Title: Ex Parte Parr
Citation: 505 S.W.2d 242
Docket Number: B-4280
State: Texas
Issuer: Texas Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1974

505 S.W.2d 242 (1974) Ex parte Jody Martin PARR. No. B-4280. Supreme Court of Texas. February 6, 1974. Walker, Strahan, Brunson &amp; Watts, Larry Watts, Houston, A. J. Pope, III, Corpus Christi, for relator. Perkins, Davis, Oden &amp; Warburton, Kenneth Oden, Alice, John J. Pichinson, Mahoney, Shaffer, Hatch &amp; Layton, Lee Mahoney, Spitz &amp; Grossman, Oscar Spitz, Corpus Christi, for respondent. STEAKLEY, Justice. This is an original habeas corpus proceeding. The Relator is Jody Martin Parr, who was found guilty of contempt of the Court by Honorable Magus Smith, Judge presiding, and sentenced to jail for one hundred fifty days.[1] We granted Relator's petition to determine whether she was afforded the due process of law requisites of fair notice and opportunity to be heard. Ex Parte Thetford, 369 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.1963); Ex Parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 186 S.W.2d 225 (1945); and Ex Parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 239 S.W. 1101 (1922). *243 The chain of events, as pertinent here, was as follows. On June 25, 1973, Relator filed suit for divorce from Archer Parr in the Court of Domestic Relations of Nueces County, Texas. On July 3, 1973, Archer Parr filed suit for divorce from Relator in the 229th District Court of Duval County, Texas. On August 4, 1973, the First State Bank of San Diego, Texas, filed suit in the 229th District Court of Duval County, seeking judgment against Relator and Archer Parr on an alleged promissory note in the principal sum of $125,000. Also on August 4, Honorable O. P. Carrillo, Judge of the 229th District Court, Issued an order temporarily restraining Relator and Archer Parr from proceeding in their divorce suits or from interfering with any of their assets. On August 15, 1973, Judge Carrillo appointed a Receiver "to take charge of said separate and community property of the defendants Archer Parr and Jody Martin Parr." Relator has appealed this order to the Court of Civil Appeals. On August 28, 1973, Judge Carrillo entered an additional order consolidating other suits of alleged creditors against Relator and Archer Parr. He further ordered Relator and Archer Parr "to account for and turn over to the Receiver ... all sums of money in their possession or under their control plus all stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, insurance policies, jewelry, paintings and all other assets that are in the possession and/or control of the said defendants Archer Parr and Jody Martin Parr immediately upon being notified to do so by said Receiver." On October 1, 1973, the Receiver filed a contempt affidavit complaining of Relator and Bonnie M. White, Relator's sister. In brief, the affidavit alleged that Relator had refused to obey the prior orders of the Court and among other acts, had refused to surrender possession of certain described property. It was also alleged that Relator physically assaulted and cursed the Receiver. The prayer was that Relator and her sister be cited to appear to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt, and that after hearing, each of them be punished for contempt. On October 5, 1973, Honorable Magus F. Smith, Judge presiding, issued a show cause order commanding Relator and her sister to appear in the 229th District courtroom of Duval County to show cause why they should not be found and adjudged guilty of contempt. The hearing on the show cause order was heard by Judge Smith on October 19, 1973, at the conclusion of which he stated in open Court: This colloquy then occurred: A court docket entry reading as follows is also shown by the record: "10-19-73 Motion for contempt heard. Mrs. Parr ordered to jail for 90 days but allowed to purge herself by disclosing certain facts within 10 days as per decree." However, neither a decree nor an order of commitment to such effect was entered. It is further shown that subsequent to the October 19 hearing, Relator invoked the Federal Bankruptcy Act. In doing so, she subjected the property in her control to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. It is further recited in the record "that on this 31st day of October, 1973, pursuant to previous setting and notice, at a continuation of the hearing of the affidavit for contempt aforementioned, the following proceedings were had...." At this time Judge Smith stated: Counsel for Relator then stated to the Court: Later in this continued hearing, counsel for Relator referred to the prior hearing of October 19, as if Relator had been found guilty of contempt, conditioned upon purgation; thereupon this colloquy occurred: MR. WATTS: Then she has not been found in contempt yet? At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Smith made the following announcement: Counsel for Relator then inquired if there was a method of purgation whereby Relator might purge herself at that time, to which the Court replied, "I think all other avenues have been foreclosed. You have put it in Federal Court, and I can't do anything about it." The Court was then asked by counsel for Relator what would be required for Relator to purge herself, to which Judge Smith replied, "A hundred and fifty days in jail." As indicated earlier, the question is whether Relator was afforded due process in the procedure under which her punishment for contempt was assessed at one hundred fifty days in jail. We do not question the power of Judge Smith to place her in jail for ninety days or for one hundred fifty days. Nor do we have the question of whether she may be placed in such restraint for ninety days pursuant to Judge Smith's earlier announcement. An order to such effect was not entered. The commitment in question orders Relator to jail for one hundred fifty days pursuant to the only decree entered by Judge Smith. As to this, Relator is entitled to know what acts or failures subject her to punishment and to be afforded the opportunity to be *246 heard as to why, if guilty of contempt, she should be spared. If her conduct in asking for time to purge herself, and in then using the granted grace period to deliver her property to a Receiver in Bankruptcy, is to subject her to an additional sixty days in jail, she should have been given notice of new gravamen and exposure and be given the opportunity to be heard. In the absence of any advance word that the announced sentence of ninety days might be increased, and with no other reason for the increase being given by Judge Smith, we are entitled to conclude that the extra sentence of sixty days was caused by the conduct of Relator after October 19. If so, she has been denied due process. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), where it was held that the imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be no less a violation of due process of law. The Relator is ordered discharged. Concurring opinion by SAM D. JOHNSON, J. POPE, J., not sitting. SAM D. JOHNSON, Justice (concurring). It is beyond question that the trial court judge found the relator in contempt of court on October 19, 1973; he so announced and her punishment was set at confinement in the county jail for ninety days. It was in response to the request of the attorney for the relator that the trial court judge thereupon gave the relator one week in which to purge herself from the punishment assessed. At the subsequent hearing on October 31, 1973 the relator made no attempt to purge herself and of course did not do so. The trial court judge was at that time empowered to enter his judgment of contempt for any period of time not in excess of ninety days. The trial court judge increased the punishment for contempt from ninety to 150 days, however, and it is this action, this increase in the punishment, without hearing or justification which the majority holds violative of due process. There is no dissent from this determination. The majority opinion in the next to last paragraph states, "[n]or do we have the question of whether she may be placed in such restraint for ninety days pursuant to Judge Smith's earlier announcement. An order to such effect was not entered." The power of the trial court judge now to enter a judgment in conformity with his announced determination of October 19, 1973 is not reached by the majority. This writer is of the opinion that the trial court judge, if he so chooses, is not now inhibited from entering a judgment in conformity with his announced determination of October 19, 1973. [1] Vernon's Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1911a, § 2(a) (Supp.1972): Sec. 2. (a) Every court other than a justice court or municipal court may punish by a fine of not more than $500, or by confinement in the county jail for not more than six months, or both, any person guilty of contempt of the court....