Title: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12638
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2019

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SJC-12638 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 7, 2019. - May 28, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 8, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to reconsider sentencing was heard by Thomas P. 
Billings, J., and a question of law was reported by him to the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Steven J. Rappaport for the defendant. 
 
Howard P. Blatchford, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a 
large capacity feeding device, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (m), as well as carrying a firearm without a license and 
related offenses.  As relevant here, the defendant was 
2 
 
 
sentenced, over the Commonwealth's objection, to a term of from 
one to two and one-half years' imprisonment following his 
conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  In a motion for 
reconsideration, the Commonwealth sought a sentence of at least 
two and one-half years.  The judge then reported the following 
question to the Appeals Court: 
"May a defendant who has been convicted of possession of a 
large capacity feeding device, in violation of [G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (m)], lawfully be sentenced to State [p]rison 
for not less than one year nor more than two and one-half 
years?" 
 
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004).  We 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion, and now 
answer the reported question, "Yes." 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The indictments arose from an 
incident in June 2015, in which the defendant brandished a gun 
at another driver and then drove off before police arrived.  
Sergeant Marisol Nobrega of the Lowell police department 
responded to a report of the incident. Based on a general 
description of the man and the vehicle involved, she located and 
arrested the defendant.  Under a floor mat in the defendant's 
vehicle, police found a firearm with one round in the chamber 
and a large capacity (twelve-shot) feeding device attached.  The 
defendant did not have a license to possess a firearm in 
Massachusetts. 
3 
 
 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  In December 2015, the defendant was 
indicted on charges of possession of a large capacity feeding 
device, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m) (count 1); possession of a 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (count 2); 
possession of a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) 
(count 3); and possession of ammunition without a firearm 
identification card (FID), G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (count 4).  
Following his guilty pleas, he was sentenced to a term of from 
one to two and one-half years in State prison on count 1; 
eighteen months in a house of correction on count 2, concurrent 
with count 1; and one day in a house of correction on count 3, 
from and after the sentence on count 2 and concurrent with 
count 1.  Count 4 was placed on file. 
 
2.  Discussion.  General Laws c. 269, § 10 (m), provides, 
in relevant part: 
"[A]ny person not exempted by statute who knowingly has in 
his possession, or knowingly has under his control in a 
vehicle, a large capacity weapon or large capacity feeding 
device therefor who does not possess a valid Class A or 
Class B license to carry firearms . . . shall be punished 
by imprisonment in a [S]tate prison for not less than two 
and one-half years nor more than ten years.  The possession 
of a valid firearm identification card issued under 
[§] 129B shall not be a defense for a violation of this 
subsection; provided, however, that any such person charged 
with violating this paragraph and holding a valid firearm 
identification card shall not be subject to any mandatory 
minimum sentence imposed by this paragraph.  The sentence 
imposed upon such person shall not be reduced to less than 
one year, nor suspended, nor shall any person convicted 
under this subsection be eligible for probation, parole, 
furlough, work release or receive any deduction from his 
4 
 
 
sentence for good conduct until he shall have served such 
minimum term of such sentence . . . .  Prosecutions 
commenced under this subsection shall neither be continued 
without a finding nor placed on file." 
 
 
The Superior Court judge who reported this case aptly 
characterized this imperfect statute as "vexing."  The Appeals 
Court in separate opinions observed that it was "no grammatical 
paragon," Commonwealth v. Semegen, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 480 
(2008), and branded it as "confusing," after having "caused 
courts some consternation."  Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 72 Mass. 
App. Ct. 485, 493 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1183 (2009).  
We cannot disagree. 
 
