Title: Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Trust v. Allstate Insurance Co., et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 381, 2017
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MOTORS LIQUIDATION 
COMPANY DIP LENDERS TRUST, 
 
Plaintiff Below,  
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, et al., 
 
Defendants Below,  
Appellees. 
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No.  381, 2017 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
CA No. N11C-12-022  
CCLD  
 
 
Submitted:  May 2, 2018 
Decided:  July 10, 2018 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, oral argument, and the record on 
appeal, it appears that: 
 
1. 
This is an insurance coverage case involving excess general liability 
policies purchased by General Motors for policy periods spanning from the late 
1960’s to the mid-1980’s.  In 2009, General Motors underwent a bankruptcy 
reorganization, and as a result of that proceeding the rights to any proceeds from the 
policies were assigned to the Appellant, Motors Liquidation Company DIP Lenders 
Trust (“the Trust”).  The Appellees are 14 insurance companies that sold the excess 
 
 
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policies to General Motors.  The issue is whether the excess policies provide 
coverage for asbestos-related and environmental claims asserted against General 
Motors.  In three opinions, the Superior Court determined that they do not and 
granted summary judgment to the Appellees.  We have concluded that the judgment 
of the Superior Court should be affirmed for the reasons given by it in those opinions. 
2.  For more than 50 years, General Motors purchased comprehensive 
products liability insurance from Royal Insurance Company (“Royal”).  Policies 
issued through 1971 were “occurrence-based,” meaning the coverage responded to 
injuries arising from incidents occurring within the time at risk.  The parties then 
negotiated Endorsement 15, which shifted policies issued after 1971 to “claims-
made” insurance which covered occurrences reported during the policy period.  
Royal is not a party to this litigation. 
3.  The excess policies involved here are ones that towered above the Royal 
policies.  General Motors continuously bought layers of excess coverage that 
towered over the Royal policies during the time-frame relevant to this case.  These 
excess policies were issued by different carriers, covering different time frames, in 
different amounts, and with different attachment points.  The pre-1972 excess 
policies “follow-form” by adopting the terms of the underlying Royal policy.  It 
appears that some of the post-1971 excess policies follow form to the underlying 
Royal policies, but some contain other triggering language, such as occurrence-
 
 
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based language, and some contain other language which differs from the Royal 
policies.   
4.  In 1977, General Motors received the first of what would become 
thousands of claims from plaintiffs alleging they had sustained personal injury from 
exposure to General Motors automotive products containing asbestos.  In the years 
that followed, more than 40,000 such claims were filed against General Motors. 
5.  From 1977 until 1993, when the Royal insurance program was terminated, 
almost 2,000 asbestos suits were filed against General Motors and tendered to Royal 
for handling.   Royal handled these claims on a claims-made basis.  It registered 
these claims only to the year in which the claim was received and paid each claim 
off the Royal policy for that year.  Asbestos claims made during the period of Royal 
coverage are not the subject of this action.  In the early 2000’s, asbestos claims 
against General Motors increased dramatically.  In 2004, General Motors tendered 
to Royal, for defense and indemnity, 60 CDs of asbestos claims.  All of those claims 
were made after the Royal policy periods had expired.  None were ever submitted 
to General Motors or Royal during any policy year.  They are the claims for which 
coverage is sought in this action.  Royal denied coverage and on January 26, 2005 
filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court in Delaware to determine 
whether it had any obligation to General Motors under either the pre-1972 policies 
or the post-1971 policies for asbestos-related and environmental claims.  Later that 
 
 
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same day General Motors filed a declaratory judgment action in Michigan to 
determine Royal’s obligations under the pre-1972 policies.  In the Michigan action, 
General Motors did not seek any determination regarding the post-1971 policies.  
General Motors moved for dismissal or stay of the Delaware action.  The action in 
Delaware was not dismissed but it was stayed in favor of the Michigan action.  The 
Michigan action proceeded, and in 2008 General Motors and Royal entered into a 
settlement.  The settlement released all of Royal’s general liability policies, both 
the pre-1972 policies and the post-1971 policies, from any further liability.  None 
of the excess general liability carriers were parties to either the Michigan or 
Delaware actions, and none were involved in the 2008 settlement. 
6.  As mentioned, in 2009 General Motors entered bankruptcy.  During the 
bankruptcy, General Motors was renamed Motors Liquidation Corp.  On December 
1, 2011 Motors Liquidation Corp. filed this action.  Shortly after the action was 
filed, Motors Liquidation Corp. assigned its rights to proceeds under its pre-1986 
excess general liability policies to the Trust, as required by the bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization. 
7.  The first Superior Court opinion in the case, dated December 31, 2013, 
was issued in response to two motions for partial summary judgment filed by the 
 
 
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Trust.1  In those motions the Trust argued that all asbestos-related claims were a 
single occurrence and “all sums” allocation should apply to the pre-1972 policies.  
In the policies, the pertinent provision relied upon by General Motors provided that 
the insurance company agreed: 
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall be 
obligated to pay by reasons of the liability 
 
(i)  Imposed upon the Insured by law arising out of an event or 
a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in 
Personal Injury or Property Damage as defined in the 
Underlying Insurance . . . which occurs during the period of this 
Insurance.2 
 
 
8.  The Insurers argued that allocation should be pro rata.  With regard to 
occurrence, the Insurers argued that the course of dealing between General Motors 
and Royal and latent ambiguity in the policies affected the interpretation of the 
policy language, and they should be permitted to conduct discovery. 
 
9.  The Superior Court denied both motions for summary judgment.  It 
concluded that in order to determine whether “all sums” or “pro rata” allocation 
applied, it must first determine whether Michigan law or Delaware law applied.  
The court reasoned that choice of law was not the subject of the motions, had not 
been fully briefed, and any decision on choice of law was premature.  As to 
                                                 
1 Motors Liquidation Co., DIP Lenders Trust v. Allianz Ins. Co., 2013 WL 7095859 (Del. Super. 
Dec. 31, 2013). 
2 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A592–593. 
 
 
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occurrence, the court concluded that discovery should be permitted to proceed.  The 
court did, however, decide that if Michigan law applied, allocation would be pro rata 
under the law of that state. 
 
10.  The second Superior Court opinion, dated November 25, 2015, was 
issued in response to a defendants’ motion for summary judgment, a cross-motion 
for summary judgment filed by the Trust, and a motion filed by defendant Munich 
Reinsurance America, Inc. for an order declaring that the Trust was judicially 
estopped from asserting claims against the post-1971 excess policies.3  The 2015 
opinion addressed only the post-1971 policies.  The Court found that the asbestos-
related claims at issue were not covered under any of the post-1971 Royal claims-
made policies because none of the claims were reported to either General Motors or 
Royal during any post-1971 policy period.  It then reasoned that claims not covered 
under the Royal post-1971 policies were not covered under the post-1971 excess 
policies.  Munich Reinsurance America’s estoppel motion was granted for reasons 
which will be discussed hereinafter.  The effect of the 2015 opinion was to grant 
summary judgment to all of the post-1971 insurers. 
 
11.  The third Superior Court opinion, dated June 19, 2017, dealt with seven 
motions of various types, but most especially a defense motion calling for pro rata 
                                                 
3 Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Trust v. Allianz Ins. Co., 2015 WL 10376123 (Del. Super. 
Nov. 25, 2015).  
 
 
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allocation under Michigan law. policies.4  The court ruled that pro rata allocation 
applied, thus granting the defendants’ motion on that point.  The effect of this ruling 
was to grant summary judgment to all of the pre-1972 excess insurers.  The 
combined effect of the 2015 opinion and the 2017 opinion was to grant summary 
judgment for all defendants. 
12.  AThis Court reviews de novo the Superior Court=s grant or denial of 
summary judgment >to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are 
no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.=@5 
 
13.  The Trust makes five claims of error on appeal.  The first is that the 
Superior Court erred in finding that under Michigan law pro rata allocation, not all 
sums, applies to the pre-1972 excess policies.  In its 2013 opinion, the Superior 
Court analyzed this issue as follows: 
Arco Industries Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., the 
current precedent in Michigan, rejected “all sums” allocation in favor 
of “time on the risk” proration where continuous property damage 
was covered by successive insurance policies.  After discussing and 
comparing five allocation methods, Arco held, “we must reject any 
method of allocation that would require . . . coverage on a joint and 
several or ‘all sums’ basis, since that method would require 
                                                 
4 Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Trust v. Allianz Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2495417 (Del. Super. 
June 19, 2017). 
5 Brown v. United Water Del., Inc., 3 A.3d 272, 275 (Del. 2010) (quoting Estate of Rae v. Murphy, 
956 A.2d 1266, 1269-70 (Del. 2008)).  
 
 
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[indemnification] for damage occurring outside the policy period.”  
Arco was affirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court.  Moreover, a 
federal court applying Michigan law also held that the Michigan 
Supreme Court would adopt pro rata “time on the risk.”  Stryker 
Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania conducted a thorough analysis of lower court 
decisions, policy language, and earlier Supreme Court rulings. 
Stryker relied on the Michigan Supreme Court’s prior approval of pro 
rata “time on the risk” allocation’s simplicity and predictability, 
especially as paired with an injury-in-fact trigger.  The court found, 
“the Michigan Supreme Court would adopt the pro rata ‘time on the 
risk’ method of allocation applied in Arco.” 
 
Plaintiff alleges there is no true conflict, because another Michigan 
appellate decision, Dow Corning Co. v. Continental Casualty 
Company, Inc., applied “all sums” allocation.  That was after 
distinguishing Arco by relying heavily on policy language explicitly 
extending coverage outside the policy period.  But, Dow Corning is 
an unpublished decision, and in Michigan “an unpublished opinion 
of the Court of Appeals is of no precedential value.”  Further, the 
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Arco after Dow Corning was 
decided.6 
 
The Court followed similar reasoning when it ruled in its 2017 opinion that under 
Michigan law allocation is pro rata.7  We agree with the Superior Court’ analysis as 
forth in its 2013 and 2017 opinions.  While Michigan will apply all sums allocation 
where there is policy language leading to that result, as in Dow, it applies pro rata 
allocation to policy language like that contained in the policies involved in this case. 
                                                 
6 Motors Liquidation Co., DIP Lenders Trust v. Allianz Ins. Co., 2013 WL 7095859, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Dec. 31, 2013) (citing and quoting Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins., Co., 594 
N.W.2d 61 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1998), aff’d, 617 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2000); Stryker Corp. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2005 WL 1610663 (W.D. Mich. July 1, 2005); Dow 
Corning Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., Inc., 1999 WL 33435067 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1999)). 
7 Motors, 2017 WL 2495417, at *18–20. 
 
 
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14.  The Trust next contends that the Superior Court erred in finding that the 
Trust was judicially estopped by General Motors’ prior statements in litigation 
against the underlying insurer, Royal, as to the operation of the post-1971 Royal 
coverage.  It argues that no court adopted or relied on these statements by General 
Motors, and there can be no judicial estoppel.   
 
15.  In its opinion granting a stay in the 2005 litigation, the Superior Court 
noted that General Motors represented to the court that “it does not seek insurance 
coverage from Royal for the post-1971 policies and will not do so in any forum with 
respect to the asbestos-related and environmental claims at issue in [the Delaware] 
and the Michigan litigations.”8  In its 2015 opinion, the Superior Court elaborated 
on this representation: 
In 2005, GM and Royal sued each other over pre-1972 coverage, with 
GM filing in Michigan and Royal filing here.  To bolster its forum 
choice, GM assured both the courts here and in Michigan that GM 
would never make an asbestos claim under its post-1971 policies, the 
ones underlying the excess policies here.  Moreover, the record in both 
cases is replete with GM’s admissions that its post-1971 coverage was 
“claims made.”  Specifically, for example, GM’s counsel 
unequivocally assured this court: 
 
[W]ith respect to the [post-1971] years of coverage, there is no 
justiciable issue here.  These are claims made policies.  We 
are not submitting claims under them, and I don’t know how 
much clearer we can say that. 
 
                                                 
8 Royal Indem. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 2005 WL 1952933, at *10 (Del. Super. July 26, 
2005). 
 
 
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GM similarly assured the court in Michigan concerning the post-1971 
policies: 
 
General Motors has informed [Royal] that [GM is] not claiming 
and will not claim under those remaining twenty years.  They 
don’t believe us, but we submit that we are judicially bound; we 
would be estopped to contend otherwise.9 
 
Judicial estoppel applies when a litigant’s position “contradicts another position that 
the litigant previously took and that the Court was successfully induced to adopt in 
a judicial ruling.”10  The Trust argues that the representations made in the 2005 
litigation were not accepted by the Superior Court as a basis for its ruling, as General 
Motors could add the post-1971claims by counterclaim in the Michigan action.  
However, the representations were a part of the argument made by General Motors 
that persuaded, or induced, the Superior Court to grant a stay.  General Motors itself 
admitted that it would be estopped.  Under these circumstances, a finding of judicial 
estoppel was warranted.  The estoppel established that the Trust was estopped from 
denying that the post-1971 Royal policies were claims-made and that claims made 
in separate policy periods were separate occurrences.  The ruling estopped the Trust 
from arguing that any of the claims at issue in this case triggered coverage under the 
post-1971 Royal policies. 
                                                 
9 Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Trust v. Allianz Ins. Co., 2015 WL 10376123, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Nov. 25, 2015).  Actually, the Delaware action involved the post-2971 policies as well. 
10 Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Tech, Inc., 958 A.2d 852, 859–860 (Del. 2008) (quoting Siegman v. 
Palomar Med. Techs., Inc., 1998 WL 409352, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jul. 13, 1998)). 
 
 
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16.  The Trust’s third argument is that the Superior Court erred in holding 
that the judicial estoppel which it held prevented the underlying Royal policies from 
being triggered also negated coverage under the post-1971 excess insurance policies.  
In addressing this argument, it should first be noted that judicial estoppel was not 
the sole reason that the Superior Court found that the post-1971 Royal policies were 
claims-made and that each claim was a separate occurrence.  The Superior Court 
also determined that Endorsement 15 was intended by the parties to convert the 
Royal policies from occurrence-based to claims-made.  Specifically, it found that 
“under the policies’ clear, negotiated language, the Royal policies are claims-
made.”11  In a 2016 order denying reargument of its 2015 opinion, it stated that 
Endorsement 15 “unambiguously converted the primary coverage from occurrence-
based to claims-made coverage, as old-GM and Royal intended.” 12   General 
Motors’ conduct was consistent with these findings.  The asbestos-related claims 
after the first in 1977 were never aggregated by it with other asbestos-related claims.  
General Motors treated each claim as a separate occurrence, tied to the year it was 
reported.  The Superior Court reasoned that since the post-1971 Royal policies were 
claims made and none of the claims involved in this case were made against either 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Trust v. Allianz Ins. Co., 2016 WL 825473, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Mar. 2, 2016). 
 
 
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General Motors or Royal during a post-1971 policy period, none of the claims were 
covered under those policies.  The Superior Court then considered the nature of the 
excess policies.  It noted that the policies were generally structured and sold as 
excess insurance.  It took notice of the fact the policies were captioned as excess 
policies and repeatedly referred to underlying insurance.13  Specifically, with regard 
to Aetna policies for which Travelers Casualty and Surety Company is now 
responsible, it analyzed a net loss provision contained in those policies.  Under the 
net loss provision, the excess insurance was obligated to pay only sums “which 
would be covered by the terms of the controlling underlying insurance [i.e. the 
primary policy], if written without any limit of liability.”14  Ultimately the Superior 
Court concluded that the excess policies were not required to respond to claims 
which did not trigger coverage under the primary policies.  We agree for the reasons 
given by the Superior Court.   
 
17.  The Trust’s next argument is that the Superior Court erred by 
disregarding the express triggering language found in a number of the post-1971 
excess policies, as well as policy language requiring that those excess policies own 
provisions control over language in the underlying Royal policies.  This argument 
                                                 
13 Id.  
14 Motors, 2015 WL 10376123, at *4.  The 2015 opinion states that all of the excess policies 
contained this same net loss provision.  The Trust argues that this is not true.  However, no 
express language has been identified which would require an excess policy to respond to claims 
excluded from coverage under the primary policies. 
 
 
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is based upon the occurrence-based language and other language found in some of 
the post-1971 excess policies. 
 
18. 
This issue was also addressed in the Superior Court’s 2015 opinion.  In 
the opening paragraph of its 2015 opinion, the Superior Court stated that the “focus 
now is on the . . . disharmony between the primary and excess policies’ triggers of 
coverage.”15  Specifically, the disharmony was between the primary’s “narrow, 
claims-made trigger” and the excess policies “broader, occurrence-based language.  
The question here is whether the excess policies have been triggered.”16  
    19. 
The Superior Court then engaged in a careful and thorough analysis of 
the issue.  It reasoned that the occurrence-based language must give way to 
language in the policies having the effect of providing that the excess policies are 
not obligated to respond to claims not triggered under the primary policy, stating 
that “barring exceptional circumstances or policy language not present here, higher 
level excess insurance policies do not respond if the primary . . . policies have not 
been triggered.”17  We agree there any policy language requiring excess policies to 
respond to claims not triggered under the primary insurance should be clear and 
unambiguous, and none is present here. 
                                                 
15 Id. at *1. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at *4. 
 
 
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20. 
The Trust’s fifth and final argument is that the Superior Court erred in 
holding that the first claim in General Motors’ asbestos products liability occurrence, 
reported to General Motors during the 1977 policy year, did not trigger coverage for 
the full asbestos product liability occurrence under those excess policies that 
incorporate a trigger of “occurrences which are reported” during the policy period.  
This argument is premised on all of the asbestos-related claims being a single 
occurrence.  It must fail for the same reason the previous argument fails, which is 
that claims which are excluded from coverage under the post-1971 Royal policies 
are not covered by the excess policies. 
 
21.  Appellees OneBeacon Insurance Company and Continental Casualty 
Company filed a cross-appeal.  Since we are affirming the judgment of the Superior 
Court, we need not address the cross-appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
  Justice