Title: Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13070
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2021

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SJC-13070 
 
PAMELA LARAMIE1  vs.  PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 3, 2021. - September 15, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & 
Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Tobacco.  Wrongful Death.  Warranty.  Wilful, Wanton, or 
Reckless Conduct.  Damages, Wrongful death, Punitive, 
Breach of warranty.  Collateral Estoppel.  Res Judicata.  
Practice, Civil, Wrongful death, New trial, Hearsay, 
Instructions to jury, Argument by counsel.  Evidence, 
Relevancy and materiality, Hearsay. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 17, 2017. 
 
 
The case was tried before Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
William J. Trach for the defendant. 
 
Celene H. Humphries, of Florida, for the plaintiff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & William W. Porter, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General. 
 
1 Individually, and as personal representative of the estate 
of Fred R. Laramie. 
2 
 
 
Traci L. Lovitt, Christopher M. Morrison, & Kate Wallace, 
for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
 
Holly M. Polglase & Peter C. Netburn for Product Liability 
Advisory Council, Inc., & another. 
 
Andrew Rainer & Meredith Lever for Public Health Advocacy 
Institute. 
 
Douglas S. Brooks for Washington Legal Foundation. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  In this case, we consider whether a 1998 
settlement agreement between Philip Morris USA Inc. (Philip 
Morris) and the Attorney General precludes recovery of punitive 
damages against Philip Morris under the wrongful death statute, 
G. L. c. 229, § 2, for claims brought by the widow of a smoker 
who died from lung cancer after decades of smoking Philip Morris 
cigarettes.  In 1995, the Attorney General filed a complaint 
against Philip Morris and other manufacturers of tobacco 
products and tobacco research institutes in the Superior Court, 
alleging, inter alia, that the companies had engaged in a 
conspiracy to mislead the Commonwealth and its citizens 
concerning the health risks of smoking.  The Attorney General 
sought to recover the Commonwealth's costs for providing 
smoking-related medical assistance to Massachusetts residents 
under the Commonwealth's Medicaid and CommonHealth programs, see 
G. L. c. 118E, as well as injunctive relief, civil penalties, 
and punitive damages pursuant to the consumer protection act, 
G. L. c. 93A.  The Attorney General asked that the companies be 
ordered to pay restitution and fund smoking cessation programs 
3 
 
and public information campaigns.  The parties settled the case 
in 1998, as part of a nationwide settlement. 
Nearly two decades later, in 2017, the plaintiff sued 
Philip Morris, pursuant to the wrongful death statute, G. L. 
c. 229, § 2; the plaintiff claimed that Philip Morris caused her 
husband's death in 2016 by, inter alia, selling defective and 
unreasonably dangerous cigarettes to him beginning in 1970.  A 
jury awarded the plaintiff $11 million in compensatory damages 
and $10 million in punitive damages.  On appeal, Philip Morris 
argues that while the 1998 settlement had no effect on the 
plaintiff's wrongful death claim insofar as it sought 
compensatory damages, the settlement precluded the plaintiff's 
recovery of punitive damages. 
 
As the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply in these 
circumstances, we disagree.  Because Philip Morris was not 
prejudiced by the other asserted errors at trial, we affirm the 
judgment.2 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the relevant facts in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.  See Linkage Corp. v. Trustees 
of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 4, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General and Public Health Advisory Institute in support of the 
plaintiff; Washington Legal Foundation, Product Liability 
Advisory Counsel, Inc., and Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America, in support of the defendant; and R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
4 
 
(1997) (facts are recited in light most favorable to party for 
whom jury found). 
In the summer of 1970, when Fred Laramie was thirteen years 
old, he smoked his first cigarette; a salesman had handed him a 
free sample pack of Marlboro cigarettes, a Philip Morris brand.  
Within a year, Laramie was smoking every day.  One or two years 
later, he was smoking a pack per day.  Laramie smoked Marlboro 
cigarettes for much of the rest of his life.  In December 2016, 
when he was fifty-nine years old, he died of lung cancer. 
In July 2017, the plaintiff, Laramie's wife, brought a 
civil action against Philip Morris3 pursuant to the wrongful 
death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2.  She alleged, among other 
things, that Philip Morris had committed a breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability by manufacturing, selling, and 
distributing defectively designed cigarettes, and thereby 
causing Laramie's death.4 
At trial, the plaintiff demonstrated that Marlboro 
cigarettes were defective and unreasonably dangerous to a person 
who was not yet addicted to smoking.  The plaintiff's expert 
 
3 The plaintiff also filed claims against a distributor of 
cigarettes and a retail store; she voluntarily dismissed those 
claims prior to trial. 
 
4 The plaintiff also brought claims against Philip Morris 
for civil conspiracy and negligence.  She dismissed the civil 
conspiracy claim prior to trial, and the jury found for Philip 
Morris on the negligence claim. 
5 
 
testified that Marlboro cigarettes were "highly engineered" to 
deliver nicotine and sustain addiction, that repeatedly smoking 
Marlboro cigarettes caused lung cancer, and that it would have 
been feasible for Philip Morris to create a safer, nonaddictive 
alternative. 
The same expert testified that at the time Laramie began 
smoking in 1970, the public perceived smoking to be "desirable, 
socially acceptable, [and] pleasurable."  This perception, 
according to the expert, was attributable largely to "pervasive" 
advertising by Philip Morris and the cigarette industry.  
Through testimony and documentary evidence, the plaintiff showed 
that Philip Morris had engaged in a sophisticated public 
relations campaign to foster doubt about the reported risks of 
smoking, and to assure the public that smoking was safe, while, 
internally, it understood the dangerousness and addictiveness of 
its cigarettes. 
The evidence showed that Laramie was addicted to the 
nicotine in Marlboro cigarettes, and that once he was addicted, 
smoking became a "need" rather than a "choice."  Although 
Laramie tried to quit smoking many times, he was unable to do 
so, until he was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2016.  He died 
less than seven months thereafter. 
In its defense, Philip Morris introduced evidence that 
there was no adequate, safer alternative design for Marlboro 
6 
 
cigarettes.  An expert for Philip Morris testified that all 
cigarettes are dangerous, and that any proposed alternative 
design was not safer, not acceptable to consumers, or not 
technologically feasible.  Philip Morris maintained that 
Marlboro cigarettes were not unreasonably dangerous to Laramie 
because Laramie understood the risks of smoking.  Reports 
linking smoking to cancer had been published in the 1950s and 
1960s, and people had recognized that tobacco was addictive 
"going back almost [one hundred] years."  Moreover, there was 
testimony that every pack of Marlboro cigarettes sold between 
1970 and 1984 contained a warning label from the Surgeon General 
that "cigarette smoking is dangerous to your health," and that 
every pack sold thereafter contained one of four warning labels 
that are still in use.  Cigarette advertisements also were 
banned from television and radio beginning in January 1971, when 
Laramie was thirteen or fourteen years old.  In addition, since 
January 1972, every print advertisement for cigarettes has been 
required to include a warning label similar to those on 
cigarette packs.  In sum, based on this evidence, Philip Morris 
argued that Laramie caused his own death because, despite being 
adequately informed of the health risks of smoking, Laramie 
chose to smoke, and then chose not to quit smoking. 
The jury found for the plaintiff on the breach of warranty 
claim and awarded her $11 million in compensatory damages and 
7 
 
$10 million in punitive damages.  After Philip Morris's motion 
for a new trial was denied, it appealed to the Appeals Court, 
and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Philip Morris argues that the plaintiff is 
barred from recovering punitive damages because of the prior 
action resulting in the 1998 settlement agreement between it and 
the Attorney General.  Philip Morris also contends that a new 
trial is required due to two evidentiary rulings, an asserted 
error in the jury instructions, and several alleged improper 
statements in the plaintiff's closing argument.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
a.  The prior action and the 1998 settlement.  In 1995, the 
Attorney General, "on behalf of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts including without limitation its Division of 
Medical Assistance," sued Philip Morris and other manufacturers 
of tobacco products, and certain tobacco research institutes.  
The Attorney General argued that the companies successfully had 
conspired to "mislead, deceive and confuse" the Commonwealth and 
its citizens regarding the health risks of smoking and the 
addictive qualities of nicotine.  The Attorney General asserted 
multiple causes of action arising from this conspiracy, 
including fraud, breach of warranty, and violations of the 
consumer protection act, G. L. c. 93A.  The Attorney General 
sought to recover the "millions of dollars" in costs the 
8 
 
Commonwealth had to spend each year to "provide medical and 
related services for Massachusetts citizens suffering from 
diseases caused by cigarette smoking," and also sought 
declaratory and equitable relief, civil penalties under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 4, and treble damages under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.  The 
complaint asserted that the Attorney General had reason to 
believe that proceedings under G. L. c. 93A, § 4, would be in 
the public interest. 
Around the same time, all fifty States, the District of 
Columbia, and five territories brought similar claims against 
Philip Morris and other manufacturers of tobacco products.  See 
Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 174 (2004).  In 1998, most 
of those jurisdictions, including the Commonwealth, entered into 
a master settlement agreement with the companies. 
In exchange for monetary and injunctive relief,5 the 
settling States released the companies from liability for all 
"Released Claims" of "Releasing Parties."  The agreement defined 
"Released Claims" as "Claims" for "past conduct . . . in any way 
 
5 The defendants agreed to pay approximately $240 billion to 
the settling States over twenty-five years, and to pay 
approximately $9 billion per year thereafter in perpetuity, 
subject to various adjustments.  The agreement allocated 
approximately four percent of those payments to the 
Commonwealth.  The defendants also agreed to restrict cigarette 
advertising and lobbying efforts, to permit public access to 
certain internal documents, and to fund youth education 
programs. 
9 
 
related . . . to (A) the use, sale, distribution, manufacture, 
development, advertising, marketing or health effects of, (B) 
the exposure to, or (C) research, statements, or warnings 
regarding Tobacco Products."  In turn, "Claims" was defined as 
"liabilities of any nature including civil penalties and 
punitive damages . . . accrued or unaccrued, whether legal, 
equitable, or statutory."  The agreement defined "Releasing 
Parties" to include "each Settling State" as well as, inter 
alia, "persons or entities acting in a parens patriae, 
sovereign, quasi-sovereign, private attorney general, . . . or 
any other capacity . . . (A) to the extent that any such person 
or entity is seeking relief on behalf of or generally applicable 
to the general public . . . as opposed solely to private or 
individual relief for separate and distinct injuries."  Thus, 
the agreement released Philip Morris from liability for punitive 
damages to persons acting as private attorneys general seeking 
relief on behalf of the general public, but preserved claims for 
individual relief for separate and distinct injuries. 
 
In December 1998, a judge of the Superior Court approved 
the agreement and entered a "Consent Decree and Final Judgment," 
which provided, "The Agreement, [and] the settlement set forth 
therein . . . are hereby approved in all respects, and all 
claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice as provided therein." 
10 
 
 
b.  Claim preclusion.  Philip Morris maintains that the 
doctrine of claim preclusion bars the plaintiff from pursuing 
punitive damages for her husband's wrongful death.6  We review 
this question de novo.  See DeGiacomo v. Quincy, 476 Mass. 38, 
41 (2016). 
 
"Claim preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive 
on the parties and their privies, and prevents relitigation of 
all matters that were or could have been adjudicated in the 
action" (citation omitted).  O'Neill v. City Manager of 
Cambridge, 428 Mass. 257, 259 (1998).  "The doctrine is a 
ramification of the policy considerations that underlie the rule 
against splitting a cause of action, and is 'based on the idea 
that the party to be precluded has had the incentive and 
opportunity to litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit.'"  
Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 24 (1988), quoting Foster v. 
Evans, 384 Mass. 687, 696 n.10 (1981).  "Considerations of 
fairness and the requirements of efficient judicial 
administration dictate that an opposing party in a particular 
action as well as the court is entitled to be free from 
 
6 In motions for partial summary judgment and for a directed 
verdict, Philip Morris argued that claim preclusion barred the 
plaintiff from recovering punitive damages.  A Superior Court 
judge denied the motion for partial summary judgment.  At trial, 
a different Superior Court judge denied the motion for a 
directed verdict. 
11 
 
continuing attempts to relitigate the same claim."  Wright Mach. 
Corp. v. Seaman-Andwall Corp., 364 Mass. 683, 688 (1974). 
Three elements must be established to show claim 
preclusion:  "(1) the identity or privity of the parties to the 
present and prior actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, 
and (3) prior final judgment on the merits."  DaLuz v. 
Department of Correction, 434 Mass. 40, 45 (2001), quoting 
Franklin v. North Weymouth Coop. Bank, 283 Mass. 275, 280 
(1933).  As the party invoking claim preclusion, Philip Morris 
bears the burden of proving that each element has been met.  See 
Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 416-417 
(2007).  The parties do not dispute that the consent decree 
constitutes a prior final judgment on the merits.  See Kelton 
Corp. v. County of Worcester, 426 Mass. 355, 359 (1997).  Their 
dispute centers on the other two elements. 
i.  Identity or privity of the parties.  Philip Morris 
contends that the plaintiff stands in privity with the Attorney 
General with respect to their requests for punitive damages.  
Privity "represents a legal conclusion that the relationship 
between the one who is a party on the record and the non-party 
is sufficiently close to afford application of the principle of 
preclusion."  DeGiacomo, 476 Mass. at 43, quoting Southwest 
Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 95 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977).  Whether the plaintiff 
12 
 
and the Attorney General are in privity turns on (i) the nature 
of the plaintiff's interest, (ii) whether that interest was 
adequately represented by the Attorney General, and (iii) 
whether binding the plaintiff to the prior judgment is 
consistent with due process and common-law principles of 
fairness.  See DeGiacomo, supra at 43-44, and cases cited. 
Here, the plaintiff's interest in an award of punitive 
damages is rooted in the wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, 
§ 2, itself.  See International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 
Mass. 841, 856 n.20 (1983) ("Under Massachusetts law, punitive 
damages may be awarded only by statute").  The statute creates 
an "action of tort," derivative of a decedent's personal injury 
claim, for the executor or administrator of a decedent's estate 
to recover damages stemming from the decedent's death.  See 
GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. Schrader, 484 Mass. 181, 185, 188 
(2020). 
General Laws c. 229, § 2, permits recovery of compensatory 
and punitive damages, and each award is tied directly to the 
decedent.7  Punitive damages may be awarded where "the decedent's 
 
7 Compensatory damages under G. L. c. 229, § 2, are based on 
the "fair monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled 
to receive the damages recovered," such as a spouse or a child, 
see G. L. c. 229, § 1, and the "reasonable funeral and burial 
expenses of the decedent."  They "are intended to redress the 
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the 
defendant's wrongful conduct."  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). 
13 
 
death was caused by the malicious, willful, wanton or reckless 
conduct of the defendant or by the gross negligence of the 
defendant."  G. L. c. 229, § 2. 
Punitive damages "operate as 'private fines' intended to 
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing."  Cooper 
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 
(2001).  As Philip Morris notes, punitive damages "are aimed at 
deterrence and retribution," State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (Campbell), and thus serve a 
public interest.  See Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 767 
(1997) (punitive damages are awarded where defendant's conduct 
"warrants condemnation"); Burt v. Meyer, 400 Mass. 185, 188 
(1987) (punitive damages under G. L. c. 229, § 2, are meant "to 
punish the defendant, not to restore the plaintiff[]").  
Nonetheless, they also serve to vindicate a personal right.  See 
Gasior v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 446 Mass. 645, 654-655 
(2006) (recognizing that punitive damages vindicate "personal 
rights," as well as broader public interest).  See also Drywall 
Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., 435 Mass. 664, 670 (2002) ("the 
objectives of punitive damages . . . include compensating 
claimants for their legal costs and emotional injuries and 
punishing and deterring actual and potential wrongdoers" 
[citation omitted]). 
14 
 
To comply with due process, an award of punitive damages 
must be related to the "actual and potential" harm caused to a 
plaintiff by a defendant.  See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 
549 U.S. 346, 353-354 (2007) (Williams); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-581 (1996).  Punitive damages are not 
intended to punish a defendant for its unlawful conduct 
generally, but to punish a defendant for its unlawful conduct 
that caused a plaintiff's specific harm.  See Williams, supra at 
354.  See also Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc., 466 Mass. 398, 414 
(2013) (reprehensibility of defendant's conduct turns in part on 
whether harm inflicted on plaintiff was physical as opposed to 
economic).  In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that "few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process."  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.  An award of punitive 
damages also may not be used to punish a defendant for harm 
inflicted upon nonparties, or "strangers to the litigation."  
Williams, supra at 353.  Because due process precludes a 
defendant from being punished without "an opportunity to present 
every available defense," id., quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
U.S. 56, 66 (1972), permitting punishment based on harm to 
nonparties implicates due process concerns, including 
"arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice," Williams, 
supra at 354. 
15 
 
