Title: State v. Jacob J. Faust
Citation: 2004 WI 99
Docket Number: 2003AP000952-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2004

2004 WI 99 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0952-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jacob J. Faust, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 243 
Reported at:  267 Wis. 2d 783, 672 N.W.2d 97 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 6, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Gary Langhoff   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and PROSSER, J.J., join dissent. 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by Mary T. Wagner and Joseph DeCecco, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Stephen 
M. Seymour, Sheboygan, and oral argument by Stephen M. Seymour. 
 
 
2004 WI 99 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0952-CR  
(L.C. No. 
02CT145) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jacob J. Faust,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The State appeals from a published 
court of appeals decision, State v. Faust, 2003 WI App 243, 267 
Wis. 2d 783, 672 N.W.2d 97, which affirmed an order of the 
Sheboygan County Circuit Court, Gary J. Langhoff, Judge, 
granting the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a 
forced blood draw taken from him that indicated he was operating 
a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration. 
I. 
ISSUE 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether, under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, exigent circumstances 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
2 
 
exist for a nonconsensual warrantless blood draw after the 
police have obtained what the arresting officer believes to be a 
voluntary, 
satisfactory, 
and 
useable 
chemical 
breath 
test 
indicating that the individual arrested was operating a motor 
vehicle with a prohibited level of alcohol concentration.1   
¶3 
For the reasons discussed below, we reaffirm that the 
rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream of an individual 
arrested for a drunk driving related offense constitutes an 
exigency that justifies the warrantless nonconsensual test of 
that individual's blood, so long as the test satisfies the four 
factors enumerated in State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 533-34, 
494 N.W.2d 399 (1993).  We hold that the presence of one 
presumptively valid chemical sample of the defendant's breath 
does not extinguish the exigent circumstances justifying a 
warrantless blood draw.  The nature of the evidence sought——that 
is, the rapid dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream——not 
the existence of other evidence, determines the exigency.  
Because exigent circumstances were present in this case and the 
blood test satisfied the test we set forth in Bohling, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.    
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The operative facts of this case are undisputed.  On 
February 19, 2002, Officer James Olsen of the Sheboygan Police 
Department was on routine patrol and was inspecting the license 
                                                 
1 We do not address whether exigent circumstances would 
exist if the first test indicates that the defendant's blood 
alcohol concentration is within the legal limits.  
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
3 
 
plates of vehicles parked behind a local tavern.  Upon checking 
the plates of a 1998 Chevrolet coupe, Officer Olsen discovered 
that the plates were registered to an Audi coupe.  A short time 
thereafter, Officer Olsen observed the vehicle leave the parking 
lot.  Officer Olsen initiated a routine traffic stop, and the 
driver of the vehicle, the defendant, identified himself as one 
Jacob J. Faust.  Officer Olsen noticed a "strong odor of 
intoxicants" emanating from the vehicle and observed that Faust 
was slurring his speech and exhibited bloodshot, glassy eyes.  
Upon questioning, Faust indicated to Officer Olsen that he had 
consumed "five brandies" before driving. 
¶5 
Officer Olsen thereafter administered a field sobriety 
test that Faust failed to successfully complete.  Faust then 
voluntarily submitted to a preliminary breath test under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (2001-02),2 the result of which indicated 
Faust possessed an alcohol concentration of 0.13.3  Officer Olsen 
placed Faust under arrest and transported him to police 
headquarters.  Upon arriving, Faust consented to provide a 
                                                 
2 Section 343.303 states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he 
result of the preliminary breath screening test shall not be 
admissible in any action or proceeding except to show probable 
cause for an arrest, if the arrest is challenged, or to prove 
that a chemical test was properly required or requested of a 
person under s. 343.305(3)."   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
3 "'Alcohol concentration' means the number of grams of 
alcohol in 100 milliliters of a person's blood or the number of 
grams of 
alcohol 
in 210 
liters 
of 
a person's breath."  
Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1)(a).  
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
4 
 
sample of his breath for chemical analysis.  The results of the 
breathalyzer 
indicated 
that 
Faust 
possessed 
an 
alcohol 
concentration of 0.09 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.  
Officer Olsen then performed a search of Faust's criminal 
driving record, the result of which indicated that Faust had two 
prior 
convictions 
for 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated.  
As 
an individual with 
two 
or 
more 
prior 
convictions for operating a motorized vehicle while intoxicated, 
Faust was subject to the prohibited alcohol concentration of 
0.08.  Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(cd). 
¶6 
Officer Olsen then requested that Faust provide a 
blood sample.  After Officer Olsen read Faust the Informing the 
Accused form,4 Faust refused to submit to the blood test without 
giving any reason.  Officer Olsen then issued a Notice of Intent 
to Revoke Faust's license for refusing the blood test.5  Faust 
was transported to the hospital where, following routine 
procedures, a phlebotomist administered the blood test.  The 
result from the blood test indicated that Faust possessed a 
blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood.  Officer Olsen did not request a drug 
analysis of Faust's blood sample.  It is undisputed that Officer 
Olsen at no time sought a warrant for the blood test.   
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4). 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a). 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
5 
 
