Title: Coffman v. Fisher
Citation: 203 Kan. 618, 455 P.2d 490
Docket Number: 45,372
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 1969

203 Kan. 618 (1969)
455 P.2d 490
VIRGINIA C. COFFMAN, WAYNE E. COFFMAN, and DANA O. COFFMAN, by VIRGINIA C. COFFMAN, His Mother and Next Friend, Appellants,
v.
JOHN F. FISHER and MARVEL E. FISHER, His Wife, CONTRACTORS, INC., a Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS of the County of Osage, Kansas, Appellees.
No. 45,372

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 14, 1969.
Stephen Jones, of Lyndon, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
Adrian M. Farver, of Lyndon, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Board of County Commissioners of Osage County, Kansas, in an action for wrongful death due to an alleged defect in a county road.
*619 The general facts may be stated as follows:
A county road extends in a general north and south direction from Quenemo on the south, passing through the city of Overbrook, and extending to the north county line of Osage County. At a point about one-half mile south of Overbrook the county road is intersected by a township road which runs in an east and west direction at that location.
In the year 1958, the county engineer directed personnel under his supervision to place and erect stop signs on the east and west sides of the county road at the intersection of the township road directing traffic traveling on the township road to stop before entering such intersection. The stop sign on the east side of the county road was installed east of the east line of the right-of-way. The installation was made without any authority, direction or order from the Board of County Commissioners.
Several months before October 16, 1965, the defendant, Contractors, Inc., in its construction work on the county road, knocked the stop sign down and employees of the Osage County Highway Department, with the knowledge of the county engineer, failed to replace the stop sign. It was removed to storage at Lyndon, Kansas.
On October 16, 1965, a collision occurred at such intersection between a vehicle being driven in a southerly direction on the county road by Richard M. Coffman and an automobile belonging to John F. Fisher, which was being driven by Marvel E. Fisher in a westerly direction and had entered the intersection from the township road on the east side. Richard Coffman was fatally injured. The present case involves an action by the heirs at law of Richard M. Coffman against the county, and others, for his wrongful death.
The petition alleged:
The defendant, the Board of County Commissioners, answered denying liability and presented affidavits. There was a joint affidavit by the three county commissioners which read in part:
There was also an affidavit by the county engineer which read in part:
Although the oral testimony of the county engineer was also taken, it tended to support the statement in the affidavit.
The trial court sustained the motion of the Board of County Commissioners for summary judgment and in support of its action filed a well reasoned and comprehensive opinion in which it concluded:
*621 There is no genuine dispute on any material issue of fact, hence the case was ripe for a summary judgment.
The only issue before us is whether or not the failure to place a stop sign, or the failure to replace the stop sign which had been knocked down by the contractor widening the county road, constituted a defect under the provisions of K.S.A. 68-301, which reads in part:
We need not cite authority for the statement that the liability of the county for any defects there may be in a county road is fixed by the above statute. The statute does not impose liability for general negligence. It is strictly a statutory liability for defects in highways. Whether an alleged defect comes within the purview of the statute is a question of law to be determined by the statute in the absence of any factual dispute as to the nature of the alleged defect. (Dunlap v. Lawless, 192 Kan. 686, 391 P.2d 70.)
In considering whether or not the absence of a stop sign constitutes a defect in a state highway under K.S.A. 68-419, a statute similar to K.S.A. 68-301, this court has established the rule that failure to place a stop sign does not constitute a defect unless there is a statutory duty to erect a stop sign at the intersection. There would appear to be no reason why the same rule should not apply to county highways.
In Phillips v. State Highway Comm., 148 Kan. 702, 84 P.2d 927, we stated:
..............
In Brown v. State Highway Commission, 202 Kan. 1, 444 P.2d 882, we construed the above statement in the following language:
Although we hasten to add that the Brown case does not control the decision in the present case because of the difference in the factual situation, we do have authority for a definite rule that the absence of a stop sign on a highway, either state or county, does not constitute a statutory defect unless there is a breach of a statutory duty to maintain such a stop sign.
We fail to find any statutory duty on the part of the Board of County Commissioners of Osage County to erect and maintain a stop sign at the intersection in question.
The statute, K.S.A. 8-568 (a), dealing with authority to designate through highways and yield intersections, provides:
The phrase "Through highway" is defined in K.S.A. 8-501 as 
Had the Board of County Commissioners designated the county highway under consideration as a through highway, or designated the intersection as a yield or stop intersection, it would then have had the statutory duty to place stop signs to so direct the traveling public. The trial court properly summed up the matter as follows:
..............
The appellants appear to recognize the above rules and to have now abandoned the allegation in the petition that the Board of County Commissioners of Osage County designated the county road in question as a "through highway" and pursuant to such designation and order the county engineer erected the stop signs at the intersection. The uncontroverted facts were directly to the contrary. There had been no designation and no order to erect the stop sign on the part of the Board of County Commissioners.
The appellants would now contend that since the members of the Board of County Commissioners authorized the payment for the stop sign and learned that it had been placed at the intersection in question they ratified the act of the engineer and are now estopped to deny their approval. There is no evidence that a stop sign was bought for the particular location.
Although a board of county commissioners may ratify and make valid its faulty attempt to do a certain thing, we must question its authority to make a valid police regulation by acquiescence in the acts of an employee even though the employee has the status of a county engineer.
The legislature delegated to "local authorities" the power to designate "through highways" and "stop intersections" or "yield intersections."
The term "Local authorities" is defined by K.S.A. 8-501:
The board of county commissioners is the only county authority having the power to adopt local police regulations. Certainly the county engineer cannot.
*624 In Chaput v. Demars, 120 Kan. 273, 243 Pac. 311, we find the following statement:
In Moore v. Wilson, 84 Kan. 745, 115 Pac. 548, we state:
We must conclude that a board of county commissioners could not be charged with having done by acquiescence and estoppel that which it could not have done by direct delegation of authority.
The record having disclosed no statutory duty on the part of the Board of County Commissioners of Osage County to erect and maintain a stop sign at the intersection in question, the absence of the stop sign did not constitute a defect under the provisions of K.S.A. 68-301.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
FATZER, J., dissents from the affirmance of the judgment of the district court.