-planning order on 10 September 2019 in which it found that 
respondent-mother continued to live with her mother, continued to struggle with 
anxiety and depression, and had not attended parenting classes or mental health 
treatment since December 2018 until restarting treatment in May 2019.  In addition, 
the trial court found that respondent-mother had refused to participate in the drug 
screening process, had failed to appear for the purpose of providing a sample to be 
screened in December and January, had not been screened for drugs from December 
2018 through 22 March 2019, had failed to appear for a scheduled drug screen on 10 
June 2019, and had admitted to having taken Adderall that was purchased 
unlawfully.  The trial court further found that respondent-mother had failed to 
participate in a second psychological evaluation that she had been ordered to obtain 
after reporting that she had ceased making any effort to satisfy the requirements of 
her case plan as the result of anxiety and depression.  Moreover, the trial court also 
found that respondent-mother had reported that she had been involved in an incident 
of domestic violence during which Arty’s father had become violent and which had 
led her to obtain the entry of a domestic violence protective order against Arty’s 
father.  Finally, the trial court found that respondent-mother had failed to 
demonstrate that she was employed.  As a result, the trial court changed Arty’s 
primary permanent plan to one of adoption. 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 6 
 
Following a permanency-planning hearing held on 10 October 2019, the trial 
court entered an order on 7 November 2019 determining that respondent-mother was 
obtaining housing with Arty’s father, had completed a domestic violence support 
group, had completed parenting classes, and had obtained a psychological evaluation.  
On the other hand, the trial court also found that respondent-mother continued to 
either refuse to participate in the drug screening process or to fail to appear upon 
occasions when she was requested to provide a sample for screening and that she had 
tested positive for the presence of Subutex and methamphetamines on 4 September 
2019.  In addition, the trial court found that respondent-mother had failed to attend 
Arty’s medical appointments. 
¶ 7 
 
On 7 November 2019, DSS filed a motion seeking to have respondent-mother’s 
parental rights in Arty terminated on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) 
(2019); willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions 
that had led to Arty’s removal from her care, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and 
dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6).  On 13 July 2020, the trial court entered an 
adjudicatory order determining that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty 
were subject to termination on the basis of all three grounds for termination alleged 
in the termination motion and a separate dispositional order determining that the 
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights would be in Arty’s best interests.  
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
As a result, the trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty.2  
Respondent-mother noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s termination 
orders.3 
¶ 8 
 
As an initial matter, respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred by 
determining that her parental rights in Arty were subject to termination.  A 
termination of parental rights proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage and a 
dispositional stage.  N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 
101, 110 (1984).  At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving 
by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” that one or more of the grounds for 
termination set out in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) exist.  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f).  We review 
a trial court’s adjudication decision in order “to determine whether the findings are 
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 
conclusions of law.”  In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 
394, 404 (1982)).  “[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is 
                                            
2 Although the trial court terminated the parental rights of Arty’s father as well, he 
did not note an appeal from the trial court’s termination orders and is not a party to the 
proceedings before this Court. 
3 The notice of appeal that respondent-mother filed in this case was directed to the 
Court of Appeals rather than this Court.  In view of the seriousness of the consequences of 
the trial court’s orders for both respondent-mother and Arty and the fact that neither DSS 
nor the guardian ad litem have objected to the sufficiency of respondent-mother’s notice of 
appeal, we elect to treat the record on appeal as a certiorari petition and allow that petition 
in order to reach the merits of respondent-mother’s challenge to the lawfulness of the trial 
court’s termination orders.  Anderson v. Hollifield, 345 N.C. 480, 482 (1997). 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
sufficient to support a termination of parental rights.”  In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 
395 (2019). 
¶ 9 
 
A parent’s parental rights in a child are subject to termination pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in the event that the trial court concludes that the parent 
has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101.  N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1).  A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile “whose 
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, 
or discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.”  
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).  As we have recently explained, 
[t]ermination of parental rights based upon this statutory 
ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the 
termination hearing or, if the child has been separated 
from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a 
showing of a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.  
When determining whether such future neglect is likely, 
the district court must consider evidence of changed 
circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect 
and the time of the termination hearing. 
In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020) (cleaned up) (first quoting In re D.L.W., 368 
N.C. 835, 843 (2016); then quoting In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 212 (2019). 
¶ 10 
 
In determining that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty were subject 
to termination on the basis of neglect, the trial court took judicial notice of the file in 
the underlying juvenile neglect and dependency proceeding and found that Arty had 
been adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile on 27 September 2018.  In addition, the 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
trial court found that respondent-mother had agreed to a case plan on 19 September 
2018 that required her to (1) attend and successfully complete an approved parenting 
class; (2) complete a parenting psychological evaluation, a mental health evaluation, 
a domestic violence assessment, and a substance abuse assessment and comply with 
all treatment-related recommendations; (3) participate in a random drug screening 
process; (4) communicate with DSS on a weekly basis; (5) maintain a legal and stable 
source of income for a period of at least three months; and (6) obtain and maintain 
stable housing for a period of at least three months.  Although the trial court did find 
that respondent-mother had made some progress toward satisfying the requirements 
of her case plan, it also found, however: 
36. That [respondent-mother] stated to Dr. Schaeffer 
during her psychological evaluation that she had 
broken up with the father and that she didn’t 
understand why he was listed as an aggressor in a 
report.  
. . . .  
 
