Title: Cooper v. Bank of New Mexico
Citation: 423 P.2d 431, 77 N.M. 398
Docket Number: 7887
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1966

423 P.2d 431 (1966) 77 N.M. 398 Charles A. COOPER, John H. McDowell, Thomas Hall, Clair Miller, L.E. Meyer, Otis Campbell, Trustees of the New Mexico Pipe Trades Welfare Trust Fund, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BANK OF NEW MEXICO, a state banking corporation, Defendant-Appellant. No. 7887. Supreme Court of New Mexico. November 21, 1966. Rehearing Denied February 13, 1967. *432 Tonkin, Cotter &amp; Hendley, Albuquerque, for appellant. Knight &amp; Sullivan, Albuquerque, for appellees. CHAVEZ, Justice. This case arose from the same factual situation which gave rise to the case of Cooper v. Albuquerque National Bank, 75 N.M. 295, 404 P.2d 125. Plaintiffs-appellees, as trustees of the New Mexico Pipe Trades Welfare Trust Fund, sued defendant-appellant Bank of New Mexico, alleging that from October 14, 1953, to March 15, 1958, checks drawn payable to appellees in the amount of $14,341.76 were paid by appellant bank upon forged, unauthorized, unlawful, fraudulent or irregular endorsements; that appellees had no knowledge thereof until August 29, 1958, but that appellant knew or should have known thereof prior to said date. The question here presented is whether the trust fund administrator John A. Peke had the authority to endorse checks made payable to the New Mexico Pipe Trades Welfare Trust Fund, and/or whether he could only deposit checks so made to said trust fund into its account in the Albuquerque National Bank. Appellees contend that endorsements by the administrator to an account with appellant bank were unlawful *433 and unauthorized. Appellant bank argues that the administrator had the authority to endorse the checks for deposit and collection to an account with appellant. The trial court made the following findings of fact: Under point I, appellant argues that the trust fund administrator had actual authority to endorse checks for deposit and collection with appellant bank. This argument is based primarily upon appellant's interpretation of the language contained in the two signature cards of the Albuquerque National Bank, the first completed on November 30, 1953, and the second on January 30, 1956. Appellant contends that these cards show the authority of the administrator to endorse the checks to appellant bank. Appellant also argues that testimony of one of appellee's witnesses proved the authority of the administrator to endorse the checks by rubber stamp endorsement to appellant bank. Under point II, appellant argues that if there was no actual authority there was apparent authority. This argument is mainly supported by the citation of cases and other *435 authorities defining the term "apparent authority." Appellant has not complied with Supreme Court Rule 15(6) (§ 21-2-1(15) (6), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.), which provides: Neither has appellant attacked any of the findings of fact made by the trial court and thus said findings must be accepted by us and are the facts upon which the case rests in this court. Covington v. Rutledge Drilling Company, 71 N.M. 120, 376 P.2d 180; J.A. Silversmith, Inc. v. Marchiondo, 75 N.M. 290, 404 P.2d 122; Michael v. Bauman, 76 N.M. 225, 413 P.2d 888. Nor can appellant find any support from Alvarez v. Alvarez, 72 N.M. 336, 383 P.2d 581, where we decided that it was not necessary to copy the objectionable finding or findings. Alvarez is distinguishable because appellant, in that case, set out in his brief, with proper references to the transcript, a considerable amount of testimony clearly indicating an attack on a certain finding made by the trial court. A general attack is not sufficient. Hugh K. Gale, Post No. 2182 Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Norris, 53 N.M. 58, 201 P.2d 777. The substance of all evidence bearing on the proposition must be included, with proper reference to the transcript. Hugh K. Gale, Post No. 2182 Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Norris, supra. In the case before us, none of the trial court's findings are attacked, either by argument or point, as not being supported by substantial evidence. We can only determine if the conclusions of law find support in the findings of fact. Jontz v. Alderete, 64 N.M. 163, 326 P.2d 95; Marrujo v. Martinez, 65 N.M. 166, 334 P.2d 548. As the findings of fact stand, and such findings being supported by substantial evidence, the conclusions of law follow. There is then no issue for our consideration. The judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. NOBLE, J., and OMAN, J., Court of Appeals, concur. PER CURIAM. The point of appellant's argument was not made clear to us originally. On rehearing, appellant bank asserts that the point of its argument was that, upon the facts found by the trial court, § 33-1-4, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., relieves the bank of liability. The pertinent portion of the statute reads: The bank relies exclusively upon the italicized language above, as affording it protection in accepting the checks for deposit. It points to the trial court's finding that Peke, along with another officer, were authorized to endorse the checks, and asserts that a proper construction of the statutory language "empowered to endorse such instrument on behalf of his principal" *436 means that, if the fiduciary has any authority to endorse in any manner, the endorsee (bank) is relieved of any obligation to inquire whether the endorsee is exceeding his authority. We find the argument to be without merit. The words "empowered" and "endorse" must be construed with reference to the intention or purpose of the legislation to be derived from the whole statute. Allen v. McClellan, 75 N.M. 400, 405 P.2d 405; C. de Baca v. Baca, 73 N.M. 387, 388 P.2d 392 Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771; In re Vigil's Estate, 38 N.M. 383, 34 P.2d 667, 93 A.L.R. 1506. "Endorse," as used in the statute, means to transfer a negotiable instrument by signing one's name on the back thereof. See Webster's Third International Dictionary, p. 749. The word "empowered" means authorized. 14A Words and Phrases, p. 137. The obvious intent of the legislature in enacting § 33-1-4, supra, was to relieve the endorsee of the obligation to inquire respecting a breach of duty by a fiduciary endorser, where such fiduciary had authority to transfer the instrument by his endorsement or signature. The trial court, however, expressly found that Peke was not authorized or empowered to transfer these checks by his endorsement alone. Accordingly, the statute did not operate to relieve the bank of its obligation to inquire whether he breached his duty to his principal. The motion for rehearing is denied. It is so ordered.