Title: Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 102359
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2012

1 
 
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II,  
IN HIS CAPACITY AS  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 102359 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
March 2, 2012 
RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
The threshold issue in this case is whether the University 
of Virginia is a "person" under the Virginia Fraud Against 
Taxpayers Act (FATA or Act), Code §§ 8.01-216.1 through -
216.19.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it is 
not. 
I.  Background 
 
This case arises from two Civil Investigative Demands 
(CIDs) issued to the University of Virginia and the Rector and 
Visitors of the University of Virginia (collectively, UVA) by 
Attorney General Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, pursuant to FATA.  
The CIDs sought information relating to the research of climate 
scientist Dr. Michael Mann, who taught at UVA from 1999 to 
2005.  While employed by UVA, Dr. Mann received a series of 
grants to fund his research on climate change. 
Amidst allegations that some climate scientists had 
falsified data to indicate a dramatic upturn in the earth's 
2 
 
surface temperatures as a result of the use of fossil fuels, 
the Attorney General launched a FATA investigation into the 
grants Dr. Mann received while employed by UVA.  The Attorney 
General issued two CIDs pursuant to Code § 8.01-216.10(A), one 
to the University and one to its Rector and Visitors.*  The 
content of the CIDs was identical.  In relevant part, each CID 
provided: 
 
This [CID] is issued in connection with an 
investigation by the Attorney General into possible 
violations by Dr. Michael Mann of §§ 8.01-
216.3(A)(1), (2), and (3) of FATA.  The investigation 
relates to data and other materials that Dr. Mann 
presented in seeking awards/grants funded, in whole 
or in part, by the Commonwealth of Virginia or any of 
its agencies as well as data, materials and 
communications that Dr. Mann created, presented or 
made in connection with or related to the following 
awards/grants. 
 
The CID then went on to list five grants, each of which was on 
Dr. Mann's curriculum vitae.  Four of the grants were funded by 
the federal government and one was funded by UVA. 
 
UVA petitioned the circuit court to set aside the CIDs, 
arguing, among other things, that the Attorney General had no 
statutory authority to serve CIDs upon agencies of the 
Commonwealth and that the CIDs were defective in that they 
failed to state the nature of the conduct alleged.  The circuit 
                     
 
* At oral argument, counsel for both sides agreed that, for 
the purposes of this case, the entities were one and the same; 
Deputy Attorney General Wesley G. Russell, Jr., explained that 
UVA had been served with process under both titles merely to be 
thorough and avoid error. 
3 
 
court issued a letter opinion rejecting UVA's position that it 
was not subject to FATA investigations, finding that UVA is "a 
proper subject for a CID and the Attorney General may 
investigate grants made with Commonwealth of Virginia funds to 
professors such as Dr. Mann."  The circuit court also 
concluded, however, that the CIDs were unlawful because they 
failed to comply with FATA's requirement that CIDs "state the 
nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation of 
[FATA] that is under investigation."  Code § 8.01-216.11.  The 
circuit court therefore granted UVA's petition and set aside 
the CIDs, without prejudice. 
 
The Attorney General appeals, asserting several 
assignments of error, and UVA assigns cross-error to the 
circuit court's conclusion that UVA constitutes a "person" 
under FATA and is thus subject to CIDs under the Act. 
II.  Discussion 
We will first address UVA's assignment of cross-error 
because it is a dispositive threshold issue:  if UVA is not a 
"person" under FATA, then it cannot be the proper subject of a 
CID, and the Court need not consider the Attorney General's 
assignments of error.  See, e.g., DurretteBradshaw, P.C. v. MRC 
Consulting, L.C., 277 Va. 140, 142 n.*, 670 S.E.2d 704, 705 n.* 
(2009) (declining to address non-dispositive assignments of 
error where a dispositive assignment of error is addressed). 
4 
 
A. 
Standard of Review and Applicable Principles 
 of Statutory Construction 
Whether the University is a "person" under FATA is a 
question of statutory interpretation.  As such, it " 'presents 
a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo 
review by this Court.' "  Warrington v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 
365, 370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010) (quoting Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008)). 
 
When construing a statute, our primary objective is " 'to 
ascertain and give effect to legislative intent,' " as 
expressed by the language used in the statute.  Commonwealth v. 
Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418, 706 S.E.2d 879, 882 (2011) (quoting 
Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 702 S.E.2d 117, 118 
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  " 'When the 
language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language.' "  Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 
347, 349, 706 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. 
Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 
S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007)).  And if the language of the statute 
" 'is subject to more than one interpretation, we must apply 
the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent 
behind the statute.' "  Id. at 349-50, 706 S.E.2d at 862 
(quoting Conyers, 273 Va. at 104, 639 S.E.2d at 178). 
5 
 
In evaluating a statute, moreover, we have said that 
"consideration of the entire statute . . . to place its terms 
in context to ascertain their plain meaning does not offend the 
rule because 'it is our duty to interpret the several parts of 
a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to 
effectuate the legislative goal.' "  Eberhardt v. Fairfax 
County Employees' Retirement System Board of Trustees, 283 Va. 
190, 194-95, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2012) (quoting Virginia 
Electric & Power Co. v. Board of County Supervisors, 226 Va. 
382, 387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983)).  Thus, " '[a] statute 
is not to be construed by singling out a particular phrase.' "  
Id. at 195, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (quoting VEPCO, 226 Va. at 388, 
309 S.E.2d at 311). 
We apply these principles of statutory construction to the 
issue raised by UVA in its assignment of cross-error. 
B. 
Definition of "Person" under FATA 
 
Pursuant to FATA, the Attorney General may serve a CID 
upon "any person" whom he has "reason to believe . . . may be 
in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material 
or information relevant to a false claims law investigation."  
Code § 8.01-216.10.  For purposes of FATA, a "person" is 
defined as "any natural person, corporation, firm, association, 
organization, partnership, limited liability company, business 
or trust."  Code § 8.01-216.2.  Because this definition does 
6 
 
not specifically include the agencies of the Commonwealth, UVA 
contends that it is not a "person" under FATA and therefore is 
not subject to CIDs.  Conversely, because the General Assembly 
has indicated elsewhere in the Code that UVA is a corporation, 
and this Court has so held, the Attorney General argues that 
the definition necessarily includes UVA.  See Code § 23-69 
("The board of visitors of the University of Virginia shall be 
and remain a corporation."); Phillips v. Rector & Visitors of 
the University of Virginia, 97 Va. 472, 475, 34 S.E. 66, 67 
(1899) ("[UVA,] from its foundation, has been wholly governed, 
managed, and controlled by the State through a corporation 
created for the purpose, under the style 'The Rector and 
Visitors of the University of Virginia,' which is a public 
corporation."). 
Because UVA is indeed a public corporation, and the term 
"corporation" can be found in the definition of a "person" 
under FATA, Code § 8.01-216.2, the circuit court ended its 
investigation at this juncture.  We find that this conclusion 
ignored several significant reasons why "person" in Code 
§ 8.01-216.2 cannot properly be read to include agencies of the 
Commonwealth. 
1. Commonwealth Agencies and Statutes 
 of General Applicability 
 
7 
 
It is well-settled law that Commonwealth agencies are not 
bound by statutes of general application "no matter how 
comprehensive the language, unless named expressly or included 
by necessary implication."  Commonwealth ex. rel. Pross v. 
Board of Supervisors of Spotsylvania County, 225 Va. 492, 494, 
303 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1983) (emphasis added).  This "ancient 
rule of statutory construction" has been "consistently applied 
by this Court for more than a century."  Id.  See, e.g., 
Whiteacre v. Rector, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 714, 716 (1878) ("It is 
old and familiar law . . . that where a statute is general, and 
any . . . interest is diverted or taken from the king, . . . 
the king shall not be bound unless the statute is made by 
express words or necessary implication to extend to him."); 
Levasser v. Washburn, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 572, 577 (1854) 
("[L]egislative acts are intended to regulate the acts and 
rights of citizens; and it is a rule of construction not to 
embrace the government or effect its rights by the general 
rules of a statute, unless it be expressly and in terms 
included or by necessary and unavoidable implication."). 
The Commonwealth has conceded that Code § 8.01-216.2 is a 
statute of general applicability.  And we have consistently 
held that UVA is an arm or agency of the Commonwealth.  Rector 
& Visitors of the University of Virginia v. Carter, 267 Va. 
242, 245, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004) (referring to UVA as an 
8 
 
agency of the Commonwealth); James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 51, 282 
S.E.2d 864, 868 (1980) (noting that UVA is an "agency of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia . . . entitled to the protection of 
the immunity of the state.").  The same is true of other state 
universities.  See, e.g., George Mason University v. Floyd, 275 
Va. 32, 37, 654 S.E.2d 556, 558 (2008).  Other courts have 
agreed with our construction.  See, e.g., Wilson v. University 
of Virginia, 663 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (W.D. Va. 1987) ("It 
cannot be disputed that the University of Virginia is an arm of 
the state entitled to eleventh amendment protection.").  The 
Virginia Administrative Code also lists UVA as an 
administrative agency.  8 VAC 85.  Finally, the consistent 
position of the Attorney General's opinions has been that state 
universities are Commonwealth agencies, with all the benefits 
and obligations that accompany such status, including 
exemptions from statutes of general applicability.  See, e.g., 
1983 Op. Atty. Gen. 381 ("Generally, the State and its agencies 
are not bound by any statute, unless the statute in express 
terms is made to extend to the State.  Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University is a State agency for purposes 
of the State's general exemption from statutory and local 
requirements." (internal citations and footnote omitted)). 
In Richard L. Deal & Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 224 
Va. 618, 620, 299 S.E.2d 346, 347 (1983), the Court 
9 
 
specifically applied this principle to a statute utilizing the 
term "person."  There, an agency of the Commonwealth refused to 
abide by an arbitration provision of a contract on the ground 
that it could not be bound by such a clause.  The plaintiff 
argued that the Commonwealth was bound by the provision because 
it was a "person" authorized to enter into an arbitration 
agreement under Code § 8.01-577.  The Court disagreed, holding 
that "the sovereign is a person or party within the intendment 
of a statute only when the General Assembly names it expressly 
or by necessary implication."  Id. 
Code § 8.01-216.2, the definitional portion of FATA, 
contains no express inclusion of the Commonwealth in its 
definition of "person."  Nor do we find the term "corporation" 
to be sufficient to expressly include corporate agencies of the 
Commonwealth such as public universities.  This conclusion is 
evidenced by the incongruity that would be introduced into the 
Code as a whole, beyond FATA, by affirming the circuit court's 
interpretation.  The Code is replete with definitions of 
"person" that include the term "corporation" but do not 
otherwise include governmental entities.  See, e.g., Code 
§§ 4.1-401 (Wine Franchise Act), 5.1-89 (Air Carriers), 6.2-
2200 (Motor Vehicle Title Loans), 10.1-1000 (Cave Protection 
Act).  The General Assembly has also demonstrated throughout 
the Code its ability to define the term "person" to include 
10 
 
governmental bodies when it so intended.  See, e.g., Code 
§§ 5.1-1 (Aircraft, Airmen, and Airports Generally), 6.2-100 
(Financial Institutions and Services, General Provisions), 
8.01-412.9 (Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act), 
10.1-560 (Erosion and Sediment Control Law).  The General 
Assembly could have defined "person" accordingly in Code 
§ 8.01-216.2.  Since the General Assembly has expressly 
included the Commonwealth and its agencies when the General 
Assembly so intended and expressly excluded the Commonwealth 
and its agencies elsewhere in the Code, we cannot find that 
FATA expressly includes UVA under its definition of "person" 
merely because the definition includes corporations.  See, 
e.g., Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 268 Va. 641, 654, 604 
S.E.2d 403, 408 (2004) (stating that, when the legislature 
omits language from one statute that it has included in 
another, courts may not construe the former statute to include 
that language, as doing so would ignore "an unambiguous 
manifestation of a contrary intention" of the legislature). 
We do observe the express use of the term "agency" 
elsewhere in FATA:  the word "agency" appears in the definition 
of "Commonwealth" in Code § 8.01-216.2, and an express 
reference to "agency" can be found in Code § 8.01-216.8, a 
section of FATA addressing certain actions that are barred, 
relief from employment discrimination, and waiver of sovereign 
11 
 
immunity in the case of retaliatory action.  Because neither of 
these references pertains directly to a "person" under the 
statute, we find that they do not constitute the type of 
express reference required by this Court in Deal.  If anything, 
the use of the term "agency" elsewhere in the Act lends greater 
strength to our belief that the General Assembly would have 
expressly included the term "agency" in the definition of 
"person," had it been intended.  We operate from the basic 
principle of statutory construction that, when the General 
Assembly opts to invoke two different terms within the same 
act, "those terms are presumed to have distinct and different 
meanings."  Industrial Development Authority of Roanoke v. 
Board of Supervisors of Montgomery County, 263 Va. 349, 353, 
559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002).  The express use of the word 
"agency" in Code § 8.01-216.8 implies that, had the General 
Assembly intended its definition of "person" in Code § 8.01-
216.2 to encompass agencies, it would have done so, rather than 
use the term "corporation," which applies to some arms of the 
Commonwealth but not all. 
We likewise reject the Attorney General's claim that UVA 
is swept into the definition of "person" by necessary 
implication.  A necessary implication is "[a]n implication so 
strong in its probability that anything to the contrary would 
be unreasonable."  Black's Law Dictionary 822 (9th ed. 2009).  
12 
 
The Attorney General's argument for a "necessary implication" 
amounts to a policy preference for CIDs as an investigatory 
tool.  The language of the Act still functions without 
including Commonwealth agencies within the statute's definition 
of corporations.  We therefore do not find that Commonwealth 
agencies are included by "necessary implication." 
We recognize that the third paragraph in Code § 8.01-216.8 
seems to address a private party bringing an action against a 
Commonwealth agency.  See Ligon v. County of Goochland, 279 Va. 
312, 318, 689 S.E.2d 666, 669-70 (2010) (involving a 
retaliatory discharge claim made by an employee against the 
county pursuant to Code § 8.01-216.8).  This raises the 
possibility that the General Assembly intended agencies to be 
persons under Code § 8.01-216.3 (the false claims provision).  
The less-than-clear statement of Code § 8.01-216.8, however, 
occurs outside of the primary portions of FATA addressing 
definitional terms, false claims, and CIDs.  None of these 
primary sections make reference to Commonwealth agencies as 
persons and all function more coherently – as discussed in Part 
II.B, infra – when construed otherwise.  We do not find that 
this one anomalous phrase creates such a strong implication as 
to render any other interpretation unreasonable. 
In sum, neither by express language nor by necessary 
implication does FATA provide the Attorney General with 
13 
 
authority to issue CIDs to Commonwealth agencies.  We remain 
unconvinced that this statute of general applicability was 
intended to apply to corporate bodies that are arms of the 
Commonwealth. 
2. Functional Incongruity within the Statute 
As we have previously held, evaluation of the plain 
meaning of a statute permits the consideration of the 
legislative act as a whole.  Eberhardt, 283 Va. at 194-95, ___ 
S.E.2d. at ___.  We recognize that functional inconsistencies 
exist in some portion of FATA when "person" is always construed 
to include Commonwealth agencies as well as when it is never 
construed to include Commonwealth agencies.  Given this 
unfortunate conflict, we are left to select the definition that 
best refines the Act "as a consistent and harmonious whole so 
as to effectuate the legislative goal."  VEPCO, 226 Va. at 387-
88, 309 S.E.2d at 311.  The following functional incongruities, 
however, caused by defining a Commonwealth agency as a 
"person," do superior damage to FATA as a whole.  Accordingly, 
we decline to include agencies in the definition. 
The definitional portion of FATA in Code § 8.01-216.2 
applies to all subsequent portions of the Act.  As a result, 
the "person" subject to CIDs under Code § 8.01-216.10 is 
defined in the same way as the "person" "liable to the 
Commonwealth" under the false claims provision in Code § 8.01-
14 
 
216.3.  As UVA notes, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity 
subjecting the Commonwealth to the false claims provision.  An 
agency cannot be a "person" "liable to the Commonwealth" when 
there has been no express waiver of sovereign immunity in the 
statute. 
There is an express waiver of sovereign immunity in FATA 
in Code § 8.01-216.8, in the context of discrimination 
protection from retaliation for employees of the Commonwealth 
who report violations of FATA.  The express waiver there only 
serves to highlight the absence of such a waiver in other parts 
of the Act.  In its 2011 amendment, the General Assembly 
specifically chose to attach the sovereign immunity waiver only 
to the retaliatory discharge portion of Code § 8.01-216.8, and 
not to the other portions of the statute. 
FATA also separately defines "Commonwealth" in Code 
§ 8.01-216.2 as the "Commonwealth of Virginia, any agency of 
state government, and any political subdivision of the 
Commonwealth."  As we have said, UVA is unambiguously an agency 
of the Commonwealth.  Carter, 267 Va. at 245, 591 S.E.2d at 78.  
As a result, under the circuit court's ruling, UVA fits under 
the definitions of both "person" and "Commonwealth" in FATA. 
 
This is again inconsistent with the principle, discussed 
supra, that, "[w]hen the General Assembly uses two different 
terms in the same act, those terms are presumed to have 
15 
 
distinct and different meanings."  Industrial Development 
Authority, 263 Va. at 353, 559 S.E.2d at 623.  The consequence 
is no mere blunder in statutory construction.  Defining a 
corporate-form agency of the Commonwealth under the term 
"Commonwealth" in one definition and "person" in a separate 
definition in Code § 8.01-216.2 introduces functional 
incongruity into FATA. 
Code § 8.01-216.5(A) allows a "person" to bring a civil 
action for FATA violations "for the person and for the 
Commonwealth . . . in the name of the Commonwealth."  The 
Commonwealth may then intervene and proceed with the action, 
although the "person" may continue as a party subject to 
certain limitations.  Code §§ 8.01-216.5(B) and -216.6(A).  The 
provisions of Code §§ 8.01-216.5 through -216.8 repeatedly 
treat the "person" that initially brought the private action as 
a separate entity from the "Commonwealth."  This distinction is 
lost if, as the circuit court held, the term "person" is 
construed as including agencies of the Commonwealth. 
In addition, as not all Commonwealth agencies are 
corporations, reading "corporations" to include UVA would 
produce the inexplicable and awkward result that state agencies 
operating as public corporations are subject to FATA while 
other arms of the Commonwealth are not.  We find it unlikely 
that the General Assembly intended such a result.  In light of 
16 
 
the multiple inconsistencies raised by such an interpretation, 
we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend Code 
§ 8.01-216.2 to include agencies of the Commonwealth in its 
definition of "person." 
3. Noscitur a Sociis 
Finally, the principle of noscitur a sociis – that a word 
is known by the company it keeps – suggests that the term 
"corporation" in FATA excludes governmental agencies: 
The maxim of noscitur a sociis provides that the 
meaning of doubtful words in a statute may be 
determined by reference to their association with 
related words and phrases.  When general words and 
specific words are grouped together, the general 
words are limited and qualified by the specific words 
and will be construed to embrace only objects similar 
in nature to those objects identified by the specific 
words. 
 
Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 319, 585 S.E.2d 780, 784 (2003).  
The definition of "person" in Code § 8.01-216.2 includes 
"natural person" and a list of similarly related entities: 
"corporation, firm, association, organization, partnership, 
limited liability company, business or trust."  Accompanied by 
these other terms, "corporation" should be understood as a 
similarly oriented private sector entity, and not as 
encompassing an agency of the Commonwealth. 
C.   Other Issues 
 
As a result of this Court's conclusion that UVA is not a 
"person" under the statute, we need not reach the assignments 
17 
 
of error raised by the Attorney General.  Because the statute 
does not give the Attorney General authority to issue CIDs to 
UVA, all other issues are rendered moot. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court setting aside the CIDs, but, unlike the circuit 
court, we set aside the CIDs with prejudice, on the different 
ground that the University of Virginia, as an agency of the 
Commonwealth, does not constitute a "person" under the Fraud 
Against Taxpayers Act and therefore cannot be the proper 
subject of a CID.  Accordingly, we enter final judgment here in 
favor of the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. 
Affirmed and final judgment. 
 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
 
Like the majority, I would affirm the circuit court's 
judgment granting the petition filed by the Rector and 
Visitors of the University of Virginia (UVA) to set aside the 
Attorney General's Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) served 
upon UVA pursuant to Code § 8.01-216.10 of the Virginia Fraud 
Against Taxpayer's Act (FATA) (Code §§ 8.01-216.1 through -
216.19).  Unlike the majority, however, I would affirm the 
circuit court in issuing its judgment without prejudice.  I 
disagree with the majority's threshold determination that UVA, 
18 
 
as an agency of the Commonwealth, is exempt from FATA – which 
is the majority's rationale for setting aside the CIDs with 
prejudice. 
 
Concluding that UVA is subject to the Attorney General's 
investigative authority under FATA, I would affirm the circuit 
court on its finding that the CIDs were facially deficient, 
but only on the ground that they were deficient in "stat[ing] 
the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation" 
of FATA that was under investigation, as expressly required by 
Code § 8.01-216.11.  I would reject the circuit court's 
holding that the CIDs were also required to contain the 
Attorney General's "reason to believe" that UVA was in 
possession of material or information relevant to that 
investigation under the terms of Code § 8.01-216.10(A), as I 
read no such requirement in the statute. 
I. Application of FATA to UVA 
 
FATA is enforceable by both the Attorney General and 
private citizens.  Under Code § 8.01-216.4, the Attorney 
General is given the authority to investigate a FATA violation 
and bring a civil action under FATA against an alleged 
violator implicated in the investigation.  To aid the Attorney 
General in conducting the investigation, Code § 8.01-216.10 
authorizes the Attorney General to issue CIDs, which may 
require the recipient to produce documentary material, answer 
19 
 
written interrogatories and/or give oral testimony.  Under 
Code § 8.01-216.5, a private citizen may also bring a FATA 
civil action "in the name of the Commonwealth," subject to a 
number of conditions and restrictions. 
 
Code § 8.01-216.8, in turn, sets forth limits on the 
circuit court's jurisdiction to adjudicate certain actions 
initiated by private citizens under FATA.  In carving out 
those limitations, the statute, in my opinion, plainly evinces 
the General Assembly's intent to bring the agencies of the 
Commonwealth within the scope of the investigative and civil 
enforcement provisions of FATA, subject to the statute's 
jurisdictional limitations.  Code § 8.01-216.8 provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action 
brought under this article against any department, 
authority, board, bureau, commission, or agency of 
the Commonwealth, any political subdivision of the 
Commonwealth, a member of the General Assembly, a 
member of the judiciary, or an exempt official if 
the action is based on evidence or information known 
to the Commonwealth when the action was brought. For 
purposes of this section, "exempt official" means 
the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General 
and the directors or members of any department, 
authority, board, bureau, commission or agency of 
the Commonwealth or any political subdivision of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  By the express terms of this provision, 
the only limit specifically placed upon the institution of a 
FATA civil action against an agency of the Commonwealth is 
20 
 
where the action is initiated by a private citizen based "on 
evidence or information known to the Commonwealth when the 
action was brought."  Id.  FATA imposes no such jurisdictional 
limitation on actions initiated by the Attorney General.  This 
means, in my opinion, that the Attorney General may bring a 
FATA action against an agency of the Commonwealth in the same 
manner that the Attorney General may do so against any other 
person or entity alleged to have presented a false claim in 
violation of FATA under Code § 8.01-216.3(A).1  To interpret 
Code §§ 8.01-216.3(A) and -216.8 otherwise would mean that a 
                     
 
1 Code § 8.01-216.3(A), in setting forth the elements of a 
FATA violation, provides in relevant part, as follows: 
 
A. Any person who: 
 
 
1. Knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment 
or approval; 
 
 
2. Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement material to a 
false or fraudulent claim; 
 
 
3. Conspires to commit a violation of 
subdivision 1 [or] 2 . . .  
 
 
shall be liable to the Commonwealth for a civil 
penalty of not less than $ 5,500 and not more than $ 
11,000, plus three times the amount of damages 
sustained by the Commonwealth. 
 
 
A person violating this section shall be liable 
to the Commonwealth for reasonable attorney fees and 
costs of a civil action brought to recover any such 
penalties or damages. All such fees and costs shall 
be paid to the Attorney General's Office by the 
2 
 
private citizen could do what the Attorney General could not 
do in terms of initiating a FATA action against the numerous 
entities and individuals, including agencies of the 
Commonwealth, listed in Code § 8.01-216.8 as quoted above.  
And, yet, the Attorney General, in acting for the 
Commonwealth, could then proceed with such action initiated by 
a private citizen.  See Code §§ 8.01-216.5 and -216.6.  Such 
an interpretation of these statutes would lead to this absurd 
result, which the General Assembly surely did not intend.  As 
this Court has repeatedly stated, in the context of statutory 
construction, "[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a 
statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or 
strained construction, and a statute should never be construed 
in a way that leads to absurd results."  Meeks v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Because an agency of the Commonwealth falls within the 
definition of the term "[a]ny person" in Code § 8.01-216.3(A) 
under my reading of this statute in conjunction with Code 
§ 8.01-216.8, it follows, I believe, that the Attorney General 
                                                                 
defendant and shall not be included in any damages 
or civil penalties recovered in a civil action based 
on a violation of this section.  
 
(Emphasis added.) 
  
3 
 
has the authority to serve a CID on UVA, as an agency of the 
Commonwealth, based on an application of the same definition of 
the term "any person" under Code § 8.01-216.10(A).  Pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-216.10(A), the Attorney General may serve a CID 
upon "any person" that the Attorney General "has reason to 
believe . . . may be in possession, custody, or control of any 
documentary material or information relevant to a [FATA] 
investigation."  In short, I would apply the same definition to 
the term "any person" as it appears in both Code § 8.01-
216.3(A) and Code § 8.01-216.10(A), and that term would include 
UVA as an agency of the Commonwealth. 
My reading of Code § 8.01-216.10 is indeed dictated by its 
common sense application.  If the legislature intended to allow 
the Attorney General to bring a FATA action against an agency 
of the Commonwealth, the legislature undoubtedly intended to 
grant the Attorney General the authority to obtain relevant 
investigative information from an agency of the Commonwealth 
through the issuance of a CID to the agency, whether the object 
of the investigation was the agency or some third party.  See 
McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 287, 292, 99 S.E.2d 623, 627-
28 (1957) (explaining that "in the construction of a statute 
the court will look to the whole body of the Act to determine 
the true intention of each part. All of its parts must be 
examined so as to make it harmonious if possible.").  
4 
 
Furthermore, this interpretation of Code § 8.01-216.10 is 
bolstered by the fact that, pursuant to Code § 8.01-216.4, the 
filing of a FATA civil action by the Attorney General must be 
predicated upon an investigation conducted by the Attorney 
General into whether a violation of Code § 8.01-216.3 has 
occurred.  See Code § 8.01-216.4 ("The Attorney General shall 
investigate any violation of Code § 8.01-216.3. If the Attorney 
General finds that a person has violated or is violating 
§ 8.01-216.3, the Attorney General may bring a civil action 
under this section.").  Thus, the Attorney General would be 
required to conduct an investigation into a possible FATA 
violation involving a state agency before bringing a FATA civil 
action against the agency or a third party.  To do so, the 
Attorney General, no doubt, would have to obtain information 
from the agency, as in the instant case, and the CID would be 
the Attorney General's primary means of obtaining that 
information under FATA's statutory scheme.2 
For these reasons, in my judgment, UVA is not exempt from 
the Attorney General's authority to issue CIDs pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-216.10. 
II. Evaluation of CIDs Issued to UVA 
                     
 
2 Nine of the nineteen statutes comprising FATA (Code 
§§ 8.01-216.10 through -216.18) address the substance and 
utilization of the CID under this statutory scheme.   
5 
 
Because I would hold that the Attorney General was 
authorized to issue CIDs to UVA, I would proceed, as did the 
circuit court, to review the CIDs at issue for their conformity 
to FATA's substantive requirements.  The review must be 
limited, however, to determining the facial validity of the 
CIDs since there was no evidentiary hearing on UVA's petition 
to set aside the CIDs. 
Code § 8.01-216.11 provides that each CID "shall state the 
nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation of a 
false claims law that is under investigation, and the 
applicable provision of law alleged to be violated."  The CIDs 
before us for review state that they were "issued in connection 
with an investigation by the Attorney General into possible 
violations by Dr. Michael Mann of [Code] §§ 8.01-216.3(A)(1), 
(2), and (3) of FATA."   They further provide that "[t]he 
investigation related to data and other materials that Dr. Mann 
presents in seeking awards/grants funded, in whole or in part, 
by the Commonwealth of Virginia or any of its agencies as well 
as data, materials and communications that Dr. Mann created, 
presented or made in connection with or related to [five 
specifically identified] awards/grants . . . ."  I agree with 
the circuit court that this description failed to sufficiently 
describe "the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged 
violation[s]," as required by Code § 8.01-216.11.  That is, it 
6 
 
did not sufficiently state what the Attorney General suspected 
Dr. Mann did that was "false or fraudulent" in violation of 
Code § 8.01-216.3(A). 
I disagree with the circuit court, however, in its 
interpretation and application of Code § 8.01-216.10(A) in 
relation to the court's review of the sufficiency of the CIDs.  
As previously noted, subsection A of the statute provides that, 
"[w]henever the Attorney General . . . has reason to believe 
that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of 
any documentary material or information relevant to a [FATA] 
investigation," the Attorney General may issue a CID to such 
"person" and require this recipient to produce documentary 
material, answer written interrogatories and/or give oral 
testimony.  In an alternative ruling, the circuit court held 
that, under the terms of Code § 8.01-216.10(A), the CIDs issued 
to UVA were defective on their face because they did not set 
forth the Attorney General's "reason to believe" that UVA was 
in possession of material or information pertaining to the 
subject investigation.  I would reject this holding as there is 
no requirement in Code § 8.01-216.10 or any other provision of 
FATA that the CID must contain the Attorney General's "reason 
to believe" that the recipient of the CID possesses such 
material or information.  The statutory requirements under FATA 
7 
 
for what must be contained in a CID are limited to Code § 8.01-
216.11.3 
I would thus affirm the circuit court's judgment setting 
aside the CIDs issued by the Attorney General to UVA, but, 
unlike the majority, I would do so without prejudice. 
 
                     
 
3 UVA indicates that the circuit court relied upon yet an 
additional ground for holding that the CIDs were defective, 
which was purportedly the circuit court's determination that 
the Attorney General could not investigate the four "federal 
grant funds" from the total of five grants listed in the CIDs 
because FATA only applies to funds provided by the 
Commonwealth.  I do not believe the circuit court so held, as 
the circuit court only postulated in its letter opinion that, 
"[i]f the Attorney General and [UVA] agree that the first four 
listed grants are federal grants, this [c]ourt supports the 
position of [UVA] that the Attorney General should not be able 
to investigate these grants . . . ."  In any event, the limited 
record in this case cannot support a decision on that issue.  
Without knowing the specific nature of those grants, no ruling 
could be made as to whether or not they were subject to FATA.