Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Matthew T. Luening
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP002166-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2023

2023 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2166-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Matthew T. Luening, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Matthew T. Luening, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LUENING  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 15, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam.  
  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP2166-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Matthew T. Luening, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Matthew T. Luening, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 15, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   This 
matter 
returns 
to 
the 
court 
following remand to Referee James J. Winiarski.   
¶2 
Attorney Matthew Luening was admitted to practice law 
in Wisconsin in 2010 and practices in Milwaukee.  His 
disciplinary 
history 
consists 
of 
two 
consensual 
public 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
2 
 
reprimands.  Public Reprimand of Matthew T. Luening, No. 2017-3;1 
Public Reprimand of Matthew T. Luening, No. 2017-10.2 
¶3 
On December 29, 2020, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint against Attorney Luening, alleging 
twelve counts of misconduct.  Seven of those counts arose out of 
Attorney Luening's practice before an immigration tribunal.  
Attorney Winiarski was appointed referee.  During the pendency 
of the case, the referee granted summary judgment in favor of 
OLR on one count of misconduct, and OLR dismissed one count.  
Following an evidentiary hearing, the referee issued a report 
finding that OLR met its burden of proof with respect to six of 
the counts of misconduct alleged in the complaint, including 
three of the immigration-based counts.  The referee recommended 
a six-month suspension of Attorney Luening's license to practice 
law. 
¶4 
Attorney Luening appealed, arguing that a six-month 
suspension was excessive.  The OLR cross-appealed, arguing that 
the referee erred in finding that OLR failed to meet its burden 
of proof on one of the alleged counts of misconduct and that a 
six- month suspension was inadequate. 
¶5 
In advance of oral argument, the court learned that on 
the same day it filed the complaint against Attorney Luening, 
                                                 
1 Electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/6a7e2925573043408b558b4b0a75
2f7f6b1d1933.continue?action=detail&detailOffset=1.  
2 Electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/6a7e2925573043408b558b4b0a75
2f7f6b1d1933.continue?action=detail&detailOffset=0.  
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
3 
 
OLR filed a complaint in another case involving an attorney's 
immigration practice.  The complaint filed in the other case 
cited both the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct alleged 
to have been violated as well as the rules promulgated by the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), as set forth in 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.102. 
¶6 
On February 24, 2023, we ordered the first seven 
counts alleged in the complaint in this proceeding, all of which 
arose out of Attorney Luening's representation of clients before 
an immigration tribunal, dismissed because those counts should 
have been pleaded under the rules promulgated by EOIR rather 
than under Wisconsin's Rules of Professional Conduct.  We 
remanded the matter to the referee for a recommendation on the 
appropriate sanction for the remaining non-immigration related 
counts 
of 
misconduct 
found 
by 
the 
referee. 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Luening, 2023 WI 12, 406 Wis. 
2d 1, 985 N.W.2d 773. (Luening I).  
¶7 
On remand, the referee asked the parties to file 
briefs on the sanction issue.  Both parties advocated for a 
suspension not to exceed 60 days.  On May 10, 2023, the referee 
issued a Report Following Remand in which he concluded that a 
60-day suspension of Attorney Luening's license to practice law 
in Wisconsin would be an appropriate sanction for the remaining 
counts of misconduct.  The referee also recommended that 
Attorney Luening should be responsible for 25% of the costs in 
this case, which would be $8,639.22.  
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Since no appeal was filed from the Referee's Report 
Following Remand, we review the report pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).3  After careful review of the matter, and 
noting the unique circumstances of this case, we agree that 
Attorney Luening's non-immigration related misconduct warrants a 
60-day suspension.  We also agree that Attorney Luening should 
be assessed 25% of the costs of this proceeding.   
¶9 
Three 
of 
the 
non-immigration 
based 
counts 
of 
misconduct alleged in OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney 
Luening's representation of L.S.  L.S. is from Kenya but has 
spent considerable time in the Milwaukee area. In 2013, L.S. was 
living in the Milwaukee area with her husband.  She had 
previously used Attorney Luening's legal services in efforts to 
secure a green card for her son.  As a result of that 
representation, Attorney Luening and L.S. became close friends.  
¶10 L.S. and her husband returned to Kenya in 2013.  
L.S.'s husband was in the military.  He passed away while the 
couple was in Kenya, and L.S. applied for military benefits as a 
result of his death.  When L.S. ran into problems securing the 
benefits, she asked Attorney Luening, who was in Milwaukee, for 
help.  Attorney Luening and L.S. communicated via Skype, email, 
and written correspondence.  Attorney Luening agreed to help 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  "If no appeal is filed timely, the 
supreme court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or remand the 
matter to the referee for additional findings; and determine and 
impose appropriate discipline.  The court, on its own motion, 
may order the parties to file briefs in the matter." 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
5 
 
L.S. obtain the military benefits.  There was no discussion of 
legal fees and no written fee contract.  Attorney Luening said 
he had no intention of charging his friend for his help. 
¶11 In order to secure the military death benefits, L.S. 
executed a Wisconsin General Durable Power of Attorney on 
October 25, 2016 while she was in Kenya.  The power of attorney 
was a general grant of many powers to the named agent, Attorney 
Luening, and it gave Attorney Luening powers over L.S.'s banking 
and other financial transactions.  The power of attorney also 
included powers to resolve the military benefits issue.  
¶12 In 
his 
communications 
with 
authorities 
while 
attempting to secure military benefits for L.S., Attorney 
Luening referred to L.S. as his client. 
¶13 In March 2018, Attorney Luening received notice that 
L.S. would receive the death benefits.  In a March 18, 2018 
letter to L.S., Attorney Luening said he was happy they were 
able to deal successfully with the military.  He also said, "My 
representation as your attorney is now ended, as I see it."  
¶14 In April 2018, L.S. sent Attorney Luening a check for 
$3,000 accompanied by a note in which L.S. said the money was to 
thank Attorney Luening for helping her with the military 
benefits issue.  Attorney Luening sent L.S. a handwritten letter 
that month in which he discussed his financial problems.  In a 
May 4, 2018 letter to Attorney Luening, L.S. said: 
I received your mssge (sic) and note Babe.  I can help 
you.  I can lend you $25,000 if you need it.  You can 
deposit payments when I come over. 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
6 
 
¶15 No further communication occurred between L.S. and 
Attorney Luening about a loan agreement or about the terms of a 
loan such as the type of disbursement that would be made or the 
repayment of interest.  
¶16 In June 2018, using the power of attorney L.S. had 
signed, Attorney Luening began making electronic withdrawals 
from L.S.'s checking account and transferring the funds to his 
bank account for his own personal use.  He did not provide L.S. 
notice of the electronic withdrawals. 
¶17 Between June 28, 2018 and January 2, 2019, Attorney 
Luening stated that he made thirteen withdrawals totaling 
$23,600.  L.S. said the number and total amounts of the 
withdrawals was greater.  
¶18 L.S. returned to Milwaukee from Kenya in February 
2019.  Between January 28, 2019 and February 8, 2019, Attorney 
Luening withdrew an additional $7,200 from L.S.'s checking 
account to cover the expense of her hotels, food, security 
deposit at her Milwaukee apartment, cell phone, and for expenses 
Attorney Luening and his staff incurred taking L.S. shopping, 
looking for apartments, taking her to visit friends in town, and 
making trips back and forth to his office.  L.S. knew and 
approved of those withdrawals. 
¶19 On or about February 22, 2019, L.S. paid Attorney 
Luening $10,000 in attorney's fees for his representation in the 
military benefits matter.  Attorney Luening did not provide L.S. 
with any billing statements for his work in representing her in 
that matter. 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
7 
 
¶20 Beginning in June 2019, Attorney Luening began making 
payments, via electronic deposits and cashier's checks, to L.S. 
as repayment for the purported loan.  As of March 10, 2020, 
Attorney Luening had repaid L.S. $33,000.  Attorney Luening 
considered the purported loan amount to be $23,600 and interest 
to be $9,400. 
¶21 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Luening's dealings with 
L.S.: 
Count 8:  By failing to communicate to [L.S.] in 
writing the scope of his representation or the basis 
or rate of his fee or expenses for which [L.S.] would 
be 
responsible, 
[Attorney] 
Luening 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.5(b)(1).4 
Count 9:  Having formerly represented [L.S.], by using 
his knowledge of [L.S.]'s funds in the . . . checking 
account to the disadvantage of [L.S.], [Attorney] 
Luening violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(1).5 
                                                 
4 SCR 
20:1.5(b)(1) 
provides: 
 
"The 
scope 
of 
the 
representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for 
which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to 
the client in writing, before or within a reasonable time after 
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will 
charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate 
as in the past. If it is reasonably foreseeable that the total 
cost of representation to the client, including attorney's fees, 
will be $1000 or less, the communication may be oral or in 
writing. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses 
shall also be communicated in writing to the client." 
5 SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) provides:  "A lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm 
has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would 
permit or require with respect to a client, or when the 
information has become generally known." 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
8 
 
Count 10:  By misappropriating [L.S.]'s funds for his 
own personal use, [Attorney] Luening violated SCR 
20:8.4(c).6 
¶22 The last two non-immigration related counts alleged in 
OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Luening's practicing law 
while his license was suspended.  
¶23 On April 5, 2019, the Wisconsin Board of Bar Examiners 
(BBE) sent a Notice of Noncompliance to Attorney Luening 
advising him that he had until June 4, 2019 to complete his 
2017-2018 
mandatory 
continuing 
legal 
education 
(CLE) 
requirements and informing him that if he did not become 
compliant, his law license would be automatically suspended on 
June 5, 2019.  The notice also stated that the CLE report and 
any unpaid late fee must be received no later than June 4, 2019 
in order for him to remain eligible to practice law in 
Wisconsin.  
¶24 Attorney Luening acknowledged that he received notice 
prior to June 5, 2019.  Although he timely obtained the 
necessary CLE credits and filed a CLE report showing compliance, 
he failed to pay the late fee by June 4, 2019. 
¶25 On June 5, 2019, BBE suspended Attorney Luening's 
Wisconsin law license for noncompliance with the 2017-2018 
mandatory CLE requirements because the late fee had not been 
paid.  The BBE sent a memorandum to the clerk of this court and 
all judges of courts of record in Wisconsin listing the 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
9 
 
attorneys who were suspended as of that date for failure to 
comply with CLE requirements.  Attorney Luening's name was on 
the list.  The BBE also mailed Attorney Luening a notice on that 
date informing him that his law license had been suspended.  
¶26 Due to the suspension of his Wisconsin law license, 
Attorney Luening was not eligible to practice in any United 
States immigration court, per 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1.  Attorney 
Luening continued to practice law and represent clients on June 
5, 6, and 7, primarily in criminal and immigration matters, 
including appearing in court and by phone, as well as filing 
motions.  He did not inform any of the courts presiding over 
those matters of his suspension.  
¶27 When Attorney Luening learned that he had failed to 
pay the late fee, he stopped practicing law and took immediate 
action to remedy the situation.  On June 10, 2019, Attorney 
Luening filed a petition for reinstatement with BBE in which he 
reported 
compliance 
with 
the 
2017-2018 
mandatory 
CLE 
requirements, identified the instances in which he had practiced 
law during the period of suspension, and verified that he had 
paid the $200 reinstatement fee. 
¶28 On June 10, 2019, Attorney Luening's license to 
practice law was reinstated. 
¶29 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Luening's practice of law 
while suspended: 
Count 11:  By appearing on behalf of clients and 
filing motions on behalf of clients in circuit court 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
10 
 
while subject to a CLE suspension, [Attorney] Luening 
violated SCR 31.10(1)7 and SCR 22.26(2)8, enforceable 
via SCR 20:8.4(f).9 
Count 12:  By appearing on behalf of clients in 
immigration court while he was not eligible to 
practice law in immigration court, [Attorney] Luening 
violated SCR 20:5.5(a)(1).10 
                                                 
7 SCR 31.10(1) provides:  "If a lawyer fails to comply with 
the attendance requirement of SCR 31.02, fails to comply with 
the reporting requirement of SCR 31.03(1), or fails to pay the 
late fee under SCR 31.03(2), the board shall serve a notice of 
noncompliance on the lawyer. This notice shall advise the lawyer 
that the lawyer’s state bar membership shall be automatically 
suspended for failing to file evidence of compliance or to pay 
the late fee within 60 days after service of the notice. The 
board shall certify the names of all lawyers so suspended under 
this rule to the clerk of the supreme court, all supreme court 
justices, all court of appeals and circuit court judges, all 
circuit court commissioners appointed under SCR 75.02(1) in this 
state, all circuit court clerks, all juvenile court clerks, all 
registers in probate, the executive director of the state bar of 
Wisconsin, the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office, and the 
clerks of the federal district courts in Wisconsin. A lawyer 
shall not engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin while his 
or her state bar membership is suspended under this rule." 
8 SCR 22.26(2) provides:  "An attorney whose license to 
practice law is suspended or revoked or who is suspended from 
the practice of law may not engage in this state in the practice 
of law or in any law work activity customarily done by law 
students, law clerks, or other paralegal personnel, except that 
the attorney may engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice of law." 
9 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
10 SCR 5.5(a)(1) provides:  "A lawyer shall not practice law 
in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the 
legal profession in that jurisdiction except that a lawyer 
admitted to practice in Wisconsin does not violate this rule by 
conduct in another jurisdiction that is permitted in Wisconsin 
under SCR 20:5.5 (c) and (d) for lawyers not admitted in 
Wisconsin." 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
11 
 
¶30 OLR dismissed Count 12 during the pendency of this 
action. 
¶31 In his Report Following Remand, the referee found that 
OLR had met its burden of proof as to Counts 8, 10, and 11 of 
the complaint. 
¶32 With respect to the counts relating to L.S., the 
referee noted that Attorney Luening was successful in securing 
military benefits for L.S.  The referee also noted that in the 
letter Attorney Luening wrote to L.S. confirming that successful 
outcome, Attorney Luening made no request for any legal fees.  
The referee said, "Much later, and upon her return from Kenya to 
Milwaukee in 2019, [L.S.] voluntarily gave [Attorney] Luening a 
$10,000 payment.  There was no bill issued by [Attorney] Luening 
in relation to the $10,000 payment and it apparently was an 
amount [L.S.] came up with on her own to show her appreciation 
for [Attorney] Luening's services."  The referee went on to say: 
Count 8 of the complaint alleges that [Attorney] 
Luening failed to communicate to [L.S.] in writing the 
scope of his representation or the basis or the rate 
for his fee.  Despite the fact that [Attorney] Luening 
never had any intention of charging his friend for his 
legal services, [Attorney] Luening was a lawyer and 
did perform legal services for [L.S.] without any 
discussion or written agreement in relation to the 
cost of his legal services.  There should have been 
some discussion or writing between [Attorney] Luening 
and [L.S.] in relation to the cost of such legal 
services.  If [Attorney] Luening did not intend to 
charge her anything for his legal services, that 
should have been conveyed to [L.S.] at the beginning 
of the representation.  While I find [Attorney] 
Luening's gratuitous thinking in relation to his close 
friend, [L.S.], to be a friendship gesture, as a 
lawyer, he was still required to convey intended 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
12 
 
charges or lack thereof to [L.S.]  His failure to do 
so is a violation of SCR 20:1.5(b)(1).  His gratuitous 
and friendship goals are more of a mitigating factor 
to be considered by me in recommending appropriate 
discipline for this violation of the rules. 
¶33 In finding that OLR failed to meet its burden of proof 
with respect to Count 9 of the complaint, the referee said that 
the evidence showed that L.S. "knew perfectly well that the 
power of attorney allowed [Attorney] Luening access to her 
[bank] account and she benefitted from his continuing access to 
her accounts."  The referee said L.S. testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that she thought the proceeds from the 
military benefits claim were being deposited into her bank 
accounts; she thought additional benefits were due her; the 
power of attorney she gave to Attorney Luening was not only to 
obtain the military benefits but also to have him help her with 
the military benefits after they were deposited into her 
accounts; and she never revoked the power of attorney.  The 
referee also noted that L.S. testified that she never arranged 
for her bank statements to be forwarded to her in Kenya; she 
knew the statements were being sent to her old address in 
Milwaukee; and she had no way to access her bank account other 
than through Attorney Luening.  
¶34 The referee rejected OLR's claim that Attorney Luening 
used his knowledge of L.S.'s bank accounts as a result of 
"formerly" representing her in obtaining the military benefits. 
Rather, the referee said: 
The representation of [L.S.] by [Attorney] Luening and 
the use of the power of attorney was continuous at 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
13 
 
[L.S.]'s directions to [Attorney] Luening.  [L.S.] 
knew that [Attorney] Luening continued to have the 
power of attorney and she made use of the power by 
directing 
[Attorney] 
Luening 
to 
conduct 
certain 
transactions with the [bank] accounts.  [L.S.] knew 
she had given [Attorney] Luening the general durable 
power of attorney and that it remained in effect even 
after some of the military benefits had been received 
as 
a 
result 
of 
[Attorney] 
Luening's 
efforts. . . . [L.S.] benefitted from and directed 
further use of the power of attorney by [Attorney] 
Luening. 
 ¶35 The referee found that the evidence showed a close 
personal relationship between L.S. and Attorney Luening while 
she was residing in Kenya, with considerable communications of a 
personal nature.  The referee said after Attorney Luening 
indicated 
he 
was 
experiencing 
financial 
problems, 
L.S. 
responded, "I can help you. I can lend you $25,000 if you need 
it.  You can deposit payments when I come over."  The referee 
found Attorney Luening's testimony that he believed L.S. was 
offering him a loan up to $25,000 that he could repay when she 
returned to Milwaukee a plausible interpretation of L.S.'s 
statement to him.  By contrast, the referee said the language of 
the communication did not support L.S.'s claim that she meant 
she would consider making a loan to Attorney Luening when she 
returned to Milwaukee.  The referee said although L.S. claimed 
she did not have any money to make the loan when she sent her 
communication to Attorney Luening, "She knew the military death 
benefits were going into her [bank] accounts" and "she knew 
perfectly well that she had given [Attorney Luening] a power of 
attorney that gave him access to the . . . accounts."  The 
referee also said, "While there is some nominal disputes as to 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
14 
 
the exact amounts removed by [Attorney] Luening from [L.S.]'s 
accounts, all of the money removed has been returned by 
[Attorney] Luening to [L.S.] and OLR does not claim . . . any 
additional amount is still owed by [Attorney] Luening in 
relation to the loans."  
¶36 The referee found that OLR met its burden of proof 
with respect to Count 10 of the complaint, and he found that 
Attorney Luening did violate SCR 20:8.4(c) by removing money 
from L.S.'s accounts.  However, the referee rejected OLR's 
contention that Attorney Luening planned to use L.S.'s power of 
attorney to "misappropriate" her funds. The referee said: 
[Attorney] Luening did not make gifts to himself using 
the power of attorney.  He made loan payments to 
himself which he believed [L.S.] had offered to him.  
There is no evidence that [Attorney] Luening ever 
suggested the loan amounts were gifts. . . . 
[L.S.] was a nurse and thus highly educated. . . . 
While I have found [Attorney] Luening, as a lawyer, 
should have further clarified the loan offer from a 
client, [L.S.] needs to take responsibility for the 
language she used.  Also, her claim that she did not 
realize [Attorney] Luening had the ability to transfer 
money from her account lacks credibility, given that 
she was the one who actually gave such power to him in 
the power of attorney she prepared and signed. 
¶37 Finally, with respect to Attorney Luening's practicing 
law while suspended, the referee noted that he had previously 
granted OLR's motion for summary judgment on Count 11, and the 
referee described Attorney Luening's failure to pay the late 
fees to BBE "an oversight . . . and not a deliberate act of 
defiance."  
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
15 
 
¶38 Turning to the appropriate level of discipline for the 
three counts of misconduct, the referee noted that courts should 
consider:  (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; 
(3) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
conduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan, 2011 WI 
7, ¶15 n.9, 331 Wis. 2d 341, 795 N.W.2d 745 (recognizing the ABA 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, as amended in 1992, as 
a guidepost). 
¶39 The referee noted that Attorney Luening's two public 
reprimands did not adequately demonstrate to Attorney Luening 
the need to scrupulously comply with Supreme Court Rules.  The 
referee also noted that this court has recognized the need for 
progressive discipline in attorney disciplinary cases.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 
296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.  
¶40 With respect to the two counts involving L.S., the 
referee said Attorney Luening believed L.S. was offering him a 
loan of up to $25,000, and although he should have clarified and 
documented the loan offer, Attorney Luening did not outright 
steal L.S.'s money.  The referee said: 
[Attorney Luening] was fully aware that [L.S.] would 
learn of the loans upon her return to Milwaukee.  
Also, he actually arranged for bank statements to be 
sent to her upon her return to Milwaukee.  He did not 
try to hide the loan amounts he received.  He repaid 
the loans and he claims with interest.  While the 
evidence in regard to the repayments of the loans was 
not clear, OLR does not argue in its post-hearing 
briefs that any amount remains due.  Nonetheless, 
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
16 
 
