Title: Commonwealth v. Ronchi
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13043
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 2023

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SJC-13043 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER RONCHI. 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 13, 2022. - February 14, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Pattern of conduct, 
Expert opinion, Intent.  Intent.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, 
Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury.  Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 21, 2009. 
 
The cases were tried before David A. Lowy, J. 
 
 
Neil L. Fishman for the defendant. 
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On the evening of May 16, 2009, the defendant 
repeatedly stabbed his nine months pregnant girlfriend, Yuliya 
Galperina, killing her and her viable fetus.  At trial, there 
was no dispute that the defendant had stabbed Galperina; the 
primary issue before the jury was whether the fatal stabbing had 
2 
 
been mitigated by heat of passion upon reasonable provocation so 
as to reduce the defendant's liability from murder to 
manslaughter.  The basis for the provocation, the defendant 
argued, was Galperina's (false) disclosure that he was not the 
father. 
 
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of two counts 
of murder in the first degree.  In this appeal, the defendant 
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions of murder in the first degree, on the ground that no 
rational juror could have found that the stabbings were not the 
result of a heat of passion upon reasonable provocation.  The 
defendant also argues that he cannot, as a matter of law, be 
held liable for the death of the full-term fetus because he did 
not stab or injure the fetus, who died due to loss of maternal 
blood circulation.  In addition, the defendant challenges 
certain of the judge's evidentiary rulings, statements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument, and the discharge of a 
deliberating juror.  The defendant also asks this court to 
exercise its extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to reduce the verdicts to manslaughter. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions and, after a thorough review of the entire trial 
record, decline to allow relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We 
also take this opportunity to disavow our precedent on 
3 
 
reasonable provocation based on sudden oral revelations of 
infidelity, and, relatedly, lack of paternity.  See Commonwealth 
v. Schnopps, 383 Mass. 178, 180-182 (1981), S.C., 390 Mass. 722 
(1984). 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain facts for later discussion of specific issues. 
 
a.  Commonwealth's case.  In May of 2009, Galperina was 
living in an apartment in Salem with her eight year old son and 
three year old daughter; the apartment was on the fifth floor of 
a two-building complex.  Galperina and the defendant had been 
dating for approximately two years.  She was nine months 
pregnant, with a due date of May 21 or 22, 2009; the defendant 
was the father. 
 
On Saturday, May 16, 2009, the defendant ate dinner and 
watched a movie at a friend's house in Gloucester.  He left at 
approximately 10 P.M.  The friend described the evening as 
ordinary and the defendant's demeanor as "pleasant" and 
"jovial."  Security surveillance footage at Galperina's 
apartment building showed the defendant entering the building at 
10:16 P.M. and reaching the fifth-floor hallway at 10:17 P.M.  
The defendant left Galperina's apartment approximately ninety 
minutes later, at 11:46 P.M.  A neighbor, who lived two 
apartments away from Galperina, had heard a scream sometime 
between 11:30 P.M. and midnight. 
4 
 
 
At around 7:20 A.M. on the morning of May 17, 2009, Alvaro 
Espinal-Martes took the elevator to the fifth floor to get a 
ride to work from his friend and coworker.  When the elevator 
door opened, he saw Galperina's distraught children in the 
hallway.  One of the children grabbed his hand and led him to 
Galperina's apartment.  Her body was on the living room floor, 
bloody and covered with a sheet.  Espinal-Martes brought the 
children to his friend's nearby apartment and called 911. 
First responders observed Galperina lying on her back next 
to a futon, covered in a sheet.  She had lacerations to her 
torso, and blood was splattered on the furniture, the floors, 
and the walls.  In the bathroom, police found a pair of blood-
soaked pants on the floor and bloodstains on the sink, faucet, 
and toilet. 
An autopsy revealed that Galperina had sustained at least 
fifteen stab wounds, including wounds to the back of her head, 
upper chest, and back.  She died of blood loss from the multiple 
stab wounds to her neck and torso.  The fetus was full term and 
would have been capable of surviving outside the uterus.  The 
fetus had not been stabbed; the cause of death was "loss of 
maternal [blood] circulation due to stab wounds to the mother." 
On May 17, 2009, at approximately 4 P.M., the defendant 
approached a uniformed police officer outside a Norwalk, 
Connecticut, police station.  The defendant was sobbing and 
5 
 
asked the officer for help.  He told the officer that he had had 
a nightmare in which "he killed his eight-and-a-half-month 
pregnant girlfriend."  The defendant then explained to that 
officer, and others who had joined them, that it was actually 
not a nightmare at all.  The defendant said that he had killed 
his girlfriend in Salem, Massachusetts, with a knife, but had 
left her children unharmed.  He placed a blanket over Galperina 
so that her children would not see her when they awoke.  The 
defendant then drove to Norwalk and parked at a discount 
department store.  He left the knife he had used in the stabbing 
in his minivan, purchased a bicycle, and rode around until he 
reached a police station.  The defendant told the officers that 
he was not a "bad guy," and that he had stabbed his girlfriend 
because she told him that he was not the father of her baby. 
After the defendant was arrested, police obtained a warrant 
to search his house and the minivan.  They found a pair of 
bloodstained white sneakers and a jacket with bloodstains inside 
one of the sleeves in the defendant's living room.1  Inside the 
 
1 Police also found a ripped-up letter with the words "Last 
Will and Testament" in a waste basket in the defendant's home 
office.  The letter was dated May 14, 2009, and stated:  "I wish 
to leave all my assets to my two children. . . .  It is my 
understanding and hope that the trust . . . will be of benefit 
to [them], as well, and they will be the sole beneficiaries of 
the trust."  The torn-up pieces of paper did not include a 
bequest for the expected child.  The defendant testified that he 
had planned to update his will, and introduced another note 
dated May 14, 2009, which said, "Once my unborn son . . . is 
6 
 
minivan, investigators found a bloodstained knife and sheath in 
the driver's door compartment.  There was occult blood on the 
driver's door handle and seatback.  Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing on the sneakers, the knife, and the sheath, according to 
the Commonwealth's expert, matched Galperina's genetic profile.  
The knife handle and the bloodstain on the jacket each contained 
a mixture of DNA from Galperina and the defendant.2 
b.  Defendant's case.  As stated, the theory of defense was 
that the defendant stabbed Galperina in the heat of passion 
following her announcement that he was not the baby's father, 
and that he lacked the intent for premeditated murder. 
The defendant testified in his own defense.  He said that 
he met Galperina in 2006 and they began an intimate 
relationship.  At first, they agreed to use birth control.  In 
2008, Galperina told the defendant that she was pregnant.  This 
 
born, I would like him to get a quarter of these assets, and to 
have this administered by his mother."  The defendant also said 
that he intended to provide for the child by purchasing a life 
insurance policy. 
 
 
2 In Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 851-853 & n.25 
(2010), this court concluded that testimony that a DNA "match" 
exists is inadmissible without accompanying statistical 
interpretation of the likelihood of that match by an expert.  
Here, however, the expert testified, without objection, that 
"[t]he major DNA profile matched the DNA profile of Yuliya 
Galperina."  We conclude that, in these circumstances, there was 
no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice from the 
expert's unobjected-to use of the word "match" without further 
discussion of the underlying statistics.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 469-472 (2018). 
7 
 
upset the defendant, because he did not think they were ready to 
have a baby, and they had agreed they would not.  The two split, 
and soon thereafter Galperina learned that she in fact was not 
pregnant. 
Galperina and the defendant reconciled, and then they 
decided to have a child together.  The defendant testified that 
he changed his mind because he "loved [Galperina] very much."  
He went with her to prenatal appointments, displayed an 
ultrasound image of the fetus in his living room, and purchased 
a changing table.  He also kept a file of things having to do 
with his expected child, and he had chosen a name for the child.  
The defendant said that he and Galperina had agreed to "raise 
the child as we were a married couple.  We were both going to 
participate in the raising of the child . . . equally." 
During the course of her pregnancy, the defendant and 
Galperina nonetheless had several disagreements concerning her 
parenting practices and, in particular, her use of natural and 
traditional remedies.  The defendant pointed out that she left 
her young children unattended, failed to dress them in clothing 
appropriate for the weather, and allowed them to play in the 
rear seat of a moving vehicle while they were not wearing 
seatbelts.  The defendant also disliked that Galperina brought 
her daughter to an unqualified healer to treat a learning 
disability.  Galperina consumed "all kinds of weird 
8 
 
concoctions," including large doses of raw apricot seeds, that 
the defendant believed were toxic and potentially harmful to 
their child.  Galperina refused to allow the defendant to take 
the baby to meet his family until the baby was three months old, 
because her ethnic tradition required that a newborn child be 
isolated from visitors for the child's protection.  As her due 
date approached, Galperina acquiesced to several of the 
defendant's demands; she promised to take the child to a 
conventional holistic pediatrician, and to permit State-mandated 
vaccinations. 
The defendant also testified that he usually visited 
Galperina on Saturday nights and carried a hunting knife for his 
own protection.  He believed that her apartment building was in 
a "potentially dangerous area," and had seen groups of young and 
"seedy looking" individuals gathered around the entrance to the 
building.  When he visited Galperina for the last time, he was 
carrying a knife in his coat pocket. 
On that evening, he arrived at around 10 P.M.  They 
discussed the pending birth, and Galperina said that she no 
longer wanted the baby to be vaccinated.  The defendant was 
annoyed that she was reneging on their agreement.  She further 
angered the defendant by telling him that she had paid one 
hundred dollars to the natural healer for the baby's care.  She 
added that she had ignored his advice and had consumed a large 
9 
 
number of apricot seeds, and she insisted that the baby could 
not visit with the defendant's family as a newborn.  These 
statements made the defendant "quite angry," and he raised his 
voice.  He announced that he was leaving because he was not 
being allowed to make "any decisions about the baby," and he put 
on his coat.  The defendant told Galperina, "I'm leaving you and 
I'll send you money."  She replied, "Don't even bother sending 
the money.  It's not your child." 
The defendant testified that he felt anger, rage, and 
betrayal.  He "lost it" and blacked out.  His next memory was 
being in the bathroom, covered in blood and holding a knife.  
"It was, like, waking up.  I had the knife in my hand and there 
was blood everywhere."  He removed his bloodstained pants, 
dressed in a pair of pants he found in a hamper, kissed 
Galperina, covered her up with a sheet, and left the apartment. 
The defendant introduced expert testimony to establish that 
the killing was mitigated by a fragile mental state.  Dr. Thomas 
Deters, a neuropsychologist, conducted a comprehensive 
examination of the defendant.  Deters interviewed the defendant 
a number of times, administered a battery of tests, reviewed 
police reports and statements, and interviewed the defendant's 
relatives and friends.  Deters noted that the defendant suffered 
head trauma as a young child and as an adolescent, as well as 
from playing soccer in college.  Multiple stressors affected the 
10 
 
defendant's mental functioning at the time of the stabbing; 
these included the recent death of his mother, his strained 
relationship with his brother, a loss of employment, isolation 
from his children, and Galperina's refusal to allow him to 
coparent. 
Deters diagnosed the defendant as suffering from numerous 
neurological impairments, including Asperger's syndrome, anxiety 
disorder, mood disorder, personality disorder, major depression, 
sleep disorder, and prefrontal lobe abnormalities.  As a result 
of these illnesses, Deters opined, the defendant was unable to 
act appropriately when confronted with a stressful situation.  
Deters believed that, at the time of the stabbing, the defendant 
had been unable to weigh the consequences of his actions or to 
appreciate the cruelty of his actions.  The defendant's mental 
impairments made him susceptible to an enraged response to 
provocation. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor introduced testimony by Dr. 
Tali Walters, a forensic psychologist.  Based on her interview 
of the defendant, and her examination of the police reports and 
the defendant's statements, Walters testified that the defendant 
did not have a mental illness.  It was her opinion that he had 
no impairments that would affect his ability to reflect coolly, 
to premeditate, or to form an intent to kill. 
11 
 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In August of 2009, a grand jury 
returned indictments charging the defendant with two counts of 
murder in the first degree in connection with the deaths of 
Galperina and "Baby Boy Galperina."  Beginning on October 9, 
2012, the defendant was tried before a Superior Court jury.  The 
Commonwealth proceeded on theories of deliberate premeditation 
and extreme atrocity or cruelty for the death of Galperina, and 
deliberate premeditation for the death of her fetus.  On 
November 8, 2012, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of two counts of murder in the first degree, under each of the 
theories alleged by the Commonwealth. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that his convictions 
of murder in the first degree should be vacated because no 
rational juror could have found the absence of heat of passion 
upon reasonable provocation based on the revelation of his lack 
of paternity.  The defendant also maintains that his conviction 
for the death of the fetus cannot stand because the common-law 
rule of liability for the death of a viable fetus, see 
Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 805-807 (1984), is based on 
the direct infliction of prenatal injuries.  Accordingly, he 
contends, he cannot be liable for murder where the fetus died as 
a result of maternal blood loss.  The defendant further argues 
that the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, 
12 
 
because the Commonwealth did not prove an intent to kill the 
fetus. 
 
In addition, the defendant maintains that a number of other 
errors at trial mandate that he receive a new trial.  He 
challenges several of the judge's evidentiary rulings, including 
the exclusion of pattern evidence to demonstrate that Galperina 
told another intimate partner that he was not the father of 
another of her children; the denial of the defendant's motion to 
introduce expert testimony on his mental state, in reliance on 
Commonwealth v. Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 577-578 (2001), and 
Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531-532 
(1986); and the denial of a motion to strike Walters's testimony 
due to its lack of scientific reliability. 
 
The defendant also asserts that the prosecutor's reference 
in her closing argument to "transferred intent" created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, and that the 
conviction of murder of the fetus was predicated on an erroneous 
jury instruction that lessened the Commonwealth's burden to 
prove that the fetus had been viable.  In addition, the 
defendant argues that the judge erred in dismissing a 
deliberating juror.  Finally, the defendant asks us to exercise 
our extraordinary authority, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the degree of guilt in the interest of justice, due to 
the mitigating circumstances of a crime of passion. 
13 
 
 
a.  Heat of passion upon reasonable provocation.  The 
defendant contends that this was a case of manslaughter, not 
murder, and that no reasonable juror could have found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the absence of the mitigating circumstance of 
heat of passion upon reasonable provocation, based on the 
combination of Galperina's "extraordinary provocations" and his 
fragile mental state. 
An intentional killing that otherwise would be murder may 
be reduced to voluntary manslaughter where there are extenuating 
circumstances, such as "sudden passion based on provocation."  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Whitman, 430 Mass. 746, 753-755 
(2000), and cases cited ("Voluntary manslaughter is an 
intentional killing in the heat of passion as a result of severe 
provocation" [citation omitted]).  In general, words alone are 
not sufficient provocation to reduce the crime of murder to 
manslaughter.  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 396 Mass. 306, 314 
(1985).  "[V]erbal insults and arguments, even if obscene or 
hostile, cannot constitute sufficient provocation, for a 
reasonable person 'can be expected to control the feelings 
aroused' thereby" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Estremera, 383 Mass. 382, 392 (1981).  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Vatcher, 438 Mass. 584, 589 (2003) (eleven year old 
physically challenged victim's extended temper tantrum, "however 
frustrating, annoying, and even infuriating his behavior, . . . 
14 
 
did not rise to 'adequate provocation'"); Commonwealth v. 
Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 219-222 (2001) (victim's revelation that 
she had acquired immunodeficiency syndrome and probably had 
transmitted disease to defendant was insufficient to support 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Masello, 
428 Mass. 446, 449 (1998) (heated argument was insufficient to 
constitute adequate provocation); Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 425 
Mass. 507, 514 (1997), S.C., 433 Mass. 439 (2001) (false 
accusation of crime was insufficient to establish adequate 
provocation); Commonwealth v. Burke, 376 Mass. 539, 542-543 
(1978) (defendant was not entitled to instruction on provocation 
where he told victim that he loved her, and she responded with 
expletive and words of rejection). 
 
An exception to this rule exists, however, "where the words 
convey inflammatory information to the defendant."  Commonwealth 
v. Mercado, 452 Mass. 662, 671 (2008).  "[T]he existence of 
sufficient provocation is not foreclosed because a defendant 
learns of a fact from a statement rather than from personal 
observation.  If the information conveyed is of the nature to 
cause a reasonable person to lose his self-control and did 
actually cause the defendant to do so, then a statement is 
sufficient."  Groome, 435 Mass. at 220-221, quoting Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 28-29 (1999). 
15 
 
 
An even more narrow exception is applicable where the words 
constitute a "peculiarly immediate and intense offense to 
[one's] sensitivities."  Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 370 Mass. 
438, 440-442 (1976).  We have deemed a sudden oral revelation of 
infidelity inflammatory information sufficient to constitute 
such provocation.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. LeClair, 445 Mass. 
734, 741-743 (2006); Schnopps, 383 Mass. at 180-182.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 748-749 (2017) 
(defendant's prior knowledge of infidelity precluded claim of 
sudden discovery).  See also 2 W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal 
Law § 15.2(b)(5), at 500 (2d ed. 2003) ("a sudden confession of 
adultery by a wife, or information from a third person that a 
wife has been unfaithful, has sometimes been held to constitute 
a provocation to the husband of the same sort as if he had made 
an 'ocular observation' of his wife's adultery").3 
 
To be sufficient to establish reasonable provocation, the 
words must comprise sudden knowledge; an actual confirmation of 
 
3 In some other States, a verbal revelation of infidelity 
falls within the general rule that mere words are insufficient 
to establish reasonable provocation.  In those cases, reasonable 
provocation requires that a defendant catch the other spouse and 
the spouse's paramour in the act.  See, e.g., Luch v. State, 413 
P.3d 1224, 1230 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018) (common law requires 
defendant find spouse in very act of committing adultery); 
People v. Chevalier, 131 Ill. 2d 66, 76 (1989) (only discovery 
of parties in act of adultery or immediately before or after act 
will suffice as provocation); State v. Thomas, 169 Iowa 591, 598 
(1915) (adequate provocation existed where act of adultery 
committed in presence and sight of defendant). 
16 
 
a suspicion of infidelity is not sufficient.  See Schnopps, 383 
Mass. at 181-182 (new trial was required where judge declined to 
give instruction on manslaughter because there was conflicting 
evidence whether defendant had just learned of wife's infidelity 
or had known of it for months); Bermudez, 370 Mass. at 440-442 
(no instruction on reasonable provocation was warranted where 
defendant had been separated from wife for three weeks and she 
made hostile and "obscene" statements telling defendant of her 
infidelity when he went to visit her to see their baby, but 
holding that "[t]he existence of sufficient provocation is not 
foreclosed absolutely because a defendant learns of a fact from 
oral statements rather than from personal observation. . . .  A 
reasonable man can be expected to control the feelings aroused 
by an insult or an argument, but certain incidents may be as 
provocative when disclosed by words as when witnessed 
personally.  Therefore, we leave open the possibility that, in 
an appropriate case, testing the defendant's response on an 
objective standard, sufficient provocation may be found in 
information conveyed to a defendant by words alone").  Compare 
Mercado, 452 Mass. at 672 (no reasonable provocation where 
defendant had suspected for some time that wife had been 
unfaithful); Commonwealth v. Andrade, 422 Mass. 236, 237-238 
(1996) (no reasonable provocation where defendant had suspected 
for several weeks that wife had been unfaithful, even though he 
17 
 
had confirmed his suspicion less than seven hours before killing 
her). 
Accordingly, based on our existing jurisprudence on 
manslaughter, the defendant had grounds upon which to argue that 
the Commonwealth failed to establish that there were no 
mitigating circumstances that would reduce the stabbing here 
from murder to manslaughter, see Bermudez, 370 Mass. at 440-442, 
and the judge properly instructed on manslaughter due to heat of 
passion, see Commonwealth v. Brown, 387 Mass. 220, 227 (1982), 
quoting Commonwealth v. LePage, 352 Mass. 403, 419 (1967) 
(manslaughter instruction must be given where "any view of the 
evidence will permit a finding that the offence is manslaughter 
and not murder").  The defendant's argument before us, however, 
rests on viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
him, rather than, as we must consider it when analyzing a 
question of sufficiency, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Hrycenko v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 
503, 510-511 (2011). 
Notwithstanding the testimony that the defendant 
highlights, the jury were free to disregard his explanation that 
"he lost it" upon hearing that he was not the father of the 
fetus.  See Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 478 Mass. 154, 166-167 
(2017).  The jury reasonably could have adopted the 
Commonwealth's theory that the defendant got into a heated 
18 
 
argument with his girlfriend, formed an intent to kill her and 
her fetus, and stabbed her multiple times in the area of her 
vital organs, in accordance with that plan.  See Commonwealth v. 
Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 432 (2008) (deliberate premeditation 
matter of logical sequence not necessarily time).  These were 
questions of fact reserved for a fact finder properly instructed 
on the crimes of murder and voluntary manslaughter.  We discern 
no basis in this record to second guess the jury's 
determination. 
 
