Title: Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11943
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2016

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SJC-11943 
 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.  vs.  DEBORA A. CASEY, trustee.1 
 
 
 
 February 11, 2016. - June 16, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Mortgage, Validity.  Real Property, Mortgage. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
 
 
 
Adam C. Ponte for the defendant. 
 
Mark B. Johnson for the plaintiff. 
 
Lawrence P. Heffernan & Danielle Andrews Long, for The 
Abstract Club & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  We consider two questions certified to this 
court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit (First Circuit).2  The questions, which arise in 
                     
 
1 Of the bankruptcy estate of Alvaro M. Pereira. 
 
 
2 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 
Mass. 700 (1981), provides in relevant part:  "This court may 
answer questions of law certified to it by . . . a Court of 
2 
 
 
 
connection with a bankruptcy proceeding, concern the power and 
effect of an affidavit of an attorney executed pursuant to G. L. 
c. 183, § 5B, in relation to a mortgage containing a defective 
certificate of acknowledgment.  The two questions ask: 
 
"1.  May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant 
to [G. L. c.] 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper 
acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a 
Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the 
mortgagor, correct what the parties say is a material 
defect in the Certificate of Acknowledgment of that 
mortgage? 
 
 
"2.  May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant 
to [G. L. c.] 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper 
acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a 
Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the 
mortgagor, provide constructive notice of the existence of 
the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently 
or in combination with the mortgage?" 
 
For the reasons that follow, we answer both questions yes, in 
certain circumstances.3 
 
1.  Background.4  By quitclaim deed dated September 29, 
1999, Alvaro and Lisa Pereira (collectively, Pereiras) acquired 
title to the property located at 107 Colonial Drive in New 
                                                                  
Appeals of the United States . . . when requested by the 
certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before 
it questions of law of this State which may be determinative of 
the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which 
it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling 
precedent in the decisions of this court." 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by The Abstract 
Club and the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, 
Inc., in support of Bank of America, N.A. (bank). 
 
 
4 The facts are taken from the record on appeal and are 
undisputed. 
3 
 
 
 
Bedford (property).  On October 1, 1999, the deed was recorded 
with the Southern Bristol County registry of deeds (registry).  
On December 27, 2005, the Pereiras refinanced the property, 
granting to Bank of America, N.A. (bank), a mortgage in the 
principal amount of $240,000.  The Pereiras individually 
initialed the bottom of each page of the mortgage agreement 
except the signature page, on which the full signature of each 
appears.  Attorney Raymond J. Quintin also signed this page, as 
witness to the Pereiras' execution of the mortgage.  The 
mortgage agreement contains a certificate of acknowledgment 
(acknowledgment) on a separate page.  The Pereiras individually 
initialed the acknowledgment page at the bottom, but the 
acknowledgment itself is blank in the space designated for the 
names of the persons appearing before the notary public, and the 
Pereiras' names do not appear elsewhere on the page.5  Quintin 
                     
 
5 The certificate of acknowledgment (acknowledgment) is a 
preprinted page of the mortgage agreement, and provides as 
follows: 
 
"COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
Bristol County, ss. 
 
"On this 27 day of December, 2005, before me, the 
undersigned notary public, personally appeared 
 
"[BLANK] 
 
"through satisfactory evidence of identification, which 
was/were MA Driver's Lic, proved to me to be the person(s) 
whose name(s) is/are signed on the preceding document, and 
acknowledged to me that he/she/they signed it voluntarily 
for its stated purpose. 
4 
 
 
 
notarized the acknowledgment, affixing his signature and his 
notary public seal.6  The mortgage agreement, with the 
acknowledgment included, was recorded in the registry on 
December 28, 2005. 
 
On January 19, 2012, Quintin caused to be recorded in the 
registry an affidavit titled "Attorney's Affidavit, M.G.L. 
Ch. 183, Sec. 5B" (attorney's affidavit) that was dated 
January 11, 2012.  The attorney's affidavit states in relevant 
part: 
 
"I, Raymond J. Quintin, do under oath depose and say 
that I am a practicing [a]ttorney . . . ; that I have 
personal knowledge of the facts stated herein; that they 
are relevant to the title to land in the property described 
herein; and that this affidavit will be of benefit to 
clarify the chain of title; and do hereby under oath depose 
and say as follows: 
 
"1.  On December 27, 2005, I witnessed the execution 
of a [m]ortgage from Lisa M. Pereira and Alvaro M. Pereira 
to Bank of America, N.A. in the original principal amount 
of $240,000.00, for the property located at 107 Colonial 
Drive, New Bedford . . . .  I subsequently recorded this 
mortgage at the [registry] on December 28, 2005, in Book 
7940, Page 14. 
 
                                                                  
 
"My Commission Expires:  July 10, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"/s/ Raymond J. Quintin 
 
 
 
 
 
"Notary Public, Raymond J. Quintin" 
 
Words above that appear to be typed onto the preprinted page are 
identified by emphasis. 
 
 
6 See note 5, supra. 
5 
 
 
 
"2.  Through inadvertence, the names of the parties 
executing this mortgage, Lisa M. Pereira and Alvaro M.  
Pereira, were omitted from the notary clause. 
 
"3.  I hereby certify that I witnessed their 
signatures on said mortgage, that they provided 
satisfactory evidence of their identity to me, and that 
they acknowledged that they signed said mortgage 
voluntarily. 
 
"Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 
11th day of January, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
"/s/ Raymond J. Quintin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Raymond J. Quintin"7 
 
Approximately six months later, in July, 2012, Alvaro 
Pereira (debtor) filed a voluntary petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Eastern 
Division (Bankruptcy Court), seeking bankruptcy relief pursuant 
to Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 301 et seq. (2012) (Chapter 7).  In September, 2012, Debora 
Casey, the Chapter 7 trustee (trustee), filed an adversary 
complaint in the bankruptcy action, seeking to avoid the 2005 
mortgage granted by the Pereiras to the bank on the ground that 
the mortgage contained a material defect, namely, the omission 
of the mortgagors' names from the acknowledgment.  On April 16, 
2013, the bank filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
any material defect in the mortgage was cured by Quintin's 
attorney's affidavit.  The trustee opposed the motion, and after 
a hearing, a judge in the Bankruptcy Court granted summary 
                     
 
7 The affidavit is notarized by a notary public identified 
as Sara B. O'Leary. 
6 
 
 
 
judgment to the trustee, concluding that the material defect in 
the mortgage -- the incomplete acknowledgment -- was not cured, 
and could not be cured, by the attorney's affidavit.  Ruling on 
the bank's appeal, a judge in the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts (District Court) reversed and 
granted summary judgment to the bank, based on the judge's 
determination that Quintin's attorney's affidavit did clarify 
the chain of title and in substance cured the material defect in 
the mortgage created by the absence of the mortgagors' names 
from the acknowledgment.  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Casey, 517 B.R. 1 
(D. Mass. 2014).  The trustee appealed to the First Circuit, 
which concluded that a proper resolution of the appeal turned on 
undecided issues of Massachusetts law and accordingly certified 
to this court the two questions previously set out. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The starting point for both of the First 
Circuit's questions is that a recorded mortgage, like the 
Pereiras,' that omits the names of the mortgagors from the 
mortgage's certificate of acknowledgment contains a material 
defect.  Both questions then focus on whether and, if so, how an 
attorney's affidavit prepared pursuant to G. L. c. 183, § 5B 
(§ 5B), may affect the material defect and the recording of the 
mortgage.8  Before turning to the questions, it is useful to 
                     
8 General Laws c. 183, § 5B (§ 5B), provides in relevant 
part: 
7 
 
 
 
summarize certain principles relating to deeds and mortgages 
that provide context for the questions.   
 
Under Massachusetts law,  
"[t]itle to real estate may be transferred by a deed which 
has not been acknowledged or which contains a certificate 
showing a defective acknowledgement, and the deed is good 
against the grantor and his heirs and those having actual 
notice, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 183, § 4 . . . ; but the 
grantor must acknowledge that he has executed the 
instrument as his free act and deed, and a certificate 
reciting that the grantor appeared before the officer 
making the certificate and made such acknowledgment must be 
attached to the instrument in order to entitle it to be 
recorded, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 183, § 29; . . . so that 
notice of the conveyance shall be given to all the 
world. . . .  The certificate of acknowledgment furnishes 
formal proof of the authenticity of the execution of the 
instrument when presented for recording" (citations 
omitted).   
 
McOuatt v. McOuatt, 320 Mass. 410, 413 (1946).  Although 
mortgages are not specifically mentioned in G. L. c. 183, § 4,9 
                                                                  
 
 
"[A]n affidavit made by a person claiming to have 
personal knowledge of the facts therein stated and 
containing a certificate by an attorney at law that the 
facts stated in the affidavit are relevant to the title to 
certain land and will be of benefit and assistance in 
clarifying the chain of title may be filed for record and 
shall be recorded in the registry of deeds where the land 
or any part thereof lies." 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 183, § 4, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"A conveyance of an estate in fee simple, fee tail or 
for life, or a lease for more than seven years from the 
making thereof, or an assignment of rents or profits from 
an estate or lease, shall not be valid as against any 
person, except the grantor or lessor, his heirs and 
devisees and persons having actual notice of it, unless it 
8 
 
 
 
referenced in the quoted passage from McOuatt, that statute 
applies to mortgages, and requires that a mortgage be recorded 
in the appropriate registry of deeds in order to provide 
effective notice to anyone beyond the parties to the mortgage 
transaction and those with actual notice of it.  See Tramontozzi 
v. D'Amicis, 344 Mass. 514, 517 (1962).  In other words, unless 
a mortgage is recorded, it does not provide constructive notice 
of its existence. 
General Laws c. 183, § 29, also referenced in the quoted 
passage from McOuatt, provides: 
 
"No deed shall be recorded unless a certificate of its 
acknowledgement or of the proof of its due execution, made 
as hereinafter provided, is endorsed upon or annexed to it, 
and such certificate shall be recorded at length with the 
deed to which it relates . . . ."10 
 
                                                                  
. . . is recorded in the registry of deeds for the county 
or district in which the land to which it relates lies." 
 
 
10 The bank acknowledges that, as Tramontozzi v. D'Amicis, 
344 Mass. 514, 517 (1962), states, a mortgage must be recorded 
to provide constructive notice, but argues that G. L. c. 183, 
§ 29, applies only to "deeds" and not to mortgages.  The bank is 
incorrect.  Although § 29 expressly refers only to the recording 
of a deed, under Massachusetts law the effect of a mortgage is 
to transfer legal title of the mortgage property from the 
mortgagor to the mortgage holder, and in that sense a mortgage 
is a document of title transfer that operates as a deed.  See, 
e.g., Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 575-576 
(2012), and cases cited.  Accordingly, in order to be properly 
recorded, a mortgage must have endorsed upon or annexed to it a 
certificate of acknowledgment pursuant to § 29. 
9 
 
 
 
The acknowledgment required for proper recording of a mortgage 
by § 29 need not take any one specific form.  See G. L. c. 183, 
§ 42. 
 
The reason for requiring a certificate of acknowledgment to 
be appended to a deed as a condition of the deed's proper 
recording is most fundamentally to ensure that public notice of 
the transfer of title to the land, appearing in the registry's 
record, is accurate.  See Pidge v. Tyler, 4 Mass. 541, 543, 545-
546 (1808).  See also McOuatt, 320 Mass. at 414-415.  This 
reason applies with equal force to mortgages.  See In re Giroux, 
U.S. Bankr. Ct., No. 08-14708-JWF, slip op. at 12-16 (D. Mass. 
May 21, 2009), aff'd, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 09-CV-10988-PBS (D. 
Mass. Nov. 17, 2009). 
 
