Title: Williams v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121815
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2021

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 121,815 
 
RONELL WILLIAMS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
Under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 
(2012), mandatory life without parole for a juvenile offender violates the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. But a sentencing scheme that 
gives the sentencing authority discretion to impose a lesser punishment is constitutional 
under Miller. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 58 Kan. App. 2d 947, 476 P.3d 805 (2020). 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed December 17, 2021. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the 
brief for appellant.  
 
Daniel G. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mark A. Dupree Sr., 
district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee. 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  In 2000, a jury convicted Ronell Williams of two counts of 
premeditated murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated 
burglary for acts he committed when he was 14 years old. For the murder convictions, the 
district court sentenced Williams to two concurrent life sentences without the possibility 
of parole for 50 years (hard 50). Many years after his sentencing, Williams filed an action 
under K.S.A. 60-1507, arguing that the scheme under which he was sentenced violated 
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district 
court dismissed the motion as untimely and successive. The Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded the case for a new hearing on whether Williams' youth and attendant 
characteristics made the hard 50 disproportionate punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. The State petitioned for review. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
At Williams' original criminal trial, the State put forth evidence to establish that 
Williams killed two people when he was 14 years old. The evidence showed that, on 
August 3, 1999, Williams and his twin brother Donell encountered Wilbur and Wilma 
Williams (no relation to the appellant) outside their house and forced the couple inside. 
The brothers searched the house, allegedly looking for things to steal. After finding the 
couple's car keys, Donell went outside to get the car and Ronell shot and killed both 
Wilbur and Wilma before the brothers left the scene. State v. Williams, 277 Kan. 338, 
341, 85 P.3d 697 (2004). The State prosecuted Williams as an adult, and a jury convicted 
him of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, 
and one count of aggravated burglary. 277 Kan. at 338.  
 
 
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After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the district court sentenced 
Williams to two hard 50 life terms for the murders, 59 months' imprisonment for the 
robbery, and 32 months' imprisonment for the burglary, all to run concurrent. Williams, 
277 Kan. at 339. This court affirmed the convictions. 277 Kan. at 358. 
 
 
Williams filed a motion in 2005 under K.S.A. 60-1507 alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Williams v. State, No. 99,516, 2009 WL 1140260 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 
 
On September 30, 2016, Williams filed a second motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. 
He argued his hard 50 life sentences were cruel and unusual punishment. He relied on 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), which 
held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual 
punishment, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 210-12, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. 
Ed. 2d 599 (2016), which announced that Miller was a retroactive change in the law. The 
district court dismissed the motion as successive and untimely.  
 
 
Williams appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. 
Williams v. State, 58 Kan. App. 2d 947, 985, 476 P.3d 805 (2020). It concluded his 
motion was subject to an exception to the prohibition on successive motions because it 
was based on a change in law, and that "rare and extraordinary circumstances" required 
an extension of the one-year time limit to prevent manifest injustice. Williams, 58 Kan. 
App. 2d at 954.  
 
 
The Court of Appeals further held that under the sentencing rules announced in 
Miller, a hard 50 sentence for a juvenile offender is unconstitutional unless the sentencer 
 
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first considers the offender's youth and the characteristics of youth before imposing the 
sentence. The panel ruled that the sentencing court failed to adequately take these factors 
into consideration. Consequently, it held Williams' sentence was unconstitutional under 
the Eighth Amendment.  
 
 
We granted the State's petition for review.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
The State argues that the panel has impermissibly extended Miller and that the 
Supreme Court's position in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S.__, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 209 L. Ed. 
2d 390 (2021), confirms this. Alternatively, the State argues, the sentencing court 
properly considered Williams' youth and the characteristics of youth, so the sentencing 
process satisfied the Miller requirements. We agree with the State that Jones requires us 
to reverse the Court of Appeals.  
 
 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This clause "guarantees individuals the 
right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-
61, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). A punishment that is disproportionate to the 
offense is excessive and thus cruel and unusual under the Eighth amendment. 543 U.S. at 
560-61.  
 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that certain sentencing practices will 
always be disproportionate to the offense because of "mismatches between the culpability 
of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty." Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. It has 
 
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imposed categorical bans on these sentencing practices. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525 (2008) (death penalty for individuals 
who commit nonhomicide crimes violates Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002) (death penalty for mentally disabled 
offenders violates Eighth Amendment). In 2005, the Court began a string of cases—
Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery, and Jones—that barred certain sentencing practices 
for juveniles.  
 
 
In Roper, the Court held that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for 
juvenile offenders. The Court explained that society reserves the death penalty for "those 
offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme 
culpability makes them 'the most deserving of execution.'" Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 
[2002]). It concluded juveniles are not in this class because they have a less developed 
character, are immature and irresponsible, are vulnerable to peer pressure and negative 
influence, have a high capacity for reform, and are unlikely to be "irretrievably 
depraved." 543 U.S. at 569-70. After recognizing "the diminished culpability of 
juveniles," the Court concluded that "the penological justifications [of retribution and 
deterrence] for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults." 543 U.S. 
at 571.  
 
 
In Graham, the Court relied on the Roper reasoning to hold that life without parole 
is also a disproportionate sentence for juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide 
crimes. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81-82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 
(2010). And, in Miller, the Court recognized that life without parole would be 
disproportionate for most juvenile offenders regardless of the nature of their crimes—
homicide or nonhomicide. Consequently, it held that "mandatory life without parole for 
 
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juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment." (Emphasis added.) Miller, 567 U.S. at 487. 
The Court explained it would require any sentencer "to take into account how children 
are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a 
lifetime in prison" before imposing life without parole. 567 U.S. at 480. In Montgomery, 
the Court held that Miller has retroactive effect. 577 U.S. at 208. 
 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that Miller requires sentencing courts to 
consider youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing life without parole or the 
functional equivalent of life without parole. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 970. It concluded the 
hard 50 is the functional equivalent of life without parole. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 972-73. 
Thus, it ruled, the district court should have considered youth and its attendant 
characteristics in this case and, if it did not, Williams' sentencing procedure ran afoul of 
Miller. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 983-84. The panel ultimately concluded the district court 
failed to comply with the Miller requirements. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 984. 
 
 
After the Court of Appeals ruled, the Supreme Court decided Jones. In Jones, the 
Court held that Miller does not require a sentencing court to explain on the record how it 
considered youth and its attendant characteristics or make an explicit finding of 
permanent incorrigibility before imposing life without parole on a juvenile offender. In so 
ruling, the Court explained that "[u]nder Miller [], an individual who commits a homicide 
when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced to life without parole . . . if the sentence is 
not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment." 
(Emphasis added.) Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1311. The Court reasoned that an on-the-record-
discussion "is not necessary to ensure that a sentencer considers a defendant's youth," 
because "if a sentencer has discretion to consider the defendant's youth, the sentencer 
necessarily will consider the defendant's youth." 141 S. Ct. at 1319. We conclude the 
Court of Appeals interpretation of Miller cannot survive Jones. 
 
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When Williams committed his crimes, the base sentence for premeditated first-
degree murder was life without the possibility of parole for 25 years (hard 25). K.S.A. 
1999 Supp. 21-4706(c); K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 22-3717(b)(1). K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4635 
required the district court to consider whether that sentence should be elevated to the hard 
50. Relevant here, this statute provided:  
 
"if a defendant . . . is convicted of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of 
premeditated murder, the court shall determine whether the defendant shall be required to 
serve . . . a mandatory term of imprisonment of 50 years or sentenced as otherwise 
provided by law. 
"(b) In order to make such determination, the court may be presented evidence 
concerning any matter that the court deems relevant to the question of sentence and shall 
include matters relating to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 
21-4636 and amendments thereto and any mitigating circumstances. . . .  
"(c) If the court finds that one or more of the aggravating circumstances 
enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4636 and amendments thereto exist and, further, that the 
existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating 
circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to 
K.S.A. 21-4638 . . . ." 
 
 
K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4638 provided:  
 
"When it is provided by law that a person shall be sentenced pursuant to this section, such 
person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation 
or suspension, modification or reduction in sentence. . . . [A] person sentenced pursuant 
to this section shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 50 years' imprisonment, and 
such 50 years' imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time 
credits." 
 
 
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K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4637 enumerated a non-exclusive list of mitigating factors. 
It provided: 
 
"Mitigating circumstances shall include, but are not limited to, the following: 
"(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
"(b) The crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbances. 
"(c) The victim was a participant in or consented to the defendant's conduct. 
"(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person, 
and the defendant's participation was relatively minor. 
"(e) The defendant acted under extreme distress or under the substantial 
domination of another person. 
"(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's 
conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired. 
"(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
"(h) At the time of the crime, the defendant was suffering from posttraumatic 
stress syndrome caused by violence or abuse by the victim." 
 
 
Under this scheme, the sentencing court was directed to consider aggravating and 
mitigating evidence, including the defendant's age at the time of the crime, to decide 
whether the hard 50 was the appropriate sanction. If the court found that the mitigating 
factors outweighed the aggravating factors, it was permitted to impose a hard 25. As the 
State argues, this is not a mandatory sentencing scheme as contemplated by Jones 
because the court had discretion to impose a lesser sentence than the hard 50. See Jones, 
141 S. Ct. at 1322 (sentencing scheme at issue was constitutional "because the sentence 
was not mandatory and the trial judge had discretion to impose a lesser punishment in 
light of Jones's youth"). Consequently, under the Supreme Court's most recent precedent, 
Williams' discretionary sentencing procedure satisfied Miller. See People v. Dorsey, No. 
 
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123010, 2021 WL 3204034, at *8 (Ill. 2021) (Miller's applicability to discretionary 
sentences is questionable after Jones); see also Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317, 1320-
22 (10th Cir. 2015) ("while Miller certainly reiterated the relevance of youth at 
sentencing as a general matter," it did not "alter the law governing statutory schemes 
giving the sentencing authority a choice between imposing life with or without possibility 
of parole on juvenile offenders"); Croft v. Williams, 773 F.3d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(life without parole sentence could not run afoul of Miller, even if court did not consider 
juvenile offender's age, because sentence was not mandatory); Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 
857, 869 (9th Cir. 2014) (individualized sentencing before life without parole is the only 
thing required under Miller); Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 241 (1st Cir. 
2014) (even if sentencing court failed to consider differences in juvenile offenders "as the 
Supreme Court required in Miller," this "procedural shortfall did not violate the bar on 
mandatory life sentences for juveniles" because life without parole was not mandatory). 
   
 
Consistent with the Court's ruling in Jones, we must assume that the sentencing 
court here used its discretion to consider Williams' youth and its attendant characteristics 
before it imposed the hard 50. In coming to its holding, the Supreme Court rejected Jones' 
position that "meaningful daylight exists between (i) a sentencer's discretion to consider 
youth, and (ii) the sentencer's actual consideration of youth." Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1319. It 
explained that a sentencer with "discretion to consider the defendant's youth . . . 
necessarily will consider the defendant's youth, especially if defense counsel advances an 
argument based on the defendant's youth." 141 S. Ct. at 1319. The Court noted that 
different sentencers may weigh youth differently, and then expressly sanctioned this 
result:  "Some sentencers may decide that a defendant's youth supports a sentence less 
than life without parole. Other sentencers presented with the same facts might decide that 
life without parole remains appropriate despite the defendant's youth." 141 S. Ct. at 1319. 
But, the Court ruled, "the key point remains that, in a case involving a murderer under 18, 
 
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a sentencer cannot avoid considering the defendant's youth if the sentencer has discretion 
to consider that mitigating factor." 141 S. Ct. at 1319-20. 
 
 
The Court recognized that a defendant might have an Eighth Amendment claim "if 
a sentencer considering life without parole for a murderer who was under 18 expressly 
refuses as a matter of law to consider the defendant's youth." Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1320 
n.7. But we do not face that situation here. Not only did Williams argue youth as a 
mitigating factor, but the district court also expressly acknowledged it as a mitigating 
factor on the record. Thus, even if we had reservations about making assumptions 
regarding the district court's considerations, the sentencing scheme's explicit direction to 
consider youth as a mitigating sentence and the court's consideration of that factor 
resolves any hesitation.  
 
 
Williams insists that Jones stands for only two things:  that a court need not lay 
out its sentencing considerations on the record and that a court need not make a finding of 
permanent incorrigibility before imposing a sentence. Williams argues we can take 
nothing more from Jones. In light of the explicit language in Jones, we disagree. In no 
uncertain terms, the Court instructs that its "precedents require a discretionary sentencing 
procedure" and that a sentencing complies with that precedent when "the sentence [is] not 
mandatory and the trial judge [has] discretion to impose a lesser punishment in light of [] 
youth." 141 S. Ct. at 1322. 
  
 
While the Court of Appeals pre-Jones opinion is thorough and lengthy, Jones 
makes quick work of our review. Because the district court had discretion to impose a 
lesser sentence, we need not consider the panel's multiple holdings. Even if we were to 
assume that Miller applies to the functional equivalent of life without parole and that the 
hard 50 is such an equivalent, Williams' sentencing satisfied Miller.  
 
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In practical terms, this means that the 60-1507 court was correct to dismiss 
Williams' 60-1507 motion as untimely. Because his sentencing scheme satisfied Miller's 
constitutional requirements, it was unnecessary to consider Williams' motion to prevent 
manifest injustice. The Court of Appeals is reversed and the district court's decision 
denying the motion is affirmed.   
 
 
STANDRIDGE, J., not participating. 
 
MICHAEL B. BUSER, J., assigned.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Judge Buser, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed to 
hear case No. 121,815 vice Justice Standridge under the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court by K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 20-3002(c).