Title: P. v. Braxton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S114375
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2004

1 
Filed 12/13/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S114375 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A096083 
MICHAEL GLENN BRAXTON, 
) 
 
 
) 
Solano County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FCR 178124 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Penal Code section 12021 contains this sentence:  “If the court shall refuse 
to hear a defendant’s motion for a new trial or when made shall neglect to 
determine such motion before pronouncing judgment or the making of an order 
granting probation, then the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial.”  In this 
case, on the day set for sentencing, the trial court refused to entertain defendant’s 
oral motion for a new trial.  On defendant’s appeal, the Court of Appeal, relying 
on the above quoted provision, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for 
a new trial. 
We granted review to address these issues:  (1) Is section 1202 self-
executing or must a defendant bring a motion under that provision?  (2) If a 
separate motion is required, may this requirement be excused on the ground that 
making the motion would have been futile?  (3) Does section 1202 require a new 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
stated. 
 
2 
trial without regard to whether the trial court’s failure to hear or determine the new 
trial motion has prejudiced the defendant?  (4) If prejudice is required, may the 
reviewing court avoid any prejudice by remanding the matter to the trial court to 
hear and determine the defendant’s new trial motion? 
We resolve the issues in these ways:  (1) When a trial court has refused or 
neglected to hear a defendant’s new trial motion, a separate motion citing section 
1202 is not required (and thus the futility exception does not come into play), but a 
defendant may forfeit a claim to the section 1202 remedy by acquiescing in the 
trial court’s failure to hear the new trial motion.  (2) A reviewing court may order 
a new trial under section 1202 only if the trial court’s failure to hear the 
defendant’s new trial motion has resulted in a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 13).  (3) A reviewing court may, in appropriate circumstances, prevent a 
miscarriage of justice by remanding the matter to the trial court for a belated 
hearing and ruling on the defendant’s new trial motion. 
I 
On June 14, 2001, a jury returned verdicts finding defendant Michael Glenn 
Braxton guilty of the attempted murder of Beatrice Violet Bruno.  (§§ 664, 187, 
subd. (a).)  At the same time, the jury found that in the commission of this 
attempted murder defendant had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm 
causing great bodily injury to Bruno.  (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).)  
The trial court set the matter for sentencing on August 9, 2001. 
When the matter was called on that date, defendant’s trial attorney said he 
had “affidavits from three of the jurors that indicate there may be possible 
misconduct by the jury in reaching their verdicts.”  The trial court interrupted to 
ask why no motion had been filed.  Defense counsel replied:  “Your honor, I 
haven’t filed a written motion for new trial.  I could make it orally, but I prefer to 
do it in writing.” 
 
3 
The trial court stated:  “Let me just state, Counsel, today is the date and 
time for sentencing.  Normally motions for new trial are filed before the date for 
sentencing, and I haven’t received anything.  So as far as this Court is concerned, 
we are going to proceed to sentencing.” 
Defense counsel replied that he “would like to make a motion for new 
trial.” 
The trial court stated:  “I think that, given the seriousness of these charges, 
any motion of that magnitude should be done in writing and in advance of today’s 
hearing.  I will certainly not entertain any oral motion.” 
Defense counsel said he wanted to “make a record,” and reiterated that he 
had declarations signed by three jurors indicating possible juror misconduct.  The 
trial court again interrupted, saying that “this all seem[ed] quite out of order,” that 
counsel “seem[ed] to be continuing to try to make a motion for new trial,” that 
new trial motions must be submitted in writing before a sentencing hearing, and 
that the court therefore did not understand what counsel was “trying to do.” 
Defense counsel said that he was not certain a new trial motion needed to 
be in writing and that he “would prefer that the matter be continued so that the 
motion could be—so that [he] could file a written motion.”  The trial court replied 
that motions to continue required a showing of good cause and needed to be filed 
“at least two days before the hearing.” 
The prosecutor objected to a continuance, stating that the defense had not 
shown good cause for a continuance and that the victims were in the courtroom 
expecting to address the court about defendant’s sentence.  Defense counsel 
replied that he was “sympathetic to the trauma . . . that Mrs. Bruno and her family 
have experienced,” and he noted that defendant had been “willing to plead guilty 
to charges that would have subjected him to 18-and-a-half years in state prison.” 
 
4 
The trial court said that its “sole concern” was whether or not there was 
good cause to continue the matter, and that it was “not going to entertain an oral 
motion for a new trial, there being no excuse offered for the failure to file a written 
motion.”  The court added it was “prepared to go forward with sentencing” unless 
counsel could “establish some good cause” for not having filed a written new trial 
motion. 
Defense counsel responded:  “My explanation is this:  It’s always difficult 
to contact jurors, especially when we’re not given the personal identification 
information.  Secondly, that the issue that I believe is a basis for the new trial has 
to do with misconduct.  I have researched the issue, and it’s somewhat 
complicated.  It’s a serious enough case that I—I don’t want to just file a very 
quick boilerplate motion.  I’d like to—I think it’s necessary that it be briefed 
adequately and written properly.  [¶]  Again, I don’t think that—I think 
Mr. Braxton not only has a right to make a motion for new trial, for those reasons, 
but—I would just submit it on that issue.” 
The court announced its ruling:  “The Court will deny defense counsel an 
opportunity to make an oral motion for a new trial.”  The court then proceeded to 
sentencing.  The defense requested several changes in the presentence report, 
some of which the court agreed to make, and presented argument about the 
appropriate sentence.  The prosecutor also presented argument about the proper 
sentence, after which the victim, Beatrice Violet Bruno, addressed the court, as did 
her daughter, and the prosecutor read a statement by the victim’s husband. 
When the trial court asked whether there was “any legal cause why 
judgment cannot now be pronounced,” defense counsel replied:  “No, nothing 
other than what was mentioned earlier this morning.”  The trial court then denied 
probation and sentenced defendant to a term of nine years for the attempted 
murder, consecutive to a sentence of 25 years to life for the enhancement under 
 
5 
subdivision (d) of section 12022.53 (infliction of great bodily injury by personally 
and intentionally discharging a firearm). 
On defendant’s appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and 
remanded the matter for a new trial.  In its opinion, the court concluded that the 
trial court had erred when it refused to entertain defendant’s oral motion for a new 
trial because in criminal cases new trial motions may be made either orally or in 
writing (see, e.g., People v. Simon (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 841, 847) and the only 
time limit that section 1182 imposes is that the motion “be made and determined 
before judgment.”2 
The Court of Appeal further held that the trial court’s error entitled 
defendant to a new trial.  The court stated that section 1202 was not self-
executing.  In other words, the court concluded that when a trial court does not 
hear or determine a defendant’s new trial motion, the defendant normally must 
“supplement[] the original new trial motion with a second new trial motion 
specifying the ground of refusing to hear or decide such a motion as required by 
                                             
 
2  
Although we do not question the Court of Appeal’s determination that the 
trial court erred in refusing to entertain defendant’s oral new trial motion made on 
the date set for sentencing, neither do we condone defense counsel’s conduct in 
making the motion at this time and in this fashion.  Defense counsel has a 
professional duty, if not a legal obligation, to notify the court and opposing 
counsel whenever feasible that the defense contemplates making a new trial 
motion at the time set for sentencing, and to indicate the proposed grounds for the 
motion.  Providing this notice is particularly appropriate when, as here, a victim is 
planning to address the court for sentencing purposes and it is likely that proper 
consideration of the new trial motion will require a continuance.  Should a 
situation of this kind nonetheless arise in the future, we suggest the trial court 
consider permitting the victim or victims, should they so desire, to address the 
court to memorialize their statements, even though the matter will then be 
continued for proceedings on the new trial motion before pronouncement of 
judgment. 
 
6 
section 1202.”  The court also concluded, however, that this “second motion” 
requirement was excused in this case.  A second or supplemental new trial motion 
under section 1202 would necessarily have been an oral motion, and the trial court 
had repeatedly stated it would not entertain any oral new trial motion.  Thus, 
making the second or supplemental motion would have been futile. 
The Court of Appeal explained its holding:  “In summary, the court erred in 
refusing to entertain [defendant]’s timely new trial motion.  [Defendant] was not 
permitted to create a record that would permit a reviewing court to measure the 
harm of that error.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; see People v. Sarazzawski [(1945)] 
27 Cal.2d [7,] 11, 17.)  He was relieved of any obligation to bring a second motion 
for new trial based on the court’s refusal to hear his first motion, given the futility 
of such a second motion.  For these reasons, [defendant] is entitled to a new trial 
under section 1202.” 
The Attorney General petitioned for review, raising two issues:  “1.  Does 
Penal Code section 1202 authorize the reversal of a judgment where defendant in 
the trial court never sought a new trial based on judicial refusal or neglect to 
determine an unnoticed motion for a new trial under Penal Code section 1181 
made at the time of sentencing?  [¶]  2.  If so, does Penal Code section 1202 
mandate an exclusive appellate remedy of reversal without a showing of prejudice 
or does subsequently enacted law provide the appellate court with authority to 
remand for a hearing on the section 1181 motion?  (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; 
Pen. Code, § 1260.)”  Defendant’s answer to the petition for review asked this 
court to address an additional issue in the event we granted the Attorney General’s 
petition:  “When a trial court refuses to entertain a defendant’s properly brought 
motion for new trial, is the defendant entitled to a new trial under the second 
sentence of Penal Code section 1202 regardless of whether he makes a second new 
 
7 
trial motion mentioning section 1202?”  We granted the Attorney General’s 
petition and also granted review of the additional issue defendant raised. 
II 
At the outset we are met with defendant’s argument that the Attorney 
General has forfeited the issues he seeks to raise on review because he did not 
make the same contentions in the Court of Appeal.  Defendant raised this 
objection in his answer to the petition for review and again in a motion to dismiss 
review.  We denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and now explain our reasons. 
In a letter brief submitted at the Court of Appeal’s request, the Attorney 
General argued that a second or supplemental new trial motion based on section 
1202 would not have been futile, and that a remand for a hearing on the alleged 
jury misconduct was the proper remedy for the trial court’s violation of section 
1202 by failing to hear or determine defendant’s new trial motion.  Thus, the 
Attorney General did present to the Court of Appeal the same issues and 
arguments that he raised in his petition for review to this court. 
In any event, the rule prohibiting parties from raising new issues in this 
court is not absolute.  Rule 28(c)(1) of the California Rules of Court reads:  “As a 
matter of policy, on petition for review, the Supreme Court normally will not 
consider an issue that the petitioner failed to timely raise in the Court of Appeal.”  
(Italics added.)  But rule 29(b) recognizes that this court may decide “any issues 
that are raised or fairly included in the petition or answer” and also “an issue that 
is neither raised nor fairly included in the petition or answer if the case presents 
the issue and the court has given the parties reasonable notice and opportunity to 
brief and argue it.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1)&(2).) 
When this court granted review, by a unanimous vote of its seven justices, 
we necessarily determined that the issues the Attorney General raised have 
sufficient statewide importance to warrant an opinion from this court, and that this 
 
8 
case presents those issues.  Even assuming that the Attorney General did not 
timely raise in the Court of Appeal the two issues he has presented and briefed 
here, this court has authority under rule 29(b)(2) of the California Rules of Court 
to decide any issue that the case presents.  There is no unfairness to defendant, 
who has received a full opportunity in this court to respond to the Attorney 
General’s arguments. 
III 
We consider in this part whether, when a trial court has refused or 
neglected to hear a defendant’s new trial motion before pronouncing judgment, the 
defendant’s entitlement to a new trial under section 1202 is conditioned on the 
making of another new trial motion that expressly relies on section 1202. 
When construing a statute, a court seeks to determine and give effect to the 
intent of the enacting legislative body.  (Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 262, 268.)  Normally, the first step is to examine the statute’s text because 
the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  
(People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241.)  The words of the statute should 
be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their 
statutory context.  (Ibid.; see also Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 282; 
Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 570-571.) 
Section 1202 consists of two sentences.  The first sentence, concerning the 
time for sentencing, reads:  “If no sufficient cause is alleged or appears to the court 
at the time fixed for pronouncing judgment, as provided in Section 1191, why 
judgment should not be pronounced, it shall thereupon be rendered; and if not 
rendered or pronounced within the time so fixed or to which it is continued under 
the provisions of Section 1191, then the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial.”  
The second sentence, concerning new trial motions, reads:  “If the court shall 
refuse to hear a defendant’s motion for a new trial or when made shall neglect to 
 
9 
determine such motion before pronouncing judgment or the making of an order 
granting probation, then the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial.” 
By its terms, section 1202 entitles a criminal defendant to a new trial when 
the trial court does any of the following:  fails to pronounce judgment within the 
time allowed by section 1191, refuses to hear the defendant’s new trial motion 
before sentencing, or neglects to determine the defendant’s new trial motion 
before sentencing.  Section 1202 does not expressly require a second or 
supplemental motion for new trial to obtain the benefit of its remedy in any of 
these situations.  Also, it may be significant that the situations described in section 
1202 are not among the grounds for a new trial motion listed in section 1181.  
Thus, the text of section 1202, viewed in the statutory context of the grounds for 
new trial motions specified in section 1181, does not support the proposition that 
to obtain section 1202’s new trial remedy a defendant must bring a new trial 
motion that is expressly grounded on section 1202. 
In concluding that a second or supplemental motion was required, the Court 
of Appeal relied primarily on appellate decisions construing the first sentence of 
section 1202, which states that “the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial” if the 
trial court, without good cause, does not pronounce judgment within the time 
required by section 1191.  We likewise will review those decisions. 
As enacted in 1872, as part of the original Penal Code, section 1202 read:  
“If no sufficient cause is alleged or appears to the Court, why judgment should not 
be pronounced, it must thereupon be rendered.”  In 1909, the Legislature amended 
section 1202 by adding the provisions entitling the defendant to a new trial if the 
trial court did not pronounce the sentence within the time required by law or 
refused to hear or neglected to determine the defendant’s new trial motion.  (Stats. 
1909, ch. 589, § 2, p. 898.) 
 
10 
After the 1909 amendment, this court first construed section 1202 in 
Rankin v. Superior Court (1910) 157 Cal. 189.  There, after expiration of the time 
that section 1191 allowed for pronouncing judgment, the defendant petitioned this 
court for a writ of prohibition restraining the superior court from pronouncing 
judgment.  We denied the petition, with this explanation:  “Sections 1191 and 
1202 were directed to the end of preventing delay in rendering judgment.  For that 
purpose the power of the court to extend the time was abridged, and to prevent the 
superior courts from arbitrarily ignoring or disobeying the law in that respect, it 
was declared that if the time was extended beyond that authorized, the defendant 
should perforce be entitled to a new trial.  If judgment was not pronounced within 
the time limited, a new trial was made imperative if the defendant so desired; he 
became ‘entitled’ to it.  This does not indicate a legislative intent that the lapse of 
time and failure of the court to render the judgment within the time fixed should 
oust the court of further jurisdiction to proceed in the case and render a dismissal 
necessary.  On the contrary, it necessarily implies that the jurisdiction shall 
continue and that the court shall retain authority to order the new trial and proceed 
therewith to verdict and final judgment.  If the court should refuse a new trial and 
render judgment against the defendant after the authorized time has passed[,] its 
action would be erroneous and the judgment would be reversed on appeal, if an 
appeal should be taken.  But as it would be a judgment rendered by a court having 
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person, it would not be void, nor 
subject to collateral attack upon the ground of its untimely rendition.  As the court, 
even if it does give judgment, as the petitioner alleges it to be about to do, will not 
be acting without, or in excess of its jurisdiction, prohibition is not maintainable.  
[Citation.]”  (Rankin v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 191-192, italics added.) 
The issue arose again in People v. Polich (1914) 25 Cal.App. 464 (Polich).  
There, the defendant contended on appeal that he was entitled to a new trial under 
 
11 
section 1202 because the trial court had pronounced sentence after expiration of 
the time fixed by section 1191.  (Polich, supra, at p. 465.)  In rejecting this 
contention, the Court of Appeal observed:  “[I]t does not appear that the defendant 
objected to the pronouncing of judgment on April 3rd, or that he demanded a new 
trial upon the ground that the five days’ limit had expired.”  (Ibid.)  Citing Rankin 
v. Superior Court, supra, 157 Cal. 189, the court concluded that the trial court 
“might rightfully enter the judgment in the absence of a motion or demand for a 
new trial based upon the claim of delay in rendering judgment.”  (Polich, supra, at 
p. 466.) 
On similar facts, the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion a year 
later in People v. Okomoto (1915) 26 Cal.App. 568 (Okomoto).  There, the court 
gave this explanation for rejecting the defendant’s argument:  “Here it appears that 
the defendant was entitled to a new trial; but it further appears that a new trial was 
not refused, inasmuch as he did not ask for it. . . .  [I]n the absence of any 
objection made by the defendant at the time of pronouncing judgment and in the 
absence of any demand made by him for a new trial upon the ground that the legal 
time limit had expired, the court might rightfully enter the judgment.”  (Okomoto, 
supra, at p. 573.) 
Consistent with these decisions, it is now well established that to obtain the 
new trial remedy that section 1202 provides for a trial court’s failure to timely 
pronounce sentence, a defendant must promptly object and demand a new trial on 
the ground that the time for sentencing has expired.  (People v. Cunningham 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044; People v. Von Moltke (1931) 118 Cal.App. 568, 573; 
People v. Manes (1930) 104 Cal.App. 493, 497-498; People v. Martinez (1922) 57 
Cal.App. 771, 778.) 
Here, the Court of Appeal reasoned that if a defendant forfeits a section 
1202 untimely sentencing claim by failing to make a demand or motion for a new 
 
12 
trial, then “by a parity of reasoning,” when the trial court has refused to hear or 
failed to rule upon a new trial motion, a defendant forfeits entitlement to a new 
trial under section 1202 if the defendant does not make a second or supplemental 
new trial motion expressly relying on section 1202.  We are not persuaded that “a 
parity of reasoning” supports or compels this conclusion. 
As this court explained in Rankin v. Superior Court, supra, 157 Cal. 189, 
when the time allowed for sentencing under section 1191 expires, a defendant 
becomes entitled to a new trial under section 1202 “if the defendant so desire[s].”  
(Rankin, supra, at p. 192.)  Although this court did not elaborate on the point in 
Rankin, it stands to reason that a defendant will not invariably desire a new trial 
when the time for sentencing has elapsed.  In particular, a defendant might prefer 
untimely sentencing to a new trial if the chances of a more favorable verdict on 
retrial are slight, and the defendant prefers to commence service of the sentence so 
it can be completed and the defendant returned to free society at the earliest 
possible date. 
This reasoning does not apply, however, to the situations covered by the 
second sentence of section 1202:  a trial court’s refusing to hear or neglecting to 
rule upon a new trial motion.  In these situations, the defendant has already, by 
bringing a new trial motion, expressed a preference for a new trial over prompt 
sentencing.  The new trial motion is itself sufficient proof that the defendant 
desires a new trial. 
This does not mean, however, that the concept of forfeiture has no 
application or significance in this context.  If the trial court’s failure to hear or rule 
on the new trial motion appears to be inadvertent, the defendant must make some 
appropriate effort to obtain the hearing or ruling.  (See People v. Cunningham, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 984 [failure to “press for a ruling” on motion to sever 
forfeited the issue on appeal]; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 312-313 
 
13 
[same; venue motion]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 931 [same; 
motion to sever]; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 195 [objection to 
admission of evidence forfeited on appeal by failure to press for a ruling]; People 
v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 618-619 [same].)  “ ‘[W]here the court, through 
inadvertence or neglect, neither rules nor reserves its ruling . . . the party who 
objected must make some effort to have the court actually rule.  If the point is not 
pressed and is forgotten, [the party] may be deemed to have waived or abandoned 
it, just as if he had failed to make the objection in the first place.’ ”  (People v. 
Obie (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 744, 750, quoting Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) 
§ 1302, p. 1205, disapproved on another ground in People v. Rollo (1977) 20 
Cal.3d 109, 120, fn. 4; accord, People v. Brewer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 442, 459; 
People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 554.) 
This is an application of the broader rule that a party may not challenge on 
appeal a procedural error or omission if the party acquiesced by failing to object or 
protest under circumstances indicating that the error or omission probably was 
inadvertent.  (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 73; People v. Vera (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 269, 275-276; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590; see also 
People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 441; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
900, 1000.)  “ ‘In the hurry of the trial many things may be, and are, overlooked 
which would readily have been rectified had attention been called to them.  The 
law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the 
judge’s attention to any infringement of them.’  [Citation.]”  (Sommer v. Martin 
(1921) 55 Cal.App. 603, 610; accord, In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 198.) 
Applying these principles to the issue before us, we conclude that when a 
trial court has failed to hear a defendant’s motion for a new trial, the defendant 
need not bring a second or supplemental motion for new trial under section 1202.  
On the other hand, a defendant may forfeit the issue for appellate review by failing 
 
14 
to press for a hearing or by acquiescing in the court’s failure to hear the new trial 
motion.  (See, e.g., People v. Murphy (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 885, 889-890; 
People v. Asher (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 876, 925-926, overruled on another point 
by People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 39.) 
On the facts shown here, we conclude, as did the Court of Appeal, that 
defendant did not forfeit the issue by acquiescence in the court’s error.  The trial 
court’s failure to hear defendant’s new trial motion was not the result of 
inadvertence; it resulted instead from the court’s repeatedly stated decision not to 
entertain any oral motion for a new trial.  Defendant did all that could reasonably 
be expected or required under the circumstances to obtain a hearing of his new 
trial motion. 
The Attorney General argues that defendants should be required to bring a 
second new trial motion in these situations because a trial court might change its 
position if the defendant cites section 1202 and claims an entitlement to a new trial 
under its provisions.  We disagree.  A trial court is presumed to know the 
governing law, and litigants generally are not required, on pain of forfeiting 
valuable rights, to remind trial courts of relevant statutory provisions. 
Moreover, to require a defendant to make a second motion for new trial in 
this situation would have the paradoxical result of making defendants worse off 
than they would be if section 1202 had never been enacted.  Absent section 1202, 
a trial court’s error in failing or refusing to hear a defendant’s new trial motion 
would be treated like any other procedural error:  On appeal, a claim for reversal 
on this ground would be subject to rules of forfeiture for inviting or acquiescing in 
the procedural error, and it would also be subject, as explained, post, in part IV, to 
the constitutional miscarriage-of-justice harmless error standard.  Adding a 
second-motion requirement to these existing qualifications would not be consistent 
with the apparent legislative intent underlying section 1202, which was “to 
 
15 
prevent the superior courts from arbitrarily ignoring or disobeying the law” by 
expressly acknowledging a defendant’s entitlement to a new trial for these 
procedural errors.  (Rankin v. Superior Court, supra, 157 Cal. at pp. 191-192.) 
IV 
We consider next the constitutional rule that a judgment of conviction will 
be set aside only when necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the effect 
of this rule on the provision of section 1202 entitling a defendant to a new trial 
when a trial court has refused to hear the defendant’s new trial motion before 
pronouncing judgment. 
In article VI, section 13, the California Constitution provides:  “No 
judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of 
misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or 
for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of 
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, 
the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.”  (Italics added.)  This provision is derived from former 
article VI, section 4½, which was added to the state Constitution in 1911.  (See 
People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 488.)  Under this provision, determining 
whether a procedural error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice in most 
instances “will depend upon an appellate court’s evaluation of the effect of the 
error in light of the evidence at trial . . . .”  (Id. at p. 491.)  In some instances, 
however, an error may result in a miscarriage of justice regardless of the strength 
of the evidence.  (Ibid.)  In this latter category are certain structural errors that 
deny the defendant a fundamental constitutional right or otherwise do not lend 
themselves to ordinary harmless error analysis.  (Id. at p. 493.) 
It has long been established that application of the constitutional 
miscarriage-of-justice standard to the first sentence of section 1202, concerning 
 
16 
timely sentencing proceedings, means that “tardy pronouncement of judgment is 
reversible error only if the defendant can show prejudice.”  (People v. Teddie 
(1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 756, 764 (Teddie); accord, People v. Cunningham, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at p. 1044; People v. Ford (1966) 65 Cal.2d 41, 47; People v. Williams 
(1944) 24 Cal.2d 848, 850; People v. Zuvela (1923) 191 Cal. 223, 224; People v. 
Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 638, 642; People v. Fritz (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 
866, 872-873; People v. Palmer (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 567, 574-575; People v. 
Chan Chaun (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 586, 594.) 
In Teddie, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 756, the Court of Appeal, in an opinion 
by then Presiding Justice Otto Kaus, concluded that the miscarriage-of-justice 
standard articulated in article VI, section 13, of the state Constitution has a similar 
effect on the second sentence of section 1202, stating that a defendant is entitled to 
a new trial if the trial court refused to hear or neglects to rule on a new trial 
motion, so that reversal is required only if the defendant has been prejudiced.  The 
court said it could “think of no reason” why the constitutional provision should 
not apply in the same manner to both sentences of section 1202.  (Teddie, supra, at 
p. 764.)  Defendant argues, however, that Teddie is wrong on this point and that its 
holding conflicts with this court’s decision in People v. Sarazzawski, supra, 27 
Cal.2d 7 (Sarazzawski). 
In Sarazzawski, the trial court sentenced the defendant to death for the 
crime of murder.  On his appeal to this court, we reversed on two grounds.  The 
first ground was the trial court’s error in insisting that defense counsel argue the 
defendant’s new trial motion on October 6, 1944, despite the court’s previous 
assurance that argument would be heard ten days later, and despite counsel’s 
protestations that she was not prepared to argue.  (Sarazzawski, supra, 27 Cal.2d at 
pp. 11-18.)  The second ground was the trial court’s error in instructing the 
prospective jurors, during voir dire, that if they honestly forgot anything during 
 
