Title: Condos v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INS. CO. OF OMAHA, NEB.
Citation: 379 P.2d 129, 93 Ariz. 143
Docket Number: 7087
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 1963

93 Ariz. 143 (1963) 379 P.2d 129 Steve CONDOS, Appellant, v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF OMAHA, NEBRASKA, an Insurance corporation, Appellee. No. 7087. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division. February 27, 1963. *144 Charles Christakis, Phoenix, for appellant. Snell &amp; Wilmer, Phoenix, for appellee. BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice. Appellant was plaintiff in a suit to enforce conditions on which he was sold life insurance policies or in the alternative for a refund of premiums. Summary judgment was entered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff was delivered two life insurance policies in 1941, and he claims at the time he was sold the policies, the agent told him they would start paying dividends at the end of three years; there was a cash redemption provision that went into effect at the end of five years, and that the premium would be waived if he was ill. The only one of these conditions which existed was that the policies provided for a cash or loan value after three years and no dividends were paid. It is plaintiff's position that these representations were made fraudulently and he relied upon them when he bought the policies. Plaintiff cannot read English and as soon as he received the policies, he put them in a strong box, where they remained for the next 15 years. Plaintiff never asked anyone to read the policies to him, but he continued to pay premiums on them. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, laches and estoppel. As our decision turns on the application of the statute of limitations, we do not discuss the questions of laches or estoppel. A.R.S. § 12-543 states: Plaintiff claims not to have discovered the fraud until 1958, filed his complaint at that time, and contends that the three-year period begins to run from the time of this discovery. The reason he gives for failing to discover the fraud is because he cannot read English and he trusted the agent who sold him the policies. From 1954 to 1958 he attempted to get the company to honor the policy as represented to him or refund his premiums, and he claims the promises of action by the employees of the company were calculated to keep him from looking into the exact terms of the policies. Accepting the latter statements as true, the question is whether plaintiff may rely on his inability to read English to justify not advising himself of the contents of the policies between 1941 and 1954. In Sovereign Camp of the W.O.W. v. Daniel, 48 Ariz. 479, 487, 62 P.2d 1144, 1148, this court said: See, also, Betancourt v. Logia Suprema de La Alianza Hispana-Americana, 53 Ariz. 151, 86 P.2d 1026, and the statement of this court in Mutual Benefit Health &amp; Accident Association v. Ferrell, 42 Ariz. 477, 488-489, 27 P.2d 519, 523-524: We are of the opinion that at some time during the period from 1941 to 1954, plaintiff could and should have informed himself about the terms and conditions of the policies. An illiterate may not turn his disability into a sword with which to improve his own rights at the expense of others. The cause of action is barred by A.R.S. § 12-543. Affirmed. STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.