Title: Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87809
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2002

Docket No. 87809-Agenda 16-September 2001.
THE SOUTHWESTERN ILLINOIS DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. NATIONAL CITY
ENVIRONMENTAL, L.L.C., et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed April 4, 2002.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue in this case is whether the Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority (SWIDA) properly exercised the power of
eminent domain to take property owned by National City
Environmental, L.L.C., and St. Louis Auto Shredding Company
(collectively NCE), and convey that property to Gateway
International Motorsports Corporation (Gateway). The circuit
court of St. Clair County ruled that SWIDA had properly exercised
its authority to take the land in question. The appellate court
reversed. 304 Ill. App. 3d 542. On April 19, 2001, we reversed the
decision of the appellate court, but subsequently granted rehearing.
We now affirm the decision of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	SWIDA was created in 1987 by the Illinois General Assembly
through passage of the Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority Act (the Act) (70 ILCS 520/1 et seq. (West 1998)
(formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 6151 et seq.)). SWIDA
is a political entity and municipal corporation whose stated
purpose is to "promote industrial, commercial, residential, service,
transportation and recreational activities and facilities, thereby
reducing the evils attendant upon unemployment and enhancing
the public health, safety, morals, happiness and general welfare of
this State." 70 ILCS 520/2(g) (West 1998).
	The Act mandates that SWIDA "promote development within
the geographic confines of Madison and St. Clair counties." 70
ILCS 520/5 (West 1998). It is the duty of SWIDA to assist in the
development, construction, and acquisition of industrial,
commercial, housing or residential projects within these counties.
70 ILCS 520/5 (West 1998). A "[c]ommercial project" is defined
as "any cultural facilities of a for-profit or not-for-profit type
including *** racetracks *** [and] parking facilities." 70 ILCS
520/3(j) (West 1998).
	To accomplish the purposes of the Act, the legislature
empowered SWIDA to issue bonds for the purpose of acquiring,
improving or developing projects, including those established by
business entities attempting to locate or expand property within
Madison and St. Clair Counties. 70 ILCS 520/7 (West 1998).
SWIDA also has the authority to acquire property by
condemnation. According to the Act, SWIDA's "acquisition by
eminent domain of such real property or any interest therein by
[SWIDA] shall be in the manner provided by the 'Code of Civil
Procedure' [735 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)], *** including
Section 7-103 thereof [735 ILCS 5/7-103 (West 1998)]." 70 ILCS
520/8(b) (West 1998).
	In June 1996, SWIDA issued $21.5 million in taxable sports
facility revenue bonds. The proceeds of the bonds were lent to
Gateway to finance the development of a multipurpose automotive
sports and training facility in the region (the racetrack). Gateway
signed a loan agreement and a note to evince its obligation to
repay the loan. Revenues received by SWIDA pursuant to the loan
agreement are pledged to secure payment of the bonds. 70 ILCS
520/7(d) (West 1998). If at any time SWIDA is unable to pay the
principal and interest on the bonds, it shall so certify to the
Governor, who then submits the amounts so certified to the
General Assembly. As such, the bonds constitute a moral
obligation of the state. 70 ILCS 520/7(f) (West 1998).
	The racetrack was developed and has flourished. In 1997, the
racetrack had a total attendance of 400,000 at various large and
small events. Seating included 25,000 grandstand seats and 25,000
portable seats. In 1998, Gateway increased its seating capacity and
desired to increase its parking capacity as well. It called upon
SWIDA to use its quick-take eminent domain powers to acquire
land to the west of the racetrack for the purposes of expanded
parking facilities. The adjacent 148.5 acre tract of land sought was
owned by NCE.
	NCE operates a metal recycling center in an area of St. Clair
County that, until recently, was National City, Illinois. NCE
employs 80 to 100 persons full time and has been at its present
location since 1975. NCE shreds cars and appliances and separates
the reusable metals. It disposes of nearly 100,000 cars per year.
Nonrecyclable by-products of the process, referred to as "fluff,"
are deposited in NCE's landfill, located to the east of its recycling
center. When this landfill site reaches capacity, NCE plans to
expand its landfill operations onto the 148.5 acre tract of land it
owns to the east of the current landfill. NCE uses clay and dirt
from the 148.5 acre tract to fill and cover fluff in the landfill area
currently in use.
	In early 1998, Gateway attempted to discuss the purchase of
NCE's land with NCE's owner. NCE would not discuss the matter
and, initially, Gateway made no offer to purchase the land. Instead,
Gateway asked SWIDA to exercise its quick-take eminent domain
powers to take the 148.5 acres of land and transfer it to Gateway.
	Gateway completed a "Quick-Take Application Packet" and
stated that it wanted to use the land as a parking lot for the purpose
of increasing the value of Gateway's racetrack. Gateway paid
SWIDA an application fee of $2,500, and the sum of $10,000 to
be applied toward SWIDA's sliding scale fee of 6% to 10% of the
acquisition price of property being condemned. In addition,
Gateway agreed to pay SWIDA's expenses, including the
acquisition price of the property, and other costs associated with
the quick-take process.
	Approval of the county board is required before SWIDA can
use its quick-take eminent domain powers within unincorporated
areas of a county. 70 ILCS 520/8(b) (West 1998). On February 23,
1998, the St. Clair County board adopted a resolution authorizing
SWIDA to exercise its quick-take eminent domain authority to
acquire the NCE tract of land for Gateway parking. The board
noted that dramatic attendance increases could be expected at the
racetrack and that it was necessary to create additional parking
facilities to adequately serve patrons. The board also found that
expansion of the racetrack facilities would enhance the public
health, safety, morals, happiness, and general welfare of the
citizens of southwestern Illinois by increasing the tax base in the
area and generating additional tax revenues.
	On March 5, 1998, SWIDA held a public meeting to address
the proposed taking. Notice was given to NCE and adjacent
property owners. Over the objections of NCE's counsel, SWIDA
adopted a resolution manifesting an intent to assist Gateway with
racetrack expansion through the acquisition of NCE's property.
Like the St. Clair County board resolution, SWIDA's resolution
recounted the numerous benefits that could be created for the
region. SWIDA found that the acquisition of NCE's property was
essential to the success of the proposed expansion and further
development of the racetrack, and authorized its executive
director, Alan Ortbals, to acquire title to the property by all
necessary and appropriate means, including negotiations and
quick-take eminent domain proceedings. SWIDA authorized the
execution of an agreement with Gateway for acquisition of the
property through quick-take eminent domain proceedings and
subsequent conveyance of the property to Gateway.
	In an effort to acquire the property through a negotiated sale,
Ortbals attended a meeting on March 17, 1998, at which he
delivered to NCE a written offer to purchase the property for $1
million. By letter dated March 19, 1998, NCE rejected the $1
million offer but indicated its willingness to meet with SWIDA the
week of March 30, 1998, following an expected appraisal of the
property. On March 20, 1998, SWIDA made another written offer
to NCE to purchase the property for $1 million and advised NCE
that SWIDA would initiate proceedings to condemn the property
if NCE did not accept the offer by 5 p.m. on March 30, 1998.
	NCE did not respond to the second offer and ultimatum until
April 20, 1998. By letter, NCE indicated that it felt it was
unnecessary to respond to the offer, as SWIDA was aware of
NCE's prior rejection of the earlier offer to purchase the property
for the identical sum of $1 million. However, to be clear on the
matter, NCE indicated that it was again rejecting the offer of $1
million for the sale of its property.
	Meanwhile, on March 31, 1998, SWIDA filed a complaint in
the circuit court of St. Clair County seeking condemnation of, and
acquisition of fee simple title to, the property. In addition, SWIDA
filed a motion for immediate vesting of title, and asked the circuit
court to fix a date for quick-take proceedings pursuant to sections
7-103 and 7-104 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/7-103, 7-104 (West 1998)). On the same date, NCE filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint and on April 2, 1998, filed a
traverse and motion to dismiss. NCE argued that the proposed
taking was for an unconstitutional private use; the proposed taking
was excessive; additional parking at Gateway's racetrack was not
needed; and SWIDA had failed to make a good-faith effort to
negotiate an acceptable purchase price with NCE. In addition,
NCE filed a motion to strike SWIDA's request for immediate
vesting of title. The circuit court denied both the motion to dismiss
and the motion to strike the request for immediate vesting of title.
	The circuit court held a quick-take hearing and on April 27,
1998, ruled in SWIDA's favor. Relying on testimony from Mike
Pritchett of the Illinois Department of Transportation (the
Department), the circuit court found that the taking was for a
public purpose as there were serious public safety issues involved.
Pritchett had testified that the Department was working with
Gateway to develop a traffic plan that would move traffic into and
out of the racetrack facility, while minimizing impact on the
surrounding state and interstate highways. According to traffic
pattern data studied by the Department, significant traffic
congestion occurred on Interstate 55-70 when major events were
held at the racetrack. According to Pritchett, a safety hazard was
created because drivers do not normally anticipate stopped traffic
on the interstate. Pritchett further testified that pedestrians often
crossed Illinois Route 203 from the parking areas east of the
highway to the racetrack. A traffic signal was in place to allow
patrons to cross Route 203. However, the signals created even
more automobile traffic delays. There was additional testimony
that there was a risk pedestrians would be struck by automobile
traffic as they crossed Route 203 at improper locations away from
the designated crossing area and signal. Pritchett testified that
construction of a parking lot on NCE's property, as suggested in
the Department's 1996 traffic impact study, would provide parking
to the west of the racetrack and alleviate traffic problems when
major events were taking place at the racetrack. Therefore,
according to Pritchett, there was some urgency in acquiring the
property and developing parking facilities to alleviate stress on the
highway system and improve safety.
	The circuit court also relied on Ortbals' testimony regarding
public safety, economic development, and elimination of blight.
According to Ortbals, the county was experiencing serious traffic
problems on days the racetrack hosted events. Like Pritchett,
Ortbals also referred to congestion on Interstate 55-70 and traffic
and pedestrian concerns related to Illinois Route 203. In addition,
Ortbals testified that development of a parking facility on the
property was necessary to promote economic development, as the
number of spectators, development and expansion of neighboring
businesses, and other economic spin-off, all had exceeded initial
expectations. Ortbals testified that it was necessary to acquire the
entire 148.5 acre tract owned by NCE because areas that had
previously been used for patron parking, such as areas now
occupied by hotels and restaurants and the golf course, were no
longer available. In addition, Ortbals testified that the development
of the racing facilities had indirectly helped to eliminate blight in
the area.
	Rod Wolter, president and general manager of Gateway
International Raceway, testified that by turning the 148.5 acres
owned by NCE into parking for the racetrack, Gateway would
grow and profits would increase. Wolter acknowledged that
Gateway had discussed developing a parking garage facility to
meet its needs but that it would be much less expensive to have
SWIDA take the property in question from NCE and give it to
Gateway for ground parking.
	The circuit court also heard testimony from a number of other
sources, including city officials from the region, area businessmen
and other Gateway officials. Most, if not all, testified as to the
many benefits that continued expansion of Gateway could
potentially bring to the area. The court found that the taking was
not excessive and that NCE had been unwilling to negotiate in a
meaningful fashion for the sale of the property. The court found
that SWIDA had bargained for the property in good faith and
NCE's failure to timely reject SWIDA's final offer of sale or to
present a counteroffer was dispositive of this issue. Therefore, the
circuit court held that quick-take procedures were necessary to
avoid any negative economic impact to the people of the region.
	The circuit court denied NCE's oral motion for a stay of
proceedings (see 735 ILCS 5/7-104(b) (West 1998)) and heard
evidence of just compensation for the property (see 735 ILCS
5/7-104(c) (West 1998)). On April 28, 1998, the circuit court
made a preliminary finding that $900,000 was just compensation
for the property. On April 30, 1998, the circuit court entered an
order of taking, vesting SWIDA with title to the property in fee
simple and granting it the right to immediate possession of the
property. See 735 ILCS 5/7-105(a) (West 1998)). On the same
day, SWIDA conveyed title to the property to Gateway by way of
a quit-claim deed. NCE filed an emergency motion in the circuit
court seeking a stay of the transfer of title or, in the alternative, an
order requiring SWIDA to post a bond of $38 million pending
appeal. The motion was denied.
	Pursuant to section 7-104(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/7-104(b) (West 1998)) and Supreme Court Rule
307(a)(7) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(7)), NCE filed an interlocutory
appeal arguing in part that SWIDA lacked constitutional authority
to take the property and convey it to Gateway. NCE also filed an
emergency motion for a stay of the condemnation, which was
granted.
	The appellate court determined that SWIDA had exceeded its
constitutional authority in taking NCE's land by eminent domain
and reversed the decision of the circuit court. 304 Ill. App. 3d 542.
	SWIDA filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 317 (134 Ill. 2d R. 317). We granted the
petition and on April 19, 2001, reversed the judgment of the
appellate court and remanded the cause. Subsequently, NCE
petitioned this court for rehearing, which we allowed on June 4,
2001. 155 Ill. 2d R. 367. On rehearing, we now affirm the decision
of the appellate court.

ANALYSIS
	The State of Illinois, as a sovereign, has the inherent right to
condemn property, subject to the state constitutional mandate that
private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation to its owner. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§15; Forest Preserve District v. West Suburban Bank, 161 Ill. 2d 448, 455 (1994). The fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. V), made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.
XIV), also provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 191, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1984).
	In this case, we determine whether this taking achieves a
legitimate public use pursuant to the constitutionally exercised
police power of the government (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98 (1954)) and, therefore, whether eminent
domain powers authorized by the State of Illinois were improperly
exercised in the taking of private property from one private entity
for the benefit and use of another private entity.
	The right of a sovereign to condemn private property is
limited to takings for a public use. U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §15; Gaylord v. Sanitary District, 204 Ill. 576,
588 (1903). Clearly, private persons may ultimately acquire
ownership of property arising out of a taking and the subsequent
transfer to private ownership does not by itself defeat the public
purpose. Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 243-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 199, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331. However, that principle alone cannot
adequately resolve the issues presented in this case. "Before the
right of eminent domain may be exercised, the law, beyond a
doubt, requires that the use for which the land is taken shall be
public as distinguished from a private use." People ex rel. Tuohy
v. City of Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 481 (1946).
	SWIDA's action in taking NCE's property and transferring it
to Gateway for Gateway's private use presents fundamental
constitutional issues that are essential to resolving this dispute.
The essence of this case relates not to the ultimate transfer of
property to a private party. Rather, the controlling issue is whether
SWIDA exceeded the boundaries of constitutional principles and
its authority by transferring the property to a private party for a
profit when the property is not put to a public use.
	It may be impossible to clearly delineate the boundary
between what constitutes a legitimate public purpose and a private
benefit with no sufficient, legitimate public purpose to support it.
"We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known
as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts."
Berman, 348 U.S.  at 31-32, 99 L. Ed.  at 37, 75 S. Ct.  at 102.
"While, from time to time, the courts have attempted to define
public use, there is much disagreement as to its meaning." Tuohy,
394 Ill.  at 481. Great deference should be afforded the legislature
and its granting of eminent domain authority. Berman, 348 U.S.  at
31-32, 99 L. Ed.  at 37, 75 S. Ct.  at 102; Old Dominion Land Co.
v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66, 70 L. Ed. 162, 165, 46 S. Ct. 39,
40 (1925); United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552, 90 L. Ed. 843, 848, 66 S. Ct. 715, 718
(1946). However, the exercise of that power is not entirely beyond
judicial scrutiny (see Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 241,
81 L. Ed. 2d  at 197, 104 S. Ct.  at 2329 (and cases cited therein)),
and it is incumbent upon the judiciary to ensure that the power of
eminent domain is used in a manner contemplated by the framers
of the constitutions and by the legislature that granted the specific
power in question. "Courts all agree that the determination of
whether a given use is a public use is a judicial function." Tuohy,
394 Ill.  at 481.
	SWIDA contends that the condemnation and taking of NCE's
property is sustainable because a public purpose will be served
through (1) the fostering of economic development, (2) the
promotion of public safety, and (3) the prevention or elimination
of blight. Moreover, once the determination is made that one or all
of these requirements is satisfied, "possesory use by the public is
not an indispensable prerequisite to the lawful exercise of the
power of eminent domain." People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of
Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 539, 544-45 (1954).
