Title: Chapliski v. Churchill Coal Corp.
Citation: 349 Pa. Super. 285, 503 A.2d 1
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 1985

349 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (1985) 503 A.2d 1 Leonard CHAPLISKI and Walter Folger t/d/b/a Ranshaw Transportation and Auto Wreckers Company, Appellees, v. CHURCHILL COAL CORPORATION, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 17, 1985. Filed December 27, 1985. Christopher J. Foust, Milton, for appellant. Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and CERCONE, JJ. BECK, Judge: Appellant, Churchill Coal Corporation, defendant below, appears before us seeking to vacate the order of the court *286 below. For the following reasons, we vacate that order and remand for further proceedings. The facts and procedure of this case are long and involved and clearly set out in President Judge Krehel's opinion. The issue is whether the Automatic Stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 barred the Court of Common Pleas from entering the retroactive order of July *288 7, 1981. We reluctantly find that it did. Since this issue is dispositive of the matter we do not address the other issue raised by appellant. Section 362(a)(1) provides: Ordinarily, we would uphold the trial court's power to enter an Order retroactively (or as the trial court characterized it, nunc pro tunc) where the purpose of such an action is to avoid an injustice. See Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 53 Pa. 343 (1866) (". . . the court has the power, in order to do justice, to enter judgment at their discretion, as of a time when it ought to have been entered." Id. at 347.) Yet where such an order is in direct conflict with the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Act's stay provision, it cannot be given effect. "[I]t is also well established that any action taken by a non-bankruptcy forum in violation of the automatic stay including judgments or decrees are legal nullities and have no force and effect. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy Para. 362.11, Note 2; In re Cramer, 7 B.R. 133 (Bkrtcy.D.Col. 1980)." Matter of Johnson, 16 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1981) (emphasis added). The broad goal of the automatic stay provision is to protect debtors from harassment during reorganization and "to promote orderly administration of the estate." Aaron, Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals 5-2 (1985). "The import of [section 362(a)(1)] is that all legal actions being taken or to be taken against the debtor are halted. The section is inclusive. Every proceeding of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature is affected." In re Jose DeLisi Fruit Co., 11 B.R. *289 694, 695 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1981). "The automatic stay `is extremely broad in scope and aside from the limited exceptions of subsection (b) should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor or the property of that estate.' 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, Para. 362.04 (15th ed. 1982) (footnote omitted)." In re Wallingford's Fruit House, 30 B.R. 654, 659 (Bankr.D.Me. 1983). We conclude that the Order dated July 7, 1981 must be vacated as it was entered after the filing of appellant's petition in Bankruptcy. Since that action is concluded, however, the stay is now lifted and the matter may again be dealt with by the Court of Common Pleas. We therefore remand this case for further proceedings. Order is vacated and case remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.