Title: Carnes v. Chesterfield County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 960352
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 1996

Present:  All the Justices 
 
W. S. CARNES, INC., ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 960352 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                       November 1, 1996 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 
 
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 
 
 
The primary issue in this appeal concerns the validity of 
two ordinances which impose a $125 increase in the fee charged 
for new residential building permits. 
 
The Home Builders Association of Richmond, Inc. (the 
Association), and W. S. Carnes, Inc., a Chesterfield County 
homebuilder (collectively, the builders), filed a motion for 
declaratory judgment against the Board of Supervisors of 
Chesterfield County (the Board), and William D. Dupler, the 
Chesterfield County Building Official.  The builders sought an 
order declaring invalid two ordinances adopted by the Board, 
which imposed a $125 increase in the permit fee charged for all 
new residential construction. 
 
In their motion for declaratory judgment, the builders  
contended that the ordinances violate (1) Code § 36-105, which 
authorizes a locality to charge building permit fees only to 
defray the cost of building code enforcement and related appeals; 
(2) Uniform Statewide Building Code
1 § 104.3, which states that 
building permit fees shall incorporate unit rates; and (3) Code 
                     
    
1The Uniform Statewide Building Code has been incorporated into 
Volume 13 of the Virginia Administrative Code (1996) at 5-60-10. 
 
 
 
 
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§ 15.1-37.3:9(B), which prohibits the direct or indirect use of 
building permit fee funds for the repair of residences damaged by 
moisture-related shrinking and swelling in soil having a high 
clay content.  
 
The builders also alleged that the ordinances violate the 
"special laws" prohibition of the Virginia Constitution.  Va. 
Const. art. IV, §§ 14 and 15.  Finally, the builders contended 
that the revenue received from the ordinances exceed the County's 
costs of building code enforcement.  The builders sought, among 
other things, entry of an order declaring the ordinances invalid. 
 
During a bench trial, Dupler testified that in 1991, the 
Board became aware that many houses in the County had cracked 
foundations caused by the use of improper construction methods 
for building in soil having a high clay content.  This type of 
soil is commonly referred to as "shrink/swell" soil.  Dupler 
stated that special construction methods are necessary for 
building in this type of soil because the soil places greater 
than normal stress on foundations, since the soil expands when 
wet and contracts when dry.  Dupler testified that the cracked 
foundations were evidence of possible violations of the Uniform 
Statewide Building Code (building code). 
 
To address this problem, the Board directed the County 
Administrator to appoint a task force to work with the Building 
Inspection Department to develop a program which became known as 
the Citizen's Assistance Program, Phase I (CAP I).  The Board 
 
 
 
 
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enacted the CAP I program in 1993. 
 
CAP I provided for an ombudsman to render "assistance to 
citizens in resolving shrink/swell soil [problems] and other 
construction related issues."  CAP I also included a provision 
authorizing the hiring of legal advisors to offer free advice to 
affected homeowners regarding their available legal remedies.  
 
Under CAP I, homeowners who suspected that their houses had 
been constructed on "shrink/swell" soil could submit applications 
requesting the County to examine their house foundations.  CAP I 
authorized the County to obtain the assistance of privately-
employed engineers to work on these requests. 
 
Dupler testified that the private engineering assistance was 
necessary because the County staff was unable to handle the large 
volume of homeowner requests for investigations.  He also stated 
that his department did not have the necessary laboratory 
facilities to analyze the soil removed from the homeowners' 
building foundation sites. 
 
Dupler further stated that, before he retained a private 
engineer to provide a foundation study of an existing house, his 
department would review the homeowner's CAP application to 
determine whether the house had foundation cracks.  If Dupler 
noted conditions indicating a potential building code violation, 
he retained a private engineer on behalf of the County to 
determine the nature and extent of foundation damage due to 
"shrink/swell" soil.  The engineer then prepared a report, for 
 
 
 
 
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the homeowner and the County, detailing the extent of damage, the 
recommended repairs, and an estimated cost of repair. 
 
Although Dupler testified that the reports frequently 
contained evidence of building code violations, he stated that 
his department had not instituted criminal enforcement actions 
because such actions would have been barred by the statute of 
limitations.  However, Dupler used the engineering reports to 
determine whether a homeowner's proposed repair plans met 
building code requirements and, thus, qualified for the issuance 
of a repair permit. 
 
The engineering assistance portion of CAP I was funded from 
the $125 increase in permit fees authorized by the ordinances.  
The ombudsman and legal advisor portions of CAP I were paid for 
out of the general fund and application fees, because these 
services were not part of the building code enforcement process.  
 
The Board later terminated CAP I and adopted a program known 
as CAP II, which was limited to providing engineering assistance 
to the Building Official.  Under CAP II, the private engineers 
hired by the County performed essentially the same functions as 
the engineers hired by the County under CAP I.  
 
The engineers' reports did not contain any repair 
specifications and, therefore, could not be used by the 
homeowners' contractors to perform the necessary repair work.  
The homeowners were required to retain engineers at their own 
expense to draw foundation repair specifications, which were 
 
 
 
 
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submitted to the County with their applications for building 
repair permits. 
 
After the Building Official issued a repair permit, the 
homeowner's contractor performed the necessary repairs using the 
homeowner's repair plan.  When the repairs were completed, the 
Building Official conducted a final inspection to determine 
whether the repairs had corrected the building code violation.  
 
Like the engineering assistance provided by CAP I, the 
engineering assistance provided by Cap II was funded by the 
Board's adoption of an ordinance which increased by $125 the fee 
charged for new residential building permits.  The balance of the 
permit fee was computed by use of a unit charge of $4.25 for each 
$1,000, or fraction thereof, of the estimated construction cost. 
 
The trial court also received evidence concerning the 
builders' contention that the total permit fees exceeded the 
actual costs necessary to enforce the building code.  Their 
allegations were based on the results of an audit of the 
Chesterfield Building Inspection Department (BID) commissioned by 
the Board.  The audit, performed by the accounting firm of 
Coopers & Lybrand in December 1992, indicated that, between 1981 
and 1992, BID's revenues exceeded its costs by almost $2,000,000. 
 
The Board presented evidence that the Coopers & Lybrand 
audit did not include the total expenditures relating to building 
code enforcement.  Specifically, Dupler, James J.L. Stegmaier, 
the County's Budget Director, and Christine Zitzow, a cost 
 
 
 
 
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accounting expert, testified that, in order to ascertain the true 
cost of building code enforcement, the enforcement-related costs 
of three other County departments needed to be added to BID's 
expenses. 
 
The three departments, Utilities, Fire, and Environmental 
Engineering, review all building plans and perform building 
inspections for the Building Official relating to building code 
requirements that are within those departments' expertise.  The 
cost of these reviews and inspections were not reflected in the 
Coopers & Lybrand audit because the audit included only BID 
budget documents.  Stegmaier testified that the revenues received 
by the County from the building permit fees, including the 
increases authorized by the fee ordinances, were less than the 
total cost of building code enforcement in 1993 and 1994. 
 
Finally, the evidence showed that the Association does not 
build houses in Chesterfield County and has not paid any building 
permit fees such as those at issue in this suit.  The Association 
is a nonstock corporation, which functions as a trade association 
and has members who are homebuilders in Chesterfield County.  
 
The trial court initially ruled that the Association had 
standing to bring this action "in a representative capacity."  
The court also sustained the County's demurrer to Count III, 
ruling that the ordinances in question were not special laws 
within the meaning of Article IV of the Virginia Constitution. 
 
The trial court granted the defendants' motion in limine to 
 
 
 
 
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exclude evidence of the Board's minutes taken at the time the 
ordinances were passed.  The court stated that, because the fee 
ordinances adopted by the Board were unambiguous, an examination 
of the Board's legislative intent was not appropriate.  After 
considering the evidence presented, the trial court held that the 
CAP ordinances were valid, and that the County did not charge 
building permit fees in excess of the cost of building code 
enforcement. 
 
On appeal, we first consider the assignment of cross error 
raised by the Board and Dupler (collectively, the County), that 
the trial court erred in ruling the Association had standing to 
bring this declaratory judgment action.  The County argues that 
the Association does not have any rights which are affected by 
the ordinances, and that the Association is not authorized by law 
to bring this action on behalf of its member builders. 
 
In response, the Association argues that, as a nonstock 
corporation which operates as a trade association for the common 
benefit of its members, the Association has standing to bring 
this suit.  The Association notes that its status as a nonstock 
corporation permits it to sue or be sued in its corporate name.  
See Code § 13.1-826.  The Association further argues that the 
declaratory judgment statutes are remedial in nature and must be 
liberally interpreted.  See Code § 8.01-191.  Thus, the 
Association asserts that it is a proper party to this declaratory 
judgment action.  We disagree with the Association. 
 
 
 
 
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A plaintiff has standing to institute a declaratory judgment 
proceeding if it has a "justiciable interest" in the subject 
matter of the proceeding, either in its own right or in a 
representative capacity.  Henrico County v. F. & W., Inc., 222 
Va. 218, 223, 278 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1981); Lynchburg Traffic 
Bureau v. Norfolk and Western Railway, 207 Va. 107, 108, 147 
S.E.2d 744, 745 (1966).  In order to have a "justiciable 
interest" in a proceeding, the plaintiff must demonstrate an 
actual controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, such 
that his rights will be affected by the outcome of the case.  See 
Code § 8.01-184; Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589, 
318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984). 
 
Here, the Association has failed to demonstrate that it has 
any rights that will be affected by the outcome of this case.  
The Association does not build houses in Chesterfield County and 
has not paid any building permit fees for new residential 
construction.  Thus, the Association has not shown that an actual 
controversy exists between it and the County. 
 
This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the 
Association purports to act in a "representative capacity" on 
behalf of its members.  An individual or entity does not acquire 
standing to sue in a representative capacity by asserting the 
rights of another, unless authorized by statute to do so.  See, 
e.g., Code §§ 8.01-69, 20-88.45, 37.1-141.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the 
 
 
 
 
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Association had standing to bring this action.  Nevertheless, 
since W. S. Carnes, Inc. (Carnes) paid several building permit 
fee surcharges to Chesterfield County, the present action remains 
viable based on the controversy existing between Carnes and the 
County.  See Cupp, 227 Va. at 589-90, 318 S.E.2d at 411. 
 
We next consider Carnes's argument that the trial court 
erred in sustaining the County's demurrer to Count III of the 
motion for judgment, which alleged that the fee ordinances 
violate "the prohibition against special laws contained in 
Article IV, Sections 14 and 15, of the Constitution of Virginia." 
 Carnes argues that the issue whether the ordinances were special 
laws was a matter for proof at trial, not susceptible of 
disposition as a matter of law.  We disagree. 
 
A demurrer will be sustained if the pleading, considered in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails to state a valid 
cause of action.  See Luckett v. Jennings, 246 Va. 303, 307, 435 
S.E.2d 400, 402 (1993); Hop-In Food Stores, Inc. v. Serv-N-Save, 
Inc., 237 Va. 206, 209, 375 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1989).  A demurrer 
tests only the legal sufficiency of a pleading, not matters of 
proof.  Luckett, 246 Va. at 307, 435 S.E.2d at 402; Cox Cable 
Hampton Rds., Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 402-03, 410 
S.E.2d 652, 656 (1991).  The facts admitted on demurrer are those 
expressly alleged in the motion for judgment, those which fairly 
can be viewed as impliedly alleged, and those which can be 
reasonably inferred from the facts alleged.  Rosillo v. Winters, 
 
 
 
 
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235 Va. 268, 270, 367 S.E.2d 717, 717 (1988). 
 
We conclude that the trial court properly sustained the 
County's demurrer, because the fee ordinances are general, rather 
than special, laws.
2  "A law is general though it may immediately 
affect a small number of persons, places or things, provided, 
under named conditions and circumstances, it operates alike on 
all who measure up to its requirements."  Bray v. County Board, 
195 Va. 31, 36, 77 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1953) (quoting Gandy v. 
Elizabeth City County, 179 Va. 340, 344, 19 S.E.2d 97, 99 
(1942)).  By contrast, a law is "special" in a constitutional 
sense when it contains an inherent limitation that arbitrarily 
separates some persons, places, or things from those on which, 
without such separation, it would also operate.  Id. at 36-37, 77 
S.E.2d at 482. 
 
Here, the fee ordinances are general laws because, by their 
plain wording, they operate alike on any individual or entity who 
obtains a building permit for new residential construction.  This 
result is not changed by Carnes's allegation in Count III that 
the underlying purpose of the fee ordinances was to benefit 
County residents who had sustained certain damage to their homes. 
 The alleged purpose of the fee ordinances cannot change their 
                     
    
2Based on this conclusion, we do not reach the issue whether 
Va. Const. art. IV, §§ 14-15, is applicable to the passage of 
local ordinances. 
 
 
 
 
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content or effect. 
 
Carnes next argues that the trial court erred in granting 
the Board's motion in limine and in excluding from evidence all 
minutes of the Board meetings, except actual motions, 
resolutions, ordinances, and the votes cast on those items.  
Carnes contends that the excluded minutes would have provided "a 
clearer understanding of the purpose and the intent" of the 
ordinances. 
 
We conclude that the trial court properly excluded the 
proffered evidence of the Board's minutes.  Generally, evidence 
of the Board's intent or motive in enacting ordinances is 
irrelevant to our consideration whether they are valid laws.  As 
this Court stated in Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 
49 S.E.2d 321 (1948), 
 
[c]ourts are not concerned with the motives which 
actuate members of a legislative body in enacting a 
law, but in the results of their action.  Bad motives 
might inspire a law which appeared on its face and 
proved valid and beneficial, while a bad and invalid 
law might be, and sometimes is, passed with good intent 
and the best of motives. 
 
Id. at 105, 49 S.E.2d at 325 (citations omitted). 
 
We next consider Carnes's arguments that the fee ordinances 
are invalid.  The trial court's rulings were based on its 
application of the evidence to the three statutes cited by 
Carnes.  Under Code § 8.01-680, the trial court's judgment will 
not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the 
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  
 
 
 
 
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Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 
627, 630 (1992).  Since the trial court heard the evidence ore 
tenus, its factual findings are entitled to the same weight as a 
jury's verdict.  RF&P Corporation v. Little, 247 Va. 309, 319, 
440 S.E.2d 908, 915 (1994).  Thus, on appeal we examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the County, the 
prevailing party at trial, and determine whether the evidence 
supports the trial court's decision.  See Ravenwood Towers, Inc., 
244 Va. at 57, 419 S.E.2d at 630. 
 
Carnes first contends that the fee ordinances violate Code 
§ 36-105, which provides, in relevant part, that "[building 
permit] [f]ees may be levied by the local governing body in order 
to defray the cost of [building code] enforcement and appeals."  
During oral argument in this case, Carnes contended that such 
enforcement is limited to the criminal prosecution and appeal of 
building code violations.  We disagree. 
 
The Building Official has many duties, only one of which is 
to prosecute building code violations under USBC § 112.3.  The 
Building Official is also charged with responsibility for 
examining all plans and applications for building permits (USBC 
§ 105.6), issuing permits when satisfied that the proposed work 
conforms to building code requirements (USBC § 109.1), and 
conducting inspections to ensure compliance with the building 
code (USBC § 110.1).  Under USBC § 103.3, the Building Official 
may delegate these duties and powers. 
 
 
 
 
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Here, the evidence showed that the engineering assistance 
funded by the fee ordinances was necessary to enable the Building 
Official to perform these enforcement-related duties.  The 
ombudsman and legal services provided under CAP I also did not 
violate Code § 36-105 because those services were paid for out of 
the general fund, rather than from the permit fee increases.  
Thus, the trial court's finding that the fee ordinances do not 
violate Code § 36-105 is supported by the evidence. 
 
We next hold that the record supports the trial court's 
finding that the fee ordinances do not violate USBC § 104.3, 
which provides, in relevant part, that "local government[s] shall 
establish a [building permit] fee schedule.  The schedule shall 
incorporate unit rates which may be based on square footage, 
cubic footage, cost of construction or other appropriate 
criteria."  The evidence showed that the County's building permit 
fees incorporate both the $125 flat fee and a unit rate of $4.25 
for each one thousand dollars of estimated construction cost.  
This provision complies with USBC § 104.3, because that section 
requires only that the fee schedule incorporate unit rates, not 
that it be based exclusively on unit rates. 
 
We also conclude that the record supports the trial court's 
finding that the fee ordinances do not violate Code § 15.1-
37.3:9(B), which permits a local governing body to enact an 
ordinance authorizing the use of public funds to repair 
foundation failures caused by "shrink/swell" soil.  The statute 
 
 
 
 
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provides that public funds expended for this purpose shall be 
derived only from tax revenues from real and personal property, 
not from any special fee, assessment, or other tax or charge.  
The statute also states that localities "may not use fees 
collected for building permits . . . directly or indirectly, for 
purposes authorized under this subsection." 
 
The evidence showed that the engineering reports funded by 
the permit fees under the CAP programs were not used to repair 
foundation failures, but were used to help the Building Official 
ascertain building code compliance during the various stages of 
the homeowners' repair efforts.  Thus, the expended funds were 
not used, directly or indirectly, for purposes prohibited by Code 
§ 15.1-37.3:9(B).
3
 
Carnes next contends that the trial court erred in finding 
that the building permit fees did not exceed the cost of building 
code enforcement and appeals.  Carnes relies on the results of 
the audit conducted by Coopers & Lybrand in support of its 
position.  We disagree with Carnes's contention. 
 
As stated above, the Coopers & Lybrand audit did not include 
 
    
3Based on this conclusion, we need not address Carnes's 
argument that, prior to the enactment of Code § 15.1-37.3:9(B) in 
July 1993, a local governing body did not have the authority to 
expend public funds to repair existing foundations damaged due to 
"shrink/swell" soil. 
 
 
 
 
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all costs of building code enforcement, nor did the audit cover 
the time frame in which the CAP programs operated.  Additionally, 
Stegmaier's testimony showed that building code enforcement costs 
for the years 1993 and 1994 had exceeded the building permit fees 
collected in those years.  Thus, we hold that the evidence 
supports the trial court's ruling that the expenditures funded by 
the fee ordinances were rationally related to the cost of 
building code enforcement. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm in part, and reverse in 
part, the trial court's judgment and enter final judgment in 
favor of the County. 
                                              Affirmed in part,
                                              reversed in part,
 
and final judgment.