Title: Dawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Citation: 394 S.W.2d 877
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 1965

394 S.W.2d 877 (1965) Forrest C. DAWSON v. SEARS, ROEBUCK &amp; CO., Inc. Supreme Court of Tennessee. October 15, 1965. *878 Fritz Bateman, Nashville, for plaintiff-in-error. Joseph G. Cummings, Nashville, Boult, Hunt, Cummings &amp; Conners, Nashville, of counsel, for defendant-in-error. DYER, Justice. This is an appeal, by plaintiff in error, from the action of the trial judge in sustaining a demurrer to the declaration filed by defendant in error. In this opinion the parties will be referred to in accord with their status in the trial court, that is, Forrest C. Dawson as plaintiff and Sears Roebuck and Co. as defendant. The declaration alleged defendant operates a retail store in Nashville, Tennessee and, for the convenience of its customers, maintains a large paved parking lot adjacent to the store. This lot has directional markers painted on the pavement, curbs and islands raised some few inches above the pavement, all to facilitate the movement of traffic. That it began to snow late on the afternoon of December 22, 1963, and by early the next morning the snow had reached a depth of about seven inches. The surface of the snow was smooth and even and it covered the parking lot completely obscuring from view the directional markers, curbs and islands of the lot. That at approximately 10:45 A.M. on December 23, some five hours after the snow had accumulated, the plaintiff, intending to shop in the defendant's department store, drove his car on this lot with only the tracks in the snow made by other vehicles to guide him, which tracks he slowly and cautiously followed. As the plaintiff was backing to permit another car to pass, in an apparently open area of the lot, the right front wheel of his car struck one of these hidden curbs causing the front wheels to turn sharply to the right. This sudden and unexpected spin of the steering wheel resulted in serious injuries to the plaintiff for which he has brought this action. The demurrer setting forth twelve grounds is as follows: The demurrer filed by defendant was sustained by the trial court although no specific ground for doing so was given. There is one assignment of error: The trial court erred in ruling the plaintiff's declaration failed to set out a cause of action against the defendant and sustaining the demurrer of the defendant. The plaintiff entered defendant's parking lot to shop in defendant's store and while there the plaintiff was an invitee due the standard of care which is owed an invitee. Riddell v. Great Atlantic &amp; Pacific Tea Co., 192 Tenn. 304, 241 S.W.2d 406 (1951); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Lyle, 49 Tenn.App. 78, 351 S.W.2d 391 (1961). Both of these cases involved customers falling on the store's parking lot. In the former case, the court reversed the lower court because of plaintiff's contributory negligence but the plaintiff was considered an invitee. In the latter case it was conceded the plaintiff was an invitee. 65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 44b and 48a, pp. 520 and 536, states the rule: The standard of care defendant would owe plaintiff as an invitee is stated in Broome v. Parkview, Incorporated, 49 Tenn.App. 725, 359 S.W.2d 566 (1962). This holding in the Broome case has been followed in a long line of Tennessee cases including Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 22 Tenn. App. 70, 118 S.W.2d 561 (1938); Dolan v. Bry Block Mercantile Co., 23 Tenn.App. 47, 126 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Phillips v. Harvey Co., 196 Tenn. 174, 264 S.W.2d 810 (1954); Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, 41 Tenn.App. 201, 293 S.W.2d 40 (1955). Plaintiff has based his cause of action on the fact that he was an invitee and was injured by a concealed perilous condition in the defendant's parking lot. He alleges the defendant had a duty to remove the snow, warn him of the danger or close the parking lot. Several of the grounds for defendant's demurrer deal with whether there is any duty on the part of the defendant and also whether defendant is guilty of actionable negligence. Mr. Chief Justice Burnett, while a member of the Court of Appeals, Eastern Division, spoke for the court in Smith v. Roan-Anderson Co., 30 Tenn.App. 458, 207 S.W.2d 353 (1947), which held: The defendant in the case of Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, supra, was cleaning the pavement of his service station when the plaintiff drove up. The plaintiff, getting out of his car to buy gas, slipped on the concrete surface which was covered with soap and water. The court in that case said: This was repeated in the case of Broome v. Parkview, Inc., supra, when the invitee brought an action against a bowling alley proprietor and a contractor for injuries sustained when she attempted to lean against the wall and fell through an opening covered by an opaque plastic sheet. There is similar language in the case of Dolan v. Bry Block Mercantile Co., supra. These type cases mentioned deal with whether the directing of a verdict by the trial judge would be proper but can it be said in the present cause as a matter of law that the plaintiff did not state a cause of action? Can it be said as a matter of law that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff? It does not seem these answers can be answered affirmatively but to sustain a demurrer they have to be. It seems to be a jury question as to whether defendant had time, or had a duty, to clear the parking lot, or whether it had a duty to close the parking lot or whether the plaintiff knew of the concealed dangers, or even whether they were dangers. Other grounds of defendant's demurrer deal with foreseeability. In Gentry v. Taylor, et al., 182 Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945), it was said: In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nichols, 173 Tenn. 602, 118 S.W.2d 213, supra, and repeated in Walls v. Lueking, 46 Tenn.App. 636, 332 S.W.2d 692 (1959), and Ashworth v. Carnation Co., 190 Tenn. 274, 229 S.W.2d 337, supra, we find the following: The words of the court in Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 46 Tenn.App. 539, 330 S.W.2d 569 (1959), are helpful: The argument on the foreseeability issue is that this was a freak, once-in-a-lifetime accident. This was an unusual accident but as to whether defendant should have foreseen such, under the allegations of this declaration, is a question for the jury. Other grounds of the demurrer deal with assumption of risk or contributory negligence. These two doctrines will be discussed separately although they are often used interchangeably. The court in Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery &amp; Baking Co., 22 Tenn.App. 70, 118 S.W.2d 561 (1938) said: The duty on the part of the proprietor or management of a store to use or *882 exercise ordinary care for the safety and protection of the invitee does not relieve the invitee of the duty of exercising ordinary care for his or her own safety; and upon failure to do so, the invitee is deemed contributorily negligent. Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery &amp; Baking Co., supra. It could be possible in the present cause to say the plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence but the court in Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, supra, held: In Kemp v. Town of Lebanon, 215 Tenn. ___, 384 S.W.2d 14 (1964), the court said: In the case of Great Atlantic &amp; Pacific Tea Co. v. McLravy, 71 F.2d 396 (1934), a sixth circuit court of appeals case from Michigan, the plaintiff, a customer in defendant's store, slipped and fell while leaving defendant's store through the vestibule because of ice and snow. The court held that the questions of negligence of the defendant and knowledge of the dangerous condition of the icy vestibule by the defendant were for the jury. The court further held: Did the plaintiff assume the risk involved by driving onto defendant's parking lot. A long line of cases have held: Once again, we're back to the issue of whether this was a normal or obvious risk and once again this seems to be a factual question to be determined by a jury. As was said in Pierce v. United States, D.C., 142 F. Supp. 721 (1955): The defendant raises the point that a storeowner is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees and this is true. *883 There are several factual issues in this case and they cannot be properly determined on demurrer. The judgment of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer of defendant is reversed and the cause remanded.