Title: Floridians For A Level Playing Field v. Floridians Against Expanded Gambling, Et Al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-2505
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-2505 
____________ 
 
FLORIDIANS FOR A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDIANS AGAINST EXPANDED GAMBLING, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[September 27, 2007] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
We have for review the decision in Floridians Against Expanded Gambling 
v. Floridians for a Level Playing Field, 945 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in 
which the First District Court of Appeal certified a question to be of great public 
importance.  Initially, the Court accepted review pursuant to article V, section 
3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, which gives us discretionary jurisdiction to 
review “any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question 
certified by it to be of great public importance.”  Upon further consideration, we 
conclude that jurisdiction was improvidently granted and therefore discharge this 
case for the two reasons explained below.  
In order to have discretionary jurisdiction based on a certified question, there 
are essentially three prerequisites that must be met.  First, it is essential that the 
district court of appeal pass upon the question certified by it to be of great public 
importance.  We have previously discharged jurisdiction where the district court of 
appeal has not in fact passed upon the question certified.1  Second, there must be a 
district court “decision” to review.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For instance, 
where a district court is unable to reach a clear majority decision on an issue and 
elects to certify a question without resolving the merits, we are without jurisdiction 
to answer such a question under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida 
Constitution.  See Boler v. State, 678 So. 2d 319, 320 n.2 (Fla. 1996) (stating that 
if a district court is evenly split on a legal issue and specifically withholds a 
decision on the merits, there is no “decision” on which to base certified conflict 
review under article V, section 3(b)(4)).  Third, and most important for this case, 
the question must be in fact “certified” by a majority decision of the district court.  
For the same reasons that we are without jurisdiction under article V, section 
3(b)(4) if there is no majority decision on the merits, we are equally without 
jurisdiction if there is no clear majority on the decision to certify.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, it is 
                                          
 
1.  See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Jensen, 777 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2001); 
Salgat v. State, 652 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1995); Gee v. Seidman & Seidman, 653 So. 
2d 384 (Fla. 1995). 
 
 
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required that a majority of those judges participating in the case concur in the 
decision to certify. 
In this case, only six of the twelve judges that participated in the en banc 
decision concurred in certification.2  Five judges, although concurring in the 
majority decision, disagreed with the decision to certify.  Importantly, Judge 
Benton did not fully concur with the majority decision; rather, Judge Benton only 
concurred in the judgment.  This vote indicates Judge Benton’s agreement only 
with the judgment of the majority; that is, its decision to reverse the summary 
judgment and remand.  See Home Dev. Co. of St. Petersburg v. Bursani, 168 So. 
2d 131, 134 (Fla. 1964) (distinguishing between the judgment, which is essentially 
the ultimate decision in the case, and the opinion, which sets “forth the theory and 
reasoning upon which a decision” is reached); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 
858 (8th ed. 2004) (defining judgment as “[a] court’s final determination of the 
rights and obligations of the parties in a case”).  In this sense, “concurring in the 
judgment” is akin to “concurring in result only,” which “expresses agreement with 
                                          
 
2.  Three judges, Judges Browning, Webster and Lewis, concurred in the 
judgment and the certification; Judge Benton concurred in the judgment only; three 
judges, Judges Kahn, Ervin, and Wolf, dissented as to the reasoning and result 
reached by the majority but concurred in the certification; and five judges, Judges 
Padovano, Barfield, Davis, Polston, and Hawkes, joined “the decision and opinion 
on this issue presented” but dissented from the court’s decision to certify.  Three 
judges, Judges Allen, Van Nortwick and Thomas, did not participate in the en banc 
panel. 
 
 
 
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the ultimate decision but not the opinion.”  Rowe v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 
So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), disapproved on other grounds by Owens 
v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001); accord Harry Lee 
Anstead, Gerald Kogan, Thomas D. Hall & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation 
and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida, 29 Nova L. Rev. 431, 460 (2005) 
(“A concurring in result only opinion indicates agreement only with the decision, 
that is, the official outcome and result reached, but a refusal to join in the 
majority’s opinion and its reasoning.”).   
Conversely, certification is separate from the judgment of the court and its 
reasoning for the judgment as expressed in its opinion.  This is evident by 
comparing the definition of judgment, i.e., “[a] court’s final determination of the 
rights and obligations of the parties in a case,” with the definition of a certified 
question, i.e., “[a] point of law on which a[n] . . . appellate court seeks guidance” 
from a higher court by the procedure of certification.  Black’s Law Dictionary at 
858, 241 (emphasis supplied).  Moreover, there are separate and specific rules that 
both permit a party to file a motion seeking certification and authorize the district 
court to certify the question.  Compare Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) (granting 
discretionary jurisdiction to the Court if a district court decision certifies a 
question), with Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a) (authorizing a party to a file motion for 
certification to the district court); cf. Floridians, 945 So. 2d at 562 (reversing 
 
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summary judgment and remanding for a trial, and then certifying two questions to 
the Court, specifically in accordance with article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida 
Constitution and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v)).  We 
conclude that by “concurring in the judgment” and failing to indicate his 
agreement with the decision to certify, Judge Benton’s vote cannot be counted as 
agreeing with the certification.  Cf. Hadden v. State, 670 So. 2d 77, 83 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1996) (Benton, J., concurs in result and in certification) (indicating Judge 
Benton’s agreement with the result and the decision to certify, but disagreement 
with the reasoning of the majority opinion).   
Even assuming that we had jurisdiction based on either a certification of a 
question of great public importance or express and direct conflict under article V, 
section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, we would nevertheless decline to 
exercise our jurisdiction.  After having reviewed the opinions from this Court that 
deal with post-election challenges based on various issues regarding the election 
process, we have determined that it is preferable that the facts of this case be 
developed regarding the allegations and pervasiveness of the fraud before we 
articulate a rule of law regarding the election cure doctrine in such circumstances.  
This is the position advocated by the Secretary of State, Kurt S. Browning, and the 
Department of State represented by its General Counsel and the Attorney General.  
As stated in its answer brief: 
 
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The long-standing principle that an election cures irregularities in the 
process and thereby promotes finality and administrative efficiency is 
a weighty one; similarly, the ability of citizens to amend the state 
constitution through the initiative process without fraud is extremely 
important. This Court should avoid making rulings affecting the 
application of these principles until the specific allegations of fraud 
are adjudicated. A fully-developed record with a proven set of facts 
will allow this Court to carefully consider and balance the competing 
legal principles; that cannot properly be done based on speculative, 
unproven factual allegations. 
Answer Brief of Respondent Secretary of State at 6.   
We believe that the position of the Attorney General is a sound one and 
conclude, as an alternative basis for discharging jurisdiction, that review in this 
case is premature.3  Accordingly, we hereby discharge jurisdiction and dismiss this 
review proceeding. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D05-575 
 
                                          
 
3.  Although we agree that review in this case would be premature, we 
disagree with Judge Padovano to the extent he reasons that certified question 
jurisdiction was only “meant to apply to a final decision by a district court of 
appeal.”  Floridians, 945 So. 2d at 568 (Padovano, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 
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(Leon County) 
 
Bruce S. Rogow and Cynthia E. Gunther of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, Wilbur E. Brewton and Tana D. Storey of Roetzel and 
Andress, LPA, Tallahassee, Florida, John M. Hogan of Holland and Knight, LLP, 
Miami, Florida, and Thomas R. Julin and Jamie Z. Isani of Hunton and Williams, 
LLP, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
John H. Pelzer of Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster and Russell, P.A., Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor 
General and Timothy D. Osterhaus, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
and Lynn C. Hearn, General Counsel, Department of State, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents