Title: Gilbert L. Alderson, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al., County Employees' Retirement Fund, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC89370
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
GILBERT L. ALDERSON, et al.,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  
No. SC89370 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Defendants,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT  
) 
FUND, et al.,  
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondents.  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY 
The Honorable Richard G. Callahan, Judge 
 
  Juvenile office employees1 challenge sections 50.1000(8), 50.1010, and 211.393, 
RSMo Supp. 2007,2 and a related rule,3 all concerning eligibility for membership in the 
County Employees' Retirement Fund ("CERF").  They sought a declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief in the circuit court, arguing that the statutory exclusion of juvenile office 
personnel from membership in CERF is a constitutional violation of equal protection, 
                                             
 
1 Plaintiffs Alderson, Allen, and Polette hold the positions of juvenile officer, attorney for the 
juvenile officer, and the deputy juvenile officer, respectively.   
2 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2007. 
3 16 CSR 50-2.010. 
special laws, and separation of powers.  After cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
court entered judgment against the employees ("Plaintiffs"), who now appeal.   
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3 of the Missouri 
Constitution as this appeal involves the constitutional validity of Missouri statutes.  This 
Court finds that the challenged laws are not clearly arbitrary and do not otherwise violate 
the relevant constitutional provisions.  As such, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
I. Background 
 
The material facts related to CERF and to Plaintiffs' ineligibility for membership 
are not in dispute. 
 
CERF was formed in 1994 by the enactment of section 50.1010 and its related 
provisions.  It was designed to provide retirement benefits for employees of Missouri 
counties other than the first class charter counties and the city of St. Louis.  At that time, 
more than 50 Missouri counties did not offer retirement benefits for their public 
employees.  CERF provides that eligible employees shall receive monthly benefits after 
retirement based on years of service and salary.  It is funded by a number of sources, 
mainly by penalties related to property tax collected by counties.  Only a small portion of 
the funding is tied to the number of members in the program.4   
 
Eligibility for the fund has been limited by a rule and several statutes.  Section 
50.1000(8),  which has been amended twice since 1994, originally stated in relevant part 
                                             
 
4 Section 50.1020 provides that penalties collected by covered counties, pursuant to sections 
137.280 and 137.345, shall be deposited in CERF.  It also states that "[n]o state moneys shall be 
used to fund sections 50.1000 to 50.1300."  In addition, a smaller percentage of the funding 
comes from payroll deductions from participating county employees who are not members of the 
Missouri Local Government Employees Retirement System ("LAGERS").  See section 50.1040.     
 
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that an "employee" for CERF purposes was "any county elective or appointive officer or 
employee whose position requires the actual performance of duties during not less than 
one thousand hours per year . . . ."  Section 50.1000(8), RSMo 1994.   
 
In 1998, section 50.1000(8) was amended to limit the definition of an "employee" 
to "any county elective or appointive officer or employee who is hired and fired by the 
county and whose work and responsibilities are directed and controlled by the county . . . 
."  Section 50.1000(8), RSMo 2000.   
 
A 2001 amendment added eligibility for individuals hired "by the circuit court 
located in a county of the first classification without a charter form of government which 
is not participating in LAGERS."  Section 50.1000(8).5      
 
The eligibility requirements for CERF benefits, as contained in 50.1000(8), are  
                                             
 
5 Section 50.1000(8) now states in relevant part:  
"Employee", any county elective or appointive officer or 
employee who is hired and fired by the county or by the circuit 
court located in a county of the first classification without a charter 
form of government which is not participating in LAGERS, whose 
work and responsibilities are directed and controlled by the county 
or by the circuit court located in a county of the first classification 
without a charter form of government which is not participating in 
LAGERS, who is compensated directly from county funds, and 
whose position requires the actual performance of duties during 
not less than one thousand hours per year . . . .  
 
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reflected in a rule,6 section 50.1010, 7 and section 211.393. 8
 
Plaintiffs are employees in the juvenile office of the Twenty-third Judicial Circuit, 
which is composed of a single county, Jefferson County, a first class county without a 
charter form of government.  Each Plaintiff receives all or part of his salary from the 
county, and each is eligible for retirement programs other than CERF.  Following 
creation of CERF and Plaintiffs' attempt to enroll, they were informed that they were not 
eligible for the program because they were not "county employees" for purposes of 
CERF.  The reason given was that juvenile office personnel were subject to hiring, 
supervision, and termination by either the circuit court or chief juvenile officer, not the 
county.            
                                             
 
6 16 CSR 50-2.010(1)(L), which mirrors section 50.1000(8) as amended in 1998, states:  
"Employee means any county elective or appointive officer or 
employee who is hired and fired by an employer and whose work 
and responsibilities are directed and controlled by the employer 
and who is compensated directly from county funds and whose 
position requires the actual performance of duties during not less 
than one thousand (1,000) hours per year . . ." 
7 Section 50.1010 states in relevant part:   
Notwithstanding any provision of sections 50.1000 to 50.1200 to 
the contrary, an individual who is in a job classification that the 
retirement system finds not eligible for coverage under the 
retirement system as of September 1, 2001, shall not be considered 
an employee for purposes of coverage in the retirement system, 
unless adequate additional funds are provided for the costs 
associated with such coverage. 
8 Section 211.393.5 appears in chapter 211, concerning juvenile court employees: 
"No juvenile court employee employed by any single or multicounty circuit shall be eligible to 
participate in the county employees' retirement system fund pursuant to sections 50.1000 to 
50.1200, RSMo." 
 
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II. Standard of Review 
Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo.  ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. 
Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts 
as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.   
III. Analysis 
A. The provisions do not violate equal protection 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the statutes and rule excluding appellants from CERF 
membership violate the equal protection provisions of the United States and Missouri 
constitutions.9  They do not complain that the challenged laws infringe on a fundamental 
right; rather, it is agreed that the laws amount to economic legislation.  As such, Plaintiffs 
contend that the laws' current exclusions do not reasonably relate to the original purpose 
of CERF10 and that no rational or legitimate end can be gleaned from the laws' exclusions 
as amended.    
 
The issue for this Court, then, is whether the classification is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.  See Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden, 959 
S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. banc 1997) (citation omitted).  "[L]egislation that touches only 
upon economic interests carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be 
overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality."  In re Marriage of 
                                             
 
9 U.S. Const. amend XIV; Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 2.  
10 Plaintiffs refer to section 50.1000(8), RSMo 1994, which, prior to being amended, stated in 
relevant part that an employee was "any county elective or appointive officer or employee whose 
position requires the actual performance of duties not less than one thousand hours per year," but 
did not further define the term. 
 
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Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Mo. banc 1999).  Notably, under this standard, a 
classification is constitutional "if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that 
would justify it."  Missourians for Tax Justice, 959 S.W.2d at 103 (citing McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)).  
 
As illustrated in section 50.1000(8), which is representative of the challenged 
laws, the General Assembly chose to draw a line.  It decided that a county's right to 
control employees was relevant as to whether they should be eligible for a county 
retirement fund, which, by its nature, has limited resources.  The General Assembly later 
decided that eligibility should be extended to only those employees not covered by an 
alternative retirement fund, LAGERS.   There are a number of legitimate and rational 
reasons why the General Assembly might have chosen this path, and that fact alone 
requires this Court to uphold the law.  The right to control an employee will more often 
than not indicate a more direct employer-employee relationship as compared to a 
situation where the employee is merely paid by a central body, but does not answer to it.  
As such, tying a finite retirement fund to a quintessential characteristic of employment--
control--is, at a minimum, rational.  Further, it is rational to carve out eligibility for a 
class of employees who might otherwise be left with no retirement fund whatsoever.  
 
Plaintiffs wish to focus on the historical progression of the laws, suggesting that 
the original language of section 50.1000(8) (making no mention of control) reflects an 
intent that is inconsistent with the laws as now amended.  They assert that this is evidence 
of arbitrariness consistent with Sommer v. Bihr, 631 F.Supp. 1388 (Mo. App. 1986) 
(finding an irrational class under an equal protection challenge to a teacher's retirement 
 
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system).  Sommer, however, dealt with a retirement system classification that had no 
plausibly legitimate basis whatsoever and that had apparently resulted from an 
inadvertent statutory "hodgepodge."  Id. at 1391.  In contrast, the laws here have 
conceivably legitimate rationales; further, there is no indication that Plaintiffs' exclusion 
is a case of "legislative oversight or inaction."  Id.  Reliance on Sommer is misplaced.          
 
In sum, the classification is constitutional under an equal protection analysis.  It is 
not this Court's role to write the law or to question its wisdom beyond applying this 
constitutional minimum.  See Mo. Prosecuting Attorneys & Cir. Attorneys Ret. Sys. v. 
Pemiscot County, 256 S.W.3d 98, 102-03 (Mo. banc 2008). 
  
B. The provisions are not special laws 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the laws in question are special laws because they exclude a 
subclass of county employees from CERF eligibility.  They state that these provisions 
naturally pertain to a broad class of county employees of which they are included, but 
then impermissibly subdivide this class for purposes of defining "employee" for CERF.    
 
Missouri's constitution forbids the passage of special laws where a general law can 
be made applicable.  Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 40.  A special law "includes less than all 
who are similarly situated . . . but a law is not special if it applies to all of a given class 
alike and the classification is made on a reasonable basis."  Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. 
Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo., 950 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo. banc 1997) (citation omitted).  "A 
law based on open-ended characteristics is not facially special and is presumed to be 
constitutional."  Jefferson County Fire Prot. Dists. Ass'n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866, 870 
(Mo. banc 2006) (citation omitted).  When a law is open-ended, the reasonableness 
 
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standard applies the same general principles used to determine if a statute violates equal 
protection.  Id. (citation omitted).  If a law is found to be special, it will be invalid absent 
"substantial justification."  Id. at 871. 
 
This Court first asks if the challenged laws create an open-ended class, entitling 
the classification to a presumption of constitutionality.   Here, employees come and go 
from the eligible class as they are hired and fired; this is an open class because eligibility 
turns on their relationship to their employer.  See id. at 868 ("Special legislation refers to 
statutes that apply to localities rather than to the state as a whole and statutes that benefit 
individuals rather than the general public.").  Therefore, the Court must simply determine 
if this open-ended classification is reasonable.  
 
As outlined above, the classification is rational under equal protection because 
there is, at a minimum, a conceivably legitimate basis for it.  In turn, there is a reasonable 
basis under a special law analysis for classifying these employees based on their being 
hired, fired, directed, and controlled by the county.11  As these laws apply to the entire 
class, no special law is present.  See City of Springfield v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 203 
S.W.3d 177, 184 (Mo. banc 2006) (“The vice in special laws is that they do not embrace 
all of the class to which they are naturally related.”). 
 C. The provisions do not infringe on the separation of powers 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that the statutes and rule violate standards guaranteed by the  
                                             
 
11 Because Plaintiffs are ineligible under the 1998 amendment to 50.1000(8) (concerning 
control), the later amendment in 2001 (concerning LAGERS) has no effect on Plaintiffs' status, 
even if invalidated as a special law.  As such, the classification particular to the 2001 amendment 
is not addressed. 
 
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constitution's separation of powers.  To this end, they correctly point out that the net 
effect of the laws is to exclude employees like themselves from CERF eligibility based 
on the fact that they are appointed and controlled by the judiciary.  They then argue that 
because this compromises the judiciary's ability to secure personnel relative to other 
governmental branches, it amounts to a constitutional violation.   
 
Article II, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution concerns the division of power, 
including the judicial power, which in turn guarantees certain rights to the public and 
places obligations on the courts to protect and enforce those rights and to administer 
justice.  See State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Mo. banc 
1970).  It is said that "[t]he reason for the separation of powers is to protect the liberty 
and security of the governed."  Savannah, 950 S.W.2d at 859.  As relevant here, the 
judicial power includes the right to appoint necessary staff, which "carries with it the 
right to have such appointees paid a salary commensurate with their responsibilities."  
Weinstein, 451 S.W.2d at 102 (citation omitted).  The right to hire necessary employees 
cannot be denied by the legislature, nor can it otherwise be "shackled or made impotent."  
Id. (citation omitted).   
 
Plaintiffs suggest that ineligibility for CERF may affect an applicant's desire to  
work for the juvenile division or other judicially appointed positions.12  But, unlike the 
Court's examples in Weinstein, the present scenario does not involve interference by  
                                             
 
12 The example offered by Plaintiffs is that an attorney appointed by the juvenile division would 
receive a salary set by the circuit court and the retirement benefit LAGERS.  That same attorney, 
they assert, if hired by the prosecuting attorney's office, would be eligible for LAGERS and 
CERF retirement benefits.   
 
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"limiting the number of employees, regardless of need, or by providing for no employees 
at all."  Id.  Indeed, other than through bare assertions, Plaintiffs provide no evidence that 
CERF ineligibility has or will make the hiring of employees by the judiciary more 
difficult or that this amounts to being "shackled."  A lack of supporting evidence is due, 
perhaps, in part to the fact that Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, already qualify for 
other retirement funds.  Further, Plaintiffs have been aware of their ineligibility for more 
than a decade, yet have continued their employment and have failed to challenge the 
constitutionality of their ineligibility until now.13  In any event, they have not shown that 
these laws rise to the level of infringing on the separation of powers through rendering 
Plaintiffs ineligible for a county retirement fund.     
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.  
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
All concur. 
                                             
 
13 The assertion of laches need not be addressed because Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges fail. 
 
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