Title: Ex Parte Bd. of School Com'rs of Mobile Co.
Citation: 824 So. 2d 759
Docket Number: 1000593
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2001

824 So. 2d 759 (2001)
Ex parte BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY.
(In re Herman Finklea v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County).
1000593.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 2, 2001.
*760 Robert C. Campbell III and Frank G. Taylor of Sintz, Campbell, Duke &amp; Taylor, Mobile, for petitioner.
Mary E. Olsen and J. Cecil Gardner of Gardner, Middlebrooks, Gibbons &amp; Kittrell, P.C., Mobile, for respondent.
WOODALL, Justice.
We granted the petition for certiorari review filed by the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County (hereinafter "the Board"). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, and remand the cause for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
In its opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals clearly and accurately stated the procedural history of this case and the undisputed facts:
Finklea v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 824 So. 2d 755, 756-57 (Ala. Civ.App.2000).
The Board contends that it was not required to advertise any of the four positions at issue, because, as it interprets its policy, none of the positions involved filling a vacant position or filling a new position. The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the reasonableness of the Board's interpretation of its policy, and, for that reason, reversed the summary judgment in favor of the Board. Finklea, 824 So. 2d  at 759. In doing so, the Court of Civil Appeals erred.
A board of education must comply with the policies it adopts. Belcher v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 474 So. 2d 1063, 1068 (Ala.1985). "This court and the trial court must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its rules and regulations. Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County v. Bailey, 475 So. 2d 863 (Ala.Civ. App.1985)." Mobile County Pers. Bd. v. Tillman, 751 So. 2d 517, 518 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999). "It is well settled that `an agency's interpretation of its own regulation must stand if it is reasonable, even though it may not appear as reasonable as some other interpretation.' Ferlisi v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 481 So. 2d 400, 403 (Ala. Civ.App.1985)." State Pers. Bd. v. Wallace, 682 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996). An agency's interpretation of its own policy is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous. Brunson Constr. &amp; Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. City of Prichard, 664 So. 2d 885, 890 (Ala.1995). See also Peacock v. Houston County Bd. of Educ., 653 So. 2d 308, 309 (Ala.Civ.App.1994).
Under these well-established principles, the clearly dispositive issue is whether the Board's interpretation of its policy as not requiring it to advertise any of the four positions at issue in this case was reasonable. We conclude that it was, and that that interpretation certainly was not clearly erroneous.
*762 The Board is required to advertise only when it is attempting to fill a vacancy or a new position. In 1997, Jake Laffitte and Louise Smith's immediate supervisor retired, creating a vacancy. However, the superintendent decided not to fill that vacancy. Instead, the duties of that position were divided between Laffitte and Smith, who also continued to perform their other duties. In order to compensate Laffitte and Smith for their additional duties, their positions were upgraded from "director" level to "executive director" level, thereby providing greater salaries. Considering these facts, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that advertising for the positions was not required, because it was not filling a vacant or new position.
The positions held by Kim Brown and Veronica Rogers were reclassified from "coordinator" level to "director" level for the sole purpose of increasing their salaries; their job duties did not change. Clearly, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that neither of these reclassifications involved the filling of any vacant or new position.
Therefore, we hold that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and this cause is remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.