Title: In re J.A.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 7PA17-3
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 7PA17-3 
Filed 25 September 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: J.A.M. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 20 May 
2019 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in District Court, Mecklenburg County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 29 July 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Marc S. Gentile, Associate County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Mecklenburg 
County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services Division. 
 
Matthew D. Wunsche, GAL Appellate Counsel, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice.  
 
Respondent appeals from an order entered by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in 
District Court, Mecklenburg County, on 20 May 2019 terminating her parental rights 
in J.A.M., a girl born in January 2016.1 Respondent’s counsel has filed a no-merit 
brief pursuant to Rule 3.1(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
                                            
1 The trial court previously terminated the parental rights of J.A.M.’s father, who is 
not a party to this appeal. The testimony presented in this case was incorrect to the extent 
that it states that the father’s parental rights in J.A.M. were terminated on 31 March 2016. 
The father’s parental rights were actually terminated on 14 November 2016.  
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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respondent has filed her own written arguments as permitted by that rule. Because 
we conclude that the issues raised by respondent and her counsel are meritless, we 
affirm. 
On 29 February 2016, soon after J.A.M.’s birth, the Mecklenburg County 
Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services Division (YFS), filed a 
juvenile petition alleging that the infant child was neglected due to the serious 
domestic violence histories of both parents. With regard to respondent, the juvenile 
petition alleged that she “had a child receive life[-]threatening injuries while in her 
care in the past and [had] her rights terminated to six other children.” The juvenile 
petition further noted that “[b]oth parents refused to sign a Safety Assessment, 
stating that [respondent] does not trust anyone with YFS.”  
In a prior decision in this case, we summarized respondent’s history with YFS 
in Mecklenburg County as follows:  
Respondent[ ] 
has 
a 
significant 
history 
of 
involvement with YFS extending back to 2007 relating to 
children born prior to J.A.M. . . . [R]espondent[ ] has a long 
history of violent relationships with the fathers of her 
previous six children, during which her children “not only 
witnessed domestic violence, but were caught in the middle 
of physical altercations.” Furthermore, during this period, 
she repeatedly declined services from YFS and “continued 
to deny, minimize and avoid talking about incidences of 
violence.” All of this resulted in her three oldest children 
first entering the custody of YFS on 24 February 2010. 
 
The most serious incident occurred in June 2012 
when respondent[ ] was in a relationship with E.G. Sr., the 
father of her child E.G. Jr., a relationship that—like prior 
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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relationships between respondent[ ] and other men—had a 
component of domestic violence. Respondent[ ] had 
recently represented to the court that “her relationship 
with E.G. Sr. was over” and stated that she “realized that 
the relationship with E.G. Sr. was bad for her children”; 
however, she quickly invited E.G. Sr. back into her home. 
Following another domestic violence incident between 
respondent[ ] and E.G. Sr., E.G. Jr. “was placed in an 
incredibly unsafe situation sleeping on the sofa with E.G. 
Sr.” for the night, which resulted in E.G. Jr. suffering 
severe, life-threatening injuries, including multiple skull 
fractures, at the hands of E.G. Sr. The next morning, 
respondent[ ] “observed E.G. Jr.’s swollen head, his failure 
to respond, and his failure to open his eyes or move his 
limbs,” but she did not dial 911 for over two hours. 
Following this incident, respondent[ ]’s children re-entered 
the custody of YFS. Afterwards, she refused to 
acknowledge E.G. Jr.’s “significant special needs” that 
resulted from his injuries, maintaining that “there was 
nothing wrong with him” and “stating that he did not need 
all the services that were being recommended for him.” 
Respondent[ ] proceeded to have another child with E.G. 
Sr. when he was out on bond for charges of felony child 
abuse. 
 
In response to respondent[ ]’s failure to protect E.G. 
Jr., as well as her other children, her parental rights to the 
six children she had at the time were terminated in an 
order filed on 21 April 2014 by Judge [Louis A.] Trosch. The 
2014 termination order was based largely on the court’s 
finding that she had “not taken any steps to change the 
pattern of domestic violence and lack of stability for the 
children since 2007.” 
 
In re J.A.M. (J.A.M. II), 372 N.C. 1, 2–3, 822 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2019) (cleaned up).  
 
Judge Louis A. Trosch2 held a hearing on YFS’s juvenile petition on 30 March 
                                            
2 Judge Louis A. Trosch and Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch are both district court judges 
in Mecklenburg County. Because both judges entered orders in this matter, they are referred 
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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2016 and entered an order the same day adjudicating J.A.M. a neglected juvenile and 
ordering that reunification efforts with respondent were not required based on the 
trial court’s previous termination of her parental rights in J.A.M.’s six siblings. As 
part of the adjudication and disposition order, the trial court maintained J.A.M. in 
YFS custody and awarded respondent one hour of supervised visitation semiweekly. 
 
Respondent appealed the 30 March 2016 adjudication and disposition order. 
While her appeal was pending, the trial court continued to conduct permanency 
planning hearings. In an order entered on 12 April 2016, Judge Louis Trosch 
suspended respondent’s visitation with J.A.M., reaffirmed that efforts for 
reunification with respondent were not required, and ordered YFS to file for 
termination of respondent’s parental rights within sixty days. YFS filed a motion to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights in J.A.M. on 10 May 2016 (TPR motion). The 
TPR motion was held in abeyance pending the outcome of respondent’s appeal from 
the initial adjudication and disposition order.3  
 
In an opinion filed on 20 December 2016, the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
reversed the adjudication and disposition order holding that the evidence and the 
trial court’s findings of fact did not support the trial court’s adjudication of neglect. 
In re J.A.M., 251 N.C. App. 114, 120, 795 S.E.2d 262, 266 (2016), rev’d per curiam, In 
                                            
to by their first and last names. 
3 On 2 September 2016, YFS filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of J.A.M.’s 
father. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on 31 October 2016 and terminated the 
father’s parental rights in an order entered on 14 November 2016.  
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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re J.A.M. (J.A.M. I), 370 N.C. 464, 809 S.E.2d 579 (2018). YFS and the guardian ad 
litem (GAL) filed a joint petition for discretionary review in this Court on 6 January 
2017, which we allowed by order entered on 8 June 2017. 
 
On 11 January 2017, following the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing the 
trial court’s order adjudicating J.A.M. to be a neglected juvenile, respondent filed a 
motion to reinstate her supervised visitation privileges. Judge Elizabeth Trosch 
granted the motion, awarding respondent one hour of supervised visitation with 
J.A.M. biweekly and authorizing YFS to expand respondent’s supervised visitation 
privileges. 
After we granted discretionary review in J.A.M. I, Judge Elizabeth Trosch 
again suspended respondent’s visitation in a permanency planning hearing order 
entered on 22 August 2017 finding that respondent 
has begun to visit with the juvenile but has engaged in no 
other service[s] related to domestic violence, mental health, 
parenting or substance abuse. [Respondent] is currently 
pregnant and refuses to provide any information related to 
the father of that child. [Respondent] has chosen to take no 
action since the Court of Appeals decision to demonstrate 
she understands the impact that domestic violence has on 
a child . . . and has shown no evidence of changed behavior. 
 
Respondent appealed the trial court’s order, but the Court of Appeals dismissed her 
appeal, holding that the trial court’s order was interlocutory, and denied her petition 
for writ of certiorari. In re J.M., 259 N.C. App. 250, 812 S.E.2d 413 (2018) 
(unpublished).  
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On discretionary review in J.A.M. I, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ 
decision reversing the 30 March 2016 adjudication and disposition order and 
remanded “for reconsideration and for proper application of the standard of review.” 
370 N.C. at 467, 809 S.E.2d at 581. On remand, a divided panel of the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. In re J.A.M., 259 N.C. App. 810, 817, 816 
S.E.2d 901, 905 (2018), aff’d, 372 N.C. 1, 822 S.E.2d 693 (2019). Respondent appealed 
to this Court.  
In J.A.M. II, we affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision in an opinion filed on 
1 February 2019. 372 N.C. at 11, 822 S.E.2d at 700. We held the trial court’s findings 
of fact supported the trial court’s conclusion that J.A.M. was a neglected juvenile 
based on the substantial risk of harm she faced in respondent’s care. 
Combined with the lengthy record from her past 
cases, the findings that respondent[ ] believed she did not 
need any services from YFS, had opted not to directly 
confront her romantic partner’s prior domestic violence 
history, and continued to minimize the role her own prior 
decisions played in the harm her older children had 
suffered all support a conclusion that respondent[ ] had not 
made sufficient progress in recognizing domestic violence 
warning signs, in accurately assessing poor decisions from 
the past, or in identifying helpful resources. It was proper 
for the trial court to then reach the conclusion that 
respondent[ ] had not developed the skills necessary to 
avoid placing J.A.M. in a living situation in which she 
would suffer harm. 
 
Id. at 10–11, 822 S.E.2d at 699. 
 
 
Following our decision in J.A.M. II, YFS provided notice of a hearing on the 
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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TPR motion. Respondent filed a motion for Judge Elizabeth Trosch’s recusal on the 
ground that she had conducted multiple permanency planning hearings in the case 
since January 2017 and had maintained a primary permanent plan of adoption for 
J.A.M. based on her assessment of the child’s best interests.4 Inasmuch as Judge 
Elizabeth Trosch had “already formed an opinion that termination [of respondent’s 
parental rights was] in the child’s best interest[s],” respondent argued that her 
recusal was required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
well as Canon 3C(1) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Elizabeth 
Trosch denied respondent’s motion to recuse in a written order entered on 14 March 
2019, finding as follows: 
4. 
The practice in Mecklenburg County and others 
across this state is that the same judge will hear 
matters regarding the same family. It is known 
colloquially as “one judge-one family.” Thus, it is 
common practice for the same judge to hear both an 
underlying juvenile court matter with a family and 
then also hear a Termination of Parental Rights 
(TPR) proceeding involving that same family. 
 
5. 
This one judge-one family practice has not been 
found by the appellate courts to be inappropriate or 
to prejudice litigants or to violate the Constitutional 
rights of the litigants. 
 
6. 
A juvenile court judge hearing a TPR proceeding is 
presumed to set aside any incompetent evidence and 
                                            
4 Respondent also erroneously claimed that Judge Elizabeth Trosch entered the 2014 
order terminating her parental rights to her six older children and thus “has independent 
knowledge about an allegation [made] by YFS” in the TPR motion. The record actually shows 
that Judge Louis Trosch entered the prior termination order.  
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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to decide the matter solely based upon the record 
evidence presented during the proceeding. 
 
7. 
[Respondent] has not demonstrated that she will be 
prejudiced by the undersigned remaining as the 
judge of record. 
 
Judge Elizabeth Trosch heard the TPR motion on 8 April 2019. Respondent 
was represented by counsel but did not attend the hearing. Counsel for respondent 
offered no evidence but cross-examined YFS’s witness, objected to the introduction of 
the GAL’s report at disposition, and made closing arguments at each stage of the 
hearing.  
 
Judge Elizabeth Trosch entered an “Order Terminating Parental Rights of 
Respondent Mother” (termination order) on 20 May 2019. In adjudicating grounds for 
termination under N.C.G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1), Judge Elizabeth Trosch concluded that 
respondent had previously neglected J.A.M. “and there remains a high probability of 
the repetition of neglect.” See N.C.G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019). Judge Elizabeth Trosch 
also adjudicated grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) in that “respondent . . . had her parental rights to six other 
children terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction and she further 
lacks the ability or willingness to establish a safe home” for J.A.M. See N.C.G.S. 7B-
1111(a)(9). Upon written findings addressing the dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1110(a), Judge Elizabeth Trosch further concluded that terminating respondent’s 
parental rights is in J.A.M.’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). 
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Respondent filed a notice of appeal from the termination order.  
Counsel for respondent has filed a no-merit brief on her behalf pursuant to 
N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(e). Counsel has advised respondent of her right to file pro se 
written arguments on her own behalf and provided her with the documents necessary 
to do so. Respondent has submitted pro se arguments to this Court, which we consider 
below. 
Respondent first denies neglecting J.A.M. and claims that YFS “has been using 
[her] past to take [her children] away and to keep them from [her].” Respondent 
asserts that “it is an illegal and an unconstitutional practice for [YFS] to remove 
children because they witness domestic violence” and that YFS violated her rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by removing J.A.M. from her care without 
probable cause.  
As respondent’s arguments challenge J.A.M.’s initial removal by YFS and her 
adjudication as a neglected juvenile on 30 March 2016, we conclude that her 
arguments are foreclosed by our decision affirming the trial court’s adjudication and 
disposition order in J.A.M. II, 372 N.C. at 11, 822 S.E.2d at 700. Our decision in 
J.A.M. II constitutes “the law of the case” and is binding as to the issues decided 
therein. Shores v. Rabon, 253 N.C. 428, 429, 117 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1960) (per curiam). 
Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s arguments insofar as they concern the trial 
court’s prior adjudication of neglect.  
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Respondent next accuses YFS and the “Trosch Judges” of bias, alleging that 
YFS relied on perjured testimony and fraudulent documents to prevail in the 
proceedings against her. She notes that YFS failed to report at the termination 
hearing that she is successfully raising her eighth child in South Carolina without 
incident. Respondent states that she refused to cooperate with YFS because YFS 
rewards its social workers with financial bonuses and promotions if they successfully 
terminate a parent’s parental rights. She refused to identify the father of her eighth 
child in order to keep the child out of YFS custody. Respondent declined to sign a case 
plan because “a case plan is essentially a plea of guilty” and she “did nothing wrong.”  
Respondent’s allegations of corruption, misconduct, and bias find no support 
in the record. Respondent points to no evidence that YFS employees committed 
perjury or tendered forged documents to the trial court, or that they received bonuses 
or promotions for terminating respondent’s parental rights in her children. Nor does 
respondent show that YFS withheld evidence favorable to respondent from the trial 
court, let alone that YFS had an affirmative duty to present such evidence. We note 
that respondent was afforded the opportunity to present evidence at the termination 
hearing and chose not to do so.  
Respondent also fails to show any circumstances giving rise to a reasonable 
perception of judicial bias against her. As Judge Elizabeth Trosch pointed out, it is 
the practice in North Carolina for one judge to preside over a juvenile case throughout 
the life of the case. This is known as the “one judge, one family” policy. See In re 
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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M.A.I.B.K., 184 N.C. App. 218, 225–26, 645 S.E.2d 881, 886 (2007). Rather than 
showing a bias, this practice reflects a central policy of the state. As shown on the 
North Carolina Judicial Branch’s website, a “major goal of family court is to 
consolidate and assign a family’s legal issues before a single district court judge or 
team 
of 
judges.” 
Family 
Court, 
North 
Carolina 
Judicial 
Branch, 
https://www.nccourts.gov/courts/family-court (last visited Sept. 4, 2020). These 
judges are experienced in family law matters and receive specialized training so that 
family courts can produce “more timely, consistent, and thoughtful outcomes.” Id. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that Judge Elizabeth Trosch presided at earlier 
permanency planning hearings and determined that a permanent plan of adoption 
was in J.A.M.’s best interests did not require her to recuse herself from the 
termination hearing. See, e.g., In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 215, 835 S.E.2d 425, 
431 (2019) (“If the bias alleged here were to be deemed to exist . . . and ultimately to 
require recusal, then the illogical consequence would follow that a district court would 
not ever be able to preside over a termination hearing after it had previously set the 
permanent plan for a juvenile as a plan that would imply or be compatible with 
termination . . . .”); In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 570-71, 571 S.E.2d 65, 
69 (2002) (“[K]nowledge of evidentiary facts gained by a trial judge from an earlier 
proceeding does not require disqualification. Furthermore, we reject any contention 
that [the judge] should be disqualified because he earlier adjudicated the four 
children abused and neglected.” (citations omitted)). 
IN RE J.A.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Finally, we find respondent’s insistence that she “did nothing wrong” and her 
insistence that “it is an illegal and an unconstitutional practice for [YFS] to remove 
children because they witness domestic violence” to be consistent with Judge 
Elizabeth Trosch’s finding that respondent made no meaningful effort or progress 
toward resolving the substantial risk posed to J.A.M. by respondent’s lengthy history 
of relationships involving domestic violence. See generally In re T.M., 180 N.C. App. 
539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 241 (2006) (upholding “the [trial] court’s conclusion that 
[the child’s] exposure to domestic violence rendered him a neglected juvenile”). 
Moreover, the evidence and Judge Elizabeth Trosch’s findings show that respondent 
refused to engage in “services to ameliorate the substantial risk of domestic violence” 
or to maintain contact with YFS even at the cost of having no contact with J.A.M. 
since mid-2017. Respondent’s arguments thus have no legal or factual basis. 
 We also independently review issues identified by respondent’s counsel in a 
no-merit brief filed pursuant to Rule 3.1(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396, 402, 831 S.E.2d 341, 345 (2019). Counsel 
has identified three issues that could arguably support an appeal, while also 
explaining why he believes those issues lack merit. The issues presented by counsel 
are (1) whether Judge Elizabeth Trosch erred by denying respondent’s motion for 
Judge Elizabeth Trosch to recuse herself; (2) whether the termination order contained 
sufficient findings based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to establish the 
existence of statutory grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights; and 
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(3) whether Judge Elizabeth Trosch abused her discretion by concluding that it was 
in J.A.M.’s best interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.  
Having carefully considered the issues identified in the no-merit brief in light 
of the entire record, we conclude that (1) Judge Elizabeth Trosch did not err in 
denying respondent’s motion for Judge Elizabeth Trosch to recuse herself; (2) the 
termination order contains sufficient findings based on clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence to establish the existence of a statutory ground of neglect under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1) for terminating respondent’s parental rights, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1109(f) (2019);5 and (3) Judge Elizabeth Trosch did not abuse her discretion by 
concluding that it was in J.A.M.’s best interests that respondent’s parental rights be 
terminated. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination order. 
AFFIRMED. 
                                            
5 Because we determine that the termination order contains sufficient findings based 
on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to establish the existence of a statutory ground of 
neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we do not address whether additional grounds for 
termination exist under subsection (a)(9). See In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 S.E.2d 49, 
53-54 (2019) (“[W]here the trial court finds multiple grounds on which to base a termination 
of parental rights, and 'an appellate court determines there is at least one ground to support 
a conclusion that parental rights should be terminated, it is unnecessary to address the 
remaining grounds.' " (quoting In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 8, 618 S.E.2d 241, 246 (2005))).