	SWIDA contends that any distinction between the terms
"public purpose" and "public use" has long since evaporated and
that the proper test is simply to ask whether a "public purpose" is
served by the taking. While the difference between a public
purpose and a public use may appear to be purely semantic, and
the line between the two terms has blurred somewhat in recent
years, a distinction still exists and is essential to this case. We
agree that these terms are necessarily somewhat loosely defined.
However, that does not mean they are indistinguishable. The term
" '[p]ublic purpose' is not a static concept. It is flexible, and is
capable of expansion to meet conditions of a complex society that
were not within the contemplation of the framers of our
constitution." People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal
Authority, 14 Ill. 2d 230, 236 (1958) (citing People ex rel.
Gutknecht v. Chicago Regional Port District, 4 Ill. 2d 363 (1954),
Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 (1952), People v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77 (1945), and People ex rel.
Greening v. Bartholf, 388 Ill. 445 (1944)). However, this
flexibility does not equate to unfettered ability to exercise takings
beyond constitutional boundaries. "A purely private taking could
not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would
serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be
void." Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 245, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at
200, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331. As this court held in Gaylord, 204 Ill.  at
584, "[t]he public must be to some extent entitled to use or enjoy
the property, not as a mere favor or by permission of the owner,
but by right."
	Clearly, the taking of slums and blighted areas is permitted for
the purposes of clearance and redevelopment, regardless of the
subsequent use of the property. See, e.g., Village of Wheeling v.
Exchange National Bank of Chicago, 213 Ill. App. 3d 325 (1991);
City of Chicago v. Gorham, 80 Ill. App. 3d 496 (1980); City of
Chicago v. Walker, 50 Ill. 2d 69 (1971). However, this proposition
and the cases supporting it are of little assistance in this instance,
as we are not dealing with a taking for the purposes of eliminating
slums or blight.
	If this taking were allowed to stand, it may be true that
spectators at Gateway would benefit greatly. Developing
additional parking could benefit the members of the public who
choose to attend events at the racetrack, as spectators may often
have to wait in long lines of traffic to park their vehicles and again
to depart the facility. We also acknowledge that a public use or
purpose may be satisfied in light of public safety concerns. See
Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n v. Eden Cemetery Ass'n, 16 Ill. 2d 539 (1959). The public is allowed to park on the property in
exchange for the payment of a fee. Gateway's racetrack may be
open to the public, but not "by right." Gaylord, 204 Ill.  at 584. It
is a private venture designed to result not in a public use, but in
private profits. If this taking were permitted, lines to enter parking
lots might be shortened and pedestrians might be able to cross
from parking areas to event areas in a safer manner. However, we
are unpersuaded that these facts alone are sufficient to satisfy the
public use requirement, especially in light of evidence that
Gateway could have built a parking garage structure on its existing
property.
	We have also recognized that economic development is an
important public purpose. See People ex rel. City of Canton v.
Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980); People ex rel. City of Urbana v.
Paley, 68 Ill. 2d 62 (1977); People ex rel. City of Salem v.
McMackin, 53 Ill. 2d 347 (1972). SWIDA presented extensive
testimony that expanding Gateway's facilities through the taking
of NCE's property would allow it to grow and prosper and
contribute to positive economic growth in the region. However,
"incidentally, every lawful business does this." Gaylord, 204 Ill. 
at 586. Moreover, nearly a century ago, Gaylord expressed the
long-standing rule that "to constitute a public use, something more
than a mere benefit to the public must flow from the contemplated
improvement." Gaylord, 204 Ill.  at 584.
	This case is strikingly similar to our earlier decision in Limits
Industrial R.R. Co. v. American Spiral Pipe Works, 321 Ill. 101
(1926). In Limits Industrial, this court held that a railroad could
not exercise eminent domain authority to acquire property for the
purpose of expanding its facilities. Despite a certificate of
convenience and necessity issued by the Illinois Commerce
Commission, we found the proposed spur track and public freight
house provided minimal public benefit and principally benefitted
the railroad itself and a few other business entities. Limits
Industrial, 321 Ill.  at 109-10. Similarly, it is incumbent upon us to
question SWIDA's findings as to the parking situation at Gateway
and determine whether the true beneficiaries of this taking are
private businesses and not the public.
	We do not require a bright-line test to find that this taking
bestows a purely private benefit and lacks a showing of a
supporting legislative purpose. As was the case in Limits
Industrial, members of the public are not the primary intended
beneficiaries of this taking. Limits Industrial, 321 Ill.  at 109-10.
This condemnation clearly was intended to assist Gateway in
accomplishing their goals in a swift, economical, and profitable
manner.
	Entities such as SWIDA must always be mindful of
expediency, cost efficiency, and profitability while accepting the
legislature's charge to promote development within their defined
parameters. However, these goals must not be allowed to
overshadow the constitutional principles that lie at the heart of the
power with which SWIDA and similar entities have been
entrusted. As Justice Kuehn stated in dissent in the appellate court,
"If property ownership is to remain what our forefathers intended
it to be, if it is to remain a part of the liberty we cherish, the
economic by-products of a private capitalist's ability to develop
land cannot justify a surrender of ownership to eminent domain."
304 Ill. App. 3d at 556 (Kuehn, J., specially concurring).
	While the activities here were undertaken in the guise of
carrying out its legislated mission, SWIDA's true intentions were
not clothed in an independent, legitimate governmental decision
to further a planned public use. SWIDA did not conduct or
commission a thorough study of the parking situation at Gateway.
Nor did it formulate any economic plan requiring additional
parking at the racetrack. SWIDA advertised that, for a fee, it
would condemn land at the request of "private developers" for the
"private use" of developers. In addition, SWIDA entered into a
contract with Gateway to condemn whatever land "may be desired
*** by Gateway." Clearly, the foundation of this taking is rooted
not in the economic and planning process with which SWIDA has
been charged. Rather, this action was undertaken solely in
response to Gateway's expansion goals and its failure to
accomplish those goals through purchasing NCE's land at an
acceptable negotiated price. It appears SWIDA's true intentions
were to act as a default broker of land for Gateway's proposed
parking plan.
	This point is further emphasized by the fact that other options
were available to Gateway that could have addressed many of the
problems testified to by Pritchett, Ortbals and others. Gateway
could have built a parking garage structure on its existing property
rather than develop the land owned by NCE. However, when
Gateway discovered that the cost of constructing a garage on land
it already owned was substantially higher than using SWIDA as its
agent to take NCE's property for open-field parking, Gateway
chose the easier and less expensive avenue.
	As a result of the acquisition of NCE's property, Gateway
could realize an estimated increase of $13 to $14 million in
projected revenue per year. While we do not deny that this
expansion in revenue could potentially trickle down and bring
corresponding revenue increases to the region, revenue expansion
alone does not justify an improper and unacceptable expansion of
the eminent domain power of the government. Using the power of
the government for purely private purposes to allow Gateway to
avoid the open real estate market and expand its facilities in a
more cost-efficient manner, and thus maximizing corporate
profits, is a misuse of the power entrusted by the public.
	The legislature intended that SWIDA actively foster economic
development and expansion in Madison and St. Clair Counties. 70
ILCS 520/2(g), 5 (West 1998). However, the actions of SWIDA
in this case blur the lines between a public use and a private
purpose. A highway toll authority may justify the use of eminent
domain to ensure that motorists have reasonable access to gas
stations. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 16 Ill. 2d  at 546. Does the
highway authority's power include the ability to use eminent
domain authority to take additional land for a car wash, and then
a lube shop? Could the authority then use its power to facilitate
additional expansions for a motel, small retail shops, and
entertainment centers? The initial, legitimate development of a
public project does not justify condemnation for any and all related
business expansions.
	SWIDA contends that the "wisdom *** of the legislation and
'the means of executing the project' are beyond judicial scrutiny
'once the public purpose has been established.' It is that purpose
which controls and not the 'means' or 'mechanics' of how the
purpose is carried out." We disagree. The Constitution and the
essential liberties we are sworn to protect control. In its wisdom,
the legislature has given SWIDA the authority to use eminent
domain power to encourage private enterprise and become
involved in commercial projects that may benefit a specific region
of this state. While we do not question the legislature's discretion
in allowing for the exercise of eminent domain power, "the
government does not have unlimited power to redefine property
rights." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 885, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3178 (1982).
The power of eminent domain is to be exercised with restraint, not
abandon.

CONCLUSION
	Accordingly, we agree with the appellate court's finding that,
in this case, SWIDA exceeded its constitutional authority in taking
NCE's land by eminent domain. The judgment of the appellate
court is therefore affirmed.



Affirmed.
 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	The majority holds that the Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority (SWIDA) may not use the power of
eminent domain to take real property owned by National City
Environmental, L.L.C., and St. Louis Auto Shredding Company
(collectively NCE), and convey same to Gateway International
Motorsports Corporation (Gateway). Because I believe the taking
at issue is for a public use, and in furtherance of the purposes for
which SWIDA was created, I respectfully dissent.

BACKGROUND
	I agree with that portion of the majority's statement of facts
setting forth the procedural posture of this case. I also agree with
that portion of the statement of facts outlining the creation of
SWIDA, the purposes of SWIDA, and the issuance of bonds by
SWIDA to finance the costs of acquiring, constructing and
installing a multipurpose automotive sports and training facility in
the City of Madison. As to the balance of the statement of facts, I
find that it contains conclusions unfairly slanted toward the result
the majority desires to reach. Additionally, the majority omits
certain facts adduced at trial which outline the reasons for the
taking, and support the conclusion reached by the circuit court. I
believe the reader of this opinion may benefit from a more
complete rendition of the evidence in the record.
	In June 1996, SWIDA issued $21.5 million in taxable sports
facility revenue bonds. Gateway used the proceeds from the bonds
to acquire a small racetrack and transform it into a racing and
training facility capable of hosting major race car events. In 1997,
the racetrack had 25,000 grandstand seats and 25,000 portable
seats. The racetrack hosted three major events and a number of
smaller events, with total attendance of 400,000. In 1998, Gateway
increased seating capacity and hosted four major events at the
racetrack. Gateway's goal is to increase seating capacity in
increments to the point where the racetrack has the 85,000 to
100,000 seats needed to host a Winston Cup NASCAR event.
	On February 20, 1998, Gateway requested that SWIDA use its
quick-take eminent domain powers to acquire a 148.5 acre tract of
land (the Property) west of the racetrack for parking. Gateway
asked SWIDA to acquire the Property from its owner, NCE, and
convey it to Gateway. Gateway paid an application fee of $2,500
to SWIDA, and the sum of $10,000 to be applied toward
SWIDA's sliding scale fee of 6% to 10% of the acquisition price
of property being condemned. Gateway also agreed to pay
SWIDA's out-of-pocket expenses or other costs associated with
the quick-take process, including the acquisition price of the
Property. Members of SWIDA's board are not entitled to
compensation (70 ILCS 520/4(c) (West 1998)) and did not receive
any part of these fees.
	On February 23, 1998, the St. Clair County board adopted a
resolution authorizing SWIDA to exercise its quick-take eminent
domain powers to acquire the Property for use by Gateway for
racetrack parking. See 70 ILCS 520/8(b) (West 1998) (requiring
the approval of the county board before SWIDA can use its quick-take eminent domain powers within the unincorporated areas of a
county). The board noted that attendance at the racetrack was
expected to increase from 400,000 in 1997 to 600,000 in 1998,
and that other development projects in the area would reduce
available racetrack parking by 100 acres. The board found that it
was necessary to create additional parking areas to safely and
adequately service the spectators who would be attending events
at the racetrack during 1998 and in subsequent years. Further, the
board found that expansion of the racetrack would enhance the
public health, safety, morals, happiness, and general welfare of the
citizens of southwestern Illinois by increasing the tax base in St.
Clair County and generating additional tax revenues.
	Upon receipt of the St. Clair County board resolution,
SWIDA held a public hearing on March 5, 1998, with notice given
to NCE and adjacent property owners. Ray Reott, an attorney
representing NCE, attended the meeting and voiced NCE's
objections to the proposed taking. At the meeting, SWIDA
adopted a resolution to assist the expansion of the racetrack (the
Development Project) through the acquisition of the Property.
SWIDA found that the Development Project would enhance the
public health, safety, morals, happiness, and the general welfare of
the citizens of southwestern Illinois through the creation of job
opportunities, the generation of additional tax revenues and the
expansion of the tax base within St. Clair County. SWIDA also
found that the Property was integral to the success of the
Development Project and authorized its executive director to take
all necessary and appropriate actions, including negotiations and
commencement of quick-take eminent domain proceedings, to
acquire title to the Property. Further, SWIDA authorized its
chairman or vice-chairman to execute an agreement between
SWIDA and Gateway for acquisition of the Property through the
use of quick-take eminent domain proceedings and conveyance of
the Property to Gateway in furtherance of the Development
Project.
	Alan Ortbals, SWIDA's executive director, attended a
meeting in Chicago on March 17, 1998, in an attempt to acquire
the Property through negotiations. At the meeting, Gateway
delivered a written offer to NCE to purchase the Property for $1
million. By letter dated March 19, 1998, NCE rejected the offer,
but indicated its willingness to meet the week of March 30, 1998,
when NCE expected to have a completed appraisal of the Property.
In a separate letter to SWIDA, NCE requested that SWIDA
forward copies of any appraisals of the Property in its possession
by March 25, 1998. SWIDA complied with this request.
	On March 20, 1998, SWIDA made a written offer to NCE to
purchase the Property for $1 million, and advised NCE that it
would initiate condemnation proceedings if NCE did not accept
the offer by 5:00 p.m. on March 30, 1998. SWIDA also attempted
to follow through with the suggestion in NCE's letter of March 19,
1998, that the parties meet the week of March 30, 1998. On March
30, 1998, Harry Sterling, SWIDA's attorney, and Ortbals
attempted to place a conference call to Reott. Reott was not
available and failed to return the telephone call.
	NCE did not respond to SWIDA's offer by the stated
deadline. Instead, by letter dated April 20, 1998, NCE indicated
that it did not feel that it was necessary to respond to SWIDA's
offer because SWIDA knew that NCE had rejected Gateway's
offer to purchase the Property for the identical sum of $1 million.
However, to remove any uncertainty on the subject, NCE indicated
that it was rejecting SWIDA's offer.
	Meanwhile, on March 31, 1998, SWIDA filed a complaint for
condemnation in the circuit court of St. Clair County, seeking to
acquire fee simple title to the Property. SWIDA also filed a motion
for immediate vesting of title and requested that the court fix a
date for a quick-take hearing, pursuant to the quick-take provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/7-103, 7-104
(West 1998).
	Also on March 31, 1998, NCE filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for condemnation. Subsequently, on April 2, 1998, NCE
filed a traverse and motion to dismiss, arguing that the proposed
taking was for an unconstitutional private use; that the proposed
taking was excessive; that the racetrack did not need additional
parking; and that SWIDA had not made a good faith attempt to
agree with NCE on an acceptable purchase price. NCE also filed
a motion to strike SWIDA's request for immediate vesting of title.
The circuit court denied NCE's motion to dismiss and motion to
strike SWIDA's request for immediate vesting of title.
	The court proceeded to hold a quick-take hearing. At the
hearing, John Baricevic, St. Clair County board chairman, testified
that the Property is located in unincorporated St. Clair County, and
that the board adopted a resolution authorizing SWIDA to exercise
its quick-take eminent domain powers to acquire the Property.
Baricevic also testified that certain economic studies were done in
connection with the bond issue and Gateway's acquisition of the
racetrack. These studies showed the projected economic impact
from the development of the racetrack and from increased
attendance as the racetrack expands. No specific studies were
made regarding the impact of the proposed taking on tax revenues
or the tax base.
