Title: Matter of a Member of the Bar: Feuerhake
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 41, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
In the Matter of a Member of the 
§ 
Bar of the Supreme Court of 
 
§  
No. 41, 2014 
Delaware 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
HERBERT G. FEUERHAKE,  
§  
Board Case No. 2012-0025-B 
 
Respondent. 
§ 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Submitted: February 26, 2014 
Decided:  April 4, 2014 
 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Disciplinary Proceeding Upon Final Report of the Board on Professional 
Responsibility of the Supreme Court.  DISBARRED.  
 
 
 
Jennifer-Kate Aaronson, Esquire, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Wilmington, 
Delaware.  
 
Herbert G. Feuerhake, pro se.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
 
 
2 
This is an attorney disciplinary matter involving Herbert G. Feuerhake’s 
practice of law during a disciplinary suspension imposed by this Court.  In a report 
dated January 30, 2014 (the “Report”), a Panel of the Board on Professional 
Responsibility (the “Panel”) found that Feuerhake had violated Rules 3.4(c) and 
8.4(d) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 7(c) of 
the Delaware Lawyers Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.  The Panel recommended 
disbarment.  Feuerhake objects to the Panel’s recommended sanction and argues 
that we should extend his suspension.  We find no merit to his objection and order 
disbarment.  
I. 
Facts and Procedural History1 
Feuerhake was admitted to the bar in 1987 and engaged in private practice 
until July 2010.  On July 13, 2010, this Court entered an order suspending 
Feuerhake from the practice of law for two years (the “Suspension Order”).2  In 
relevant part, the Suspension Order provides: 
3.  During the period of suspension, Respondent shall conduct 
no act directly or indirectly constituting the practice of law, 
including the sharing or receipt of any legal fees, except that 
Respondent shall be entitled to any legal fees earned before the 
date of this Order. 
4.  Respondent shall be prohibited from having contact with 
clients or prospective clients, witnesses, or prospective 
                                          
 
1 The facts, taken from the Panel’s Report, are not disputed by the parties.  See In re Feuerhake, 
No. 2012-0025-B (Del. Bd. Prof. Respons. Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Report]. 
2 In re Feuerhake, 998 A.2d 850, 2010 WL 2757030 (Del. 2010). 
3 
witnesses when acting as a paralegal, legal assistant, or law 
clerk under the supervision of a member of the Delaware Bar or 
otherwise.3 
During his suspension, Feuerhake worked as a paralegal under the 
supervision of Jeffrey K. Martin, Esquire.  But Feuerhake never provided Martin 
with a copy of the Suspension Order.  Nor did he inform Martin of this Court’s 
prohibition on his ability to practice law during his suspension.  The record also 
demonstrates that there was sufficient staff available at Martin’s office to return 
phone calls and contact clients.   
Following his suspension, Feuerhake communicated with a client, Ms. 
Lamb, to inquire about facts related to her case.  They planned for and later 
discussed the results of a pretrial conference.  Feuerhake also spoke with another 
client, Ms. Barkes, up to twenty times to discuss the contents of briefs he wrote 
and filings by opposing counsel.  Feuerhake also attended four depositions at 
which Ms. Barkes was present and communicated with the four different witnesses 
being deposed.   
In conjunction with these specific violations, Feuerhake continued to engage 
in the practice of law in violation of the Suspension Order.  He discussed cases 
with clients.  He exchanged emails with opposing counsel about a draft pre-trial 
order and commented substantively on its contents.  Feuerhake also attended a pre-
                                          
 
3 Id. at *4.  
4 
trial conference before the District Court on behalf of a client.  Although 
Feuerhake noted on the record that he was only attending as a paralegal, he 
nonetheless addressed the court, made arguments and objections, responded to 
opposing counsel, and tried to distinguish case law.   
Finally, Feuerhake received $39,466.66 as his share of a contingency fee 
from a settlement agreement.  Even though the Suspension Order prohibited 
Feuerhake from receiving any legal fees following his suspension, the settlement 
payment was for work he performed both before and after his suspension.  Rather 
than calculate the appropriate division from the settlement, Feuerhake chose 
instead to take his full share because he claimed that a more precise figure would 
have been too difficult to calculate and because he was proud of the quality work 
he provided to his client.   
In 2013, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) filed a Petition for 
Discipline against Feuerhake.  After an investigation and a hearing, the Panel 
found that Feuerhake had violated Rules 3.4(c) and 8.4(d) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Rule 7(c) of the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.  To 
determine the appropriate sanction, the Panel considered six aggravating factors 
and one mitigating factor.  Feuerhake’s aggravating factors included (1) his prior 
disciplinary record, (2) his year-and-a-half pattern of misconduct, (3) the multiple 
offenses of misconduct, (4) a refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his 
5 
conduct, and (5) his substantial experience in the practice of law since 1987.  His 
mitigating factor included his cooperation with the ODC and the disciplinary 
proceedings. 
The ODC urged the Panel to recommend a sanction of disbarment.  
Feuerhake advocated for an extended suspension.  The Panel ultimately 
recommended a sanction of disbarment.  Feuerhake’s objection to the Panel’s 
Report followed. 
II. 
Supreme Court Review 
This Court has “inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of 
the Delaware Bar.”4  Although the recommendations of the Board of Professional 
Responsibility are helpful, “we are not bound by those recommendations.  Our role 
is to review the record independently and determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Board’s factual findings.”5  We review de novo the Board’s 
conclusions of law.6 
Rule 8.4(d) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides:  “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”7  Rule 3.4(c) provides that a lawyer 
                                          
 
4 In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 484 (Del. 2007) (quoting In re Froelich, 838 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Del. 
2003)). 
5 Id. (citing Froelich, 838 A.2d at 1120). 
6 Id. (citing Froelich, 838 A.2d at 1120). 
7 Del. Lawyers’ Rules Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d). 
6 
shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”8  Finally, 
Rule 7(c) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure states: “It 
shall be grounds for disciplinary action for a lawyer to . . . [v]iolate the terms of 
any conditional diversion or private or public disciplinary or disability 
disposition.”9 
In the proceeding below, the Panel found that Feuerhake violated two Rules 
of Professional Conduct and one Rule of Disciplinary Procedure.  Feuerhake 
violated Rule 3.4(c) when he knowingly disobeyed the terms of his Suspension 
Order by continuing to practice law, appearing in District Court, attending 
depositions, contacting clients, and accepting fees for work performed after his 
suspension.  This same conduct supports his violation of Rule 7(c) of the Rules of 
Disciplinary Procedure by violating the terms of his Suspension Order.  Finally, his 
disregard of a binding order of this Court was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.  A suspended attorney cannot provide the necessary representation before a 
court, at a deposition, or by simply answering a client’s questions.  By ignoring a 
clear suspension order to the contrary, Feuerhake violated Rule 8.4(d) by 
prejudicially affecting the administration of justice.   
                                          
 
8 Del. Lawyers’ Rules Prof. Conduct R. 3.4(c). 
9 Del. Lawyers’ Rules Disciplinary Pro. R. 7(c).  
7 
Feuerhake concedes these violations.  Further, there is adequate record 
evidence to support the Panel’s findings by clear and convincing evidence.   
III. 
Sanctions 
Having determined that there is sufficient evidence to support the Panel’s 
findings, our next step is to make an independent determination of an appropriate 
sanction.  In determining the appropriate sanctions for lawyer misconduct, we 
traditionally follow the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions (the “ABA Standards”).10  This ABA framework requires that 
we determine (1) “the ethical duty violated;” (2) “the lawyer’s state of mind;” and 
(3) “the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.”11   
As set forth above, the record confirms that Feuerhake violated Rules 3.4(c) 
and 8.4(d) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 7(c) 
of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.  The record also shows 
that Feuerhake acted with a knowing state of mind during the course of these 
violations.  The mental state of knowledge occurs where there “is the conscious 
awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the 
                                          
 
10 In re Tonwe, 929 A.2d 774, 780 (Del. 2007). 
11 Id. (quoting In re Steiner, 817 A.2d 793, 796 (Del. 2003)).  
8 
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”12  Intent requires 
“the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”13   
In this case, Feuerhake concedes that he acted with knowledge during his 
violative conduct.  He was consciously aware of his Suspension Order and the 
requirements thereof.  Feuerhake continued to represent clients before the District 
Court, at a deposition, and in emails with opposing counsel.  And he continued to 
have contact with clients and witnesses.  Finally, Feuerhake received a contingent 
fee from a settlement for work that occurred before and after his suspension.  He 
chose to accept this full payment because it would have been too difficult to 
determine proper computation.   
It is also undisputed that there was potential injury as a result of Feuerhake’s 
actions.  His continued representation of client matters resulted in the reliance by 
the public, other attorneys, and the District Court on Feuerhake’s ability to 
represent clients in such matters when he clearly was prohibited from doing so.  
Further, Feuerhake’s failure to disclose his suspension to Martin, his supervising 
attorney during his suspension, put Martin at risk of discipline.  Feuerhake’s 
knowing violations left the impression that the Court permitted his conduct.14 
                                          
 
12 ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Definitions.  
13 Id.  
14 See In re Mekler, 672 A.2d 23, 26 (Del. 1995) (“[T]his Court cannot countenance any conduct 
by a suspended lawyer which would leave the impression to a reasonable person that the Court 
would allow the same kind of ‘business as usual’ . . . or that it is de facto permitting a suspended 
9 
We now turn to the appropriate sanction.  For cases involving prior 
discipline, the ABA Standards provide four options for sanctioning an attorney and 
the basis to impose each sanction.15  The options include: 
8.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:  
(a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior 
disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or 
potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or 
the profession; or 
(b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, 
and intentionally or knowingly engages in further similar 
acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a 
client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.   
8.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been 
reprimanded for the same or similar misconduct and engages in 
further similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential 
injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.   
8.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:  
(a) negligently violates the terms of a prior disciplinary 
order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a 
client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or  
(b) has received an admonition for the same or similar 
misconduct and engages in further similar acts of 
misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, 
the public, the legal system, or the profession.  
8.4 An admonition is generally not an appropriate sanction 
when a lawyer violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order or 
                                                                                                                                        
lawyer to be doing any act which a reasonable member of the public could believe to be the 
practice of law.”). 
15 ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 8.0. 
10 
when a lawyer has engaged in the same or similar misconduct 
in the past.16  
In this case, Feuerhake knowingly violated the terms of his prior Suspension Order 
causing potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, and the profession. 
Aggravating factors here include (1) Feuerhake’s prior disciplinary record, 
(2) his year-and-a-half pattern of misconduct, (3) the multiple offenses of 
misconduct, (4) a refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct, and (5) 
his substantial experience in the practice of law since 1987.17  A mitigating factor 
is Feuerhake’s cooperation with the ODC and the Panel in this disciplinary 
proceeding.18   
To determine the whether the appropriate sanction should be a suspension or 
disbarment, we also rely on related Delaware case law.  In In re McCann, we 
disbarred an attorney who, inter alia, was suspended from the practice of law but 
never made arrangements for another lawyer to handle his clients’ matters.19  In In 
re Davis, we disbarred an attorney, in part, because he knowingly disobeyed a 
suspension order by meeting with clients and continuing to act as an attorney.20  In 
our In re Tonwe decision, we recommended to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
                                          
 
16 Id. at 8.1–8.4. 
17 Report at 18.  
18 Id.  
19 In re McCann, 894 A.2d 1087, 1088 (Del. 2005). 
20 In re Davis, 43 A.3d 856, 861 (Del. 2012). 
11 
that Tonwe be disbarred for her continued practice in Delaware despite a cease and 
desist order.21   
The ODC agrees with the Panel’s recommendation of disbarment and urges 
this Court to impose that sanction.  Feuerhake argues that disbarment is overly 
punitive and instead suggests that a continued and extended suspension is more 
appropriate because he adequately performed during his suspension in aiding his 
clients.  He further suggests that disbarment is inappropriate because he did not act 
wantonly or maliciously.  We disagree.  Disbarment is not limited to wanton or 
malicious misconduct.  Disbarment is necessary to protect the public and the 
administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal profession, and to 
deter other lawyers from engaging in similar conduct during a period of 
suspension.  Any other sanction would not sufficiently preserve the public’s trust 
and confidence in the integrity of the disciplinary process for Delaware lawyers. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that Herbert G. Feuerhake is disbarred 
effective immediately. 
                                          
 
21 Tonwe, 929 A.2d at 781.