Title: MARRIAGE OF KRAUSE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-020
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 23, 1982

No. 82-20 IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF MONTANA IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BARBAJPA J. KRAUSE, Petitioner and Appellant, and LARRY KRAUSE, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable William Speare, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Stephens & Cole, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Gary L. Beiswanger, Billinqs, Montana Submitted on briefs: June 24, 1982 Decided: September 23, 1982 Filed: 8EP 23 " 1 3 8 2 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s is an a p p e a l from a judgment of the District Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District, S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone, d i v i d i n g t h e marital assets of t h e p a r t i e s . The w i f e a p p e a l s . The p a r t i e s were married on O c t o b e r 1 8 , 1974, a t B i l l i n g s , Montana. It was t h e second m a r r i a g e f o r both p a r t i e s . T h e r e were no c h i l d r e n born of t h e m a r r i a g e , however, each of t h e par- t i e s h a s c h i l d r e n from t h e i r p r e v i o u s m a r r i a g e . Barbara Krause was t r a i n e d t o be a r e g i s t e r e d nurse b u t h a s not worked i n t h a t c a p a c i t y s i n c e 1970. L a r r y Krause p r e s e n t l y works a s a p e t r o l e u m e n g i n e e r . I n February of 1977, Barbara p e t i t i o n e d f o r a d i v o r c e . A d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n was signed by t h e District Judge on May 1 7 , 1978. The d e c r e e d i d n o t make a p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n , r a t h e r t h e District Court e x p r e s s l y r e s e r v e d j u r i s d i c t i o n to make t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a t a l a t e r d a t e . During t h e m a r r i a g e t h e p a r t i e s pooled t h e i r assets and made i n v e s t m e n t s . P r i n c i p a l l y , t h e y i n v e s t e d i n o i l and g a s p r o p e r t i e s , t h r e e k i n d s of common s t o c k , and r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d on t h e Boulder R i v e r . Only t h e above-mentioned a s s e t s were d i s p u t e d a t t h e t r i a l ; t h e p a r t i e s having p r e v i o u s l y agreed on a d i v i s i o n of t h e b a l a n c e of t h e p r o p e r t y . By s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s t h e District Court appointed a S p e c i a l Master, a c e r t i f i e d p u b l i c a c c o u n t a n t , f o r purposes of r e p o r t i n g to t h e Court on t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : 1. A s c e r t a i n i n g t h e n e t worth of t h e respec- t i v e p a r t i e s i n c l u d i n g a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a l l assets owned or a c q u i r e d by t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s ; Determining t h o s e assets of t h e p a r t i e s .at were a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e r r i a g e and t r a c i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r e m a r i t a l assets of t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s and t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c q u i s i t i o n of mari- t a l assets or p o s t - m a r i t a l assets; 3 . P r o v i d i n g a w r i t t e n r e p o r t t o t h e Court s p e c i f i c a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s o u r c e s or d e r i - v a t i o n of t h e assets of t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s . ( 2 ) whether t h e District Court e r r e d by f a i l i n g to v a l u e a s s e t s a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l h e a r i n g ; and ( 3 ) w h e t h e r t h e r e was a want of candor and d i s c l o s u r e r e g a r d i n g f i n a n c i a l i n f o r - mation r e l a t i n g to t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s ? I n r e l a t i o n to t h e f i r s t i s s u e , t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t : ( 1 ) h e r husband ' s non-mone t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s were wrongly con- s i d e r e d as monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s , and ( 2 ) t h a t h e r non-monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s were n o t c o n s i d e r e d . W e do n o t a g r e e w i t h e i t h e r a s s e r t i o n . Regarding h e r f i r s t a s s e r t i o n s h e p o i n t s t o h e r h u s b a n d ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s . During t h e m a r r i a g e , L a r r y Krause was g i v e n t h e o p t i o n to t a k e a d e c r e a s e i n e a r n i n g s i n r e t u r n f o r t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n working o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s . I n 1975 he took a c u t of $6.25 from h i s h o u r l y c o n s u l t a n t s f e e . Then i n 1977 he took a n o t h e r c u t of $2.90 p e r hour. These foregone e a r n i n g s of t h e husband coupled w i t h a c a s h c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e w i f e r e s u l t e d i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s . The District Court found t h a t t h e c o s t of a c q u i r i n g t h e s e i n t e r e s t s was $36,847; w i t h $29,088 a t t r i- b u t a b l e t o t h e husband I s foregone e a r n i n g s and $7,759 a t t r i b u - t a b l e t o t h e w i f e ' s c a s h c o n t r i b u t i o n . The a p p e l l a n t / w i f e c o n t e n d s it is error to "give any monetary w e i g h t to non-monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s . . . " I n o t h e r words, s h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e foregone e a r n i n g s were non-monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s and t h e District Court i m p r o p e r l y a s s i g n e d to them a d o l l a r v a l u e . I n a l l of o u r p r e v i o u s c a s e s when w e spoke of non-monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s we were r e f e r r i n g to t h o s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s which a r e d i f f i c u l t t o q u a n t i f y i n d o l l a r s and c e n t s . For example, i n Eschenburg v. Eschenburg ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1014, w e noted t h a t a m a r r i a g e is much more t h a n a b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h u s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to t h e 32-year marriage included r a i s i n g f o u r c h i l d r e n , managing t h e household, e n t e r t a i n i n g a t social a c t i v i t i e s , and v o l u n t e e r i n g s e r v i c e s t o a c t i v i t i e s The S p e c i a l Master completed h i s r e p o r t on J a n u a r y 31, 1981. The r e p o r t set o u t t h e o r i g i n a l a c q u i s i t i o n cost of t h e v a r i o u s pro- p e r t i e s and t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of each p a r t y . A l s o , t h e f a i r market v a l u e a t o r n e a r t h e time of d i v o r c e is i n d i c a t e d and d i v i d e d between t h e p a r t i e s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to t h e amount of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n a t t h e t i m e of a c q u i s i t i o n . The p e r t i n e n t p a r t of t h e r e p o r t is s e t o u t below: L a r r y B a r b a r a T o t a l Krause Krause - - - - - - - -- - -- 2000 S h a r e s Energy Resources S t o c k $ 4,109.85 2,339.81 1,770.04 Value 5/17/78 18,000.00 10,247.40 7,752.60 300 S h a r e s C o n t i n e n t a l Group S t o c k 8,599.68 2,010.89 6,588.79 Value 5/17/78 9,375.00 2,191.88 7,183.12 100 S h a r e s S i m p l i c i t y P a t t e r n 1,639.50 383.37 1,251.63 Value 5/17/78 1,375.00 321.48 1,053.52 Boulder P r o p e r t y Value 5/17/78 O i l P r o p e r t i e s Value 1/1/79 T o t a l C o s t Values 66,169.66 41,322.56 24,869.60 T o t a l F a i r Market Value @ 5/31/78 $119,164.00 78,924.37 40,239.63 On March 3 , 1981, t h e p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n p a r t of t h e i r case was heard b e f o r e t h e District Court. The c o u r t made f i n d - i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law on J u n e 22 and e n t e r e d its j udgment on September 16. The c o u r t awarded 65 p e r c e n t of t h e i n t e r e s t i n t h e o i l and g a s p r o p e r t i e s to L a r r y Krause and t h e b a l a n c e to Barbara Krause; each w a s awarded 50 p e r c e n t of t h e Boulder R i v e r p r o p e r t y ; and t w o of t h e common s t o c k s , Energy Resources and C o n t i n e n t a l Group, were s p l i t 65 p e r c e n t and 35 p e r c e n t t o L a r r y and B a r b a r a respec- t i v e l y . The remaining s t o c k , S i m p l i c i t y P a t t e r n , w a s awarded to B a r b a r a . The p e t i t i o n e r , Barbara Krause , was u n s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n and a p p e a l s t o t h i s Court. The a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s : (1) whether t h e District C o u r t e r r e d i n i t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of non-mone t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s ; r e l a t e d t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s career. I n t h e case of B i e g a l k e v. B i e g a l k e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 311, 316, 564 P.2d 987, 990, non- monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e w i f e included "wearing o u t h e r wedding band chopping wood, t u r n i n g b a l e s i n t h e f i e l d , [ a n d ] c h a s i n g c a t t l e on f o o t . . ." Again, i n I n R e Marriage of Kaasa ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 1 8 , 23, 591 P.2d 1110, 1113 non-monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s were d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : " she helped move c a t t l e o u t t o p a s t u r e , hauled cattle by t r u c k s , helped w i t h b r a n d i n g , cooked f o r t h e crews, r a i s e d c h i c k e n s and was respon- s i b l e f o r t h e f a m i l y g a r d e n ." W e b e l i e v e it is t h e s e k i n d s of c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had i n mind when they e n a c t e d s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, which mandates c o n s i d e r a t i o n of " c o n t r i b u t i o n [ s ] of a spouse as a homemaker o r to t h e f a m i l y u n i t . " W e do n o t intend to p r e c i s e l y d e f i n e non-monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Such d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s f o r e g o n e e a r n i n g s as mone- t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s toward t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s . Indeed, t h e y are measured a c c u r a t e l y i n d o l l a r s and c e n t s and it is d i f f i c u l t to c o n c e i v e of them as anything b u t monetary. The a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r contends t h a t h e r non-monetary c o n t r i- b u t i o n s were n o t c o n s i d e r e d . A t t h e t r i a l t h e a p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e term of t h e m a r r i a g e she maintained t h e h o u s e , k e p t it c l e a n , provided meals, d i d t h e shopping, cared f o r t h e c h i l d r e n , d i d i r o n i n g , helped w i t h lawn care, and w a s a c t i v e i n social f u n c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o t h e husband I s b u s i n e s s . Obviously t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s are s u b s t a n t i a l . However, we f i n d no error. T h i s Court h a s s t a t e d innumerable t i m e s t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court had broad d i s c r e t i o n i n d i v i d i n g t h e marital estate. "The t e s t for reviewing t h e District C o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n is : Did t h e District Court i n t h e e x e r c i s e of its d i s c r e t i o n act a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t employment of c o n s c i e n t i o u s j udgement , o r exceed t h e bounds of reason i n view of a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? " Converse v. Converse ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - - - . - Mont . I -- -- - - - - .- --- , 645 P.2d 413, 4 1 5 , 39 S t .Rep, 887, 889; Levandowski v. Levandowski ( 1 9 8 1 ) , -- Mont . - -. -. - -. - , 630 P.2d 239, 38 St.Rep. 1002; In R e Marriage of Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361; Ze11 v. Ze11 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33. W e f i n d no error w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n its e v a l u a t i o n of t h e v a r i o u s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e m a r r i a g e . The a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r contends " t h e c o u r t 1 s f i n d i n g s d i d n o t a d d r e s s i t s e l f to t h e e f f e c t or t h e weight t h a t was t o be g i v e n B a r b a r a 1 s non-mone t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s . " Presumably t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n s i d e r s such an omission as r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e do n o t a g r e e . " ' F i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law pro- v i d e a f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e c o u r t ' s judgment. Marriage of Barron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 161, 580 P.2d 936. T h i s f o u n d a t i o n need n o t c o n s i s t o f a m u l t i t u d e of e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s , b u t t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t must set f o r t h a r e c o r d a t i o n o f t h e e s s e n t i a l and d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t s upon which t h e c o u r t r e s t e d its c o n c l u s i o n s of law and w i t h o u t which t h e judgment would l a c k s u p p o r t . J o n e s v. J o n e s ( 1 9 8 0 ) f Mon t . - --- , 620 P.2d 850, 37 St.Rep. 197T.-i-"- Converse, s u p r a , 645 P.2d a t 416, 39 St.Rep. a t 890. --- A s t h e second i s s u e , t h e a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s error by t h e District Court i n f a i l i n g to c o n s i d e r t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s p r o p e r l y . E r r o r is a l l e g e d through a two-pronged argument, f i r s t , " f o r f a i l u r e to c o n s i d e r t h e income t h a t was d e r i v e d from t h e marital o i l and g a s p r o p e r t i e s and, second; t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g to c o n s i d e r any v a l u e f o r a d d i t i o n a l o i l and g a s a s s e t s a c q u i r e d as a r e s u l t of income earned from what was an a g r e e d marital asset ." T h i s s i t u a t i o n is one of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n , c o n s e q u e n t l y a more d e t a i l e d view of t h e f a c t s is n e c e s s a r y . A s noted above, when t h e p a r t i e s were divorced i n May of 1978 t h e D i s t r i c t Court r e s e r v e d j u r i s d i c t i o n to a p p o r t i o n t h e marital p r o p e r t y . From t h e d i v o r c e to t h e h e a r i n g on p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n , t h i r t y - f o u r months e l a p s e d . During t h i s t h i r t y - f o u r month p e r i o d t h e husband had c o n t r o l o v e r t h e o i l and g a s p r o p e r t i e s . The p r o p e r t i e s c o n s i s t e d of "working i n t e r e s t s " i n twenty-three o i l and g a s w e l l s , twenty of which were producing. The p r o p e r t i e s g e n e r a t e d income and more "working i n t e r e s t s " were purchased. L a r r y Krause t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e he had purchased i n t e r e s t s i n t e n to twenty a d d i t i o n a l w e l l s . The funds t o purchase t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s came from two s o u r c e s ; h i s income as a c o n s u l t a n t , and from income generated from t h e o r i g i - n a l twenty producing w e l l s . It was t h e w i f e ' s c o n t e n t i o n a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t she be allowed to s h a r e e q u a l l y i n both t h e income r e a l i z e d from t h e o r i g i n a l twenty wells and t h e a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s purchased w i t h t h e income of t h e o r i g i n a l twenty. Before a d d r e s s i n g t h i s c o n t e n t i o n w e f i n d it n e c e s s a r y to evalu- a t e t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s which g e n e r a t e d t h i s i s s u e . T h i s problem a r i s e s because t h e r e w a s a t i m e l a p s e of t h i r t y - f o u r months between t h e d a t e of d i s s o l u t i o n and t h e h e a r i n g on p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . The record does not provide any j u s t i f i- c a t i o n f o r such a l e n g t h y d e l a y . Even i f t h e t i m e d e l a y had n o t caused c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e v a l u a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y , t h i s s i t u a t i o n should not o c c u r . Here t h e p a r t i e s were divorced f o r n e a r l y t h r e e y e a r s y e t t h e y still owned p r o p e r t y as i f they were husband and w i f e . A D i s t r i c t Court may postpone d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y . The a u t h o r i t y is found i n s e c t i o n 40-4-104, MCA, which r e a d s i n p a r t : "The District Court s h a l l e n t e r a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n i f : ". . . t h e c o u r t has c o n s i d e r e d , approved, o r made p r o v i s i o n f o r . . . t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of prope;ty o r provided -- - f o r a s e p a r a t e , --- l a t e r h e a r i n g - t o c o m p l e t e t h e s e m a t t e r s . " (Emphasis added. ) The comments to t h i s s e c t i o n s t a t e : "The phrase , cons i d e r e d , approved, or pro- v i d e d f o r ' i n s u b s e c t i o n . . . ( l ) ( d ) is i n t e n d e d t o c o n f e r upon t h e c o u r t t h e a u t h o r i t y to r e f u s e to make any award, i f t h e e v i d e n c e j u s t i f i e s an o u t r i g h t d e n i a l , as well a s t h e a u t h o r i t y to make such a l l o t m e n t a s t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e . To avoid any d o u b t , t h e c o u r t is a u t h o r i z e d e x p r e s s l y to p r o v i d e f o r a l a t e r h e a r i n g to complete a c t i o n on t h e s e m a t t e r s , - i f - n e c e s s a r y . " (Emphasis added. ) Commissionerls Note, ~ h n o t a t i o n s to MCA, T i t l e 40, Family Law, p. 49. Once b e f o r e w e have focused on t h e language of s u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( d ) . I n Miller v. Miller ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - - .- Mont . ----I , 616 P.2d 313, 318, 37 St.Rep. 1523, 1528; t h e a p p e l l a n t claimed t h a t it was error to s e p a r a t e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n a s p e c t of t h e m a r r i a g e from t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n . T h i s Court denied t h a t claim and s t a t e d : " t h e i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e and j u d i c i a l economy are b e s t s e r v e d by g i v i n g D i s t r i c t C o u r t s broad d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e conduct of t h e i r p r o c e e d i n g s and t h e s e v e r a n c e of t h e v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s of d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e s . " N o n e t h e l e s s w e do n o t view t h e s t a t u t e and comments as a l l o w i n g an i n d e f i n i t e postponement of t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n . The language is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . The c o u r t can postpone matters o n l y i f it h a s "provided f o r a s e p a r a t e later h e a r i n g . " I n o u r view, " p r o v i d e f o r " means to make arrangements f o r . Making a r r a n g e m e n t s i n c l u d e s t h e s e t t i n g of a d a t e o r a t i m e p e r i o d which is a g r e e a b l e between t h e p a r t i e s . To do o t h e r w i s e is to u n n e c e s s a r i l y p u n i s h t h e p a r t i e s . An i n d e f i n i t e postponement m e r e l y p l a c e s t h e p a r t i e s i n limbo and creates a p p e l l a t e problems. Furthermore, a postponement should n o t be a r o u t i n e matter. The comments note t h a t postponement is a u t h o r i z e d " i f n e c e s s a r y . " C e r t a i n l y t h e r e a r e c a s e s where postponement of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i - b u t i o n o r o t h e r matters is i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e p a r t i e s . However, it should be clear t h a t d e l a y is "necessary." P r e s e n t Colorado law s u g g e s t s a balanced approach. T h e i r s t a t u t e also allows District Court d i s c r e t i o n i n postponement of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n , yet t h a t d i s c r e t i o n is l i m i t e d . T h e i r comparable v e r s i o n of o u r s u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( d ) r e a d s : "The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h a l l e n t e r a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e when: " ( b ) I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h e v e r y d e c r e e of d i s s o - l u t i o n . . . t h e c o u r t s h a l l c o n s i d e r , approve, o r make p r o v i s i o n f o r . . . t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y ; b u t t h e e n t r y o f a d e c r e e w i t h r e s p e c t t o . . . d i s p o s i t i o n o F - - p r o p e r t y - - may b e d e f e r r e d by t h e c o u r t u n t i l a t i m e subsequent to t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e -- upon a f i n d i n g t h a t such d e f e r r a l - - - - - - is n e c e s s a r y i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e -- - - -- - - p a r t i e s . " Colo .Rev.Stat. s e c t i o n 14-10-106 ( 1973 ) . T h i s r e q u i r e s t h e Colorado c o u r t s to make s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s of n e c e s s i t y b e f o r e d e f e r r i n g p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . " I t is c l e a r t h a t t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e requirement f o r a s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g o n t h i s i s s u e is t o p r e v e n t unwarranted d e l a y s i n d i v i d i n g pro- p e r t y i n d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e c a s e s . " I n R e Marriage of R o s e ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 40 Co10.App. 176, 177, 574 P.2d 112, 113. I n summary, we encourage District C o u r t s to conclude a l l m a t - ters upon e n t r y of a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n . I n t h o s e unusual c a s e s where t h e t r i a l c o u r t is n o t a b l e to p r o v i d e f o r t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n a t t h e t i m e of d i s s o l u t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t must make w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s t h a t a postponement of t h e pro- p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n is i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e p a r t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e District Court must "provide f o r a s e p a r a t e later h e a r i n g " by e i t h e r s e t t i n g a s p e c i f i c h e a r i n g d a t e to complete matters o r by s e t t i n g a t i m e p e r i o d w i t h i n which t h e p a r t i e s must come b e f o r e t h e c o u r t f o r f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n . W e do n o t i n t e n d to set p r e c i s e t i m e l i m i t s . Such d e c i s i o n s are w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Furthermore, we d o n o t hold t h a t an unwarranted d e l a y w i l l r e s u l t i n a f a u l t y D i s t r i c t Court judgment. However, i n t h i s case, t h e unwarranted d e l a y coupled w i t h v a l u a t i o n f a c t o r s r e s u l t e d i n an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . P a r t of t h e problem r e s u l t s from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s timing of t h e p r o p e r t y v a l u a t i o n . The District Court r e l i e d on t h e S p e c i a l Master's r e p o r t which valued t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 1979, seven months a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . A l l of t h e o t h e r c o n t e s t e d p r o p e r t y w a s valued e f f e c t i v e May 1 7 , 1978, t h e d a t e of d i s s o l u t i o n . A s to t h e t i m e of v a l u a t i o n w e have s a i d , " [ t l h e t i m e f o r p r o p e r v a l u a t i o n cannot be t i e d to any s i n g l e e v e n t i n t h e d i s s o l u t i o n p r o c e s s . The f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n , t r i a l of t h e matter, o r even t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n do n o t c o n t r o l t h e p r o p e r p o i n t of e v a l u a t i o n by t h e District Court." L i p p e r t v. L i p p e r t ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - .- Mont . ---I , 627 P.2d 1206, 1208, 38 St.Rep. 625, 628. Furthermore, w e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e r e c a n be s e v e r a l v a l u a t i o n p o i n t s r a t h e r t h a n one s i n g l e p o i n t f o r a l l of t h e p r o p e r t y . T h i s is so because some a s s e t s may f l u c - t u a t e i n v a l u e . Although A L i p p e r t d i d n o t involve a p o s t - d i s s o l u t i o n p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n t h e same r u l e a p p l i e s and e x t e n d s beyond t h e d i s s o l u t i o n d a t e . Thus, i n t h e s e f a c t s , t h e t i m e of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l h e a r i n g on March 3, 1981, was a f e a s i b l e and a l l o w a b l e p o i n t t o d e t e r m i n e v a l u a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , it was t h e p r e f e r a b l e p o i n t i n view of t h e o f t e n s t a t e d r u l e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s g n e t worth must be determined a t o r n e a r t h e t i m e of t h e d i v o r c e . See Hamilton v. Hamilton ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mon t . - - , 607 P.2d 102, 37 St.Rep. 247; Vivian v. V i v i a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 341, 583 P.2d 1072; I n R e Marriage of Kramer ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439; Downs v. Downs ( 1 9 7 6 ) I 170 Mont. 150, 551 P.2d 1025. The c r u x of t h e above-cited cases is t h a t p r o p e r t y v a l u a t i o n should o c c u r a t t h e t i m e of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n , o r i n o t h e r words, emphasis is on c u r r e n t v a l u a t i o n s . T h i s r e a s o n i n g is e v i d e n t i n Herring v. Herring (19791 I Mont . , 602 P.2d 1006, 1007, 36 St.Rep. 2052, 2054, where w e remanded s i n c e " t h e r e was no a t t e m p t to p l a c e a p r e s e n t , f a i r market value upon t h e s e items o r to d e t e r - mine t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r d i v o r c e . " A d d i t i o n a l l y , i n E v e r t v. E v e r t ( 1 9 8 2 ) f Mont . - -- -- - - , 645 P.2d 417, 39 St.Rep. 860, w e remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f a i l u r e t o " p l a c e c u r r e n t v a l u e s on t h e p a r t i e s g a s s e t s . " I n t h a t case t h e District Court awarded a house and a 2% acre p a r c e l o f land based o n l y upon t h e e q u i t y b u i l t by t h e p a r t i e s r a t h e r t h a n any v a l u a t i o n f i g u r e . From t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n s e v e r a l p r i n c i p l e s are e v i d e n t ; (1) p r o p e r v a l u a t i o n is n o t t i e d to a s p e c i f i c e v e n t , ( 2 ) t h e r e may be more than one v a l u a t i o n p o i n t , depending upon t h e kind of p r o p e r t y i n v o l v e d , and ( 3 ) p r e f e r a b l y , v a l u a t i o n should o c c u r a t t h e t i m e of d i s t r i b u t i o n , o r , s t a t e d a n o t h e r way, p r e s e n t f a i r market v a l u e s should be used. I n g i v e n f a c t s i t u a t i o n s , t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s con£ l i c t w i t h each o t h e r . When one c o n s i d e r s t h e many d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of marital p r o p e r t y and t h e a s s o c i a t e d problems o f v a l u a t i o n it is obvious t h a t a hard and f a s t r u l e should n o t b e imposed. Thus, w e cannot r u l e t h a t District C o u r t s must always v a l u e p r o p e r t y a t t h e time of d i s t r i b u t i o n . Time and t i m e a g a i n w e have s a i d it is t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t h a s broad d i s c r e t i o n i n p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . I n S e l l v. S e l l ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - - Mont. 630 P.2d 222, 224, 38 St.Rep 956, 958, we s t a t e d : " [ t l h i s c o u r t has a l i m i t e d scope of a p p e l l a t e review and w i l l n o t i n t e r v e n e e x c e p t when t h e District Court h a s d e p a r t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h e norms of e q u i t y . " "The e x e r c i s e o f d i s c r e t i o n by t h e District Court is n e c e s s a r y when d e t e r m i n i n g t h e worth of marital assets which f l u c t u a t e i n v a l u e . " L i p p e r t , 627 P.2d a t 1208, 38 St.Rep. a t 628. I n t h i s case we f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e v a l u a t i o n of t h e c o n t e s t e d m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y . The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e v a l u e of some of t h e p r o p e r t y from t h e District C o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n d a t e s to t h e t i m e of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l h e a r i n g . For example, t h e Energy Resources s t o c k was valued a t $18,000 o n May 1 7 , 1978, t h e d a t e of d i s s o l u t i o n . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t used t h i s v a l u e i n its d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Testimony a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l h e a r i n g showed its p r e s e n t v a l u e a t $31,000. F a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e s e k i n d s of v a l u e f l u c t u a t i o n s is error. On remand t h e D i s t r i c t Court should a c c e p t e v i d e n c e on c u r r e n t v a l u a t i o n s of a l l of t h e c o n t e s t e d marital p r o p e r t y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o c o n s i d e r both t h e o i l and g a s income and t h e a d d i t i o n a l a c q u i s i t i o n s . I n a p p e l l a n t ' s view, t h e s e assets are p a r t of t h e marital estate. W e a g r e e . The case of L i p p e r t is c i t e d i n s u p p o r t of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . There t h e husband took $96,000 o f t h e marital p r o p e r t y to i n v e s t i n a b u s i n e s s . The b u s i n e s s went bad and t h e i n v e s t m e n t was l o s t . The District Court c o n s i d e r e d t h e $96,000 as p a r t of t h e m a r i t a l estate even though it was n o t i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e of d i s s o l u t i o n . The judgment ordered t h e husband t o pay t h e wife a sum of $48,000, one-half of t h e amount t h a t was l o s t . W e r e v e r s e d s t a t i n g t h a t " t h e award i g n o r e s fundamental l e g a l p r i n - c i p l e s of m a r i t a l s t a t u s ; s p o u s e s p o s s e s s mutual powers, o b l i g a - t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s which endure u n t i l l a w f u l l y modified o r t e r m i n a t e d . One of those powers is t h e power to f r e e l y c o n t r a c t w i t h o t h e r s r e g a r d i n g marital p r o p e r t y . " - - L i p p e r t , 627 P.2d a t 1209, 38 St.Rep. a t 629. That r e a s o n i n g a p p l i e s to t h i s s i t u a t i o n . The a p p e l l a n t was never d i v e s t e d of h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e marital p r o p e r t y . She r e t a i n e d a mutual i n t e r e s t even though t h e r e s p o n d e n t was i n c o n t r o l of t h e p r o p e r t y . I t cannot be d i s p u t e d ; t h e a p p e l l a n t h e l d an i n t e r e s t i n income-generating p r o p e r t y . T h a t income, of which s h e had an i n t e r e s t , was r e i n - v e s t e d to a c q u i r e more assets. It f o l l o w s t h a t she also h a s an i n t e r e s t i n t h o s e a d d i t i o n a l assets. I n e f f e c t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d to v a l u e a l l of t h e marital assets, c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e case must be remanded. T e f f t v. T e f f t ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. I 628 P.2d 1094, 38 St.Rep. 837; Hamiton v. Hamilton ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . - - - .- , 607 P.2d 10 2, 37 St.Rep. 247. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s were purchased i n p a r t from t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s own e a r n i n g s . A l s o , it may be t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t a c q u i r e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s t h r o u g h c a r e f u l and p r u d e n t management. These c o n t r i b u t i o n s d e s e r v e c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . F i n a l l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r e was a l a c k of can- d o r and d i s c l o s u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e r e s p o n d e n t i n f a i l i n g to or i n t e n t i o n a l l y r e f u s i n g to p r o v i d e i n £ ormat i o n concerning t h e a d d i t i o n a l o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s . The record does not substan- t i a t e such a claim. Presumably t h e a p p e l l a n t hoped to g e t t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e day of t r i a l through t h e testimony of Robert Nance , t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s b u s i n e s s a s s o c i a t e . It w a s l e a r n e d t h e d a y b e f o r e t r i a l t h a t M r . Nance could n o t a t t e n d , t h u s h u r r i e d a r r a n g e m e n t s were made to t a k e h i s d e p o s i t i o n . During t h e depo- s i t i o n t h e f o l l o w i n g exchange occurred: "Q. Has L a r r y Krause a c q u i r e d o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s i n a d d i t i o n to t h e s e t h a t are set o u t i n t h e s e t h r e e e x h i b i t s t h a t are b e f o r e you s i n c e t h e d a t e of t h e l a s t a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e i n t e r e s t s l i s t e d t h e r e ? A. Oh, boy, I would s a y y e s , b u t I d o n ' t know t h a t f o r a f a c t because I d o n ' t keep up w i t h L a r r y ' s endeavors as f a r as o u r p a r t i c i p a t i o n is con- c e r n e d . I would have t o go back and check o u r blow s h e e t s as t o who g o t what i n what wells. I d o n ' t keep t h a t r i g h t on t h e t i p of my tongue. "Q. Who would have a c c e s s to t h o s e r e c o r d s to d e t e r m i n e t h e a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s t h a t L a r r y would have a c q u i r e d , say s i n c e May of 1978? A. W e l l , my bookkeeper would. "Q. What is h e r name? A. Marlene Conrad ." Then, t h e morning of t h e t r i a l , M r . Nance's bookkeeper w a s s e r v e d w i t h a subpoena duces tecum. However, t h e bookkeeper d i d n o t appear w i t h t h e d e s i r e d documents because she f e l t s h e d i d n o t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o produce t h e r e c o r d s of M r . Nance. The a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r s o u g h t t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e r e s p o n d e n t d u r i n g t r i a l where t h e f o l l o w i n g exchange o c c u r r e d : " 8 . Have you a c q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l producing i n t e r e s t s from income t h a t was g e n e r a t e d from t h o s e o r i g i n a l 20 w e l l s ? A. Income from t h o s e wells and income t h a t I ' v e made on con- s u l t i n g , y e s . I have a c q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l wells. "Q. Do you know how many a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s you have a c q u i r e d ? A. Not j u s t o f f h a n d . I would be g u e s s i n g what it is, because I r e a l l y don' t know f o r s u r e . "Q. Would it be more t h a n 20? A. N o . "Q. Would it be less t h a n t e n ? A. I would s a y between 1 0 and 20, somewhere i n t h a t range." These f a c t s t a k e n t o g e t h e r c e r t a i n l y do not s u b s t a n t i a t e a l a c k of candor or d i s c l o s u r e . A review of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i l e c e r t a i n l y shows o t h e r w i s e . S i m i l a r i n f o r m a t i o n w a s s o u g h t by t h e a p p e l l a n t e a r l y i n t h e a c t i o n through t h e use of i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . The r e s p o n d e n t ' s answers were v e r y complete i n t h o s e e a r l y i n s t a n c e s and t h e r e is nothing t o s u g g e s t t h a t a t t r i a l he would n o t have been as complete g i v e n a d e q u a t e t i m e to p r e p a r e t h e in£ ormat i o n . The judgment is vacated and remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . We concur: