Title: MICHAEL STANTON V CITY OF BATTLE CREEK
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 115909
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2002

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 17, 2002  
MICHAEL STANTON and JOY STANTON,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v  
No. 115909  
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, and 
ALLEN MAYNARD HOWARD,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CAVANAGH, J.  
This case calls into question whether a forklift is a  
“motor vehicle” within the ambit of the motor vehicle  
exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405.  We hold  
that it is not, and, therefore, we affirm the decision of the  
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s order  
granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.  
 
I. Facts And Proceedings  
On April 28, 1995, plaintiff Michael Stanton1 was working as  
a truck driver for Hover Trucking Company and delivered  
hardware to a site defendant city of Battle Creek owned.  
Defendant Allen M. Howard, a city employee, drove a forklift  
owned by the city to plaintiff’s truck and loaded the hardware  
onto the forklift.  After the hardware was removed from  
plaintiff’s truck, Howard prepared to back up and drive away,  
and plaintiff lowered the truck door and stepped down.  The  
brakes on the forklift stuck and the forklift stayed in  
neutral, rolled forward, and struck plaintiff.  Plaintiff  
alleges he suffered numerous injuries as a result.  
In August 1996, plaintiff sued the city, alleging  
negligent maintenance and operation of the forklift, and sued  
Mr. 
Howard, 
alleging 
negligent 
or 
grossly 
negligent  
maintenance and operation of the forklift. Defendants moved  
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),(8), and (10).  
The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion for summary  
disposition 
on 
governmental 
immunity 
grounds, 
MCR 
2.116(C)(7),  
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  237 Mich App 366; 603 NW2d  
285 (1999).  When the plaintiff initially appealed to this  
Court, we denied leave to appeal.  461 Mich 1019 (2000).  
1 The claim for loss of consortium, brought by plaintiff’s
wife Joy Stanton, is derivative. 
2  
 
 
  
Plaintiff, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration,  
which we granted.2  
II. Standard of Review  
We review de novo decisions on summary disposition  
motions. Sewell v Southfield Pub Schs, 456 Mich 670, 674; 576  
NW2d 153 (1998).  
Similarly, 
we 
review 
questions 
of 
statutory  
interpretation de novo.  In re MCI Telecommunications, 460  
Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  
III. Discussion  
A. Liability of the City of Battle Creek  
The governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et  
seq., provides immunity from tort liability to governmental  
2 
The 
order 
granting 
plaintiff’s 
motion 
for 
reconsideration directed the parties to brief the following
five issues: 
(1) whether a forklift is a “motor vehicle” as 
that term is used in MCL 691.1405; (2) whether, in 
light of 1995 PA 140, Mull v Equitable Life  
Assurance Society of the United States, 444 Mich 
508 (1994), affects the answer to the previous 
question; (3) whether, if the answer to (2) is in 
the affirmative, language in Mull not affected by 
1995 PA 140 should be disavowed; (4) whether a 
decision by this Court to disavow such parts of 
Mull would affect the outcome in this case; and (5) 
whether the “vehicle exception” in MCL 691.1405 
creates a cause of action against governmental 
agencies, or merely defines an exception to the 
immunity conferred by MCL 691.1407(1).  [465 Mich 
855 (2001).]  
3 
 
 
 
 
 
agencies3 
engaged 
in 
a 
governmental 
function.4
 
MCL  
691.1407(1).  The act provides immunity from tort liability to  
governmental employees if, inter alia, the employee’s conduct  
does not amount to gross negligence.5
 The legislative  
immunity granted to governmental agencies and their employees  
is broad.  This immunity, however, is subject to five narrowly  
drawn statutory exceptions.6
 Ross v Consumers Power (On  
3 The municipal defendant is a governmental agency, as
noted by the following statutory definitions: 
(a) “Municipal corporation” means a city, 
village, or township or a combination or 2 or more 
of these when acting jointly.  
(b) “Political subdivision” means a municipal 
corporation, county, county road commission, school 
district, 
community 
college 
district, 
port 
district, metropolitan district, or transportation 
authority or a combination of 2 or more of these 
when acting jointly; a district or authority 
authorized by law or formed by 1 or more political 
subdivisions; or an agency, department, court, 
board, or council of a political subdivision.  
* * *  
(d) “Governmental agency” means the state or a 
political subdivision. [MCL 691.1401.]  
4 Neither party disputes that the city was engaged in a
governmental function at the time of the incident. 
5 MCL 691.1407(2). 
6 The five statutory exceptions are: the “highway 
exception,” MCL 691.1402; the “motor vehicle exception,” MCL 
691.1405; the “public building exception,” MCL 691.1406; the 
“governmental hospital exception,” MCL 691.1407(4); and the 
“proprietary function exception,” MCL 691.1413.  
4  
Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 593-595, 622; 363 NW2d 641 (1984).  
Plaintiff asserts that he may recover from the city for  
his injuries suffered as a result of the negligent operation  
of the government-owned forklift under the motor vehicle  
exception.  Thus, we must examine the language of the motor  
vehicle exception to determine whether a forklift is a “motor  
vehicle” as that term is used in the exception.  
Whether the Legislature intended that the term “motor  
vehicle” include a forklift is an issue of statutory  
interpretation.  The primary rule of statutory interpretation  
is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature.  
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d  
686 (2001). To achieve this task, we must first examine the  
statute’s language.  Id.
 If the language is clear and  
unambiguous, we assume the Legislature intended its plain  
meaning, and the statute is enforced as written.  People v  
Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).  
The motor vehicle exception does not define “motor  
vehicle.”  Further, contrary to the interpretation of the  
Court of Appeals, the governmental tort liability act does not  
refer to the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq., for the  
definition.
 Section 1405, the motor vehicle exception,  
provides:  
5  
 
 
Governmental agencies shall be liable for 
bodily injury and property damage resulting from 
the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or 
employee of the governmental agency, of a motor 
vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, 
as defined in [the Michigan Vehicle Code], as 
amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the 
Compiled Laws of 1948.  
The Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that the  
definitional phrase in § 1405 refers to the term “motor  
vehicle.”  Grammatically, the final clause of § 1405 sends the  
reader to the Michigan Vehicle Code only for the definition of  
“owner.”  
The 
“last 
antecedent” rule of statutory construction  
provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause  
contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately  
preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the  
statute 
requires 
a 
different interpretation.  Sun Valley Foods  
Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). Applying  
this rule, the reference to §§ 257.1 to 257.923 in § 1405  
defines “owner,”7 not “motor vehicle,” and nothing in the  
statute demands a different interpretation. Haveman v Kent Co  
Rd Comm’rs, 356 Mich 11, 18-22; 96 NW2d 153 (1959).8  
7The parties do not dispute that defendant city was the
“owner” of the forklift. 
8This very construction was utilized in Haveman, in which 
this Court had to determine whether a “Gradall” road­
maintenance machine was a “motor vehicle” within the meaning
of an earlier version of what has become the GTLA’s motor 
vehicle 
exception. 
 
Construing 
nearly 
identical 
language, 
this
Court held that the reference clause in the prior version of 
6  
 
  
Accordingly, 
because 
the 
motor 
vehicle 
exception 
does 
not  
provide a definition of “motor vehicle,” we are required to  
give the term its plain and ordinary meaning.  MCL 8.3a;  
People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 153; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).  
When determining the common, ordinary meaning of a word or  
phrase, consulting a dictionary is appropriate.  Horace v City  
of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756; 575 NW2d 762 (1998).  
It is possible to find varying dictionary definitions of  
the term “motor vehicle.”  For example, the Random House  
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001) defines a “motor vehicle”  
as “an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven  
conveyance,” a definition that does not include a forklift.9  
In our view, this definition appropriately reflects the  
§ 1405 applied to only the term “owner.”  Id. at 18-22.  We  
note that although the earlier version of the statute has been 
repealed and replaced by § 1405, the definitional reference 
has remained virtually unchanged by the Legislature since 
Haveman was decided.  
9Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (OnLine ed) and
Webster’s 
Ninth 
New 
Collegiate 
Dictionary 
define 
motor 
vehicle 
as “an automotive vehicle not operated on rails, esp: one with 
rubber tires for use on highways.” [Emphasis added.] 
Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d College ed) defines 
motor vehicle as “a vehicle on wheels having its own motor and 
not running on rails or tracks, for use on streets or  
highways, esp. an automobile, truck, or bus.” [Emphasis 
added.]  
7  
 
