Title: State v. Gutierrez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP002364-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2020

2020 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2364-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
David Gutierrez, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 312,933 N.W.2d 133 
PDC No:2019 WI App 41 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 10, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green Lake   
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew E. Voigt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew 
from participation.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Daniel J. O’Brien assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Daniel J. O’Brien. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by Chris 
A. Gramstrup and Gramstrup Law Office, Superior. There was an oral 
argument by Chris A. Gramstrup. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP2364-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF115) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David Gutierrez, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
JUN 3, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew 
from participation. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the judgment 
of conviction entered against David Gutierrez. 
¶2 
Gutierrez was convicted of multiple counts of sexual 
assault and enticement of his stepdaughter.  In a postconviction 
                                                 
1 State v. Gutierrez, 2019 WI App 41, 388 Wis. 2d 312, 933 
N.W.2d 133. 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
2 
 
motion, Gutierrez alleged the denial of his constitutional right 
to an impartial jury and to effective assistance of counsel.  
Gutierrez appealed the denial of his postconviction motion.  He 
also appealed his judgment of conviction on the grounds that the 
circuit court2 erred in its decision to exclude unidentified DNA 
evidence and to admit "other acts" evidence.  The court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's decision to exclude the unidentified 
DNA evidence and affirmed its decision to admit other acts 
evidence.  The judgment of conviction was vacated and the case was 
remanded for a new trial.  The State petitioned for review. 
¶3 
We conclude that the court of appeals erroneously 
reversed the circuit court's exercise of discretion in excluding 
unidentified DNA evidence.  We further conclude that the court of 
appeals properly affirmed the circuit court's admission of other 
acts evidence.  Lastly, we conclude that Gutierrez was not denied 
his right to an impartial jury or his right to effective assistance 
of counsel.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision 
as to the unidentified DNA evidence and affirm its decision as to 
the other acts evidence.  We also affirm the circuit court's denial 
of Gutierrez's postconviction motion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On November 2, 2012, twelve-year-old A.R. told her 
cousin she was afraid to return home because her stepfather, 
Gutierrez, touched her the night before.  In a forensic interview 
conducted later that day, A.R. alleged that the prior evening, 
                                                 
2 The Honorable W. Andrew Voigt of the Green Lake County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
3 
 
November 1, Gutierrez removed her clothes, touched her genitals, 
made her touch his genitals, performed oral sex on her, forced her 
to perform oral sex on him, ejaculated in her mouth, and attempted 
to penetrate her with his penis.  A.R. further alleged that 
Gutierrez first sexually assaulted her when she was six years old 
by luring her into a closet and performing oral sex on her.  A.R. 
also provided specific details about an alleged sexual assault 
that took place in a van some time between May and October 2011 
and in a garage some time between September 2011 and May 2012. 
¶5 
After her forensic interview, A.R. submitted to a sexual 
assault forensic exam where she indicated that in the 24 hours 
since the assault she had urinated, defecated, washed her genital 
area, taken a shower, drank liquid, brushed her teeth, swished out 
her mouth, and changed her clothes.  The nurse collected a perioral 
swab from A.R. to test for DNA.3 
¶6 
Additional DNA swabs were taken from two pairs of A.R.'s 
underwear seized during the execution of a search warrant on 
November 3.  One pair, which A.R. indicated she wore during the 
November 1 assault, was pulled mid-cycle from the washing machine.  
It did not match the description A.R. had initially given to the 
police.  The second pair, which was purportedly the underwear A.R. 
wore on November 2, was retrieved from a pile of soiled laundry.  
DNA from at least three unidentified males was detected on the 
perioral swab, and DNA from at least five unidentified males was 
                                                 
3 "Perioral" refers to the exterior area around a person's 
mouth.  See Perioral, Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine (Oct. 
2019). 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
4 
 
detected on the underwear swabs.  The testing excluded Gutierrez 
as a contributor to either DNA mixture.  The testing also 
determined that none of the DNA was from semen or saliva. 
¶7 
Based on the three allegations of sexual assault that 
took place between 2011 and 2012, Gutierrez was charged with three 
counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen, 
three counts of incest with a child by stepparent, three counts of 
child enticement, and one count of exposing a child to harmful 
material.4  Prior to trial, Gutierrez moved to admit the DNA test 
results.  The State objected, arguing that the DNA evidence was 
not relevant and that any probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, and misleading the jury.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 904.01, 904.03.  
Additionally, 
the 
State 
asserted 
that 
the 
indication 
of 
unidentified male DNA on the swabs would invite speculation as to 
why male DNA would be around A.R.'s mouth and on her underwear, a 
purpose barred by Wisconsin's rape shield law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b).  Defense counsel argued that the unidentified DNA 
evidence was highly probative to rebut the State's theory that 
Gutierrez's DNA would not likely be found on A.R. since she had 
washed and wiped herself in the time between the assault and when 
the swabs were collected, and that this purpose was not contrary 
to the rape shield law. 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)(e), 948.06(1m), 948.07(1), 
& 948.11(2)(a) (2017-18).  All subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
The circuit court ruled that Gutierrez could introduce 
evidence only that DNA testing was performed on the perioral and 
underwear swabs and that his DNA was not found on those swabs.  
While the circuit court "agree[d] with [defense counsel's] 
analysis of the rape shield law," it precluded Gutierrez from 
presenting the unidentified DNA evidence because the lack of 
information surrounding the sources of the DNA and when it had 
been deposited rendered its probative value "extraordinarily 
limited."  The circuit court also raised concerns that expert 
testimony on this issue could consume half a day and could take 
the trial "down a rabbit hole."  As an alternative, the court 
allowed defense counsel to generally explore how DNA is 
transferred, how long foreign DNA remains viable on another person, 
and how easily DNA can be washed or wiped off with the expert 
witness. 
¶9 
The State moved to admit as "other acts" evidence 
allegations of prior sexual assaults dating back to when A.R. was 
approximately six years old.  In light of the greater latitude 
rule applicable in child sexual assault cases,5 the circuit court 
granted the State's motion in part, admitting only the first 
incident of alleged assault for the limited purposes of proving 
                                                 
5 The circuit court initially denied the State's motion to 
admit the other acts evidence but reversed that decision upon the 
State's motion to reconsider.  Specifically, the circuit court 
cited the greater latitude rule which permits a greater latitude 
of proof as to other acts "in sexual assault cases, particularly 
cases that involve sexual assault of a child . . . ."  State v. 
Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶36, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606. 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
6 
 
motive and providing context and background.  The court agreed to 
instruct the jury that if it believed A.R., it could consider 
Gutierrez's other act of child sexual assault for only these 
limited purposes.6 
¶10 With Gutierrez's trial only weeks away, defense counsel 
disclosed a recent claim by Gutierrez's mother that while staying 
with her in Texas, A.R. confessed that she fabricated the 
allegations because she was upset with Gutierrez.  While 
Gutierrez's mother appeared on his amended witness list, defense 
counsel announced at the outset of Gutierrez's case-in-chief that 
                                                 
6 The circuit court modeled its cautionary instruction after 
Wis JI——Criminal 275 (2015).  Specifically, the court instructed 
the jury: 
Evidence has been presented regarding other conduct 
of the defendant for which the defendant is not on trial. 
Specifically, evidence has been presented that the 
defendant had sexual contact with [A.R.] in a closet 
when she was about six years old and living in the State 
of Texas and that the defendant told [A.R.] not to tell 
anyone because it was a secret.  If you find that this 
conduct did occur, you should consider it only on the 
issues of motive, context or background. 
You may not consider this evidence to conclude that 
the defendant has a certain character or a certain 
character trait and that the defendant acted in 
conformity with that trait or character with respect to 
the offense charged in this case. 
. . . 
You may consider this evidence only for the 
purposes I have described, giving it the weight you 
determine it deserves.  It is not to be used to conclude 
that the defendant is a bad person and for that reason 
is guilty of the offense charged. 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
7 
 
he would not be calling her to testify.  Defense counsel opted 
instead to confront A.R. with the claim on cross-examination. 
¶11 During jury selection, defense counsel asked whether any 
prospective juror felt they could not be fair and impartial given 
the nature of the charges.  Juror R.G. responded, "I don't know if 
I could be impartial.  I work with kids.  I drive school bus, so 
I deal with kids all the time, and I just, I don't know if I can 
be impartial."  Defense counsel moved the court to excuse Juror 
R.G. for cause, but the State objected arguing that there needed 
to be a "little more certainty."  The circuit court never ruled on 
the motion.  Defense counsel did not renew the motion, question 
Juror R.G. further, or exercise a peremptory strike on her.  She 
subsequently served on Gutierrez's jury. 
¶12 One of the witnesses called by the defense at trial was 
State Crime Laboratory DNA Analyst Samantha Delfosse, who 
testified that Gutierrez's DNA was not present on A.R.'s perioral 
or underwear swabs.  On cross-examination, the State elicited her 
testimony that DNA can be washed, scrubbed, or wiped off, and the 
more a person is washing or wiping, "the more likely you are 
removing any kind of DNA that was deposited."  Defense counsel did 
not conduct any redirect examination. 
¶13 The jury ultimately found Gutierrez guilty on nine 
counts.7 
                                                 
7 The jury found Gutierrez not guilty of exposing a child to 
harmful material.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a). 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
8 
 
¶14 Gutierrez filed a postconviction motion, arguing that he 
was denied his right to an impartial jury.  He also asserted that 
his defense counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective because he 
did not further question or exercise a peremptory strike on Juror 
R.G., or call his mother as a witness.8  At the Machner9 hearing, 
defense counsel testified that he did not remember Juror R.G., her 
statement, or why he exercised each of Gutierrez's peremptory 
strikes on other prospective jurors.  He admitted that "the best 
I can say is I must have felt there were other people that I needed 
off the jury more than her."  As for not calling Gutierrez's mother 
as a witness, defense counsel stated that he did not make that 
decision until the defense's case-in-chief.  In making that 
decision, he considered that Gutierrez's mother could not recall 
specifics surrounding the recantation such as why A.R. was at her 
home in Texas, when the recantation was made, or why she did not 
immediately report it.  Defense counsel described Gutierrez's 
mother as a "loose cannon" who "loved to talk" and determined that 
these characteristics would allow her credibility to be undermined 
on cross-examination.  Finally, he expressed concern that by 
calling the defendant's mother as a witness, the jury might infer 
that the defense was desperate. 
¶15 The circuit court denied Gutierrez's postconviction 
motion and affirmed the judgment of conviction.  Gutierrez appealed 
                                                 
8 Gutierrez also claimed his counsel was unconstitutionally 
ineffective for not properly subpoenaing his wife to testify at 
trial, but this claim was not pursued on appeal. 
9 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
9 
 
the denial of his postconviction motion and, by direct appeal, 
also challenged the circuit court's decision to exclude the 
unidentified DNA evidence and to allow the other acts evidence. 
¶16 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  The 
court of appeals held that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in excluding the unidentified DNA evidence and that 
the error was not harmless.10  State v. Gutierrez, 2019 WI App 41, 
¶¶9-12, 388 Wis. 2d 312, 933 N.W.2d 133.  It reasoned that the 
exclusion of this evidence "incorrectly led [the jury] to believe 
that the underwear and mouth swabs contained no DNA evidence," 
thereby bolstering the State's theory that A.R. washed or wiped 
Gutierrez's DNA off and preventing Gutierrez from rebutting that 
theory.11  Id., ¶9.  For purposes of remand, the court of appeals 
also decided that the circuit court did not erroneously admit the 
other acts evidence in light of the greater latitude rule.  Id., 
                                                 
10 The dissent concluded that the majority misapplied the 
standard of review because the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion to exclude the unidentified DNA evidence.  
Gutierrez, 388 Wis. 2d 312, ¶¶16-38. 
11 The court of appeals, in a footnote, formulated a 
constitutional argument for Gutierrez based on the Confrontation 
Clause and Compulsory Process Clause found in the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Gutierrez, 
388 
Wis. 2d 312, ¶8 n.4 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 7).  As the court of appeals notes, however, this 
argument is gleaned from a single reference in Gutierrez's reply 
brief to the fundamental right of a criminal defendant to present 
a defense.  This amounts to a forfeiture of the issue and we do 
not address it further.  See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. 
Companies, 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) 
("[A] party has to adequately, and with some prominence, argue an 
issue in order for this court to decide it."). 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
10 
 
¶¶13-15.  The court of appeals did not reach the juror bias or 
ineffective assistance claims raised in Gutierrez's postconviction 
motion since it remanded the case for a new trial.  Id., ¶12 n.8.  
The State petitioned for review, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 A decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the 
circuit court's discretion.  State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶17, 
315 Wis. 2d 253, 759 N.W.2d 557.  This court will reverse that 
decision only if the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Id. 
¶18 When reviewing a claim of juror bias, we "uphold the 
circuit court's factual finding that a prospective juror is or is 
not subjectively biased unless it is clearly erroneous."  State v. 
Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, ¶23, 374 Wis. 2d 98, 892 N.W.2d 682. 
¶19 Finally, whether a defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law.  State 
v. Wayerski, 2019 WI 11, ¶32, 385 Wis. 2d 344, 922 N.W.2d 468.  
The circuit court's factual findings, including the circumstances 
of the case and trial counsel's conduct and strategy, will be 
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Whether counsel's 
performance satisfies the constitutional standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a question of law we review de novo.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶20 We first address whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in excluding unidentified DNA evidence 
and admitting other acts evidence of a prior child sexual assault.  
Next we consider Gutierrez's postconviction claims that he was 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
11 
 
denied the right to an impartial jury and effective assistance of 
counsel. 
A.  Unidentified DNA Evidence 
¶21 The State argues that the court of appeals erred in 
second-guessing the circuit court's discretionary decision to 
exclude the unidentified DNA evidence found on A.R.'s perioral and 
underwear swabs.  An appellate court upholds a circuit court's 
exercise of discretion to admit or exclude evidence where it 
"examined the relevant facts, applied a proper legal standard, 
and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable 
conclusion."  State v. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, ¶20, 362 Wis. 2d 370, 
864 N.W.2d 806. 
¶22 Here, the proper legal standard is the balancing test 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 904.03:  "Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  Applying 
this proper legal standard to all of the relevant facts using a 
demonstrated rational process, it was reasonable for the circuit 
court to conclude that the probative value of the unidentified DNA 
was "extraordinarily limited." 
¶23 First and foremost, Gutierrez was not the source of the 
DNA and no known male was identified as a contributor.  The DNA 
was not semen or saliva as might be expected where the allegations 
include oral sex, attempted vaginal penetration, and ejaculation.  
As recognized by the circuit court, the DNA could have come from 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
12 
 
