Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. David V. Moss
Citation: 2014 WI 95
Docket Number: 2013AP002088-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2014

2014 WI 95 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2088-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against David V. Moss, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
David V. Moss, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MOSS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 30, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 95
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP2088-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against David V. Moss, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
David V. Moss, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 30, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   On January 23, 2014, referee James C. 
Boll, Jr. issued a report recommending that Attorney David V. 
Moss be declared in default, concluding that Attorney Moss 
engaged in numerous counts of professional misconduct, and 
recommending that his license to practice law in Wisconsin be 
suspended for nine months, that he be ordered to make 
restitution to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
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(Fund), and that he pay the full costs of this proceeding, which 
are $1,123.44 as of February 11, 2014. 
¶2 
We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are 
supported by satisfactory and convincing evidence.  Since 
Attorney Moss failed to present a defense despite being given 
the opportunity to do so, we declare him to be in default.  
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that 
a two-year suspension of Attorney Moss's license to practice law 
in Wisconsin, rather than the nine months recommended by the 
referee, is an appropriate sanction.  We also agree that 
Attorney Moss should be ordered to make restitution to the Fund 
and that he should be assessed the full costs of the proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney 
Moss 
was 
admitted 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin in 2009 and practiced in Galesville.  According to the 
record, he now lives in the state of Oregon.  Attorney Moss's 
Wisconsin law license is currently suspended for failure to 
cooperate with OLR grievance investigations, failure to pay 
State Bar of Wisconsin (State Bar) dues, and non-compliance with 
trust account certification requirements.   
¶4 
On September 19, 2013, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) issued a complaint against Attorney Moss alleging 35 
counts of misconduct with respect to his handling of eight 
client matters.   
¶5 
The allegations in the 35-page OLR complaint will not 
be extensively recited or repeated here.  Counts One through 
Five 
of 
the 
complaint 
arose 
out 
of 
Attorney 
Moss's 
representation of S.H. and her then-husband J.H., who hired 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
3 
 
Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Attorney Moss charged them a $1,000 flat fee.  The 
bankruptcy petition was never filed.  Despite never filing the 
bankruptcy petition, Attorney Moss informed S.H. that he had 
spent ten hours working on her case.  On February 27, 2012, 
Attorney Moss sent S.H. a letter saying he was closing his 
office and moving to Oregon.   
¶6 
On April 28, 2012, Attorney Moss sent a letter to the 
OLR saying he would not respond to any grievances.  He enclosed 
his State Bar membership card to serve as his resignation from 
the State Bar.  On May 25, 2012, the OLR wrote to Attorney Moss 
informing him that voluntary resignation is governed by Supreme 
Court Rule (SCR) 10.03(7) and that the OLR would continue to 
notify him of any grievance filed against him.   
¶7 
In June of 2012, the OLR notified Attorney Moss of the 
grievance S.H. had filed against him and requested a written 
response.  Attorney Moss failed to respond.  On November 14, 
2012, this court temporarily suspended Attorney Moss's law 
license.   
¶8 
S.H. filed a claim against Attorney Moss with the 
Fund, and the Fund approved the claim for $1,000.   
¶9 
Counts Six through Ten of the OLR's complaint arose 
out of Attorney Moss's representation of G.H., who hired 
Attorney Moss to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Attorney Moss charged G.H. a $750 flat fee, but 
never initiated bankruptcy proceedings.  The Fund approved 
G.H.'s claim for $750. 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
4 
 
¶10 Counts Eleven through Fifteen of the OLR's complaint 
arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of S.J. and J.J., 
who hired Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding.  Attorney Moss charged them a $1,000 flat 
fee.  The bankruptcy petition was never filed.  The Fund 
approved a claim for S.J. and J.J. for $1,000. 
¶11 Count Sixteen of the OLR's complaint arose out of 
Attorney Moss's representation of S.K., who hired Attorney Moss 
to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  Attorney 
Moss charged S.K. a $500 flat fee.  Attorney Moss did file a 
bankruptcy petition on behalf of S.K.  S.K. subsequently hired 
Attorney Moss to represent him in a post-divorce matter in which 
a $5,600 money judgment had been entered against S.K.  Attorney 
Moss agreed to request sanctions through the bankruptcy court 
for the issuance and enforcement of the money judgment and 
agreed to file a Section 1983 lawsuit.  Attorney Moss never 
requested sanctions through the bankruptcy court and never filed 
the promised lawsuit.   
¶12 Counts Seventeen and Eighteen of the OLR's complaint 
arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of S.L., who hired 
Attorney Moss to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Attorney Moss charged S.L. a $1,600 flat fee.  In 
September of 2010, S.L. purged a bench warrant, issued as a 
result of an order for contempt in a Trempealeau County case, by 
posting a $1,000 bond.  Attorney Moss filed the bankruptcy 
petition on behalf of S.L., and he also represented S.L. in two 
adversary proceedings.  As a result of an adversary proceeding 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
5 
 
