Title: Blekley Coicou v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-637
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-637 
____________ 
 
BLEKLEY COICOU,  
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. 
 
[April 1, 2010] 
 
QUINCE, C.J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District 
Court of Appeal in Coicou v. State, 867 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).  In its 
decision the district court certified a question to this Court to be of great public 
importance.  We have revised the question as follows: 
MAY AN APPELLATE COURT DIRECT THE ENTRY OF A 
CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED SECOND-DEGREE MURDER 
WHERE THE JURY‟S VERDICT DOES NOT REFLECT A 
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT ACTED WITH A 
DEPRAVED MIND? 
 
Coicou v. State, No. 3D03-271 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 10, 2004) (on motion to certify 
question of great public importance).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), 
 
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Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the 
negative.  Because the jury did not determine that the defendant acted with a 
depraved mind, a required element of attempted second-degree murder, we quash 
the decision under review and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Coicou was charged with attempted first-degree felony murder for 
committing or attempting to commit a robbery against the victim and, as a separate 
act not an essential element of the robbery, shooting the victim in the chest.  
Coicou v. State, 867 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).1  Twice during the trial, 
defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal by arguing that there was no 
proof of the underlying felony, the robbery, and that the State did not prove the 
essential elements of attempted felony murder.  The trial court denied both 
motions.  Id. at 410-11.  The jury convicted Coicou of attempted first-degree 
felony murder with a firearm.  The jury specifically found that Coicou committed a 
robbery and used a firearm.  Id. at 411.  Defense counsel moved for a new trial, 
which the trial court denied.  Id.   
                                          
 
 
1.  The State also charged Coicou with aggravated battery, possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, and use of a weapon during the commission of a 
felony.  These charges were dropped.   See Coicou, 867 So. 2d at 410 n.1. 
 
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On appeal, Coicou argued that the trial court fundamentally erred by 
convicting him of attempted felony murder because the State used the same act, the 
shooting of the victim, to prove both the attempted felony murder and the 
underlying felony offense.  Coicou, 867 So. 2d at 411.  Thus, Coicou argued that 
Florida law prohibits a court from convicting a person of attempted felony murder 
using proof of an element essential to the underlying felony.  Id.  The Third 
District agreed and held that the trial court erred in denying Coicou‟s motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  Id. at 412.   
Additionally, Coicou argued that his conviction and sentence must be 
reversed and that he should be discharged because the State failed to prove one of 
the elements of attempted felony murder under section 782.051(1), Florida Statutes 
(2001).  Coicou, 867 So. 2d at 412.  The district court agreed that Coicou‟s 
conviction and sentence for attempted felony murder should be reversed.  
However, the court did not agree that Coicou should be discharged.  Id.  The court 
held that under section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2001), Coicou‟s conviction should 
be reduced to a permissive lesser-included offense, attempted second-degree 
murder.  Id.  In making this determination, the court relied on this Court‟s holding 
in I.T. v. State, 694 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1997), which held that section 924.34 refers to 
both category one necessarily lesser-included offenses and category two 
permissive lesser-included offenses.  Coicou, 867 So. 2d at 412.  Additionally, the 
 
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court reasoned that the evidence in the record supported a finding that Coicou 
acted in a manner that was imminently dangerous to the victim.  Id.  Thus, the 
evidence supported a conviction of the lesser-included offense of attempted 
second-degree murder.  Id. (citing Mingo v. State, 680 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1996); Hayes v. State, 564 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)).  The Third 
District remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a judgment of 
conviction for attempted second-degree murder.  Id. 
In response to Coicou‟s motion for certification, the Third District 
certified to this Court the following question as one of great public 
importance: 
WHETHER ATTEMPTED SECOND-DEGREE 
MURDER IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER? 
Coicou v. State, No. 3D03-271 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 10, 2004).  We accepted 
jurisdiction to answer the certified question.   
ANALYSIS 
The question before this Court is whether the jury‟s verdict of guilty on the 
charge of attempted first-degree felony murder provided an adequate basis for 
directing—pursuant to section 924.34—the entry of a conviction for attempted 
second-degree murder.  Because the certified question involves solely a legal 
 
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determination based on undisputed facts, this Court‟s review is de novo.  See 
Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 595, 598 (Fla. 2007). 
In Amlotte v. State, 456 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 1984), we found that  
attempted felony murder was a common law offense in Florida.  However, some 
years later in State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552, 552-53 (Fla. 1995), we receded from 
our holding in Amlotte.  We reasoned that the “legal fictions required to support 
the intent for felony murder [were] simply too great” to extend to attempted felony 
murder.  Gray, 654 So. 2d at 554.  The Legislature in 1996, in response to our 
decision in Gray, enacted section 782.051, which created the offense of “Felony 
causing bodily injury.”  See ch. 96-359, § 1, at 2052, Laws of Fla.  In 1998, the 
Legislature substantially rewrote section 782.051 and retitled it “Attempted felony 
murder.”  See ch. 98-204, § 12, at 1970, Laws of Fla.2  Thus, attempted felony 
murder is specifically provided for by statute. 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.510, entitled “Determination of 
Attempts and Lesser Included Offenses,” provides the following: 
On an indictment or information on which the defendant is to 
be tried for any offense the jury may convict the defendant of: 
 . . . . 
(b) any offense that as a matter of law is a necessarily included 
offense or a lesser included offense of the offense charged in the 
                                          
 
 
2.  The 1998 amendment also added the element of an intentional act that is 
not an essential element of the underlying felony.  See § 782.051(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2001). 
 
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indictment or information and is supported by the evidence.  The 
judge shall not instruct on any lesser included offense as to which 
there is no evidence. 
 
In Sanders v. State, 944 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2006), we defined and explained the 
distinction between necessarily and permissive lesser-included offenses: 
Lesser included offenses fall into two categories:  necessary and 
permissive.  Necessarily lesser included offenses are those offenses in 
which the statutory elements of the lesser included offense are always 
subsumed within those of the charged offense.  State v. Paul, 934 So. 
2d 1167, 1176 (Fla. 2006).  A permissive lesser included offense 
exists when “the two offenses appear to be separate [on the face of the 
statutes], but the facts alleged in the accusatory pleadings are such that 
the lesser [included] offense cannot help but be perpetrated once the 
greater offense has been.”  State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923, 925 n.2 
(Fla. 1991). 
 
Sanders, 944 So. 2d at 206 (alterations in original).   
 
 
In this case the Third District found that attempted second-degree murder is 
a permissive lesser-included offense of attempted felony murder.  In determining 
whether attempted second-degree murder is a permissive lesser-included offense of 
attempted felony murder, “the pertinent inquiry is whether the greater crime may 
be charged in a manner encompassing the lesser.”  Williams, 957 So. 2d at 598.   
The crime of attempted felony murder is codified in section 782.051, Florida 
Statutes (2001).  Section 782.051(1) provides:     
Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any 
felony enumerated in s. 782.04(3) and who commits, aids, or abets an 
intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that 
could, but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of 
the first degree . . . . 
 
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The crime of attempted second-degree murder is codified in section 777.04(1), 
Florida Statutes (2001), defining attempt, and section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes 
(2001), defining second-degree murder.  See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 
(Fla. 2005), overruled in part by Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009).  As we 
explained in Florida, attempted second-degree murder has two elements: “(1) the 
defendant intentionally committed an act that could have resulted, but did not 
result, in the death of someone, and (2) the act was imminently dangerous to 
another and demonstrated a depraved mind without regard for human life.”  Id. at 
945-46 (citing Brown v. State, 790 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 2000); State v. Brady, 745 
So. 2d 954, 957 (Fla. 1999)).  “Use of a firearm is a third element that increases the 
penalty for the crime.”  Id. at 946. 
Attempted second-degree murder and attempted first-degree felony murder 
appear to be separate on the face of the statutes because each crime contains an 
element that the other does not.  Attempted first-degree felony murder requires that 
the act be committed during the course of committing a felony.  See § 782.051.  
Attempted second-degree murder requires that the perpetrator‟s act be “imminently 
dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life,” § 
782.04(2).  In order to find attempted second-degree murder a permissive lesser 
included offense of attempted first-degree felony murder, the facts alleged in the 
accusatory pleadings must be such that the lesser-included offense cannot help but 
 
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be perpetrated once the greater offense has been demonstrated.  See Sanders, 944 
So. 2d at 206.  Accordingly, because the facts alleged in an accusatory pleading 
will vary on a case-by-case basis, we conclude that a case-by-case determination is 
warranted when deciding whether attempted second-degree murder is a permissive 
lesser-included offense of attempted felony murder.   
This Case 
The trial court instructed the jury on attempted felony murder and instructed 
them that the shooting constituted a separate intentional act that was not an element 
of the charged robbery.  Coicou, 867 So. 2d at 411.  The jury convicted Coicou of 
attempted felony murder with a firearm because it specifically found that Coicou 
committed a robbery and used a firearm.  Id.  In reversing Coicou‟s conviction and 
sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder, the Third District acknowledged 
that the prosecution used the same act, the shooting of the victim, to prove both the 
attempted felony murder and the underlying robbery offense.  Id. at 411-12.  
However, the district court determined that pursuant to section 924.34, Florida 
Statutes (2001), Coicou‟s conviction should be reduced to the lesser-included 
offense of attempted second-degree murder.  Id. at 412.  The district court reasoned 
that the evidence contained in the record supported a conviction for attempted 
second-degree murder.  Id.  We disagree. 
 
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Section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2001), entitled “When evidence sustains 
only conviction of lesser offense,” provides: 
When the appellate court determines that the evidence does not 
prove the offense for which the defendant was found guilty but does 
establish guilt of a lesser statutory degree of the offense or a lesser 
offense necessarily included in the offense charged, the appellate 
court shall reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter 
judgment for the lesser degree of the offense or for the lesser included 
offense. 
 
In I.T., 694 So. 2d at 724, we held that section 924.34 extends to include both 
necessarily and permissive lesser-included offenses.3  Further, “section 924.34 . . . 
allow[s] an appellate court to direct a trial court to enter an adjudication or 
judgment for a permissive lesser-included offense where supported by the 
allegations in the charging document and the proof at trial.”  State v. Sigler, 967 
So. 2d 835, 842 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing I.T., 694 So. 2d at 724).  
Moreover, we held in Sigler that section 924.34 permits an appellate court to direct 
a judgment for a lesser-included offense when the jury determines all of the 
elements of the lesser offense.  See 967 So. 2d at 844. 
The question presented here requires us to determine whether attempted 
second-degree murder is either a necessary or permissive lesser-included offense 
of attempted first-degree felony murder.  This Court has not previously addressed 
                                          
 
 
3.  There are no necessarily lesser included offenses for attempted first-
degree felony murder listed in the Standard Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases. 
 
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this question, but has addressed whether second-degree murder is a lesser-included 
offense of first-degree felony murder.  In Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 
1985), we addressed a certified question of  “[w]hether a jury instruction on second 
degree (depraved mind) murder is necessary, if supported by the evidence, when 
defendant is charged with first degree (felony) murder.”  Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 
1263.  This Court held that second-degree murder was a necessarily lesser-
included offense of first-degree premeditated and felony murder.  Id. at 1263-64.  
This Court further suggested that the Florida Standard Jury Instructions schedule of 
lesser included offenses should be amended to include second-degree murder as a 
necessarily lesser-included offense of first-degree felony murder.  Id. at 1265.  The 
Court repeated this holding in Scurry v. State, 521 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 1988), 
and again directed that the Standard Jury Instructions be amended.  The 
recommended change was subsequently incorporated into the schedule of lesser-
included offenses.  See Standard Jury Instructions—Criminal Cases No. 92-1, 603 
So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1992). 
In a dissent to Linehan, Justice Shaw expressed disagreement with the 
majority‟s holding.  Justice Shaw concluded that second-degree, depraved mind, 
murder is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree felony murder because it is 
the statutory elements that determine whether an offense is a lesser-included 
offense of another.  See Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 1266 (Shaw, J., dissenting).  Justice 
 
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Shaw reasoned that offenses are separate and not lesser-included if each offense 
contains an element that the other does not have.  See id.  Justice Shaw further 
noted that it is the Legislature, through its definition of statutory elements of 
offenses, that determines whether offenses are lesser included or separate.  
Therefore, standard jury instructions and the rules of criminal procedure must give 
way to that legislative decision.  See id. (citing § 775.021(4), Florida Statutes 
(1983)).  Justice Shaw found that the majority of this Court and the district court 
below had departed from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), in 
looking to the evidence rather than to the statutory elements of first-degree felony 
murder and second-degree depraved mind murder.  See Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 
1266 (Shaw, J., dissenting). 
As we explained in Sanders, “[n]ecessarily lesser included offenses are those 
offenses in which the statutory elements of the lesser included offense are always 
subsumed within those of the charged offense.”  944 So. 2d at 206 (emphasis 
added).  It follows, then, that attempted second-degree murder is not a necessarily 
lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree felony murder.  This is because 
attempted second-degree murder contains an element, a depraved mind, that is not 
an element of the greater offense. 
For the same reason, and for the reasons expressed in Justice Shaw‟s dissent 
to Linehan, it is equally clear that second-degree murder cannot and should not be 
 
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considered a necessarily lesser-included offense of first-degree felony murder.  
While not unmindful of the principle of stare decisis, this Court has in the past 
“departed from precedent to correct legally erroneous decisions when such 
departure is „necessary to vindicate other principles of law or to remedy continued 
injustice.‟”  Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121, 1131 (Fla. 2005) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla. 1992)).  We 
therefore recede from Linehan and Scurry to the extent those decisions are 
inconsistent with this opinion, and direct the Committee on Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases to consider a revision of the Florida Standard Jury 
Instructions. 
In the instant case, we also find that attempted second-degree murder is not a 
permissive lesser-included offense, because the allegations in the charging 
document and the proof at trial do not support a finding that Coicou acted with a 
depraved mind without regard for human life.  See I.T., 694 So. 2d at 724.  The 
charging document for attempted felony murder simply alleged that Coicou 
intentionally committed an act that could have resulted, but did not result, in the 
death of someone.  There was no allegation of an act that was “imminently 
dangerous” or that “demonstrated a depraved mind without regard for human life.”  
 
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See Florida, 894 So. 2d at 945-46. 4  Therefore, attempted felony murder was not 
charged in a manner encompassing a showing of a depraved mind, the required 
mental element of attempted second-degree murder.  See Mitchell v. State, 830 So. 
2d 944, 948 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (Pleus, J., dissenting) (“Attempted second-degree 
murder requires a showing of recklessness, of a „depraved mind without regard for 
human life‟; attempted felony murder does not.”).  Moreover, there is no indication 
that the jury found the “depraved mind” element of attempted second-degree 
murder.  Thus, the jury in this case did not find all of the elements of the lesser 
offense.  See Sigler, 967 So. 2d at 844. 
Section 924.34 does not permit an appellate court to direct entry of a 
conviction for a crime where the jury has not determined all of the elements of that 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  To do so would amount to a violation of the 
defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.  See id. at 841, 844.  
Accordingly, pursuant to section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2001), it was improper 
for the Third District to remand to the trial court with directions to enter a 
judgment of conviction for attempted second-degree murder.  The proper remedy 
                                          
 
 
4.  Under Florida‟s standard jury instruction for attempted second-degree 
murder, “[a]n act is „imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a 
depraved mind‟ if: a person of ordinary judgment would know that it is reasonably 
certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another; it is done from ill will, hatred, 
spite, or evil intent; and it is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an 
indifference to human life.”  Battle, 911 So. 2d at 92 (Quince, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 6.4). 
 
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is remand to the trial court for retrial on any lesser offenses contained in the 
charging instrument and instructed on at trial.  See State v. Wilson, 680 So. 2d 411, 
412 (Fla. 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that a case-by-case determination is 
warranted when deciding whether attempted second-degree murder is a permissive 
lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree felony murder.  Additionally, we 
hold that section 924.34 did not apply to this case because the allegations in the 
charging document and the proof at trial did not support the element of a depraved 
mind without regard for human life, and the jury did not determine all of the 
elements of the lesser offense.  Accordingly, we answer the certified question in 
the negative, quash the decision of the Third District, and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PERRY, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D03-271 
 
 
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(Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Harvey J. Sepler, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner/Cross Respondent 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, and Timothy R.M. Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent/Cross Petitioner