Title: Commonwealth v. Dorvil
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11738
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2015

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SJC-11738 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEAN G. DORVIL. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     February 5, 2015. - June 25, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Parent and Child, Discipline.  Child 
Abuse. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Brockton Division of 
the District Court Department on May 16, 2011. 
 
 
The case was heard by Julie J. Bernard, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jacob B. Stone for the defendant. 
 
Audrey Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
LENK, J.  We are called upon in this case, where the 
defendant stands convicted of assault and battery for spanking 
his minor child, to examine the contours of a parental privilege 
2 
 
defense.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the use of 
force to control and discipline his child in the circumstances 
was justified, excusing him from liability for conduct that 
otherwise would constitute a crime.  Although we have on several 
prior occasions assumed that such a common-law privilege exists, 
we have neither expressly recognized it nor considered its 
proper scope.  We do so today, deeply mindful of the dual 
important interests implicated in the defense:  the welfare of 
children requiring protection against abuse, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the avoidance of unnecessary State 
interference in parental autonomy as it concerns child rearing.1 
1.  Background.  a.  Overview.  After a jury-waived trial, 
the defendant was convicted of assault and battery for spanking 
his daughter, then almost three years old.  He also was 
convicted of threatening to commit a crime, based on his conduct 
while he was held at the police station following his arrest.  
He was acquitted of two other charges stemming from the same 
series of events. 
In his appeal to the Appeals Court, the defendant argued, 
among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of assault and battery in light of the 
parental privilege to use force in disciplining a minor child.  
                                                 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services on behalf of the defendant. 
3 
 
The Appeals Court, in an unpublished memorandum and order issued 
pursuant to its rule 1:28, determined that the defendant's 
conduct fell outside of the parental privilege defense and 
affirmed the defendant's convictions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Dorvil, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2014).  We granted further 
appellate review, limited to the assault and battery conviction, 
to clarify the scope of the parental privilege defense.  We now 
reverse that conviction.2 
b.  Facts.  We recite the facts based on the evidence 
introduced at trial.  We construe the evidence offered to 
support the defendant's conviction of assault and battery in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  We note conflicting 
testimony where relevant in light of the defendant's acquittal 
of certain charges. 
The Brockton police station sits across the street from the 
Brockton Area Transit bus terminal.  At shortly before 4 P.M. on 
May 13, 2011, Detective Ernest S. Bell of the Brockton police 
department was arriving at the police station at the end of his 
eight-hour shift; at the same time, Lieutenant Mark Porcaro was 
arriving to begin his eight-hour shift.  Both officers observed 
                                                 
 
2 As stated in the Appeals Court's memorandum and order, the 
judgment on the count of the complaint charging threatening to 
commit a crime is affirmed. 
4 
 
a commotion at the bus terminal, although their accounts of the 
incident at trial differ somewhat. 
Bell testified that he observed the defendant yelling, 
"[S]hut up, shut up," at a young child and a woman while walking 
on the sidewalk near the bus station.  Bell then saw the 
defendant kick the child in the backside.  He described the kick 
as "kind of like a football kick," and indicated that the 
defendant was wearing sneakers at the time.  The defendant then 
shouted, "[S]hut up," again before bending over and "smack[ing] 
the child on the buttocks."  Right after the kick and the smack, 
Bell observed the woman bend down and pick up the child; Bell 
testified that he regarded this as an effort "to shield" the 
child from the defendant.  Throughout the incident, according to 
Bell, the defendant appeared "very upset" and "angry," and he 
was shouting sufficiently loudly to be audible at the police 
station, approximately thirty-five yards away.  Bell indicated 
that the child was crying and "looked frightened." 
Porcaro also observed the defendant yelling at the woman 
and child, and saw the defendant kick the child.  Porcaro, 
however, testified that the kick "wasn't like a full blown, 
swift kick"; instead, he said, "it was . . . slow and there was 
almost like a hesitation to it, but he eventually came . . . up 
and made contact with the girl."  Additionally, although the 
police report that Porcaro completed following the arrest 
5 
 
indicated that he saw the defendant hit the child, he testified 
at trial that he did not have any memory of the child being hit. 
The police officers approached the trio and separated the 
defendant from the woman and the child.  The defendant, the 
child's father, denied kicking the child, instead saying that he 
was "just playing around with her."  With respect to the 
spanking, the defendant indicated that he was "disciplining his 
child."  The child's mother, Crystal Steele, likewise stated 
that the defendant and the child were "horseplaying," but that 
the defendant then became upset when the child was disobedient. 
The defendant was arrested, brought to the police station 
for booking, and placed in a holding cell.  Six hours later, at 
approximately 10 P.M. that evening, Porcaro had another 
encounter with the defendant; their accounts of the encounter 
again differ.  Porcaro testified that, while he was 
administering to a prisoner with a medical emergency in a nearby 
holding cell, the defendant began talking, yelling at him and 
another officer, and spitting on the plexiglass.  According to 
Porcaro, the defendant claimed that Porcaro was "lying about 
seeing him kick the girl," called Porcaro various insulting 
names, and indicated that "he wanted to box" Porcaro. 
The defendant testified in his own defense at trial, along 
with Steele.  The defendant denied calling Porcaro names, and 
denied yelling or spitting at the officers.  The defendant did 
6 
 
testify, however, that he told Porcaro, "[I]f you know where 
there's a ring around here, . . . we can go box it out."  The 
defendant insisted that this was not meant as a threat. 
As to the initial incident at the bus terminal, the 
defendant and Steele offered accounts at trial that were 
essentially similar to one another and to the accounts that they 
gave to the police officers at the scene.  The defendant stated 
that, after the trio got off the bus, he was playing a game 
where he chased his daughter and lifted her up with his legs, 
"like [he] was playing soccer."  He continued in that manner for 
a period, chasing his daughter and yelling loudly at her.  He 
indicated that at the time she was "happy," explaining, "[S]he 
likes when I play like that with her." 
The defendant then told his daughter to go to her mother.  
She responded, "[N]o," telling him, "[Y]ou go to your mother."  
He chastised her for talking back to him.  He cautioned that he 
would spank her if she continued talking back, saying, "[D]addy 
will pow pow, if you don't stop."  He then "tapped her" on "her 
butt" in an effort to make her "calm down."  The defendant 
testified that the child never fell down or began crying, either 
when they were playing or when he spanked her.  He also denied 
ever telling his daughter to "shut up." 
Steele similarly testified that, after the defendant and 
the child got off the bus, they were "playing . . . very 
7 
 
loudly," and that she had seen the defendant and their daughter 
"play together in a similar manner in the past."  The defendant 
then told the child to go to her mother; Steele explained that 
the child "was running around," and speculated that the 
defendant "didn't want her to run into . . . the street or 
anything."  The defendant then told his daughter, "[W]e're not 
playing anymore," and "gave her a little tap on her behind."  
Steele indicated that the child was not crying and did not 
appear fearful when she picked up the child after the spanking. 
c.  Proceedings.  The defendant was charged with assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a shod foot), based 
on the kick; assault and battery, based on the spanking; and 
witness intimidation and threatening to commit a crime, based on 
the defendant's statements indicating his desire to "box" 
Porcaro at the police station.  Defense counsel argued in 
closing that there had been no kick, and, as the defendant and 
Steele testified, the defendant simply had been playing with the 
child.  As to the second count, counsel conceded that the "pat 
on the butt" did occur, but asserted that the pat was 
permissible because the defendant had "a right to use reasonable 
force in disciplining [his] child."  As to the third and fourth 
counts, counsel argued that there was no evidence that the 
defendant "had a specific intent to try to influence the outcome 
of an investigation or a criminal action or prosecution," and 
8 
 
that the evidence failed to show that the defendant "intended to 
harm and place . . . Porcaro in fear." 
After closing arguments, the judge denied the defendant's 
renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty.  The judge 
found the defendant guilty of assault and battery and 
threatening to commit a crime, and not guilty of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon and witness intimidation.  
The judge issued no written findings of fact or conclusions of 
law.  Her remarks at sentencing, however, provide some 
indication of her thinking. 
The judge acknowledged that "it's not easy being a parent."  
She indicated that the defendant had not been convicted for the 
kick, noting that, in light of the inconsistency between the 
police officers' testimony, the defendant "could've been playing 
around with [his] daughter."  The judge explained her decision 
to convict the defendant of assault and battery, however, by 
observing that, while she did not "think [the defendant] 
intended to kick [his] daughter, . . . [he] did hit her."  In 
apparent response to the defendant's argument that the spanking 
was permissible in light of his parental privilege to use 
reasonable force in disciplining the child, the judge concluded 
that, "[i]f you're in public with your kids, it's not 
appropriate to discipline in this fashion." 
The defendant appealed.  He challenged the sufficiency of 
9 
 
the evidence to support each conviction, argued in particular 
that the evidence to support the conviction of assault and 
battery was insufficient in light of the parental privilege 
defense, and contended that certain statements in the 
Commonwealth's closing argument were not supported by the 
evidence.  The Appeals Court affirmed.  With respect to the 
assault and battery conviction, the Appeals Court acknowledged 
that it previously had held that a parent may use reasonable 
force to discipline his or her minor child.  The court 
determined, however, that the evidence indicated that the child 
lacked the capacity to understand the discipline, and that the 
"defendant spanked his child when he was upset and angry and not 
in a calm and controlled manner, as required for parental 
discipline to fall within the reasonable force defense."  We 
granted further appellate review, limited to the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction of assault 
and battery. 
2.  Discussion.  "The punishments for the crimes of assault 
and assault and battery . . . are established by statute, but 
the elements necessary to convict a person of these crimes are 
determined by the common law."  Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 
526, 529 (2010).  "An assault and battery is the intentional and 
unjustified use of force upon the person of another, however 
slight . . . ."  Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 203 
10 
 
(1931).  In accordance with the crime's common-law character, we 
have turned to the common law to articulate defenses to a charge 
of assault and battery, such as the justification of self-
defense, see Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508, 511 (1975), 
or defense of another, see Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 
640, 646-647 (1976). 
This court has not expressly recognized a parental 
privilege defense to use force in disciplining a child, nor have 
we articulated the scope of any such privilege.  We have, 
however, alluded to the privilege on several occasions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005), cert. 
denied, 548 U.S. 924 (2006) (observing that court has "not 
addressed the issue [of the parental privilege defense] one way 
or the other," and determining that defendant's request for jury 
instruction on that defense "[would] be best addressed on 
remand"); Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554, 568 n.11 (2004) 
(rejecting defendant's contention that trial judge erred in 
failing to give instruction regarding parental privilege 
defense; "[o]n any view of the evidence, [the] frequent beating 
of . . . very young children . . . would not come within that 
privilege"); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 664, 667, 
669 (1990) (where defendant was convicted of assault and battery 
on fourteen year old daughter of his girl friend, observing that 
"[n]o Massachusetts decision or statute grants parents or others 
11 
 
a right to use reasonable force in disciplining a child," and 
concluding that defendant could not avail himself of such 
privilege in any event because he did not stand "in loco 
parentis to the victim"); Commonwealth v. Coffey, 121 Mass. 66, 
68-69 (1876) (noting defense of "father's parental right and 
authority," but concluding that evidence supported jury's 
finding that force used was "excessive and unjustifiable," or 
that "acts were not done in the exercise or support of the 
rightful authority of the father, but in the execution of a 
scheme of" another). 
The Appeals Court, by contrast, has expressly recognized a 
parental privilege defense, although the court confronted the 
issue in an ancillary context, and its treatment of the 
privilege was consequently not exhaustive.  In Commonwealth v. 
Rubeck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 396-397 (2005), the defendant was 
convicted of assault and battery for her conduct towards her two 
year old son in the waiting room of a medical center.  The 
defendant argued that her attorney had provided ineffective 
assistance in failing to request a jury instruction stating that 
a "parent, or one acting in the position of a parent and who has 
assumed the responsibilities of a parent, may use reasonable 
force to discipline (his/her) minor child.  However, a parent 
may not use excessive force as a means of discipline or 
chastisement."  Id. at 399-400, quoting Massachusetts Superior 
12 
 
Court Criminal Practice Jury Instructions § 3.15 (Mass. Cont. 
Legal Educ. 1st Supp. 2003).  The Appeals Court concluded that 
"the instruction was warranted," although the court affirmed the 
defendant's conviction because it determined that the omission 
of the jury instruction did not produce a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Rubeck, supra at 400-
401. 
Despite the lack of express recognition by this court, a 
privilege to use reasonable force in disciplining a minor child 
has long been recognized at common law.  Blackstone, for 
instance, remarked that "battery is, in some cases, justifiable, 
or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent or a 
master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or 
his apprentice."  3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *120.  A mid-
Nineteenth Century commentator similarly observed that parents 
have a duty "to maintain and educate their children," and 
possess the concomitant "right to the exercise of such 
discipline as may be requisite for the discharge of their sacred 
trust."  J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 203 (O.W. Holmes, 
Jr., ed., 12th ed. 1873). 
In a number of States, the parental privilege defense has 
been codified by statute; in others, it remains a common-law 
doctrine.  See Johnson, Crime or Punishment:  The Parental 
Corporal Punishment Defense -- Reasonable and Necessary, or 
13 
 
Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 413, 440-446 (Johnson).  In 
either instance, "[a]ll American jurisdictions allow parents to 
use at least moderate or reasonable physical force when they 
reasonably believe that such force is necessary to control their 
children."  State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 455 (Me. 2000).  
Neither the Commonwealth nor the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, appearing before the court in this case as amicus 
curiae, has argued that the court should not recognize a 
parental privilege defense at all. 
The widespread recognition of a parental privilege defense 
accords with important constitutional values.  The United States 
Supreme Court has long held that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control."  Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925).  See Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).  Indeed, "the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court."  
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).  
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing 
"[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the 
care, custody, and management of their child"); Quilloin v. 
14 
 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (observing, "[w]e have 
recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between 
parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (indicating, "[i]t is plain 
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this 
Court with a momentum for respect' . . ." [citation omitted]). 
The use of moderate corporal punishment to discipline one's 
children is viewed by many in our country as an integral aspect 
of parental autonomy that furthers the welfare of those 
children.  Indeed, while surveys suggest that support for 
corporal punishment has declined in the United States over the 
past one-half century, substantial majorities of parents 
continue to say that spanking is sometimes necessary to 
discipline children.  See Hanes, To Spank or Not to Spank, 
Corporal Punishment in the U.S., Christian Sci. Monitor (Oct. 
19, 2014); Reeves & Cuddy, Hitting Kids:  American Parenting and 
Physical Punishment, Brookings Inst. Long Memos No. 4 (Nov. 6, 
2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-
memos/posts/2014/11/06-parenting-hitting-mobility-reeves 
[http://perma.cc/2H8A-W6JX].  Of course, others "believe that 
parents should not use physical force to control their 
children"; indeed, "[a]t least nine countries ban corporal 
punishment of children."  State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d at 457 n.13.  
15 
 
Notwithstanding these contrary views and disputes as to the 
efficacy of such parenting techniques, the long-standing and 
widespread acceptance of such punishment remains firmly woven 
into our nation's social fabric.  It follows that we must guard 
against the imposition of criminal sanctions for the use of 
parenting techniques still widely regarded as permissible and 
warranted. 
The parental right to direct the care and upbringing of 
children, however, is far from absolute.  Although a "child is 
not the mere creature of the [S]tate," Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535, our law has long rejected "the notion 
that children [are] the property of their parents."  Custody of 
Kali, 439 Mass. 834, 840 (2003).  Accordingly, this court has 
recognized that a parent's right to direct the care and 
upbringing of minor children may be limited in light of the 
State's "compelling interest [in] protect[ing] children from 
actual or potential harm."  Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 656 
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003).  This interest is 
particularly powerful in the context of corporal punishment, 
given the risk that the parental privilege defense will be used 
as a cover for instances of child abuse. 
In the absence of legislation delineating the scope of the 
parental privilege defense, therefore, we must articulate a 
framework that respects a parent's primary responsibility to 
16 
 
direct the care and upbringing of a child, while protecting the 
child against abuse and endangerment.  Otherwise put, the 
parental privilege defense must strike a balance between 
protecting children from punishment that is excessive in nature, 
while at the same time permitting parents to use limited 
physical force in disciplining their children without incurring 
criminal sanction.  A survey of other jurisdictions' 
articulations of the parental privilege defense reveals three 
types of approaches to this balance.  See Johnson, supra at 440-
446.  The first type of approach requires that the force "be 
judged by an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 442, 
and typically provides that a "parent is privileged to apply 
such reasonable force . . . as he [or she] reasonably believes 
to be necessary for [the child's] proper control, training, or 
education."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147 (1965).3  The 
                                                 
 
3 For examples of this approach, see Ala. Code. § 13A-3-24 
(permitting "reasonable and appropriate physical force"); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 13-403(1) (same); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-605 (same); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-703 (same); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 
(permitting "reasonable physical force"); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-
20 (permitting "the reasonable discipline of a minor by his 
parent or a person in loco parentis"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
14:18(4) (permitting "reasonable discipline of minors by their 
parents, tutors or teachers"); Mich. Comp. Laws. § 750.136b(9) 
(in child abuse statute, providing that "[t]his section does not 
prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by law 
or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking steps to 
reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable 
force"); Minn. Stat. § 609.06 (permitting "reasonable force"); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-107 (permitting "the use of force that is 
reasonable and necessary to restrain or correct the person's 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
child, ward, apprentice, or pupil"); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 643 
(permitting parental "use of force or violence" provided it "is 
reasonable in manner and moderate in degree"); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 161.205 (permitting "reasonable physical force . . . to the 
extent the person reasonably believes it necessary to maintain 
discipline or to promote the welfare of the minor or incompetent 
person"); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-5 (permitting force 
provided it is "reasonable in manner and moderate in degree").  
See also Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1241 (D.C. 2002) 
(recognizing "parent's privilege to use reasonable force to 
discipline her minor child without being subjected to criminal 
liability"); Raford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012, 1020 (Fla. 2002) 
("a parent may assert as an affirmative defense his or her 
parental right to administer 'reasonable' or 'nonexcessive' 
corporal punishment"); People v. Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 40 (1974) 
(determining that use of force by parents and teachers is to be 
analyzed under "a reasonableness standard"); Willis v. State, 
888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008) ("A parent is privileged to 
apply such reasonable force . . . upon his [or her] child as he 
[or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper 
control, training, or education" [citation omitted]); State v. 
Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa 1996) (holding that "parents 
have a right to inflict corporal punishment on their child, but 
that right is restricted by moderation and reasonableness"); 
Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126 (1978) (adopting "well-
recognized precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that the 
parent of a minor child or one standing in Loco parentis was 
justified in using a reasonable amount of force upon a child for 
the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare"); 
State v. Suchomski, 58 Ohio St. 3d 74, 75 (1991) (holding that 
"[a] child does not have any legally protected interest which is 
invaded by proper and reasonable parental discipline"); Newman 
v. State, 298 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Nev. 2013) ("The parental 
privilege defense comes down to punishment -- was it cruel or 
abusive -- or did it amount to a parent's use of reasonable and 
moderate force to correct his child?" [citations, quotations, 
and alterations omitted]); State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785, 788 
(R.I. 1981) (recognizing that "a parent has a right to use 
reasonable and timely punishment as may be necessary to correct 
faults in his/her growing children"); Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 
209 Va. 695, 697-698 (1969) (holding that "parents or persons 
standing in loco parentis may administer such reasonable and 
timely punishment as may be necessary to correct faults in a 
growing child"); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 270 (Wyo. 1985) 
(recognizing parental privilege defense where "a parent in 
punishing his children . . . act[s] in good faith with parental 
18 
 
second type of approach omits the reasonableness requirement, 
instead granting a general privilege to use force while defining 
specific types of force as impermissible.  Johnson, supra at 
442-443.4 
Finally, some jurisdictions employ a third approach that 
combines features of the first two.  See Johnson, supra at 443-
444.  These jurisdictions follow the first approach in requiring 
that the force used be objectively reasonable, while following 
the second in identifying certain types of force as invariably 
unreasonable.  Some jurisdictions adopting this approach only 
identify "deadly force" as inherently unreasonable.5  Others, 
borrowing from the Model Penal Code, specifically prohibit force 
that "create[s] a substantial risk of death, serious bodily 
                                                                                                                                                             
affection, [does] not exceed the bounds of moderation, and [is] 
not . . . cruel or merciless" [citation omitted]). 
 
 
4 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 503.110 (exempting force 
"designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of 
causing death, serious physical injury, disfigurement, extreme 
pain, or extreme mental distress"); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1413 
(exempting force "designed to cause or known to create a 
substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily harm, 
disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or gross 
degradation"); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-8 (exempting "[d]eadly 
force"); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 509 (exempting force "designed to 
cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, 
serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental 
distress or gross degradation"). 
 
 
5 See Alaska Stat. § 11.81.430; N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10; Tex. 
Penal Code § 9.61. 
 
19 
 
injury, disfigurement, or gross degradation."6  Still others 
provide an extensive list of impermissible forms of corporal 
punishment,7 or provide that "the physical force applied to the 
child may result in no more than transient discomfort or minor 
temporary marks on that child."8 
We conclude that a combined approach best balances the 
                                                 
 
6 N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-05.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 
§ 468; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.061 (exempting force "designed to 
cause or believed to create a substantial risk of causing death, 
serious physical injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or extreme 
emotional distress"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:6 (excluding 
"the malicious or reckless use of force that creates a risk of 
death, serious bodily injury, or substantial pain"); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-401 (prohibiting the parental privilege defense "if 
the offense charged involves causing serious bodily 
injury, . . . serious physical injury, . . . or the death of the 
minor"); Wis. Stat. § 939.45 (exempting "force which is intended 
to cause great bodily harm or death or creates an unreasonable 
risk of great bodily harm or death").  See also Model Penal Code 
§ 3.08. 
 
 
7 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 468 (specifically 
prohibiting "[t]hrowing the child, kicking, burning, cutting, 
striking with a closed fist, interfering with breathing, use of 
or threatened use of a deadly weapon, prolonged deprivation of 
sustenance or medication"; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-309 
(prohibiting "throwing, kicking, burning, biting, cutting, 
striking with a closed fist, shaking a minor under three years 
of age, interfering with breathing, or threatening with a deadly 
weapon"); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.100 (permitting force "when it 
is reasonable and moderate," while identifying certain forms of 
force as "presumed unreasonable . . . : (1) Throwing, kicking, 
burning, or cutting a child; (2) striking a child with a closed 
fist; (3) shaking a child under age three; (4) interfering with 
a child's breathing; (5) threatening a child with a deadly 
weapon; or (6) doing any other act that is likely to cause and 
which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or 
minor temporary marks"). 
 
 
8 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 106.  See Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 9A.16.100. 
20 
 
parental right to direct the care and upbringing of a child with 
the Commonwealth's interest in protecting children from abuse.  
Accordingly, we hold that a parent or guardian may not be 
subjected to criminal liability for the use of force against a 
minor child under the care and supervision of the parent or 
guardian, provided that (1) the force used against the minor 
child is reasonable; (2) the force is reasonably related to the 
purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, 
including the prevention or punishment of the minor's 
misconduct; and (3) the force used neither causes, nor creates a 
substantial risk of causing, physical harm (beyond fleeting pain 
or minor, transient marks), gross degradation, or severe mental 
distress.  By requiring that the force be reasonable and 
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, this approach 
effectively balances respect for parental decisions regarding 
the care and upbringing of minor children with the 
Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting children 
against abuse.  By additionally specifying certain types of 
force that are invariably unreasonable, this approach clarifies 
the meaning of the reasonableness standard and provides guidance 
to courts and parents. 
In applying the framework, each of the three prongs 
constitutes a question for the trier of fact.  In evaluating the 
reasonableness of the force used, and of the relation of that 
21 
 
force to a permissible parental purpose (the first two prongs of 
the test), the trier of fact may consider, among other factors, 
the child's "age, the "physical and mental condition of the 
child," and "the nature of [the child's] offense."  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra at § 150.  In evaluating 
the third of the three, the trier of fact must decide whether 
the force used or the risk of injury it created was, in context, 
sufficiently "extreme" as to be inherently impermissible.  See 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 3.08 commentary, at 140 
(1985).  As with other affirmative defenses, where the parental 
privilege defense is properly before the trier of fact, the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving at least one prong 
of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
370 Mass. 684, 687-688 (1976); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 
182 (Ind. 2008). 
Having articulated this framework, we conclude that the 
evidence adduced at the defendant's trial was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of assault and battery.  Bell testified 
that he witnessed the defendant "smack[]" the child once on her 
clothed bottom.  The defendant and the child's mother testified 
that he administered the spanking because the child disobeyed 
his direction to go to her mother, and continued playing on the 
sidewalk near the street.  The Commonwealth offered no evidence 
22 
 
