Title: Harrison v. Tauheed
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 102214
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: August 5, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 102,214 
 
MONICA HARRISON, now Mitchell, 
Next Friend and Natural Guardian of J.D.H., a Minor Child, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ADIEL TAUHEED, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
When an initial custody issue lies only between the parents, the paramount 
consideration of the court is the welfare and best interests of the child. The district court 
is in the best position to make the inquiry and determination, and, in the absence of abuse 
of sound judicial discretion, its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal.  
 
2.  
 
Under an abuse of discretion standard, a district court's decision is protected if 
reasonable persons could differ upon the propriety of the decision, as long as the 
discretionary decision is made within and takes into account the applicable legal 
standards. An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court's decision goes outside 
the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations.  
 
3.  
 
Determination of the correct legal standard raises a question of law subject to de 
novo appellate review.  
 
2 
 
4. 
 
The district judge who presided over the initial custody determination in this case 
employed the correct best interests of the child legal standard.  
 
5. 
 
Judges who preside over child custody disputes must differentiate between a 
parent's religious beliefs on the one hand and religiously motivated actions or conduct 
with implications for the paramount best interests of the child on the other. Disapproval 
of mere belief or nonbelief cannot be a consideration in a custody determination, but 
consideration of religiously motivated behavior with an impact on the child's welfare 
cannot be ignored. It is one of the many relevant factors that must be part of the holistic 
custody calculus required under Kansas law.   
 
6. 
 
In a child custody dispute between parents, a judge may not speculate about 
behavior that a parent's religious beliefs may motivate in the future. 
 
7.  
 
In a child custody dispute between parents, a court may not weigh the merit of one 
parent's religious belief or lack of belief against the other's. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 44 Kan. App. 2d 235, 235 P.3d 547 (2010). 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JEFF GOERING, judge. Opinion filed August 5, 2011. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.   
 
Linus L. Baker, of Stilwell, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant. 
 
Rebecca Mann, of Young, Bogle, McCausland, Wells & Blanchard, P.A., of Wichita, argued the 
cause and was on the briefs for appellee.   
 
3 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  This appeal arising out of an initial residential custody determination 
requires this court to revisit the potential for tension between a parent's constitutionally 
protected right to free exercise of religion and the judicial system's responsibility to 
further the best interests of the child.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
The subject of this dispute, J.D.H., was 4 years old when his mother, Monica 
Harrison, filed a paternity action in Wichita. The district court entered a temporary order 
granting Monica primary residential custody of J.D.H. In response to the paternity action, 
father Adiel Tauheed admitted paternity and sought primary residential custody of his 
son.   
 
 
The district court entered an Order for Limited Case Management, and attorney 
David N. Johnson was appointed as the case manager. He prepared two comprehensive 
reports and made recommendations based on interviews he had conducted with the 
parties and others connected with J.D.H., including extended family members, day care 
workers, teachers, and counselors.  
 
 
Johnson's first report recommended that the parties share joint legal custody of 
J.D.H. and that Monica be designated J.D.H.'s primary residential parent, with specific 
parenting time awarded to Adiel.  Johnson emphasized: "Both parties appear to be very 
educated, reasonable, responsible, loving parents to [J.D.H.]. I have no doubt [J.D.H.] 
would thrive in the primary residential custody of either parent." Johnson concluded: 
 
"Monica has been [J.D.H.'s] primary (but certainly not exclusive) caretaker throughout 
his five (5)-year lifetime to date. With all of the statutory factors and other considerations 
4 
 
being relatively equal . . . the deciding factor in this case comes down to which 
arrangement would most closely mirror the status quo. Although Adiel presents plausible 
arguments and supporting facts in his case for primary residential custody, there 
ultimately is no compelling reason to significantly change the arrangement that has 
existed all of [J.D.H.'s] life."  
 
 
Johnson's second report also recommended that Monica be designated J.D.H.'s 
primary residential parent with specific parenting time awarded to Adiel. Before the 
second report, Adiel reported concerns regarding J.D.H.'s emotional wellbeing, 
schooling, and health and hygiene. He also reported an incident in which Monica left 
J.D.H. unattended. Monica's religious beliefs and practices as a Jehovah's Witness also 
arose as a potential issue. Johnson's report concluded: 
 
"[T]here are a number of questions/concerns that made it difficult to arrive at a 
conclusion that would best serve [J.D.H.'s] interests in this updated Recommendation. 
Reasonably sound arguments can be made for either parent to be designated as having 
primary residential custody. Ultimately, the burden of proof is that a preponderance of 
the 'evidence' must favor a change in the existing primary residential placement. I am 
concluding that there is not a preponderance of evidence to establish that a change in the 
primary placement of [J.D.H.] with his mother should occur at this time."   
 
Adiel objected to Johnson's recommendation, arguing that he should be awarded primary 
residential custody, and the parties proceeded to bench trial on that issue. 
 
 
In opening statement, Monica's counsel emphasized that she had been J.D.H.'s 
primary caregiver his whole life, while Adiel's counsel stressed that Adiel had been an 
actively involved father. Counsel for Adiel also asserted that Monica's religious teachings 
were harming J.D.H and that Monica was alienating J.D.H from Adiel.   
 
 
Monica testified that Adiel was a good father but that he had not had extended 
parenting time with J.D.H. since J.D.H. was 3 years old. She said that she spoke very 
5 
 
highly of Adiel in J.D.H.'s presence. Monica expressed her belief that she should 
continue to have primary residential custody because J.D.H. had been with her from the 
beginning; was grounded and excelling in school; and was happy with his religious 
activities. Monica admitted to having left J.D.H. at home alone at night on at least two 
occasions, with a police report filed in one instance. She also admitted to representing on 
one of J.D.H.'s school forms that a man was his stepfather when he was not.   
 
 
During Monica's cross-examination, her counsel objected to questions about her 
religious beliefs. The district court permitted the questions as "fair cross." Monica 
testified that she was a member of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of the 
Jehovah's Witness religion. Her faith, she said, prohibits the celebration of certain events, 
such as holidays and birthdays, as well as saluting the flag, saying the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and serving in the military. Certain extracurricular activities, such as sports, 
also are not encouraged. Monica testified that J.D.H. was not involved in school-related 
extracurricular activities. She also testified that her faith discouraged "unwholesome 
relationships," which are distractions that deter a believer from doing what he or she is 
supposed to be doing. Relationships with some who are not Jehovah's Witnesses qualify 
as unwholesome associations. According to Monica's faith, all who reject Jehovah will be 
annihilated. She also testified about her religious practice of going door-to-door 
"witnessing" with J.D.H. and said that Adiel had been accommodating about her beliefs, 
as well as the religious training J.D.H. was receiving from her. 
 
