Title: State v. Forrett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001850-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2022

2022 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
19AP1850-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Scott William Forrett, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 371,961 N.W.2d 132 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 31 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 17, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Aprahamian    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by David Malkus, assistant state public defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney 
general.  
 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus brief was filed by Douglas Hoffer, deputy city 
attorney, with whom on the brief was Stephen C. Nick, city 
attorney, for the City of Eau Claire.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 37 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP1850-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF603) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott William Forrett, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed as 
modified and remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Scott Forrett was convicted 
of his seventh offense for operating while intoxicated (OWI).  
Counted as one of the six prior offenses was a 1996 temporary 
revocation of his driving privileges for refusing to submit to a 
warrantless blood draw.  That led to him receiving a longer 
sentence than he could have received had the revocation not been 
counted as an offense.  Forrett asserts that this aspect of 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
2 
 
Wisconsin's 
graduated-penalty 
scheme 
for 
OWI 
offenses 
is 
unconstitutional because it threatens with criminal penalties 
those who exercise their Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches.  We agree.  We conclude that under the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in North Dakota v. Birchfield, 579 
U.S. 438 (2016), and our decision in State v. Dalton, 2018 
WI 85, 
383 
Wis. 2d 147, 
914 
N.W.2d 120, 
Wisconsin's 
OWI 
graduated-penalty scheme is unconstitutional to the extent it 
counts prior revocations for refusing to submit to a warrantless 
blood draw as offenses for the purpose of increasing the 
criminal penalty. 
I 
¶2 
In 2017, when Scott Forrett was arrested and charged 
with OWI, he had five previous OWI convictions.  He also had his 
driving privileges temporarily revoked in 1996 because he had 
refused to consent to a warrantless blood draw after the police 
stopped him on suspicion of OWI.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2) 
(2019–20) (authorizing the police to request that a driver 
submit to a chemical test of her breath, blood, or urine).1  That 
encounter did not result in an OWI conviction.  Nevertheless, 
under 
Wisconsin's 
graduated-penalty 
scheme 
for 
repeat-OWI 
offenders, Forrett's 1996 revocation counts as a prior "offense" 
for the purposes of determining the appropriate charge and 
punishment 
for 
subsequent 
OWIs. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent statutory references are also to the 2019–
20 version. 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
3 
 
§§ 346.65(2)(am), 343.307(1).  Thus, in 2017, Forrett was 
charged with his seventh OWI offense, a Class F felony.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. 
 
He 
was 
also 
charged 
with 
possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, failure to install an ignition-interlock device, 
operating a vehicle with a prohibited blood-alcohol content, and 
driving with a revoked license.  The State agreed to dismiss 
those charges in exchange for Forrett pleading guilty to the 
seventh-offense OWI.  Forrett accepted that deal and pleaded 
guilty, and the circuit court imposed an 11-year sentence, 
bifurcated as six years of initial confinement and five years of 
extended supervision.2  See Wis. Stat. § 973.01. 
¶3 
Forrett sought post-conviction relief, arguing that 
under Birchfield and Dalton, it was unconstitutional to count as 
a criminal offense his 1996 revocation for refusing to submit to 
a warrantless blood draw.3  He pointed out that but for his 1996 
revocation, he would have been charged with a Class G felony, 
which carries with it a mandatory minimum of 18 months initial 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Michael J. Aprahamian of the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court presided over Forrett's conviction and sentencing.  
The Honorable Brad D. Schimel presided over the post-conviction 
proceedings. 
3 A person's license can be revoked for many other reasons, 
such as committing a homicide or exceeding the speed limit by 
more than 25 miles per hour.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 343.30–
.32.  The only basis for revocation at issue here is refusing to 
submit to a warrantless blood draw.  Thus, throughout this 
opinion, we use "revocation" as a shorthand for a "revocation 
for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw."  Our 
conclusions pertain only to such revocations and we do not 
address revocations for any other purpose. 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
4 
 
confinement and a maximum confinement period of five years.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(am)5, 973.01(2)(b)7.  He was charged, 
however, with a Class F felony, which is punishable by a 
mandatory minimum of three years of initial confinement and a 
maximum confinement period of seven years and six months.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(am)6., 973.01(2)(b)6m.  Forrett argued 
that this penalty structure is unconstitutional because it 
threatens to criminally punish people who exercise their Fourth 
Amendment right to refuse a warrantless blood draw.  The circuit 
court denied Forrett's post-conviction motion, reasoning that 
the OWI-penalty statutes do not "punish him for directly 
exercising some constitutional right[;] rather, [the 1996 
revocation] simply . . . affects the penalty structure relative 
to his conduct." 
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that 
counting prior revocations as "offenses" under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 343.307(1)(f) and 343.305(10) "impermissibly . . . penalizes 
a defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an 
unreasonable warrantless search."  State v. Forrett, 2021 WI 
App 31, ¶19, 398 Wis. 2d 371, 961 N.W.2d 132.  In doing so, the 
court of appeals distinguished between using one's refusal to 
submit to a warrantless blood draw as evidence of criminal 
liability for OWI in the same case, which is constitutionally 
permissible, and using a prior refusal to increase a defendant's 
criminal penalty for a subsequent OWI, which it held is improper 
under Birchfield and Dalton.  Id., ¶¶18–19.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals commuted Forrett's conviction to a sixth-
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
5 
 
offense OWI and remanded the cause to the circuit court for 
resentencing.  Id., ¶19.  The State appealed. 
II 
¶5 
Whether a statute is unconstitutional is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  E.g., State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, 
¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  A statute is facially 
unconstitutional 
when 
it 
"cannot 
be 
enforced 
under 
any 
circumstances."  E.g., Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 
2020 WI 67, ¶92, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (quoting another 
source).  Forrett's constitutional challenge requires us to 
interpret several statutes, which is also a question of law 
subject to de novo review.  E.g., State v. Matthews, 2021 WI 42, 
¶7, 397 Wis. 2d 1, 959 N.W.2d 640. 
III 
¶6 
A few constitutional principles lie at the foundation 
of our analysis.  The first is a person's right under the Fourth 
Amendment to refuse "unreasonable searches."  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV; see also Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 455 (a chemical test of a 
person's breath or blood is a "search").  Second is that 
warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable," unless some 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies.  
E.g., State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶17, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 
N.W.2d 891.  And third is that it has "long been established 
that a [s]tate may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise 
a right guaranteed by the Constitution," such as the right to 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
6 
 
refuse a warrantless, unreasonable search.  See Harman v. 
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965); Buckner v. State, 56 
Wis. 2d 539, 550, 202 Wis. 2d 406 (1972).  With those principles 
in mind, we turn to Forrett's challenge to the constitutionality 
of the OWI statutes. 
A 
¶7 
Wisconsin penalizes OWI offenders under a graduated-
penalty system.  A person's first OWI offense is generally a 
civil infraction.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)1.  Subsequent 
offenses are criminal and, depending on how many prior offenses 
a person has, may constitute a felony punishable by up to 10 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
5 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(am)7. (a person guilty 
of 10 or more OWI offenses is guilty of a Class E felony), 
939.50(3)(e).  Per statute, a person's total number of OWI 
offenses is determined by counting not only OWI convictions but 
also 
"suspensions 
or 
revocations" 
of 
a 
person's 
driving 
privileges resulting from a "refusal to submit to chemical 
testing," provided the refusal and the conviction do not 
"aris[e] out of the same incident or occurrence."  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 343.307(1)(e), (f); 346.65(2)(am)2.–7.  Thus, a prior 
revocation that is not tied to an OWI conviction nevertheless 
threatens to increase the criminal penalties that may be imposed 
for a subsequent OWI conviction.  See generally Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am).  For example, take an individual who has no 
prior OWI convictions but who, in a prior, separate incident 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
7 
 
that did not result in a conviction, is revoked for refusing to 
submit to a chemical test.  If, in the current incident, she is 
convicted of OWI, her prior revocation increases her penalty 
from a civil offense to a criminal one——for no reason other than 
that she previously refused to submit to a warrantless chemical 
test.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2. 
¶8 
The OWI statutes treat refusing any type of chemical 
test the same, but the U.S. Supreme Court has drawn a key 
constitutional distinction between a warrantless test of a 
person's breath and a warrantless test of her blood.4  Whereas a 
breath test implicates no "significant privacy concerns"——
because exhaled air "is not part of [one's] body" and the test's 
"physical intrusion is almost negligible"——warrantless blood 
draws are "another matter."  Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 461–63, 
474–76.  Blood draws are "significantly more intrusive" than a 
breath test in that they "'require piercing the skin' and 
extract a part of the subject's body."  Id. at 463–64 (quoting 
Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)).  
Those differences are why, after an OWI arrest, a warrantless 
breath test is permissible as a reasonable search incident to an 
arrest but a warrantless blood draw is not.  Id. at 474–76; see 
also 
Missouri 
v. 
McNeely, 
569 
U.S. 141, 
152–53 
(2013).  
Accordingly, for blood draws, the police must get a warrant, and 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(2) also applies to chemical 
tests of a person's urine.  Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor 
this court has addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of a 
urine test, and we do not need to do so here since Forrett's 
revocation was based on his refusing a blood test. 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
8 
 
when they do not have one, "a person has a constitutional right 
to refuse" the request.  See State v. Prado, 2021 WI 64, ¶47, 
397 Wis. 2d 719, 960 N.W.2d 869; see also Birchfield, 579 U.S. 
at 474–75.  It therefore follows that a state cannot threaten or 
"impose criminal penalties on th[at] refusal," Birchfield, 579 
U.S. at 477, because "a [s]tate may not impose a penalty upon 
those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution," 
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965).  See also 
Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶66; Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 
550, 202 Wis. 2d 406 (1972).5   
¶9 
Such unconstitutional criminal penalties can take 
several forms.  It could be that a person is criminally charged 
specifically for refusing a warrantless blood draw.  See 
Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 478.  Or, as was the case in Dalton, a 
person could be subjected to a longer sentence "for the sole 
reason that he refused to submit to a [warrantless] blood test."  
383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶59–61, 67 (explaining that a "lengthier jail 
sentence is certainly a criminal penalty"); see also Birchfield, 
579 U.S. at 476–78.  These two examples are illustrative but not 
exhaustive:  No matter the form the criminal penalty takes, the 
state cannot impose such a penalty on a person because she 
exercised her Fourth Amendment right.  See Harman, 380 U.S. at 
540; Buckner, 56 Wis. 2d at 550. 
                                                 
5 There is no constitutional issue, however, when a state 
imposes only "civil penalties," such as revoking a person's 
operating privileges, for refusing a warrantless blood draw.  
See Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 476–77 (adding that imposing 
"evidentiary consequences" is also permissible). 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
9 
 
B 
¶10 In both Birchfield and Dalton, the refusal and the 
related criminal penalties arose in the same case.  Here, 
however, Forrett's refusal and the criminal penalties for that 
refusal arise in different cases.  The question then, is whether 
it is unconstitutional under Birchfield and Dalton to increase 
the criminal penalty for a separate, subsequent OWI because, in 
a prior instance, the driver refused a warrantless blood draw.   
¶11 We conclude that it is.  Neither Birchfield nor Dalton 
limited its holding to refusals related to the instant OWI 
charge.  Both cases rested on the idea that the state cannot 
criminalize the exercise of a constitutional right, and we see 
no reason why that rationale does not apply equally when the 
criminal penalty is imposed in a later case.  See Birchfield, 
579 U.S. at 476–78; Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶61–66; see also, 
e.g., County of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmnt., Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 
400–01, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999) (explaining that a person may not 
be prosecuted in retaliation for exercising her constitutional 
rights).  After all, delayed criminal penalties are still 
criminal penalties.  Thus, reading Birchfield and Dalton 
together with Harman, Buckner, and the Fourth Amendment, it is 
unconstitutional in all circumstances to threaten criminal 
penalties for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw.  
Yet that is what the OWI statutes do by counting revocations as 
offenses under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1).  See generally Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am).   
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
10 
 
¶12 To be sure, there are limited instances in which 
counting a prior revocation as an offense will have no immediate 
effect.  For example, a person who has four prior OWI 
convictions and one revocation and is then convicted of another 
OWI is subject to the same criminal penalties as a person with 
the same number of prior convictions but no revocations.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)5. 
(imposing 
the 
same 
minimum 
punishment for a fifth and sixth offense).  Although the 
criminal penalty is not increased in such a case, the statutes 
still count revocations as offenses for penalty purposes.  
Therefore there is still at least a threat of an increased 
criminal penalty in a subsequent case.  And that threat——just 
like its realization——is unconstitutional.  See Birchfield, 579 
U.S. at 477–78. 
¶13 There is no constitutional issue, however, when the 
revocation and the ensuing conviction "arise out of the same 
incident or occurrence."  In that case, the revocation and 
conviction "shall be counted as one" offense, so there is no 
criminal 
penalty 
for 
the 
revocation. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)2.–7; cf. Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶60–67.  In 
Forrett's case, however, his 1996 refusal resulted only in a 
revocation, not an OWI conviction.  There is therefore no 
underlying criminal conduct from 1996 for which Forrett is being 
criminally punished.  Instead, he is being criminally punished 
only for exercising his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches.  That is unconstitutional.  See Buckner, 
56 Wis. 2d at 550; Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 477–78. 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
11 
 
¶14 We therefore hold that the OWI statutes are facially 
unconstitutional to the extent they count a prior, stand-alone 
revocation resulting from a refusal to submit to a warrantless 
blood draw as an offense for the purpose of increasing the 
criminal penalty. 
C 
¶15 The State argues that there is no difference between 
the OWI statutes' graduated-penalty scheme and any other statute 
that imposes heightened penalties on repeat offenders, pointing 
out that both this court and the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld 
such statutes as constitutional.  See, e.g., Ingalls v. State, 
48 Wis. 647, 658, 4 N.W. 785 (1880) ("The increased severity of 
the punishment for the subsequent offence is not a punishment of 
the person for the first offence a second time, but a severer 
punishment 
for 
the 
second 
offence."); 
United 
States 
v. 
Rodriguez, 553 U.S. 377, 386 (2008) (finding no double-jeopardy 
issue when a defendant receives a higher sentence under a 
recidivism statute because "100% of the punishment is for the 
offense of conviction").  Applying the rationale of Ingalls and 
Rodriguez to the OWI context, the State asserts that the 
graduated-penalty scheme is constitutional because it imposes no 
direct criminal punishment on the exercise of a constitutional 
right; it only considers that conduct for the purpose of 
increasing the punishment for a subsequent crime.  Thus, in the 
State's view, Forrett was not criminally punished for refusing a 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
12 
 
warrantless blood draw in 1996; he was punished only for 
violating the OWI statutes a seventh time. 
¶16 We reject that argument for the same reasons we 
rejected the State's similar argument in Dalton.  See 383 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶65.  The repeat-offender analogy fails because, in 
cases like Ingalls and Rodriguez, the initial conduct was not 
constitutionally protected.  It is therefore permissible to 
punish a third-time bank robber more harshly than a first-time 
offender because there is no constitutional right to rob a bank.  
Likewise, it is constitutional to punish a person more harshly 
for her third OWI conviction than for her first because no one 
has a constitutional right to drive while intoxicated.  But a 
person has a constitutional right to refuse a warrantless blood 
draw, so that refusal cannot be treated as an offense for the 
purposes of increasing the criminal penalty for a subsequent 
offense.  See Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶66; Buckner, 56 Wis. 2d 
at 550.6 
¶17 The State also rehashes another argument we rejected 
in Dalton:  that it is permissible for the State to use a prior 
refusal to submit to a warrantless blood draw as the reason for 
an increased criminal penalty so long as the penalty is not 
assessed directly on the refusal.  See 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶63.  
This supposed distinction makes no difference——both achieve the 
                                                 
6 The State also relies on Nichols v. United States, 511 
U.S. 738 (1994), but that reliance is misplaced because Nichols 
involved no argument that the defendant was being punished for 
exercising a constitutional right, which is the basis for 
Forrett's claim under Birchfield and Dalton. 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
13 
 
same unconstitutional result.  See id. ("[T]he fact that refusal 
is not a stand-alone crime does not alter our analysis."); 
Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 476–78; see also Commonwealth v. 
Monarch, 200 A.3d 51, 57 (Pa. 2019) ("Birchfield contemplated 
that the decision would apply not only to separate criminal 
offenses but also to enhanced sentencing . . . that might arise 
from refusal.").  Whether the criminal punishment is immediate 
or delayed, the OWI statutes impermissibly allow the State to 
punish more severely an OWI offender who refused a warrantless 
blood draw "solely because he availed himself of one of his 
constitutional rights."  See Buckner, 56 Wis. 2d at 550; see 
also Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 628 S.W.3d 18, 33 (Ky. 2021) 
(holding 
that 
a 
Kentucky 
statute 
was 
incompatible 
with 
Birchfield because it "was absolutely clear that the sentence 
[for subsequent DUI convictions] will be higher . . . due to the 
refusal"). 
D 
¶18 Consistent with our analysis above, we agree with the 
court of appeals that Forrett cannot be charged with a seventh-
offense OWI because one of his six prior "offenses" is a 
revocation for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw.  
But for his 1996 refusal, Forrett's current OWI conviction would 
be his sixth, for which he could be sentenced to no more than 
five 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.65(2)(am)5., 973.01(2)(b)7.  Instead, he was convicted of 
his seventh OWI offense and was sentenced to six years of 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
14 
 
initial 
confinement. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.65(2)(am)6., 
973.01(2)(b)6m.  Imposing such heightened criminal penalties 
based upon a person's prior refusal to submit to a warrantless 
blood draw is unconstitutional under Birchfield and Dalton.  See 
Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 476–78; Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶60–
67. 
¶19 As for the remedy, however, we reach a different 
conclusion than the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
commuted Forrett's conviction to OWI as a sixth offense and 
remanded the cause for resentencing.  Under the terms of the 
plea agreement, however, Forrett agreed to plead to a seventh-
offense OWI (a Class F felony) in exchange for the State 
dismissing his other charges and recommending substantial prison 
time consistent with that conviction.  But, for the reasons 
discussed above, Forrett could have been convicted only of a 
Class G felony, which entails substantially lesser criminal 
penalties than a Class F felony.  That alters the basis for the 
bargain struck by Forrett and the State in such a way that the 
plea agreement cannot be enforced.  See State v. Tourville, 2016 
WI 17, ¶25, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 N.W.2d 735 (explaining that 
plea agreements are "rooted in contract law," which "demands 
that each party should receive the benefit of its bargain") 
(quoting another source).  On remand, then, both the State and 
Forrett should be given the opportunity to consider their next 
steps.  See id. ("While the government must be held to the 
promises it made, it will not be bound to those it did not 
make.") (quoting another source); see also State v. Briggs, 218 
No. 
2019AP1850-CR 
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 61, 69–74, 579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning 
that vacating one of several convictions obtained by plea 
agreement required vacating the entire plea agreement).   
IV 
¶20 In conclusion, we affirm the court of appeals with the 
modification above regarding the remedy.  We hold that Wis. 
Stat. §§ 343.307(1) and 346.65(2)(am) are unconstitutional to 
the extent that they count prior revocations resulting solely 
from a person's refusal to submit to a warrantless blood draw as 
offenses for the purpose of increasing the criminal penalty.  We 
remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to 
vacate 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
and 
conduct 
further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
By the Court.—The court of appeals' decision is affirmed as 
modified, and the cause remanded. 
 
No.  2019AP1850-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶21 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority 
declares 
Wisconsin's 
escalating 
OWI 
penalty 
scheme 
unconstitutional when counting revocations based on the refusal 
to submit to a warrantless blood test.  This conclusion, 
however, is premised entirely on the notion that the later OWI 
penalty 
enhancer 
constitutes 
criminal 
punishment 
for 
the 
earlier, unrelated refusal.  Because that is not the law, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶22 In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court 
considered several questions related to implied consent laws.  
579 U.S. 438, 450-54 (2016).  The issues focused on the 
lawfulness of various searches under the Fourth Amendment, and 
whether a defendant could be criminally or civilly sanctioned 
for refusing to consent to a search.  Id. at 444.  Pertinent 
here, the Court analyzed whether North Dakota's implied consent 
law could serve as a basis for justifying a warrantless blood 
test (a search) when criminal penalties attached to the refusal.  
Id. at 451.  The Court held it could not.  Id. at 476-77.  It 
ruled that Birchfield, who was criminally prosecuted under North 
Dakota's implied consent law, "was threatened with an unlawful 
search and that the judgment affirming his conviction must be 
reversed."  Id. at 477-78.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court distinguished implied consent laws that impose civil 
penalties for refusal (which are lawful) from those that impose 
criminal penalties (which are not).  Id. at 476-77. 
¶23 Unlike North Dakota, Wisconsin imposes no criminal 
penalties for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood test.  
No.  2019AP1850-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
Our law establishes only civil consequences.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(10).  In 1996, Scott Forrett's operating privileges 
were temporarily revoked——a civil penalty——for refusing to 
submit to a warrantless blood test.  According to Birchfield, 
revoking Forrett's operating privileges was perfectly legal 
because no criminal punishment was imposed for his refusal.  See 
579 U.S. at 476-77.  That should end the matter.  But the 
majority holds otherwise, concluding Forrett's sentence for his 
most recent OWI punishes him anew for conduct that occurred 26 
years ago.  This has never been the law. 
¶24 It 
is 
well-established 
that 
a 
later 
criminal 
prosecution that takes into account prior conduct——criminal or 
not——does not amount to new criminal punishment for the prior 
conduct.  We set forth this proposition in 1880 when we 
concluded that punishing persons longer for repeat offenses did 
not violate constitutional double jeopardy protections.  Ingalls 
v. State, 48 Wis. 647, 658, 4 N.W. 785 (1880).  We explained 
that considering prior conduct in meting out punishment for a 
new crime "is not a punishment of the person for the first 
offense a second time, but a severer punishment for the second 
offense."  Id.  The United States Supreme Court is in accord:  
"When a defendant is given a higher sentence under a recidivism 
statute——or for that matter, when a sentencing judge, under a 
guidelines 
regime 
or 
a 
discretionary 
sentencing 
system, 
increases a sentence based on the defendant's criminal history——
100% of the punishment is for the offense of conviction."  
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 386 (2008); see also 
No.  2019AP1850-CR.bh 
 
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Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998) ("An enhanced 
sentence imposed on a persistent offender thus 'is not to be 
viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the 
earlier crimes' but as 'a stiffened penalty for the latest 
crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a 
repetitive one.'" (quoting another source)). 
¶25 These 
principles 
apply 
no 
less 
to 
Wisconsin's 
escalating penalty scheme for OWIs.  See State v. McAllister, 
107 Wis. 2d 532, 535, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982) (explaining that the 
OWI "graduated penalty structure is nothing more than a penalty 
enhancer similar to a repeater statute").  Wisconsin counts 
prior OWI offenses, along with revocations and suspensions in 
determining the penalty for a new OWI offense.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am).  A first-offense OWI is a civil, not criminal, 
violation yet it counts in the OWI escalating penalty scheme.  
Id.  Suspensions and revocations, which also count, can be 
caused 
by 
any 
number 
of 
violations, 
including 
excessive 
speeding.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1n). 
¶26 OWI punishments are therefore increased based on prior 
conduct of all kinds, civil and criminal alike.  And under an 
unbroken and unchallenged line of precedent, the punishment for 
the current OWI penalizes only the crime of conviction——not any 
of the past conduct that may serve as an enhancer.  See State v. 
Schuman, 186 Wis. 2d 213, 218, 520 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding an OWI penalty enhancer "is not an additional, 
retroactive, penalty" for the prior conduct, "but a stiffer 
penalty for the latest crime").  As the United States Supreme 
No.  2019AP1850-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
Court has said, "Enhancement statutes, whether in the nature of 
criminal history provisions such as those contained in the 
Sentencing 
Guidelines, 
or 
recidivist 
statutes 
that 
are 
commonplace in state criminal laws, do not change the penalty 
for the earlier conviction."  Nichols v. United States, 511 
U.S. 738, 747 (1994). 
¶27 Applying 
this 
concept 
here 
is 
straightforward.  
Forrett's present OWI prosecution punishes him only for his new 
offense.  Counting prior offenses in calculating his sentence 
does not criminally punish Forrett for any of his prior conduct.  
This is true when counting prior OWI convictions of a civil or 
criminal nature.  And it is true of revocations, whether for 
excessive speeding or for refusing to submit to a blood test.  
Thus, under binding law, the State is not criminally punishing 
Forrett for refusing a blood test back in 1996; rather, it is 
simply punishing him more harshly for his newest OWI conviction.  
Nothing in Birchfield casts any doubt on these principles.  
Nothing in Birchfield calls into question the constitutionality 
of Wisconsin's OWI escalating penalty scheme. 
¶28 The court of appeals and the majority rely heavily on 
State v. Dalton to reach a contrary result.  2018 WI 85, 383 
Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120.  In Dalton, the circuit court 
imposed a longer sentence because Dalton refused a blood test in 
the same incident that lead to his OWI conviction.  Id., ¶¶19-
21.  This court concluded that Dalton suffered criminal 
punishment in violation of Birchfield as a result of his 
refusal.  Id., ¶¶61, 67.  Dalton's facts were much closer to 
No.  2019AP1850-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
Birchfield, but Dalton's reasoning should not be extended.  The 
majority seems to interpret Dalton as prohibiting any criminal 
penalty enhancements that are connected to a prior refusal to 
consent to a warrantless blood test.  If this is what Dalton 
stands for, it was wrong.  By expanding Dalton beyond the 
circumstances of the immediate OWI conviction, the majority 
adopts a legal rule that is unrecognizable from its supposed 
roots in Birchfield and irreconcilable with more than a century 
of precedent on penalty enhancement statutes. 
¶29 The majority's conclusion in this case takes us far 
afield from the law we are supposed to apply.  Consistent with 
Birchfield, Wisconsin imposes only civil penalties for refusing 
to submit to a warrantless blood test.  Yet today, the court 
decides 
that 
Wisconsin's 
OWI 
graduated-penalty 
scheme 
is 
unconstitutional when it counts prior revocations for refusing 
to submit to a blood test.  This holding has nothing to do with 
Birchfield.  It is a classic example of pulling a line from an 
opinion and wrongly applying it to an entirely different sort of 
case and claim.  The majority misapplies Supreme Court precedent 
and in so doing, overrides the legislature's decision to count 
prior 
revocations 
toward 
increased 
OWI 
penalties. 
 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶30 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this dissent. 
No.  2019AP1850-CR.bh 
 
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