Title: In re Ayesh
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123203
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 2021

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 123,203 
 
In the Matter of MARK G. AYESH, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed May 7, 2021. Three-year suspension with a 
possibility to be placed on probation after six months upon approval of a probation plan.  
 
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Deborah L. Hughes, Deputy 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the brief for petitioner. 
 
David M. Rapp, of Hinkle Law Firm, LLC, of Wichita, and Michael D. Hepperly, of Michael D. 
Hepperly Law Office, Chtd., of Wichita, argued the cause and were on the brief for respondent. Mark G. 
Ayesh, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is a contested attorney discipline proceeding against Mark G. 
Ayesh, of Wichita, Kansas, who was admitted in 1979 to practice law in the state of 
Kansas. A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys unanimously concluded 
in a 126-page report that Ayesh violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct in two 
separate professional engagements resulting in two disciplinary complaints. The first 
arose from sprawling and acrimonious litigation in a series of disputes among residents of 
a Wichita condominium development, its governing association, and maintenance 
contractors. The second complaint—factually unrelated to the first—arose from a real 
estate transfer to avoid a tax lien in which Ayesh forged his clients' names to two 
warranty deeds, notarized their signatures, and filed the documents with the register of 
deeds. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Ayesh stipulates to the facts and admits violating KRPC 1.2 (scope of 
representation) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 323); KRPC 1.6 (confidentiality) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. 330); KRPC 1.7 (conflict of interest:  current clients) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 336); KRPC 
1.8 (conflict of interest:  current clients) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 345); KRPC 1.9 (conflict of 
interest:  former clients) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 352); KRPC 1.16 (termination of 
representation) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 372); KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and 
contentions) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 384); KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal) (2021 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 385); KRPC 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 397); 
KRPC 8.3 (failure to report misconduct) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 426); KRPC 8.4(c) 
(engaging in dishonest conduct) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427); and KRPC 8.4(d) (conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427). 
 
What remains contested focuses on the aggravating and mitigating factors leading 
to the panel's recommendation for a one-year suspension. Ayesh argues the panel gave 
insufficient weight to his mitigation evidence and asks to remain a practicing attorney 
under probation with supervision. He alternatively suggests a suspension not exceeding 
90 days with a practice supervision plan after that. The Disciplinary Administrator's 
office endorses the panel's findings, but at oral argument recommended a six-month 
suspension coupled with a reinstatement hearing to ensure Ayesh's health concerns will 
not adversely impact resuming his law practice. We hold the circumstances warrant a 
more stringent approach to discipline. 
 
We accept the panel's findings and conclusions, which we hold are supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. We suspend Ayesh from practicing law in this state for a 
period of three years, while granting him the possibility for probation after six months 
upon approval by the Disciplinary Administrator's office of a probation plan for the 
remaining suspension period, all to be followed by a reinstatement hearing once Ayesh 
completes the three-year term. 
3 
 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On March 8, 2019, the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator initiated this 
disciplinary action against Ayesh, who timely answered. As the proceeding progressed, 
Ayesh stipulated to the facts in a document spanning 82 pages regarding the two 
disciplinary complaints. He also stipulated to various disciplinary code violations. 
 
On December 10, 2019, the hearing panel began a two-day hearing on the 
complaints. It issued a 126-page formal report with its findings and recommendations. 
That report can be condensed to some extent, so it is not fully recited below to keep the 
attention on what remains contested. 
 
Condominium litigation violations 
 
The condominium litigation complaint, denoted as DA 12,111, involved the Cedar 
Lakes Village Condominium Association (CLVCA); Cross Real Estate Management 
(CREM), which was CLVCA's management company from 2008 through 2011; Simon 
Palmer Properties, CLVCA's replacement management company after CREM; Jon 
Frobish, the complainant and a condominium resident; and Jerry Berg, another 
condominium resident. 
 
In April 2011, Berg had a physical altercation with Frobish, who had a consultant 
agreement with CREM to be the development's property manager. Berg sued Frobish for 
assault and battery and sought to hold CLVCA and CREM vicariously liable for Frobish's 
conduct. Berg also made other claims against the defendants, who hired Ayesh to 
represent them all. There was no engagement letter. The panel noted: 
 
4 
 
 
 
"Even though the possible conflict was discussed, Ayesh did not document the 
discussion in writing; did not obtain written waivers from his clients to any conflict; did 
not obtain Frobish's written informed consent to a limited-scope representation; and did 
not advise his clients of the effect of common representation on client-lawyer 
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege." 
 
The assault and battery case was removed to federal court where Ayesh filed a 
counterclaim for injunctive relief against Berg. That case was remanded to state court 
after the federal court granted defendants summary judgment on Berg's federal cause of 
action. 
 
Four other lawsuits involving the parties were filed while that federal litigation 
was pending. In April 2013, Berg sued Ayesh, CLVCA, Simon Palmer Properties, and 
Frobish in federal court. Ayesh again appeared as counsel for all defendants. In June 
2014, Frobish sued CLVCA and Simon Palmer Properties for access to documents. 
Ayesh appeared as counsel for those defendants. In July 2014, Berg sued Ayesh, Frobish, 
and CLVCA concerning a no-contact list. Ayesh represented all defendants except 
Frobish in that matter. And in November 2014, Ayesh was plaintiffs' counsel in a lawsuit 
that two CLVCA board members brought against Frobish to prevent a meeting to vote on 
bylaw changes and decide whether to discharge Ayesh. 
 
The stipulated disciplinary violations in the condominium litigation revolve 
primarily around Ayesh's handling of the conflicting interests with his clients (Frobish, 
CLVCA, and CREM) concerning Berg's assault and battery claim; and to a lesser extent 
pleadings Ayesh prepared and filed containing improper, unsubstantiated allegations 
about Berg. For example, the conflict of interest between Frobish and the others regarded 
their potential liability for Frobish's confrontation with Berg which existed from the 
litigation's outset. 
 
5 
 
 
 
This conflict was particularly evident at the summary judgment stage when 
Frobish refused to swear in an affidavit he was not acting in the course of his consulting 
employment during the confrontation with Berg, so Ayesh secured affidavits from others 
to advance that fact. On another occasion, Frobish pointed out the conflict privately to 
Ayesh, who responded by calling him an "idiot." And when Ayesh finally withdrew as 
Frobish's attorney, Ayesh remained as counsel for the other defendants and sent an e-mail 
to them criticizing and personally attacking Frobish. In doing so, Ayesh disclosed 
information about his representation of Frobish to the others. Ayesh also misrepresented 
that the conflict did not arise with Frobish until Frobish became upset by not being 
elected to the CLVCA board, and claimed Frobish only asserted the conflict because he 
was "emotionally crushed." Similarly, Ayesh filed multiple pleadings containing name-
calling and unsubstantiated allegations concerning Berg—referring to Berg as having 
"psychopathic tendencies," describing him as "the condo terrorist," contending that "it is 
believed [Berg] once shot his neighbor's dog," and suggesting Berg was responsible for 
burning down the Cedar Lakes Village clubhouse. 
 
With respect to all this, the hearing panel concluded: 
 
"KRPC 1.2(c) 
 
"25. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.2(c).  
 
"26. 
KRPC 1.2(c) provides that a 'lawyer may limit the scope of the 
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives 
informed consent in writing.' 
 
"27. 
The respondent failed to obtain Mr. Frobish's informed consent in 
writing to the limited-scope representation. The hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 1.2(c). 
 
6 
 
 
 
"KRPC 1.6 
 
"28. 
The respondent stipulated that he repeatedly violated KRPC 1.6.  
 
"29. 
With certain limited exceptions, 'a lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation.' KRPC 
1.6(a). Specifically, KRPC 1.6 provides: 
 
'(a) 
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, 
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b). 
 
'(b) 
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
 
(1) 
To prevent the client from committing a crime; 
 
(2) 
to secure legal advice about the lawyer's 
compliance with these Rules; 
 
(3) 
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the 
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to 
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the 
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or 
to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of the client; 
 
(4) 
to comply with other law or a court order; or 
 
(5) 
to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising 
from the lawyer's change of employment or from changes in the 
composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed 
7 
 
 
 
information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege 
or otherwise prejudice the client.' 
 
"30. 
The respondent repeatedly improperly revealed confidential information: 
 
a. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the April 15, 2014, position statement than was reasonably necessary 
to respond to allegations concerning his representation and the conflict of 
interest.  
 
b. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the April, 2014, email message to the court than was reasonably 
necessary to respond to the allegations concerning his representation.  
 
c. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the April 28, 2014, position statement than was reasonably necessary 
to respond to allegations concerning his representation.  
 
d. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the July 25, 2014, reply to the motion for reconsideration than was 
reasonably necessary to defend himself.  
 
e. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the November 12, 2014, response to the motion to strike than was 
reasonably necessary to defend himself.  
 
f. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the November 12, 2014, response to a motion for sanctions than was 
reasonably necessary to defend himself. 
 
g. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the November 17, 2014, response to motion to vacate temporary 
8 
 
 
 
restraining order and to remove the respondent as counsel than was 
reasonably necessary to defend himself.  
 
h. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the December 3, 2014, responses to the motions for sanctions than was 
reasonably necessary to defend himself. 
 
 
i. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the December 30, 2014, response to the motion to disqualify the 
respondent as counsel than was reasonably necessary to defend himself.  
 
j. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the December 30, 2014, response to motion for sanctions than was 
reasonably necessary to defend himself.  
 
k. 
The respondent revealed more confidential information 
in the April 6, 2015, response to the motion to recuse Judge Dahl than 
was reasonably necessary to respond to the allegations contained in the 
motion.  
 
"The hearing panel concludes that the respondent repeatedly violated KRPC 1.6. 
 
 
"KRPC 1.7 
 
"31. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.7.  
 
"32. 
KRPC 1.7 provides: 
 
'(a) 
Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of 
interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
 
(1) 
the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or 
9 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
there is a substantial risk that the representation 
of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person 
or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
 
'(b) 
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
 
(1) 
the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer 
will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to 
each affected client; 
 
(2) 
the representation is not prohibited by law; 
 
(3) 
the representation does not involve the assertion 
of a claim by one client against another client represented by the 
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a 
tribunal; and 
 
(4) 
each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.' 
 
"33. 
The rules do not permit the respondent to represent clients with 
conflicting interests without taking certain steps. The respondent failed to take the steps 
required by KRPC 1.7(b) and, as a result, repeatedly violated KRPC 1.7(a), as follows: 
 
a. 
The respondent engaged in a conflict of interest by 
representing Mr. Frobish and CREM, CLVCA, and Simon Palmer 
Properties when Mr. Frobish's interests were in conflict with the 
remaining defendants. Mr. Frobish made it clear that his position was 
that he was acting within the scope of his employment during the pry bar 
incident. Despite the conflict of interest, the respondent failed to comply 
with KRPC 1.7(b).  
10 
 
 
 
 
b. 
By undertaking the joint representation of himself and 
the other defendants in Berg vs. Ayesh, et al., case number 13-CV-1164, 
there was a substantial risk that the representation of one or more of the 
respondent's clients would be materially limited by a personal interest of 
the respondent. Again, the respondent did not comply with KRPC 1.7(b) 
regarding this conflict.  
 
c. 
The respondent included defenses and issues in a 
proposed pretrial order which disadvantaged his client, Mr. Frobish. As a 
result of the defenses and issues in the proposed pretrial order, there was 
a substantial risk that the representation of Mr. Frobish would be 
materially limited by the respondent's responsibilities to the other 
defendants. The respondent failed to comply with KRPC [1.7(b)].  
 
d. 
In conjunction with a motion for summary judgment, the 
respondent prepared affidavits for [G.F.], [C.B.], and Mr. Frobish to sign 
to establish that Mr. Frobish was not acting within the scope of his 
employment. Mr. Frobish refused to sign the affidavit because he 
contended that he was acting within the scope of his employment. [G.F.] 
and [C.B.] signed affidavits that Mr. Frobish was not acting within the 
scope of his employment. Clearly, the respondent knew there was a 
conflict of interest when Mr. Frobish refused to sign the affidavit. 
Despite this knowledge, the respondent failed to comply with KRPC 
1.7(b).  
 
e. 
Mr. Frobish sought advice from the disciplinary 
administrator regarding the pending litigation. Mr. Frobish presented Mr. 
Hazlett with a description of relevant facts regarding the respondent's 
representation of Mr. Frobish and the other defendants. Mr. Hazlett 
indicated that there were potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Frobish 
forwarded Mr. Hazlett's response to the respondent. Despite receipt of 
Mr. Hazlett's assessment of the situation, the respondent took no action 
to rectify the situation as required by KRPC 1.7(b).  
11 
 
 
 
 
f. 
After the case was remanded to state court, the 
respondent filed an additional motion for summary judgment. In the state 
court motion for summary judgment, the respondent continued to argue 
that Mr. Frobish was not acting within the scope of his employment. The 
respondent's position regarding this issue is evidence of an ongoing 
conflict of interest in the respondent's representation of Mr. Frobish and 
the other defendants. Despite the conflict of interest, the respondent 
failed to comply with KRPC 1.7(b).  
 
"As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent repeatedly violated 
KRPC 1.7(a)(2). 
 
"KRPC 1.8 
 
"34. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8.  
 
"35. 
Lawyers are not permitted to: 
 
'. . . accept compensation for representing a client from [someone] other 
than the client, unless [. . . ]: 
 
'(1) 
the client gives informed consent; 
 
'(2) 
there is no interference with the lawyer's independence 
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 
 
'(3) 
information relating to representation of a client is 
protected as required by Rule 1.6.' KRPC 1.8(f). 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
"36. 
In this case, the respondent failed to obtain Mr. Frobish's informed 
consent to accept compensation from CLVCA and CREM for representing Mr. Frobish. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.8(f).  
 
"KRPC 1.9 
 
"37. 
The respondent stipulated that he repeatedly violated KRPC 1.9.  
 
"38. 
KRPC 1.9 prohibits attorneys from engaging in conflicts of interest 
regarding former clients: 
 
'(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives 
informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
 
 . . . . 
 
'(c) 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a 
matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client 
in a matter shall not thereafter: 
 
(1) 
use information relating to the representation to 
the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules 
would permit or require with respect to a client or when the 
information has become generally known; or 
 
(2) 
reveal information relating to the representation 
except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a 
client.' 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
"39. 
On April 7, 2014, the respondent terminated his representation of Mr. 
Frobish. After terminating his representation of Mr. Frobish and without first obtaining 
Mr. Frobish's written consent, the respondent continued to represent the other defendants 
with interests materially adverse to Mr. Frobish. The hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent repeatedly violated KRPC 1.9. 
 
"KRPC 1.16(a)(1) 
 
"40. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.16.  
 
"41. 
In certain circumstances, attorneys must withdraw from representing a 
client. KRPC 1.16 provides: 
 
'(a) 
Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall 
withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
 
(1) 
the representation will result in violation of the 
rules of professional conduct or other law.' 
 
"42. 
The respondent was obligated to withdraw from the representation of all 
defendants when the conflict between Mr. Frobish and the other defendants became 
known. Clearly, the respondent knew of the conflict by August, 2013, when Mr. Frobish 
refused to sign the affidavit. Further, the respondent should have recognized the potential 
for a conflict prior to that time as Mr. Berg asserted in the pleadings that Mr. Frobish was 
acting in the scope of his employment. The respondent's continued representation of the 
remaining defendants resulted in a violation of KRPC 1.7 and KRPC 1.9. The hearing 
panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.16(a)(1) by failing to withdraw 
from the representation of the other defendants. 
 
"KRPC 3.1 
 
"43. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 3.1.  
14 
 
 
 
 
"44. 
Attorneys are prohibited from bringing or defending a proceeding unless 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. KRPC 3.1. 
 
"45. 
On December 30, 2014, the respondent filed a response to a motion for 
sanctions. In the response, the respondent failed to respond to the allegations in the 
motion, rather the respondent included immaterial and irrelevant information that 
amounted to an attack on Mr. Frobish. Additionally, the court concluded that the 
respondent's response lacked good faith and was unnecessary to the merits of the motion. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1. 
 
"KRPC 3.3 
 
"46. 
The respondent stipulated that he repeatedly violated KRPC 3.3.  
 
"47. 
The foundation of the practice of law is truth. Attorneys must be honest 
in all they do, particularly in appearances before courts. 'A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.' KRPC 3.3(a)(1). 
 
"48. 
The respondent repeatedly made false statements of material fact to the 
court and failed to correct those false statements of material fact made to the court, as 
follows: 
 
a. 
On May 5, 2014, the respondent filed a response which 
misrepresented how and when the conflict of interest arose. The 
respondent failed to correct the false statement with the court. 
 
b. 
On July 25, 2014, the respondent filed a reply to Mr. 
Frobish's motion for reconsideration. In the reply, the respondent 
continued to make assertions that misrepresented the timing of the 
conflict, in violation of KRPC 3.3(a)(1). The respondent failed to correct 
the false statement with the court.  
15 
 
 
 
 
c. 
On November 12, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion to strike. In the response, the respondent made 
unsupported allegations regarding Mr. Frobish's motivation. The 
respondent took no steps to correct the false statement with the court.  
 
d. 
On November 12, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion for sanctions. In the response, the respondent 
included many of the same misrepresentations that he had previously 
made in the response to the motion to strike. The respondent did not 
correct the false statement with the court.  
 
e. 
On November 17, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion to vacate the temporary restraining order. 
Characterizing Mr. Frobish as a 'turncoat,' in the response, the respondent 
falsely stated that Mr. Frobish changed his mind and claimed that he was 
acting in the scope of his employment. Again, the respondent did not 
correct his false statement.  
 
f. 
On December 3, 2014, the respondent filed responses to 
Mr. Frobish's motions for sanctions. In the responses, the respondent 
falsely claimed that Mr. Frobish created the conflict in the 11th hour. The 
respondent knew that Mr. Frobish made his position clear by August, 
2013. The respondent failed to correct the false statement made to the 
court in the responses.  
 
g. 
On December 30, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion to disqualify the respondent as counsel for 
CLVCA. In the response, the respondent falsely stated that Mr. Frobish 
did not claim to have been acting in the scope of his employment until 
one week before trial. The respondent did not correct the false statement.  
 
16 
 
 
 
h. 
Also on December 30, 2014, the respondent filed a 
response to Mr. Frobish's motion for sanctions. In the response, the 
respondent attacked Mr. Frobish with the same statements made above. 
The respondent took no actions to correct the false statements.  
 
i. 
On April 6, 2015, the respondent filed a response to Mr. 
Frobish's motion to recuse Judge Dahl. In the response, the respondent 
engaged in name-calling, falsely accused Mr. Frobish of creating a bogus 
conflict of interest and falsely accused Mr. Frobish of filing a frivolous 
ethics complaint with the disciplinary administrator's office. 
 
j. 
On June 4, 2015, the respondent filed a reply to Mr. 
Frobish's response to the respondent's motion to reconsider. In the reply, 
the respondent continued to misrepresent the timing of the conflict of 
interest raised by Mr. Frobish.  
 
"The hearing panel concludes that the respondent repeatedly violated KRPC 
3.3(a)(1). 
 
. . . . 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"58. 
The respondent stipulated that he repeatedly violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"59. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"60. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice as follows: 
 
a. 
On June 26, 2014, the respondent filed a motion for 
reconsideration of sanctions and on July 25, 2014, the respondent filed a 
17 
 
 
 
reply to Mr. Frobish's response to the motion for reconsideration of 
sanctions. Despite having been previously sanctioned for engaging in 
intentional and malicious name-calling and making assertions not 
supported by evidence, the respondent engaged in the same conduct in 
the motion and in the reply.  
 
b. 
On November 12, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion to strike. In the motion to strike, the respondent 
attacked his former client, engaged in name-calling, and made assertions 
that were not supported by evidence.  
 
c. 
On November 12, 2014, the respondent also filed a 
response to Mr. Frobish's motion for sanctions. Again, the respondent 
continued to attack his former client, engage in name-calling, and make 
assertions not supported by evidence.  
 
d. 
On November 17, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion to vacate the temporary restraining order and to 
remove the respondent as counsel. In the response, the respondent 
continued to engage in similar conduct.  
 
e. 
On December 3, 2014, the respondent filed responses to 
Mr. Frobish's motions for sanctions. In the responses to the motions for 
sanctions, the respondent, again, continued the same conduct. 
 
f. 
On December 22, 2014, the respondent filed a 
counterclaim against Mr. Berg. In the counterclaim, the respondent 
included many of the same allegations that the court found improper and 
resulted in a sanction against the respondent's clients.  
 
g. 
On December 30, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion to disqualify the respondent as counsel for 
18 
 
 
 
CLVCA. In the responses, the respondent attacked Mr. Frobish with the 
same statements he made in previous filings.  
 
h. 
On December 30, 2014, the respondent filed a response 
to Mr. Frobish's motion for sanctions. Again, the respondent attacked Mr. 
Frobish by calling him names and making assertions that were not 
supported by evidence.  
 
i. 
On April 6, 2015, the respondent filed a response to Mr. 
Frobish's motion to recuse Judge Dahl. In the response, the respondent 
falsely accused Mr. Frobish of creating a bogus conflict of interest and 
filing a frivolous disciplinary complaint.  
 
