Title: In re Jerry's Shell, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 553PA13
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2014

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
 NO. COA13-347 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 November 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Mecklenburg County 
No. 10 CRS 249021 
TIMOTHY JOHN LONG 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 September 2012 
by Judge R. Allen Baddour in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 September 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Angenette Stephenson, for the State.  
 
Attorney 
Julie Ramseur Lewis, Assistant Public Defender, 
for defendant. 
 
 
Elmore, Judge. 
 
 
On 17 September 2012, a jury found Timothy John Long 
(defendant) guilty of felony child abuse inflicting serious 
injury. 
 
Defendant 
received 
a 
sentence 
of 
31-47 
months 
imprisonment.  Defendant now appeals and raises as error the 
trial court’s admission of 404(b) evidence and its failure to 
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conduct a proper jury poll.  After careful consideration, we 
find no prejudicial error.  
I. Facts 
Defendant was indicted on 1 November 2010 for one count of 
felonious child abuse pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-318.4.  
In August 2010, defendant lived in his parents’ home with his 
girlfriend, Cameron Lightfoot, their five-month-old child, E.L., 
Lightfoot’s 
three-year-old 
daughter, 
K.W. 
(the 
victim), 
defendant’s sister, 
Jennifer Long, 
and her three-year-old 
daughter, R.L.  Defendant is not the victim’s biological father, 
but he assumed the role of primary caregiver for her and E.L. 
because Lightfoot suffered from post-partum depression and 
frequently abused drugs and alcohol.   
The 
alleged 
offense 
occurred 
on 
12 
August 
2010 
in 
defendant’s parents’ home.  That morning, defendant was giving 
the victim a bath.  Long, who sat in the living room, heard the 
victim “screaming and crying[.]”  Long testified that she 
assumed that what she heard was “a pretty common tantrum” 
because the victim had a “tendency to pitch a fit when having to 
get clothed and diapered[.]”  Long soon heard four or five 
“soft-carpeted thumps,” but she was unable “to identify what the 
sound was[.]”  Long overheard defendant asking the victim “why 
-3- 
 
 
are you crying like this[?]”  Moments later, defendant came out 
of the bathroom crying and holding the victim in his arms.  Long 
described the victim as “completely limp” with “shallow” 
breathing.  Long testified that the victim “had a little bit of 
blood on her mouth, and it looked like she had . . . a bitten or 
busted lip.”  Long performed CPR, but when the victim’s 
breathing did not improve, defendant’s father called 9-1-1. 
Dr. Otwell Timmons, the pediatric intensive care specialist 
who treated the victim, testified that she was unresponsive upon 
arrival.  Dr. Timmons conducted a physical exam of the victim 
and found a number of “unusual bruises in places where [he 
doesn’t] tend to see bruises in children involving accidents.”  
A CAT scan revealed a “very long” complex skull fracture “that 
[was] out of character for children who fall from adult arm 
height, from high furniture.”  Based on the skull fracture, Dr. 
Timmons testified that “more energy would have to be applied to 
the impact on [the victim’s] head than a fall from a five or six 
foot height.”  The victim also suffered from a “concussion with 
a brief coma[.]”  Dr. Timmons concluded that the victim was 
injured as a result of “non-accidental trauma[.]” 
Prior to trial, the trial court heard arguments under Rule 
404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence concerning the 
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admissibility of two prior acts allegedly committed by defendant 
in June and August 2010.  First, the trial court denied 
defendant’s motion in limine to exclude testimony concerning an 
alleged prior assault by defendant on Lightfoot one week before 
the alleged assault on the victim.  Lightfoot testified at 
trial, over defendant’s objection, that a week before 12 August 
2010, defendant tackled and beat her in the head causing “welts 
on [her] head.”  Later that evening, they engaged in another 
physical altercation whereby defendant forcibly attempted to 
pull her outside the home.  
The second prior act related to the State’s motion in 
limine to admit testimony about prior injuries of the victim 
allegedly caused by defendant in June 2010.  The trial court 
allowed the State’s motion.  Angela Tate, a therapeutic 
recreation specialist who worked with Mecklenburg County Parks 
and Recreation Department, testified at trial, over defendant’s 
objections, about her observations and contact with the victim, 
defendant, and Lightfoot, while the victim was enrolled at 
summer camp.  Tate testified that she observed the victim with 
bruising under her eyes on 21 June 2010.  Tate explained that 
Lightfoot or defendant reported that the victim “had been 
playing with her cousin on their deck and had fallen, that she 
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had been pushed and fell backwards down the stairs and that her 
bruising was from her fall on the stairs.”  An incident report 
was prepared, and photographs were taken of the bruising.  On 28 
June 2010, Tate observed and documented “significant bruising 
and what appeared to be bite marks on [the victim’s] face and 
hands[.]”  Tate further described the bruising as a “large bump, 
like a goose egg on her forehead with bruising.” 
After all of the evidence was presented, the jury returned 
a unanimous verdict of guilty.  Defendant then asked for the 
trial court to poll the jury.  The clerk proceeded to ask each 
member of the jury if he or she reached a guilty verdict and 
whether 
the 
juror 
“still 
agree[d] 
with 
this 
verdict?”  
Subsequently, 
the 
trial 
court 
requested 
the 
jurors, 
collectively, to raise their hands if they found the presence of 
aggravating factors.  After all the jurors raised their hands, 
the trial court asked counsel if there was “[a]nything further 
for the jury?”  Defendant responded, “[n]o Your Honor[,]” and 
the trial court released the jury and proceeded to sentencing. 
II. Analysis 
a.) Previous Alleged Abuse Against Victim 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting 
404(b) evidence of the victim’s prior injuries allegedly 
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committed by defendant.  Defendant specifically avers that the 
State failed to produce substantial evidence to support a 
reasonable finding that defendant inflicted the prior alleged 
injuries.  Defendant further contends that the testimony should 
have been excluded under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 403 for 
unfair prejudice.  We disagree and find no error. 
In reviewing 404(b) evidence, our Supreme Court has 
previously held that 
[t]hough this Court has not used the term de 
novo to describe its own review of 404(b) 
evidence, we have consistently engaged in a 
fact-based inquiry under Rule 404(b) while 
applying an abuse of discretion standard to 
the subsequent balancing of probative value 
and unfair prejudice under Rule 403.  For 
the purpose of clarity . . . when analyzing 
rulings applying Rules 404(b) and 403, we 
conduct distinct inquiries with different 
standards of review.  When the trial court 
has made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law to support its 404(b) ruling . . . we 
look to whether the evidence supports the 
findings and whether the findings support 
the conclusions. We review de novo the legal 
conclusion that the evidence is, or is not, 
within the coverage of Rule 404(b).  We then 
review 
the 
trial 
court’s 
Rule 
403 
determination for abuse of discretion. 
 
State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726 S.E.2d 156, 158-59 
(2012). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) provides that: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
-7- 
 
 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake, entrapment or accident. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2011).  Under Rule 404(b) a 
prior act or crime is similar if there are “some unusual facts 
present in both crimes or particularly similar acts which would 
indicate that the same person committed both[.]”  State v. 
Green, 321 N.C. 594, 603, 365 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1988) (citation 
and internal quotation omitted).  However, it is not necessary 
that the similarities between the two acts “rise to the level of 
the unique and bizarre.”  Id. at 604, 365 S.E.2d at 593.  
Rule 404(b) is a “general rule of inclusion of relevant 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject 
to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only 
probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity 
or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime 
charged.”  State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278–79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 
54 (1990).  Thus, “[t]o effectuate these important evidentiary 
safeguards, the rule of inclusion described in Coffey is 
constrained by the requirements of similarity and temporal 
-8- 
 
 
proximity.”  State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154, 567 S.E.2d 
120, 123 (2002).   
This Court’s first inquiry under Rule 404(b) is to 
determine whether there was substantial evidence presented by 
the State to support a reasonable finding by the jury that the 
defendant committed the prior bad act.  State v. Stager, 329 
N.C. 278, 303, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890 (1991). The State may offer 
direct or circumstantial evidence to support this finding so 
long as the evidence “contain[s] similarities that support the 
reasonable inference that the same person committed both the 
earlier and the later [acts].”  State v. English, 95 N.C. App. 
611, 614, 383 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1989) (citation and quotation 
omitted).  Should the State offer such substantial evidence, 
“then we must conduct a three-pronged analysis regarding the 
admissibility of the 404(b) evidence.”  State v. Adams, ___ N.C. 
App. ___, ___, 727 S.E.2d 577, 580 (2012).  We must first 
determine whether “the evidence [is] relevant for some purpose 
other than to show that defendant has the propensity to commit 
the type of offense for which he is being tried[.]”  State v. 
Houseright, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 725 S.E.2d 445, 448 (2012) 
(citation omitted).  Second, we consider if that purpose is 
“relevant to an issue material to the pending case[.]” Id. 
-9- 
 
 
(citation omitted).  Under the first two prongs, relevant 
evidence means “evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence.”  State v. Capers, 208 N.C. 
App. 605, 615, 704 S.E.2d 39, 45 (2010) (citation and quotation 
omitted).  Third, we assess whether, under Rule 403, “the 
probative value of the evidence [is] substantially outweighed by 
danger of unfair prejudice” to the defendant.  Houseright at 
___, 725 S.E.2d at 448 (citation omitted).   
Here, Tate testified about two separate instances in which 
the victim arrived at summer camp with bruising on her face and 
a bump on her forehead in June 2010.  Testimony at trial 
established that the victim’s injuries in June 2010 and on 12 
August 2010 occurred 1.) while defendant assumed the role of 
primary caregiver to the victim and was responsible for her 
daily feeding, bathing, and diapering; 2.) in or around the home 
defendant shared with the victim; 3.) when the victim was in 
defendant’s exclusive care, with no other adult present to 
corroborate defendant’s account of how the victim’s injuries 
occurred.  In both instances, the victim sustained bruising 
consistent with abuse.  Thus, the State presented substantial 
-10- 
 
 
evidence to support a reasonable finding by the jury that 
defendant committed the prior acts in June 2010.  Furthermore, 
the similarities mentioned above surrounding the circumstances 
and nature of the victim’s injuries in June 2010 and on 12 
August 2010 properly allowed the jury to identify defendant as 
the individual who had the opportunity to cause the victim’s 
injuries.  See State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 
430, 
434 
(1988) 
(stating 
that 
“[c]ourts 
may 
resort 
to 
circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, capability and 
identity to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the 
crime”).  Accordingly, Tate’s testimony was both admitted for a 
proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and relevant.  See State v. 
Johnson, 317 N.C. 417, 425, 347 S.E.2d 7, 12 (1986) (“In a 
criminal case, the identity of the perpetrator of the crime 
charged is always a material fact though not always is it in 
issue.”).   
In reviewing the admission of this evidence, we conclude 
that defendant was not unduly prejudiced.   As previously 
discussed, Tate’s testimony was highly probative as to the 
issues of identity and opportunity.  Moreover, the trial court 
analyzed the evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403 for unfair 
prejudice outside the presence of the jury and was later careful 
-11- 
 
 
to give a proper limiting instruction to the jury.  See State v. 
Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 662, 566 S.E.2d 61, 75 (2002) (admitted 
prior misconduct not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 where 
trial court gave limiting instruction regarding permissible uses 
of 404(b) evidence).  Given the purpose for which this evidence 
was admitted, and the trial court’s careful determination of its 
admissibility, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that the probative value of the evidence 
was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  Thus, the 
trial court did not err in admitting Tate’s testimony. 
b.) Defendant’s Alleged Prior Assault Against Lightfoot 
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence of a prior alleged assault on Lightfoot. 
Defendant contends that this evidence was inadmissible under 
Rule 404(b) because it was not relevant for any admissible 
purpose.  Defendant further avers that even if relevant, the 
evidence was unfairly prejudicial such that it should have been 
excluded under Rule 403.  After careful consideration, we 
disagree and find no prejudicial error.  
“An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did 
not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.”  State v. Nelson, 
341 N.C. 695, 701, 462 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995).  Furthermore, 
-12- 
 
