Title: Vaughn v. City of Carbondale
Citation: 2016 IL 119181
Docket Number: 119181
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2016

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Vaughn v. City of Carbondale, 2016 IL 119181 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
JEFFREY 
W. 
VAUGHN, 
Appellee, 
v. 
THE 
CITY 
OF 
CARBONDALE, Appellant. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
119181 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
March 24, 2016 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fifth District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County; the Hon. 
Kimberly Dahlen, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
P. Michael Kimmel, City Attorney, of Carbondale, for appellant. 
 
Michael W. Maurizio and Patrick T. Sharpe, of Maurizio & Sharpe, of 
Marion, for appellee. 
 
 
Justices 
 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Karmeier, 
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and integrity 
of this document 
Date: 2016.05.11 
08:43:12 -05'00'
 
- 2 - 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
At issue in this case is whether defendant, the city of Carbondale, Illinois, is obligated to 
continue to pay the entire premium of its health insurance plan for plaintiff, Jeffrey W. 
Vaughn, and his family, pursuant to section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act 
(Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2012)). The circuit court of Jackson County denied plaintiff’s 
complaint for injunctive relief, which sought to prevent defendant from terminating plaintiff’s 
section 10 health insurance coverage. The Appellate Court, Fifth District, reversed. 2015 IL 
App (5th) 140122. This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 315(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the appellate court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Because this case has a lengthy history leading to the instant action, some of which 
overlaps with this case, we will set forth the background in some detail. On June 28, 2005, 
plaintiff was employed as a police officer for defendant’s police department. Plaintiff was on 
duty that morning, driving his patrol car in the University Mall parking lot. A motorist stopped 
plaintiff and asked him for directions, so plaintiff parked his patrol car by the curb of an island 
in the parking lot and went over to talk to the motorist. Plaintiff left the driver’s side door of his 
vehicle open. While plaintiff was outside his patrol car talking to the motorist, a Carbondale 
police department dispatcher called for plaintiff to respond over the radio. Plaintiff had a 
portable radio on his uniform when he received the call from dispatch, but the portable radio 
was turned off. Plaintiff returned to his patrol car to answer the call, reaching headfirst through 
the driver’s side door in order to reach the microphone. As plaintiff was reaching inside the 
vehicle, he struck the top of his head on the door frame, causing him to “see stars” and 
experience a sharp pain in his arm. Plaintiff did not sustain an abrasion or blood loss. 
¶ 4 
 
Plaintiff reported the incident to his shift supervisor. The next day, plaintiff went to see his 
primary care physician. Plaintiff was off work from June 28, 2005, to July 4, 2005. On July 19, 
2005, plaintiff returned to his primary care physician because his left arm and back were giving 
him pain. An MRI showed a compression fracture of plaintiff’s T1-T3 vertebrae. Plaintiff 
never returned to work with the police department following his second appointment with his 
primary care physician. 
¶ 5 
 
On April 11, 2007, plaintiff filed an application with the Carbondale Police Pension Board 
(Board) for a line-of-duty disability pension under section 3-114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code 
(40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (West 2008)). The Board found that plaintiff’s disability was not the result 
of an on-duty injury and also found that plaintiff was not disabled to the extent that he was 
unable to return to work as a patrol officer. 
¶ 6 
 
Plaintiff then filed a complaint for administrative review, and the circuit court of Jackson 
County reversed the Board’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court. Vaughn 
v. Carbondale Police Pension Board, No. 5-10-0293 (2011) (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). 
¶ 7 
 
On January 26, 2012, plaintiff sent defendant a letter requesting that defendant provide 
plaintiff with health insurance coverage in accordance with section 10 of the Act. Defendant 
thereafter began providing plaintiff and his family with health insurance coverage. 
 
