Title: Oregon v. Phillips
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S059835
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 2013

Filed:  December 27, 2013 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
STATE OF OREGON, 
Respondent on Review, 
 
v. 
JESSE JEROME PHILLIPS, 
Petitioner on Review. 
 
(CC 080431569; CA A140377; SC S059835) 
 
 
En Banc 
 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
 
Argued and submitted June 13, 2012; resubmitted January 7, 2013. 
 
Rankin Johnson, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. 
 
 
Jamie K. Contreras, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for 
respondent on review.  Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief.  With him 
on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor 
General. 
 
 
KISTLER, J. 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are 
affirmed. 
 
 
*On appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Youlee Y. You, Judge. 242 Or 
App 253, 255 P3d 587 (2011). 
 
1 
 
 
KISTLER, J. 
1 
 
 
A jury found defendant guilty of third-degree assault.  See ORS 
2 
163.165(1)(e).1  The trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find defendant liable 
3 
for that crime either as the principal or as an accomplice.  Throughout this litigation, 
4 
defendant has argued that, as a matter of statutory and constitutional law, the jurors had 
5 
to agree on which role he played in the assault:  Did he hit the victim or did he aid and 
6 
abet the person who did?  The trial court declined to give defendant's requested 
7 
instruction on that issue, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  State v. Phillips, 242 Or 
8 
App 253, 255 P3d 587 (2011).  We allowed defendant's petition for review and now 
9 
affirm the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment.  We hold that, even 
10 
though the trial court should have given defendant's requested instruction, the error was 
11 
harmless. 
12 
 
 
This case arose out of a dispute over a cell phone.  The victim sold 
13 
defendant a cell phone with prepaid minutes.  Defendant made a down payment when he 
14 
got the cell phone and agreed to pay the balance in the future.  When defendant failed to 
15 
pay the balance owed, the victim contacted the cell phone provider and caused the 
16 
remaining prepaid minutes to be cancelled, angering defendant. 
17 
                                              
 
1  
ORS 163.165(1) specifies nine ways in which a person can commit third-
degree assault.  When we refer to third-degree assault in this opinion, we refer only to 
ORS 163.165(1)(e), which  provides that a person commits that crime "if the person * * * 
[w]hile being aided by another person actually present, intentionally or knowingly causes 
physical injury to another." 
2 
 
 
A few days after the victim cancelled the remaining prepaid minutes, the 
1 
victim and his older brother went over to a neighbor's house to smoke a bowl of 
2 
methamphetamine.  When they got there, they discovered that defendant and two of his 
3 
friends were there, and a fight broke out among the victim, the victim's brother, 
4 
defendant, and defendant's two friends.  There is no dispute that, during the fight, 
5 
defendant hit the victim's brother.2  There is also no dispute that, during the fight, either 
6 
defendant or defendant's friend hit the victim in the face and broke the bone around the 
7 
victim's eye.3  What is in dispute is the role that defendant played in causing the victim's 
8 
injury.  The evidence at trial permitted the jury to draw three different conclusions 
9 
regarding that issue. 
10 
 
 
First, the jury could have found that defendant initially hit the victim's 
11 
brother, disabling him.  After that, defendant's two friends held the victim's arms while 
12 
defendant hit the victim in the face, breaking the bone around his eye. 
13 
 
 
Second, the jury could have found that one of defendant's friends hit the 
14 
victim in the face, breaking the bone around his eye, and that defendant hit the victim's 
15 
brother to prevent him from coming to the victim's aid.  Under that version of the facts, 
16 
                                              
 
2  
The victim's brother testified, and no witness disputed, that defendant 
"punched [the brother] in the nose."  With that blow, defendant "broke the [brother's 
nasal] bone, took it out of the skin."  
 
3  
Defendant and his witnesses testified that defendant's friend was the person 
who hit and injured the victim.  Conversely, the victim and his brother testified that 
defendant was the person who hit and injured the victim. 
3 
the jury could have found that defendant did not hit the victim but that he aided and 
1 
abetted the person who did. 
2 
 
 
Third, the jury could have found that defendant hit the brother but that, 
3 
when he did so, defendant was unaware that one of his friends either was hitting or was 
4 
going to hit the victim.  Under that version of the facts, the jury could have found that 
5 
defendant neither hit the victim nor aided and abetted the person who did.  
6 
 
 
In instructing the jury, the trial court explained the elements of third-degree 
7 
assault under ORS 163.165(1)(e).  It also told the jury the circumstances in which one 
8 
person will be liable for another person's criminal conduct for aiding and abetting that 
9 
conduct.  See ORS 161.155 (defining liability for aiding and abetting another person's 
10 
commission of a crime).  The trial court did not, however, give defendant's requested 
11 
instruction, which would have told the jury that 10 jurors had to agree whether defendant 
12 
was liable for third-degree assault either because he hit the victim or because he aided 
13 
and abetted the person who did.  The jury returned a verdict finding defendant liable for 
14 
third-degree assault for the injuries that the victim sustained.4 
15 
 
 
On appeal, defendant assigned error to the trial court's refusal to give his 
16 
                                              
 
4 
The state had charged defendant with three counts of assault.  The jury 
acquitted defendant of the first count, which charged him with second-degree assault for 
causing "serious physical injury" to the victim.  The jury convicted defendant of the 
second and third counts, which charged him with third-degree assault for causing 
physical injury, respectively, to the victim and his brother while being aided by another 
person actually present.  Only the conviction on the second count for causing physical 
injury to the victim is at issue on review.  
4 
requested instruction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Court of Appeals reasoned 
1 
that defendant "caused" the victim's injury within the meaning of the third-degree assault 
2 
statute if defendant either inflicted the injury himself or aided another in doing so.  242 
3 
Or App at 263.  The court explained that, because direct infliction of injury and aiding 
4 
another in inflicting that injury were alternative factual ways of proving a single element 
5 
of third-degree assault (causation), 10 jurors need not agree which set of facts proved that 
6 
element.  Id.  We allowed defendant's petition for review to consider whether, either as a 
7 
matter of statute or constitutional law, at least 10 jurors must agree whether defendant 
8 
was liable as a principal or as an accomplice. 
9 
 
 
Before turning to that issue, it is helpful to discuss briefly the crime of 
10 
third-degree assault.  ORS 163.165(1)(e) provides that a person commits that crime "if 
11 
the person * * * [w]hile being aided by another person actually present, intentionally or 
12 
knowingly causes physical injury to another."  Under that statute, three persons are 
13 
necessary for the crime of third-degree assault:  a victim who suffers physical injury, a 
14 
person who "causes" that injury, and a third person actually present who aids the 
15 
infliction of that injury.  State v. Pine, 336 Or 194, 82 P3d 130 (2003).  A person can 
16 
"cause" physical injury within the meaning of ORS 163.165(1)(e) in one of two ways.  Id. 
17 
at 207.  A person can either "inflic[t] physical injury directly himself or herself" or, 
18 
alternatively, "engag[e] in conduct so extensively intertwined with [another person's] 
19 
infliction of the injury that such conduct can be found to have produced the injury."  Id.  
20 
 
 
In Pine, this court quoted the following passage from State v. Nefstad, 309 
21 
Or 523, 789 P2d 1326 (1990), to illustrate when a person's conduct will be "so 
22 
5 
extensively intertwined with [another person's] infliction of the injury" that it will "cause" 
1 
the injury: 
2 
"'Joining in the stabbing of a dying victim or restraining the victim so that 
3 
he cannot avoid the fatal knife thrusts constitutes "personally" committing 
4 
the homicide.  Thus, in the instant case, even if [the] defendant choked and 
5 
restrained the victim[,] but did not also stab him, nonetheless [the] 
6 
defendant "personally" committed this homicide[,] and he is directly 
7 
responsible for it.'" 
8 
Id. at 206 (quoting Nefstad, 309 Or at 543; brackets in Pine); see also id. at 206-07 and 
9 
n 4 (explaining that, although the issues in Pine and Nefstad were not identical, Nefstad's 
10 
reasoning was persuasive in determining the meaning of "cause" in the third-degree 
11 
assault statute). 
12 
 
 
The court also explained in Pine that "the fact that a defendant provided on-
13 
the-scene aid to another person who inflicted physical injury upon a victim does not, in 
14 
itself, render the defendant liable for third-degree assault under that statute."  Id. at 207; 
15 
see also id. at 205 (concluding that "cause" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) reaches a narrower 
16 
range of conduct than "aid" does).  Under Pine, not everyone who aids another in 
17 
committing third-degree assault will "cause" the injury in a way that renders the aider 
18 
liable under ORS 163.165(1)(e).  Having held that the defendant in Pine would not be 
19 
liable under ORS 163.165(1)(e) if he aided but did not cause the physical injury, the court 
20 
did not reach the state's argument that the defendant in Pine could still be liable for third-
21 
degree assault for aiding and abetting the commission of that crime.  Id. at 207-08; see 
22 
ORS 166.155 (defining liability for aiding and abetting another person's criminal 
23 
conduct).  The court explained that the state had not preserved that theory of liability.  Id. 
24 
6 
 
 
As we read Pine, it stands for the following propositions:  A person need 
1 
not inflict physical injury personally to "cause" that injury within the meaning of ORS 
2 
163.165(1)(e).  Some acts by a third person actually present that aid the infliction of 
3 
physical injury will also "cause" the injury -- namely, acts that are "extensively 
4 
intertwined" with causing the injury.  However, not every act by a third person actually 
5 
present that aids the infliction of physical injury will "cause" the injury and render the 
6 
third person liable under ORS 163.165(1)(e).  Finally, Pine recognized the possibility that 
7 
a person could be liable for third-degree assault under ORS 161.155 for aiding and 
8 
abetting the commission of that crime, but the court did not have occasion to decide 
9 
when, if ever, the circumstances would justify imposition of aid-and-abet liability. 
10 
 
 
This case differs from Pine in one respect (and in another respect that we 
11 
discuss later in the opinion).  In this case, the trial court's instructions permitted the jury 
12 
to find defendant liable for third-degree assault if he aided and abetted the person who 
13 
caused the victim's physical injury, and defendant has not challenged that instruction on 
14 
review.5  Specifically, defendant does not dispute on review that, if the jury found that 
15 
one of his friends hit the victim while defendant hit the victim's brother to prevent him 
16 
from coming to the victim's aid, the jury could find defendant liable for third-degree 
17 
                                              
 
5  
Defendant argued in the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that it could find him liable for aiding and abetting.  However, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had not preserved that issue, and it declined to 
reach it under the plain error doctrine.  242 Or App at 258-59.  Defendant has not 
challenged that ruling on review. 
7 
assault because he aided and abetted his friend's assault on the victim. 
1 
 
 
Defendant's argument focuses on a different issue.  He argues that the trial 
2 
court erred in not instructing the jury that 10 of its members had to agree whether he hit 
3 
the victim or whether he aided and abetted the person who did.  In State v. Pipkin, 354 Or 
4 
513, ___ P3d ___ (2013), we clarified the proper method for analyzing a claim that either 
5 
the state or federal constitution requires jury concurrence.  When a statute specifies 
6 
alternative means of committing a crime, the initial question is what, as a matter of 
7 
legislative intent, are the elements of the crime that the state must prove.  See id. at 521-
8 
22.  If the legislature intended that each alternative means is a separate element and if the 
9 
indictment charges that element, then at least 10 members of the jury have to agree on it.  
10 
Id. at 522, 527.  If, however, the alternative means are merely different factual ways of 
11 
proving a single element, then the question becomes whether permitting the jury to find 
12 
that element based on that factual mix violates either Article I, section 11, of the Oregon 
13 
Constitution or the Due Process Clause.  See id. at 522. 
14 
 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeals began by seeking to determine the 
15 
legislature's intent.  As noted above, the Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of 
16 
legislative intent, "(1) actual infliction of injury and (2) aiding another in doing so are 
17 
two alternative methods of meeting the 'causes' element of a single crime, third-degree 
18 
assault" and that, as a result, 10 jurors need not agree on how defendant "caused" the 
19 
victim's physical injury.  Phillips, 242 Or App at 263.  The Court of Appeals' 
20 
interpretation of ORS 163.165(1)(e) is difficult to square with this court's interpretation 
21 
of that statute in Pine.  In Pine, this court held that not everyone who aids the infliction of 
22 
8 
physical injury "causes" that injury within the meaning of ORS 163.165(1)(e).  Pine, 336 
1 
Or at 205, 207.  To the extent that the Court of Appeals held that everyone who aids the 
2 
infliction of physical injury "causes" the injury within the meaning of ORS 
3 
163.165(1)(e), its interpretation conflicts with Pine and cannot stand. 
4 
 
 
The Court of Appeals' reasoning is problematic for another reason.  ORS 
5 
161.155 defines when one person will be "criminally liable for the conduct of another 
6 
person constituting a crime."  One instance is when a person aids and abets another 
7 
person's commission of a crime.  See ORS 161.155(2)(b) (defining liability for aiding and 
8 
abetting another person's criminal conduct); State v. Lopez-Minjarez, 350 Or 576, 582-83, 
9 
260 P3d 439 (2011) (explaining the elements required to prove liability for aiding and 
10 
abetting another person's commission of a crime).6  In State v. Blake, 348 Or 95, 101, 228 
11 
P3d 560 (2010), this court explained that "[a]ccomplice * * * liability is not itself an 
12 
independent offense."  Id.  Rather, "[a]ccomplice liability makes a person who aids or 
13 
abets a crime liable for that crime even though the accomplice may not have committed 
14 
any of the acts that the crime entails."  Id.  Blake thus recognized that the elements 
15 
necessary to prove accomplice liability ordinarily will be separate from and in addition to 
16 
                                              
 
6  
The court explained in Lopez-Minjarez: 
 
"[ORS 161.155(2)(b)] requires a specific intent:  the intent to 
promote or facilitate the commission of the crime committed by another.  
The statute also has a conduct element:  with that requisite intent, the 
person must assist, agree to assist, or attempt to assist in either the planning 
or commission of the crime committed by another." 
350 Or at 582. 
9 
the elements necessary to prove the principal's liability for the underlying offense. 
1 
 
 
As we reiterated in Pipkin, jury concurrence is required for each 
2 
legislatively defined element necessary to impose criminal liability.  See 354 Or at 527.  
3 
Moreover, as Blake explained, the elements necessary to prove liability as an aider and 
4 
abettor ordinarily will not be coextensive with the elements necessary to prove liability as 
5 
a principal.  See 348 Or at 101.  It follows that 10 jurors usually will have to agree on the 
6 
elements necessary to prove that a defendant is liable for aiding and abetting another 
7 
person's commission of a crime.7  Put differently, if the state seeks to hold a defendant 
8 
liable either as the principal or as an aider and abettor and if a party requests an 
9 
appropriate instruction, the trial court should instruct the jury that at least 10 jurors must 
10 
agree on each legislatively defined element necessary to find the defendant liable under 
11 
one theory or the other.  The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested 
12 
instruction. 
13 
 
 
The question that remains is whether, in light of the facts of this case and 
14 
the terms of the third-degree assault statute, that error was harmless.8  In this case, the 
15 
                                              
 
7 
We need not decide what the result would be if the legislature had defined 
criminal liability differently.  See Holland v. State, 280 NW2d 288 (Wis 1979) 
(considering a state statute that required proof of a single element (that the defendant was 
a principal) and that defined a principal as a person who either committed a crime 
directly or intentionally aided and abetted its commission); cf. State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 
379-80, 780 P2d 725 (reserving the question whether a statute similar to the one at issue 
in Holland would run afoul of either Article I, section 11, or the Due Process Clause).  
 
8  
It is possible to read the Court of Appeals' opinion as being confined to the 
facts of this case and thus implicitly resting on a harmless error analysis.   
10 
facts permitted the jury to find defendant liable for third-degree assault on one of two 
1 
bases:  (1) defendant hit the victim in the face while defendant's friends held the victim's 
2 
arms or (2) one of defendant's friends hit the victim in the face while defendant hit the 
3 
victim's brother to keep him from coming to the victim's aid.9  Under the first set of facts, 
4 
the jury could find that defendant "caused" the victim's injury by directly inflicting it.  
5 
See Pine, 336 Or at 207.  Under the second set of facts, the jury could find that 
6 
defendant's conduct was "so extensively intertwined with [another person's] infliction of 
7 
the [victim's] injury" that defendant's conduct "caused" that injury, as this court explained 
8 
the meaning of "cause" in Pine.  See id. at 207.  
9 
 
 
Specifically, if defendant had held the victim so that his friend could hit the 
10 
victim in the face, there would be little dispute that defendant "caused" the resulting 
11 
physical injury within the meaning of ORS 163.165(1)(e).  See Pine, 336 Or at 206 
12 
(explaining that restraining the victim so that another person could hit him would be so 
13 
extensively intertwined with the infliction of physical injury that the restraint would be as 
14 
much a cause of the injury as the blow).  In this case, defendant did not hold the victim so 
15 
                                              