38. That [respondent-mother] appears to have “broken 
up” with the father at least three different times 
throughout the time [Arty] has been in the care of 
Stokes DSS. 
 
. . . . 
 
42. That [respondent-mother] did not appear concerned 
that the father had not completed any domestic 
violence counseling. 
 
. . . .  
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
  
45. That although [respondent-mother] denie[d] drug 
use, the drug screens presented as Respondent’s 
Exhibit 2 still list that [respondent-mother] is 
diagnosed with severe opioid use disorder. 
 
. . . . 
 
48. That [respondent-mother] began Mental Health 
services with The Neill Group two weeks after the 
Adjudication Hearing in this matter began on March 
13th, 2020.  
 
49. That the Court has not heard any evidence regarding 
any additional Mental Health or Domestic Violence 
counseling since the last [incidents] of Domestic 
Violence.  
. . . . 
 
54. That although [respondent-mother] states that she 
does not have a relationship with the father, it is 
extremely troubling to this Court that the mother is 
in continued contact with the father and is allowing 
visitation with her new baby. 
. . . .  
 
56. That the Court finds that [respondent-mother] has 
genuine love and affection for [Arty], but that she does 
not appear to grasp the severity of the issues after all 
of the court hearings and all of the therapy that [she] 
has engaged in. 
 
57. That [respondent-mother] minimizes her role in the 
issues leading up to today’s hearing and what she 
needs to do to prevent problems of the past. 
 
58. That even during [respondent-mother’s] psychological 
evaluations 
the 
evaluators 
noted 
that 
[she] 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
minimized issues and did not grasp why this was 
happening to her. 
 
59. That Dr. Bennett specifically stated in [respondent-
mother’s] psychological evaluation that [respondent-
mother] had minimized her mental health and 
substance abuse issues. 
. . . .  
 
65. That prior to March 13th, 2020, [respondent-mother] 
had missed approximately three months of visitation 
with [Arty]. 
 
. . . .  
 
70. That the juvenile is a neglected juvenile, and that 
there is a reasonable likelihood of such neglect 
continuing in[to] the future.  More specifically: 
 
. . . .  
 
b. 
[Respondent-mother] . . . ha[s] failed to show 
conditions were remedied since the time of 
removal of the juvenile and therefore it appears 
likely that such neglect would continue into the 
foreseeable future. 
 
“Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal.”  In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). 
¶ 11 
 
As an initial matter, we consider respondent-mother’s contention that many of 
the findings of fact contained in the trial court’s adjudication order should be 
disregarded because they are nothing more than recitations of the testimony provided 
by various witnesses.  According to well-established North Carolina law, 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
“[r]ecitations of the testimony of each witness do not constitute findings of fact by the 
trial judge.”  In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 75 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Moore v. Moore, 160 N.C. App. 569, 571–72 (2003)).  In In re N.D.A., the trial court 
found as a fact that the father had “testified that he had ‘attempted to set up visits 
with the child but could not get any assistance in doing so.’ ”  Id. (emphasis added).  
On appeal, the father argued that the quoted language did not constitute a valid 
finding of fact because it contained nothing more than a recitation of his own 
testimony, a contention with which this Court agreed given that the language in 
question failed to determine whether the relevant portion of the father’s testimony 
was credible.  Id.  As a result, this Court disregarded the language in question in 
determining the validity of the trial court’s termination order.  Id. 
¶ 12 
 
A careful review of the trial court’s adjudication order satisfies us that Finding 
of Fact Nos. 33, 35, 37, 39–41, 43–44, 46–47, 50–53, and 55 are nothing more than 
recitations of the testimony of various witnesses.  Each of these findings states that 
a witness either “testified,” “contends,” or “indicated” that something was true.  In 
light of the fact that, in the relevant findings of fact, the trial court simply recited the 
testimony of various witnesses rather than indicating what actually happened or 
describing a statement that might constitute an admission by a party or otherwise 
had relevance because that statement was actually made, these “findings” fail to 
satisfy the trial court’s obligation to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
testified at the adjudication hearing and to resolve any contradictions that existed in 
the evidence.  As a result, our precedent compels us to disregard these findings of fact 
in ascertaining whether the trial court did or did not err in determining that 
respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty were subject to termination on the basis 
of neglect. 
¶ 13 
 
In addition to the findings of fact listed above, respondent-mother contends 
that Finding of Fact Nos. 54 and 59 should also be disregarded as mere recitations of 
witness testimony.  However, we are not persuaded by respondent-mother’s 
contentions with respect to these findings of fact. 
¶ 14 
 
In Finding of Fact No. 54, the trial court stated that, “although [respondent-
mother] states that she does not have a relationship with the father, it is extremely 
troubling to this Court that the mother is in continued contact with the father and is 
allowing visitation with her new baby.”  Admittedly, the trial court did point out that 
respondent-mother had “state[d]” that she was no longer in a relationship with the 
father.  In addition, however, the trial court determined in Finding of Fact No. 54 (1) 
that respondent-mother continued to have contact with the father and allowed him 
to have visitation with her new baby and (2) that her conduct in this regard was 
“extremely troubling” to the trial court.  In our view, both of these statements 
constitute actual findings of fact rather than simple recitations of witness testimony.  
See In re Harris Teeter, LLC, 271 N.C. App. 589, 611 (stating that “[a] finding of fact 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
is a ‘determination reached through logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts’ ”) 
(quoting Barnette v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 247 N.C. App. 1, 6 (2016))), cert. denied, 
376 N.C. 544 (2020), and aff’d on other grounds, 2021-NCSC-80.  As a result, the 
information contained in Finding of Fact No. 54 relating to respondent-mother’s 
continued contact with Arty’s father, her decision to allow Arty’s father to visit with 
her new baby, and the trial court’s concern about her conduct is appropriately 
considered in determining whether respondent-mother’s testimony was credible and 
whether respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty were subject to termination on 
the basis of neglect. 
¶ 15 
 
A careful reading of the trial court’s termination order persuades us that 
Finding of Fact No. 59 must be read in conjunction with Finding of Fact 58, which 
states “[t]hat[,] even during [respondent-mother’s] psychological evaluations[,] the 
evaluators noted that [respondent-mother] minimized issues and did not grasp why 
this was happening to her.”  In stating in Finding of Fact No. 59 “[t]hat Dr. Bennett 
specifically 
stated 
in 
[respondent-mother’s] 
psychological 
evaluation 
that 
[respondent-mother] had minimized her mental health and substance abuse issues,” 
the trial court was simply pointing to the portion of the record that provided the 
evidentiary support for Finding of Fact No. 58.  As a result, we decline to disregard 
the essential import of Finding of Fact Nos. 58 and 59, which is that respondent-
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
mother tended to minimize the nature and extent of the difficulties that she faced in 
attempting to parent Arty. 
¶ 16 
 
In addition, respondent-mother attacks the validity of the finding in which the 
trial court judicially noticed the materials in the underlying neglect and dependency 
action and incorporated the “file and any findings of fact therefrom within the current 
order.”  In support of this contention, respondent-mother points out that “[t]he trial 
court made broad, general statements of judicial notice and incorporation without 
specifying precisely what it was using for any specific finding” and argues that 
“[m]erely incorporating documents by reference is not a sufficient finding of fact.”  We 
do not believe that the presence of this language in the trial court’s adjudication order 
constitutes prejudicial error. 
¶ 17 
 
As an initial matter, we note that respondent-mother did not object to the trial 
court’s decision to judicially notice the file in the underlying neglect and dependency 
proceeding.  See In re A.B., 272 N.C. App. 13, 16 (2020) (stating that “[a] respondent’s 
failure to object to the trial court’s taking judicial notice of the underlying juvenile 
case files waives appellate review of the issue” (cleaned up) (quoting In re W.L.M., 
181 N.C. App. 518, 522 (2007))).  In addition, even if respondent-mother had properly 
preserved her objection to the trial court’s decision to judicially notice the materials 
in the underlying neglect and dependency proceeding for purposes of appellate 
review, her objection to the trial court’s action lacks substantive merit.  As this Court 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
has previously recognized, “[a] trial court may take judicial notice of findings of fact 
made in prior orders, even when those findings are based on a lower evidentiary 
standard because where a judge sits without a jury, the trial court is presumed to 
have disregarded any incompetent evidence and relied upon the competent evidence.”  
In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 410 (citing Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell, 301 N.C. 689, 694 
(1981)).  On the other hand, however, “the trial court may not rely solely on prior 
court orders and reports” and must, instead, “receive some oral testimony at the 
hearing and make an independent determination regarding the evidence presented.”  
Id. 
¶ 18 
 
Although the trial court did take judicial notice of the record in the underlying 
neglect and dependency proceeding and incorporated “that file and any findings of 
fact therefrom within the [adjudication] order,” it did not rely solely upon these 
materials in determining that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty were 
subject to termination.  Instead, the trial court also received oral testimony during 
the termination hearing from Katie Fulk, a social worker; respondent-mother; and 
Jodi Callahan, an addiction specialist employed by Novant Health, who counseled 
respondent-mother regarding her substance abuse issues.  In addition, the trial court 
made independent factual determinations based upon the evidence admitted at the 
termination hearing that adequately addressed the matters at issue between the 
parties.  As a result, since the trial court received evidence in the form of oral witness 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
testimony at the adjudication hearing, fully considered this evidence, and made 
findings of fact delineating its independent evaluation of the record evidence in its 
adjudication order, we conclude that respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial 
court’s decision to take judicial notice of the record developed in the underlying 
neglect and dependency proceeding lacks merit. 
¶ 19 
 
Next, respondent-mother challenges the appropriateness of Finding of Fact 
Nos. 36 and 38 on the grounds that they lack “a nexus, an anchor in time, or relevance 
as support for a conclusion on the existence of any ground at the time of the hearing.”  
According to respondent-mother, in light of the trial court’s failure to “articulat[e] the 
connection between a finding and a ground, many [of its] findings are simply 
statements with no support for a ground for termination.”  Once again, we fail to find 
respondent-mother’s argument to be persuasive. 
¶ 20 
 
As an initial matter, we hold that both of the challenged findings of fact have 
ample evidentiary support.  In Finding of Fact No. 36, the trial court stated that 
respondent-mother had told “Dr. Schaeffer during her psychological evaluation that 
she had broken up with the father and that she didn’t understand why he was listed 
as an aggressor in a report.”  As the record reflects, respondent-mother acknowledged 
that DSS had expressed concern about her relationship with Arty’s father and that 
she had told Dr. Schaeffer that Arty’s father had a “bad temper” before stating that 
she did not “know why” Arty’s father had been described as an “aggressor” in various 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
reports.  In Finding of Fact No. 38, the trial court found that respondent-mother 
“appears to have ‘broken up’ with the father at least three different times throughout 
the time the juvenile has been in” DSS care.  According to the record, respondent-
mother testified that she had “broke[n] up” with Arty’s father right after Christmas 
in 2019, after previously having ended her relationship with him one year earlier.  In 
addition, the record reflects that respondent-mother admitted that, in April 2019, 
Arty’s father had intimidated her; that she had locked herself in a bathroom in 
response to his conduct; and that, after she had done so, Arty’s father broke down the 
door and forced his way into the bathroom, causing her to obtain the entry of a 
domestic violence protective order against him.  As a result, the relevant findings of 
fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing record evidence and appear to us 
to have been relevant to the issue of whether respondent-mother’s parental rights in 
Arty were subject to termination on the basis of neglect given that they demonstrated 
the continued existence of contact between respondent-mother and Arty’s father 
despite his abusive behavior, a fact that tends to show her failure to understand and 
to address the issue of domestic violence. 
¶ 21 
 
Similarly, respondent-mother challenges a number of other findings as lacking 
in sufficient record support.  First, respondent-mother argues that the record fails to 
provide sufficient support for Finding of Fact No. 42, in which the trial court found 
that respondent-mother “did not appear concerned that the father had not completed 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
any domestic violence counselling.”  The record contains ample support for an 
assertion that respondent-mother and Arty’s father had a history of domestic 
violence.  At the termination hearing, respondent-mother testified that, during the 
first year of her relationship with Arty’s father and while she was pregnant with Arty, 
she “started noticing that he might have like some anger issues, . . . but I stayed with 
him in a chance to make our family work.  He’s gotten worse over the time.”  In 
addition, as we have already noted, respondent-mother had reported an incident of 
domestic violence between herself and Arty’s father that had occurred in April 2019 
and that had (1) caused Arty’s father to go on “a three-day high, which led to his being 
violent” and had (2) motivated respondent-mother to obtain the entry of a domestic 
violence protective order directed against Arty’s father.  In spite of this history of 
domestic violence, however, respondent-mother subsequently reconciled with Arty’s 
father.  At a permanency-planning hearing held on 10 October 2019, respondent-
mother reported that she had established housing with Arty’s father in Winston-
Salem.  In addition, respondent-mother acknowledged at the termination hearing 
that she continued to allow the father to visit with her new baby.  When asked at the 
termination hearing whether, as a victim of domestic violence, she had concerns 
about the fact that Arty’s father was having visits with her child, respondent-mother 
testified that her “only concern” was Arty’s father’s “substance abuse problems.”  As 
a result, the record contains ample support for Finding of Fact No. 42.  See In re 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843 (stating that the trial judge is required to consider all of the 
evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to determine the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence). 
¶ 22 
 
In addition, respondent-mother challenges the sufficiency of the record support 
for Finding of Fact No. 45, which states that, “although [respondent-mother] denies 
drug use, the drug screens presented as Respondent’s Exhibit 2 still list that the 
mother is diagnosed with severe opioid use disorder.”  In support of this contention, 
respondent-mother states that, since her drug screen results demonstrate that she 
had not engaged in improper drug use since July 2018, the fact that the drug screen 
summaries that were admitted into evidence at the termination hearing continued to 
“list” a diagnosis of severe opioid use disorder constitutes a misrepresentation of the 
evidence by implying that she has a new or ongoing substance abuse or disorder. 
¶ 23 
 
As the trial court’s findings reflect, the drug screen summaries indicate that, 
throughout the relevant period of time, respondent-mother was diagnosed as having 
an “[o]pioid use disorder, severe.”  For that reason, the specific finding that the trial 
court actually made has sufficient evidentiary support.  In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843.  
On the other hand, given the absence of any evidence tending to show what, if 
anything, the continued existence of this diagnosis reflects and what was necessary 
in order for this diagnosis to be deleted and the absence of any findings that 
respondent-mother had tested positive for the presence of unlawful drugs or exhibited 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
a consistent pattern of attempting to evade the required drug screening process in 
the period of time immediately prior to the termination hearing, we opt to refrain 
from considering Finding of Fact No. 45 in determining whether the trial court’s 
findings support its conclusion that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty were 
subject to termination on the basis of neglect.  See In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 900 
(stating that this Court limits its review of findings of fact “to those challenged 
findings that are necessary to support the trial court’s determination . . . that parental 
rights should be terminated”). 
¶ 24 
 
Next, respondent-mother challenges the sufficiency of the record support for 
Finding of Fact No. 49, which states that “the Court has not heard any evidence 
regarding any additional Mental Health or Domestic Violence counseling since the 
last [incidents] of Domestic Violence.”  Although respondent-mother testified at the 
termination hearing that the last incident of domestic violence in which she was 
involved with Arty’s father had occurred in April 2019, she also claims that, after this 
date, she had continued to participate in substance abuse counseling at Novant 
Health, had attended mental health treatment at Novant Health and the Neill Group, 
and had participated in group sessions that were intended to address domestic 
violence concerns.  A careful review of the record satisfies us that respondent-mother 
did, in fact, receive mental health counseling at Novant Health after April 2019, with 
the Novant Health records that were admitted into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
2 tending to show that respondent-mother saw a physician for treatment of major 
depressive disorder and panic disorder on 16 May 2019 and that she saw a provider 
at Novant Health for “[d]epression affecting pregnancy” on 3 October 2019.  In 
addition, DSS concedes that respondent-mother sought domestic violence counseling 
after April 2019 given that the record contains a certificate of participation dated 9 
October 2019 that shows that respondent-mother completed a domestic violence 
support group.4  As a result, we will disregard Finding of Fact No. 49 in evaluating 
the lawfulness of the trial court’s determination that respondent-mother’s parental 
rights in Arty were subject to termination on the basis of neglect.  In re S.M., 375 
N.C. 673, 684 (2020). 
¶ 25 
 
Moreover, respondent-mother argues that Finding of Fact Nos. 57 through 59, 
which indicate that respondent-mother failed to “grasp” and tended to minimize the 
extent of her involvement in the difficulties that precluded her reunification with 
Arty, lack sufficient record support.  Respondent-mother’s argument to the contrary 
notwithstanding, however, the record reflects that Dr. Bennett specifically stated in 
his report that respondent-mother “minimized emotional and psychiatric issues”; 
                                            
4 DSS contends that, “given that the parents reconciled and separated again by 
December of 2019, it is not beyond imagining that further instances of domestic violence 
likely occurred around that time.”  Although the trial court does have the right to make 
reasonable inferences from the evidence, “[s]uch inferences, however, ‘cannot rest on 
conjecture or surmise.’ ”  In re K.L.T., 374 N.C. 826, 843 (2020) (quoting Sowers v. Marley, 
235 N.C. 607, 609 (1952)).  The inference that DSS seeks to have us draw from the parents’ 
reconciliation and subsequent separation does not strike us as a reasonable one. 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that this tendency to minimize the problems that respondent-mother faced 
“extend[ed] to the potential for domestic violence as she does not appear to 
understand that the [April 2019] incident . . . would be considered domestic violence”; 
and that respondent-mother tended to minimize her substance abuse problems.  
Although respondent-mother points out that Dr. Bennett’s report was the only 
evidence upon which these findings could possibly rest, the report in question 
provides ample support for the challenged portions of Finding of Fact Nos. 57 through 
59, with it being the province of the trial court to evaluate the credibility of the 
evidence and to determine the reasonableness of the inferences that should be drawn 
from that evidence.  In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843.  Thus, we reject this aspect of 
respondent-mother’s challenge to the lawfulness of the trial court’s order. 
¶ 26 
 
Furthermore, respondent-mother contends that Finding of Fact No. 65, in 
which the trial court stated that, “[p]rior to March 13th 2020, [respondent-mother] 
had missed approximately three months of visitation with [Arty],” fails “to account 
for those reasonable and excusable justifications consistent with the missed visits.”  
Respondent-mother does not, however, argue that she did not miss the visits in 
question.  In addition, the trial court has the authority, in the exercise of its 
responsibility as the finder of fact, to refrain from accepting any justifications or 
explanations that respondent-mother offered for missing these visits.  See In re 
J.T.C., 273 N.C App. 66, 70 (2020) (stating that “[i]t is well-established . . . that 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
‘[c]redibility, contradictions, and discrepancies in the evidence are matters to be 
resolved by the trier of fact, here the trial judge, and the trier of fact may accept or 
reject the testimony of any witness’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. 
Smith, 89 N.C. App. 232, 235 (1988)), aff’d per curiam, 376 N.C. 642 (2021).  As a 
result, the trial court did not commit any error of law in making Finding of Fact No. 
65. 
¶ 27 
 
In Finding of Fact No. 71, the trial court stated that the allegations set out in 
the termination motion had “been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.”  
Although respondent-mother appears to contend that the trial court erred by making 
Finding of Fact No. 71 on the grounds that this finding involves an erroneous 
application of the legal principles governing the issue of judicial notice, the challenged 
finding of fact is nothing more than a statement of the applicable standard of proof.  
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (providing that, at the adjudicatory portion of a termination 
of parental rights proceeding, “[t]he burden . . . shall be upon the petitioner or movant 
and all findings of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence”); see 
also In re B.L.H., 376 N.C. 118, 127 (2020) (holding that, while the trial court failed 
to state the required standard of proof in the written termination order, its oral 
statement that its findings rested upon “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence 
satisfied the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f)). 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 28 
 
Similarly, in Finding of Fact No. 72, the trial court stated that “any additional 
allegations of the Motion for Termination of Parental Rights not specifically laid out 
[in its previous findings were incorporated into its adjudicatory order] as Findings of 
Fact.”  According to respondent-mother, the trial court erred by making this finding 
of fact on the theory that the trial court is required to find the facts specifically rather 
than simply incorporating a large body of findings from some other document by 
reference and on the grounds that a trial court cannot make adequate findings of fact 
by simply reciting the allegations set out in a termination motion.  See In re Harton, 
156 N.C. App. 655, 660 (2003) (stating that, “[w]hen a trial court is required to make 
findings of fact, it must make the findings of fact specially” and, instead of “simply 
recit[ing] allegations,” “must through processes of logical reasoning from the 
evidentiary facts find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law” 
(cleaned up) (first quoting N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2001); then quoting In re 
Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 96 (2002))).  We do not find respondent-mother’s 
argument to be persuasive. 
¶ 29 
 
As this Court has previously stated, “[t]he requirement for appropriately 
detailed findings is . . . not a mere formality or a rule of empty ritual; it is designed 
instead ‘to dispose of the issues raised by the pleadings and to allow the appellate 
courts to perform their proper function in the judicial system.’ ”  Coble v. Coble, 300 
N.C. 708, 712 (1980) (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 158 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
(1977)).  A careful review of the trial court’s adjudication order reveals that, rather 
than simply reciting the allegations set out in the termination motion, the trial court 
made “sufficient additional findings of fact which indicate the trial court considered 
the evidence presented at the hearing,” In re S.C.R., 217 N.C. App. 166, 169 (2011) 
(quoting In re O.W., 164 N.C. App. 699, 702 (2004)), with this case being readily 
distinguishable from In re S.C.R., in which the trial court erroneously made only “one 
additional finding of fact beyond those incorporated from the petition,” resulting in 
the entry of an order that was, as the Court of Appeals determined, insufficient to 
permit a “determin[ation] that the judgment is adequately supported by competent 
evidence.”  Id. at 170 (quoting Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. at 156–57).  Instead, the 
trial court made over seventy findings of fact in the adjudication order that is at issue 
in this case.  Even though, as we have already noted, a number of the trial court’s 
findings were deficient for various reasons, the remaining findings are sufficient to 
permit meaningful appellate review.  Cf. In re K.R.C., 374 N.C. 849, 861 (2020) 
(concluding that this Court was “simply unable to undertake meaningful appellate 
review of the trial court’s decision based upon a series of evidentiary findings which 
[were] untethered to any ultimate facts which undergird an adjudication pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) or to any particularized conclusions of law which would 
otherwise explain the trial court’s reasoning”).  See also In re Z.D., 258 N.C. App. 441, 
444 (2018) (stating that, in order for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
review, a “trial court must make specific findings of the ultimate facts established by 
the evidence, admissions and stipulations which are determinative of the questions 
involved in the action and essential to support the conclusions of law reached” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 452 
(1982))); In re A.B., 245 N.C. App. 35, 44–45 (2016) (stating that, “[a]lthough finding 
of fact 13 certainly includes some ‘unoriginal prose [,]’ . . . the trial court made 70 
findings of fact” and “referred to the allegations from DSS’s petitions by reference to 
subparagraphs a-k in one of seventy findings, so it is clear that the trial court made 
an independent determination of the facts and did ‘more’ than merely ‘recit[e] the 
allegations’ ” (second and fourth alterations in original) (quoting In re O.W., 164 N.C. 
App. at 702)).  As a result, we reject respondent-mother’s contention that the trial 
court erred by incorporating the allegations set out in the termination motion in its 
termination order. 
¶ 30 
 
Next, respondent-mother argues that Finding of Fact No. 70(b), which states 
that respondent-mother had “failed to show conditions were remedied since the time 
of removal of the juvenile and therefore it appears likely that such neglect would 
continue into the foreseeable future” improperly shifted the burden of proof from DSS 
to respondent-mother by requiring her to “show conditions” had been “remedied” 
since Arty had been removed from her home.  Although respondent-mother is 
certainly correct in noting that the burden of proof at the adjudication stage of a 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
termination of parental rights proceeding rests upon the petitioner or movant, see 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (stating that “[t]he burden in [an adjudicatory hearing on 
termination] shall be upon the petitioner or movant and all findings of fact shall be 
based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence”), we do not believe that Finding of 
Fact No. 70(b) indicates that the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 
from DSS to respondent-mother.  Instead, we conclude that, “[w]hen viewed in the 
context of the entire termination order, the trial court’s finding is merely an 
expression of its observation that respondent-mother failed to rebut petitioners’ clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence that the conditions of [removal had not been 
remedied],” In re D.L.A.D., 375 N.C. 565, 570 (2020); see also In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 
190, 196 (2019) (stating that “the district court did not improperly shift DSS’ burden 
of proof onto respondent-mother” and had, instead, “simply observed that respondent-
mother had failed to rebut DSS’ clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that she and 
the father had not established safe and stable housing for the children”), when viewed 
in light of its earlier determinations that respondent-mother failed to fully grasp the 
extent of her mental health problems and the difficulties created by her continued 
relationship with Arty’s father.5  As a result, we hold that this aspect of respondent-
mother’s challenge to the trial court’s adjudication order has no merit. 
                                            
5 Although respondent-mother challenges the lawfulness of Finding of Fact Nos. 41, 
60, 61, and 68 as well, we need not address the arguments that she advanced in support of 
her contention that the trial court erred by making these findings on the grounds that the 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 31 
 
Finally, respondent-mother asserts that the record evidence and the trial 
court’s findings of fact fail to support its determination that it was likely that Arty 
would be neglected in the event that he was returned to respondent-mother’s care.  
We are unable to agree with respondent-mother’s contention. 
¶ 32 
 
As we have already noted, the trial court erred by making a number of findings 
of fact that constituted nothing more than recitations of the testimony of various 
witnesses and by finding, in the absence of sufficient record support, that the record 
did not contain any indication that respondent-mother had participated in any 
mental health or domestic violence treatment after the April 2019 incident in which 
Arty’s father committed acts of domestic violence against her.  However, “[t]here is 
nothing impermissible about describing testimony, so long as the court ultimately 
makes its own findings, resolving any material disputes,” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 
408 (quoting In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 446 (2005), aff’d per curiam, in part, 
and disc. rev. improvidently allowed, in part, 360 N.C. 475 (2006)), and this Court 
simply disregards information contained in findings of fact that lack sufficient 
evidentiary support in determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact support 
a determination that a parent’s parental rights in a child are subject to termination.  
As a result, we will now examine the sufficiency of the trial court’s properly made and 
                                            
findings in question are not necessary to support a conclusion that the trial court’s findings 
support its conclusion that respondent-mother’s parental rights were subject to termination 
on the basis of neglect.  See In re N.G., 374 N.C. at 900. 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
supported findings of fact for the purpose of ascertaining whether they support a 
determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty were subject to 
termination on the basis of neglect, including whether those findings sufficed to show 
a likelihood of future neglect in the event that Arty was to be returned to respondent-
mother’s care. 
¶ 33 
 
A careful review of the trial court’s valid findings of fact establishes that, while 
respondent-mother made some progress in satisfying the requirements of her case 
plan, the progress that she did make was extremely limited; that respondent-mother 
had “broken up” with the father on at least three occasions during the pendency of 
the underlying neglect and dependency proceeding; that, in spite of her denial that 
she was still involved in a romantic relationship with Arty’s father, respondent-
mother continued to have contact with Arty’s father and allowed him to visit her new 
baby; that respondent-mother was not concerned by the fact that Arty’s father had 
failed to complete domestic violence counseling; that, in spite of the fact that 
respondent-mother had genuine love and affection for Arty, she did not grasp the 
severity of the difficulties that she faced in seeking to be reunited with him; that 
respondent-mother minimized the problems that she faced and the significance of the 
steps that she needed to take in order to prevent these past difficulties from recurring; 
that respondent-mother was completely dependent upon others for her housing and 
finances; that respondent-mother had never had stable housing or independent 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
means of support during the pendency of the underlying neglect and dependency 
proceeding; that respondent-mother missed approximately three months of visitation 
with Arty; and that respondent-mother had failed to provide any financial support 
for Arty during the time that he was in DSS custody.  In addition, the trial court 
found that Arty had been adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile in 2018; that 
respondent-mother had failed to show that the conditions that had led to Arty’s 
removal from her care had been remedied; and that there was a likelihood that the 
neglect that Arty had experienced would recur in the event that he was returned to 
respondent-mother’s care. 
¶ 34 
 
The trial court’s properly made findings indicate that Arty had previously been 
found to be a neglected juvenile.  In addition, by finding as a fact that respondent-
mother had made some progress toward satisfying the requirements of her case plan 
by submitting to psychological evaluations, completing parenting classes, obtaining 
a domestic violence assessment and completing domestic violence classes, 
maintaining some level of contact with DSS, participating in substance abuse 
treatment, participating in a number of drug screens, and submitting to a mental 
health evaluation, it is apparent that the trial court considered whether respondent-
mother’s situation had improved between the date upon which Arty entered DSS 
custody and the date of the termination hearing.  In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 212.  On 
the other hand, the trial court also found that future neglect was likely in the event 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that Arty was returned to respondent-mother’s care.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
trial court focused upon the fact that respondent-mother minimized the severity of 
her parenting-related problems and the extent to which her parenting deficiencies 
had contributed to Arty’s removal from her care, with the trial court having expressed 
particular concern about the fact that respondent-mother continued to have contact 
with Arty’s father, had reconciled with him on more than one occasion, and was 
allowing him to visit her new child in spite of his prior history of committing acts of 
domestic violence against her.  See In re M.C., 374 N.C. 882, 889 (2020) (concluding 
that “respondent’s refusal to acknowledge the effect of domestic violence on the 
children and her inability to sever her relationship with [the father], . . . supports the 
trial court’s determination that the neglect of the children would likely be repeated if 
they were returned to respondent’s care”); see also In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870 (2020) 
(holding that, even though the father claimed to have made reasonable progress 
toward satisfying the requirements of his case plan, the trial court’s findings relating 
to his failure to adequately address the issue of domestic violence, which had been 
the primary reason for the children’s removal from the family home, sufficed, 
“standing alone, . . . to support a determination that there was a likelihood of future 
neglect”); In re J.A.M., 259 N.C. App. 810, 816 (2018) (holding that, where domestic 
violence was one of the grounds for the child’s removal from the parental home, the 
mother’s denial that she needed help and her continued involvement with the father, 
IN RE:  A.C. 
2021-NCSC-91 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
who had committed acts of domestic violence against her, “constitute[d] evidence that 
the trial court could find was predictive of future neglect”).  As a result, the trial court 
did not err by determining that there was a likelihood that the neglect that Arty had 
previously experienced would be repeated in the event that he was returned to 
respondent-mother’s care and by concluding that respondent-mother’s parental 
rights in Arty were subject to termination based upon neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(1). 
¶ 35 
 
A trial court’s determination that a parent’s parental rights in a child are 
subject to termination for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is sufficient, 
in and of itself, to support the termination of that parent’s parental rights.  In re 
E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395.  For that reason, we need not determine whether the trial 
court erred by determining that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty were 
subject to termination for willful failure to make reasonable progress toward 
correcting the conditions that had led to Arty’s placement in DSS custody, N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(2), or dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6).  In addition, we note that 
respondent-mother has not challenged the lawfulness of the trial court’s 
determination that the termination of her parental rights would be in Arty’s best 
interests.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).  As a result, for all of these reasons, we affirm 
the trial court’s orders terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in Arty. 
AFFIRMED.