 
Monica also responded to a hypothetical scenario posed on cross-examination, 
saying that she would not consent to a blood transfusion even if it were necessary to save 
J.D.H.'s life. However, she also testified that, if such circumstances arose, she would talk 
to Adiel.    
 
 
Monica's trial testimony also focused on her dispute with Adiel over a "bring your 
mentor" pizza party at J.D.H.'s school. Monica maintained that it was not a "bring your 
6 
 
father" party but admitted that she did not contact Adiel to tell him about it. She and 
Adiel also differed on which school J.D.H. should attend. Monica enrolled J.D.H. in a 
school other than the one to which he ordinarily would have been assigned, even though 
its academic rating was lower, because it was closer to her work and she believed it was a 
better fit for J.D.H. Adiel was not informed of the change until Monica dropped J.D.H. 
off for his first day.   
 
 
Monica also testified about a 2001 incident in which she alleged that Adiel pushed 
her, resulting in the filing of a police report. She also expressed her fear at one point in 
time that Adiel would try to kidnap J.D.H., because Adiel had told her that he was not 
going to bring J.D.H. back. Monica also expressed concern that Adiel did not believe that 
all persons are equal.  
 
Monica's mother testified, describing Monica as a very good parent and the 
relationship between Monica and J.D.H. as very close. She also testified about one 
incident in which Monica left J.D.H. alone, believing that her husband was coming home. 
Monica's mother reinforced Monica's testimony that Jehovah's Witnesses are not 
supposed to have relationships with unbelievers.   
 
Sonya Atencio, a friend of Monica's who provides day care for J.D.H., also 
testified. She described J.D.H. as a "wonderful kid" who never struggled and was not 
unkempt or dirty while in her care.   
 
 
Shane Vondracek, J.D.H.'s teacher at the time of trial, gave testimony via a 
deposition. Vondracek had participated in a parent-teacher conference with Monica in 
person and Adiel on the telephone. She also had participated in another telephone 
conversation with Adiel in which she told him about the pizza party designed to involve 
male role models. According to Vondracek, Adiel told her he would like to attend but 
could not because of short notice. Vondracek also testified that J.D.H. had not acted in a 
7 
 
manner causing concern, despite his inability to participate in birthday celebrations at 
school. She also testified that J.D.H. did not misbehave and did not come to school 
unkempt. Vondracek said that J.D.H. showed no signs of future failure in school and that 
curriculum in various schools was standardized across the district.   
 
Adiel testified that he is married and works at an engineering firm in the Kansas 
City area, where he lives. When he moved to California for school at Stanford shortly 
after J.D.H. was born, he had hoped that Monica and J.D.H. would also move to 
California. They did not. Adiel set up a fund to support J.D.H. while he was out of state. 
Adiel admitted that he had not applied to any schools in Kansas and had not applied for 
any jobs in Wichita after he finished school. 
 
 
Adiel further testified that there were periods of time when it had been difficult for 
him to have parenting time, including when Monica was arguing that Adiel was going to 
kidnap J.D.H. Adiel stated that he would never take J.D.H. away from Monica. Adiel also 
discussed Monica's unilateral decision making, including her decision to send J.D.H. to a 
different school. He also discussed the pizza party, which he said he did not learn about 
until the night before the event. Adiel testified that J.D.H. told him on the telephone that 
he knew he would not be there because he was busy with a new baby and work, which 
made Adiel feel like his son thought he had abandoned him. Adiel recorded this 
conversation with J.D.H., as well as other conversations between them.   
 
 
Adiel also expressed concern over behavioral changes that he said he had observed 
in J.D.H. He took J.D.H. to see a professional for therapy and did not discuss the 
professional's report with Monica. Adiel also was concerned that J.D.H. had called other 
men in Monica's life "dad" and had begun calling him "Adiel." Adiel expressed concern 
that Monica was not looking after J.D.H.'s health and diet properly. Adiel stated that 
J.D.H. told him he was becoming frustrated with his mom and wanted to run away. Adiel 
8 
 
acknowledged that J.D.H.'s current teacher said he was a happy kid and well adjusted in 
school.   
 
 
Adiel testified that he had never heard Monica say that she would not allow a 
blood transfusion even if it were necessary to save J.D.H.'s life. Adiel stated that he 
would consent to any treatment. He also testified that he has not interfered with J.D.H.'s 
religious beliefs, even though he believed Monica's religious practices and what she was 
teaching J.D.H. were alienating J.D.H. from him. Adiel is a Muslim. 
  
Meighan Peifer, an early childhood educator, testified regarding time J.D.H. spent 
in her educational facility in Kansas City, where J.D.H. attended when he was in Kansas 
City with his father. Peifer described certain incidents with J.D.H. as "odd." In one, 
J.D.H. "froze" during a school performance. In the other, J.D.H. was unresponsive when 
another student asked J.D.H. to come to his house. She said that J.D.H. was shaking and 
saying, "[N]o, my mom said no, that it was wrong," when there was a school parade 
coinciding with the Fourth of July. Peifer expressed concern that J.D.H. was not 
developing personal autonomy, although all of his development in other areas was on 
target for his age. She said she had referred the family to a child psychiatrist because 
"something was off" for J.D.H. Peifer described Adiel as a very involved parent, and she 
said she believed it was very important that J.D.H. be able to make his own choices about 
religious practices or "emotionally, it is [going to] scar him for life."   
 
 
Adiel's mother testified about the closeness of her son's relationship with her 
grandson. She described Adiel as an excellent and caring dad and discussed the financial 
support Adiel had given to Monica while Adiel was away at school. She also testified 
about two incidents in which J.D.H. grew upset while with her. At a birthday celebration 
for his grandfather, J.D.H. stated "I broke my promise" not to celebrate birthdays. 
Another time, when at his uncle's house, J.D.H. refused to go inside because there was a 
flag outside of the door, which he described as an "idol." She further testified that Adiel 
9 
 
had been excluded from parenting decisions but had been allowed consistent parenting 
time since 2006. She also testified that she believed J.D.H. should have been placed in a 
school with higher academic ratings.   
 
 
Adiel's father also testified about Adiel and J.D.H., as well as J.D.H.'s school. His 
testimony was consistent with that of Adiel's mother. He also said that he believed 
Monica's religious practices had created greater tension in the bond between Adiel and 
J.D.H.   
 
 
Adiel's wife also testified regarding the pizza party issue. Her testimony on this 
point was consistent with her husband's. She said J.D.H.'s teacher had not mentioned the 
pizza party, although she did seek Adiel's participation in a mentoring program.   
 
 
Case Manager Johnson testified about his recommendation. Before Johnson's 
testimony began, Adiel's counsel objected, arguing that Johnson's reports were hearsay 
and that Johnson was acting as "judge junior." There was no objection to the evidentiary 
standard Johnson invoked in arriving at his recommendations. The district judge 
permitted Johnson to testify and admitted Johnson's reports into evidence.   
 
 
Johnson testified that he met with Adiel and Monica and spoke over the telephone 
with several witnesses. Johnson's testimony also included information from a report by 
the psychologist who saw J.D.H. after the recommendation by Peifer. The report stated 
that Monica's family dynamic was unhealthy for J.D.H. and that much of his spiritual 
teaching involved the end of times and what would happen to people who did not follow 
Jehovah's Witness' teachings. Johnson testified that the information in the psychologist's 
report was of concern. He also said that specific aspects of the report indicated that 
J.D.H. was being alienated from his father, but that the report also indicated J.D.H. still 
had a good bond with his father and stepmother. Johnson further explained that he was 
concerned about separation of church and state when he arrived at his recommendation.   
10 
 
 
 
Ultimately, Johnson said that he considered the impact "these things [are] having 
on the best interests of the child." He described the residential custody decision as a close 
call, and he said the information revealed at trial about Monica's unwillingness to consent 
to a blood transfusion for J.D.H. was concerning—potentially concerning enough to 
cause him to change his recommendation. Johnson also said it disturbed him to learn that 
Monica had left J.D.H. alone on more than the one occasion Johnson already knew about. 
 
 
In regard to alienation, Johnson testified that Monica and Adiel were better than 
most parents involved in custody disputes and that J.D.H. had bonded with both parents. 
Johnson concluded that the "main reason" for his recommendation that Monica be the 
primary residential parent was that she had been the "primary caretaker" and "that there 
weren't enough compelling reasons to justify a change—making a recommendation for a 
change in the existing status quo."   
 
 
Both parties filed post-trial briefs in the district court, focusing primarily on what 
role, if any, Monica's religious beliefs and practices should play in the court's decision. 
 
 
In his memorandum decision, the district judge first noted:  "This has been a 
difficult case for the Court. Both parents are capable and loving parents, and both 
naturally want to be the primary residential custodian for [J.D.H.]." He described the 
situation as ideal for shared custody, not possible because of the parties' geographic 
distance from one another. He repeatedly referenced his understanding that he should not 
consider Monica's religious beliefs and practices in his decision, but made clear that a 
parent could not be permitted to cloak alienation of the other parent in religion's 
protective garb. He ultimately concluded:  "[J.D.H.] is well adjusted to his current living 
arrangements, and although the Father has raised legitimate concerns, the Court has 
concluded that it is in [J.D.H.'s] best interests to retain primary residential custody with 
the Mother."   
11 
 
 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adiel argued that the district judge applied the 
wrong legal standard, treating this action as though it concerned modification of a prior 
child custody order rather than one seeking an initial custody determination. Adiel also 
argued generally that the district judge failed to give any negative impact on J.D.H. from 
Monica's religious practices due consideration. In particular, he argued that the district 
judge erred by refusing to consider Monica's attitude about potential necessary medical 
treatment of J.D.H., which would violate her religious beliefs. Monica responded that 
Adiel had failed to preserve his challenge to the legal standard applied, that the district 
judge followed a proper best interests of the child standard, and that Kansas precedent 
supported the district judge's reluctance to evaluate her religious beliefs and practices. 
 
 
A divided panel of our Court of Appeals affirmed. Harrison v. Tauheed, 44 Kan. 
App. 2d 235, 235 P.3d 547 (2010). Judge Michael B. Buser, writing for himself and 
Judge G. Joseph Pierron, concluded that the district judge had applied the correct legal 
standard to the evidence and that "a parent's religious beliefs and practices may not be 
considered by the trial court as a basis to deprive that parent of custody unless there is a 
showing of actual harm to the health or welfare of the child caused by those religious 
beliefs and practices." Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 236. Judge Nancy L. Caplinger (now 
Justice Moritz) dissented, saying the district judge failed to "fully and consistently" apply 
the best interests of the child standard. Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 260 (Moritz, J., 
dissenting). She also would not have required a showing of "actual harm to the health or 
welfare of the child" before making a parent's religious practices one of the factors to be 
weighed in arriving at a custody determination based on the child's best interests. 
Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 263 (Moritz, J., dissenting). To the extent one or the other 
parent's religious views and practices "impact upon the child's best interests," she wrote, 
"they are admissible and should be considered." Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 264.  
 
 
We granted Adiel's petition for review. 
12 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Legal Standard Used in the District Court 
 
 
This court has repeatedly held that  
 
"'[w]hen the custody issue lies only between the parents, the paramount 
consideration of the court is the welfare and best interests of the child. The trial court is in 
the best position to make the inquiry and determination, and in the absence of abuse of 
sound judicial discretion, its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations 
omitted.]'" In re Marriage of Rayman, 273 Kan. 996, 999, 47 P.3d 412 (2002) (quoting In 
re Marriage of Whipp, 265 Kan. 500, 506, 962 P.2d 1058 [1998]). 
 
See also K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3) (mandating best interests standard, taking into account "all 
relevant factors"). Under an abuse of discretion standard, "the trial court's decision is 
protected if reasonable persons could differ upon the propriety of the decision as long as 
the discretionary decision is made within and takes into account the applicable legal 
standards . . . . [A]n abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court's decision goes 
outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations." State v. 
Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 340, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007) (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 
36-38, 127 P.3d 986 [2006]); see State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755-56, 234 P.3d 1 
(2010). Determination of the correct legal standard raises a question of law subject to de 
novo appellate review. See In re M.F., 290 Kan. 142, 150, 225 P.3d 1177 (2010) (citing 
State v. Moore, 287 Kan. 121, 135, 194 P.3d 18 [2008]).  
 
 
Adiel argues that district judge's memorandum decision shows that the judge 
followed Johnson into error by applying an incorrect legal standard to evaluate the 
evidence before him. In his view, first Johnson and then the district judge demanded that 
he demonstrate a compelling reason to have J.D.H.'s living arrangement changed. This 
13 
 
pattern of analysis, Adiel asserts, improperly allocated to him "a burden of proof to alter 
the status quo" or forced him to overcome a presumption or "super factor" in favor of 
residential custody remaining with Monica. See K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(C):  
 
 
"Neither parent shall be considered to have a vested interest in the custody or 
residency of any child as against the other parent, regardless of the age of the child, and 
there shall be no presumption or that it is in the best interests of any infant or young child 
to give custody or residency to the mother."   
 
Although such a pattern may govern when a change in custodial status is sought, 
see K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(2) (court may change any prior order of custody, residency, 
visitation, parenting time when material change of circumstances shown), it does 
not govern an initial custody determination under K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B). 
  
 
Monica reads the district judge's memorandum decision differently. She believes 
that the district judge properly applied the best interests of the child standard pursuant to 
K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B), and she emphasizes that the statute's list of factors is not 
exclusive. Monica argues that the district judge was forced to "look outside the box for a 
reason to appoint one party over the other as residential custodian," and he made a legally 
legitimate choice to place persuasive weight on the living arrangement that had existed 
for all of J.D.H.'s life.    
 
 
The majority of the Court of Appeals panel first ruled that Adiel failed to raise this 
issue before the district court. It nevertheless addressed the merits, concluding: 
  
 
"Our review of the trial court's memorandum decision convinces us the correct 
legal standard and statutory factors were applied in this case. In particular, in its 
'Summary of the Court's ruling,' the trial court explicitly stated that after weighing the 
evidence it had reached a conclusion to award Monica residential custody based on 
'[J.D.H.'s] best interests.'" Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 241. 
14 
 
 
The majority determined that "the trial court explicitly identified the proper statutory 
factors to be considered" in determining the best interests of the child. Harrison, 44 Kan. 
App. 2d at 241. The district judge's use of the phrase "compelling reason" was "never 
made in the context of referencing a legal standard," but instead merely to reference "the 
weight of the evidence in favor of maintaining the existing residency arrangement." 
Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 241-42. Moreover, there was "no showing the trial court 
relied on Johnson for any legal standard." Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 243.   
 
 
Judge Caplinger dissented on the merits of this issue, accepting Adiel's argument 
that the district court erred by demanding proof of a "compelling reason" to change 
residential custody. Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 261-62. She would have remanded the 
case to the district court "with instructions to consistently apply the 'best interests of the 
child' standard to this initial custody determination." Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 262. 
 
 
We are satisfied that this issue has been adequately preserved for appellate review. 
The question of whether the district judge applied the correct legal standard in evaluating 
the evidence did not fully surface until the filing of his memorandum decision. Adiel then 
took advantage of his appeal to the Court of Appeals as a timely opportunity to raise it. 
We granted an unlimited review of the matter, which means we are free to examine any 
issue that was before the Court of Appeals. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(g)(1) (2010 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 68).   
 
 
Turning to the merits, the parties do not dispute that the best interests of the child 
must control a district judge's initial custody determination. See K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3); 
see In re Marriage of Rayman, 273 Kan. at 999; Jensen v. Runft, 252 Kan. 76, Syl. ¶ 2, 
843 P.2d 191 (1992). Further, the parties have not alleged a lack of substantial competent 
evidence to support the district judge's factual assessment. The only question, therefore, 
15 
 
is whether the district court properly employed a best interests of the child analysis, upon 
which all agree.   
 
 
K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B) provides a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered 
by a district court in determining the best interests of the child:  
 
"(i) The length of time that the child has been under the actual care and control of any 
person other than a parent and the circumstances relating thereto;  
"(ii) the desires of the child's parents as to custody or residency;  
"(iii) the desires of the child as to the child's custody or residency;  
"(iv) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings and any 
other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests;  
"(v) the child's adjustment to the child's home, school and community;  
"(vi) the willingness and ability of each parent to respect and appreciate the bond 
between the child and the other parent and to allow for a continuing relationship 
between the child and the other parent;  
"(vii) evidence of spousal abuse;  
"(viii) whether a parent is subject to the registration requirements of the Kansas 
offender registration act, K.S.A. 22-4901, et seq., and amendments thereto, or any 
similar act in any other state, or under military or federal law;  
"(ix) whether a parent has been convicted of abuse of a child, K.S.A. 21-3609, and 
amendments thereto;  
"(x) whether a parent is residing with an individual who is subject to registration 
requirements of the Kansas offender registration act, K.S.A. 22-4901, et seq., and 
amendments thereto, or any similar act in any other state, or under military or federal 
law; and  
"(xi) whether a parent is residing with an individual who has been convicted of abuse 
of a child, K.S.A. 21-3609, and amendments thereto." 
 
 
We must carefully review the language the district judge used in his memorandum 
decision to decide whether he applied the required legal standard, including these factors 
and others merited by the case. The district judge's memorandum decision discusses at 
16 
 
least (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) among the statutory factors, and his summary of his 
ruling explicitly invokes best interests of the child.  
 
 
We note that the judge acknowledged Adiel's allegation of alienation unrelated to 
Monica's religious practices, specifically her failure to communicate on school-related 
functions, which left Adiel unable to participate. The judge also explicitly recognized and 
evaluated the evidence concerning Adiel's accusation that Monica left J.D.H. home alone. 
Regarding the latter, the judge stated:  "While these events should not be minimized 
(whether it was one occurrence or two, it was one or two too many), they do appear to be 
isolated occurrences. Taking into account consideration [of] the bigger picture, there is no 
evidence that [J.D.H.] is suffering from neglect." Although Adiel also had alleged poor 
hygiene, the district judge found that photographs submitted by Adiel depicted the 
"normal dirt and grime that children of [J.D.H.'s] age attract during regular play" and that 
there was "no evidence that [J.D.H.'s] hygiene was of concern to his teachers."   
 
 
The judge next considered the "[i]nteraction of the child with his parents and the 
willingness of each parent to respect the bond between the child and the other parent." He 
concluded:  "He gets along well with both parents, and is well bonded to both parents." 
The judge agreed with Johnson's observation that J.D.H. "'would thrive in the primary 
residential custody of either parent.'"  
 
 
The judge then addressed "other acts of alienation," namely Adiel's allegation that 
Monica did not keep him informed of important school events. The judge stated:  "It is 
clear from the evidence presented at trial that Mother is less concerned about involving 
Father in events important to [J.D.H.] than she should be" and that "[t]he effort by one 
parent to undermine a child's relationship to the other parent can form the basis for a 
change of custody." He concluded, however, that Monica had not "intentionally" tried to 
harm Adiel's relationship with J.D.H. and that, in fact, J.D.H. and Adiel have a "healthy 
relationship."   
17 
 
 
 
The judge also considered the desires of the parents and J.D.H., stating that "[b]oth 
parents desire to be the residential custodian" and "[J.D.H.] seems comfortable with both 
parents."   
 
 
The judge also "placed great weight" on the "[l]ength of time [J.D.H.] has spent 
with each parent and his adjustment to his home, school and community." He determined 
that "Mother has been [J.D.H.'s] primary residential custodian since birth" and that J.D.H. 
was "well adjusted" and a "very successful student." Although the length of time a child 
has spent with one of his or her parents is not listed in the statute, it is certainly an 
appropriate consideration. See La Grone v. La Grone, 238 Kan. 630, 633, 713 P.2d 474 
(1986) (one factor: which parent has had actual care, custody of child during child's 
lifetime).   
 
 
Finally, the judge noted:  "Once those factors related to religion are removed from 
this case, what is left is a very bright little boy who is well adjusted to his current living 
environment." He thus reached the same conclusion Johnson had reached in his written 
reports, that is, that residential custody should remain with Monica.  
 
 
The district judge's choice to "place great weight" on the length of time J.D.H. had 
spent with each parent and his adjustment to his home, school, and community was 
selected as part of application of the correct legal standard and was not an abuse of 
discretion for deviation from that standard. Placing "great weight" on the length of time a 
child has spent living with a parent as part of a court's analysis of the best interests of the 
child was different from treating a parent as though he or she has a "vested interest in the 
custody or residency" of that child, which would have been impermissible pursuant to 
K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(C). Further, as the Court of Appeals majority noted, the judge's 
decision did not reference K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(2)(A), the statute governing modification of 
a prior custody order, and the district court's decision did not use the term "material 
18 
 
change of circumstances." Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 242. Rather, the judge plainly 
arrived at his ultimate decision on residential custody by exploring what would best serve 
J.D.H.'s best interests. There is no reversible error on this issue.  
 
Propriety of Consideration of Mother's Religious Beliefs and Practices 
 
 
Again, failure to apply the correct legal standard is an abuse of discretion. See 
Gonzalez, 290 Kan. at 755-56. Also, we have plenary review to determine whether a legal 
standard was correct. See In re M.F., 290 Kan. at 150; Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 
283 Kan. 911, 916, 157 P.3d 1109 (2007).    
  
 
Adiel argues that "[t]he trial court erred in refusing to consider all the evidence 
related to the negative impact upon [J.D.H.] that was caused by Monica Harrison's 
religious beliefs and practices." Although "[b]y itself, the mother's religion and her 
beliefs are beyond the scope of the trial court's inquiry," he asserts that it is proper for a 
district court to consider "evidence of the negative impact upon the child and the negative 
impact to the relationship with the parent . . . even if it is caused by religious beliefs and 
practices." Adiel further argues that Monica's "medical philosophy [opposing blood 
transfusions] towards [J.D.H.] is not in his best interests." Adiel's position is that "[t]rial 
courts are not prohibited under the best interest analysis from considering the medical 
philosophies of a parent as it bears upon future medical treatment." According to Adiel, 
the majority of the Court of Appeals improperly concluded that "there must be a requisite 
showing of 'actual harm'" before religious beliefs and practices can be considered in 
determining the best interests of the child.   
 
 
Monica responds that the district court "correctly noted that Kansas case law 
prohibited the Court from considering these [religious] factor[s] in determining custody" 
and that "[t]he Court of Appeals correctly restated and applied the legal standard for use 
of religious testimony in a 'best interests' hearing."   
19 
 
 
 
Best interests of the child analysis is complicated when a parent's rights may 
conflict. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 230 Kan. 57, 62-63, 631 P.2d 632 (1981), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, as recognized by In re J.A.H., 285 Kan. 375, 172 P.3d 1 (2007); 
In re Armentrout, 207 Kan. 366, 370, 485 P.2d 183 (1971). Further, one parent's rights 
may conflict with the rights of the other parent. Although the best interests of the child 
are always to remain the paramount consideration of the court in making a custody 
determination, we have explained that "[t]he parents' rights cannot be disregarded, . . . 
and the child's best interests may be considered in conjunction with the parents' rights." 
In re Cooper, 230 Kan. 57, 62, 631 P.2d 632 (1981) (citing In re Armentrout, 207 Kan. 
366, 370, 485 P.2d 183 [1971]; Lennon v. State, 193 Kan. 685, 691, 396 P.2d 290 
[1964]).  
 
"A parent's right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of his 
or her child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." In 
re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 166, 159 P.3d 974 (2007) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 65-66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 [2000]; Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 
146, 152, 630 P.2d 1121 [1981], cert. denied 455 U.S. 919 [1982]). Further, all 
individuals in Kansas have the right to religious freedom, protected by both the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and the Kansas Bill of 
Rights. Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7; Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990) (citing Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 [1940]).   
 
 
Custody cases implicating questions of religious belief and practice require a 
delicate balancing of the rights of each parent and the welfare of the child whose custody 
is in question. Prior cases from this court, Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 602 P.2d 1279 
(1979), Sinclair v. Sinclair, 204 Kan. 240, 461 P.2d 750 (1969), Jackson v. Jackson, 181 
Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705 (1957), and have provided some guidance to the lower courts on 
20 
 
this subject, yet additional clarification is needed to enable review of the district judge's 
performance here.   
 
 
In Jackson, the father moved for a change in custody, which was granted by the 
district court. Mother appealed, arguing that "'the real, underlying reason for depriving 
her of custody was her membership in Jehovah's Witnesses and training the children in 
that faith'" and that the "'"emotional instability" argument against her . . . was a mere 
subterfuge.'" Jackson, 181 Kan. at 4. This court concluded that the "question of religion   
. . . permeates the record." Jackson, 181 Kan. at 5. We noted that "[t]he evidence in trial 
was replete with testimony and exhibits as to the tenets of Jehovah's Witnesses and the 
possible effect of such beliefs upon the children." Jackson, 181 Kan. at 5. Thus the "only 
question upon this appeal is whether or not the court abused its discretion by allowing the 
matter of religion to become an integral part of its determination of this custody matter." 
Jackson, 181 Kan. at 8  
 
 
Jackson held that "the court abused its discretion in allowing the matter of religion 
to become an integral part of its decision to change custody," that "the question of 
religion cannot be regarded by the court in determining the care, custody and control of 
minor children . . . and in a dispute relating to custody, religious views afford no ground 
for depriving a parent of custody who is otherwise qualified," and that "[r]eligious 
freedom, as guaranteed by our Constitution, should be faithfully upheld, and religious 
teachings to the children . . .  regardless of how obnoxious the same might be to the Court 
. . .  should not and must not be considered as basis of making child custody orders." 
(Emphases added.) Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 6.  
 
 
Justice Robert Price, joined by Justice William Wertz, dissented, arguing: 
 
"If a divorced parent's extreme religious views and activities are such as to result in 
emotional instability in such parent, then most certainly I feel that a trial court has not 
21 
 
only the right, but the duty, to take such fact into consideration in the determination of 
what appears to be the welfare and best interests of the child." Jackson, 181 Kan. at 12. 
 
 
In Sinclair, the father was awarded custody of the children in a divorce action and 
the mother appealed. 204 Kan. at 241. Mother had become a Jehovah's Witness and "had 
become so obsessed with her religious beliefs and activities that she completely neglected 
her duties and a wife and mother," including moving away from the home and 
maintaining little contact with her family. Sinclair, 204 Kan. at 241-42. Mother argued 
that the district court's decision was "based solely on the ground of religion, which is 
impermissible." Sinclair, 204 Kan. at 244. This court distinguished Jackson, stating: 
 
"The import of our holding in Jackson was that religious views alone afford no ground 
for depriving custody to a parent who is otherwise qualified. Here, the religious beliefs of 
[Mother] precipitated a course of action on her part of utter disregard and indifference to 
her children and their activities." (Emphases added.) Sinclair, 204 Kan. at 244.  
 
The court stressed that "[t]he paramount consideration of the court in custody cases 
between parents is always the welfare and best interests of the children" and concluded 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the father. 
Sinclair, 204 Kan. at 244. 
 
 
In Beebe, father filed a habeas corpus action seeking custody of his son. Mother, 
characterized by the district court as a "'non-secretarian religious sermonizer,'" had been 
granted custody in an Arizona divorce decree, but the Kansas district court determined 
that there had been a change in circumstances necessitating a switch in custody to father. 
Beebe, 226 Kan. at 597, 601.   
 
 
On appeal, this court first noted that the absence of an emergency meant that the 
courts of Arizona had continuing jurisdiction and that the Kansas courts should not have 
intervened. Beebe, 226 Kan. at 599. However, we addressed the merits, "assuming that 
22 
 
jurisdiction was properly exercised." Beebe, 226 Kan. at 601. Regarding the district 
court's finding that the child was not receiving proper medical attention in Mexico, where 
he and mother were living part of the time, this court noted that the child had emerged 
from that period healthy. Beebe, 226 Kan. at 602.   
 
"[Mother] was not questioned as to her religious beliefs concerning medical treatment, 
and the evidence of her beliefs is sparse. Assuming, however, that her religion does 
discourage or prohibit the use of drugs or medications, or treatment by physicians, is that 
a valid reason to change custody? Christian Science, a denomination with wide 
membership, has similar teachings; it discourages as unnecessary the use of drugs or 
treatment by physicians; yet though such beliefs may be 'unorthodox' to the trial judge, 
they are constitutionally protected and form no basis for denying or changing custody." 
(Emphasis added.) Beebe, 226 Kan. at 602.  
 
The court then quoted from Jackson and concluded that mother's custody should not have 
been terminated. Beebe, 226 Kan. at 602-03.   
 
 
Then Chief Justice Alfred Schroeder dissented, joined by Justices Alex Fromme 
and Kay McFarland. Beebe, 226 Kan. at 603-608. He argued:  "The question in this case 
goes beyond religious freedom. Here the trial court was concerned that appellant's 
religious beliefs had led to neglect of [the child's] health." Beebe, 226 Kan. at 606. Chief 
Justice Schroeder then concluded:  "If the religious beliefs of a parent threatened a child's 
health or well-being, or would lead to neglect of the child, the adverse effects upon the 
child may be considered in making a change of custody." Because the "trial court clearly 
concerned itself with the appellant's religion as it affected [the child's] health and 
education, it cannot be said the trial court abused its . . . discretion." Beebe, 226 Kan. at 
606-07.  
 
 
The majority of the Court of Appeals panel in this case reviewed these Kansas 
cases and believed they demonstrate that Kansas courts have distinguished between 
23 
 
"State disapproval of religion, which is improper under our constitution, and State 
disapproval of actual harm suffered by children as a result of religious beliefs and 
practices." Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 248. The majority thus held that Kansas law 
prohibits a parent's religious beliefs and practices from being considered in a custody 
determination, absent a threshold showing of actual harm to the health or welfare of the 
child caused by those religious beliefs and practices. Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 248.   
 
 
Judge Caplinger's dissent, in contrast, argued that Kansas precedent does not 
require a threshold showing of "actual harm"; "impact" on the best interests of the child is 
enough. Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 264. Still, Judge Caplinger stated that courts must 
"be mindful" not to make a parent's religious beliefs and practices the "sole deciding 
factor" and "be mindful" of each parent's two constitutional rights—freedom to exercise 
care, custody, and control of his or her child and freedom to exercise his or her religion 
without government interference. Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 267.   
 
We are of the view that neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion 
from the Court of Appeals got the standard for consideration of a parent's religion in child 
custody proceedings completely correct, although each has correct elements and any 
confusion is understandable. In Jackson, some of this court's language suggested a bright-
line rule:  religious beliefs and practices could play no role in custody determinations. 
181 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 5, and 6. In Sinclair, however, this court blurred the line, instead 
saying Jackson held that "religious views alone afford[ed] no ground for depriving 
custody to a parent who [was] otherwise qualified." (Emphasis added.) 204 Kan. at 244. 
This court also emphasized in Sinclair that the "paramount consideration" for custody 
always remains the best interests of the child. 204 Kan. at 244. Beebe also stressed that 
religious belief alone, including belief regarding the propriety of specific medical 
treatment, is "constitutionally protected and [can] form no basis for denying or changing 
custody." 226 Kan. at 602.   
 
24 
 
The majority of the Court of Appeals apparently was led to its actual harm 
threshold because Sinclair hinged on the behavioral change the mother's religious beliefs 
"precipitated," i.e., "'utter disregard and indifference'" to her children. Harrison, 44 Kan. 
App. 2d at 248. But, as Judge Caplinger observed, the court in Sinclair "did not restrict 
the trial court's consideration to such egregious circumstances." Harrison, 44 Kan. App. 
2d at 263. 
 
Instead, what we discern in our previous cases, including Sinclair, is an attempt to 
differentiate between religious beliefs on the one hand and religiously motivated actions 
or conduct with implications for the paramount best interests of the child on the other. 
Disapproval of mere belief or nonbelief cannot be a consideration in a custody 
determination—judges are not trained to mediate theological disputes. Yet consideration 
of religiously motivated behavior with an impact on a child's welfare cannot be ignored. 
It is one of the many relevant factors that must be part of the holistic custody calculus 
required under Kansas law. See K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B) ("In determining the issue of 
child custody, residency and parenting time, the court shall consider all relevant 
factors.").   
 
 
With that as theorem, we move to corollaries. Just as mere religious beliefs cannot 
be solely determinative of custody, a court may not speculate about behavior that 
religious beliefs may motivate in the future. See Beebe, 226 Kan. at 602; Sinclair, 204 
Kan. at 244. A court also may not weigh the merit of one parent's religious belief or lack 
of belief against the other's. Nothing in law school or practice in any setting qualifies a 
judge for this task, and any judicial effort to tackle it is far too likely to lead to the 
substantial impairment of the free exercise of religion our federal and state constitutional 
provisions were designed to avoid. Courts must be vigilant to avoid invidious 
discrimination against religious beliefs or practices merely because they seem 
unconventional. The consideration of religiously motivated actions as a part of holistic 
evaluation of the best interests of the child, while excluding consideration of religious 
25 
 
beliefs, strikes an appropriate balance among the free exercise rights of each parent; the 
right of each parent to the care, custody, and control of his or her child; and the welfare of 
the child. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes [or prescribes] conduct that his 
religion prescribes [or proscribes].' [Citation omitted.]"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 233-34, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972) ("[T]he power of the parent, even 
when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that 
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child."); but see Shulman, 
What Yoder Wrought: Religious Disparagement, Parental Alienation and the Best 
Interests of the Child, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 173, 205-08 (2008); Note, Free Exercise Claims in 
Custody Battles: Is Heightened Scrutiny Required Post-Smith?, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 716, 
734-36, 740-41 (2008) (discussing the applicability of the concept of hybrid rights to 
child custody determinations). 
 
 
Our research into how our sister states have dealt with the doctrinal and emotional 
tension inherent when religion and child custody become intertwined satisfies us that the 
clear distinction we draw today between beliefs and action is endorsed by other courts. 
See 124 A.L.R.5th 203, § 2[a] ("While it would presumably be possible to leave the 
religious factor entirely out of consideration, at least formally, most of the courts have 
taken the view that while they will adopt an attitude of strict impartiality between 
religions and will not disqualify any applicant for custody because of the faith the 
applicant follows . . . the religious factors involved in an award are a proper matter to be 
considered by the court in determining what decision is best for the general welfare of the 
child, temporally considered."); Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 333 (Mo. 1978) ("We 
hold that no judicial officer may determine child custody based on approval or 
disapproval of the beliefs, doctrine, or tenets of the religion of either parent or their 
interpretation thereof. We recognize it would be impossible and unrealistic to expect 
courts to ignore the existence of religion or to be blind to its place in our mores. But there 
26 
 
is a vast difference between concentrating on the religious choice of a parent as compared 
to concentrating on what is best for the child."); Pater v. Pater, 63 Ohio St. 3d 393, 397-
98, 588 N.E.2d 794 (1992) ("Courts have repeatedly held that custody cannot be awarded 
solely on the basis of the parents' religious affiliations and that to do so violates the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . . On the other hand, a parent's actions 
are not insulated from the domestic relations court's inquiry just because they are based 
on religious beliefs, especially actions that will harm the child's mental or physical 
health.").  
 
 
Likewise, we see support in other jurisdictions for our caution regarding 
speculation about future behavior that religious beliefs may motivate. See, e.g., Varnum 
v. Varnum, 155 Vt. 376, 385, 586 A.2d 1107 (1990) ("We are also concerned about the 
use of the finding that defendant would not allow her children to have blood transfusions 
even if medically necessary, in the absence of any evidence that such an eventuality is 
likely and cannot be resolved in ways other than depriving defendant of custody."); 
Garrett v. Garrett, 3 Neb. App. 384, 395, 527 N.W.2d 213 (1995) ("Likewise, regarding 
[Mother's] refusal to consent to a blood transfusion for her children even in the event of 
an emergency, no evidence was presented showing that any of the minor children were 
prone to accidents or were plagued with any sort of affliction that might necessitate a 
blood transfusion in the near future. We cannot decide this case based on some 
hypothetical future accident or illness which might necessitate such treatment.").  
 
 
It also appears our sister states share our wariness of interference with the 
fundamental right to religious freedom that court comparison of beliefs or lack of beliefs 
between parents is likely to foster. See 124 A.L.R.5th 203, § 3 (listing cases "support[ing] 
the view that a court in a child custody proceeding cannot pass on the comparative merits 
of various religions"); Osteraas v. Osteraas, 124 Idaho 350, 355, 859 P.2d 948 (1993) 
("It is thus clear that the trial court's distinction between religion and lack thereof cannot 
prevail against provisions stated in the United States Constitution."); Waites, 567 S.W.2d 
27 
 
at 333 ("Any suggestion that a state judicial officer was favoring or tending to favor one 
religious persuasion over another in a child custody dispute would be intolerable to our 
organic law."); LeDoux v. LeDoux, 234 Neb. 479, 485, 452 N.W.2d 1 (1990) ("Courts 
must preserve an attitude of impartiality between religions and may not disqualify a 
parent solely because of his or her religious beliefs."); In re Marriage of Decker, 666 
N.W.2d 175, 179 (Iowa App. 2003) ("We do not favor one religion over another in a 
custody determination."); but see Pietrzak v. Schroeder, 759 N.W.2d 734, 744-45 (S.D. 
2009) ("The manner in which a parent encourages his or her child to practice a religion is 
a legitimate factor for trial courts to consider when awarding custody."). 
 
 
Turning to the question of whether the district judge correctly applied this clarified 
legal standard when arriving at his initial custody determination in this case, we conclude 
that the judge properly distinguished between religious belief and religiously motivated 
conduct having an impact on the best interests of the child. Despite his protestations to 
the contrary, it is apparent from the judge's memorandum decision that he did in fact 
consider religiously motivated action. But he stopped there. He did not improperly 
consider religious belief alone or allow speculation about conduct potentially affecting 
the child. 
 
 
The judge first considered "the degree to which the Court may consider Monica's 
religious practices in making a determination of the residential custody of [J.D.H.]." He 
cited two decisions of this court and two decisions of the Court of Appeals in his 
assessment as to what extent religious practices could be considered. The judge noted that 
religious views cannot deprive a person of custody who is otherwise qualified, Denton v. 
James, 107 Kan. 729, 736, 193 P. 307 (1920), and that freedom of religion prevents a 
court from considering "solely" religion, Anhalt v. Fesler, 6 Kan. App. 2d 921, Syl. ¶ 3, 
636 P.2d 224 (1981). The judge also explained that a court must segregate factors that are 
proper for consideration from legitimate religious practices, citing Jackson, 181 Kan. at 
11. The judge then noted that a parent cannot hide behind religion to alienate a child from 
28 
 
the other parent, citing In re Marriage of Cobb, 26 Kan. App. 2d 388, 988 P.2d 272 
(1999). He then went on to address the evidence presented at trial by Adiel regarding 
Monica's religious beliefs and practices.  
 
 
The judge divided Adiel's concerns based on Monica's religious beliefs and 
practices into the following categories:  (1) "Father contends that the Mother's religious 
practices are alienating him from his son"; (2) "Father further contends that Mother's 
religious practices are creating problems for his son's social interactions with other 
children"; (3) "Father contends that [J.D.H] is being forced to participate in activities 
associated with the Jehovah's Witnesses which are not in his best interests"; and (4) 
"Father contends that the Jehovah's Witness prohibition on blood transfusion, and the 
Mother's reluctance to disavow this prohibition as it relates to the possible future medical 
needs of [J.D.H.], creates an unacceptable risk that [J.D.H.] would not receive medically 
necessary healthcare."   
 
 
In regard to the claim that J.D.H. experienced social anxiety in connection with 
holiday celebrations, the district court stated: "While this is a concern to the Court, 
ultimately the Court must respect Mother's religious practices. Case law which is binding 
precedent on this Court prohibits consideration of matters directly associated with 
decisions a parent makes in an effort to put into practice the teachings of that parent's 
faith." With respect to J.D.H. disliking going door-to-door with his mother to teach about 
the Jehovah's Witnesses, the judge stated:  "Kansas case law prohibits the Court from 
considering these factors." He nevertheless went on to find that "these activities do not 
appear to have any adverse impact on [J.D.H.]." We first observe that it is ever important 
for any district judge examining claims such as those advanced by Adiel to analyze 
whether any anxiety, doubt, frustration, or guilt a child may suffer from being identified 
with a particular religious group is due to our society's tendency to bestow public 
recognition or endorsement upon a different, dominant religious group. The district judge 
in this case appears to have grasped this point. And, because of the district judge's factual 
29 
 
finding that J.D.H. did not seem to be adversely affected, we need not further discuss 
here whether a child's general discomfort or uneasiness stemming from participation in a 
parent's religious practices can ever influence a custody decision in favor of the other 
parent.   
 
 
Adiel also argued to the district judge that he was being alienated from his son 
because the Jehovah's Witnesses believe only they will survive annihilation, a claim the 
district judge stated "is a particularly thorny issue for the Court to wade through." The 
judge stated:  "The teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses, including those that teach non-
Jehovah's Witnesses will suffer annihilation, may not be considered by this Court in 
deciding custody issues." He went on to state, however, that "while Mother has the 
constitutional right to raise [J.D.H.] as a Jehovah's Witness, she cannot hide behind this 
right to alienate [J.D.H.] from his father" and that "Mother should respect the bond 
[J.D.H.] has with his father." In other words, the judge properly disregarded Monica's 
religious belief alone, while noting that her professed belief could not be used to shield 
inquiry into acts of alienation. 
 
 
The district judge was most clearly troubled with Monica's beliefs concerning 
blood transfusions. He stated:  "Of greater concern to the Court is the practice by 
Jehovah's Witnesses prohibiting the use of blood products. . . . [I]t was clear to the Court 
that Mother was not going to disavow the teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses on the use 
of blood products." He urged this court to reconsider what he believe to be Beebe's rule 
prohibiting consideration of a religious practice discouraging medical treatment. The 
district judge also noted Johnson's revised recommendation at trial based on Monica's 
testimony regarding the use of blood products, but he determined that "the limited case 
manager's revised recommendation is of little use since it depends in no small part on 
consideration of factors which the Court constitutionally may not take into account." 
Although it obviously made the district court uncomfortable, he proceeded correctly, 
albeit for the wrong reason. It would not have been appropriate for him to speculate about 
30 
 
an unlikely future event; and, in fact, Monica testified that she would consult Adiel in the 
event a blood transfusion was recommended for J.D.H. In such a case, Adiel would be 
empowered to consent to the treatment for his minor son.    
 
 
In conclusion, although the district judge attempted to cabin his consideration of 
Monica's religion, it is apparent from the rest of his decision that he did not in fact 
categorically exclude all matters religious from his examination. Instead, while he 
properly excluded religious belief alone and refused to speculate about potential 
religiously motivated conduct in the future, he did in fact consider the ways in which 
current religiously motivated conduct affected J.D.H.'s best interests. This was the right 
approach, striking the delicate balance necessary in this difficult area. There was no 
abuse of discretion for failure to apply the correct legal standard.  
 
 
The majority of the Court of Appeals is affirmed; the district court is affirmed.  
 
 
JOHNSON and MORITZ, JJ., not participating.  
 
 
CHARLES E. ANDREWS, JR., and DAVID L. STUTZMAN, District Judges, assigned. 1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judges Andrews and Stutzman were appointed to hear 
case No. 102,214 vice Justices Johnson and Moritz respectively pursuant to the authority 
vested in the Supreme Court by Art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.