Title: John D. Farris v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 02S03-0904-PC-181
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2009

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Tracy A. Nelson  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas D. Perkins 
Deputy Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 02S03-0904-PC-181 
 
JOHN D. FARRIS, 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court, No. 02D04-0301-PC-1 
The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 02A03-0805-PC-245 
_________________________________ 
 
June 16, 2009 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
Breaston v. State, – N.E.2d –, No. 20S04-0810-CR-561, slip op. (Ind. June 16, 2009), 
holds that consecutive habitual offender enhancements are improper where the enhancements 
arise from separate trials on unrelated charges.  This case presents a somewhat easier question 
than Breaston: whether consecutive habitual offender enhancements are improper where the en-
hancements arise from separate trials on related charges.  Precedent dictates that they are.  Be-
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 16 2009, 1:49 pm
 
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cause John Farris’s counsel did not object to the imposition of consecutive habitual offender en-
hancements and Farris’s sentence was improperly enhanced by 30 years, we find that Farris re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel and is entitled to post-conviction relief. 
 
Background 
 
 
In June, 1997, John Farris and Richard Foreman committed a robbery.  In August, 1997, 
the State charged Farris with Class B felony robbery and alleged that he was a habitual offender.  
Foreman cooperated with police and agreed to testify against Farris at the robbery trial.  In Janu-
ary, 1998, Farris instructed Danny Littlepage to kill Foreman because he cooperated with police.  
Shortly thereafter, Littlepage went to the Foreman home and shot four people, one of whom died.  
(Foreman was not home at the time of the shootings.)  In March, 1999, police arrested Farris fol-
lowing a traffic stop.  The State charged Farris with murder, three counts of Class B felony ag-
gravated battery, and also alleged Farris to be a habitual offender.   
 
 
Farris went to trial for the robbery charge in April, 1999, and was convicted of Class B 
felony robbery and found to be a habitual offender.  The trial court sentenced Farris to fifteen 
years for the robbery conviction, and enhanced the sentence by 30 years based on the habitual 
offender finding, for an executed sentence of 45 years.  Farris’s trial for murder and aggravated 
battery began in January, 2000, but ended in a mistrial.  Farris was retried and convicted of all 
charges, and found to be a habitual offender.  The trial court sentenced Farris to 65 years for the 
murder conviction, enhanced by 30 years for the habitual offender finding, 20 years on each of 
the three aggravated battery convictions, and imposed all of these terms consecutively for an ex-
ecuted sentence of 155 years.  The trial court then ordered the total executed sentence in the 
second proceeding to be served consecutive to that of the first, for a total executed sentence of 
200 years.  
 
Farris’s conviction and sentence for robbery were affirmed on appeal, Farris v. State, 732 
N.E.2d 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), as were his conviction and sentence for murder and aggravated 
battery, Farris v. State, 753 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 2001).  Farris petitioned for post-conviction relief, 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, but the post-conviction court denied his petition.  On 
 
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review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court.  Farris v. State, No. 02A03-
0805-PC-245, slip. op., 899 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2008) (table).  Judge Darden dis-
sented in part.  Farris now appeals the denial of that petition.1   
 
Farris sought, and we granted, transfer.  App. R. 58(A)(2). 
 
Discussion 
 
Farris contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel 
failed to oppose the imposition of the habitual offender enhancement in the second proceeding 
consecutive to the habitual offender enhancement in the first proceeding.  To establish ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, Farris must show that: (1) counsel performed deficiently; and (2) the 
deficiency resulted in prejudice.  See Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 2008) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  To show prejudice, the petitioner must 
show that but for the counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.  Reed 
v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006).   
 
The post-conviction court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
oppose the imposition of the habitual offender enhancement in the second proceeding consecu-
tive to that in the first.  Today, in Breaston, we were faced with a situation in which consecutive 
habitual offender enhancements had been imposed in cases where the enhancements stem from 
separate trials on unrelated charges.  We looked to precedent, namely our opinion in Starks v. 
State, 523 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ind. 1988), and that of the Court of Appeals in Smith v. State, 774 
N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, in holding that a trial court is precluded 
from ordering habitual offender sentences to run consecutively following unrelated criminal tri-
als.   
 
                                                 
1  Specifically, Farris contends that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use existing precedent to 
have the subsequently brought charges dismissed; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
for dismissal of the habitual offender count when precedent prohibited the State from seeking a consecu-
tive habitual offender enhancement.  We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as to all 
issues not addressed in this opinion.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).   
 
 
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Farris’s claim is similar to the one in Breaston except that here, the question is not 
whether consecutive habitual offender enhancements following unrelated criminal trials are im-
proper, but whether such consecutive enhancements are improper following separate trials for 
charges that could have been consolidated.  Once again, we find controlling precedent. 
 
In Seay v. State, the State pursued successive prosecutions for related offenses that could 
have been consolidated for trial.  550 N.E.2d 1284, 1289 (Ind. 1990).  Specifically, the State 
filed and prosecuted four charges for sales of controlled substances in two successive actions.  
Id. at 1286-87.  Based on the reasoning in Starks (the case we rely on in Breaston), Seay held 
that “the State is barred from seeking multiple, pyramiding habitual offender sentence enhance-
ments by bringing successive prosecutions for charges which could have been consolidated for 
trial.” Id. at 1289.   
 
Here, the post-conviction court ruled that Seay is only applicable where the State pur-
posely delayed filing charges for the improper purpose of seeking multiple enhancements, but 
Seay contains no such limitation.  Although the Court of Appeals did not rely on the post-
conviction court’s reasoning, it too, misapplied Seay.  It deemed Seay distinguishable from the 
present case and held that Farris had not shown that trial counsel was ineffective.  Farris, slip op. 
at 11.  We find no analysis or case law to support this distinction. 
 
In this case, it is not disputed that the robbery charge and the murder and battery charges 
were based on a “series of acts connected together.”  See Ind. Code § 35-34-1-9(a)(2).  After Far-
ris had already been convicted on the robbery charge, found to be a habitual offender, and had 
his sentence enhanced by 30 years based on the habitual offender status, trial counsel appeared 
on the murder charges.   The trial court ordered consecutive habitual offender enhancements for 
charges that could have been consolidated for trial when it ordered the habitual offender en-
hancement in the murder and aggravated battery conviction to be served consecutively to the en-
hancement in the robbery conviction.   
 
 
Seay was decided in 1990.  By the time Farris committed these offenses in 1997 and 
1998, and at the time of Farris’s appeal, the question of whether a trial court could impose con-
 
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secutive habitual offender sentences for charges that could have been consolidated for trial had 
been answered.  Pursuant to the holding in Seay, it was “incumbent upon Farris’ counsel to move 
to dismiss the habitual offender allegation filed with the murder and battery charges.”  Farris, 
slip. op. at 13 (Darden, J., dissenting).  Counsel was guilty of deficient performance for not doing 
so, or at least opposing in some way the imposition of the second habitual offender enhancement 
consecutive to the first. 
 
We find that Farris was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the issue of consecutive 
habitual offender sentences.  Had counsel opposed the imposition of the second habitual offender 
enhancement consecutive to the first, Seay would have required the motion to be granted.  Con-
sequently, the result of the proceeding for the murder and battery charges “would have been dif-
ferent,” Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1195; Farris would not have been ordered to serve an additional 30-
year habitual offender enhancement for the murder charge.  Farris has established ineffective as-
sistance of counsel with respect to this issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The post-conviction court’s denial of Farris’s petition for relief is reversed with regards 
to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for dismissal of the consecu-
tive habitual offender enhancement.  We remand the issue of Farris’s sentence to the post-
conviction court with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order vacating Farris’s second 
habitual offender enhancement in accordance with this opinion, without a hearing.  (We calculate 
that this will reduce the length of Farris’s sentence from 200 to 170 years.)  In all other respects, 
we summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to App. R. 58(A)(2).   
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.