Title: Wendy Lynne Helgemo v. Board of Bar Examiners
Citation: 2002 WI 57
Docket Number: 2001AP002611-BA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2002

2002 WI 57 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2611-BA 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission 
of Wendy Lynne Helgemo: 
 
Wendy Lynne Helgemo,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
BAR ADMISSION OF HELGEMO 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 31, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
May 2, 2002   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Gordon E. McQuillen 
and Cullen Weston Pines & Bach LLP, Madison, and Wendy L. 
Helgemo, Black River Falls. 
 
For the respondent there was a brief by Alan Lee, assistant 
attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 57 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2611-BA  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission 
of Wendy Lynne Helgemo: 
 
Wendy Lynne Helgemo,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 31, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of Board of Bar Examiners' decision.    Decision 
affirmed with directions.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review, pursuant to SCR 40.08(5),1 a 
decision of the Board of Bar Examiners (Board) concluding that 
the petitioner, Wendy Lynne Helgemo, failed to satisfy the 
requirements for admission to the practice of law in Wisconsin 
                                                 
1  SCR 40.08(5) provides that "[a] petition to the supreme 
court for review of an adverse determination of the board under 
this rule shall be filed with the clerk within 30 days of the 
date on which written notice thereof was mailed to the 
applicant."   
 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
2 
 
based on "proof of practice elsewhere."  SCR 40.05.  The Board 
also declined to allow Ms. Helgemo to maintain a simultaneous 
application to sit for the Wisconsin bar exam.  We affirm the 
Board's conclusion that Ms. Helgemo failed to satisfy the 
requirements of SCR 40.05(c).  However, we conclude that the 
Board erred in precluding Ms. Helgemo from maintaining a 
separate application to sit for the Wisconsin bar exam and, as 
will be discussed herein, we direct the Board to allow Ms. 
Helgemo to sit for the Wisconsin bar exam at her earliest 
convenience. 
¶2 
Ms. Helgemo graduated from the University of Colorado 
School of Law on May 12, 1995.  She moved to Minnesota and 
commenced employment as a "law clerk" for the Prairie Island 
Indian Community in Minnesota.  During this period she sat for 
and passed the Minnesota Bar Examination.  She was admitted to 
the Minnesota bar on October 27, 1995.  She continued to work 
for the Prairie Island Indian Community for approximately one 
year after her admission to the Minnesota bar.  Admission to the 
Minnesota bar was not a prerequisite to her legal employment 
with the Prairie Island Indian Community, although she did 
appear in Minnesota state court on various Indian Child Welfare 
matters.  
¶3 
In November 1996 Ms. Helgemo was hired as Deputy 
Solicitor General and later became Acting Solicitor General for 
the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwa, in Onamia, Minnesota.  She held 
that position until February 2000.   
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
3 
 
¶4 
In March 2000 Ms. Helgemo left Minnesota and commenced 
employment as a tribal attorney for the Ho-Chunk Nation, 
centered within the State of Wisconsin.  This position did not 
require that Ms. Helgemo gain admission to the Wisconsin bar.  
It did require her admission to the Supreme Court of the Ho-
Chunk Nation.  
¶5 
On 
November 
29, 
2000, 
Ms. 
Helgemo 
applied 
for 
admission to the State Bar of Wisconsin.  She sought admission 
pursuant to SCR 40.05, which is entitled: "Legal competence 
requirement: Proof of practice elsewhere."  Supreme Court Rule 
40.05(1) provides that an applicant may "satisfy the legal 
competence requirement" by demonstrating that she satisfies 
certain requirements. It states in relevant part: 
(1) An applicant shall satisfy the legal competence 
requirement by presenting to the clerk certification 
of the board that the applicant has provided all of 
the following: 
(a) Proof of admission to practice law by a court of 
last resort in any other state or territory or the 
District of Columbia. 
(b) Proof 
that 
the 
applicant 
has been 
primarily 
engaged in the active practice of law in the courts of 
the United States or another state or territory or the 
District of Columbia for 3 years within the last 5 
years prior to filing application for admission. 
SCR 40.05(1)(a) and (b).   
¶6 
If an applicant proposes to satisfy the "proof of 
practice" requirement of SCR 40.05(1)(b) by practice in a 
jurisdiction that has different requirements for admission on 
the basis of prior practice than does Wisconsin, then the 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
4 
 
applicant must satisfy those requirements as well.  SCR 
40.05(1)(c).2  Consistent with standard SCR 40.05 bar application 
proceedings, the record reflects that Ms. Helgemo supplied the 
Board with a copy of the Minnesota rule governing admission 
based on proof of practice elsewhere.  See SCR 40.05(1)(c); 
Minn. R. 7.A. 
¶7 
Minnesota Rule 7.A. is more stringent than the 
comparable Wisconsin rule.  It requires the applicant to 
demonstrate that she has engaged in the active practice of law 
for five of the previous seven years.  It states in relevant 
part: 
7.A. Eligibility by Practice. An applicant may be 
eligible for admission without examination if the 
applicant otherwise qualifies for admission under Rule 
4 [the character and fitness requirement] and provides 
documentary evidence showing that for at least five of 
the seven years immediately preceding the application, 
the applicant has been licensed to practice law, has 
                                                 
2 SCR 40.05(1)(c) provides:   
If any state, territory or the District of Columbia 
practice 
in 
which 
is 
proposed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
requirement of sub. (b) has, as of the date of the 
filing of 
the application, requirements 
for bar 
admission in that jurisdiction on the basis of 
practice in Wisconsin other than those set forth in 
subs. (a) and (b), proof that the applicant has 
satisfied those requirements of that state, territory 
or the District of Columbia. 
Similarly, SCR 40.05(1m)(a) provides that if a particular 
jurisdiction does not grant reciprocity admission to lawyers 
based on their "proof of practice" in Wisconsin, then Wisconsin 
will not allow lawyers from that jurisdiction to be admitted in 
Wisconsin based on their "proof of practice" in the other 
jurisdiction. 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
5 
 
been in good standing in the highest court of another 
jurisdiction, and as principal occupation, has been 
actively and lawfully engaged in the practice of 
law. . . . 
Minn. R. 7.A.3 
¶8 
On December 12, 2000, the Board notified Ms. Helgemo 
that it had determined that her years of practice in Minnesota 
fell 
short 
of 
the 
five 
of 
seven 
years 
of 
having 
"actively . . . engaged in the practice of law" necessary to 
satisfy the durational requirements of Minn. R. 7.A., made 
applicable to her by SCR 40.05(1)(c).  Specifically, the Board 
advised Ms. Helgemo that it had declined to "count" the period 
of time Ms. Helgemo worked as a law clerk for the Prairie Island 
Indian Community prior to her admission to the Minnesota bar.  
The Board also declined to "count" the time Ms. Helgemo 
practiced as a tribal attorney for the Ho-Chuck Nation within 
Wisconsin. 
¶9 
On May 4, 2001, when it had become apparent that the 
Board was questioning whether she would be admitted to practice 
under SCR 40.05, Ms. Helgemo submitted a second bar application, 
seeking permission to sit for the Wisconsin bar examination 
pursuant to SCR 40.04.  The Board advised Ms. Helgemo that it 
would not permit her to maintain two applications for admission 
to the Wisconsin bar simultaneously.  The Board returned her 
second application, together with the filing fee that had 
                                                 
3 Rule 8.F. provides for the situation where an attorney has 
received a temporary license to allow representation in a legal 
services program.  It is not relevant here. 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
6 
 
accompanied it.  The petitioner was thus unable to sit for 
either the July 2001 or the February 2002 bar exam.   
¶10 On August 30, 2001, the Board issued its final 
decision concluding that Ms. Helgemo failed to satisfy the 
"proof of practice elsewhere" requirements for admission to the 
practice of law in Wisconsin.  Specifically, the Board stated: 
The applicant's employment as a law clerk for the 
Prairie Island Indian Community in Minnesota prior to 
her admission to the practice of law in Minnesota was 
not countable as the practice of law for she was not 
admitted to nor was it conducted before the court of 
the United States or another state or territory or the 
District of Columbia. 
The applicant's practice as a tribal attorney by the 
Ho-Chunk Nation in Wisconsin, a state where she was 
not admitted, is not practice in the court of the 
United States or another state or territory or the 
District of Columbia. 
In re Application of Wendy Lynne Helgemo for Admission Under SCR 
40.05, unpublished decision (Board of Bar Examiners, Aug. 30, 
2001) at 2.  This petition ensued.  Ms. Helgemo raises a number 
of challenges to the Board's decision, which will be addressed 
seriatim.   
¶11 In a review pursuant to SCR 40.08(5) of an adverse 
determination of the Board, the court adopts the Board's 
findings of fact if they are not clearly erroneous.  In re Bar 
Admission of Crowe, 141 Wis. 2d 230, 232, 414 N.W.2d 41 (1987). 
The court then determines whether the Board's conclusions of law 
based on those facts are proper.  In making that determination, 
the 
court 
is 
appreciative 
of 
the 
Board's 
experience 
in 
administering the court's bar admission rules, but the court 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
7 
 
makes its legal determinations de novo.  In re Bar Admission of 
Rusch, 171 Wis. 2d 523, 492 N.W.2d 153 (1992). 
¶12 First, Ms. Helgemo contends that she did satisfy the 
durational requirements of SCR 40.05(1)(c) such that the Board 
erred in concluding otherwise.  As previously noted, the Board 
"counted" the period of time from the date Ms. Helgemo was 
admitted to the Minnesota bar (October 1995) through the date 
she left Minnesota (February 2000).  This period amounts to 
about four and one-half years and falls short of the five years 
required by Minn. R. 7.A.  Thus, Ms. Helgemo's argument is 
predicated upon her claim that the Board erred in concluding 
that "[l]egal service before tribal courts is not one of the 
activities which the rule allows to be counted as the practice 
of law."  
¶13 Having reviewed SCR 40.05 and Minn. R. 7.A., we are 
compelled to affirm the Board's decision.  As presently drafted, 
SCR 40.05(1)(b) is clear.  It requires "[p]roof that the 
applicant has been primarily engaged in the active practice of 
law in the courts of the United States or another state or 
territory or the District of Columbia. . . . " (Emphasis added.)  
Although Indian tribal courts may be located within the 
geographic or geopolitical boundaries of a state, they are not 
state courts; they are courts of separate sovereign nations.  
See Teague v. Bad River Band of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, 
236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709.  As such, while practice before 
a tribal court may certainly constitute the active practice of 
law, it is not the active practice of law "in the courts of the 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
8 
 
United States or another state or territory or the District of 
Columbia. . . . "4   
¶14 Our conclusion is consistent with our holding in In re 
Admission of Blue Dog, 126 Wis. 2d 136, 375 N.W.2d 660 (1985).  
There, Attorney Blue Dog also sought admission to the Wisconsin 
bar pursuant to SCR 40.05.  At the time of his application 
Attorney Blue Dog was admitted to the Minnesota bar.  However, 
he practiced predominantly before the federal courts in Colorado 
although he was not admitted to practice before the Colorado 
Supreme Court.5  We admitted Attorney Blue Dog to the Wisconsin 
bar based on his practice before the federal courts of the 
United States, albeit conducted in a state where he was not 
admitted to practice.  While Ms. Helgemo's legal work is also 
conducted in a state where she was not admitted (Wisconsin) it 
was not conducted before the federal courts.  Rather, it was 
conducted before the courts of the Ho-chunk Nation, which are 
the courts of a separate sovereign nation.  Again, this is a 
jurisdiction with which Wisconsin currently has no reciprocity 
because the Ho-Chunk Nation is not a "state, territory, or the 
District of Columbia" as required by SCR 40.05.   
¶15 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the Board's 
conclusion that Ms. Helgemo failed to satisfy the "proof of 
                                                 
4 Our holding is such that we need not directly address the 
Board's statement that work as a law clerk can never constitute 
the practice of law.   
5 Attorney Blue Dog had obtained special permission from the 
Colorado Supreme Court to practice before the federal courts and 
administrative agencies of that state. 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
9 
 
practice elsewhere" requirements for admission to the practice 
of law in Wisconsin pursuant to SCR 40.05.   
¶16 Ms. Helgemo next raises a number of challenges to SCR 
40.05 and to its manner of application by the Board.  First, Ms. 
Helgemo claims that SCR 40.05 is inherently discriminatory 
against American Indian attorneys.  We disagree.  Supreme Court 
Rule 40.05 treats practice before tribal courts in the same 
manner that it treats practice before the courts of other 
separate sovereignties.  Moreover, beyond a general assertion 
that the rule is discriminatory, Ms. Helgemo provides no 
evidence to support her claim.  Indeed, Ms. Helgemo acknowledges 
there is no record evidence regarding the effect of this rule 
upon other American Indians who seek to be admitted to the 
Wisconsin bar, "notwithstanding that they have practiced only in 
tribal courts previously."   
¶17 Ms. Helgemo next asserts that SCR 40.05 is "inherently 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because it excludes from 
its list of activities deemed to be the practice of law practice 
before the highest courts of other jurisdictional bodies of the 
tribes of American Indians throughout the United States."  
Again, we cannot agree.  The Board is obligated to apply the 
rule's unambiguous terms to undisputed facts.  In this case the 
Board's conclusion that Ms. Helgemo's tribal practice before the 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
10 
 
Supreme Court of the Ho-Chuck Nation does not meet the 
requirements of SCR 40.05 is correct.6 
¶18 We turn to Ms. Helgemo's claim that the Board's denial 
of her bar application fails "to give full faith and credit to 
the admission of petitioner to practice before the Supreme Court 
of the Ho-Chunk Nation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.245."7 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245 does not require the Board 
to admit Ms. Helgemo to the Wisconsin bar.  Other states have 
uniformly held that the full faith and credit clause to Article 
IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution does not require 
                                                 
6 Similarly, we cannot agree that the Board should have 
interpreted the existing rule to include practice in tribal 
courts or that the list of activities that constitute the 
practice of law set forth in SCR 40.05 should not be considered 
an exclusive list.  The rule is clear and we are bound by its 
terms.  In addition, as the petitioner correctly acknowledges 
"there is a lack of uniformity of admission standards among the 
tribal courts in Wisconsin."  As such, it cannot be said that 
SCR 40.05 is necessarily "arbitrary and capricious" for failing 
to uniformly recognize practice before any Indian tribal court.  
Various tribal courts traditionally have had extremely disparate 
requirements for admission to practice.  Some tribal courts do 
not require their practitioners to have a law degree; in some 
cases tribal advocates may be admitted based on their tribal 
membership with rather minimal educational requirements.  See, 
e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisdiction, A Snapshot 
From The Field, 21 VT. L. REV. 7 (Fall 1996).  Other tribal 
courts, such as the Navajo Supreme Court, require all those 
practicing before the court to pass a tribal bar examination.  
Compare SCR 40.05(1m). 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245(1) is entitled "Indian Tribal 
documents: full faith and credit" and provides in relevant part: 
"(1) The judicial records, orders and judgments of an Indian 
tribal court in Wisconsin and acts of an Indian tribal 
legislative body shall have the same full faith and credit in 
the courts of this state as do the acts, records, orders and 
judgments of any other governmental entity . . . ." 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
11 
 
a state to recognize the bar admissions of a sister state.  See, 
e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 1012 (1990); Matter of Tocci, 413 Mass. 542, 600 N.E.2d 
577 (1992).  Similarly, the full faith and credit statute does 
not require that we automatically admit to the Wisconsin bar any 
attorney who was admitted to a tribal court in Wisconsin, any 
more than it requires those tribal courts to automatically admit 
to its courts any attorneys authorized to practice law in 
Wisconsin. 
¶20 Nor are we persuaded by Ms. Helgemo's claim that 
comity compels the result she seeks.  Under the doctrine of 
comity, where a jurisdictional conflict exists, a court may 
yield jurisdiction as a matter of discretion and defer to the 
assertion of jurisdiction by another state or sovereign.  A 
court does so out of mutual respect and for the purpose of 
furthering the orderly administration of justice.  Teague v. Bad 
River Band, 2000 WI 79, ¶¶35-36, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 
709.  The petitioner cites Teague for the proposition that 
comity requires the Board to honor Ms. Helgemo's admission to 
the Supreme Court of the Ho-Chuck Nation by granting her 
admission to the Wisconsin bar. 
¶21 We disagree.  There is no jurisdictional conflict 
here.  This court recognizes the sovereign authority of the 
Supreme Court of the Ho-Chunk Nation to admit individuals to 
practice before its courts and to establish its own admission 
standards.   
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
12 
 
¶22 Next, Ms. Helgemo asserts that the Board misused its 
discretion when it declined her request for an evidentiary 
hearing, particularly regarding the nature of her work as a law 
clerk for the Prairie Island Indian Community.  Again we 
disagree. 
¶23 The Board is required to grant an applicant a hearing 
"only upon a showing that there are facts bearing on the 
applicant's case that cannot be presented in writing."  SCR 
40.08(2).  The record does not reflect what facts, if any, Ms. 
Helgemo was unable to present to the Board in writing.  We can 
perceive no reason why the specifics of her employment with the 
Prairie Island Indian Community could not have been disclosed to 
the Board in written form.  
¶24 Ms. Helgemo suggests further that the Board misused 
its discretion when it declined to waive the requirements of SCR 
40.05 as to her.  The bar admission rule governing waiver of 
requirements provides: 
The Board will consider requests for waiver only on 
receipt of an application and the applicable filing 
fee. On receipt of the written request for waiver, the 
Director will make a ruling and issue an appropriate 
refund of some or all of the filing fee if the request 
is denied.  The applicant may make written request for 
review 
of 
the 
Director's 
determination 
as 
to 
waiver. . . .  Board decisions on review will be 
reported by letter to the applicant. 
BA 10.01.  However, as the Board reports: "nowhere in the record 
is there any indication that Ms. Helgemo asked the Board to 
exercise 
its 
authority 
under 
SCR 
40.10 
and 
waive 
the 
requirements of 40.05."  Therefore, the Board did not misuse its 
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
13 
 
discretion by declining to waive the requirements; no such 
waiver was ever formally requested.  In any event, under Minn. 
R. 7.C, the minimum time requirements of Minn. R. 7.A. cannot be 
waived.8  As such, it is questionable whether the Board could 
have waived them in this case. 
¶25 Finally, this petition presents the question whether 
an applicant seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar pursuant to 
SCR 40.05 may maintain a simultaneous application to sit for the 
Wisconsin bar exam pursuant to SCR 40.04.   
¶26 We can discern no compelling reason for such a policy 
and the Board has cited no authority for it.  We hold that 
henceforth, as of the date of this order, an applicant to the 
Wisconsin bar pursuant to SCR 40.05 may simultaneously maintain 
an application to sit for the Wisconsin bar exam pursuant to SCR 
40.04.  Consistent with this, we direct that Ms. Helgemo shall 
be permitted to sit for the Wisconsin bar exam at her earliest 
convenience.  If Ms. Helgemo wishes to sit for the July 2002 
exam, she shall so advise the Board within 21 days of the date 
of this order.  The Board is directed to waive any filing 
deadlines as to Ms. Helgemo. 
¶27 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Board of Bar 
Examiners concluding that Ms. Helgemo failed to satisfy the 
requirements of SCR 40.05(c) is affirmed. 
                                                 
8 Minnesota 
Rule 
7.C. 
provides: 
"No 
Waiver 
of 
Time 
Requirements.  The minimum time requirements and the timely 
filing requirements of this Rule shall be strictly enforced."   
No. 
01-2611-BA   
 
14 
 
¶28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ms. Helgemo shall be 
permitted to sit for the Wisconsin bar exam at her earliest 
convenience, notwithstanding any application deadlines that may 
have passed while this matter was pending.   
No.  01-2611-BA.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶29 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I join the opinion.  I do think, however, that the court ought 
to reexamine its reciprocity rule and ought to adopt a rule 
relating to how the practice in tribal courts fits into our 
system for admitting lawyers. 
 
 
No.  01-2611-BA.ssa 
 
 
 
1