Title: In re Stone
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 242A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 242A19 
28 February 2020 
IN RE INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 18-069 
MICHAEL A. STONE, Respondent 
 
 This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and -377 upon 
a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission entered on 3 June 2019 
that respondent Michael A. Stone, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District 
Court Division 16A,1 be censured for conduct in violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the 
North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and for conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b). This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court 
on 8 January 2020 but was determined on the record without briefs or oral argument 
pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 
3 of the Rules for Supreme Court Review of Recommendations of the Judicial 
Standards Commission. 
 
 
No counsel for Judicial Standards Commission or respondent. 
 
 
                                            
1 Respondent Michael A. Stone is now a Judge of the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division 19. 
IN RE STONE 
 
Order of the Court 
 
 
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ORDER 
 
The issue before the Court is whether Judge Michael A. Stone, respondent, 
should be censured for violations of Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of the North Carolina Code 
of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b). 
Respondent has not challenged the findings of fact made by the Judicial Standards 
Commission (the Commission) or opposed the Commission’s recommendation that he 
be censured by this Court. 
 
On 24 October 2018, Commission Counsel filed a Statement of Charges against 
respondent alleging that he had engaged in conduct inappropriate to his judicial office 
by demonstrating a lack of respect for the office; by inappropriately using judicial 
letterhead and invoking his judicial title to strongly challenge the jurisdiction of the 
State Bar over his conduct while he was an attorney in private practice; and by 
making a number of misleading and grossly negligent assertions regarding his 
representation of a former client, bringing the judicial office into disrepute. 
Respondent fully cooperated with the Commission’s inquiry into this matter. In the 
Statement of Charges, Commission Counsel asserted that respondent’s actions 
constituted conduct inappropriate to his judicial office and prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute or otherwise 
constituted grounds for disciplinary proceedings under Chapter 7A, Article 30 of the 
North Carolina General Statutes.  
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Respondent filed his answer on 11 December 2018. On 30 April 2019, 
Commission Counsel and respondent entered into a Stipulation and Agreement for 
Stated Disposition (the Stipulation) containing joint evidentiary, factual, and 
disciplinary stipulations as permitted by Commission Rule 22 that tended to support 
a decision to censure respondent. The Stipulation was filed with the Commission on 
30 April 2019. The Commission heard this matter on 10 May 2019 and entered its 
recommendation on 3 June 2019, which contains the following stipulated findings of 
fact: 
7. 
On or about August 21, 2014, Respondent was 
sworn in as a district court judge for Judicial District 16A, 
including Anson, Hoke, Richmond, and Scotland Counties. 
Prior to that time, Respondent was in private practice 
primarily focused on criminal defense and Department of 
Social Services work. 
8. 
On or about May 2, 2017, a “Petition for 
Resolution of Disputed Fee” was filed against Respondent 
with the State Bar’s “Attorney Client Assistance Program” 
by 
Dahndra 
Moore 
based 
upon 
Respondent’s 
representation of Mr. Moore for several months in 2014 
prior to Respondent’s appointment to the bench. 
9. 
In his fee dispute petition, Mr. Moore alleged 
that Respondent agreed to represent him in a criminal 
matter for a total fee of $10,000, and that Mr. Moore paid 
Respondent $5,000 when Respondent withdrew from the 
representation to accept appointment as a judge. Mr. 
Moore disputed that Respondent earned the $5,000 he paid 
Respondent at the time of his withdrawal as counsel.  
10. 
On or about May 8, 2017, Respondent 
received a “Notification of Mandatory Fee Dispute 
Resolution” from the State Bar’s Attorney Client 
Assistance Program. The letter was addressed to “Judge 
Michael A. Stone” but also noted “Attorney at Law” and 
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was mailed to Respondent’s home address, not a 
courthouse or business address. 
11. 
When Respondent received notice of the fee 
dispute in 2017, he did not recognize Mr. Moore’s name, 
had no independent recollection of his representation of 
Mr. Moore in 2014, and had no files or other documents 
relating to the representation. 
12. 
At some point thereafter, and to refresh his 
recollection as to his representation of Mr. Moore, 
Respondent contacted his former paralegal Sylvia Williams 
to gain more information about the representation. 
13. 
Ms. Williams reminded Respondent about the 
circumstances of his representation of Mr. Moore and 
informed Respondent that she was still in contact with 
Nina McLaurin, who had made payments to Respondent on 
Mr. Moore’s behalf during the representation. Based upon 
the information provided to him by Ms. Williams, 
Respondent asked Ms. Williams to contact Ms. McLaurin 
to provide a statement to the State Bar indicating that she 
personally paid for the legal work performed by 
Respondent and that she was satisfied with the legal 
representation he provided. 
14. 
On or about June 19, 2017, the State Bar 
received Respondent’s response to the fee dispute. 
15. 
Respondent wrote his response to the State 
Bar on official court letterhead despite the fact that it 
addressed Respondent’s conduct in his private capacity 
prior to taking the bench. Respondent’s letter also 
immediately invoked his judicial title to strongly challenge 
the jurisdiction of the State Bar over his conduct while he 
was an attorney in private practice. Respondent closed the 
letter by signing his name, and again invoking his judicial 
title by including “District Court Judge – District 16A” 
under his signature.  
16. 
Respondent 
incorrectly 
believed 
it 
was 
appropriate to use judicial letterhead and invoke his 
judicial title in a personal matter because the fee dispute 
notices from the State Bar were addressed to Respondent 
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as “Judge Michael A. Stone,” and he was responding to the 
State Bar, a government agency.  
17. 
In Respondent’s written response to the State 
Bar, Respondent also made a number of assertions 
regarding his representation of Mr. Moore. Respondent 
acknowledges those assertions were either misleading or 
made with reckless disregard for the truth because he did 
not have independent recollection of the details of Mr. 
Moore’s case or records to justify his assertions. Those 
assertions include the following statements from his 
response to the State Bar: 
a. 
Respondent informed the State Bar that Mr. 
Moore was not entitled to any part of the fees 
paid because they were not paid by him, but 
by family and friends. In support of this 
statement, Respondent included a signed 
statement 
purportedly 
from 
Ms. 
Nina 
McLaurin, a friend of Mr. Moore’s, stating 
that she made the majority of the payments 
towards the legal fees and that she was “very 
happy with Mr. Stone’s legal services” 
because Respondent “really helped” Mr. 
Moore. In fact, because Mr. Moore was in jail 
and unable to make the payments in person, 
Mr. Moore’s family and friends paid the fees 
on his behalf with funds from Mr. Moore’s 
bank 
account. 
In 
addition, 
the 
letter 
Respondent submitted to the State Bar 
purportedly from Ms. McLaurin was prepared 
by Ms. Sylvia Williams, Respondent’s former 
legal assistant. Ms. Williams prepared the 
statement requested by Respondent, and then 
forged Ms. McLaurin’s signature after being 
unable to secure the statement from her. 
Respondent was not aware of, nor responsible 
for, the forgery. 
b. 
Respondent also asserted to the State Bar 
that he withdrew from representing Mr. 
Moore because he had not been paid all of the 
legal fees due to him. However, Respondent 
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now acknowledges that he withdrew from Mr. 
Moore’s case because he was appointed to the 
bench and could no longer serve as counsel 
regardless of Mr. Moore’s ability to pay. 
c. 
Respondent informed the State Bar that he 
was unable to produce a copy of his fee 
agreement with Mr. Moore because he had 
given it to the court-appointed attorney who 
took over Mr. Moore’s representation after 
Respondent withdrew, as was his practice as 
he prepared to wind down his law office. Mr. 
Moore’s new attorney stated that he never 
received the fee agreement. 
d. 
As part of the justification of the fees he 
retained, Respondent asserted to the State 
Bar that he earned his fees because he 
“worked very hard in negotiating a plea 
arrangement” that would have avoided a 
lengthy prison sentence for Mr. Moore. While 
there may have been serious discussions with 
prosecutors about Mr. Moore’s case, there was 
never a plea offer made by the District 
Attorney’s 
office, 
which 
also 
has 
no 
documentation of plea negotiations or plea 
offers 
made 
during 
Respondent’s 
brief 
representation of Mr. Moore. 
18. 
Respondent’s response to the State Bar also 
included a very detailed summary of the work and hours 
Respondent claimed to have performed in Mr. Moore’s case, 
including inter alia:  
a. 
“5 separate meeting with the District 
Attorney’s office discussing the case and 
negotiating his case (6½ hours + minimum 6 
hours travel time)”;  
b. 
“Meeting with the District Attorney’s office 
about discovery in the case and potential 
evidentiary issues related to DNA of an 
aborted fetus from an abortion and legal chain 
of custody issues as to the evidence, DNA, and 
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legality of evidence related to the tissue of 
aborted fetus. (2 Hrs. + 2 Hrs travel)”; 
c. 
“Legal Research and case law research 
related to the unique and novel DNA evidence 
issues in the case (5 Hrs)”; and 
d. 
“Meeting with my private investigator to go 
over his report regarding the alleged rape 
victim and her family as well as travel to try 
to interview the alleged rape victim and her 
mother (6 hrs + 2 hours travel).” 
19. 
Respondent knew or should have known that 
the statements to the State Bar described in paragraph 18 
above were misleading, or made with reckless disregard for 
the truth. Respondent concedes that he based his 
statements upon his review of the court file because he had 
an insufficient recollection of the work and no records. The 
following facts establish that the statements to the State 
Bar were misleading:  
a. 
Despite Respondent’s affirmative assertion to 
the State Bar that he spent two hours of work 
plus two hours of travel time to the DA’s office 
to discuss DNA issues and evidence in the 
case, and despite Respondent’s claims that he 
worked very hard to negotiate a plea deal for 
Mr. Moore, Respondent admits that he has no 
specific recollection of the time spent or travel 
time involved and the Assistant District 
Attorney who prosecuted Mr. Moore and who 
handled the DNA issues in Mr. Moore’s case 
never discussed Mr. Moore’s charges, the 
DNA 
issues, 
or 
any 
plea 
offer 
with 
Respondent in person, by telephone, or via 
email.  
b. 
Despite Respondent’s affirmative assertion to 
the State Bar that he performed five hours of 
legal research, Respondent admits that he 
only recalls this research because it involved 
a unique DNA issue, and he does not have any 
specific recollection or documentation of 
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actual time spent doing the research, and did 
not document any of his research about the 
DNA issues in Mr. Moore’s case.  
c. 
Despite Respondent’s affirmative assertion to 
the State Bar that he spent six hours meeting 
with his private investigator to go over the 
investigator’s report, the investigator in fact 
never produced a written investigative report 
for Respondent’s review and does not recall 
even being paid to do any work in Mr. Moore’s 
case, which Respondent says was not unusual 
in their working relationship.  
20. 
On or about July 24, 2017, the Fee Dispute 
Resolution Program notified Mr. Moore and Respondent 
that the State Bar’s fee dispute facilitator concluded that 
the parties were unable to reach a voluntary resolution of 
the fee dispute and therefore the dispute was closed. 
21. 
After the fee dispute was closed, the State Bar 
received a letter from Ms. McLaurin, who had learned from 
Mr. Moore that Respondent had given the State Bar a 
letter allegedly provided by her. Ms. McLaurin informed 
the State Bar that she had no knowledge of the statement 
and that her signature was forged.  
22. 
Based upon Ms. McLaurin’s forgery claim, the 
State Bar opened a grievance against Respondent, 
although Respondent asserts that the State Bar did not 
formally notify him that he was under investigation or why 
he was under investigation. During the State Bar’s 
investigation, Respondent was interviewed by a State Bar 
Investigator. During the interview, Respondent reiterated 
all of the specific assertions as to time worked on Mr. 
Moore’s case made in his June 7, 2017 response letter, and 
further expressed anger and irritation at being subject to 
an investigation by the State Bar for his conduct as an 
attorney, particularly after Respondent believed the 
matter to have already been concluded. 
23. 
The State Bar Investigator did not reveal to 
Respondent that Ms. McLaurin’s letter was forged. 
Respondent remained unaware of the forgery until he 
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received notice of the Commission’s formal investigation 
into this matter.  
24. 
While Respondent did not intentionally 
attempt to deceive the State Bar, he acknowledges that his 
assertions to the State Bar were willful, and that those 
assertions were either misleading or made with reckless 
disregard for the truth because he did not have any 
independent recollection of the details of Mr. Moore’s case 
or records to justify his assertions. 
 (Citations to pages of the Stipulation omitted.) 
 
Based on these findings of fact, the Commission concluded as a matter of law 
that: 
1. 
Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct sets 
forth the broad principle that “[a] judge should uphold the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary.”  To do so, 
Canon 1 requires that a “judge should participate in 
establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should 
personally observe, appropriate standards of conduct to 
ensure that the integrity and independence of the judiciary 
shall be preserved.” 
2. 
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
generally 
mandates 
that 
“[a] 
judge 
should 
avoid 
impropriety in all the judge’s activities.”  Canon 2A 
specifies that “[a] judge should respect and comply with the 
law and should conduct himself/herself at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary.” Canon 2B specifies that 
a “judge should not lend the prestige of the judge’s office to 
advance the private interest of others . . . .” 
3. 
Respondent concedes that he violated these 
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
4. 
Upon the Commission’s independent review 
of the stipulated facts concerning Respondent’s conduct, 
the Commission concludes that Respondent failed to 
personally observe appropriate standards of conduct 
necessary to ensure that the integrity of the judiciary is 
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preserved, in violation of Canon 1 of the North Carolina 
Code of Judicial Conduct, and failed to conduct himself in 
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity 
of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A of the North 
Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.  
5. 
The Commission further concludes that the 
facts establish that Respondent engaged in willful 
misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into 
disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-376(b). See 
also Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble (“[a] violation of 
this Code of Judicial Conduct may be deemed conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the 
judicial office into disrepute, or willful misconduct in office 
. . .”). 
6. 
The 
Supreme 
Court 
defined 
conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice in In re Edens, 
290 N.C. 299 (1976) and stated as follows: 
Conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice that brings the judicial office into 
disrepute has been defined as “conduct which 
a judge undertakes in good faith but which 
nevertheless would appear to an objective 
observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but 
conduct prejudicial to the public esteem for 
the judicial office.” Whether the conduct of a 
judge may be so characterized “depends not so 
much upon the judge’s motives but more on 
the conduct itself, the results thereof, and the 
impact such conduct might reasonably have 
upon knowledgeable observers.”  
 
 
Id. at 305-306 (internal citations omitted). 
7. 
The Supreme Court has defined “willful 
misconduct in office” as “improper and wrong conduct of a 
judge acting in his official capacity done intentionally, 
knowingly and, generally in bad faith. It is more than a 
mere error of judgement or an act of negligence.” In re 
Edens. 290 N.C. 299, 305 (1976). The Supreme Court has 
also made clear, however, that “willful misconduct in office” 
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is not limited to conduct undertaken during the discharge 
of official duties. As stated in In re Martin, 302 N.C. 299 
(1981):  
We do not agree, nor have we ever held, that 
“willful misconduct in office” is limited to the 
hours of the day when a judge is actually 
presiding over court. A judicial official’s duty 
to conduct himself in a manner befitting his 
professional office does not end at the 
courthouse door. Whether the conduct in 
question can fairly be characterized as 
“private” or “public” is not the inquiry; the 
proper focus is on, among other things, the 
nature and type of conduct, the frequency of 
occurrences, the impact which knowledge of 
the conduct would likely have on the 
prevailing attitudes of the community, and 
whether the judge acted knowingly or with a 
reckless disregard for the high standards of 
the judicial office.  
Id. at 316 (internal citation omitted).  
8. 
In the present case, Respondent made 
detailed, affirmative and specific factual assertions to the 
State Bar during its investigation that Respondent knew 
were unsupported by any personal recollection or 
documentation. Respondent also did so while invoking his 
position as a sitting judge and on letterhead bearing the 
imprimatur of the North Carolina Judicial Branch. 
Respondent has also fully admitted that his factual 
assertions to the State Bar were not only misleading and 
grossly negligent, but that he knew or should have known 
that such statements were made with reckless disregard 
for the truth.  
9. 
The Commission concludes that this course of 
action amounts to willful misconduct in office and that 
Respondent willfully engaged in misconduct  prejudicial to 
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office 
into disrepute.  
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10. 
Respondent also acknowledges that the 
factual stipulations contained herein are sufficient to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that his actions constitute 
willful misconduct in office and that he willfully engaged 
in misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-376. 
(Brackets in original and citations to pages of the Stipulation omitted.) 
 
Based on these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission 
recommended that this Court censure respondent. The Commission based this 
recommendation on its earlier findings and conclusions, as well as the following 
additional dispositional determinations: 
1. 
The Supreme Court in In re Crutchfield, 289 
N.C. 597 (1975) first addressed sanctions under the 
Judicial Standards Act and stated that the purpose of 
judicial discipline proceedings “is not primarily to punish 
any individual but to maintain due and proper 
administration of justice in our State’s courts, public 
confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and 
integrity of its judges.” Id. at 602.  
2. 
The Commission recommends censure rather 
than 
a 
more 
severe 
sanction 
based 
on 
several 
considerations. First, the actions identified by the 
Commission as misconduct by Respondent appear to be 
isolated and do not form any sort of recurring pattern of 
misconduct. Second, Respondent has been cooperative with 
the Commission’s investigation, voluntarily providing 
information about the incident and reaching a resolution 
through this Stipulation. Third, the Commission has 
observed that Respondent not only fully and openly 
admitted his error and expressed genuine remorse, but 
that he fully understands the negative impact his actions 
have had on the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
3. 
The 
Commission 
and 
Respondent 
acknowledge the ultimate jurisdiction for the discipline of 
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judges is vested in the North Carolina Supreme Court 
pursuant to Chapter 7A, Article 30 of the North Carolina 
General Statutes, which may either accept, reject, or 
modify any disciplinary recommendation from the 
Commission. 
4. 
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-377(a5), 
which requires that at least five members of the 
Commission concur in a recommendation of public 
discipline to the Supreme Court, all seven Commission 
members present at the hearing of this matter concur in 
this recommendation to censure Respondent. 
(Citations to pages of the Stipulation omitted.) 
 
“The Supreme Court ‘acts as a court of original jurisdiction, rather than in its 
typical capacity as an appellate court’ when reviewing a recommendation from the 
Commission.”  In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428, 722 S.E.2d 496, 503 (2012) (order) 
(quoting In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 207, 657 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2008) (order)). Neither 
the Commission’s findings of fact nor its conclusions of law are binding on this Court, 
but we may adopt them. Id. (citing In re Badgett, 362 N.C. at 206, 657 S.E.2d at 349).  
If the Commission’s findings are adequately supported by clear and convincing 
evidence, the Court must determine whether those findings support the 
Commission’s conclusions of law. Id. at 429, 722 S.E.2d at 503. 
 
The Commission found the stipulated facts to be supported by “clear, cogent 
and convincing evidence.”  Respondent entered into the Stipulation agreeing that 
those facts and information would serve as the evidentiary and factual basis for the 
Commission’s recommendation, and respondent does not contest the findings or 
conclusions made by the Commission. We agree that the Commission’s findings are 
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supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and we now adopt them as our 
own. Furthermore, we agree with the Commission’s conclusions that respondent’s 
conduct violates Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, 
and is prejudicial to the administration of justice, thus bringing the judicial office into 
disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. 
 
This Court is not bound by the recommendations of the Commission. In re 
Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429, 722 S.E.2d at 503. Rather, we may exercise our own 
judgment in arriving at a disciplinary decision in light of respondent’s violations of 
the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. Accordingly, “[w]e may adopt the 
Commission’s recommendation, or we may impose a lesser or more severe sanction.”  
Id. The Commission recommended that respondent be censured. Respondent does not 
contest the Commission’s findings of fact or conclusions of law and voluntarily 
entered into the Stipulation with the understanding that the Commission’s 
recommendation would be censure. 
 
We appreciate respondent’s cooperation and candor with the Commission 
throughout these proceedings. Furthermore, we recognize respondent’s expressions 
of remorse and his understanding of the negative impact that his actions have had 
on the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Weighing the severity of 
respondent’s misconduct against his candor and cooperation, we conclude that the 
Commission’s recommended censure is appropriate. 
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina orders that respondent 
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Michael A. Stone be CENSURED for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of 
the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and for conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. 
 
By order of the Court in Conference, this the 26th day of February, 2020. 
 
s/Davis, J. 
For the Court 
 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this 
the 28th day of February, 2020. 
 
AMY L. FUNDERBURK 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
 
s/M.C. Hackney 
Assistant Clerk