Title: State v. Gerard W. Carter
Citation: 2010 WI 132
Docket Number: 2008AP003144-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2010

2010 WI 132 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP3144-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
           Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Gerard W. Carter, 
           Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
   
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 156 
Reported at: 321 Wis. 2d 719, 775 N.W.2d 297 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 2, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: CROOKS, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general, and oral argument by Michael C. 
Sanders. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Craig M. 
Kuhary and Walden, Schuster, & Vaklyes, S.C., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Craig M. Kuhary. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 132
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports. 
 
No.   2008AP3144-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CT738) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Gerard W. Carter, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 2, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.  
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals.1  The court of 
appeals reversed the judgment imposed by the Circuit Court for 
Walworth County, Michael S. Gibbs, Judge.   
¶2 
The question of law before this court is whether 
Gerard Carter's two prior suspensions of his operating privilege 
                                                 
1 State v. Carter, 2009 WI App 156, 321 Wis. 2d 719, 775 
N.W.2d 297. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
2 
 
under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law2 fall within Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1) (2007-08)3 so that the Illinois suspensions are 
counted in sentencing Carter for his Wisconsin offense of 
Operating While Under the Influence (OWI) under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2).   
¶3 
The 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
has 
established 
an 
accelerated penalty structure for OWI offenses in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2).  The severity of a defendant's penalty for OWI is 
based on the number of prior convictions under §§ 940.09(1) and 
940.25 "plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and 
other convictions counted under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)."4  The 
present case requires us to interpret "suspensions, revocations, 
and other convictions" under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1). 
¶4 
The circuit court determined that the suspensions of 
Carter's operating privilege in Illinois were either for refusal 
to submit to chemical testing or for submitting to chemical 
testing which disclosed an alcohol concentration greater than 
0.00.  In either event, according to the circuit court, Carter 
should be sentenced as a fourth offender under Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
2 The terms "zero tolerance law" and "absolute sobriety law" 
are used here to refer to laws suspending or revoking the 
operating privilege of a person who has not attained the legal 
drinking age and who engages in certain conduct. 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise noted. 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2.-7. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
3 
 
§ 343.307(1)(d), counting his two prior suspensions under the 
Illinois "zero tolerance" law.   
¶5 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court, concluding that the two prior suspensions of 
Carter's operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" 
law  do not fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) to be counted in 
determining his sentence.5  The court of appeals remanded the 
cause to the circuit court for sentencing based on OWI, second 
offense. 
¶6 
For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court.  We conclude that the two prior suspensions of Carter's 
operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law are 
convictions within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 343.307(1)(d) 
and 340.01(9r), and that the circuit court appropriately counted 
them in sentencing Carter for his OWI violation.  
I 
¶7 
For purposes of this review the relevant facts are not 
in dispute.  Carter was arrested in Wisconsin on August 25, 
2007, and charged with operating while under the influence of an 
intoxicant, second offense,6 and with a prohibited blood alcohol 
concentration.  The State amended this charge to OWI, fourth 
offense, upon discovering that Carter had two prior suspensions 
                                                 
5 Carter, 321 Wis. 2d at ¶14. 
6 Carter was previously convicted of driving under the 
influence. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
4 
 
of his Illinois operating license under the Illinois "zero 
tolerance" law.7   
¶8 
Carter entered a guilty plea to the OWI charge and 
filed a motion challenging, under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1), the 
State's counting for sentence enhancement purposes his two prior 
Illinois suspensions.  The circuit court denied the motion. 
¶9 
As background to resolve whether the two prior 
Illinois suspensions are counted under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) 
for penalty enhancement, we describe briefly Illinois' "zero 
tolerance" law and Wisconsin's "absolute sobriety" law.  
¶10 Our description of the Illinois law comes from the 
Illinois Supreme Court's description of the law in Arvia v. 
Madigan, 809 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 2004), which resolved a challenge 
to the constitutionality of the law.   
¶11 In Illinois, a driver under the age of 21 arrested for 
any violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (or similar local 
ordinance) is deemed to have given consent to chemical tests to 
determine the alcohol content of the driver's blood if the 
police officer has probable cause to believe the driver has 
consumed any amount of an alcoholic beverage.  The officer must 
warn the driver that refusal to submit to the test or submission 
to a test resulting in an alcohol concentration greater than 
0.00 may result in a suspension of the driver's license; the 
suspension may range from three months to two years.  
                                                 
7 These suspensions resulted from violations occurring in 
1999 
and 
2001, 
when 
Carter 
was 
18 
and 
20 
years 
old, 
respectively. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
5 
 
¶12 Upon refusal to submit to the test or upon a test 
resulting in an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00, the 
Illinois arresting officer must file a sworn report with the 
Illinois Secretary of State and notify the driver of the 
sanction.  Upon receipt of the officer's sworn report, the 
Secretary of State enters the appropriate sanction on the 
driver's record and notifies the driver of the sanction and the 
effective date. 
¶13 A driver can request an administrative hearing before 
the Illinois Secretary of State.  The hearing is limited in 
scope 
and 
governed 
by 
the 
provisions 
applicable 
to 
administrative hearings before the Illinois Secretary of State.  
The Secretary of State may rescind, modify, or continue the 
sanction.  The final decision of the Secretary of State is 
subject to judicial review.   
¶14 In Illinois, a suspension may result from refusal to 
submit to chemical testing or the consumption of even small 
amounts of alcohol.  In Illinois a young driver whose license is 
suspended under the zero tolerance law for refusal to submit to 
chemical testing or for a test resulting in a blood alcohol 
concentration greater than 0.00 but less than 0.08 ordinarily 
faces no other criminal prosecution.  
¶15 Wisconsin has laws similar to those in Illinois 
governing "absolute sobriety" for persons who have not attained 
legal drinking age.  First, if a person who has not attained 
legal drinking age improperly refuses to submit to a test for 
prohibited alcohol concentration, one penalty is revocation of 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
6 
 
the person's operating privilege.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(2m), 
343.305(10)(em). 
¶16 Second, Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2m) makes it illegal for a 
person who has not attained legal drinking age to operate a 
motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00 
but less than 0.08.  One penalty for this violation is 
suspension of the person's operating privilege under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.30(1p).   
¶17 Under Wisconsin's accelerated OWI penalty structure, 
these two "absolute sobriety" statutes governing "underage" 
persons, namely improperly refusing to submit to a test for 
intoxication8 and operating with a concentration of more than 
0.00 but less than 0.08,9 are not counted for the purposes of 
Wisconsin's penalty enhancement.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.307.     
¶18 Accordingly, one way of viewing the issue before us is 
to ask whether Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) treats a violation of the 
Illinois "zero tolerance" laws differently than the way it 
treats a violation of the Wisconsin "absolute sobriety" laws in 
counting offenses for purposes of sentencing.  
II 
¶19 We must interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) to 
undisputed facts in the present case. Interpretation and 
application of a statute to undisputed facts are ordinarily 
questions of law that this court decides independently of the 
                                                 
8 See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(2m), 343.30(1p), 343.305(10)(em). 
9 See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(2m), 343.30(1p). 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
7 
 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from their 
analyses.10  
III 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307(1) instructs the circuit 
court to count convictions of certain offenses and specific 
suspensions or revocations of operating privileges for the 
purpose of the accelerated OWI penalty structure.  
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307(1) provides as follows: 
343.307 Prior convictions, suspensions or revocations 
to be counted as offenses.  
(1) The court shall count the following to determine 
the length of a revocation under s. 343.30(1q)(b) and 
to determine the penalty under ss. 114.09(2) and 
346.65(2): 
(a) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63(1), or 
a local ordinance in conformity with that section. 
(b) Convictions for violations of a law of a federally 
recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state 
in conformity with s. 346.63(1). 
(c) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63(2) or 
940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense involved the 
use of a vehicle. 
(d) Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction 
that prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing 
or using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under 
the influence of a controlled substance or controlled 
substance analog, or a combination thereof; with an 
excess or specified range of alcohol concentration; 
while under the influence of any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely driving; or 
while having a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood, as those or 
                                                 
10 State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶32, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 
749 N.W.2d 611. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
8 
 
substantially 
similar 
terms 
are 
used 
in 
that 
jurisdiction's laws. 
(e) Operating privilege suspensions or revocations 
under the law of another jurisdiction arising out of a 
refusal to submit to chemical testing. 
(f) Revocations under s. 343.305(10). 
(g) Convictions for violations under s. 114.09(1)(b) 
1. or 1m. 
¶22 Two 
subsections 
are 
relevant 
here: 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(e) and (1)(d).   
¶23 We examine Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(e) first.  This 
subsection provides that a circuit court shall count for 
purposes of sentencing, "operating privilege suspensions or 
revocations under the law of another jurisdiction arising out of 
a refusal to submit to chemical testing."  The plain language of 
the statute provides that if a suspension or revocation under 
the law of another state arises out of a refusal to submit to 
chemical 
testing, 
the 
out-of-state 
operating 
privilege 
suspension counts as a prior offense under § 343.307(1)(e) for 
penalty enhancement.   
¶24 Section 343.307(1)(e) treats a violation of the 
Illinois "zero tolerance" laws differently than the way the 
legislature treats a violation of the Wisconsin "absolute 
sobriety" laws in counting offenses for purposes of sentencing. 
The legislature has expressly directed that if Carter's two 
previous Illinois suspensions arose from a refusal to submit to 
chemical 
testing 
they 
would 
count 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(e) for penalty enhancement even though similar 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
9 
 
refusals under Wisconsin's absolute sobriety law do not count as 
a penalty enhancement.    
¶25 The State bears the burden of establishing prior 
offenses as the basis for the imposition of enhanced penalties.11  
Carter's Illinois driving record was before the circuit court.  
The driving record does not, however, state whether Carter's two 
suspensions under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law arise from a 
refusal to submit to testing or from a test resulting in an 
alcohol concentration of more than 0.00.     
¶26 The 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
length 
of 
Carter's 
suspensions indicates that the suspensions were likely for 
refusal to submit to chemical testing and thus fall within Wis. 
Stat. § 343.307(1)(e).  Carter disputes this assertion.   
¶27 We agree with Carter and the court of appeals that the 
driving record does not provide sufficient information to 
conclude that the suspensions arose from refusals to submit to 
testing.  We conclude, as did the court of appeals, "that the 
State has failed to establish that Carter's suspension was the 
result of a refusal and therefore has failed to establish that 
the suspension counts under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(e) for 
purposes of penalty enhancement under § 346.65(2)."12    
¶28 We therefore turn to Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) to 
determine whether Carter's two Illinois operating privilege 
                                                 
11 State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 91, 94, 556 N.W.2d 737 
(1996). 
12 Carter, 321 Wis. 2d at ¶13.  
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
10 
 
suspensions are to be counted in Wisconsin under § 343.307(1)(d) 
for penalty enhancement.     
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) is not easy to read 
and is not a model of clarity.  The sentence is composed of 
several clauses that lack consistent parallel structure.  The 
phrase 
"with 
an 
excess 
or 
specified 
range 
of 
alcohol 
concentration" lacks the parallel structure of three other 
phrases, 
each 
of 
which 
begins 
with 
the 
word 
"while."  
Nevertheless, statutory interpretation begins with the text of 
the statute.  This subsection reads as follows: 
(1) The court shall count the following to determine 
the length of a revocation . . . and to determine the 
penalty . . . : 
. . . . 
(d) Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction 
that prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing 
or using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under 
the influence of a controlled substance or controlled 
substance analog, or a combination thereof; with an 
excess or specified range of alcohol concentration; 
while under the influence of any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely driving; or 
while having a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood, as those or 
substantially 
similar 
terms 
are 
used 
in 
that 
jurisdiction's laws.  
¶30 In 
examining 
the 
run-on 
list 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d), we conclude that the phrase "with an excess or 
specified range of alcohol concentration"  modifies the phrase 
"using a motor vehicle,"  not the phrase "using a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled 
substance or controlled substance analog, or a combination 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
11 
 
thereof."  Thus, this part of the statute should be read as 
follows:  convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that 
prohibits a person from using a motor vehicle with an excess or 
specified range of alcohol concentration.  This interpretation 
comports with the text (and its punctuation) and fulfills the 
objectives of the OWI statutes to prohibit both operating while 
intoxicated and operating when tests show a prohibited alcohol 
concentration in excess of that permitted by statute. 
¶31 We turn now to the first word we encounter in need of 
definition in Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d), namely the word 
"convictions."  The State and Carter disagree about the meaning 
of the word "convictions" as used in Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d). 
¶32 The State argues that the definition of the word 
"conviction" set forth in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(9r) applies to the 
word "convictions" in § 343.307(1)(d).13   
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 340.01(9r) explicitly provides a 
definition of "conviction" that applies to chapters 340 to 349 
of the statutes, "unless a different meaning is expressly 
provided or the context clearly indicates a different meaning."  
Wis. Stat. § 340.01.  See also § 343.01(1), which provides that 
"[w]ords and phrases defined in s. 340.01 are used in the same 
sense 
in 
this 
chapter 
unless 
a 
different 
definition 
is 
specifically provided."   
                                                 
13 "'Conviction' . . . means an unvacated adjudication of 
guilt, or a determination that a person has violated or failed 
to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an 
authorized 
administrative 
tribunal . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 340.01(9r).   
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
12 
 
¶34 The text of chapter 343, and specifically Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1), does not expressly provide a meaning for the word 
"convictions" 
that 
is 
different 
from 
the 
definition 
of 
"conviction" in § 340.01(9r).  
¶35 Nor does the context of Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) 
clearly indicate a different meaning of "conviction" than that 
set 
forth 
in 
§ 340.01(9r). 
 
Rather, 
the 
context 
of 
§ 343.307(1)(d) supports the conclusion that the § 340.01(9r) 
definition 
of 
"conviction" 
applies 
to 
§ 343.307(1)(d).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307(1) contains a list of acts that a 
court shall count in determining the penalty for an OWI 
violation.  Subsections (1)(a)-(d) & (g) all begin with the word 
"convictions."  For subsections (1)(a)-(c) & (g) of § 343.307(1) 
the statutory definition of "convictions" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(9r) apparently fits and makes sense.  Why would the 
legislature intend a different definition of "convictions" in 
subsection (1)(d) than it uses in the other subsections? 
¶36 Carter's response to this question is that the 
§ 340.01(9r) definition of "conviction" does not apply in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d) 
because 
suspension 
of 
an 
operating 
privilege falls under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(e), which more 
specifically addresses out-of-state suspensions and revocations.  
Carter asserts that applying the § 340.01(9r) definition of 
"convictions" to include a suspension resulting from a refusal 
to submit to chemical testing within § 343.307(1)(d) effectively 
renders § 343.307(1)(e) redundant and therefore is an incorrect 
interpretation of the statutes.      
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
13 
 
¶37 Carter relies on State v. Machgan, 2007 WI App 263, 
306 Wis. 2d 752, 743 N.W.2d 832, to support his interpretation 
of the statutes.  The court of appeals determined in Machgan 
that an out-of-state administrative suspension of operating 
privilege based on probable cause that the defendant was 
operating while under the influence of alcohol was not counted 
as a conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d).  The court of 
appeals concluded in Machgan that § 343.307(1)(d) is the 
specific 
statute 
addressing 
out-of-state 
convictions, 
suspensions, and revocations for purposes of penalty enhancement 
and therefore controls over the statutory definition of the word 
"conviction" in § 340.01(9r).   
¶38 The Machgan court of appeals noted that Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(e) separately and specifically provides only one 
type of revocation or suspension "under the law of another 
jurisdiction," that is, "a suspension or revocation arising out 
of a refusal to submit to chemical testing."  According to the 
Machgan court, the legislature did not intend § 343.307(1)(d) to 
include an out-of-state suspension or revocation, rendering 
(1)(e) redundant.  We disagree with the Machgan court. 
¶39 While there may be many instances in which suspensions 
that fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(e) also are convictions 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d), that fact does not necessarily 
make (1)(e) redundant.  The legislative history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d) suggests that the legislature intended the scope 
of the statute to be broad.  For example, in recreating Wis. 
Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) in 1989 the legislature removed the 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
14 
 
requirement that only violations of other statutes in conformity 
with Wisconsin law were to be counted for accelerated sentencing 
purposes.14   
¶40 The 
legislative 
history 
of 
subsection 
(1)(e) 
demonstrates that the subsection was added in an effort to 
address the fact that the circuit courts were not counting out-
of-state refusals to submit to testing as convictions.  In 
responding to a request to comment on adding subsection (1)(e), 
Assistant General Counsel of the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation John Sobotik concluded that "[a]rguably, this 
provision was already in the law due to the definition of 
conviction in Ch. 340.  The courts, however, have not been 
                                                 
14 Prior to 1989 Wis. Act 105, Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1987-
88) provided:  "For purposes of counting the number of refusals, 
revocations 
and 
convictions 
[under 
enumerated 
statutes] . . . convictions for violation[ ] . . . [of] a state 
statute of another state in conformity therewith . . . shall be 
counted . . . ." 
In State v. Mattson, 140 Wis. 2d 24, 409 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. 
App. 1987), the court of appeals determined that violations of 
Minnesota's Operating While Intoxicated (OWI) statutes could not 
be counted in sentencing under Wisconsin law because Minnesota 
statutes were not in "conformity" with Wisconsin's OWI statutes. 
Act 105 creating Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) addressed and 
repudiated the Mattson decision by eliminating the requirement 
of conformity.  See Memo of John Sobotik, Assistant General 
Counsel, Dep't of Transp. (May 24, 1990), writing "to clear up 
some misunderstandings regarding Wisconsin Act 105" (on file at 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.). 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
15 
 
counting out-of-state refusals, and this provision will make 
them countable."15 
¶41 There is no indication in the legislative history that 
the addition of subsection (1)(e) was intended as a limitation 
to 
the 
scope 
of 
out-of-state 
convictions 
counted 
under 
subsection (1)(d). 
¶42 Applying the definition of "conviction" under Wis. 
Stat. § 340.01(9r) to the word "convictions" in § 343.304(1)(d) 
comports with the text of the statutes and the legislative 
policy 
choice 
evidenced 
in 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
§ 343.307(1)(d) 
and 
(1)(e) 
to 
ensure 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d) and (e) apply broadly to prior out-of-state 
conduct.     
                                                 
15 John Sobotik, Assistant General Counsel of the Department 
of Transportation wrote:  "Proposed 343.307(1)(e) and (2)(f) 
both provide that out of state revocations and suspensions 
resulting from a refusal to submit to chemical testing shall be 
counted.  This is a new provision to 343.307.  Arguably, this 
provision was already in the law due to the definition of 
conviction in Ch. 340. The courts, however, have not been 
counting out-of-state refusals, and this provision will make 
them countable."  Memorandum from John J. Sobotik, Assistant 
General Counsel, Wis. Dep't of Transp., to Senator Carol 
Buettner; Joe Maassen, Deputy General Counsel, Dep't of Transp.; 
Bob Nelson, LRB; Gary Radloff, Aide to Senator Buettner; Re: 
Drunk Driving cleanup bill (Jan. 17, 1992), in Legislative 
Reference Bureau Bill drafting file for 1991 Senate Bill 504, 
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.    
1991 Senate Bill 504 failed to pass.  Subsection (1)(e) 
was, however, included in 1991 Senate Bill 308 which addressed a 
number of areas of Wisconsin's drunk driving law and was enacted 
as 1991 Wis. Act 277. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
16 
 
¶43 We therefore conclude that the definition of the word 
"conviction" in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(9r) applies to the word 
"convictions" in § 343.307(1)(d).16  We further conclude that the 
court of appeals erred in the present case and in State v. 
Machgan, 2007 WI App 263, 306 Wis. 2d 752, 743 N.W.2d 832, in 
holding that the definition of the word "conviction" in 
§ 340.01(9r) does not apply to the word "convictions" in 
§ 343.307(1)(d).  As a result, we overrule that portion of 
Machgan in conflict with the interpretation of the statutes set 
forth herein. 
¶44 We next examine the meaning of the word "convictions" 
in Wis. Stat. § 343.07(1)(d) in conjunction with the phrase 
"under the law of another jurisdiction."  Section 343.307(1)(d) 
provides that the court shall count convictions (as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 340.03(9r)) under "the law of another jurisdiction 
that prohibits" conduct specified in (1)(d).  Thus, we read 
"'under the law of another jurisdiction' not as delimiting 
'convictions,' but rather as introducing and pertaining to 'that 
prohibits' and the remainder of the paragraph."17  
                                                 
16 State v. List, 2004 WI App 230, 277 Wis. 2d 836, 691 
N.W.2d 366, supports our reading of Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) 
and § 340.01(9r).  The court of appeals in List applied the 
statutory definition of "conviction" in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(9r) 
to § 343.307(1)(d). 
17 List, 277 Wis. 2d 836, ¶7. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
17 
 
¶45 The other jurisdiction need only have a law that 
prohibits conduct specified in Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d), 
namely refusing to submit to chemical testing; operating while 
intoxicated; operating while under the influence of a controlled 
substance or controlled substance analog, or a combination 
thereof; operating with an excess or specified range of alcohol 
concentrations; operating while under the influence of any drug 
to a degree that renders the person incapable of driving safely; 
or operating while having a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood.   
¶46 The 
conduct 
prohibited 
under 
Illinois' 
"zero 
tolerance" law relevant to  Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) in the 
instant case is refusing to submit to chemical testing or using 
a motor vehicle with an excess or specified range of alcohol 
concentration. 
¶47 We now turn to applying Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d), 
using the § 340.01(9r) definition of "conviction," to the facts 
of the instant case. 
¶48 The word "conviction" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(9r) to mean "an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or a 
determination that a person has violated or failed to comply 
                                                                                                                                                             
The State argues that the court of appeals followed a 
similar approach in State v. Puchacz, 2010 WI App 30, ¶13, 323 
Wis. 2d 741, 780 N.W.2d 536.  In that case the court of appeals 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) to count three prior 
violations in Michigan for operating while visibly impaired for 
purpose of sentencing on an OWI charge. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
18 
 
with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an 
authorized administrative tribunal . . . ."    
¶49 No one argues that Carter's operating privilege 
suspensions involved an unvacated adjudication of guilt under 
the definition of "convictions" or involved "a determination 
that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a 
court of original jurisdiction."   
¶50 Illinois 
"zero 
tolerance" 
suspensions 
are 
administrative 
in 
nature. 
 
These 
suspensions 
are 
not 
adjudications of guilt or "determination[s] that a person has 
violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original 
jurisdiction."18  
¶51 Because 
these 
prior 
Illinois 
suspensions 
are 
administrative, the pertinent question we must analyze under 
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(9r) is whether an Illinois "zero tolerance" 
suspension is a determination that a person has violated or 
failed to comply with the law in an authorized administrative 
tribunal.  We agree with the State that the Illinois suspensions 
in the present case were determinations in "an authorized 
administrative tribunal" that Carter "violated or failed to 
comply with the law."     
                                                 
18 In List, 306 Wis. 2d 752, ¶10, the court of appeals 
determined that an Illinois court's supervision of a defendant 
was a conviction, that is, a determination that the defendant 
"violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of 
original jurisdiction."  In contrast, the Illinois "zero 
tolerance" statutory scheme is administrative and does not 
provide for a determination in a court of original jurisdiction.  
See Arvia v. Madigan, 809 N.E.2d at 98-99. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
19 
 
¶52 In the Illinois "zero tolerance" suspension statutory 
framework, an initial determination that a person has violated 
or failed to comply with the law is made by the law enforcement 
officer.  Upon submission of a report of the violation from the 
police officer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State 
appears to automatically affirm the suspension.  The statutory 
procedure allows, however, for an appeal of the suspension to 
the Secretary of State.  This appeal requires the Secretary of 
State, 
an 
authorized 
administrative 
tribunal, 
to 
make 
a 
determination as to whether the person has violated or failed to 
comply with the law.  The decision of the Secretary of State is 
subject to judicial review.19 
¶53 Carter's 
two 
prior 
Illinois 
"zero 
tolerance" 
suspensions are determinations by an authorized administrative 
tribunal that Carter has violated or failed to comply with the 
law.  Therefore, the two prior Illinois "zero tolerance" 
suspensions fall within the definition of the word "convictions" 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 340.01(9r) and 343.307(1)(d). 
                                                 
19 Arvia v. Madigan, 809 N.E.2d 88, 98-99 (Ill. 2004). 
Although Carter did not seek administrative or judicial 
review of the Secretary of State's initial decision, he had the 
opportunity to do so.  Carter's failure to seek administrative 
or judicial review in effect renders the decision of the 
Secretary 
of 
State 
a 
determination 
by 
an 
authorized 
administrative tribunal.  There is no justification for treating 
a person who does not seek administrative or judicial review in 
Illinois more favorably under Wisconsin law than a person who 
sought administrative or judicial review and lost. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
20 
 
¶54 Because the Illinois "zero tolerance" suspensions are 
convictions for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d), we 
continue our analysis under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) to 
determine the conduct proscribed under Illinois law.  The 
Illinois statutory scheme for "zero tolerance" punishes a person 
who is less than 21 years of age for refusing to submit to a 
chemical test, or for using a motor vehicle with an alcohol 
concentration above 0.00.  
¶55 Analyzed in the context of the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d), an Illinois "zero tolerance" suspension is a 
conviction under a law of another jurisdiction that prohibits 
refusal of chemical testing or prohibits using a motor vehicle 
with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration.  In 
this case it is undisputed that the Illinois zero tolerance law 
prohibits a person under the age of 21 from using a motor 
vehicle with an alcohol concentration in excess of 0.00.  Thus 
Carter's Illinois "zero tolerance" suspensions fall squarely 
within 
the 
prohibited 
conduct 
listed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d). 
¶56 Because 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
suspensions 
under 
Illinois' "zero tolerance" law are convictions under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 340.01(9r) and 343.307(1)(d) as administrative determinations 
in an authorized administrative tribunal that a person has 
violated or failed to comply with a law and that the conduct 
prohibited under the Illinois law falls squarely within conduct 
specifically prohibited in Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d), we hold 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
applied 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
21 
 
§ 343.307(1)(d) in counting Carter's two prior Illinois "zero 
tolerance" suspensions for purposes of enhancement in sentencing 
for his OWI offense. 
IV 
¶57 Carter asserts that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d) is incorrect because it results in unfairness.  
He argues that fairness played a factor in the List, Machgan, 
and Carter decisions in the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals tended to treat out-of-state violations in the same way 
similar Wisconsin violations would be treated.     
¶58 Carter urges us to accept the reasoning of the court 
of appeals in Machgan that an out-of-state administrative 
suspension under a "zero tolerance" law should not be counted as 
a conviction for enhancement purposes when in-state similar 
revocations are not counted for enhancement purposes.20 
¶59 Carter and Machgan are correct that revocations and 
suspensions under the Wisconsin "absolute sobriety" law do not 
count for purposes of penalty enhancement in OWI violations.  
Yet we now hold that a suspension under the Illinois "zero 
tolerance" law counts for the purpose of penalty enhancement in 
OWI violations.  Thus we interpret the Wisconsin statutes as 
imposing a greater penalty on an underage individual driving in 
Illinois than they impose on the same individual driving in 
                                                 
20 State v. Machgan, 2007 WI App 263, ¶15, 306 Wis. 2d 752, 
743 N.W.2d 832. 
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
22 
 
Wisconsin for the same kind of conduct involving the "zero 
tolerance" or "absolute sobriety" laws. 
¶60 For example, a person under the legal drinking age 
driving in South Beloit, Illinois (just over the Wisconsin 
border) whose chemical test demonstrates a 0.01 blood alcohol 
concentration and whose operating privilege is suspended, will 
have that suspension count in Wisconsin as a prior conviction 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d).  But a person under the legal 
drinking age driving in Beloit, Wisconsin (just over the 
Illinois border), whose chemical test demonstrates a 0.01 blood 
alcohol concentration and whose operating privilege is suspended 
will not have that suspension count in Wisconsin as a prior 
conviction under § 343.307(1). 
¶61 Similarly, under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(e) it is 
clear that Illinois "zero tolerance" revocations and suspensions 
for refusal to submit to chemical testing count for penalty 
enhancement, even though a Wisconsin revocation for the same 
conduct is not counted.  Thus, the legislature has expressly 
chosen to 
exclude 
revocations under Wisconsin's "absolute 
sobriety" statutes from being counted in penalty enhancement, 
but has not made a similar exclusion for suspensions under out-
of-state "zero tolerance" statutes in § 343.307(1)(e). 
¶62 Carter also argues that our interpretation treats too 
harshly persons who have not attained the legal drinking age and 
who are violating a zero tolerance law but are not operating a 
vehicle while intoxicated.  
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
23 
 
¶63 The Wisconsin legislature could have carved out an 
exception for out-of-state "zero tolerance" suspensions, similar 
to the exception it carved out for Wisconsin "absolute sobriety" 
suspensions.  It did not.  Instead the legislature has 
promulgated language in Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) and (e) to 
encompass a broad array of convictions, suspensions, and 
revocations under the laws of another jurisdiction for counting 
purposes.  Under these circumstances, the court cannot usurp the 
role of the legislature and carve out an exception for 
suspensions under the Illinois "zero tolerance" laws.   
¶64 Whether consistency in counting "absolute sobriety" 
revocations under Wisconsin law and similar "zero tolerance" 
suspensions under other states' laws is appropriate, and whether 
burdening 
youths 
with 
multiple 
convictions 
by 
counting 
suspensions under out-of-state zero tolerance laws for penalty 
enhancement is appropriate, are policy decisions for the 
legislature. 
 
If 
consistency 
is 
desirable, 
it 
is 
the 
legislature's role to determine how best to achieve it. 
¶65 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court.  We conclude that the two prior suspensions of Carter's 
operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law are 
convictions within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 343.307(1)(d) 
and 340.01(9r) and that the circuit court appropriately counted 
them in sentencing Carter for his OWI violation.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
No. 
2008AP3144-CR   
 
24 
 
¶66 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶67 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I believe that 
those who repeatedly operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated 
(OWI) should have their record travel with them, no matter where 
in the country these offenses were committed.  For instance, if 
the defendant had two prior OWI convictions in Illinois and was 
subsequently arrested in Wisconsin for OWI, the prior Illinois 
offenses should be counted for sentence enhancement purposes and 
the defendant should be charged with OWI third offense.  I 
conclude that this is a result that the legislature intended 
when 
it 
enacted 
the 
counting 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d).   
¶68 I also believe that Wisconsin's "absolute sobriety" 
law for underage drivers and its Illinois counterpart, called 
"zero tolerance," are important legislative enactments of public 
policy.  Both provide that it is against the law for persons 
under the age of 21 to drive if they have consumed even one sip 
of alcohol——regardless of whether this consumption actually 
affects their driving or judgment.   
¶69 I write separately because I conclude that the 
majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) is in 
error.  The majority concludes that in enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d), the legislature intended to count a prior out-
of-state youthful zero tolerance violation the same as a prior 
out-of-state OWI offense for purposes of sentence enhancement.  
A review of the legislative history reveals a very different 
legislative intent.   
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶70 The rationale for the introduction of the legislation 
can be found in several places in the legislative history and 
can 
be 
succinctly 
stated 
as 
follows: 
"DOT 
RATIONALE: . . . Without having the ability to treat out of 
state OWI convictions as if they had occurred in Wisconsin, we 
may not be in compliance with the federal requirements."1  In 
addition, the legislative history reflects an intent to address 
offenses related to the lower range of alcohol concentration for 
commercial carriers.  Because I conclude that the majority 
interpretation is at odds with the legislative history and fails 
to 
apply 
a 
standard 
canon 
of 
statutory 
construction, 
I 
respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶71 As 
the 
majority 
acknowledges, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d) is a cumbersome statute.  Majority op., ¶29.  In 
relevant part, that statute provides that when calculating the 
length of an OWI sentence,2 the court shall count "[c]onvictions 
                                                 
1 See CDL Advisory Council, Draft #3 Resolution of Issues 
Discussed March 6, 1989, at 7 (June 5, 1989) (on file at the 
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin) 
[hereinafter CDL Advisory Council Memorandum]. 
2 The Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook explains that "[t]he 
offense commonly referred to as OWI relates to three (3) 
separate, 
but 
interrelated offenses."  Wisconsin Judicial 
Benchbook: Criminal and Traffic, TR 1-15 (2010).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) prohibits driving or operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, controlled 
substance, controlled substance analog, or any combination that 
renders a person incapable of safely driving ("OWI").  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) prohibits driving or operating a motor 
vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled 
substance ("OCS").  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) prohibits 
driving or operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration ("PAC").    
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
under the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits a person 
from . . . using 
a 
motor 
vehicle . . . with 
an 
excess 
or 
specified range of alcohol concentration . . . as those or 
substantially similar terms are used in that jurisdiction's 
laws."  Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d). 
¶72 Given that Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) does not count a 
violation of Wisconsin's absolute sobriety law, the majority 
asks whether Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) "treats a violation of the 
Illinois 'zero tolerance' laws differently than the way it 
treats a violation of the Wisconsin 'absolute sobriety' laws in 
counting offenses for purposes of sentencing."  Majority op., 
¶18.  In answering this question, the majority focuses its 
examination on the statutory term "conviction."  Id., ¶¶31-53.  
It concludes that an administrative suspension for a violation 
of the Illinois zero tolerance law is a "conviction" as that 
term is used in Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d), and that such a 
conviction should be counted for enhancing the penalty at 
sentencing.   
¶73 The problem with the majority's analysis is that it 
focuses on only part of the statutory language.  It does not 
separately examine whether the legislature intended the phrase 
"with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration" to 
encompass Illinois zero tolerance violations.  If it had 
examined this additional phrase, it would have reached a 
different conclusion.  Instead, the majority simply concludes 
that the conduct prohibited under the Illinois law "fall[s] 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
squarely 
within 
the 
prohibited 
conduct 
listed 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d)."  Id., ¶55.    
¶74 The majority's focus is not surprising, given that the 
parties focused their arguments on the term "conviction."  
Neither party advanced any interpretation of the phrase "with an 
excess 
or 
specified 
range 
of 
alcohol 
concentration."  
Nevertheless, my review of the legislative history indicates 
that the legislature intended the phrase "excess or specified 
range 
of 
alcohol 
concentration" 
to 
encompass 
OWI-related 
offenses and offenses related to the lower range of alcohol 
concentration for commercial vehicle operators——not youthful 
zero-tolerance offenses.    
II 
¶75 The phrase "with an excess or specified range of 
alcohol concentration" first appeared in the Wisconsin Statutes 
in 1989.  It was introduced by 1989 Wis. Act 105, which 
significantly 
amended 
Wisconsin's 
driver 
licensing 
scheme.  
Among other changes, the phrase "with an excess or specified 
range 
of 
alcohol 
concentration" 
was 
inserted 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) and five other statutes.3   
¶76 The drafting history reveals that the act was intended 
to implement the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 
1986.  The legislature requested that the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) draft legislation to accomplish this goal.  
It appears that the DOT convened an advisory council to evaluate 
                                                 
3 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 343.307(2), 
343.30(1q)(b)1, 
343.305(10)(b)1, 343.31(2), and 343.315(2)2 (1989-90, as amended 
by 1989 Wis. Act 105). 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Wisconsin law in light of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act and to make recommendations.    
¶77 The advisory council identified what it referred to as 
"the Mattson problem."4  In State v. Mattson, 140 Wis. 2d 24, 409 
N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals held that a 
Minnesota drunk driving conviction did not count as a prior 
conviction because Minnesota's OWI statute was not in strict 
conformity with Wisconsin's OWI statute.  Minnesota's statute 
included several offenses, such as intoxicated snowmobiling, 
that were not penalized as OWI offenses in Wisconsin.5  The 
Mattson holding made it very difficult to count out-of-state OWI 
offenses as prior convictions, and it appeared to bring 
Wisconsin law out of compliance with the Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act. 
¶78 The advisory council explained: "Without the Mattson 
solution, our ability to consider offenses committed in other 
states could again be challenged.  Without having the ability to 
treat out of state OWI convictions as if they had occurred in 
Wisconsin, we may not be in compliance with the federal 
requirements."6  Noncompliance would result in a loss of 
substantial federal highway funds.  Thus, it was imperative to 
add language which would nullify the effect of Mattson.   
                                                 
4 See CDL Advisory Council Memorandum, supra n.1, at 7. 
5 State v. Mattson, 140 Wis. 2d 24, 29-30, 409 N.W.2d 138 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
6 CDL Advisory Council Memorandum, supra n.1, at 7. 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶79 Based on the advisory council's recommendations, the 
DOT drafted proposed legislation.  It explained that the 
proposed legislation "revises the present statutory provisions 
concerning the counting of prior convictions in other states for 
operating while intoxicated ('OWI') and certain major traffic 
offenses" and "would count out-of-state OWI offenses as prior 
offenses even if the other state's law was not completely 
identical to Wisconsin's law."7  The new legislation would allow 
convictions under another state's law to be counted "if that law 
prohibited the same sort of conduct as Wisconsin's law, 
regardless of technical or minor substantive differences between 
the two states' laws."8   
¶80 To accomplish this end, the DOT proposed that the 
legislature insert the new phrase "with an excess alcohol 
concentration" in several places throughout the statute.  It 
proposed 
that 
this 
phrase 
be 
placed 
in 
both 
Wis. Stat. §§ 343.30(1q)(b)1 and 343.305(10)(b)1, which provided 
that under certain circumstances, a court was required to 
suspend or revoke a person's operating privileges.  Prior to the 
1989 amendments, both of these statutes read: "If a person has a 
conviction for any offense under a local ordinance in or a state 
statute of another state which is in conformity with s. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Wisconsin Motor 
Carrier Safety Act Draft #4, at 2 (August 18, 1989) (on file at 
the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin) 
[hereinafter DOT Draft]. 
8 Id. 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
346.63(1)(a) [OWI] or (b) [PAC] or both, that conviction shall 
count as a prior conviction under this subdivision."   
¶81 The DOT proposed that Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1q)(b)1 be 
amended to require suspension of operating privileges when a 
person has:  
a conviction for any offense under a local ordinance 
in conformity with s. 346.63(1)(a) or (b) or both, or 
under the law of another state that prohibits refusal 
of alcohol testing or use of a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled 
substance or a compilation thereof, or with an excess 
alcohol concentration, or under the influence of any 
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of 
safely driving, as those or substantially similar 
terms are defined in that state's laws.9 
The DOT proposed that nearly identical language be inserted into 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(b)1.10   In both places, a note from the 
Office of General Counsel for the DOT explained that "[t]his 
language is intended to allow counting of out-of-state OWI-
related convictions, notwithstanding [Mattson]."11   
 
¶82 At the same time that the DOT proposed the above 
modifications, 
it 
also 
proposed 
modifying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1), the counting statute which is relevant to Carter's 
case.  Prior to the 1989 amendments, this statute provided in 
part that "convictions for violations under s. 346.63(1), or a 
local ordinance in conformity therewith or a local ordinance in 
or a state statute of another state in conformity therewith" 
                                                 
9 Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added).   
10 In the draft of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(b)1, the word 
"combination" is used instead of "compilation."   
11 DOT Draft, supra n.7, at 78, 87. 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
would count for sentencing purposes.  Wis. Stat. § 343.307 
(1987-88).  The DOT proposed adding the following language: 
"convictions under the law of another state that prohibits 
refusal of alcohol testing or use of a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance, or 
a combination thereof, or with an excess alcohol concentration, 
or under the influence of any drug to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely driving, as those or substantially 
similar terms are defined in that state's laws."12   
¶83 Because the proposed language modifying the counting 
statute is identical to the proposed language modifying Wis. 
Stat. §§ 343.30(1q)(b)1 and 343.305(10)(b)1, and because the 
proposals were contemporaneously made, it appears that the 
intent underlying the DOT's proposed amendments was the same.  I 
conclude that the intent was to "count out-of-state OWI offenses 
as prior offenses even if the other state's law was not 
completely identical to Wisconsin's law."13       
¶84 The DOT's proposal was sent to the Legislative 
Reference Bureau (LRB).  The LRB retained much of the language 
that had been proposed by the DOT.  However, the LRB modified 
the phrase "or with an excess alcohol concentration" to "or with 
an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration" in a 
draft dated September 28, 1989.14  This change was likewise 
                                                 
12 Id. at 88-89 (emphasis added).  
13 See id. at 2. 
14 See Preliminary Draft of 1989 Wis. Act 105, at 65 (Sept. 
28, 1989) (emphasis added) (on file at the Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin). 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
reflected in the amendments to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.307(2), 
343.30(1q)(b)1, 343.305(10)(b)1, 343.31(2), and 343.315(2),15 and 
it was passed by the legislature.16 
¶85 There is no explicit explanation for the LRB's 
addition of the phrase "or specified range" to the proposed 
amendments.  It likely was to reference the new offense created 
by the legislation for operating a commercial vehicle with a 
blood alcohol concentration of 0.04-0.08——a lower blood alcohol 
concentration than for non-commercial drivers.17  There is no 
indication whatsoever that the modification of this language was 
intended to substantively change the DOT's proposal.   
¶86 Accordingly, it appears that the LRB's intent was the 
same as the expressed intent of the DOT——to count OWI-related 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307(2) is the counterpart to the 
counting statute interpreted today.  It comes into play when the 
offender's current offense is for refusal to take a test rather 
than OWI.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 343.30(1q)(b) and 343.305(10)(b)1, 
discussed above, provide that under certain circumstances a 
court must suspend or revoke a person's operating license.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
343.31(2) 
provides 
that 
under 
certain 
circumstances the DOT (rather than a court) must suspend or 
revoke a person's operating license.  Finally, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.315(2), discussed below, provides that a person shall be 
disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a 
period of time upon conviction of certain offenses.   
16 See 1989 Wis. Act 105. 
17 To bring Wisconsin into compliance with the Commercial 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Wisconsin was required to lower the 
range of alcohol concentration permitted for commercial motor 
vehicle 
operators. 
 
The 
council 
explained: 
"Regulations 
implementing the [Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act] require a 
.04 BAC standard for commercial driver licensees."  Policy 
Recommendations for Implementing the Commercial Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act, at 4 (June 30, 1989) (on file at the Wisconsin 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin). 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
offenses and offenses related to the lower range of alcohol 
concentration for commercial vehicle operators.  The change was 
necessary for Wisconsin to come into compliance with the federal 
Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986.   
¶87 The analysis that the LRB provided for 1989 Wis. Act 
105 clearly shows the purpose and goals of the legislation.  The 
purpose was to come into compliance with the federal law 
pertaining to the safety of commercial motor vehicles.  The 
goals included removing problem drivers from the highways and 
establishing uniformity.  Finally, new offenses were created 
related to the operation of commercial vehicles:   
This bill implements the requirements of the federal 
commercial motor vehicle safety act of 1986 and 
establishes a classified driver license system.  The 
goals of the federal act are to improve driver 
quality, remove problem drivers from the highways and 
to establish uniform procedures . . . . The federal 
act requires states to establish minimum standards to 
ensure a uniform national system and to participate in 
a national information system to exchange information 
regarding the licensing, suspension or conviction of 
traffic 
violations 
of 
commercial 
motor 
vehicle 
drivers. . . .  
The bill also creates numerous offenses relating to 
driver licensing and the operation of commercial motor 
vehicles.18 
Accordingly, I conclude that the majority's interpretation is at 
odds with the legislative history. 
III 
                                                 
18 Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, at 4 (on 
file at the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wisconsin). 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶88 The majority's interpretation also fails to apply a 
standard canon of statutory construction. When the same phrase 
is used repeatedly throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is 
reasonable to deduce that the legislature intended the phrase to 
have the same meaning each time it appears.19  Bank Mutual v. 
S.J. Boyer Constr., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 
N.W.2d 462.  This is especially true when the phrase was 
introduced in multiple places of the statutory chapter at the 
same time, all as part of the same bill.  Like the legislative 
history, this rule of statutory construction supports the 
conclusion that the legislature intended the phrase "excess or 
specified range of alcohol concentration" to encompass OWI-
related offenses and offenses related to the lower range of 
alcohol concentration for commercial vehicle operators.  
¶89 In addition to appearing in the counting statute, the 
phrase 
"with 
an 
excess 
or 
specified 
range 
of 
alcohol 
concentration" now appears in two other statutes:  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.31 and Wis. Stat. § 343.315(2).  It is of great import 
that when it is used in these other statutes, the phrase "excess 
or specified range of alcohol concentration" is consistently 
paired with OWI-related offenses and offenses related to the 
lower range of alcohol concentration for commercial vehicle 
operators——not youthful zero-tolerance offenses. 
                                                 
19 The 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau 
has 
provided 
the 
following guidance when drafting legislation: "[L]egislative 
style should avoid variation in sentence form and should use 
identical words for the expression of identical ideas to the 
point of monotony."  Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin 
Bill Drafting Manual 2011-2012 § 2.01(15)(a) (rev. ed. 2010).   
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶90 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.31 directs the DOT to revoke 
operating privileges of anyone convicted of certain Wisconsin 
and out-of-state offenses.  Subsection (1) lists Wisconsin 
convictions warranting revocation, including convictions for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant, injury by intoxicated operation of vehicle, and 
injury by operation of a commercial motor vehicle when the 
person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less 
than 0.08.  Subsection (1) does not provide for revocation upon 
violation of Wisconsin's absolute sobriety law. 
¶91 Subsection (2) provides that "[t]he department shall 
revoke the operating privilege of any resident upon receiving 
notice" of an out-of-state conviction which, "if committed in 
this state, would have been cause for revocation under this 
section or for revocation under s. 343.30(1q)."  As set forth 
above, a youthful zero tolerance violation would not have been 
"cause for revocation under this section."  Likewise, a youthful 
zero 
tolerance 
violation 
would 
not 
have 
been 
cause 
for 
revocation under Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1q).  Under that statute, 
revocation is required if the resident has been convicted of 
OWI, causing injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, or homicide 
by intoxicated use of a vehicle.    
¶92 Similarly, the phrase "with an excess or specified 
range of alcohol concentration" is found twice within the 
commercial motor vehicle disqualification statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.315(2).  That statute provides that a person shall be 
disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle upon a 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
first conviction of certain offenses.  Again, the phrase is 
paired with OWI-related offenses and offenses related to the 
lower range of alcohol concentration for commercial vehicle 
operators——not youthful zero-tolerance offenses.20     
                                                 
20 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.315(2)(a)2 
mandates 
disqualification from operating a commercial motor vehicle upon 
conviction 
under 
two 
Wisconsin 
statutes, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.63(1)(b) and (5)(a).  Those two statutes prohibit 
operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration and 
operating a commercial motor vehicle with a range of blood 
alcohol concentration between 0.04 and 0.08.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.315(2)(a)2 also mandates disqualification upon conviction 
of "the law of another jurisdiction prohibiting driving or 
operating a commercial motor vehicle while the person's alcohol 
concentration is 0.04 or more or with an excess or specified 
range of alcohol concentration, as those or substantially 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
¶93 Along with the legislative history, the legislature's 
use of this phrase in similar and contemporaneous statutes 
bolsters the conclusion that the legislature intended the phrase 
to encompass OWI-related offenses and offenses related to the 
lower range of alcohol concentration for commercial vehicle 
operators——not youthful zero tolerance violations.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent.    
                                                                                                                                                             
similar terms are used in that jurisdiction's laws." 
Wisconsin Stat. 343.315(2)(a)6 mandates disqualification 
upon conviction under four Wisconsin statutes, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 346.63(2), 346.63(6), 940.09(1) and 940.25.  Those four 
statutes make it unlawful for any person to cause injury to 
another by operation of a vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant, controlled substance, or drug, or while operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
content. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
343.315(2)(a)6 mandates disqualification upon conviction of "the 
law of another jurisdiction prohibiting causing or inflicting 
injury, great bodily harm or death through use of a motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated 
 
or 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
alcohol . . . or with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more 
or 
with 
an 
excess 
or 
specified 
range 
of 
alcohol 
concentration . . .as those or substantially similar terms are 
used in that jurisdiction's laws."   
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
 
No.  2008AP3144-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1