Title: Bass v. City of Richmond Police Dept.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 980612
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CLAUDE A. BASS, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 980612 
 
CITY OF RICHMOND 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 
    OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  June 11, 1999 
JOHN B. PATTON, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 980861 
 
LOUDOUN COUNTY BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS 
 
 
CITY OF HOPEWELL, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 982126 
 
MICHAEL W. TIRPAK 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
We consolidated for argument three workers' compensation 
appeals from the Court of Appeals.  All three cases present the 
question whether the Workers' Compensation Commission properly 
concluded that the employers failed to present sufficient 
evidence to overcome the occupational disease presumption 
established in Code § 65.2-402(B).  The facts in the three cases 
differ and will be described separately. 
 
Code § 65.2-402(B) of the Virginia Workers' Compensation 
Act provides, in relevant part: 
Hypertension or heart disease causing the death of, or 
any health condition or impairment resulting in total 
or partial disability of . . . (iii) members of 
county, city or town police departments [and] (iv) 
sheriffs and deputy sheriffs . . . shall be presumed 
to be occupational diseases, suffered in the line of 
duty, that are covered by this title unless such 
presumption is overcome by a preponderance of 
competent evidence to the contrary. 
 
BASS v. CITY OF RICHMOND POLICE DEPARTMENT 
 
In October 1994, Claude A. Bass, Jr., suffered a temporary 
loss of vision in his left eye and was diagnosed with 
atherosclerotic blockages of his left carotid and right iliac 
arteries.  He underwent surgery to correct these conditions and 
was unable to work for about one month after the operation.  At 
the time, Bass was a police captain in the City of Richmond 
Police Department (the employer), where he had worked since 
1964.  He had been diagnosed with hypertension in the early 
1970's and had taken medication for that condition since the 
mid-1980's. 
In April 1996, Bass filed a claim for workers' compensation 
benefits under Code § 65.2-402(B), seeking temporary total 
disability benefits for his hypertension and vascular disease.  
At a hearing before a deputy commissioner, Bass presented 
evidence from Dr. Nicolas P. Tulou, his treating physician, who 
first stated that Bass' employment "in large measure" 
contributed to his hypertension and vascular disease, but later 
testified that job stress was only a "plausible" factor in the 
development of his condition.  Dr. Tulou also stated that 
 
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several non-work-related "risk factors" were present in Bass' 
case, including a family history of heart disease, a lengthy 
history of cigarette smoking, high blood cholesterol levels, and 
excess weight. 
Dr. Ronald K. Davis, a vascular surgeon who treated Bass, 
stated that the probable causes of Bass' condition were "genetic 
and environmental," but that he could not "rule out" 
occupational stress as a contributing factor.  Dr. Michael L. 
Hess, a cardiologist who reviewed Bass' medical records at the 
request of the employer, stated that "it was extremely difficult 
to incriminate" job stress as the cause of Bass' condition. 
 
The deputy commissioner awarded Bass compensation benefits, 
and the Commission affirmed the award, noting that Bass 
presented medical evidence that occupational stress "played some 
part" in the development of his condition, and that there was 
"no medical evidence to the contrary."  The Commission agreed 
with the deputy commissioner's conclusion "that, on a somewhat 
conflicting record, the claimant's evidence was sufficient to 
bring him within the purview of the presumption." 
 
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
Commission's award of benefits and dismissed Bass' claim.  City 
of Richmond Police Dept. v. Bass, 26 Va. App. 121, 493 S.E.2d 
661 (1997).  The Court noted that two physicians attributed 
Bass' condition to a genetic cause.  Id. at 134, 493 S.E.2d at 
 
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667.  The Court stated that, "[u]nder the standard set forth in 
[Augusta County Sheriff's Dept. v. Overbey, 254 Va. 522, 492 
S.E.2d 631 (1997)], this evidence of a genetic cause 
sufficiently rebutted the statutory presumption that claimant's 
heart disease is work-related."  Bass, 26 Va. App. at 134, 493 
S.E.2d at 667.  The Court held that Bass failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence, under Code § 65.2-401, that his 
disease arose out of and in the course of his employment.  Id. 
at 135, 493 S.E.2d at 667. 
PATTON v. LOUDOUN COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
 
In July 1994, John B. Patton, Jr., suffered a myocardial 
infarction, or "heart attack," and underwent emergency cardiac 
catheterization and angioplasty.  The symptoms of the heart 
attack began while Patton was working on the patrol division 
evening shift in the Loudoun County Sheriff's Department (the 
employer), where he had been employed for about 14 years.  
Patton later had a recurrence of chest pain and, as a result, 
had coronary artery bypass surgery. 
 
Patton later filed a workers' compensation claim seeking 
temporary total disability benefits for his heart disease.  At a 
hearing before a deputy commissioner, Patton introduced evidence 
from Dr. Carey M. Marder, his treating cardiologist.  Dr. Marder 
noted that Patton had "multiple cardiovascular risk factors," 
 
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including a past history of cigarette smoking, a history of 
adult onset diabetes, hypertension, a positive family history 
for heart disease, and high cholesterol levels in his blood.  
Dr. Marder stated that it was difficult to say how much of 
Patton's coronary artery disease was related to the stress of 
his employment, because "[s]tress as an independent risk factor 
is very difficult to quantitate." 
Dr. Richard A. Schwartz stated that occupational stress, 
hypertension, a history of cigarette smoking, and possibly 
diabetes, were identifiable factors causing Patton's heart 
disease.  Dr. Schwartz explained that coronary artery disease is 
a "multifactorial process" and that none of the above factors 
could be specifically implicated or excluded. 
The employer presented the opinion of Dr. Stuart F. Seides, 
a cardiologist, who stated that although Patton experienced the 
onset of his heart attack while on duty as a police officer, "it 
is highly likely that [the heart attack] would have occurred in 
or around the same time frame regardless of his activities."  
Dr. Seides stated that the presence of atherosclerosis is the 
most important factor in the development of a myocardial 
infarction, and that the "relationship of occupation to the 
development of atherosclerosis is virtually nil." 
The deputy commissioner awarded benefits to Patton.  The 
Commission affirmed the award, holding that the employer had not 
 
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excluded work-related stress as a contributing cause of the 
claimant's heart disease.  The Commission noted that both Dr. 
Marder and Dr. Schwartz concluded that "occupational stress was 
one of the [causative] factors in the claimant's heart disease." 
 
While the employer's appeal of the Commission's decision 
was pending in the Court of Appeals, this Court decided the 
Overbey case.  Patton then filed a petition asking the Court of 
Appeals to remand the entire case to the Commission for 
reconsideration "under the Overbey standard."  Citing Overbey, 
the Court of Appeals held in an unpublished order that "the 
evidence of claimant's risk factors and the medical opinions 
offered constituted 'competent medical evidence of a non-work-
related cause' sufficient to rebut the presumption."  Board of 
Supervisors v. Patton, Record No. 2015-97-4 (Feb. 6, 1998).  
However, since the Court was unable to determine whether Patton 
had proved "by clear and convincing evidence that his heart 
disease arose out of and in the course of his employment," the 
Court remanded the case to the Commission to make specific 
findings regarding the credibility of conflicting medical 
evidence.  Id.
CITY OF HOPEWELL v. MICHAEL W. TIRPAK 
 
In February 1995, Michael W. Tirpak had a "stress test" as 
part of a routine physical examination scheduled by his 
employer, the City of Hopewell Police Department (the employer).  
 
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During the test, Tirpak experienced a burning sensation in his 
chest and shortness of breath, and an electrocardiogram revealed 
some coronary abnormalities.  A cardiac catheterization showed 
blockages in three of his coronary arteries.  As a result, 
Tirpak had coronary artery bypass surgery.  At the time of 
surgery, Tirpak was a supervising sergeant of the evening patrol 
shift for the City of Hopewell Police Department, where he had 
been employed since 1973. 
 
Tirpak filed a claim for temporary total disability 
benefits based on his heart disease.  At a hearing before a 
deputy commissioner, Tirpak presented evidence from his treating 
cardiologist, Dr. Ashok Kumar, who stated that Tirpak had a 30-
year history of smoking cigarettes, and that he had a family 
history of premature coronary artery disease.  Dr. Kumar also 
stated that he could not exclude job-related stress as a cause 
of Tirpak's heart disease.  Dr. J. James Zocco, the cardiac 
surgeon who performed Tirpak's surgery, stated that work-related 
stress could not be excluded as a contributing factor in 
Tirpak's heart disease.  Dr. Zocco also stated that Tirpak had 
other coronary risk factors, including a family history of heart 
disease, a 30-year history of smoking cigarettes, hypertension, 
and elevated blood cholesterol levels. 
The employer presented evidence from Dr. Stuart F. Seides, 
a cardiologist who reviewed Tirpak's medical records.  Noting 
 
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Tirpak's several "risk factors," Dr. Seides stated that Tirpak's 
employment had "nothing whatsoever" to do with his coronary 
artery disease.  The employer also presented evidence from Dr. 
Jack Freund, a specialist in internal medicine who reviewed 
Tirpak's medical records.  Dr. Freund stated that, based on 
Tirpak's non-work-related "risk factors" for coronary artery 
disease, Tirpak's heart disease and heart attack "would have 
occurred no matter what type of employment he was engaged in." 
 
The deputy commissioner awarded Tirpak benefits, and the 
Commission affirmed the award, stating that it gave greater 
weight to the opinion of the treating physicians, who had stated 
that they could not exclude employment-related stress as one of 
the contributing factors.  The Commission stated that "[t]he 
employer fails to rebut the [statutory] presumption where a work 
related factor such as occupational stress is not excluded." 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission's 
language "indicated" that it had applied an incorrect standard, 
which required the employer to exclude the possibility of a 
work-related cause of Tirpak's disease without regard to whether 
he had presented evidence of such a causal link.  City of 
Hopewell v. Tirpak, 28 Va. App. 100, 111-12, 502 S.E.2d 161, 
166-67 (1998).  The Court vacated the award of benefits and 
remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings on 
 
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the issue whether the employer had overcome the statutory 
presumption.  Id. at 129, 502 S.E.2d at 175. 
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION 
 
 
In Code § 65.2-402(B), the legislature included 
"[h]ypertension or heart disease" among those diseases that 
"shall be presumed to be occupational diseases . . . unless such 
presumption is overcome by a preponderance of competent evidence 
to the contrary."  In Page v. City of Richmond, 218 Va. 844, 
847, 241 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1978), we explained that the purpose 
of the statutory presumption is to establish by law, in the 
absence of evidence, a causal connection between certain 
occupations and death or disability resulting from specified 
diseases.  We held that a claimant firefighter was entitled to 
compensation benefits because his employer had failed to 
overcome the statutory presumption by showing both that 1) the 
claimant's disease was not caused by his employment, and 2) 
there was a non-work-related cause of the disease.  Id. at 847-
48, 241 S.E.2d at 777. 
We again applied this two-part test in Fairfax County Fire 
& Rescue Servs. v. Newman, 222 Va. 535, 281 S.E.2d 897 (1981).  
There, a firefighter who developed sarcoidosis, a disease 
affecting the lungs, relied on the statutory presumption of 
occupational disease provided by former Code § 65.1-47.1.  The 
employer produced medical testimony that the firefighter's 
 
9
employment did not cause his disease, but the employer failed to 
present any medical evidence of a non-work-related cause of the 
disabling disease.  Since the employer failed to prove one of 
the two elements required to overcome the statutory presumption, 
we upheld the Commission's award of benefits.  Id. at 539, 281 
S.E.2d at 900; see also Berry v. County of Henrico, 219 Va. 259, 
265, 247 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1978). 
In Doss v. Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Dep't., 229 Va. 
440, 331 S.E.2d 795 (1985), we applied the two-part test to a 
firefighter's claim for benefits for a respiratory disease.  The 
claimant relied on the statutory presumption and presented no 
evidence to counter the employer's medical evidence that 1) the 
claimant's job did not cause his respiratory disability, and 2) 
the claimant's condition was "more than likely a hereditary 
phenomenon."  Id. at 441-42, 331 S.E.2d at 795-96.  We held that 
the Commission did not err in ruling that the employer presented 
sufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption, and 
that the evidence concerning a "hereditary" cause was sufficient 
to meet the Page requirement that the employer produce evidence 
of a non-work-related cause of the disease.  Id. at 442-43, 331 
S.E.2d at 796-97. 
In Overbey, the employer acknowledged the applicability of 
the two-part test by conceding that, to overcome the statutory 
presumption of Code § 65.2-402(B), the employer was required "to 
 
10
establish a non-work-related cause for [the claimant's] heart 
condition and that job stress was not the cause."  254 Va. at 
526, 492 S.E.2d at 633.  The claimant contended, however, that 
the presumption also imposed on the employer the burden of 
"producing a preponderance of evidence excluding the possibility 
that his heart disease was work related."  Id.
In rejecting the claimant's contention, we quoted from 
Doss, stating that, to overcome the statutory presumption, the 
employer merely "must adduce competent medical evidence of a 
non-work-related cause of the disabling disease."  Overbey, 254 
Va. at 527, 492 S.E.2d at 634 (quoting Doss, 229 Va. at 442, 331 
S.E.2d at 796).  This quotation was made in the context of our 
holding that, to overcome the statutory presumption of Code 
§ 65.2-402(B), an employer is not required to exclude the 
possibility that job stress may have been a contributing factor 
in the development of a claimant's heart disease.  Id. at 527, 
492 S.E.2d at 634.  However, because that quotation did not 
discuss both parts of the two-part test applied in Page and our 
other decisions, some confusion has resulted regarding the 
viability of both parts of that test.  To clarify this matter, 
we reaffirm the two-part test employed in Page and our other 
decisions cited above concerning the elements of proof necessary 
to overcome the statutory presumption of Code § 65.2-402(B). 
 
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The claimant in Overbey relied on the statutory presumption 
of Code § 65.2-402(B) and did not present any medical evidence.  
The employer presented medical evidence showing that 1) the 
claimant's job was not a cause of his heart disease, and 2) the 
disease was caused by several "risk factors," including a 
history of heavy cigarette smoking, elevated cholesterol, a 
family history of heart disease, and diabetes mellitus.  Id. at 
525, 492 S.E.2d at 633.  Thus, our holding in Overbey 
effectively applied the two-part test used in Page, while 
rejecting the claimant's attempt to add another requirement to 
the employer's statutory burden for overcoming the presumption 
established by Code § 65.2-402(B). 
ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE UNDER CODE § 65.2-402(B) 
Under the statutory language, the employer may overcome the 
presumption by producing "a preponderance of competent evidence 
to the contrary."  Code § 65.2-402(B).  To overcome the 
presumption the employer must show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, both that 1) the claimant's disease was not caused by 
his employment, and 2) there was a non-work-related cause of the 
disease.  See Newman, 222 Va. at 539, 281 S.E.2d at 899-900; 
Page, 218 Va. at 847-48, 241 S.E.2d at 777.  Thus, if the 
employer does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence both 
parts of this two-part test, the employer has failed to overcome 
the statutory presumption.  Id.
 
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The determination whether the employer has met this burden 
is made by the Commission after exercising its role as finder of 
fact.  In this role, the Commission resolves all conflicts in 
the evidence and determines the weight to be accorded the 
various evidentiary submissions.  "The award of the Commission 
. . . shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of 
fact."  Code § 65.2-706(A); Falls Church Constr. Co. v. Laidler, 
254 Va. 474, 478-79, 493 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1997); Ivey v. Puckett 
Constr. Co., 230 Va. 486, 488, 338 S.E.2d 640, 641 (1986). 
In providing that the statutory presumption may be overcome 
by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, Code § 65.2-
402(B) implicitly directs the Commission as finder of fact to 
consider all evidence on the issue of causation presented by the 
claimant, as well as by the employer.  When the Commission 
determines that the employer has failed to overcome the 
statutory presumption, the claimant is entitled to an award of 
benefits under the Act.  See Code §§ 65.2-400 to -407. 
On appeal from this determination, the reviewing court must 
assess whether there is credible evidence to support the 
Commission's award.  Celanese Fibers Co. v. Johnson, 229 Va. 
117, 121, 326 S.E.2d 687, 690 (1985); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 
13 Va. App. 357, 361, 412 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1991).  Thus, unlike 
the Commission, the reviewing court is not charged with 
determining anew whether the employer's evidence of causation 
 
13
should be accorded sufficient weight to constitute a 
preponderance of the evidence on that issue.  See Celanese 
Fibers Co., 229 Va. at 121, 326 S.E.2d at 690; Caskey v. Dan 
River Mills, Inc., 225 Va. 405, 411, 302 S.E.2d 507, 510-11 
(1983); Macica v. ARA Servs. Tidewater Vending, 26 Va. App. 36, 
41, 492 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1997); Shawnee Management Corp. v. 
Hamilton, 25 Va. App. 672, 679, 492 S.E.2d 456, 459 (1997). 
BASS v. CITY OF RICHMOND POLICE DEPARTMENT 
PATTON v. LOUDOUN COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we disagree with the 
employers' assertion that, since undisputed evidence showed 
there were non-work-related causes of both claimants' heart 
disease, this evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to 
overcome the statutory presumption.  As we have stated, to 
overcome the statutory presumption, the employer must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence both that 1) the claimant's 
disease was not caused by his employment, and 2) there was a 
non-work-related cause of the disease.  See Newman, 222 Va. at 
539, 281 S.E.2d at 899-900; Page, 218 Va. at 847-48, 241 S.E.2d 
at 777.  Thus, we conclude that the evidence of non-work-related 
causes of Bass' and Patton's heart disease, standing alone, did 
not overcome the statutory presumption, because that evidence 
satisfied only one part of the two-part test. 
 
14
We disagree, however, with the claimants' assertions that 
the records in their cases permit us to enter final judgment 
reinstating the Commission's awards.  In both cases, the 
Commission failed to address the applicable two-part test and 
state whether the employer had met its statutory burden to 
overcome the presumption of Code § 65.2-402(B) by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Therefore, we will reverse both 
judgments of the Court of Appeals, vacate the Commission's 
awards, and remand the cases to the Court of Appeals for remand 
to the Commission to reconsider the evidence presented in 
accordance with the principles expressed in this opinion. 
CITY OF HOPEWELL v. TIRPAK 
The employer first contends that the Court of Appeals erred 
in upholding the Commission's determination that the claimant's 
evidence established a communication of occupational disease on 
February 17, 1995.  We disagree with this contention, because 
the Commission's factual findings are binding on appeal.  See 
Code § 65.2-706(A); Falls Church Constr. Co. v. Laidler, 254 Va. 
at 478-79, 493 S.E.2d at 524; Ivey v. Puckett Constr. Co., 230 
Va. at 488, 338 S.E.2d at 641.  Here, the Commission relied on 
the claimant's testimony that Dr. Kumar told him on that date 
that his heart disease was caused by "stress on the job."  Since 
the Commission accepted the claimant's testimony on this issue, 
 
15
we conclude that the Court of Appeals properly refused to 
disturb the Commission's factual finding on appeal. 
The employer next asserts that the Court of Appeals 
"ignored the concession by Tirpak that Hopewell had rebutted the 
heart disease presumption."  We disagree with the employer's 
argument, because the record shows that Tirpak conceded only 
that "non-work-related causes [of his disease] were adduced by 
the employer."  He made no further concession, but merely 
addressed the proper outcome of the case in the event the Court 
of Appeals concluded that the employer had overcome the 
presumption. 
Next, we disagree with the employer's argument that it 
would be denied due process if the statutory presumption is 
upheld in the face of credible evidence of non-work-related 
causes of the claimant's disease.  In Newman, we stated that, by 
establishing the statutory presumption, the legislature made a 
public policy judgment allocating to the employer a burden of 
proof that carried the ultimate risk of non-persuasion.  222 Va. 
at 541, 281 S.E.2d at 901.  We explained that the legislature's 
decision "to cast that burden upon the employer infringes no 
constitutional right," because the employer may introduce 
evidence to overcome the statutory presumption.  Id.  Thus, the 
employer's right of due process is not violated by requiring it 
 
16
to produce a preponderance of the evidence in accordance with 
the two-part test set forth above. 
We also find no merit in the employer's central contention 
in this appeal, that the employer met the burden of proof set 
forth in Overbey to overcome the statutory presumption by 
proving a non-work-related cause of Tirpak's disease.  As stated 
above, proof by a preponderance of the evidence of a non-work-
related cause of a claimant's disease satisfies only one part of 
the two-part test applied in Overbey and several of our earlier 
decisions.  To overcome the statutory presumption, the employer 
must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
claimant's disease was not caused by his employment.  See 
Newman, 222 Va. at 539, 281 S.E.2d at 899-900; Page, 218 Va. at 
847-48, 241 S.E.2d at 777. 
Although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' 
characterization of the Commission's decision, we observe that 
the Commission did not state whether the employer met the 
required two-part test in accordance with its statutory burden 
of producing a preponderance of the evidence to overcome the 
presumption.  Therefore, on remand, the Commission will be 
required to reconsider the evidence under that standard. 
Finally, we note that we have considered the remaining 
assignments of error raised by the employer.  We conclude that 
they do not require discussion because they are resolved by our 
 
17
earlier analysis in this opinion, are beyond the scope of the 
judgment appealed from, or are without merit. 
For these reasons, we will affirm that part of the Court of 
Appeals' judgment addressing the issues of subject matter 
jurisdiction,* due process, date of communication of occupational 
disease, and the absence of a concession by Tirpak regarding the 
statutory presumption.  We will vacate the balance of the Court 
of Appeals' judgment, vacate the Commission's award of benefits 
to Tirpak, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for 
remand to the Commission to reconsider the evidence presented in 
accordance with the principles expressed in this opinion. 
Record No. 980612 Reversed and remanded. 
Record No. 980861 Reversed and remanded.
                         Record No. 982126 Affirmed in part,
 
 
 
 
   vacated in part,
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
                     
 
*In its brief filed in this case, the employer withdrew its 
assignment of error challenging the Commission's subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
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