Title: Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin
Citation: 57 N.W.2d 588
Docket Number: 7335
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 1953

57 N.W.2d 588 (1953) KINNISCHTZKE v. CITY OF GLEN ULLIN. No. 7335. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 8, 1953. On Rehearing March 25, 1953. *590 T. J. Boutrous, of Glen Ullin, and Higgins &amp; Donahue, of Bismarck, for defendant-appellant. J. K. Murray and W. J. Austin, both of Bismarck, for plaintiff-respondent. MORRIS, Chief Justice. This is an action for damages against the City of Glen Ullin based upon negligent injury to plaintiff's property. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff owns 640 acres of land approximately one-half mile from the City of Glen Ullin and maintains thereon his home and residence for his family. It is then alleged that the defendant carelessly and negligently operates its sewer system and cesspool and by reason of such negligence causes the city sewage and offal to be discharged into a creek which flows through and adjacent to the plaintiff's premises and that the sewage has polluted the water in the creek and has piled up on the banks thereof adjacent to plaintiff's premises and home, causing a nauseating stench that has greatly damaged the plaintiff personally and injured the value of the premises; that plaintiff's livestock drink the water from said creek and that as a result of the pollution the plaintiff's cattle have become greatly emaciated and reduced in value. The defendant answered with a general denial and further answering the complaint admitted that it maintains and operates a sewage system for the treatment of sewage and waste which flows into a creek running across plaintiff's farm. It states that in so doing it acts entirely in a governmental capacity and in the performance of a governmental function; that it acts pursuant to the laws of the State of North Dakota and in accordance with approved engineering standards and in accordance with the plans and specifications approved by the state board of health; that the sewage passes through an Imhoff septic tank where it is properly treated before being discharged; and that the defendant operates the sewage system in a prudent and lawful manner. The defendant also alleges that the plaintiff purchased his land with actual knowledge of the sewage system of the City of Glen Ullin and its manner of discharge and that the farm and lands have not decreased in value since his purchase thereof and that by virtue of his purchase of the farm with such knowledge he is now estopped from alleging or claiming damages due to the proper operation of the defendant's sewage system. The case was tried to a jury and a verdict returned in favor of the plaintiff, upon which judgment was rendered December 7, 1951. On December 11, 1951, the defendant *591 moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 15, 1952. On June 7, 1952, the defendant caused to be served on the plaintiff's attorney and filed with the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal from the judgment entered on December 7, 1951. No appeal was taken from the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The record in this case involves an important question of practice which affects the scope of our review. The plaintiff and respondent herein contends that the order denying the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is an appealable order and that, no appeal having been taken therefrom and the order being now final, the sufficiency of the evidence which was challenged by the motion cannot now be considered by this court on appeal from the judgment. A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict can only be entertained when at the trial the moving party asked the trial court for a directed verdict and was denied. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in effect, reviews the court's ruling in denying a previous motion for a directed verdict and thus brings before the trial court for the second time the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict adverse to the moving party. Bormann v. Beckman, 73 N.D. 720, 19 N.W.2d 455; Ennis v. Retail Merchants Association Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 33 N.D. 20, 156 N.W. 234; Olson v. Ottertail Power Co., 65 N.D. 46, 256 N.W. 246, 95 A.L.R. 418; Weber v. United Hardware &amp; Implement Mutuals Co., 75 N.D. 581, 31 N.W.2d 456. In a number of cases prior to 1934 this court held that an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not an appealable order. Turner v. Crumpton, 25 N.D. 134, 141 N.W. 209; Houston v. Minneapolis, St. Paul, &amp; Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 25 N.D. 469, 141 N.W. 994, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 589, Ann.Cas.1915C, 529; Starke v. Wannemacher, 32 N.D. 617, 156 N.W. 494, 4 A.L.R. 167; Welch Manufacturing Co. v. Herbst Department Store, 53 N.D. 42, 204 N.W. 849; Stratton v. Rosenquist, 37 N.D. 116, 163 N.W. 723; Gray v. Elder, 61 N.D. 672, 240 N.W. 477. In Welch Manufacturing Co. v. Herbst Department Store, supra, it was held that under the provisions of Chapter 335, SLND 1923, where a motion for a directed verdict has been denied and the moving party thereafter moves in the alternative for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial and the court denies the motion for judgment but grants or denies the motion for new trial, the moving party may appeal from the whole order and have the ruling on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict reviewed in the supreme court. In 1934 this court decided: Following this decision, the legislature, by the enactment of Chapter 245, SLND 1935, provided that: thus establishing by statute that a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict might be made either before or after the judgment was entered. This statute also provided that: It is of more than passing interest to note that in Kinney v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 15 N.D. 21, 106 N.W. 44, this court held that it is a proper and commendable practice to include in a single notice of appeal an appeal from a judgment and an appeal from an order made after judgment denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The practice question with which we are now concerned arises under Chapter 204, SLND 1951, purporting to amend and reenact Section 28-1510, NDRC 1943, as amended by Chapter 220, SLND 1945, and Section 28-1511, NDRC 1943, so that these sections now read as follows: The meaning of the italicized language of the last section above quoted becomes plain when we transpose the phrases so as to read: "The supreme court on appeal from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may review the ruling on the motion for directed verdict and may order judgment to be entered when it appears from the testimony that a verdict should have been so directed." Where a motion for a directed verdict has first been made, the supreme court on an appeal from the judgment may review the evidence and when it appears therefrom that a verdict should have been directed by the trial court, the supreme court may order the entry of such a judgment as would have resulted had the jury been properly directed. This was the law under Chapter 220, SLND 1945. The new statute made no change in this respect. *593 The change comes in the provision that the supreme court "also may so order on appeal from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or on appeal from an order denying a motion for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict if no verdict was returned." This language clearly vests in the supreme court on an appeal from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the same power to review the evidence and order judgment as it has on an appeal from the judgment, provided a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made. The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be made pursuant to the provisions of the preceding section, 28-1510, as set forth in Chapter 204, SLND 1951. which now provides: The motion made by the defendant did not comply with the statute. It did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by proper specifications thereof and made no reference to the motion for a directed verdict. "A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict reviews only the court's ruling in denying a motion for a directed verdict, * * *." Westerso v. City of Williston, 77 N.D. 251, 42 N.W.2d 429, 430. See also Weber v. United Hardware &amp; Implement Mutuals Co., 75 N.D. 581, 31 N.W.2d 456; Bormann v. Beckman, 73 N.D. 720, 19 N.W.2d 455; Ennis v. Retail Merchants Association Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 33 N.D. 20, 156 N.W. 234. The defendant's motion was a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in name only. It did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or seek a review of the trial court's action in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. This is the view taken by the trial court, who stated in his order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict: The only function of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to review the ruling on the motion for directed verdict. The defendant's motion sought no such review and was a nullity. Its denial did not render the question of the sufficiency of the evidence res adjudicata, as the respondent contends. The failure of the defendant to appeal from the order denying its motion does not preclude a review on this appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence as challenged by the motion for a directed verdict or limit in any way the scope of this review. At the close of the testimony and after both sides had rested the defendant moved for a directed verdict on two groundsfirst, that the plaintiff could not recover against the city for the negligent operation of its sewage plant, since in operating the plant the city was engaged in a governmental function; and, second, that there was no competent evidence of damage or detriment to plaintiff's farm in that the evidence failed to show the fair and reasonable market value of the farm at the time it was acquired by the plaintiff and no evidence showing loss in value or detriment during the period it was owned by the plaintiff and up to the time of the commencement of the action. The defendant predicates error on the denial of its motion for a directed verdict. In support of its contention that the plaintiff cannot maintain an action based entirely upon negligence in the maintenance and operation of the sewer system, defendant cites Mayer v. Studer &amp; Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190, 262 N.W. 925, 926, and Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, *594 300 N.W. 631. The former case involved an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint which alleged that the county and the state highway commission negligently directed, consented to, and permitted the construction of a highway grade and culvert that was so defective that it stopped the natural flow of flood waters and caused them to back up and spread on the plaintiff's land. In the opinion we pointed out that Section 14 of the state constitution provides that: Then we said: But we also said: The foregoing is in accord with the well established principle that the state may not be sued in its own courts without its consent. Dunham Lumber Co. v. Gresz, 70 N.D. 455, 295 N.W. 500; Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N.D. 603, 200 N.W. 524; State ex rel. Shafer v. Lowe, 54 N.D. 637, 210 N.W. 501; Watland v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 58 N.D. 303, 225 N.W. 812. In Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, supra, after quoting from Mayer v. Studer &amp; Manion Co., we said [71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 633]: This court has taken a liberal view of the right of recovery by one whose property has been damaged by the deliberate and purposeful action of a municipality while engaged in a governmental function. See Messer v. City of Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3 N.W.2d 241; Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808; Conlon v. City of Dickinson, 72 N.D. 190, 5 N.W.2d 411, 142 A.L.R. 525. In Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, supra, we said [7 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 817]: The plaintiff relies upon our decision in Messer v. City of Dickinson, supra, and *595 quotes copiously from our opinion. The majority of this court therein said [71 N.D. 568, 3 N.W.2d 246]: Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of the syllabus, it is said: The action in Messer v. City of Dickinson was one for damages for maintaining a nuisance. Recovery was sought under the law of nuisances and not that of general negligence or general liability of the municipality for the commission of a tort. In addition to the cases cited in Messer v. City of Dickinson we find similar authority in City of Temple v. Mitchell, Tex.Civ.App., 180 S.W.2d 959; Gray v. City of High Point, 203 N.C. 756, 166 S.E. 911. Jeakins v. City of El Dorado, 143 Kan. 206, 53 P.2d 798, 800, involved the sufficiency of a petition alleging that the city constructed a sewer system emptying into a stream and then so negligently operated it as to damage the plaintiffs. The court says: In this case the complaint alleges: A municipality differs somewhat in the nature of its creation and operation *596 from the state and its political subdivisions, such as counties. Article X of the North Dakota Constitution provides for county organization which is set forth therein in considerable detail, including provisions for the election of certain county officials. Duties and limitations of the legislative assembly with respect to counties are also prescribed. Much greater authority with respect to municipal corporations is vested in the legislative assembly by Article VI, which provides: The legislature has given to municipalities the authority to establish and maintain sewer systems. Section 40-2202, NDRC 1943. When necessary a municipality may conduct its sewage beyond the municipal limits and may, by purchase or condemnation proceedings, acquire private property over which to construct the sewer. Section 40-2203, NDRC 1943. As we held in Messer v. City of Dickinson, supra, the legislature, by these provisions, did not sanction acts of a municipality resulting in private damage where that damage was not the inherent result of the exercise of statutory authority, but resulted from the manner in which that authority was exercised. This is in accordance with the general rule which is thus stated in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Section 53.49: Negligence may or may not result in the creation of a nuisance, and, on the other hand, a nuisance may be created wholly without negligence. The distinction is set out in 39 Am.Jur., Nuisances, Section 4, thus: In Bates v. City of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 189 S.W.2d 17, 21, it is said: Negligent operation of a septic tank may result in a nuisance which renders the municipality liable. Newton v. City of Roundup, 60 Mont. 24, 198 P. 441; City of Tecumseh v. Deister, 112 Okl. 3, 239 P. 582. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Section 53.131, has this to say: We reach the conclusion that where a municipality purposely or negligently so operates a sewage disposal plant that it *597 becomes a nuisance which results in injury to property, the municipality is liable for damages in an amount sufficient to compensate for the injury. Defendant's second ground of attack upon the verdict and judgment is based upon the contention that the plaintiff failed to prove damages. It is claimed that there is no showing of the fair market value of the farm at the time of its purchase by the plaintiff and no competent evidence showing loss of value. Plaintiff and other witnesses testified that the defendant's sewage disposal plant which consisted of an Imhoff tank was located about one-half mile west of plaintiff's land and that the tank discharged into a creek that ran across plaintiff's farm. The plaintiff bought the land November 1, 1950, and did not notice any sewage pollution at that time. The stream runs through plaintiff's pasture in which, in the summer time, he keeps nineteen cows. Plaintiff described in some detail the pollution of the creek as the result of the discharge of sewage from the Imhoff tank. He testified that he paid $37 an acre for the farm, or about $22,000 in all. One of the defendant's witnesses testified that in October or November of 1950 the fair market value of the farm was $37 an acre, or what it sold for. The plaintiff further testified that as a result of the pollution the farm was actually worth about one-half of that amount. The evidence furnished the jury a measure for determining the dollar value of the detriment to the farm, which was the difference in value between the time of purchase and the time of trial. Neither the correctness nor the applicability of that measure has been questioned. The trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict. Moreover, the trial court in an unchallenged instruction with regard to the measure of damages applicable to the farm instructed the jury as follows: Without expressing our approval of the measure of damages, we point out that it was submitted to the jury and acquiesced in by the defendant and became the law of the case. The evidence is sufficient to warrant the verdict of the jury under the measure of damages as submitted had the element of damages to the cattle been eliminated. This brings us to the final point in the case. The defendant specifies as error the refusal of the trial court to give a requested instruction to the effect that the plaintiff failed to prove any amount of damage whatsoever to the livestock owned by him arising out of the operation of the city's sewage system or Imhoff tank and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any damages claimed to have been suffered for detriment to his cattle. Paragraph 3 of the complaint, which we have quoted above, sets forth that the plaintiff's livestock drank water from the creek and that as a result of the sewage the cattle became greatly emaciated and reduced in value. This statement is in part the basis upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages. The evidence, however, shows no measurable damage to the cattle. The plaintiff did testify that at the time he placed his cattle in the pasture they were in better shape than when he took them out and that because of the water situation they wouldn't drink enough water. Four of the cattle were milk cows and when asked about the effect of drinking *598 water from the creek, the plaintiff stated: There is no evidence in the record upon which the jury could determine the amount of damage to the cattle, if any. The evidence, while indicating that a detriment may have been suffered, furnishes no measure of damages. As far as the record goes, the jury could only speculate. The defendant was therefore entitled to an instruction similar to the one requested eliminating the cattle as a basis for awarding damages. Instead of pointing out this lack of evidence to the jury, the trial court did the opposite, and instructed them as follows: Thus the court permitted the jury to find damages in favor of the plaintiff for an item upon which there was no proof as to the amount of damage suffered, if any. The jury brought in a verdict for $2,975, which, under the instructions, could, and presumably did, include damages for injury to the cattle which the jury could arrive at only by speculation. The pleadings, proof, and instructions are such that it is impossible to tell what, if any, amount was included in the verdict as damages for the cattle. Such a verdict cannot stand. This situation leaves us no alternative but to direct that the judgment appealed from be reversed, and a new trial granted. Reitman v. Miller, N.D., 54 N.W.2d 477. It is so ordered. GRIMSON, CHRISTIANSON, SATHRE and BURKE, JJ., concur. MORRIS, Chief Justice. We granted a rehearing at which the case was reargued in behalf of both parties as to all nonprocedural questions. The appellant challenges the correctness of our decision as a departure from the rule that in North Dakota municipalities are not liable for tort under these decisions: Vail v. Town of Amenia, 4 N.D. 239, 59 N.W. 1092; Montain v. City of Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416, L.R.A.1918C, 600; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502, 167 N.W. 717, L.R.A.1918D, 1108; Hadler v. North West Agricultural, Live Stock &amp; Fair Ass'n, 61 N.D. 647, 239 N.W. 736; Holgerson v. City of Devils Lake, 63 N.D. 155, 246 N.W. 641. All of these cases involve the liability of political subdivisions of the state or municipalities for personal injuries or death. They are, of course, grounded on negligence. In none of them was recovery permitted. However, they do not establish a general and all-inclusive rule that municipalities are not liable for tort. Vail v. Town of Amenia, supra, involved damages for personal injuries which the plaintiff contended resulted from the failure on the part of the Township of Amenia to properly maintain a bridge in a safe condition. The court, after pointing out that the township was a political subdivision of the state, said [4 N.D. 239, 59 N.W. 1095]: In Hadler v. North West Agricultural, Live Stock &amp; Fair Ass'n, supra, the plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries received while attending a fair. The court, after discussing the organization of the fair association and the annual appropriation provided therefor by state statute, said [61 N.D. 647, 239 N.W. 739]: In none of the cases cited above was there a statutory or constitutional provision requiring the municipality or subdivision to respond in damages for the injury inflicted. Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution provides that: Negligence constitutes no exception to this provision, nor is tort of any kind made an exception. If private property is taken or damaged for public use, compensation must be made in all cases, regardless of the means employed or the intent or the lack of intent on the part of public officials. There may be instances where private property is injured through the negligence of municipal officials acting in a governmental capacity which would not amount to damaging the property for public use within the meaning of Section 14 of our constitution. See Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 631. But that is not the case here. The facts set out in the complaint indicate that damage to property resulted from a governmental activity negligently conducted over a considerable period of time and in such a manner that it became a nuisance. The appellant argues that damages cannot be recovered in an action in which the basis for recovery is primarily that of negligence for that would be permitting recovery for a tort and would be contrary to the holdings of this court in the cases above cited. In support of this contention appellant cites Mayer v. Studer &amp; Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190, 262 N.W. 925, in which we held that a demurrer to a complaint based wholly upon the careless and negligent construction of a highway and culvert should be sustained. It should also be noted, however, we ordered that the plaintiff be permitted to amend the complaint. In this case no attack was made upon the sufficiency of the complaint before trial. After the jury had been chosen and the first witness called, counsel for the appellant stated: This objection was overruled. We think it was properly overruled. It does not directly attack the complaint as failing to state a cause of action, nor does it correctly state the law under our constitution and statutes *600 with respect to the liability of a city for damage to property resulting from its performance of a governmental function. Such an objection, coming as it does at the beginning of the trial without warning to the court or opposing counsel, will be construed strictly against the maker and the pleading against which the attack is made will be most liberally construed. In Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wash. 2d 227, 155 P.2d 500, 503, 157 A.L.R. 530, it is said: In Keller v. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 564, the court stated: If we construe appellant's objection as a belated challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint, we must construe that complaint with liberality and, in so doing, we find that, while it pleads negligence, it does set forth certain acts of the city and alleges that those acts "greatly injured the value of his said premises." The appellant, having elected to defer its attack until the taking of testimony was reached, will not now be permitted to take advantage of a technical situation which might deprive the plaintiff of compensation contemplated by the constitution, and since a new trial must be granted for other reasons expressed in our opinion to which we adhere, we deem it in the interests of justice and orderly procedure, when the case is remanded to the district court, that both parties be permitted to amend their pleadings. We adhere to our former decision. GRIMSON, CHRISTIANSON, SATHRE and BURKE, JJ., concur.