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¶ 8 
 
Also in 2012, the Board directed plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, as required 
by the Illinois Pension Code. See 40 ILCS 5/3-115, 3-116 (West 2012). Plaintiff was examined 
by Dr. Jeffrey Ripperda in May 2012. Following his examination of plaintiff, Dr. Ripperda 
concluded that plaintiff was physically able to return to work as a police officer. Dr. Ripperda 
submitted his findings to the Board. 
¶ 9 
 
On June 26, 2012, at a previously scheduled meeting, the Board discussed whether 
plaintiff’s disability pension should be terminated. The Board voted to accept Dr. Ripperda’s 
report and to terminate plaintiff’s disability pension in light of Dr. Ripperda’s reported 
findings. On or about July 9, 2012, the Board notified plaintiff by letter that it had voted to 
terminate plaintiff’s pension benefits effective June 26, 2012. 
¶ 10 
 
On August 3, 2012, plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing with the Board, alleging that he 
had a meritorious defense to the termination of his pension benefits and that he had not 
received notice of the meeting where the Board had voted to terminate his pension benefits. On 
August 7, 2012, plaintiff also filed a complaint for administrative review of the Board’s 
decision in the circuit court of Jackson County. On August 31, 2012, the Board sent plaintiff’s 
counsel a letter advising that the Board had voted to deny plaintiff’s petition for rehearing. 
¶ 11 
 
Thereafter, on June 14, 2013, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision to terminate 
plaintiff’s pension benefits, holding that the Board’s finding that the plaintiff was no longer 
disabled was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Plaintiff filed a motion to 
reconsider in the circuit court, noting that the circuit court’s decision did not address plaintiff’s 
claim that the Board had denied him procedural due process when it failed to give him 
adequate notice of the meeting at which his benefits were terminated. The circuit court denied 
plaintiff’s motion to reconsider on August 28, 2013. 
¶ 12 
 
Plaintiff then filed an appeal of the Board’s decision terminating his pension benefits. The 
appellate court reversed the circuit court in an order entered on June 30, 2014, finding that the 
Board had violated plaintiff’s due process rights by unilaterally voting to terminate plaintiff’s 
disability pension without notice or a proper hearing. Vaughn v. Carbondale Police Pension 
Board, 2014 IL App (5th) 130457-U. The appellate court did not address whether the Board’s 
determination that plaintiff was no longer disabled was against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. 
¶ 13 
 
Relevant to the instant appeal, following the Board’s finding that plaintiff was no longer 
disabled, defendant sent plaintiff a letter dated July 17, 2012, notifying him that his coverage 
under the defendant’s group health benefit plan would end on August 31, 2012, and informing 
him of his rights and obligations regarding continuation of group health coverage pursuant to 
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) (29 U.S.C. § 1161 
et seq. (2012)). 
¶ 14 
 
On September 4, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the circuit court of 
Jackson County, asking the court to preserve his right to health insurance coverage under 
section 10 of the Act. The circuit court entered an order granting plaintiff’s petition for 
preliminary injunction on September 17, 2012. However, on February 21, 2014, while the 
appeal of the circuit court’s order affirming the termination of plaintiff’s pension benefits was 
pending, the circuit court entered an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and denying 
plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction. 
 
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¶ 15 
 
In its order denying the complaint for injunctive relief, the circuit court noted that plaintiff 
asserted he was entitled to insurance coverage for life under section 10 of the Act and that he 
began receiving insurance benefits based upon a letter sent to defendant citing the Act. In 
response, defendant submitted an affidavit denying that it had provided insurance pursuant to 
the Act. Defendant’s affidavit claimed that insurance was provided pursuant to plaintiff’s 
disability pension. 
¶ 16 
 