We also take this opportunity to address the question 
whether our jurisprudence on manslaughter should continue to 
recognize oral revelations of infidelity as a basis for 
reasonable provocation.  In Commonwealth v. Steeves, 490 Mass. 
270, 292 n.12 (2022), we "express[ed] serious doubt about the 
ongoing viability of this legal principle, where it rests on the 
outmoded perception that '[t]he killing of a spouse (usually a 
wife) by a spouse (usually a husband)' is 'an acceptable 
response to the discovery of infidelity,' thereby 'reinforc[ing] 
male irrationality as normal, and legitim[izing] the view of 
women as property'" (citation omitted).  Likewise, in State v. 
Shane, 63 Ohio St. 3d 630, 637 (1992), the Supreme Court of Ohio 
observed that the doctrine "has its foundation in the ancient 
common-law concept that the wife is the property of the 
husband":  "[w]hen a man is taken in adultery with another man's 
19 
 
wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock out his 
brains, that is bare manslaughter; for jealousy is the rage of a 
man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property" (citation 
omitted).  The court concluded that "[t]his archaic rule has no 
place in modern society."  Id. 
We conclude that the exception in the Commonwealth to the 
mere words rule for sudden oral revelations of infidelity has 
run its course.  The exception rests upon a shaky, misogynistic 
foundation and has no place in our modern jurisprudence.  Going 
forward, we no longer will recognize that an oral discovery of 
infidelity satisfies the objective element of something that 
would provoke a reasonable person to kill his or her spouse. 
By today's ruling, however, we do not foreclose the 
possibility of sufficient provocation caused by learning of 
other types of information of a "nature to cause a reasonable 
person to lose his self-control" (citation omitted).  Groome, 
435 Mass. at 220.  It is difficult, given the vagaries of human 
conduct, to delineate all of the exceptions to the general rule 
that mere words are insufficient to constitute reasonable 
provocation.  In each case, the trial judge must consider 
whether the particular information conveyed to the defendant was 
sufficient to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  
See Commonwealth v. Felix, 476 Mass. 750, 756-757 (2017) 
(discussing judge's duty to provide instruction on reasonable 
20 
 
provocation where precipitating event would have provoked heat 
of passion in ordinary person); Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 
Mass. 587, 602 (2015) (instruction on reasonable provocation is 
warranted if there is evidence deemed legally sufficient to 
cause accused to lose self-control in heat of passion).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 422 (2019) 
(instruction on manslaughter is required if evidence, considered 
in light most favorable to defendant, would permit verdict of 
manslaughter, not murder). 
 
b.  Liability for death of viable fetus where fetus was not 
directly injured.  At common law, the destruction of a fetus in 
utero was not a homicide.  See Cass, 392 Mass. at 805.  The 
issue "debated at common law" was whether criminal liability 
"might rest on a defendant's injuring a fetus in utero, where 
the fetus was later born alive, and then died of the injury 
without further guilty intervention by the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 512 (1976).  See Dietrich 
v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15, 17 (1884) (discussing common-
law "born alive" rule). 
In Cass, 392 Mass. at 799, the court addressed whether a 
viable fetus is a "person" for purposes of the statute on motor 
vehicle homicide.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24G (homicide by motor 
vehicle is defined, in part, as operating motor vehicle while 
under influence of intoxicating substances and by such operation 
21 
 
"caus[ing] the death of another person").  The court examined 
the foundation for the "ancient" rule that a fetus must be "born 
alive," and rejected this limitation to the statutory definition 
of a person.  See Cass, supra at 805-807.  The dominant 
rationale for the rule, the court noted, was the impossibility 
of determining whether "the fetus was alive when the accused 
committed his act."  Id. at 806 & n.5.  The better rule, the 
court held, "is that infliction of prenatal injuries resulting 
in the death of a viable fetus, before or after it is born, is 
homicide."  Id. at 807.  See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 
378, 383-384 (1989) (extending liability for death of viable 
fetus to charge of involuntary manslaughter). 
The defendant contends that "Cass does not apply to the 
circumstances at bar because the fetus did not suffer a prenatal 
injury."  The defendant emphasizes that the fetus was uninjured 
by the stabbing and died as a result of loss of maternal blood.  
In the alternative, he urges this court to overrule Cass as an 
unlawful usurpation of the Legislature's authority to define 
criminal liability. 
The defendant's contention that the fetus was uninjured by 
the stabbing of Galperina is strained at best.  Admittedly, none 
of the fifteen stab wounds was inflicted on or touched the 
fetus.  Nonetheless, the defendant committed an act of violence 
against a woman who was nine months pregnant, repeatedly 
22 
 
stabbing her in, among other areas, the torso, where the vital 
organs are located.  By ending the mother's life, he destroyed 
the viable fetus through the cessation of life-sustaining 
maternal blood flow.  See Cass, 392 Mass. at 807 ("If a person 
were to commit violence against a pregnant woman and destroy the 
fetus within her, we would not want the death of the fetus to go 
unpunished").  See also Commonwealth v. Crawford, 417 Mass. 358, 
359 (1994), S.C., 430 Mass. 683 (2000) (upholding conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter where mother was killed by gunshot 
wound to face and viable fetus died of oxygen deprivation).  
Nothing in Cass, supra at 806-807, or our subsequent cases, 
requires that a viable fetus suffer a direct traumatic injury 
such as a gunshot wound or a stab wound. 
The defendant also argues that we should overrule Cass as 
an inappropriate exercise of "raw judicial power."  Relying on 
the dissent by Justice Wilkins, he argues that Cass is flawed 
because the court usurped the Legislature's exclusive authority 
to define criminal offenses and what conduct is punishable under 
the criminal law.  The defendant appears to overlook Justice 
Wilkin's discussion of the court's expanded definition of the 
word "person" "in the construction of an exclusively statutory 
crime," motor vehicle homicide.  Id. at 809 (Wilkins, J., 
dissenting).  Here, the question is not the interpretation of a 
statutorily defined offense.  At issue in this case is the 
23 
 
common-law definition of murder, a matter within the sole 
jurisdiction of this court.  See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 
Mass. 852, 865-866 (2020) (exercising court's authority to 
redefine homicide offense).  Accordingly, the defendant's 
argument concerning the purported violation of the separation of 
powers is unavailing. 
c.  Evidence of deliberate premeditation with respect to 
fetus.  The defendant also argues that the death of the fetus 
was "merely incident to and an unintentional byproduct of the 
death of Galperina."  He contends that no rational juror could 
have found that he specifically intended to kill the fetus. 
To convict a defendant of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of deliberate premeditation, the Commonwealth must prove 
that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim 
"after a period of reflection."  Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 
Mass. 262, 269 (1994).  "No particular period of reflection is 
required for deliberate premeditation to be found. . . .  The 
law recognizes that a plan to murder may be formed within a few 
seconds."  Id.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 46-47 
(2018) (key is sequence of thought process). 
In determining whether the Commonwealth met its burden to 
establish each element of the offense charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we rely on the familiar Latimore standard.  
See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  
24 
 
