Title: City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers
Citation: 49 Cal. 4th 597
Docket Number: S162647
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2010

1 
 
Filed 7/1/10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CITY OF SAN JOSE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S162647 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H030272 
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 
)  
UNION NO. 3 et al., 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. CV064707 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
In California, labor relations between most local public entities and their 
employees are governed by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov. Code, 
§ 3500 et seq.), which recognizes the right of public employees to bargain 
collectively with their employers over wages and other terms of employment.  The 
administrative agency authorized to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges under 
the MMBA is the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB).  
Subject to certain exceptions, local public agencies and their employees must 
exhaust their administrative remedies under the MMBA by applying to PERB for 
relief before they can ask a court to intervene in a labor dispute. 
 
California allows public employees to go on strike to enforce their 
collective bargaining demands unless the striking employees perform jobs that are 
essential to public welfare.  But whether a particular employee‟s job is so essential 
that the employee may not legally strike is a complex and fact-intensive matter, 
and one on which public employee organizations and public entities may disagree. 
 
2 
 
 
Here, we address this issue:  If a public entity is of the view that a 
threatened strike by its employees will be unlawful because a strike by some or all 
of the employees creates a substantial and imminent threat to public health and 
safety, must the public entity first file an unfair labor practice complaint with 
PERB and await PERB‟s adjudication of the complaint before asking a court for 
an injunction prohibiting the strike? 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that PERB has initial jurisdiction over a 
claim by a public entity that a strike by some or all of its employees is illegal.  In 
addition, we conclude that a public entity must exhaust its administrative remedies 
before PERB before seeking judicial relief unless one of the recognized exceptions 
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is established. 
I 
 
In January 2006, plaintiff City of San Jose (City) and defendant Operating 
Engineers Local Union No. 3 (Union), which represented some 808 full-time 
employees of the City, started negotiating a new labor contract.  The old contract 
was to expire on April 14, 2006.  The parties agreed that if their negotiations 
reached an impasse, the Union would give the City 72 hours‟ notice before 
engaging in any work stoppages.  The Union did so on May 30, 2006, when it 
notified the City that work stoppages could occur any time after June 2.  The City 
responded that it would by June 2 seek a court order prohibiting any strike or work 
stoppage by Union members performing services essential to public health and 
safety.   
 
On May 31, 2006, the Union filed with PERB an unfair labor practice 
charge against the City.  The Union alleged that the City‟s threatened court action 
interfered with the Union‟s right to represent its members, interfered with the 
rights of its members to participate in activities of an employee organization, and 
breached the City‟s obligation to meet and confer with the Union in good faith. 
 
3 
 
 
On June 1, 2006, the City filed a complaint in the superior court seeking to 
enjoin 110 employees (identified by name and employment position) from 
engaging in any work stoppage, as such action would endanger public health and 
safety.  Specifically, the complaint alleged that such work stoppage would:  
(1) disrupt the City‟s environmental service department‟s operation and 
maintenance of the San Jose/Santa Clara Water Pollution Control Plant, which 
treats waste and sewage water of some 1.3 million people before discharge into 
San Francisco Bay; (2) impair the ability of the City‟s department of transportation 
to maintain and repair traffic signals and streetlight poles; and (3) impair the 
ability of the City‟s general services department to adequately service facilities 
that support communications among emergency personnel, such as the police and 
fire departments. 
 
The Union opposed the City‟s request for injunctive relief, as did PERB.  In 
denying relief, the superior court pointed to the City‟s failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies by not first seeking relief from PERB, which the court 
ruled had exclusive initial jurisdiction over the matter.  
 
The City filed a notice of appeal, and it petitioned the Court of Appeal for a 
writ of supersedeas.  That court issued a stay prohibiting a strike by the 59 
employees identified in the City‟s petition.1 
 
When the Court of Appeal learned that the parties had in November 2006 
ratified a labor agreement, it deemed the appeal to be moot but, at the urging of 
both parties, nevertheless addressed the issues presented because of their statewide 
                                              
1  
The record before us contains no explanation why, after identifying in the 
trial court 110 employees whose services were alleged to be essential to public 
health and safety, the City‟s writ petition in the Court of Appeal put the number of 
such employees at 59. 
 
