Title: Bussey v. E.S.C. Restaurants, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050358
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2005

1
Present:  All the Justices 
 
SUSIE CAROL BUSSEY 
 
v.  Record No. 050358 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 4, 2005 
 
E.S.C. RESTAURANTS, INC., 
t/a GOLDEN CORRAL 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Charles N. Dorsey, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff upon her 
cause of action for negligence and implied breach of warranty 
and whether the trial court erred in setting aside the jury’s 
verdict. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Susie Carol Bussey (“Bussey”) became acutely ill after 
eating beef tips at a Golden Corral restaurant.  She filed a 
Motion for Judgment against E.S.C. Restaurants, Inc., t/a 
Golden Corral (“Golden Corral”), claiming negligence and 
breach of implied warranty.  The evidence at the jury trial 
consisted of testimony from both lay witnesses and medical 
experts.  The jury returned a verdict for Bussey and awarded 
her $111,765.25 in damages.  Golden Corral filed a motion to 
set aside the verdict on the basis that the evidence presented 
at trial was insufficient to prove proximate causation. 
 
2
 
The trial court granted the motion and cited an “apparent 
lack of factual basis” for the treating physician’s opinion on 
these questions.  The trial court concluded that there is “no 
proof of a causal connection” outside of the plaintiff’s own 
testimony.  Bussey appealed the trial court’s order setting 
aside the verdict. 
II. Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
A trial court is authorized to set aside a jury verdict 
only if it is plainly wrong or without credible evidence to 
support it.  Jenkins v. Pyles, 269 Va. 383, 388, 611 S.E.2d 
404, 407 (2005); Rogers v. Marrow, 243 Va. 162, 166, 413 
S.E.2d 344, 346 (1992); Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 578, 581, 260 
S.E.2d 238, 240 (1979).  See Code § 8.01-430.  This authority 
is explicit and narrowly defined.  Jenkins, 269 Va. at 388, 
611 S.E.2d at 407; Rogers, 243 Va. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 346. 
Trial court judges must accord the jury verdict the 
utmost deference.  If there is a conflict in the testimony on 
a material point, or if reasonable people could differ in 
their conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence, or if 
the conclusion is dependent on the weight to be given to the 
testimony, the trial court may not substitute its conclusion 
for that of the jury merely because the judge disagrees with 
the result.  Id.; Lane, 220 Va. at 581, 260 S.E.2d at 240. 
 
3
Because the jury’s function is to determine the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and 
to resolve all conflicts in the evidence, we will reinstate 
the verdict on appeal if credible evidence supports the 
verdict.  Jenkins, 269 Va. at 388, 611 S.E.2d at 407; Hoar v. 
Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 256 Va. 374, 378, 506 S.E.2d 777, 
780 (1998); Carter v. Lambert, 246 Va. 309, 314, 435 S.E.2d 
403, 405-06 (1993); Rogers, 243 Va. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 346.  
On appeal, evidence is deemed to be credible unless it is “so 
manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it, 
or it [is] shown to be false by objects or things as to the 
existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not 
differ."  Burke v. Scott, 192 Va. 16, 23, 63 S.E.2d 740, 744 
(1951).  Accord Commonwealth v. McNeely, 204 Va. 218, 223, 129 
S.E.2d 687, 690 (1963).  In reviewing the evidence, we will 
accord the recipient of the verdict the benefit of all 
substantial conflicts of evidence, and all fair inferences 
that may be drawn from the evidence.  Jenkins, 269 Va. at 388, 
611 S.E.2d at 407; Rogers, 243 Va. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 346 
(citing Graves, 226 Va. at 169-70, 306 S.E.2d at 901). 
B.  Evidence presented at trial 
 
The evidence at trial consisted of lay testimony and 
medical expert testimony.  Bussey testified that she ate lunch 
with a companion at Golden Corral.  The companion's 
 
4
uncontradicted testimony showed that the pair arrived at 
Golden Corral after 10:30 a.m.  Bussey ordered beef tips 
cooked “well done,” but after eating some portion of the meal 
she complained that the meat “smelled bad.”  The manager was 
summoned to her table, and according to Bussey, he stated: 
“The meat is bad . . . I just told the guy five minutes ago 
not to cut that piece of meat up in the back, it’s no good.”  
Bussey decided to leave without eating anything more. 
 
Her uncontradicted testimony was that she did not eat 
anything else on the day in question.  Further, Bussey could 
not recall eating anything the day before except a bowl of 
cereal for breakfast, establishing a period without other food 
in excess of 24 hours before the meal at Golden Corral. 
 
Later that day she began to experience nausea and 
diarrhea.  The day after she ate at Golden Corral, Bussey was 
still experiencing gastrointestinal disturbance and she went 
to the emergency room where she was treated with intravenous 
fluids and medications.  The next day (two days after eating 
at Golden Corral) she went to her treating physician, Dr. 
Gaylord, who diagnosed her condition as food poisoning.  She 
was hospitalized for four days. 
 
Additional lay testimony corroborated much of Bussey’s 
version of events.  Her dining companion, testifying for the 
defense, confirmed that Bussey ate beef tips on the day in 
 
5
question and complained about the smell.  The restaurant 
manager recalled Bussey’s complaint about the smell and taste 
of her beef tips.*  Bussey’s fiancé, whose deposition was read 
into evidence, personally observed her ill state the evening 
after she ate the beef tips.  
 
Bussey also presented expert testimony from her treating 
physician, Dr. Gaylord, who is board certified in internal 
medicine.  He saw Bussey two days after she ate at Golden 
Corral and diagnosed her symptoms as being caused by 
staphylococcal food poisoning.  Dr. Gaylord based his 
diagnosis upon a multitude of factors including the history 
provided by Bussey, review of her medical record from the 
emergency room, direct observation and evaluation of her 
symptoms, and the swift resolution of her illness in response 
to hydration.  Additionally, he conducted lab testing that 
excluded other causes of gastrointestinal distress, e.g. 
ulcer, gastrointestinal bleeding, pancreatitis.  He testified 
that her symptoms could not have been caused by a casual 
contact with bacteria such as having dirty hands.     
                     
* Although Golden Corral presented evidence that 
specifically contradicted Bussey’s version of her conversation 
with the restaurant manager, we are required to give Bussey 
the benefit of that conflict and consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party who received the verdict.  
Jenkins, 269 Va. at 388, 611 S.E.2d at 407; Rogers, 243 Va. at 
166, 413 S.E.2d 344 (citing Graves, 226 Va. at 169-70, 306 
S.E.2d at 901). 
 
6
C.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
In the context of unwholesome food, the proof necessary 
to sustain a cause of action based upon negligence or breach 
of warranty is the same.  “[T]he burden requires the plaintiff 
to show ‘(1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous either 
for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some 
other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the 
unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left 
the defendant’s hands.’ ”  Harris Teeter v. Burroughs, 241 Va. 
1, 4, 399 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1991) (quoting Logan v. Montgomery 
Ward, 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)).  The 
implied warranty of wholesomeness applies to the sale of food 
by restaurants.  Levy v. Paul, 207 Va. 100, 106, 147 S.E.2d 
722, 726 (1966).  With regard to proximate causation where 
there is no direct proof, the circumstantial evidence must be 
sufficient to show that the causation alleged is “a 
probability rather than a mere possibility.”  Southern States 
Coop. v. Doggett, 223 Va. 650, 657, 292 S.E.2d 331, 335 
(1982). 
In his order setting aside the jury verdict, the trial 
judge opined that the testimony of Dr. Gaylord lacked a 
sufficient factual basis, and the remaining circumstantial 
evidence consisting of lay testimony was insufficient to 
 
7
support the jury verdict.  We disagree with both of the trial 
court’s holdings. 
 
Certainly, expert testimony is inadmissible if it is too 
speculative or lacks a sufficient factual basis.  Forbes v. 
Rapp, 269 Va. 374, 381, 611 S.E.2d 592, 596 (2005); John v. 
Im, 263 Va. 315, 319-20, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002); 
Countryside Corp. v. Taylor, 263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 680, 
682 (2002); see Code §§ 8.01-401.1 and –401.3.  According to 
the trial court, Dr. Gaylord’s testimony lacked sufficient 
factual basis because of “the non-contemporaneous medical 
examination, the lack of laboratory testing, and the 
discrepancy in the timeline.”  We will address each issue 
seriatim. 
 
Dr. Gaylord examined Bussey less than two days after the 
onset of her illness.  At that time, he analyzed the factors 
discussed in his testimony and reviewed the emergency room 
report prepared the previous evening.  The essential nature of 
Bussey’s symptoms remained the same from onset of illness 
until Dr. Gaylord’s examination. 
 
Next, the trial court cites the lack of laboratory tests 
showing the existence of staphylococcal bacteria.  We have 
never required positive proof by scientific testing to 
establish a factual basis for medical diagnosis and opinion.  
Dr. Gaylord cited a multitude of factors, including laboratory 
 
8
testing that excluded other causes of illness, which 
contributed to his opinion.  Moreover, he testified that food 
poisoning is a “fairly common illness” for which scientific 
testing would not be cost effective, and the “emphasis is on 
the last meal before the event.”  We are satisfied on this 
point that Dr. Gaylord’s opinion was based sufficiently on 
facts known to him and was not speculative.  Cf. Forbes, 269 
Va. at 382, 611 S.E.2d at 597 (excluding expert testimony 
given “off the top of [his] head”). 
 
With regard to the alleged timeline discrepancy, Golden 
Corral makes much of the two hour difference between Bussey’s 
testimony concerning the onset of illness four hours after 
eating, and Dr. Gaylord’s testimony that “most cases of 
bacterial food poisoning with manifestations such as hers 
arise within 6 to 24 hours.”  Of course, Bussey cannot rise 
above her own testimony, Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 
S.E.2d 652 (1922), but here the suggested conflict merely 
reflects the difference between symptoms experienced in the 
general population and those experienced by Bussey in 
particular, and created a jury issue regarding the weight to 
be given to the testimony. 
 
For these reasons, we hold that Dr. Gaylord’s expert 
testimony concerning causation had a sufficient factual basis 
and the evidence was properly before the jury. 
 
9
Turning to the lay testimony, we begin with the 
proposition that, generally, lay testimony is admissible to 
prove proximate causation.  Todt v. Shaw, 223 Va. 123, 127, 
286 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1982) (lay testimony sufficient to raise 
a jury question even when expert testimony failed to establish 
causation); Sumner v. Smith, 220 Va. 222, 226, 257 S.E.2d 825, 
827 (1979) (“[direct medical] evidence is not a prerequisite 
to recovery”).  In Sumner, we held that testimony of the 
plaintiff, indirect medical evidence, and the reasonable 
inferences derived therefrom presented a jury issue as to 
causal connection.  220 Va. at 225-26, 257 S.E.2d at 827.  See 
also Gwaltney v. Reed, 196 Va. 505, 509, 84 S.E.2d 501, 503 
(1954) (plaintiff’s testimony of pain occurring soon after an 
accident was sufficient to raise a jury question on 
causation).  “All that is required is that a jury be satisfied 
with proof which leads to a conclusion with probable certainty 
where absolute logical certainty is impossible.”  Bly v. 
Southern Ry. Co., 183 Va. 162, 176, 31 S.E.2d 564, 570 (1944).  
Our holdings in Sumner and Bly are directly applicable here.  
Cases involving food poisoning present unique circumstances 
because the primary source of evidence is usually consumed and 
transmuted in the ordinary course of its use.  As a result, 
most cases will necessarily rely upon circumstantial evidence. 
 
10
We hold that the lay testimony coupled with the doctor’s 
diagnosis was sufficient to support the jury verdict.  Bussey 
ate only one meal within a 36 hour period, the meal consisted 
of beef that “smelled bad,” and thereafter she suffered a 
sudden illness that was diagnosed as food poisoning.  The 
evidence is neither speculative nor scant, and the jury 
verdict naturally follows from fair inferences drawn from the 
evidence. 
The right to a trial by a jury in a civil case is 
constitutional in origin.  Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia provides that in civil suits 
respecting property interests, "trial by jury is preferable to 
any other, and ought to be held sacred.”  A jury’s verdict 
should be set aside only where it is plainly wrong or there is 
no credible evidence in the record to support that verdict.  
Such circumstances did not exist in this case. 
D.  Conclusion 
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury’s verdict and that the trial court erred in setting aside 
the verdict for the plaintiff and entering judgment for the 
defendant.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court, reinstate the jury verdict, and enter judgment 
for the plaintiff, Bussey. 
Reversed and final judgment.