Title: Nieves v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 381, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MANUEL NIEVES,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 381, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. ID No. 0107022700 
                      
 
Submitted: April 1, 2005  
   Decided: May 18, 2005    
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 18th day of May 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Manuel Nieves, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s August 16, 2004 order denying his motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to the 
appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In March 2002, Nieves was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of 
twenty counts of Rape in the First Degree, ten counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact 
in the Second Degree, one count of Rape in the Second Degree, and one count of 
Continuing Sexual Abuse of a Child.  He was sentenced to a total of 322 years 
 
 
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incarceration at Level V.  Nieves’ convictions and sentences were affirmed by this 
Court on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Nieves claims that: a) his trial attorney provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to secure an interpreter, properly prepare for trial, 
secure witness testimony, and investigate the motives of the victim; b) the trial 
judge improperly permitted a biased individual to sit on the jury; c) the trial 
judge’s comment following the victim’s testimony was unduly prejudicial; and d) 
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. 
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Nieves must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different.2  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.”3 
 
(5) 
While Nieves claims that his counsel should have secured a Spanish 
interpreter, he offers no factual basis for that claim.  There is no evidence in the 
record that Nieves was not able to communicate with his counsel in English.  
                                                 
1 Nieves v. State, Del. Supr., No. 352, 2002, Steele, J. (Feb. 11, 2003). 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
 
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Moreover, he testified in his own defense at trial in English without any apparent 
difficulty.  Nieves’ claims that his trial counsel did not properly prepare for trial, 
secure the testimony of defense witnesses and investigate the motives of the victim 
are also without record support.  Moreover, Nieves fails to demonstrate how the 
actions he claims should have been taken by his counsel would have altered the 
outcome of his case.  Nieves’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim is, thus, 
without merit.   
 
(6) 
  Nieves’ next claim is that the trial judge improperly permitted a 
biased individual to sit on the jury.  Specifically, Nieves argues that one of the 
jurors had a niece who had been sexually assaulted.  While it appears that during 
voir dire one of the prospective jurors revealed that his niece had been sexually 
assaulted, that individual ultimately was dismissed from the jury.  Because Nieves 
presents no evidence of bias on the part of the jurors who served, this claim is, 
therefore, without merit.             
 
(7) 
Nieves next claims that he was deprived of a fair trial because of a 
remark the trial judge made following the testimony of the eight-year old victim.  
Specifically, the judge stated, “ . . . you’ve done a great job.  You can be excused 
now.  Go outside and join your Mommy.  Thank you very much.”  No objection 
was made at the time of the judge’s remark.  On direct appeal, this Court found 
 
 
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that the remark did not jeopardize Nieves’ right to a fair trial given the 
circumstances surrounding the remark and the fact that the jury was instructed that 
they were the sole determiners of the facts.  Because Nieves failed to raise this 
claim in his postconviction motion, we decline to address it in this appeal.4  Even if 
Nieves had properly raised the claim in this appeal, it would be procedurally barred 
as formerly adjudicated.5 
 
(8) 
Nieves’ final claim is that there was insufficient evidence presented to 
sustain his convictions.  Because this claim was asserted, unsuccessfully, in the 
Superior Court trial, it is barred in this proceeding as formerly adjudicated.6  The 
claim is without merit in any case.  The testimony of the eight-year old victim 
provided sufficient evidence of Nieves’ guilt, even though some of the specific 
details were contradicted by the testimony of another witness.7 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
4 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
6 Id. 
7 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992).