Title: Gray v. Rhoads
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031852
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
and Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
ABRAHAM GRAY, JR., ADMINISTRATOR 
FOR THE ESTATE OF FREDERICK GRAY, 
DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 031852  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    June 10, 2004 
DOUGLAS RHOADS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 
CAPTAIN OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF 
ALBEMARLE COUNTY, ET AL. 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 
Lydia C. Taylor, Judge Designate 
 
 
 
The provisions of Code § 8.01-404 prohibit the use of 
certain types of prior written statements to contradict a 
witness in a personal injury or wrongful death action.  In 
this appeal, we decide whether that statutory prohibition 
prevents a plaintiff from introducing prior written 
statements into evidence as party admissions during the 
plaintiff’s case-in-chief.  Concluding that this statute 
does not prohibit such use of prior written statements, we 
will reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
This appeal arises from the fatal shooting of 
Frederick Gray by an officer employed by the Albemarle 
County Police Department.  In the early morning hours of 
May 15, 1997, several police officers responded to “911” 
calls concerning a disturbance at an apartment located at 
 
2
827 Old Brook Road in Albemarle County where Gray and his 
female companion resided.  Four officers, Amos Chiarappa, 
David Wallace, Sharn Perry, and Philip Giles, entered the 
apartment and observed Gray near or coming out of the 
bathroom.1  They also saw a woman in the apartment.  She 
appeared to have blood on her clothing.  Wallace described 
his impression of the scene in the apartment: 
 
[S]ome type of an assault had occurred.  There [were] 
blood drops on the various clothing items, property 
items off to the left in the big living room and along 
the little short hallway going back towards the 
bathroom.  And there − I think there was some blood on 
the − maybe even the walls.  I know there was some on 
the bathroom floor.  There were drops of blood where 
they were both standing, so I really couldn’t tell 
where it was coming from, but somebody had been hurt. 
 
One of the officers ordered Gray to “get down” on the 
floor.  Although Gray seemed to comply with the direction, 
a struggle ensued when Wallace started to handcuff Gray.  
During that struggle, Chiarappa attempted unsuccessfully to 
restrain Gray by hitting him with an “asp baton” between 
Gray’s shoulder blades and on his forehead.  In Chiarappa’s 
words, after seeing what he believed to be “Sha[r]n Perry’s 
condition . . . at that time, after seeing Phil Giles 
sliding down the wall . . . , after [Gray] threw David 
Wallace out that door and after [Gray] turned to attack 
                     
1 Officer James Hanover arrived at the scene only 
seconds before the shooting and did not enter the apartment 
 
3
me,” Chiarappa withdrew his weapon and fired three shots.  
Gray fell facedown in the doorway of the apartment.  A 
subsequent autopsy of Gray’s body revealed that the cause 
of death was “two gunshot wounds to the chest causing 
injury to both lungs and the heart.”  He also sustained 
“blunt force injuries including a bruise to the back[,] a 
bruise to the right leg[,] a deep bruise to the left top of 
the head[,] and a laceration of the left forehead.” 
Subsequently, Abraham Gray, Jr., administrator of the 
estate of the decedent, filed an amended motion for 
judgment against Chiarappa, Wallace, Hanover, Giles, and 
Perry (collectively the “Officers”); Douglas Rhoads, 
Captain of the Police Department of Albemarle County; and 
John Miller, Chief of the Police Department of Albemarle 
County.  He asserted claims for assault and battery, false 
arrest and imprisonment, gross negligence resulting in the 
wrongful death of Gray, grossly negligent retention, and 
grossly negligent hiring. 
The circuit court entered a pre-trial order requiring 
the parties to exchange 15 days before trial a list of 
exhibits to be introduced at trial and a list of witnesses 
who would be testifying.  The order also directed the 
parties to file any objections to the exhibits and 
                                                             
prior to the incident. 
 
4
witnesses, except those based on relevance, five days 
before trial; otherwise, the objections would be deemed 
waived absent a showing of good cause.  The defendants did 
not file any objections to the exhibits at issue in this 
appeal. 
However, during the plaintiff’s opening statement at 
trial, the defendants objected for the first time to the 
use of certain prior statements made by the Officers.2   
Those prior statements were obtained during two sets of 
audio-recorded interviews of the Officers after the 
shooting incident had occurred.  The audio-recordings of 
the interviews were subsequently transcribed.  Two 
detectives employed by the Albemarle County Police 
Department conducted the first set of interviews in May 
1997.  A lieutenant employed by the Albemarle County Police 
Department conducted the second set of interviews in June 
1997. 
The defendants based their objection on the provision 
in Code § 8.01-404 prohibiting the use of certain types of 
prior written statements to contradict a witness in a case 
for personal injury or wrongful death.  The circuit court 
                     
2 We reject the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff 
did not adequately identify the Officers’ prior statements 
in his pre-trial exhibit list. 
 
 
5
agreed and ruled that the statements could not be used 
either to impeach the Officers who had made the statements 
or as substantive evidence of what the Officers had said in 
the interviews.3 
A jury returned a verdict in favor of Chiarappa on the 
claims alleging assault and battery, and gross negligence.4  
We awarded the plaintiff this appeal on the sole issue 
whether the circuit court erred in barring the plaintiff 
from using, for any purpose, the statements made by the 
Officers after the shooting death of Gray when the 
defendants had failed to make a timely objection to their 
admissibility in accordance with the circuit court’s pre-
trial order. 
ANALYSIS 
A trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit or 
exclude evidence will not be overturned on appeal unless 
the court abused its discretion.  May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 
                     
3 The circuit court did allow the plaintiff to ask the 
two detectives and the lieutenant who conducted the 
interviews whether they remembered any oral statements made 
by the Officers. 
 
4 The circuit court, in ruling on various motions, 
dismissed the other claims and defendants, except the 
negligent retention claim against Rhoads and Miller.  The 
court severed that claim from the others and decided that 
it would proceed to trial only if the plaintiff prevailed 
against Chiarappa.  None of those rulings are pertinent to 
this appeal. 
 
6
358, 362, 568 S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002).  However, a “trial 
court has no discretion to admit clearly inadmissible 
evidence because ‘admissibility of evidence depends not 
upon the discretion of the court but upon sound legal 
principles.’ ”  Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Puryear, 250 
Va. 559, 563, 463 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1995) (quoting Coe v. 
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986)).  
The converse is likewise true because admissibility of 
evidence is always governed by legal principles.  See 
Crowson v. Swan, 164 Va. 82, 92-93, 178 S.E. 898, 903 
(1935).  Furthermore, a trial court’s interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.  
Simon v. Forer, 265 Va. 483, 487, 578 S.E.2d 792, 794 
(2003). 
The terms of the statute at issue, Code § 8.01-404, 
are clear and unambiguous as written.  Thus, in construing 
the statute, this Court looks no further than the plain 
meaning of the statute’s words.  Supinger v. Stakes, 255 
Va. 198, 205-06, 495 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1998); City of 
Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 250 Va. 451, 457, 
464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995).  Under the plain meaning rule, 
“we must . . . assume that the legislature chose, with 
care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant 
statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret 
 
7
the statute.”  Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 
Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990).  We cannot depart 
from the words used by the legislature when its intent is 
clear.  Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 
S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944). 
In pertinent part, Code § 8.01-404 states: 
 
A witness may be cross-examined as to 
previous statements made by him in writing or 
reduced into writing, relative to the subject 
matter of the civil action, without such writing 
being shown to him. . . .  This section is 
subject to the qualification, that in an action 
to recover for a personal injury or death by 
wrongful act or neglect, no ex parte affidavit or 
statement in writing other than a deposition, 
after due notice, of a witness and no 
extrajudicial recording of the voice of such 
witness, or reproduction or transcript thereof, 
as to the facts or circumstances attending the 
wrongful act or neglect complained of, shall be 
used to contradict him as a witness in the case. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The revisors of the Code of 1919 added 
language which, as amended, has become the emphasized 
portion of current Code § 8.01-404 prohibiting the use of 
certain prior written statements to contradict a witness in 
an action for personal injury or wrongful death.  Robertson 
v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 534, 25 S.E.2d 352, 358 
(1943).  In Harris v. Harrington, 180 Va. 210, 220, 22 
S.E.2d 13, 17 (1942), we explained the reason for the 
prohibition: 
 
8
The purpose of the addition to the statute was to 
correct an unfair practice which had developed, 
by which claim adjusters would hasten to the 
scene of an accident and obtain written 
statements from all eye-witnesses.  Frequently, 
these statements were neither full nor correct 
and were signed by persons who had not fully 
recovered from shock and hence were not in full 
possession of their faculties.  Later, such 
persons, when testifying as witnesses, would be 
confronted with their signed statements and, 
after admitting their signatures, these 
statements would be introduced in evidence as 
impeachment of their testimony given on the 
witness stand. 
 
Accord Alspaugh v. Diggs, 195 Va. 1, 10, 77 S.E.2d 362, 367 
(1953); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Venable, 194 Va. 357, 364, 
73 S.E.2d 366, 370-71 (1952). 
 
In applying the provisions of this statute in 
different factual scenarios, we have held that the 
prohibition against using certain written statements to 
contradict a witness applies both to a witness who is a 
party to the action and a witness who is not.  Alspaugh, 
195 Va. at 11, 77 S.E.2d at 367.  In Scott v. Greater 
Richmond Transit Co., 241 Va. 300, 303, 402 S.E.2d 214, 217 
(1991), we concluded that the prohibition did not apply to 
a written narrative by a person to whom the witness had 
given an oral statement because the written narrative was 
not signed by the witness, nor was it in the handwriting of 
the witness.  And, in Liberty Mut. Ins., 194 Va. at 365, 73 
S.E.2d at 371, we held that the prohibition “is 
 
9
specifically made applicable only to actions to recover for 
personal injury or death by wrongful act.”  We have never 
directly confronted the dispositive question presented in 
this appeal, whether Code § 8.01-404 precludes the 
introduction of a witness’ prior written statement as a 
party admission in a plaintiff’s case-in-chief.5 
 
The defendants argue that, if the Officers’ statements 
were introduced into evidence as party admissions, the 
provisions and intent of Code § 8.01-404 would be 
emasculated because the plaintiff’s purpose in using the 
statements would, nevertheless, be to contradict the 
Officers’ trial testimony.  The plaintiff, however, asserts 
that the provisions of Code § 8.01-404 address only the use 
                     
5 The defendants assert that the plaintiff failed to 
argue before the circuit court that the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-404 do not prohibit the use of the Officers’ prior 
written statements as party admissions.  We do not agree.  
During the extensive argument before the circuit court on 
the defendants’ objection, the plaintiff stated to the 
court that he sought to use the Officers’ statements not 
just to impeach the Officers but also as “substantive” 
evidence.  The circuit court understood the plaintiff’s 
position because it ruled that the statements were not 
admissible either for impeachment purposes or as 
substantive evidence.  The circuit court specifically 
stated, “[E]ven if used as substantive evidence in the 
case-in-chief, which it always is even if used for 
impeachment if it’s a party[,] . . . you can use it on 
credibility or substantive evidence and, therefore, putting 
it into evidence to contradict the version that he gives in 
court is in essence using it to contradict him as a witness 
even if it isn’t used in impeachment.”  The plaintiff also 
 
10
of prior written statements to impeach a witness.  Thus, 
according to the plaintiff, the circuit court improperly 
extended the reach of this statute and, by doing so, 
prevented the plaintiff from admitting the Officers’ 
statements as party admissions in his case-in-chief to 
prove the events surrounding the shooting death of Gray.  
We agree with the plaintiff’s position. 
 
The opening phrase of Code § 8.01-404 states that “[a] 
witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements 
made by him in writing or reduced into writing, relative to 
the subject matter of the civil action, without such 
writing being shown to him.”  (Emphasis added.)  We have 
held that this opening portion of a prior version of the 
statute “applies only to the cross-examination of a witness 
. . . and not to an examination in chief of one’s own 
witness.”  Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Wilkes, 137 Va. 
302, 311-12, 119 S.E. 122, 125-26 (1923).  The statute then 
sets out the steps that must be followed “if it is intended 
to contradict such witness by the writing.”  Code § 8.01-
404 (emphasis added).  The use of prior written statements 
to contradict a witness is, however, made subject to the 
prohibition at issue here, “in an action to recover for a 
                                                             
raised this argument in his post-trial motion to 
reconsider. 
 
11
personal injury or death by wrongful act . . . no 
extrajudicial recording of the voice of such witness, or 
reproduction or transcript thereof . . . shall be used to 
contradict him as a witness in the case.”  Code § 8.01-404  
(emphasis added). 
 
The plain terms of Code § 8.01-404 limit the 
application of the prohibition at issue to those situations 
where a prior written statement is used to “contradict” a 
witness.  In the specific context of the present case, that 
was not the result.  The plaintiff sought to introduce the 
transcripts of the Officers’ prior audio-recorded 
statements as party admissions in the plaintiff’s case-in-
chief.  At that point in the trial, the Officers would not 
have been testifying as witnesses nor would they have 
previously testified.  Thus, the statements would not have 
been used to “contradict” the Officers because they would 
not yet have been witnesses and might never have been.  If 
the Officers had already testified and, thereafter, the 
prior audio-recorded statements had been offered as 
evidence, they would have been properly refused.  
Notwithstanding that the statements constituted party 
admissions, their effect, in that circumstance, would have 
been to contradict the witnesses and Code § 8.01-404 would 
not have permitted their introduction.  As we said in 
 
12
Harris, the history of the statute, “as well as the 
language used, clearly indicates that the provisions of the 
statute are confined to the contradiction of a witness by 
the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement in 
writing.”  180 Va. at 220, 22 S.E.2d at 17. 
 
There is an important distinction between a party 
admission and a prior inconsistent statement used to 
impeach a witness’ present testimony.  The latter is never 
admissible to prove the truth of the statement’s content.  
Commercial Distrib., Inc. v. Blankenship, 240 Va. 382, 394, 
397 S.E.2d 840, 847 (1990); Hall v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 
369, 375, 355 S.E.2d 591, 595 (1987).  Accordingly, when 
such a statement is offered for impeachment, the opposing 
party is entitled, upon request, to have the trial court 
give a cautionary instruction to the jury advising that the 
statement is to be considered only insofar as it affects 
the witness’ credibility and that it cannot be considered 
as proof of the statement’s content.  Id. at 374, 355 
S.E.2d at 595. (citing Stoots v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 857, 
866, 66 S.E.2d 866, 871 (1951)). 
In contrast, “[e]xtra-judicial admissions made by a 
party to a civil action are admissible in evidence against” 
that party.  Prince v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 610, 613, 324 
S.E.2d 660, 662 (1985).  “An admission deliberately made, 
 
13
precisely identified and clearly proved affords evidence of 
a most satisfactory nature and may furnish the strongest 
and most convincing evidence of truth.”  Tyree v. Lariew, 
208 Va. 382, 385, 158 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1967).  A party 
admission does not have to be inculpatory or incriminating 
when made.  Alatishe v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 376, 378, 
404 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1991). 
 
Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred by refusing 
to allow the plaintiff to introduce into evidence the 
transcripts of the Officers’ prior audio-recorded 
statements as party admissions in the plaintiff’s case-in-
chief.  We cannot say that the plaintiff was not prejudiced 
by this error since party admissions “may furnish the 
strongest and most convincing evidence of truth.”  Tyree, 
208 Va. at 385, 158 S.E.2d at 143. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment 
of the circuit court and remand this case for a new trial 
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.6 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
                     
6 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
decide whether the circuit court abused its discretion by 
failing to enforce the terms of its pre-trial order 
regarding objections to the admissibility of exhibits. 
 
14
SENIOR JUSTICE STEPHENSON, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The majority concedes, as it 
must, that the statements could not be used to contradict 
witnesses in the trial.  Nevertheless, the majority holds 
that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the 
plaintiff to introduce the statements into evidence "as 
party admissions in the plaintiff's case-in-chief." 
 
In Alspaugh v. Diggs, 195 Va. 1, 9, 77 S.E.2d 362, 366 
(1953), the defendant contended that a writing signed by 
the plaintiff was admissible as " 'a statement against 
interest made by a party in litigation.' "1  We rejected 
that contention, holding that "the introduction in evidence 
of a prior ex parte written statement signed by an 
interested party is within the purview of the Code [present 
§ 8.01-404] and cannot be used for the purpose of 
contradicting him."  Id. at 11, 77 S.E.2d at 367. 
 
In spite of the holding in Alspaugh, which the 
majority does not address, the majority holds that the 
statements in the present case are admissible as party 
admissions based upon the following rationale: 
                     
1 Historically, the terms "admissions against interest" 
and "party admissions" have been used interchangeably.  The 
latter term, however, seems to be preferred at present.  
See Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia 
§ 251, at 465-66 (Michie 1977). 
 
15
At that point in the trial [when the statements 
were proffered as exhibits], the Officers would 
not have been testifying as witnesses nor would 
they have previously testified.  Thus, the 
statements would not have been used to 
"contradict" the Officers because they would not 
yet have been witnesses and might never have 
been.2 
 
 
To me, it is abundantly clear that plaintiff's sole 
purpose in introducing the statements was to contradict the 
Officers when they testified.  Indeed, twenty pages of his 
brief before us were used to endeavor to explain how these 
statements would have contradicted the Officers' testimony.  
Additionally, the majority acknowledges that "[i]f the 
Officers had already testified and, thereafter, the . . . 
statements had been offered as evidence, they would have been 
properly refused."  Continuing, the majority states that the 
effect of the statements "would have been to contradict the 
witnesses and Code § 8.01-404 would not have permitted their 
introduction." 
 
It appears to me that the majority's ruling will allow a 
party to circumvent Code § 8.01-404 by doing indirectly what 
the party could not do directly.  I submit that the 
majority's holding will effectively emasculate the clear 
                                                             
 
2 We do not find in the record that this argument 
(i.e., the timing of the introduction of the statements) 
was ever made by Gray either at trial or on brief in this 
appeal. 
 
16
provisions of Code § 8.01-404.  I would hold that the trial 
court properly prohibited the use of the statements by the 
plaintiff in his case-in-chief.