Title: City of Champaign v. Torres
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97926
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2005

Docket No. 97926-Agenda 18-November 2004.
THE CITY OF CHAMPAIGN, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee, 							v. CHRISTIAN TORRES, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 17, 2005.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER(1) delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Champaign County,
defendant, Christian Torres, was found to have violated article 2,
section 23-21(a), of the Champaign Municipal Code, as amended
(Champaign Municipal Code, art. 2, §23-21(a) (eff. April 18, 1988)),
which makes it unlawful to "knowingly resist or obstruct the
performance by *** a peace officer *** of any authorized act within
the peace officer's official capacity." The court fined defendant $175
and ordered him to pay court costs. The appellate court affirmed. 346
Ill. App. 3d 214. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
	According to the evidence presented at trial, defendant was a 21-year-old student at the University of Illinois in Champaign at the time
of the events giving rise to this case. In April of 2002, he attended a
party hosted by the teaching assistant for one of his classes. The party
was held at the teaching assistant's apartment and included a number
of defendant's classmates. Defendant did not live at the apartment and
did not sleep there overnight. In his words, "I was just a party guest."
	The party lasted into the early hours of the morning. The
Champaign police department eventually received a complaint of very
loud noise and "disorderly subjects" at the apartment. Sergeant
Charles Shepard of the Champaign police department was dispatched
to investigate shortly after 2 a.m.
	When Sergeant Shepard arrived at the scene, he stood outside the
apartment for approximately 10 minutes to observe what was taking
place. He heard very loud music and laughter emanating from the
apartment and decided that he should contact the people inside about
the situation. He therefore knocked on the apartment's front door.
Defendant answered, opening the door just wide enough to stick his
head out and talk to Shepard. According to Shepard, defendant's eyes
were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he smelled heavily of
alcohol. In Shepard's estimation, defendant was very intoxicated.
	Although Shepard did not identify himself as a police officer
when he initially knocked on the door, there is no dispute that
defendant recognized him as a police officer as soon as he looked
outside. Shepard asked defendant if he lived there. When defendant
responded that he did not, Shepard directed him to summon someone
who did and to tell them that he, Shepard, needed to talk to them.
Defendant responded by saying, "okay," and then attempted to close
the front door.
	Based on his prior experience responding to loud, late night
parties in the campus area, Sergeant Shepard was concerned that if he
allowed defendant to close the door, no one would come back to talk
to him, the problem would not be resolved, and the disturbance would
continue unabated. Shepard therefore put his right arm on the door to
prevent it from being shut. He told defendant "he could leave the door
open to where it was," but that defendant still needed to go find
someone who lived in the apartment and tell them that the police
needed to talk to them.
	An argument between defendant and Shepard ensued. Defendant
was insistent on closing the door while he left to summon the person
who lived there. Shepard was equally insistent that the door remain
open. In the course of the dispute, defendant asked Shepard if he had
a search warrant. Shepard responded that he did not and that he did
not need one because he had no intention of entering the premises. At
this point, defendant opened the door and said, "See. There's nothing
going on inside." Defendant then attempted to close the door again.
When he did so, Shepard put his arm out to block it.
	The dispute escalated. Defendant opened the door wide a second
time and then tried to slam it shut. Shepard, in turn, used his right arm
to again block the door and prevent it from being closed. The door
struck Shepard "very hard," at which point Shepard advised defendant
that he was under arrest for obstructing a peace officer. Continuing to
use his right arm to keep the door from closing, Shepard reached
around with his left arm and pulled defendant from the apartment.
	After a brief scuffle, Shepard subdued defendant by placing him
in handcuffs. Defendant's teaching assistant, who resided in the
apartment, subsequently came forward and spoke to Shepard. The
party was quickly disbanded, and Shepard left defendant with a
written notice advising him that if he did not pay a fine of $175 within
three weeks, he would have to appear in court to answer a charge that
he had violated article 2, section 23-21(a), of the Champaign
Municipal Code, as amended (Champaign Municipal Code, art. 2,
§23-21(a) (eff. April 18, 1988)). That ordinance, which parallels
section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)
(West 2002)), makes it unlawful to "knowingly resist or obstruct the
performance by *** a peace officer *** of any authorized act within
the peace officer's official capacity" (Champaign Municipal Code, art.
2, §23-21(a) (eff. April 18, 1988)).
	When defendant elected not to pay the fine, the City of
Champaign (the City) filed a complaint against him in the circuit court
of Champaign County alleging that he had violated the municipal
ordinance specified in the notice originally issued by Sergeant Shepard
and asking that he be fined not less than $175 or more than $750.
With the assistance of an attorney from the university's student legal
services office, defendant pleaded not guilty. The matter eventually
proceeded to trial before the court, sitting without a jury, in October
of 2002.
	At trial, defendant argued that he could not be found to have
knowingly resisted or obstructed a peace officer's performance of an
"authorized act within the peace officer's official capacity" as those
terms are used in the City's ordinance because the acts in question,
Shepard's blocking the apartment door to prevent defendant from
closing it, were not "authorized." To the contrary, defendant asserted
that those acts were illegal. Specifically, defendant contended that
Shepard's actions were "tantamount to an entry and a search of the
private residence without a warrant" in violation of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
IV).
	The circuit court rejected defendant's argument, found that he
had violated the ordinance as alleged by the City in its complaint, and
ordered him to pay $175, the minimum fine authorized by the
governing law, plus court costs. Defendant moved for reconsideration.
Following a hearing, that motion was denied. Defendant then appealed
to the appellate court. There, as in the trial court, defendant asserted
that his conduct did not violate the City's ordinance because the
actions he resisted were undertaken in violation of his fourth
amendment rights and therefore could not have been "authorized."
	With one justice dissenting, the appellate court rejected
defendant's argument and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
346 Ill. App. 3d 214. Defendant then petitioned this court for leave to
appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we allowed. Defendant
subsequently elected to have the petition stand as his brief (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(g)), a brief was filed by the City, and oral argument was
conducted. The matter is now before us for a decision on the merits.
	In his appeal to our court, defendant challenges the appellate
court's judgment based on the same argument he has advanced
throughout these proceedings. Reduced to its component parts, the
argument is straightforward: (1) the City's ordinance only prohibits
resistance or obstruction to an "authorized act within the peace
officer's official capacity" (Champaign Municipal Code, art. 2,
§23-21(a) (eff. April 18, 1988)), (2) police officers are not authorized
to engage in illegal acts, (3) Sergeant Shepard's actions were illegal
because they violated the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV),(2) (4) because Shepard's
conduct was illegal, defendant's actions in resisting that conduct were
not directed to "any authorized act within [Shepard's] official
capacity" as the ordinance requires, and (5) because his actions were
not directed to "any authorized act within [Shepard's] official
capacity," defendant did not violate the ordinance.
	In considering defendant's argument, we begin by noting that
resolution of this appeal does not turn on any disputed questions of
fact. The pertinent facts are uncontroverted. The task before us is to
determine how the relevant statutory terms and constitutional
principles should apply to those uncontroverted facts. Where, as here,
the question on appeal is limited to application of the law to
undisputed facts, the standard of review is de novo. Steinbrecher v.
Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001).
	We further note that we are in no way constrained by the
appellate court's reasoning. It is the appellate court's judgment, not
the reasons given therefor, that is before us for review. Greenwald v.
Baltimore &amp; Ohio R.R. Co., 332 Ill. 627, 633 (1928). We may affirm
on any basis supported by the record. See Home Insurance Co. v.
Cincinnati Insurance Co., No. 97873, slip op. at 6 (December 2,
2004).
	Defendant's interpretation of the City's ordinance is reminiscent
of the traditional common law rule that a person has the right to use
reasonable force to resist an illegal arrest. See J. Ghent, Annotation,
Modern Status of Rules as to Right to Forcefully Resist Illegal Arrest,
44 A.L.R.3d 1078 (1972). That rule, however, is not followed in
Illinois. Section 7-7 of the Criminal Code of 1961 expressly provides
that
			"[a] person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest
which he knows is being made either by a peace officer or by
a private person summoned and directed by a peace officer to
make the arrest, even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful
and the arrest in fact is unlawful." 720 ILCS 5/7-7 (West
2002).
	Our court has applied section 7-7 to cases brought under section
31-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2002)),
the state counterpart to the municipal ordinance at issue in this case.
Section 31-1 makes it an offense to restrict or obstruct the
performance by a peace officer of "any authorized act" within the
peace officer's official capacity. 720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2002). In
People v. Locken, 59 Ill. 2d 459 (1974), we construed section 31-1
in conjunction with section 7-7 and held that an arrest made by a
peace officer is an "authorized act" even if the arrest is unlawful.
"Consequently, resistance of even an unlawful arrest by a known
officer" is a violation of the statute. People v. Locken, 59 Ill. 2d  at
465.
	People v. Locken was followed by our court in People v.
Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368 (1992). In Villarreal, the defendants were
charged with violating section 31-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 and
various other offenses after they attempted to forcibly prevent police
officers from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into their
residence to arrest a third person. Defendants moved to quash their
arrests and for dismissal of the charges against them, arguing, among
other things, that they could not be prosecuted for resisting or
obstructing the police under section 31-1 because the officers' entry
was illegal. The circuit court granted defendants' motions. After the
matter proceeded through the appellate court, we allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal and reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
	Reiterating the rule stated in People v. Locken, we held that the
resistance of even an unlawful arrest violates section 31-1. Because
defendants knew that the police were entering the residence for the
sole purpose of effectuating the arrest of the third person, we ruled
that they "were precluded from resisting the officers' attempt to enter
the residence ***, regardless of whether the arrest *** would have
been legal." Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d  at 376-77.
	The defendants in Villarreal sought to validate their use of force
by invoking section 7-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which provides
that
			"[a] person is justified in the use of force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such
conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's
unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling." 720 ILCS
5/7-2 (West 2002).
We noted, however, that application of that statute here would
conflict with sections 7-7 and 31-1 of the Code. Because sections
7-7 and 31-1 deal specifically with the use of force against peace
officers, while section 7-2 applies generally to the use of force against
anyone, we concluded that the specific provisions of sections 7-7 and
31-1 controlled. That being so, we held that the defendants could not
lawfully employ physical force to prevent the police from entering
their residence to effectuate the arrest. The circuit court therefore
erred in allowing defendants' motion to quash arrest and dismiss the
charges. People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d  at 379-81.
	Unlike Villarreal, the present case does not involve a situation
where a peace officer entered the premises for the sole purpose of
effectuating an arrest. Indeed, Sergeant Shepard's testimony at trial
makes clear that when he arrived at the apartment, he had no intention
of making an arrest at all. He simply wanted to speak to a resident of
the apartment in order to address the complaint of noise and
disorderly conduct he had been dispatched to investigate.
	Where, as here, a peace officer is not undertaking an arrest,
section 7-7 is inapplicable. In such cases, our appellate court has held
that the officer's warrantless, nonconsensual, and forcible entry into
a person's residence in violation of the fourth amendment will not be
considered an "authorized act" for purposes of section 31-1 of the
Criminal Code. See People v. Swiercz, 104 Ill. App. 3d 733, 736-37
(1982). That is so even if the entry is undertaken pursuant to an
official police investigation. People v. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d
286, 294 (1991). Accordingly, where a police officer is not trying to
make an arrest, section 31-1 would not prohibit a person from using
reasonable force to prevent the officer from making an
unconstitutional entry into his or her apartment. See People v. Young,
100 Ill. App. 2d 20, 23-26 (1968).
	Unlike the defendants in the foregoing appellate court cases, the
defendant in the matter before us today was not charged with violating
section 31-1 or any other provision of the Criminal Code of 1961.
This dispute involves the violation of a municipal ordinance. Municipal
ordinance violations do not fall within the definition of an "offense"
under either the Criminal Code of 1961 (see 720 ILCS 5/2-12 (West
2002)) or the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
5/102-15 (West 2002)), and because violation of the ordinance at
issue in this case is punishable only by a fine and not by incarceration,
the ordinance is not among those that the Municipal Code allows to
be prosecuted as a criminal offense (see 65 ILCS 5/1-2-1.1 (West
2002)).
	The defendant nevertheless contends that we should follow the
appellate court's construction of the criminal provisions in People v.
Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d 286 (1991), People v. Swiercz, 104 Ill.
App. 3d 733 (1982), and People v. Young, 100 Ill. App. 2d 20 (1968),
to hold that defendant's actions in this case were not unlawful.
Without addressing the merits of those decisions, we note simply that
they are inapposite. Central to each of those cases was that entry onto
the premises by law enforcement officers violated or would have
violated the defendants' rights under the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV). Although the
defendant in this case asserts that it "is uncontested that the actions of
the police [here] clearly violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution," the City has argued vigorously that Sergeant Shepard's
actions did not trammel on defendant's fourth amendment rights. We
believe the City's position is well taken.
	Defendant, as we noted at the outset of this opinion, did not live
at the apartment Sergeant Shepard was investigating. He was not even
an overnight guest. By his own admission, he was just there to attend
a party hosted by one of his teaching assistants. Illinois courts have
repeatedly held that persons who are guests or merely present in
someone else's home or on another person's property when it is
searched do not have the right to contest the legality of that search
and seizure. See People v. Wimbley, 314 Ill. App. 3d 18, 23 (2000);
People v. Ervin, 269 Ill. App. 3d 141, 147 (1994).(3) Accordingly, the
defendant in this case had no right to complain that the actions by
Sergeant Shepard violated the fourth amendment. From the record
before us, it appears that the only person entitled to challenge the
constitutionality of Shepard's actions in blocking the front door of the
apartment was the teaching assistant who lived there. The teaching
assistant, however, not only did not protest Shepard's presence, he
cooperated fully when the matter was brought to his attention. He
spoke with Shepard, turned the music off, and sent everyone home.
	Because defendant has no legally cognizable right to challenge
the constitutionality of Sergeant Shepard's conduct, he cannot assert
that Sergeant Shepard violated the fourth amendment when he
prevented defendant from closing the door to the apartment. During
oral argument, defendant's attorney attempted to overcome this
impediment by arguing that even though defendant's own fourth
amendment rights may not have been abridged, Sergeant Shepard's
conduct in blocking the door necessarily required that he cross the
threshold of the apartment. In defendant's view, the mere act of
breaking the plane of the apartment's entrance was sufficient, in itself,
to establish a fourth amendment violation and render Shepard's
actions unlawful.
	Defendant's argument fundamentally misconstrues the nature of
fourth amendment guarantees. The fourth amendment protects people,
not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967). Accordingly, whether the fourth
amendment has been abridged cannot be assessed simply by looking
at whether and to what extent a police officer has breached the
boundaries of a particular structure. For fourth amendment purposes,
a structure's boundaries have no significance standing alone. They are
relevant only insofar as they pertain to the reasonable privacy
expectations of a particular person.
	Our court recently touched on these issues in People v.
Rosenberg, No. 96834 (November 18, 2004). We held there that
because fourth amendment rights attach to people, not places, the
relevant inquiry is whether the disputed search and seizure has
infringed an interest of the defendant which the fourth amendment was
designed to protect. Accordingly, a defendant seeking to claim the
protections of the fourth amendment must demonstrate that he or she
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched and that
his or her expectation is reasonable. People v. Rosenberg, slip op. at
6-7. Under the authorities cited above, the defendant in this case, as
a mere party guest, can make no such showing.
	Defendant's inability to assert a fourth amendment violation is
fatal to his defense. Without such a violation, defendant has no basis
for claiming that Shepard's actions exceeded his legal authority and
were not "authorized" within the meaning of the City's ordinance.
Aside from the fourth amendment issue, no other grounds have been
asserted which would bring the legality of Shepard's actions into
question. The appellate court therefore ruled correctly when it upheld
the circuit court's judgment against defendant for violating the City's
ordinance.
	As an alternative basis for assailing the appellate court's
judgment, defendant argues that his conduct was justified under
section 7-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/7-2 (West
2002)), a provision discussed earlier in this opinion. Defendant has not
cited any authority addressing the applicability of that provision of the
Criminal Code to ordinance violation cases. Moreover, as we have
already noted, violation of the ordinance at issue in this case is
punishable only by a fine and not by incarceration. It is therefore not
among those that the Municipal Code allows to be prosecuted as a
criminal offense.
	Under these circumstances, the relationship defendant seeks to
establish between section 7-2 of the Criminal Code and municipal
ordinances of the type involved here is problematic. This is not an
appropriate case to engage in further analysis of the question,
however, for even if we agreed with defendant's position, it would not
affect the outcome of these proceedings. Even if we assumed, for the
sake of argument, that section 7-2 were available as a defense to a
complaint filed under article 2, section 23-21(a), of the Champaign
Municipal Code, as amended, defendant's conduct would not fall
within its provisions. By its terms, the statute only justifies the use of
force to prevent or terminate "unlawful" entries. The sole basis for
defendant's claim that the entry here was unlawful is that Sergeant's
Shepard's conduct violated the fourth amendment. As we have just
discussed, that claim is meritless.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	In this case, we are called upon to address a Champaign
municipal ordinance which makes it illegal to "knowingly resist or
obstruct the performance by *** a peace officer *** of any
authorized act with the peace officer's official capacity." (Emphasis
added.) Champaign Municipal Code, art. 2, §23-21(a) (eff. April 18,
1988). By its terms, this ordinance only makes illegal resistance to or
obstruction of an "authorized" act. The ordinance does not, however,
define the term "authorized"; therefore, it would appear then that the
only reason why we would grant leave to appeal in such a case is so
that we might address what could be the only issue of real importance
in the prosecution of cases under this ordinance or statutes similar to
it:(4) What constitutes a proper or "authorized" act or order? In this
particular case, the issue would seem clear: In investigating a
complaint of noise, was Sergeant Shepard's order to leave the door
open authorized? Unfortunately, my colleagues do not answer this
question. Because they fail to examine whether Sergeant Shepard's
actions were authorized, I cannot join in their opinion and respectfully
dissent. 
	Rather than address the critical question in this case of whether
Sergeant Shepard's order to leave the door open was "authorized,"
the court today holds that Sergeant Shepard's actions did not
"trammel on" defendant's fourth amendment rights solely because
defendant did not live at the apartment Shepard was investigating. Slip
op. at 8. Noting that "Illinois courts have repeatedly held that persons
who are guests or merely present in someone else's home or on
another person's property when it is searched do not have the right to
contest the legality of that search and seizure," the court holds that
defendant "had no right to complain that the actions by Sergeant
Shepard violated the fourth amendment." Slip op. at 8. Leaving aside
the fact that this case does not concern an actual search or seizure, the
court's analysis leaves defendant in the untenable position of being
unable to challenge whether Sergeant Shepard's initial demand that
the apartment door be kept open was "authorized," as is required
under the ordinance in question.
	I note that in ruling that defendant had violated the municipal
ordinance, the circuit court found that the germane question in this
case was whether defendant's actions defeated the "lawful authority"
of the officer. The circuit court correctly believed that to answer that
question, one first had to define what constituted the "the lawful
authority" of the officer. According to the circuit court's ruling, "[t]he
door is opened, he [Sergeant Shepard] has a right to look in, he has
right to continue to look in to that premises. Does the defendant take
an act? Yes. He's not refusing to consent to entry. He's taking an
affirmative act in order to prevent the officer from doing what he's
lawfully entitled to do, that is look through an open door which has
been opened consensually." The appellate court upheld the circuit
court's finding on the basis that Officer Shepard "was engaged in an
'authorized act' when defendant forcefully closed the door on Officer
Shepard's arm." 346 Ill. App. 3d at 217. 
	 According to the facts, after Champaign police received a
complaint about a loud party, Sergeant Shepard went to the address
that was the subject of the complaint and heard loud music emanating
from the apartment in question. The officer observed the location for
about 10 minutes, decided to speak to a resident of the apartment,
and, to that end, knocked on its door. Defendant answered the door,
opening it only slightly. Sergeant Shepard asked defendant if he was
a resident of the apartment, and defendant responded truthfully that
he was not. At this point, defendant's behavior was not a problem.
Sergeant Shepard then requested that defendant go and get a resident
of the apartment so that the officer could speak with that person.
Defendant indicated he would comply by agreeing to do so. Defendant
then began to shut the door, at which point the officer told defendant
not to close the door, but to leave it open. By what authority does the
officer have to order an occupant of a private residence, who is
complying with the officer's request to get a resident of the premises,
to keep the front door to that private residence ajar? The majority's
analysis fails to provide us with the answer, as it holds that
"[d]efendant's inability to assert a fourth amendment violation is fatal
to his defense. Without such a violation, defendant has no basis for
claiming that Shepard's actions exceeded his legal authority and were
not 'authorized' within the meaning of the City's ordinance." Slip op.
at 9. 
	As I noted above, the circuit court found that, once defendant
answered the door, the police officer had the "right" to "continue" to
look into the premises. I disagree. Defendant opened the door,
ascertained that someone was present, acknowledged that the person
knocking was a police officer, and agreed to comply with that
officer's request to get the owner. It cannot be said that defendant's
act of initially and consensually opening the front door authorized
Sergeant Shepard to insist that the door be kept open while the owner
was being summoned. I know of no law which authorizes a police
officer to insist, in the first instance, that a front door of a private
residence be kept open while an occupant complies with a request to
bring the owner to the door. While I understand that Sergeant
Shepard may have had prior unsuccessful experiences in having people
return to the front door, nothing about Shepard's interaction with
defendant suggested that the same thing would happen here. 
	Contrary to my colleagues in the majority, I believe People v.
Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d 286 (1991), provides the proper analysis
for such cases. There, 36 defendants were charged with the offense of
obstructing a peace officer, in that they " 'refused to open the door or
permit *** entry' " to the officer when he investigated a complaint of
unlawful consumption of alcoholic beverages and disorderly conduct
in connection with a loud party. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 287.
In affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the charges, the appellate
court held as follows:
		"Although the officer may have been authorized in the course
of his investigation to request that the door be opened or that
he be permitted to enter, it is significant that the officer had
no right to open that door himself or insist that it be opened
or that he be allowed to enter. The occupants of the premises
had a right to refuse the request." (Emphases in original.)
Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 290-91.
The court further noted that "[a]lleging 'an official police
investigation' does not constitute an 'authorized' act requiring
defendants to open the door *** [because] [a]bsent specific factual
allegations that the officer was acting on the basis of a warrant,
consent, or probable cause to arrest coupled with exigent
circumstances, the complaint does not state an offense." Hilgenberg,
223 Ill. App. 3d at 294. For these reasons, the court concluded that
the officer could not lawfully order the door to be opened. 
	The court states that Hilgenberg "cannot be read as supporting
a contrary conclusion" because the opinion does not describe the
relationship of the defendants to one another or to the dwelling they
occupied. Slip op. at 8 n.2. The court has misconstrued the concept
of standing in this case. Defendant, who is being prosecuted under this
ordinance, certainly has standing to challenge whether the officer's
actions were authorized. Sergeant Shepard had no legal right to insist
that defendant leave the door to the apartment open while defendant
went to fetch the owner of the apartment. In my view, the fourth
amendment does not come into play here since Sergeant Shepard
technically did not "search" the apartment nor did he "seize" anything
from it.(5) 
	I believe the court may be straining in its analysis in this case
because defendant forcefully slammed the apartment door on Sergeant
Shepard's right arm. Although the law allows for resistance to
unauthorized police acts, no citizen has the right to physically harm a
peace officer. Under the Criminal Code, it is a Class 3 felony to
commit a battery upon a peace officer. See 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6)
(West 2002). Under the language of the aggravated battery statute, an
officer need not be engaged in an "authorized act," but rather only be
injured while engaged in "official duties." See 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6)
(West 2002). Thus, the statute protects officers from violence during
a broader range of police activity. It seems to me that defendant's
actions fall under the offense of aggravated battery and not resisting
an officer. In this case, however, defendant was not charged with
aggravated battery. The court should not use its opinion to rectify the
State's failure to do so.
	For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
 
1.                 
             
    
Justice Karmeier succeeded Justice Rarick in 
office after this case was taken under advisement.  He has reviewed the record, 
the briefs and the audio recordings of the oral argument.
2.                     
    In his 
petition for leave to appeal, which he elected to have stand as his brief, 
defendant argues that Shepard=s 
actions also contravened article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 
1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
'6). 
We note, however, that defendant did not raise this claim in the circuit court.  
From the appellate court=s 
opinion, it does not appear that he raised the claim in that court either.  The 
issue is therefore not properly before us.  See, e.g., In re 
Liquidations of Reserve Insurance 
Co., 
122 Ill. 2d 555, 567-68 (1988).                 
             
    

3.                    
          
           
            
             
           
    People v. 
Hilgenberg,  
223 Ill. App. 3d 286 (1991), cannot be read as supporting a contrary conclusion. 
Although the defendants in that case were numerous, the opinion does not 
describe their relationship to one another or to the dwelling they occupied when 
the sheriff appeared at the front door, asked that the door be opened and 
requested permission to enter. If the State believed  that any of the individual 
defendants lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the sheriff=s 
actions, it was incumbent on it to raise that challenge, as the City has done in 
this case. There is no indication in the appellate court=s 
opinion that such a challenge was made.         

4.      A provision in the Criminal Code of 1961 makes it a Class A
misdemeanor for a person to "knowingly resist[ ] or obstruct[ ] the
performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer *** of any
authorized act within his official capacity." 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West
2002). Like the Champaign ordinance, the statute does not define the term
"authorized."

5.      Of course, had defendant left the door open as the officer had requested,
anything seen in "plain view" may have given the officer the probable cause
to expand the nature of his investigation. For example, had he seen a
partygoer smoking marijuana or snorting cocaine, the investigation would
have expanded from a simple disturbing the peace complaint to a drug raid. 
In such a situation, the State would surely argue that defendant did not have
to leave the door open, but merely "consented" to the request to leave the
door open.