 
“the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render error 
of constitutional dimension harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 400, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988) 
(citation omitted).  The defendant carries the burden to show 
both error and that “there is a reasonable possibility that, had 
the error in question not been committed, a different result 
would have been reached at the trial.”  State v. Anderson, 177 
N.C. App. 54, 62, 627 S.E.2d 501, 505 (2006) (citation and 
quotation omitted).   
We first note that the trial court might not have erred in 
admitting Lightfoot’s testimony regarding defendant’s alleged 
prior assault on her.  However, we need not answer that question 
to dispose of this issue on appeal.  See State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 
272, 278, 697 S.E.2d 319, 323 (2010) (determining whether the 
admission of the defendant’s prior act was prejudicial error 
assuming arguendo that the court erred).  Instead, we assume 
arguendo that the trial court erred in admitting Lightfoot’s 
testimony and must now decide whether the error was prejudicial.   
At trial, defendant did not testify or present any 
evidence.  The State offered undisputed evidence that on 12 
August 2010, defendant was alone in giving the victim a bath, 
several thumps were heard, and the victim was screaming and 
-13- 
 
 
crying.  Shortly  thereafter, defendant emerged from the 
bathroom crying while he carried the victim.  Long described the 
victim as “completely limp” with “shallow” breathing and a 
bloody lip.  Moreover, Dr. Timmons concluded that the victim’s 
injuries on the morning of 12 August 2010 were caused by “non-
accidental trauma[.]”  In support of his conclusion, Dr. Timmons 
listed the following: 1.) a skull fracture that could not have 
been caused by an accidental fall; 2.) no explanation from the 
victim’s caregivers as to “how the skull fracture happened[;]” 
3.) no documented history of the victim falling in the past; and 
4.) multiple “bruises in unusual places” on the victim.  Tate 
also testified that she observed similar bruising on the victim 
in June 2010, at a time when the victim was under the exclusive 
supervision of defendant. 
Accordingly, even if the admission of the alleged prior 
assault on Lightfoot amounted to error, it did not constitute 
prejudicial error due to the presence of other overwhelming 
evidence pointing to defendant’s guilt.  See State v. Anderson, 
___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 730 S.E.2d 262, 267 (2012) (finding 
harmless error as to the admission of prior acts when 1.) 
overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt was found from 
victim’s detailed testimony about when and where he suffered 
-14- 
 
 
injuries; and 2.) defendant “did not present any evidence or any 
witnesses to suggest an alternate theory of events”).   
c.) Jury Poll  
In his last issue on appeal, defendant argues that the 
trial court violated Article I, § 24 of the North Carolina 
Constitution and North Carolina General Statute § 15A-1238 in 
conducting a jury poll by allowing the jury to collectively 
raise its hands to establish assent to a special verdict finding 
of two aggravating factors.  Because defendant failed to 
preserve his argument on appeal, we dismiss this issue.  
“Generally . . . issues occurring during trial must be 
preserved if they are to be reviewed on grounds other than plain 
error.”  Reep v. Beck, 360 N.C. 34, 36-37, 619 S.E.2d 497, 499 
(2005).  To preserve an issue for appellate review, “a party 
must have presented to the trial court a timely request, 
objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling 
the party desired the court to make.” Id. at 37, 619 S.E.2d at 
499 (citation and quotation omitted).   
Here, defendant requested that “the jury be polled” as to 
the general guilty verdict pursuant to N.C. Gen Stat. § 15A-
1238.  The clerk responded by polling each juror, individually, 
as to their guilty verdicts.  Thereafter, the trial court polled 
-15- 
 
 
the jurors, collectively, concerning the aggravating factors 
without objection from defendant.  Before releasing the jury, 
the trial court asked counsel, “[a]nything further for the 
jury?” Defendant replied “[n]o, Your Honor.”  Because defendant 
did not object to the trial court’s method of polling or make a 
timely 
request 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
poll 
the 
jurors, 
individually, concerning the aggravating factors, defendant has 
waived this issue on appeal.  See State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 
458, 467, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009) (holding that the defendant 
waived any error by the trial court and did not preserve an 
issue on appeal where he “fail[ed] to object to the trial 
court's polling of the jury by show of hands and did not request 
individual polling”).    
III. Conclusion 
 
In sum, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence 
of the victim’s prior injuries allegedly caused by defendant, 
nor did it commit prejudicial error by allowing testimony 
related to defendant’s alleged prior assault on Lightfoot.  We 
dismiss defendant’s issue on appeal relating to the trial 
court’s jury poll because he failed to preserve this issue for 
our review.  
No prejudicial error. 
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Judges CALABRIA and STEPHENS concur. 
Report per Rule 30(e).