Title: State v. Moore
Citation: 562 P.2d 629
Docket Number: 14607
State: Utah
Issuer: Utah Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 1977

562 P.2d 629 (1977) The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David Lewis MOORE, Defendant and Appellant. No. 14607. Supreme Court of Utah. March 30, 1977. Darrell G. Renstrom, Ogden, for defendant and appellant. Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., William W. Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City for plaintiff and respondent. BALDWIN, District Judge: Defendant appeals from a conviction, upon trial by jury, of the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute the same for value, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8 (1953) as amended. Sixteen jurors were called as a panel to try the case and during examination of the panel as to their qualifications to serve on the jury the prosecutor asked the jury: A member of the panel, Mr. Rock, answered. The Judge then asked: Mr. Rock replied: The court then asked Mr. Rock: Mr. Rock answered: Defendant's attorney challenged the juror, Mr. Rock, for cause stating to the court, as a basis for challenge: The juror, Rock, never stated that he would or could act impartially and the record is clear that actual bias did exist. Section 77-30-18, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, provides that a particular cause of challenge is: During the questioning by the court and counsel, the juror Rock candidly and honestly stated that he could not answer the court's question yes or no as to whether or not he could sit as a juror and listen to the facts and make a determination of guilt or innocence. He answered several times that he was not sure if he could be fair and impartial. Defendant's attorney challenged the juror for cause and the trial Judge refused to excuse the juror for cause, although there were eight other jurors present in the court room to take his place. Because of the failure of the trial court to excuse the juror for cause upon challenge being made, attorney for the defendant was required to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. All defendant's peremptory challenges were used in selecting the jury. In Crawford v. Manning, Utah, 542 P.2d 1091 (1975), this court specifically held that the failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus require a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror was prejudical. This court stated: Plaintiff-respondent relies upon the case of State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973). In that case this court held that the failure to excuse a juror for cause upon challenge was not prejudicial. That case did not hold or discuss the question as to whether the court should have excused the juror for cause but held: In the present case the point is made on appeal that the defendant was required to "waste" a peremptory challenge on a juror the court should have removed for cause. The defendant was required to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to challenge a juror who clearly stated he was not sure he could be impartial and unbiased in deciding the case. The failure of the trial court to excuse the juror Rock for actual bias as that term is defined in Section 77-30-18(2), was prejudicial and in effect it deprived defendant of one of his statutory peremptory challenges in that he was required to exercise one of the peremptory challenges to have Rock excused from serving on the jury. The Utah Statutes allow either party in a criminal action to challenge a juror for cause and Section 77-30-16, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, provides: The defendant's lawyer challenged for cause the juror Rock. The court denied the challenge. Defendant's lawyer was then required to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to exclude juror Rock. The trial court erred in refusing to excuse Mr. Rock upon challenge being made by defendant's attorney in accordance with statute and it appearing clearly that Mr. Rock was actually biased, as that term is defined in our statute. The other errors claimed by defendant appear to be without merit and no recitation of the same is necessary and in view of our ruling on this issue. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. ELLETT, C.J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. HENRIOD, J., who was Chief Justice when the case was heard but has since retired, does not participate herein. [1] This was a civil action.