Title: People v. Bell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S080056
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL LEON BELL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S080056 
 
Stanislaus County Superior Court 
133269 
 
 
 
May 2, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
S080056 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
While his girlfriend and her teenage son waited outside, 
defendant Michael Leon Bell robbed a convenience store and 
fatally shot the clerk.  He was convicted of murder in the course 
of a robbery along with burglary, robbery, shooting at an 
occupied vehicle, unlawful possession of a firearm, and 
enhancements for a serious felony conviction and personal use 
of a firearm.1  The jury fixed the penalty at death.  The court 
also imposed a determinate sentence of 25 years and 4 months 
on the additional charges and enhancements.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
 
Three surveillance cameras recorded a robbery of the Quik 
Stop convenience store in Turlock on January 20, 1997.  The 
footage showed clerk Simon Francis dusting shelves at 3:54 a.m. 
when a man entered the store.  The robber wore a ski mask and 
a dark hooded jacket.  He appeared to be somewhere between 
six feet, two inches and six feet, five inches tall.2  He wore gloves 
                                        
1  
Penal Code sections 187, 190.2, subdivisions (a)(17)(A) & 
(a)(17)(G), 211, 246, former 12021, 667, subdivision (d), 1192.7, 
subdivision (c), and 12022.5.  All statutory references are to the 
Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 
2  
Defendant is six feet, five inches tall and, when arrested, 
weighed 260 pounds.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
2 
and carried a revolver.  The robber grabbed Francis and pulled 
him across the store, telling him to open the safe.  When Francis 
said he did not know the combination, the robber dragged him 
behind the counter to the cash register, which Francis opened.  
The robber ordered him to lie face down on the floor, grabbed 
cash from the register, and threw the money tray to the floor.  
He fired two shots at Francis and left.  The robber was in the 
store less than a minute and escaped with $261.  Surveillance 
equipment also recorded the sound of gunshots being fired 
outside after the robber left the store.   
 
Shortly before 4:00 a.m., truck driver Daniel Perry 
stopped at an intersection near the Quik Stop and saw a tall 
man in a dark hooded jacket run out of the store.  Perry pulled 
away but heard two gunshots.  Believing he was being shot at, 
Perry kept going.  He passed a dark sedan parked off the side of 
the road.  As Perry watched from his side mirror, the sedan’s 
lights came on and it drove off.  Perry called the police.  His truck 
had been dented near the passenger door.  Later, police 
recovered a bullet from the driveway just north of the Quik Stop.  
Tire tracks and shoe prints were also visible nearby.  
 
Truck driver Richard Faughn stopped at the Quik Stop at 
3:58 a.m.  The cash register drawer was open, and the clerk lay 
motionless behind the counter.  The register’s money tray sat 
against the clerk’s leg, and change was scattered on the floor.  
Faughn called 911 and stayed until police arrived.  
 
Emergency responders tried to resuscitate Francis 
without success.  When they moved his body, they found a 
deformed bullet beneath him.  Francis had been shot twice in 
the back.  The fatal bullet traveled through his heart and lungs, 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
3 
exiting through the chest.  A second bullet lodged in his 
abdominal cavity.  
 
Police identified defendant as a suspect and interviewed 
him.  Defendant said he had been sick and spent the weekend of 
the murder at his girlfriend’s apartment.  He claimed he did not 
go to the Quik Stop or anywhere else the entire weekend.  He 
said he had been with his girlfriend, Roseada T., her teenage 
son, Taureen “Tory” T.,3 and Tory’s friend, later identified as 
Robert D.  Roseada drove a blue 1988 Chevrolet Beretta.  
 
The police later arrested Roseada, searched her home, and 
impounded her car.  Tread patterns from her car tires were 
compared with tire tracks found near the Quik Stop.  Patterns 
from both front tires and the right rear tire could not be excluded 
as a source of marks left at the scene.  Roseada helped police 
recover the murder weapon from a field.  A .357 magnum 
revolver and several .38 caliber bullets were buried inside a 
green cloth case.  Bullets fired from this gun matched slugs 
recovered from the crime scene and the victim’s autopsy.  
Another bullet, recovered from outside the store, was too 
damaged for a comparison.  Gunshot residue on the victim’s 
sweater indicated that the gun was only one to two feet away 
when fired.  
 
Witness Phillip Campbell recognized the revolver as one 
he had purchased from his brother-in-law and later sold to Nick 
Feder.  Feder sold the gun to Debra Ochoa.  Ochoa testified that 
                                        
3  
Because Roseada and Tory share the same last name, and 
because Tory was a minor, we use their given names.  Roseada 
died from natural causes on December 27, 1998, around three 
months before the trial began.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
4 
she had known defendant for approximately 14 years.  She was 
not questioned about the gun.  (See post, at pp. 37-39.) 
 
Nathan N. was 15 years old at the time of the murder.4  
Roseada, Tory, and the defendant were all friends of his.  
Defendant borrowed a black hooded jacket, size XXXL, from 
Nathan about a month before the murder and returned it 
sometime thereafter.  Nathan and his foster mother brought the 
jacket to the police.  Nathan examined still images from the 
Quik Stop surveillance video and testified that the murderer’s 
jacket looked like his.   
 
Nathan recalled seeing defendant with a revolver two or 
three weeks before the robbery.  Sometime later, defendant gave 
the gun to a friend.  Roseada later asked Nathan and Felix F. to 
get the gun back.  They brought the gun to Roseada, who cleaned 
it.  Afterward, they buried it in a field inside a green package.  
 
Tory, 14 years old at the time of the murder, testified as 
part of a plea agreement.5  Defendant moved in with Tory and 
his mother sometime in 1996.  In December of that year, 
defendant showed Tory a .357 revolver loaded with .38 caliber 
bullets.  Defendant said he got the gun because he wanted to rob 
someone.  One night, Tory saw the gun and a red ski mask in 
his mother’s bedroom.  Roseada and defendant were loading the 
gun and cleaning it with alcohol, which they said would prevent 
fingerprints.  They also wrapped electrical tape around 
defendant’s shoes to mask their appearance.  Defendant wore a 
black jacket Tory recognized as belonging to Nathan.  Tory 
                                        
4  
Nathan testified under a grant of immunity.  
5  
He pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact and 
was sentenced to time served.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
5 
understood his mother and defendant were preparing to commit 
a robbery and wanted to join them.  Although Roseada 
protested, defendant convinced her to let Tory come along.  
 
At defendant’s direction, Roseada drove around looking for 
a store to rob.  After defendant rejected some locations, they 
chose the Quik Stop because it had no customers and was in an 
isolated area.  Defendant got out of the car and asked Tory if he 
should kill the clerk.  Tory said no.  When defendant ran out, 
holding cash in his hand, a large truck drove by.  Defendant shot 
twice at the truck, got in the car, and Roseada drove off.  Back 
at the apartment, they cleaned the gun and bullets.  Tory buried 
the gun and burned defendant’s shoes, as defendant told him to 
do.  Tory identified defendant as the shooter in the surveillance 
video.  Defendant told Tory he shot the clerk because he put up 
a struggle.  He said he shot at the truck driver because he 
wanted to leave no witnesses.  
 
The defense presented testimony from two boys who had 
been in custody with Tory in juvenile hall.  Kenneth A. said Tory 
had bragged that he committed the Quik Stop murder and was 
going to let defendant take the blame for it.6  Tory told Brandon 
T. he was in the car with his mother when her boyfriend 
committed the murder, but he described the boyfriend as “a 
black guy” from Las Vegas.  He did not mention defendant.  Tory 
also said he had buried the gun and burned a mask used in the 
crime.  
                                        
6  
At 5 feet, 10 inches tall and 135 pounds, Tory was 
considerably smaller than defendant, but the defense stressed 
that police had originally described the suspect as someone 
under six feet tall and of slim build. 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
6 
 
On rebuttal, Tory’s grandmother testified that Roseada 
was once married to an African-American man from Las Vegas 
who died 10 months before the Quik Stop murder.  
B. Penalty Phase 
 
1. 
Prosecution Evidence 
 
The victim’s father testified that Francis was the youngest 
of seven children.  He was very upset after Francis died and 
could not go to church or visit his son’s grave.  The victim’s older 
sister described Francis as kind and understanding, “the jewel 
of our family.”  He was precious to her because she had raised 
him like a son.  She suffered a stroke upon learning of his death.  
Francis was 27 years old and had been married less than two 
months when murdered.  His wife’s cousin described him as her 
“best friend” and “the nicest guy [she had] ever met.”  Shortly 
before his death, Francis was buying frames for wedding 
photographs and planning to pick up the videotape of his 
wedding.  He never had a chance to see it.  The prosecutor played 
a four-minute excerpt from the tape.  
 
The prosecution presented extensive testimony about 
defendant’s past.  L.O. described a sexual assault in May 1991.  
She was 19 years old, living with the defendant and their two 
young children.  Defendant came home angry and intoxicated.  
He dragged her to the bedroom, threw her onto the bed, removed 
some of her clothing, and tried to have sex with her.  In her 
struggle to escape, L.O. suffered a swollen lip.  She later learned 
she was more than three months pregnant with defendant’s 
third child at the time.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
7 
 
In September 1993, defendant assaulted Patrick Carver.7  
Defendant and some others confronted Carver at a house where 
he was staying.  A girl tried to provoke Carver into hitting her, 
while the group circled around him.  This incident ended 
without a fight, but later that evening the group returned.  
Defendant dragged Carver out of his car and slammed him to 
the ground.  Defendant repeatedly kicked Carver in the face 
while the others restrained him.  After Carver was beaten into 
unconsciousness, defendant threw him over a backyard fence.  
Carver recalled being tied to a chair while the group continued 
to beat and kick him.  At one point, defendant took Carver’s 
knife, held it across his throat, and jabbed its tip into the top of 
Carver’s head.  Feigning concern at Carver’s distress, defendant 
asked if he would like a drink.  When Carver said yes, defendant 
turned on the garden hose and held it to Carver’s mouth.  As 
Carver started to drink, defendant grabbed his head and shoved 
the hose deep into his mouth.  Carver began choking, shaking, 
and kicking.  Defendant did not remove the hose until one of the 
others pointed a gun at him and said “that was enough.”  
Defendant demanded money from Carver, who said he could get 
some from his family.  The group drove to a pay phone.  While 
Carver was using the phone, the police drove up and defendant 
fled.  
 
Defendant assaulted two other men less than a year before 
the Quik Stop killing.  In February 1996, he confronted Gary 
Wolford, claiming Wolford’s friend had provided “some bad 
                                        
7  
Two witnesses testified about this assault.  Lawrence 
Smith, one of the assailants, testified during the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief, and victim Patrick Carver testified in rebuttal.  
Carver identified his primary assailant as “Mike Brown” but 
said he did not recognize defendant as being this person.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
8 
crank.”  Defendant insisted Wolford take drugs with him to 
show he was not “a snitch and a rat” and demanded $100.  He 
shoved Wolford to the ground, grabbed him by the neck, and 
smashed his head against a wall.  After three to four hours, 
defendant let Wolford leave but warned that he would hurt 
Wolford if he did not get $100 by the next day.  A month later, 
defendant assaulted Larry Woolridge, a friend he had known 
since childhood.  Woolridge had given defendant $25 to buy 
marijuana.  Defendant left with the money but returned and 
accused Woolridge of “being a cop.”  Defendant and another man 
pulled Woolridge outside, struck him in the face, and swung 
machetes at him.  Defendant demanded Woolridge’s money, 
which he surrendered.  
 
Around a month after the Quik Stop murder,  defendant 
led the police on a high-speed chase.  A patrol officer saw 
defendant shortly after midnight, going 90 miles per hour on city 
streets.  He slowed after passing the patrol car, but then drove 
through a stop sign and accelerated away with his headlights 
off.  The officer pursued with lights and siren.  Rounding a 
corner, the officer noticed defendant’s car parked at the curb, 
apparently unoccupied.  As the officer stood outside his patrol 
car, defendant sat up, started his car’s engine, and sped away.  
The chase continued through narrow residential streets at 
speeds between 55 and 75 miles per hour.  Defendant ran 
multiple stop signs and sometimes drove on the wrong side of 
the road.  He was eventually forced to stop at a construction 
barricade.  Defendant was uncooperative, initially refusing to 
leave the car or put his hands in the air.  He yelled at officers 
and resisted being handcuffed.  His blood alcohol content was 
between .10 and .11 percent.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
9 
 
Finally, sheriff’s deputies described two incidents while 
defendant was in custody.  Before trial began, a deputy 
discovered a jail-made knife, or shank, hidden inside one of 
defendant’s shoes.  It had been sharpened on both sides and 
tapered on one end to a sharp point.  Hidden inside the other 
shoe was a piece of glass wrapped in tape.  Later, during the 
penalty phase, deputies heard the sound of metal hitting the 
floor near defendant’s cell.  When they came to investigate, 
defendant handed over a shank he had hidden under his 
mattress.  
 
Defendant stipulated that in September 1995 he was 
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  
 
2. 
Defense Evidence 
 
Joseph Black and Lawrence Smith gave additional details 
about defendant’s fight with Patrick Carver.  Black said the 
fight concerned Carver’s delinquent rent.  Carver wanted to 
brawl, but defendant “got the better of the fight.”  Black never 
saw defendant use a knife, jump on Carver, throw him over a 
fence, or force a garden hose into his mouth.  Smith admitted 
that, contrary to his testimony for the prosecution, he did not 
initially tell the police about the knife, fence-throwing, or garden 
hose.  He lied because he feared for his safety.  However, he later 
told the police that defendant had hit Carver several times and 
used a knife.  Black confirmed that the group drove to a pay 
phone so that Carver could ask his family for money and that 
defendant ran away when police arrived.  The group falsely 
identified defendant as “Mike Brown.”  
 
James Park testified as an expert on conditions for 
California prisoners sentenced to life without parole.  He showed 
pictures of a typical cell and explained that all life prisoners are 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
10 
automatically assigned to a maximum security prison.  Two 12-
foot fences topped with razor wire surround the prison.  Between 
them is a 13-foot high-voltage electric fence.  Prisoners who get 
in “bad trouble” can be kept in secure housing for up to 23 hours 
a day.  Those not confined in the secure unit can work, go to 
school, exercise, watch television, or visit prison shops and 
libraries.  
 
Defendant’s mother described his upbringing.  She gave 
birth to defendant when she was 16 years old.  He was nearly 
three months premature and weighed slightly over three 
pounds, requiring incubation for eight weeks.  During his first 
two years, he was very sickly and frequently hospitalized.  The 
family moved often because defendant’s father was in the Air 
Force.  At about age four, defendant was prescribed Ritalin for 
hyperactivity.  His mother stopped giving it to him after a few 
days because of its effect on him.  Defendant’s father had little 
patience with defendant, and the parents separated when 
defendant was about 10 years old.  His mother remarried, but 
defendant disliked his stepfather.  Defendant was caught 
shoplifting and had increasing difficulties in school.  Frustrated 
with the rules in his mother’s house, defendant moved in with 
his girlfriend at age 16.  He became more distant and frustrated.  
Defendant’s younger siblings had no behavioral problems.  Both 
were in college at the time of trial. 
 
Defendant’s mother said she loved him and was 
overwhelmed by the possibility he would receive the death 
penalty.  Defendant’s brother said he loved him, too.  Defendant 
often advised his brother to stay in school and not behave as he 
had.  L.O. testified that defendant was drunk on the night he 
sexually assaulted her, and she no longer hated him for it.  She 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
11 
allowed him to see their three young children.  They would be 
devastated if he were executed.  
 
Neuropsychologist Nell Riley testified.  Defendant’s IQ 
was 77, which, while not indicating mental retardation, was “a 
very low score” correlating with subnormal intelligence.  He had 
severe 
dyslexia, 
poor 
reading 
skills, 
attention 
deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and impaired executive 
functioning.  Defendant’s prematurity and low birth weight put 
him at high risk for developmental disabilities.  Such children 
often have lifelong challenges.  They are frequently disruptive 
and have difficulty with others.  Reading problems hamper their 
academic and work ability.  Although Ritalin and other drugs 
can help, defendant did not have the benefit of these 
medications.  Finally, Riley addressed an emotional outburst 
defendant made at the end of his mother’s testimony.  (See post, 
at p. 12.)  Defendant’s inability to control his emotions or 
behavior in this situation was typical for someone with his 
neurological deficits.  
 
Psychologist Gretchen White compiled a psychosocial 
history based on available records and interviews with 
defendant and his family.  Defendant faced “risk factors” at 
every developmental stage.  He was negatively influenced by his 
prematurity and low birth weight, the young age of his mother, 
sickliness during early life, hyperactivity, his father’s extended 
absences, and marital strife.  Infants with birth weights as low 
as defendant’s tend to display negative temperaments, ADHD, 
and low social competence.  Defendant also suffered digestive 
problems and was hospitalized for anemia at seven months old.  
He suffered congestive heart failure and required a blood 
transfusion.  At school, defendant demonstrated learning 
disabilities and low intelligence, which made him feel like a 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
12 
failure.  His world changed dramatically at age eight when his 
two siblings were born only a year apart.  At age nine, he 
underwent two surgeries on his genitals but still had a 
deformity despite the attempt at correction.  He was distressed 
by his parents’ divorce and a lack of paternal attention.  
Defendant did not see his father after age 12 or 13.  He felt 
rejected and had trouble adjusting to the new family 
arrangement.  As an adolescent, defendant had conflicts with 
his authoritarian stepfather.  He transferred to a different high 
school and was humiliated by his placement in special education 
classes.  All these risk factors led to an increasingly troubled life.  
 
3. 
Rebuttal 
 
Sherriff’s deputies testified about defendant’s courtroom 
outburst.  Defendant’s mother was crying when she left the 
witness stand.  The judge called for a recess and jurors started 
walking toward the jury room.  Although the record is not clear, 
it appears the jurors were no longer present when the outburst 
began.  Defendant began pounding on the counsel table with 
both fists, then stood and tried to lift the table.  Three deputies 
grabbed him but were unable to subdue him.  Additional 
deputies joined the struggle.  One deputy was hit and thrown 
over the railing into the audience section.  Another deputy 
struck defendant on the legs with a baton, to no avail.  At one 
point, defendant grabbed a deputy by the hair and held her in a 
headlock.  Ultimately, it took eight or nine deputies to restrain 
defendant, who was still struggling as he was carried out in 
handcuffs and leg irons.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
13 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
 
1. 
Funds for Jury Consultant  
 
Defense counsel filed multiple requests for section 987.98 
funds to hire a jury consultant.  The court denied his requests 
but ultimately authorized an even greater amount for the 
appointment of Keenan9 counsel.  Defendant argues the rulings 
violated both state law and his rights to due process, equal 
protection, and a reliable penalty determination.  There was no 
error.10 
                                        
8  
Section 987.9, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “In 
the trial of a capital case . . . the indigent defendant, through the 
defendant’s counsel, may request the court for funds for the 
specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the 
preparation or presentation of the defense. . . .  Upon receipt of 
an application, a judge of the court, other than the trial judge 
presiding over the case in question, shall rule on the 
reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an appropriate 
amount of money to the defendant’s attorney. . . .  In making the 
ruling, the court shall be guided by the need to provide a 
complete and full defense for the defendant.” 
9  
Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 430 
provides that section 987.9 funds may be used to appoint second 
defense counsel in a capital case.  (See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 353, 407-408.) 
10  
“With regard to this claim and virtually every other claim 
raised on appeal, defendant asserts that the error violated his 
rights to a fair trial and reliable penalty determination under 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the 
California Constitution.  In most instances, defendant failed to 
make these constitutional arguments in the trial court.  
Nevertheless, unless otherwise indicated, we consider the 
merits of these newly raised arguments because either (1) the 
appellate claim is of a kind that required no objection to preserve 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
14 
 
 a. 
Background 
 
Defense counsel first sought to retain Eda Gordon from 
New Mexico, who had assisted the Stanislaus County Public 
Defender’s Office in a previous murder case.  The court denied 
this request, noting that defense counsel was “quite competent 
to select his own jury,” especially given that voir dire would be 
conducted largely by the judge.  Counsel renewed his request in 
a supplemental declaration.  He argued the district attorney had 
greater resources available for jury selection and funding a 
defense expert would ultimately save both money and time.  
After an ex parte hearing, the court again denied the request.  
The case was neither unusual nor complex.  Defense counsel was 
“highly competent,” with “considerable experience in trying 
capital cases.”  The court doubted whether retaining an expert 
would save costs because counsel would spend considerable time 
talking with the expert.  Moreover, even assuming the district 
attorney had superior resources, the defense is not entitled to 
equivalency but only assistance that is reasonably necessary.  
Finally, the occasional approval of funds for a jury consultant 
did not suggest an expert was constitutionally required.  The 
majority of murder cases are tried without one.  
                                        
it, or (2) the claim invokes no facts or legal standards different 
from those before the trial court, but merely asserts that an 
error had the additional legal consequence of violating the 
Constitution.  [Citation.]  In those circumstances, defendant’s 
new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal.  
[Citations.]  Where rejection of a claim of error on the merits 
necessarily leads to a rejection of the newly asserted 
constitutional objection, no separate constitutional analysis is 
required and we have provided none.”  (People v. Virgil (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 1210, 1233-1234, fn. 4 (Virgil).) 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
15 
 
Less than a week after this ruling, defense counsel 
requested a new hearing on the ground that defendant was not 
present at the previous hearing and had not waived his right to 
attend.  Another ex parte hearing was held before a different 
judge.  At this hearing, a deputy public defender testified about 
his use of jury consultant Gordon in a recent murder trial.  The 
case involved an African-American defendant who murdered an 
Assyrian clerk during a late-night convenience store robbery, 
which was captured on videotape.  Although the jury found that 
defendant guilty with special circumstances, it returned a 
verdict of life without possibility of parole.  The public defender 
explained in detail how the consultant assisted him, both in jury 
selection and later stages of trial.  Defendant’s counsel believed 
a jury consultant would be helpful because the community had 
become especially sensitive to violence committed by African 
Americans.  The court concluded a jury consultant was not 
needed to ensure a fair trial and denied the requested funds.  
However, because defense counsel demonstrated a need for 
assistance in the jury selection process, the court invited him to 
submit a new application for a private investigator’s services.  
 
Defendant then sought $4,500 for investigative assistance 
during jury selection.  The court granted $2,750 and specified 
that only previously authorized defense investigators Joe 
Maxwell and Robert Wood could be retained.  A month later, 
defense counsel advised the court that both of these 
investigators had refused the assignment.  He now sought 
$7,000 to retain Karen Fleming, an Oakland consultant 
experienced in selecting capital juries.  The request was denied.  
Counsel later renewed his request for investigative funds and 
asked that the court expand its authorization to include 
investigators other than Maxwell and Wood.  The court denied 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
16 
additional funds but permitted counsel to hire a different 
investigator.  
 
Defendant later renewed his request for a jury consultant 
after learning that a second deputy district attorney would 
assist in jury selection and trial.  At an ex parte hearing, Deputy 
District Attorney Birgit Fladagar testified that a second 
prosecutor had been assigned to try the case jointly with her.  
Both would take an active role in jury selection.  Defense counsel 
asserted that he also required assistance in jury selection, 
although he was not seeking a second lawyer.  Counsel said he 
needed an expert’s help identifying jurors who would be 
receptive to defendant’s mitigation defense.  The court once 
again denied the request, explaining it had never perceived a 
correlation between use of a jury consultant and a trial’s result.  
Shortly after the hearing, defense counsel requested $6,750 to 
expand the authorization of previously appointed Keenan 
counsel to include assistance with jury selection.11  This request 
was granted in full.  
 
 b. 
Discussion 
 
Section 987.9 provides a mechanism for indigent capital 
defendants to seek funds for investigators, experts, and others 
whose assistance is needed to prepare or present a defense.  In 
ruling on such a request, the court must consider the 
defendant’s “need to provide a complete and full defense.”  
(§ 987.9, subd. (a).)  While the court should generally view a 
motion for assistance with “considerable liberality,” it should 
also order the requested services only if the defendant 
                                        
11  
The prior appointment extended only to discovery, 
research, and motion and writ preparation.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
17 
demonstrates they are reasonably necessary.  (People v. 
Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 286; People v. Guerra 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1085.)  The court here acted within its 
discretion.  (See Gonzalez and Soliz, at p. 286.) 
 
As defendant recognizes, we have previously upheld 
orders denying section 987.9 funds for a jury selection expert.  
(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1182-1185 (Box); 
People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 847-848 (Mattson).)  The 
circumstances here are no more compelling.  Mattson and Box 
both involved the murder of a child, yet the potentially upsetting 
nature of those crimes did not demand the use of a jury 
consultant.  This convenience store robbery murder was not so 
unusual or complex that it would be particularly difficult to find 
impartial jurors.  (See Mattson, at p. 848.)  Although defense 
counsel argued he needed help identifying jurors who would be 
responsive to his mitigation case, it does not appear an expert 
was reasonably necessary to ensure a fair penalty trial.  Defense 
counsel had extensive trial experience, which included death 
penalty cases, and was described by the court as highly 
competent.  Experienced attorneys “ ‘are trained as well as 
anyone else to select juries.’ ”  (Box, at p. 1184.)  Defendant’s 
claim is not supported by Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 1087, 
which held that psychiatric assistance must be provided when 
an indigent defendant presents a plausible insanity defense.  
“Unlike psychiatric expertise, . . . a jury selection expert . . . 
would not offer any expertise not already available to counsel.”  
(Box, at p. 1185.) 
 
Nor did the assertedly greater resources of the district 
attorney’s office require the court to fund a jury consultant for 
the defense.  The prosecution did not employ such an expert.  
Once it became clear that two deputy district attorneys would 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
18 
be trying the case, the court expanded defendant’s Keenan 
counsel appointment to include jury selection.  As a result, the 
court did authorize section 987.9 funding to assist counsel with 
jury selection.  Defendant’s complaint is merely that the court 
funded a second lawyer for this purpose rather than one of his 
preferred experts.  The decision fell within the court’s ample 
discretion.  
 
Finally, there was no equal protection violation.  
Defendant complains that if he had been represented by the 
public defender, that office could have hired a jury selection 
expert without obtaining court approval.  Because his counsel 
was appointed from a panel of private attorneys, he had to apply 
for court funding.  The premise of this claim is speculative.  
Although a public defender’s office can hire an expert from its 
own funds, its ability to obtain reimbursement for this expense 
is also measured by section 987.9.  (See Gov. Code, § 15201; Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 1025.1, 1025.3; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 310 
(1984).)  Despite minor differences in the process, indigent 
defendants represented by the public defender’s office have no 
greater access to state-sponsored jury consultants than those 
represented by private counsel.  Both are entitled to state 
funding for a jury consultant only when such services “are 
reasonably necessary for the preparation or presentation of the 
defense.”  (§ 987.9, subd. (a).) 
 
2. 
Jury Selection  
 
Defendant contends voir dire was impermissibly restricted 
and the trial court failed to excuse panelists who were biased in 
favor of the death penalty.  To the extent these claims were not 
forfeited, they lack merit. 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
19 
 
The jury selection process consisted of both group and 
individual voir dire.  Prospective jurors completed a 39-page 
questionnaire and came to court in groups of 15 or 16.  For each 
group, the court read general instructions explaining the nature 
of the case, including the possibility of a penalty phase trial, and 
conducted a groupwide inquiry touching generally on bias and 
prejudice.  Panelists were then questioned individually about 
their death penalty views.  (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 
28 Cal.3d 1 (Hovey).)  The court advised counsel in advance that 
it intended to ask each juror a specific set of questions to 
evaluate their qualification to serve under Wainwright v. Witt 
(1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).  Both defense counsel and the 
prosecutor were given an opportunity to question each panelist 
during the sequestered voir dire.  Jury selection proceeded over 
nine court days and comprises five volumes of transcript.  At the 
conclusion of this process, defendant used 14 of his 20 
peremptory challenges and did not express dissatisfaction with 
the jury selected.  
 
 a. 
Adequacy of Voir Dire 
 
Defendant makes several arguments concerning the 
adequacy of voir dire.  He first asserts the court unfairly 
restricted voir dire because it curtailed questioning from defense 
counsel.  The record is to the contrary.  Defense counsel had an 
opportunity to question each prospective juror, sometimes at 
considerable length, during the sequestered voir dire.  Counsel 
frequently used this questioning to probe panelists’ assurances 
that they could be fair and to lay the groundwork for cause 
challenges.  The court initially became frustrated with the 
length of this questioning and perceived that defense counsel 
was “putting words in” prospective jurors’ mouths.  It announced 
that attorneys would question the panelists first, followed by 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
20 
court questioning, after which no further questioning would be 
permitted.  Immediately after this decision, however, the court 
allowed defense counsel to ask follow-up questions of the next 
panelist. The court quickly reverted to its original pattern of 
questioning the jurors first and then allowing questions from 
counsel.  
 
Defendant did not object to the adequacy of voir dire (see 
People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1324 (Foster)), nor does 
he identify any specific questions he was precluded from asking 
(see People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 287).  Assuming his 
claim of error was not forfeited (see People v. Taylor (2010) 48 
Cal.4th 574, 608), it lacks merit.  Although the court sometimes 
told defense counsel to limit or wrap up his questioning, any 
restrictions on voir dire were reasonable.  We have repeatedly 
observed that the trial court has “ ‘considerable discretion . . . to 
contain voir dire within reasonable limits.’ ”  (People v. Jenkins 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 990; see People v. Williams (2006) 40 
Cal.4th 287, 307.)  This discretion extends to death qualification.  
(People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 859.)  The court may 
limit attorney questioning as appropriate (People v. Robinson 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 614), and, indeed, “has a duty to restrict 
voir dire within reasonable bounds to expedite the trial.”  (People 
v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 536, italics added.)  Defendant’s 
attorney had wide latitude to explore prospective jurors’ biases.  
(Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 80; see Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 
at p. 847.)  He had an opportunity to question each prospective 
juror and typically did so.  The mild limitations placed on 
counsel’s questioning did not deprive defendant of an impartial 
jury. 
 
Nor is there merit to defendant’s related claim that the 
court impermissibly “chilled” defense counsel’s advocacy by 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
21 
threatening to end the Hovey voir dire.  The first prospective 
juror called in for sequestered voir dire strongly supported the 
death penalty but clearly told the court he could keep an open 
mind and base his verdict on the evidence presented.  Defense 
counsel asked several leading questions that attempted to 
portray the juror as unqualified to serve.  The court expressed 
exasperation with this tactic and suggested counsel was abusing 
the voir dire process.  If counsel continued to question jurors in 
this manner, the court said it would end the sequestered 
questioning and bring all panelists into court for group voir dire.  
Later that day, the court again expressed frustration at defense 
counsel’s attempts to paint jurors as disqualified after they had 
promised to keep an open mind on penalty.  Noting that defense 
counsel was “taking too long with each juror,” the court proposed 
to avoid the problem by switching to group voir dire with the 
next panel.  The court never did change the process, however, 
and individual, sequestered questioning continued until the 
conclusion of voir dire. 
 
There was no discernable reduction in the extent of voir 
dire.  “We have repeatedly held that ‘there is no federal 
constitutional 
requirement 
that 
a 
trial 
court 
conduct 
individualized, sequestered voir dire in a capital case.’ ”  (People 
v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 357.)  In any event, considered 
in context, the court’s statements about switching to group voir 
dire were mere expressions of frustration, and the court took no 
steps to change the process for later panels.  Nor does defendant 
demonstrate that the statements impermissibly “chilled” his 
attorney’s advocacy.  Defendant now theorizes that counsel 
could have pursued other lines of inquiry with some seated 
jurors.  The assertion is not persuasive.  All attorneys have to 
make choices about the areas explored and the time devoted to 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
22 
the process.  Nor is a “chilling” effect evident from counsel’s 
failure to ask probing questions of jurors that the defense might 
have found favorable for other reasons.  Despite questionnaire 
responses defendant now claims were problematic, his attorney 
chose not to peremptorily challenge any of the jurors whose 
questioning defendant now claims was inadequate.  The trial 
court’s manner of conducting voir dire is not reversible unless it 
is clear the resulting trial was rendered fundamentally unfair.  
(People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1250.)  No such 
showing has been made here. 
 
Defendant also complains the court “did not engage in a 
bona fide” assessment of jurors’ qualification to serve but found 
them qualified so long as they paid “lip service to neutrality” in 
responding to a series of rote, leading questions under Witt.  
Trial courts are obligated to make a conscientious effort to 
determine prospective jurors’ views on capital punishment to 
ensure qualification to serve.  (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
758, 779.)  However, the court does not necessarily shirk this 
obligation because it asks uniform questions that track 
appropriate qualification concerns.  Indeed, we have previously 
“advised trial judges to ‘closely follow the language and formulae 
for voir dire recommended by the Judicial Council . . . to ensure 
that all appropriate areas of inquiry are covered in an 
appropriate manner.’ ”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 
538 (Bolden).) 
 
In People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 588-589 (Leon), 
the entire voir dire of nearly every potential juror consisted of 
four 
questions 
addressing 
the 
Witt 
death-qualification 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
23 
standard.12  The court rarely asked follow-up questions and 
permitted no attorney inquiry.  (Leon, at p. 589.)  Although we 
chastised this parsimonious approach, we concluded the voir 
dire was not so inadequate as to render the trial unfair.  (Ibid.)  
Here, the voir dire was far more expansive.  The court 
questioned each prospective juror in accordance with the Witt 
standard and frequently asked additional questions.  It gave 
both attorneys an opportunity to inquire further and explore 
other areas of concern.  Defendant complains the court gave 
undue weight to favorable responses to the Witt questions, but 
the court was entitled to accept jurors’ assurances that they 
could set aside personal feelings and judge the case fairly.  This 
is the heart of the death-qualification inquiry.  (See Leon, at 
pp. 591-592; Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176.)  
When jurors admitted they could not set aside their biases, 
                                        
12  
The questions were:  “(1) ‘Do you have such conscientious 
objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence 
in this case, you would refuse to vote for murder in the first 
degree merely to avoid reaching the death penalty issue?’  (2) ‘Do 
you have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, 
regardless of the evidence in this case, you would automatically 
vote for a verdict of not true as to any special circumstance 
charged merely to avoid the death penalty issue?’  (3) ‘Do you 
have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, 
should we get to the penalty phase of this trial, and regardless 
of the evidence in this case, you would automatically vote for a 
verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and 
never vote for a verdict of death?’  (4) ‘Do you have such 
conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that, should 
we get to the penalty phase of this trial, and regardless of the 
evidence in this case, you would automatically, and in every 
case, vote for a verdict of death and never vote for a verdict of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?’ ”  (Leon, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 588-589.) 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
24 
either for or against the death penalty, the court properly 
excused them for cause.  Moreover, to the extent defendant 
argues overreliance on the Witt questioning led the court to 
erroneously deny cause challenges and seat biased jurors, he 
forfeited this claim by failing to exhaust his peremptory 
challenges or express dissatisfaction with the jury.  (See post, at 
p. 25.) 
 
Nor is there merit to defendant’s complaint that the court 
unfairly rehabilitated biased jurors with leading questions that 
signaled an “ ‘appropriate’ ” response.  We recently rejected the 
same claim in People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pages 358-
359, explaining that “ ‘[t]he possibility that prospective jurors 
may have been answering questions in a manner they believed 
the trial court wanted to hear identifies at most potential, rather 
than actual, bias and is not a basis for reversing a judgment.’ ”  
“Nor does the court’s occasional use of leading questions when 
attempting to rehabilitate ‘death-leaning’ jurors suggest a lack 
of impartiality.”  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 190.)  
Here, the court posed rehabilitative questions to all prospective 
jurors who expressed opinions on the death penalty, including 
those who strongly opposed it.  This questioning was neither 
unfair nor improper. 
 
 b. 
Denial of Cause Challenges 
 
Defendant claims the court erroneously refused to dismiss 
seven prospective jurors based on their death penalty views.  
(Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  He also contends another juror 
would have been incapable of judging the case impartially 
because the juror’s wife received dialysis treatments from the 
murder victim’s wife.  He argues deferential review is improper 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
25 
because the court was motivated simply to expedite voir dire, 
rather than ascertain jurors’ true qualifications.  
 
“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges 
or to express dissatisfaction with the jury as selected forfeits 
[these claims] on appeal.”  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
539, 582; see People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 216.)  
“Moreover, whatever the scope may be of the trial court’s power 
or duty to excuse biased jurors sua sponte, any failure to do so 
does not ‘excuse defendant’s failure to preserve this issue for 
review.’ ”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487.)  Nor 
can defendant establish prejudice.  None of the prospective 
jurors in question served on his jury.  (See Davis, at p. 582.)  
Defendant excused six of the eight with peremptory challenges, 
and a seventh was never called into the jury box.  The eighth 
was seated as an alternate but did not deliberate in either phase 
of trial.  Where no challenged panelist actually served on 
defendant’s jury, “ ‘there is no basis for us to conclude that the 
jury empanelled was anything but impartial.’ ”  (Davis, at 
p. 582; see Hillhouse, at pp. 487-488.) 
 
3. 
Claims Related to Codefense Counsel’s Later 
 
Employment with District Attorney 
 
When a juvenile delinquency petition was filed against 
Tory T. in connection with the Quik Stop robbery, the court 
appointed the private law firm of Perry and Wildman.  Attorney 
Alan Cassidy had primary responsibility for the case and 
represented Tory when he entered into a written plea agreement 
with the prosecution.  Tory promised to testify against 
defendant and plead to a reduced charge in exchange for the 
prosecution’s recommendation that he be released from custody 
and placed on probation.  The next day, Tory testified at a 
preliminary hearing.  During the months Cassidy represented 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
26 
Tory, Cassidy had applied for and ultimately accepted an offer 
of employment with the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s 
Office.  Almost two weeks after Tory entered the plea agreement 
and testified at defendant’s preliminary hearing, Cassidy 
started work at the district attorney’s office.  
 
Based on these facts, defendant filed a pretrial motion 
seeking recusal of the entire district attorney’s office and 
disclosure of all communications between Tory and Cassidy.  In 
the alternative, he argued Tory should be precluded from 
testifying at trial.  Cassidy and the head of his former firm 
testified at a hearing on the motion.  Both claimed the attorney-
client privilege as to communications with Tory and the contents 
of his case file.  Cassidy testified that the plea negotiations for 
Tory began early in the case and “had been pretty much 
finalized” well before Cassidy became aware of the opening at 
the district attorney’s office.  He stated that the possibility of 
this employment did not change his negotiations for Tory, and 
he acted at all times in Tory’s best interest.  Once at the district 
attorney’s office, in accordance with its conflicts policy, Cassidy 
took no part in discussions about any cases handled by his 
former firm.  Cassidy had no supervisorial role in the 
prosecutor’s office.  
 
The court refused to order production of Tory’s case file 
because it contained privileged documents and defendant 
presented no ground for invading the privilege.  The court also 
denied the motions to recuse the district attorney’s office or 
preclude Tory from testifying.   The district attorney’s office and 
Cassidy had taken appropriate steps to prevent Cassidy’s 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
27 
involvement in the case, and the court found nothing to suggest 
interference with defendant’s right to a fair trial.13  
 
 a. 
Discovery Motion  
 
Defendant 
contends 
his 
rights 
to 
confrontation, 
compulsory process, and due process were violated by the denial 
of discovery into Tory’s discussions with his former attorney.  
We have previously rejected similar claims and do so again. 
 
The attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest recognized, 
allows a client to refuse to disclose, and to prevent others from 
disclosing, confidential communications with an attorney.  
(Evid. Code, § 954.)  The “fundamental purpose behind the 
privilege is to safeguard the confidential relationship between 
clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open 
discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal 
matters.”  (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599.)  
The privilege is absolute (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior 
Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 (Costco)) and can take 
precedence even over a criminal defendant’s trial rights.  Thus, 
                                        
13  
This hearing, very early in defendant’s case, featured the 
first of his courtroom outbursts.  (Another is described post, at 
page 61, footnote 17.)  When the court was announcing its 
ruling, defendant interrupted: 
 
“THE COURT:  . . . And it appears to me that he would get 
a fair trial. 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Bull shit. 
 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Hey, that’s enough. 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  I don’t get no fair trial, man. 
 
“THE COURT:  You haven’t even had your trial yet, Mr. 
Bell. 
 
“[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL, 
apparently 
speaking 
to 
defendant]:  That’s okay.  That’s enough.  This is not helping.” 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
28 
it is settled that “a criminal defendant’s right to due process does 
not entitle him to invade the attorney-client privilege of 
another.”  (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 594; see 
People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 (Johnson).)  Nor 
does the withholding of material protected by the attorney-client 
privilege violate a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation.  
(Gurule, at p. 594; see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 
39, 54.) 
 
Similar facts arose in Littlefield v. Superior Court (1982) 
136 Cal.App.3d 477.  Two individuals were charged with a series 
of murders, but one pleaded guilty with a promise to testify 
against the other.  (Id. at pp. 480-481.)  The remaining 
defendant sought to discover conversations between that 
individual and his public defender, arguing he needed these 
confidential communications to impeach this crucial witness 
against him.  (Id. at pp. 481-482.)  The Court of Appeal observed 
that the attorney-client privilege continues even after the 
relationship has ended, and that bolstering an attack on a 
witness’s credibility was not a valid reason to invade the 
privilege.  (Id. at pp. 482-483.)  Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at 
page 1228 adopted Littlefield’s reasoning against a similar 
challenge.  As in those cases, defendant here was able to cross-
examine Tory about the plea bargain and Tory’s motivation for 
testifying.  He was not entitled to obtain absolutely privileged 
communications between Tory and his attorney merely to 
bolster this attack.  (See Johnson, at p. 1228; Littlefield, at 
p. 482.) 
 
Nor is there merit to defendant’s argument that the trial 
court should have held an in camera hearing to balance his 
constitutional rights against the confidentiality interests of Tory 
and his attorney.  With few exceptions, none of which apply 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
29 
here, the court may not require disclosure in order to rule on a 
privilege claim.  (Evid. Code, § 915, subd. (a); Costco, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at pp. 736-739.)  To support a contrary position, 
defendant cites a dissenting opinion positing that in camera 
review and a balancing of interests might be appropriate to 
avoid “[e]xtreme injustice” when “a criminal defendant seeks 
disclosure of a deceased client’s confession to the offense.”  
(Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998) 524 U.S. 399, 413 (dis. 
opn. of O’Connor, J.).)  Justice O’Connor’s concerns about 
preventing injustice after a client’s death simply do not apply 
here.  Tory was both alive and subject to cross-examination.  The 
trial court correctly denied defendant’s request and was not 
required to conduct an in camera hearing before doing so. 
 
 b. 
Motion to Recuse District Attorney’s 
  
Office  
 
Defendant’s recusal motion was properly denied.  A 
motion to recuse the district attorney “may not be granted 
unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that 
would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair 
trial.”  (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1).)  “The statute ‘articulates a two-part 
test:  “(i) is there a conflict of interest?; and (ii) is the conflict so 
severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting?” ’ ”  
(Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 
(Haraguchi).)  A “conflict” exists, under section 1424’s first 
prong, whenever there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the DA’s 
office may not exercise its discretionary function in an 
evenhanded manner.’ ”  (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 
580, 592 (Eubanks).)  But recusal is not required unless, under 
the second prong, the possibility of unfair treatment “is so great 
that it is more likely than not the defendant will be treated 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
30 
unfairly during some portion of the criminal proceedings.”  
(Haraguchi, at p. 713.) 
 
The trial court’s decision on a motion to recuse the 
prosecutor is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Haraguchi, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 711), “even in capital cases” (Hollywood v. 
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 721, 728).  The trial court’s 
factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its 
application of the law will be reversed only if arbitrary and 
capricious.  (Haraguchi, at pp. 711-712; People v. Vasquez (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 47, 56.) 
 
Defendant fails to show an abuse of discretion.  Cassidy 
negotiated a plea bargain that served the best interests of his 
client.  The terms of this agreement were discussed “well before” 
Cassidy applied for employment with the district attorney.  The 
agreement was finalized before he started work there.  Cassidy 
did not participate in any way in this case.  His only 
conversations about the matter concerned scheduling his own 
appearance to testify at the recusal hearing.  Drawing in part 
on cases from the civil context, defendant complains the district 
attorney’s “ ‘ethical screen’ ” was inadequate because the office 
employed few attorneys and Cassidy’s work area was located 
near those of defendant’s prosecutors.  The court credited 
Cassidy’s sworn testimony that he took no part in any case 
discussions.  Defendant offers nothing to the contrary beyond 
speculation.  Even assuming the circumstances gave rise to a 
conflict, recusal was appropriate only if defendant could show a 
“real, not merely apparent,” potential for prejudice.  (Eubanks, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 592.)  Because defendant failed to show 
an actual likelihood that he would receive unfair treatment as a 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
31 
result of Cassidy’s employment (see ibid.), the court properly 
denied the recusal motion.14 
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
 
1. 
Alleged Confrontation Errors 
 
Defendant 
claims 
his 
constitutional 
rights 
to 
confrontation and effective cross-examination were violated 
three times during the guilt phase.  To the extent the claims are 
not forfeited, there was no prejudicial error. 
 
 a. 
Admission of Deceased Codefendant’s 
  
Statements  
 
At the close of his guilt phase evidence, defendant called 
Detective 
Olson 
for 
additional 
questioning 
about 
the 
investigation.  Among other things, defendant asked about the 
forensic testing done on a “possible bloodstain sample” taken 
from the Chevy Beretta’s passenger door frame.  Olson said he 
sent the sample to the Department of Justice for testing but 
never received the results.  On cross-examination, Olson 
testified that there was little blood at the crime scene and no 
reason to believe a substance found on the car “at some point 
later on” would be blood.  The following colloquy ensued: 
                                        
14  
Defendant also contends section 1424 violates equal 
protection because it applies more relaxed ethical standards to 
conflicts arising in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases.  
Because he failed to raise this challenge below it is forfeited, as 
are his derivative claims that section 1424 violates due process 
and the right to a reliable penalty judgment.  (See People v. 
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14.)   
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
32 
 
“Q: 
Did you also receive information from [Roseada 
T.][15] that things were done to that car subsequent or after 
the killing? 
 
“A: 
That’s correct. 
 
“Q: 
Did she tell you that the car was washed? 
 
“A: 
She said it was washed, yes. 
 
“Q: 
At a professional car wash? 
 
“A: 
I don’t recall if she said professional.  What I recall 
— at least the portion I recall is that she went out the next 
morning and washed down the interior of the car herself.  
That’s what I recall. 
 
“Q: 
Did she also talk about washing the exterior of the 
car, if you remember? 
 
“A: 
I recall something about the exterior, but I don’t 
know if she did it or a professional did it.” 
 
Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.  During a 
recess, however, he complained that the prosecutor had elicited 
statements made by a codefendant in violation of People v. 
Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 
391 U.S. 123.  Counsel said he had not objected at the time 
because he “didn’t think that was the appropriate thing to do in 
terms of trial strategy,” but he argued the testimony was 
material and grounds for a mistrial.   
 
The court denied the motion.  First, defendant failed to 
object, even though he had an opportunity to do so.  Any problem 
could have been cured at that time.  Second, defendant had 
opened the door to this evidence by questioning Detective Olson 
                                        
15  
As noted, Roseada died of natural causes before trial.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
33 
about the failure to test possible blood found on the car, and the 
prosecution had a right to follow up and explain why testing 
would have been futile.  The court invited defendant to submit 
an appropriate limiting instruction, but no such instruction was 
sought or given. 
 
Although he asserted Aranda/Bruton error below, 
defendant now concedes the rule “has no application where, as 
here, the defendant and the codefendant whose incriminating 
extrajudicial statements are offered . . . are not jointly tried.”  
(See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537 (Brown).)  In 
any event, Roseada’s statements about washing the car were not 
“ ‘facially incriminating’ of defendant and so would not run afoul 
of the rule.”  (Id. at p. 537, fn. 5; see Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 
481 U.S. 200, 207.)  Defendant now complains the admission of 
Roseada’s statements about washing the car violated his 
confrontation rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 
U.S. 36 (Crawford).  Assuming this claim was not forfeited by 
defendant’s failure to make a timely hearsay objection at trial 
(see Evid. Code, § 353), it also lacks merit. 
 
Detective Olson related an out-of-court statement from 
Roseada, but the statement was admissible, regardless of its 
truth, to show its effect on Olson.  It tended to explain why Olson 
had not pursued forensic testing of the possible blood stain 
found on Roseada’s car.  “ ‘ “[E]vidence of a declarant’s 
statement that is offered to prove that the statement imparted 
certain information to the hearer and that the hearer, believing 
such information to be true, acted in conformity with that belief 
. . . is not hearsay, since it is the hearer’s reaction to the 
statement that is the relevant fact sought to be proved, not the 
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1162.)  “Out-of-court 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
34 
statements that are not offered for their truth are not hearsay 
under California law [citations], nor do they run afoul of the 
confrontation clause.”  (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 
775-776 (Ervine).)  Moreover, as the trial court observed, the 
defense opened the door by questioning Olson about his failure 
to test for blood on the car.  Defendant’s questioning insinuated 
that the investigation was sloppy, and Roseada’s statement was 
admissible to rebut that suggestion.  Accordingly, there was no 
confrontation clause violation.  Although a limiting instruction 
was not given, defendant is in no position to complain.  He failed 
to make a hearsay objection and, despite the court’s invitation, 
failed to propose a limiting instruction. 
 
 b. 
Testimony Regarding Citizen 
  
Informant’s Identification  
 
Defendant’s probation officer, Michael Moore, testified at 
the preliminary hearing that he called the Turlock Police 
Department after he recognized a newspaper photograph 
related to the Quik Stop murder.  Moore was shown the 
surveillance tape and still images from the video.  He told police 
that the shooter’s posture, gait, and voice all resembled 
defendant.  Defendant moved to exclude Moore’s testimony from 
trial, arguing it would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  The 
court denied the motion, with the prosecution’s assurance that 
the jury would not learn defendant was on probation.  
 
Before Moore was called to testify, he informed the 
prosecutor that he recognized one of the seated jurors.  The juror 
was an acquaintance who might know Moore’s occupation.  
Defendant refused to agree to a stipulation in lieu of Moore’s live 
testimony, and the prosecution decided not to risk a mistrial by 
calling Moore as a witness.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
35 
 
Later, defendant called Detective Olson and questioned 
him about the surveillance video.  When asked why he had 
watched the video on one occasion, Olson replied, without 
naming Moore, that he “had a person that wanted to look at it.”  
Defense counsel asked if Olson had “discussions with anyone 
about the height and weight of [the] perpetrator . . . after 
watching the videotape.”  Olson responded that he and the 
unnamed person had such a discussion while they watched the 
tape together, and this discussion informed his opinion about 
the suspect’s appearance.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor 
sought to flesh out this testimony.  He requested permission to 
ask about information Olson had received from a citizen 
informant, promising not to name Moore or his occupation. The 
court remarked that the defense had “opened the door” and 
allowed the questioning.   
 
The prosecutor elicited testimony that, the day after the 
crime, Olson met with a citizen informant who knew defendant.  
Olson showed this person the surveillance videotape and 
photographs and played an audiotape from the crime.  The 
prosecutor then asked what the person said about how the 
photograph looked in relation to defendant.  Before Olson could 
answer, the court interrupted and excused the jury.  During the 
ensuing colloquy, defense counsel objected to the questioning on 
foundation and hearsay grounds and continued to dispute that 
his questions had opened the door for testimony about Olson’s 
discussion with Moore.  The prosecutor argued that Moore’s 
statements identifying defendant as the person in the videotape 
could be admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of establishing 
why Olson proceeded as he did with the investigation.  Although 
the court did not accept this argument, it allowed the prosecutor 
to elicit evidence of what Olson did after talking to the citizen 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
36 
informant.  Defense counsel did not object to this resolution.  
Back on the stand, the prosecutor asked Olson what he did 
“based on” watching the surveillance tape with the citizen 
informant.  Olson replied, “I set up an appointment to meet with 
Michael Bell.”  
 
Defendant now complains “the identification statements 
of Michael Moore [related] through the testimony of Detective 
Olson” were hearsay, admitted in violation of due process and 
the confrontation clause.  (See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36.)  
Although Olson did not relate a hearsay statement attributable 
to Moore, defendant argues the informant’s identification of him 
was obvious to jurors.  Citing various federal appellate 
decisions, 
he 
argues 
Crawford 
extends 
to 
“testimony 
communicating the substance of an absent declarant’s 
statements . . . even when there is no verbatim account of the 
declarant’s testimonial hearsay.”  (See Ocampo v. Vail (9th Cir. 
2011) 649 F.3d 1098, 1110; Ryan v. Miller (2d Cir. 2002) 303 
F.3d 231, 250-251.) 
 
Assuming without deciding that the claim was preserved, 
and a legitimate application of the hearsay rule, any error in the 
admission of Olson’s testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 
18.)  An implied identification from an unidentified citizen 
informant was not significant given the considerable direct and 
circumstantial evidence placing defendant at the crime scene.  
Neither side mentioned it during closing argument.  Defendant’s 
claim that Tory committed the crime was comparatively quite 
weak.  The defense was itself based primarily on hearsay and 
did not account for the significant disparity in the two men’s 
statures.  Defendant was close to 6 feet, 5 inches tall and 260 
pounds, while Tory was only 5 feet, 10 inches, and 135 pounds.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
37 
Finally, the jury viewed the tape repeatedly.  They saw Tory 
testify and saw defendant daily.  They were able to form their 
own opinions about whether defendant was the person in the 
surveillance tape. 
 
 c. 
Witness Who Invoked Privilege Against 
  
Self-incrimination 
 
Before trial, defense counsel learned that prosecution 
witness Debra Ochoa was on felony probation or parole and 
would claim her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination if asked questions about gun possession or 
ownership.  The prosecution hoped to show that the murder 
weapon was sold to Ochoa, who gave it to defendant.  Defense 
counsel said he would not object to the prosecutor establishing 
Ochoa’s possession of the gun through other witnesses but 
opposed mention of her expected testimony during opening 
statements.  The prosecutor agreed, and the topic was not 
mentioned in openings.  
 
During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Los Angeles 
resident Phillip Campbell testified that he sold a .357 Smith & 
Wesson revolver to Nick Feder in 1995.  Feder testified that he 
purchased the gun from Campbell and four or five months later 
sold it to his friend Debra Ochoa.  Feder said the murder weapon 
recovered by the police looked just like the gun he sold Ochoa.  
 
Before Ochoa’s testimony, the court held a hearing outside 
the jury’s presence.  In response to the prosecutor’s questions, 
Ochoa said defendant had been her friend for approximately 14 
years and had worked for her on many occasions. When defense 
counsel asked if she ever gave defendant a handgun, Ochoa 
invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege.  Arguing Ochoa’s 
invocation prevented an effective cross-examination, defendant 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
38 
moved to exclude her testimony and strike the testimony of 
Feder and Campbell.  The prosecutor responded that any cross-
examination about the gun would be outside the scope of her 
direct, which would be limited to questions about Ochoa’s 
relationship with defendant.  The court permitted the 
prosecution to call Ochoa but ruled neither party could ask her 
questions that would elicit an invocation of the privilege.  In the 
jury’s presence, Ochoa testified that she had known defendant 
for approximately 14 years.  Defendant did not cross-examine.  
 
Defendant now complains the court violated his 
confrontation rights by allowing Ochoa to testify because her 
anticipated claim of privilege prevented him from cross-
examining her about the gun.  Prosecution witnesses traced the 
gun to Ochoa before the crime.  After the crime, witnesses 
described receiving the gun from defendant.  Defendant argues 
his inability to cross-examine Ochoa was prejudicial because he 
could not combat the prosecution’s inference, advanced in both 
guilt and penalty phase closing arguments, that Ochoa had 
given defendant the murder weapon.  The claim lacks merit. 
 
The trial court properly explored Ochoa’s claim of privilege 
and instructed the parties not to ask questions that would 
prompt its invocation.  (See Evid. Code, § 913, subd. (a); People 
v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743.)  The constitutional 
concern raised by a witness’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
is that the witness cannot be cross-examined about the 
testimony that elicited the claim.  (See People v. Douglas (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 468, 508.)  There was no Sixth Amendment violation 
here because the trial court’s ruling prevented Ochoa from 
providing any testimony that would have evaded cross-
examination.  The prosecution properly asked about Ochoa’s 
relationship with defendant, which was relevant.  Defendant 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
39 
was free to cross-examine her on that subject.  If defendant 
wished to dispel the inference that Ochoa gave him Feder’s gun, 
he could have asked whether she saw defendant during his trip 
to Los Angeles, or generally how they spent that time together.  
Defendant was not precluded from eliciting facts about their 
friendship that might have cut against the inference that Ochoa 
gave him a weapon. 
 
It also bears noting that any hindrance of defendant’s 
cross-examination 
resulted 
from 
Ochoa 
and 
was 
not 
attributable to the People or the court.  Her “attorney’s decisions 
regarding the best means to defend her, including the advice to 
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, may not have 
been consistent with defendant’s interest, but they do not 
establish prosecutorial manipulation or any other impropriety.”  
(People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 442, fn. 7 (Mincey).)  To 
the extent defendant contends the prosecution should not have 
been allowed to call Ochoa without granting her immunity, he 
did not request this remedy below.  Although defendant now 
speculates that Ochoa could have given the gun to someone else, 
he also risked the possibility that her testimony would be quite 
damaging.  “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an 
opportunity 
for 
effective 
cross-examination, 
not 
cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 
extent, the defense might wish.”  (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 
474 U.S. 15, 20.)  The prosecution was not required to grant 
unsolicited immunity or forgo calling a relevant witness under 
these circumstances. 
 
2. 
Admission of Surveillance Videotape  
 
Before trial, defendant moved under Evidence Code 
section 352 to exclude the audio from the crime scene 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
40 
surveillance video.  He argued the victim’s noises after being 
shot were “extremely prejudicial” and not probative.  After 
listening to the tape, the court disagreed, noting that the tape 
was probative to show what happened during the offense.  
Moreover, the tape captured the sound of two gunshots outside, 
which corroborated the account of the truck driver who said he 
was shot at by someone who had just come out of the store.  The 
court took the matter under submission but was inclined to find 
that the audiotape’s probative value outweighed any prejudice.  
The record does not include a ruling on defendant’s motion.  
However, in later proceedings the attorneys repeatedly observed 
that approximately two minutes of footage containing the 
victim’s dying sounds had been edited out of the videotape 
shown during the guilt phase. 
 
The prosecution played the videotape with two guilt-phase 
witnesses. During the testimony of store owner Henry 
Benjamin, the prosecutor played footage that simultaneously 
displayed images from four surveillance cameras.  She then 
showed footage of the crime captured by two additional cameras.  
A later portion of the videotape was shown during the testimony 
of customer Richard Faughn, who had found the clerk and called 
911.  The prosecutor played footage starting when Faughn 
entered the store and ending when responding officers arrived 
at the scene.  The video was also played during the prosecution’s 
guilt phase closing argument.  
 
Defendant’s opening brief on appeal contends the trial 
court erred by allowing the prosecutor to repeatedly play sounds 
of the victim dying during the guilt phase of trial.  However, 
apart from his response immediately upon being shot, the 
victim’s sounds were redacted from the video shown in the guilt 
phase.  Defendant’s own trial attorney observed that the court 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
41 
had “limited the playing of the [tape] to the video only without 
the sounds.”  Accordingly, defendant’s claim is at variance with 
the record.  To the extent defendant now argues the court erred 
in allowing video images of the crime to be shown multiple 
times, the claim has been forfeited.  Defense counsel specifically 
told the court, “I’m not objecting to the tape or any portion of the 
tape except the small portion that records the victim’s dying.”  
The court addressed that issue by having the sounds removed.  
Defense counsel questioned the wisdom of showing the crime 
from multiple camera angles after the video proved to be 
upsetting to the victim’s family members who attended the trial.  
But he did not raise an objection.  In any event, there was no 
error.  The videotape was highly probative evidence of how the 
crime was committed.  Further, because the victim was shot 
while lying behind a counter, images of the victim sustaining the 
wounds were not presented. 
 
During the penalty phase, the prosecutor sought to play 
the entire surveillance tape, including the two minutes after the 
shooting that had been redacted in the guilt phase.  Over 
defense counsel’s objection that sounds of the victim dying were 
“inflammatory,” the court observed that a murder victim’s last 
moments are relevant at the penalty stage.  The court admitted 
the entire tape, and the prosecutor played it during her closing 
argument.  Defendant claims the court erred because the record 
does not affirmatively establish that the court weighed the 
tape’s relevance against the potential for undue prejudice.  (See 
Evid. Code, § 352.)  He argues the prejudicial effect of the 
victim’s dying noises was “compounded” by statements in the 
prosecutor’s closing argument imagining what the victim’s last 
thoughts might have been.  Defendant did not object to these 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
42 
statements in the prosecutor’s closing argument, and his appeal 
does not claim the argument was improper. 
 
The court has discretion to exclude evidence under 
Evidence Code section 352 “if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the probability that its admission will 
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  “ ‘ “Prejudice” as contemplated by 
[Evidence Code] section 352 is not so sweeping as to include any 
evidence the opponent finds inconvenient.  Evidence is not 
prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely 
because it undermines the opponent’s position or shores up that 
of the proponent.  The ability to do so is what makes evidence 
relevant.  The code speaks in terms of undue prejudice.  Unless 
the dangers of undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption 
“ ‘substantially outweigh’ ” the probative value of relevant 
evidence, a section 352 objection should fail.  [Citation.]  . . .  The 
prejudice that section 352 “ ‘is designed to avoid is not the 
prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from 
relevant, highly probative evidence.’  [Citations.]  ‘Rather, the 
statute uses the word in its etymological sense of “prejudging” a 
person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors. [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]”  [Citation.]  In other words, evidence should be 
excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is of such nature as to 
inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the 
information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is 
relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ 
emotional reaction.  In such a circumstance, the evidence is 
unduly prejudicial because of the substantial likelihood the jury 
will use it for an illegitimate purpose.’ ”  (People v. Doolin (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 390, 438-439.)  “An exercise of discretion under 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
43 
Evidence Code section 352 will be affirmed unless it was 
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and the ruling resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
402, 469 (Winbush).) 
 
As to victim photographs, the court’s discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence showing 
circumstances of the crime “is much narrower at the penalty 
phase than at the guilt phase.  This is so because the prosecution 
has the right to establish the circumstances of the crime, 
including its gruesome consequences ([Pen. Code,] § 190.3, 
factor (a)), and because the risk of an improper guilt finding 
based on visceral reactions is no longer present.”  (People v. 
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 353-354; see People v. Anderson 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 591-592.)  At the penalty phase, the jury 
“is expected to subjectively weigh the evidence, and the 
prosecution is entitled to place the capital offense and the 
offender in a morally bad light.”  (Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 1201.) 
 
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
unredacted videotape in the penalty phase.  There is no dispute 
that it accurately represents the events depicted.  The 
prosecution was entitled to demonstrate the full extent of the 
suffering defendant inflicted on his victim.  We have listened to 
the penalty-phase tape.  The sounds are relatively brief, lasting 
around 30 seconds.  While unpleasant, they are not so gruesome 
that they would distract the jury or prevent it from performing 
its proper role. 
 
3. 
Character Evidence  
 
Defendant asserts the court erred in allowing Kenneth A.’s 
mother to testify about her son’s untruthfulness.  Kenneth, who 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
44 
testified for defendant, said Tory had bragged in juvenile hall 
that he had committed the Quik Stop murder.  The prosecution 
called Kenneth’s mother in rebuttal.  Regina A. had raised her 
son until he was 13.  During the ensuing six years, they had only 
infrequent contact when she visited Kenneth in juvenile hall or 
county jail.  Regina thought she knew her son well, although not 
“real well.”  She knew his family members but not many of his 
friends or neighbors.  Over defendant’s objection, the court 
allowed Regina to give an opinion that sometimes Kenneth was 
truthful and sometimes he was not.  She said he had been known 
to lie at times to gain an advantage for himself.  Defendant also 
objected unsuccessfully when Regina was asked whether 
Kenneth had a reputation among family members for 
truthfulness.  She responded, “they probably would think that 
he wasn’t truthful.”   
 
Evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness, or its 
opposite, is relevant to credibility and admissible for this 
purpose.  (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (e).)  This evidence may be 
shown by “(a) evidence of specific instances of conduct, 
(b) opinion evidence, or (c) reputation evidence.”  (Simons, Cal. 
Evidence Manual (2018) Witnesses, § 3:49, p. 288.) 
 
Defendant concedes evidence of Kenneth A.’s character for 
truthfulness was admissible but argues there was insufficient 
foundation for Regina’s testimony about it.  A lay witness may 
testify to an opinion if the testimony is based on the witness’s 
personal observations or knowledge.  (See People v. McAlpin 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1306-1307.)  “An individual who has 
known a witness for a reasonable length of time or who knows 
the reputation of that witness for honesty and veracity in the 
community may qualify to testify as to the witness’ character for 
honesty or veracity.”  (People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
45 
34, 39.)  Regina had raised her son for 13 years.  Although her 
contact with Kenneth grew less frequent, she continued to visit 
him during the time he was in custody.  These contacts were 
more than adequate to establish a foundation of personal 
knowledge.  (See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.)  Nor 
did the court err in admitting reputation testimony.  Although 
Regina could not speak to Kenneth’s reputation among friends 
and neighbors, she was aware of his reputation for honesty 
among family members.  Her testimony about Kenneth’s 
reputation was limited to these family views.  (See People v. 
Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 164.) 
 
4. 
Alleged Instructional Errors 
 
 a. 
Credibility of a Drug Addict  
 
Several prosecution witnesses, including its key witness 
Tory T., admitted being under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
at the time of the events they described.  At the close of the guilt 
phase, defendant requested an instruction stating:  “The 
testimony of a drug addict must be examined and weighed by 
the jury with greater care than the testimony of a witness who 
does not abuse drugs.  The jury must determine whether the 
testimony of the drug addict has been affected by the drug use 
or the need to obtain drugs.”  The court properly refused to give 
the instruction.  
 
“[A] trial court may properly refuse an instruction offered 
by the defendant if it incorrectly states the law, is 
argumentative, duplicative, or potentially confusing [citation], 
or if it is not supported by substantial evidence [citation].”  
(People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 30 (Moon).)  Instructions 
that highlight specific evidence, or invite the jury to draw 
inferences favorable to one side, are considered argumentative 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
46 
and generally should not be given.  (People v. Earp (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 826, 886; Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 437.)   
 
In directing the jury to examine the testimony of certain 
prosecution witnesses with greater skepticism, defendant’s 
proposed instruction was argumentative.  It implied that 
witnesses had not only used drugs but were addicted to them.  
It was also duplicative of a proposed instruction the court did 
give, with modification, at defendant’s request.  The jury was 
instructed:  “In determining the credibility of a witness, you may 
consider the witness’s capacity to hear or see that about which 
the witness testified and the witness’s ability to recollect or 
relate such matters.  [¶] Specifically, in this regard, you may 
consider whether any witness was under the influence of alcohol 
and drugs or other intoxicants at the time the witness testified.  
If you believe that any witness was under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicants at the time the witness 
testified, this factor may be considered by you in judging the 
credibility of the witness.”  The court did not err in refusing to 
give defendant’s duplicative instruction on the same topic. 
 
Although defendant contends federal courts have allowed 
similar instructions, the decisions he cites involved “a far 
narrower category of witnesses—namely, narcotics addicts who 
are paid informers for the Government with criminal charges 
pending against them.”  (U.S. v. Kinnard (D.C. Cir. 1972) 465 
F.2d 566, 572; see U.S. v. Collins (5th Cir. 1972) 472 F.2d 1017, 
1018.)  Paid informers present special reliability concerns not 
present here.  Moreover, federal courts have held that the 
“addict-informer” jury instruction is not required if the witness 
has been cross-examined about the addiction or if another 
cautionary instruction has been given.  (U.S. v. Vgeri (9th Cir. 
1995) 51 F.3d 876, 881.) 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
47 
 
 b. 
Lesser-included Offense of Firearm 
  
Discharge  
 
Defendant was charged with the felony of maliciously and 
willfully discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle (§ 246) 
when he shot at truck driver Daniel Perry.  A related statute, 
section 246.3, subdivision (a), makes it a public offense to 
“willfully discharge[] a firearm in a grossly negligent manner 
which could result in injury or death to a person.”  The only 
difference between the two crimes is that the charged offense 
“requires that an inhabited dwelling or other specified object be 
within the defendant’s firing range.”  (People v. Ramirez (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 980, 990 (Ramirez).)  Section 246.3, subdivision (a) is 
a necessarily included lesser offense of section 246.  (Ramirez, 
at p. 990.) 
 
“ ‘[A] trial court must give “ ‘ “instructions on lesser 
included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to 
whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present 
[citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was 
less than that charged.” ’ ”  [Citation.]  “As our prior decisions 
explain, the existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ will 
not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such 
instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant 
is guilty only of the lesser offense is ‘substantial enough to merit 
consideration’ by the jury.  [Citations.]  ‘Substantial evidence’ in 
this context is ‘ “evidence from which a jury composed of 
reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[]” ’ that the lesser 
offense, but not the greater, was committed.”  [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 477.) 
 
The People contend defendant invited any error.  The trial 
court asked whether additional instructions were needed on 
lesser offenses; defense counsel agreed they were not.  The 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
48 
invited error doctrine bars an appellate challenge to the absence 
of a lesser included offense instruction if the defendant, for 
tactical reasons, persuaded the trial court to forgo giving the 
instruction.  (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 927-928; 
People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 905.)  However, the 
doctrine does not apply if defendant merely acquiesced in the 
absence of an instruction.  (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 
216, 229.)  “The record must reflect that counsel had a deliberate 
tactical purpose.”  (Ibid.; accord Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
p. 28.)  Because the record here reveals no such purpose, nor 
indeed any discussion of a specific instruction, the doctrine does 
not apply. 
 
The People also argue there is no substantial evidence 
defendant committed only the lesser offense.  “The crime of 
shooting at an occupied vehicle ‘is not limited to shooting 
directly at [the] occupied target.’  (People v. Overman (2005) 126 
Cal.App.4th 1344, 1355-1356.)  Rather, the applicable statute 
‘proscribes shooting either directly at or in close proximity to an 
. . . occupied target under circumstances showing a conscious 
disregard for the probability that one or more bullets will strike 
the target or persons in or around it.’ ”  (People v. Phung (2018) 
25 Cal.App.5th 741, 761.)  Thus, to find defendant guilty of 
section 246.3, subdivision (a) but not section 246, the jury would 
have had to find that defendant’s shots were not aimed at or “ ‘in 
close proximity to’ ” Perry’s truck.  (Phung, at p. 761; see 
Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 990.) 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
49 
 
Two witnesses described the shooting.16  Perry testified 
that he saw someone emerge from the Quik Stop and heard two 
shots.  The shooter was running toward his truck.  Perry later 
found a dent in his passenger door, which suggested the vehicle 
had been hit.  Perry thought the shots were directed at him but 
never said he saw the shooter aim at his truck.  Tory, however, 
testified that he saw defendant shoot at Perry.  According to 
Tory, defendant also said he “shot at the trucker” because 
defendant wanted to leave no witnesses.  Defendant argues the 
jury could have disregarded Tory’s testimony because he “had 
significant credibility problems.”  Even so, the record includes 
no evidence that defendant fired aimlessly or into the air.  
“ ‘Speculation is an insufficient basis upon which to require the 
giving of an instruction on a lesser offense.’ ”  (People v. Rogers 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1169.)  There was no substantial 
evidence that defendant was guilty only of a grossly negligent 
firearm discharge.  The court had no sua sponte duty to instruct 
on this lesser offense.  (See People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
175, 215-217 (Huggins).) 
 
Instructions 
on 
lesser 
included 
offenses 
are 
not 
constitutionally required in a noncapital case.  (People v. 
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165.)  Nevertheless, 
defendant contends the court’s failure to instruct on 
section 246.3, subdivision (a) violated due process and denied 
him a reliable penalty determination.  He argues that, in a 
capital case, due process requires instructions on all lesser 
included offenses supported by the evidence.  (See Beck v. 
                                        
16  
The jury may also have heard gunshots in the store’s 
surveillance video, but the sound would not have disclosed 
where the shots were aimed. 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
50 
Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637-638.)  The constitutional 
concerns in Beck v. Alabama are not implicated when, as here, 
substantial evidence does not support an instruction.  (People v. 
Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 404 (Romero).)  Moreover, 
defendant’s federal authorities discuss the importance of 
instructing on lesser noncapital offenses that are necessarily 
included within a capital charge.  (See Beck, at pp. 634-637.)  
Here, defendant’s claim centers on a lesser offense to an 
auxiliary charge that is entirely separate from his first degree 
murder conviction. 
 
5. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct  
 
Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by trivializing the reasonable doubt standard during the guilt 
phase closing argument.  The claim fails. 
 
Before closing arguments, the jury heard numerous 
instructions including one defining reasonable doubt (CALJIC 
No. 2.90).  Referring back to this instruction, the prosecutor 
made the following statements in his rebuttal argument:  “You 
have got an instruction about reasonable doubt. . . . Reasonable 
doubt is not all possible doubt.  It has to be based on reason.  [¶] 
If I take this quarter and flip it in the air over a hard surface, 
it’s possible it could land on heads or it’s possible it could land 
on tails.  It’s reasonable either way.  It’s reasonable because it’s 
based on physics, logic and reason.  [¶] But if I flip this coin up 
in the air and expected it to land smack dab on its side and stay 
standing still, is it possible?  Sure, it’s possible.  Anything is 
possible, but is it reasonable?”  The court overruled defendant’s 
objection that this argument misstated the reasonable doubt 
standard.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
51 
 
“As we have often explained, ‘it is improper for the 
prosecutor to misstate the law generally [citation], and 
particularly to attempt to absolve the prosecution from its prima 
facie obligation to overcome reasonable doubt on all elements 
[citation].’  (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 831.)  
Improper comments violate the federal Constitution when they 
constitute a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the 
trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of 
due process.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)  
Improper comments falling short of this test nevertheless 
constitute misconduct under state law if they involve use of 
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 
either the court or the jury.  (Ibid.)  To establish misconduct, 
defendant need not show that the prosecutor acted in bad faith.  
(Id. at p. 822.)”  (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 130 
(Cortez).)  However, “[w]hen attacking the prosecutor’s remarks 
to the jury, the defendant must show that, ‘[i]n the context of 
the whole argument and the instructions’ [citation], there was ‘a 
reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the 
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.’ ”  
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667 (Centeno).) 
 
“The case law is replete with innovative but ill-fated 
attempts to explain the reasonable doubt standard.”  (Centeno, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)  We have generally discouraged 
prosecutors from using colorful analogies or displays on this 
topic.  (Ibid.)   
 
The prosecutor’s coin-toss analogy here was somewhat 
problematic because it is commonly linked to the concept of 
probability and 50-50 odds.  Prosecutors should avoid drawing 
comparisons that risk confusing or trivializing the reasonable 
doubt standard.  Nevertheless, it is not reasonably likely the 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
52 
jury would have misunderstood the prosecutor’s argument as 
suggesting they could decide the case by flipping a coin.  This 
court does not “ ‘ “lightly infer” that the jury drew the most 
damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the 
prosecutor’s statements.  [Citation.]’ ”  (Brown, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at pp. 553-554.) 
Here, the prosecutor was attempting to explain the 
meaning of “reasonable.”  The jury had been properly instructed 
on the reasonable doubt standard, and the prosecutor’s 
argument specifically brought their attention to this instruction.  
(See Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 131-132.)  In contrast to 
some other cases, the prosecutor here did not attempt to 
quantify reasonable doubt or analogize it to everyday decisions 
like whether to change lanes in traffic.  (See People v. Nguyen 
(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 35-36.)  He gave jurors an example of 
a possible or imaginary, but unlikely, occurrence.  The statute 
defining the burden of proof expressly states that a “reasonable” 
doubt is not a mere “ ‘possible’ ” or “ ‘imaginary’ ” doubt.  (§ 1096; 
see Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 672.)  The prosecutor’s 
argument did not undermine this standard.  (See Romero, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 416.) 
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
 
1. 
Claims Related to Defendant’s Courtroom 
 
Outburst and Fight with Deputies 
 
Defendant raises several claims related to events after his 
courtroom outburst during the penalty phase.  (See ante, at 
p. 12.)  To recap:  Defendant became upset when his mother 
cried while leaving the stand.  Defense counsel asked for a 
recess, and the jurors left the courtroom.  Defendant began 
banging on counsel table with both hands, making noises, and 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
53 
trying to lift the table.  Courtroom deputies surrounded him and 
a scuffle ensued.  During this time, the judge retreated to his 
chambers.  It ultimately took nine deputies three to five minutes 
to subdue defendant, and some deputies were injured.  The 
judge later described the incident as the most serious courtroom 
disturbance he had seen in 17 years on the bench.  After 
defendant was removed, the court and counsel discussed 
potential security measures (see post, at pp. 68-70) and jury 
instructions.  
 
 a. 
Defendant’s Absence from Later 
  
Proceedings  
 
  
i. 
Background 
 
The next day, a Friday, defendant came to court in a 
wheelchair, wearing jail clothes, and reporting severe pain in 
his back and legs.  Defense counsel believed the pain would 
prevent him from participating in trial that day.  Counsel faced 
a dilemma, however, because witnesses had traveled to court to 
testify for the defense.  After defendant and his attorney 
conferred, defense counsel reported:  “Mr. Bell does not want to 
be here today.  He wants to go back to his cell. . . . He 
understands that there will be testimony.  He’s willing to not be 
here.  I told him what the testimony would be.  [¶] I believe that 
his presence will not be required for me to effectively present the 
testimony that I’m going to be presenting and any redirect or 
any other things I have to do today in court.  [¶] I think Mr. 
Bell’s physical condition is such that he’s going to be in pain, 
probably making some noise from having pain, moving around, 
which would distract me and disrupt the courtroom.  Therefore, 
I think the Court can make a finding . . . under the case law that 
he can be excluded for that reason.  [¶] I would be willing to 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
54 
waive any other irregularities that the Court feels would be 
appropriate.”   
 
The court and prosecutor expressed concern that it would 
be error to proceed in defendant’s absence.  The court observed 
it could have excluded defendant from court the previous day, 
based on his behavior, and then asked defense counsel, “are you 
saying things might get disrupted again today . . . ?”  Defense 
counsel confirmed that if the court did not grant defendant’s 
wish to be excused from trial that day, there was “a strong 
possibility of further disruption.”  Based on defendant’s express 
desire to be excused, his choice to wear jail clothing to court, his 
exceptional outburst the previous day, and his attorney’s 
prediction of further disruption, the court found grounds to 
excuse defendant for the day.  The court then suggested that the 
case could be continued to the following Monday.  Defendant 
initially agreed with that suggestion, but the scheduling was 
problematic for his expert witness, Nell Riley.  After again 
conferring with counsel, defendant expressly waived his right to 
be present.  He said he understood two psychologists and two 
character witnesses would be testifying that day and specifically 
affirmed that he did not object to their testifying in his absence.  
 
Immediately after defendant was excused from the 
courtroom, the court and counsel discussed a note from the jury 
about defendant’s violent behavior the previous day.  (See post, 
at pp. 63-65.)  The court questioned jurors about the note.  In 
this discussion, the court noted defendant’s absence and told the 
jury they could not consider it in deciding the case.  Defense 
counsel then presented testimony from expert Nell Riley, 
defendant’s brother Scheron Bell, and defendant’s ex-girlfriend 
L.O.  After a break in Riley’s testimony, the court admonished 
the jury again not to speculate about defendant’s absence “or 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
55 
consider that in any way in making [its] decision.”  After the jury 
was excused for the day, the court and counsel discussed jury 
instructions and evidentiary issues.  
 
Defendant returned to court on Monday, walking without 
assistance and wearing a suit.  He reported that he felt “fine.”  
The court asked if defendant was going to be disruptive, and 
defense counsel responded he was no longer concerned about 
disruptions because defendant was feeling better.  The court 
stressed that defendant had not been excused solely because he 
reported being in pain.  The court told counsel:  “I didn’t get that 
from what you said on Friday, that his disruptive behavior 
would only be because of the pain. . . . I was prepared to put the 
case over [until] Monday to see if he felt better.  [¶] You didn’t 
want to put the case over because you had your witnesses here 
and then you talked to Mr. Bell again, and . . . my interpretation 
of what you were saying is that, while he might be disruptive 
because of his pain, he might also be disruptive because I wasn’t 
going to let him go back to his jail cell.  [¶] I don’t want anything 
in the record here to indicate that we excluded him from trial 
against his will or just because he was in some pain after that 
incident on Thursday.  I mean, if that’s the case, you can call 
your witnesses back here and we will put them on again . . . .”  
Defense counsel did not ask to recall his witnesses.  Instead, he 
responded:  “Your Honor, I think that it’s clear from the record 
that was taken on Friday that Mr. Bell did not want to be here, 
that . . . — yes, I probably indicated that the disruption could 
have come from two sources.  I am not now trying to backpedal 
on what I said on Friday.”  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
56 
 
  
ii. 
Discussion 
 
Defendant now contends his absence from trial violated 
his rights to due process and confrontation under the state and 
federal constitutions and also violated state statutory law.  
Defendant waived his constitutional rights and any statutory 
error was harmless. 
 
A criminal defendant accused of a felony has the 
constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of the 
trial, including during the taking of evidence.  (Illinois v. Allen 
(1970) 397 U.S. 337, 338 (Allen); People v. Rundle (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 76, 133 (Rundle); People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
1164, 1209 (Jackson).)  “ ‘A competent defendant may waive that 
right, however.  [Citation.]  Neither the constitutional right to 
confrontation nor the right to due process precludes waiver of a 
defendant’s right to be present at a critical stage of a capital 
trial.  [Citation.]’ ”  (Romero, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 418; People 
v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 966 (Weaver).)  The waiver 
must, of course, be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  (See 
Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 21.) 
 
Defendant clearly and expressly waived his right to be 
present during Friday’s proceedings.  Nevertheless, he now 
asserts his waiver was not voluntary because he was offered no 
meaningful alternatives.  The record belies this claim.  The court 
offered to continue the trial until Monday, when defendant 
would presumably feel well enough to attend, but defendant’s 
expert witness was not available that day.  Defendant now 
faults the court for failing to offer a longer continuance, but he 
did not seek one below.  On the contrary, defendant’s attorney 
repeatedly said he was ready to proceed with the witnesses 
whose presence he had secured for that day, including an expert 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
57 
neuropsychologist who had traveled to court at some expense.  
Although defendant was initially agreeable when the court 
suggested delaying the trial until Monday, he changed his mind 
after conferring with counsel.  After this conference, defendant 
expressly affirmed that he wanted to return to his cell and for 
trial to proceed that day in his absence. 
 
We found a waiver voluntary under similar facts in 
Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164.  There, the defendant came to 
court with a black eye.  When the court refused to grant a 
continuance, the defendant expressed a preference to be absent 
that day.  (Id. at p. 1209.)  He was advised of his right to be 
present, told of the prosecution witnesses who would be 
testifying, and reminded he was eligible for the death penalty.  
(Ibid.)  There, as here, the defendant made it clear he wished to 
be absent.  (Ibid.)  We found “no constitutional infirmity . . . with 
the defendant’s voluntary waiver of his right to be present on a 
single day of the trial.”  (Id. at p. 1210.)  The same conclusion 
obtains here.  To the extent defendant faced a difficult choice, 
the problem was of his own making.  His suit was badly rumpled 
and he was in pain following the fight he had precipitated with 
courtroom deputies.  Although his behavior was subdued the 
next morning, he did not want to remain in court for the trial, 
even though witnesses his lawyer had brought to court would be 
testifying on his behalf.  After consulting with counsel, he 
expressly waived his right to be present.  Because the record 
confirms this waiver was knowing and voluntary, his absence 
from trial was not constitutional error.  (See Moon, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at pp. 20-21; Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967.) 
 
The defense also urges statutory error.  Section 977, 
subdivision (b)(1) states that in all felony cases, “the accused 
shall be personally present . . . during those portions of the trial 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
58 
when evidence is taken before the trier of fact,” unless he has 
executed a written waiver of that right in open court.  
Section 1043 generally provides that a felony defendant must be 
personally present at trial except that a defendant’s absence will 
not prevent trial from continuing to verdict in:  “(b) . . . [¶] 
(1) [a]ny case in which the defendant, after he has been warned 
by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his 
disruptive behavior, nevertheless insists on conducting himself 
in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the 
court that the trial cannot be carried on with him in the 
courtroom[, or] [¶] (2) [a]ny prosecution for an offense which is 
not punishable by death in which the defendant is voluntarily 
absent.” 
 
“Thus, when read together, sections 977 and 1043 permit 
a capital defendant to be absent from the courtroom only on two 
occasions:  (1) when he has been removed by the court for 
disruptive behavior under section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), and 
(2) when he voluntarily waives his rights pursuant to section 
977, subdivision (b)(1).  However, section 977, subdivision (b)(1), 
the subdivision that authorizes waiver for felony defendants, 
expressly provides for situations in which the defendant cannot 
waive his right to be present, including during the taking of 
evidence 
before 
the 
trier 
of 
fact. 
 
Section 1043, 
subdivision (b)(2), further makes clear that its broad ‘voluntary’ 
exception to the requirement that felony defendants be present 
at trial does not apply to capital defendants.”  (Jackson, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)  This means that, under state law, “a 
capital defendant may not voluntarily waive his right to be 
present during . . . portions of the trial in which evidence is 
taken, and . . . may not be removed from the courtroom unless 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
59 
he has been disruptive or threatens to be disruptive.”  (Id. at 
p. 1211.) 
 
The People concede defendant could not waive his 
statutory rights but suggest the removal was appropriate 
because defendant was potentially disruptive.  We generally 
defer to the trial court’s determination as to when a disruption 
has occurred or is likely to occur.  (See People v. Welch (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 701, 774 (Welch); Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211.)  
Defendant’s violent and prolonged outburst the previous 
afternoon had clearly disrupted the trial.  Although he was not 
actively disruptive on Friday morning, his arrival in a 
wheelchair and jail clothes presented other difficulties.  
Generally, a defendant has the right not to appear at trial in jail 
clothing.  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1362.)  
More importantly, defense counsel represented that there was 
“a strong possibility” defendant would once again disrupt the 
proceedings.  He was upset, in pain, and did not want to be in 
court.  Although counsel’s later comments focused on potentially 
distracting noises and movements defendant might make, he 
did not exclude the possibility of another violent disruption if 
defendant were forced to remain in court against his wishes.  
Combined with the severity of defendant’s outburst the day 
before, counsel’s explanation of defendant’s physical and mental 
state and unwillingness to attend court provided substantial 
support for the court’s conclusion that defendant would be 
disruptive if compelled to be present.  (See Welch, at p. 774.)  
Counsel’s comments also essentially conceded defendant was 
not prepared to “reclaim” his right to be present by acting with 
appropriate decorum.  (See § 1093, subd. (c); People v. Banks 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1180 (Banks).) 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
60 
 
Even assuming the court erred in allowing defendant to 
absent himself, the error was purely statutory.  (Weaver, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 968; Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211.)  
Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable defendant 
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error.  
(See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  Any error in 
excusing defendant from the day’s proceedings was clearly 
harmless.  Defense counsel was well prepared to present the 
testimony of his witnesses.  Defendant’s absence occurred 
during his own case, not that of the prosecution.  Defendant was 
aware of what his witnesses would say.  In addition, the court 
offered the defense an opportunity to recall the witnesses to 
testify in defendant’s presence, and the defense declined the 
offer. 
 
The court also repeatedly and appropriately instructed the 
jury not to consider defendant’s absence in deciding the case.  
Defendant now complains the jury might have drawn the 
damaging inference that he was absent because he had 
continued to engage in physically dangerous or threatening 
behavior, but he could have cured any potential harm by 
requesting a specific instruction.  He did not do so.  Indeed, 
lengthy or detailed admonitions may have risked drawing 
greater attention to defendant’s absence.  Moreover, some jurors 
were apparently unsettled by defendant’s courtroom outburst.  
(See post, at pp. 63-65.)  His absence the following day, “and the 
concomitant inability of the jury to observe him” in a wheelchair 
and jail clothing, “may actually have helped him.”  (Weaver, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 968.)  Of course, a negative inference was 
also possible, but defendant offers nothing beyond speculation 
to suggest he was so prejudiced.  The speculative nature of any 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
61 
possible harm precludes a finding that the penalty phase verdict 
was affected.  (Ibid.) 
 
Finally, to the extent defendant’s complaint encompasses 
his absence on Thursday, immediately after his courtroom 
outburst, there was no statutory or constitutional error.  Under 
the federal and state constitutions, “a defendant can lose his 
right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the 
judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive 
behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a 
manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court 
that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.”  
(Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 343; see Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 1180.)  Similarly, section 1043 “provides that an unduly 
disruptive defendant, after being warned, may be removed from 
the courtroom until he ‘reclaims’ his right to be present by 
expressing his willingness to conduct himself properly.  (See id., 
subds. (b)(1) & (c).)”  (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 
738.) 
 
It was within the trial court’s discretion to conclude 
defendant’s violent physical outburst necessitated his removal 
from court and absence for the remainder of the afternoon’s 
proceedings.  (See Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 774.)  
Defendant had to be restrained by nine deputies after a violent 
outburst the trial judge described as the most serious he had 
seen in 17 years on the bench.  Nor was this defendant’s first 
courtroom disruption.  We have noted defendant’s expression of 
displeasure at the court’s ruling on his discovery requests.  
(Ante, at p. 27, fn. 13.)  Again, two weeks before the courtroom 
melee, defendant interrupted the testimony of prosecution 
witness Nick Lauderbaugh with profanities and accusations of 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
62 
lying.17  After being cautioned that such outbursts could hurt 
him if the case reached a penalty phase, defendant apologized 
for his behavior.  He was therefore on notice that courtroom 
disruptions were inappropriate and not to be tolerated.  
Although the record includes no evidence of an express warning, 
one was not required under the circumstances here.  “Some 
misconduct, such as a violent assault in court, is so dangerous 
as to justify a defendant’s removal even without a prior warning.  
[Citations.]  Because ‘dignity, order, and decorum’ are essential 
to the administration of criminal justice, a trial court ‘must be 
given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each 
case.’  (Allen, [supra, 397 U.S.] at p. 343.)”  (People v. Johnson 
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 557, italics added.)  Defendant’s statutory 
and constitutional claims also fail because he did not “reclaim” 
his right to be present Thursday afternoon by informing the 
court he wished to be readmitted to the courtroom and was 
willing to behave appropriately.  (See Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th 
at p. 1181.) 
 
Finally, the proceedings defendant missed on Thursday 
afternoon were not critical.  “A critical stage of the trial is one in 
which a defendant’s ‘ “absence might frustrate the fairness of 
the proceedings” [citation], or “whenever his presence has a 
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend against the charge” [citation].’ ”  (Rundle, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 133.)  Defendant’s outburst occurred 
                                        
17  
When Lauderbaugh began answering a question about 
what defendant had said about the Quik Stop robbery, 
defendant 
interrupted, 
“Lying 
fool.” 
 
Defense 
counsel 
immediately requested a break.  The court agreed, and as it told 
jurors they were free to go outside, defendant said, “— shit.  He’s 
lying.”  The court observed, “Mr. Bell, you’re not helping.”  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
63 
after the testimony of the last witness of the day, and the jury 
was sent home immediately afterward.  In defendant’s absence, 
the court and counsel described for the record what had 
happened and discussed various security options with the 
courtroom bailiffs.  After touching on some evidentiary matters, 
they resumed a discussion about jury instructions.  These 
proceedings consumed one hour, after which court recessed for 
the day.  “[A] defendant may ordinarily be excluded from 
conferences on questions of law, even if those questions are 
critical to the outcome of the case, because the defendant’s 
presence would not contribute to the fairness of the proceeding.”  
(People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 82, fn. 6.)  A criminal 
defendant has no constitutional right to be present when the 
court and counsel discuss questions of law, including discussions 
on jury instructions.  (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 
210.) 
 
 b. 
Potential Jury Bias Resulting from 
  
Outburst 
 
Defendant next claims the court failed to take appropriate 
steps to ensure the jury was not biased against him as a result 
of the incident.  He also contends the court erred in denying his 
motion for mistrial.  The court’s voir dire and admonitions were 
adequate, and its mistrial ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
  
i. 
Background 
 
The morning after defendant’s courtroom outburst, the 
jury foreperson sent out a note, which stated:  “ ‘To whom it may 
concern:  We the jury are concerned with walking past the 
Defendant while he is not restrained.  Yesterday’s event could 
have caused injury to some jurors that were rushed into the jury 
room during the incident.’ ”  The court observed that jurors were 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
64 
not in the courtroom during the disruption but might have heard 
it.  At defense counsel’s suggestion, the court called for the jury 
as a group, noting that individual questioning could be reserved 
for any juror who indicated concern about the ability to remain 
fair and impartial.  
 
In response to the court’s questions, the jury foreperson 
confirmed that jurors could hear the incident from the jury 
room.  The note was based on their experience of the incident 
and not from a newspaper article or media report.18  The court 
admonished jurors not to speculate about what might have 
happened in the courtroom, although they could consider 
testimony about the incident if it was presented.  The court then 
stated, “I want to make sure that because of what happened 
yesterday no one is feeling biased or prejudiced in the case at 
this point in time and feels they could not make a fair decision 
based on the evidence.”  It invited any juror having such 
thoughts to alert the court by note or otherwise.  A juror 
explained that they had sent the note because some of the jurors 
had been “shov[ed] and pushe[d]” into the jury room when the 
incident began.  The court responded that when defendant 
returned, the court would “work it logistically so there won’t be 
a problem with you — take care of any fears you might have.”  
At defense counsel’s request, the court asked if there had been 
any discussion of the incident in the jury room.  The jurors 
confirmed that the only discussion concerned getting everyone 
in the room and locking the door.  They did not discuss the facts 
of the case.  The court then repeated, “If anyone does feel that 
                                        
18  
Defendant’s outburst was reported in a local newspaper, 
although the article inaccurately suggested the jury was in the 
courtroom at the time.  
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
65 
something is bothering them about [the incident] or feel they 
couldn’t be fair and impartial, please let us know, write a note 
or something like that.”  
 
At counsel’s urging, the court again asked if jurors had 
discussed “the incident that was going on in the courtroom.”  The 
foreperson said that although they could hear “screaming and 
yelling” from the courtroom, the jurors discussed only the 
experience of being pushed into the jury room and how they 
wanted to ensure their safety walking past defendant in the 
future.  Defense counsel declined the court’s invitation to 
question the jury further.  No other communication was received 
from the jury on this topic. 
 
Defendant moved for a mistrial.  His attorney expressed 
concern that jurors had discussed defendant’s personality or 
said they were afraid of him.  The court observed that, if jurors 
were afraid, defendant had “brought that on himself.”  It denied 
the motion.  Although defendant might seek a new trial if he 
obtained evidence that the incident tainted the jury, the court 
found no basis for a mistrial at that time given the jurors’ 
responses.  The court invited defense counsel to propose a 
special jury instruction on the issue if he felt one was necessary.  
 
  
ii. 
Voir Dire of Jury and Instructions  
 
Defendant argues the court did not conduct an adequate 
inquiry into the prejudicial effect of his courtroom outburst.  He 
forfeited this claim by not asking for additional questioning.  
(See People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 126.)  The court 
specifically invited defense counsel to question the jury further 
about potential bias, and he declined.  
 
The claim also fails on the merits.  In general, the “court 
must conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine facts alleged as 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
66 
juror misconduct ‘whenever the court is put on notice that good 
cause to discharge a juror may exist.’  (People v. Burgener (1986) 
41 Cal.3d 505, 519.)”  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 
547; see People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 942.)  Not 
every incident warrants investigation, however.  (People v. 
Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478.)  The decision whether, 
and to what extent, investigation into possible juror bias is 
required “ ‘rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ”  
(Ibid.; see People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 434.)  Here, 
the record demonstrates adequate inquiry.  The court 
questioned jurors about their conversations, ensuring they did 
not discuss the facts of the case.  The court expressed its concern 
that jurors remain unbiased because of the incident and invited 
jurors to notify the court privately if they had any such 
inclinations.  Defendant’s speculation that jurors failed to 
disclose personal fears or bias has no basis in the record.  Such 
speculation does not support a duty to inquire further.  (See 
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 231; Davis, at 
p. 548.)19 
 
Defendant also faults the court for failing to instruct 
jurors to disregard their personal experiences of the outburst.  
The court admonished the jury not to speculate about what 
happened in the courtroom, although it could consider evidence 
about the incident that might be presented.  If defendant 
believed any further instruction was necessary, he was obliged 
                                        
19  
At oral argument here, defendant’s attorney argued the 
trial court should have separately questioned each juror about 
the incident.  However, such focused questioning would have 
drawn further attention to the event and might have amplified 
its significance.  For strategic reasons, defendant’s trial counsel 
may have preferred to avoid this risk. 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
67 
to request it.  (See People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638.)  
Defendant’s failure to propose an instruction, even after the 
court invited him to do so, forfeits his claim of error.  (See People 
v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 641, 697-698 (Ledesma).)  Moreover, it is far from clear 
that jurors were required to ignore their personal experience of 
defendant’s courtroom outburst.  (See post, at pp. 67-68; People 
v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1156.)  The absence of an 
instruction to this effect was not error. 
 
  
iii. 
Motion for Mistrial  
 
Defendant asserts the court erred in denying his motion 
for a mistrial.  In general, “a motion for mistrial should be 
granted only when ‘ “a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial 
have been irreparably damaged.” ’ ”  (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 225, 282.)  “We review a ruling on a mistrial motion for 
an abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  A trial court should declare 
a mistrial only ‘ “if the court is apprised of prejudice that it 
judges incurable by admonition or instruction.” ’  [Citations.]  ‘In 
making this assessment of incurable prejudice, a trial court has 
considerable discretion.’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
415, 501.) 
 
The court properly refused to grant a mistrial.  
Defendant’s motion was based on a concern that jurors were 
afraid of him, or had concluded he was a violent person, because 
of his courtroom outburst.  However, we have long held that “a 
defendant may not be heard to complain when, as here, such 
prejudice as he may have suffered resulted from his own 
voluntary act.”  (People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 643.)  
In People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 1156, we 
explained that, while it is misconduct for jurors to obtain 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
68 
evidence from outside the court, “[i]t is not clear . . . that such a 
rule applies to the jurors’ perceptions of the defendant, 
particularly when the defendant engages in disruptive or 
otherwise improper conduct in court.  As a matter of policy, a 
defendant is not permitted to profit from his own misconduct.”  
(Italics added; see also People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 970, 1030 (Lewis and Oliver); People v. Arias (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 92, 148.)  Denial of mistrial motions based on the 
defendant’s own courtroom misbehavior have been repeatedly 
upheld.  (See, e.g., Lewis and Oliver, at pp. 1030-1031; Huggins, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 201.)  So too here.  As the trial court 
observed, any fear or prejudice the jurors felt as a result of 
defendant’s courtroom outburst was a problem of his own 
making.  A criminal defendant “ ‘should not be permitted to 
disrupt courtroom proceedings without justification [citation] 
and then urge that same disruption as grounds for a mistrial.’ ”  
(Lewis and Oliver, at p. 1030.) 
 
 c. 
Physical Restraints  
 
After defendant’s outburst, the court ordered him 
physically restrained.  While not contesting this decision itself, 
defendant argues the court improperly deferred to security 
personnel regarding the type of restraints to employ and 
improperly imposed two visible forms of restraint.  He also 
contends the court erred by not instructing the jury to disregard 
the restraints.  To the extent defendant’s claims are not 
forfeited, they lack merit. 
 
  
i. 
Background 
 
Shortly after defendant’s outburst, the court discussed 
potential security measures with the courtroom bailiffs and 
counsel.  The court expressed concern for the safety of court staff 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
69 
and counsel and found “ample grounds” to impose restraints.  
The bailiffs recommended placing defendant in full chains and 
seating him next to a deputy armed with a Taser.  A third option 
was to place him in a REACT stun belt.  Defense counsel agreed 
that “something is in order.”  Although doubtful about the need 
for full chains, counsel assured the court he was “not going to 
object to some kind of restraint.”  The court then stated it was 
inclined to order “whatever [security measure] the bailiffs feel is 
appropriate . . . because I am not a security person . . . [and] I 
don’t want my people getting hurt.”  When defense counsel 
expressed concern that full chains would be visible to the jury, 
the court urged him to talk with the bailiffs off the record.  The 
court observed the bailiffs had “been dealing with Bell from a 
security standpoint . . . for a few weeks” and had developed “a 
good sense” of his agitation level.   
 
Defendant came to court in a wheelchair the next day, 
restrained with chains and wearing a stun belt.  He left before 
the jury was called in.  When he returned to court the following 
Monday, he was out of the wheelchair and wearing a suit but 
was still restrained with chains and the stun belt.  The court 
concluded restraints were needed because of the violence of 
defendant’s outburst.  “I can’t restrain him just because . . . 
somebody in the jail or something thinks he should be, but there 
has to be a reason for it.  There certainly was a reason for it on 
Friday, and I am going to continue to think that there is a reason 
for it unless someone tells me differently.  [¶] But based on what 
happened Thursday afternoon, he was a danger to the entire 
courtroom and the staff and the deputies.  And so several 
deputies were bruised and clearly in some pain.  So it was 
necessary for the safety of the entire courtroom, in my opinion, 
to restrain him on Friday.  That’s also after consulting the bailiff 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
70 
and the deputies and security because of what happened [on] 
Thursday.”  
 
Before the jury entered the courtroom, the court asked if 
defendant wanted an instruction telling jurors not to consider 
the restraints.  Defense counsel expressed doubt that the jury 
could see the restraints, but the court observed that it could see 
a handcuff and a bulge from the belt.  The court explained, 
“There is legal authority to give that kind of an instruction, but 
there is also authority” supporting the absence of an instruction 
if “you don’t want it brought to the jurors’ attention.”  Defense 
counsel responded, “I don’t think I want to draw their attention 
to it right now.  If I think it’s a problem, I will ask for it.”  The 
court suggested an instruction about restraints might be 
advisable because jurors had expressed concern for their safety.  
However, defense counsel ultimately decided to forgo an 
instruction “at this point,” noting that if jurors “raise[d] the 
issue, which they might,” it could be addressed at that time.  
 
  
ii. 
Discussion 
 
“In general, the ‘court has broad power to maintain 
courtroom security and orderly proceedings’ (People v. Hayes 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269), and its decisions on these matters 
are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Stevens (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 625, 633.)  However, the court’s discretion to impose 
physical restraints is constrained by constitutional principles.  
Under California law, ‘a defendant cannot be subjected to 
physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the 
jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for 
such restraints.’  (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-
291.)  Similarly, the federal ‘Constitution forbids the use of 
visible shackles . . . unless that use is “justified by an essential 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
71 
state interest”—such as the interest in courtroom security—
specific to the defendant on trial.’  (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 
U.S. 622, 624, italics omitted.)  We have held that these 
principles also apply to the use of an electronic ‘stun belt,’ even 
if this device is not visible to the jury.  (People v. Mar (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 1201, 1219.)”  (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 
558-559 (Lomax).) 
 
Defendant did not object to being restrained.  His attorney 
expressly agreed with the court that “some kind of restraint” 
was appropriate, although he preferred it be invisible to jurors.  
Accordingly, defendant “has forfeited his claim to the extent he 
contends he should not have been restrained at all, or that the 
stun belt was an inappropriate form of restraint.”  (Foster, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1321; see People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 40, 85.) 
 
Furthermore, the record belies defendant’s claim that the 
court improperly deferred to security personnel in deciding to 
impose the restraints.  It is true that a trial court abuses its 
discretion if it delegates this decision to law enforcement 
officers.  (Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 773; People v. Hill, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 841.)  However, “[t]he court here was 
clearly aware of its obligation to make its own determination on 
the need for restraints, and not simply defer to the wishes of the 
prosecutor or courtroom security personnel.”  (People v. Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 391; see People v. 
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 117.)  Although the court solicited 
opinions from security staff about the best type of restraints to 
use, given their experience handling defendant and his unusual 
size and strength, it recognized that the decision to impose 
restraints could not be based simply on what “somebody in the 
jail” said.  Thus, the court explained that, in its opinion, 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
72 
restraints were needed to protect the safety of everyone in the 
courtroom from another violent outburst by defendant.  The 
court’s finding of manifest need is amply supported by the 
record, which includes escalating instances of defendant’s 
misconduct.  The decision to restrain defendant was well within 
the court’s discretion.  (See, e.g., Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 
p. 562.)  To the extent defendant complains the court failed to 
consider the “harmful psychological effects” of wearing a stun 
belt (see People v. Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1225-1230), our 
discussion of this topic in Mar was offered for guidance “in future 
trials” (id. at p. 1225, italics added).  Because defendant’s trial 
occurred over three years before we decided Mar, the court 
cannot be faulted for failing to consider the potential 
psychological consequences identified in that opinion.  (See 
People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 871; Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler, at p. 391; Lomax, at p. 562.) 
 
Defendant also claims the court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury to disregard his restraints.  He asserts the error was 
compounded because, although the jury had previously been 
instructed to disregard courtroom security measures, this 
instruction was not repeated at the penalty phase and the jury 
was directed to disregard guilt phase instructions that were not 
repeated.  The record does not support defendant’s claim, and 
any error was harmless. 
 
The trial court’s obligation to instruct depends on visibility 
of the restraints.  “In those instances when visible restraints 
must be imposed the court shall instruct the jury sua sponte that 
such restraints should have no bearing on the determination of 
the defendant’s guilt.  However, when the restraints are 
concealed from the jury’s view, this instruction should not be 
given unless requested by defendant since it might invite initial 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
73 
attention to the restraints and thus create prejudice which 
would otherwise be avoided.”  (People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 
at pp. 291-292 (Duran).)  Nothing in the record demonstrates 
that defendant’s restraints were visible to the jury.  Although 
the court observed that it could see a handcuff and the outline 
of the belt from its vantage point on the bench, defense counsel 
was skeptical that the jury could see the restraints.  He 
preferred to avoid drawing the jury’s attention to them with an 
instruction.  Because there is no evidence any juror actually saw 
the stun belt or restraints, we cannot say the court erred in 
failing to give an instruction against the wishes of defendant’s 
attorney.  (See Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1322; Ervine, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 773; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
759, 775.)  “In these circumstances, an instruction may have 
achieved the opposite result than was intended by Duran by 
calling attention to defendant’s restraints when, otherwise, the 
jury would have been unaware of them.”  (People v. Lopez (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 1028, 1080 (Lopez).) 
 
Moreover, any error in failing to instruct was clearly 
harmless.  “The purpose of requiring the instruction is to 
prevent the jury from inferring that, because a defendant 
charged with a violent crime is restrained, he is ‘a violent person 
disposed to commit’ the charged crime.  (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 
at p. 290.)  Where, however, as here, a defendant has been 
convicted of a special circumstance murder, the rationale 
requiring a sua sponte instruction is no longer applicable.”  
(Lopez, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1081.)  The jury had already 
convicted defendant of murdering Simon Francis in the course 
of a robbery.  Under any standard, its penalty phase verdict 
would not have been affected by the absence of an instruction on 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
74 
defendant’s restraints.  (See ibid.; see also People v. Slaughter 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1214.) 
 
 d. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel  
 
Defendant argues his attorney rendered constitutionally 
ineffective assistance in certain proceedings following the 
courtroom outburst.  “In order to establish a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient 
because it ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶] 
. . . under prevailing professional norms.’  [Citations.]  Unless a 
defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that 
‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional 
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be 
explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.’  [Citation.]  If the 
record ‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the 
manner challenged,’ an appellate claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel must be rejected ‘unless counsel was asked for an 
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply 
could be no satisfactory explanation.’  [Citations.]  If a defendant 
meets the burden of establishing that counsel’s performance was 
deficient, he or she also must show that counsel’s deficiencies 
resulted in prejudice, that is, a ‘reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.’ ”  (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
pp. 745-746; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 
687-688, 694.)  Defendant fails to show that his attorney’s 
performance was constitutionally deficient or that the penalty 
verdict would have been different absent counsel’s asserted 
errors, whether considered individually or cumulatively. 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
75 
 
Defendant first argues his attorney was ineffective for 
failing to object to the use of restraints, or at least to the court’s 
decision to restrain him with both chains and a stun belt.  
However, the violence of defendant’s courtroom outburst, and 
the extreme difficulty deputies had in subduing him, made the 
legitimacy of ordering these restraints manifest.  A decision not 
to pursue futile or frivolous motions does not make an attorney 
ineffective.  (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.)  
Counsel wisely conceded the need for increased security 
measures and focused his efforts on advocating for the least 
visible forms of restraint.  Defendant now argues having an 
armed deputy stationed behind him would have been preferable 
to the stun belt.  It is difficult to conclude that such an overt 
action would have been preferable to restraints that may not 
have actually been seen by jurors.  Counsel could well have 
concluded this option would emphasize defendant’s perceived 
dangerousness.  A deputy standing or sitting close to him at all 
times, in stark departure from earlier practice, would surely 
have been more conspicuous than a slight bulge in defendant’s 
clothing from the stun belt.  As to the complaint that chains 
were used in addition to a belt, it is unclear how defendant could 
have been prejudiced by the lack of an objection because the 
record does not establish that the jury could see either type of 
restraint. 
 
Defendant next complains his attorney did not seek 
additional instructions regarding his absence from court the day 
after the outburst.  The court twice admonished the jury not to 
speculate about defendant’s absence or consider it in any way in 
reaching a decision.  Defendant argues his counsel should have 
sought an instruction explaining he was “voluntarily absent 
from the courtroom for good cause.”  It is unclear what this 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
76 
phrase means, and it would likely have been just as opaque to 
the jury.  Jurors might have mistakenly thought defendant had 
been excluded from court for his disruptive behavior.  Defense 
counsel could reasonably have preferred the admonition that 
was given.  Any hints about why defendant was not present 
risked emphasizing his upsetting behavior the previous day. 
 
Finally, defendant asserts counsel should have objected to 
the prosecution’s use of the courtroom outburst as aggravating 
evidence under section 190.3, factor (b).  Such an objection 
would have been futile because defendant’s conduct was 
admissible.  Section 190.3, factor (b) directs the jury to consider, 
at the penalty phase of a capital case, the “presence or absence 
of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied 
threat to use force or violence.”  Defendant struggled violently 
with the nine deputies who tried to subdue him, injuring some 
of them in the confrontation.  This conduct constituted criminal 
assault and battery and manifestly “involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence.”  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  Counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection to this 
relevant aggravating evidence.  (See People v. Thompson, supra, 
49 Cal.4th at p. 122.) 
 
2. 
Victim Impact Evidence  
 
Simon Francis had been married less than two months 
when he was murdered.  Over defendant’s objection, the court 
admitted a redacted videotape of Francis’s wedding during the 
penalty phase of trial.  The prosecutor played a four-minute 
excerpt, which shows Francis having cake, throwing the bride’s 
garter, and dancing to the song “Tequila.”  Defendant claims the 
court abused its discretion in admitting the videotape because it 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
77 
was cumulative of other evidence and likely to provoke an 
irrational response, especially considered in juxtaposition with 
the surveillance video of the crime.  The redacted videotape was 
properly admitted. 
 
“The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence 
only if it is ‘so unduly prejudicial’ as to render the trial 
‘fundamentally unfair.’  ([Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 
808, 825.])  State law is consistent with these principles.  Unless 
it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the 
devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the 
community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of the 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a).”  (Lewis and Oliver, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at pp. 1056-1057; see People v. Pollock (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 1153, 1180.) 
 
Victim impact evidence presented through videotape “may 
be relevant to the penalty determination, because it 
‘humanize[s] [the victim], as victim impact evidence is designed 
to do.’  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 797.)”  (People v. 
Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 784 (Dykes).)  It can also sometimes 
be problematic.  (See, e.g., People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 
394, 442.)  We have advised trial courts to “exercise great 
caution in permitting the prosecution to present victim-impact 
evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to 
the victim.  Particularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few 
moments, or emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim, or is 
accompanied by stirring music, the medium itself may assist in 
creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond 
what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs of 
the victim or listening to the victim’s bereaved parents.”  (People 
v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1289.)  That said, “[t]here is no 
bright-line rule pertaining to the admissibility of videotape 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
78 
recordings of the victim at capital sentencing hearings.  (People 
v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1288.)  We consider pertinent 
cases in light of the general understanding that the prosecution 
may present evidence for the purpose of reminding the 
sentencer that ‘ “the victim is an individual whose death 
represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his 
family” ’ (Payne[ v. Tennessee], supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825), but 
that the prosecution may ‘not introduce irrelevant or 
inflammatory material’ that ‘ “ ‘diverts the jury’s attention from 
its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective 
response.’ ” ’  (People v. Edwards [(1991)] 54 Cal.3d [787,] 836.)”  
(Dykes, at p. 784.) 
 
The four-minute wedding video shown here resembles 
other videotape evidence held permissible.  In Dykes, for 
example, the prosecutor played a videotape of the victim and his 
family visiting Disneyland.  (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 783.)  
We approved of the trial court’s precautions, which included 
reviewing the videotape itself and requiring that its audio track 
be deleted.  (Id. at p. 784.)  After viewing that tape ourselves, we 
observed that it showed only “ordinary activities” and family 
interactions.  (Id. at p. 785.)  “The videotape is an awkwardly 
shot ‘home movie’ depicting moments shared by [the victim] 
with his family shortly before he was murdered.  The videotape 
does not constitute a memorial, tribute, or eulogy; it does not 
contain staged or contrived elements, music, visual techniques 
designed to generate emotion, or background narration; it does 
not convey any sense of outrage or call for vengeance or 
sympathy; it lasts only eight minutes and is entirely devoid of 
drama; and it is factual and depicts real events.”  (Ibid.)  In 
People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 579 (Brady), we upheld 
the admission of a four-minute videotape of the victim 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
79 
celebrating Christmas with his family, only two days before he 
was murdered.  And in People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 
888 (Vines), it was not error it admit a five-minute videotape “of 
‘home movie’ quality” that showed the victim singing, dancing, 
and rapping with family members and in a high school 
performance. 
 
The videotape here was similar.  Although shot by a 
wedding videographer, its quality resembles a “home movie” 
more than a professional production.  It depicts a real event in 
the victim’s life, shortly before his murder.  It is “not enhanced 
by narration, background music, or visual techniques designed 
to generate emotion,” nor does it “convey outrage or call for 
vengeance or sympathy.”  (Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 579.)  
It is a standard wedding video.  It humanizes the murder victim 
but contains nothing that would divert the jury from its proper 
function.  (See Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 888.)  Defendant 
complains the videotape was cumulative of other evidence 
because a bridesmaid testified that the victim had married 
shortly before his death.  However, the videotape conveyed more 
than the simple fact of the victim’s marriage.  The prosecution 
was entitled to show the jury what the victim was like and 
convey the loss suffered by his friends and family.  (See Vines, 
at p. 888; Brady, at p. 579.) 
 
Defendant contends the wedding videotape was especially 
problematic because the jury also saw a videotape that captured 
surveillance footage of the victim’s death.  Beyond asserting the 
point, however, defendant does not explain why the mere 
existence of other evidence in the same format would have a 
“synergistic effect” rendering the videotape prejudicial.  
Although video footage juxtaposing the victim in life and in 
death might create prejudice in some circumstances, here the 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
80 
trial court took steps to ensure that the wedding video would not 
inflame the jury’s emotions.  The court first required the 
prosecutor to reduce the videotape’s length.  It carefully 
reviewed the edited portion and ordered the prosecutor to 
remove a segment that showed the bride receiving communion 
during the ceremony.  Finally, the court instructed the jury that 
the videotape, along with other victim impact evidence, “ha[d] 
been introduced for the purpose of showing the specific harm 
caused by defendant’s crime” and could “not be considered . . . to 
divert your attention from your proper role of deciding whether 
or not the defendant should live or die.  You must face this 
obligation soberly and rationally, and you may not impose the 
ultimate sanction as a result of an irrational, purely subjective 
response 
to 
emotional 
evidence.” 
The 
court 
exercised 
appropriate caution and ensured that the videotape was not 
overly emotional or inflammatory.  Its admission of the tape was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
 
3. 
“Gangsta Rap” During Carver’s Assault  
 
While describing defendant’s assault on Patrick Carver, 
Lawrence Smith testified that defendant asked a friend “to put 
on a gangsta rap tape named Dr. Dre.”  Defendant said, “ ‘You 
know how I get when I hear my Dre.’ ”  Once the music was 
playing, defendant confronted Carver.  Defendant now argues 
the court abused its discretion and violated due process in 
overruling his objections to this testimony about “gangsta rap.”  
The evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. 
 
The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
witness’s brief reference to “gangsta rap.”  As we have explained, 
the court’s discretion to exclude evidence under Evidence Code 
section 352 is somewhat narrower at the penalty phase than at 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
81 
the guilt phase of trial.  (See People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 774, 834-835.)  The prosecution is entitled to present a 
full picture of the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s prior 
criminal acts under section 190.3, factor (b).  (Jablonski, at 
pp. 834-835; see Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1276.)  
Defendant’s request of a soundtrack for his beating of Carver 
showed the callousness of his crime. 
 
Defendant relies on various cases precluding admission of 
evidence about a defendant’s gang membership, but these cases 
are inapposite.  No evidence suggested that defendant was 
active in or involved with criminal street gangs.  Nor was the 
jury likely to draw this inference from his musical selection. 
 
4. 
Constitutionality of Death Penalty Law  
 
Defendant 
raises 
several 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s capital sentencing scheme.  This 
court has previously rejected all of these claims, and we do so 
again.  Specifically, we continue to hold the following: 
 
“Section 190.2 adequately narrows the category of death-
eligible defendants and is not impermissibly overbroad under 
the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.”  (Winbush, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 488; see People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
1048, 1072.)  Section 190.3, factor (a), directing the jury’s 
consideration to circumstances of the crime, does not result in 
an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.  
(People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1129; see People v. 
Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 255.)  “ ‘ “Defendant’s argument 
that a seemingly inconsistent range of circumstances can be 
culled from death penalty decisions proves too much.  What this 
reflects is that each case is judged on its facts, each defendant 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
82 
on the particulars of his offense.  Contrary to defendant’s 
position, a statutory scheme would violate constitutional limits 
if it did not allow such individualized assessment of the crimes 
but instead mandated death in specified circumstances.” ’ ”  
(Winbush, at p. 489.) 
 
“The federal Constitution does not require that the court 
designate which factors are aggravating or mitigating, or 
instruct the jury that certain factors are relevant only in 
mitigation.”  (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.)  Moreover, 
the use of restrictive adjectives such as “extreme” and 
“substantial” in section 190.3’s description of mitigating 
circumstances does not impermissibly limit the jury’s 
consideration of mitigating factors.  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 
Cal.5th 49, 94; see People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 620 
(Jones).) 
 
The death penalty is not unconstitutional for failing to 
require “findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Penal Code section 190.3, 
factor (b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 
1235; see Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 489; People v. Clark 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 643-644.)  “This conclusion is not altered 
by the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 
(Apprendi), Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Hurst v. 
Florida (2016) 577 U.S. __ [193 L.Ed.2d 504, 136 S.Ct. 616] 
(Hurst).”  (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45 
(Henriquez).) 
 
“The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal activity involving force or violence under factor (b) of 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
83 
section 190.3 and need not make a unanimous finding on 
factor (b) evidence.”  (People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 644; see Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 617-618.)  The use of 
unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating factor does 
not violate a defendant’s right to due process or a jury trial.  
(Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 489.) 
 
“The federal Constitution does not require that a burden 
of proof be placed on the prosecution at the penalty phase.  
[Citation.]  ‘Unlike the guilt determination, “the sentencing 
function is inherently moral and normative, not factual” 
[citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof 
quantification.’  [Citation.]  The trial court did not err in failing 
to instruct the jury that the prosecution had the burden of 
persuasion regarding the existence of aggravating factors or the 
appropriateness of the death penalty.  [Citation.]  ‘Nor is an 
instruction on the absence of a burden of proof constitutionally 
required.’ ”  (Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 619.)  “On the 
contrary, trial courts should not instruct on any burden of proof 
or persuasion at the penalty phase because sentencing is an 
inherently moral and normative function, and not a factual one 
amenable to burden of proof calculations.”  (Winbush, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 489.) 
 
“The lack of written findings by the jury during the 
penalty phase does not violate the federal Constitution or 
deprive a capital defendant of meaningful appellate review.”  
(Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490; see Henriquez, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at p. 46.)  Nor does the federal Constitution require 
intercase proportionality review, assessing the relative 
culpability of defendant’s case compared to other murders.  
(Winbush, at p. 490; Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 620.)  The 
death penalty statute does not violate equal protection by 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
84 
providing different procedural safeguards to capital and 
noncapital defendants.  (Henriquez, at p. 46; People v. 
Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1130.)  Finally, we have 
repeatedly held that California’s use of the death penalty does 
not violate international norms or evolving standards of decency 
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (People 
v. Thompson, at p. 1130; see Henriquez, at p. 47; Winbush, at 
p. 490.) 
D. Cumulative Error  
 
Defendant claims that even if errors at the guilt and 
penalty phases were individually harmless, they were 
cumulatively prejudicial.  We assumed error in the admission of 
testimony arguably conveying the substance of a hearsay 
declarant’s out-of-court identification and in defendant’s 
absence during one day of the penalty phase trial.  Each of these 
assumed errors was harmless, as were any other possible errors 
we contemplated.  No cumulative prejudicial effect warrants 
reversal.  (See Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 567-568.) 
 
PEOPLE v. BELL 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
85 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Bell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S080056 
Date Filed: May 2, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Stanislaus 
Judge: David G. Vander Wall 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna, Sean M. McCoy and 
William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Melissa Hill 
P.O. Box 2758 
Corrales, NM  87048 
(505) 898-2977 
 
William K. Kim 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA  93721 
(559) 477-1675