Title: Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2022

Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Graphnet, Inc. and defendant Retarus, Inc. were considered industry competitors -- they each provided, among other things, cloud-based facsimile services. In 2014, Retarus published a brochure containing allegedly defamatory statements about Graphnet. Graphnet representatives received a copy of the brochure at a May 2016 event. In August 2016, Graphnet filed a complaint against Retarus. Throughout discovery, Graphnet failed to produce requested documents and took no depositions. Based on Graphnet’s failure to present supporting evidence, the trial court dismissed all claims except for the defamation and slander claims. The trial court and the parties agreed that the court would charge the jury pursuant to Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46, “Defamation Damages (Private or Public),” which instructed a jury on the elements of defamation. The trial court’s instructions tracked the model charge closely, including Section D, which is devoted to “Nominal Damages for Slander Per Se or Libel.” In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether a new trial on all damages was required when the jury was improperly instructed on nominal damages and a plaintiff opposes remittitur. Graphnet argued the trial court erred as a matter of law by ordering remittitur without Graphnet’s consent. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, reversed in part, recognizing the jury’s $800,000 nominal damages award was “shockingly excessive and cannot stand” but concluded that the trial court improperly awarded Graphnet $500 in nominal damages in violation of the doctrine of remittitur. The appellate court remanded for a new trial on nominal damages only. As the Appellate Division found, the Supreme Court found remittitur was improper without Graphnet’s consent. But this matter required a new trial on all damages in which the jury was properly instructed on actual and nominal damages. The Supreme Court also referred Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46D to the Committee on Model Civil Jury Charges to be amended. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc. (A-71-20) (085529)Argued November 30, 2021 -- Decided February 11, 2022FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a new trial on all damages is required when the jury is improperly instructed on nominal damages and a plaintiff opposes remittitur. Plaintiff Graphnet, Inc. and defendant Retarus, Inc. are considered industry competitors -- they each provide, among other things, cloud-based facsimile services. In 2014, Retarus published a brochure containing allegedly defamatory statements about Graphnet. The brochure described Retarus’s services, listed some of its then-clients, and contained a section titled “Competition Analysis” that described the purported advantages of Retarus’s services over named competitors, including Graphnet. The brochure listed several “[d]isadvantages” of Retarus’s competitors, including security issues, lack of customer support, and “difficulty with uptime (especially Graphnet).” Graphnet representatives received a copy of the brochure at a May 2016 event. In August 2016, Graphnet filed a complaint against Retarus. Throughout discovery, Graphnet failed to produce requested documents and took no depositions. Based on Graphnet’s failure to present supporting evidence, the trial court dismissed all claims except for the defamation and slander claims. The trial court and the parties agreed that the court would charge the jury pursuant to Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46, entitled “Defamation Damages (Private or Public),” which instructs a jury on the elements of defamation. The trial court’s instructions tracked the model charge closely, including Section D, which is devoted to “Nominal Damages for Slander Per Se or Libel.” In keeping with the model charge, the court instructed the jurors in part (emphases added): For these reasons, you are permitted to award nominal damages to compensate the plaintiff for injury to reputation which you reasonably believe that may have been sustained. Nominal damages are a small amount of money damages that are not designed to compensate a plaintiff, but are awarded for 1 the infraction of a legal right where the extent of the loss is not shown or where the right is one not dependent on the loss or damage. Neither party objected to the instructions at trial. The jury ultimately awarded Graphnet $0 in compensatory damages but $800,000 in nominal damages. Retarus filed a motion for remittitur. Graphnet opposed the motion. The trial court granted Retarus’s motion, holding that the $800,000 award “was grossly disproportionate to the purpose of nominal damages.” The court reduced Graphnet’s award to $500, in part relying on N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10, which defines nominal damages as “damages that are not designed to compensate a plaintiff and are less than $500.” A final order of judgment in the amount of $500 was entered in May 2019. Graphnet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of law by ordering remittitur without Graphnet’s consent. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, reversed in part. The court recognized that the jury’s $800,000 nominal damages award was “shockingly excessive and cannot stand” but concluded that the trial court improperly awarded Graphnet $500 in nominal damages in violation of the well-settled doctrine of remittitur. The appellate court remanded for a new trial on nominal damages only. The Court granted certification. 246 N.J. 440 (2021).HELD: As the Appellate Division found, remittitur was improper without Graphnet’s consent. But this matter requires a new trial on all damages in which the jury is properly instructed on actual and nominal damages. The Court also refers Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46D to the Committee on Model Civil Jury Charges to be amended.1. There are three main types of damages available in an action for defamation: (1) compensatory or actual; (2) punitive or exemplary; and (3) nominal. Compensatory damages depend on showings of actual harm, and may not include a damage award presumed by the jury. Unlike compensatory damages, nominal damages do not attempt to compensate the plaintiff for an actual loss. A nominal damages award may be made in a defamation case to a plaintiff who has not proved a compensable loss. Such an award is a judicial declaration that the plaintiff’s right has been violated. It serves the purpose of vindicating the plaintiff’s character by a verdict of a jury that establishes the falsity of the defamatory statement. Because nominal damages are awarded only when no showing of loss has been made, they are envisioned as more of a legal remedy than a financial one. Nominal damages, under New Jersey law, can best be defined as “a token amount of not more than $500.” (pp. 14-16)2. A grant of remittitur allows a court to decrease a “grossly excessive damages award returned by a jury.” Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 499 (2016). In setting a 2 remittitur, the court must determine “the amount that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, would have awarded.” Orientale v. Jennings, 239 N.J. 569, 577 (2019). However, the court must obtain the plaintiff’s consent before it may grant remittitur. In other words, “[t]he plaintiff has the choice either to accept the award as remitted by the court or to proceed with a new damages trial before another jury.” Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 499. “The absence of mutual consent means that the case proceeds to a second jury for a new damages trial.” Orientale, 239 N.J. at 595. (p. 17)3. Erroneous jury instructions typically constitute reversible error. Such error most commonly results from changes to adapt a model jury charge to the circumstances of a particular case, but it can also result from a fatal flaw within a charge itself. (pp. 17-19)4. The grant of remittitur here -- made without consent of the plaintiff -- was error. The Court therefore considers the appropriate scope of the proceedings on remand. One can only speculate as to the jury’s intentions in awarding Graphnet $0 in compensatory damages and $800,000 in nominal damages. That is because the awards were made after improper jury instructions. Nominal damages can be awarded in a defamation case when a plaintiff has not proven a compensable loss. Here, following the model jury charge, the jury was first told it could “award nominal damages to compensate the plaintiff” and then told that “[n]ominal damages . . . are not designed to compensate a plaintiff.” The contradictory instruction given on nominal damages did not adequately convey the law. Instead, it opened the door for the jury to attempt to compensate Graphnet through nominal damages in a way that was either wholly impermissible under the law or a miscategorized but otherwise permissible form of compensatory damages. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Graphnet, as is required under the appropriate standard of review, there is a possibility that the compensatory damages award might have been different had the jury been properly instructed on the nature and function of nominal damages. Therefore, a new trial on all damages is required. (pp. 19-21)5. The model jury charge, as written, fails to instruct on the definition, scope, and purpose of nominal damages. It instructs the jury “to compensate the plaintiff,” but then contradicts itself by explaining that nominal damages “are not designed to compensate a plaintiff.” The Court provides a charge for use on remand in the instant case and refers Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46D to the Committee on Model Civil Jury Charges to address the issues noted in this opinion. (pp. 22-23) AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. REMANDED for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 71 September Term 2020 085529 Graphnet, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Retarus, Inc., Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided November 30, 2021 February 11, 2022 Joseph Schramm, III, argued the cause for appellant (FisherBroyles, attorneys; Joseph Schramm, III, on the briefs). Karl Geercken argued the cause for respondent (Alston & Bird, attorneys; Karl Geercken and Steven L. Penaro, on the briefs). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a new trial on all damages isrequired when the jury is improperly instructed on nominal damages and aplaintiff opposes remittitur. 1 Plaintiff Graphnet, Inc. and defendant Retarus, Inc. are competitors inthe cloud-based messaging industry. In 2014, Retarus published a brochurecontaining allegedly defamatory statements about Graphnet. Graphnet filed acivil action against Retarus in 2016 alleging, among other causes of action,defamation. Following trial, the court instructed the jury on damages for defamationfollowing Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46D, which instructs a jury that it mayaward nominal damages “to compensate” a plaintiff for injury to reputationcaused by a defendant’s defamation. The jury returned a unanimous verdictfinding that Retarus defamed Graphnet. By a 5-1 vote, the jury found thatGraphnet failed to show that it suffered actual damages. However, the juryawarded Graphnet $800,000 in nominal damages. Without obtaining Graphnet’s consent, the trial court granted Retarus’smotion for remittitur and reduced the nominal damages award to $500, holdingthat $800,000 in nominal damages was grossly disproportionate to the purposeof nominal damages. The Appellate Division agreed that the initial nominal damages awardcould not stand, but it vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a newtrial on nominal damages because, in its view, granting a defendant’s motionfor remittitur without a plaintiff’s consent was improper. 2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Appellate Division’s findingthat remittitur was improper without Graphnet’s consent. However, weconclude that this matter requires a new trial on all damages in which the juryis properly instructed on actual and nominal damages. We also refer ModelCivil Jury Charge 8.46D to the Committee on Model Civil Jury Charges to beamended. I. Graphnet and Retarus are considered industry competitors -- they eachprovide, among other things, cloud-based facsimile services. In February2011, Retarus, which is headquartered in Germany, announced an expansioninto the North American market. In 2014, Retarus prepared the brochure that is the subject of Graphnet’sdefamation claim here. The brochure described Retarus’s services, listed someof its then-clients, and contained a section titled “Competition Analysis” thatdescribed the purported advantages of Retarus’s services over namedcompetitors, including Graphnet. The brochure listed several“[d]isadvantages” of Retarus’s competitors, including security issues, lack ofcustomer support, and “difficulty with uptime (especially Graphnet).” In May 2016, members of Graphnet’s sales team attended a technologyexposition event called Techspo in New York City. Retarus distributed the 3 brochure at the event, and Graphnet’s sales team brought a brochure back to amember of Graphnet’s Executive Team, Guy Conte. A. On August 16, 2016, Graphnet filed a complaint against Retarusasserting defamation/slander; disparagement of goods/trade libel; false light;tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; tortiousinterference with a contract; and unjust enrichment. Through an amendment tothe complaint, Graphnet added several causes of action, including violations ofthe Telecommunications Act and Federal Communication Commissionregulations. Throughout discovery, Graphnet failed to produce requested documentsand took no depositions. On September 14, 2018, Retarus moved for summaryjudgment. Based on Graphnet’s failure to present supporting evidence, thetrial court dismissed all claims except for the defamation and slander claims. A six-day jury trial began on January 29, 2019. At trial, Graphnetintroduced evidence that it had lost revenue from several clients after Retaruspublished the brochure, most notably J.P. Morgan Chase (JPMC). JPMC was alongstanding client of Graphnet’s for almost two decades and, at times,generated $1.5 million in annual revenue for Graphnet. Retarus began doingbusiness with JPMC in 2014; that year, JPMC generated more than $1 million 4 in revenue for Graphnet. However, by 2015, Graphnet’s revenue from JPMCbegan to decline, generating approximately $800,000 in 2015, $300,000 in2016, and $100,000 in 2017. During this time, Retarus’s revenue from JPMCbegan to increase. Retarus gained revenue from JPMC of approximately $1.5million in 2016, $1.7 million in 2017, and $1.8 million in 2018. By 2019,JMPC had ceased doing business with Graphnet. Retarus’s Senior Vice President of Sales, Tim Valentine, testified at trialthat the brochure was not a promotional brochure intended to be given topotential clients, but rather an internal tool used to train Retarus’stelemarketers. He testified that he was unaware of Retarus distributing thebrochure to any potential clients or anywhere outside of the company .Graphnet did not provide testimony at trial from anyone who received thebrochure at the Techspo exhibition. The jury heard testimony derived from the affidavit and deposition ofJeffrey Chaney, who worked at JPMC from 2001 to 2015 and had dealingswith both Graphnet and Retarus during that time. Chaney testified that he hadseen the brochure years earlier and that it looked “like a sales pitch to [JPMC]of what Retarus can do for [JPMC].” He also testified that Retarus had neitherdisparaged Graphnet nor provided materials to JPMC that cast Graphnet in a 5 negative light. Chaney stated that JPMC did not rely on the brochure inchoosing Retarus as a new vendor. Conte testified that JPMC began reducing its business with Graphnet asearly as 2013 and conceded that Graphnet received complaints from manycustomers, including JPMC, regarding issues in Graphnet’s services thatresulted from damage sustained from Hurricane Sandy in 2012. B. The trial court and the parties agreed that the court would charge the jurypursuant to Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46, entitled “Defamation Damages(Private or Public),” which instructs a jury on the elements of defamation.Section A provides general instructions on damages, distinguishing betweencompensatory and punitive damages. Sections B through D, in turn, focus oncompensatory damages: Section B applies to most claims for compensatory oractual damages; Section C is devoted to compensatory damages for emotionalsuffering; and, of particular relevance here, Section D is devoted to “NominalDamages for Slander Per Se or Libel.” The trial court first provided the following instruction to the jury ongeneral damages: For the injury to reputation caused by defendant’s alleged defamatory statement, plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are sought by the plaintiff for the recovery of money value 6 of their loss. If the plaintiff has established the essential elements of their claim as explained in my instructions, they’re entitled to compensatory damages for all detrimental effects of the defamatory statement relating to the plaintiff’s reputation which were reasonably to be foreseen and which are the direct and natural result of the defamatory statement. Damages awarded for such purposes are compensatory.That instruction followed Section A nearly verbatim other than the removal oflanguage about punitive damages, which were not sought by Graphnet. The trial court then provided the jury the following instruction oncompensatory damages: [C]ompensatory damages are referred to as special damages. These damages are never presumed. They must be specified by the plaintiff and proved by the evidence. Plaintiff must show you what the special loss was and by what sequence of connected events it was produced by the defamation. Plaintiff can recover these damages only if you determine that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s actual losses, financial or economic. Evidence of embarrassment, mental suffering or physical sickness will not -- and this really doesn’t apply to it -- a company mental suffering or sickness, but embarrassment will not, without more, entitle plaintiff to these damages. Here, the plaintiff claims that they suffered specific damage as a result of the publication of the defamatory statement. I will now outline the specific damages claimed by the plaintiff. And these damages are as follows: it is the loss of business opportunity and loss of business property. 7 That instruction likewise followed Section B very closely, except for theclarification about mental suffering or physical sickness. Lastly, the trial court provided the following instruction to the jury onnominal damages: In the event that you find the plaintiff is not entitled to actual damages plaintiff claims were caused by defendant’s wrongful act, plaintiff seeks for recovery for nominal damages which the law presumes to follow naturally and necessarily from the publication of the [libel] and are recoverable by the plaintiff without proof of causation and without proof of actual injury. The law recognizes the damage to reputation caused by defamation may not always lend itself to proofs of -- by objective evidence. An opportunity may be closed to the business without their knowledge. Damage to the character or reputation could occur without the corporation or the business knowing of the [libel] or slander. A person’s business or, in this case, may be limited by the operations of forces which the person cannot identify, but which, nevertheless, were set in motion by the defamatory statement. In fact, it has been said that the damages which are presumed from publication of a defamatory statement or material, while not capable of being accurately measured, are in many ways more substantial and real than those which can be proved and measured accurately by a dollar amount. For these reasons, you are permitted to award nominal damages to compensate the plaintiff for injury to reputation which you reasonably believe that may have been sustained. Nominal damages are a small amount of money damages that are not designed to compensate a plaintiff, but are awarded for the infraction of a legal 8 right where the extent of the loss is not shown or where the right is one not dependent on the loss or damage. [(emphases added).]Again, that instruction essentially followed Section D of the Model Civil JuryCharge verbatim. Neither party objected to the instructions at trial, and the parties agreedto a jury verdict sheet of six questions, three of which were related to damages.While it deliberated, the jury asked the court questions about calculatingdamages, including whether the verdict sheet contained a typo in Question 6,printed below, which concerned nominal damages. The court explained to thejury that Question 6 asked “what is the amount of nominal damage -- damagesGraphnet is entitled to compensate Graphnet -- Graphnet’s injury to reputationwhich you reasonably believe it sustained.” The parties agreed on the court’sexplanation. On February 5, 2019, the jury returned a verdict finding Graphnet hadnot shown actual damages suffered as a result of the 2014 publication of thebrochure to a third party. The jury answered the questions concerningdamages as follows, and these responses were confirmed by individuallypolling the jurors: Question 4: Has Graphnet shown by a preponderance of the evidence actual damages that it suffered as a result of the statement made by Retarus? 9 Answer 4: No. Question 5: What is the amount of compensatory damages (actual damages) Graphnet is entitled to as a result of Retarus’s defamatory statements? Answer 5: Zero. Question 6: In the event that you find that Graphnet is not entitled to actual damages, Graphnet may recover nominal damages without proof of causation and without proof of actual harm for the publication of the defamatory statement to a third party other than Graphnet. What is the amount of nominal damages Graphnet is entitled to compensate Graphnet for the injury to reputation which you reasonably believe is sustained? Answer 6: Amount of nominal damages: $800,000. VOTE 6:0 At least five jurors must agree on the answer to this question. Cease deliberations and return your verdict. Retarus filed a motion for remittitur. Graphnet opposed the motion. OnMay 8, 2019, the trial court granted Retarus’s motion, holding that the$800,000 award “was grossly disproportionate to the purpose of nominaldamages.” The court reduced Graphnet’s award to $500, in part relying on N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10, which defines nominal damages as “damages that are notdesigned to compensate a plaintiff and are less than $500.” A final order ofjudgment in the amount of $500 was entered on May 24, 2019. 10 C. Graphnet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of lawby ordering remittitur without Graphnet’s consent. Graphnet soughtreinstatement of the jury award or, in the alternative, a new trial on alldamages. Graphnet contended that the jury instruction constituted harmfulerror and was contradictory because it provided that nominal damages could beawarded “to compensate” a plaintiff. Retarus argued that a plaintiff’s consent to remittitur is not required andthat Graphnet waived its opportunity to object to the jury instructions at trial.Retarus submitted that the jury was properly instructed on damages and that,because Graphnet presented no evidence of actual damages, the $800,000award was excessive as either a nominal damages or actual damages award. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed in part,reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial on nominal damages only. Thecourt recognized that the jury’s $800,000 nominal damages award was“shockingly excessive and cannot stand.” However, it concluded that the trialcourt improperly awarded Graphnet $500 in nominal damages in violation ofthe well-settled doctrine of remittitur: “when a court determines that adamages award cannot stand because it is so grossly excessive that it shocksthe judicial conscience, [a] 'plaintiff has the choice either to accept the award 11 as remitted by the court or to proceed with a new damages trial before anotherjury.’” (quoting Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 499 (2016)).Relying on this Court’s recent decision in Orientale v. Jennings, the appellatecourt emphasized that the “absence of mutual consent means that the caseproceeds to a second jury for a new damages trial.” (quoting 239 N.J. 569,595 (2019)). The Appellate Division vacated the trial court’s order andremanded for a new trial limited to nominal damages. We granted Graphnet’s petition for certification requesting a new trial onall damages. 246 N.J. 440 (2021). II. Graphnet argues that the Appellate Division properly vacated the trialcourt’s remittitur but improperly ordered a new trial on nominal damages only.It maintains that a new jury trial on all damages is required under this Court’sholding in Nuwave Investment Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., Inc., which“requires a new trial on damages in which the [new] jury is properly instructedon the various categories of damages.” 221 N.J. 495, 498 (2015). Graphnetsubmits that the trial court’s erroneous instruction to the jury that it could“compensate” Graphnet with a nominal damages award described actualdamages and led to the $800,000 nominal damages award. Graphnet also 12 requests that this Court provide guidance on Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46Dfor future cases. Retarus, on the other hand, argues that the Appellate Division correctlygranted a new trial on nominal damages only. It relies on Fertile v. St.Michael’s Medical Center to support the argument that the purpose ofremittitur is to “avoid the necessity of a new trial.” 169 N.J. 481, 491 (2001) .Retarus also relies on an unpublished Appellate Division opinion to support itsargument that Graphnet is not entitled to a new trial on compensatory damagesbecause the jury found that Graphnet did not suffer actual harm. Retarusargues that, if granted a new trial on all damages, Graphnet will unfairly begiven another bite at the apple to prove compensatory damages, even thoughthe jury found it was entitled to none. III. This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of remittitur de novo, but defersto a trial court’s “feel of the case.” Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 502. However, “[a]judge’s 'feel of the case’ based on observing a party or a witness in thecourtroom is entitled to minimal weight if the jury had the same opportunity tomake similar observations”; it is “the jury’s 'feel of the case’ [that] controlsthe outcome of the issues in dispute.” Ibid. 13 “[S]ubstantial deference . . . must be accorded [to] a damages awardrendered by a jury.” Orientale, 239 N.J. at 589. That deference can beovercome only if a defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence“that the award is a 'miscarriage of justice.’” Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 501 (quotingBaxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977)). The fact that adamages award is substantial does not necessarily mean it is excessive and amiscarriage of justice; so long as a jury could rationally have reached theverdict from the evidence presented, it will be upheld. Jastram v. Kruse, 197 N.J. 216, 235 (2008); see also Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256, 283 (2007)(finding a remittitur unjustified even though the jury’s award was“undoubtedly high, perhaps overly generous”). Finally, “the trial record underlying a remittitur motion must be viewedin the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 486. A. There are three main types of damages available in an action fordefamation: “(1) compensatory or actual, which may be either (a) general or(b) special; (2) punitive or exemplary; and (3) nominal.” W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 239 (2012) (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 116A at 842 (5thed. 1984)). “All compensatory damages . . . depend on showings of actualharm, . . . and may not include a damage award presumed by the jury.” 14 Nuwave, 221 N.J. at 499. Special actual damages “compensate a plaintiff forspecific economic or pecuniary loss,” while general actual damages “addressharm that is not capable of precise monetary calculation.” Ibid. Therefore,actual damages may include “impairment to reputation and standing in [a]community.” W.J.A., 210 N.J. at 239 (citation omitted). Unlike compensatory damages, “[n]ominal damages . . . do not attemptto compensate the plaintiff for an actual loss. Rather, they are a trivial amount. . . .” Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48 (1984)(citation omitted). Nominal damages “'serve[] the purpose of vindicating’ thecharacter of 'a plaintiff who has not proved a compensable loss.’” Nuwave, 221 N.J. at 499 (quoting W.J.A., 210 N.J. at 240-41). If “compensatorydamages are otherwise available to the plaintiff,” nominal damages are not tobe awarded. Id. at 500. With regard to defamation cases, if a statement is found to bedefamatory without a finding of actual harm, then “only nominal damages canbe awarded.” Id. at 499. A nominal damages award may be made in a defamation case to a plaintiff who has not proved a compensable loss. Nominal damages are awarded for the infraction of a legal right, where the extent of the loss is not shown, or where the right is one not dependent upon loss or damage. Such an award is a judicial declaration that the plaintiff’s right has been violated. It serves the purpose of vindicating the 15 plaintiff’s character by a verdict of a jury that establishes the falsity of the defamatory statement. [W.J.A., 210 N.J. at 240-41 (citations and quotations omitted).] Because nominal damages are awarded only when no showing of losshas been made, they are envisioned as more of a legal remedy than a financialone. Modern Federal Jury Instruction 77-6, for example, specifies that“[n]ominal damages may not be awarded for more than a token sum.” And theModel Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Third Circuit(2010) explicitly require that, for certain causes of action, if the jury should“return a verdict for [plaintiff], but [plaintiff] has failed to prove compensatorydamages, then you must award nominal damages of $1.00.” See, e.g., Charges4.8.2; 5.4.5; 6.4.5 (emphasis added). New Jersey’s court rule does not definenominal damages, but N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10, which provides “[d]efinitionsrelative to punitive damages awards,” states that “'[n]ominal damages’ aredamages that are not designed to compensate a plaintiff and are less than$500.” We find no reason to depart from the limit set for nominal damages bythe Legislature. In sum, nominal damages, under New Jersey law, can best bedefined as “a token amount of not more than $500.” 16 B. A grant of remittitur allows a court to decrease a “grossly excessivedamages award returned by a jury.” Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 499. In setting aremittitur, the court must determine “the amount that a reasonable jury,properly instructed, would have awarded.” Orientale v. Jennings, 239 N.J. 569, 577 (2019) (quoting Tronolone v. Palmer, 224 N.J. Super. 92,103 (App.Div. 1988)). If “[a] damages award . . . is so grossly excessive that it shocks thejudicial conscience [it] cannot stand, and . . . remittitur allows the parties theoption of avoiding the unnecessary expense and delay of a new trial.” Ibid.However, the court must obtain the plaintiff’s consent before it may grantremittitur. Fertile, 169 N.J. at 491. In other words, “[t]he plaintiff has thechoice either to accept the award as remitted by the court or to proceed with anew damages trial before another jury.” Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 499. Under thisCourt’s holding in Orientale, “[t]he absence of mutual consent means that thecase proceeds to a second jury for a new damages trial.” 239 N.J. at 595. C. Erroneous jury instructions typically constitute reversible error. Das v.Thani, 171 N.J. 518, 527 (2002). A reviewing court must determine whether“the charge, considered as a whole, adequately conveys the law and is unlikely 17 to confuse or mislead the jury, even though part of the charge, standing alone,might be incorrect.” Fischer v. Canario, 143 N.J. 235, 254 (1996). “The test,therefore, is whether the charge in its entirety was ambiguous or misleading.”State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 324 (2005) (quoting State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 317 (1960)); see also Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 468 (2000) (taking a similar approach to mistakes in jury sheets, whichare not grounds for reversal unless they are “so misleading, confusing, orambiguous that they produce[] an unjust result”). Such error most commonly results from changes made to adapt a modeljury charge to the circumstances of a particular case, cf. State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61, 70 (2021) (“It is difficult to find that a charge that follows the ModelCharge so closely constitutes plain error.” (quoting Mogull, 162 N.J. at 466)),but it can also result from a fatal flaw within a charge itself, see, e.g., Williamsv. State, 200 A.3d 314, 316, 328 (Md. 2019) (finding reversible error “wherethe trial court gave a pattern jury instruction that erroneously omitted anelement of the sole offense for which the petitioner was convicted”). New Jersey’s Model Civil Jury Charges are valuable aids created by theModel Civil Jury Charge Committee “to be useful to trial judges and litigants,”see Model Civil Jury Charges: General Comments, https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/civilcharges/generalcomments.pdf?c=UtQ, but they “are not 18 binding authority,” State v. Bryant, 419 N.J. Super. 15, 28 (App. Div. 2011).“[W]hen the Court has occasion to address the contents of an adopted charge ,”it may review the language of the charge in question to ensure it is “consistentwith the Court’s instructions.” See Flood v. Aluri-Vallabhaneni, 431 N.J.Super. 365, 384 (App. Div. 2013) (underscoring that courts may “rest assured”that the language of a model charge is indeed consistent with this Court’sinstructions only when such review has occurred); see also, e.g., Morlino v.Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cty., 152 N.J. 563, 590 (1998) (referring a jury charge tothe Committee with instructions for modification). IV. A. We first consider whether the grant of remittitur here -- made withoutconsent of the plaintiff -- was error. On this point, our precedent is clear:“only the plaintiff -- not the defendant -- has the choice to accept the remittedamount or proceed to a new damages trial.” Orientale, 239 N.J. at 590.Because that did not happen at the trial court, we affirm the AppellateDivision’s decision to vacate the trial court’s order of remittitur and to remandfor further proceedings. B. We next consider the appropriate scope of the proceedings on remand. 19 At trial, the jury heard several witnesses testify that a decline inGraphnet’s business was unrelated to and occurred well before Retarus’spublication of the brochure. And the jury unanimously found that, althoughRetarus defamed Graphnet, Graphnet failed to prove by a preponderance of theevidence that it suffered actual damages from the defamation (response toQuestion 4). Accordingly, it awarded Graphnet $0 in compensatory damages(response to Question 5). Yet it simultaneously awarded $800,000 in nominaldamages (response to Question 6), which were described first in the jurycharge, then in Question 6 itself, and finally in the court’s response to thejury’s inquiry about Question 6, as a means “to compensate Graphnet for theinjury to reputation which you reasonably believe is sustained.” We can only speculate as to the jury’s intentions in awarding Graphnet$0 in compensatory damages and $800,000 in nominal damages. That isbecause the awards were made after improper jury instructions. As notedearlier, nominal damages can be awarded in a defamation case when a plaintiffhas --- proven a compensable loss. Here, following the model jury charge, the notjury was first told it could “award nominal damages to compensate theplaintiff” and then told that “[n]ominal damages . . . are not designed tocompensate a plaintiff.” 20 The contradictory instruction given on nominal damages did not“adequately convey[] the law.” Fischer, 143 N.J. at 254. Instead, it openedthe door for the jury to attempt to compensate Graphnet through nominaldamages in a way that was either wholly impermissible under the law or amiscategorized but otherwise permissible form of compensatory damages.Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Graphnet, as is requiredunder our standard of review, we can only conclude that there is a possibilitythat the compensatory damages award might have been different had the jurybeen properly instructed on the nature and function of nominal damages. Retarus submits that a new trial solely on nominal damages is requiredhere. We disagree. As originally charged, the instruction conflated actualdamages with nominal damages. Under our precedent in Nuwave, theincorrect jury instruction warrants a new trial on all theories of damages ratherthan one limited to nominal damages only. See 221 N.J. at 500 (“Because it isunclear whether the entirety of the jury award was influenced by theinadequate instruction . . . , the cleanest and most fair resolution is to vacatethe entire award and remand this matter for a new trial on damages.”).Therefore, a new trial on all damages is required. 21 C. Finally, we consider how an instruction on nominal damages couldappropriately convey to the jury the purpose -- and limitations -- of suchdamages. The model jury charge, as written, fails to instruct on the definition,scope, and purpose of nominal damages. It instructs the jury “to compensatethe plaintiff,” but then contradicts itself by explaining that nominal damages“are not designed to compensate a plaintiff.” Therefore, in the instant case, weremand with instructions to charge the jury on nominal damages as follows : In the event you find plaintiff is not entitled to actual damages, plaintiff seeks an award of nominal damages, which are recoverable without proof of causation and without proof of actual injury. The law recognizes that damage to reputation caused by defamation may not always lend itself to proof by objective evidence. An opportunity may be closed to the person without the person’s knowledge. Damage to character or reputation could occur without the person knowing of the libel. A person’s business or professional career may be limited by the operation of forces which the person cannot identify but which, nevertheless, were set in motion by the defamatory statement. For those reasons, you are permitted to award nominal damages to plaintiff for injury to reputation which you reasonably believe plaintiff sustained. Nominal damages are a small amount of money damages that are awarded for the infraction of a legal right. They are a token amount of no more than $500. 22 Nominal damages are not designed to compensate a plaintiff, but rather to recognize that the plaintiff has suffered an infraction and to vindicate the plaintiff’s character where the extent of loss is not shown, or where the right is not one dependent upon loss or damage. The law presumes that nominal damages follow naturally and necessarily from the publication of a libel even when no proof of actual loss is available. We also refer Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46D to the Committee onModel Civil Jury Charges to address the issues noted in this opinion. V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified, and thematter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 23