[Attorney] Luening should have known that he needed to 
confirm [L.S.]'s willingness to make the loan and he 
should have kept her inform[ed] of the amounts he was 
taking from her account.  In essence, both [L.S.] and 
[Attorney] Luening were sloppy in how both of them 
approached the loan.  However, [Attorney] Luening was 
the professional attorney who should have realized the 
need to further document the situation. 
¶41 The referee went on to say: 
While I have found that [Attorney] Luening should have 
had a fee agreement or at least something in writing 
when he began helping [L.S.] obtain the military 
benefits due her as a result of her husband's death, 
it is clear from the evidence that [Attorney] Luening 
did not intend to charge her anything for his legal 
services.  While OLR suggests in their briefs some 
sort of evil motive and intent to ultimately charge 
[L.S.] for the services, I did not find anything of 
the sort in the evidence. . . . I do not see this as a 
classic case where a lawyer simply did not provide a 
fee contract to a client. . . . There certainly are 
mitigating circumstances to be taken into account in 
both the fee contract and loan counts. 
¶42 The referee concluded that a 60-day suspension was an 
appropriate sanction for Attorney Luening's misconduct.  
¶43 As to the assessment of costs, the referee noted that 
this court's general policy is to impose all costs upon a 
finding of misconduct.  SCR 22.24(1m).  The referee noted that 
OLR's complaint alleged twelve counts of misconduct, while the 
referee was tasked with recommending an appropriate sanction for 
only three of those counts.  The referee noted that SCR 
22.24(1m) sets forth the factors to be considered in assessing 
costs.  The referee said: 
I believe the two most important factors in relation 
to the assessment of costs in this case are that 
[Attorney] Luening has previously received two public 
reprimands, 
each 
involving 
multiple 
violations.  
No. 
2020AP2166-D   
 
17 
 
However, I cannot ignore the fact that the respondent 
has only been found responsible on three of twelve 
counts.  Seven of the original 12 counts were 
improperly charged.  While mathematical equality is 
not always required, I believe the respondent should 
be responsible for 25% of the costs in this case. 
¶44 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The 
court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of 
the 
referee's 
recommendations. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶45 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law and find that Attorney Luening violated the 
Supreme Court Rules as alleged in Counts 8, 10, and 11 of the 
complaint.  After careful consideration, we also agree with the 
referee that a 60-day suspension of Attorney Luening's license 
to practice law in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction for his 
misconduct, and we agree with the referee's recommendation on 
the imposition of costs.  
¶46  We frequently say that since no two disciplinary 
cases are precisely the same, there is no standard sanction for 
any particular misconduct.  We find, however, that the counts of 
misconduct found by the referee in this case are somewhat 
similar to the misconduct at issue in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Toran, 2018 WI 26, 380 Wis. 2d 531, 909 
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N.W.2d 411 and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bartz, 
2015 WI 61, 362 Wis. 2d 752, 864 N.W.2d 881.  
¶47 In Bartz, we imposed a 60-day suspension for five 
counts of professional misconduct that included a violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) that was more egregious than the violation that 
occurred in the instant case since Attorney Bartz, after 
settling a personal injury claim, disbursed monies held in trust 
to himself, leaving no funds in trust attributable to his client 
or the client's medical provider.  Attorney Bartz's disciplinary 
history consisted of a consensual private reprimand.  In Toran, 
we imposed a 60-day suspension for three counts of misconduct 
that included failing to enter into a written fee agreement with 
a client and failing to return an advanced payment of fees when 
the attorney did not complete the work for which he was 
retained.  Attorney Toran's disciplinary history consisted of 
two 
consensual 
public 
reprimands, 
a 
consensual 
private 
reprimand, and a six-month suspension.  
¶48 Here, the referee found Attorney Luening's failure to 
pay the late fee associated with his lack of timely compliance 
with mandatory CLE requirements to be an oversight.  Although 
Attorney Luening practiced law for several days after his law 
license was suspended, as soon as he learned he had not paid the 
late fee, he ceased practicing law and took immediate steps to 
correct his error.  Although his practice of law during those 
few days is a violation of the rules of professional misconduct, 
standing alone it would not warrant a license suspension. 
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¶49 Attorney Luening's misconduct related to L.S. is 
obviously more serious.  Even if Attorney Luening did not intend 
to charge his friend for assisting her in obtaining military 
benefits following the death of her husband, as an attorney he 
had the obligation to clearly communicate with L.S. regarding 
the issue of fees.  The fact that Attorney Luening was 
successful in obtaining an award of the military benefits does 
not relieve him of his responsibilities under SCR 20:1.5(b)(1).  
¶50 Attorney Luening's transfer of funds from L.S.'s bank 
account after she told him, "I can lend you $25,000 if you need 
it," is his most serious transgression.  As the referee noted, 
Attorney Luening was serving as L.S.'s agent under the power of 
attorney and was acting as a fiduciary for her.  As an attorney, 
he should have recognized the need to clarify the terms of the 
loan offer he believed she had made.  It is significant, 
however,  that the referee, who was in the best position to 
judge witness credibility, found Attorney Luening's testimony 
about the loan to be credible, and he found parts of L.S.'s 
testimony about the loan to be less than credible.  We agree 
with the referee that while both L.S. and Attorney Luening were 
sloppy in how they approached the loan, as both an attorney and 
as L.S.'s fiduciary, Attorney Luening bore the responsibility of 
clarifying and documenting the terms of the loan before 
transferring any funds from L.S.'s account to his own.  
¶51 The referee is correct that we generally adhere to the 
concept of progressive discipline.  This is Attorney Luening's 
third disciplinary proceeding.  The referee is also correct that 
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Attorney Luening's two previous public reprimands apparently did 
not impress upon him the need to strictly adhere to the rules of 
professional conduct.  We concur with the referee's conclusion 
that a 60-day suspension of Attorney Luening's law license is an 
appropriate sanction. 
¶52 We turn now to the issue of costs.  The referee 
recommends that Attorney Luening be responsible for 25% of the 
costs.  As the referee noted, upon a finding of misconduct, our 
general policy is to impose all costs of the proceeding upon the 
respondent.  See SCR 22.24(1m).  In appropriate cases, the court 
may, in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount of 
costs.  In exercising its discretion regarding the assessment of 
costs, the court considers the statement of costs, any objection 
and reply, the recommendation of the referee, and (a) the number 
of counts charged, contested, and proven; (b) the nature of the 
misconduct; (c) the level of discipline sought by the parties 
and recommended by the referee; (d) the respondent's cooperation 
with the disciplinary process; (e) prior discipline, if any; and 
(f) other relevant circumstances.  Id.  
¶53 The pre-appellate costs of this proceeding, prior to 
October 24, 2022 when this court asked the parties to advise 
whether SCR 20:8.5(b)11 required that the counts of misconduct 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:8.5(b) provides:  "Choice of law. In the exercise 
of the disciplinary authority of this state, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct to be applied shall be as follows:  
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before 
a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal 
sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and  
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arising out of Attorney Luening's representation of clients 
before an immigration tribunal should have been pleaded under 
EOIR rules, are $34,556.88.  In addition, OLR's appellate 
counsel fees are $4,207.00.  Twelve counts of misconduct were 
charged in OLR's complaint.  Three were proven.  In their post-
remand briefs, the parties agreed that a suspension not 
exceeding 60 days would be appropriate, and the referee agreed 
with their assessment.  As noted, this is Attorney Luening's 
third disciplinary proceeding.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) for any other conduct,  
(i) if the lawyer is admitted to the bar of only this 
state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this 
state.  
(ii) if the lawyer is admitted to the bars of this 
state and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied 
shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which 
the lawyer principally practices, except that if particular 
conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to the bar, 
the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that 
conduct.  
(iii) if the lawyer is admitted to the bar in another 
jurisdiction and is providing legal services in this state  
(Continued) 
 