The circuit court then observed that in order to be covered by section 10 of the Act, a police 
officer must meet two requirements. First, the officer must suffer a catastrophic injury in the 
line of duty. Second, the injury must have occurred as a result of the officer’s response to a 
fresh pursuit, a response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, in response to an 
unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. The circuit 
court held that plaintiff could not establish a clear and palpable right to insurance coverage 
because he could not meet the first requirement of section 10: a catastrophic injury in the line 
of duty. The circuit court stated that plaintiff’s injury could not be catastrophic, given the 
Board’s finding that plaintiff was able to return to work. The circuit court found that even if 
plaintiff’s insurance benefits had been provided under the Act, it did not follow that plaintiff 
and his family were entitled to continued benefits under the Act, in light of the fact that 
plaintiff had been found to have recovered from his disability. 
¶ 17 
 
Plaintiff appealed the circuit court’s decision denying his complaint for injunctive relief. 
The appellate court reversed the circuit court. 2015 IL App (5th) 140122. In reversing the 
circuit court, the appellate court first noted that the circuit court’s reason for denying health 
insurance benefits under the Act was no longer applicable. Id. ¶ 10. The circuit court had 
reasoned that, given the Board’s termination of plaintiff’s line-of-duty pension benefits on the 
ground that plaintiff had recovered from his disability, plaintiff had not suffered a catastrophic 
injury for purposes of section 10. However, the appellate court in the termination of benefits 
appeal had since reversed that decision and had reinstated plaintiff’s line-of-duty pension 
benefits, finding that plaintiff had been denied procedural due process. 
¶ 18 
 
Because plaintiff’s line-of-duty pension benefits had been reinstated, the appellate court in 
this case looked to the decisions in Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392 (2003), and 
Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, 2011 IL 111838, where the courts held that a 
“catastrophic injury” as used in section 10 of the Act was synonymous with an injury resulting 
in the awarding of a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4-110 of the Illinois Pension 
Code (40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2012)). 2015 IL App (5th) 140122, ¶¶ 9, 10. Based upon those 
decisions, plaintiff had suffered a catastrophic injury within the meaning of section 10(a) of the 
Act because he currently was receiving a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4-110 of 
the Illinois Pension Code. Id. ¶ 10. 
¶ 19 
 
The appellate court next held that plaintiff’s work-related injury occurred as a result of his 
response to what he reasonably believed was an emergency, one of the circumstances set forth 
in section 10(b) of the Act. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff, therefore, met the requirements of section 10 of 
the Act and was entitled to the health benefits therein. Accordingly, the appellate court 
reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its 
decision. 
 
 
 
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¶ 20 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 21 
 
Our analysis in this case is governed by section 10 of the Act. That statute provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
“(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or 
correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date of this 
Act suffers a catastrophic injury *** shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s 
health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for 
each dependent child of the injured employee ***. *** 
 
(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, 
firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance coverage under 
this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response to 
fresh pursuit, the officer or firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be 
an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a 
criminal act.” 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2012). 
¶ 22 
 
As noted, the instant case arose from plaintiff’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying 
his complaint for injunctive relief. Generally, a reviewing court will not overturn a trial court’s 
order concerning a permanent injunction unless that order is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. Swigert v. Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th) 120043, ¶ 28. However, when the appeal of 
an order granting or denying a permanent injunction involves a question of law, the standard of 
review is de novo. Id. 
¶ 23 
 
The issue in this case is whether, under the facts of the case, plaintiff was entitled to 
benefits under section 10 of the Act. Accordingly, because the appeal involves a question of 
fact, the standard of review is whether the trial court’s order was against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the findings 
appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence, or when an opposite conclusion 
is apparent. Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106 (1995). 
¶ 24 
 
In this court, defendant does not dispute that plaintiff suffered a catastrophic injury for 
purposes of section 10(a) in this case. As the court recently reiterated, “a pension board’s 
award of a line-of-duty disability pension establishes that the public safety employee suffered a 
catastrophic injury as required by section 10(a) of the Act.” Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 
2015 IL 118170, ¶ 25. 
¶ 25 
 
Defendant, however, notes that section 10 not only requires a catastrophic injury, but also 
provides that the injury must have occurred in one of the four situations specified in section 
10(b) of the Act. The parties agree that plaintiff’s injury did not occur in response to fresh 
pursuit, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. 
Therefore, the only applicable situation is if plaintiff’s injury occurred in response to what is 
reasonably believed to be an emergency. 
¶ 26 
 
The court in Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 
110012, addressed the meaning of the term emergency for purposes of section 10(b). Gaffney 
involved two consolidated cases where plaintiff firefighters sought continuing health insurance 
coverage benefits under section 10 of the Act. 
¶ 27 
 
The plaintiff in the Gaffney case was injured during a training exercise involving a live fire 
on the third floor of a building. Id. ¶ 8. Gaffney’s crew responded to the exercise with their 
engine’s lights and sirens activated. Id. Gaffney’s crew was instructed to advance a hose line to 
 
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the seat of the fire and to search for victims along the way. Id. ¶ 9. The hose became entangled 
as Gaffney’s crew was advancing from the second floor to the third floor, with no visibility, 
through smoke and obstacles. Id. ¶ 8. Gaffney followed the hose back to where it was 
entangled, in what turned out to be a “loveseat type chair.” Id. ¶ 6. Gaffney flipped the loveseat 
backward and injured his shoulder, resulting in a catastrophic injury. Id. ¶ 8. 
¶ 28 
 
The plaintiff in the case consolidated with Gaffney’s case, Lemmenes, also was injured 
while participating in a training exercise. The training did not involve a live fire, but the 
firefighters’ masks were blacked out to simulate live fire conditions. Id. ¶ 23. The firefighters 
were instructed to advance a hose line into the building along a predetermined path and to 
rescue a “downed firefighter.” Id. ¶ 24. Lemmenes was injured while “ ‘twisting and turning 
and pulling this [downed firefighter] trying to free him’ from an unknown obstacle.” Id. ¶ 22. 
Lemmenes also suffered a catastrophic injury as a result of the exercise. Id. 
¶ 29 
 
Both Gaffney and Lemmenes claimed that they were entitled to continuing health 
insurance benefits under section 10 of the Act because they each had suffered catastrophic 
injuries and those injuries occurred “in response to what is reasonably believed to be an 
emergency” as set forth in section 10(b). As in this case, the parties agreed that each plaintiff 
had suffered a catastrophic injury and disputed only whether the injuries occurred in response 
to what was reasonably believed to be an emergency. 
¶ 30 
 
In addressing the emergency requirement set forth in section 10(b) of the Act, the Gaffney 
court held: 
“the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘emergency’ in section 10(b) is an 
unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or property requiring 
an urgent response. To be entitled to continuing health coverage benefits under section 
10(b), the injury must occur in response to what is reasonably believed to be an 
unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or property requiring 
an urgent response.” Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 64. 
¶ 31 
 
The Gaffney court concluded that Gaffney’s belief that he was responding to an emergency 
during the training exercise was reasonable and fell within the purview of the Act. Id. ¶ 69. The 
court noted that after Gaffney’s training exercise began, the hose line became tangled in an 
unseen object, which was an unforeseen circumstance. Id. ¶ 65. Further, the response to that 
event also was unforeseen, because Gaffney was required to follow the hose line back to the 
obstruction and free the hose, with no visibility and with the risk of becoming disoriented in 
the smoke-filled building. Id. Those unforeseen circumstances involved imminent danger to a 
person or property requiring an urgent response, because the crew was stranded on the 
stairwell to the third floor of the burning building with no visibility and no water to put out the 
fire, given the tangled hose line. Id. ¶ 66. The court concluded that in those minutes, when 
something went wrong in the training exercise, the training exercise turned into an emergency, 
so that Gaffney’s injury fell within section 10(b) of the Act. Id. ¶ 67. 
¶ 32 
 
In contrast, the Gaffney court found the facts in Lemmenes’ case did not establish any 
unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or property requiring an 
urgent response. Id. ¶ 77. Lemmenes understood he was participating in a training exercise, 
which was conducted under planned, controlled conditions. Id. The training exercise did not 
involve a live fire, nor was there any smoke in the structure. Id. ¶ 78. No one was in imminent 
danger during the exercise. Id. No unexpected or unforeseen developments arose during that 
 
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training exercise. Id. ¶ 77. Therefore, the circumstances in Lemmenes’ case did not satisfy the 
requirements of section 10(b). Id. ¶ 79. 
¶ 33 
 
In reversing the circuit court, the appellate court in this case cited Gaffney, as well as the 
appellate court decisions in Springborn v. Village of Sugar Grove, 2013 IL App (2d) 120861, 
and Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402. 
¶ 34 
 
Springborn was a consolidated case concerning whether two police officers were 
responding to emergencies for purposes of section 10(b) of the Act when they suffered 
catastrophic injuries. Officer Springborn had observed a mass of asphalt chunks on a major 
highway, so he activated his emergency lights and parked behind the chunks of asphalt in the 
highway. Springborn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120861, ¶¶ 8-10. While clearing the highway of the 
asphalt chunks, Springborn slipped and injured his back, suffering a catastrophic injury. Id. 
¶ 10. 
¶ 35 
 
Officer Cecala, the officer whose case was consolidated with Springborn’s case, was 
dispatched to investigate a traffic accident and possible case of driving under the influence. Id. 
¶ 15. Cecala headed to the scene with his emergency lights and siren activated. Id. When he 
arrived on the scene, Cecala observed a traffic signal lying in the road and a truck against a tree 
at a corner of the intersection. Id. Cecala was concerned not only because the pole posed a 
roadway obstruction, but also because its wires had been pulled out of the ground and were still 
live. Id. Cecala parked his squad car behind the signal pole and activated his emergency lights, 
as well as his squad car’s directional signal. Id. ¶ 16. Cecala was catastrophically injured as he 
was manually moving the pole off the roadway. 
¶ 36 
 
The Springborn court found that both Officer Springborn and Officer Cecala believed that 
they were facing emergencies and that their subjective beliefs about the presence of an 
emergency were reasonable. Id. ¶ 36. The Springborn court also found that each situation 
presented imminent danger, requiring an urgent response, and that the particular circumstances 
of each event were not foreseeable. Id. Accordingly, both officers were entitled to benefits 
under section 10 of the Act. 
¶ 37 
 
In Pedersen, the plaintiff firefighter responded to a call regarding a tanker truck on fire on 
an Illinois toll road. After the fire was extinguished, plaintiff was cleaning the scene and 
packing equipment. Pedersen, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶ 7. The fire engine remained 
positioned to protect the firefighters, with its emergency lights still activated. Id. Plaintiff was 
moving a reflective triangle from the tanker truck, within feet of the fire engine, when the fire 
engine’s siren inadvertently and unexpectedly activated, causing plaintiff to become 
catastrophically disabled due to hearing loss. Id. 
¶ 38 
 
The Pedersen court found that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to believe the emergency 
was ongoing and that the scene remained dangerous. Id. ¶ 60. Therefore, the plaintiff was 
injured as a result of an unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or 
property, requiring an urgent response, so that the plaintiff was entitled to benefits under 
section 10 of the Act. Id. 
¶ 39 
 
Based upon the preceding cases, the appellate court in this case concluded that plaintiff was 
entitled to benefits under section 10 of the Act. The appellate court noted that plaintiff was 
returning to his patrol car in order to answer a call from dispatch when he suffered his 
work-related injury. The court stated: 
 
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“The plaintiff’s affidavit indicated that a call from dispatch was one means in 
which the officers are notified of an emergency. Although we recognize that there was 
no evidence presented that this dispatch call resulted in an emergency situation, it is an 
officer’s duty to respond to dispatch calls in a timely manner and be prepared for any 
eventuality. An officer cannot know the nature of the call until he responds. Therefore, 
until the officer is able to eliminate the possibility that the dispatch call is an 
emergency, the officer treats the call as if it were such. Like Springborn, the 
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s injury are no less dire because it fell within 
the kinds of events that police officers anticipate encountering in their daily duties. The 
evidence established that the plaintiff was engaged in the act of responding to what he 
believed was a potential emergency that could have, based on the fact that a radio call 
from dispatch was a means of communication concerning an emergency situation, 
involved imminent danger to a person or property and therefore required an urgent 
response. Accordingly, we conclude that these facts establish that the plaintiff’s injury 
was incurred as a result of his response to what he reasonably believed was an 
emergency.” 2015 IL App (5th) 140122, ¶ 19. 
¶ 40 
 
Defendant argues that the appellate court’s holding essentially has added a fifth basis for 
recovery to section 10(b): an injury occurring while responding to any call by a superior, until 
such time as that call is determined not to be an emergency. Defendant maintains that the 
appellate court’s reading of the statute improperly expands section 10(b). 
¶ 41 
 
Plaintiff responds that he was injured when he was responding to what he reasonably could 
have believed was an emergency call. Plaintiff states that all actions that he took, which 
resulted in his injury, were before he had any knowledge of the nature of dispatch’s call. 
Plaintiff asserts that this court should review the facts from his subjective perspective at the 
time of the call and at the time he made his response, not at a later time. 
¶ 42 
 
We agree with defendant that the facts of this case do not fit within the emergency situation 
set forth in section 10(b). The facts of this case are more analogous to the facts in Lemmenes’ 
case than the facts of Gaffney’s case, or the fact situations presented in Springborn and 
Pedersen. That a call from dispatch potentially could evolve into an emergency situation for 
purposes of section 10(b) of the Act does not mean that every call from dispatch is an 
emergency until proven otherwise. Answering a call from dispatch is not an unforeseen 
circumstance. No unexpected or unforeseen developments arose while plaintiff was answering 
the call from dispatch. Moreover, there are no facts establishing any imminent danger to a 
person or property requiring an urgent response surrounding the call from dispatch. For those 
reasons, there is no evidence that plaintiff’s injury was suffered in response to what was 
reasonably believed to be an emergency. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order denying 
plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, 
as plaintiff was not eligible for insurance coverage under section 10 of the Act. 
¶ 43 
 
In so holding, we note that although the appellate court acknowledged that this case arose 
from the circuit court’s denial of plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief, the appellate court 
simply cited the black letter law concerning permanent injunctions, and did not otherwise 
analyze whether plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction. The appellate court’s order 
simply held that the facts established that plaintiff’s injury was incurred as a result of his 
response to what he reasonably believed was an emergency. Therefore, the appellate court 
 
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reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with its decision, presumably finding that plaintiff had established the elements necessary to 
issue a permanent injunction. 
¶ 44 
 
To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party “must demonstrate (1) a clear and 
ascertainable right in need of protection, (2) that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the 
injunction is not granted, and (3) that no adequate remedy at law exists.” Swigert, 2012 IL App 
(4th) 120043, ¶ 27. Because we find that plaintiff’s injury did not occur as a result of one of the 
conditions of section 10(b) of the Act, it follows that plaintiff did not demonstrate a clear and 
ascertainable right in need of protection, and therefore was not entitled to a permanent 
injunction. We find that the circuit court correctly denied plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive 
relief, albeit for different reasons than those set forth by the circuit court. As a reviewing court, 
this court can sustain the decision of a lower court on any grounds called for in the record, 
regardless of whether the lower court relied upon those grounds, or whether the lower court’s 
reasoning was correct. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 97. 
¶ 45 
 
In his complaint for injunctive relief, plaintiff also alleged that defendant cannot terminate 
the payment of plaintiff’s section 10 benefits except as set forth in sections 10(a)(2) and (3) of 
the Act. Those sections provide: 
 
“(2) It is unlawful for a person to willfully and knowingly make, or cause to be 
made, or to assist, conspire with, or urge another to make, or cause to be made, any 
false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement to obtain health insurance 
coverage as provided under this Section. A violation of this item is a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
 
(3) Upon conviction for a violation described in item (2), a law enforcement, 
correctional or correctional probation officer, or other beneficiary who receives or 
seeks to receive health insurance benefits under this Section shall forfeit the right to 
receive health insurance benefits and shall reimburse the employer for all benefits paid 
due to the fraud or other prohibited activity.” 820 ILCS 320/10(a)(2), (3) (West 2012). 
¶ 46 
 
Plaintiff maintains that the provisions of section 10 set forth the sole basis for termination 
of section 10 benefits. Plaintiff argues that because he has not been convicted of any charge or 
allegation as set forth in section 10, his benefits, having been provided, cannot now be 
terminated. 
¶ 47 
 
As the court noted in Gaffney, the Act does not provide any guidance on the proper 
procedure for seeking section 10 benefits. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 44. The statute “only 
mandates that an employer shall provide the benefits if the specified requirements are met.” 
(Emphasis added.) Id. Those requirements are that the party seeking benefits suffered a 
catastrophic injury and that the injury or death occurred in one of the four situations specified 
in section 10(b). Section 10 expressly states that, “[i]n order *** to be eligible for insurance 
coverage under this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of *** the officer 
or firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency.” (Emphasis 
added.) 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2012). Here, plaintiff’s injury did not occur as the result of 
a response to what was reasonably believed to be an emergency. Consequently, plaintiff was 
not eligible for insurance benefits under section 10 of the Act in the first place. Defendant, 
therefore, was not statutorily mandated to provide those benefits and was not prohibited from 
terminating payment of those benefits. 
 
- 10 - 
 
¶ 48 
 
Finally, plaintiff argues that defendant is equitably estopped from terminating plaintiff’s 
health insurance benefits under section 10. Equitable estoppel may apply against 
municipalities in extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. 
City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 35. In order to apply equitable estoppel against a 
municipality, a plaintiff “must plead specific facts that show (1) an affirmative act by either the 
municipality itself or an official with express authority to bind the municipality; and (2) 
reasonable reliance upon that act by the plaintiff that induces the plaintiff to detrimentally 
change its position.” Id. ¶ 40. The usual elements of estoppel are further supplemented with the 
additional restriction that a public body will be estopped only when necessary to prevent fraud 
or injustice, particularly when public revenues are involved. Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. 
Department of Revenue, 112 Ill. 2d 174, 185-86 (1986). 
¶ 49 
 
Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s provision of health insurance to plaintiff, without 
objection, was an affirmative act. Moreover, plaintiff states that he reasonably relied upon 
defendant’s provision of health insurance benefits, which induced him to detrimentally change 
his position and drop the health insurance he had at the time. Plaintiff maintains that defendant 
is thereby equitably estopped from now terminating plaintiff’s health insurance. 
¶ 50 
 
We disagree with plaintiff that he detrimentally changed his position when he dropped his 
health insurance in reasonable reliance on defendant’s provision of health insurance benefits. 
The fact that defendant will no longer pay the entire premium of its health insurance plan for 
plaintiff and his family does not prevent plaintiff from continuing his health insurance 
coverage under COBRA or from obtaining his own health insurance pursuant to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2012)). The fact that plaintiff 
now will have to pay some or all of his health insurance premiums does not constitute a 
detrimental change in position for purposes of equitable estoppel, let alone rise to the level of 
fraud or injustice. Considerations of equitable estoppel do not bar defendant from terminating 
plaintiff’s section 10 health insurance benefit. 
¶ 51 
 
We therefore reverse the appellate court’s decision, which reversed the circuit court’s order 
denying plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief. We find that plaintiff was not entitled to a 
permanent injunction and, for the reasons set forth herein, affirm the circuit court’s order 
denying plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief. 
 
¶ 52 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 53 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed.