Title: Lawson v. State
Citation: 280 N.W.2d 400
Docket Number: 61820
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 1979

280 N.W.2d 400 (1979) Donald LAWSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. No. 61820. Supreme Court of Iowa. June 27, 1979. *401 Patrick J. Life of Life Law Office, Oskaloosa, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Ann Fitzgibbons, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN, and LARSON, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. This appeal from denial of postconviction relief questions the validity of a verdict where, without the knowledge of either party, a witness was hypnotized before testifying in the prior trial. In 1972 petitioner Donald Lawson was convicted and sentenced for second-degree murder. In 1976 he commenced the present postconviction proceeding, claiming in part that a witness in the murder trial had been hypnotized. Section 663 A. 2 of the Code of 1975 provides that a convicted person may institute proceedings to secure relief when: Marilyn Yeager, a material witness in the homicide trial, testified in that case for the State and for Lawson. The evidence at the postconviction trial establishes beyond question that in connection with the prior trial Yeager underwent some type of hypnosis on at least three occasions: before she originally testified for the State, before she testified on rebuttal for the State, and later to obtain headache relief. We may safely say that the third time did not affect her testimony. The record shows that neither the State nor Lawson knew, at the time of the homicide trial, about the hypnotization. The hypnotization was administered by a neighbor, Ed Augustine, ostensibly to calm Yeager's nerves so she could face the ordeal of taking the stand. Lawson learned about it later when Yeager informed him at the penitentiary where she came with a friend who desired to see another inmate. In the present postconviction proceeding Lawson claims violation of his constitutional and nonconstitutional rights in the homicide trial. The postconviction trial court found that Lawson "failed to establish that [Yeager] was in a hypnotic condition when she testified at the trial of [Lawson]." The State's position on appeal is essentially the same: "There is no showing that [Yeager] was in a hypnotic state when she testified." This position seems to be based on the theory that if Yeager was not in a state of hypnosis when on the stand, any prior hypnosis was immaterial. We believe this theory requires further analysis. The present case is governed by the following principles enunciated in Snyder v. State, 262 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 1978): We first consider the evidence and then the legal effect of the hypnosis. I. The evidence. Portions of Yeager's direct testimony in the postconviction proceeding follow: On cross-examination, Yeager testified in part: Q. And you weren't disoriented in any way or anything like that? A. No, other than being nervous. Yeager also testified: D. Eric Elster, a clinical psychologist, was a witness. He testified that hypnotism has various stages, "from a very, very light level of hypnosis to a very, very deep level called somnambulism, similar to sleepwalking." He described the stages thus: Relevant portions of Elster's testimony follow: Defense counsel then posed the following hypothetical question: Elster answered: At the postconviction hearing the prosecutor in the homicide case testified regarding that trial: Defense counsel at the homicide trial testified at the postconviction hearing: II. Effect on validity of verdict. The State seems to approach the effect of the hypnosis from the standpoint of the admissibility of Yeager's testimony at the homicide trial. Its argument runs thus: Yeager was not under hypnosis at the homicide trial itself, her testimony was thus admissible, and the prior hypnosis was therefore immaterial. We assume that the evidence in this proceeding does not show Yeager was under hypnosis when she testified in the homicide trial and her testimony in that trial was thus admissible. Most of the cases in this area holding "hypnotic" evidence inadmissible involve testimony of witnesses as to pretrial statements of other persons then under hypnosis, or testimony of witnesses who are under hypnosis at trial. E. g., State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 716, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974) ("We agree with the vast majority of authorities which have concluded that hypnotic evidence, whether in the form of the subject testifying in court under hypnosis or through another's revelation of what the subject said while under a hypnotic trance is not admissible."). The problem here relates to the State's conclusion that prior hypnosis is immaterial. Courts have said that a defendant may use the fact of a witness' prior hypnosis in an attempt to discredit or destroy his testimony, but these are cases of course in which the defendant *405 knew at trial about the prior hypnosis. Among them are United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S. Ct. 621, 58 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1978); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974) (civil case); Harding v. State, 5 Md.App. 230, 247, 246 A.2d 302, 312 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949, 89 S. Ct. 2030, 23 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1969) ("the hypnosis procedure was fully exposed in the evidence"); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); and State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or.App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971). Federal courts have held that a defendant's right to try to discredit a previously hypnotized witness is of such importance that a guilty verdict cannot stand where the prosecutor violated a duty to disclose information about the hypnotization. United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga.1975). We do not have such a case here. What should be the result in the present case where we have a material witness hypnotized before testifying in chief and on rebuttal in a prior trial, a prosecutor unaware of the hypnosis, and an accused likewise uninformed of the hypnosis and thus unable to delve into the facts about it at that trial? Since the prosecution was not responsible for the accused's unawareness of the hypnosis, should a guilty verdict be permitted to stand? While Lawson argues several grounds, we believe what we actually have here is a claim by Lawson of newly discovered evidence, and that the result turns on whether that evidenceunquestionably newly discoveredrequires a new trial under the present facts. We stated the principles regarding newly discovered evidence in State v. Sims, 239 N.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Iowa 1976): On the basis of the evidence presented here, and having in mind that Lawson has the burden of proof, State v. Hicks, 277 N.W.2d 889, 896 (Iowa 1979), we hold that Lawson did not satisfy elements three and four of the newly discovered evidence rule. The trial court therefore properly dismissed his postconviction petition. AFFIRMED.