as allowed under these rules, the rules to be applied shall 
be the rules of this state.  
(c) A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the 
lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of 
the lawyer's conduct will occur." 
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¶54 Recognizing that its charging decisions resulted in 
substantial additional costs——as well as the dismissal of seven 
out of the originally pleaded twelve counts of misconduct——OLR 
urges the court to assess 50% of the pre-appellate costs against 
Attorney Luening.  In support of its recommendation, OLR points 
to Attorney Luening's two previous public reprimands.  It also 
asserts, "most of the work that OLR performed would have taken 
place regardless of the number of counts charged."  OLR 
recommends that the court assess 50% of the costs incurred prior 
to October 24, 2022, or $17,278.44.  For the period beginning 
October 24, 2022, OLR recommends that the court assess no costs 
since it concedes those amounts arose directly from the charging 
decision that this court held was improper.  
¶55  Upon consideration of the factors set forth in SCR 
22.24(1m), along with the unique circumstances of this case, we 
adopt the referee's recommendation to impose 25% of the pre-
October 24, 2022 costs, or $8,639.22.  Of the twelve counts of 
misconduct alleged in OLR's complaint, only three were proven.  
One count was dismissed by OLR, and this court dismissed the 
seven immigration-based counts due to OLR's failure to plead 
them under the rules promulgated by EOIR.  If OLR's complaint 
had contained only the five counts unrelated to Attorney 
Luening's 
practice 
before 
an 
immigration 
tribunal, 
this 
proceeding would have been greatly simplified and the costs 
would likely have been a fraction of their actual amount.  While 
the referee is correct that costs should not be assessed based 
on "mathematical equality," we conclude that requiring Attorney 
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2020AP2166-D   
 
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Luening to pay 25% of the pre-October 24, 2022 costs would be 
equitable based on the unique circumstances presented here. 
¶56 We note that while it may appear that by dismissing 
the seven counts of misconduct arising out of the representation 
of clients before an immigration tribunal and reducing the costs 
of the proceeding by 75%, Attorney Luening is getting off 
lightly, that is not the case.  As we noted in Luening I, OLR's 
failure 
to 
plead 
the 
seven 
immigration-based 
counts 
of 
misconduct under EOIR rules, while simultaneously pleading 
immigration-based counts against another attorney under EOIR 
rules, 
threatened 
to 
undermine 
confidence 
in 
Wisconsin's 
attorney regulatory system given OLR's disparate treatment of 
two similarly situated attorneys.  Luening I, 2023 WI 12, ¶20. 
We concluded that the appropriate remedy for OLR's decision not 
to prosecute Attorney Luening's immigration-based misconduct 
counts under EOIR rules was dismissal of those counts.  Id., 
¶22.  
¶57 The suspension of an attorney's license to practice 
law, even for a brief period of time, is a significant sanction.  
The attorney is deprived of his livelihood during the period of 
suspension.  He is required to notify all clients and courts 
before which he practices of the suspension.  The court's order 
of suspension is published and may have an adverse impact on the 
attorney's ability to attract future clients.  In short, a 60-
day suspension is not a de minimus sanction, and we find it is 
the appropriate sanction under the unique facts of this case.  
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2020AP2166-D   
 
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¶58 As to the 75% reduction in costs, since the vast 
majority of the costs incurred in this matter arose out of OLR's 
prosecution of, and Attorney Luening's vigorous defense against, 
the seven immigration-based counts of misconduct that this court 
dismissed, Attorney Luening should be relieved of having to pay 
the costs associated with OLR's significant error in pleading.   
¶59 In closing, we note again that this is Attorney 
Luening's third disciplinary proceeding.  We remind him that the 
court may impose progressively severe sanctions when an attorney 
engages in a pattern of misconduct.  We impose the sanction 
recommended by the referee in this matter with the expectation 
that Attorney Luening will not commit future misconduct that 
would 
subject 
him 
to 
additional, 
potentially 
harsher, 
discipline. 
¶60 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Matthew T. Luening 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 
days, effective January 26, 2024. 
¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Matthew T. Luening shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation costs in the amount of $8,639.22.  
¶62 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Matthew T. Luening shall 
comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the 
duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin 
has been suspended.  
 
 
 
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