Title: New Jersey v. Ahmad
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2021

New Jersey v. Ahmad Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant Zakariyya Ahmad’s statement to police -- which occurred when defendant was 17 years old and without his being advised of his Miranda rights -- was properly admitted at his trial for multiple offenses related to the murder of a cafe owner in Newark, New Jersey. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that defendant was questioned as “part of an investigatory procedure rather than a custodial interrogation” and that Miranda was therefore not implicated. The Supreme Court found admission of the statement was harmful error: a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have believed he was in custody and not free to leave, so Miranda warnings were required. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Zakariyya Ahmad (A-54-19) (083736)Argued October 27, 2020 -- Decided June 15, 2021PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this case, the Court considers whether defendant Zakariyya Ahmad’s statement to police -- which occurred when defendant was 17 years old and without his being advised of his Miranda rights -- was properly admitted at his trial for multiple offenses related to the murder of a café owner in Newark. On October 27, 2013, defendant, who had turned seventeen just two months earlier, arrived at the Emergency Room at University Hospital in Newark at 11:20 a.m. He had been shot in his left arm and leg. A detective and two other officers from the Newark Police Department (Newark PD) arrived at the hospital shortly after defendant. The detective asked defendant where he was shot and how he got to the hospital. While medical professionals were tending to defendant, his mother, father, and other family members arrived. Defendant was discharged at 2:30 p.m. Upon discharge, instead of being allowed to go home with his family, defendant was advised by Newark Police officers that he had to report to the Newark PD. According to defendant’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, officers told him he had no choice in the matter. Officers escorted defendant from the hospital to a marked police car, put him in the back seat, and drove him to Newark PD’s Major Crimes Unit. Defendant’s mother testified that officers told her she could not take defendant home or drive him to the police station from the hospital. Eventually, Detective Rashaan Johnson of the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office (ECPO) told defendant and his father to drive to the ECPO for further questioning. Defendant rode with his father to the ECPO, but they were escorted there by Detective Johnson. Earlier in the day, Detective Johnson had been dispatched to investigate a homicide. Joseph Flagg, the owner of Zakkiyah’s Café (the Café), had been shot and killed in an apparent robbery attempt. When Detective Johnson arrived at the Café, he learned that a gunshot victim at University Hospital had reported being shot about four blocks away from the Café earlier that morning. Upon leaving the Café, Detective Johnson went to Newark PD, where he met defendant and his father and then escorted them to the ECPO for questioning. 1 At the ECPO, Detective Johnson placed defendant in an interview room apart from his parents. Defendant was told that the interview was being recorded but was not advised of his Miranda rights. According to Detective Johnson, he did not suspect defendant of killing Flagg or robbing the Café at that time. Defendant narrated his version of the events of the day, stating that he was shot while walking on the street and that he flagged down Steffon Byrd, who drove defendant to the hospital along with two other men. Defendant stated that he recognized the two other passengers but did not know their names. The interview concluded after twenty-seven minutes. Defendant’s mother testified that she asked for the interview to cease because she saw an officer enter the interview room holding what she believed to be a forensic kit. Detective Johnson later matched the bullet removed from defendant’s ankle and blood swabbed from defendant’s pants to physical evidence found at the Café. According to Detective Johnson, it was at that point that defendant became a suspect in Flagg’s murder. Detective Johnson also reviewed surveillance footage from the morning of the murder; it captured defendant, Ja-Ki Crawford, and Daryl Cline exiting the Café. Crawford gave a statement to the ECPO incriminating defendant and Cline, stating Cline had shot and killed Flagg and inadvertently shot defendant in the course of an attempted robbery of the Café. Crawford reached an agreement with the ECPO pursuant to which he would cooperate and plead guilty in exchange for being sentenced as a juvenile. Defendant was indicted, and a pretrial evidentiary hearing was held to address the State’s motion to admit defendant’s videotaped statement at trial. The court granted the motion, finding that defendant was interrogated as a shooting victim, not a suspect. At trial, Byrd testified that defendant was running down the street with Crawford and Cline when the trio asked Byrd to drive defendant to the hospital. Crawford recanted the version of events he gave earlier, testifying instead that he was at the Café when an argument erupted between Cline and Flagg and that defendant, his close friend at the time, was trying to deescalate the argument when Flagg attacked him. The State played defendant’s statement, which was inconsistent with Crawford’s and Byrd’s testimonies and did not account for the physical evidence obtained at the Café. Defendant did not testify. The jury convicted defendant on all charges except first-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that defendant was questioned as “part of an investigatory procedure rather than a custodial interrogation” and that Miranda was therefore not implicated. The Court granted certification, “limited to the issue of whether defendant’s statement was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).” 