Title: IN RE STEVENSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12956
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 1975

No. 12956 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA I N THE M A T T E R OF RODNEY D E A N STEVENSON, a child under eighteen years of age. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Paul G, Hatf i e l d , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : John M. McCarvel argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Thomas Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana J, Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Norman L. Newhall, 111, argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: May 8, 1975 Decided : JUN I 7 jt~as M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. On the evening of November 9, 1974, Albert Rusch, pro- p r i e t o r of the Rainbow Grocery i n Great F a l l s , Montana, was severely wounded by a shotgun b l a s t during an attempted armed robbery. Three days l a t e r the Great F a l l s c i t y police were informed by a number of individuals t h a t they had some informa- t i o n t o divulge about the crime. On November 13, 14, and 18, sworn statements were taken from f i v e minors and two adults by the deputy county attorney f o r Cascade County. Through t h e use of those statements, Kenneth Kreuger and Rodney Stevenson, both minors, were implicated i n the crime. O n November 15, 1974, a p e t i t i o n was f i l e d i n the youth court f o r t h e purpose of declaring Rodney Stevenson a delinquent youth, pursuant t o section 10-1203 (12) (a), R.C,M, 1947. The sub- stance of t h e p e t i t i o n alleged t h a t Stevenson had committed o r was l e g a l l y accountable f o r the following crimes within t h e meaning of section 94-2-107 (3), R.C.M. 1947: 1) Attempt ------- section 94-4-103, R.C.M. 1947. 2) Robbery-------- section 94-5-401 (1) (a), R.C.M. 1947. 3) Aggravated Assault----- section 94-5-202(1) (a), R.C.M. 1947. A motion requesting t r a n s f e r of Stevenson from youth court2to adult criminal court pursuant t o section 10-1229 ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, accompanied the petition. O n November 21, 1974, a hearing on the t r a n s f e r motion was held and evidence heard. Four days l a t e r the youth court relinquished i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n and transferred the case t o t h e d i s t r i c t court where Stevenson was t o be prosecuted a s an adult. On appeal the principal issue is whether the youth court judge abused his discretion in ordering Stevenson transferred from youth court to adult criminal court pursuant to section 10-1229. We hold the youth court judge abused his discretion in failing to consider all of the criteria established by statute as a prerequisite to a valid transfer order. We remand the cause to the youth court so that all criteria may be properly considered. For a complete understanding of this case, we will review the evidence presented at the transfer hearing. During the hearing, the sworn statements of the five minors and two adults, previously referred to, were introduced into evidence. The contents of those statements were summarized by Norman Newhall 111, the deputy county attorney for Cascade County : "MR. NEWHALL: Now, then, these statements essentially corroborate the same version of what occurred here, including, in particular, statements by Rodney Stevenson to his date of that evening, and his apparent girl friend for sometime, a girl by the name of Susan Ultrainetz, that the boys, Kenneth Kreuger and Rod Stevenson, were that evening together, and they went in Kenneth Kreuger's truck, at approx- imately 7:30 P.M., and they proceeded, by what route I don't know, they eventually proceeded to the Rainbow Grocery. It is unclear from the statements whether there was any casing of the premises by the boys before the actual incident, but essentially what occurred was that Rod Stevenson stayed in the truck, as the driver * * * * " Later in the transcript, Mr. continued: "MR. NEWHALL: In any event Kenneth Kreuger went into the store, the Rainbow Grocery, and he had the shotgun, and the shotgun was fired, and the charge struck Mr. Rusch, two shots, in the back, and then Kenneth ran out of the store, and jumped into the truck, which was being driven by Rod Stevenson, and they proceeded then to the home of Anita Jermolajevs, where they spent most of the rest of that evening, and disbanded sometime around mid- night. Before that time, Rod Stevenson had gone out driving with Sue Ukrainetz, at which time he told her of this incident. That, essentially, is the bare bones of which is contained in those statements. Now, then, other aspects of all of the statements indicate that Rod Stevenson and Kenneth Kreuger had gone out and shot this shotgun on at least one other occasion