Title: Connor v. State
Citation: 153 So. 2d 787
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 1963

153 So. 2d 787 (1963)
Theophilus Eugene CONNOR et al.
v.
STATE of Alabama on Information of Albert BOUTWELL et al.
6 Div. 992.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 23, 1963.
*789 Reid B. Barnes and S. Palmer Keith, Jr., Birmingham, for appellants.
John S. Foster and Graham, Bibb, Wingo &amp; Foster, Birmingham, for appellees.
GOODWYN, Justice.
Appellants, respondents below, were elected in 1961 to a four-year term as the three members of the Birmingham City Commission. Appellees, petitioners below, were elected on April 2, 1963, as Mayor and Councilmen of the City of Birmingham and took their oaths of office as such on April 15, 1963. This quo warranto proceeding, a sequel to the declaratory judgment proceeding in Reid v. City of Birmingham, Ala.Sup., 150 So. 2d 735, was brought for the purpose of determining when the Mayor and Councilmen take office.
At an election held on November 6, 1962, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 434, appvd. Sept. 9, 1955, Acts 1955, Vol. II, p. 980, as amended by Act No. 1029, appvd. Sept. 9, 1961, Acts 1961, Vol. II, p. 1615, the voters of Birmingham chose the Mayor-Council form of government for the City in place of the existing Commission form of government. (Another choice on the ballot was the Council-Manager form provided for by Act No. 518, appvd. Sept. 3, 1953, Acts 1953, Vol. I, p. 652, as amended by Act No. 1028, appvd. Sept. 9, 1961, Acts 1961, Vol. II, p. 1612.) Thereupon, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 452, appvd. Sept. 9, 1955, Acts 1955, Vol. II, p. 1004, as amended by Act No. 1030, appvd. Sept. 9, 1961, Acts 1961, Vol. II, p. 1616, an election of a Mayor and Councilmen was called for March 5, 1963, with a runoff election to be held on April 2, 1963. As already noted, the Mayor and Councilmen were elected at the runoff election on April 2, 1963. Prior to the holding of those elections, a declaratory judgment proceeding was instituted in the circuit court of Jefferson County to determine the validity of the election held on November 6, 1962, which would have the effect also of determining the validity of the elections to be held on March 5 and April 2, 1963. The trial court held the election of November 6, 1962, to be valid and we affirmed. Reid v. City of Birmingham, Ala.Sup., 150 So. 2d 735, supra. Left unanswered in that case, because not properly presented, was the question of when the newly elected officials take office. As already noted, the proceeding now before us was brought to determine that question. The trial court held the Mayor and Councilmen to be entitled to assume their respective offices, and the three City Commissioners were "prohibited from further use or usurpation or intrusion in purporting to act as Commissioners of the City of Birmingham."
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
The Commissioners contend that, under the provisions of Act No. 71, appvd. June 18, 1959, Acts 1959, Vol. I, p. 477, they are entitled to hold their offices until October 1, 1965. Act No. 71 provides as follows:
The Mayor and Councilmen, on the other hand, contend that Act No. 452, as amended, supra, controls as to the time for their taking office, viz.: On April 15, 1963, the date they took their oaths of office. Act No. 452 provides for their taking office "on the second Monday following the date the election of all nine councilmen is completed," that is, the second Monday following the April 2, 1963, runoff election, viz.: April 15, 1963.
The problem presented is whether it was intended by Act No. 71, a general law, to change the time for taking office provided for in Act No. 452, as amended, a general law of local application. As originally enacted in 1955, Act No. 452 applied to all cities "having a population of more than 200,000 according to the last or any succeeding Federal or municipal census." Birmingham was the only city coming within that population classification. The 1961 amendment of Act No. 452 (Act No. 1030, supra) changed the population classification to "more than 300,000." According to the 1960 Federal census, the City of Mobile had grown to a population of more than 200,000 (but not as much as 300,000), thus bringing it within the classification prescribed by original Act No. 452. Birmingham is the only city coming within the higher classification prescribed by amendatory Act No. 1030.
Although appellees, in their petition, challenged the constitutionality of Act No. 71, no specific ruling on the question was made by the trial court. Aside from that, no question as to the Act's constitutionality is raised on this appeal.
The holding of the trial court is based on the following statement, taken from the trial court's opinion accompanying its judgment, viz.:
The foregoing finds support in our cases.
It is an established principle, adhered to in this jurisdiction, that a general law will not repeal by implication a local lawa law affecting a limited territory although in form a general law, unless there is a manifestation of a different intent to be found in the statute. Thompson v. City of Birmingham, 217 Ala. 491, 494, 117 So. 406; Tucker v. McLendon, 210 Ala. 562, 565, 98 So. 797, supra; Board of Revenue v. Johnson, 200 Ala. 533, 534, 76 So. 859. And, for purposes of construction, an Act based on a population classification, applicable at the time of passage to a limited area, is to be considered a local law, although in form a general law. Tucker v. McLendon, supra; Board of Revenue v. Johnson, supra.
There being no express repeal of the provisions of Act No. 452, the question is whether Act No. 71 has impliedly repealed the provisions of Act No. 452 prescribing the time when the newly elected Mayor and Councilmen take office.
In 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, §§ 561 and 564, are the following statements of principles applicable to the case before us, viz.:
From 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 298b and 298c is the following:
"b. Particular Local Acts
"When the provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such general law does not operate to repeal the special law, either in whole or in part, unless such repeal is provided for by express words, or arises by necessary implication. * * *
"Acts relating to municipal corporations. The maxim, Generalia specialibus non derogant, is especially applicable to cases where general statutes are argued to overrule the provisions of special charters granted to municipal corporations, or special acts passed for their benefit. * * *
"c. Acts Relating to Particular Subjects
From Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d Ed., Vol. 1, § 2021, p. 486, is the following:
The foregoing principles find support in our cases, viz.: Personnel Board of Mobile County v. City of Mobile, 264 Ala. 56, 60, 84 So. 2d 365; Shepherd v. Clements, 224 Ala. 1, 2, 141 So. 255; Ex parte Jones, 212 Ala. 259, 261, 102 So. 234; Herring v. Griffin, 211 Ala. 225, 226, 100 So. 202; Tucker v. McLendon, 210 Ala. 562, 564, 565, 98 So. 797, supra; Ex parte Central Iron &amp; Coal Co., 209 Ala. 22, 25, 95 So. 472; City Council of Montgomery v. National Building and Loan Association, 108 Ala. 336, 18 So. 816; Iverson v. State, 52 Ala. 170, 172; Magruder v. State, 40 Ala. 347, 349; Hall v. City of Birmingham, 20 Ala.App. 437, 438, 102 So. 732.
In State ex rel. Brown v. Township Committee of the Township of Mullica, 48 N. J.L. 447, 448, 4 A. 427, 428, it is said:
In Wells v. Price, 183 Md. 443, 454, 37 A.2d 888, 893, it was held that a provision of the Baltimore city charter prescribing six months as the maximum period of confinement for non-payment of fines was not repealed by implication by a subsequent amendment to the statewide law prescribing three months as the maximum period. The court, in referring to the trial court's opinion, stated:
In Shepherd v. Clements, 224 Ala. 1, 2, 141 So. 255, 256, supra, is the following apt statement:
Appellants agree that the foregoing principles have application here, but take the position that Act No. 71 discloses a manifest legislative intent to establish a uniform system throughout the state whereby elected municipal officials may not be removed from office prior to expiration of their terms by changing the form of the city's government. However, it seems to us that Act No. 71 was not intended to establish such uniform system for the reason, aside from any other consideration, that said Act deals only with the Commission and Mayor-Council forms of government, while the voters of Birmingham, under the provisions of Acts Nos. 434, 452, and 518, had the choice not only between those two forms but also the Council-Manager form. It seems more reasonable to us that if the legislature had intended for Act No. 71 to apply to Birmingham in effectuating a uniform system throughout the state, it would also have been made to apply when the Council-Manager form is involved in a change in the form of government. A manifest intent is one which is clearly evident. We do not think Act No. 71 fits that meaning.
As we view it, Act No. 71 does not present "an irreconcilable conflict" with Act No. 452 with respect to the time of taking office. Since Act No. 452 is to be treated as a local or special law, applicable only to Birmingham, there appears no reason why it cannot continue to be so applicable, with the provisions of Act No. 71, a general law, applying to other appropriate situations. We hold that Act No. 452 should "be construed as remaining in effect as a qualification of or exception to the general *794 law" embraced in Act No. 71. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d Ed., Vol. 1, § 2021, p. 486, supra; Ex parte Jones, 212 Ala. 259, 261, 102 So. 234, supra; Herring v. Griffin, 211 Ala. 225, 226, 100 So. 202, supra.
The judgment appealed from is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.