a skin cell, hair follicle, or some other source deposited during 
an innocuous interaction. 
¶24 Moreover, there was no evidence of when the DNA had been 
deposited.  The perioral and underwear samples were not collected 
until roughly 24 and 48 hours after the alleged assault, 
respectively.  Neither party could say whether the DNA found on 
those samples was deposited before the time of the alleged assault, 
or during the extended interim period afterwards.  As the State 
emphasized, the time gap also presented the potential for 
contamination of the underwear, as one pair was pulled still wet 
from a running washing machine and the other was taken from a pile 
of soiled laundry.  The circuit court could reasonably conclude 
that without knowing the critical timeframe for when the 
unidentified DNA evidence was deposited, the evidence had limited 
probative value in rebutting the State's theory that A.R. washed 
or wiped off Gutierrez's DNA. 
¶25 Finally, A.R.'s initial description of the underwear 
worn during the alleged assault was inconsistent with the underwear 
tested.  The questions regarding the timeframe, source of and 
contributors to the DNA, and the high potential for contamination 
of the underwear all gave the circuit court reasonable grounds to 
conclude that the DNA had low probative value. 
¶26 The circuit court could also reasonably conclude that 
the limited probative value of the unidentified DNA evidence was 
substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the issues, 
misleading the jury, and waste of time pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03.  Specifically, the circuit court raised concern that the 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
13 
 
questions surrounding the unidentified male DNA would lead the 
trial down "a rabbit hole" calling for speculative testimony.  A 
jury could be confused or misled by the collateral issue of why 
male DNA was present and therefore distracted from the pertinent 
issue of whether Gutierrez's DNA had been present but was washed 
or wiped off.  The circuit court also expressed apprehension that 
the expert testimony on this collateral issue would consume a 
significant portion of the trial.  The circuit court provided for 
an alternative way to elicit the relevant information:  defense 
counsel could question the expert witness generally on how DNA is 
transferred, how long foreign DNA remains viable on another person, 
and how easily DNA can be washed or wiped off. 
¶27 The court of appeals disagreed with the low probative 
value the circuit court assigned to the unidentified DNA evidence.  
The court of appeals also dismissed the factors considered by the 
circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.03:  the dangers of 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and wasting time.  
Gutierrez, 388 Wis. 2d 312, ¶¶6, 9-10.  While the court of appeals 
may have preferred that the circuit court give more weight to the 
evidence's probative value, it "may not substitute its discretion 
for that of the circuit court."  State v. Rhodes, 2011 WI 73, ¶26, 
336 Wis. 2d 64, 799 N.W.2d 850.  Instead, appellate courts should 
"look for reasons to sustain a trial court's discretionary 
decision."  State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶18, 385 Wis. 2d 120, 
921 N.W.2d 730 (quoted source omitted).  Our review of the record 
shows the circuit court applied the proper legal standard to the 
relevant facts and reached a reasonable discretionary decision.  
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
14 
 
The court of appeals thus erred in reversing the circuit court's 
decision to exclude the unidentified DNA evidence. 
B.  Other Acts Evidence of Child Sexual Assault 
¶28 Gutierrez argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in admitting evidence that he sexually 
assaulted A.R. when she was approximately six years old.  We agree 
with the court of appeals that the circuit court properly admitted 
this other acts evidence of child sexual assault in light of the 
greater latitude rule. 
¶29 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted 
if:  (1) offered for an acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2); (2) relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01; and (3) its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  
See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998).  Alongside this general framework, courts accept a "greater 
latitude of proof as to other like occurrences" of sexual assault, 
particularly against children.  State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 
¶36, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606; see also § 904.04(2)(b)1. 
(codifying the common law greater latitude rule).  The greater 
latitude rule liberalizes each of Sullivan's three prongs in favor 
of admitting similar acts of child sexual assault.  See Davidson, 
236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶51.  The greater latitude rule, however, does 
not relieve a court of the duty to ensure that the other acts 
evidence is offered for a proper purpose, is relevant, and its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue 
prejudice.  Id., ¶52. 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
15 
 
1.  Acceptable purposes 
¶30 Under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), evidence of other 
"crimes, wrongs, or acts" is inadmissible unless offered for an 
acceptable 
purpose 
such 
as 
"motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident."  Here, the circuit court instructed the jury to consider 
the other acts evidence only for the purposes of motive, context, 
and background. 
¶31 The other acts evidence of sexual assault was offered 
for the admissible purpose of proving that Gutierrez's motive was 
to intentionally touch A.R. for the purpose of sexual arousal or 
gratification.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a) (defining the 
element of "sexual contact").  "When a defendant's motive for an 
alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged crime, we have 
held that other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of 
establishing . . . motive."  State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶72, 361 
Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174 (alteration in original) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶60, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 
666 N.W.2d 771); see also Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶¶57-59.  The 
evidence further provided context for A.R.'s delayed disclosure 
and a more complete story for the jury.  Context and background, 
while not expressly listed in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), can also 
be acceptable purposes.  See State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶27, 
331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399 ("We have previously recognized 
that context, . . . and providing a more complete background are 
permissible purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).") (citing 
Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶58).  The circuit court did not erroneously 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
16 
 
exercise its discretion by concluding motive, context, and 
background were acceptable purposes for the admission of other 
acts evidence. 
2.  Relevance 
¶32 Other acts evidence is relevant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01 if it:  (1) "relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action"; and (2) is 
probative because it "has a tendency to make a consequential fact 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785–86.  We consider relevancy 
in the context of the greater latitude rule.  See Davidson, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, ¶51. 
¶33 Several of the counts——sexual assault of a child under 
the age of thirteen, incest with a child by stepparent, and child 
enticement——required the State to prove "sexual contact," defined 
under Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a) as intentional touching for the 
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e), 948.06(1m), 948.07(1).  This motive, as an 
element of the charges, is a fact of consequence.  See Hurley, 361 
Wis. 2d 529, ¶83 (citing Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶65).  The 
other acts evidence was also relevant to A.R.'s credibility, a 
consequential fact in this case.  Id., ¶81 ("A witness's 
credibility is always 'consequential' within the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 904.01.") (quoting Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶34). 
¶34 The probative value of the other acts evidence is 
measured by the factual similarities it shares with the charged 
conduct.  See Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶67; see also Sullivan, 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
17 
 
216 Wis. 2d at 787.  Here, the charged conduct and the other acts 
evidence share many factual similarities:  the same victim and 
assailant; similar alleged acts of sexual contact; and the secluded 
location of all of the assaults.  These strong similarities are 
highly probative as to Gutierrez's motive in the charged assaults 
and as to A.R.'s credibility. 
3.  Unfair prejudice 
¶35 Lastly, Wis. Stat. § 904.03 requires the circuit court 
to determine whether the probative value of the other acts evidence 
"is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."  Unfair prejudice occurs 
when the evidence "influence[s] the outcome by improper means or 
if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury 
to base its decision on something other than the established 
propositions in the case."  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶73 (quoting 
State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 64, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999)). 
¶36 The other acts evidence was highly probative as to 
motive, context, and background because of the marked similarities 
with the charged conduct.  See id., ¶¶75-76; supra, ¶34.  The 
danger of unfair prejudice based on the jury hearing evidence of 
other, similar conduct did not substantially outweigh its high 
probative value, especially in light of the greater latitude rule.  
See, e.g, State v. Veach, 2002 WI 110, ¶91, 255 Wis. 2d 390, 648 
N.W.2d 447 (holding that even "graphic, disturbing, and extremely 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
18 
 
prejudicial" testimony detailing a similar other act of child 
sexual assault is admissible under the greater latitude rule).  
Additionally, the cautionary instruction mitigated the possibility 
of unfair prejudice.  See Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶89 ("Limiting 
instructions 
substantially 
mitigate 
any 
unfair 
prejudicial 
effect."). 
¶37 Because the other acts evidence of child sexual assault 
was probative as to motive, context, and background and was not 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, we affirm the court 
of appeals in upholding the circuit court's admission of that 
evidence. 
C.  Juror Bias 
¶38 Gutierrez argues that by not further questioning or 
excusing an equivocating juror, the circuit court denied him his 
constitutional right to an impartial jury.  See U.S. Const. amends. 
VI, XIV; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 7.  "To be impartial, a juror must 
be indifferent and capable of basing his or her verdict upon the 
evidence developed at trial."  Lepsch, 374 Wis. 2d 98, ¶21 (citing 
State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999)). 
¶39 There are three disqualifying forms of juror bias:  (1) 
statutory; (2) subjective; and (3) objective.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 
at 716.  Gutierrez's claim falls under subjective bias because it 
turns on "the words and the demeanor of the prospective juror."  
Id. at 717.  "A prospective juror is subjectively biased if the 
record reflects that the juror is not a reasonable person who is 
sincerely willing to set aside any opinion or prior knowledge that 
the prospective juror might have."  State v. Williams, 2015 WI 75, 
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2017AP2364-CR   
 
