Title: State v. Hatfield
Citation: 213 Kan. 832, 518 P.2d 389
Docket Number: 47,163
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1974

213 Kan. 832 (1974)
518 P.2d 389
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
ZELDA HATFIELD, Appellant.
No. 47,163

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 26, 1974.
John F. Christner, of Abilene, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Gordon Davis, Jr., County Attorney, argued the cause, but filed no brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
The defendant, Zelda Hatfield, appeals from a misdemeanor conviction for obstructing legal process or official duty as defined by K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 21-3808. Defendant waived a jury trial and was tried and convicted by the court. The basis of the charge is defendant's alleged refusal to unlock the doors of her home at the request of the sheriff who was attempting to serve an order of protective custody upon defendant's fourteen year old daughter. The facts surrounding the incident are not in dispute.
On application of Linda Field, a social worker for the county welfare department, the probate court of Dickinson County, on August 11, 1972, issued an order of protective custody directing the sheriff and Linda Field to take Toni Lea Martin into custody and transport her to the State Hospital in Topeka. The order directed that Toni Lea be held in protective custody pending a hearing on an application to determine her alleged mental illness.
Sheriff Anderson, accompanied by Linda Field and another welfare worker from the county welfare department, proceeded to the Hatfield home about 10 a.m. on August 11, 1972. The sheriff testified he found no one at home, that he left and returned again at *833 10:30 a.m. The sheriff's testimony describing subsequent events is narrated in the record as follows:
The sheriff further testified that it was necessary to force both the storm door and the main door to gain entry to the house.
Mrs. Hatfield's testimony, in pertinent part, is narrated:
Linda Field testified that more than one request was made of defendant to admit the sheriff to her house, but in each instance her response was negative.
The offense was charged under 21-3808 which reads:
With respect to obstructing process in civil or misdemeanor cases the statute's predecessor, K.S.A. 21-718, defined the offense in essentially the same terms, employing the words "obstruct," "resist" or "oppose."
After hearing the evidence the trial court determined that acts of obstructing, resisting or opposing could be acts of either omissions or commissions. The court then reasoned:
The trial court mentioned that in arriving at its decision it had relied on our opinion in State v. Merrifield, 180 Kan. 267, 303 P.2d 155.
The state did not file a brief on appeal; however, the present county attorney appeared at oral argument. He explained that his predecessor in office had filed the charges and tried the case.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in finding that the acts of defendant, which were labeled as acts of omission, were sufficient to bring her conduct within the scope of the statute. Defendant also maintains the state must show that defendant had the capability to unlock the door before her refusal could be considered as conduct in violation of the statute.
As indicated, the trial court relied upon our decision in State v. Merrifield, supra. The facts in Merrifield are not analogous to the situation in the instant case, neither does the interpretation of G.S. 1949, 21-718 [now K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 21-3808], appearing in the opinion, support the conviction here. In Merrifield defendant had been arrested and was in custody. While enroute to jail the defendant persuaded the sheriff to drive by defendant's farm in order that he might turn off lights and lockup. Upon arrival at the farm, defendant went into the house, locked the door, and refused to come out on demand of the sheriff. Defendant was convicted. On appeal defendant contended that since he used no force resisting the sheriff his conviction could not stand. This court rejected defendant's contention, holding that the statute did not require direct force; and that the conduct prohibited by the statute included willful acts of obstruction or opposition.
The statute, in its present form, was considered by this court in the recent case of State v. Pruett, 213 Kan. 41, 515 P.2d 1051. In Pruett Justice Prager speaking for the court interpreted the Merrifield holding in this fashion:
In the instant case, taking the evidence most strongly against the defendant, the state has shown nothing more than that she refused to comply with the request of the sheriff to unlock the doors of her house in order that he might enter and serve a protective custody order upon her fourteen year old daughter. There is no evidence that she physically attempted to block or obstruct the sheriff's entrance nor is there any evidence of trickery or deceit on the part of defendant that in any way impeded the sheriff. In this case the storm door and main door were locked upon the sheriff's arrival. Defendant did not lock the doors and then hinder or prevent the sheriff's access by refusing to unlock as was the case in Merrifield. Moreover, there is no evidence here that defendant could have unlocked or unbarred the two dors even if she had attempted to do so.
In State v. Goering, 193 Kan. 307, 392 P.2d 930, a conviction under G.S. 1949, 21-718 [now K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 21-3808], was upheld, but the evidence revealed forceful and overt acts on the part of defendant.
In an almost identical factual situation, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Vince v. State, 113 Ga. 1070, 39 S.E. 435, was called upon to consider the Georgia prototype of K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 21-3808. The Georgia statute, like the Kansas Act, embodied the words "obstruct," "resist" or "oppose." In reversing a judgment of conviction the Georgia court held:
In the instant case, it affirmatively appears from the record that the defendant did not obstruct, resist, impede or oppose the sheriff, but, at most, simply refused to assist him in executing the process in his hands. The locked and barred doors were not defendant's doing nor is there evidence that she could have opened them or persuaded her daughter to do so.
*836 It is our conclusion that the facts established do not constitute an offense against the statute.
The judgment is reversed.