Title: People v. Guerrero
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S253405
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RAUL OSUNA GUERRERO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S253405 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H041900 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
C1476320 
 
 
April 30, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
S253405 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
Proposition 47 reduced the punishment for certain 
nonserious, 
nonviolent 
crimes 
previously 
classified 
as 
“wobblers,” which were punishable either as a felony or as a 
misdemeanor.  Among the offenses it amended was forgery not 
exceeding $950 dollars.  (Pen. Code, § 473, subd. (b) (section 
473(b)); all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)  
But Proposition 47 also included an exception to that 
amendment.  The exception provides that the sentencing 
reduction for forgery is not “applicable to any person who is 
convicted both of forgery and of identity theft, as defined in 
Section 530.5.”  (§ 473(b).) 
 
In People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 (Gonzales), we 
held that this exception applies only when there is a 
“meaningful connection” between a defendant’s forgery 
conviction and his conviction for misuse of personal identifying 
information (§ 530.5), commonly referred to as identity theft.  
(Gonzales, at p. 53.)  We concluded that the mere fact that those 
convictions were secured in the same proceeding does not 
demonstrate such a connection.  (Id. at p. 54.) 
 
In this case, we are asked to further clarify the meaningful 
connection standard by answering a related question:  Does the 
fact that a defendant possessed separate stolen identification 
and forged instruments together at the same time provide a 
sufficient connection between the two offenses to bar him from 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
a sentence reduction pursuant to section 473(b)?  We hold that 
it does not.  A meaningful connection between forgery and 
identity theft for purposes of the identity theft exception 
requires a facilitative relationship between the two offenses.  
The mere fact that a defendant possessed two separate items of 
contraband at the same time does not demonstrate such a 
relationship. 
I. 
 
Defendant Raul Osuna Guerrero was arrested in 2014 for 
violating a no-contact protective order after he refused to leave 
his daughter’s apartment.  When one of the arresting officers 
searched Guerrero, he found a wallet in Guerrero’s jacket and 
placed it in a plastic bag along with Guerrero’s other personal 
belongings.  Guerrero was booked into Santa Clara County jail 
that same day, where a corrections officer inventoried his 
possessions.  Inside Guerrero’s wallet, the officer found a 
driver’s license belonging to another person, a benefits card 
belonging to another person, a counterfeit $50 bill, a check from 
the St. Thomas More Society of Santa Clara County, and four 
personal checks neither owned by Guerrero nor made out to him. 
 
Based on Guerrero’s conduct and the items found in his 
wallet, he was charged with one misdemeanor count of 
possessing the personal identifying information of another 
person (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1)), one felony count of concealing or 
withholding stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), one misdemeanor 
count of contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)), and one felony 
count of forgery by possession of fictitious bill (§ 476).  The 
prosecution also alleged that Guerrero had a prior robbery 
conviction that counted as a strike within the meaning of the 
“Three Strikes” law.  (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12.)  A jury 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
found Guerrero guilty of all charges, and the trial court found 
the strike allegation true. 
 
After Guerrero was convicted but before he was sentenced, 
the electorate approved Proposition 47 in November 2014, the 
Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which reduced the 
punishment for certain crimes previously punishable as 
felonies.  At sentencing, the trial court found that Proposition 
47 reduced Guerrero’s felony stolen property conviction (§ 496, 
subd. (a)) to a misdemeanor.  But the court did not make the 
same finding with respect to his felony forgery conviction 
(§ 476).  The court sentenced Guerrero to a four-year term for 
forgery and to two-month terms for each remaining count, all 
running concurrently.  
 
On appeal, Guerrero argued, among other things, that 
section 473(b) reduced his forgery conviction to a misdemeanor 
because the counterfeit bill on which his conviction was based 
was less than $950.  The Court of Appeal rejected this argument 
and affirmed Guerrero’s sentence in an unpublished opinion, 
reasoning that the sentence reduction for forgery in section 
473(b) does not apply “where a defendant is concurrently 
convicted of both forgery and identity theft [which] is what 
occurred in this case.” 
 
After the Court of Appeal affirmed Guerrero’s sentence, 
we held in Gonzales that a forgery conviction under section 473 
not exceeding $950 must be punished as a misdemeanor unless 
the underlying conduct was committed “ ‘in connection with’ ” 
conduct underlying an identity theft conviction.  (Gonzales, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 53.)  We then granted Guerrero’s petition 
for review and transferred his case to the Court of Appeal with 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
directions to vacate its decision and to reconsider Guerrero’s 
appeal in light of Gonzales.  
 
On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal again affirmed 
Guerrero’s forgery sentence, concluding that Gonzales did not 
change the outcome.  The court held that there was a 
meaningful connection between Guerrero’s forgery and identity 
theft convictions because he “contemporaneously possessed 
another person’s personal identifying information and a 
fictitious $50 bill.”  We granted review. 
II. 
 
Forgery is a wobbler crime punishable either as a felony 
or as a misdemeanor.  (§ 473, subd. (a).)  Proposition 47 reduced 
forgery offenses to a misdemeanor when the amount in question 
does not exceed $950.  It added section 473(b), which provides 
that “forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s 
check, traveler’s check, or money order, where the value of the 
[instrument] does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), 
shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not 
more than one year . . . .”  Section 473(b) goes on to provide two 
exceptions:  First, regardless of the value of the offense, forgery 
may be punished as a felony “if that person has one or more prior 
convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of 
subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 
667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to 
subdivision (c) of Section 290.”   Second, section 473(b) does not 
apply “to any person who is convicted both of forgery and of 
identity theft, as defined in Section 530.5.”  The second 
exception — the identity theft exception — is at issue in this 
case. 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
We recently interpreted section 473(b)’s identity theft 
exception in Gonzales.  The defendant in that case was charged 
with felony forgery and identity theft in the same information 
but the conduct underlying those two charges occurred years 
apart and had no relationship to each other.  (Gonzales, supra, 
6 Cal.5th at p. 47.)  The defendant pleaded guilty to those 
charges and, after passage of Proposition 47, sought reduction 
of his forgery conviction to a misdemeanor.  We held that section 
473(b) did not preclude his resentencing.  (Gonzales, at p. 56.) 
 
We began by noting that section 473(b)’s language is 
ambiguous as to what relationship between forgery and identity 
theft is required to trigger the exception.  (Gonzales, supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 52.)  The word “both” can be reasonably construed 
to mean that a defendant’s forgery conviction is punishable as a 
felony “(1) whenever the defendant has also been convicted of 
identity theft; (2) whenever the defendant is convicted of 
identity theft at the same time he is convicted of forgery; or (3) 
whenever the defendant is convicted of identity theft for the 
same conduct as his forgery conviction.”  (Ibid.) 
 
We rejected the first construction as contrary to the text 
and structure of the statute.  (Gonzales, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 54.)  The identity theft exception, we explained, is phrased in 
the present tense:  Protection from felony punishment is 
unavailable “to any person who is convicted both of forgery and 
of identity theft.”  (§ 473(b), italics added.)  This is in contrast 
with other language in section 473(b) disqualifying a forgery 
conviction for reduction to a misdemeanor if the defendant has 
“prior convictions” for specified violent felonies and sex offenses.  
If Proposition 47 had intended to preclude a forgery defendant 
from relief whenever the defendant also had an identity theft 
conviction regardless of when it was received, Proposition 47 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
would have included identity theft among those previous 
disqualifying convictions.  Instead, the drafters added a 
separate exception using the present tense, indicating that 
“conviction for the forgery offense must at least occur in a 
timeframe concurrent with the conviction for identity theft.”  
(Gonzales, at p. 54.) 
 
We also rejected the second possible construction, i.e., that 
a forgery conviction is punishable as a felony “whenever the 
defendant is convicted of identity theft at the same time he is 
convicted of forgery.”  (Gonzales, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 52.)  We 
indicated that such a construction would be arbitrary.  It would 
mean that a defendant convicted of forgery and identity theft in 
the same proceeding could have his forgery conviction punished 
as a felony “simply because he was convicted and sentenced in a 
consolidated proceeding, whereas another defendant in a 
comparable situation [could not] if he were convicted in separate 
proceedings.”  (Id. at p. 51.)  Nothing in the statute suggests that 
eligibility for felony punishment should turn on the procedural 
sequence of a defendant’s forgery and identity theft convictions. 
 
Instead, Gonzales held that the identity theft exception 
makes forgery not exceeding $950 punishable as a felony only if 
the defendant is also convicted of identity theft in the same 
proceeding and the “conduct related to the forgery and identity 
theft convictions were made ‘in connection with’ each other.”  
(Gonzales, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 50.)  The two convictions “must 
bear some meaningful relationship to each other — beyond the 
convictions’ inclusion in the same judgment.”  (Id. at p. 54.)  We 
reached this conclusion based on the legislative history and 
purpose of Proposition 47.  The Legislative Analyst’s 
interpretation of section 473(b) explained that “[u]nder this 
measure, forging a check worth $950 or less would always be a 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
misdemeanor, except that it would remain a wobbler crime if the 
offender commits identity theft in connection with forging a 
check.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) 
analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35, italics added.)  
Moreover, we found that the electorate had a purpose in 
combining the two offenses:  Forgery and identity theft “tend to 
facilitate each other and, committed together, arguably trigger 
heightened law enforcement concerns.  A person who commits 
forgery by imitating the victim’s signature on a check, for 
example, will often present identification to falsely represent his 
or her identity.”  (Gonzales, at p. 54.)  At the same time, we 
declined to adopt a requirement that the forgery and identity 
theft offenses must be “committed in a transactionally related 
manner” (id. at p. 53) or that they must relate to the “same 
instrument” (id. at p. 57; see also id. at p. 53, fn. 6).  Because the 
conduct underlying Gonzales’s forgery and identity theft 
convictions occurred years apart and was unrelated, we held 
that section 473(b) did not preclude reduction of his forgery 
conviction to a misdemeanor.  (Gonzales, at p. 56.) 
 
Our reasoning and holding in Gonzales are instructive on 
the question now before us:  whether forgery and identity theft 
are undertaken in connection with each other for purposes of the 
identity theft exception in section 473(b) simply because a 
defendant possessed separate stolen identification and forged 
instruments together at the same time.  Guerrero contends that 
concurrent possession, without more, is not enough to establish 
a meaningful connection between his forgery and identity theft 
convictions.  The Attorney General argues that the answer 
depends on the “totality of the circumstances,” including 
whether the convictions “are linked in time or place, whether 
the crimes required an identical or similar intent, whether the 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
same course of conduct played a significant part in both 
convictions, and whether the crimes facilitated one another or 
shared some other transactional relationship.”  According to the 
Attorney General, because Guerrero possessed the counterfeit 
bill and the stolen identification in the same place, with the 
intent to defraud in both cases, and because proof of each crime 
relied on largely the same evidence, there was a sufficient 
relationship between his identity theft and forgery convictions 
to disqualify him from a sentence reduction.  
 
We agree with Guerrero that concurrent possession, 
without more, does not establish a meaningful connection 
between the two offenses for purposes of the identity theft 
exception.  As we said in Gonzales, the identity theft exception 
does not arbitrarily combine two unrelated crimes; it “lists two 
offenses that tend to facilitate each other and, committed 
together, arguably trigger heightened law enforcement 
concerns.”  (Gonzales, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 54, italics added.)  
Although our reference to facilitation in Gonzales was 
illustrative, we now conclude that it provides the clearest 
standard rooted in the purpose of Proposition 47 to evaluate 
whether a meaningful connection between forgery and identity 
theft exists.  To disqualify a defendant for relief under section 
473(b), the prosecution must show that the forgery offense 
facilitated the identity theft offense, or vice versa.  The fact that 
both offenses were committed at the same time and place, or the 
fact that evidence of both offenses was found at the same time 
and place, does not by itself mean that one offense facilitated the 
other. 
 
As we have explained, section 473(b) does not disqualify a 
defendant from relief whenever there is any superficial 
connection between his forgery and identify theft convictions; 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
the connection must be a “meaningful” one.  (Gonzales, supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 53.)  Here, as in Gonzales, Proposition 47’s 
remedial objectives as well as the limits of those objectives 
inform our interpretation of the identity theft exception.  
(Gonzales, at p. 52, citing People v. Dehoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 
597–599.)  Proposition 47 intended “to ensure that prison 
spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, [and] to 
maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime.”  (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70.)  
To this end, Proposition 47 redefined several theft-related 
offenses as misdemeanors instead of wobblers, including forgery 
of instruments worth $950 or less.  At the same time, 
Proposition 47 limited its ameliorative reach by excluding more 
serious offenses from relief.  We infer that the voters disqualified 
defendants convicted of both forgery and identity theft from 
sentence reduction because they believed that the commission 
of one of those crimes to facilitate the other “arguably trigger[s] 
heightened law enforcement concerns.”  (Gonzales, supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 54; see also Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 
supra, analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35 [forgery 
“would remain a wobbler crime if the offender commits identity 
theft in connection with forging a check”].)  Forgery offenses that 
either facilitate or are facilitated by identity theft may result in 
greater economic and personal harms.  Other Penal Code 
provisions recognize these heightened concerns by specifically 
punishing the falsification or possession of false driver’s licenses 
and identification cards “with the intent that [they] be used to 
facilitate the commission of any forgery.”  (§§ 470a, 470b.) 
 
Requiring a showing of facilitation provides a familiar and 
workable standard for determining whether a meaningful 
connection exists.  Courts and juries are frequently asked to 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
determine whether conduct aids or facilitates the commission of 
an offense (e.g., § 31 [aiding and abetting]) or whether a 
defendant harbored the intent to facilitate (§§ 470a [falsifying 
identification to facilitate forgery], 470b [possessing false 
identification to facilitate forgery]).  We said in Gonzales that 
“[w]e can reasonably distinguish . . . between foreclosing relief 
to those convicted of felony forgery that was also facilitated by 
the felony offense of identity theft, and barring relief for anyone 
who happens to have been convicted, at some point in his or her 
life, of unrelated forgery and identity theft offenses.”  (Gonzales, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 55, italics added.)  And we provided a 
typical example:  “A person who commits forgery by imitating 
the victim’s signature on a check, for example, will often present 
identification to falsely represent his or her identity.”  (Id. at 
p. 54.)  Identity theft may also facilitate forgery in relation to 
the same instrument.  For example, a person may obtain a 
victim’s home address or checking account number to create a 
forged check.  This standard is preferable to the totality of the 
circumstances approach proposed by the Attorney General, 
which may create further uncertainty and result in inconsistent 
application. 
 
An individual can commit forgery by possessing a forged 
instrument (§ 476), and an individual can commit identity theft 
by possessing stolen identification (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1)).  But 
simultaneous possession of separate stolen identification and 
forged instruments, without more, does not raise the same 
heightened law enforcement concerns that the identity theft 
exception in section 473(b) intended to address and is not 
sufficient to show a facilitative relationship.  Of course, when a 
defendant possesses two items of contraband at the same time, 
those items are connected in a superficial sense — the same 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
person possesses them.  But without additional evidence of a 
connection, that is all that can be said.  Possession of one 
instrument need not have facilitated possession of the other.  
(Cf. Ondarza v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 195, 203 
[“commission of two separate crimes on the same day does not 
justify an inference that they were necessarily connected”]; 
People v. Saldana (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 24, 30 [“logic supports 
the inference that the Legislature did not intend the phrase ‘two 
or more different offenses connected together in their 
commission’ to apply to two wholly unrelated crimes merely 
because they were committed on the same day or . . . at the same 
time” (quoting § 954)].) 
 
The Attorney General contends that a defendant “found in 
possession of the personal identifying information of one person 
and an altered check of another person” raises heightened law 
enforcement 
concerns 
because 
concurrent 
possession 
demonstrates that the defendant is “engaged in broad and wide-
ranging efforts to defraud multiple victims.”  First, we doubt 
that voters intended to preclude a forgery defendant from relief 
simply because he engaged in a scheme to defraud multiple 
victims.  If they did, section 473(b) would have also precluded 
relief for defendants convicted of two forgery offenses, two 
identity theft offenses, or more than one of any number of other 
fraud offenses (see, e.g., §§ 477 [counterfeiting coin], 532a 
[making false representations]) so long as those offenses had 
different victims.  The electorate instead chose to exclude 
defendants who committed two and only two distinct fraud 
offenses together.  Moreover, the law already accounts for the 
heightened seriousness of a criminal scheme to defraud multiple 
victims:  The more separate counts of forgery and identity theft 
a defendant commits, the more convictions he may suffer. 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
Second, even if the electorate intended to exclude 
defendants engaged in “broad and wide-ranging efforts to 
defraud multiple victims,” the bare fact that a defendant 
possessed two separate items of contraband at the same time, 
without evidence of how and when the defendant came into 
possession of the contraband, does not itself demonstrate such a 
connection.  If the defendant came to possess the two items at 
different times through unrelated conduct, the fact that he was 
found with both items at the same time would not indicate that 
the items are part of a common scheme.  (Cf. People v. Ewoldt 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403 [“To establish the existence of a 
common design or plan, the common features must indicate the 
existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous 
acts . . . .”].) 
 
In this case, the stolen identification information and the 
counterfeit $50 bill were not shown to be connected in any way 
except that they were both found in Guerrero’s wallet.  There 
was no evidence that Guerrero used the stolen information to 
obtain the counterfeit bill.  Without such evidence, we cannot 
draw any conclusion beyond the fact that Guerrero happened to 
possess both items of contraband at the same time. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the meaningful connection requirement of 
section 473(b)’s identity theft exception is satisfied only if a 
defendant convicted of forgery is also convicted of identity theft 
in the same proceeding and only if one of the offenses facilitated 
the other.  The sole fact that a defendant happened to possess 
two separate items of contraband at the same time does not 
demonstrate such a facilitative relationship.  Simultaneous 
possession of contraband, without more, does not raise the same 
PEOPLE v. GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
law enforcement concerns that the electorate intended to 
address when it excluded defendants “convicted both of forgery 
and of identity theft” from sentencing relief.  (§ 473(b).) 
 
Because Guerrero had not yet been sentenced at the time 
Proposition 47 became effective, its ameliorative provisions 
apply directly to his case.  (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 
1135.)  It is uncontested that the only evidence supporting his 
forgery conviction was the counterfeit $50 bill, which is valued 
at far less than the $950 threshold below which a forgery 
conviction must be punished as a misdemeanor.  Guerrero is 
therefore entitled to reduction of his forgery conviction to a 
misdemeanor.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal with instructions to remand to the trial court to 
reduce Guerrero’s forgery conviction to a misdemeanor. 
 
 
LIU, J.  
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Guerrero 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. Filed 12/5/18 – 6th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S253405 
Date Filed: April 30, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Linda R. Clark 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Jeffrey M. Laurence and Gerald A. Engler, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Seth K. Schalit, Lisa Ashley Ott, Catherine A. Rivlin and Claudia H. Amaral, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Randall Conner 
State Public Defender 
717 Washington Street, Second Floor 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(415) 264-1238 
 
Lisa Ashley Ott 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3839