Title: Kansas City Star Co. v. Fossey
Citation: 230 Kan. 240, 630 P.2d 1176
Docket Number: 53,196
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 1981

230 Kan. 240 (1981)
630 P.2d 1176
THE KANSAS CITY STAR COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
THE HONORABLE LEIGHTON A. FOSSEY, Associate District Judge, District Court of Miami County, Kansas, Respondent.
No. 53,196

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 17, 1981.
Myron S. Silverman, of Gage &amp; Tucker, of Kansas City, Missouri, Scott Whiteside, of Kansas City, Missouri, and Carl W. Hartley, of Rinehart, Bright &amp; Hartley, of Paola, were on the pleadings and briefs for the petitioner.
Dan Biles, assistant attorney general, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, were on the pleadings and briefs for the respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRAGER, J.:
This is an original action in mandamus filed by the Kansas City Star Company to compel the Honorable Leighton A. Fossey, Associate District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, to allow petitioner access to certain criminal proceedings in the case of State of Kansas v. James M. Crumm, and all future criminal proceedings which the respondent may order closed. The petition for a writ of mandamus was filed on May 1, 1981. This court on May 7, 1981, directed the respondent, Judge Fossey, to respond to the petition. The attorney general appeared on behalf of respondent and filed an entry of appearance and a motion to dismiss the petition for mandamus. The essential facts in the case are not in dispute. They are either admitted by the parties or contained in transcripts of proceedings in the district court held on April 27 and 28, 1981.
The case of State of Kansas v. James M. Crumm arose from a *241 homicide which occurred on April 17, 1980, in a secluded area of Miami County. James M. Crumm, a juvenile, was certified as an adult and charged with the first-degree murder of his thirteen-year-old stepbrother, Christen Andrea Hobson. Another juvenile, Paul Sorrentino, was also jointly charged with the killing. A great amount of news media publicity developed as a result of the case. The case proceeded to trial in Miami County and James M. Crumm was convicted of first-degree murder. The trial caused a great deal of interest in Miami County, since it was the first murder trial in at least eight years for this rural county.
The preliminary hearing in the case was held in February of 1981. During the course of the preliminary hearing, a motion was made by the defense to close the preliminary hearing to the press and public while the court considered a suppression motion made with regard to defendant's confessions. The Kansas City Star Company immediately filed an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the motion for closure. The motion for closure was argued and all parties, including the Kansas City Star Company, were given an opportunity to be heard. Judge Stephen D. Hill, who heard the motion, overruled defendant's motion to close that portion of the preliminary hearing. Judge Hill, in substance, found that the defendant had failed to make a satisfactory showing that there was a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced if closure was denied. The preliminary hearing was then conducted in open court and, at the close of that proceeding, James M. Crumm was bound over for trial on the charge of murder in the first degree.
On April 27, 1981, the trial of James M. Crumm was commenced. A jury was selected but, prior to the swearing in of the jury, the respondent, Judge Fossey, on his own motion stated that he desired to conduct a Jackson v. Denno suppression hearing concerning the voluntary nature of two incriminating statements made by Crumm to the police. Earlier, on April 22, 1981, defense counsel had specifically waived any Jackson v. Denno hearing concerning these statements. That waiver was reaffirmed by the defense on April 27, 1981.
After the judge made known his intention to call a Jackson v. Denno hearing on his own motion, a discussion in open court was held between the judge and counsel concerning the closing of the suppression hearing. The judge indicated his desire to close the *242 hearing to the public. Defense counsel concurred. Three reporters stood and identified themselves at this time. An objection to the closing was raised by Liz Reardon, a reporter for the Kansas City Times. She read a statement previously prepared by her employer for just such a purpose. The statement contained the newspaper's request for a hearing on the closure issue and then summarized legal arguments outlining the legal standards for closing a criminal proceeding as viewed by the newspaper. The basis of petitioner's argument was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
In response to the statement read by Ms. Reardon, counsel for the defendant pointed out that the same issue had previously been raised at the preliminary hearing before Judge Stephen D. Hill and that the respective positions of the parties and the news media had already been presented. In addition, defense counsel suggested that the proceedings then before the court differed materially from the prior hearing, in that the case was now at the trial stage. He pointed out that a jury had already been impaneled, that the newspaper and television media were present and were going to be talking about the case, and that there was a substantial danger of publicity prejudicial to the defendant until such time as the validity and admissibility of the two confessions could be determined. Defense counsel also suggested that it would be highly prejudicial to the defendant to continue the trial and to spend further time on a hearing to determine the issue of closure.
Following the arguments, Judge Fossey stated for the record:
All persons, except court personnel, were required to leave the courtroom at that time.
Following this ruling, the courtroom was closed and the suppression hearing was conducted. A transcript of the suppression hearing has been filed with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts and has been considered by this court. Only two witnesses were called. Both were police officers. One of the witnesses, a detective *243 with the Overland Park police department, testified as to an inculpatory statement taken from James Crumm on May 3, 1980. The other witness, a deputy sheriff of the Miami County sheriff's department, testified as to an inculpatory statement taken from James Crumm on May 4, 1980. Following the introduction of this testimony, Judge Fossey ruled that the two confessions would be admitted into evidence at the trial. In addition, the court stated in the record that members of the press would be able to be present in the courtroom and hear matters of evidence but that he would not permit the press to read the confessions prior to their introduction at the trial. The reason for this ruling was that the reporters were looking for news, a jury had already been impaneled, and the judge did not want the jury exposed to any more publicity than necessary.
On the following day, April 28, 1981, the Kansas City Star Company filed a motion to intervene to present a motion to vacate the closure order and for a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the Jackson v. Denno suppression hearing conducted the previous day. After hearing the arguments of the amicus curiae, Kansas City Star Company, and of defense counsel, the judge denied the motion to vacate his original closure order. The judge did, however, sustain the motion of the Kansas City Star Company for a copy of the transcript of the suppression hearing when the transcript was prepared by the reporter. Copies of the transcript taken during the suppression hearing were later prepared. A copy was subsequently filed with the Clerk of the Miami District Court and is a part of the public record in the case of State v. Crumm. A copy of this transcript was also filed with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts as a part of the record in this action.
On April 27, 1981, the case of State v. Crumm proceeded to trial, resulting in a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder on May 1, 1981. On the same day, the Kansas City Star Company filed this original proceeding in mandamus in the Supreme Court. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for mandamus, raising the following four issues:
(1) The instant case is moot;
We have carefully considered the petition in mandamus and the motion to dismiss filed in response thereto. We have determined that there is no issue of fact presented in the case and that the public interest justifies the court in considering the case on its merits. On occasions, this court, when confronted with significant issues of statewide concern, has broadened the availability of mandamus in order to expeditiously resolve such issues. Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 227 Kan. 676, 608 P.2d 972 (1980). In Stephens, we held that mandamus may properly be used to expedite the official business of state officials in the discharge of their duties, where the issues are of significant statewide concern of a recurring and ongoing nature, and the essential purpose of the proceeding is to obtain an expeditious, authoritative interpretation of the law. On the basis of Stephens, we find that mandamus is an appropriate remedy in this case.
The respondent has raised the issue that the case is moot because the trial of State v. Crumm has been completed in the district court. The suppression hearing, closed to the public and press, was conducted and completed by the district judge on April 27, 1981. A copy of the transcript of that suppression hearing has been made available to the news media. It is true that, technically, the case is moot. We hold, however, that the case is not so moot as to preclude review by this court since it can reasonably be expected that the petitioner in this case would be objecting to similar closure orders entered by other district courts in other cases. In view of petitioner's newspaper coverage in the state, the underlying dispute between the parties is one capable of repetition, yet evading review. We thus decline to dismiss the writ of mandamus on the basis of mootness. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980); Reece Shirley &amp; Ron's Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Union &amp; Local 782, 225 Kan. 470, 592 P.2d 433 (1979).
In our judgment, the validity of the decision of Judge Fossey closing the suppression hearing is controlled by Gannett Co. v. *245 DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, rather than by Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia. Gannett involved a pretrial suppression hearing. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., involved the closing of a portion of the actual trial of a criminal case being presented on its merits before a jury. This case is somewhat unique, since the suppression hearing was conducted by the trial court after the jury was impaneled but before the jury was sworn. However, all of the evidence offered by the State and by the defense was presented to the jury in a hearing fully open to the public and to the news media. Thus, the public and the reporters for the petitioner, Kansas City Star Company, had a full opportunity to hear every bit of evidence presented by the prosecution and defense which was considered by the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of James M. Crumm, including the two confessions which were the subject of the suppression hearing.
K.S.A. 22-3215 provides as follows:
It is important to note that K.S.A. 22-3215 contemplates that, in the usual situation, a motion to suppress as evidence a confession or admission shall be made before the preliminary examination or trial unless opportunity did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the ground for the motion. Under subsection (6), however, a trial court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial.
It is well recognized that adverse publicity can endanger the *246 ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial. Where a motion to suppress is heard prior to or shortly after the preliminary hearing and there may be adverse publicity at that time, the prejudicial effect of such publicity often abates between the time of the preliminary hearing and the time the case is actually set for trial. Where, however, a hearing on a motion to suppress is held on the day of the trial after a jury has been selected and the jurors are in the courthouse, a greater danger exists that disclosure of evidence at the suppression hearing will prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial. At that point, the members of the jury, called to try the particular case, are more susceptible to influence from the publicity. A defendant's right to a fair trial may be seriously prejudiced where an inadmissible confession of the defendant is brought to the jurors' attention by media publicity.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.  at 378-79, the following statement is made in the opinion by Justice Stewart:
Thus, Gannett specifically sanctions a closure decision of a trial court, when closure is necessary to insure a fair trial for the defendant.
*247 The petitioner urges that the respondent's closure order constituted a violation of petitioner's right of freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by restricting access to information which would have been available to petitioner had its reporter been able to attend the suppression hearing. It should be noted in this regard that the petitioner does not occupy a special status distinct from that of the general public. The petitioner's right to be present is derived from its status as a member of the public. Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 54 (Hawaii 1978); Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S.  at 578.
In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion on the subject of "fair trial and free press" and the right of the public and news media to attend court proceedings. There is almost universal agreement among the courts and writers who have considered the issue that access to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional circumstances. It has been said that the reason for requiring all court proceedings to be open, except where extraordinary reasons for closure are present, is to enhance the public trust and confidence in the judicial process and to insulate the process against attempts to use the courts as tools for persecution. The problem, of course, is to establish criteria or standards to guide a trial court in the exercise of its discretion in determining whether or not a closure order should be made.
There are no prior decisions of this court setting standards in this area as a guide to the Kansas trial courts. In our judgment, the standard adopted August, 1978, by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice represents the most acceptable approach to the right-of-access problem. Specifically, we refer to Fair Trial and Free Press: Standard 8-3.2 which provides as follows:
The commentary of the standards committee (2d ed. Tentative Draft) following Standard 8-3.2 discusses in some detail the purpose of the standard and the sometimes conflicting interests of the accused, the public, and news media. It suggests certain procedural alternatives which should be considered by a trial court in determining the closure issue. The commentary states:
*250 To insure compliance with this standard, a record of the hearing where the issue of closure is determined should be prepared. In making a decision of either closure or nonclosure, the trial judge should make findings and state for the record the evidence upon which the court relied and the factors which the court considered in arriving at its decision. Such a procedure will protect both the right of the defendant to a fair trial and the right of the public and news media to have access to court proceedings.
In the case now before us, the respondent conducted a hearing on the record and made rather cursory findings in support of his decision for closure of the suppression hearing. We must recognize, however, that when the closure decision was made, there were no existing standards to guide the court. We cannot say that Judge Fossey abused his discretion in ordering a closure of the suppression hearing in this case after considering the evidentiary record before us.
Following the impaneling of the jury, but before the jury was sworn, Judge Fossey, in his discretion, determined that there should be an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of Crumm's two confessions. Although the confessions had been introduced at the preliminary hearing, they had not yet come to the attention of the twelve persons selected to serve as a trial jury in the Crumm case. It is clear that the statements were particularly incriminating to the defendant. Voir dire of the potential jurors had already been completed, and the selected jurors excused before the issue of closure of the hearing arose. The trial court was cognizant of the considerable pretrial publicity that had arisen in this unusual murder case. Apparently, there are no adequate facilities to sequester the jury available at the Miami County courthouse. When the possibility of closure was raised by Judge Fossey in open court, a representative of the Kansas City Star Company was given an opportunity to argue its position.
The trial court found that closure was justified, pointing out (1) the nature of the special hearing was strictly to determine whether any confession made by the defendant was to be admitted into evidence; (2) a jury had already been selected; (3) there was considerable publicity concerning the case already; and (4) the possibility existed the jury might be influenced by a report on this special hearing despite the judge's admonition to the jurors *251 concerning news media accounts. We further note that there is no evidence that the State objected to the closure order. The following day, attorneys for the petitioner were permitted to intervene in the action, and to argue the motion to vacate the closure order. The court ordered that a complete transcript of the suppression hearing be made available to the petitioner. No other portion of the criminal proceedings in State v. James C. Crumm was closed to the public and the press. On the basis of these undisputed facts, we find that the respondent, Judge Fossey, did not abuse his discretion either in refusing to continue the suppression hearing until a separate hearing on the closure issue could be scheduled or in ordering closure of the suppression hearing. As to future closure determinations, this court has, by this opinion, adopted Fair Trial and Free Press Standard 8-3.2 which will govern the closure issue in future cases.
For the reasons set forth above, it is the judgment of the court that the petition for a writ of mandamus be denied.