Title: Bright v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-2244
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 2020

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-2244 
____________ 
 
RAYMOND BRIGHT, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
April 2, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
In 2009, Raymond Bright was convicted of the first-degree murders of 
Derrick King and Randall Brown and sentenced to death for each murder.  This 
Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  Bright v. State 
(Bright I), 90 So. 3d 249, 265 (Fla. 2012).  In subsequent postconviction 
proceedings, Bright was granted a new penalty phase proceeding on the basis that 
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in investigating and presenting 
mitigating evidence.  State v. Bright (Bright II), 200 So. 3d 710, 736 (Fla. 2016).  
Bright now appeals from the second penalty phase at which a death sentence was 
imposed for each murder following jury verdicts unanimously recommending 
 
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death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm the sentences. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Trial and Direct Appeal 
This Court previously set forth the relevant facts in Bright I: 
 
On February 18, 2008, Michael Majors went to the home of 
fifty-four-year-old defendant Raymond Bright in Jacksonville, 
Florida.  Twenty-year-old Derrick King, sixteen-year-old Randall 
Brown, and Bright were in the house.  At approximately 8 p.m., 
Majors and Brown both left the home. 
 
Brown returned to his mother’s home and, after receiving a 
phone call, borrowed his mother’s rental vehicle and left her house 
between 9 and 9:30 p.m.  At approximately 11 p.m., Brown spoke 
with his mother by phone and advised that he would be home shortly; 
however, he never returned.  At around 8 a.m. the next morning, 
Majors attempted to call Brown on his cellular phone, but there was 
no answer.  Majors called Brown’s mother and was advised that 
Brown had not returned.  Majors then went to Bright’s house and, 
having no response to his knock at the door, Majors climbed into the 
house through an open window.  Upon entering the family room, 
Majors discovered the bodies of King and Brown. 
 
Derrick King was lying face down on the carpet next to a sofa, 
partially wrapped in a sleeping bag or comforter.  The sofa was 
saturated with blood on one end, which was adjacent to where King’s 
head rested on the floor.  The wall behind the sofa and the ceiling 
above the sofa evidenced blood.  An evidence technician testified 
during trial that the blood on the ceiling was cast-off blood, [n.1] and 
the pattern was consistent with someone being on the couch and 
swinging his arm back. 
 
[N.1] Cast-off blood is defined as droplets of blood 
that are flung from a weapon so as to make a trail of 
blood where it lands. 
 
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Randall Brown was found seated sideways in a recliner with his 
head leaning up against a wall and a blanket covering his head.  The 
wall against which Brown’s body rested presented a pattern of blood 
that radiated from his head, and there was also blood on the ceiling.  
When crime scene technicians moved the recliner away from the wall, 
a pool of blood was discovered on the floor.  Above Brown’s head 
was a framed picture with one side of the frame broken away.  That 
one side was indented, consistent with having been struck by 
something round, such as a hammer. 
 
Outside the house, the crime scene technicians located a loaded 
nine-millimeter Smith & Wesson pistol, a loaded assault rifle, and a 
pair of mechanic’s gloves.  During a subsequent search of Bright’s 
yard, technicians recovered a hammer that had been buried.  DNA 
testing on the hammer revealed two separate DNA profiles, one of 
which was a major contributor and the other of which was a minor 
contributor.  During trial, the parties stipulated that the DNA of the 
major contributor matched the known profile of Derrick King.  
Randall Brown could not be excluded as the minor contributor.  The 
gloves did not test positive for blood.  Further, no latent fingerprints 
of value were found on the hammer, the nine-millimeter handgun, the 
assault rifle, or their magazines or ammunition.  No foreign DNA was 
detected on the fingernail clippings of either victim. 
 
At 7:30 a.m. on the morning of February 19 (the day that the 
victims were discovered), Bright’s ex-wife picked him up at a church 
near his home.  The ex-wife testified that she and Bright had made 
plans to secure the admission of Bright to a United States Department 
of Veterans Affairs clinic for treatment of his cocaine addiction.  She 
testified that they had agreed to meet at the church because she “was 
in fear of what was going on” at Bright’s house.  During the Spencer 
hearing, see Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993), the ex-wife 
testified that she and Bright had previously made multiple calls to law 
enforcement—including the narcotics division of the Jacksonville 
Sheriff’s Department and Crime Stoppers—to report that Bright 
wanted certain individuals removed from his house because they had 
essentially taken over the house for the purpose of selling drugs. 
While one officer suggested that Bright accompany the police to the 
house and identify the persons who were allegedly dealing drugs, 
 
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Bright and his ex-wife refused to agree to this proposal because they 
feared retaliation. [n.2] 
 
[N.2] Bright’s sister, Janice Jones, also testified 
during the Spencer hearing as to her efforts to remove 
individuals who were staying in Bright’s house.  When 
asked what their names were, she replied Lavelle and 
Derrick.  During the guilt phase, Michael Majors testified 
that Bright rented a room to an individual named Lavelle 
Copeland, who was friends with Majors and King.  Jones 
managed to convince Copeland to call her and, when he 
called, she informed him that she was coming to 
Jacksonville and would bring the police with her. 
Copeland responded that he would not leave until Bright 
paid the money owed to him.  When Jones offered to pay 
the money so that Copeland would leave the house, he 
responded, “You need to stay out of this.  You don’t 
know what you’re getting into.  It’s between me and your 
brother.”  Copeland was not at Bright’s house on the 
night of the murders because he was in jail. 
 
After the ex-wife met Bright at the church on the morning of 
February 19, she called a lawyer and arranged for Bright to speak with 
homicide detectives the next day.  However, at 1:45 a.m. on February 
20, law enforcement arrived at the home of the ex-wife and Bright 
was placed in custody.  Subsequent to the arrest, the ex-wife disposed 
of Bright’s bloody clothes because she did not want them in her 
house. 
 
Bright made statements to separate individuals with regard to 
what allegedly occurred on the night of the murders.  Prior to his 
arrest, Bright informed friend and former coworker Benjamin Lundy 
that he had “screwed up” and may have killed two people.  Bright told 
Lundy that the murders occurred after a confrontation erupted when 
one of the victims accused Bright of stealing drugs.  After his arrest, 
Bright also described the events to Mickey Graham, who was in jail at 
the same time with Bright on unrelated charges.  According to 
Graham, Lavelle Copeland had moved in with Bright, and he and 
others were running a crack cocaine operation out of the house.  [n.3] 
Bright was afraid of them and felt threatened because they possessed 
 
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guns.  Bright did not want them there and had called the police in an 
attempt to remove them from the premises. 
 
[N.3] On a table in the home, an evidence 
technician found scales, money, and a “push rod,” which 
is used to pack drugs into a pipe or a bong.  However, no 
drugs were found in the house other than 4.6 grams of 
marijuana, which was discovered inside Derrick King’s 
sneaker. 
 
Bright told Graham that he went into the kitchen at 2 a.m. on 
February 19.  King was on the sofa and Brown was in the recliner.  
Brown had a nine-millimeter handgun in his hand and started waving 
it around.  King rose from the sofa and removed the gun from 
Brown’s hand.  Bright saw an opportunity and attempted to take the 
gun away from King.  The men struggled and the gun discharged. 
[n.4]  The gunshot startled King and caused him to release the 
handgun.  Bright then pointed the gun at King and attempted to shoot 
him, but the gun misfired.  Bright dropped the weapon and attempted 
to run out of the house, but he tripped and fell.  He grabbed a hammer 
that was within reach, turned around, and commenced striking King, 
knocking him back toward the sofa where King had previously been 
lying down.  When Bright turned around, he saw that Brown was 
about to pick up the handgun.  Bright then began to strike Brown with 
the hammer.  The next time Bright turned toward the sofa, he saw 
King reaching for an assault rifle.  At that time, Bright again struck 
King with the hammer.  When Bright stopped, he could still hear King 
and Brown breathing and gurgling, but then the room became silent. 
Bright described his actions to Graham as having “lost it.” 
 
[N.4] In the vicinity of King’s body was a section 
of carpet that appeared to be stained with gunshot 
residue.  Testing on the carpet was positive for gunshot 
residue, and a firearms expert testified that, based upon 
the location of the residue, a weapon had been fired 
within six inches of the carpet.  From that stain, the 
evidence technicians traced a bullet trajectory and 
ultimately discovered a bullet lodged in the wall near the 
front door of the house.  However, neither of the victims’ 
hands tested positive for gunshot residue.  A firearms 
 
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expert confirmed that the bullet lodged in the wall had 
been fired from the nine-millimeter handgun that had 
been discovered in the yard. 
 
90 So. 3d at 252-54.  The jury found Bright guilty of two counts of first-degree 
murder and ultimately recommended a sentence of death for the murders of King 
and Brown by a vote of eight to four.  Id. at 256.  After conducting a Spencer1 
hearing, the trial court found the same aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
for each victim and concluded that the established aggravating2 factors 
substantially outweighed the mitigating3 circumstances.  90 So. 3d at 256-57.  The 
 
 
1.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
2.  The trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt the following statutory aggravators: (1) previous conviction of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to the person (a 1990 conviction for 
robbery) (great weight); (2) previous conviction of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to the person (the contemporaneous murder of the other victim) 
(great weight); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC) (great weight).  90 So. 3d at 256-57. 
 
3.  The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance—that the 
murders were committed while Bright was under the influence of an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance (some weight).  The trial court also found 
nineteen nonstatutory mitigators: 
 
(1) a long and well-documented history of drug abuse (some weight); 
(2) Bright repeatedly sought help for his problems (some weight); (3) 
remorse (little weight); (4) Bright was afraid of the victims and took 
steps to remove them from his house (little weight); (5) ten years of 
service in the USMC with two honorable discharges and a third 
discharge under honorable circumstances (considerable weight); (6) 
Bright has skills as a mechanic and served as an aviation mechanic in 
the USMC (some weight); (7) Bright’s actions as a USMC aviation 
 
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trial court sentenced Bright to death.  Id. at 257.  On direct appeal, this Court 
affirmed the convictions and sentence.  Id. at 265.  The United States Supreme 
Court denied Bright’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Bright v. Florida, 568 U.S. 
897 (2012). 
Postconviction Proceeding 
On November 6, 2013, Bright filed an amended motion to vacate his 
judgment and sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  In 
his motion, Bright claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt 
and penalty phases of his trial and that he was deprived of a fair trial by the 
cumulative effect of any errors.  Bright II, 200 So. 3d at 722.  After conducting an 
evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court held that Bright’s penalty phase 
 
mechanic likely saved lives (some weight); (8) Bright mentored 
young mechanics (some weight); (9) Bright was a good employee 
(some weight); (10) Bright was a loving and giving boyfriend (slight 
weight); (11) Bright is a good brother (some weight); (12) Bright was 
a good father, and imposition of the death penalty would have a 
serious, negative impact on others (slight weight); (13) Bright shares 
love and support with his family (slight weight); (14) Bright was a 
good friend (slight weight); (15) Bright has been an exceptional 
inmate (some weight); (16) Bright exhibited good behavior 
throughout the court proceedings (slight weight); (17) Bright 
maintained gainful employment (considerable weight); (18) Bright is 
amenable to rehabilitation and a productive life in prison (slight 
weight); and (19) Bright has bonded with another inmate and taught 
him how to read (slight weight). 
 
90 So. 3d at 257. 
  
 
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counsel were ineffective but denied Bright’s remaining claims.  Id. at 723.  The 
postconviction court entered an order granting Bright a new penalty phase.  Id.  
The parties cross-appealed the order. 
This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order granting a new penalty 
phase,4 holding that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial 
court’s findings that penalty phase counsel were deficient in investigating 
mitigation evidence concerning Bright’s mental health and that Bright was 
prejudiced by that deficient performance.  Id. at 732-36.  This Court remanded for 
a new penalty phase proceeding.  Id. at 742. 
Second Penalty Phase Proceeding 
The second penalty phase proceeding began on September 5, 2017.  The 
State presented much of the same guilt-phase evidence through live witness 
testimony, including Brown’s mother, Carrie Mae Brown Gray; Brown’s friend, 
Michael Majors; and police officers and crime scene investigators from the 
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office.  Victim impact statements were read by King’s 
grandmother, Eartha Jaudon; Brown’s mother, Gray; Brown’s sister, Shannon 
Brown; and King’s mother, Carolyn Jaudon.  Retired Pensacola Police Department 
Sergeant Robert Bell testified that on September 6, 1989, he witnessed Bright 
 
 
4.  This Court also affirmed the denial of Bright’s claims that guilt-phase 
counsel were ineffective.  200 So. 3d at 737, 742. 
 
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holding a knife while robbing a convenience store clerk.  Specifically, Bell 
testified that he saw Bright “standing on the side of the counter, holding the knife, 
leaning over the counter like he was attempting to get money out of the register.” 
Bright ran from the store but was eventually caught and arrested.  The State 
introduced a copy of the conviction, judgment, and sentence from 1990. 
 
The State’s final witness was Dr. Valerie Rao, the Chief Medical Examiner 
for Clay, Nassau, and Duval Counties.  With regard to Brown, Dr. Rao testified 
that his cause of death was blunt head trauma.  He had more than fourteen injuries 
to the outside of his head, which included lacerations, bruises, contusions, and 
fractures.  The fourteen injuries did not include the skull fractures or brain injuries.  
Dr. Rao testified that the lacerations on Brown’s head and skull fractures were 
consistent with a hammer being used to inflict the injuries.  Brown had many 
defensive injuries, including a fracture of his left ulna, punctate-type lacerations to 
his left arm, and injuries to his wrists, hands, and thigh.  Brown also suffered 
multiple skull fractures.  Dr. Rao also testified that Brown was alive when the 
injuries were inflicted, as evidenced by the bruising and swollen face. 
With regard to King, Dr. Rao testified that King also died from blunt impact 
to the head.  He had thirty-eight blunt impact injuries to his head and about twenty 
injuries to his extremities.  King suffered a laceration through the upper eyelid 
above the right eyebrow, through the left eye.  His eye was sunken because of the 
 
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trauma.  One injury on his head went through his scalp to reveal his underlying 
skull; the injuries on his head showed a parallel pattern received from a claw 
impacting and dragging.  King also had circular fractures that caused multiple 
injuries to his brain and bleeding on the surface of his brain.  These injuries were 
consistent with being caused by a hammer.   Dr. Rao also testified that King was 
alive when these injuries were inflicted and that he suffered.  King was covered 
with numerous defensive wounds: bruising on his left arm; a fracture of his left 
ulna; abrasions and bruising of the entire back of his left hand; bruising and 
abrasions on his right forearm and back of his right hand; and an abrasion and 
laceration on his left knee.  On redirect, Dr. Rao also testified that King and Brown 
were not unconscious after one blow because each individual had defensive 
wounds. 
The defense then presented its case for mitigation.  The first witness for the 
defense was Janice Jones, Bright’s sister.  Jones testified regarding her and 
Bright’s impoverished childhood.  She also testified that Bright was abused by 
their father during his childhood.  Their father would hit Bright two or three times 
a week with items from the junkyard where they lived.  Additionally, at least twice 
a month, their father would administer hours-long planned beatings, which were 
for previously unpunished wrongs that the father would add-up.  Bright’s father 
would beat him to the point of drawing blood, and sometimes losing 
 
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consciousness.  During the beatings, the father would lecture them from the Bible.  
Bright was also beaten for stuttering and wetting his bed.  Bright’s father ran a 
junkyard that surrounded their house.  As children, both Jones and Bright were 
forced to work in the junkyard from the time the sun rose until dark.  Jones also 
testified that she and Bright witnessed their father abuse their mother and that their 
father would frequently binge drink alcohol. 
Jones also testified about Bright joining the United States Marine Corps and 
training to be an aircraft mechanic.  When Bright returned from the military, Jones 
noticed him struggling with alcohol.  She also noticed him having problems with 
other substances in 1989.  She helped Bright participate in a thirty-day treatment 
program with the Veterans Administration, but he struggled after the program was 
over. 
In November of 2007, three months before the murders, Jones saw Bright 
and believed he was depressed.  Jones testified that shortly before the murders she 
tried unsuccessfully to get individuals who were residing in Bright’s house to 
leave.  After failing to get the individuals out of Bright’s house, Bright seemed to 
be in distress and in fear.  Finally, Jones testified that Bright has taken care of her 
and her children and that they have a positive relationship.  Bright also has a 
positive relationship with his grandchildren and Jones’s grandchildren. 
 
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Bright’s childhood friend and neighbor, Isidore Knight, also testified.  
Knight grew up across the street from Bright and remembers that Bright had to 
work in the junkyard from the age of six or seven, from sunup to sundown, six 
days a week.  Bright worked even when injured.  Knight saw Bright get “whipped” 
with an extension cord as punishment and characterized Bright’s childhood as 
“torture.” 
Psychologist Dr. Harry Krop testified regarding an assessment and testing 
done for Bright’s original penalty phase.  Dr. Krop saw Bright in August of 2008 
to assess Bright’s competency to proceed to trial and again in July of 2009.  
Dr. Krop found Bright competent.  His testing revealed no signs of psychopathy or 
malingering.  Bright appeared highly anxious, situationally depressed and reported 
having panic attacks.  Dr. Krop did not diagnose Bright with Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD). 
The defense also presented the testimony of Dr. Steven Gold, a psychologist 
and expert in trauma psychology who interviewed Bright in 2013.  Dr. Gold 
evaluated Bright using risk factors set forth in the Adverse Childhood Experience 
Study (ACES).  ACES identifies ten adverse childhood experiences, or factors.  
The greater the number of factors a person has in his or her background the higher 
the rate of psychological and medical problems.  Bright experienced all ten ACES 
factors.  Dr. Gold diagnosed Bright with PTSD as a result of his childhood abuse.  
 
