Title: Johnson v. Goodman
Citation: 1997 OK 77, 68OBJ2210, 941 P.2d 990
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1997

Johnson v. Goodman Annotate this Case Johnson v. Goodman 1997 OK 77 941 P.2d 990 68 OBJ 2210 Case Number: 83279 Decided: 06/24/1997 Supreme Court of Oklahoma TREVA L. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. MAGGIE E. GOODMAN, Appellee. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GREER COUNTY, OKLAHOMA HONORABLE CHARLES L. GOODWIN, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 In an action by a single plaintiff to recover for bodily injuries sustained in an automobile collision, two petitions were filed in the same case, the first of which - filed over three years before the second - had been stricken, and the second of which was dismissed with prejudice by the District Court, Greer County, Charles L. Goodwin, Judge. On appeal from the order dismissing the second petition the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the plaintiff sought certiorari. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL REVERSED. J. Phillip Olson, Altus, Oklahoma For Appellant, Bruce A. Robertson, Wilson, Cain & McAtee, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma For Appellee. SIMMS, J. ¶1 On April 25, 1990 the plaintiff, Treva L. Johnson, timely commenced an action against the defendant, Maggie E. Goodman, seeking to recover for alleged bodily injuries from an automobile collision that occurred on April 26, 1988. The petition was signed by the plaintiff and her lawyer, who was neither licensed to practice law in Oklahoma nor admitted pro hac vice. The lawyer continued to represent the plaintiff until, during a status conference in August 1990, the trial judge apparently discovered the problem regarding the lawyer's professional status. ¶2 Concluding that the attorney's signature on the plaintiff's pleadings and motions constituted a violation of 12 O.S.Supp.1987 § 2011,1 the trial judge ordered them [941 P.2d 991] stricken. The issue of attorney's fees and costs incurred by the defendant in having to attend the status conference was reserved for future determination upon defendant's application. ¶3 Following an August 30, 1990, hearing the trial court imposed monetary sanctions against the lawyer alone. He appealed in case No. 76,383, and sought leave to appear as attorney of record on behalf of both the plaintiff and himself. This Court granted his motion in part, permitting him to represent only himself in his appeal from the sanctions order against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order, and this Court denied his petition for certiorari on September 15, 1992. ¶4 Exactly one year later the plaintiff, represented by other counsel, filed another petition in the same case. The defendant moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. She argued that the propriety of the order striking the first petition was not the subject of any appeal and that the order therefore became final. This argument was premised on the notion that the order striking the pleading operated as a dismissal or failure of the action "otherwise than upon the merits" within the meaning of 12 O.S.1991 § 100.2 ¶5 The defendant thus maintained that the plaintiff's second petition is time-barred because (1) the plaintiff waited more than one year to attempt to initiate a new action, and (2) even if she had made a timely attempt to do so, she would have failed to commence a new action because her second petition was filed in the same "deemed-dismissed" case. In support of the latter argument the defendant cited Wiley Elec., Inc. v. Brantley, 1988 OK 80, 760 P.2d 182 , which holds that the filing of an amended petition in a previously dismissed case is insufficient to avail a party of the savings provisions of §100. ¶6 The trial court accepted the defendant's viewpoint and dismissed the second petition with prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and this Court granted the plaintiff's petition for certiorari. The dispositive issue is whether the order striking the first petition is the functional equivalent of a dismissal and thus caused plaintiff's failure in the action "otherwise than upon the merits" within the meaning of § 100. We answer in the negative and hold that the order should not have been treated as a dismissal and that the case has remained pending since the first petition was stricken. ¶7 The striking of a pleading does not mark the end of an action, as does a dismissal, though it renders the pleading inefficacious. This conclusion is consistent with the manner in which rulings on motions to strike have generally been treated. Such motions are authorized (see 12 O.S.1991, § 2012(D)), As a general rule, the office of a motion to strike . . . [was] not to test the sufficiency of a pleading; the motion relate[d] collaterally or preliminarily to the issue and . . . [was] not directed against the cause of action or defenses as a whole to test its sufficiency; the motion . . . [was] not a substitute for a general demurrer and . . . [was] not the proper pleading by which to raise the objections of res judicata, statute of limitations, or laches. Bronson v. Reed * * * It is elementary that any defendant has a right to have redundant or immaterial matter stricken from a petition, to have an indefinite petition made more definite and certain, and to move for a dismissal if the facts and pleadings warrant such motion. (Emphasis added.) Orders granting motions to strike, then, ordinarily did not (and do not) bring an end to the action. Furthermore, such orders are not appealable. DLB Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Com'n, 1991 OK 5, 805 P.2d 657 , 660-661; Riise v. Riise, Okl., 332 P.2d 963 , 965 (1958). ¶8 Today's pronouncement is also consistent with federal procedural law in which a motion to strike is not the appropriate vehicle for a claim's dismissal. Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2nd Cir. 1992), citing 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Prac. & Proc. § 1380 at 644 (1990) (A motion to strike "is neither an authorized nor a proper way to procure the dismissal of all or a part of a complaint."). See also Click v. Abilene National Bank, 822 F.2d 544, 545 (5th Cir. 1987), where the U.S. Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from an order imposing sanctions, concluding that "[i]n striking the appellant's amended complaint, the district court did not dismiss the action in its entirety. The action remains pending before the district court." ¶9 In conclusion, the order striking all of the pleadings and motions filed on this plaintiff's behalf did not constitute a dismissal or failure in the action "otherwise than upon the merits" within the meaning of § 100. The claim presented in her second petition is not barred by limitations. [941 P.2d 993] ¶10 THE OPINION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS THEREFORE VACATED, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING THE SECOND PETITION WITH PREJUDICE IS REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS KAUGER, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS, and HARGRAVE, JJ. CONCUR OPALA, J., CONCURS BY SEPARATE OPINION., WITH WHOM SUMMERS, V.C.J,, and WILSON, J., JOIN. WATT, J., NOT VOTING. FOOT