Title: People v. Lampitok
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93699
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 18, 2003

Docket No. 93699-Agenda 2-May 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 							RONALD J. LAMPITOK, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 18, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Ronald Lampitok, was arrested and charged with five
offenses based on evidence found in his motel room by three
probation officers. The officers went to the motel to verify whether
defendant's fiancée, Kitty Bircher, had violated her probation order.
Upon their arrival, defendant informed the officers that Bircher was
not present but that she had been staying there. Despite defendant's
objection, the officers conducted a warrantless search of the room
pursuant to a search condition of Bircher's probation order and seized
several items as evidence. Defendant was later arrested and charged
based on this evidence.
	After making several factual findings, the circuit court of Coles
allowed defendant's pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence. A divided appellate court affirmed. No. 4-01-0085
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d Rs. 315, 612(b)) to
address whether a search of defendant's motel room in which a
probationer subject to a search condition was staying was reasonable
under the fourth amendment.
BACKGROUND
	Because we are reviewing the circuit court's ruling on a pretrial
motion, the record before us is limited. In July 2000, defendant and
Bircher were engaged to be married and were living with Bircher's
cousin, Bobby Craig, Bircher's daughter, and two other roommates
in an apartment on Madison Street in Charleston. Bircher reported
this apartment as her place of residence as required by her probation
order. Defendant and Bircher had been living in this apartment for
approximately one month when Craig asked them to leave because
the landlord was coming to inspect the apartment. Craig was listed on
the lease, and the lease prohibited him from having roommates. At
the motion hearing, Bircher testified that "he [Craig] asked us to leave
for a couple of days so they could do that [the inspection] and then we
were allowed to go back." Bircher also testified that she had clothes
at this apartment, and her mailing address was in Charleston. She did
not notify her probation officer about being at the motel because she
"had not moved." She acknowledged that under her probation order,
which she had signed, her residence could be searched at any time.
	On July 12, 2000, the first night away from the Charleston
apartment, Bircher stayed with her cousin, Lori, in Mattoon, and
defendant stayed at the U.S. Grant Motel in Mattoon. Defendant
registered for the motel room while Bircher stayed in the car;
defendant paid for the room for the nights of July 12 and 13. Bircher
did not have a key to the room. Bircher and her daughter stayed in the
room with defendant the night of July 13, and Bircher brought
clothing with her. Bircher obtained a Salvation Army voucher to pay
for the motel room for the night of July 14. Bircher testified that they
intended to return to the Charleston apartment on the morning of July
15.
	Probation Officer Steve Kelly also testified at the hearing.
Bircher's probation officer, Mitch Goodwin, had attempted a routine
home visit at Bircher's Charleston apartment on the morning of July
14. Kelly testified that Goodwin told him that "he made contact with
two relatives and they stated that she no longer lived there, she was
staying with Mr. Lampitok at the U.S. Grant Motel in Mattoon."
Kelly, Goodwin, and fellow probation officer Vicki Starwalt
discussed the situation. The three officers decided to go to the motel
primarily to verify whether Bircher violated her probation order by
changing residences without prior notification and also to verify
whether Bircher was in further violation by residing in the presence
of weapons or drugs. Kelly had previous personal encounters with
defendant during which he suspected that defendant had been under
the influence of drugs. During these encounters, defendant
acknowledged that Bircher was on probation. Kelly admitted that at
that time they had no information that defendant was involved in any
illegal activity.
	The officers arrived at the motel around 1:15 p.m. Goodwin and
Kelly stopped at the motel office to ask what room Bircher was
staying in, and they were directed to room 14. Goodwin knocked
repeatedly on the door; the officers could hear movement in the room.
Eventually, defendant answered the door. Goodwin asked whether
Bircher was there, and defendant responded that she was not. Kelly
also testified that "Officer Goodwin asked him if Kitty [Bircher] was
staying there with him and he said yes." After additional conversation
not disclosed in the record, Kelly informed defendant that they were
going to enter the room. Defendant refused and attempted to close the
door. Because Kelly was in the doorway with his foot in the door jam,
defendant was unable to close the door. The officers entered, and
nothing illegal was in plain view. Bircher was in fact absent, but she
had left her two-year-old daughter in defendant's care.
	The officers did not have a warrant to search the motel room. As
the officers began to search the room, defendant fled. Starwalt
attended to the young girl. Kelly discovered a soft makeup bag
containing a pistol and ammunition between the mattress and box
springs of the bed. He also found a sword and a knife on the floor
underneath this portion of the bed. Goodwin discovered a syringe and
a plastic baggy with a white powder, later determined to be a
controlled substance. Kelly speculated that Goodwin discovered this
evidence in a duffel bag in the closet, but he was not certain because
he was busy searching at the time.
	Certain conditions of Bircher's probation order are relevant to
this case:
			"1. That the Defendant shall not violate any criminal
statute of any jurisdiction.
* * *
			6. That the Defendant shall keep her Probation Officer
advised of her place of residence and employment at all
times, advising the Probation Officer prior to any change of
residence or employment.
* * *
			8. That the Defendant shall not possess a firearm or other
dangerous weapon.
* * *
			11. That the Defendant shall submit to a search of her
person, residence, or automobile at any time as directed by
her Probation Officer to verify compliance with the
conditions of this Probation Order."
Bircher's two-year probation period began April 6, 1999, so she
clearly was on probation at the time of the July 14, 2000, search.
	On the basis of the evidence seized from the motel room,
defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1998)), unlawful
possession of firearm ammunition by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1
(West 1998)), unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe (720
ILCS 635/1 (West 1998)), unlawful possession of a controlled
substance (720 ILCS 570/402(d) (West 1998)), and armed violence
(720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1998)).
	The circuit court made numerous findings when allowing
defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The court
stated that "[a] warrantless search was conducted without defendant's
consent. The Probationer, Kitty Bircher, was not present. The
defendant has standing to object to same. He was the registered tenant
of the room searched with an expectation of privacy." The court
found that paragraph 11 of Bircher's probation order was not
authorized by section 5-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections
(Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3 (West 2000)). The court further
condemned the search given the lack of applicable "regulations,
guidelines, standards or procedures" comparable to those present in
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 3164
(1987), and the lack of "reasonable grounds to believe that
contraband was present or that the Probationer or the defendant had
committed a criminal offense." The court also found that the motel
room was not Bircher's residence.
	A divided appellate court affirmed. No. 4-01-0085 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court agreed with
the circuit court that defendant was the registered tenant of the room
and that he had an expectation of privacy in the room. The order did
not review the finding that the room was not Bircher's residence
because it did not consider that fact to be dispositive in its analysis.
The order noted that although section 5-6-3(b) of the Code does not
list submission to a probation search as a possible condition, it "may
be" permissible under the section's general authorization of "other
reasonable conditions relating to the nature of the offense or the
rehabilitation of the defendant." 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b) (West 1998).
However, Bircher's probation order required her to "submit to a
search *** as directed by her Probation Officer." Because she was not
present at the time of the search, she could not be directed by her
probation officer to submit to the search. Thus, the search was not
authorized by the probation order. In addition, defendant was not a
probationer, the officers had no information that defendant was
involved in criminal activity, and he did not consent to the search,
making the search constitutionally unreasonable as to him.
	The special concurrence noted that the relevant issue was
whether the officers reasonably believed that the motel room was
Bircher's residence rather than whether it was her actual residence.
The record contained sufficient facts to find that the officers
reasonably believed the room was Bircher's residence so that she was
in violation of her requirement to notify them of a change in
residence. The concurrence disagreed with the majority order's
finding that defendant did not have a reduced expectation of privacy
because he cohabited with a probationer. However, the concurrence
agreed that the search did not comply with the probation order's
specification that it be "directed by her Probation Officer," which
required either Bircher's presence or notice of the search. Because the
search was also warrantless, the evidence was properly suppressed on
this basis.
	The dissent agreed with the special concurrence that the officers
had a reasonable belief that the motel room was Bircher's residence
and that defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy. However,
the dissent did not agree that the probation order required Bircher's
presence at the search because the probationer could always evade
probation conditions by not answering the door or having another
falsely claim she was gone.
	The complexity of this issue and the inclusion of three separate
appellate opinions in this order create an unusual disposition. The
concurring and dissenting justices agree on the resolution of some
issues so that they become the holding of the appellate court even
though they are not found in the principal order. See Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 n.8, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260, 266 n.7, 97 S. Ct. 990, 994 n.8 (1977). Specifically, these two justices agree that the
officers had a reasonable belief that the motel room was Bircher's
residence and that defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy.
Two justices found that the language of Bircher's probation order
required her to be present during a search so that she could initially
submit to that search directed by her probation officer, the basis on
which the court affirmed suppression of the evidence. Thus, although
fourth amendment principles are discussed, the appellate court's
affirmance of the suppression of the evidence is based on
noncompliance with the terms of the probation order.
	In reviewing this appellate decision, we examine whether the
search was unconstitutional so that the evidence it uncovered was
properly suppressed. This fourth amendment analysis has several
components: (A) a discussion of relevant case law, demonstrating that
the search must be reasonable at its inception and in its scope under
the totality of the circumstances; (B) a determination of what level of
individualized suspicion is required for the probation search to be
justified at its inception; (C) an evaluation of what level of
individualized suspicion the officers had that Bircher was in violation
of her probation order; (D) an examination of whether the scope of
the search exceeded the initial justification for the search; and (E) an
analysis of whether Bircher's acceptance of the search condition in
her probation order constituted prospective consent to all searches,
waiving fourth amendment protection.
ANALYSIS
	The burden of proof is on the defendant at a hearing on a motion
to suppress evidence. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2002); People v.
Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (2003). If the defendant makes a prima
facie case that the evidence was obtained through an illegal search,
then the State can counter with its own evidence. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 
at 306-07. At the hearing, defendant contended that evidence was
seized pursuant to an unconstitutional search; he offered testimony to
support that the search of his motel room was nonconsensual,
warrantless, and suspicionless and that the probationer, Bircher, was
not present during the search. The State responded that this search
was proper because the search was conducted pursuant to the search
condition in Bircher's probation order and was conducted in
compliance with fourth amendment principles.
	Generally, a circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. People v.
Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 108 (2001). The reviewing court upholds the
factual findings and witness credibility determinations of the circuit
court unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175 (2003). If the reviewing court
accepts the factual findings, it reviews de novo whether suppression
is appropriate under those facts. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d  at 175. In the
present case, our conclusions do not depend upon factual findings by
the circuit court that are disputed by the parties, so we conduct de
novo review.



A. Relevant Precedent
	In his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, defendant
challenged the search on both federal and state constitutional grounds.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution applies to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because "the right to be free from arbitrary government intrusion is
basic to a free society and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311 (1994), citing Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119, 96 L. Ed. 138, 141-42, 72 S. Ct. 118,
119-20 (1951). In addition, this court has acknowledged that the
fourth amendment provides the same level of protection as the search
and seizure provision in article I, section 6, of our Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 241 (1984). The narrow exception we have carved to the
lockstep doctrine in the fourth amendment context is not relevant to
this case. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 75-76 (1996). Defendant
provides no specific argument that the Illinois Constitution should
provide broader protection than that of the fourth amendment in this
situation. Thus, we follow United States Supreme Court decisions on
fourth amendment issues in this case. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 74.
	Pursuant to the exclusionary rule, courts are precluded from
admitting evidence that is gathered by government officers in
violation of the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649,
6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1086, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1688 (1961); see People v.
Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 453-56 (1923). The rule is not designed to
redress the invasion of privacy experienced by the search victim.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571,
94 S. Ct. 613, 619 (1974). Instead, the exclusionary rule is a judicially
created remedy that protects fourth amendment rights by deterring
future unlawful police conduct. Calandra, 414 U.S.  at 347, 38 L. Ed. 2d  at 571, 94 S. Ct.  at 619-20. The exclusionary rule may be invoked
by the victim of the unlawful search when the State seeks to introduce
the evidence uncovered by the search in a criminal prosecution.
Calandra, 414 U.S.  at 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d  at 571-72, 94 S. Ct.  at 620.
	The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution requires
searches and seizures to be reasonable, "measured in objective terms
by examining the totality of the circumstances." Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 354, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
There are two steps in the analysis of whether a search is reasonable
under the fourth amendment: "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968).
	A defendant can claim fourth amendment protection if he or she
has a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the area or item searched.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430 (1978). A legitimate expectation of privacy must be " 'one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable" ' " rather than a
mere subjective expectation. Rakas, 439 U.S.  at 143 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d  at 401 n.12, 99 S. Ct.  at 430 n.12, quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 588, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring). We have held that hotel or motel guests
generally are accorded the same fourth amendment protection in their
rooms as residents in their private homes. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 364-65 (1982); accord Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
490, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 861, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893 (1964). A person's
right to retreat into his or her home without unreasonable
governmental interference is a core fourth amendment principle.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 100, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041-42 (2001), quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 739, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683 (1961);
People v. White, 117 Ill. 2d 194, 210 (1987).
	A person's expectation of privacy is affected by living with
another person, a point which typically arises in third-party consent
cases. The law recognizes that a cohabitant possesses common
authority over the premises such that he or she can consent to a search
of the common area, meaning property of which there is "joint access
or control for most purposes." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 n.7 (1974)
("it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the
right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have
assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched"); see People v. Stacey, 58 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1974)
(adopting Matlock). Nonetheless, because cohabitation does not
completely remove a person's expectation of privacy, defendant can
claim fourth amendment protection in the motel room.
	Law enforcement officers are not entitled to enter, much less
search, a person's home without a warrant absent exigent
circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382 (1980). Under the fourth amendment,
entry into a motel room is the equivalent of entering into a
defendant's home. Stoner, 376 U.S.  at 490, 11 L. Ed. 2d  at 861, 84 S. Ct.  at 893; Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d  at 364-65. The State does not
assert that exigent circumstances existed in this case.
	Further analysis is needed to determine whether the officers were
entitled to search the motel room for evidence that Bircher had
violated her probation order. In the usual case, the fourth amendment
requires the government to obtain a warrant supported by probable
cause before conducting a search. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,
330, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838, 847, 121 S. Ct. 946, 949 (2001); People v.
Adams, 149 Ill. 2d 331, 341 (1992). The Court has noted, however,
that "there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. When faced
with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of
privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that
certain general, or individual circumstances may render a warrantless
search or seizure reasonable." McArthur, 531 U.S.  at 330, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 847, 121 S. Ct.  at 949; see Adams, 149 Ill. 2d  at 341-42.
	The Supreme Court analyzed a warrantless probation search in
Griffin v. Wisconsin. In that case, probation officers conducted a
warrantless search of the home of probationer Griffin and found a gun
that led to his conviction for a weapons offense. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at
870, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 715, 107 S. Ct.  at 3166. Although the Court
found the search did not violate fourth amendment principles, it
expressly declined to hold that any search of a probationer's home by
probation officers is valid if the officers have reasonable grounds for
the search. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 872, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 717, 107 S. Ct.  at
3168. The Court recognized that a state-run probation system presents
"special needs" beyond typical law enforcement that "may" justify an
exception to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.
Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 873-74, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 717, 107 S. Ct.  at 3168.
In addition, "[t]o a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of
probationers *** that they do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.' "
Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 874, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718, 107 S. Ct.  at 3169,
quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484,
494, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972). Probation restrictions promote the
purposes of probation: rehabilitation of probationers and protection
of the public. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 875, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718, 107 S. Ct. 
at 3169. Supervision during probation, ensuring that such restrictions
are followed, constitutes the "special need" of the State, which
justifies a greater degree of infringement on privacy than is generally
constitutional with regard to the general public. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at
875, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718, 107 S. Ct.  at 3169.
	The Court then evaluated whether this "special need" of the
probation system justified the particular search. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at
875, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718, 107 S. Ct. 3169. Under Wisconsin law,
probationers are placed in the legal custody of the State Department
of Health and Social Services, and courts can subject them to
conditions pursuant to certain rules and regulations. Griffin, 483 U.S. 
at 870, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 715, 107 S. Ct.  at 3167. Under these
regulations, a probation officer can conduct a warrantless search of a
probationer's home upon "reasonable grounds" to believe the
probationer possesses any item that violates his or her probation
order. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 870-71, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 715, 107 S. Ct.  at
3167, citing Wis. Adm. Code §§328.21(4), 328.16(1) (1981). The
Court recognized that it was bound by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's interpretation of these state regulations; the Wisconsin high
court had found that a police officer's tip that Griffin "had" or "may
have had" an illegal weapon in his home satisfied the "reasonable
grounds" standard set by Wisconsin law. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 875, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718, 107 S. Ct.  at 3169.
	The Court found that the "special needs" of Wisconsin's
probation system justify searches upon "reasonable grounds" as
defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, rather than upon a warrant
supported by probable cause. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 875-76, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718-19, 107 S. Ct.  at 3169-70. Requiring a warrant would
interfere with the probation system in two ways: a magistrate rather
than the more-involved probation officer would decide the level of
supervision, and the delay of obtaining a warrant would hamper
response to evidence of misconduct. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 876, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 719, 107 S. Ct.  at 3170. Similarly, requiring probable cause
to search could allow a probationer to evade probation conditions
because sufficiently concealed illegal conduct could go undetected.
Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 878, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 720, 107 S. Ct.  at 3171. In
summary, the Court explained:
			"In such circumstances it is both unrealistic and
destructive of the whole object of the continuing probation
relationship to insist upon the same degree of demonstrable
reliability of particular items of supporting data, and upon
the same degree of certainty of violation, as is required in
other contexts. In some cases-especially those involving
drugs or illegal weapons-the probation agency must be able
to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth
Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene
before a probationer does damage to himself or society. The
agency, moreover, must be able to proceed on the basis of its
entire experience with the probationer, and to assess
probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life,
character, and circumstances." Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 879, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 721, 107 S. Ct.  at 3171.
The Court again emphasized the narrowness of its holding by
specifying that this probation search was reasonable under the fourth
amendment because it was conducted in compliance with a valid
regulation permitting warrantless probation searches upon
"reasonable grounds," a standard which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court found had been met. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 880 &amp; n.8, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 721-22 &amp; n.8, 107 S. Ct.  at 3172 &amp; n.8.
	Probation searches in Illinois are not subject to regulations
comparable to those in Wisconsin that were discussed in Griffin.
People v. Flagg, 217 Ill. App. 3d 655, 657 (1991). Bircher's
probation search condition itself does not mention "reasonable
grounds" or any other standard of suspicion needed to justify a search.
Section 5-6-3 of the Code addresses conditions of probation.
Subsection (a) specifies eight required probation conditions;
subsection (b) provides numerous examples of conditions that the
court in its discretion may require, "in addition to other reasonable
conditions relating to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of
the defendant as determined for each defendant." 730 ILCS
5/5-6-3(a), (b) (West 1998). Neither subsection lists a search
condition, so this provision does not impose a particular standard of
suspicion to support a search. We decline to follow the State's
suggestion that the requirement that other discretionary probation
conditions be "reasonable" itself imposes a "reasonable grounds"
requirement specifically upon probation searches. Such a detailed
interpretation is not plainly evident within the single word
"reasonable" used in such a general, catch-all phrase. See Paris v.
Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). In addition, the Illinois
Administrative Code contains no regulation of probation searches.
The Court in Griffin explicitly conditioned its finding that the
probation search was reasonable on the fact that it was conducted
pursuant to a state regulation requiring officers to have "reasonable
grounds" to justify the search. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 880 &amp; n.8, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 721-22 &amp; n.8, 107 S. Ct.  at 3172 &amp; n.8. Thus, Griffin alone
does not confirm the constitutionality of the search in the present
case.
	The Supreme Court again reviewed a warrantless search of a
probationer's home in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 122 S. Ct. 587 (2001). Probationer Knights was subject
to a probation condition in California requiring him to " '[s]ubmit his
... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to
search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest
or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement
officer.' " Knights, 534 U.S.  at 114, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 502, 122 S. Ct. 
at 589. As part of a vandalism investigation, Detective Hancock
suspected the involvement of Knights. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 114-15,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 502, 122 S. Ct.  at 589. Hancock observed suspicious
activity at Knights's apartment and suspicious objects in plain view
in the truck parked in the driveway. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 115, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 502-03, 122 S. Ct.  at 589. Hancock, aware of Knights's
probation search condition, conducted a search of Knights's
apartment without the knowledge or participation of any probation
officers. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 115, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 503, 122 S. Ct.  at
589.
	The Court framed the issue of the case to be whether the fourth
amendment requires probation searches to have a "probationary"
purpose rather than a law enforcement purpose even though the
search condition itself did not contain this requirement. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 116, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 503, 122 S. Ct.  at 590. In Knights the
Court could not apply the "special needs" warrant exception of
Griffin because this search was conducted for a law enforcement
purpose. 4 W. LaFave, Search &amp; Seizure §10.10, at 206 (3d ed. Supp.
2003). Instead, the Court concluded that this particular search was
reasonable when evaluated under the general fourth amendment
" 'totality of the circumstances' " inquiry, with the search condition
considered as a relevant factor. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 505, 122 S. Ct.  at 591, quoting Robinette, 519 U.S.  at 39, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 354, 117 S. Ct.  at 421. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the court " 'assess[es], on the one hand, the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.' " Knights, 534 U.S.  at 118-19, 151 L. Ed. 2d 
at 505, 122 S. Ct.  at 591, quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 414, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999).
	The Court noted that Knights' probationary status had an impact
on both sides of the balance. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 119, 151 L. Ed. 2d 
at 505, 122 S. Ct.  at 591. Because the liberty of probationers is
legitimately limited through probation conditions, Knights had a
"significantly diminished" expectation of privacy because he accepted
a broad probation search condition. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 119-20, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 505, 122 S. Ct.  at 591-92. Because probationers'
recidivism rates are higher than the general crime rate, the State is
justified in focusing greater attention on probationers to protect the
public and to promote rehabilitation of probationers. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 120-21, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 506, 122 S. Ct.  at 592. The Court
held that "the balance of these considerations requires no more than
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house"
so that a warrant and probable cause are not required. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 506, 122 S. Ct.  at 592-93. The Court
specifically held that the search was reasonable under the fourth
amendment because the defendant conceded and the district court
found that reasonable suspicion had supported the search. Knights,
534 U.S.  at 122, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 507, 122 S. Ct.  at 593.
	Unlike in Griffin, nothing in the Knights opinion indicated that
the probation search was subject to any regulations imposing a certain
standard of suspicion. In fact, Knights' probation order permitted
searches " 'with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or
reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement
officer.' " Knights, 534 U.S.  at 114, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 502, 122 S. Ct. 
at 589. Because there was no dispute that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to search, the Knights opinion did not address whether the
fourth amendment would have been satisfied had there been no
individualized suspicion. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 120 n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d 
at 505 n.6, 122 S. Ct.  at 592 n.6. The Court also did not reach the
question of whether Knights' acceptance of the search condition was
comparable to a complete waiver of fourth amendment rights as seen
in consent cases. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 504-05,
122 S. Ct.  at 591.



B. Level of Individualized Suspicion Required
	In light of these principles from Griffin and Knights, we apply
the totality-of-the-circumstances test to the facts of this case to
determine whether this search was reasonable at its inception and in
its scope under the fourth amendment.
	When evaluating the propriety of this search pursuant to
Bircher's search condition, we balance the level of intrusion on
personal privacy against the degree of need for the search to promote
legitimate government interests. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 118-19, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 505, 122 S. Ct.  at 591. The State of Illinois certainly has a
legitimate interest in promoting its probation system effectively. Like
Wisconsin in Griffin, we recognize that our probation system serves
the purposes of rehabilitating probationers while punishing them and
protecting the public from crime. People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372,
379 (1997); Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 875, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718, 107 S. Ct. 
at 3169. We agree that supervising the administration of the probation
system is a "special need" of the state beyond the typical needs of law
enforcement that justifies a greater governmental intrusion on privacy
than would be constitutional as to an ordinary citizen. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 875, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718, 107 S. Ct.  at 3169; Knights, 534 U.S.  at 120-21, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 506, 122 S. Ct.  at 592.
	In addition, imposing the traditional warrant and probable-cause
requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration
of the Illinois probation system. See Adams, 149 Ill. 2d  at 342, citing
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 661, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989). The probation
officer, given his or her personal experience with the probationer, is
better able to determine the level of supervision required than a
neutral magistrate, and the process of obtaining a warrant would delay
the officer's ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the
probationer. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 876, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 719, 107 S. Ct. 
at 3170. Similarly, requiring probable cause would facilitate the
probationer's evasion of probation conditions through concealment
of misconduct. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 878, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 720, 107 S. Ct.  at 3171. We acknowledge that the importance of the Illinois
probation system may justify a warrantless search of a probationer
upon a lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause.
	A probationer has a reduced expectation of privacy compared to
ordinary citizens because he or she is a criminal offender. Adams, 149 Ill. 2d  at 348. Specifically, section 5-6-3 of the Code authorizes the
imposition of reasonable probation conditions, which legitimately
limit a probationer's liberty. Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 874, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at
718, 107 S. Ct.  at 3169. The Court in Knights concluded that the
defendant had a "significantly diminished" expectation of privacy
because of his acceptance of the broad search condition of his
probation order. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 119-20, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 505,
122 S. Ct.  at 591-92. However, Knights' probation condition was
broader than Bircher's condition in that it permitted a search by any
probation officer or law enforcement officer instead of a search "as
directed by her Probation Officer" and in that it lacked the limitation
found in Bircher's condition that the search be "to verify compliance
with the conditions of this Probation Order." Knights, 534 U.S.  at
114, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 502, 122 S. Ct.  at 589. The Court recognized a
correlation between the terms of the probation search condition and
the degree of the probationer's expectation of privacy, which in turn
influences the level of individualized suspicion required to justify a
search:
			"We do not decide whether the probation condition so
diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable
expectation of privacy *** that a search by a law
enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion
would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment." Knights, 534 U.S.  at 120 n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 505 n.6, 122 S. Ct.  at 592 n.6.
Because Bircher agreed to a more limited probation search condition
than Knights, her expectation of privacy was not as diminished, and
more individualized suspicion was required by the fourth amendment
than would have been required for Knights. The Court in Knights did
not reach the issue of the minimum level of individualized suspicion
that would have satisfied the fourth amendment. Knights, 534 U.S.  at
120 n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 505 n.6, 122 S. Ct.  at 592 n.6. However, we
conclude that this comparison lends support to the assertion that a
probation search of Bircher upon no individualized suspicion would
be constitutionally unreasonable.
	In addition, although Bircher has a reduced expectation of
privacy as a probationer subject to a search condition, the search of
the motel room remains a significant intrusion on her privacy. United
States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657-60, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 577-79, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392-94 (1995) (analyzing
defendant's expectation of privacy separately from degree of
intrusiveness of the search when evaluating the reasonableness of a
warrantless search under the fourth amendment). Again, whether or
not room 14 was Bircher's actual residence at the time of the search,
we regard fourth amendment protection for guests in motel rooms the
same as for residents in their private homes. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d
at 364-65; Stoner, 376 U.S.  at 490, 11 L. Ed. 2d  at 861, 84 S. Ct.  at
893. The importance of fourth amendment protection in one's home
has been stressed by the Court,
		"The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in
a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous
physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that
finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: 'The
right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not
be violated.' " Payton, 445 U.S.  at 589, 63 L. Ed. 2d  at 653,
100 S. Ct.  at 1381-82, quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV.
See White, 117 Ill. 2d  at 210. The primacy of fourth amendment
protection against intrusions into a person's home further encourages
us to require some level of individualized suspicion prior to a
probation search of a probationer's residence.
	After balancing these privacy and government interest
considerations under the circumstances of this case, we find that the
officers were constitutionally authorized to search the motel room
only if they had reasonable suspicion of a probation violation by
Bircher. Even though neither Bircher's probation order nor Illinois
regulations imposed a reasonable suspicion requirement, the search
can be valid under the fourth amendment if the officers actually had
reasonable suspicion of a probation violation supporting the probation
search. See, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 167 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir.
1999) (probation search is permissible, even if probation condition is
overbroad, if the search authority is "narrowly and properly
exercised").
	Even though the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed
this issue, we note that the clear majority of federal courts of appeals
also require reasonable suspicion to support a probation search.
United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Payne, 181 F.3d 781, 787 (6th Cir. 1999); Vincent, 167 F.3d  at 431;
Crawford, 323 F.3d  at 714. The only case that has found that no
individualized suspicion was required for a probation search was
decided prior to the Griffin and Knights cases. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1368 (11th Cir. 1982).
	In addition, none of the cases in which the Court has permitted
warrantless searches without individualized suspicion involved a
search of the home. Crawford, 323 F.3d  at 712; see, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S.  at 650, 664-65, 132 L. Ed. 2d  at 572, 582, 115 S. Ct.  at 2389,
2396 (permitting warrantless, suspicionless drug testing of
interscholastic athletes); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 659-60, 677, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 698, 709, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1387, 1396-97 (1989) (allowing warrantless,
suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs employees who have
contact with illegal drugs, firearms or classified materials); Skinner,
489 U.S.  at 606, 624, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 653, 664, 109 S. Ct.  at 1407,
1417 (upholding warrantless, suspicionless mandated drug and
alcohol testing of railroad employees involved in certain train
accidents).
	The Court's conclusions in these cases were based, in part, on
the fact that the urinalysis tests were conducted in such a manner that
the invasion of privacy was "not significant." Acton, 515 U.S.  at 660,
132 L. Ed. 2d  at 579, 115 S. Ct.  at 2394; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
at 672 n.2, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 706 n.2, 109 S. Ct.  at 1394 n.2; Skinner,
489 U.S.  at 624-25, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 664-65, 109 S. Ct.  at 1417. The
Court explained,
		"Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion
are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests
implicated by a search are minimal and where 'other
safeguards' are available 'to assure that the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy is not "subject to the
discretion of the official in the field." ' Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979) (citation omitted)." New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735 n.8,
105 S. Ct. 733, 743 n.8 (1985).
In contrast, a search of a person's home, whether consisting of one
room or an entire house, cannot be characterized as a minor invasion
of privacy. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 &amp; n.12, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 695-96 &amp; n.12, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2041-42 &amp; n.12 (1969). The
clear trend in the federal courts of appeals and the rarity of the
Court's allowance of warrantless, suspicionless searches provide
additional support for our conclusion that a probation search of the
residence of a probationer subject to a search condition like Bircher's
complies with the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement only
if the searching officers had reasonable suspicion of a probation
violation.



C. Level of Individualized Suspicion Present
	Next, we evaluate whether the officers had reasonable suspicion
that Bircher had violated her probation order so that the search was
justified at its inception under the fourth amendment. Reasonable
suspicion exists when "articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts, *** warrant a reasonably
prudent officer" to investigate further. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990); see
People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 503 (1992). Reasonable suspicion is
a less stringent standard than probable cause (Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990)),
but it requires more than a mere "hunch" on the part of the officer
(Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 503). An officer's good-faith, subjective belief
that he or she has sufficient suspicion to justify the intrusion alone is
inadequate to satisfy the objective reasonable suspicion standard.
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 906, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880.
	In the present case, the officers decided to go to the motel on
July 14 because Bircher's relatives told Officer Goodwin that Bircher
was no longer living at the Charleston apartment and that she was
staying with defendant at a specific Mattoon motel. If this constituted
a change in residence, Bircher had violated the probation condition
requiring her to give her probation officer notice of such a change.
The officers were told at the motel's front desk that Bircher was
staying in room 14. Upon answering the door to room 14, defendant
admitted that Bircher was staying there.
	Officer Kelly identified an additional purpose to going to the
motel: to check for the presence of weapons and/or drugs because she
was staying with defendant. However, Kelly admitted at the motion
hearing that he "had no specific information from anyone that Mr.
Lampitok was doing anything illegal." Instead, any notion that
defendant could bring Bircher in contact with weapons or drugs
appears to be based on a prior encounter. Kelly and defendant were
at a scene where drugs and a syringe were present and arrests were
made. Defendant was not arrested during this incident, but Kelly
speculated that defendant appeared to be "under the influence of
something." On this basis, defendant's "reputation precede[d] him."
No testimony at the hearing otherwise potentially linked defendant or
Bircher with drugs or weapons, and Bircher's conviction leading to
her sentence of probation was for felony forgery rather than for a
drug- or weapon-related offense. The State aptly summarizes this
evidence as: (1) Bircher never informed her probation officer that she
left the Charleston apartment, and (2) she was living with a suspected
drug user.
	In United States v. Payne, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that officers lacked reasonable suspicion where they
conducted a parole(1) search given knowledge of defendant's two prior
drug offense convictions and an anonymous, general tip, received six
weeks earlier, that defendant possessed methamphetamines. Payne,
181 F.3d  at 789-91. Specifically, the court concluded that the stale tip
added little, and criminal history alone did not constitute reasonable
suspicion. Payne, 181 F.3d  at 790-91.
	In this case, the information the officers possessed that Bircher
might be in the presence of drugs or weapons was even less
substantial than knowledge of criminal history. The record indicates
that one officer had a subjective perception that defendant was a drug
user; there is no indication in the record that defendant was ever
arrested for or convicted of a drug-related offense. Absolutely no
evidence links Bircher directly with drugs or weapons. We conclude
that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Bircher
violated her probation order by possessing weapons or drugs merely
because she cohabited with defendant, a suspected drug user.
Individualized suspicion must be based at least in part on facts
indicating possible present criminal activity. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
The additional fact that defendant delayed opening the motel room
door for an unspecified time period is insufficient to show that the
officers had reasonable suspicion that Bircher possessed weapons or
drugs. Thus, a search by the officers of room 14 for the sole purpose
of discovering drugs and weapons was unreasonable in violation of
the fourth amendment under the facts of this case.
	A closer question is presented by whether officers had reasonable
suspicion that Bircher was in violation of her probation order by
changing residences without notifying her probation officer in
advance. In evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court
should consider the quality and content of information known to
officers as well as the reliability of the source of the information. See
White, 496 U.S.  at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d  at 309, 110 S. Ct.  at 2416;
People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 872-73 (1997). Certain factors
can support a finding of reasonable suspicion, including corroboration
of the tip through observation by officers (White, 496 U.S.  at 331, 110 L. Ed. 2d  at 309, 110 S. Ct. at 2416-17), inclusion of details in the tip
(United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 2002)),
explanation of the basis of knowledge of the tip by the informant
(Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1201), and little passage of time between
receiving tip and acting upon it by officers (see Payne, 181 F.3d at
790). Other factors can belie such a finding, including anonymity of
the tipster (People v. Carlson, 313 Ill. App. 3d 497, 449-50 (2000);
see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 262,
120 S. Ct. 1375, 1380 (2000)), and absence of track record of
supplying reliable information by known tipster (People v. Lockhart,
311 Ill. App. 3d 358, 362 (2000)). However, deficiency or uncertainty
in the reliability of the informant can be compensated for by a strong
level of detail and corroboration of the content of the tip, and vice
versa. White, 496 U.S.  at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d  at 309, 110 S. Ct.  at
2416; see Lockhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 362.
	The officers received information from three sources that Bircher
was staying at the motel rather than her listed Charleston apartment.
First, Bircher's relatives, her roommates, told Goodwin that she was
no longer living there and instead was staying with defendant at the
U.S. Grant Motel in Mattoon. Though not anonymous, they had no
track record of providing reliable information. In addition, Craig had
an incentive to lie because he was violating his lease by allowing
Bircher and defendant to reside there. However, as relatives and
roommates, they had explained the source of their knowledge. In
addition, the relatives gave the specific name of the motel at which
Bircher was staying, which was corroborated before the search took
place by the motel clerk and defendant himself, neither of whom had
an incentive to answer as they did. The officers certainly had a
reasonable suspicion prior to the search that Bircher was staying at
the motel.
	However, at issue is whether Bircher had changed her residence
from the Charleston apartment to room 14 because she would have
been in violation of her probation order only if she had changed
residences without giving prior notice to her probation officer. Thus,
the officers needed to have reasonable suspicion that room 14 had
become Bircher's residence.
	Again, two relatives of Bircher's had told one officer, Goodwin,
that she no longer lived there and that she was staying with defendant
at the U.S. Grant Motel in Mattoon. Kelly admitted at the suppression
hearing that he did not have independent knowledge about the
reliability of these relatives. The record does not indicate whether
Goodwin knew that these relatives were also Bircher's roommates or
that under his lease Craig had reason to convey an impression that he
had no roommates given the imminent inspection by his landlord. We
conclude that the officers reasonably decided to investigate further
whether Bircher had in fact changed her residence because the
statement that she had moved came from Bircher's relatives present
at the Charleston apartment. Subsequently, both the motel clerk and
defendant himself corroborated that Bircher had been staying at the
motel as claimed by the relatives. Thus, we find that the officers had
reasonable suspicion that Bircher had changed residences without
providing prior notification, in violation of her probation order. See
White, 496 U.S.  at 331, 110 L. Ed. 2d  at 309, 110 S. Ct. at 2416-17;
Tucker, 305 F.3d  at 1201. At the inception of the search, the officers
were constitutionally justified in searching room 14 to verify whether
Bircher had in fact changed residences in violation of her probation
order but not to look for weapons and drugs. See Terry, 392 U.S.  at
19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879.



D. Scope of the Search
	Our fourth amendment inquiry does not end here, however.
Under Terry, we must determine whether the search "was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879. We already have found that the officers were not
entitled to search for weapons or drugs under the facts of this case;
they were entitled only to verify that Bircher was residing in room 14.
	We find that the officers were only authorized to check whether
Bircher was in fact in room 14 despite defendant's statement to the
contrary. Searching for Bircher herself was the constitutional limit to
a probation search premised on reasonable suspicion that Bircher had
changed residences without notifying her probation officer. The
record, however, discloses that none of the evidence used to charge
defendant was found in plain view. Clearly the search between the
mattress and box springs of the bed, for example, was conducted to
check for weapons and drugs rather than to confirm Bircher's
residence in the room. Thus, we find that the circuit court properly
suppressed all the evidence found in room 14 because it was
discovered beyond the constitutionally reasonable scope of the
probation search.



E. Waiver of Fourth Amendment Protection
	We address a final fourth amendment issue raised by the State.
The State asserts that Bircher's acceptance of the conditions of her
probation constituted prospective consent that waived fourth
amendment protection. This issue was expressly left open by the
Court in Knights. Knights, 534 U.S.  at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 504-05,
122 S. Ct.  at 591.
	None of the probation conditions explicitly express a waiver of
fourth amendment rights. Bircher's probation order stated, "That
Defendant shall submit to a search *** as directed by her Probation
Officer." Two members of the appellate panel interpreted this
language as requiring Bircher's presence during a probation search,
while one of the two justices concluded that the condition could also
be satisfied if Bircher had prior notice of the search.
	Each of the 20 conditions of Bircher's probation, including the
search condition, begin with the phrase "That the Defendant" shall do
or refrain from doing certain things. The inclusion of this phrase is
significant because it shows that compliance by Bircher is dependent
on her conduct. In other words, the search condition did not directly
empower her probation officer to conduct searches to verify
compliance; it required action by Bircher, that she "shall submit" to
a search.
	The term "shall" is often the focus of scrutiny during statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 104 Ill. 2d 8, 15
(1984). We note the primary definition of "shall" is, "[h]as a duty to;
more broadly, is required to." Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (7th ed.
1999). In other words, by accepting the probation order, Bircher
accepted a duty to submit to a probation search when directed to do
so by her probation officer. Creating such a duty implies a
requirement of further action by Bircher rather than a prospective
consent toward possible future, unspecified searches.
	We are informed about the meaning of "submit" by examining
the usage of this term elsewhere in the probation order. See McMahan
v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 499, 513 (1998), citing People v.
Talbot, 322 Ill. 416, 422 (1926). The term "submit" appears only in
one other condition, "20. That the Defendant shall submit herself to
and successfully complete Mental Health evaluation and treatment as
deemed reasonably necessary by her Probation Officer." The purpose
of such a condition was not merely to obtain prospective consent to
attend future treatment. Instead, this condition clearly required future
action by Bircher, specifically that she actually attend mental-health
appointments when told to do so by her probation officer or risk
revocation of her probation. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that
"submit" was used similarly in the search condition, that upon the
request of the probation officer she would either have to agree to
permit the search or face possible probation revocation.
	These probation conditions were mandatory limits upon the
liberty of Bircher. See Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 874, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 718,
107 S. Ct.  at 3169, quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S.  at 480, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
at 494, 92 S. Ct.  at 2600. However, their mandatory nature did not
remove the element of choice from Bircher's life. During the period
of her probation, Bircher repeatedly was faced with the decision of
whether to comply with these conditions or whether to face
revocation of her probation and possible incarceration, just as all
citizens are subject to the requirements and proscriptions of civil and
criminal laws and regulations.
	We find that the plain language of this probation search
condition affirmatively required Bircher's probation officer to ask her
to consent-or submit-to a particular search prior to conducting it;
agreeing to the probation order did not constitute a prospective
consent to all probation searches that waived fourth amendment
protection. See, e.g., State v. Hindman, 125 Or. App. 434, 439, 866 P.2d 481, 483 (1993); contra State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209
(Utah App. 1991); see also 4 W. LaFave, Search &amp; Seizure,
§10.10(b), at 764-66 (3d ed. 1996).


CONCLUSION
	The circuit court properly suppressed the evidence found in room
14 because the search that uncovered it was constitutionally
unreasonable in its scope. 
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
1.