Title: STATE EX REL FLAMMOND v FLAMMOND
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-012
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 1980

No. 80-12 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 STATE O F M O N T A N A , ex rel., SHELLEY ANN F L A M M O N D , -vs- JOSEPH L. F L A M M O N D , P e t i t i o n e r s and Appellants, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of G l a c i e r , The Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Larry Epstein argued, Deputy County Attorney, Cut Bank, Montana For Respondent: Steven Bunch argued, Montana Legal S e r v i c e s , Helena, Montana D. Michael Eakin argued, Montana Legal S e r v i c e s , Hardin, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Michael G. G a r r i t y , Dept. of Revenue, Helena, Montana -- Submitted: September 15, 1980 Decided: 1 g lg80 F i l e d : ffEC 1 9 1980 Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J . Snea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P e t i t i o n e r Shellyann Flammond a p p e a l s a r u l i n g of t h e G l a c i e r County D i s t r i c t Court dismissing, f o r l a c k of j u r i s - d i c t i o n , an a c t i o n seeking t o e n f o r c e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments under Montana's Uniform R e c i p r o c a l Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), T i t l e 40, Chapter 5, MCA. Having determined t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court lacked both s u b j e c t m a t t e r over t h e t r a n s a c t i o n and p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e r e s p o n d e n t , we a f f i r m . Lloyd Flammond is an e n r o l l e d member of t h e B l a c k f e e t T r i b e . Shellyann Flammond i s n o t . They were married on March 25, 1976 i n Long Beach, C a l i f o r n i a , and then moved t o Babb, Montana, which is l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e boundaries of t h e B l a c k f e e t R e s e r v a t i o n . On August 5, 1976, t h e i r o n l y c h i l d , S u s i e Renee Flammond, was born t o them. I n November of t h e same y e a r , t h e couple s e p a r a t e d . Mother and c h i l d moved t o C a l i f o r n i a and e s t a b l i s h e d r e s i d e n c e t h e r e . The f a t h e r remained on t h e r e s e r v a t i o n where he s t i l l r e s i d e s . I n 1977 t h e mother f i l e d a p e t i t i o n under C a l i f o r n i a ' s URESA seeking monthly c h i l d s u p p o r t payments of $320 from t h e f a t h e r . The County of Los Angeles, from whom t h e mother was r e c e i v i n g p u b l i c a i d f o r t h e c h i l d , j o i n e d t h e p e t i t i o n . The C a l i f o r n i a S u p e r i o r Court f o r t h e County of Los Angeles found t h a t t h e f a t h e r owed a d u t y of s u p p o r t and o r d e r e + t h e p e t i t i o n s e n t t o G l a c i e r County D i s t r i c t Court i n Montana f o r t h e f i l i n g of an enforcement a c t i o n under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of Montana's URESA, s e c t i o n 40-5-101, e t s e q . , MCA. The Montana c o u r t i s s u e d an o r d e r f o r t h e f a t h e r t o show cause why he should n o t be r e q u i r e d t o make s u p p o r t payments under t h e Montana Act. A G l a c i e r County Deputy S h e r i f f served t h e show c a u s e o r d e r on t h e f a t h e r w i t h i n t h e boundaries of t h e B l a c k f e e t R e s e r v a t i o n . The f a t h e r moved t o d i s m i s s on g r o u n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t l a c k e d p e r s o n a l and s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h a t s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s was i n s u f f i c i e n t . The D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d t h e motion. F i n d i n g , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t none of t h e a c t s of nonsupport a l l e g e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n had occurred i n Montana, t h e c o u r t concluded t h a t it lacked s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s - d i c t i o n . Where, a s h e r e , n e i t h e r t h e s t a t e nor t h e t r i b e h a s complied w i t h t h e c u r r e n t f e d e r a l e n a b l i n g s t a t u t e s , 25 U.S.C. SS 1321-1326, r e g u l a t i n g t h e e x t e n s i o n of s t a t e c i v i l and c r i m i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n t o I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n s , Montana may n o t e x e r c i s e s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t r a n s a c t i o n s a r i s i n g on I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n s ( s e e Blackwolf v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293; Kennerly v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 5 0 7 ) , u n l e s s t h e t r a n s a c t i o n e n t a i l s " s i g n i f i c a n t " o r " s u b s t a n t i a l " c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e s t a t e o u t s i d e of r e s e r v a t i o n boundaries. Crawford v. Roy ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 227, 557 P.2d 392, ( a c t i o n t o recover payments f o r s e r v i c e s rendered t o I n d i a n a t t o r n e y both on and o f f t h e r e s e r v a t i o n where t h e employment c o n t r a c t was e n t e r e d i n t o o f f t h e r e s e r v a t i o n ) ; L i t t l e Horn S t a t e Bank v. S t o p s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 510, 555 P.2d 211, c e r t . d e n . S t o p s v. L i t t l e Horn S t a t e Bank ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 430 U.S. 904, 97 S.Ct. 1171, 51 L.Ed.2d 580 (where I n d i a n p a r t i e s had o b t a i n e d l o a n s o f f t h e r e s e r v a t i o n b u t w i t h i n Montana); S t a t e ex r e l . Old E l k v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 208, 552 P.2d 1394, (where t h e r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n was a s u s p e c t i n an o f f - r e s e r v a t i o n s h o o t i n g ) ; Bad Horse v. Bad Horse ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, c e r t . d e n . 419 U.S. 847, 95 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed.2d 76 (where t h e I n d i a n couple had been married o f f t h e r e s e r v a t i o n ) ; See a l s o , F i s h e r v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 424 U.S. 382, 389 n. 1 4 , 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106; De Coteau v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 420 U.S. 425, 429 n. 3 , 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300, reh.den. 421 U.S. 939, 95 S.Ct. 1667, 44 L.Ed.2d 95. Nowhere does e i t h e r T i t l e I V of t h e S o c i a l S e c u r i t y Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601, e t s e q . , o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n s promulgated under it a f f i r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e t h e s t a t e s by means of URESA l e g i s l a t i o n t o assume j u r i s d i c t i o n over r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n s who have n e g l e c t e d t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r t h e i r dependents. Here t h e r e a r e a b s o l u t e l y no o f f - r e s e r v a t i o n a c t s i n Montana s u f f i c i e n t t o v e s t s t a t e c o u r t s w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e respondent, a r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n . The o n l y o f f - r e s e r v a t i o n a c t s occurred i n C a l i f o r n i a . I t is w e l l - s e t t l e d t h a t a r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n ' s d o m i c i l e on t h e r e s e r v a t i o n is n o t an i n - s t a t e c o n t a c t which g r a n t s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o s t a t e c o u r t s . F i s h e r v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 6 ) , s u p r a ; Kennerly v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 1 ) , s u p r a ; Williams v. Lee ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251. A s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e 7 forum s t a t e and t h e p a r t y over whom j u r i s d i c t i o n is sought must be l i n k e d by c e r t a i n "minimum c o n t a c t s . . . such t h a t t h e maintenance of t h e s u i t does n o t o f f e n d ' t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s o f f a i r p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . ' " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe v. Washington ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, q u o t i n g ~ i l l i k e n v. Meyer ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278. Here t h e respondent f a t h e r has i n j u r e d n e i t h e r p e r s o n s nor p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e of Montana. The c a u s e of a c t i o n t o e n f o r c e s u p p o r t payments a r i s e s s o l e l y from h i s domestic r e l a t i o n s . The c o n t r o v e r s y is t h e outgrowth of a s e p a r a t i o n t h a t d i d n o t occur w i t h i n Montana's t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h a t was n o t o t h e r w i s e c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h i s s t a t e . Under e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same c o n s t e l l a t i o n of f a c t s , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court has h e l d t h a t a s t a t e ' s a s s e r t i o n of p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n would be both unreasonable and imper- m i s s i b l e . Kulko v. C a l i f o r n i a S u p e r i o r Court ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S. 84, 96-97, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, reh.den. 438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150; See a l s o , Rule 4 ( B ) , 14.R.Civ.P. The D i s t r i c t Court had no b a s i s t o a s s e r t p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e respondent. Contrary t o t h e m o t h e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n s , Natewa v. Natewa ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691, does n o t s u p p o r t s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . There t h e N e w Mexico Supreme Court found s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e URESA a c t i o n brought by a non-Indian Wisconsin p l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t her I n d i a n husband l i v i n g on t h e Zuni R e s e r v a t i o n . C i t i n g Daly v. Daly ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 21 N . J . 