Looking first at the ordinary meaning of the statutory 
language, Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584, 586 (2002), as we 
do to discern the Legislature's intent in enacting it, 
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 777 (2017), citing 
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, 167 (2017), we see that 
the first provision states that "any person" convicted under it 
"shall be punished by imprisonment in a [S]tate prison for not 
less than two and one-half years nor more than ten years."  
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  The second provision in effect then 
creates two categories of felon:  those who do (FID-card-holding 
felons) and those who do not hold valid FID cards (non-FID-card-
holding felons).  Those who do "shall not be subject to any 
mandatory minimum sentence imposed by this paragraph."  Id. 
5 
 
 
So far so good; if the paragraph ended there, the two 
provisions might readily be reconciled, as our case law would 
permit us to view the sentencing range of "not less than two and 
one-half years nor more than ten years," id., as calling for a 
mandatory minimum sentence of two and one-half years applicable 
to "any person" other than a valid FID card holder.1  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 776 (2000); Commonwealth 
v. Claudio, 418 Mass. 103, 109 (1994). 
Of course, the paragraph has three, not two provisions, the 
third one bearing yet more of the hallmarks of a mandatory 
minimum sentence than the first.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
369 Mass. 904, 905 n.1, 916-920 (1976) (construing language 
comparable to that in third provision of G. L. c. 269, § 10 [m], 
as creating mandatory minimum sentence).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Cowan, 422 Mass. 546, 548-549 (1996).  This is the locus of 
the conundrum.  See Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 302 
(2014) ("Where the words of the statute are ambiguous, we strive 
to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with 
common sense and sound reason and consistent with legislative 
intent" [quotation and citation omitted]).  See also Morgan, 476 
                     
 
1 Insofar as it is extremely unlikely that the Legislature 
meant an FID card to act as a "get out of jail free" card, we 
take it that a sentencing judge, to the extent legally 
permissible, would have discretion to sentence an FID-card-
holding felon to a sentence ranging presumably from probation to 
no more than ten years in State prison. 
6 
 
 
Mass. at 777, citing 2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction § 46:5 (7th ed. rev. 2014) ("We do not 
confine our interpretation to the words of a single section"). 
 
The third provision of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), states that 
"[t]he sentence imposed upon such person shall not be reduced to 
less than one year, nor suspended, nor shall any person 
convicted under this subsection be eligible for probation, 
parole, furlough, work release or receive any deduction from his 
sentence for good conduct until he shall have served such 
minimum term of such sentence."  "Such person" arguably could 
mean one of the felons holding FID cards referred to in the 
second provision, but this would be nonsensical.  See G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (m).  To the extent that the third provision 
properly is deemed a mandatory minimum sentence, felons holding 
FID cards are not subject to such a sentence by virtue of the 
second provision.2  Thus, if the third provision is a mandatory 
minimum sentence, "such person" refers to "any person," namely, 
                     
 
2 Even if the third provision were not viewed as setting 
forth a mandatory minimum sentence, it would not make sense to 
say "such person" refers to FID card holders while the first 
provision and its term "any person" refers to only non-FID-card 
holders.  That would mean that only FID card holders, and not 
their non-FID-card-holding counterparts, would be subject to the 
restrictions set out in the third provision, namely, no 
eligibility for probation, parole, or furlough, or to receive 
good conduct credits until after having served a term of at 
least one year of incarceration in State prison.  This would 
contravene the legislative intent to treat FID card holders 
favorably, as set forth in the second provision. 
7 
 
 
the same non-FID-card-holding felons to whom the first provision 
also applies.  The issue turns on whether the first and third 
provisions each provide for mandatory minimum sentences, albeit 
different ones, each applicable to the same non-FID-card-holding 
felons. 
 
