Title: Startin v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100778
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Russell, Lacy, and Koontz, S.JJ.∗ 
 
DUANE ELMER STARTIN, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 100778 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   March 4, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred when it affirmed the convictions of Duane Elmer Startin, 
Jr. (“Startin”) for use or display of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony under Code § 18.2-53.1. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
On January 12, 2005, Startin entered a pharmacy in 
Fairfax County and stated that he needed a bottle of 
Oxycontin.  When the pharmacist asked him for a prescription, 
Startin lifted his shirt to reveal an object that appeared to 
be a black .45 caliber handgun tucked into the front waistband 
of his pants.  The pharmacist saw the object and hesitated.  
Startin told her to “hurry up, lady,” and she handed him a 
bottle containing 100 pills of Oxycodone, the generic name for 
Oxycontin.  Startin left the store with the bottle. 
On January 21, 2005, Startin entered a different store in 
Fairfax County and asked the pharmacist whether “Oxycontin 80” 
                     
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
was in stock.  After the pharmacist confirmed that this drug 
was in stock, Startin removed an object that appeared to be a 
black handgun from the waistband of his pants.  Startin 
pointed it at the clerk and demanded to the pharmacist, “give 
me the medicine, give me the medicine.”  The pharmacist gave 
Startin a bottle containing 100 Oxycontin pills and Startin 
left the store.  Later, the clerk described the object as “a 
black older model handgun” but could not state whether it was 
a revolver or a pistol. 
Startin was later arrested in Petersburg, Virginia for a 
robbery charge in that jurisdiction.  After being read his 
Miranda rights, Startin admitted to committing the robberies 
in Fairfax County and identified himself in several 
photographs taken by surveillance cameras during the 
robberies.  Startin further stated that the weapon he used 
during the robberies was a commemorative “John Wayne Replica” 
.45 caliber handgun (“the replica”). 
In its outward appearance, the replica has the same size, 
weight and shape of an operational firearm designed to expel 
.45 caliber ammunition by explosion.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth conceded that the replica was the object used or 
displayed by Startin during the robberies.  Startin pled 
guilty to three counts of robbery but pled not guilty to two 
counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, 
 
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arguing that the replica did not meet the definition of a 
firearm under Code § 18.2-53.1.  The parties stipulated that 
[t]his weapon is a commemorative replica.  In 
its outward appearance, including size, weight, 
and shape, it appears to be an operational 
firearm designed to expel .45 caliber ammunition 
by explosion.  However, because the weapon was a 
replica, the manufacturer did not include a 
firing pin or other mechanical device necessary 
to fire a projectile by explosion. 
Based on this evidence, the trial court convicted Startin 
of two counts of use of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony under Code § 18.2-53.1.  The trial court concluded that 
this Court’s holding in Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 
269 S.E.2d 356 (1980), presented the 
good policy . . . . to discourage criminal 
conduct that produces fear [of] physical harm.  
Because the victim can be intimidated as much 
by a pistol that doesn’t fire bullets [as] by 
one that does. 
 
And in a crime, a victim can’t distinguish 
between a loaded pistol and one that is 
designed to look precisely like one. 
The trial court cited several other cases from this Court for 
the proposition that the items in these cases “were held to be 
firearms, because they appeared to be capable of firing.”  
Accordingly, the trial court held that “the bottom line is 
that . . . the item that was used was a firearm, pursuant to 
Virginia Code Section 18.2-53.1.”  Startin was sentenced to 10 
years with six years suspended for the two robbery convictions 
 
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and six years for the two convictions for the use or display 
of a firearm in the commission of a felony. 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed Startin’s two 
convictions for use of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony, Startin v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 778, 682 S.E.2d 
115 (2009), and also affirmed upon a rehearing en banc.  
Startin v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 26, 690 S.E.2d 310 
(2010).  The Court of Appeals concluded that “Startin’s 
replica of a firearm was certainly capable of evoking fear of 
physical harm” and therefore held that “the trial court did 
not err in finding that the item Startin used was a firearm 
for the purposes of Code § 18.2-53.1.”  Id. at 41, 690 S.E.2d 
at 317.  Startin timely filed his notice of appeal to this 
Court. 
II.  Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court applies a de novo standard of review when 
addressing a question of statutory construction.  Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 409, 413, 650 S.E.2d 89, 91 (2007); 
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 
104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).  Additionally, when 
considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
conviction, 
 
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this Court reviews “the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party at trial 
and consider[s] all inferences fairly deducible 
from that evidence.”  This Court will only 
reverse the judgment of the trial court if the 
judgment “ ‘is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.’ ”  “If there is 
evidence to support the convictions, the 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute 
its own judgment, even if its opinion might 
differ from the conclusions reached by the 
finder of fact at the trial.” 
 
Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 640-41, 691 S.E.2d 786, 
788 (2010) (citations omitted). 
B. Display or Use of a Firearm 
 in the Commission of a Felony 
 
Startin argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that the evidence of his use of the replica in committing the 
robberies was sufficient to support his conviction under Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. 
Under Code § 18.2-53.1, it is “unlawful for any person to 
use or attempt to use any pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other 
firearm or display such weapon in a threatening manner while 
committing or attempting to commit . . . robbery.”  We have 
held that in order to convict a person under this statute,  
the Commonwealth must prove that the accused 
actually had a firearm in his possession and 
that he used or attempted to use the firearm or 
displayed the firearm in a threatening manner 
while committing or attempting to commit robbery 
or one of the other specified felonies. 
 
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Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441 S.E.2d 342, 
344 (1994). 
In Holloman, we explained that Code § 18.2-53.1 has dual 
objectives.  221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 358.  First, the 
statute criminalizes the use or display of an actual firearm 
that has the capability of expelling a projectile by 
explosion, including “any pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other 
firearm.”  Code § 18.2-53.1.  Second, the statute also has the 
additional purpose of preventing fear of physical harm by the 
use or threatening display of an instrumentality that has the 
appearance of having the capability of an actual firearm.  We 
explained that “[t]he statute not only is aimed at preventing 
actual physical injury or death but also is designed to 
discourage criminal conduct that produces fear of physical 
harm.”  Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 358.  
Therefore, the statute bears a broader meaning and includes 
those items which, although lacking the physical capability of 
firing a projectile by explosion, have the appearance of 
having the capability to do so. 
In Holloman, we held that evidence showing that the 
defendant used a replica of a .45 caliber pistol that fired 
BBs by the force of a spring, but not gunpowder, was 
sufficient to convict him of using a firearm in the commission 
of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  Id. at 197, 
 
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199, 269 S.E.2d at 357-58.  We observed that “fear of harm 
results just as readily from employment of an instrument that 
gives the appearance of having a firing capability as from use 
of a weapon that actually has the capacity to shoot a 
projectile.”  Id. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 358.  Consequently, 
evidence of the display of the BB gun was sufficient to 
convict Holloman under Code § 18.2-53.1, “upon proof that 
defendant employed an instrument which gave the appearance of 
having a firing capability, whether or not the object actually 
had the capacity to propel a bullet by the force of 
gunpowder.”  Id. at 199, 269 S.E.2d at 358. 
In Yarborough, we revisited the meaning of Code § 18.2-
53.1 and reversed the defendant’s conviction because it was 
based on evidence that merely raised a suspicion that he 
possessed a firearm while committing a robbery.  247 Va. at 
218-19, 441 S.E.2d at 344.  Yarborough had approached a woman 
and demanded her money, stating that “this is a stickup.”  Id. 
at 216, 441 S.E.2d at 343.  The woman saw “something 
protruding . . . from [the] right hand pocket of his jacket,” 
but when Yarborough was apprehended a short time later, he 
only had an unopened can of beer in one of his jacket pockets.  
Id. at 217, 441 S.E.2d at 343.  No weapon or item that had the 
appearance of a weapon was in his possession, and none was 
found during the search of the crime scene or where Yarborough 
 
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was arrested.  Id.  In reversing his conviction, we stated 
that “the fact that [the victim] merely thought or perceived 
that [the defendant] was armed is insufficient to prove that 
he actually possessed a firearm.”  Id. at 219, 441 S.E.2d at 
344.  Therefore, any “evidence that Yarborough ‘may have had’ 
a firearm in his possession create[d] merely a suspicion of 
guilt” and was insufficient to show that Yarborough used a 
firearm or an item that had the appearance of a firearm in 
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1  Id. at 218, 441 S.E.2d at 344. 
In our interpretation of Code § 18.2-53.1, we recognize 
that “[p]enal statutes must be strictly construed against the 
State and . . . cannot be extended by implication or 
construction, or be made to embrace cases which are not within 
their letter and spirit.”  Department of Motor Vehicles v. 
Athey, 261 Va. 385, 388, 542 S.E.2d 764, 766 (2001) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  However, “[e]ven 
though any ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to the meaning of 
a penal statute must be resolved in favor of an accused, 
nevertheless a defendant is not entitled to benefit from an 
‘unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute.’ ”  
Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (quoting Ansell v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979)). 
Consistent with these principles, when the legislature 
seeks to criminalize the use of a firearm, the term “firearm” 
 
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may be defined differently among several criminal statutes and 
“must not be unreasonably restricted by judicial construction 
such that the legislative intent is thereby frustrated.”  
Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 581-82, 562 S.E.2d 
139, 144 (2002). 
In Armstrong, we distinguished between a “firearm” for 
purposes of Code § 18.2-53.1 as compared to Code § 18.2-308.2, 
penalizing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Id. 
at 581-84, 562 S.E.2d at 144-45.  The definition is more 
narrowly construed under the possession statute, Code § 18.2-
308.2, and requires proof that the defendant “possessed an 
instrument which was designed, made, and intended to expel a 
projectile by means of an explosion,” although it is not 
necessary that the instrument is “operable [or] capable of 
being fired.”  Id. at 583-84, 562 S.E.2d at 145 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In contrast, 
when the nature of some other criminal act is 
defined by whether the defendant achieves his 
purpose through the use of a firearm, a narrow 
construction of the term is not warranted.  
See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 
291, 296, 163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968) (charge 
that attempted robbery involved “ ‘presenting 
of firearms or other violence’ ” did not 
warrant jury instruction that the instrument 
displayed was an operable firearm). 
Id. at 582, 562 S.E.2d at 144.  Accordingly, the definition 
under Code § 18.2-53.1 for use or display of a firearm during 
 
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the commission of a felony warrants a “broad construction” and 
includes any instrument that “gives the appearance of being a 
firearm.”  Id. at 582-83, 562 S.E.2d at 144 (emphasis added).  
Therefore, in pursuing its objective of preventing fear of 
physical harm by an instrumentality that has the appearance of 
a firearm, Code § 18.2-53.1 encompasses a broader definition. 
In this case, the replica used by Startin is similar to 
the BB gun in Holloman.  In their outward appearance, both 
have the same size, weight and shape of an operational firearm 
designed to expel .45 caliber ammunition by explosion.  221 
Va. at 197, 269 S.E.2d at 357.  The only meaningful difference 
is the ability of the weapon in Holloman to propel BBs by the 
force of a spring.  Id.  Neither the replica nor the BB gun 
have a firing pin or any other mechanical device necessary to 
fire a projectile by explosion.  Id.  Therefore, neither the 
replica at issue here nor the BB gun in Holloman would be 
sufficient to convict a person under Code § 18.2-308.2 for 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because they are 
not “designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a 
projectile by means of an explosion.”  Armstrong, 263 Va. at 
583, 562 S.E.2d at 145. 
However, both are sufficient to support a conviction 
under the broader definition of firearm as used in Code 
§ 18.2-53.1 and construed in our prior decisions applying the 
 
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statute.  While the replica used by Startin was not an actual 
operational firearm, it nonetheless was a weapon within the 
meaning of that term as used in this statute.  In affirming 
Startin’s conviction, the Court of Appeals correctly held that  
[b]ecause Code § 18.2-53.1 is aimed at 
preventing actual physical injury or death, the 
term ‘firearm’ includes any instrument that is 
capable of expelling a projectile by force or 
gunpowder.  As importantly, the term firearm in 
Code § 18.2-53.1 also includes other objects 
that are not capable of firing projectiles but 
give the appearance of being able to do so. 
Startin, 56 Va. App. at 38-39, 690 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting 
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 681, 685, 492 S.E.2d 460, 
462 (1997)).  Startin’s replica of a firearm gave the 
appearance of an actual firearm and was certainly capable of 
evoking fear of physical harm.  Consequently, we hold that the 
Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to convict Startin of 
using a firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1 upon proof 
that he “employed an instrument which gave the appearance of 
having a firing capability, whether or not the object actually 
had the capacity to propel a bullet by the force of 
gunpowder.”  Holloman, 221 Va. at 199, 269 S.E.2d at 358. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
did not err in affirming Startin’s convictions for use or 
display of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  
 
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals.  
Affirmed. 
SENIOR JUSTICE KOONTZ, concurring. 
 
 
I concur with the Court’s analysis and decision in this 
case.  I write separately to stress that the commemorative 
“John Wayne Replica” .45 caliber handgun at issue in this case 
comes within the sweep of Code § 18.2-53.1 as we have 
construed that statute in Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 
196, 269 S.E.2d 356 (1980).  Here, it is undisputed that this 
replica has the appearance of having the capability of 
expelling a projectile by explosion, although in fact it lacks 
that capability. 
This is not a case where in the commission of a felony 
the defendant used or displayed an instrument which lacked the 
capability of expelling a projectile by explosion and also 
lacked the appearance of having that capability.  Holloman 
requires that the instrument used or displayed by the 
defendant comport with one or the other characteristic in 
order to come within the sweep of Code § 18.2-53.1.  Id. at 
198, 269 S.E.2d at 358. 
 
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