Title: Commonwealth v. Carney
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11092
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2015

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SJC-11092 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AARON CARNEY. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     May 5, 2015. - July 20, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Photograph, Relevancy and materiality, 
Firearm.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Argument by 
prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 11, 2009. 
 
 
The case was tried before Robert J. Kane, J. 
 
 
 
Alan Jay Black for the defendant. 
 
Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant was convicted of deliberately 
premeditated murder.  On appeal he asserts error in the 
admission in evidence of (1) an autopsy photograph, and (2) a BB 
rifle together with ammunition that were unrelated to the 
killing.  He also argues that the prosecutor's closing argument 
2 
 
was improper.  We affirm the conviction and decline the 
defendant's request for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  We reserve other details for discussion of particular 
issues.  The defendant and Kenneth Fontaine became friends at 
sometime around 2005.  Kenneth lived with his mother, Elizabeth 
Fontaine, the victim.  Elizabeth was a registered nurse.  She 
had significant issues with her health, including obesity.  
Kenneth assisted his mother with some of her needs.  Kenneth and 
his mother purchased a single-family house in Attleboro during 
2007.  Because of her health and limited mobility, Elizabeth 
converted the first-floor living room into her bedroom.  They 
took in boarders to help with their finances.  The defendant was 
one such boarder.  His rent was $400 per month.  Kenneth and the 
boarders had bedrooms on the second and third floors.  There 
also was a bedroom on the third floor that the boarders used for 
storage.  Kenneth did not use that room. 
 
During 2008, some of Elizabeth's medication began to 
disappear.  Kenneth and Elizabeth believed it was taken by one 
of the other boarders, so they evicted him.  Kenneth also 
discovered that an old shotgun he had kept in his closet was 
missing.  He assumed it had been stolen by the same boarder who 
he thought had taken his mother's medication.  Kenneth had 
3 
 
discussed these losses with the defendant, but he did not 
suspect the defendant of taking them. 
 
At one point, the defendant's employment situation changed 
and he fell behind in his rent.  The arrearage was about $8,000 
as of October, 2009.  Nevertheless, the defendant and Elizabeth 
maintained a very good relationship.  The defendant had told 
Kenneth at times that he did not understand how Kenneth could be 
so good to his mother, as her health problems seemed so 
burdensome.  Kenneth typically paid for the defendant's food and 
cellular telephone bill, and he gave the defendant money for 
miscellaneous expenses such as cigarettes.  He did this because 
he valued the defendant's friendship.  Kenneth would sometimes 
use Elizabeth's prescription pain medication for migraine 
headaches, with her approval.  What Elizabeth did not know was 
that Kenneth also gave the defendant some of her Oxycontin pills 
on a regular basis. 
 
In the fall of 2009, the defendant told Kenneth that he 
wanted to end his dependence on pain medication.  He tried to 
stop taking them, but the withdrawal symptoms were intolerable.  
Kenneth gave the defendant two Oxycontin pills per day on 
weekends, and Vicodin once or twice a week to ease the 
defendant's withdrawal symptoms and enable him to function at 
his part-time job.  During that period, the defendant became 
4 
 
depressed over his employment situation, his indebtedness to 
Kenneth and Elizabeth, and the fact that he did not own a car. 
 
On Friday, October 2, Kenneth and a friend drove in the 
friend's vehicle to New Hampshire.  Kenneth left his own vehicle 
for the defendant to use.  In the second-floor living room, 
Kenneth had left the defendant two or four Oxycontin pills for 
the weekend.  The defendant visited a friend, Gerald Knight, 
Sunday evening, October 4.  Knight did not see the defendant 
taking any prescription pills, but they may have smoked 
marijuana.  Late that evening, the defendant retrieved the 
shotgun he had stolen from Kenneth.  He had "sawed off" a 
portion of the barrel.1  He went downstairs with the shotgun and 
had some conversation with Elizabeth.  He aimed the shotgun at 
her and pulled the trigger.  The blast caused multiple fractures 
to the right side of her skull and caused injuries to her brain.  
She died from these injuries. 
 
The defendant wrote a note to Kenneth explaining what he 
had done.  He said he did it because "[i]t was the only going 
away present I could think of that would improve your 
life. . . .  Without the two of us in your life dragging you 
down, things can get a lot better for you if you let them. . . .  
                     
 
1 The record reflects that the length of the resulting 
barrel of the shotgun is sixteen inches.  The defendant was not 
charged with possession of a sawed-off shotgun.  See G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (c). 
5 
 
You deserve to be freed of these burdens, and I am only trying 
to help you with that. . . .  I'm sorry for the pain I caused 
you." 
 
The defendant contemplated suicide, but was unable to 
follow through.  He drove to Knight's home, arriving shortly 
after noon on Monday, October 5.  He described for Knight what 
he had done.  The defendant did not mention anything about 
having taken drugs or having been under the influence; he did 
not mention what he and Elizabeth had discussed; and he did not 
say why he had killed her.  The defendant turned himself in to 
police.  He telephoned Kenneth to apologize and said he did it 
with a shotgun.  When Kenneth asked why he did it, he said he 
did not remember. 
 
2.  Autopsy photograph.  The defendant argues that the 
judge abused his discretion by admitting in evidence an 
inflammatory autopsy photograph of Elizabeth's gunshot wound.  
The defendant objected to the ruling, so our review is under the 
prejudicial error standard.  See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 
Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  "The question whether the inflammatory 
quality of a photograph outweighs its probative value and 
precludes its admission is determined in the sound discretion of 
the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 Mass. 1, 12 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. DeSouza, 428 Mas. 667, 670 (1999).  A 
defendant bears a "heavy burden of demonstrating an abuse of 
6 
 
that discretion."  Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 108 
(1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 519 
(1990).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2015) (relevant evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by danger of unfair prejudice).  Photographs depicting a fatal 
wound generally are admissible on the issue of deliberate 
premeditation.  See Commonwealth v. Haith, 452 Mass. 409, 415 
(2008); Commonwealth v. Berry, supra. 
 
The photograph was relevant to the question of deliberate 
premeditation.  Elizabeth was found lying on her back with her 
legs off the side of the bed.  Her feet were touching a short 
step she used to get in and out of bed.  There was shotgun 
damage to the headboard of her bed.  The jury could have found 
that the defendant aimed the shotgun at Elizabeth, as he had 
told Knight, and shot her while she was sitting on the side of 
her bed.  The photograph was consistent with the other physical 
evidence, the testimony, and the Commonwealth's theory of 
deliberate premeditation.  In addition, the photograph was 
relevant to the question of accident, which trial counsel raised 
in his opening statement.  Trial counsel indicated in his 
opening that the gun discharged accidentally when Elizabeth 
reached for the barrel of the gun and the defendant tripped over 
7 
 
a cat.2  The photograph, the position of Elizabeth's body on her 
bed after the shooting, and the location of the shotgun damage 
to the headboard were inconsistent with the defendant's 
explanation of accident as put forth by trial counsel in his 
opening.3 
 
The gruesome aspects of Elizabeth's head wound were 
minimized by the indirect angle from which the photograph was 
taken relative to the wound.  The photograph was of Elizabeth's 
face, and depicted only the edge of the wound on the right side 
of her head.  The judge took further precautions to mitigate the 
potential for prejudice by not allowing the photograph to be 
handled by the jury, by segregating it from the other exhibits, 
and by instructing the jury at the time the photograph was 
admitted not to be swayed by emotions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 684 n.11 (2011), citing DeSouza, 428 
                     
2 The jury could have accepted the testimony of a firearms 
expert who tested the gun and determined that it did not 
malfunction and would not discharge if it were dropped or 
otherwise struck against an object. 
 
 
3 After the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant 
decided not to testify.  The judge conducted a colloquy with the 
defendant and determined that the defendant voluntarily waived 
his right to testify.  In the course of the colloquy the 
defendant said he understood that without his testimony there 
would be no basis to put the question of accident before the 
jury.  In closing argument, trial counsel argued that Kenneth 
had manipulated the defendant by plying him with drugs, that the 
defendant was confused at the time of the killing, and that 
there was no evidence of premeditation. 
8 
 
Mass. at 670.  There was no abuse of discretion in the admission 
of the autopsy photograph. 
 
3.  BB gun and ammunition.  The defendant asserts error in 
the admission in evidence of a BB gun and some ammunition that 
were recovered from a third-floor closet used only by him.  The 
items were unrelated to the killing.  The judge instructed the 
jury at the time the items were admitted and again in his final 
instructions that if the Commonwealth proved they belonged to 
the defendant, the jury could consider them solely on the 
question of the defendant's capacity to use the shotgun that 
caused Elizabeth's death.  The defendant objected to the 
admission of this evidence, so we review under the prejudicial 
error standard.  Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353. 
 
A judge has discretion to admit such evidence to show that 
the defendant had access to or knowledge of firearms and 
ammunition.  See Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 157 
(2014), and cases cited.  This is particularly relevant here, 
where the defendant had indicated that accident would be an 
issue.  The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 
Mass. 354, 356-357 (1985), is misplaced.  In Toro, the defendant 
claimed he did not do the shooting.  Id. at 355.  Here, the 
defendant made no such claim, and the question of his 
familiarity with guns was relevant to his claim of accident.  
9 
 
There was no abuse of discretion in the admission of these 
items. 
 
4.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial by making 
improper closing argument in several respects.  There was no 
objection, so we review to determine if any error created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992). 
 
The prosecutor began his closing argument by inviting the 
jury to put themselves in the mind of the victim.  He asked them 
to speculate what Elizabeth would have been thinking at the 
point in time when the defendant aimed the shotgun at her.  The 
prosecutor continued: 
 
"Why would a man who was given so much from that 
family, and specifically by Kenneth Fontaine, who was given 
everything for a period of time, everything he chose to 
take, why would he do what he did?  She must have asked 
that to herself in those moments before he shot and killed 
her. 
 
 
"And he didn't give her the opportunity to do the 
things that he had the opportunity to do.  You heard that 
he told Gerald Knight that after he killed Mrs. Fontaine, 
he had the opportunity to go say goodbye to those he wanted 
to say goodbye to before he contemplated suicide that he 
could not commit.  He didn't give her that chance.  Instead 
he shot and killed her and violently brought her life to an 
end.  She didn't get to know why." 
 
 
The Commonwealth concedes, correctly so, that this was an 
improper appeal to the jury "to render a verdict based on 
emotion and sympathy for the victim rather than on a reasoned 
10 
 
judgment based on the evidence at trial."  See Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 494 (1997).  In addition, the 
prosecutor invited the jury to speculate about matters that were 
not in evidence.  The record reflects that the defendant and 
Elizabeth did have conversation just before he shot her, but the 
record is silent about the details of that conversation.  As 
such, the argument that Elizabeth did not know why he was about 
to kill her has no basis in the evidence, and was improper.  See 
Commonwealth v. Coren, 437 Mass. 723, 732 (2002).  Moreover, 
Elizabeth's state of mind was irrelevant in the circumstances, 
where the jury were not instructed on the theory of murder with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, see Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 
Mass. 382, 389-390 (1997), and where her state of mind shed no 
light on whether the defendant had a motive to kill her.  See 
Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 169 (1997), S.C., 440 
Mass. 576 (2003).  Finally, the prosecutor's closing argument 
improperly encouraged the jury to convict the defendant for 
being an ingrate. 
 
The defendant has not shown, however, that the introductory 
portion of the prosecutor's closing argument created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  It was just 
a brief segment of the over-all closing argument, and it was not 
a recurring theme.  Contrast Santiago, supra at 494-495.  The 
main section of the prosecutor's argument was based on a highly 
11 
 
detailed and proper analysis of the evidence, and it was well 
reasoned.  The judge's final instructions directed the jury to 
decide the case without emotion or sympathy, and he told them to 
base their verdict on the evidence.  The judge instructed that 
opening statements and closing arguments of the lawyers were not 
evidence.  The case against the defendant was overwhelming.  In 
balance, the impropriety in the prosecutor's closing argument 
does not require a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 
459 Mass. 400, 420-421 (2011). 
 
The defendant next argues that the prosecutor argued facts 
not in evidence when he said the defendant was "getting that gun 
ready . . . while he was upstairs."  There was no direct 
evidence of this, but it was a permissible inference to ask the 
jury to draw.  There was evidence that a box of shotgun shells 
matching the type used to shoot Elizabeth had been seized from 
the defendant's bed.  The jury could have inferred that the 
defendant loaded the gun shortly before going downstairs.  The 
defendant told Knight that he brought the shotgun downstairs, 
aimed it at Elizabeth, and pulled the trigger.  Although the 
inference the prosecutor had asked the jury to draw was not the 
only inference that could be drawn from the evidence, it was 
both a reasonable and a possible inference.  As such, it was 
permissible, and one that the jury could draw if they so 
12 
 
decided.  See Commonwealth v. Marquetty, 416 Mass. 445, 452-453 
(1993). 
 
The final claim of misconduct the defendant advances is the 
prosecutor's alleged expression of personal opinion.  We are 
satisfied that the prosecutor did not offend principles of 
proper argument through his use of the pronoun "I."  "Merely 
using a 'first person pronoun does not interject personal belief 
into a statement.'"  Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 Mass. 687, 699 
(2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Mamay, 407 Mass. 412, 424 
(1990).  The prosecutor did not suggest that he had personal 
knowledge of the defendant's guilt.  He merely summed up, 
accurately, the Commonwealth's case.  See Commonwealth v. Stone, 
366 Mass. 506, 516 n.4 (1974). 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
briefs and the entire record and see no reason to order a new 
trial or reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.