Title: Michael Gordon Reynolds v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-1602
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1602 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL GORDON REYNOLDS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-693 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL GORDON REYNOLDS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNETH S. TUCKER, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[September 27, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Michael Gordon Reynolds appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ 
 
 
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of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For 
the reasons provided below, we affirm the denial of the rule 3.851 motion and deny 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.   
Background 
Trial Court Proceedings 
A jury convicted Michael Gordon Reynolds of first-degree murder in 
connection with the deaths of Robin Razor and her eleven-year-old daughter, 
Christina Razor; second-degree murder in the death of Danny Ray Privett, 
Christina’s father; and burglary of a dwelling during which a battery upon Robin or 
Christina or both was committed while Reynolds was armed with a weapon.  See 
Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1137 (Fla. 2006).  The jury recommended 
death by a unanimous vote for the murders of Robin and Christina Razor.  See id. 
at 1138.  The trial court sentenced Reynolds to life in prison for the murder of 
Privett and the burglary conviction, and sentences of death for the murders of the 
Razors, all to run concurrently.  See id.  In our opinion that affirmed the imposition 
of the death penalty, this Court detailed the following facts with regard to the 
underlying crimes: 
The circumstances surrounding the crimes involved in this 
matter and the nature of the physical evidence cause the facts 
established at trial to be crucial in our analysis of this case.  
Specifically, we note that physical evidence produced at trial placing 
Reynolds at the scene of the crimes, inconsistencies in Reynolds’ 
statements to the authorities regarding injuries he sustained on the 
 
 
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evening the murders were committed, and evidence tending to 
establish his involvement in the murders are all important to our 
decision to affirm Reynolds’ convictions and sentence. . . .  On July 
22, 1998, the bodies of the victims were found on the property located 
at 1628 Clekk Circle in Geneva, Florida.  Danny’s body was found 
outside near a large pine tree, and the bodies of Robin and Christina 
were found inside a trailer in which the victims were living.  
 
. . . 
 
The evidence established that on July 22, 1998, Shirley Razor, 
the mother of victim Robin Razor, traveled to the crime scene to 
deliver items Danny used in the work he was doing on trailers at that 
location.  Upon arriving at the property, Shirley noticed Danny lying 
on the ground outside.  Shirley, being accustomed to seeing Danny 
drunk and passed out, proceeded to her separate trailer on the property 
and ate her lunch.  After finishing her lunch, Shirley walked over to 
the trailer in which Danny and Robin were living when she noticed 
that Danny had a “hole in his head.”  After discovering that Danny 
was dead, Shirley ran to a neighbor’s residence and called the 
authorities.  Subsequent to the arrival of the fire department personnel, 
Shirley went to her daughter’s trailer and upon looking inside found 
that her daughter, Robin, and her granddaughter, Christina, were 
inside and apparently dead. 
 
At trial, a medical examiner, Dr. Sara Hyatt Irrgang, testified 
that the deaths had occurred at least eight hours, but probably more 
than twelve hours prior to her arrival at the crime scene, placing the 
time of death between nine p.m. on July 21 and seven a.m. on the 
morning of July 22.  The evidence demonstrated that Danny Ray 
Privett was found lying outside beneath a large pine tree on his side 
with his face down, surrounded by bloody pieces of concrete block 
and broken pieces of glass.  Danny’s jeans were partially unzipped 
suggesting that he had been in the process of urinating when the attack 
occurred.  The autopsy of Danny Ray Privett revealed that he suffered 
a large depressed skull fracture with additional injuries to the head 
area.  The wounds appeared to have been caused by three or more 
separate blows, with the injuries indicating that the assailant had been 
behind the victim.  There was no indication of any defensive wounds 
on Danny, and examination of his major skull injury revealed that the 
 
 
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injury was likely caused by a partially broken cinder block, based on 
fragments found within the wound.  The medical examiner was unable 
to determine the order in which the injuries had been inflicted upon 
him.  The cause of death for Danny was determined to be primarily 
due to blunt force trauma to the head with the large depressed skull 
fracture probably being the fatal blow.  If this blow had been inflicted 
first, the medical examiner opined that the victim would have lost 
consciousness within a second to a minute or two. 
 
Robin and Christina Razor were found dead inside the living 
room portion of the camper trailer being used as living quarters.  
Robin was found lying on the floor, face up.  Christina was found 
nearby sitting on the couch and leaning to her left.  The living room 
area was in disarray and a large amount of blood was scattered 
throughout this area of the trailer.  Robin Razor’s autopsy revealed 
that she suffered multiple stab wounds along with multiple blows to 
the side of her face and a broken neck resulting in injuries to her 
spinal cord.  Closer examination revealed that Robin suffered ten stab 
wounds to the head and neck area and one to the torso area.  The 
wounds appeared to have been inflicted with a sharp object such as a 
knife or scissors.  Based on examination of [] Robin’s body and the 
defensive wounds present, the medical examiner opined that she had 
been involved in a violent struggle.  In addition to the above wounds, 
Robin suffered multiple superficial wounds to her torso area which the 
medical examiner stated to be consistent with torment wounds—
wounds produced not to cause serious injury but to cause aggravation 
and produce fear in the victim.  The medical examiner was of the 
opinion that because blows to the victim’s head were inflicted at 
different angles and the presence of significant defensive wounds, it 
was likely that she was conscious and struggling when these wounds 
were inflicted.  The primary cause of death for Robin was determined 
to be the broken neck and spinal cord injury, although bleeding from 
the stab wounds would have also resulted in death. 
 
The autopsy of Christina Razor revealed that she suffered blunt 
force trauma to her head, a stab wound to the base of her neck that 
pierced her heart, and another stab wound to her right shoulder that 
pierced her lung and lacerated her pulmonary artery.  These latter two 
wounds would have resulted in significant internal and external 
hemorrhaging and would have been fatal.  The medical examiner 
 
 
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indicated that the only sign of defense wounds to Christina was the 
presence of a small contusion to her left hand, which could have 
occurred as she attempted to block a blow from her assailant.  The 
medical examiner opined that Christina would have lost consciousness 
within a minute or two of receiving the stab wounds.  The primary 
cause of death for Christina was determined to be internal and 
external hemorrhaging. 
 
During his investigation of the crimes, Investigator John Parker 
of the Seminole County Sheriff’s Department made contact with 
Reynolds and requested that he submit to an interview, to which 
Reynolds voluntarily agreed.  During this interview, Investigator 
Parker also inquired about injuries that he observed on Reynolds’ 
hand and ankle.  In response to inquiries made about these injuries, 
Reynolds advised the investigator that at approximately five a.m. on 
the morning that the victims’ bodies were discovered, he was taking 
his dog outside and slipped on the exterior step of his camper, twisting 
his ankle.  Reynolds stated that the cut on his hand occurred when he 
caught his hand on a burr on the aluminum door frame of his trailer as 
he attempted to break his fall by grabbing the door frame.  Reynolds 
advised the investigator that approximately thirty or forty minutes 
after sustaining the injuries he cleaned the cut to his hand and 
proceeded to an emergency room for treatment.  Reynolds stated that 
while on his way to the emergency room he suffered a flat tire and 
borrowed a jack from a convenience store to change his tire and after 
doing so he proceeded to the emergency room.  After receiving 
treatment for his injuries, Reynolds informed the investigator that he 
returned to his residence and removed the burr from the trailer door 
frame with a pair of channel-lock pliers.   
 
In addition to the discussion concerning the injury, Reynolds 
also discussed an altercation in which he was involved with Danny 
Ray Privett regarding a trailer that was allegedly given to Reynolds by 
his landlord.  According to Reynolds, the argument with Danny was 
centered upon Danny removing the trailer from Reynolds’ property 
without permission.  Upon discovering that Danny had removed the 
trailer, Reynolds indicated that he confronted Danny and a heated 
argument ensued.  Reynolds stated that after exchanging words with 
Danny, he left Danny’s property but returned a short while later to 
apologize and advise Danny that he could keep the trailer.  
 
 
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Significantly, during this interview Reynolds advised the investigator 
that he had never been inside the trailer in which the victims were 
living.  Subsequent to this interview, Reynolds gave permission for 
the search of both his trailer and his vehicle, and he also agreed to 
provide hair and blood samples for DNA analysis.  Additionally, 
pursuant to a search warrant certain evidence was seized from 
Reynolds’ vehicle and residence. 
 
At trial, a neighbor of the victims testified that on the night 
prior to the discovery of the bodies he observed a car similar to that of 
Reynolds[’] parked at the victims’ residence.  Fingerprint and shoe 
pattern analysis of the crime scene and items collected from the scene 
revealed several prints of value, but none of them connected Reynolds 
to the scene.  However, extensive evidence with regard to DNA 
analysis resulting from testing of items of evidence recovered from 
the crime scene was presented.  Several of the items recovered from 
the crime scene inside the trailer and on the exterior of the trailer 
contained a DNA profile matching that of Reynolds.  There was no 
eyewitness testimony offered by the State and, other than the concrete 
block allegedly used to strike the victims, no other weapon was 
recovered. 
 
The defense attempted to establish mishandling and 
contamination of the evidence, along with suggesting that other 
individuals had committed the crimes with which Reynolds had been 
charged. . . .  After hearing all the evidence, the jury rendered a 
verdict finding Reynolds guilty of second-degree murder as to the 
death of Danny Privett, two counts of first-degree murder as to the 
deaths of Robin and Christina Razor, and burglary of a dwelling 
during which a battery was committed while Reynolds was armed 
with a weapon. 
 
Id. at 1134-37. 
In rendering the death sentence, the trial court determined that the 
State had proven the existence of four statutory aggravating factors in the 
murder of Robin Razor: (1) Reynolds had previously been convicted of 
 
 
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aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery in incidents 
prior to those associated with the present case, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. 
(2003); (2) Reynolds committed the capital felony while he was engaged in 
or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit a 
burglary of a dwelling, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003); (3) the capital 
felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, see § 
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003); and (4) the capital felony was committed in 
an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion, see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. 
Stat. (2003).  See Reynolds, 934 So. 2d at 1138.  The trial court assigned 
each of these aggravators great weight.  See id. 
As to the murder of Christina Razor, the trial court found that the 
State had proven the existence of five statutory aggravators: (1) Reynolds 
had previously been convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, 
and aggravated battery in incidents prior to those associated with the present 
case, see § 921.141(5)(b); (2) Reynolds committed the capital felony while 
he was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt 
to commit a burglary of a dwelling, see § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the capital 
felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, see § 
921.141(5)(e); (4) the capital felony was committed in an especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel fashion, see § 921.141(5)(h); and (5) the victim of the 
 
 
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capital felony was a person less than twelve years of age, see § 
921.141(5)(l), Fla. Stat. (2003).  See Reynolds, 934 So. 2d at 1138.  The trial 
court assigned each of these aggravators great weight.  See id. 
In the analysis of mitigation evidence, the trial court acknowledged 
that Reynolds had waived the presentation of such evidence, but considered 
and weighed any mitigation of which it was aware.  The trial court found the 
following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to be applicable to the 
murders of both Robin and Christina Razor, see 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. 
(2003): (1) Reynolds had been gainfully employed; (2) he manifested 
appropriate courtroom behavior throughout the proceedings; (3) he 
cooperated with law enforcement; and (4) he had a difficult childhood.  The 
court assigned each of these factors little weight.  See Reynolds, 934 So. 2d 
at 1138-39.  The court determined that the evidence did not establish that 
Reynolds could easily adjust to prison life.  See id. at 1139.  The court 
recognized that Reynolds had attempted to present evidence to establish 
lingering doubt, but ruled that it would not consider any theory of lingering 
doubt as nonstatutory mitigation in the sentencing analysis.  See id.   
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and sentences.  
See id. at 1161.  Reynolds filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United 
 
 
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States Supreme Court, which was denied on January 8, 2007.  See Reynolds 
v. Florida, 549 U.S. 1122 (2007).   
Postconviction Proceedings 
 
On December 28, 2007, Reynolds filed a motion to vacate and set 
aside his convictions and sentences pursuant to rule 3.851.  The motion set 
forth the following claims: (1) State misconduct in allowing DNA expert 
Charles Badger to testify that DNA from Reynolds was found on vaginal 
swabs from Christina Razor and introduce an unsupported sexual battery 
theory and (2) a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in a 
failure to disclose the extent of the involvement of a lab technician in the 
DNA testing and the lack of integrity of a deputy.  The motion also set forth 
that trial counsel were ineffective for: (3) failing to object to or cure the 
testimony of Charles Badger; (4) failing to object to the theory of sexual 
battery as a motive for the homicides; (5) failing to object to the repetition of 
the sexual battery theory in the closing statement from the State or to rebut 
the theory effectively in closing; (6) failing to object to a misstatement of 
law regarding the burdens of proof stated by the trial court during voir dire, 
and in not moving for a mistrial; (7) failing to conduct proper and reasonable 
voir dire; (8) informing prospective jurors during voir dire of prior criminal 
convictions although no “Williams Rule” notice had been filed; (9) failing to 
 
 
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request a jury interview to determine whether any jurors had seen a 
memorial to the victims constructed outside the courtroom, and for not 
moving for a mistrial based on the presence of the memorial; (10) failing to 
object to thirty-seven autopsy photographs being placed into evidence; (11) 
failing to object to lay witness testimony concerning metallurgical issues of 
a trailer door; (12) failing to object to testimony concerning a prior arrest on 
a warrant from Hillsborough County; (13) failing to object to lay witness 
testimony concerning the condition of clothing on the day of the homicides; 
and (14) failing to properly present certain issues to the jury and failing to 
preserve those issues for appeal.  He also asserted (15) Section 27.702, 
Florida Statutes (2004), which mandates the duties of capital collateral 
regional counsel, is unconstitutional; (16) Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.575 and Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which 
prohibited trial counsel from interviewing jurors to determine if 
constitutional error was present, violates the federal and Florida 
constitutions; and (17) the cumulative errors of trial counsel deprived 
Reynolds of a fair trial.   
Reynolds requested an evidentiary hearing for all claims.  On April 3, 
2008, the postconviction court held a Huff1 hearing, after which it 
                                          
 
1.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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summarily denied claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, and 13.  The postconviction court 
held that claims 15 and 16 did not require an evidentiary hearing, and 
deemed claim 17, regarding cumulative error, premature.  Due to a conflict, 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel was discharged before the evidentiary 
hearing.  Reynolds acted pro se for a short time before new counsel was 
appointed.   
After new counsel was appointed, Reynolds filed an amended motion 
to vacate his convictions and sentences and requested an evidentiary hearing.  
This amended motion added five claims to his original motion.  These 
claims were that: (I) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate 
and present evidence of substantial mitigation, including mental health 
mitigation; (II) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate or 
present testimony to support the defense theory that reasonable doubt of 
guilt existed due to a conflict in the evidence, or that the evidence was 
legally insufficient for a conviction and failing to support an alternative 
theory that persons other than Reynolds killed the decedents; (III) the lethal 
injection procedure in Florida violates the federal and Florida constitutions 
because it constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment; (IV) trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to request removal of a sleeping juror who had 
been admonished and then proceeded to fall asleep during critical testimony; 
 
 
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and (V) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to prepare Reynolds to 
testify after informing the jury that he would testify and after trial counsel 
informed potential jurors that Reynolds was a convicted felon.   
On August 10, 2009, the postconviction court held a second Huff 
hearing and summarily denied claims III, IV, and V.  The postconviction 
court thereafter granted an evidentiary hearing on claims 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 
14, I, and II.  After the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court 
rendered a final order that denied all of the claims.  This appeal followed.   
We first address the summarily denied claims and follow with an 
analysis of the other claims denied after the evidentiary hearing.     
Rule 3.851 Proceeding 
Standard of Review 
In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required on an initial rule 
3.851 motion, in Seibert v. State, we held that:  
[A] court cannot look beyond the filings.  An evidentiary hearing must 
be held whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that 
requires a factual determination.  [See Amendments to Fla. Rules of 
Crim. Pro. 3.851, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (hereinafter 
“Amendments I”) (endorsing the proposition that “an evidentiary 
hearing is mandated on initial motions which assert . . . legally 
cognizable claims which allege an ultimate factual basis”); see also 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A)(i) (providing that, on initial motions, 
an evidentiary hearing is required “on claims listed by the defendant 
as requiring a factual determination”).]  On an initial rule 3.851 
motion, to the extent there is any question as to whether the movant 
has made a facially sufficient claim requiring a factual determination, 
 
 
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the court must presume that an evidentiary hearing is required.  See 
Amendments I, 772 So. 2d at 492 n.2 (stating that adoption of 
provision addressing evidentiary hearings is consistent with Court’s 
endorsement of a presumption in favor of evidentiary hearings on 
initial postconviction motions raising factually based claims).  In other 
words, a postconviction claim may be summarily denied only when 
the claim is “legally insufficient, should have been brought on direct 
appeal, or [is] positively refuted by the record.”  Connor v. State, 979 
So. 2d 852, 868 (Fla. 2007). 
 
64 So. 3d 67, 75 (Fla. 2010).   
 
The decision of a trial court of whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a 
rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court and its 
ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.  See id. 
at 75; State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003).  This Court will affirm the 
summary denial of a postconviction claim only when the claim is conclusively 
refuted by the record.  See Seibert, 64 So. 3d at 75.   
 
Reynolds contends that his defense attorneys were ineffective during both 
the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
are reviewed under the two-pronged standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  First, the defendant must establish that the 
performance of counsel was deficient.  See id. at 687.  To do this, the defendant 
must identify specific acts or omissions that demonstrate the performance of 
counsel was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.  Hoskins v. State, 
75 So. 3d 250, 253-54 (Fla. 2011).  “[S]trategic decisions do not constitute 
 
 
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ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and 
rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct.”  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  The defendant 
must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  Second, the defendant must establish that the deficit performance of 
counsel prejudiced the defendant.  See id.  The defendant must demonstrate that 
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial.  See id. 
at 694.  This Court employs a mixed standard of review when reviewing Strickland 
claims because the standard presents mixed questions of law and fact.  See 
Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 509 (Fla. 2009).  We defer to the factual findings 
of the postconviction court that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
but review the legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 
(Fla. 2004).   
Claims Denied Without an Evidentiary Hearing 
Testimony of FDLE Analyst Charles Badger 
Reynolds first alleges that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
denying the claim that trial counsel were ineffective for their failure to object to or 
 
 
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cure the allegedly false testimony of Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE) senior crime laboratory analyst Charles Badger.  The trial transcript 
reflects the testimony of Badger with regard to the DNA testing performed on the 
vaginal swabs from Christina Razor as follows: “[A]nd those results that were 
obtained were found to be consistent with Christina Razor and Michael Reynolds.  
Robin Razor and Danny Privett were excluded from being the donors of the DNA 
profile observed.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  In contrast to the words recorded in the 
written transcript, however, Badger’s report indicated that Reynolds was excluded 
as a donor of the DNA profile that was derived from the swabs.  During the 
postconviction process, the State filed a motion to correct the record.  It attached 
an affidavit from the court reporter (in addition to a tape recording of the 
testimony) stating that the transcript should have read as follows: “[A]nd those 
results that were obtained were found to be consistent with Christina Razor.  And 
Michael Reynolds, Robin Razor and Danny Privett were excluded from being the 
donors of the DNA profile observed.”  (Emphasis in original.)  The trial court 
denied the State’s motion.2 
                                          
 
2.  In its denial order, the trial court stated: “The Defendant continues to 
argue what he terms ‘the Badger lie.’  This issue has been litigated extensively 
throughout the post-conviction process, and is outlined at various points in the 
record.  This Court declined to correct the transcript to comport with the State’s 
interpretation of what it said, nor did the Court accept that the Defendant’s 
interpretation was correct.  The Court simply let the transcript speak for itself, 
leaving the parties to argue about the differing interpretations.  However, this 
 
 
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In this case, the claim that trial counsel were ineffective for permitting 
Badger to testify without objection is conclusively refuted by the record.  First, 
after the direct appeal, the State provided the postconviction court with an affidavit 
from the court reporter at the trial.  The affidavit states that the reporter simply 
misplaced the period in the disputed statement—that it should have been placed 
before the words “and Michael Reynolds,” thus excluding him as a donor of the 
DNA found on the vaginal swabs.  The affidavit states that the court reporter 
mistyped the relevant testimony, not that Badger misspoke at trial.   
Second, during the postconviction evidentiary hearing, one of the defense 
attorneys testified that he did not object to Badger’s statement because he did not 
believe that Badger had testified falsely.  Rather, counsel testified that he believed 
that the amended transcript accurately reflected what he had heard at trial—that 
Reynolds was excluded as a donor of the DNA that Badger derived from the 
vaginal swabs of Christina Razor.  Upon review of a recording of Badger’s 
testimony,3 trial counsel confirmed that this was why he did not object at trial.  We 
conclude that the performance of defense counsel was not deficient under 
                                                                                                                                        
Court has heard the tape of the trial, as did [defense counsel].  It does appear that 
the State’s interpretation of the testimony is correct, especially when noting, as 
[defense counsel] did, that the presence of a gender marker would necessarily 
make the identification of the DNA coming from both the Defendant and the 
female victim a genetic impossibility.”  (Citation omitted.) 
 
3.  This recording was not included in the record on appeal. 
 
 
- 17 - 
Strickland because counsel decided not to object to correct trial testimony.  See 
Williams v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:07-cv-591-T-33TBM, 2009 WL 910789, 
at *10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2009) (holding that counsel cannot be considered 
ineffective for failing to object to a correct statement); Franqui v. Fla., No. 07-
22384-CIV, 2008 WL 2747093, at *14 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 2008); Payne v. Am., 
564 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2008).   
Third, even if the performance of defense counsel was deficient for not 
moving to clarify the Badger statement, this failure did not affect the jury’s verdict 
and thus did not prejudice Reynolds.  The State presented testimony that no semen 
was found on the vaginal swab from Christina.  Another FDLE crime laboratory 
analyst testified that she found no semen on the vaginal, oral, and anal swabs taken 
from both Christina and her mother, thereby contradicting the allegedly inaccurate 
statement.  Therefore, even if there was some confusion because of the trial 
testimony from Badger regarding DNA evidence, the other FDLE analyst clearly 
established that no semen from Reynolds was found inside of Robin or Christina 
Razor.   
Fourth, the report prepared by Badger addressing the results of his DNA 
analysis of the swabs at issue which were referenced during the testimony 
contradicts the postconviction claim.  This report reflects that DNA from Reynolds 
was not found in Christina or her mother.  
 
 
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Fifth, the State presented different DNA evidence that linked Reynolds to 
the crime.  During the police investigation following the murders and before 
Reynolds was formally arrested, Reynolds stated that he had never been in the 
trailer where the bodies were found.  Investigators, however, found substantial 
DNA evidence connecting Reynolds to the inside of the trailer.  Investigators 
recovered a pubic hair from a towel and pillow found at the crime scene with DNA 
that matched the known profile of Reynolds.4  Badger testified that the DNA from 
that pubic hair matched the known DNA profile of Reynolds to the exclusion of 
one in thirty quintillion other Caucasians, one in fourteen sextillion African 
Americans, and one in eighty-seven quintillion Hispanics based on an FDLE 
database.  Based on a different FBI database, this match was to the exclusion of 
one in thirty-two quintillion Caucasians, one in thirteen sextillion African 
Americans, and one in sixty-six quintillion Hispanics.   
Badger also presented findings that connected the known DNA profile of 
Reynolds to other items found in and around the trailer.  Badger testified that DNA 
found on underwear located in the trailer matched the known DNA profile of 
Reynolds to the same statistical exclusion as the pubic hair.  Badger also testified 
that DNA from a blood sample taken from a piece of wood found above an air 
                                          
 
4.  The towel and pillow were packaged together for testing.    
 
 
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conditioning unit, and a switch plate from a cabinet, were matches with the DNA 
profile of Reynolds.  
A blanket from the crime scene stained with blood contained DNA that 
matched the DNA profiles of Robin and Christina Razor and Reynolds.  The State 
presented an extensive amount of DNA evidence to link Reynolds to the crimes 
which refuted the claim that he had never been in the Razor trailer.  
Sixth, although the DNA evidence alone does not establish that Reynolds 
attempted a sexual battery upon Christina before he killed her, other evidence was 
available for the State to argue in its closing statement that supported an attempted 
sexual battery theory.  Christina’s underwear was found on the floor of the trailer 
where she and her mother lived and were killed.  Christina’s body was in a 
nightgown, but not underwear, while Robin was wearing a T-shirt, shorts, 
underwear, and jewelry.  Christina’s grandmother testified that Christina always 
slept with her underwear on.  Therefore, the State’s attempted sexual battery theory 
is not inconsistent with the facts and evidence presented during trial.  See Hodges 
v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 537 (Fla. 2010) (“Attorneys are permitted wide latitude in 
closing arguments but are not permitted to make improper argument.” (cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 164 (2011)); Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 984 (Fla. 1999) 
(noting that attorneys are permitted to advance all legitimate arguments that derive 
from logical inferences drawn from the evidence).  Thus, we conclude that there is 
 
 
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no reasonable possibility that the alleged deficiency to object or cure the 
purportedly false testimony of Badger affected the jury’s verdict.   
In sum, the summary denial of this claim by the postconviction court is 
supported by the record, which provides evidence to conclusively refute the claim 
asserted by Reynolds.  We further conclude that Reynolds was not prejudiced by a 
failure to object to the Badger testimony or to the attempted sexual battery theory.  
Consequently, we deny relief on this claim. 
Burden of Proof Misstatement 
Reynolds next claims that defense counsel were ineffective for failing to 
object to a misstatement by the trial court regarding the burden of proof.  During 
voir dire, the trial court incorrectly stated on one occasion that “the State doesn’t 
have to do anything, you can’t hold it against them.”  It appears evident that the 
trial court meant to instruct the jurors was “the defense doesn’t have to do 
anything, you can’t hold it against them.”  (Emphasis supplied.)   
The State claims this issue is procedurally barred and we agree.  Although 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable on direct 
appeal and are properly raised in postconviction proceedings, see Franqui v. State, 
59 So. 3d 82, 96 (Fla. 2011), this claim is barred.  After voir dire had concluded, 
 
 
- 21 - 
the State brought the error to the attention of the original trial court.5  In response, 
the trial court stated that even if the instruction had been incorrect, he believed that 
he “drove [the proper burdens] home enough to where [the jury] understands.”  
This issue, which pertained to a jury instruction during voir dire, could have been, 
and should have been, raised on direct appeal, and because it was not, is 
procedurally barred.  Cf. Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 96 n.14.  An attempt to circumvent 
the procedural bar by cloaking this claim in the guise of ineffective assistance, 
therefore, is to no avail.   
Furthermore, even if the claim was not barred, it lacks merit.  Reynolds 
relies on Murray v. State, 937 So. 2d 277, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), in which the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal deemed the trial judge’s erroneous instruction 
regarding the burden of proof to be fundamental error.  In Murray, the trial judge 
both orally stated, and provided in written form, an instruction that the defendant 
                                          
 
5.  The full conversation between trial counsel and the court regarding the 
erroneous instruction reads: 
PROSECUTOR 1: [R]ight before you turned it over to the State, you were 
talking about the burdens and everything, it’s probably not a big deal, I think you 
misspoke, you said the State doesn’t have to prove anything.   
PROSECUTOR 2: I think you said something to the effect that the State can 
just, you know, stand back and rest and not do anything. 
PROSECUTOR 1: I think you meant to say the Defendant.   
THE COURT: Probably did.  I think I drove it home enough to where they 
understand.  
PROSECUTOR 1: Yes. 
 
DEFENSE: If you would order that now, we would appreciate that.  
 
THE COURT: Anything further from the State?  
 
 
- 22 - 
carried the burden of proving an affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See id. at 280.  While reading the written instructions to the jury, the judge faltered 
over the language, and the Fourth District surmised this was because “it must have 
occurred to the Judge that there is something improbable about a criminal 
defendant having a burden of proving any defense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . 
.”  Id.6  Thereafter, the jury retired to deliberate with the erroneous written 
instructions and a muddled oral instruction from the judge.  See id.  The Murray 
court held that the contradictory and confusing instructions were given in such a 
way as to define the legal defense of the defendant out of existence and, therefore, 
the case should be remanded for a new trial.  See id. at 280-81.  The Fourth District 
noted that when juries are provided with both correct and incorrect instructions 
there is “no reason to believe that [the jury is] likely to intuit which is the correct 
[instruction].”  See id. at 280. 
This case, however, involves one isolated misstatement of the burden of 
proof that occurred during voir dire only, and was amongst more than a dozen 
correct statements regarding the proper burden of proof, which were stated during 
                                          
 
6.  When reading the erroneous instruction out loud, the judge stated: “To 
prove the crime of aggravated battery, great bodily harm, the State must prove—
the defense—for the defense of self-defense must be proved the following two 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Murray, 937 So. 2d at 280 (emphasis in 
original).   
 
 
- 23 - 
both voir dire and the trial.  Correct statements from the judge regarding the proper 
burdens included: 
Presumptions have long been a part of criminal law.  The 
presumption of innocence is such an example.  Our system of justice 
is accusatorial in nature.  That means that the State has the power to 
accuse, and the responsibilities to prove, a charge against the 
Defendant.  As a result, a defendant is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Do you agree with the principle of law that a person is presumed to 
be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
 
I always ask the State in the presence of all the members of the 
panel, if they accept the burden of proving the case beyond and to 
the exclusion of a reasonable doubt?  This case is no different.  Mr. 
Hastings, does the State of Florida accept the burden of proof beyond 
and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt?  . . .  And to that extent, 
let me go a little bit further.  You [the jury] need to answer out loud 
to these questions.  Does everybody understand that it is the State’s 
responsibility to prove the case.  . . .  Does everybody understand the 
Defense doesn’t have to prove anything?   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)   
 
The State also correctly addressed the burden of proof.  Such 
statements included: 
[E]ach of the crimes in the State of Florida, no matter what they are, 
whether it’s a shoplifting or first degree murder, have certain number 
of elements, and each of those elements, the Judge told you, has to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
And you all indicated that before you would find the Defendant guilty, 
you would make sure that the State proved those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
Now, the burden of proof, as you’ve heard and everything, in a 
criminal case, it doesn’t matter whether it’s a shoplifting case or a 
first degree murder case, is beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .  Do you 
feel that’s [an] appropriate burden? 
 
Correct statements from defense counsel regarding the burden of proof 
included: 
Do you [the jurors] believe he, in fact, should be presumed to be 
innocent? 
 
That presumption stays with Mr. Reynolds until such time, if any, 
that the State Attorney’s office proves beyond a reasonable doubt 
that it should go away; that, in fact, he was guilty.  Do you 
understand that? 
 
In a criminal case, the burden of proof is much different, it’s beyond 
each and every reasonable doubt.  Standard is much higher.  Do each 
of you accept that that standard is much higher? 
 
Throughout closing statements, the State and the defense addressed the 
burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence multiple 
times.  For each count with which Reynolds was charged, the judge correctly 
instructed the jury on the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.   
Moreover, defense counsel was not ineffective with regard to redressing 
the misstatement of law.  First, the State brought the one misstatement to the 
attention of the trial judge and defense counsel asked the judge to correct the 
misstatement.  Defense counsel was not deficient because he requested a 
correction.  Second, Reynolds has not shown that this misstatement prejudiced 
him.  Given the fleeting nature of the misstatement, that it occurred only once and 
 
 
- 25 - 
during voir dire, and the numerous references to the correct allocation of the 
burdens of proof, we disagree with Reynolds that the jury would have been 
misled or confused as to which party carried the burdens of proof when they 
retired to deliberate.  See Rodriguez v. State, 27 So. 3d 753, 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2010) (holding that the prosecutor’s misstatement regarding the burden of proof 
did not constitute fundamental error and affect the fairness of the trial where the 
misstatement “occurred only once, during closing argument”); Henyard v. State, 
689 So. 2d 239, 250 (Fla. 1996) (holding that the trial court’s error in instructing 
jurors during voir dire regarding aggravators, mitigators, and the death penalty 
was harmless where error occurred only three times during voir dire and it was 
not repeated by the trial court during the penalty phase).  Thus, both requirements 
of Strickland fail in this case.   
We affirm the postconviction summary denial of this claim.  
Lay Witness Testimony: Hand Injury 
Reynolds next asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
denying the claim that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to object 
to impermissible lay witness testimony.  During the trial, a videotape of an 
interview between Sheriff’s Deputy John Parker and Reynolds was presented to the 
jury.  During the interview, Reynolds described his hand injury to Parker.  
Reynolds stated that he had slipped on the exterior step of his trailer and, in an 
 
 
- 26 - 
attempt to break his fall, grabbed the door and cut his hand on a burr on the 
aluminum frame.  Thereafter, Reynolds stated he drove himself to the hospital for 
treatment.  After he returned from the hospital, he removed the burr from the door 
frame with channel-lock pliers.  During trial, Parker testified that he and another 
detective visited the trailer and found the burr on the ground near the door.  The 
challenged testimony is as follows:  
PROSECUTOR 3: Now, you said that the Defendant told you that he used 
channel locks and a screwdriver to remove what he termed as a burr; 
correct? 
 
PARKER: Correct. 
 
PROSECUTOR 3: And from your examination [of] that V notch,7 from your 
experience, . . . did you believe that? 
 
PARKER: No, I did not. 
 
PROSECUTOR 3: Why not? 
 
PARKER: Because as I said earlier, the entire notch was nice and shiny.  
If it had been cracked and a piece of it sticking out, first place, it would 
have to be really sticking out to cut his finger like that, in my opinion.  
Secondly, it would have been gray somewhere in that crack.  And the piece 
that we found and the entire notch that it went to is nice and shiny as 
though it had just been created. 
 
PROSECUTOR 3: Now he had already come up with that explanation at 
that time when you were out there, did he not? 
 
PARKER: Yes. 
 
                                          
 
7.  The burr was also referred to as a notch during trial. 
 
 
- 27 - 
Reynolds contends that defense counsel were ineffective because they failed 
to object to this testimony on the grounds that Parker was not qualified to testify as 
an “expert in metallurgy or the rate of oxidation of aluminum.”  The State contends 
that an expert is not required to testify as to “whether or not a piece of metal would 
be shiny if recently cut.” 
Section 90.701, Florida Statutes (2011), provides: 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s testimony 
about what he or she perceived may be in the form of inference and 
opinion when: 
 
(1) 
The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and 
adequacy, communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of 
fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the 
witness’s use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of 
fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and 
 
(2) 
The opinions and inferences do not require a special 
knowledge, skill, experience, or training. 
 
§ 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis supplied). 
 
Reynolds relies on the decision in Nardone v. State, 798 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2001), to support this claim.  Nardone, however, suggests that it was not 
necessary to admit the witness in this case, Parker, as an expert.  In Nardone, the 
court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to 
introduce the opinion of a police officer regarding whether an aluminum strip torn 
from a planter could be a weapon.  See id. at 874.  The Nardone court explained 
that lay witness opinion testimony is permitted only when it is based on what the 
 
 
- 28 - 
witness has personally perceived.  See id. at 873.  Since the testifying officer’s 
conclusion was not based on eyewitness testimony of the assault that had 
purportedly transpired with the strip, the district court concluded the testimony was 
speculative and impermissible lay opinion.  See id.  It distinguished its decision 
from those in Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990), and Peacock v. State, 
160 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), in which this Court and the First District, 
respectively, admitted opinion testimony from law enforcement.  In Floyd, this 
Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the 
testimony of a police officer regarding the impressions of what occurred at a crime 
scene.  See 569 So. 2d at 1232.  In that case, a police officer testified “that a 
tablecloth found lying on the bed ‘appeared like someone had taken some type of 
object that had blood on it and wiped it on there . . . .’ ”  See id. at 1231.  That 
same officer testified that a tissue box lying on the floor appeared to have been 
knocked off a dresser.  See id.  We affirmed the admission of this testimony and 
noted that the officer’s “testimony [was] within the permissible range of lay 
observation and ordinary police experience.”  Id. at 1232. 
In Peacock, the First District held that an officer was permitted to testify 
with regard to his visual comparison of tires and casts made from tire prints found 
at the scene of the crime.  See 163 So. 2d at 542-43.  The Peacock court stated that 
a witness does not need to be specially trained to make the type of visual 
 
 
- 29 - 
comparison at issue in that case, and concluded that “an intelligent person with 
some degree of experience . . . may and should be permitted to testify, leaving to 
the jury . . . the determination of the credence and weight to be given thereto.”  Id. 
at 543.   
Here, Parker testified as to his observations of the burr and his impression of 
what should have been found.  Based on the statements from Reynolds, Parker 
testified that he believed a piece of the burr should have “really [been] sticking out 
to cut [Reynolds’] finger.”  The door and metal burr were available during trial for 
the jury to personally examine.  The door was in the courtroom and the burr was 
admitted into evidence.  The jury members, therefore, could make their own 
“determination of the credence and weight to be given” to the testimony from 
Parker.  See Peacock, 160 So. 2d at 542-43.   
Additionally, we conclude that the testimony was “within the permissible 
range of lay observation . . . .”  See Floyd, 569 So. 2d at 1232.  Parker testified that 
he thought the burr looked too “nice and shiny,” that it should have been grayer, 
and that if the cuts Reynolds sustained were actually from contact with the burr, 
the burr would have had a sharper edge, or, as Parker reasoned, a piece of the burr 
would have been “really sticking out.”  Counsel was not deficient for failing to 
object to this testimony as it falls within the range of lay observation permitted by 
Florida law.   
 
 
- 30 - 
Furthermore, even if the testimony from Parker was impermissible and could 
only have been provided by one who specializes in the study of metals, this claim 
is still without merit because Reynolds has not met the second of Strickland’s two 
required prongs: prejudice.  Reynolds has failed to show that but for the alleged 
deficiency of counsel, our confidence in the outcome of the proceeding would be 
undermined.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 
(Fla. 2010).  Indeed, this challenge is almost completely tangential to a 
determination of guilt in this case.   
The State introduced a significant amount of DNA evidence during trial 
which linked Reynolds to the crime scene.  As addressed in the first claim, the 
State presented evidence demonstrating that Reynolds’ DNA was found on 
underwear, a blanket and towel, and a piece of wood in the Razor trailer.  This 
DNA evidence was in addition to statements from Reynolds to law enforcement 
concerning an altercation he had with Danny Ray Privett, eyewitness testimony of 
Privett sitting on Reynolds’ car which was parked at the crime scene the night the 
crimes were committed, eyewitness testimony of Reynolds washing clothes at 5:30 
a.m. on the morning the bodies were discovered, clothes found on a clothesline 
belonging to Reynolds that appeared to have been bleached, and testimony from 
two prisoners who had previously been incarcerated with Reynolds to whom he 
admitted committing the crimes.  Furthermore, the State provided expert testimony 
 
 
- 31 - 
as to the cause of Reynolds’ hand injury, which suggested that it was not from 
falling and catching his hand on a metal burr.  A medical examiner testified that 
the hand injury most likely was from a knife, or a similarly long and sharp object.   
Given the copious amount of evidence connecting Reynolds to the crimes, 
irrespective of the testimony from Parker regarding the metal burr, we conclude 
that Reynolds has not satisfied the requirements of Strickland.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the denial of relief on this claim by the postconviction court. 
Lay Witness Testimony: Clothing Condition 
At trial, two witnesses testified with regard to incriminating clothing.  
Reynolds contends that his counsel were ineffective because they permitted his 
landlady to testify with regard to the condition of his clothing as it was found on 
the day of the homicides.  Based on the record, however, it was the crime scene 
investigator, not the landlady, who testified as to the condition of the clothing.  The 
contested testimony is as follows: 
PROSECUTOR 3: Okay.  Now, clothes, did you see any clothes that 
appeared to have been washed— 
 
INVESTIGATOR: Yes. 
 
PROSECUTOR 3: —recently?  And tell us about that. 
 
INVESTIGATOR: There was a clothesline approximately fifty feet 
from where the washing machine was, and it was full of clothing that 
had been washed. 
 
PROSECUTOR 3: Were these men’s clothes or women’s clothes? 
 
 
- 32 - 
 
INVESTIGATOR: Men’s clothes. 
 
PROSECUTOR 3: Anything that appeared to be significant about any 
of those clothes? 
 
INVESTIGATOR: They appeared to be bleached, strongly bleached.  
They were very faded. 
 
The claim that his attorneys were ineffective for their failure to object to this 
testimony is premised on the assumption that a non-expert was permitted to offer 
expert testimony.  Reynolds contends that a layperson should not be permitted to 
testify whether clothing provides an appearance as though it has been bleached.  
Given that it was an individual trained in crime scene investigation and 
documentation, and not a landlady, who testified as to the state of this clothing, we 
note that the claim is weaker than either of the parties recognized.  The investigator 
was not admitted as an expert and, according to Reynolds, the individual who 
testified offered expert conclusions.  We address the argument as if it was directed 
to the investigator rather than to the landlady—neither of whom were qualified as 
bleach experts. 
Reynolds claims that the investigator should not have been permitted to 
testify regarding the state of his clothing because she “lacked the special 
knowledge, experience, skill or training required to express an opinion as to 
whether the condition or makeup of [his] clothing showed that it had been 
 
 
- 33 - 
bleached. . . .  [The investigator] had no chemical or business background allowing 
her to render an opinion” with regard to the state of his clothes.   
This asserted expert issue is a non-issue because it is immaterial.  Whether 
clothes appear to have been bleached is an observation within the province of a lay 
witness.  As addressed in the previous claim, lay witnesses can provide opinion-
type testimony if it is “within the ken of an intelligent person with a degree of 
experience.”  Floyd, 569 So. 2d at 1232.  An opinion as to whether clothes appear 
to be bleached does not require “any special knowledge, skill, experience, or 
training,” see Williams v. State, 70 So. 3d 733, 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and 
would be within the knowledge of an average person who has washed and 
bleached clothing.  The type of testimony here was not a chemical analysis.  
Therefore, trial counsel were not deficient in their failure to object to the testimony 
concerning the impression of the clothing on the day of the murders.   
Moreover, even if counsel were deficient in failing to object to this specific 
testimony, based on the extensive DNA evidence and testimony presented at trial, 
the error was not prejudicial to the extent that it undermines our confidence in the 
outcome of this case.  Therefore, we affirm the summary denial of this claim by the 
postconviction court. 
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
Sleeping Juror 
 
Reynolds contends that trial counsel were ineffective for not seeking to 
remove a sleeping juror because she fell asleep during “critical testimony.”  The 
juror first fell asleep during the testimony of an evidence specialist, and later 
during the testimony of forensic analyst Charles Badger.  The record reflects that 
the juror fell asleep when the evidence specialist was discussing packaging 
evidence from the crime scene for scientific analysis and processing.  Noting the 
sleeping juror, the trial judge requested that the State and defense approach the 
bench to discuss the issue.  Following the bench conference, the trial judge had the 
testifying specialist pause her testimony, admonished the juror outside the presence 
of the whole jury, and then resumed the trial.  Later, during Badger’s testimony, 
the trial judge again called a bench conference, excused the jury, and discussed the 
conduct of the juror with the State and defense.  The trial judge commented that 
the juror was distracting others with her dozing.  After a lunch recess, the trial 
judge asked the parties to readdress the issue.  The State did not make any specific 
request to have the sleeping juror removed, and the defense confirmed that they 
wanted her to continue as a juror.   
Reynolds asserts that the court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing 
on this claim.  We affirm the denial of this claim because the sleeping juror issue 
was fully addressed during trial.  Furthermore, Reynolds has failed to show that he 
 
 
- 35 - 
suffered undue prejudice as a result of the behavior of the juror.  The record 
conclusively refutes the claim that trial counsel were ineffective because they did 
not request the removal of this juror.   
Florida courts have reversed and remanded summary denials of claims 
involving the failure of trial counsel to bring a sleeping juror to the attention of the 
court.  In Terrell v. State, 9 So. 3d 1284, 1290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), for example, 
the Fourth District held that the defendant presented a “legally and factually 
sufficient” claim that defense counsel failed to object to a sleeping juror and the 
postconviction court erred in summarily denying the claim.  See also Judd v. State, 
951 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Erlsten v. State, 842 So. 2d 967, 968-69 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2003); McClendon v. State, 765 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2000); Kesick v. State, 448 So. 2d 644, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).  The Terrell 
court, accordingly, reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this claim.  
See 9 So. 3d at 1290.  Conversely, the Fourth District has also affirmed the denial 
of sleeping juror claims when trial counsel has brought the problem to the attention 
of the trial court, thereby “conclusively refut[ing] the allegations of 
ineffectiveness.”  See Prince v. State, 40 So. 3d 11, 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).   
The transcript from this trial indicates that the court brought this issue to the 
attention of all involved.  In Terrell, the trial court erred in summarily denying the 
claim because the sleeping juror situation was not addressed at trial—thus, 
 
 
- 36 - 
addressing this problem at trial was the issue.  See 9 So. 3d at 1290; see also 
Wilson v. State, 828 So. 2d 1086, 1086-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (reversing and 
remanding the summary denial of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel failed to notify the court that a juror was sleeping during 
critical testimony).  In this case, however, this situation was discussed, although it 
was the court that first addressed the issue.  If the issue is correctly addressed, no 
reversible error is presented. 
The issue with regard to trial counsel waiving objection to the removal of the 
juror, however, is a separate claim.  In Simo v. State, the Fourth District stated that 
trial counsel may be ineffective for “waiving objection to the presence of a 
sleeping juror.”  790 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding the trial 
court erred in summarily denying the claim of ineffective assistance for “failing to 
object and in waiving objection to the presence of a sleeping juror”); see also 
McGraw v. State, 796 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (noting that it is 
“usually improper to summarily deny a claim that counsel failed to act upon being 
informed that a juror was sleeping during trial”).  In this case, defense counsel did 
not request the removal of the sleeping juror.  Whether trial counsel had a tactical 
or strategic reason for not pursuing the dismissal of the juror is a determination that 
usually should require an evidentiary hearing.  See Erlsten, 842 So. 2d at 968-69.  
Here, however, we conclude that the colloquy that transpired during trial between 
 
 
- 37 - 
the court and trial counsel over the course of two separate bench conferences 
produced sufficient information and evidence to render an evidentiary hearing and 
further inquiry unnecessary.   
During the first bench conference, the trial court asked both the State and 
defense counsel whether they wanted the juror to remain on the panel.  At that 
time, the juror was observed dozing during what would be considered 
inconsequential testimony.  An evidence specialist was simply listing the items she 
had collected, confirming that these items were labeled, and addressing security at 
the crime scene.  Although the State did not make a specific request with regard to 
the juror, State counsel was concerned with keeping the juror on the panel and 
expressed a willingness to replace the juror if defense counsel requested a removal.  
Defense counsel specifically stated that they would prefer that the court not 
remove the juror, and instead discuss the situation with the subject juror.  The trial 
court, in response, addressed the issue and admonished the juror. 
During the second bench conference to discuss this juror’s behavior, State 
witness Badger was presenting testimony which addressed the processing of DNA 
samples recovered from the crime scene.  The record reflects that Badger was 
discussing DNA matches, and the lack thereof, from Reynolds to items associated 
with the crime.  Before the trial court again noted the dozing juror, Badger testified 
regarding whether DNA from Reynolds was found on vaginal swabs from 
 
 
- 38 - 
Christina Razor.  Indeed, if Badger had testified that DNA from Reynolds was 
found on the swabs as Reynolds contends, then the juror at issue fell asleep during 
highly inculpatory testimony, and defense counsel decided not to have the juror 
removed for strategic reasons.  Following these two incidents, the juror was not 
addressed or admonished again and there is no indication that the issue arose again.    
The record reflects that the court asked both the State and defense counsel to 
fully consider their positions with regard to the sleeping juror.  The State indicated 
that it was not making “any specific request of the Court at this time,” and defense 
counsel stated to the trial court that “we want her to continue as a juror.”  The 
strategic decision is clear.  Reynolds now contends that his trial counsel misstated 
his position and that he wanted the juror removed.  The trial transcript also reflects 
that the court directed defense counsel to speak with Reynolds regarding the 
decision,8 and although Reynolds did not personally respond, his counsel did so on 
his behalf.  If Reynolds did not agree with the response of his attorney, which 
                                          
 
8.  The following exchange took place regarding whether to keep the 
sleeping juror on the jury: 
THE COURT: Okay.  Why don’t you talk to your client and make sure 
that’s his position too, then you can announce on the record what your positions 
are.   
DEFENSE: We talked about it.  
THE COURT: No, no, no.  What does your— 
DEFENSE: We’ve talked to I (sic) him about it.  That is his position.   
THE COURT: No.  What is your position?  Do you want her excused or not 
want her excused? 
DEFENSE: No, we want her to continue as a juror. 
 
 
- 39 - 
indicated that they wanted to keep this juror on the panel, Reynolds did not make 
his position known when the opportunity arose.  It must be assumed that Reynolds 
would have indicated his disapproval at that time, in some fashion, during the 
specific discussion in his presence regarding this issue.  Consequently, we affirm 
the summary denial of this claim by the postconviction court. 
Criminal Conduct and the Right to Testify 
Reynolds presents a number of issues under this claim.  We address each, 
and affirm the summary denial by the postconviction court.  First, Reynolds states 
that his counsel were ineffective because they informed the jurors of his prior 
criminal convictions during voir dire and, during opening statements, twice 
informed jurors he would testify, but never prepared him to do so.  He claims that 
if he had been prepared, he would have testified as to the source of his injuries, 
why he was cooperative with the police, that he had always maintained his 
innocence, that he had a friendly relationship with Danny Privett, that he did not 
kill the victims, and that he could explain inconsistencies in the evidence.  
Reynolds claims that his DNA was found inside the trailer on a towel that 
belonged to him and was mishandled during a search of his residence that he 
authorized.  However, whether the towel was, in fact, from Reynolds’ home and 
mishandled does not explain away that his DNA was also found on a piece of 
wood in the Razor trailer or on underwear also recovered from the trailer. 
 
 
- 40 - 
Further, Reynolds does not specifically address the manner in which 
counsel failed to prepare him to testify—rather, he just states a conclusion that 
counsel was ineffective.  This claim is insufficiently pled.  See Wyatt v. State, 78 
So. 3d 512, 521 n.6 (Fla. 2011) (denying claims as insufficiently pled in part 
because counsel failed to specifically address what was allegedly erroneous or 
what counsel should have done instead); Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 849, 852 n.2 
(Fla. 1990) (noting that the defendant’s failure to fully brief and argue his claims 
constituted a waiver of those claims).  Nevertheless, even if we accept this claim 
that his counsel was deficient in this regard, Reynolds does not set forth the 
manner in which this failure ultimately prejudiced his case which would 
“undermine judicial confidence in the outcome” of his trial.  See Lawrence v. 
State, 831 So. 2d 121, 129 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  It 
should be noted that Reynolds ultimately decided not to testify at trial.   
Second, Reynolds contends that he felt threatened by his counsel because 
defense counsel informed him that if he testified it would “f**king kill him.”  
Although perhaps this is a poor choice of words, this statement itself does not 
indicate that defense counsel threatened Reynolds and thereby coerced his 
silence.  Nor do such words connote, as Reynolds alleges, that if he testified, he 
would definitely receive the death penalty.  Rather, the statement suggests that 
counsel believed it would be poor strategy and detrimental to the case if Reynolds 
 
 
- 41 - 
testified during trial.  Indeed, the postconviction court stated in the denial order 
that given the expectation of trial counsel that Reynolds would testify, “it was not 
unreasonable for counsel to ‘take the wind out of the sails’ of that basis for 
impeachment by bringing out [prior convictions] during voir dire.  The fact that 
the strategy evolved during the course of the trial does not retroactively render 
the decision unreasonable.”   
As this Court has indicated time and again, counsel will not be found 
ineffective for decisions that “in hindsight, did not work to the defendant’s 
advantage.”  See Souffrant v. State, 994 So. 2d 407, 410-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) 
(citing Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1174 (Fla. 2005)); see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Mendoza v. State, 87 So. 3d 644, 655 (Fla. 2011); 
Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 478 (Fla. 2010); Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 
509 (Fla. 2009).  Review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be from 
the perspective of defense counsel at the time of trial rather than with the 
“heightened perspective of hindsight.”  See Patton v. State, 784 So. 2d 380, 391 
(Fla. 2000).  Indeed, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Reynolds may have benefitted from 
testifying, but the record indicates that during the trial Reynolds decided against 
that approach.  This decision does not render his trial counsel ineffective. 
 
 
- 42 - 
Third, Reynolds claims that the trial court failed to ask him whether his 
decision not to testify was voluntary and knowing.  When the time arrived for 
Reynolds to testify, the following colloquy occurred: 
THE COURT:  [Defense counsel], have you figured out what the order 
of trial is gonna be for this afternoon, sir?   
 
DEFENSE:  Judge, we’re gonna rest at this time. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Reynolds, like I said before, this would be 
the time when in the trial if you wanted to testify where you would be 
able to testify.  If you want to testify, that’s fine, your testimony is 
considered by the same standard as any other witness.  If you don’t want 
to testify, that’s fine, it can’t be held against you.  As I said before, you 
should naturally listen very carefully to your attorneys whenever they 
advise you as far as this particular matter, but again, this is your case, 
your life, so to speak, you make the final decision.   
 
REYNOLDS:  Yes, sir.  
 
THE COURT:  Knowing that—You’ve spoken to your attorneys about 
this; is that correct?   
 
REYNOLDS:  Yes, sir, I have.  
 
THE COURT:  And have you reached a decision whether you want to 
testify or not testify?  
 
REYNOLDS:  Yes, sir.  
 
THE COURT:  And what is your decision, sir?   
 
REYNOLDS:  No, I don’t want to testify.  
 
The Court:  And you understand that this is the one time of the trial 
where basically you’d be able to if you wanted to?  
 
REYNOLDS:  Right.  
 
 
- 43 - 
 
THE COURT:  And is this your personal decision?  
 
REYNOLDS:  Yes, sir.  
 
THE COURT:  Then we’ll abide by that. So you’re gonna rest at this 
time?   
 
DEFENSE:  Yes, sir.  
 
This evidences that indeed a colloquy was conducted, and Reynolds is essentially 
arguing that the trial court should have engaged in a more detailed discussion 
than that which actually occurred during the quoted exchange.  Reynolds 
contends that his counsel were ineffective because they misadvised him with 
regard to testifying, and in doing so, coerced him into silence.  Reynolds also 
asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to further investigate this 
claim.   
The right to testify is a “fundamental right[] under our state and federal 
constitutions.”  See Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1993).  “[T]he record 
must support a finding that such a waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently made.”  Id.; see also State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1112 (Fla. 
2002).  In Gonzalez v. State, this Court held that the defendant had knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to testify.  See 990 So. 2d 1017, 
1031 (Fla. 2008).  After counsel had informed the trial judge that the defendant 
 
 
- 44 - 
would not be testifying, the trial court conducted a colloquy with the defendant 
which addressed that he  
understood that he had a constitutional right to testify even if his 
counsel believed that he should not[,] . . . that he was going to follow 
his counsel’s advice to not testify, . . . that it was his personal 
decision not to testify, and counsel did not promise him anything or 
force him into not testifying.   
 
See id. at 1031-32.  The Gonzalez Court noted that 
[a]lthough this Court has held that “a trial court does not have an 
affirmative duty to make a record inquiry concerning a defendant’s 
waiver of the right to testify,” this Court has stated that . . . “it would 
be advisable for the trial court . . . to make a record inquiry as to 
whether the defendant understands he has a right to testify . . . .”   
 
Id. at 1031 (quoting Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403, 411 n.2 (Fla. 
1988)). 
The colloquy that occurred between Reynolds and the trial court did not 
specifically address two elements that were present in Gonzalez: whether counsel 
promised anything or forced the defendant not to testify, and whether the 
defendant knew that he had a constitutional right to testify.  Despite these 
omissions, we are satisfied that the trial court obtained a knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver from Reynolds of his right to testify as demonstrated by the 
quoted exchange.   
Moreover, there is no mandate that a trial court conduct a “Faretta-type 
inquiry” to accept a defendant’s decision to waive his Fifth Amendment right to 
 
 
- 45 - 
testify.  In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1975), despite a 
particularly searching inquiry, the trial court did not accept the decision of the 
defendant to conduct his own defense and waive his right to counsel.  The United 
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court and held that the 
defendant had been deprived of his constitutional right to self-representation.  See 
id. at 836.  Since Faretta, courts have interpreted the case to require that they 
conduct a sufficiently searching inquiry when evaluating whether a defendant has 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.  With regard 
to the right to testify, however, this inquiry need not rise to the Faretta level; it 
must only indicate that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived his right.  See Deaton, 635 So. 2d at 8.   
The waiver by Reynolds was expressed on the record even though this 
Court has held that it is not necessary to do so.  See Lawrence v. State, 831 So. 2d 
121, 132 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the trial court need not obtain defendant’s 
waiver of his right to testify on the record to ensure that his waiver was knowing 
and intelligent).  Reynolds confirmed with the trial court that his decision not to 
testify was his own, that he understood now was the time to testify if he so 
desired, that he discussed his decision with his attorneys, and that he personally 
decided against it.  This claim that the trial court did not question Reynolds 
 
 
- 46 - 
regarding his decision not to testify is conclusively refuted by the record.  We 
agree with the denial of this claim by the postconviction court.   
Fourth, Reynolds alleges that defense counsel failed to effectively 
challenge the jailhouse witnesses and that, if he had testified, he could have 
explained the situation with regard to these witnesses.  Reynolds does not provide 
any insight as to what information could have been discovered by counsel, or the 
manner in which this evidence could have helped his defense.  Additionally, this 
claim is not specifically alleged, and thus was properly summarily denied.  See 
Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 834 (Fla. 2011) (“A court may summarily deny a 
postconviction claim when the claim is legally insufficient, procedurally barred, 
or refuted by the record.”); Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 95-96.   
Reynolds alleges, in passing, that the trial court did not perform a sufficiently 
searching inquiry with regard to his decision to waive mitigation.  There is no 
argument, analysis, or elaboration with regard to this issue.  Reynolds has, 
consequently, waived this claim.  See Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 851-52 (Fla. 
1990) (The defendant “seeks to raise eleven other claims by simply referring to 
arguments presented in his motion for postconviction relief.  The purpose of an 
appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal.  Merely 
making reference to arguments below without further elucidation does not suffice 
to preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived.”).   
 
 
- 47 - 
Furthermore, this claim also fails on the merits and was properly summarily 
denied.  The record demonstrates that Reynolds filed, and the court granted, a 
Waiver of Right to Present Mitigation Evidence.  The trial transcript demonstrates 
that the court engaged in a colloquy with Reynolds with regard to his decision to 
waive the presentation of mitigation evidence.9 
                                          
 
9.  The following colloquy occurred: 
THE COURT: The State is entitled to go forward with its aggravators . . . 
With respect to mitigation, naturally your attorneys are gonna listen very 
careful[ly] and very strongly to your request, but I have to make an inquiry first 
from you and from your attorneys to make sure that certain things have been 
considered by you— 
REYNOLDS: Yes, sir.  
THE COURT: —prior to considering your request.  And [defense counsel], 
we have discussed this before, you’ve already had your client examined; is this 
correct? 
DEFENSE: Yes, Judge, and Judge— 
THE COURT: I mean by a doctor or psychiatrist or psychologist; is that 
correct?  
DEFENSE: Yes, sir.   
THE COURT: Now, with respect to this phase of the proceedings, when we 
go to the penalty phase, Mr. Reynolds, it’s not unusual for attorneys to have their 
client examined again— 
REYNOLDS: Right. 
THE COURT: —after the trial by a psychiatrist, typically, or a psychologist, 
and it’s my understanding that in order for us to go forward and not to have that 
come back on us somewhere down the road and say that, well, your attorneys 
didn’t consider that, and even though Mr. Reynolds wanted to go forward and 
waived his participation in the hearing, he still should have had a psychiatrist 
examine him.  Are you telling me that you want to dispense with having the 
psychiatrist examine you at this stage?  
REYNOLDS: Oh, yes, sir.  I’m not crazy, no by far, chance, far, my sanity 
hasn’t changed ever.   
THE COURT: But you got to listen to my question.   
REYNOLDS: Right. 
 
 
- 48 - 
Before the penalty phase, the court verified with Reynolds that he did not 
want to present mitigation.  Reynolds stated that he had been in prison all his life, 
and “[m]y mitigating is not nothing compared to the aggravators that the State is 
gonna bring in here against me.”  Reynolds stated that he did not want to present 
mitigation evidence and wanted to proceed as quickly as possible to the Spencer10 
hearing “because there’s no such thing . . . .  It’s a waste of time because I have 
none.  I’ve been locked up all my life.” 
After the State presented evidence during the penalty phase, the trial court 
again questioned Reynolds with respect to his decision not to present mitigating 
evidence.  The court then recessed, instructing Reynolds to again consider his 
decision overnight.  The next day, the court asked Reynolds again if he wanted to 
present mitigating evidence.  Reynolds responded that he only wanted to address 
the court and the victims’ families, to which the court explained that Reynolds 
could express such sentiments at the Spencer hearing, not the penalty phase.  
Reynolds thereafter reconfirmed his decision not to present mitigating evidence.  
                                                                                                                                        
THE COURT: Are you saying you do not want to have a psychiatrist— 
REYNOLDS: No sir. 
THE COURT: —examine you at this time?  
REYNOLDS: No, sir.   
THE COURT: I don’t mean to be—When you say no, sir, you would have to 
say no, sir— 
REYNOLDS: No, sir, Your Honor, I don’t wish to see a psychiatrist at this 
time. 
 
10.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).  
 
 
- 49 - 
This in-depth exchange between the trial court and Reynolds conclusively refutes 
the claim that trial counsel were somehow ineffective for not presenting mitigation 
evidence.  The postconviction court properly summarily denied this claim.   
Lethal Injection 
This Court has consistently rejected constitutional challenges to lethal 
injection.  See, e.g., Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 541 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1 (2011); Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 219 (2010); Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
2839 (2009); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 1161 (2009); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007), cert. 
denied, 553 U.S. 1059 (2008).  This claim, therefore, has no merit, and we affirm 
the denial of the request for an evidentiary hearing. 
Claims Denied After the Evidentiary Hearing 
In reviewing a decision of the postconviction court to deny claims after an 
evidentiary hearing we review the trial court’s findings on questions of fact, the 
credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial 
evidence.  See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 993 (Fla. 2009); Green v. State, 
975 So. 2d 1090, 1100 (Fla. 2008); Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 747-48 
(Fla. 1998).  We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.  
See Green, 975 So. 2d at 1100; Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 32 (Fla. 2005). 
 
 
- 50 - 
Closing Statement: Attempted Sexual Battery  
Reynolds contends that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object 
to the State’s remark during closing statements that “Reynolds’ motive was the 
attempted sexual battery of an 11-year old.”  The denial of this claim by the 
postconviction court is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Thus, we 
affirm its ruling.   
The following evidence was presented during the trial: Christina’s 
grandmother testified that Christina usually slept with her underwear on and 
identified a Rugrats sleeping bag11 as belonging to Christina.  Another witness, and 
friend of the three victims, testified that she too recognized the Rugrats item as 
something Christina slept with every night.  During trial, a DNA lab analyst 
testified that he analyzed the underwear recovered from the crime scene and found 
blood from Christina on them.  A medical examiner testified that Christina was 
found not wearing any underwear.  
In closing, the State asserted the following:  
Christina always slept with her panties . . . and always slept 
with this Rugrats blanket.  However, when the investigators came 
inside, they found her panties were removed and panties on the floor 
and the Rugrats blanket removed from her. . . .  
 
Christina’s panties were removed, indicative that the perpetrator 
had other things on his mind other than just killing Christina. . . . 
                                          
 
11.  The Rugrats item is referred to as both a blanket and sleeping bag 
throughout the record.  Christina’s grandmother claimed it was a sleeping bag. 
 
 
- 51 - 
 
[T]here’s several stains found on these panties. . . .  [A]s you 
might expect, a bloodstain of Christina, one was a bloodstain of 
Robin, and the other was a mixture . . . a mixture of that of Christina 
and the Defendant, Michael Gordon Reynolds.   
 
[W]e know that Christina’s panties were removed, no sperm 
found on her, but we know, from the evidence, the evidence certainly 
is suggestive that the Defendant had other thoughts in mind, you 
might look for some evidence that the Defendant went beyond just 
thinking about this, and you might look for pubic hair, and, indeed, 
the hairs were found, collected, and as we talked earlier, whose pubic 
hair was found right near the little girl, right near the panties, that of 
the Defendant, matched to the Defendant with DNA . . . . 
 
[T]he perpetrator in this case, the Defendant, didn’t follow 
through, as evidenced by the fact there was no sperm, no semen found 
on or about this little girl’s body, is indicative of the fact that 
something caused him to want to leave quick.  He was spooked. 
 
 
In support of his claim, Reynolds relies on the Second District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Coverdale v. State, 940 So. 2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), 
in which that court held the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for 
mistrial when a witness, in response to a question regarding a friend’s feelings, 
stated that the friend “was okay with [the defendant] until he tried to molest her 
daughter.”  The Coverdale court held that the trial court should have declared a 
mistrial because “[f]ew criminal allegations would be more prejudicial to a 
defendant than molesting a child.  If the jury believed the statement that [the 
defendant] was a child molester, this gratuitous statement would deny him a fair 
trial on the aggravated stalking charge, and no curative instruction” would rectify 
 
 
- 52 - 
that situation.  Id. at 561.  However, the Coverdale opinion did not identify any 
evidence presented during the trial that would have supported an assertion that the 
defendant actually molested children.  In the present case, in contrast, the State 
provided facts in evidence to support its inference.   
During the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that he did not 
object to the contested closing remark because he regarded it as a permissible 
inference based on the evidence presented.12  To find the performance of trial 
counsel deficient, Reynolds must have established that counsel’s assessment was 
so unreasonable that he essentially was not functioning as counsel, thus satisfying 
the first prong of Strickland.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; see also Occhicone, 
768 So. 2d at 1048.  Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the 
statements from the State in closing were not unreasonable or without support in 
the evidence, and counsel, therefore, were not deficient for failing to object.   
Reynolds also fails to satisfy the second prong of Strickland by 
demonstrating that, had defense counsel objected, the trial court would have 
                                          
 
12.  Defense counsel testified:  
[T]here was evidence that was presented during the course of the trial 
that there was a blanket that the child had that had Mike’s DNA on it, 
allegedly.  Her panties that were locate[d] near her had Mike’s DNA on it, 
allegedly, and then there was a pubic hair that was located near both of 
those.   
And it was my position then and still is now that that leads to an 
inference based upon the evidence in the case that the State could argue that 
there potentially was or was an attempted battery of the child.  Sexually.  
 
 
- 53 - 
sustained any objection.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Given that the State 
presented evidence supporting an inference of attempted sexual battery, including 
DNA evidence on Christina’s underwear, our confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding is not undermined.  Reynolds, therefore, fails to meet either prong of 
Strickland.   
The postconviction court correctly found that trial counsel were not 
ineffective and its conclusion is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  
Therefore, we affirm the denial of this claim.   
Sexual Battery Motive and HAC 
Reynolds claims that defense counsel were ineffective during the penalty 
phase for three reasons.  First, he contends they were ineffective because they did 
not object to the sexual battery motive argument presented by the State in closing, 
and because they failed to effectively rebut this theory during closing statements.  
Second, Reynolds contends that his counsel were ineffective because they did not 
address the claim that Christina’s death was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  
The only argument advanced was that the sexual battery motive did not support the 
aggravator that the murders were committed to avoid arrest.  Third, Reynolds 
contends that the failure to rebut the testimony of forensic analyst Badger 
regarding the identification of the DNA profile found on the vaginal swab from 
Christina prejudiced him during the penalty phase.   
 
 
- 54 - 
 
Reynolds fails to identify any objectionable statements in the record.  
Reynolds also does not explain the manner in which a failure to object prejudiced 
his case except to reiterate the statement in Coverdale from the Second District that 
allegations of child molestation are amongst the most prejudicial comments that 
can be stated.  See 940 So. 2d at 561.  Regardless, the conclusion from the 
postconviction court that trial counsel did not perform ineffectively because the 
State’s closing remarks were a fair comment on the evidence, as addressed in the 
prior claim, is supported by competent, substantial evidence.   
With regard to the HAC claim, the State suggests that Reynolds’ allegation 
may be directed to closing argument when the State commented that Christina 
suffered defensive wounds, contusions to her face, injuries to her mouth, and also 
stated: 
You couple that with the removal of her panties and we know the last 
few moments of Christina’s life, first with the realization that her 
mother was being brutally attacked by this Defendant, and then the 
last few moments of her life were really indescribable.  
 
On direct appeal, this Court held that the HAC aggravator was supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  We stated that: 
With regard to Christina Razor, the trial court made the following 
findings: 
 
a.  Dr. Sarah Irrgang, the medical examiner, testified that the victim 
Christina Razor, suffered two stab wounds to the neck and shoulder 
area, contusions to her face, and injuries to her mouth.  It was Dr. 
Irrgang’s testimony that Christina Razor also suffered an abrasion on 
 
 
- 55 - 
the back of one of her hands which was characterized as being 
consistent with a defensive wound. 
 
b.  The presence of defensive wounds allows the assumption to be 
made that the victim was alive unless shown otherwise by the 
evidence. 
 
c.  The existence of a defensive wound demonstrates that the victim 
was aware of her plight and was [resisting].  The stab wounds suffered 
by the victim, Christina Razor, are consistent with having been made 
with a weapon such as a knife. 
 
d.  At the moment that the victim, Christina Razor, was being 
attacked, it is not known whether or not her mother was still alive and 
conscious or unconscious or had been murdered.  Regardless, in the 
close confines of that cramped camping trailer, Christina Razor, in 
great pain and fear, was forced to fight a losing battle for her life 
knowing that either her mother had already been killed and she was 
next or that after Reynolds killed her, he was sure to end her mother’s 
life.  For a child to experience the fear, terror and emotional strain that 
accompanied Christina Razor as she fought for her life, knowing full 
well that she was fighting a losing battle, is unimaginable, heinous, 
atrocious and cruel. . . . 
 
Reynolds, 934 So. 2d at 1154. 
As noted in the opinion of this Court, a vast amount of evidence supported 
the HAC argument.  Moreover, as addressed in the prior claim, the State’s 
inferences regarding sexual battery were reasonable based on the evidence 
presented.  See Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2007) (“Closing 
argument is an opportunity for counsel to review the evidence and to explicate 
those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”).  Given this 
reasonable inference and the presence of competent, substantial evidence in the 
 
 
- 56 - 
record to support the denial of this claim by the postconviction court, we affirm its 
ruling.   
With regard to the transcription error in the Badger testimony, Reynolds 
claims counsel were either ineffective for their failure to object to or cure the 
testimony or, more relevantly, that the transcription error prejudiced the conclusion 
reached by this Court on direct appeal.  Defense counsel, who listened to the tape 
of the trial during the evidentiary hearing, explained that he could not understand 
the discrepancy between what the court reporter had transcribed and what was 
presented at trial—that DNA from Reynolds was not found on the vaginal swab.  
Moreover, even though DNA from Reynolds was not found on the vaginal swab 
from Christina, it was found on other evidence connecting Reynolds to the crime 
and presented at trial.  In addition, the DNA testing results Badger referenced 
during trial stated that DNA from Reynolds was not found on the swab, thereby 
contradicting the contested transcript testimony.  We conclude, therefore, that any 
error with regard to this issue in the transcript was harmless and did not affect our 
affirmance of the judgment and sentences of death in this case.   
Memorial at the Courthouse 
Reynolds claims that his trial counsel were ineffective for not conducting a 
juror inquiry to determine whether any of the jurors had seen a “memorial or 
shrine” constructed outside the courtroom.  He also claims that counsel was 
 
 
- 57 - 
ineffective for not moving for a mistrial based on the “improper and highly 
prejudicial state-sanctioned action by the victim’s family.” 
During the trial, the following exchange transpired: 
THE COURT: What’s happened, it’s been brought to my attention 
that somebody has put a memorial or shrine to the victims right 
outside the courtroom.  I don’t know, does anybody know?  
 
VICTIM ADVOCATE: Yes, sir, I do.  That is some thank yous that 
the family has provided to some of the advocates for all their time and 
attention for the past five years, so—  
 
THE COURT: I understand.  Remove it at this time.  
 
VICTIM ADVOCATE: Yes, sir, I will.  
 
THE COURT: Take it out of here.  You should know better.  That’s 
not allowed. As I told you before, that takes place outside of the 
courthouse.  Inside the courthouse is a sterile environment.   
 
VICTIM ADVOCATE: Not a problem, sir.   
 
THE COURT: State, any problem with that instruction?   
 
PROSECUTOR 3: No.  
  
THE COURT: Defense, any problem with that instruction?   
 
DEFENSE: No.   
 
THE COURT: State, Defense, approach.  
 
(Whereupon, the jurors were returned to the courtroom.)   
 
BAILIFF: Jury is now present.  
 
 
 
- 58 - 
During the evidentiary hearing, several witnesses testified regarding their 
recollection of the memorial.  A former victim services coordinator for the State 
Attorney’s Office testified that she had responded to the inquiry of the trial court 
regarding the erection of a memorial.  She testified that she had informed the trial 
court that members of the victims’ family had brought flowers for the two 
advocates who assisted them during the trial.  The coordinator stated that although 
she was at the trial “most every day,” she never saw a shrine or memorial for the 
victims.  She also stated that she was not aware of any situation where the jury 
would have been able to see the flowers that the victims’ family had brought.   
Reynolds’ sister testified that she remembered seeing flowers, a balloon, 
stuffed animals, a poster board, and pictures outside the courtroom.  The sister 
described seeing this memorial during the penalty phase of the trial, and confirmed 
that it was placed where the public entered and exited the courtroom, but not where 
the jury entered and exited. 
Reynolds testified that he did not see any flowers, but saw a wreath on a 
stand with cards and a heart-shaped balloon outside the courtroom.  He testified 
that the jurors must have seen the memorial because “they would have had to see 
exactly what I seen.”  Reynolds also stated that he never instructed his attorneys 
not to ask the jurors whether they had seen the memorial, and that his attorneys 
 
 
- 59 - 
never addressed whether he may have wanted to move for a mistrial based on the 
erection of a memorial.   
During cross-examination of Reynolds, the following dialogue occurred 
among the court, Reynolds, and postconviction counsel:  
STATE: My question relates to the positioning of the jury deliberation 
room that you [Mr. Reynolds] indicate the jury was in when—when 
they would have had to have seen this what you call a shrine or 
what—in your motion, and you assume they would have had to come 
back in that way through the back door, right?  
 
REYNOLDS: I would assume that, yes.  
 
STATE: Okay.  Now, I want to move now to claim— 
 
THE COURT: Let me—let me just—I have to interrupt here at this 
stage, as far as that’s concerned.  Because what’s being portrayed here 
is somehow not—missing in the record, or incomplete. 
 
What transpired on that particular instance was, there was a 
break.  During the breaks, as is the case for years on end and 
throughout the course of that trial, we admonish the jury to remain 
away from Courtroom E, not Courtroom B, where the jury trial was 
being held, because from time to time attorneys need to meet with 
witnesses, there’s a lot of activity out there, people don’t talk. 
 
The jury is down the hall toward the north end of the building.  
Mr. Reynolds was correct, the trial room is—the trial courtroom is on 
the south end of the building.  And the lobby area or the mezzanine 
away by the banks of the elevators. 
 
Mr. Reynolds was brought into the courtroom.  Prior to Mr. 
Reynolds being brought into the courtroom, I had gone down the hall, 
nothing was in the hallway.  I had taken the bench, Mr. Reynolds was 
brought in, at that time it was brought to my attention that the 
shrine—and his recollection and his sister’s recollection is more 
accurate than the witness coordinator for the State Attorney’s office, 
 
 
- 60 - 
there was an actual poster board of sorts there at that time.  At that 
time, [I] ordered it to be removed, it was removed, jury was then 
brought in.  Jury was brought in down from the mezzanine area.  Jury 
did not see the shrine, did not have the opportunity to pass by it.  They 
were brought into the room in back.  Mr. Reynolds is correct in one 
extent, there’s a room inside there, they’re brought into the room and 
taken to the jury room in the back.  The jury room used in the 
courtroom only has one entrance in and out.  That’s why mention is 
made in the record as far as that shrine being there.  But the jury was 
never exposed to the shrine.  It was removed before the jury was 
brought down from the mezzanine area into the courtroom area.  
 
During redirect, the judge added:  
 
THE COURT: And Mr. Reynolds and everybody else is aware of this, 
you [collateral counsel] aren’t.  What happens is, we keep the jury 
away from Mr. Reynolds, because Mr. Reynolds is correct, he’s in a 
holding cell down the hall.  We keep the jury away from Mr. 
Reynolds so they don’t see him as he’s being led.  I think you had 
shackles on at that time, Mr. Reynolds. 
 
REYNOLDS: Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT: Then they remove that in the courtroom.  So the jury is 
down out of sight.  In between the time that I came and the time that 
Mr. Reynolds appeared is when the shrine was put up, and that’s when 
they told me.  As far as Mr. Reynolds, that’s when Mr. Reynolds had 
the opportunity to see it, as he was being led in the courtroom at that 
time. 
 
COLLATERAL COUNSEL: Well, Judge, I’ll just ask you 
straightaway, is there any way you know for sure that these jurors 
never saw that shrine? 
 
THE COURT: Yes, because I tell— 
 
COLLATERAL COUNSEL: You know for a fact that no one— 
 
 
 
- 61 - 
THE COURT: Because I tell the Bailiff afterwards to bring the jury 
down.  The same people who bring in Mr. Reynolds that we have the 
jury brought down. 
 
COLLATERAL COUNSEL: So to clarify the record, you know when 
the shrine was placed there and you know when it was taken away. 
 
THE COURT: Right. 
 
COLLATERAL COUNSEL: Okay. 
 
When defense counsel testified with regard to whether he noted a memorial 
outside the courtroom during the trial, he stated: 
I don’t remember if it was something we were really concerned about, 
or just something we were hoping to make a record of.  Uhm, there 
were a courtroom full of angry friends and family every day, so I 
personally don’t think a little shrine was going to make any 
difference.   
 
Defense counsel also testified that he believed he would have asked the trial court 
for permission to question the jurors as to whether they had seen the memorial, but 
he could not remember if he had done so.  The trial record does not indicate that 
defense counsel requested the inquiry.   
Reynolds claims that “[t]he State did not present any evidence that the shrine 
issue was addressed, removed or that the jury did not see it.”  The record, however, 
refutes this allegation, and indicates that it was addressed by the trial court.  
Moreover, Reynolds does not provide evidence to support his assertion that the 
jury actually saw a memorial.  Reynolds, instead, only refers to a single case, 
Holbrook v. Flynn, in which the United States Supreme Court noted that “certain 
 
 
- 62 - 
practices pose such a threat to the ‘fairness of the factfinding process’ that they 
must be subjected to ‘close judicial scrutiny.’ ”  See 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986) 
(quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976)).  Holbrook, however, 
does not address memorials or shrines and ultimately holds that the defendant 
failed to demonstrate that the presence of four uniformed troopers at his trial was 
“so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to [his] right to a fair 
trial.”  Id. at 561. 
Apart from Reynolds’ own testimony, his sister added only that she also saw 
the shrine, but was uncertain whether the jury had seen it as well.  The sister noted 
that the jury entered through an entrance other than the one where the memorial 
was located, which establishes that, at a minimum, the jury did not physically pass 
a memorial upon entering or exiting the courtroom.   
Competent, substantial evidence supports the finding of the postconviction 
court that Reynolds presented no basis to support a conclusion that the jury saw the 
memorial.  Accordingly, counsel was not deficient for failing to request an 
interview with the jurors to determine if they had seen it.  Therefore, we affirm the 
denial of this claim by the postconviction court. 
Mitigation Evidence 
Reynolds alleges that his trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to 
investigate and present evidence of substantial mitigation.  He claims that his 
 
 
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counsel did not engage experts to interview and evaluate him and failed to call 
witnesses to testify on his behalf during the penalty phase.   
The record reflects that during trial, Reynolds waived his right to present any 
mitigating evidence.  Reynolds signed and filed with the trial court a Waiver of 
Right to Present Mitigation Evidence.  Before the penalty phase, the trial court 
engaged in a colloquy with Reynolds to address his decision to waive his right to 
present mitigation: 
THE COURT: [I]t’s been brought to my attention by your attorneys 
that with respect to their defense of you and your participation in this 
phase of the trial, that you’ve instructed them that you don’t want 
them to basically do certain things or put forth a defense on your 
behalf; is that correct, sir?  
 
REYNOLDS: Yes, sir, Your Honor, and the reason why that is is, I 
mean, you know, it’s been five years, and to get to this point, I never 
thought that we would get to this point, but here we are.   
 
I’ve been in prison all my life.  My mitigating is not nothing 
compared to the aggravators that the State is gonna bring in here 
against me.   
 
I know the people of Seminole County and the State of Florida 
are tired of seeing me about as much as I’m tired of seeing them.   
 
I know I am going to death row, sir, I know by law, and I’m not 
trying to put words in your mouth or dictate, but I know by the law, I 
know that you’re by the law, I know that your politics dictate that.  I 
know that is coming and I’m very aware of that.  I don’t agree with 
that, but I know that that’s going to be the outcome.  And my wish is 
this right here, sir, is that I would ask you, that I’ve always conducted 
myself as a gentleman in your courtroom and respected your wishes 
and your rules and you would honor my wishes.  We don’t, I don’t 
want to present a mitigating case here because there’s no such thing.  I 
 
 
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mean, Your Honor, it’s a waste of time because I have [no mitigators].  
I’ve been locked up all my life.   
 
 
My attorneys have done a great job, and at this point in time it’s 
not a matter of the sentencing in this case, it’s gonna be a matter of a 
trial that brings me back.   
 
 
I know, sir, that you have to have time, that you followed this 
case, I know you was in through it with all through the trial, I would 
like to request that you would grant a Spencer hearing as quick as 
possible and to go into the sentencing phase, Your Honor, to get 
sentenced so that I may leave here because my situation in Seminole 
County jail, as you’re aware of, has not been very well, and it hasn’t 
changed, and it’s never have . . . , at this point in time I’m tired, sir.  
I’m tired.  And I really am tired, and I’m just wore out. . . .  And if 
you could grant me a Spencer hearing, if I could get out of here next 
week, that wouldn’t be soon enough for me.  I mean, I’m ready to go, 
honestly.   
 
And I know the State has to do what they have to do as far as 
presenting the aggravators, I don’t contest that in any way.  My record 
speaks for itself.  I have no mitigating, I have nothing that’s gonna 
dictate against my record, and I know that the final outcome of this is 
that I’m gonna go to death row, and I would wish, if you would, and if 
y’all would honor that and please let me get this done and get up the 
road.  And that’s about the best way I can say it, Your Honor.  I’m 
ready to go. . . .  
 
[L]ike I said, I never thought I’d come to this point, but here I 
am and I got to deal with that.  It’s not gonna change, it’s not gonna 
change here, it’s gonna have to be changed later on, and I realize that.  
And I just wish that y’all could get me out of here within the next 
week would be great, two weeks, that would be great, but I don’t want 
to sit here no three, four, six months, Your Honor.  There’s no need.   
 
You’re aware of this case and the State’s been involved in this 
case and my attorneys and y’all.  This is, you know, this trial was very 
in-depth and everybody was in . . . up-to-date on everything, and I 
know that you’ve been studying, and I know you don’t go home and 
just forget about it, I know you work on this case and you’ve been 
 
 
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aware of this case, and I think that you’re in a situation now that you 
could rule on this in a week or so, sir.   
 
I think that by law, by the law that you’re gonna have to do 
what you have to do.  And mitigating, I have none.  Spencer hearing, 
there’s nothing else for me to say.  There’s nothing else that we could 
do at this point in time to change what has already happened, not at 
this time. . . . 
 
 
THE COURT: [W]hat I need to tell you is that regardless of your 
request, I still have to follow certain protocol . . . . 
 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
 
 
 
The colloquy regarding the decision to waive mitigation continued among 
Reynolds, his attorneys, the State, and the court.  See supra note 9 (quoting 
additional text from the relevant colloquy).  During the exchange, the trial court 
questioned Reynolds a number of times regarding his decision to waive mitigation 
and asked him to reconfirm his decision.  The trial court questioned defense 
counsel as to whether they were prepared to present a case for mitigation and had 
witnesses ready to testify on their client’s behalf.  Defense counsel responded in 
the affirmative.  The court asked the State whether it had any additional questions 
regarding the decision, and the State requested an inquiry into mental competency.  
The trial court engaged Reynolds with regard to his competency, which his trial 
counsel and Reynolds confirmed.  Reynolds stated that he did not want to present 
mitigation because he did not believe he had any to present, and because he did not 
want to cause his family or the family of the victims additional emotional hardship.  
 
 
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The court informed Reynolds that it appeared that his family still wanted to assist 
him, but Reynolds reconfirmed his decision not to have them testify on his behalf 
despite their wishes.  
After the State concluded its presentation during the penalty phase, the Court 
recessed to provide Reynolds with the opportunity to again reconsider his decision 
to waive mitigation.  The following day, the trial court again questioned Reynolds 
with respect to his decision, and he confirmed his waiver.  The evidence presented 
in the trial transcripts alone confirms the ruling of the postconviction court that 
defense counsel were not ineffective for a failure to present mitigation evidence.  
Reynolds formed, and clearly articulated, his decision to waive the presentation of 
mitigation evidence at his trial.  Thus, competent, substantial evidence supports the 
denial of this claim by the postconviction court. 
Reynolds next contends that his waiver of mitigation evidence was not 
voluntary because the trial record demonstrates that his attorneys failed to 
investigate any mitigation evidence or to prepare for the penalty phase in general.  
Indeed, this Court has held that “[a]lthough a defendant may waive mitigation, he 
cannot do so blindly . . . .”  See Lewis, 838 So. 2d at 1113.  Counsel must 
“investigate all avenues and advise the defendant so that the defendant reasonably 
understands what is being waived and its ramifications and hence is able to make 
 
 
- 67 - 
an informed, intelligent decision.”  Id. (citing Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 249 
(Fla. 1993)); see also Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 983 (Fla. 2010).   
We conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the finding of the 
postconviction court that counsel spent sufficient time investigating mitigation 
prior to the signing of a written waiver of rights to present evidence and the oral 
acknowledgement before the trial court that Reynolds waived his right to its 
presentation.13  The trial record reflects that a presentence investigation report was 
prepared and reviewed by all.  Specifically, during the evidentiary hearing, trial 
counsel testified that he hired a mitigation specialist to assist in the development of 
evidence for the penalty phase of the underlying trial.  Counsel stated that he and 
the mitigation specialist worked together to develop mitigation evidence, and that a 
“big part of [their work] was just trying to convince Michael to let us do anything 
mitigation-wise.”  Trial counsel stated that he and the specialist obtained school 
records, medical records, records from Arizona and Florida prisons, criminal 
records from prior criminal cases, and family photographs.   
Trial counsel also testified that he hired a psychologist to interview and 
evaluate Reynolds.  Counsel stated that Reynolds “had made it perfectly clear he 
had no interest in presenting mental mitigation or any mitigation,” and that he met 
                                          
 
13.  The State suggests that Reynolds also claims that the trial court failed to 
conduct a proper Koon inquiry regarding his decision not to present mitigation.  
Reynolds disagrees with this characterization of his claim.  Given that Reynolds’ 
claim fails regardless of the Koon issue, we have not addressed it further.   
 
 
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with a psychologist “as more or less a favor to [the mitigation specialist] and I, to 
make our jobs easier and so that we could do one of the things that we’re required 
to do.”  Counsel explained that he asked the psychologist not to record in writing 
any of his findings because he was concerned that if they were memorialized, he 
would have to provide a copy to the State.  Counsel testified that he decided not to 
have the psychologist testify because the psychologist concluded that Reynolds 
suffered from antisocial personality disorder—a diagnosis that some courts have 
regarded as detrimental to a defendant’s case for mitigation.  Further, counsel 
testified that he was informed by the psychologist that he would be a better witness 
for the State than for the defense.  Trial counsel reviewed the psychologist’s 
diagnosis against the DSM-IV, a manual providing standard criteria for the 
classification of mental disorders.  Trial counsel testified that he agreed with the 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.  
Trial counsel also spoke with Reynolds’ two sisters, both of whom were 
available to testify during the penalty phase.  He explained that much of the 
information he gathered concerning Reynolds’ past came from his conversations 
with one sister.  Trial counsel engaged in a lengthy conversation with the sister at 
her home, and later obtained her testimony by deposition.  He spoke with the sister 
“behind [Reynolds’] back” because he had determined that Reynolds would not 
have allowed him to speak with her.  Counsel stated that Reynolds “did not want 
 
 
- 69 - 
his sisters and family involved.”  The sister confirmed that she had been served 
with a subpoena to testify during the penalty phase and was ready to do so but, 
during trial, counsel stated, without further explanation, that she was no longer 
needed to testify.   
Based on his investigations, trial counsel was aware that Reynolds: (1) had 
an alcoholic father who was extremely abusive; (2) lived in poverty during most of 
his life; (3) had a father who worked sporadically and was absent for long periods 
of time; (4) was very devoted to his mother as a child; (5) had a sister who was 
severely disabled; (6) together with his non-disabled sister, took the brunt of his 
father’s abuse; (7) would be awakened by his father pouring ice cold water on him 
and his siblings in the middle of the night; (8) was forced to dig a grave for the 
family’s horse in middle of the night after his father killed it; (9) lost his mother 
when his father “pulled the plug” on her when she became very ill during the 
holiday season when Reynolds was a child; and (10) had left home to escape the 
abuse and was already involved in drugs and alcohol at that time.   
A psychiatrist testified during the evidentiary hearing that he believed 
Reynolds suffered from adult antisocial personality disorder.  The psychiatrist 
evaluated Reynolds in August 2009—eleven years after the murders.  Although 
Reynolds had reported that he had been hit on the head with a baseball bat nineteen 
years prior, the psychiatrist, relying on this self-report, concluded that this incident 
 
 
- 70 - 
was not responsible for Reynolds’ criminal history.  The psychiatrist stated that he, 
the psychologist who had previously evaluated Reynolds, and a social worker all 
concluded that the problems stemmed from substance abuse and a conduct 
disorder, likely antisocial personality disorder.  The psychiatrist did not believe 
that Reynolds qualified for any statutory mitigators, or anything different from that 
produced at trial could have been offered to help Reynolds.  Unlike the 
psychiatrist, the social worker had a different view that Reynolds qualified for a 
statutory mitigator—that he exhibited extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  
See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003).   
At the evidentiary hearing, Reynolds testified that during his trial he was 
committed to presenting mitigation evidence, and although he confirmed signing 
and reading the mitigation waiver, he did not remember being advised by the trial 
court that he could present such evidence.  Reynolds asserted that he was not 
truthful with the court when he stated that he had read and understood the form, 
and denied the accuracy of the court transcripts which reported that he stated he 
would rather die than spend his life in prison.  Reynolds asserted that he did not 
present mitigation evidence because his attorneys stated that the State had not met 
its burden of proof and it was unnecessary for him to present such evidence.  He 
alleged that his waiver, at the time, was not knowing and voluntary, and that he 
now understood the importance of presenting mitigation. 
 
 
- 71 - 
The testimony provided at the evidentiary hearing establishes that the 
defense attorneys were prepared to present mitigation evidence, but Reynolds 
decided not to do so.  Reynolds had a right to refuse the presentation of mitigation 
evidence, and he invoked that right at the appropriate time.  See Dessaure v. State, 
55 So. 3d 478, 484 (Fla. 2010) (holding counsel is not ineffective for following the 
wishes of a competent defendant, even if that wish is to not present mitigation to a 
penalty phase jury).  His counsel will not now be deemed ineffective because they 
followed his decision.  See Spann v. State, 985 So. 2d 1059, 1070 (Fla. 2008); 
Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 100-01 (Fla. 2007); Brown v. State, 894 So. 2d 137, 
146 (Fla. 2004) (“An attorney will not be deemed ineffective for honoring [his or 
her] client’s wishes.”).   
In addition, as evidenced in the sentencing order, the presentation of 
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase would have been cumulative because 
it had already been considered by the trial court.  Thus, no prejudice can be 
established.  Prior to the Spencer hearing, defense counsel filed documents with 
the trial court to be considered when sentencing Reynolds.  The trial court found 
the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and gave each little weight: 
(1) Reynolds was gainfully employed at the time of the crimes; (2) he manifested 
appropriate courtroom behavior throughout the proceedings; (3) he cooperated 
 
 
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with law enforcement; and (4) he had a difficult childhood.14  With regard to his 
childhood, the court found the following mitigating circumstances: (1) Reynolds 
suffered from an upbringing marked by physical and psychological abuse; (2) his 
father was a chronic alcoholic; (3) his mother was chronically ill and often 
hospitalized during his childhood; (4) he was regularly hit, slapped, and kicked by 
his drunken father, without warning; (5) during the school week, he would 
sometimes be kept awake all night by his father and would sometimes be 
awakened by having ice water poured on him; (6) he regularly cared for his 
disabled, wheelchair-bound sister because his mother was unable to do so; (7) he 
helped run household affairs by cooking, cleaning, and doing yard work; (8) he 
was very close to his mother who died on Christmas day when Reynolds was 
seventeen; (9) despite his father’s abuse, he still showed his father respect and 
assisted him around the house; (10) he was a hard worker, beginning employment 
at an early age by working around the home and mowing lawns in the 
neighborhood; (11) he attended church as a child, even though his parents did not; 
(12) his education was limited to the tenth grade; (13) he began using alcohol at an 
early age; and (14) he essentially had no adult supervision as a child due to his 
mother’s chronic illness and his father’s habitual drunkenness.  The trial court did 
not find that Reynolds could easily adjust to prison life. 
                                          
 
14.  The trial court gave no weight to the mitigating circumstance of residual 
doubt. 
 
 
- 73 - 
The denial of this claim by the postconviction court is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm its denial.  
Expert Engagement 
Reynolds claims that trial counsel failed to engage expert or lay witnesses to 
support his theory that the evidence was either legally insufficient to convict him 
of the homicides, or that someone else killed the victims.  We affirm the ruling of 
the postconviction court.   
First, Reynolds contends that his counsel were ineffective for not presenting 
expert testimony regarding his mental health.  We note that Reynolds does not 
explain the manner in which this alleged failure relates to and negatively impacts 
his case with regard to the theory that his conviction was premised on legally 
insufficient evidence or that reasonable doubt exists.  Defense counsel retained a 
psychologist who, as addressed in the prior claim, stated that he believed he would 
be a better witness for the State than the defense, and diagnosed Reynolds with 
antisocial personality disorder.  Defense counsel, therefore, appears to have 
strategically decided against calling the psychologist.  This Court has held time and 
again that counsel will not be held ineffective for making strategic decisions that 
are reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.  See, e.g., Schwab v. 
State, 814 So. 2d 402, 412 (Fla. 2002); Mann v. State, 770 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 
2000); Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048.  Although Reynolds may have benefitted 
 
 
- 74 - 
from the testimony of other expert witnesses, he clearly conveyed to his trial 
attorneys that he did not want to address his mental health and provide evidence in 
mitigation during the penalty phase.  Although two witnesses who testified during 
the evidentiary hearing indicated that they could have provided testimony to 
support mitigation, the record indicates that at the relevant time Reynolds would 
not have permitted them to testify.  Trial counsel, therefore, cannot be deemed 
ineffective for not presenting mental mitigation evidence.    
Second, Reynolds alleges that his attorneys were ineffective for not 
engaging other experts to refute the State’s theory that the wounds on his hand 
were caused by a sharp object rather than by a burr on his doorframe.  Defense 
counsel retained a forensic pathologist to review the photos of the wounds.  The 
pathologist concluded that the injury could have been the result of contact with a 
burr or the result of a struggle.  Defense counsel testified that he decided not to 
have the pathologist testify because the doctor did not fully agree with the 
explanation Reynolds provided for his injuries.  Defense counsel also retained a 
crime scene investigator and blood-spatter expert.  Defense counsel stated that they 
decided not to have the investigator/blood-spatter expert testify because the expert 
concluded that the hand injuries were defensive and consistent with a struggle. 
During the evidentiary hearing, Reynolds provided the expert testimony of a 
retired forensic pathologist who testified that, based on his review of the photos of 
 
 
- 75 - 
the hand injuries, the injuries were the result of a laceration, or a tear in the skin, as 
opposed to an incised wound.  The pathologist testified that he believed, with 
ninety percent certainty, that the hand injuries were due to blunt force and 
consistent with a story of falling and injuring his hand on a metal burr on a door.  
Thus, the pathologist disagreed with the assessment of the forensic pathologist that 
defense counsel had retained before the trial.   
Although the pathologist who testified at the evidentiary hearing likely 
would have assisted Reynolds at the time of trial, the fact that the experts who 
defense counsel consulted at the time of trial ultimately reached unfavorable 
conclusions does not mean that counsel were deficient.  See Carroll v. State, 815 
So. 2d 601, 618 (Fla. 2002) (holding that defendant did not establish that the 
mental health experts who evaluated him at the time of his trial provided 
insufficient evaluations because he had now secured more favorable expert 
evaluations).  Moreover, Reynolds has not alleged or established that the failure to 
call an expert to address his hand injuries prejudiced his case.  Reynolds, therefore, 
failed to meet either of Strickland’s prongs to show ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  
Third, Reynolds claims that counsel were ineffective for not calling any 
experts to rebut the State’s presentation of DNA evidence implicating Reynolds for 
the homicides.  Defense counsel retained a forensic expert to consult with them 
 
 
- 76 - 
regarding DNA evidence and procedures.  Although this expert did not testify 
during the trial, defense counsel testified that the expert advised counsel about “all 
aspects of DNA” and that “every piece of paper that [counsel] got from [the] 
FDLE or from the State Attorney’s office that dealt with DNA was forwarded to 
[the expert].”  Defense counsel explained that they (counsel and the expert) would 
have had a conversation regarding the significance of, and the way to address, each 
piece of evidence received.  Although counsel testified that he believed that the 
defense effectively rebutted the issues the State presented at trial, counsel 
acknowledged that if given the opportunity to retry the case he would have a 
qualified expert testify to address the DNA evidence.  Despite counsel’s admission 
with regard to the manner in which he would now address the DNA evidence 
differently if given a second chance, the record indicates that counsel made a 
strategic decision not to call expert witnesses and had a reasonable explanation for 
this decision (i.e., the experts would have provided unfavorable testimony).  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680 (“[C]ounsel’s investigatory decisions must be assessed 
in light of the information known at the time of decisions, not in hindsight . . . .”); 
see also Schwab, 814 So. 2d at 412 (holding that trial counsel’s decision to present 
particular testimony was strategic and one that counsel could reasonably make). 
In addition to retaining experts, defense counsel also had LabCorp, an 
independent testing facility, test the DNA evidence received from the FDLE.  In its 
 
 
- 77 - 
review of the evidence, LabCorp reached the same results as the FDLE.  Defense 
counsel moved to exclude the DNA evidence.  The court held a Frye15 hearing to 
determine whether the DNA testing on this evidence was generally accepted in the 
scientific community and, concluding that it was, denied the defense’s motion.   
The trial record and evidentiary hearing indicate that trial counsel 
investigated the DNA evidence presented at trial but, due to unfavorable findings, 
strategically decided against presenting the results of their investigations.  
Reynolds, therefore, has not shown that his counsel, at the time of trial, were 
ineffective.   
Habeas Corpus Petition 
Standard of Review 
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant habeas 
relief based on ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must determine 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
                                          
 
15.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 
 
- 78 - 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In raising such a 
claim, “[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or 
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 
1981).   
Burden of Proof Misstatement 
This claim is essentially the same as that raised by Reynolds in the 
postconviction motion regarding the single misstatement of the burden of proof by 
the trial court during voir dire.  We reach the same result here as we did in that 
claim, and deny relief.  Reynolds contends that his appellate counsel performed 
ineffectively and prejudiced the outcome of his direct appeal by failing to address 
the misstatement of law at the time it was made by the trial court during voir dire.  
“If a legal issue ‘would in all probability have been found to be without merit’ had 
counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise 
the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  
Pittman v. State, 90 So. 3d 794, 817 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Rutherford v. Moore, 774 
So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000)); see also Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 
(Fla. 1994).  Reynolds has not shown that defense counsel were ineffective in 
handling the misstatement of the burden of proof—this issue was addressed at 
 
 
- 79 - 
trial—thus his appellate counsel will not be held ineffective for not arguing it to 
this Court on direct appeal.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643.     
Automatic Aggravator 
Reynolds claims that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel 
because counsel did not raise or discuss the error by the trial court in instructing 
the jurors on the during the course of a felony aggravating circumstance.  Reynolds 
claims that the finding by the trial court that the murders were committed in the 
course of a felony amounted to an automatic aggravator.  This Court has repeatedly 
rejected claims that the “committed in the course of a felony” aggravator 
constitutes an unconstitutional automatic aggravator.  See McWatters v. State, 36 
So. 3d 613, 644 (Fla.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 510 (2010); Owen v. State, 862 So. 
2d 687, 704 (Fla. 2003); see also Johnson v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 343, 348 (Fla. 
2002); Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997).  Therefore, this claim is 
meritless and we hold that appellate counsel was not ineffective for the failure to 
present that issue on appeal. 
Testimony of FDLE Analyst Charles Badger 
 
Reynolds contends that he was denied his right to a full and fair direct 
appeal because the trial transcript contained the false statement that his DNA was 
found on the vaginal swabs from Christina Razor.  As discussed previously, 
Charles Badger’s report did not corroborate this representation and allegation. 
 
 
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It is indisputable that a complete and accurate record is indispensable to a 
defendant’s right to a full and fair direct appeal.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
(guaranteeing a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to direct appeal); Douglas 
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (holding that a defendant is entitled to a 
full and fair appellate review); Delap v. State, 350 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 1997) 
(remanding case for a new trial because full transcript of proceedings was 
unavailable for review by this Court).  Although the trial transcript provided on 
appeal to this Court contained an error, Reynolds was not denied his right to a full 
and fair appeal of his convictions and sentences because he has not demonstrated 
that, without this error in the transcript, the conclusion of this Court on appeal 
would have been any different.  During the trial, both the State and defense 
presented testimony that no semen was found on the vaginal swab from Christina.  
Then, Badger testified and made the statement upon which this dispute has been 
constructed.  The State, in closing, reiterated the correct DNA results—that no 
semen was found on or in Christina’s body.  Badger’s statement, therefore, at a 
minimum was bookended by correct and unambiguous statements of fact regarding 
whether DNA from Reynolds was found on the vaginal swabs.  
Furthermore, at trial, the State presented other DNA evidence linking 
Reynolds to the crime.  Investigators recovered a pubic hair from the crime scene 
with DNA matching the profile of Reynolds.  Investigators also processed a 
 
 
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blanket and pillow stained with blood from the scene; the results revealed DNA 
from Christina and Robin Razor and Reynolds.  Investigators also matched DNA 
from Reynolds and DNA from the Razors to underwear found in the trailer.   
In crafting our opinion on the direct appeal, we relied on cases that 
addressed attempted or completed sexual batteries to support our conclusion that 
the State’s case does not rely wholly upon circumstantial evidence.  See Reynolds, 
934 So. 2d at 1146-47.  Our reliance on this case law, however, does not illustrate, 
as Reynolds claims, the “pernicious effect of the court reporter’s misstatement of 
trial testimony.”  Evidence presented by the State, including the testimony of 
Badger, reflected that an attempted sexual battery was a reasonable explanation for 
a motive for the crimes.  As addressed in the analysis of the claim discussing the 
testimony of FDLE analyst Badger, underwear was found on the floor of the trailer 
in which Christina and her mother lived and were killed.  DNA from Reynolds was 
on the underwear.  Christina’s grandmother testified that Christina always slept 
with her underwear on.  Christina, unlike her mother, was found wearing no 
underwear.  Thus, the State provided evidence from which the jury could infer that 
an attempted sexual battery occurred.  Reynolds has not demonstrated that this 
alleged error in the transcript fundamentally affected the outcome of his appeal in 
light of the other DNA evidence the State provided.  Therefore, we conclude that 
Reynolds is not entitled to a new appeal.  We deny relief on this claim.   
 
 
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Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the denial of relief by the postconviction 
court, and deny the habeas petition.  
It is so ordered.   
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,  
Kenneth Russell Lester, Jr., Judge - Case No. 98-3341-CFA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
 
Melodee A. Smith of the Law Offices of Melodee A. Smith, Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida,  
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Kenneth Sloan 
Nunnelley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,  
 
for Appellee/Respondent