Title: Mason v. Carroll
Citation: 269 So. 2d 879
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 1972

269 So. 2d 879 (1972)
Johnnie Mae MASON etc.
v.
B. F. CARROLL etc.
SC 81.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 30, 1972.
McCollough, McCollough &amp; Callahan, Birmingham, for appellant.
Norman &amp; Fitzpatrick, Birmingham, for appellee.
MERRILL, Justice.
Plaintiff took a nonsuit after the demurrer to Count X of the complaint was sustained and appealed.
Plaintiff, seeking damages for the wrongful death of her thirteen year old daughter, alleged that "the Defendants entered *880 into an agreement with the City of Birmingham, a municipal corporation, a copy of which agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein and made a part hereof as if set forth herein in its entirety.
"Now Plaintiff avers that the Defendants negligently conducted themselves in the exercise of the license granted in the above and foregoing agreement, by constructing and causing to be maintained upon those certain premises known as `George Ward Park', a public park, a body of water sufficiently deep for the complete immersion of the body, said body of water being approximately 20 feet in width at its greatest point and approximately 10 feet in depth at its greatest point, thereby creating an unreasonable risk to children of tender years who had become accustomed to resorting to said premises for recreative purposes at the invitation of the City of Birmingham."
After alleging the definition of a swimming pool and the requirement to have a life guard in attendance as required by the City Code, the complaint continued:
There is no authority given to defendant to operate anything other than the par 3 golf course, and the vending machines.
When considering the sufficiency of the allegations of a count on demurrer, the court will assume that the pleader has stated his cause as favorably as possible, and the averments will not be aided by implications or intendments, but the pleading will be construed most strongly against him. Ramsey v. Sentell Oil Co., 280 Ala. 475, 195 So. 2d 527; Harper v. Talladega County, 279 Ala. 365, 185 So. 2d 388.
Although the agreement attached to the complaint refers to the City as "Licensor" and defendant as "Licensee," we think the agreement is a lease instead of a license. In Holt v. City of Montgomery, 212 Ala. 235, 102 So. 49, this court said:
Here, the defendant had the "exclusive right, privilege and license of constructing and operating" the 3 par golf course: the agreement refers in one place to the defendant as "Lessee" and in another place it *881 states that "The Licensee shall maintain throughout the term of this lease a public liability insurance policy covering the operations of Licensee upon the leased premises written by a corporate insurance company * * *." (Emphasis supplied)
Also, Section 26 of the agreement provides for thirty days written notice of termination of the agreement if its provisions are breached, and "Upon any such termination of this agreement, the Licensor shall have the right to forthwith re-enter the premises and take full possession thereof to the complete exclusion of the Licensee."
It has been held that even though a contract purports to be a license, if it is within the definition of a lease, it will be construed as such. Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 129, 113 N.E.2d 869; Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 255 N.Y.S.2d 78, 203 N.E.2d 478. Also, the right given by this contract was not revocable at the will or pleasure of the owner of the land, but was to continue for five years, barring the breach of certain listed conditions. See Messer v. City of Birmingham, 243 Ala. 520, 10 So.2d 760(10).
Since we construe what the defendant had was a leasehold interest, there is no merit to appellant's contention that the child was an invitee merely because she would have been an invitee had the leased premises continued to be a part of a public park as they were prior to the lease.
We quoted paragraph 1 of the agreement which was made a part of Count X. It stated in part a "par 3 golf course within the area outlined on the map attached hereto which is by reference made a part hereof," (Emphasis supplied), but there is no map in this record and, therefore, no premises located or described in Count X or the exhibits attached thereto.
For aught that appears from the allegations of Count X, the child was a trespasser on defendant's premises. In Earnest v. Regent Pool, Inc., 288 Ala. 68, 257 So. 2d 313, it was said:
In the Earnest case, the defendants operated a swimming pool, while here, based on the allegations in Count X, there was merely a pond of water on the premises "sufficiently deep for the complete immersion of the body and which was used collectively by numbers of persons, * * * for swimming and recreative purposes" but not with the other features contained in the definition of a swimming pool in the City Code.
There was no allegation in Count X which charged the breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the child.
The demurrer was properly sustained.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur.