Title: King v. Westlake
Citation: 572 S.W.2d 841
Docket Number: 78-112
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 1978

572 S.W.2d 841 (1978) Wanda KING, Appellant, v. Harry WESTLAKE, Appellee. No. 78-112. Supreme Court of Arkansas, Division 2. November 13, 1978. *842 Wright, Lindsey &amp; Jennings, Little Rock, for appellant. Haskins, Eubanks &amp; Wilson by Gary Eubanks, Little Rock, for appellee. BYRD, Justice. For reversal of a $15,000 judgment in favor of appellee, Harry Westlake, arising out of a rear-end automobile collision, the appellant, Wanda King, who has only $10,000 in liability insurance coverage, makes the two contentions hereinafter discussed. Her first contention is that the trial court erred in ordering her to permit appellee to present the testimony of his medical witness by means of a videotaped deposition. To support her contention appellant argues that the law does not provide for the recording and presenting of a deposition by videotape and that the presentation of the videotape left the jury with the impression that the witness' testimony was more significant than it really was. We find no merit to either argument: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-104 (Repl.1962) provides: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-105 (Repl.1962) provides: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-106 (Repl.1962) provides: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-107 (Repl.1962) provides: The Uniform Rules of Evidence, Ark. Stat.Ann. § 28-1001 (1976 Supp.) provide: The statute upon which appellant relies is Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-352 (Repl.1962) which provides: The record here shows that in addition to permitting the videotape of the medical evidence, appellee took the precaution of also introducing the stenographically transcribed testimony. Our law, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-348 (Repl.1962), as does the law of most other common law jurisdictions, readily recognizes that in matters involving credibility of witnesses it is the better practice for the witnesses to testify orally before the tribunal which is to decide the facts. Since the use of a videotape is the best substitute for permitting testimony being heard by the trial tribunal from the lips of a witness, we are not in a position to say that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the deposition of the medical witness by videotape instead of having the stenographically transcribed testimony read to the jury. Such action on the part of the trial court is certainly within keeping of the Uniform Rules of Evidence's admonition that the rules of evidence shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of the law of evidence. Other courts have likewise reached the same result, Lucas v. Moss, 498 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. 1973). With respect to appellant's contention that "the obviously costly and elaborate lengths to which the [appellee] went to record and present the deposition on videotape left the jury with the impression that Dr. Hundley's testimony was more significant than it really was," we are not in a position to second guess the trial courtappellant has not shown the costs involved and did not designate the videotape as a part of the record. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in permitting counsel for appellee to ask potential jurors whether they had liability insurance and whether they believed the size of jury verdicts in personal injury cases affects automobile liability insurance premiums. The record shows that for sometime preceding the trial date a number of liability insurance companies had run advertisements in Time, The Wall Street Journal and *844 the Smithsonian Institute magazine aimed at jurors in general to the effect that jurors themselves were affected by the verdicts they rendered in that such verdicts resulted in increased premiums. On voir dire by appellee's counsel and in response to questioning a number of potential jurors responded that they had read Time, The Wall Street Journal, or the Smithsonian Institute magazine. All but two of the jurors indicated that they had seen one or more of the advertisements. Thereafter, as abstracted by appellant, the record shows: The voir dire of the jury was obviously in good faith and as such was proper. See Dedmon v. Thalheimer, 226 Ark. 402, 290 S.W.2d 16 (1956), where we held the purpose of voir dire examination is to enable counsel to ascertain whether there is ground for a challenge of a juror for cause, or for a peremptory challenge and that so long as counsel acts in good faith, he may, in one form or another question prospective jurors respecting their interest in or connection with liability insurance companies. Appellant while recognizing the rule set forth in Dedmon v. Thalheimer, supra, states: During oral argument counsel for appellant was questioned extensively about this contention. He has not pointed to any portion of the record that he did not abstract and we have copied his abstract in full. Based upon the record as it is presented to us, we have been unable to follow appellant's contention that the voir dire by appellee's counsel inevitably indicated to the jurors that appellant had insurancei. e. appellant's conclusion is not sustained by the record. Affirmed. We agree: HARRIS, C. J., and FOGLMAN and HICKMAN, JJ.