599, 123 A.2d 3, t h e New Mexico c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t " a l l t h a t was needed f o r proper j u r i s d i c t i o n " under URESA was " t h e presence of t h e husband o r f a t h e r i n t h e responding s t a t e , t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e w i f e o r c h i l d i n another s t a t e , and t h e e x i s t e n c e of a d u t y of s u p p o r t on t h e p a r t of t h e f a t h e r under t h e laws of t h e responding s t a t e . " 499 P.2d a t 693. I n Natewa, t h e husband was c l e a r l y " p r e s e n t " i n t h e responding s t a t e (New Mexico) f o r a s t h e c o u r t h e l d , he had submitted t o s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n when he v o l u n t a r i l y appeared i n lower c o u r t proceedings. 499 P.2d a t 693. I n t h i s c a s e , however, t h e f a t h e r h a s challenged s t a t e c o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n from t h e o u t s e t . He h a s n o t acquiesced i n s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n s o a s t o g i v e t h e Montana c o u r t - i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n over him. He cannot be s a i d t o be " p r e s e n t " w i t h i n t h e responding s t a t e , f o r t h e r e s e r v a t i o n i s c l e a r l y beyond t h e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e Montana c o u r t s . See, Kennerly v. D i s t r i c t Court, s u p r a . S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e e x i s t s no d u t y t o s u p p o r t on t h e p a r t of t h e f a t h e r i n Montana. For, a s w e have determined, t h e Montana c o u r t s do n o t have s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i n q u e s t i o n . I t is n o t our purpose h e r e t o deny M s . Flammond a forum. W e have no c h o i c e b u t t o apply t h e law a s it h a s been d e c l a r e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court. I n h i s b r i e f and a t o r a l argument, respondent v i g o r o u s l y contended t h a t t h e t r i b a l c o u r t would p r o v i d e a f a i r and v i a b l e forum f o r t h e j u d i c i a l enforcement of c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s . I n r e c e n t y e a r s , American I n d i a n t r i b e s have s t r i v e d t o become i n d e p e n d e n t and r e s p o n s i b l e g o v e r n m e n t e n t i t i e s . There is e v e r y reason t o hope, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e B l a c k f e e t T r i b e w i l l a f f o r d t h e p e t i t i o n i n g w i f e a v i a b l e remedy i n its c o u r t s . Should t r i b a l governments prove uncooperative o r s h o u l d t h e i r c o u r t s d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t n o n - I n d i a n p l a i n t i f f s , they run t h e r i s k of e v e n t u a l Congressional l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t could d e p r i v e them of much of t h e autonomy t h e y have s t r u g g l e d so long t o a c h i e v e . I t appears t h a t t h e r e is no a p p e a l from a t r i b a l c o u r t r u l i n g t o t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t system. See Wells v. P h i l b r i c k ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 486 F.Supp. 807, 809 and n. 2; ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 25 U.S.C. 9 1303. However, t h a t is n o t an argument i n f a v o r of s t a t e c o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n . A s t a t e may simply n o t extend its j u r i s d i c t i o n by j u d i c i a l f i a t no m a t t e r how compelling t h e p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r doing s o may seem i f t h e r e is no l e g a l b a s i s t o s u p p o r t s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . I f a remedy o t h e r t h a n t r i b a l c o u r t is t o e x i s t , Congress must p r o v i d e it. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d . W e Concur: C M f J u s t i c e J u s t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison dissenting: I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . The majority has found t h a t t h i s s t a t e ' s courts cannot e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over M r . Flamrnond because he has i n s u f f i c i e n t contacts with the S t a t e of Montana. For t h e purposes of the URESA, he i s a c i t i z e n only of t h e Black- feet reservation. I believe t h a t i n rendering such a deci- sion, m y colleagues have continued on a course t h a t leads even f u r t h e r away from t h e establishment of a common-sense r u l e of law i n Indian j u r i s d i c t i o n cases. This Court e a r l y recognized t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d an inherent f a i r n e s s i n a r u l e t h a t ". . .'Indians may sue - o r be sued i n s t a t e c o u r t s , s i n c e the' latter a r e generally open -- t o a l l persons i r r e s p e c t i v e of race, color, o r c i t i z e n s h i p . ' " Bonnet v. Seekins (1952), 126 Mont. 2 4 , 26, 243 P.2d 317, 318, c i t i n g 27 Am.Jur. Indians, S 2 1 a t 554. (Emphasis supplied.) Is it no longer the policy of t h i s Court t o s t r i v e t o i n t e r p r e t the law i n a f a i r and j u s t manner with- o u t regard t o t h e color of a person's skin? I am mindful t h a t the majority i s i n keeping with the trend of case law i n t h i s area, b u t I cannot i n good con- science support a l e g a l trend which operates upon the in- equitable and u n f a i r premise t h a t some c i t i z e n s can be c i t i z e n s f o r t h e purposes of s t a t e b e n e f i t s , y e t escape r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by t h e d e n i a l of t h a t c i t i z e n s h i p when a judgment t o support h i s children may be rendered a g a i n s t him. I t i s m y view t h i s opinion serves only t o perpetuate and expand an already unworkable l e g a l framework. When Congress made Indians c i t i z e n s of the United S t a t e s , it a l s o made them c i t i z e n s of t h e s t a t e s i n which they l i v e d . "An Indian, becoming a c i t i z e n of the United S t a t e s and r e s i d i n g i n a s t a t e , i s held t o be a c i t i z e n of t h a t s t a t e . " Confederated S a l i s h and Kootenai Tribes, Mont. v. Moe (D.c. Mont. 1975), 392 F.Supp. 1297 1319, n. 5 (Judge Smith, d i s s e n t i n g ) , c i t i n g Boyd v. Nebraska (1892), 143 U.S. 135-162, 1 2 S.Ct. 375, 36 L.Ed. 103. I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s no longer p r e c i s e l y t r u e . A s t o t h e b e n e f i t s of s t a t e c i t i z e n s h i p , Indians a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e f u l l measure of s t a t e s e r v i c e s , b u t a s t o t h e burdens of s t a t e c i t i z e n s h i p , t h e r e s e r v a t i o n Blackfeet Indians a r e c i t i z e n s n o t answerable i n our c o u r t s . Such a double standard i s an a f f r o n t t o common-sense p o l i c i e s of f a i r n e s s and equal treatment under t h e law. H o w can t h e Blackfeet people so h e a r t i l y embrace Montana c i t i z e n s h i p when educating t h e i r c h i l d r e n , seeking s t a t e p u b l i c a s s i s - tance, voting, and using s t a t e roads on t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , y e t use t h e i r s t a t u s as on-reservation Indians as a s h i e l d a g a i n s t t h e i r s o c i a l and l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s , without i n - f r i n g i n g on the equal p r o t e c t i o n r i g h t s of non-Indian Montana c i t i z e n s ? I would submit t h a t they cannot. W e a r e faced with a choice of inferences i n t h i s case. W e can i n f e r t h a t Congress intended t o make Joseph Lloyd Flammond a f u l l and complete c i t i z e n of t h i s s t a t e , o r t h a t it d i d not. I f it bestowed upon him a l l t h e r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of Montana c i t i z e n s h i p , then it must have i n - tended t h a t he be f u l l y a s answerable i n state c o u r t s a s any o t h e r Montana c i t i z e n . To i n f e r otherwise would be t o abandon t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e Congress no longer seeks t o e q u a l i z e t h e b e n e f i t s and burdens of government. M y colleagues have concluded t h a t M r . Flammond has i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s with t h e s t a t e f o r it t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over him. M r . Flammond t r a v e l s on state roads when he i s on t h e reservation. He is e n t i t l e d t o vote f o r persons who w i l l conduct state a f f a i r s . H e i s e n t i t l e d t o educate h i s c h i l d r e n i n public schools. H e i s e n t i t l e d t o bring h i s claims and l i t i g a t e them i n state c o u r t s . He i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e any p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e f o r which he q u a l i f i e s . O n appeal, Joseph Lloyd Flammond w a s represented by Montana Legal Services a t t o r n e y s , n o t t r i b a l attorneys. Y e t , when a l l t h i s i s considered, t h e majority concludes t h a t M r . Flammond has i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s with t h e S t a t e of Montana f o r s t a t e c o u r t s t o e n t e r t a i n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t him. I n m y opinion, M r . Flammond i s a Montanan and answer- a b l e t o t h e s t a t e c o u r t l i k e a l l o t h e r Montanans who enjoy t h e s e p r i v i l e g e s . The majority a s s e r t s t h a t Kulko v. C a l i f o r n i a Superior Court (1978), 436 U.S. 84, 96-97, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, reh. denied, 438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150, has e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same set of f a c t s a s i n t h i s c a s e and stands f o r t h e proposition t h a t a s t a t e ' s e x e r c i s e of personal j u r i s d i c t i o n would be both unreasonable and imper- missible. I i n t e r p r e t t h e f a c t s i n Kulko t o be completely d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case. I n Kulko t h e husband had v i r t u a l l y no c o n t a c t s with t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a . H e l i v e d i n New York and h i s wife, who brought t h e a c t i o n , l i v e d i n C a l i f o r n i a . C a l i f o r n i a attempted t o e x e r c i s e per- sonal j u r i s d i c t i o n over M r . Kulko, b u t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court r u l e d t h a t C a l i f o r n i a d i d n o t have j u r i s d i c - t i o n , and it would be unreasonable t o compel h i s appearance. This was n o t a U R E S A a c t i o n , and t h e s u i t w a s not brought i n t h e s t a t e of t h e responding spouse. Compare t h i s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n before us. The s u i t was a U R E S A p e t i t i o n designed f o r the convenience of t h e responding spouse and brought within a f e w m i l e s of M r . Flammond's home. Is t h i s more "unreasonable" than compelling h i s appearance i n California, which he admits the S t a t e of California could do? I con- clude t h a t the S t a t e of Montana's exercise of personal j u r i s d i c t i o n would not only be permissible, but reasonable and proper, and i n keeping with t h e s p i r i t of URESA. I a m n o t concerned here with t r i b e s , b u t with indi- viduals. There i s something fundamental i n t h e concepts of f a i r n e s s and e q u a l i t y t h a t someone a b l e t o sue i n a c o u r t should be amenable t o s u i t . What w e a r e saying i s t h a t M r s . Flammond, a California c i t i z e n , cannot bring her a c t i o n i n state c o u r t s o l e l y because her husband i s now an on-reser- vation Blackfoot Indian. A r e we n o t denying her equal pro- t e c t i o n of the law under t h e F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments? It should be f u r t h e r noted t h a t our decision today does n o t j u s t t r a n s f e r M r s . Flammond's case t o t r i b a l c o u r t , b u t i n a p r a c t i c a l sense, may leave her without any remedy. The Blackfeet Code has n o t adopted any r e c i p r o c a l provision which would c r e a t e a mechanism by which they may process a URESA p e t i t i o n . Therefore, although t h e t r i b e has undis- puted j u r i s d i c t i o n , it may be unable t o proceed with t h e p e t i t i o n because of the absence of any r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n - s h i p with California. Assuming t h e t r i b e can l i t i g a t e a URESA a c t i o n , o r a l argument revealed t h a t two U R E S A a c t i o n s had been r e f e r r e d t o t r i b a l courts i n Montana with no r e s u l t s Unless t h a t s i t u a t i o n has changed, the t r i b a l c o u r t s seem r e l u c t a n t t o decide URESA cases a g a i n s t on-reservation t r i b a l members. M r s . Flammond could e i t h e r sue M r . ~lammond i n California s t a t e court, o r disregard U R E S A and come t o Montana t o sue i n t r i b a l c o u r t f o r r e l i e f . E i t h e r a l t e r - n a t i v e c l e a r l y d e f e a t s t h e s p i r i t and purpose of t h e U R E S A system. For t h e purposes of argument, I w i l l assume t h a t t h e t r i b a l c o u r t d i d e n t e r t a i n and r e s o l v e M r s . Flammond's case. I am s t i l l n o t persuaded t h a t she could r e c e i v e due process p r o t e c t i o n s s i n c e t h e r e appears t h a t t h e r e may be no adequate appeal from t r i b a l c o u r t a t t h e f e d e r a l l e v e l . See Wells v. P h i l b r i c k (D. S.D. 1980), 486 F.Supp. 807, 809, n. 2 (concluding t h a t habeas corpus i s unavailable i n domestic r e l a t i o n s c a s e s ) . I t i s unfortunate t h a t w e have denied M r s . Flamrnond her remedy. This maze of l e g a l c r e a t i o n s serves only t o impede t h e administration of j u s t i c e and make a mockery o u t of j u d i c i a l economy. Not only i s U R E S A de- f e a t e d , b u t the mechanical and p r a c t i c a l problems with t h i s d e c i s i o n l e a d m e t o b e l i e v e t h a t M r s . Flammond and o t h e r s l i k e her w i l l have a very d i f f i c u l t t i m e obtaining r e l i e f . Although I r e s p e c t t h e m a j o r i t y ' s decision, t h e r e s u l t appears t o m e t o be u n f a i r t o M r s . Flammond and u n j u s t t o t h e people of Montana, and I cannot join i n t h e i r opinion.