Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Jerry Jerome Smith v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060427
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2007

REL: 05/25/2007 - Ex parte Smith
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1060427
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Jerry Jerome Smith
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-97-270;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-97-1258)
STUART, Justice.
1060427
2
The issue in this case is whether Jerry Jerome Smith is
mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding
unconstitutional 
the 
execution of a mentally retarded
offender).
On February 24, 1998, Smith was found guilty of capital
murder, and on March 19, 1998, he was sentenced to death.  On
August 31, 2001, after twice remanding the case for the trial
court to address errors in its sentencing order, the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed Smith's conviction and death
sentence. Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-97-1258, December 22, 2000]
___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). 
In 2002, after the Court of Criminal Appeals had affirmed
Smith's conviction and sentence and after we had granted
Smith's petition for certiorari review of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision, the United States Supreme Court
released Atkins.  At that time Smith raised an Atkins claim
before this Court, which we denied after conducting a plain-
error review.  We held that the facts before us did not
support a finding that Smith was mentally retarded.  However,
we reversed Smith's death sentence and remanded the case to
1060427
3
the trial court for new penalty-phase proceedings because the
trial court had erroneously excluded certain mitigating
evidence during the original penalty phase of Smith's trial.
Ex parte Smith, [Ms. 1010267, March 14, 2003] ___ So. 2d ___
(Ala. 2003).
On remand, Smith attempted to litigate the Atkins claim
in the trial court.  It is unclear from our review of the
proceedings and the trial court's order whether the trial
court believed that the Atkins claim could be litigated on
remand.  Before the penalty-phase proceedings could be held on
remand, Smith filed three Atkins motions; two of those motions
requested a pre-penalty-phase hearing on the issue.  During a
recess in voir dire examination of the venire for the penalty-
phase hearing, the trial court deferred ruling on the Atkins
motions until it heard the evidence relating to Smith's mental
capabilities.  The trial court specifically denied Smith's
request for a pre-penalty-phase hearing on the Atkins issue.
There is no further mention in the record of these motions,
and the trial court did not issue a specific ruling on Smith's
Atkins motions.
1060427
Dr. Michael D'Errico, a forensic psychologist, testified
1
at the new penalty-phase hearing that Smith was "mildly
mentally retarded."  He had previously testified at Smith's
trial that Smith was "mildly mentally deficient."
4
On November 9, 2004, after the new penalty-phase hearing,
the jury recommended that Smith be sentenced to death.  In its
sentencing order of January 18, 2005, the trial court found as
a "nonstatutory mitigating circumstance" that Smith is "mildly
mentally retarded" but nonetheless imposed a death sentence.
On March 22, 2005, the trial court denied Smith's motion for
a new sentencing hearing.   
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment and held as a matter of law that
"[Smith] is mentally retarded and is therefore not
eligible for the death penalty.  In reaching this
conclusion, we find Dr. [Michael] D'Errico's[1]
testimony and change of opinion during the new
sentencing proceeding to be compelling.  We also
find the trial court's findings that the appellant
was borderline mentally retarded and mildly mentally
retarded and its findings about his deficits in
adaptive behavior to be significant and entitled to
great weight."
Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-97-1258, September 29, 2006] ___ So.
2d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)(opinion on return to
remand).
1060427
5
The State filed an application for rehearing, which the
Court of Criminal Appeals overruled on December 1, 2006.  The
State then filed a petition for the writ of certiorari with
this Court.  
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
and remand the case for that court to remand it to the trial
court with directions that the trial court conduct an Atkins
hearing and make an explicit determination whether Smith is
mentally retarded and, consequently, ineligible for the death
penalty.  If the trial court determines that Smith is mentally
retarded as provided in Atkins, the trial court has the
authority to vacate its sentencing order and resentence Smith
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Facts
On October 19, 1996, at about 8:30 p.m., Smith went to
Willie Flournoy's residence in Houston County to collect
between $1,500 and $1,700 Flournoy owed him for crack cocaine.
When Smith arrived, Flournoy told Smith that he did not have
the money but that he would have it later that night.  They
then smoked some crack cocaine together before Smith left.  
1060427
6
Smith returned to Flournoy's residence later that night,
accompanied by his girlfriend, Lekina Smith.  Smith carried
with him, inside his sleeve, a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle.
Smith again asked Flournoy for his money, but Flournoy said
that he did not have it.  At that point, Smith told Lekina to
get out of the way as he raised his rifle.  Smith then  shot
Flournoy, who was unarmed, with the rifle.  In order to
eliminate any witnesses, Smith proceeded to shoot Theresa
Helms and David Bennett, who were at Flournoy's house that
night and who were also unarmed.  Derrick Gross, who was also
at the residence, confronted Smith.  As Smith tried to prevent
Gross from getting away, the two men wrestled over the gun.
As the two men struggled at the back steps of the residence,
Smith told Lekina to give him a knife she was holding so that
he could stab Gross.  A vehicle then pulled up to the
residence, and Gross was able to get away and report the
shootings to the police.  
Smith and Lekina fled to Lekina's father's house.  From
there, they got a ride to the residence of Miranda Felder.  At
Smith's request, Felder hid the rifle at her residence.  Smith
and Lekina then went to the residence of Lavoris Smith,
1060427
7
Lekina's mother, where they changed clothes.  Smith was
eventually apprehended at about 2:00 a.m. at his father's
house, where he was found hiding under the bedcovers.  After
he was taken into custody and advised of his rights by law-
enforcement officers, Smith confessed to the three murders. 
In his brief to this Court, Smith sets forth the
following evidence from the previous proceedings in support of
his claim that he is mentally retarded and, thus, ineligible
for the death penalty.  
When he was eight years old, Smith's IQ was measured at
61.  Tests given to him at ages 9 and 12 showed his IQ to be
72 and 66, respectively.  After repeating the first grade,
Smith was classified as "educably mentally retarded" and was
placed in special-education classes, where he remained until
he left school after the eighth grade.  David Glanton, a
special-education teacher who knew Smith when he was in
elementary school, testified that he believed Smith to be
mentally retarded.
Other witnesses testified that it was clear from a young
age that Smith had significant mental limitations.  Charles
Davis, a neighbor, noticed that when Smith was nine years old
1060427
8
he was different in "his ability to comprehend and his ability
to respond to things you would tell him to do. He couldn't
respond as a normal child would."  Fred Davis, a childhood
friend and neighbor of Smith's, testified that he regarded
Smith as mentally retarded based on his knowledge of Smith's
childhood.  Davis testified that if Smith was asked to drive
to a specific address to pick up some documents, he would be
unable to do so.  A third neighbor, Napoleon Bradley, who also
knew Smith as a child, regarded him as "slow."  Bradley was an
automobile mechanic, and when Smith was a teenager he would
help Bradley with his work, but Bradley had to carefully
supervise Smith and could entrust him with only simple tasks.
Testimony indicated that Smith struggled with literacy
into adulthood. Officer Ted Yost, formerly of the Headland
Police Department, testified that he stopped Smith in Headland
in October 1996 for a traffic violation.  Smith gave his name
as "Christopher Michael Turner," but after he was arrested
signed a waiver-of-rights form "C-U-M-R-I-M T-U-M-N-T-H-N." 
In July 1997, in preparation for Smith's trial, Dr.
Michael D'Errico, a forensic psychologist, tested Smith's IQ
1060427
9
and found it to be 67.  Two months later, a defense expert
tested Smith's IQ and reported the resulting score to be 72.
During the guilt phase of trial, Smith called Dr. Donald
Crook, a licensed professional counselor, who testified that
before developing his opinion of Smith's intelligence level,
he administered the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale IQ test
to Smith.  Dr. Cook stated that Smith scored a full-scale IQ
of 72 on this test.  Based on this IQ score and a childhood IQ
score of Smith's, Dr. Crook opined that Smith's level of
functioning was best described as mildly mentally retarded. 
Additionally, during the guilt phase of Smith's trial,
the State called Dr. D'Errico, who testified that in his
opinion Smith was "mildly mentally deficient."  Dr. D'Errico
also testified at the second penalty-phase hearing; at that
time he diagnosed Smith as being mildly mentally retarded.
Dr. D'Errico explained that he did not see the record
containing Smith's IQ score of 61 at age eight until the
summer of 2004, which was after Dr. D'Errico had testified in
the first trial.  Dr. D'Errico testified that this early test
score provided additional information necessary to support his
present diagnosis that Smith is mildly mentally retarded. 
1060427
10
Evidence regarding the history of mental retardation in
Smith's family was also presented at the second penalty-phase
hearing.  At least three of Smith's siblings have been
diagnosed with mental retardation.  Smith's brother, Arlester,
is described in records from the Department of Human Resources
as "severely retarded."  Another brother, Darron, has a
full-scale IQ of 65 and was diagnosed as being mildly mentally
retarded.  Smith's sister, Debra, was also diagnosed as being
mildly mentally retarded.  In addition, his sister Mary
attended special-education classes.  Charles Davis testified
that Smith's mother was also mentally retarded.
On the other hand, in addition to the facts surrounding
the murders that show Smith's intellectual and adaptive
functioning at the time of the offenses, the State sets forth
the following evidence that tends to show that Smith is not
mentally retarded.
Smith testified on his own behalf during the guilt phase
and the first penalty phase of his trial.  Smith was
articulate and responded appropriately to the questions asked
of him during his testimony.  In addition, he did not have any
difficulty understanding the questions.  During his testimony,
1060427
11
Smith used words such as "paranoid" and "overexaggerate"
appropriately.  He also knew that there were 60 minutes in an
hour and that 911 was the telephone number to call in an
emergency.  Smith testified that at the time of his trial he
was 27 years old and had an eighth-grade education but that he
could not read or write.  He also testified that on October
19, 1996, he was living at 608 Whiddon Street.  Smith also
knew what he was saying when he testified, knew where he was,
and understood the charges against him.  Also, as this Court
has previously found, "the record indicates that before the
murders Smith was able to hold various jobs. At the time of
the murders, Smith was working a construction job." Ex parte
Smith, ___ So. 2d at ___.
During the guilt phase of the trial, Smith testified that
he was not married to Lekina Smith but that he considered her
to be his common-law wife and that they had been in that
relationship for a year -- that he lived with her, slept with
her, and they had talked about having children together.  
Smith also testified that he had been involved in an
interstate drug ring with a man named Tony.  Smith first met
Tony, a Jamaican who lived in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, while
1060427
12
Smith was serving time in prison on charges of assault,
unlawful breaking and entering of a motor vehicle, robbery,
and escape.  On at least one occasion, in August 1996, Smith
met Tony in Jacksonville, Florida, and obtained drugs from
him.  Smith testified that he knew that bringing drugs from
Florida to Alabama was illegal but that he did it anyway
because he wanted to make money.  At the time of the murders,
Smith owed Tony $27,000, and Tony had threatened to kill Smith
and his mother if Smith did not pay him.  Smith also testified
that at the time of the murders he had a $400-a-day crack
habit and that he sold drugs to maintain that habit.
As noted earlier, Smith called Dr. Crook to testify
during the guilt phase of the trial.  Dr. Crook testified that
in his opinion Smith's level of mental functioning was best
described as mildly mentally retarded.  However, as this Court
observed in our prior opinion:
"Dr. Crook admitted that his conclusions did not
take into consideration Smith's articulate statement
made to the police after he was arrested for the
murders; the facts surrounding the murders, which
indicate 
intentional, 
goal-oriented 
behavior;
Smith's relationship with his girlfriend; or Smith's
statements while he was in jail awaiting trial to
the effect that he had committed the murders and
that he would 'get off' on a plea of mental disease
or defect."
1060427
13
Ex parte Smith, ___ So. 2d at ___.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the State called Dr.
D'Errico to testify during the guilt phase.  Dr. D'Errico
testified that when he talked to Smith he could see that Smith
was very "street-wise" or "street-smart."  Dr. D'Errico
defined mild mental retardation as follows: 
"Mild[ly] mentally retarded means that you have an
individual who scored between 50 and 70 on a
standardized intelligence test. Also, an individual
has 
at 
least 
two 
deficits 
in 
two 
areas 
of
independent functioning, and these intellectual
deficits and independent functioning deficits were
apparent before the individual was the age of
eighteen."
Although Smith scored below a 70 on the intelligence test Dr.
D'Errico administered to him, Dr. D'Errico did not classify
Smith as mildly mentally retarded; rather he classified him as
mildly mentally deficient.  Dr. D'Errico explained this
decision as follows:
"Mild[ly] mentally deficient refers to intellectual
ability as measured by an intelligence test.
Mild[ly] mentally retarded is an official diagnosis
which involves not only intellectual deficits, but
as I stated before, deficits in independent living.
When I reviewed Mr. Smith's case, I found that he
was living independently at a level, probably,
higher than a mentally retarded individual would be
living.  Therefore, I felt that I was at a loss to
come up with a diagnosis of mental retardation.
1060427
14
However, his score on the intelligence test placed
him in the mild range of mental deficiency." 
Smith called Dr. D'Errico to testify at the second
penalty-phase hearing; he testified that he had changed his
opinion about Smith's intellectual functioning from his trial
testimony, and he now concluded that Smith is mentally
retarded.  Dr. D'Errico testified that he classified Smith as
mentally deficient during the initial trial because he lacked
clear evidence of Smith's low IQ before age 18.
During Smith's second penalty-phase hearing, Kevin
Bridges, who had been incarcerated with Smith for a year,
testified that he had heard Smith telling other inmates that
he was going to "get off" the capital-murder charges on a
"mental plea."  
Officer Yost also testified for the State during Smith's
second penalty-phase hearing.  On October 16, 1996, Officer
Yost was a patrolman with the Headland Police Department.  On
that night, while driving a marked police car, Officer Yost
observed a vehicle that had a cracked windshield and one
working headlight.  It appeared to Officer Yost that the
vehicle was trying to avoid him.  When the vehicle stopped,
Officer Yost pulled up to it.  Officer Yost identified Smith
1060427
15
as the man he saw get out of the vehicle and walk to a pay
telephone.  Officer Yost approached Smith and identified
himself as a police officer.  Smith told Officer Yost that his
name was Christopher Michael Turner.  After Smith admitted
that he had a pistol under the driver's seat of the vehicle,
Officer Yost obtained Smith's consent to search the vehicle,
and he confiscated the pistol.  Smith stated that he did not
have a permit for the gun, so Officer Yost arrested Smith for
carrying a concealed weapon.  Officer Yost then transported
Smith to the Headland Police Department.  After arriving at
the police station, Smith told the officers that he needed to
go to the bathroom.  While in the bathroom, Smith escaped.
Officer Yost learned that Smith had given him a false name
when Smith was arrested three days later on the capital-murder
charge.  
Additionally, the State called Dr. Doug McKeown, a
forensic psychologist, to testify at the second penalty-phase
hearing.  Dr. McKeown testified that a person is not
automatically classified as mentally retarded if the person's
IQ score is below 70.  Dr. McKeown explained that a number of
different variables affect an individual's performance on an
1060427
16
IQ test, including the individual's relationship with the
examiner, the individual's interest in taking the test, and
the individual's motivation while taking the test.  Dr.
McKeown also testified that when considering whether an
individual could be classified as mentally retarded, a
psychologist also has to consider an individual's adaptive
functioning.  Dr. McKeown testified that a person's adaptive-
functioning skills are just as important, or more important,
than an IQ score because they indicate a person's ability to
function in the real world.  According to Dr. McKeown, an IQ
score cannot show how well a person functions in his
environment and in society. 
Dr. McKeown explained that he examined a wealth of
information concerning Smith before he rendered his opinion
that Smith is not mentally retarded.  This information
included Dr. Crook's report, Dr. D'Errico's report, Smith's
test results on the Vineland Social Maturity Scale, and
historical documents indicating Smith's intelligence.  Dr.
McKeown also reasoned that a mentally retarded person could
not (as Smith had done): file a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
1060427
In 1991, Smith filed a pro se Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
2
petition challenging his 1991 conviction for first-degree
assault.
17
petition,  give a false name to police, escape from custody,
2
understand the word "paranoid," want to represent himself in
court, put items on layaway, do mechanical work on cars, pay
child support, live independently, or respond appropriately to
questions in a deposition.  Therefore, Dr. McKeown stated that
Smith is not mentally retarded but functions more in the
borderline range of intellectual functioning.
Discussion
The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in finding that Smith is mentally retarded as a matter
of law and, consequently, in reversing Smith's sentence of
death.  Specifically, the State alleges that the decision of
the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with this Court's
decision in Ex parte Smith because the holding of the Court of
Criminal Appeals focused on Smith's intellectual and adaptive
functioning before age 18, while ignoring Smith's intellectual
and adaptive functioning at the time of the offense.  The
State also alleges that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by
placing "great weight" on the trial court's finding that Smith
1060427
18
is "mildly mentally retarded" because that finding was only in
the context of a "nonstatutory mitigating circumstance."  The
State further argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred
by holding that Smith is mentally retarded for Atkins purposes
because the appellate court's determination rested on the
appellate record and that court cannot determine the weight
and credibility to give the changed testimony of Dr. D'Errico
without an initial finding of fact by the trial court, which
had an opportunity to observe Dr. D'Errico and assess his
credibility.
I.  Definition of Mental Retardation under Atkins
In order to accomplish our review of this case, this
Court must first consider the definition of mental retardation
in the context of an Atkins claim.  In Atkins, the United
States Supreme Court set forth some clinical definitions of
mental retardation as examples, but clearly left the ultimate
determination of what constitutes mental retardation to the
individual states, as follows:
"To the extent there is serious disagreement
about the execution of mentally retarded offenders,
it is in determining which offenders are in fact
retarded. 
In 
this 
case, 
for 
instance, 
the
Commonwealth 
of 
Virginia disputes that Atkins
suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who
1060427
19
claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as
to fall within the range of mentally retarded
offenders about whom there is a national consensus.
As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986), with regard to insanity, 'we leave to
the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
[their] execution of sentences.' Id., at 405,
416-417."
536 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted).
In deciding that the execution of a mentally retarded
offender is unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court
hinged its reasoning on a definition of mental retardation
that requires "not only subaverage intellectual functioning,
but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction that became
manifest before age 18." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
  
This Court has not previously taken up the task of
specifically defining what constitutes mental retardation in
the Atkins context because doing so is a policy decision that
is more appropriately the responsibility of the legislature.
In previous cases, this Court has merely reviewed a lower
court's decision on an Atkins claim under the plain-error
standard of review and applied the "most common" or "broadest"
definition of mental retardation, as represented by the
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20
clinical definitions considered in Atkins and the definitions
set forth in the statutes of other states that prohibit the
imposition of the death sentence when the defendant is
mentally retarded.  See, e.g., Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d
453, 455-56 (Ala. 2002).  We have taken this action while
urging "the Legislature to expeditiously develop procedures
for determining whether a capital defendant is mentally
retarded and thus ineligible for execution." Ex parte Perkins,
851 So. 2d at 455 n.1.
Until the legislature defines mental retardation for
purposes of applying Atkins, this Court is obligated to
continue to operate under the criteria set forth in Ex parte
Perkins.  We reiterate that policy decisions such as this
should be made by the legislature, not this Court, and we
continue to urge the legislature to define mental retardation
for use in the context of an Atkins claim and to establish a
procedure for deciding such a claim.  However, until the
legislature acts, the definition of mental retardation set
forth in Ex parte Perkins, along with the procedures set forth
in this opinion, must guide the lower courts in deciding
Atkins claims.  
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21
In Ex parte Perkins, we concluded that the "broadest"
definition of mental retardation consists of the following
three factors: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning (i.e., an IQ of 70 or below); (2) significant or
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) the
manifestation of these problems during the defendant's
developmental period (i.e., before the defendant reached age
18).  851 So. 2d at 456.  All three factors must be met in
order for a person to be classified as mentally retarded for
purposes of an Atkins claim.  Implicit in the definition is
that the subaverage intellectual functioning and the deficits
in adaptive behavior must be present at the time the crime was
committed as well as having manifested themselves before age
18.  This conclusion finds support in examining the facts we
found relevant in Ex parte Perkins and Ex parte Smith and
finds further support in the Atkins decision itself, in which
the United States Supreme Court noted: "The American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental
retardation 
as 
follows: 'Mental retardation refers to
substantial limitations in present functioning.'"  536 U.S. at
308 n.3 (second emphasis added).  Therefore, in order for an
1060427
If a person is deemed to be mentally retarded because the
3
three prongs of Ex parte Perkins have been satisfied, the
degree of mental retardation is based on the level of
intellectual 
impairment: 
Mild 
= 
IQ 
level 
50-55 
to
approximately 70; Moderate = IQ level 35-40 to 50-55; Severe
= IQ level 20-25 to 35-40; Profound = IQ level below 20 or 25.
22
offender to be considered mentally retarded in the Atkins
context, the offender must currently exhibit subaverage
intellectual functioning, currently exhibit deficits in
adaptive behavior, and these problems must have manifested
themselves before the age of 18.
The definition set forth in Ex parte Perkins is in
accordance with the definitions set forth in the statutes of
other states and with recognized clinical definitions,
including those found in the American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.
1994).  The Manual of Mental Disorders lists four degrees of
mental retardation: mild, moderate, severe, and profound. Id.
at 40-41.  All four degrees of mental retardation require that
all three prongs of the Ex parte Perkins test be satisfied
before an individual can be diagnosed as mentally retarded;
thus, if the defendant proves that he or she suffers any
degree of mental retardation, the defendant is ineligible for
the death penalty.   However, a classification of "borderline
3
1060427
Manual of Mental Disorders at 40.
23
intellectual 
functioning" 
describes 
an 
intelligence 
level 
that
is higher than mental retardation, id. at 45, 684, and, thus,
does not render a person ineligible for the death penalty.  
Finally, we note that one section of the trial court's
sentencing order lists certain evidence that was presented at
trial and that the court considered in deciding whether a
certain statutory mitigating circumstance existed.  In that
section, the trial court states that evidence was presented
indicating that Smith is "borderline mentally retarded."  The
term "borderline mentally retarded" does not have a clinical
definition, nor is it generally recognized by the psychiatric
community. See Manual of Mental Disorders (no definition
provided for "borderline mentally retarded").  Therefore,
because this term has no basis on which to support a diagnosis
of intelligence, it should not be used in legal proceedings
when determining an offender's intellectual functioning.
II.  The Court of Criminal Appeals' Decision Conflicts
with this Court's Decision in Ex Parte Smith
In Ex parte Smith, Smith raised an Atkins claim before
this Court.  In reviewing that claim, we applied the plain-
error standard of review and the three-prong test for mental
1060427
24
retardation found in Ex parte Perkins, requiring a defendant
to show significant subaverage intellectual functioning at the
time the crime was committed, to show significant deficits in
adaptive behavior at the time the crime was committed, and to
show that these problems manifested themselves before the
defendant reached the age of 18.  We reviewed the facts
presented at Smith's trial, including the testimony of Dr.
Crook and the testimony of Dr. D'Errico, and held as follows:
"We reject Smith's contention that in light of
the holding in Atkins, we must remand this cause for
the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine if
he is mentally retarded and therefore not subject to
the death penalty. Plain error did not occur in that
regard in this case.
"....
"Based on the facts presented at Smith's trial,
under even the broadest definition of mental
retardation Smith is not mentally retarded. Those
states that have statutes prohibiting the execution
of a mentally retarded defendant require that to be
considered mentally retarded a defendant must have
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
(an IQ score of 70 or below) and significant or
substantial 
deficits 
in 
adaptive 
behavior.
Additionally, those problems must have manifested
themselves before the defendant reached age 18.
"....
"The 
testimony 
with 
regard 
to 
Smith's
intellectual functioning indicates that he falls
within the borderline to mildly mentally retarded
1060427
25
range with an overall IQ score of 72 a year after
the 
murders, 
which 
seriously 
undermines 
any
conclusion that Smith suffers from significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning as contemplated
under even the broadest definitions.
"Likewise, 
with 
regard 
to 
evidence 
of
'significant' or 'substantial' deficits in adaptive
behavior, our review of the record indicates little,
if any, deficit. At the time of the murders, Smith
had had an ongoing year-long relationship with his
girlfriend. His articulate testimony indicates that
he loved his girlfriend, maintaining that she had
been his 'common-law wife' for a year, and that they
had planned on having children. Additionally, we
note that the evidence indicates that before Smith
shot the first victim, he told his girlfriend to
move out of harm's way.
"Moreover, the record indicates that before the
murders Smith was able to hold various jobs. At the
time 
of 
the 
murders, 
Smith 
was 
working 
a
construction job. More insightful into Smith's
adaptive behavior is the fact that Smith was
involved in an interstate illegal-drug enterprise.
Smith testified that at the time of the murders he
was under stress because he owed a Jamaican drug
supplier in Jacksonville, Florida, $27,000. Smith
admitted that at the time of the murders he was
addicted to cocaine and that he was using $400 worth
of crack cocaine per day; he said that in order to
maintain that habit he 'distributed' drugs.
"Furthermore, the fact that Smith gave a police
officer a false name two days before the murders
when he was stopped for a traffic violation, the
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
murders, 
Smith's
actions after the murder--enlisting the help of a
friend to dispose of the gun and to hide from the
police--his 
bragging 
about 
the 
murders, 
his
statement 
about 
'getting 
off' 
using 
a
mental-disease-or-defect defense, and his statement
1060427
26
that he shot two of the individuals in the house to
eliminate witnesses indicate that Smith does not
suffer from deficits in his adaptive behavior.
"Lastly, because the evidence does not support
Smith's contention that he manifested subaverage
intellectual functioning and significant deficits in
adaptive behavior, we need not address the third
factor--whether those problems evinced themselves
before Smith was 18 years old.
"Because the record does not support Smith's
contention that he falls within the parameters of
the most liberal requirements to support a finding
of mental retardation, we reject his contention that
we must remand this cause for resentencing on this
ground. Applying the plain-error standard of review,
we hold that no reversible error occurred in this
regard and a death sentence may be imposed in this
case if such a sentence is deemed proper after the
new penalty-phase proceeding."
Ex parte Smith, ___ So. 2d at ___.
Initially, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly held that our holding in Ex parte Smith did not
preclude the trial court from allowing the Atkins claim to be
litigated on remand if relevant new evidence was presented.
Indeed, because our holding with regard to Smith's Atkins
claim consisted of a plain-error review based solely on the
record that was before us, if new facts were presented on
remand that would change the result of our analysis in Ex
parte Smith, then litigation of the Atkins claim was proper.
1060427
27
The State argues that the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals conflicts with our decision in Ex parte Smith
because, the State argues, in holding that Smith is mentally
retarded the Court of Criminal Appeals ignores the first two
prongs of the Perkins test and rests its conclusion entirely
on new evidence that was presented of Smith's intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior before age 18.  We agree. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
"The record before us, which was more fully
developed on remand following Atkins, affirmatively
establishes that, well before age eighteen, [Smith]
had 
significantly 
subaverage 
intellectual
functioning.  Specifically, as early as age eight,
his IQ score was 61.  There is also an indication
that [Smith's] IQ at age twelve was 66.  From an
early age, [Smith] performed poorly in school.  As
a result, he was classified as educably mentally
retarded and was placed in special education
classes.  Finally, subsequent Stanford Achievement
Test scores showed that he was below average in the
majority of the areas tested. 
"When it conducted its plain error review of
this issue based on the record before it, the
Alabama Supreme Court did not have the benefit of
information about [Smith's] IQ scores and adaptive
skills before the age of eighteen.  In fact, it
specifically noted that, based on the record before
it at that time, it did not need to address the
matter of whether [Smith's] problems manifested
themselves before the age of eighteen.  Likewise,
[Dr.] D'Errico did not have such information when he
first concluded that [Smith] was mildly mentally
deficient. 
 
However, 
he 
explained 
that 
the
1060427
28
additional information about [Smith's] IQ scores and
adaptive skills before the age of eighteen caused
him to change his initial opinion and conclude that
[Smith] was indeed mildly mentally retarded.
"In 
addition, 
the 
record 
affirmatively
establishes 
that 
[Smith] 
had 
significant 
or
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior before the
age of eighteen.  He clearly had significant or
substantial deficits in functional academics.  Also,
the testimony of various witnesses who knew [Smith]
during his developmental period establishes that, at
the very least, he had substantial deficits in self-
care, home living, and social skills.  In fact, even
the State's expert, Dr. McKeown, conceded that
[Smith] had deficits in home living and functional
academics.  
"For these reasons, we conclude that [Smith] is
mentally retarded and is therefore not eligible for
the death penalty."
Smith v. State, ___ So. 2d at ___. 
The 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals' 
focus 
on 
Smith's
functioning before the age of 18 is misplaced.  Both Ex parte
Smith and Ex parte Perkins specifically hold that all three
prongs of the test set forth in Ex parte Perkins must be
satisfied in order for a person to be considered mentally
retarded.  Consequently, the holding of Court of Criminal
Appeals conflicts with our decision in Ex parte Smith by
placing great emphasis on new evidence that tended to show
deficits in Smith's intellectual functioning and adaptive
1060427
29
behavior before he reached the age of 18, while ignoring
evidence that shows that Smith's intellectual functioning and
adaptive behavior as an adult places him above the mentally
retarded range.  Therefore, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed because that court did not apply
the first two prongs of the three-prong test set forth in Ex
parte Perkins to reach its conclusion.
III.  The Trial Court's Factual Finding that Smith Is Mildly
Mentally Retarded as a Mitigating Circumstance Should Not Be
Given "Great Weight" in Support of Smith's Atkins Claim
The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in placing "great weight" on the trial court's finding
that Smith is mildly mentally retarded, which finding was made
in the context of a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.  The
trial court found, without mentioning Atkins, that the
evidence 
established 
as 
a 
"nonstatutory 
mitigating
circumstance" that "Jerry Jerome Smith is mildly mentally
retarded."  The issue is whether such a finding is necessarily
the same as finding someone mentally retarded for Atkins
purposes and, thus, whether the finding should be given "great
weight" in determining whether the defendant is eligible for
the death penalty. 
1060427
30
In his dissent in Smith v. State, Judge Shaw noted the
actions of the trial court regarding Smith's Atkins motions
and then emphasized that the record is not clear as to whether
the trial court considered any of Smith's evidence of mental
retardation as relevant to an Atkins claim or whether it
believed 
that 
evidence 
of 
mental retardation would be relevant
only as a mitigating circumstance. Smith v. State, ___ So. 2d
at ___ (Shaw, J., dissenting).  The record supports Judge
Shaw's observation.
Smith maintains, and the Court of Criminal Appeals
appears to agree, that the trial court's finding as a
mitigating circumstance that he is mildly mentally retarded is
necessarily the same as finding that Smith is mentally
retarded in the Atkins context.  However, the two findings are
not the same.  A finding of mild mental retardation in the
context of a mitigating circumstance does not necessitate a
finding that a person fits the definition of mental
retardation in the context of an Atkins claim.  At least one
reason for this conclusion is that the burden of proof in each
context is completely different.  The burden of proof on the
defendant 
in 
proving 
the 
existence 
of 
a 
mitigating
1060427
31
circumstance is much lower than the burden the defendant faces
when attempting to prove that he is mentally retarded for
purposes of Atkins.  The burden of proof to establish a
mitigating circumstance is as follows:
"The defendant shall be allowed to offer any
mitigating circumstance defined in Sections 13A-5-51
and 13A-5-52. When the factual existence of an
offered mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the
defendant shall have the burden of interjecting the
issue, but once it is interjected the state shall
have the burden of disproving the factual existence
of that circumstance by a preponderance of the
evidence."
§ 13A-5-45(g), Ala. Code 1975.
In the context of an Atkins claim, the defendant has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he
or she is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death
penalty. See Morrow v. State, 928 So. 2d 315, 323 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2004); see also Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d
1324, 1341 n.21 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (interpreting Alabama law to
require that the defendant prove mental retardation by a
preponderance of the evidence).  Therefore, it is certainly
possible for a court to conclude that a defendant has met his
burden of proving mild mental retardation as a mitigating
circumstance but, at the same time, to conclude that the
1060427
32
defendant has not carried the burden of proving mental
retardation for purposes of an Atkins claim.  Consequently,
the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in placing "great weight"
on the trial court's finding, made in the context of a
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, that Smith is mentally
retarded to conclude that Smith can be categorized as mentally
retarded in an Atkins context. 
The trial court appears to have correctly concluded that
a finding of mild mental retardation in the context of a
mitigating circumstance does not necessitate a finding of
mental retardation on an Atkins claim.  The trial court's view
is evidenced by a complete absence of any mention of Atkins in
its sentencing order and the obvious inconsistency that would
result in holding that a person meets the definition of mental
retardation for the purposes of an Atkins claim and then
sentencing that person to death, in violation of Atkins.
Thus, the trial 
court's finding of this nonstatutory
mitigating 
circumstance 
merely 
establishes 
that 
Smith
interjected the issue of his mild mental retardation and that
the State failed to disprove that fact and, thus, that Smith's
mild mental retardation existed as a mitigating circumstance.
1060427
33
This 
finding, 
however, 
does 
not 
establish 
that 
Smith 
satisfied
his burden of proof to warrant relief under Atkins.
Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by placing
"great weight" on the trial court's finding that Smith is
mildly mentally retarded in the context of a mitigating
circumstance to conclude that Smith is mentally retarded in an
Atkins context.
IV.  The Record Does Not Clearly Demonstrate
that Smith Is Mentally Retarded
Finally, the State contends that the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred by holding that Smith is mentally retarded in an
Atkins context because an appellate court's determination
rests solely on the record and that court cannot determine the
weight and credibility to give the changed testimony of Dr.
D'Errico without an initial finding of fact by the trial
court, which had an opportunity to observe Dr. D'Errico and to
assess his credibility.  
Based on all the evidence that has been presented, it is
not clear that Smith is mentally retarded as a matter of law.
As Judge Shaw correctly stated: "Such a question involves a
factual 
finding 
based 
on 
weight 
and 
credibility
determinations, determinations that are better left in the
1060427
34
first instance to the trial court, which had the opportunity
to personally observe the witnesses and assess their
credibility." Smith v. State, ___ So. 2d at ___ (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).  Therefore, neither this Court nor the Court of
Criminal Appeals should make any factual determination as to
Smith's mental retardation for purposes of Atkins without
allowing the trial court to make the initial determination on
the issue.  
Contrary to the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding, Dr.
D'Errico's changed testimony is not a compelling reason to
find that Smith is mentally retarded for purposes of Atkins
but is a compelling example of why the trial court should be
allowed to make the initial determination of Smith's mental
retardation; the trial court is in a much better position than
this Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals to observe Dr.
D'Errico and to evaluate his credibility.  
Here, Smith presented the trial court with three Atkins
motions.  The trial court, however, did not address the merits
of Smith's Atkins claim.  The exact reason for the trial
court's failure  to make an explicit determination on Smith's
Atkins motions is unclear from the record.
1060427
35
Generally, an Atkins claim should be raised and addressed
by the trial judge in a pretrial hearing without a jury.
Morrow, 928 So. 2d at 324.  However, if it was not possible to
raise the claim at trial or on appeal because a defendant was
sentenced to death and had exhausted his appeals before the
Atkins decision was released, then the defendant should bring
any Atkins claim he or she may have in a Rule 32, Ala. R.
Crim. P., petition. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, [Ms.
CR-04-2566, September 29, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim.
App. 2006).  In the rare situation, such as the one presented
here -- where the defendant had already been convicted and
sentenced to death but his case was pending on appeal at the
time Atkins was released -- the defendant is allowed to have
the claim reviewed by the trial court if the case is remanded
and new evidence of mental retardation is presented.  This
procedure gives the defendant an initial opportunity to
properly present and litigate his Atkins claim in the trial
court, and it serves to promote judicial economy. 
In the present case, Smith could not have raised his
Atkins claim in the trial court before the case was remanded
because Atkins had not yet been decided.  Smith could, and
1060427
36
did, raise the Atkins claim on remand, but the trial court did
not address it.  Therefore, in order to assure that Smith has
had a chance to properly present his Atkins claim in the trial
court and that the reviewing appellate court has factual
findings from the trial court related to the Atkins claim, we
remand this case for the trial court to conduct a hearing,
without a jury, on Smith's Atkins claim.  At the hearing,
Smith and the State may introduce any additional evidence that
would aid the trial court in determining whether Smith is
mentally retarded.  Remand for an Atkins hearing will allow
the trial court to make the factual determinations, including
credibility determinations, in an Atkins context.  After the
hearing, the trial court shall enter an order that explicitly
states its determination on the Atkins issue and that makes
specific findings of fact with regard to each of the three Ex
parte Perkins criteria.  Then the appellate courts can review
the trial court's Atkins determination under a standard of
review that is deferential to the trial court, as we do in
other contexts concerning factual determinations and as the
Court of Criminal Appeals has previously held should be done
in the context of an Atkins claim. See Morrow, 928 So. 2d at
1060427
37
323 (holding that when there are disputed facts the standard
of review is whether the trial court exceeded the scope of its
discretion).
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded for that court to remand
this case to the trial court with directions that the trial
court conduct an Atkins hearing, make a specific determination
as to whether Smith is mentally retarded for purposes of
Atkins, and enter an order with specific findings of fact
concerning each of the three Ex parte Perkins criteria.  If
the trial court determines that Smith is mentally retarded as
provided in Atkins, and thus ineligible for the death penalty,
the trial court has the authority to vacate Smith's sentence
and to resentence Smith to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
See, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Lyons, Woodall, and Murdock, JJ., concur in the rationale
in part and concur in the result.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1060427
38
LYONS, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result).
Because it does not appear with sufficient certainty that
the trial court addressed the issue of mental retardation in
light of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the judgment
of the trial court must be reversed for that reason alone and
the case remanded to the trial court for a hearing to
determine whether Smith is mentally retarded for purposes of
Atkins.
I do not consider a discussion of the evidence as set
forth under that portion of the main opinion entitled "Facts"
to be necessary to a determination of the necessity for such
remand. 
I concur as to Part I, "Definition of Mental Retardation
under Atkins."  This aspect of the main opinion will give the
trial court helpful guidance on remand. 
I concur in the result as to Part II, "The Court of
Criminal Appeals' Decision Conflicts with this Court's
Decision in Ex parte Smith," and Part III, "The Trial Court's
Factual Finding that Smith Is Mildly Mentally Retarded as a
Mitigating Circumstance Should Not Be Given 'Great Weight' in
Support of Smith's  Atkins Claim."  Because it does not appear
1060427
39
with sufficient certainty that the trial court addressed the
issue of mental retardation in light of Atkins, those portions
of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals dealing with
mental retardation under Atkins, an issue not reached by the
trial court, are therefore premature.  Any discussion by this
Court of issues that should never have been addressed by the
Court of Criminal Appeals is dicta. 
I concur as to Part IV, "The Record Does Not Clearly
Demonstrate that Smith Is Mentally Retarded," and with the
portion of the main opinion entitled "Conclusion."  In all
other respects, I concur in the result only.
Woodall, J., concurs.
1060427
40
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result).
I concur in Part IV of the main opinion; in all other
respects, I concur in the result reached by the main opinion.