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¶79, 364 Wis. 2d 126, 867 N.W.2d 736.  "Prospective jurors are 
presumed impartial," and it is Gutierrez's burden to rebut this 
presumption.  Lepsch, 374 Wis. 2d 98, ¶22 (quoting State v. Funk, 
2011 WI 62, ¶31, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421). 
¶40 Gutierrez argues that Juror R.G.'s statement "I don't 
know if I could be impartial" is enough to establish subjective 
bias and cites as support State v. Carter, 2002 WI App 55, 250 
Wis. 2d 851, 641 N.W.2d 517.  In Carter, the court of appeals 
concluded that a juror was subjectively biased based upon his 
affirmative response when asked if his brother-in-law's experience 
as a sexual assault victim would influence his ability to be fair 
and impartial in a sexual assault trial.  Id., ¶¶3, 12-13. 
¶41 Contrary 
to 
Gutierrez's 
contention, 
Juror 
R.G.'s 
uncertainty is distinguishable from the juror's definitive "yes" 
in Carter.  We accept and tolerate that a prospective juror may 
honestly equivocate in response to voir dire questions exploring 
their fears, biases, and predilections.  See State v. Erickson, 
227 Wis. 2d 758, 776, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) ("[W]e expect a circuit 
court to use voir dire to explore a prospective juror's fears, 
biases, and predilections and fully expect a juror's honest answers 
at times to be less than unequivocal.").  A circuit court "is in 
a far superior position to ascertain bias than is an appellate 
court whose only link to the voir dire is through the 'bare words 
on a transcript,'" and may properly determine a prospective juror 
can be impartial despite a less than unequivocal affirmation of 
impartiality.  Id. at 775-77 (quoting State v. Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d 481, 508, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998) (Geske, J., dissenting)). 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
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¶42 Here, the circuit court made no express finding and the 
record is devoid of any questions that could clarify whether Juror 
R.G. actually harbored any bias or, if she did, whether she was 
credibly willing to set it aside.12  See Williams, 364 Wis. 2d 126, 
¶79.  Gutierrez asks us to speculate as to how Juror R.G. would 
answer unasked questions.  Such speculation is insufficient to 
overcome Juror R.G.'s presumed impartiality.  See In re 
Gutenkunst's Estate, 232 Wis. 81, 86-87, 286 N.W. 566 (1939) ("It 
was for appellant to rebut the presumption . . . in this case, and 
it is plain to us that he failed to bring the issue out of the 
field of speculation and conjecture.  This being true, the 
presumption stands . . . .").  Considering the sparse record in 
this case and in light of the presumption of juror impartiality, 
the circuit court did not err by seating Juror R.G. as a juror. 
D.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶43 Lastly, Gutierrez argues that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel based on his counsel's decisions not to 
further examine or exercise a peremptory strike on Juror R.G., and 
not to call Gutierrez's mother as a witness.  Implicit in a 
criminal defendant's right to counsel is the guarantee that such 
counsel provides effective assistance.  See U.S. Const. amends. 
VI, XIV; Wis. Const. Art I, § 7; see also Strickland v. Washington, 
                                                 
12 As the circuit court itself recognized in its oral ruling 
denying postconviction relief, the better practice would have been 
to follow up with an equivocating juror to elicit more definitive 
answers to these important questions. 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
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466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[T]he right to counsel is the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel." (quoted source omitted)). 
¶44 To 
demonstrate 
that 
counsel's 
assistance 
was 
ineffective, the defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  First, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient, which requires a showing that "counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Id.  
Second, the defendant must show prejudice by establishing that 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different."  Id. at 694.  "A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  
Id.  A failure to satisfy either prong eliminates the need to 
consider the other.  Id. at 697. 
¶45 As to counsel's decision not to further examine or strike 
Juror R.G., Gutierrez cannot establish prejudice.  Prejudice 
requires that counsel's performance resulted in the seating of a 
biased juror.  See State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶14, 248 
Wis. 2d 259, 635 N.W.2d 838 (citing State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 
¶81, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; State v. Traylor, 170 
Wis. 2d 393, 400–01, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992)).  This record 
does not support more than "rank speculation" that Juror R.G. was 
biased, see supra, ¶42, which is insufficient to establish 
prejudice.  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 774; see also Lepsch, 374 
Wis. 2d 98, ¶37.  Because Gutierrez cannot demonstrate that he was 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
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prejudiced as a result of his counsel's conduct, we need not 
address 
whether 
his 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
¶46 Regarding counsel's decision not to call Gutierrez's 
mother as a witness, Gutierrez cannot demonstrate deficient 
performance.  Deficient performance requires that counsel's 
performance fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness."  
Id. at 688.  Gutierrez must overcome "a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance."  Id. at 689.  Our review is "highly 
deferential" and we do "not second-guess a reasonable trial 
strategy, [unless] it was based on an irrational trial tactic or 
based upon caprice rather than upon judgment."  State v. Breitzman, 
2017 WI 100, ¶65, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶49, 337 
Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364). 
¶47 Defense counsel articulated several reasons why he opted 
not to call Gutierrez's mother as a witness at trial.  Recognizing 
that "this was obviously a case about credibility," defense counsel 
was concerned that Gutierrez's mother's credibility would be 
undermined because she did not immediately report A.R.'s 
recantation and provided few details surrounding when A.R. made 
her recantation and why A.R. was with her in Texas at the time.  
Defense counsel stated that he judged Gutierrez's mother to be "a 
loose cannon" who "loved to talk" and "would just go off on 
something else" in response to any question.  Ultimately, he 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
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decided that calling her as a witness would not benefit Gutierrez's 
case.13 
¶48 In a trial where credibility is paramount, it is 
reasonable not to call a witness whose perceived inability to give 
clear, coherent responses may subject her to a damaging cross-
examination.  Defense counsel was legitimately concerned that the 
jury would view the defendant calling his mother to the stand with 
an unreliable story as a desperate measure.  Since defense counsel 
pursued a strategy within "the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance," Gutierrez has failed to establish his 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
unconstitutionally 
deficient.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Absent this showing, we need not 
address his claim of prejudice.  Id. at 697. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶49 We conclude that the court of appeals erroneously 
reversed the circuit court's exercise of discretion in excluding 
unidentified DNA evidence.  We further conclude that the court of 
appeals properly affirmed the circuit court's admission of the 
other acts evidence.  Lastly, we conclude that Gutierrez was not 
denied his right to an impartial jury or his right to effective 
                                                 
13 Gutierrez attempts to rebut defense counsel's articulated 
rationale, citing his mother's post-trial testimony at the Machner 
hearing.  However, these later statements tell us little about 
what his counsel observed leading up to trial.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (emphasizing the need to 
"evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time" to 
"eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight").  Moreover, the 
circuit court noted that Gutierrez's mother's testimony at the 
Machner hearing was "littered with examples of the witness 
answering unasked questions, veering away from the question asked 
to some unrelated or tangential topic all while on direct." 
No. 
2017AP2364-CR   
 
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assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals' decision as to the unidentified DNA evidence and affirm 
its decision as to the other acts evidence.  We also affirm the 
circuit court's denial of Gutierrez's postconviction motion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part. 
¶50 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
¶51 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.
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2017AP2364-CR   
 
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