Title: State v. Serrano
Citation: 394 P.2d 262, 74 N.M. 412
Docket Number: 7426
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 1964

394 P.2d 262 (1964) 74 N.M. 412 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard SERRANO, Defendant-Appellant. No. 7426. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 13, 1964. *263 Hart &amp; Brockman, Tucumcari, for appellant. Earl E. Hartley, Atty. Gen., George Richard Schmitt, James E. Snead, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee. GEORGE L. ZIMMERMAN, District Judge. This is an appeal from a conviction under § 40-1-6, N.M.S.A. 1953. Under points I and II defendant contends that an information charging "Attempting to break and enter the Westside Grocery in the nighttime with the intent to take property therefrom on or about April 27, 1963, contrary to 40-1-6, NMSA" fails to allege a felony offense. Defendant further contends that larceny of property over the value of $50.00 is an essential element of proof in a charge of attempting to commit an offense under § 40-9-6, N.M.S.A. 1953. From an examination of the foregoing statutory sections the requirement for a conviction for an attempted felony demands that the attempt must be to commit a felony as described in § 40-9-6, supra, i.e., murder, rape, robbery, larceny, or any other felony. The offense must be a felony. To attempt to commit a felony is a felony; however, to attempt to commit a misdemeanor is not a felony. The attempted offense alleged herein is breaking and entering into places other than dwellings with the intent to commit larceny therein. The parties agree that § 40-9-6, supra, does not define the term "larceny" used therein. Defendant suggests that the meaning to be assigned to the term "larceny" is "grand larceny" as defined in § 40-45-2, N.M.S.A. 1953: The answer is set forth in §§ 40-45-6 and 40-45-7, N.M.S.A. 1953: Stealing property of any value is, under one or the other of the sections, a felony. Therefore, the requirement of value in the information charged in this case need not be specified and we hold that the term "larceny" as used in § 40-9-6, supra, is not limited to "grand larceny" as defined in § 40-45-2, supra, and the value of over $50.00 is not an essential element of proof in a charge of attempting to commit an offense under §§ 40-1-6 and 40-9-6, supra. With this determination under point III, we hold that the court did not err in giving the following instructions: Defendant's final point is that the court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty and contends that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to prove defendant guilty. Defendant suggests that the ultimate facts show that a window was broken at Westside Grocery late at night; that the defendant was standing 4-5 feet from the window when police came upon the scene; that the defendant ran and was arrested; that no entry was made by any person, and there was no evidence of an attempted entry; and that no property was taken. He agrees arguendo that this evidence is sufficient from a legal standpoint to infer that the defendant broke the window and then raises the question as to what evidence shows an attempt to enter. He claims the jury relied on an inference based upon an inference. The result would be that because the jury inferred that defendant broke the window, the jury inferred that defendant attempted to enter, and then inferred that the defendant intended to take property. Defendant's authority is as follows: *265 In the Rosenberg case the defendant was wrongfully convicted of using the mails to defraud, because no evidence whatsoever was ever introduced to show that he actually used the mails in furtherance of his scheme. In the Sapir case the jury could not lawfully find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United States, because there was no evidence introduced which would have permitted them to infer the defendant knew that the property, which was the subject matter of the alleged fraudulent sale, belonged to the United States. In these two cases the juries used an inference based on an inference to reach an ultimate conclusion of guilt, because they inferred a finding of fact, pertaining to an essential element of the crimes, upon mere suspicion or conjecture (not direct or circumstantial evidence) and used that inference as a basis for inferring the guilt of the defendants. However, in the Gallegos case a conviction for unlawful importation of a narcotic drug was upheld, because the jury was entitled to infer the defendant's possession of heroin from the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that fact. Though the defendants in that case correctly contended that conviction could not be based upon a pyramiding of inference on inference, the court said, at 237 F.2d 698: The general explanation of the inference upon an inference rule is contained in 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 579, pp. 329, 330: We hold that the jury in this case, after they had found that the defendant shattered the grocery store window, validly inferred that the window was broken in an attempt to enter and unlawfully take property from inside the store. That the defendant acted with this criminal intent was another question of fact for the jury which could be inferred from the circumstances established at the trial. State v. Roybal, 66 N.M. 416, 349 P.2d 332. The judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and CHAVEZ, J., concur.