Title: People v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S188619
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2012

1 
Filed 1/30/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S188619 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A124643 
ANDREW D. JOHNSON, 
) 
 
) 
Solano County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. VCR 191129 & 
 
 
) 
 VCR 191363 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendants in criminal cases have a federal constitutional right to represent 
themselves.  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).)  In Indiana v. 
Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), however, the United States Supreme 
Court held that states may, but need not, deny self-representation to defendants 
who, although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health or capacity to 
represent themselves at trial — persons the court referred to as ―gray-area 
defendants.‖  (Id. at p. 174.)  We must decide whether California courts may 
accept this invitation and apply a higher standard of mental competence for self-
representation than for competency to stand trial. 
Because California law — which, of course, is subject to the United States 
Constitution — has long been that criminal defendants have no right of self-
representation, we conclude that California courts may deny self-representation 
when the United States Constitution permits such denial.  We also conclude the 
2 
trial court acted within its discretion in revoking defendant‘s self-representation 
status. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
These facts are taken largely from the Court of Appeal‘s opinion. 
A jury convicted defendant Andrew D. Johnson of crimes arising out of 
two separate assaults.  The facts of the crimes are irrelevant to the legal issue 
before us.  Essentially, the evidence presented at trial showed that during the early 
morning hours of June 23, 2007, defendant committed a brutal sexual assault on a 
Vallejo bartender.  Later that same day, he hit the patron of a sandwich shop on 
the head with a metal chair, rendering him temporarily unconscious. 
A single judge, Judge Allan P. Carter, was assigned to the case for all 
proceedings.  Defendant was originally represented by counsel, but on July 5, 
2007, he asked to represent himself, and Judge Carter allowed him to do so.  He 
represented himself at various pretrial proceedings through January 2008.  On 
January 30, 2008, Judge Carter expressed a doubt about defendant‘s competence 
to be tried due to his unusual behavior and the nature and tone of letters defendant 
had written to the court and others.  The court appointed an attorney to provide an 
opinion on defendant‘s competency and to represent defendant at any competency 
hearing.  After meeting with defendant, the attorney told the court he believed it 
was a ―close call,‖ but he shared the court‘s concern about defendant‘s 
competency.  The court suspended the criminal proceedings and appointed two 
experts, and later a third, to evaluate defendant‘s competency.  Defendant refused 
to meet with any of these experts. 
A jury trial on defendant‘s competency was held in October 2008.  Dr. 
Kathleen O‘Meara testified for the defense.  She said there was ―a very strong 
possibility‖ that defendant had some type of delusional thought disorder coupled 
with conspiracy paranoia and, ―err[ing] in the direction of caution,‖ concluded that 
3 
it was ―more likely than not‖ that defendant was not competent.  She said she 
believed defendant understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings against 
him, at least to some degree, but that his paranoia might impair his ability to 
cooperate with defense counsel in a rational manner.  She based her opinion on her 
review of transcripts of the pretrial proceedings, defendant‘s letters, defendant‘s 
medical chart, and conversations with correctional staff.  She said it was ―very 
unusual‖ to offer an opinion without having interviewed the defendant and that her 
opinion was ―therefore somewhat speculative.‖  She had reservations about her 
opinion and said that defendant could be malingering. 
Two psychiatrists testified for the prosecution.  Dr. Herb McGrew testified 
that it was not possible to form an opinion on competency without interviewing 
defendant.  He reviewed collateral materials including court transcripts and 
defendant‘s letters and medical chart.  He said these materials suggested the 
possibility of mental illness but no conclusion could be reached without 
interviewing defendant; one can be ―extremely crazy and be competent‖ so an 
interview is essential in determining competency.  Dr. Murray Eiland also testified 
that an interview was essential and that he could not form an opinion on 
competency without one. 
The court instructed the jury, ―The defendant is mentally competent to 
stand trial if he can do all of the following:  [¶]  One, understand the nature and 
purpose of the criminal proceedings again[st] him;  [¶] Two, assist in a rational 
manner his attorney in presenting his defense or conduct his own defense in a 
rational manner; and,  [¶] Three, understand his own status and condition in the 
criminal proceedings.‖ 
On October 28, 2008, the jury found defendant competent to stand trial.  
The court reinstated criminal proceedings and defendant resumed self-
representation. 
4 
Two days later, the court expressed concern about defendant‘s ability to 
represent himself.  It told defendant, ―You may be competent to stand trial, but 
I‘m not convinced that you are competent to represent yourself.‖  It noted that in 
Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, filed the previous June, the United States Supreme 
Court had held that judges may insist on representation by counsel for those who 
are competent to stand trial but who suffer from mental illness to the point where 
they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. 
The court found that defendant met this description.  It catalogued his 
bizarre, noncompliant, and disruptive behavior in court and in jail.  It found that 
defendant ―has disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and 
concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety and other common symptoms 
of severe mental illnesses which can impair his ability to play the significantly 
expanded role required for self-representation, even if he can play the lesser role 
of a represented defendant.‖  Over defendant‘s objection, the court revoked his 
self-representation status and appointed the attorney who had represented him 
during the competency proceeding to represent him in the criminal proceedings.  
That attorney represented him from that point on, including at trial and sentencing. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison, and he appealed.  The Court 
of Appeal affirmed the judgment.  It rejected defendant‘s argument that the trial 
court erred in revoking his self-representation status.  We granted defendant‘s 
petition for review limited to the question regarding defendant‘s self-
representation. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, the high court held that states may, but 
need not, deny self-representation in limited circumstances due to a defendant‘s 
mental incapacity.  The trial court relied on Edwards in revoking defendant‘s self-
representation status.  This circumstance gives rise to two questions:  (1)  Should 
5 
California accept the high court‘s invitation; that is, may California courts deny 
self-representation when Edwards permits such denial?  (2)  If so, did the trial 
court properly deny self-representation in this case?  We will discuss the former 
question first.  Because we conclude that California courts may deny self-
representation when Edwards permits, we will then proceed to the second 
question. 
A.  Whether California courts may deny self-representation when 
Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 permits such denial 
In Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives criminal defendants 
the right to represent themselves.  When Faretta was decided, the law in 
California had been that a criminal defendant had no constitutional or statutory 
right to self-representation, although in noncapital cases the trial court had 
discretion to grant a defendant‘s request for self-representation.  (People v. Sharp 
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 448, 459, 461, 463-464 [no right to self-representation]; People v. 
Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 702-703 [discretion to grant self-representation]; see 
People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 871-872 (Taylor).)  The California 
Constitution gives criminal defendants only the right to ―the assistance of counsel‖ 
and ―to be personally present with counsel.‖  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  Still today, 
Penal Code section 686.1 provides that ―the defendant in a capital case shall be 
represented in court by counsel at all stages of the preliminary and trial 
proceedings.‖  (See Taylor, supra, at p. 872, fn. 8.) 
When the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 686.1, it made this 
finding:  ―The Legislature finds that persons representing themselves cause 
unnecessary delays in the trials of charges against them; that trials are extended by 
such persons representing themselves; and that orderly trial procedures are 
disrupted.  Self-representation places a heavy burden upon the administration of 
6 
criminal justice without any advantages accruing to those persons who desire to 
represent themselves.‖  (Stats. 1971, ch. 1800, § 6, p. 3898; see People v. Sharp, 
supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 463 [quoting this policy statement].) 
Obviously, California law is subject to the United States Constitution, 
including the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation as established in 
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, and its progeny.  Penal Code section 686.1, for 
example, cannot be given effect.  But People v. Sharp, supra, 7 Cal.3d 448, 
―remains good law as to the California Constitution and Penal Code.‖  (Taylor, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 872, fn. 8.)  California courts should give effect to this 
California law when it can. 
―In the wake of Faretta‘s strong constitutional statement, California courts 
tended to view the federal self-representation right as absolute, assuming a valid 
waiver of counsel.‖  (Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 872.)  This view was 
strengthened by the later decision in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 
(Godinez).  In Godinez, the defendant, found competent to stand trial, sought and 
was allowed to waive counsel and plead guilty.  The high court held that he was 
properly permitted to do so.  It rejected the argument that federal law required a 
higher standard of competence for waiving counsel or pleading guilty than is 
required to stand trial.  (See Taylor, supra, at p. 874.)  California courts, including 
this one, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, generally interpreted Faretta and 
Godinez as prohibiting states from imposing a higher standard of competency for 
self-representation than the standard of competency to stand trial.  (Taylor, supra, 
at pp. 874-876.) 
In 2008, however, the high court decided Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164.  
Edwards held that ―the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the 
particular defendant‘s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks 
to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.  That is to say, 
7 
the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those 
competent enough to stand trial under Dusky [v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 
402] but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not 
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.‖  (Edwards, supra, at pp. 
177-178.)  The court called those defendants competent to stand trial but not to 
represent themselves ―gray-area defendants.‖  (Id. at p. 174.) 
The Edwards court quoted an amicus curiae brief from the American 
Psychiatric Association stating that ― ‗[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in 
sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and 
other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant‘s 
ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation even 
if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.‘ ‖  (Edwards, supra, 554 
U.S. at p. 176.)  It noted that some of the documents the defendant had prepared 
―suggest to a layperson the common sense of this general conclusion.‖  (Ibid.) 
―The court in Edwards did not hold . . . that due process mandates a higher 
standard of mental competence for self-representation than for trial with counsel.  
The Edwards court held only that states may, without running afoul of Faretta, 
impose a higher standard . . . .‖  (Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 877-878.)  In 
Taylor, the trial court had permitted a defendant who was competent to stand trial 
and waive counsel to represent himself.  Because the Edwards rule is permissive, 
not mandatory, we held that Edwards ―does not support a claim of federal 
constitutional error in a case like the present one, in which defendant‘s request to 
represent himself was granted.‖  (Taylor, supra, at p. 878.)  This case presents the 
reverse situation:  the trial court denied self-representation under Edwards.  We 
must decide whether California courts may accept Edwards‘s invitation and deny 
self-representation to gray-area defendants. 
8 
Defendant argues that we should not accept the Edwards invitation.  
Preliminarily, he argues that the courts below violated the rule that ―all tribunals 
exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising 
superior jurisdiction,‖ and, specifically, ―decisions of this court are binding upon 
and must be followed by all the state courts of California.‖  (Auto Equity Sales, 
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity).)  Citing a pre-
Edwards decision from this court that had assumed that federal law did not permit 
a higher standard of competency for self-representation than for standing trial 
(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 431-434), and a post-Edwards 
decision that explained that previous cases had so assumed (Taylor, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at pp. 874-876), defendant argues that only this court could decide whether 
to accept the Edwards invitation and adopt a higher standard for self-
representation. 
Defendant is incorrect.  The trial court and Court of Appeal are, indeed, 
bound by decisions of this court.  If this court had held that trial courts should not 
accept the Edwards invitation, the lower courts would have been bound to follow 
that holding.  But this court has never so held.  The cases defendant relies on did 
not consider the question.  ― ‗[C]ases are not authority for propositions not 
considered.‘ ‖  (In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388.)  Lower 
courts may decide questions of first impression, including the effect that 
subsequent events, such as a United States Supreme Court decision, have on 
decisions from a higher court, including this one.  In this case, that authority 
includes deciding whether to accept the Edwards invitation.  If a higher court 
believes the lower court decided a question erroneously, it can take appropriate 
action.  But a lower court does not violate Auto Equity, supra, 57 Cal.2d 450, 
merely by deciding questions of first impression. 
9 
Turning to the merits, the Attorney General and amici curiae San Francisco 
Public Defender, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and the Office of the 
State Public Defender all argue that California courts should have discretion to 
deny self-representation to gray-area defendants.  We agree.  Indeed, to refuse to 
recognize such discretion would be inconsistent with California‘s own law.  In 
People v. Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d 694, we upheld the denial of a capital defendant‘s 
request for self-representation citing, among other factors, his youth, his low level 
of education, and his ignorance of the law.  (Id. at pp. 703-704.)  Certainly, a 
defendant who could be denied self-representation under Edwards, supra, 554 
U.S. 164, could also have been denied self-representation under People v. Sharp, 
supra, 7 Cal.3d 448, and People v. Floyd.  Denying self-representation when 
Edwards  permits does not violate the Sixth Amendment right of self-
representation.  Because California law provides no statutory or constitutional 
right of self-representation, such denial also does not violate a state right.  
Consistent with long-established California law, we hold that trial courts may deny 
self-representation in those cases where Edwards permits such denial. 
It remains to consider the standard for trial courts to employ when deciding 
whether to deny self-representation under Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164.  The 
Attorney General suggests the ―standard could be as simple as determining 
whether the defendant can conceive of a defense and coherently communicate it to 
the judge and jury.‖  Amici curiae San Francisco Public Defender and California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice urge this court to return to what they view as the 
pre-Faretta standard in California ―requiring that a defendant who wishes to 
represent himself demonstrate an understanding of the charges, defenses and 
punishments, and an ability to rationally communicate.‖  Amicus curiae Office of 
the State Public Defender urges this court to adopt the standard stated in People v. 
Burnett (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1314.  As we explained in Taylor, Burnett stated 
10 
―a test for the ‗cognitive and communicative skills‘ involved in competently 
representing oneself:  ‗Such skills are present where the accused:  (1) possesses a 
reasonably accurate awareness of his situation, including not simply an 
appreciation of the charges against him and the range and nature of possible 
penalties, but also his own physical or mental infirmities, if any; (2) is able to 
understand and use relevant information rationally in order to fashion a response 
to the charges; and (3) can coherently communicate that response to the trier of 
fact.‘  (Burnett, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1327, fn. omitted.)‖  (Taylor, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 873.) 
Two thoughtful law review articles have suggested more specific standards.  
One suggested this standard:  ―A criminal defendant is mentally incompetent to 
represent himself or herself at trial if and only if a mental disorder or disability 
would prevent the defendant from achieving a basic understanding of the charges, 
law, and evidence, from formulating simple defense strategies and tactics, or from 
communicating with the witnesses, the court, the prosecutor, and the jury in a 
manner calculated to implement those strategies and tactics in at least a 
rudimentary manner.‖  (Marks, State Competence Standards for Self-
Representation in a Criminal Trial:  Opportunity and Danger for State Courts 
after Indiana v. Edwards (2010) 44 U.S.F. L.Rev. 825, 847, italics deleted 
(Marks).) 
Drawing on ―social problem-solving theory,‖ another article suggests a 
more technical standard:  ―[P]roblem-solving theory suggests that, to represent 
oneself at a criminal trial, one should possess foundational abilities to perceive 
problematic situations, generate alternative courses of action, maintain mental 
organization, and communicate decisions to a functionary of the court.  Within the 
context of a prosecution, a defendant should also possess the ability to identify a 
plausible source of the prosecution, an ability to gather information to evaluate the 
11 
state‘s case, a willingness to attend to the prosecution, and an ability to withstand 
the stress of trial.  Finally, for certain key decisions, such as selecting the defense 
to pursue at trial, a defendant should be capable of justifying a decision with a 
plausible reason.‖  (Johnston, Representational Competence:  Defining the Limits 
of the Right to Self-representation at Trial (2011) 86 Notre Dame L.Rev. 523, 
595.) 
All of these suggested standards are plausible.  But we are constrained by 
the circumstance that what is permissible is only what Edwards permits, not what 
pre-Faretta California law permitted.  In other words, because of federal 
constitutional constraints, in considering the defendant‘s mental state as a reason 
to deny self-representation, a California court may not exercise the discretion 
permitted under California law but solely that permitted in Edwards. 
Edwards described competence to represent oneself at trial as the ability ―to 
carry out the basic tasks needed to present [one‘s] own defense without the help of 
counsel.‖  (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 175-176.)  It also said the states may 
deny self-representation to those competent to stand trial but who ―suffer from 
severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial 
proceedings by themselves.‖  (Id. at p. 178.)  Although asked to adopt ―a more 
specific standard,‖ the high court declined to do so.  (Ibid.) 
At this point, at least, we also think it best not to adopt a more specific 
standard.  The discussion in People v.  Burnett, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at page 
1327, and the standards suggested in the two law review articles quoted above are 
helpful to the extent they suggest relevant factors to consider.  Experts asked to 
examine defendants for this purpose, and trial courts called on to make these 
rulings, may consider these factors in their examinations and rulings.  But, 
pending further guidance from the high court, we believe the standard that trial 
courts considering exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should 
12 
apply is simply whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the 
point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the 
defense without the help of counsel. 
A trial court need not routinely inquire into the mental competence of a 
defendant seeking self-representation.  It needs to do so only if it is considering 
denying self-representation due to doubts about the defendant‘s mental 
competence.  When a court doubts a defendant‘s competence to stand trial, it 
―shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, and any other expert the 
court may deem appropriate, to examine the defendant.‖  (Pen. Code, § 1369, 
subd. (a).)  Similarly, when it doubts the defendant‘s mental competence for self-
representation, it may order a psychological or psychiatric examination to inquire 
into that question.  To minimize the risk of improperly denying self-representation 
to a competent defendant, ―trial courts should be cautious about making an 
incompetence finding without benefit of an expert evaluation, though the judge‘s 
own observations of the defendant‘s in-court behavior will also provide key 
support for an incompetence finding and should be expressly placed on the 
record.‖  (Marks, supra, 44 U.S.F. L.Rev. at p. 849.)1 
Trial courts must apply this standard cautiously.  The Edwards court 
specifically declined to overrule Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806.  (Edwards, supra, 
554 U.S. at p. 178.)  Criminal defendants still generally have a Sixth Amendment 
right to represent themselves.  Self-representation by defendants who wish it and 
validly waive counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly.  A court 
                                              
1  
―To avoid the need for repeated psychiatric examinations, a court ordering 
a trial-competence examination might choose to include in its order the question of 
self-representation competence, even if the defendant has not made a Faretta 
motion.‖  (Marks, supra, 44 U.S.F. L.Rev. at p. 849.) 
13 
may not deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be 
tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides.  Rather, it 
may deny self-representation only in those situations where Edwards permits it. 
B.  Whether the court properly denied self-representation in this case 
Defendant argues that the holding of Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, may 
not be applied ―retroactively‖ to this case.  But the trial court did not apply 
Edwards retroactively.  It revoked defendant‘s self-representation after Edwards 
was decided and in express reliance on that decision.  ―[A] law governing the 
conduct of trials is being applied ‗prospectively‘ when it is applied to a trial 
occurring after the law‘s effective date, regardless of when the underlying crime 
was committed or the underlying cause of action arose.‖  (Tapia v. Superior Court 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 289.)  Tapia involved legislation, but we see no reason to 
apply a different rule to a judicial decision.  Edwards was applied prospectively, 
not retroactively. 
Defendant also argues the record does not support the court‘s ruling.  As 
with other determinations regarding self-representation, we must defer largely to 
the trial court‘s discretion.  (People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 191-192; 
People v. Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 702-703 [pre-Faretta holding that denial of 
self-representation is subject to review for abuse of discretion].)  The trial court‘s 
determination regarding a defendant‘s competence must be upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence.  (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131 [competence 
to stand trial].)  Such deference is especially appropriate when, as here, the same 
judge has observed the defendant on numerous occasions.  ―[T]he trial judge, 
particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, who presided over one of 
Edwards‘ competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove best able to 
14 
make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized 
circumstances of a particular defendant.‖  (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 177.) 
We see no abuse of discretion in this case.  The trial judge, who had 
permitted defendant to represent himself for several months, revoked defendant‘s 
self-representation status following a very careful and thorough discussion.  He 
cited and applied the precise standard stated in Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164.  He 
had previously appointed three mental health experts to evaluate defendant‘s 
competence to stand trial and had heard their testimony at the trial competency 
hearing.  Although he did not appoint a mental health expert specifically to 
evaluate defendant‘s competence to represent himself, we believe under the 
circumstances doing so was not necessary for the court to make a sufficiently 
informed decision. 
We agree with the Court of Appeal‘s assessment:  ―The record here 
supports the trial court‘s conclusion that defendant, although competent to stand 
trial, was not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.  A psychologist 
had testified at the trial-competency hearing that there was ‗a very strong 
possibility‘ that defendant had some type of delusional thought disorder coupled 
with conspiracy paranoia.  Defendant had represented himself for almost seven 
months of preliminary proceedings during which he filed a number of nonsensical 
motions and conducted himself in a bizarre and disruptive manner.  The trial 
judge, who had presided over all these matters, was well acquainted with 
defendant‘s limitations and reasonably concluded that defendant lacked the mental 
capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.  The court 
found, upon substantial evidence, that defendant ‗has disorganized thinking, 
deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, 
anxiety and other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses which can impair 
his ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation, 
15 
even if he can play the lesser role of a represented defendant.‘  The trial judge 
showed great patience in permitting defendant an opportunity to represent himself 
but chose to deny further self-representation when it became clear that defendant 
was accomplishing nothing and might, in the court‘s opinion, be deprived of a fair 
trial if allowed to continue his self-representation.‖ 
In Edwards, the high court attached as an appendix a bizarre document the 
defendant had prepared as an example suggesting the common sense of the 
American Psychiatric Association‘s observations regarding how symptoms of 
severe mental illnesses can impair a defendant‘s capability for self-representation.  
(Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 176, 179.)  Similar examples abound in the 
record of this case.2 
Defendant notes that the jury that had found him competent to stand trial 
had been instructed that to be competent, he had to be able to ―assist in a rational 
manner his attorney in presenting his defense or conduct his own defense in a 
rational manner.‖  (Italics added.)  He argues that this means the jury had 
specifically found that he could conduct his own defense in a rational manner.  As 
the Court of Appeal found in a portion of its opinion not now under review, the 
                                              
2  
As one example, defendant prepared a handwritten document containing a 
bizarre caption and addressed to the ―Executive Office for Claims.‖  The first 
paragraph of that document states:  ―Efficient proffessional Salutations.  As to the 
chief unparallel tainted tailspin exploition, incomplete concord tactical operation 
submission of facts.  In rapid ex-parte pressing arrangment, with a bust of 
counterfeit ring.  Inside of Superior Court department 12, with regard to all 
applicable factions.  At center of false and deceptive copyright infringement hand 
manipulation practices is at ONE, California Superior Court Judge Allan Patrick 
Carter.  Please note that in endeavoring to case targeted light into a presently dark 
corner.  key & compelling affirmed facts can be further examined online under the 
cover or disguise of Federal Pace Service.  The factually correct in case and key 
point, keeping all enclosed documents sealed, to applicable loophole composite 
design.  Is complete case number 2:08-CV-00462.‖ 
16 
trial court probably erred, although harmlessly, by including the italicized 
language.  That language set too high a standard for competence to stand trial.  But 
the jury‘s verdict and the instructions did not deprive the trial court of discretion to 
find defendant incompetent to represent himself under Edwards.  Whether to deny 
self-representation due to mental incompetence is for the court, not a jury, to 
determine based on all of the information available to the court.  (See Edwards, 
supra, 554 U.S. at p. 177.) 
Defendant also notes that none of the experts appointed to evaluate him for 
trial competency had interviewed him personally.  He is correct.  The reason for 
this, however, is that defendant refused to meet with the experts.  This refusal 
certainly handicapped the experts and made it more difficult for the jury to 
determine his competence to stand trial.  But a defendant‘s refusal to be examined 
does not eliminate the court‘s and, ultimately, the jury‘s duty (see Pen. Code, 
§§ 1368, 1369) to determine his competence to stand trial when a doubt exists.  
The court and jury must do the best they can under the circumstances.  Similarly, 
the refusal to be examined does not, and cannot, deprive the court of discretion to 
deny self-representation due to defendant‘s mental incompetence.  The court had 
to, and did, do the best it could under the circumstances. 
Because the record supports the trial court‘s findings regarding defendant‘s 
competence to represent himself, that court‘s ruling revoking his self-
representation status was within its discretion.  The Court of Appeal correctly so 
concluded. 
17 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Johnson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 10/25/10 – 1st Dist., Div. 4 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S188619 
Date Filed: January 30, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Solano 
Judge: Allan P. Carter 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Barry M. Karl, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Rene A. Chacon 
and David M. Baskind, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, Barry P. Helft, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, and Nina 
Rivkind, Deputy State Public Defender, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Cliff Gardner and Lawrence A. Gibbs for San Francisco County Public Defender and California Attorneys 
for Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Barry M. Karl 
620 Jefferson Avenue 
Redwood City, CA  94063 
(650) 366-6789 
 
David M. Baskind 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1308