Title: Krupp v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC91613
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: December 6, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
LESTER F. KRUPP, JR.,  
 
 
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) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
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v. 
 
 
 
 
 
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No. SC91613 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
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Respondent.  
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Colleen Dolan, Judge 
 
Opinion issued December 6, 2011 
 
 
Lester F. Krupp, Jr., was convicted by a jury of one count of felonious restraint, 
four counts of deviate sexual assault, and one count of sexual misconduct.  Prior to 
sentencing, Krupp entered into an agreement with the State that he would plead guilty to 
two additional counts: one count of felonious restraint and one count of second-degree 
domestic assault.  He also agreed to waive his right to a jury trial, right to direct appeal, 
and right to seek post-conviction relief on the counts tried and also the counts to which he 
pleaded guilty.  In exchange for his pleas of guilty to the additional counts and his waiver 
of these rights, the State recommended that Krupp be sentenced to a combined total of 15 
years in the Missouri Department of Corrections on all counts.  The circuit court rendered 
a judgment and sentence in accord with the agreement. 
Krupp subsequently filed a pro se post-conviction relief motion, and, thereafter, 
counsel filed an amended motion pursuant to Rule 29.15.1  The motion court denied 
Krupp's request for an evidentiary hearing and entered written findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment overruling the amended motion on the merits.  
Krupp appealed the overruling of his motion to the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals transferred this case to this Court pursuant to Rule 83.02 because of the issue of 
general interest and importance that the case raised.  This Court vacates the motion 
court's judgment and remands the case with instructions to dismiss Krupp's Rule 29.15 
post-conviction motion.    
Facts 
 
Krupp was charged with two counts of felonious restraint, four counts of forcible 
sodomy, four alternative counts of deviate sexual assault, one count of forcible rape, one 
alternative count of sexual assault, one count of second-degree domestic assault, and one 
count of first-degree sexual misconduct.  Prior to trial, Krupp moved to sever one count 
of felonious restraint and one count of second-degree domestic assault.  The circuit court 
sustained the motion and proceeded to trial on the 12 remaining counts. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Krupp guilty of one count of 
felonious restraint, four counts of deviate sexual assault, and one count of first-degree 
                                             
 
1  The original pro se motion that included allegations that may have been considered under Rule 
24.035 and Rule 29.15 was amended.  The amended motion is pursuant to Rule 29.15 only and 
only alleges ineffective assistance of counsel to matters related to the counts tried.  Once the 
amended motion is filed, those allegations not included in the amended motion are abandoned.  
State ex el. Boggs v. Roper, 179 S.W.3d 893, 894 (Mo. banc 2005); Rule 29.15(g).   
sexual misconduct.  The jury acquitted Krupp on the four counts of forcible sodomy, one 
count of forcible rape, and one count of sexual assault.   
 Prior to the sentencing phase of the trial, Krupp and the State made an agreement 
regarding the two counts that previously had been severed from the jury trial and the 
sentences to be ordered on the counts tried to the jury.  The circuit court put the terms of 
that agreement on the record.  The State explained the agreement as follows:  
[T]he State's recommendation is for the Court to sentence [Krupp] on all 
the charges for a total of 15 years.  In exchange for all that, [Krupp] will 
waive his right to file a Post Conviction Relief Motion and waive his 
appeals on all the charges, and in some form or another the sentence will be 
a three, with a five consecutive to that, with a seven consecutive to that, for 
a total of 15 years. 
 
The court inquired of Krupp as to whether he understood the agreement.  
Court:  Has [your attorney] explained to you that you are entitled to have a 
jury make a recommendation as to the sentences that should be imposed 
regarding the counts they found you guilty of last evening[?] 
 
Krupp: Yes. 
 
Court:  Is it true you wish to waive your right to jury sentencing and submit 
to sentencing by the Court pursuant to an agreement your attorney has 
reached with the office of the Prosecuting Attorney[?] 
 
Krupp: Yes.  
 
Court: Is it also true you wish to waive your right to a trial on the remaining 
two counts and enter a plea of guilty to both of those pursuant to the State's 
recommendation? 
 
Krupp: Yes. 
 
Court: Is it also part of the agreement that you are agreeing to waive your 
right to an appeal, a Motion for New Trial, or a Post Conviction Relief 
proceedings in this trial? 
 
 
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Krupp: Yes.  
 
The State explained the evidence it would present as to the two counts filed against 
Krupp and again stated it was recommending a 15-year total sentence for all counts for 
Krupp.  The court again questioned Krupp regarding this recommendation: 
Court:  Mr. Krupp, is that your understanding of what the State was going 
to recommend if you entered a plea of guilty today? 
 
Krupp:  Yes. 
 
Court:  Has anyone made any threats or promises to you or your family to 
convince you to enter this plea of guilty? 
 
Krupp:  No.  
 
Court:  Has your attorney done everything you've asked him to do? 
 
Krupp:  Yes. 
 
Court:  Has he answered all of your questions? 
 
Krupp: Yes. 
 
Court: Have you been given enough time to discuss this case with your 
attorney? 
 
Krupp: Yes.  
 
Court:  Do you have any complaints or criticisms of him? 
 
Krupp: No.  
 
Court:  Do you know of anything he could have done that he didn't do? 
 
Krupp: No. 
 
Court: Or any witnesses that he could have contacted that he didn't contact? 
 
Krupp: No.  
 
 
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Court:  Has he investigated this case to your complete satisfaction? 
 
Krupp: Yes. 
 
Court:  Do you believe you've been fully advised by your attorney as to all 
aspects of your case, including your legal rights, and the possible 
consequences of your plea? 
 
Krupp: Yes. 
 
Court: Do you believe your attorney has adequately, completely, and 
effectively represented you in your defense to these charges? 
 
Krupp: Yes. 
 
The circuit court continued this line of questioning, walking Krupp through the jury trial 
process and making sure that he understood that he was waiving this right.  The questions 
then culminated with the following question and response: 
Court:  Mr. Krupp, are you pleading guilty voluntarily and of your own free 
will because you are guilty as charged in both counts? 
 
Krupp: Yes.  
 
Based on his testimony, the court found that Krupp's guilty plea was   
made voluntarily and intelligently, with a full understanding of the charges 
and the consequences of his plea, with an understanding of his rights 
attending a jury trial and the effect of a plea of guilty on those rights.  The 
Court also finds there is a factual basis for the plea.  The Court therefore 
accepts the plea of guilty to the offenses with which he is charged.  
 
 
The circuit court subsequently began the sentencing phase of the hearing.  In that 
phase, it again asked Krupp a series of questions regarding what rights he was waiving.  
It asked him specifically about the waiver of his post-conviction rights: 
Court: Mr. Krupp, do you understand that pursuant to Missouri Supreme 
Court Rule 29.15 you have the right to file a motion in this court seeking to 
vacate, set aside or correct the judgment of conviction or sentences imposed 
 
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if you claim that your conviction or the sentences imposed violate the 
constitution and laws of this state or the constitution of the United States or 
that this Court is without jurisdiction to impose the sentences or that the 
sentences to be imposed are in excess of the maximum sentences 
authorized by law?  Did you understand that? 
 
Krupp: Yes. 
 
Court: And did you also understand that you were waiving your right to 
claim that your attorney rendered ineffective assistance to you during the 
trial? 
 
Krupp:  Yes. 
 
The circuit court then allowed the State to call its first and only witness, who was 
one of Krupp's victims.  At the conclusion of this evidence, the Court sentenced Krupp to 
three years on count 1 of felonious restraint, five years on count 3 of deviate sexual 
assault, seven years on count 5 of deviate sexual assault, seven years on count 7 of 
deviate sexual assault, seven years on count 9 of deviate sexual assault, one year on count 
12 of sexual misconduct, three years on count 13 of felonious restraint, and three years on 
count 14 of domestic assault.2  The circuit court imposed the three three-year sentences 
for counts 1, 13, and 14 to run concurrently along with the one-year jail sentence for 
count 12.  It imposed the three seven-year sentences for counts 5, 7, and 9 to run 
concurrently with each other but to run consecutively with the sentences for counts 1, 12, 
13, and 14.  It imposed the five-year sentence for count 3 and ran it consecutively with 
both the sentences for counts 1, 12, 13, and 14 and the sentences for counts 5, 7, and 9.  
                                             
 
2 The jury acquitted Krupp on counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 11.    
 
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In total, Krupp was sentenced to 15 years in the Missouri Department of Corrections in 
accord with the agreement.  
Prior to concluding the hearing, the circuit court, for the third time, informed 
Krupp of the rights to post-conviction relief that he was waiving and examined him 
regarding the assistance of counsel that he received. 
Court:  When you made the decision to waive jury sentencing this morning, 
was that your decision? 
 
Krupp:  Yes. 
  
Court:   And although you may have consulted with your attorney as to 
what decision you were going to make, ultimately did you make it on your 
own?  
 
Krupp:  Yes.  
 
Court: And do you believe you were forced or made to make that decision 
your will in any way? 
 
Krupp:  No. 
 
The circuit court also asked Krupp if he understood the sentences that he was receiving 
and if he was satisfied with his attorney's service. 
Court:  Regardless of whether you are satisfied with the sentences that you 
have received from this Court in this case, are you satisfied with the legal 
services that you have received from your attorney? 
 
Krupp:  Absolutely. 
 
The court concluded by asking Krupp: 
Court:  Mr. Krupp, you [understand] that part of the agreement as to 
sentencing was that you would waive your right to an appeal of the verdicts 
of guilt that the jury returned during the trial.  Is that correct? 
 
Krupp:  Yes. 
 
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Court:  And did you also understand that you would waive your right to any 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by your attorney, either at the 
trial or at the plea of guilty? 
 
Krupp:  Yes. 
 
After the circuit court entered its judgment sentencing Krupp, he filed both a direct 
appeal and a pro se motion for post-conviction relief.  The court of appeals sustained the 
State's motion to dismiss his direct appeal based on Krupp's waiver of his right to appeal.  
Counsel was appointed to represent Krupp on his post-conviction relief motion, and an 
amended motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15 was filed on Krupp's 
behalf.   The amended motion requested that the motion court vacate, set aside, or correct 
judgment and sentence and an evidentiary hearing.  It alleged ineffective assistance of 
Krupp's trial counsel for failing to offer testimony from Krupp's mother to impeach one 
of the victims, failing to submit a lesser-included offense instruction, and for incorrectly 
advising Krupp that if he waived his right to direct appeal he would only serve a few 
months of the agreed-to 15-year sentence.3   
The motion court denied his request for an evidentiary hearing and denied his 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits.  Krupp appealed to the court of 
appeals.  The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which the court of appeals 
indicated it was inclined to sustain based on the waiver of post-conviction relief, but   
because of the issue of general interest and importance of whether the waiver of post-
                                             
 
3   The motion court found that the record clearly showed that Krupp "voluntarily waived his 
right to appeal, among other rights, in exchange for the State's recommendation of a reduced 
sentence and no additional charges." 
 
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conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15 was permissible, transferred the case to this 
Court.  
Analysis 
Waiver of Rule 29.15 Post-Conviction Relief 
Krupp argues on appeal that his waiver of post-conviction rights was unknowing, 
unintelligent, and involuntary due to defense counsel's potential conflict of interest in 
advising him to waive his post-conviction rights.   Krupp relies on Advisory Committee 
opinion 126 for his position that in the absence of additional counsel without a potential 
conflict of interest, the waiver of post-conviction remedies cannot be voluntary and 
intelligent.4 
Krupp argues that defense counsel's potential conflict of interest alone is enough to 
render his guilty plea unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent.  He contends defense 
counsel's interest in avoiding a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel and in 
protecting his reputation conflicted with Krupp's interest in challenging his convictions 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.   
                                             
 
4 It is important to note that discipline could not be sought against defense counsel or the 
assistant prosecuting attorney in this case for a potential violation of Advisory Committee 
opinion 126 because Krupp's waiver of his post-conviction rights predated the issuance of this 
opinion.  Rule 5.30(a) states that "[t]he advisory committee may give formal opinions as to the 
interpretations of Rules 4, 5, and 6" and provides a mechanism for judicial review of formal 
opinions.  Rule 5.30(b) provides that "any member of the bar who is substantially and 
individually aggrieved by any formal opinion of the advisory committee may petition this Court 
for review of the opinion."  No attorneys have petitioned this Court to review Advisory 
Committee opinion 126, nor has any discipline ever been sought against an attorney for violating 
Advisory Committee opinion 126. 
 
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The circuit court confirmed that Krupp understood the waiver and that it 
specifically included the waiver to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Moreover, Krupp was questioned by the circuit court extensively about whether defense 
counsel fully apprised him of the consequences of his agreement, whether he understood 
his agreement, and whether his decision to enter into the agreement was the result of his 
own free will.   
 
Krupp received a substantial benefit in exchange for his waiver of post-conviction 
relief.  The circuit court could have sentenced Krupp to as much as 50 years5 in the 
Missouri Department of Corrections.  Instead, because of the agreement between Krupp 
and the State, the assistant prosecuting attorney recommended a combined sentence of 15 
years on all eight counts.  The circuit court approved the agreement and sentenced Krupp 
to serve a combined total of 15 years.  
 
For the reasons set forth and explained in Cooper v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. 
banc 2011) (No. SC91695, decided December 6, 2011), handed down contemporaneously 
with this opinion, this Court holds that a waiver must be knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent, but that allegations of only a potential conflict of interest based on defense 
counsel's advice concerning the waiver of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15, 
                                             
 
5 Krupp was convicted of five class C felonies and one class A misdemeanor.  Each C felony 
carried a maximum sentence of seven years.  Section 558.011(3), RSMo Supp. 2005.  The one 
class A misdemeanor carried a maximum sentence of one year.  Section 558.011(5), RSMo 
Supp. 2005.  If Krupp was convicted of the two additional counts for which he had not yet been 
tried, was given the maximum sentence on all eight counts, and the circuit court chose to run 
each sentence consecutively, Krupp's total sentence would have been 50 years in the Missouri 
Department of Corrections.  
 
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including allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, do not render an agreement 
unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent.   
 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on an actual 
conflict of interest, it must be alleged and demonstrated that the waiver was not knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent and that there was an actual conflict of interest that adversely 
affected defense counsel's performance.  Id. at 10.  Furthermore, in order to plead and 
prove an actual conflict of interest, "something must have been done by counsel or 
something must have been forgone by counsel and lost to the defendant, which was 
detrimental" to the defendant and advantageous to the other.  Id.6 
 
Krupp's motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment and sentence and request 
for evidentiary hearing contains allegations that his defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance during the course of his trial by failing to offer testimony from Krupp's mother 
to impeach one of the victims, failing to submit a lesser-included offense instruction, and 
for incorrectly advising Krupp that if he waived his right to a direct appeal, he would 
only serve a few months of the agreed-to 15-year sentence.  These allegations are clearly 
refuted by the record.  Furthermore, the record in this case clearly demonstrates that 
Krupp was properly informed of his rights, and his waiver of those rights was made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.   
                                             
 
6 To prevail, based on an allegation that his counsel had "a conflict of interest that violated his 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights" and "the companion clauses of the Missouri 
Constitution," movant "must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected 
counsel's performance."  State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 377 (Mo. banc 1997). 
 
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Conclusion 
 
Because Krupp knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to waive his post-
conviction rights after his trial, this Court vacates the motion court's judgment and 
remands the case with instructions to dismiss Krupp's Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge, Stith  
and Price, JJ., and Martin, Sp.J., concur.  
Draper, J., not participating.