Title: Hackett v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 200, 2019
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 16, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
VICTOR HACKETT, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 200, 2019 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. N0609019128 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: August 23, 2019 
Decided: 
October 16, 2019 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Victor Hackett, appeals from the Superior Court’s order 
sentencing him for a violation of probation (“VOP”).  The State has filed a motion 
to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of Hackett’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Hackett pleaded guilty on December 4, 2006 to 
Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine.  As part of the plea, Hackett agreed that 
he was subject to sentencing as an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and 
acknowledged that the Superior Court was required to impose no fewer than fifteen 
 
2 
years of imprisonment.  In exchange for this plea, the State agreed to drop other 
charges.  The Superior Court sentenced Hackett to twenty years of imprisonment, 
suspended after fifteen years for five years at Level IV halfway house inpatient 
substance abuse treatment, suspended after nine months for eighteen months at Level 
III probation.   
(3) 
Hackett did not file a direct appeal, but after an appeal from a motion 
for correction of illegal sentence,1 on December 4, 2015 the Superior Court 
resentenced Hackett to fifteen years of imprisonment, followed by nine months at 
Level IV halfway house inpatient substance abuse treatment, followed by eighteen 
months at Level III probation.  This sentence is the “original” sentence for purposes 
of the current appeal.  The sentence was effective December 4, 2006, and gave 
Hackett credit for thirteen days previously served.  As a result, Hackett’s release 
date, before accounting for good time or meritorious credit, was November 20, 2021.   
(4) 
On or about March 30, 2019, the Department of Correction (“DOC”) 
transferred Hackett to the Level IV Crest substance abuse program.  Hackett refused 
to participate in the program and was charged with a violation of probation (“VOP”).  
At a VOP hearing on April 18, 2019, the Superior Court found Hackett in violation 
of his probation and sentenced him to two years and six months of imprisonment, 
                                                 
1 See Hackett v. State, 2015 WL 4463789 (Del. July 21, 2015) (holding that the suspended portion 
of the term of imprisonment was in violation of Section 4214(a) and that the sentence was required 
to include a transition period under 11 Del. C. § 4204(l)). 
 
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with credit for eighteen days served, suspended immediately for one year of Level 
IV supervision at DOC discretion, followed by eighteen months of Level III 
probation.   
(5) 
On appeal from his VOP sentence, Hackett argues that (i) the Superior 
Court erred by imposing the VOP sentence because the sentence exceeds the original 
sentence, (ii) the court acted contrary to 11 Del. C. § 4204(n) by “fail[ing] to give 
its reasons for going past the original habitual sentence,” and (iii) the probationary 
period of the sentence should be limited to six months under 11 Del. C. § 4204(l). 
(6) 
After careful consideration, we find no merit to Hackett’s appeal.  Our 
review of a sentence generally ends upon a determination that the sentence is within 
the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.2  When sentencing a defendant for 
a VOP, the trial court may impose any period of incarceration up to and including 
the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on the original sentence.3  In 
this case, the Superior Court accounted for the time Hackett had already served and 
sentenced Hackett to two years and six months, which was a slightly shorter period 
of incarceration than the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on his 
original sentence, which was approximately two years and seven months.  The court 
also suspended that Level V time immediately for a lower level of supervision.  This 
                                                 
2 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
3 11 Del. C. § 4334(c). 
 
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sentence did not exceed the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on 
Hackett’s sentence.  Similarly, because the term of imprisonment imposed in the 
original sentence was mandated by the habitual offender statute and the VOP 
sentence did not exceed the original sentence, Hackett’s argument concerning 
Section 4204(n) is without merit. 
(7) 
Finally, Hackett’s contention that the probationary period must be 
limited to six months under 11 Del. C. § 4204(l) is without merit.  As we have 
previously held, “Section 4204(l) sets a minimum, not a maximum, period of 
transition time.”4 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
4 Hackett v. State, 2016 WL 4091242, at *2 (Del. July 18, 2016).