241 N.J. 161 (2020).HELD: Pursuant to the facts of this case, a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have believed he was in custody and not free to leave, so Miranda warnings were required. It was harmful error to admit his statement at trial. 2 1. The privilege against self-incrimination is one of the most important protections of the criminal law. Individuals who are “subjected to police interrogation while in custody . . . or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom of action in any significant way” must be advised of certain rights so as to not offend the right against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-79. Once advised of their Miranda rights, defendants may knowingly and intelligently waive those rights and make a statement or answer law enforcement’s questions. Id. at 479. If Miranda warnings are required but not given, the unwarned statements must be suppressed. Miranda is triggered only when a person is in custody and subject to questioning by law enforcement. Whether an individual is “in custody” for purposes of administering Miranda warnings is a fact-sensitive inquiry. The inquiry is an objective one, determined by how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation. Juveniles are afforded the same protections of the privilege against self-incrimination as adults. (pp. 21-24)2. The trial court focused almost exclusively on what occurred during the interview. The Court’s analysis, however, ends at the moment defendant was placed in the back of a patrol car and transported to the Newark PD, having been told that he could not leave the hospital with his parents. At that moment, looking objectively at the totality of the circumstances, it is difficult to conceive that any reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have felt free to leave; nor did any subsequent events do anything to lessen that impression. By any objective measure, from the moment defendant left the hospital, he was in a continued state of law enforcement custody. As a result, the detectives should have given defendant Miranda warnings prior to taking his statement. Whether defendant was viewed as a victim by law enforcement at the time of questioning is not, and has never been, the relevant inquiry under Miranda for determining whether someone is in custody. Defendant’s statement should have been suppressed. (pp. 24-27)3. The error in admitting defendant’s statement was harmful, that is, “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. Crawford, the State’s key witness, testified at trial that his previous statements were false, and he professed defendant’s innocence. Defense counsel presented a defense in line with Crawford’s trial testimony -- that defendant was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Defendant’s statement to detectives, however, contradicted Crawford’s trial testimony and defendant’s asserted defense; it was thus a damning piece of evidence that cast defendant as a liar. The State argues that it presented overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt “independent of defendant’s statement.” But the State unquestionably relied on the statement in attempting to convince the jury that defendant was guilty, so admission of the statement cannot possibly be viewed as harmless. (pp. 27-29) REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial on the counts of conviction.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 54 September Term 2019 083736 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Zakariyya Ahmad, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided October 27, 2020 June 15, 2021Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of counsel and on the briefs).Caroline C. Galda, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Caroline C. Galda, of counsel and on the briefs, and Stephen A. Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). 1 William J. Munoz argued the cause for amici curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, American Civil Liberties of New Jersey, and Northeast Juvenile Defender Center (Whipple Azzarello, Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic, and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; William J. Munoz, Laura Cohen, and Alexander Shalom, on the brief). Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Frank Muroski, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, defendant Zakariyya Ahmad appeals from his conviction ofmultiple offenses related to the murder of a café owner in Newark. We areasked to determine whether defendant’s statement to police -- which occurredwhen defendant was 17 years old -- was properly admitted at trial. At the timedefendant gave the statement, he had been shot several times hours earlier, hadbeen heavily medicated, and had undergone surgery to remove a bullet fromhis leg. As he was released from the hospital, still wearing bandages and ahospital bracelet and walking with the assistance of crutches, law enforcementplaced defendant in the back of a patrol car and transported him to the Newark 2 Police Department for questioning. The officers did not advise defendant ofhis Miranda1 rights in advance of the interrogation. Defendant was later tried and convicted. The Appellate Divisionaffirmed his conviction and the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppresshis statement, finding that defendant presented himself to police as a victim, soMiranda warnings were not required. We find that, pursuant to the facts of thiscase, a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have believed hewas in custody and not free to leave, so Miranda warnings were required. Wehold that it was harmful error to admit his statement at trial and reverse. I. A. We rely on testimony from the trial and the pretrial evidentiary hearing forthe following summary. On October 27, 2013, defendant Zakariyya Ahmad arrived at theEmergency Room at University Hospital in Newark at 11:20 a.m. complainingof significant pain in his left arm and left leg. Defendant, a minor who hadturned seventeen just two months earlier, had been shot multiple times. Aphysical examination of defendant revealed gunshot wounds to his leftforearm, left hand, left thigh, and left ankle. A bullet was still lodged in his1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 left ankle, requiring surgery. In all, defendant had five or six gunshot wounds,according to the medical records. Defendant was treated with pain medicationwhile at the hospital, including five doses of Fentanyl. Doctors gavedefendant a dose of Fentanyl shortly after his arrival at 11:31 a.m. and thenagain at 11:52 a.m., 12:20 p.m., 12:50 p.m., and 1:10 p.m. Detective Emanuel Miranda and two other officers from the NewarkPolice Department (Newark PD) Major Crimes Division arrived at UniversityHospital shortly after defendant in response to a report of a shooting victim’sarrival at the hospital. Detective Miranda approached defendant, who waslying on a hospital bed in the Emergency Room’s Trauma Section, and askedhim where he was shot and how he got to University Hospital. Defendant toldDetective Miranda that he was shot in Newark on Clinton Place, betweenPomona and Goldsmith Avenues. Defendant further advised that he wasdriven to the hospital by Steffon Byrd in Byrd’s vehicle. Detective Mirandainterviewed the two passengers who accompanied defendant and Byrd toUniversity Hospital -- Ja-ki Crawford and Daryl Cline -- but failed to developany leads as to who shot defendant. Crawford told the officers that he, Byrd,and Cline happened upon defendant when they were returning from thelaundromat and, seeing that he had been shot, took him to University Hospital. 4 At some point while medical professionals were tending to defendant,defendant’s mother, father, and other family members arrived at the hospital.His mother testified at the evidentiary hearing that she was not allowed to seedefendant and waited at the hospital for approximately two hours. Defendantwas discharged at 2:30 p.m. Upon discharge, instead of being allowed to go home with his family,defendant was advised by Newark Police officers that he had to report to theNewark PD. According to defendant’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing,officers told him he had no choice in the matter. Officers escorted defendant --who was walking with crutches -- from the hospital Trauma Section to amarked police car, put him in the back seat, and drove him to Newark PD’sMajor Crimes Unit. Defendant’s mother testified at the evidentiary hearingthat officers told her she could not take defendant home or drive him to thepolice station from the hospital. Defendant’s parents followed the patrol carthat was transporting their son to Newark PD. Officers further tolddefendant’s mother that her son would be questioned about his injuries andhow he got shot. At Newark PD, defendant waited in a room with his father for severalhours without speaking to any detectives or being told when he could go home.Eventually, Detective Rashaan Johnson of the Essex County Prosecutor’s 5 Office (ECPO) briefly spoke with defendant and his father. Detective Johnsontold defendant and his father to drive to the ECPO for further questioning.Defendant rode with his father to the ECPO, but they were escorted there byDetective Johnson and Detective Miranda Mathis. Earlier in the day, Detective Johnson had been dispatched to investigatea homicide at Zakkiyah’s Café (the Café) in Newark. When Detective Johnsonarrived at the Café, he learned that a gunshot victim at University Hospital hadreported being shot about four blocks away from the Café earlier that morning.Detective Johnson stayed at the Café with the ECPO’s crime scene unit forseveral hours to examine the Café and the body of the store owner, JosephFlagg, who had been shot and killed in an apparent robbery attempt. Police atthe Café observed signs of a struggle, found several .45 caliber shell casingson the floor, and identified bullet holes in the Café’s ceiling and in a windowbeneath the counter. Upon leaving the Café, Detective Johnson went toNewark PD, where he met defendant and his father and then escorted them tothe ECPO for questioning. At the ECPO, Detective Johnson placed defendant, who was nothandcuffed, in an interview room apart from his parents, who were seated in anearby conference room. Detective Johnson told defendant’s parents thatdefendant needed to be interviewed because he was a victim of a shooting 6 potentially related to the shooting at the Café. The interview room was small -- approximately four feet by four feet -- and contained an audio and videorecording device, a table, and chairs for defendant, Detective Johnson, andDetective Mathis. Defendant was told that the interview was being recorded.The detectives did not advise him of his Miranda rights. According toDetective Johnson, he did not suspect defendant of killing Flagg or robbing theCafé at that time. The video recording of the statement depicts Detectives Johnson andMathis interviewing defendant from 5:07 p.m. to 5:34 p.m. on October 27,2013. Detective Johnson began by stating that the ECPO was investigating ahomicide that occurred at 282 Chancellor Avenue, Newark, New Jersey -- thelocation of Zakkiyah’s Café where Flagg was killed. Defendant responded tosome preliminary questions in the beginning of the interview, confirmed thathe was a minor, and provided his address and information about his parents.Defendant acknowledged that Detective Johnson spoke with his parents beforethe interview and that his parents gave permission for defendant to beinterviewed. Next, defendant narrated his version of the events of the day. He saidthat he woke up at his brother’s house that morning, a Sunday, and took the107 bus back to his neighborhood which was a five- to seven-minute ride. 7 Defendant told the detectives he was wearing navy blue sweatpants, a whitethermal shirt, and red and gray sneakers. He said that he got off the 107 busand was walking on Clinton Place between Pomona and Goldsmith Avenueswhen he heard several gunshots and began running down Clinton Place, neverlooking back to see who was shooting. Defendant stated he then felt a tinglingsensation and some pain and realized he had been shot. He said that when hereached the corner of Clinton Place and Hansbury Avenue, he flagged downSteffon Byrd and got into Byrd’s pickup truck to go to the hospital. Byrddrove defendant to University Hospital along with two other men. Defendanttold the detectives that he recognized the two other passengers but did notknow their names. Later in the interview, Defendant said that one of thepassengers was one of Byrd’s relatives named “Woo.” “Woo” is a nicknameused for Daryl Cline. Defendant stated that he removed his shirt and pants onthe ride to the hospital and left his clothing and phone in Byrd’s truck . Defendant then recounted his injuries and treatment to DetectivesJohnson and Mathis. He explained that he did not call his parents when heheaded to the hospital because he was afraid they would worry that he woulddie. Detective Mathis then asked defendant several questions about each partof his account of the day. Defendant told the detectives that he had no feudswith anyone that would explain the shooting. The detectives inspected 8 Ahmad’s hands, which were partially bandaged from the gunshot wound andpartially scratched. Defendant could not account for the scratches on hishands. The detectives also asked defendant about scratches they noticed on hisneck, which defendant attributed to rough sex with his girlfriend. The interview concluded after twenty-seven minutes. Defendant’smother testified that she asked for the interview to cease because she saw anofficer enter the interview room holding what she believed to be a forensic kit .Defendant’s mother, who had been waiting in another conference room, sawthe officers photographing her son’s hands as she approached the interviewroom. At that point, she asked for the interview to end. Defendant then wenthome with his parents. Pursuant to the investigation into Flagg’s murder, Detective Johnsonretrieved from University Hospital the bullet that was surgically removed fromdefendant’s ankle. Ballistics testing confirmed that the bullet removed fromdefendant’s ankle matched shell casings recovered from the Café.Additionally, blood found at the Café matched blood swabbed fromdefendant’s pants. According to Detective Johnson, it was at that point thatdefendant became a suspect in Flagg’s murder. Detective Johnson alsoreviewed surveillance footage depicting the exterior of the Café. Around 9 11:00 a.m. on October 27, 2013, the video captured defendant, Ja-KiCrawford, and Daryl Cline exiting the Café. On November 4, 2013, Crawford gave a Mirandized statement to theECPO incriminating defendant and Cline. In the videotaped statement,Crawford stated that he, defendant, and Cline were walking near Zakkiyah’sCafé when Cline said he was going to rob the business. Crawford claimed hefelt threatened by Cline, so he complied by going into the Café and orderingfood as Cline directed. Crawford said that defendant and Cline entered thestore shortly after he did. Crawford stated that Flagg tackled defendant to theground, which caused Cline to fire his gun into the fray, wounding defendantand killing Flagg. Crawford gave a similar account before the grand jury.Crawford reached an agreement with the ECPO pursuant to which he wouldcooperate against defendant and Cline and plead guilty to felony murder inexchange for being sentenced as a juvenile. B. An Essex County Grand Jury indicted defendant for second-degreeconspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and :15-1(a)(1); first-degreerobbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)and (2); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a); second-degreeunlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree 10 possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).2 Clinewas indicted for the same offenses. A pretrial evidentiary hearing was held to address the State’s motion toadmit defendant’s October 27, 2013 videotaped statement at trial. The courtheard testimony from Detective Johnson, defendant, and defendant’s mother.Detective Johnson stated that on October 27, 2013, he was investigatingFlagg’s murder, but his assumption nevertheless “was that [defendant] was avictim of a violent crime.” He explained, “[Defendant] was a victim -- heindicated that he was a victim of a crime -- a violent crime and in the vicinitywe were investigating a murder. So, it possibly could be the same actorsinvolved so we wanted to make sure.” Detective Johnson also clarified thatdefendant’s parents did not need to be in the interview room because defendant“was a witness at that time,” but that Johnson nonetheless asked for theirpermission to interview him. Defendant testified that he thought he was in custody when he was takenfrom University Hospital to the Newark police station and then to the ECPO: DEFENDANT: From the hospital, I thought I was going home, but the officer, he told me I had to go downtown for some questioning.2 The trial record reflects that defendant was waived to the Law Division and tried as an adult. 11 DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did he tell you why?DEFENDANT: No, I told him I wanted to go with my mother and my family.DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, he said?DEFENDANT: He said, I had no choice.DEFENSE COUNSEL: So, basically, did he tell you that you were not free to leave?DEFENDANT: Yes. I thought I was under arrest because he put me in the back seat of the car, so --DEFENSE COUNSEL: If you -- you weren’t permitted to go with your parents?DEFENDANT: No.DEFENSE COUNSEL: You weren’t permitted to go with anybody but the police officers?DEFENDANT: No....DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, while you were in that room and your father was there, were you free to leave?DEFENDANT: No.DEFENSE COUNSEL: How do you know? 12 DEFENDANT: Because I told my father I wanted to go -- I was in pain -- I was very agitated. I was 17 and I was shot at the time -- I wanted to go home. They told me I had to wait. ... DEFENSE COUNSEL: You got to the Prosecutor’s Office and you were -- what did they tell you when you got to the Prosecutor’s Officer? DEFENDANT: I recall Detective saying he wanted to question me about an incident that took place on Chancellor. The court granted the State’s motion to admit defendant’s statement attrial, finding that Detective Johnson’s testimony was credible and thatdefendant was interrogated as a shooting victim, not a suspect for Flagg’smurder. The oral opinion highlighted that defendant’s statement “was limitedto the facts and circumstances surrounding his injuries without any questionsor references of the shooting and/or death of Joseph Flagg. Nor did thedefendant disclose any information or any involvement in the shooting of Mr.Flagg.” Additionally, the court found that defendant never asked for a breakor to stop the interview, never asked for an attorney or his parents to be presentin the interrogation room, and answered all of the detectives’ questions withouthesitation. 13 In noting that Miranda requires an objective analysis “to establishwhether or not a defendant was in custody based on the totality of thecircumstances,” the court held that defendant’s statement was voluntary and“not the product of a custodial interrogation.” The court found that the factorsindicating custody -- that defendant was questioned by detectives in aninterview room at the ECPO, while being recorded, shortly after he had beenshot, and without his parents present -- were outweighed by the factorsindicating that the interrogation was not custodial: One, the defendant presented himself to officers as a victim of a shooting several blocks from where another man had just been murdered. Two, the detective did not pressure the defendant, nor did their questioning appear to be pursued in order to obtain any incriminating statements. The defendant was not linked to the homicide in question at the time of his questioning. Objectively, defendant was not a suspect at the time of the questioning. The detectives only later received [the ballistics] report and incriminating statements from others . . . connecting the defendant at the scene of the homicide. Detectives did not ask the defendant any questions whatsoever pertaining to the murder of Joseph Flagg and restricted their questioning specifically to his injuries and/or the gunshots causing those injuries. ... Furthermore, defendant did not confess to any crime. Nor did he, from what I can read from the transcript, incriminate himself in any way in the shooting and/or the death of Mr. Flagg. Instead, again as previously noted, the only questions asked of the defendant clearly 14 related to the wounds he received as a result of a shooting in the vicinity. Finding that “the totality of the circumstances do not support theconclusion that the defendant was unduly restrained,” the court ordered thatdefendant’s October 27, 2013 videotaped statement be admitted into evidence. Defendant went to trial, arguing that even if he had been shot in theCafé, the State could not prove that he shot Flagg or that he conspired to robthe Café. Byrd testified that defendant was running down the street withCrawford and Cline when the trio asked Byrd to drive defendant to thehospital. Crawford testified at trial but recanted the version of events he gavein his statement to detectives and during his grand jury testimony. Crawfordtestified that he was at the Café on October 27, 2013 when an argumenterupted between Cline and Flagg. Crawford testified that defendant, his closefriend at the time, was trying to deescalate the argument when Flagg attackeddefendant. After a brief tussle, Crawford heard several gunshots, ran out ofthe store, and realized that defendant was shot after defendant and Cline exitedthe Café. Crawford also read two letters he wrote to defendant’s attorney to“help clear [defendant’s] name.” In one of the letters, Crawford claimed thatdefendant “did not know what was going on” and had been “in the wrong placeat the wrong time.” Crawford further stated in a letter that he “couldn’t livewith someone as smart and innocent as [defendant] doing time for something 15 he didn’t do.” The court admitted Crawford’s previous statements inculpatingdefendant and played a recording of his November 4, 2013 interview withDetective Johnson for the jury. The State played the video recording of defendant’s October 27, 2013statement, which was inconsistent with Crawford’s and Byrd’s testimonies.Defendant’s recorded statement, during which he stated he was shot in thestreet, did not account for the physical evidence obtained at the Café --specifically a blood sample taken from the scene that matched the blood ondefendant’s pants. Defendant did not testify. The jury convicted defendant on all charges except first-degree murder,but found him guilty of the lesser-included reckless manslaughter charge. Adifferent trial court judge sentenced defendant to the mandatory minimumthirty-year prison sentence with a thirty-year parole disqualifier for first-degree felony murder, in addition to a concurrent five-year sentence and forty-two-month parole disqualifier for second-degree unlawful possession of aweapon, while merging the other four counts into those two. C. Defendant appealed, arguing that his October 27, 2013 statement shouldhave been suppressed because he was in custody when he gave the statementand did not receive Miranda warnings. Defendant also argued that Detective 16 Johnson misrepresented his status as a victim to obtain permission from hisparents to conduct the interrogation. 3 In an unpublished opinion, the AppellateDivision affirmed, deferring to the trial judge’s “cogent application of the lawto the facts he found” at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. The appellate courtagreed that defendant was questioned as “part of an investigatory procedurerather than a custodial interrogation” and that Miranda was therefore notimplicated. Additionally, the Appellate Division held that the trial court’sfactual findings “scotch defendant’s claim that the police misrepresented hisstatus as a victim to his parents in order to obtain their permission to questionhim.” That the ECPO detectives treated defendant as a victim was, accordingto the Appellate Division, supported by the fact that the detectives did not askdefendant about Flagg’s murder and there was no information linkingdefendant to Flagg’s murder until after the October 27, 2013 interview. We granted defendant’s petition for certification, “limited to the issue ofwhether defendant’s statement was obtained in violation of Miranda v.3 Although not presently before the Court in light of our limited grant of certification, defendant also argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict him for felony murder for being a mere co-conspirator to robbery, and that his conviction for reckless manslaughter should be vacated because the jury was not instructed on how to reconcile the purposeful state of mind required to impose accomplice liability with the reckless state of mind that is an element of manslaughter. The Appellate Division rejected each of those arguments. 17 Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).” 241 N.J. 161 (2020). We also granted leaveto participate as amici curiae to the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey(ACLU), the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL),the Northeast Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC), participating jointly, and to theAttorney General of New Jersey. II. A. Defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in affirming thedenial of his motion to suppress his statement because he was in custody andwas not advised of his Miranda rights prior to questioning. Defendant arguesthat objectively viewing the facts of this case, no reasonable 17-year-old in hisposition would have felt free to leave the Newark PD or ECPO. According todefendant, the Appellate Division reached its conclusion by erroneouslyfocusing on the detectives’ subjective belief that defendant was a victim, ratherthan applying the objective reasonable person standard to determine whether areasonable person in defendant’s position would have believed they were incustody. Defendant asserts that this violation of his constitutional right toremain silent required suppression of his statement. Because defendant wasprejudiced by its admission, defendant maintains that his conviction must bereversed. 18 The ACLU, ACDL, and NJDC support defendant’s position and arguethat the trial court and the Appellate Division focused on the wrong standard indetermining that defendant was not in custody at the time of questioning.Amici argue that the trial court and the Appellate Division should haveengaged in the objective analysis of whether a reasonable person indefendant’s position would have believed they were in custody. Amici furtherargue that defendant’s status as a juvenile should have been taken intoconsideration in the analysis of whether he was in custody. B. The State argues that the Appellate Division properly affirmed the denialof defendant’s motion to suppress his statement because the October 27, 2013interview did not implicate Miranda. The State contends that defendant wasnot in custody at the time of the questioning because he was questioned as avictim and potential witness as part of the investigation into the homicide atthe Café. The State argues that an objective view of the circumstances arounddefendant’s statement indicates that a reasonable person in defendant’sposition would have felt free to leave. The State further asserts that even if theadmission of defendant’s statement was erroneous, the error was harmless andshould not result in the reversal of his conviction. 19 The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, echoes the State’s argumentsand emphasizes that defendant was treated as a shooting victim and was free toleave at any time, so Miranda warnings were unnecessary. The AttorneyGeneral cautions against setting a precedent that would require police to giveMiranda warnings to all victims before questioning them. The AttorneyGeneral asks the Court to affirm the Appellate Division decision and adhere toprecedent requiring that Miranda warnings be given only to those who areconsidered suspects. III. A. Our scope of review in this matter is limited. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). “[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress mustuphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long asthose findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.”State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (quotation omitted). This Courtgives deference to those findings in recognition of the trial court’s“opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel’ of the case,which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.” Id. at 244. A trial court’s legalconclusions, however, “and the consequences that flow from establishedfacts,” are reviewed de novo. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015). 20 And, if the trial court does not make any factual finding on a given topic, nodeference is due the conclusions it reaches on that subject. See, e.g., Hogan v.Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297 , 1306 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the OklahomaCourt of Criminal Appeals made no findings as to whether Hogan hadpresented sufficient evidence to warrant a first-degree manslaughterinstruction, it is axiomatic that there are no findings to which we can givedeference.”). B. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable tothe States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see State in Interest of A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 351 (2020), guarantees that no person “shall be compelled in anycriminal case to be a witness against himself,” U.S. Const. amend. V. ThisCourt has reaffirmed time and time again that “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination . . . is one of the most important protections of the criminal law.”State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000). Although not included in the NewJersey Constitution, the right against self-incrimination is deeply rooted inNew Jersey common law and is codified in statutes and the Rules of Evidence.See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503. Indeed, this Court has treated the stateprivilege against self-incrimination “as though it were of constitutional 21 magnitude, finding that it offers broader protection than its Fifth Amendmentfederal counterpart.” State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 176-77 (2007). In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held thatindividuals who are “subjected to police interrogation while in custody . . . orotherwise deprived of [their] freedom of action in any significant way” mustbe appropriately advised of certain rights so as to not offend the right againstself-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 477-79. Miranda warnings, as they are nowcommonly referred to in the 55 years since that decision, include advisingindividuals of the right to remain silent, of the right to the presence of anattorney during any questioning, and that anything the individual says can beused against that person in a court of law. Id. at 479. Once advised of theirMiranda rights, defendants may knowingly and intelligently waive those rightsand make a statement or answer law enforcement’s questions. Ibid. IfMiranda warnings are “required but not given, the unwarned statements mustbe suppressed.” Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 265. Miranda is triggered only when a person is in custody and subject toquestioning by law enforcement. State v. Wint, 236 N.J. 174, 193 (2018).This Court has “recognized that 'custody in the Miranda sense does notnecessitate a formal arrest, “nor does it require physical restraint in a policestation, nor the application of handcuffs, and may occur in a suspect’s home or 22 a public place other than a police station.”’” State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103(1997) (quoting State v. Lutz, 165 N.J. Super. 278, 285 (App. Div. 1979)).Whether an individual is “in custody” for purposes of administering Mirandawarnings is a fact-sensitive inquiry. Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 266. “The critical determinant of custody is whether there has been asignificant deprivation of the suspect’s freedom of action based on theobjective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, thestatus of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors. ”P.Z., 152 N.J. at 103. The inquiry is an objective one, determined by “how areasonable [person] in the suspect’s position would have understood hissituation.” Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 267 (alteration in original) (quoting Berkemerv. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 442 (1984)). The inquiry is not based on “thesubjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the personbeing questioned.” Ibid. (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 , 323(1994)). Juveniles are afforded the same protections of the privilege against self -incrimination, so for a juvenile’s statement to be admissible into evidence attrial, the statement must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.State in Interest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 146 (2010). “In determining whether asuspect’s confession is the product of free will, courts” generally consider “the 23 totality of circumstances surrounding the arrest and interrogation, includingsuch factors as 'the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice as toconstitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeatedand prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mentalexhaustion was involved.’” Presha, 163 N.J. at 313 (quoting State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978)). If a defendant’s un-Mirandized statement is admitted into evidence inerror, an appellate court will not reverse the conviction unless the error was“of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjustresult.” R. 2:10-2. Stated differently, “the error must be 'sufficient to raise areasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result it otherwise mightnot have reached.’” State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004) (alteration inoriginal) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). IV. Applying those principles to the facts of this case, we first considerwhether defendant gave his unwarned statement while in police custody andwhether the statement should therefore have been suppressed. A. Our objective analysis focuses on what transpired at the hospital --particularly the moment defendant was advised that he would be transported to 24 Newark PD for questioning and had no choice in the matter. The trial courtmade no factual findings regarding what occurred at the hospital and focusedits analysis almost exclusively on what occurred during the interview,defendant’s demeanor while answering questions, and the detectives’perspective that defendant was a victim at the time. Our analysis, however,ends at the moment defendant was placed in the back of a patrol car andtransported to the Newark PD, having been told that he could not leave thehospital with his parents, because that is the moment at which we find that areasonable 17-year-old would no longer have felt free to leave. In the present case, on the day defendant gave his statement to police, hehad just been shot multiple times. He was rushed to the hospital where heunderwent surgery to remove a bullet from his ankle and was given five dosesof the powerful narcotic Fentanyl. Upon being released from the hospital, this17-year-old defendant was not allowed to go home with his family members,who were not permitted to be present when defendant was being treated.Instead, he was placed in the back of a Newark PD patrol car, crutches and all,and transported to the police station for questioning. At that moment, lookingobjectively at the totality of the circumstances, it is difficult to conceive thatany reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have felt free toleave; nor did any subsequent events do anything to lessen that impression. 25 It is undisputed that police transported defendant directly fromUniversity Hospital to Newark PD, where he waited with his father in aconference room for a couple of hours. Thereafter, defendant and his fatherwere asked to travel to the ECPO for questioning. Defendant and his fatherdrove together, but Detectives Johnson and Mathis escorted them to the ECPOwhere defendant provided a statement. By any objective measure, from themoment defendant left the hospital, he was in a continued state of lawenforcement custody. A review of the facts surrounding defendant’s statementleads us to only one conclusion -- that a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’sposition would have understood that he was in custody. As a result, thedetectives should have given defendant Miranda warnings prior to taking hisstatement. The Appellate Division found that defendant was treated as a victim andwas therefore not in custody. The State and the Attorney General’s Officemake the same argument. However, whether defendant was viewed as a victimby law enforcement at the time of questioning is not, and has never been, therelevant inquiry under Miranda for determining whether someone is incustody. That detectives believed defendant was a victim is of no momentbecause the inquiry is not based “on the subjective views harbored by either 26 the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Hubbard, 222 N.J.at 267 (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323). Defendant was a minor, still in high school. He suffered the significanttrauma of being shot multiple times. Immediately upon release from thehospital, he was placed in the back of a patrol car -- where arrestees arenormally held -- and taken to the police station. We doubt there are many, ifany, reasonable 17-year-olds who would think they were free to leave aftersuch events. Accordingly, our decision today simply honors the long-heldstandard of whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position wouldhave believed they were free to leave. Based on the totality of those circumstances, we find that defendant wasin custody at the time he provided his statement. And because defendant wasnot advised of his constitutional rights prior to giving his statement, thestatement should have been suppressed. B. Having determined that the admission of defendant’s statement at trialwas error, we must now decide whether that error was harmful, that is, “clearlycapable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. We conclude that it was. At trial, Crawford testified that defendant was not involved in any planto rob the Café. Crawford further testified that he and defendant were at the 27 Café when an argument erupted between Cline and Flagg, leading defendant totry to deescalate the situation. According to Crawford, defendant was shotwhile attempting to calm the argument. Crawford, the State’s key witness,testified that his previous statements were false, and his trial testimonydiffered drastically from his grand jury testimony and his previous statementsto police. He also sent two letters to defense counsel professing defendant’sinnocence. Defendant did not testify, but defense counsel presented a defense in linewith Crawford’s trial testimony -- that defendant was simply in the wrongplace at the wrong time. Defendant’s statement to detectives, however,contradicted that version of events because defendant told police he was shoton the street as opposed to inside the Café. Defendant also told police that hedid not know Crawford or Cline and that they were relatives of Byrd. Giventhat defendant’s recorded statement contradicted Crawford’s trial testimonyand defendant’s asserted defense, the statement was a damning piece ofevidence that cast defendant as a liar. We cannot find that its admission washarmless. The State argues that it presented overwhelming evidence of defendant’sguilt “independent of defendant’s statement.” That evidence, as previouslydiscussed, included contradictory and recanted statements from Crawford, who 28 testified at trial that defendant was innocent of the charges. It matters not, asthe State suggests, that defendant’s statement included exculpatory statementswhich “placed him several blocks away at the time of the shooting.” Indeed,as the Supreme Court in Miranda aptly pointed out, If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. [ 384 U.S. at 477.] Here, the State used defendant’s recorded statement to demonstrate thatdefendant told untruths to detectives when he was questioned. In summation,the prosecutor argued that the statement was unbelievable, not supported bythe evidence, and comprised of inconsistencies and falsities. The Stateunquestionably relied on defendant’s recorded statement in attempting toconvince the jury that defendant was guilty of the offenses charged, so itsadmission cannot possibly be viewed as harmless. V. For those reasons, the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed,and the matter is remanded for a new trial on the counts of conviction. 29 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE- LOUIS’s opinion. 30