Title: Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45916
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2001

Filed:  January 11, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MARK PARROTT,
Petitioner on Review,
	and
CHARLES FORSHEY,
Plaintiff,
	v.
CARR CHEVROLET, INC.,an Oregon corporation,
Respondent on Review.
__________________________________________________________________
MARK PARROTT,
Respondent on Review,
	and
CHARLES FORSHEY,
Plaintiff,
	v.
CARR CHEVROLET, INC.,an Oregon corporation,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC C93-0873CV; CA A88512; SC S45916, S45917)(Cases Consolidated For Argument And Decision)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 8, 1999.
	Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner-cross respondent on review Parrott.  With her on the briefs were
Maureen Leonard and Michael C. Baxter, Portland.
	Barbee B. Lyon, of Tonkon Torp LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for respondent-cross petitioner on
review Carr Chevrolet, Inc.
	Megan A. Flynn and Kevin Keaney, Portland, and James S. Coon,
of Swanson, Thomas &amp; Coon, Portland, filed briefs on behalf of
amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
	Craig A. Nichols, of Nichols &amp; Associates, Portland, filed a
brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Automobile Dealers
Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Durham, Kulongoski, and
Leeson, Justices.**
	KULONGOSKI, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court with instructions to reinstate the jury's $1 million
punitive damages award.
* 	Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Michael J. McElligott, Judge. 156 Or App 257, 965 P2d 440 (1998).
**	Gillette, Riggs, and De Muniz JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.  Van Hoomissen, J.,
retired on December 31, 2000, and did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
	KULONGOSKI, J.
Parrott (plaintiff) (1) brought this civil action against
Carr Chevrolet, Inc. (defendant), arising from defendant's sale of
a used 1983 Chevrolet Suburban to plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleged,
inter alia, that defendant had violated certain provisions of the
Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), ORS 646.608(1)(e), (g), and
(t). (2)  The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and
awarded $11,496 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
damages.  After the verdict, defendant filed motions for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) under Oregon Rule of
Civil Procedure (ORCP) 63 or, in the alternative, for a new trial
under ORCP 63 C and ORCP 64.  One of the grounds that defendant
asserted in support of its motion for a new trial was that the
jury's punitive damages award was excessive.  Although the trial
court denied defendant's JNOV and new-trial motions, it ruled that
the punitive damages award was excessive and reduced it to
$50,000.  The trial court then entered judgment for plaintiff in
the amount of $11,496 in actual damages and $50,000 in punitive
damages.  The trial court also rejected plaintiff's attorney fees
request for $55,468.75, awarding, instead, fees of $15,000.  Both
plaintiff and defendant appealed.  
	On appeal, plaintiff assigned error to the trial court's
reduction of the punitive damages award from $1 million to $50,000
and to the trial court's rejection of plaintiff's attorney fees
request.  Defendant cross-appealed, contending, generally, that
plaintiff had failed to state a claim under the UTPA, that the
trial court had erred in awarding any punitive damages, and that
the trial court's $50,000 punitive damages award was excessive. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed on defendant's cross-appeal.  On
plaintiff's appeal, it reversed the trial court's reduction of the
jury's punitive damages award and remanded with instructions to
enter judgment allowing defendant's motion for new trial unless
plaintiff filed a remittitur of punitive damages in the amount of
$300,000.  Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 156 Or App 257, 965
P2d 440 (1998). (3)  Both parties petitioned for review, challenging
the Court of Appeals' analysis in its review of the punitive
damages award and whether the punitive damages award was
unconstitutionally excessive. (4)  We allowed both petitions.
	The primary issue on review is the appropriate standard
for post-verdict judicial review of a punitive damages award in
Oregon in light of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559,
116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996).  For the reasons that
follow, we hold that the rational juror inquiry in Oberg v. Honda
Motor Co., 320 Or 544, 888 P2d 8, cert den 517 US 1219 (1996)
(Oberg (state)), (5) remains the standard of post-verdict judicial
review  of punitive damages in Oregon for excessiveness under the
federal constitution and that Gore's set of nonexclusive
guideposts are factors that the reviewing court should consider as
part of the Oberg (state) review.  Applying the Oberg (state)
standard and the Gore guideposts to the record before the jury in
this proceeding, we hold that the jury's $1 million award of
punitive damages is within the range that a rational juror would
be entitled to award.
	The following facts are taken from the record.  We view
the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the party in whose favor
the jury returned the verdict.  Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Chase
Gardens, Inc., 328 Or 487, 490, 982 P2d 1117 (1999).
	Defendant operated a budget lot for used vehicles
advertised as "quality checked used cars."  The vehicles on that
lot were sold "as is" and had been driven at least 100,000 miles. 
In December 1992, defendant acquired a 1983 Suburban as a trade-in
from Myers.  Defendant sent the Suburban to the budget lot, priced
at $5,995.  Two weeks after defendant had acquired the Suburban,
plaintiff went to defendant's budget lot in search of a three-quarter ton truck.  A salesperson directed him to the Suburban. 
After examining the Suburban, plaintiff noticed that someone had
polished, cleaned and serviced it, and that the radiator,
batteries, tires, and upholstery looked new.  The engine was
painted blue, and plaintiff assumed that it had been replaced.  He
commented:  "It looks like quite a lot of recent work was done on
this vehicle," to which the salesperson replied, "[y]eah." 
Plaintiff also noticed that the Suburban's air cleaner was
missing, but the salesperson assured him that defendant would
replace it.
	The following week, plaintiff purchased the Suburban. 
After trading in his two vehicles as a down payment toward the
purchase price of the Suburban, plaintiff signed a credit
agreement through defendant for the balance of the Suburban's
purchase price, $2,892.17.  Plaintiff also signed the sales
documents to complete the transaction, which included a "Special
Disclaimers and Conditions" form and a "Buyer's Order."
	Included in the Special Disclaimers and Conditions form
was a section stating that the dealership visually had inspected
the vehicle and that there were no apparent deficiencies in the
installation of emission control devices.  When plaintiff pointed
out that that statement was inconsistent with the missing air
cleaner, defendant gave him a "we owe" statement for that missing
piece of equipment.  The Buyer's Order, in contrast, included a
typewritten section stating that the dealership had not inspected
the vehicle and had no knowledge of the vehicle's condition, the
accuracy of the odometer, or Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) certification.  After he had completed all the paperwork,
plaintiff drove the Suburban home.
	Shortly thereafter, plaintiff discovered multiple
problems with the Suburban, including several missing pieces of
emission control equipment, not only the air cleaner. (6)  Through
his own investigation, plaintiff also discovered that it was
impossible to bring the Suburban into DEQ compliance because of
the missing equipment and a difference in age between the Suburban
and its engine.  Plaintiff noticed that the Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN) located on the door, which should have matched with
the VIN in the glove box, had been removed.  He also noticed that
there were white lines between the numbers on the odometer. 
Plaintiff conducted his own title search and learned through the
Department of Transportation, Driver and Motor Vehicle Services
(DMV), that the Suburban previously had been damaged in California
and that it had a "title brand," which meant that the Suburban's
title had a notation indicating that it had been damaged severely,
totaled, or stolen.  Once plaintiff's insurer learned about the
branded title, it no longer would provide comprehensive insurance
for the Suburban.
	When plaintiff complained to defendant, defendant's
employees told plaintiff that repair was his problem because he
had purchased the Suburban "as is."  They also told him that the
Suburban's engine did not require DEQ equipment and that,
regardless of that fact, he should not worry about DEQ compliance,
because the registration was valid for another two years.  At one
point, a salesperson told plaintiff that defendant would replace
the engine, but with junkyard parts.  Ultimately, negotiations
between plaintiff and defendant for a replacement vehicle failed
when one of defendant's salespeople yelled at plaintiff, telling
him that the Suburban was "unfixable" and that he would have to
"learn to live with it" unless he agreed to a refund of $3,100 --
an amount equivalent to his down payment but that did not include
reimbursement for the value of his trade-ins or his loan and
insurance fees.  Negotiations between plaintiff and defendant's
attorney for rescission of the transaction also failed.  
	As a result, plaintiff filed this action against
defendant, alleging, among other things, that defendant had
violated the UTPA by willfully selling the Suburban:
"1) Falsely claiming it was equipped with proper
emission controls;
 "2) Falsely representing it had been driven
100,608 miles;
 "3) With defaced or missing VIN numbers in
violation of Oregon law;
 "4) Without disclosing that the emission control
equipment had been removed; and
 "5) Selling the vehicle without disclosing it had
previous out of state damage."
		At trial, plaintiff proved that defendant had known
about the condition of the Suburban when defendant sold it to
plaintiff.  When defendant had acquired the Suburban as a trade-in from Myers, Myers had provided defendant with a temporary
registration form as proof of ownership.  It was clear from
examining Myers's temporary registration form that someone had
altered it in an attempt to conceal that it had expired. 
Plaintiff's experts testified that no used car dealership would
accept the expired document as proof of ownership without
confirmation from DMV.  The Monday after Myers had brought the
Suburban to defendant, someone had requested and received a Basic
Vehicle Information sheet from a DMV field office.  That document
confirmed that Myers was the registered owner of the Suburban,
that the Suburban had an odometer discrepancy, and that the
Suburban had received "out-of-state damage - CA."
		Preble, co-owner and chairman of the board of Carr
Chevrolet, acknowledged at trial that, as proof of ownership,
Myers's temporary registration form was a "flimsy document" and
that, consequently, defendant had asked Myers to sign a "Secure
Power of Attorney."  A Secure Power of Attorney is a DMV form
that dealers use when the owner of a vehicle has lost a title or
the title is in the possession of a security interest holder. 
The form authorized defendant to transfer title from Myers to the
new owner, in this case, plaintiff.  One purpose of the form is
to protect customers, like plaintiff, from an odometer
discrepancy.  Although Myers had filled out Part A of the Secure
Power of Attorney, defendant never completed Parts B and C.  Had
defendant completed the Secure Power of Attorney when it sold the
Suburban to plaintiff, plaintiff would have learned about the
odometer discrepancy before completing the transaction. 
		In addition to the Secure Power of Attorney, Myers also
had filled out, albeit incompletely, a "Secure Odometer
Disclosure/Reassignment" form for his trade-in vehicles. 
Plaintiff's expert testified that the only reason that a
dealership would fill out both a Secure Power of Attorney and an
incomplete Secure Odometer Disclosure/Reassignment form for the
same vehicle was so that it could "try to sell [the vehicle] at a
later date without proper disclosure of the mileage." 
Plaintiff's evidence demonstrated that the incorrect use of title
transfer forms was a regular part of defendant's business
practice.  For its part, defendant acknowledged that it routinely
asked customers to sign blank, undated, or otherwise incomplete
title transfer forms, but it denied that it used incorrect,
extra, or incomplete forms for any wrongful purpose.  
		When plaintiff purchased the Suburban, defendant had
represented to plaintiff that it had possession of the Suburban's
title, when, in fact, it had only Myers's expired temporary
registration.  Defendant subsequently obtained the replacement
title that stated that the odometer reading "exceed[ed]
mechanical limits" and that the car had received "previous damage
- California."  However, defendant did not disclose that
information to plaintiff.  When completing the documents to
transfer title from Myers to plaintiff, defendant's title clerk
had failed to notice that the mileage indicated on the front of
the title, 107,497 miles as of July 1992, was greater than
defendant's odometer reading when it acquired the Suburban from
Myers, 100,608 miles as of December 1992.  She testified that
defendant had not trained her to check for such a discrepancy and
that she never had done so.  Referring to the discrepancy between
the odometer statements on the front and back of the replacement
title, Preble testified:  "We would have been as alarmed as you
were, had we paid attention to that fact."  Claiming ignorance of
DMV vehicle transfer requirements, Preble declined to identify
anyone in the company with sufficient knowledge and authority to
be responsible for what had happened, stating:  "Our management
style doesn't cause us to have final authority [for that] type of
thing.  That's not the style of management we have."
		Defendant claimed that it had no knowledge of the
Suburban's physical and mechanical defects before selling the
Suburban to plaintiff and was equivocal about whether it had
inspected the Suburban when it accepted it in trade.  Defendant
ultimately conceded, however, that, to accept the Suburban in
trade, defendant had appraised it and performed a "minimal"
inspection as part of that appraisal.  Defendant's used car
manager testified that a "minimal" inspection included a visual
inspection of the physical condition of the Suburban, including
the body, paint, glass, upholstery, and carpet, a check of
specific equipment on the Suburban, such as the transmission and
brakes, and a test drive of the Suburban "to make sure that the
engine runs [and that] the transmission shifts." 
		Plaintiff's experts testified that, even without a
detailed inspection of the Suburban, any minimally trained
dealership employee would have recognized the following "red
flags" indicating that someone had "altered" the Suburban:  (1)
the driver's door was misaligned and was a different color; (2)
the VIN was missing from the door and from the transmission; (3)
several pieces of the emission control equipment were missing;
(4) the engine was not the original engine that had come with the
Suburban; and (5) "very visible" white lines were present between
the odometer numbers -- a clear indication that someone had
tampered with the odometer and, therefore, that the mileage
indicated likely was inaccurate.  One of plaintiff's experts
opined that there was "no question" that defendant knew that the
mileage on the Suburban was not accurate, that the VIN had been
removed, and that the Suburban was missing its emission control
equipment and could not pass DEQ inspection. 
As noted, the jury found for plaintiff on his UTPA
claim, awarding him compensatory and punitive damages.  Defendant
challenged the jury's award of punitive damages on several
grounds, including excessiveness under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. (7)  The trial court noted that
the record supported what was "an extraordinarily egregious
violation" of the UTPA, but, on defendant's motion for
elimination or reduction of the punitive damages award, lowered
plaintiff's punitive damages award to $50,000, finding that
$50,000 "is the number which is the top of the range which * * *
a rational factfinder could award on this * * * record."
		On appeal, the Court of Appeals followed Blume v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 155 Or App 102, 963 P2d 700 (1998), which held that,
after Gore, the Oberg (state) rational juror standard for post-verdict judicial review of punitive damages for excessiveness
under the federal constitution no longer is applicable.  Parrott,
156 Or App at 274-75.  Both defendant and plaintiff petitioned
for review, seeking clarification of the appropriate standard for
post-verdict judicial review of a punitive damages award in
Oregon in light of Gore.  We allowed review to consider that
issue. 
Before we reach that issue, however, we turn to the
additional issue raised in defendant's petition for review, which
is whether, in light of ORS 72.3160(3)(a), which permits "as is"
sales, plaintiff failed to state a claim under ORS
646.608(1)(t). (8)  We have considered and, for the reasons
explained by the Court of Appeals, Parrott, 156 Or App at 270-71,
reject without additional discussion defendant's arguments
relating to that issue.
		We turn, then, to the primary issue on review:  What is
the appropriate standard of post-verdict judicial review of a
punitive damages award in Oregon following Gore?  In Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, 512 US 415, 114 S Ct 2331, 129 L Ed 2d 336 (1994)
(Oberg (federal)), the United States Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause requires the availability of post-verdict
judicial review of punitive damages awards.  In that opinion,
however, the Court did not "address the more difficult question
of what standard of review is constitutionally required."  Id. at
432 n 10.  On remand, this court held:
"[T]he standard for post-verdict judicial review of an
award of punitive damages is as follows:  A jury's
award of punitive damages shall not be disturbed when
it is within the range that a rational juror would be
entitled to award in the light of the record as a
whole; the range that a rational juror would be
entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory
and common law factors that allow an award of punitive
damages for the specific kind of claim at issue."
Oberg (state), 320 Or at 549 (footnote omitted).   
		Approximately one year after this court's decision in
Oberg (state), the United States Supreme Court in Gore decided to
address the question it previously had left unanswered in Oberg
(federal) and "illuminate the character of the standard that will
identify unconstitutionally excessive awards of punitive
damages[.]"  517 US at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The plaintiff in Gore filed an action against BMW for fraud after
he discovered that BMW had failed to disclose that his new
automobile had been repainted due to damage during delivery.  The
jury awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4
million in punitive damages.  The trial court denied BMW's post-trial motion to set aside the punitive damages award, holding,
among other things, that the award was not excessive.  On appeal,
the Alabama Supreme Court applied its state law criteria for
judicial review (previously endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 449 US 1, 21-22, 111
S Ct 1032, 113 L Ed 2d 1 (1991)), and concluded that the jury's
punitive damages award did not exceed the constitutionally
permissible amount.  The Alabama Supreme Court, however, reduced
that award to $2 million, because it found that the jury
improperly had computed the amount of punitive damages by
multiplying the plaintiff's compensatory damages by the number of
similar sales in jurisdictions other than Alabama. 
		The United States Supreme Court reversed.  Gore, 517 US
at 586.  Although the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of a
state's interests in "punishing unlawful conduct and deterring
its repetition" through punitive damages awards, it emphasized
that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from imposing
"grossly excessive" punishment on a tortfeasor.  Id. at 568
(citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US
443, 456, 113 S Ct 2711, 125 L Ed 2d 366 (1993)).  The Court
explained that an award that the Court can characterize as
"grossly excessive" in relation to the state's interests is one
that is arbitrary and, therefore, violates due process.  Id. 
Accordingly, review of a punitive damages award for excessiveness
begins with identification of the state interests that a punitive
damages award is designed to serve.  Id.
The Court also held that "a person [must] receive fair
notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."  Id. at 574.  The Court identified three
"guideposts" to consider when evaluating whether a defendant has
received fair notice of the magnitude of the punitive damages
award that might be imposed:  (1) the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between the
punitive damages award and the actual or potential harm
inflicted; and (3) the civil and criminal sanctions provided for
comparable misconduct.  Id. at 574-85.  The Court then analyzed
the facts of Gore in light of those guideposts and concluded that
the punitive damages award in that case was "grossly excessive,"
in violation of the Due Process Clause. (9)  It then remanded the
case to the Alabama Supreme Court.  Id. at 586.  
		In this proceeding, defendant argues that the Oberg
(state) rational juror standard of post-verdict judicial review
"has been effectively overruled" by Gore and that the Gore
guideposts alone should guide post-verdict review of punitive
damages awards in Oregon.  Defendant contends that, under the
Gore guideposts, the jury's $1 million punitive damages award and
the Court of Appeals' $300,000 punitive damages award both are
"grossly excessive" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
		In response, plaintiff disputes whether Gore superseded
Oberg (state).  According to plaintiff, Oberg (state) announced a
"state law review process" that the court must apply before
applying Gore's substantive due process review under the federal
constitution.  Citing Oberg (state), 320 Or at 549, plaintiff
argues that, by focusing solely on the Gore guideposts, defendant
has "abandoned its state law prong of its challenge" and conceded
that the jury's verdict was rational "in light of the record as a
whole," based on "the statutory and common law factors" governing
the proceeding.  Plaintiff also argues that, under the Gore
guideposts, the evidence before the jury in this proceeding
"fully supports" the reasonableness of the jury's $1 million
punitive damages award and, therefore, that award does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
		Although defendant's challenge to the jury's punitive
damages award arises under the federal constitution, we begin by
addressing plaintiff's characterization of the Oberg (state)
rational juror standard as a "state law standard."  See State v.
Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (court must resolve
all questions of state law before reaching federal constitutional
arguments).  As mentioned above, the court in Oberg (state)
responded to the Supreme Court's holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires post-verdict review
for excessiveness.  There is, however, no "state law
excessiveness challenge" under the Oregon Constitution. (10)  See Or
Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3 (prohibiting any "fact tried by a
jury" from being "re-examined in any court of this state," unless
no evidence supports the verdict); (11)

 Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187
Or 89, 110-13, 210 P2d 461 (1949) (assessment of punitive damages
is question of fact committed to decision of jury), overruled in
part on other grounds by Oberg (state), 320 Or at 549. 
Before the people adopted Article VII (Amended),
section 3, in 1910, an Oregon trial court had the power to set
aside a jury's verdict when it considered the verdict to be
excessive.  See, e.g., Lindsay v. Grande Ronde Lumber Co., 48 Or
430, 438-39, 87 P 145 (1906) (duty of trial court to set aside
excessive jury verdict); Nelson v. Oregon Railway Etc. Co., 13 Or
141, 142-43, 9 P 321 (1886) (same).  It was well settled at that
time that a trial court's refusal to set aside a jury verdict as
excessive could not be reviewed on appeal (except when there was
"no evidence to support the verdict"), "because [that decision]
does not present a question of law, but one of fact[.]"  Lindsay,
48 Or at 438.  Under Article VII (Amended), section 3, however,
courts no longer have a common-law power to review punitive
damages awards for excessiveness.  See Van Lom, 187 Or at 94 (so
stating).  In Van Lom, the court emphasized the importance of a
litigant's state constitutional guarantee to a jury trial (12) and
concluded that the purpose of Article VII (Amended), section 3,
was "to eliminate, as an incident of jury trial in this
state, the common law power of a trial court to re-examine the evidence and set aside a verdict because it
was excessive or in any other respect opposed to the
weight of the evidence."
Id. at 99.  Consequently, the court held that, under the Oregon
Constitution, a reviewing court may examine the record only "to
determine whether it can affirmatively say there is no evidence
to support the verdict."  Id. at 95 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also State v. Brown, 306 Or 599, 604, 761 P2d 1300
(1988) (fact decided by jury may not be reexamined unless
reviewing court can say affirmatively that there is no evidence
to support jury's decision); ORCP 64 B(5) (trial court may grant
new trial if evidence is insufficient to justify verdict or is
against the law); Hill v. Garner, 277 Or 641, 643, 561 P2d 1016
(1977) (court may not grant judgment notwithstanding verdict if
there is any evidence to support verdict).  As noted by the
Supreme Court in Oberg (federal), between 1910 and 1995, Oregon
was the only state in the Union that did not have some form of
post-verdict judicial review of the amount of a punitive damages
award.  Oberg (federal), 512 US at 427-28. 
		The defendants in Oberg (state) challenged the jury's
punitive damages award as excessive under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  320 Or at 547.  In response to that
challenge, Oberg (state) announced the standard that this court
determined was required by the federal constitution for post-verdict review of punitive damages awards.  320 Or at 549-51. 
Similarly, defendant in this proceeding challenges the jury's $1
million punitive damages award as excessive.  As is made clear
from the preceding discussion, in Oregon, except for issues
arising on review under ORS 18.537, a challenge to a punitive
damages award may be made only under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  By relying on the Fourteenth Amendment
as the source for that challenge, defendant has not conceded the
reasonableness of the punitive damages award under the rational
juror standard articulated in Oberg (state).
		As noted, defendant questions the validity of the Oberg
(state) standard following the Supreme Court's decision in Gore.  
We find no suggestion in Gore that the Court changed the existing
standard -- gross excessiveness -- or excluded judicial
consideration of other factors that might be relevant in
assessing whether a punitive damages award is excessive.  In
Oberg (federal), the Court stated:
"Although courts adopting a more deferential approach
use different verbal formulations, there may not be
much practical difference between review that focuses
on 'passion and prejudice,' 'gross excessiveness,' or
whether the verdict was 'against the great weight of
the evidence.'  All of these may be rough equivalents
of the standard this Court articulated in Jackson v.
Virginia, [443 US 307, 324, 99 S Ct 2781, 61 L Ed 2d
560 (1979)] (whether 'no rational trier of fact could
have' reached the same verdict)."
512 US at 432 n 10 (emphasis added).  That statement was one of
two passages from Oberg (federal) that led this court to conclude
in Oberg (state) that the correct standard is whether the award
of punitive damages is within the range that a rational juror
would be entitled to award in light of the record as a whole. 
Oberg (state), 320 Or at 550-51. (13)  In other words, the rational
juror inquiry merely is one of the "different verbal
formulations" of the "grossly excessive" standard previously
adopted by the Supreme Court.  Subsequently, in Gore, the Court
adhered to its "gross excessiveness" standard: 
"Only when an award can fairly be categorized as
'grossly excessive' * * * does it enter the zone of
arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
517 US at 568 (emphasis added).  We conclude, therefore, that the
rational juror standard is compatible with and does not differ
practically from Gore's gross excessiveness inquiry, and that
Gore has not "superseded" the rational juror standard that this
court articulated in Oberg (state).   
		We find further support for our conclusion in the Gore
Court's discussion of the "guideposts."  To begin with, the Gore
majority did not reject the standards of review that the Alabama
Supreme Court already had applied -- standards that the Supreme
Court previously had endorsed in Haslip.  Moreover, on more than
one occasion, the Court expressly has stated that the federal
excessiveness standard cannot be defined by a formula or a bright
line.  See id. at 582 (rejecting notion that "the constitutional
line is marked by a simple mathematical formula"); see also TXO,
509 US at 455-58 (refusing to formulate "test" for determining
whether particular punitive damages award is "grossly
excessive"); Haslip, 499 US at 18 ("We need not, and indeed we
cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable
that would fit every case.").  Accordingly, we conclude that the
guideposts announced in Gore are additional factors for the
reviewing court in Oregon to consider as part of the Oberg
(state) rational juror review.
		In summary, the rational juror inquiry survives as the
standard for post-verdict judicial review of an award of punitive
damages in Oregon under the Fourteenth Amendment.  A jury's
punitive damages award is not "grossly excessive" -- and,
therefore, will not be disturbed on review -- if it is within the
range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in light
of the record as a whole.  Combining the factors announced by the
Supreme Court in Gore with those announced by this court in Oberg
(state), the range that a rational juror would be entitled to
award depends on the following:  (1) the statutory and common-law
factors that allow an award of punitive damages for the specific
kind of claim at issue, Oberg (state), 320 Or at 549; (2) the
state interests that a punitive damages award is designed to
serve, Gore, 517 US at 568; (3) the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct, id. at 575; (4) the disparity between
the punitive damages award and the actual or potential harm
inflicted, id. at 580; and (5) the civil and criminal sanctions
provided for comparable misconduct, id. at 583. 
		Before we can apply those factors to this proceeding,
we must consider two preliminary procedural issues regarding
judicial review of a punitive damages award:  (1) the factual
record to which the court addresses its review; and (2) the
remedies available if the reviewing court concludes that an award
of punitive damages is grossly excessive.  We turn now to the
first issue.
In Oregon, calculating punitive damages is the function
of the jury.  Van Lom, 187 Or at 108.  Since its adoption,
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution has
prevented Oregon courts from reviewing punitive damages awards
for alleged excessiveness unless there was no evidence to support
the jury's verdict.  Id. at 110-13.  Under Oberg (federal), and
Gore, however, the federal constitution requires the availability
of post-verdict judicial review of punitive damages awards. 
Although application of the gross excessiveness standard is a
question of law, we recognize that, as part of that application,
the reviewing court must "re-examine" the facts in the record --
a requirement that is contrary to Oregon law.  As this court
noted in Oberg (state): 
"In Van Lom * * *, this court held that an assessment
of punitive damages is a question of fact committed to
the decision of a jury, to which Article VII (Amended),
section 3, applies.  Therefore, a trial or appellate
court is prohibited from reviewing an award of punitive
damages if there is evidence in the record to support a
jury's finding that punitive damages should be awarded. 
* * * It is that aspect of the holding in Van Lom,
construing Article VII (Amended), section 3, that comes
into direct conflict with the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in this case, [Oberg
