Title: State Ex Rel. Poteat v. Bowman
Citation: 491 S.W.2d 77
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 1973

491 S.W.2d 77 (1973) STATE of Tennessee ex rel. G.E. POTEAT, Appellant, v. Joe BOWMAN, Building Commissioner and Regional Planning Commission of Williamson County, Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. February 20, 1973. Tyler Berry, III, Berry &amp; Berry, Franklin, E.C. Yokley, Nashville, for appellant. Henry Denmark Bell, Franklin, for appellees. JOHN W. WILSON, Special Justice. The appellant hereinafter will be referred to as plaintiff and the appellees referred to as defendant or defendants. The cause was heard in the Chancery Court of Williamson County, Chancellor Brooks McLemore sitting by designation of the Supreme Court upon a complaint as amended for a writ of mandamus against the Building Commissioner, namely, Joe Bowman, seeking to have the Building Commissioner issue a building permit on an approved site plan, under the Planned Shopping Center ordinance of Williamson County, Tennessee, and a writ of supersedeas to the Regional Planning Commission of Williamson County, Tennessee. The complaint also sought damages from the defendant Joe Bowman for arbitrarily withholding the building permit. The complaint was filed on the 27th day of March, 1972, and on the same day a writ of supersedeas was issued to the Regional Planning Commission, as prayed in the complaint, and an alternative writ of mandamus *78 issued upon the fiat of Honorable John H. Henderson, requiring the defendant Joe Bowman to issue building permit for the shopping center as applied for under the application for building permit, or show cause why he had not done so. The complaint, in substance, averred that on March 14, 1972, plaintiff appearing before the Regional Planning Commission for Williamson County, Tennessee, had approved a site plan under the Planned Shopping Center district, which zoning is that carried by property of plaintiff, which property is described by metes and bounds. The approval was given, subject to two conditions: (1) that evidence in writing be given that the City of Franklin had agreed to furnish sewer services to the property, the sewer line to be constructed by the owner of the property, and (2) that construction of the project be undertaken not later than April 10, 1972, at midnight, that being the end of the second year extension period. The foregoing recital is from excerpts of the minutes of the Regional Planning Commission, March 14, 1972, offered as exhibit 1 to the bill. That on March 22, 1972, plaintiff made application for a building permit, attaching thereto certified copy of minutes of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of Franklin, stating that condition (1) above had been met; that plaintiff stood ready and able to comply with condition (2), except that on Monday, March 27, 1972, plaintiff was informed that his application for a permit was denied, attached thereto being letter of H.D. Bell, County Attorney, the letter being attached to the complaint as an exhibit, and which the plaintiff assumed was the reason for the denial of the permit. Further, plaintiff averred that his property was zoned "Planned Shopping Center" on April 10, 1967, by the Quarterly County Court (collective Exhibit 5), and that he had complied with the Planned Shopping Center district ordinance of Williamson County, and that the defendant Joe Bowman arbitrarily withheld the building permit, supposedly on purely legal and judicial questions, which was neither his authority or office to do. That Section 6 of the Zoning Ordinance of Williamson County, Tennessee, states that in such cases appeal to the Zoning Commission shall be made, that such an appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals would be useless and unavailing as the reasons for denial of the permit are purely legal, and that the Board should be by-passed and the Court should take jurisdiction. Further, it is averred by plaintiff that he does not admit that April 10, 1972 is the deadline by which commencement of the work must begin, but he is informed that it is the deadline by the defendant Regional Planning Commission, and that, while having the legal and necessary approval of Regional Planning Commission, he is being arbitrarily denied a permit, plaintiff averring, in fact, that his extension of two years relates from January 7, 1971 and ends January 7, 1973 (plaintiff referring to exhibit 6, minutes of Planning Commission). On April 15, 1972, a motion to dismiss the complaint for mandamus and supersedeas was filed in the following language: On April 15, 1972, the plaintiff was allowed to amend so as to allege he is entitled to a building permit because he is in compliance with Ordinance No. ____ of the Williamson County Court, adopted on the 10th day of October, 1966; that he is in compliance with County zoning regulations as contained in T.C.A. § 13-401 et seq., and that the plans submitted to the Building Commissioner fully conformed to all zoning regulations then in effect as contained in T.C.A. § 13-410. On June 6, 1972 the trial court heard argument on the motion to dismiss and sustained the motion to dismiss insofar as it sought to collect damages against the defendant Joe Bowman, Building Commissioner. Judgment on the motion to dismiss was otherwise reserved. On June 27, 1972, the trial judge filed a memorandum in the cause and on July 15, 1972 entered an order dismissing the petition. We here insert the material parts of the findings of the trial court: It must be remembered that the cause is before this Court upon appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. All we have before the Court is the complaint with the exhibits and lengthy briefs from the parties. We cannot become a fact-finding body and determine such things as to whether the plaintiff is trying to use, as is asserted by the defendant in the brief, the writ of mandamus to avoid his administrative remedies, nor can we determine as a fact, whether the plaintiff's two-year extension relates from January 7, 1971, so as to extend his time to 1973, instead of 1972, as is asserted in the complaint by the plaintiff. The only question presented is whether the plaintiff is permitted to use the writ of mandamus before exhausting his administrative remedies. In the cases of Tennessee Enamel Mfg. Co. v. Hake (1946), 183 Tenn. 615, 194 S.W.2d 468, and State ex rel. Jones v. City of Nashville (1955), 198 Tenn. 280, 279 S.W.2d 267, this Court ruled that the administrative *81 remedies had to be exhausted before resorting to the writ of mandamus. In State ex rel. Wright v. City of Oak Hill (1959), 204 Tenn. 353, 321 S.W.2d 557, and State ex rel. Morris v. City of Nashville (1961), 207 Tenn. 672, 343 S.W.2d 847, in both of which cases the writ of mandamus was asked for, the administrative remedies had, as a fact, been exhausted. We are of the opinion that the trial court was correct and the judgment is affirmed. Costs will be assessed against the plaintiff. DYER, C.J., and CHATTIN, HUMPHREYS and McCANLESS, JJ., concur.