Title: State v. Murle E. Perkins
Citation: 2001 WI 46
Docket Number: 1999AP001924-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2001

2001 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1924-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Murle E. Perkins, III,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 137 
Reported at:  237 Wis. 2d 313, 614 N.W.2d 25 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 1, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jackson 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. McAlpine 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by William E. Schmaal, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
1 
2001 WI 46 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Murle E. Perkins, III,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Murle E. Perkins, III, 2000 WI App 137, 237 Wis. 2d 313, 614 
N.W.2d 25, affirming an order of the Circuit Court for Jackson 
County, Michael McAlpine, Circuit Court Judge.  The circuit 
court order denied the motion of the defendant, Murle E. Perkins 
III, for postconviction relief from a conviction for threatening 
a judge in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2) (1997-98).1 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
2 
¶2 
The question of law presented in this case is whether 
a new trial should be granted because the jury instruction 
relating to the crime of threatening a judge failed to shield 
the defendant from a conviction based on constitutionally 
protected speech.2  We conclude that the jury instruction in this 
case was inadequate.  The real controversy in this case has not 
been fully tried and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.  
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
 
I 
 
¶3 
The facts of this case, although somewhat conflicting, 
are set forth below.  On March 25, 1998, after spending the 
afternoon in a bar, the defendant called his sister-in-law, 
Peggy Perkins, to ask for a ride home.  Ms. Perkins testified 
that the defendant was intoxicated and depressed because he had 
recently broken up with his girlfriend and he missed his 
                     
2 U.S. Const. amend. I; Wis. Const. art. I, § 3. 
We determine this question of law independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses. 
The defendant raises two other issues that we need not and 
do not address here: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the conviction, and (2) whether his attorney's failure 
to stipulate to his prior felony convictions, as allowed by 
State v. McAllister, 153 Wis. 2d 523, 451 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 
1989), constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
3 
children.  Ms. Perkins drove the defendant to the residence of 
his parents, who were out of town.  Ms. Perkins then returned to 
her nearby home. 
¶4 
A few hours later, Ms. Perkins heard a loud bang that 
sounded like a gunshot coming from the parents' residence.  She 
called the defendant to see if he was all right, and he laughed 
and told her, "I haven't killed myself yet."  She then visited 
the defendant and found him calm, but still intoxicated and 
depressed.  The defendant told her that he would call the police 
before killing himself so that the police could remove his body 
before his parents arrived home. 
¶5 
Additional testimony from friends of the defendant 
established that he had called at least one friend that evening 
to say good-bye.  One of these friends contacted the police, who 
visited the parents' residence, where they found the defendant 
and his sister-in-law. 
¶6 
One 
of 
the 
police 
officers 
testified 
at 
trial 
regarding 
his 
ensuing 
thirty-minute 
conversation 
with the 
defendant.  During the course of this conversation, the 
defendant appeared to him to be intoxicated and depressed, but 
calm.  According to the officer, the defendant stated that he 
had fired a gun that evening in the hopes that someone would 
come to talk to him.  The defendant said he was thinking about 
killing himself, but that he did not have a specific plan.  The 
officer asked the defendant what he would use if he were going 
to kill himself; the defendant grinned and said that he would 
use a shoestring.  Later in the conversation, the defendant 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
4 
stated that if he were going to kill himself, it would be easy, 
and gestured toward a gun cabinet belonging to his parents. 
¶7 
The officer continued to question the defendant, and 
the defendant eventually stated that if he were going to kill 
himself, he would first kill Judge Robert W. Radcliffe, whom he 
referred 
to 
as 
a 
"brain-dead 
son-of-a-bitch." 
 
It 
was 
established at trial that Judge Radcliffe had recently held a 
contempt hearing in which the defendant had been ordered to pay 
$50,000 in overdue child support. 
¶8 
According to the testimony at trial, the conversation 
between the officer and the defendant continued calmly for 
several more minutes, when the officer decided to take the 
defendant to a hospital under an emergency chapter 51 detention. 
 The officer believed that the defendant "was possibly a danger 
to himself and possibly others." 
¶9 
The defendant was later charged with one count of 
threatening a judge in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2).3  At 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.203(2) provides as follows: 
 
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm or threatens 
to cause bodily harm to the person or family member of 
any judge under all of the following circumstances is 
guilty of a Class D felony: 
 
(a) At the time of the act or threat, the actor knows 
or should have known that the victim is a judge or 
member of his or her family. 
 
(b) The judge is acting in an official capacity at the 
time of the act or threat or the act or threat is in 
response to any action taken in an official capacity. 
 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
5 
trial, the defendant's mother testified that the defendant did 
not have access to the guns in the locked gun cabinet.  The 
defendant testified that he had not shot a gun that evening, but 
rather had set off a large firecracker.  The defendant also 
testified that his statement regarding Judge Radcliffe was 
intended as a hypothetical to show that he had no intention of 
killing himself.  The defendant denied that he had intended to 
threaten or harm Judge Radcliffe. 
¶10 At the close of the evidence, the jury instructions 
included an instruction in accordance with Wisconsin Jury 
InstructionsCriminal 1240, Battery or Threat to a Judge, 
§ 940.203.  The defendant did not object to this instruction.  
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the count of 
intentional threat to a judge.  The defendant filed a motion for 
postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court. 
 
II 
 
¶11 The State argues that the defendant has waived the 
right to seek review of any error in the jury instructions 
                                                                  
(c) There is no consent by the person harmed or 
threatened. 
 
The defendant was also charged with one count of using a 
firearm while intoxicated, and one count of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.  The jury acquitted him of these two 
weapons charges, and they are not at issue in this review. 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
6 
because the defendant failed to object to the jury instructions 
at trial.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(3) provides that "[f]ailure 
to 
object 
at 
the 
conference 
[about 
jury 
instructions] 
constitutes a waiver of any error in the proposed instructions 
or verdict."4 
¶12 We agree with the State that the defendant has waived 
his right of review of any allegedly erroneous jury instruction. 
 Nevertheless, this court may reverse a conviction based on a 
jury instruction regardless of whether an objection was made, 
when the instruction obfuscates the real issue or arguably 
caused the real controversy not to be fully tried.  Reversal is 
available under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 at the discretion of this 
court.5 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(1) makes § 805.13(3) applicable 
to criminal proceedings. 
5 Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 22, 456 N.W.2d 797 
(1990). 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 751.06, 
entitled 
"Discretionary 
reversal," provides as follows: 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been fully 
tried, or that it is probable that justice has for any 
reason miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper 
motion or objection appears in the record, and may 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for the entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of 
such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of 
such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
7 
¶13 Along with this statutory authority to reverse a 
judgment on the basis of a waived error, this court has the 
inherent authority to review a waived error.  In previous cases 
addressing this inherent authority to review a waived error, we 
have noted that this court "undoubtedly has the power, but 
ordinarily will not exercise it.  The question is one of 
administration, not of power."6  When we review an alleged error 
under our inherent authority, "we do so because the alleged 
error in issue has some substantial significance in our 
institutional law-making responsibility as set forth in the 
statute and constitution."7 
¶14 The alleged error in this casein the jury instruction 
relating to the crime of threatening a judgehas substantial 
significance in our body of statutory and constitutional law.  
Furthermore, if the jury instruction was erroneous, it is 
probable that the "instruction obfuscate[d] the real issue or 
arguably caused the real issue not to be tried [and] reversal 
would be available in the discretion" of this court.8  We 
consequently conclude that this court should exercise its 
discretion to review the jury instruction relating to the 
elements of the crime of threatening a judge to determine 
                     
6 Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 12 (quoting Cappon v. O'Day, 165 
Wis. 486, 491, 162 N.W. 655 (1917)). 
7 Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 14.  See also State v. Schumacher, 
144 Wis. 2d 388, 404-07, 410, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988). 
8 Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 22. 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
8 
whether 
the 
jury 
instruction 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
constitutional right to freedom of speech. 
¶15 We therefore exercise our discretion to review the 
merits of the defendant's objections to the jury instruction. 
 
III 
 
¶16 We begin our review of the jury instruction given in 
this case on the elements of the crime of threatening a judge by 
examining the First Amendment case law relating to statutes 
criminalizing threats to persons. 
¶17 This court agrees with the State and the defendant 
that some threatening words are protected speech under the First 
Amendment.  Only a "true threat" is constitutionally punishable 
under statutes criminalizing threats.  The phrase "true threat" 
is a term of art used by courts to refer to threatening language 
that is not protected by the First Amendment. 
¶18 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 
(1992), the U.S. Supreme Court offered three rationales for 
denying First Amendment protection to threats of violence: 
"protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the 
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that 
the 
threatened 
violence 
will 
occur." 
 
The 
leading 
case 
distinguishing between punishable and protected threatening 
speech is Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  In that 
case the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed Watts's conviction for 
violating a federal statute proscribing threats against the 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
9 
president of the United States.  Watts was convicted for 
"threatening" President Lyndon Johnson at an antiwar rally, 
where he said: 
 
They always holler at us to get an education.  And now 
I have already received my draft classification as 1-A 
and I have got to report for my physical this Monday 
coming.  I am not going.  If they ever make me carry a 
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J. 
Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
¶19 In 
reversing 
the 
defendant's 
conviction 
for 
threatening the president, the U.S. Supreme Court evaluated the 
federal anti-threat statute in light of the First Amendment 
rights at stake.  The Court determined that the statute was 
constitutional 
given 
the 
"valid, 
even . . . overwhelming, 
interest in protecting" the president.  Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
 However, despite the strength of this interest, the Court held 
that a statute criminalizing "pure speech" must distinguish 
between "true threats" and constitutionally protected speech.  
Id. 
¶20 In Watts, the Court concluded that Watts's statement 
was not a true threat but rather "political hyperbole."  Watts, 
394 U.S. at 708.  Thus, Watts's only offense was "a kind of very 
crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the 
President."  Id. 
¶21 The Watts court imposed a clear constitutional limit 
on the government's ability to punish threatening speech.  Watts 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
10
did not, however, "fashion a bright-line test for distinguishing 
a true threat from protected speech."9 
¶22 As a result, federal and state courts that have 
considered the issue of threatening speech have apparently 
created several tests to discern whether threatening language 
constitutes protected or unprotected speech.  The tests are an 
attempt to balance freedom of speech with the public interest in 
prohibiting threatening statements that cause substantial harm by 
instilling fear.10 
¶23 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that a "true 
threat" must be "on its face and in the circumstances in which it 
is made so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as 
                     
9 See United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
10 For discussions of the true threat doctrine and the 
various tests applied by the federal and state courts, see 
Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value 
of Threats, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 541 (2000); John Rothchild, Menacing 
Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to 
Incitement that Threatens, 8 Tex. J. Women & L. 207 (1999); 
Robert Kurman Kelner, Note: United States v. Jake Baker: 
Revisiting Threats and the First Amendment, 84 Va. L. Rev. 287 
(1998); Leigh Noffsinger, Notes & Comments: Wanted Posters, 
Bullet Proof Vests, and the First Amendment: Distinguishing True 
Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 1209 
(1999); David C. Potter, Note: The Jake Baker Case: True Threats 
and New Technology, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 779 (1999); Recent Case: 
United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997), 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (1998); Anna S. Andrews, When Is a Threat 
"Truly" a Threat Lacking First Amendment Protection?  A Proposed 
True Threats Test to Safeguard Free Speech Rights in the Age of 
the Internet, UCLA Online Inst. for Cyberspace L. & Pol'y 
(1999), 
at 
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/aandrews2.htm 
(last 
visited April 24, 2001). 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
11
to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and 
imminent prospect of execution."  United States v. Kelner, 534 F. 
2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976).11  In contrast to the Second 
Circuit, other courts have said that the absence of explicitly 
threatening language does not preclude the finding of a threat 
and that a conditional threat is nonetheless a threat.12 
¶24 Several courts have adopted an objective reasonable 
person standard to determine a "true threat."  The objective 
standard 
asks 
whether 
the 
statement 
could 
reasonably 
be 
interpreted as a serious expression of an intention to inflict 
bodily harm.  The federal and state cases applying an objective 
standard are, however, divided about whether to focus the test 
for reasonableness on the person who makes the threatening 
statement, the person who hears the threatening statement, or 
both.13 
                     
11 See also United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831-32 
(10th Cir. 1986) (requiring a showing that a threat "according 
to [its] language and context conveyed a gravity of purpose and 
likelihood of execution so as to constitute speech beyond the 
pale of protected 'vehement, caustic . . . unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.'") (quoting United 
States v. Kelner, 534 F. 2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 
12 United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492 (1st Cir. 
1997); United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990). 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 913 
n.6 (7th Cir. 1999), and Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491-92 (noting 
agreement among federal circuit courts of appeal that an 
objective test be employed to determine whether a statement is a 
true threat, but disagreement among those courts regarding 
whether the test should be speaker- or listener-based). 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
12
¶25 For 
example, some 
courts 
approach 
the 
objective 
standard from the perspective of the speaker, asking whether the 
statement was made "in a context or under such circumstances 
wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement 
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict 
bodily harm upon or take the life of [another]."14  The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this speaker-based objective 
standard, reasoning that it is untenable to apply a standard 
guided from the perspective of a listener because a defendant 
might be convicted for making an ambiguous statement that a 
listener might find threatening because of events not within the 
knowledge of the defendant.15  United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 
1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997). 
                     
14 United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 
1986) (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 
1969)).  For other courts applying this test, see, for example, 
Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1492 (test focuses on "what the defendant 
reasonably should have foreseen"); Saunders, 166 F.3d at 912 
(test is whether "statement was made 'in a context or under such 
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the 
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates a statement as a serious expression of an intention 
to inflict bodily harm'") (quoting United States v. Khorrami, 
895 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986 
(1990)); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 
(9th Cir. 1990) (test is "whether a reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom 
the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of 
intent to harm"). 
15 The listener might be the victim of a threat or another 
recipient of the communication.  In this case, for example, the 
victim of the threat was Judge Radcliffe.  But the listener, the 
recipient of the communication, was the police officer. 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
13
¶26 One question raised by the speaker-based objective 
standard is whether the reference to "those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement" contemplates the subjective view of 
an actual listener or the objective view of a reasonable 
listener.  Language in some opinions adopting the speaker-based 
objective standard indicates that the likely effect on the 
listener 
is 
judged 
from 
the 
standpoint 
of 
a 
reasonable 
listener.16 
¶27 In contrast to the jurisdictions using a speaker-based 
objective standard, which may or may not implicitly incorporate 
the view of a reasonable listener, other jurisdictions appear to 
approach the objective standard explicitly from the standpoint 
of 
the 
listener 
only, 
requiring 
that 
"[t]he 
prohibited 
statements must be understandable as a threat by a reasonable 
                     
16 The Seventh Circuit treats both the listener's response 
to a statement and the listener's belief that it was a threat as 
relevant evidence, even though the standard is what a person 
making the statement should have reasonably foreseen.  Saunders, 
166 F.3d at 913-14.  The Seventh Circuit explained in Khorrami, 
895 F.2d at 1192, that the listener is viewed as "a reasonable 
recipient, familiar with the context of the communication." 
In Schneider, 910 F.2d at 1570-71, the Seventh Circuit 
stated the following: 
The test for whether a statement is a threat is an 
objective one; it is not what the defendant intended 
but 
whether the recipient could 
reasonably 
have 
regarded the defendant's statement as a threat. . . .  
The fact that the victim acts as if he believed the 
threat is evidence that he did believe it, and the 
fact that he believed it is evidence that it could 
reasonably be believed and therefore that it is a 
threat.  (Emphasis in original.) 
 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
14
person of ordinary intelligence."17  A benefit of this listener-
based objective standard is that it explicitly states that the 
determination of whether the language is a true threat does not 
involve the reaction of a uniquely sensitive person or a person 
whose reaction is based on special information not available to 
the defendant.18 
                     
17 Iowa v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 1997).  See also 
Malik, 16 F.3d at 49 ("The test is an objective one——namely, 
whether 'an ordinary reasonable recipient who is familiar with 
the context of the letter would interpret it as a threat of 
injury.'") (quoting United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 
1358 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 933 (1974)); United 
States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) ("To 
determine 
'whether 
a 
true 
threat 
exists, 
a 
court 
must . . . determine whether the recipient of the alleged threat 
could reasonably conclude that it expresses a determination or 
intent to injure presently or in the future.'") (quoting United 
States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) (cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1043 (1996)); United States v. Viefhaus, 168 
F.3d 392, 396 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The question is whether those 
who hear or read the threat reasonably consider that an actual 
threat has been made."). 
18 See, e.g., Anna S. Andrews, When Is a Threat "Truly" a 
Threat Lacking First Amendment Protection?  A Proposed True 
Threats Test to Safeguard Free Speech Rights in the Age of the 
Internet, UCLA Online Inst. for Cyberspace L. & Pol'y 11 (1999), 
at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/aandrews2.htm (arguing that a 
standard that considers the particular sensitivities of the 
listener is underprotective of free speech). 
One commentator takes this approach a step further, arguing 
that evidence of the listener's subjective response should be 
barred under the reasonable listener standard in order to 
prevent convictions based on a listener's unique sensitivity.  
See Recent Case: United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st 
Cir. 1997), 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1113 (1998) ("This evidence 
[of the actual listener's reaction] yields precisely the danger 
that the objective, speaker-based test seeks to avoid: namely, 
that a jury will consider a hearer's 'unique sensitivity.'"). 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
15
¶28 Finally, 
at 
least 
one 
jurisdiction 
apparently 
incorporates both 
speaker- 
and listener-based 
elements of 
reasonableness, holding that a true threat exists when "a 
reasonable person would foresee that an objective rational 
recipient of the statement would interpret its language to 
constitute a serious expression of intent to harm."19  This 
standard 
requires 
that 
a 
reasonable 
person 
uttering 
the 
statement would foresee that a reasonable person listening to 
the statement would interpret the statement as a serious 
expression of an intent to harm.  The benefit of this standard 
is that it considers the standpoint of both a reasonable speaker 
and a reasonable listener, which seems the best approach to 
evaluating the nature of a communication. 
¶29 This court has considered these cases and concludes 
that the test for a true threat that appropriately balances free 
speech and the need to proscribe unprotected speech is an 
objective standard from the perspectives of both the speaker and 
listener.  A true threat is determined using an objective 
                     
19 United States v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 
1997) (citations omitted). 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
16
reasonable person standard.20  A true threat is a statement that 
a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would 
reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to 
inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous 
talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly 
protected speech.  It is not necessary that the speaker have the 
ability to carry out the threat.  In determining whether a 
statement is a true threat, the totality of the circumstances 
must be considered.21 
¶30 This test for a "true threat" may, of course, need 
modification to fit the particular statute that criminalizes 
threatening speech.  In this case, for example, the harm 
                     
20 One commentator has embraced a subjective standard as a 
necessary supplement to the objective standard in order to best 
protect free speech.  See, e.g., Anna S. Andrews, When Is a 
Threat "Truly" a Threat Lacking First Amendment Protection?  A 
Proposed True Threats Test to Safeguard Free Speech Rights in 
the Age of the Internet, UCLA Online Inst. for Cyberspace L. & 
Pol'y 11 (1999), at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/aandrews2.htm 
("The subjective element, requiring that a speaker intend that 
his speech be taken as a threat, is what is missing from the 
tests currently followed by a majority of courts.  This element 
is particularly important to protecting freedom of speech, as it 
insures that a person will not be prosecuted for speech that he 
or she did not intend to be taken as a threat.") (emphasis in 
original).  In this case the sixth element of the crime of 
intentional threat to a judge requires a subjective intent. 
21 For application of this true threat test in prosecutions 
under the disorderly conduct statute, see In the Interest of 
Douglas D., 2001 WI 47,  ¶37, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, and 
In the Interest of A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
17
threatened is bodily harm.  Other statutes may criminalize 
speech that threatens different harms.  
¶31 In applying the objective test we have set forth 
herein, the trier of fact should consider the full context of 
the statement, including all relevant factors that might affect 
how the statement could reasonably be interpreted.22  For 
example, the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in United States 
v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000), set forth various 
factors for consideration in evaluating the circumstances of a 
threatening statement under the speaker- and listener-based 
objective test: 
 
[F]actors to be taken into consideration when making 
this determination [include]: how the recipient and 
other listeners reacted to the alleged threat, whether 
the 
threat 
was 
conditional, 
whether 
it 
was 
communicated directly to its victim, whether the maker 
of the threat had made similar statements to the 
victim on other occasions, and whether the victim had 
reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a 
propensity to engage in violence. 
Hart, 212 F.3d at 1071 (citation omitted). 
 
IV 
 
                     
22 The Ninth Circuit has recently cautioned about the use of 
a background of violence to gauge whether a true threat has been 
made against abortion providers where the speech did not contain 
an 
explicit 
statement 
of 
violence 
and 
was 
not 
directly 
communicated to the intended victim.  See Planned Parenthood of 
Columbia/Willamette, 
Inc. 
v. 
American 
Coalition 
of 
Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
18
¶32 We now turn to the jury instruction used in this case, 
to determine whether this instruction was sufficient for First 
Amendment purposes.  The defendant argues that the jury 
instruction did not define the word "threat," that is, it did 
not adequately explain to the jury the difference between a 
"true threat" and protected free speech.  Thus, argues the 
defendant, the conviction violated his right to free expression 
and his conviction is not constitutionally sound. 
¶33 The jury instruction used in this case, patterned on 
Wisconsin Jury Instructions——Criminal 1240, explains that in 
order for the jury to render a guilty verdict it must find that 
six elements are present: (1) the defendant "threatened to cause 
bodily harm to" a person; (2) the threatened person "was a 
judge"; (3) the defendant "knew that [the threatened person] was 
a judge"; (4) the judge "was acting in an official capacity" or 
the threat "was in response to an action taken in the judge's 
official capacity"; (5) "the defendant threatened bodily harm 
without the consent of" the person threatened; and (6) "the 
defendant acted intentionally." 
¶34 The jury in this case was instructed as follows: 
 
Section 940.203 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is 
violated by one who intentionally threatens to cause 
bodily harm to the person of any judge where at the 
time of the threat the person knows that the victim is 
a judge, the threat is in response to an action taken 
in the judge's official capacity, and there is no 
consent by the person threatened. 
 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
19
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following six elements were present. 
 
The 
first 
element 
requires 
that 
the 
defendant 
threatened 
to 
cause 
bodily 
harm 
to 
Robert 
W. 
Radcliffe. 
 
The second element requires that Robert Radcliffe was 
a judge. 
 
A circuit court judge is a judge. 
 
The third element requires that the defendant knew 
that Robert W. Radcliffe was a judge. 
 
The fourth element requires that the threat was in 
response to an action taken in the judge's official 
capacity.  The responsibilities of a judge include 
making a determination which results in the issuance 
of an Order regarding back child support. 
 
The 
fifth 
element 
requires 
that 
the 
defendant 
threatened bodily harm without the consent of Robert 
W. Radcliffe.  "Without consent" means that there was 
no consent in fact. 
 
The sixth element requires that the defendant acted 
intentionally.  This requires that the defendant acted 
with the mental purpose to threaten bodily harm to 
another human being. 
 
You cannot look into a person's mind to find out 
intent.  You may determine such intent directly or 
indirectly from all the facts in evidence concerning 
this offense.  You may consider any statements or 
conduct of the defendant which indicate state of mind. 
 You may find intent to threaten bodily harm from such 
statements or conduct, but you are not required to do 
so.  You are the sole judges of the facts, and you 
must not find the defendant guilty unless you are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
intended to threaten bodily harm. 
 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant intentionally threatened to cause bodily 
harm to Robert W. Radcliffe, that the threat was in 
response to an action taken in the judge's official 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
20
capacity, that the defendant knew that the victim was 
a judge, that Robert W. Radcliffe did not consent to 
the threatening of bodily harm, and that the defendant 
intended 
to 
threaten 
bodily 
harm 
to 
Robert 
W. 
Radcliffe, you should find the defendant guilty of the 
first count of the information. 
 
If you are not so satisfied, you must find the 
defendant not guilty.  
 
¶35 Two elements set forth in the jury instructions are 
relevant for the purposes of our discussion.  Under the first 
element, the jury was required to find that the defendant 
threatened to cause bodily harm to Robert W. Radcliffe.  No 
further instruction was given to tell the jury what language 
would be sufficient to find that the defendant "threatened to 
cause bodily harm." 
¶36 Under the sixth element, the jury was required to find 
that the defendant acted intentionally.  The jury was instructed 
with regard to the sixth element that acting intentionally meant 
that "the defendant acted with the mental purpose to threaten 
bodily harm to another human being."  This instruction told the 
jury to examine the subjective intent of the defendant. 
¶37 Because the instructions did not define the first 
element, namely, whether the defendant "threatened to cause 
bodily harm," the jury was not instructed that it had to apply 
an objective test in the first element to determine whether the 
defendant had "threatened to cause bodily harm," that is, that a 
speaker 
would 
reasonably 
foresee 
that 
a 
listener 
would 
reasonably interpret the statement to be a serious expression of 
a purpose to inflict bodily harm, as distinguished from 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
21
hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, 
or other similarly protected speech.  
¶38 The State acknowledges that an objective standard is 
constitutionally 
required 
to 
define 
threat 
in 
order 
to 
criminalize 
only 
"true 
threats," 
that 
is, 
threats 
not 
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.  The State 
also concedes that the instruction given on the elements of the 
crime of intentional threat to a judge was not perfect and could 
be improved. 
 The State 
urges, 
however, 
that 
the 
jury 
instruction in conjunction with other aspects of the trial was 
sufficient to ensure that the defendant's conviction was not 
based on protected speech. 
¶39 The State offers several arguments to support its 
position.  First, it asserts that the jury would have relied on 
the common understanding of the word "threat" as referring to an 
expression of intent to inflict injury, damage, or harm on 
another, as opposed to jest or hyperbole.  Second, the State 
contends that the sixth element, requiring the jury to find that 
the defendant acted intentionally, means that the jury must have 
found that the defendant spoke with the mental purpose of 
expressing an intent to inflict bodily harm, as opposed to 
hyperbole or jest.  Third, the State argues that the testimony 
and closing arguments in this case adequately informed the 
jurors that they could convict the defendant only if they found 
that the defendant made a true threat to kill Judge Radcliffe. 
¶40 We reject the State's argument that other aspects of 
the trial adequately informed the jury that it could convict the 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
22
defendant only if it found that the defendant made a true 
threat.  A proper jury instruction is a crucial component of the 
fact-finding process.  State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 290, 
564 N.W.2d 763 (1997).  The validity of the jury's verdict 
depends on the completeness of the instructions.  State v. 
Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 87, 580 N.W.2d 181 (1998). 
¶41 Arguments 
by 
counsel 
cannot 
substitute 
for 
an 
instruction by the court.  Arguments by counsel are likely to be 
viewed as statements of advocacy, whereas a jury instruction is 
a definitive and binding statement of law.  Moreover, in this 
case, the jury was expressly instructed to base its verdict on 
the 
court's 
instructions 
rather 
than 
on 
the 
attorneys' 
arguments.23 
¶42 Likewise, the defendant's testimony that he did not 
intend a threat cannot make up for the deficiency of the jury 
instruction.  The defendant's testimony raised a factual dispute 
concerning his intent and his exact words to the officer. 
¶43 We conclude that the testimony and closing arguments 
in this case were insufficient to overcome the deficiencies in 
the jury instruction on the elements of the crime of intentional 
                     
23 The instruction given to the jury, patterned on Wis 
JICriminal 160 (1999), entitled "Closing Arguments of Counsel," 
provides as follows: 
Consider 
carefully the 
closing arguments 
of the 
attorneys, but their arguments and conclusions and 
opinions are not evidence.  Draw your own conclusions 
from the evidence, and decide upon your verdict 
according to the evidence, under the instructions 
given you by the court. 
 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
23
threat to a judge.  In this case the jury instruction was an 
incomplete statement of the law.  The danger in this case is 
that the instruction gave the jury no definition of the 
essential element of a "threat" and that the jury may have used 
the common definition of "threat," thereby violating the 
defendant's constitutional right to freedom of speech.  The 
common definition of threat is an expression of an intention to 
inflict injury on another.  The definition of threat for the 
purposes of a statute criminalizing threatening language is much 
narrower.  Therefore a reasonable likelihood exists that the 
jury interpreted and applied the instruction to the detriment of 
the defendant's constitutional right to freedom of speech. 
¶44 We have no reason to believe that the jury would have 
added the necessary elements to the instruction it received on 
the elements of the crime of intentional threat to a judge and 
thus would have applied an interpretation of the statute that 
withstands 
constitutional 
scrutiny. 
 
If 
the 
jurors 
were 
following the jury instruction they would have concentrated 
simply on the subjective intent of the defendant to make the 
threatening statement and would have failed to consider whether 
a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would 
reasonably interpret the defendant's statement to be a serious 
expression of a purpose to inflict bodily harm, as distinguished 
from hyperbole, jest, expressions of political distaste, or 
other similarly protected speech. 
¶45 Indeed, the jury instruction in this case stands in 
stark contrast to the suggested federal jury instruction for the 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
24
federal crime of threatening the president, which sets forth a 
distinction between a true threat and protected speech.24  The 
jury instruction used in this case also stands in stark contrast 
to the jury instructions provided in several of the true threat 
cases cited herein.25  It is apparent from these cases that other 
jurisdictions provide an extensive jury instruction that follows 
the 
test 
for 
a 
true 
threat 
applied 
in 
the 
respective 
jurisdiction.  
¶46 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the jury 
instruction on the elements of the crime of intentional threat 
to a judge should, to comply with constitutional requirements, 
contain a clear definition of a threat based on the true threat 
standard we set forth herein. 
                     
24 The suggested instruction states inter alia: "A threat is 
an avowed present determination or intent to injure, at once or 
in the future.  The mere hope, desire or wish to kill or to 
inflict harm upon the President is insufficient to constitute a 
threat.  In order to find that the defendant threatened the 
President you must find that a reasonable person would have 
understood the defendant's statement as a serious expression of 
intent, determination, or purpose to harm the President.  Even 
the crudest, most offensive methods of stating political 
opposition to the President are not threats."  See Leonard B. 
Sand et al., 2 Modern Federal Jury Instructions 31-5 (1998). 
25 See, e.g., Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1493-94; Malik, 16 F.3d at 
51; Hoffman, 806 F.2d at 705-06. 
See also Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1016-20 (jury 
instruction was insufficient because it allowed jurors to 
consider the violent acts of others in finding a true threat 
based on speech that did not contain an explicit statement of 
violence and was not directly communicated to the victims). 
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
25
¶47 The defendant notes that this court must determine, as 
a matter of law, the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
conviction even if there are grounds to reverse the judgment of 
conviction and remand for a new trial.  If the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction, the federal and state 
constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy may preclude 
remanding the case for a new trial.26 
¶48 Courts have viewed the question whether an alleged 
statement constitutes a true threat, unprotected by the First 
Amendment, as an issue of fact for the fact finder unless a 
court can determine that the evidence is insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to support the defendant's conviction under the 
statute.27  Reviewing the evidence presented to the jury in the 
light most favorable to sustaining the conviction, we conclude 
that a jury properly instructed could be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the State proved all the elements of the 
crime of intentional threat to a judge. 
¶49 The deficiency in the jury instruction on the elements 
of the crime of intentional threat to a judge in the present 
case leads us to conclude that the controversy was not fully 
tried.  Accordingly, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 751.06, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and the order of the 
                     
26 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978); State v. 
Hamilton, 120 Wis. 2d 532, 540, 356 N.W.2d 169 (1984); State v. 
Ivy, 119 Wis. 2d 591, 610, 350 N.W.2d 622 (1984). 
27 See, e.g., Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 397; Miller, 115 F.3d at 
364; Schneider, 910 F.2d at 1570; Khorrami, 895 F.2d at 1192.  
No. 99-1924-CR 
 
26
circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
No. 99-1924.jpw 
 
1 
¶50 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).  I concur with the 
majority.  However, I write separately to underscore the 
constitutional framework that governs this review. 
¶51 This case involves far more than the limits that the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution place on the State's 
authority 
to 
punish 
speech. 
 
It 
also 
implicates 
the 
constitutional guarantees of due process and the right to a jury 
trial. 
¶52 The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution protects a criminal defendant 
"against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the 
defendant] is charged."28  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970).  Closely tied to this guarantee is the right to a jury 
trial, embodied in the Jury Clauses of the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution29 and Article I, Section 7 of the 
                     
28 The Due Process Clause provides:  "nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
29 The Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides:  "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."  The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
protects 
this 
constitutional guarantee against infringement by the states.  
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
No. 99-1924.jpw 
 
2 
Wisconsin Constitution.30  In combination, these constitutional 
protections ensure a criminal defendant the right to be free 
from conviction unless a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he or she violated every element of the alleged offense.  
"Thus, although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant 
if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he 
[or she] may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how 
overwhelming the evidence."  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 277 (1993).  
¶53 This right would ring hollow if courts were permitted 
to uphold convictions based on jury instructions that fail to 
set forth all the elements of the particular crime at issue.  
Courts instruct juries to decide cases based on the law set 
forth in the jury instructions.  See, e.g., Wis JI——Criminal 100 
(Opening Instructions) ("[Y]ou must base your verdict on the law 
I give you in these instructions.").  As this court has 
explained,  "[p]roper jury instruction is a crucial component of 
the fact-finding process.  The jury must determine guilt or 
guiltlessness in light of the jury charge, and the validity of 
that determination is dependent upon the correctness, and 
                     
30 The Jury Clause of Article I, Section 7 provides:  "In 
all criminal prosecutions [by indictment, or information,] the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense 
shall have been committed."  See also Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) 
(1997-98) (codifying the right to a jury trial in criminal 
proceedings). 
All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 99-1924.jpw 
 
3 
completeness of the instructions given."  State v. Howard, 211 
Wis. 2d 269, 290, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997) (citation omitted).  If 
a court fails to instruct the jury regarding a key element of 
the crime at issue, the court effectively removes that element 
from the jury's consideration.  As to that element, then, the 
jury is precluded from deciding the defendant's guilt or 
innocence.  Id. at 293.  Accordingly, to uphold a conviction 
under such circumstances would be tantamount to directing a 
verdict in favor of the State on the omitted element:  the 
court, not the jury, is deciding guilt.  Pursuant to the Due 
Process and Jury Clauses, such a result is strictly forbidden.  
¶54 To 
be 
sure, 
error 
in 
jury 
instructions——even 
constitutional error——can be harmless.  Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 
278-81.  Harmless error analysis, however, looks to the basis on 
which the jury rested its verdict.  Id. at 279.   
 
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a 
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 
the guilty verdict actually rendered . . . was surely 
unattributable to the error.  That must be so, because 
to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never 
rendered——no matter how inescapable the findings to 
support that verdict might be——would violate the jury-
trial guarantee.   
Id.   
¶55 As explained above, where jury instructions are devoid 
of explanation regarding an element of an alleged offense, the 
instructions effectively preclude the jury from rendering a 
verdict on that element.  In such circumstances, there can be no 
jury verdict on that particular element and, therefore, harmless 
No. 99-1924.jpw 
 
4 
error analysis——which analyzes cases in terms of the jury 
verdict——is inapplicable.  Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 293; see also 
State v. Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 870, 893A, 532 N.W.2d 423 (1995) 
("When a jury does not make a finding of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt on an element of the crime, a court cannot 
conclude that a deficient jury instruction with regard to that 
element is harmless error.").  Accordingly, jury instructions 
that fail to set forth all the requisite elements of the charged 
offense always are grounds for reversal.  Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 
293; 
accord 
Sullivan, 
508 
U.S. 
at 
279 
("Although 
most 
constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error 
analysis, some will always invalidate the conviction."). 
¶56 In the present case, Perkins was convicted for 
violating Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2) for allegedly threatening a 
judge.  As the majority explains, pursuant to the First 
Amendment 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, the State may not convict a person for uttering 
threatening words unless that speech is a constitutionally 
unprotected "true threat."  Majority op. at ¶17.31  Thus, a key 
element to Perkins' alleged offense is that the speech at issue 
was a true threat. 
¶57 However, the circuit court did not instruct the jury 
that, prior to returning a guilty verdict, it must find that 
                     
31 The court further discusses this issue in two companion 
cases to the present case, also released today.  See State v. 
A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶¶22-24, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; 
State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶31, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
No. 99-1924.jpw 
 
5 
Perkins' speech was a true threat.  That is, the court failed to 
instruct the jury regarding a key element to Perkins' alleged 
offense.  The jury consequently was entirely precluded from 
considering that element.  Thus, Perkins' conviction does not 
rest upon a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
violated every element of the alleged offense. 
¶58 Indeed, 
Perkins 
may 
be 
guilty 
of 
violating 
§ 940.203(2).  The record seems to contain sufficient evidence 
to support a guilty verdict.  However, it is not the province of 
this court to hypothesize a guilty verdict that, although 
possibly supported by the record, a jury never rendered.  In 
light of the constitutionally deficient jury instructions at 
issue, if this court were to uphold Perkins' conviction, it in 
effect would be upholding a directed verdict in favor of the 
State on the issue of whether Perkins uttered a true threat.  To 
do so would violate Perkins' constitutional rights to due 
process and a jury trial.  For this reason, this court cannot 
uphold Perkins' conviction and must remand this case for a new 
trial.32 
                     
32 As noted above, a court can determine that there is 
insufficient 
evidence 
to 
support 
a 
guilty 
verdict 
and, 
therefore, dismiss a case as a matter of law.  Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993); see also majority op. at 
¶¶47-48.  However, such disposition would not be appropriate in 
the case at hand.  Taking into account the substantial evidence 
which may support a jury finding that Perkins' speech was a true 
threat, this court must remand this case for a new trial.  See 
majority op. at ¶¶48-49. 
No. 99-1924.jpw 
 
6 
¶59 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-1924.jpw 
 
1