Title: Rybicki v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 332, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HEATHER J. RYBICKI, 
§  
 
§ 
No. 332, 2014 
 
Defendant-Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant. 
§ 
Court Below:   
 
 
 
 
§ 
Superior Court of the 
 
 
v. 
§ 
State of Delaware, in and for 
    
§ 
New Castle County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 1306019828 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  May 20, 2015 
Decided:  July 20, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices.  
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire (argued), Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant. 
Andrew J. Vella, Esquire (argued), Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Appellee. 
 
VALIHURA, Justice: 
 
 
 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Heather J. Rybicki (“Rybicki”) was convicted by a jury of driving 
under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”).1  Rybicki was sentenced to two years of 
Level V incarceration, suspended after three months for one year and six months of 
Level IV home confinement, suspended after six months for one year of Level III 
probation.  On appeal, Rybicki raises five issues.  She argues that (1) there was no 
probable cause to issue the search warrant to obtain a blood sample used to 
determine her BAC; (2) there was no probable cause for her warrantless arrest; (3) 
absent the BAC evidence, there was insufficient evidence for conviction; (4) the 
State did not lay a sufficient foundation for the BAC evidence; and (5) two jury 
instructions given by the trial court were improper comments on the evidence.  We 
disagree, and for the reasons stated herein, AFFIRM the judgment below. 
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 22, 2013, Rybicki was arrested and charged with DUI following a 
single-vehicle accident, during which she lost control of her car.  John Klingler 
(“Klingler”), who was driving on the highway, witnessed a cloud of dust and 
Rybicki’s vehicle settle in the lanes of traffic coming toward him.  Her vehicle was 
1 21 Del. C. § 4177(a). 
1 
                                          
 
“almost facing the wrong way.”2  Klingler approached Rybicki as she was 
attempting to restart her car.  He noted that she seemed disoriented, as if she were 
in a state of shock.  Klingler testified at trial that Rybicki smelled of alcohol, 
slurred her words, and “became very unhappy” when he told her that he had called 
911.3  He noticed the smell of alcohol when he was two to three feet from 
Rybicki’s window. 
Newark Police Officer Corporal Joseph Kendrick (“Corporal Kendrick”) 
responded to the 911 call.  He found Rybicki seated in the driver’s seat of her 
vehicle.  Rybicki’s vehicle was in the northbound lanes facing west, perpendicular 
to the lanes of traffic.  Corporal Kendrick immediately noted a strong odor of 
alcohol as he spoke with Rybicki.  Rybicki could not explain how the accident 
happened, but complied with Corporal Kendrick’s instructions without staggering 
or slurring her speech.4  Rybicki refused to submit to field sobriety, preliminary 
breath, or Intoxilyzer tests, but conceded at trial that she had been drinking on the 
night of her arrest.  She testified that she had consumed approximately four beers 
over a four and one-half hour period. 
2 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A38. 
3 Id. at A39. 
4 Rybicki struggled to produce documents requested by Corporal Kendrick, and was seen passing 
over the requested documents as she searched for them.  When asked for her driver’s license, 
Rybicki gave Corporal Kendrick her state identification card and not her driver’s license. 
2 
                                          
 
Corporal Kendrick obtained a search warrant to compel Rybicki’s 
submission to a blood test in order to determine Rybicki’s BAC.  The probable 
cause affidavit attached to the application for the search warrant provided: 
This Affiant responded to a one vehicle accident at S. College Ave. 
just south of Rt. 4. This Affiant observed the suspect’s vehicle, a 2010 
black nissan rogue, Delaware registration # 743036, went up and over 
a grass embankment from the park and ride parking lot striking the 
curb and coming to rest facing w/b across the n/b lanes on S. College 
Ave. This Affiant contacted the driver, Heather J. Rybicki, and could 
smell an odor of alcoholic beverages emanating from her breath. Ms. 
Rybicki refused all field sobriety tests, preliminary breath test and 
Intoxilyzer 5000. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant believes there is probable cause that the 
above-named defendant is presently under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs and requests a search warrant to draw the above-named 
defendants blood be issued.5 
 
After a magistrate judge issued the search warrant, a phlebotomist drew 
Rybicki’s blood in an interview room at the police station using a sealed kit.  At 
the time her blood was drawn, Rybicki’s BAC was 0.18. 
On November 8, 2013, Rybicki moved to suppress the BAC evidence, 
arguing that the search warrant authorizing the blood draw was fatally defective 
because it did not suggest a fair probability that Rybicki was under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs while driving.  On December 19, 2013, Rybicki filed a second 
motion to suppress based on a theory that there was no probable cause for her 
5 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A30. 
3 
                                          
 
arrest.   Both of these motions were denied by the trial court.  Rybicki filed a 
motion to reargue on January 16, 2014, but the trial court declined to hear 
reargument. 
As a result, the BAC evidence was introduced at Rybicki’s two-day trial in 
April 2014.  A jury found Rybicki guilty of DUI under 21 Del. C. § 4177(a), 
although it was not clear whether the jury found that she was guilty of driving 
while impaired under § 4177(a)(1) or having a prohibited BAC within four hours 
of driving under § 4177(a)(5). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Rybicki first argues that there was no probable cause to issue a 
search warrant for the BAC evidence.  Generally, a trial court’s denial of a motion 
to suppress after an evidentiary hearing challenging the sufficiency of a search 
warrant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.6  “Where the facts are not in dispute 
and only a constitutional claim of probable cause is at issue, this Court’s review of 
the Superior Court’s ruling is de novo.”7  However, as we explained in State v. 
Holden, “[a] court reviewing the magistrate’s determination has the duty of 
ensuring ‘that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable 
6 Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d 961, 966 (Del. 2010). 
7 State v. Holden, 60 A.3d 1110, 1113 (Del. 2013) (quoting Smith v. State, 887 A.2d 470, 473 
(Del. 2005)). 
4 
                                          
 
cause existed.’”8 “A magistrate’s determination of probable cause ‘should be paid 
great deference by reviewing courts’ and should not, therefore, ‘take the form of a 
de novo review.’”9 “‘Notwithstanding this deference,’ the reviewing court must 
determine whether the magistrate’s decision reflects a proper analysis of the 
totality of the circumstances.”10 
Before issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must find that probable cause 
exists that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.11  The 
magistrate may only consider the information contained within the four corners of 
the affidavit.12  “[A] neutral and detached magistrate may draw reasonable 
inferences from the factual allegations in the affidavit.”13  For an affidavit to be 
sufficient, it must “set forth facts permitting an impartial judicial officer to 
reasonably conclude that the items sought would be found at the location.”14  The 
officer is “only required to present facts which suggest, when those facts are 
viewed under the totality of the circumstances, that there is a fair probability that 
8 Id. at 1114 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)). 
9 Id.  
10 Id. (quoting LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1108 (Del. 2008) (citing U.S. v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 915 (1984))). 
11 Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237). 
12 LeGrande, 947 A.2d at 1107. 
13 Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006). 
14 Holden, 60 A.3d at 1115 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jones v. State, 28 A.2d 1046, 1057 
(Del. 2011)). 
5 
                                          
 
the defendant has committed a crime.”15  The affidavit need not rule out potentially 
innocent explanations for a fact.16  Probable cause may be found so long as the 
facts presented in the affidavit are “sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”17 
The facts set forth in the affidavit must provide a sufficient indication of the 
timing of events to allow the issuing judge to conclude that the evidence remains in 
the place to be searched.18  This Court has recognized that “the basic (and, so far as 
we know, unanimous) rule is that failure to state when the alleged facts occurred is 
fatally defective.”19  Without temporal facts, the magistrate has no basis for 
determining whether the information supporting a finding of probable cause is 
stale.20  This concern is most acute when the evidence is likely to be moved or 
destroyed.21  When timing is unclear, a magistrate is “free to draw upon his 
15 State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993) (emphasis in original) (citing Jarvis v. State, 
600 A.2d 38, 42-43 (Del. 1991)). 
16 Id. (observing that “[t]he possibility that there may be a hypothetically innocent explanation 
for each of several facts revealed during the course of an investigation does not preclude a 
determination that probable cause exists for an arrest”). 
17 Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
18 Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 573 (Del. 1975) (“Probable cause must be based on current 
information, not conjecture, for stale information will not support a finding of probable cause.”).  
19 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
20 Id. (finding that an affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause that evidence of a 
burglary would be found in the defendant’s residence “because there was no chronology in the 
affidavit”). 
21 Sisson, 903 A.2d at 297. 
6 
                                          
 
commonsense [sic] to infer reasonably from the facts alleged” that the objects to be 
seized remain on the property to be searched.22 
Here, the affidavit described the unusual nature of the one-vehicle accident 
where Rybicki’s vehicle was discovered over the grass embankment, perpendicular 
to the direction of traffic.  It indicated that Rybicki smelled of alcohol and that she 
refused all field sobriety, preliminary breath and Intoxilyzer tests.  Corporal 
Kendrick also stated in the affidavit that he “believes there is probable cause that 
[Rybicki] is presently under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.”23  Further, the 
affidavit included two time stamps:  June 22, 2013 2:40 and June 22, 2013 2:48.24  
Based on the information contained in the affidavit, and because BAC evidence is 
constantly deteriorating and diminishing with time as the body naturally filters 
alcohol out of the system, the magistrate could reasonably infer that Corporal 
Kendrick had probable cause to believe that Rybicki was driving under the 
influence of alcohol and that she was presently intoxicated.  We acknowledge, 
however, that such an inference relies on the assumption that a responding officer 
22 Id. at 297-98 (finding that probable cause existed despite a potential staleness problem because 
the affidavit provided a date on which an email, which was evidence of a crime, was discovered, 
and the magistrate could reasonably infer that the crime occurred within a short time prior to the 
discovery).  
23 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A30 (emphasis added). 
24 The time stamps appear to be notations made by the fax machine used to transmit the affidavit 
to and from the Newark Police Department. 
7 
                                          
 
would have no apparent reason to delay presentment of the probable cause 
affidavit; indeed the nature of Delaware’s DUI law encourages prompt 
presentment because delays could result in a falsely low BAC level.25  Thus, 
although a reasonable question, we decline to find on this record that the facts set 
forth in the affidavit were insufficient.26 
Further, the affidavit provided sufficient information to establish probable 
cause to obtain Rybicki’s BAC.  The affidavit stated that Corporal Kendrick 
arrived at the scene of a serious one-vehicle accident to find Rybicki disoriented 
and smelling of alcohol.  It appeared from the scene of the accident that Rybicki 
had lost control of her vehicle and had crossed over a grass embankment ending up 
perpendicular to oncoming traffic.  Rybicki also refused to submit to field sobriety, 
preliminary breath, and Intoxilyzer tests.  Any one of these facts, considered in 
isolation, may be insufficient to establish probable cause.  However, the totality of 
the circumstances presented, and the rational inferences drawn therefrom, reveal 
that the police possessed a quantum of trustworthy facts sufficient to warrant a 
25 See 21 Del. C. § 4177(g). 
26 Defense counsel stated at oral argument that Rybicki was not challenging the affidavit on the 
grounds that it lacked a sufficient indication of the timing of events.  Following oral argument, 
defense counsel attempted to raise the argument in a Motion for Reargument.  This Court denied 
the motion.  Our decision as to the sufficiency of the warrant is not based upon counsel’s 
concession at argument. 
8 
                                          
 
person of reasonable caution to conclude that probable cause existed to believe that 
Rybicki was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.27 
Rybicki next argues that there was no probable cause for her arrest.  This 
Court reviews a denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.28  Factual 
findings are reviewed “for whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in 
determining whether sufficient evidence supported the findings and whether those 
findings were clearly erroneous.”29  Where the underlying facts are not in dispute, 
a finding of probable cause to arrest for driving under the influence constitutes a 
legal determination that is subject to de novo review.30   
In order to establish probable cause for an arrest predicated on an alleged 
violation of a DUI statute, the arresting officer must articulate facts considered in 
the totality of the circumstances that suggest there is a fair probability that the 
driver is under the influence.31  A driver is “under the influence” when he or she is, 
“because of alcohol or drugs or a combination of both, less able than the person 
would ordinarily have been, either mentally or physically, to exercise clear 
27 See Maxwell, 624 A.2d at 931. 
28 Miller v. State, 4 A.3d 371, 373 (Del. 2010). 
29 Id. 
30 See Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Del. 2008); Maxwell, 624 A.2d at 928. 
31 Lefebrve v. State, 19 A.3d 287, 292-93 (Del. 2011). 
9 
                                          
 
judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the driving of a vehicle.”32  In 
the specific context of DUI arrests, probable cause is generally based on the 
arresting officer’s observations of the arrestee, which may include field sobriety 
tests.33  An officer need not rule out potentially innocent, alternative explanations 
for a driver’s conduct.34 
We have previously stated that “a traffic violation combined with an odor of 
alcohol, standing alone, do[es] not constitute probable cause to arrest [a] driver for 
a DUI offense.”35  Yet, when “rapid speech, admission to drinking, bloodshot and 
glassy eyes and a failed alphabet test” are added to a traffic violation and odor of 
alcohol, the probable cause standard has been satisfied.36 
Here, the Superior Court concluded that “the nature of the accident, 
combined with the officer’s personal observation of an odor of alcohol on 
Defendant’s breath, constitute probable cause to believe that Defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.”37  In our review of the totality 
of the circumstances, we consider the facts referenced in the Superior Court’s 
32 21 Del. C. § 4177(c)(11). 
33 Lefebvre, 19 A.3d at 293. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (citing Esham v. Voshell, 1987 WL 8277 (Del. Super. Mar. 2, 1987)). 
36 Id. (citing Bease v. State, 884 A.2d 495, 499-500 (Del. 2005)). 
37 State v. Rybicki, 2014 WL 637004, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 14, 2014). 
10 
                                          
 
ruling, along with the facts included within the four corners of the affidavit, 
including Rybicki’s refusal to submit to the “field sobriety tests, preliminary breath 
test and Intoxilyzer 5000.”  The totality of these circumstances suggests that a fair 
probability existed that Rybicki was driving while under the influence.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in determining that 
there was probable cause to arrest Rybicki for DUI. 
Rybicki next contends that if the BAC evidence should have been 
suppressed, then the remaining evidence is insufficient to support her conviction.  
First, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rybicki’s motion 
to suppress the BAC evidence.  Second, Rybicki did not present this argument to 
the trial court below, and thus, we decline to review it for the first time on appeal.38 
Next, Rybicki argues that the State did not lay a proper foundation for the 
introduction of the BAC evidence.  She contends, for the first time on appeal, that 
this Court should hold that the State was required to show that a BAC test kit was 
sterile in order to establish the accuracy and reliability of the results. 
 At trial, defense counsel objected that the State had failed “to lay a proper 
legal foundation for the introduction of blood test results.”39  But defense counsel 
38 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”); Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995). 
39 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A52. 
11 
                                          
 
refused to articulate any specific objection beyond that.  The trial court asked, 
“What are they missing?”40  Defense counsel replied that he was not “here to 
teach” the prosecution so that they could “cure the problem.”41  The trial court 
continued to press:  “Well, you expect me to rule on it, I have to give the basis of 
my ruling.”42  Defense counsel responded, “I know you’re going to overrule me 
because I haven’t articulated a specific reason of the objection so the record will be 
what the record is.”43  The trial court then overruled the objection “because [it did 
not] have any basis upon which to sustain it.”44 
Generally, this Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse 
of discretion.45  The failure to timely object to the admission of evidence based 
upon a lack of foundation is typically reviewed only for plain error.46  “However, if 
the record reflects that the decision not to object at trial was a deliberate tactical 
maneuver by defense counsel and did not result from oversight, then that action 
40 Id. at A52. 
41 Id. at A52-53. 
42 Id. at A53. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Norwood v. State, 95 A.3d 588, 594 (Del. 2014). 
46 Winn v. State, 1993 WL 144875, at *2 (Del. 1993). 
12 
                                          
 
constitutes a true waiver [that precludes plain error review].”47  Here, there was a 
general objection, followed by a tactical refusal to provide the court with a specific 
basis for it. 
On appeal, Rybicki points to no Delaware case law or statute requiring the 
State to demonstrate that the BAC collection equipment was sterile before such 
evidence may be admissible at trial.  There is no indication in the record that 
suggests that the equipment used was not sterile.  Nor is there a statutory provision 
that expressly requires testimony about the sterility of the equipment used in a 
blood draw.48  Instead, Rybicki points to examples where courts in other 
jurisdictions have adopted this specific foundation requirement for admission of 
blood test results.49  Given that Rybicki points to no Delaware authority supporting 
her objection, she cannot maintain that the specific grounds for her foundation 
47 Wright v. State, 980 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Del. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Czech v. 
State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008)); see also Bowersox v. State, 2013 WL 1198083, at *2 (Del. 
Mar. 25, 2013); Crawley v. State, 2007 WL 1491448, at *2 (Del. May 23, 2007); Baker v. State, 
1993 WL 557951, at *4 (Del. Dec. 30, 1993); Tucker v. State, 564 A.2d 1110, 1118-19 (Del. 
1989). 
48 See 21 Del. C. § 4177(h).  In fact, the State called Julie Willey, the crime lab director at the 
Delaware State Police Crime Lab, who testified that the sample of Rybicki’s blood that she 
received from the Newark Police did not appear to be tampered with; the device she used to 
analyze Rybicki’s blood was working properly when the blood was tested; there did not appear 
to be any contamination of Rybicki’s blood; routine maintenance is performed on the testing 
devices; and the lab participates in proficiency testing. 
49 See, e.g., People v. Coronado, 2012 WL 470188 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2012); State v. 
Jordan, 181 S.W.3d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Duncan v. City of Cedar Rapids, 560 N.W.2d 320 
(Iowa 1997). 
13 
                                          
 
objection should have been apparent to the trial judge without further explanation.  
She now asks this Court to consider the issue in the first instance, and to adopt 
such a foundation requirement after having made the deliberate, tactical decision 
not to advise the trial court of the specific basis of her objection.  We decline to 
consider this issue now, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Rybicki’s objection.   The trial court was in the best position 
to rule on the matter and to consider it in the appropriate factual context.50 
Finally, Rybicki argues that the Superior Court erred in giving two jury 
instructions that she claims were improper comments on the evidence.  The first 
instruction that Rybicki claims was error discussed the reliability of the BAC 
testing method (the “Reliability Instruction”): 
In this case, the State presented the results of a test that uses a 
scientifically sound method of measuring the alcohol content of a 
person’s blood.  The State is not required to prove the underlying 
scientific reliability of the method used.  The State is required, 
however, to establish that the proper blood collection and testing 
protocols were followed, that the testing device was in proper working 
order and the testing device was correctly operated by a qualified 
person at the time of the test.51 
50 Given Rybicki’s refusal to articulate the specific basis for her objection in response to the trial 
court’s repeated inquiries, this Court would also be justified in concluding that Rybicki has 
waived the argument.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text.   
51 App. to State’s Answering Br. at B48-49. 
14 
                                          
