Title: Commonwealth v. Holland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-08737
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2017

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SJC-08737 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANIEL L. HOLLAND. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 10, 2016. - April 19, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Home Invasion.  Constitutional Law, Assistance 
of counsel, Fair trial.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Postconviction relief, Assistance of counsel, Fair trial, 
Comment by judge.  Mental Impairment.  Insanity. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 18, 1998. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas E. Connolly, J., and 
motions for a new trial, filed on April 3, 2006, and December 
18, 2008, were heard by him. 
 
 
 
Kevin S. Nixon for the defendant. 
 
Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  On October 13, 1998, the victim was shot to 
death in her home.  A jury convicted the defendant, the victim's 
estranged husband, of murder in the first degree on the theories 
of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
2 
 
armed home invasion.  The defendant appealed from his 
convictions and from the denial of his two motions for a new 
trial.  In his brief on appeal, the defendant argues that the 
trial judge erred in denying his first motion for a new trial on 
the ground that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in failing to investigate and present a defense of 
lack of criminal responsibility.   We affirm his convictions as 
well as the orders denying the motions for a new trial. 
 
Background.  1.  The trial.  Based on the evidence adduced 
at trial, the jury could have found the following facts.  The 
defendant and the victim were married in 1989, and their son was 
born later that year.  A few years later, the couple moved into 
their family home, located in Quincy.  As time progressed, the 
marriage became turbulent and tension grew between the couple.  
In February, 1998, the victim sought and was granted a 
restraining order against the defendant, the terms of which 
required him to vacate the marital home.  For a number of 
months, the defendant stayed with family or friends and later 
moved into an apartment in the Dorchester section of Boston.  In 
September, 1998, the defendant and his then girl friend moved to 
Richmond, New Hampshire, to live with the defendant's uncle. 
 
On the afternoon of the day of the murder, the defendant 
began drinking one hundred proof peppermint schnapps and 
3 
 
ingesting Elavil1, a prescription medication that the defendant 
had found.  Later that evening, the defendant purchased two 
twelve packs of beer, and drove to a nearby bridge where he 
drank the beers, smoked "crack" cocaine, and took more Elavil.  
Next, the defendant drove to a bar just over the Massachusetts 
border where he consumed more alcohol until the bartender 
refused to serve him.  After leaving the bar, he ingested more 
Elavil and smoked crack cocaine and marijuana, before driving to 
Quincy. 
 
The defendant arrived the victim's home between 
approximately 11:30 P.M. and midnight.  He retrieved his golf 
bag, containing golf clubs and a .22 caliber rifle, from the 
trunk of his vehicle.  The defendant had purchased the rifle and 
.22 caliber ammunition a month or so before that night.2  Once on 
the porch, the defendant dropped a can of beer and a straw, and 
used the golf bag to break the front porch window of the home.  
He entered and went up the stairs to the master bedroom where he 
shot the victim with the rifle and beat her with the stock of 
                                                          
 
 
1 Elavil is an antidepressant prescription medication, which 
has sedative effects. 
 
 
2 When purchasing the rifle from a department store, the 
defendant provided several false responses on the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives form that is required 
to secure a firearm.  He falsely indicated that he was neither 
subject to a restraining order nor "under indictment or 
information in any court" for which he could be imprisoned for 
more than one year. 
4 
 
the rifle until it broke into pieces.  At around 8:30 A.M. the 
next day, the victim's eight year old son discovered his 
mother's body in the bedroom. 
 
The victim suffered gunshot wounds to her chest and 
abdomen, multiple lacerations on her head caused by blunt force 
trauma, and abrasions on her back.  The cause of death was 
multiple gunshot wounds. 
 
Following the murder, the defendant drove back to his 
uncle's home.  The defendant spoke with his uncle briefly and 
then got into bed with his girl friend.  She noticed that his 
hands were swollen and had cuts on them.  The defendant 
explained that he had been in a bar fight. 
 
When the defendant and his girl friend awoke on the morning 
of October 14, they packed an overnight bag for a trip to 
Massachusetts, where they planned to go to a bank to get money, 
possibly to leave town.  The girl friend drove while the 
defendant slept in the passenger seat.  The two arrived in 
Braintree at around 5 P.M., after the bank had closed.  
 
After speaking to a longtime friend of the defendant who 
did not want the pair to come to her house, the girl friend 
attempted to hide the vehicle, and ultimately discovered that 
the defendant's golf bag was missing from the trunk.  When she 
asked the defendant if he had killed the victim, he said he was 
not sure, but that he remembered being on the porch of the 
5 
 
victim's home.  After this conversation, the defendant and the 
girl friend planned to go to Florida, where she had family.  The 
defendant ended up driving to Lawrence, where his cousin lived.  
Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and arrested the 
defendant.  During a search of the defendant's vehicle, the 
police found one live round of ammunition; a box of .22 caliber 
ammunition; live rounds of .22 caliber ammunition in the pouch 
of a sweatshirt; and full and empty beer cans that matched the 
brand of beer the defendant had dropped on the porch. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified and presented witnesses 
in support of his mental impairment (diminished capacity) 
defense.3  The defendant and his uncle testified extensively on 
the defendant's drug and alcohol use, beginning when he was 
thirteen years of age.  In his later teen years, the defendant 
was committed to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) because 
of his increasing drug and alcohol use.  Even after his release 
from DYS custody, the defendant consistently used drugs and 
alcohol until he was twenty-four or twenty-five years old.  His 
                                                          
 
 
3 Although the mental impairment is often colloquially 
referred to as "diminished capacity," it is well established 
that "there is no 'diminished capacity' defense in this 
Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 45 n.7 
(2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Hardy, 426 Mass. 725, 729 n.5 
(1998).  However, "[i]n accordance with Commonwealth v. Gould, 
380 Mass. 672, 673 (2005), a defendant 'may produce expert 
testimony on the issue whether or not the impairment of his 
mental processes precluded him from being able to deliberately 
premeditate.'"  Companonio, supra. 
6 
 
drug use abated for a period of time after meeting and marrying 
the victim. 
 
The defendant acknowledged that, in February, 1998, he had 
to vacate the marital home because, following an argument, the 
victim obtained a restraining order against him.  After staying 
with his parents for a few weeks, the defendant left their home 
and moved in with friend who lived in New Hampshire.  During 
this time, the defendant used alcohol and drugs, including 
cocaine, prescription pills, sleeping pills, mushrooms, and 
marijuana.  In March, 1998, after the defendant met and began 
dating his girl friend, his drug use "got out of control."  The 
defendant's longtime friend testified that because of the 
restraining order and issues concerning the custody of the 
defendant's son, the defendant was "upset," "confused," and 
"stressing out," and began drinking more heavily, partying, and 
using crack cocaine and other drugs. 
 
A few months after meeting his girl friend, the defendant 
moved with her into an apartment in Dorchester.  While living 
there, the defendant's job performance began to suffer, and he 
was referred to the Employee Assistance Program.  According to 
the program counsellor, the defendant appeared depressed, upset, 
and emotional.  Although the defendant admitted that he drank 
some alcohol during the week, the defendant did not mention his 
drug use. 
7 
 
 
The program counsellor referred the defendant to a 
therapist, Dr. John D. Eckelman, who assisted the defendant in 
obtaining paid stress leave from work.  While on leave, the 
defendant's drug use increased to the point where he was 
drinking alcohol and using drugs all day.  Although the 
defendant was receiving his salary while on paid leave, he took 
out a $20,000 loan against his retirement savings plan, using 
the money to pay legal bills and rent for the Dorchester 
apartment, and to purchase drugs. 
 
In August, 1998, the defendant lost visitation rights with 
his son and sunk deeper into drug and alcohol use.  On August 
31, 1998, the defendant went to a hospital emergency room, and 
checked himself in to a detoxification facility known as NORCAP, 
where he remained for approximately ten days.  Shortly after 
leaving the detoxification facility, however, the defendant 
returned to his Dorchester apartment and resumed using drugs and 
alcohol.  He missed two appointments with his employee 
assistance therapist.  Although the defendant was supposed to 
return to work in August, 1998, he failed to do so. 
 
Throughout September, 1998, the defendant continued to use 
drugs and alcohol in increasing amounts and contemplated 
suicide.  After exhausting his retirement loan funds, the 
defendant was unable to pay rent and was evicted from his 
apartment.  The defendant and his girl friend moved in with the 
8 
 
defendant's uncle in Richmond, New Hampshire.  There, the 
defendant continued to use drugs:  crack cocaine, Klonopin, 
Valium, painkillers, and alcohol.  According to the defendant's 
uncle, the defendant was "pretty well burned out" and "loaded" 
in the days leading up to the murder. 
 
Dr. Robert H. Joss, the defendant's retained expert and a 
forensic psychologist, opined that the defendant's drug and 
alcohol use on the day of the murder impaired his "ability . . . 
to carry out planful action" at that time.  Joss added that the 
level of drugs and alcohol ingested by the defendant that day 
would have impaired his executive functioning, and would be 
"consistent with [the defendant] suffering blackouts." 
 
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called Dr. John D. Eckelman, 
the therapist to whom the defendant was referred by his employee 
assistance counsellor.  Eckelman testified that during their 
sessions, the defendant discussed his marital issues and 
admitted to feeling "very stressed and pressured" in his 
relationship with the victim.  Although the defendant admitted 
to Dr. Eckelman that he drank during the week, the defendant 
apparently did not mention drug use.  The Commonwealth also 
called Dr. Malcolm P. Rogers, a forensic psychiatrist with 
expertise in the effects of drug and alcohol consumption on the 
central nervous system.  After interviewing the defendant and 
reviewing relevant records, Dr. Rogers opined that the defendant 
9 
 
"did not have any significant cognitive deficits" on October 13, 
1998, and that the defendant had the capacity to form the 
specific intent kill the victim. 
 
2.  First motion for a new trial.  In April, 2006, after 
filing a timely notice of appeal in this court, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to "investigate or 
develop a defense of lack of criminal responsibility stemming 
from defendant's history of mental illness and from defendant's 
drug and alcohol intoxication."4  We remanded the motion to the 
Superior Court.  Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial 
judge denied the defendant's motion without specifically 
addressing the merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Where a defendant has 
been convicted of murder in the first degree, we review his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to determine whether counsel's action, or the failure to 
act, created a "substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice," a standard more favorable to the defendant than the 
constitutional standard otherwise applied under Commonwealth v. 
                                                          
 
 
4 The defendant filed a second motion for a new trial 
claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial.  He does not press the denial of this second motion for a 
new trial in this appeal.  Nonetheless, we have reviewed the 
issue pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
10 
 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 
Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  We focus 
more broadly on whether there was error, rather than on the 
"adequacy of counsel's performance."  Id. at 682.  If there was 
error, the defendant will meet his burden to establish a 
"substantial likelihood of a miscarriage" of justice only if the 
error "was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  
Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 472 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wright, supra.  "Where a new trial is sought 
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
burden of proving ineffectiveness rests with the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 673 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 755 (2008). 
 
2.  Trial counsel's failure to investigate and develop a 
lack of criminal responsibility defense.  a.  Failure to 
investigate.  The defendant recounts a litany of claimed lapses 
in making the case that counsel failed to investigate the 
possibility that at the time of the murder, the defendant 
suffered from a mental illness that would support and compel a 
lack of criminal responsibility defense.  In particular, he 
claims that counsel erred in failing to investigate (1) the 
defendant's self-reporting of a diagnosis, made some seventeen 
years earlier, of mental illness (schizophrenia) and "organic 
brain abnormality"; (2) facts contained in the homicide 
11 
 
investigation reports suggesting that the defendant was mentally 
ill;5 (3) a statement from his girl friend that the defendant, on 
the day after the murder, told her "it had seemed like a bad 
dream"; (4) the defendant's report to his investigator that he 
was in a "dreamlike" state; (5) the defendant's statement to the 
Commonwealth's examining psychiatrist that he remembered being 
on the porch but he could not recall if it was a dream or 
reality; (6) the defendant's statement during the competency 
evaluation that he "hears screaming"; (7) a statement to the on-
call employee assistance therapist on August 31, 1998, that he 
was having "crazy thoughts"; and (8) progress notes from the 
Norfolk County jail where the defendant was being held pending 
trial.  These lapses, he argues, are of such moment that the 
judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial.  We disagree. 
 
"Failure to investigate an insanity defense [falls] below 
the level of competence demanded of attorneys, if facts known 
to, or accessible to, trial counsel raised a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's mental condition."  Commonwealth v. Roberio, 
428 Mass. 278, 279-280 (1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 245 (2003), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 458-459 (1984).  
Thus, a duty to investigate an insanity defense arises when 
counsel is aware of information suggesting at least the 
                                                          
 
 
5 The defendant does not specify, in his brief, the facts 
upon which this contention is based. 
12 
 
viability of a lack of criminal responsibility defense.  
Roberio, supra at 280.  We consider next the information 
available to trial counsel and whether counsel acted reasonably 
in response to that information. 
 
The defendant's assertion that he had a history of mental 
illness that warranted further investigation is not borne out by 
the record.  What counsel knew from the defendant and others he 
consulted during his preparation for trial was not of sufficient 
clarity or certainty to create a "reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's mental condition."  Roberio, 428 Mass. at 280.  At 
best, counsel was aware that the defendant believed that he 
suffered from a mental illness.  The only evidence of this 
condition was the defendant's self-reporting and his uncle's 
claim that he suffered from mental illness and an "organic brain 
abnormality," both discovered when he was committed to DYS and 
hospitalized seventeen years earlier.  Even if the evidence had 
established that the defendant suffered from psychotic episodes 
or some other mental illness when he was an adolescent, 
seventeen years prior to the murder, counsel had no basis to 
assume a connection between his mental condition as a teenager 
and his mental condition at the time of the murder.  See 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 225-226 (2005) (suicide 
attempt and military discharge occurring thirteen years before 
13 
 
victim's killing insufficient to suggest potential insanity 
defense). 
 
In the motion for a new trial, the defendant claimed that 
certain facts discovered during the homicide investigation 
should have alerted counsel to the need to investigate a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense.  Because the defendant has not 
informed us of those facts, we cannot determine whether, with 
knowledge of those facts, counsel would be compelled to consider 
the defense. 
 
The statements from those persons in close contact with the 
defendant, both before and after the murder, are scant evidence 
that the defendant may have lacked criminal responsibility when 
he killed the victim.  These statements do not necessarily 
signify mental illness.  Instead, they may just as easily 
manifest profound regret that a life has been taken in so brutal 
a fashion. 
 
Last, the defendant's reliance on progress notes from the 
health services for the Norfolk County sheriff's office also 
fails to advance his argument.  The progress notes report that 
the defendant was "quite anxious," had "excessive dwelling on 
. . . problems," "low energy," "variable sleep," and "racing 
thoughts on other problems."6  Similarly, a September, 1998, 
                                                          
 
 
6 Intake forms from the defendant's detoxification facility, 
NORCAP, list a litany of symptoms as an option for "[c]hief 
14 
 
discharge summary from NORCAP noted that the facility's 
psychiatrists thought the defendant had "dysthymia"7 and "some 
mood swings," and prescribed an antidepressant medication.  The 
report also noted, "[m]ini mental normal," "[n]eurological 
negative."  Notably, the discharge summary discharge disposition 
reflected only follow up with a primary care physician.  As we 
have stated previously, "a decision not to pursue an insanity 
defense for tactical reasons, for instance because in the 
circumstances the defense would be factually weak, is not 
tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel."  Spray, 467 
Mass. at 473. 
 
Given the dearth of information suggesting even the 
possibility of a viable lack of criminal responsibility defense, 
we discern no basis to conclude that trial counsel was obliged 
to embark on a futile journey into the realm of an insanity 
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 15 (2015) 
(Hines, J., concurring) (rejecting proposition that defense 
counsel must "pursue a full scale mental evaluation in every 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[c]omplaint," including but not limited to hallucinations, 
delusions, severe agitation, manic behavior, and bizarre 
behavior, but only "depression," "ETOH dependence," and "drug 
dependence" were marked for the defendant. 
 
 
7 Dysthymia is mild depression or a chronic, more persistent 
depression that is not of the same severity as a major 
depression. 
15 
 
case where the facts or the defendant's background suggests only 
a hint of a mental issue"). 
 
Even if counsel was obligated to investigate the 
defendant's mental history, trial counsel was not culpably 
derelict in handling the issue of the defendant's mental 
condition at the time of the murder.  Leading up to the trial, 
the defendant was represented by three different attorneys.  
Although these attorneys, both retained and appointed, did not 
do all that the defendant demanded, they took appropriate and 
necessary steps to investigate the defendant's mental history 
and the possibility of a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Candelario, 446 Mass. 847, 857-858 
(2006).  Trial counsel had the benefit of these efforts in 
preparing the defense offered at trial. 
 
The defendant's first attorney retained Dr. Harold R. 
Rosenblatt, a specialist in internal medicine and addiction 
medication at the Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital, to assess 
the impact that drugs and alcohol may have had on the 
defendant's mental state at the time of the murder.  Although 
privately retained, this attorney also filed a motion for funds 
for electroencephalogram (EEG) and computerized tomography (CT) 
testing of the defendant's brain functioning.  Dr. Rosenblatt 
did not testify at trial, but the first attorney's pretrial 
disclosure indicated that Dr. Rosenblatt was prepared to opine 
16 
 
on the effect of drugs and alcohol on the defendant's ability to 
form a specific intent to kill. 
 
The defendant's second attorney requested and received 
authorization from the trial court judge to retain a 
psychiatrist to examine the defendant.8  Prior to his withdrawal 
from the case,9 this attorney, at the defendant's insistence, 
also filed a motion for funds to hire a neurologist to evaluate 
the defendant for his claimed "brain abnormality."  In 
advocating for the testing, defense counsel explained that 
although no medical professional recommended the testing, he 
sought funds because "[the defendant] feels and strongly 
suspects that he suffers from a brain abnormality, which if 
[sic] could be explored and shown to be true would then allow a 
him a full-blown insanity defense."  Noting that the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
8 Although the judge allowed the defendant's motion in the 
amount of $5,000 in October, 2000, defense counsel represented 
to the judge that the funds allotted were insufficient to hire a 
psychiatrist.  This attorney, who was personally selected by the 
defendant for appointment by the court, withdrew from the case 
after the defendant represented to the judge that the 
relationship had broken down over the defense of the case. 
 
 
9 The defendant filed an oral motion to "discharge" his 
attorney due to a "breakdown of [the attorney-client 
relationship] with regard [the defendant's] defense."  The 
attorney assisting the defendant's second defense attorney 
stated that he was in communication with forensic psychologist 
Dr. Robert Joss and a neuropsychologist to explore the impact 
that prolonged substance abuse may have had on the defendant's 
brain, but did not move forward with the process because he was 
not primary counsel on the case.  After several disruptions by 
the defendant, the judge granted defense counsel's motion to 
withdraw. 
17 
 
presented no evidence (medical or otherwise), beyond his own 
belief, that he suffered from an brain abnormality, the judge 
denied the motion. 
 
In December, 2000, the judge appointed the third attorney, 
who eventually tried the case.  At counsel's urging, the judge 
ordered the defendant to undergo EEG testing and a CT scan.  
Neither test yielded abnormal results.  Beyond these tests, 
trial counsel also took steps to have the defendant evaluated to 
determine whether he was competent to stand trial.  A few days 
before the defendant's scheduled trial date, trial counsel filed 
a motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15, and, in "an exercise of extreme caution," the judge 
granted the motion. 
 
After evaluating the defendant, the director of forensic 
services at Bridgewater State Hospital determined that the 
defendant was not suffering from a major mental illness and that 
he was competent to stand trial.  Other tests suggested that the 
defendant was possibly "exaggerat[ing] or malingering."10  This 
doctor noted: 
 
"In my opinion, [the defendant's] behavioral 
outbursts, bouts of uncooperativeness with attorneys, 
insistency that his wife is not dead, and rigidity and 
                                                          
 
 
10 Indeed, while awaiting trial in pretrial detention, the 
defendant told his girl friend during telephone conversations 
that if he went to Bridgewater State Hospital, it would be 
"easier," the food would be better, and he would be able to give 
her a hug. 
18 
 
stubbornness about these issue[s] make him [a] problematic 
defendant, but not an incompetent one.  His difficulties 
are not born of a mental illness or mental defect, but 
rather reflect a man who is desperately trying to avoid 
reality, of which he is well aware." 
 
Following a hearing on competency, the judge found the defendant 
competent to stand trial. 
 
Considering the totality of the information available to 
counsel, the record is devoid of evidence that even remotely 
suggests a more comprehensive investigation would have revealed 
evidence supporting an insanity defense.  See Walker, 443 Mass. 
at 225-226.  Accordingly, trial counsel's decision to forgo 
further investigation of a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense based on mental illness was not error. 
 
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that he 
was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate the  
information that counsel would have discovered if the claimed 
lapses had not occurred.  Rather than showing prejudice, 
however, this information shows that it would not have made a 
difference in the viability of a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense.  A July, 1981, DYS psychiatric evaluation noted that 
the defendant described "recurrent experience of 
depersonalization" and "paranoid delusions," but also noted that 
the defendant's "[r]eality testing was intact and there were no 
indications of thought disorder."  Although the evaluation 
concludes that the defendant was "bordering on psychotic 
19 
 
decompensation" and recommended that he undergo further 
psychiatric treatment, nothing in the evaluation suggests that 
the defendant was ever diagnosed with a mental illness.  
Similarly, absent from the September, 1981, follow up DYS report 
detailing the defendant's treatment plan is the suggestion that 
the defendant suffered from a mental illness. 
 
The defendant also points to certain DYS records indicating 
that he was an inpatient at a hospital in August, 1981.11  In his 
affidavit, the defendant asserts that the EEG test administered 
at the hospital he was sent to by DYS "indicated possible 
schizophrenia."  However, as is clear from Dr. Joss's affidavit, 
EEG testing will not show schizophrenia.  Therefore, the records 
would have provided little if any insight into whether the 
defendant suffered from such a mental illness, evidence that 
could have triggered an obligation to further investigate the 
issue.  See Roberio, 428 Mass. at 279-280. 
 
The defendant's reliance on seventeen year old DYS and 
related hospital records is not persuasive.  At most, the 
records reflect only a suggestion that the defendant may have 
suffered from a mental illness as an adolescent.  The defendant 
was thirty-four at the time of the murder.  Moreover, the 
defendant's EEG and CT scans showed no abnormalities.  Beyond 
                                                          
 
 
11 Although this hospital confirmed that the defendant was 
an inpatient, the facility was unable to locate his charts. 
20 
 
indicating that the defendant appeared to exhibit signs of 
depression and to be upset, tired, and emotional, neither the 
employee assistance counsellor nor Dr. Eckelman's testimony 
suggested that the defendant was suffering from a mental 
illness. 
 
3.  Reasonableness of trial counsel's strategic decision.  
Where the claimed ineffectiveness is the result of a tactical 
decision of counsel, the defendant will prevail only if he 
demonstrates that counsel's tactical choice was "manifestly 
unreasonable" (citation omitted).  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 674.  
As a threshold matter, we do not doubt that trial counsel's 
decision to forgo a lack of criminal responsibility defense in 
favor of a mental impairment defense was a tactical choice.  In 
January, 2001, trial counsel filed a notice of intent to present 
an insanity defense.  However, at trial, counsel noted, "I 
deliberately stayed as far away from the issue of insanity as I 
could" because "I do not know if I have it," and eventually 
chose to withdraw that defense. 
 
Based on what we have said about the lack of evidentiary 
support for a lack of criminal responsibility defense, we are 
persuaded that counsel's strategic decision was not manifestly 
unreasonable.  "[A] decision not to pursue an insanity defense 
for tactical reasons . . . is not tantamount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel."  Spray, 467 Mass. at 473. 
21 
 
 
Two principles guide the "manifestly unreasonable" test.  
First, "we evaluate the [strategic or tactical] decision at the 
time it was made, and make 'every effort . . . to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight.'"  Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 
Mass. 836, 843 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Fenton F., 442 
Mass. 31, 38 (2004).  Second, "[s]ubstantively, [o]nly strategy 
and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and skill in 
criminal law would not consider competent are manifestly 
unreasonable" (quotations omitted).  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 
674, quoting Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 186-187 
(2005). 
 
Although there was little evidence that the defendant 
suffered from a mental illness at the time of the murder, there 
was substantial evidence of the defendant's alcohol and drug 
use.  Defense counsel had information from the defendant, a 
close relative, and close friends regarding his history of drug 
and alcohol use.  Trial counsel also had access to records from 
the defendant's stay at NORCAP and from the counselling sessions 
with Dr. Eckelman.  Indeed, other than a mental impairment 
defense based on the defendant's drug and alcohol use, counsel 
had no other option. 
 
As we have stated, "reasonableness does not demand 
perfection."  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 674.  Rather, "the 
manifestly unreasonable test . . . is essentially a search for 
22 
 
rationality in counsel's strategic decisions, taking into 
account all the circumstances known or that should have been 
known to counsel in the exercise of his duty to provide 
effective representation."  Id. at 674-675.  "The deference we 
give to defense counsel's strategic judgment in determining 
whether it was manifestly unreasonable reflects the strong 
presumption that counsel knows best how to defend a client."  
Glover, 459 Mass. at 843.  Although trial counsel's strategic 
choice failed to yield a favorable disposition for the 
defendant, nevertheless, we cannot conclude that it was 
manifestly unreasonable or inconsistent with what "'lawyers of 
ordinary training and skill in criminal law' would deem to be 
competent."  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 675, quoting Pillai, 445 
Mass. at 186-187. 
 
4.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In his appeal, 
the defendant raises only the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim discussed above.  Nevertheless, pursuant to our 
obligations under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we examine the "whole 
case for its consideration of the law and the evidence."  G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 166-
167 (1978). 
 
a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel in the presentation 
of the mental impairment defense.  Although the defendant did 
not argue in his motion for a new trial that counsel's 
23 
 
presentation of the mental impairment defense based on drug and 
alcohol use was inadequate, he asserts the point indirectly in 
this appeal from the denial of the first motion for new trial.  
Nonetheless, we consider the issue in our G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
review in which the inquiry is whether counsel's performance in 
presenting the mental impairment defense resulted in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
We conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate 
that better preparation of the mental impairment defense would 
have produced more persuasive testimony from Dr. Joss or more 
convincing evidence of mental impairment.  In analyzing defense 
counsel's presentation of the defense of mental impairment, we 
"evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."  
Lang, 473 Mass. at 21 (Lenk, J., concurring), quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
 
At trial, defense counsel presented the testimony of the 
defendant's uncle, with whom the defendant lived prior to the 
murder, and the defendant's longtime friend, both of whom 
testified to the defendant's extensive and consistent history of 
drug and alcohol use.  Trial counsel also vigorously cross-
examined the defendant's girl friend regarding the defendant's 
history of drug and alcohol use.  Additionally, the defendant 
testified at length to his drug and alcohol use both 
historically and on the day of the victim's killing. 
24 
 
 
Beyond the defendant's testimony and the testimony of the 
lay witnesses, trial counsel introduced expert testimony from 
Dr. Joss, a forensic psychologist experienced in evaluating 
individuals in the area of criminal responsibility and 
competency to stand trial.  In support of his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant points out that 
defense counsel waited until after trial had begun to contact 
Dr. Joss and failed to provide him pertinent written records.  
Further, the defendant notes that Dr. Joss interviewed him a 
mere four days before Dr. Joss testified.  Although we are 
troubled by trial counsel's unorthodox approach of preparing Dr. 
Joss for trial at what can unarguably be described as the 
eleventh hour, ultimately the issue is not what it took to 
accomplish the task but whether it was accomplished.  
Notwithstanding trial counsel's ill-advised timing with respect 
to contacting Dr. Joss, the testimony as to the defendant's 
mental impairment on the day of the murder was adequate for its 
purpose. 
 
Dr. Joss opined that, based on the various substances that 
the defendant ingested, including large quantities of alcohol, 
prescription medications, crack cocaine, and marijuana, the 
defendant was "impaired in his ability to plan [and] to carry 
out planful action" on October 13, 1998.  Moreover, Dr. Joss 
opined that the amount of drugs and alcohol the defendant 
25 
 
ingested on the night of the victim's killing was "consistent 
with suffering blackouts."  Importantly, Joss explained to the 
jury the difference between the effect of drugs and alcohol on 
cognitive function versus motor function, a topic on which the 
Commonwealth focused in its cross-examination.  Specifically, he 
explained that a person may be able to maintain motor 
coordination "reasonably well," yet be deficient in other 
aspects of cognitive function.  Thus, Dr. Joss opined that 
although a person's mental state may be impaired, he may still 
retain the physical coordination to move or travel. 
 
To arrive at his opinion Dr. Joss interviewed the defendant 
for ninety minutes and examined myriad written materials, 
including the defendant's thirty-one page narrative of his drug 
and alcohol abuse throughout his life, Dr. Rogers's two 
evaluations, records from a "private, live-in school" where the 
defendant resided for a period of time as an adolescent, and 
medical records from the defendant's visit to a hospital 
emergency room visit in August, 1998.  Moreover, the record 
suggests that even though trial counsel did not ultimately 
secure Dr. Joss as an expert until midtrial, trial counsel had 
been in contact with Joss well before the trial commenced.12 
                                                          
 
 
12 In fact, Dr. Joss was among the specialists with whom the 
defendant's second set of trial counsel communicated in order to 
explore the issue whether the defendant suffered from an organic 
26 
 
 
Given Dr. Joss's testimony as to the defendant's mental 
state at the time of the victim's killing, along with the 
extensive lay witness testimony as to the defendant's use of 
drugs and alcohol, we conclude that trial counsel's preparation 
and presentation of the mental impairment defense was not 
inadequate such that it was likely to have influenced the jury's 
verdict. 
 
b.  Closed court room.  We have considered the issue raised 
in the defendant's second motion for a new trial and "conclude 
that the motion judge properly determined that the defendant had 
not borne his burden of demonstrating that the court room was 
closed during any portion of the jury selection, because the 
defendant offered no evidence indicating that the court room was 
closed by any specific order or that court officers ever told 
anyone to leave."  Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 31 
(2015).  Moreover, the defendant failed to object to the alleged 
court room closure during trial and declined to raise the issue 
on direct appeal, therefore it is deemed procedurally waived.  
See Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 622 (2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
317 (2015). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
brain syndrome due to a period of prolonged substance abuse.  
See note 9, supra. 
27 
 
 
c.  The trial judge's comments to defense counsel.  We also 
briefly address the trial judge's interactions with defense 
counsel in the presence of the jury.  On two occasions the judge 
made comments during trial that, according to defense counsel, 
suggested to the jury that the judge had an opinion in the case 
or negatively characterized defense counsel's behavior.  As we 
have stated, "a judge need take no vow of silence.  He is there 
to see that justice is done, or at least to see that the jury 
have a fair chance to do justice. . . .  The judge ought not let 
the jury be diverted from the real issue" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Haley, 363 Mass. 513, 519 (1973).  Based on our 
review of the transcript, we conclude that the trial judge 
adequately "[trod] the narrow path that lies between 
meddlesomeness . . . and ineffectiveness" (citation omitted).  
Id. at 519.  Throughout the trial, the judge was generally 
respectful and patient with both parties, reserving most 
colloquies between the parties and the court for sidebar.  
Although the judge may have gently rebuked defense counsel on 
occasion, we conclude that the comments did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See id. at 
521 ("A judge may warn or rebuke counsel in a proper case").  
Moreover, in an abundance of caution, the judge twice gave 
28 
 
curative instructions reminding the jury that he was neutral on 
the issue and had no opinion regarding the facts of the case.13 
 
Conclusion.  Having reviewed the entire record and the 
briefs on appeal, we see no reason to reduce the verdict or 
grant a new trial.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions and the orders denying his motions for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
13 The trial judge instructed, "If I have said or done 
anything to cause you to believe that I have any opinion 
concerning the facts in this case, you are mistaken because I am 
totally neutral on this issue.  It is your decision, not mine, 
to determine whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of 
proof."