Title: State v. Jackson
Citation: 144 Ariz. 53, 695 P.2d 742
Docket Number: 6451-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 1985

144 Ariz. 53 (1985) 695 P.2d 742 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert JACKSON, Appellant. No. 6451-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 25, 1985. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and Jack Roberts, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Storrs &amp; Storrs by Robert L. Storrs, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. We granted defendant's petition for review of a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, to answer only one question: whether it is error in a criminal case to fail to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt following closing arguments, when the jury has been previously instructed prior to the taking of evidence. Defendant was charged with burglary and theft with one prior conviction. After the jury was selected and sworn, the trial judge gave preliminary instructions to the jury including an instruction on reasonable doubt. At the close of evidence, even though requested by the defendant, the trial judge ruled that because she had previously instructed the jury on basic matters of law including reasonable doubt, she would not repeat that instruction. Instead, *54 she gave only those additional instructions not previously given. Counsel for the defendant in closing argument referred extensively to the reasonable doubt instruction previously given. The matter was then submitted to the jury. All instructions, both those given prior to the taking of evidence and those given prior to submission, were reduced to writing and given to the jury together with the forms of verdict. The jury took the instructions into the jury room for reference during their deliberation. Citing State v. McVay, 127 Ariz. 450, 622 P.2d 9 (1980), the Court of Appeals held that it was error not to reinstruct the jury on the State's burden of proof but that the matter was not reversible error. As the Court of Appeals pointed out: We agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. Their decision was a memorandum decision pursuant to Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 17A A.R.S., and as such was unpublished. We granted the petition for review to reaffirm in a published opinion, for the guidance of all judges in the state, our position that certain basic instructions, including a reasonable doubt instruction, must be given by the court following closing arguments even though the jury had been previously instructed prior to the receipt of evidence. There is nothing wrong with instructing the jurors as to reasonable doubt or other basic legal principles for their guidance prior to the receipt of evidence. Indeed, Rule 18.6(c) provides "[i]mmediately after the jury is sworn, the court shall instruct the jury concerning its duties, its conduct, the order of proceedings, and the elementary legal principles that will govern the proceeding." Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. An instruction on burden of proof prior to the receipt of evidence can be helpful to the jury and is not to be discouraged. However, closing jury instructions may not be dispensed with simply because they have been given prior to the receipt of evidence. Our rules provide first: Rule 19.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. Second: Rule 21.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. Rules 19.1(a) and 21.2 when read together indicate that the judge should instruct the jury at the end of the evidence and oral argument. Instructing the jury at the close of the trial emphasizes the instruction's importance. Instructions given at the end of the trial just before the jury begins to deliberate will make more of an impression on the jury than those given prior to the receipt of the evidence. This is especially true when there has been a long trial. In such cases, failure to give the instructions could be reversible error. We *55 agree with a previous statement of the Court of Appeals: State v. Marquez, 135 Ariz. 316, 322, 660 P.2d 1243, 1249 (App. 1983). Admittedly, this Court has held in State v. Kinkade, 140 Ariz. 91, 94, 680 P.2d 801, 804 (1984), that such error is not fundamental and, therefore, can be waived by the defendant's failure to object. See also State v. Jackson, 139 Ariz. 213, 216, 677 P.2d 1321, 1324 (App. 1983). In this case, the defendant did object and it was error not to instruct. As stated above, we granted review to reaffirm the law that basic fundamental instructions must be given at the close of the evidence. We need not reverse, however, because we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to instruct at the end of the trial did not influence the verdict of the jury. This is the test whether the error is denominated harmless as dealing with constitutional error or prejudicial as dealing with nonconstitutional error. State v. McVay, supra, 127 Ariz. at 453, 622 P.2d at 12. The decision of the Court of Appeals is approved and the convictions, judgments and sentences are affirmed. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.