"As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent continued to violate 
KRPC 8.4(d) in many ways for an extended period of time. The respondent's 'bad faith 
allegations . . . reflecting improper motive' as found by Judge Gale in July of 2013 
continued to be observed in December of 2013 by Judge Vratil, adopted by Judge Yost in 
June of 2014, and Judge Wooley in April of 2015. The conclusions and findings of each 
judge appeared to have no impact on the conduct of the respondent." 
 
Deed transactions violations 
 
The deed transactions complaint, denoted as DA 12,700, involved Ayesh assisting 
a married couple with unpaid tax liabilities the husband incurred before the marriage. 
Over an eight-year period, Ayesh worked with the couple "on tax avoidance through 
series of transactions that involved transferring real property out of his clients' names to 
protect them from levy and execution." In November 2011, Ayesh signed his clients' 
names on two warranty deeds, each transferring 80 acres solely to the wife. Ayesh 
notarized both deeds, "falsely certifying" his clients "signed the deeds in his presence," 
and recorded them. Ayesh sent the recorded deeds to the clients with a note indicating he 
had taken "'the liberty of signing your name to expedite the transfers.'" 
19 
 
 
 
 
When the couple later divorced, the husband challenged the deeds' authenticity. 
His counsel contacted Ayesh, who admitted notarizing the deeds outside the couples' 
presence but denied signing them. Ayesh later represented to the Disciplinary 
Administrator's office that he learned the truth only after retrieving the file from storage. 
He said he believed he had authority to sign the deeds on the clients' behalf. 
 
The panel concluded from this: 
 
"KRPC 4.1 
 
"49. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 4.1. 
 
"50. 
Attorneys are required to be honest in dealings with third persons:  '[i]n 
the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a third person.' KRPC 4.l(a). 
 
"51. 
The respondent made a false statement of material fact when he signed 
his clients' names to the deeds, when he notarized the forged signatures, and when he 
filed the deeds with the Montgomery County Register of Deeds. The hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 4.l(a).  
 
"KRPC 8.3 
 
"52. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 8.3. 
 
"53. 
Attorneys are required to report misconduct. 'A lawyer having 
knowledge of any action, inaction, or conduct which in his or her opinion constitutes 
misconduct of an attorney under these rules shall inform the appropriate professional 
authority.' KRPC 8.3(a). 
 
20 
 
 
 
"54. 
The respondent knew it was attorney misconduct to sign his clients' 
names to the deeds, to notarize the forged signatures, and to file the deeds with the 
Montgomery County Register of Deeds, yet, the respondent failed to report his 
misconduct. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.3(a).  
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
"55. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 8.4(c). 
 
"56. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). 
 
"57. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he 
signed his clients' names to the deeds, when he notarized the forged signatures, and when 
he filed the deeds with the Montgomery County Register of Deeds on two occasions. As 
such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c)."  
 
Ayesh's mitigation case and the hearing panel's recommendation 
 
Because he stipulated to his misconduct and the disciplinary violations, Ayesh was 
the only party to present witnesses at the panel hearing. He focused on mitigation. He 
presented more than 50 supporting letters and testimony from two CLVCA board 
members from the time of the condominium litigation; District Judge Eric Yost, who 
presided over some of the condominium litigation; retired District Judge Robert 
Schmisseur; retired federal magistrate judge Karen Humphreys; Dr. Peter Graham, a 
clinical psychologist; Father Paul O'Callaghan; Wichita attorney James Walker, who had 
agreed at that time to supervise the proposed probation plan; and himself. 
 
CLVCA board members, Almer J. Mandt and Cheryl Hinshaw, described Ayesh 
favorably and testified about Berg and Frobish's character. Both described Berg's 
litigiousness and abusive conduct toward themselves and other residents. Retired judge 
21 
 
 
 
Schmisseur described Ayesh as professional, honest, and ethical. He said Berg is a bully 
who brings out the worst in everybody. Retired federal magistrate Humphreys testified 
Ayesh could not have a better reputation and was probably the only lawyer who would 
have undertaken a vigorous representation of the Cedar Lakes Village residents. She 
believed he should be allowed to continue practicing. She characterized the CLVCA case 
as a wildfire destroying everything in its path. She agreed disciplinary punishment was in 
line but thought probation appropriate. 
 
Judge Yost, who ordered Ayesh to withdraw from a case and imposed sanctions, 
testified Ayesh is an honest person and honest attorney. He said Ayesh's courtroom 
demeanor was appropriate during the case. And when asked if there was a reason for his 
removing Ayesh that was not evident from the journal entry, he said he "thought that 
[Ayesh] had gotten too sucked in to the Berg vortex and . . . too invested in" the case. 
Yost said Ayesh is compassionate and that it would diminish the bar to lose him. He 
agreed with Ayesh's counsel that Frobish "contributed mightily" to the problems that 
brought the litigation on. Among them, he said, was that Frobish seemed to "switch 
sides" after losing the board election. Father Paul O'Callaghan, dean of St. George 
Orthodox Christian Cathedral in Wichita, said Ayesh is "very very intense and . . . deeply 
committed to" his charitable endeavors, and was his "go-to" for attorneys willing to do 
pro bono work in difficult cases. 
 
Dr. Peter Graham, Ph.D., is a Kansas licensed psychologist and a cofounder of 
Acumen Assessments and Acumen Institute. Acumen Assessments evaluates licensed 
professionals' fitness to practice, and Acumen Institute provides remediation and 
treatment. Acumen performed a fitness-to-practice evaluation with Ayesh. Graham 
testified Ayesh was functioning at high average to superior level cognitively and did not 
manifest symptoms of psychological illness, including major depression. At the time of 
evaluation, Ayesh had several serious chronic conditions:  morbid obesity; working seven 
22 
 
 
 
days a week for long hours; not eating or sleeping well; and alcohol consumption. He 
said Ayesh has an obsessive compulsive personality style and that his life becomes so 
single-mindedly work focused that everything else goes to the wayside. Graham said 
Ayesh had committed himself to living according to principles revolving around hard 
work, not engaging in primarily personal or pleasure relationships, and focusing on work 
in the interests of others. Graham believed Ayesh lacked a sober, objective prospective 
for protecting his own interests to sustain his ability to be a philanthropist. He said Ayesh 
was not thinking about his own interests in a reasonable way. 
 
Graham said the Acumen team's impression of the ethics cases was that Ayesh's 
personal mission impacted his decision making. Graham said Ayesh is cognitively, 
morally, and intellectually fit to practice; but that something about his personality makes 
him vulnerable to pursuing work in a client, mission-oriented way that can impact his 
ethical professional decision making—"putting certain sort of convictions related to his 
personal mission above really the rules and expectations of the profession." On cross-
examination, Graham agreed Ayesh was prone to get into cases like the condominium 
litigation more than the average lawyer and can get too involved emotionally when he 
sees an urgency around clients' interests. 
 
Graham said Ayesh should not go back to practice and be left to his own devices 
because he needs some help. He identified several risk factors to take into account:  
Ayesh's self-sacrifice, his consequent tendency to not think carefully from time to time, 
his volume of cases and lack of time, and his penchant for driving head-long toward a 
self-conceived mission to the exclusion of thinking about his own self-interest. He said 
Ayesh could be rehabilitated using a systematic approach to helping him address these 
personal vulnerabilities. Graham said he was familiar with the proposed probation and 
believed it had the elements the Acumen treatment team believed were called for. 
 