prior to this in- c&nt, oh, apparently hunting, or whatever they were doing, and the statements a l s o indicate t h a t Rod Stevenson was aware t h a t Kenneth went i n t o t h e s t o r e with the shot- gun, and he was aware, a f t e r t h e incident, t h a t a per- son had been shot, because Kenneth had t o l d him. That w i l l be t h e summary I have of these statements. I t Here, f o r t h e f i r s t time, Stevenson contends the court erred i n receiving these statements i n t o evidence because they were hearsay and, furthermore, t h e i r r e c e i p t i n t o evidence vio- l a t e d c e r t a i n basic l e g a l r i g h t s granted t o minors by section 10- 1218, R.C.M. 1947, W e decline t o r u l e upon t h i s question, absent a proper and timely objection by defense counsel a t t h e hearing. This Court w i l l not consider objections urged f o r the f i r s t t i m e on appeal. State v. Whitcomb, 94 Mont. 415, 22 P.2d 823; Boehler v, Sanders, 146 Mont. 158, 404 P.2d 885; Carpenter v. Free, 138 Mont. 552, 357 P.2d 882; Bower v. Tebbs, 132 Mont. 146, 314 P.2d 731. A t the hearing Jack Macek, a detective with the Great F a l l s police department, t e s t i f i e d as t o the circumstances surrounding the crime and t h e subsequent investigation which led t o t h e apprehension of Kreuger and Stevenson. D. W. Avery, Jr., chief youth probation o f f i c e r f o r Cascade County, t e s t i f i e d a s t o stevenson's p r i o r record, which revealed : 1. Stevenson had stolen gasoline on two previous occa- sions. 2. Stevenson had been involved i n a "high speed chase" with the Great F a l l s c i t y police while driving a vehicle on Central Avenue. The police report s t a t e d t h a t he was drunk a t t h e time he was apprehended. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s incident, Stevenson was referred t o the juvenile department where he was placed on a n . e i g h t week probation and h i s driving privileges were suspended f o r s i x t y days. 3. Stevenson was involved i n a vaguely described "fighting incident" the facts of which were not ascertained by the juvenile department. During the hearing stevenson's mother attempted t o explain that t h i s incident had occurred when he was attacked by another minor and badly beaten. 4. Stevenson was involved i n the attempted t h e f t of a garden hose. The juvenile department considered t h i s matter t o be so t r i v i a l that no disposition was made. Avery also t e s t i f i e d that Stevenson had dropped out of school on November 30, 1973, and had not attended school since that time. The s t a t u t e which pertains t o the relinquishment of jurisdiction from youth court t o adult criminal court is section 10-1229, R.C.M. 1947, which states i n pertinent part: "(1) After a petition has been f i l e d alleging delinquency the court may, upon motion of the county attorney, before hearing the petition on its merits, transfer the matter of prosecution t o the d i s t r i c t court i f : "(a) the youth charged was sixteen (16) years d a g e or more a t the time of the conduct alleged t o be unlawful and the unlawful act i s one or more of the following: " ( i i i ) aggravated assault as defined i n section 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947; "(iv) robbery a s defined i n section 94-5-401, R.C.M. 1947; "(b) a hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held i n conformity with the rules on a hearing on a petition alleging delinquency, except that the hearing w i l l be t o the youth court without a jury; and "(c) notice in writing of the t i m e , place and purpose of the hearing is given t o the youth, h i s counsel, and h i s parents, guardian or custodian a t l e a s t ten (10) days before the hearing * * *. "(3) Upon transfer t o d i s t r i c t court, the judge shall make written findings of the reasons why the juris- diction of the court was waived and the case transferred t o d i s t r i c t court. 1 t Section 10-1229 was enacted in 1974 as part of a compre- hensive new act called the "Montana Youth Court Act", sections 10-1201 through 10-1252, R . C . M . 1947. This Act established the rights of minors and brought ~ontana's youth court procedures up to date with relatively recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In re Gault, 387 U . S . 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L ed 2d 527; Kent v, United States, 383 U . S . 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L ed 2d 84; In re Winship, 397 U . S . 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L ed 2d 368. The predecessor statute to section 10-1229 was section 10-603(c), R . C . M . 1947, as amended, which read in pertinent part: " ( c ) When the juvenile court has jurisdiction of any child sixteen ( 1 6 ) years of age, or over, who is ac- cused of committing or the attempt to commit murder, manslaughter * * * then the county attorney may request the juvenile court to be permitted to file an informa- tion against the juvenile in district court, or, when the facts warrant, the juvenile judge may order the county attorney to proceed against the juvenile in dis- trict court on an information. "~efore making such order the juvenile judge must hear the matter by an informal preliminary hearing to deter- mine first, if there is probable cause to believe the juvenile has committed the felony, and, second, to de- termine whether under the circumstances it appears necessary for the best interest of the state that the juvenile be held to answer the information in district court.+< * + c " In Lujan v . District Court, 161 Mont. 287, 296, 505 P. 2 d 896, this Court reviewed section 10-603 and established the following criteria to guide the district court judge in the exer- cise of his discretion: " * * * We further hold that in the exercise of his discretion in juvenile transfer proceedings under the present Montana Juvenile Court Act, the judge of the juvenile court is entitled to consider the nature and enormity of the alleged crime, the serious personal injuries inflicted on the victim, and the absence of provocation as the controlling determinants in ordering waiver and transfer to adult criminal court for prosecution. " (Emphasis supplied). An examination of section 10-1229 of Montana's recently enacted Youth Court Act compels the conclusion that the criteria established in Luj an are no longer the "controlling determinants " in the consideration of whether the youth court should waive juris- diction. Instead the applicable c r i t e r i a a r e s t a t e d i n section "(d) t h e court finds upon the hearing of a l l relevant evidence t h a t there a r e reasonable grounds t o believe t h a t : " ( i ) the youth committed t h e delinquent a c t alleged; and " ( i i ) the seriousness of t h e offense and the protection of the community requires treatment of t h e youth beyond t h a t afforded by juvenile f a c i l i t i e s ; and " ( i i i ) t h e alleged offense was committed i n an aggressive, violent, o r premeditated manner. "(2) In transferring the matter of prosecution t o the d i s t r i c t court t h e court s h a l l a l s o consider t h e following factors: "(a) the sophistication and maturity of the youth, determined by consideration of h i s home, environ- mental s i t u a t i o n , and emotional a t t i t u d e and pattern of living; "(b) the record and previous h i s t o r y of the youth, including previous contacts with t h e youth court, law enforcement agencies, youth courts i n other j u r i s - dictions, p r i o r periods of probation and p r i o r commit- ments t o juvenile i n s t i t u t i o n s ; "(c) the prospects f o r adequate protection of t h e public and the likelihood of reasonable r e h a b i l i t a - t i o n of the youth by the use of procedures, services and f a c i l i t i e s currently available t o the youth court. 11 Summarizing a l l the evidence presented a t the t r a n s f e r hearing we note t h a t there was evidence4 (1) which tended t o e s t a b l i s h reasonable grounds t o believe t h a t Stevenson had commit- ted t h e a c t s alleged; (2) t h a t t h e offense was committed i n an aggressive, violent o r premeditated manner;.ancl, (3) there was evidence regarding h i s p r i o r school and offense record. However, t h i s is not enough. The Montana Youth Court Act requires more before t h e youth court is authorized t o relinquish i t s jurisdiction Too, t o the adult criminal court./ juvenile t r a n s f e r hearings a r e not adjudicatory hearings within the meaning of constitutional re- quirements. Allen F. Breed, Etc., Petitioner v. Gary Steven Jones, U . S. 9 S.Ct. 9 L ed 2d 9 No. 73-1995, May 27, 1975. Here, the evidence presented a t the transfer hearing was insufficient t o waive jurisdiction because there was no showing t h a t "the seriousness of the offense and the protection' of the community requires treatment of the youth beyond that afforded by juvenile f a c i l i t i e s " a s required by section 10- 1229 (1) (d) ( i i ) . The s t a t e argues the very nature of the offenses demonstrates the need f o r treatment of the youth beyond avail- able juvenile f a c i l i t i e s . W e cannot agree. To assume that juvenile f a c i l i t i e s a r e inadequate from the mere f a c t t h a t the youth i s charged with a serious offense, completely ignores the rehabilitative purpose of the Act a s s e t forth i n section 10-1202, and i s tantamount t o a judicial admission the juvenile f a c i l i t i e s i n Montana are inadequate t o cope with the hard core youth offender. W e w i l l not do t h i s . The transfer hearing was further defective because the youth court failed t o consider the "sophistication and maturity of the youth, determined by consideration of h i s home, environ- mental situation, and emotional a t t i t u d e and pattern of living" a s mandated by section 10-1229(2) (a). During the hearing, M r . Avery touched on t h i s matter briefly: "MR. AVERY: Well, a l l w e know, your honor, i s while he was on probation t o our office, and a t that time he was living i n the home, and I did t a l k t o h i s father, along with M r . Schwanke, who was originally h i s attorney, l a s t Friday, i n m y office, where I was going t o t r y t o get some family history i n t h i s case, and so on and a t that time M r . Stevenson told m e that the boy had been living a t home, so t h a t ' s a l l I have t o go on, and our office has no other knowledge than that." (Emphasis supplied). This cursory examination i s insufficient t o properly consider a factor mandated by statute. Finally, there was no inquiry into the important question of whether Stevenson could be rehabilitated within the present structure of the youth system. A s a related matter, there was no inquiry i n t o the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f a c i l i t i e s , programs and personnel under the youth court system and whether he would be amenable to these. Yet, a judicial consideration of this factor is required by section 10-1229 ( 2 ) ( c ) . In State v . Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209, the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in a case where a seventeen year old youth was charged with two separate acts of burglary with intent to commit larceny. After establishing specific criteria for the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, the court held the lower court had erred when it failed to make a specific finding, supported by substantial evi- dence, that the juvenile was not amenable to the rehabilitative programs existing under the juvenile court system. For other decisions stressing the importance of considering a juvenile's amenability to the juvenile court system as a factor in deciding whether juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived see: In re Patterson, 210 Kan. 245, 499 P.2d 1131; State v . Yard, 109 Ariz. 198, 507 P.2d 123; P . H . v. State, (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 837; In re Johnson, 17 Md. App. 705, 304 A.2d 859; H . v . Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 478 P.2d 32. ~ontana's Youth Court Act does not require that the youth court make a specific finding that the youth is not amenable to the rehabilitative programs currently existing under the system as a condition precendent to a valid waiver of jurisdiction. How- ever, it does require the judge to carefully consider this factor along with all other factors set out by statute. The transfer hearing is a critically important phase in youth proceedings. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 ( D . C . Cir. 1965); Kent v . United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L ed 2d 8 4 . Its importance is highlighted by F. Thomas Schorn- horst in his article entitled "The Waiver of Juvenile Court Juris- diction: Kent Revisited", 43 Ind. Law Journal 583, 586: 1 1 ~ ~ * There is convincing evidence that most juvenile court personnel, and the judges them- selves, regard the waiver of jurisdiction as the most severe sanction that may be imposed by the juvenile court. Not only is the juvenile exposed mthe probability of severe punishment, but the confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile proceeding is replaced by the publicity and norma- tive concepts of penal law; the child acquires a public arrest record which, even if he is acquitted, will inhibit his rehabilitation because of the opprobrium attached thereto by prospective employers '/c 2 ' : * . I 1 The importance of a transfer hearing demands that the youth court carefully consider - all factors set forth in section 10-1229. Evidence relevant to each factor should be preserved in the transcript in order to permit meaningful appellate review. After the presentation of all evidence, written findings giving reasons why the jurisdiction of the court was waived must be made pursuant to section 10-1229(3). It is not necessary that all factors be resolved against the youth in order to justify the waiver, nor is it necessary that the youth court make an arith- metical type calculation as to the weight it assigns each factor. However, all factors set forth by statute must be carefully con- sidered and a very deliberate evaluation of each individual case must be effectuated prior to the entry-of a waiver order. This cause is remanded to the youth court of Cascade County for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. We Concur: 1 / ' I < ; \ 4 - * b - d - & . a d W - - * - - - - * & - d - - - - - - . L - e Chief Justice - dP Justices.