Title: The Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County
Citation: 2003 WI 57
Docket Number: 2002AP002756-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2003

2003 WI 57 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2756-W 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. The Cincinnati 
Insurance Company,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the 
Honorable Dominic Amato, presiding, The 
Honorable Michael J. Skwierawski, Chief Judge, 
First Judicial Circuit, Hidden Oaks Homeowners 
Assoc., Gerald Nagel, Cindy Nagel, Hollie 
Jambretz, Ann Philips, Ray Maciejewski, Tina 
Stewart, Ronald Will, Bernie Will, Patricia 
Reilly, Carol Molling, Tari Garnaas, Richard 
Tabbert, Laverne Tabbert, Darlene Jaskowiak, 
Lorraine Tollefsrud, Esther Pliszka, Max 
Boschke, Angelina Boschke, Frank Rondinelli, 
Mary Rondinelli, Mary Ann Wehner, Ron Scott, 
Carol Scott, Betty Schleck, Carol Rouillier, 
Norb Putz, Gary Loehrer, Patricia Loehrer, Ceil 
Mueller, James Schulte, Sheila Schulte, Jacob 
Stasek, Kathleen Stasek, Audrey Schmidt, Ray 
Reiman, Geri Reiman, Lou Birchbauer, Marilyn 
Birchbauer, Gloria Bruss, Edward Grzegorski, 
Judy Grzegorski, Milt Baggenstoss, Judy 
Baggenstoss, Anthony Napoli, Margaret Napoli, 
Albert Yaccarino, Barbara Yaccarino, Old 
Tuckaway Assoc. Limited Partnership, Affiliated 
Capital Corporation, Capital Associates, Ltd., 
Fred Loeb and Continental Casualty Company,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
 
2
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there was a brief by Mark W. Rattan, 
Lynne M. Mueller, and Litchfield Cavo, Shorewood, and oral 
argument by Lynne M. Mueller. 
 
For the respondent, Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the 
cause was argued by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
 
2003 WI 57 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2756-W  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. The Cincinnati  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the  
Honorable Dominic Amato, presiding, The  
Honorable Michael J. Skwierawski, Chief  
Judge, First Judicial Circuit, Hidden  
Oaks Homeowners Assoc., Gerald Nagel,  
Cindy Nagel, Hollie Jambretz, Ann  
Philips, Ray Maciejewski, Tina Stewart,  
Ronald Will, Bernie Will, Patricia  
Reilly, Carol Molling, Tari Garnaas,  
Richard Tabbert, Laverne Tabbert, Darlene  
Jaskowiak, Lorraine Tollefsrud, Esther  
Pliszka, Max Boschke, Angelina Boschke,  
Frank Rondinelli, Mary Rondinelli, Mary  
Ann Wehner, Ron Scott, Carol Scott, Betty  
Schleck, Carol Rouillier, Norb Putz, Gary  
Loehrer, Patricia Loehrer, Ceil Mueller,  
James Schulte, Sheila Schulte, Jacob  
Stasek, Kathleen Stasek, Audrey Schmidt,  
Ray Reiman, Geri Reiman, Lou Birchbauer,  
Marilyn Birchbauer, Gloria Bruss, Edward  
Grzegorski, Judy Grzegorski, Milt  
Baggenstoss, Judy Baggenstoss, Anthony  
Napoli, Margaret Napoli, Albert  
Yaccarino, Barbara Yaccarino, Old  
Tuckaway Assoc. Limited Partnership,  
Affiliated Capital Corporation, Capital  
Associates, Ltd., Fred Loeb and  
Continental Casualty Company,  
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
2
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for supervisory writ.  Request for substitution of 
judge granted. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   The Cincinnati 
Insurance Company has petitioned this court for a supervisory 
writ 
directing 
the 
chief 
judge 
for 
the 
first 
judicial 
administrative 
district 
(Milwaukee 
County), 
the 
Honorable 
Michael J. Skwierawski, to honor Cincinnati Insurance's request 
for a substitution of judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.58 
(2001-2002).1   
¶2 
The question of law presented is whether Cincinnati 
Insurance is "united in interest" with another insurance 
company, 
Continental 
Casualty 
Company, 
for 
purposes 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3) so that they are entitled to only one 
substitution request between them.  We hold that because the two 
insurance companies' policies were in effect on different dates 
and provide different types of coverages, these two insurance 
companies have directly adverse interests in the present case, 
and that Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty are not 
united in interest for purposes of § 801.58(3).  We therefore 
grant Cincinnati Insurance's petition for a supervisory writ 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-2002 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
3 
 
directing the chief judge for the first judicial administrative 
district to honor Cincinnati Insurance's substitution request. 
¶3 
The facts underlying the substitution request are 
undisputed. 
Hidden 
Oaks 
Homeowners' 
Association 
and 
47 
individual owners of condominiums in the Hidden Oaks Condominium 
development brought suit against four defendants who are the 
developers and sellers of Hidden Oaks.2  The complaint alleges 
over thirty causes of action including misrepresentation and 
construction defects.  The complaint does not allege the dates 
on which injuries occurred or damages arose. 
¶4 
The defendants in the Hidden Oaks case brought a 
third-party complaint against Continental Casualty Company and 
Cincinnati Insurance Company.  The defendants in the Hidden Oaks 
case are named insureds on a series of insurance policies issued 
by Continental Casualty beginning December 31, 1996, and lasting 
through December 31, 1999.  The defendants are also named 
insureds on a series of insurance policies issued by Cincinnati 
Insurance beginning December 31, 1999, and lasting through 
December 31, 2003. 
¶5 
The Hidden Oaks lawsuit was originally assigned to 
Judge Thomas Cooper of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  On 
May 
23, 
2002, 
Continental 
Casualty 
filed 
a 
request 
for 
substitution pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.58.  The request was 
                                                 
2 The four defendants are Old Tuckaway Associates, Ltd.; 
Affiliated Capital Corporation; Capital Associates, Ltd.; and 
Fred Loeb. 
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
4 
 
granted and the case was reassigned to Judge Dominic S. Amato  
of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.   
¶6 
Cincinnati Insurance then filed its own request for 
substitution under § 801.58 on June 5, 2002.  Judge Amato denied 
Cincinnati Insurance's request on the ground that Cincinnati 
Insurance was united in interest with Continental Casualty 
within the meaning of § 801.58(3) and thus was barred from 
filing a substitution request in the present case.   
¶7 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(2), 
Cincinnati 
Insurance requested that Judge Skwierawski, chief judge of the 
first judicial administrative district, review Judge Amato's 
decision to deny Cincinnati Insurance's substitution request.3  
The chief judge affirmed the decision, agreeing with Judge Amato 
that the two insurance companies were united in interest because 
they are "clearly pleading along parallel, if not united, lines 
on a number of issues." 
¶8 
Cincinnati Insurance then petitioned the court of 
appeals for a supervisory writ ordering the chief judge to honor 
its request for substitution.  The court of appeals denied 
Cincinnati Insurance's petition for a supervisory writ, holding 
that Cincinnati Insurance had failed to carry its burden of 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58(2) provides, in relevant part: 
"If the judge named in the substitution request finds that the 
request was not timely and in proper form, that determination 
may 
be 
reviewed 
by 
the 
chief 
judge 
of 
the 
judicial 
administrative district . . . ." 
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
5 
 
showing that it was not united in interest with Continental 
Casualty.4   
¶9 
Cincinnati Insurance now comes before this court 
seeking a supervisory writ directing that its request for a 
substitution of judge be granted.5  The issue presented is one of 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals concluded that "Cincinnati has not 
carried its burden . . . .  Cincinnati's bald assertions that 
its policies were in effect at dates different from those of 
Continental Casualty's and that its policies differed from 
Continental Casualty's is not sufficient to demonstrate that the 
circuit court was required to grant the substitution request."  
State of Wisconsin ex rel. The Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, No. 02-1902-W, unpublished slip op. 
at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2002). 
In oral argument before this court, counsel for Cincinnati 
Insurance surmised that the court of appeals concluded that 
Cincinnati Insurance failed to meet its burden because it failed 
to include in its petition to the court of appeals all of the 
pleadings necessary to clarify the differences in coverage 
between the two insurance companies.  Cincinnati Insurance's 
brief here does include this information. 
5 Article VII, Section 3(1), of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states that "[t]he supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts."   
Depending on the circumstances, a party seeking review in 
this court of a court of appeals's decision on a petition for a 
supervisory writ regarding substitution may file either a 
petition for review or a petition for supervisory writ.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 809.71; Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1981, 
§ 809.71, Stats.  
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
6 
 
statutory interpretation, requiring that we interpret "united in 
interest" in Wis. Stat. §§ 801.58(3) and determine whether the 
two insurance companies are "united in interest" under the 
substitution statute in the present case.       
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58 establishes the procedure for 
substitution of a judge in a civil case.6  Section 801.58(1) 
states that a party to a civil action may file a written request 
for substitution of the judge assigned to the case and sets out 
time constraints for filing the request.7  If the request is 
                                                                                                                                                             
In considering the petition and response, this court 
determined that Cincinnati Insurance made a sufficient showing 
to justify treating this petition as a petition for supervisory 
writ rather than as a petition for review and that the court 
should order oral argument on the merits of the petition for 
supervisory writ.  See, e.g., State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, 
Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, 233 
Wis. 2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679 (reviewing a court of appeals 
decision on substitution brought to this court on a petition for 
review).     
6 The Wisconsin statutes permitting substitution without 
proof of, or a determination of, a judge's prejudice date back 
to 1853.  For a discussion of the history of statutes governing 
substitution, see Findorff, 233 Wis. 2d 428, ¶24; State v. 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).   
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58(1) provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Any party to a civil action or proceeding may file 
a written request, signed personally or by his or her 
attorney, with the clerk of courts for a substitution 
of a new judge for the judge assigned to the case.  
The written request shall be filed preceding the 
hearing of any preliminary contested matters and, if 
by the plaintiff, not later than 60 days after the 
summons and complaint are filed or, if by any other 
party, not later than 60 days after service of a 
summons and complaint upon that party.  If a new judge 
is assigned to the trial of a case, a request for 
substitution must be made within 10 days of receipt of 
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
7 
 
timely filed within the limits set forth in § 801.58(1), and is 
in the proper form, § 801.58(2) directs that "the clerk shall 
request the assignment of another judge."8  Under § 801.58(3) a 
party is allowed only one substitution request in any action and 
"parties united in interest and pleading together shall be 
considered as a single party."9  Section 801.58(3) reads, in 
pertinent part:   
[N]o party may file more than one such written request 
in any one action, nor may any single such request 
name more than one judge.  For purposes of this 
subsection parties united in interest and pleading 
together shall be considered as a single party, but 
the consent of all such parties is not needed for the 
filing by one of such party of a written request.   
¶11 No dispute exists in the present case that Cincinnati 
Insurance's substitution request was filed within the time limit 
                                                                                                                                                             
notice of assignment, provided that if the notice of 
assignment is received less than 10 days prior to 
trial, the request for substitution must be made 
within 24 hours of receipt of the notice and provided 
that if notification is received less than 24 hours 
prior to trial, the action shall proceed to trial only 
upon stipulation of the parties that the assigned 
judge may preside at the trial of the action. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58(2) provides, in relevant part: 
(2) 
When 
the 
clerk 
receives 
a 
request 
for 
substitution, the clerk shall immediately contact the 
judge whose substitution has been requested for a 
determination of whether the request was made timely 
and in proper form.  If the request is found to be 
timely and in proper form, the judge named in the 
request has no further jurisdiction and the clerk 
shall request the assignment of another judge under s. 
751.03.   
9 Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3).  
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
8 
 
and in the proper form.  The sole issue, therefore, is whether 
Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty are "united in 
interest and pleading together" such that they constitute a 
single party under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3) and are thus entitled 
to 
one 
motion 
for 
substitution 
between 
them. 
Although 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3) 
considers 
multiple 
parties 
that 
are 
"united in interest and pleading together" to be a single party, 
the court order accepting Cincinnati Insurance's petition for a 
supervisory writ limited arguments to the meaning of the term 
"united in interest."   
¶12 Interpretation of the phrase "united in interest" in 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3) presents a question of law that this 
court reviews independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals but with the benefit of their analyses.  The burden is 
on Cincinnati Insurance, as the party seeking substitution, to 
demonstrate that it is not united in interest with Continental 
Casualty.10 
¶13 This court discussed the meaning of the phrase "united 
in interest" under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3) in State ex rel. 
Carkel, 
Inc. 
v. 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Lincoln 
County, 
141 
Wis. 2d 257, 414 N.W.2d 640 (1987).  The Carkel court wrote that 
there is no single definition of the phrase "united in interest" 
and did not define the scope of the phrase. 11   The Carkel court 
                                                 
10 State ex rel. Carkel, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Lincoln 
County, 141 Wis. 2d 257, 266, 414 N.W.2d 640 (1987). 
11 Id. at 267.   
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
9 
 
held, 
however, 
that 
the 
director, 
president, 
and 
sole 
shareholder of a corporation and the corporation itself, on the 
facts of the case, had identical interests and were united in 
interest for purposes of § 801.58(3) despite the fact that the 
director was a plaintiff to the underlying litigation and the 
corporation was named as a defendant.12  We concluded in Carkel 
that "the substance of the parties' interests" and not the form 
of the pleadings governs the applicability of § 801.58.13 
¶14 The conclusion in Carkel that the director and his 
corporation had identical interests and were united in interest 
under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3) rested on the alignment of a series 
of facts.  First, the director and the corporation, as a unit, 
shared the benefit of the contract forming the basis for the 
underlying litigation.  Second, the amended complaint adding the 
corporation as a defendant made no claim and sought no relief 
from the corporation.  Third, the same attorney represented both 
the director and the corporation in the litigation.  From these 
facts, we concluded, the parties had identical interests.   
¶15 In contrast, the facts in the case at hand demonstrate 
that Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty's interests 
are far from united.  First and foremost, the two insurance 
companies' policies were in effect at different times.  Since 
none of the 48 plaintiffs in this case have specified in their 
complaint when any injuries or damages occurred, a determination 
                                                 
12 Id. at 267-68. 
13 Id. at 269. 
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
10 
 
will have to be made regarding when each respective claim arose 
for each of the different plaintiffs.  As Cincinnati Insurance 
argues, the two insurance companies are diametrically opposed to 
each other because their policy periods do not overlap and each 
wants the court to determine that damages were incurred during 
the other insurance company's respective policy period. 
¶16 Second, Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty 
issued different types of policies to the defendants during 
their respective periods of coverage.  Continental Casualty 
issued policies providing inland marine and first party property 
coverage.  Cincinnati Insurance, during its period of coverage, 
issued policies providing general liability coverage as well as 
umbrella policies.  The result of these differing types of 
coverage is that Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty 
have pled separate defenses unique to the policies each issued.14 
¶17 Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty do share 
some interests in the case at hand.  For example, both insurance 
companies would benefit from a finding that the defendants are 
not liable for the injuries alleged and both insurance companies 
would benefit from findings that, where liability is found, the 
amount of damage caused was minimal.  Thus, it is not 
                                                 
14 For example, Cincinnati Insurance alleges that it has no 
obligation to defend or indemnify the defendants because the 
complaint does not seek damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property 
damage" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
its 
policies; 
Continental Casualty alleges that there is no coverage under any 
of its policies to the extent that the defendants failed to 
comply with their notice requirements.  
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
11 
 
surprising, as Chief Judge Skwierawski noted, that Cincinnati 
Insurance and Continental Casualty have asserted some common 
defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, failure to mitigate damages, and statute of 
limitations.15 
¶18 These common interests, however, do not amount to 
"united in interest" for 
purposes 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58.  
Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty are not even 
similarly interested in and will not be similarly affected by 
the court's determination of when damages occurred.16  In fact, 
the court's determination of dates will oppositely affect the 
two parties, eliminating the possibility of coverage by one 
insurance company and raising the possibility of coverage by the 
                                                 
15 The chief judge found that Cincinnati Insurance had 
adopted and incorporated several affirmative defenses raised by 
Continental Casualty.  Cincinnati Insurance's counsel stated at 
oral argument that this finding was erroneous, and that, in 
fact, Cincinnati Insurance had adopted the affirmative defenses 
of the defendants in the underlying case, not those asserted by 
Continental Casualty.  The record supports counsel's statement 
and counsel for the circuit court conceded as much at oral 
argument. 
 See Third-party 
Defendant 
Cincinnati 
Insurance 
Company's Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 5.   
16 The Carkel decision took guidance from Black's Law 
Dictionary, which defined parties as united in interest "when 
they are similarly interested in and will be similarly affected 
by the determination of the issues involved in the action."  
Carkel, 141 Wis. 2d at 267. 
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
12 
 
other.17  Thus, we conclude that the interests of the two 
companies are directly adverse to each other, and unlike in 
Carkel, an attorney would probably be unable, without adhering 
to the requirements of SCR 20:1.7, to represent both insurance 
companies in the present litigation.18   
¶19 On the basis of these facts, that is, that the two 
insurance companies' policies were in effect on different dates 
and provided different types of coverages, we conclude that 
Cincinnati Insurance and Continental Casualty have directly 
adverse interests in the present case and that the two insurance 
companies are therefore not united in interest in the present 
case.19 
¶20 For the reasons stated above, we grant Cincinnati 
Insurance's petition for a supervisory writ and order the chief 
                                                 
17 Cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC, 173 Wis. 2d 700, 722, 495 
N.W.2d 660 (1993) (holding that the interests of two insurance 
companies were "adverse" under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a) (1989-
1990) relating to workers compensation "when the respective 
liability of the two insurance companies depends on the 
determination of the date of injury").     
18 See SCR 20:1.7(a), governing conflict of interest. 
19 No evidence exists in the present case, as there was in 
Carkel, that the two parties worked together to defeat the 
statutory 
limits 
on 
substitution 
requests 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(3). 
 
See 
Carkel, 
141 
Wis. 2d at 
268 
(concluding that the plaintiff and one defendant were united in 
interest, in part, because the record suggested that the 
plaintiff may have named a corporation——of which he was the 
director, president, and sole shareholder——as a defendant rather 
than as a plaintiff in order to allow the corporation to seek 
substitution of the judge). 
No. 
02-2756-W   
 
13 
 
judge for the first judicial district to grant Cincinnati 
Insurance's request for a substitution of judge. 
By the Court.—The petition for supervisory writ is granted 
and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  02-2756-W.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶21 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
court's analysis and holding in the present case.  I write 
separately to emphasize that this court's decision should not be 
viewed as expanding substitution.   
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58 (2001-2002), 
which governs 
substitution of judges, makes clear that substitution is to be 
granted under limited circumstances.  Section 801.58(1) includes 
time limits for requests and further, as noted by this court, 
"[t]he purpose behind sec. 801.58(3) is to limit substitution 
requests to 'one per side.'" Carkel, Inc. v. Circuit Court for 
Lincoln County, 141 Wis. 2d 257, 265, 414 N.W.2d 640 (1987).  
Under § 801.58(3), "parties united in interest and pleading 
together shall be considered as a single party."   
¶23 This court's decision interprets "united in interest" 
under the circumstances presented and appropriately holds that 
because Continental Insurance Company and Cincinnati Insurance 
Company provided different types of policies during different 
periods of time, the companies were each entitled to request 
substitution.  It is the particular circumstances presented that 
make substitution appropriate.  As discussed by the court, in 
contrast to the facts presented in Carkel, we find in the 
present case that the companies have directly adverse interests 
based on the different types of coverage and periods of coverage 
provided by each carrier.  Majority op., ¶18.  In ¶¶16-17, the 
court notes that the parties have some common interests, but 
finds that these interests are insufficient because the parties 
No.  02-2756-W.jpw 
 
2 
 
would be oppositely affected by the court's determination of 
when the damages occurred. 
¶24 Courts should be wary of cases in which the different 
interests alleged may be merely facial.  It is rare for parties 
to share exactly the same interests in an action.  Based on the 
language of this case, parties may attempt to emphasize their 
differences in order to get additional substitutions.  Today's 
decision should be read to mean that courts facing multiple 
substitution requests in the same case should carefully examine 
the facts and circumstances to determine whether parties are, in 
fact, united in interest, or have directly adverse interests 
that require allowance for multiple substitutions.  The rule has 
been, and remains, "one per side." 
 
No.  02-2756-W.jpw 
 
 
 
1