Title: People v. Fitzgibbon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83350, 83790
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 1998

People v. 
Fitzgibbon &amp; Merritt, Nos. 83350, 83790 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 83350, 83790 cons.-Agenda 
4-September 1998.
Opinion filed December 3, 1998.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the 
court:
In this consolidated appeal, we are asked to interpret 
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) so as to require appointed 
defense counsel to certify that he or she has reviewed the transcript from the 
original sentencing hearing prior to a hearing on a motion to reconsider 
sentence. For reasons that follow, we decline to interpret Rule 604(d) in such a 
manner.
BACKGROUND
Docket No. 83350
A Du Page County grand jury indicted defendant, Philip 
Fitzgibbon, for one count of residential burglary. On July 20, 1995, the circuit 
court, after admonishing defendant in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 402 
(134 Ill. 2d R. 402), accepted defendant's plea of guilty to residential 
burglary. The circuit court then conducted a sentencing hearing at which it 
sentenced defendant to a 12-year term of imprisonment. Defendant subsequently 
filed a motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Rule 604(d), which the circuit 
court denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, defendant argued that the matter must be remanded 
to the circuit court because his trial attorney failed to certify that he had 
reviewed the transcript of the original sentencing hearing in violation of Rule 
604(d). The appellate court rejected the contention. The court held that Rule 
604(d) does not expressly require an attorney to certify that he or she has read 
the transcript of the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the Rule 604(d) certificate 
filed in the case comported with the rule. Fitzgibbon, No. 2-96-0072 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant thereafter sought 
leave to appeal in this court.
Docket No. 83790
On March 24, 1993, a Du Page County grand jury returned 
an 11-count indictment against defendant, David Merritt. The indictment included 
two counts of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1992)), four counts of 
aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5) (West 1992)), one 
count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a)(8) (West 1992)), one count of 
aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3.1 (West 1992)), two counts of 
armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1992)), and one count of vehicular 
invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11.1 (West 1992)). Prior to trial, defendant and the 
State entered into a plea arrangement in which defendant agreed to plead guilty 
to one count each of aggravated battery, armed violence, and vehicular invasion. 
In return, the State agreed to nol-pros all of the remaining counts in the 
indictment. At a hearing held on August 17, 1993, the circuit court admonished 
defendant in accordance with Rule 402 and accepted defendant's guilty plea. The 
circuit court then sentenced defendant to 12-year terms of imprisonment for the 
aggravated kidnapping and vehicular invasion and to an 18-year prison term for 
the armed violence, each sentence to be served concurrently. Defendant 
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the sentence, which the 
circuit court denied.
Defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed and 
remanded the cause due to defense counsel's failure to file the certificate 
mandated by Rule 604(d). Merritt, No. 2-94-0035 (unpublished order 
under Supreme Court Rule 23). On remand from the appellate court, defense 
counsel filed the requisite certificate, and the circuit court once again denied 
defendant's motion for reconsideration of sentence.
Defendant again appealed, arguing that the cause must be 
remanded once again for reconsideration of the sentence because his attorney 
failed to provide a certificate indicating that he had read the prior sentencing 
transcript. The appellate court affirmed, stating that it was clear from the 
record "that defendant's counsel performed his duties in conformity with the 
rule and the binding precedent of this court." Merritt, No. 2-96-0042 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant thereafter sought 
leave to appeal in this court.
We granted both defendants' petitions for leave to appeal 
(166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and consolidated the causes for review.
ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Rule 604(d) 
should be interpreted so as to require defense counsel to certify in the 
mandatory Rule 604(d) certificate that he or she has reviewed the transcript of 
the sentence hearing prior to the hearing on a motion to reconsider sentence. 
Rule 604(d) states in pertinent part
This court, in the past, has given Rule 
604(d) a literal interpretation and has required strict compliance with its 
provisions. See People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27 (1994) (Janes 
I); People v. Janes, 168 Ill. 2d 382 (1995) (Janes 
II).
Defendants contend that Rule 604(d) must be interpreted so 
as to require counsel to certify that he or she has read the transcript of the 
sentence hearing because Rule 605(b)(5) requires the circuit court, after 
imposing sentence upon a plea of guilty, to advise defendants that if they are 
indigent, "a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the time of [the] plea 
of guilty and sentence will be provided without cost to [them] and counsel will 
be appointed to assist [them] with the preparation of the motions". 145 Ill. 2d 
R. 605(b)(5). According to defendant, when Rule 604(d) is read together with 
Rule 605(b)(e), "there is no doubt that this Court contemplated that a 
defendant's attorney read the original sentencing hearing before proceeding on a 
motion to reconsider sentence." The State, on the other hand, notes that Rule 
604(d) does not contain this express requirement and no reversible error should 
be found here because the certificates filed in these cases fully comport with 
the language of the rule.
We note that our appellate court has addressed the issue 
raised in this appeal in opposite ways. The Second District, in People v. 
Heinz, 259 Ill. App. 3d 709 (1994), held that the language of Rule 604(d) 
does not require such certification and that there was no legal authority for 
such an argument. The appellate court, in the present appeals, based its summary 
orders on Heinz.
The Fourth District, in contrast, has found that, because 
Rule 604(d) requires a defense counsel to review a transcript from the 
defendant's guilty plea proceedings, "it would seem logical for Rule 604(d) to 
also require [that] defense counsel review transcripts of defendant's initial 
sentencing hearing." (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Munetsi, 283 Ill. 
App. 3d 326, 334 (1996). Although the court noted that Rule 604(d) did not 
explicitly require such a review, the court believed that established rules of 
statutory construction nevertheless allowed for such a requirement to be read 
into the rule. To this end, the court initially noted such rules of construction 
apply to supreme court rules. Munetsi, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 334. As 
such, the court reasoned that its primary goal was to ascertain and give effect 
to the true intent of the governmental body which adopted the enactment. 
Moreover, "[a]mbiguity caused by a literal and confined construction may be 
modified, changed or rejected to conform to an otherwise clear legislative 
intent, and the judiciary has the authority to read language into a statute that 
the legislature omitted through oversight." Munetsi, 283 Ill. App. 3d 
at 335-36. The court then focused on what it perceived to be a problem created 
by a literal interpretation of the rule:
Accordingly, the court held that Rule 
604(d) requires the preparation and review of transcripts of both the 
defendant's guilty plea proceeding and the defendant's sentencing hearing 
whenever a defendant files a motion to reconsider sentence pursuant to Rule 
604(d). Moreover, the court held that the Rule 604(d) certificate must reflect 
the fact that counsel has reviewed the transcript. The court stated that it 
interpreted the rule in this manner so as to give "actual aid to trial courts, 
as we believe our supreme court must have intended Rule 604(d) to be 
interpreted." (Emphasis omitted.) Munetsi, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 
336.
We are not unmindful of the concerns expressed in the 
Munetsi decision. Nevertheless, we decline, at this time, to add an 
additional certification requirement to Rule 604(d). In so holding, we have no 
quarrel with the implicit suggestion in Munetsi that such an 
interpretation would bring symmetry to the rule vis-à-vis the 
motion to withdraw plea and vacate judgment and the motion to reconsider 
sentence. We are not persuaded, however, that such symmetry is a legal necessity 
given the fundamental differences between the plea proceeding and the sentencing 
hearing which results from that plea proceeding. As the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized, "[a] plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits 
that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains 
but to give judgment and determine punishment." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12 (1969). Indeed, it 
is at the plea proceeding where defendant forgoes his or her right to 
trial, a right which is the cornerstone of our criminal justice system. See 
Boykin 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (acknowledging 
that right to trial encompasses the waiver of three important federal rights, 
namely (i) the privilege against self-incrimination, (ii) the right to trial by 
jury, and (iii) the right to confront one's accusers). In order to ensure that 
this most basic of rights has been relinquished by a defendant in a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary fashion, this court promulgated Rule 402. See 134 
Ill. 2d R. 402, Committee Comments, at 339-42. This rule mandates that a 
defendant be admonished in open court regarding the fell consequences of a plea 
of guilty. The certification requirement contained in Rule 604(d), with respect 
to the transcript of the plea proceeding, serves as yet another level of 
protection of the defendant's right to trial-the requirement further safeguards 
against the possibility of a constitutionally infirm waiver of the right to 
trial by mandating that the attorney review the actual transcript of the 
proceeding. See Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 103-04 (recognizing that the rule 
not only works to protect defendants' constitutional rights, but also to avoid 
abuses by defendants). This is not to say that the resulting sentencing hearing 
does not deserve careful scrutiny. However, the fundamental constitutional 
concerns attendant to a plea proceeding are notably absent at the sentencing 
hearing which flows from that plea proceeding. Therefore, in light of the 
critical distinction between the plea proceeding and the sentencing hearing, we 
are of the opinion that the certification requirements contained in Rule 604(d), 
as the rule is currently worded, adequately further the goals of the rule as 
identified by this court in our previous opinions. See Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93; Janes I, 158 Ill. 2d 27; Janes II, 168 Ill. 2d 382; 
People v. Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d 59 (1991).
Although we acknowledge that Supreme Court Rule 2 provides 
that our rules are to be construed in the same manner as statutes are construed 
(see 134 Ill. 2d R. 2), we do not believe that the rules of construction mandate 
the type of substantive change to an existing rule sought here. Notwithstanding 
this fact, today's decision should not be read in any way as a condemnation of 
the general rule requiring supreme court rules to be construed in the same 
manner as statutes are construed. Nor should this holding be viewed as a 
departure from strict compliance with Rule 604(d). Those principles remain the 
law in this state.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, the judgments of the appellate 
court are affirmed.
No. 83350-Appellate court judgment 
affirmed.
No. 83790-Appellate court judgment 
affirmed.