17 
voir dire, and then after being sworn to try the case innocently discovered they had 
made any mistake or omission in their voir dire answers, it would be their secret 
and they should not disclose it to anyone.  (Id. at pp. 18-19.)  This court concluded 
that the giving of this erroneous instruction was prejudicial per se.  (Id. at p. 19.)  
Regarding the former error, the court stated:  “Refusal to permit counsel for the 
defendant a reasonable opportunity to both prepare and present a motion for a new 
trial is, under the circumstances shown here, more than a mere error in procedure.  
It amounts to a deprival of a substantial statutory right and is not covered by 
[former section 4½ of article VI of the state Constitution].”  (Id. at p. 18, italics 
added.) 
The proposition that a trial court’s refusal to hear a defendant’s motion for 
a new trial is a kind of error that “is not covered by” the constitutional harmless 
error provision is unsound.  As our more recent decisions have explained, the 
constitutional provision—which precludes the reversal of a judgment or the 
granting of a new trial for a trial court error unless that error is determined to have 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice—applies to state law errors generally.  (See 
People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 142, 173-174; People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 491.)  Assuming that 
the Legislature intended, when it amended section 1202 in 1909, to require 
appellate courts to grant defendants new trials automatically, without any 
consideration of prejudice, whenever the trial court refused or neglected to hear a 
defendant’s new trial motion, that intention must yield to the later amendment of 
the California Constitution, in 1911, imposing the miscarriage-of-justice 
limitation.  This limitation applies to the state law errors mentioned in section 
1202.  Insofar as it held or suggested otherwise, People v. Sarazzawski, supra, 27 
Cal.2d 7, is overruled. 
 
18 
How exactly does the miscarriage-of-justice limitation apply to a trial 
court’s error in refusing to hear a defendant’s motion for a new trial?  In previous 
decisions, we have cited Sarazzawski, supra, 27 Cal.2d 7, for the proposition that 
a trial court’s refusal to hear a defendant’s new trial motion is a form of structural 
error that constituted a miscarriage of justice regardless of the strength of the 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt.  (See People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 197; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 488; People v. 
Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 495, fn. 11; People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 
1 Cal.4th 56, 70; People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 790; People v. Modesto 
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 722, 730; Spector v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 839, 844.)  
On further consideration, we now conclude that this is not necessarily or 
universally true. 
Section 1202 entitles a defendant to a new trial when the trial court has 
refused to hear or neglected to determine a defendant’s motion for a new trial and 
a reviewing court has properly determined that the defendant suffered actual 
prejudice as a result.  This will occur when, for example, the reviewing court 
properly determines from the record that the defendant’s new trial motion was 
meritorious as a matter of law, or the record shows that the trial court would have 
granted the new trial motion and the reviewing court properly determines that the 
ruling would not have been an abuse of discretion.  (See, e.g., In re Rothrock 
(1939) 14 Cal.2d 34, 38, 41.)  In these situations, the trial court’s error has resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of article VI, section 13, of the 
California Constitution. 
On the other hand, a judgment of conviction may not be reversed and a new 
trial may not be ordered for a trial court’s failure to hear a new trial motion when a 
reviewing court has properly determined that the defendant suffered no prejudice 
as a result.  This will occur when, for example, the record shows that the trial court 
 
19 
would have denied the new trial motion and the reviewing court properly 
determines that the ruling would not have been an abuse of discretion, or the 
reviewing court properly determines as a matter of law that the motion lacked 
merit.  (See, e.g., Teddie, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 763; see also People v. Allen 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 (lead opn. of Grodin, J.); People v. Murphy, 
supra, 207 Cal.App.2d at p. 890; People v. Chan Chaun, supra, 41 Cal.App.2d at 
pp. 593-594.) 
In some cases, a trial court’s refusal to hear a new trial motion will result in 
a record from which a reviewing court will be unable to determine with sufficient 
certainty whether the new trial motion was meritorious as a matter of law or 
whether the trial court would properly have exercised its discretion in favor of 
granting or denying the new trial.  Here, for example, the trial court did not permit 
defense counsel to present the juror declarations he had obtained or to explain the 
nature of the claimed juror misconduct, and the trial court expressed no view on 
the merits of the proposed motion.  We consider these situations in the next part. 
V 
When a trial court has refused to hear a defendant’s new trial motion before 
pronouncing judgment, may a reviewing court remand the matter to the trial court 
for a belated hearing and a ruling on the defendant’s new trial motion? 
Section 1260 provides that, on an appeal from a judgment of conviction, a 
reviewing court “may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed 
from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment 
imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings 
subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, 
order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such 
further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.”  (Italics added.) 
 
20 
A limited remand is appropriate under section 1260 to allow the trial court 
to resolve one or more factual issues affecting the validity of the judgment but 
distinct from the issues submitted to the jury, or for the exercise of any discretion 
that is vested by law in the trial court.  (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 253, 258-260; People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 420-421; 
People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 483; People v. McGee (2002) 104 
Cal.App.4th 559, 571-573; People v. Von Villas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 259-
261.)  In one case, this court determined that, because of the passage of time, 
remand was not feasible.  (People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 226-227; see 
also People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 296-297 (dis. opn. of George, C. J.).)  
Generally, however, if there is any reasonable possibility that the parties can fairly 
litigate and the trial court can fairly resolve the unresolved issue on remand, 
reviewing courts have ordered the remand with directions that the defendant must 
receive a new trial if, for one reason or another, a fair hearing is no longer 
possible. 
Defendant here has not argued, much less presented evidence, that the 
passage of time has resulted in a dimming of memories, destruction of relevant 
documents, unavailability of material witnesses, or any other circumstance that 
would now preclude a fair hearing on the jury misconduct claim that the trial court 
refused to entertain.  In short, he has not argued that a remand for a belated 
hearing is infeasible.  Instead, defendant cites Sarazzawski, supra, 27 Cal.2d 7, for 
the proposition that a trial court’s refusal to entertain a new trial is prejudicial per 
se and requires a new trial in every instance, or at least in every instance where the 
appellate record is inadequate to permit the reviewing court to conclusively 
determine that the trial court’s error was not prejudicial.  As noted above, 
Sarazzawski is unsound to the extent it suggests that a new trial is required 
whenever a trial court has refused to entertain a criminal defendant’s motion for a 
 
21 
new trial.  Moreover, in Sarazzawski this court never considered the feasibility of 
a remand for a belated hearing on the defendant’s new trial motion, and an 
appellate court’s opinion is not authority for propositions the court did not 
consider or on questions it never decided.  (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 
262.) 
We conclude that when, as here, a trial court has refused to hear a 
defendant’s new trial motion, and the appellate record is insufficient to permit a 
reviewing court to determine as a matter of law whether the proposed motion was 
meritorious, the reviewing court may remand the matter to the trial court for a 
belated hearing of the new trial motion, absent a showing that a fair hearing of the 
motion is no longer possible. 
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
When, as happened in this case, a trial court does not afford a criminal 
defendant a hearing on the defendant’s new trial motion, section 1202 entitles the 
defendant to a new trial.  To exercise this entitlement, the defendant need not 
make a second or supplemental new trial motion in the trial court relying on 
section 1202.  To avoid forfeiture of the claim on appeal, it is sufficient that the 
defendant did not acquiesce in the trial court’s failure to hear the motion, but 
instead made reasonable efforts to obtain a hearing. 
A defendant’s entitlement to a new trial under section 1202 is qualified by 
the constitutional command that a new trial should be granted for procedural error 
only to prevent a miscarriage of justice.  A trial court’s refusal to hear a new trial 
motion does not result in a miscarriage of justice if the appellate record allows the 
reviewing court to determine, as a matter of law, that the new trial motion lacked 
merit or that the trial court would properly have exercised its discretion to deny 
the motion.  In these cases, the reviewing court should affirm the judgment of 
conviction.  On the other hand, if the appellate record does not permit the 
 
22 
reviewing court to make this determination, then the reviewing court normally 
should remand the matter to the trial court for a belated hearing on the defendant’s 
new trial motion.  If after remand the trial court determines either that the new trial 
motion is meritorious, or that a fair hearing of the new trial motion is no longer 
feasible for one reason or another, the defendant must receive a new trial. 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed.  That court is directed to 
remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing on defendant’s motion for a new 
trial on the ground of jury misconduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
23 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Braxton 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 106 Cal.App.4th 137 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S114375 
Date Filed: December 13, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Solano 
Judge: Ramona Joyce Garrett 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Richard C. Neuhoff, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys, General, René A. 
Chacón, Ronald S. Matthias and Bruce Ortega, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard C. Neuhoff 
11 Franklin Square 
New Britain, CT  06051 
(860) 229-0433 
 
Bruce Ortega 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1335