Title: State v. Marvin L. Beauchamp
Citation: 2011 WI 27
Docket Number: 2009AP806-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 3, 2011

2011 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP806-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Marvin L. Beauchamp, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 42 
Reported at: 324 Wis. 2d 162, 781 N.W.2d 254 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 3, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 4, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Craig S. Powell, Kohler & Hart, LLP, 
Milwaukee. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Maura 
F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 27
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2009AP806-CR2009AP806-CR 
(L.C. No. 
06-CF-3184) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Marvin L. Beauchamp, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAY 3, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published 
court of appeals decision1 in a case arising from a shooting on a 
Milwaukee street on a summer morning.  The murdered man, Bryon 
Somerville, made statements to an ambulance driver and a police 
officer just before he died that gave a brief description of his 
assailant——a man named Marvin, whose last name Somerville did 
not know, who was dark-skinned with "a bald head and big 
forehead." Beauchamp distinguished him from another man named 
                                                 
1 State v. Beauchamp, 2010 WI App 42, 324 Wis. 2d 162, 781 
N.W.2d 254. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
2 
 
Marvin by saying he meant "big head Marvin."  Other witnesses 
gave statements about seeing Marvin Beauchamp at the scene and 
seeing him shoot Somerville point blank, statements they later 
said had been coerced and were untrue.  The case proceeded to 
trial in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the Hon. 
Jeffrey A. Wagner presiding.  When two witnesses testified that 
their previous statements implicating Beauchamp had been lies 
coerced by the police, the court permitted the State to impeach 
their testimony by cross-examining them with their prior 
inconsistent statements. The jury convicted Beauchamp of first-
degree intentional homicide while using a dangerous weapon.  
Beauchamp appealed, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the admission of the Somerville statements and the prior 
statements 
of 
the 
two 
recanting 
witnesses 
violated 
his 
constitutional rights to confrontation and due process.  The 
circuit 
court 
admitted 
the 
statements 
under 
the 
dying 
declaration and prior inconsistent statement hearsay exceptions 
found 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 
908.045(3) 
and 
908.01(4)(a)1, 
respectively.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
rulings on both issues. 
¶2 
Beauchamp argues that the circuit court erred in 
admitting into evidence the statements made by Somerville prior 
to his death because there was no opportunity for Beauchamp to 
cross-examine Somerville about his statements, and Beauchamp was 
therefore deprived of his constitutional right to confront the 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
3 
 
witnesses against him.2  He argues that the hearsay rules' so-
called "dying declaration" exception, applicable to statements 
made by a declarant who believes he is facing imminent death, is 
not compatible with the holding of Crawford v. Washington,3 a 
case in which the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
confrontation of witnesses as "the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands"4 for testimonial 
statements. Beauchamp argues that while the Crawford Court 
declined to rule on whether or how its bright line rule applied 
to dying declarations, its holding compels this court to exclude 
all unconfronted testimonial hearsay statements, including dying 
declarations. 
¶3 
Beauchamp further argues that even if a hearsay 
exception for dying declarations was recognized and implicitly 
incorporated by the framers of the United States Constitution in 
                                                 
2 "The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, 
'[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.'  
We have held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to 
both federal and state prosecutions."  Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
406 (1965)).  Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees the accused, inter alia, "the right . . . to meet the 
witnesses face to face . . . ." 
3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
4 Id. at 68-69 ("Where testimonial statements are at issue, 
the 
only 
indicium 
of 
reliability 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.") 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
4 
 
the Confrontation Clause,5 it is now time to abrogate the common 
law on this point.  He claims that the rationales given for the 
exception, such as wide acceptance of particular religious 
beliefs and the evidentiary necessity of such statements, are 
now antiquated and irrelevant.  Beauchamp argues that he is 
entitled 
to 
a 
new 
trial 
because 
Somerville's 
statements 
implicating Beauchamp were testimonial statements that were 
admitted into evidence in violation of his right under Crawford 
to test their reliability by cross-examination, because there is 
no longer a basis for presuming the reliability of such 
statements, and because in fact there are reasons to doubt it.  
¶4 
Beauchamp also claims that the admission of the two 
witnesses' prior inconsistent statements violated his right to 
due 
process.6 
 
This 
court 
has 
stated 
that 
due 
process 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54: "[T]he [Sixth 
Amendment] 'right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him' . . . is most naturally read as a reference to the 
right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding." 
6 The right to due process of law is guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment applicable to the 
states).  Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides the following guarantees:  
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
5 
 
requirements are satisfied in such a situation so long as the 
declarant 
is 
"present 
and 
subject 
to 
cross-examination."7  
Specifically, he argues that in order to protect a defendant’s 
due 
process 
right 
to 
have 
unreliable 
prior 
inconsistent 
statements excluded, this court should discard that standard and 
instead adopt a multi-factor test set forth by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Vogel v. Percy.8   He contends that 
if the court were to apply the Vogel test, under which the 
availability of the declarant for cross-examination is just one 
consideration among several, the statements in question would be 
deemed too unreliable to be admitted, and he contends that their 
erroneous admission was a violation of his right to due process 
and thus entitles him to a new trial. 
¶5 
We hold that the admission of the dying declaration 
statement violates neither Beauchamp's Sixth Amendment right to 
                                                                                                                                                             
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
7 Robinson v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 343, 349, 306 N.W.2d 668 
(1981). 
8 Vogel v. Percy, 691 F.2d 843, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1982).  The 
court cited a Fifth Circuit case establishing the following 
“guidelines” for determining "whether substantive use of a prior 
inconsistent statement would comport with due process”:  
(1) the declarant was available for cross-examination; 
(2) the statement was made shortly after the events 
related 
and 
was 
transcribed 
promptly; 
(3) 
the 
declarant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right 
to remain silent; (4) the declarant admitted making 
the statement; and (5) there was some corroboration of 
the statement's reliability. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
6 
 
confront witnesses nor his corresponding right under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.9  As the court of appeals noted, "the 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the confrontation right does not 
apply 'where an exception to the confrontation right was 
                                                 
9 The concurrence would avoid reaching the question that is 
squarely before us, the question of whether a dying declaration 
constitutes an exception to an accused's Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation.  We do not think it is appropriate to dodge 
this question.  First, the record is sufficiently developed with 
evidence to establish, as even defense counsel essentially 
conceded at trial, that the statements involved here constitute 
dying declarations under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(3).  Second, the 
parties have fully briefed the question presented.  Third, the 
Supreme Court has set forth principles in Giles and Crawford 
that get us to an answer on this question.  And fourth, many 
other jurisdictions have answered this question.  The United 
States Supreme Court was barred, given the procedural history of 
the case before it in Michigan v. Bryant, from addressing the 
question of dying declarations; as a matter of state law, the 
opportunity for that legal theory had been deemed waived below.  
See Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) 
(holding that unconfronted statements made by a shooting victim 
to police on the scene were nontestimonial and therefore 
admissible without violation of the Confrontation Clause).  Had 
the Bryant Court had a properly developed record and properly 
presented question regarding a dying declaration, it might well 
have chosen to address that question instead.   
The Bryant Court acknowledged that it was reviewing "a 
record that was not developed to ascertain the 'primary purpose 
of the interrogation.'"  Id. at 1163.  However, the first step 
in the Court's analysis, id. at 1163-65, focused on "the 
available evidence, which suggests that [the victim] perceived 
an ongoing threat."  Id. at 1164 n.16.  Nothing in the Court's 
analysis indicated that every incident in which a shooting 
victim is treated by emergency responders constitutes an 
"ongoing emergency" such that the victim's statements are 
rendered non-testimonial.  Having granted the petition for 
review in this case and having the benefit of a properly 
developed record, we see no need to leave this important 
question to be answered another day.   
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
7 
 
recognized at the time of the founding.'"10  Beauchamp concedes 
that the dying declaration exception was an established hearsay 
exception at common law.  The Crawford Court acknowledged the 
dying declaration hearsay exception and indicated that the 
exception might be an exception that survives a Confrontation 
Clause challenge.11  Without a direct answer from Crawford on 
this point, we are given the task of resolving this question by 
applying the principles set forth in Crawford and a related 
case, Giles v. California,12 which bases its holding on an 
analysis of what specific hearsay exceptions were permitted at 
common law at the time of the ratification of the Sixth 
Amendment and were therefore incorporated into its confrontation 
right.  Those principles compel the conclusion that allowing 
this hearsay exception comports with the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause.  While the United States Supreme Court has 
yet to give its explicit blessing to the dying declaration 
exception, it has given us no reason to abandon a principle that 
is so deeply rooted in the common law.  Nor does Beauchamp.  The 
fairest way to resolve the tension between the State's interest 
in presenting a dying declaration and a defendant's concerns 
about its potential unreliability is not to prohibit such 
evidence, but to continue to freely permit, as the law does, the 
                                                 
10 State v. Beauchamp, 324 Wis. 2d 162, ¶11 (citing Giles v. 
California, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008)). 
11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
 
12 Giles v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2678 
(2008). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
8 
 
aggressive impeachment of a dying declaration on any grounds 
that may be relevant in a particular case.13  In other words, if 
there is evidence the declarant had a motive to accuse falsely, 
introduce it.  If there is evidence that the declarant was 
cognitively 
impaired 
and 
incapable 
of 
perceiving 
events 
accurately, introduce it.  Such facts may, in particular cases, 
justifiably undermine the reliability of a dying declaration.  
The reliability of evidence is an issue for the trier of fact, 
and the assertion that some dying declarations may be unreliable 
can not justify the per se exclusion of such potentially 
valuable evidence. 
¶6 
We are likewise unpersuaded by Beauchamp's argument 
that the failure to exclude the prior inconsistent statements of 
recanting witnesses here violated due process rights and, as he 
argued before the court of appeals, constituted either plain 
error by the circuit court or prejudicial error by counsel 
necessitating remand for a Machner hearing, when the grounds for 
the claim is that a test different from Wisconsin's should have 
                                                 
13 In a concurrence in a dying declaration case, a state 
court justice critical of the reliability of dying declarations 
asserted that when jurors hear the dramatic circumstances 
surrounding a dying declaration, "there is no effective way to 
challenge its truth and it is more than just likely that the 
jury will attach undue importance to it and give it undue weight 
in arriving at a verdict."  Kidd v. State, 258 So. 2d 423, 430 
(Miss. 1972) (Smith, J., concurring).  A statement about whether 
such evidence can be successfully challenged cannot be readily 
disproved, of course, by recourse to appellate case law research 
given that a case involving a successfully impeached dying 
declaration that results in an acquittal would not be the 
subject of appeal. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
9 
 
been applied and that, if applied, the test would have barred 
the statements from evidence.  The statements in question were 
admitted without objection and consistent with controlling 
Wisconsin law.  Beauchamp was not prejudiced by his counsel's 
failure to urge the court to apply the law of another 
jurisdiction, nor can the circuit court be said to have 
committed plain error when it applied what was then the 
controlling law in Wisconsin.  There was no violation of 
Beauchamp's right to due process here. 
¶7 
We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
¶8 
According to statements by witnesses and testimony at 
the trial, the conflict that ultimately led to the shooting was 
a couple's fight over rumored infidelity, though the shooting 
itself was by a person whose interest in the argument seems 
impossible to discern from the evidence in the record.  On the 
morning of June 16, 2007, Somerville was angrily going from one 
residence to another trying to find his girlfriend, Dalynn 
Brookshire, and a flurry of phone calls were being made to and 
from Somerville, Brookshire, and her friends and relatives.  One 
of those calls came to Marvin Beauchamp as he was driving home 
with his girlfriend from an appointment, and his girlfriend 
testified that after he took that call, they quickly headed 
toward the Sherman Avenue address where Somerville had said he 
was going next.  They parked a block away, and Beauchamp and his 
girlfriend took different routes to the house.  Dominique Brown, 
Beauchamp's girlfriend, who had just arrived with him moments 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
10 
 
before, found Shainya Brookshire, the sister of Somerville's 
girlfriend, near the house.  According to a signed statement 
given to police but later recanted, Beauchamp's girlfriend told 
the second woman that "Marvin" was "hiding in the bushes on the 
side of the house, and he has a gun."   
¶9 
Witnesses testified to seeing Somerville walk out of 
the house and hearing Somerville briefly exchange words with 
someone outside the house.  Just before the gunshots, witnesses 
told police, they heard Somerville say, "Oh, you got a gun. Oh, 
you're going to shoot me. Shoot me then."  In a statement to 
police that she later said was untrue, Beauchamp's girlfriend 
said she then saw Beauchamp point a gun at Somerville and shoot 
him in the stomach from a distance of about five feet.  A boy 
who was selling bottled water at the intersection nearby 
testified that he saw a man come up from behind the house, saw 
Somerville walk out of the house, heard the two exchange words, 
and saw the man shoot Somerville, though when shown a group of 
photographs that included Beauchamp, he was unable to identify 
him as the shooter.  He then saw the wounded man walk toward his 
vehicle and open the door before falling to the ground. 
¶10 When police and fire department units responded to the 
call 
reporting 
the 
shooting, 
that 
is 
where 
they 
found 
Somerville, conscious but gravely injured with five gunshot 
wounds.  The EMT who arrived on the scene, Marvin Coleman, 
testified that he asked Somerville, "Who did this?"  Somerville 
responded, "Marvin."  When Coleman, who was an acquaintance of 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
11 
 
the victim and had recognized his vehicle at the scene, asked, 
"Who, me?"  Somerville responded, "No, big head Marvin."14 
¶11 Police officer Wayne Young rode in the ambulance with 
Somerville. In the ambulance, Somerville stated that "Marvin" 
shot him.  An emergency room doctor told Young shortly before 
Somerville died that his time for asking questions was short.  
In response to Young's questions, Somerville described "Marvin" 
as dark-skinned, bald, and having a big forehead.  People who 
had known Beauchamp prior to his arrest in this case described 
his physical appearance in trial testimony in ways that were 
consistent with the description Somerville provided of the man 
who shot him.  Somerville's girlfriend described Beauchamp as 
having a bald head and dark skin. An acquaintance who grew up 
with Beauchamp and was housed in the same county jail with him 
for three days described him as having "a big head," and 
"particularly a large forehead." 
¶12 The two women, Brown and Brookshire, were at the house 
where the shooting occurred, and it is their "prior inconsistent 
statements" whose admissibility Beauchamp challenges.  Both gave 
multiple statements to the police.  First, each gave initial 
statements that did not implicate Beauchamp.  Second, when re-
                                                 
14 Somerville also repeatedly said things like "Please don't 
let me die."  Those statements were evidence that the statements 
were made "under belief of impending death," see Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.045(3), which was a contested issue at the circuit court 
and before the court of appeals.  However, Beauchamp is not 
disputing in this review that the statements fit the definition 
of "dying declaration." 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
12 
 
interviewed by police after other witnesses told the police that 
the two women had actually been in the front yard quite close to 
where the shooting occurred, each signed statements that put 
Beauchamp at the scene with a gun and identified him as the 
shooter.  There was evidence of statements that each feared 
Beauchamp; his girlfriend's statement to police was that she had 
received a call from him after the shooting telling her to "keep 
[her] mouth shut."  However, at the preliminary hearing and at 
the trial, each characterized the statements given to police as 
lies coerced by law enforcement officers who demanded a specific 
story.  Each recanted the statements to the extent that they 
implicated Beauchamp as the shooter. 
¶13 At a pre-trial motion hearing, over defense counsel's 
objection, the circuit court ruled that the evidence of 
Somerville's statements to the EMT and police officer, as well 
as the evidence of Somerville's grave wounds, supported a 
finding that the statements were made while Somerville thought 
he was dying and that the statements were therefore admissible 
under Wis. Stat. 908.045(3) as exceptions to the hearsay rule.15  
                                                 
15 Wis. Stat. § 908.01 provides as follows:   
The following definitions apply under this chapter: 
(1) Statement. A “statement” is (a) an oral or written 
assertion or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it 
is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(2) Declarant. A “declarant” is a person who makes a 
statement. 
(3) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
13 
 
The court of appeals rejected Beauchamp's challenge, grounded on 
the holding in Crawford, to the dying declaration exception, 
reasoning that the Giles Court's "deliberate recognition of the 
Sixth Amendment's reach" and its "further analysis of the pre-
founding [dying declaration] cases it cited" made it clear that 
the dying declaration hearsay exception is not constitutionally 
prohibited. 
 
We 
review 
Beauchamp's 
confrontation 
clause 
challenge de novo.  "Whether admission of a hearsay statement 
violates a defendant's right to confrontation presents a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo."  State v. 
Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶10, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485 (citing 
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1999)). 
¶14 The standard of review for the second issue Beauchamp 
presents is determined by the fact that the recanting witnesses' 
prior inconsistent statements were read into the record at trial 
without objection.  Because the claimed error was not preserved 
by an objection at trial, the court of appeals reviewed the 
                                                                                                                                                             
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
(4) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is 
not hearsay if: 
(a) 
Prior 
statement 
by 
witness. 
The 
declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is: 
1. Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 908.02 provides, "Hearsay is not admissible 
except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by 
the supreme court or by statute." 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
14 
 
claim as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant 
to State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, ¶47, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 
N.W.2d 31 (noting that in the absence of an objection an 
appellate court addresses issues "within the rubric of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel").  The court of appeals 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
and 
order 
denying 
Beauchamp's motion for post-conviction relief seeking a new 
trial, or in the alternative a Machner hearing to pursue his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  For the same reason, 
the court of appeals reviewed for plain error the circuit 
court's failure to exclude the statements on the basis of a 
Vogel analysis.16  The court of appeals held Beauchamp's plain 
error claim to be without merit because such error must be 
"obvious and substantial,"17 and that standard cannot be met in a 
case such as this where there is not even a citation to the 
Vogel factors, much less an adoption of the standard, in any 
published Wisconsin case.  It therefore affirmed the judgment 
and order. 
¶15 We likewise review the claimed error involving the 
admission of the prior inconsistent statements recognizing that 
these are unobjected-to matters.  We therefore determine whether 
Beauchamp is entitled to the Machner hearing he sought in his 
post-conviction motion and on appeal to pursue a claim of a new 
                                                 
16 See State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 
754 N.W.2d 77. 
17 Id. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
15 
 
trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.  That claim is 
premised on the argument that Beauchamp was prejudiced by his 
counsel's error in failing to object to the admission of the 
statements and also failing to advocate for the statements to be 
excluded on due process grounds based on an allegedly more 
restrictive standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  We also must determine whether it was plain error for 
the court not to apply the Seventh Circuit's standard sua 
sponte. 
I.  SOMERVILLE'S DYING DECLARATIONS 
¶16 Beauchamp argues that the admission of unconfronted 
hearsay statements made by Somerville to the medical and law 
enforcement personnel who arrived at the scene violated his 
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him, as 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  He contends that a proper reading of Crawford v. 
Washington, in which the United States Supreme Court abrogated a 
previous rule18 that allowed unconfronted testimonial hearsay 
                                                 
18 The rule abrogated was that of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 66 (1980), which favored a balancing approach applied by the 
circuit court for determinations of reliability of unconfronted 
testimonial statements.  After noting that the Court had held in 
1965 that the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation is 
applicable in state as well as federal criminal trials, one 
commentator 
briefly 
summarized 
the 
subsequent 
history 
of 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence thus: 
Since that time, the Court has tried to define the 
circumstances under which statements can be offered by 
the prosecution against the accused without having to 
accord the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.  Eventually the Court developed a two-part 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
16 
 
deemed reliable by a judge, compels the conclusion that the 
dying 
declaration 
hearsay 
exception 
is 
no 
longer 
constitutionally permitted.  The State responds that the 
Crawford Court declined to address the question of dying 
declarations, and appeared to leave open the possibility that 
such statements would be found to constitute an exception to 
Confrontation Clause guarantees.19  Further, the State argues 
                                                                                                                                                             
test: (1) if the statement offered against the 
defendant fell within a "firmly rooted" exception to 
the hearsay rule, cross-examination could be done away 
with; (2) but if the statement did not fall into such 
an 
exception, 
then 
cross-examination 
could 
be 
dispensed with only if the prosecution convinced the 
judge that the statement offered was reliable.  In 
Crawford v. Washington, the Court abandoned the two-
part test, at least when the statement offered against 
the defendant qualifies as a "testimonial statement." 
Miguel A. Méndez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 Stan. 
L. Rev. 569, 571 (2004)(footnotes omitted). 
19 Crawford concerned the admission of the defendant's wife's prior statements to police 
concerning the defendant; the prosecution sought to admit the prior statements to rebut the 
defendant's assertion of self-defense.  The defendant's wife was unavailable to testify in that case 
due to a relevant marital privilege statute.  The Court asserted that confrontation was the only 
constitutionally sound way to determine reliability, and noted, "Dispensing with confrontation 
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant 
is obviously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
62.  Nevertheless, the court conceded the following: 
The one deviation we have found involves dying 
declarations. The existence of that exception as a 
general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be 
disputed.  Although many dying declarations may not be 
testimonial, there is authority for admitting even 
those that clearly are.  We need not decide in this 
case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an 
exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this 
exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it 
is sui generis.   
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
17 
 
here that the analysis in Giles, as well as further commentary 
on the dying declaration hearsay exception in that case, 
confirms that the Supreme Court has clearly signaled that a 
dying declaration may safely be deemed an exception to the 
Confrontation Clause by virtue of its acceptance at common law 
at the time of the founding.   
¶17 The State also argues that Somerville's statement to 
the emergency medical technician (EMT) was not testimonial and 
therefore is exempted by Crawford from the confrontation 
requirement that applies to testimonial statements.  After this 
case was briefed and argued, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Bryant, which examined the parameters of the "ongoing 
emergency" 
rule 
established 
by 
the 
holding 
in 
Davis 
v. 
Washington that statements to police are non-testimonial when 
the "primary purpose of the interrogation" that produced them 
"is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."  
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  Though the 
underlying facts and the statements at issue in this case and 
Bryant are similar, the legal questions presented are different.  
In Bryant, the statements at issue had been admitted under a 
different hearsay exception, and no factual foundation was 
established 
for 
a 
finding 
that 
they 
qualified 
as 
dying 
declarations.  The Court stated, "Because of the State's failure 
to preserve its argument with regard to dying declarations, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, n.6 (citations omitted). 
 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
18 
 
we . . . need not decide that question here."  Bryant, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1151, n.1.  It thus proceeded with its analysis of 
whether the Davis "ongoing emergency" rule rendered statements 
made to police by a shooting victim nontestimonial.  The Court 
concluded that the statements were made in the context of an 
ongoing emergency and deemed them nontestimonial, ruling that 
the admission of the unconfronted statements did not violate the 
defendant's constitutional confrontation right.  Id. at 1167.  
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg recapped the brief mentions of 
the dying declaration hearsay exception in Crawford and Giles 
and acknowledged that the Court has yet to address its continued 
viability: 
In Crawford v. Washington, this Court noted that, in 
the law we inherited from England, there was a well-
established 
exception 
to 
the 
confrontation 
requirement: The cloak protecting the accused against 
admission of out-of-court testimonial statements was 
removed 
for 
dying 
declarations. 
 
This 
historic 
exception, we recalled in Giles v. California, applied 
to statements made by a person about to die and aware 
that death was imminent.  Were the issue properly 
tendered here, I would take up the question whether 
the exception for dying declarations survives our 
recent Confrontation Clause decisions.  The Michigan 
Supreme Court, however, held, as a matter of state 
law, that the prosecutor had abandoned the issue.  The 
matter, therefore, is not one the Court can address in 
this case. 
Id. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
19 
 
¶18 The State argues that Somerville's statements to the 
EMT 
were 
nontestimonial,20 
but 
it 
does 
not 
argue 
that 
Somerville's 
statements 
to 
the 
police 
officer 
were 
nontestimonial.  Both sets of Somerville's statements, those 
made to the EMT and those made to the police officer, were 
admitted pursuant to the dying declaration hearsay exception.  
Therefore, while we recognize the different treatment required 
by Crawford for testimonial and nontestimonial statements, we 
are presented in this case the question of the dying declaration 
exception's viability under Crawford's restrictive standard for 
testimonial statements, and we assume for purposes of our 
analysis that the statements admitted here pursuant to the dying 
declaration 
hearsay 
exception 
were 
testimonial.21 
 
We 
consequently acknowledge but need not address further in this 
case the argument that Somerville's unconfronted statements to 
                                                 
20 This argument was not presented below, but the State 
raised it before this court in light of the fact that an 
appellate court "may review the record to determine if a 
statement is admissible under a particular hearsay exception 
even though the trial court did not admit the statement on that 
basis."  State v. Kutz, 2003 WI App 205, ¶33, 267 Wis. 2d 531, 
671 N.W.2d 660.  Our holding in this case makes it unnecessary 
to address the State's additional harmless error arguments. 
21 We note that under the multi-factor approach taken by 
Bryant in determining whether a statement is nontestimonial 
under Davis because its "primary purpose" is "to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency," a statement that 
qualifies as a dying declaration under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(3) 
could, depending upon the circumstances, be categorized as 
testimonial or as nontestimonial.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 
1160(citing to Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006)). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
20 
 
the EMT are non-testimonial and for that reason their admission 
does not violate his confrontation right. 
¶19 "[W]hether 
the admission of evidence violates a 
defendant's right to confrontation is a question of law subject 
to independent appellate review."  State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, 
¶ 12, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518. 
¶20 We 
begin 
by 
acknowledging 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination that the statements Somerville made to the EMT and 
to the officer in the ambulance and in the operating room were 
dying declarations.  Beauchamp's counsel conceded that a motion 
to exclude the statements was unlikely to succeed: 
I am well aware of what the case law says and as it 
relates to what the State must show.  Whether or not 
the victim either knew he was dying or had a 
reasonable belief that he was dying.  I think it's 
clear from the fire fighter who testified today that 
the victim at least indicated don't let me die and I 
think that is one indication that the victim may have 
been under the impression that he was going to die. 
It's also clear to me that what was being done to Mr. 
Somerville during the time that he was on scene, while 
in transport and at the facility, the hospital 
facility, that it's clear that he could have believed 
he was going to die. 
It seems to me also that the information that the 
victim has indicated was answers that were given upon 
questions being asked by law enforcement or fire 
fighters.  So, as a result of that I think it would be 
very difficult for me to do anything other than a pro 
forma motion to exclude the statements of the victim. 
¶21 The circuit court then noted that upon the evidence 
provided, it would permit the statements to come in under Wis. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
21 
 
Stat. § 908.045(3).  We agree with the circuit court that the 
statutory requirements are met on the facts presented. 
¶22 There is a dual framework for our analysis, as 
Professor Daniel Blinka has explained:  "In effect, the 
government's use of hearsay is regulated by both the rules of 
evidence and the confrontation clause.  Put differently, there 
are two distinct hearsay rules, one rooted in constitutional law 
and the other found in evidence law.  While there is overlap and 
even some interrelationship, the two doctrines are nonetheless 
fundamentally different."22  The question presented then is, as 
another court phrased it, "whether the statutorily proper 
admission of [a] statement was nonetheless an unconstitutional 
violation . . . ."  Vogel, 691 F.2d 843, 846 n.9 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
¶23 If we were to accept that the Confrontation Clause, as 
set 
forth 
in 
Crawford's 
seemingly 
unbending 
declaration, 
requires 
that 
all 
testimonial 
statements 
be 
subject 
to 
confrontation to test their reliability, we would exclude dying 
declarations as, by definition, unconfrontable, and therefore, 
statements whose reliability cannot be tested.  In fact, where 
the admissibility of a statement is governed by the Crawford 
                                                 
22 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin 
Evidence, § 802.301 at 711 (3d ed. 2008). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
22 
 
analysis, one never reaches the issue of reliability23 because of 
the Confrontation Clause threshold question:  "Where testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation."  Crawford at 
65-69. 
¶24 But such a seemingly rigid approach cannot prevail 
here.  As noted above, the Crawford Court deliberately avoided 
the question of how such a rule would apply in a dying 
declaration case.  In addition, in Giles, the Court made clear 
that 
notwithstanding the categorical language employed in 
Crawford, there remain situations in which a defendant may not 
successfully 
invoke 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
to 
exclude 
testimonial hearsay statements.  In Giles, the court rejected a 
California hearsay exception that was a broader version of the 
exception than the one that was accepted at common law at the 
time of the Sixth's Amendment's ratification.  Giles involved a 
murder case in which the California courts had ruled that 
statements of the murder victim had been properly admitted under 
a theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  As applied in Giles, the 
theory had permitted the judge to determine, without a specific 
showing of the defendant's intent to keep the person from 
                                                 
23 As one law review article author stated, "The key test of 
Crawford for a Confrontation Clause violation is whether the 
hearsay statement offered against a criminal defendant is 
testimonial." 
 
Michael 
J. 
Polelle, 
The 
Death 
of 
Dying 
Declarations in a Post-Crawford World, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 285, 286 
(2006).   
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
23 
 
testifying, that the defendant had forfeited by his wrongdoing 
the right to confront the witness.  The Giles Court's analysis 
of the Confrontation Clause issue turned on a determination of 
the contours of the common law forfeiture rule in existence at 
the time of the Constitution's drafting, and it made clear that 
the flaw in the application of the California forfeiture rule 
was that it permitted evidence that the common law rule in 
existence in 1791 would have excluded.  The Court made two 
statements in that regard that are of significance to our 
analysis. 
¶25 First, in answering the question of whether a doctrine 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing comports with the guarantees of the 
Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court found that it does so 
only where there has been a showing of the defendant's specific 
intent to keep the victim from testifying.  The basis for its 
holding was that there had not been, at the time of the Sixth 
Amendment's ratification,24 an exception to the Confrontation 
Clause for forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine that required no 
showing of intent to prevent the witness's appearance at trial.  
                                                 
24 Giles, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008) ("We held in Crawford 
that the Confrontation Clause is 'most naturally read as a 
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting 
only 
those 
exceptions 
established 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
founding.'")  The Crawford analysis noted that the Sixth 
Amendment was ratified in 1791, 541 U.S. 36, 46, and stated, "As 
the English authorities [cited] above reveal, the common law in 
1791 
conditioned 
admissibility 
of 
an 
absent 
witness's 
examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.  The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those 
limitations."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-55 (internal citations 
omitted). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
24 
 
However, the court documented the numerous instances in the pre-
founding common law where the right to confrontation of 
testimonial statements had indeed been deemed waived where there 
had been a showing of the defendant's intent to prevent the 
witness's appearance.   
¶26 It considered the following fact "conclusive" to the 
question: 
[The fact of] the common law's uniform exclusion of 
unconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims 
(except testimony given with awareness of impending 
death) in the innumerable cases in which the defendant 
was on trial for killing the victim, but was not shown 
to have done so for the purpose of preventing 
testimony. 
Giles, 554 U.S. at 368 (emphasis added).  Notably, the Court did 
not say that the Confrontation Clause barred all testimony 
admitted pursuant to a forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.  It 
merely described what kind of forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
would comport with constitutional guarantees.  After all, the 
Court remanded the case to the California court with the 
observation that "the court is free to consider evidence of the 
defendant's intent on remand."  Id. at 377.  In other words, 
Giles stands for the proposition that the permissible contours 
of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and the point 
beyond which it becomes a violation of Confrontation Clause 
guarantees, are co-extensive with the contours of that exception 
at the time of the founding of our nation and specifically the 
Sixth Amendment's ratification. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
25 
 
¶27 The second statement the Giles Court made that is 
relevant to this case was its specific reference to the dying 
declaration exception: 
We have previously acknowledged that two forms of 
testimonial statements were admitted at common law 
even though they were unconfronted.  The first of 
these were declarations made by a speaker who was both 
on the brink of death and aware that he was dying. 
Giles, 554 U.S. at 358.  
¶28 Given the Court's recent acknowledgement of the dying 
declaration hearsay exception under the common law at the time 
of the founding and specifically the ratification of the Sixth 
Amendment, as well as the assertion of treatise writers such as 
Wigmore that the exception was not merely in existence but was 
centuries old by that point,25 the logic of Giles cannot support 
the conclusion that the hearsay exception afforded for dying 
declarations offends the constitution.  We had concluded as much 
in 1892 when we considered a challenge based on Article 1, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the provision that 
corresponds to the federal Confrontation Clause.  In a case 
concerning a different facet of the hearsay exception, we 
explained 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
confrontation clause: 
                                                 
25 See Wigmore on Evidence § 1430-1431, citing the leading 
case from 1761, Wright v. Littler, which articulated a notion 
that had even at that point, according to Wigmore, been long 
accepted. 
 
Wigmore 
states, 
"The 
custom 
of 
using 
dying 
declarations probably comes down as a tradition long before the 
evidence system arises in the 1500s . . . ." Id. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
26 
 
It is claimed that such ruling [permitting the 
introduction, over objection, of testimony from a 
previous trial when the witness had died] was an 
infringement of a right secured to the accused by that 
clause of the constitution of this state which 
declares 
that 
“in all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to meet the 
witnesses face to face.” Section 7, art. 1.  . . .  
[T]he right of the accused to meet the witnesses face 
to 
face 
was 
not 
granted, 
but 
secured, 
by 
the 
constitutional clauses mentioned. It is the right, 
therefore, as it existed at common law that was thus 
secured. That right was subject to certain exceptions. 
One of these exceptions was that the declarations of a 
murdered person, made when he was at the point of 
death, and every hope of this world gone, as to the 
time, place, and manner in which, and the person by 
whom, the fatal wound was given, are admissible in 
evidence, notwithstanding such deceased person was not 
sworn nor examined, much less cross-examined. This 
court has frequently held that the constitutional 
clause quoted is no bar to the admission in evidence 
of such declarations. 
Jackson v. State, 81 Wis. 127, 131, 51 N.W. 89 (1892). 
¶29 While acknowledging the deep historical roots of the 
dying declaration hearsay exception, Beauchamp argues that such 
statements 
were 
previously 
presumed 
to 
be 
reliable 
and 
considered to be necessary evidence but that those rationales 
are no longer tenable.  Further, he argues that courts have 
ignored factors that would tend to show that such statements are 
likely to be especially unreliable and should therefore be 
subject to exclusion under Crawford just as other unconfronted 
testimonial statements are.  He argues that there is no reason 
to presume that all dying declarations are reliable given 
possible motives to accuse falsely and the likelihood that a 
mortally wounded victim is too cognitively impaired by his 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
27 
 
injuries to give an accurate account of the crime.  He discounts 
the necessity of such evidence given the advances of forensic 
science.  The State counters that Beauchamp had the opportunity 
at trial to impeach Somerville's statements pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 908.06 by introducing evidence of any fact that would 
have called into question the reliability of Somerville's 
statements on grounds of malice or mental status, and that he 
did not do so.  As to the presumed reliability of dying 
declarations, the State points to legal precedent that affirms 
such a presumption on other than religious grounds.26 
¶30 The hearsay exception has sometimes been justified on 
the grounds that a dying person was presumed under the common 
law to have, due to commonly held religious beliefs concerning 
the afterlife, such a fear of dying without the opportunity to 
expiate a lie that the reliability of any statement  made in 
those circumstances was deemed equivalent to that of sworn 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douglas, 337 A.2d 860, 864 
(Pa. 1975) (upholding a dying-declaration exception where a 
defendant had claimed the exception was "without meaning in our 
modern 
society" 
and 
rejecting 
the 
notion 
that 
"the 
sophistication of mankind today is such that the knowledge of 
impending death no longer engenders apprehension of the unknown 
and fails to deter falsehood and is incapable of inspiring 
truth.")  See also Fed. R. Evid. 804, Adv. Comm. Notes, Note to 
Subdivision (b), Exception (2) (1972) ("While the original 
religious justification for the exception may have lost its 
conviction for some persons over the years, it can scarcely be 
doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present.") 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
28 
 
testimony.27  As one commentator noted, "The original premise of 
this assumption was that the fear of divine judgment for lying 
provided religious assurance that the dying person would speak 
the truth."28  As early as 1860, however, a treatise writer 
disputed the notion that the doctrine's underpinnings were 
religious: 
[A dying declaration] is not received upon any other 
ground than that of necessity, in order to prevent 
murder going unpunished.  What is said in the books 
about the situation of the declarant, he is being 
virtually under the most solemn sanction to speak the 
truth, is far from presenting the true ground of the 
admission.  . . . [T]he rule is no doubt based upon 
the presumption that in the majority of cases there 
will be no other equally satisfactory proof of the 
same facts.  This presumption and the consequent 
probability 
of 
the 
crime 
going 
unpunished 
is 
unquestionably the chief ground of this exception in 
the law of Evidence. 
1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 156, editorial note (1860) (cited in 
Wigmore on Evidence, § 1431). 
¶31 We do not disagree with Beauchamp's contention that we 
live in "a society more secular than the one in which the 
exception originated."29  Nor do we disagree with his contention 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., The Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox. Crim. Cases 1, 3 
(Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881)("No person, who is immediately going 
into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon his 
lips.") (cited in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990)). 
28 Polelle, supra, at 300. 
29 Stanley 
A. 
Goldman, 
Not 
So 
"Firmly 
Rooted": 
Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 
24 
(1987). 
 
For 
example, 
whether 
the 
religious 
justification 
was 
the 
"original 
premise" 
or 
not, 
religiously-based reasoning is cited in cases in ways that 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
29 
 
that under certain circumstances, factors exist which may 
undermine the reliability of a particular dying declaration.  
However, those facts cannot justify eliminating this hearsay 
exception and creating a per se prohibition against dying 
declarations on the grounds that such statements are in almost 
all cases unconfronted and unconfrontable.  We find persuasive 
the California Supreme Court's analysis of this question in 
People v. Monterroso: 
Thus, if, as Crawford teaches, the confrontation 
clause “is most naturally read as a reference to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
can be jarring to a present-day reader.  In a case 
challenging a trial court's admission of a murder victim's 
statement under the dying declaration hearsay exception, 
the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, focusing on the 
profanity 
employed 
in 
the 
victim's 
many 
statements 
concerning the accused (e.g., "What will you do if I die; 
will you hang the damned son of a  bitch?", "[I will] meet 
[the defendant] in hell and have it out with him there," 
and "You are a hell of a set of doctors not to help a 
fellow with as little cuts as these."  Tracy v. Illinois, 
97 Ill. 101, 110-11 (Ill. 1880))  The court reasoned that 
the statement implicating the defendant had to be excluded 
from the jury on the following grounds:  
Assuming that the deceased was a believer in a future 
state of rewards and punishments, and such is the 
presumption where nothing appears to the contrary, the 
use of profane language immediately preceding the 
statement 
is 
hardly 
to 
be 
reconciled 
with 
the 
assumption that he was at the time of sound mind and 
impressed 
with 
a 
sense 
of 
almost 
immediate 
death. . . . It is hard to realize how any sane man 
who believes in his accountability to God can be 
indulging in profanity when at the same time he really 
believes that in a few short hours at most he will be 
called upon to appear before Him to answer for the 
deeds done in the body. 
Id. at 105-06. 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
30 
 
right of confrontation at common law, admitting only 
those exceptions established at the time of the 
founding,” it follows that the common law pedigree of 
the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict 
with the Sixth Amendment. 
Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004). 
¶32 We further agree with that court's observation that to 
exclude such evidence as violative of the right to confrontation 
“would not only be contrary to all the precedents in England and 
here, 
acquiesced 
in 
long 
since 
the 
adoption 
of 
these 
constitutional provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that 
sense of justice and regard for individual security and public 
safety which its exclusion in some cases would inevitably set at 
naught.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
¶33 This 
case 
is 
an 
example 
of 
that 
possibility.  
Notwithstanding advances in forensic science, there was in this 
case, as in many cases, no fingerprint evidence, no DNA 
evidence, and no definitive ballistics evidence that would tie 
the defendant directly to the crime.  In any event, of course, 
such evidence, as valuable as it may be, does not necessarily 
prove a defendant's guilt any more than its absence necessitates 
his acquittal. 
¶34 We 
therefore, 
like 
every 
state 
court 
that 
has 
considered the dying declaration exception since Crawford, take 
a position consistent with the language of Crawford and Giles 
and decline to hold that the constitutional right to confront 
witnesses is violated by the admission of statements under the 
dying declaration hearsay exception.  As the State notes, no 
published decision of any state court in the country has 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
31 
 
eliminated the dying declaration hearsay exception based on the 
reading of selected language of Crawford.  We concur with the 
courts30 that have addressed this question after Crawford: a 
hearsay exception as long-standing, well-established and still 
necessary as this one, as indeed this case illustrates, cannot 
be 
lightly 
dismissed. 
 
Regardless 
of 
the 
religious 
justifications that have been articulated for dying declarations 
over the centuries, this hearsay exception is a crucial one, and 
it retains its vitality.  We disagree with Beauchamp that 
scientific advances have changed criminal law such that there is 
always sufficient evidence without admitting the inculpatory 
words of a dying victim to fairly try a defendant accused of 
murder. 
¶35 We therefore affirm the court of appeals' holding that 
the statements made by Somerville to the EMT and the officer 
were 
properly 
admitted 
and 
did 
not 
violate 
Beauchamp's 
confrontation rights under the state and federal constitutions. 
II.  PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
                                                 
30 Cobb v. State, 16 So.3d 207, 212 (Fla. App. 2009); People 
v. Gilmore, 828 N.E.2d 293, 302 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005); Wallace v. 
State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Jones, 
197 P.3d 815, 822 (Kan. 2008); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 
N.E.2d 299, 310-11 (Mass. 2008); People v. Taylor, 737 N.W.2d 
790, 795 (Mich. App. 2007); State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 
585-86 (Minn. 2005); State v. Minner, 311 S.W.3d 313, 323, n.9 
(Mo. App. 2010); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 711 (Nev. 
2006); State v. Calhoun, 657 S.E.2d 424, 427-28 (N.C. App. 
2008); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 147-48 (Tenn. 2007); 
Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 289 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2009); Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, 695 S.E.2d 555, 568 (Va. 
App. 2010). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
32 
 
¶36 Beauchamp argues that the court erred when it allowed 
admission of the prior inconsistent statements of the two women, 
Brown and Brookshire.  As described above, each woman gave 
initial statements to the police that did not implicate 
Beauchamp, and then each woman gave a statement detailing that 
she had seen and heard Beauchamp commit the murder.  Each later 
recanted the portions of the statements implicating Beauchamp.  
Beauchamp contends that the admission of the inculpatory 
statements as substantive evidence was error because they are 
insufficiently reliable and thus their admission constituted a 
violation of his constitutional right to due process. 
¶37 The State argues that the statements were properly 
admitted under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a) because the women's 
statements at the preliminary hearing and at trial recanted the 
portions that implicated Beauchamp.  The State argues that the 
declarants were available for cross-examination at trial, and 
therefore the admission of the prior statements satisfied the 
due process test set forth in Robinson.  The State also notes 
that any appellate review of unobjected-to matters is governed 
by the analysis appropriate for claims of plain error or 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The State's brief also notes 
that "an appellate court may not conclude that counsel was 
ineffective without a Machner hearing," a proposition stated in 
State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 554, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
¶38 We review the unobjected-to admission of the prior 
inconsistent statements to determine whether Beauchamp is 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
33 
 
entitled to a new trial due to plain error by the circuit court.  
Though failure to object ordinarily constitutes waiver of an 
issue, a defendant is entitled to a new trial where unobjected-
to error is "plain error."31  As this court stated in State v. 
Mayo, the determination of plain error is made in the context of 
the facts of a case: 
Under the doctrine of plain error, an appellate court 
may review error that was otherwise waived by a 
party's failure to object properly or preserve the 
error for review as a matter of right. This court has 
not 
articulated 
a 
bright-line 
rule 
for 
what 
constitutes plain error, acknowledging that there is 
no “hard and fast classification” relative to its 
application.  Virgil v. State, 84 Wis.2d 166, 190-91, 
267 N.W.2d 852 (1978). Rather, the existence of plain 
error will turn on the facts of the particular case. 
Id. Of particular importance is the quantum of 
evidence properly admitted and the seriousness of the 
                                                 
31 Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1) and (4) state as follows: 
Effect 
of 
erroneous 
ruling. 
Error 
may 
not 
be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected; and 
(a) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context; or 
(b) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the judge by offer or was apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked.Plain 
error.  . . .  
Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain 
errors affecting substantial rights although they were 
not brought to the attention of the judge.  
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
34 
 
error involved. Id. The burden is on the State to 
prove that the plain error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. King, 205 Wis.2d 81, 93, 
555 N.W.2d 189 (1996). 
State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶29, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115. 
¶39 Additionally, 
we 
review 
whether 
Beauchamp 
was 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the admission 
of the statements and whether Beauchamp is, as a result, 
entitled to a remand for a Machner hearing to pursue a new trial 
via an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.32  The standard 
set forth for reviewing a denial of a motion seeking a Machner 
hearing was set forth and applied in State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 
80, ¶¶43-44.  There, this court stated that a circuit court may 
deny a postconviction motion for a Machner hearing "if the 
motion fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a question of 
fact, presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief."  Id., citing State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 
548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  In Roberson, this court concluded, 
                                                 
32 A Machner hearing is "a prerequisite to a claim of 
ineffective representation on appeal to preserve the testimony 
of trial counsel."  See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 
285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. App. 1979) and State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 
550, 555, 582 N.W.2d 409 (1998) (stating that "the lack of a 
Machner 
hearing 
prevents 
our 
review 
of 
trial 
counsel's 
performance.")  Though he did not directly ask this court to 
remand for a Machner hearing, Beauchamp did seek such a hearing 
in his post-conviction motion and in his brief to the court of 
appeals.  Given the context in which Beauchamp's due process 
claim arises, we construe his arguments as seeking either a 
remand for a new trial because the circuit court's admission of 
the evidence was plain error, or a remand for the Machner 
hearing that is necessary for him to pursue the claimed error as 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.   
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
35 
 
"[b]ecause . . . the 
record 
sufficiently 
establishes 
that 
Roberson was not prejudiced by his counsel's actions . . . the 
circuit court did not err in denying Roberson a [Machner] 
hearing . . . ."  Id. 
¶40 The law governing the admissibility of such statements 
is well settled in Wisconsin, and, given the standard of review 
that governs here, that is dispositive in either analysis.  As 
noted above, this court has stated that due process requirements 
are satisfied in such a situation so long as the declarant is 
"present and subject to cross-examination."33  Both declarants in 
this situation were present and subject to cross-examination.     
¶41 Beauchamp urges a different standard for determining 
whether 
due 
process 
considerations 
are 
satisfied 
by 
the 
admission of a prior inconsistent statement: a test in which the 
availability of the declarant for cross-examination is only one 
of five factors to consider.  That test, as noted above, is 
taken from Vogel v. Percy, 691 F.2d 843, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1982).  
That court cited a Fifth Circuit case establishing the following 
“guidelines” for determining whether “substantive use of a prior 
inconsistent statement would comport with due process”:  
(1) the declarant was available for cross-examination; 
(2) the statement was made shortly after the events 
related 
and 
was 
transcribed 
promptly; 
(3) 
the 
declarant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right 
to remain silent; (4) the declarant admitted making 
the statement; and (5) there was some corroboration of 
the statement's reliability. 
                                                 
33 Robinson v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 343, 349, 306 N.W.2d 668 
(1981). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
36 
 
Id. 
¶42 In Vogel, which concerned the prior inconsistent 
statement of a co-defendant against the defendant in a case 
arising from a Beloit armed robbery, the co-defendant had given 
a prior statement to police implicating the defendant, but in 
trial testimony gave a different version that minimized the 
defendant's role in the robbery. Id. at 844.  The Seventh 
Circuit bolstered its analysis of the admissibility of the 
statements with consideration of the test originally set forth 
by the Fifth Circuit, to be used when a court is determining 
"whether 
the 
statutorily 
proper 
admission 
of 
[the 
co-
defendant's] 
statement 
was 
nonetheless 
an 
unconstitutional 
violation of petitioner's due process rights."  Id. at 846 n.9.  
After applying the five factors, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that there was no due process violation.34 
                                                 
34 The State points out that even if the Vogel test 
were applied, the statements in this case would satisfy the 
test.  We agree.  We are hard pressed to see how the 
application of the test would change the outcome in this 
case.  Each of the applicable factors would in the case of 
Brookshire's and Brown's statements favor admissibility.  
Both declarants were available for cross-examination.  The 
statements were made shortly after the events related and 
were transcribed promptly.  Brookshire was not taken into 
custody, but Brown, who was interrogated while in custody, 
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to remain 
silent.  There was corroboration of the statements' 
reliability because 
there were statements from other 
witnesses that corresponded to the facts as presented in 
the women's prior statements, not least of which were the 
statements of the murder victim himself.  Even the fourth 
factor, that the declarant admitted making the statement, 
favors admissibility in this case; although each claimed 
that the statements were coerced by the police, there were 
substantial parts of the prior statements that the women 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
37 
 
¶43 We are unpersuaded that our simple, straightforward 
and workable requirement for the admission of prior inconsistent 
statements——that the declarant be present and available for 
cross-examination——needs any revision, and we decline the 
invitation to reformulate Wisconsin's standard on this question. 
¶44 Even if we favored the test set forth in Vogel, we 
could not determine that the circuit court had erred such that 
Beauchamp was entitled to a new trial.  Nor can we determine 
that counsel's failure to object prejudiced Beauchamp and that 
he is consequently entitled to a remand for a Machner hearing to 
pursue a new trial via an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  We note that the standard of review governing this issue 
in this case sets the bar high.  We are satisfied that Beauchamp 
was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to seek to bar the 
admission of the statements on the basis of a standard not 
employed in Wisconsin law.  Counsel was not required to urge the 
circuit court to apply the law of another jurisdiction when 
Wisconsin had its own test.  In light of this standard of 
review, we agree with the court of appeals that Beauchamp's 
claims regarding the prior inconsistent statements' admission 
are without merit.  Where a legal standard has been set forth in 
another jurisdiction, counsel is free to make an argument 
                                                                                                                                                             
themselves did not disavow.  The fact that the application 
of the Vogel test would not necessarily change the ultimate 
admissibility 
of 
the 
statements 
further 
undermines 
Beauchamp's claims of error by the circuit court and trial 
counsel in regard to their admission at trial. 
 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
38 
 
setting forth the other jurisdiction's practice as persuasive 
authority, but it simply cannot be said here either that 
Beauchamp was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object or that 
the circuit court erred in permitting the admission of the 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
¶45 We hold that the admission of the dying declaration 
statement violates neither Beauchamp's Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses nor his corresponding right under the 
Wisconsin Constitution. As the court of appeals noted, "the 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the confrontation right does not 
apply 'where an exception to the confrontation right was 
recognized at the time of the founding.'"35  Beauchamp concedes 
that the dying declaration exception was an established hearsay 
exception at common law.  The Crawford Court acknowledged the 
dying declaration hearsay exception and indicated that the 
exception might be an exception that survives a Confrontation 
Clause challenge.36  Without a direct answer from Crawford on 
this point, we are given the task of resolving this question by 
applying the principles set forth in Crawford and a related 
case, Giles,37 which bases its holding on an analysis of what 
specific hearsay exceptions were permitted at common law at the 
                                                 
35 Beauchamp, 324 Wis. 2d 162, ¶11 (citing Giles, 128 S. Ct. 
at 2682). 
36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.  
 
37 Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008). 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
39 
 
time of the ratification of the Sixth Amendment and were 
therefore incorporated into its confrontation right.  Those 
principles compel the conclusion that allowing this hearsay 
exception comports with the protections of the Confrontation 
Clause.  While the United States Supreme Court has yet to give 
its explicit blessing to the dying declaration exception, it has 
given us no reason to abandon a principle that is so deeply 
rooted in the common law.  Nor does Beauchamp.  The fairest way 
to 
resolve 
the 
tension 
between 
the 
State's 
interest 
in 
presenting a dying declaration and a defendant's concerns about 
its potential unreliability is not to prohibit such evidence, 
but to continue to freely permit, as the law does, the 
aggressive impeachment of a dying declaration on any grounds 
that may be relevant in a particular case.  In other words, if 
there is evidence the declarant had a motive to accuse falsely, 
introduce it.  If there is evidence that the declarant was 
cognitively 
impaired 
and 
incapable 
of 
perceiving 
events 
accurately, introduce it.  Such facts may, in particular cases, 
justifiably undermine the reliability of a dying declaration.  
The reliability of evidence is an issue for the trier of fact, 
and the assertion that some dying declarations may be unreliable 
can not justify the per se exclusion of such potentially 
valuable evidence. 
¶46 We are likewise unpersuaded by Beauchamp's argument 
that the failure to exclude the prior inconsistent statements of 
recanting witnesses here violated due process rights and, as he 
argued before the court of appeals, constituted either plain 
No. 
2009AP806-CR   
 
40 
 
error by the circuit court or prejudicial error by counsel 
necessitating remand for a Machner hearing, when the grounds for 
the claim is that a test different from Wisconsin's should have 
been applied and, if applied, would have barred the statements 
from evidence.  The statements in question were admitted without 
objection 
and 
consistent 
with 
controlling 
Wisconsin 
law.  
Beauchamp was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to urge 
the court to apply the law of another jurisdiction, nor can the 
circuit court be said to have committed plain error when it 
applied what was then the controlling law in Wisconsin.  There 
was no violation of Beauchamp's right to due process here. 
¶47 We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—Affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶48 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority opinion unnecessarily creates an exception to an 
accused's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation——an exception 
not yet recognized by the United States Supreme Court.  The 
present case can be decided upon existing law.  I therefore do 
not 
join 
the 
majority 
in 
reaching 
out 
to 
create 
new 
constitutional law.     
¶49 I conclude that the victim's comments to the emergency 
medical technician were not testimonial.  The technician's 
testimony relating to the victim's comments is therefore not 
barred by the Confrontation Clause and is admissible under the 
dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule.   
¶50 I need not determine whether the victim's comments to 
the police officer were testimonial, a closer call.  As I see 
it, if admitting the police officer's testimony was an error, it 
was harmless.   
¶51 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
I 
¶52 I first address the issue of testimonial and non-
testimonial statements raised in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004).  
¶53 The majority opinion suggests that the "fairest way" 
to resolve the tension between the State's interests in 
presenting unconfronted testimonial dying declarations and a 
defendant's concern about unreliability is to "continue to 
freely permit . . . the aggressive impeachment of a dying 
declaration . . . ."  Majority op., ¶5.  Yet Crawford v. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
Washington is rather explicit in stating that for testimonial 
evidence the Sixth Amendment "commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (2004). 
¶54 The Court in Crawford elucidated two inferences from 
its historical review of the Sixth Amendment.  First, not all 
hearsay implicates the core concerns of the Sixth Amendment's 
confrontation clause.  Instead, the confrontation clause focuses 
on "testimonial statements."  Second, "the 'right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him,' is most naturally 
read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, 
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the 
founding."1  
¶55 Crawford held that for testimonial evidence to be 
admissible absent confrontation, the Sixth Amendment "demands 
what the common law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination."2  I acknowledge that the 
Court left open the possibility that there may be historical 
exceptions to this discrete and clearly defined right.3  However, 
                                                 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (internal 
citations omitted).  
2 Id. at 68. 
3 Id. at 56 n.6. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority of the Court in 
Crawford, 
explicitly 
refrained 
from 
determining 
whether 
historical exceptions, and specifically dying declarations, 
"must be accepted."4  Justice Scalia's language is significantly 
less than a resounding endorsement, nor is it a strong portent 
of the Supreme Court establishing dying declarations as a 
historical exception to the Crawford rule.     
¶56 The Supreme Court has not subsequently determined 
whether a historical exception to the right of confrontation for 
testimonial dying declarations "must be accepted."  Instead the 
focus 
of 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
recent 
Sixth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence has been on developing the law surrounding the 
first inference of Crawford, differentiating between testimonial 
and non-testimonial statements. 
II 
¶57 I now turn to Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. 
Ct. 1143 (2011), which was decided after oral argument in the 
instant case.  Both the State and the defendant submitted letter 
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly, the Supreme Court acknowledged this possibility 
in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008) ("We have 
previously acknowledged that two forms of testimonial statements 
were admitted at common law even though they were unconfronted.  
The first of these were declarations made by a speaker who was 
both on the brink of death and aware that he was dying" 
(internal citations omitted).). 
4 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 ("Although many dying 
declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for 
admitting even those that clearly are.  We need not decide in 
this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception 
for testimonial dying declarations.  If this exception must be 
accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis" (internal 
citations omitted).). 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
briefs to the court discussing the effect of Bryant on the 
present case.  
¶58 In Bryant, to the dismay of Justice Scalia (the author 
of Crawford),5 the Supreme Court clarified the distinction 
between testimonial and non-testimonial statements made to 
emergency personnel in a fact situation similar to the case 
before us.  Relying upon the Supreme Court's analysis in Bryant, 
I conclude that the challenged statements made to Coleman, the 
emergency medical technician in the present case, identifying 
and describing the shooter, were non-testimonial statements.   
¶59 Because I conclude that the victim's statements to 
Coleman were not testimonial under Bryant, I do not join the 
majority opinion in creating an exception to the Confrontation 
Clause for testimonial dying declarations.  Under the facts of 
the instant case, it is unnecessary to create a historical 
exception for testimonial dying declarations, as the majority 
does today.  Under the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
statements of the victim to Coleman in the present case are 
admissible because they are non-testimonial statements and are 
admissible under Wisconsin's hearsay rules.6 
                                                 
5 See Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 
1168, 
1170 
(2011) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("Instead 
of 
clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of 
last resort";  "The only virtue of the Court's approach (if it 
can be misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach 
the 'fairest' result under the totality of circumstances"; 
"Unfortunately, under this malleable approach 'the guarantee of 
confrontation is no guarantee at all.'").   
6 The admissibility of non-testimonial hearsay statements is 
governed by the rules of evidence.  
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶60 In Bryant, the Supreme Court determined whether 
statements of a mortally wounded victim made to responding 
police officers were admissible hearsay statements at trial.7  
The facts of Bryant are similar to those in the present case.   
¶61 In Bryant, police officers responded to an emergency: 
a man had been shot and was lying on the ground, bleeding, next 
to his car in a gas station parking lot.  A number of police 
officers arrived on the scene, and asked the victim "what had 
happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had 
occurred."8  The victim responded with truncated answers, 
indicating "Rick" shot him, and that the shooting had occurred 
at the back door of Bryant's ("Rick's") house.  Emergency 
medical services arrived within 5 to 10 minutes of the police 
officers' arrival.  The victim's conversation with the police 
officers ended as he was treated and transported to the 
hospital, where he died within the hour. 
¶62 Based on the information police obtained from the 
victim, they left the gas station, called for backup, and 
traveled to Bryant's house.  When they arrived at the house, 
Bryant was not there; however, the officers found blood, a 
bullet on the back porch, a hole in the back door, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the present case, the circuit court concluded that the 
challenged statements were testimonial under Crawford and fell 
within the dying declaration exception to Crawford and the 
hearsay rule, Wis. Stat. § 908.045(3).   
7 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
8 Id.  Various officers arriving on the scene asked the 
victim variants on these three basic questions. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
victim's wallet and identification outside the house.  Bryant 
was eventually arrested nearly a year later. 
¶63 At trial the police officers who responded to the 
scene testified about the statements the victim made regarding 
"what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had 
occurred."9  The Supreme Court determined that the testimony was 
admissible and did not violate the defendant's right to 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment because the statements 
were non-testimonial.  The Supreme Court determined that the 
"primary purpose of" the interrogation was to enable the police 
officers to meet an ongoing emergency.  The primary purpose is 
illustrated, according to the Supreme Court, by an objective 
analysis of the informality of the encounter and the questions 
and answers of the parties.  This primary purpose led the Court 
to conclude that the statements were non-testimonial. 
¶64 The Supreme Court concluded that the analysis in 
determining whether a hearsay statement is testimonial or non-
testimonial is an objective analysis of the "primary purpose" of 
the questioning and the answering.10  This analysis "requires a 
combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant and the 
interrogator.  In many instances, the primary purpose of the 
interrogation will be most accurately ascertained by looking to 
the contents of both the questions and the answers. . . . The 
combined approach also ameliorates problems that could arise 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1160-62. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
from looking solely to one participant."11  To determine the 
"primary purpose" of an encounter, a court must "objectively 
evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the 
statements and actions of the parties."12 
¶65 When an encounter is between an individual and the 
police, the existence of an "ongoing emergency" is among the 
most important circumstances informing the primary purpose of 
the encounter.13  The existence, the scope, and the duration of 
an emergency is dependent upon the type and scope of the danger 
posed "to the victim, the police, and the public."14   
¶66 The existence of an "ongoing emergency" is, however, 
not the only factor that informs the determination of the 
primary purpose of an encounter. 
¶67 The severity of the victim's medical condition also 
plays an objective role in evaluating the primary purpose, as it 
"sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at 
all in responding to police questions . . . ."15 
¶68 Another factor is the formality (or lack thereof) of 
the encounter.  While informality does not necessarily indicate 
a lack of testimonial purpose, it is an important factor in 
determining the primary purpose of the encounter.16   
                                                 
11 Id. at 1160-61. 
12 Id. at 1156. 
13 Id. at 1157. 
14 Id. at 1162. 
15 Id. at 1159. 
16 Id. at 1160. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶69 The Supreme Court examined the encounter presented by 
the facts in Bryant objectively, analyzing the circumstances of 
the encounter and the statements and actions of the declarant 
and the interrogator, to determine the primary purpose and to 
determine whether the victim's statements were testimonial or 
non-testimonial.17 
¶70 The Bryant Court determined that the police officers 
were responding to an ongoing emergency.  The police did not 
know whether the threat was limited to the victim, whether the 
threat to the victim was over, or whether a threat to the public 
existed because a gun was used.  "At bottom, there was an 
ongoing emergency here where an armed shooter, whose motive for 
and location after the shooting were unknown, had mortally 
wounded [the victim] within a few blocks and a few minutes of 
the location where the police found [the victim]."18  
¶71 The Supreme Court then went on to consider how the 
victim's condition affected the analysis of the "primary 
purpose" of the statements that he made.  Based upon the 
victim's condition, lying on the ground of a gas station 
bleeding from a mortal gunshot wound, and upon the victim's 
short, truncated responses due in part to difficulty breathing, 
the Supreme Court determined that a person in the victim's 
condition cannot be said to have a "primary purpose" of 
                                                 
17 Id. at 1160-62. 
18 Id. at 1164. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to a 
later prosecution.19 
¶72 Similarly, the Supreme Court evaluated the statements 
and actions of the police officers.  The officers were 
responding to an emergency call.  "[T]hey did not know why, 
where, or when the shooting had occurred."20  The questions they 
asked were questions necessary to assess the situation, the 
threat to the victim and themselves, and the potential for an 
ongoing threat to the public.  The questions the officers asked 
were initial inquiries of the type that often produces non-
testimonial statements.21 
¶73 Lastly, the Supreme Court examined the informality of 
the encounter in determining the "primary purpose" of the 
statements.  The Court evaluated the statements in the case 
within a spectrum of informality bounded by a harried 911 call 
and a formal station-house interview.  
¶74 The statements in Bryant fell nearer to the harried 
911 call in Davis v. Washington22 than to the formal station-
house interview in Crawford.23  In Bryant, the Supreme Court 
determined that the officers and the victim were in a fluid 
emergency situation; there was little to no structure in the 
                                                 
19 Id. at 1165. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1166. 
22 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2004). 
23 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
questions asked, and the victim's responses were truncated and 
punctuated with his questions regarding when emergency medical 
aid would arrive.  Ultimately the Bryant Court concluded, "the 
circumstances lacked any formality that would have alerted [the 
victim] to or focused him on the possible future prosecutorial 
use of his statements."24 
¶75 Based on an objective evaluation of the circumstances 
in which the encounter occurred and the statements and actions 
of both of the parties, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
"primary purpose" of the victim's statements in Bryant was to 
enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency.  Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the statements in Bryant were 
non-testimonial and were properly admitted at trial. 
¶76 Bryant is informative for the present case.  In the 
present 
case, 
emergency 
medical 
services 
and 
the 
police 
responded to a call reporting a shooting.  Upon arriving on the 
scene, they found a man who had been shot numerous times, lying 
next to his car and bleeding.   
¶77 Marvin Coleman, a heavy equipment operator and trained 
emergency medical technician with the Milwaukee Fire Department, 
responded to the scene.  Coleman testified that upon arriving at 
the scene he recognized the car near where the victim lay as 
belonging to an acquaintance.  When he approached the victim he 
recognized him as that acquaintance.  According to Coleman's 
testimony, the victim recognized him and implored, "Please don't 
let me die, please don't let me down."  Coleman testified that 
                                                 
24 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1166. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
in response he stated, "We're not going to let you go, we'll do 
our best," and that he asked the victim, "Who did this?"   
¶78 Coleman testified that the following brief exchange 
occurred in response to that question.  The victim responded, 
"Marvin."  Marvin Coleman responded, "Who, me?" and the victim 
responded, "No, Big Headed Marvin."  
¶79 Coleman then asked the victim what had happened.  
Coleman testified that the victim responded he "was in the house 
arguing with some woman and he felt like he was lured outside 
and that's where [the shooting] happened."    
¶80 Applying the analysis used by the Supreme Court in 
Michigan v. Bryant, I conclude that the victim's statements made 
to Coleman were non-testimonial.   
¶81 The circumstances in which the encounter between the 
victim and Coleman took place are substantially similar to the 
circumstances in Bryant.  The victim was lying next to his car, 
bleeding from a mortal gunshot wound.  The distinctions in the 
circumstances of this case are that Coleman is an EMT, not a 
police officer, and Coleman was acquainted with the victim. 
¶82 These distinctions further support the conclusion that 
under an objective analysis, the primary purpose of the 
statements to Coleman was not to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to a later prosecution. 
¶83 That Coleman was an emergency medical technician, not 
a police officer, and was acquainted with the victim objectively 
increases the informality of the situation.   
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶84 Emergency medical technicians play a distinct role 
from police officers in responding to an ongoing emergency.  
However, these emergency service people (similar to police 
officers upon arriving at the scene of an emergency) must ensure 
that the scene is secure for the victim, for themselves, and for 
the public.  While emergency medical service people may not play 
the primary role in ensuring public safety in an ongoing 
emergency in which the situation is fluid and somewhat confused, 
emergency responders play a role in ensuring the safety of all 
those involved. 
¶85 The statements and actions of the declarant and 
interrogator in this encounter are also substantially similar to 
the statements evaluated by the Supreme Court in Bryant.  
Coleman asked, "Who did this?" and "What happened?"  The answers 
were "Marvin," "Big Headed Marvin," and that he was arguing with 
some woman, was lured outside, and that's when he was shot.    
¶86 Coleman's 
questions were similar to the initial 
inquires in Bryant, and under an objective evaluation of the 
"primary purpose" of the statements made by the victim, 
similarly result in a conclusion that they are non-testimonial 
statements.   
¶87 I conclude that the admission of Coleman's testimony 
in the present case did not violate the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation 
Clause; 
the 
victim's 
statements 
were 
non-
testimonial and fall within the hearsay exception. 
¶88 I turn now to the testimony of police officer Wayne 
Young.  Officer Young testified that he and his partner 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
responded to the scene of the shooting.  When they arrived, 
Officer Young's primary responsibility was to get observers out 
of the street, clearing the area around the emergency.  At the 
scene Officer Young did not approach the victim while he was 
lying on the ground. 
¶89 Officer Young was instructed to ride along with the 
victim to the hospital with the emergency medical unit.  Officer 
Young accompanied the victim into the hospital emergency 
department.  
¶90 Officer Young testified that while he was standing by 
in the emergency department, a doctor notified him that if he 
had any questions for the victim he should ask them now because 
the doctor's opinion was that the victim was not going to 
survive the gunshot injuries. 
¶91 Officer Young testified that he spoke with the victim, 
asking him if he had "any information about who may have shot 
him."  Officer Young testified that the victim responded 
"Marvin" and gave a brief description of "dark complected, bald 
headed guy with a big forehead." 
¶92 Officer Young testified that the victim then lost 
consciousness and was taken to surgery, where he ultimately 
succumbed to the gunshot injuries.       
¶93 The statements and actions of Officer Young and the 
victim did not go beyond the initial inquiry of who may have 
shot the victim.   
¶94 The informalities of the situation suggest that the 
primary purpose of the interrogator was not focused on possible 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
future prosecutorial use of the statements.  The questions and 
answers were given in a harried, informal way.  There was no 
structure to the questions asked.  Officer Young asked an open-
ended initial inquiry question and the statements in response 
gave little detail or information.  These informalities suggest 
a purpose of meeting the ongoing emergency, that is, a shooter 
at large, potentially not satisfied that the victim was not yet 
dead, and potentially a danger to the public or hospital staff.  
The informalities of the encounter suggest the primary purpose 
was not prosecutorial.   
¶95 An emergency response to a potentially mortal shooting 
is a fluid environment of competing priorities.  Objectively, 
prosecution of the killer may also have been an ancillary factor 
to Officer Young's questioning.  The encounter between the 
victim and Officer Young occurred at the hospital and not at the 
scene of the shooting, after significant time had lapsed.  
Officer Young asked questions knowing that the victim was likely 
to die.  An objective analysis might lead one to conclude that 
the primary purpose of the questions and answers in the hospital 
just prior to the victim's undergoing surgery was not to meet an 
"ongoing emergency" and instead was testimonial, focused on 
prosecution. 
¶96 The distinctions between the circumstances surrounding 
the encounter between Officer Young and the victim in this case 
and the encounter analyzed in Bryant are that Officer Young's 
encounter with the victim did not occur upon arrival at the 
scene of an ongoing emergency, but rather after significant time 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
had passed, and that the encounter occurred within a hospital 
emergency department removed from the crime scene.   
¶97 In Bryant, the Supreme Court did not have to determine 
when the "ongoing emergency" ended; statements made within the 
first few minutes of the arrival of emergency services, near the 
location of the shooting, and well before the scene of the 
shooting was secure fell well within the bounds of an "ongoing 
emergency."25  In the present case, statements made to Coleman, 
the EMT, upon his arrival at the scene of the shooting similarly 
fall within the bounds of an "ongoing emergency."  Statements 
made to Officer Young are more difficult to categorize. 
¶98 I refrain, however, from determining whether the 
victim's statements to Officer Young were testimonial or non-
testimonial, a closer call.  And I refrain from determining 
whether 
testimonial 
dying 
declarations 
are 
a 
historical 
exception to the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause.  These 
determinations are not necessary to decide the present case. 
Officer Young's testimony was repetitive of Coleman's testimony.  
Even 
if 
the 
victim's 
statements 
to 
Officer 
Young 
were 
testimonial hearsay and even if the dying declaration exception 
is not recognized, the admission of Young's testimony was 
harmless error.  
¶99 For these reasons, I do not join the majority in 
creating an exception to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
confrontation, an exception not yet recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court, and I concur.  
                                                 
25 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165. 
No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
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No.  2009AP806-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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