Title: Amoco Foam Products Co. v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 980139
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
AMOCO FOAM PRODUCTS  
COMPANY 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 980139 
January 8, 1999 
 
ESSIE L. JOHNSON 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal of an award under the Workers' Compensation 
Act, we review the Court of Appeals' application of the doctrine 
of compensable consequences. 
 
In July 1992, appellee Essie L. Johnson, the claimant, 
sustained a compensable left ankle injury that arose out of and 
in the course of her employment with appellant Amoco Foam 
Products Company, the employer.  Following lengthy treatment and 
June 1994 surgery on the ankle, the claimant fell at home in 
August 1994 while recovering from the surgery when the ankle 
gave way, causing injury to her right knee. 
 
In a September 1995 opinion, the Workers' Compensation 
Commission affirmed a deputy commissioner's ruling that the 1994 
right knee injury was a compensable consequence of the July 1992 
industrial accident, and awarded compensation accordingly.  The 
self-insured employer did not appeal this award. 
 
The present case arises from the claimant's application 
seeking payment of compensation as a result of a further right 
knee injury that occurred in November 1995 when her right knee 
"gave out" at home causing her to fall.  The claimant sought 
permanent disability benefits as a result of a 20% loss of use 
to the right leg caused by the August 1994 compensable 
consequence injury.  The claimant also sought compensation for a 
period of total work incapacity of about 30 days during 
November-December 1995 as a result of the further right knee 
injury occurring in November 1995. 
 
In a January 1997 opinion, the Commission affirmed a deputy 
commissioner's decision awarding benefits.  The deputy found 
that the claimant's November 1995 fall was a compensable 
consequence of her August 1994 accident, which, in the 
Commission's words, "was previously adjudged to be a compensable 
consequence of the claimant's original industrial injury." 
 
Following the employer's appeal, a panel of the Court of 
Appeals unanimously affirmed the Commission.  Amoco Foam Prod. 
Co. v. Johnson, 26 Va. App. 267, 494 S.E.2d 169 (1997).  In 
framing the issue, the Court of Appeals said:  "The 
determination that the 1994 knee injury was a compensable 
consequence of claimant's ankle injury is res judicata.  It is 
undisputed that claimant's original 1992 injury was not the 
immediate cause of her 1995 injury.  Consequently, the issue 
before us is whether as a matter of law the commission may award 
benefits for an injury caused by a compensable consequence, or, 
 
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in other words, whether a claimant may recover for a compensable 
consequence of a compensable consequence."  Id. at 273, 494 
S.E.2d at 172. 
 
Answering the question in the affirmative, the Court of 
Appeals stated:  "In the instant case, the evidence established 
that claimant's 1995 knee injury was causally related to her 
1994 knee injury which was causally related to her initial ankle 
injury.  This chain of causation is direct and natural, and 
there is no evidence of any intervening cause attributable to 
claimant's conduct.  Furthermore, claimant's 1994 compensable 
consequence knee injury becomes a primary injury, and the injury 
it caused in 1995 is clearly a compensable consequence of it.  
We hold that claimant's November 1995 knee injury is a 
compensable consequence of her 1994 knee injury and of her 1992 
ankle injury."  Id. at 275-76, 494 S.E.2d at 173-74.  The 
employer appeals. 
 
The question is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in 
answering the foregoing question affirmatively.  We hold that 
the court erred. 
 
Any discussion of the doctrine of compensable consequences 
must recognize the basic concept that a disputed accidental 
injury must arise out of and be in the course of employment in 
order to be compensable.  See Code § 65.2-101 (defining 
"Injury"). 
 
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This Court first addressed the compensable consequences 
idea in Immer and Co. v. Brosnahan, 207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 
(1967).  There, the question presented was "whether an employee 
who suffers a compensable injury may be awarded compensation for 
additional injuries suffered in an automobile accident occurring 
while the employee is en route from his place of employment to a 
doctor's office for further treatment of the original injury."  
Id. at 721, 152 S.E.2d at 255.  The Court stated, regarding the 
second injury, "[t]he struggle seems to be with determining 
whether such an additional injury 'arises out of the 
employment.'  The eternal search in making the . . . 
determination is to find the presence or absence of a 'causal 
connection' between the incidents of employment and the 
additional injuries."  Id. at 722, 152 S.E.2d at 255-56.  
Affirming the employee's award of compensation, the Court said 
the evidence in that case established such a causal connection.  
Id. at 728, 152 S.E.2d at 259. 
 
Citing Brosnahan, the Court discussed the doctrine of 
compensable consequences in Leonard v. Arnold, 218 Va. 210, 237 
S.E.2d 97 (1977).  There, a claimant was injured in a restaurant 
when he fell while on crutches required for treatment of an 
initial industrial injury.  This Court pointed out that the 
"doctrine extends the canopy of the Workman's Compensation Act 
to the resulting injury . . . because the second injury is 
 
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treated as if it occurred in the course of and arising out of 
the employee's employment."  Id. at 214, 237 S.E.2d at 100. 
 
Under the Brosnahan test, the crucial inquiry here is 
whether there is a causal connection between the incidents of 
employment giving rise to the 1992 ankle injury and the 
additional 1995 knee injury.  The record in this case clearly 
establishes there is not. 
 
The Court of Appeals stated:  "It is undisputed that 
claimant's original 1992 injury was not an immediate cause of 
her 1995 injury."  This conclusion is fully supported by the 
relevant medical testimony.  The claimant's attending physician 
reported in April 1996:  "Essie Johnson fell originally in 
August of 1994.  She had another fall in November 1995, but I 
tend to think that this was largely due to the injury of August 
1994.  She was having pain at the time of November 1995 
following the injury of August 1994 and her knee 'buckled' on 
her.  I tend to think that her continued pain is what actually 
caused her to buckle, and that this is all causily [sic] related 
to the August 1994 injury." 
 
In sum, the record fails to establish a causal connection 
between the original injury and the November 1995 injury, a 
requirement for compensability of the latter injury.  In other 
words, the latter injury did not arise out of the employment 
 
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because there is absence of a causal connection between the 
incidents of claimant's employment and the 1995 injury. 
 
Under these circumstances, contrary to the Court of 
Appeals' ruling, it does not logically follow that merely 
because the 1994 injury was causally related to the 1992 
accident and the 1995 injury was causally related to the 1994 
injury, then the 1995 injury was causally related to the 1992 
accident.  The link of causation must directly connect the 
original accidental injury with the additional injury for which 
compensation is sought.  Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that claimant's November 1995 knee injury was a 
compensable consequence of her 1992 ankle injury. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals affirming the award of compensation for total work 
incapacity from November 13 through December 12, 1995, and will 
enter final judgment here dismissing the application for those 
benefits.  This judgment, however, does not affect the award of 
compensation "for 20% permanent loss of the right leg."  Those 
permanent disability benefits are not legitimately in question 
in this appeal because they were based on the ruling that the 
August 1994 injury was a compensable consequence of the 1992 
injury, a ruling that was not appealed. 
Reversed and final judgment.
 
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