Title: Reiling v. Reiling
Citation: 474 P.2d 327
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 11, 1970

474 P.2d 327 (1970)
M. Lela REILING, Petitioner,
v.
Edward A. REILING, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted June 3, 1970.
Decided September 11, 1970.
John A. Bryan, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were DeArmond, Sherman &amp; Barber, Salem.
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., and John L. Schwabe, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With them on the briefs were Mautz, Souther, Spaulding, Kinsey &amp; Williamson, Portland.
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, SLOAN, DENECKE, HOLMAN and HOWELL, JJ.
HOLMAN, Justice.
Wife sued husband for divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce and awarded alimony. It held an antenuptial agreement invalid which provided the wife would receive no alimony upon divorce. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the allowance of alimony and held the agreement valid. Or. App., 90 Adv.Sh. 51, 463 P.2d 591 (1970). This court granted a writ of review.
The sole issue is whether that part of an antenuptial agreement is invalid, because of public policy, which provides that the wife should receive no alimony in case the parties were subsequently divorced. There was no evidence or claim of fraud or unfair advantage surrounding the execution of the agreement. The case is one of first impression in this state.
Authority is almost unanimously to the effect that antenuptial agreements to forego alimony are void because they are contrary to public policy.[1] The rationale is *327 twofold. Some cases say that such agreements encourage divorce because the husband knows that he will not have to support his wife if a divorce ensues, and, therefore, he will not treat her with the consideration with which he otherwise would have treated her. This argument is refuted by some critics who say that, on the other hand, such an agreement is an inducement to the wife to bear with her husband's fobiles because she knows she will receive no support in the event of divorce. Such critics contend there is no demonstrable evidence that such an agreement promotes divorce. Other cases hold that the state has a paramount interest in the adequate support of its citizens, and, therefore, the husband's duty of support, either before or after divorce, should not be left to private control. This argument has more and more cogency as government increasingly considers itself responsible for the adequate support of its citizens.
A good summary of the permissible scope of antenuptial agreements under the present case law is found in Clark, Law of Domestic Relations 28-29 (1968):
We are not so sure as some of the critics that such agreements do not tend to invite inconsiderateness and marital conflict. See Cohn v. Cohn, note 1, supra. In addition, the state has a paramount interest in the adequate support of the wife both before and after divorce or separation.
Despite the advance of women's rights and their increasing participation as wage earners, we believe there is much to be said for a public policy that protects the right of a wife to receive support upon separation or divorce. There is still a vast number of women with no skills who are only marginally employable or who properly devote their full time to the rearing of their children. We hold that antenuptial agreements which prohibit alimony are contrary to public policy and void.
*328 The husband contends the legislature has expressed approval of antenuptial agreements by the adoption of ORS 108.140, which is as follows:
He further contends this court has approved of antenuptial agreements in Moore v. Schermerhorn, 210 Or. 23, 307 P.2d 483, 308 P.2d 180, 65 A.L.R.2d 715 (1957), and Newton v. Pickell et al, 201 Or. 225, 269 P.2d 508 (1954), where such agreements concerning the disposition of real property were upheld. He also points to numerous decisions of this court approving postnuptial agreements made in contemplation of immediate separation or divorce.
We believe the enactment of ORS 108.140 and the aforementioned opinions of this court concerning antenuptial agreements are no indications, one way or the other, concerning the legislature's or this court's views on antenuptial agreements which provide there shall be no alimony or support in the event of separation or divorce. Both the statute and the decisions relate to property rights and not to alimony. An argument can be made that any antenuptial agreement concerning the disposition of property upon either the death of one of the parties or divorce may result in one of them ultimately being put in a position where he or she is not adequately provided for, and, therefore, insofar as public policy is concerned, antenuptial agreements concerning alimony and property should be treated similarly. The refutation of such an argument is that the rule prohibiting antenuptial agreements concerning alimony gives courts the ability to allow the wife and society a measure of protection and still leaves the parties to the marriage as much freedom as possible to contract concerning their affairs. It is a balancing of contending values.
Insofar as postnuptial agreements made in contemplation of immediate separation or divorce are concerned, they do not suffer, as antenuptial agreements do, from the time lag and the resultant change in economic circumstances which tend to bring about untoward results. Both parties know their financial circumstances at the time of a separation, which is not the case when an antenuptial agreement is made. Neither do such postnuptial agreements tend to promote separation or divorce because the parties have already failed in their marriage relationship.
We believe the trial court properly exercised its authority under the statute to award alimony. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the decree of the trial court is affirmed.
[1]  Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163 So. 2d 336 (Fla.App. 1964); Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906); Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1 (1896); Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956); Stefonick v.v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848, 164 A.L.R. 1211 (1946); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis.2d 237, 133 N.W.2d 820 (1965); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950). Contra: Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okl. 1960).