Title: Alabama Power Co. v. Drummond
Citation: 559 So. 2d 158
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 1990

559 So. 2d 158 (1990)
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY
v.
Silvia Easterwood DRUMMOND.
88-990.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 16, 1990.
James H. Miller III, Dan H. McCrary and James H. Hancock, Jr. of Balch &amp; Bingham, Birmingham, for appellant.
H. Thomas Wells, Jr. and Alfred F. Smith, Jr. of Maynard, Cooper, Frierson &amp; Gale, Birmingham, for appellee.
HORNSBY, Chief Justice.
Alabama Power Company (hereinafter "APCo") appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Walker County granting Silvia Drummond the right to maintain an *159 existing encroachment onto APCo's flood easement adjacent to Drummond's land.
Silvia Drummond owns a parcel of land in Walker County known as lot 1 in Longview Subdivision. This land is adjacent to Lewis M. Smith Reservoir ("Smith Lake"), an APCo hydroelectric development. APCo acquired much of the land around what is now Smith Lake in the years prior to the development of the lake. Later, however, APCo sold off some parcels of that land. Drummond's land is one such parcel.
APCo acquired the subject property in 1930 from W.H. and Gladys Parker. Thereafter, APCo conveyed this parcel to Alabama Properties Company. APCo retained the fee title to land lying at elevations less than 510 feet above mean sea level, and retained a flood easement over lands lying between 510 and 522 feet above mean sea level and the right of ingress to and egress from that easement. The conveyance to Alabama Properties Company also contained certain restrictive covenants. Those covenants are as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Longview Subdivision was created after Alabama Properties Company took title from APCo, and certain building restrictions, recorded in 1961, were placed on lot 1. Those restrictions provide that a 15-foot sideyard is to be maintained on lot 1. The set-back line from which the sideyard is to begin is at the 522-foot line.
Silvia Drummond's deposition testimony shows that she and her husband, Gary Neil Drummond, acquired title to the subject property in the late 1960's. In 1979, the Drummonds divorced. As a part of the divorce settlement, Gary Drummond conveyed to Silvia Drummond lots 1 and 2 of Longview Subdivision, together with the house situated on lot 1. Lot 2 of these tracts is specifically described as lying between the 510- and 522-foot lines; and lot 2 is specifically encumbered by a flood easement in favor of APCo.
It appears to be undisputed that Silvia Drummond was aware of the flood easement. Her deposition testimony indicates that she was aware that the easement covered land up to the 522-foot line and that she may have known this for as long as 10 years before the challenged construction was begun. She also indicates that the contractors who performed the construction work were also aware of the easement. The evidence is disputed as to whether these contractors made Drummond aware that the proposed addition to her home would encroach into the flood easement. Despite the fact that the flood easement and restrictive covenants were a matter of public record, Drummond constructed an addition to her home that now encroaches onto the APCo flood easement. Certain "fill material" was also placed in the easement.
APCo filed suit in this matter on January 29, 1985. In its complaint, APCo sought a permanent injunction enjoining Drummond from "maintaining [the] house and associated structures within plaintiff's flood easement" and from maintaining the fill *160 material in the easement, and requiring Drummond to remove the addition, the fill material, and "associated structures" within the easement. Drummond points out, however, that APCo has in the past granted numerous persons "waivers" from its flood easements and has not sought to have the encroaching structures removed.
After a hearing, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion and order, which, in part, reads as follows:
Our review of the trial court's order indicates that the judge attempted to balance the parties' interests in the case at hand. APCo argues in its brief that the trial court erred by "balancing the relative equities." APCo argues that Alabama law precludes the trial court from balancing the equities in a case like this one. We note, however, that the issuance of injunctive relief is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Hood v. Neil, 502 So. 2d 749 (Ala.1987); Powell v. Phenix Federal Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 247 (Ala.1983). Thus, APCo must show that the trial court committed plain and palpable error to warrant a reversal. Reed v. City of Montgomery, 341 So. 2d 926 (Ala. 1976); Ex parte Jones, 246 Ala. 433, 20 So. 2d 859 (1945). Granting injunctive relief is within the trial court's discretion especially where, as here, the evidence was presented only to the trial court and not to a jury. Powell, supra. The trial court's judgment may be reversed if the court violates a principle of equity or misapprehends a controlling principle of law. Id. at 251.
