Title: Varga v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992681
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2000

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
JOHN JAMES VARGA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 992681 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  November 3, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court in 1998 
properly convicted a defendant of driving after being declared 
an habitual offender under Code § 46.2-357(A) (formerly Code 
§ 46.1-387.8), relying upon a 1984 order by which the defendant 
was declared an habitual offender. 
BACKGROUND 
 
By order entered on December 13, 1984, the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County, the trial court, declared John James Varga an 
habitual offender pursuant to the provisions of former Code 
§ 46.1-387.2.1  The order stated, in pertinent part, that “John 
Varga, is hereby DECLARED to be a Habitual Offender and [his] 
                     
1Subsequent to the entry of this order, Title 46.1 was 
superseded by Title 46.2.  Code § 46.2-351, the successor 
statute to former Code § 46.1-387.2, was subsequently repealed 
effective July 1, 1999; however, the status of persons declared 
habitual offenders prior to that date was not affected by the 
repeal.  Relevant to the issue raised in this appeal, there is 
no material change between the former and current versions of 
the statutes we address in this opinion.  Accordingly, we will 
refer herein to the current version of these statutes. 
 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, BE and is HEREBY REVOKED.” 
 
On June 23, 1986, Varga was convicted of driving after 
having been declared an habitual offender.  He was next 
convicted of driving while intoxicated on June 23, 1988.  And 
then, on August 29, 1994, Varga was again convicted of driving 
after being adjudicated an habitual offender. 
 
Thereafter, Varga took no steps to have his driving 
privileges restored, but continued to operate a motor vehicle on 
the public highways of the Commonwealth.  On January 3, 1998, a 
police officer of the Fairfax County police department, on 
routine patrol, observed the vehicle operated by Varga drifting 
across both northbound lanes of travel.  The officer arrested 
Varga for driving while intoxicated. 
Subsequently, Varga was indicted for driving after being 
declared an habitual offender.  Approximately four days before 
trial, Varga moved to quash the indictment, arguing that the 
1984 order declaring him an habitual offender was no longer 
effective because that order had been entered more than ten 
years previously and it did not state that he would remain an 
habitual offender until his privilege to drive was restored.  
Varga contended that Code § 46.2-356, which restricts the 
issuance of a license to drive motor vehicles to a person 
previously declared an habitual offender for a period of ten 
 
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years after being so declared, effectively limits the term of an 
habitual offender order to a ten year period unless the express 
terms of the order state otherwise.  The trial court denied 
Varga’s motion. 
 
During a subsequent bench trial, Varga renewed his motion 
to quash and, at the close of the Commonwealth’s case, moved to 
strike the evidence.2  In support of his motions, Varga 
essentially repeated his prior arguments.  The trial court 
denied both motions and convicted Varga under Code § 46.2-357(A) 
of driving after being adjudicated an habitual offender.  By 
order entered on June 8, 1998, the court sentenced Varga to 
imprisonment for a term of five years. 
Varga appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
contending that the trial court erred in denying his motions to 
quash and to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence.  The Court of 
Appeals rejected Varga’s contentions and affirmed the conviction 
in an unpublished memorandum opinion.  Varga v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 1490-98-4 (October 19, 1998).  We awarded Varga this 
appeal. 
                     
2Varga pleaded guilty to the DWI charge and was sentenced to 
incarceration for a term of twelve months on that charge. 
 
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Code § 46.2-357(A) defines the felony of driving after 
being declared an habitual offender.  In pertinent part, Code 
§ 46.2-357(A) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person 
to drive any motor vehicle . . . on the highways of the 
Commonwealth while the revocation of the person’s driving 
privilege remains in effect.”  Under Code § 46.2-358, any person 
declared an habitual offender “five years from the date of any 
final order . . . may petition the court . . . for restoration 
of his privilege to drive a motor vehicle” at which time the 
court may “restore to the person the privilege to drive . . . or 
. . . order that the person be issued a restricted license to 
drive.”  See also Code §§ 46.2-359 to -361 (permitting at any 
time the restoration of conditional driving privileges of 
certain persons declared habitual offenders).  In contrast, Code 
§ 46.2-356 states that a person declared an habitual offender 
shall not be issued a license to drive “for a period of ten 
years from the date of any [such] final order . . . and . . . 
until the privilege of the person to drive . . . has been 
restored by an order of a court entered in a proceeding as 
provided in this article.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Varga relies primarily on Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 
App. 246, 402 S.E.2d 711 (1991), to support his contention that 
the 1984 order declaring him an habitual offender was no longer 
 
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effective.  In pertinent part, the order in Davis stated:  “The 
Court doth ADJUDGE, ORDER, and DECREE that said Calvin Windell 
Davis is such an ‘habitual offender’ as is set forth in Section 
46.1-387.2 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, and that 
his driving privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state 
is revoked for a period of ten (10) years from the date of this 
order.”  12 Va. App. at 247 n.2, 402 S.E.2d at 712 n.2.  The 
Court of Appeals held that this order “revoked Davis’ license 
and prohibited him from driving for a period of ten years.”  Id. 
at 249, 402 S.E.2d at 713.  Varga argues that Davis stands for 
the proposition that only in those cases where the order 
contains additional language providing that the order remains in 
force until the habitual offender’s privilege to drive has been 
restored can a person be convicted of driving after having been 
declared an habitual offender after the ten-year period has 
expired.  This is so, Varga asserts, because the ten-year period 
in Code § 46.2-356 implicitly restricts the duration of the 
effectiveness of an habitual offender order which does not 
contain express language extending the effectiveness of the 
order until the person’s driving privilege is restored or for 
some specific period of time in excess of ten years. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the habitual 
offender statutes authorize the appropriate courts to revoke 
indefinitely the driving privilege of an habitual offender and 
 
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to restore that privilege at certain times and under certain 
conditions.  The Commonwealth further asserts that the ten-year 
limitation for the issuance of an operator’s license to an 
habitual offender contained in Code § 46.2-356 does not restrict 
that authority.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
Reading the habitual offender statutes in pari materia, it 
is clear that once a person is declared an habitual offender by 
order of a trial court, he retains that status and loses his 
driving privilege for so long as the order is effective.  Thus, 
unless the trial court specifically limits the duration of the 
effect of the order, as was the case in Davis, the habitual 
offender status of the person so declared continues until that 
person successfully petitions the court to have that status 
removed and his privilege to drive restored under one of the 
code sections permitting such petitions.  See Manning v. 
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 252, 255-56, 468 S.E.2d 705, 707 
(1996). 
Code § 46.2-356 does not restrict the effectiveness of a 
trial court’s order declaring a person an habitual offender to a 
period of ten years.  To the contrary, by use of the conjunctive 
“and,” the statute is clear that both the passage of ten years 
from the entry of the order declaring the person an habitual 
offender and the restoration of the privilege to drive by the 
trial court are prerequisites to the issuance of a new, 
 
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unrestricted license by the Commissioner of the Department of 
Motor Vehicles.  While a person declared an habitual offender 
may successfully petition to have his privilege to drive 
restored and obtain a license to drive after this ten-year 
period, or sooner under the specific circumstances contemplated 
by Code §§ 46.2-358 to –361, the mere passage of the period of 
time required before seeking to have that privilege restored 
does not act to vitiate the effectiveness of the order which 
revoked that privilege initially.  Thus, we hold that, in the 
absence of express language limiting the duration of the effect 
of the order declaring a person an habitual offender, the order 
remains in force until that person actually has his privilege to 
drive restored.  In the present case, Varga had not had his 
privilege to drive restored and, thus, the 1984 order remained 
in effect.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly held 
that Varga was properly convicted for driving after having been 
declared an habitual offender when he drove his motor vehicle in 
1998. 
 
Our holding today ensures that the policies of the habitual 
offender statutes can be effectuated by the orders issued by 
Virginia courts.  We have explained the purposes behind the 
habitual offender statutes as follows:  
 
Virginia’s Habitual Offender Act declared it to 
be the policy of the state to provide maximum safety 
for all persons using the highways; to deny the 
 
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privilege of operating motor vehicles to persons who 
by their record have demonstrated their indifference 
to the safety of others and their disrespect for the 
laws of the state and the orders of its courts; to 
discourage repetition of criminal acts by individuals; 
and to impose increased and added deprivation of the 
privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual 
offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of 
violations of traffic laws. 
 
Whorley v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 740, 745-46, 214 S.E.2d 447, 
451 (1975). 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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