23 
 
 
 
When confronted with the dishonest conduct, Graham said the way to effectively 
supervise that was to focus Ayesh's attention on being clear about what he did wrong, 
why he did it, and the rationalization he gives for it; to make it clear that none of that is 
an excuse; and to make it clear it is always Ayesh's duty to use the filter of professional 
ethics. Graham believed accountability from colleagues is part of that process. He also 
said Ayesh does not have any severe character pathology—he has not lived a life of self-
indulgence or of overall rule-flouting. Graham also said every professional has a capacity 
for the conduct Ayesh engaged in but concluded it was possible to help right the ship and 
use better judgment. He predicted Ayesh's risk of reoffending is at the lower end of the 
spectrum in terms of "all of us" not just people he evaluates. 
 
In response to questioning by hearing panel members, Graham gave seemingly 
contradictory answers to one line of questioning, saying Ayesh should be monitored by 
Acumen for the rest of his career, and also that five years' monitoring is usually 
reasonable and would be for Ayesh. He agreed a benefit to suspension is that it can focus 
a person's attention and allow them to make changes in the structure of their practice. But 
he acknowledged suspension has an impact on a professional's financial and emotional 
well-being and that the issue is not really his "zone" because it is more in the purview of 
punishment than rehabilitation. Regarding the deeds case, Graham said Ayesh told him 
he does not routinely sign and notarize clients' signatures and had not done it before. 
 
Ayesh testified he essentially took a vow of poverty at 40 to give away all but 
expenses for living on a modest, sustenance basis. He estimated he was giving away 
about $475,000 a year. He said Berg was "satanic, demonic," and he planned to try to get 
Berg ejected from the condominium development under the covenants. When Berg sued 
first, Ayesh fashioned this into a counterclaim. Ayesh acknowledged there was a brief 
discussion about Berg trying to get the CLVCA board on the hook for Frobish's tort, but 
that Frobish wanted him to represent him, did not see a conflict, and wanted the board to 
24 
 
 
 
pay for the defense. Ayesh agreed he violated the ethics rules and knew better and should 
have gotten consent. 
 
Regarding the assertions about Berg, Ayesh acknowledged he attempted to find 
affidavits to support his allegations. He then commented: 
 
"And herein lies the biggest problem with the criticism saying that I was over-zealous, 
over the top, trying to embarrass Jerry Berg, going way out of what was needed. The 
problem is the whole case was about Jerry Berg's conduct and his conduct was so 
egregious and all the residents had described it in very colorful words and all that. And 
all I did was adopt their words. And whether it's Kathryn Vratil, Judge Vratil, they were 
offended by my pleadings. Offended. And I said, I'm sorry you're offended but this case 
is about this man's conduct and his conduct is offensive. And it's been described very 
clearly." 
 
As for the Frobish conflict, Ayesh accused Frobish of being untruthful about 
whether he had seen the answer denying he was in the course of his employment at the 
time of the physical confrontation with Berg, commenting that "Jon reviewed that even 
though now he's saying he didn't. But he reviewed and approved. He reviewed and 
approved every pleading." Ayesh told the panel he had the case settled eight or nine 
months in, but Frobish "nixe[d] it," and that the only thing more disappointing was 
Frobish switching on him ten days before trial. Ayesh said he understands now he 
represented Frobish, the seriousness of the conflict of interest, and that he could not 
disclose confidential information received from Frobish. But he said the line got blurred 
because Frobish was publishing everything to the condominium development residents. 
Ayesh also said his judgment was clouded by his fixation on Berg. 
 
Regarding the deed case, Ayesh said the incidents occurred before the Berg 
litigation. He said he was working long hours, seven days a week. He said he understands 
25 
 
 
 
the seriousness of the violations. He believed he had authority to sign the deeds and said 
it was important to file them right away to prevent a federal tax lien from attaching. He 
disputed the husband's claim that he did not authorize Ayesh to sign for him, pointing to 
the letter he sent with the recorded deeds. He said he had no reason to do that and nothing 
to gain financially from it. He admitted he could have obtained a formal power of 
attorney from the clients but did not think it was necessary. Ayesh said this was the only 
occurrence. 
 
The panel recommended a one-year suspension, reasoning as follows: 
 
"American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"61. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
"62. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to refrain 
from conflicts of interest. Additionally, the respondent violated his duty to the public and 
to the legal profession to maintain his personal integrity. Finally, the respondent violated 
his duty to the legal system to refrain from actions that result in prejudice to the 
administration of justice. 
 
"63. 
Mental State. The respondent knowingly and intentionally violated his 
duties. 
 
"64. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to Mr. Frobish, the legal profession, and the legal system. The respondent 
caused serious potential injury to C.M. and P.M. 
26 
 
 
 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"65. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
a. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been 
previously disciplined on three occasions. The hearing panel gives little 
weight to the respondent's disciplinary history. See ¶ [66(d)], below. 
 
i. 
In 2006, the disciplinary administrator 
admonished the respondent for violating KRPC 4.2 
(communication with person represented by counsel). 
 
ii. 
In 2008, the disciplinary administrator 
admonished the respondent for violating KRPC 1.1 
(competence) and KRPC 1.2 (scope of representation). 
 
iii. 
In 2013, the respondent successfully completed 
an attorney diversion agreement, for violating KRPC 1.15 
(safeguarding client property). 
 
b. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive. While the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty 
and selfishness, the hearing panel gives little weight to this factor. The 
respondent's actions rather than the motivations for his actions are 
important to the hearing panel. 
 
i. 
In the litigation involving Mr. Frobish and Mr. 
Berg, the respondent provided false information to the court on 
multiple occasions to make it appear that a conflict did not exist 
27 
 
 
 
and that Mr. Frobish invented a conflict as a last ditch effort to 
thwart the litigation. The respondent knew that a conflict existed 
at the latest, August, 2013. It is reasonable to conclude that the 
reason the respondent continued to assert that there was no 
conflict of interest was based on a dishonest motive to make the 
court believe that there was no conflict. 
 
ii. 
Additionally, it appears that the respondent 
remained in the litigation because he wanted to be the one to 
save the day for the community. The respondent's motives for 
such litigation reflect both his genuine concern for CLVCA 
residents and his unhealthy compulsion to prevail against Mr. 
Frobish and Mr. Berg. 
 
iii. 
Finally, it appears that the respondent's signing 
of his clients' names on the two deeds and false notarization of 
same was a deliberate course of conduct which constituted a 
'fraud against the judicial system.' In re Daugherty, 285 Kan. 
1143, 1156-7, 180 P.3d 536, 547 (2008), citing In re Thebeau, 
111 Ill.2d 251 (1986). 
 
c. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. Throughout the litigation 
involving Mr. Frobish, after being admonished by the courts, the 
respondent continued to engage in the same types of misconduct. 
Specifically, the respondent repeatedly disclosed confidential 
information, the respondent repeatedly engaged in conflicts of interest, 
the respondent repeatedly provided false information to the courts, and 
the respondent repeatedly engaged in conduct that prejudiced the 
administration of justice. Additionally, the respondent signed his clients' 
name to not one, but two deeds, notarized the signatures on both deeds, 
and filed both deeds with the Montgomery County Register of Deeds. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent engaged in patterns of 
28 
 
 
 
misconduct. The hearing panel is troubled by the ongoing nature of the 
respondent's misconduct. 
 
d. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple 
rule violations. The respondent violated KRPC 1.2 (scope of 
representation), 1.6 (confidentiality), 1.7 (conflict of interest), 1.8 
(conflict of interest), 1.9 (conflict of interest), 1.16 (termination of 
representation), 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 3.3 (candor to 
the tribunal), 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others), 8.3 (failure to 
report misconduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in dishonest conduct), and 8.4(d) 
(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed 
multiple offenses. The large number of violations of the rules is a 
significant aggravating factor. 
 
e. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The 
Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the 
State of Kansas in 1979. At the time of the misconduct, the respondent 
has been practicing law for more than thirty-five years. The respondent's 
substantial experience aggravates the misconduct in this case. 
 
"66. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
a. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes 
Have Contributed to the Violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct. The respondent has an obsessive compulsive personality style. 
Based on all the evidence presented, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent's personality style contributed to the violations of the rules. 
The respondent has taken steps to address the challenges of having an 
obsessive compulsive personality style. The steps the respondent has 
29 
 
 
 
taken to address his obsessive compulsive personality style significantly 
mitigate the misconduct and justify the reduction of what would 
otherwise be a substantially greater disciplinary recommendation by the 
hearing panel. 
 
b. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown 
by His or Her Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and 
Free Acknowledgment of the Transgressions. The respondent fully 
cooperated with the disciplinary process. Additionally, the respondent 
admitted the facts and the rule violations in an extensive stipulation. The 
respondent's level of cooperation is an important mitigating factor. 
 
c. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the 
Community Including Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in 
Support of the Character and General Reputation of the Attorney. The 
respondent is an active and productive member of the bar of Wichita, 
Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally 
possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by the testimony 
of judges and lawyers and the many letters received by the hearing panel. 
In addition to the letters of support, the respondent presented compelling 
evidence of his extensive philanthropic support of charities and people in 
need. The hearing panel acknowledges the compelling evidence of the 
respondent's good character and high esteem of the members of his 
community. 
 
d. 
Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The discipline imposed in 
2006, 2008, and 2013, is remote in character and in time to the 
misconduct in this case. The hearing panel gives the respondent's 
disciplinary record little weight. 
 
e. 
Exceptional Circumstances. Finally, the hearing panel 
finds the exceptional circumstances surrounding the [CLVCA] litigation 
to be a significant mitigating factor in its recommendation for discipline. 
30 
 
 
 
The hearing panel has rarely seen litigation as protracted and pernicious, 
as was presented in the underlying litigation involving Mr. Berg and Mr. 
Frobish. In testimony before the panel, the Honorable [Karen] 
Humphreys compared the litigation to a wildfire, in that it 'destroy[ed] 
everything in its path.' The hearing panel finds that the respondent's 
conduct and admitted violations with respect to the CLVCA litigation, 
were borne out of his obsessive efforts to navigate exceptionally 
challenging legal circumstances. 
 
"67. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.22 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly reveals information relating to the representation of a client 
not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure 
causes injury or potential injury to a client.' 
 
'4.31 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, 
without the informed consent of Client(s): 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
(b) 
simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer 
knows have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the lawyer 
or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
client; or 
 
(c) 
represents a client in a matter substantially 
related to a matter in which the interests of a present or former 
client are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information 
relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit 
the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a client.' 
31 
 
 
 
 
'4.32 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the 
possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client.' 
 
'5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in any other intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
that serious[ly] adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice.' 
 
'6.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the 
court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and 
takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party 
to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect 
on the legal proceeding.' 
 
'6.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is 
negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are 
false or in taking remedial action when material information is being 
withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal 
proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the 
legal proceeding.' 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
"Recommendation of the Parties 
 
"68. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's 
license to practice law be suspended for a period of one year. The disciplinary 
administrator further recommended that the respondent be required to undergo a 
reinstatement hearing under Rule 219 prior to consideration of reinstatement. 
 
"69. 
The respondent recommended that the respondent's license to practice 
law be suspended for not less than 90 days and that the respondent be granted probation 
under the terms and conditions of the proposed plan of probation. (Even though counsel 
for the respondent argued for a suspension of not less than 90 days, the hearing panel 
believes that counsel meant to say not more than 90 days.) 
 
"Discussion of the Respondent's Request for Probation 
 
"70. 
When a respondent requests probation, the hearing panel is required to 
consider Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(3), which provides: 
 
'(3) 
The Hearing Panel shall not recommend that the 
Respondent be placed on probation unless: 
 
(i) 
the Respondent develops a workable, 
substantial, and detailed plan of probation and provides a copy of 
the proposed plan of probation to the Disciplinary Administrator 
and each member of the Hearing Panel at least fourteen days 
prior to the hearing on the Formal Complaint; 
 
(ii) 
the Respondent puts the proposed plan of 
probation into effect prior to the hearing on the Formal 
Complaint by complying with each of the terms and conditions 
of the probation plan; 
 
33 
 
 
 
(iii) 
the misconduct can be corrected by probation; 
and 
 
(iv) 
placing the Respondent on probation is in the 
best interests of the legal profession and the citizens of the State 
of Kansas.' 
 
"71. 
The respondent developed a workable, substantial, and detailed plan of 
probation. On November 25, 2019, 15 days prior to the hearing, the respondent provided 
a copy of the proposed plan of probation to the disciplinary administrator and each 
member of the hearing panel. 
 
"72. 
It appears that the respondent took some steps to put the proposed plan of 
probation into effect prior to the hearing. The proposed supervisor testified about the 
limited steps [he] had taken to put the plan into place. The respondent testified about how 
he has implemented some of the terms and conditions included in his proposed plan of 
probation. However, it is not clear that the respondent put each term and condition of the 
proposed plan of probation into effect. 
 
"73. 
Further, some of the misconduct, in this case, cannot be corrected by 
probation. Specifically, dishonest conduct cannot be effectively supervised. See In re 
Stockwell, 296 Kan. 860, 868, 295 P.3d 572 (2013) ('Moreover, this court is generally 
reluctant to grant probation where the misconduct involves fraud or dishonesty because 
supervision, even the most diligent, often cannot effectively guard against dishonest 
acts.'). The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct in both cases—he repeatedly 
violated KRPC 3.3(a)(l) by providing the court with false information and he violated 
KRPC 8.4(c) when he signed his clients' names to two deeds, notarized the deeds, and 
filed the forged deeds with the Montgomery County Register of Deeds. 
 
"74. 
Finally, placing the respondent on probation is not in the best interests of 
the legal profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas. 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
"Recommendations of the Hearing Panel 
 
"75. 
Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the 
Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously agrees with the disciplinary 
administrator and recommends that the respondent be suspended for a period of one year. 
The hearing panel further recommends that prior to reinstatement, the respondent be 
required to undergo a reinstatement hearing under Rule 219. Finally, should the 
reinstatement hearing panel propose supervision upon reinstatement, this hearing panel 
would support such a recommendation." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the panel's findings, 
and the parties' arguments and determines whether KRPC violations exist and, if they do, 
what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see also 
Supreme Court Rule 211(a)(2) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 259) (a misconduct finding must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence). "Clear and convincing evidence is 
'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of the facts asserted is highly 
probable.'" In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 218, 473 P.3d 886 (2020). 
 
Ayesh was given adequate notice of the formal complaint to which he filed an 
answer. He was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the 
hearing before this court. 
 
Ayesh filed six exceptions, all concerning the recommended discipline. He did not 
take exception to the panel's factual findings or conclusions of law concerning the 
misconduct. We address the findings and conclusions first. 
 
35 
 
 
 
"When a respondent does not take exception to a finding it is deemed admitted. 
But when an exception is taken, the panel's findings are not typically deemed admitted, 
so the court must determine whether the disputed findings are supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. In making this determination, the court does not weigh conflicting 
evidence, assess witness credibility, or redetermine questions of fact. If a disputed finding 
is supported by clear and convincing evidence, it will not be disturbed. [Citations 
omitted.]" In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 209-10, 407 P.3d 613 (2017). 
 
The stipulations before the hearing panel establish by clear and convincing 
evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.2 (scope of representation) (2021 
Kan. S. Ct. R. 323); KRPC 1.6 (confidentiality) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 330); KRPC 1.7 
(conflict of interest:  current clients) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 336); KRPC 1.8 (conflict of 
interest:  current clients) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 345); KRPC 1.9 (conflict of interest:  
former clients) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 352); KRPC 1.16 (termination of representation) 
(2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 372); KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions) (2021 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 384); KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 385); KRPC 4.1 
(truthfulness in statements to others) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 397); KRPC 8.3 (failure to 
report misconduct) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 426); KRPC 8.4(c) (engaging in dishonest 
conduct) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427); and KRPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427). 
 
The question remaining is the appropriate discipline. 
 
"In any given case, this court is not bound by the recommendations from the hearing 
panel or the Disciplinary Administrator. 'Each disciplinary sanction is based on the 
specific facts and circumstances of the violations and the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances presented in the case.' 'Because each case is unique, past sanctions provide 
little guidance.' [Citations omitted.]" Hodge, 307 Kan. at 230. 
 
36 
 
 
 
The court generally looks to the American Bar Association Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to determine the appropriate sanction. Under that framework, 
the court considers "four factors in determining punishment:  (1) the ethical duty violated 
by the lawyer; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury resulting 
from the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." 
Hodge, 307 Kan. at 231. 
 
Ayesh does not challenge the first factor, i.e., the hearing panel's conclusion that 
he violated his duties to refrain from conflicts of interest, to maintain personal integrity, 
and to refrain from actions that prejudice the administration of justice; that he knowingly 
and intentionally violated the duties; or that his misconduct caused actual injury to 
Frobish, serious potential injury to the married couple, or actual injury to the legal 
profession and legal system. 
 
Ayesh's exceptions focus on six aspects of the panel's application of factors two 
(lawyer's mental state) and four (existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances). 
He first questions the panel's finding that his misconduct was motivated by dishonesty 
and selfishness. His remaining focus is on:  the weight placed on the personal and 
emotional problems that contributed to the misconduct and his efforts to address them; 
the weight placed on the evidence of his good character; the panel's conclusion that the 
misconduct could not be corrected by probation; the panel's decision that probation is not 
in the best interest of the legal profession; and the panel's ultimate recommendation for a 
year's suspension.  
 
Conceptually, these exceptions relate to two separate points within our framework 
for determining what discipline is appropriate. First, was there sufficient evidence to 
establish Ayesh's misconduct was motivated by selfishness or dishonesty? And second, 
what is the appropriate discipline under the four factors for determining punishment? 
37 
 
 
 
 
Ayesh first argues the panel's conclusion that his misconduct was accompanied by 
selfish or dishonest motive was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. He 
argues that the evidence established his only motivation was to help his clients; that he 
did not have a dishonest motive at the time he made his multiple false representations 
about the conflict of interest in the condominium case; and that his forgery of client 
signatures, false notarization, and filing deeds was motivated only by his clients' best 
interests. Even so, the panel assigned little weight to this factor. 
 
"Unlike the standard for proving attorney misconduct, the panel does not need 
clear and convincing evidence to consider aggravating and mitigating factors." In re Hall, 
304 Kan. 999, 1013, 377 P.3d 1149 (2016) (holding panel did not err considering 
respondent's voluntary license surrender as mitigating factor since there was some 
evidence of respondent's wish to voluntarily suspend). Nonetheless, "some evidence of 
those circumstances still must be presented for weighing." 304 Kan. at 1014. 
 
We hold there was evidence to support the panel's finding that Ayesh's conduct 
was motivated by selfishness and dishonesty. Paragraph 60 of the panel's hearing report 
details pleadings Ayesh filed in November 2014 concerning Frobish's pursuit of sanctions 
against him—including his removal from the case and the costs of the proceedings. In his 
effort to defeat those requests and their negative ramifications for him personally, Ayesh 
employed improper methods including name calling, false representations about the 
conflict, and unsupported allegations about Frobish. These circumstances provided a 
logical basis for concluding at least some of Ayesh's misconduct was self-serving. See In 
re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 222, 311 P.3d 321 (2013) (former attorney general acted with a 
selfish motive when the wrongful public disclosure of sealed documents was motivated 
by a desire to help "'others'" understand his position on a matter; and that other wrongful 
38 
 
 
 
conduct was designed to "protect himself from perceived ridicule and unfavorable public 
scrutiny and cull favor with the public for his cause").  
 
There was also ample evidence that misconduct in both the CLVCA and deeds 
matters was motivated by dishonesty. Despite Ayesh's claim his dishonesty in the 
condominium case was unintentional, that cannot be reconciled with several facts in the 
record. He stipulated the misconduct was knowing and intentional. And the panel found 
he "knew that a conflict existed at the latest, August, 2013," when Frobish refused to 
assist Ayesh in demonstrating he was not acting within the scope of his employment for 
the purposes of the summary judgment motion. Ayesh stipulated he was "[a]t this 
point . . . on notice that there was a conflict." All the deceptive pleadings—ten in total—
were filed after that date. 
 
Ayesh also points out he did not receive any personal gain from his misconduct in 
the deeds complaint. And he seizes on the panel's belief that the recording of falsely 
signed and notarized deeds was a "fraud against the judicial system" and its attendant 
citations to In re Daugherty, 285 Kan. 1143, 1153, 180 P.3d 536 (2008), and In re 
Thebeau, 111 Ill. 2d 251, 489 N.E.2d 877 (1986). Ayesh distinguishes Daugherty on the 
ground that it involved dishonesty undertaken for personal gain. See Daugherty, 285 
Kan. at 1153 (attorney made false statements supporting his own bankruptcy petition). He 
distinguishes Thebeau on the basis it involved "a continual course of conduct with respect 
to forged documents" and that the respondent in that case "did not present any mitigating 
facts or circumstances, nor did he present any character or reputation testimony." Instead, 
he argues his circumstances are more analogous to In re Roy, 261 Kan. 999, 933 P.2d 662 
(1997), or In re Grant, 262 Kan. 269, 936 P.2d 1360 (1997), in which attorneys were 
censured for filing documents on which they forged signatures. We disagree.  
 
