Title: Foss Methodist Church v. City of Wahpeton
Citation: 157 N.W.2d 347
Docket Number: 8465
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: February 29, 1968

157 N.W.2d 347 (1968) FOSS METHODIST CHURCH, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF WAHPETON, North Dakota, a municipal corporation, and Dean K. Bassett, as Auditor of the City of Wahpeton, Defendants and Respondents. No. 8465. Supreme Court of North Dakota. February 29, 1968. Lewis &amp; Bullis, Wahpeton, for plaintiff and appellant. Johnson, Milloy &amp; Eckert, Wahpeton, for the defendants and respondents. ERICKSTAD, Judge (on reassignment). By summons and complaint dated September 26, 1966, Foss Methodist Church brought an action against the City of Wahpeton and its auditor, seeking to have certain special assessments levied against its property set aside as being invalid or to have them reduced to the amount of the benefits derived by the church as determined by the court. It further asked the court to enjoin the City and its auditor from levying and collecting the assessments that were made. The summons and complaint were served upon the City and its auditor on October 6, 1966. The basic contentions of the complaint were that the assessments that were made against the church's property were not based upon the benefits especially received by *348 that property; that the assessments levied against the church's property exceeded the benefits received by it; that no benefits accrued to the church from the construction of the parking lots for which the assessments were made; that the method used by the City in levying the special assessments was arbitrary and contrary to law, in that the assessments were made on the basis of foot frontage instead of upon the benefit actually received by each tract included in the improvement district; and that the assessments deprived the church of its property without due process of law and thus were unconstitutional, being in violation of § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution and the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The answer served on the church on behalf of the City and its auditor on October 26, 1966, denied those allegations and asked that the complaint be dismissed, or, if the court should determine that the assessments were improper, that the court determine the proper assessments. At the commencement of the trial the parties, through their attorneys, stipulated the following: Following the trial the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered judgment in favor of the City for a dismissal of the church's complaint. The pertinent findings of the trial court were: Its conclusions which are pertinent to the issues in this case are: Judgment was entered accordingly, and it is from that judgment that the church appeals and demands a trial de novo in this court. It is apparent that the first thing we must determine in this case is the scope of our review. The church seems to take the view that the trial court's approach would have been the correct approach under the statutes as they existed in North Dakota before the enactment in 1919 of ch. 230, § 1, which is now incorporated in N.D.C.C. § 40-26-01. It states that it relies mainly for its position on Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348 (N.D.1955). It stresses that this court stated in that case that the principal special benefit conferred upon a lot by the establishment of a parking lot in its vicinity is proportionate to the need that the business conducted thereon has for a parking lot; and it asserts that the church had little or no need for the public parking lots, because on Sundays, when it had the greatest need for the use of its property, it had accessible onstreet parking, the parking facilities to the west provided by the Metropolitan Savings &amp; Loan Association, and the parking facilities to the east provided by the County in conjunction with the courthouse. It further asserts that nothing contained in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. indicates that the Court's review is in any way limited. *350 In the latest decision in which this court discussed its scope of review in special assessment proceedings, it quoted American Jurisprudence as follows: That statement is only a dictum, however, as the Court did not apply the rule. Because the special assessment commission had not acted, the Court held that any review would be premature. That the court had the power of review in special assessment proceedings before the enactment of N.D.Sess.Laws 1919, ch. 230, at least as early as 1905, and thus before Hale v. City of Minot, 52 N.D. 39, 201 N.W. 848 (1924), and other decisions cited, is clear from a reading of N.D.Sess.Laws 1905, ch. 62, § 155. The pertinent part reads: The provisions of that section of the 1905 Act are now contained in N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07, the relevant part of which reads: North Dakota Century Code. Realizing, then, that the court had the power of review in special assessment proceedings, what purpose did the legislature have in enacting N.D.Sess.Laws 1919, ch. 230? It reads: It is interesting to note what this court said in Bismarck Home Builders' Co. v. City of Bismarck, a case decided in 1924 on the basis of the laws that existed in 1917: We see from Bismarck Home Builders' Co. that the court had repeatedly refused to review the determinations of special assessment commissions and the governing bodies unless equitable grounds had existed. North Dakota Sess.Laws 1919, ch. 230, § 3, discloses a finding of the legislature that the courts were not at that time reviewing the levy and apportionment of special assessments. It is obvious that the purpose of enacting § 1 was to secure such a review. In so doing, the legislature broadened the scope of the court's review. Lest it be argued that the rule applied by the trial court as to its scope of review may have been equivalent to the one required to be applied by the trial court in reviewing a determination of an administrative agency pursuant to § 28-32-19, it is to be noted that the provisions of our Administrative Agencies Practice Act, ch. 28-32, are much different from the provisions of our special assessment statutes, chs. 40-23 and 40-26. Section 40-26-01, supported by § 40-26-07, read in the light of our trial de novo statute, § 28-27-32, would normally require, when demand for trial de novo is properly made, that we try the case anew. In this case the trial court in its memorandum opinion said: Because the trial court, relying on a rule which we find to have been abrogated by the 1919 enactment, did not determine the church's benefits and assessments, even though it thought they were too high, and because we believe that under those circumstances *352 it is desirable to the proper disposition of the case on appeal that a determination of the church's benefits and assessments be made by the trial court, we could remand this case for that purpose, pursuant to the provisions of § 28-27-29. Notwithstanding that alternative, we have decided that in the interests of accomplishing justice a new trial should be ordered in which the district court should review the proceedings and determinations of the church's special benefits and assessments in the light of the principles laid down in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348 (N.D.1955). This we do, pursuant to the authority granted this court in § 28-27-32. The judgment is therefore set aside and a new trial is hereby ordered. TEIGEN, C. J., and STRUTZ, KNUDSON and PAULSON, JJ., concur.