Title: Miles v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 257, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TYRONE MILES,
 
§
§
No. 257, 2009
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
§
Court Below:  Superior Court
v.
§
of the State of Delaware,
§
in and for Kent County
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
§
Cr. No. 0709015392
Plaintiff Below, 
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted:  September 9, 2009
Decided:  November 23, 2009
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 23  day of November 2009, on consideration of the briefs and arguments
rd
of the parties, it appears to the court that:
1) Tyrone Miles appeals from his convictions, following a jury trial, of
attempted first degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon by a person
prohibited.  He argues that the trial court erred by:  1) denying his motion to suppress
his statement to the police; 2) failing to redact a police officer’s comments in a tape
recorded interview; and 3) admitting a witness’s out-of-court statement.
2
2) On September 11, 2007, Asmi Patel was shot in the abdomen while working
as a cashier at the Duncan Depot, a convenience store in Dover, Delaware.  The store’s
security cameras videotaped the shooting.  Patel survived, and testified at trial that
Miles walked into the store and asked for a pack of cigarettes.  He told Patel that he
would pay for the cigarettes when his ride arrived.  After a few minutes, Miles
removed a gun from his waistband, pointed it at Patel, and pulled the trigger.  But the
gun misfired, and Miles walked away from the counter.  He then returned to the
counter and shot again.  This time the gun fired, and Patel was struck in the stomach.
3) After the shooting, the police released a still photograph of the shooter, taken
from the store videotape.  The photograph showed a man in a black T-shirt, jeans and
a “do rag”.  The police also took a palm print from a door handle that Miles had
touched shortly before the shooting.  The photo appeared in the newspaper on
September 12 , and someone tipped the police that the shooter was Miles.  Based on
th
that tip, the police requested that the State Bureau of Identification compare the palm
print from the crime scene with Miles’ prints.  The Bureau confirmed that the prints
were a match.  
4) The police then tried to apprehend Miles where he worked, at Harris
Manufacturing in Smyrna.  Miles was not at work, but the police got a description of
Miles’ car and later spotted him in Clayton.  A Clayton police officer stopped Miles
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1
3
and brought him to Dover for questioning.  Detective Richardson informed Miles of
his Miranda  rights before beginning the interrogation, and Miles waived his rights.
1
The interrogation lasted about 1 ½ hours, during which time Miles denied being in the
store on the day of the shooting.  Miles claimed that he had been in the store the day
before the shooting.  He also claimed that he had worked on the day of the shooting,
and that Linda Robbins, his supervisor,  had been at her nearby desk when he clocked
in.  Miles told Richardson that on the day of the shooting he was wearing a white T-
shirt, jeans, and a baseball hat.  He said that he rarely wears a “do rag” on his head.
5) At the end of the interrogation, Miles was placed in an individual cell while
the police executed several search warrants.  About 5 hours later, Richardson returned
to Miles’ cell and took him to be booked.  During that process, Miles asked Richardson
about the strength of the State’s case against him.  Richardson said he believed it was
a very strong case.  Miles then said, “She was in on it.”  Richardson responded by
suggesting that, if Miles wanted to talk, they could go back upstairs.  They did, and
during the second interrogation, Miles admitted shooting Patel.  He explained that she
wanted him to shoot her, because she wanted to commit suicide.  He also said that she
offered him $10,000 and provided the gun.  Finally, Miles said that Patel put $500 on
the counter as payment after he shot her.
564 A.2d 1125 (Del. 1989).
2
Id. at 1130.
3
4
6) Richardson followed up by questioning Robbins about Miles’ claim to have
been at work on the day of the shooting.  Robbins confirmed that Miles came to work,
but said that he was wearing the same clothes and “do rag” seen on the still photograph
from the crime scene videotape.  At trial, Robbins testified that she did not remember
seeing Miles at work that day.  She recalled speaking to Richardson, however, and
testified that she answered his questions truthfully.
7) Miles first argues that he should have been given his Miranda warnings again
before he gave his second statement to Richardson.  In Ledda v. State,  this Court
2
identified several factors that bear on whether Miranda warnings must be
readministered:  “. . . the time lapse since prior warnings, change of location,
interruptions in interrogation, whether the same officer who gave the warning also
interrogated, and significant differences of statements.”   The time lapse here, although
3
greater than in Ledda, was less than the 7 hour delay cited with approval in that case.
There was no change of location, and the second interrogation was conducted by the
same officer who gave the warnings initially.  The only factor weighing in Miles’ favor
is that his second statement was significantly different from his first.
Appellee’s Appendix, B-7.
4
5
8) The trial court reviewed the Ledda factors and concluded that there was no
need to readminister Miranda warnings.  The trial court noted that Miles had been left
alone during the 5 hours before the second statement; that Miles initiated the second
interview; and that it was “almost all a statement by the defendant with little more than
pause fillers by the investigating officer.”   We find that the trial court acted well
4
within its discretion in analyzing the totality of circumstances and reaching its
conclusion.
9) Miles next argues that, before the second videotaped statement was played
for the jury, all of Richardson’s comments should have been redacted.  Alternatively,
if all comments were not redacted, then at least the prejudicial comments reflecting
Richardson’s assessment of Miles’ credibility should have been removed from the tape.
Specifically, Miles argues that Richardson’s comment, “Looks real bad for you,” is
inadmissible opinion evidence about the strength of the State’s case.  The second
comment – “You thought your were doing her a favor?” – was Richardson’s mocking
response to Miles’ statement that he shot Patel because she wanted to commit suicide.
That, too, was inadmissible because it was a comment on Miles’ credibility.
10)  This Court recognizes that professional interviewers may make comments,
suggestions, even false statements, as a means of eliciting a response from the witness.
Waterman v. State, 956 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 2008).
5
Ibid.  See, also, Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 951 (Del. 2006); Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385,
6
398 (Del. 2006); Holtzman v. State, 1998 WL 666722 at *5 (Del. 1998).
Appellee’s Appendix, B-7.
7
The trial court did insist that other portions of the transcript be redacted.
8
6
But it is settled law that “experts may not usurp the jury’s function by opining on a
witness’s credibility.”   Thus, any comments, questions, or responses by the
5
interviewer that convey the interviewer’s belief or disbelief must be redacted.   The
6
prosecutor in this case tried to convince the trial court that a defendant’s statement has
“historically . . . [been] permitted to be shown . . . to a jury in its entirety.”   As the
7
prosecutor participated in the Hassan-El case, where this Court discussed at length the
need to redact a police officer’s credibility opinions, we question the good faith of the
prosecutor’s argument.  In any event, the prosecutor convinced the trial court that a
curative instruction would suffice in place of the two redactions.  
8
11) The trial court’s failure to redact the two comments described above was an
abuse of discretion.  We recognize that many questions are direct, non-prejudicial, and
need to be included for continuity and ease of understanding.  Questions in that
category do not need to be redacted.  But the State’s alleged difficulty in making
redactions is not a factor to be considered.  If the interviewer conveys a view (through
comment or gesture) about the strength of the State’s or the defendant’s case, the
Mason v. State, 963 A.2d at 127.
9
7
credibility of the witness/defendant, or any disputed facts, then that comment must be
redacted at the request of the defendant.  It is hoped that the process of redacting the
tape will not interfere with the trial, since it is a matter that can and should be resolved
before the trial begins.
12) Here, as in several prior “redaction” cases, we are satisfied that the failure
to redact was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  There was a videotape of the
shooting and the victim survived, identified Miles, and recounted her ordeal in court.
Given these facts, Richardson’s two comments during Miles’ second interview would
not have had any material impact on the verdict.   
9
13) Finally, Miles argues that Robbins’ statement to Richardson should not have
been admitted under 11 Del. C. § 3507 because Robbins could not remember what she
said during the interview.  Robbins did recall talking to Richardson on September 13,
2007 about Miles and a photograph in the newspaper.  Robbins testified that she
answered Richardson’s questions truthfully and voluntarily, but she could not recall
the questions or her answers.
14) Before an out-of-court statement may be admitted under 11 Del. C.  § 3507,
the declarant must “touch on the events perceived and the out-of-court statement
Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 127 (Del. 1975).
10
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
11
8
itself.”  Robbins did both – she testified that she gave a statement to Richardson about
10
a newspaper photograph involving Miles.  
15) Miles also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Richardson’s description
of Robbins’ statement was inadmissible because it was his “interpretive narrative,” not
Robbins’ actual statement.  Assuming, without deciding, that Miles is correct, we find
no plain error.  Robbins’ statement was cumulative.  She knew nothing about the crime
and only confirmed that Miles was wearing the clothing that was clearly shown on the
security camera videotape.  Thus, Richardson’s description of Robbins’ statement did
not deprive Miles of a fair trial.  
11
9
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby are, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
Justice