Title: Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 76819 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12462
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 1, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12462 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 76819 & others1  vs.  
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 3, 2018. - August 1, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Burden 
of proof.  Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Hearing, 
Burden of proof, Standard of proof.  Evidence, Sex 
offender, Burden of going forward, Presumptions and burden 
of proof.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Motion to 
dismiss, Presumptions and burden of proof, Standard of 
proof.  Supreme Judicial Court, Jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 10, 2017. 
 
 
The case was reported by Gants, C.J. 
 
 
 
Christopher M. Bova (William H. Burke, Special Assistant 
Attorney General, also present) for the defendant. 
                     
 
1 John Does, Sex Offender Registry Board Nos. 293109, 22306, 
21890, 1719, 208025, 3687l, 21916, 11751, 645, 22023, 5165, 
34293, 20594, 37783, 54040, 6063, 96160, 7320, 11596, 151563, 
276695, 35451, 31337, and 156025; and Alexander H., intervener. 
2 
 
 
 
Eric B. Tennen (Kate A. Frame & Andrew S. Crouch also 
present) for the plaintiffs. 
 
John Reinstein, for the intervener, was present but did not 
argue. 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In this companion case to Noe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 
Mass.     (2018) (Noe No. 5340), we consider the burden and 
quantum of proof in cases in which sex offenders seek 
termination of their duty to register under the State's sex 
offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.  We also 
address the requirement imposed on the Sex Offender Registry 
Board (board) to hold hearings in reclassification and 
termination proceedings requested by the sex offender within a 
reasonable amount of time.  Finally, we address various other 
procedural and jurisdictional questions raised by the parties. 
 
The plaintiffs, sex offenders seeking reclassification or 
termination of their duty to register, sought relief from a 
single justice of this court, challenging both the board's 
allocation of the burden of proof in these proceedings and the 
board's failure to timely conduct offender-initiated 
reclassification and termination hearings.  The board moved to 
dismiss the petition and complaint, arguing that the single 
justice did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.  The board 
3 
 
 
further contended that its delay was justified by its duty to 
prioritize other cases, pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178K (3), and 
its interest in the resolution of the pending Noe No. 5340 
litigation. 
 
The single justice reserved and reported to the full court 
so much of the case as involved the board's motion to dismiss.  
Additionally, the single justice reserved and reported the 
following question:  "What is the quantum of proof required at a 
hearing where a sex offender requests reclassification or 
termination of his or her status as a registered sex offender?" 
 
For the reasons discussed below, the motion to dismiss is 
denied.  Additionally, for substantially the reasons discussed 
in Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    , we conclude that due process 
requires that the appropriate quantum of proof in termination 
proceedings, as in reclassification proceedings, is clear and 
convincing evidence, and that the burden is imposed on the 
board, not the sex offender.  The sex offender does, however, 
retain an initial burden of production to introduce evidence of 
changed circumstances showing that he or she "does not pose a 
risk to reoffend or a danger to the public."  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.30(1) (2016).  We further conclude that such hearings 
on reclassifications and terminations must take place within a 
4 
 
 
reasonable period of time after the issuance of the rescript in 
this case.2 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Statutory scheme.  Under the sex 
offender registry law, an individual convicted of an enumerated 
sex offense may be required to register as a sex offender in the 
Commonwealth.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E.  Offenders are classified 
in one of three levels depending on their risk of reoffense and 
degree of dangerousness.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2).  A sex 
offender is classified as level one where "the board determines 
that the risk of reoffense is low and the degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public is not such that a public 
safety interest is served by public availability" of 
registration information.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a).  A sex 
offender is classified as level two where "the board determines 
that the risk of reoffense is moderate and the degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public is such that a public safety 
interest is served by public availability of registration 
information."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).  A sex offender is 
classified as level three where "the board determines that the 
risk of reoffense is high and the degree of dangerousness posed 
to the public is such that a substantial public safety interest 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services in support of the plaintiffs. 
5 
 
 
is served by active dissemination" of registration information.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c). 
 
Pursuant to the sex offender registry law, the board 
prepares a recommended classification for each sex offender.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  If an offender objects to the board's 
recommendation, he or she is entitled to request an evidentiary 
hearing for a final determination as to his or her registration 
and classification.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1) (a), (2).  The 
sex offender registry law requires that the hearing officer 
"determine by a preponderance of evidence such sex offender's 
duty to register and final classification."  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (2).  In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 311 (2015) (Doe No. 
380316), this court concluded that the statutory provision 
requiring only a preponderance of the evidence to determine an 
offender's duty to register and classification level violated 
the offender's procedural due process rights.  We held that the 
board was instead constitutionally required to prove the 
appropriateness of an offender's initial classification by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Id. 
 
No sooner than three years after initial classification, an 
offender may seek to be reclassified at a lower level.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(a) 
(2016).  After our decision in Doe No. 380316, the board amended 
6 
 
 
its regulations to require that offenders prove the 
appropriateness of downward reclassification by clear and 
convincing evidence, rather than a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(c).  Today, in Noe 
No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    , we held that the regulation placing 
the burden of proof on the offender in downward reclassification 
hearings violated the offender's procedural due process rights.  
We concluded that the burden of proof must remain with the board 
to prove the appropriateness of an offender's existing 
classification by clear and convincing evidence.  See id.  The 
offender does, however, have an initial burden of production to 
provide "new information" of a decreased risk of reoffense or 
degree of dangerousness.  See id.; G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3). 
 
At least ten years after initial classification, an 
offender may seek to have his or her duty to register 
terminated.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178G.  Here, we are confronted 
with the question of the appropriate quantum and burden of proof 
in the context of such termination hearings.  Pursuant to G. L. 
c. 6, § 178G: 
"A person required to register with the sex offender 
registry board may make an application to said board to 
terminate the obligation upon proof, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the person has not committed a 
sex offense within ten years following conviction, 
adjudication or release from all custody or supervision, 
whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a danger to 
the safety of others." 
 
7 
 
 
To answer the reported question from the single justice, we must 
determine whether placing the burden of proof on an offender in 
termination hearings, by clear and convincing evidence, is in 
violation of procedural due process. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Reported question.  For substantially 
the same reasons outlined in our decision in Noe No. 5340, we 
now conclude that the appropriate quantum of proof in 
termination proceedings is also clear and convincing evidence 
and that the burden is imposed on the board.  We further 
conclude, as we did in Noe No. 5340, that the offender retains 
an initial burden of production to provide new evidence.  In so 
doing, we balance "the private interests affected, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional or 
substitute safeguards, and the governmental interests involved."  
Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 311, quoting Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90, 
100 (1998) (Doe No. 972). 
 
i.  Private interests.  As we stated in Doe No. 380316, 473 
Mass. at 311, the private interests at stake in sex offender 
registration and classification are significant.  A sex offender 
faces "increasingly stringent affirmative reporting 
requirements" and is "likely to confront stigma and legal 
restrictions that will make it harder for him to find stable 
8 
 
 
housing or employment, and may even face threats of physical 
harm."  Id. 
 
Although an offender who is already registered is in a 
different position from that of an individual who has not yet 
registered, the private interests at stake remain significant.  
See Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    .  The sex offender registry 
law requires sex offenders to register annually.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178F.  Such registration information is transmitted to 
local law enforcement where the offender lives and works, as 
well as law enforcement where the offender attends an 
institution of higher learning.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2); 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.05(9) (2016).  The information is also 
disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and may also 
be provided to numerous State agencies.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.05(9)(c).  In other words, 
"the Commonwealth [is required] annually to inform local and 
Federal law enforcement officers that, in its view, [the 
offender] presents a risk of committing a sex offense," despite 
any subsequent conduct to the contrary (emphasis in original).  
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 790-791 (2008).  A sex offender's continued 
duty to register thus remains "a continuing, intrusive, and 
humiliating regulation of the person himself."  Doe v. Attorney 
Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997) (Fried, J., concurring).  
9 
 
 
Accordingly, sex offenders seeking termination of their 
continued duty to register, and the significant consequences 
that follow from such registration, have substantial privacy and 
liberty interests at stake. 
 
ii.  Risk of erroneous deprivation.  As we stated in Noe 
No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    , "the risk of erroneous 
classification and deprivation remains in reclassification 
proceedings and . . . that risk must continue to be borne by the 
government."  Therefore, in reclassification proceedings the 
ultimate burden of proof must remain with the board to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the existing classification 
is current and correct.  Id.  See Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 
313, quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) 
(offenders "should not be asked to share equally with society 
the risk of error" in initial classification proceedings).  We 
further concluded, however, that there is a burden of production 
on the offender seeking reclassification to demonstrate some 
change in his or her circumstances indicating a reduced risk of 
reoffense or degree of dangerousness, as he or she is in the 
best position to provide such evidence.  Noe No. 5340, supra at    
.  The same essential reasoning applies to terminations as well. 
 
Termination, like reclassification, is not "a mere 
continuation of the original classification" proceedings, 
designed to verify the board's initial determination.  Id. at    
10 
 
 
.  An offender may not apply for termination unless the offender 
"has not committed a sex offense within ten years following 
conviction, adjudication or release from all custody or 
supervision, whichever is later."  G. L. c. 6, § 178G.  
Subsequent requests for termination may be made three years 
after the board has denied the last motion for termination.  See 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.30(9).  Thus, at minimum, a sex 
offender only becomes eligible to apply for termination ten 
years after his or her initial offense. 
 
By including a decade-long waiting period for initial 
termination requests, the Legislature recognized that an 
offender may no longer pose a danger to others after the passage 
of such a significant period of time.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178G.  
See also 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(29), (30), (31) (2016) 
(recognizing that likelihood of recidivism and dangerousness 
decreases with additional offense-free time in community, 
advanced age, and debilitating illness).  This ten-year waiting 
period is significantly longer than the three-year 
reclassification waiting period that we concluded amounted to a 
"significant passage of time and thus a meaningful waiting 
period" in Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    .  Over the course of 
ten years, it is even more possible that an offender has 
undergone a significant change in his or her degree of 
dangerousness than over the course of three years.  Thus, rather 
11 
 
 
than a continuation of the original classification hearing, a 
termination hearing is an independent proceeding designed to 
determine whether an offender currently poses a danger to the 
safety of others, taking into account this significant passage 
of time and the new evidence provided by the offender.  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
472 Mass. 475, 483 (2015). 
 
Given that passage of time, the production of new evidence 
by the sex offender, and the difficulty of assessing an 
offender's degree of dangerousness, there is a risk of erroneous 
classification.  See Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    .  As we have 
concluded in Doe No. 380316 and Noe No. 5340, that risk must be 
borne by the government.  Placing the burden of proof on the 
board by clear and convincing evidence, as is necessary in 
original classification and reclassification hearings, 
appropriately reduces the risk of erroneous deprivation.  See 
Noe No. 5340, supra at    ; Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 311-
314. 
Offenders do have a burden of production to show a change 
in circumstances indicating that they do not pose a risk to 
reoffend or a danger to the public.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.30(1).  Placing the burden of proof on the board and the 
burden of production on the offender seeking termination further 
minimizes the risk of error.  See Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    
12 
 
 
.  Offenders are in the best position to provide such 
information and thus have a duty to do so if they want their 
registration requirement terminated. 
 
iii.  Government interests.  The State has a public safety 
interest in protecting "children and other vulnerable people 
from recidivistic sex offenders."  Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 
313, quoting Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 103.  In passing the sex 
offender registry law, the Legislature found "the danger of 
recidivism posed by sex offenders, especially sexually violent 
offenders who commit predatory acts characterized by repetitive 
and compulsive behavior, to be grave and that the protection of 
the public from these sex offenders is of paramount interest to 
the government."  St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.  That government 
interest is best accomplished, however, by accurately 
classifying each offender.  See Soe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 252997 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 391 
(2013). 
 
In Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    , we stated that the 
"government interest in accurate classifications applies equally 
to reclassifications and to original classifications."  So too 
does that interest apply to termination hearings.  A sex 
offender's continued duty to register, despite no longer posing 
a risk to reoffend or a danger to the public, "distracts the 
public's attention from those offenders who pose a real risk of 
13 
 
 
reoffense, and strains law enforcement resources."  Doe No. 
380316, 473 Mass. at 313-314.  See Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 107 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As 
observed in an altogether different context but oddly apropos of 
this classification system as well, 'when everything is 
classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes 
one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless'" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
iv.  Balancing.  Balancing the factors specified above, we 
conclude that the significant private interests at stake, the 
need to avoid erroneous classification, and the government's own 
overarching interest in accurate classification require that the 
burden of proof remain with the board in termination hearings.  
In balancing these factors in Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 314-
315, we determined that procedural due process required that the 
board have the burden of proving the appropriateness of an 
offender's initial classification by clear and convincing 
evidence.  We reached this conclusion in Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. 
at    , with regard to reclassification hearings, so long as the 
offender satisfies his or her initial burden of production to 
establish changed circumstances justifying reclassification, and 
we reach the same conclusion here as to termination hearings. 
 
An individual's ongoing duty to register as a sex offender 
implicates significant liberty and privacy interests for as long 
14 
 
 
as the individual is required to register as a sex offender.  
Applying a clear and convincing evidence standard, with the 
burden on the board, throughout the classification, 
reclassification, and termination process provides "greater 
certainty that the burdens placed on [the offender] . . . are 
warranted," by providing greater protection against erroneous 
classification.  Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 314.  The 
government's public safety responsibilities are also best served 
by accurate classification, not overclassification, which "both 
distracts the public's attention from those offenders who pose a 
real risk of reoffense, and strains law enforcement resources."  
Id. at 313-314. 
Accordingly, we conclude that G. L. c. 6, § 178G, 
unconstitutionally places the burden of proof in termination 
hearings on the sex offender.  Procedural due process requires 
that the burden of proof remain with the board to demonstrate 
the continued appropriateness of the offender's duty to 
register, by clear and convincing evidence.  See Noe No. 5340, 
480 Mass. at    ; Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 314-315.  The 
offender's burden is only one of production, to introduce 
credible evidence of changed circumstances demonstrating that he 
or she is no longer a risk to public safety. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, and for the reasons stated 
in our decision in Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. at    , we answer the 
15 
 
 
reported question as follows:  the quantum of proof required at 
a hearing where a sex offender requests reclassification or 
termination of his or her status as a registered sex offender is 
clear and convincing evidence, with the burden of proof on the 
board.  An offender seeking reclassification has a burden of 
production to show a change in circumstances indicating that the 
offender poses a decreased risk of reoffense or degree of 
dangerousness.  Id.  An offender seeking termination has a 
burden of production to show a change in circumstances 
indicating that the offender no longer poses a risk to reoffend 
or a danger to the public. 
 
b.  Motion to dismiss.  In addition to the reported 
question, the single justice also reported this case to the full 
court on the motion to dismiss.  "Factual allegations are 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss if they plausibly 
suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief."  A.L. Prime 
Energy Consultant, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 479 
Mass. 419, 424 (2018).  See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 
Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 557 (2007) ("What is required at the pleading stage 
are factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting [not merely 
consistent with]' an entitlement to relief").  The board's 
motion to dismiss asserts lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
16 
 
 
and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.  We 
address each argument in turn. 
 
i.  Subject matter jurisdiction.  Although the parties 
disagree over the grounds on which this court has subject matter 
jurisdiction, there is no question that this case is properly 
before us.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, this court "may on 
appropriate proceedings make binding declarations of right, 
duty, status and other legal relations sought thereby."  See 
generally Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 600 
(2014) (single justice reserved and reported complaint seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief to full court).  More 
particularly, we have previously held that declaratory relief is 
the proper mechanism for challenging the constitutionality of 
the board's regulations.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 629 (2011) 
("A challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation of 
general application is appropriately presented as an action for 
declaratory judgment").  Additionally, pursuant to G. L. c. 214, 
§ 1, the Supreme Judicial Court has "original and concurrent 
jurisdiction of all cases and matters of equity cognizable under 
the general principles of equity jurisprudence."  Thus, the 
17 
 
 
plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are 
properly before this court.3 
 
ii.  Failure to state a claim.  Under the sex offender 
registry law, reclassification hearings must be conducted "in a 
reasonable time."  G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3).  The board's 
regulations further require that sex offenders must be provided 
with notification of the board's reclassification or termination 
decision "as soon as practicable."  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.30(8)(a), 1.31(7)(a).  General Laws c. 6, § 178K (3), also 
                     
 
3 While the amended complaint focuses largely on declaratory 
and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs continue to argue for 
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, as well as for mandamus under 
G. L. c. 249, § 5, both in their opposition to the board's 
motion to dismiss and in their brief to the full court.  The 
board argues on appeal that the plaintiffs are foreclosed from 
seeking relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, or G. L. c. 249, § 5.  
We agree.  Our superintendence authority under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, "is to be used sparingly, and 'should be exercised only in 
exceptional circumstances and where necessary to protect 
substantive rights in the absence of an alternative, effective 
remedy.'"  MacDougall v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 505, 510 
(2006), quoting Soja v. T.P. Sampson Co., 373 Mass. 630, 631 
(1977).  Similarly, a claim seeking mandamus under G. L. c. 249, 
§ 5, "does not lie if any other effective remedy exists."  
County Comm'rs of Middlesex County v. Sheriff of Middlesex 
County, 361 Mass. 89, 90–91 (1972).  Here, the plaintiffs have 
other available remedies, namely declaratory and equitable 
relief, and thus are not entitled to relief under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, or G. L. c. 249, § 5.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 629 
(2011) ("A challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation of 
general application is appropriately presented as an action for 
declaratory judgment").  Further, G. L. c. 211, § 3, only 
empowers us to exercise superintendence over "courts of inferior 
jurisdiction," not executive agencies. 
18 
 
 
creates a specific prioritization scheme for conducting initial 
classifications that the board must follow.4 
 
Subsequent to our decision in Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 
314 n.26, hundreds of initial classification proceedings then 
pending before the board, the Superior Court, and the appellate 
courts were remanded to the board to apply the appropriate 
quantum of proof.  In light of our ruling, and the board's 
statutory duty to prioritize certain cases under G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (3), the board "triaged" its caseload, prioritizing this 
backlog of initial classifications.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (3).  
Less than two years later, when the Superior Court judge in the 
case underlying Noe No. 5340 declared that placing the burden of 
proof on offenders in reclassification hearings was 
unconstitutional, the board elected not to resume 
                     
 
4 General Laws c. 6, § 178K (3), provides in relevant part: 
 
"The sex offender registry board shall make a 
determination regarding the level of risk of reoffense and 
the degree of dangerousness posed to the public of each sex 
offender listed in said sex offender registry and shall 
give immediate priority to those offenders who have been 
convicted of a sex offense involving a child or convicted 
or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or as a youthful 
offender by reason of a sexually violent offense or of a 
sex offense of indecent assault and battery upon a mentally 
retarded person pursuant to [G. L. c. 265, § 13F], and who 
have not been sentenced to incarceration for at least 
[ninety] days, followed, in order of priority, by those sex 
offenders who (1) have been released from incarceration 
within the past [twelve] months, (2) are currently on 
parole or probation supervision, and (3) are scheduled to 
be released from incarceration within six months." 
19 
 
 
reclassification hearings pending a definitive resolution of 
that case by this court.  As of February, 2018, approximately 
1,115 sex offenders were waiting for a hearing on their request 
for downward reclassification or termination.5 
 
On appeal, the board argues that the plaintiffs' claims for 
equitable relief must be dismissed because the board was 
lawfully acting within its own discretion in prioritizing 
initial classification hearings and awaiting the outcome of Noe 
No. 5340 before resuming reclassification or termination 
hearings. 
 
We recognize the practical constraints placed on the board 
by our decision in Doe No. 380316, as well as the board's 
interest in awaiting the outcome of Noe No. 5340 before 
reinitiating reclassification and termination hearings, which 
may otherwise have to be remanded to the board to apply a 
different quantum or burden of proof.  Further, we recognize the 
board's statutory mandate to prioritize particular hearings 
under G. L. c. 6, § 178K (3).  However, Noe No. 5340 has now 
been decided and the board properly conceded at oral arguments 
that it has worked through the backlog generated by Doe No. 
380316, with only a "handful" of those cases left.  Thus, the 
                     
 
5 Downward reclassification hearings constituted 12.8 per 
cent of the total number of hearings conducted by the board in 
2014; 23.7 per cent of the hearings conducted in 2015; and 1.8 
per cent of the hearings conducted in 2016. 
20 
 
 
reasons cited by the board for failing to conduct offender-
initiated reclassification and termination hearings no longer 
exist.  More importantly, a significant backlog of such hearings 
has been created with lengthy delays for individual offenders, 
some of whom have waited over four years for a hearing.  Given 
this backlog, and the lengthy delays for individual offenders, 
we conclude that the motion to dismiss is properly denied. 
 
We do not consider the "reasonable time" standard to be a 
rigid one; rather, it requires a "fair consideration of the 
total circumstances of the case."  School Comm. of Boston v. 
Board of Educ., 363 Mass. 20, 28 (1973).  However, it does not 
provide the board with unfettered discretion to delay offender-
initiated reclassification and termination hearings, 
particularly given that the Doe No. 380316 backlog no longer 
exists and Noe No. 5340 has now been decided.  The board must 
promptly begin to confront this large backlog of offender-
initiated reclassification and termination hearings, and conduct 
such hearings in a reasonable time after the issuance of this 
rescript.  The board shall report to the single justice on its 
plan for addressing this backlog within thirty days from 
issuance of this rescript.  The single justice shall determine 
whether the plan satisfies the reasonable time standard and, if 
it does not, shall issue appropriate orders to ensure compliance 
with that standard, consistent with this opinion. 
21 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
claims is denied.  The case is remanded to the single justice 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, as 
appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.