Title: CHADWICK v GIBERSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-007
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 1980

No. 80-7 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 ELIZABETH FULLER CHADWICK, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -V8- CHARLES HOWARD GIBERSON AND LURA B. GIBERSON, husband and wife, Defenc1ant.s and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f The Eleventh J'udicial D i s t r i c t , I n and for: t h e County of Flathead, The Hortorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presidincj. Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Murphl , Rcbinsor~, Heck~.thorn 6( Phj.lljps, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Karden, C h r i s t i a n s e n & Johnson, Kalisy:ell, Montana For Respondent: Robert Skelton, F i s s o u l a , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : Aug~ist 13, 1 9 8 0 Decided : C ~ x c + L c & f, / q@ F i l e d : OCT 8 - 7980 9 1 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal a r i s e s from a judgment entered by t h e Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Flathead County D i s t r i c t Court, g r a n t i n g p l a i n t i f f s p e c i f i c performance and ordering defen- dants t o convey by c o n t r a c t f o r deed a p a r c e l of land located i n Flathead County. Defendants Charles and Lura Belle Giberson l i s t e d f o r s a l e with Douglas Johns Real E s t a t e of K a l i s p e l l , Montana, four forty-acre t r a c t s i n Flathead County (Parcels A, B, C , and D ) . I n August 1976, p l a i n t i f f Elizabeth Chadwick viewed t h e property i n t h e presence of F. E. McHenry, an agent of Douglas Johns Real E s t a t e . I n viewing t h e property, t h e two p a r t i e s discussed access t o t h e various p a r c e l s . I n par- t i c u l a r , McHenry t e s t i f i e d t h a t he informed Chadwick t h a t t h e r e would be a need t o provide access t o Parcel B. A t t h e t i m e of t h e showing, however, a survey showing t h e e x a c t l o c a t i o n and dimensions of any proposed access w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e . A s a r e s u l t of t h e August viewing, Chadwick submitted an o f f e r t o purchase a l l four t r a c t s . The Gibersons counteroffered, b u t p l a i n t i f f was unable t o accept, and t h e e a r n e s t money paid was returned. O n September 25, 1976, Chadwick made an o f f e r t o pur- chase only P a r c e l A. A n e a r n e s t money r e c e i p t and agreement t o sell and purchase was prepared by McHenry on t h a t d a t e , which was signed by p l a i n t i f f and then s e n t t o t h e Gibersons f o r t h e i r signatures. Earnest money i n t h e amount of $1,000 was paid by Chadwick. Defendants signed t h e agreement and returned it t o defendants' o t h e r real e s t a t e agent, Douglas Johns, who on October 1, 1976, added t h e s p e c i a l provisions: " S e l l e r w i l l provide l e g a l access from t h e south t o t h i s property. " On October 18, 1976, M r . Johns mailed t o Chadwick her copy of t h e e a r n e s t money r e c e i p t and enclosed a copy of t h e preliminary t i t l e r e p o r t issued on October 5, 1976. The r e p o r t d i s c l o s e d t h a t t h e only easement of record a t t h e time t h e p a r t i e s signed t h e September 25 agreement w a s one recorded on J u l y 26, 1967, which reserved f o r defendants' predecessor, Vernon and Marva Schmid, a r i g h t of way f o r i n g r e s s and e g r e s s a c r o s s Parcel A ( t h e Schmid easement). Subsequent t o receiving the t i t l e insurance r e p o r t , however, Chadwick w a s forwarded a copy of t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of survey f o r Parcel A. The c e r t i f i c a t e showed a s i x t y - f o o t roadway easement along an e x i s t i n g logging road and running north-south j u s t west of t h e e a s t e r n boundary of Parcel A. I t narrowed t o t h i r t y f e e t near i t s northern terminal and provided access t o P a r c e l B. A t h i r t y - f o o t roadway easement w a s a l s o shown a c r o s s t h e southeast corner of Parcel A i n t o P a r c e l B. Chadwick objected t o t h e easements shown on t h e sur- vey--particularly t o t h e length and l o c a t i o n of t h e north- south easement t o Parcel B. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s o b j e c t i o n , a revised c e r t i f i c a t e of survey w a s prepared eliminating t h e long north-south easement b u t increasing t h e width of t h e s h o r t easement a c r o s s t h e southeast corner of Parcel A from t h i r t y t o s i x t y f e e t . On December 15, 1976, Chadwick received a proposed con- tract f o r deed f o r t h e purchase and s a l e of Parcel A. The c o n t r a c t n o t only reserved t h e Schmid easement, b u t a l s o contained a r e s e r v a t i o n unto defendants, t h e i r h e i r s and a s s i g n s , of t h e s i x t y - f o o t roadway and u t i l i t y easement a c r o s s t h e southeast corner of t h e p a r c e l . hadw wick would n o t s i g n t h e c o n t r a c t o r tender t h e balance of t h e down- payment i n t h a t she continued t o o b j e c t t o t h e sixty-foot easement which was n o t provided f o r i n t h e September 25, 1976, e a r n e s t money r e c e i p t and agreement t o sell and purchase. Chadwick brought s u i t on February 1 4 , 1977, f o r s p e c i f i c performance of t h e September 25 agreement t o s e l l and pur- chase, a l l e g i n g t h a t a t t h e t i m e t h e p a r t i e s entered i n t o t h e agreement, t h e only easement of record was t h e Schrnid easement. She a l s o f i l e d on t h i s d a t e a l i s pendens i n regard t o P a r c e l A, thereby giving n o t i c e of her claim t o s a i d parcel. Defendants answered and counterclaimed, a l l e g i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f was f u l l y advised of t h e s i x t y - f o o t easement and t h a t it would be reserved t o provide access t o an adjoining p a r c e l of land. O n February 15, 1977, defendants f i l e d with t h e F l a t - head County c l e r k and recorder a n o t i c e of purchasers' i n t e r e s t wherein n o t i c e was given t h a t defendants granted t o V e s t e r and Theila Banta Parcel B, a s well as an i n t e r e s t i n t h e s i x t y - f o o t roadway and u t i l i t y easement through Parcel A. The c o n t r a c t f o r deed between defendants and t h e Bantas was dated January 1 4 , 1977. Defendants forwarded t o p l a i n t i f f on March 2 , 1977, a n o t i c e demanding t h a t p l a i n t i f f execute t h e c o n t r a c t of s a l e o r f o r f e i t t h e e a r n e s t money previously paid. P l a i n t i f f refused t o perform o r o f f e r t o perform as demanded i n t h e n o t i c e . T r i a l on p l a i n t i f f ' s claim was held on August 7 , 1979, a f t e r which t h e D i s t r i c t Court found f o r p l a i n t i f f and granted s p e c i f i c performance. Defendants have appealed* The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e d on appeal i s whether t h e is- t r i c t Court e r r e d i n concluding t h e r e was an enforceable agreement between t h e p a r t i e s . From t h e f i l i n g of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint and defen- d a n t s ' answer and counterclaim t o eventual t r i a l , both p a r t i e s have contended t h a t the September 25, 1976 agreement t o sell and purchase was v a l i d and enforceable a s a g a i n s t t h e other. The i s s u e i n t h e proceeding was n o t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e c o n t r a c t , b u t whether it embraced c e r t a i n a l l e g e d easements. Defendants now argue on appeal t h a t although t h e p a r t i e s executed t h e same agreement, they never agreed on t h e same terms concerning t h e r e s e r v a t i o n of an access road a c r o s s P a r c e l A; thus, no c o n t r a c t w a s created. I t i s a well-established r u l e t h a t t h e r e must be mutual a s s e n t o r a meeting of t h e minds on a l l e s s e n t i a l elements o r terms t o form a binding c o n t r a c t . See Johnson v. Smith (1954), 127 Mont. 594, 289 P.2d 384; 17 Arn.Jur.2d Contracts, 818 a t 354. However, it i s a l s o a w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e of law t h a t a l l e g e d e r r o r a s t o i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i l l n o t be considered on appeal. S t a t e v. Armstrong (1977), 172 Mont. 296, 562 P.2d 1129; Spencer v. Robertson (1968), 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48; Clark v. Worrall (1965), 146 Mont. 374, 406 P.2d 822. Here, defendants have f a i l e d t o a l l e g e a t t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court l e v e l , a s evidenced by t h e pleadings and p r e t r i a l o r d e r , t h a t t h e r e w a s any lack of mutual consent, and thus, no enforceable c o n t r a c t . With t h i s being t h e case, defen- d a n t s ' argument a s t o lack of mutual consent w i l l n o t be considered on t h i s appeal. The f i n a l i s s u e r a i s e d on appeal i s whether t h e is- t r i c t Court e r r e d i n granting s p e c i f i c performance of t h e September 25, 1976 agreement t o s e l l and purchase. Defendants contend t h a t t h e agreement i s n o t s p e c i f i c enough i n i t s terms t o warrant s p e c i f i c performance a s prayed. I n support of t h e i r p o s i t i o n , defendants argue t h a t t h e easement a c r o s s Parcel A, f o r use a s access t o Parcel B, was an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e agreement, and s i n c e t h e agreement a s t o easements was n o t complete o r s p e c i f i c , t h e c o n t r a c t i s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y enforceable. I n r e j e c t i n g defendants' argument, w e need only note t h a t it was defendants' r e a l e s t a t e agent who prepared t h e agreement. Had defendants wished t o include t h i s a l l e g e d " e s s e n t i a l " element dealing with a r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e pro- posed access a c r o s s Parcel A, they could very e a s i l y have done so. Defendants should n o t now be a b l e t o r e l y upon t h e i r f a i l u r e i n t h i s regard i n concluding t h e agreement i s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y enforceable. Defendants a l s o contend t h a t s i n c e p l a i n t i f f d i d n o t perform pursuant t o t h e sell and purchase agreement, i n t h a t she f a i l e d t o tender t h e balance of t h e downpayment owing, p l a i n t i f f i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e l i e f of s p e c i f i c per- formance. I n support of t h i s contention, defendants c i t e S e i f e r t v. S e i f e r t (1977), 173 Mont. 501, 568 P.2d 155, and McDonald v. Stewart (1953), 127 Mont. 188, 259 P.2d 799, f o r t h e general proposition t h a t unless performance i s waived o r excused, a p l a i n t i f f seeking t o enforce a c o n t r a c t must per- form h i s o b l i g a t i o n thereunder, and any w i l l f u l v i o l a t i o n of an e s s e n t i a l covenant of t h e c o n t r a c t i s a defense t o spec- i f i c performance of t h e c o n t r a c t . See a l s o 81 C.J.S. S p e c i f i c Performance, S109 a t 958. Defendants then conclude t h e purchase p r i c e and i t s payment are e s s e n t i a l covenants t o a c o n t r a c t , and s i n c e p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o tender per- formance of t h i s covenant, her a c t i o n f o r s p e c i f i c per- formance cannot be enforced. W e agree with defendants' general statement of the l a w a s set f o r t h i n the above cases; however, we conclude t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o tender performance should be excused i n t h i s instance. P r i o r t o t h e s u i t being brought by p l a i n t i f f , defen- dants conveyed t o a t h i r d p a r t y an i n t e r e s t i n t h e sixty- f o o t roadway and u t i l i t y easement a t i s s u e , thereby indi- c a t i n g t o p l a i n t i f f t h e i r r e f u s a l , and i n a b i l i t y , t o s e l l t o her Parcel A absent s a i d easement. Under these circumstances, when by reason of encumbrances placed on t h e t i t l e , defen- dants a r e unable t o convey such t i t l e a s t h e p l a i n t i f f contracted f o r , t o require a tender of t h e purchase p r i c e would be useless and i d l e ceremony, and it i s therefore excused. See Ceizyk v. Goar Service and Supply, Inc. (1973), 2 1 Ariz.App. 119, 516 P.2d 61; Leche v. S t o u t (Okla. 1972), 514 P.2d 1399; Greenstone v. C l a r e t i a n Theological Seminary, C l a r e t v i l l e (1959), 173 C.A.2d 2 1 , 343 P.2d 161; 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance, 8112 a t 965. P l a i n t i f f , by way of her pleadings, stood ready, w i l l i n g and a b l e t o pay the purchase p r i c e under t h e speci- f i c t e r m s of the p a r t i e s ' agreement t o purchase and s e l l . Under the f a c t s of t h i s case, her f a i l u r e t o tender t h e purchase p r i c e w i l l n o t preclude her t h e e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f of s p e c i f i c performance. Nor do we f i n d m e r i t with defendants' contention t h a t s p e c i f i c performance i n t h i s instance r e s u l t s i n an uncon- scionable advantage t o p l a i n t i f f . P l a i n t i f f i s merely receiving, under t h e terms of t h e p a r t i e s ' i n i t i a l agreement t o purchase and s e l l , t h a t portion of t h e property defendants a r e now a b l e t o convey. The f a c t t h a t defendants are only a b l e t o convey t h e very same t i t l e , including the encum- brance of the sixty-foot roadway easement which p l a i n t i f f refused i n the f i r s t instance, has no e f f e c t upon the out- come of t h i s matter. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. LL J u s t i c e kfW+ W e concur: %-w,&&4 Chief J u s t i c e J u s t i c e s