Title: State v. Anderson
Citation: 2014 WI 93
Docket Number: 2011AP001467-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2014

2014 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1467-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Donyil Leeiton Anderson, Sr., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 350 Wis. 2d 505, 838 N.W.2d 136 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 30, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 8, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
James P. Daley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Sally Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by William 
E. Schmaal, assistant state public defender, and oral argument 
by William E. Schmaal.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 93
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  202011AP1467-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF2428) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Donyil Leeiton Anderson, Sr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
JUL 30, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the 
judgment of the Rock County Circuit Court2 convicting Donyil L. 
Anderson, Sr., of one count of first-degree intentional homicide 
and one count of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. 
¶2 
The question presented in this case is whether the 
circuit court erred in instructing the jury that "[a] temporary 
                                                 
1 State v. Anderson, No. 2011AP1467-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2013). 
2 The Honorable James P. Daley presided. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
2 
 
mental state which is brought into existence by the voluntary 
taking of drugs or alcohol does not constitute a mental defect."  
The State and Anderson both argue that this jury instruction was 
erroneous, but for different reasons.  Anderson argues that the 
jury instruction was erroneous because it failed to distinguish 
between prescription medication and illegal drugs.  As a result, 
the jury was prevented from considering whether his use of 
Strattera, a prescription medication used to treat Attention 
Deficit Disorder, supported an insanity defense.  The State's 
position is that the jury instruction was erroneous because 
Anderson's defense was premised on his reaction to the mixture 
of alcohol and Strattera.  Therefore, the instruction used the 
wrong conjunction by referring to "drugs or alcohol," rather 
than "drugs and alcohol."  However, the State argues that any 
error was harmless because as a matter of law, an insanity 
defense cannot be premised on a mental state arising from the 
voluntary use of drugs and alcohol. 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court's instruction to 
the jury was an accurate statement of the law.  This court has 
never determined that consumption of prescription medication can 
give rise to a mental defect that would sustain an insanity 
defense.  We decline to craft a new affirmative defense that 
would incorporate elements of the involuntary intoxication and 
insanity defenses simply because Anderson cannot meet the 
requirements of the involuntary intoxication defense statute.  
Moreover, even if the circuit court had instructed the jury that 
the consumption of "drugs and alcohol" cannot create a mental 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
3 
 
defect, Anderson would fare no better, because it is established 
law that one who mixes prescription medication with alcohol is 
responsible for any resulting mental state. Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
This case centers around an incident that arose in the 
early morning hours of August 9, 2008, when the defendant, 
Donyil L. Anderson, Sr. ("Anderson"), arrived at a residence he 
had previously shared with his then-girlfriend, Stacey Hosey 
("Hosey"), with whom he had a one-year-old son.  Upon arriving, 
Anderson saw the car of Hosey's new boyfriend, Branden Beavers-
Jackson ("Beavers-Jackson").  Anderson removed the car stereo 
from his own car and used it to smash the windows of Beavers-
Jackson's car.  Anderson then proceeded to kick in the back door 
of Hosey's home and enter the residence.  A neighbor witnessed 
Anderson's entry and called the police.     
¶5 
Upon entering the residence, Anderson stabbed Hosey 
multiple times with various kitchen knives.3  Anderson also 
stabbed Beavers-Jackson five times in the abdomen and hip.  
Shortly 
thereafter, 
as 
Officer 
Richard 
LeFeber 
("Officer 
                                                 
3 The criminal complaint filed against Anderson specifies 
that he inflicted "13 individual stab wounds to Hosey's back, a 
large laceration across the front of Hosey's neck near her 
throat and voice box area which was approximately 4" to 5" wide, 
a puncture wound below Hosey's left breast, several laceration 
and possible puncture wound [sic] to Hosey's left arm, spanning 
from her shoulder area all the way down to her wrist, one 
laceration to Hosey's right forearm which was approximately four 
inches long and several lacerations on both Hosey's hands which 
appeared to be defensive wounds." 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
4 
 