Thus, the plaintiff's interest in an award of punitive 
damages was not a general interest in punishing Philip Morris 
for selling defective Marlboro cigarettes or in recovering for 
harms to the public at large; rather, the plaintiff asserted a 
personal interest, tied to punishing Philip Morris for the harm 
its conduct specifically inflicted on the plaintiff's husband, 
Laramie.  See Williams, 549 U.S. at 353. 
This interest in punitive damages was not adequately 
represented by the Attorney General in the prior action.  To be 
sure, where a State litigates on behalf of its citizens' "common 
public rights," judgments resulting from such litigation will 
bind the State's citizens and, as to those rights, will have 
preclusive effect.  See Washington v. Washington State 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 692 
n.32 (1979); Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 340-
341 (1958).  Such litigation does not, however, bar citizens 
from recovering for injuries to private interests.  See Satsky 
v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
Here, as detailed supra, the plaintiff sought punitive 
damages for Laramie's death under the wrongful death statute, 
and her award was tethered to the harm the jury determined that 
Philip Morris had inflicted on Laramie.  By contrast, the 
Attorney General's interest in punitive damages in the 1995 
16 
 
action stemmed from the consumer protection act, G. L. c. 93A,8 
and was tied to the harm Philip Morris had inflicted on the 
Commonwealth, in the form of increased medical expenditures 
incurred by the Commonwealth as a result of Philip Morris's 
unfair and deceptive trade practices.  Specifically, the 
Attorney General sought civil penalties under G. L. c. 93A, § 4, 
and punitive damages under G. L. c. 93A, § 9. 
General Laws c. 93A, § 4, permits the Attorney General to 
bring an action "in the name of the [C]ommonwealth" when he or 
she has reason to believe that a person is violating G. L. 
c. 93A, § 2, and that such proceedings would be "in the public 
interest."  Civil penalties under G. L. c. 93A, § 4, which are 
limited to $5,000 per violation, thus serve the public's 
interest in punishing a defendant for violating the State's 
consumer protection act.  Punitive damages under G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 9, by contrast, are tied to the injury caused by a defendant's 
use of unfair or deceptive conduct, in violation of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 2.  Punitive damages under this provision are limited 
to from two to three times the amount of compensatory damages 
 
8 General Laws c. 93A seeks to provide a "more equitable 
balance in the relationship of consumers to persons conducting 
business activities," see Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 
234, 238 (1974), and prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce," G. L. 
c. 93A, § 2. 
17 
 
awarded.  See Rhodes v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 461 Mass. 486, 
503 (2012). 
In the 1995 action, the Attorney General did not seek 
damages for personal injuries suffered by Massachusetts 
residents.  Rather, he sought compensatory damages for the 
increased medical expenditures the Commonwealth incurred because 
of the defendant cigarette manufacturers' unfair and deceptive 
trade practices in the marketing of cigarettes.  Compare Alfred 
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 
600, 607 (1982) (State acting as parens patriae does not 
represent rights of private individuals but, rather, health and 
well-being of its citizens in general). 
The punitive damages available to the Attorney General in 
the 1995 action thus comprised the civil penalties under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 4, as well as, under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, a maximum of 
three times the Commonwealth's compensatory damages.  The 
Attorney General did not represent the plaintiff's interest in 
punitive damages under the wrongful death statute, which, while 
cabined by the requirements of due process, see Gore, 517 U.S. 
at 580-583, are not limited to civil penalties and treble the 
amount of the Commonwealth's compensatory damages. 
In this case, by contrast, the plaintiff has a private 
interest in punitive damages under G. L. c. 229, § 2.  Compare 
In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1227-1228 (9th Cir. 2001) 
18 
 
(request for punitive damages, seeking to vindicate private harm 
due to oil spill, was not barred by prior judgment for punitive 
damages sought by State for public harm due to same oil spill).  
Indeed, the 1998 settlement agreement expressly preserved the 
rights of individual smokers to bring claims against the 
defendants for "private or individual relief for separate and 
distinct injuries."  This reservation indicates that the 
Attorney General did not understand himself to be acting on 
behalf of any individual smoker, or as personal representative 
of a smoker, with respect to that interest.  See DeGiacomo, 476 
Mass. at 48, quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900 
(2008) ("A party's representation of a nonparty is 'adequate' 
for preclusion purposes only if, at a minimum . . . either the 
party understood herself to be acting in a representative 
capacity or the original court took care to protect the 
interests of the nonparty").  Although Philip Morris contends 
that the so-called "carve-out" was limited to claims for 
compensatory damages, the settlement agreement contains no such 
limitation.  It explicitly states the parties' intent to 
preserve personal rights, which, by statute, include an action 
under the wrongful death act for conduct causing the death, and 
if proved, to seek both compensatory and punitive damages. 
Thus, the Attorney General did not adequately represent the 
plaintiff's personal interest in punitive damages, an interest 
19 
 
in punishing Philip Morris for Laramie's death.  See Bullock v. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 198 Cal. App. 4th 543, 557-558 (2011) 
(under primary rights theory of res judicata, no preclusion 
where State sought to vindicate economic injuries while 
plaintiff sought to vindicate personal injuries); Engle v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1260-1262 (Fla. 2006) 
(punitive damages settled by State pursuant to settlement 
agreement with manufacturers of tobacco products was distinct 
from punitive damages sought by class of plaintiffs who suffered 
or died from smoking-related diseases).9 
 
9 We recognize that appellate courts in New York and Georgia 
have taken a different view and have concluded that the master 
settlement agreement precludes their residents from seeking 
punitive damages in wrongful death claims against manufacturers 
of tobacco products.  See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
Gault, 280 Ga. 420, 424 (2006) (Gault); Fabiano v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 54 A.D.3d 146, 151 (N.Y. 2008).  These determinations, 
however, have been based on specific statutes or prior precedent 
in those States which differ markedly from Massachusetts 
precedent. 
 
In New York, the court reasoned that punitive damages, 
"even when asserted in the context of a personal injury action, 
[do not] essentially relate to individual injury," and relied on 
New York precedent holding that the imposition of punitive 
damages for private purposes violates public policy.  See 
Fabiano, 54 A.D.3d at 150, citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 
40 N.Y.2d 354, 358 (1976).  This court has explicitly declined 
to adopt New York's view that punitive damages serve only a 
public purpose, see Drywall Sys., Inc., 435 Mass. at 670, and we 
discern no reason to depart from that determination. 
 
In Georgia, the court reasoned that Georgia law "limits the 
recovery of punitive damages in product liability cases to one 
award of punitive damages from a defendant . . . 'for any act or 
omission . . . regardless of the number of causes of action 
20 
 
To establish that the plaintiff and the Attorney General 
are in privity, Philip Morris also must show that the 
application of claim preclusion would not offend notions of 
fairness.  See DeGiacomo, 476 Mass. at 43-44.  "A person who was 
not a party to a suit generally has not had a 'full and fair 
opportunity to litigate' the claims and issues settled in that 
suit.  The application of claim . . . preclusion to nonparties 
thus runs up against the 'deep-rooted historic tradition that 
everyone should have his own day in court.'"  Taylor, 553 U.S. 
at 892-893, quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 
793, 798 (1996). 
As stated, the plaintiff has a statutory right to bring a 
wrongful death action.  See G. L. c. 229, § 2.  That right, if 
proved, includes a right to punitive damages.  See Aleo, 466 
Mass. at 412 (statute sets minimum award of $5,000).  Where the 
terms of the settlement agreement explicitly preserved the 
rights of individual smokers to bring their own personal injury 
claims, see Lopes, 442 Mass. at 177, it would be unfair to bind 
the plaintiff to the Attorney General's settlement agreement and 
to bar her from vindicating her statutory right.  Accordingly, 
 
which may arise from such act or omission,'" and seventy-five 
percent of the award goes to the State.  See Gault, 280 Ga. at 
422-423, quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1).  Punitive 
damages in Massachusetts under G. L. c. 229, § 2, are not so 
limited, and the plaintiff, not the State, receives them.  See 
Burt, 400 Mass. at 190. 
21 
 
Philip Morris has not met its burden of demonstrating that the 
Attorney General and the plaintiff are in privity. 
ii.  Identity of the cause of action.  Philip Morris 
contends, similarly, that the plaintiff's request for punitive 
damages constitutes the same claim as the Attorney General's 
request, because both sought to punish Philip Morris for the 
same conduct. 
In determining whether two causes of action are identical 
for purposes of claim preclusion, we ask whether the two actions 
arose from the same transaction or series of connected 
transactions.  See Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Med., 444 
Mass. 837, 843 (2005) and cases cited; Mackintosh v. Chambers, 
285 Mass. 594, 596-597 (1934).  Plaintiffs are "not entitled to 
pursue their claim[s] . . . through piecemeal litigation, 
offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in 
reserve for future litigation should the first theory prove 
unsuccessful."  Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 633, 638 (1990).  
"The statement of a different form of liability is not a 
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same 
transaction, act, or agreement, and seeks redress for the same 
wrong."  Mackintosh, supra at 596.  A "transaction" generally 
"connotes a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative 
facts," see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 comment b 
(1982), and a party may be precluded from requesting damages for 
22 
 
an injury flowing from conduct that has been dealt with fully by 
a prior judgment, see Dwight v. Dwight, 371 Mass. 424, 429-430 
(1976). 
The Attorney General's complaint in the 1995 action 
alleged, among other things, that Philip Morris had manufactured 
and sold defective and unreasonably dangerous cigarettes; so too 
does the plaintiff's.  Indeed, both complaints assert breach of 
warranty claims against Philip Morris, and both complaints 
sought to punish Philip Morris based in part on that conduct. 
The allegations in the complaints, however, differ in 
important respects.  The "wrong" the plaintiff sought to remedy 
was the loss she and her daughter sustained due to Laramie's 
death, caused by Philip Morris's malicious, willful, wanton, 
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, see G. L. c. 229, § 2.  
The "wrong" the Attorney General sought to remedy, by contrast, 
was the Commonwealth's increased medical expenditures caused by 
Philip Morris's commission of unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2. 
Indeed, Philip Morris acknowledges that the plaintiff's 
claim for wrongful death is not precluded to the extent that it 
sought recovery for compensatory damages based on Laramie's 
death.  Philip Morris cites no Massachusetts authority, however, 
and we are aware of none, for the proposition that, for purposes 
of claim preclusion, a claim is not the "same claim" for one 
23 
 
type of recovery (such as compensatory damages) and yet is the 
"same claim" for a different type of recovery (such as punitive 
damages).  Accordingly, Philip Morris has not met its burden of 
demonstrating that the two claims are the same, see Longval, 448 
Mass. at 416-417, and the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages 
is not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.10 
c.  Other asserted errors at trial.  Following the jury's 
verdict, Philip Morris's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial, was denied.  Aside 
from the issue of preclusion, Philip Morris maintains that a new 
trial is required due to several of the errors it asserted in 
that motion.  We review the denial of a motion for a new trial 
for an abuse of discretion.  See DaPrato v. Massachusetts Water 
Resources Auth., 482 Mass. 375, 377 n.2 (2019). 
i.  Internal documents.  Philip Morris argues that the 
judge abused his discretion in allowing the plaintiff to 
introduce documents internal to Philip Morris and industry trade 
 
10 Philip Morris also argues that, under the terms of the 
1998 settlement agreement, the plaintiff was a "Releasing Party" 
and therefore barred from recovering punitive damages.  The 
plaintiff was not a "Releasing Party" within the meaning of the 
agreement.  See Williams v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 351 Or. 
368, 387 (2011) (estate seeking punitive damages was not 
releasing party under master settlement agreement).  The 
plaintiff sought to punish Philip Morris for the harm that it 
inflicted on Laramie specifically; the plaintiff did not seek 
relief "on behalf of or generally applicable to the general 
public." 
24 
 
groups, which acknowledged the risks of smoking and outlined 
public relations strategies to create doubt about those risks 
and to retain and attract new smokers.11  Philip Morris maintains 
that such evidence was not relevant to the plaintiff's claims 
for negligence or breach of warranty. 
"Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a 
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence 
and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action."  
Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2021).  "To be relevant, '[e]vidence need 
not establish directly the proposition sought; it must only 
provide a link in the chain of proof.'"  Commonwealth v. Scesny, 
472 Mass. 185, 199 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 
Mass. 340, 351 (1990).  "A judge has broad discretion to make 
evidentiary rulings," Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 488 
(2003), and "substantial discretion" to determine whether 
evidence is relevant, Commonwealth v. Mason, 485 Mass. 520, 533 
(2020), quoting Scesny, supra. 
Here, the judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding 
that the internal documents were relevant to the jury's 
 
11 For example, one Philip Morris memorandum regarding a 
1964 Surgeon General report linking smoking to cancer indicated 
that the company would need to "give smokers a psychological 
crutch and self-rationale to continue smoking."  Another 
memorandum concerning the industry's efforts to fund research 
into smoking-related diseases stated, "Let's face it.  We are 
interested in evidence which we believe denies the allegation 
that cigarette smoking causes disease." 
25 
 
consideration of consumer expectations in connection with the 
claim for breach of warranty,12 or to counter Philip Morris's 
argument that Laramie caused his own death.  The documents 
provided a link in the chain toward a conclusion, integral to 
the plaintiff's claim, that consumers did not comprehend fully 
that Marlboro cigarettes were dangerous.  The documents outlined 
Philip Morris's extensive strategy to conceal the health risks 
of smoking and to pursue research that "denies the allegation 
that cigarette smoking causes disease."  See Commonwealth v. 
Hinds, 487 Mass. 212, 219 (2021) ("The relevance threshold for 
the admission of evidence is low" [citation omitted]).  
Moreover, evidence that Philip Morris concealed information from 
the public and sought to persuade the public to continue smoking 
by, for example, providing "smokers a psychological crutch and 
 
12 "A seller breaches its warranty obligation when a product 
that is defective and unreasonably dangerous for the ordinary 
purposes for which it is fit causes injury" (quotations, 
citations, and alterations omitted).  Haglund v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 446 Mass. 741, 746 (2006).  A product may be defective and 
unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect.  See Evans v. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. 411, 422 (2013).  A product has 
a design defect "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design."  Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Products Liability § 2(b) (1998).  In determining "whether an 
alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission 
renders a product not reasonably safe," a jury may consider a 
broad range of factors, including "the nature and strength of 
consumer expectations regarding the product."  Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  Products Liability § 2 comment f (1998).  See 
Evans, supra. 
26 
 
self-rationale to continue smoking" tended to negate Philip 
Morris's contention that Laramie caused his own death because he 
was adequately informed about the risks of smoking, freely chose 
to smoke, and could have quit smoking at any time. 
In addition, the internal documents were relevant to the 
plaintiff's request for punitive damages under G. L. c. 229, 
§ 2, which are available where a defendant's conduct that caused 
a decedent's death was "malicious, willful, wanton[,] . . . 
reckless[,] . . . or gross[ly] negligen[t]."  Evidence that 
Philip Morris knew its cigarettes were dangerous and addictive, 
concealed that information from the public, and actively tried 
to persuade the public otherwise was relevant to the malicious, 
willful, wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent manner by which 
Philip Morris manufactured and sold those cigarettes. 
 
ii.  Federal Trade Commission reports.  Philip Morris 
argues that the judge also abused his discretion in allowing the 
plaintiff's expert to read and display to the jury excerpts from 
two Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports summarizing the 
results of a number of surveys on the effect of warning labels 
on cigarette packaging and advertising.13  One report, from 1967, 
stated that "youngsters consider cigarette smoking to be an 
acceptable and socially desirable activity" because the health 
 
13 The parties stipulated that the reports themselves would 
not be admitted in evidence. 
27 
 
risks are not "brought home to them in a[n] effective and 
meaningful way," due in part to the "strong force" of cigarette 
advertising.  The other report, from 1981, stated that "less 
than [three] percent of adults exposed to cigarette ads ever 
even read the warning," and that "few people ever notice or pay 
attention to [the warnings]." 
The judge overruled Philip Morris's objection to the 
reports on grounds of relevancy and hearsay, because he 
concluded that they were admissible as ancient documents under 
Mass. G. Evid. § 803(16) (2021).  " We review a trial judge's 
evidentiary decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.  
See Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 32 (2012).  In applying 
that standard, 'we look for decisions based on "whimsy, caprice, 
or arbitrary or idiosyncratic notions,"' and do not disturb the 
judge's ruling "simply because [we] might have reached a 
different result; the standard of review is not substituted 
judgment."'  Cruz v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 664, 670 (2012)."  
N.E. Physical Therapy Plus, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 
Mass. 358, 363 (2013). 
A.  Relevance.  Philip Morris contends that the reports 
were not relevant to the plaintiff's claims because, as a matter 
of law, post-1969 warning labels on cigarette packaging are 
sufficient to warn the public about the risks of smoking.  See 
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 79 (2008).  As Philip 
28 
 
Morris asserts, Federal law preempts State law failure-to-warn 
claims based on post-1969 warning labels.  In 1969, Congress 
preempted "any State law claim imposing liability based on a 
showing that a cigarette manufacturer's 'post–1969 advertising 
or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly 
stated, warnings.'"  Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. 
411, 440-441 (2013), quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).  The 
plaintiff's breach of warranty claim, however, did not assert 
liability on the basis that Philip Morris should have included 
additional, or more clearly stated, warnings.  Rather, the 
complaint alleged that Philip Morris was liable for the 
manufacturing and sale of unreasonably dangerous and defectively 
designed Marlboro cigarettes; as part of that claim, the 
plaintiff sought to demonstrate consumer expectations regarding 
Marlboro cigarettes around the time that Laramie began smoking.  
See Evans, supra at 422-428. 
While warnings accompanying a product are relevant in 
determining whether the product is unreasonably dangerous, see 
Evans, 465 Mass. at 425, consumer expectations also may depend 
upon the manner in which the product is portrayed and marketed, 
see Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability § 2 
comment g (1998).  Philip Morris argued at trial that Laramie 
fully understood the risks of smoking, in part due to the 
29 
 
presence of the warning labels.  Evidence that consumers did not 
notice or read the mandated warnings thus was relevant, because 
it made it more likely that consumers formed opinions about 
cigarettes through sources other than the warning labels (such 
as Philip Morris's advertising) and thus that, despite the 
warnings, consumers believed that Marlboro cigarettes were safe. 
To the extent that there was a risk that the jury might 
have used this evidence improperly, see Evans, 465 Mass. at 440-
442, the judge mitigated that risk by providing multiple, 
contemporaneous limiting instructions informing the jury that 
the plaintiff was not claiming a failure to warn, and that the 
warnings were adequate as a matter of law to inform the public 
of the risks of smoking.  Cf. Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 510 
(2003). 
B.  Hearsay.  Philip Morris also maintains that the FTC 
reports contained inadmissible hearsay.  "The rule against 
hearsay bars admission of out-of-court statements offered for 
their truth."  Hinds, 487 Mass. at 234, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Mendes, 463 Mass. 353, 367-368 (2012).  The ancient documents 
exception to this rule permits the admission of a "statement in 
a document that is at least thirty years old and whose 
authenticity is established."  Mass. G. Evid. § 803(16).  See 
Langbord v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 
190 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1578 (2017) 
30 
 
(ancient document exception is based on rationale that 
authenticated ancient documents bear certain indicia of 
trustworthiness).  While Philip Morris does not challenge the 
authenticity of the FTC reports, it argues that the statements 
in the reports constitute hearsay within hearsay because the 
statements came not from the FTC itself but rather from third-
party responses to consumer surveys. 
Generally, where multiple out-of-court statements are 
embedded in one, the combined statement is admissible only if 
"each out-of-court assertion falls within an exception to the 
hearsay rule."  Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 259, 268 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 558 
(2015).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 805 (2021).  While statements by 
the author of the document may be introduced under the ancient 
documents exception, "[i]f the document contains more than one 
level of hearsay, an appropriate exception must be found for 
each level."  United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 444 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (discussing analogous Federal rule).  See Langbord, 
832 F.3d at 190.  Accordingly, because the FTC reports contained 
multiple levels of hearsay, the judge erred in concluding that 
the excerpts of the reports were admissible under the ancient 
documents exception. 
This error, however, did not prejudice the defendant, as 
the improperly introduced evidence was cumulative of other, 
31 
 
properly introduced evidence.  See Slater v. Burnham Corp., 4 
Mass. App. Ct. 791, 791 (1976).  The plaintiff introduced 
numerous advertisements and public statements from Philip Morris 
to demonstrate that the public perception of smoking around the 
time Laramie smoked his first cigarette was that smoking was not 
unreasonably dangerous.  Cf. Kace v. Liang, 472 Mass. 630, 646 
(2015). 
 
iii.  Jury instructions.  In his final charge, the judge 
instructed: 
"[T]he plaintiff is not making any claim in this case that 
the Defendant failed to warn Mr. Laramie of the dangers 
associated with smoking or engaged in any fraud.  As I told 
you during trial, the United States Congress has mandated 
since July 1 of 1969 what warning labels cigarette 
manufacturers such as the Defendant have been required to 
place on all cigarette packages and cigarette 
advertisements, and you must accept as true in this case 
that those congressionally mandated warnings were adequate 
as a matter of law to warn Mr. Laramie and other members of 
the public of the hazards associated with smoking.  The 
law, however, does not permit a cigarette manufacturer 
through its statements or actions to mislead consumers or 
make misrepresentations about the risks or hazards 
associated with smoking." 
 
Philip Morris argued during the charge conference, as it does 
before us, that the jury should not be instructed as to this 
last sentence because the statement invites the jury to impose 
liability based on theories of fraud, conspiracy, and failure to 
warn -- theories of liability that were not before the jury. 
 
"In a civil trial, a judge should instruct the jury fairly, 
clearly, adequately, and correctly concerning principles that 
32 
 
ought to guide and control their action."  Doull v. Foster, 487 
Mass. 1, 5-6 (2021), quoting DaPrato, 482 Mass. at 383 n.11.  We 
do not review an individual instruction in isolation, see 
Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 547 (2014); 
rather, "[j]ury instructions must be construed as a whole to 
prevent isolated misstatements or omissions from constituting 
reversible error where there is little chance that the jury 
would have misunderstood the correct import of the charge."  
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 844 (2006), citing 
Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 607 (1993). 
Here, the preceding instructions made clear that the 
plaintiff had not raised claims of failure to warn or fraud.  
The judge also twice instructed the jury that the warning labels 
were adequate, as a matter of law, and that the plaintiff had 
not raised a claim of failure to warn.  The judge thereafter 
outlined the elements of the claims on which the jury 
permissibly could have found liability; those instructions did 
not invite the jury improperly to impose liability based on any 
misrepresentation Philip Morris might have made.  In addition, 
the verdict slip, which the judge reviewed with the jury, 
explicitly specified the contested elements of the plaintiff's 
claims.  The instructions, viewed as a whole, thus made clear to 
the jury which claims were before them. 
33 
 
 
iv.  Closing argument.  Philip Morris argues that a new 
trial is necessary due to improper statements by the plaintiff's 
counsel during closing argument.  Philip Morris contends that 
counsel misstated the evidence, made arguments not based on the 
evidence, disparaged opposing counsel, and enflamed the jurors' 
emotions.  We examine whether the challenged statements were 
improper and, if so, whether they were prejudicial.14  See Haddad 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (No. 1), 455 Mass. 91, 112 (2009).  We 
review the challenged remarks in the context of the entire 
argument, the evidence presented at trial, and the judge's 
instructions.  See Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 430 Mass. 198, 213 
(1999). 
 
Philip Morris argues that the plaintiff's trial counsel 
misstated the evidence by telling the jury that Laramie would 
not have become addicted to low nicotine cigarettes (a "safer" 
alternative that the plaintiff claimed Philip Morris chose not 
to manufacture or market), and that there was no evidence that 
Laramie would have started smoking simply because his friends 
and parents smoked.  In closing, a lawyer may argue fair 
inferences from the evidence introduced.  See Back v. Wickes 
 
14 Appellate review of two statements challenged on appeal 
to which Philip Morris did not object at trial -- references to 
Laramie living "paycheck-to-paycheck" and characterizing Philip 
Morris's argument as "muck on the wall" -- has not been 
preserved.  See Gath, 440 Mass. at 492. 
34 
 
Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 644 (1978); Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b) 
(2021).  That is precisely what the plaintiff's counsel did 
here.  One of the plaintiff's experts testified that low 
nicotine cigarettes are unlikely to lead to persistent daily use 
or to cause addiction among young people.  Another expert 
testified that "if you had a nonaddictive cigarette, people 
could choose to stop [smoking] whenever they wanted."  Likewise, 
while the trial testimony indicated that Laramie's friends and 
parents smoked, it was not an unreasonable inference from the 
evidence that Laramie would not necessarily have followed their 
lead.  See Commonwealth v. DeCaro, 359 Mass. 388, 391 (1971) (no 
error where prosecutor did not distort evidence before jury). 
Philip Morris maintains that the plaintiff's counsel 
improperly disparaged Philip Morris's counsel by telling the 
jury that Philip Morris's counsel "want[s] to confuse you," and 
by accusing him of putting words in the mouths of witnesses 
through leading questions.  Counsel may, within reason, be 
critical of an opposing counsel's tactics.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 436 Mass. 671, 674 (2002).  It was not improper for 
the plaintiff's counsel to argue that Philip Morris was seeking 
to distract the jury from what the plaintiff viewed as the more 
relevant evidence. 
Philip Morris also argues that the plaintiff's counsel made 
a number of remarks designed to enflame the jury's emotions, 
35 
 
such as mentioning Philip Morris's corporate revenues, telling 
the jury that they "can't punish [Philip Morris] for all the 
other people that they killed," and stating that "[r]egular lung 
cancer wasn't good enough . . . [Philip Morris] came up with a 
whole new different kind of cancer." 
Counsel discussed Philip Morris's net revenues in the 
context of suggesting how the jury could calculate punitive 
damages.  The statements were not improper, as the financial 
information was in evidence, and were relevant to the jury's 
determination of punitive damages.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 908(2) (1979). 
The statement that the jury could not punish Philip Morris 
"for all the other people that they killed," on the other hand, 
was improper and inflammatory.  Nonetheless, a "certain measure 
of jury sophistication in sorting out excessive claims on both 
sides fairly may be assumed."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 
514, 517 (1987).  In addition, the judge gave an immediate 
curative instruction.  Following closing arguments, in response 
to Philip Morris's objection, the judge instructed the jury that 
"this case is not about what happened to anybody other than Fred 
Laramie."  In his final charge, the judge again instructed the 
jury that they could not assess punitive damages against Philip 
Morris for any harm caused to persons other than Laramie and his 
36 
 
family.15  See Gath, 440 Mass. at 492 (curative instruction may 
remedy any prejudice).  See also Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 
Mass. 657, 669 (2016).  The curative instructions were 
sufficient to dispel any prejudice from the statement, which, 
absent such instructions, was not so inflammatory as to have 
required a new trial.  See id. 
The statement that Philip Morris had invented a new kind of 
cancer because "[r]egular lung cancer wasn't good enough" also 
was improper.  Although the statement was loosely based on the 
evidence that adenocarcinoma, the type of lung cancer Laramie 
contracted, increased in prevalence following the emergence of 
filtered cigarettes, such as Marlboros, the remark nonetheless 
was clearly designed to arouse the jurors' passions and 
sympathies.  In responding to Philip Morris's objection, the 
judge decided to "[l]eave it up to the jury to make [the] 
determination" whether the statement was based on the evidence.  
The judge had the discretion to decide whether any corrective 
action was necessary.  See Santos, 430 Mass. at 214.  While the 
remark should not have been made, considered in the context of 
 
15 The jury appears to have heeded the judge's instructions; 
they awarded the plaintiff an amount of punitive damages ($10 
million) far less than that which counsel suggested would be 
reasonable ($410 million) for the plaintiff's own injuries, and 
in proportion to the amount of compensatory damages they awarded 
($11 million). 
37 
 
the entire argument, it would have had no effect on the jury, 
and caused no prejudice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.