Title: Taylor v. Methodist Home for the Aging d/b/a Fair Haven, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2022-0681
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2023

Rel: May 12, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0681 
_________________________ 
 
Angelia Taylor, as personal representative of the Estate of 
Willie M. Latham, deceased  
 
v.  
 
Methodist Home for the Aging d/b/a Fair Haven and Maria 
Ephraim 
 
 
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-19-905045) 
 
STEWART, Justice. 
Angelia Taylor, as personal representative of the Estate of Willie 
M. Latham, deceased, appeals from the denial by operation of law of her 
SC-2022-0681 
2 
 
Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking to vacate an arbitration award 
entered in favor of Methodist Home for the Aging d/b/a Fair Haven and 
its administrator, Maria Ephraim (referred to collectively as "Fair 
Haven"). We affirm. 
Relevant Background 
 
From August 1, 2018, until September 16, 2018, Latham was a 
resident of a nursing home operated by Methodist Home for the Aging. 
While a resident, Latham fell and broke her hip. Latham was eventually 
transported to a hospital for surgery, and she died a few days later. In 
November 2019, Taylor, as the personal representative of Latham's 
estate, commenced in the Jefferson Circuit Court a wrongful-death action 
under the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala. 
Code 1975 ("the 1987 AMLA"),1 against Fair Haven and other defendants 
not involved in this appeal.2 In December 2019, Fair Haven moved to 
compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement Latham had 
 
1The 1987 AMLA is "intended to supplement" the original Alabama 
Medical Liability Act, which was enacted in 1975 and is codified at § 6-5-
480 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. § 6-5-541, Ala. Code 1975. 
  
2Taylor does not appeal the circuit court's judgment insofar as it 
relates to the other defendants. 
SC-2022-0681 
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signed. The parties filed a joint stipulation to submit the case to 
arbitration, and in February 2020 the circuit court entered an order 
compelling arbitration. Thereafter, Taylor filed a demand for arbitration 
with Judicial Administration and Mediation Services, Inc. 
While in arbitration, Fair Haven moved for a summary judgment 
supported with evidentiary submissions. Taylor filed a response in 
opposition to Fair Haven's summary-judgment motion that she, likewise, 
supported with evidence.  
 
On November 22, 2021, the arbitrator issued a final award in favor 
of Fair Haven, finding, in pertinent part: 
 
"The claims in this case are governed by the [1987] 
Alabama Medical Liability Act, which requires 'substantial 
evidence' that the standard of care was breached and that the 
breach was the proximate cause of the injury or death. Golden 
v. Stein, 670 So. 2d 904, 906-07 (Ala. 1995). Expert testimony 
is required to establish the standard of care, and a breach of 
that standard. Anderson v. Alabama Reference Labs, 778 So. 
2d 806, 8011 (Ala. 2000). That expert testimony must come 
from a health care provider with proper credentials who is 
'similarly situated' to the health care provider whose conduct 
is in issue. Alabama Code § 6-5-548(e). 
 
 
"Not only are the nursing experts relied upon by [Taylor] 
not similarly situated, the only standard of care utilized is one 
published by a Nursing Association. If that were proper under 
the [1987] AMLA, there would be no need for expert testimony 
from a similarly situated professional.  Additionally, rather 
tha[n] specify the precise conduct required, the witness only 
SC-2022-0681 
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stated that a nurse should 'go above and beyond,' a standard 
that is impossible to practically apply in this case. 
 
 
"The [1987] AMLA also requires that [Taylor] establish 
that the breach in the standard of care 'probably' caused Ms. 
Latham's death. University of Alabama Health Svcs. 
Foundation v. Bush, 638 So. 2d 794, 802 (Ala. 1994). [Taylor's] 
medical expert attempts to link her fall to her ultimate 
demise, but that effort not only fails to link a specific breach 
and the death, it is based on speculation and conjecture by the 
witness, which renders it of no value. See Bradley v. Miller, 
878 So. 2d 262, 266 (Ala. 2003). [Taylor's] medical expert did 
eliminate [Taylor's] delay in treatment claim, however, 
opining that the timing of the surgery did not affect Ms. 
Latham's outcome. 
 
 
"[Taylor] has failed to introduce any evidence in support 
of her other claims. As a result of all these failings, the 
motions of [Fair Haven] must be and are hereby GRANTED." 
 
(Capitalization in original.) 
 
 
On December 22, 2021, Taylor filed in the circuit court a notice of 
appeal from the arbitration award pursuant to Rule 71B, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
On January 24, 2022, Taylor filed a motion to set aside or vacate the 
arbitration award. In response, Fair Haven filed a motion for the entry 
of a final judgment and a motion in opposition to Taylor's motion to 
vacate the arbitration award. On February 2, 2022, the circuit court 
entered an order noting that the purported postjudgment motions were 
not ripe, because the circuit clerk had not entered the arbitration award 
SC-2022-0681 
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as a final judgment, and it directed the circuit clerk to enter the 
arbitration award as a judgment of the court. See Rule 71B(f), Ala. R. 
Civ. P. On February 22, 2022, the circuit clerk entered the arbitration 
award on the record as a final judgment. On that date, Taylor's 
postjudgment motion became effective. See Ex parte Cavalier Home 
Builders, LLC, 275 So. 3d 1110, 1111-12 (Ala. 2018) (holding that a 
postjudgment motion seeking to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to 
the process found in Rule 71B(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., that was filed before the 
circuit clerk had entered the award as a judgment, became effective when 
the award was entered as a judgment). Taylor's motion to vacate was 
denied by operation of law 90 days later, on May 23, 2022.3 See Rule 59.1, 
Ala. R. Civ. P. Because the 42d day following May 23, 2022, was 
Independence Day, Taylor timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court on 
July 5, 2022. See Rule 4(a) and Rule 26(a), Ala. R. App. P.   
Standard of Review 
"The standard by which an appellate court reviews a trial court's 
order confirming an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act 
 
3On June 23, 2022, the circuit court purported to enter an order 
stating that Taylor's motion to set aside or vacate the arbitrator's award 
is "denied by operation of law."   
SC-2022-0681 
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is that questions of law are reviewed de novo and findings of fact are 
reviewed only for clear error." Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 
375, 378 (Ala. 2009) (citing Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 
1289 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
Discussion 
Taylor contends that the circuit court should have granted her 
motion to vacate the arbitration award. In support of her argument, 
Taylor asserts that she offered expert testimony from her proposed 
expert, Sonya Prichard-Prins, a nursing-home nurse, as to Fair Haven's 
breach of the standard of care. Taylor also argues that she presented 
substantial evidence demonstrating that Prichard-Prins possessed the 
requisite experience required under the 1987 AMLA to be considered a 
similarly situated health-care provider and that she was qualified to 
opine to all of Fair Haven's alleged breaches of the standard of care. See 
§ 6-5-548(c), Ala. Code 1975 (defining a "similarly situated health care 
provider"). 
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., provides limited 
grounds for vacating an arbitration award. 9 U.S.C. § 10. One such 
ground is "where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
SC-2022-0681 
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arbitrators, or either of them." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). In considering a motion 
to vacate an arbitration award, a trial court is constrained in its review; 
it may only ascertain whether one of the specific grounds to vacate the 
arbitration award recognized in 9 U.S.C. § 10 exists. Guardian Builders, 
LLC v. Uselton, 154 So. 3d 964, 968 (Ala. 2014) (quoting R.P. Indus., Inc. 
v. S & M Equip. Co., 896 So. 2d 460, 464 (Ala. 2004)). 
Taylor asserts that there was evidence of partiality on the part of 
the arbitrator, and she relies solely on Waverlee Homes, Inc. v. 
McMichael, 855 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 2003), in which this Court discussed 
numerous federal cases and recognized that a trial court should use the 
"reasonable impression of partiality" standard in reviewing allegations of 
"evident partiality" seeking to set aside arbitration awards. That 
standard requires the trial court to consider whether the movant has 
presented credible, admissible evidence "that gives rise to an impression 
of bias that is direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, as distinct 
from a 'mere appearance' of bias that is remote, uncertain, and 
speculative." Waverlee, 855 So. 2d at 508. The federal cases addressed in 
Waverlee involved evidence demonstrating that the arbitrator and one of 
the parties had some sort of undisclosed relationship or business dealing 
SC-2022-0681 
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that could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator was 
partial to one party. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Southern Energy Homes, 
Inc., 101 So. 3d 1190, 1205 (Ala. 2012). Alternatively, a movant may 
present evidence of actual bias to support its allegations seeking to set 
aside an arbitration award based on bias or partiality. See id. 
 
Taylor asserts that she presented the circuit court with "the 
undisputed evidence of nurse Prichard-Prins'[s] qualification to testify as 
a nursing home nurse expert against Fair Haven and its nurses," which 
she asserts "is admissible, credible, and gives rise to an impression of [the 
arbitrator's] bias that is direct, definite and capable of demonstration." 
Taylor's brief at 15. Although Taylor asserts "partiality" as the basis for 
vacating the arbitration award, her supporting argument centers on the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a summary judgment and whether 
the arbitrator correctly concluded that her expert was not qualified as a 
similarly situated health-care provider. 
The arbitrator's failure to rule in Taylor's favor and the arbitrator's 
failure to accept her proposed expert as a similarly situated health-care 
provider under the 1987 AMLA are not evidence of partiality. Taylor did 
not present the circuit court with any allegation of bias or partiality on 
SC-2022-0681 
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the part of the arbitrator, and she did not present any evidence "that 
gives rise to an impression of bias that is direct, definite, and capable of 
demonstration, as distinct from a 'mere appearance' of bias that is 
remote, uncertain, and speculative." Waverlee, 855 So. 2d at 508. 
Likewise, Taylor has not presented this Court with any allegations 
supporting an impression of bias or partiality. Because Taylor did not 
present argument or evidence to the circuit court establishing a specified 
ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10 for vacating the arbitration award, the circuit 
court had no basis on which to grant her motion to vacate. Guardian 
Builders, 154 So. 3d at 968. Accordingly, Taylor has not demonstrated 
that the denial by operation of law of her motion to vacate the arbitration 
award constituted reversible error.   
Conclusion 
Because Taylor failed to demonstrate a recognized basis under 9 
U.S.C. § 10 for vacating the arbitration award, the denial by operation of 
law of her Rule 59 motion to vacate the arbitration award is affirmed.  
AFFIRMED. 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.