Title: Larry Eugene Mann v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-885
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 28, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94885
____________
LARRY EUGENE MANN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[September 28, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Larry Eugene Mann, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit
court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial.
I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mann was convicted in 1982 of kidnapping and first-degree murder in the
death of ten-year-old Elisa Nelson and was sentenced to death.  The facts of the
case are further set forth in our opinion on Mann’s first direct appeal.  See Mann v.
State, 420 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1982).  This Court affirmed the conviction but
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remanded for resentencing.  See id.  On remand, the circuit court again sentenced
Mann to death, and this Court affirmed.  Mann v. State, 453 So. 2d 784 (Fla.
1984).  After the signing of his death warrant in 1986, Mann filed a motion for
postconviction relief with the circuit court and a petition for writ of habeas corpus
with this Court.  This Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of relief and denied
the habeas petition.  See Mann v. State, 482 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1986).  Mann
received a stay of execution in the federal system, and the circuit court of appeal
eventually decided that his jury had been misinformed as to its role in sentencing
and directed that he be resentenced.  See Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446 (11th
Cir.1988).  After that resentencing, in which Mann was again sentenced to death,
this Court affirmed Mann’s sentence on appeal.  See Mann v. State, 603 So. 2d
1141 (Fla. 1992).
On July 7, 1997, Mann filed a motion for postconviction relief challenging his
convictions and sentence of death.  The circuit judge issued an order on July 29,
1998, denying the majority of Mann’s claims and ordering that an evidentiary
hearing be held concerning Mann’s claim that counsel was ineffective for presenting
evidence of Mann’s pedophilia as mitigation during the penalty phase.  After the
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued an order denying Mann relief.  Mann
now appeals that order.
1Mann alleges that:  (1) the circuit court erred in denying Mann’s claim that counsel was ineffective
for presenting evidence of Mann’s pedophilia; (2) the circuit court erred in denying Mann’s request for an
evidentiary hearing on the remaining ineffective assistance claims; (3) the circuit court erred in denying an
evidentiary hearing concerning Mann’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
extensive prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the circuit court erred in denying Mann an evidentiary hearing
concerning the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; (5) the circuit court erred in
denying an evidentiary hearing concerning Mann’s claim that the court refused to find mitigation that was
established by the evidence; (6) the circuit court erred in dismissing without an evidentiary hearing Mann’s
claim that the rules prohibiting juror interviews are unconstitutional; (7) the circuit court erred in denying an
evidentiary hearing concerning Mann’s claim that section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad; (8) the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing regarding Mann’s claim
that he was denied his right to effective mental heath assistance as required under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68 (1985); (9) the circuit court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing concerning Mann’s claim
that the State unconstitutionally commented on Mann’s right to remain silent; and (10) cumulative error
resulted in an unfair trial.
2Issues four and nine are procedurally barred because they were raised and decided adversely to
Mann on direct appeal, see Mann, 603 So. 2d at 1142-43, and are now improperly recast as ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.  See Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1995).  The following claims are
procedurally barred because they could have been but were not raised on direct appeal:  claim five, see
Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995); claim six, see Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 553,
n.5 (Fla. 1999); and claim seven, see Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1016 (Fla. 1999);
Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2000).
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II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL
In this appeal, Mann raises ten issues.1  We find five to be procedurally
barred,2 and the remaining issues to be without merit for the following reasons.
Mann first argues that defense counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase
for presenting evidence that Mann is a pedophile.  Mann claims that counsel was
aware of the stigma attached to pedophilia and that no reasonable attorney would
offer pedophilia in mitigation in a case with a child victim and no physical indication
of sexual assault.
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In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficiency prejudiced the defense.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).  To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the penalty
phase, the defendant must show that, but for counsel’s errors, a life sentence
would probably have been imposed.  See Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109
(Fla. 1995).  Mann has not met this burden.
In its order denying relief on this issue, the circuit court found that defense
counsel’s decision to introduce pedophilia as a mitigator was a tactical and
strategic decision.  At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified as follows:
Q.  Was the decision to put on mental mitigation a tactical or
strategic decision that you made?
A.  Sure, it was.  We spent a lot of time discussing whether or
not that was a good idea or a bad idea.  What were the pros and what
were the cons.
     You know, was that stuff [pedophilia] going to come out or
not come out, so yeah, we discussed it.  We went over it and when we
made the decision to do it.  I could be questioned either way with
regard to whether or not it was right or wrong to do it, but we did
discussed [sic] it and we made the decision that we thought that it was
necessary and that we felt that in some way it would be helpful to put
in the mental mitigation that was there that we had to offer to the jury.  
Q.  You didn’t have the option of picking another diagnosis other than
the pedophilia so that was pretty much–
A.  I’m not aware of any other diagnosis other than, of course,
Dr. Wayland, who had the opinion that it was a personality disorder as
opposed to anything that ever rose to the level of mental mitigation,
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but no, of the other doctors that had seen him there was no other route
for me to go.
     If you are suggesting brain damage or something like that,
no, I was aware that that did not exist based on the prior examinations.
The record demonstrates that defense counsel considered other ways in
which mental mitigation could have been presented and made a tactical decision to
present evidence of Mann’s pedophilia.  As this Court has held, “Strategic
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action
have been considered and rejected."  State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250
(Fla.1987).  We find that defense counsel’s decision to introduce evidence of
Mann’s pedophilia was strategic and not “outside the broad range of reasonably
competent performance under prevailing professional standards."  Maxwell v.
Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  After much thought and evaluation,
defense counsel determined that the evidence of Mann’s pedophilia was necessary
to establish mental mitigation.  Based on this evidence, the circuit court found in
mitigation that “Mann suffered from psychotic depression and feelings of rage
against himself because of strong pedophilic urges.”  Mann, 603 So. 2d at 1142. 
Mann has not demonstrated that counsel’s performance was below the Strickland
standard.  Thus, relief was properly denied on this issue.
Mann next argues that the circuit court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary
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hearing concerning Mann’s other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  A
court must grant an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel if the motion contains specific facts that are not conclusively
rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency in counsel’s performance
that prejudiced the defendant.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2000). 
When reviewing a court’s summary denial, this Court must accept the defendant’s
factual allegations as true to the extent they are not rebutted by the record.  See id.
Mann claims that counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing
to:  investigate the possibility of brain damage and Mann’s history of substance
abuse as mitigating factors; challenge Mann’s prior conviction; effectively cross-
examine a witness; document the presence of a victim rights organization at Mann’s
resentencing; object to improper closing argument; and, object to improper jury
instructions concerning the aggravating circumstance of prior violent felony.
The record conclusively rebuts Mann’s claim that counsel failed to
adequately investigate and present available mitigation concerning the possibility of
brain damage or the effects of Mann’s history of substance abuse.  Dr. Carbonel
affirmatively stated at the resentencing that she performed a series of
neuropsychological tests that indicated that Mann was not brain-damaged.  As set
forth above, defense counsel also indicated at the evidentiary hearing concerning
3See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999).
4See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999).
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Mann’s pedophilia that brain damage had been ruled out by other experts who had
examined Mann.
At the resentencing, Carbonel testified that she performed various tests
based on Mann’s history of serious alcohol and substance abuse.  She described
Mann as a “polysubstance abuser,” a “very serious substance abuser.”  Carbonel
also testified that Mann was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance when he committed the murder3 and that his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired,4 which was due in part to Mann’s history of substance
abuse.  Based on this evidence, the circuit judge found in mitigation Mann “had a
long history of alcohol and drug dependency.”  Mann, 603 So. 2d at 1142.  Thus, it
is clear that the expert hired by defense counsel considered Mann’s history of
substance abuse and its effects.
The record also conclusively refutes Mann’s claim that counsel failed to
adequately challenge his previous conviction for a violent felony in Mississippi. 
The record reflects that counsel challenged the prior conviction by objecting to its
admissibility, arguing that it was the result of an unconstitutionally vague statute,
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that Mann received ineffective assistance of counsel, that it was in violation of
double jeopardy, based on an unconstitutionally unreliable identification, and that it
was not properly a conviction for a prior violent crime.  Our review of the record
also indicates that defense counsel adequately cross-examined the victim of Mann’s
prior violent felony.  Thus, the circuit court properly denied Mann an evidentiary
hearing on this matter.
Mann’s next subclaim in this issue is that an evidentiary hearing should have
been granted to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to more
vigorously cross-examine Fred Daniels about his knowledge of Mann’s drinking
habits.  Daniels testified at Mann’s resentencing that Mann appeared sober the
morning of the murder.  The cross-examination was as follows:
Q.  Sir, in all the times that you have known Mr. Mann when he
lived in that neighborhood, he always acted the same to you.  You
testified that he didn’t appear any different that day than any other day
when you saw him.  Is that right?
A.  That’s right.
Q.  You were aware of the fact, were you, sir, that Mr. Mann
was quite a big drinker at the time that he lived in your neighborhood?
A.  No.  I’m not aware that he is a drinker of any kind.  I know
he has a beer occasionally, that I do know.
Q.  You didn’t know about him going out and drinking all day
long and not going to work?
A.  No.
Q.  You didn’t know about him coming home late at night?
A.  I don’t know where he is when he comes home at night.
Q.  All the times when you saw him he was the same?
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A.  He was sober.
Q.  That’s not what you stated earlier.  You said he appeared to
be the same, not sober?
[THE STATE]:  That’s argumentative
THE COURT:  Sustained.
Q.  You used the term “sober,” sir.  But my question is:  He
appeared to be the same way the morning you saw him of the
homicide as well as any other time you saw him”
A.  That’s correct.
Q.  And you were not aware of his drinking habits then, are
you?
A.  I’m not aware of his drinking habits, no.
Contrary to Mann’s assertions, defense counsel attempted to elicit from Daniels
that he could not distinguish Mann’s intoxicated and sober behavior.  Thus,
Mann’s request for an evidentiary hearing was properly denied.
Mann’s claim that counsel failed to document the presence of a victims’
rights organization is also without merit.  While not formally objecting to their
presence, defense counsel discussed the victims’ rights group and its name tags
and asked that the group be kept separate from jurors.  The circuit judge asked that
the sheriff’s staff watch carefully to make sure no members of the group
approached the jurors.  Defense counsel again raised the issue later in the trial,
complaining that the group had been talking and groaning during the presentation of
one of the defense’s witnesses but also noting that the group had “been great” until
that incident.  Because Mann has not shown any deficiency in counsel’s
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performance, the evidentiary hearing was properly denied.  See Valle v. State, 705
So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1997) (finding similar conduct not ineffective).
Mann’s final subclaim in this issue, that counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the prior violent felony instruction, is procedurally barred because it was
decided adversely to Mann on direct appeal and is now being recast as a claim of
ineffective assistance.  See Mann, 603 So. 2d at 1143.  Thus, summary denial of
this claim was proper.  See Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).
Mann’s next issue is that the circuit judge erred in denying an evidentiary
hearing concerning Mann’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the extensive prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial and closing.  Our review
of the record indicates that defense counsel did object to several of the comments
Mann claims to be improper.  Additionally, the bulk of Mann’s claim in this issue
relates to the prosecutor’s comments concerning Mann’s pedophilia.  Defense
counsel not only objected to these comments, but this issue was decided adversely
to Mann on direct appeal, see Mann, 603 So. 2d at 1143, and is now improperly
recast as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  See Cherry, 659 So. 2d at
1072.  We find that counsel’s failure to object to the remaining comments that
Mann claims were improper does not demonstrate a deficiency that prejudiced
Mann.  Thus, the circuit court properly denied relief on this issue.
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Mann next argues that an evidentiary hearing should have been granted
concerning his claim that he was denied his right to effective mental heath
assistance as required under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  Ake requires
that a defendant have access to a “competent psychiatrist who will conduct an
appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of
the defense.”  Id. at 83.
The record reveals that Carbonel performed an extensive evaluation of Mann
that included neuropsychological testing based on his history of serious alcohol
and substance abuse and his history of head injury.  Carbonel testified that, in
addition to interviewing Mann, she reviewed numerous documents including
affidavits from family members, Mann’s childhood health records, records from
correctional institutions, hospital records, and expert testimony from prior
proceedings.  Carbonel also testified that she did a lengthy psychological evaluation
of Mann and conducted various tests including a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI) and a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test, among others. 
Based on this evaluation, Carbonel was able to testify to the existence of the two
statutory mental mitigators.
The record demonstrates that Mann’s expert performed all the essential tasks
required by Ake.  Thus, Mann’s request for an evidentiary hearing was properly
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denied.
Mann’s final argument is that cumulative error resulted in an unfair trial.  All
of Mann’s claims were either meritless or procedurally barred; therefore, there was
no cumulative effect to consider.  See Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 749 (Fla.
1998).
III.  CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Mann’s rule
3.850 motion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
James R. Case, Judge - Case No. CRC-80-08741-CFANO-C
John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Julius J. Aulisio, Assistant
CCRC, and Leslie A. Scalley, Staff Attorney, of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-
Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
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for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee