Title: Michael S. Sullivant and Sandy Sullivant v. Charles James ( 331 ) Sullivan III, as administrator of the estate of Susan Toler Sullivan, deceased
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051803
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2007

REL: 06/15/2007 Sullivant v. Sullivan
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051803
_________________________
Michael S. Sullivant and Sandy Sullivant
v.
Charles James Sullivan III, as administrator of the estate
of Susan Toler Sullivan, deceased
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-05-1589)
LYONS, Justice.
Michael S. Sullivant and his wife, Sandy Sullivant,
appeal from a final judgment dismissing their action against
Charles James Sullivan III, in his capacity as administrator
1051803
2
of the estate of Susan Toler Sullivan, deceased (hereinafter
"the administrator").  We affirm.  
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Michael Sullivant, a resident of Elba, was driving his
vehicle when he collided with a vehicle operated by Susan
Toler Sullivan, a resident of Montgomery.  Sullivan  was
killed as a result of the accident, and Sullivant was injured.
The administrator published notice to potential creditors of
Sullivan's estate in the Montgomery Independent, a newspaper
published in Montgomery County.  No actual notice was given to
the Sullivants.  Six months after his appointment the
administrator, alleging that all debts of the estate had been
paid in full, obtained an order from the Montgomery Probate
Court closing the estate and discharging him from further
liability.  Within two years of the accident, but after the
estate had been closed, the Sullivants sued the administrator
in the Montgomery Circuit Court, asserting claims of personal
injury and loss of consortium.  The administrator moved to
dismiss the Sullivants' action because the six months allowed
by the statute of nonclaims, § 43-2-350(b), Ala. Code 1975,
had expired without their having filed a claim against the
1051803
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estate and the administrator had been discharged by order of
the probate court.  The trial court dismissed the action, and
the Sullivants appealed.  
II. Standard of Review
"In Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.
1993), this Court set forth the standard of review
applicable to an  order granting a motion to
dismiss:  
"'The appropriate standard of review under
Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is
whether, when the allegations of the
complaint are viewed most strongly in the
pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader 
could 
prove 
any 
set 
of
circumstances that would entitle her to
relief.  In making this determination, this
Court 
does 
not 
consider 
whether 
the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only
whether she may possibly prevail.  We note
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper
only when it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of the claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief.'"
Beckerle v. Moore, 909 So. 2d 185, 186-87 (Ala. 2005)
(citations omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Overview
Relying on American Home Assurance Co. v. Gaylor, 894 So.
2d 656 (Ala. 2004), the Sullivants contend that because the
1051803
4
administrator failed to provide to them the requisite notice
of 
the 
administration 
of 
the 
estate 
as 
reasonably
ascertainable creditors under §§ 43-2-60 and 43-2-61, Ala.
Code 1975, the statute of nonclaims is not a bar to their
claims against the estate, and they may collaterally attack
in the circuit court the judgment of the probate court closing
the estate and discharging the administrator.  In Gaylor, this
Court held that the driver of a truck involved in a fatal
accident was a reasonably ascertainable creditor of a deceased
motorist's estate, and, thus, the personal representative of
motorist's estate was required to give the truck driver actual
notice of the probate proceedings.  Gaylor is not dispositive,
however, because the plaintiff there asserted his claim
against the estate in the circuit court before the probate
court had entered an order closing the estate and discharging
the administrator.  
The administrator argues that the statute of nonclaims
precludes the Sullivants' action, regardless of the resolution
of the collateral-attack issue, because the Sullivants did not
file their claims against the estate within 30 days of the
date they acquired actual knowledge that an administrator of
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5
Sullivan's estate had been appointed, as required by § 43-2-
350(b).  The administrator also contends that a collateral
attack on the probate court's judgment in the circuit court is
prohibited under Alabama law.  We first address the issue
whether the Sullivants' claims are barred by the statute of
nonclaims because, if they are, any issue concerning the
availability of collateral attack would be rendered moot.  
B. Statute of Nonclaims
The statute of nonclaims provides, in part:
"(b) All claims against the estate of a
decedent, other than the claims referred to in
subsection (a) of this section [claims held by the
personal representative], whether due or to become
due, must be presented within six months after the
grant of letters, or within five months from the
date of the first publication of notice, whichever
is the later to occur, provided however, that any
creditor entitled to actual notice as prescribed in
section 43-2-61 must be allowed 30 days after notice
within which to present the claim, and if not
presented within that time, they are forever barred
and the payment or allowance thereof is prohibited.
..."
§ 43-2-350(b) (emphasis added).  It is undisputed that the
administrator did not provide the Sullivants with actual
notice of his appointment as administrator; rather, the
Sullivants learned of his appointment from their attorney
after Sullivan's estate had been closed and the administrator
1051803
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discharged.  The issue before us is whether the notice the
Sullivants received from their attorney, and not from the
administrator, after the estate had been closed and the
administrator discharged, is sufficient to trigger the 30-day
period in § 43-2-350(b) for filing claims after the receipt of
actual notice.  If so, their claims are barred, because it is
undisputed that this action was commenced more than 30 days
after 
the 
Sullivants 
learned 
of 
the 
administrator's
appointment from their attorney.  
Sections 43-2-60 and 43-2-61 set forth the provisions
relevant to giving notice to creditors of an estate of the
appointment of an administrator for the estate.  Section 43-2-
60 provides, in pertinent part:
"The personal representative 
must 
give 
notice 
of
the appointment, stating the name of the deceased,
the day on which letters were granted, by what
court, stating the county and notifying all persons
having claims against the estate to present the same
within the time allowed by law or that the same will
be barred. The notice of appointment,
"(1) For actual notice as required in
section 43-2-61(1), must be given as soon
as 
practicable 
after 
a 
creditor's
identification is known ...."
(Emphasis added.)  The type of notice to which each creditor
is entitled depends on the classification of that creditor.
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Section 43-2-61 describes the two classes of creditors and the
notice to which each class is entitled:  
"Notice, as prescribed in section 43-2-60, must
be given:
"(1) By first-class mail addressed to
their last known address, or by other
mechanism reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice, to all persons, firms, and
corporations having claims against the
decedent, 
who 
are 
known 
or 
who 
are
reasonably ascertainable by the personal
representative within six months from the
grant of letters; and
"(2) By publishing a notice once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation published
in the county in which the letters were
granted ...."
(Emphasis added.)  The administrator does not here dispute
that the Sullivants were reasonably ascertainable creditors.
Rather, the administrator contends that the notice the
Sullivants received from their attorney after the estate had
been closed and the administrator discharged was sufficient to
trigger the 30-day savings clause in § 43-2-350(b) of the
statute of nonclaims.  
The administrator further contends that the statute of
nonclaims may be triggered by any notice, not necessarily
notice as described in §§ 43-2-60 and 43-2-61.  The
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administrator cites Blackwell v. Williams, 594 So. 2d 56 (Ala.
1992), but notes that in that case this Court did not reach
the issue whether the creditor's receipt of notice of
appointment 
from 
a 
source 
other 
than 
the 
personal
representative was sufficient to trigger the 30-day period,
because the Court determined that the creditor was not
reasonably ascertainable and therefore was not entitled to
actual notice.  The administrator also cites Ivory v.
Fitzpatrick, 445 So. 2d 262 (Ala. 1984); Moore v. Stephens,
264 Ala. 86, 84 So. 2d 752 (1956); Barrett v. Fondren, 262
Ala. 537, 80 So. 2d 243 (1955); and Smith v. Nixon, 205 Ala.
223, 87 So. 326 (1921), for the proposition that the statute
of nonclaims has long been applied to tort claims.  That issue
is not in question here.
The relevant portion of § 43-2-350(b) states that "any
creditor entitled to actual notice as prescribed in section
43-2-61 must be allowed 30 days after notice within which to
present the claim" in order to prevent the claim from being
barred.  (Emphasis added.)  The entitlement to which § 43-2-
350(b) refers is expressly tied to § 43-2-61, which provides
the manner of giving notice when notice is required by § 43-2-
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60.  Section 43-2-60 clearly imposes a duty upon the personal
representative of an estate to "notify[] all persons having
claims against the estate" of the appointment of the personal
representative in accordance with the provisions of § 43-2-61.
Section 43-2-61(1) states that the personal representative
must provide notice as required by § 43-2-60, by first-class
mail addressed to their last known address or by other
mechanism reasonably calculated to provide actual notice to
claimants who are known or who are reasonably ascertainable,
within six months from the grant of letters of administration.
It is undisputed that the administrator did not provide
first-class notice by mail in this case; therefore, that
provision of the statute does not apply.  The remaining
alternative of "other mechanism reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice" does not apply in this case to trigger
the running of the 30-day period in § 43-2-350(b).  The
legislature's use of the passive voice in § 43-2-61 in the
context of "calculated" compels the conclusion that the
personal representative must be the entity doing the
calculating, and, therefore, the fortuitous act of a third
party who gives notice falls beyond the contemplation of the
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statute.  Thus, the notice to which reasonably ascertainable
creditors are entitled, which triggers the 30-day savings
provision, clearly refers to actual notice from the personal
representative. 
 
Because the 
Sullivants as reasonably
ascertainable creditors were entitled to actual notice from
the personal representative, their receipt of notice from an
unaffiliated third party--their attorney--did not trigger the
running of the 30-day period; therefore, their claims are not
barred by the statute of nonclaims. 
C. Collateral Attack
Alternatively, the administrator contends that the
Sullivants cannot collaterally attack the order of the probate
court settling the estate and discharging the administrator.
Section 12-13-1 confers on the probate court jurisdiction over
the administration of estates.  Subsection (b) of that section
states, in pertinent part:
"(b) The probate court shall have original and
general jurisdiction over the following matters:
"(1) The probate of wills.
"(2) 
The 
granting 
of 
letters
testamentary and of administration and the
repeal or revocation of the same.  
1051803
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"(3) All controversies in relation to
the 
right 
of 
executorship 
or 
of
administration.
"(4) The settlement of accounts of
executors and administrators. ..."
(Emphasis added.)  As § 12-13-1 indicates, jurisdiction over
the administration of an estate, including any claims against
the estate by potential creditors, generally lies with the
probate, not the circuit, court.  Exceptions include § 12-11-
41, Ala. Code 1975, permitting removal of an estate to the
circuit court prior to final settlement, and § 12-11-60, Ala.
Code 1975, authorizing the circuit court to correct errors of
law or fact in the settlement of an estate within two years of
final settlement.  Section 12-11-41 is clearly inapplicable.
The Sullivants did not rely on § 12-11-60 in their opposition
to the administrator's motion to dismiss, nor do they rely on
§ 12-11-60 on appeal.  We therefore make no determination as
to whether the Sullivants' claims would have been properly
before the circuit court under § 12-11-60.
The Sullivants brought their personal-injury action
against the administrator in the circuit court after the
probate court had entered an order of final settlement of the
estate and had discharged the administrator from his duties.
1051803
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The administrator argued in the circuit court that the
Sullivants' personal-injury action was an impermissible
collateral attack on the judgment of the probate court.  The
Sullivants contend on appeal that the probate court was
without jurisdiction to enter an order of final settlement and
discharge the administrator from his duties and that,
therefore, the probate court's judgment is void.  However, the
Sullivants 
never 
argued 
in 
their 
opposition 
to 
the
administrator's motion to dismiss in the circuit court that
the probate court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment
settling the estate as to their claims because they never
received notice of the appointment of the administrator and
were never made parties to the proceedings in the probate
court.  In their response to the administrator's motion to
dismiss, the Sullivants, relying exclusively on Gaylor, supra,
contended that they were entitled to "receive[] actual written
notice of the opening of the estate by first class mail.
Since [they] did not, [the Sullivants'] claims are not barred
and the [administrator's] Motion to Dismiss is due to be
denied."  
1051803
13
As previously noted, Gaylor is distinguishable because in
that case the contention as to lack of notice was raised
before an order of final settlement had been entered by the
probate court, and concerns over the availability of
collateral attack were not at issue.  The Sullivants' argument
as to the unavailability of the statute of nonclaims in
reliance upon Gaylor does not address the separate issue,
which was not addressed in Gaylor, of the availability of a
collateral attack on the final settlement of the probate court
as a void judgment.  This Court does not reach arguments never
presented to the trial court.  In Ex parte State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 924 So. 2d 706, 711 (Ala. 2005), we
stated:
"We note that '[a]ny grounds not argued to the trial
court, but urged for the first time on appeal,
cannot be considered' on appeal.  Lloyd Noland Hosp.
v. Durham, 906 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 2005).  Thus,
the judgment of the trial court cannot be reversed
on this ground."
(Footnote omitted.)  See also Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612
So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("This Court cannot consider
arguments raised for the first time on appeal; rather, our
review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered
by the trial court.").  Because the Sullivants did not present
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to the circuit court their contention that the probate court's
judgment was void as to their claims because they did not
receive notice of the appointment of the administrator, we do
not reach the merits of the Sullivants' contention that the
probate court under the circumstances here presented was
without jurisdiction to enter a judgment of final settlement
of the estate.  
IV. Conclusion
The Sullivants' claims are not barred by the statute of
nonclaims, § 43-2-350(b), providing that a creditor must file
his or her claims within 30 days of receiving actual notice.
Furthermore, because the Sullivants did not address in the
circuit court the separate issue, unaddressed in Gaylor, of
the availability of a collateral attack on the final
settlement of the probate court as a void judgment, we do not
reach that issue.   Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
1051803
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 circuit court dismissing the Sullivants' action against the
administrator of the estate of Susan Toler Sullivan.
AFFIRMED.  
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker,* and Murdock, JJ., concur.  
*Although Justice Parker did not sit for oral argument of
this case, he has listened to the tape of oral argument.