Title: Lupo v. Lineberger
Citation: 313 Ark. 315, 855 S.W.2d 293
Docket Number: 92-1168
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 1993

855 S.W.2d 293 (1993) 313 Ark. 315 David A. LUPO, M.D., Petitioner, v. Hon. John LINEBERGER, Circuit Judge, Respondent. No. 92-1168. Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 1, 1993. Wright, Lindsey &amp; Jennings, Little Rock, for petitioner. Peter A. Miller, Little Rock, for respondent. HOLT, Chief Justice. This is a petition for a writ of prohibition or writ of certiorari to prevent the Jefferson County Circuit Court, specifically the Honorable John Lineberger, sitting on special assignment, from ordering Dr. David A. Lupo to testify as a witness in a deposition in the matter of William Rodgers, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Patricia Rodgers v. Dr. Robert Teryl Brooks, No. 91-439-2-3. In response to the petition, we issued a temporary *294 stay of all proceedings, including discovery, pending the submission of briefs on the main issue and the question of the propriety of a writ of certiorari. See Lupo v. Lineberger, 311 Ark. 80, 841 S.W.2d 158 (1992). The parties have responded by submitting briefs on the appropriateness of both writs of prohibition and certiorari as well as on the main issue; however, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under either writ and deny his application in all particulars. In Webb v. Harrison, 261 Ark. 279, 547 S.W.2d 748 (1977), we reiterated our general position that a writ of prohibition is a discretionary writ and is only proper when the trial court has no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, is clearly warranted, and there are no disputed facts. In Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400, 614 S.W.2d 671 (1981), where the court's order in question was essentially a pretrial discovery order, discretionary, and within our Rules of Civil Procedure, Ark.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), we cited Webb with approval. Yet we altered Webb's language somewhat and granted a writ of prohibition stating that such a procedure was proper in extraordinary cases. In support of our decision, we noted that the California Supreme Court had used writs of prohibition to review interim orders in discovery matters which ordinarily would not be reviewed until after the case was tried and appealed. Oceanside Union School District v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 23 Cal. Rptr. 375, 373 P.2d 439 (1962). In Fore v. Circuit Court of Izard County, 292 Ark. 13, 727 S.W.2d 840 (1987), we were confronted with a question of whether a writ of prohibition should issue. We correctly granted the writ as the trial court did not have jurisdiction over a workers' compensation matter, although this was not our holding. Instead, we utilized some rather loose language in declaring that the writ was warranted to prevent untold time and expense, as well as unnecessary grief to the parties. We should have simply said writs of prohibition lie when the court is without jurisdiction and has clearly exceeded its authority. Later, in Duncan v. Cole, 302 Ark. 60, 786 S.W.2d 587 (1990), we concluded that a discovery order was not the proper subject for a writ of prohibition and commented further, "We regard the Curtis decision as unique in that the demonstration of irreparable harm was compelling." In a concurring opinion, Justices Glaze and Newbern agreed with the majority's results but made specific note "that the majority should have completed this job and overruled Curtis." In Ridenhower v. Erwin, 303 Ark. 647, 799 S.W.2d 535 (1990) we declared, "it would be a mistake to read Curtis as a general precedent for the issuance of writs of prohibition in discovery disputes." We also labored over the Curtis issue in Forrest City Machine Works, Inc. v. Erwin, 304 Ark. 321, 802 S.W.2d 140 (1991) and explained: As we are confronted with Curtis once again, we take this opportunity to overrule Curtis and retreat from the overreaching language in Fore to our earlier posture on writs of prohibition, as most recently stated in Juvenile H. v. Crabtree, 310 Ark. 208, 833 S.W.2d 766 (1992): The taking of Dr. Lupo's deposition pursuant to Ark.R.Civ.P. 26(a) falls within our discovery procedures. In this regard our rules provide: Since issues of discovery are squarely under the trial court's jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that a writ of prohibition is not the solution to this discovery problem. For this reason, Dr. Lupo's petition for writ of prohibition is denied. Nor is the issuance of a writ of certiorari appropriate under the factual circumstances of this case. Certiorari lies to correct proceedings erroneous on the face of the record where there is no other adequate remedy and is available to us in exercise of superintending control over a tribunal which is proceeding illegally where no other mode of review has been provided. State v. Nelson and Barry Petroleum Co., 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969). Sexton v. Supreme Court, 297 Ark. 154A, 761 S.W.2d 602 (1988); Bridges v. Arkansas Motor Coaches, 256 Ark. 1054, 511 S.W.2d 651 (1974). However, certiorari may only be resorted to in cases where an excess of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record. Nelson and Barry Petroleum Co., supra. From our inspection of the trial court's proceedings, we do not see any irregularities for which there is no other adequate remedy which would require the issuance of a writ. Under Ark.R.Civ.P. 26(a), a party has an absolute right to take a deposition. If the deponent is asked questions that are inappropriate or unreasonable, he has a right to refuse to answer the question and request a protective order from the trial court to prevent the deposer from asking further questions along that line. More particularly, Ark.R.Civ.P. 26(c) provides: Specifically, Ark.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(4) is available and has been available at all times as an adequate remedy to Dr. Lupo for matters *296 that should not be inquired into. Granted, the trial court, through its written order and statements made in open court, gave the parties apparently inconsistent guidelines as to what it considered to be acceptable or unacceptable deposition questions; however, the giving of these guidelines or setting of these parameters does not preclude the taking of Lupo's deposition or take away from the trial court's jurisdiction to sit and pass judgment on each one of the issues raised during discovery. Dr. Lupo has the option to return to the trial court and ask for a protective order if he is asked a question during the deposition which he considers unacceptable. Ark.R.Civ.P. 26(c). A writ of certiorari is a remedy to quash irregular proceedings "but only for errors apparent on the face of the record; not to look beyond the record to ascertain the actual merits of a controversy or to control discretion or to review of finding upon facts." (Citations omitted.) Hardin, Comm'r of Revenues v. Norsworthy, 204 Ark. 943, 165 S.W.2d 609 (1942). Under the circumstances and facts of this case, we find that there is no such patent error. Since the petitions for writs of prohibition or certiorari do not properly lie, we do not address the main issues in controversy. Petition denied. HAYS, J., dissents. HAYS, Justice, dissenting. I could agree with the majority if this were a discovery dispute between litigants. But petitioner is not a party and is without the recourse otherwise available, a circumstance the majority ignores. Consequently he is confronted with the distasteful prospect of facing contempt charges for refusing to answer questions involving his opinions as a physician. That, I believe, provides the extraordinary circumstances appropriate to prohibition or certiorari. Respondent insists he does not propose to obtain expert testimony from Dr. Lupo. "The crux of the case," he tells us, is that Dr. Lupo "is not being forced to provide expert testimony against his will.... He is merely another person who is being deposed because he has knowledge concerning matters involved in the case. [Respondent] is merely seeking to discover what that knowledge is." Respondent's brief, page 14. That assurance is reenforced elsewhere: Id. at 21. Yet it is all too apparent from oral argument and respondent's brief that the "knowledge" respondent hopes to discover is essentially Dr. Lupo's professional judgment and opinion as to the appropriate standard of care for urologists in the community, whether certain medical texts are "learned treatises" in their field, and opinions he may have formed concerning the deceased patient not protected by the scope of peer review. But these are patently areas of expert testimony and not obtainable by compulsion. Ark.R.Evid. 706. Nor can I see anything to be gained by overruling Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400, 614 S.W.2d 671 (1981). That decision, issued unanimously, was expressly for the guidance of the trial bench when privileged information is sought by discovery. We have made it clear the case is not to be read broadly for the issuance of writs of prohibition in discovery disputes. Ridenhower v. Erwin, 303 Ark. 647, 799 S.W.2d 535 (1990). And we have said as to prohibition that Curtis v. Partain is "limited to its facts." Forrest City Machine Works, Inc. v. Erwin, 304 Ark. 321, 802 S.W.2d 140 (1991). Why not leave it at that. There are principles of law announced in that opinion "of general interest to all trial courts" that I believe are sound today. To *297 overrule Partain needlessly undermines those pronouncements.