Title: Windsor v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 10, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM T. WINDSOR, III, 
 
Defendant-Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 10, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 1212009736 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 27, 2014 
  Decided: August 28, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of August 2014, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, the State’s response, and the record below, 
it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
On February 18, 2013, a grand jury indicted William T. 
Windsor, III, on three counts of rape in the second degree, two counts of 
continuous sexual abuse of a child, ten counts of sexual abuse of a child by a 
person in a position of trust in the first degree, three counts of rape in the 
fourth degree, ten counts of sexual solicitation of a child, eighty-seven 
counts of sexual abuse of a child by a person of trust in the second degree, 
forty-three counts of unlawful sexual contact in the second degree, and two 
 
2
counts of endangering the welfare of a child.  The victims (“Victim 1” and 
“Victim 2”) were daughters of Windsor’s girlfriend.   
(2) 
Windsor moved for a bill of particulars, to sever the charges 
related to the two victims, and to suppress his inculpatory statement to the 
police.  The Superior Court granted the motion to sever.  The parties agreed 
that the State would not use Windsor’s statement after the one hour and 
twenty-five minute mark of the police interview at trial and the Superior 
Court denied the motion to suppress.  
(3) 
At an office conference on September 5, 2013, the Superior 
Court directed the State to consider reducing the number of charges it 
presented at trial.1  The State then requested that the Superior Court 
reconsider severance if the number of charges was reduced and the Superior 
Court indicated that it would do so.2 
(4) 
On September 9, 2013, the morning of jury selection, the State 
offered an amended indictment reducing the number of charges involving 
Victim 1 from 151 counts to twelve counts and indicated it had a draft 
amended indictment reducing the number of charges against Victim 2 from 
                                                 
1 Appendix  to Appellant’s Non-Merit Brief at A52-54. 
2 Id. at A59. 
 
3
nine counts to eight counts.3  The State also sought to rejoin the charges 
involving both victims so there could be one trial instead of two.4  The State 
indicated it would not oppose a continuance if Windsor was not prepared to 
proceed to trial that day on the charges against both victims.5  The Superior 
Court denied the request for rejoinder of the charges and held that trial 
would proceed the next day, as originally scheduled, on the twelve counts 
involving Victim 1.6 
(5) 
Later that same day, Windsor pled guilty to one count of rape in 
the second degree in the case involving Victim 1 and nolo contendere to 
continuous sexual abuse of a child in the case involving Victim 2.  Before 
accepting his plea, the Superior Court conducted a lengthy colloquy with 
Windsor.  During the colloquy, Windsor stated under oath that: (i) he had 
freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to rape in the second degree 
and nolo contendere to continuous sexual abuse of a child; (ii) he had not 
been promised anything that was not stated in the written plea agreement; 
(iii) nobody had forced or threatened him to enter the plea; (iv) he 
                                                 
3 Id. at A65. 
4 Id. at A65-66. 
5 Id. at A69. 
6 Id. at A75. 
 
4
understood that by entering the plea there would not be a trial and that he 
would be waiving several constitutional rights, including the right to be 
presumed innocent until the charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
and the right to hear and question witnesses; and (v) he understood that he 
could receive a total maximum penalty of fifty years of incarceration.7  After 
pleading guilty, Windsor sent two letters to the Superior Court inquiring 
about the substance of the September 5, 2013 office conference.   
(6) 
The sentencing hearing took place on December 13, 2013.  
After the Superior Court heard statements from Windsor’s counsel and 
relatives, Windsor asked the Superior Court if he could make a Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 32(d) (“Rule 32(d)”) motion.8  Under Rule 32(d), the 
court may permit withdrawal of a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere 
upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason, if the defendant 
moves to withdraw his plea before imposition of the sentence.  Windsor’s 
counsel did not file a Rule 32(d) motion before the hearing and indicated 
that he did not know Windsor was going to make such a request at the 
hearing.9  The Superior Court informed Windsor: 
                                                 
7 Id. at A115-26. 
8 Id. at A139. 
9 Id. at A140, 150. 
 
5
You know, if you wanted to do such a thing, one minute before 
the sentencing is not the time to do it.  It is required by the 
Court that there are motions to be filed.  The lawyer makes the 
motion.  It is in writing, so something of that nature would have 
to fill that requirement, and that has not happened. 
 
And the second thing is that under the law there is–on this 
record, on this presentence report, on this plea of guilty, the 
evidence of guilt with respect to [Victim 1] is overwhelming.  I 
understand that you pled nolo contendere with respect to the 
charge as to [Victim 2].  I have reviewed the record and that is 
overwhelming as well.  You admitted your guilt as to [Victim 
1] with the detective, and there is absolutely–as far as I am 
concerned, what you are attempting to do is a dilatory tactic.  It 
is completely out of bounds, and I am not going to hear it.10 
 
(7) 
After hearing statements from the State and the victims, the 
Superior Court found there were aggravating factors, including vulnerability 
of the victims and lack of remorse.  The Superior Court sentenced Windsor 
as follows: (i) on rape in the second degree, to twenty-five years of Level V 
imprisonment, suspended after twenty years for decreasing levels of 
supervision; (ii) on continuous sexual abuse of a child, to twenty-five years 
of Level V supervision, suspended after two years for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  This is Windsor’s direct appeal.   
(8) 
On appeal, Windsor’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”) filed a 
brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 
26(c)”).  Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and careful 
                                                 
10 Id. at A140-41. 
 
6
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Counsel informed Windsor of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided Windsor with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the 
accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed Windsor of his right to identify 
any points he wished this Court to consider on appeal.  Windsor has raised 
several issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the 
issues raised by Windsor and moved to affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
(9) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying 
brief, this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and 
(ii) conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is 
so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided 
without an adversary presentation.11 
(10) The issues Windsor raises on appeal may be fairly summarized 
as follows: (i) the Superior Court erred in refusing to let him present the 
grounds for a Rule 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (ii) the sentence 
was outside statutory guidelines, resulted from judicial bias and prejudice, 
                                                 
11 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 
1996). 
 
7
exceeded the parties’ “outside oral agreement,”12 and constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; (iii) his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation was violated and he was deprived of due 
process by the Superior Court limiting the length of his trial to three days; 
and (iv) there was prosecutorial misconduct.  We address these in turn. 
(11) First, the Superior Court did not err by refusing Windsor’s tardy 
pro se request to bring a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Rule 47 of the 
Superior Court Criminal Rules states that the Superior Court “will not 
consider pro se applications by defendants who are represented by counsel 
unless the defendant has been granted permission to participate with counsel 
in the defense.”13  At the time of the sentencing hearing, Windsor was 
represented by counsel and had not been granted permission to participate 
with his counsel in his defense.  Only Windsor’s counsel could act on 
Windsor’s behalf in the Superior Court.14  Windsor’s counsel did not file a 
Rule 32(d) motion before the sentencing hearing and indicated at the hearing 
that he did not know Windsor was going to seek to withdraw his guilty plea.  
                                                 
12 Opening Brief, Exhibit A at 6. 
13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 47.  See also In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del. 1988) (stating 
Superior Court had no duty to consider pro se motions filed by criminal defendant 
represented by counsel).  
14 Haskins, 551 A.2d at 67. 
 
8
Absent the endorsement of his counsel, Windsor’s attempt to withdraw his 
guilty plea under Rule 32(d) was a legal nullity.15  Thus, the Superior Court 
was not required to consider Windsor’s last minute attempt to make a pro se 
Rule 32(d) motion.  That the Superior Court acted within its discretion is 
also reinforced by the extensive colloquy that the Superior Court had with 
Windsor before accepting his guilty plea.  Although Windsor may have 
sought to withdraw his guilty plea based on a supposed promise that he 
would receive a twelve year sentence, the written plea agreement and plea 
colloquy were clear and to the contrary.  The plea agreement, signed by 
Windsor, expressly stated that the maximum penalty for the offenses was 
fifty years incarceration.16  During the plea colloquy, Windsor stated that he 
understood each offense was punishable by two to twenty-five years of 
incarceration and that the maximum penalty he could receive was up to fifty 
years of incarceration, of which twelve years was a minimum-mandatory 
sentence.17   
                                                 
15 Chavous v. State, 953 A.2d 282, 286 (Del. 2008) (prosecutor’s belief that defendant 
had breached plea agreement by bringing pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea was 
premature because motion was legal nullity until it was endorsed by defendant’s 
counsel). 
16 Superior Court Docket Entry 32. 
17 Appendix  to Appellant’s Non-Merit Brief at A119-20. 
 
9
(12) Second, Windsor’s challenges to his sentence are also without 
merit.  “[A]ppellate review of sentences is extremely limited” in Delaware.18  
Appellate review “generally ends upon determination that the sentence is 
within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.”19  Windsor’s 
sentence is within the statutory limits.  Rape in the second degree and 
continuous sexual abuse of a child are both Class B felonies, so the Superior 
Court could impose sentences of up to twenty-five years incarceration for 
each crime.20  To the extent Windsor claims his sentence violated sentencing 
guidelines, it is settled that the Delaware Sentencing Accountability 
Commission Guidelines are voluntary and non-binding.21  A defendant has 
no legal or constitutional right to appeal a statutorily authorized sentence 
simply because it does not conform to guidelines established by the 
Sentencing Accountability Commission.22  The Superior Court found 
aggravating factors, including the vulnerability of the victims and Windsor’s 
lack of remorse, weighed in favor of a greater sentence.   
                                                 
18 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992).   
19 Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296, 1297 (Del. 1989). 
20 11 Del. C. §§ 772, 776, 4205(b)(2). 
21 Mayes, 604 A.2d at 845. 
22 Id.  
 
10
(13) As far as Windsor’s claim that the Superior Court demonstrated 
bias and prejudice by referring to his physical size compared to the victims 
and his use of economic pressure on the victims and their mother, Windsor 
does not contend that either of those statements was false or based on false 
information.  And each was a case-specific factor that rationally bore on the 
sentence Windsor should receive.  The Superior Court imposed the sentence 
after receiving the presentence investigation as well as materials submitted 
by Windsor’s relatives, reviewing the record, and hearing statements from 
Windsor’s counsel, Windsor’s family members, Windsor, the State, and the 
victims.  The record reflects that the sentence was based on the nature of 
Windsor’s crimes and does not support Windsor’s claims of bias and 
prejudice.  
(14) Likewise, Windsor’s contention that the sentence exceeded an 
“outside oral agreement” with the State for a twelve year sentence is 
contradicted by the plea agreement and the plea colloquy.  The plea 
agreement, signed by Windsor, expressly stated that the offenses were 
subject to a maximum consecutive incarceration of fifty years and that 
Windsor was not promised a particular sentence.23  During the plea colloquy, 
Windsor stated that he had not been promised anything that was not 
                                                 
23 Superior Court Docket Entry 32. 
 
11
reflected in the plea agreement and that he understood each offense was 
punishable by two to twenty-five years of incarceration.24  The sentence 
imposed was within statutory limits and Windsor has not offered any 
evidence suggesting that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his 
crimes.25  Thus, his conclusory Eighth Amendment claim, like his other 
challenges to his sentence, is without merit.   
(15) Third, Windsor’s claims that he was denied his right to confront 
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and that a three day trial would 
deprive him of due process were not raised in the proceedings below.  
Therefore, those claims are waived absent plain error.26  An error is plain 
when it is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the 
fairness and integrity of the trial process.”27  There is no plain error here.  
Windsor does not explain how his right to confront witnesses was violated 
and there is no indication in the record that he was deprived of this right.  If 
Windsor had proceeded to trial, his counsel would have had the opportunity 
                                                 
24 Appendix  to Appellant’s Non-Merit Brief at A115, A119. 
25 Ducote v. State, 2005 WL 1200859, at *3 (Del. May 18, 2005) (rejecting Eighth 
Amendment claim of defendant who did not present any evidence suggesting life term 
was grossly disproportionate to crime of attempted murder in first degree and who had to 
be sentenced to life imprisonment under habitual offender statute). 
26 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Harris v. State, 968 A.2d 32, 35 (Del. 2009). 
27 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
12
to cross-examine the State’s witnesses.  Windsor also fails to explain why a 
three day trial was too short for his counsel to call witnesses or present 
evidence and does not offer any evidence suggesting he could not have 
presented an effective defense within the time allotted.  Accordingly, both of 
these claims are without merit. 
(16) Fourth, Windsor seems to claim that the prosecution engaged in 
misconduct by improperly consolidating the indictment to bring the cases 
involving Victim 1 and Victim 2 together, bringing multiple and duplicative 
charges, and coercing him into pleading guilty by seeking to rejoin the cases 
against Victim 1 and Victim 2.  Windsor also complains that he was never 
shown the discovery or other materials.  Windsor did not object to the 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct below, so we also review these claims for 
plain error.28  
(17) Windsor cites no legal authority in support of the proposition 
that an indictment can only charges offenses relating to one victim.  “Two or 
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a 
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or 
similar character….”29  The record also does not support Windsor’s claim 
                                                 
28 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Harris v. State, 968 A.2d at 35. 
29 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8(a). 
 
13
that he was deprived of notice and the opportunity to challenge the 
“consolidated” charges.  In any event, the Superior Court granted Windsor’s 
motion to sever the Victim 1 charges from the Victim 2 charges.  The State 
moved to rejoin the Victim 1 and Victim 2 charges after reducing the 
number of charges against both victims as directed by the Superior Court, 
but the Superior Court denied that motion.  Thus, it is plain that Windsor had 
notice and opportunity to challenge the “consolidation” of charges involving 
Victim 1 and Victim 2.   
(18) Windsor makes a conclusory claim that the State engaged in 
misconduct by bringing multiple, duplicative charges against him, but fails 
to identify the counts of the indictment that he contends are based on the 
same offense.  A person who commits multiple sexual assaults on the same 
victim may be convicted and punished for each separate act.30  Windsor was 
originally charged with 151 counts involving Victim 1 and nine counts 
involving Victim 2, but those counts were later reduced to twelve counts 
involving Victim 1 based on multiple sexual acts occurring over a four year 
period and eight counts involving Victim 2 based on multiple sexual acts 
occurring over a two year period.  Windsor has not shown that the charges in 
the indictment were unlawfully duplicative.    
                                                 
30 Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 288 (Del. 1989). 
 
14
(19) Windsor also repackages his claim by arguing that the rejoinder 
coerced him into pleading guilty.  This claim is entirely without merit.  
Windsor stated under oath at his plea colloquy that no one had threatened or 
forced him to plead guilty and that he freely and voluntarily pled guilty to 
rape second degree and nolo contendere to continuous sexual abuse of a 
child.31  Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Windsor is 
bound by these statements.32  A claim of coercion in the plea bargaining 
process can only be substantiated if the State threatens to take action or takes 
action that is not legally authorized.33  Windsor fails to explain why it was 
improper at all, much less coercive, for the State to move to rejoin the 
Victim 1 and Victim 2 cases after reducing the number of charges involving 
each of the victims as urged by the Superior Court.  In any event, the 
Superior Court denied the State’s motion to rejoin.  Windsor was left to 
proceed to trial on twelve charges involving one victim, not a trial involving 
both victims with little notice as he appears to suggest.   
(20) Windsor also claims that he accepted the plea bargain because 
he was not informed that the number of charges had been reduced and that 
                                                 
31 Appendix  to Appellant’s Non-Merit Brief at A115-16. 
32 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
33 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1988). 
 
15
the State’s motion to rejoin the charges involving both victims was denied.  
To the extent Windsor is attempting to bring an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim because his counsel was responsible for informing him of 
important developments in the litigation,34 this Court does not consider 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on direct 
appeal.35  Given the extensive colloquy undertaken before Windsor’s guilty 
plea, we are dubious about his contention that he would not have pled guilty 
and no contest to crimes against two victims solely because he would have 
otherwise faced separate trials as to each set of charges.  Nothing in the 
record suggests the State was not going to pursue Windsor for convictions as 
to crimes against both victims even if it took two trials.  In any event, for 
present purposes, Windsor may not press a Strickland claim.  Relatedly, 
although Windsor claims there was prosecutorial misconduct because he was 
not shown discovery, an unspecified DVD, or the victim statements, he does 
not claim that his counsel lacked access to those materials.  In fact, the 
record reflects that Windsor’s counsel requested discovery, viewed 
Windsor’s confession, and reviewed the victim’s statements.  The 
                                                 
34 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 841 (Del. 2009) (recognizing defense counsel’s duties 
include keeping defendant informed of important developments); Principles of 
Professionalism for Delaware Lawyers Rule 1.4(a)(3) (stating lawyer shall keep client 
reasonably informed about status of matter). 
35 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986). 
 
16
prosecution was not responsible for ensuring that Windsor personally 
viewed materials made available to his counsel.  Windsor’s claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct based on his non-viewing of these materials is 
therefore without merit.  Again, we are dubious that anything in these 
allegations bears a rational connection to Windsor’s decision to plead guilty, 
but to the extent he is attempting to raise a Strickland claim based on what 
his counsel did with the materials provided by the State, he cannot do so 
now on direct appeal.  
(21) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Windsor’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Windsor’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Windsor could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice