Title: Masonic Temple Ass'n of Quincy, Inc. v. Patel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13109
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13109 
 
MASONIC TEMPLE ASSOCIATION OF QUINCY, INC.  vs.  JAY PATEL & 
another;1 LEO MARTIN & others,2 third-party defendants (and two 
companion cases3). 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     October 6, 2021. - April 27, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Fire.  Insurance, Coverage, Construction of policy, General 
liability insurance, Fire, Insurer's obligation to defend, 
Agent's negligence, Broker, Misrepresentation, Certificate 
of insurance.  Negligence, Insurance agent, 
Misrepresentation.  Broker, Insurance.  Words, "Doing 
business as." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 29, 2016. 
 
 
1 Dipika, Inc. 
 
2 Seymour H. Marcus, also known as Sy Marcus; Roblin 
Insurance Agency, Inc.; Treace, Ltd.; Quincy Adams Building 
Corporation; Shea Street Realty Trust; Ellen Rea Marcus, as 
trustee of the Grossman Monroe Trust; and Union Insurance 
Company. 
 
3 Masonic Temple Association of Quincy, Inc. vs. Acadia 
Insurance Company; Dipika, Inc. vs. Acadia Insurance Company. 
2 
 
 
The case was heard by Thomas A. Connors, J., on motions for 
summary judgment, and entry of separate and final judgment was 
ordered by him. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 17, 2019. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas A. Connors, J. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 23, 2019. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas A. Connors, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the cases from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Nina L. Pickering-Cook (Steven L. Schreckinger also 
present) for Masonic Temple Association of Quincy, Inc. 
 
David V. Lawler for Jay Patel & another. 
 
Robert J. Maselek, Jr., for Union Insurance Company & 
another. 
 
William D. Chapman for Roblin Insurance Agency, Inc. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Harry P. Cohen, of New York, & Laura A. Foggan, of the 
District of Columbia, for Complex Insurance Claims Litigation 
Association. 
 
Peter A. Halprin, of New York, & Jacquelyn M. Mohr, of 
California, for United Policyholders. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  While renovating a historic Masonic Temple in 
Quincy, workers sparked a fire that nearly burned the structure 
to the ground.  At the time of the fire, Jay Patel, the 
president and sole owner of Dipika, Inc. (Dipika), was holder of 
a purchase and sale agreement to buy the Temple.  We are called 
upon to decide, among other things, whether Dipika's putative 
liabilities arising from the fire are covered by its general 
3 
 
liability insurance policy.4  Interpreting the language of the 
policy in its entirety, including, but not limited to, the 
designation of "Dipika Inc. dba Super 8" as the named insured 
and the description of its business as "Motel," we conclude that 
the policy does not afford such coverage.  We further hold that, 
viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving parties, Dipika's insurance broker did not 
commit a breach of its duty of care.  We therefore affirm.5 
Background.  We recite the events underlying these cases, 
drawing from the undisputed facts in the summary judgment 
record. 
Faced with financial pressure, the members of the Quincy 
Rural Masonic Lodge decided to sell their Temple building 
(Masonic Temple or Temple), a 1926 neoclassical edifice located 
on Hancock Street in Quincy.  Title to the property was held by 
an affiliated charitable corporation, Masonic Temple Association 
of Quincy, Inc. (Masons).6  The Masons entered into a purchase 
 
4 Should we determine that there is coverage under Dipika's 
primary policy, the fire losses could also implicate Dipika's 
umbrella policy, which was issued by Acadia Insurance Company 
(Acadia). 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Complex 
Insurance Claims Litigation Association and United 
Policyholders. 
 
 
6 For ease of reference, we refer to the corporation as the 
Masons. 
4 
 
and sale agreement with the Grossman Munroe Trust (Grossman 
Trust), under which the Grossman Trust would develop the 
building into two condominium units.  The basement unit would be 
retained by the Masons to use as their lodge, while the Grossman 
Trust would become owner of the two-story upstairs unit. 
Partway into the renovation, the Grossman Trust concluded 
that the project was not financially viable and assigned its 
interest in the purchase and sale agreement to Patel.  Neither 
the purchase and sale agreement nor the assignment reference 
Dipika.  Patel was the president and sole owner of Dipika, which 
operated a Super 8 motel in Weymouth.  Patel also had prior 
experience, separate and distinct from his interest in Dipika, 
owning and operating several other hotels.7  He intended to 
convert the upstairs condominium unit in the Masonic Temple into 
a "boutique hotel." 
During Patel's stewardship of the renovation, the Masons 
requested that he provide them with proof of insurance for the 
work.  In response, Patel contacted Roblin Insurance Agency, 
Inc. (Roblin), which had acted as Dipika's agent in acquiring 
its existing commercial property and general liability insurance 
policy for the Weymouth Super 8 motel from Union Insurance 
Company (Union).  On July 25, 2013, Patel left a voicemail 
 
7 Before its involvement at the Temple, Dipika's business 
consisted solely of operating the Super 8 motel. 
5 
 
message with Dipika's account manager at Roblin, stating:  "I 
need to do a name, loss payee of Quincy Masonic Temple 
Associates, and this is something I need right away."  One 
minute later, he also sent Roblin an e-mail message, which read:  
"I need ryder [sic] for dipika inc name quincy masonic Temple 
association loss payee."  Roblin responded to Patel's e-mail 
message within one-half hour, transmitting a certificate of 
insurance for Dipika's current policy.  A Roblin account manager 
also followed up the next day, sending an e-mail message to 
Patel asking, "What is the relationship between Quincy Masonic 
Temple Association and Dipika?  Are they asking you for a 
certificate?"  Patel received that message but never responded 
to it. 
 
Several months later, two workers were on site, cutting 
metal, when a fire broke out.8  The damage was extensive; the 
Masons, through their public adjuster, submitted a claim to 
their property insurer for over $12 million, only about one-half 
of which was paid out.  Shortly after the fire, Patel notified 
Union and requested coverage under the Dipika policy. 
 
8 Dipika did not employ the workers who started the fire; 
rather, they worked for a company owned by the Grossman Trust's 
real estate manager.  The record contains some evidence that 
Patel was involved in supervising them and paying for their 
work. 
6 
 
 
A tangle of litigation ensued.  The Masons brought claims 
for negligence against Patel and Dipika, both in starting the 
fire and in failing to obtain proper insurance.9  Dipika then 
brought third-party claims against Union, for wrongful denial of 
coverage, and Roblin, for, inter alia, professional negligence.10  
The Masons subsequently amended their complaint to also assert a 
number of claims against Union and Roblin,11 and later moved to 
amend a second time to add a coverage claim against Dipika's 
umbrella policy insurer, Acadia Insurance Company (Acadia). 
 
Union and Roblin filed motions for summary judgment against 
the Masons, Dipika, and Patel.  A Superior Court judge granted 
 
9 Dipika and the Masons settled these claims prior to this 
appeal.  Union's and Roblin's oppositions to the resulting entry 
of separate and final judgment were overruled, a decision they 
now cross-appeal. 
 
10 Specifically, Dipika alleged four counts against Roblin:  
indemnification and contribution, breach of contract, 
negligence, and violation of G. L. c. 93A. 
 
Dipika also impleaded the Grossman Trust and related 
entities and individuals for indemnification and contribution; 
those claims, too, settled prior to this appeal. 
 
Additionally, Patel, acting in his individual capacity, 
brought claims that mirrored Dipika's.  Our references to 
Dipika's claims and arguments should be understood to include 
Patel's. 
 
11 These included claims for breach of contract, violation 
of G. L. c. 93A, misrepresentation, coverage by estoppel, and 
negligence, and a request for a judgment declaring that the 
Masons' fire loss was covered under Dipika's policy. 
7 
 
summary judgment in favor of Union and Roblin on all counts.12  
This appeal followed.13 
Discussion.  We review the grant of summary judgment de 
novo, and in doing so examine "whether, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material 
facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law."  Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 
56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). 
 
12 The motion judge concluded, and the parties on appeal 
agree, that the claims against Acadia rise or fall with the 
coverage determination under the Union primary policy.  After 
finding no coverage, the judge denied as futile the Masons' 
motion to add Acadia as a party.  To preserve their appellate 
rights, the Masons and Dipika then filed separate suits against 
Acadia, which were dismissed.  Those two companion cases were 
consolidated with the main case for the purposes of this appeal. 
 
13 To summarize, the dismissed causes of action now before 
us are (1) the Masons' claims against Union for 
misrepresentation, negligence, and violations of G. L. c. 93A; 
(2) the Masons' claims against Roblin for misrepresentation and 
negligence; (3) the Masons' request for a declaratory judgment 
as to coverage; (4) Dipika's and Patel's claims against Roblin 
for indemnification and contribution, breach of contract, 
negligence, and violations of G. L. c. 93A; (5) Dipika's and 
Patel's claims against Union for indemnification and 
contribution, breach of contract, negligence, and violations of 
G. L. c. 93A; (6) Dipika's and Patel's request for a declaratory 
judgment as to coverage; (7) the Masons' claims against Acadia, 
mirroring those they brought against Union; and (8) Dipika's and 
Patel's claims against Acadia, mirroring those they brought 
against Union.  Also before us are Union's and Acadia's cross 
appeals of the trial court's entry of a consent judgment between 
Dipika and the Masons. 
8 
 
1.  Coverage under the policy.  a.  Scope of the base 
policy.  Dipika's policy contains two distinct coverages, a 
commercial property part and a commercial general liability 
part.  Dipika does not press a claim that the former applies, so 
we concern ourselves with the latter.  The designation of the 
named insured is located on the policy's common declarations 
page, which expressly notes that the designation is part of the 
policy.  The general liability coverage vows that the insurer 
will "pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of . . . 'property damage' to which 
this insurance applies."  All agree that Dipika's fire-related 
losses would be qualifying sums; the disagreement is over 
whether the insurance applies to those losses. 
The heart of the parties' dispute over the scope of 
coverage is the designation of the named insured as "Dipika Inc. 
dba Super 8."  According to Dipika and the Masons, because use 
of a "dba" name does not create a separate legal entity, all of 
Dipika's activities are covered under the policy, whether 
related to the Super 8 or not.14  In their view, "dba Super 8" 
 
14 Massachusetts appellate courts have not explicitly 
decided that a "dba" designation does not create a separate 
legal entity, but for the purposes of our decision we will 
assume, without deciding, that this is the case.  See Roberts 
vs. Delta Air Lines, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 07-cv-12154-DPW, 
n.3 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2008), aff'd 599 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2010) 
("The designation 'd/b/a' typically describes an entity's 
9 
 
merely clarifies that the Weymouth Super 8 business was included 
within the broader Dipika coverage.  Union's stance is that the 
identification of the named insured as "Dipika Inc. dba Super 8" 
means that the policy covers only liability arising from 
Dipika's activities doing business as the Super 8. 
"The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of 
law."  Wilkinson v. Citation Ins. Co., 447 Mass. 663, 667 
(2006).  "The interpretation of an insurance contract is no 
different from the interpretation of any other contract, and we 
must construe the words of the policy in their usual and 
ordinary sense."  Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers' Insolvency 
Fund, 424 Mass. 275, 280 (1997).  "If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, we must give effect to that language, without 
considering the underlying intent of the parties."  Great Divide 
Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 478 Mass. 264, 267 (2017).  
Moreover, "we must read the language of an insurance policy as a 
whole," id. at 270, and, if possible, "every word in a policy 
should be given meaning," Vickodil v. Lexington Ins. Co., 412 
Mass. 132, 138 (1992). 
Applying these familiar principles, we decline the 
invitation of both parties to establish a bright-line rule that 
a "dba" designation means either everything or nothing.  Rather, 
 
efforts to conduct business under another name [an alias], 
rather than describing a separate legal entity"). 
10 
 
we decide the issue before us:  does Dipika's policy cover 
losses stemming from the Temple fire?  We need not determine the 
precise outer boundaries of the policy's coverage to conclude 
that it unambiguously does not. 
Although "dba Super 8" may not be determinative on its own, 
this is not to say that its plain meaning is not an important 
consideration in our analysis.  Here, the ordinary understanding 
of the phrase "doing business as Super 8" suggests that the 
policy covers only liability arising from Dipika's activities 
that it undertakes doing business as a Super 8.  Even if the 
phrase "doing business as" does not operate to create a separate 
legal entity, see note 14, supra, that does not preclude it from 
being used in the ordinary sense, as here, to describe the ambit 
of a policy's coverage.  See Hakim, 424 Mass. at 280.  Notably, 
Dipika has not even argued that the Temple project was to create 
a new Super 8 or was in any way connected to its existing Super 
8 business, and the record is devoid of any evidence of such. 
Other language in the policy supports the conclusion that 
it affords no coverage for the Temple fire.  For example, 
elsewhere in the policy declarations Dipika's "Business 
Description" is given as "Motel."15  "General usage recognizes 
 
15 In exercising our duty to interpret the language of the 
policy as a whole, we have previously relied on provisions like 
business descriptions to determine the extent of a policy's 
coverage.  See, e.g., Anderson's Case, 276 Mass. 51, 52-53 
11 
 
differences between conventional hotels and most motels."  
Gallagher v. Board of Appeals of Falmouth, 351 Mass. 410, 416 
(1966).  "A motel is more restrictive" and generally has direct 
access to rooms from outside.  Id.  A boutique hotel, on the 
other hand, has been defined "as a smaller, uniquely designed 
independent hotel that provides a high level of service to its 
guests and has a signature restaurant on site."16  In re Miami 
Beach Hotel Investors LLC, 304 B.R. 532, 535 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2004).  The performance of demolition and construction work to 
 
(1931) ("on the face of the policy it would seem that only the 
employees of the hay, grain and feed business were insured; and 
it could have been found that [the insured] was not in the junk 
business when the policy was issued, that the insurer had no 
knowledge that the insured was in the junk business, that the 
wrecking of a power building was not part of the junk 
business"); People's Ice Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 
161 Mass. 122, 125 (1894) (policy of insured ice cutting 
business afforded no coverage for liabilities arising out of 
construction work because "the agreement between these parties 
[did] not refer to or include an operation of that character").  
Accord Westfield Ins. Co. v. Vandenberg, 796 F.3d 773, 779 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (business designation, liability schedule, and 
incorporated application, when read together, limit scope of 
policy to described business). 
 
16 Indeed, that the policy does not extend to any "boutique 
hotel" at the Temple is underscored by the name after the "dba."  
Dipika is doing business as "Super 8," an internationally known 
affordable chain.  See Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Super 8 by 
Wyndham, https://corporate.wyndhamhotels.com/our-brands/super-8/ 
[https://perma.cc/UB2A-4H4Y].  See also Barnes vs. Marriott 
Hotel Servs., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 15-cv-01409-HRL (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 16, 2017) (taking judicial notice of hotel chain 
website); Mass. G. Evid. § 201(b) (2021). 
12 
 
transform the Temple into a "boutique hotel" is a significantly 
different business from operating a motel. 
Additionally, we note that the policy indicates that its 
premium was based on the gross revenue generated at a single 
location, which could only have been the existing Super 8.  This 
suggests to us that it should not provide coverage for 
liabilities arising from Dipika's activities at the Temple, 
which, as discussed, were of a different scope and nature from 
those of the Super 8.17  Cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. 
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 4th 1080, 1086 (1998) 
("The insured's payment of a relatively small premium suggests 
that [the insurer] provided coverage for the relatively small 
risks associated with the ["dba" business], not the much larger 
risks associated with all of [the insured's] projects"). 
Taken together, these provisions clearly express that the 
policy does not cover Dipika's losses arising out of the Temple 
fire.  Our analysis is similar to that undertaken by courts in 
 
17 A necessary implication of the Masons' and Dipika's 
proposed interpretation is that Dipika has coverage under the 
policy for a vast array of possible activities that are even 
more dissimilar to operating a Super 8 than its renovation of 
the Temple.  Our decision today rests on the plain language of 
the insurance contract and not on any public policy 
considerations, but we are skeptical of an interpretation that 
would allow such an open-ended risk of liability, unforeseeable 
to the insurer at the time of contracting, for an insured's 
unilateral decision to undertake drastically different business 
ventures not even in existence at the time the policy was 
executed. 
13 
 
many other jurisdictions that have likewise relied on a "dba" 
designation alongside other policy details to determine that 
coverage did not extend to a largely unrelated enterprise.  For 
example, the facts of Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Shelby 
Ins. Group, 197 Wis. 2d 663 (Ct. App. 1995), are similar to the 
case at bar.  There, the insured ran a video rental business and 
held a policy identifying the named insured as "Robert C. Smith, 
d/b/a Sunnyside Audio and Video."  Id. at 668.  Smith 
subsequently started a construction business, and after an 
accident during a renovation job saddled him with liability, he 
sought coverage under the policy.  Id.  Because the declarations 
page identified the named insured as Smith "d/b/a Sunnyside 
Audio and Video" and described his business as "video rental," 
the court held that there could be no coverage for risks arising 
from his construction business.  Id. at 671. 
Likewise, in Musselwhite v. Florida Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 273 
So. 3d 251, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019), the policy 
declaration page "identified 'JODH3, Inc. d/b/a Bell Feed & 
Farm' as the named insured and described the business as a 'feed 
store.'"  Considering the plain language of these provisions, 
the court concluded that there was no coverage for liabilities 
incurred by the insured entity where those liabilities arose 
from its operation of "a well drilling business that did not 
exist when the policy terms were agreed upon."  Id. 
14 
 
This is the only interpretation that appropriately lends 
meaning to the choice of the insurer and insured to include the 
"dba Super 8" language when designating the named insured.18  See 
J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795 (1986), 
quoting Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 
501 (1939) ("every phrase and clause must be presumed to have 
been designedly employed, and must be given meaning and 
effect").  Cf. Gordon Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 358 
Mass. 632, 634, 638-639 (1971) (honoring express designation of 
three corporations as named insureds in declining to treat them 
as one entity).  The Masons' and Dipika's interpretation, 
conversely, requires us to render "dba Super 8" wholly 
superfluous, which we cannot do.19  See United States Fid. & 
 
18 The dissent cites Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Wakelin, 484 
Mass. 222, 234 (2020), as requiring us to consider whether the 
insurer could have included more explicit limiting language in 
the policy.  See post at note 5.  This principle of construction 
may be useful in interpreting ambiguous terms, as was the case 
in the Green Mountain decision, but need not be employed here, 
where we see no similar ambiguity.  See Mission Ins. Co. v. 
United States Fire Ins. Co., 401 Mass. 492, 499 (1988) (where 
policy language is clear, comparison "with a separate unrelated 
document[] does not justify construing [the] policy other than 
as written"). 
 
19 We note that the identity of the insured is essential to 
determining the scope of coverage.  See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. 
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 599, 607 (2005) (no 
coverage for employee leasing company under client company's 
policy where leasing company was not named insured under 
client's policy's plain language); Jacobs v. United States Fid. 
& Guar. Co., 417 Mass. 75, 79 (1994) ("for purposes of uninsured 
and underinsurance benefits, officers and employees of a 
15 
 
Guar. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 Mass. 651, 658 n.5 (1994) 
(noting "[t]he better definition" of policy term is "the one 
which would not make [it] redundant"); Shea v. Bay State Gas 
Co., 383 Mass. 218, 225 (1981) ("It is neither reasonable nor 
practical to interpret the clause as being meaningless"). 
Trustees of Tufts Univ. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 415 
Mass. 844 (1993), the principal case from this court that the 
Masons and Dipika cite in support of their interpretation, is in 
accord with our decision.  There, the insurer disclaimed any 
duty to defend by arguing that the insured's loss was not 
contemplated by its general liability policy's schedule of 
hazards.  Id. at 855-856.  We observed that the policy 
unambiguously granted comprehensive coverage for property damage 
liability -- like the loss in question -- and "[n]owhere [did 
it] unambiguously provide that coverage is limited to the 
specific hazards listed in the schedule."  Id. at 856.  Thus, in 
that case, the insured prevailed because the plain language of 
the policy did not limit the scope of coverage as argued by the 
insurers.  In the instant case, the insured cannot prevail 
 
corporation do not qualify as named insureds when the 
corporation is listed as the named insured").  By disregarding 
the plain language of the declarations pages and relying only on 
the coverage form to determine the scope of the policy, the 
dissent runs afoul of our customary directive to read "the 
insurance policy as a whole 'without according undue emphasis to 
any particular part over another.'"  Hakim, 424 Mass. at 282 
n.11, quoting Mission Ins. Co., 401 Mass. at 497. 
16 
 
because the plain language of the policy does limit the scope of 
coverage as argued by the insurers.20,21 
b.  Endorsements.  The Masons and Dipika also argue that 
two endorsements to the commercial general liability policy 
expand coverage to include the Masonic Temple fire losses, 
pointing to schedules applying the endorsements to "ALL 
PROJECTS" and "ALL LOCATIONS."  We disagree.  The endorsements 
unambiguously raise the maximum dollar amount recoverable under 
the policy in certain circumstances, but -- equally 
 
20 The Masons and Dipika also direct us to GRE Ins. Group v. 
Metropolitan Boston Hous. Partnership, 61 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 
1995), where an insured who inspected apartments was named as a 
defendant in tenant lawsuits alleging injurious exposure to 
lead.  While that case is not binding on us, the court's 
approach there was the same as ours today.  Reading the plain 
language of the policy as a whole, the court weighed certain 
references to the insured's home office against an endorsement 
that applied "anywhere in the world" and another that 
contemplated off-site liability, concluding that coverage was 
not limited to liabilities arising at the home office.  See id. 
at 81-84.  The named insured had no "dba" designation in the 
policy at issue; in the instant case, the different language of 
Dipika's policy dictates a different result. 
 
21 Because we do not find the relevant policy language to be 
ambiguous, we need not utilize additional interpretive tools.  
See Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krusell, 485 Mass. 431, 437 
(2020) ("we first must determine whether the term . . . is 
ambiguous; if it is, we proceed to consider how an objectively 
reasonable insured would interpret the term"); Great Divide Ins. 
Co., 478 Mass. at 269 ("we strive to effectuate not our own 
ideas about the language that could have been used to best 
effectuate the intent of the parties but, rather, the actual 
contract language"). 
17 
 
unambiguously -- they do not affect what losses are covered in 
the first instance. 
The first endorsement, titled "DESIGNATED CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECT(S) GENERAL AGGREGATE LIMIT," states that it "modifies 
insurance provided under the . . . COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
COVERAGE PART," and goes on to provide, in pertinent part: 
"For all sums which the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages caused by 'occurrences' under Section I - 
Coverage A . . . which can be attributed only to ongoing 
operations at a single designated construction project 
shown in the Schedule above[, a] separate Designated 
Construction Project Aggregate Limit applies to each 
designated construction project . . . ." 
 
The schedule lists the designated construction projects as "ALL 
PROJECTS."  The second endorsement is nearly identical, save 
that it substitutes "location" for "construction project"; it is 
titled "DESIGNATED LOCATION(S) GENERAL AGGREGATE LIMIT," 
operates on occurrences attributable "only to operations at a 
single designated 'location,'" creates a "Designated Location 
General Aggregate Limit," and includes a schedule listing "ALL 
LOCATIONS" as designated locations. 
A careful reading of the endorsements reveals that they do 
not expand the scope of coverage to encompass occurrences not 
otherwise covered.  Rather, the endorsements operate exactly as 
advertised in their titles:  they create separate general 
aggregate limits for occurrences at different locations or 
involving different construction projects.  See United Specialty 
18 
 
Ins. Co. v. Tzadik Acquisitions, LLC, 859 Fed. Appx. 426, 427 
(11th Cir. 2021) ("[T]he coverage limits for scheduled 
properties were subject to a Designated Locations General 
Aggregate Limit Endorsement (DLE).  The DLE assigned each 
scheduled property its own liability limit").  Practically, and 
consistent with our interpretation of the scope of the policy's 
coverage, this means Dipika could enjoy a separate aggregate 
limit if, for example, it incurred liability while constructing 
a new building for its Super 8, or as a result of Super 8-
related activities at a different location.22  The endorsements 
do not, either by plain language or implication, affect what 
losses are covered in the first instance, and therefore do not 
extend coverage to include the Masonic Temple losses. 
c.  Application.  Interpreting the policy language as a 
whole, we conclude that it provides no coverage for Dipika's 
liabilities associated with the fire at the Temple.  Union 
therefore has no duty to indemnify Dipika for the resulting 
losses, and summary judgment on the claims against Union was 
proper.23 
 
22 If, for example, a Dipika Super 8 employee's negligence 
at an out-of-State industry convention led to liability for 
Dipika, Dipika could benefit from a separate aggregate limit 
under the locations endorsement. 
 
23 As discussed in note 12, supra, our holding dictates that 
the denial of the motion to add Acadia in the primary case, and 
the dismissal of the two companion cases, were proper. 
19 
 
2.  Duty to defend.  Dipika argues that, whatever the 
ultimate determination of indemnity, Union was at least 
obligated to defend it against fire-related lawsuits.  "An 
insurer has a duty to defend an insured when the allegations in 
a complaint are reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that 
states or roughly sketches a claim covered by the policy terms."  
Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 460 Mass. 352, 
357 (2011) (Metropolitan), quoting Billings v. Commerce Ins. 
Co., 458 Mass. 194, 200–201 (2010).  "However, when the 
allegations in the underlying complaint lie expressly outside 
the policy coverage and its purpose, the insurer is relieved of 
the duty to investigate or defend the claimant" (quotations 
omitted).  Metropolitan, supra at 357-358, quoting Billings, 
supra.  Although "an insurer's duty to defend is independent 
from, and broader than, its duty to indemnify," Union had no 
duty to defend here.  Metropolitan, supra at 357, quoting A.W. 
Chesterton Co. v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 445 
Mass. 502, 527 (2005).  The factual allegations against Patel 
all concern the fire at the Masonic Temple.  When matched to the 
policy's terms -- which, as discussed supra, unambiguously do 
not extend coverage to Dipika's activities at the Temple -- the 
allegations cannot reasonably supply even a rough sketch of a 
claim.  See Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 
439 Mass. 387, 395 (2003). 
20 
 
3.  Dipika's claims against Roblin.  Dipika insists that, 
should it be unable to recover from Union, its losses should 
instead fall upon Roblin.  All Dipika's claims against Roblin, 
however, suffer from the same fundamental flaw:  they are all 
premised on Patel requesting additional insurance for Dipika 
from Roblin.  But even viewed in the light most favorable to 
Dipika, Patel's asking to add the Masons as a "loss payee" was 
not a request for insurance.24  Brokers have a duty to obtain 
insurance coverage that their client asks them for, see Rae v. 
Air-Speed, Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 192 (1982), but Roblin cannot be 
liable for failing to procure insurance when there was no 
intelligible request for it to do so. 
Dipika insists that Patel's communications should have 
nevertheless triggered a duty to inquire further, so that Roblin 
could have better understood what Patel wanted.  Even if we were 
to put aside that Roblin did attempt to contact Patel again, and 
Patel never called Roblin back or otherwise responded, we think 
this asks too much of Roblin.  We have never held that such 
proactive behavior is part of a broker's general duty of care; 
 
24 Patel requested that the Masons be added as a "loss 
payee."  Such a designation could act to redirect any payout 
under the policy, but would do nothing to expand the granted 
coverage.  See Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 
388 Mass. 289, 291 (1983) ("the loss payee, who is not the 
insured, but is only a designated payee, can recover only what 
the insured is entitled to recover under the contract"). 
21 
 
it aligns more closely with the heightened duty we apply when 
there exists "special circumstances of assertion, representation 
and reliance" between a broker and their client.  Rapp v. Lester 
L. Burdick, Inc., 336 Mass. 438, 442 (1957).  See Baldwin Crane 
& Equip. Corp. v. Riley & Rielly Ins. Agency, Inc., 44 Mass. 
App. Ct. 29, 32 (1997) (heightened duty "generally exists when 
the agent holds himself out as an insurance specialist, 
consultant or counselor and is receiving compensation for 
consultation and advice apart from premiums" [citation 
omitted]).  Dipika concedes that no such special circumstances 
exist here, and we decline to impose a heightened duty in the 
absence of special circumstances.  Summary judgment on Dipika's 
claims against Roblin was therefore warranted. 
4.  The Masons' claims against Roblin.  The Masons also 
assert claims for misrepresentation and negligence against 
Roblin, premised on Roblin's sending of the certificate of 
insurance to Patel.  These claims, too, must fail. 
In the context of a liability policy like Dipika's, "a 
certificate of insurance is simply a form that is completed by 
an insurance broker or agent at the request of a policyholder to 
document the fact that an insurance policy has been written."  
Commonwealth v. Gall, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 289 (2003).  The 
one-page certificate furnished to Patel accurately describes his 
commercial general liability policy, lists the Masons as the 
22 
 
"Certificate Holder," and states on its face:  "THIS CERTIFICATE 
IS ISSUED AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS 
UPON THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. . . .  THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE 
POLICIES OF INSURANCE LISTED BELOW HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE 
INSURED NAMED ABOVE . . . ." 
In Quigley v. Bay State Graphics, Inc., 427 Mass. 455 
(1998), the owner of a fire-destroyed building claimed that he 
was deceived into thinking he had coverage for his losses 
because his lessee's insurance agency had furnished him a 
certificate of insurance for the policy his lessee had taken out 
on the building.  We held that no claim for misrepresentation 
could lie, for three independently sufficient reasons:  (1) the 
certificate was accurate; (2) by its plain language, it did not 
apply to the losses in question; and (3) there was no evidence 
that the broker had actual knowledge that the owner would rely 
on the certificate as proof of coverage.  Id. at 462.  The 
decision in Quigley disposes of the misrepresentation claim 
here.  The certificate Roblin furnished is accurate, and nothing 
on its face suggests that Dipika's existing coverage extended to 
the project at the Masonic Temple.  Further, it is undisputed 
that, at the time the certificate issued, Roblin had no contact 
with the Masons, no knowledge about Dipika's relationship with 
them, and no awareness of Dipika's work at the Masonic Temple.  
The record is thus devoid of evidence that Roblin had actual 
23 
 
knowledge that the Masons "would rely on the certificate as 
confirming that [Dipika] had procured insurance to cover their 
interests . . . .  The plain terms of the certificate stated 
otherwise."25  Id. 
The Masons' negligence claim against Roblin also suffers 
from fatal defects.  "[I]n certain limited circumstances an 
agent's failure to procure insurance coverage may give rise to 
liability to a third party."  Quigley, 427 Mass. at 459.  But "a 
necessary prerequisite to a recovery under either tort or third-
party contract liability is the existence of a promise by the 
agent to procure the insurance requested by the client" 
(emphasis added).  Id. at 459-460.  As discussed supra, there is 
no evidence that Dipika requested relevant insurance.  Nor is 
there evidence that Roblin ever promised Dipika to obtain such 
 
25 The Masons also rely on Witkowski v. Richard W. Endlar 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 785 (2012), for the premise 
that even a facially accurate certificate can be the basis for a 
misrepresentation claim if the context in which it was issued 
was misleading.  Witkowski's facts are readily distinguishable 
from the case at bar.  There, the plaintiff specifically asked 
the insurer for a certificate verifying flood insurance coverage 
for his condominium unit.  Id. at 791.  The certificate he 
received in response accurately listed that the condominium 
building master policies included flood coverage, but not that 
his unit was specifically excluded from that coverage.  Id.  In 
contrast, the Masons never had any interaction with Roblin, 
Patel never specifically requested from Roblin a certificate 
evincing coverage for the work at the Masonic Temple, and 
nothing on the face of the certificate suggests that such 
coverage existed. 
24 
 
insurance.26  Without these necessary elements, Roblin owed no 
duty to the Masons.27 
Conclusion.  Summary judgment properly entered in favor of 
Union and Roblin, and the denial of the Masons' motion to amend 
their complaint was proper.  The judgments are therefore 
affirmed.  The judgments of dismissal in the two companion cases 
are also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
 
26 We reject the Masons' assertion that the sending of the 
insurance certificate could be construed as an "implied promise" 
to obtain coverage, given the undisputed facts that Dipika did 
not request coverage and that Roblin knew nothing about Dipika's 
relationship with the Masons, the project at the Masonic Temple, 
or any resulting obligation to procure insurance. 
 
27 Because we hold that neither Roblin nor Union is liable, 
we need not address their arguments regarding their standing to 
request a reasonableness hearing regarding the settlement 
between the Masons and Dipika. 
 
BUDD, C.J. (dissenting in part).  I agree with the court 
that summary judgment on the claims against Roblin Insurance 
Agency, Inc., was proper.  However, I do not agree that the 
commercial general liability policy (policy) issued by Union 
Insurance Company (Union) to Dipika, Inc. (Dipika), 
unambiguously limits the operations covered by the policy to 
those associated with Dipika's Super 8 motel.  The court infers 
that the scope of coverage is so limited based on language in 
the policy that does not reference the scope of coverage, and 
despite language elsewhere in the policy that expressly provides 
for coverage the court here denies.  We previously have refused 
to grant summary judgment to an insurer in similar 
circumstances, see Trustees of Tufts Univ. v. Commercial Union 
Ins. Co., 415 Mass. 844, 856 (1993), and ought to do so here as 
well. 
"As with any contract, in interpreting an insurance policy, 
we begin with the plain language of the policy."  Holyoke Mut. 
Ins. Co. in Salem v. Vibram USA, Inc., 480 Mass. 480, 485 
(2018), quoting Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Visionaid, Inc., 
477 Mass. 343, 348 (2017).  The policy's coverage form states 
that Union "will pay those sums that the insured[1] becomes 
 
 
1 The policy specifies that "insured" refers to the insured 
entity designated in the declarations.  That entity is Dipika.  
Neither Union nor the court contends otherwise. 
 
 
2 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . 'property 
damage' to which this insurance applies."  The policy has 
detailed provisions concerning the types of property damage to 
which the insurance expressly does and does not apply.  The 
court does not dispute that the fire-related damage to the 
Masonic Temple in Quincy (Temple) is "'property damage' to which 
this insurance applies," nor that Dipika is the insured, see 
note 1, supra, and has accrued liability for this damage.  Thus, 
applying the plain contractual language, Dipika's liability 
arising from the fire at the Temple falls within the policy's 
broad grant of coverage. 
Concluding otherwise, the court asserts that the policy's 
coverage clearly does not encompass Dipika's liability arising 
from the fire at the Temple.  Ante at    .  The court bases this 
conclusion on (1) the description of Dipika as "dba Super 8"2 and 
 
 
2 In the declarations, under the heading "named insured and 
address," the policy lists: 
 
Dipika Inc. 
dba Super 8 
655 Washington Street 
Weymouth, MA 02188. 
 
 
The phrase "dba Super 8" indicates that Dipika does 
business under the trade name "Super 8."  See Providence 
Washington Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 
1200 (1996), quoting Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc. 425 F. 
Supp. 1381, 1387 (D. Neb. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 
1978) ("The designation 'd/b/a' means 'doing business as' but is 
merely descriptive of the person or corporation who does 
 
 
3 
of Dipika's business as "Motel" on the declarations page, and 
(2) the indication that the premium was calculated based on 
gross sales at a single location, presumably the Super 8 motel 
in Weymouth.  Ante at    .  Notably, however, these aspects of 
the policy are not accompanied by any language indicating that 
they define the scope of coverage. 
The stand-alone phrase "dba Super 8" means only "doing 
business as Super 8."  See Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. 
Valley Forge Ins., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1200 (1996).  The 
phrase itself says nothing about the scope of coverage under the 
policy.  Compare American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Teamcorp., 
Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1122, 1132 (D. Colo. 2009) (that 
insured's trade name was listed on declarations page did not, as 
matter of law, limit coverage to only those operations of 
insured associated with that name).  Likewise, the stand-alone 
description of Dipika's business as "Motel" says nothing about 
the scope of coverage.  See Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Belize 
NY, Inc., 277 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 2002) (designation on 
declarations page of insured business as "carpentry" did not 
limit coverage to insured's carpentry operations).  As a matter 
of plain language, both these descriptions are just 
descriptions:  declarative statements that Dipika does business 
 
business under some other name").  The phrase "dba Super 8" 
neither appears nor is referenced anywhere else in the policy. 
 
 
4 
as "Super 8" and is in the motel industry.3  For these 
descriptions to have an effect on coverage, they would need to 
be accompanied or referenced by language delineating the scope 
of coverage.4,5 
 
 
3 I do not agree with the court that the inclusion of "dba 
Super 8" in the declarations is rendered "wholly superfluous" if 
not read as a limitation on the scope of coverage.  Ante at    .  
Rather, the phrase assists in identifying the insured by 
providing one of its names.  See S. Plitt, D. Maldonado, & J.D. 
Rogers, 3 Couch on Insurance 3d § 40:4 (rev. ed. 2011) ("the 
purpose of [providing] a name [for the insured] is to designate 
a person").  It is logical that in the declarations, under the 
heading "named insured and address," the insured is identified 
by its corporate name as well as any name under which it does 
business. 
 
 
4 Although the declarations page undoubtedly is part of the 
policy, information provided in that portion of the policy 
cannot define the scope of coverage unless it does so expressly.  
Indeed, that Dipika's address is listed in the declarations does 
not mean that coverage is limited to liabilities arising from 
operations at that address. 
 
 
5 Union easily could have added such language to its policy.  
That it did not counsels against interpreting these stand-alone 
phrases as limiting coverage to Dipika's operation of its Super 
8 motel.  See Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Wakelin, 484 Mass. 222, 
234 (2020) ("where the insurer had the ability to include . . . 
language in its policy" that clearly would have excluded 
disputed loss from coverage and "failed to do so," court will 
not interpret policy to exclude coverage for such loss); Vermont 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zamsky, 732 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(applying Massachusetts law) (interpreting policy to cover 
specific liabilities where, had insurer wanted to exclude these 
risks from coverage, "it would have been child's play to say 
so," yet insurer had not).  Compare Carlson v. Doekson Gross, 
Inc., 372 N.W.2d 902, 906 (N.D. 1985) ("any limitation on 
coverage should be accomplished by specific exclusions or 
endorsements to the policy, not by a limiting designation of the 
named insured"); Providence Washington Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App. 
4th at 1202 ("We agree with the Carlson court that such a 
limitation cannot be fairly read in the designation of an 
 
 
5 
Similar reasoning applies to the portion of the policy 
indicating that the premium was calculated based off gross sales 
from the operation of Dipika's Super 8 motel.  No language in 
the policy indicates that coverage is limited to those of 
Dipika's operations that Union factored into the calculation of 
the premium.  Compare Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 277 F.3d at 
239 ("Mount Vernon contends that it calculated its premiums 
based on the number of Belize's employees engaged in carpentry.  
However, it failed to include in its Policy any indication that 
it limited its risk to carpentry operations.  It therefore is 
precluded from denying coverage here"). 
Neither the "dba" designation, nor the business 
description, nor the premium calculation explicitly addresses 
the scope of coverage.  Nevertheless, by interpreting these 
aspects of the policy as defining the scope of coverage, the 
court adds meaning not supplied by any of the policy's words -- 
something we typically avoid.  See Massachusetts Insurers 
Insolvency Fund v. Premier Ins. Co. of Mass., 439 Mass. 318, 323 
(2003) ("Although insurance provisions that are plainly 
 
individual as a 'dba', although coverage limited to certain 
business operations could be the subject of specific exclusions 
or endorsements").  Indeed, the policy contains a detailed list 
of exclusions, but none excludes liabilities arising from 
operations unassociated with Dipika's Super 8 motel. 
 
 
6 
expressed must be enforced, those that are conspicuously absent 
should not be implied" [citation omitted]). 
The court appears to infer from these aspects of the policy 
that the parties contemplated only operations connected with the 
Super 8 motel when the policy was put in place.  However, 
regardless of the specific risks that the parties may have 
contemplated, the coverage language that they agreed to 
explicitly provides for a broader scope of coverage -- and it is 
this language that binds them.  Union may have intended to 
provide narrower coverage; however, "we strive to effectuate not 
our own ideas about the language that could have been used to 
best effectuate the intent of the parties but, rather, the 
actual contract language."  Great Divide Ins. Co. v. Lexington 
Ins. Co., 478 Mass. 264, 269 (2017).6  See Trustees of Tufts 
 
 
6 The court expresses concern that interpreting the scope of 
this policy's coverage in line with its plainly expansive 
coverage language will force general liability insurers to incur 
"open-ended risk of liability, unforeseeable to the insurer at 
the time of contracting, for an insured's unilateral decision to 
undertake drastically different business ventures not even in 
existence at the time the policy was executed."  Ante at note 
17.  But that is precisely the risk that general liability 
insurers take on (unless they expressly provide otherwise).  See 
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bizzack Constr., LLC, 259 F. Supp. 
3d 451, 456 (W.D. Va. 2017), quoting Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. 
Kenway Contr., Inc., 240 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Ky. 2007) ("because 
the purpose of commercial general liability insurance is to 
'provide broad comprehensive insurance . . . all risks not 
expressly excluded . . . are covered, including those not 
contemplated by either party'").  See also Quaker State Minit-
Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278, 1295 
(D. Utah 1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir. 1995); J.W. 
 
 
7 
Univ., 415 Mass. at 849, quoting Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane 
Bldg. Co., 391 Mass. 143, 147 (1984) ("We read the policy as 
written.  We are not free to revise it"). 
We previously have refused to narrow coverage based on 
hints in a policy that the parties contemplated fewer risks than 
those encompassed by the policy's expansive coverage language.  
In Trustees of Tufts Univ., 415 Mass. at 855-856, we considered 
an insurer's argument that coverage under its general liability 
policy was limited to those risks included in the policy's 
schedule of hazards.  We rejected this argument even though such 
schedules indicate those risks that an insurer contemplated when 
a policy was drafted, reasoning that "[n]owhere d[id] the policy 
unambiguously provide that coverage is limited to the specific 
hazards listed in the schedule."  Id. at 856.  Likewise here, 
even though the "dba" designation, business description, and 
premium calculation indicate that Union contemplated the risks 
associated with Dipika's operation of its Super 8 motel when 
this policy was drafted, nowhere does the policy unambiguously 
state that coverage is limited to those operations. 
 
Stempel & E.S. Knutsen, 2 Stempel & Knutsen on Insurance 
Coverage § 14.01(C) (4th ed. & Supp. 2021-1) (unless policy 
expressly provides otherwise, insurer "accepts the risk that [a] 
policyholder's operations will expand or diversify along with 
the risk that these expanded or diversified activities will 
result in lawsuits, settlements, and adverse judgments"). 
 
 
8 
At a minimum, it is not unreasonable to interpret the 
policy as covering the fire-related damages at the Temple in 
line with the policy's express coverage language.  Thus, 
although the "dba" designation, business description, and 
premium calculation may hint at the parties' contrary intention, 
these clues at most render the policy's scope of coverage 
ambiguous.  See Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krusell, 485 Mass. 
431, 437 (2020), quoting Citation Ins. Co. v. Gomez, 426 Mass. 
379, 381 (1998) (policy language "is ambiguous where 'it is 
susceptible of more than one meaning and reasonably intelligent 
persons would differ as to which meaning is the proper one'").7 
Because the policy nowhere expressly provides that coverage 
is limited to operations associated with Dipika's Super 8 motel, 
this interpretation cannot form the basis of summary judgment in 
favor of Union.  See Trustees of Tufts Univ., 415 Mass. at 856.  
Accordingly, I dissent from the court's affirmance of the order 
granting summary judgment on the claims against Union and the 
denial of the motions to add Acadia as a defendant.  I instead 
 
 
7 I note, however, that any such ambiguities must be 
"interpreted against the insurer who" drafted the unclear policy 
"and in favor of the insured."  Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 485 
Mass. at 437, quoting Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 449 Mass. 621, 628 (2007).  See 
Trustees of Tufts Univ., 415 Mass. at 849, quoting Hazen Paper 
Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 700 (1990) 
("where 'there are two rational interpretations of policy 
language, the insured is entitled to the benefit of the one that 
is more favorable to it'"). 
 
 
9 
would vacate the order granting summary judgment on the claims 
against Union and remand for the Superior Court's 
reconsideration.8  Insofar as the court affirms this order, I 
dissent. 
 
 
8 I would therefore also vacate the Superior Court's order 
denying the motion by Masonic Temple Association of Quincy, 
Inc., to add Acadia Insurance Company (Acadia) as a defendant 
(or alternatively dismissing the independent actions against 
Acadia), because the claims against Acadia have merit to the 
same extent as those against Union.