Title: Berg v. Allied Security, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85967, 85974
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2000

Docket Nos. 85967, 85974 cons.-Agenda 17-May 2000.
JOAN BERG, Appellee, v. ALLIED SECURITY, INC., et al., 
								Appellants.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue presented is whether the appellate court possessed
jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal. We hold that it did not.
BACKGROUND
	Plaintiff, Joan Berg, filed a personal injury action against
defendants, Allied Security, Inc., and Podolsky &amp; Associates, Inc.
On September 4, 1996, the circuit court of Cook County granted
summary judgment in favor of both defendants. 735 ILCS
5/2-1005 (West 1998). Thirty days later, on October 4, plaintiff
moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for leave to file an
amended complaint. On October 15, the circuit court denied
reconsideration and took under advisement the request for leave to
amend. On November 21, leave to amend was denied. Five days
later, on November 26, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal.
	In the appellate court, defendants argued that plaintiff's notice
of appeal was untimely. Although it was filed less than a week after
the circuit court had disposed of plaintiff's post-judgment request
for leave to amend, defendants contended that plaintiff's motion
was so deficient that it did not qualify as a post-judgment motion
under section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1203 (West 1998)) and therefore did not operate to toll the
30-day appeal period under Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (155 Ill.
2d R. 303(a)). Defendants' theory was that, because the 30-day
period was not tolled by the pendency of the plaintiff's motion, the
notice of appeal came too late, and the appellate court therefore
lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal.
	The appellate court rejected defendants' jurisdictional
challenge and addressed plaintiff's appeal on the merits. It held that
genuine issues of material fact existed and that summary judgment
therefore was improper. Accordingly, it set aside the circuit court's
summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the cause
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	Both defendants petitioned this court for leave to appeal (177
Ill. 2d R. 315). We granted those petitions and consolidated the
appeals. Before this court, defendants again argue that plaintiff's
post-judgment motion was deficient and therefore did not toll the
time for filing a notice of appeal. In addition, defendants argue that,
even assuming that plaintiff's post-judgment motion was sufficient
to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, the appellate court still
lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal because plaintiff's notice
of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the trial court's denial
of plaintiff's motion to reconsider.(1)
ANALYSIS
	We need not decide whether plaintiff's post-judgment motion
was sufficient to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. As
defendants correctly point out, even assuming that plaintiff's post-judgment motion was sufficient, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal
more than 30 days after the trial court's denial of her motion to
reconsider. Accordingly, the appellate court did not have
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal.
	We begin with the familiar proposition that jurisdiction is
conferred upon the appellate court only through the timely filing of
a notice of appeal. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538 (1984); 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. Under Supreme Court Rule
303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)), a notice of appeal must be filed
			"within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment
appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed
against the judgment is filed, *** within 30 days after the
entry of the order disposing of the last pending
post-judgment motion."
A post-judgment motion for leave to amend the complaint is not a
motion directed against the judgment and therefore does not
extend the time for appeal. Andersen v. Resource Economics
Corp., 133 Ill. 2d 342, 347 (1990); Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131,
135-36 (1971); see also Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 258 (1981).
	On October 4, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment and requested leave to file a
second amended complaint. On October 15, the circuit court
denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and took under
advisement her request for leave to file a second amended
complaint. Thus, as of October 15, the only matter pending in the
trial court was plaintiff's request for leave to file a second amended
complaint, a request that was not directed against the judgment and
did not extend the time for appeal. See Andersen, 133 Ill. 2d  at
347; Fultz, 49 Ill. 2d  at 135-36. Nevertheless, plaintiff filed her
notice of appeal 42 days later, on November 26. Plaintiff's notice
of appeal therefore was untimely, and the appellate court did not
possess jurisdiction to hear her appeal.
	Plaintiff's invocation of section 2-1005(g) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(g) (West 1998)) does not change
our analysis. Section 2-1005(g) specifically permits the amendment
of pleadings before or after the entry of summary judgment.
According to plaintiff, a motion requesting such amendment after
the entry of summary judgment is necessarily directed against the
verdict because, if the trial court grants the requested leave to
amend, the entry of summary judgment cannot stand. Thus, every
motion for leave to file an amended complaint after the entry of
summary judgment implicitly includes a request to vacate the entry
the summary judgment.
	The problem with plaintiff's argument is that it is wholly
incompatible with Fultz. In Fultz, this court held that a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint, filed after a dismissal with
prejudice, was not directed against the verdict and therefore did
not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 303(a).
Fultz, 49 Ill. 2d  at 135-36. Significantly, the motion in Fultz did
not request to conform the pleadings to the proofs but rather
sought substantive amendments adding both additional parties and
additional counts. Fultz, 49 Ill. 2d  at 136-37. Thus, just as in the
present case, the motion in Fultz included an implicit request to
vacate the judgment, as the dismissal with prejudice could not
stand if the motion were granted. Nevertheless, this court
unambiguously held that "[t]he motion for leave to amend is not a
motion directed against the judgment." Fultz, 49 Ill. 2d  at 136.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we hold that plaintiff's notice of appeal
was untimely and that the appellate court did not possess
jurisdiction to hear her appeal. The appellate court's judgment
therefore is vacated, and the appeal is dismissed.
Appellate court judgment vacated;
appeal dismissed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	In his dissent, the Chief Justice recounts the history of this
case during the appeal to this court and states:
		"Subsequent to our [July 1, 1999] decision, the
defendants, Allied Security, Inc., and Podolsky &amp;
Associates, Inc., each petitioned our court for rehearing.
Neither of their petitions raised any new matters, and our
court properly voted to deny rehearing. Subsequent to that
vote, however, Justice Freeman announced that he no
longer agreed with the majority's opinion in the case and
believed that rehearing should be allowed. Once rehearing
was allowed, Justice Freeman changed his position and
joined the three original dissenters in the case. The result
is today's disposition." Slip op. at 8 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting).	
Although I am not entirely sure what legal point the Chief Justice
is making in this regard, I welcome his comments because they
provide the opportunity for a discussion of what occurs in this
court when a petition for rehearing is filed.
	Once this court issues an opinion, our rules of appellate
procedure provide the nonprevailing party with the opportunity for
rehearing in order to apprise the court of points the party believes
were "overlooked or misapprehended." 134 Ill. 2d R. 367(b). "The
right to apply for a rehearing is not given by the statute, but is a
matter of grace or favor, growing largely out of the willingness of
the court to correct any inadvertent error." Vickers v. Tyndall, 168 Ill. 616, 617 (1897). This rule exists so that the court can correct
errors "into which the court may have inadvertently fallen in
deciding the case as originally presented." Matthews v. Granger,
196 Ill. 164, 170 (1902). This court has previously noted that the
filing of a petition for rehearing does not alter the effective date of
the judgment unless the court allows the petition, in which case the
effective date of judgment is the date that judgment is entered on
rehearing. See PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291 (1981); Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 346 Ill. App. 72
(1952) (noting that when a petition for rehearing is filed, the
judgment of the reviewing court does not become final until the
petition is denied). Thus, once defendants filed petitions for
rehearing in this case, the original July 1, 1999, decision was not a
final one.
	As an initial matter, this court never officially denied
defendants' petitions for rehearing in this case. Once the petitions
were filed and an initial vote was taken, two justices, myself
included, voted to allow rehearing. In my view, rehearing was
warranted because of several points raised by defendants in their
petitions. I then informed my colleagues that I intended to file a
dissenting opinion to the denial of rehearing. A majority of the
court voted to postpone the announcement of the denial of
rehearing pending the completion of my dissent. Once I completed
that dissent, I, in accordance with court custom, circulated it
amongst my colleagues. Subsequently, two other members of the
court voted to allow rehearing, thereby providing the four votes
needed for rehearing to be granted. An official order to that effect
was entered on January 31, 2000.
	Certainly, a justice is entitled to the view that the petitions for
rehearing that were filed in this case presented no new issues. I did
not share in that view, however. Rather, I believed that the
petitions presented this court with several points that warranted a
response from plaintiff and merited reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 367(b). Given the importance of stare decisis, I believed
it was better to reconsider these matters now, before our opinion
became final, than to use a later case to limit or overrule the
previous decision, particularly because this case concerned the
application of one of the rules of this court. I must stress that the
civil appeals rules involved in this case and the issues raised
pertaining to them are of importance not only to the parties in this
appeal, but for all civil litigants in this state. If granting rehearing
under these circumstances is somehow improper or unjust, then I
must ask to what end does a rehearing petition serve? Rather than
cast the court's actions in this case in a bad light, as the Chief
Justice's dissent clearly seeks to do, our efforts and attention to
detail in this matter should serve to reassure both bench and bar
that (i) the filing of a petition for rehearing is not a pro forma
exercise in futility and (ii) the court takes seriously the rehearing
period as well as the issues sought to be heard therein.
	I will not use this special concurrence to recite the points
defendants made on rehearing which prompted my vote to rehear
the case. I will note, however, two points that I believed warranted
reconsideration. First, in our July 1, 1999, opinion, we noted that
this case was distinguishable from Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131
(1971), because plaintiff's motion for leave to amend was filed "in
tandem" with the motion for reconsideration. Thus, by filing an
additional motion, the nonprevailing litigant causes the period
between the entry of the appealable order and the filing of the
notice of appeal to potentially become prolonged. As noted by
defendants in their petitions for rehearing, such a practice
undercuts the salutary purposes served by Rule 303(d), which
specifically provides nonprevailing litigants with an extension of
time in which to file an appeal. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(d); see also
Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 303, Historical &amp; Practice Notes, at
91-92 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (noting that rule was promulgated
because the "delay in the finality of judgments was more harmful
than could be justified"). Therefore, our previous ruling in this case
created tension within Rule 303 which justified reconsideration.
	Secondly, I strongly believed that the concerns raised by
defendants in their petitions warranted our reconsideration of the
following language contained in the court's original opinion:
		"Although this rule [303(a)] utilizes language which makes
its requirements appear mandatory, our court has recently
recognized that the rule's requirements may be relaxed. In
an appropriate case, the appellate court may entertain an
appeal even where the appellant has failed to comply with
Rule 303. In re Marriage of Skahan, 178 Ill. 2d 577
(1998)." Slip op. at 2.
The Chief Justice again cites this very language today. Slip op. at
10 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). I must point out that Skahan is not
an opinion of this court. Rather, it is a supervisory order entered
upon the denial of a petition for leave to appeal. Upon further
reflection, I do not believe that this court should utilize our
supervisory orders in this manner because they are not binding
authority. This court has never before elevated these orders to the
level of a published decision, and I believe it profoundly unwise to
do so now. Supervisory orders do not provide bench or bar with
a clear exposition of the facts which led this court to enter the
order in the first instance. Plaintiff in this case argued for, and
originally won, a construction of Rule 303(a) which was somewhat
at odds with the plain, mandatory language of the rule. After
considering this matter further, I preferred to consider the
arguments raised on rehearing against the backdrop of the
published precedent of this court.
	In closing, I note that a " dissent should be impassive in tone
rather than angry." People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 219 (1998),
quoting R. Aldisert, Opinion Writing, §11.5, at 170 (1990). The
Chief Justice, however, intertwines his dissent with both stridence
and derision. Unfortunately, this type of rhetoric serves only to
create and foster an environment where incivility becomes the rule,
not the exception, in our courtrooms. I repeat Justice Miller's
eloquent comment contained in his concurrence in People v. Bull,
185 Ill. 2d 179, 222 (1998), in discussing this same justice's
remarks in dissent on that occasion, "[w]hen rancor eclipses
reason, the quality of the debate is diminished, the bonds of
collegiality are strained, and the judicial process is demeaned."
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	At issue in these two consolidated appeals is whether
plaintiff's post-judgment motion was sufficient to toll the period
for filing her notice of appeal following entry of summary judgment
in favor of defendants. In an opinion filed last July, our court
answered this question in the affirmative and upheld the appellate
court's judgment. Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., Nos. 85967, 85974
cons. (July 1, 1999).
	Subsequent to our decision, the defendants, Allied Security,
Inc., and Podlowsky &amp; Associates, Inc., each petitioned our court
for rehearing. Neither of their petitions raised any new matters, and
our court properly voted to deny rehearing. Subsequent to that
vote, however, Justice Freeman announced that he no longer
agreed with the majority's opinion in the case and believed that
rehearing should be allowed. Once rehearing was allowed, Justice
Freeman changed his position and joined the three original
dissenters in the case. The result is today's disposition.
	Those who believe I have been too critical of my colleague's
inconsistencies on the bench would do well to consider this case.
Nearly a year after our original decision, the court has done a
complete about face. Even though no new issues were raised and
no changes in the law or facts occurred, the court today reaches
exactly the opposite conclusion. This has become all too common.
Above the front entrance to the United States Supreme Court is
chiseled the phrase "Equal Justice Under Law." A more suitable
motto for Illinois might be "Here today, gone tomorrow."
	Here is what the court held when it first decided the case and
what we should continue to hold today:
			"Plaintiff, Joan Berg, filed a personal injury action
against defendants, Allied Security, Inc., and Podolsky &amp;
Associates, Inc. On September 4, 1996, the circuit court
of Cook County granted summary judgment in favor of
both defendants. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1996). Thirty
days later, on October 4, plaintiff moved for
reconsideration or, in the alternative, for leave to file an
amended complaint. In an order filed October 15, the
circuit court denied reconsideration and took the request
for leave to amend under advisement. On November 21,
leave to amend was denied. Five days later, on November
26, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal.
			In the appellate court, defendants argued that plaintiff's
notice of appeal was untimely. Although it was filed less
than a week after the circuit court had disposed of the last
matter raised by plaintiff's post-judgment motion,
defendants contended that plaintiff's motion was so
deficient that it did not qualify as a post-judgment motion
under section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 1996)) and therefore did not
operate to toll the 30-day appeal period under Rule 303(a)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)). Defendants' theory was that
because the 30-day period was not tolled by the pendency
of the plaintiff's motion, the notice of appeal actually came
too late, and the appellate court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's appeal.
			The appellate court rejected defendants' jurisdictional
challenge and addressed plaintiff's appeal on the merits. It
held that genuine issues of material fact existed and that
summary judgment was therefore improper. Accordingly,
it set aside the circuit court's summary judgment in favor
of defendants and remanded the cause to the circuit court
for further proceedings. 297 Ill. App. 3d 891.
			Both defendants petitioned this court for leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We granted those petitions and
consolidated the appeals for hearing and disposition.
			In the proceedings before us, neither defendant takes
issue with the appellate court's handling of the substantive
issues related to their motions for summary judgment.
Defendants' arguments are strictly procedural. They
contend, as they did in the appellate court, that plaintiff's
notice of appeal simply came too late to confer jurisdiction
on the appellate court and that the appellate court
therefore had no right to review the circuit court's
judgment on the merits. Accordingly, defendants assert
that the appellate court's judgment should be vacated for
lack of jurisdiction and that plaintiff's appeal should be
dismissed.
			In addressing defendants' claims, we begin with the
familiar proposition that jurisdiction is conferred upon the
appellate court only through the timely filing of a notice of
appeal. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538 (1984); 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. Under Supreme
Court Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)), a notice of
appeal must be filed
				'within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment
appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed
against the judgment is filed, *** within 30 days after
the entry of the order disposing of the last pending
post-judgment motion.'
		Although this rule utilizes language which makes its
requirements appear mandatory, our court has recently
recognized that the rule's requirements may be relaxed. In
an appropriate case, the appellate court may entertain an
appeal even where the appellant has failed to comply with
Rule 303. In re Marriage of Skahan, 178 Ill. 2d 577
(1998).
			There is no dispute that within 30 days of the circuit
court's entry of summary judgment in this case, plaintiff
did file a post-trial motion directed against the judgment.
As previously indicated, the sole issue raised by
defendants is the sufficiency of that motion. Because the
motion attacked a judgment entered by the court sitting
without a jury, it was subject to section 2-1203 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West
1996)) and had to specifically request one or more of the
types of relief specified in that provision, i.e., rehearing,
retrial, modification of the judgment, vacating the
judgment or other similar relief. Marsh v. Evangelical
Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461 (1990); Fultz v.
Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131, 135-36 (1971).
			Plaintiff's motion here included such a request. It
expressly asked the court to reconsider its entry of
summary judgment and to reverse that judgment.
Although plaintiff did not detail in the motion itself
precisely why she thought the judgment was infirm, she
was not required to do so under section 2-1203. In
contrast to section 2-1202 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-1202 (West 1996)), which governs post-trial motions in jury cases, section 2-1203 contains no
requirement that the motion contain the points on which
it is based or that it specify the grounds supporting it. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Jerome, 255 Ill. App. 3d 374, 389
(1994).
			The distinction between section 2-1203 and 2-1202, as
the appellate court in this case correctly recognized (297
Ill. App. 3d at 895), reflects the different requirements for
preserving error on review in jury and nonjury cases.
Section 2-1202 mandates specificity in post-judgment
motions in jury cases because in such cases, the post-judgment motion defines the scope of review. In a jury
case, "[a] party may not urge as error on review of the
ruling on the party's post-trial motion any point, ground,
or relief not specified in the motion." 155 Ill. 2d R.
366(b)(2)(iii). If an issue is not raised in the post-trial
motion, it is waived for review. See Majcher v. Laurel
Motors, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 719, 738 (1997).
			In nonjury cases, by contrast, post-trial motions are not
required at all, and "[n]either the filing of nor the failure to
file a post-judgment motion limits the scope of review"
(155 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(3)(ii)). As long as the issue sought
to be contested on appeal is presented to the trial court at
some point, the issue is not waived on appeal by failure to
file post-judgment pleadings. See In re Marriage of Mohr,
260 Ill. App. 3d 98, 101 (1994). Post-judgment pleadings
are not necessary to preserve the right to raise issues
concerning entry of summary judgment even where the
case involves additional matters which subsequently
proceed to trial before a jury. Mohn v. Posegate, 184 Ill. 2d 540, 546-47 (1998).
			Notwithstanding these considerations, the appellate
court has sometimes viewed the requirements for post-trial
motions under section 2-1203 more stringently. Based on
language this court used in Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232,
241 (1991) and Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp.,
133 Ill. 2d 342, 347 (1990), various appellate court
decisions have held that motions filed under section
2-1203 are required to specify the grounds warranting the
relief requested. See, e.g., J.D. Marshall, International,
Inc. v. First National Bank, 272 Ill. App. 3d 883, 888
(1995); Sho-Deen, Inc. v. Michel, 263 Ill. App. 3d 288,
293 (1994). As the appellate court in this case correctly
pointed out, however, the circumstances in Beck and
Andersen were qualitatively different from those present
here.
			In this case, the post-judgment motion was clearly
identifiable as such, it was directed at the circuit court's
judgment, and it included an explicit request that the
judgment be reconsidered and reversed, the type of relief
contemplated by section 2-1203 of the Code. That was
not true in either Beck or Andersen.
			In Beck, the only document submitted by counsel after
entry of summary judgment was a letter to the trial judge
noting that the judge's order differed from counsel's
understanding of what the court told the parties it was
going to do during a conference call. That letter did not
constitute an application for judicial relief. It therefore
could not qualify as any kind of motion, much less a post-trial motion under section 2-1203.
			In Andersen, plaintiff's counsel simply requested leave
to file an additional amended complaint after three prior
versions of the complaint were dismissed. The motion did
not seek reconsideration of the previous dismissals. Unlike
the case at bar, the propriety of the court's prior rulings
was not at issue. Counsel's motion was based on the
wholly separate theory that additional facts previously
unknown to plaintiff's attorney had been discovered which
would permit plaintiff to now plead a new theory of
recovery substantively different from those previously
advanced.
			Because neither Beck nor Andersen involved motions
attacking the circuit court's judgment and requesting the
type of relief contemplated by section 2-1203, the issue of
how much specificity is required by a proper section
2-1203 motion was not actually before the court. The
court's discussion of the specificity requirements should
therefore not be construed as establishing a rule that is
controlling where, as here, the post-judgment motion does
attack the circuit court's judgment and does request relief
in accordance with section 2-1203. See Mendelson v. Ben
A. Borenstein &amp; Co., 240 Ill. App. 3d 605, 615 (1992).
			Proponents of greater specificity under section 2-1203
cite the need to afford the trial judge an opportunity to
evaluate what exactly it is he is alleged to have done
wrong so he can take appropriate corrective action. While
this is a legitimate consideration, we note that the
particulars of the movant's claims can always be explored
at the hearing on the motion. As far as the trial court's
deliberative process is concerned, having the specifics set
out in the motion itself is not essential.
			A more compelling reason for requiring greater
specificity in the motion is to give opposing counsel fair
notice of the arguments he must be prepared to address
once the hearing on the motion is convened. If opposing
counsel cannot reasonably understand and prepare for
movant's arguments based on the text of the motion,
however, that is a reason for denying the motion or
granting counsel an additional opportunity to respond
after the initial hearing is concluded. It is not a reason for
holding that the motion does not even qualify as motion.
A lame horse, after all, is still a horse.
			Those who would graft additional requirements onto
section 2-1203 forget that, as part of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the statute is to be liberally construed. 735
ILCS 5/1-106 (West 1994). They also fail to heed the
basic principle of statutory construction that where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, as the
language of section 2-1203 is, we must give it effect as
written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations, or
conditions that the legislature did not express. Garza v.
Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996).
			Because the post-judgment motion in this case was
clearly identifiable as such, was directed at the circuit
court's judgment, and included an explicit request that the
judgment be reconsidered and reversed, it met the
requirements of section 2-1203 and operated to toll the
period for filing a notice of appeal under our Rule 303(a).
The appellate court was therefore correct in rejecting
defendants' challenge to its jurisdiction.
			Our conclusion that plaintiff's notice of appeal was
timely is not affected by the fact that the circuit court
proceeded in stages, first refusing to reconsider the entry
of summary judgment and then denying leave to file an
amended complaint. Standing alone, a request for leave to
amend a complaint after dismissal with prejudice does not
extend the time for appeal or the time for filing other
motions. Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d  at 135-36. In this
case, however, the prayer for leave to amend was
submitted in tandem with plaintiff's request for
reconsideration, and it was appropriate for plaintiff to wait
until all matters raised by her post-trial motion were
concluded before filing her notice of appeal. Rule 303
contemplates that parties will proceed in this fashion,
rather than through piecemeal notices following each of
the trial court's post-trial rulings. To penalize plaintiff for
proceeding as she did would require a hypertechnical
application of the rule which would be manifestly unfair
and would serve no legitimate purpose."
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, also dissenting:
	I respectfully dissent. Rehearing in this case should not have
been allowed. I agree with the original opinion that was filed in this
cause, as quoted in Chief Justice Harrison's separate dissent. I,
however, do not join in the additional remarks set forth in Chief
Justice Harrison's dissent because they are not necessary for
deciding the issue before us.
  
	JUSTICE McMORROW, also dissenting:
	Although I disagree with Justice Freeman's position on the
jurisdictional issue in this case, I agree with the remainder of his
special concurrence. In particular, I join in his remarks about the
rehearing process, the citation of supervisory orders as authority,
and the appropriate tone for opinions issued by this court. These
matters prevent me from joining Chief Justice Harrison's dissent.
I have chosen to file my own dissenting opinion to explain my view
that, under the unique facts of this case, the appellate court's
exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate.
	The majority concludes that plaintiff's notice of appeal was not
timely under this court's decisions in Fultz and Andersen that a
motion for leave to amend is not a valid post-judgment motion
under Rule 303. These cases, however, are factually distinguishable
from plaintiff's. In Fultz and Andersen, the plaintiffs filed motions
for leave to amend following the dismissals of their complaints.
This court held that those motions were not "directed against the
judgment" because they did not request modification or vacation
of the circuit court's judgment. Thus, they were not valid post-judgment motions for purposes of Rule 303(a). By contrast,
plaintiff's request for leave to amend was part of a valid post-judgment motion, which asked for reconsideration of the circuit
court's summary judgment ruling. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West
1998); Anderson, 133 Ill. 2d  at 347.
	Unlike the majority, I believe this distinction is significant.
Rule 303(a) provides that the 30-day time limit for filing a notice
of appeal begins to run upon the entry of an order "disposing" of
the last "post-judgment motion." Given that plaintiff's post-judgment motion included a request for leave to amend in addition
to a request for reconsideration, it was not unreasonable for her to
believe that her "motion" was not "disposed" of until the court had
ruled on both issues.
	Justice Freeman asserts that a holding in this case that
plaintiff's notice of appeal was timely would permit nonprevailing
litigants to prolong the 30-day period under Rule 303 by filing
motions for leave to amend in addition to their other post-judgment
motions. I disagree that this would be the result of finding that
jurisdiction existed under the particular facts of this case.
	Because of differences in the motion filed by plaintiff and the
motions at issue in Fultz and Andersen, holding that plaintiff's
motion was timely would not alter the Fultz-Andersen rule that a
motion requesting only leave to amend does not extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal. Moreover, it is important to note that,
in this case, the circuit court separated plaintiff's request for leave
to amend from the remainder of plaintiff's post-judgment motion
and chose to decide it at a later time. A circuit court faced with a
similar motion in the future could dispose of all portions of the
motion at the same time, thereby preventing a request for leave to
amend from prolonging the appellate process.
	Under the circumstances of this case, the timing of plaintiff's
notice of appeal was proper under a reasonable interpretation of
Rule 303. In my view, it would be unfair to deny plaintiff access to
the appellate court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1.      1We note that, although defendants did not raise this argument in the
appellate court, a challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time. See Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 515 (1994).