"[The] question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  Although a conviction may be based 
entirely on circumstantial evidence, and the inferences drawn 
need only be reasonable, not inescapable, see Commonwealth v. 
Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32, 45 (2017), a "conviction may not rest 
on the piling of inference upon inference or on conjecture and 
speculation," Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), 
S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011), citing 
Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 339–343 (2004). 
Considering the evidence before the jury in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence 
would have permitted a reasonable juror to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant deliberately intended to 
kill the fetus.  By his own statements, the defendant was well 
aware of the correlation between Galperina's health and the 
health of the fetus.  Among other things, he excoriated her for 
consuming what he viewed as toxic amounts of apricot seeds while 
she was pregnant.  The defendant told the jury that he was 
furious at Galperina's revelation that he was not the father.  
Fueled by anger, he pulled a hunting knife from his coat pocket, 
removed the knife from its sheath, and stabbed her fifteen times 
25 
 
in the torso, the location of her vital organs, and in the back 
of the head and neck.  The jury reasonably could have inferred 
that the defendant knew that by killing a woman who was nine 
months pregnant, he would end the life of the viable fetus 
carried in utero.  See Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 
419 (2011) (deliberate premeditation may be inferred from 
"nature and extent of a victim's injuries, the duration of the 
attack, the number of blows, and the use of various weapons").4 
 
d.  Evidentiary rulings.  i.  Exclusion of pattern 
evidence.  The defendant sought to introduce evidence that, 
while she was pregnant with her daughter, Galperina told a 
former boyfriend that he was not the baby's father.  The 
defendant argued that the evidence was admissible to show a 
pattern of misconduct, to corroborate his testimony that he had 
been "extraordinarily" provoked by Galperina, or to rebut the 
 
4 The judge imposed consecutive sentences for Galperina's 
death and the death of her fetus.  The defendant contends that 
this sentencing scheme violated the prohibition against double 
jeopardy by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense, 
as well as the "the fundamental principle of the criminal law" 
that liability rests on a defendant's intent and the results of 
his or her actions.  We discern no abuse of discretion.  As 
discussed supra, the evidence before the jury would have allowed 
them to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was liable for the death of the fetus based on a finding that he 
specifically intended to kill the fetus.  The judge had 
authority to impose consecutive sentences for the unlawful 
killings of a mother and her viable fetus.  See Commonwealth v. 
Crawford, 417 Mass. 358, 359 (1994), S.C., 430 Mass. 683 (2000). 
26 
 
suggestion that he was fabricating the reason for that 
provocation. 
Prior bad act evidence generally is inadmissible.  See 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014); Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2022).  It may be admissible, however, to 
demonstrate a common scheme, pattern of operation, absence of 
accident or mistake, identity, or motive.  Commonwealth v. 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128 (2006); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2).  
It was the defendant's burden, as the proponent of the evidence, 
to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the 
act occurred; (2) that the prior bad act evidence pertained to 
some relevant issue at trial; and (3) that the prior event and 
the circumstances of the crime charged had a uniqueness or 
particularly distinguishing pattern of conduct common to the 
current and former incidents.  See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 428 
Mass. 782, 785-786 (1999).  A judge may exclude prior bad act 
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Almeida, 479 Mass. 562, 568 
(2018).  "Determinations of the relevance, probative value, and 
prejudice of such evidence are left to the sound discretion of 
the judge" and will not be disturbed absent clear error 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 735 
(2019). 
27 
 
 
Following the defendant's motion, the judge conducted a 
voir dire hearing of the former boyfriend.  The former boyfriend 
testified that he had been annoyed by Galperina's frequent 
contact with her son's father, who maintained a regular presence 
in his son's life.  The former boyfriend asked Galperina "as a 
joke, 'Were you sleeping with him?'"  Galperina replied, "Yes, 
and you know, the child I'm carrying is his."  According to the 
former boyfriend, she said this once or twice "as a joke," and 
they both laughed. 
The judge then excluded the proffered evidence about 
Galperina's statements to the former boyfriend on three separate 
grounds.  First, he found that the prior comment did not 
establish a pattern (possibly because the testimony was that 
Galperina had been joking around, as compared to the volatile 
situation leading to her death).  Second, the judge found that 
the defendant was attempting to introduce the evidence for 
impermissible propensity purposes.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(1).  The judge commented, "[B]ased on this proffer, 
anything that could be taken from it, if anything at all, and 
really, nothing can, would be a propensity inference."  Third, 
the judge found that the probative value of the statement was 
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.  We 
discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to deny 
the introduction of the prior bad act evidence. 
28 
 
The judge also denied the defendant's request to extend 
Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 664 (2005), and to 
allow the admission of Galperina's statement as character 
evidence.  See id. at 650, 663-664 (where issue of self-defense 
is raised and identity of first aggressor is in dispute, judge 
may allow introduction of evidence of specific incidents of 
violence initiated by victim even if incidents were unknown to 
defendant).  The defendant argues that "[t]here is no reason why 
the same rule should not adhere here -- where the victim had a 
pattern of making identical extraordinarily provocative 
statements."   Adjutant establishes an exception to our general 
rule prohibiting evidence of a person's character "to prove that 
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character or trait."  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(a)(1).  "Our 
decision in the Adjutant case is specifically limited to 
situations where the defendant claims self-defense . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 228 (2008).  See Camacho, 
472 Mass. at 596 n.12 (Adjutant rule is not applicable to 
defense of another).  We decline the defendant's invitation to 
extend the holding in Adjutant beyond its narrow exception. 
ii.  Exclusion of opinion testimony by defense expert.  
Prior to the testimony by Deters, the defendant's psychological 
expert, the judge reminded the attorneys that he intended to 
enforce this court's rulings in Jaime, 433 Mass. at 577-578, and 
29 
 
Department of Youth Servs., 398 Mass. at 531-532.  "The purpose 
of this limitation on expert witness testimony is to prevent the 
proponent of the opinion from 'import[ing] inadmissible hearsay 
into the trial.'"  Commonwealth v. Piantedosi, 478 Mass. 536, 
543 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Goddard, 476 Mass. 443, 448 
(2017). 
Under that precedent, an expert's opinion may be based on 
"(a) facts observed by the witness or otherwise in the witness's 
direct personal knowledge; (b) evidence already in the record or 
that will be presented during the course of the proceedings, 
which facts may be assumed to be true in questions put to the 
witness; and (c) facts or data not in evidence if the facts or 
data are independently admissible in evidence and are a 
permissible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an 
opinion."  Mass. G. Evid. § 703.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 
457 Mass. 773, 784-785 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011) 
(expert was prohibited from informing jury during direct 
examination about facts and data that were not in evidence, but 
such testimony would have been admissible with proper witness or 
with foundation that expert considered in forming opinion); 
Department of Youth Servs., 398 Mass. at 532 ("thrust of [our] 
rule is to leave inquiry regarding the basis of expert testimony 
to cross-examination"). 
30 
 
The defendant objects to the judge's ruling that precluded 
Deters from testifying on direct examination to facts that were 
not in evidence, but upon which he had relied to form the basis 
of his opinion.  The defendant argues that the judge's decision, 
which fully comported with the rules of evidence concerning 
expert opinion testimony, undermined Deters's testimony "by 
impeding its narrative flow and calling into question its 
credibility and reliability."  The defendant maintains that the 
exclusion of certain of Deters's proffered testimony violated 
his right to a fair trial and to present a complete defense. 
We do not agree.  The judge's decision to exclude 
statements by Deters about the basis of his knowledge, where the 
facts upon which Deters relied were not in evidence, did not 
deprive the defendant of the ability to present a full defense.  
See Piantedosi, 478 Mass. at 543.  "A defendant's right to 
present a full defense . . . is not without limits . . . , and 
as a general rule, does not entitle him [or her] to place before 
the jury evidence normally inadmissible" (quotation and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 
204 (2015). 
Deters testified to having reviewed thousands of pages of 
discovery interviewing the defendant for twenty-nine hours and 
conducting batteries of neurological testing, having interviewed 
the defendant's family members, and having reviewed the 
31 
 
substance of the defendant's medical history.  Deters also 
referenced, as facts already in the record that underlay the 
bases of his opinion, the defendant's statements on direct and 
cross-examination, and the testimony of the defendant's brother, 
daughter, and ex-wife; an acquaintance; and a business 
associate.  The direct examination of Deters included details 
concerning the defendant's medical history, educational 
background, career, major bouts of depression, panic attacks, 
sleep dysfunction, social isolation, stressors, and 
abnormalities of his prefrontal lobe. 
iii.  Motion to strike certain testimony by Commonwealth's 
expert.  Walters, the Commonwealth's psychological expert, 
testified that the defendant was not mentally ill.  The 
defendant moved to strike her opinion testimony on the ground 
that she did not frame her opinion as being held to a reasonable 
degree of psychological certainty.  The judge denied the motion.  
He noted that, in the "ballistics case" -- Commonwealth v. Pytou 
Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 848-849 (2011) -- this court required that 
testimony be framed in that manner but has not done so in "any 
other situation."  The defendant argues that this decision was 
error, because it "gave Walters'[s] opinion an air of 
certitude." 
Because the defendant objected, we review for prejudicial 
error and consider whether there was a reasonable possibility 
32 
 
that the error contributed to the guilty verdicts.  Commonwealth 
v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 7 (2014). 
A witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education" may testify to an opinion if 
to do so would be helpful to the jury's understanding of the 
evidence "or to determine a fact in issue."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 702.  See Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487 Mass. 212, 217 (2021) 
(role of expert witness is to help jurors understand evidence 
that lies outside their common experience).  "[E]xpert witness 
testimony may be excluded as not probative of a material fact in 
dispute and thus of no assistance to the jury when it amounts to 
a mere guess or conjecture."  Mass. G. Evid. § 702 note.  See 
Kennedy v. U-Haul Co., 360 Mass. 71, 73-74 (1971) ("A mere guess 
or conjecture by an expert witness in the form of a conclusion 
from basic facts that do not trend toward that conclusion any 
more than toward a contrary one has no evidential value").  A 
decision to admit or to exclude expert testimony falls within 
the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be 
disturbed unless it is an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 603 (2012). 
In general, no threshold level of certainty is required of 
an expert before the expert's opinion may be admitted at trial.  
See Commonwealth v. Torres, 469 Mass. 398, 407 (2014) ("expert 
opinion that is not definitive but expressed in terms of 
33 
 
observations being consistent with a particular cause, or words 
of similar effect, does not render the opinion inadmissible on 
the ground that it is speculative" [quotations and citation 
omitted]); Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 396 Mass. 342, 359-360 
(1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986) (pathologist's 
inability to testify to cause of death to reasonable degree of 
medical certainty did not render opinion inadmissible as 
speculative).  Cf. United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 381 
(3d Cir. 2005) (there is "nothing magical about the phrase, 'to 
a reasonable degree of scientific certainty'"); United States v. 
Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072-1073 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 843 (1977) (no requirement that expert's testimony be 
expressed in terms of reasonable scientific certainty). 
Undoubtedly, the phrase "reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty," or other forms of that phrase, is "a useful 
shorthand expression . . . helpful for forestalling challenges 
to the admissibility of expert testimony" (citation omitted).  
Anderson v. Paulo, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 635, 641 (2009).  See 
Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 280 (1998), S.C., 440 
Mass. 245 (2003) (psychologist testified to reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty that defendant suffered from three mental 
diseases or defects).  "[C]are must be taken," however, "to see 
that the incantation does not become a semantic trap and the 
34 
 
failure to voice it is not used as a basis for exclusion" 
(citation omitted).  Anderson, supra. 
The defendant contends that Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. at 848-
850, mandates that "subjective expert opinion" be presented to a 
reasonable degree of certainty.  We disagree.  In that case, we 
discussed a significant challenge to the admissibility of 
forensic ballistics testimony in light of concerns "about both 
the lack of a firm scientific basis for evaluating the 
reliability of forensic ballistics evidence and the subjective 
nature of forensic ballistics comparisons."  Id. at 837.  We 
offered guidelines "to ensure that expert forensic ballistics 
testimony appropriately assists the jury in finding the facts 
but does not mislead by reaching beyond its scientific grasp."  
Id. at 846-847.  The guidelines included a requirement that the 
expert's opinion be offered to a "reasonable degree of ballistic 
certainty."  Id. at 848.  Noting that other jurisdictions had 
come to different conclusions regarding the admissibility of 
such evidence, we struck a "middle ground" by permitting the 
introduction of an opinion that a match existed to a reasonable 
degree of ballistics certainty.  Id. at 850. 
Accordingly, we discern no prejudicial error arising from 
the judge's decision to deny the defendant's motion to strike 
Walters's testimony.  We also decline to extend our decision in 
Pytou Heang to encompass all expert opinion testimony. 
35 
 
e.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  i.  Transferred intent.  
As discussed, the defendant argues that a new trial is required 
because "no rational juror could have . . . found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant deliberately premeditated 
and specifically intended the death of the fetus."  He also 
argues that the prosecutor improperly raised the theory of 
transferred intent in her closing argument, in an effort to 
disguise the Commonwealth's lack of evidence as to the 
defendant's intent. 
The Commonwealth did not seek an instruction on transferred 
intent, see generally Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 
(2012), with respect to the charge for killing the fetus.  
Nonetheless, in her closing argument, the prosecutor suggested 
that the jury infer that the defendant intended to kill the 
fetus with deliberate premeditation based on the attack on 
Galperina.  She argued: 
"And again, I don't want to tell you what premeditation is; 
the judge will instruct[] you on it.  But I'd suggest to 
you that from the evidence that you heard, the Commonwealth 
has proven premeditation.  As it relates to [Galperina] and 
her child, the intent that the judge will instruct you 
about is whatever intent you find is the intent that can be 
transferred to [Galperina's] child." 
 
