Title: State v. Hayes
Citation: 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514
Docket Number: N/A
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 1891

BURGLARY —
EVIDENCE — PETIT LARCENY.
        The accused
proposed the commission of a burglary to H., who agreed to join in
it, and notified the authorities. The accused and H. went together
to the building. The accused raised a window, and assisted H. in
getting into the building. H. handed out a piece of bacon to the
accused, and was assisted by him in getting out. The accused picked
up the bacon, and was carrying it off, when he was arrested.
Held, that the accused could not be convicted of burglary,
but of petit larceny only.
        Appeal from
circuit court, Sullivan county; G. D. BURGESS, Judge.
        A. C.
Eubanks and A. D. Christy, for appellant. The
Attorney General, for the State.
        THOMAS, J.
        The defendant
appeals from a sentence of five years' imprisonment in the
penitentiary for burglary and larceny, by the circuit court of
Sullivan county, November 23, 1887. The evidence shows that A.
Payne &amp; Son kept a general store in Boynton, Sullivan county,
in 1886, and that on the night of June 1, 1886, Addison Payne, Jr.,
one of the members of the firm of A. Payne &amp; Son, and Enoch Van
Wye, Frank Van Wye, James Yardley, Sherman Van Wye, and John E.
Senate secreted themselves in and near the storehouse of said Payne
&amp; Son for the purpose of capturing defendant and one William
Hill, if they should break into the store. About 11 or 12 o'clock
of that night defendant and Hill came, sat down on the well-curb,
and talked a short time, and then went to a window of the warehouse
attached to the store. Defendant raised the window about six
inches, when Hill helped him break the catch, and raise the window
so a man could go in. Defendant assisted Hill in through the
window. The latter handed out to the former a piece of bacon, (side
meat,) weighing 45 pounds. Defendant asked that more meat be handed
out, but this was all that was taken. Defendant then assisted Hill
out of the window, and picked up the meat, which was in a gunny
sack, and they both started off. When they got 15 or 20 steps away
they were halted, and some shots were fired. They both ran, and the
defendant threw the meat down, and was captured a short distance
from the store. He denied being at the store. Hill was not arrested
at all. Hill was the step-son of A. Payne, Sr., and the
half-brother of A. Payne, Jr. It further appears that defendant
about a week before the alleged burglary, proposed to Hill to go
with him and break into and rob Payne's store. Hill notified "Enoch
Van Wye and John E. Senate of the Anti-Horse-Thief Association of
Boynton, Mo., of Hayes' proposition." On the night of June 1, 1886,
Hill met defendant about half a mile from the store, whence they
went and broke in, as above stated. A. Payne was not sworn as a
witness, but A. Payne, Jr., one of the proprietors of the store,
testified that he watched the store that night, expecting that
defendant and Hill would come, break into it, and steal, but that
he gave no consent for them to enter the store. He had been
informed by Van Wye that these parties were expected there that
night, and he, with others, watched to capture them if they did
come. Frank Van Wye and James Yardley testified that they had been
informed by Enoch Van Wye and John E. Senate that defendant and
Hill were expected there that night, and they guarded the store to
capture them if they did come. The defendant called Enoch Van Wye
and Senate as witnesses, who corroborated the state's witnesses in
all essential particulars. Defendant also read the deposition of
William Hill, who had moved to Kansas in the mean time. Hill
stated, in substance, that defendant proposed to him to rob the
store in question about a week before June 1st, and he met
defendant, and they went and broke into it as stated above. He
informed Enoch Van Wye and Senate of defendant's proposition. He
said the Paynes did not consent for him to enter the store. He
testified as follows: "Question. Who first proposed to go and rob
the store in question? Answer. Defendant. Q. What was your object
in going to the store in question with defendant, Hayes? A. My
object was to let the Anti-Horse-Thief Association catch him
burglarizing and robbing the store, as he had the reputation of
being a desperate character."
        The only
question of importance before us grows out of the instructions of
the court to the jury. The court gave a lengthy charge to the jury,
and refused several declarations of law asked by defendant.