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Dr. Gold testified that PTSD played a role in this case.  Specifically, Gold testified 
that Bright felt threatened and in constant danger in his home as a child and that 
Bright’s childhood related to the murders because two men had entered Bright’s 
home, destroyed it, and refused to leave.  Dr. Gold stated that Bright felt in danger 
over a period of days or weeks before the murders and opined that Bright killed 
King and Brown while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.  He also opined that Bright’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was 
substantially impaired. 
Finally, the defense presented the testimony of Dr. Robert Ouaou, a 
neuropsychologist.  Dr. Ouaou evaluated Bright in 2014.  Dr. Ouaou stated Bright 
suffered from severe emotional distress as a result of his abusive parents.  
Dr. Ouaou did not diagnose Bright with PTSD and did not find Bright to have a 
cognitive disability.  Dr. Ouaou acknowledged that Bright’s military discharge was 
related to his alcohol problem and that after his discharge, he developed a drug 
addiction.5 
 
5.  Concerning Bright’s military career, the defense presented the testimony 
of James Hernandez, an attorney and retired Marine.  Hernandez testified, as he did 
in Bright’s first penalty phase proceeding, regarding Bright’s personnel records for 
the time Bright served in the Marine Corps.  Hernandez testified that during his 
career in the Marines, Bright received two awards for good conduct.  Bright also 
received an award called a Meritorious Mast when, while working as a fighter jet 
mechanic, he observed a mechanical difficulty with an aircraft upon take-off and 
 
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After closing arguments and deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for 
each victim—King (Count I) and Brown (Count II)—unanimously recommending 
that Bright be sentenced to death.  As to King, the jury unanimously found that two 
aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Bright was previously 
convicted of a capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a 
person; and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  With regard 
to mitigators, by a vote of eleven to one, the jury rejected the statutory mitigator 
that the murder was committed while Bright was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.  The jury also unanimously rejected the statutory 
mitigator that the capacity of Bright to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  By 
a vote of eleven to one, the jury rejected the mitigator that there existed any other 
factors in Bright’s character, background, or life or the circumstances of the 
offense mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty.6  The jury 
 
relayed to the pilot to come down.  Bright’s actions prevented a “tragic mishap.”  
On his last period of active service, Bright received a “general under honorable 
conditions” discharge “by reason of alcohol rehab failure.”  The defense also 
presented the testimony of attorney Michael Bossen, who testified that Bright’s 
ex-wife, Bridgett Bright, contacted him early in the morning of February 19, 2008.  
He spoke with both Bridgett and Bright on the phone, and Bright was despondent 
and cried.  When Bossen met Bright the next day at his first appearance, Bright 
was very despondent and could not communicate at all. 
 
 
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unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to warrant a 
sentence of death and that those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  
Ultimately, the jury unanimously found that Bright should be sentenced to death 
for the murder of King. 
As to Brown, the jury unanimously found the aggravator that Bright was 
previously convicted of a capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to a person was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, unlike 
King, the jury did not find that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel.  By a vote of eleven to one, the jury rejected each of the following statutory 
mitigators: (1) that the murder was committed while Bright was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) that the capacity of 
Bright to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired; and (3) that there existed any other 
factors in Bright’s character, background, or life or the circumstances of the 
offense mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty.  The jury 
unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to warrant a 
sentence of death and that those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  
 
6.  Bright requested one finding as to this catch-all provision and therefore 
the jury voted on this mitigator as a whole, rather than as to each nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstance. 
 
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The jury unanimously found that Bright should be sentenced to death for the 
murder of Brown. 
The trial court conducted a Spencer hearing on November 1, 2017.  Bright’s 
daughter, Tenneka Bright, testified as to the close relationship she has with her 
father and the fact that he has always been there for her.  She also testified that in 
the days before the murders she was not able to reach her father by phone and that 
when she called his number someone else answered.  A classification officer from 
the correctional institution where Bright is incarcerated testified that Bright had no 
disciplinary reports. 
On December 8, 2017, the trial court entered its sentencing order, imposing 
a sentence of death on Bright for each murder.  As to King, the trial court found 
that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravators that 
Bright was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (the 
1990 conviction for armed robbery and the contemporaneous murder) (great 
weight), and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), 
§ 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2017) (great weight).  As to Brown, the trial court 
found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravator 
that Bright was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony 
 
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involving the use or threat of violence to the person (the 1990 conviction for armed 
robbery and the contemporaneous murder) (great weight). 
 
The trial court rejected the two statutory mitigating circumstances presented 
by Bright with respect to each murder—that the murder was committed while 
Bright was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
§ 921.141(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017), and that Bright’s capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired, § 921.141(7)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017).  The trial court 
considered thirty-eight nonstatutory mitigating circumstances under the catch-all 
provision for the existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that 
would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty, § 921.141(7)(h), Fla. Stat. 
(2017).  The trial court grouped the nonstatutory mitigators into six categories, 
found each established, and assigned no or little weight to each category.  
Specifically, the trial court found: (1) Bright was the victim of child abuse and 
 
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neglect7 (no weight); (2) Bright’s military career8 (little weight); (3) Bright’s 
history of drug and alcohol abuse9 (little weight); (4) Bright’s positive 
 
 
7.  This category included the following nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances: (1) Bright was forced to work long hours as a child in his father’s 
junkyard; (2) Bright was not allowed to play with other children while growing up; 
(3) Bright’s father made him work in the junkyard through injury; (4) Bright 
suffered an eye injury while working in the junkyard that still affects him; (5) 
Bright was a victim of violence and abuse; (6) Bright’s father would beat him for 
hours at a time, drawing blood, leaving welts, and rendering him unconscious; (7) 
Bright grew up extremely poor with no running water, adequate heating, or trash 
collection; (8) Bright would wet the bed and was beaten for it; (9) Bright stuttered 
and was beaten for that; (10) Bright was choked by his older brother until he was 
unconscious; (11) Bright was sexually abused by his older brother; (12) Bright’s 
father fired a gun around the house; (13) Bright’s father beat and raped his mother; 
(14) Bright’s father was an alcoholic; (15) Bright’s father would disappear for days 
and weeks at a time; (16) Bright was a poor student because of his home life; (17) 
Bright’s punctuality at school was poor; and (18) Bright ran away from home after 
high school. 
 
8.  This category included the following nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances: (1) Bright served in the Marine Corps for nine years as a jet 
mechanic; (2) Bright had multiple promotions in the Marine Corps, including a 
meritorious promotion; (3) Bright received two separate awards for good conduct; 
(4) Bright received a “meritorious mast” for noticing a problem with a jet upon 
take-off; (5) Bright served in the Red Sea and went to Africa for a deployment; (6) 
Bright attended a noncommissioned officer leadership course where he learned 
basic leadership skills and discipline; (7) Bright was presented with a certificate of 
appreciation; (8) Bright achieved the rank of sergeant; and (9) Bright received two 
honorable discharges and one “general under honorable conditions” discharge from 
the Marines. 
 
9.  This category included the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that 
Bright struggled with drugs and alcohol use for decades and has sought help for his 
substance abuse problems on multiple occasions. 
 
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relationships with others10 (little weight); (5) Bright’s good and mannerly behavior 
during court proceedings (no weight); and (6) Bright’s behavior while incarcerated 
(no weight). 
The trial court found that the “aggravating circumstances heavily outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances, and that death is the proper penalty the Court should 
impose for the murders of Derrick King and Randall Brown.”  Bright appeals from 
the trial court’s order imposing sentences of death for the murders of King and 
Brown. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Bright raises the following five claims: (1) the trial court 
committed fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury that it must determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravators were sufficient to impose death 
and outweighed the mitigators; (2) the prosecutor made multiple improper 
comments during closing argument constituting fundamental error; (3) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the finding of the especially heinous, atrocious, or 
 
 
10.  This category included the following nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances: (1) Bright took care of his sister when she was young; (2) Bright 
repaired a roof on his sister’s house after a hurricane; (3) Bright is a good friend; 
(4) Bright is very close to his daughter; (5) Bright is close with his grandchildren; 
(6) Bright’s family will continue to foster their relationships with him while he is 
incarcerated; (7) Bright encouraged his daughter to go to college; and (8) Bright’s 
daughter loves him unconditionally and is grateful for their relationship. 
 
- 20 - 
cruel aggravator; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting statutory 
mitigating circumstances and in assigning no weight to the nonstatutory mitigation 
of Bright’s childhood abuse; and (5) the sentences of death are not proportionate.  
We address each claim in turn. 
A.  Sufficiency of the Jury Instructions 
Bright argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it 
must determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating factors were 
sufficient to impose a sentence of death and whether those factors outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances.  Bright’s argument has no merit. 
“[S]ubsequent to our decision in Hurst v. State, we already have receded 
from the holding that the additional Hurst v. State findings are elements.”  State v. 
Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020).  In Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 
872, 885-86 (Fla. 2019), we clarified: 
To the extent that in Perry v. State, 210 So. 3d 630, 633 (Fla. 
2016), we suggested that Hurst v. State held that the sufficiency and 
weight of the aggravating factors and the final recommendation of 
death are elements that must be determined by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we mischaracterized Hurst v. State, which did not 
require that these determinations be made beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Since Perry, in In re Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital 
Cases [244 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 2018)] and Foster [v. State, 258 So. 3d 
1248 (Fla. 2018)], we have implicitly receded from its 
mischaracterization of Hurst v. State.  We now do so explicitly.  Thus, 
these determinations are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury. 
 
 
- 21 - 
Thus, because the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury to 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating factors were 
sufficient and outweighed mitigating circumstances, no fundamental error 
occurred,11 and Bright is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
B.  Improper Prosecutorial Comments in Closing Argument 
 Bright next asserts that the State’s prosecutor made multiple improper 
comments during closing argument.  As an initial matter, Bright’s counsel did not 
contemporaneously object to the comments Bright now raises as error on appeal.  
Generally, the failure to contemporaneously object to allegedly improper closing 
argument comments waives the issue for review.  Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 
622 (Fla. 2001) (“As a general rule, the failure to raise a contemporaneous 
objection when improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim 
concerning such comments for appellate review.”); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 
418 n.8 (Fla. 1998) (“We have long held that allegedly improperly [sic] 
prosecutorial comments are not cognizable on appeal absent a contemporaneous 
objection.”).  “๠e sole exception to the general rule is where the unobjected-to 
comments rise to the level of fundamental error.”  Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 
1176 (Fla. 2006); accord Card, 803 So. 2d at 622.  “๠is is a high burden which 
 
11.  Because the trial court did not err, we do not reach the State’s argument 
that Bright waived fundamental error review by agreeing to the jury instructions.  
 
- 22 - 
requires an error that ‘goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause 
of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process.’ ”  Bailey v. State, 998 So. 2d 
545, 554 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 955 (Fla. 2007)).  
Fundamental error “has also been described as error that is so signiﬁcant that the 
sentence of death ‘could not have been obtained without the assistance of the 
alleged error.’ ”  Poole v. State, 151 So. 3d 402, 415 (Fla. 2014) (quoting 
Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 257 (Fla. 2012)). 
First, Bright argues that the prosecutor erroneously told the jury to ignore 
evidence of mitigation (i.e., that Bright suﬀered childhood abuse) in contravention 
of the United States Supreme Court’s mandate in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104 (1982), that the sentencer in a capital case consider mitigation evidence.  See 
id. at 113-14 (“Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from 
considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as 
a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.”).  ๠e allegedly improper 
comment, to which defense counsel did not object, is as follows: 
Your decision should not be inﬂuenced by feelings of prejudice or by 
racial or ethnic bias or sympathy.  ๠at’s not a basis for your decision, 
that he was abused, et cetera.  No.  You cannot have sympathy for that 
in terms of - - it’s mitigation and aggravation.  You can’t have 
sympathy for the victim or the defendant - - for the victims, I should 
say. 
 
Here, the prosecutor did not instruct the jurors to disregard evidence of 
Bright’s abuse in reaching their decisions, but rather, explained that the evidence 
 
- 23 - 
of abuse is properly considered as mitigation, and that their decisions may not be 
based upon sympathy.  See Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 24 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he 
State’s argument concerning sympathy was a proper admonition for the jurors to 
consider the mitigation evidence without resort to their emotions.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Saﬄe v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990) (“[N]othing in . . . 
Eddings prevents the State from attempting to ensure reliability and 
nonarbitrariness by requiring that the jury consider and give eﬀect to the 
defendant’s mitigating evidence in the form of a ‘reasoned moral response,’ rather 
than an emotional one.” (citation omitted) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 
538, 545 (1987))).  Furthermore, the prosecutor’s argument concerning sympathy 
was consistent with the ﬁnal jury instructions read by the trial court to the jury,12 
which in turn mirrored interim amended jury instruction 7.11(a) Final Instructions 
in Penalty Proceedings—Capital Cases.13  As such, the prosecutor’s comments 
were not error, much less fundamental error. 
 
12.  The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
 
 
Your decision must not be based upon the fact that you feel sorry 
for anyone or are angry at anyone. 
. . . . 
Your decisions should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice, 
racial or ethnic bias or sympathy.  Your decisions must be based upon 
the evidence and the law contained in these instructions. 
 
13.  See In re Std. Crim. Jury Instrs. in Capital Cases, 214 So. 3d 1236, 
1266 (Fla. 2017) (appendix) (“Rules for deliberation. . . . 3. Your decisions must 
 
- 24 - 
 
Second, Bright argues that the prosecutor improperly instructed the jury that 
the only way to follow the law was to vote for death.  Bright points to the 
following statement by the prosecutor, to which Bright’s counsel did not object: 
And by the way, as we stressed about in jury selection, you’re never 
compelled to actually vote for death.  But I would submit to you that 
this is the case that you should in terms of following the law. 
 
๠is Court has held that it is improper for a prosecutor to assert in closing 
argument that it is a juror’s duty under the law to vote for a sentence of death 
rather than life.  For example, in Urbin, the prosecutor argued to the jury that “my 
concern is that some of you may be tempted to take the easy way out, to not weigh 
the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and not want to 
fully carry out your responsibility and just vote for life,” and “I’m going to ask you 
not be swayed by pity or sympathy. . . . I’m going to ask you to follow the law.  
I’m going to ask you to do your duty.”  714 So. 2d at 421.  ๠is Court found the 
comments improper because they “implied that the jury was required by law to 
return a recommendation of death.”  Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 851 (Fla. 
2012) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 871 (Fla. 
2010) (addressing the holding in Urbin)); see also Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 
 
not be based upon the fact that you feel sorry for anyone or are angry at 
anyone. . . . 6. Your decisions should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice, 
racial or ethnic bias, or sympathy.  Your decisions must be based on the evidence 
and the law contained in these instructions.”). 
 
- 25 - 
1207 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]his Court has concluded that it is improper for the State to 
tell jurors that ‘the only proper recommendation to this court is a recommendation 
of death’ or that the jurors have a legal duty to recommend the ‘appropriate 
punishment’ of death.”).  Here, however, the prosecutor’s comment that the jurors 
“should” vote for a sentence of death did not imply that they were required by law 
to do so.  Indeed, immediately before the comment, the prosecutor correctly told 
the jurors that they are never compelled to vote for death.  ๠us, the allegedly 
improper comment was not error, much less fundamental error. 
 
Next, Bright argues that the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof for 
mitigating circumstances.  Again, Bright’s counsel did not object to the following 
comment: 
๠en you go, okay, what - - what mitigation has been proven?  And 
remember, we talked about that mitigation doesn’t have to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It’s just a reasonable certainty. 
 
๠is Court has held that a mitigating circumstance exists where it is 
established by the greater weight of the evidence.  See Diaz v. State, 132 So. 3d 93, 
117 (Fla. 2013) (stating that established law recognizes “that mitigating factors 
[must] be ‘established by the greater weight of the evidence’ ” (quoting Mansﬁeld 
v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 646 (Fla. 2000))); Bolin v. State, 117 So. 3d 728, 740 (Fla. 
2013) (“๠e trial court must ﬁnd a mitigating circumstance if it ‘has been 
established by the greater weight of the evidence.’ ” (quoting Coday v. State, 946 
 
- 26 - 
So. 2d 988, 1003 (Fla. 2006))).  ๠us, as the State properly acknowledges, the 
prosecutor’s comment that the mitigation must be proven to a reasonable certainty 
was erroneous. 
In determining whether a comment found to be improper constitutes 
fundamental error, this Court’s consideration “include[s] whether the statement 
was repeated and whether the jury was provided with an accurate statement of the 
law after the improper comment was made.”  Poole, 151 So. 3d at 415.  Here, the 
prosecutor did not repeat the improper burden of proof in closing argument.  
Additionally, the ﬁnal jury instructions read by the trial court to the jury included 
an accurate statement of the law on the burden of proof regarding mitigating 
circumstances.14  We therefore ﬁnd that the prosecutor’s single misstatement of the 
law was not so harmful that the sentence of death could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the error.  Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comment does 
 
14.  The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
 
As explained before these proceedings, the defendant need only 
establish a mitigating circumstance by the greater weight of the 
evidence, which means the evidence that more than likely - - more 
likely than not tends to establish the existence of a mitigating 
circumstance.  If you determine by the greater weight of the evidence 
that a mitigating circumstance exists, you must consider it established 
and give that evidence such weight as you determine it should receive 
in reaching your verdict about the appropriate sentence to be imposed. 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
not rise to the level of fundamental error.  See Kaczmar v. State, 228 So. 3d 1, 12 
(Fla. 2017) (ﬁnding that prosecutor’s improper characterization of mitigating 
evidence did not rise to the level of fundamental error where comment was made 
only once, and the trial court read the standard jury instructions, which included an 
accurate statement of the law). 
 
Finally, Bright argues that the prosecutor mischaracterized mitigation as a 
“credit” for Bright.  ๠e comments, to which defense counsel did not object, are as 
follows: 
Defendant’s character?  I guess they’re going to say - - and he did.  He 
served nine years.  We’ve got to give him credit for that.  He served 
nine years in the Marines. . . . Defense is going to go, well, hold on.  
At one point, he saved some aircraft that potentially could have 
crashed and potentially saved the life of an airman that was going to 
ﬂy.  He should get credit for that. 
 
 
Bright appears to be arguing that the prosecutor improperly told the jury that 
the process of weighing aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances is a 
quantitative analysis.  See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590, 601 (Fla. 2006) 
(holding that the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
during capital sentencing proceedings is not a quantitative comparison).  ๠e 
prosecutor’s comments, however, are more properly read as the State’s 
acknowledgment that Bright’s service in the Marines, including his action of 
discovering a potentially fatal mechanical problem with an aircraft, constitutes a 
mitigating circumstance.  A review of the prosecutor’s entire closing argument 
 
- 28 - 
shows that no other proposed mitigation was characterized as a “credit” for Bright.  
Accordingly, the prosecutor did not impermissibly argue to the jury that its 
weighing process should be conducted by comparing the number of aggravating 
factors with the number of mitigating circumstances. 
Bright also contends that the cumulative eﬀect of the prosecutor’s improper 
remarks constituted fundamental error.  See Card, 803 So. 2d at 622 (“We do not 
examine allegedly improper comments in isolation.  Rather, the Court examines 
the totality of the errors in the closing argument and determines whether the 
cumulative eﬀect of the numerous improprieties deprived the defendant of a fair 
penalty phase hearing.”).  A review of the unobjected-to comments made by the 
prosecutor, however, shows that only one comment was improper—the 
misstatement of law as to burden of proof for mitigators—and that this single error 
did not rise to the level of fundamental error.  A single improper comment in 
closing argument does not support a cumulative error analysis.  See, e.g.,  Diaz, 
132 So. 3d at 118 (“[A] cumulative error claim fails when there are not multiple 
errors.”); Johnson v. State, 104 So. 3d 1010, 1029 (Fla. 2012) (“[๠e defendant], 
however, has failed to identify multiple instances of error. And because multiple 
errors did not occur in this case, [the defendant]’s claim of cumulative error must 
fail.”).  Accordingly, Bright’s claim of cumulative error fails as well. 
 
- 29 - 
Because none of the allegedly improper comments—either individually or 
cumulatively—rise to the level of fundamental error, Bright is not entitled to relief 
with regard to this claim.  See Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 846 (“Likewise if any 
unpreserved improper comments do not individually or cumulatively constitute 
fundamental error, we will not reverse [the defendant’s] sentence.”). 
C.  Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating Factor 
Bright argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 
finding of the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” (HAC) aggravator.  
§ 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2017).  Specifically, Bright contends that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the finding of the HAC aggravator because there is no 
evidence that King was conscious and aware of his impending death.  Because we 
find that there was competent, substantial evidence that King was conscious and 
aware of impending death, Bright’s claim is without merit. 
“When reviewing claims alleging error in the application of aggravating 
factors, this Court does not reweigh the evidence.”  McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 
777, 792 (Fla. 2010); accord Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997) 
(“[I]t is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the 
State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is 
the trial court’s job.”).  Instead, “[i]n reviewing an aggravating factor challenged 
on appeal, this Court’s task ‘is to review the record to determine whether the trial 
 
- 30 - 
court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, 
whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding.’ ”  Douglas v. State, 
878 So. 2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Willacy, 696 So. 2d at 695). 
This Court has previously defined the HAC aggravator as follows: 
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or 
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; 
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with 
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. 
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the 
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such 
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital 
felonies—the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim. 
 
Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 668-69 (Fla. 2009) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 
So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)).  The HAC aggravator focuses on the means and manner of 
the victim’s death and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death.  See 
Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 497 (Fla. 2011); McGirth, 48 So. 3d at 794.  “[I]n 
order to support a finding of this aggravator, ‘the evidence must show that the 
victim was conscious and aware of impending death.’ ”  King v. State, 130 So. 3d 
676, 684 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Douglas, 878 So. 2d at 1261).  However, “the 
victim’s perception of imminent death need only last seconds for this aggravator to 
apply.”  Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1157; see also Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 
1214 (Fla. 2006) (finding that victim was aware of impending death “[w]hether 
this state of consciousness lasted minutes or seconds” and upholding HAC 
 
- 31 - 
aggravator).  Relevant here, “[t]his Court has ‘consistently upheld HAC in beating 
deaths.’ ”  Douglas, 878 So. 2d at 1261 (quoting Lawrence v. State, 698 So. 2d 
1219, 1222 (Fla. 1997)); accord King, 130 So. 3d at 684; see also, e.g., Buzia, 926 
So. 2d at 1214 (upholding the HAC aggravator where victim was struck with a fist 
and an ax and was awake and aware for at least part of the ordeal); Dennis v. State, 
817 So. 2d 741, 766 (Fla. 2002) (upholding finding of HAC aggravator where 
victims suffered skull fractures as a result of beating and were conscious for at 
least part of the attack); Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 671 (Fla. 2000) (holding 
that competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding of the HAC 
aggravator where victim suffered blunt trauma to the head by a hammer and was 
not rendered immediately unconscious as evidenced by defensive injuries). 
Bright contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s 
finding of HAC because there is no evidence that King was conscious and aware of 
his impending death.  Specifically, Bright relies upon Dr. Rao’s testimony during 
cross-examination that each blow to the head that caused a skull fracture could 
have caused death by itself.  Bright’s argument, however, ignores case law from 
this Court explaining that “[t]he existence of defensive wounds is relevant to the 
HAC analysis.”  King, 130 So. 3d at 684.  Where, like here, the sequence of 
injuries cannot be established, this Court has found that evidence of defensive 
wounds indicates that the victim was conscious and aware of impending death.  
 
- 32 - 
For example, in King, this Court concluded that the trial court’s finding of the 
HAC aggravator was supported by competent, substantial evidence where the 
medical examiner testified that the victim was struck seventeen times with a 
hammer.  Id. at 686.  “Three of the blows were to the head, which would have been 
fatal and rendered the victim unconscious.”  Id. at 680.  Although the medical 
examiner could not testify to the sequence of the blows inflicted on the victim, this 
Court found that “[t]he defensive wounds to the victim’s hand and arm clearly 
demonstrate that the victim was conscious and aware of her impending death and 
attempting to fend off the attack.”  Id. at 685. 
Similarly, in Douglas, the medical examiner could not determine the 
sequence of injuries to the victim, who died of blunt head trauma, and testified that 
“if the first injury inflicted was one of the more severe [the victim] could have 
been rendered unconscious.”  878 So. 2d at 1251, 1262.  On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the evidence left open the possibility that the victim lost consciousness 
after the first blow.  Id. at 1262.  This Court upheld the trial court’s finding of the 
HAC aggravator, relying upon the medical examiner’s testimony that it was “not 
likely” that the victim was rendered unconscious by the first blow given that she 
turned her head during the beating and suffered defensive wounds to her hands and 
forearms.  Id.; see also Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 191 (Fla. 2005) (finding that 
“[w]hile the exact order of wounds could not be established, there was competent, 
 
- 33 - 
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that [the victim] was alive 
and conscious for some of the attack, and was struggling with her attacker” where 
victim sustained defensive wounds); Beasley, 774 So. 2d at 670 (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that the murder was not HAC because the victim might have 
been rendered immediately unconscious by blows from a hammer where evidence 
of defensive wounds existed). 
Here, there was competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the 
finding of the HAC aggravator.  Dr. Rao testified that King received thirty-eight 
blunt impact injuries to his head and about twenty injuries to his extremities and 
that the injuries were consistent with being caused by a hammer.  Dr. Rao also 
testified that King was alive when these injuries were inflicted and that he suffered.  
Significantly, King had numerous defensive wounds: bruising on his left arm; a 
fracture of his left ulna; abrasions and bruising of the entire back of his left hand; 
bruising and abrasions on his right forearm and back of his right hand; and an 
abrasion and laceration on his left knee.  Although Dr. Rao testified on cross-
examination that each blow to the head that caused a skull fracture and brain injury 
could have caused death by itself, Dr. Rao also opined that King’s defensive 
wounds evidenced that he was not rendered unconscious after one blow.  Thus, 
competent, substantial evidence supports the finding of the HAC aggravator. 
 
- 34 - 
Bright relies on Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 2010), in support of 
his argument that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding 
of the HAC aggravator.  In Williams, this Court struck the HAC aggravator, 
concluding that given the lack of any defensive wounds and the speculative nature 
of other evidence relied upon by the trial court, there was no evidence to support 
the trial court’s finding that the victim was conscious and aware of impending 
death.  Id. at 200-01.  As Dr. Rao’s testimony established that King suffered 
defensive wounds, Williams is not analogous.  Bright’s reliance on Elam v. State, 
636 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1994), is also misplaced.  In Elam, this Court held that the 
trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator where, although the victim suffered 
“defensive wounds, the medical examiner testified that the attack took place in a 
very short period of time (‘could have been less than a minute, maybe even half a 
minute’), the defendant was unconscious at the end of this period, and never 
regained consciousness.”  Id. at 1314.  This Court subsequently declined to apply 
Elam in Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997), where the evidence 
demonstrated that the victim, who was stabbed while asleep in her bed, “sustained 
several defensive wounds to her arms and leg, and did not die instantaneously.”  Id. 
at 296.  We find the instant case more akin to Rolling, where King’s defensive 
wounds negate the possibility that he was rendered immediately unconscious after 
in initial blow to the head.  Cf. Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 378-79 (Fla. 2005) 
 
- 35 - 
(finding Elam “clearly distinguishable” where victim suffered defensive wounds 
and blunt force trauma to the head, was stabbed ninety-four times, and the medical 
examiner testified that the victim “would have lost consciousness within a matter 
of a few seconds to as much as two minutes” after receiving the fatal stab wound). 
Because competent, substantial evidence supports the finding of the HAC 
aggravator as to the murder of King, Bright is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
D.  Mitigating Circumstances 
Bright also argues that the trial court erred in rejecting the two statutory 
mitigating circumstances presented with respect to both murders: (1) that Bright 
committed the murders while he was “under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance,” § 921.141(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2107), and (2) that Bright’s 
“capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of his . . . conduct or to conform his . . . 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” § 921.141(7)(f), 
Fla. Stat. (2017).  Bright further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
assigning no weight to the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of his abusive 
childhood.  As explained below, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by not finding that either statutory mitigating circumstance was established or by 
assigning no weight to the nonstatutory circumstance of Bright’s abusive 
childhood. 
 
- 36 - 
“Where it is clear that the trial court has considered all evidence presented in 
support of a mitigating factor, the court’s decision as to whether that circumstance 
is established will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.”  Ault v. State, 53 So. 
3d 175, 186-87 (Fla. 2010).  A trial court’s determinations on the issue will be 
upheld when supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Hoskins v. State, 965 
So. 2d 1, 17 (Fla. 2007).  “A trial court must find a proposed mitigating 
circumstance when the defendant has established that mitigator through competent, 
substantial evidence.”  Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 444 (Fla. 2012).  “A trial 
court may reject a defendant’s claim that a mitigating circumstance has been 
proved, however, provided that the record contains ‘competent substantial 
evidence to support the trial court’s rejection of these mitigating circumstances.’ ”  
Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Kight v. State, 512 So. 
2d 922, 933 (Fla. 1987)).  “A mitigator may . . . be rejected if the testimony 
supporting it is not substantiated by the actions of the defendant, or if the testimony 
supporting it conflicts with other evidence.”  Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 445.  With regard 
to expert opinion testimony, “[e]ven uncontroverted opinion testimony can be 
rejected, especially when it is hard to reconcile with the other evidence presented 
in the case.”  Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 936 (Fla. 2002).  With these 
principles in mind, we address each of Bright’s arguments in turn. 
1.  Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Mitigator 
 
- 37 - 
Bright argues that the trial court erred in failing to find the statutory 
mitigating circumstance that he committed the murders while under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.15  Because there is competent, 
substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding, we disagree. 
In support of his argument, Bright relies upon Dr. Gold’s testimony that he 
diagnosed Bright with PTSD.  Dr. Gold testified that Bright’s PTSD played a role 
in this case because Bright perceived that he was in danger in his home, which was 
impacted by the trauma of his childhood abuse.  Dr. Gold further opined that as a 
result of Bright’s mounting sense of fear in his home, Bright killed King and 
Brown while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.  Unlike Dr. Gold, however, Dr. Krop, who evaluated Bright shortly 
after the murders in 2008 and 2009, did not diagnose Bright with PTSD.  Dr. Krop 
testified that there were several reasons he did not diagnose Bright with PTSD at 
the time of his evaluation.  First, records Dr. Krop reviewed from the time Bright 
received treatment from the Veteran’s Administration contained no indication of 
PTSD.  Second, as reflected in a report authored by Dr. Krop in August 2008, 
Bright stated that he had a normal childhood, free from abuse and trauma.  
 
15.  The statutory mitigator of extreme emotional disturbance “has been 
defined as ‘less than insanity, but more emotions than the average man, however 
inflamed.’ ”  Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 756 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Duncan v. 
State, 619 So. 2d 279, 283 (Fla. 1993)). 
 
- 38 - 
Furthermore, the psychological testing Dr. Krop conducted on Bright, including 
the Beck Anxiety Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory, and the MMPI-2, did not 
suggest a basis for a PTSD diagnosis.  Thus, the trial court’s finding that the 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator was not established was 
supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record that Bright was not 
suffering from PTSD at the time of the murders. 
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting this proposed mitigating circumstance.  See Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 
747, 755 (Fla. 1996) (“As long as the court considered all of the evidence, a trial 
judge’s determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a palpable abuse of 
discretion.”). 
2.  Capacity to Appreciate the Criminality of Conduct or 
Conform Conduct to the Requirements of Law 
 
Bright next argues that he presented unrebutted expert testimony through 
Dr. Gold that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, and 
that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting this mitigator.  Bright’s claim is 
without merit. 
“A mitigator may . . . be rejected if the testimony supporting it is not 
substantiated by the actions of the defendant, or if the testimony supporting it 
conflicts with other evidence.”  Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 445.  Indeed, even “[w]hen 
 
- 39 - 
expert opinion evidence is presented, it ‘may be rejected if that evidence cannot be 
reconciled with the other evidence in the case.’ ”  Williams, 37 So. 3d at 204 
(quoting Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1003). 
In finding that this mitigator had not been proven by a greater weight of the 
evidence, the trial court stated as follows in its sentencing order: 
Defendant took actions immediately after committing the crimes that 
suggest he was attempting to conceal his identity.  Defendant used and 
then disposed of gloves in order to conceal his fingerprints, he hid the 
murder weapon, and he fled his home.  All of these actions are 
consistent with someone who understands their actions are wrong and 
is attempting to avoid the repercussions of what they have done. 
 
As this Court explained in Ault, 53 So. 3d 175, a defendant’s purposeful actions 
after the crime indicating that the defendant was aware of the criminality of his 
conduct may be sufficient to reject a defendant’s claim that this mitigator applies.  
In Ault, the defendant admitted that he murdered the victims out of fear of going to 
jail, placed the victims’ bodies in his attic, and lied to the victims’ mother and the 
police regarding his knowledge of the victims’ disappearance.  Id. at 189.  This 
Court found that the record demonstrated that the defendant was not substantially 
impaired in his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law, explaining: 
We have upheld a trial court’s rejection of this mitigating 
circumstance when a defendant’s actions during and after the crime 
has indicated that he was aware of the criminality of his conduct.  In 
Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 531 (Fla. 2003), for example, we 
upheld the trial court’s ruling where the defendant removed the victim 
 
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from her home after sexually assaulting her, drove to two separate 
orange groves before killing her, and lied to police about the crime.  
We found that the defendant’s “purposeful actions [were] indicative 
of someone who knew those acts were wrong and who could conform 
his conduct to the law if he so desired.”  Id.  Similarly, in Hoskins v. 
State, 965 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 2007), we found that the trial court 
properly rejected the defendant’s inability “to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct” as mitigation where, after raping the 
victim, “Hoskins’s purposeful actions in binding and gagging [the 
victim] before placing her in the trunk, driving to his parents’ home 
six hours away, borrowing a shovel, driving to a remote area where he 
killed [the victim], and then telling his brother he hit a possum when 
blood was noticed dripping from the rear wheel well [were] indicative 
of someone who knows his conduct is wrong.” 
 
53 So. 3d at 188-89 (alterations in original). 
Here, Bright’s purposeful actions after the murders are indicative of 
someone who knew that his actions were criminal and could conform his conduct 
to the law.  Specifically, there was testimony that Bright fled his home after the 
murders.  Additionally, there was testimony from a crime scene investigator and 
police officers from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office that Bright concealed the 
murder weapon by burying it deeply in his backyard.  Thus, Bright’s purposeful 
actions after the murders constitute competent, substantial evidence to support the 
trial court’s rejection of this mitigating circumstance.  Accordingly, we reject 
Bright’s claim on this issue. 
 
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3.  The Existence of Any Other Factors in the Defendant’s Background That 
Would Mitigate Against Imposition of the Death Penalty 
 
Bright also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning no 
weight to the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that Bright was the victim of 
childhood abuse and neglect.  This argument is without merit. 
“A trial court’s decision with regard to the weight to be assigned to a 
mitigating circumstance that it determines has been established is ‘within the trial 
court’s discretion, and its decision is subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard.’ ” 
Perez, 919 So. 2d at 372 (quoting Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1133 (Fla. 
2000)); accord Allen v. State, 137 So. 3d  946, 967 (Fla. 2013).  This includes the 
discretion to assign an established mitigating circumstance no weight.  Trease v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 2000) (“We hereby recede from our opinion in 
Campbell [v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 420 (Fla. 1990] to the extent it disallows trial 
courts from according no weight to a mitigating factor and recognize that there are 
circumstances where a mitigating circumstance may be found to be supported by 
the record, but given no weight.”); accord Mullens v. State, 197 So. 3d 16, 30 (Fla. 
2016) (stating that a trial court “may conclude that a particular mitigating 
circumstance exists, but assign it no weight”).  Under the abuse of discretion 
standard, a trial court’s determination as to the weight assigned to a mitigating 
circumstance will be upheld unless “no reasonable [person] would take the view 
 
- 42 - 
adopted by the trial court.”  Perez, 919 So. 2d at 372 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Trease, 768 So. 2d at 1053 n.2.). 
This Court addressed a trial court’s refusal to grant nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances any weight in Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2002).  In Cox, the 
trial court assigned slight or no weight to the “mitigating nature of [the 
defendant’s] childhood.”  Id. at 722.  In finding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in assigning no weight to certain mitigating circumstances, this Court 
reasoned that the trial court “simply attempted to place the appellant’s mitigation 
evidence in context.  The trial court’s holdings regarding certain of the appellant’s 
proffered mitigators resulted from an absolute dearth of evidence contained in the 
record supporting the notion that the cited mitigators are relevant to the defendant 
in the instant case.”  Id. at 723 (footnote omitted).  The trial court’s “attempt[] to 
place the appellant’s mitigation evidence in context” was demonstrated in the trial 
court’s statement that: 
While the evidence supports the existence of his heightened anxiety in 
dealing with other people, the evidence does not support any 
conclusions or even speculations as to how it contributed to Mr. Cox’s 
decisions and actions that led to [the victim’s] death. . . .  Thus, while 
established by Dr. McMahon’s opinion, the court declines to afford 
any weight to this circumstance. 
 
Id. at 723 n.15. 
 
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Here, the trial court found that the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of 
Bright’s childhood abuse and neglect had been established but assigned it no 
weight, concluding: 
More notably, there is a disconnect between Defendant’s trauma and 
the offenses.  Once Defendant left his home and joined the military he 
was a productive member of society and there is no evidence that the 
trauma in his childhood prevented him from living like a normal 
person.  Therefore, the Court finds that the non-statutory mitigators 
under this heading have been established, however, the Court assigns 
no weight to these mitigators. 
 
Thus, as in Cox, the trial court in the present case simply placed the mitigation 
evidence in the context of the other evidence presented.  Specifically, the trial court 
considered the mitigating circumstance of Bright’s childhood in the context of 
Bright’s subsequent ability as an adult to serve in the military and function 
productively such that the abuse and neglect Bright suffered as a child were shown 
to have no real bearing on Bright’s action in committing the murders. 
Accordingly, because we cannot conclude that no reasonable person would 
have assigned the mitigating circumstance of Bright’s childhood abuse and neglect 
no weight, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in 
assigning no weight to this mitigating circumstance. 
E.  Proportionality 
Finally, Bright argues that the sentences of death are disproportionate 
because his case is not among the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-
 
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degree murder cases.  We find that the sentence of death is proportionate in both 
murders. 
This Court has explained proportionality review as follows: 
This Court reviews the proportionality of each death sentence 
“to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the 
most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring 
uniformity in the application of the [death] sentence.”  Anderson v. 
State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003) (citation omitted).  In 
conducting its proportionality review, this Court does not compare the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Pham v. State, 
70 So. 3d 485, 500 (Fla. 2011).  Rather, “the Court looks at the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if death is warranted in 
comparison to other cases where the sentence of death has been 
upheld.”  Id. (quoting England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 408 (Fla. 
2006)). 
 
Cozzie v. State, 225 So. 3d 717, 734 (Fla. 2017).  A proportionality review 
therefore entails “a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for 
each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.”  Urbin, 714 So. 
2d at 416. 
Although the same mitigating circumstances apply, the jury found different 
aggravating factors for each murder.  Because it has fewer aggravating factors, we 
first address the murder of Brown. 
As to the murder of Brown, a unanimous jury and the trial court found one 
aggravating factor—that Bright was previously convicted of a capital felony or a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person or both (great weight).  
The aggravator was based upon Bright’s contemporaneous murder of King and his 
 
- 45 - 
1990 conviction for armed robbery.  With regard to mitigating circumstances, the 
jury found the nonstatutory mitigator that there existed other factors in Bright’s 
character, background, or life or the circumstances of the offense mitigating 
against the imposition of the death penalty to be established by a vote of one to 
eleven.  Within this catch-all mitigator, the trial court found thirty-eight 
nonstatutory mitigating factors were established, grouped them into six categories, 
and assigned each category little or no weight.  As explained above, we find no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court finding that no statutory mitigating 
circumstances had been established. 
“[T]his Court has indicated that where only a single valid aggravating 
circumstance exists, a sentence of death may be inappropriate.”  Mullens, 197 So. 
3d at 35.  However, where the “single aggravator . . . involved a prior murder or 
manslaughter,” this Court has upheld a sentence of death.  Green v. State, 975 So. 
2d 1081, 1088 (Fla. 2008); accord Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 933 (Fla. 
1999) (“[T]his Court has affirmed the death penalty in single-aggravator cases 
where a prior murder was involved.”). 
For example, in Bolin, 117 So. 3d at 728, this Court upheld a death sentence 
based on a single prior violent felony aggravator where that aggravator involved 
another murder, and the mitigation was not substantial.  In Bolin, Bolin stabbed 
and beat the victim to death.  The death sentence was found to be proportionate 
 
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where the trial court found one aggravator—previously convicted of another 
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person—
and assigned it great weight.  The aggravator was based upon Bolin’s conviction 
for another first-degree murder, a kidnapping and rape conviction, and a conviction 
for felonious assault.  Id. at 742.  In mitigation, the trial court found: 
(1) age of defendant at time of crime (24)—little weight; and (2) the 
following statutory catch-all mitigator of any other factors in the 
defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the 
death penalty: (a) defendant suffered from the effects of his mother’s 
alcoholism and his own substance abuse—little weight; (b) defendant 
was abused as a child—some weight; (c) defendant had a poor and 
unstable childhood—little weight; (d) defendant had sporadic minimal 
education—little weight; (e) defendant received his GED while 
incarcerated—little weight; (f) defendant developed skills which 
included welding, electrical, plumbing, and small machinery skills—
little weight; (g) defendant saved the life of another—little weight; (h) 
defendant was gainfully employed at the time—little weight; (i) 
defendant behaved appropriately at trial—little weight; (j) defendant 
has adapted to institutional living and had not received any 
disciplinary reports—little weight; (k) defendant has been married for 
eleven years and he seems to maintain that relationship, considering 
the obvious limitations—little weight; and (l ) defendant’s physical 
and mental medical history indicates several problems—little weight. 
Additionally, the trial court gave some weight to a finding of some 
mental or emotional disturbance. 
 
Id. at 741.  After considering the facts underlying the prior violent felony 
aggravator and noting that the aggravator is one of the most weighty, this Court 
characterized the mitigation, which included nonstatutory mitigation similar to that 
of Bright, as well as “some mental or emotional disturbance,” as being of 
“insubstantial effect” and found the death sentence to be proportionate.  Id. at 742; 
 
- 47 - 
see also, e.g., Sheppard v. State, 151 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. 2014) (finding death 
sentence to be proportionate where trial court found a single aggravator of violent 
felony conviction based upon an almost contemporaneous murder and earlier 
violent felonies committed as a juvenile, statutory mitigator of age, and fifteen 
nonstatutory mitigators); Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 672 (Fla. 2006) (finding 
death penalty proportionate where the trial court found a single aggravator of prior 
violent felony conviction based on prior convictions for robbery and manslaughter 
and “insubstantial mitigation” consisting of statutory mitigation based on 
impoverished background and nonstatutory mitigation); Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 
390 (Fla. 1996) (finding death sentence proportionate where the trial court found a 
single aggravator of prior violent felony conviction based on second-degree 
murder and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances). 
This Court has also found the death sentence proportionate where the single 
aggravator was based in part upon a contemporaneous murder and mitigation was 
insubstantial.  In Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2008), Bevel shot and killed 
two victims, Stringfield and Sims, and attempted to kill a third.  As to the murder 
of Stringfield, the trial court found only one aggravating factor, that the defendant 
was previously convicted of a capital offense or of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to some person, and assigned it very great weight.  Id. at 513.  
The prior violent felony aggravator was based upon the contemporaneous murder 
 
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of Sims, the attempted murder of the third victim, and a prior attempted robbery 
conviction.  The trial court found six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and 
assigned most little or very little weight.16  Even though it was a single aggravator 
case, this Court found the death penalty proportionate given the “minimal 
nonstatutory mitigation” and the facts upon which the aggravator was based, i.e., 
the contemporaneous murder of Sims, an attempted murder, and a prior robbery.  
Id. at 525.  Indeed, in reaching its conclusion, this Court stated that in looking at 
the totality of the circumstances, it had to consider the facts upon which the prior 
violent felony aggravator was based.  See id. at 524. 
Bright argues that his case is analogous to Nibert, 574 So. 2d at 1059, where 
this Court found a death sentence based on a single aggravator and substantial 
mitigation to be disproportionate.  In Nibert, Nibert stabbed the victim to death 
while the two were drinking.  Id. at 1059-60.  The trial court found one aggravating 
factor—that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
 
16.  The nonstatutory mitigators found were as follows: 
 
(1) the defendant has religious faith and loves his family members 
(minimal weight); (2) defendant confessed to the crime (little weight); 
(3) defendant has exhibited good behavior in jail (very little weight); 
(4) defendant exhibited good behavior in court (little weight); (5) 
defendant has an IQ of 65 (little weight); and (6) defendant struggled 
with the death of his mother (very little weight). 
 
Bevel, 983 So. 2d at 513 n.4. 
 
- 49 - 
manner.  Id. at 1061.  The trial court found no statutory mitigating circumstances 
and “possible” nonstatutory mitigation that Nibert had been abused as a child.  Id.  
On appeal, this Court found that the trial court erred in rejecting the nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstance of childhood abuse, as Nibert presented uncontroverted 
evidence that his mother was an abusive alcoholic who beat him daily.  Id. at 1062.  
This Court also found that the trial court should have found the statutory mitigating 
circumstances that Nibert lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law and that Nibert was under the influence of extreme 
emotional or mental disturbance.  Id. at 1062-63.  Concluding that the death 
penalty was disproportionate, this Court noted that “[t]his case involves substantial 
mitigation, and we have held that substantial mitigation may make the death 
penalty inappropriate even when the aggravating circumstance of heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel has been proved.”  Id. at 1063.  We find that Nibert is 
distinguishable from the instant case.  While, as in this case, the mitigating 
circumstances in Nibert included childhood abuse, unlike the instant case, they 
included additional mitigating circumstances—that Nibert’s capacity to control his 
behavior was substantially impaired and that Nibert was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  Moreover, in Nibert, the record showed 
that Nibert was drinking when he committed the murder and that Nibert lacked 
control over his behavior when he drank.  Id.  Here, however, there is no evidence 
 
- 50 - 
Bright was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs when he murdered King and 
Brown. 
We hold the death sentence for Brown’s murder to be proportionate.  
Although Bright’s death sentence for Brown’s murder was based on a single prior 
violent felony aggravator, that one aggravator was based on two crimes—the  
contemporaneous murder of King and the 1990 conviction for an armed robbery 
Bright committed with a knife.  The circumstances of the contemporaneous murder 
were brutal.  Bright beat King to death, causing thirty-eight blunt impact injuries to 
his head and about twenty to his extremities.  Dr. Rao testified that King was alive 
when the injuries were inflicted, and King suffered extensive defensive wounds.  
The trial court assigned this aggravator great weight, and this Court has stated that 
the prior violent felony aggravator is one of the most weighty aggravating 
circumstances in Florida’s statutory sentencing scheme.  See Bolin, 117 So. 3d at 
742; Armstrong v. State, 73 So. 3d 155, 175 (Fla. 2011).  Bright argues that the 
circumstances surrounding the prior violent felony aggravator are not compelling, 
speculating that Bright’s attack may have been provoked because live rounds were 
found on top of the television and in the carpet and gunpowder residue was found 
next to the couch.  This argument is not persuasive, however, given that a detective 
from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office testified that neither King nor Brown had 
gunshot residue on his hands.  With regard to mitigation, the trial court found that 
 
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six categories of nonstatutory mitigation were established, but assigned them little 
or no weight: (1) Bright was the victim of child abuse and neglect (no weight); (2) 
Bright’s military career (little weight); (3) Bright’s history of drug and alcohol 
abuse (little weight); (4) Bright’s positive relationships with others (little weight); 
(5) Bright’s good and mannerly behavior during court proceedings (no weight); 
and (6) Bright’s behavior while incarcerated (no weight).  This Court has 
considered similar nonstatutory mitigation to be of “insubstantial effect.”  See 
Bolin, 117 So. 3d at 742.  Given the totality of the circumstances, including the 
weighty aggravator of a prior violent felony that was based upon a brutal, 
contemporaneous murder and our review of the mitigation, we conclude that the 
death sentence for Brown’s murder is proportionate when compared to other single 
aggravator cases where the single aggravator was weighty and the mitigation was 
not substantial. 
The sentence of death for the murder of King is proportionate as well.  As 
with the murder of Brown, the jury and the trial court found the prior violent 
felony aggravator for the murder of King (great weight).  This aggravator was 
based in part on the contemporaneous brutal beating death of Brown and Bright’s 
1990 conviction for armed robbery.  However, the jury and trial court additionally 
found the HAC aggravator for the murder of King, which the trial court assigned 
great weight.  As explained above, there is competent, substantial evidence to 
 
- 52 - 
support the finding of the HAC aggravator.  “Qualitatively, prior violent felony 
and HAC are among the weightiest aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing 
scheme.”  Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 542 (Fla. 2010)); accord Jordan v. State, 
176 So. 3d 920, 936 (Fla. 2015); Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1167; see also Fletcher v. 
State, 168 So. 3d 186, 220 (Fla. 2015) (“[T]he HAC aggravator is among the 
weightiest of the aggravating circumstances.”).  Bright argues that the HAC 
aggravator must be considered in light of the fact that Bright felt fearful of King 
and Brown because they were threatening him in his home.  This argument is 
unpersuasive as there was no evidence presented at the penalty phase proceeding 
that Bright was in fear of Brown or King, which Bright’s counsel conceded 
below.17  Regarding the mitigation, as the mitigating circumstances were the same 
for both murders, our consideration of the mitigating circumstances for the murder 
of Brown applies equally for the murder of King. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, Bright’s sentence of death for the 
murder of King is proportionate in relation to other death sentences this Court has 
 
17.  As defense counsel stated during the conference on jury instructions: 
 
I’ve agreed that there’s been no evidence presented that [Bright] was 
in fear at all of the victims in this case.  There was testimony from 
Miss Jones that she made efforts to get people out of his house, and 
Mr. [sic] Gold was also able to corroborate that.  But I’m not going to 
alleged [sic] in any way that it was the victims. 
 
 
- 53 - 
upheld with similar aggravation and similar or more substantial mitigation.  See, 
e.g., Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2007) (finding death sentence 
proportionate for stabbing murder where trial court found prior violent felony and 
HAC aggravators, statutory age mitigator, and several nonstatutory mitigators, 
including a difficult family background, alcohol use the night of the murder, and a 
capacity to form positive relationships); Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 
2002) (upholding death sentence where victim died from combination of 
strangulation, stabbing, and blunt force trauma to the head and trial court found 
prior violent felony aggravator, based on contemporaneous murder, and HAC 
aggravator, statutory mitigators of under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance and capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or 
conform conduct to the requirements of the law substantially impaired, as well as 
nonstatutory mitigation); Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2001) (finding 
death sentence proportionate where defendant stabbed a supine victim and trial 
court found prior violent felony and HAC aggravators and mitigating 
circumstances including under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance, capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or to conform 
conduct to the requirements of law substantially impaired, alcoholism, and 
honorable service in the military); Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1996) 
(holding death sentence proportionate where trial court found prior violent felony 
 
- 54 - 
aggravator based on contemporaneous convictions for aggravated assault, 
aggravated battery, and attempted second-degree murder; the HAC aggravator; 
statutory mitigating circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and 
impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to 
requirements of law; and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances including drug and 
alcohol abuse, sexual abuse, and honorable military record). 
Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, and in 
comparison with other death cases, we conclude that the sentences of death are 
proportionate for the murders of Brown and King. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Having considered each of Bright’s claims, we affirm the sentences of death. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Russell L. Healey, Judge - Case No. 162008CF002887AXXXMA 
 
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
- 55 - 
 
for Appellee