filed by Attorney Moss in January of 2011, the $1,000 was 
returned to Attorney Moss as a preference.  Attorney Moss told 
S.L. he would hold the $1,000 in trust until the bankruptcy was 
resolved.  S.L. tried to contact Attorney Moss regarding the 
status of his bankruptcy and the $1,000 preference in early 
February 2011, but Attorney Moss failed to return S.L.'s phone 
calls.   
¶13 In July of 2011, pursuant to SCRs 22.02(6)(b) and 
22.10(4), Attorney Moss entered into a diversion agreement with 
the OLR related to S.L.'s grievance.  Attorney Moss breached the 
conditions of the diversion agreement when he failed to provide 
to the OLR verification of his attendance at six continuing 
legal education/ethics credit hours of instruction by July 1, 
2012.  On August 8, 2012, the OLR director notified Attorney 
Moss that he was terminating the diversion agreement and 
referring the matter to investigation.  The record indicates 
that Attorney Moss returned the $1,000 to S.L. 
¶14 Counts Nineteen through Twenty-Three of the OLR's 
complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of C.L. 
and S.L., who hired Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  Attorney Moss charged them a 
$1,400 flat fee.  The L.s informed Attorney Moss that S.L.'s 
wages were being garnished as a result of a money judgment 
entered against them in Trempealeau County.  Attorney Moss 
agreed to take his flat fee from the previously garnished wages 
and returned the leftover funds to the L.s.  Attorney Moss also 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
6 
 
agreed to negotiate with the L.s' mortgage lender in an attempt 
to lower their interest rate as part of the representation.   
¶15 Attorney Moss filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of 
the L.s in March of 2011.  In May of 2011, Attorney Moss filed a 
reaffirmation agreement regarding the L.s' mortgage.  Attorney 
Moss also filed an adversary proceeding to collect S.L.'s 
garnished wages.  As a part of the proceeding, the entire 
preference payment was returned to Attorney Moss.  Attorney Moss 
failed to account for and return any of the leftover funds to 
the L.s.  In September 2011, Attorney Moss filed a revocation of 
the reaffirmation agreement.  He failed to inform the L.s of the 
status or results of his purported negotiations with their 
mortgage lender.  He also failed to inform the L.s that he was 
terminating his representation and/or closing his law office and 
moving to Oregon, and failed to return their client file.   
¶16 Counts Twenty-Four through Twenty-Nine of the OLR's 
complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of K.Q. 
and J.Q., who hired Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  Attorney Moss charged them a 
$1,500 flat fee.  He did not have them sign a written fee 
agreement.   
¶17 In February 2012, after missing several scheduled 
meetings with the Q.s, Attorney Moss met with them and told them 
he was closing his law office and moving to Oregon.  He agreed 
to continue representing them after the move.  The bankruptcy 
petition was never filed.  In April 2012, K.Q. terminated the 
representation via email and asked Attorney Moss to return her 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
7 
 
client file and unearned fees.  The Fund approved a claim for 
the Q.s for $1,200.   
¶18 Counts 
Thirty 
through 
Thirty-Five 
of 
the 
OLR's 
complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of K.S. 
and her then-husband G.G., who hired Attorney Moss to represent 
them in a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  Attorney Moss 
charged them a $1,500 flat fee.  He did not have them sign a 
written fee agreement.  Despite agreeing to do so, Attorney Moss 
failed to contact the couple's mortgage lender in an attempt to 
negotiate a reaffirmation agreement.  From September 2010 
through August 2011, Attorney Moss failed to return most of the 
couple's phone calls regarding the status of their bankruptcy.  
The parties' mortgage lender filed a foreclosure action in 
February 2011, and a default judgment was granted in April 2011.   
¶19 The parties filed for a divorce in June 2011.  In 
August 2011, Attorney Moss filed the bankruptcy petition.  In 
October 2011, Attorney Moss had G.G. sign three reaffirmation 
agreements, which were filed in December 2011.  Attorney Moss 
informed G.G. that K.S. would need to sign a reaffirmation 
agreement for her motorcycle, but Attorney Moss failed to take 
any further action regarding the motorcycle.   
¶20 From October 2011 through March 2012, Attorney Moss 
failed to return K.S.'s numerous phone calls.  The parties' 
divorce was finalized in December of 2011.   
¶21 In February of 2012, G.G. and K.S. met with Attorney 
Moss at his Galesville law office.  During the meeting they saw 
a handgun in Attorney Moss's lap and in his hand as he was 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
8 
 
sitting behind his desk.  Attorney Moss told them he was 
carrying the handgun for protection from people who were 
hounding him and from clients who stalked and harassed him.   
¶22 Attorney Moss was personally served with the OLR's 
complaint on September 20, 2013.  He did not file an answer to 
the complaint.  On December 18, 2013, the referee sent a letter 
to Attorney Moss setting a telephone scheduling conference for 
January 15, 2014.  Attorney Moss failed to respond to the letter 
or appear at the scheduling conference. 
¶23 On January 8, 2014, the OLR filed a motion for default 
judgment.  At the January 15, 2014 scheduling conference, of 
which Attorney Moss had notice, the referee recommended that 
Attorney Moss be declared in default.   
¶24 Attorney Moss has not filed an appeal from the 
referee's report and recommendation. 
¶25 Although Attorney Moss was given the opportunity to 
present a defense to the OLR's complaint, he failed to do so.  
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to declare him in default. 
¶26 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may 
impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.   
¶27 There is no showing that the referee's findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
9 
 
also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney 
Moss violated the following supreme court rules, some of them in 
multiple instances:  20:1.3;1 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4);2 20:1.5(a);3 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.3 states: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
2 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4) provides that a lawyer shall 
"keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter" and shall "promptly comply with reasonable requests by 
the client for information." 
3 SCR 20:1.5(a) states:  
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
10 
 
20:1.5(b)(1) and (2);4 20:1.15(d)(1) and (2);5 20:1.16(d);6 
20:8.4(g);7 and 22.03(2)8 and 22.03(6)9, enforced via 20:8.4(h).10 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2) states:  
(1) The scope of the representation and the basis 
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall be communicated to the 
client in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation, except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on 
the same basis or rate as in the past.  If it is 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
the 
total 
cost 
of 
representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may be 
oral or in writing. Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client.  
(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing. 
5 SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) and (2) states:  
(1) Notice and disbursement.  Upon receiving 
funds or other property in which a client has an 
interest, or in which the lawyer has received notice 
that a 3rd party has an interest identified by a lien, 
court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or 3rd party in writing.  
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted 
by law or by agreement with the client, the lawyer 
shall promptly deliver to the client or 3rd party any 
funds or other property that the client or 3rd party 
is entitled to receive. 
(2) Accounting.  Upon final distribution of any 
trust property or upon request by the client or a 3rd 
party having an ownership interest in the property, 
the lawyer shall promptly render a full written 
accounting regarding the property. 
6 SCR 20:1.16(d) states:  
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
11 
 
¶28 After careful review of this matter, we conclude that 
the nine-month suspension sought by the OLR and recommended by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
7 SCR 20:8.4(g) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate the attorney's oath." 
8 SCR 22.03(2) states:  
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
9 SCR 22.03(6) states: "In the course of the investigation, 
the respondent's wilful failure to provide relevant information, 
to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents and the 
respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are misconduct, 
regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in the 
grievance." 
10 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
12 
 
the referee is an insufficient sanction for Attorney Moss's 
misconduct.  Although Attorney Moss had a license to practice 
law in Wisconsin for only slightly more than three years before 
his license was suspended, during that short timeframe he 
engaged in repeated misconduct where he took fees from clients, 
failed to perform the work for which he was retained, failed to 
communicate with the clients regarding the status of their 
matters, and failed to return fees and client files upon 
request.  The incident in which Attorney Moss was brandishing a 
handgun during a client meeting is disturbing.  We believe that 
a two-year suspension of his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin is a sanction more commensurate with the misconduct at 
issue in this case.   
¶29 A two-year suspension is also consistent with the 
level of discipline imposed in prior cases.  For example, in In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Cooper, 
2013 WI 55, 
348 Wis. 2d 266, 833 N.W.2d 88, we imposed a two-year suspension 
in a case involving 42 counts of misconduct arising out of nine 
separate client matters.  In In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Lucius, 2008 WI 12, 307 Wis. 2d 255, 744 N.W.2d 605, we 
imposed a two-year suspension in a case where the attorney was 
found to have committed ten counts of misconduct arising out of 
six client matters.  Attorney Moss was found to have committed 
35 counts of misconduct in his handling of eight client matters.  
A two-year suspension of his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction.   
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
13 
 
¶30 We agree with the referee that Attorney Moss should be 
required to make restitution to the Fund and that he should be 
required to pay the full costs of this proceeding. 
¶31 IT IS ORDERED that the license of David V. Moss to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two 
years, effective the date of this order.   
¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, David V. Moss should make restitution to the 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection as follows:  
$1,000 attributable to S.H.; $750 attributable to G.H.; $1,000 
attributable to S.J. and J.J.; and $1,200 attributable to K.Q. 
and J.Q.   
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, David V. Moss shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, $1,123.44. 
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified 
above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation. 
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that David V. Moss shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an 
attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended.  
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
No. 
2013AP2088-D   
 
 
 
1