Title: Tommy Pruitt v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 15S00-0512-PD-617
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2009

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Thomas C. Hinesley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James B. Martin 
Deputy Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Kathleen Cleary 
Deputy Public Defender 
 
 
Laura L. Volk 
Deputy Public Defender 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 15S00-0512-PD-617 
 
TOMMY PRUITT, 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit Court, No. 15C01-0109-CF-054 
The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Rehearing 
_________________________________ 
 
June 16, 2009 
 
Per curiam. 
 
In Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2009), this Court affirmed the denial of Tommy 
Pruitt’s petition for post-conviction relief in respect of his conviction for murder and sentence of 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 16 2009, 1:53 pm
 
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death.  Pruitt now seeks rehearing on grounds that this Court erroneously found five of his post-
conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel procedurally defaulted.  He contends that 
he adequately raised each of these claims, and that the Court should have reviewed them on the 
merits, instead of dismissing them through waiver. 
 
This Court has reviewed these contentions and concludes that we were correct to hold 
four of these claims to have been procedurally defaulted or otherwise adequately addressed their 
merits in our opinion. 
 
We do agree, however, that we should have reviewed on the merits Pruitt’s claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective for misinforming the jury that the State would present expert 
testimony rebutting Pruitt’s mental retardation.   
 
Trial counsel, in opening statement to the jury, stated:  
 
I’m sure the State will have their experts come in here and say, Tommy’s 
not mentally retarded, but make no doubt about it, we believe that every single 
expert that will come here will tell you that if Tommy is not mentally retarded, 
he’s just a fraction away and that it’s a difference without a distinction, a person 
with a 71 IQ is functionally the equivalent of a person with a 69 IQ. 
 
(Trial Tr. 4960.)   
 
The post-conviction court (PC court) made certain findings of fact from which it 
concluded that trial counsels’ performance in this regard was not deficient, as follows: 
 
First, the above is clearly a statement of what trial counsel expected Dr. 
Groff to say, and not a promise to the jury regarding what they were going to 
hear.  Regardless, based upon what transpired at the pretrial hearing on mental 
retardation, the statement expresses a reasonable expectation regarding the 
testimony.  Moreover, the statement is reasonably accurate estimate of the State’s 
expert testimony at the penalty phase with regard to mental retardation.  Knowing 
that there had already been an adjudication that Pruitt was not mentally retarded 
under the statute, trial counsel made a reasonable effort to condition the jury to 
consider his borderline intellectual functioning in mitigation.     
 
 
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(App. to the Br. of the Petitioner-Appellant at 679) (emphasis in the original).   
 
As discussed in our opinion, see Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 905, “[we] will disturb a post-
conviction court’s decision as being contrary to law only where the evidence is without conflict 
and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite 
conclusion.”  Id.  (citing Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Miller v. 
State, 702 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000))).  Our review of 
the PC court’s findings and conclusions do not lead us to an opposite conclusion than that 
reached by the PC court. 
 
Pruitt’s petition for rehearing is denied. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
 
Rucker, J. dissents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rucker, Justice, dissenting. 
 
 
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 940 
(Ind. 2009), I would grant rehearing, vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court, and 
remand this cause with instructions to impose a term of years.