Title: Jinks v. Credico (USA) LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13106
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2021

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SJC-13106 
 
KYANA JINKS1 & others2  vs.  CREDICO (USA) LLC. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 4, 2021. - December 13, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Independent Contractor Act.  Massachusetts Wage Act.  Labor, 
Overtime compensation, Wages.  Statute, Construction. 
Collateral Estoppel.  Res Judicata.  Practice, Civil, 
Summary judgment, Judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 25, 2016. 
 
A motion for judgment on the pleadings was considered by 
Kenneth W. Salinger, J., and motions for summary judgment were 
heard by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Harold L. Lichten for the plaintiffs. 
Barry J. Miller (Alison H. Silveira also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
2 Antwione Taylor, Lee Tremblay, and Justin Jackson, 
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 
2 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
Ana Muñoz, Joseph Michalakes, & Audrey Richardson, for 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case presents the issue whether G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B (independent contractor statute), which sets 
forth the standard to classify an individual as an employee or 
an independent contractor for purposes of the minimum wage and 
overtime statutes, G. L. c. 151, §§ 1 and 1A (wage laws), also 
establishes the standard to determine whether an entity is that 
individual's joint employer for purposes of those laws.  We 
conclude that it does not.  Instead, we borrow the test applied 
to determine joint employer status under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), from which the Massachusetts wage laws 
derive.  Pursuant to that test, whether an entity is a joint 
employer of an individual is determined by considering the 
totality of the circumstances of the relationship between the 
individual and the entity, guided by a framework of four 
factors:  whether the entity (1) had the power to hire and fire 
the individual, (2) supervised and controlled the individual's 
work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the 
rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment 
records. 
3 
 
Considering these factors in light of the undisputed 
material facts in the record before us, we affirm the Superior 
Court judge's allowance of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant, Credico (USA) LLC (Credico).  More specifically, the 
plaintiffs were salespersons directly retained by DFW 
Consultants, Inc. (DFW), an entity with which Credico 
subcontracted to provide regional direct sales services for its 
national clients.  The record, when considered in view of the 
aforementioned factors as a whole, does not support the 
conclusion that the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of 
proving that Credico exercised the type of control over their 
employment necessary to conclude it was their joint employer.  
Further determining that the claims of the plaintiff Justin 
Jackson were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, we 
affirm.3 
1.  Background.  The undisputed material facts are as 
follows.  Credico was a client broker for independent direct 
marketing companies; for years, it contracted with DFW to 
provide regional door-to-door and other face-to-face sales 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Legal Foundation and by the Massachusetts Employment 
Lawyers Association; Lawyers for Civil Rights; the Immigrant 
Worker Center Collaborative; the Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute; the National Employment Law Project; Justice at Work; 
Fair Employment Project, Inc.; and the Jewish Alliance for Law 
and Social Action. 
4 
 
services for Credico's nationally based telecommunications and 
energy clients.  DFW, in turn, retained the services of the 
plaintiffs -- Kyana Jinks, Antwione Taylor, and Lee Tremblay -- 
as salespersons to work on various marketing campaigns in 
Massachusetts for Credico's clients.4  Without any apparent input 
from Credico, DFW classified Jinks and Taylor as independent 
contractors and Tremblay as an employee. 
Two agreements governed DFW's relationship with Credico 
during the years that the plaintiffs worked for DFW -- a 2013 
"Subcontractor Agreement" (2013 agreement) and a 2015 "Services 
Agreement" (2015 agreement), which apparently superseded the 
2013 agreement.  Relevant to the issues on appeal, the 2013 
agreement provided that DFW would comply, and have its employees 
comply, with Credico's "Code of Business Ethics and Conduct"; 
otherwise, "[DFW] retain[ed] sole and absolute discretion, 
control, and judgment in the manner and means of carrying out 
the assignment," including "filing all necessary and required 
tax filings, reports, payments, and similar obligations," as 
well as "any workers' compensation, Medicare, Medicaid, or other 
similar deductions or contributions."  The 2013 agreement also 
provided that "[i]nvoicing by and payment to [DFW] shall be in 
accordance with the Subcontractor Commission Schedule."  The 
 
4 DFW was owned and operated by Jason Ward. 
5 
 
schedule governed when Credico would pay DFW, made provisions in 
case of fraud on the part of DFW, reserved Credico's right to 
amend the schedule, and provided a table of the rates at which 
Credico would compensate DFW for particular types of sales.  The 
plaintiffs cite to no record support for their contention that 
the schedule additionally governed the commissions DFW paid to 
them; to the contrary, the records show that Credico had no 
involvement in DFW's policies regarding the compensation DFW 
paid to its salespersons. 
The 2015 agreement similarly provided that DFW "retain[ed] 
sole and absolute discretion, control, and judgment in the 
manner and means of carrying out the Services."  DFW had 
"exclusive control over its labor and employee relations 
policies, and its policies relating to wages, hours, or working 
conditions of its employees," and had "the exclusive right to 
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, assign, 
discipline, adjust grievances and discharge its employees."  
Credico required DFW to ensure that its workers complied with 
certain regulatory requirements, including undergoing background 
checks and signing nondisclosure agreements.  Credico provided 
DFW with access to a data portal, ARC, capable of tracking the 
number of salespersons working on a particular campaign on a 
particular day; the plaintiffs' additional contentions that the 
portal provided Credico with salespersons' daily rankings and 
6 
 
pay reports and that Credico used the portal to gather 
information about DFW's salespersons are unsupported. 
Aside from reporting to the DFW office at the beginning and 
end of a workday, the plaintiffs completed their sales work "in 
the field" via face-to-face interactions with consumers.5  The 
plaintiffs testified that they had never met, communicated with, 
or seen anyone employed by Credico, and had never been to a 
Credico office. 
In June 2019, the plaintiffs filed the third amended 
complaint in this action, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated,6 against Credico, DFW, and Jason 
Ward.7  With respect to Credico, the plaintiffs alleged that, as 
 
5 The plaintiffs' contention that their workday schedules, 
including reporting to the DFW office at the beginning and end 
of each day, mirrored the schedule followed by Credico 
subcontractors nationwide, is not supported by the record on 
summary judgment. 
 
6 The claims on behalf of those similarly situated were 
placed on hold pending resolution of the parties' cross motions 
for summary judgment.  Thus, a class has not been certified. 
 
7 Kanika Misra and Craig Levine were originally plaintiffs 
in this action; their claims against Credico were dismissed as 
barred by claim preclusion.  See Vasto vs. Credico (USA) LLC, 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 15 Civ. 9298 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017), 
aff'd, 767 Fed. Appx. 54 (2d Cir. 2019).  Following the addition 
of more plaintiffs in the second amended complaint, claims by 
the plaintiff Jacqueline Sill against Credico were effectively 
stayed when the Superior Court judge granted a motion to compel 
arbitration as to her claims.  Finally, claims asserted by the 
plaintiff Juan Melo against Credico were dismissed for failure 
to prosecute.  None of these rulings is the subject of this 
appeal. 
7 
 
the plaintiffs' joint employer, Credico violated the independent 
contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, by misclassifying 
Jinks and Taylor as independent contractors rather than 
employees, and that it violated the wage laws, G. L. c. 151, 
§§ 1 and 7, and G. L. c. 151, § 1A, by failing to pay each of 
the plaintiffs minimum wage and overtime for hours worked in 
excess of forty hours per week.  The claims asserted by Jackson, 
who was a named plaintiff in the second amended complaint, 
against Credico, see note 7, supra, were found by the Superior 
Court judge to be barred by the doctrine of claim splitting 
based on Jackson's participation in a Federal lawsuit against 
Credico in which he did not raise his State law claims, see 
Huffman vs. Credico (USA) LLC, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:17CV04242 
(S.D.N.Y.). 
After a period of discovery, the parties submitted cross 
motions for summary judgment in December 2019.  Credico sought 
summary judgment on all claims raised against it in the third 
amended complaint.  The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on 
their claims that Credico violated the wage laws, maintaining 
that Credico was their joint employer, that they were not exempt 
under the statutes' "outside sales" exemption, and that Jinks 
8 
 
and Taylor were misclassified by Credico as independent 
contractors.8 
The judge granted summary judgment to Credico on all claims 
on the ground that the undisputed facts established it was not 
the plaintiffs' joint employer.  The plaintiffs appealed from 
the allowance of Credico's motion for summary judgment, as well 
as the allowance of Credico's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings as to Jackson's claims.  This court transferred the 
case sua sponte from the Appeals Court. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Summary judgment.  i.  Employer 
"ordinarily" is entity for whom employee directly performs 
services.  The appropriate test to determine whether an entity 
is an individual's employer under the wage laws is a legal 
 
8 The plaintiffs also sought summary judgment against DFW 
and Ward for violation of the wage laws.  DFW and Ward sought 
partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim that they 
violated the overtime statute by failing to pay overtime for 
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.  The judge 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs Jinks and Taylor on 
their claim that DFW misclassified them as independent 
contractors.  He denied summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' 
minimum wage claims against DFW and Ward on the ground that 
there was a genuine dispute of material fact whether the 
plaintiffs fell within the "outside sales" exemption of the 
minimum wage statute, as defined in G. L. c. 151, § 2.  He 
granted summary judgment in favor of DFW and Ward on the 
plaintiffs' overtime claims, concluding that the plaintiffs fell 
within the separate outside sales exemption of the overtime 
statute, G. L. c. 151, § 1A (4).  None of these rulings was 
appealed; instead, the plaintiffs entered into a settlement 
agreement with DFW and Ward and dismissed their claims against 
both parties. 
9 
 
question, which we consider de novo.  Rotondi v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 648 (2012).  Relying on 
the independent contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, the 
plaintiffs urge that an entity is an individual's employer so 
long as the individual is "performing any service" from which 
the entity derives an economic benefit.9 
We rejected such an approach in Depianti v. Jan-Pro 
Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607 (2013), determining 
instead that the entity for whom the individual directly 
performs services is ordinarily the individual's employer 
responsible for compliance with the wage laws.  In particular, 
we posited a hypothetical situation in which "company A 
 
9 The independent contractor statute provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
"For the purpose of [G. L. cc. 149 and 151], an individual 
performing any service . . . shall be considered to be an 
employee under those chapters unless: -- 
 
"(1) the individual is free from control and direction in 
connection with the performance of the service, both under 
his contract for the performance of service and in fact; 
and 
 
"(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of 
the business of the employer; and, 
 
"(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the service 
performed." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B. 
10 
 
contracts with company B for services, and company B enters into 
arrangements with third parties to perform the work it undertook 
under its contract with company A."  Id. at 624 n.17.  Even 
though company A derived an economic benefit from the third-
party workers, we concluded that "ordinarily, in such 
circumstances, company A would not be liable for 
misclassification of the third-party workers.  This is because 
ordinarily, in such circumstances, company B would be the agent 
of any misclassification" as the third parties' direct employer.  
Id. 
In the present case, DFW, like company B in the 
hypothetical scenario, was the direct employer of the 
plaintiffs.  Credico, like company A, did not classify the 
plaintiffs.  Therefore, Credico was not the direct employer of 
the plaintiffs and thus "ordinarily" would not be liable for any 
misclassification under the wage laws.  See id. 
While this is the ordinary outcome, we have recognized at 
least two exceptions –- first, where the law of corporate 
disregard is applicable and, second, where an entity has engaged 
in an "end run" around its wage law obligations.  We describe 
each in turn. 
ii.  Alter ego employer.  First, company A could be liable 
for company B's misclassification of the employee if company B 
is the "alter ego" of company A pursuant to the narrowly 
11 
 
tailored, equitable doctrine of corporate disregard.  See 
Attorney Gen. v. M.C.K., Inc., 432 Mass. 546, 555 (2000) ("The 
doctrine of corporate disregard is an equitable tool that 
authorizes courts, in rare situations, to ignore corporate 
formalities, where such disregard is necessary to provide a 
meaningful remedy for injuries and to avoid injustice").  To 
trigger such veil-piercing liability, a plaintiff must show the 
following factors: 
"(1) common ownership; (2) pervasive control; (3) confused 
intermingling of business assets; (4) thin capitalization; 
(5) nonobservance of corporate formalities; (6) absence of 
corporate records; (7) no payment of dividends; 
(8) insolvency at the time of the litigated transaction; 
(9) siphoning away of corporation's funds by dominant 
shareholder; (10) nonfunctioning of officers and directors; 
(11) use of the corporation for transactions of the 
dominant shareholders; and (12) use of the corporation in 
promoting fraud." 
 
Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., 471 Mass. 321, 328 (2015), 
quoting M.C.K., Inc., supra at 555 n.19.  See My Bread Baking 
Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 618 (1968) 
(setting forth principle that "corporations are generally to be 
regarded as separate from each other and from their respective 
stockholders" absent showing of factors permitting disregard of 
corporate form). 
In the present action, the plaintiffs have not alleged or 
attempted to show that Credico is the alter ego of DFW, nor 
12 
 
would the facts in the summary judgment record support this 
conclusion. 
iii.  End-run employer.  Second, an employment relationship 
between company A and company B's employees could exist if 
company A has engaged in a scheme as an "end run" around its 
wage law obligations such that company A, even though it is not 
the employee's direct employer and cannot be shown to be the 
direct employer's "alter ego," nonetheless is the agent of the 
misclassification.  Such a scenario would occur if company A 
"designed and implemented the contractual framework under which 
[company B's employee] was misclassified as an independent 
contractor," specifically to evade obligations under the wage 
laws.  Depianti, 465 Mass. at 624 n.17 (noting that where first 
entity is agent of misclassification it may be directly liable 
under independent contractor statute).  See id. at 625-626 
(Cordy, J., dissenting in part) (recognizing that liability 
under independent contractor statute may flow where entity is 
set up specifically for purpose of evading wage law 
obligations); Cumpata v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 
113 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (D. Mass. 2000) ("The Wage Act is meant 
to protect employees from the dictates and whims of shrewd 
employers"). 
In the present action, despite their continued allegations 
that Credico established a "fissured" employment structure with 
13 
 
DFW,10 the plaintiffs have not adduced facts to show that DFW was 
set up by Credico for the purposes of evading wage law 
obligations. 
iv.  Joint employment.  We turn now to consider a third 
exception to the rule that, ordinarily, one entity is not the 
employer of a different entity's employees.  In the parlance of 
Depianti's hypothetical scenario, we consider whether an 
employment relationship exists between company A and company B's 
employees when company A is the employees' joint employer. 
A.  Whether the joint employment concept is included in the 
wage laws.  "The basis of the [joint employer] finding is simply 
that one employer while contracting in good faith with an 
otherwise independent company, has retained for itself 
sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees who are employed by the other employer."  Swallows 
 
10 In a "fissured" employment structure, a company funnels 
work through subcontractors or other intermediaries, which are 
often judgment-proof.  When workers attempt to sue the company 
over wage issues, the company avoids liability by pointing to 
the intermediary as the responsible party.  See Griffith, The 
Fair Labor Standards Act at 80:  Everything Old Is New Again, 
104 Cornell L. Rev. 557, 571-597 (Mar. 2019); Weil, Why the 
Fissured Workplace Is Bigger than the Contingent Worker Survey 
Suggests, The American Prospect (May 14, 2019), https://prospect 
.org/economy/future-real-jobs-prospect-roundtable [https://perma 
.cc/4BFP-TYKQ].  We agree that "[t]o allow such an 'end run'" 
around the wage laws would contradict their purpose, which is to 
provide broad remedial protection to workers.  Depianti, 465 
Mass. at 624, quoting DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 
Mass. 486, 496 (2009). 
14 
 
v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 n.4 (6th 
Cir. 1997), quoting National Labor Relations Bd. v. Browning–
Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982).  
See 2 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 
1312 (3d ed. 1996).  See also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 
473, 481 (1964) (describing inquiry whether bus company had 
"sufficient control over the work of the employees" of another 
company).  In other words, company A, by its good faith 
retention of sufficient control over the terms and conditions of 
employment of company B's employees, has created a "work 
arrangement" between it and company B's employees.  Depianti, 
465 Mass. at 625 (Cordy, J., dissenting in part).  We conclude 
that the wage laws, which neither define "employer" nor 
expressly provide for "joint employers," include this long-
standing concept of joint employment.11  Compare G. L. c. 152, 
§ 26B (workers' compensation law, expressly providing for joint 
and several liability "[w]hen an employee [is] employed in the 
concurrent service of two or more insured employers").  See, 
e.g., Sebago, 471 Mass. at 329 (implicitly acknowledging that 
more than one entity could constitute employee's employer); 
Gallagher v. Cerebral Palsy of Mass., Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 
 
11 None of the other provisions in G. L. c. 151 defines 
"employer." 
15 
 
207, 214 (2017) (applying joint employment concept in connection 
with wage laws). 
"Where the meaning of a statute is not plain from its 
language, familiar principles of statutory construction guide 
our interpretation."  Depianti, 465 Mass. at 620, quoting 
DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490 (2009).  
We interpret the statute "according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 
Mass. 360, 364 (1975), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 
447 (1934).  Because of their remedial nature, employment 
statutes are generally "entitled to liberal construction," see 
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 822 (1985), 
"with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them," 
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 
1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915).  See, e.g., Boston v. 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 453 Mass. 389, 391 
(2009). 
Where, as here, the Legislature has not defined a term in a 
statute, we presume that its use of the term (in this case, the 
16 
 
term "employer") incorporates the understanding of that term 
under the common law.  See Koshy v. Sachdev, 477 Mass. 759, 770 
(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. 745, 747 
(2011) ("Where the Legislature does not define a term, we 
presume that its intent is to incorporate the common-law 
definition of the term, 'unless the intent to alter it is 
clearly expressed'").  The concept of joint employment finds 
long-standing support in the common law.  See Whitman's Case, 80 
Mass. App. Ct. 348, 355 (2011), quoting Williams v. Westover 
Finishing Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 58, 60 (1987) (noting "[j]oint 
employment . . . is a well recognized phenomenon"); Commodore v. 
Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 61-62 
(2005) (reviewing Federal jurisprudence defining concept of 
joint employer and applying same in context of Massachusetts 
employment discrimination claims).  See also Kelley v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 324 (1974) (setting forth common-law 
principles whereby individual "can establish his 'employment' 
with [one entity] even while he is nominally employed by 
another"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. National 
Labor Relations Bd., 911 F.3d 1195, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (joint 
employment "finds extensive support in the common law of 
agency").12 
 
12 See generally 5 L.K. Larson & T.A. Robinson, Larson's 
Workers' Compensation Law §§ 68.01, 68.02 (2021) ("[T]here is 
17 
 
Thus, in the absence of an expressed indication to the 
contrary and in view of the broad remedial nature of the wage 
laws, we presume that the term "employer" includes the concept 
of joint employment, which itself is deeply rooted in the common 
law.  See Depianti, 465 Mass. at 621, quoting Psy-Ed Corp. v. 
Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 708 (2011) ("In light of the [wage laws'] 
broad remedial purpose, 'it would be an error to imply . . . a 
limitation where the statutory language does not require it'").13 
 
nothing unusual about the coinciding of both control by two 
employers and the advancement of the interests of two employers 
in a single piece of work"); id. (noting trend of courts "to 
dispose of close cases, not by insisting on an all-or-nothing 
choice between two employers both bearing a close relation to 
the employee, but by finding a joint employment on the theory 
that the employee is continuously serving both employers under 
the control of both"). 
 
13 This conclusion is further bolstered by the history of 
the wage laws, which were modeled after the FLSA.  See Mullally 
v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 531 (2008), quoting 
Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 447 (2004) (wage laws 
were "intended to be 'essentially identical'" to FLSA).  Other 
States also have interpreted their wage statutes to incorporate 
the concept of joint employment and provide broad protection for 
workers, relying in part on the FLSA's inclusion of the joint 
employment concept.  See, e.g., Director of the Bur. of Labor 
Standards v. Cormier, 527 A.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (Me. 1987) 
(recognizing that Federal interpretation of FLSA, while not 
binding, provides guidance, and that remedial nature of State 
minimum wage and overtime statutes requires liberal construction 
to further purpose of protecting employees, and finding joint 
employment available under State statutes); Becerra v. Expert 
Janitorial, LLC, 181 Wash. 2d 186, 195-198 (2014) (looking to 
Federal jurisprudence to determine availability of joint 
employment concept under State statutes based on FLSA).  But see 
Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 66-68 (2010) (finding that, 
because State minimum wage act was enacted before FLSA and 
18 
 
B.  Standard for determining joint employment under the 
wage laws.  Having established that the wage laws include the 
concept of joint employment, the next issue is the proper 
factors to consider in determining whether an entity, 
contracting in good faith with a second entity, has retained for 
itself sufficient control over the terms and conditions of the 
second entity's employees to be considered the joint employer of 
those employees.14  See Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993 n.4. 
 
amendments were intended to distinguish it from FLSA, it does 
not incorporate expansive Federal definition of employer). 
 
14 Credico points to the "paycheck" test as a potentially 
viable option to determine joint employer status.  Under this 
test, "[t]he plain and common understanding of 'employer' is the 
entity with which an employee has an express or implied contract 
to work for compensation and from which he receives pay."  
Rogier vs. Chambers, Mass. Super. Ct., Nos. SUCV201502876BLS1 & 
SUCV201600849BLS1 (Suffolk County Sept. 1, 2016).  This test 
effectively precludes a finding of joint employer status in 
circumstances where a worker receives only one paycheck. 
 
 
Because we conclude that the wage laws include the common-
law concept of joint employment, the paycheck test is not the 
appropriate standard for the joint employer inquiry.  To adopt 
it would be inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the wage 
laws and this court's recognition that employment statutes merit 
a liberal construction.  See Depianti, 465 Mass. at 620.  
Indeed, we have already implicitly rejected this test in 
Depianti by finding in the context of the independent contractor 
statute that "the lack of a contract between the parties does 
not itself, without more, preclude liability" for the employer.  
Id. at 619.  See Sebago, 471 Mass. at 329 ("[I]f, for example, 
the plaintiffs . . . were found to be employees of [company A 
(the entity with which they contracted)], the lack of a contract 
between the plaintiffs and [company B] would not shield [company 
B] from potential misclassification liability").  Accordingly, 
we reject it. 
19 
 
The plaintiffs urge that the test set forth in the 
independent contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, also known 
as the "ABC" test, determines joint employment status.  Section 
148B "establishes a standard to determine whether an individual 
performing services for another shall be deemed an employee or 
an independent contractor for purposes of our wage statutes."  
Sebago, 471 Mass. at 327, quoting Somers v. Converged Access, 
Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 589 (2009).  See Taylor v. Eastern 
Connection Operating, Inc., 465 Mass. 191, 198 (2013) (purpose 
of independent contractor statute is "to protect workers by 
classifying them as employees, and thereby grant them the 
benefits and rights of employment, where the circumstances 
indicate that they are, in fact, employees").  Section 148B (a) 
provides that "an individual performing any service . . . shall 
be considered to be an employee under [G. L. cc. 149 and 151] 
unless" three factors are established to rebut this presumption 
of employment: 
"(1) the individual is free from control and direction in 
connection with the performance of the service, both under 
his contract for the performance of service and in fact; 
and (2) the service is performed outside the usual course 
of the business of the employer; and, (3) the individual is 
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business of the same nature as 
that involved in the service performed." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a).  See Sebago, supra. 
20 
 
The ABC test thus asks a question that differs from the 
question relevant to determining whether an entity is a joint 
employer.  The test classifies a worker as either an employee or 
an independent contractor for purposes of the wage laws based on 
the answer to the question "who, if anyone, controls the work 
other than the worker herself."  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., 
Inc., 911 F.3d at 1214.  By contrast, the question of joint 
employment focuses on whether an individual, whose work is 
controlled by one entity, is also subject to the control of 
another entity.  See id.  "In short, using the independent-
contractor test exclusively to answer the joint-employer 
question would be rather like using a hammer to drive in a 
screw:  it only roughly assists the task because the hammer is 
designed for a different purpose."  Id. at 1215.  See Henderson 
v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 40 Cal. App. 5th 1111, 1125 (2019) 
(determining that ABC test "does not fit analytically with and 
was not intended to apply to claims of joint employer 
liability"). 
Instead, we are persuaded that whether an entity is a joint 
employer under the wage laws, which were modeled after the FLSA, 
should be determined (as is done under the FLSA) by examining 
the totality of the circumstances of the parties' working 
relationship, guided by a useful framework of four factors:  
"whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire 
21 
 
the employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work 
schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate 
and method of payment; and (4) maintained employment records."  
Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 
(1st Cir. 1998). 
Notably, the determination whether an entity is a joint 
employer is "not a mechanical determination."  Bonnette v. 
California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th 
Cir. 1983).  "The four factors . . . provide a useful framework 
for analysis . . . , but they are not etched in stone and will 
not be blindly applied."  Id.  See Rutherford Food Corp. v. 
McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947) (considering that meat boners 
worked onsite, alongside slaughterhouse employees; 
responsibility under contracts passed without material change 
from one meat boner to another; lack of business organization 
that could or did shift to another slaughterhouse; 
slaughterhouse manager kept close eye on operations; and profits 
essentially were based on piecework rather than dependent on 
"initiative, judgment or foresight" of putative employees).  
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 
32-33 (1961) (concluding that it is "the 'economic reality' 
rather than 'technical concepts' [that] is to be the test of 
employment," and considering whether knitters who worked from 
home as members of cooperative were employed by cooperative 
22 
 
where they were not otherwise self-employed; members were not 
independently selling products on market for whatever price they 
could command; they were regimented under one organization, 
manufacturing what cooperative desired and receiving 
compensation as cooperative dictated; management fixed piece 
rates; and management retained authority to fire members for 
substandard work or failure to obey regulations [citations 
omitted]). 
Nevertheless, the four aforementioned factors provide a 
framework that, in many cases, will capture both the nature and 
structure of the working relationship as well as the putative 
employer's control over the economic aspects of the working 
relationship.  Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc., 163 F.3d at 
675-676.  No one factor is dispositive; instead, it is the 
totality of the circumstances that will determine whether an 
entity ought to be considered a joint employer.  Id. at 676.15 
v.  Analysis.  Having determined that the wage laws 
incorporate the concept of joint employment and having set forth 
 
15 Massachusetts courts have previously applied the "right 
to control" test when determining joint employer status, which 
is similar to the test we adopt today.  See Gallagher, 92 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 214, quoting Commodore, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 62 
(assessing joint employer status under right to control test by 
examining whether defendant "has retained for itself sufficient 
control of the terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees who are employed by the other employer").  In fact, 
the judge here applied the "right to control" test using the 
four-factor framework we set forth herein. 
23 
 
the framework to be considered when determining whether an 
entity is a joint employer, we turn to the record on summary 
judgment to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving or opposing party, "there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law."  Conservation Comm'n of Norton 
v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 330 (2021), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 
56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). 
"[A] party moving for summary judgment in a case in which 
the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial 
is entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrates, by 
reference to material described in Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), 
unmet by countervailing materials, that the party opposing 
the motion has no reasonable expectation of proving an 
essential element of that party's case.  To be successful, 
a moving party need not submit affirmative evidence to 
negate one or more elements of the other party's claim." 
 
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 
(1991).  Once the moving party has met this burden, the opposing 
party is "required to respond by 'set[ting] forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"  Id., quoting 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, "we look to the 
summary judgment record and review de novo."  Carey v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 479 Mass. 367, 369 (2018).  Thus, it 
is important on appeal, just as it was before the Superior Court 
judge, that the parties provide "'an appropriate and accurate 
record reference' for each and every fact set forth in the 
24 
 
brief."  Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 56 n.4 (2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1131 (2002), quoting Mass. R. A. P. 16 (e), as 
amended, 378 Mass. 940 (1979).  This requirement "prevents 
parties from exaggerating or distorting the facts as presented 
below, or from inserting into the analysis on appeal facts that 
are simply nonexistent."  Lynn, supra. 
With these principles in mind, we turn to examine the 
summary judgment record to determine whether, considering the 
totality of the circumstances guided by the four-factor 
framework, the plaintiffs have any reasonable expectation of 
showing that Credico "(1) had the power to hire and fire the 
employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules 
or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and method 
of payment; and (4) maintained employment records."  Baystate 
Alternative Staffing, Inc., 163 F.3d at 675. 
 
The first two factors "address the extent of a putative 
employer's control over the nature and structure of the working 
relationship."  Id.  The plaintiffs present no evidence that 
Credico had the power to hire or fire DFW employees.  To the 
contrary, the record shows that only DFW had that power.  For 
example, the 2015 agreement stated that DFW retained "the 
exclusive right to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, 
promote, assign, discipline, adjust grievances and discharge its 
employees."  The plaintiffs contend that, because Credico 
25 
 
retained responsibility under its agreements with clients for 
ensuring quality control as it pertained to how salespersons 
conducted themselves in the field, DFW did not retain exclusive 
control over hours and working conditions.  In support of this 
claim, the plaintiffs cite to passages from contracts between 
Credico and its clients stating that Credico is responsible for 
ensuring that subcontractors and salespersons receive proper 
training, monitoring against fraudulent activity, and 
maintaining records of salespersons' background checks and drug 
tests.16  Exercising such quality control measures does not 
constitute supervising and controlling work conditions.  See, 
e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 
2003) ("[S]upervision with respect to contractual warranties of 
quality and time of delivery has no bearing on the joint 
employment inquiry, as such supervision is perfectly consistent 
with a typical, legitimate subcontracting arrangement"); 
Godlewska v. HDA, 916 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), 
aff'd, 561 Fed. Appx. 108 (2d Cir. 2014) ("Exercising quality 
control by having strict standards and monitoring compliance 
 
16 These agreements between Credico and its clients do show 
that Credico agreed to assume these responsibilities, but they 
do not mandate that Credico control specifics of working hours 
and conditions, nor does the record show that Credico attempted 
to do so. 
26 
 
with those standards does not constitute supervising and 
controlling employees' work conditions"). 
The second two factors of the framework "address the extent 
of a putative employer's control over the economic aspects of 
the working relationship."  Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc., 
163 F.3d at 676.  Nothing in the record supports a reasonable 
conclusion that Credico determined the rate and method of 
payments made by DFW to the plaintiffs or maintained employment 
records. 
The plaintiffs contend that pay "flowed from" Credico 
because the 2013 agreement incorporated a commission schedule 
for each campaign, stating that "[i]nvoicing by and payment to 
[DFW] shall be in accordance with the Subcontractor Commission 
Schedule."17  The plaintiffs contend that, although the schedule 
determined only the payments from Credico to DFW and not the 
payments received by the plaintiffs, this evidence, when taken 
in conjunction with Ward's testimony that he did not set the DFW 
commission schedules, suffices to put the fact of payment 
determination in dispute.  Ward, however, testified that he did 
not know whether the schedules were set by Credico, and the 
 
17 The schedule for one campaign states that Credico "will 
pay to [DFW one hundred percent] of the reported sales that have 
the Installed status," makes provisions in case of fraud or 
negligence by DFW, reserves Credico's right to alter or amend 
the schedule, and provides payment rates to DFW for various 
sales. 
27 
 
plaintiffs provide no additional support for their assertion 
that Credico had any role in setting the commission schedules 
for payments from DFW to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs assert that Credico "maintained employment 
records" for DFW salespersons by receiving information through 
the ARC portal it required DFW to use –- the portal "track[ed] 
the sales agents that were working that day," as well as daily 
rankings of salespersons from DFW and pay reports broken down by 
salesperson.  The record does not show that Credico received any 
reports as to the activity or employment of specific 
salespersons; to the contrary, Ward testified that Credico 
received reports directly from the clients rather than from DFW.  
Considering these factors and the totality of the circumstances, 
the plaintiffs have no reasonable expectation of proving that 
Credico was their joint employer, and therefore Credico is 
entitled to summary judgment.18 
b.  Motion for judgment on the pleadings.  As set forth 
supra, the judge granted Credico's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings as to Jackson's claims, concluding that they were 
barred by the doctrine of claim splitting in view of Jackson's 
decision to join a Federal action naming Credico as a defendant 
 
18 Because we find that Credico was not the plaintiffs' 
joint employer and was thus not subject to the requirements of 
the wage laws, we need not address whether the plaintiffs fall 
into the outside sales exemption of G. L. c. 151, § 1A (4). 
28 
 
and asserting claims under the FLSA arising from wage 
violations.  Jackson contends on appeal that the dismissal of 
his claims was in error.  This court reviews de novo a decision 
granting or denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, LLC, 488 Mass. 237, 240 (2021). 
Briefly, in June 2017, Michaela Huffman commenced a 
collective action under the FLSA in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York against Credico,19 
Huffman vs. Credico (USA) LLC, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:17-CV-04242 
(S.D.N.Y.), asserting that Credico was her joint employer and 
violated the FLSA by failing to pay her minimum wage and 
overtime.  Jackson, who subsequently would join the present 
action, opted into the Huffman litigation, thereby "consent[ing] 
and agree[ing] to pursue [his] claims arising out of [his] 
employment at [Credico and DFW] in connection with the [Huffman] 
lawsuit."  The opt-in form was silent as to any State law 
claims, and Jackson did not raise any Massachusetts law claims 
in the Huffman litigation. 
In May 2019, the Huffman parties stipulated to the 
dismissal of the case on the ground that a decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Vasto 
v. Credico (USA) LLC, 767 Fed. Appx. 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2019), 
 
19 Neither DFW nor Ward was a defendant in the Huffman 
action. 
29 
 
another lawsuit alleging claims under the FLSA against Credico, 
was dispositive of all claims.  See note 7, supra. 
 
Although Credico's motion for judgment on the pleadings 
alleged that Jackson's claim was barred by claim splitting and 
the judge granted the motion on that basis, Credico's argument 
is more properly treated as asserting claim preclusion.20  "When 
a State court is faced with the issue of determining the 
preclusive effect of a Federal court's judgment, it is the 
Federal law of res judicata which must be examined."  Anderson 
v. Phoenix Inv. Counsel of Boston, Inc., 387 Mass. 444, 449 
(1982).  "The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, 
holds that 'a final judgment on the merits of an action 
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues 
that were or could have been raised in that action.'"  Monahan 
 
20 Claim splitting and claim preclusion are related but 
distinct concepts.  See Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212, 1218 
(10th Cir. 2011); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 
(2d Cir. 2000).  Claim splitting does not generally require a 
final judgment as a necessary component, unlike claim 
preclusion.  Katz, supra ("[T]he test for claim splitting is not 
whether there is finality of judgment, but whether the first 
suit, assuming it were final, would preclude the second suit").  
Indeed, a dismissal on claim-splitting grounds generally occurs 
while "the dismissed party is involved in another pending suit 
regarding the same subject matter against the same defendants."  
Id. at 1219.  By the time the Superior Court judge ruled on 
Jackson's claim, final judgment had already entered in the 
Huffman litigation, meaning that Jackson was not, at that time, 
"involved in another pending suit regarding the same subject 
matter against the same defendants."  Id.  Accordingly, the 
dismissal of Jackson's claim is properly analyzed under the 
doctrine of claim preclusion. 
30 
 
v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 214 F.3d 275, 284-285 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000), quoting Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).  The doctrine bars a subsequent 
action when "(1) the previous action involved an adjudication on 
the merits; (2) the previous action involved the plaintiffs or 
those in privity with them; [and] (3) the claims asserted in the 
subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior 
action."  Monahan, supra at 285. 
The first two factors are readily shown.  The stipulation 
of dismissal in Huffman must "be accorded the same effect as a 
final judgment" to avoid "parties [being] permitted to change 
their minds and relitigate the exact same claims against the 
same parties."  Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 536 (2002).  
Moreover, both Jackson and Credico were parties to Huffman and 
the present action. 
 
We thus consider whether Jackson's State law claims could 
have been raised in the Federal action.  In general, 
"if a set of facts gives rise to a claim based on both 
State and Federal law, and the plaintiff brings the action 
in a Federal court which had 'pendent' jurisdiction to hear 
the State claim but the plaintiff declines to assert such 
State claim, he may not subsequently assert the State 
ground in a State court action.  The exception to this rule 
is that if the Federal court in the first action would 
clearly not have had jurisdiction to hear the State claim 
or, if having jurisdiction, clearly would have declined to 
exercise it as a matter of discretion, then a second action 
in a State court should not be precluded."  (Citations 
omitted.) 
 
31 
 
Anderson, 387 Mass. at 450.  Pendent or "[s]upplemental 
jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and decide state-law 
claims along with federal-law claims when they 'are so related 
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 
they form part of the same case or controversy.'"  Wisconsin 
Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998), 
quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  "The state and federal claims must 
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."  United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
The court in Huffman had Federal question jurisdiction over 
the plaintiffs' FLSA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
including Jackson's.  The claims raised in Huffman and in the 
present action are essentially identical, other than the theory 
of liability (State versus Federal law) and arise from the same 
set of facts (Jackson's alleged employment by Credico).  There 
is no indication that the Federal court in Huffman would have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jackson's State law 
claims; other Federal courts have consented to hear State law 
claims supplemental to FLSA actions.  See, e.g., Vasto, 767 Fed. 
Appx. at 57 (deciding claims based on New York and Arizona law 
alongside FLSA claims). 
Finally, there is no indication that Jackson would be 
prevented from asserting State law claims due to the collective 
nature of the Huffman action.  Collective actions under the FLSA 
32 
 
are "fundamentally different" from other class actions.  Genesis 
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 74 (2013).  "Unlike 
class actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, collective actions under 
the FLSA . . . require would-be members of the collectivity to 
opt in to (i.e., voluntarily join) the class."  DeKeyser v. 
Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 860 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 2017).  
"This difference means that every plaintiff who opts in to a 
collective action has party status, whereas unnamed class 
members in Rule 23 class actions do not."21  Halle v. West Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2016), 
quoting 7B C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1807 (3d ed. 2016).  "Consequently, although the 
original plaintiffs in a collective action may pursue the suit 
on a representative basis, each FLSA claimant has the right to 
be present in court to advance his or her own claim."  Wright & 
Miller, supra. 
"The difference between the opt-in requirement of the Act 
and the opt-out requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has raised the 
question whether it is improper to join state-law class-
action claims in a collective FLSA action because the two 
procedures are fundamentally incompatible.  Joining them in 
one action creates serious management issues and the 
possibility of confusion relating to the notice.  Thus, 
some courts have exercised their discretion not to assume 
jurisdiction over the state-law class-action claims under 
these circumstances.  Other courts, however, have allowed 
 
21 Other than this difference, "case law has largely merged 
the standards" for collective actions under the FLSA and class 
actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, 
LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013). 
33 
 
class and collective-action claims to be litigated 
simultaneously."  (Footnotes omitted.) 
 
Id. (collecting cases). 
 
Huffman was litigated in the Southern District of New York.  
Courts in that district "have unflinchingly certified FLSA and 
New York Labor Law claims together," even though the State law 
claims tend not to predominate the lawsuit.  Iglesias-Mendoza v. 
La Belle Farm, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 363, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  This 
practice extends to claims under other States' laws.  Shahriar 
v. Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 247, 
249 (2d Cir. 2011), quoting Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, 
Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that "nothing 
in the language of the FLSA prevents the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law wage 
claims," and that "the 'conflict' between the opt-in procedure 
under the FLSA and the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 is not a 
proper reason to decline jurisdiction" over claims under New 
York law).  Therefore, because Jackson could have brought his 
State law claims against Credico in the Huffman action, his 
claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.