Title: Citizens Organizing Project v. Dept. of Natural Resources
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86878
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2000

Docket No. 86878-Agenda 27-September 1999.
CITIZENS ORGANIZING PROJECT, Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
The issue in this case is whether the Citizens Organizing Project (C.O.P.) is 
entitled to an award of litigation expenses under section 10-55 of the Illinois 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10-55 (West 1998)) based on its success 
in having an administrative rule of the Department of Natural Resources 
invalidated. The circuit court denied C.O.P.'s petition for such expenses and 
the appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting. No. 4-97-0851 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings.
C.O.P. is a citizens group organized as an Illinois general not-for-profit 
corporation. It opposed a decision by the Department of Natural Resources to 
approve a permit for strip mining in Knox County. The permit procedures were 
governed by the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act (225 
ILCS 720/1.01 et seq. (West 1996)). Pursuant to section 2.11 of that 
Act (225 ILCS 720/2.11 (West 1996)), C.O.P. requested a hearing on the 
Department's decision.
During the course of the ensuing administrative proceedings, C.O.P. argued 
that the Department's permit decision should be reviewed under a "preponderance 
of the evidence" standard rather than under the "clear and convincing" standard 
then specified by the Department's administrative regulations. See 62 Ill. Adm. 
Code §1847.3(g) (1996). C.O.P.'s argument was initially rejected by the hearing 
examiner, but in his final decision, the hearing examiner reconsidered his 
position. Although he ultimately denied C.O.P.'s challenge to the Department's 
decision granting the permit, the hearing examiner ruled that the matter should, 
indeed, be governed by the "preponderance of the evidence" standard advocated by 
C.O.P.
At the conclusion of those proceedings, C.O.P. filed a complaint for 
administrative review in the circuit court of Sangamon County pursuant to the 
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1996)). In 
its complaint, C.O.P. sought judicial review of the Department's decision to 
grant the strip mining permit. It also requested that the circuit court 
invalidate the Department's regulation specifying a "clear and convincing" 
burden of proof in proceedings to review Department decisions.
The circuit court affirmed the Department's decision to grant the strip 
mining permit. In so doing, however, it found meritorious C.O.P.'s challenge to 
the Department's regulation containing the "clear and convincing" burden of 
proof. Accordingly, it expressly declared the regulation to be invalid. Based on 
that ruling, the Department removed the "clear and convincing" standard from its 
regulations and replaced it with a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 22 
Ill. Reg. 5183 (proposed March 20, 1998); 22 Ill. Reg. 20144 (eff. November 5, 
1998); 62 Ill. Adm. Code §1847.3(g) (1999).
Section 10-55(c) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 
100/10-55(c) (West 1998)) provides:
For the purposes of this provision, an "administrative rule" encompasses any 
principle, procedure, or regulation governing an agency's conduct or action. See 
Ardt v. State, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1063 (1997). This includes 
regulations governing the standard of proof. See 5 ILCS 100/10-10 (West 1998). 
Accordingly, there is no dispute that section 1847.3(g) of title 62 of the 
Illinois Administrative Code, which fixed the burden of proof in proceedings to 
review the Department's decisions on permits, constituted an "administrative 
rule" within the meaning of the statute.
Because the circuit court sustained C.O.P.'s challenge to section 1847.3(g) 
and declared the rule to be invalid, C.O.P. petitioned for an award of its 
reasonable litigation expenses in accordance with section 10-55(c). That 
petition was timely filed, contained no procedural defects, and was supported by 
detailed billing records and an affidavit from counsel explaining the basis for 
the fees and expenses claimed. C.O.P. subsequently filed two supplements to its 
petition, including an affidavit from an expert attesting to the reasonableness 
of the litigation expenses claimed.
As indicated at the outset of this disposition, the circuit court denied 
C.O.P.'s petition. C.O.P. appealed, challenging only the denial of its petition 
for litigation expenses. The propriety of the circuit court's rulings in the 
underlying action for administrative review was not at issue. The appellate 
court affirmed in an unpublished decision under Supreme Court Rule 23. We 
granted C.O.P.'s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and the 
matter is now before us for review.
In undertaking our analysis, we begin with the unassailable fact that when 
the circuit court disposed of C.O.P.'s complaint on administrative review, it 
expressly invalidated the version of section 1847.3(g) of title 62 of the 
Illinois Administrative Code containing the "clear and convincing" burden of 
proof. Whether the court needed to do so or should have avoided doing so is 
immaterial. What matters is that it did invalidate the rule, and the Department 
elected not to appeal its decision.
Section 10-55(c) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 
100/10-55(c) (West 1998)) specifically states that where, as here, an 
administrative rule has been invalidated by a court, "the court shall 
award the party bringing the action the reasonable expenses of the litigation, 
including reasonable attorney's fees." (Emphasis added.) When used in a statute, 
the word "shall" is generally interpreted to mean that something is mandatory. 
People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997). That is how it has been 
construed in the context of other fee-shifting statutes. See, e.g., 
North Shore Community Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Kollar, 304 Ill. App. 3d 
838, 846-47 (1999); Maher &amp; Associates, Inc. v. Quality Cabinets, 
267 Ill. App. 3d 69, 81 (1994); Verdonck v. Scopes, 226 Ill. App. 3d 
484, 488 (1992); Schackleton v. Federal Signal Corp., 196 Ill. App. 3d 
437, 446 (1989); Cuevas v. Bill Tsagalis, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 977, 
992-93 (1986). There is no reason to believe that the legislature intended 
otherwise here. Accordingly, the circuit court was required to award C.O.P. its 
reasonable litigation expenses. To hold otherwise would require us to disregard 
the plain and unambiguous language of the statute.
C.O.P.'s entitlement to an award of its reasonable litigation expenses is not 
diminished by the fact that it did not prevail on all of its claims. The purpose 
of the fee-shifting provisions of section 10-55(c) of the Illinois 
Administrative Procedure Act is to discourage enforcement of invalid rules and 
give those subject to regulation an incentive to oppose doubtful rules where 
compliance would otherwise be less costly than litigation. See Kaufman Grain 
Co. v. Director of the Department of Agriculture, 179 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 
1048 (1988); Board of Education of School District No. 170 v. Illinois State 
Board of Education, 122 Ill. App. 3d 471, 480 (1984). C.O.P.'s conduct was 
fully in keeping with these objectives.
In virtually every instance, an attack on the validity of an administrative 
regulation will come, as it did here, in the context of a broader challenge to a 
decision of an administrative agency. The issues will be intertwined, and the 
difficulties of assessing what litigation expenses are attributable to which 
theories can be substantial. The legislature was surely aware of these problems 
when it drafted this legislation.
The law, as written, contains no provisions requiring that compensable 
litigation expenses be limited to those demonstrably and directly related to the 
limited question of the rule's validity. The law does not even require the party 
seeking litigation expenses to have prevailed on any other aspect of the case. 
If you are a party who has brought any case and you succeed in that 
case in having any administrative rule invalidated by a court for 
any reason, you are entitled to recover all of your reasonable 
litigation expenses, including attorney fees. See Ardt, 292 Ill. App. 
3d at 1067.
It is difficult to see how any law could be more straightforward or less 
encumbered by qualification or restriction. Where, as here, the language in a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we are not at liberty to depart from the plain 
language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, 
or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. Woodard, 
175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997).
For the foregoing reasons, C.O.P. is entitled to all reasonable litigation 
expenses incurred throughout this action, including this appeal. See 
Ardt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. The judgments of the circuit and 
appellate courts are therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe that Citizens Organizing Project 
(C.O.P.) is entitled to recover all the attorney fees and litigation expenses it 
incurred in the underlying litigation. Accordingly, I dissent.
Section 10-55(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act states:
As an initial matter, I do not agree with the majority that the circuit court 
properly invalidated the administrative regulation concerning the standard of 
review of the Department's decision. Notably, the hearing officer did not apply 
the challenged standard in ruling against C.O.P., and therefore the standard was 
not properly before the circuit court when the court heard the case on 
administrative review. C.O.P. had no standing to challenge an administrative 
regulation that did not apply to it. See Pre-School Owners Ass'n of 
Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children &amp; Family Services, 119 Ill. 2d 268, 287 (1988). For these reasons, I do not believe that the circuit court's 
action, on administrative review, in purporting to invalidate the regulation 
should qualify under section 10-55(c) as a decision invalidating a rule or 
regulation, triggering application of the fee-recovery provision.
Even if section 10-55(c) is applicable in this case, I do not agree with the 
majority that C.O.P.'s "reasonable expenses of the litigation" include fees and 
expenses that are entirely unrelated to its challenge to the invalidated 
administrative regulation, or that are computed without regard to its lack of 
success in other aspects of the proceedings. C.O.P. seeks an award of nearly 
$50,000 for its expenses, representing the sum of the attorney fees, expert 
witness fees, and other costs it incurred in the underlying litigation, in which 
it failed to overturn the Department's adverse decision. Only a small fraction 
of the amount sought, however, can be said to be associated with C.O.P.'s 
challenge to the administrative regulation concerning the standard of review-the 
one area in which its litigation efforts were successful.
Besides not prevailing on the merits of the case, C.O.P. seeks reimbursement 
for some legal work that seems entirely unnecessary. As one example, in 
proceedings before the hearing officer, C.O.P. moved to dismiss briefs filed by 
the Department and the mining company, arguing that the briefs were filed late. 
In the alternative, C.O.P. asked the hearing officer to strike the portions of 
the briefs that referred to evidence admitted in an earlier case; C.O.P. 
insisted that the evidence had not been properly introduced in these 
proceedings. Both of C.O.P.'s requests for relief were wholly without merit. The 
briefs had been filed in a timely manner: the deadline was a Sunday, and, by 
administrative rule, as well as standard practice, the other parties had until 
the next day to submit them. 62 Ill. Adm. Code §1700.15 (1996). C.O.P.'s further 
assertion in the motion that the one-day delay was prejudicial in reducing its 
own time to file a reply brief strikes a false note, for C.O.P. filed its reply 
on the same day it submitted the dismissal motion, and long before its own 
deadline. Finally, C.O.P.'s challenge to the other parties' discussion of the 
evidence from the other matter was also groundless. At an earlier point in these 
proceedings, C.O.P. had in fact stipulated, rather than objected, to the 
admission of the evidence from the other case.
As this case illustrates, under the majority's interpretation of the fee 
statute, a party can succeed in obtaining the invalidation of an incidental 
administrative rule or regulation, fail on every other issue, and still recover 
all its litigation fees and expenses. I do not believe that the legislature, in 
enacting section 10-55(c), could have intended that result. The recovery of 
attorney fees was unknown at common law, and therefore statutes permitting their 
award must be construed narrowly. Carson Pirie Scott &amp; Co. v. State of 
Illinois Department of Employment Security, 131 Ill. 2d 23, 49 (1989). 
Moreover, in interpreting statutes, this court will seek to avoid absurd or 
unjust results. State Farm Fire &amp; Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992). "Where the language of a statute admits of two 
constructions, one of which would make the enactment absurd and illogical, while 
the other renders it reasonable and sensible, the construction which leads to an 
absurd result must be avoided." Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port 
District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 312-13 (1988). Given the tangential nature of 
the issue on which C.O.P. prevailed and C.O.P.'s lack of success in every other 
aspect of the proceedings, I do not believe that the legislature could have 
intended an award of litigation expenses of the magnitude sought here; if C.O.P. 
must be reimbursed for any of its expenses, I would limit recovery under section 
10-55(c) accordingly.
JUSTICE BILANDIC joins in this dissent.