Title: Barker v. Curtis
Citation: 287 S.W.2d 43
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 1956

287 S.W.2d 43 (1956) Hugh BARKER, d/b/a Black Coal Company, etc., v. John Wilford CURTIS. Supreme Court of Tennessee. February 3, 1956. *44 A. A. Kelly, South Pittsburg, for appellant. Raulston, Raulston &amp; Swafford, Jasper, for appellee. BURNETT, Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case. The only question involved is whether or not the petitioner Curtis was an independent contractor or an employee of the appellant. The Chancellor after having heard the proof in open court determined that Curtis was an employee and fixed his compensation accordingly. An appeal was seasonably prayed and has been perfected. Able briefs have been filed and argument heard and we now have the matter for determination. The finding and memorandum of the Chancellor is in the record and portions of this finding are apropos and necessary for this decision. The Chancellor found as follows: After making this very comprehensive finding of fact which is well supported by the record and the material facts therein the Chancellor concluded that Curtis was an employee and not an independent contractor. There have been many of these cases where the determinative question was whether or not the person was an employee or an independent contractor. Under all of the cases it is recognized that there is no absolute formula whereby it can be determined which a party is, that is, an employee or independent contractor, but the facts of each particular case have to be taken into consideration and from these facts a determination made. One of the most widely accepted definitions of an independent contractor is: This definition goes down through many of our cases and is a fair definition of what an independent contractor is. In the instant case of course there are many badges of an independent contractor but when we take the proof as a whole as so well analyzed by the able Chancellor it seems clear to us that the Chancellor was correct in concluding that this man was an employee rather than an independent contractor. *46 In any event the question of whether or not he was an employee or an independent contractor is a question of fact for the Chancellor in this particular case. When such matters are tried to a jury it becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine. Odom v. Sanford &amp; Treadway, supra; Tennessee Valley Appliances, Inc., v. Rowden, 24 Tenn.App. 487, 146 S.W.2d 845; Gulf Refining Co. v. Huffman &amp; Weakley, 155 Tenn. 580, 297 S.W. 199, and others. In determining whether or not one is an employee or an independent contractor in a suit under the Workmen's Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-901 et seq., it is our duty to give the Workmen's Compensation Act a liberal construction in favor of the fact that he is an employee rather than a strict construction. Frost v. Blue Ridge Timber Corp., 158 Tenn. 18, 11 S.W.2d 860. In Knoxville Power &amp; Light Co. v. Barnes, 156 Tenn. 184, 188, 299 S.W. 772, 774, it was held, Thus it would seem when we find that there is material evidence in the record to support these findings of the able Chancellor then in a compensation case, as this is, this finding of fact by the Chancellor, the trial court, is not open to review by this Court. Griffith v. Goforth, 184 Tenn. 56, 62, 195 S.W.2d 33. We, in our study of the case think that we could go further and point out other instances in the record that clearly point to the fact that the man is an employee and not an independent contractor. We say this and do this because the able Chancellor probably did not have a written transcript of the evidence before him when he made his finding, but probably made it from his seeing and hearing the witnesses and the notes that he made at the time. When we review this evidence we find in addition to the material evidence to support the finding of the Chancellor the following badges, that to our minds, clearly point to the fact that he was an employee. We think that the evidence clearly shows that Curtis could have been fired at the will of the Coal Company if he had done anything that they thought was out of line with how they thought and directed that the coal should be mined. It must be remembered that this record, insofar as the question of independent contractor is concerned, is made up of the testimony of Curtis, the petitioner and of Travis who was really in effect a silent partner with Barker in the operation of the coal company. All the way through Curtis' testimony he testifies time and again as to conversations and things that he said to Barker. Barker was present at the trial and did not take the witness stand to contradict any of the statements that Curtis made. Clearly such being the case any statement that Curtis made in reference to what Barker told him must be taken by the Court as true. It is true Curtis did not testify that he made the original contract with Barker, this according to the testimony of Travis was made by Travis. Travis' testimony though clearly leads one to believe that he is primarily testifying as the manager of the Tennessee Products Company rather than a partner of Barker in the Black Coal Company. When we thus consider this testimony, Curtis at different places testifies that he could have been fired at any time they wanted to, then he also says that Barker told him that they had compensation on Curtis. This fact is also supported too by the statement of the insurance agent that they did take out this conpensation coverage. The insurance agent uses the term several times that Cutis was covered as an employee. At other times he used him as one of the operators of these mines for the Black Coal Company. The fact that this premium was paid on Curtis in and of itself is without probative value. Weeks v. McConnell, 1954, 196 Tenn. 110, 264 S.W.2d 573. In this case though we have more than that. It is true that it is the contention of counsel in his *47 able argument of the case for the Coal Company or really the insurance company, that this position should be taken about it, and this is probably true from Travis' testimony, but we think the fact that Curtis testifies that Barker told him that they had insurance on it and then that when this insurance agent says that he was covered as an employee, this could have had some effect in that it is some evidence of the fact by him having been told this by Barker the real operator of the Black Coal Company that he was covered as an employee and was an employee. The fact is his salary or wages were fixed at $300 a month or $75 per week for the work that he did for this coal company. Incidentally, too, it is rather interesting to observe from this testimony that the Black Coal Company had a spread of about 20¢ a ton on the price of coal for what they got for it after it was mined and delivered by Curtis from the Tennessee Products Company. Travis says two or three times that the Black Coal Company made about 5¢ a ton on it, the inference is that the only responsibility they had was to write compensation insurance on Curtis and those people that he had working for him. And too, Travis' testimony which is the only testimony offered by the Coal Company other than the deposition of a doctor, does not overcome the presumption within itself of the fact that where the employment appears he is presumed to be a servant rather than an independent contractor. D.M. Rose &amp; Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 206 S.W.2d 897, 904. A long time ago this Court in Finley v. Keisling, 151 Tenn. 464, 270 S.W. 629, 632, said: This is still true. Of course the contention here is that the power to control this work of Curtis was limited but when we take the work as a whole, the really essential things, the main and important things in doing this work all except the actual, physical labor of getting it out and putting it in a truck and hauling it, was reserved to the Coal Company or their immediate superior Tennessee Products Corporation under whatever their contract was with the Coal Company. We think it is rather obvious that there really was that reservation of control which controlled the thing in the main and the thing that Curtis did was more or less a menial part. This to us, as are all of these independent contractor cases, has been a rather interesting proposition. After much thought though we are convinced that the Chancellor was right and the decree below will be affirmed with costs.