LeFeber") of the City of Beloit police department approached the 
scene, he saw Beavers-Jackson standing in his boxer shorts, 
covered in blood and waving frantically.  Officer LeFeber also 
found Hosey leaning against a nearby garage door, while Anderson 
lay motionless in Hosey's driveway.  Officer LeFeber called to 
Anderson, and Anderson stood up, held a four-inch kitchen knife 
above his head, and walked towards Officer LeFeber, asking to be 
killed.  Officer LeFeber ordered Anderson to drop the knife, but 
Anderson continued to approach, and Officer LeFeber subdued him 
with a Taser.  
¶6 
At the hospital, Anderson admitted to police that he 
had a few beers before the incident but stated he was not 
intoxicated.  Anderson also explained that he had been taking 
Strattera, a prescription medication used to treat Attention 
Deficit Disorder, for about two months, and it been making him 
"real edgy."4     
¶7 
Beavers-Jackson survived his injuries, but Hosey's 
wounds proved fatal.  Anderson was charged with one count of 
First-Degree Intentional Homicide and one count of Attempted 
First-Degree Intentional Homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 
940.01(1)(a) and 939.32 (2007-08).5   
                                                 
4 During the trial, a psychologist for Anderson's counseling 
center testified that Anderson was prescribed 80 milligrams of 
Strattera, to be taken once per day.   
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
At trial, the State presented its case-in-chief, and 
Anderson then entered an Alford plea on both counts.6  Anderson 
argued that he was not guilty by reason of insanity due to a 
mental disease or defect under Wis. Stat. § 971.15.  During the 
insanity phase of the trial, Anderson called an expert witness, 
Dr. Hugh Johnston ("Dr. Johnston").  Dr. Johnston testified that 
he believed Anderson suffered a temporary mental defect at the 
time of the homicide that made him unable to control himself or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  This 
condition, 
according 
to 
Dr. 
Johnston, 
was 
caused 
by 
a 
combination of four factors: (1) a lifelong impairment of the 
ability 
to 
exert 
self-control 
in 
emotionally 
provocative 
situations; (2) a major depressive disorder that was not 
appropriately treated; (3) the impact of Strattera on brain 
functioning; and (4) Anderson's ingestion of alcohol.7   Dr. 
Johnston 
explained 
that, 
while 
all 
of 
these 
factors 
simultaneously played a role in Anderson's behavior, he believed 
if Anderson had not been taking Strattera, it was "highly 
                                                 
6 "An Alford plea is a guilty plea in which the defendant 
pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or not 
admitting having committed the crime."  State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 856, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995). 
7 Dr. Johnston's written report recited the results of a 
blood alcohol test taken by hospital staff following the 
homicide as 0.176.  However, at trial, Dr. Johnston testified 
that Anderson's blood alcohol concentration was 0.0176.  It 
appears Dr. Johnston misspoke during trial, given that a later 
blood sample of Anderson revealed a blood alcohol concentration 
of 0.150——well above the 0.08 legal limit for driving in 
Wisconsin. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
6 
 
unlikely that Ms. Hosey would have been killed."  In Dr. 
Johnston's opinion, Anderson's use of Strattera played "a very 
important role" in the incident.   
¶9 
Dr. Johnston also described the half life of Strattera 
and explained that in most cases, a blood test administered 
twenty hours after consumption of Strattera would likely show no 
detectable traces of the medication.  Dr. Johnston further 
concluded that Anderson's ability to distinguish right from 
wrong was not impaired by his "abnormal mental state" at the 
time of the homicide.   
¶10 The State called its own expert witness during the 
trial, Dr. Christopher Tyre ("Dr. Tyre").  Dr. Tyre opined that 
Anderson had an antisocial personality disorder but did not 
suffer from a mental disease or defect due to a major depressive 
disorder or ingestion of alcohol and Strattera.  Dr. Tyre 
concluded that at the time of the incident, Anderson was able to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior.  
¶11 The State also called a toxicologist who examined the 
blood test administered to Anderson when he was taken into 
custody.  The toxicologist testified that the post-crime blood 
test administered to Anderson showed no detectable levels of 
Strattera in his blood.  
¶12 In addition, the State presented evidence that shortly 
before Anderson's arrival at Hosey's residence, he had been 
arrested for striking someone in a bar.  The arresting officer 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
7 
 
charged Anderson with battery but then released him because he 
did not appear to be intoxicated.   
¶13 At 
the 
close 
of 
evidence, 
a 
jury 
instructions 
conference was held, during which counsel discussed a modified 
version of a proposed pattern jury instruction indicating that 
the 
voluntary 
consumption 
of 
drugs 
or 
alcohol 
does 
not 
constitute a mental defect.  Anderson's counsel asked the 
circuit court to insert the word "street" before the word 
"drugs."  Instead, the circuit court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
The first question is at the time the crime was 
committed, did the defendant have a mental defect?  
Mental defect is an abnormal condition of the mind 
which 
substantially 
affects 
mental 
or 
emotional 
processes.  The term "mental defect" identifies a 
legal standard that may not exactly match the medical 
terms used by mental health professionals.  You are 
not 
bound 
by 
medical 
labels, 
definitions, 
or 
conclusions as to what is or is not a mental defect to 
which the witnesses may have referred.  
You should not find that a person is suffering from a 
mental defect merely because the person committed an 
act, committed a criminal act or because of the 
unnaturalness or enormity of the act or because a 
motive for the act may be lacking.  Temporary passion 
or frenzy prompted by revenge, hatred, jealousy, envy, 
or the like does not constitute a mental defect. . . . 
An abnormally, an abnormality [sic] manifested only by 
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct does 
not constitute a mental defect.  A temporary mental 
state which is brought into existence by the voluntary 
taking of drugs or alcohol does not constitute a 
mental defect.  
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
8 
 
(Emphasis added).  The jury found that Anderson did not have a 
mental defect at the time the crime was committed, and Anderson 
was therefore convicted.   
¶14 In an unpublished, per curiam opinion, the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court for a new 
trial on Anderson's insanity defense.  The court concluded that 
the real controversy in Anderson's case was not fully tried 
because the jury instruction incorrectly suggested that the 
consumption of prescription medication is voluntary and cannot 
give rise to a mental defect.  According to the court of 
appeals, the instruction prevented the jury from addressing 
whether Anderson's use of Strattera created a mental defect that 
made him unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
the law.  
¶15 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
accepted on January 13, 2014.  We now reverse. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 "'A circuit court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to give a requested jury instruction.'"  State v. 
Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶28, 313 Wis. 2d 1, 752 N.W.2d 839 (citing 
State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996)).  
We will not overturn a circuit court's decision to give or not 
give a requested jury instruction absent an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  Id.  "However, we independently review whether a 
jury instruction is an accurate statement of the law applicable 
to the facts of a given case."  State v. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, ¶9, 
281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594 (citation omitted).  "'If the 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
9 
 
overall meaning communicated by the instructions was a correct 
statement of the law, no grounds for reversal exist.'"  Hubbard, 
313 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27 (citing Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 
850, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992)).   
III. DISCUSSION 
¶17 The question before us is whether the circuit court's 
instruction to the jury that "[a] temporary mental state which 
is brought into existence by the voluntary taking of drugs or 
alcohol does not constitute a mental defect" was erroneous.  
Anderson argues that the jury instruction failed to distinguish 
between the use of prescription medication and the use of 
illegal drugs, and as a result, the jury was prevented from 
considering whether Anderson's use of Strattera could give rise 
to a mental defect.  Anderson relies on State v. Gardner, 230 
Wis. 2d 32, 601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1999), for the proposition 
that the consumption of prescription drugs is not "voluntary" 
for purposes of an insanity defense.  Gardner involved an 
involuntary intoxication defense under Wis. Stat. § 939.42, as 
opposed to an insanity defense under Wis. Stat. § 971.15, but 
Anderson maintains that the rationale applies equally to both 
defenses. 
¶18 The State concedes that the jury instruction was "not 
legally correct" because Anderson's defense was premised on his 
consumption 
of 
Strattera 
and 
alcohol, 
whereas 
the 
jury 
instruction discussed the taking of drugs or alcohol.  According 
to the State, an insanity defense would not be precluded by a 
defendant's consumption of prescription medication alone, but 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
10 
 