It would be considerably less daunting a task were we to 
regard either the first or the third provision as not calling 
for a mandatory minimum sentence, since the clear minimum 
sentence then would be either two and one-half years or one 
year.  But we have little doubt that both the first and third 
provisions call for mandatory minimum sentences that are, by 
virtue of the second provision, applicable only to non-FID-card 
holders.3  No case of which we are aware has a statute containing 
                     
 
3 It is true, however, that in some cases, we have 
determined that, absent the word "mandatory," statutory language 
cannot impose a mandatory minimum sentence that is not subject 
to judicial discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Hines, 449 Mass. 
183, 191 (2007) (rejecting contention that statute imposes 
mandatory minimum prison sentence of five years in absence of 
word "mandatory"); Commonwealth v. Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 
718-719, 721 (1984) (declining to interpret statutory language 
that judge "shall" impose five-year sentence and $5,000 fine as 
precluding judicial discretion in absence of word "mandatory"); 
note 4, infra.  See also Boston v. Quincy Mkt. Cold Storage & 
Warehouse Co., 312 Mass. 638, 646–647 (1942), quoting Swift v. 
Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, 276 (1932) ("The 
word 'shall' as used in statutes, although in its common meaning 
mandatory, is not of inflexible signification and not 
infrequently is construed as permissive or directory in order to 
effectuate a legislative purpose").  In none of these cases was 
there a minimum and maximum sentencing range set forth, as here. 
 
8 
 
 
both a provision setting out a full sentencing range -- here, a 
minimum of two and one-half years and maximum of ten years -- as 
required by G. L. c. 279, § 24, and a subsequent provision 
requiring a lesser but more stringent sentence to be served, 
without exception, in prison.4  Harmonizing the provisions in a 
                     
 
In any event, if the first provision does not create a 
mandatory minimum sentence but the third provision does, the 
non-FID-card holder would be subject to the one-year mandatory 
minimum sentence of the third provision.  The FID card holder 
then would be subject to the sentencing range set forth in the 
first provision, but without any of the restrictions set forth 
in the third provision.  See note 2, supra. 
 
 
4 In Lightfoot, 391 Mass. at 718-719, we considered a 
statute that appeared to contain two different mandatory minimum 
sentences.  The first sentence of G. L. c. 272, § 7, which 
prohibited deriving support from a prostitute, mandated that a 
person convicted under it "shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the [S]tate prison for a period of five years and by a fine of 
[$5,000]."  The second provision set out a significantly shorter 
sentence that also appeared to be a mandatory minimum:  "[t]he 
sentence of imprisonment imposed under this section shall not be 
reduced to less than two years, nor suspended, nor shall any 
person convicted under this section be eligible for probation, 
parole, or furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence 
for good conduct or otherwise until he shall have served two 
years of such sentence."  Id. 
 
 
We concluded that the words "shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for a period of five years 
and by a fine of [$5,000]" in the first provision did not create 
a mandatory minimum sentence that was not subject to a judge's 
discretion.  Lightfoot, 391 Mass. at 721.  We noted in that 
regard that the language did not include the word "mandatory."  
Id.  We determined further, however, that language in the second 
provision ("shall not be reduced to less than two years"), in 
conjunction with the requirement that the sentence not 
be "suspended, nor shall any person convicted under this section 
be eligible for probation, parole, or furlough or receive any 
deduction from his sentence for good conduct or otherwise until 
he shall have served two years of such sentence" did create a 
9 
 
 
manner that does not make any of the statutory language 
superfluous, that sees the statute as a whole without internal 
contradiction, and that renders the legislation consistent with 
common sense, all as the Legislature intended, is quite the job 
with this statute.  See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 
368 (2012), quoting DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 
Mass. 486, 491 (2009) ("Where possible, we construe the various 
provisions of a statute in harmony with one another, recognizing 
that the Legislature did not intend internal contradiction"); 
Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. 
Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618 (1967) ("[n]one of the words of a 
statute is to be regarded as superfluous, but each is to be 
given its ordinary meaning without overemphasizing its effect 
upon the other terms appearing in the statute" [citation 
omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620, 623–
                     
mandatory minimum term of two years.  Id.  In conformance with 
the statutory mandate in G. L. c. 279, § 24, that a minimum and 
a maximum sentence must be imposed for all convictions under 
G. L. c. 272, § 7, we concluded that § 7 established a minimum 
sentence of two years and a maximum sentence of five years.  See 
Lightfoot, supra. 
 
 
The language at issue in the third provision of G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (m), with its requirement that the sentence "shall 
not be reduced" and its restrictions on parole, probation, 
furloughs, and good conduct credits until such minimum term has 
been served, is very similar to the second provision of G. L. 
c. 272, § 7.  Nonetheless, here, we are confronted with what 
appear to be two different mandatory minimum sentences and one 
maximum sentence. 
10 
 
 
624 (2012) (rejecting interpretation that would have rendered 
one word, "with," superfluous); Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 
Mass. 507, 511 (2012), quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 136, 140 (1998) (interpreting 
statute "so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that 
no part will be inoperative or superfluous"). 
 
The legislative history, while interesting, is only 
minimally helpful in resolving the issue at hand.  General Laws 
c. 269, § 10, was enacted in 1906, see St. 1906, c. 172, and was 
amended in 1935 to reflect the Federal ban on fully automatic 
weapons contained in the National Firearms Act of 1934, see St. 
1935, c. 290.  Sixty years later, in 1994, the Federal Public 
Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, also known 
as the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, was enacted.5  In it, 
Congress defined the term "large capacity ammunition feeding 
device," and made the transfer and possession of such devices 
unlawful.6  See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(31) (repealed in 2004 pursuant 
to sunset provision).  In 1998, Massachusetts adopted a version 
                     
 
5 Under that act, however, semiautomatic weapons were 
permissible, so the size of a weapon's magazine ultimately 
determined the impact of discharging it.  See A. Winkler, 
Gunfight:  The Battle Over the Right to Bear Arms in America 37 
(2011). 
 
 
6 Feeding devices were much simpler to define, and easier to 
recognize on visual inspection, than the myriad types of 
firearms, legal and otherwise, that could be defined as 
"semiautomatic." 
11 
 
 
of the Federal weapons ban by adding G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  
See St. 1998, c. 180, § 70. 
 
Contemporaneously with these Federal and State efforts to 
keep firearms out of the hands of unsuitable individuals, in 
1993, the Legislature enacted the "truth-in-sentencing" act.  
See St. 1993, c. 432.  That comprehensive act was intended to 
ensure that defendants actually served at least the minimum 
terms of imprisonment to which they were sentenced.7  Presented 
as a "get tough on crime" bill, the most significant and widely 
discussed provision of the truth-in-sentencing act was to 
eliminate so-called "Concord" sentences, which were intended to 
allow rehabilitation for young, first-time offenders.8  See 
Brown, 431 Mass. at 778-779; St. 1993, c. 432, § 20; State House 
                     
7 Then Governor William Weld introduced the bill on June 3, 
1993, following public outrage at the release from prison of a 
former professor, who admitted to having bludgeoned a prostitute 
to death, after having served only nine years of his twenty-year 
sentence.  See State House News Service, June 3, 1993; 1993 
House Doc. 5682 (1994). 
 
 
8 Concord sentences allowed judges to sentence someone to a 
lengthy term, for example of twenty years, and order that the 
sentence be served at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution 
at Concord, where the person could be released on parole after 
approximately eighteen months.  See State House News Service, 
Apr. 6, 1994.  Where a defendant sentenced to the same term 
served the sentence at a different State prison, on the other 
hand, the defendant would be eligible for parole after twelve 
years.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 778-779 
(2000); St. 1993, c. 432, § 20; State House News Service, June 
3, 1993.  Thus, by their terms, every Concord sentence 
effectively established a form of split sentence. 
12 
 
 
News Service, June 8, 1993.  The truth-in-sentencing act also 
modified provisions that had made prison inmates eligible for 
parole after having served two-thirds of their sentences, so 
that they were not eligible for parole until having served the 
entire minimum terms of their sentences; removed statutory good 
time credits; and eliminated split prison sentences.  See 
Commonwealth v. Azar, 444 Mass. 72, 78-79 (2005); Brown, supra 
at 778 n.9; G. L. c. 127, § 133, as appearing in St. 1993, 
c. 432, § 11. 
 
Given that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), was enacted only a few 
years after the truth-in-sentencing act, the Legislature could 
not have intended to establish a possible split sentence for 
everyone convicted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  Otherwise put, 
the Legislature would not have intended a sentence with one year 
to serve (the minimum set forth in the third provision), and the 
remainder suspended for one and one-half years (the remaining 
term after subtracting one year from the minimum two and one-
half years in the first provision).  Indeed, the language in the 
third provision, mandating that the sentence "imposed upon such 
person shall not be reduced to less than one year, nor 
suspended," clarifies that a split sentence was not intended. 
 
Although the statutory language remains somewhat opaque, we 
think essentially what the Legislature intended to do was to 
establish, for non-FID-card holders, a lower end of the 
13 
 
 
sentencing range of from one to two and one-half years, with at 
least one year to serve, in State prison.9  FID card holders were 
intended to be sentenced quite differently, for reasons that are 
not made clear, although inferably to recognize that those who 
possess a valid FID card have at least attempted to be more 
compliant with the gun laws.  The language of the second 
provision suggests that such attempted compliance should count 
                     
 
9 The Commonwealth argues, as an extension of Commonwealth 
v. Semegen, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 480-481 (2008), that the one-
year period in the third provision must apply to FID card 
holders only, and sentences for non-FID-card holders may not be 
less than the two and one-half years set out as the lowest of 
the sentencing range in the first provision.  But see note 3, 
supra.  The Commonwealth also contends in this regard that 
sentencing someone to a shorter period of imprisonment for 
possession of a high capacity feeding device (one year) than for 
possession of an ordinary firearm (eighteen months) produces an 
absurd result. 
 
 
We note first that, when G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), was 
enacted in 1998, the minimum sentence for possession of a 
firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), was one year.  Eight years 
later, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), was amended such that the 
mandatory minimum sentence changed from one year to eighteen 
months.  St. 2006, c. 48, § 5.  None of the other minimum 
sentences for firearms offenses was increased.  This amendment 
to § 10 (a), however, cannot be used to inform as to the 
Legislature's intent in enacting § 10 (m) eight years earlier.  
Moreover, as possession of a feeding device alone cannot result 
in a shooting, a mandatory minimum sentence for a feeding device 
that would be almost twice the length of the minimum sentence 
for possession of a firearm also could appear anomalous.  In any 
event, here, an individual unlawfully in possession of a firearm 
capable of accepting a high capacity feeding device could be 
charged separately for possession of that firearm, in addition 
to charges for possession of the feeding device.  We discern no 
absurdity. 
14 
 
 
at sentencing, even though not as a defense to the felony 
charged. 
 
Moreover, to the extent that the statute as it affects non-
FID-card holders, like the defendant, is ambiguous as to the 
minimum sentence it mandates, the rule of lenity leads to the 
same conclusion:  the lower end of the sentencing range is from 
one to two and one-half years, with at least one year to serve, 
in State prison.  See Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 167 
(2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Kerr, 409 Mass. 284, 286 (1991) 
("It is a well-established proposition that criminal statutes 
are to be construed narrowly.  We have stated that '[w]e must 
resolve in favor of criminal defendants any reasonable doubt as 
to [a] statute's meaning'").10 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the reported question, "Yes," a 
defendant who has been convicted of possession of a large 
capacity feeding device, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), 
lawfully may be sentenced to State prison for not less than one 
year nor more than two and one-half years. 
 
The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
                     
 
10 To the extent that our decision conflicts with 
Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 485, 493 (2008), 
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1183 (2009), and Semegen, 72 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 480, those cases are overruled.  Neither interpreted the 
entirety of the statute as we do here. 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.