Title: Leo Louis Kaczmar, III v. State of Florida - on Rehearing
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-2247
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2017 
 
CASE NO.: SC13-2247 
Lower Tribunal No(s).: 
102009CF000233000AMX 
 
 
LEO LOUIS KACZMAR, III 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA 
 
Appellant(s) 
 
Appellee(s) 
 
 
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is hereby denied without prejudice to raise, 
in a separate habeas corpus proceeding alleging ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, the trial court’s error in disclosing appellant’s prior death sentence for the 
crime at issue to the venire, which appellate counsel raised for the first time on 
rehearing. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
PARIENTE, J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent from the denial of rehearing.  First, I would grant rehearing for the 
reasons stated in my original concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion as to 
why Kaczmar should be granted a new penalty phase in light of Hurst v. Florida 
(Hurst v. Florida), 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 
CASE NO.: SC13-2247 
Page Two 
 
 
 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).  See Kaczmar v. State, 42 Fla. L. 
Weekly S127, 2017 WL 410214, at *10-11 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017) (Pariente, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Second, I would grant rehearing, rather 
than requiring Kaczmar to file a separate habeas petition, because the trial court’s 
improper comments to the jury about Kaczmar’s prior death sentence, which 
appear on the face of the record, warrant reversal based on our precedent in 
Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859, 863 (Fla. 1996).   
 
In Hitchcock, this Court cautioned trial courts against “mentioning the 
defendant’s prior [death] sentence” in cases remanded for a new penalty phase.  Id.  
The Hitchcock Court explained that “[n]o other instruction” but the following 
should be given when a death sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for a 
new penalty phase: 
An appellate court has reviewed and affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction for the murder of [the victim].  However, the appellate 
court sent the case back to this court with instructions that the 
defendant is to have a new trial at this time to decide what sentence 
should be imposed.   
 
Id.   
 
Nevertheless, the trial court in this case addressed the venire, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
CASE NO.: SC13-2247 
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THE COURT:  Be seated, please.  All right.  Good morning, 
ladies and gentlemen.  My name is William Wilkes, and I’m the Judge 
that will be handling this case.  
 
This case has a little history to it so let me explain your duty 
today.  It’s different than most trials we ever have.  
 
The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on 
8/12/2010, sentenced on 11/5/10 to life—to death in this case.  
Anyway, the Supreme Court always reviews any type of death case so 
the case went to the state Supreme Court, Florida State Supreme 
Court.  They affirmed his conviction, that is they confirmed his 
conviction for the first degree murder.  However, the Supreme Court 
sent the case back here with instructions that the defendant is to have 
a new trial to decide what sentence should be imposed. 
 
 
I realize that my colleagues have denied rehearing without prejudice to filing 
a separate habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
because this issue, constituting clear reversible error, was not raised on direct 
appeal and only first raised in the motion for rehearing.  Not raising this issue on 
appeal, in my view, constitutes ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that is 
apparent on the face of the record.  See, e.g., Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494, 502 
(Fla. 2008); Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 642 (Fla. 2000).  Rather than 
require a separate habeas petition, I would request a response from the State and 
then determine if there is any reason that relief in the form of a new sentencing 
proceeding is not warranted. 
 
CASE NO.: SC13-2247 
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Additionally, these clear errors only strengthen the conclusion in my original 
concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion in regard to the Hurst error in this 
case.  See Kaczmar, 2017 WL 410214, at *10-11 (Pariente, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  The trial court’s error of informing the jury about 
Kaczmar’s prior death sentence further compounds the prejudice to Kaczmar, 
rendering the jury’s unanimous recommendation for death unreliable.  For these 
reasons, I dissent from the denial of the motion for rehearing.  
QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
I would grant rehearing based on the fact that the jury was told that the 
defendant had previously been sentenced to death.  It would be more efficient to 
grant rehearing to resolve the issue, than to require the filing of a new habeas 
petition.   
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
A True Copy 
Test: 
 
 
so 
CASE NO.: SC13-2247 
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Served: 
 
CHARMAINE M. MILLSAPS 
RICHARD M BRACEY III 
HON. TARA S. GREEN, CLERK 
STEPHEN M. NELSON 
HON. MARK H. MAHON, CHIEF JUDGE 
HON. WILLIAM ARTHUR WILKES, JUDGE