Title: Brimhall v. State
Citation: 279 N.E.2d 557
Docket Number: 770S165
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 9, 1972

279 N.E.2d 557 (1972)
Jerry BRIMHALL, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 770S165.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
March 9, 1972.
*558 John D. Shuman, Elkhart, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Walter E. Bravard, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
DeBRULER, Judge.
On March 7, 1970, a Saturday night, a fight broke out in the Sportsman's Bar in Goshen, Indiana, and sometime later a shot was fired in the Bar. In connection with that incident, the appellant was asked to report to the police department for questioning and after the appellant went to the police department in response to this request, he was arrested on a charge of public intoxication. Sometime on the following Monday, March 9, 1970, the appellant was charged by affidavit with assault with intent to kill. The relevant portion of the charging affidavit read as follows:
The court found that probable cause existed for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the appellant, and set the bail at $25,000.00. On the next day, Tuesday, March 10, 1970, the State moved in open court to amend the charging affidavit to assault with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: mayhem, rather than assault with intent to kill. The appellant appeared before the Honorable Aldo J. Simpson, Judge of the Elkhart Circuit Court of Elkhart County, and entered a plea of guilty to assault with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: mayhem. The following is a record of that guilty plea proceeding:
Approximately one month later the appellant filed a verified petition for vacation of judgment and for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty, on the grounds that his plea of guilty was not made freely and understandingly. Pursuant to this petition, an evidentiary hearing was held and the court subsequently overruled the defendant's petition. This appeal is from that decision.
At the evidentiary hearing on the petition to withdraw the guilty plea, the following facts were adduced. The appellant testified that he was intoxicated on the Saturday in question and that a fight erupted in the tavern while a friend of his was being ejected. He admitted breaking a beer bottle and brandishing it to keep *560 others from jumping on his friend, but denied swinging it at anyone or cutting anyone. He stated that he was arrested later that evening in the company of two other men who had not been involved in the incident on a charge of public intoxication and that he remained in jail until the following Monday morning. At that time he went to a hearing for public intoxication, and he testified that he posted a $50.00 bond on that charge and was told that he would be released. However, when he returned to the jail to pick up his things he was detained, and several hours later charged with assault and battery with intent to kill. He testified that no one questioned him at any time concerning the events of that previous Saturday night. He stated that he went to a hearing the next morning and spoke to an attorney briefly about his case. He said that the attorney advised him that his bail was set at $25,000.00, and that it would be impossible to get it lowered. He also was told that he would have to wait in jail from three to six months before he went to trial unless he wanted to plead guilty, and that he would have to get another lawyer if he wanted to go to trial.
There is no evidence that the appellant ever discussed his version of the incident with an attorney, and he testified that the first time that he heard anyone had been cut was after he had been imprisoned after several weeks. As to his state of knowledge at the time of entering the plea of guilty, he testified as follows:
Donald Cook, the victim testified that one of the appellant's friends and an employee of the bar began scuffling and a crowd of people moved outside. The appellant broke a beer bottle on the door and was telling the crowd to leave his friend alone. The owner of the bar grabbed the appellant and told him to settle down and Mr. Cook also grabbed at the bottle. He testified that he did not remember the bottle touching him at that point and that the appellant lowered the bottle to his side. Then a short fight occurred between the original antagonists and the victim and the appellant stood aside and watched it. The following testimony reveals the nature of the wound received in this case:
The victim, Mr. Cook, further testified that he signed a statement for the police concerning the incidents that evening. When questioned about that portion of the statement which indicated that the appellant had hit him with a bottle, he replied:
He denied that the appellant had intended to strike him at any time.
The appellant's attorney testified that he was in court on the day in question on other matters. He spoke to the appellant briefly and, in response to appellant's questions, told him that he could not get his bail reduced and that his case would not come to trial for at least three months, and would probably be scheduled sometime in September or October, some six to seven months away. He testified that he got the court file and read the charging affidavit to the appellant and let him read it for himself. He testified that he neither went over the language of the affidavit with the appellant, nor did he talk about any of the legal elements of assault and battery with intent to kill. He further testified that he did not show the appellant a copy of the statute under which he was charged, and that, although he would have discussed the definition of mayhem with the appellant if he had been asked, he had no recollection of discussing mayhem with the appellant.
He further testified that he told the appellant that the prosecutor would accept a guilty plea to the lesser offense of assault and battery with the intent to commit a felony, to-wit: mayhem, and that he told the appellant what the lesser sentence would be for this offense. At that time the appellant said he was going to enter a plea of not *562 guilty and the attorney informed him that he would not be willing to represent him at trial. The appellant again indicated his desire to plead not guilty and the attorney left. A short while later, the appellant's co-defendant decided to plead guilty. After this plea was entered, the attorney testified as follows:
One of the attorneys present at the conference prior to the arraignment that morning was called and testified as follows:
He also testified that he believed that Mr. Brimhall understood the situation in that his choice was between waiting several months to go to trial on a more serious charge, and immediately pleading guilty to a lesser charge. He did not recall any discussion concerning the nature of the charges or the elements of the charges in his presence.
The appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the appellant's verified motion for vacation of judgment and for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty, and to enter a plea of not guilty. It is important to emphasize that the appellant does not raise a question of guilt or innocence, but merely asks he be allowed to go to trial. A plea of guilty, to be valid, must be made freely and understandingly by the accused. Thacker v. State (1970), Ind., 262 N.E.2d 189; Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618, 115 N.E.2d 501; State v. Lindsey (1952), 231 Ind. 126, 106 N.E.2d 230; Ketring v. State (1935), 209 Ind. 618, 200 N.E. 212; Rhodes v. State (1926), 199 Ind. 183, 156 N.E. 389. The law in this State as it applies to pleas of guilty was well stated in Harshman v. State, supra, where it was said:
The reasons for this careful approach to a plea of guilty were well expressed by the *563 United States Supreme Court in a recent case, where it was said:
Because of the grave nature of a guilty plea the trial court has a duty to closely scrutinize the situation and be sure that the offered plea is freely and understandingly given, for "the court is backward in receiving and recording the plea of guilty from a prisoner." Griffith v. State (1871), 36 Ind. 406, 408. As we said in Mislik v. State (1915), 184 Ind. 72, 110 N.E. 551, "that a plea of guilty should be entirely voluntary, and made by one competent to know the consequences thereof, and that the trial court should satisfy itself of these facts before receiving it, appears to be well settled."[1]
In discharging this duty to consider and pass upon the validity of the guilty plea, *564 the trial judge must put on the record facts which indicate the status of the plea, as called for in Supreme Court Rule 1-11, (now Criminal Rule 10). Lockhart v. State (1971), Ind., 274 N.E.2d 523. As we said in Campbell v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 198, 96 N.E.2d 876:
The United States Supreme Court, in discussing a similar federal rule, held that the rule had two purposes, first to assist the district judge to make a constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary, and second, to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination. McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418.
The court in McCarthy reversed a conviction where the federal rule was not complied with holding that there is no adequate substitute for "demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him." (Emphasis added.) 394 U.S.  at 470, 89 S. Ct.  at 1173. In summing up their disposition of this case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
This reasoning is persuasive and was given constitutional dimension in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process, the record of the entry of the plea must demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by the accused of his constitutional rights. Since the Boykin case, presuming waiver from a silent record in a guilty plea case is impermissible.
In this case, the record is silent as to the discharging of the trial court's burden to determine that the guilty plea was properly entered. It is axiomatic that "every reasonable presumption should and is indulged against a waiver of fundamental rights." United States ex rel. Pierce v. Lane, 193 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.C.Ind. 1961), rev. on other grounds, 302 F.2d 38 (7 Cir.1962). See also, Grubbs v. State (1970), Ind., 265 N.E.2d 40; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461; Glasser v. United States (1941), 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680. There is nothing in this record to indicate that the appellant was advised of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions, and nothing to indicate that he intentionally and freely waived those rights.
In addition, no evidence exists to support the conclusion that this plea was "intelligently" and "understandingly" entered for there is no *565 evidence that the appellant understood the facts to which he was admitting nor that he understood the law in relation to those facts. There is no evidence in this case that any attempt was ever made to ascertain the appellant's version of the events in question, and to analyze that version in relation to the formal charge. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the legal elements of the crime were not discussed. In Indiana, there exist nine separate offenses with varying sentences which can be charged under the general rubric of assault and battery, with maximum sentences varying from six months to fourteen years. See Foust, "Some Thoughts on Criminal Code Revision", 1 Ind. Legal Forum 4, 23 (1967). The initial charge in this case, assault with intent to kill, was changed to assault and battery with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: mayhem, prior to the entry of the plea. Indiana statutes recognize two kinds of mayhem, simple and malicious. Simple mayhem, as defined in I.C. 1971, XX-X-XX-X, being Burns § 10-408, is as follows:
Malicious mayhem, on the other hand, is defined in I.C. 1971, XX-X-XX-X, being Burns § 10-407, as:
The charging affidavit did not distinguish the type of mayhem being charged and the appellant can surely not be presumed to understand the subtle differences involved. Suffice it to say that in a case such as this, a close examination of the facts and their relevance to the specific charge are of the utmost importance. As we said in Goff v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 267, 163 N.E.2d 888:
In the present case, we have no indication that his examination and analysis of the facts in relation to the charge was ever made. We are reminded of this situation in Rhodes v. State, supra, in which a guilty plea was entered after a short conference with an attorney. In that case it was stated:
Under the formal charge in this case, assuming that the felony involved was meant to be malicious mayhem,[2] the State was faced with the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant purposely and maliciously attempted to cut off or permanently disable a limb of the victim. Burns § 10-407, supra; Pierce v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 225, 41 N.E.2d 797.
We hold that this plea was not understandingly and intelligently entered. The judgment of the trial court denying this petition is reversed and his cause is now remanded to the trial court and the trial court is ordered to grant said petition.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and GIVAN, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
[1]  As guidelines in this area, we can find none better than those outlined in the following sections of the approved draft of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty:

"1.4 Defendant to be advised by court.
The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally and
(a) determining that he understands the nature of the charge;
(b) informing him that by this plea of guilty or nolo contendere he waives his right to trial by jury; and
(c) informing him:
(i) of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that possible from consecutive sentences;
(ii) of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge; and
(iii) when the offense charged is one for which a different or additional punishment is authorized by reason of the fact that the defendant has previously been convicted of an offense, that this fact may be established after his plea in the present action if he has been previously convicted, thereby subjecting him to such different or additional punishment.
"1.5 Determining voluntariness of plea.
The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining that the plea is voluntary. By inquiry of the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the court should determine whether the tendered plea is the result of prior plea discussions and a plea agreement, and, if it is, what agreement has been reached. If the prosecuting attorney has agreed to seek charge or sentence concessions which must be approved by the court, the court must advise the defendant personally that the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the court. The court should then address the defendant personally and determine whether any other promises or any force or threats were used to obtain the plea.
"1.6 Determining accuracy of plea.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as may satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.
"1.7 Record of proceedings.
A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere should be made and preserved. The record should include (i) the court's advice to the defendant (as required in section 114), (ii) the inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea (as required in section 1.5), and (iii) the inquiry into the accuracy of the plea (as required in section 1.6)."
[2]  Simple mayhem is a misdemeanor and could not be charged as an attempted felony in this case.