Title: Com. v. Stanton
Citation: 388 A.2d 1053, 479 Pa. 521
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 1978

479 Pa. 521 (1978) 388 A.2d 1053 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David STANTON, Vaughn Howell and Gerald Hinkley. Appeal of Vaughn HOWELL. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted January 10, 1978. Decided July 14, 1978. *522 Gerald C. Grimaud, Tunkhannock, for appellant. Edward P. Little, Jr., Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Vaughn Howell, was tried by a judge and a jury and was convicted of burglary. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to three-to-ten years' imprisonment. An appeal was filed with the Superior Court. That court remanded the matter for resentencing because appellant's counsel had not been given an opportunity to inspect the presentence report, but affirmed the judgment of sentence in all other respects. Commonwealth v. Stanton, 239 Pa.Super. 47, 362 A.2d 355 (1976). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which this court granted. *523 The facts are as follows. Shortly before midnight on August 18, 1973, appellant and his co-defendants, Gerald Hinkley and David Stanton, were drinking at Red's Diner in Springville Township, Susquehanna County. Appellant offered to sell Hinkley four calves and one beef cow for $600. The four calves were taken from the barn of Roger Sherman while the beef cow was taken from the barn of Dale Brown. Hinkley gave appellant a check for $150 with the balance of $450 due within two weeks. Sherman and Brown discovered their animals were missing the next morning. Both farmers notified the police. Subsequent investigation led to the arrest of all three co-defendants. Appellant testified in his own defense, claiming that Sherman owed him money for work performed. When appellant pressed Sherman for the money, Sherman told him he was short of cash. As appellant had helped Sherman for a number of years and Sherman had often paid his debts by giving cattle, the pair discussed paying appellant in cattle. Sherman offered appellant any four calves of his choice. When told this was insufficient, Sherman offered to throw in a beef cow. For some reason, appellant believed the cow was the one eventually taken from the Brown farm.[1] Appellant testified that on the night the cattle were taken, he intended to tell either Sherman or a member of the family that he was taking the cattle. When driving past the Sherman farmhouse, however, appellant saw no lights on, so he decided to wait until the next day to tell Sherman he had taken the cattle. After taking the beef cow from the Brown farm, appellant and his co-defendants went to the Sherman barn and took the four calves.[2] *524 Appellant and Hinkley[3] were convicted of burglary for their entry into the Brown barn, but acquitted of the charges relating to their entry of the Sherman barn. Further, both were acquitted of the charges of theft of the livestock. Appellant first argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for burglary. We do not agree. The Crimes Code provides: In Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 267-68, 344 A.2d 824, 825-826 (1975), we stated: Viewing the evidence in the light of this standard, we believe the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction for burglary. *525 Appellant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.[4] He claims counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's charge on the intent necessary to convict for burglary. We agree with appellant and grant him a new trial. In Com. ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352-53 (1967), we stated: The exact question for our disposition, as set forth in Judge Hoffman's dissenting opinion in the Superior Court, is: In the instant case, appellant was charged with burglary. He admitted entering both barns, but denied having the requisite intent required to sustain a conviction for burglary. The jury's proper understanding of intent was paramount in this case. Yet, as pointed out by Judge Hoffman: We believe the court's charge is confusing and thus inadequate for two reasons. First, as alluded to by Judge Hoffman, the trial court never made it clear that a conviction for burglary requires a specific intent on the part of the actor. The jury could have believed that appellant could be convicted for negligently or recklessly entering the Brown barn. Second, when speaking of intent, the court told the jury that they had to be convinced that appellant entered the barn "with the intent of a thief." As Judge Hoffman stated: In our view, we find no reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant's interest in counsel's actions regarding the court's charge on intent. As such, appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel and is entitled to a new trial. *528 Judgment of sentence reversed and case remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County for a new trial. POMEROY, J., dissents. [1] Various witnesses and Sherman himself testified that he kept his cattle in four barns in the area. Sherman further testified, however, that he never kept any cows in the Brown barn. [2] At trial, Sherman testified that appellant always had permission to go in and out of the barn, because appellant had, for a number of years, provided various services to Sherman. [3] Co-defendant Stanton pled guilty and testified as a Commonwealth witness. [4] On appeal to the Superior Court, appellant was represented by new counsel. Appellant raised various instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but the precise issue now being considered was not raised until a reply brief, which is too late. Counsel, however, argues his own ineffectiveness for failing to include this claim in the original Superior Court brief. As the error is apparent from the record, counsel can argue his own ineffectiveness and we will consider the issue on the merits. Commonwealth v. Fox, 476 Pa. 475, 383 A.2d 199 (1978).