Title: Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89661
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2001

Docket No. 89661-Agenda 20-March 2001.
CONNIE HARRISON, Appellee, v. HARDIN COUNTY 
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2001.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In December 1995, plaintiff, Connie Harrison, filed a civil
action against Hardin County Community Unit School District No.
1 (school district), Joshua Davis and his grandfather, Jimmy
Davis, for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident.
Claims against Jimmy Davis and Joshua Davis, who was driving
his grandfather's car when he lost control and struck plaintiff's
vehicle, were settled. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the school
district was liable because its personnel were willful and wanton
in refusing Joshua Davis's request to leave school early due to
inclement weather and deteriorating road conditions. The school
district filed a motion for summary judgment maintaining, inter
alia, that it was entitled to immunity under section 2-201 of the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994)). The circuit court of
Hardin County granted the school district summary judgment. The
appellate court reversed. 313 Ill. App. 3d 702. We granted the
school district's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

BACKGROUND
	On December 8, 1995, Joshua Davis, age 16, drove his
grandfather's car to school. Joshua was a student at Hardin County
High School, which is owned and operated by the school district.
During the school day, a mixture of freezing rain, sleet, and snow
began falling in Hardin County.
	At his evidentiary deposition, Joshua Davis testified that
during his lunch period, at approximately 11:40 a.m., he
approached his principal, Ron Brumley, and asked if he could
leave school early because of the deteriorating weather conditions.
Joshua told Brumley that he wanted to leave early before it started
snowing heavily because he "didn't want to have a wreck."
Brumley told Joshua that all of the students who drove to school
would be dismissed early, at a certain time after lunch. After the
lunch period ended, Joshua went to his next class and asked his
teacher if he could use the phone to call his parents to get
permission to leave early. The teacher told Joshua to sit down and
that school would be dismissed early.
	Joshua further testified that school was dismissed at
approximately 12:15 p.m. that day. Accompanied by three other
students, including his girlfriend, Michelle Williams, Joshua drove
his grandfather's car from school. Joshua passed the driveway to
his home and continued toward his girlfriend's house. En route,
Joshua lost control of the vehicle, crossed the center line, and
struck the front of plaintiff's vehicle. Joshua admitted that if he
had wanted to ride the bus, that option would have been available
to him. Joshua further acknowledged that the accident would not
have occurred had he not been taking his girlfriend home and that
there was no reason why he could not have asked his girlfriend to
ride home on the bus and driven himself directly home.
	Ron Brumley, principal of Hardin County High School,
testified that a procedure was in place by which parents could call
the school and request that their children be dismissed early. If an
individual student asked to leave early due to inclement weather,
the school usually required parental permission. The school
allowed students to call home to ask their parents if they could
leave school early. Brumley stated he may deny a student's request
to call home if school was going to be dismissed within a short
period of time.
	In plaintiff's complaint, she alleged that the accident and her
injuries were "directly and proximately caused" by the following
willful and wanton acts committed by school district personnel:
			"a. Refused to allow Joshua Davis to leave school when
it was safe to do so given the deteriorating weather
conditions on local roads;
			b. Permitted Joshua Davis to leave school property in a
motor vehicle after having been advised by the student
that he had difficulty driving in inclement weather
conditions;
			c. Failed to call Joshua Davis' grandparents, parents,
and/or adult guardian to have him picked up from
school."
	The circuit court granted the school district's motion for
summary judgment based on the immunity protections of section
2-201 of the Act. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting,
held that Brumley's decision not to allow Joshua to leave early
was not an exercise of discretion in the determination of policy
and, thus, did not fall within the protections of the Act. 313 Ill.
App. 3d at 707. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the
circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the school
district. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 708. We granted the school district's
petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
ANALYSIS
	Summary judgment is proper "where the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Busch v. Graphic Color Corp.,
169 Ill. 2d 325, 333 (1996); 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996).
If the party moving for summary judgment supplies facts that, if
not contradicted, would warrant judgment in its favor as a matter
of law, the opponent cannot rest on his pleadings to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 (1986); Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher &amp; Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376,
380 (1974); see also Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights Comm'n, 267 Ill.
App. 3d 386, 391 (1994). Our review of an order granting
summary judgment is de novo. Zekman v. Direct American
Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 374 (1998).
 	In 1959, this court abolished the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No.
302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959). In response to Molitor, the General
Assembly, in 1965, enacted the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS
10/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)). Under the Act, Illinois adopted the
principle that local governmental units are liable in tort, but
limited this liability with an extensive list of immunities based on
specific government functions. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale
Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 506 (1990). The 1970 Illinois
Constitution also abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
except as the General Assembly may provide by law. Ill. Const.
1970, art. XIII, §4. Accordingly, the Act governs whether and in
what situations local governmental units are immune from civil
liability. See Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 375 (1997).
	In this case, the school district claims that it is absolutely
immune from liability under the Act. Section 2-201 states:
			"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public
employee serving in a position involving the
determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not
liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in
determining policy when acting in the exercise of such
discretion even though abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201
(West 1994).
Also relevant here is section 2-109 of the Act, which immunizes
a local public entity from liability for an injury resulting from an
employee's act or omission where the employee is not liable. 745
ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1994). In construing the Act, our primary
goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 340 (1998). Further, we will not depart from the plain
language of the Act by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or
conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. In re
Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 193 (1997). These
grants of immunity to public officials are premised upon the idea
that such officials should be allowed to exercise their judgment in
rendering decisions without fear that a good-faith mistake might
subject them to liability. See White v. Village of Homewood, 285
Ill. App. 3d 496, 502 (1996).
	This court has determined that section 2-201 requires the act
or omission to be both a determination of policy and an exercise
of discretion. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 341. Cases considering this
Act have recognized a distinction between "discretionary duties,
the negligent performance of which does not subject a
municipality to tort liability, and ministerial duties, the negligent
performance of which can subject a municipality to tort liability."
Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 473 (1995). This
court has held that "discretionary acts are those which are unique
to a particular public office, while ministerial acts are those which
a person performs on a given state of facts in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without
reference to the official's discretion as to the propriety of the act."
Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474. Further, this court has defined policy
decisions as those that require the governmental entity or
employee to balance competing interests and to make a judgment
call as to what solutions will best serve each of those interests.
West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). Both parties agree that
principal Brumley's actions were discretionary in nature.
However, they disagree as to whether Brumley was determining
policy when he denied Joshua's request to be dismissed early.
	In Harinek, an office worker was struck by a door during a
fire drill after being instructed by the City of Chicago's fire
marshall to stand near the door. This court, applying the Kirkham
definition of policy decisions, found that section 2-201
immunized the City from liability because the fire marshall's
decision involved a determination of policy and an exercise of
discretion. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 343. We stated that in planning
and conducting fire drills, the fire marshall had to balance various
interests that might compete for the time and resources of the fire
department, including the interests of efficiency and safety.
Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 342. The marshall's decision regarding the
placement of fire drill participants served to balance these
interests, and the marshall's "acts and omissions were undertaken
in determining policy within the meaning of the statute." Harinek,
181 Ill. 2d  at 343.
	The appellate court applied the Harinek principles in Johnson
v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798 (1998). In that case,
a youth was injured in a fall at a power tumbling practice and
alleged that the park district, which had hired his coach, acted
willfully and wantonly in failing to warn of the dangers associated
with using a mini-trampoline and mats and to provide certain
safety measures and equipment. The plaintiffs also alleged
negligence and willful and wanton conduct on the part of the
coach. Johnson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 801. The appellate court
affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the park district and its coach pursuant to the Act. Johnson, 301
Ill. App. 3d at 810. As to the coach, the court found that he
determined what maneuvers the tumblers would perform, whether
each tumbler was capable of performing those maneuvers, and
what equipment and safety precautions were needed. Johnson, 301
Ill. App. 3d at 809. Thus, the coach had to consider each tumbler's
abilities, balance these interests against the resources of the park
district, and make a judgment as to how best to perform his
coaching duties. The court found that this qualified as the making
of policy under Harinek, and thus the coach's actions were
immunized under section 2-201 of the Act. Johnson, 301 Ill. App.
3d at 809-10.
	In this case, Brumley had to consider the circumstances
surrounding Joshua's request, including the weather and road
conditions, Joshua's safety, and the lack of permission from
Joshua's parents or guardian. Brumley then had to balance the
competing interests of Joshua's desire to leave early before the
weather worsened with that of the school's interest in an orderly
dismissal, along with the possibility that if one student was
dismissed early then, in the future, every student would want to
leave early. Brumley then had to make a judgment as to how best
to perform his duties as principal and find a solution that best
served all of these interests. Just as the actions of the fire marshall
in Harinek and the coach in Johnson constituted policy
determinations, Brumley also made a policy decision when he
refused Joshua's request for early dismissal and instead told him
to wait for the entire school to be dismissed early.
	Plaintiff argues that Brumley could not have been determining
policy because his decision only impacted an individual student.
In that regard, the appellate court stated that Brumley's decision
was not an exercise of discretion in the determination of policy
because it was not a decision at the "planning level" and "did not
involve the formulation of principles to achieve a common public
benefit." 313 Ill. App. 3d at 707. We disagree. The language of
section 2-201 and the cases considering its applicability do not
require that the decision achieve a common public benefit to come
within the Act's immunity protections. Under the principles set
forth in Harinek, Brumley's actions clearly qualify as the making
of policy. Based on this analysis, we hold that the school district
enjoys the immunity protections provided under section 2-201.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court of Hardin County
is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	I agree with the result reached by the majority. I do so,
however, for reasons other than those stated in the majority
opinion.
	Based upon the reasons set forth in my dissent in Harinek v.
161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 355-56
(1998) (Harrison, J., dissenting), I do not believe that the school
district was entitled to immunity under section 2-201 of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994)), because principal Brumley was
not determining policy when he denied Joshua's request to be
dismissed early. However, a reviewing court may affirm a grant of
summary judgment on any basis found in the record (see Alliance
Syndicate, Inc. v. Parsec, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 590, 599 (2000);
Lawrence &amp; Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Resource Group,
Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 131, 135 (1997)), and I believe that summary
judgment was properly granted because uncontradicted evidence
advanced in support of the school district's motion for summary
judgment conclusively establishes that the alleged misconduct by
the school district did not proximately cause the accident or
plaintiff's injuries.
	To properly state a cause of action for willful and wanton
conduct, as asserted herein, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant owed a duty of care, that the defendant breached this
duty, and that the plaintiff incurred injuries proximately caused by
the breach. See Urban v. Village of Lincolnshire, 272 Ill. App. 3d
1087, 1094 (1995); Laco v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. App. 3d 498,
502 (1987). In its motion for summary judgment, the school
district claimed, inter alia, that "[v]iewing the facts as alleged in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the conduct of the School
District was not sufficiently closely connected with Plaintiff's
injury so that, given considerations of justice or policy, the School
District should be held liable for Plaintiff's injury."
	The issue of the existence of proximate cause is ordinarily
determined by the trier of fact. Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority,
152 Ill. 2d 432, 454 (1992). However, where the facts are
undisputed and reasonable men could not differ as to the
inferences to be drawn from those facts, proximate cause may be
determined as a matter of law. Merlo v. Public Service Co. of
Northern Illinois, 381 Ill. 300, 318 (1942); see also Kimber v. City
of Warrenville, 248 Ill. App. 3d 361, 367 (1993). Proximate cause
is an issue of material fact in a negligence suit (Gatlin v. Ruder,
137 Ill. 2d 284, 293 (1990); see Meck v. Paramedic Services, 296
Ill. App. 3d 720, 730 (1998)), and where a plaintiff does not
present any evidence in reply to counter the facts presented by a
defendant in support of a motion for summary judgment on that
issue, summary judgment is properly granted (see Kennedy v.
Joseph T. Ryerson &amp; Sons, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d 914, 919 (1989);
see also Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d  at 241 (facts contained in an affidavit
in support of a motion for summary judgment which are not
contradicted by counteraffidavit are admitted and must be taken as
true for purposes of the motion)).
	Proximate cause encompasses cause in fact and legal cause.
Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455. The key inquiry into cause in fact is
whether the defendant's conduct was "a material element and a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury." Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at
455. The key inquiry into cause in fact is whether the defendant's
conduct was "a material element and a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury." Legal cause is a question of
forseeability: a negligent act is a proximate cause of an injury if
the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a
likely result of his or her conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 456; see also
Williams v. Chicago Board of Education, 267 Ill. App. 3d 446,
451 (1994). If cause in fact is established, the next question is
whether the defendant should be held legally responsible for it.
See Kimber, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 367. The test to be applied in all
proximate cause cases is whether the first wrongdoer reasonably
might have anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural
and probable result of the first party's own act or omission. Seith
v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 252, 260 (1909). Even
assuming arguendo that the school district's acts or omissions
were a cause in fact of the accident, the evidence establishes that
the school district could not reasonably have anticipated the
independent acts of Joshua Davis which directly caused the
accident and plaintiff's injuries.
	Here, where the undisputed facts show that the school
district's conduct was not the legal cause of plaintiff's injury,
summary judgment on this issue is proper as a matter of law.
Joshua's deposition testimony makes clear that the accident which
injured plaintiff occurred because, after professing a desire to
avoid driving in inclement weather, he made the independent
decision to drive past his home and toward the home of his
girlfriend, despite the fact that bus transportation was available.
The school district and its personnel neither caused Joshua to
make that decision, nor reasonably could have foreseen that
decision as a likely consequence of their conduct in dismissing
Joshua at the same time as the other students who drove to school.
Thus, any act or omission committed by the school district would
be too remote to be considered a proximate cause of the accident.
See Urban, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 1097, citing Kimber, 248 Ill. App.
3d at 370-71 (where police officer abandoned pursuit, his conduct
was too remote to have been a proximate cause of the accident
which led to the decedent's death).
	Therefore, one element of plaintiff's claim is lacking where,
based on Joshua's deposition testimony presented by the school
district in support of its motion for summary judgment, there
remains no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged
acts by the school district proximately caused plaintiff's injury.
Joshua's testimony conclusively demonstrates that he was on the
road at the time of the accident because he voluntarily chose to
drive his girlfriend and others home.
	Based on this analysis, I would hold that the circuit court
properly granted summary judgment to the school district.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this special concurrence.