Title: People v. King
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84261
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2000

Docket No. 84261-Agenda 5-September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								DERRICK KING, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Derrick King, initiated this action for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit
court denied the defendant's amended petition without an
evidentiary hearing. Because the defendant received the death
penalty for his underlying murder conviction, the present appeal
lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	In 1981 the defendant was convicted of murder and armed
robbery and was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. The
offenses occurred when the defendant shot and killed the cashier
at a small store in Chicago during a robbery. On direct appeal, this
court affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentence.
People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514 (1986). The United States Supreme
Court denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. King
v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 872, 93 L. Ed. 2d 173, 107 S. Ct. 449 (1986).
The defendant then filed, pro se, a petition for post-conviction
relief in the circuit court of Cook County. Counsel was appointed
to represent the defendant in the proceedings. After a period of
delay, the defendant received the appointment of new counsel,
who later filed an amended post-conviction petition. Another
period of delay ensued, and a different lawyer was then appointed
to represent the defendant in the present proceedings. The circuit
court later granted the State's motion for dismissal of the
defendant's amended post-conviction petition. The defendant
brings this appeal from the order of the circuit court dismissing the
amended petition. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through
122-7 (West 1996)) provides a means by which a defendant may
challenge his conviction or sentence for violations of federal or
state constitutional rights. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377
(1997). An action seeking post-conviction relief is a collateral
proceeding, not an appeal from the underlying judgment. People
v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999); People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1995). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a
defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or
state constitutional rights in the proceedings that resulted in the
conviction or sentence being challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). Considerations of res judicata and waiver
limit the scope of post-conviction review "to constitutional matters
which have not been, and could not have been, previously
adjudicated." People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). As a
general matter, then, issues that were raised on appeal from the
underlying judgment of conviction, or that could have been raised
but were not, will not be considered in a post-conviction
proceeding. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999); People v.
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995). Guided by principles of
fundamental fairness, however, a court will relax the customary
doctrines of waiver and res judicata when appropriate. People v.
Neal, 142 Ill. 2d 140, 146 (1990).
	The defendant raised numerous claims in the post-conviction
proceedings below; defense counsel has culled through these
matters and has selected five questions for our consideration here.
The defendant first argues that the post-conviction judge erred in
refusing to allow counsel to file an addendum to the amended
post-conviction petition. The defendant's second set of lawyers
had submitted an amended petition, omitting some issues
originally raised by the defendant in the pro se petition while
adding several other issues. The addendum drafted by the
defendant's new lawyer sought to reintroduce issues that had been
contained in the defendant's original, pro se petition but had been
left out of the amended petition.
	It was well within the post-conviction court's discretion to
decide whether or not to grant leave to counsel to file the
addendum to the amended post-conviction petition. See People v.
Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 502-03 (1996) (denial of motion to file
additional documentation in support of post-conviction petition;
motion made several weeks after parties presented arguments on
State's motion to dismiss petition). We recognize that the
defendant's current lawyer came into the case at a relatively late
stage in the proceedings below, and that she is the third lawyer or
set of lawyers to represent the defendant in this matter. The post-conviction court was concerned, however, that allowing counsel
to file the addendum would only add further delay to these already
lengthy proceedings. Counsel filed the motion to submit the
addendum two years after the amended petition was filed and one
year after the motion to dismiss was filed. On this record, we
cannot say that the post-conviction judge abused his discretion in
declining to permit counsel to file the addendum to the amended
post-conviction petition.
	The defendant next raises an issue relating to his fitness at the
post-conviction proceedings. The defendant argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the amended post-conviction
petition without having conducted a hearing on the defendant's
fitness or having found the defendant competent to assist counsel.
In an order entered May 14, 1993, the circuit court granted the
defendant's motion for a stay of the proceedings pending a
determination of the defendant's mental status and a psychiatric
examination of the defendant. The record does not contain any
indication that the court later found the defendant fit in the matter,
and the defendant now argues that he was denied both due process
and the reasonable assistance of counsel in the post-conviction
proceedings because there was no formal judicial determination of
his fitness. The defendant further contends that, in the absence of
a fitness examination and a judicial determination of fitness, the
prejudicial effect of the court's denial of leave to file the
addendum to the amended post-conviction petition was manifest;
the defendant asserts that he might not have been able to assist his
second set of lawyers in the preparation of the amended petition.
	The record, however, shows that the examination ordered by
the court was conducted, and that the psychiatrist who examined
the defendant found him to be fit. While this case was pending
before this court, we allowed a motion by the State to supplement
the record with a copy of the report made by a psychiatrist at
Pontiac Correctional Center, where the defendant was
incarcerated. In the report, dated August 21, 1993, the examining
psychiatrist concluded that the defendant was fit and competent.
Although there is nothing of record to show whether or in what
manner the post-conviction court disposed of this question, we
believe that the report provides persuasive evidence of the
defendant's fitness. Too, there was no showing before the post-conviction court, in denying counsel's motion to file the
addendum, that the defendant had been unable to assist counsel in
the preparation of the amended petition. Together, these
circumstances demonstrate to us that the omission of a fitness
order from the record fails to suggest either that the defendant was
denied due process or that he was impeded in the assistance he
could provide to counsel.
	We note, moreover, that the defendant's current lawyer
apparently did not perceive any problem with the defendant's level
of functioning during the period she represented him in the
proceedings below; significantly, counsel raised no question on
her own regarding the defendant's competency, and, as she states
in her brief, she was not aware of the prior request for a fitness
hearing until she reviewed the record while preparing for this
appeal. As we explain later in this opinion, the cause must be
remanded to the circuit court for further proceeding on other
issues; if counsel believes that there then exists a further question
regarding the defendant's fitness, counsel is free to raise the
question at that time.
	The defendant next argues that the cause must be remanded
for an evidentiary hearing on his contention challenging the State's
use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks during jury
selection. The defendant's trial took place in 1981. This court
issued its opinion in the case in January 1986, and rehearing was
denied in April 1986. The United States Supreme Court decided
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712
(1986), several weeks later, and before the defendant's petition for
certiorari came before that court for consideration. The present
case was therefore pending on direct review when Batson was
decided, and Batson would be applicable to this case. See Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708
(1987).
	In support of this contention, the defendant relies on an
affidavit that was prepared by one of his trial lawyers. In the
affidavit, dated August 12, 1985, some four years after trial,
counsel stated that the defendant's jury consisted of 11 whites and
one black, that the prosecution exercised seven peremptory
challenges in the case, and that all seven challenges used by the
State were to black jurors. The affidavit does not describe the
ethnicity of the alternate jurors or the composition of the jury pool.
	The substantive issue has been waived by counsel's failure to
raise an appropriate objection during jury selection, either under
the reasoning later adopted in Batson, or under the then-existing
law expressed in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824 (1965). Both Batson and Swain required the
defense to make timely objections to the prosecutor's exclusion of
jurors (see Batson, 476 U.S.  at 99, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 89-90, 106 S.
Ct. at 1724-25; People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 409-10
(2000)), and no objection was raised in this case. Accordingly,
trial counsel waived the issue by failing to make an objection and
establish a record on which the issue could be resolved.
	The defendant makes the further argument, however, that trial
counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
preserve the issue for purposes of appeal. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant must show both a deficiency
in counsel's performance and prejudice resulting from that
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). We must reject this
contention as well. First, appellate counsel cannot be faulted for
failing to argue on appeal an issue that trial counsel had already
waived. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 412-13. Moreover, on this
record, trial counsel also cannot be deemed ineffective for failing
to preserve the issue. Under the law in effect at the time of
counsel's affidavit, it was the defendant's burden to show the
systematic exclusion of jurors in case after case. Swain, 380 U.S. 
at 226, 13 L. Ed. 2d  at 776, 85 S. Ct.  at 839. Counsel's affidavit
pertains only to the present proceeding, and does not provide any
basis on which one could conclude that the prosecution had acted
in violation of Swain. Nor do we believe that trial counsel may be
considered ineffective for failing to anticipate the ruling in Batson.
Conduct of a lawyer will not be deemed deficient for his or her
failure to make an argument that has no basis in the law. See
People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 305 (1994).
	The defendant notes, however, that counsel on direct appeal
had taken an active role in challenging race-based jury selection
processes in a number of cases, and the defendant maintains that
counsel therefore should have been particularly sensitive to the
preservation of this issue. We do not believe that appellate
counsel's special expertise in this area of the law affords the
defendant any help here, for counsel's familiarity with the issue
actually argues against the defendant's position. Counsel could
have simply believed that the present case did not give rise to a
valid question regarding the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges during jury selection, especially in view of trial
counsel's failure to preserve the issue.
	The defendant next presents an argument relating to
allegations that the defendant was mistreated while undergoing
questioning by police in this case. The defendant in this case was
interrogated at Area 2 headquarters by Detective Robert Dwyer,
while Sergeant Jon Burge was also present. On direct review, this
court upheld that trial court's determination that the defendant's
confession was given voluntarily and was not the product of
physical coercion. People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 523-26 (1986).
In his brief before this court, the defendant argues that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to introduce at trial testimony by a
witness who would have supported the defense theory that the
defendant's confession was coerced. The issue is broader than that,
however, for what the defendant really seeks is a fresh
examination of the circumstances in which he gave a confession
statement to authorities. Attached as exhibits to the defendant's
amended post-conviction petition are a number of documents
purporting to establish a history of police misconduct at Area 2
headquarters. These include a report from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation regarding mistreatment by a defendant in another
case, a report by the Chicago police department's office of
professional standards (OPS), the complaint in a federal action
against Burge and others, and the decision by the Chicago police
board dismissing Burge from his employment as a Chicago police
officer.
	This court has addressed a similar issue in People v.
Patterson, No. 82711 (August 10, 2000). In that case, defendant
also raised a number of arguments regarding counsel's failure to
present evidence that the confession in that case was the product
of coercion. The defendant in Patterson also argued that new
evidence supported the defense theory of coercion. The new
evidence presented by the defendant in that case consisted of the
OPS report cited by the present defendant, appellate court
decisions holding that Burge had tortured another suspect and was
fired for that misconduct, the discovery of 60 additional incidents
of torture occurring at Area 2, and a report by an expert concluding
that the defendant in Patterson had been tortured. This court
concluded that an evidentiary hearing was warranted on the
defendant's allegations. Patterson, slip op. at 32-38. We believe
that a similar hearing should be conducted in this case on the
defendant's allegations of police misconduct.
	In light of the new evidence included in the amended post-conviction petition, most notably the report by the OPS, we
believe that an evidentiary hearing should be conducted on this
portion of the defendant's post-conviction petition. After the
parties filed their briefs, but before oral argument was held in this
case, the defendant submitted a motion seeking a remand to the
circuit court for purposes of conducting a new suppression hearing
in this case. Given our decision to remand the cause for an
evidentiary hearing, we deny the defendant's motion.
	In his final post-conviction challenge, the defendant argues
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present certain mitigating evidence at the capital sentencing
hearing conducted in this case.
	At the second stage of the defendant's sentencing hearing, the
State presented evidence regarding the defendant's prior offenses.
In mitigation, defense counsel presented only two witnesses, and
their testimony spans fewer than 16 pages of the transcript. The
first defense witness was one of the defendant's aunts, Geneva
Jackson, who testified in general terms about the defendant's
childhood. Jackson was one of the defendant's mother's sisters,
and she stated that the defendant, while a youth, lived with her and
other relatives for varying periods of time. The witness explained
that the defendant was not able to live at home because the
defendant's mother was not stable. The witness said further that
the defendant's mother used drugs and alcohol. The second
defense witness was the defendant's mother, whose testimony was
even briefer than her sister's. She stated that she loved her son,
that the defendant's biological father was dead, that she was
divorced from her second husband, and that the defendant had
lived with a number of her sisters for extended periods of time. In
closing argument, counsel argued that three mitigating
circumstances had been established in this case: that the defendant
was young when he committed the offense, that he did not have a
substantial criminal record, and that he came from a troubled
background. Defense counsel also devoted a substantial part of his
closing argument to an attack on the death penalty law,
questioning its deterrent value and challenging its morality.
	The amended post-conviction petition alleges that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
substantial evidence in mitigation that would have supported the
defense theory at the sentencing hearing. Accompanying the
defendant's amended post-conviction petition were a number of
affidavits describing additional evidence in mitigation that defense
counsel could have presented at sentencing. These witnesses
included a mitigation specialist, Cynthia Hines, who submitted a
report documenting the defendant's troubled childhood. Other
witnesses included a number of family members and other
relatives, who further described the defendant's troubled
childhood, his close relationship with his grandmother, who died
when the defendant was 13, and his history of drug and alcohol
abuse. These witnesses stated in their affidavits that defense
counsel did not contact them prior to sentencing or ask them
whether they would testify in the defendant's behalf at the hearing.
The defendant's former stepfather, Clifford Rhymes, stated in his
affidavit that he asked defense counsel whether he could testify for
the defendant at the hearing, and counsel replied that his testimony
would not be necessary. We note that the defendant's trial
concluded on June 12, 1981; the sentencing hearing did not begin
until July 28, 1981. Thus, defense counsel still had more than
month after trial to complete their preparations for the sentencing
hearing.
	Our cases have previously recognized that evidence of a
difficult childhood is not inherently mitigating. People v. Madej,
177 Ill. 2d 116, 140 (1997); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472,
491-92 (1996). Similarly, there is nothing inherently mitigating
about evidence regarding a defendant's history of drug and alcohol
abuse. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d at 138-39; People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 160 (1996). Accordingly, counsel is not automatically
ineffective for failing to present evidence of that nature. In this
case, however, defense counsel presented evidence about the
defendant's background and argued to the sentencing judge that
the defendant's difficult and tumultuous upbringing was a
mitigating circumstance. Counsel apparently neglected, however,
to investigate and present evidence that would have added
substance to that argument and would have provided greater detail
about the defendant's childhood and upbringing. The evidence
presented by counsel showed only the broad outlines of this theory
of mitigation, and counsel apparently presented only a small
amount of the available evidence in support of this contention.
Given the allegations raised in the defendant's amended post-conviction petition and the information accompanying the petition,
we believe that an evidentiary hearing is warranted on this issue.
People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 24-28 (1989); see People v. Morgan,
187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999) (ordering new sentencing hearing, following
evidentiary hearing on allegations); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 (1992) (same).
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause
is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.