commonly understood meaning of the term.10 The American  
Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed), on the other hand,  
defines 
“motor 
vehicle” 
as 
“self-propelled, 
wheeled 
conveyance  
that does not run on rails,” a definition, which would  
arguably include a forklift. 
Given these divergent  
definitions, we must choose one that most closely effectuates  
the Legislature’s intent.  Fortunately, our jurisprudence  
under the governmental tort liability act provides an answer  
regarding which definition should be selected.  As previously  
noted, it is a basic principal of our state’s jurisprudence  
that the immunity conferred upon governmental agencies and  
subdivisions is to be construed broadly and that the statutory  
exceptions are to be narrowly construed.  Nawrocki v Macomb Co  
Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). Thus, this  
Court must apply a narrow definition to the undefined term  
“motor vehicle.”  
The definition of a “motor vehicle” as “an automobile,  
truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance” is the  
10This definition is also consistent with other analogous
legislative provisions concerning “motor vehicles.”  For 
example, a forklift is expressly excluded from the statutory
definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of the civil
liability act.  MCL 257.33. Nor does the definition of motor 
vehicle in our no-fault act–a “vehicle . . . operated or
designed for operation upon a public highway”–encompass
construction 
equipment 
such 
as 
a 
forklift. 
MCL 
500.3101(2)(e). 
8  
 
narrower 
of 
the 
two 
common dictionary definitions.  Therefore,  
we apply it to the present case.  A forklift–which is a piece  
of industrial construction equipment–is not similar to an  
automobile, truck, or bus.  Thus, the motor vehicle exception  
should not be construed to remove the broad veil of  
governmental immunity for the negligent operation of a  
forklift.  
B. Liability of the Employee  
Plaintiff also brought claims asserting that the city’s  
employee, Mr. Howard, negligently maintained and operated the  
forklift.11  
Mr. Howard is entitled to immunity as a city employee  
from the negligent maintenance and operation claims if §  
1407(2) is satisfied. Section 1407(2) provides:  
Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
and 
without 
regard 
to 
the 
discretionary 
or  
ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each 
officer and employee of a governmental agency, each 
volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental 
agency, and each member of a board, council, 
commission, or statutorily created task force of a  
11Even if we concluded § 1405 applied to this case,
because § 1405 only applies to the negligent operation of 
motor vehicles, plaintiff’s claim for negligent maintenance 
against the city is barred by the general immunity statute, §
1407(1). 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a 
governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
if the governmental agency is engaged in the 
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.  
9 
 
 
governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
for an injury to a person or damage to property 
caused by the officer, employee, or member while in 
the course of employment or service or caused by 
the volunteer while acting on behalf of a  
governmental agency if all of the following are 
met:  
(a) 
The 
officer, 
employee, 
member, 
or  
volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or 
she is acting within the scope of his or her 
authority.  
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the 
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.  
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or 
volunteer’s conduct does not amount to gross 
negligence that is the proximate cause of the 
injury or damage.  As used in this subdivision, 
“gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to 
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for  
whether an injury results.  
There is no dispute that subsections (a) and (b) are  
satisfied, thus, the question is whether Mr. Howard was  
grossly negligent in maintaining and operating the forklift  
under subsection (c). Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Howard was  
grossly negligent in failing to check the brakes after knowing  
the brakes were faulty and in driving the forklift without a  
valid license to operate the lift.  We reject plaintiff’s  
arguments.  As the Court of Appeals noted, once Mr. Howard  
noticed the problematic brakes, he notified his supervisor.  
Once Mr. Howard retrieved the forklift, he thought the brakes  
had been fixed, as there was no indication otherwise.  
Moreover, once the forklift began to roll forward at the time  
10  
of the accident, Mr. Howard used his toe to unstick the brakes  
and the forklift retreated backward, as intended.  Even though  
Mr. Howard did not have a valid license to operate the lift at  
the time plaintiff was injured, the above evidence shows that  
Mr. Howard was not otherwise unqualified to operate the  
forklift.  
Additionally, Mr. Howard maintained the forklift as  
best he could by reporting the problem, taking the forklift  
for repairs, and retrieving and operating the lift after he  
thought repairs were completed, since there was no red flag on  
the forklift, which would have indicated a faulty lift.  We  
agree with the Court of Appeals that no reasonable mind could  
conclude that this amounts to reckless conduct showing Mr.  
Howard’s substantial lack of concern of whether an injury  
would occur when Mr. Howard used the forklift.  Thus, we hold  
that summary disposition for defendants on the negligent  
maintenance and operation claims was proper.  
IV. Conclusion  
For these reasons, we hold that a forklift is not a  
“motor vehicle” for purposes of the motor vehicle exception to  
governmental 
immunity; 
therefore, 
the 
exception 
does 
not 
apply  
to plaintiff’s case and the city is immune from liability.  We  
additionally hold that summary disposition was properly  
granted to the city’s employee because no reasonable juror  
could conclude that he maintained or operated the forklift in  
11  
 
a grossly negligent manner.  Accordingly, for the reasons  
stated, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
12  
___________________________________ 
  
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHAEL STANTON and JOY STANTON,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
No. 115909  
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK and  
ALLEN MAYNARD HOWARD,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I disagree with the majority's construction of the term  
"motor vehicle" and would hold that a forklift truck falls  
within the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity,  
MCL 650.1405.  I would reverse the Court of Appeals conclusion  
to the contrary and therefore must dissent.  In all other  
respects, I concur with the majority opinion.  
Two basic maxims of statutory construction collide in  
this case.  The words in a statute must be given their  
ordinary meaning according to common usage. Western Michigan  
Univ Bd of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828  
 
 
 
(1997); Tryc v Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135­
136; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).  At the same time, certain statutes,  
such as the exception to governmental immunity, must be  
narrowly construed.  See Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463  
Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). 
Neither rule  
predominates, 
and 
this Court has not established a methodology  
for applying both to the same statute.  
When the two principles of statutory construction are  
properly applied, neither should be rendered nugatory.  Thus,  
although care must be taken not to apply an expansive meaning  
to "motor vehicle," we must ensure that the term is not given  
too narrow a meaning, thereby departing from its commonly  
understood meaning.  I believe that happened in this case. By  
narrowly construing MCL 691.1405, the majority improperly  
departs from the ordinary meaning of the term "motor vehicle."  
It 
considers 
the 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
"motor 
vehicle"  
and recognizes that dictionaries vary in the definition. It  
settles on Webster's definition: "an automobile, truck, bus,  
or 
similar 
motor-driven conveyance."  It reads this definition  
as excluding a forklift truck. However, if one examines the  
definition of "vehicle," one finds that the notion of a "motor  
vehicle" is more broad. Webster's defines "vehicle" as "any  
means in or by which someone or something is carried or  
conveyed; means of conveyance or transport:  a motor vehicle."  
2  
I believe that this suggests that a forklift truck is commonly  
understood to be a motor vehicle.  
Moreover, the majority begs the question what "motor­
driven conveyance" is "similar" to an automobile, truck or  
bus, if not a forklift.  One may read together Webster's  
definition with The American Heritage Dictionary definition,  
rejected as overly broad by the majority.  Then, a "motor  
vehicle" is "any self-propelled, wheeled conveyance that does  
not run on rails."  It appears that the factor that makes  
nonautomobiles "similar" to automobiles, cars, and trucks, is  
that they have wheels and are designed to transport something  
on a road.  Thus, I believe that the commonly understood  
meaning of the term "motor vehicle" is any self-propelled  
device that is used to transport someone or something on a  
road.  
This Court came to the same conclusion when it considered  
the term "motor vehicle" in the context of the civil liability  
act.1  At that time, the Court determined that the term  
included a front-end loader, a machine strikingly similar to  
a forklift.  See Mull v Equitable Life Assur Soc, 444 Mich  
508, 514-519; 510 NW2d 184 (1994). Most significantly, this  
Court recognized that the term "motor vehicle" has a broader  
meaning than "automobile," stating that "[i]t is a generic  
1MCL 257.401 et seq. 
3  
 
term for all classes of self-propelled vehicles not operated  
on stationary rails or tracks." Id. at 515, citing Jernigan  
v Hanover Fire Ins Co of New York, 235 NC 334, 335-336; 69  
SE2d 847 (1952).  I believe that this Court was correct to  
recognize a difference in meaning between "motor vehicle" and  
"automobile," a distinction that is ignored in the majority  
opinion.  
The 
majority 
departs 
from 
the 
commonly 
understood 
meaning  
of "motor vehicle" when it applies to MCL 691.1405 a narrow  
definition of the term in an attempt to narrowly construe the  
statute.  Under the majority's construction, MCL 650.1405  
becomes the automobile exception, rather than the motor  
vehicle exception.  The most plain meaning of the term "motor  
vehicle" 
includes 
any 
self-propelled 
vehicle 
used 
to 
transport  
materials on a road and is not limited to automobiles.  
Because a forklift truck is indisputably a self-propelled  
vehicle driven on a road to transport materials, I would  
conclude that it is a motor vehicle within the meaning of MCL  
650.1405.  I believe that plaintiff is entitled to bring a  
cause of action for the negligent operation of a forklift  
truck and that it should survive a governmental immunity  
challenge.  
4