	Alan Ortbals testified regarding the economic and traffic
impact of the racetrack on the surrounding area. Ortbals stated that
the racetrack hosted more major races and drew more spectators
in 1997 than anticipated in studies performed prior to the
development of the racetrack. The racetrack had added 10,000
seats and was ahead of projections for attendance in 1998. As a
result, the county was experiencing faster economic spin-off than
anticipated. A truck stop across from the racetrack was undergoing
expansion; a parcel of land across from the racetrack sold for
development of a restaurant; and a golf course was being
developed on the site of a former junk yard. In addition, several
hotels and restaurants were being developed in the immediate area
of the racetrack and in nearby municipalities.
	Due to the success of the racetrack, the county was
experiencing serious traffic problems on race days with traffic
backed up on both sides of Interstate 55-70. A number of racetrack
patrons parked east of Illinois Route 203, creating traffic safety
problems as they crossed Illinois Route 203 to gain access to the
racetrack. Using the Property for racetrack parking would alleviate
both of these traffic problems.
	Ortbals also testified that when Gateway approached SWIDA
regarding the Property, he reviewed the studies that were done in
connection with the financing of the racetrack, including an
analysis of Gateway's business plan, an analysis of the economic
impact of the racetrack, an analysis of the traffic impact of the
racetrack, and a market demand study. He also reviewed an
analysis of the economic impact of a similar racetrack in Topeka,
Kansas. He presented a report to SWIDA board members
regarding these studies. In Ortbals' opinion as an expert in the
field of economic development, SWIDA's acquisition of the
Property by quick-take was necessary to promote economic
development, alleviate traffic safety problems, and eliminate
blight.
	On cross-examination, Ortbals testified that SWIDA did not
commission any studies analyzing the effect of the condemnation
of the Property on employment levels, the tax base of St. Clair
County, or traffic safety problems. Ortbals admitted that there
were no slums on the Property. However, the development of the
racetrack has had an indirect effect on the elimination of blight in
the area. The golf course replaced an old junk yard and three or
four dilapidated and abandoned homes on Bend Road have been
demolished.
	Mike Pritchett, a design and planning engineer employed by
the Illinois Department of Transportation (the Department),
testified as an expert in the field of civil engineering. He stated
that the Department was working with Gateway to find a traffic
plan that would move traffic in and out of the racetrack efficiently,
with minimal impact on the state and interstate highways. To that
end, the Department has studied the traffic patterns occurring
around the racetrack. On days of major events, there were
significant backups on Interstate 55-70, extending into Missouri.
Because the interstate was designed to facilitate travel at high
speeds, drivers do not anticipate that cars will be stopped in traffic
on the interstate. Stopped traffic on the interstate is thus a safety
hazard.
	Pritchett also testified that large numbers of racetrack patrons
crossed Illinois Route 203 from the parking areas east of the
highway to the racetrack. Illinois State Police troopers operate a
traffic signal at Ohio Street and Illinois Route 203 manually to
allow racetrack patrons to cross the highway. However, the traffic
backed up at the signal had negative repercussions on Interstate
55-70. Furthermore, many racetrack patrons crossed at random
locations along the highway. When the Department put a fence
along Illinois Route 203 to try to channel racetrack patrons to Ohio
Street, they pushed the fence down to cross the highway. Although
no accidents had yet occurred, there was no assurance that none
would.
	Pritchett testified further that the Department had improved
Illinois Route 203 to help the flow of traffic in and out of the
racetrack. These improvements were based on a traffic impact
study conducted in 1996, which assumed a considerable amount
of parking west of the racetrack. Construction of a parking lot on
the Property would provide parking west of the racetrack, as
suggested in the study, and alleviate traffic problems on race days.
Pritchett concluded that it was necessary, from a safety standpoint,
for SWIDA to acquire the Property for development of a parking
lot.
	On cross-examination, Pritchett testified that taking the
Property would not solve all the traffic problems in the area. Some
racetrack patrons would continue to park east of Illinois Route 203
and cross the highway to gain access to the racetrack. And if the
racetrack was able to host a Winston Cup race, the traffic jams in
the area would increase. However, construction of a parking lot on
the Property was one of several measures the Department was
considering to provide additional access to the racetrack and ease
the pressure on Illinois Route 203.
	The mayor of the City of Madison testified that the racetrack
had brought new jobs to the city and increased revenues from sales
and entertainment taxes. He attributed the development of the golf
course to the racetrack and testified that several developers were
negotiating plans with the city to develop motels and restaurants
in the area. He also testified regarding the traffic problems on race
days and stated that it would be beneficial to have parking on the
Property.
	The president of the Village of Fairmont City attributed the
development of an 86-room hotel in the village to the racetrack.
He testified that continued growth of the racetrack was in the best
economic interest of the village.
	The president of the Southwestern Illinois Tourism and
Convention Bureau, a not-for-profit corporation representing eight
southwestern Illinois counties, testified that tourism was the
second largest industry in the area. He estimated that in 1997
tourism added between $520 million and $530 million to the
economies of the eight counties, with the economic impact of the
racetrack being $43.4 million. He also testified that, since January
1, 1996, in excess of 30 hotels had been built, were under
construction, or were slated for construction in the area. The
racetrack was a major contributing factor to the construction and
proposed development of the hotels.
	Scott Harding, a consulting engineer, performed an offsite
evaluation of the Property. He testified that approximately 27 to 48
acres of the Property constitute wetlands. A developer who
proposes to drain and build on an area that has been designated a
wetland must first obtain a permit from the United States Army
Corps of Engineers, listing conditions that must be met to
minimize impact on the wetland, or steps, such as compensation,
that must be taken in mitigation. Compensation involves replacing
wetland that is used in a project with wetland that is created on
another part of the same site or on a different site. Harding
testified that Corps of Engineers policies call for compensation
ratios of three to one for wooded wetlands, two to one for
wetlands with scrub shrub, one and a half to one for emergent
wetlands and one to one for farm wetlands. The Corps of
Engineers may determine that certain high quality wetlands should
not be impacted at all.
	Based upon the types of wetland found on the Property,
Harding estimated that the Corps of Engineers would require two
to one compensation, that is, for every acre of wetland impacted
by construction, the Corps of Engineer would require that Gateway
create or construct two acres of wetlands. Thus, assuming that
Gateway impacted 48 acres of wetlands and compensated on site,
approximately 50 acres of land would remain for development.
	Rod Wolter, Gateway's president and general manager,
testified that all the major events at the racetrack were sold out in
1997. Total attendance at the racetrack that year was 400,000. The
racetrack's schedule for 1998 listed more events than in 1997. In
addition, the racetrack expected sell-out crowds at the major
events in 1998. Attendance at those events would be greater than
in 1997 because of increased seating capacity at the racetrack.
	On cross-examination, Wolter testified that the racetrack had
an immediate need for 2,000 to 5,000 parking spaces. The
racetrack can park 2,000 cars on as little as 20 acres, and 5,000
cars on as little as 49 acres. The racetrack could get through the
1998 season without the Property, using remote parking areas. On
redirect, Wolter testified that it was not in the racetrack's best
interest to "get by" with parking. Lack of adequate parking could
result in faltering attendance at the racetrack.
	Christopher Pook, the CEO of Grand Prix, testified that
Gateway added 10,000 seats to the racetrack in the spring of 1998
and planned to add another 20,000 seats in the fall. He also
testified that, in order to obtain a contract to host a NASCAR
Winston Cup event, Gateway would have to increase seating
capacity to a minimum of 85,000 seats and have adequate parking
in place. Gateway has considered building a raised parking garage
at the racetrack. However, building such a garage was not
economically feasible.
	Pook testified next regarding several unsuccessful attempts,
starting in May 1995, to reach an agreement with NCE for the use
or purchase of the Property. Irv Pielet, one of NCE's owners, told
him repeatedly that NCE was not interested in selling the Property
or in any business relationship with Gateway. Pook also testified
that two nearby landowners had notified Gateway that 30 acres of
land previously used for parking would no longer be available.
	Roger Bowler, the plant manager for St. Louis Auto
Shredding Company, testified that the plant employed 80 people
on a full-time basis. During periods of peak activity, the plant
hired additional employees on a part-time basis. On an annual
basis, the plant recycled 90,000 to 100,000 cars, recovering metals
from the cars for shipment to foundries, steel mills and smelters,
and depositing other materials in a landfill operated by the plant.
Bowler also testified that the current landfill would be capped in
five to eight years and NCE planned to use the Property as its new
landfill.
	In lieu of personal testimony, the circuit court admitted into
evidence Irv Pielet's discovery deposition. Pielet stated that Pook
was interested in some part of NCE's land for a business venture,
but he denied that Pook spoke to him about purchasing the
Property. Pielet claimed that he learned of Gateway's interest in
the Property from a newspaper account of the St. Clair County
board's resolution.
	Pielet stated further that the NCE's current landfill had less
than 10 years of capacity remaining. However, no studies had been
done of the landfill's capacity and 11 acres of the landfill had not
yet been used. Pielet also stated that NCE had taken dirt once from
the Property to cover a portion of the current landfill. NCE
planned to take more dirt from the Property as needed to cover the
section of the landfill the auto recycling plant was currently using.
Lastly, Pielet indicated that the Property has 9.2 acres of wetlands.
	At the conclusion of the quick-take hearing, the circuit court
approved the condemnation. The court found that the taking was
for a public purpose, referring specifically to Pritchett's testimony
regarding public safety and Ortbals' testimony regarding public
safety, economic development and the elimination of blight. The
court also found, in light of the testimony regarding wetlands and
testimony that parking west of the racetrack would promote public
safety, that the taking was not excessive. Further, the court found
that Pielet had been unwilling to negotiate in a meaningful fashion
and the use of quick-take procedures was necessary to avert any
negative economic impact to the people of Madison and St. Clair
Counties. Finally, the court found that the SWIDA had bargained
for the Property in good faith; NCE's failure to reject SWIDA's
offer in a timely manner or to present a counteroffer was
dispositive of this issue.

ANALYSIS
 A. Public Use
	The majority recognizes that the State, as a sovereign, has the
inherent right to condemn property, subject to the constitutional
mandate that private property may not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation to the owner. See slip op. at
7. Further, the majority recognizes that the subsequent transfer of
property to a private entity does not transform a taking for public
use into a taking for private use. See slip op. at 8. The majority
correctly cites Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984), and Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98 (1954), for these
propositions. However, Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman
provide additional guidance in this area of law, which the majority
fails to acknowledge. Contrary to the holdings of Hawaii Housing
Authority and Berman, the majority gives little deference to the
legislature's public use determination. Further, the majority
engrafts upon Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman a
requirement that property taken by eminent domain be put into use
for the public, a proposition specifically rejected by the Court in
Hawaii Housing Authority. See Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 243-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 199, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331. Today's
opinion is not an accurate rendition of the holdings of Hawaii
Housing Authority and Berman and of the principles of law
involved in this area.
	In Berman, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 (60 Stat. 790, D.C. Code
§§5-701 through 5-719 (1951)). That act provided for the use of
eminent domain to acquire property in slums and blighted areas
and for the lease or sale of the property to private interests for
redevelopment pursuant to a comprehensive redevelopment plan.
The appellants argued that their property could not be taken
constitutionally because the property was commercial, not
residential property; the property was not slum housing; the
property would be put into the project under the management of a
private, not a public, agency and redeveloped for private, not
public, use. The Court considered first whether the takings
authorized by the act were for a public use, stating:
			"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia
includes all the legislative powers which a state may
exercise over its affairs. [Citation.] We deal, in other
words, with what traditionally has been known as the
police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own
facts. The definition is essentially the product of
legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of
government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically
capable of complete definition. Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation, whether it be Congress
legislating concerning the District of Columbia [citation]
or the States legislating concerning local affairs.
[Citations.] This principle admits of no exception merely
because the power of eminent domain is involved. The
role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely
narrow one." Berman, 348 U.S.  at 31-32, 99 L. Ed.  at 37,
75 S. Ct.  at 102.
The Court then rejected the appellants' contention that their
property was being taken for a private use because the property
would be transferred to a private individual or company, stating:
			"Once the object is within the authority of Congress,
the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end. [Citations.] Once the object
is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it
will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here
one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise
for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that this
makes the project a taking from one businessman for the
benefit of another businessman. But the means of
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone
to determine, once the public purpose has been
established. [Citations.] The public end may be as well or
better served through an agency of private enterprise than
through a department of government-or so the Congress
might conclude." Berman, 348 U.S.  at 33-34, 99 L. Ed.  at
38, 75 S. Ct.  at 103.
	In Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 240, 81 L. Ed. 2d 
at 197, 104 S. Ct.  at 2329, the Supreme Court explained that the
public use principle is "coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police powers." The Court also explained the role of
the judiciary in reviewing a legislature's public use determination:
			"There is, of course, a role for courts to play in
reviewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a
public use, even when the eminent domain power is
equated with the police power. But the Court in Berman
made clear that it is 'an extremely narrow' one. [Citation.]
The Court in Berman cited with approval the Court's
decision in Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925), which held that deference to the
legislature's 'public use' determination is required 'until
it is shown to involve an impossibility.' The Berman
Court also cited to United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch,
327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946), which emphasized that '[a]ny
departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts
deciding on what is and is not a governmental function
and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their
view on that question at the moment of decision, a
practice which has proved impracticable in other fields.'
In short, the Court has made clear that it will not
substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to
what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation.' [Citation.]
			*** [W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power
is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the
Court has never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause." Hawaii Housing
Authority, 467 U.S.  at 240-41, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 197-98, 104 S. Ct.  at 2329-30.
See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &amp; Maine Corp.,
503 U.S. 407, 422, 118 L. Ed. 2d 52, 69, 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1404
(1992).
	Additionally, the Court reaffirmed the principle outlined in
Berman that a taking for a public use is not transformed into a
private taking through a subsequent transfer to a private party. The
Court stated:
			"The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent
domain is transferred in the first instance to private
beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only
a private purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for
the general public. 'It is not essential that the entire
community, nor even any considerable portion, ... directly
enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it]
to constitute a public use.' [Citation.] '[W]hat in its
immediate aspect [is] only a private transaction may ... be
raised by its class or character to a public affair.' ***
[G]overnment does not itself have to use property to
legitimate the taking; it is only the taking's purpose, and
not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public
Use Clause." Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 243-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 199, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331.
	This court has, heretofore, been guided by the principles
outlined in Berman. Thus, in People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago
R.R. Terminal Authority, 14 Ill. 2d 230 (1958), this court held
constitutional the Railroad Terminal Authority Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1957, ch. 114, pars. 361 through 389). This court noted that the
plaintiff's basic objection was that the principal beneficiaries of
the act were private corporations. This court stated:
			"To the extent that plaintiff's contentions are directed
to an alleged absence of public use and public purpose,
they are without merit. The General Assembly has
described in considerable detail the conditions which the
act is designed to eliminate and has declared the public
use and public interest that it found to exist. Such a
legislative declaration is not to be lightly set aside.
[Citations.] 'Public purpose' is not a static concept. It is
flexible, and is capable of expansion to meet conditions of
a complex society that were not within the contemplation
of the framers of our constitution. [Citations.]
			The primary objects of the statute are the removal of the
blighted conditions caused by antiquated terminal areas,
the promotion of the growth and development of the city,
and the relief of traffic congestion ***. [Citations.] It may
be that private railroad corporations will derive some
benefit under the act. Those benefits, however, will be
incidental to the principal purpose of the statute ***."
Adamowski, 14 Ill. 2d  at 235-36.
	In Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n v. Eden Cemetery Ass'n, 16 Ill. 2d 539, 541 (1959), the Illinois Toll Highway Commission
sought to acquire an underground easement for sewer and water
facilities through the defendants' cemetery property. The
defendants objected that the property was being taken to service a
gasoline station to be operated by a private corporation and to
service a privately owned restaurant. This court noted that the
purpose of the toll highways was to provide fast, through traffic in
a safe manner, and that it was necessary that gasoline service
stations and restaurants be located on or in close proximity to the
highway proper, thereby reducing a great number of entrances and
exits to reach these services. This court reasoned:
		"As plaintiff points out, the operations of a gas station or
a restaurant are specialized businesses, and are enterprises
calling for experts in these fields. So the legislature wisely
granted to the Commission the power to make contracts
with, and to grant concessions to, and to lease to persons
and private corporations. As the court said in the case of
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27, at pages 33-34: 'The public end may be as well or better served
through an agency of private enterprise than through a
department of government-or so the Congress might
conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole
method of promoting the public purposes of community
redevelopment projects.'