[16 S.W. 515]
It will not be necessary, however, to present the question
involved, to do more than copy the following instruction given by
the court: "The jury are further instructed that William Hill is
not on trial in this case, and that, although the jury may believe
from the evidence that said Hill did not break and enter the
storehouse of A. Payne &amp; Son with the felonious intent to steal
therefrom, yet, if they further believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was present and assisted said
Hill in breaking and entering said store, and taking therefrom a
side of meat of any value whatever, with the felonious intent to
convert said meat to his own use, then, in that case, the defendant
is guilty of burglary, and the jury ought to so find." It will be
seen the trial court told the jury in this instruction that
defendant was guilty of burglary if he, with a felonious intent,
assisted and aided Hill to enter the building, notwithstanding Hill
himself may have had no such intent. In this we think the court
erred. One cannot read this record without being convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that Hill did not enter the warehouse with intent
to steal. He was the step-son of the senior and the half-brother of
the junior member of the firm of A. Payne &amp; Son, and all the
evidence shows that he engaged in the enterprise for the sole
purpose of enabling the parties on guard to capture the defendant,
and that this purpose on his part was well known to the owners of
the store. We may assume, then, for the sake of the argument, that
Hill committed no crime in entering the wareroom. The act of Hill,
however, was by the instruction of the court imputed to defendant.
This act, according to the theory of the instructions, so far as
Hill was concerned, was not a criminal act, but when it was imputed
to defendant it became criminal because of the latter's felonious
intent. This would probably be true if Hill had acted under the
control and compulsion of defendant, and as his passive and
submissive agent. But he was not a passive agent in this
transaction. He was an active one. He acted of his own volition. He
did not raise the window and enter the building with intent to
commit crime, but simply to entrap defendant in the commission of
crime, and have him captured. Judge BREWER sets this idea in a very
clear light in State v. Jansen, 22 Kan. 498. He says: "The act of a
detective may perhaps be not imputable to the defendant, as there
is a want of community of motive. The one has a criminal intent,
while the other is seeking the discovery and punishment of crime."
Where the owner learns that his property is to be stolen, he may
employ detectives and decoys to catch the thief. And we can do no
better than to quote again from Judge BREWER, in the case above
cited, as to the relation of the acts of detectives and the thief
when a crime is alleged to have been committed by the two. He says:
"Where each of the overt acts going to make up the crime charged is
personally done by the defendant, and with criminal intent, his
guilt is complete, no matter what motives may prompt or what acts
be done by the party who is with him, and apparently assisting him.
Counsel have cited and commented upon several cases in which
detectives figured, and in which defendants were adjudged guiltless
of the crimes charged. But this feature distinguishes them: that
some act essential to the crime charged was in fact done by the
detective, and not by the defendant, and, this act not being
imputable to the defendant, the latter's guilt was not made out.
The intent and act must combine, and all the elements of the act
must exist and be imputable to the defendant." Applying the
principle here announced to the case at bar, we find that defendant
did not commit every overt act that went to make up the crime. He
did not enter the warehouse, either actually or constructively, and
hence he did not commit the crime of burglary, no matter what his
intent was, it clearly appearing that Hill was guilty of no crime.
To make defendant responsible for the acts of Hill, they must have
had a common motive and common design. The design and the motives
of the two men were not only distinct, but dissimilar, even
antagonistic. In support of the doctrine announced in the Jansen
Case, supra, which seems eminently just and humane, and in support
of the rule we have applied in this case, we cite Speiden v. State,
30 Amer. Rep. 126, and cases cited in principal case and note; 1
Bish. Crim. Law, § 262, and cases cited; 1 Whart. Crim. Law,
§§ 149, 766, 770, 919, and cases cited; article in 25
Alb. Law J. 184, and cases cited.
        These citations
sufficiently show the relation a detective or decoy bears to the
alleged criminal, and the criminal act. There is a feeling in
society, and, indeed, inheres in our very nature, against detective
methods in the discovery and punishment of crime. These methods may
be often necessary, and in extreme cases commendable, but yet the
sentiment of mankind is against them. And why should it not be?
