Title: Quaker Oats Co. v. Miller
Citation: 370 So. 2d 1363
Docket Number: 50987
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 1979

370 So. 2d 1363 (1979) QUAKER OATS COMPANY, Employer, The Travelers Insurance Company, Carrier v. Littrell B. MILLER, Claimant. No. 50987. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 16, 1979. *1364 Megehee, Brown &amp; Williams, Larry A. Smith, Pascagoula, for appellant. Cupit &amp; Maxey, Robert W. Sneed, Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, BROOM and BOWLING, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal by Littrell B. Miller's former employer, Quaker Oats Company, and its carrier, Travelers Insurance Company, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County. That court affirmed an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission granting Miller $28 a week for 450 weeks as apportioned total benefits arising from job-related aggravation of hypertension. Miller entered the employ of Quaker Oats Company in 1954. His job consisted of inspecting containers of canned pet food in an assembly line method of production. He was exposed to considerable heat since the containers were filled with pet food of high temperature. During the late 1950's to the early 1960's Miller developed high blood pressure which was treated by Dr. Hicks. The condition reappeared in 1969 and by 1970 Miller was experiencing "dizzy spells" and faintness which interfered with his employment. Dr. McBroom, a specialist in internal medicine, treated Miller with various medications, but this failed to reduce the hypertension. The company informed Miller in March 1973 that his job performance was deteriorating. In consultation, Dr. McBroom was of the opinion that it was necessary for Miller to leave his work in order for the hypertension to be controlled. Acting upon his physician's advice, Miller began a four-month sick leave on March 30, 1973, and later, in mid-August 1973, Miller permanently severed his employment by retiring. It is undisputed that Miller was unaware that his disability was compensable until he was advised by an attorney in April 1974. Claimant's motion to controvert was thereafter filed on July 17, 1975. The appellants maintain the trial court erred by (1) finding a causal connection between injury and employment, (2) not designating an independent physician to examine Miller and therefore Dr. McBroom's fees were not recoverable, and (3) adjudicating the claim was not barred by limitations. We need not reach the first two assignments of error because we are of the opinion the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the circuit court erred as a matter of law in their adjudications that the statute of limitations had not run. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-35 (1972), Limitation, subsection (1) provides: Limitation of action was not considered by the administrative judge, apparently because it was not called to his attention. However, when the claim was considered by the full commission, limitation was an issue. Two of the commissioners were of the opinion the statute had not run. They stated: The other commissioner was of the opinion that the statute of limitations had run, thereby barring the claim. His opinion was: On appeal to the circuit judge the majority order of the commission was affirmed. The issue presented is, in our opinion, one of law rather than a review of conflicting facts. We recognize fully that a latent injury does not cause the statute to begin to run until the disabling nature of the injury manifests itself. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Tupelo, Inc. v. Long, 362 So. 2d 182 (Miss. 1978); Struthers Wells-Gulfport, Inc. v. Bradford, 304 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1974); and Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, 233 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1970). However, our language in each of these cases needs clarification. In Tabor we stated with regard to limitations, the following: In Struthers Wells-Gulfport we stated in referring to Tabor the following: And, in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. we held in reliance upon Struthers Wells-Gulfport and Tabor the following: We continued by stating: By using the word "compensable" or "non-compensable" injury or disease instead of "disabling" or "non-disabling" injury or disease the impression has apparently been left with the commission and others that the statute begins to run only from the time the claimant is aware that he is entitled to compensation (payment) for a work-connected disability. In each of the cited cases the primary issue was a determination of when the disability arose from an accident or bite, initially considered insignificant, but which progressed over a period of time to disabling proportions. In each we uniformly held the statute did not begin to run until the disabling characteristics of the work-related injuries or bite became known. The present issue differs. In the first instance, probably immaterial, this claim arises from a progressive disease and not an accidental injury. It differs materially in that this claimant was aware of his illness, had knowledge of its nature, its seriousness, and the aggravation, leading to disability, was work connected. The claimant did not know his disability entitled him to payment, i.e., it was compensable. This last factor projects a novel question not found in either of the cited cases and which has not been considered by the Court. In Long, Struthers Wells-Gulfport and Tabor, we did not use the word "compensable" or "non-compensable" injury to connote legal knowledge that a claim is within the Workmen's Compensation Act. What we meant then and now attempt to clarify is that "compensable" injury means that the disabling injury was work connected. Progressing from this distinction to the present facts, the remaining issue is, when did the statute of limitations begin to run? Larson, Workmen's Compensation, section 78.41 (1978), explains what we believe to be a reasonable rule derived from any cases upon the subject: In explanation, it is stated: We note that in many of the cases cited in Larson the term "probable compensable character" means nothing more than the injury or disease was work related. In giving application to this rule, we are led to believe, and now hold, the statute of limitations began to run on March 31, 1973, when Miller left his employment on sick leave. At that time as a reasonable man Miller knew, or should have known, the nature, seriousness and disabling character of his disease. By his testimony Miller had actual knowledge of his disability and that it was caused by a work-connected aggravation of hypertension. In our opinion the two-year limitation statute began to run on March 31, 1973, and barred this action two years thereafter. We conclude the circuit court erred as a matter of law in affirming the commission's decision that the statute of limitations had not run. *1367 This case was considered by a conference of the justices en banc. REVERSED AND RENDERED. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.