It is also well recognized that Alabama law requires the owner of a servient tenement to refrain from doing any act that would interfere with or be inconsistent with the proper right to use and enjoy the easement vested in the owner of the dominant tenement. Alabama Power Co. v. Martin, 341 So. 2d 695 (Ala.1977). See also Brown v. Alabama Power Co., 275 Ala. 467, 156 So. 2d 153 (1963) (owner of the servient estate may not interfere with the dominant estate); Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926) (servient estate owner not allowed to build house on power line easement). It is also well settled that one who takes land "with notice of, an easement, takes the estate subject to such easement." Brown, supra, 275 Ala. at 470, 156 So. 2d  at 155.
Drummond and APCo have stipulated that the construction of the addition to the Drummond house constitutes an encroachment onto APCo's flood easement. Drummond contends, however, that the encroachment is, as found by the trial court, "infinitesimal" and that if APCo, under its easement, were to flood the land up to the 522-foot line, only the "footings" of the house would be under water.
In Brown, supra, a case in which the servient owner built a house on APCo's flood easement, this Court stated:
Brown, supra, 275 Ala. at 471, 156 So. 2d  at 156 (emphasis added).
However, Brown and the other cases cited to us by APCo do not stand for the proposition that removal of the offending structure is the sole remedy allowed under the trial court's equitable jurisdiction. In fact, certain of the cases cited by APCo have allowed an encroaching structure to remain in place pending some other remedy. See, e.g., Magna, Inc. v. Catranis, 512 So. 2d 912 (Ala.1987) (damages allowed); Hood v. Neil, 502 So. 2d 749 (Ala.1987) *162 (damages allowed and injunctive relief denied).
The equity powers of a trial court are broad. The United States Supreme Court has discussed the extent of those powers as follows:
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971).
This broad power to fashion judgments applies in the context of an injunction action, and the trial court may refuse injunctive relief in its attempt to do equity in a given case. A court may "balance the equities" in deciding whether to grant an injunction, and may specifically consider the "convenience" of the requested relief to both the plaintiff and the defendant. H. Joyce, Joyce on Injunctions § 20 at 41 (1909).
In the present case, the trial court fashioned a judgment that sought to protect both parties to the litigation. The trial court found that Drummond had mistakenly built the addition on APCo's flood easement and that substantial damage would be done to her house by removal of the small encroachment. Moreover, there is evidence in the record tending to support the trial court's conclusion that Drummond was unaware that the addition actually encroached into the APCo easement until construction was virtually complete and that the encroachment was not knowingly or intentionally erected. APCo also received great protection under the trial court's order, and Drummond may yet be required to remove the encroachment if she fails to comply with the conditions of the trial court's order.
Based upon our review of the law and the evidence in this case, we cannot say that the trial court erred. Its judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
In Magna, Inc. v. Catranis, 512 So. 2d 912, 913 (Ala.1987), we held:
Alabama Power Company has the right to flood each square foot of the property on which it has a floodage easement. This is a property right. My respect for property rights will not permit me to diminish or reduce Alabama Power Company's rights simply because it does not need to use at all times all of the property to which it has property rights. Our federal and state constitutions protect such rights and would prohibit judicial deprivation or diminution of such rights based solely upon a judicial determination that in depriving the owner of that property right it can "adjust the equities." I would reverse and remand on the authority of Magna, Inc. v. Catranis, supra; McGuire v. Lawrence, 523 So. 2d 380 (Ala. 1988); Snider v. Alabama Power Co., 346 So. 2d 946 (Ala.1977); Brown v. *163 Alabama Power Co., 275 Ala. 467, 156 So. 2d 153 (1963).
MADDOX, J., concurs.
STEAGALL, Justice (dissenting).
I concur in Justice Houston's dissent. I also point out that the majority opinion acknowledges that the appellee was aware of the flood easement. The appellant's flood easement was recorded, and it is undisputed that the appellee's landscape architect and designer had actual knowledge of the existence and location of that easement prior to the commencement of construction.
The appellee testified as follows:
Even under a "balancing of the equities" test, in my opinion, this knowledge of the easement prior to construction should weigh heavily in favor of the appellant.
I respectfully dissent.