Title: STATE v SHERIFF
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-017
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1980

No. 80-17 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . DONALD A. SHERIFF, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Calvin Stacey, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Honorable Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Filed: Submitted on briefs: August 6, 1980 Decided: ?!Eli 3 - 3986 M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his appeal a r i s e s from a conviction of t h e defendant of robbery following a jury t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, t h e Honorable Robert H. Wilson presiding. O n A p r i l 5, 1979, a t approximately 1:30 a.m., t h e 1145 Club i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, w a s robbed by a man wearing a s k i mask over h i s face, a red o r orange T-shirt and faded blue jeans. The robber was carrying a handgun. S h i r l e y Murphy, t h e barmaid a t 1145 Club on t h e n i g h t of t h e robbery, and two off-duty B i l l i n g s p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i n t h e bar a t t h e time of t h e robbery, Gary Cooper and Dennis Moen, described t h e robber a s being about 6'1" o r 6 ' 2 " t a l l and weighing approximately 130 pounds. S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e robbery, a p o l i c e o f f i c e r c a l l e d t o t h e scene t o i n v e s t i g a t e approached an automobile i n t h e v i c i n i t y which was occupied by t h e defendant, Donald A. S h e r i f f . A search of t h e c a r revealed an orange T-shirt, damp with p e r s p i r a t i o n , and a p a i r of faded Levis on t h e f l o o r behind t h e f r o n t s e a t . A . 3 8 c a l i b e r revolver and t h e s t o l e n money were found hidden under t h e f r o n t fender of a c a r which was parked i n a c a r p o r t located d i r e c t l y west of t h e backdoor of t h e 1145 Club. A t t r i a l t h e bartender, S h e i l a Murphy, and each of t h e two off-duty p o l i c e o f f i c e r s who witnessed t h e robbery i d e n t i f i e d t h e s h i r t and jeans found i n defendant's c a r a s those worn by t h e robber. I n addition, t h e two off-duty p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t S h e r i f f ' s voice sounded l i k e t h a t of t h e robber. S h e r i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t on t h e evening of ~ p r i l 4 , 1979, he had dinner with Pam E l l e r , a g i r l f r i e n d , and then went t o v i s i t a f r i e n d , John Stekar. S h e r i f f f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r knocking on t h e door of S t e k a r ' s residence and g e t t i n g no response, he l e f t and went t o t h e C a t t l e Company, a l o c a l bar, t o have a drink. A f t e r s e v e r a l d r i n k s , defendant s t a t e d t h a t he l e f t t h e bar and while d r i v i n g down Yellow- stone Avenue, g o t s i c k and pulled t o t h e s i d e of t h e road. I t was here t h a t S h e r i f f was approached by t h e B i l l i n g s p o l i c e and a r r e s t e d f o r t h e robbery of t h e 1145 Club. The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e d on appeal i s whether t h e D i s - t r i c t Court e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o suppress a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by defendant t o a f r i e n d while incarcerated i n t h e Yellowstone County j a i l awaiting t r i a l . Shortly a f t e r h i s a r r e s t , S h e r i f f s e n t a l e t t e r t o h i s g i r l f r i e n d , Pam E l l e r , and one t o John Stekar. These letters w e r e both opened and photocopied by a j a i l o r . A motion t o suppress t h e letters was f i l e d by S h e r i f f . A t a hearing on t h e matter, the j a i l o r who "booked" t h e de- fendant i n t o j a i l on A p r i l 5, 1979, t e s t i f i e d t h a t S h e r i f f signed a "booking sheet" which authorized j a i l personnel t o open h i s mail. The t r i a l judge suppressed t h e letter w r i t - t e n t o t h e g i r l f r i e n d b u t admitted i n t o evidence t h e l e t t e r s e n t t o John Stekar. The l e t t e r t o Stekar, although ad- mitted, w a s n o t read t o t h e jury a t trial. The l e t t e r i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t s t a t e d : "Well, I guess you know I r e a l l y screwed up t h i s t i m e . Whatever I g e t o u t of t h i s I w i l l deserve. I ' v e g o t t o look t o t h e f u t u r e j u s t t h e s a m e . " On appeal defendant argues t h a t t h e l e t t e r he wrote t o Stekar should have been suppressed based on h i s r i g h t of privacy a s guaranteed by 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, ~ 1 0 . Defendant f u t h e r contends t h a t use of t h e letter a t t r i a l v i o l a t e d h i s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t t o freedom of speech and h i s Fourth Amendment r i g h t t o freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. Censorship p r a c t i c e s with r e s p e c t t o unconvicted p r i s - o n e r s ' mail, n o t r a i s i n g t o t h e l e v e l of deprivation o r s i g n i f i c a n t impairment of a s s i s t a n c e of counsel o r of access t o t h e c o u r t s , g e n e r a l l y have n o t been regarded as objec- t i o n a b l e on grounds t h a t such p r a c t i c e s c o n s t i t u t e a n inva- s i o n of privacy o r an unreasonable search and s e i z u r e . See S t a t e v. McCoy ( O r . 1974), 527 P.2d 725; United S t a t e s v. Wilson ( 9 t 5 C i r . 1971), 447 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1053, 92 S.Ct. 723, 30 L.Ed.2d 742; S t a t e v. Hawkins (1967), 70 Wash.2d 697, 425 P.2d 390, c e r t . denied, 390 U.S. 912, 88 S.Ct. 840, 19 L.Ed.2d 883; People v. Dinkins (1966), 242 Cal.App.2d 892, 52 Cal.Rptr. 134. Courts, i n allowing t h e p r a c t i c e , recognized t h e need f o r j a i l o f f i c i a l s t o read p r i s o n e r s ' m a i l i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e enforcement of j a i l s e c u r i t y and d i s c i p l i n e . I n formulating t h e general r u l e , t h e c o u r t s based t h e i r d e c i s i o n s , i n p a r t , on Stroud v. United S t a t e s (1919), 251 U.S. 15, 40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103, and p l a c e a degree of emphasis on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e w r i t e r was aware t h a t t h e mail was s u b j e c t t o censorship. Mail censorship by j a i l o f f i c i a l s , however, has r e c e n t l y come under a t t a c k on both F i r s t and Fourth Amendment grounds. I n Procunier v. Martinez (1974), 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224, t h e Supreme Court held t h a t C a l i f o r n i a ' s p r i s o n r e g u l a t i o n s , which permitted t h e reading of incoming and outgoing m a i l , were contra t o t h e F i r s t Amendment and could n o t be permitted because t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t they were reasonably o r n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d t o t h e advancement of some j u s t i f i a b l e purpose of imprisonment o r p r i s o n s e c u r i t y . See a l s o Palmigiano v. Travisono (D. R.I. 1970), 317 F.Supp 776, i n which t h e c o u r t condemned a s i m i - l a r p r a c t i c e on both F i r s t and Fourth Amendment grounds. Upon reviewing t h e above decisions, it i s apparent t h a t absent a showing of some compelling j u s t i f i a b l e purpose i n t h e n a t u r e of p r i s o n s e c u r i t y and d i s c i p l i n e , the i n t e r - ception and photocopying of t h e l e t t e r w r i t t e n by S h e r i f f t o Stekar was v i o l a t i v e of t h e F i r s t and Fourth Amendments. H e r e , no such f i n d i n g was made. I n t h i s instance, t h e s o l e reason t h e l e t t e r w a s ex- amined and then photocopied was t o o b t a i n evidence t o be used a g a i n s t defendant. A t no t i m e during t r i a l d i d t h e S t a t e r e v e a l any r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e censorship prac- t i c e and prison s e c u r i t y o r d i s c i p l i n e . With t h i s being t h e case, t h e l e t t e r should have been excluded. Despite t h e f a i l u r e t o exclude t h e letter, however, S h e r i f f ' s conviction must stand. There w a s ample evidence of S h e r i f f ' s g u i l t even absent t h e letter. Therefore, t o exclude it would n o t r e s u l t i n a d i f f e r e n t outcome. With t h i s being t h e case, w e conclude t h e r e i s no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . I n support of h i s argument t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e a t i s s u e unduly v i o l a t e s t h e r i g h t of privacy under t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , defendant c i t e s S t a t e v. Brackman (1978) , Mont. , 582 P.2d 1216, 35 St.Rep. 1103. I n Brackman - t h e Court made an in-depth a n a l y s i s of t h e r i g h t of privacy under t h e Montana Constitution. W e note, however, t h a t Brackman does n o t d e a l with how t h e r i g h t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y a f f e c t e d by a person's i n c a r c e r a t i o n , t h e gravaman of t h e i s s u e a t hand. Thus, it w i l l not be considered c o n t r o l l i n g i n regard t o t h i s appeal. Even assuming defendant's r i g h t t o privacy was v i o l a t e d and t h e l e t t e r should have been suppressed, i n t h i s instance, a s s t a t e d above, t h e f a i l u r e t o exclude the l e t t e r was n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . The second i s s u e r a i s e d on appeal i s whether t h e D i s - t r i c t Court erred i n l i m i t i n g defendant's r i g h t of cross- examination. Sheriff was interrogated by Detective Henry Fox a f t e r h i s a r r e s t and eventually gave a recorded statement l a t e r reduced t o writing. A t t r i a l , t h e S t a t e questioned Detec- t i v e Fox concerning the statement and had t h e statement marked f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n purposes so t h a t Fox could examine it while t e s t i f y i n g . P r i o r t o Fox's testimony, defendant requested t h e c o u r t ' s permission t o cross-examine Fox as t o p a r t of t h e statement--namely, whether Sheriff responded i n t h e affirma- t i v e when asked i f he would submit t o a polygraph t e s t . Sheriff sought t o question Fox about t h i s matter t o estab- l i s h h i s willingness t o cooperate with the police. Defen- d a n t ' s request w a s denied by the t r i a l court. O n appeal Sheriff contends t h a t Rule 106, Mont.R.Evid., i s an appropriate b a s i s f o r finding t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n denying h i s request. Rule 106, Mont.R.Evid., provides t h a t when p a r t of an a c t , declaration, conservation, writing o r recorded state- ment i s introduced by a party, the adverse p a r t y can re- q u i r e , i f f a i r n e s s s o requires, t h a t any other p a r t of such i t e m a l s o be admitted. The purpose of t h i s r u l e i s t o avoid a misleading and u n f a i r impression which can r e s u l t when matters a r e presented o u t of context. See omm mission Com- ment t o Rule 106, Mont.R.~vid. This Court i s unable t o f i n d t h a t an u n f a i r o r m i s - leading impression on t h e minds of t h e jury r e s u l t s i f defendant i s unable t o i n q u i r e on cross-examination a s t o h i s willingness t o take a polygraph test. The p a r t of defendant's statement t e s t i f i e d t o by Fox on d i r e c t examina- t i o n r e l a t e d t o whether o r n o t defendant owned a gun o r t h e c l o t h i n g found i n t h e back s e a t of h i s c a r . The f a c t t h a t defendant a l s o made a statement showing t h a t he would take a polygraph t e s t i s n o t of t h e nature t h a t t o omit it c r e a t e d a misleading impression on those statements t h a t w e r e ad- m i t t e d . Even assuming t h e r e was e r r o r by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , t o omit t h e inquiry does n o t s o prejud.ice defendant t h a t a d i f - f e r e n t decision would have r e s u l t e d . A t no time d i d t h e prosecution raise t h e i s s u e t h a t defendant f a i l e d t o co- operate with t h e police. Defendant was a b l e t o take t h e stand and i n h i s own defense t e s t i f i e d a s t o h i s f u l l co- operation with t h e police. The f a c t t h a t he was a l s o w i l l i n g t o take a polygraph test would n o t be determinative i n t h e case, e s p e c i a l l y when such tests generally a r e n o t allowed a s evidence i n a criminal trial. See S t a t e v. Bashor (1980), Mont. , 614 P.2d 470, 37 St.Rep. 1098. - - F i n a l l y , w e can f i n d no m e r i t i n defendant's f i n a l i s s u e , t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g h i s pro- posed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 21. Defendant's proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 2 1 read a s f o l - lows: "The mere f a c t t h a t Donald S h e r i f f was found i n t h e r e l a t i v e v i c i n i t y of t h e robbery i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n and of i t s e l f t o support a finding of g u i l t y . " Defendant contends t h a t t h e r e f u s a l t o give t h i s pro- posed i n s t r u c t i o n was e r r o r ; however, he f a i l s t o i n d i c a t e why s a i d a c t i o n was improper. I n h i s b r i e f defendant merely point's o u t t o t h e Court t h a t h i s a r r e s t took place s e v e r a l blocks away from t h e scene of the robbery. It i s t r u e t h a t mere presence a t t h e scene of a crime does n o t e s t a b l i s h criminal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . See S t a t e ex rel. Murphy v. McKinnon (1976), 171 Mont. 120, 125, 556 P.2d 906, 909. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , however, we a r e unable t o f i n d t h a t an i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h i s regard i s e s s e n t i a l t o a proper decision. This c a s e does n o t involve an attempt t o c o n v i c t on mere presence. The jury w a s properly and adequately i n s t r u c t e d on t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w and burden of proof, a s well a s being i n - s t r u c t e d t h a t defendant may n o t be convicted on m e r e con- j e c t u r e , suspicion o r p r o b a b i l i t y . With t h i s being t h e case, w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o omit t h e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n . The d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e