 
9  
As noted above, the facts also permitted the jury to find that defendant was 
unaware that one of his friends was hitting or about to hit the victim when defendant hit 
the victim's brother.  Those facts, however, would not have permitted the jury to find 
defendant liable for third-degree assault either for causing the victim's physical injury or 
for aiding and abetting the person who caused it.  See Lopez-Minjarez, 350 Or at 582 
(explaining that to find a defendant liable for aiding and abetting another person's 
commission of a crime, the jury would have to find that the defendant had "the intent to 
promote or facilitate the commission of the crime"). 
11 
that his friend could hit him.10  Rather, he hit the victim's older brother to prevent the 
1 
brother from coming to the victim's aid.  It is difficult, however, to see how the latter act 
2 
placed the victim in any different situation from the former.  If the jury found defendant 
3 
liable for aiding his friend's infliction of physical injury, it had to find that defendant 
4 
acted for the purpose of making the victim vulnerable to that injury.  See Lopez-Minjarez, 
5 
350 Or at 582-83 (explaining the mental state necessary for aiding and abetting).  
6 
Moreover, in this case, the direct and immediate effect of defendant's act was to prevent 
7 
the victim from escaping the blow that resulted in his injury.  On this record, the jury 
8 
could find that, by hitting the brother to keep him from coming to the victim's aid, 
9 
defendant "caused" the victim's injury, as this court defined that term in Pine. 
10 
 
 
Under Pine, the only two sets of facts that permitted the jury to find 
11 
defendant liable for third-degree assault were alternative factual ways of proving a single 
12 
element of third-degree assault -- that defendant "caused" the victim's physical injury.  
13 
On this record, the jury was not presented with two competing theories of liability, each 
14 
of which required proof of discrete, separate facts.  Rather, the facts in this case presented 
15 
                                              
 
10  
One witness agreed on cross-examination that he had testified at the grand 
jury that "when [the victim] walked out, that actually [defendant] grabbed [the victim], 
and that then a kid hit [the victim]."  Considered in isolation, that grand jury testimony 
could be read two ways.  The word "then" could imply that "a kid hit" the victim while 
defendant was holding him, or it could imply that the kid hit the victim after defendant 
had let go of the victim.  At trial, the witness clarified that the latter meaning was correct; 
he testified that defendant was not "holding [the victim] while the kid hit him."  Even if 
the jury could have disregarded the witness's trial testimony, that does not help defendant.  
If defendant were holding the victim when his friend hit him, defendant "caused" the 
injury as this court explained that term in Pine. 
12 
the jury with two alternative factual ways of proving the "causes" element of third-degree 
1 
assault. 
2 
 
 
To be sure, the trial court instructed the jury that it could find defendant 
3 
liable for aiding and abetting the infliction of injury, and some jurors could have found 
4 
defendant liable under ORS 161.155 rather than directly under ORS 163.165(1)(e).  
5 
However, when the only act that could have constituted aiding and abetting the infliction 
6 
of physical injury under ORS 161.155 also constituted "causing" that injury within the 
7 
meaning of ORS 163.165(1)(e), we fail to see how any error in requiring jury 
8 
concurrence on one theory or the other prejudiced defendant.  The same is true for intent.  
9 
A finding that defendant intended to promote or facilitate the assault subsumes a finding 
10 
that he intentionally or knowingly caused the injury.  See State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 377-
11 
78 n 6, 780 P2d 725 (1989) (distinguishing cases from other jurisdictions because the 
12 
facts necessary to prove one theory of liability were subsumed within the other).  On this 
13 
record, we cannot say that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to give 
14 
defendant's requested instruction. 
15 
 
 
That is not the end of the inquiry, however.  Even though the trial court's 
16 
failure to give defendant's requested instruction did not prejudice defendant's right to 
17 
have 10 jurors agree on each legislatively defined element of the offense, ORS 
18 
163.165(1)(e) still permitted the jury to find that defendant "caused" the injury by either 
19 
inflicting the injury directly or by taking actions that were extensively intertwined with 
20 
causing it.  Both Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Due Process 
21 
Clause place limits on the legislature's ability to define alternative factual means of 
22 
13 
proving a single element.  See Pipkin, 354 Or at 527-29 (Article I, section 11); Schad v. 
1 
Arizona, 501 US 624, 637-38, 111 S Ct 2491, 115 L Ed 2d 555 (1991) (due process).11  
2 
And the constitutional question in this case reduces to whether the legislature could 
3 
provide that a person "causes" physical injury either by directly inflicting it or by 
4 
engaging in conduct "so extensively intertwined" with inflicting the injury that the 
5 
conduct can be said to have caused it.  See Pine, 336 Or at 207 (describing those two 
6 
alternative means of causing physical injury). 
7 
 
 
On that issue, defendant relies solely on the common law to argue that 
8 
permitting the jury to find him liable for third-degree assault based on either of those two 
9 
theories violates the state and federal constitutions.  He reasons that, because the common 
10 
law treated principal and accomplice liability as separate, distinct theories, permitting the 
11 
jury to base its verdict on what amounts to a combination of those theories violates his 
12 
constitutional rights.  Before turning to defendant's argument, it is helpful to describe the 
13 
common law that preceded the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and 
14 
then turn to the Oregon statutes and cases that preceded the adoption of the relevant part 
15 
                                              
 
11  
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part: 
"[I]n the circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty 
or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, 
which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict."   
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:  "[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  US Const, 
Amend XIV, § 1.  
14 
of Article I, section 11, in 1934. 
1 
 
 
The common law divided persons charged with felonies into three classes:  
2 
principals in the first degree; principals in the second degree; and accessories before the 
3 
fact.  See Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(b) (2d ed 2003).12  "[A] 
4 
principal of the first degree is one who does the act, either himself directly, or by means 
5 
of an innocent agent."  Joel Prentiss Bishop, 1 Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 456 
6 
(2d ed 1858).  "A principal of the second degree is one who is present lending his 
7 
countenance and encouragement, or otherwise aiding, while another does it."  Id.; accord 
8 
James Fitzjames Stephen, 2 A History of the Criminal Law of England 230 (1883).  At 
9 
common law, a principal in the second degree could be actually or constructively present.  
10 
Bishop, Criminal Law § 460; LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(b).  Finally, a 
11 
person who aided and abetted the commission of a crime but who was not actually or 
12 
constructively present was an accessory before the fact.  Bishop, 1 Criminal Law §§ 473-
13 
74. 
14 
 
 
Viewed through a common-law lens, a person who "caused" physical injury 
15 
within the meaning of ORS 163.165(1)(e) would be either a principal in the first degree 
16 
or a principal in the second degree.  If a person caused the injury by directly inflicting it, 
17 
the person would be a principal in the first degree.  If the person caused the injury 
18 
                                              
 
12  
The common law also classified persons as accessories after the fact if they 
aided a person after the commission of a felony.  See LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal 
Law § 13.6(a).  That classification is not relevant to the issues defendant raises.  
15 
because that person's conduct was extensively intertwined with the injury's infliction, that 
1 
person would be a principal in the second degree; that is, he or she would be a person 
2 
who, while actually present, aided the infliction of physical injury.  It follows that, 
3 
whether defendant personally hit the victim or hit the victim's brother to keep him from 
4 
coming to the victim's aid, defendant would have been either a principal in the first or 
5 
second degree at common law.  He would not have been an accessory before the fact 
6 
because, at a minimum, he was actually present when he aided his friend's infliction of 
7 
the victim's physical injury. 
8 
 
 
At common law, the distinction between a principal in the first and second 
9 
degree had "no practical use or effect whatever."  Bishop, 1 Criminal Law § 456.  The 
10 
state could charge a defendant as a principal in the second degree and prove that he was a 
11 
principal in the first degree or vice versa.13  Id.  As Bishop explained, "[t]he distinction is 
12 
in all respects without a difference."  Id.  Similarly, at common law, "[a] second degree 
13 
principal could be tried and convicted even though the person who actually committed 
14 
the crime had not yet been tried."  LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(d).  
15 
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law between principals and 
16 
                                              
 
13  
Bishop stated: 
"And now an indictment against a man as principal of the first degree is 
sustained by proof of his being principal of the second degree; and, on the 
contrary, an indictment against him as principal of the second degree is 
supported by proof that he is principal of the first degree." 
Bishop, Criminal Law § 456. 
16 
accessories before the fact, the common law did not recognize a distinction of any 
1 
practical significance between principals of the first and second degree. 
2 
 
 
Oregon went further than the common law.  It made no distinction between 
3 
principals and accessories before the fact.  The Deady Code provided: 
4 
"All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony 
5 
or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the 
6 
crime, or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, are principals, 
7 
and to be tried and punished as such." 
8 
General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch LIII, § 691, p 573 (Deady 1845-1864).  Given 
9 
that legislative choice, this court held in 1887 that it was immaterial that the indictment 
10 
charged the defendant as a principal in the victim's murder but that the state proved only 
11 
that the defendant aided and abetted another person who administered the fatal poison.  
12 
State v. Moran, 15 Or 262, 275, 14 P 419 (1887).  Since then, this court consistently has 
13 
adhered to that proposition.  See State v. Fraser, 105 Or 589, 594-95, 209 P 467 (1922); 
14 
State v. Branton, 33 Or 533, 540-42, 56 P 267 (1899). 
15 
 
 
With that background in mind, we turn to Article I, section 11.  As initially 
16 
adopted in 1857, Article I, section 11, did not expressly address jury unanimity or jury 
17 
concurrence.  Or Const, Art I, § 11 (1857); Pipkin, 354 Or at 526 (discussing that issue).  
18 
In 1934, the people approved a legislatively referred amendment to Article I, section 11, 
19 
that for the first time expressly addressed jury concurrence and jury unanimity.  The 
20 
amendment added the following provision to Article I, section 11:  "[I]n the circuit court 
21 
ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a 
22 
verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous 
23 
17 
verdict."  See Or Laws 1935, p 5. 
1 
 
 
Nothing in the context that preceded the enactment of the 1934 amendment 
2 
to Article I, section 11, suggests any state constitutional problem with defining "causes" 
3 
broadly enough to include actors who, at common law, would have been principals in the 
4 
first and second degree.  Rather, as explained above, the common law, the Deady Code, 
5 
and the Oregon cases that preceded the adoption of the 1934 amendment regarded those 
6 
categories as interchangeable. 
7 
 
 
The same is true for the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified by 
8 
three-fourths of the states in 1868.  To be sure, defendant argues that the common law 
9 
that preceded the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment distinguished between 
10 
principals and accessories before the fact.  The difficulty, however, with defendant's 
11 
argument is that the word "causes" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) embraces only principals in the 
12 
first and second degree.  The common law that preceded the adoption of the Fourteenth 
13 
Amendment drew no meaningful distinction between those two classes of actors.  Even if 
14 
there might be a federal due process problem with a statute that allowed a jury to find a 
15 
defendant liable for a crime without regard to whether the defendant acted as a principal 
16 
or an accessory before the fact, this case does not present that problem.  Nothing in the 
17 
common law suggests that due process would be offended by permitting the state to 
18 
prove that a defendant caused a victim's physical injury either by directly inflicting that 
19 
injury or by taking actions while actually present that were extensively intertwined with 
20 
18 
the infliction of the injury.  See Schad, 501 US at 637 (plurality); id. at 649-51 (Scalia, J., 
1 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).14  
2 
 
 
We summarize our conclusions briefly.  The requirement recognized in 
3 
Boots and reaffirmed in Pipkin that at least 10 jurors must agree on each legislatively 
4 
defined element of a crime means that 10 jurors ordinarily must agree whether a 
5 
defendant committed a crime him or herself or, alternatively, whether the defendant aided 
6 
and abetted another person's commission of that crime.  Even though the trial court 
7 
should have given defendant's requested instruction to that effect, the error was harmless 
8 
because, on the facts in this case, the factual findings necessary to find defendant liable 
9 
on one theory either subsumed or were the same as the factual findings on the other 
10 
theory.  Finally, the legislative determination that causation in ORS 163.165(1)(e) can be 
11 
proved either by directly inflicting an injury or by engaging in acts extensively 
12 
intertwined with inflicting that injury does not violate either Article I, section 11, or the 
13 
Due Process Clause. 
14 
                                              
 
14  
In determining whether due process permitted a legislatively defined 
element to be proved by alternative factual means, the plurality in Schad considered 
history, the breadth of the practice, and the "moral and practical equivalence" of the 
alternative means.  501 US at 637 (plurality).  In this case, defendant bases his due 
process argument solely on history and does not contend that the two ways of proving 
"cause" in ORS 163.165(1)(e) are either novel or lack "moral and practical equivalence."  
Justice Scalia's separate opinion in Schad looked solely to history to determine what due 
process requires.  See 501 US at 649-51 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  As explained above, defendant's argument based solely on history fails, and 
he provides no other reason for us to conclude that the Oregon legislature's decision in 
ORS 163.165(1)(e) to permit juries to find alternative factual bases for proving causation 
violates due process. 
19 
 
 
The Court of Appeals decision and the judgment of the circuit court are 
1 
affirmed. 
2