Title: State v. Little
Citation: 104 Ariz. 479, 455 P.2d 453
Docket Number: 1896
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 1969

104 Ariz. 479 (1969) 455 P.2d 453 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Melvin Larry LITTLE, Appellant. No. 1896. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division. June 11, 1969. Rehearing Denied July 15, 1969. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Thomas M. Tuggle, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Vernon B. Croaff, Public Defender, by Anne Kappes, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice. Melvin Larry Little, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was adjudged guilty of the crime of grand theft with a prior conviction and sentenced to a term of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years in the Arizona State Prison; from his conviction and sentence he appeals. The facts briefly stated are that on April 21, 1967, defendant stole seven tires valued at more than $100 from a Goodyear Retread Plant located in Phoenix, Arizona. Defendant was thereafter informed against for the crime of grand theft; the charging part of the information reads: The trial proceedings, which were held on July 25, 1967, began as follows: Mr. Wamacks from the County Attorney's Office was present for the State, and Mrs. Bailey from the Public Defender's Office was present for the defendant. Defendant's first contention is that he did not make an express and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial. The Constitution of the State of Arizona, Article VI, Section 17, A.R.S., reads in part as follows: As defendant correctly states in his brief, a waiver is valid only if made with the "express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854. However, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the defendant has the burden of showing essential unfairness, and that the burden is to be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable realty. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L. Ed. 268. The following statement appears in the opinion at page 242, 63 S.Ct.: It should be noted that although the waiver in the Adams case was made without the aid of counsel, the Supreme Court was unable to find that defendant's right to a jury trial was not intelligently waived. Citing Adams v. United States, supra, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia circuit held as follows, in Hatcher v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 148, 352 F.2d 364: In McCranie v. United States, 333 F.2d 307, a decision of the Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit), the appellant complained that his express waiver of a trial by jury was ineffective because the District Judge failed to advise him sufficiently of his right to a jury. The Court, in affirming the conviction, stated: The extent to which the trial judge discusses the matter with the defendant before accepting the express waiver is one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether a valid waiver has been made. The court's question to the defendant in the instant case was clear and understandable, and the defendant had the assistance of counsel at the time of his waiver. Neither has the defendant presented us with any evidence that his express decision was not the result of a free and intelligent choice on his part, nor have we been able to find any evidence in the record before us that the defendant did not make an intelligent and competent waiver of his right to a jury trial. We therefore hold that there was a valid waiver. Defendant's next contention is that the information is fatally defective in that it does not describe the property alleged to be stolen with sufficient particularity to support a conviction. Rule 114, Rules of Crim.Proc., 17 A.R.S., provides the proper form of an information as follows: And Rule 115, Rules of Crim.Proc., 17 A.R.S., sets forth the various ways by which an offense may be charged: The form suggested in Rule 114, supra, was substantially followed in the information in the instant case, and the offense of grand theft was charged both by the giving of the statutory name of the *482 crime and by the reference to the applicable sections of Arizona Revised Statutes. If the defendant were in doubt as to which Goodyear tires were taken from the Goodyear Retread Plant by him on the 21st day of April 1967 he should have requested such additional information as he desired pursuant to Rule 116, Rules of Crim.Proc., 17 A.R.S., which reads as follows: In State v. Benham, 58 Ariz. 129, 118 P.2d 91, we held: It is stated in State v. Gallegos, 99 Ariz. 168, 407 P.2d 752: Defendant cites State v. Kuhnley, 74 Ariz. 10, 242 P.2d 843, in his brief as authority for his contention that the information here is fatally defective. In the Kuhnley case the information did not set forth the section or subsections of the statute under which the defendant was charged, nor specify from where the articles (radio, two sewing machines, saw, and two typewriters) were taken, and no identifying information was given. However, in the present case, the sections which defendant was charged with violating were set forth in the information. Also, the brand of the tires Goodyear is given, and the particular location of the theft is given Goodyear Retread Plant. In State v. Bundy, 91 Ariz. 325, 372 P.2d 329, 99 A.L.R.2d 808, this Court considered the application of Kuhnley, supra, to a case where the property was described as "`one braille man's watch, one Hamilton ladies' watch, and one gold ring, of the value in excess of Fifty Dollars in lawful money * * *.'" We there said, "Here, in contrast to the Kuhnley case, trade names of the items which bore such were given, and the type of watch was indicated by the designation `man's' or `ladies'.'" We hold that the information adequately informed the defendant of the charge against him. The above cases make it clear that the defendant's remedy in the instant case was by way of a request for a bill of particulars pursuant to Rule 116, supra. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence introduced at the trial from which the jury could have found that the tires found in defendant's car were stolen from Goodyear Retread Plant. As we said in State v. Bearden, 99 Ariz. 1, 405 P.2d 885: *483 There is sufficient evidence in the instant case to support the jury's finding of guilty. The manager of the plant testified that he himself had conducted an inventory of the tires prior to the theft on the same day that the theft occurred, and he gave the following description of the tires which, according to his inventory, were missing after the theft: Officer Audsley, one of the arresting officers at the scene of the theft, testified that he took seven tires from a vehicle into which defendant was seen loading tires; his description of the allegedly stolen tires was as follows: Both the manager of the plant and the arresting officer independently described seven tires whose sizes were as follows: two 6.95 x 14; three 8.25 x 14; and two 8.55 x 14. Officer Audsley further testified that on arriving at the scene of the crime, an alley behind the Goodyear Retread Plant, he saw one man passing tires to another, who in turn placed them in the trunk; and that the tires in the trunk and back seat of the car were all Goodyear brands. There was also evidence that a gate located at the rear of the plant was pulled up at the bottom and that the car containing the stolen tires was in front of the gate. The next contention of defendant is that the proof was not sufficient to support the finding by the court of a prior conviction. The evidence in the case shows: The fingerprint expert never testified. In State v. Pennye, 102 Ariz. 207, 427 P.2d 525, we held that when a prior conviction is alleged the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has in fact been convicted of the prior criminal offense. While the State presented a duly authenticated copy of the judgment of prior conviction which was marked for identification from which the court could have found that defendant had been convicted of a prior offense, it was never admitted in evidence. *484 Defendant also states that the record presented was not sufficient in that the name on the certified copy of the prior judgment MELVIN LITTLE is different from the name on the information in the instant case MELVIN LARRY LITTLE. In State v. McGonigle, 103 Ariz. 267, 440 P.2d 100, we held that evidence of prior convictions consisting of copies of judgments and fingerprint records and photographs of defendant was sufficient to support a finding that defendant had suffered a prior felony conviction. Specifically, the court stated: However, since the exhibit was not admitted in evidence, we must hold that, under the test of State v. Pennye, supra, a prior conviction was not proven. The judgment of conviction of the crime of grand theft is affirmed, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the finding that defendant had been convicted of a prior offense. The cause is remanded to the Superior Court of Maricopa County for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. UDALL, C.J., and LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., concur.