Title: ESTATE OF HARTMAN SR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13391
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 28, 1977

No. 13391 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 I N T H E M A T T E R O F T H E ESTATE O F W A L L A C E J. HARTMAN, SR., Deceased. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: G r a y b i l l , O s t r e m , Warner and C r o t t y , Great F a l l s , Montana George R. C r o t t y , Jr. argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Rapkoch and Knopp, Lewistown, Montana P e t e r L. Rapkoch argued, Lewistown, Montana Submitted: January 21, 1977 Decided: WPR 2 8 1 9 f l F i l e d : Fg>a21! 1977 Mr. Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the district court, Lewis and Clark County, admitting to probate a carbon copy of the will of Wallace J. Hartman, Sr., hereinafter referred to as decedent. Decedent was a resident of Lewis and Clark County at the time of his death on January 29, 1976. He was survived by three children: Wallace J. Hartman, Jr., Shirley Hartman, respondent here, and Delores Puckett, appellant here. It is undisputed that decedent had properly executed a will on March 22, 1974, in the office of Charles M. Joslyn, an attorney in Choteau, Montana. The original will was given to decedent and a carbon copy retained by the attorney. This will provided that Delores Puckett receive $10.00, Wallace J. Hartman, Jr. receive $1,000 and some personal property, and Shirley Hartman receive the remainder of the estate. Evidence presented indicated the estate exceeds $1,000,000. On the date of decedent's death, Wallace J. Hartman, Jr., his wife, Janny, Shirley Hartman, and her fiance searched decedent's automobile and residence in Lincoln, Montana. Decedent's personal property and papers were taken to the house of Wallace J. Hartman, Jr. in Great Falls, Montana. A subsequent examin- ation of these papers did not reveal a will. Wallace J. Hartman, Jr. was appointed personal representative of the estate. There- after, Shirley Hartman presented a carbon copy of the March 22, 1974 will for probate. The district court entered its order admitting the carbon copy to probate. The primary conflict concerns the procedure and the proof required to probate a lost will under Montana's Uniform Probate Code, Section 91A-1-101, et seq., R.C.M. 1947. Prior to enactment of Montana's Uniform Probate Code, sections 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947, imposed special require- ments of proof in formal testacy proceedings seeking the probate of lost or destroyed wills. Section 91-1201, R.C.M. 1947, provided : "Whenever any will is lost or destroyed, the district court must take proof of the execution and validity thereof, and establish the same; notice to all persons interested being first given, as prescribed in regard to proofs of wills as in other cases. All the testimony given must be reduced to writing, and signed by the witnesses." Section 91-1202, R.C.M. 1947, provided: "No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will, unless the same is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." To establish a prima facie case under these statutes, it was incumbent upon the proponent of a lost or destroyed will to show affirmatively either that the will he proposed was in exis- tence at the time of the death of testator or that it was fraud- ulently destroyed during his lifetime, in addition to the execution, validity and provisions of the will. In re Colbert's Estate, 31 Mont. 461, 468, 78 P. 971; In re Estate of Una M. Newman, 164 Mont. 15, 19, 20, 22, 518 P.2d 800. Colbert and Newman also stated that a will, last seen in the possession of a testator, which cannot be found after a careful and exhaustive search follow- ing death, is presumed to have been destroyed by the testator with the intent of revoking it, and that this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Montana's Uniform Probate Code contains no special stat- utory requirements of proof when seeking probate of a lost or destroyed will. The official comment to section 91A-3-303, R.C.M. 1947, states: " * * * Lost o r destroyed w i l l s must be e s t a b l i s h e d i n formal proceedings. See Section [91A-3-4023. * * *" Section 91A-3-402, R.C.M. 1947, which governs t h e c o n t e n t s of p e t i t i o n s i n formal proceedings, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " I f t h e o r i g i n a l w i l l i s n e i t h e r i n t h e posses- s i o n of t h e c o u r t nor accompanies t h e p e t i t i o n and no authenticated copy of a w i l l probated i n another j u r i s d i c t i o n accompanies t h e p e t i t i o n , t h e p e t i t i o n a l s o must state t h e contents of t h e w i l l , and i n d i c a t e t h a t it i s l o s t , destroyed, o r otherwise unavailable." Furthermore, Sec 15, Chap. 263, Laws 1975 expressly repealed s e c t i o n s 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947. The i n s t a n t c a s e involves no d i s p u t e a s t o t h e execution of t h e w i l l , nor i t s provisions. What respondent contends i s t h a t t h e presumption favoring revocation under t h e circumstance of t h i s c a s e was abolished when t h e s p e c i a l s t a t u t o r y require- ments of proof under s e c t i o n s 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947 were repealed. Therefore s i n c e s e c t i o n 91A-3-407, R.C.M. 1947 places t h e burden of proof of revocation upon t h e c o n t e s t a n t , he must so do without t h e b e n e f i t of t h e presumption of revocation. Appel- l a n t , on t h e o t h e r hand, contends t h a t t h e presumption discussed i n Colbert and Newman s t i l l e x i s t s , and proponent must r e b u t t h e presumption when it a r i s e s by showing t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e w i l l a t t h e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s death. Neither of t h e s e conten- t i o n s is e n t i r e l y c o r r e c t . A s found from a reading of Colbert and c a s e s c i t e d there- i n , t h e presumption favoring revocation which a r i s e s when a w i l l known t o be i n t h e t e s t a t o r ' s possession cannot be found a f t e r h i s death, o r i g i n a t e d from t h e common l a w of England, where t h e c o u r t s a r e not c o n t r o l l e d by any p o s i t i v e s t a t u t o r y provisions. Loxley v. Jackson, 3 P h i l l - E c c . 126, 161 Eng. Reprint 1277 (1819); Colvin v. Fraser, 2 Hagg.Ecc. 266, 162 Eng. Reprint 856, 874, (1829); L i l l i e v. L i l l i e , 3 Hagg.Ecc. 184, 162 Eng. Reprint 1124 (1829). Colvin explains t h e reasoning behind t h i s presumption: " A l l t h e s e presumptions, i f they come t o be analysed, may be resolved i n t o t h e reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y of f a c t , deduced from t h e ordinary p r a c t i c e of mankind and from sound reason. Persons i n general keep t h e i r w i l l s i n places of s a f e t y , o r , a s we here t e c h n i c a l l y express it, 'among t h e i r papers of moment and concern.' They a r e instruments i n t h e i r n a t u r e revocable: t e s t a - mentary i n t e n t i o n i s ambulatory till death; and i f t h e instrument be not found i n t h e r e p o s i t o r i e s of t h e t e s t a t o r , where he had placed it, t h e common sense of t h e matter, prima f a c i e , is t h a t he himself destroyed it, meaning t o revoke it * * *." A s t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Colbert c i t i n g I n re Kennedy's W i l l , 30 M i s c . Rep. 1, 62 N . Y S . 1 0 1 1 : "'"Legal presumptions are founded upon t h e exper- ience and observation of d i s t i n g u i s h e d j u r i s t s a s t o what is u s u a l l y found t o be t h e f a c t r e s u l t i n g from any given circumstances; and, t h e r e s u l t being t h u s a s c e r t a i n e d , whenever such circumstances occur, they a r e prima f a c i e evidence of t h e f a c t presumed."'" The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i n t h i s case i s whether t h e pre- sumption favoring revocation and t h e s t a t u t o r y requirements of proof i n s e c t i o n s 91-1202 a r e one and t h e s a m e . A thorough re- search of t h e law on t h i s p o i n t i n d i c a t e s they a r e not. A c a r e f u l reading of Colbert and Newman show t h i s Court was speaking of two s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t r u l e s of law when they considered t h e s t a t u t e , on one hand, and t h e presumption on t h e o t h e r . I n Newman, it i s s t a t e d : "Not only do t h e proponents of t h e proposed w i l l have t h e burden of proof t o e s t a b l i s h i t s existence when it is a l o s t w i l l , b u t -- a l s o where no testamentary papers have been found a f t e r a c a r e f u l and exhaustive search, a s i n t h i s case, a presumption arises t h a t t h e deceased destroyed t h e w i l l animo revocandi (with i n t e n t i o n t o revoke). * * * "For t h e reason t h a t t h e respondents d i d not m e e t t h e i r burden of proof t h a t t h e w i l l was a c t u a l l y i n e x i s t e n c e o r i n e x i s t e n c e i n contem- p l a t i o n of law a t t h e t i m e of deceased's death, and f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e presumption of d e s t r u c t i o n i s not overcome by t h e testimony adduced a t t h e hearing, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n admitting t h e w i l l t o probate." (Emphasis supplied. ) Likewise, t h e c o u r t s of New York have made t h e d i s t i n c - t i o n t h a t s t a t u t e s i n t h e nature of s e c t i o n 91-1202, R.C.M. 1947, d i d not r e p l a c e t h e common law presumption of revocation, but added t o it. The c o u r t , i n Knapp v. Knapp,Selden 6, 1 0 N.Y. 276, 278 (1851) s t a t e d : " I t was w e l l s e t t l e d a t common law by a long series of adjudications i n t h e c o u r t s i n England, and which have been followed by t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e , t h a t t h e presumption of law is, t h a t a w i l l proved t o have had existence, and n o t found a t t h e death of t e s t a t o r , was destroyed animo revocandi. ( B e t t s v. Jackson, 6 Wend., 173; I d l e y v. Bowen, 1 1 Wend., 227.) And our s t a t u t e has placed t h i s matter beyond a l l c a v i l and doubt. It is a s follows: 'No w i l l of any t e s t a t o r , who s h a l l d i e a f t e r t h i s chapter s h a l l t a k e e f f e c t a s a law, s h a l l be allowed t o be proved as a l o s t o r destroyed w i l l , unless t h e s a m e s h a l l be proved t o have been i n existence a t t h e death of t h e t e s t a t o r o r be shown t o have been f r a u d u l e n t l y destroyed i n t h e l i f e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r ; nor unless its provisions s h a l l be c l e a r l y and d i s - t i n c t l y proved by a t least two c r e d i b l e witnesses, a c o r r e c t copy o r d r a f t being deemed equivalent t o one witness. ' (2 R.S., 68, B 67. ) This s t a t u t e recognizes t h e former common law r u l e , by r e q u i r i n g proof e i t h e r t h a t t h e w i l l w a s i n exis- t e n c e a t t h e time of t h e d e a t h of t h e t e s t a t o r , o r t h a t t h e l e g a l presumption t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r destroyed it animo revocandi be overcome by sat- i s f a c t o r y proof t h a t it w a s f r a u d u l e n t l y destroyed i n t h e l i f e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r . " The t r u e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e presumption of revocation and such s t a t u t o r y requirements of proof i s t h a t t h e former is a r u l e of s u b s t a n t i v e law governing revocation, whereas t h e l a t t e r is a procedural l a w governing t h e probate of l o s t o r destroyed w i l l s . This d i s t i n c t i o n i s f u r t h e r explained i n J u s t i c e Traynor's d i s s e n t i n I n r e B r i s t o l ' s E s t a t e , 23 Cal.2d 221, 143 P.2d 689, "While t h e overruling of I n r e E s t a t e of Sweetman d i d much t o d i s p e l t h e confusion engendered by t h a t case, t h e r e l a t i o n of Probate Code, s e c t i o n 350, t o t h e presumption of revocation t h a t i s s a i d t o arise i n t h e s e c a s e s s t i l l r e q u i r e s c l a r i f i c a - t i o n . I f s e c t i o n 350 provided simply t h a t a pre- sumption of revocation a r i s e s i n t h e case of a l o s t w i l l , it would be necessary only t o r e b u t t h e pre- sumption t o prove t h a t t h e w i l l was i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e time of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s death. A presumption of revocation independent of s e c t i o n 350 becomes super- fluous, however, i f t h e very e x i s t e n c e of t h e w i l l a t t h e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s d e a t h must be proved. While proof of t h a t e x i s t e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h e f a c t of nonrevocation, t h e converse does not follow t h a t a w i l l e x i s t s because t h e r e i s no revo- c a t i o n t h e r e o f . I t would t h e r e f o r e be i d l e t o r e b u t t h e presumption of revocation i f t h e r e w e r e no proof t h a t a w i l l e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s death. "Section 350 cannot reasonably be construed a s c r e a t i n g a presumption of revocation. It i s concerned, not with t h e r u l e s governing revo- c a t i o n , which a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 74 of t h e Probate Code, but with t h e procedure f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a l o s t o r destroyed w i l l . * * * Com~liance with t h e s u b s t a n t i v e D r c v i s i o n s t h a t deiermine t h e s t a t u s of t h e w i l i a s an executed instrument is not enough t o render t h e w i l l o p e r a t i v e a s a conveyance. A w i l l cannot be given i n evidence a s t h e foundation of a r i g h t o r t i t l e u n l e s s it has been duly probated * * * and s e c t i o n 350 prescribed t h e requirements t h a t must be s a t i s f i e d before a l o s t w i l l can be probated. It i s t h e r e f o r e not c o n t r o l l i n g t h a t under t h e s u b s t a n t i v e provisions of t h e law, t h e w i l l has been duly executed and has n o t been revoked, f o r it cannot be probated i f t h e require- ments prescribed i n t h e Code f o r t h e probate of w i l l s cannot be met. The requirement of proof t h a t t h e w i l l e x i s t e d a t t h e time of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s death cannot be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a requirement of proof of nonrevocation." (Emphasis supplied.) Other a u t h o r i t i e s a l s o point o u t t h i s presumption i s a s u b s t a n t i v e r u l e of law r e l a t e d t o revocation by a physical a c t , r a t h e r than a procedural r u l e governing l o s t o r destroyed w i l l s . on 9 Wigmore/Evidence 3d Ed, B 2523, s t a t e s : "The revocation of a w i l l by d e s t r u c t i o n may be i n f e r r e d , on a p r i n c i p l e of Relevancy already considered * * * from t h e f a c t t h a t it once e x i s t e d but cannot be found a t t h e t e s t a - t o r ' s death." (Emphasis supplied.) Atkinson W i l l s 2nd Ed, S 1 0 1 , p. 5 5 3 , s t a t e s "The matter of revocation by physical a c t i s compli- cated by t h e operation o f presumptions under c e r t a i n circumstances. Thus, it i s o f t e n held t h a t where t h e w i l l was i n t e s t a t o r ' s possession and cannot be found a t t h e t i m e of h i s death, it w i l l be presumed t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r destroyed it with i n t e n t t o revoke, and t h e same has been held where a d u p l i c a t e w i l l i n t e s t a t o r ' s possession cannot be found. Indeed it i s o f t e n s a i d t h a t t h e burden of proof i s on t h e proponent under t h e s e circumstances. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, t h i s presumption i s c o n t r o l l i n g i n j u r i s d i c - t i o n s which do not have and never have had s t a t u t e s imposing s p e c i f i c requirements of proof f o r probating l o s t o r destroyed wills. This statement is found at Anno. 3 ALR2d 949, 986: "It has been provided by statute in some instances that no will shall be proved as a lost will unless it is shown to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown to have been destroyed either without his consent or fraudulently during his lifetime. Among the juris- dictions which, as shown by the adjudications falling within the scope of this annotation, have had statutes which in effect so provide, are Arkansas, California, Indiana, Montana, New York, Ohio, and Washington." Nevertheless, the annotation lists another 32 jurisdictions which adhere to this presumption and have done so for a long time, as evidenced by these few cases: Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 21 S.Ct. 474, 45 L ed 663 (1901); McBeth v. Mc- Beth, 11 Ala. 596 (1847); Weeks v. McBeth, 14 Ala. 474 (1848); Allen v. Scruggs, 190 Ala. 654, 67 So 301 (1914); Valentine's will, 93 is. 45, 67 N.W. 12 (1896); Scoggins v. Turner, 98 N.C. 135, 3 S.E. 719 (1887); Shacklett v. Roller, 97 Va. 639, 34 S.E. Thus the repeal of sections 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947 did not abolish the rebuttable presumption of revocation, which arises when a duly executed will, last seen in the testator's possession, cannot be found at his death. Section 91A-3-407, R.C.M. 1947, provides in part: "In contested cases, petitioners who seek to establish intestacy have the burden of establish- ing prima facie proof of death, venue, and heir- ship. Proponents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution in all cases, and, if they are also petitioners, prima facie proof of death and venue. Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake or revocation. Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters with respect to which they have the initial burden of proof. * * *" As the official comment states, this is a fairly general approach to questions concerning burdens of going forward with the evidence. I n essence, t h e procedure i s t h e same a s t h a t under t h e o l d law. A s s t a t e d i n I n re C o l b e r t l s E s t a t e , 31 Mont. 461, " I n order t o simplify t h e discussion, it w i l l be w e l l t o a s c e r t a i n f i r s t what a r e t h e essen- t i a l s i n proving a l o s t w i l l . I n every case under our s t a t u t e t h e r u l e of procedure i s t h a t t h e proponent of t h e w i l l must f i r s t make o u t a prima f a c i e case; t h a t i s t o say, must make such proof a s would e n t i t l e t h e w i l l t o probate i n t h e absence of a c o n t e s t . Then t h e c o n t e s t a n t a t t a c k s t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e w i l l , t h e proponent defends t h e same, and t h e c o n t e s t a n t r e b u t s t h e testimony of t h e proponent." What w e have held i s t h a t t h e c o n t e s t a n t may u t i l i z e t h i s rebut- t a b l e presumption i n meeting h i s burden of proving revocation. The proponent then has t h e burden of going forward with s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o r e b u t t h i s presumption. However, a p p e l l a n t i s mistaken i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e proponent can only r e b u t t h e presumption by proving e x i s t e n c e of t h e w i l l subsequent t o t h e t e s t a t o r ' s death. I n a d d i t i o n t o such evidence, t h e proponent may a l s o show (1) t h a t one o t h e r than t h e t e s t a t o r had possession of t h e w i l l ; ( 2 ) t h a t t h e t e s t a - t o r was on f r i e n d l y o r unfriendly t e r m s with c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t e d persons; (3) t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r was p h y s i c a l l y o r mentally in- capable of destroying t h e w i l l with t h e i n t e n t t o revoke; o r ( 4 ) t h a t another had t h e opportunity t o dispose of t h e w i l l and b e n e f i t thereby. See3ALR2d 949. This l i s t has not been exhausted; c e r t a i n l y t h e r e may be o t h e r f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e . I n any event, t h e proof required must be c l e a r , s a t i s f a c t o r y and convincing. I n re C o l b e r t l s E s t a t e , supra. The second i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t i s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n disallowing c e r t a i n d e c l a r a t i o n s of decedent i n which he a l l e g e d l y s t a t e d t o h i s son t h a t he had destroyed h i s w i l l and t h e reason f o r doing so. This i s s u e i s well s e t t l e d i n Montana by Colbert. Such d e c l a r a t i o n s are n o t admissible, unless they a r e a p a r t of t h e r e s gestae, and a r e used t o simply show t h e mental s t a t e of t h e t e s t a t o r when he e i t h e r executed t h e w i l l o r when he destroyed it. A n extensive discussion of t h e reasoning f o r t h i s r u l e of law i s provided i n Colbert. The declarations sought by appellant w e r e not admissible, s i n c e no a c t of destroying t h e w i l l was ever proven. What a p p e l l a n t was t r y i n g t o prove by these declarations was t h e a c t of destroying t h e w i l l , not t h e i n t e n t of t h e decedent while t h e alleged destruction was taking place. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t w a s c o r r e c t i n i t s exclusion of t h e evidence. This case i s remanded f o r hearing c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. Chief J u s t i c e D