 
III. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶7 
On March 7, 2002, the State filed a criminal complaint 
against 
Faust, 
alleging 
violations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)(operating 
while 
intoxicated) 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b)(operating with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration).  On October 15, 2002, Faust filed a motion to 
suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the 
warrantless test was taken in violation of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions because exigent circumstances did not 
exist due to the fact that the arresting officer already had 
obtained what he believed to be a voluntary and sufficient 
breath test that indicated Faust's level of intoxication was in 
excess of the legal limit.  At the motion hearing, Officer Olsen 
indicated that while it was not department procedure to request 
a blood test in all drunken driving cases, he sought a blood 
test for the purpose of gathering additional evidence because 
the previous two tests were very near the legal limit.  Officer 
Olsen also testified that at the time the breathalyzer was 
administered, he believed it to be a voluntary and satisfactory 
test.  The circuit court granted Faust's motion to suppress on 
February 25, 2003, concluding that "exigent circumstances did 
not exist to justify the warrantless taking of the Defendants 
blood."   
¶8 
The court of appeals, based on our decision in State 
v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385, 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
6 
 
affirmed 
the 
order 
of 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
Faust, 
267 
Wis. 2d 783, ¶1.  In Krajewski, this court held: 
a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw from a person 
arrested on probable cause for a drunk driving offense 
is constitutional based on the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, even if the person offers to submit to a 
chemical test other than the blood test chosen by law 
enforcement, provided that the blood draw complies 
with the factors enumerated in Bohling.  
Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶3.  However, we also stated in 
Krajewski 
that 
"[t]he 
exigency 
that 
exists 
because 
of 
dissipating alcohol does not disappear until a satisfactory, 
useable chemical test has been taken."  Id., ¶40.  The court of 
appeals concluded that this sentence from Krajewski compelled 
the conclusion that "once an individual arrested on probable 
cause for OWI has provided a satisfactory and useable chemical 
test, the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless and 
nonconsensual 
blood 
draw 
no 
longer 
exist." 
 
Faust, 
267 
Wis. 2d 783, ¶1.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Neal P. 
Nettesheim stated that although he felt bound by this sentence 
from Krajewski, the remainder of the analysis in Krajewski 
contradicted this isolated passage.  Faust, 267 Wis. 2d 783, 
¶¶18-21 (Nettesheim, J. concurring).  
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
There are no genuine issues of material fact for the 
purposes of this appeal.  Whether a nonconsensual warrantless 
blood draw taken to obtain evidence of a driver's blood alcohol 
concentration following an arrest falls within the exigent 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
7 
 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the state 
and federal constitutions is a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶17.   
V. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Exigent Circumstances 
¶10 We begin our analysis by reiterating some basic 
constitutional principles applicable to the case at bar.  Both 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution "guarantee 
citizens the right to be free from "'unreasonable searches.'"  
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 536.6  A "compelled intrusion[] into the 
body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content" constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).   
¶11 Subject 
to 
a 
few 
well-delineated 
exceptions, 
warrantless searches are deemed per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 536 (quoting State v. 
Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 227, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990)).  It is 
clear 
that 
"[a] 
governmental 
search 
based 
on 
'exigent 
circumstances,' like a search incident to an arrest, is a well-
established exception to the warrant requirement."  Id. at 537.  
                                                 
6 "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution are 
virtually identical.  Both establish the right of persons to be 
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Consequently, 
this court interprets the two constitutional provisions in 
concert."  State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶18 n.9, 255 
Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385. 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
8 
 
Exigent circumstances are present so as to justify a search in 
the absence of a warrant where there is a threat that "evidence 
will be lost or destroyed if time is taken to obtain a warrant."  
Id. at 537-38.   
¶12 The test for whether exigent circumstances are present 
is an objective one, id. at 538, and inquires into whether the 
officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted 
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of 
evidence[.]'"  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (quoting Preston v. 
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).  In Schmerber, the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
established 
that 
the 
rapid 
metabolization and dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream 
of an individual arrested for a drunk driving related offense 
qualifies as an exigent circumstance justifying the attempt to 
secure evidence of intoxication without first securing a 
warrant.  Id. at 770-71.  
¶13 Faust asks us to conclude that once the police have 
obtained what they believe at the time to be a voluntary, 
satisfactory, and useable chemical sample of the level of the 
defendant's intoxication, the exigency supporting a warrantless 
blood draw disappears.  Faust's argument relies primarily upon 
one sentence from our decision in Krajewski, where we stated 
that "[t]he exigency that exists because of dissipating alcohol 
does not disappear until a satisfactory, useable chemical test 
has been taken."  Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶40.   
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
9 
 
¶14 In contrast, the State argues that the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment is premised on the danger that evidence will be 
destroyed rather than whether the police already possess 
evidence of a criminal violation.  The State contends that 
simply because the police already have collected what they 
believe 
to 
be 
a 
valid 
chemical 
sample 
establishing 
the 
defendant's level of intoxication does not remove the exigency.  
In other words, the State asserts that the circumstances giving 
rise 
to 
the 
exigency 
in 
the 
first 
instance——the 
rapid 
dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream——are still present, 
regardless of whether the police have other evidence of 
intoxication.   
¶15 We agree with the State and Judge Nettesheim's 
concurrence that to read the isolated passage from Krajewski 
upon which Faust relies as providing that exigent circumstances 
cease to exist in all cases when the police have already 
obtained a supposedly valid chemical test would be inconsistent 
with the nature of the exigency as illustrated in Bohling and 
Krajewski.   
¶16 In Bohling, this court explained that Schmerber could 
be interpreted in one of two ways: 
(a) that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the 
bloodstream alone constitutes a sufficient exigency 
for a warrantless blood draw to obtain evidence of 
intoxication following a lawful arrest for a drunk 
driving related violation or crime——as opposed to 
taking a blood sample for other reasons, such as to 
determine 
blood 
type; 
or 
(b) 
that 
the 
rapid 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
10 
 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream, coupled 
with an accident, hospitalization, and the lapse of 
two 
hours 
until 
arrest, 
constitute 
exigent 
circumstances for such a blood draw.   
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539.  We determined that the more 
reasonable interpretation of Schmerber was the former one:  that 
exigent circumstances exist "based solely on the fact that 
alcohol rapidly dissipates in the bloodstream."  Id. at 539.7  In 
other words, we determined in Bohling that Schmerber stands for 
the proposition that the fact that alcohol rapidly dissipates in 
the bloodstream justifies an officer's belief that he is faced 
with "an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant, under the circumstances, threaten[s] 'the destruction 
of evidence[.]'"  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (citation omitted).   
¶17  In addition, we noted that the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that "in the context of a warrantless blood 
draw, . . . the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is relaxed 
when the activity at issue constitutes a serious risk to public 
safety.  Because of the public safety risk, persons engaging in 
such 
activities 
have 
a 
reduced 
expectation 
of 
privacy."  
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 540 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989)).  We went on to 
explain the serious public safety concerns involved when a 
                                                 
7 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent contends that the State 
was 
required 
to 
offer 
additional 
evidence 
of 
exigent 
circumstances.  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶44.  This 
suggestion is clearly at odds with our decision in State v. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993)(stating 
that exigent circumstances exist "based solely on the fact that 
alcohol rapidly dissipates in the bloodstream")(emphasis added). 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
11 
 
driver chooses to drive under the influence and that such 
concerns reduce a driver's expectation of privacy.  Id. at 541.8  
We explained that our interpretation of Schmerber "strikes a 
favorable balance between an individual's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and Wisconsin's interest in enforcing its 
drunk driving laws.  Wisconsin's interest is vital whereas the 
resulting intrusion on individual privacy is minimal."  Id. at 
545.  
¶18 Therefore, we concluded that exigent circumstances 
exist based solely on the rapid dissipation of alcohol from a 
person's bloodstream, such that a warrantless blood sample could 
lawfully be taken under the following circumstances: 
(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is 
a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in 
a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw.   
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 533-34. 
¶19 In 
Krajewski, 
we 
determined 
that 
the 
exigency 
justifying a warrantless blood draw——the fact that evidence is 
likely to be destroyed——does not disappear "as soon as a person 
                                                 
8 "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken 
driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it.  
Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the 
Nation's roads are legion."  Michigan State Police Dept. v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).  More than one-third of all 
fatal traffic crashes in the state of Wisconsin involve alcohol.  
http://www.dot.state.wi.us/safety/motorist/drunkdriving/ 
index.htm (last modified September 29, 2003).   
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
12 
 
agrees to submit to a breath test as opposed to a blood test."  
Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶36.  Focusing on the destructibility 
of the evidence, we reasoned that "[t]he exigency upon which a 
warrantless blood draw is premised is the dissipation of alcohol 
in the blood stream.  An arrested person's offer to submit to 
one chemical test rather than another does not slow this 
dissipation.  The evidence remains on a course to be destroyed."  
Id., ¶37 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).   
¶20 Further, we noted that "[e]ven when a person submits 
to a breath test in lieu of a blood test——outside the provisions 
of the implied consent statute——the test may be subject to 
challenge on grounds that the person's consent to the test was 
not given freely and voluntarily."  Id., ¶41 (emphasis added).  
Ultimately, we reaffirmed the four-factor test set forth in 
Bohling and held that "a person's agreement to submit to a test 
of the person's choice does not negate the exigency, nor render 
unconstitutional a nonconsensual test of the officer's choice."  
Id. ¶63.  We concluded:  
[T]he rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream 
creates an exigency that justifies a nonconsensual 
test of the blood, breath, or urine of a person 
arrested 
for 
driving 
while intoxicated 
or 
other 
similar drunk-driving related offenses, so long as the 
test 
is 
administered 
pursuant 
to 
the 
factors 
enumerated in Bohling.  
Id. (emphasis added).  
¶21 The trouble with Faust's argument and both dissents is 
that they ignore the nature of the exigency that justifies a 
warrantless blood draw as described in Bohling and Krajewski.  
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
13 
 
This court in Bohling and Krajewski clearly stated that the 
exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw is the rapid 
metabolization and dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream.  
The 
reasoning 
of 
Krajewski——which 
focused 
on 
the 
rapid 
dissipation of alcohol from the blood stream——is inconsistent 
with the conclusion that the exigency disappears as soon as the 
police have obtained what they at the time believe to be a valid 
chemical breath sample.   
¶22 The fact that the police have obtained a presumably 
valid chemical sample of the defendant's breath indicating the 
defendant's level of intoxication does not change the fact that 
the 
alcohol 
continues 
to 
dissipate 
from 
the 
defendant's 
bloodstream.  The evidence sought "remains on a course to be 
destroyed."  Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶37.  In Krajewski, we 
specifically 
rejected 
the 
contention 
that 
"the 
exigency 
exception to the warrant requirement . . . turn[s] upon the 
means used for executing the search rather than the urgency 
involved in the steady dissipation of alcohol."  Id., ¶42 
(emphasis in original).  We also intimated that the exigency 
remained "[e]ven when a person submits to a breath test in lieu 
of a blood test" because the suspect could later challenge the 
test on the grounds that he did not freely and voluntarily 
consent to the test.  Id., ¶41. 
¶23 Thus, we conclude, based on the rationale of Bohling 
and Krajewski, that the presence of one presumptively valid 
chemical sample of the defendant's breath does not extinguish 
the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw.  
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
14 
 
"[T]he relevant basis for exigency here is that evidence is 
likely to be destroyed."  Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶36.   
Regardless of whether the police had obtained a breath sample 
from Faust, the evidence of intoxication revealed by the blood 
test was on a course towards destruction.  The nature of the 
evidence sought, not the existence of other evidence, determines 
the exigency.  We have found no authority that stands for the 
proposition that the police are limited to obtaining only a 
single piece of evidence under the exigent circumstances 
doctrine.9 
                                                 
9 Cf. United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990, 991-94 (4th Cir. 
1991)(upholding multiple breath tests of one defendant under the 
exigent circumstances doctrine).  Also, we note that the United 
States Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration 
that authorized railroads to collect both blood and urine 
samples from employees involved in railroad accidents.  Skinner 
v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 609-10, 624 (1989).   
Although 
the 
case 
did 
not 
specifically 
involve 
an 
application of the exigent circumstances doctrine, in rejecting 
the contention that a warrant was necessary to render these 
tests reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted 
that 
"alcohol 
and 
other 
drugs 
are 
eliminated 
from 
the 
bloodstream at a constant rate, and blood and breath samples 
taken 
to 
measure 
whether 
these 
substances 
were 
in 
the 
bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as 
soon as possible."  Id. at 623 (citations omitted).  The Court 
stated 
that 
"the 
delay 
necessary 
to 
procure 
a 
warrant 
nevertheless 
may 
result 
in 
the 
destruction 
of 
valuable 
evidence."  Id.  The Court did not state or even imply that the 
need to gather the evidence or the danger of its destruction was 
extinguished once one of the tests was performed. 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
15 
 
¶24 In addition to being consistent with the nature of the 
exigency as described in Bohling and Krajewski, our conclusion 
comports with the underlying objective test for determining 
whether exigent circumstances exist.  As noted supra, the test 
for whether exigent circumstances are present is an objective 
one and inquires into whether the officer "might reasonably have 
believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the 
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened 'the destruction of evidence[.]'"  Schmerber, 384 
U.S. at 770 (quoting Preston, 376 U.S. at 367).  Here, despite 
the presence of one presumptively voluntary and valid breath 
test, Officer Olsen might have reasonably believed that it was 
necessary to secure additional evidence of Faust's level of 
intoxication without a warrant in order to prevent needed 
evidence from being destroyed. 
¶25 First, we recognize the police do not know when they 
administer a breath test whether the result of that test is 
valid and useable.  In his concurrence, Judge Nettesheim 
indicated that appellate courts routinely hear a stream of 
                                                                                                                                                             
We discussed Skinner in Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539-41, to 
support our conclusion that the exigency was based solely on the 
fact that alcohol rapidly dissipates from the bloodstream.  See 
also Reid, 929 F.2d at 993 ("In Skinner, the Supreme Court 
reiterated the notion that time is of the essence when there is 
a need to test alcohol in the body.").  We find these more 
recent decisions, which address the warrant requirement in the 
context of gathering evidence of intoxication, to be more 
persuasive than the dated cases relied upon by Justice Prosser's 
dissent that do not concern the issue presented in this case.  
Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶58-60. 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
16 
 
challenges involving breath tests.  Faust, 267 Wis. 2d 783, ¶23 
n.3.  As Judge Nettesheim stated: 
[M]y concern is that the police do not have a crystal 
ball in these situations, a proposition which the 
Krajewski decision seems to recognize.  While the 
police here presumably believed that they had obtained 
a valid breath test, this does not guarantee, in the 
very words of Krajewski, a satisfactory and useable 
breath test.  That determination would depend on a 
future ruling by the trial court in the event that 
Faust should challenge the breath test. 
Id., ¶22 (emphasis in original).  Indeed, at oral argument 
counsel for Faust indicated that he planned to challenge the 
accuracy of the chemical breath test, due to medication that 
Faust was allegedly taking at the time of arrest.   
¶26 Second, police often need to acquire additional, more 
definitive evidence of intoxication where the results of a 
chemical analysis of a breath sample are close to the legal 
limit.  Here, the preliminary breath test indicated that Faust 
possessed an alcohol concentration of 0.13.  Chemical analysis 
of the breath sample provided at police headquarters indicated 
an alcohol concentration of 0.09.  While a search of Faust's 
criminal driving record indicated that he had two drunk driving 
related offenses and was thus subject to a prohibited alcohol 
content of 0.08, the police do not know in advance whether any 
of these prior convictions will ultimately be admitted into 
court.  See Faust, 267 Wis. 2d 783, ¶23 (Nettesheim, J., 
concurring)(collecting cases where the defendant challenged 
alleged prior convictions).  Had Faust ultimately successfully 
challenged one or both of his prior convictions——something the 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
17 
 
police had no way of knowing at the time the breath test was 
taken——the State would have had to prove that Faust operated his 
motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of at least 0.1.  
See Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(c).  However, preliminary breath 
tests are not admissible at trial to prove the defendant's level 
of intoxication; they are only admissible at the probable cause 
hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  Thus, the State would have been 
left with the results of the breathalyzer, which indicated that 
Faust possessed an alcohol concentration of only 0.09.   
¶27 Third, even if the suspect has apparently complied 
with the implied consent statute and provided an initial 
chemical sample, there may later be an issue as to whether the 
defendant actually consented to take the test.  State v. 
Rydeski, 
214 
Wis. 2d 101, 
106, 
571 
N.W.2d 417 
(Ct. 
App. 
1997)("[A] verbal refusal is not required.  The conduct of the 
accused may serve as the basis for a refusal.").  Likewise, 
there is no guarantee that the defendant will not argue at trial 
that the police coerced his or her consent to a test through use 
of the implied consent law or failed to properly administer the 
warning in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).10  Also, if a suspect 
consents to a blood test outside the parameters of the implied 
consent statute, there may later be an issue as to whether his 
consent was freely given.  Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶41. 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶1, 241 
Wis. 2d 754, 
623 
N.W.2d 528; 
Village 
of 
Little 
Chute 
v. 
Walitalo, 2002 WI App 211, ¶8, 256 Wis. 2d 1032, 650 N.W.2d 891; 
County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 274, 280-84, 542 
N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
18 
 
Therefore, the fact that the police had obtained a single 
presumptively valid breath sample from Faust did not remove the 
need to gather evidence of intoxication in light of "the urgency 
involved in the steady dissipation of alcohol."  Krajewski, 255 
Wis. 2d 98, ¶42.11  The threat remained that "evidence [would] be 
lost or destroyed if time [were] taken to obtain a warrant."  
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 538. 
¶28 Furthermore, we note the practical consequences that 
would ensue if we were to accept Faust's position that the 
exigency evaporates once the police have secured a single breath 
test that the officer believes to be voluntary and useable.  
First, as we explained in Krajewski, under Wisconsin's implied 
consent statute, § 343.305, "[a] person who operates a motor 
vehicle in this state is deemed to have given consent to one or 
more tests of his or her blood, breath, or urine upon the 
request of a law enforcement officer if the person is arrested 
                                                 
11 Our opinion in Krajewski emphasized that "[t]he exigency 
upon which a warrantless blood draw is premised is the 
dissipation of alcohol from the blood stream."  Krajewski, 255 
Wis. 2d 98, ¶37.  Also, we reiterated that "the relevant basis 
for exigency here is that evidence is likely to be destroyed."  
Id., ¶36.  We emphasized "the urgency involved in the steady 
dissipation of alcohol."  Id., ¶42.  Also, we acknowledged that 
this court in Bohling had established that "[t]he rapid 
dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream alone constitutes a 
sufficient exigency" and "reject[ed] a requirement that an 
officer seek a search warrant in the period immediately 
following arrest."  Id., ¶32.  Thus, we do not understand how 
one of the dissents, written by the author of Krajewski, can 
accuse us of "focus[ing] narrowly on the fact that alcohol is 
dissipating in the bloodstream."  Justice Prosser's dissent, 
¶57.   
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
19 
 
for a drunk driving offense."  Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶19 
(emphasis added).12  If we were to accept Faust's position, then 
when an individual arrested for drunk driving consents to the 
initial breath test and refuses all subsequent tests, the police 
would be compelled to obtain a warrant to conduct any additional 
test.  As a result, "the arrested person would dictate the terms 
of investigation, limiting the police to a single option for a 
blood test——a search warrant."  Id., ¶42.13 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3) provides, in pertinent part:  
(a) Upon arrest of a person for violation of s. 
346.63(1) . . . a law enforcement officer may request 
the person to provide one or more samples of his or 
her breath, blood or urine for the purpose specified 
under sub. (2).  Compliance with a request for one 
type of sample does not bar a subsequent request for a 
different type of sample.   
Notably, Justice Prosser's dissent fails to even mention 
§ 343.305(3). 
13 As we discussed in Krajewski,  
In enacting the implied consent statute, the 
legislature authorized a law enforcement officer to 
request his or her choice among these three chemical 
tests and to request more than one chemical test from 
a person arrested for a drunk driving offense.  In the 
absence of compelling evidence otherwise, we must 
presume that the legislature had good reasons for 
giving law enforcement officers the right to choose 
among chemical tests.  These reasons could include the 
fact that one test may be better able to detect the 
presence of controlled substances than another; one 
test may be more efficacious as evidence before a jury 
than another; one test may be less susceptible to 
attack in court than another; one test may be more 
readily available on any given occasion than another; 
and tests taken in a hospital permit observation of an 
intoxicated person by a medical professional before 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
20 
 
¶29 Second, as we noted in Krajewski, "[b]lood samples are 
the most direct means of measuring alcohol concentration in the 
blood . . . ."  Id., ¶40.  However, obtaining a warrant to 
authorize a blood draw may take some time and may often be 
impracticable.  Id., ¶42 n.19.14  Police would be forced to 
choose between obtaining the most direct and accurate evidence 
of intoxication and taking the risk this evidence would be 
destroyed, or procuring the most easily ascertainable evidence 
of intoxication, knowing that it is often subject to challenge 
in court.  Thus, such a result would impair the legitimate 
evidence gathering objectives of the police because the level of 
blood alcohol would continue to dissipate until the person is 
transported to a hospital and blood is actually drawn.  See id., 
¶38.  Yet, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in 
Skinner, "[t]he government's interest in dispensing with the 
warrant requirement is at its strongest when, as here, 'the 
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the 
governmental purpose behind the search.'" Skinner, 489 U.S. at 
                                                                                                                                                             
the person is taken to jail.  These reasons are 
equally valid for chemical tests taken outside the 
implied consent statute.   
Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶55 (emphasis added). 
14 Apparently, according to Justice Prosser's dissent, these 
concerns that we recognized in Krajewski are no longer valid.  
Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶59 (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948)).  We also note that the 
length of time required to secure a warrant is important because 
chemical tests must usually be taken within three hours after 
arrest in order to be considered prima facie evidence of 
intoxication.  See Wis. Stat. § 885.235(3). 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
21 
 
623 (quoting Camara v. San Francisco Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 533 
(1967)).   
¶30 Ironically, 
Faust's 
position 
might 
also 
subject 
Wisconsin drivers to a greater number of blood tests.  Because 
the police would be required to obtain a warrant to perform a 
nonconsensual blood test after a driver had consented to a 
breath test, police departments might routinely make a blood 
test the first test for which they ask under the implied consent 
statute so as to be able to gather the most direct evidence of a 
driver's level of intoxication without fear of the evidence 
being destroyed.  Those stopped for an alcohol-related driving 
offense would be routinely subject to a blood test as a first 
test, a procedure far more time-consuming and intrusive than a 
simple chemical breath test.  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625-26. 
B. 
Reasonableness  
¶31 Although we have concluded that the nature of the 
evidence sought, not the existence of other evidence, determines 
the exigency, our holding does not mean that the police have 
carte blanche to take an unlimited number of tests as long as 
alcohol continues to dissipate from the bloodstream.  We need 
not today determine the outer boundaries of the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and draw a 
bright line in order to answer questions such as whether the 
police may constitutionally take multiple blood tests or a 
combination of chemical breath samples, urine tests, and blood 
tests all without a warrant, for these are not the facts before 
us.  As explained in Krajewski, "[e]xigency relieves the state 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
22 
 
of the burden of obtaining a warrant before a search.  It does 
not relieve the state of establishing, in a hearing after the 
search, that it met the requirements for a constitutional search 
without a warrant, including the requirement of reasonableness."  
Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶44.  Thus, the mere presence of 
exigent circumstances is insufficient for a warrantless blood 
draw to pass constitutional muster; the search must also meet 
the test for reasonableness that we articulated in Bohling.  
Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶¶45, 63; Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 
533-34.15  Faust concedes that the test here satisfied the 
requirements set forth in Bohling. 
¶32 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."  Florida 
v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).  "Reasonableness" pervades 
the test we set forth for evaluating the constitutionality of 
warrantless blood draws in Bohling.  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 
533-34.  There may well be circumstances where the police have 
                                                 
15  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent is just plain wrong 
when it asserts that Bohling is not applicable in this case.  
Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶49.  As we explained in 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 533-34, even when exigent circumstances 
are present based on the rapid dissipation of alcohol from the 
bloodstream, the search still must be reasonable in order to 
pass constitutional muster.  See also Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 
¶63 ("[W]e reaffirm that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the 
bloodstream creates an exigency that justifies a nonconsensual 
test of the blood, breath, or urine of a person arrested for 
drunk driving while intoxicated . . . so long as the test is 
administered 
pursuant 
to 
the 
factors 
enumerated 
in 
Bohling.")(emphasis added).  Thus, Bohling is always applicable 
when evaluating the constitutionality of a warrantless blood 
draw in a drunk driving case. 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
23 
 
obtained sufficient evidence of the defendant's level of 
intoxication that a further test would be unreasonable under the 
circumstances presented.   
¶33 However, such are not the facts presented today.  
Here, the police obtained a chemical breath sample, the testing 
of which indicted that Faust possessed an alcohol concentration 
of 0.09.  As noted supra, while the police were made aware after 
this test was performed that Faust had incurred two previous 
alcohol-related driving convictions, they could not know whether 
one or both of these convictions would ultimately be admitted at 
trial.  If either of them were ultimately determined to be 
inadmissible, the State would be required to prove that Faust 
was operating his vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.1 
or higher.  See Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(c).  The preliminary 
breath 
test 
that 
indicated 
Faust 
possessed 
an 
alcohol 
concentration of 0.13 would not have been admissible for this 
purpose.  Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  Additionally, the police had no 
way of knowing at the time the test was administered whether the 
chemical analysis of Faust's breath sample would be useable at 
trial.  Given the strong state interest in removing drunk 
drivers from Wisconsin's roadways (especially reoffending drunk 
drivers), 
Faust's 
two 
apparent 
drunk 
driving 
related 
convictions, and the results of the initial chemical breath 
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
24 
 
test, we cannot say that requiring Faust to submit to a single 
warrantless blood draw was unreasonable.16   
VI. CONCLUSION  
¶34 In sum, we reaffirm that the rapid dissipation of 
alcohol in the bloodstream of an individual arrested for a drunk 
driving related offense constitutes an exigency that justifies 
the warrantless nonconsensual test of that individual's blood, 
breath, or urine, so long as the test satisfies the four factors 
enumerated in Bohling.  The presence of one presumptively valid 
chemical sample of the defendant's breath does not extinguish 
the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw.  
The 
nature 
of 
the 
evidence 
sought——that 
is, 
the 
rapid 
dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream——not the existence 
of other evidence, determines the exigency.  Because exigent 
                                                 
16 Thus, we merely determine that under the facts of this 
case, it was reasonable for police to take one blood test in 
addition to the single chemical breath test.  We do not hold 
that it is reasonable for the police to "take as many valid 
tests of the suspect's blood alcohol as they [think] necessary 
to sustain a conviction."  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, 
¶45.  To assuage the concern of the dissent, we reiterate that 
the reasonableness of a warrantless nonconsensual test when a 
presumptively valid consensual test is present will depend upon 
the totality of the circumstances of each individual case. 
We also point out the internal inconsistencies present in 
Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent.  On the one hand, it 
stresses that exigent circumstances are to be determined under a 
totality of the circumstances test and chastises the majority 
opinion for supposedly allowing police to take an unlimited 
number of tests.  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶43, 45.  
On the other hand, the dissent bemoans the fact that we do not 
create a bright line rule establishing how many tests are 
reasonable.  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶50.   
No. 
03-0952-CR   
 
25 
 
circumstances were present in this case and the blood test 
satisfied the test we set forth in Bohling, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  03-0952-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the circuit court that the results of the forced blood test 
should be suppressed.  The blood test was taken without consent, 
without a search warrant and without exigent circumstances.   
¶36 Exigent circumstances did not exist, the circuit court 
ruled, because the arresting officer had already obtained what 
he believed to be a voluntary and sufficient breath test that 
demonstrated that Faust's BAC was in excess of the legal limit.  
The circuit court postulated that "the problem could have been 
obviated by [the law enforcement officer] purely requesting 
blood as the primary test."  
¶37 The circuit court got the case right.  It followed 
this court's decision in State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶40, 
255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1089 
(2002):  "The exigency that exists because of dissipating 
alcohol does not disappear until a satisfactory, useable 
chemical test has been taken."  
¶38 Law enforcement officers have a choice of which of 
several chemical tests to administer.  As we explained in 
Krajewski, we must presume that the legislature had good reasons 
for giving law enforcement officers a choice among chemical 
tests.  Each test has different attributes.17  Krajewski made it 
clear that the choice was the officer's, not the accused's.   
The chemical test the officer chose in the present case was, 
                                                 
17 State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶40, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 
N.W.2d 385, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1089 (2002). 
No.  03-0952-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
according to the officer's own testimony, a satisfactory, 
useable chemical test.   
¶39 Adhering to the Krajewski case decided and published a 
mere two years ago, I conclude that, without consent, without a 
search warrant, and without exigent circumstances, the forced 
blood test in the present case violated the United States 
Constitution. 
¶40 The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated".18  The crux of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. 
¶41 "The United States Supreme Court has consistently held 
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
subject 
to 
a 
few 
carefully 
delineated 
exceptions."19  The majority relies upon the exigency exception 
to justify the warrantless search in the present case, and its 
reasoning is broader than the exception.  
¶42 The majority erroneously holds that the nature of the 
evidence alone determines whether exigent circumstances exist.20  
The majority declares without any legal support at all, and 
contrary to our own Krajewski decision, that "[t]he nature of 
                                                 
18 U.S. Const Amend. IV.     
19 State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 227, 455 N.W.2d 618 
(1990). 
20 Majority op., ¶34. 
No.  03-0952-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the evidence sought, not the existence of other evidence, 
determines the exigency."21       
¶43 The 
accepted 
principle 
of 
law 
is 
that 
exigent 
circumstances are determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances.22   The test for exigent circumstances upon review 
is whether a police officer under the circumstances known to the 
officer at the time "might reasonably have believed that he was 
confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to 
obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the 
'destruction of evidence.'"23   
¶44 Evidence of alcohol in the body is destroyed by the 
passage of time, without any act of the individual involved or 
of law enforcement.  All evidence of intoxication cannot be 
gathered and preserved.  Here evidence of intoxication has been 
preserved in the form of the result of a valid breathalyzer 
test.  Evidence of intoxication that is being destroyed in the 
present case is cumulative of evidence already collected and 
preserved.  The State offered no proof of exigent circumstances 
except for continuing dissipation of alcohol. 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶23. 
22 State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 388 N.W.2d 601 
(1986); State v. Kraimer, 99 Wis. 2d 306, 321, 298 N.W.2d 568 
(1980); State 
v. 
Mielke, 
2002 WI 
App 251, 
¶¶7-10, 257 
Wis. 2d 876, 653 N.W.2d 316; State v. Garrett, 2001 WI App 240, 
¶16, 248 Wis. 2d 61, 71, 635 N.W.2d 615. 
23 State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 538-9, 494 N.W.2d 399 
(1993) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 
(1966)). 
No.  03-0952-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶45 The majority's argument is essentially that because 
law enforcement officers do not know what will happen at trial 
(and no one does, of course), it was reasonable for them to take 
as many valid tests of the suspect's blood alcohol as they 
thought necessary to sustain a conviction.24   The majority also 
is concerned 
that 
a defendant may 
exercise 
his or her 
constitutional rights and challenge prior convictions or the 
validity of the results of a chemical test.25   
¶46 This court understood and responded to these problems 
in Krajewski.  The Krajewski court held that law enforcement 
officers may choose to give the chemical test they think 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
¶47 Furthermore, the legislature apparently enables law 
enforcement officers to take more than one chemical test by 
request.  Under the implied consent law, if the suspect refuses 
to submit to a chemical test, the police may take possession of 
the person's driver's license and prepare a notice of intent to 
revoke the person's operating privilege.26  Therefore, the 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶33.    
25 Id. 
26 Wisconsin's implied consent statute states in pertinent 
part: 
343.305 
Tests 
for 
intoxication; 
administrative 
suspension and court-ordered 
(3) Requested or required. 
(a) Upon arrest of a person for violation of s. 
346.63(1), (2m) or (5) or a local ordinance in 
conformity therewith, or for a violation of s. 
346.63(2) or (6) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the 
No.  03-0952-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
state's interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road appears 
to be met, even if a warrantless blood draw is prevented by the 
Fourth Amendment. 
¶48 Although the majority concedes that law enforcement 
officers do not have carte blanche to take an unlimited number 
of tests as long as alcohol continues to dissipate in the 
bloodstream, it refuses to define the outer limits of how many 
tests are reasonable.  The majority opinion falls back to the 
reasonableness test, citing the four-part reasonableness test of 
Bohling.27     
¶49 Bohling 
is 
not 
applicable 
to 
determine 
exigent 
circumstances in the present case when more than one test was 
administered.  The first and second of the four Bohling factors 
amount to justification for arrest for drunk driving.  The third 
factor relates to the setting under which blood is drawn.  The 
fourth factor relates to exigent circumstances.  But, according 
                                                                                                                                                             
offense 
involved 
the 
use 
of 
a 
vehicle, 
a 
law 
enforcement officer may request the person to provide 
one or more samples of his or her breath, blood or 
urine for the purpose specified under sub. (2). 
Compliance with a request for one type of sample does 
not bar a subsequent request for a different type of 
sample. 
 
 . . . . 
(9) Refusals; Notice and Court Hearing. 
(a) If a person refuses to take a test under sub. 
(3)(a), the law enforcement officer shall immediately 
take possession of the person's license and prepare a 
notice of intent to revoke, by court order under sub. 
(10), the person's operating privilege. 
27 Majority op., ¶31. 
No.  03-0952-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
to the majority opinion, dissipation of alcohol creates exigent 
circumstances.  So no reasonableness test is offered by the 
majority.  The internal inconsistencies in the majority opinion 
are apparent and troubling.  
¶50 By failing to define the outer limits of what is 
reasonable in a blood draw case, the majority opinion opens the 
door to more litigation.  The majority opinion also leaves law 
enforcement officers, litigants, circuit courts, and the court 
of appeals in a quandary, without guidance regarding what number 
of tests is reasonable.         
¶51 Because the breathalyzer 
test was 
sufficient to 
preserve evidence of Faust's intoxication until trial, no 
exigent circumstances existed to take blood without consent or a 
search warrant.  That alcohol naturally dissipates in the blood 
ordinarily creates an exigent circumstance.  It does not, 
however, create an exigent circumstance under the facts of this 
case.  
¶52 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DAVID T. PROSSER, JR. join this dissent.  
 
No.  03-0952-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶54 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion is well intentioned.  None of the members of the court 
is unconcerned about the continuing carnage from intoxicated 
drivers,28 or the continuing prevalence of impaired driving on 
Wisconsin roadways.29  These legitimate concerns underlay our 
decisions in State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 
(1993), and State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 
N.W.2d 385. 
¶55 The problem in this case is that the arresting officer 
was not satisfied with a voluntary, satisfactory, and useable 
chemical breath test from the defendant.  He wanted a second 
test as backup.  No reason was given for this second "search" of 
the defendant except the desire to gather additional evidence in 
the event it was needed.  The circuit court later suppressed the 
product of this second search without a warrant on grounds that 
"exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the warrantless 
taking of Defendant's blood."   
                                                 
28 There were 292 people killed and 6,570 people injured as 
a result of alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes in Wisconsin 
during the year 2002, according to a report published in 
February 2004 by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
Bureau of Transportation Safety (an average of 1 person killed 
or 
injured 
every 
77 
minutes).  
www.dot.wisconsin.gov/safety/motorist/crashfacts/index/htm (last 
visited June 30, 2004). 
29 There were 37,775 people arrested for operating while 
intoxicated on Wisconsin roadways in 2002.  Id. 
No.  03-0952-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶56 In order to justify a second warrantless taking, we 
are forced to redefine "exigency" to the point that it becomes 
meaningless.   
I 
 
¶57 The 
American Heritage Dictionary 
of 
the English 
Language defines "exigent" as an adjective that means "Requiring 
immediate action or remedy."  The American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language 642 (3d ed. 1992).  An "exigency" is 
defined as a "pressing or urgent situation."  Id.  "Exigencies 
are "urgent requirements; pressing needs."  Id.  It is easy 
enough to explain a second search for breath, blood, or urine if 
one focuses narrowly on the fact that alcohol is dissipating in 
the blood stream at the time the search is undertaken.  It is 
not so easy to justify a second search for backup evidence if 
one attempts to justify that search as an urgent requirement. 
¶58 "Exigency" 
first 
appeared 
in 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 
(1948).  In that case, the Court suppressed evidence obtained 
when police intruded into the home of a suspected "numbers" 
operator. 
 
The 
officers, 
who 
had 
the 
defendant 
under 
surveillance for two months, entered by open window to arrest 
the suspect because the police heard an adding machine typically 
used in numbers operations.  Justice Douglas, writing for the 
majority, reflected on the importance of the Fourth Amendment: 
We are not dealing with formalities.  The presence of 
a search warrant serves a high function.  Absent some 
grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a 
magistrate between the citizen and the police.  This 
was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home 
No.  03-0952-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
a safe haven for illegal activities.  It was done so 
that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade 
that privacy in order to enforce the law.  The right 
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the 
discretion of those whose job is the detection of 
crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady 
thing; and history shows that the police acting on 
their own cannot be trusted.  And so the Constitution 
requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the 
police before they violate the privacy of the home.  
We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement 
and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a 
showing 
by 
those 
who 
seek 
exemption 
from 
the 
constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the 
situation made that course imperative.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶59 McDonald followed a line of cases that included 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).  In Johnson, the 
Court explained the justification for one of the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement but it did not use the term "exigency."  
Instead it used the term "exceptional circumstances."  Id. at 
14-15.  The Court addressed the search of a hotel room where, 
based on the smell of opium in the hallway, officers believed 
that narcotics activity would be found.  The Court held that the 
officers could have, and therefore should have, obtained a 
warrant. 
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on 
balancing the need for effective law enforcement 
against the right of privacy, it may be contended that 
a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed 
with.  But this is not such a case.  No reason is 
offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the 
inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay 
necessary to prepare papers and present evidence to a 
magistrate.  There are never very convincing reasons 
and, in these circumstances, certainly are not enough 
to bypass the constitutional requirement.  No suspect 
was fleeing or likely to take flight.  The search was 
of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle.  No 
No.  03-0952-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or 
destruction, except perhaps the fumes which we suppose 
in time would disappear.  But they were not capable at 
any 
time 
of 
being 
reduced 
to 
possession 
for 
presentation to court. 
Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). 
¶60 Three years later, in United States v. Jeffers, 342 
U.S. 48 (1951), the Court was again presented with a warrantless 
hotel room search.  The defendant in Jeffers attempted to bribe 
the hotel detective with $500 to let the defendant into a room 
occupied by his two aunts so that the defendant could retrieve 
something he had "stashed" in the room.  The hotel detective 
asked that the defendant call back later, and in the meantime 
phoned the police.  The police investigated and tried knocking 
on the hotel room door, and, when nobody answered, the police 
had an employee let them into the hotel room.  After a thorough 
search, they discovered narcotics in the room's closet.  The 
Court found the search violated the Fourth Amendment and 
suppressed the evidence of the narcotics.  The Court reviewed 
the principles of the Fourth Amendment and, in doing so, cited 
Johnson for the proposition that warrantless searches may be 
proper in "exceptional circumstances."  Id. at 51.  The Court 
cited McDonald for the proposition that the Government bears the 
burden of demonstrating that an exception to the warrant 
requirement may be justified, id., but the Court did not mention 
"exigency" in any manner.   
¶61 The landmark decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966), is an important link in this line of cases, but 
No.  03-0952-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
it also did not use the terms "exigent" or "exigency."  The 
relevant discussion instead used the term "emergency."  
The officer in the present case, however, might 
reasonably have believed that he was confronted with 
an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the 
destruction of evidence," Preston v. United States, 
376 U.S. 364, 367.  We are told that the percentage of 
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after 
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 
from the system.  Particularly in a case such as this, 
where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a 
hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, 
there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure 
a warrant.  Given these special facts, we conclude 
that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol 
content in this case was an appropriate incident to 
petitioner's arrest.  
Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added).   
¶62 Over the years, the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court have characterized Schmerber as 
representing the "exigent 
circumstances" exception to the 
warrant requirement.  See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 
(1985); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973); State 
v. Bohling, 173 Wis.2d 529, 538, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993).   
II 
 
¶63 In the present case, the police obtained satisfactory, 
useable evidence.  Nothing threatened the destruction of that 
evidence.  The only thing "threatened" was the destruction of 
additional evidence of the same character. 
 
¶64 As a former prosecutor, I repeatedly represented to 
juries that machines to measure the alcohol content of breath 
were scientific and reliable.  Consequently, it is hard to 
embrace the proposition that an "exigency" of constitutional 
No.  03-0952-CR.dtp 
 
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stature exists to obtain backup evidence from samples of blood 
or urine.  If that were correct, it would seem as though an 
exigency exists in every case in which blood is not drawn.  Such 
an exigency is a built-in rationale for extended detention and 
additional tests potentially amounting to harassment. 
 
¶65 If the officer in this case had offered any compelling 
explanation for why a second test was "needed" as opposed to 
"desired," I would probably not be writing this dissent.  But on 
the 
facts 
presented, 
I 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
the 
second 
warrantless search of the defendant was entitled to march with 
other recognized "exigencies" in our law.  The result in this 
case untethers the "exigent circumstances" exception to the 
warrant requirement from the premises supporting the exception.  
I join the opinion of the Chief Justice and respectfully 
dissent.  
 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  03-0952-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
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