(federal)], concerning the requirements of federal due
process.  Under the Supremacy Clause, we are bound to
follow the requirements of federal due process in the
face of that conflict."
320 Or at 548-49 (footnotes and citations omitted).  
		Although the federal requirement of judicial review for
excessiveness directly conflicts with the re-examination clause
of Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution,
that requirement has not altered the parties' right, under
Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution, to a trial by
jury regarding a claim for punitive damages.  As is true in other
contexts, the proper response of an Oregon court to the
overlapping and potentially conflicting requirements of federal
and state constitutional law is to give effect, to the greatest
extent possible, to all pertinent constitutional requirements. 
That principle applies in the context of judicial review of a
punitive damages award.
		Accordingly, because the amount necessary to punish
what has occurred and deter its repetition is a question for the
jury, we hold that, when reviewing a punitive damages award for
excessiveness, the reviewing court must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict if there is evidence
in the record to support them.  See generally Gore, 517 US at
579-80 (accepting jury's finding that BMW suppressed material
fact that it was obligated to communicate to customers under
Alabama law, but determining that BMW's omission was not
sufficiently reprehensible to justify $2 million punitive damages
award); Haslip, 499 US at 13 (no reason to question jury finding
when it is supported by record).  In other words, the reviewing
court must resolve all disputes regarding facts and factual
inferences in favor of the jury's verdict and then determine, on
the facts as the jury was entitled to find them, whether the
award violates the legal standard of gross excessiveness.  The
reviewing court's examination of the "record as a whole" is
limited to the evidence that was before the jury.  Oberg (state),
320 Or at 552-56.   
		Those same overlapping and potentially conflicting
requirements of federal and state constitutional law are relevant
to our consideration of the second procedural issue noted ante,
concerning the remedies available if the reviewing court
concludes that an award of punitive damages is excessive.  We
turn now to that issue.
		As noted, the federal requirement of judicial review of
a punitive damages award for excessiveness protects a party from
entry of a judgment that contains a grossly excessive award of
punitive damages.  However, that requirement has not altered the
parties' right, under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon
Constitution, to a trial by jury regarding a claim for punitive
damages, including the determination of the amount of punitive
damages.  For example, the federal requirement of judicial review
does not empower Oregon courts to disturb a jury's award and
enter an award of punitive damages that the court regards as not
excessive.  Accordingly, if a court reviews a punitive damages
award and determines, as the trial court did here, that some
lesser amount is the highest amount that a jury lawfully could
award, then the court must protect the moving party from entry of
a judgment for the excessive amount, but at the same time must
give effect, to the extent practicable, to the state-protected
right to have a jury determine the amount of a punitive damages
award.  Courts can fulfill both federal and state constitutional
obligations, and avoid a potential conflict in those
requirements, by proceeding as follows when reviewing a jury's
award of punitive damages.
		A party may challenge a jury's punitive damages award
as excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment by filing a motion
for a new trial under ORCP 64 (B)5, which provides:   
	"A former judgment may be set aside and a new
trial granted in an action where there has been a trial
by jury on the motion of the party aggrieved for any of
the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of such party:
	"* * * * *
	"B(5) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against the
law."
See also Oberg (state), 320 Or at 552 n 9 (defendants' challenge
to punitive damages award on ground of excessiveness
appropriately raised in trial court in motion for new trial). (14)
		In response to the motion, the reviewing court must
determine whether the jury's award is grossly excessive under the
standards discussed in this opinion.  If the answer is yes, then
the reviewing court, in addition, should determine, by applying
the same standards, the upper limit of the range, or the highest
lawful amount, of punitive damages that a rational juror could
award, consistent with the Due Process Clause, based on the
record as a whole.  Unless the nonmoving party agrees to entry of
an amended judgment for the reduced amount of punitive damages
determined by the court, the court must grant a new trial.
The procedure described above is required to protect
the nonmoving party's right to a jury trial regarding the issue
of punitive damages. (15)  That procedure also protects the moving
party's right to a jury trial.  That is, the jury trial and
verdict afford the moving party the right to a jury trial
protected by the Oregon Constitution.  The moving party's motion
for a new trial, on the ground that the jury's verdict is grossly
excessive, signifies that party's election for a reexamination by
the court of the jury's punitive damages award under the legal
standard required by the Due Process Clause.  After conducting
that reexamination, the court must deny the motion for new trial
on that ground if the award meets the required standard.  If the
award fails that test, however, then the court must grant a new
trial unless the nonmoving party agrees to entry of an amended
judgment for a reduced amount of punitive damages, as determined
by the reviewing court. (16)  Each party may seek appellate review
of any determination by the court to which it timely objects.  In
any event, the procedure discussed above affords both the moving
party and the nonmoving party with all to which they are entitled
under the state and federal constitutions.
		We turn to our review of the jury's punitive damages
award in this proceeding, beginning with the statutory and
common-law factors that allow an award of punitive damages for a
UTPA violation in Oregon.  Oberg (state), 320 Or at 552-56. 
		The substantive criteria to be considered by an Oregon
factfinder in deciding whether to make an award of punitive
damages in an action for unlawful trade practices are set out in
ORS 646.638.  That statute provides that punitive damages may be
awarded when a person has suffered 
"any ascertainable loss of money or property * * * as a
result of willful use or employment by another person
of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by ORS
646.608[.]"
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that it could
consider awarding punitive damages if it found that defendant
"willfully engaged in * * * unlawful trade practices."  The jury
so found.  
		The court also instructed the jury that, to award
punitive damages, plaintiff had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant had engaged in conduct "amounting to a
particularly aggravated, deliberate disregard of the rights of
others."  See former ORS 41.315 (1993), repealed by Or Laws 1995,
ch 688, § 6 (plaintiff must prove entitlement to punitive damages
by clear and convincing evidence); UCJI 75.02 (so defining
"wanton" misconduct).  Finally, the trial court instructed the
jury that, in setting an award for punitive damages, it should
consider:  (1) the character of defendant's conduct; (2)
defendant's motive; and (3) the "sum of money that would be
required to discourage the defendant and others from engaging in
such conduct in the future."  
		We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the record in this proceeding reveals that defendant
committed "an extraordinarily egregious violation" of the UTPA. 
Parrott, 156 Or App at 272.  At trial, plaintiff presented
evidence that permitted the jury to conclude, by clear and
convincing evidence, that defendant acted with a deliberate
disregard of the rights of others "of a magnitude evincing a high
degree of social irresponsibility."  Schmidt v. Pine Tree Land
Dev., 291 Or 462, 466, 631 P2d 1373 (1981).  As noted by the
Court of Appeals,
"[t]here was evidence from which the jury could have
found that defendant knew of the extensive defects of
the Suburban and of its branded title and odometer
discrepancy, and that it concealed those facts from
plaintiff.  There was evidence from which the jury
could have concluded that defendant's treatment of
plaintiff was not an isolated incident in that it had
established business procedures that it could employ to
cover any failure to disclose. There was evidence that
defendant also used abusive tactics to cover its
deceptions.  Furthermore, from the evasive,
inconsistent, and implausible explanations given by
defendant's representatives as to defendant's business
practices, the jury could infer that defendant had no
intention of altering its practices in the future."
Parrott, 156 Or App at 272-73. 
		Next, we identify the state interests that punitive
damages are designed to advance in this proceeding.  Gore, 517 US
at 568.  Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Gore, we
focus our attention on the scope of Oregon's legitimate interests
in punishing defendant and deterring it from future misconduct. 
Id.  The state interest served by a punitive damages award under
the UTPA is protection of the consumer.  It is unquestionable
that Oregon has a significant interest in protecting its citizens
from deceptive trade practices.  See, e.g., id. ("No one doubts
that a State may protect its citizens by prohibiting deceptive
trade practices[.]").  It also is clear that Oregon's interests
were implicated by defendant's tortious conduct.  Plaintiff
proved that defendant willfully engaged in deceptive business
practices in Oregon.  Cf. id. at 572-73 (state "does not have the
power * * * to punish [a defendant] for conduct * * * that had no
impact on [the state] or its residents").   
		We consider next the degree of reprehensibility of
defendant's conduct.  Id. at 575.  As stated by the Supreme Court
in Gore, the degree of reprehensibility of defendant's conduct is
"[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award[.]"  Id.  In Gore, the Court concluded
that the defendant's conduct was not "particularly
reprehensible," because the harm was "purely economic" and
because there was no evidence that the defendant had "repeatedly
engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it
was unlawful[.]"  Id. at 576.
		Unlike in Gore, the tortious conduct in this proceeding
did not involve undisclosed cosmetic damage to a new vehicle. 
Rather, defendant made material misrepresentations about the
Suburban's condition that affected its value.  As a result of the
Suburban's defects, plaintiff was unable to obtain comprehensive
insurance coverage.  Additionally, when the Suburban's then-current registration expired, he would have been unable to drive
it within the Portland metropolitan area because it could not
have been brought into DEQ compliance.  Moreover, defendant's
failure to disclose that the Suburban previously had been damaged
also implicated its overall safety and evinced an indifference
not only to plaintiff's health and safety, but also to the health
and safety of the general public that would share the road with a
potentially unsafe vehicle.  
		As stated by the Supreme Court in Gore, the "infliction
of economic injury, especially when done intentionally through
affirmative acts of misconduct * * * can warrant a substantial
penalty."  Id.  Plaintiff did suffer economic injury, but
defendant inflicted that injury intentionally through affirmative
misrepresentation of material facts. 
		Additionally, plaintiff established that defendant's
misconduct was part of defendant's day-to-day business dealings
and was not limited to the sale of the Suburban to plaintiff. 
Defendant acknowledged that it never had completed the DMV forms
that would have alerted customers to odometer discrepancies. 
Defendant failed to train its title clerks to look for odometer
discrepancies.  Defendant's employees asked customers to sign
blank or incomplete forms so that defendant could disclaim
awareness of odometer discrepancies.  In addition, defendant's
representations about its sales forms were inconsistent and
misleading.  
		As the trial court noted, "this jury found that
[defendant] intentionally took advantage of [plaintiff] in a very
blatant sort of way."  We agree.  Defendant's business practices
were designed to facilitate nondisclosure to customers. 
Defendant deliberately misrepresented or failed to disclose to
plaintiff material information that implicated the value and
safety of the Suburban.  Defendant also demonstrated a willful
disregard of the legislative protections for Oregon consumers and
an unwillingness to modify its practices.  Those factors
distinguish this case from the injury suffered by the plaintiff
in Gore.  We conclude that defendant's conduct was highly
reprehensible.
		The third factor that we consider is the disparity
between the punitive damages award and the actual or potential
harm inflicted on plaintiff.  Id. at 580.  That inquiry focuses
not only on whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the punitive damages award and the harm that actually occurred,
but also between the punitive damages award and "the harm likely
to result[.]"  Id. at 581.  The Supreme Court expressly has
rejected, however, "the notion that the constitutional line is
marked by a simple mathematical formula[.]"  Id. at 582.  The
Court also has noted that
"low awards of compensatory damages may properly
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards,
if * * * a particularly egregious act has resulted in
only a small amount of economic damages[,]"
and that, "[i]n most cases, the ratio will be within a
constitutionally acceptable range[.]"  Id. at 582-83.
		In Gore, the Court found that the "breathtaking" 500 to
1 ratio "must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.'"  Id.
at 583 (quoting TXO, 509 US at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
Just three years earlier, however, in TXO, the Court had approved
a punitive damages award that was 526 times greater than the
compensatory damages award.  509 US at 459-62.  And, two years
before the TXO decision, the Court had referred to the 4 to 1
ratio in Haslip as being "close to the line."  Haslip, 499 US at
23.  The Court's inconsistent treatment of this particular factor
demonstrates that no "simple mathematical formula" controls our
review of the ratio of punitive damages to actual and potential
harm.  Gore, 517 US at 582.
		In this proceeding, the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages is 87 to 1.  Because defendant's tortious
conduct was a routine part of its business practice that it was
unwilling to change, we also consider the potential injury that
its misconduct may have caused to past, present, and future
customers.  Additionally, although the actual economic harm that
plaintiff suffered in this proceeding was relatively small, that
harm was the result of defendant's "particularly egregious" acts. 
Id.  Taking all those considerations together, the ratio between
the punitive damages award and the actual damages award in this
proceeding does not "raise [our] suspicious judicial eyebrow." 
Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted).
		Finally, we compare the jury's punitive damages award
and "the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
comparable misconduct[.]"  Id.  According to Gore, penalties for
comparable misconduct are relevant to whether defendant was on
notice of "the severity of the penalty" that might be imposed. 
Id. at 574.  
		The UTPA explicitly authorizes an award of punitive
damages in an action for violations of that act.  ORS 646.638(1). 
The UTPA also provides for administrative sanctions ranging from
the extraction of an assurance of voluntary compliance, ORS
646.632(2), to injunctive relief, ORS 646.632, and the loss of a
business license, ORS 646.646.  In addition, the UTPA authorizes
the imposition of other civil remedies, including civil penalties
of up to $25,000 per violation, ORS 646.642, restitution, ORS
646.636, and attorney fees, ORS 646.632(8).  Although the UTPA
also authorizes lesser sanctions, we agree with plaintiff that a
regulatory scheme of sanctions that includes interruption or
closure of business operations provides sufficient notice to a
business defendant that its violation of the law could have
serious economic consequences.  
Defendant argues that, based on reported Oregon
judgments in other UTPA proceedings, "Oregon gave [defendant] no
notice that it might impose a penalty this severe."  Although
punitive damages awards previously imposed for UTPA violations in
Oregon generally are instructive, we disagree that defendant had
"no notice" that a jury might impose a punitive damages award in
this range.  Before trial, in response to plaintiffs' second
amended complaint seeking $1 million in punitive damages on
various claims, defendant stipulated that it "would be able to
meet any punitive damage award." (17)  (Emphasis added.)  In light
of that stipulation, and considering the range of sanctions
provided by the UTPA itself, we conclude that defendant was on
notice of the magnitude of the sanction that the jury might
impose.
		In summary, after considering (1) the statutory and
common-law factors that allow an award of punitive damages for a
UTPA violation; (2) the state's interest in protecting Oregon
consumers by punishing violators of the UTPA and deterring them
and others from similar misconduct; (3) the reprehensible nature
of defendant's conduct; (4) the ratio between punitive damages
awarded and the actual and potential harm caused by defendant's
tortious conduct; and (5) the range of sanctions provided under
the UTPA for comparable misconduct and defendant's stipulation
that it could pay "any punitive damages award," we conclude that
$1 million is within the range that a rational juror would be
entitled to award in light of the record as a whole.  The jury's
punitive damages award in this case was not grossly excessive in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court with instructions to reinstate the jury's $1
million punitive damages award.



1. 	After plaintiffs Parrott and Forshey presented their
case-in-chief, the trial court directed a verdict in defendant's
favor on all claims that plaintiff Forshey had asserted.  Forshey
is not a party to the appeal or review.

2. 	ORS 646.608(1) provides, in part:
	"A person engages in an unlawful practice when in
the course of the person's business, vocation or
occupation the person does any of the following:
	"* * * * *
	"(e)  Represents that real estate, goods or
services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits, quantities or qualities
that they do not have * * *.
	"* * * * *
	"(g)  Represents that real estate, goods or
services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that real estate or goods are of a particular
style or model, if they are of another.
	"* * * * *
	"(t)  Concurrent with tender or delivery of any
real estate, goods or services fails to disclose any
known material defect or material nonconformity."

3. 	The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court's
award of attorney fees and held that the trial court had abused
its discretion when it awarded plaintiff's counsel $15,000,
rather than the $55,468.75 that counsel had requested.  Parrott,
156 Or App at 282.  In its brief on the merits, defendant asks
this court to reverse the Court of Appeals on that issue and to
"restore the trial court's award of attorney fees."  Defendant,
however, did not raise that issue in its petition for review. 
Because of that omission, we decline to consider the issue and
express no opinion on its merits.  See ORAP 9.17(2)(b)(i) (brief
on merits may not raise additional questions or change substance
of questions already presented in petition for review); ORAP
9.20(2) (Supreme Court may review issue raised in Court of
Appeals but not presented on review).  See, e.g., Stupek v. Wyle
Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 437, 963 P2d 678 (1998)
("Although, under ORAP 9.20(2), this court may review an issue
that properly was raised on appeal and preserved, but not
presented on review, we ordinarily will not do so unless the
issue requires resolution.").

4. 	Defendant raised only one additional issue in its
petition for review:  Whether, in light of ORS 72.3160(3)(a)
(allowing "as is" sales), plaintiff failed to state a claim under
the UTPA.

5. 	The Oberg v. Honda Motor Co. case resulted in two
opinions from this court and one from the United States Supreme
Court.  For purposes of our discussion, only two of those
decisions are relevant:  the Supreme Court's opinion in Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 US 415, 114 S Ct 2331, 129 L Ed 2d 336
(1994), which we refer to as Oberg (federal); and the final
opinion issued by this court, Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 320 Or
544, 888 P2d 8, cert den 517 US 1219 (1996), which we refer to as
Oberg (state). 

6. 	One of plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that the
emission control equipment missing from the Suburban included an
air cleaner, an exhaust gas recirculation system, and an air
pump.	

7. 	The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[.]"

8. 	 In its petition for review, defendant presented the
court with three issues, two of which concerned review of 
punitive damages awards for excessiveness under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and one of which concerned reconciliation of ORS
72.3160(3)(a) and ORS 646.608(1)(t).  In its brief on the merits,
however, defendant presented several additional issues, one of
which concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury's findings that defendant violated the UTPA.  We did not
allow review of defendant's petition on that issue.  Therefore,
we decline to consider it and express no opinion on its merits. 
ORAP 9.17(2)(b)(i); ORAP 9.20(2).  See ___ Or ___ (slip op at 3 n
3).

9. 	The Court has indicated that the Due Process Clause
imposes both procedural and substantive limits on punitive
damages awards.  Procedural due process requires "adequate
guidance from the court" in the form of procedural safeguards to
ensure that juries do not impose punitive damages in an arbitrary
manner.  See Oberg (federal), 512 US at 432 (post-verdict
judicial review of punitive damages awards required as procedural
safeguard under Due Process Clause); Haslip, 499 US at 23
(endorsing Alabama's procedural protections, including adequate
jury instructions and post-trial procedures for scrutinizing
punitive damages awards).  
		Substantive due process, by contrast, requires a jury's
punitive damages award to be "reasonable in [its] amount and
rational in light of [its] purpose to punish what has occurred
and to deter its repetition."  Haslip, 499 US at 21; see also
Gore, 517 US at 562 (Due Process Clause prohibits imposition of
"grossly excessive" punishment on tortfeasors); TXO, 509 US at
453-54 (Due Process Clause "imposes substantive limits beyond
which penalties may not go" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

10. 	After the Oberg (state) decision, the 1995 Oregon
Legislature codified the Oberg (state) standard of post-verdict
review in ORS 18.537.  Or Laws 1995, ch 688, § 2.  That statute
provides, in part:
	"(2) If an award of punitive damages is made by a
jury, the court shall review the award to determine
whether the award is within the range of damages that a
rational juror would be entitled to award based on the
record as a whole, viewing the statutory and common-law
factors that allow an award of punitive damages for the
specific type of claim at issue in the proceeding."
ORS 18.537 became effective after the trial in this proceeding. 
Or Laws 1995, ch 688, § 6. 

11. 	Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution provides, in part:
	"In actions at law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed $750, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of this state,
unless the court can affirmatively say there is no
evidence to support the verdict. * * *"
12. 	That right is found in Article I, section 17, of the
Oregon Constitution, which provides:  "In all civil cases the
right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate."

13. 	The second passage from Oberg (federal) that this court
relied on in Oberg (state), 320 Or at 550, for guidance stated:
"What we are concerned with is the possibility that a
culpable defendant may be unjustly punished; evidence
of culpability warranting some punishment is not a
substitute for evidence providing at least a rational
basis for the particular deprivation of property
imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing."
Oberg (federal), 512 US at 429 (emphasis added).

14. 	In this proceeding, defendant filed motions for
directed verdict (ORCP 60) and for JNOV (ORCP 63) on the ground
that there was "no evidence to support [plaintiff's] punitive
damages claim."  See ORCP 63 A (condition precedent to motion for
JNOV is motion for directed verdict); Vancil v. Poulson, 236 Or
314, 320, 388 P2d 444 (1964) (grounds asserted in motion for JNOV
must have been raised in preceding motion for directed verdict). 
However, a party cannot challenge a verdict for punitive damages
as excessive until after the jury renders its verdict. 
Therefore, that challenge properly is made by a motion for new
trial (ORCP 64 B(5)).  A motion for new trial on the ground that
a jury's punitive damages award is excessive may be joined with a
motion for JNOV, or may be made on its own.  See ORCP 63 C
(motion in alternative for new trial may be joined with motion
for JNOV).

15. 	The United States Supreme Court has reached the same
conclusion under the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 US 208, 211,
118 S Ct 1210, 140 L Ed 2d 336 (1998) (imposition of reduced
punitive damages award without allowing nonmoving party option of
new trial "cannot be squared with the Seventh Amendment"). 
Although the Seventh Amendment does not apply through the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states, Minn. &amp; St. Louis R. R. v.
Bombolis, 241 US 211, 36 S Ct 595, 60 L Ed 961 (1916), with the
exception of the final phrase, that amendment almost is identical
to Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. 
The Seventh Amendment provides:
	"In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."

16. 	See generally Adcock v. Oregon Railroad Co., 45 Or 173,
178-81, 77 P 78 (1904) (defendant who moves for new trial on
ground that punitive damages award is excessive is not deprived
of right to jury trial when trial court overrules motion for new
trial on condition that plaintiff agree to reduced damages
award). 

17. 	The court did not inform the jury about defendant's
stipulation.