Title: Commonwealth v. Hart
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13217
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2023

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SJC-13217 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSHUA HART. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     September 15, 2023. - December 8, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Fair trial, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Sentence, Cruel and unusual punishment.  Fair 
Trial.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness 
of statement, Hearsay, Testimonial statement.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Venue, Fair trial, 
Hearsay, Confrontation of witnesses, Sentence. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 19, 2016, and March 31, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John A. 
Agostini, J., and the cases were tried before him. 
 
 
Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant and his girlfriend entered an 
elderly couple's home through an unlocked door, stabbed and 
suffocated the two occupants of the house, and stole their 
2 
 
valuables.  They then fled the Commonwealth in the victims' car.  
One of the victims died immediately, and the other died 
approximately one month later.  Following a jury trial, the 
defendant was convicted of two charges of murder in the first 
degree.1 
In this appeal, the defendant argues that his convictions 
should be reversed on three bases:  (1) the defendant's 
confession to law enforcement was involuntary and should have 
been suppressed; (2) the trial should have been transferred to 
another venue due to pretrial publicity; and (3) a victim's out-
of-court statement should have been excluded from evidence 
because it was inadmissible hearsay and the victim did not 
testify at trial.  The defendant further contends that, 
considering his age at the time of the crimes, his sentences of 
life without the possibility of parole constitute cruel or 
unusual punishment.  Lastly, the defendant asks us to exercise 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or 
remand the case for resentencing.  We find no reversible error 
in any issue raised by the defendant and, after plenary review, 
no cause to exercise our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We 
therefore affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of attempted murder, two 
counts of armed robbery, larceny of a motor vehicle, and 
fraudulent use of a credit card. 
3 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
reasonably found, reserving certain details for our analysis of 
the issues. 
a.  The attack on Thomas Harty and Joanna Fisher.  On 
October 5, 2016, the defendant and his girlfriend, Brittany 
Smith, decided that they would leave town in light of pending 
criminal charges and that they would break into a house to steal 
a car and money to effectuate their escape.  At around 7:30 
P.M., they chose a specific house in Orange because the garage 
contained an older car, which they believed would be less likely 
to have a tracking system.  The defendant and Smith knew that 
there were two individuals inside the house, and they intended 
to intimidate the occupants of the house into providing money 
and the keys to the car. 
The defendant and Smith both entered the garage of the 
house through an unlocked door, collected a socket wrench from 
the garage, and proceeded into the house.  As they walked 
through the kitchen towards the living room, each also picked up 
a knife from the kitchen counter. 
Thomas Harty, the ninety-five year old homeowner, stood up 
from an armchair in the living room to confront the two 
intruders.  The defendant entered the living room, where he 
stabbed Harty in the neck and multiple times in the chest.  The 
4 
 
defendant then put a pillow over Harty's face until Harty ceased 
breathing. 
Next, the defendant turned to Joanna Fisher, Harty's 
seventy-seven year old wife, who was nonambulatory and a full-
time wheelchair user.  Smith had already assaulted Fisher, and 
Fisher was lying on the ground.  The defendant stabbed Fisher 
numerous times, stood on her stomach in an attempt to take the 
air out of her body, and put a pillow over her face to suffocate 
her. 
The defendant and Smith proceeded to steal credit and debit 
cards, approximately $200, a cell phone, and a car.  They then 
disabled the house telephones and fled. 
b.  Fisher's statements.  At approximately 9:10 A.M. the 
following day, October 6, 2016, Cindy Sumner-Moryl arrived at 
the house.  Sumner-Moryl was Fisher's nurse and had a scheduled 
appointment to assist Fisher with physical therapy exercises and 
other personal care needs.  She and another care worker found 
the house in disarray, Harty motionless in the armchair in the 
living room, and Fisher on the floor in her bedroom.  Fisher had 
a blanket over her legs, she was lying in a pool of blood, and 
there was blood on the side of her face.  Sumner-Moryl testified 
as follows at trial: 
"I heard her moaning, so I went over to her right away.  
And she said, [']Cindy, is that you?[']  And I said 
[']yes['] and she said [']invasion, ambulance.[']  And I 
5 
 
reassured her that we had help coming and that she was 
safe. . . .  I directed [the other care worker] to call 
911. . . .  And I stayed with Ms. Fisher to comfort her. 
. . .  She wanted to know if she had a black eye and I said 
yes, she did.  And she told me that they tried to kill her, 
that they kept putting a pillow over her face and tried to 
smother her[;] she said, [']But, I'm tough.[']  Then she 
told me that she dragged herself out onto the porch and 
tried to call for help, but no one heard her." 
 
Fisher was brought to the hospital for medical attention 
for stab wounds, loss of blood, rib fractures, and other 
abrasions and lacerations.  Harty was declared deceased; Fisher 
died weeks later from complications arising from the attack. 
c.  The police investigation.  Shortly after Sumner-Moryl 
found Fisher, police arrived at Harty and Fisher's home.  There 
was evidence of an attack throughout the house.  Harty lay 
lifeless in the armchair in the living room, and there were 
bloodstains across the living room –- on the floor, on multiple 
pillows, and on the chair in which Harty was found dead –- as 
well as in the rest of the house.  The police found a socket 
wrench and a disabled cordless telephone on the dining room 
table, and a disabled cordless telephone in the living room. 
Within hours of the attack, the police were notified that 
someone attempted to use Harty's credit card at a store in 
Worcester.  The police then obtained photographs showing the 
defendant and Smith attempting to use Harty's credit card and 
successfully using Fisher's debit card there.  A photograph and 
a video recording also showed the defendant and Smith in the 
6 
 
store's parking lot with Harty and Fisher's car.  The police 
were first able to identify the defendant and Smith based on 
these photographs. 
The police proceeded to speak with witnesses who stated 
that they saw the defendant and Smith together immediately 
before the attack.  Surveillance footage from a small market 
further placed the couple together near the victims' house 
around the time of the attack, and the local police's bloodhound 
tracked Smith from the market to the victims' home based on the 
scent of a shirt Smith had been wearing shortly before the 
attack. 
Forensic and physical evidence also tied the defendant and 
Smith to the crime scene.  Rosary beads, matching a description 
from a rosary worn by the defendant on the night of the attack, 
were discovered on the living room floor and in the chair in 
which Harty was found.  The defendant's fingerprint was found on 
a window shade behind Harty's body, and Smith's fingerprints 
were found on various windows around the house.  A footwear 
impression consistent with the heel print of a Nike Air Jordan, 
the type of sneaker the defendant wore on the night of the 
attack, was found on the floor of the living room. 
Massachusetts law enforcement tracked the defendant and 
Smith over the following days as the two assailants fled down 
the east coast.  On October 8, 2016, Rockbridge County, 
7 
 
Virginia, deputy sheriffs (Virginia officers) arrested the 
defendant and Smith.  The victims' car was found in a nearby U-
Haul parking lot.  The police later learned that the defendant 
and Smith had rented a U-Haul motor vehicle after the car had 
broken down.  The defendant's and Smith's fingerprints were 
found in the car, along with Smith's pocketbook, a wallet with 
the defendant's MassHealth card, receipts showing purchases with 
Fisher's debit card, and an identification card for Harty. 
d.  The defendant's interrogations with law enforcement.  
Once in custody, the defendant immediately indicated that he 
wanted to speak with the Virginia officers.  The Virginia 
officers, after consultation with Massachusetts law enforcement 
officers, agreed to meet with the defendant and brought him from 
his cell to an interview room.  During an approximately one-hour 
long audio-recorded conversation, the defendant confessed to the 
attack on Harty and Fisher.  The defendant also provided a 
sketch of the victims' house and a written confession. 
The next day, two Massachusetts State police troopers 
(Massachusetts officers) met with the defendant in the 
Rockbridge County, Virginia, sheriff's office.  This 
conversation was also audio recorded and lasted approximately 
two hours and ten minutes.  The defendant again made numerous 
admissions detailing the crimes that he and Smith committed. 
8 
 
e.  The defendant's convictions and sentencing.  On April 
13, 2018, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of 
murder in the first degree for Harty's death based on the theory 
of felony-murder; murder in the first degree for Fisher's death 
based on the theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder; and other charges.2  The 
defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole for each conviction of murder in the first degree, to be 
served consecutively. 
The defendant's codefendant, Brittany Smith, was 
subsequently and separately tried for and convicted of two 
charges of murder in the first degree for killing Harty and 
Fisher, among other charges.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 492 
Mass. 604, 604-605 (2023). 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Voluntariness of confession.  The 
defendant argues that his rights under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution were violated because the trial 
judge improperly denied the defendant's motion to suppress his 
 
2 As stated, the defendant was also convicted of attempted 
murder, two counts of armed robbery, larceny of a motor vehicle, 
and fraudulent use of a credit card. 
 
9 
 
allegedly involuntary confession to the Virginia officers.3  When 
reviewing a trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress, we 
"conduct an independent review of [the trial judge's] ultimate 
findings and conclusions of law."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 
Mass. 645, 652 (2018).  We review subsidiary findings of fact 
with differing deference based on the type of evidence from 
which the findings are drawn.  See id. at 655.  "[F]indings 
drawn partly or wholly from testimonial evidence are accorded 
deference and are not set aside unless clearly erroneous."  Id.  
That is, such findings are set aside only if, although evidence 
supports such findings, we are nonetheless "left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed" 
after review of all the evidence (citation omitted).  Id. at 655 
n.7.  On the other hand, we review de novo any findings based 
entirely on documentary evidence.  Id. at 655.  Where we are 
solely reviewing an audio recording of an interrogation, for 
example, "we are in the same position as the motion judge to 
determine what occurred during the interview."  Commonwealth v. 
Hammond, 477 Mass. 499, 502 (2017).  We conclude, based upon the 
judge's findings of fact from the evidentiary hearing, and our 
 
3 It is uncontested that the defendant was in custody and 
that the conversation between the defendant and the Virginia 
officers constituted interrogation. 
10 
 
independent review of the recording here, that the trial judge 
properly determined the defendant's statements to be voluntary. 
A statement is presumed voluntary until a defendant 
produces any evidence showing otherwise.4  Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 206 (2011).  Once a defendant presents 
such evidence through a motion, affidavit, or proffer, the 
burden shifts to the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the statement was made voluntarily.  Id.  A voluntary 
statement is "the product of a 'rational intellect' and a 'free 
will,' and not induced by physical or psychological coercion" 
(citation omitted).  Hammond, 477 Mass. at 502.  More 
specifically, "[t]he test for voluntariness . . . is 'whether, 
in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statement, the will of the defendant was overborne 
to the extent that the statement was not the result of a free 
and voluntary act'" (citation omitted).  Id.  "Under this 
'totality of the circumstances' test, we consider all of the 
relevant circumstances surrounding the interrogation and the 
individual characteristics and conduct of the defendant" 
 
4 The rights to due process and against self-incrimination 
afforded to defendants under the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights are at least as protective as, if not even more expansive 
than, those afforded under the United States Constitution.  
Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 60 (2022).  Commonwealth 
v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 858-859 (2000). 
11 
 
(citation omitted).  Id.  The nonexhaustive list of relevant 
factors includes 
"promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, 
the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional 
stability, experience with and in the criminal justice 
system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the 
discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or 
the police), and the details of the interrogation[, 
including the recitation of Miranda warnings]" (citation 
omitted). 
 
Id. at 502 n.3. 
The totality of the circumstances here demonstrates that 
the will of the defendant was not overborne when he confessed to 
the Virginia officers.  The interrogation lasted only 
approximately one hour, and the tone during the entirety of the 
interview was conversational rather than adversarial:  no one 
raised his or her voice, the Virginia officers never harassed 
the defendant, and the defendant never appeared agitated or 
intimidated by the Virginia officers.  Additionally, the 
defendant did not appear particularly vulnerable to coercion.  
He was an adult with a postsecondary education; he appeared 
physically healthy and mentally coherent; and he had had 
significant experience with the criminal justice system.  The 
defendant was able to recite the Miranda warnings himself -- 
saying that "[he knew] them very well" -- prior to the Virginia 
officers formally providing those warnings and obtaining a 
voluntary waiver.  The defendant initiated the conversation with 
12 
 
the Virginia officers and displayed an obvious desire to speak 
and confess to them.  Indeed, the defendant specifically 
mentioned to the Massachusetts officers that he had "volunteered 
to talk" to the Virginia officers. 
The defendant nonetheless contends that his statements were 
involuntary because the police (i) used a "now or never" 
interrogation tactic; (ii) used language minimizing the crimes; 
(iii) appealed to the defendant's religious beliefs; and 
(iv) made a promise to facilitate leniency for the defendant's 
girlfriend.  We disagree. 
i.  "Now or never."  A "now or never" interrogation tactic 
is one that "lead[s] a defendant to believe that the 
conversation with police will be his or her sole opportunity to 
tell his or her story."  Commonwealth v. Miller, 486 Mass. 78, 
92 (2020).  The "now or never" tactic "casts substantial doubt 
on the voluntariness of a subsequent confession and on the 
integrity of the interrogation process leading up to it," and 
"[t]his doubt would be extremely difficult for the Commonwealth 
to overcome in any case."  Id. at 93, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 269 (2004).  This tactic was not used here, 
however.  The Virginia officers encouraged the defendant to 
"take advantage of this opportunity to talk with [them]," but at 
no time insinuated that this was the defendant's "sole 
opportunity" to tell his story.  Further, our prior cases have 
13 
 
found the "now or never" tactic problematic particularly in 
circumstances that have an impact on a defendant's right to 
counsel or right to testify before a jury.  See Commonwealth v. 
Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 541-542 (statement that "[t]his is your 
only opportunity to tell your story to us so that we can help 
you" would be improper "where a suspect has invoked her right to 
counsel"); Novo, supra at 268-269 (statement that if defendant 
did not speak to officers as to reason for his conduct, "a jury[ 
were] never going to hear a reason" was improper 
"misrepresentation of the defendant's right to defend himself at 
trial").  Here, the Virginia officers did not suggest in any way 
that not speaking now would have an impact on his right to 
counsel, his right to testify on his own behalf, or his right to 
represent himself. 
ii.  Minimization.  We have explained that "the standard 
interrogation tactic of minimization is problematic" because 
describing a crime repeatedly "as understandable, justifiable, 
and not particularly serious" could imply a promise of leniency 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Harris, 468 Mass. 429, 436 
(2014).  "Use of the tactic by itself, however, does not 
compel[] the conclusion that a confession is involuntary" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  See Hammond, 477 Mass. 
at 503-504 ("Minimization, combined with other factors, may 
render a confession involuntary . . .").  When analyzing the 
14 
 
impact of minimization on voluntariness, we look not only to 
whether law enforcement utilized minimization tactics, but also 
to whether the tactics caused the defendant to be "misled as to 
the severity of his situation."  Commonwealth v. Newson, 471 
Mass. 222, 231 (2015). 
Here, the defendant's statements demonstrate that he was 
not misled into somehow believing the situation was not serious.  
The Virginia officers interrogating the defendant twice used 
minimizing language, categorizing the defendant's crimes as "a 
mistake" and "a lapse in judgment."  But the defendant 
immediately disagreed with the Virginia officers:  when one 
Virginia officer characterized the crimes as "a mistake," the 
defendant replied, "Well this is bigger than a little mistake."  
The Virginia officers also later stated to the defendant that 
"this is a pretty severe, heinous incident," to which the 
defendant agreed.  Any minimization tactic employed here did not 
coerce the defendant to confess because "the defendant's actions 
reveal that he was able to decide what to tell the officers and 
could further identify the officers' tactics for what they 
were."  Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 596-598 (2010), 
S.C., 475 Mass. 657 (2016), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 896 (2017).  
Indeed, even had the defendant been misled, the Virginia 
officers' use of minimization, without more, would not affect 
the outcome of our analysis here in the face of significant and 
15 
 
considerable evidence that the defendant sought to speak to law 
enforcement and then voluntarily did so consistent with his 
desire.  See Commonwealth v. Cartright, 478 Mass. 273, 289 
(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 
438-439 (2004) (explaining we "expressly disclaimed the 
suggestion that an officer's use of the standard interrogation 
tactic of minimization, by itself, compels the conclusion that a 
confession is involuntary" [quotations omitted]). 
iii.  Appeal to religion.  In Cartright, we adopted the 
approach of some jurisdictions that "condemn 'the tactic of 
exploiting a suspect's [specific] religious anxieties,' but [do] 
not order suppression where the commentary on religion is 
limited and not 'calculated to exploit a particular 
psychological vulnerability of the defendant.'"  Cartright, 478 
Mass. at 289-291, quoting People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 953 
(1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842 (1991).  Here, the reference 
to religion was extremely limited, if present at all.  The 
Virginia officers referenced Smith's "soul" only once.5  
 
5 The Virginia officer testified at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress that he was not seeking to invoke religion 
when he mentioned Smith's "soul," but instead was only 
attempting to reference Smith's "being."  Cf. Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/soul [https://perma.cc/ZZY8-RUG7] (defining soul as "the 
immaterial essence, animating principle, or actuating cause of 
an individual life").  Further, the defendant stated that he was 
not very religious at the time of the interrogation, and it is 
16 
 
Moreover, there was no evidence that the Virginia officers were 
attempting to exploit the defendant's religious sensibilities or 
that the defendant's religious sensibilities were affected.  The 
trial judge, in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, 
found that "the police were unaware of any religious affiliation 
of the defendant or of any personal religious sensibilities, 
particularly those that would be a means to break his will," and 
we have no reason to disagree with this finding.  Accordingly, 
the singular reference to Smith's "soul" is insufficient to 
upend our conclusion that the defendant's statement was freely 
and voluntarily made. 
iv.  Promise of leniency.  The defendant's remaining 
contention is that the Virginia officers promised leniency for 
his girlfriend in exchange for his confession.  Officers may not 
make a threat concerning a person's loved one, such as 
threatening arrest and charging a loved one without any basis to 
do so or "expressly bargain[ing] with the defendant over the 
release of other individuals."  Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 
Mass. 382, 396 (1997), S.C., 450 Mass. 729 (2008).  See 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 483 Mass. 378, 389 (2019).  However, this 
is not a case where the Virginia officers threatened the 
defendant as to his relationship with a loved one, contrast 
 
therefore less likely that he would have interpreted the word 
"soul" in the spiritual sense. 
17 
 
Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 469 (2015) (threats to 
defendant's ability to maintain contact with daughter 
characterized as coercion); or a case where the Virginia 
officers threatened to charge the defendant's girlfriend without 
any basis to do so, contrast Commonwealth v. Hunt, 12 Mass. App. 
Ct. 841, 842-843 (1981) (confession found to be involuntary 
where officers promised leniency for defendant's wife in 
exchange for defendant's confession even though officers never 
had probable cause to hold wife); or a case where the Virginia 
officers expressly assured the defendant that his girlfriend 
would be released if he confessed. 
Instead, the Virginia officers simply provided a truthful 
response to the defendant's inquiry.  Both the defendant and 
Smith were taken into custody by the Virginia officers under 
warrants based on probable cause.  The defendant then requested 
to speak with the Virginia officers and, with urgency, raised 
the issue of his girlfriend's innocence and stated multiple 
times at the beginning of the interrogation that Smith was not 
responsible for what had occurred.  Only after raising the issue 
of his girlfriend's lack of responsibility did the defendant, in 
reference to his girlfriend's then-alleged innocence, ask, "[D]o 
you think after we talk there's a way we could try to contact 
the police department down there and arrange something?"  The 
18 
 
Virginia officer responded, If you're honest with me and you're 
telling me everything that's going on." 
In this context, the Virginia officer's response was a 
truthful explanation of what he believed would be the benefit of 
the defendant's confession:  if the defendant was being honest 
when he stated that Smith was not involved in the killings, then 
leniency for Smith would likely result.  Explaining the 
truthful, natural result of a suspect's statement is 
permissible.  See Commonwealth v. Berg, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 
205-206 (1994); United States v. Hufstetler, 782 F.3d 19, 24 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 884 (2015) ("Without more, an 
officer's truthful description of the family member's 
predicament is permissible since it merely constitutes an 
attempt to both accurately depict the situation to the suspect 
and to elicit more information about the family member's 
culpability"); United States v. McWhorter, 515 Fed. Appx. 511, 
518 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 912 (2013) (confession 
was voluntary where officer stated to suspect "that if he was 
responsible for all the criminal activity, the state would not 
be interested in prosecuting his wife"); United States v. Jones, 
32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1994) (where agents truthfully 
told defendant that "unless [he] explained the participation of 
his girlfriend, she would continue to be considered a suspect," 
confession was found to be voluntary); Bruno v. State, 574 So. 
19 
 
2d 76, 79-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991) ("Even 
taking into account that [the detective] later testified at the 
trial that he had told [the defendant] that if he gave a sworn 
statement exculpating his son, his son would not be charged, the 
record supports the conclusion that the confession was freely 
and voluntarily made[;] [t]he police legitimately believed that 
[the defendant's] son was involved but recognized that if [the 
defendant] gave a sworn statement exculpating his son there 
would be no basis upon which his son could be charged"); Bailey 
v. State, 473 N.E.2d 609, 610 (Ind. 1985) (confession was 
voluntary where defendant "was merely advised that [friend's 
release] would not be forthcoming without some basis for 
believing that, although the two were caught in the car with the 
goods, the friend had no knowledge of the burglary"). 
Indeed, the defendant's motivation for speaking with law 
enforcement, at its core, can be reduced to one driving force:  
his desire to protect his girlfriend.  This desire, absent any 
illegitimate police tactics, does not render a confession 
involuntary.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 430 Mass. 351, 355 
(1999) ("The defendant's concern for his sister is not enough to 
tip the balance where all other factors indicate that the 
defendant made his statement voluntarily"); Raymond, 424 Mass. 
at 396 ("a motive to protect his mother is not sufficient to 
find [the defendant's] confession involuntary" [citation 
20 
 
omitted]).  We thus conclude that the response of the Virginia 
officers to the defendant's inquiry concerning his potential 
cooperation did not detract from the voluntariness of his 
confession. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's 
statements to the Virginia officers were made freely and 
voluntarily.6 
b.  Fair and impartial jury.  The defendant argues that his 
right to a fair and impartial jury as violated when the trial 
judge declined to change the venue of the trial despite local 
pretrial publicity of the crimes.  A trial judge "should 
exercise [the] power to change the venue of a trial with great 
caution" and only after the defendant has met his or her burden 
"to establish the 'solid foundation of fact' necessary to 
support a grant of the motion" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Bateman, 492 Mass. 404, 430 (2023).  "The mere existence of 
pretrial publicity, even if it is extensive, does not constitute 
a foundation of fact sufficient to require a change in venue" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  Rather, the defendant must establish 
that the pretrial publicity created presumptive prejudice or 
 
6 As the defendant makes no independent claim of coercion 
during his interview with the Massachusetts officers, and as we 
find that no coercion occurred upon our own review of the 
interrogation, the defendant's statements to the Massachusetts 
officers were likewise voluntary. 
21 
 
actual prejudice.  Id.  The trial judge has "substantial 
discretion" to decide the motion, and we review the trial 
judge's decision for abuse of discretion (citation omitted).  
Id. at 431.  Indeed, "[i]n evaluating the risk of prejudice 
posed by pretrial publicity, we give careful attention to the 
evaluation of the trial judge, especially one who, as here, 
presides in the county where the crime occurred and is familiar 
with the nature and pervasiveness of the pretrial publicity."  
Id.  We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion because the pretrial publicity caused neither 
presumptive nor actual prejudice. 
Presumptive prejudice "exists only in truly extraordinary 
circumstances" and where the trial atmosphere had become 
"'utterly corrupted' by media coverage."  Bateman, 492 Mass. at 
431, quoting Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 463 (2011), 
S.C., 490 Mass. 698 (2022), and Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 
Mass. 205, 221 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013).  
There are two factors that are central to this analysis:  
(1) whether the nature of the pretrial publicity was "both 
extensive and sensational;" and (2) "whether the judge was in 
fact able to empanel jurors who appear impartial" (citation 
omitted).  Bateman, supra.  First, the defendant referenced only 
eleven news reports in his motion to change venue, almost all of 
which were in the immediate aftermath of the crimes themselves 
22 
 
(i.e., almost one and one-half years prior to the trial) and 
only contained factual descriptions of the relevant events.  
This publicity was insufficiently "all-consuming and constant" 
to be even close to extensive.  Id. at 432.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 406-407 (2014) (sixteen articles "did not 
constitute pervasive publicity because they appeared in a small 
number of local news sources and the intensity of the reporting 
decreased over time with no articles appearing between January, 
2010, and the time of the judge's ruling in April, 2010").  Nor 
was the publicity sufficiently sensational.  See Bateman, supra, 
quoting Hoose, supra at 407 ("Publicity is sensational when it 
contains emotionally charged material that is gratuitous or 
inflammatory, rather than a factual recounting of the case"). 
Second, less than twenty percent of potential jurors were 
excused during voir dire due to pretrial publicity exposure.  We 
have required a "high percentage of the venire" to be prejudiced 
as a result of pretrial publicity to show that the judge could 
not have empanelled an impartial jury.  Hoose, 467 Mass. at 407-
408.  Twenty percent of the venire does not meet this 
requirement for presumptive prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 541-542 (2003) (claim of presumptive 
prejudice rejected where approximately twenty-five percent of 
venire was disqualified for exposure to media coverage); 
Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 515 (1993) (claim of 
23 
 
presumptive prejudice rejected where forty-two percent of venire 
was excused).  We thus find no presumptive prejudice. 
"To demonstrate actual prejudice, a defendant must show 
that, in the totality of the circumstances, pretrial publicity 
deprived . . . him of his right to a fair and impartial jury."  
Hoose, 467 Mass. at 408.  "[T]he voir dire procedures utilized 
by the judge are particularly important" in this analysis.  Id.  
Here, the trial judge was cognizant of the issue and took 
careful, deliberate, and extensive steps to protect the 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury.  The judge 
conducted a thorough and individual voir dire of each potential 
juror, allowed both counsel and the prosecutor to ask questions 
during the individual voir dire, on a daily basis reminded 
seated jurors not to discuss the case with anyone and not to 
come into contact with any media accounts of the case, inquired 
when the jurors returned to the court whether anyone had come 
into contact with any information related to the case, and noted 
on each trial day their lack of affirmative responses for the 
record.  These guardrails were sufficient.  See Hoose, supra at 
409.  See also Smith, 492 Mass. at 610-611 (no actual prejudice 
from pretrial publicity in codefendant's trial).  We therefore 
find no actual prejudice. 
24 
 
Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in denying the defendant's motion to change venue, and the 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated. 
c.  Fisher's statements.  The defendant contends that 
Sumner-Moryl's testimony, communicating Fisher's statements on 
the morning after the attack, contained inadmissible hearsay and 
was violative of his right to confront witnesses against him. 
i.  Spontaneous utterance.7  The defendant specifically 
argues that the trial judge erred by allowing Fisher's out-of-
court statements in evidence as a spontaneous utterance.  Where 
a hearsay issue was properly preserved, as it was here,8 we 
review the issue for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. 
Cheremond, 461 Mass. 397, 411 (2012).  An error is not 
prejudicial if it "did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 
Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
Here, we need not decide whether the trial judge erred in 
admitting Fisher's statements because, even assuming error, 
 
7 Courts and litigants alike have used various terms to 
describe this hearsay exception, including "spontaneous 
exclamation," "spontaneous utterance," "excited utterance," and 
others.  We reiterate that we will use the term "spontaneous 
utterance."  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 4 n.1 
(2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006). 
 
8 The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this 
testimony, which is sufficient to preserve the issue.  
Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016). 
25 
 
there was no resulting prejudice.  Fisher's statements contained 
only three inculpatory facts:  there was an invasion into her 
home, she had a black eye, and multiple individuals attempted to 
suffocate her.  The Commonwealth presented other compelling 
admissible evidence of all these facts in various forms:  
forensic and physical evidence showed that the defendant invaded 
the victims' home, a police officer and a doctor each testified 
as to Fisher's injuries, and the defendant himself confessed to 
all these facts in detail.  Fisher's statements were thus 
duplicative and, at most, had "but very slight effect" on the 
jury (citation omitted).  See Cheremond, 461 Mass. at 411 (no 
prejudice where, even though it was error to admit victim's 
statements to prove motive and nature of parties' relationship, 
abundance of admissible evidence was presented to prove these 
two facts).  The Commonwealth presented a strong case, and the 
defendant therefore suffered no prejudice even if Fisher's 
statements were admitted in error.  Accordingly, we find no 
reversible error. 
ii.  Confrontation clause.  The defendant also asserts that 
admitting Fisher's statements violated his right to 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  See Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 550 n.11 
(2010), S.C., 483 Mass. 227 (2019).  In contrast to our review 
26 
 
of hearsay evidence, if we do find error, "we evaluate the 
admission of constitutionally proscribed evidence to determine 
whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Rand, 487 Mass. 811, 814-815 (2021). 
We have interpreted the confrontation clause to "bar[] the 
admission of testimonial hearsay by a declarant who does not 
appear at trial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify 
as a matter of law and the defendant had an earlier opportunity 
to cross-examine him or her."  Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass. 
312, 316 (2020).  Nontestimonial hearsay, however, does not 
violate the United States Constitution or the Declaration of 
Rights.  Rand, 487 Mass. at 815.  We conclude that Fisher's 
statements were nontestimonial and that, therefore, there was no 
constitutional violation despite Fisher being unable to appear 
at trial. 
"Testimonial statements are those made with the primary 
purpose of 'creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brum, 492 Mass. 
581, 596 (2023).  "The inquiry is objective, asking not what 
that particular declarant intended, but rather 'the primary 
purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the 
statement, taking into account all of the surrounding 
circumstances'" (citation omitted).  Id.  Although "[a]n ongoing 
emergency is not necessary for a statement to be nontestimonial, 
27 
 
. . . when one is present it takes a central place in our 
analysis."  Rand, 487 Mass. at 817.  "The reason for this is 
straightforward:  when preoccupied by an ongoing emergency, a 
victim is unlikely to have the presence of mind to create a 
substitute for trial testimony."  Id.  "Factors bearing on the 
existence of an ongoing emergency include (1) whether an armed 
assailant poses a continued threat to the victim or the public 
at large, (2) the type of weapon that has been employed, and (3) 
the severity of the victim's injuries or medical condition" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  A victim's medical condition, in 
particular, "sheds light on the ability of the victim to have 
any purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the 
likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a 
testimonial one."  Id. at 824, quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 
U.S. 344, 365 (2011). 
Fisher unquestionably had extreme and near-fatal injuries 
when she made her statements:  she was stabbed with multiple 
knives, suffocated, brutally beaten, and left on the ground to 
die.  After repeatedly crying out for help without any response 
for over twelve hours, Fisher finally had an opportunity to 
speak to someone who could assist her.  We find that Fisher's 
statements were made in the throes of an ongoing emergency in 
light of these circumstances. 
28 
 
The defendant contends that, even if the conversation 
between Fisher and Sumner-Moryl had begun during an ongoing 
emergency, Fisher's statements turned testimonial once she was 
told that "help was on the way."  The emergency did not end in 
the middle of the conversation, however:  "[j]ust because an 
ambulance has been called does not mean that any potential 
medical emergency has dissolved."  Rand, 487 Mass. at 825.  In 
particular, "it was prudent for [Sumner-Moryl] to continue 
collecting medical information from the victim in case [she] 
needed to relay it to paramedics upon their arrival."  Id. at 
825-826. 
While the ongoing emergency here, in and of itself, was 
enough for Fisher's statements to constitute nontestimonial 
hearsay, we mention two additional factors present here:  
"(1) the formality [or informality] of the statements, and 
(2) the nature of 'the statements and actions of both the 
declarant and interrogators'" (citation omitted).  Id. at 817.  
These factors only further support a finding that Fisher's 
statements were nontestimonial.  The exchange between Fisher and 
Sumner-Moryl "was informal and very brief, which was consistent 
with an interview whose purpose was to respond to an emergency 
rather than to develop a case for prosecution."  Commonwealth v. 
Beatrice, 460 Mass. 255, 263 (2011).  Indeed, far from being a 
formal account of what transpired, Fisher's statements were 
29 
 
devoid of any identification of the assailants -- information 
that a reasonable person who intended to provide a substitute 
for trial testimony might have provided.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mulgrave, 472 Mass. 170, 180 (2015) ("Further, she did not name 
the defendant, a fact likely to be communicated by a declarant 
attempting to establish her perpetrator's identity"); 
Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 636 (2013) 
(statements "were concerned primarily with assessing the 
victim's medical condition and collecting as much information as 
possible to prepare first responders for what they would soon 
encounter" and were, therefore, not testimonial). 
Lastly, that Fisher was speaking with a health care 
professional rather than law enforcement weighs heavily in favor 
of her statements being nontestimonial.  Although the United 
States Supreme Court has declined to adopt a categorical rule 
excluding statements to individuals other than law enforcement 
from the reach of the confrontation clause, "such statements are 
much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law 
enforcement officers."  Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 246 (2015). 
In sum, for twelve hours, Fisher was lying on the ground on 
the verge of death near her husband, who had been viciously 
murdered in front of her.  She was without any ability to 
contact the outside world despite crawling outside and 
attempting to attract help.  When she was finally given a chance 
30 
 
to speak to a health care professional through her pain and 
anguish, she provided only the most basic of details.  The 
ability for a reasonable person in Fisher's position to think 
about anything other than obtaining medical assistance or the 
horror of what she continued to endure, such as creating trial 
testimony, is remote in the extreme.  We conclude that Fisher's 
statements were nontestimonial and that, accordingly, there was 
no confrontation clause violation. 
d.  Sentencing.  The defendant contends that his two 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole are cruel or 
unusual punishment under art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights because he was less than twenty-five years 
old at the time of the offenses.  In Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013), S.C., 
471 Mass. 12 (2015), we declared that the Legislature's 
authorization of life sentences without the possibility of 
parole for juveniles (i.e., those under eighteen years of age) 
was unconstitutional.  The defendant, however, "has provided no 
evidence of any circumstance that plausibly could suggest that 
the known research on adolescent brain development, and its 
impact on adolescent behavior, ought to extend to individuals 
who are [under the age of twenty-five]."  Commonwealth v. Yat 
Fung Ng, 491 Mass. 247, 271-272 (2023).  We thus find no error 
in the defendant's sentencing. 
31 
 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entire record in accordance with our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, we discern no reason to reduce the degree of guilt or to 
order a new trial.9 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
9 Pursuant to our review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we note 
that there may be an issue whether the convictions of attempted 
murder and murder in the first degree resulting from the 
defendant's attack of Fisher constitute inconsistent verdicts 
and, if so, whether reversal of the conviction of murder in the 
first degree for the killing of Fisher is required.  
Inconsistent verdicts generally do not raise issues of concern.  
See Commonwealth v. Resende, 476 Mass. 141, 147 (2017).  Here, 
however, there may be an issue of concern due to an error in the 
trial judge's instruction on attempted murder.  In particular, 
the trial judge instructed the jury that they must find that 
"the defendant's act did not result in the completed crime" in 
order to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder.  But 
"nonachievement of murder is not an element of attempted murder" 
(emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754, 765 
(2016).  The jury then found the defendant guilty of attempted 
murder and murder in the first degree for the killing of Fisher.  
Accordingly, due to the instruction error, the jury found that 
the defendant's attack "did not result in [murder]."  Yet the 
jury also found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree and, therefore, found that the defendant's attack 
resulted in Fisher's death.  If these are legally inconsistent 
verdicts, "[both verdicts] must be set aside."  See Resende, 
supra.  Should the defendant choose to raise this issue, he may 
do so directly in the Supreme Judicial Court due to potential 
constraints involving gatekeeper petitions.