Title: State v. Charles C. Downing
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP001264-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-0207-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
John C. Setagord, 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  204 Wis. 2d 275, 554 N.W.2d 683 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 6, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert R. Pekowsky 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bablitch, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Abrahamson, C.J. and Bradley, J. joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Charles G. Curtis, Jr. And Foley & Lardner, Madison and 
oral argument by Charles G. Curtis, Jr. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1264-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Charles C. Downing, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 6, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert R. Pekowsky 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bablitch, J. dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Abrahamson, C.J. and Bradley, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by Robert T. Ruth, Madison. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
Case Nos. 95-0207-CR 
 
 
96-1264-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0207-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
John C. Setagord, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 96-1264-CR 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Charles C. Downing, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
No. 95-0207-CR:  REVIEW of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
No. 96-1264-CR:  APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Robert R. Pekowsky, Circuit Court Judge.  
Affirmed. 
 
 
Case Nos. 95-0207-CR 
 
 
96-1264-CR 
 
2 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  For their roles in a 1991 
hostage-taking 
and 
attempted 
jailbreak, 
John 
C. 
Setagord 
(Setagord) and Charles C. Downing (Downing) received mandatory 
life sentences, with parole eligibility dates far beyond their 
respective anticipated life spans.  Setagord seeks review of a 
court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's 
imposition of a parole eligibility date of October 21, 2091.  On 
a motion to bypass the court of appeals, Downing appeals the 
circuit court's imposition of a parole eligibility date of 
October 21, 2177. 
¶2 
Both defendants argue that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) 
does not authorize the circuit court to effectively deny parole 
by setting a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's 
anticipated 
lifetime. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
§ 
973.014(1)(b) 
unambiguously grants the circuit court discretion to impose a 
parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's expected lifetime. 
 We also conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in setting Setagord and Downing's 
respective parole eligibility dates.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals' decision in the Setagord case, and affirm the 
circuit court's order imposing sentence in the Downing case. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Setagord and 
Downing unsuccessfully attempted to escape from the Dane County 
Jail with a third inmate, Juan Ruiz, on October 20, 1991. 
 
 
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3 
Setagord, Downing and Ruiz took Deputy Julie McReynolds hostage 
during a jailbreak attempt.  During the seizure, both Setagord 
and Downing struck McReynolds.  She was tied up by her hands and 
feet.  Setagord threatened several times to kill McReynolds, and 
also threatened to break her legs. Deputy McReynolds was 
released 
after 
thirteen 
hours 
of 
confinement, 
and 
after 
sustaining a cut to the head, bruises and a knee injury.  During 
the early part of the escape attempt, Downing struck another 
deputy several times with a cribbage board. 
¶4 
The State filed a criminal complaint that charged 
Downing, Setagord and Ruiz with the Class A felony of taking a 
hostage, as a party to a crime, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.3051 and 939.05; with conspiracy to escape, in violation 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 946.42(3)(a) and 939.31; and with battery to a 
police officer in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2).  Because 
they were repeat offenders, Setagord and Downing were also 
charged under the penalty enhancement provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(1).   
¶5 
Setagord and Downing each reached plea agreements with 
the State following a half day of trial testimony on May 19, 
1992.  Setagord entered a plea of no contest to the hostage-
                     
1  As the court of appeals correctly noted, Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.305(2) provides that if a person taken hostage is released 
without bodily harm before the actor's arrest, the crime is a 
Class B felony.  Setagord and Downing were charged with a Class 
A 
felony 
because 
they 
inflicted 
bodily 
harm 
on 
Deputy 
McReynolds.  The penalty for a Class A felony is life 
imprisonment.  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a). 
 
 
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taking charge and guilty to the other two charges in return for 
dismissal of the repeater allegation on the hostage-taking 
charge.  Downing entered a plea of no contest to the charges in 
return for dismissal of the repeater allegation on the hostage-
taking charge. 
¶6 
On August 28, 1992, the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Robert R. Pekowsky, conducted a sentencing hearing for Setagord. 
The circuit court sentenced Setagord to life in prison without 
parole for the hostage-taking charge, and to 11 years for each 
of the other two charges.  Setagord appealed the sentence of 
life without parole.  The court of appeals reversed that 
sentence,2 holding that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1991-92) did not 
authorize a circuit court to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole.  The court held that the statute 
allows the circuit court only two options, either to determine 
parole eligibility pursuant to the standards under Wis. Stat. 
§ 304.06(1),3 or to set an alternative parole eligibility date of 
                     
2  State v. Setagord, 187 Wis. 2d 340, 342, 523 N.W.2d 124 
(Ct. App. 1994)(hereinafter Setagord I). 
3  Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1)(1991-92) provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Paroles from state prisons and house of correction. 
 
(b) Except as provided in sub. (1m) or s. 
161.49(2), 
302.045(3) 
or 
973.032(5), 
the 
parole 
commission may parole an inmate of the Wisconsin state 
prisons or any felon or any inmate of the Wisconsin 
state prisons or any felon or any person serving at 
least one year or more in the Milwaukee county house 
of correction or a county reforestation camp organized 
under s. 303.07, when he or she has served 25% of the 
 
 
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5 
its own.  187 Wis. 2d at 344.  On remand for resentencing, the 
circuit court imposed a parole eligibility date of October 21, 
2091.  That date was one hundred years from the date of the 
crimes Setagord committed, as requested by the State.4  Setagord 
again appealed. 
¶7 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
upheld 
Setagord’s 
parole 
eligibility 
date. 
 
State 
v. 
Setagord, 
No. 
95-0207-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 11, 1996)(hereinafter 
Setagord II).  The court held that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) 
permits a circuit court to set a parole eligibility date beyond 
a person's expected lifetime.  Setagord II at 10-11.  Because 
the court found the sentencing statute ambiguous, the appellate 
court looked to legislative history to discern the legislative 
intent.  Id. at 5.  The court found that this history supported 
the State's view that the circuit court may effectively deny 
parole by setting a parole eligibility date 100 years in the 
                                                                  
sentence imposed for the offense, or 6 months, 
whichever is greater.  Except as provided in s. 
973.014, the parole commission may parole an inmate 
serving a life term when he or she has served 20 
years, as modified by the formula under s. 302.11(1) 
and subject to extension using the formulas under s. 
302.11(2).  The person serving the life term shall be 
given credit for time served prior to sentencing under 
s. 973.155, including good time under s. 973.155(4).  
The secretary may grant special action parole releases 
under s. 304.02.  The department or the parole 
commission shall not provide any convicted offender or 
other person sentenced to the department's custody any 
parole eligibility or evaluation until the person has 
been confined at least 60 days following sentencing. 
(c)  
4  At the resentencing, the circuit court also imposed five 
years on Count 2 consecutive to Count 1, and 11 years on Count 3 
consecutive to each other and to Count 1. 
 
 
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future.  Id. at 9.  The court of appeals also held that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
imposing the 100-year parole eligibility date.  Id. at 23.  
Setagord petitioned for review by this court. 
¶8 
Like Setagord, Downing was initially sentenced by 
Judge Pekowsky.  At the January 19, 1993, sentencing hearing, 
the State asked that "Mr. Downing be sentenced to serve the rest 
of his life in prison with no opportunity for parole."  The 
circuit court sentenced Downing to life imprisonment without 
parole on the hostage-taking charge, to be served consecutively 
to the sentences he was already serving.  In addition, the court 
sentenced Downing to three consecutive five-year sentences on 
the remaining charges.  Downing appealed, arguing that the 
circuit court erred in imposing a life sentence without parole. 
 The court of appeals reversed, and remanded for resentencing 
based on its decision in Setagord I.  State v. Downing, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 18, 1995). 
¶9 
The circuit court conducted a resentencing hearing on 
November 8, 1995.  At that time, the State asked the court to 
ensure that Downing never again be a free man.  The circuit 
court agreed to follow the State's recommendation, and sentenced 
Downing to life imprisonment with a parole eligibility date of 
October 21, 2177, on the hostage-taking charge.  The circuit 
court also reimposed the five-year consecutive sentences on the 
other charges.  Downing again appealed, arguing that Wis. Stat. 
 
 
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7 
§ 973.014(1)(b) did not authorize a parole eligibility date 
beyond his expected lifetime.  We granted Downing's petition to 
bypass the court of appeals.  
¶10 The principal question presented by both Setagord and 
Downing involves interpretation of a statute, a question of law 
that we review de novo.  State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 560, 
455 N.W.2d 143 (1990).  The purpose of statutory interpretation 
is to discern the intent of the legislature.  Id.  To do so, we 
first consider the language of the statute.  If the language of 
the statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative 
intent, we apply that intent to the case at hand and do not look 
beyond the statutory language to ascertain its meaning.  Kelley 
Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 493 N.W.2d 68 
(1992); UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-82, 548 N.W.2d 57 
(1996). 
¶11 Setagord contends that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) is 
ambiguous, and when properly construed, requires an earlier 
parole eligibility date.  Downing takes a different approach, 
but reaches the same result.  Downing contends that the statute 
is 
unambiguous, 
and 
clearly 
requires 
meaningful 
parole 
eligibility. The State asserts that the statute is unambiguous. 
 Under the State's reading, the term "any later date" can 
include a parole eligibility date beyond the defendant's 
expected lifetime.   
 
 
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¶12 A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being 
understood in two or more different senses by reasonably well-
informed persons.  Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 
Wis. 2d 585, 592, 527 N.W.2d 301 (1995).  However, a statute is 
not rendered ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to 
its meaning.  Id.  If a statute is ambiguous, we look to the 
scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the 
statute in order to ascertain legislative intent.  However, 
resort to legislative history is not appropriate in the absence 
of a finding of ambiguity.  See Cynthia E. v. LaCrosse County 
Human Services Dep't, 172 Wis. 2d 218, 229, 493 N.W.2d 56 
(1992). 
¶13 These cases present a question of first impression.  
We upheld Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) against a constitutional 
challenge in State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 759, 482 N.W.2d 
883 (1992).  Now we are asked to determine whether the 
legislature intended to authorize a sentencing court to set a 
parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's expected lifetime. 
 If we conclude that the statute authorizes parole eligibility 
determinations that afford no possibility of parole, Setagord 
and Downing ask that we then conclude that the sentencing court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in setting their parole 
eligibility dates. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
 
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9 
¶14 We begin with the premise that sentencing is a matter 
of legislative policy.  In Matter of Judicial Administration: 
Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 353 N.W.2d 
793 (1984).  The legislature decides whether and to what degree 
the sentencing court's discretion should be limited.  120 Wis. 
2d at 203.  The legislature conveys its intent as to sentencing 
policy, and the extent of judicial sentencing discretion, by 
enacting sentencing statutes.  At the time Setagord and Downing 
took Deputy McReynolds hostage, the sentencing statute at issue 
here provided: 
. . . the court shall make a parole eligibility 
determination . . . (b) . . . Under this subsection, 
the court may set any later date than that provided in 
s. 304.06(1) . . . 
 
Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1).  (Emphasis added). 
 
¶15 Through this provision the legislature has delegated 
to the sentencing court the power to make a determination of 
parole eligibility by setting a minimum date for a convicted 
felon's parole eligibility. 
¶16 The statute does not set, however, a maximum date for 
a convicted felon's parole eligibility.  The only qualification 
expressed by the term "any later date" is a minimum eligibility 
date.  We conclude that the only reasonable reading of the plain 
language of the statute is that the legislature unambiguously 
set a minimum, but not a maximum, date for parole eligibility. 
¶17 Setagord 
contends, 
however, 
that 
this 
sentencing 
statute is ambiguous, and, taking into account rules of 
 
 
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statutory interpretation and construction, must be read to 
authorize a parole eligibility date reasonably less than the 
functional equivalent of life without parole. 
¶18 Setagord 
first 
makes 
a 
comparative 
argument, 
juxtaposing Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) against other sentencing 
statutes.  He points out that other statutory provisions 
expressly provide for life sentences without parole in different 
circumstances than those present here.  Thus, according to 
Setagord, the legislature could not have intended to allow 
courts to impose an "indirect" sentence of life without parole 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b).  Section 973.014(2)(1993-94), 
for example, expressly provides that "persistent repeaters" are 
subject to life imprisonment "without possibility of parole."  
The more recently enacted Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c)5 expressly 
authorizes the circuit court to declare that a defendant 
sentenced to life imprisonment "is not eligible for parole."  
Setagord argues that these provisions show that when the 
legislature intends to authorize a sentence of life without 
parole, it does so directly through plain and unambiguous 
language.  Setagord does not argue that these other provisions 
                     
5  1995 Wis. Act 48, § 5, codified as Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014(1)(c), and effective August 31, 1995, provides: 
The person is not eligible for parole.  This paragraph 
applies only if the court sentences a person for a 
crime committed on or after the effective date of this 
paragraph. 
 
 
 
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expressly preclude a sentence of parole eligibility under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) beyond the defendant's expected lifetime. 
¶19 Setagord also points to two federal court decisions 
that found sentencing statutes ambiguous.  In United States v. 
Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982 
(1988),6 the court considered a defendant's challenge to a 150-
year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder, with parole 
eligibility after 50 years.  The sentence effectively denied 
parole.  The court first considered the requirements of the 
applicable sentencing statues.  Under the first degree murder 
statute, a life sentence was mandatory.  18 U.S.C. § 1111.  
Under the plain language of the conspiracy statute,  18 U.S.C. § 
1117, the trial court could impose imprisonment "for any term of 
years or for life."  840 F.2d at 517.  The reviewing court 
concluded, however, that when juxtaposed with other sentencing 
statutes, that "plain" language lost its clarity.  Id.  Another 
                     
6  We recognize that the Fountain decision reflects one side 
of a split among the federal circuits on the question of the 
effect of 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) in conjunction with sentences 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1117.  United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 
509, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1988).  Setagord also cites to Chief Judge 
Posner's concurrence in  United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840 
(7th Cir. 1995) in support of his position.  Chief Judge Posner 
noted that if a judge used a sentence of a term of years to 
imprison a defendant for his natural life, such a sentence would 
circumvent the federal statute requiring that a jury recommend a 
life sentence.  Id. at 846-47.  The Prevatte holding, that the 
district court would have to consider the defendant's life 
expectancy, id. at 843-44, and Chief Judge Posner's concurrence, 
which in any event are not binding on this court, are 
distinguishable in that parole had been abolished in the federal 
penal system, and the Wisconsin legislature has not delegated 
the authority to recommend life sentences to juries. 
 
 
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statute provided for parole eligibility after one-third of the 
sentence had been served, "or after serving ten years of a life 
sentence or of a sentence over thirty years."  When the sentence 
term provision and the parole eligibility provision were 
juxtaposed, the court concluded that the phrase "any term of 
years" did not unambiguously mean any amount of years less than 
the age of the universe.  Rather, the court interpreted that 
phrase to mean a span of years less than the defendant's life.  
Id. at 517-18. 
¶20 In United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422, 1434 (7th 
Cir. 1995), the court held that where a statutory scheme 
expressly deprives a court of the possibility of imposing a life 
sentence, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to impose a 
life sentence by sentencing the defendant to a term of years 
that exceeds his or her life expectancy. 
¶21 Neither federal case cited by Setagord persuades us 
that Wis. Stat. § 973.041(1)(b) is not clear on its face, nor 
that it must be read to be limited to a term of years less than 
the convicted felon's life expectancy.  The statute in Fountain 
openly contained a maximum, i.e., "any term of years or life."  
As we concluded above, in enacting Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b), 
our legislature included only a minimum, and not a maximum 
restriction 
on 
the 
sentencing 
court's 
parole 
eligibility 
determination.  In effect, the range of sentences permitted 
under this statute is open-ended. 
 
 
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¶22 Neither the facts nor the law in Martin are analogous 
to the cases before us.  In Martin, the statute expressly 
precluded the court from imposing a life sentence.  An indirect 
route to the same result was therefore improper.  Here, however, 
the legislature has not expressly precluded courts from imposing 
an effective life sentence on persons such as Setagord and 
Downing. 
¶23 The intent of the Wisconsin legislature expressed in 
this statute thus stands in contrast to Congress' express intent 
underlying the federal statute at issue in Martin.  By enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b), our legislature did not expressly 
deprive sentencing courts of the authority to impose a parole 
eligibility date that exceeds the person's life expectancy.  
Instead, the legislature provided that "the court shall make a 
parole 
eligibility 
determination." 
 
In 
making 
that 
determination, the sentencing court has two options.  The first 
is to set a parole eligibility date in accordance with Wis. 
Stat. § 304.06(1).  The second option is to set any later date 
than the date authorized by Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1).  It is clear 
from the face of the statute that the legislature established a 
floor, and not a ceiling, to the court's authority to make a 
parole eligibility determination.  
¶24 Setagord next makes an argument interpreting the term 
"any" in the context of the other language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014.  Relying upon Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory 
 
 
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Construction, 7 Setagord contends that "any" may have a diversity 
of meanings, and consequently "its meaning in a given statute 
depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute." 
 The State turns the context argument around, asserting that the 
context of the statute here makes clear that no temporal 
limitations are imposed on the parole eligibility date.  We 
essentially agree with the State.  The subject matter of the 
statute is the court's authority to make a parole eligibility 
determination for persons sentenced to life imprisonment.  In 
the context of this statute, the phrase, "any later date," is a 
temporal 
restriction 
on 
the 
determination 
of 
the 
parole 
eligibility portion of the sentence.  One temporal restriction 
on that determination, the minimum eligibility date, has already 
been set by the legislature.  The legislature did not set a 
maximum eligibility date, leaving that to the sentencing court's 
discretion.     
¶25 In a decision issued after these cases were argued, we 
considered another statutory use of the term “any.”  State v. 
Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997).  In that case we 
analyzed language in the restitution statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20, which provides that "any defense available in a civil 
action" may be used to bar individual crime victims' claims for 
restitution.  Id. at 413.  We said that the term "any" on its 
                     
7  2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory 
Construction, § 46.07, p. 153 (5th ed., 1992 revision). 
 
 
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own is unequivocal, but observed that the term "any defense" as 
used in that statute was not defined.  Id. at 417.  Moreover, 
because the language of the statute was ambiguous when viewed in 
light of the statute as a whole, we examined the scope history, 
context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute.  When we 
view the term "any later date" in light of the statute as a 
whole, no clouds of ambiguity appear.   The statute as a whole 
contains only one temporal restriction.  The statute as a whole 
does not impose an outside limitation on the phrase "any later 
date." 
¶26 We next consider petitioner Downing's arguments.  He 
reads the 
statute 
to 
require that 
a 
defendant have an 
opportunity for conditional release, or parole eligibility, 
during his or her lifetime.  Downing contends that "any later 
date" must be viewed in the context of another phrase in that 
same provision, "[t]he person is eligible for parole."  Downing 
asserts that a plain reading of the statute commands that a 
realistic opportunity for parole be maintained in the setting of 
a parole eligibility date.  Downing's plain reading would 
effectively graft the phrase, "within the person's expected 
lifetime," onto the statute.  Undeniably, the legislature could 
have added that phrase.  It did not. 
¶27 Downing 
additionally 
suggests 
that 
there 
is 
a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine if we engage in 
 
 
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this plain reading of the statute and allow the sentences here 
to stand.  We disagree. 
¶28 A person convicted of a crime has no legal or 
constitutional right to parole.  Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 764.  
Simply because the legislature has provided the possibility of 
parole creates "no more than a mere hope that the benefit will 
be obtained."  Id. at 771-72 (citations omitted).  Thus, parole 
is a statutory privilege, and not a constitutional right.  In 
Borrell we concluded that "the court's authority under sec. 
973.014 to determine the parole eligibility date of a person 
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment does not encroach 
upon or unduly burden the executive branch's authority to grant 
pardons, commute sentences, or grant parole."  167 Wis. 2d at 
770.  The Parole Board's power to grant parole release is not 
initiated 
until 
the 
prisoner 
reaches 
his 
or 
her 
parole 
eligibility date.  Id. at 770.  We satisfied ourselves in 
Borrell that the Parole Board's authority to grant parole 
release is not circumscribed by § 973.014.  Id. at 770. 
¶29 It is true that the Borrell court also stated that the 
court does not have power over the actual release decision.  Id. 
 But by recognizing that the legislature can deny parole 
eligibility, the court affirmed that there is no separation of 
powers violation when a branch other than the executive denies 
parole eligibility.   The Borrell court also pointed out that 
the parole eligibility determination by the court in no way 
 
 
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prevents the governor from granting a pardon or from commuting 
the sentence.  Id. 
¶30 We 
have 
previously 
considered 
constitutional 
challenges to this statute, including a separation of powers 
challenge. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 762.  We did not engage in 
statutory construction.  Instead, we reviewed the plain language 
of the statute to first consider whether this provision violated 
the separation of powers doctrine.  167 Wis. 2d at 766-67.  From 
that plain language, we discerned a legislative intent to allow 
the sentencing court to use its discretion in setting a parole 
eligibility date later than the statutory minimum where the 
circumstances warrant.  Id. at 767.  We concluded that the 
legislature acted in such a manner because it realized that the 
sentencing court is in a better position to assess the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case and of each 
defendant.  Id.  We invoke Borrell's analysis here, and hold 
that a plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) to include 
authority 
to 
impose 
a 
parole 
eligibility 
date 
beyond 
a 
defendant's expected lifetime does not violate the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
¶31 Finally, both Setagord and Downing contend that if we 
find the statute ambiguous, and Setagord urges that we must, we 
should observe the Rule of Lenity and construe the statute in 
their favor.  The Rule of Lenity only comes into play after two 
conditions are met.  First, we must determine that the penal 
 
 
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18
statute is ambiguous.  Second, we must be unable to clarify the 
intent of the legislature by resort to legislative history.  See 
State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982); 
State v. Wilson, 77 Wis. 2d 15, 28, 252 N.W.2d 64 (1977).  
Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) is plain and 
unambiguous on its face, the Rule of Lenity does not apply here.8 
¶32 We recognize that the court of appeals in Setagord II 
determined that the statute was ambiguous.  While we have due 
respect for the court of appeals' analysis, a division of 
judicial authority over the proper construction of a statute 
does not, ipso facto, render it ambiguous.  Reno v. Koray, 115 
S. Ct. 2021, 2029 (1995)(ruling that Bail Reform Act of 1984 is 
not ambiguous for purposes of lenity merely because circuit 
courts split over its construction). 
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 
¶33 Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) 
permits the circuit court to set a parole eligibility date 
beyond the person's expected lifetime, we consider the second 
                     
8  Nor do we consider extrinsic aids under a plain language 
interpretation.  Nonetheless, we note that our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) is shared by authors Walter Dickey, 
David Schultz, and James L. Fullin, Jr. in their article, The 
Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide:  The Wisconsin 
Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323.  Referring to 1987 Wisconsin 
Act 412 which created Wis. Stat. §  973.014, the authors 
concluded that "legislation separate from the homicide revision 
introduced a new sentencing option for all crimes carrying a 
life sentence:  The sentencing judge may set parole eligibility 
at any period of time in excess of the regular eligibility term, 
as a practical matter, giving the judge the power to deny parole 
eligibility altogether."  Id. at 1334. 
 
 
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question raised: Did the sentencing court erroneously exercise 
its discretion by setting parole eligibility dates for Setagord 
and Downing 100 years or more after the date of their crimes? 
¶34 The primary factors a court considers in fashioning a 
sentence are the gravity and nature of the offense, including 
the effect on the victim, the character of the offender, 
including his or her rehabilitative needs and the interests of 
deterrence, and the need to protect the public.  State v. 
Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 142, 156, 560 N.W.2d 256 (1997).  See also 
State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655, 673-74, 348 N.W.2d 527 
(1984).9  The sentence imposed should represent the minimum 
amount of custody consistent with those factors.  Borrell, 167 
Wis. 2d at 764. 
¶35 The factors that a sentencing court considers when 
imposing a sentence are the same factors that influence the 
determination of parole eligibility.  Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 
774.  Parole eligibility date determinations are reviewable 
under the same standard as are other sentencing decisions.  167 
Wis. 2d at 778.  Thus, we limit our review to determining 
whether there has been an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971);  
                     
9  Other relevant factors include the defendant's age, 
personality, 
social 
traits, 
remorse, 
repentance, 
cooperativeness, 
educational 
level, 
employment 
background, 
degree of culpability, and demeanor at trial.  State v. Killory, 
73 Wis. 2d 400, 408, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976). 
 
 
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20
State v. Iglesias, 185 Wis. 2d 117, 517 N.W.2d 175, cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1045 (1994).   
¶36 The court of appeals, applying the correct standard, 
conducted a thorough examination of the sentencing factors 
articulated by the circuit court and applied to the facts of 
Setagord's crime.  Slip op. at 15.  The court of appeals upheld 
the circuit court's exercise of discretion in setting Setagord's 
parole eligibility date.  We adopt the analysis and conclusion 
of the court of appeals that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it resentenced Setagord 
to life imprisonment, with a parole eligibility date of October 
21, 2091.10 
¶37 We next turn to Mr. Downing.  Without benefit of 
intermediate 
review, 
we 
consider 
his 
assertion 
that 
the 
resentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion. 
                     
10  We note, however, that as part of its review, the court 
of appeals relied on State v. Solles, 169 Wis. 2d 566, 569, 485 
N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1992), for the limitation that "when 
resentencing a defendant the trial court must consider only the 
circumstances existing when defendant was first sentenced."  
Earlier this term we overruled Solles.  State v. Carter, 208 
Wis. 2d 142, 560 N.W.2d 256 (1997).  We held in Carter that a 
circuit court should, when imposing sentence at a resentencing 
hearing, consider all relevant information about the defendant, 
including information about events and circumstances either that 
the sentencing court was unaware of at the initial sentencing or 
that occurred after the initial sentencing.  208 Wis. 2d at 158. 
Based on our review of the resentencing hearing transcript, 
we conclude that the circuit court met the requirements of 
Carter, 
and 
that 
the 
court 
considered 
all 
the 
relevant 
information about Setagord's conduct that occurred after the 
initial sentencing. 
 
 
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21
¶38 We generally afford sentencing decisions a strong 
presumption of reasonableness because the circuit court is best 
suited 
to 
consider 
the 
relevant 
factors 
and 
assess 
the 
defendant’s demeanor.  Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 781-82.  Thus, 
the defendant has the burden to show that the sentence was 
unreasonable or unjustified.  Id.  We will find an erroneous 
exercise of discretion when a sentence is so excessive and 
unusual, and so disproportionate to the offense committed, as to 
shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable 
persons 
concerning 
what 
is 
right 
and 
proper 
under 
the 
circumstances. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d at 673.  Finally, when the 
legislature has granted the sentencing court the authority to 
impose sentences within a certain range, the legislature has 
given the court discretion to determine where in that range a 
sentence should fall.  State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 624, 
350 N.W.2d 633 (1984). 
¶39 Downing asserts that "the trial court continued to 
pile on incarceration time after it conceded that Downing cannot 
possible live to serve the excessive time."  Petitioner's Brief 
at 31.  Downing thus argues that the length of imprisonment 
imposed for the hostage-taking charge signals a disregard for 
the relevant sentencing factors.  We disagree, and conclude that 
the court here properly considered and articulated the relevant 
factors when it resentenced Downing.  The sentence imposed is 
 
 
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22
not so unusual, or disproportionate, as to shock public 
sentiment. 
¶40 At the resentencing hearing, the State asked the court 
to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, consecutive to the 
total 129 years imposed earlier for other charges.  The State 
also specifically requested a parole eligibility date of October 
21, 2177.  The State calculated Downing's mandatory release date 
on the prior sentences - after 86 years - and then added 100 
years from that point. 
¶41 Next, defense counsel reviewed with the court the pre-
sentence 
investigation 
report, 
and 
the 
defendant's 
own 
statements as to the events on the day of the hostage-taking.  
Defense counsel also offered two letters from the Department of 
Corrections and two inmate performance evaluations.  All four of 
these documents were generated in the interim between Mr. 
Downing's 
original 
sentencing 
and 
the 
November, 
1995, 
resentencing hearing. 
¶42 After receiving those documents, and the comments of 
counsel, the court revisited the events of the crime.  The court 
adopted its comments made at the original sentencing.11   
                     
11 At the original sentencing, the court considered, among 
other things, the "lengthy and extremely thorough" pre-sentence 
report.  In considering the gravity of the offense, the court 
noted that Downing participated in the hostage-taking as part of 
a planned escape from jail at a time when he was going through a 
trial on very serious charges.  The court also considered that 
the crime of hostage taking was "at the peak" of seriousness.  
 
 
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23
¶43 The court then weighed the gravity of the hostage-
taking offense, its seriousness in part reflected by the 
statutory sentencing option of life imprisonment.  
¶44 The court made further comments on Mr. Downing's 
character, finding that he demonstrated no remorse, and posed a 
continuing risk to society.  Considering the Department of 
Corrections 
letters 
and 
positive 
evaluations, 
the 
court 
concluded that Downing could only perform at that level within a 
locked facility.  Referring to factors considered at both 
hearings, the court then stated, "I knew of almost no redeeming 
values.  I know of very few now.  I know of nothing that would 
cause me to stray from my earlier views about your character."  
¶45 Finally, weighing the public protection factor, the 
court 
described 
the 
terror 
that 
Downing 
brought 
to 
the 
community, the state, and employees of the jail building during 
the hostage-taking.  In light of all those considerations, the 
court followed the State's sentence recommendation. 
¶46 The record, as summarized above, demonstrates that the 
judge here considered the comments of both counsel and the facts 
                                                                  
At the original sentencing, the court also considered 
Downing's character, outlining a long and serious criminal 
history.  The court found Downing to be one of the most 
antisocial persons he had encountered, and that he demonstrated 
no likelihood to change his behavior for the better.  
The court also considered Downing's character in light of 
the need to protect the public.  The court concluded that 
Downing was a man "who doesn't care about hurting people.  He 
will do it at will whenever, for whatever purpose, to whomever 
if they are in his way."  
 
 
Case Nos. 95-0207-CR 
 
 
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24
of the specific crime.  The judge applied each of the pertinent 
sentencing factors, and explained the reasons for its parole 
eligibility determination.  Based on all of the factors 
considered and articulated by the sentencing court, we disagree 
with Downing's contention that the sentence imposed could not 
have been directed at any of the relevant sentencing factors. 
¶47 This is true despite the judge's remarks that "It 
sounds silly. It sounds far-fetched, that you have already been 
handed 129 consecutive years by other courts, that indeed I 
would add another 100, but that is what I am going to do."  
Those remarks followed the court's recitation of the factors set 
out above, as well as a consideration of remarks by counsel.  
The fact that Downing already was serving a lengthy sentence for 
prior offenses did not automatically make the parole eligibility 
determination here unreasonable or unjustified.  If we take 
Downing's argument that a parole eligibility date must be within 
a defendant's expected lifetime to its logical conclusion, 
sentencing courts would have to impose diminishing sentences for 
a defendant's subsequent offenses, in order to preserve an 
"attainable parole date".  See Petitioner Downing's Brief at 18. 
 Offenders who commit multiple crimes should not receive a 
sentencing "discount" due to the sheer volume of their crimes.  
See also Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(a).12  Making an attainable 
                     
12  Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(a)(1993-94) provides: 
 
 
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25
parole date the primary gauge of the reasonableness of a 
sentence disregards traditional sentencing factors.  
¶48 The court clearly considered that Downing showed 
little or no chance of rehabilitation, based on his prior 
criminal record and his efforts to avoid one trial and 
sentencing by taking a jail deputy hostage in an escape attempt. 
 Even Downing's counsel admitted that Downing's only relevant 
work history occurred while he was an inmate. 
¶49 It is important to note that the reason for Downing's 
resentencing 
was 
not 
that 
the 
court 
improperly 
weighed 
sentencing factors in the first instance.  Thus, it was 
reasonable for the court on resentencing to adopt its prior 
comments, 
particularly 
those 
concerning 
Downing's 
ruthless 
attempt to leave the county jail at almost any cost.  The court 
was not unreasonable in focusing on the terror instilled in the 
community at large, as well among corrections workers, at the 
prospect of inmates holding deputies hostage under the threat of 
death.  These findings led the court, on resentencing, to 
heavily weigh the public protection and deterrence factors.  
Imposition of a sentence with a parole eligibility date of 
October 21, 2177, is not so excessive as to shock public 
sentiment. 
                                                                  
Except as provided in par. (b), the court may impose 
as many sentences as there are convictions and may 
provide that any such sentence be concurrent with or 
consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same 
time or previously. 
 
 
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26
¶50 Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold 
that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) unambiguously allows the circuit 
court to impose a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's 
expected lifetime, and that the specific parole eligibility 
dates set for petitioners Setagord and Downing do not constitute 
erroneous exercises of discretion by the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed as to Setagord, and the order of the circuit court is 
affirmed as to Downing.  
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
1 
¶51 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Dissenting).   On August 28, 
1992, John Setagord was sentenced to life in prison without 
parole.  Setagord appealed, and the court of appeals concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1991-92)13 clearly and unambiguously 
did not permit the circuit court to impose a sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole for Setagord’s crime.  
State v. Setagord, 187 Wis. 2d 340, 523 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 
1994).  Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the sentence 
and remanded for resentencing.  Upon remand, the circuit court 
sentenced Setagord to life in prison with a parole eligibility 
date of October 21, 2091in effect, a sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.  By affirming this sentence, 
the majority elevates form over substance.14  It tells the 
circuit courts that, if you don’t use the words “without 
possibility of parole,” even though that is the effect, we will 
approve.   
¶52 In essence, the majority concludes the legislature 
deliberately intended to create a classic, albeit cynical, “good 
news, bad news” situation for the defendant when it drafted the 
                     
13  Unless otherwise indicated, future statutory references 
are to the 1991-92 volume. 
14  Frequently the wisest analysis can be found in the 
simple adage.  “’If something walks like a duck, quacks like a 
duck and swims, covering it with chicken feathers will not make 
it into a chicken.’”  Boyd v. Layher, 427 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Mich. 
App. 1988)(citation omitted).  Likewise, Setagord’s sentence is 
a sentence of life in prison without parole; calling it a term 
of years sentence with a parole eligibility date far beyond life 
expectancy cannot alter that simple fact.  
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
2 
mandate “the court shall make a parole eligibility determination 
. . .”  Wis. Stat. § 973.014.  The good news for the defendant: 
you’re eligible for parole.  The bad news:  it won’t be during 
your lifetime.  I conclude the legislature did not intend Wis. 
Stat. § 973.014 to be used by the sentencing judge in this 
manner.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶53 When 
interpreting 
this 
statute, 
one 
overarching 
principle must guide the court’s analysisthe legislature sets 
sentencing policy.  It is well settled that “the court’s 
sentencing power is derived solely from the statutes and . . . 
the courts must adhere to statutory limits when fashioning 
sentences.”  State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 553, 350 
N.W.2d 96 (1984)(footnote omitted).  In other words, the 
sentencing court can only impose a sentence if that sentence is 
authorized by the legislature.  By imposing a sentence not 
authorized by the statute, the circuit court usurps the 
legislature’s authority to set sentencing policy. 
¶54 The majority concludes that by its use of the phrase 
“any later date” in Wis. Stat. § 973.014, the legislature 
unambiguously granted the circuit court discretion to impose a 
parole eligibility date far beyond even Methuselah’s life 
expectancy.  Apparently, even a parole eligibility date of 4001 
or any other year would meet with the consent of the majority.  
The majority reaches this conclusion by ignoring a basic rule of 
statutory construction:  A phrase must be defined within the 
context of the statute in which it is used.  Pulsfus Farms v. 
Town of Leeds, 149 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 440 N.W.2d 329 (1989).   
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
3 
¶55 Ignoring this rule, the majority analyzes only one 
part of Wis. Stat. § 973.014:   
 
the 
court 
shall 
make 
a 
parole 
eligibility 
determination . . . (b) . . . Under this subsection, 
the court may set any later date than that provided in 
s. 304.06(1). 
Majority opinion at 9.  However, at the time of Setagord’s 
sentencing, § 973.014, provided: 
 
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), when a court 
sentences a person to life imprisonment for a crime 
committed on or after July 1, 1988, the court shall 
make a parole eligibility determination regarding the 
person and choose one of the following options: 
(a) The person is eligible for parole under s. 
304.06(1). 
(b) The person is eligible for parole on a date 
set by the court.  Under this paragraph, the court may 
set any later date than that provided in s. 304.06(1), 
but may not set a date that occurs before the earliest 
possible parole eligibility date as calculated under 
s. 304.06(1).15 (Emphasis added). 
¶56 By analyzing just the underlined portion of the 
statute, without benefit of the context of the entire statute, 
the majority reaches an erroneous conclusion.   
¶57 This court recently visited a similar problem of 
statutory interpretation.  In State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 
561 N.W.2d 695 (1997), we interpreted the phrase “any defense 
available 
in 
a 
civil 
action” 
as 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b).  In that case, we held that “any” when 
modifying “defense,” though unambiguous when standing alone, was 
                     
15 Wis. Stat. § 973.014 was renumbered by 1993 Wis. Act 289, 
§11-12.  As did the court of appeals, and as does the majority, 
I refer to the provisions of § 973.014 by the current numbering. 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
4 
ambiguous when read in conjunction with the statute as a whole. 
 Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409.  See also 2A Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland’s Statutory Construction § 46.07, p. 153 (5th ed., 
1992) (the word “any” has “a diversity of meanings . . . and its 
meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the 
subject matter of the statute”)(footnote omitted).  
¶58 A statutory provision is ambiguous if reasonable minds 
could differ as to its meaning.  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 416.  
Here, the court concludes that “any” when modifying “later date” 
is unambiguous.  And it iswhen standing alone.  However, when 
read in conjunction with other provisions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014, the phrase “any later date” is ambiguous.  
¶59 One reasonable interpretation of the statute is that 
rendered by the majority that, essentially, “any later date” 
means “any later date from here to eternity.”  Another 
reasonable interpretationand an interpretation more in harmony 
with Wis. Stat. § 973.014 as a wholeis that the phrase “any 
later date” means “any later date, but not life imprisonment 
without parole because the statute states that the person is 
eligible for parole on a date set by the court” or “any later 
date within the average person’s life expectancy.”  Because 
these interpretations can reasonably be drawn, the reasonable 
conclusion is that § 973.014 is ambiguous. 
¶60 When 
a 
statute 
is 
ambiguous, 
several 
rules 
of 
statutory construction come into play.  In construing Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014, these rules of construction indicate that the phrase 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
5 
“any later date” is more reasonably interpreted as “any later 
date within the average person’s life expectancy.” 
¶61 First, it is well-established that ambiguous, penal 
statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 973.014 should be interpreted to 
the defendant’s benefit.  In construing federal statutes, the 
federal courts apply the rule of lenity.  Bell v. United States, 
349 U.S. 81, 83.  This court applies a similar concept, stating 
that 
“penal 
statues 
are 
generally 
construed 
strictly 
to 
safeguard defendant’s rights.”  State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 
402, 417, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983)(citation omitted).  Thus, as 
Setagord argues, criminal penalties must be narrowly construed 
and any ambiguities in a penal statuteincluding sentencing 
provisionsmust be resolved in favor of the defendant.  See 
Strong v. C.I.R., Inc., 184 Wis. 2d 619, 628, 516 N.W.2d 719 
(1994).  State v. Christensen, 110 Wis. 2d 538, 546, 329 N.W.2d 
382 (1983).  See also State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 322 
N.W.2d 264 (1982)(“in case of doubt concerning the severity of 
the penalty prescribed by the statute, the court will favor a 
milder penalty over a harsher one. . . . ‘Since it is within the 
power of the lawmakers, the burden lies with them to relieve the 
situation of all doubts.’”)(citation omitted)); 3 Sutherland’s 
Statutory 
Construction 
§ 59.03 
at 
103 
(“’It 
is 
a 
well-
established principle of statutory construction that . . . the 
more severe the penalty, and the more disastrous the consequence 
to the person subjected to the provisions of the statute, the 
more rigid will be the construction of its provisions in favor 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
6 
of 
such 
person 
and 
against 
the 
enforcement 
of 
such 
law.’”)(footnote omitted). 
¶62 In sum, the burden lies with the legislature to enact 
a statute that clearly and unambiguously provides for the most 
severe criminal punishment available in Wisconsina sentence of 
life in prison without even the possibility of parole, and this 
statute does not clearly establish such an intent by the 
legislature.  
¶63 Another fundamental rule of statutory construction 
supports this conclusion.  Statutes are to be construed to avoid 
rendering any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous. 
State v. Achterberg, 201 Wis. 2d 291, 299, 548 N.W.2d 515 
(1996).  That the majority’s interpretation violates this 
principle is most glaringly illustrated by the interplay of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 973.014(1)(b) and (2)(1993-94):16  If “any later date” 
in subsection (1)(b) authorized the imposition of a life 
sentence with a parole eligibility date far beyond life 
expectancy, i.e., life in prison without the possibility of 
parole, why would the legislature have added subsection (2) 
which specifically authorizes a life sentence without parole? 
Simply put, if the majority’s interpretation of subsection (b) 
                     
16 1993 Wisconsin Act 289 amended Wis. Stat. § 973.014, 
renumbering the statute and adding the following provision: 
(2) 
when 
a 
court 
sentences 
a 
person 
to 
life 
imprisonment under s. 939.62(2m), the court shall 
provide that the sentence is without possibility of 
parole. 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
7 
is correct, subsection (2) is unnecessary.  It is superfluous 
and meaninglessa result that must be avoided. 
¶64 A 
related 
canon 
of 
construction 
supports 
the 
conclusion that “any later date” does not give the circuit court 
the authority to impose a life sentence without parole: “Where 
the legislature uses two different phrases . . . in two 
paragraphs in the same section, it is presumed to have intended 
the two phrases to have different meanings.”  Armes v. Kenosha 
County, 81 Wis. 2d 309, 318, 260 N.W.2d 515 (1977)(footnote 
omitted).  See also Weber v. Town of Saukville, 209 Wis. 2d 214, 
231, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997).  Since the legislature has used 
language in Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c)(1995-96) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014(2)(1993-94) expressly authorizing life without parole 
sentences, 
its 
omission 
of 
such 
language 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.014(1)(b) 
ought to 
be 
given 
substantive, 
meaningful 
effect.  The majority’s reading strips the different statutory 
wordings of any real difference. 
¶65 This is exactly the point of a recent decision by the 
Seventh Circuit in an analogous situation.  The federal statutes 
involved in United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 
1995), provided that a person guilty of arson, in which death 
resulted, “shall” be subject to “imprisonment for any term of 
years, or to the death penalty, or to life imprisonment as 
provided in § 34 of this title.”  Id. at 1432.   Section 34 
provided that a person shall be subject to the “death penalty or 
to imprisonment for life, if the jury shall in its discretion so 
direct.”  Id. 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
8 
¶66 Although the jury had not directed that Martin be 
sentenced to life in prison, the trial court imposed a term of 
years far beyond his life expectancy.  The Seventh Circuit 
vacated and remanded for resentencing, holding that where a 
legislatively enacted sentencing scheme has expressly deprived a 
court of the possibility of imposing a life sentence, a sentence 
for a term of years exceeding the defendant’s approximate life 
expectancy would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion.  
Judge Flaum explained, “If we are to give [the statute] real 
meaning, 
a 
sentencer 
cannot 
be 
permitted 
to 
evade 
the 
restrictions on one kind of sentence by imposing a substantially 
identical one with a slightly different name.”  Martin, 63 F.3d 
at 1434.  See also United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 843-
44 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (where sentencing 
judge was “disempowered” from imposing life, “if he used a term 
of years to impose a life sentence he was evading a limitation 
on his authority.”). 
¶67 Legislative 
history 
can 
also 
be 
indicative 
of 
legislative intent.  However, as the defendant argues, the 
legislative history of this statute raises more questions than 
it answers. 
¶68 The original version of Wis. Stat. § 973.014 was 
enacted by 1987 Wisconsin Act 412.  That Act was first 
introduced as Assembly Bill 8 (November 1987 Special Session).  
As enacted by the Assembly, the bill originally provided that 
anyone convicted of a crime punishable by life imprisonment 
could 
be 
sentenced 
to 
life 
“without 
parole 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
9 
eligibility”precisely the sentence imposed in this case.  The 
Senate then enacted a much narrower version, which simply 
provided that a circuit court could defer the date of parole 
eligibility in cases where the defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder while committing or attempting certain violent 
felonies, including hostage taking.  See § 5 of Senate 
Substitute Amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 8. 
¶69 The measure then moved back to the Assembly, where it 
was further amended by a provision that ultimately became the 
basis for the present Wis. Stat. § 973.014.  See § 5 of Assembly 
Amendment 1 to Senate Substitute Amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 8. 
 That version would have provided the circuit court with three 
sentencing options: 
 
973.014  SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT; PAROLE 
ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION.  When a court sentences a 
person to life imprisonment for a crime committed on 
or after the effective date of this section . . . 
[revisor inserts date], the court shall make a parole 
eligibility determination regarding the person and 
choose one of the following options: 
 
(1) The person is not eligible for parole. 
 
(2) The person is eligible for parole under s. 
57.06(1). 
 
(3) The person is eligible for parole on a date 
set by the court.  The court may not set a date that 
occurs before the earliest possible parole eligibility 
date as calculated under s. 57.06(1). 
(Emphasis added).  Thus, this version would have expressly 
authorized the sentence imposed in this caselife without 
possibility of parole.  But, the legislature’s Committee of 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
10
Conference recommended that this option be struck; Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014 was thereafter adopted with only two parole options 
rather than with the third option of life without parole. 
¶70 Since the legislature struck a provision that would 
have expressly authorized precisely the sentence that was 
imposed here (life without parole), the remainder of the statute 
as enacted should not be construed as authorizing such a 
sentence.  The legislature’s action “strongly militates against 
a [judicial] judgment that [the legislature] intended a result 
that it expressly declined to enact.”  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp 
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).  “Where [a legislature] 
includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but 
deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the 
limitation was not intended.”  Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983). 
¶71 The State argues that a May 23, 1988 one-page memo to 
“File” 
prepared 
by 
Bruce 
Feustel, 
an 
attorney 
with 
the 
Legislative Reference Bureau, and a one-page “Drafting Request” 
from the “Conference” that was apparently received by Mr. 
Fuestel on May 24 provide a clear indication of legislative 
intent.  The Feustel memo summarized the three parole options 
contained in the amended Assembly version of A.B. 8 before it 
went to the Committee of Conference, and opined that there was 
“no limit” on how long parole eligibility could be deferred by a 
circuit court; it “could be a date 100 years in the future.” 
¶72 I disagree with the State’s interpretation.  The 
Feustel memo is simply too slim a reed to support the conclusion 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
11
that the legislature definitely intended to grant implicit 
authority to circuit courts to impose indirect life without 
parole sentences on the basis of ambiguous statutory language.   
¶73 Finally, the court must recognize that the legislature 
knows how to create an unambiguous statute.  In his brief, 
Setagord sets forth several examples of legislative drafting 
that exhibit an unambiguous legislative intent to allow the 
circuit court to impose a life sentence without parole, 
demonstrating that when the legislature intends to authorize 
such 
punishment 
it 
does 
so 
directly 
through 
plain 
and 
unambiguous language. 
¶74 In the first example, Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2)(1993-94) 
expressly provides that “persistent repeaters” are subject to 
life imprisonment “without the possibility of parole.”  Setagord 
is not a persistent repeater.  Yet he has been sentenced as if 
he were. 
¶75 Second, Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c)(1995-96) expressly 
gives the circuit court the power to declare that any defendant 
sentenced to life imprisonment “is not eligible for parole,” but 
“only if the court sentences a person for a crime committed on 
or after August 31, 1995.”  Setagord is not subject to this 
section.  Yet he has been sentenced as if he were. 
¶76 The legislature’s direct authorization of life without 
parole sentences in these situations demonstrates that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.014(1)(b)(1991-92) does not extend so far as to 
authorize the imposition of an indirect sentence of life without 
parole by the setting of a parole eligibility date that no 
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
12
defendant could possibly live to reach.  Had the legislature 
intended to permit such sentences in § 973.014(1)(b), it could 
and would have used the same language as it used in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.014(2)(1993-94) 
and 
the 
newly 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.014(1)(c)(1995-96).   
¶77 The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1) during 
the pendency of this case to add another parole eligibility 
option: a circuit court now has the power to declare that any 
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment “is not eligible for 
parole,” but “only if the court sentences a person for a crime 
committed on or after the effective date” of the amendment, 
August 31, 1995.  See 1995 Wis. Act. 48, § 5 (to be codified as 
Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c)).  It is conceded that Setagord is 
not subject to sentencing under this provision because his crime 
was committed prior to its effective date. 
¶78 The majority’s interpretation fails for yet another 
reason:  since the legislature clearly knows how to authorize 
life without parole sentences, its command in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014 that a sentencing “shall” set a parole eligibility 
date can only be construed as requiring that the defendant be 
given a meaningful possibility for parole at some point within 
an average person’s lifetime.  To construe a command that a 
parole eligibility date be set as allowing a circuit court to 
render a convicted defendant entirely ineligible for parole is 
inconsistent with the duty to set a date for parole eligibility. 
 It results in making a “charade” out of the whole parole 
eligibility date determination and exalts form over substance.  
 
 
950207 and 961264wab 
 
13
This violates the fundamental canon that statutes are to be 
construed 
to 
avoid 
absurd, 
unreasonable, 
illogical, 
and 
senseless interpretations.  See, e.g., State v. Moore, 167 Wis. 
2d 491, 496, 481 N.W.2d 633 (1992). 
¶79 In sum, looking at the phrase “any later date” in 
isolation, the majority erroneously concludes that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014 is unambiguous.  However, when that phrase is properly 
construed in conjunction with other provisions of the statute, 
more than one reasonable interpretation can be drawn as to its 
meaning.  Accordingly, the statute is ambiguous.  Because it is 
the function of the legislature to establish sentencing policy, 
and because fundamental rules of statutory construction indicate 
that the legislature’s sentencing policy as established in 
§ 973.014(1)(b) was to allow the circuit court the discretion to 
set a parole eligibility date that provided a reasonable 
expectation of parole eligibility, I respectfully dissent. 
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradely join this dissenting 
opinion.