39 
 
 
 
Neither Roy nor Grant are instructive on whether there was evidence to support 
the panel's finding that Ayesh's misconduct in the deeds case was motivated by 
dishonesty. The hearing panel in Roy found the respondent did not act with a dishonest or 
selfish motive when he forged his client's signatures on a bankruptcy petition and then 
filed it to stop a sheriff's sale. Roy, 261 Kan. at 999-1000. But neither party took 
exception to the hearing panel's finding on appeal. In Grant, the hearing panel found the 
attorney's decision to forge a testator's signature on a will submitted for probate was 
dishonest, but not selfish. Grant, 262 Kan. at 270. Two justices dissented because they 
would have imposed suspension. 262 Kan. at 273-74. 
 
Here, the act itself is evidence of a dishonest motive. Ayesh contends he had 
authority from his clients to sign the deeds on their behalf. But even if that were true, 
Ayesh notarized the signatures on the deeds, falsely acknowledging both personally 
executed the documents, and had them filed. Such acknowledgements are routinely 
considered prima facie proof of a deed's validity and the signer's identity. See 91 Am. Jur. 
Proof of Facts 3d 345, § 1 (2006); In re Adoption of X.J.A., 284 Kan. 853, 872, 166 P.3d 
396 (2007). Having personally forged his clients' signatures on the real estate deeds, 
Ayesh knew his clients did not sign them and then hid that fact by using his office as a 
notary to falsely certify otherwise. He then recorded falsified evidence of the conveyance 
to defeat a tax lien he believed impending. In addition, Ayesh denied signing the deeds 
when confronted by his client's divorce attorney. The panel reasonably concluded Ayesh 
had a dishonest motive. 
 
We hold the panel properly concluded that a selfish and dishonest motive existed 
and appropriately considered this as an aggravating factor. 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINE 
 
Ayesh presents his remaining five exceptions as separate issues:  two going to the 
weight that should be placed on his mitigation evidence, two going to whether probation 
is appropriate, and the final one arguing generally that the recommended one-year 
suspension is too harsh. But because the court is not bound by the panel's discipline 
recommendation, the issue here is whether the court independently considers Ayesh's 
arguments persuasive enough to impose the lesser discipline he seeks. See In re Biscanin, 
305 Kan. 1212, 1229, 390 P.3d 886 (2017) ("The recommendations of the hearing panel 
and office of the Disciplinary Administrator are advisory only and do not prevent us from 
imposing greater or lesser sanctions."); In re Barker, 299 Kan. 158, 167, 321 P.3d 767 
(2014) ("The panel must consider the evidence presented as to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and determine the weight to be assigned to each in arriving at an 
appropriate discipline. On appeal, this court determines whether it agrees with the panel's 
findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances."). 
 
Viewed from that perspective, our question is whether Ayesh should be placed on 
probation rather than suspended from the practice of law. Under the ABA standards, 
"[p]robation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. 
Probation can be imposed alone or in conjunction with a reprimand, an admonition or 
immediately following a suspension. Probation can also be imposed as a condition of 
readmission or reinstatement." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 2.7. 
Ayesh seeks probation in lieu of suspension or immediately following a suspension not 
exceeding 90 days. 
 
Ayesh argues probation will correct his past dishonest conduct, will deter future 
misconduct, and be in the legal profession's best interests. He contends his past dishonest 
conduct "[was] motivated by his obsessive devotion to his clients' causes," which caused 
41 
 
 
 
him to lose "his sense of objectiveness and caution." He argues now he has taken "a step 
back and reflect[ed] on the situations," he acknowledges his "devotion" to his clients 
"clouded his better judgment." Ayesh also contends there is "no evidence that [his] 
actions were driven by greed or selfish motives" and that the hearing testimony 
established his inability to practice law would be a loss to the bar; would negatively 
impact his clients; would harm his staff; and would hinder his ability to continue 
receiving treatment. 
 
In the end, Ayesh believes he has taken the necessary steps to prevent the 
misconduct from occurring again by altering his lifestyle and caseload. And, he argues, 
his punishment should reflect his view that the mitigating factors both "provide an 
understandable basis behind [his] pattern of misconduct and number of violations," and 
"far outweigh the aggravating factors." The Disciplinary Administrator contends 
probation alone is inappropriate because Ayesh's client-protection motivation did not 
justify the dishonest conduct. 
 
Generally, we are "reluctant to grant probation where the misconduct involves 
fraud or dishonesty because supervision, even the most diligent, often cannot effectively 
guard against dishonest acts." In re Stockwell, 296 Kan. 860, 868, 295 P.3d 572 (2013). 
Under the ABA standards the panel cited, a sanction of at least suspension would be a 
reasonable discipline for the misconduct in this case after weighing the competing 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
 
"The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the 
administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are 
unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal 
system, and the legal profession." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 1.1. 
We readily acknowledge Ayesh presented evidence tending to demonstrate the 
42 
 
 
 
exceptional circumstances attendant to his misconduct in the condominium litigation and 
his otherwise exemplary character. And in Ayesh's view, in recommending suspension 
and declining to recommend probation the panel placed insufficient weight on the 
personal and emotional problems contributing to the misconduct and affecting his good 
character. But there are other considerations. 
 
Admittedly, the mitigation evidence is weighty, but it is offset by significant 
aggravating factors, namely that Ayesh persisted in a pattern of misconduct involving 
many rule violations over a two-year period, despite court admonishments, warnings of 
disciplinary violations from Frobish, and court-imposed sanctions. Also, a significant 
portion of Ayesh's mitigation case appeared to be aimed at deflecting blame by putting 
Berg and Frobish's character in issue. And regardless of what other health problems 
Ayesh may have been suffering, Graham testified Ayesh is cognitively, intellectually, and 
morally fit to practice law, and that Ayesh is capable of thinking ethically. Drawing from 
Graham's conclusions, Ayesh argues to us that his professional judgment was 
compromised by his "moral feeling and tendency to go the extra mile for others in self-
defeating ways." 
 
But the sustained vitriol Ayesh participated in or unleashed on his own accord 
over such a lengthy period—at friend, foe, and neutral alike—is distressing. So is the 
dishonesty accompanying his misconduct and permeating his actions in the deeds case. A 
myopic dedication to helping others neither explains nor diminishes the pervasive lack of 
civility and candor displayed in the stipulated facts.  
 
We conclude suspension with a three-year term is the appropriate discipline. In 
arriving at this, we have considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
described above, as well as the clear and convincing evidence supporting the panel's 
findings and conclusions. That said, the court is amenable to staying the suspension after 
43 
 
 
 
the first six months so long as Ayesh adheres to a probation plan approved by the 
Disciplinary Administrator's office that extends for the remaining suspension period. And 
after successfully completing probation, or at the end of the suspension, we conclude a 
reinstatement hearing is also necessary to ensure Ayesh is capable of practicing law 
without further supervision. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mark G. Ayesh be and he is hereby suspended 
from the practice of law in the state of Kansas in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 
225(a)(3) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 275) for three years as of the date of this opinion.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above suspension will be stayed after the first six 
months provided respondent enters into a probation plan approved by the Disciplinary 
Administrator's office that extends for the remaining suspension period. Approval of a 
probation plan by that office is required before any stay can commence. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 231 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 286) (notice to clients, opposing counsel, and courts of 
record following suspension). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent comply with Supreme Court Rule 232 
(2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 287), including undergoing a reinstatement hearing after the three-
year suspension term ends. Additional conditions for reinstatement may be explored by 
the Disciplinary Administrator's office, a reinstatement panel, or the court during any 
reinstatement process. 
 
44 
 
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.