the 
defense 
is 
unavailable 
if 
the 
defendant 
mixes 
the 
prescription medication with alcohol.  However, the State argues 
that any error in the instruction was harmless, because even if 
the instruction had used "and" instead of "or," Anderson would 
still be ineligible for an insanity defense, because he admits 
he voluntarily consumed alcohol while taking Strattera. 
¶19 Although the State concedes that the jury instruction 
was incorrect, we are not bound by a party's concession of law.  
Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997).  
Moreover, we independently review whether a jury instruction is 
an accurate statement of the law.  Fonte, 281 Wis. 2d 654, ¶9.  
The State and Anderson both maintain that the jury instruction 
was erroneous, but as we discuss below, nothing in our case law 
supports the proposition that the consumption of prescription 
medication may form the basis for an insanity defense.  We 
therefore hold that the circuit court's jury instruction was a 
proper articulation of the law. 
¶20 We begin our discussion in Part A by reviewing the 
statutory and procedural requirements under Wis. Stat. § 971.15, 
the insanity defense statute, and Wis. Stat. § 939.42, the 
involuntary intoxication defense statute.  In Part B, we apply 
these requirements to the facts of this case and conclude that 
the circuit court's insanity defense instruction was an accurate 
statement of the law.   
A. Insanity and Involuntary Intoxication Defenses 
¶21  A criminal defendant may raise an affirmative defense 
of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, also known 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
11 
 
as an "insanity" or "NGI" defense.  Wis. Stat. § 971.15.  The 
defendant bears the burden of establishing the defense "to a 
reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 971.15(3).  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.15(1) 
provides that the defendant may establish an insanity defense by 
demonstrating that he lacked substantial capacity either to (1) 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or (2) conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.  
¶22 In contrast to an insanity defense under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.15, an involuntary intoxication defense is established if 
a defendant's intoxicated or drugged condition is involuntarily 
produced and either: (1) "Renders the [defendant] incapable of 
distinguishing between right and wrong;" or (2) "[n]egatives the 
existence of a state of mind essential to the crime."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.42.    
¶23 An insanity defense under Wis. Stat. § 971.15 has been 
described as "coextensive" with the involuntary intoxication 
defense in Wis. Stat. § 939.42, although each contains distinct 
elements.  See Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 38.  For instance, a 
defendant capable of distinguishing between right and wrong may 
not assert an involuntary intoxication defense but may still be 
able to raise an insanity defense.   
¶24 Beyond the defenses' distinct elements, each has 
unique 
procedural 
requirements 
that 
correspond 
to 
their 
respective substantive purposes.  For instance, when an insanity 
defense is asserted, the trial is bifurcated into two phases: a 
"guilt" phase and a "responsibility" or "insanity" phase.  Wis. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
12 
 
Stat. § 971.165(1); State v. Langenbach, 2001 WI App 222, ¶16, 
247 Wis. 2d 933, 634 N.W.2d 916.  During the guilt phase of the 
trial, the State must prove all the elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 
809, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995).  If the insanity defense succeeds, 
the defendant will be found "not responsible" for the criminal 
conduct, but is still subject to commitment and treatment.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.15, 971.17.   
¶25 In contrast, an involuntary intoxication defense does 
not result in a bifurcated trial; rather, the entire trial 
consists of a "guilt" phase, at the end of which a prevailing 
defendant is found "not guilty" due to involuntary intoxication.  
See Christine M. Wiseman & Michael Tobin, 9 Wisconsin Practice 
Series: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 17.25 (2d ed.) ("If 
the [involuntary intoxication] defense is successfully applied, 
the result will be an acquittal on the charge . . . .").  
B. The Circuit Court's Instruction to the Jury 
¶26 The jury instruction at issue in this case explained 
that "[a] temporary mental state which is brought into existence 
by the voluntary taking of drugs or alcohol does not constitute 
a mental defect."  Anderson stresses that the instruction failed 
to distinguish between prescription medication and illegal 
drugs.  As a result, Anderson argues the jury was prevented from 
considering whether his use of Strattera, in conjunction with 
his consumption of a moderate amount of alcohol, supported an 
insanity defense.  The State does not dispute that the 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
13 
 
instruction was erroneous, but instead takes the position that 
any resulting error was harmless. 
¶27 We disagree with both parties regarding the accuracy 
of the jury instruction.8  This court has never held that 
consumption of prescription medication may give rise to a mental 
defect that would sustain an insanity defense, and Anderson has 
failed to cite to any Wisconsin case law that supports the 
conclusion that it does.  The jury instruction was an accurate 
recital of the law.  We have never distinguished between the use 
of prescription drugs and the use of illegal drugs in the 
context of an insanity defense, and see no reason to do so now.  
Anderson's attempt to shoehorn an involuntary intoxication 
defense under the insanity statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.15, is 
essentially nothing more than a policy argument that is wholly 
unsupported by our case law.   
 
¶28 In general, when a defendant argues that prescription 
medication contributed to criminal conduct, the defense is 
raised under the involuntary intoxication statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.42.  However, Anderson cannot assert an involuntary 
intoxication defense because his own expert witness concedes 
that he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong at the 
time of the crime.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.42(1).  Consequently, 
Anderson is stuck with raising an insanity defense, which is not 
                                                 
8 Because we conclude that the circuit court's instruction 
to the jury was an accurate recital of the law, we need not 
address 
the 
State's 
argument 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting a new trial 
under Wis. Stat. § 752.35. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
14 
 
precluded by his expert's testimony.  To succeed on his defense, 
Anderson must invoke the second prong of the insanity defense, 
which asks whether he was able to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.9  As explained above, this latter prong 
is available only as an insanity defense and not as an 
involuntary intoxication defense.   
¶29 Anderson argues his use of Strattera should be able to 
form the basis of his insanity defense.  Anderson correctly 
points out that in Gardner, the court of appeals determined that 
the use of prescription medication can form the basis of an 
involuntary intoxication defense under Wis. Stat. § 939.42.  
Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40.  However, Anderson ignores the fact 
that this holding has never been extended to an insanity defense 
raised under Wis. Stat. § 971.15.  The involuntary intoxication 
defense focuses on the mental state of the defendant at the time 
of the crime and provides clear-cut requirements for the level 
of intoxication necessary to invoke the defense.  See Wiseman & 
Tobin, supra ¶25 ("The defendant's intoxicated mental state is a 
defense 
only 
if 
it 
rendered 
him 
or 
her 
incapable 
of 
distinguishing between right and wrong when the act was 
committed.").  In State v. Strege, 116 Wis. 2d 477, 486, 343 
N.W.2d 100 (1984), we explained that a defendant raising a 
voluntary intoxication defense "must come forward with some 
                                                 
9 Much like the involuntary intoxication defense, the first 
prong of the insanity defense asks whether the defendant was 
able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.  The 
testimony of Anderson's expert precludes him from raising a 
defense under this prong.  
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
15 
 
evidence of the degree of intoxication which constitutes the 
defense. An abundance of evidence which does not meet the legal 
standard for the defense will not suffice."  This rationale was 
applied to an involuntary intoxication defense in Funmaker v. 
Litscher, No. 00-C-625-C, 2001 WL 34377571, at *5 (W.D. Wis. 
Sept. 20, 2001).     
¶30 Because Anderson cannot demonstrate that he possessed 
the requisite mental state for an involuntary intoxication 
defense, he attempts to bypass the defense's requirements by 
framing his argument as an insanity defense.  In essence, 
Anderson asks us to create a new affirmative defense that would 
absolve a defendant whose use of prescription medication makes 
him unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.10   
¶31 At the same time, Anderson's argument would require us 
to ignore our existing precedent by holding that a jury 
instruction that provided for no such defense was in error.  In 
other words, Anderson asks us to change the law and make this 
change retroactively apply to the time when the circuit court 
                                                 
10 In fact, Anderson asks us to do even more.  In spite of 
Gardner's caveat that the use of prescription medication will 
not give rise to an involuntary intoxication defense when the 
defendant "mixes a prescription medication with alcohol or other 
controlled substances," Anderson asserts that only "excessive" 
consumption of alcohol, as opposed to "moderate" drinking, 
should prevent a defendant from raising an insanity defense.  
State v. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32, 42, 601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 
1999).  Anderson does not explain how "moderate," as opposed to 
"excessive," drinking should be gauged by this court, but as he 
provides no support for his proposed rule, the omission is of no 
consequence. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
16 
 
issued its jury instruction.  We decline to undertake such a 
gross overreaching of our judicial mandate.11  
¶32  The circuit court properly declined to amend the jury 
instruction to include an implied involuntary intoxication 
defense.  However, we note that even if the law provided for an 
insanity defense arising from a defendant's use of prescription 
medication, it would have been inappropriate for the circuit 
court to instruct the jury that consumption of Strattera could 
create a mental defect under the facts of this case.  The basis 
of Anderson's insanity defense was not his use of Strattera 
alone; rather, he argued that the drug, in combination with 
three other factors——including his consumption of alcohol——
created a mental defect.   
¶33 The State maintains that the circuit court erred by 
instructing the jury regarding the effects of drugs or alcohol, 
rather than drugs and alcohol.  The State's proposed jury 
instruction would read as follows: "[a] temporary mental state 
which is brought into existence by the voluntary taking of drugs 
and alcohol does not constitute a mental defect."  Because 
Anderson's argument is founded in part on his consumption of 
                                                 
11 We do not suggest that a defendant who takes prescription 
medication as directed is barred from raising an insanity 
defense.  The circuit court instructed the jury that "[a] 
temporary mental state which is brought into existence by the 
voluntary taking of drugs or alcohol does not constitute a 
mental defect."  (Emphasis added).  This instruction explained 
that use of prescription medication cannot create a mental 
defect, but it in no way precludes a defendant from asserting an 
insanity defense on other grounds. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
17 
 
alcohol along with Strattera, it is unquestionable that he would 
not prevail on his insanity defense regardless of whether the 
circuit court's instruction had used the term "and alcohol" 
instead of "or alcohol."  Assuming arguendo that the rationale 
in Gardner——which holds prescription drugs can form the basis of 
an involuntary intoxication defense——is also applicable to an 
insanity defense, any limitations to that defense would apply 
with equal force to this case.  And, as the court of appeals 
explained in Gardner, one who "mixes a prescription medication 
with alcohol or other controlled substances" is not eligible for 
the involuntary intoxication defense.12  Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 
42; see also City of Waukesha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401, 406, 
164 N.W.2d 314 (1969).   
¶34 Gardner's reasoning is in keeping with the generally 
accepted principle that an individual is responsible for the 
consequences that result from voluntary consumption of mind-
altering substances.  For instance, in State v. Kolisnitschenko, 
84 Wis. 2d 492, 499, 503, 267 N.W.2d 321 (1978), we explained 
that an insanity defense cannot be premised on the interaction 
between 
alcohol 
and 
illegal 
drugs, 
because 
"[o]ne 
who 
                                                 
12 Gardner also explained that the involuntary intoxication 
defense is available only to a defendant who takes his 
prescription medication as ordered.  Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 42.  
As the State points out, Anderson did not testify that he took 
his Strattera as prescribed, and at the time of the crime, there 
was no trace of Strattera in his bloodstream.  Anderson's friend 
testified at trial that he had once observed Anderson taking an 
unidentified medication three times a week, but the Strattera 
was prescribed as a daily medication. 
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
18 
 
intentionally consumes drugs should be held to have intended all 
the consequences of the resulting intoxicated condition," since 
"individual volition played a major part in producing that 
condition."  In Gardner, we extended this rationale to cases 
involving the interaction between alcohol and prescription 
medications.   
¶35 Anderson's 
claim 
shares 
similarities 
with 
the 
defendant's argument in Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401.  In Godfrey, 
the defendant consumed prescription codeine and alcohol and was 
charged with driving while intoxicated.  The defendant contested 
the 
circuit 
court's 
jury 
instruction 
that 
a 
driver 
is 
intoxicated "when his ability to operate a motor vehicle is 
appreciably or materially impaired because of his consumption of 
an 
alcoholic 
beverage 
or 
other 
intoxicating 
substance."  
Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d at 405 (emphasis added).  Godfrey argued 
that the instruction confused the jury regarding whether to 
consider his codeine consumption and its effect when mixed with 
alcohol.  We disagreed, explaining: "We fail to see how these 
assertions could favorably affect the plight of the unfortunate 
defendant.  A person who consumes an intoxicant along with 
medication, does so at his own peril."  Id. at 406.  Our 
reasoning in Godfrey equally applies in the context of an 
insanity 
defense. 
 
The 
established 
rule 
from 
Gardner, 
Kolisnitschenko, and Godfrey is that one who mixes drugs——
prescription or otherwise——with alcohol does so at his or her 
own risk and is responsible for any consequences that result.   
No. 
2011AP1467-CR   
 
19 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION  
¶36 We conclude that the circuit court's instruction to 
the jury was an accurate statement of the law.  We have never 
held that consumption of prescription medication can give rise 
to a mental defect that would sustain an insanity defense.  We 
decline 
to 
craft 
a 
new 
affirmative 
defense 
that 
would 
incorporate 
elements 
of 
the 
involuntary 
intoxication 
and 
insanity defenses simply because Anderson cannot meet the 
requirements of the involuntary intoxication defense statute.  
Moreover, even if the circuit court had instructed the jury that 
the consumption of "drugs and alcohol" cannot create a mental 
defect, Anderson would fare no better, because it is established 
law that one who mixes prescription medication with alcohol is 
responsible for any resulting mental state.  For these reasons, 
the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2011AP1467-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The defendant 
admitted to police that he had a few beers before he killed 
Stacey Hosey and stabbed Branden Beavers-Jackson.  Majority op., 
¶¶5-7.  Two blood tests taken after the homicide showed his 
blood alcohol concentration to be at least 0.15.  Id., ¶8 n.7.  
Anderson did not consume alcohol involuntarily.  Consequently, 
Anderson's claim of a temporary mental state brought into 
existence by the voluntary taking of a prescription drug could 
not prevail unless Anderson alleged and proved that his drinking 
had no effect on his allegedly drug-induced mental state.  His 
own expert testified otherwise.  Id., ¶8.  Accordingly, any 
error in the jury instruction would be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶38 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP1467-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the court of appeals that the jury instruction incorrectly 
conveyed 
to 
the 
jury 
that 
the 
voluntary 
consumption 
of 
prescription medication cannot give rise to a defense of not 
guilty by reason of insanity (NGI).1  
¶40 I disagree with the majority opinion's creation of a 
new rule that the effects of prescription medicines used as 
directed can never be the basis of an NGI defense.2   
¶41 I start with the statutes, the one governing NGI and 
the other governing involuntary intoxication.  The two are 
closely related.  They have distinctive features but also share 
certain legal similarities; violation of each might be proven by 
similar facts.3   
¶42 The NGI statute provides that a person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such 
                                                 
1 The case raises numerous issues, including preservation of 
objections in the circuit court and the power of the court of 
appeals under Wis. Stat. § 752.35 to grant a new trial.  The 
court of appeals' per curiam opinion addressed several of them.  
I address only the issue of the instruction.     
The legal concept of "voluntary intoxication" is not at 
issue here.  Voluntary intoxication cannot form the basis of 
NGI.  State v. Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492, 495, 503, 267 
N.W.2d 321 (1978).  Yet simply because a defendant's use of 
prescription drugs as directed is "voluntary" in common parlance 
does not mean that it causes "voluntary intoxication" as a legal 
concept.   
2 Majority op., ¶29-32. 
3 See State v. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32, 38, 601 N.W.2d 670 
(1999) (citing Wis JI——Criminal 755, cmt for the proposition 
that 
"[t]he 
involuntary 
intoxication 
standard . . . is 
coextensive with the mental responsibility test"). 
No.  2011AP1467-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the person 
lacked the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
or her conduct or conform to the requirements of the law.  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.15(1). 
¶43 The involuntary intoxication or drugged condition 
defense provides that a person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if, at the time the act is committed, the intoxicated or 
drugged condition is involuntarily produced and renders the 
actor incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in 
regard to the alleged criminal act.  Wis. Stat. § 939.42(1). 
¶44 A person who attempts to rely on an involuntary 
intoxication defense under Wis. Stat. § 939.42 can often meet 
the standard of possessing a "mental disease or defect" under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.15.  "[I]n regard to the effect which 
involuntary intoxication must produce in order to be considered 
a defense, the same test applies as in the case of mental 
disease or deficiency as a defense."  State v. Gardner, 230 
Wis. 2d 32, 38, 601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added, 
quoted source omitted).  In sum, the facts giving rise to an 
involuntary intoxication defense can also support an NGI 
defense.  
¶45 An involuntary intoxication defense can be based on 
prescription medicine, when used as directed by a medical 
professional.4  The majority opinion accepts this premise.  "It 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶29 (citing Gardner). 
No.  2011AP1467-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
is clear that the effects of prescription medication can form 
the basis of an involuntary intoxication defense."5 
¶46 In contrast, according to the majority opinion, under 
no circumstances may prescription medicine, when used as 
directed by a medical professional, be the basis of an NGI 
defense. 
¶47 I disagree with the majority opinion.  I agree with 
both parties in the instant case that based on Gardner,6 
Kolisnitschenko,7 and Gibson,8 a temporary mental state that is 
brought into existence by the taking of a prescription medicine 
as directed can qualify as a mental defect for purposes of an 
NGI defense.   
¶48 I reach this conclusion not only on the basis of these 
specific cases but also on the basis of the underlying statutes, 
which demonstrate that the defenses of NGI and involuntary 
intoxication are closely related in the law.  If the effects of 
prescription medicines used as directed can form the basis of 
involuntary intoxication, why cannot the effects of prescription 
medicines used as directed form the basis of an NGI defense, 
when the two defenses overlap?  Why does the majority opinion 
create a new per se rule that is inconsistent with the 
                                                 
5 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40, 41-42.  
6 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32. 
7 Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492. 
8 Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110, 197 N.W.2d 813 (1972). 
No.  2011AP1467-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
overlapping aspects of the NGI and involuntary intoxication 
defenses?9   
¶49 I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion, which 
reaches what on its face appears to be a conclusion contrary to 
the statutes and case law.   
¶50 In any event, the real dispute between the parties  
focuses on whether the defendant's use of a combination of 
prescription drugs and alcohol may constitute the basis of an 
NGI defense.  The State urges that a temporary mental state 
brought into existence by the voluntary taking of prescribed 
medicine as directed in combination with alcohol (no matter how 
small an amount) cannot be the basis of an NGI defense.   
¶51 The majority opinion need not grapple with this issue 
because it holds that a defendant who consumes only prescription 
drugs is not eligible for an NGI defense.  Under the majority 
opinion, whether the defendant consumed alcoholic beverages 
along with the prescription medication is irrelevant. 
¶52 Because the majority opinion fails to provide any 
reason why the use of prescription drugs as directed cannot form 
the basis of an NGI defense when our case law already recognizes 
that such use can form the basis of an involuntary intoxication 
defense, I dissent. 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶29. 
No.  2011AP1467-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1