a.  Question 1.  The first question asks whether an 
attorney's affidavit like Quintin's, executed and recorded 
pursuant to § 5B and attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a 
recorded mortgage that, as originally executed and recorded, 
omitted the name of the mortgagor from the acknowledgment and 
thereby contained a material defect, may correct that omission 
and thereby the material defect.  The trustee argues that the 
answer to this question must be no.  Although she does not 
dispute the veracity of any of the facts averred in Quintin's 
attorney's affidavit -- i.e., she does not question that 
Quintin, in fact, did witness the Pereiras' voluntary execution 
10 
 
 
 
of the mortgage agreement with the bank on December 27, 2005 -- 
she contends that the affidavit nonetheless does not and legally 
cannot cure the defect reflected in the acknowledgment.  She 
advances three reasons in support of her position that we next 
discuss; we disagree with each of them. 
 
i.  "Functus officio."11  The trustee argues that the 
doctrine or principle of "functus officio" prohibits a public 
official, including a notary public such as Quintin, from 
unilaterally recording what essentially constitutes a formal 
reacknowledgment of the mortgage agreement without the assent of 
the mortgagors, here the Pereiras.12  Functus officio is a 
common-law principle that has been referenced in our cases since 
at least the early Nineteenth Century.  In those early cases, 
the term appeared to signify that because of identified actions 
taken by one or more relevant parties, a particular pleading 
(e.g., a writ) or document with legal significance (e.g., a note 
or mortgage) was of no further legal effect and could not be the 
                     
 
11 The bank argues that the trustee waived any argument 
concerning the principle of "functus officio" by failing to 
raise it in the earlier proceedings in this case.  Waiver in 
this instance is a matter for the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit (First Circuit) to decide; to answer the 
First Circuit's questions, we consider here the trustee's 
functus officio argument. 
 
 
12 "Functus officio" is defined as "without further 
authority or legal competence because the duties and functions 
of the original commission have been fully accomplished."  
Black's Law Dictionary 787 (10th ed. 2014). 
11 
 
 
 
basis of any subsequent legal action.  See, e.g., Kidder v. 
Browne, 9 Cush. 400, 401-402 (1852) (writ filed by plaintiff 
after statutory deadline for filing was functus officio); 
Claflin v. Godfrey, 21 Pick. 1, 8-9 (1838) (where note or 
mortgage was paid off, it was functus officio, i.e., no longer 
operative); Clark v. Lyman, 10 Pick. 45, 47-48 (1830) 
(attachment of property with altered writ of attachment in 
violation of statute was functus officio).  Currently, the 
principle appears to be used primarily, if not exclusively, in 
relation to arbitration awards and the power of an arbitrator.13  
In this context, functus officio has been defined as meaning 
"that an arbitrator is without power to modify his final award 
except where the controlling statute or the parties authorize 
modification."  Ciampa v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 26 Mass. 
App. Ct. 941, 941 (1988).  See Connecticut Valley Sanitary Waste 
Disposal v. Zielinski, 436 Mass. 263, 268 (2002).  Cf. Eastern 
Seaboard Constr. Co. v. Gray Constr., Inc., 553 F.3d 1, 4 & n.2 
(1st Cir. 2008) (Federal Arbitration Act). 
 
We conclude that the principle of functus officio does not 
apply here for two reasons.  First, as just suggested, it is 
                     
13 Our research has not uncovered any case since 1926 in 
which a Massachusetts appellate court has applied the principle 
of functus officio outside the arbitration context.  See 
Kalbritan v. Isidor, 255 Mass. 494, 497-498 (1926) (execution 
issued in "poor debtor" proceeding was functus officio where it 
failed to show that time required by statute was allowed). 
12 
 
 
 
doubtful the principle continues to be recognized outside the 
arbitration context.14  Second, § 5B, by its terms (see note 8, 
supra), appears to contemplate that an attorney's affidavit 
prepared and recorded in accordance with the requirements of 
that statute, by "clarifying" the chain of title, will 
necessarily alter at least in some respect that chain of title 
as it is reflected in the documents previously recorded.  In 
other words, when its requirements are met, § 5B effectively 
supersedes any continuing common-law functus officio principle 
in this arena.  See, e.g., Coburn v. Palmer, 10 Cush. 273, 275 
(1852) ("the common law remains in force in all the cases in 
which the statutes have not altered it"). 
 
ii.  Curative provisions and effect of § 5B affidavit.  The 
trustee argues the following:  the omission of the mortgagor's 
name in the acknowledgment is a material defect that renders 
invalid the recording of the mortgage to which the 
acknowledgment is affixed; a § 5B attorney's affidavit like 
Quintin's in this case is insufficient to correct such a defect 
                     
 
14 There is some question whether the functus officio 
principle continues to operate even within the arbitration 
context.  See Eastern Seaboard Constr. Co. v. Gray Constr., 
Inc., 553 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008), citing and quoting Glass, 
Molders, Pottery, Plastics, & Allied Workers Int'l Union, AFL-
CIO, CLC, Local 182B v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 846 
(7th Cir. 1995) (functus officio doctrine is "riddled with 
exceptions . . . [and] is hanging on by its fingernails"). 
13 
 
 
 
because G. L. c. 184, § 24,15 prescribes the sole means of curing 
a defect in an acknowledgment; relief under § 24 was not pursued 
here, and therefore, the recording of the Pereiras' mortgage 
remained legally defective at the time the debtor filed his 
Chapter 7 petition; and accordingly, the trustee, through the 
exercise of her statutory "strong-arm" powers, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 544(a)(3) (2012),16 was entitled to avoid the mortgage for the 
                     
 
15 General Laws c. 184, § 24, as amended by St. 1964, 
c. 311, § 1, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"When any owner of land the title to which is not 
registered, or of any interest in such land, signs an 
instrument in writing conveying or purporting to convey his 
land or interest . . . and the instrument, whether or not 
entitled to record, is recorded, and indexed, in the 
registry of deeds . . . , and a period of ten years elapses 
after the instrument is accepted for record, and the 
instrument or the record thereof because of defect, 
irregularity or omission fails to comply in any respect 
with any requirement of law relating to . . . the validity 
of . . . [a] certificate of acknowledgment . . . , such 
instrument and the record thereof shall notwithstanding any 
or all of such defects, irregularities and omissions, be 
effective for all purposes to the same extent as though the 
instrument and the record thereof had originally not been 
subject to the defect, irregularity or omission, unless 
within said period of ten years a proceeding is commenced 
on account of the defect, irregularity or omission, and 
notice thereof is duly recorded in said registry of deeds 
and indexed and noted on the margin thereof under the name 
of the signer of the instrument and, in the event of such 
proceeding, unless relief is thereby in due course 
granted." 
 
 
16 Title 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2012) provides: 
 
 
"(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of 
the case, and without regard to any knowledge of the 
trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or 
14 
 
 
 
benefit of the bankruptcy estate because the mortgage did not 
represent a perfected security interest held by the bank. 
 
We disagree with the premise of the trustee's argument that 
§ 24 provides the sole means by which to cure a defect in an 
acknowledgment of a mortgage; rather, as the Federal District 
Court judge concluded, § 24 in effect creates a statute of 
repose to protect the chain of title to real property from 
attenuated challenges.  The ten-year period stated in § 24 
simply allows those individuals whose rights have been affected 
by the purported conveyance to commence a proceeding to 
vindicate their rights, but once ten years have elapsed, the 
rights of those parties to challenge the validity of the 
conveyance are lost.  See Opinion of the Justices, 360 Mass. 
894, 899 (1971) (describing § 24 as "curative legislation 
providing for saving periods during which existing rights can be 
preserved").  See also Nett v. Bellucci, 437 Mass. 630, 639 
(2002) ("The purpose of a statute of repose is to give 
particular types of defendants the benefit of a date certain on 
                                                                  
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by --  
 
". . . 
 
 
"(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other 
than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law 
permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the 
status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such 
transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, 
whether or not such a purchaser exists." 
15 
 
 
 
which their liability for past conduct will definitively come to 
an end").  Nothing in the language of § 24 states or implies 
that it defines the exclusive permissible method of curing any 
and all defects that may exist in an acknowledgment.  Indeed, 
the Legislature has enacted statutes in addition to § 24 that 
provide solutions to certain types of problems relating to 
acknowledgments; in this regard, see G. L. c. 183, §§ 36, 37.17  
We consider § 5B to be another example of such a statute, 
providing a method to correct certain types of errors that may 
affect the validity of an acknowledgment that accompanies or is 
annexed to a recorded deed or mortgage. 
 
The question then becomes, what types of errors relating to 
a defective acknowledgment may properly be corrected with an 
attorney's affidavit prepared and recorded under § 5B.  The 
answer derives from the text of § 5B, and in particular, the 
requirements that (1) facts contained in the affidavit must be 
based on the personal knowledge of the affiant; and (2) the 
affidavit include a certification by an attorney that the facts 
stated are both relevant to the title of specifically identified 
property and "will be of benefit and assistance in clarifying 
                     
 
17 General Laws c. 183, § 36, provides a method for curing a 
grantor's refusal to acknowledge his or her deed by permitting a 
subscribing witness to testify that the deed was duly executed; 
G. L. c. 183, § 37, provides that where a grantor refuses to 
acknowledge his or her deed, due execution may be shown by 
proving the handwriting of the grantor and of a subscribing 
witness. 
16 
 
 
 
the chain of title."  The Legislature's choice of the word 
"clarifying"18 suggests that the attorney's affidavit must be 
limited to facts that explain what actually occurred, and are 
not inconsistent with the substantive facts contained in the 
original document.19  See Allen v. Allen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 
299-300, 305-308 (2014) (facially proper acknowledgment, 
reflecting grantor signed deed in presence of notary, deemed 
invalid where evidence established grantor in fact did not 
execute deed in notary's presence on date stated in deed). 
 
Here, the undisputed facts indicate that the § 5B 
attorney's affidavit recorded by Quintin was sufficient to 
correct or cure the defect in the acknowledgment and, in turn, 
the recording of the mortgage given by the Pereiras to the bank.  
                     
 
18 To "clarify" means "to free (the mind or understanding) 
of confusion, doubt, or uncertainty"; "to explain clearly:  make 
understandable"; or "to make less complex or less ambiguous."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 415 (1993). 
 
 
19 In two recent cases, this court has approved the use of 
an attorney's affidavit to clarify compliance with statutory 
requirements relating to mortgages that appear in the chain of 
title.  See Pinti v. Emigrant Mtge. Co., 472 Mass. 226, 244 
(2015) (in connection with mortgage foreclosure proceeding, 
mortgage holder may record attorney's affidavit to demonstrate 
compliance with notice provisions of paragraph 22 of standard 
mortgage); Eaton, 462 Mass. at 589 n.28 (mortgage holder may use 
attorney's affidavit to establish it held note or was agent of 
note holder at time of foreclosure sale).  These decisions serve 
to illustrate the point we make here, which is that § 5B permits 
attorney's affidavits to explain a set of existing facts 
relevant to the chain of title where the facts had not been 
stated explicitly in the property record, whether through 
inadvertent omission or mistake or because no document 
previously called for them. 
17 
 
 
 
The defect in the acknowledgment was the omission of the names 
of the mortgagors; Quintin's attorney's affidavit supplies the 
missing information and confirms that all the steps necessary to 
acknowledge the mortgage properly were taken, namely, that the 
mortgagors, Lisa M. Pereira and Alvaro Pereira, personally 
appeared before the affiant, Quintin; that Quintin confirmed 
their identities; that he witnessed them execute the mortgage 
agreement; and that they did so voluntarily.  The affidavit also 
attests that the omission of the mortgagors' names was 
inadvertent, and, finally, references the book and page number 
of the previously recorded mortgage -- a step that enables the 
two documents to be connected, thereby effectuating the intended 
clarification of the chain of title. 
 
iii.  Illegally recorded mortgage.  Finally, the trustee 
argues that because the defect in the certificate of 
acknowledgment precluded the mortgage to which it was annexed 
from being legally recorded, see G. L. c. 183, § 29, the 
mortgage did not and could not enter the chain of title relating 
to the property.  As a consequence, she claims, nothing exists 
on record to be "clarified" by an attorney's affidavit recorded 
pursuant to § 5B.  See In re Mbazira, U.S. Bankr. Ct., No. 13-
16586-WCH (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2015) ("[I]f a [mortgage] is 
improvidently recorded due to a defective acknowledgement, the 
court must honor [G. L. c. 183, § 29,] by adopting a fiction 
18 
 
 
 
that the [mortgage] is unrecorded and outside the chain of 
title").  We disagree.  As indicated previously, we have 
accepted the premise on which the First Circuit's questions are 
based, namely, that the omission of the names of the mortgagors 
in an acknowledgment is a material defect.  It follows that 
under G. L. c. 183, § 29, the defect should operate to preclude 
the legal recording of the mortgage.  For the reasons previously 
discussed, however, an attorney's affidavit filed and recorded 
pursuant to § 5B that supplies the omitted names of the 
mortgagors, explains the circumstances of the omission, and 
confirms that in fact the affiant did witness the voluntary 
execution of the mortgage by the mortgagors on the date stated 
operates to cure the original defect in the acknowledgment.  The 
curing of the defect in the acknowledgment also cures the defect 
in the original recording of the mortgage, and the mortgage 
thereafter is properly considered within the mortgage property's 
chain of title.20 
                     
 
20 General Laws c. 183, § 29, requires that a certificate of 
acknowledgment be "endorsed upon or annexed to" the recorded 
mortgage (emphasis added).  It could be argued that even where 
an attorney's affidavit supplies necessary information that was 
omitted inadvertently from the original acknowledgment, it 
cannot cure that original defect because the attorney's 
affidavit, recorded at some time after the original 
acknowledgment was recorded, is by definition not "endorsed upon 
or annexed to" the mortgage itself.  We agree with the Federal 
District Court judge, however, that where, as here, the 
attorney's affidavit explicitly references the book and page 
numbers where the mortgage and original acknowledgment were 
19 
 
 
 
 
b.  Question 2.  The second question asks whether an 
attorney's affidavit, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of 
a previously recorded mortgage accompanied by an acknowledgment 
that omitted the name of the mortgagor, may provide constructive 
notice to a bona fide purchaser of the existence of the 
mortgage, by itself or in combination with the mortgage. 
 
We answer as follows.  As applied to the chain of title to 
real property, constructive notice arises by operation of law 
under G. L. c. 183, § 4, in any case where the mortgage is 
properly recorded.21  See Allen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 298-300, 
and cases cited.  See also Tramontozzi, 344 Mass. at 517.22  If a 
deed or mortgage is recorded without an acknowledgment, it is 
                                                                  
recorded, the affidavit is properly deemed "annexed" to the 
mortgage. 
 
 
21 "Constructive notice" is defined as "[n]otice arising by 
presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances 
that a party had a duty to take notice of, such as a registered 
deed or a pending lawsuit; notice presumed by law to have been 
acquired by a person and thus imputed to that person."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 1227 (10th ed. 2014). 
 
 
22 Cf. In re Ryan, 851 F.2d 502, 506-507 (1st Cir. 1988), 
quoting Tiffany's Law of Real Property § 1284, at 50 (B. Jones 
ed. 1939) ("It would seem that one might properly be said to 
have actual notice when he has information in regard to a fact, 
or information as to circumstances an investigation of which 
would lead him to information of such fact, while he might be 
said to have constructive notice when he is charged with notice 
by a statute or rule of law, irrespective of any information 
which he might have, actual notice thus involving a mental 
operation on the person sought to be charged, and constructive 
notice being independent of any mental operation on his part" 
[emphasis in original]). 
20 
 
 
 
not properly recorded, see G. L. c. 183, § 29, and does not 
provide constructive notice.  See, e.g., Graves v. Graves, 6 
Gray 391, 392-393 (1856) ("But the instrument of defeasance, not 
being acknowledged, was improvidently admitted to registration, 
and the record does not operate as constructive notice of the 
execution of the assignment of the equity of redemption, as 
against an attaching creditor of the equity; and therefore the 
title of the attaching creditor, though subsequent in time, 
takes precedence of the assignment").  See also McOuatt, 320 
Mass. at 413-414.  Similarly, a mortgage recorded with an 
acknowledgment that contains a material defect is not properly 
recorded and does not provide constructive notice of the 
mortgage.  See id. at 415 (where lack of proof that grantor in 
fact acknowledged conveyance of property to his wife as his free 
act and deed, deed was not properly acknowledged; although deed 
with acknowledgement was recorded, no effect could be given to 
it).  See also Allen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 299-300 (although 
deed was accompanied by facially correct acknowledgement, where 
proper acknowledgement never actually occurred, deed not 
entitled to be recorded). 
 
As our answer to the first question indicates, where, as 
here, the attorney's affidavit complies with the formal 
requirements of § 5B, attests to facts that clarify the chain of 
title by supplying information omitted from the originally 
21 
 
 
 
recorded acknowledgement, and references the previously recorded 
mortgage, the affidavit -- not by itself but in combination with 
that mortgage -- provides legally adequate constructive notice 
to a bona fide purchaser or, here, a trustee in bankruptcy.  
This is so because the prior recording of the mortgage has been 
remedied and is deemed proper through the curative effect of the 
affidavit.23 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We respond to the certified questions as 
follows. 
An attorney's affidavit filed pursuant to G. L. c. 183, 
§ 5B, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a recorded 
mortgage that has annexed to it an acknowledgment that omitted 
the mortgagors' names, in certain circumstances (such as those 
                     
 
23 It is important to note that even though a § 5B affidavit 
purportedly correcting a defect in a mortgage acknowledgement, 
in combination with the original mortgage, may provide 
constructive notice of the mortgage to a trustee in bankruptcy 
or a bona fide purchaser more generally, the trustee or bona 
fide purchaser may still challenge -- as the trustee here has 
done -- the validity of the acknowledgement, and thereby the 
existence of constructive notice.  See McOuatt v. McOuatt, 320 
Mass. 410, 413 (1946) ("The certificate of acknowledgment 
furnishes formal proof of the authenticity of the execution of 
the instrument when presented for recording.  The certificate of 
acknowledgment is of evidentiary character, and the taking of 
the acknowledgment has always been regarded in this Commonwealth 
as a ministerial and not as a judicial act and the recitals 
contained in the certificate may be contradicted").  If the 
challenge were successful, the uncorrected defect in the 
original acknowledgement would signify that the mortgage was not 
entitled to be recorded and, therefore, no constructive notice 
of the mortgage would exist.  See id. at 415; Allen v. Allen, 86 
Mass. App. Ct. 295, 299-300 (2014). 
22 
 
 
 
present in this case) may cure the defect in the acknowledgment 
and, in turn, effectuate a proper recording of the mortgage.  
Second, in a case in which the § 5B attorney's affidavit does 
cure the defect in the acknowledgment, the attorney's affidavit, 
considered in combination with the originally recorded mortgage, 
provides constructive notice of the existence of the mortgage to 
a bona fide purchaser; in a case where the attorney's affidavit 
does not cure the material defect in the acknowledgment, the 
affidavit, whether alone or in combination with the mortgage, 
does not provide constructive notice. 
 
The Reporter of Decisions is directed to furnish attested 
copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in 
turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the 
clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, as the answer to the questions certified, and will also 
transmit a copy to each party.