Hill testified in this case that a long time prior to the alleged
burglary defendant requested him to join him in a general scheme to
steal, and about a week prior thereto he suggested the crime with
which he was charged, and of which he was convicted. What was
Hill's plain duty, under the circumstances, as a citizen and
neighbor? It was to condemn the project, and in the strongest and
most emphatic terms possible. A courageous and indignant
denunciation of the suggestion, at the time, might have turned
defendant into the path of honesty, and it is almost certain this
case would never have been in court. He betrayed the defendant. He
made the defendant believe he was engaging in the burglary and
theft, whereas he was simply engaged in it to capture and convict
the defendant. The fact that defendant may have been regarded as an
old offender can be no excuse, much less a justification, for
Hill's conduct. If he was an old offender, the greater the reason
there would seem to be why he should not be actively assisted and
encouraged in the commission of a new crime, which could in no way
throw
[16 S.W. 516]
light on his past offenses. "Human nature is frail enough at
best, and requires no encouragement in wrong-doing. If we cannot
assist another, and prevent him from violating the laws of the
land, we at least should abstain from any active efforts in the way
of leading him into temptation. Desire to commit crime, and
opportunities for the commission thereof, would seem sufficiently
general and numerous, and no special efforts would seem necessary
in the way of encouragement or assistance in that direction."
Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218. Hill committed no crime, and
intended to commit none, but he played a false part. He seemed to
be what he was not in fact. And deep down in the hearts of all
right-thinking men and women there is a feeling against such
conduct as his. These remarks are made to show the injustice of
imputing to defendant the acts of Hill, done under such
circumstances and actuated by such motives. 1 Bishop, in his work
on Criminal Law, (section 262,) says: "If a man suspects that an
offense is to be committed, and, instead of taking precautions
against it, sets a watch and detects and arrests the offenders, he
does not thereby consent to their conduct or furnish them any
excuse." In such case he remains passive, and the offenders do
every overt act necessary to constitute the crime. That is not like
this case. Here Hill met defendant a half mile from the store. They
proceeded to the place, and sat down on the well-curb, and talked a
while. They then went to the window, and Hill entered the house
while defendant stood on the outside. He did not commit the overt
act of entering the wareroom and stealing, and Hill's act, not
being criminal, cannot be imputed to defendant as a criminal act on
the ground that he supposed Hill was in fact stealing. Our ruling
is that defendant cannot be convicted of burglary and larceny,
unless he committed the crimes himself, or was present aiding and
abetting another in their commission, that other acting with a
felonious intent. The court should instruct the jury that if Hill
broke into and entered the wareroom with a felonious intent, and
defendant was present, aiding him with the same intent, then he is
guilty; but if Hill entered the room with no design to steal, but
simply to entrap defendant, and capture him in the commission of
crime, and defendant did not enter the room himself, then he is not
guilty of burglary and larceny as charged. He may be found guilty,
however, of petit larceny, in taking and removing the bacon after
it was handed to him. This overt act he did in fact commit. And
while he may not be guilty of the burglary, or grand larceny,
accompanying a burglary, yet he may be convicted of that which he
does commit. Reg. v. Johnson, 41 E. C. L. 123; Rex v. Egginton, 2
Bos. &amp; P. 508; 2 East, P. C. 666, 667. Indeed, we think this is
the only crime he did commit. But it is a question of fact whether
Hill entered the store with a felonious intent or not to be
submitted to and determined by the jury, and, while the court
should submit this question to the jury, it should also submit the
other hypothesis, and that is, if Hill committed no crime, and
defendant did not enter the room, then whether defendant was guilty
of petit larceny in taking and removing the meat with intent to
steal it after it was handed out to him. As this case will have to
be retried, we will remark that, if the court should use the word
"felonious" in the instructions, it should define it. The judgment
is reversed, and the cause remanded for new trial.
        All concur.