 
The second instruction that Rybicki argues was error discussed Rybicki’s refusal to 
submit to sobriety testing (the “Refusal Instruction”): 
In this case, the State contends that the defendant refused to perform 
standardized field tests as requested by the investigating officer.  
Evidence of refusal of standardized tests is admissible in a DUI case 
as a circumstance that may or may not show consciousness of guilt.  
You may consider this evidence for this limited purpose only.  You 
may not consider evidence of refusal as proof that the defendant 
probably committed the offense.  The evidence of refusal, if proved, 
must be considered by you in light of all other evidence.  Whether or 
not such evidence shows consciousness of guilt and the significance 
attached to such evidence are matters solely for your determination.52 
Although Rybicki claims to have objected to both instructions at trial, her 
references to the record in support of this claim indicate that defense counsel only 
objected to the Refusal Instruction and not the Reliability Instruction. 
Rybicki claims that the jury instructions at issue violated her constitutional 
rights and should both be subject to de novo review.53  However, because Rybicki 
did not object to the Reliability Instruction at trial, and because “[t]he failure to 
object at trial usually constitutes a waiver of a defendant’s right to raise the issue 
on appeal unless the error is plain,” the Reliability Instruction is subject to plain 
error review.54 
52 Id. at B49. 
53 Floray v. State, 720 A.2d 1132, 1137-38 (Del. 1998). 
54 Probst v. State, 547 A2d. 114, 119 (Del. 1988). 
15 
                                          
 
The Delaware Constitution commands that “[j]udges shall not charge juries 
with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact in issue and 
declare the law.”55  This Court has defined an improper comment on the evidence 
as follows: 
A forbidden comment on the evidence or a charge as to matters of fact 
would consist of comments such as an expression of opinion as to the 
credibility of one witness’ testimony as opposed to that of another 
witness, or the expression of a view that one piece of evidence should 
be given more weight than is given to specified conflicting evidence.  
It is not a comment on the evidence for a judge to explain the legal 
significance which the law attaches to a particular factual finding 
provided that it is clear to the jury that the judge is not expressing an 
opinion as to the existence or non-existence of the underlying facts.  
In explaining the law as it applies to various possible findings of 
fact[,] the judge states the questions of fact and declares the law.56 
In Mullin v. State, this Court applied the above rule to a jury instruction 
similar to the Reliability Instruction at issue here.57  This Court held that the 
instruction given in that case, to the extent that it addressed the reliability of the 
Intoxilyzer, was not improper, stating that “[i]t is entirely appropriate for the trial 
court to explain to the jury that Intoxilyzers are scientifically sound devices for 
55 Del. Const. art. IV, § 19. 
56 Hall v. State, 473 A.2d 352, 356 (Del. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). 
57 Mullin v. State, 2006 WL 2506358, at *1 (Del. Aug. 26, 2006).  The pertinent part of the 
instruction at issue was as follows: “The State presented the results of the Intoxilyzer[,] which 
uses a scientifically sound method of measuring the alcohol content of a person’s blood.  The 
State is not required to prove the underlying scientific reliability of the method used by the 
Intoxilyzer.  The State is required to establish that the Intoxilyzer was in proper working order 
and that it was correctly operated by a qualified person. . . .”  Id. 
16 
                                          
 
measuring blood alcohol level, and that the State need not prove their scientific 
reliability.”58   
Here, the Reliability Instruction is nearly identical to the instruction 
endorsed by this Court in Mullin.  The only difference is that here, the Reliability 
Instruction was used with a different blood-testing device, namely, a gas 
chromatograph.  Although Rybicki argues that “[t]here is absolutely no recorded 
case precedent in Delaware where that language was utilized with regard to gas 
chromatography,”59 this Court did address such an instruction when a gas 
chromatograph was used in Bowersox v. State.60  There, Bowersox argued that the 
jury instructions were incorrect statements of the law, and in particular, that the 
following language was in error: 
This Court recognizes that the blood-testing device; i.e. the gas 
chromatograph used in this case employs a scientifically sound 
method of measuring the alcohol content of a person’s blood. The 
State is not required to prove the underlying scientific reliability of the 
blood-testing device, but is required to establish that the procedure 
and testing needs was done pursuant to proper protocol and was 
performed by a qualified person.61 
This Court disagreed, and held that “[a]lthough the instruction could have been 
better phrased, it clarified for the jury that the scientific basis for gas 
58 Id. at *2. 
59 Appellant Opening Br. at 30. 
60 2013 WL 1198083 (Del. Mar. 25, 2013). 
61 Bowersox, 2013 WL 1198083, at *3. 
17 
                                          
 
chromatography was not at issue in the trial,” and that “[t]he instruction states in 
plain language that the State was required to prove the testing was done pursuant to 
proper protocol by a qualified person.”62  We similarly conclude here that the 
Superior Court did not commit plain error in giving the Reliability Instruction. 
As for the Refusal Instruction, Rybicki did object in the proceeding below.  
She claims on appeal that although the State is free to argue the significance of her 
refusal to submit to the tests, the Superior Court’s instruction served as an 
improper “endorsement” of the State’s view of the evidence.   
We will review a trial judge’s charge to the jury by looking at the jury 
instructions “as a whole.”63  Jury instructions are considered sufficient so long as 
they are “reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices 
and standards of verbal communication.”64  Some deficiencies in jury instructions 
will be tolerated, so long as the instructions are “a correct statement of the 
substance of the law . . . [and the jury was able to] intelligently perform its duty in 
returning a verdict.”65 
62 Id. 
63 Probst, 547 A.2d at 119. 
64 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
65 Floray, 720 A.2d at 1138. 
18 
                                          
 
In a trial for DUI, the refusal to submit to sobriety testing is admissible “for 
any relevant purpose, including to show consciousness of guilt.”66  An instruction 
stating that “evidence of refusal of standardized tests is admissible in a DUI case as 
a circumstance that may or may not show consciousness of guilt” is a correct 
statement of the law. 
We conclude that the Refusal Instruction was not an improper comment on 
the evidence, but we also recognize the possibility that placing too much emphasis 
on certain evidence could, in different circumstances, mislead a jury.  Reversal is 
required only if the “deficiency undermined the ability of the jury to intelligently 
perform its duty in returning a verdict.”67 
Here, the Superior Court, at the request of defense counsel, made a number 
of changes to the version of the instruction initially proposed.  The language in the 
initially proposed instruction, based upon our review of the limited portions of the 
record provided, indicates that it was modified from a formulation stating that a 
refusal tends to show consciousness of guilt, to state that a refusal “is admissible.”  
Defense counsel agreed that this change was a correct statement of the law.  The 
instruction was further modified to state that a refusal “may or may not” show 
consciousness of guilt.  Defense counsel agreed that using “may or may not” 
66 Church v. State, 2010 WL 5342963, at *2 (Del. Dec. 22, 2010). 
67 Floray, 720 A.2d at 1138 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
19 
                                          
 
“would take away the comments -- the court commenting.”  The initial language 
was changed further at defense counsel’s request to refer to the refusal “to perform 
standardized field tests,” and to exclude reference to the Intoxilyzer 5000 test.  
Finally, the trial court included the sentence, “You may not consider evidence of 
refusal as proof that the defendant probably committed the offense,” to which 
defense counsel responded, “Fine.  Thank you.” 
Rybicki continues to press her objection to the Refusal Instruction, but 
viewing the instructions as a whole -- and given the modifications made by the trial 
court -- we conclude that Rybicki was not prejudiced by the Refusal Instruction.  
As is reflected by the painstaking efforts of the Superior Court to make sure that 
the Refusal Instruction was carefully balanced so as to not encourage the jury to 
give undue weight to any specific part of the record, refusal instructions have been 
found by other courts to pose more of a risk than a benefit.  Although the record 
and briefing before us make it hazardous to make broad pronouncements about the 
utility of such instructions, we do acknowledge that Rybicki’s concerns as a 
general matter are colorable.  But as can be seen by any fair reading of the Refusal 
Instruction ultimately given by the Superior Court, the Refusal Instruction here 
posed no risk of prejudice to Rybicki, and might have even been favorable to her, 
as it accurately and carefully instructed the jury on the appropriate way to consider 
an important part of the record.  Given the accuracy and balance of the instruction 
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before us, we decline, on a record as narrow as this one, to find error in the trial 
court’s instruction.  Finally, we observe that such an instruction need not be given 
in every case.  As with many instructions covering discrete subjects that may not 
be pertinent in every case, it need only be given in those cases where it is requested 
and supported by the evidence. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based upon the forgoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby 
AFFIRMED. 
 
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