Title: Commonwealth v. Barnett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11910
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2019

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SJC-11910 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL BARNETT. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 8, 2019. - July 11, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Evidence, 
Hearsay.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Argument by counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 28, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on September 19, 2016, was considered by 
her. 
 
 
 
Dennis A. Shedd for the defendant. 
 
Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney 
(Christopher M. Tarrant, Assistant District Attorney, also 
present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-
2 
 
 
murder in the strangulation death of the victim.1  The defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel's 
performance was constitutionally ineffective, particularly 
counsel's treatment of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence 
presented by the Commonwealth.  The motion for a new trial and 
subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied.  On appeal, 
the defendant raises the same ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, raises for the first time a challenge that certain 
testimony should have been excluded as hearsay, and 
alternatively asks us to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce his conviction from murder in the first degree 
to murder in the second degree.  We affirm. 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We recite the essential facts, 
reserving some additional facts for later discussion.  The 
victim, his older brother, and their mother lived together in an 
apartment in Somerville.  The victim spent the evening of 
November 22, 2009, playing video games with his brother.  The 
victim had two video game consoles:  an Xbox 360 (Xbox), which 
he kept in the living room, and a PlayStation 3 (PlayStation), 
which he kept in his bedroom.  The victim and his brother were 
using the Xbox in the living room when their mother returned 
                     
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of armed robbery, G. L. 
c. 265, § 17, and was acquitted of witness intimidation, G. L. 
c. 268, § 13B. 
3 
 
 
from work at approximately 6 P.M.  She went to sleep shortly 
thereafter.  The brothers continued using the Xbox until 
approximately 8:30 P.M., and at around 9:30 P.M., the victim's 
brother took a taxicab to a friend's house. 
The victim's brother returned to the victim's and their 
mother's apartment on the morning of November 23, but his knocks 
on the door went unanswered.  When his mother woke up at 
approximately noon, she found the victim dead on the floor with 
cords wrapped around his neck and a bag over his head. 
 
A police officer unwrapped the cords from the victim's neck 
and realized that he was dead.  A search of the apartment 
revealed several video game cartridges, but neither the Xbox nor 
the PlayStation were found.2  The victim's cause of death was 
asphyxia by ligature strangulation. 
 
The defendant had grown up in the same neighborhood as the 
victim, and the two were acquaintances.  The defendant and his 
girlfriend, Kelly Murray, were each drug users, and after the 
victim had been found dead the defendant agreed to speak with 
police.  On the night of November 22, the defendant's drug 
dealer, Durevil Admiral, was not answering the defendant's calls 
from either Murray's cell phone, which they shared, or a 
"landline" telephone.  The defendant went to the victim's 
                     
 
2 A dusty Xbox console was found under the couch. 
4 
 
 
apartment between 11:30 P.M. and midnight to use the victim's 
telephone to contact Admiral, in hopes that Admiral would not 
recognize the incoming telephone number and answer the call.  
The defendant told police that he stayed at the victim's 
apartment for approximately one hour, and that the victim's Xbox 
was in the living room when he left.  Telephone records admitted 
in evidence at trial indicated that 101 calls had been made from 
the victim's telephone to a cell phone number used by Admiral 
between 11:42 P.M. on November 22 and 1:09 A.M. on November 23.  
Records further indicated that Admiral had received numerous 
calls from a telephone that belonged to Murray earlier in the 
night on November 22, and that Murray's cell phone also was used 
to make several calls to Amery Gesse, who also sold drugs to the 
defendant. 
 
Murray testified that she had smoked "crack" cocaine with 
the defendant on November 22 and went to sleep at some point 
before midnight.  The defendant was still awake when Murray went 
to sleep.  When she woke up at approximately 6:30 A.M., the 
defendant was in the apartment and a video game system was in 
his mother's bedroom.  Murray thought it was a PlayStation but 
was "not a hundred percent sure."  The system had not been there 
the night before.  As Murray left the apartment to bring her 
daughter to school that morning, she saw Gesse in the hallway.  
When Murray returned to the apartment, the defendant "was coming 
5 
 
 
off of being high," and the video game console she had seen for 
the first time that morning was gone. 
 
Both Admiral and Gesse also testified.  Admiral recalled 
that the defendant had called him several times at around the 
time of the victim's death and had offered to sell him a popular 
game that could be played with "an Xbox or a PlayStation," but 
he could not recall which console.  Gesse testified that the 
defendant contacted him offering a PlayStation, and that Gesse 
bought it from him for fifty dollars.  The PlayStation was 
missing a power cord.  According to records from Sony Computer 
Entertainment America LLC (Sony),3 a PlayStation was activated on 
December 16, 2009, with Gesse's e-mail address and Internet 
protocol (IP) address. 
 
Manual Leal, an acquaintance of the defendant's and 
Murray's, testified to an incident that took place when he was 
with the defendant in 2011.  After overhearing the defendant 
argue with Murray on his cell phone, Leal saw a text message 
sent by Murray to the defendant saying that the defendant "was 
going down" and that "he was a murderer."4  The defendant then 
"got a little emotional" and, when Leal asked what that text 
                     
 
3 A PlayStation video game console is a Sony-brand product. 
 
 
4 Murray testified that she had referred to the defendant as 
a murderer in text messages, but that she had no knowledge that 
he had murdered anyone and referred to him as a murderer to make 
him angry. 
6 
 
 
message was about, told him that "he fucked up," "that he killed 
Chris," that "[h]e strangled him with a cord" and had broken 
into the victim's apartment and stolen a video game console.  
Several months later, Leal relayed this conversation to the 
Somerville police department, which to that point had had little 
success investigating the victim's death. 
 
The jury also heard expert testimony from a supervisor in 
the DNA unit at the State police crime laboratory.  DNA testing 
was conducted on several samples from the crime scene, including 
the cords used to strangle the victim, a wallet, fingernail 
clippings, and two microphones from video game headsets.  The 
laboratory had DNA samples from the victim, the defendant, the 
victim's mother, the victim's brother, and the police officer 
who had removed the cords from around the victim's neck.  Two 
DNA profiles were found both on the cords wrapped around the 
victim's neck and on one of the microphones -- a major profile 
matching the victim's DNA, and a second of inconclusive origin.  
The second microphone had a major profile matching the victim's 
DNA and a second profile from which the defendant's DNA was 
excluded.  The fingernail clippings matched the victim's DNA, 
while the victim's mother's wallet and purse each contained a 
mixture of DNA samples, none of which was conclusive.  Defense 
counsel did not mention the DNA evidence in his closing 
argument, although the Commonwealth emphasized that because the 
7 
 
 
second DNA sample found on the cords was inconclusive, "we can't 
tell you whether or not it's [the defendant]." 
 
Finally, the jury heard conversations between Murray and 
the defendant, recorded while the defendant was in jail, in 
which the defendant attempted to help Murray avoid speaking to 
the police. 
 
2.  Motion for a new trial.  After the defendant had been 
convicted, he filed a motion for a new trial asserting that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) sufficiently 
investigate the DNA evidence or retain a DNA expert; (2) move to 
exclude the Commonwealth's inconclusive DNA evidence; (3) 
adequately undercut inconsistencies in the Commonwealth expert's 
testimony on cross-examination; and (4) emphasize that the 
Commonwealth did not prove that the PlayStation that Gesse 
activated was the same PlayStation that was stolen from the 
victim's apartment.  The motion judge, who was also the trial 
judge, denied the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing 
on his motion.  A DNA expert reviewed the DNA report on which 
the Commonwealth's expert had relied and provided an affidavit 
in which he opined that the defendant's DNA should have been 
excluded as a possible contributor to the second DNA sample 
found on the cords.  The DNA expert also stated in his affidavit 
that the interpretation process utilized by the Commonwealth's 
8 
 
 
expert was inconsistent with the protocols that were in place at 
the time at the State police crime laboratory. 
 
Trial counsel submitted an affidavit in which he discussed 
receiving the State police crime laboratory's report that the 
DNA on the cords was inconclusive.  Trial counsel indicated 
that, after reviewing those results, he "thought an inconclusive 
result was good.  I did not consider retaining a DNA expert to 
review the evidence, moving to exclude the inconclusive results, 
objecting to the evidence when it was presented, or eliciting in 
cross-examination of the Commonwealth's expert that [the 
defendant] has alleles[5] at at least six locations that were not 
present on the cords." 
 
In denying the motion, the judge concluded that defense 
counsel's failure to investigate the DNA evidence through his 
own expert did not prejudice the defendant because the 
inconclusive DNA evidence was not a significant part of the 
Commonwealth's case, and therefore any testimony from a defense 
expert was unlikely to have had any effect on the jury's 
                     
 
5 We have defined alleles thusly:  "A single DNA molecule 
contains approximately three billion rungs, or base pairs.  
Certain types of human genes that are called 'polymorphic' can 
occur in alternate forms (that is, with differing sequences of 
base pairs), each of which is capable of occupying a gene's 
position on the DNA ladder.  These alternate forms of genes are 
called 'alleles,' and are highly variable from one person to 
another."  Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 228 (1991) 
(Appendix). 
9 
 
 
conclusion.  She further held that, because the defense 
suggested the possibility that the defendant would pursue a 
Bowden defense in his opening statement and through cross-
examination, the evidence was relevant and any motion to exclude 
it would have been denied.  She further concluded that even if 
its admission had been erroneous, the inconclusive nature of the 
evidence did not prejudice the defendant and did not create a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  She found no 
error in defense counsel's failure to more aggressively cross-
examine the Commonwealth's DNA expert and held that, even if it 
were error, the inconclusive results were of such 
inconsequential evidentiary value that the manner in which they 
were admitted could not give rise to a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Finally, the judge held that defense 
counsel's failure to argue the lack of direct connection between 
the PlayStation stolen from the victim and the one sold to Gesse 
was not likely to have influenced the jury's decision, where 
counsel "strenuously" argued that the Commonwealth had not shown 
that the PlayStation the Gesse had was the one stolen from the 
victim. 
 
Discussion.  In this consolidated appeal, the defendant 
raises the same ineffective assistance of counsel arguments 
raised at his motion for a new trial, asserting that the denial 
of that motion was an abuse of discretion.  He further contends 
10 
 
 
that the admission of testimony regarding Murray's text message 
calling the defendant a murderer created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because it should have 
been excluded as hearsay or accompanied by a limiting 
instruction.  Finally, the defendant asks us to exercise our 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce his conviction to 
murder in the second degree.  Having concluded that any 
purported error does not require reversal and that relief 
pursuant to § 33E is not appropriate here, we affirm. 
 
1.  Text message.  We first address the defendant's 
contention that Leal's testimony6 concerning the text message 
sent by Murray to the defendant, in which she referred to him as 
a murderer, was inadmissible hearsay, and that its unobjected-to 
admission created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  There was no error. 
 
Absent an exception or exemption to the rule against 
hearsay, out-of-court statements cannot be offered in evidence 
for the truth of the matter asserted in the statements.  
However, some "accusatory statements shed their hearsay 
character when they are offered not for the truth of the matter 
                     
 
6 The defendant also asserts error in testimony of a 
detective recounting Leal's statement to police.  This testimony 
is cumulative of both Leal's and Murray's testimony and could 
not independently give rise to a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 
116, 127 (2012). 
11 
 
 
asserted, but to provide context for admissible statements of 
the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 838 
n.13 (2015).  That is the case here.  The text message provided 
necessary context to Leal's testimony regarding the defendant's 
confession that he had murdered the victim.  The defendant's 
statements to Leal were properly admitted against the defendant 
as a statement by a party opponent.  See Commonwealth v. 
Marshall, 434 Mass. 358, 365 (2001); Mass. G. Evid. § 
801(d)(2)(A) (2019).  Absent testimony regarding the text 
message, the jury would have been left to consider a confession 
made by the defendant to an acquaintance without any context as 
to how or why the conversation began.  See Bonnett, supra.7 
 
2.  DNA evidence.  We next consider to the defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Because the defendant 
was convicted of murder in the first degree, we review "for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by asking 
whether there was error and, if so, whether the error 'was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Copeland, 481 Mass. 255, 266 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 845 (2013).  "[W]e consider a defendant's 
claim even if the action by trial counsel does not constitute 
conduct 'falling measurably below that . . . of an ordinary 
                     
7 Murray testified that she sent such text messages to the 
defendant, but stated that she did so just to make him angry. 
12 
 
 
fallible lawyer.'"  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 
808-809 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 
498, 517 (1992).  Where, as here, the trial judge also 
considered the motion for a new trial, we extend "special 
deference" to the judge's action on the motion.  Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986). 
 
As he did in his motion, the defendant maintains that 
defense counsel's treatment of the DNA evidence constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to retain an 
independent DNA expert, object to the admission of the 
Commonwealth's DNA testimony, and effectively cross-examine that 
expert.  We agree with the motion judge that none of the 
defendant's claims of error require a new trial. 
 
In limited circumstances, we have recognized as relevant 
DNA evidence termed "inconclusive."  "We use[] the term 
'inconclusive' to refer to results that provide no information 
whatsoever due to insufficient sample material, contamination, 
or some other problem."  Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 
853 (2010).  In particular, inconclusive DNA results have been 
considered admissible where the defense calls into question the 
integrity of the police investigation.  Commonwealth v. Mathews, 
450 Mass. 858, 872 (2008).  Although the defendant did not 
request a Bowden jury instruction, see Commonwealth v. Bowden, 
379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980) (defendant may present evidence 
13 
 
 
suggesting the police investigation was inadequate), he 
suggested in his opening statement that there was something 
amiss in the passage of nearly four years between the murder and 
the defendant's indictment, which rendered the inconclusive DNA 
results relevant to this case.  See Mathews, supra at 872 n.15, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Talbot, 444 Mass. 586, 589 n.2 (2005) 
("Generally, a trial judge is accorded 'substantial discretion 
in deciding whether evidence is relevant'"). 
 
We conclude, as did the motion judge, that the inconclusive 
DNA evidence was properly admitted here.  Because of our 
conclusion, the failure to object to its admission did not 
prejudice the defendant and could not have created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Woollam, 478 Mass. 493, 498 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
1579 (2018) (counsel's failure to object to admission of 
evidence did not create "a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice because the records were admissible").  
Furthermore, the lack of consequence from the DNA evidence, 
coupled with the breadth of additional compelling evidence 
against the defendant, leads us to conclude that the DNA 
evidence, regardless of how it was handled, would not have had 
an impact on the jury's verdict. 
 
The defendant admitted to having been in the victim's 
apartment between the time he was last seen alive and when his 
14 
 
 
body was discovered, a fact corroborated by the victim's 
telephone records.  The defendant's girlfriend discovered a 
video game console in their apartment the morning after the 
murder that had not been there the night before, and that was no 
longer there after she saw Gesse leaving the apartment the 
following morning.  Gesse said he bought a PlayStation that was 
missing a power cord from the defendant the morning after the 
murder, and Admiral testified that the defendant also offered to 
sell him a popular video game.  Leal testified that he saw a 
text message in which Murray called the defendant a murderer, 
which upset the defendant; Leal also testified that when he 
inquired, the defendant confessed to murdering the victim.  
Finally, on a recorded telephone call from jail, the defendant 
and Murray discussed ways that she could avoid cooperating with 
police if questioned. 
 
In addition to this strong circumstantial evidence, the 
jury also heard about the inconclusive results of the testing of 
the defendant's DNA against the second DNA sample found on the 
cords used to kill the victim.  Therefore, any supposed failure 
in cross-examining the Commonwealth's expert, or in engaging in 
a "battle of the experts" about whether testing of the 
defendant's DNA against the second sample found on the cords 
yielded inconclusive results or excluded the defendant, would 
not have been so significant as to influence the jury's verdict.  
15 
 
 
See Field, 477 Mass. at 556-561.  There was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
3.  Closing argument.  The defendant contends that trial 
counsel's failure to address the lack of evidence that the 
PlayStation that the defendant sold to Gesse was the same 
PlayStation that had disappeared from the victim's apartment 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he 
contends that trial counsel should have argued that Sony's 
records of the PlayStation that Gesse activated on his IP 
address did not directly match Gesse's PlayStation to the 
victim's PlayStation. 
 
However, as the judge pointed out in her written decision 
on the defendant's motion, trial counsel did argue that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove that Gesse's PlayStation was the 
same as the victim's PlayStation, focusing on inconsistencies in 
testimony:  "I'm not even sure they proved that it's the same 
PlayStation, given that it was silver and the one that he sold 
to Mr. Gesse was black."   Although the argument about Sony's 
records might have marginally bolstered trial counsel's closing 
argument as a whole, "suggesting ways in which counsel's closing 
argument might have been stronger does not make out a claim of 
ineffective assistance."  Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 
628 (2004).  Trial counsel focused in closing argument on 
undermining the credibility of Leal's testimony and his 
16 
 
 
credibility as a witness in general because it was Leal who 
focused the investigation on the defendant.  Counsel also 
offered a third-party culprit defense because there was evidence 
that the lock to the victim's building was broken, and argued 
that even if the defendant had the PlayStation, it did not prove 
that the defendant killed the victim for it.  "With hindsight, 
one can always craft a more eloquent and forceful closing 
argument."  Id. at 627.  Here, trial counsel's closing argument 
brought to bear what evidence the defendant had in his favor in 
the face of considerable circumstantial evidence. 
 
4.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce his conviction to murder in the second degree.  
"It is our statutory duty 'to consider broadly the whole case on 
the law and the facts to determine whether the verdict is 
consonant with justice.'"  Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 
105, 118-119 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 
338, 363-364 (2016). 
 
Although our thorough review of the record did not present 
any errors that would prompt us to reduce the defendant's 
conviction, we note an error in the presentation of the DNA 
evidence by the Commonwealth's expert.  In describing the 
inconclusive results for the second DNA sample on the cords used 
to strangle the defendant, the expert stated that, because of 
17 
 
 
"the number of places where there's potential drop-out, the 
minor profile was inconclusive for comparison with other 
individuals."  Dropout refers to "when alleles from the . . . 
DNA donors fail to appear in the DNA profile, a result 
frequently caused by the failure of the . . . testing to detect 
an allele because of the small size of the sample."  United 
States v. Morgan, 53 F. Supp. 3d 732, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 
Inconclusive DNA results, as detailed supra, ultimately 
provide the jury with no information.  See Mattei, 455 Mass. at 
853.  This differs from "nonexclusion" DNA results, which "could 
suggest to the jury that a 'link would be more firmly 
established if only more [sample] were available for testing.'"  
Commonwealth v. Cameron, 473 Mass. 100, 106 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 254 (2008).  The 
Commonwealth expert's testimony that the second DNA profile 
found on the cords was inconclusive because of dropout suggests 
that, had there been a more complete DNA profile, it could have 
matched the defendant's DNA.  This was error.  Testimony 
regarding inconclusive DNA results must be presented in a manner 
that makes clear to the jury that the testing yielded no 
relevant results and that the individual tested against the 
sample neither matched the sample nor was excluded from a 
18 
 
 
possible match.  We set forth a model jury instruction in the 
margin.8 
 
However, due to the strength of the evidence presented 
against the defendant, the Commonwealth's proper argument in 
closing regarding the inconclusive DNA evidence, and the DNA 
evidence's relatively low import to the case as a whole, this 
error does not undermine the jury's verdict.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the verdicts and decline to exercise our power under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed. 
                     
 
8 "In this case, you heard expert testimony about 
inconclusive DNA testing. 
 
 
"Where DNA results are deemed inconclusive, the results 
provide no information whatsoever as to the source of the DNA.  
Therefore, inconclusive results may not be considered for any 
identification purpose.  Inconclusive DNA results may be 
considered only if there is a suggestion that the Commonwealth 
failed to adequately investigate the crime."