Title: State v. Torzeski
Citation: 54 N.W.2d 879
Docket Number: 244
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 1952

54 N.W.2d 879 (1952) STATE v. TORZESKI Cr. No. 244. Supreme Court of North Dakota September 25, 1952. Milton K. Higgins, Bismarck, for appellant. E. T. Christianson, Atty. Gen., and George S. Register, State's Atty., Bismarck, for respondent. CHRISTIANSON, Judge. The defendant was convicted in the District Court of Burleigh County of the crime of embezzlement and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary. Defendant has appealed from the judgment of conviction. On such appeal errors are assigned upon the rulings on the admission of evidence and upon the court's instructions to the jury. No specifications of the insufficiency of the evidence were served or filed. *880 In the information it was charged that the defendant committed the crime of embezzlement in Burleigh County, North Dakota. That at the time and place stated the defendant, being then and there an agent of Harry O. Berg and having in his control property, to wit: $150 good and lawful money of the United States of America for the use of said Harry O. Berg, fraudulently appropriated the said property to his own personal use and purpose, and not in the due and lawful execution of his trust. That the circumstances of the embezzlement were that said $150 were the proceeds of a certain check drawn and issued by Elmer Shira, payable to the order of Nick Torzeski, the defendant, for the sum of $150 drawn on the State Bank of Burleigh County and delivered by said Elmer Shira to said defendant for the use of said Harry O. Berg and which said check was duly cashed by said defendant and said proceeds fraudulently appropriated to the fraudulent use and purpose of said defendant and not in the due and lawful execution of his trust as aforesaid; and that at the time involved the said defendant was an agent of said Harry O. Berg. The statutes of this state provide: The defendant requested that the court give the following instruction: The court endorsed upon the request the word "Given" and affixed his signature below. The instructions given to the jurors by the court must be filed with the clerk and need not be embodied in the statement of the case, but the same and each of them, with the endorsements, if any, showing the action of the court thereon, form a part of the record of the action. Section 29-2306, NDRC 1943. The instructions in this case were in writing and such instructions, together with the instructions requested by counsel showing the action of the court thereon, were transmitted to this court as a part of the record on appeal. The defendant predicates error upon the following instruction: Mr. Shira testified that on or about September 30, 1948, the defendant prepared an order for the insulation of his house and that he signed the order and gave the defendant a check for $48 as an advance or down payment. The order was introduced in evidence and it recited such advance payment and further recited a balance of $150 to be paid upon completion of the job. It also contained a provision written on the order: "Will notify when ready." Shira testified that about a week before January 10, 1949, the defendant came to his farm and brought with him a $500 note signed by himself payable to Shira and that he wanted to borrow that sum from Shira. Shira testified he told defendant he was not a banker and didn't have so much money; that a short time later defendant came out to his place and that at that time Shira loaned him $50; that on January 10, 1949, defendant came to see him and requested payment of the $150 balance due on the order for insulation and that Shira gave him his check for that amount, which check was payable to the order of the defendant and which check was later cashed. Shira denied that there was any arrangement whereby the $150 paid was to be a loan to the defendant but that, on the contrary, it was to be delivered to Berg in payment of the balance to be paid on completion of the job under the order for insulation. As to what took place at the time Shira executed and delivered the $150 check to the defendant, the defendant testified: The instruction set forth above which the defendant requested be "given" to the jury and which the court approved was predicated upon said NDRC 1943, Sec. 12-3614, but the instruction was not given in the form requested. It was materially different. *883 The requested instruction was that "if the defendant believed he was entitled to use the money, no matter how groundless you may find that belief was, yet he cannot be convicted of embezzlement if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he believed he was entitled to use it." This part of the instruction as given by the court read as follows: "if the defendant believed he was entitled to use the money, no matter how groundless you may find that belief was, yet he cannot be convicted of embezzlement if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not you believe he was entitled to use it." (Italics supplied.) The court followed this by the following explanatory statement: "That is in the event you find and determine that the Defendant intended in good faith to borrow the money from Elmer Shira, and was at the time not engaged as the agent or employer of his principal, or in his principal's business, you are to find the Defendant not guilty." It made the defense of the defendant that he received and used the money in good faith in the belief that it was given to him by Shira as a loan to the defendant personally applicable only in the event the jury found that at the time he received the money and used it he was not engaged as the agent or employee of his principal or in his principal's business. The effect of the part of the instruction last quoted was to deprive the defendant of the defense authorized by NDRC 1943, 12-3614. Under our laws, every person accused of crime is entitled to a fair trial according to the principles embodied in the Constitution and the laws of this state. The test is not whether certain legal forms have been literally complied with but whether anything has been done or left undone which prejudices the substantial rights of the accused. If a substantial right has been prejudiced a new trial should be had. State v. Schmidt, 72 N.D. 719, 734, 10 N.W.2d 868. In this case it cannot be said that the substantial rights of the defendant were not prejudiced by the instruction that was given. Inasmuch as the error in the instructions to the jury requires a reversal other errors assigned need not be considered as the questions raised by such assignments are not likely to arise on another trial. The judgment of the conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. MORRIS, C. J., and GRIMSON, SATHRE, and BURKE, JJ., concur.