Title: Steven C. Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.
Citation: 2007 WI 97
Docket Number: 2004AP002655
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2007

2007 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2655 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Steven C. Tietsworth, David Bratz, John W. 
Myers, Gary Streitenberger, Gary Wegner and on 
behalf of themselves and all others similarly 
situated, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Harley-Davidson, Inc. and Harley-Davidson Motor 
Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 5 
Reported at: 288 Wis. 2d 680, 709 N.W.2d 901 
(Ct. App. 2005—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and CROOKS, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by W. Stuart Parsons, Patrick W. Schmidt, Jeffrey O. 
Davis, Kelly H. Twigger, David A. Strifling, and Quarles & Brady 
LLP, Milwaukee; Robert L. Binder and Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by W. Stuart Parsons. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Ted W. 
Warshafsky, Frank T. Crivello, II, and Warshafsky, Rotter, 
Tarnoff, Reinhardt & Bloch, S.C., Milwaukee; Jonathan D. Selbin, 
Lisa J. Leebove, and Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, 
San Francisco, CA; David J. Bershad, Michael M. Buchman, Michael 
R. Reese, and Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, New York, 
NY; Shpetim Ademi, Guri Ademi, Robert K. O’Reilly, and Ademi & 
 
 
2 
O’Reilly, LLP, Cudahy, WI, and oral argument by Jonathan D. 
Selbin. 
 
 
2007 WI 97
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2655   
(L.C. No. 
2001CV5928) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steven C. Tietsworth, David Bratz, John W. 
Myers, Gary Streitenberger, Gary Wegner 
and on behalf of themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Harley-Davidson, Inc. and Harley-Davidson Motor 
Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The issue presented in this 
review is whether plaintiffs may reopen their case and amend 
their complaint after the circuit court has dismissed the 
complaint in its entirety on the merits and the dismissal has 
been affirmed on appeal.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's determination that it could not reopen the case 
to amend the complaint on these facts without a clear directive 
from the court deciding the appeal.  Tietsworth v. Harley-
No.  2004AP2655 
2 
 
Davidson, Inc. (Tietsworth III), 2006 WI App 5, 288 Wis. 2d 680, 
709 N.W.2d 901.  After carefully reviewing the facts, the 
statutory and case law, and the policy embodied in the 
procedural code, we agree with the circuit court.  Consequently, 
we reverse the court of appeals. 
¶2 
We hold that in the absence of a remand order in the 
mandate line or some other clear directive from the appellate 
court ultimately deciding the appeal, a circuit court has no 
authority to reopen the case for an amended complaint after an 
appellate court has affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in 
its entirety on the merits.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶3 
This case has a lengthy history, including a previous 
decision by this court.  Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc. 
(Tietsworth II), 2004 WI 32, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233.  
In Tietsworth II, this court addressed the merits of plaintiffs' 
tort-based complaint against the defendants.  Now we are called 
upon to address the procedural ramifications of Tietsworth II.  
This requires us to set out the procedural history of the case. 
 
¶4 
On June 28, 2001, Steven C. Tietsworth, a resident of 
California, filed a complaint in the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court on behalf of himself and a class consisting of all persons 
and entities in the United States who have owned, own, leased, 
lease, or acquired 1999 and early 2000 model Harley-Davidson 
motorcycles equipped with Twin Cam 88 or Twin Cam 88B engines.  
Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc. (Tietsworth 2001), No. 
No.  2004AP2655 
3 
 
2001CV5928 (Mil. Cty. Cir. Ct. June 28, 2001).1  The complaint 
alleged that defendants, Harley-Davidson, Inc. and Harley-
Davidson Motor Company (Harley), had designed, manufactured, 
marketed, and sold motorcycles with defective engines because of 
cam bearings that were faulty, inferior, and prone to sudden 
failure.  The complaint asserted four tort-based causes of 
action: (1) negligence; (2) strict products liability; (3) 
fraudulent concealment; and (4) fraudulent misrepresentation and 
deceptive trade practices in violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) 
and (11)(b). 
 
¶5 
On 
September 
27, 
2001, 
Tietsworth 
amended 
his 
complaint, adding four Wisconsin residents as named plaintiffs 
(collectively, Tietsworth). 
 
¶6 
The factual basis for the complaint is discussed in 
Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶¶5-6.  In essence, Harley-
Davidson, the only major American-based motorcycle manufacturer, 
redesigned its motorcycle engines in the late 1990s, developing 
the Twin Cam 88 and Twin Cam 88B engines for the 1999 and early 
2000 models.  A problem cropped up.  On January 22, 2001, Harley 
sent a letter to Tietsworth and approximately 140,000 other 
owners of the subject motorcycles, explaining that "the rear cam 
bearing in a small number of Harley-Davidson Twin Cam 88 engines 
                                                 
1 Tietsworth 
2001 
is 
a 
nonlegal 
denomination 
that 
distinguishes this case from a second Tietsworth case filed in 
2004 (Tietsworth 2004).  The appellate decisions heretofore 
published in this case are denominated Tietsworth I, Tietsworth 
II, and Tietsworth III.  Hence, this decision will become 
Tietsworth IV. 
No.  2004AP2655 
4 
 
has failed."  While the letter assured Harley owners that they 
would probably never have to worry about this problem, it 
reported 
that 
Harley 
was 
extending 
the 
standard 
one-
year/unlimited mileage warranty to a five-year/50,000 mile 
warranty on the rear cam bearing.  For owners who wanted to 
repair their engines immediately, Harley made available cam 
bearing repair kits for $495.00. 
¶7 
Tietsworth's complaint alleged that Harley motorcycles 
with the Twin Cam 88 or 88B engines are inherently defective and 
have an unreasonably dangerous propensity to suffer premature 
cam bearing failure, resulting in engine failure.  Although 
Tietsworth did not identify any specific engine failures, 
especially in motorcycles owned by the named plaintiffs, he 
asserted that the "inherent cam bearing defect" posed safety 
risks and diminished the value of all Harley motorcycles with 
Twin Cam 88 engines.  This led to his four tort-based claims. 
¶8 
On November 1, 2001, Harley filed motions to dismiss 
the complaint and to stay discovery.  On December 3, 2001, 
Tietsworth filed a cross-motion to compel discovery.  The 
circuit court, William J. Haese, Judge, granted Harley’s motion 
to stay discovery; and on February 27, 2002, it dismissed the 
entire complaint for failure to state a claim.2  The court 
dismissed the negligence and strict products liability claims 
because the plaintiffs failed to allege any actual damages and 
                                                 
2 The circuit court dismissed the complaint approximately 
eight months after the complaint was filed. 
No.  2004AP2655 
5 
 
because the economic loss doctrine barred the claims.  The court 
dismissed the two fraud claims because the plaintiffs did not 
allege any actual damages. 
¶9 
On April 12, 2002, Tietsworth filed a notice to appeal 
the dismissal of his common law fraud and statutory fraudulent 
misrepresentation/deceptive trade practices claims. 
¶10 On that same day——April 12——Tietsworth’s counsel filed 
a separate class action lawsuit against Harley on behalf of 
Wilton Jones and Richard Kempen (collectively, Jones).  The 
Jones suit made contract claims, namely, breach of warranty and 
unjust enrichment, based on the same facts involving the Twin 
Cam 88 and 88B Harley engines.  Jones v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
No. 2002CV3629 (Mil. Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 2002). 
¶11 On September 23, 2002, the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, Jeffrey A. Kremers, Judge, dismissed the entire Jones 
complaint for failure to state a claim because Jones did not 
allege a cognizable injury.  The court stated that to recover 
under a breach of warranty, Jones was required to allege an 
actual failure of the engine and Harley’s refusal or inability 
to fix the failure.  A mere allegation of a defect was not 
sufficient.  Likewise, to recover under unjust enrichment, Jones 
must have alleged actual engine failure.  Jones did not appeal. 
¶12 On March 4, 2003, the court of appeals decided 
Tietsworth’s appeal.  Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc. 
(Tietsworth I), 2003 WI App 75, 261 Wis. 2d 755, 661 N.W.2d 450.  
The court of appeals reinstated both the common law fraud and 
statutory fraudulent misrepresentation/deceptive trade practices 
No.  2004AP2655 
6 
 
claims on the theory that plaintiffs had suffered actual damages 
under the "benefit of the bargain" rule and under the standard 
enunciated in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 
Wis. 2d 302, 315, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  Tietsworth I, 261 
Wis. 2d 755, ¶¶11-16.   
¶13 Harley sought review of the decision to reinstate the 
two 
fraud 
claims; 
and on March 26, 2004, we reversed.  
Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d 146.  With regard to the fraudulent 
misrepresentation/deceptive trade practices claim, we held that 
the plaintiff did not allege facts to meet the elements of the 
statutory claim.  See id., ¶40.  Specifically, we held that non-
disclosure did not constitute an assertion, representation, or 
statement of fact under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  Id., ¶40.  In 
addition, 
we 
stated 
that 
to 
the 
extent 
any 
affirmative 
assertions were made, they were mere commercial puffery.  Id., 
¶41.   
¶14 We dispatched the common law fraud claim by holding 
that it was barred by the economic loss doctrine.  Id., ¶37.  
Our discussion of the economic loss doctrine included the 
following passages in paragraphs 36 and 37: 
As such, the plaintiffs have warranty remedies 
for the alleged defects in their motorcycles.  In 
addition, there are contract remedies at law and in 
equity 
to 
the 
extent 
that 
the 
plaintiffs 
were 
fraudulently induced to purchase their motorcycles.  A 
contract fraudulently induced is void or voidable; a 
party fraudulently induced to enter a contract may 
affirm the contract and seek damages for breach or 
pursue the equitable remedy of rescission and seek 
restitutionary 
damages . . . . 
The 
economic 
loss 
No.  2004AP2655 
7 
 
doctrine does not bar these contract remedies for 
fraudulently induced contracts. . . .  
In short, we see no reason to recognize an 
exception to the economic loss doctrine to allow this 
consumer contract dispute to be remedied as an 
intentional misrepresentation tort.  The economic loss 
doctrine bars the plaintiffs' common-law fraud claim.  
The plaintiffs may have contract remedies——breach of 
contract/warranty or rescission and restitution——but 
may not pursue a tort claim for misrepresentation 
premised 
on 
having 
purchased 
allegedly 
defective 
motorcycles. 
Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶¶36-37. 
¶15 After discussing both fraud claims, we reversed the 
court of appeals.  Our mandate stated: "The decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed."  Id. at 172.  There was no 
mention of "remand" in the mandate or in the decision.   
¶16 Following the release of Tietsworth II, Tietsworth 
filed a completely new lawsuit against Harley alleging (1) 
breach 
of 
warranty; 
(2) 
restitution; 
and 
(3) 
fraudulent 
inducement to contract.  Tietsworth v. Harley Davidson, Inc. 
(Tietsworth 2004), No. 2004CV3305 (Mil. Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 
2004).  This new case was assigned to Circuit Judge Francis 
Wasielewski.  Tietsworth soon decided, however, that he had made 
a procedural error by filing a new complaint, that instead he 
wanted to reopen Tietsworth 2001.  He asked Harley to stipulate 
to the voluntary dismissal of Tietsworth 2004.  Harley refused.  
Harley filed a motion to dismiss Tietsworth 2004 on May 26, 
2004, under the theory of claim preclusion.   
¶17 On June 17, 2004, while Tietsworth 2004 was pending, 
Tietsworth asked Circuit Judge Michael Guolee, who had inherited 
No.  2004AP2655 
8 
 
the original case from Judge Haese, for leave to reopen 
Tietsworth 2001 to amend the complaint.  Tietsworth asserted 
three new claims: (1) breach of warranty; (2) fraudulent 
inducement to contract; and (3) unjust enrichment.  Id. 
¶18 Before Judge Guolee ruled on Tietsworth’s motion, 
Judge Wasielewski granted Harley’s motion to dismiss Tietsworth 
2004.3  Judge Wasielewski reasoned that the new claims were 
barred by claim preclusion based on this court's decision in 
Tietsworth II.4  He also considered whether the new claims were 
barred under claim preclusion by the circuit court’s decision in 
Jones.  Although he noted that the parties in the two cases were 
not identical, Judge Wasielewski pondered whether the parties 
shared a unity of interest sufficient that claim preclusion 
barred the claims in Tietsworth 2004.  The court reached no 
conclusion on that question.  The parties agreed, however, that 
the dismissal of Tietsworth 2004 would not in itself preclude 
Judge Guolee from reopening the original Tietsworth 2001 case on 
grounds of claim preclusion. 
¶19 On August 23, 2004, Judge Guolee ruled that Tietsworth 
could not amend his original complaint to introduce contract and 
warranty claims.  The court held that it did not have authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) to reopen the case.  It found that 
the decision of this court was final and that "[a] trial court 
                                                 
3 The case was dismissed on July 26, 2004. 
4 It also dismissed Tietsworth's claim for breach of 
warranty for failure to state a claim. 
No.  2004AP2655 
9 
 
may not allow amendments of pleadings when the Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment [of dismissal]."  The court found that the 
language in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the supreme court opinion, 
when read in context, did not grant or allow the court to reopen 
the case. 
¶20 Again Tietsworth appealed.  On December 13, 2005, the 
court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court 
"erred in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reopen and amend the 
complaint."  Tietsworth III, 288 Wis. 2d 680, ¶9.  The court of 
appeals said that Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) allowed the circuit 
court to reopen the case.  Id., ¶¶13-18.  It reasoned that this 
court reversed the court of appeals but did not "affirm a 
judgment of dismissal or direct that a judgment of dismissal be 
entered."  Id., ¶14.  The court cited State ex. rel. J.H. 
Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 
WI 30, ¶25, 233 Wis. 2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679, for the proposition 
that the trial court often has some discretion "on remand" to 
resolve matters left open, provided that its action is not 
inconsistent with the order of the higher court.  The court of 
appeals said that the "mandate [of this court] left open the 
opportunity for the plaintiffs to pursue contract and warranty 
claims[;]" therefore, amending the complaint would not be 
inconsistent with the supreme court’s order.  Tietsworth III, 
288 Wis. 2d 680, ¶15.  The court distinguished the present case 
from Sutter v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 709, 233 N.W.2d 391 (1975), 
where the controversy went to trial and was fully tried upon the 
merits.  Tietsworth III, 288 Wis. 2d 680, ¶19.  The court of 
No.  2004AP2655 
10 
 
appeals further concluded that justice requires an amendment of 
the pleadings because the law was unclear as to the viability of 
Tietsworth’s claims when Tietsworth first filed the complaint.  
Id., ¶22.  The court also said that justice requires an 
amendment because this court acknowledged that Tietsworth was 
entitled to pursue contract and warranty claims in paragraphs 36 
and 37 of its decision.  Id., ¶18. 
¶21 Harley petitioned for review, which this court granted 
on February 27, 2006. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 Whether a circuit court has statutory authority to 
reopen a case is a question of statutory interpretation that we 
review de novo as a question of law.  Robin K. v. Lamanda M., 
2006 WI 68, ¶5, 291 Wis. 2d 333, 718 N.W.2d 38.  Whether a 
circuit court has non-statutory authority to reopen a case also 
presents a question of law.  Harvest Sav. Bank v. ROI Invs., 228 
Wis. 2d 733, 737-38, 598 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1999); see Breier 
v. E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 381, 387 N.W.2d 72, 74 (1986).  This 
court is the final arbiter of the meaning of its own mandates, 
which we review as questions of law. 
ANALYSIS 
¶23 This case requires the court to determine whether the 
circuit court had authority to reopen the case and grant leave 
to amend the complaint after the circuit court had dismissed the 
original complaint in its entirety on the merits and the 
dismissal was affirmed on appeal.  The court of appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
when 
it 
denied 
No.  2004AP2655 
11 
 
Tietsworth's 
motion 
to 
reopen 
the 
case 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) and when it denied his motion to file an 
amended complaint under Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1).  Tietsworth III, 
288 Wis. 2d 680, ¶25.  On these grounds, the court of appeals 
reversed and directed the circuit court to enter an order 
allowing Tietsworth to file an amended complaint.  Id. 
¶24 We reverse the court of appeals because the circuit 
court did not have authority under Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) to 
reopen this case for an amended complaint without a remand or 
order and therefore did not have authority to grant leave to 
amend Tietsworth's complaint under Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1).   
A. 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) 
¶25 We 
look 
first 
at 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) 
and 
acknowledge that Wisconsin embraces a policy in favor of liberal 
amendment of pleadings.5  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.09(1) allows a 
party to amend the pleading "once as a matter of course at any 
time within 6 months after the summons and complaint are filed 
or within the time set in a scheduling order under s. 802.10."  
Under other circumstances, "a party may amend the pleading only 
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1). 
 
However, 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) 
provides that "leave shall be freely given at any stage of the 
action when justice so requires."  Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) 
(emphasis added); see Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Practice Series: 
                                                 
5 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP2655 
12 
 
Civil Procedure § 209.2, at 355 (3d ed. 2003) (stating, "The 
court has wide discretion in determining whether to permit the 
amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings if 
justice so requires."). 
¶26 The liberal policy embodied in Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) 
does have limitations.  The presumption in favor of amendment, 
which is grounded in a statute whose chapter is entitled 
"Pleadings, Motions and Pretrial Practice," applies logically 
only before judgment has been entered in the case.  See 
Wis. Stat. ch. 802 (emphasis added); Piaskoski & Assocs. v. 
Ricciardi, 
2004 
WI 
App 
152, 
¶31, 
275 
Wis. 2d 650, 
686 
N.W.2d 675; Mach v. Allison, 2003 WI App 11, ¶27, 259 
Wis. 2d 686, 656 N.W.2d 766.  Once judgment has been entered, 
the presumption in favor of amendment disappears in order to 
protect the countervailing interests of the need for finality.   
¶27 The present case does not implicate, or alter the 
interpretation of, Wis. Stat. § 802.09 and the policy in favor 
of liberal amendment of pleadings.  Rather, the present case 
turns on whether the circuit court had authority to grant leave 
to amend Tietsworth's complaint after the circuit court had 
dismissed Tietsworth's claim in its entirety on the merits and 
Tietsworth appealed.  Once the circuit court issued an order 
dismissing Tietsworth's complaint in its entirety and Tietsworth 
appealed that final order, the circuit court no longer had 
jurisdiction over the case.   
¶28 If the court of appeals had affirmed the circuit 
court's dismissal of the complaint in Tietsworth I, the court of 
No.  2004AP2655 
13 
 
appeals could have directed the circuit court to grant leave to 
amend Tietsworth's complaint.  The court of appeals, however, 
reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint.  The 
decision to reverse and remand would have restored the circuit 
court's jurisdiction if the decision had not been appealed.  But 
when Harley petitioned this court and this court granted review, 
the court of appeals also lost jurisdiction over the case.   
¶29 When this court decided in Tietsworth II to reverse 
the court of appeals and thereby affirm the circuit court's 
dismissal of Tietsworth's complaint, this court's decision 
became the law of the case.  At that point, neither the circuit 
court nor the court of appeals had authority to grant leave to 
amend Tietsworth's complaint without a clear directive from this 
court. 
B. 
Wis. Stat. §§ 808.08 and 808.09 
¶30 Whether this court granted the circuit court authority 
to reopen the case is thus an issue.  To resolve this issue, we 
examine Wis. Stat. §§ 808.08 and 808.09, and the relevant 
language in Tietsworth II.   
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.09 provides an appellate court 
with several options on appeal: (1) the appellate court may 
reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order; (2) it may 
order a new trial; or (3) if the appeal is from a part of the 
judgment or order, it may reverse, affirm, or modify that part 
of the judgment or order.  Wis. Stat. § 808.09.  "In all cases 
an appellate court shall remit its judgment or decision to the 
No.  2004AP2655 
14 
 
court below and thereupon the court below shall proceed in 
accordance with the judgment or decision."  Id.   
¶32 The 
last 
sentence 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 808.09 
is 
an 
explicit directive to "the court below" to "proceed" to 
implement the "judgment or decision."  Thus, the circuit court 
has clear authority to carry out the mandate, whether the 
appellate court has affirmed or reversed the circuit court.  The 
circuit court also has authority, without explicit direction, to 
address collateral matters "left open" in the case, such as 
costs, preparation and entry of necessary documents, and 
correction of clerical or computational errors, so long as these 
actions do not undo the decision of the appellate court.  
However, there can be no amendments in the trial court that 
conflict with the expressed or implied mandate of the appellate 
court.  See 6A Callaghan's Wisconsin Pleading & Practice § 55.81 
(4th ed. 2005) (citing State ex rel. Kurath v. Ludwig, 146 Wis. 
385, 132 N.W. 130 (1911); Smith v. Armstrong, 25 Wis. 517, 1870 
WL 4034 (1870)). 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.08 
is 
different 
from 
Wis. Stat. § 808.09.  Entitled "Further proceedings in trial 
court," it governs situations in which the appellate court has 
provided the circuit court with explicit orders or directions 
for further proceedings.  These situations fall into three 
categories.  Wisconsin Stat. § 808.08 reads: 
Further Proceedings in trial court.   
When the record and remittitur are received in 
the trial court: 
No.  2004AP2655 
15 
 
(1) If the trial judge is ordered to take 
specific action, the judge shall do so as soon as 
possible. 
(2) If a new trial is ordered, the trial court, 
upon receipt of the remitted record, shall place the 
matter on the trial calendar. 
(3) If action or proceedings other than those 
mentioned in sub. (1) or (2) is ordered, any party 
may, within one year after receipt of the remitted 
record 
by 
the 
clerk 
of 
the 
trial 
court, 
make 
appropriate motion for further proceedings.  If 
further proceedings are not so initiated, the action 
shall be dismissed except that an extension of the 
one-year period may be granted, on notice, by the 
trial court, if the order for extension is entered 
during the one-year period. 
¶34 The issue in this case requires us to interpret 
subsection (3) of Wis. Stat. § 808.08 to determine whether the 
trial court had statutory authority to reopen the case for 
further proceedings.  Subsection (1) of § 808.08 does not apply 
because Tietsworth II did not order "specific action"——that is, 
Tietsworth II did not order the trial court to perform a "purely 
ministerial 
duty." 
 
See 
Findorff, 
233 
Wis. 2d 428, 
¶20.  
Subsection (2) of § 808.08 does not apply because Tietsworth II 
did not order "a new trial." 
¶35 To determine whether the circuit court had authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) to reopen the case for further 
proceedings, 
we 
engage 
in 
statutory 
interpretation.  
"[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
No.  2004AP2655 
16 
 
(quoting Seider v. O’Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659).  Except for technical or specially defined 
words, "statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning."  Id.   
¶36 Examining the language of Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3), we 
see that the statute expressly provides that "action" or 
"proceedings" be "ordered."  The common meaning of the noun 
"order" is an "authoritative direction" or "command."  Webster's 
Dictionary 372 (Albert & Loy Morehead eds., 1981).  The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1273 (3d ed. 1992), 
indicates that in law, an "order" is "a direction or command 
delivered by a court or other adjudicative body and entered into 
the record;" the verb "order" means to "issue a command or 
instruction."  Therefore, under the plain language of the 
statute, subsection (3) is triggered if and when the appellate 
court directs, commands, or instructs (i.e., "orders") the 
circuit court to take "action" or proceedings other than the 
"specific action" or new trial described in subsections (1) and 
(2). 
¶37 This court had occasion to interpret subsection (3) in 
Findorff.  The court explained that Wis. Stat. § 808.08 and 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58 have often been read together.  Findorff, 
233 Wis. 2d 428, ¶15.6  The court was required to decide whether 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58(7) reads: 
 
If upon an appeal from a judgment or order or 
upon a writ of error the appellate court orders a new 
trial [e.g., § 808.08(2)] or modifies the judgment or 
order as to any or all of the parties in a manner such 
No.  2004AP2655 
17 
 
Findorff was entitled to a substitution of judge after "the 
court of appeals reversed and remanded a circuit court decision" 
in Findorff's favor.  Id., ¶2.  The decision turned on whether 
the 
court's 
instructions 
on 
remand 
directed 
"further 
proceedings" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) 
or 
a 
purely 
ministerial duty under § 808.08(1). 
¶38 The 
court 
correctly ruled that subsection (3)——
ordering "further proceedings"——"required the circuit court to 
exercise its discretion," thereby giving Findorff a right of 
substitution.  In the course of the decision, the Findorff court 
said: 
[O]ur decision today comports with the traditional 
view that a circuit court often has some discretion on 
remand to resolve matters not addressed by a mandate 
in a manner consistent with that mandate.  Fullerton 
[Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 483, 80 
N.W.2d 461 
(1957)]. 
 
In 
Fullerton, 
this 
court 
specifically stated that: 
 
Where a mandate directs the entry of a 
particular judgment, it is the duty of the 
trial court to proceed as directed.  The 
trial court may, however, determine any 
matters left open, and in the absence of 
specific directions, is generally vested 
with a legal discretion to take such action, 
not inconsistent with the order of the upper 
                                                                                                                                                             
that further proceedings in the trial court are 
necessary [e.g., § 808.08(3)], any party may file a 
request under sub. (1) [for substitution of judge] 
within 20 days after the filing of the remittitur in 
the trial court whether or not another request was 
filed prior to the time the appeal or writ of error 
was taken. 
Wis. Stat. § 808.58(7) (emphasis added). 
No.  2004AP2655 
18 
 
court, as seems wise and proper under the 
circumstances. 
Id. 
 
"Specific 
action" 
is 
limited 
to 
purely 
ministerial duties to reflect this court's preference 
for providing a circuit court with discretion on 
remand. 
Findorff, 233 Wis. 2d 428, ¶25. 
 
¶39 In the present case, the court of appeals incorrectly 
took the above-quoted language from Findorff and Fullerton and 
applied it in a different context.  The court of appeals stated: 
"The mandate by the supreme court in this case simply 'reversed 
the decision of the court of appeals' and remanded the matter to 
the trial court."  Tietsworth III, 288 Wis. 2d 680, ¶14 
(emphasis added).  However, Tietsworth II did not "remand" the 
case to the circuit court.  The court of appeals added: "The 
mandate left open the opportunity for the plaintiffs to pursue 
contract and warranty claims."  Tietsworth III, 288 Wis. 2d 680, 
¶15.  "[W]e conclude the trial court retained authority to grant 
Tietsworth's motion and, in fact, should have granted the motion 
to reopen."  Id., ¶20 (emphasis added). 
 
¶40 What is especially startling about the court of 
appeals' decision is that it misstated the mandate of this 
court, construed the mandate as giving the circuit court 
"discretion" to reopen a case dismissed on the merits, and 
implicitly gave Tietsworth a right of substitution as well.  In 
sum, the court of appeals turned Tietsworth II into little more 
than an advisory opinion.  To vindicate such action would be "to 
recognize . . . power to set at naught the judgments of this 
court."  Kurath, 146 Wis. at 388. 
No.  2004AP2655 
19 
 
¶41 When appellate courts intend to remand the case for 
action 
or 
proceedings 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3), 
they 
normally issue mandates like the following:7 
"We therefore reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion."  Brown County v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, 
286 Wis. 2d 278, 324, 706 N.W.2d 269.  "The decision 
of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause 
remanded."  Id. 
"The 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion."  Mitchell Bank v. Schanke, 2004 WI 13, 268 
Wis. 2d 571, 619, 676 N.W.2d 849. 
"The judgment of the Jackson County Circuit Court 
is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion." 
 
State 
v. 
Fisher, 
2006 
WI 
44, 
290 
Wis. 2d 121, 149, 714 N.W.2d 495. 
"The 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
is 
affirmed, and the case is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings in accord with this 
opinion."  State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 
28, 718 N.W.2d 90. 
"The decision of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion."  
State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 636, 716 
N.W.2d 906.   
"The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed 
in part; reversed in part, and the cause is remanded 
                                                 
7 These mandate lines could also be used when appellate 
courts 
are 
ordering 
"specific 
action" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 808.08(1) 
or 
"a 
new 
trial" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 808.08(2).  Cf. State ex. rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, 
Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, ¶¶20-21, 
233 Wis. 2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679. 
No.  2004AP2655 
20 
 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent with this opinion."  Megal v. Green Bay 
Area Visitor & Convention Bureau, 2004 WI 98, 274 
Wis. 2d 162, 181-82, 682 N.W.2d 857.  
"Reversed 
and 
cause 
remanded 
for 
further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion." Johnson v. 
Rogers Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, 283 Wis. 2d 
384, 421, 700 N.W.2d 27. 
C. 
Relevant Language in Tietsworth II 
 
¶42 Our mandate line in Tietsworth II read nothing like 
the mandate line in the above-cited cases.  It did not read like 
the mandate line at issue in Fullerton: "Judgment reversed, and 
cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion."  Fullerton, 274 Wis. at 488.  It did not read like the 
September 16, 1997, mandate line at issue in Findorff: "Judgment 
reversed and cause remanded with directions" (preceded by a 
lengthy, 
detailed 
final 
paragraph). 
 
See 
Findorff, 
233 
Wis. 2d 428, ¶37. 
¶43 The mandate in Tietsworth II states, "The decision of 
the Court of Appeals is reversed."  Tietsworth II, 270 
Wis. 2d at 172.  This mandate is clear: the decision of the 
court of appeals is reversed, thus affirming the circuit court’s 
dismissal of the entire action.  The mandate does not order or 
direct or instruct the trial court to take further action or 
proceedings.  There is no reference to a remand. 
¶44 If we had wanted to allow the trial court to take 
further action, we would have specified as much in the mandate 
or by clear directive in the text of the opinion. 
No.  2004AP2655 
21 
 
¶45 If we search the opinion for aid in construing the 
mandate, we find further evidence that this court intended that, 
upon reversing the court of appeals, this case would be ended.  
In paragraph 2 of Tietsworth II, we stated that "[t]he circuit 
court dismissed the entire action for failure to state a claim."  
Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶2 (emphasis added).  In 
paragraph 10, we stated again, "The Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court . . . granted Harley’s motion, dismissing the complaint in 
its entirety for failure to state a claim."  Id., ¶10 (emphasis 
added).  These statements reflect this court’s understanding 
that the circuit court dismissed the entire action on the 
merits.  Therefore, when this court reversed the court of 
appeals without remand, it affirmed the circuit court’s judgment 
dismissing the entire action. 
¶46 In her dissent in Tietsworth II, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson acknowledged as much.  After stating that "[t]his 
case comes to us on a motion to dismiss a complaint," id., ¶48, 
the Chief Justice added that "[t]he majority opinion dismisses 
the plaintiffs' complaint," id., ¶94; see also ¶48 ("The 
majority opinion dismisses this claim . . . ."), and ¶49 ("The 
majority dismisses the second claim . . . ."). 
¶47 Paragraphs 
36 
and 
37 
in 
Tietsworth 
II, 
which 
Tietsworth claims "explicitly recognize" his contract claims, 
must be read in the context in which they appear.  These 
paragraphs are near the end of a 15-paragraph discussion of the 
economic loss doctrine and describe a specific part of this 
court's version of the doctrine.  See id., ¶¶23-37.  They are 
No.  2004AP2655 
22 
 
fairly 
interpreted 
as 
this 
court's 
explanation 
of 
the 
application of the economic loss doctrine to fraud claims.8  In 
effect, the court simply recognized that, although the economic 
loss doctrine bars tort claims, plaintiffs may have a remedy in 
contract claims.9   
                                                 
8 Tietsworth relies on the following language to assert that 
this court allowed Tietsworth to pursue any potential contract-
based claims: 
As such, the plaintiffs have warranty remedies 
for the alleged defects in their motorcycles.  In 
addition, there are contract remedies at law and in 
equity 
to 
the 
extent 
that 
the 
plaintiffs 
were 
fraudulently 
induced 
to 
purchase 
their 
motorcycles. . . . 
In short, we see no reason to recognize an 
exception to the economic loss doctrine to allow this 
consumer contract dispute to be remedied as an 
intentional 
misrepresentation 
tort. . . . 
 
The 
plaintiffs 
may 
have 
contract 
remedies——breach 
of 
contract/warranty or rescission and restitution——but 
may not pursue a tort claim for misrepresentation 
premised 
on 
having 
purchased 
allegedly 
defective 
motorcycles.   
Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶¶36-37. 
9 We agree with Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge 
Guolee’s statements: 
Now, I think it is very clear here when I read 
the totality of the decision by Judge Sykes that this 
language was not a grant to allow these claims or 
amendment of these claims.  When we look at her 
decision, the paragraph that included the warranty 
remedy language was preceded by discussion of the 
Huron Tool exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine.   
 
This is a major issue that has been before the 
Supreme Court and there’s been some controversy on 
this, the economic loss doctrine.  That was what she 
was really talking about.  The Court noted that the 
No.  2004AP2655 
23 
 
D. 
Option To Clarify Mandate 
¶48 Tietsworth contends that he believes paragraphs 36 and 
37 of Tietsworth II invited the circuit court to allow amendment 
of his complaint.  This contention is implausible because 
Tietsworth's initial action after appeal was to file an entirely 
new lawsuit, e.g., Tietsworth 2004, instead of seeking to amend 
the original complaint.  If Tietsworth believed the mandate 
favored reopening the case, he should have filed a motion under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.14 to clarify the effect of our mandate 
or 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.64.10  See Johann v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 270 Wis. 
573, 579, 72 N.W.2d 401 (1955) (finding that where party finds 
any ambiguity in the opinion or the mandate the proper place to 
                                                                                                                                                             
[Huron Tool] exception did not apply to this case, 
because the fraud alleged pertained to the character 
and quality of the goods that were the subject of the 
matter of the contract.  The following paragraph 
stated 
as 
such. 
 
The 
plaintiffs 
have 
warranty 
remedies.   
 
Now, by saying this, these warranty remedies were 
never brought up by the plaintiff or addressed by the 
Court.  The Court was simply implying that economic 
loss doctrine would not bar these claims . . . not 
that the plaintiff would be allowed to bring them. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.14 (Motions) provides, "A 
party seeking an order or other relief in a case shall file a 
motion for the order or other relief . . . ." 
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.64 (Reconsideration) provides, 
"A party may seek reconsideration of the judgment or opinion of 
the supreme court by filing a motion under s. 809.14 for 
reconsideration within 20 days after the date of the decision of 
the supreme court."   
No.  2004AP2655 
24 
 
raise the issue is before the court that issued the mandate and 
not before the trial court); State ex rel. Lisbon Town Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Crosby, 240 Wis. 157, 159, 2 N.W.2d 700 (1942); State ex 
rel. Blackdeer v. Township of Levis, 176 Wis. 2d 252, 260, 500 
N.W.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1993).11   
¶49 Parties should follow this procedure because it 
promotes finality and protects scarce judicial resources by 
permitting the court that issued the mandate to resolve any 
ambiguity.  Cf. Blackdeer, 176 Wis. 2d at 260 n.4. 
E. 
General Rule 
¶50 From this discussion, it is possible to state a 
general rule.  In the absence of a remand order in the mandate 
line or some other clear directive from the appellate court 
ultimately deciding the appeal, a trial court whose judgment or 
final order has been affirmed by the appellate court on the 
merits has no authority to reopen the case for an amended 
complaint.  This general rule is designed to assure compliance 
                                                 
11 Parties often file these motions to clarify a mandate.  
For example, in Kenosha Hospital & Medical Center v. Garcia, 
2004 WI 137, 276 Wis. 2d 359, 688 N.W.2d 462, plaintiffs filed a 
motion in this court asking us to clarify "the directions upon 
remand as to whether Kenosha Hospital should be allowed to 
conduct further discovery to support its claim."  n Metropolitan 
Ventures, LLC v. GEA Associates, 2007 WI 23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
727 N.W.2d 502, plaintiffs asked this court to clarify the 
issues on remand to eliminate any needless arguments about this 
court’s 
holdings 
in 
Metropolitan 
Ventures, 
LLC 
v. 
GEA 
Associates, 2006 WI 71, 291 Wis. 2d 393, 717 N.W.2d 58.  In 
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Mayer, 11 Wis. 2d 58, 69, 105 
N.W.2d 322 (1960), the parties asked this court to clarify its 
mandate because the parties differed as to the meaning of this 
court’s language near the end of the opinion. 
No.  2004AP2655 
25 
 
with the appellate court's decision.  It conforms to the long-
established principle that "a judgment of a trial court when 
affirmed by this court becomes in legal effect the judgment of 
this court and the trial court has no power to vacate or set it 
aside."  Hoan v. Journal Co., 241 Wis. 483, 485, 6 N.W.2d 185 
(1942).12   
F. 
Policy Interests 
¶51 Our holding today furthers the interests in finality, 
fairness, and efficiency by holding parties responsible for 
their deliberate choice of strategy and by preventing piecemeal 
litigation.  It also enforces compliance within the judicial 
system.  See Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Barker, 628 A.2d 38, 41 (Del. 
1993).  The holding protects the interest in finality by 
preventing Tietsworth from having another "kick at the cat."  
See Sutter, 69 Wis. 2d at 715. 
                                                 
12 This holding is consistent with the rule in other 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Madeksho v. Abraham, Watkins, 
Nichols, & Friend, 112 S.W.3d 679, 695-96 (Tex. App. 2003) 
(holding that where "the judgment of the trial court is simply 
affirmed, there is no reinvestiture of any 'jurisdiction' 
(limited or otherwise) in the trial court"); Griset v. Fair 
Political Practices Comm’n, 23 P.3d 43, 51 (Cal. 2001) (holding 
unqualified affirmance ordinarily sustains judgment and ends 
litigation; therefore, trial court did not have jurisdiction to 
reopen case once supreme court’s decision became final); 
Waterhouse v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Linn County, 593 N.W.2d 141, 
142 (Iowa 1999) (holding that in absence of remand directing 
further proceedings in trial court, jurisdiction of district 
court terminates both as to parties and subject matter when 
district court judgment has been affirmed); see also State ex 
rel. Frazier & Oxley, L.C. v. Cummings, 591 S.E.2d 728 (W.Va. 
2003); Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Barker, 628 A.2d 38 (Del. 1993). 
No.  2004AP2655 
26 
 
¶52 The record indicates that Tietsworth has had many 
kicks so far.  Tietsworth commenced litigation in June 2001.  
Since that time, his action has been heard two times in the 
circuit court, two times in the court of appeals, and now two 
times in this court.  Tietsworth also filed a second action, 
Tietsworth 2004, in the circuit court that was barred by claim 
preclusion.  His counsel, representing overlapping plaintiffs, 
filed another class action, Jones, that was dismissed for 
failure to state a claim, but not appealed.  To allow Tietsworth 
to continue with new claims would have the same effect as 
allowing a party to file a claim after the statute of 
limitations has expired: finality and predictability would be 
jeopardized, and the evidence might be stale.  As we stated in 
Sutter, "It is desirable that litigation come to an end."  
Sutter, 69 Wis. 2d at 716. 
¶53 As noted above, our holding is not at odds with the 
sensible principle stated in Fullerton that a trial court may 
determine any matters left open by the higher court as long as 
the determination is not inconsistent with the higher court’s 
mandate.13  Fullerton, 274 Wis. at 483.  In Fullerton, the 
plaintiff business was seeking an injunction and damages against 
the defendant, its former employee, for violating a restrictive 
covenant not to compete.  The trial court held that the covenant 
                                                 
13 In Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 482, 80 
N.W.2d 461 
(1957), 
the 
court 
cited 
Wis. Stat. § 274.35(1) 
(1955), as the source of authority for the trial court to act on 
matters "left open."  This statute is the predecessor of 
Wis. Stat. § 808.09, not Wis. Stat. § 808.08. 
No.  2004AP2655 
27 
 
was invalid.  This court reversed, remanding the case to the 
trial court to determine the appropriate duration of the 
covenant.  The opinion instructed the lower court as follows: 
"The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a 
determination by the trial court of the extent of time as to 
which the restrictive covenant with respect to defendant's 
operations in Clintonville is reasonable and necessary for 
plaintiff's protection, and for judgment enjoining defendant 
from a breach thereof."  Id. at 480. 
¶54 Upon 
remand, 
the 
trial 
court 
judge 
refused 
to 
establish the amount of damages, stating, "If [the supreme 
court] wanted me to also establish damages and take testimony I 
suppose [it] would have said a new trial is granted for the 
purpose of determining damages."  Id. at 481.  This court 
reversed, holding that the trial court should have established 
damages because the plaintiff's motion was not inconsistent with 
this court's mandate and directions.  This court stated, "The 
trial court may, however, determine any matters left open, and 
in the absence of specific directions, is generally vested with 
a legal discretion to take such action, not inconsistent with 
the order of the upper court, as seems wise and proper under the 
circumstances."  Id. at 483.   
¶55 Fullerton may be distinguished from this case as one 
where the higher court did not resolve all issues pertaining to 
the claim and specifically remanded the case to the trial court 
for further proceedings.  In Fullerton, this court had issued 
the following mandate in the first appeal: "Judgment reversed, 
No.  2004AP2655 
28 
 
and cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with 
this opinion."  Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 
148, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955)  (emphasis added).  The mandate was 
clear, therefore, that this court intended to vest authority in 
the trial court to take further proceedings.  This court could 
have mandated further proceedings in this case, but it chose not 
to do so.   
¶56 In addition, this court’s reversal in Tietsworth II 
did not leave open any unresolved issues as in Fullerton.  
Tietsworth 
argues 
that 
his 
contract-based 
claims 
remain 
unresolved.  However, these claims do not remain unresolved 
because he chose not to allege them in his original pleadings or 
to amend the pleadings while the case was still in the trial 
court.  Therefore, these claims were not part of this action. 
¶57 Tietsworth also argues that the trial court should 
have authority to reopen the case and allow the amendment of the 
pleadings because this court’s reversal in Tietsworth II, which 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, did not 
constitute a final judgment on the merits.  In Sutter, we stated 
that "[a]fter final judgment has been rendered or directed on 
appeal, ordinarily the trial court has no power to allow the 
amendment of the pleadings."  See Sutter, 69 Wis. 2d at 717.   
¶58 Tietsworth seeks a ruling that the Sutter finality 
principle does not apply in this case because this court’s 
reversal does not equal a final judgment on the merits.  
However, a dismissal for failure to state a claim is a judgment 
on the merits.  See Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat’l 
No.  2004AP2655 
29 
 
Bank, 122 Wis. 2d 673, 686, 364 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(citing Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 
399 n.3 (1981)); cf. Medved v. Baird, 58 Wis. 2d 563, 567, 207 
N.W.2d 70 (1973).   
¶59 It is suggested that the circuit court’s failure to 
state whether its dismissal was "with prejudice" created 
confusion as to the finality of the judgment.  Of course, the 
circuit court may have been willing to consider an amendment of 
the complaint in February or March 2002.  However, when 
Tietsworth appealed, he forced the issue and resolved any 
ambiguity, if there were any, as to whether the circuit court’s 
dismissal was with or without prejudice: Tietsworth deemed it to 
be with prejudice.  Tietsworth would not have been able to 
appeal his claim to the court of appeals without permission if 
the circuit court had not dismissed his claim with prejudice, 
thus constituting a final judgment on the merits.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) (stating that "[a] final judgment or a 
final order of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of 
right to the court of appeals"); Plourde ex rel. State v. 
Habhegger, 2006 WI App 147, ¶1 n.2, 294 Wis. 2d 746, 720 
N.W.2d 130 (stating that party could not appeal order denying 
motion for summary judgment without permission because order was 
a nonfinal order). 
¶60 Accordingly, when this court reversed the court of 
appeals in Tietsworth II, it affirmed the circuit court's 
dismissal as a final judgment.  See Juneau Square, 122 
Wis. 2d at 686.  Without an "order" for further proceedings by 
No.  2004AP2655 
30 
 
this court in the mandate line or in some other clear directive, 
the circuit court lacked statutory authority to grant Tietsworth 
leave to amend his complaint.  See Hoan, 241 Wis. at 485.14   
¶61 Our decision in this matter promotes finality and 
fairness by holding parties responsible for the consequences of 
their deliberate choices of strategy.  As stated in Sutter, 
"Justice does not require that plaintiffs be twice afforded 
their day in court."  Sutter, 69 Wis. 2d at 719.  If Tietsworth 
had wanted to amend his complaint to add or substitute the 
contract-based claims, he should have sought leave to amend the 
complaint with Judge Haese in 2001 or early 2002.  Tietsworth, 
however, chose a different strategy——he chose to appeal the 
dismissal of his tort claims.  At that point, he waived his 
opportunity to amend his complaint in the trial court and to 
assert a new cause of action absent permission from a reviewing 
court.  See State ex rel. Freeman Printing Co. v. Luebke, 36 
Wis. 2d 298, 304, 152 N.W.2d 861 (1967) (stating, "An appeal 
from a final judgment would normally remove the complete case 
from the trial court at the time the appeal was perfected.").  
¶62 Tietsworth cannot argue that he was not aware of the 
contract-based claims at the time he filed the complaint in the 
                                                 
14 The circuit court’s dismissal of Tietsworth 2004 under 
the theory of claim preclusion supports this conclusion.  The 
court in that case recognized that this court’s dismissal of 
Tietsworth’s claims in Tietsworth II operated as a final 
judgment and therefore precluded subsequent claims.  If the 
court in Tietsworth 2004 did not think our dismissal was a final 
judgment, it would have allowed Tietsworth to proceed. 
No.  2004AP2655 
31 
 
trial court.  On June 28, 2001, when Tietsworth first filed his 
complaint, the law was well established as to the viability of 
contract-based claims.15   
¶63 In addition, by his own admission at the oral argument 
for Tietsworth II on November 5, 2003, Tietsworth’s counsel 
recognized that contract causes of action were available.  In 
response to a question why he did not pursue contract claims, 
Tietsworth’s counsel explained that he was not obligated to have 
one cause of action from one set of facts, that he could have 
tort and contract causes of action at the same time.16  When 
asked why he did not sue for breach of warranty, Tietsworth’s 
counsel replied that he had sued Harley for breach of warranty 
                                                 
15 See First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Racine v. Notte, 97 
Wis. 2d 207, 225, 293 N.W.2d 530 (1980) (stating that a contract 
fraudulently 
induced 
is 
void 
or 
voidable 
and 
a 
party 
fraudulently induced to enter into a contract "has the election 
of either rescission or affirming the contract and seeking 
damages"). 
16 The dialogue occurred as follows: 
COURT: 
So why shouldn’t they then abide by their 
contract causes of action and not a tort 
cause of action? 
ATTORNEY: That's a very good question and part of the 
answer 
here 
is . . . that 
you're 
not 
obligated to only have one cause of action.  
As this court has recognized, it's often the 
case that the same set of facts will give 
rise to multiple causes of action.  I think 
Your 
Honors' 
opinion 
just 
this 
year 
recognized that it's often the case that you 
can have a contract claim as well as a tort 
claim arising from the same set of facts.  
There's nothing novel about that. 
No.  2004AP2655 
32 
 
in a separate action (Jones) shortly after the circuit court 
dismissed Tietsworth 2001 but that the circuit court had 
dismissed Jones for failure to state a claim.17   
¶64 Tietsworth cannot assert, however, that the decision 
in Jones deterred him from amending his complaint to add 
contract-based claims.  Tietsworth’s counsel filed his notice to 
appeal the dismissal of Tietsworth’s tort claims the same day he 
filed 
the 
Jones 
contract 
complaint. 
 
This 
shows 
that 
Tietsworth’s decision to appeal, rather than to amend his 
complaint, was not affected by the subsequent Jones decision. 
¶65 Also 
during 
oral 
argument, 
Tietsworth’s 
counsel 
revealed the reason why Tietsworth did not pursue contract 
claims: Tietsworth wanted punitive damages.  As Tietsworth’s 
counsel was explaining the limitations of a warranty claim, he 
                                                 
17 The dialogue occurred as follows: 
COURT: 
Counselor, even if there wasn't back and 
forth negotiation, can't your client still 
sue for breach of warranty?  I mean, you 
have to negotiate for it to be able to use 
it, do you? 
ATTORNEY: You would think we would be able to sue for 
breach of warranty, and after this case was 
dismissed at the trial court level, we 
brought a lawsuit for breach of warranty, 
and 
Harley-Davidson 
stood 
up 
and 
made 
precisely the same arguments with regard to 
our warranty claims that they made with 
regard to these claims.  They said, "Ah, 
until your motorcycle fails; until you're 
stranded in the middle of nowhere, you don't 
have a cause of action under warranty," and 
they prevailed upon that. 
No.  2004AP2655 
33 
 
stated that one of the limitations was that "it [would] wipe out 
the ability to seek punitive damages."18  When asked whether 
Tietsworth was seeking punitive damages, counsel replied that he 
was.19   
                                                 
18 The dialogue occurred as follows: 
COURT: 
Why, why would the manufacturer immunize 
itself by giving a warranty . . . ?  Don't 
they just provide an overt cause of action 
that 
otherwise you'd have to argue is 
implied? 
ATTORNEY: They would provide an overt cause of action 
under a warranty that they have unilaterally 
issued and whose terms they've decided with 
limitations, with limitations on what you 
can recover and how you can recover, they 
can wipe out your common law claims; they 
can wipe out your right to pursue claims 
based on all of their fraud that proceeded 
the sale simply by giving you a contract 
claim.  And, for example, it would wipe out 
the ability to seek punitive damages. 
COURT: 
Well, that’s because contracts don’t have 
punitive damages in Wisconsin, but . . .  
ATTORNEY: Right 
19 The dialogue occurred as follows: 
COURT: 
Are you seeking punitive damages in this 
case? 
ATTORNEY: We are not seeking punitive damages in this 
case. 
COURT: 
You were seeking punitive damages? 
ATTORNEY: Well, I’m sorry, I misspoke, Your Honor.  We 
are under the fraud, the common law claim, 
we are seeking punitive damages, Your Honor.  
I apologize; I misspoke. 
No.  2004AP2655 
34 
 
¶66 It appears then that Tietsworth deliberately chose a 
strategy to pursue tort claims for the opportunity to recover 
punitive damages.  When a member of the court observed that 
Tietsworth had a heavy burden to establish tort claims, 
Tietsworth’s counsel replied, "We’ve got a tough case to prove. 
We think we can prove it."  Tietsworth knew, therefore, that he 
had chosen a tough strategy.  Tietsworth had every right to 
choose that strategy, but by doing so, he risked losing the 
opportunity to pursue other causes of action, and he must now 
accept the consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
¶67 We reverse the court of appeals and affirm the circuit 
court's judgment denying Tietsworth's motion to reopen the case.  
When this litigation came before this court in Tietsworth II, 
both the circuit court and the court of appeals were divested of 
any authority to grant leave to amend Tietsworth's complaint 
without permission from this court.  Our decision in Tietsworth 
II, which affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Tietsworth's 
complaint in its entirety, became the law of the case.  In the 
absence of a remand order in the mandate line or some other 
clear directive from this court in Tietsworth II, the circuit 
court had no authority to reopen the case for an amended 
complaint after this court had affirmed the dismissal of the 
complaint in its entirety on the merits.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶68 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
parties, the circuit court, and the court of appeals ask just 
what did this court mean in Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
2004 WI 32, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233 (Tietsworth II), 
when this court announced that it reversed the decision of the 
court of appeals.1  More specifically they ask, may the 
plaintiffs reopen the case and amend their complaint or are they 
barred from pursuing these actions?   
¶69 The circuit court denied the plaintiffs' motion to 
reopen the case, holding that it lacked authority to do so.  The 
court of appeals reversed the circuit court, holding that the 
plaintiffs were entitled, as a matter of law, to reopen and 
amend their complaint. 
¶70 In trying to resolve the case, the majority opinion 
adopts a new rule (apparently interpreting Wis. Stat. §§ 808.08 
and 808.09), holding as follows: "[I]n the absence of a remand 
order in the mandate line or some other clear directive from the 
appellate court ultimately deciding the appeal, a circuit court 
has no authority to reopen the case for an amended complaint 
after an appellate court has affirmed the dismissal of the 
complaint in its entirety on the merits."  Majority op., ¶¶2, 
67.  See also majority op., ¶50.  The majority opinion thus 
devises a new, special rule to reach its result.  
                                                 
1 The 
majority 
opinion 
identifies 
this 
decision 
as 
Tietsworth II, and for ease of reading I will use the same 
designation. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶71 Clear, easy-to-apply rules that are not manipulable 
are valuable.  The majority opinion's new rule, however, is not 
easy to apply, is susceptible to manipulation, and creates 
tensions and inconsistencies with past precedent. 
¶72 Moreover, this new rule is at one and the same time 
too broad to address the facts of the present case and too 
narrow to govern other fact situations.  Indeed, the majority 
opinion recognizes this latter deficiency of its rule.  The 
majority severely curtails and undercuts its new rule with 
language interpreting Wis. Stat. § 808.09 in paragraph 32 of the 
majority opinion.  This language endorses the traditional, oft-
repeated precedential rule relating to a circuit court's power 
after appellate review and, in effect, engulfs and replaces the 
textual holding.2  
¶73 Paragraph 32 explicitly recognizes that a circuit 
court has "clear authority to carry out the mandate [of the 
appellate court], whether the appellate court has affirmed or 
reversed the circuit court" and "also has authority, without 
explicit direction, to address collateral matters 'left open' in 
the case, such as costs, preparation and entry of necessary 
documents, and correction of clerical or computational errors, 
so long as these actions do not undo the decision of the 
appellate court.  However, there can be no amendments in the 
                                                 
2 See State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, ¶25, 233 Wis. 2d 428, 
608 N.W.2d 679, quoting with approval J.H. Fullerton Lumber Co. 
v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 483, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957) (discussed 
at ¶106 and notes 13, 14 of this dissent). 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
3 
 
trial court that conflict with the expressed or implied mandate 
of the appellate court."  Majority op., ¶32.  In other words, 
the circuit court "may permit amendments which are not contrary 
to the decision of the reviewing court on appeal."3  Contrary to 
the new rule adopted by the majority opinion, matters remain 
within the circuit court's discretion and may very well include 
amendment of the pleadings, so long as they do not conflict with 
the decision of the appellate court.     
¶74 In contrast with the majority opinion and in accord 
with the decision of the court of appeals, I conclude that the 
circuit court retained authority to implement the appellate 
court's decision in Tietsworth II that left open the plaintiffs' 
right to pursue contract and warranty claims.  I further 
conclude that the Tietsworth II decision falls within Wis. Stat. 
§§  808.08(3) and 808.09 (2003-04),4 which empower a circuit 
court to reopen a case for further proceedings.  Furthermore, 
§ 802.09(1) authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to 
grant the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to pursue the 
contract and warranty remedies this court recognized in the 
Tietsworth II decision.  I therefore dissent. 
¶75 I would remand this cause to the circuit court and 
have it decide, within its discretion, whether the plaintiffs 
                                                 
3 6A Callaghan's Wisconsin Pleading & Practice, § 55:81 (4th 
ed. 2005) (citations omitted). 
4 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
4 
 
should be granted leave under Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) to amend 
their pleadings to raise the contract and warranty claims.  
¶76 I have organized my discussion in this dissent as 
follows:  Part I briefly looks at the changed nature of supreme 
court review upon the creation of the court of appeals in 1978.  
Part II critiques the majority opinion's new rule by applying it 
to the present case.  Part III examines and applies Wis. Stat. 
§§ 808.08(3) and 808.09 to the present case.  Part IV discusses 
§ 802.09(1).  
I conclude that the mandate line is not 
dispositive of the power of the circuit court after review; the 
decision is. 
I 
¶77 This case must be examined in the context of the 
supreme court's present review of decisions of the court of 
appeals in contrast to the supreme court's direct consideration 
of trial court orders and judgments before 1978.  Before 1978, 
that is, before the creation of the court of appeals, this court 
would directly review an order or judgment of a trial court.  If 
in a pre-1978 appeal the supreme court announced its affirmance 
of a circuit court order or judgment, the trial court's order or 
judgment became in effect the judgment of this court.5    
                                                 
5 Hoan v. Journal Co., 241 Wis. 483, 485, 6 N.W.2d 185 
(1942). 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶78 Since 1978, upon granting a petition for review,6 the 
supreme court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the judgment or order of the circuit court.7  This court does not 
ordinarily affirm a judgment or final order of a circuit court 
on review.8  Any such affirmance must be read into the decision 
by examining the reasoning of this court's decision and the 
decision of the court of appeals.  A careful reading of 
Tietsworth II demonstrates that the decision never explicitly 
affirmed the circuit court.9 
                                                 
6 This court also accepts cases on certification from the 
court of appeals and on bypass.  In these instances, the court 
takes a direct appeal from the circuit court and decides whether 
to affirm or reverse a judgment or order of the circuit court.  
The present case is here on a petition to review a decision of 
the court of appeals, not certification or bypass. 
7 Although the supreme court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals, the supreme court is directed to remit, that 
is to send back, to the circuit court the circuit court record 
and the supreme court's decision (unless the court of appeals is 
to act further).  The process by which the decision and mandate 
of the appellate court, along with the circuit court record, are 
returned to the circuit court is referred to as remittitur.  
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.26. 
8 Occasionally a decision of this court on a petition for 
review explicitly affirms the circuit court's order or judgment.  
See, e.g., State v. Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 288 N.W.2d 114 
(1980).  There, the text announced an affirmance of a circuit 
court order.  The mandate line in Jenich also expressly stated: 
"Decision of the court of appeals is reversed; order of the 
circuit court is affirmed."  
9 The majority opinion supports its conclusion that this 
court affirmed the judgment or final order of the circuit court 
by snipping and pasting various phrases in Tietsworth II that 
describe the order of the circuit court as dismissing the 
complaint in its entirety, and then bootstraps a conclusion that 
in reversing the court of appeals this court "affirmed the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
dismissing 
the 
entire 
action."  
Majority op., ¶45.  
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶79 The majority opinion conveniently ignores that upon 
granting a petition for review this court does not review a 
judgment or order of the circuit court and repeatedly——and 
mistakenly——asserts that in Tietsworth II this court affirmed 
the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint.  See, e.g., 
majority op., ¶¶29, 43, 45.  Moreover, the majority opinion 
equates this court's reversal in Tietsworth II of the decision 
of the court of appeals (which in turn reversed the circuit 
court's order of dismissal) not only with an affirmance of the 
circuit court's dismissal of the tort claims but also with an 
affirmance of a dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims for all 
time.  Care must be taken not to fall for this sleight of 
argument.   
¶80 Nothing in Tietsworth II explicitly states that this 
court is affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the 
complaint, let alone that this court is affirming the dismissal 
of the entire complaint for all time. 
¶81 Moreover, beware of references to our pre-1978 case 
law, especially regarding the mandate line.  Before 1978, this 
court directly reviewed circuit court judgments and orders and 
formulated mandate lines and decisions to that effect.    Before 
1978, the court also used a different style manual that 
instructed the justices and staff regarding acceptable mandate 
lines.   
¶82 The Wisconsin Supreme Court Style and Procedures 
Manual presently in use states that although the mandate line 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
7 
 
gives direction, instructions are also given in the body of the 
decision.  It states as follows:  
The mandate line gives the court's decision.  If it is 
necessary to include further instructions or direction 
to another court, that information may be placed in 
the last paragraph or two of the opinion where it can 
be easily located.  If another court is to take 
specific action, it is essential that a specific court 
be mentioned. 
The Style and Procedures Manual provides an illustrative, non-
exhaustive list of mandate lines, but the use of these mandate 
lines is not required.  As the examples set forth in the 
majority opinion at ¶41 illustrate, the framing of the mandate 
lines varies.   
 
¶83 The mandate line cannot be taken as the dispositive 
interpretative tool to our decisions.  The decision must be read 
along with the mandate line. 
¶84 I turn now to critique the majority opinion's new rule 
by applying it to the present case. 
II 
 
¶85 I have organized this part of my dissent as follows:  
 
(A) A critique of the majority's new rule requiring 
the word "remand" in the mandate and the application of 
this rule to the present case.   
 
(B) A critique of the majority's new rule requiring 
"some other clear directive" and the application of this 
rule to the present case.  
 
(C) The significance to the present case of paragraph 
32 in the majority opinion and the traditional case law 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
8 
 
approach to a circuit court's power after a decision of an 
appellate court and their application to the present case.  
A. "Remand" in the Mandate 
¶86 As part of its holding, the majority opinion fashions 
a new rule that requires that the mandate line state that the 
cause is being remanded or that the appellate court provide some 
other clear directive in order for the circuit court to have 
authority to reopen the case for the amendment of pleadings.  I 
begin with the first of these requirements: "remand."   
¶87 The majority opinion endows the word "remand" in the 
mandate line with magical powers, in spite of the court's 
ordinary reluctance to require the use of magic words or phrases 
to command results.  
¶88 The initial line (the disposition) in our Tietsworth 
II decision simply states: "Reversed" and the mandate line 
simply states, "The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed."  Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d at 151, 172.   
¶89 The majority opinion's interpretation of Tietsworth II 
turns on these two lines of the lengthy decision.  The majority 
opinion's reasoning, and its holding for future cases, primarily 
rest on this court's omission in Tietsworth II of the words "and 
cause 
remanded" 
after 
the 
initial 
word 
of 
disposition, 
"reversed," and the court's omission of the same words "and 
cause remanded" in the mandate line.  The majority opinion 
concludes that "[i]f we had wanted [in Tietsworth II] to allow 
the trial court to take further action, we would have specified 
as much in the mandate . . . ."  Majority op., ¶44. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶90 The word "remand" does not have the same meaning as 
"remit."  The process by which the decision and mandate of the 
appellate court, along with the circuit court record, are 
returned to the circuit court is referred to as remittitur.  The 
last sentence of Wis. Stat. § 808.09 is both a remittitur 
provision and a direction to the circuit court to proceed when 
it gets the remittitur.  It states that "[i]n all cases an 
appellate court shall remit its judgment or decision to the 
court below and thereupon the court below shall proceed in 
accordance with the judgment or decision."  See also Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.26 (relating to remittitur).  The supreme court 
need not use the word "remand" in the mandate line for the case 
to be returned (that is, remitted) to the circuit court and for 
the circuit court to take further action.  Section 808.08 
supplements § 808.09 and discusses further proceedings in the 
trial court after remittitur. 
¶91 Notably, our disposition and mandate in Tietsworth II 
did not prohibit the plaintiffs from reopening their complaint 
to plead the contract and warranty claims we had recognized.  
They did not explicitly order that the action be dismissed in 
its entirety.  They did not explicitly direct that a judgment of 
dismissal be entered.   
¶92 Although the majority opinion penalizes the plaintiffs 
because the court did not use the magic word "remand" in the 
mandate line, the majority opinion nonetheless recognizes that 
mandate 
lines 
may 
be 
Delphic 
and 
open 
to 
competing 
interpretations. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶93 The majority opinion acknowledges that motions have 
been filed in this court to clarify a mandate, see majority op., 
¶48.  Indeed, the majority opinion even faults the plaintiffs 
for not bringing a motion to clarify the mandate.  Majority op., 
¶48.  This criticism misses the mark.  One reason the plaintiffs 
may not have sought clarification is that they believed that 
Tietsworth II allowed them to amend the complaint to assert the 
contract and warranty claims the decision explicitly stated were 
available.  Furthermore, this court's appellate practice and 
procedure rules do not explicitly authorize the motion for 
clarification that the majority opinion embraces.  Although such 
a motion may be a good idea and the court has responded to such 
motions, they are not the only recognized way to proceed.10 
¶94 Commentary on appellate practice often complains that 
appellate decisions are not clear regarding what, if anything, 
should happen when the trial court record and the supreme 
court's decision are returned to the trial court.  Appellate 
                                                 
10 The defendant suggests that the procedural remedy may be 
to move the court to reconsider under Wis. Stat. § 809.64 and 
the Internal Operating Rules, § II J. In Johann v. Milwaukee 
Electric Tool Corp., 270 Wis. 573, 579, 72 N.W.2d 401 (1955), 
the court concluded (without citation) that when filing its 
motion for a rehearing (now a motion for reconsideration) the 
party should have raised any question about any ambiguity in the 
remand.  Johann does not speak to a case in which no party seeks 
a motion for rehearing or reconsideration.  It is also arguable 
that the remedy of a party aggrieved when a circuit court does 
not follow a mandate of an appellate court is to seek mandamus 
in the appellate court that issued the decision.  See, e.g., 
Litzen v. Eggert, 238 Wis. 121, 123, 297 N.W. 382 (1941); State 
ex rel. Blackdeer v. Township of Levis, 176 Wis. 2d 252, 259, 
500 N.W.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1993); 6A Callaghan's Wisconsin 
Pleading & Practice, §55:82 (4th ed. 2005) (citations omitted).   
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
11 
 
courts are urged to spell out the consequences, if any, of a 
decision for further proceedings.  In fact, the mandates at ¶41 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
which 
the 
opinion 
offers 
as 
illustrations, are typical of mandates that are criticized as 
not helpful.11 
¶95 The meaning of a mandate line must be deciphered by 
applying a generally accepted rule of interpretation: Interpret 
words in their context.  Thus, the mandate line must be 
interpreted in light of the text of the lengthy decision itself.  
The 
majority 
opinion, 
despite 
the 
rigid 
and 
formalistic 
components of its rule, actually agrees with this interpretive 
approach.  Majority op., ¶47.  I now attempt to apply it.  
B. "Some Other Clear Directive" 
¶96 The failure of the mandate line to include the word 
"remand" does not sink the circuit court's powers.  The majority 
opinion allows a circuit court to reopen a case and amend the 
                                                 
11 Barbara Green, Cracking the Code: Interpreting and 
Enforcing the Appellate Court's Decision and Mandate, 32 Stetson 
L. Rev. 393, 394, 402 (2002) (discussing the difficulties 
involved with deciphering mandates from the appellate court and 
announcing that "it would be helpful for appellate courts to 
give clear guidance to the trial court and to the parties" 
following remand).  Green chides appellate courts, writing that 
trial courts and lawyers sometimes need to look for a "Rosetta 
Stone" to decipher appellate mandates.  Id. at 393.  According 
to this author, the mandate lines set forth in the majority 
opinion at ¶41 do not satisfy the standards of clarity 
recommended in this article. 
Nancy 
A. 
Wanderer, 
in 
Writing 
Better 
Opinions: 
Communicating with Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 Me. L. Rev. 
47, 60 (2002), also explains that "[i]f the case on appeal is to 
be remanded, the appeals court should provide clear directions 
about what the trial court should do on remand. In this way, 
subsequent appeals may be avoided."  Id. at 60. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
12 
 
pleadings when "in the absence of a remand order in the mandate 
line," the circuit court "is given some other clear directive 
from the appellate court" (emphasis added).  Majority op., ¶¶2, 
67.  The standard "some other clear directive" is not easy to 
apply and is susceptible to manipulation.  
¶97 As I see it, this court in Tietsworth II did give the 
circuit court a clear directive.  In Tietsworth II, the court 
announced that the plaintiffs have warranty and contract 
remedies for the alleged defects in their motorcycles and did 
not declare that these remedies were barred: 
As such, the plaintiffs have warranty remedies for the 
alleged defects in their motorcycles.  In addition, 
there are contract remedies at law and in equity to 
the extent that the plaintiffs were fraudulently 
induced to purchase their motorcycles.  A contract 
fraudulently induced is void or voidable; a party 
fraudulently induced to enter a contract may affirm 
the contract and seek damages for breach or pursue the 
equitable remedy of rescission and seek restitutionary 
damages . . . . The economic loss doctrine does not 
bar these contract remedies for fraudulently induced 
contracts. . . . 
Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶36. 
 
¶98 The 
court 
continued, 
stating 
that 
although 
the 
plaintiffs are barred from pursuing tort claims, they may have 
contract remedies: 
In short, we see no reason to recognize an exception 
to the economic loss doctrine to allow this consumer 
contract dispute to be remedied as an intentional 
misrepresentation tort.  The economic loss doctrine 
bars the plaintiffs' common-law fraud claim.  The 
plaintiffs 
may 
have 
contract 
remedies——breach 
of 
contract/warranty or rescission and restitution——but 
may not pursue a tort claim for misrepresentation 
premised 
on 
having 
purchased 
allegedly 
defective 
motorcycles. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
13 
 
Tietsworth II, 270 Wis. 2d 146, ¶37. 
 
¶99 The majority opinion unpersuasively plays down the 
importance of these two lengthy paragraphs in Tietsworth II, in 
which the court explicitly declared that the plaintiffs have 
viable claims against Harley-Davidson grounded in contract and 
warranty.12 
¶100 The majority opinion asserts in a conclusory fashion 
that the Tietsworth II court was simply saying that the economic 
loss doctrine would not bar these claims, not that the 
plaintiffs may bring these claims.  Majority op., ¶47.  And how 
does the majority opinion divine that these two paragraphs do 
not give the plaintiffs the opportunity to bring their contract 
claims?  By just saying that the two paragraphs "are fairly 
interpreted as this court's explanation of the application of 
the economic loss doctrine to fraud claims."  Majority op., ¶47.  
That's the legal equivalent of a parent answering a child's 
query of "why" with a "because I said so."  
¶101 I conclude that paragraphs 36 and 37 in Tietsworth II 
are just as easily and just as fairly interpreted as leaving 
open the opportunity for the plaintiffs to bring contract and 
warranty claims.  The Tietsworth II court acknowledged that the 
                                                 
12 Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted to allege that 
Harley-Davidson fraudulently induced class members to purchase 
the motorcycles; that Harley-Davidson breached the express 
warranty that the motorcycles and engines were free from defects 
in factory materials and workmanship at the time of sale and for 
a period of 12 months thereafter; and that Harley-Davidson was 
unjustly enriched.  The first two of these claims, warranty and 
contract, were explicitly recognized by this court, and the 
third 
claim, 
unjust 
enrichment, 
is 
a 
corollary 
of 
the 
plaintiffs' contract claims. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
14 
 
plaintiffs "have warranty remedies" and "may have contract 
remedies" claims (emphasis added).  The Tietsworth II court 
deliberately employed the present tense in these paragraphs, not 
the past tense, thus leaving open the possibility that the 
plaintiffs may pursue these claims in the future.  
¶102 That the mandate line in Tietsworth II does not 
explicitly remand the cause to the circuit court for purpose of 
allowing the plaintiffs to amend the complaint does not dispel 
the significance of our language in paragraphs 36 and 37.  That 
the court did not explicitly direct or order a remand or an 
amendment to the pleadings is not unexpected.  The plaintiffs 
did not request a remand to amend the complaint.  It is likewise 
inconsequential 
that 
the 
court 
did 
not 
provide, 
in 
the 
paragraphs preceding the mandate, instructions to the plaintiffs 
in regard to bringing these claims.  The court does not usually 
give legal advice to the parties and does not ordinarily address 
amendments to the pleadings unless raised by the parties.   
¶103 Under the circumstances of the Tietsworth II case, an 
appellate court would not necessarily order the plaintiffs to 
file an amended complaint asserting these additional theories of 
liability and would not likely provide explicit guidance in 
regard to amending the complaint, but it might——and did——leave 
open the possibility that the plaintiffs may take the initiative 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 808.08(3) and 802.09(1) to file an amended 
complaint. 
¶104 If the majority opinion is looking for "some clear 
directive" that the amendment of the pleadings is permitted on 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
15 
 
remittitur, paragraphs 36 and 37 in Tietsworth II may be as 
clear a directive as the court could legitimately provide given 
the issue actually before the court and the procedural posture 
of the case. 
C. Majority Opinion Paragraph 32 and the Traditional Approach 
¶105 Until it was altered today by the holding in the 
instant 
case 
(although 
retained 
in 
paragraph 
32), 
the 
traditional pre-1978 rule was that a circuit court must comply 
with the appellate court's decision but has the authority to 
take further action in a case as long as the action is not 
inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court.13  The 
permissible further actions included reopening a case and 
amending the pleadings, so long as the amendments did not 
conflict with the decision of the appellate court.  Recognizing 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 
483-84, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957).  This rule was based in part on 
Wis. Stat. § 808.09 (and its predecessor statutes), which not 
only guides the actions an appellate court may take on appeal 
but also instructs that the circuit court must act in accordance 
with the appellate court's rulings on remittitur.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 808.09 provides that an appellate court may reverse, 
affirm, or modify the judgment or order; may order a new trial; 
or, if the appeal is from a part of the judgment or order, it 
may reverse, affirm, or modify that part of the judgment or 
order.  Wisconsin Stat. § 808.09 then states in relevant part 
that "[i]n all cases an appellate court shall remit its judgment 
or decision to the court below and thereupon the court below 
shall proceed in accordance with the judgment or decision."  
Courts 
have 
interpreted 
the 
language 
"shall 
proceed 
in 
accordance with the judgment" as not limiting the circuit 
court's ability to take action, so long as the action is not 
inconsistent with the decision from the appellate court.  See, 
e.g., Fullerton Lumber Co., 274 Wis. at 482-83 (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 274.35(1), the predecessor statute to Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.09, for the proposition that the circuit court may act on 
matters "left open"). 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
16 
 
that this court is fallible and that not all circumstances are 
foreseen or foreseeable, this court adopted a rule that gave 
some flexibility to the circuit court after an appeal was 
decided. 
¶106 Citing Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torbord, 274 Wis. 478, 
80 N.W.2d 461 (1957), this court has endorsed the pre-1978 view 
of a circuit court's powers in post-1978 cases, stating, "Where 
a mandate directs the entry of a particular judgment, it is the 
duty of the trial court to proceed as directed.  The trial court 
may, however, determine any matters left open, and in the 
absence of specific directions, is generally vested with a legal 
discretion to take such action, not inconsistent with the order 
of the upper court, as seems wise and proper under the 
circumstances."  State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, ¶25, 233 
Wis. 2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679.14  The court of appeals has 
similarly followed Fullerton, declaring that a circuit court is 
bound to follow the mandate of the court of appeals (which 
covered only some issues in that case) but "also has the 
authority to address any remaining unresolved issues, so long as 
it acts in a manner consistent with [the appellate court's] 
mandate."  Harvest Sav. Bank v. ROI Invs., 228 Wis. 2d 733, 738, 
598 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1999).  
                                                 
14 In Findorff, 233 Wis. 2d 428, ¶25 (citing Fullerton, 274 
Wis. at 483), the court declared that the "traditional view [is] 
that a circuit court often has some discretion on remand to 
resolve matters not addressed by a mandate in a manner 
consistent with that mandate." 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶107 The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Findorff 
and Fullerton from Tietsworth II, stating that in the prior 
cases, in contrast with Tietsworth II, the mandate line remanded 
the cause to the circuit court.  See majority op., ¶55.  The 
Findorff court did not give weight to any difference in the 
Findorff and Fullerton mandates in vesting discretion with the 
circuit court.  See Findorff, 233 Wis. 2d at 428, ¶25 n.16.    
¶108 In 
Sutter 
v. 
State, 
69 
Wis. 2d 709, 
717, 
233 
N.W.2d 391 (1975), a pre-1978 case, the mandate line stated, 
"Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to enter 
judgment not inconsistent with this opinion."   On remand the 
plaintiffs in that case sought relief from the judgment and 
leave to amend their complaint.  The Sutter court held against 
the plaintiffs, declaring, "The trial court has no authority to 
amend the pleadings after remittitur with the mandate of this 
court 
providing 
specific 
directions 
for 
the 
entry 
of 
a 
particular judgment."15  Nevertheless Sutter recognized this rule 
was not ironclad, stating: 
Generally, amendments are not permissible on remand 
where the case was determined on the merits.  After 
final judgment has been rendered or directed on 
appeal, ordinarily the trial court has no power to 
allow the amendment of the pleadings . . . .16 
¶109 The key words in Sutter for purposes of the present 
case are "generally" and "ordinarily."  The Sutter court 
                                                 
15 The Sutter court distinguished Fullerton Lumber on the 
ground that the Sutter mandate directed the entry of a 
particular judgment.  It interpreted the mandate as not 
requiring further proceedings.  Sutter, 69 Wis. 2d 717-18. 
16 Id. at 717 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
18 
 
deliberately 
used 
these 
"appellate-court-wiggle-room-words" 
twice to signal the reader that exceptions exist to the rule 
that amendments are not permissible when the appeal was 
determined on the merits.17 
¶110 Tietsworth II falls within the traditional rule and 
paragraph 32 of the majority opinion.  The decision left open 
the opportunity for the plaintiffs to pursue contract and 
warranty remedies.  The plaintiffs' pursuit of these contract 
claims is consistent with our reversal of the decision of the 
court of appeals and the circuit court's dismissal of the tort 
claims in the complaint. 
¶111 Furthermore, although I conclude that Tietsworth II 
specifically left open the plaintiffs' contract and warranty 
claims, other members of the court disagree with me and with 
each other about what Tietsworth II means.  If we who write the 
opinions and the mandates cannot agree about the meaning of 
Tietsworth II, it is perfectly understandable that the parties 
disagree and that the three members of the court of appeals 
disagree with the circuit court judge about the import of our 
decision.  
¶112 Inasmuch as this substantial difference of opinion 
exists about Tietsworth II, should not this court err on the 
side of giving the plaintiffs their day in court?   
¶113 I turn now to Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3). 
                                                 
17 See also State ex rel. Freeman Printing Co. v. Luebke, 36 
Wis. 2d 298, 304, 152 N.W.2d 861 (1967) ("An appeal from a final 
judgment would normally remove the complete case from the trial 
court at the time the appeal was perfected.") (emphasis added). 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
19 
 
III 
¶114 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.08 describes, according to the 
majority opinion at ¶33, what the circuit court must or may do 
upon receiving the remittitur pursuant to § 808.09.     
¶115 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.08 provides in full as follows: 
Further proceedings in trial court.  When the record 
and remittitur are received in the trial court: 
(1) If the trial judge is ordered to take specific 
action, the judge shall do so as soon as possible. 
(2) If a new trial is ordered, the trial court, upon 
receipt of the remitted record, shall place the matter 
on the trial calendar. 
(3) 
If 
action 
or 
proceedings 
other 
than 
those 
mentioned in sub. (1) or (2) is ordered, any party 
may, within one year after receipt of the remitted 
record 
by 
the 
clerk 
of 
the 
trial 
court, 
make 
appropriate motion for further proceedings.  If 
further proceedings are not so initiated, the action 
shall be dismissed except that an extension of the 
one-year period may be granted, on notice, by the 
trial court, if the order for extension is entered 
during the one-year period. 
 
¶116 The dispute between the parties centers on subsection 
(3) of Wis. Stat. § 808.08.  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 808.08(1) and 
(2), which are addressed to the circuit court, § 808.08(3) is 
addressed to the parties.  Subsection (3) preserves a party's 
ability to move the circuit court for "further proceedings."  
Subsection (3) instructs that a party may "make appropriate 
motion for further proceedings" within a year, or the action 
will be dismissed.  The plaintiffs moved the circuit court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) within a year for further 
proceedings. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
20 
 
 
¶117 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.08 has been in the statute books 
for many years with substantially the same language, although 
the statute has been renumbered several times. 
 
¶118 Chapter 187, Laws of 1977 renumbered former Wis. Stat. 
§ 817.36 (1975) as Wis. Stat. § 808.08, making only minor 
changes in the statutory language for clarification purposes.18  
Former § 817.36 (1975) itself was formerly numbered Wis. Stat. 
§ 274.36 (1971). See In the Matter of the Promulgation of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the State of Wisconsin, 67 
Wis. 2d 585, 761 (1975).19  No change in statutory language was 
made.20  By supreme court order dated November 10, 1964 and 
effective March 1, 1965, former § 274.36 (1963) was repealed and 
recreated as § 274.36 (1965).21   
                                                 
18 Chapter 187, Laws of 1977; 1977 S.B. 1.  The legislative 
note from the Legislative Reference Bureau that accompanies the 
1977 change emphasizes that "[i]t contains no substantive 
change."  Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 1977 
S.B. 1, LRB-9037/1, in Bill Drafting File on 1977 S.B. 1, 
available at Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, 1 East Main 
Street, Madison, Wisconsin. 
19 This supreme court order was dated February 17, 1975 and 
took effect January 1, 1976, and adopted in part, substantially 
revised in part, and reorganized the rules governing civil 
procedure into a comprehensive structure known as the Wisconsin 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Former § 274.36 was incorporated 
wholesale into chapter 817. 
20 An earlier Supreme Court Order, dated March 31, 1971 and 
effective July 1, 1971, made minor changes in the statutory 
language of former § 274.36, "to clear up an ambiguity in the 
present language."  50 Wis. 2d xvii.  No substantive changes 
were effected. 
21 1964 Supreme Court Order, 25 Wis. 2d vii (1964).  An 
earlier version of the statute is found in Zeidler v. Goelzer, 
191 Wis. 378, 388, 211 N.W. 140 (1926) as follows: 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
21 
 
 
¶119 Although brief, my recitation of the lengthy history 
of Wis. Stat. § 808.08 is sufficient for purposes of this 
dissent.  I want to make the following point:  Section 808.08 
has been on the books for a long time, but the key cases stating 
what I call the traditional rule of a circuit court's power 
after an appellate decision (see, e.g.,  Fullerton and Sutter) 
do not rest the traditional rule on the language of § 808.08 or 
its predecessor.  If § 808.08 (or other numbered version of the 
statute) is mentioned in the cases, the citation is only in 
passing.  These cases rely on Wis. Stat. § 808.09 or its 
predecessor statutes. 
 
¶120 In contrast, the majority opinion appears to peg its 
holding about the circuit court's power to Wis. Stat. § 808.08, 
which the majority opinion characterizes as "plain."  Majority 
op., ¶36.  The majority opinion states that § 808.08(3) is 
triggered if and when the appellate court directs or commands or 
instructs the trial court to take "action" other than the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In every case in error or on appeal in which the 
Supreme Court shall order a new trial or further 
proceedings in the court below, the record shall be 
transmitted to such court and proceeding had thereon 
within one year from the date of such order in the 
Supreme Court, or in default thereof the action shall 
be dismissed, unless, upon good cause shown, the court 
shall otherwise order.  It shall be the duty of the 
losing party in any action or proceeding when a 
judgment or order in his favor in the court below is 
reversed by the Supreme Court on the appeal of the 
opposing party to pay the clerk's fees on such 
reversal, procure the record in said cause to be 
remitted to the trial court and bring the cause to 
trial within one year after such reversal, unless the 
same be continued for cause, and if he fail so to do, 
his action shall be dismissed. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
22 
 
"specific action" or new trial described in subsections (1) and 
(2), and gives examples at paragraph 41.  
 
¶121 Although it bases its reasoning primarily on Wis. 
Stat. § 808.08(3), the majority fails to engage in a proper 
interpretation of this statute.  The court wrestled with the 
meaning of § 808.08(3) in State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 233 Wis. 2d 428, 608 
N.W.2d 679 (1999), while interpreting and applying §§ 808.08 and 
801.58(1).   
 
¶122 As acknowledged by the majority opinion, the Findorff 
court drew a distinction between "specific action" and "further 
proceedings," 
in 
subsections 
(1) 
and 
(3) 
of 
§ 808.08 
respectively.  Majority op., ¶37.  It concluded that "specific 
action" 
in 
subsection 
(1) 
refers 
to 
a 
circuit 
court's 
ministerial duty and "further proceedings" in subsection (3) 
refers to any proceeding in which the circuit court will 
exercise discretion.  Findorff, 233 Wis. 2d at 442-43.  See also 
In re Commitment of Thiel, 2004 WI App 140, ¶27, 275 
Wis. 2d 421, 685 N.W.2d 890 (viewing § 808.08(3) as applying by 
default when neither subsection (1) nor (2) applies and 
acknowledging 
this 
court's narrow definition of "specific 
action" in § 808.08(1)). 
¶123 According to Findorff, the mere recitation of a 
mandate does not tell us whether the mandate falls within 
§ 808.08(1) or (3).  Under Findorff, this determination requires 
a careful examination of each case to determine whether the 
circuit court will perform a ministerial duty or a discretionary 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
23 
 
act.  Findorff, 233 Wis. 2d at 448-49.  The majority opinion 
does not engage in the careful analysis of ministerial and 
discretionary duties as required by Findorff. 
¶124 Moreover, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
errs 
in 
its 
interpretation of Findorff, resulting in an application that 
chokes all meaning out of § 808.08(3).  As I see it, to give 
subsection (3) meaning, that is, for it not to be superfluous, 
it must be interpreted to allow the parties to move for further 
proceedings in the circuit court when a circuit court is not 
required by subsections (1) and (2) to act upon its own, that 
is, when an appellate court does not order or direct or give 
instructions about specific actions (subsection (1)) or a new 
trial (subsection (2)). In other words, subsection (3) is 
triggered when the mandate does not fall within subsections (1) 
or (2).  What else can subsection (3) mean?   
¶125 Subsection (3) must be read harmoniously with the 
authority supplied to the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.09.  Subsection (3) thus encompasses cases that fall under 
the traditional rule, namely that a circuit court must comply 
with the appellate court's decision but has the authority to 
take further action in a case as long as the action is not 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
decision 
of 
the 
appellate 
court.  
Subsection (3) allows parties to petition the circuit court to 
take these discretionary actions that are not explicitly 
commanded by the mandate but are not inconsistent with the 
decision.  How else would the parties be able to implement the 
traditional rule embodied in § 808.09? 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶126 The majority opinion expresses great horror at the 
court of appeals decision in the instant case, exclaiming that 
"the court of appeals turned Tietsworth II into little more than 
an advisory opinion."  Majority op., ¶40.  Wrong!  Tietsworth II 
remains the definitive decision in regards to the plaintiffs' 
tort claims.  The circuit court cannot undo or undermine the 
initial judgment and certainly cannot revive those dismissed 
claims.  The circuit court, however, retains authority, within 
its discretion, to permit the plaintiffs to bring the contract 
and warranty remedies recognized by the Tietsworth II court.  
This is not a power "'to set at naught the judgments of this 
court.'"  Majority op., ¶40 (quoted source omitted).   
¶127 Underlying 
much 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
interpretation of Tietsworth II and Wis. Stat. § 808.08 is the 
public policy of finality.  I agree that finality is important.  
Indeed the legislature expressly embraced finality in Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.08(3):  A party must bring proceedings under § 808.08(3) 
within one year or be forever barred.  The court should follow 
the legislative directive. 
¶128 It is clearly desirable that litigation come to an 
end.  But it is also clearly desirable in the present case that 
the doors of the courthouse be open to consumers, the purchasers 
of the motorcycles at issue, who (in the very words of this 
court) have valid contract and warranty claims that have not 
been barred explicitly.  The majority opinion should not 
determine the point of finality upon remand when Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.08(3) explicitly provides a point of finality: This 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
25 
 
statute permits a party to move for further proceedings 
consistent with the appellate opinion within one year.  The 
plaintiffs in the present case met this deadline. 
¶129 Furthermore, despite this case's lengthy procedural 
history, the plaintiffs have not yet had their fabled "day in 
court."  The plaintiffs have never had the opportunity to 
present the consumer complaints to a judge or a jury.   
¶130 That the majority opinion denies the plaintiffs their 
day in court on the merits of their claims conflicts with basic 
concepts of justice and the clear policy of modern law favoring 
access to the courts and adjudication of cases on their merits.22  
¶131 After examining Tietsworth II, the traditional rule 
about a circuit court's power after an appellate decision,  Wis. 
Stat. § 808.08, and the public policy of finality, I conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
the 
authority, 
pursuant 
to 
§ 808.08(3) and paragraphs 36 and 37 of Tietsworth II, to reopen 
the plaintiffs' case to consider amending the pleadings.   
IV 
¶132 Under Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1), a party may seek leave 
of the circuit court at any stage of the proceedings, including 
after judgment, to amend the pleadings "and leave shall be 
freely given at any stage of the action when justice so 
requires" (emphasis added).23 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Gaddis v. La Crosse Products, Inc., 198 
Wis. 2d 396, 407, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996); Schlumpf v. Yellick, 94 
Wis. 2d 504, 511, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980). 
23 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.09 provides in relevant part: 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Amendments.  A party may amend the party's 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time within 
6 months after the summons and complaint are filed or 
within the time set in a scheduling order under s. 
802.10.  Otherwise a party may amend the pleading only 
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given at any stage of 
the action when justice so requires.  A party shall 
plead in response to an amended pleading within 45 
days after service of the amended pleading, or within 
20 days after the service if the proceeding is to 
foreclose or otherwise enforce a lien or security 
interest, unless (a) the court otherwise orders or (b) 
no responsive pleading is required or permitted under 
s. 802.01(1). 
(2) Amendments to conform to the evidence.  If issues 
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings.  Such amendment of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and 
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any 
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to 
so amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues.  If evidence is objected to at the trial 
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by 
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice 
such party in maintaining the action or defense upon 
the merits.  The court may grant a continuance to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(3) Relation back of amendments.  If the claim 
asserted 
in 
the 
amended 
pleading 
arose 
of 
the 
transaction, 
occurrence, 
or 
event 
set 
forth 
or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, 
the amendment relates back to the date of the filing 
of the original pleading.  An amendment changing the 
party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if 
the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the 
period provided by law for commencing the action 
against such party, the party to be brought in by 
amendment has received such notice of the institution 
of the action that he or she will not be prejudiced in 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
27 
 
¶133 Because the majority opinion concludes that the 
circuit court did not have authority to reopen the case for 
purposes of amendment of the complaint, its discussion of Wis. 
Stat. § 802.09 is unnecessary and irrelevant.  
 
¶134 Because I conclude that the circuit court has power 
under Tietsworth II and Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3) to reopen the 
case, I reach the question of the circuit court's power under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) to grant the plaintiffs leave to amend 
their complaint.  
 
¶135 In Mach v. Allison, 2003 WI App 11, 259 Wis. 2d 686, 
656 N.W.2d 766, the court of appeals concluded that the words 
"at any stage of the action" in the present statute mean exactly 
what 
they 
say, 
having 
retained 
the 
previous 
statute's 
application to amendments "before or after judgment."  Mach, 259 
Wis. 2d 686, ¶23.  Mach held that "the statement . . . that a 
trial court may grant a motion to amend, either before or after 
judgment, 
is 
still 
a 
correct 
statement 
of 
the 
law. . . . [W]hether the amendment is before or after judgment 
does have a bearing on what justice requires."  Mach, 259 
Wis. 2d 686, ¶24.  According to Mach, the timing of the motion 
and the reason for not bringing it sooner are relevant factors 
for a circuit court to consider in determining what justice 
requires. 
                                                                                                                                                             
maintaining a defense on the merits, and knew or 
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning 
the identity of the proper party, the action would 
have been brought against such party. 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
28 
 
¶136 Because the circuit court did not exercise its 
discretion under Wis. Stat. § 809.02 in the present case, I 
would remand the cause to the circuit court to exercise its 
discretion.  I disagree with the court of appeals, which 
permitted the amendment of the pleading as a matter of law.  The 
statute commits the decision whether to allow amendment to the 
circuit court's discretion.   
¶137 I would remand the cause to the circuit court to apply 
Mach in exercising its discretion.    
¶138 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the circuit 
court and majority opinion have erred as a matter of law in 
declaring that the circuit court in the present case does not 
have power to reopen the case for amendment of the pleadings.  I 
therefore dissent. 
¶139 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion. 
 
No.  2004AP2655.ssa 
 
 
 
1