that this "smack" resulted in any injury to the child.  Under 
these circumstances, the Commonwealth failed to offer evidence 
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant's use of force was unreasonable or not reasonably 
related to a permissible parental purpose. 
The Commonwealth offers two arguments in support of the 
contrary conclusion.  First, the Commonwealth asserts that the 
judge could have found "that the defendant in his angry state 
was not disciplining the child at all, but struck her out of 
anger and frustration."  That remark finds support in 
Commonwealth v. Rubeck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 400-401, where the 
Appeals Court, in affirming the defendant's conviction of 
assault and battery on her two year old son, observed that 
"there was evidence that [the defendant] did not use reasonable 
force in a calm, nonviolent and controlled manner to train or 
educate her two year old child, but rather that she screamed, 
yelled and used unreasonable force, that she was frustrated and 
out of control, and that the use of force escalated and 
continued as [the defendant] grew more angry and frustrated." 
It is true that certain older decisions from other 
jurisdictions granted wide leeway to parental authority, so long 
as parents did not act with "malice."  See, e.g., State v. 
Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 592 (1886) ("The test, then, of criminal 
responsibility is the infliction of permanent injury by means of 
23 
 
the administered punishment, or that it proceeded from malice, 
and was not in the exercise of a corrective authority").  See 
also Johnson, supra at 435.  The view under which the 
availability of the parental privilege defense hinges on a 
parent's subjective state, however, finds scant support in 
modern law, and we reject it.  Model Penal Code and Commentaries 
§ 3.08 commentary, at 140 ("Older decisions tended to treat the 
motive of the actors as decisive . . . .  Modern authority has 
tended towards a more objective test of moderation"). 
As a means of balancing parents' right to direct the 
upbringing of their children against the State's compelling 
interest in protecting children from abuse, a focus on a 
parent's emotional state is at once over- and underinclusive.  
It is understandable that parents would be angry at a child 
whose misbehavior necessitates punishment, and we see no reason 
why such anger should render otherwise reasonable uses of force 
impermissible.  Conversely, we see no reason why the 
Commonwealth should be barred from protecting children against 
unreasonable methods of discipline -- methods that, for 
instance, threaten serious physical or emotional injury -- 
simply because it lacks evidence that a parent acted from anger.  
As the facts of this case aptly demonstrate, moreover, 
interactions between parents and children may appear ambiguous 
to outside observers and are susceptible to misinterpretation, 
24 
 
leading to significant difficulties of proof at trial and 
heightened risk of wrongful convictions. 
Second, the Commonwealth notes that the child at issue here 
was two years old at the time of the spanking, and cites dicta 
from Commonwealth v. Rubeck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 400, 
indicating that "physical chastisement for preservation of 
discipline might never be justified in the case of a child of 
two years."   While we agree that a child's age is one among a 
number of factors to be considered in assessing the 
reasonableness of corporal punishment, we reject a bright-line 
cutoff age below which any corporal punishment is impermissible.  
The child here was approximately one and one-half months away 
from her third birthday at the time of the incident.  According 
to her mother's uncontroverted testimony, she spoke "very well," 
communicated "in full sentences," and was "very advanced for her 
age."  Indeed, her response to her father's direction that she 
go to her mother -- "[N]o, you go to your mother" -- evinces a 
well-developed verbal acuity.  According to the defendant's 
testimony, moreover, he warned the child of the impending 
punishment before administering it, stating that "daddy will pow 
pow, if you don't stop."  Under these circumstances, the 
Commonwealth failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove that 
the defendant's use of force was impermissible because the child 
lacked the capacity to understand or appreciate the reason for 
25 
 
the punishment.  Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's 
conviction of assault and battery. 
3.  Conclusion.  We recognize that the balance we strike 
with the parental privilege defense may well be imperfect and 
that absolute equipoise between the goals of protecting the 
welfare of children and safeguarding the legitimate exercise of 
parental autonomy is likely unattainable.  To the extent that 
that is so, the balance will tip in favor of the protection of 
children from abuse inflicted in the guise of discipline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed.