Title: Newtowne Village Service Corp., et al v. Newtowne Road Development Co., Inc. et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 613, 1999
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
NEWTOWNE VILLAGE SERVICE §
CORPORATION and 
§
MICHAEL CIABATTONI,
§
§
Plaintiffs Below,
§
Appellants,
§ No. 613, 1999
§
v.
§ Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
NEWTOWNE ROAD
§ for New Castle County
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
§ C.A. No. 98C-09-188
INC., and BLENHEIM HOMES,
§
L.P.,
§
§
Defendants Below,
§
Appellees.
§
Submitted: March 20, 2001
Decided:
May 2, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE,
Justices, constituting the Court En Banc.
Appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Matthew P. Denn, Esquire and John W. Shaw, Esquire (argued), Young,
Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellants.
Richard P. Beck, Esquire, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington,
Delaware and Jeffrey M. Weiner, Esquire (argued), Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellees.
Per Curiam:
1 For purposes of this opinion, Blenheim and Newtowne Road Development Co. will be
referred to collectively as “Blenheim.”  
2
In this appeal from the Superior Court, we consider the proper construction
of Section 20-70 of the New Castle County Code (“NCCC”), as it existed in 1993,
which governed the financial responsibility for the upkeep of open spaces in housing
subdivisions.   We conclude that the applicable provisions of Section 20-70 of the
NCCC in effect at the time of the dispute in this case were not ambiguous and did
not require developers to maintain open spaces in housing developments pending
approval of those areas of the subdivision by New Castle County (“County”).
Accordingly, the decision of the Superior Court is affirmed.  
I  
Newtowne Village is a community of homes situated near Bear, Delaware.
Appellee/defendant-below, Blenheim Homes, L.P. (“Blenheim”), constructed all the
homes located in Newtowne Village.  Appellee/defendant-below, Newtowne Road
Development Company1 was the owner of the lots upon which the homes were built.
Newtowne Village was developed in three separate phases, each governed by a
separately approved and recorded subdivision plan.  The present dispute involves the
financial responsibility for the upkeep of open space located in Phase III of
Newtowne Village.
2The relevant provisions of the NCCC applicable to this dispute were those in existence
when the County accepted the exploratory plan for review.
3 Section 20-70(c)(1) required maintenance declarations to be executed in substantially the
same form as Appendix XIV.  Here, the Maintenance Declaration, which mirrored the language
found in the NCCC Appendix XIV, provided in relevant part: 
1.  In order that the Private Open Spaces shall be maintained in good and
proper condition, fit for their intended purposes, according to the provisions of
Sections 20-70(c) and (d) of the New Castle County Code, Declarant shall organize
a maintenance corporation (hereinafter “the Corporation”) whose Members shall
be the record Owners of the Lots. 
2.  Prior to the conveyance of the first Lot to any Owner, Declarant shall
incorporate under the laws of the State of Delaware the Corporation referred to in
paragraph I hereof as a nonprofit corporation to be known as a “maintenance
corporation” for the benefit of all Owners, which Corporation shall be charged
with the duty of maintaining the Private Open Spaces in the condition required by
the aforesaid laws of New Castle County, and all other applicable laws and
covenants, and by the Corporation’s Charter and By-Laws. 
3
On March 3, 1993, the County approved the exploratory plan for Phase III.2
On September 3, 1993, a Maintenance Declaration was recorded in accordance with
NCCC Section 20-70(c)(1), which provided that:  
All areas designated on the record plan as private open space, private
streets or rights-of-way, parking areas, or other common facilities, shall
be maintained pursuant to the terms of a maintenance agreement
executed by the owner of the common areas in a form substantially
similar to that set forth in appendix XIV to this Chapter.  The
maintenance agreement shall be subject to the approval of the New
Castle County Law Department and shall be executed and submitted to
that Department for recording prior to the approval of the record plan.
The Maintenance Declaration,3 which was approved by the New Castle
County Law Department, created Appellant/plaintiff-below, Newtowne Village
4The 1995 amendments to the NCCC addressed the source of confusion that is at the heart
of this dispute.  The 1995 amendments clearly place the responsibility for maintaining open spaces
upon the owner or developer of the subdivision until the maintenance corporation has been
transferred to the homeowners and the open space properly completed and conveyed to the
maintenance corporation.   
4
Service Corporation (“Service Corporation”), in order to maintain the open spaces
and other common facilities in Phase III.  
Prior to the 1995 amendments, which substantially revised the NCCC as it
related to the responsibility and maintenance of open space,4 Section 20-70(c)(5)
provided that: 
The corporation created to maintain the private areas shall be created
prior to the conveyance of the first lot or dwelling within the
subdivision.  The developer and/or owner of the subdivision shall be a
member of the maintenance corporation until the last lot in the
subdivision has been conveyed, and shall be assessed for the
maintenance costs attributable to the lots he owns from the time of
creation of the maintenance corporation until the transfer of the last lot
in the subdivision.
In accordance with this provision, Blenheim was initially the sole member of Service
Corporation because it collectively owned all the houses and lots in Newtowne
Village.  At this time, a Blenheim employee was appointed to manage Service
Corporation.  On September 20, 1993, the Major Subdivision Plan for Phase III was
approved by the County and recorded. In 1995, control of Service Corporation was
passed to the homeowners in Phase III of Newtowne Village.  
5
The open space for Phase III of Newtowne Village has not been approved by
the County.  When control of Phase III open space was turned over to Service
Corporation in the Spring of 1995, Blenheim ceased funding the maintenance of
open space.  In September 1998, Service Corporation filed suit alleging that
Blenheim was required to pay Service Corporation for the cost of maintaining open
space and common facilities in Phase III pending County approval of the transfer of
such land to Service Corporation.  Service Corporation further contended that
Bleinheim was obligated to maintain the open spaces using its own funds, rather than
those funds designated for Service Corporation, and sought repayment of monies
used by Service Corporation to maintain open spaces prior to the transfer of those
areas.  Before trial, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
Blenheim’s motion for Summary Judgment was granted by the Superior Court,
which ruled that the ordinance was not ambiguous and limited Blenheim’s
maintenance obligation to its pro rata ownership.
II
Whether the grant or denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment is proper
presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.   See Alfieri v. Martelli,
Del. Supr., 647 A.2d 52, 53 (1994).  The Superior Court’s decision granting
6
Summary Judgment will be affirmed if it appears that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See
Bailey v. City of Wilmington, Del. Supr., 766 A.2d 477, 479-80 (2001);  Merrill v.
Crothall-American, Inc., Del. Supr., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (1992).  Where, as here,
the issue on appeal is a matter of law, we must determine whether the Superior
Court “erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.”  Hudson Farms, Inc. v.
McGrellis, Del. Supr., 620 A.2d 215, 217 (1993). 
Service Corporation contends that Section 20-70 of the NCCC is ambiguous
as to who bears financial responsibility for the upkeep of open space and should be
interpreted to require Blenheim to pay the cost of maintaining open space in Phase
III of Newtowne Village pending County approval.  Specifically, Service
Corporation contends that, because the NCCC does not specify whether the
developer or maintenance corporation has financial responsibility for the upkeep of
unapproved open spaces, it is susceptible to different conclusions or interpretations.
According to Service Corporation, the 1993 Code makes a distinction between
construction of open space, which is the express responsibility of the developer, and
maintenance of open space, which is the responsibility of the maintenance
corporation.  The selection of these two different terms suggests different purposes,
thus creating an ambiguity since the statute does not delineate “the period of time
7
when open space is being constructed ... and the time when the open space is no
longer being constructed.”  Service Corporation contends the ambiguity should be
resolved by requiring developers to maintain open spaces pending County approval.
Blenheim responds that the statute is not ambiguous and, by its terms, fixes
responsibility for maintaining open spaces with the maintenance corporation.
Blenheim contends the statute requires the creation of a maintenance corporation
charged with the duty of maintaining open spaces, and empowered to levy
assessments to cover the costs of such maintenance, prior to the first conveyance of
a deed to a homeowner.  Therefore, according to Blenheim, a developer’s sole
responsibility for maintaining open spaces ends after a third party receives a deed to
one of the lots.  At this point, Blenheim asserts that  responsibility shifts to the
maintenance corporation. 
Only where a statute is ambiguous and its meaning cannot be clearly
ascertained does a court engage in the process of statutory construction and
interpretation.   See Carper v. New Castle County Bd. of Ed., Del. Supr., 432 A.2d
1202, 1205 (1981).  Our first task, therefore, is to determine whether the provisions
of the NCCC are ambiguous.  See State Dept. of Labor v. Reynolds, Del. Supr., 669
A.2d 90, 93 (1995).  A statute will be considered ambiguous when it is reasonably
susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations. See Snyder v. Andrews, Del.
8
Supr., 708 A.2d 237, 241 (1998); Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus.
Control Bd., Del. Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985).  Ambiguity may also be
found if a literal reading of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result
not contemplated by the legislature.   See Snyder, 708 A.2d at 241; Distefano v.
Watson, Del. Supr., 566 A.2d 1, 4 (1989); Coastal Barge, 492 A.2d at 1246.  When
the language and intent of a statute are clear, no ambiguity exists and the Court will
not engage in construing or interpreting the statute.  General Motors Corp. v.
Burgess, Del. Supr., 545 A.2d 1186, 1191 (1988);  Distefano, 566 A.2d at 4.  If a
statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute controls.  See Eliason v.
Englehart, Del. Supr., 733 A.2d 944, 946 (1999); Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., Del.
Supr., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (1982); Daniels v. State, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 1104,
1109 (1988); Coastal Barge, 492 A.2d at 1246.  
We conclude that the provisions of the NCCC pertinent to this dispute are not
ambiguous.  Section 20-70 of the NCCC does not appear “reasonably susceptible of
different conclusions or interpretations.”  Distefano, 566 A.2d at 4. The ordinance
required the creation of a maintenance corporation prior to the first conveyance of
a lot in the subdivision in order to maintain open spaces.  See NCCC Section 20-
70(c)(5)(“The corporation created to maintain the private areas shall be created prior
to the conveyance of the first lot or dwelling within the subdivision...”).  In addition,
5 We also note that there is no language in the NCCC to suggest that the maintenance
corporation was not to have any maintenance duties until the County approved the transfer of the
open spaces from the developer to the maintenance corporation.  
9
Appendix XIV to Section 20 specifically authorized the maintenance corporation to
“collect the equivalent of two (2) years of assessments for the maintenance costs
associated with the maintenance of the common areas....”  The code clearly required
the creation of a maintenance corporation prior to the conveyance of a lot to a home
buyer, and the funding of this corporation through fees charged to purchasers at
settlement, to establish an entity charged with maintaining open spaces in the
development.5  The plain language of the ordinance placed the responsibility for
maintaining open spaces on the maintenance corporation.
Furthermore, Service Corporation’s reading of the ordinance would lead to an
unreasonable result. Pursuant to Section 20-70(c)(5), the developer of a given
subdivision was required to be a member of the maintenance corporation and
contribute to the maintenance corporation in proportion to the number of lots it
owned.   Service Corporation’s interpretation of the ordinance would require the
developer to contribute assessments to the maintenance corporation based on the
number of lots it owns and to be solely responsible for maintenance while awaiting
County approval of the transfer of title from the developer to the maintenance
corporation.  See NCCC Section 20-70(c)(5).  Such a reading of the  ordinance
10
would nullify the provision that permits a sharing of the financial responsibility
between the developer and the new homeowners while the developer owns lots in the
subdivision.  Service Corporation’s argument is contrary to the plain meaning of the
language of the ordinance and such a reading would create an incongruity in the
ordinance.  See, e.g., Coastal Barge, 492 A.2d at 1245 (stating that “each part or
section [of a statute or ordinance] should be read in light of every other part or
section to produce an harmonious whole”).
Therefore, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in finding that the
applicable ordinance of the NCCC was not ambiguous.  The plain language of the
statute required the maintenance of open space in County subdivisions to be handled
by a specially created maintenance corporation.  Because we agree with the Superior
Court that the ordinance is not ambiguous, we decline to address Service
Corporation’s remaining arguments regarding the proper interpretation of the NCCC
and the effect of the 1995 amendments.  
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.