Title: Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp.
Citation: 601 So. 2d 538
Docket Number: 78244
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 1992

601 So. 2d 538 (1992)
David MORALES, Petitioner,
v.
SPERRY RAND CORPORATION, etc., et al., Respondents.
No. 78244.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 11, 1992.
Karen J. Haas of the Law Offices of Karen J. Haas, and Richard L. Allen, Jr., of Allen &amp; Bush, Orlando, for petitioner.
Jeffrey B. Shapiro of Herzfeld and Rubin, and Judy D. Shapiro of the Law Offices of Judy D. Shapiro, Miami, for respondents.
R.J. Beckham of Beckham &amp; McAliley, P.A., Jacksonville, amicus curiae for The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
McDONALD, Judge.
We review Morales v. Sperry Rand Corporation, 578 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), because of certified conflict with Berdeaux v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 575 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
At issue are the consequences of failing to obtain service of process within 120 days of the filing of a complaint as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j) when no good cause for this failure is demonstrated. In Morales the district court held that rule 1.070(j) required dismissal. Whereas, Berdeaux held that dismissal is not in order if service of process is effected before a motion to dismiss predicated on noncompliance with rule 1.070(j) is filed. We adopt Morales and disapprove Berdeaux.
On August 17, 1989, Morales filed a personal injury claim against Sperry Rand Corporation and codefendants based on an injury he incurred on August 20, 1985. On December 5, 1989, Morales' attorney mailed the summons forms to the clerk of the court and the clerk issued the summonses on December 8, 1989. However, the 120-day period for service required by rule 1.070(j) expired on December 15, 1989 and Morales' attorney did not serve Sperry's resident agent until December 19, 1989.
Sperry filed a motion to dismiss on January 18, 1990, asserting failure to state a cause of action, allege privity of contract, and allege sufficient facts. On January 31, Sperry filed a supplement to the motion to dismiss, adding the defense of failure to *539 serve process within the time period specified by rule 1.070(j).
In affirming the dismissal in the instant case, the district court of appeal stated:
578 So. 2d  at 1144-45.
For rule 1.070(j) to fulfill its mission of assuring diligent prosecution of lawsuits once a complaint is filed, the district court's conclusion and analysis must be approved. We do not believe the rule is unduly harsh in that the trial judge has broad discretion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b) to extend the time limitation if reasonable grounds are asserted before the 120-day period expires. Likewise, the trial judge has broad discretion in declining to dismiss an action if reasonable cause for the failure to effect timely service is documented.
The approach taken by the Third District Court of Appeal, while reasonable, would for practical purposes, negate rule 1.070(j) and the reason for its existence. Thus, we prefer Morales over Berdeaux.
In this review, Morales also claims that because Sperry did not raise the defense of noncompliance with rule 1.070(j) in its original motion to dismiss, but rather by an amendment to the motion, it waived this ground for dismissal. This issue was not raised before the trial judge and was not discussed by the district court in the opinion under review. We therefore decline to address this issue. Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982). The opinion under review is approved.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, BARKETT, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.