Title: State v. Nunez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 102377
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2014

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 102,377 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ARMANDO NUNEZ, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
The phrase "force or fear" in Kansas' rape statute, K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A), 
merely describes a factual circumstance that may prove a distinct, material element of 
rape—namely, having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a victim who is 
"overcome." In other words, the actus reus of subsection (a)(1)(A) is "to overcome," and 
the phrase force or fear merely describes this material element. Accordingly, the phrase 
force or fear does not create alternative means of committing rape and, consequently, a 
defendant's conviction for rape under K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A) will be affirmed on appeal 
when the jury was instructed that it must find that the victim was overcome by force or 
fear and evidence of either force or fear was presented at trial. Language contained in 
State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 875 P.2d 242 (1994), and State v. Wright, 290 Kan. 194, 
224 P.3d 1159 (2010), suggesting otherwise is specifically disapproved.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision filed June 3, 2011. 
Appeal from Finney District Court; ROBERT J. FREDERICK, judge. Opinion filed January 24, 2014. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
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Deborah L. Hughes, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Ryan Eddinger, 
of the same office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Tamara S. Hicks, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Lora D. Ingels and Lois K. 
Malin, assistant county attorneys, and John P. Wheeler, Jr., county attorney, and Steve Six, former 
attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Armando Nunez was convicted of rape in violation of K.S.A. 21-
3502(a)(1)(A) (defining rape as "[s]exual intercourse with a person who does not consent 
to the sexual intercourse" under circumstances "[w]hen the victim is overcome by force 
or fear"). On appeal before the Court of Appeals, he argued that the phrase "force or fear" 
in K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A) establishes alternative means of committing rape, requiring 
that the State present sufficient evidence of both force and fear. Nunez conceded on 
appeal that the State presented sufficient evidence of force, but he argued that the State 
failed to present evidence establishing that the victim was overcome by fear. 
Accordingly, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the rape 
conviction.   
 
The Court of Appeals reviewed this court's decisions in State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 
286, 875 P.2d 242 (1994), and State v. Wright, 290 Kan. 194, 224 P.3d 1159 (2010), and 
determined that based on the alternative means analysis applied in those cases concerning 
the phrase force or fear, it was unclear whether the phrase should be construed as 
establishing a single means or alternative means of committing rape. The Court of 
Appeals ultimately determined, however, that this issue need not be decided definitively 
in this case because it viewed the evidence presented at Nunez' trial as establishing that 
the victim was overcome by both force and fear. Therefore, the court affirmed Nunez' 
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rape conviction. State v. Nunez, No. 102,377, 2011 WL 2191686 (Kan. App. 2012) 
(unpublished opinion).     
 
We granted Nunez' petition for review to address the apparent confusion caused by 
Timley and Wright. Based on our decision in State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 194, 200, 284 
P.3d 977 (2012), and the cases following Brown, we conclude that the phrase force or 
fear merely presents options within a means and, accordingly, including this language in 
the jury instruction on rape did not make this an alternative means case triggering 
concerns of jury unanimity. Because sufficient evidence of force was presented at Nunez' 
trial, we affirm his rape conviction. See, State v. Brooks, No. 102,452, this day decided. 
 
FACTS 
 
Nunez married M.N. when she was 14 years old. They were married for 
approximately 8 years, during which time they had two children. They eventually 
divorced and lived apart for 2 months but then resumed living together and had a third 
child, a daughter. Despite living together and having a third child, the couple remained 
divorced. 
 
On the morning of January 21, 2007, M.N. was at home sleeping in her bedroom. 
Her daughter was sleeping in a crib next to the bed. M.N. was awakened by the sound of 
Nunez coming home that morning and playing loud music. Eventually, M.N. went back 
to sleep.   
 
Later, M.N. was again awakened when Nunez came into her bedroom and told her 
he wanted to have sex. M.N. told him no. Nunez proceeded to take off his clothes and 
then started to forcibly remove M.N.'s clothes while she fought with him. Eventually, 
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Nunez began having sexual intercourse with M.N. M.N. tried pushing Nunez away, but 
she was unable to do so.   
 
While M.N. was struggling with Nunez, their daughter awoke in her crib. M.N. 
told Nunez that their daughter was awake and watching them. Nunez stopped and M.N. 
got up from the bed, gathered her clothes, and ran into the bathroom. Nunez followed 
M.N. into the bathroom and forced her to the floor. According to M.N., as she struggled 
against him, Nunez lifted her legs up and penetrated her anus with his penis. 
 
While in the bathroom, M.N. cried out loudly, conveying, according to her, that 
she was "very scared." At this point, Nunez let go of M.N., and M.N. then got up from 
the floor and eventually called the police. They arrived 10 minutes later. Through a friend 
who acted as her interpreter, M.N. told the police that Nunez had vaginal and anal 
intercourse with her against her will in the master bedroom and bathroom.   
 
Nunez was taken into custody and transported to the law enforcement center. With 
the assistance of an interpreter, a detective with the Garden City Police Department 
conducted an interview of Nunez. During the interview, Nunez said that M.N. was angry 
at him because he wanted to have "relations" with her and she did not want to. Notably, 
he admitted to taking her clothes off and forcing her to have sexual relations with him. 
He stated the incident started in the bedroom and finished in the bathroom. When asked 
whether he inserted his penis into M.N.'s anus, Nunez said he might have. 
 
Nunez' case proceeded to a jury trial on one count of rape in violation of K.S.A. 
21-3502(a)(1)(A)—based on his alleged actions in the bedroom—and one count of 
aggravated criminal sodomy in violation of K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(3)(A)—based on his 
alleged actions in the bathroom. The jury found Nunez guilty of rape but acquitted him of 
aggravated criminal sodomy. The district court sentenced Nunez to 176 months' 
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imprisonment. After the Court of Appeals affirmed Nunez' conviction, he filed a timely 
petition for review which this court granted.    
 
ANALYSIS  
 
In Timley, this court, quoting State v. Kitchen, 100 Wash. 2d 403, 410, 756 P.2d 
105 (1988), stated:    
 
"'In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in more 
than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime charged. 
Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was committed 
so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means.'" Timley, 255 Kan. at 
289.  
 
Subsequently, in Wright this court held that appellate courts should apply a super-
sufficiency of the evidence test in alternative means cases. Under this test, the State must 
present sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find each means of committing the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, when the jury is instructed on alternative means of 
committing a single crime and the State fails to present sufficient evidence to support 
each means, reversal is required. 290 Kan. at 202-03. Conversely, if the jury was not 
instructed on alternative means but merely received instructions on "options within a 
means," then the lack of evidence on one of the options will not require reversal. See 
Brown, 295 Kan. at 196-98; Wright, 290 Kan. at 203.   
 
The above-noted rules shape Nunez' argument on appeal. He argues that the 
phrase force or fear in K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A) establishes alternative means of 
committing rape, requiring the State to present sufficient evidence of both force and fear 
at trial. Like he did before the Court of Appeals, Nunez concedes that the State presented 
sufficient evidence that M.N. was overcome by force. But he contends that the State 
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failed to present sufficient evidence that she was overcome by fear. He concedes that 
there was evidence presented at trial indicating that M.N. was scared when she was in the 
bathroom. But he contends that this evidence cannot be considered in affirming his rape 
conviction because the bathroom incident took place after the alleged rape—occurring in 
the bedroom—was complete.   
 
In order to address Nunez' argument, we must first determine whether the phrase 
force or fear establishes alternative means of committing rape, resulting in the application 
of the super-sufficiency of the evidence test. After addressing this issue, we can then 
determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Nunez of rape as 
defined in K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A). 
 
Recently, we held in Brown that appellate courts must first determine whether the 
jury was presented with alternative means on a charge before it applies the super-
sufficiency requirement. 295 Kan. at 194. "Issues of statutory interpretation and 
construction, including issues of whether a statute creates alternative means of 
committing a crime, raise questions of law reviewable de novo on appeal." State v. Britt, 
295 Kan. 1018, Syl. ¶ 1, 287 P.3d 905 (2012). 
 
In Brown, this court stated:    
 
"In examining legislative intent, a court must determine for each statute what the 
legislature's use of a disjunctive 'or' is intended to accomplish. Is it to list alternative 
distinct, material elements of a crime—that is, the necessary mens rea, actus reus, and, in 
some statutes, a causation element? Or is it to merely describe a material element or a 
factual circumstance that would prove the crime? The listing of alternative distinct, 
material elements, when incorporated into an elements instruction, creates an alternative 
means issue demanding super-sufficiency of the evidence. But merely describing a 
material element or a factual circumstance that would prove the crime does not create 
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alternative means, even if the description is included in a jury instruction." 295 Kan. at 
194. 
 
In Brown, this court discussed some guideposts for determining whether the 
legislature intended to create alternative means as opposed to merely options within a 
means. The Brown court noted that in conducting this analysis and determining the 
legislature's intent, ordinary rules of statutory construction apply. 295 Kan. at 193-94. In 
addition, "[t]ypically . . . a legislature will signal its intent to state alternative means 
through structure, separating alternatives into distinct subsections of the same statute." 
295 Kan. at 196 (citing State v. Smith, 159 Wash. 2d 778, 784-86, 154 P.3d 873 [2007]). 
However, the Brown court went on to say: 
 
 
"Regardless of such subsection design, . . . a legislature may list additional 
alternatives or options within one alternative means of committing the crime. But these 
options within an alternative do not constitute further alternative means themselves if 
they do not state additional and distinct ways of committing the crime, that is, if they do 
not require proof of at least one additional and distinct material element. Rather they are 
only options within a means if . . . their role is merely to describe a material element or to 
describe the factual circumstances in which a material element may be proven. [Citation 
omitted.]" 295 Kan. at 196-97. 
 
With these guidelines in mind, it is helpful to look at the structure of K.S.A. 21-
3502 before examining the specific language of subparagraph (a)(1)(A). K.S.A. 21-
3502(a) describes the various acts that constitute rape. The statute states: 
  
"(a) Rape is:  (1) Sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent to the 
sexual intercourse, under any of the following circumstances: 
(A) When the victim is overcome by force or fear; 
(B) when the victim is unconscious or physically powerless; or 
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(C) when the victim is incapable of giving consent because of mental deficiency 
or disease, or when the victim is incapable of giving consent because of the effect of any 
alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug or other substance, which condition was known by the 
offender or was reasonably apparent to the offender; 
"(2) sexual intercourse with a child who is under 14 years of age; 
"(3) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was obtained 
through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse 
was a medically or therapeutically necessary procedure; or 
"(4) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was obtained 
through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse 
was a legally required procedure within the scope of the offender's authority." (Emphasis 
added.)  
 
K.S.A. 21-3502(a) is divided into four subsections, each subsection addressing a 
scenario that would constitute rape. Subsection (a)(1) proscribes the general act of having 
"sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent to the sexual intercourse" under 
circumstances which are divided into three subparagraphs. The language at issue in this 
case, "[w]hen the victim is overcome by force or fear," is contained within the first 
subparagraph and is separated from the other circumstances constituting rape under 
subsection (a)(1) (i.e., "when the victim is unconscious or physically powerless," or 
"when the victim is incapable of giving consent [for other various reasons]"). See K.S.A. 
21-3502(a)(1)(A), (B), (C). The structure of subsection (a)(1) suggests that the legislature 
intended for subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) to constitute three alternative means of 
committing rape when the victim does not consent to having sexual intercourse.    
 
As mentioned above, this court explained in Brown that options listed within a 
single subsection of a statute do not state alternative means if the language merely defines 
other statutory language in a way that elaborates on or describes a material element or 
describes factual circumstances that prove the crime. 295 Kan. at 196-97. In Brown, the 
statutory language defining aggravated indecent liberties with a child stated in one 
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subsection that the crime was committed by "any lewd fondling or touching of either a 
child who is under 14 years of age or the offender 'done or submitted to with the intent to 
arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the offender, or both.'" 295 Kan. 
at 201. Brown argued that the language "either the child or the offender, or both" created 
alternative means of committing the crime, but this court found that the language created 
options within a means instead. 295 Kan. at 201-02. The court concluded that the 
language was "merely descriptive of the types of factual circumstances that may prove 
the distinct, material element of intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires, that is, the mens 
rea required for commission of the offense." 295 Kan. at 201; see State v. Cheffen, 297 
Kan. 689, 699, 702, 303 P.3d 1261 (2013) (concluding that the phrase "in the commission 
of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony" did not create 
alternative means of committing felony murder); State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 850, 
295 P.3d 1020 (2013) (concluding that the phrases "great bodily harm to another person 
or disfigurement of another person" and "bodily harm to another person with a deadly 
weapon or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be 
inflicted" did not create alternative means of committing aggravated battery); State v. 
Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 208-09, 290 P.3d 640 (2012) (concluding that the phrases 
"force, threat, or deception" and "to facilitate flight or the commission of any crime" did 
not create alternative means of committing kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping); Britt, 
295 Kan. at 1026-27 (concluding that the phrase "any penetration of the female sex organ 
by a finger, the male sex organ or any object" contained within definition of sexual 
intercourse did not create alternative means of committing rape); State v. Burns, 295 Kan. 
951, 962-64, 287 P.3d 261 (2012) (concluding that the phrase "oral contact or oral 
penetration of the female genitalia or oral contact of the male genitalia" contained within 
definition of sodomy did not create alternative means of committing aggravated criminal 
sodomy), overruled on other grounds by State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 305 P.3d 641 
(2013); State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 546-48, 285 P.3d 361 (2012) 
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(concluding that the phrase "to commit or submit to an unlawful sexual act" did not 
create alternative means of committing aggravated indecent solicitation of a child). 
 
Similarly, the statutory language "[w]hen a victim is overcome by force or fear" 
does not present two alternative means of committing rape. Rather, the phrase force or 
fear, like the language at issue in Brown, merely describes a factual circumstance that 
may prove a distinct, material element of rape—namely, having nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse with a victim who is "overcome." In other words, the actus reus of K.S.A. 21-
3502(a)(1)(A) is "to overcome," and the phrase force or fear merely describes this 
material element. See Brown, 295 Kan. at 196-97. In accordance with our holding in 
State v. Brooks, No. 102,452, this day decided, we conclude that force or fear are not 
alternative means but options within a means, and the inclusion of this language in the 
jury instructions did not make this an alternative means case triggering concerns of jury 
unanimity (i.e., evidence of either force or fear is sufficient to sustain Nunez' rape 
conviction under K.S.A. 21-3502[a][1][A]).    
 
It should be noted that in Timley, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that it could find him guilty of rape based on the victims being 
overcome by either force or fear. The defendant argued that instructing the jury in this 
manner deprived him of a unanimous verdict because some jurors may have found that 
the victims were overcome by force while other jurors may have found that the victims 
were overcome by fear. The defendant, however, mischaracterized this issue as a 
"multiple acts" issue instead of an alternative means issue. Despite this error, the Timley 
court applied an alternative means analysis to the defendant's argument and rejected the 
argument. The court stated: 
 
"In his appellate brief, Timley's counsel readily points out that there was 
evidence from which the jury could determine that each sexual act was the result either of 
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force, based on Timley's choking the victims, or of fear, based on the threats Timley 
made to the victims. There was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, that a rational factfinder could have found Timley guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy either by the 
means of force or by the means of fear. There was no error in including both alternative 
means in one instruction to the jury." (Emphasis added.) Timley, 255 Kan. at 290. 
 
Subsequently, this court in Wright analyzed the Timley decision and reiterated its 
conclusion that force and fear are separate alternative means of committing rape, 
requiring sufficient evidence of both means to uphold a conviction: 
 
 
"The [Timley] court then held that there was sufficient evidence to convict 
Timley of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy either by force or by fear; thus, '[t]here 
was no error in including both alternative means in one instruction to the jury.' [Citation 
omitted.] The indispensable component in the court's holding was 'super-sufficiency' of 
evidence, i.e., proof adequate to persuade a rational factfinder of Timley's guilt on rape 
by fear and rape by force. [Citation omitted.] If evidence had been lacking on either 
means alleged, Timley's rape conviction would have been reversed." (Emphasis added.) 
Wright, 290 Kan. at 203. 
 
This passage from Wright appears to reaffirm Timley's construction of the phrase 
force or fear as establishing alternative means of committing rape. But later in the 
decision, when the Wright court applied Timley to the facts of the case, the court clearly 
treated the phrase force or fear as establishing a single means of committing rape. The 
defendant in Wright argued that the jury was instructed on alternative means when it was 
instructed that the defendant could be convicted of rape if the act of sexual intercourse 
was committed without the consent of the victim under circumstances where (a) the 
victim was overcome by force or fear, or (b) the victim was unconscious or physically 
powerless. The defendant conceded there was sufficient evidence that the victim was 
unconscious or physically powerless. Her only argument on appeal was that there was 
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insufficient evidence to establish that the victim was overcome by force or fear. In 
addressing the defendant's argument, this court stated: 
 
"The evidence in this case was sufficient to find Wright guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of committing rape by force or fear. J.L. testified that she woke to the 
realization that Wright was digitally penetrating her vagina and was paralyzed with fear. 
Under [State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 133 P.3d 14 (2006)], it does not matter that the 
initial penetration by Wright may not have been temporally coincidental with J.L.'s fear; 
it is enough that the penetration and fear were eventually contemporaneous. There is no 
error under the Timley alternative means rule here, because the evidence of each means of 
committing rape—by force or fear or by unconsciousness—was sufficient to uphold a 
guilty verdict on the rape charge." (Emphasis added.) Wright, 290 Kan. at 206-07. 
 
Despite recognizing Timley's construction of the phrase "force or fear" as 
establishing alternative means of committing rape, the final paragraph of the alternative 
means analysis in Wright suggests that the Wright court actually considered force or fear 
as a single means of committing rape because the only evidence the court cited to support 
the defendant's rape conviction was evidence showing that the victim was overcome by 
fear. The Wright court neither mentioned nor analyzed the lack of evidence suggesting 
that the victim was overcome by force. Admittedly, the defendant in Wright did not 
specifically raise the argument that force or fear are alternative means of committing 
rape, but if the phrase truly establishes alternative means—as the Wright court recognized 
was Timley's holding—then the rape conviction in Wright should have been reversed due 
to insufficient evidence showing that the victim was overcome by force. However, 
because the rape conviction was found to be supported by sufficient evidence, Wright can 
be read as implicitly construing force or fear as a single means of committing rape.    
 
Regardless of whether Wright should be read as an acceptance or ultimate 
rejection of Timley's construction of the phrase force or fear, one thing is clear:  Timley 
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reached the conclusion that the phrase establishes alternative means of committing rape 
without conducting any analysis of the statutory language. This implies that the Timley 
court simply assumed that the appearance of an "or" in statutory language automatically 
creates alternative means for committing a crime. As noted above, the Brown decision 
did away with this assumption and established a framework for determining for each 
statute what the legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" is intended to accomplish—
establish alternative means or options within a means. Based on Brown and its progeny, 
we conclude that sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent under 
circumstances when the victim is overcome by force or fear is a single, unified means of 
committing rape. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports a defendant's conviction for 
rape under K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A) when the jury was instructed that it must find that 
the victim was overcome by force or fear and evidence of either force or fear was 
presented at trial. Language contained in Timley and Wright suggesting otherwise is 
specifically disapproved.  
 
As mentioned above, Nunez concedes on appeal that the State presented sufficient 
evidence that M.N. was overcome by force when he had nonconsensual sex with her in 
the bedroom. Because this evidence is sufficient to show that Nunez raped M.N. in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A), we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision affirming 
Nunez' conviction for rape.  
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.