Because the defendant did not object to these statements, we 
review to determine whether any error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
36 
 
 
We analyze the prosecutor's statement "in light of the 
entire argument, as well as in light of the judge's instruction 
to the jury and the evidence at trial" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 684, 694 (2004).  
The single passing reference to transferred intent consisted of 
one line in a closing argument that occupied twenty-six pages of 
transcript.  The judge instructed the jury, before closing 
arguments were presented, that "the lawyers will, at some point 
in time, in order to structure their closing, inevitably be 
referencing the law.  I will instruct you on the law.  You must 
accept the law as I instruct you, whether you agree with that 
law or not." 
 
In his final charge, the judge instructed that it was his 
responsibility to "teach [the jurors] the law that applies to 
the case."  He also explained that the Commonwealth was required 
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
deliberately premeditated the deaths of both Galperina and the 
fetus.  The judge emphasized, "There are two separate 
indictments.  One indictment alleges the murder of [Galperina], 
and one indictment alleges the murder of the fetus.  You must 
consider these indictments separately and the Commonwealth has 
the burden of proving each element of the indictment or its 
lesser included offenses beyond a reasonable doubt."  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 645, 651 (2008) (jury are 
37 
 
presumed to follow judge's instructions).  Given the passing use 
of the term "transferred intent," its vagueness in the context 
of the closing argument as a whole, and the judge's instructions 
about the nature of closing arguments, we discern no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
ii.  Statement that mere words cannot establish reasonable 
provocation.  The defendant contends that the prosecutor 
"wrongly" told the jury that mere words cannot furnish the 
provocation necessary for manslaughter.  In her closing, the 
prosecutor stated that "mere words are not enough, so that when 
[Galperina] says to [the defendant], 'It's not your baby,' the 
Commonwealth would say to you, mere words are not enough."  She 
added that "[t]he court will instruct you on that, so I'm not 
going to tell you what those words mean." 
 
The defendant was not prejudiced by these statements.  The 
judge instructed that "[m]ere words, no matter how insulting or 
abusive, standing alone, do not constitute reasonable 
provocation."  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra 
at 77.  He explained:  "[T]he existence of sufficient 
provocation is not foreclosed because a defendant learns of a 
fact from a statement rather than from personal observation.  If 
the information conveyed is of the nature to cause a reasonable 
person to lose his self-control and did actually cause [the 
defendant] to do so, then a statement is sufficient."  See Model 
38 
 
Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra.  We presume that the jury 
followed the judge's instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Bins, 
465 Mass. 348, 367-368 (2013) (possible confusion from 
prosecutor's misstatement of law was remedied by judge's final 
charge). 
f.  Instruction on viability.  In accordance with 
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 691 (2000), the judge 
instructed the jury that they were required to determine whether 
the fetus was viable as part of their determination whether the 
fetus had been murdered.  The judge explained that "[a] killing 
is not murder unless a human being has been killed.  A viable 
fetus is a human being under the law of homicide.  A fetus is 
viable when there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus's 
sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial 
support." 
The defendant recognizes that this instruction "apparently 
has the imprimatur of this [c]ourt."  He argues, however, that 
the instruction that this court accepted in Crawford is 
constitutionally flawed, because the third sentence would allow 
a jury to find that a fetus was a human being if there were 
merely a "reasonable likelihood" of sustained survival outside 
the womb.  In the defendant's view, the instruction "dilute[s]" 
the Commonwealth's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the fetus was viable. 
39 
 
Although the defendant did not object to the judge's 
instruction at trial, he argues that it resulted in structural 
error requiring reversal without a showing of actual harm.  
"[T]here is a very limited class of cases presenting structural 
errors that require automatic reversal absent waiver.  Such 
errors include the denial of counsel or the right to public 
trial, the omission of an instruction on the standard of beyond 
a reasonable doubt, racial discrimination in the selection of a 
jury, or trial before a biased judge.  These errors contain a 
defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Francis, 
485 Mass. 86, 99-100 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2762 
(2021).  An error in defining an element of the crime, as the 
defendant alleges in this case, is not among the very limited 
class of structural errors requiring automatic reversal.  See 
Commonwealth v. McCray, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 845 (2018) 
(omission of element of crime from judge's charge did not 
constitute structural error and was subject to harmless error 
analysis).  See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 
(1999) ("jury instruction that omits an element of the 
offense . . . differs markedly from the constitutional 
violations we have found to defy harmless-error review").  We 
therefore review the defendant's argument for a substantial 
40 
 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Wright, 411 Mass. 
at 681. 
 
Because Galperina was approximately one week away from her 
delivery date, and the fetus was full term, there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in the 
purported diminution of the Commonwealth's burden to prove that 
the fetus was viable.5  Given the facts of this case, and as the 
language used in Crawford is no longer included in the Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide, there is no need to consider the 
question whether the "reasonable likelihood" portion of the 
Crawford instruction on viability relates to a preliminary 
question of fact that need not be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
g.  Discharge of deliberating juror.  On the second full 
day of deliberations, the judge received a note from the 
foreperson reading, "We are concerned that one juror is not able 
 
5 The defendant also contends that the judge, sua sponte, 
should have provided the jury with an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction, and that the failure to do so created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The instruction, he 
argues, was based on the "entirely plausible -- indeed likely -- 
[proposition] that [he] was not even thinking of the fetus when 
he stabbed Galperina."  We conclude that the judge was not 
required to instruct on this lesser included offense where no 
rational view of the evidence established that the defendant 
"was not even thinking about the fetus."  This theory would have 
been farfetched given the defendant's position at trial that he 
"lost it" in light of evidence introduced at trial centered 
around Galperina's pregnancy and the defendant's expected 
relationship with his unborn son named "David." 
41 
 
to productively contribute to deliberations."  The judge 
questioned the foreperson with the caveat that the foreperson 
not reveal "anything about [the jury's] deliberations."  The 
foreperson reported that juror no. 12 "[s]everal times . . . 
refused to participate" in deliberations and seemed mentally 
unstable.  The foreperson also stated that this was "not related 
to the case." 
Where reliable information comes to a judge suggesting a 
lack of impartiality, bias, extraneous influence, or inability 
to deliberate on the part of one of the jurors, a judge should 
conduct a voir dire of the juror.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 748 (2019) (possible extraneous 
influence and prejudice); Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 
182-183 (2019) (question of lack of impartiality due to racial 
or ethnic bias); Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 478 Mass. 1007, 
1007-1009 (2017) (possibly inattentive or sleeping juror); 
Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643-646 (2015) (same). 
Here, the judge determined, based on the note, that he had 
enough information to inquire of juror no. 12 due to her alleged 
refusal to deliberate.  The judge began the voir dire by 
informing the juror, "[W]hen you answer the questions, as 
difficult as it is, I can't have you tell me anything about the 
content about the deliberation . . . .  In other words, don't 
talk to me about anything that you have talked about with your 
42 
 
fellow jurors during jury deliberations."  The juror responded, 
"I understand what the constraint is."  She explained that it 
had been a "difficult day" and that there were "a lot of 
emotions around," but that she had been able to participate in 
the discussions.  The judge invited both sides to suggest 
further questions, and they each indicated that they were 
satisfied with the inquiry.  The judge ruled that, at that 
point, he did not have adequate grounds to discharge the 
deliberating juror.  Defense counsel then noted that he was 
concerned that juror no. 12 "basically grabbed a point of view 
and [was] sticking to it" and had "not mentally even explored 
her position or anyone else's."  Counsel added that the 
defendant was "content to have her removed." 
The judge decided to ask juror no. 12 additional questions 
about her ability to deliberate.  She answered that she could 
participate fully in deliberations.  She indicated that she felt 
"singled out" because she had "a difference of opinion in 
weighing of evidence."  Based on his observations of the juror, 
the judge made clear that the juror's angry and unstable 
demeanor would not be apparent from the trial transcripts.  
Defense counsel agreed; he commented that juror no. 12 was 
"immediately strident" and "angry" and appeared to be incapable 
of following the judge's instruction to keep an open mind.  
43 
 
Counsel also asserted that the voir dire hearings had made juror 
no. 12 "more damaged." 
The judge indicated that he would consider an agreement to 
discharge the juror.  He added, "If there was an objection from 
either party, . . . I probably wouldn't excuse [juror no. 12]."  
Defense counsel stated that juror no. 12 should be discharged 
and that he would object if the juror were to remain on the 
jury.  The judge then conducted a colloquy with the defendant.  
The defendant said that he had had an adequate opportunity to 
consult with counsel on the issue, and that he was acting on the 
advice of counsel and agreed to defer to counsel's judgment.  
The judge discharged juror no. 12. 
The defendant now argues that it was error to discharge the 
deliberating juror without following the requirements set forth 
in Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 843-846 (1984).  In 
particular, the defendant points out, the juror was not informed 
that she could not be discharged unless she had a personal 
problem unrelated to her relationship with other jurors or their 
views of the case.  The defendant maintains that this error 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
"The discharge of a deliberating juror is a sensitive 
undertaking and is fraught with potential for error.  It is to 
be done only in special circumstances, and with special 
precautions.  Great care must be taken to ensure that a lone 
44 
 
dissenting juror is not permitted to evade his 
responsibilities."  Connor, 392 Mass. at 843.  A judge is 
required to hold a hearing "to determine whether there is good 
cause to discharge a juror."  Id. at 844.  "At the hearing, the 
issues of the case and the juror's relationship to his [or her] 
fellow jurors are not to be discussed. . . .  If the 'problem' 
juror is questioned, the judge should preliminarily inform [the 
juror] that [the juror] cannot be discharged unless [the juror] 
has a personal problem, unrelated to his [or her] relationship 
to his [or her] fellow jurors or his [or her] views on the 
case."  Id. at 845. 
We agree with the defendant's argument that the judge 
failed strictly to adhere to our holding in Connor, 392 Mass. at 
843-846.  The judge took "utmost caution . . . to avoid invading 
the province of the jury," see id. at 844, by instructing juror 
no. 12 not to discuss the content of the jury's deliberations.  
He did not, however, preliminarily notify juror no. 12 that she 
could not "be discharged unless [she] has a personal problem, 
unrelated to [her] relationship to [other] jurors or [her] views 
on the case."  Id. at 845.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 486 
Mass. 646, 656 (2021). 
 
Having determined that the judge did not provide juror 
no. 12 an adequate preliminary warning, we consider whether this 
error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
45 
 
justice.  "General Laws c. 234A, § 74, provides that any 
'irregularity' with respect to discharging or managing jurors 
will not lead to vacatur unless the error is preserved by 
objection and the 'objecting party has been specially injured or 
prejudiced thereby.'"  Williams, 486 Mass. at 657.  See 
Swafford, 441 Mass. at 336 ("While we have established 
guidelines that trial judges must follow when discharging a 
deliberating juror," verdict is not set aside unless objecting 
party is prejudiced); Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 431 
(2002) (verdict shall not be set aside based on irregularity in 
discharging deliberating juror absent objection and prejudice). 
 
Here, defense counsel requested the discharge of juror 
no. 12 and objected to her remaining on the jury.  The defendant 
has not pointed to any prejudice, however, from the assented-to 
discharge of juror no. 12 beyond speculation that "she was a 
dissenting or hold-out juror, leaning towards a manslaughter 
verdict."  See Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485, 493 
(2019) (discharge of juror had impact on case where jury 
appeared deadlocked).  We therefore conclude that there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
h.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no reason to order a new trial 
or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  I concur with the court's opinion 
completely.  I write separately to call attention to the fact 
that women in the United States are more likely to be killed by 
homicide during pregnancy or soon after childbirth than to die 
from the three leading obstetric causes of maternal mortality 
(hypertensive disorders, hemorrhage, or sepsis).  Lawn & Koenen, 
Homicide Is a Leading Cause of Death for Pregnant Women in US, 
BMJ 2022;379:o2499 (Oct. 19, 2022).  "Homicide during pregnancy 
or within [forty-two] days of the end of pregnancy exceeded all 
the leading causes of maternal mortality by more than twofold."  
Wallace, Gillispie-Bell, Cruz, Davis, & Vilda, Homicide During 
Pregnancy and the Postpartum Period in the United States, 2018-
2019, Obstetrics & Gynecology, vol. 138, no. 5, Nov. 1, 2021, at 
762-769, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC9134264 [https://perma.cc/D7Q4-YZV2]. 
It is important to emphasize that the brutal facts of this 
case are not an anomaly.  The disconcerting frequency of lethal 
violence against pregnant women warrants concomitant response 
from our justice system.  This court's acknowledgement that oral 
revelations, on their own, cannot induce a reasonable person to 
kill their pregnant partner is a laudable first step.  See ante 
at    .  I would take it one step further and reject the 
principle that discovery of infidelity, whether oral or through 
personal observation, can amount to adequate provocation to kill 
2 
 
a partner, standing alone.  Compare Commonwealth v. Steeves, 490 
Mass. 270, 292 n.12 (2022) (expressing "serious doubt about the 
ongoing viability of [the] legal principle [that sudden 
revelation of infidelity may be adequate provocation]"), 
Commonwealth v. Paige, 488 Mass. 677, 686-687 (2021) (Cypher, 
J., concurring) (allowing discovery of infidelity as adequate 
provocation "implies that the victim, by committing adultery, is 
partly to blame for the defendant's violence . . . .  Where the 
law treats homicide as a reasonable reaction to infidelity, it 
condones femicide"), and Commonwealth v. Richards, 485 Mass. 
896, 922-923 (2020) (Cypher, J., concurring) ("it is time to 
retire the legal principle that spousal infidelity, even if it 
is a sudden discovery, entitles a defendant to an instruction on 
reasonable provocation for murder"), with Commonwealth v. 
LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 317 (1999) ("A sudden oral revelation of 
infidelity may be sufficient provocation to reduce murder to 
manslaughter").