Title: Johnson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 398, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GEORGE L. JOHNSON,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 398, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9806010948 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 11, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 2, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 2nd day of October 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, George L. Johnson, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s June 23, 2009 order denying his second motion 
for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In September 1999, Johnson was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Attempted Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  He was sentenced to a total of 
35 years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 25 years for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  This Court affirmed Johnson’s convictions 
on direct appeal.2  In 2002, Johnson filed his first motion for postconviction 
relief, in which he argued that his due process rights were violated when the 
Superior Court, first, denied his motion for a continuance so that three alibi 
witnesses could be located and, second, admitted evidence at trial of the 
extent of the victim’s injuries.  Johnson also claimed that the amenability 
process was violated when his case was not transferred to Family Court and 
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by not advising him of his 
amenability claim.  Johnson did not appeal the Superior Court’s denial of his 
first postconviction motion.     
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Johnson claims that a) the Superior Court lacked the 
authority to try and convict him without first conducting an amenability 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Johnson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 569, 1999, Walsh, J. (Sept. 20, 2000). 
 
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hearing; b) the Superior Court lacked the authority to admit evidence of his 
prior juvenile firearm adjudication at trial; and c) the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct in his closing argument and rebuttal. 
 
(4) 
When considering a postconviction motion under Rule 61, the 
Superior Court must first apply the procedural requirements of the Rule 
before reaching the merits of the petitioner’s claims.3  Here, Johnson’s 
conviction became final in 2000, more than three years before he filed his 
latest motion in April 2009.  As such, his claims are time-barred pursuant to 
Rule 61(i)(1).  Moreover, Johnson’s amenability claim is barred as formerly 
adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4) because it was previously raised in his first 
postconviction motion and his two remaining claims are procedurally barred 
under Rule 61(i)(2) because they were not raised in his first postconviction 
motion.  In the absence of any evidence that the procedural bars should not 
be applied in the interest of justice,4 the Superior Court’s denial of Johnson’s 
second motion for postconviction relief must be affirmed. 
 
(5) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
                                                 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 745 (Del. 1990). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2), (4) and (5). 
 
4 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice