Title: State v. Oshiro
Citation: 746 P.2d 568
Docket Number: 12183
State: Hawaii
Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 1987

746 P.2d 568 (1987) STATE of Hawaii, Petitioner, v. Hiroshi OSHIRO, Judge of the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division, and Edwin R. Aton, Jr., Respondents. No. 12183. Supreme Court of Hawaii. November 24, 1987. *569 Sandra Ann Yee (Arthur E. Ross on the petition and supplemental memorandum), Deputies of the Prosecuting Atty., Honolulu, for petitioner. Christopher D. Ferrara (Robinson &amp; Ferrara, of counsel), Honolulu, for respondent Aton. Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ. HAYASHI, Justice. In this original proceeding, Petitioner State of Hawaii (hereinafter "State") seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition for an order vacating the trial court's grant of a deferred acceptance of no contest (hereinafter "DANC") plea to Respondent Edwin R. Aton, Jr. (hereinafter "Aton") pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (hereinafter "HRS") chapter 853 (1985). State had charged Aton with second-degree negligent homicide under HRS § 707-704 (1985). State contends that 1) a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is the only appropriate remedy since no appeal exists from the grant of a DANC plea; and 2) the trial court abused its discretion because no DANC plea may be given for any negligent homicide case. We agree that State cannot appeal from the grant of a DANC plea but discern no abuse of discretion. The issuance of a writ is therefore denied. The facts are not controverted. In February 1986 at the intersection of Hunakai and Ulumaika Streets in Honolulu, the car driven by Aton struck and killed jogger Carol Rollman. Aton had just finished his first night-shift at his new job, was driving in excess of the twenty-five mile per hour posted speed limit, and was not wearing any corrective lenses as required by his Hawaii driver's license. His victim, however, was jogging in the street with a stereo headset on (thereby reducing her ability to detect oncoming traffic) and had, according to Aton, suddenly darted in front of his car without first looking. After he was charged with second-degree negligent homicide, Aton moved for the granting of a DANC plea. State opposed arguing that the legislature intended to preclude the use of DANC pleas in all cases of "negligent" killings. Aton responded that HRS § 707-704 involves "simple negligence," which is distinguishable from "negligence," and is thus not within the class of offenses for which DANC pleas may not be given. The trial court, agreeing with Aton's position, granted the DANC plea. State then petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition claiming that it possessed no other means to seek review of the trial court's decision. Aton, while asserting that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion, has not disputed State's argument about the lack of a statutory basis to appeal the granting of a DANC plea. We will address the issues posed in the following order: 1. Whether State can appeal the granting of a DANC plea? NO. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting a DANC plea for Aton's violation of HRS § 707-704(1)? NO. State initially maintains that it lacks the statutory authority to appeal the granting of a DANC plea, so a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition under HRS § 602-5(4) (1985)[1] is the only available remedy. Aton *570 is in apparent agreement with this proposition. A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy which may not be utilized as a substitute for an appeal. Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 580 P.2d 49 (1978). Similarly, a writ of mandamus will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates 1) a clear and indisputable right to relief; and 2) a lack of other means to adequately redress the wrong or to obtain the requested action. State ex rel. Marsland v. Shintaku, 64 Haw. 307, 640 P.2d 289 (1982) (per curiam). We begin our analysis of this question by noting that the right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision. State v. Swafford, 68 Haw. ___, 729 P.2d 385 (1986); State v. Ferreira, 68 Haw. ___, 709 P.2d 607 (1985). State may accordingly only appeal in those limited instances established by HRS § 641-13 (1985). This statute reads: A DANC plea is not a conviction nor is it a sentence. See State v. Ritte, 68 Haw. ___, 710 P.2d 1197 (1985); HRS § 853-1 (1985). The granting of a DANC plea, moreover, is not listed as an appealable decision by HRS § 641-13. State therefore lacks the authority to appeal the granting of a DANC plea, and we thus adopt the reasoning of the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals to that effect in State v. Johnson, 5 Haw. App. 357, 692 P.2d 1171 (1984). See State v. Bikle, 60 Haw. 576, 592 P.2d 832 (1979); see also State v. Miura, 6 Haw. App. ___, 730 P.2d 917 (1986). In State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 662 P.2d 212 (1983), and State v. Brown, 1 Haw. App. 602, 623 P.2d 892 (1981) (per curiam), State appealed from a deferred acceptance of guilty (hereinafter "DAG") plea and a DANC plea, respectively. No party, though, raised the jurisdictional issue then. We now hold that HRS § 641-13 does not confer on State the authority to appeal from the granting of DAG pleas or DANC pleas. See State v. Brandimart, 68 Haw. ___, 720 P.2d 1009 (1986) (overruling the *571 State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw. App. 143, 662 P.2d 517 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984), holding which recognized the tolling effect of a motion for reconsideration in a criminal case). Because State cannot appeal the granting of a DANC plea and possesses no other adequate legal remedy, this case may be decided pursuant to HRS § 602-5(4). See State ex rel. Marsland v. Town, 66 Haw. 516, 668 P.2d 25 (1983). State maintains that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting a DANC plea for Aton's second-degree negligent homicide. Aton replies that the trial court properly exercised its discretion because the controlling statutes preclude the granting of DANC pleas to "negligence" homicides, and not "simple negligence" killings. Because of the complex analysis required to discuss this issue, we must first analyze A) the statutes at issue; then B) the relevant legislative history; and finally C) the application of the statutes to the instant action. Although we have rejected an approach to statutory construction which is limited to the words of the statute, it is still fundamental that the statutory language is the starting point for any interpretation. State v. Moniz, 69 Haw. ___, 742 P.2d 373 (1987). Any interpretation, though, must be consistent with the legislative purpose, State v. Kala, 6 Haw. App. ___, 718 P.2d 1117 (1986), and cannot contradict the plain and obvious meaning of the law. State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. ___, 706 P.2d 1293 (1985). The statutes indicating the scope of DAG pleas and DANC pleas read in relevant part (emphasis added): "Negligently" is defined by HRS § 702-206(4) (1985) as: By contrast, HRS § 707-704 (1985) provides (emphasis added): Clearly, then, an important distinction exists between "negligence" and "simple negligence" for the purposes of criminal mens rea. We go on to describe the reasons for this distinction based on an examination of the germane legislative history. Hawaii's penal statutes have traditionally contained a felony negligent homicide and a misdemeanor negligent homicide. Prior to 1972, the then-existing HRS § 748-9(a) explained the felony crime as involving "gross negligence." HRS § 748-9(b), however, described the misdemeanor offense as a killing caused by "negligence." In 1972, the legislature enacted HRS § 707-703 (it remains unchanged to this day) wherein "negligence" was substituted *573 for "gross negligence" as the requisite state of mind for felony negligent homicide: See State v. Johnson, 3 Haw. App. 472, 653 P.2d 428 (1982). By comparison, HRS § 707-704 now employed the "simple negligence" mens rea. The law now made a "gross deviation" from prudent conduct (negligence) a felony whereas conduct which merely "deviates" from the law-abiding (simple negligence) a misdemeanor. Unlike the penal code, HRS chapter 853 was first adopted in 1976. As originally worded, HRS § 853-4(1) prohibited the use of a DAG plea or DANC plea when "[t]he offense charged involves the intentional, knowing, reckless or grossly negligent killing of another person." In 1980, the statute was amended "to correct obsolete wording and expand upon the exclusions from deferred acceptance of guilty pleas (DAG), particularly in view of the proliferation of DAG pleas being granted by judges." Act 292, § 1, 1980 Haw. Sess. Laws 557, 557. Several new offenses were added to the list for which DAG pleas and DANC pleas could not be granted, and "grossly," which had modified "negligent," was stricken from HRS § 853-4(1). Based on the above legislative history two conflicting views arise. State declares that, by eliminating the term "grossly," the legislature intended to expand the class of offenses for which a DAG plea or DANC plea could not be given to include all negligent killings, including "negligence" and "simple negligence." State additionally reasons that, because "gross negligence" was no longer used to describe the felony offense in 1976 (when HRS chapter 853 was enacted), the 1980 amendment of HRS § 853-4(1) was not only to correct obsolete wording but also to increase the exclusion's scope. Aton, on the other hand, advances that, if the 1980 amendment was meant to exclude HRS § 707-704, the legislature would have specifically listed the negligence and simple negligence killing, which did not happen. He thus concludes that the term "negligent" in HRS § 853-4 cannot be construed to encompass all negligence and simple negligence killings where "negligence" is defined in HRS § 702-206(4) and "simple negligence" is described in HRS § 707-704(2). Aton characterizes the 1980 amendments as housekeeping to clarify what mens rea constituted negligent homicide. We must now decide which view is correct. Based on the statutory language and in light of the pertinent legislative history, see State v. Tupuola, 68 Haw. ___, 711 P.2d 1289 (1985), we determine that HRS § 707-704 is not within that group of offenses subject to HRS § 853-4(1). That is, a trial court retains the discretion to grant a DAG plea or a DANC plea for a second-degree negligent homicide. Had the legislature desired a contrary result, then HRS § 853-4(1) would have been amended in 1980 to have read that "all offenses involving the killing of another person" would have been unavailable for a DAG plea or DANC plea. Because all homicide crimes would have then been excluded, there would have been no need to enumerate the different states of mind. The legislature clearly did not intend this outcome. See State v. Mehau, 68 Haw. ___, 711 P.2d 727 (1985). The statutory language evidences that the legislature did not mean to divest a trial court of the discretion to grant a DAG plea or a DANC plea for violations of HRS § 707-704. This is the most reasonable interpretation. See State v. Herrera, 63 *574 Haw. 405, 629 P.2d 626 (1981); see also State v. Lo, 66 Haw. 653, 675 P.2d 754 (1983). State, furthermore, has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion. Toledo v. Lam, 67 Haw. 20, 675 P.2d 773 (1984); see State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. ___, 738 P.2d 812 (1987). This case is thus not a rare and exceptional instance where the issuance of an extraordinary writ would be appropriate. Wolfe v. Au, 67 Haw. 259, 686 P.2d 16 (1984) (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we rule that the trial court correctly exercised its discretion and acted within the scope of its power. Hence, a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition will not issue, and this petition is dismissed. See Iaea v. Heely, 69 Haw. ___, 743 P.2d 456 (1987). [1] HRS § 602-5 reads in relevant part: Jurisdiction and powers. The supreme court shall have jurisdiction and powers as follows: ... . (4) To exercise original jurisdiction in all questions arising under writs directed to courts of inferior jurisdiction and returnable before the supreme court, or if the supreme court consents to receive the case arising under writs of mandamus directed to public officers to compel them to fulfill the duties of their offices; and such other original jurisdiction as may be expressly conferred by law. .. . [2] In 1986, the legislature amended HRS § 702-206 to read: (4) "Negligently." (a) A person acts negligently with respect to his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk taken that the person's conduct is of the specified nature. HRS § 702-206(4)(a) (Supp. 1986). This change does not affect this case since it was enacted after the negligent homicide occurred. See Act 314, § 4, 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 593, 594-95.