Title: State v. Robideau
Citation: 425 P.2d 880, 70 Wash. 2d 994
Docket Number: 38953
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 1967

70 Wn.2d 994 (1967) 425 P.2d 880 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JAMES GREGORY ROBIDEAU, Appellant.[*] No. 38953. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. March 31, 1967. Irving C. Paul, Jr., for appellant (Appointed counsel for appeal). Charles O. Carroll and Edwin S. Stone, for respondent. *995 ARMSTRONG, J.[] Appellant James Robideau was charged with the armed robbery of Big John's Thriftway store in Seattle on January 21, 1966. His trial commenced March 21, 1966. Six eye witnesses identified appellant as the person who committed the crime. Appellant was the only witness for the defense. The appellant's principal defense was alibi. He testified that he had not left a particular house the day the crime was committed. The deputy prosecutor, during the cross-examination, asked the appellant whether he at any time had told the police that he had been at that house all day on January 21. The appellant answered "no." The trial court overruled appellant's objection to that question, but refused to permit the deputy prosecutor to ask appellant why he had not told the police. A motion for a mistrial was denied. During closing argument, the deputy prosecutor repeated the above question and appellant's answer of "no." He then asked, "Is that a logical thing to do?" He went on to say, "Any person being accused of a crime, wouldn't he naturally and normally say, `I wasn't there. I was over here'?" Defense counsel's motions for a mistrial based upon the deputy prosecutor's statements in argument were denied. Appellant concedes that when a defendant takes the witness stand in his own behalf he may be cross-examined with reference to any inconsistent statements he may have made, but appellant contends that questioning him about whether he made any statement to the police about his whereabouts on the day in question was a violation of his right to remain silent which is guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the deputy prosecutor's comments in his final argument about appellant's failure to assert his alibi to the police, over appropriate objection and request for a mistrial, *996 trenched upon appellant's rights not to incriminate himself as specified in the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. During the trial of this case no mention of appellant's alibi was made in either the state's opening statement or in the state's case in chief. The question in issue was asked after the appellant took the witness stand in his own defense. Both assignments of error raise essentially a single issue: Can a defendant who voluntarily takes the witness stand, and through his own testimony asserts alibi, be cross-examined by being asked whether he, at any time, told the police officer about the alibi? Our answer is in the affirmative. The issues in the cases cited below by appellant are different from the primary issue raised in this appeal. There are no Washington cases nor United States Supreme Court cases directly in point. In State v. James, 63 Wn.2d 71, 385 P.2d 558 (1963), the issue evolved from the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement commenting upon the fact that defendant, after his arrest, did not want to talk about the crime. The issue in the cases of State v. Redwine, 23 Wn.2d 467, 161 P.2d 205 (1945), and State v. Tembruell, 50 Wn.2d 456, 312 P.2d 809 (1957), arose from the prosecution in its case in chief introducing evidence to show that accusatory, incriminating statements were made in the presence of the defendant and the defendant did not deny, contradict, or object to the statements. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1965), the issue precipitated from the closing argument of the prosecuting attorney in which he made adverse comments about the defendant's failure to take the stand and testify. [1] Article 1, § 9 of the Washington State Constitution provides that no defendant in a criminal prosecution can be compelled to take the witness stand and testify against himself. Article 1, § 22 gives the defendant the right to *997 testify. RCW 10.52.040 provides that if the defendant takes the witness stand in his own behalf he shall be subject to all the rules of law relating to cross-examination of other witnesses. The theory of cross-examination is set forth in 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1368 (3d ed. 1940): We have recognized this theory of cross-examination in Wilson v. Miller Flour Mills, 144 Wash. 60, 66, 256 Pac. 777 (1927): The foregoing principles were summarized in State v. Jeane, 35 Wn.2d 423, 431, 213 P.2d 633 (1950): In State v. Anderson, 46 Wn.2d 864, 285 P.2d 879 (1955), a defense of alibi was asserted. A police officer was asked if he had inquired of the defendant as to his whereabouts on the night of the robbery. He replied that he had, and defendant could not tell him where he was on that night. It was contended on appeal that this was a purely collateral *998 matter. This court stated at 869: "We do not agree. The subject-matter of these rebuttal questions was in no sense collateral. It pertained to appellant's defense of alibi. The objections in these questions were properly overruled." [2] We conclude that a defendant may be cross-examined in the same manner as any other witness if he voluntarily asserts his right to testify. Any fact which diminishes the personal trustworthiness of the witness may be elicited if it is material and germane to the issue. If a defendant raises a defense of alibi, then cross-examination relative to whether he told any police officers where he was on the day the crime was committed would be material and germane, because it would bear upon the question of whether his alibi was a recent fabrication. Here the question was material and within the scope of the direct examination. Our next inquiry is whether the question and answer infringe upon defendant's right to remain silent which is accorded him by art. 1, § 9 of the Washington State Constitution and by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. [3] We considered this question in State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450, 453, 205 Pac. 850 (1922), in connection with the protection offered by our state constitution. We stated: A different perspective of the problem was considered in State v. West, ante p. 751, 424 P.2d 1014 (1967). There an officer took the stand and on cross-examination the fact that the defendant had, upon arrest, made a statement, but had not admitted certain connections with the crime was elicited. Thereafter, on redirect the officer testified to the balance of the conversation, over appellant's objection, that *999 the statements were involuntary and thus inadmissible. In concluding that voluntariness was not material, we said at 754: In State v. Kaufman, 211 La. 517, 533, 30 So. 2d 337 (1947), the appellant was tried for negligent homicide. The appellant took the stand and testified that at the time of the incident he was not under the influence of intoxicants. The prosecution asked the appellant on cross-examination: "Mr. Kaufman, will you now state to the jury whether, after you got to St. Patrick's Hospital, you were requested by anyone to submit to a test of alcoholism?" The trial court overruled an objection by the appellant that the question would require an incriminating answer, and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. In considering the relationship between the protection of an accused against self-incrimination and the decision by the accused to testify on his own behalf, the Louisiana court stated at 534: In explanation of its ruling the Louisiana Supreme Court further stated at 535: More directly in point is Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir.1953). The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, was there considering a case in which the accused was asked on cross-examination why he would not make a statement to the police. In response to an officer's question about the offense the accused had responded "no answer", "no statement." At 699 the court stated: The United States Court of Appeals in Jones v. United States, 296 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir.1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 913, 8 L. Ed. 2d 406, 82 Sup. Ct. 1260 (1962), cited Peckham v. United States, supra, and set forth the following: When the defendant asserted a defense of alibi he was susceptible to thorough cross-examination on it. It was proper for the deputy prosecutor to inquire whether he had at any time told the police about his whereabouts on the day the crime was committed. Having voluntarily taken the witness stand he waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination as to all matters concerning which cross-examination was proper. Plaintiff's first assignment of error is not meritorious. Appellant's second assignment of error relates to the alleged misconduct of the deputy prosecuting attorney in his summation. [4] In State v. Brown, 35 Wn.2d 379, 386, 213 P.2d 305 (1949), we said: The deputy prosecutor's argument was based upon testimonial evidence which we have ruled was properly elicited *1002 from appellant, and drew conclusions which were both fair and reasonable. The argument was proper. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., DONWORTH, OTT, and HUNTER, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 425 P.2d 880. [] Judge Armstrong is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.