Title: Lippmann v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau
Citation: 55 N.W.2d 453
Docket Number: 7325
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 1952

55 N.W.2d 453 (1952) LIPPMANN v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU. No. 7325. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 30, 1952. Rehearing Denied November 21, 1952. *454 *455 E. T. Christianson, Atty. Gen., and Paul M. Sand, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. McGee &amp; McGee, Minot, for respondent. CHRISTIANSON, Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The proceeding was instituted by the claimant to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state. NDRC 1943, Title 65. The claimant had been employed as a waitress by the Rex Cafe at Minot. On January 15, 1950, while so employed and while in the active discharge of her duties as such employee she was shot and severely wounded by one Aga, who at the time was sitting at a counter where customers were being served food which they had ordered. Aga had been drinking a cup of coffee, which had been served him by one of the other waitresses. Immediately after firing the shot at the claimant Aga shot and killed himself. The claimant in the ordinary course of her duties would take orders from patrons at the counter and booths as well as carry dishes to and from the kitchen. The Rex Cafe was located close to the bus depot and within one-half block of the depot of the Great Northern Railway Company. The claimant testified as follows concerning the shooting: The Rex Cafe, the employer of the claimant, had duly complied with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law of North Dakota. NDRC 1943, 65-0105. The claim was dismissed by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau "for the reason that the injury did not happen in the course of the employment or because of her employment." Plaintiff thereupon duly appealed to the District Court from the determination of the Bureau. In the specifications of error in the notice of appeal exception was made to the finding of fact that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff *456 on January 15, 1950, did not happen in the course of employment or because of her employment and it was also specified that the Workmen's. Compensation Bureau erred in its conclusion of law that the injuries did not happen in the course of employment or because of her employment. The procedure and the scope of review on such appeal from a determination of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau is prescribed by NDRC 1943, 28-3219, which, so far as material here, reads as follows: The trial court after hearing and due consideration rendered its decision reversing the determination of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau. The court found as facts: From the facts found the court drew conclusions of law that the injury sustained by the claimant was an injury arising in the course of employment; that she was entitled to compensation as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law and that the order entered by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau should be reversed *457 and compensation awarded to the claimant for the injuries sustained by her. The Workmen's Compensation Bureau has appealed to this court from the judgment of the District Court and demanded a review of the entire case in this Court. In our opinion the determination of the District Court is clearly correct and the judgment appealed from must be affirmed. The North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Law provides: It is undisputed that at the time of the injury the claimant was an employee of the Rex Cafe, that she was on the premises where her services were to be performed and was actively engaged in the performance of the work she was employed to perform at the time she sustained the injury; but it is contended by the appellant that it was incumbent upon the claimant to establish that the act of the assailant was directed against her because of her employment, and that the claimant has failed to establish that the assault upon her by Aga was directed against her because of her employment. In appellant's brief on this appeal it is said: In American Jurisprudence it is said: "The phrase `in the course of the employment,' as used in compensation acts in reference to the relation of the injury to the employment in respect of the time and place of its occurrence, is usually given the commonlaw meaning thereof, or of the substantially equivalent phrase `scope of the employment,' as used in the law of master and servant, in the absence of other language requiring that it be given a different meaning. Accordingly, it may be stated as a very general proposition that an injury occurs `in the course of' the employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties, and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto, or as sometimes stated, where he is engaged in the furtherance of the employer's business." (Italics supplied.) 58 Am.Juris., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 212, pp. 720-721. See, also, 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Law, 2d ed., Sec. 262; 6 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, Permanent ed., Sec. 1542, p. 19 et seq.; Michigan Transit Corp. v. Brown, D.C., 56 F.2d 200; Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, 127 P.2d 496; McKinney v. Dorlac, 48 N.Mex. 149, 146 P.2d 867. In Novack v. Montgomery Ward &amp; Co., 158 Minn. 495, 498, 198 N.W. 290, 292, the court said: In the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act the Legislature prescribed only one condition or element that must exist in order to render an injury to an employee compensable under the Act, namely, that the injury must have arisen "in the course of employment". This is the only condition prescribed by the statute and this has been recognized by the decisions of this Court. O'Leary v. North Dak. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 62 *459 N.D. 457, 243 N.W. 805; Moug v. North Dak. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 70 N.D. 656, 661, 297 N.W. 129; McKinnon v. North Dak. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 71 N.D. 228, 299 N.W. 856; Welch v. North Dak. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 75 N.D. 608, 31 N.W.2d 498. In O'Leary v. North Dak. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, supra, this Court said [62 N.D. 457, 243 N.W. 807]: In McKinnon v. North Dak. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 71 N.D. 228, 230, 299 N.W. 856, 857, this Court said: "There is a distinction between a physical injury occurring in the course of employment and a disease approximately caused by the employment. A compensable injury need not arise out of the employment, nor be caused by the employment. However, the injury is compensable if received in the course of employment. But a disease from which a worker dies must be one approximately caused by the employment in order to be compensable." The undisputed facts in the present case, under the established principles and the above-cited authorities, make it clear that the injury sustained by the claimant as a result of the attack made upon her on January 15, 1950, in the Rex Cafe in the City of Minot in this state was "an injury arising in the course of employment." At the time the injury was inflicted the claimant was an employee in the Rex Cafe, she was at the place where her labor was to be performed, she was engaged in the performance of the labor for which she had been employed. The North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act, NDRC 1943, 65-0102 (8), provides that "`Injury' shall mean only an injury arising in the course of employment including an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment". Appellant contends that the portion which we have italicized was intended to limit the coverage of the statute. In short, it is appellant's contention that an employee who at the time and place where he is required to perform his work and while actively engaged in the performance of the very work he was employed to perform sustains "an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against [him] because of his employment" is deprived of the protection of the statute and is not entitled to compensation unless and until he establishes that such willful act of such third person was directed against him because of his employment. In our opinion this contention is unfounded. We think that this provision evidences an intention to enlarge the operation and *460 coverage of the statute rather than to limit the same. The language of the provision indicates that the legislature intended to extend the coverage of the law and to make certain injuries compensable which might not or would not have been compensable unless it was provided, as the legislature did, that the term "injury" should include "an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment". Some compensation statutes contain provisions expressly excluding injuries caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee or because of his employment. 58 Am.Juris., Workmen's Compensation, p. 767. But the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Law contains no such provision. It does not say that such injuries shall be excluded from the operation of the statute. Neither does it say that an injury to an employee arising in the course of employment "caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee" shall be excluded from the operation of the act. But the statute does say that the term "injury" shall include "an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment". It is a matter of history that employees may be assaulted and injured because of their employment at some distance from the premises where they work and while they are not actively engaged in the performance of the services which they were employed to perform. This may be so for instance during strikes. Pinkerton Nat. Detective Agency v. Walker, 157 Ga. 548, at pages 550-551, 122 S.E. 202, at page 203, 35 A.L.R. at page 560. Likewise, in other cases an employee may be assaulted, injured and even killed because of his employment while not on the premises where his services are to be performed and while he is not actively engaged in the performance of such services. Scholl v. Industrial Commission, 366 Ill. 588, 10 N.E.2d 360, 112 A.L.R. 1254. We think it was the intention and purpose of the legislature to enlarge and extend the coverage of the statute and to afford compensation to an employee for an injury which such employee might sustain because of his employment even though he was not on the premises where his actual work was to be or was being performed and was not actively engaged in such work, but the injury was inflicted upon him because of his employment; and that the legislature thought it was as desirable and as proper that the industry should carry such off-hour risk as it was that it should carry the working-hour risk. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, 71 App.D.C. 160, 107 F.2d 959, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had occasion to deal with and construe a provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, United States Statute at Large, Vol. 44, pt. 2, Public Laws, 69th Congress, Chap. 509, p. 1424, Sec. 2(2); 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. (made applicable in the District of Columbia by D.C.Code, tit. 19, c. 2, sections 11, 12, 45 Stat. 600), which is quite similar to the provision involved here. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act reads as follows: "Sec. 2. When used in this Act * * * In that case, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, supra, an employee of an insurance company who made collections of industrial and other insurance premiums was found lying in a dazed condition by the roadside early one morning. His face was beaten and swollen. He died as the result of his injuries. The deputy commissioner sustained the claim for compensation in *461 favor of the decedent's widow. The deputy commissioner found, among other things, that the "assault and robbery were directed against him because of the said employment; that the injury and death arose out of and in the course of the employment." In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia the insurer contended that the evidence did not support such findings. In disposing of the contentions advanced in that case the court said: What was thus said by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in its opinion in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, supra, is applicable here. The claimant's presence at the time and place the injury was inflicted upon her was a necessary part of her employment, and in the prevailing circumstances she was exposed to the attack that took place. She was performing service which she was employed to perform at that time and place. The time when and the place where the happening occurred and the attending circumstances, none of which is disputed, demonstrate to an absolute certainty that the claimant at the time of the injury was acting in the course of her employment and consequently the injury which she sustained did arise in the course of her employment. Giracelli v. Franklin Cleaners &amp; Dyers, 132 N.J.L. 590, 42 A.2d 3. See, also, Louie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. MORRIS, C. J., and SATHRE, BURKE, and GRIMSON, JJ., concur.