Title: Simmons v. State
Citation: 346 S.W.2d 197
Docket Number: 5003
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 1961

346 S.W.2d 197 (1961) Bobby SIMMONS and Larry Flippo, Appellants, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. 5003. Supreme Court of Arkansas. May 15, 1961. Dissenting Opinion May 30, 1961. Rehearing Denied June 5, 1961. Lightle &amp; Tedder, Searcy, for appellants. J. Frank Holt, Atty. Gen., by Jack L. Lessenberry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. *198 JOHNSON, Justice. The appellants, Bobby Simmons and Larry Flippo, were charged with the crime of rape by felony information. They were tried jointly, convicted of assault with intent to rape, and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Following the jury's recommendations for leniency, the court suspended the sentence of Bobby Simmons and declared that Larry Flippo should be eligible for parole after 18 months. Of the several alleged errors which the appellants urge for reversal, only onerelating to the closing argument of the prosecuting attorneyneed be discussed in reaching our decision. During the course of his closing argument to the jury, the prosecuting attorney stated that the defendant, Larry Flippo, had previously raped a girl other than the prosecutrix. Neither the remarks of the prosecuting attorney, nor the specific objections of the defense attorney was recorded by the court reporter. The defense attorney then filed a bystanders' bill of exceptions pursuant to Ark.Stats. Anno., 1947, § 27-1750 et seq. The matters set out in the affidavits are uncontroverted and must be taken as true on this appeal. Boone v. Holder, 87 Ark. 416, 112 S.W. 1081; Perry v. State, 188 Ark. 133, 64 S.W.2d 328. In the affidavits it is stated that "* * * at the close of his argument to the jury, we understood the Prosecuting Attorney to state that the defendant, Larry Flippo had previously raped another girl and that he (Flippo) had never gone out with her thereafter." After overruling the defendants' objections, the court issued its only admonition to the jury on the prosecuting attorney's argument: The only testimony relating to any other offense allegedly committed by either defendant was presented during the prosecuting attorney's cross-examination of the defendant Flippo: One of the fundamental rules of trial practice in this State is that the closing arguments of counsel must be confined to the questions in issue, the evidence introduced at the trial, and all reasonable inferences and deductions which can be drawn therefrom. Vaughn v. State, 58 Ark. 353, 24 S.W. 885; Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473, 25 S.W. 279; Hicks v. State, 193 Ark. 46, 97 S.W.2d 900. There is no evidence in the record which provides, under any logical analysis, a foundation for the prosecuting attorney's statement to the jury. As was said in Brown v. State, 143 Ark. 523, 222 S.W. 377, 380; A similar problem was presented in Wimberley v. State, 217 Ark. 130, 228 S.W.2d 991, 994: The defendant's conviction of assault with intent to kill was reversed by a unanimous Court. As the Court held in its opinion written by Judge Dunaway: Many of the policies which underlie the rule prohibiting the introduction of evidence of other offenses apply with equal force to the problem presented in this case: Much of the fundamental protection thus afforded the accused would be rendered ineffective if the prosecuting attorney were allowed to place before the jury indirectly by argument that which could not be introduced as evidence. See Little Rock Railway &amp; Electric Co. v. Goerner, 80 Ark. 159, 95 S.W. 1007, 7 L.R.A.,N.S.,97. The appellee urges that the case at bar is controlled by what this Court said in Adams v. State, 165 Ark. 308, 264 S.W. 858, 859: While this case seems clearly within the exception to the rule as stated, the facts *200 here are not sufficiently analogous to the facts in Adams to require our application of its rule. During the trial of Adams for murder a witness testified that on the day of the shooting Adams had been "fooling with his gun" at the house of the witness. In his closing argument the prosecuting attorney stated that this incident had occurred at the victim's house, which in fact was only a short distance from the house of the witness. It is evident that this error was harmless. In the present case the remarks of the prosecuting attorney were inherently prejudicial. It must also be noted that in the Adams case the witness, and not the prosecuting attorney, supplied the facts that were later misapprehended in the closing argument. This Court has repeatedly observed that the prosecuting attorney acts in a quasi judicial capacity and that it is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable and lawful means to secure the conviction of the guilty in a fair and impartial trial. But as we said in Holder v. State, supra: See also, Adams v. State, 229 Ark. 777, 318 S.W.2d 599. The answers of the defendant Flippo on cross examination provide no basis whatsoever for the prosecuting attorney's positive statement to the jury that the defendant had previously raped a girl other than the prosecutrix. Under these circumstances the prosecuting attorney's closing argument was highly improper and prejudicial. Absent an affirmative showing in the record to the contrary, the error was also prejudicial to the defendant Simmons. Moore et al. v. State, 227 Ark. 544, 299 S.W.2d 838. The prejudice created was not removed by the court's admonition to the jury. For this error the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. ROBINSON, J., concurs. HARRIS, C. J., and McFADDIN, J., dissent. McFADDIN, Justice (dissenting). I am of the opinion that the admonition given by the Trial Court cured any error of the Prosecuting Attorney, even if, in fact, he misstated the evidence. When the defendants' attorney objected to the statements by the Prosecuting Attorney the Court said: Jurors are sensible persons. They had heard the witnesses and knew whether the Prosecuting Attorney was misquoting the evidence. The Court told the jury in the instructions: "In this case as in all others you are the sole and exclusive judges of the evidence, its weight, its sufficiency, and also the credibility of the witnesses * *" That instruction, coupled with the admonition previously quotedI maintainwas sufficient to cure any misstatement of the evidence. See 88 C.J.S. Trial § 197, p. 391, and see particularly Martin v. Kelley, 97 N.H., 466, 92 A.2d 163, where a very similar admonition by the Court to the jury was held to have cured any misstatement of the evidence.