Title: Tibbals Flooring Company v. Stanfill
Citation: 410 S.W.2d 892
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: January 6, 1967

410 S.W.2d 892 (1967) TIBBALS FLOORING COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-in-Error, v. Mitchell STANFILL, Defendant-in-Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. January 6, 1967. *893 Don C. Stansberry, Jr., Huntsville, Baker, Worthington, Barnett &amp; Crossley, Huntsville, of counsel, for plaintiff in error. Charles W. Martin, Oneida, for defendant in error. CHATTIN, Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case. The trial judge found the petitioner, Mitchell Stanfill, had suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant, Tibbals Flooring Company, and as a result was permanently and totally disabled. Benefits were awarded accordingly. After defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled, an appeal was perfected to this Court and errors have been assigned. The first assignment has for its basis there is no material evidence in the record to support the finding of the trial judge the injury arose out of and in the course of petitioner's employment. The facts are that petitioner was employed by the defendant for approximately six years prior to June 4, 1965. He was fifty-six years of age at the date of the trial on March 10, 1966. He was in good health at the time he began working for defendant in 1958. Petitioner's work consisted of taking strips of lumber from a cut-off saw, cutting the ends off the strips, and then placing the strips on a conveyor belt which conveyed the strips to another machine. The work was done in a room of the lumber mill. He worked eight hours a day. The work *894 required constant motion on his part in removing the lumber from the saw and placing it on the belt. Petitioner continued to enjoy good health until about eighteen months prior to April 23, 1965. During this period, petitioner experienced pains in his chest, dizziness and weakness during his work hours and also while off from work. On April 22, 1965, petitioner and his son went into the country to target practice. When they reached the place they intended to practice, their car was parked and when petitioner got out of the car his heart began to beat "hard." At the insistence of his wife and son, he went to see Dr. Milford Thompson. Dr. Thompson diagnosed petitioner's condition as an auricular fibrillation. That is, he had an irregular heart beat and shortness of breath. Petitioner continued to work until the first part of June, 1965. At that time he was told by Mr. Charles Tibbals, the President of the Company, that he would be separated from his work. Mr. Tibbals testified Dr. Thompson had told him that petitioner had a rapid heart condition which was associated with high blood pressure. That when he was advised of petitioner's physical condition he told petitioner the Company had decided it best to separate him from his employment. Dr. Thompson testified on direct examination as follows: On cross examination, he testified: On redirect examination he testified: On recross examination he testified: It is the insistence of the defendant that since Dr. Thompson testified that petitioner's heart condition was not caused or aggravated by petitioner's work there is no material evidence in the record to support the finding of the trial judge there was a causal connection between petitioner's heart condition and his employment. To meet this insistence, Counsel for petitioner insists that since Dr. Thompson also testified that petitioner's work would have an adverse effect on his heart there is material evidence to support a finding of a causal connection between petitioner's work and his heart condition. If this testimony of Dr. Thompson is to be construed as meaning petitioner's work caused or aggravated petitioner's heart condition, then his testimony is inconsistent with his testimony it did not cause or aggravate his heart condition. Contradictory statements of a witness in connection with the same fact have a result of cancelling out each other. Donaho v. Large, 25 Tenn. App. 433, 158 S.W.2d 447, 448 (1941); Todd v. Roane-Anderson Company, 35 Tenn. App. 687, 251 S.W.2d 132 (1952). Thus, there is no medical proof in the record that petitioner's heart condition was caused or aggravated by his employment. The medical question, under the facts of this case, whether petitioner's heart condition was caused or aggravated by his employment, is a complicated one and carries the finder of facts into realms which are properly within the province of medical experts. American Enka Corporation v. Sutton, 216 Tenn. 228, 391 S.W.2d 643 (1965). In the instant case, the only question is whether there was a causal connection between the work petitioner was performing and his heart condition. *897 The petitioner testified he experienced the symptoms of his heart condition while away from his work as well as when he was at his work; and that his condition worsened as time passed. We do not think an inference may be drawn from this testimony that petitioner's work caused or aggravated his heart condition which resulted in his disability, and excludes an inference his heart condition was caused by other sources and his disability resulted from the normal progress of that condition. If, upon undisputed proof, it is conjectural whether disability resulted from a cause operating within petitioner's employment, or a cause operating without his employment, there can be no award. Hagewood v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &amp; Co., 206 Tenn. 239, 332 S.W.2d 660 (1960). We think it was necessary under the particular facts of this case for the petitioner to show by competent medical testimony the employment caused or aggravated his heart condition and his resulting disability was not due to the normal progress of that condition or ailment. In the case of American Enka Corporation v. Sutton, supra, this Court approved the following principle: From our view of this record, we are unable to find any material evidence upon which a finding for the petitioner could be based. In view of what we have hereinabove said, we think it is unnecessary to discuss defendant's second assignment of error which contends petitioner failed to give the proper notice of the alleged accident. The cause is reversed and dismissed for lack of competent material evidence to show a causal connection between petitioner's employment and his heart condition. BURNETT, C. J., DYER and CRESON, JJ., and HARBISON, Special Justice, concur.