Title: Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 411A13
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2014

NO. COA12-779 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  18 June 2013 
LOIS EDMONDSON BYNUM, Individually, 
and LOIS EDMONDSON BYNUM, 
Administratrix of the Estate of 
James Earl Bynum and Lois Marie 
Bynum, 
 
Plaintiffs 
 
 
 
 
v. 
Wilson County 
No. 08 CVS 2443 
 
 
WILSON COUNTY and SLEEPY HOLLOW 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
Defendants 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendants from order entered 19 March 2012 by 
Judge Milton F. Fitch in Wilson County Superior Court.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 7 January 2013. 
 
Thomas & Farris, PA, by Albert S. Thomas, Jr., and Kurt 
Schmidt; and Narron & Holdford, PA, by Ben L. Eagles, for 
Plaintiff-appellees. 
 
Teague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Carrie E. Meigs 
and Leslie P. Lasher, for Defendant-appellants. 
 
 
ERVIN, Judge. 
 
 
Defendants Wilson County and Sleepy Hollow Development 
Company appeal from an order denying their motions for summary 
judgment with respect to the claims advanced against them by 
Plaintiff Lois Bynum, both individually and as administratrix of 
the estate of James Earl Bynum.  On appeal, Defendant Wilson 
-2- 
County argues that its appeal from the trial court’s order 
denying its motion for summary judgment on governmental immunity 
grounds, although interlocutory, is properly before us and that 
it is entitled to immunity from suit in this case on the grounds 
that “operating and maintaining a county office building is a 
governmental function.”  In addition, Defendants argue that, in 
order to “avoid a fragmentary appeal,” we should reach the 
merits of their non-immunity based challenges to the trial 
court’s order, which rest on assertions that the evidentiary 
forecast presented to the trial court did not support a finding 
of negligence-based liability.  After careful consideration of 
Defendants’ challenges to the trial court’s order in light of 
the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial 
court did not err by denying Defendant Wilson County’s motion 
for summary judgment based on governmental immunity grounds and 
that we should decline to reach Defendants’ other challenges to 
the trial court’s order.  As a result, we affirm the trial 
court’s order in part and dismiss Defendants’ appeals in part. 
I. Factual Background 
A. Substantive Facts 
The factual basis underlying Plaintiffs’ claims, to the 
extent that it is relevant to the issue properly before us at 
this time, was set out in our prior opinion in Bynum v. Wilson 
-3- 
County, __ N.C. App. __, 716 S.E.2d 90, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 
1964, [WL cite] (2011) (unpublished) (Bynum I), in which we 
stated that: 
In January 2007, Defendant Wilson County 
moved its main office building to 2201 South 
Miller Road in Wilson.  Wilson County leased 
the building in question from Defendant 
Sleepy Hollow Development Company. . . . 
 
On 15 April 2008, Plaintiffs James Earl 
Bynum and his wife, Lois Marie Bynum, drove 
to the Wilson County office building, in 
which the offices of Wilson County’s water 
department were located, for the purpose of 
paying their water bill.  Since Plaintiffs 
usually paid their water bill in person, 
they 
had 
visited 
the 
building 
on 
approximately thirteen previous occasions.  
While Mr. Bynum entered the building to pay 
the water bill, Mrs. Bynum remained in their 
car. 
 
After climbing the front exterior steps, Mr. 
Bynum entered the building and . . . paid 
the couple’s water bill.  After . . . 
exiting the building, Mr. Bynum started down 
the front exterior stairs in order to return 
to the car where Mrs. Bynum was waiting.  
Approximately two-thirds of the way down the 
stairs, Mr. Bynum fell and sustained serious 
injuries. 
 
Id., 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1964, at *1-*3, [WL cite at __]. 
B. Procedural History 
We also addressed the procedural history of this case in 
Bynum I, in which we stated that: 
On 9 December 2008, Mr. Bynum filed a 
complaint in which he alleged that he had 
been 
injured 
as 
the 
result 
of 
Wilson 
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County’s negligence.  On 2 January 2009, 
Wilson County filed an answer in which it 
denied 
the 
material 
allegations 
of 
Mr. 
Bynum’s complaint and asserted a number of 
affirmative defenses, including a contention 
that Mr. Bynum’s claims were barred by the 
doctrine of governmental immunity.  On 30 
July 
2009, 
Plaintiffs 
filed 
an 
amended 
complaint in which they claimed to have been 
injured as the result of negligence on the 
part of Wilson County and Sleepy Hollow. 
 
On 3 June 2010, Defendants sought summary 
judgment.  On 14 October 2010, the trial 
court entered an order denying Defendants’ 
summary judgment motions.  Defendants noted 
an appeal to this Court from the trial 
court’s order.  
 
Bynum I, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1964, at *4, [WL cite at __].  As 
a result of the fact that Mr. Bynum died on 27 January 2011, 
Plaintiffs sought leave of court to substitute Mrs. Bynum, in 
her capacity as administratrix of Mr. Bynum’s estate, for Mr. 
Bynum as a party plaintiff on 31 March 2011.  This Court allowed 
the substitution motion on 15 April 2011.  Id. 
In Bynum I, we held that Defendant Wilson County’s 
challenge 
to 
the 
denial 
of 
its 
summary 
judgment 
motion 
predicated 
on 
governmental 
immunity 
grounds 
affected 
a 
substantial right and was properly before us despite the 
interlocutory nature of the trial court’s order.  On the other 
hand, we held that Defendant Sleepy Hollow’s appeal and 
Defendant Wilson County’s challenge to the trial court’s refusal 
to grant summary judgment in its favor with respect to more 
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traditional liability-based issues involved a request for 
appellate review of an interlocutory order; that Defendants had 
not articulated any substantial right that would be jeopardized 
by a failure on our part to consider their non-immunity-related 
challenges to the trial court’s order on an interlocutory basis; 
and that those portions of Defendants’ appeals should be 
dismissed.  After reaching the merits of Defendant Wilson 
County’s challenge to the trial court’s rejection of its 
governmental immunity defense, we observed that Defendant Wilson 
County had mistakenly submitted a different insurance policy 
from the one in effect at the time of Mr. Bynum’s accident for 
consideration at the summary judgment hearing, refused to grant 
Defendant Wilson County’s request that we permit the proper 
insurance policy to be substituted for the one that had been 
presented to the trial court, and allowed Defendant Wilson 
County’s alternative motion to dismiss its appeal.  As a result, 
we h[e]ld that, with the exception of Wilson 
County’s challenge to the trial court’s 
refusal to grant summary judgment in its 
favor 
on 
governmental 
immunity 
grounds, 
Defendants’ appeal . . . is dismissed as 
having 
been 
taken 
from 
an 
unappealable 
interlocutory order.  In addition, . . . we 
deny Defendants’ request that we allow an 
amendment to the record on appeal to include 
what Defendants claim to be the correct 
insuring 
agreement. 
 
Finally, 
we 
deny 
Defendants’ 
request 
that 
this 
case 
be 
remanded to the trial court subject to 
certain instructions and allow Defendants’ 
-6- 
alternative motion for leave to withdraw 
their appeal. 
 
Bynum I, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1964, at *17 [WL cite at __]. 
On 23 December 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking 
leave to amend their complaint in order to assert a wrongful 
death claim.1  On 16 February 2012, Defendants filed motions 
seeking the entry of summary judgment in their favor.  On 19 
March 2012, the trial court entered an order denying Defendants’ 
summary judgment motions.  Defendants noted an appeal to this 
Court from the trial court’s order.  On 13 July 2012, Plaintiffs 
filed a motion to dismiss Defendant Sleepy Hollow’s appeal as 
having been taken from an unappealable interlocutory order. 
II. Legal Analysis 
A. Scope of Appeal 
As a preliminary matter, we must identify the issues that 
are properly before us for appellate review.  As was the case in 
Bynum I, Defendant Wilson County asserts, among other things, 
that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary 
judgment based upon governmental immunity considerations.  “This 
Court has held that appeals from interlocutory orders raising 
issues 
of 
governmental 
or 
sovereign 
immunity 
affect 
a 
substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate 
                     
1Although the record does not contain an order allowing 
Plaintiffs’ amendment motion, we gather from the contents of the 
parties’ briefs that such an order was, in fact, entered. 
-7- 
review.”  Williams v. Devere Constr. Co., Inc., __ N.C. App __, 
__, 716 S.E.2d 21, 25 (2011) (citing Price v. Davis, 132 N.C. 
App. 556, 558-59, 512 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1999) (other citations 
omitted).  As a result, Defendant Wilson County’s challenge to 
the trial court’s refusal to enter summary judgment in its favor 
on governmental immunity grounds is properly before us. 
In addition, Defendants have also sought immediate review 
of the trial court’s decision not to resolve Defendant Wilson 
County’s non-immunity-related challenges and Defendant Sleepy 
Hollow’s challenges to the trial court’s order in their favor by 
denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment concerning these 
issues.2 
 
Defendants 
have 
not, 
however, 
articulated 
any 
substantial right that would be lost in the absence of immediate 
appellate consideration of these additional challenges to the 
trial court’s order in their brief and we decline, as a general 
proposition, to sift through the record for the purpose of 
determining whether a particular trial court order does, in 
fact, affect a substantial right.  Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks 
Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 
(1994) (stating that “[i]t is not the duty of this Court to 
                     
2The non-immunity-related claims asserted in Defendants’ 
summary 
judgment 
motions 
consisted 
of 
claims 
that 
the 
evidentiary forecast presented to the trial court did not permit 
a finding that Mr. Bynum’s injuries resulted from any negligence 
on the part of Defendants and that Plaintiffs’ claims were 
barred by Mr. Bynum’s contributory negligence. 
-8- 
construct arguments for or find support for appellant’s right to 
appeal from an interlocutory order” and that “the appellant has 
the burden of showing this Court that the order deprives the 
appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized 
absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits”) 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
Although 
Defendant 
Sleepy 
Hollow’s 
response to Plaintiffs’ dismissal motion suggests that a failure 
to consider Defendants’ non-immunity-related claims might create 
a risk of inconsistent verdicts, Hartman v. Walkertown Shopping 
Center, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 632, 634, 439 S.E.2d 787, 789 
(stating that, where “dismissal of this appeal as interlocutory 
could still result in two different trials on the same issues, 
creating the risk of inconsistent verdicts, a substantial right 
is prejudiced”), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 780, 447 S.E.2d 
422 (1994), we see no such risk in the event that we decide the 
issues arising from Defendant Wilson County’s assertion of 
governmental immunity without addressing the other issues that 
Defendants seek to have us consider.  As a result, consistently 
with our decision in Bynum I, we conclude that Defendants are 
“not entitled to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s 
decision to refrain from granting summary judgment in [their] 
favor on the basis of any non-immunity-related argument and 
dismiss those portions of [their] appeal that rely on such non-
-9- 
immunity-related issues.”  Bynum I, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1964, 
at *8 n.3 [WL cite at __]. 
In attempting to persuade us to reach the merits of their 
non-immunity-related challenges to the trial court’s order, 
Defendants note that this Court has, on occasion, addressed 
additional issues that have been presented for our consideration 
in an appeal that arose from a trial court decision concerning 
immunity-related issues.  For example, Defendants cite RPR & 
Assocs. v. State, 139 N.C. App. 525, 530-32, 534 S.E.2d 247, 
251-53 (2000), aff’d, 353 N.C. 362; 543 S.E.2d 480 (2001), in 
which we addressed a service of process argument, and Colombo v. 
Dorrity, 115 N.C. App. 81, 84, 86, 443 S.E.2d 752, 755, 756, 
disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 689, 448 S.E.2d 517 (1994), in 
which we addressed a statute of limitations issue.  Although we 
held in these two instances that, given the specific factual and 
procedural contexts from which these cases arose, it would 
promote judicial economy to resolve these relatively clear-cut 
non-immunity-related issues in the same opinion in which we 
addressed the defendants’ immunity-related arguments, we did not 
hold in either case that non-immunity-related issues would 
always be considered on the merits in the course of deciding an 
immunity-related interlocutory appeal or recognize the existence 
of a substantial right to have multiple issues addressed in the 
-10- 
course of an immunity-related appeal.  On the contrary, in most 
immunity-related 
interlocutory 
appeals, 
we 
have 
declined 
requests that we consider additional non-immunity-related issues 
on the merits.  See, e.g., Green v. Kearney, 203 N.C. App. 260, 
266, 690 S.E.2d 755, 764-65 (2010) (reviewing a defendant’s 
challenge to the denial of an immunity-related dismissal motion 
on the merits while dismissing the remainder of the defendant’s 
appeal as having been taken from an unappealable interlocutory 
order); Meherrin Indian Tribe v. Lewis, 197 N.C. App. 380, 384-
85, 677 S.E.2d 203, 207-08 (2009) (reviewing the defendant’s 
challenge to the trial court’s immunity-related decision on the 
merits while dismissing the remainder of the defendant’s 
appeal), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 806, 690 S.E.2d 705 
(2010).  As we noted in Boyd v. Robeson Cty., 169 N.C. App. 460, 
464-65, 621 S.E.2d 1, 4, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 629, 615 
S.E.2d 866 (2005): 
[T]he question of whether a governmental 
entity is a “person” under [42 U.S.C.] § 
1983 
is 
analogous 
to 
the 
public 
duty 
doctrine 
and 
claims 
of 
immunity 
and, 
therefore, 
hold 
that 
it 
involves 
a 
substantial 
right 
permitting 
an 
interlocutory appeal. 
 
Defendants have, however, also [raised other 
arguments] on appeal[.] . . .  Since these 
arguments do not involve any claim of 
immunity and defendants have made no other 
showing as to how this aspect of the trial 
court’s ruling affected a substantial right, 
-11- 
we decline to address these arguments and 
dismiss this portion of defendants’ appeal. 
 
(citing Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 380, 444 S.E.2d at 254).  
Thus, we conclude, as we did in Bynum I, that the only issue 
properly before us at this time is the correctness of the trial 
court’s decision to deny Defendant Wilson County’s request for 
summary judgment in its favor on immunity-related grounds.  For 
that reason, we dismiss Defendant Wilson County’s attempted 
appeal from that portion of the trial court’s order addressing 
non-immunity-related issues and grant Plaintiffs’ motion to 
dismiss Sleepy Hollow’s appeal in its entirety as having been 
taken from an unappealable interlocutory order.3 
B. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is properly granted when “the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 
1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2012).  “‘When considering a motion for 
                     
3Although the record indicates that the trial court 
certified the order at issue in this case for immediate appeal 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b), Defendants have 
correctly refrained from relying on that certification in 
support of their request for immediate review of their non-
immunity-related claims given that the trial court’s order did 
not constitute a final resolution of any specific claim or of 
all claims relating to any specific party. 
-12- 
summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented 
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’”  In 
re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) 
(quoting Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 
(2001)).  The moving party has the burden “to show the lack of a 
triable issue of fact and to show that he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 
624, 295 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1982) (citing Oestreicher v. Stores, 
290 N.C. 118, 131, 225 S.E.2d 797, 806 (1976)). “The showing 
required for summary judgment may be accomplished by proving 
[that] an essential element of the opposing party’s claim . . . 
would be barred by an affirmative defense,”  Dobson v. Harris, 
352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000) (citing Goodman v. 
Wenco Foods, Inc., 333 N.C. 1, 21, 423 S.E.2d 444, 454 (1992)), 
such as governmental immunity.  “Our standard of review of a 
trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is de 
novo.”  Bryson v. Coastal Plain League, LLC, __ N.C. App __, __, 
729 S.E.2d 107, 109 (2012) (citing Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. 
of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009).  
“‘Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew 
and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower 
tribunal.”  Craig, 363 N.C. at 337, 678 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting 
In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 
-13- 
642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (internal citation 
omitted). 
C. Availability of Governmental Immunity 
In its brief, Defendant Wilson County argues that the trial 
court erroneously failed to enter summary judgment in its favor 
on immunity-related grounds given that the “alleged causes of 
Decedent’s injuries include governmental functions which were 
performed by Wilson County[.]”  More specifically, Defendant 
Wilson County contends that “zoning and inspection [are] 
governmental function[s,]” that “operating and maintaining a 
county office building is a governmental function,” and that 
“Wilson County’s water supply system is also a governmental 
function.”  In addition, Defendant Wilson County argues that Mr. 
Bynum’s injuries did not stem from the operation of a water 
system.  We do not find any of these contentions persuasive. 
1. General Principles 
“Sovereign immunity stands for the proposition that ‘the 
State cannot be sued except with its consent or upon its waiver 
of immunity.’”  Dawes v. Nash Cty., 357 N.C. 442, 445, 584 
S.E.2d 760, 762 (2003) (quoting Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 
39, 42, 497 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1998), and citing Guthrie v. State 
Ports Authority, 307 N.C. 522, 534, 299 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1983)).  
“The counties are recognizable units that collectively make up 
-14- 
our state, and are thus entitled to sovereign immunity under 
North Carolina law.”  Archer v. Rockingham Cty., 144 N.C. App. 
550, 553, 548 S.E.2d 788, 790 (2001), disc. rev. denied, 355 
N.C. 210, 559 S.E.2d 796 (2002).  “Nevertheless, governmental 
immunity is not without limit.  ‘[G]overnmental immunity covers 
only the acts of a municipality or a municipal corporation 
committed pursuant to its governmental functions.’  Governmental 
immunity does not, however, apply when the municipality engages 
in a proprietary function. . . .  [In] determining whether an 
entity 
is 
entitled 
to 
governmental 
immunity, 
the 
result 
therefore turns on whether the alleged tortious conduct of the 
county 
or 
municipality 
arose 
from 
an 
activity 
that 
was 
governmental or proprietary in nature.”  Estate of Williams v. 
Pasquotank County, __ N.C. __, __, 732 S.E.2d 137, 141 (2012) 
(quoting Evans v. Housing Auth. of City of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 
53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004), and citing Grimesland v. 
Washington, 234 N.C. 117, 123, 66 S.E.2d 794, 798 (1951)).  
“‘[A]lthough an activity may be classified in general as a 
governmental function, liability in tort may exist as to certain 
of its phases; and conversely, although classified in general as 
proprietary, certain phases may be considered exempt from 
liability.  [In addition], it does not follow that a particular 
activity will be denoted a governmental function even though 
-15- 
previous cases have held the identical activity to be of such a 
public necessity that the expenditure of funds in connection 
with it was for a public purpose.’  Consequently, the proper 
designation of a particular action of a county or municipality 
is a fact intensive inquiry, turning on the facts alleged in the 
complaint, and may differ from case to case.”  Estate of 
Williams, __ N.C. at __, 732 S.E.2d at 143 (quoting Sides v. 
Hospital, 287 N.C. 14, 21-22, 213 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1975) 
(citations and emphases omitted). 
The fact-intensive nature of the determination of whether a 
plaintiff’s 
suit 
is 
barred 
by 
governmental 
immunity 
is 
illustrated in Town of Sandy Creek v. East Coast Contr. Inc, __ 
N.C. App __, __ S.E.2d __, __, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 384 [WL 
cite] (2013) (Sandy Creek II), in which an engineering firm 
sought to recover damages for “breach of contract, negligence, 
and indemnity and contribution” associated with the construction 
of a sewer system.  Id., 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 384, at *2 [WL 
cite at __].  On remand for further consideration in light of 
Estate of Williams, we “recognize[d] that judicial precedent has 
previously held that construction of a sewer system is a 
governmental function.”  Id., 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 384, at *8 
[WL cite at __] (citing McCombs v. City of Asheboro, 6 N.C. App. 
234, 170 S.E.2d 169 (1969)).  However, after concluding that 
-16- 
“[construction of a sewer system] is not the nature of the claim 
in this case,” we pointed out that “‘[the] allegations of 
breaches of the duty of reasonable care [at issue in this case] 
do not concern decisions of governmental discretion such as 
whether to construct a sewer system or where to locate the sewer 
system’” and noted that, instead, “‘the alleged breaches concern 
[the municipality’s] handling of the contract and [its] business 
relationship with the contractor, acts that are not inherently 
governmental but are commonplace among private entities.’”  Id. 
(quoting Town of Sandy Creek v. East Coast Contr., Inc., __ N.C. 
App. __, __ 736 S.E.2d 793, 797-98 (2012) (Sandy Creek I) 
(superseded by Sandy Creek II)).  Thus, we held “that a local 
governmental unit acts in a proprietary function when it 
contracts 
with 
engineering 
and 
construction 
companies, 
regardless of whether the project under construction will be a 
governmental function once it is completed.”  Sandy Creek II, 
2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 384, at *10 [WL cite at __]. 
A 
reliance 
on 
the 
same 
fact-intensive 
approach 
to 
determining whether a particular activity should be deemed 
governmental or proprietary for governmental-immunity purposes 
can be seen in other cases as well.  For example, in Aaser v. 
Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 497, 144 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1965), in 
which the plaintiff alleged that she was injured by children 
-17- 
playing in a corridor of the Charlotte Coliseum, the Supreme 
Court held that “[a] city is engaging in a proprietary function 
when it operates . . . an arena, or leases it to the promoter of 
an athletic event” and that “the liability of the city and of 
the Authority to the plaintiff for injury, due to an unsafe 
condition of the premises, is the same as that of a private 
person or corporation.”  (citing Carter v. Greensboro, 249 N.C. 
328, 333, 106 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1959) (other citation omitted).  
On the other hand, in Robinson v. Nash County, 43 N.C. App. 33, 
36, 257 S.E.2d 679, 681 (1979), in which the plaintiff sought 
damages for injuries sustained after he fell down the stairs 
while visiting the Register of Deeds office, we determined that 
Nash County was entitled to the benefit of governmental immunity 
given that the operation of the register of deeds office “is 
clearly a governmental function for which the county enjoys 
immunity from suit for negligence.”  Similarly, in Seibold v. 
Library, 264 N.C. 360, 141 S.E.2d 519 (1965), the plaintiff 
sought a personal injury recovery after falling on the steps of 
a governmentally owned library.  In affirming the trial court’s 
determination that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by immunity-
related considerations, the Supreme Court held that operation of 
a public library is a governmental, rather than proprietary, 
function. 
-18- 
An analysis of these and similar cases reveals that the 
determinative factor to be considered in ascertaining whether a 
particular injury resulted from a governmental or proprietary 
activity is the nature of the plaintiff’s involvement with the 
governmental unit and the reason for the plaintiff’s presence at 
a governmental facility rather than the underlying tasks which 
the governmental entity allegedly performed in a negligent 
manner.  Although Aaser held that operation of a municipal arena 
was a proprietary function and Robinson and Seibold held that 
operating a register of deeds’ office and a library were 
governmental functions, none of these decisions rested on a 
determination of the extent to which the particular actions that 
might have prevented the plaintiff’s injury, such as posting 
guards in the Coliseum or maintaining the buildings in which the 
register 
of 
deeds 
office 
and 
library 
were 
housed, 
were 
“governmental” or “proprietary” in nature.  As a result, instead 
of holding “that maintaining county property is a governmental 
function,” the pertinent cases hold that, where a plaintiff is 
injured as a result of his or her involvement with a 
governmental function, such as transacting business at the 
register of deeds office or borrowing a book from a public 
library, the relevant governmental entity is immune from suit.  
On the other hand, if a plaintiff is injured as a result of his 
-19- 
or her involvement with a proprietary function, such as 
attending an event at a governmentally owned facility, then 
governmental immunity is not available. 
2. Applicability of Immunity-Related Principles in this Case 
According to the undisputed evidence before the trial 
court, Mr. Bynum was injured after falling on the steps of a 
building maintained by Wilson County and utilized for a number 
of different purposes, including providing a place where 
customers of the county’s water system could pay their bills.  
Mr. Bynum had visited the building to pay his water bill and was 
injured as he left the building after making a payment.  
Although Defendant Wilson County argues that the operation of a 
water system is a governmental function, it only cites cases 
discussing other services, such as the operation of a jail or 
library, in support of this proposition.  An examination of the 
decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court addressing the 
status of governmentally owned water systems for immunity-
related purposes indicates, however, Defendant Wilson County’s 
argument lacks merit. 
The 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
“long 
held 
that 
a 
municipal 
corporation selling water for private consumption is acting in a 
proprietary capacity and can be held liable for negligence just 
like a privately owned water company.”  Fussell v. N.C. Farm 
-20- 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 225, 695 S.E.2d 437, 440 
(2010) (citing Mosseller v. City of Asheville, 267 N.C. 104, 
107, 147 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1966)).  In other words, “[w]hen a 
municipal corporation operates a system of waterworks for the 
sale by it of water for private consumption and use, it is 
acting in its proprietary or corporate capacity and is liable 
for injury or damage to the property of others to the same 
extent and upon the same basis as a privately owned water 
company would be.”  Bowling v. Oxford, 267 N.C. 552, 557, 148 
S.E.2d 624, 628 (1966) (citing Mosseller, 267 N.C. at 107, 147 
S.E. 2d at 560; Faw v. North Wilkesboro, 253 N.C. 406, 409, 117 
S.E. 2d 14, 17 (1960); and Candler v. Asheville, 247 N.C. 398, 
406, 101 S.E. 2d 470, 476 (1958)) (other citations omitted).  As 
a result, the operation of a municipal or county-owned water 
system is a proprietary rather than a governmental activity. 
As we have already noted, a governmental entity acting in a 
proprietary capacity “‘is regarded as a legal individual . . . 
[which] may be held to that degree of responsibility which would 
attach to an ordinary corporation.’”  Pulliam v. City of 
Greensboro, 103 N.C. App. 748, 751, 407 S.E.2d 567, 568 (quoting 
McCombs, 6 N.C. App. at 238, 170 S.E.2d at 172) (internal 
citation omitted), disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 197, 412 S.E.2d 
59 (1991).  For that reason, “a municipal corporation selling 
-21- 
water for private consumption . . . is potentially liable for 
negligent acts of its agents or employees done in the scope of 
their agency or employment.”  Fussell, 364 N.C. at 225, 695 
S.E.2d at 440 (citing Jones v. Gwynne, 312 N.C. 393, 409, 323 
S.E.2d 9, 18 (1984), and Munick v. Durham, 181 N.C. 188, 195, 
106 S.E. 665, 668 (1921) (stating that, “[w]hen cities are 
acting in their corporate character, or in the exercise of 
powers for their own advantage, they are liable for damages 
caused by the negligence or torts of their officers or agents”). 
According 
to 
well-established 
North 
Carolina 
law, 
a 
business owner is liable for the negligent maintenance of 
buildings in which customers may pay their bills.4  For example, 
in Lamm v. Bissette Realty, 327 N.C. 412, 395 S.E.2d 112 (1990), 
the plaintiff was injured on the steps of a building to which 
she had gone for the purpose of paying an insurance bill.  As a 
result of the fact that the “owners owe a duty to business 
invitees to keep the entrance in a reasonably safe condition,” 
the Supreme Court held that “a jury could find that defendants 
were negligent for not attempting to correct what defendants 
themselves called an open and obvious condition - the sloping 
asphalt - by adding a handrail to make it reasonably safe.”  
                     
4In light of this basic principle, Defendant Wilson County’s 
argument that it should be deemed immune from suit in this case 
because Mr. Bynum’s injuries did not result from the operation 
of the county’s water system, narrowly defined, has no merit. 
-22- 
Lamm, 327 N.C. at 417, 395 S.E.2d at 116.  The Supreme Court’s 
holding in Lamm reflects the general rule that a business has a 
responsibility to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the 
premises on which others are entitled to come in the course and 
scope of the business’ operations are safe.  For example, in 
Farrell v. Thomas and Howard Co., 204 N.C. 631, 633, 169 S.E. 
224, 225 (1933), the plaintiff alleged, in pertinent part, that 
he “went upon the premises of the defendant as an invitee; that 
the steps leading from the office to the sidewalk were in an 
unsafe 
condition; 
. 
. 
. 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, 
negligently, and wilfully failed to use due care in providing 
reasonably safe steps; [and] that[,] while on the steps and in 
the act of leaving the defendant’s premises[,] the plaintiff was 
thrown to the sidewalk and injured[.]”  In rejecting the 
defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s complaint should 
have been dismissed, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
defendant owed to the plaintiff as its invitee the duty to 
exercise ordinary care for her safety in going into and retiring 
from the office.”  (citing Ellington v. Ricks, 179 N.C. 686, 
690, 102 S.E. 510, 511 (1920)); see also, e.g., Harrison v. 
Williams, 260 N.C. 392, 395, 132 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1963) (stating 
that the “[d]efendant owed plaintiff, as invitee, the legal duty 
to maintain the aisles and passageways of its place of business 
-23- 
in such condition as a reasonably careful and prudent proprietor 
would deem sufficient to protect patrons from danger while 
exercising ordinary care for their own safety”) (citations 
omitted).  As a result of the fact that the operation of a water 
system is a proprietary rather than a governmental function, the 
fact that Mr. Bynum was lawfully on the premises in question for 
the purpose of paying his water bill,5 and the fact that Mr. 
Bynum allegedly sustained injuries as the result of negligence 
on the part of Defendant Wilson County as he left the building 
after paying his water bill, we conclude that Defendant Wilson 
County is not entitled to the entry of judgment in its favor 
based on a defense of governmental immunity. 
In seeking to persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion, 
Defendant 
Wilson 
County 
notes, 
among 
other 
things, 
that 
Plaintiffs have alleged that it is liable based, at least in 
part, on the basis of an allegedly negligent zoning and 
                     
5Although the Supreme Court abolished the common law 
“trichotomy” distinguishing between invitees, licensees, and 
trespassers which governed premises liability actions at the 
time that the cases discussed in the text were decided in favor 
of a standard “requiring a standard of reasonable care for all 
lawful visitors” in Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 631, 507 
S.E.2d 882, 892 (1998), we do not believe that this change in 
the applicable legal standard undercuts the continued viability 
of the basic principle discussed in the text, which is that a 
landowner, such as a business, has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to ensure that individuals lawfully coming on particular 
premises, such as a person seeking to pay a bill, are not 
injured. 
-24- 
inspection of the county building at which Mr. Bynum’s fall 
occurred.  More specifically, Defendant Wilson County argues 
that, because zoning and building inspection are governmental 
functions, it should be deemed immune from suit in any civil 
action in which allegations of negligent zoning and inspection 
are made.  However, the ultimate issue in this case is Defendant 
Wilson County’s liability for negligence in connection with the 
operation of its water system, including its alleged failure to 
provide a reasonably safe place at which its customers could pay 
their bills or conduct other water system-related business.  The 
assertions that Plaintiffs have made with respect to zoning and 
inspection-related issues relate to their contention that 
Defendant Wilson County asserted jurisdiction over the building 
in question for zoning and inspection-related purposes in an 
effort to avoid making modifications to or repairs of the 
building and do not constitute contentions that Defendant Wilson 
County erred in the course of making specific zoning or 
inspection-related decisions.  As a result of the fact that, as 
we have already established, the determination of whether a 
governmental 
entity 
was 
engaging 
in 
a 
governmental 
or 
proprietary activity at the time that the plaintiff was injured 
focuses on the nature of the activity which led to the 
plaintiff’s injury and the fact that the zoning and inspection-
-25- 
related issues which Plaintiffs have raised do not involve any 
effort to look behind specific zoning and inspection-related 
decisions that Defendant Wilson County made, we do not believe 
that this aspect of Defendant Wilson County’s argument has 
merit. 
In addition, Defendant Wilson County posits that, because 
the water system’s office is located in a county building, it is 
immune from suit on the grounds that “Wilson County is entitled 
to 
governmental 
immunity 
for 
operating 
its 
main 
office 
building.”  As we understand this argument, Defendant Wilson 
County is contending for the recognition of a general rule 
affording immunity from suit for any injury which might have 
occurred in connection with the “operat[ion] and maintain[ance 
of] a county office.”  The decisions upon which Defendant Wilson 
County relies in support of this proposition, however, find the 
existence of immunity from suit based on the nature of the 
underlying 
function 
being 
performed 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
plaintiff’s 
injury 
rather 
than 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
tasks 
associated with maintenance of a governmentally owned building.  
E.g. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 80, 81 S.E.2d 150, 152 
(1954) (county jail); Seibold v. Kinston, 268 N.C. 615, 620-21, 
151 S.E.2d 654, 658 (1966) (public library); Doe v. Jenkins, 144 
N.C. App. 131, 134, 547 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2001) (county 
-26- 
courthouse), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 284, 560 S.E.2d 799 
(2002); and Robinson, 43 N.C. App. at 36, 257 S.E.2d at 681 
(register of deeds office).  We are unable to read any of these 
decisions 
as 
holding, 
consistently 
with 
Defendant 
Wilson 
County’s position, that a county or municipality is immune from 
any suit seeking recovery for injuries allegedly resulting from 
the “maintenance” of a governmentally owned building, regardless 
of the manner in which the building is used or the reason for 
the plaintiff’s presence at that building. 
Finally, Defendant Wilson County suggests 
that “[Mr. 
Bynum’s] subjective intent is not the appropriate basis for 
determining whether Wilson County was performing a governmental 
function at the time [he] was injured” and that, “[f]ollowing 
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ logic, if [Mr. Bynum] had chosen to travel 
to the post office to mail his water bill, and was injured in a 
car accident on the way, [his] injuries would have risen out of 
a governmental function.”  We do not find this logic persuasive, 
given the obvious differences between the claims that Plaintiffs 
have asserted in this case from those posited by Defendant 
Wilson County and the absence of any authority tending to 
suggest that a business has a duty to ensure that the roads upon 
which its customers travel are maintained in a safe manner or to 
prevent its customers from being injured by the negligent 
-27- 
driving of third parties.  For that reason, Defendant Wilson 
County’s “parade of horribles” argument does not persuade us to 
overturn the trial court’s decision. 
We 
do, 
however, 
recognize 
that 
our 
reading 
of 
the 
applicable law raises the prospect for potentially troubling 
results, such as making liability for falls like that suffered 
by Mr. Bynum contingent upon whether a plaintiff injured in a 
fall at a county-owned office building used for multiple 
purposes was on the premises for the purpose of paying a bill 
for water service or seeking the issuance of a building permit.  
On the other hand, the adoption of the approach advocated by 
Defendant Wilson County creates a risk of equally anomalous 
results, given that, under its understanding of the applicable 
law, an individual injured in a fall while paying a water bill 
would be able to pursue a damage recovery in the event that the 
governmentally owned water system was operated from a separate 
building while having no right to pursue such a recovery in the 
event that the water system was operated from a building that 
contained 
other 
offices 
performing 
clearly 
governmental 
functions. 
The existence of anomalies similar to those that result 
from the adoption of either approach advocated in this case have 
-28- 
been recognized in a slightly different context by the Supreme 
Court: 
It is generally held, that insofar as a town 
or city undertakes to sell water for private 
consumption it is engaged in a commercial 
venture, as to which it functions in a 
proprietary or corporate capacity, and for 
negligence in connection therewith it is 
liable.  Insofar, however, as a municipality 
undertakes to supply water to extinguish 
fires, or for some other public purpose, it 
acts in a governmental capacity, and cannot 
be held liable for negligence. 
 
Faw, 253 N.C. at 409-10, 117 S.E.2d at 17 (citing Klassette v. 
Drug Co., 227 N.C. 353, 360, 42 S.E.2d 411, 416 (1947); Woodie 
v. North Wilkesboro, 159 N.C. 353, 356, 74 S.E. 924, 925 (1912) 
(additional citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Candler, 247 
N.C. at 406, 101 S.E.2d at 476 (stating that “public utilities, 
like water . . . are not provided by a municipality in its 
political or governmental capacity, except insofar as they may 
furnish water for extinguishing fires and for other municipal 
purposes”) (citing Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 129, 45 
S.E. 1029, 1030 (1903); Harrington v. Greenville, 159 N.C. 632, 
635-36, 75 S.E. 849, 850-51 (1912); Howland v. Asheville, 174 
N.C. 749, 750, 94 S.E. 524, 524-25 (1917); and Klassette, 227 
N.C. at 360, 42 S.E.2d at 416).  A careful reading of these 
cases suggests that, in the event that a county or city water 
system negligently allows a water pipe to burst, the county 
-29- 
would not be immune from a suit stemming from damage to the 
plaintiff’s property resulting from water intrusion while being 
entitled to assert immunity from a suit alleging that, as a 
result of the same burst water pipe, the plaintiff had been 
unable to have a fire that burned his or her residence 
extinguished.  Although such results may seem arbitrary or 
illogical, they are inherent in the application of the dichotomy 
between governmental and proprietary functions required by North 
Carolina law.  As the Supreme Court stated in Koontz v. City of 
Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 528, 186 S.E.2d 897, 907 (1972): 
The 
case 
law 
defining 
governmental 
and 
proprietary powers as relating to municipal 
corporations 
is 
consistent 
and 
clearly 
stated in this and other jurisdictions. 
However, 
application 
of 
these 
flexible 
propositions 
of 
law 
to 
given 
factual 
situations has resulted in irreconcilable 
splits of authority and confusion as to what 
functions 
are 
governmental 
and 
what 
functions are proprietary. . . . 
 
Even so, “it is axiomatic that any change to the law in this 
area must come from the legislature, not the courts.”  Clayton 
v. Branson, 170 N.C. App. 438, 460, 613 S.E.2d 259, 274 (citing 
Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319, 324, 420 
S.E.2d 432, 435-36 (1992) (stating that, while “plaintiff asks 
us either to abolish governmental immunity or to change the way 
it is applied,” “any change in this doctrine should come from 
the General Assembly.”), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 174, 625 
-30- 
S.E.2d 785 (2005).6  As a result, given that we are required to 
determine whether the activity at issue here was governmental or 
proprietary in nature, we conclude that the operation of a 
system for distributing water to the public is a proprietary 
activity and that Mr. Bynum’s injuries stemmed from alleged 
negligence associated with and inherent in the operation of such 
a water system, necessitating the further conclusion that the 
trial court did not err by determining that Defendant Wilson 
                     
6Appellate courts in many other jurisdictions have noted 
that “application of the governmental/proprietary distinction 
‘to the facts of a particular case has led to seemingly 
incongruous and diverse results.’”  Cunningham v. City of 
Attalla, 918 So. 2d 119, 124 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (quoting 
Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 667, 151 So. 2d 240, 
243 (1963)).  See, e.g., Tarbell Adm’r, Inc. v. City of Concord, 
157 N.H. 678, 682-83, 956 A.2d 322, 326 (2008) (stating that, 
although courts have attempted “to alleviate the harshness of 
the results produced by municipal immunity” by “distinguish[ing] 
between 
municipal 
functions 
that 
were 
‘governmental 
with 
immunity on the one hand, and proprietary with liability on the 
other hand,’” “this often artificial distinction [has] produced 
results [in practice] that were not only ‘confused, inconsistent 
and difficult,’ but absurd”) (quoting Gossler v. Manchester, 107 
N.H. 310, 315, 221 A.2d 242, 245 (1966) (Kenison, J., 
dissenting), superseded by statute as stated in Dover v. 
Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 133 N.H. 109, 575 A.2d 1280 
(1990)); Greene County Agric. Soc'y v. Liming, 89 Ohio St. 3d 
551, 558, 733 N.E.2d 1141, 1147 (2000) (stating that the 
“attempted distinction between governmental and proprietary 
functions is a ‘morass of conflict and confusion,’ ‘has been 
difficult 
and 
frequently 
leads 
to 
absurd 
and 
unjust 
consequences’”) (quoting Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 394, 
189 N.E.2d 857, 864 (1963) (Gibson, J., concurring in judgment); 
and Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, 161 Vt. 168, 177-78 n.3, 
638 A.2d 561, 567 n.3 (1993) (stating that “Vermont is one of a 
minority of states that retains the governmental-proprietary 
distinction, 
which 
has 
been 
criticized 
by 
courts 
and 
commentators for many years as unworkable”). 
-31- 
County is not entitled to immunity from suit in this case on the 
basis of governmental liability.7 
III. Conclusion 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 
Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Sleepy Hollow’s appeal from the 
trial court’s order as having been taken from an unappealable 
interlocutory order should be allowed, that Defendant Wilson 
County’s attempt to assert non-immunity-related challenges to 
the trial court’s order should be dismissed for the same reason, 
and that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant Wilson 
County’s motion for summary judgment on governmental immunity 
grounds.  As a result, the trial court’s order should be, and 
hereby is, affirmed in part and Defendant’s appeals should be, 
and hereby are, dismissed in part. 
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. 
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge DILLON concur. 
                     
7Although Defendant Wilson County also argues that it had 
not waived immunity by purchasing insurance that provided 
coverage for Plaintiffs’ claims, we need not address this issue 
given the decision enunciated in the text of this opinion.