Title: State v. Lewis
Citation: 596 S.W.2d 697
Docket Number: CR 79-222
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 1980

596 S.W.2d 697 (1980) STATE of Arkansas, Appellant, v. Ronnie LEWIS, Appellee. No. CR 79-222. Supreme Court of Arkansas. April 14, 1980. *698 Joe M. Rogers, West Memphis, for appellant. Donald A. Forrest, Rieves, Rieves &amp; Shelton, West Memphis, for appellee. HICKMAN, Justice. Ronnie Lewis was charged with manslaughter in the Crittenden County Circuit Court. He moved to dismiss the charge because the State did not bring him to trial within three terms of court as required by Rules of Crim.Proc, Rule 28.1(b). The trial court granted the motion. The State appeals arguing the trial court was wrong in failing to find good cause existed for the delay. At the outset the State concedes that three full terms of court had run before the motion to dismiss was filed. So we need not consider the usual problem of counting terms that arises in the Second Judicial Circuit. See Gardner v. State, 252 Ark. 828, 481 S.W.2d 342 (1972); State v. Knight, 259 Ark. 107, 533 S.W.2d 488 (1976); Harkness v. Harrison, 266 Ark. ___, 585 S.W.2d 10 (1979), and Alexander v. State, 268 Ark. ___, ___ S.W.2d ___ (1980). The landmark case on the question of a speedy trial, a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, is Barker v. Wingo, 4UY U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). Arkansas, cognizant of Wingo, has adopted rules regarding the timely prosecution of criminal defendants and those rules are Rules of Crim.Proc, Rules 27 through 30. One of the rules is that a defendant, who is not incarcerated, must be brought to trial before the end of the third term of court or he shall be discharged. Rule 28.1(b). However, in computing time there are excludable periods of delay that are not charged to the State. One such period is a delay "... resulting from congestion of the trial docket when the delay is attributable to exceptional circumstances." Rules of Crim.Proc, Rule 28.3(b). Another is "Other periods of delay for good cause." Rule 28.3(h). The State argues that both of these circumstances existed in this case and the trial judge was wrong in failing to find they existed. We review such a finding by a trial judge to see if the trial judge abused his discretion. If we cannot find such to be the case, we must affirm his judgment. Randall v. State, 249 Ark. 258, 458 S.W.2d 743 (1970). Lewis was scheduled for trial September 1, 1978, during a special setting of cases before the end of the September term of court which ended September 18, 1978. Lewis' case was "bumped" off the docket. Three cases were set for trial that day and another criminal case was tried precluding the possibility of trying Lewis. The case was not rescheduled for trial until March, 1979. Before the trial date in March, Lewis filed a motion to dismiss based on Rule 28.1(b). The State filed affidavits showing the number of criminal cases filed, pending and terminated during the period of time in question. The deputy prosecuting attorney testified about the congestion of the docket in Crittenden County and the difficulty in timely trying criminal cases. At the request of the prosecuting attorney, the trial judge made a docket entry September 1, 1979, which reads: Sept. 1, 1978, case set for trial on this date; both State and defendant had witnesses *699 present and ready for trial but not reached because of another trial. The deputy prosecuting attorney also testified he thought he had an "oral understanding" with Lewis' counsel that the case would not be set again until a deposition of a doctor had been taken. Counsel for Lewis related that he had a different view of the oral understanding; that he understood the case would first be set for trial and then the deposition would be taken. The defendant Lewis never moved for a continuance. The State never moved for a continuance. The court never ordered the case continued finding that it was necessary because of a congested docket attributable to exceptional circumstances. The court granted the motion to dismiss and in its oral findings said: Regarding the "oral understanding," the trial judge said: It was the burden of the State to prove the delay was legally justified by *700 Randall v. State, 249 Ark. 258, 458 S.W.2d 743 (1970). The court granted the motion finding no excludable periods. A motion to reconsider this judgment was also denied. The State argues that the fact the case was set for trial September 1st is reason to exclude that whole term of court. There is no provision in any of the rules or any of our cases to exclude a term of court just because a case is set during that term. Even if the State were granted an additional two weeks of grace because the case was "bumped," it would not be sufficient to justify the delay from September of 1978 until March of 1979. Incidentally, the State asks us to overrule Harkness v. Harrison, supra and revert to the law of Gardner v. State and State v. Knight. Harkness v. Harrison, supra, in addition to dealing with terms of court in Crittenden County, also deals with the problem of whether judges who have been designated to try civil cases are responsible to try criminal cases. We held the relationship is the same. We have reconsidered our decision in Harkness and decline to overrule it. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion and affirm the order. Affirmed. FOGLEMAN, C. J, not participating.