Title: Wagner v. Shird
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 981454
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MELISSA ANN WAGNER 
 
v.  Record No. 981454  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    April 16, 1999 
KAREN DENISE SHIRD 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY 
James F. D’Alton, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we address the finality of judgments 
under Rule 1:1 and determine whether the circuit court 
still had control over a final order at the time it 
modified that order.  Because the court’s 30-day suspension 
of its final order expired without entry of an order to 
extend the length of the stay, we conclude that the court 
no longer retained jurisdiction over this action when it 
entered an order of remittitur.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court and reinstate the 
jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
On September 1, 1994, Melissa Ann Wagner filed a 
motion for judgment against Karen Denise Shird seeking 
damages for personal injuries sustained and medical 
expenses incurred as a result of an automobile accident 
that occurred in 1993.  After hearing evidence from both 
parties on January 6, 1998, a jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Wagner in the amount of $106,000.  That same day, 
the circuit court entered a final order awarding judgment 
for Wagner based on the jury’s verdict. 
 
Subsequently, in an order dated January 27, 1998, the 
circuit court granted Shird’s motion to stay the final 
order it had previously entered.  The January 27th order 
specifically stated that “the Order of Final Judgment of 
January 6, 1998 is stayed or suspended for a period of 30 
days for argument and decision upon [Shird’s] Motion for 
Remittitur.”  The court heard argument on the motion for 
remittitur on February 24, 1998, and at the conclusion of 
the hearing, orally announced its decision from the bench.  
The court granted the motion, reducing the jury’s verdict 
to $60,000, but it did not enter a written order of 
remittitur and final judgment until April 21, 1998. 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the circuit 
court retained jurisdiction over this action at the time it 
entered the April 21st order.  Wagner acknowledges that the 
circuit court had the authority under Rule 1:1 to modify, 
vacate, or suspend its January 6th final order within 21 
days after the date of entry and that the court entered its 
January 27th order within that 21-day period.  However, 
Wagner contends that the January 27th order did not stay 
the January 6th order indefinitely but, instead, 
specifically limited the duration of the stay to 30 days.  
 
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According to Wagner, that 30-day period expired on February 
26, 1998, without an additional order being entered to 
extend the length of the stay.  Thus, posits Wagner, the 
January 6th order became final on February 26th, and the 
circuit court, thereafter, retained no jurisdiction to 
enter the order of remittitur and final judgment on April 
21st, almost two months later. 
 
Shird, on the other hand, argues that the circuit 
court did not merely suspend the January 6th final order 
for a specified period but stayed it until the court heard 
argument on and decided the motion for remittitur.  Thus, 
Shird asserts that the circuit court continued to have 
jurisdiction over the case until it entered the written 
order on April 21st reflecting its oral ruling to reduce 
the jury’s verdict.  We do not agree. 
 
Rule 1:1 addresses the finality of judgments and 
provides the following, in pertinent part: 
All final judgments, orders, and decrees, 
irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the 
control of the trial court and subject to be modified, 
vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the 
date of entry, and no longer. . . . The date of entry 
of any final judgment, order, or decree shall be the 
date the judgment, order, or decree is signed by the 
judge. 
 
However, “[t]he running of time under [this rule] may be 
interrupted . . . by the entry, within the 21-day period 
 
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after final judgment, of an order suspending or vacating 
the final order.”  School Bd. of City of Lynchburg v. 
Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. 550, 556, 379 S.E.2d 
319, 323 (1989); accord Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148-
49, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996). 
 
In the present case, the circuit court suspended the 
January 6th final order within the 21-day period allowed in 
Rule 1:1 by entering the order of stay on January 27, 1998. 
Contrary to Shird’s position, the duration of the stay was 
not tied to the court’s resolution of the motion for 
remittitur.  Instead, it was expressly limited to “a period 
of 30 days.”  Since the court did not enter an additional 
order within that 30-day period to continue the stay, the 
January 6th order became final well before April 21, 1998.1
The pendency of Shird’s motion for remittitur on the 
last day of the stay did not extend or toll the running of 
the 30-day period.  See School Bd. of City of Lynchburg, 
237 Va. at 556, 379 S.E.2d at 323 (holding pendency of 
post-judgment motion does not toll or extend running of 21-
day period prescribed in Rule 1:1).  Nor does the fact that 
the circuit court had orally announced its decision to 
                     
1 The court also did not enter an order to continue the 
stay during the 21 days after the stay ended.  See Norris 
v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 239, 495 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1998); 
Rule 1:1. 
 
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grant Shird’s motion for remittitur before the expiration 
of the 30-day suspension period, but had not yet entered a 
written order reflecting that decision, extend the length 
of the stay. 
“There is a distinction between the rendition of a 
judgment and the entry of a judgment.”  McDowell v. Dye, 
193 Va. 390, 393, 69 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1952).  While the 
circuit court may have rendered its judgment on Shird’s 
motion for remittitur at the conclusion of the hearing on 
February 24, 1998, it did not enter that judgment until 
April 21, 1998.  At that time, the court no longer had 
jurisdiction over the action because the 30-day stay of the 
January 6th final order had expired and the court had not 
entered another order extending the length of the stay.  
Thus, the April 21st order was a nullity.  Davis, 251 Va. 
at 149, 466 S.E.2d at 94. 
 
Nevertheless, Shird contends that Wagner consented to 
an extension of the 30-day stay after the court orally 
announced its decision on the motion for remittitur.  While 
not waiving her argument that the original order of 
suspension was ineffective, Wagner did indeed agree to 
continue the stay for an additional period of 30 days so 
 
  
 
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that the transcript of the hearing could be prepared.2  
Additionally, when questioned about the length of the stay 
granted in the January 27th order, the court stated, “It 
did have a 30-day time limit within which to have this 
hearing . . . .” 
Regardless of any agreement by Wagner to extend the 
length of the stay or the circuit court’s statement about 
the January 27th order, a court speaks only through its 
written orders.  Davis, 251 Va. at 148, 466 S.E.2d at 94.  
And, “‘orders speak as of the day they were entered.’”  Id. 
(quoting Vick v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 474, 476, 111 S.E.2d 
824, 826 (1960)).  Moreover, the parties cannot confer 
subject matter jurisdiction on the court by agreement.  
Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169-70, 387 S.E.2d 753, 
755 (1990). 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court as reflected in the April 21, 1998 order, 
reinstate the jury’s verdict, and enter final judgment here 
in favor of Wagner. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
2 The circuit court wanted its rationale for granting 
the motion for remittitur to be recited verbatim in the 
order. 
 
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