Title: MARRIAGE OF SELL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-042
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 1981

No. 81-42 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LARRY KENNETH SELL, Petitioner and Respondent, and CAROL JEAN SELL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Darrell S. Worm, Montana Legal Services, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Patrick M . Springer, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: May 15, 1981 Decided: ' J I I I ~ ~ ~ S ~ O Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. The Flathead County District Court entered a decree of dissolution following a petition by husband, Larry K. Sell, and a trial without a jury. Carol Jean Sell, respondent and appellant, appeals from provisions of that decree relating to the distribution of marital assets. The parties were married from July 20, 1971, until the dissolution of the marriage on May 9, 1980. They had one child who was eight years old at the time of dissolution. From 1971 to 1980 there were several separations of unknown duration, but the final separation occurred in July 1979. Petitioner-respondent is employed by the Anaconda Copper Company with take-home wages of about $1,200 a month. The wife was working as a motel maid at the time of the dissolution and has had experience working as a licensed practical nurse. The major marital asset is a home purchased by the parties in December 1976, after they had been separated for several months. At the time of purchase, the appellant contributed $1,000 to the downpayment, and the husband contributed $850. The wife's contribution was from a sale of her former home. The parties lived in the home from December 1976 until July 1980. When they moved into the home it was unfinished. For three years they made substantial improvements to the home, most of the work being done by the husband. The materials used to make the improvements came to approximately $5,500. Petitioner testified that he devoted at least 1,500 hours in labor to make the improvements. I n a d d i t i o n , he was a s s i s t e d by h i s f a t h e r who d i d n o t g e t any compensation f o r h i s work. T h e r e is s h a r p disagreement over t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e a p p e l l a n t a s s i s t e d i n t h e improvements. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had worked about one-half a s much a s her husband, w h i l e he c l a i m s s h e helped v e r y l i t t l e . The p a r t i e s e v e n t u a l l y planned t o sell t h e house and purchase a bigger p i e c e of p r o p e r t y . Due t o t h e improvements p l u s a g e n e r a l i n f l a t i o n i n p r o p e r t y v a l u e s i n t h e a r e a , t h e p r o p e r t y i n c r e a s e d i n v a l u e from t h e o r i g i n a l purchase p r i c e of $28,000 t o a v a l u e set by t h e t r i a l judge a t $55,000. T h i s p r i c e was agreed upon by both p a r t i e s . The n e t v a l u e of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , determined by s u b t r a c t i n g t h e v a l u e of o t h e r d e b t s from t h e e s t a t e , is $21,000. The m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o d i s t r i b u t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o n s i s t s of t h e following: t h e family home, $55,000; proceeds from t h e s a l e of a 1976 Vega, $1,500; and, a Ventura camper, $1,500. The t o t a l a s s e t s t h e r e f o r e were valued a t $58,000. Debts of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , owing on t h e h o u s e and o t h e r d e b t s c o n s o l i d a t e d i n t o home r e f i n a n c i n g , were $34,000, l e a v i n g $24,000 i n n e t a s s e t s . Two i s s u e s a r e b e f o r e t h i s Court: (1) Does t h i s Court have j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e appeal; and ( 2 ) d i d t h e District Court abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n a p p o r t i o n i n g t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s ? The f i r s t i s s u e stems from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r e n t e r e d on September 1 2 , 1980. The o r d e r modified t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law more t h a n f i f t e e n days a f t e r submission of a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s t - t r i a l motions. By exceeding t h e time p e r i o d mandated by Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P., t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i v e s t e d i t s e l f o f j u r i s d i c t i o n t o determine t h e motion, and its o r d e r was a n u l l i t y . Marvel B r u t e S t e e l B u i l d i n g , I n c . v. Bass ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. I 616 P.2d 380, 37 St.Rep. 1670. The o r i g i n a l n o t i c e of a p p e a l from t h e second d e c r e e , based on t h a t o r d e r , was u n t i m e l y under R u l e 5 , M.R.Civ.P., and w e h a v e no j u r i s d i c t i o n a s t o t h e second d e c r e e . See P r i c e v . Zunchich ( 1 9 8 0 ) ~ Mont. , 612 P.2d 1296, 37 St.Rep. 1058. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s d e f e c t is cured by t h e a p p e l l a n t having lodged an appeal t o t h e f i r s t d e c r e e . W e a g r e e . The n o t i c e of a p p e a l t o t h e f i r s t d e c r e e was f i l e d l o n g a f t e r i t s e n t r y . However, t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t i n a d v e r t e n t l y f a i l e d t o f i l e and s e r v e t h e n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment of t h e f i r s t d e c r e e . S i n c e t h e r e was no d a t e t o begin t h e time f o r n o t i c e of t h e a p p e a l t o be f i l e d , t h e n o t i c e was n o t untimely. The time t o a p p e a l , t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t e x p i r e , and Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., was n o t v i o l a t e d . T h i s Court can assume j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e a p p e a l . Haywood v . S e d i l l o ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 101, 535 P.2d 1014. The f i r s t and second d e c r e e s d i d n o t vary substan- t i a l l y , and t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e appeal were i d e n t i c a l . Respondent is n o t p r e j u d i c e d by a s u r p r i s i n g s h i f t i n t h e s u b s t a n t i v e n a t u r e of t h e a p p e a l . W e now t u r n our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e main i s s u e on a p p e a l , whether t h e r e was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n a p p o r t i o n i n g t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . A p p e l l a n t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s have broad d i s c r e t i o n under Montana law i n d i s t r i b u t i n g m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y b u t argues t h a t t h i s d i s c r e t i o n is n o t unbounded. She a r g u e s t h a t under s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, t h e D i s t r i c t Court cannot a c t a r b i t r a r i l y and must c o n s i d e r a l l c r i t e r i a under t h e s t a t u t e s o t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a j u s t , e q u i t a b l e and r e a s o n a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s Court h a s a l i m i t e d scope of a p p e l l a t e review and w i l l n o t i n t e r v e n e e x c e p t when t h e D i s t r i c t Court has d e p a r t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h e norms of e q u i t y . I n Re Marriage o f Herron ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. I 608 P.2d 97, 37 St.Rep. 387; I n R e Marriage of Jacobson (1979) I Mont . , 600 P.2d 1183, 36 St.Rep. 1773. A p p e l l a n t h e r e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d e p a r t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h e norms of e q u i t y and a s k s t h a t t h i s Court i n t e r v e n e . I n I n R e Marriage of Berthiaume ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173 Mont. 421, 567 P.2d 1388, r e l y i n g on P o r t e r v. P o r t e r ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 451, 473 P.2d 538, we s e t t h e s t a n d a r d of review on a p p e a l i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g c l a i m s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n . These r e a s o n a b l e and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e g u i d e l i n e s were followed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. There is n o t h i n g " a r b i t r a r y " i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and we f i n d no e r r o r . There was no q u e s t i o n concerning t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e bulk of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e p a r t i e s nor w i t h t h e c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d . The o n l y q u e s t i o n concerns t h e house. The v a l u e s of t h e house, t h e c a r and t h e camper were agreed t o by s t i p u l a t i o n . A p p e l l a n t t a k e s no i s s u e w i t h t h e v a l u e o f t h e c a r o r t h e camper, and f o r a l l i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s is s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e g r a n t t o h e r of t h e b a l a n c e of h e r downpayment on t h e house. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i v i s i o n of t h e house, t h e remaining a s s e t , on o t h e r t h a n a 50-50 b a s i s is clai'med a s e r r o r by a p p e l l a n t . T h i s Court i n I n Re Marriage of Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 598 P.2d 1120, 36 St.Rep. 1525, noted: " A 1 t h o u g h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may e q u a l l y d i v i d e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , s u c h a d i s t r i b u t i o n is n o t mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4- 202, MCA. See Kuntz v. Kuntz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont., 593 P.2d 4 1 , 36 S t . R e p . 662. S e c t i o n 40-4-202 is f l e x i b l e and it v e s t s a good d e a l of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court. I n Re Marriage of Jorgensen ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont., 590 P.2d 606, 609, 36 St.Rep. 233, 237. W e have s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t each c a s e must be looked a t i n d i v i d u a l l y , w i t h a n e y e t o i t s u n i q u e circumstances. J o r g e n s e n , 590 P.2d a t 609; Cook v. Cook ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 159 Mont. 98, 495 P.2d 591. " The record h e r e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court made every e f f o r t t o comply w i t h a l l p r e v i o u s pronouncements i n m a r i t a l c a s e s . By its p r e t r i a l o r d e r d a t e d J u n e 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d t h e p a r t i e s t o submit information concerning: " a . The n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s a s of t h e f i l i n g of t h e Complaint. "b. Any p r o p e r t y e i t h e r claimed by r i g h t of i n h e r i t a n c e or o t h e r q u a l i f i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n . I 1 c . A l l p r o p e r t y t h a t is s u b j e c t t o d i s t r i b u t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e v a l u e s t h e r e o f . "d. The manner i n which s a i d d i s t r i b u t i o n s h a l l be made." T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was p r e s e n t e d by both p a r t i e s by way o f p r o p o s e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w , complying w i t h t h e requirements of I n Re Marriage of M c G i l l ( 1 9 8 o ) t - Mont . - , 609 P.2d 278, 37 St.Rep. 578. The D i s t r i c t Court chose t o adopt its own f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law, r a t h e r than t h o s e submitted by e i t h e r p a r t y , which i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t Court had t h e s t a t u t o r y requirements of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, i n mind i n a r r i v i n g a t its d e c i s i o n . A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s i n two g e n e r a l ways. F i r s t , t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o a d d r e s s t h e f a c t o r s e n u m e r a t e d i n s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, w i t h s p e c i f i c i t y i n f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law drawn from t h e evidence b e f o r e it. Second, t h e D i s t r i c t Court a c t e d s o a r b i t r a r i l y t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of s a i d m a r i t a l a s s e t s under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s was per se i n e q u i t a b l e . W e f i n d o t h e r w i s e . The c o u r t ' s d i r e c t i v e s t o t h e p a r t i e s and t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law show t h a t w h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d d o e s n o t w a r r a n t i n t e r v e n t i o n . See I n R e Marriage of Herron ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 608 P.2d 97, 37 St.Rep. 387. A review of t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law d a t e d J u l y 16, 1980, and t h e o r d e r modifying t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s d a t e d September 1 2 , 1980, whether t a k e n t o g e t h e r or s e p a r a t e l y , and when reviewed w i t h t h e remainder of t h e t o t a l r e c o r d , show t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y gave c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e elements s e t f o r t h i n Jorgenson and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n , even i f t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o " a r t i c u l a t e " each item s e p a r a t e l y w i t h i n its f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . While t h e r e is no q u e s t i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t , a s a housewife, a c q u i r e d a v e s t e d i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t t h e w i f e " d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e by work o r l a b o r any a p p r e c i a b l e e f f o r t s i n improving t h e p r o p e r t y . " The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t r e s i d e w i t h t h e husband d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e time p e r i o d i n which t h e improvements t o t h e p r o p e r t y were made. T h i s c a s e is n o t u n l i k e our r e c e n t d e c i s i o n wherein the appellant husband claimed to have made equal contributions to the "house" and therefore deserved one-half of the marital estate. In Re Marriage of Nunnally (1981), Mont. , 625 P.2d 1159, 38 St.Rep. 529, 531. There we found the case reflected a careful and conscientious consideration of the appropriate factors and affirmed the District Court. We find the same result should be reached here. Affirmed. We concur: % d J & e d w Chief ust ti he