4 
 
importance.  Agreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
PERB “has exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine whether particular public 
employees covered by the MMBA have the right to strike in cases that implicate 
the MMBA.”  We granted the City‟s petition for review.2  
II 
 
When a public employer is of the view that a threatened strike by certain 
public employees will endanger the public welfare, must it generally first seek 
relief from PERB before asking a superior court for injunctive relief?  Our answer 
is “yes.”  This is why:  The Legislature has expressly vested in PERB initial 
jurisdiction over claims of unfair labor practices arising under the MMBA.  (Gov. 
Code, § 3509.)  Because a public entity‟s claim that a threatened public employee 
strike is illegal generally constitutes an unfair labor practice claim, the claim 
comes within PERB‟s initial jurisdiction.  We begin our analysis by reviewing the 
history of local public employment labor law in California, particularly as it has 
affected PERB‟s jurisdiction and the right of public employees to strike.   
 
A.  PERB Jurisdiction and Public Employee Strikes 
 
In 1961, the Legislature enacted the George Brown Act (Stats. 1961, ch. 
1964, § 1, pp. 4141-4143, adding Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.), which granted public 
employees in California the right to organize and have their representatives “meet 
and confer” with their employers over wages and working conditions (Gov. Code, 
former § 3505).  That right was expanded in 1968, when the Legislature enacted 
the MMBA (Gov. Code, §§ 3500-3510) authorizing public entities and labor 
                                              
2  
In the Court of Appeal, PERB filed a friend-of-the-court brief in support of 
the Union.  But it did not do so in this court.  In response to our invitation to file a 
friend-of-the-court brief, PERB stated that it would not do so for “reasons that 
include diminished resources” and because of its preference to maintain “a neutral 
role in the current litigation.” 
 
5 
 
representatives not only to confer but also to reach binding agreements on wages, 
hours, and working conditions.  (Gov. Code, § 3505; Coachella Valley Mosquito 
& Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 1072, 1083 (Coachella Valley).)  At that time, PERB had not yet been 
created.   
 
The history of PERB begins in 1975, when the Legislature enacted the 
Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) (Gov. Code, §§ 3540-3549.3).  
That law established the Educational Employment Relations Board (EERB), 
which in 1977 was renamed the Public Employment Relations Board.  (Coachella 
Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1085.)  As an administrative agency, PERB was to 
adjudicate unfair labor practice charges under the EERA, and its jurisdiction was 
set forth in Government Code section 3541.5.  That statute provided and still 
provides, in part:  “The initial determination as to whether the charges of unfair 
practices are justified, and, if so, what remedy is necessary to effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
board.”  (Italics added.) 
 
We discussed Government Code section 3541.5 first in San Diego Teachers 
Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 1 (San Diego Teachers) and later in El 
Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 946 (El 
Rancho).  In each case, we held that PERB had exclusive initial jurisdiction over 
public employee strikes, as explained below.   
 
In San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1, unfair labor practice charges 
were pending before PERB when a superior court enjoined a teacher‟s association 
from striking and further held the association and its president in contempt for 
violating the injunction.  We annulled the contempt orders “on the ground that 
PERB had exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine whether the strike was an 
unfair practice . . . .”  (Id. at p. 14.) 
 
6 
 
 
In El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d 946, this court held that the statutory grant 
to PERB of exclusive initial jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges under 
the EERA divested the superior courts of jurisdiction over a school district‟s 
complaint for damages arising from a teachers‟ strike.  (El Rancho, at p. 961.)  We 
noted that some four years earlier this court in San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 
Cal.3d at page 12, had “embraced the preemption doctrine developed by the 
federal courts under the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
[NLRA]),” and “that the principles defining the preemptive reach of the NLRA are 
generally applicable in determining the scope of PERB‟s preemptive jurisdiction 
under EERA.”  (El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953.)  Accordingly, citing San 
Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 244-245, we applied to PERB the 
same rule of jurisdiction that the United States Supreme Court had adopted with 
respect to the National Labor Relations Board.  Under that rule, the administrative 
agency “is held to have exclusive jurisdiction over activities arguably protected or 
prohibited by” the governing labor law statutes.  (El Rancho, supra, at p. 953.) 
 
Neither San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1, nor El Rancho, supra, 33 
Cal.3d 946, addressed whether public employees have a legal right to strike.  And 
both the EERA and the MMBA are silent on this subject.  But in 1985 we did take 
up that question in County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County 
Employees’ Assn. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 564 (County Sanitation).  There we held:  
“[S]trikes by public employees are not unlawful at common law unless or until it 
is clearly demonstrated that such a strike creates a substantial and imminent threat 
to the health or safety of the public.  This standard allows exceptions in certain 
essential areas of public employment (e.g., the prohibition against firefighters and 
law enforcement personnel) and also requires the courts to determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the public interest overrides the basic right to strike.”  (Id. at 
 
7 
 
p. 586.)  Thus, County Sanitation vested the courts with jurisdiction to decide 
whether to allow or to prohibit a particular public employee strike. 
 
In 2000, the Legislature extended PERB‟s jurisdiction to cover matters 
arising under the MMBA — this was done through enactment of Government 
Code section 3509, which became effective July 1, 2001.  (Stats. 2000, ch. 901, 
§ 8.)  Subdivision (b) of that statute provides in relevant part:  “A complaint 
alleging any violation of [the MMBA] . . . shall be processed as an unfair practice 
charge by [PERB].  The initial determination as to whether the charge of unfair 
practice is justified and, if so, the appropriate remedy necessary to effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
[PERB].”  (Italics added.)  This enactment removed “from the courts their initial 
jurisdiction over MMBA unfair practice charges” (Coachella Valley, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at p. 1089) and vested such jurisdiction in PERB (id. at p. 1077).  Does 
this enactment also vest PERB with exclusive initial jurisdiction over public 
employee strikes that may involve claims of unfair labor practices under the 
MMBA?  Our answer is “yes,” as explained below. 
 
B.  Initial Jurisdiction over Public Employee Strikes 
 
The City contends that because the right of public employees to strike is 
founded in the common law, the statute vesting initial jurisdiction in PERB for 
claims of unfair practices arising under the MMBA (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (b)) 
is inapplicable to public employee strikes.  We disagree.  As we will explain, to 
accept the City‟s argument would be at odds with the body of public employment 
labor law as it has developed in California. 
 
The language in Government Code section 3509, subdivision (b), which is 
part of the MMBA, is virtually identical to the language in Government Code 
 
8 
 
section 3541.5, which is part of the EERA.3  Both statutory provisions expressly 
vest in the administrative board exclusive initial jurisdiction over unfair labor 
practice charges.  And with respect to the MMBA, in section 3541.5, this court in 
San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pages 12-14, held this provision vests in 
PERB “exclusive initial jurisdiction” to decide whether a strike is an unfair 
practice and, if so, to determine the appropriate remedy. 
 
Because of the similar language in these two jurisdictional statutes, and 
because of the legal presumption that the Legislature is deemed to be aware of 
existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing on the particular legislation 
enacted (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1155-
1156; People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897; Estate of McDill (1975) 14 
Cal.3d 831, 837), we conclude that when in 2000 the Legislature transferred 
jurisdiction over the MMBA from the courts to PERB it did so in light of this 
court‟s existing case law. Those court decisions established:  Public employees 
have a right to strike unless it is clearly shown that there is a substantial and 
imminent threat to public health and safety (County Sanitation, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 
p. 586); PERB has exclusive initial jurisdiction over activities “arguably protected 
                                              
3  
Government Code section 3541.5, which appears in the EERA, states in 
relevant part:  “The initial determination as to whether the charges of unfair 
practices are justified, and, if so, what remedy is necessary to effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
board.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Government Code section 3509, subdivision (b), which the Legislature 
added to the MMBA after this court‟s decision in County Sanitation, supra, 38 
Cal.3d 564, recognizing the right of public employees to strike, states in pertinent 
part, as noted above:  “The initial determination as to whether the charge of unfair 
practice is justified, and, if so, the appropriate remedy necessary to effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
board.”  (Italics added.) 
 
9 
 
or prohibited” by public employment labor law (El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 
p. 953; see San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 12); and PERB‟s exclusive 
initial jurisdiction extends to remedies for strikes considered to be unfair labor 
practices (San Diego Teachers, supra, at pp. 12, 14). 
 
The City insists, however, that this body of decisional law is inapplicable in 
this case, which arises under the MMBA, because no provision of the MMBA 
either “arguably protect[s] or prohibit[s]” (El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953) 
threatened strikes by employees whose services are essential to public health and 
safety.  The City‟s argument runs counter to this court‟s decisions in San Diego 
Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1, and in El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d 946.  Both were 
decided before the right of public employees to strike was established in this 
court‟s decision in County Sanitation, supra, 38 Cal.3d 564, and both involved the 
EERA, a statutory scheme that like the MMBA generally prohibits unfair labor 
practices but does not expressly either protect or prohibit public employee strikes.  
In San Diego Teachers, this court invalidated contempt orders arising out of an 
injunction against a strike by a teachers‟ association; we did so on the ground that 
PERB had exclusive initial jurisdiction over the matter.  (24 Cal.3d at p. 14.)  And 
in El Rancho, this court held that a complaint for damages arising out of a strike 
by a teachers‟ union was within PERB‟s exclusive initial jurisdiction over unfair 
labor practice charges.  (33 Cal.3d at p. 960.)  The holdings in those two cases 
would have been precluded if, as the City here contends, express statutory 
protection or prohibition of public employee strikes is a requirement of PERB‟s 
jurisdiction over those strikes. 
 
The City notes that under the “arguably protected or prohibited” principle 
(El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953), “all claims in which a strike is involved 
may hypothetically implicate some provision of the MMBA [] enough to invoke 
PERB‟s jurisdiction.”  As the Court of Appeal observed, however, PERB‟s 
 
10 
 
jurisdiction extends only to complaints about practices governed by the 
Government Code‟s MMBA.  (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (b).) 
 
The City contends that regardless of whether a public employee strike falls 
within the “arguably protected or prohibited” principle (El Rancho, supra, 33 
Cal.3d at p. 953), an action that, as in this case, seeks injunctive relief against a 
public employee strike as to those public employees providing services essential to 
the public welfare is outside PERB‟s purview under the “local concern” doctrine.  
That doctrine was developed by the United States Supreme Court.  In Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180, for example, the high court 
held that the National Labor Relations Board‟s authority did not preempt state 
court jurisdiction over an action by an employer for an injunction against a union 
picketing on the employer‟s property even though the picketing was arguably 
protected conduct under the federal labor law.  This was so, said the court, because 
the conduct touched interests “ „deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility‟ ” 
(id. at p. 195), and because the assertion of state jurisdiction did not create a 
significant risk of prohibiting protected conduct (id. at p. 207).  The doctrine has 
been applied in California in cases determining PERB‟s jurisdiction under the 
EERA.  (Pittsburg Unified School Dist. v. California School Employees Assn. 
(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 875, 884-886.)  The City argues that because the subject of 
public health and safety has historically been a matter of local responsibility 
(People v. Union Pacific Railroad (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1247; see Big 
Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149), the 
local concern doctrine should be applied in cases that, as here, involve strikes by 
public employees whose services are essential to public welfare, vesting in the 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. 
 
The City‟s argument overstates the reach of the local concern doctrine.  The 
doctrine applies primarily when the subject of the action is peripheral to the labor 
 
11 
 
dispute (Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 
1815), or when a judicial decision does not present a substantial danger of 
interfering with labor decisions of an administrative agency (Kaplan’s Fruit & 
Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 74-75).  The local concern 
doctrine has generally been applied in cases where it was necessary to “maintain[] 
civil order by deterring and punishing violence and other intentional torts, 
including defamation, trespass, and infliction of emotional distress.”  (2 Higgins, 
The Developing Labor Law (5th ed. 2006) pp. 2334-2335.)  Here, there was no 
evidence that a strike by the City‟s public employees posed an immediate threat to 
civil order.  At issue here is the legality of a public employee strike — an issue 
that goes to the essence of labor law.  (Fresno Unified School District v. National 
Education Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259, 268; see County Sanitation, supra, 
38 Cal.3d at p. 588.)  Therefore, we reject the City‟s contention that the local 
concern doctrine should be applied to defeat PERB‟s jurisdiction in all public 
employee strike cases arising under the MMBA. 
 
To summarize, a claim by a public entity that a proposed strike by public 
employees includes employees who perform services essential to the public 
welfare is generally subject to PERB‟s initial jurisdiction.  We next discuss 
whether a public entity may nevertheless bypass that administrative forum by 
applying to a court for relief if it can establish a recognized exception to the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
 
12 
 
III 
 
The Union contends that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies always applies in actions pertaining to public employee strikes that give 
rise to claims of unfair labor practices under the MMBA, and that therefore the 
doctrine‟s exceptions are never applicable to such strikes.  The City, on the other 
hand, argues that the exhaustion doctrine never applies to public employee strikes 
because any remedy by PERB cannot be effective when a threatened public 
employee strike includes employees whose services are essential to the public 
welfare.  Neither party is right.  As we will explain, whether a public entity must 
await PERB‟s adjudication of an unfair labor practice complaint before seeking 
judicial relief depends upon the facts of each case. 
 
When remedies before an administrative forum are available, a party must 
in general exhaust them before seeking judicial relief.  (Coachella Valley, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 1080.)  Exhaustion requires “a full presentation to the 
administrative agency upon all issues of the case and at all prescribed stages of the 
administrative proceedings.”  (Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry (1971) 18 
Cal.App.3d 415, 432.)  “ „The exhaustion doctrine is principally grounded on 
concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with 
an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial 
efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative 
dispute unless absolutely necessary).‟ ”  (Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 1080.)   
 
The exhaustion doctrine has certain exceptions.  (Coachella Valley, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 1080.)  The doctrine does not apply when the administrative 
remedy is inadequate.  (Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 342.)  For example, it does not apply when the 
administrative procedure is too slow to be effective (Los Angeles County 
 
13 
 
Employees Assn. v. Los Angeles (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 683, 686), or when 
irreparable harm would result by requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies 
before seeking judicial relief (Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior 
Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 169; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) 
Actions, § 342, p. 448; see Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 7), or when 
it is clear that seeking administrative remedies would be futile (Coachella Valley, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1080). 
 
The Union contends that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies always applies to public employee strikes arising under the MMBA 
because of the adequacy of PERB‟s administrative remedies.  It relies on this 
court‟s statement in San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at page 10, that to 
“provide an adequate alternative to a party‟s own lawsuit for an injunction, 
PERB‟s power to apply [to the courts] for injunctive relief should be exercisable 
in response to any aggrieved party‟s request, not simply on its own motion.”  The 
Union‟s reliance is misplaced.  The statement in question is devoid of any 
suggestion that PERB‟s remedies are always adequate. 
 
Likewise unconvincing is the Union‟s argument that if a matter is subject to 
PERB‟s initial jurisdiction, the proceedings before that board must be finalized 
before there can be jurisdiction in the courts.4  In support, the Union relies on 
                                              
4  
Subdivisions (a) and (b) of Government Code section 3509.5 provide that a 
party aggrieved by a final decision or order of PERB in an unfair practice matter 
— except for a decision not to issue a complaint — may seek writ relief in the 
Court of Appeal.  When the writ petition is filed timely, the Court of Appeal has 
jurisdiction to grant “any temporary relief or restraining order” (Gov. Code, 
§ 3509.5, subd. (b)) and to enforce, modify, or set aside PERB‟s decision or order.  
Although this statute authorizes judicial review of PERB‟s final decisions or 
orders, it does not address the issue confronted here.  The question here is whether 
a court is without jurisdiction or authority to act when PERB has not yet issued a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
14 
 
Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn., supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 
at page 271.  Contrary to the Union‟s assertion, the Court of Appeal in that case 
did not hold that the existence of PERB‟s initial jurisdiction over unfair labor 
practice charges nullified the jurisdiction of the courts.  Rather, it simply held that 
the conflict there in issue between PERB‟s jurisdiction and the court‟s jurisdiction 
could be resolved by having the superior court stay the judicial proceeding, 
leaving it to the court‟s “discretion as to how long the judicial proceedings should 
be stayed” while proceedings before PERB were pending.  (Id. at p. 274.)   
 
The Union also relies on this court‟s statement in San Diego Teachers, 
supra, 24 Cal.3d at page 11, that there is no “disparity between public and PERB 
interests” in arguing here that the PERB remedy is always adequate.  According to 
the Union, by making the statement in question this court recognized that the 
PERB remedy is always adequate because PERB serves the same general public 
interest as a court.  The statement, however, was made in the limited context of 
whether PERB could adequately minimize interruptions of educational services 
and therefore it does not assist the Union‟s argument here. 
 
Contrary to the Union‟s assertion, there is no legal obstacle to applying the 
exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to matters that 
are within PERB‟s initial jurisdiction. 
 
We now consider the City‟s contention that the PERB remedy can never be 
effective when a proposed strike by public employees includes employees whose 
services may be essential to protect the public welfare. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
final order or decision but there is a potential substantial and imminent threat of 
harm to the public welfare.  
 
15 
 
 
We begin with a brief review of the statutory source establishing PERB‟s 
authority over requests for injunctions in unfair labor practice charges arising 
under the MMBA, and the regulations implementing that authority.  Government 
Code section 3509, subdivision (a), incorporates into the MMBA the powers and 
duties of PERB set forth in section 3541.3.  Subdivision (j) of section 3541.3 says, 
in pertinent part:  “Upon issuance of a complaint charging that any person has 
engaged in or is engaging in an unfair practice, the board may petition the court 
for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.”  To implement this statutory 
authority, PERB has adopted regulations setting forth its procedures when 
injunctive relief has been requested.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32450-32470.)   
 
Under those regulations, a party may, after giving the opposing party 24 
hours‟ notice, file a request with PERB‟s general counsel to have PERB apply to 
the court for injunctive relief.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32450(a), (c).)  The 
general counsel then initiates an investigation (id., § 32455), after which “the 
General Counsel shall make a recommendation to [PERB] within 120 hours after 
the receipt of a request, unless the request is made during a work stoppage or 
lockout, in which case the General Counsel shall make a recommendation to 
[PERB] within 24 hours after the request is received” (id., § 32460).  PERB then 
decides whether to seek injunctive relief in court.  (Id., § 32465.)  If PERB is 
unable to act within 24 hours of receiving the general counsel‟s recommendation, 
the general counsel is authorized to apply to the court for an injunction if the 
general counsel has “reasonable cause to believe that such action is in accordance 
with [PERB] policy and that legal grounds for injunctive relief are present.”  (Id., 
§ 32470.) 
 
The City is wrong in asserting that in a case such as this the PERB remedy 
can never be adequate because PERB‟s regulations prevent it from acting with 
sufficient speed to prevent the proposed public employee strike from leading to 
 
16 
 
irreparable harm to the public welfare.  As noted above, the minimum time for 
PERB to seek injunctive relief from a court is 24 hours.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 
§ 32450(a), (c).)  In this case the Union agreed to give, and did give, the City at 
least 72 hours‟ notice of the possibility of a strike.  Thus, even if we assume that 
injunctive relief was appropriate here, there was sufficient time for the City to 
have asked PERB for injunctive relief and sufficient time for PERB to have 
decided whether to apply for such relief in court.   
IV 
 
Whenever possible, labor disputes asserting unfair labor practices under the 
MMBA should be submitted first to PERB rather than a court.  If an exception to 
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is claimed, the trial court 
should afford due deference to PERB and issue injunctive relief only when it is 
clearly shown that PERB‟s remedy would be inadequate.   
 
Here, as noted above, while the matter was pending in the Court of Appeal 
the parties were able to resolve their dispute and ratify a labor agreement.  At the 
urging of the parties, however, the Court of Appeal went ahead and decided the 
merits of the issues because of their statewide importance.   
 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 160 Cal.App.4th 951 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S162647 
Date Filed: July 1, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Kevin J. Murphy 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Richard Doyle, City Attorney, George Rios, Assistant City Attorney, Robert Fabela and Suzanne Hutchins 
Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Michael Aguirre, City Attorney (San Diego), Alan Hersh, Chief Deputy City Attorney; Renne Sloan 
Holtzman Sakai, Jeffrey Sloan and Ivan Delventhal for City of San Diego as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Ann Miller Ravel, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Nancy J. Clark, Assistant County Counsel, and Lori E. 
Pegg, Lead Deputy County Counsel, for County of Santa Clara as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Leonard Carder, Arthur A. Krantz, Margot Rosenberg; Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld and Antonio Ruiz for 
Defendants and Respondents 
 
Althsuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Rubin & Demain, Altshuler Berzon, Jonathan Weissglass and Linda Lye for 
California State Council of Service Employees as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Priscilla S. Winslow and Joseph R. Colton for California Teachers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Michael R Clancy and Arnie R. Braafladt for California School Employees Association as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S162647 – counsel continued 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Robert Thompson, Robin Wesley, Carolyn Kubish and Tammy Samsel for Public Employment Relations 
Board as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
Mary Maloney Roberts, William L. Kasley and Rebecca M. Ceniceros for Administrative Office of the 
Courts as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert Fabela 
Deputy City Attorney 
200 East Santa Clara Street 
San Jose, CA  95113-1905 
(408) 535-1900 
 
Arthur A. Krantz 
Leonard Carder 
1330 Broadway, Suite 1450 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 272-0169