Title: Oregon v. Meiser
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S068327
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 22, 2022

No. 6	
March 22, 2022	
347
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ERIK JOHN MEISER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC CR1201547) (CA A166534) (SC S068327)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 23, 2021.
Daniel J. Casey, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public 
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Ernest 
G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Thomas Stenson, Disability Rights Oregon, Portland, 
filed the briefs on behalf of amicus curiae Disability Rights 
Oregon.
Before Walters, C.J., and Balmer, Flynn, Duncan, Nelson 
and Garrett, JJ.**
FLYNN, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, 
and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings.
______________
	
*   Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Katherine E. Weber, 
Judge. 308 Or App 570, 481 P3d 375 (2021).
	
**  Nakamoto, J., retired December 31, 2021, and did not participate in the 
decision of this case. DeHoog, J., did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.
348	
State v. Meiser
Cite as 369 Or 347 (2022)	
349
	
FLYNN, J.
	
Defendant, who has been diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia and a co-occurring antisocial personality disorder, 
contends that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred 
in its understanding of the evidence required to establish 
that he was guilty except for insanity (GEI) with respect 
to charges of murder. GEI is an affirmative defense that 
requires proof that, “as a result of mental disease or defect,” 
the defendant “lacks substantial capacity either to appreci-
ate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct 
to the requirements of law.” ORS 161.295(1) (2011), amended 
by Or Laws 2017, ch 634, § 3.1 But “the terms ‘mental dis-
ease or defect’ do not include * 
* 
* any abnormality constitut-
ing solely a personality disorder.” ORS 161.295(2). The par-
ties agree that schizophrenia is a “mental disease or defect” 
within the meaning of ORS 161.295, and they agree that 
defendant’s co-occurring antisocial personality disorder is 
a “personality disorder” within the meaning of the statute. 
But they disagree about whether ORS 161.295 requires 
proof that defendant experienced the requisite incapacity 
solely “as a result of” his schizophrenia, and not in any part 
as a result of his co-occurring antisocial personality disor-
der. As explained below, we conclude that the legislature 
intended to specify that a co-occurring disorder that is solely 
a personality disorder is excluded from the “mental disease 
or defect” that forms the basis for a GEI defense, but the 
legislature did not intend to require proof that a co-occur-
ring personality disorder played no causal role in bringing 
about the requisite lack of substantial capacity. That con-
clusion resolves the issue on which we allowed review, but 
it leaves unresolved additional legal and factual questions 
	
1  The 2011 version of the statute applies in defendant’s case, and we cite 
that statute without reference to a year in the remainder of this opinion. The 
legislature amended ORS 161.295 in 2017 by replacing the term “mental disease 
or defect” with the term “qualifying mental disorder.” Or Laws 2017, ch 634, § 3. 
The preamble to the 2017 amendments indicates that the legislation intended to 
replace the term “mental disease or defect,” which “may carry a negative conno-
tation,” with an updated term, “while preserving the validity of all previous court 
decisions interpreting” the prior wording and “without making a substantive 
change to Oregon law.” Id., preamble. Although we are mindful of the negative 
connotations of the term “mental disease or defect,” it is the applicable statutory 
term in this case, and, because it would be confusing to do otherwise, we use it 
throughout this opinion.
350	
State v. Meiser
regarding defendant’s proof of causation and incapacity. We 
remand the case to the Court of Appeals to address those 
 
questions.
I.  BACKGROUND
	
Defendant, who has been diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia and antisocial personality disorder, killed FH 
during a home-invasion robbery. At the time, defendant was 
suffering from multiple delusions, including the belief that 
his children were in danger because “poorer people were 
being harvested.” Defendant believed that the only way to 
protect his children was to own property, and he set out to 
steal $40,000 for a down payment on a “condo.” Defendant 
first broke into a martial arts studio, looking for a person 
whom he believed might be a source of money. No one was 
in the building, but defendant found and stole a samurai 
sword.
	
After stealing the sword, defendant decided to rob 
FH and his wife. Defendant later told a detective that he 
targeted FH and his wife because voices—“these people 
who follow me constantly”—told him that “the only way” he 
would “ever get any money is through this course of action.” 
Defendant waited until he saw FH and his wife leave their 
house and then entered it to wait for them to return. His 
plan was to have “a discussion about the ailments of soci-
ety” and then have them transfer $40,000 to defendant. He 
did not plan to harm anyone, but he took a machete from 
the victims’ workbench to intimidate them. When the vic-
tims returned home and found defendant, both victims pan-
icked and ran outside. Defendant pursued FH and struck 
him multiple times in the head with the machete. Defendant 
then changed clothes nearby, discarded his bloody jeans, 
and entered the garage of another residence to steal a bicy-
cle to help him escape.
	
The state charged defendant with multiple counts 
of aggravated murder, robbery, and burglary related to the 
invasion of FH’s home, as well as with second-degree bur-
glary counts related to the samurai sword and the bicycle. 
Defendant was repeatedly found to lack the capacity to stand 
trial. He spent nearly four years confined at the Oregon 
Cite as 369 Or 347 (2022)	
351
State Hospital before ultimately being found competent to 
stand trial. Defendant did not dispute that he had commit-
ted the criminal acts for which he had been charged, but he 
asserted the affirmative defense of GEI to all of the charges. 
See ORS 161.295 (setting out the GEI defense); ORS 161.305 
(2011), amended by Or Laws 2017, ch 634, § 5 (specifying that 
“[m]ental disease or defect constituting insanity under ORS 
161.295 is an affirmative defense”). As defined by the legis-
lature, that defense required defendant to prove that, “as a 
result of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in 
criminal conduct,” he “lack[ed] substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the 
conduct to the requirements of law.” ORS 161.295(1). But the 
legislature also specified that “the terms ‘mental disease 
or defect’ do not include * 
* 
* any abnormality constituting 
solely a personality disorder.” ORS 161.295(2).
	
Defendant waived his right to trial by jury and tried 
his case to the court. He offered the testimony of a psycholo-
gist and three psychiatrists, all of whom opined that defen-
dant was suffering from schizophrenia but recognized that 
he had a co-occurring diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder. One of the psychiatrists explained that, as a symp-
tom of defendant’s schizophrenia, defendant experienced 
“command auditory hallucinations”—voices that defen-
dant believed to be telepathic communications from unseen 
 
entities—although defendant did not experience “the kind of 
overwhelming command auditory hallucinations some other 
psychotic individuals have.”
	
Two of the experts addressed the other elements of 
the GEI defense. Both testified that, at the time of the crimes, 
defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of the law. And both testified that, 
if not for the psychosis, defendant would not have committed 
the crimes. One of the experts specifically rejected the sug-
gestion that defendant’s “conduct [was] a result of antisocial 
personality disorder rather than schizophrenia.” The other 
opined that both of defendant’s conditions were “active” at 
the time of the murder but that defendant’s psychosis asso-
ciated with his schizophrenia “was more the predominant 
driver of his behaviors.”
352	
State v. Meiser
	
The state offered no contrary expert testimony, 
but it argued that the expert testimony failed to establish 
the elements of defendant’s GEI defense. With respect to 
causation, the state disputed both the sufficiency of defen-
dant’s evidence and the applicable legal test. The state did 
not dispute that schizophrenia is a “mental disease or defect,” 
but it argued that defendant was required to prove that the 
requisite incapacity “resulted from [that] mental disease [or 
defect] and nothing else” and that, unless the court found 
that incapacity resulted “from solely a mental disease [or 
defect], the Court may not find the defendant guilty except 
insane.” The state insisted that defendant could not prove 
the causation element of his GEI claim. It first argued that 
defendant’s “choices” were not solely the result of his schizo-
phrenia, but “were at least, if not substantially, influenced 
by his anti-social personality disorder.” Second, the state 
argued that the court could find that “neither” condition led 
to defendant’s conduct.
	
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found that 
defendant was guilty except for insanity with respect to 
the charges of burglary and robbery of FH’s home and with 
respect to the earlier burglary of the martial arts studio. 
But the court found that defendant had not proven the GEI 
defense with respect to the murder of FH and the subse-
quent burglary of the garage. As to that conduct, the court 
found defendant guilty of murder, as the lesser included 
offense of aggravated murder, and of second-degree bur-
glary. The court rendered its verdicts without explaining 
whether it had agreed with the state’s proposal that “as a 
result of mental disease or defect” required defendant to 
prove that any incapacity was solely the result of his schizo-
phrenia and without identifying the element or elements of 
the GEI defense that defendant failed to prove with respect 
to the murder and final burglary charges.2
	
2  On appeal, defendant assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his 
verbal request, made after the court announced its verdicts, that the court 
make “findings of fact and conclusions of law.” The Court of Appeals rejected 
that assignment of error, reasoning that “defendant’s generalized request 
did not trigger the trial court’s obligation to address the elements of the GEI 
defense.” State v. Meiser, 308 Or App 570, 591, 481 P3d 375 (2021) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Defendant does not reprise the issue before this 
 
court.
Cite as 369 Or 347 (2022)	
353
	
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of 
Appeals and assigned error to, among other rulings, the trial 
court’s rejection of the GEI defense to the murder charge.3 
With respect to the GEI defense, defendant insisted that the 
state had proposed an incorrect legal test when it argued that 
defendant was required to prove that his incapacity resulted 
“solely” from defendant’s schizophrenia. Although the trial 
court had not specified whether it accepted the state’s test, 
defendant urged the Court of Appeals to conclude that the 
trial court had accepted the state’s understanding that “as 
a result of” in ORS 161.295(1) means “solely” as a result of. 
Under the correct causation test, defendant contended, no 
reasonable factfinder could fail to find that defendant had 
proven the elements of his GEI defense.
	
The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Meiser, 308 
Or App 570, 481 P3d 375 (2021). Because the trial court had 
not identified the element or elements that, in its assess-
ment, defendant had failed to prove, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that defendant could establish error only if he 
established that he was entitled to prevail as a matter of 
law on each element of the defense. Id. at 578. The court 
observed that there was no dispute on appeal that defendant 
had established the first element of the GEI defense: that 
his schizophrenia qualified as a “mental disease or defect” 
under the statute. Id. But the court concluded that defen-
dant had not established that he was entitled to prevail as a 
matter of law on the causation element. Id. at 586. The court 
understood one of its own prior decisions to preclude defen-
dant’s understanding of the causation element. Id. at 581-82 
(citing State v. Peverieri, 192 Or App 229, 232-33, 84 P3d 
1125, rev den, 337 Or 248 (2004)).4 In this case, the court 
observed that defendant had not developed an argument 
for overruling Peverieri and, thus, accepted the state’s prop-
osition “that the requisite incapacity must result from a 
	
3  Defendant did not challenge the trial court’s rejection of his GEI defense on 
the second-degree burglary charge.
	
4  In Peverieri, the court held that the GEI defense was not available to a 
defendant who suffered from chronic liver failure because—even assuming the 
liver condition produced a qualifying “mental disease or defect”—the defen-
dant’s state at the time of the criminal activity “was a result of the mental 
disease or defect and voluntary intoxication.” 192 Or App at 233 (emphasis in 
 
original).
354	
State v. Meiser
qualifying mental disease or defect itself, not from a com-
bination of qualifying and nonqualifying impairments.” 
Meiser, 308 Or App at 577, 581-82.
	
Under that test, the court concluded, the evidence 
permitted the trial court to find that defendant had not 
proven causation. Id. at 585-86. The court reasoned that 
“the evidence permitted the factfinder to conclude, at the 
least, that defendant’s schizophrenia and antisocial person-
ality disorder were both active impairments” and that “[h]is 
compromised capacity could be found[ 
] not to be the result of 
a mental disease or defect.” Id. at 585-86 (emphasis in orig-
inal). The Court of Appeals then discussed the parties’ com-
peting arguments regarding whether the evidence required 
the trial court to find that defendant had been experienc-
ing either form of substantial incapacity at the time of the 
criminal activity, but the court ultimately observed that it 
was “unnecessary to resolve” those arguments in light of its 
conclusion that the trial court was permitted to find “that 
defendant’s asserted incapacity, in whatever form, is not the 
result of a mental disease or defect.” Id. at 586-88.
II.  DISCUSSION
	
To prove the statutory defense of GEI, three ele-
ments must exist “at the time of engaging in criminal con-
duct”: “mental disease or defect”; lack of “substantial capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or 
to conform the conduct to the requirements of law”; and a 
causal link between the two. ORS 161.295(1). As explained 
above, the ultimate dispute between the parties on appeal is 
whether the evidence at trial established all three elements 
as a matter of law. We allowed review to address one piece of 
that dispute, which was dispositive in the Court of Appeals: 
whether defendant was required to prove that his asserted 
lack of capacity was solely the result of his schizophrenia and 
in no part the result of his antisocial personality disorder.5 
	
5  The state contends that we should not reach the question on which we 
allowed review and should instead affirm based on defendant’s failure to chal-
lenge what the state perceives to be an “alternative holding” in the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals. But we do not read that opinion as announcing the “alternative 
holding” that the state identifies, and we reach the issue on which we allowed 
review.
Cite as 369 Or 347 (2022)	
355
We conclude that the legislature did not intend to require 
proof that a personality disorder played no role in bring-
ing about the requisite lack of capacity, and, ultimately, we 
remand to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.
A.  Causation Analysis Under ORS 161.295
	
Because the elements of the GEI defense are estab-
lished by statute, the question is what causal connection the 
legislature intended to require. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 
160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (emphasizing that, in deter-
mining the meaning of a statute, the court’s “paramount 
goal” is to discern the intent of the legislature). All require-
ments for the GEI defense are contained in ORS 161.295, 
which, as applicable to defendant’s case, provided:
	
“(1)  A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result 
of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in crimi-
nal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the 
conduct to the requirements of law.
	
“(2)  As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971,[6] the 
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise 
antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality 
constituting solely a personality disorder.”
As with all questions of statutory construction, we turn to 
the analytical framework that we described in Gaines to 
determine whether the legislature intended to require proof 
that a defendant lacked capacity solely “as a result of mental 
disease or defect” and in no part as a result of a “personal-
ity disorder.” See ORS 161.295. Under that well-established 
framework, we consider the text and context of the statute, 
and we consider legislative history “where that legislative 
history appears useful to the court’s analysis.” Gaines, 346 
Or at 171-72. In this case, the legislative history is partic-
ularly helpful to our understanding of what the legislature 
intended.
	
6  The reference in ORS 161.295(2) to “chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971” is a 
reference to the comprehensive Oregon Criminal Code adopted in 1971, of which 
the GEI defense was a part. See Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 36.
356	
State v. Meiser
	
The text that governs defendant’s case is the prod-
uct of two different legislative enactments. The relevant 
causation test—“as a result of mental disease or defect at 
the time of engaging in criminal conduct”—dates to when 
the statute was originally enacted as part of the comprehen-
sive Oregon Criminal Code of 1971. Or Laws 1971, ch 743, 
§ 36. As originally enacted, however, the statute specified 
just one exclusion from the terms “mental disease or defect,” 
for “an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal 
or otherwise antisocial conduct.” Id. The exclusion of “any 
abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder” from 
what qualifies as “mental disease or defect” was added to 
ORS 161.295(2) in 1983, through the adoption of House Bill 
(HB) 2075. Or Laws 1983, ch 800, § 1. Thus, our inquiry 
into legislative intent takes into account both the 1971 and 
the 1983 legislatures. See State v. Swanson, 351 Or 286, 
290, 266 P3d 45 (2011) (explaining that the proper inquiry 
for statutory construction focuses on “the intent of the leg-
islature that enacted the statute,” although “we also con-
sider any later amendments or statutory changes that were 
intended by the legislature to modify or otherwise alter the 
meaning of the original terms of the statute”).
	
Both parties point us to legislative history indicat-
ing that the 1983 Legislative Assembly enacted the person-
ality disorder exclusion in ORS 161.295(2) to narrow the 
availability of the insanity defense. Significantly, however, 
the legislative history suggests that the legislature did not 
intend to narrow availability of the defense so thoroughly 
that a defendant’s proof would fail if a personality disor-
der contributed in any part to the qualifying incapacity. 
This court has previously recited that legislative history 
in detail. Tharp v. PSRB, 338 Or 413, 426-30, 110 P3d 103 
(2005) (quoting Beiswenger v. PSRB, 192 Or App 38, 48-51, 
84 P3d 180, rev dismissed, 337 Or 669 (2004)).7 Here, we rely 
on that prior recitation where pertinent.
	
7  In Tharp, this court set out at length and relied upon a “detailed review 
of the legislative history leading to the legislature’s decision to exclude per-
sonality disorders from the definition of mental disease or defect in ORS 
161.295” from a recent Court of Appeals “opinion by [then-]Judge Landau.” 338 
Or at 426 (discussing Beiswenger, 192 Or App at 48-51). We provide citations 
to the legislative history that is quoted in Tharp without further reference to 
 
Beiswenger.
Cite as 369 Or 347 (2022)	
357
	
As that recitation of the legislative history explains, 
the bill as originally introduced did not address “personal-
ity disorders.” Tharp, 338 Or at 426. That changed after 
an early hearing, at which the Executive Director of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board suggested that the legis-
lature should explicitly addresses whether the definition of 
“mental disease or defect” included or excluded “personal-
ity disorders” and the chair of the board testified that “the 
board supported the exclusion of ‘personality disorders’ from 
the definition of ‘mental disease or defect.’ 
”8 Tharp, 338 Or 
at 426-27.
	
At a subsequent hearing, Representative Peter 
Courtney asked for an amendment “that would accom-
plish the exclusion of ‘personality disorders’ from the stat-
utory definition of ‘mental disease or defect,’ 
” and “Jeffrey 
Rogers, the chair of the legislative interim task force that 
had drafted the bill, * 
* 
* responded with the wording that 
is, in substance, the current law.” Tharp, 338 Or at 427-28. 
Specifically, Rogers proposed that the legislature add the 
phrase “nor does [the term ‘mental disease or defect’] include 
disorders characterized only as personality disorders.” Tape 
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, May 
13, 1983, Tape 324, Side A (statement of Jeffrey Rogers). 
He emphasized that the exclusion should include the word 
“only”—which became “solely” in the enacted provision—to 
indicate that a person who has “a personality disorder plus a 
psychosis * 
* 
* may still qualify.” Id. At the suggestion of leg-
islative counsel, Rogers’ proposal to exclude “disorders char-
acterized only as personality disorders,” see id., became an 
exclusion of “any abnormality constituting solely a person-
ality disorder,” Exhibit V, House Committee on Judiciary, 
May 31, 1983, HB 2075 (accompanying statement of Legal 
Counsel Linda Zuckerman). But legislative counsel told the 
committee that the change was not substantive—that the 
	
8  The scope of “mental disease or defect” also is at issue in cases in which a 
petitioner who has proven a GEI defense later seeks discharge from commitment 
or from the Psychiatric Security Review Board’s jurisdiction on the grounds that 
the person is “ 
‘no longer affected by mental disease or defect.’ 
” See, e.g., Tharp, 
338 Or at 416-18, 416 n 1 (discussing the versions of ORS 161.341(4) and ORS 
161.351 then in effect and explaining that the petitioner challenged the board’s 
conclusion that he was not entitled to discharge because, on account of his sub-
stance dependency, he continued to be affected by a “mental disease or defect”).
358	
State v. Meiser
exclusion was still “to the effect that the mental disease or 
defect also does not include disorders characterized only as 
personality disorders.” Tape Recording, House Committee 
on Judiciary, May 31, 1983, HB 2075, Tape 386, Side A 
(statement of Legal Counsel Linda Zuckerman).
	
Subsequently, “[t]he bill moved to the floor of the 
House, where the floor manager, Representative Courtney, 
explained that it contained a ‘personality exclusion’ that 
accomplished a narrowing of the definition of ‘mental dis-
ease or defect.’ 
” Tharp, 338 Or at 428. To further explain 
the exclusion, Representative Courtney quoted from a let-
ter that the board’s executive director had submitted to the 
House Judiciary Committee:
“ 
‘Right now if a person has what is considered a personality 
disorder, * 
* 
* they’re able to claim that they have a mental 
disease or defect. We now no longer, with this piece of legis-
lation, will allow an individual to say that I have a mental 
disease or defect because I have a personality disorder.’ 
”
Id. (quoting Audio Recording, House Floor Debate, HB 2075, 
June 16, 1983, Reel 19, Track I (statement of Rep Peter 
Courtney)). The bill passed the House. Id. at 429.
	
When the bill moved to the Senate, Representative 
Courtney introduced it to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
by “explain[ing] that it ‘would remove personality disorders 
as a category that could be relied on for use of the insan-
ity plea.’ 
” Id. (quoting Tape Recording, Senate Committee 
on Judiciary, HB 2075, June 29, 1983, Tape 234, Side A 
(statement of Rep Peter Courtney)). Ultimately, both houses 
passed the bill, and it was signed into law. Id.
	
The text of the 1983 amendment captures the leg-
islative intent to narrow the definition of a “mental disease 
or defect” to exclude personality disorders—as the chair of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board requested, and as 
legislators reiterated as the bill moved through the legisla-
ture. By specifying in ORS 161.295(2) that “the terms ‘men-
tal disease or defect’ do not include * 
* 
* any abnormality 
constituting solely a personality disorder,” the legislature 
expressed its intention to remove the category of “disorders 
characterized only as personality disorders” from the larger 
Cite as 369 Or 347 (2022)	
359
group of “mental disease or defect” that can “be relied on 
for use of the insanity plea” under ORS 161.295(1).9 See 
Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, 
 
May 13, 1983, Tape 324, Side A (statement of Jeffrey Rogers) 
(proposing wording); Tape Recording, Senate Committee on 
Judiciary, HB 2075, June 29, 1983, Tape 234, Side A (state-
ment of Rep Peter Courtney) (explaining effect of the bill); see 
also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1143 (unabridged 
ed 2002) (defining “include” to mean “to place, list, or rate as 
a part or component of a whole or of a larger group, class, or 
aggregate”). Accordingly, the effect of the 1983 amendment 
addressing personality disorders is to place a limitation on 
the “mental disease or defect” element of the defense set out 
in ORS 161.295(1).
	
Significantly, however, the 1983 text did not add a 
similar limitation to the causation element set out in ORS 
161.295(1). That is to say, it did not affirmatively require 
defendants with a personality disorder and a co-occurring 
condition that is a qualifying “mental disease or defect” to 
prove that their incapacity existed solely “as a result of men-
tal disease or defect” and in no part as a result of a personal-
ity disorder. And reading in that more extensive limitation 
would be in tension with the 1983 legislature’s intent that 
a person who has “a personality disorder plus a psychosis 
* 
* 
* may still qualify” for the defense. See Tape Recording, 
House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, May 13, 1983, 
Tape 324, Side A (statement of Jeffrey Rogers).
	
By addressing personality disorders only through an 
exclusion in ORS 161.295(2), the legislature left unchanged 
the meaning of “as a result of mental disease or defect” in 
the affirmative defense set out in 1971. And nothing about 
the text or legislative history of that 1971 enactment per-
suades us that the legislature intended “as a result of men-
tal disease or defect” to mean solely “as result of mental dis-
ease or defect.” In ordinary usage, the term “result” is not 
	
9  Given the text and legislative history, we reject an argument advanced by 
amicus Disability Rights Oregon that “abnormality” refers to a defendant’s men-
tal state as a whole—meaning that personality disorders are included within 
the broad category “mental disease or defect,” for purposes of proving the GEI 
defense, as long as the defendant has some other mental disorder or condition. We 
reject that interpretation as contrary to what the legislature intended.
360	
State v. Meiser
limited to the concept of sole causation. See Webster’s at 1937 
(defining noun “result,” most pertinently as “something that 
results as a consequence, effect, issue, or conclusion”).
	
The legislative history of ORS 161.295 also suggests 
that the 1971 legislature did not intend the “as a result of” 
standard to be limited to a solely “as a result of” standard. 
Like those who drafted and adopted the 1983 amendment, 
those who drafted and adopted the 1971 statute were con-
cerned that the defense might be used by a category of offend-
ers whom the drafters did not view as possessing “a men-
tal disease or defect.” In 1971, the category of concern was 
“psychopaths” (or “sociopaths”), and the statute addressed 
that concern by specifying that “the terms ‘mental disease 
or defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only 
by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.” Or 
Laws 1971, ch 734, § 36 (emphasis added); see Commentary 
to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon 
Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report § 36, 35 (July 1970) 
(discussing concerns regarding “psychopaths”). The drafters 
of the provision told the 1971 legislature that the purpose 
of the exclusion was to prevent “recidivists” from “quali-
fy[ing] for the defense merely by being labeled psychopaths.” 
Commentary §  36 at 35. By structuring the statute to 
exclude those who were “merely” labeled as “psychopaths,” 
see id. (or those demonstrating “an abnormality manifested 
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct,” 
see Or Laws 1971, ch 734, § 36(2) (emphasis added)), the leg-
islature left open the possibility that the defense could be 
available to offenders who suffered from a “mental disease 
or defect” in addition to whatever label attached to their 
repeated criminal or antisocial conduct. And we understand 
the legislature to have intentionally struck that balance.
	
We understand the 1983 legislature to have intended 
to retain that balanced approach when it amended subsec-
tion (2) to also exclude “personality disorders” from the defi-
nition of “mental disease or defect.” That exclusion—like the 
original exclusion—specifies certain mental conditions that 
are not included within the broader terms “mental disease 
or defect,” and in doing so, narrows access to the defense 
set out in subsection (1). But it does not make the defense so 
narrow as to require that a person who can demonstrate the 
Cite as 369 Or 347 (2022)	
361
requisite lack of substantial capacity “as a result of mental 
disease or defect” also prove that a co-occurring personal-
ity disorder in no part contributed to the incapacity. Thus, 
we agree with defendant that the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that defendant could prevail on his GEI defense 
only if he proved that his co-occurring personality disorder 
played no part in causing the requisite lack of substantial 
capacity.
B.  Proper Disposition
	
That conclusion answers the question that this 
court allowed review to address, but it does not fully resolve 
whether defendant was entitled to prevail on his GEI defense. 
As explained above, because the Court of Appeals concluded 
that defendant was not entitled to prevail on the causation 
element of the defense, it did not resolve whether the evidence 
compelled a finding in defendant’s favor on the third element 
of the defense: whether, under ORS 161.295(1), he lacked 
“substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of 
the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements 
of law.” Meiser, 308 Or App at 588. In addition, the Court 
of Appeals did not consider—except under the “sole cause” 
test that we have rejected—whether the evidence compelled 
a finding that defendant proved that he had experienced 
any qualifying incapacity “as a result of mental disease or 
defect.” As the state emphasizes, any answer to the latter 
question may turn on whether the phrase “as a result of” in 
ORS 161.295(1) means that the qualifying “mental disease 
or defect” must be sufficient, on its own, to bring about the 
requisite incapacity, or whether the legislature intended to 
require some lesser degree of causal contribution from the 
qualifying “mental disease or defect.”10
	
As a matter of judicial efficiency, this court some-
times resolves issues beyond those as to which we allowed 
review, rather than remanding to the Court of Appeals to 
resolve remaining issues, but we decline to do so in this case. 
	
10  In its amicus curiae brief, Disability Rights Oregon argues that the statute 
requires but-for causation: but for the “mental disease or defect,” the incapacity 
would not have occurred. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 41, 266 (5th ed 1984) (defining the but-for rule of causation in the tort 
context). Defendant expresses no opinion on that argument.
362	
State v. Meiser
Both the remaining evidentiary issues and the remaining 
statutory construction issue would benefit from consider-
ation in the first instance by the Court of Appeals.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in 
part, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for 
further proceedings.