Title: REPUBLIC BANK V GENESEE COUNTY TREASURER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 126247
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 2005

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 26, 2005  
REPUBLIC BANK, also known as
D & N BANK, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 126247 
GENESEE COUNTY TREASURER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
PER CURIAM.  
This case concerns the application of two notice 
provisions in the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.1 et 
seq. 
We must determine whether plaintiff may maintain a 
claim under the act on the basis of defendant county 
treasurer’s alleged failure to adequately notify plaintiff 
of a tax foreclosure on a piece of property on which 
plaintiff was the mortgagee. 
The Court of Claims granted 
summary disposition to plaintiff on a finding that the 
notice given was insufficient under the act, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed that decision. We reverse the judgment 
 
 
 
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of 
Claims. 
I 
On August 5, 1999, D & N Bank gave a $490,000 loan to 
Karmo Flint Investment, Inc. 
This loan was secured by a 
mortgage on a gas station located in Grand Blanc Township 
in Genesee County, Michigan. 
The mortgage was recorded 
with the Genesee County Register of Deeds, and it listed D 
& N Bank’s headquarters address in Hancock, Michigan, as 
the proper location for provision of any notice. 
The 
summer taxes on the secured property were due on the day 
the loan was closed. D & N Bank did not deduct the amount 
required to pay the then-delinquent property taxes from the 
funds disbursed to the mortgagor, and those 1999 summer 
taxes were mistakenly never paid. 
All subsequent tax 
assessments were paid by D & N Bank or by plaintiff 
Republic Bank as its successor. 
The dispute between the parties in this case was 
engendered by the mailing of a hearing notice to what 
plaintiff alleges was the wrong address. 
This question of 
the proper address for the notice was a consequence of a 
bank merger that occurred before the mailing. In May 1999, 
D & N Financial Corporation, the holding company of D & N 
Bank, had merged with Republic Bancorp, Inc., the holding 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
company of plaintiff Republic Bank. 
D & N Bank itself was 
subsequently merged into Republic Bank in December 2000. 
D & N Bank had its headquarters in Hancock.  Republic Bank 
has its headquarters in Lansing, Michigan. 
After the bank 
merger, Republic Bank continued to maintain an office at 
the Hancock address. 
In fact, the former president and 
chief executive officer of D & N Financial, who became 
vice-chairman of the board of directors and one of the 
largest shareholders of the merged corporation, maintained 
his office at the Hancock location, as did other corporate 
officers. 
Karmo Flint Investment ultimately defaulted on its 
loan from D & N Bank. On November 1, 2001, a stipulated 
order was entered in a civil action filed by Republic Bank 
(as D & N Bank’s successor) in Oakland Circuit Court. 
The 
order appointed a receiver for the secured property and 
authorized the receiver to take immediate possession and to 
borrow from Republic Bank the funds necessary to pay any 
delinquent and future property taxes. 
Neither D & N Bank nor Republic Bank availed itself of 
the right granted by MCL 211.78a(4) to receive delinquent 
tax notices, and the 1999 summer tax delinquency did not 
come to Republic Bank’s attention. 
Because those taxes 
were 
never 
paid, 
defendant 
Genesee 
County 
Treasurer 
3  
 
 
 
 
commenced foreclosure proceedings on the Grand Blanc 
Township property. 
Defendant did not notify either D & N 
Bank or Republic Bank of the pending forfeiture of the 
property. 
Defendant did send out a notice of show cause 
and judicial foreclosure hearings in January 2002. 
The 
notice 
was 
sent 
by 
certified 
mail, 
return 
receipt 
requested, to the D & N Bank address in Hancock listed on 
the mortgage. 
On January 8, 2002, an employee at the 
Hancock office signed the return receipt. 
According to 
plaintiff, the notice never made it to the appropriate 
personnel at Republic Bank’s Lansing headquarters. 
Republic Bank did not send a representative to appear 
at the foreclosure hearing on February 19, 2002. 
At the 
hearing, the Genesee Circuit Court ordered a judgment of 
foreclosure to be entered on March 1, 2002. 
Pursuant to 
that judgment, title in the property was to be vested in 
defendant if all delinquent taxes were not paid within 
twenty-one days of entry. 
Neither Republic Bank nor the 
receiver of the property paid the delinquent taxes. 
Consequently, defendant obtained title to the property on 
March 23, 2002. 
Upon discovery of the loss of the property, Republic 
Bank filed this action seeking monetary relief in the Court 
of Claims, alleging that defendant had not provided proper 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
notice of the foreclosure proceedings. 
At the close of 
discovery, 
both 
parties 
filed 
motions 
for 
summary 
disposition. 
The Court of Claims denied defendant’s 
motion, and granted plaintiff’s motion, finding that 
defendant had violated two notice provisions in the General 
Property Tax Act, MCL 211.78f and MCL 211.78i. 
The order 
granting plaintiff’s motion was not a final judgment, 
because a hearing to determine plaintiff’s damages was 
still required. 
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal 
with the Court of Appeals, which was granted. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Claims.1  It 
examined what it deemed the unique facts of this case and 
concluded that defendant had given plaintiff insufficient 
notice of the foreclosure proceedings. 
The Court of 
Appeals relied primarily on defendant’s failure to mail the 
notice of show cause and foreclosure proceedings to 
Republic Bank at its Lansing headquarters. 
The Court 
concluded that mailing the notice to the Hancock address 
listed on the mortgage was not reasonably calculated to 
apprise plaintiff of the pendency of the proceedings, as 
required by the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.78i. The 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 27, 2004
(Docket No. 251072). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
Court added that, although defendant’s failure to give 
notice of the threatened forfeiture, as required by MCL 
211.78f, would not, standing alone, give rise to a due 
process claim, it was an important factual consideration in 
the Court’s conclusion that the foreclosure notice failed 
to satisfy the requirements of due process. 
II 
The 
General 
Property 
Tax 
Act 
authorizes 
county 
treasurers to seize tax-delinquent property and sell it at 
auction in order to recover the delinquent taxes. 
It also 
imposes procedural safeguards in order to afford persons 
with an interest in such property an opportunity to be 
heard. 
Among 
those 
safeguards 
are 
various 
notice 
requirements. 
In this case, three provisions of the act 
are particularly relevant. 
As an overall principle, MCL 211.78(2) provides that 
the adequacy of notice under the act is governed by state 
and federal due process standards, rather than by the 
specific provisions of the act. 
The subsection states as 
follows: 
It is the intent of the legislature that the
provisions of this act relating to the return, 
forfeiture, 
and 
foreclosure 
of 
property 
for 
delinquent taxes satisfy the minimum requirements
of due process required under the constitution of
this state and the constitution of the United 
States but that those provisions do not create 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
new rights beyond those required under the state
constitution of 1963 or the constitution of the 
United States. The failure of this state or a 
political subdivision of this state to follow a
requirement of this act relating to the return,
forfeiture, 
or 
foreclosure 
of 
property 
for 
delinquent taxes shall not be construed to create
a claim or cause of action against this state or
a political subdivision of this state unless the
minimum requirements of due process accorded 
under the state constitution of 1963 or the 
constitution of the United States are violated. 
[MCL 211.78(2).] 
MCL 211.78f(1) requires a county treasurer to send 
certain parties notice of the date on which property will 
be forfeited to the county treasurer for unpaid delinquent 
taxes. The subsection states in part as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided in section 79
for certified abandoned property, not later than
the February 1 immediately succeeding the date
that unpaid taxes were returned to the county
treasurer for forfeiture, foreclosure, and sale
under section 60a(1) or (2) or returned to the
county treasurer as delinquent under section 78a,
the county treasurer shall send a notice by
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the
person to whom a tax bill for property returned
for delinquent taxes was last sent and, if 
different, to the person identified as the owner
of property returned for delinquent taxes as 
shown on the current records of the county
treasurer and to those persons identified under
section 78e(2). [MCL 211.78f(1).] 
Plaintiff, as a holder of an undischarged mortgage, is 
an entity identified under section 78e(2).2
 Therefore, 
2 MCL 211.78e(2)(b) lists (i) the owners, (ii) the
holder of any undischarged mortgage, tax certificate issued
under section 71, or other legal interest, (iii) a 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
 
 
plaintiff was entitled to notice under section 78f(1). 
It 
is undisputed that defendant did not provide such notice. 
The lower courts focused on the notice provision of 
MCL 211.78i. 
In January 2002, when defendant sent out its 
notice of show cause and foreclosure hearings, the section 
provided in relevant part as follows:3 
(1) 
Not 
later 
than 
May 
1 
immediately
succeeding the forfeiture of property to the 
county 
treasurer 
under 
section 
78g, 
the 
foreclosing governmental unit shall initiate a
title search to identify the owners of a property
interest in the property who are entitled to
notice under this section of the show cause 
hearing under section 78j and the foreclosure
hearing under section 78k. . . . 
(2) The foreclosing governmental unit or its
authorized representative shall determine the 
address reasonably calculated to apprise those
owners of a property interest of the pendency of
the show cause hearing under section 78j and the
foreclosure hearing under section 78k and shall
send notice of the show cause hearing under 
section 78j and the foreclosure hearing under
section 78k to those owners, to a person entitled
to notice of the return of delinquent taxes under
section 78a(4), and to a person to whom a tax
deed for property returned for delinquent taxes
was issued pursuant to section 72 as determined
by the records of the state treasurer, by
certified mail, return receipt requested, not 
less than 30 days before the show cause hearing.
The failure of the foreclosing governmental unit
to comply with any provision of this section
shall not invalidate any proceeding under this 
subsequent purchaser under any land contract, and (iv) a
person entitled to notice of the return of delinquent taxes
under section 78a(5). 
3 The section was substantially amended by 2003 PA 263. 
8  
 
 
 
act if the owner of a property interest or a
person to whom a tax deed was issued is accorded
the minimum due process required under the state
constitution of 1963 and the constitution of the 
United States. [MCL 211.78i.] 
In short, notice must be sent to an address reasonably 
calculated to apprise the object of notice of the pending 
proceedings, and this requirement must be evaluated in the 
context of affording the object of notice minimal due 
process. 
III 
We will first examine whether defendant failed to 
provide adequate notice under MCL 211.78i. 
As earlier 
noted, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant failed 
to determine the address reasonably calculated to apprise 
Republic Bank of the show cause and foreclosure hearings. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that defendant 
could have found an updated address in the local tax 
records, because plaintiff had paid the property taxes for 
the winter of 1999, the year 2000, and the summer of 2001, 
all before the foreclosure action. 
A search of the tax 
records, said the Court, would have given defendant an 
easily attainable updated address. 
We disagree with this 
analysis. 
In Dow v Michigan, 396 Mich 192; 240 NW2d 450 (1976), 
this Court examined the requirements of due process in the 
9  
 
 
 
 
context of giving notice of a tax sale. 
In Dow the 
question was whether notice by publication was sufficient. 
This 
Court 
found 
that 
such 
notice 
did 
not 
meet 
constitutional standards, and then went on to describe the 
kind of notice that would satisfy due process requirements: 
Personal service is not required. Notice by
mail is adequate. Mailed notice must be directed 
to an address reasonably calculated to reach the
person entitled to notice. 
Mailing should be by
registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, both because of the greater care in 
delivery and because of the record of mailing and
receipt or non-receipt provided. 
Such would be 
the efforts one desirous of actually informing
another might reasonably employ. 
If the state 
exerts 
reasonable 
efforts, 
then 
failure 
to 
effectuate 
actual 
notice 
would 
not 
preclude
foreclosure 
of 
the 
statutory 
lien 
and 
indefeasible vesting of title on expiration of
the redemption period. [396 Mich 211.] 
This analysis was acknowledged by this Court in Smith 
v Cliffs on the Bay Condo Ass’n, 463 Mich 420; 617 NW2d 536 
(2000), which considered a constitutional challenge to the 
procedures by which tax-sale title to a piece of property 
was obtained. 
The notice provision at issue was MCL 
211.131e. 
In Smith, tax notices were sent to the address 
of a corporation as indicated on a quitclaim deed. 
The 
mailing to this last known address was returned by the post 
office as not deliverable. 
The owner contended that under 
this circumstance, the notice was inadequate, and that 
additional efforts should have been undertaken to ascertain 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the owner’s current address. 
This Court disagreed, 
stating: 
In this case there is nothing to indicate 
that the township, county, or state had been
informed of a new address for the association. 
Thus, it was appropriate for notices to be sent
to the Birmingham address stated in the deed
conveying the disputed parcel to the association.
The fact that one of the mailings was returned by
the post office as undeliverable does not impose
on the state the obligation to undertake an 
investigation to see if a new address for the
association could be located. [463 Mich 429.] 
This Court held in Smith that the mailing of tax 
delinquency and redemption notices to a corporation at its 
tax address of record in the manner required by the General 
Property Tax Act was sufficient to provide constitutionally 
adequate notice. 
The Court of Appeals in this case distinguished Smith 
by noting that, here, the municipality had been informed of 
a new address through the fact that plaintiff paid taxes on 
the property under the new name and address.  We do not 
find this distinction significant. First, the record shows 
that plaintiff paid at least some of the post-summer 1999 
property taxes using checks with the Hancock address on 
them. More importantly, this Court indicated in Smith that 
due process does not impose an obligation to undertake 
additional 
investigations, 
when 
an 
address 
has 
been 
provided on the relevant document and that document address 
11  
 
 
 
 
has not been changed. 
We agree with defendant’s argument 
that to require municipalities to keep copies of checks 
that are sent to pay taxes and then compare the addresses 
thereon to those already provided for all property subject 
to foreclosure would place unwarranted burdens on those 
municipalities. 
Here, where defendant relied on the address provided 
in the mortgage recorded with the Genesee County Register 
of Deeds, Republic Bank still operated a branch office at 
that address, and an employee of the bank signed the 
certified mail receipt card at that address, defendant not 
only complied with the minimum requirements of due process, 
but provided plaintiff with actual notice of the hearings. 
Defendant clearly sent notice to “the address reasonably 
calculated to apprise” plaintiff of the hearings. 
Having 
found 
that 
defendant 
complied 
with 
the 
requirements of MCL 211.78i, we must also examine the 
implications of defendant’s failure to provide any notice 
under MCL 211.78f. 
As the Court of Appeals held, such 
failure to give notice would not, standing alone, give rise 
to a due process claim. We agree. As this Court explained 
in Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 102; 580 NW2d 845 
(1998), the critical question for purposes of due process 
is whether an individual has been given a “'meaningful 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
opportunity to be heard . . . .'” 
(Quoting Boddie v 
Connecticut, 401 US 371, 379; 91 S Ct 780; 28 L Ed 2d 113 
[1971].) 
We noted that deprivation of property by 
adjudication must be preceded by notice and opportunity 
appropriate to the nature of the case, and within the 
limits of practicability. 
Here, the minimal requirements of due process were 
satisfied where Republic Blank received constitutionally 
adequate notice of the show cause and forfeiture hearings. 
Due process does not require the advance notice of MCL 
211.78f when a person is given adequate notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard pursuant to MCL 211.78i. 
Such a conclusion is mandated by the above-quoted language 
in MCL 211.78(2). Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred 
in affirming the grant of summary disposition in favor of 
plaintiff in this case. 
We thus reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. This matter is remanded to the Court 
of Claims for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
REPUBLIC BANK, also known as
D & N BANK, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 126247 
GENESEE COUNTY TREASURER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
I agree with the disposition of this case. I continue 
to believe that a significant question exists about the 
constitutionality of the notice provisions of Michigan's 
General Property Tax Act. 
MCL 211.1 et seq.  However, in 
this case, the notice that defendant provided not only 
satisfied the act, it survives constitutional scrutiny. 
A property owner facing foreclosure must be given 
notice that foreclosure proceedings are underway. 
Mullane 
v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 315; 70 S Ct 
652; 94 L Ed 865 (1950); MCL 211.78i(2). 
The property 
owners may not have been given adequate notice in the case 
of Smith v Cliffs on the Bay Condo Ass’n, 463 Mich 420; 617 
NW2d 536 (2000) (Kelly, J., dissenting). There, notice was 
mailed to the owners but returned as undeliverable. 
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
believed that the owners may have been denied due process 
of law and I wrote: 
When the [Department of Treasury] receives
notice 
that 
its 
tax 
bills 
directed 
to 
a 
corporation 
are 
undeliverable 
at 
a 
certain 
address, reasonableness may require one more 
step: 
an 
inquiry 
to 
the 
Corporations 
and 
Securities Bureau to check for a current address.  
[Id. at 433.]  
By contrast, in the present case, defendant Genesee  
County 
Treasurer 
researched 
the 
title 
records 
for 
plaintiff’s 
correct 
address 
and 
sent 
the 
notice 
to 
plaintiff at that address by certified mail. 
Defendant 
received verification that plaintiff had accepted delivery. 
These actions reasonably warned plaintiff that foreclosure 
of the property was about to occur. 
Moreover, plaintiff Republic Bank received actual 
notice of the foreclosure hearing. 
It is the successor to 
D & N Bank's interest, and it continued to maintain an 
office at the address listed in the title records. Its 
employee accepted the notice.1 
It is true that the bank was not given notice as 
required by § 78f of the act, MCL 211.78f. 
However, the 
1 That the notice was misplaced after plaintiff's 
employee accepted it is irrelevant to the question whether
the bank received minimal due process. 
2  
 
 
 
 
notice it received of the show cause hearing and judicial 
forfeiture met the minimum requirements of due process. 
Therefore, I agree that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals should be reversed. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
3