			We therefore conclude that service stations and
restaurants are an integral part of the toll road system,
whether they be operated by the Toll Highway
Commission or leased to a private corporation who may
be better able to carry on the business, thus bringing about
the desired result. We think, further, that since access to
sewer and water facilities is essential to the operation of
service stations and restaurants, the reasoning which
sustains the propriety of arrangements for the latter must
uphold as well a reasonable exercise of condemnation
powers in obtaining the former. The present exercise of
the power has not been shown to be unreasonable under
the circumstances ***." Eden Cemetery Ass'n, 16 Ill. 2d 
at 545-46.
See also People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 68 Ill. 2d 62, 76
(1977) ("It is apparent that the city of Urbana intends to undertake
the redevelopment in question primarily for the purpose of
revitalizing an economically stagnant downtown area. The purpose
of the project is therefore clearly and predominantly a public
purpose, and the benefit reaped by private developers is merely an
inevitable incident thereto"); People ex rel. City of Salem v.
McMackin, 53 Ill. 2d 347, 355 (1972) ("While we acknowledge
that there is a benefit to private interests in the financing of
industrial projects under the Act, we hold that the principal
purpose and objective of the Act is public in nature. Therefore, it
does not matter that there will be an incidental benefit to private
interests"); City of Chicago v. Barnes, 30 Ill. 2d 255, 257 (1964)
("it does not follow that because the land may later be sold to a
private developer its taking and clearance cannot have been for a
public purpose").
	Turning to the statute in the present case, I note that the
legislature determined that "labor surplus areas currently exist in
the southwestern part of the State" (70 ILCS 520/2(a) (West
1998)) and recognized that "the economic burdens resulting from
involuntary unemployment fall in part upon the State in the form
of increased need for public assistance and reduced tax revenues
and, in the event that the unemployed worker and his family
migrate elsewhere to find work, may also fall upon the
municipalities and other taxing districts within the areas of
unemployment in the form of reduced tax revenues, thereby
endangering their financial ability to support necessary
governmental services for their remaining inhabitants." 70 ILCS
520/2(b) (West 1998). The legislature also found "[t]hat a lack of
decent housing contributes to urban blight, crime, anti-social
behavior, disease, a higher need for public assistance, reduced tax
revenues, and the migration of workers and their families away
from areas which fail to offer adequate, decent, affordable
housing." 70 ILCS 520/2(d) (West 1998). Thus, the legislature
described in detail the conditions the Act was designed to
eliminate.
	Further, the legislature declared that "decent, affordable
housing" (70 ILCS 520/2(e) (West 1998)) and access to
"educational institutions, recreation, parks and open spaces,
entertainment and sports, a reliable transportation network,
cultural facilities and theaters" (70 ILCS 520/2(f) (West 1998))
should be available to every citizen. The legislature also declared
that "the State has a responsibility to help create a favorable
climate for new and improved job opportunities for its citizens by
encouraging the development of commercial and service
businesses and industrial and manufacturing plants within the
southwestern part of the State." 70 ILCS 520/2(c) (West 1998).
The legislature affirmed that "the main purpose of this Act is to
promote industrial, commercial, residential, service, transportation
and recreational activities and facilities, thereby reducing the evils
attendant upon unemployment and enhancing the public health,
safety, morals, happiness and general welfare of this State." 70
ILCS 520/2(g) (West 1998).
	The legislature created SWIDA to promote development in
Madison and St. Clair Counties. It charged SWIDA with the duty
to assist in the development, construction and acquisition of
industrial projects, housing or residential projects, and commercial
projects including cultural facilities such as sports training
facilities, racetracks, and parking facilities. 70 ILCS 520/3, 520/6
(West 1998). In turn, SWIDA issued $21.5 million of bonds to
facilitate the development of the racetrack. SWIDA now seeks to
condemn the Property to further the development of the racetrack
by increasing available parking. The development of parking
facilities is both a project contemplated under the Act and part of
the continued development of the racetrack.
	This court has previously upheld the validity of legislative
enactments designed to assist economic development (People ex
rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356, 364 (1980); Paley, 68 Ill. 2d  at 76; McMackin, 53 Ill. 2d at 358), to prevent or eliminate
blight involving both structural infirmity and economic
deterioration (Paley, 68 Ill. 2d  at 74; Barnes, 30 Ill. 2d  at 256;
People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 539, 545
(1954); Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. White, 411 Ill. 310, 316 (1952); Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority, 399 Ill. 579, 588
(1948); Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 128 (1945), and to
promote public safety (Eden Cemetery Ass'n, 16 Ill. 2d at 544).
See also Adamowski, 14 Ill. 2d  at 236 (blighted conditions,
promotion of the growth and development of the city and the relief
of traffic congestion). Such legislative determinations are well
within the State's police powers.
	In the present case, the majority cannot dispute the legislative
findings regarding the need to alleviate certain economic, housing
and other conditions in the southwestern part of this state. Nor can
the majority dispute that alleviation of these conditions furthers
certain public purposes. The legislature is, after all, "the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation."
Berman, 348 U.S.  at 31-32, 99 L. Ed.  at 37, 75 S. Ct.  at 102. And,
the legislature has determined, as it well may, to use the power of
eminent domain to realize its objective. See Berman, 348 U.S.  at
31-32, 99 L. Ed.  at 37, 75 S. Ct.  at 102. The legislature has vested
in SWIDA the power of eminent domain so that SWIDA may
assist in the development of housing, industrial and commercial
projects in the area. The legislature has also given SWIDA the
power to issue bonds to generate the financial wherewithal for the
development of the projects. The means employed by the
legislature to further the public purposes at issue are not irrational.
	Applying the holdings of Hawaii Housing Authority and
Berman, this court should defer to the legislative determination of
the public use. Although the majority acknowledges that great
deference is due the legislative determination (see slip op. at 9),
the majority does not act in accordance with such deference.
Indeed, the majority does not afford any measure of deference to
the legislative determination.
	The majority opinion is alarming both for its use of selective
portions of Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman and for its
attempt to engraft an additional principle upon the public use
doctrine. The majority states,
		" 'A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny
of the public use requirement; it would serve no
legitimate purpose of government and would thus be
void.' Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 245, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 200, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331. As this court held in
Gaylord, 204 Ill.  at 584, '[t]he public must be to some
extent entitled to use or enjoy the property, not as a mere
favor or by permission of the owner, but by right.' " Slip
op. at 10.
The majority fails to acknowledge, however, that the Court in
Hawaii Housing Authority specifically rejected a requirement that
the property be put into use for the public,
		"The Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that
condemned property be put into use for the general public.
'It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any
considerable portion, ... directly enjoy or participate in any
improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use.'
[Citation.] '[W]hat in its immediate aspect [is] only a
private transaction may ... be raised by its class or
character to a public affair.' *** [G]overnment does not
itself have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is
only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that
must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause." Hawaii
Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 243-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at
199, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331.
Not only is the majority disingenuous in its citation to Hawaii
Housing Authority and Berman but it seeks to unravel the holdings
of these opinions, for in imposing a requirement that the property
be put into use for the general public, the majority effectively
interdicts any taking for the purpose of economic development.
	I must inquire of the majority what development project can
satisfy the requirement that the public be "entitled to use or enjoy
the property, not as a mere favor or by permission of the owner,
but by right"? Can a member of the general public enter a
manufacturing plant as of right? What of a sports facility? Can a
member of the general public enter a stadium, or for that matter
the racetrack at issue, without paying a fee for the privilege? The
majority states,
		"We also acknowledge that a public use or purpose may
be satisfied in light of public safety concerns. See Illinois
Toll Highway Comm'n v. Eden Cemetery Ass'n, 16 Ill. 2d 539 (1959). The public is allowed to park on the property
in exchange for the payment of a fee. Gateway's racetrack
may be open to the public, but not 'by right.' " Slip op. at
10-11.
Again, I ask what project will survive the majority's requirement
of use as of right by the general public?
	I suggest that, in its attempt to reach a particular result, the
majority does great harm to the public use doctrine and to the
interests of this state.

B. Particular Taking
	The majority errs in other ways. In considering the taking at
issue, the majority applies the wrong standard of review and
ignores the evidence adduced at trial.
	Section 7-104(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in
part:
			"At the [quick-take] hearing, if the court has not
previously, in the same proceeding, determined that the
plaintiff has authority to exercise the right of eminent
domain, that the property sought to be taken is subject to
the exercise of such right, and that such right is not being
improperly exercised in the particular proceeding, then the
court shall first hear and determine such matters." 735
ILCS 5/7-104(b) (West 1998).
A finding on each of these three issues amounts to a determination
of whether or not the plaintiff has the right to take the property by
eminent domain. See Department of Public Works &amp; Buildings v.
Dust, 19 Ill. 2d 217, 219 (1960). As this court noted in Department
of Transportation v. First Galesburg National Bank &amp; Trust Co.,
141 Ill. 2d 462, 468 (1990), the plaintiff has only such powers of
eminent domain as are conferred upon it by the legislature. See
also Department of Public Works &amp; Buildings v. Keller, 61 Ill. 2d 320 (1975). The law conferring the right of eminent domain must
be strictly construed. First Galesburg National Bank, 141 Ill. 2d 
at 469.
	When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging the
authority to condemn, the burden is on the condemning authority
to make a prima facie case of the disputed allegations. First
Galesburg National Bank, 141 Ill. 2d  at 469; Keller, 61 Ill. 2d  at
324. This burden may be met by introducing in evidence a statute
affirming the authority's right to acquire property by eminent
domain (see First Galesburg National Bank, 141 Ill. 2d at 469), or
a resolution and ordinance approving the taking (see City of
Chicago v. Walker, 50 Ill. 2d 69, 71 (1971)). Once the condemning
authority has made a prima facie case, the defendant is required to
go forward with evidence showing that there was an abuse of
discretion by the condemning authority. First Galesburg National
Bank, 141 Ill. 2d  at 470; Keller, 61 Ill. 2d  at 325. The courts will
interfere only where an abuse of discretion is shown, for as this
court has held many times:
		"[W]hether the exercise of the power of eminent domain
is necessary or expedient to accomplish an authorized
purpose is not a question within the province of the court
to determine. The agency on which the power has been
conferred also has the authority to decide the necessity for
its exercise. In the absence of a clear abuse of this
authority the courts will not inquire into the necessity or
the propriety of its exercise." Keller, 61 Ill. 2d  at 325
(citing Department of Public Works &amp; Buildings v.
McNeal, 33 Ill. 2d 248 (1965), Forest Preserve District v.
Wike, 3 Ill. 2d 49 (1954), City of Chicago v. Vaccarro,
408 Ill. 587 (1951), and Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114 (1945)).
	In the present case, SWIDA satisfied its prima facie burden
of proof. Pursuant to section 8 of the Act, SWIDA may acquire
real property, or rights therein, upon condemnation. 70 ILCS
520/8(b) (West 1998). Section 5 of the Act commands SWIDA to
assist in the development of commercial projects, including
racetracks and parking facilities. 70 ILCS 520/5 (West 1998).
SWIDA introduced into evidence a resolution adopted by the St.
Clair County board authorizing the acquisition of the Property by
use of quick-take eminent domain. SWIDA also introduced into
evidence a resolution it adopted to acquire the Property by quick-take eminent domain. The resolutions state that it is necessary to
create additional parking areas for the racetrack to safely and
adequately service racetrack spectators and that the acquisition of
the Property for parking purposes will enhance the public health,
safety, morals, happiness, and the general welfare of the citizens
of southwestern Illinois through the creation of job opportunities,
the generation of additional tax revenues and the expansion of the
tax base within St. Clair County. This evidence suffices for a
prima facie case.
	It became incumbent upon NCE to introduce evidence
showing that SWIDA had abused its discretion. NCE failed in this
undertaking. The evidence at the hearing fully supports the circuit
court's determination that taking the Property will further
economic development, promote safety, and lead to the
elimination of blight in the area.
	The majority disagrees. As to the elimination of blight, the
majority simply states, "we are not dealing with a taking for the
purposes of eliminating slums or blight." Slip op. at 10. Nothing
is said of Ortbals' testimony on the subject.
	The majority is more forthright on the subject of economic
development. As the majority notes,
		"SWIDA presented extensive testimony that expanding
Gateway's facilities through the taking of NCE's property
would allow it to grow and prosper and contribute to
positive economic growth in the region." Slip op. at 11.
However, the majority quickly dispenses with this "extensive
testimony" of economic development. The majority simply notes
that " 'incidentally, every lawful business does this.' " Slip op. at
11, quoting Gaylord v. Sanitary District, 204 Ill. 576, 586 (1903).
	The majority reluctantly acknowledges the evidence regarding
public safety. The majority notes,
		"If this taking were permitted, lines to enter parking lots
might be shortened and pedestrians might be able to cross
from parking areas to event areas in a safer manner." Slip
op. at 11.
However, this acknowledgment fails to convey the full impact of
the trial testimony regarding public safety. Pritchett testified that
it was necessary, from a safety standpoint, for SWIDA to acquire
the Property for development of a parking lot. Ortbals testified that
using the Property for racetrack parking would alleviate the traffic
back-ups on Interstate 55-70 and allow racetrack patrons parked
east of Illinois Route 203 to gain access to the racetrack safely.
	Acknowledgment aside, the majority then rejects the evidence
as to the traffic safety concerns. The majority states,
		"[W]e are unpersuaded that these facts alone are sufficient
to satisfy the public use requirement, especially in light of
evidence that Gateway could have built a parking garage
structure on its existing property." Slip op. at 11.
The majority's conclusion is not supported by the record. Wolter
testified at trial that the racetrack had an immediate need for 2,000
to 5,000 parking spaces. Pook testified at trial that Gateway had
considered building a raised parking garage at the racetrack.
However, building such a garage was not economically feasible.
NCE introduced no evidence that building a raised parking garage
with 5,000 parking spaces was feasible, economically or
otherwise. Given the number of parking spaces at issue and NCE's
failure to present any evidence on this matter, the majority's
conclusion demonstrates either a general misapprehension of the
nature of appellate review or a deliberate choice to substitute the
judgment of this court for the record and proper inferences to be
drawn therefrom.
	Moreover, in questioning the necessity of the taking, the
majority applies the wrong standard of review. As noted above,
this court has previously recognized that
		"The agency on which the power has been conferred also
has the authority to decide the necessity for its exercise. In
the absence of a clear abuse of this authority the courts
will not inquire into the necessity or the propriety of its
exercise." Keller, 61 Ill. 2d  at 325 (citing McNeal, 33 Ill. 2d 248, Wike, 3 Ill. 2d 49, Vaccarro, 408 Ill. 587, and 
Zurn, 389 Ill. 114).
The legislature has vested in SWIDA the power of eminent
domain to assist in the development of commercial projects
including racetracks and parking facilities. The acquisition of the
Property being in furtherance of three distinct public purposes,
SWIDA did not abuse its discretion by the use of its eminent
domain powers. The evidence at trial is not contrary and judicial
intervention is unwarranted.

CONCLUSION
	I agree with the circuit court that SWIDA properly exercised
its power of eminent domain. The taking of the Property was for
a public use, not a private use. The majority errs in its application
of the standard of review. The majority also errs in its willingness
to dispense with strong evidence at trial supporting the circuit
court's decision. Lastly, the majority commits great disservice to
the State of Illinois and its citizens in engrafting upon the public
use doctrine the requirement that property taken by eminent
domain must be accessible to the general public as of right. This
requirement is the death of social legislation in furtherance of
economic development and revitalization. I respectfully dissent.

	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.