Title: Nesbitt v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50078
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2003

Filed: June 5, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

TIM NESBITT,
TRICIA BOSAK, and KRIS KAIN,
	Petitioners,
	v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
	Respondent.
(SC S50078)

	On petitions objecting to modified ballot title.
	Submitted on the record April 14, 2003.
	Lynn-Marie Crider, Salem, filed the petition objecting to
modified ballot title for petitioner Nesbitt.
	Margaret S. Olney, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond &amp; Olney,
Portland, filed the petition objecting to modified ballot title
for petitioners Bosak and Kain.
	Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the response to objections for respondent.  With him on the
response were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
	GILLETTE, J.
	Modified ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
		GILLETTE, J.
		This ballot title review proceeding is before us again
following our previous referral for modification of the Attorney
General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 22
(2004).  Nesbitt v. Myers, 335 Or 219, 224-27, 64 P3d 1133
(2003).  The Attorney General has prepared and filed a modified
ballot title, which petitioners now challenge.  See ORS
250.085(9) (prescribing procedure for modifying ballot title
after referral). (1)  We find certain of petitioners' objections to
be well taken and, therefore, refer the modified ballot title to
the Attorney General.
		In our earlier opinion, we described the proposed
measure as follows:
	"The proposed measure, if adopted, would amend the
Oregon Constitution by adding a section forbidding use
'for a political purpose,' as the proposed measure
defines that phrase, of money deducted from an
employee's paycheck, unless the employee consents to
such use annually and in writing.  The proposed measure
contains definitions of certain of its terms,
prescribes certain administrative requirements that
must be followed by those who receive money from
payroll deductions if the proposed measure is adopted,
and prescribes the various consequences that are to
follow if any of its substantive provisions is
violated."
Nesbitt, 335 Or at 221.  For convenience, we set out the Attorney
General's modified ballot title for the proposed measure:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ENTITIES RECEIVING
PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS CANNOT USE THEM
FOR 'POLITICAL PURPOSES' (DEFINED) WITHOUT
EMPLOYEE'S WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION 

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote requires
entities receiving payroll deductions to obtain
employee's written, annual authorization and comply
with additional limitations before using deductions for
'political purposes' (defined).
		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects
requirement that entities receiving payroll deductions
obtain employee's authorization and comply with
additional limitations before using payroll deductions
for 'political purposes' (defined).
		"SUMMARY: Amends Constitution.  Measure prohibits
entities receiving payroll deductions from using those
deductions for 'political purposes' (defined below)
without employee's permission annually granted on form
used for this purpose; legislature must ensure personal
information is neither on form nor publicly available. 
Measure defines deductions used for 'political
purposes' as deductions for which any portion is:
contributed to candidate, political committee, party;
or spent supporting/opposing ballot measure or public-office candidate.  Deductions are not used for
'political purposes' when spent lobbying, unless spent
on communications identifying public-office candidate
within 60 days of election.  Entities receiving payroll
deductions to be used for "political purposes" (defined
above) must place them in segregated accounts and
cannot commingle political funds with other funds. 
Establishes penalties for violations.  Other
provisions."
		Our review of a modified ballot title has the same
scope as our review of a certified ballot title, i.e., we review
to "determine whether the modified ballot title substantially
complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035."  ORS 250.085(9). 
Petitioners assert that the Attorney General's modified ballot
title in this case fails that test with respect to each of the
ballot title's four sections -- the caption, "yes" vote result
statement, "no" vote result statement, and summary.  We address
petitioners' contentions in that order.
THE CAPTION

		As noted, the Attorney General's modified ballot title
caption states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ENTITIES RECEIVING
PAYROLL 
DEDUCTIONS CANNOT USE THEM
FOR 'POLITICAL PURPOSES' (DEFINED) WITHOUT
EMPLOYEE'S WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION" 

Petitioner Nesbitt notes that this court in its earlier opinion
concerning the certified ballot title stated that "the proposed
measure focuses wholly on what organizations that receive money
through payroll deductions may do with that money," Nesbitt, 335
Or at 224, and that the "proposed measure would enact a complete
regime of limitations on the use for 'political purposes' of any
funds obtained by any organization, public or private, through
payroll deduction."  Id. at 225.  It follows from those
statements, petitioner Nesbitt argues, that "the ballot title
must clearly describe this new regime and must tell the voters
that current law imposes no such restrictions on the use of money
-- whether [the money] is received via payroll deduction or by
any other means". 			
		Based on the foregoing, petitioner Nesbitt argues that
the Attorney General's caption fails to "reasonably identif[y]
the subject matter of the state measure," as ORS 250.035(2)(a)
requires.  He asserts that the flaw in the modified caption is
that it describes the various unions, businesses, charities, and
others who presently receive money through voluntary payroll
deductions by the phrase "entities receiving payroll deductions." 
Petitioner Nesbitt argues that the Attorney General instead
should use what he asserts is an accurate descriptive phrase,
viz., "organizations receiving money by payroll deduction."  The
Attorney General's choice of phrase, he maintains, is
impermissibly obscure.  
We disagree with petitioner Nesbitt's premise that,
even when the phrase is read in context, the average voter will
read "entities receiving payroll deductions" to mean something
different than "organizations receiving money by payroll
deduction."  In our view, the former phrase is a permissible
variant of the latter.  Certainly, we cannot say that the choice
of one permissible choice of phrase over another permissible
choice means that the Attorney General's modified caption fails
to comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(a).  Accordingly, we
decline to require the Attorney General further to modify the
wording of his modified caption. (2)
THE "YES" VOTE RESULT STATEMENT

		As noted, the Attorney General's modified "yes" vote
result statement provides:
		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote requires
entities receiving payroll deductions to obtain
employee's written, annual authorization and comply
with additional limitations before using deductions for
'political purposes' (defined)."
		Petitioner Nesbitt asserts that the Attorney General's
"yes" vote result statement "is misleading, if not actually
inaccurate."  The difficulty, he asserts, arises out of the fact
that, as now written, the modified "yes" vote results statement
	"would lead one to assume that the conditions [that the
proposed measure would place on spending money for
political purposes] may be met as a matter of course --
that the issue is when political spending can occur
rather than whether it can occur.  In addition, the
language [of the modified 'yes' vote result statement]
does not state that an organization that receives
payroll-deducted money cannot spend for political
purposes unless it obtains a specific written
authorization of political spending."			
(Emphasis in original.)  He then proposes wording that he asserts
would meet his objections.
Our problem with that argument is that we do not read
the Attorney General's modified "yes" vote result statement the
same way that petitioner Nesbitt does.  Respecting his first
concern, we perceive no intimation in the statement that suggests
that meeting the conditions the proposed measure would set would be simple or routine.  Respecting his second concern, we read the
statement to say specifically what he wants it to say, viz., that
the employee's written, annual authorization must be for the use
of a payroll deduction for political purposes.  Perhaps that
proposition could be made even more explicit by adjusting the
wording in the statement to more directly connect "written,
annual authorization" with "deductions for political purposes." 
But the Attorney General's failure to do so does not mean that
the modified "yes" vote result statement fails to comply
substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(b).  We
decline to require the Attorney General further to modify the
wording of his modified "yes" vote result statement. (3)
THE "NO" VOTE RESULT STATEMENT

		As noted, the Attorney General's modified "no" vote
result statement provides:
		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects
requirement that entities receiving payroll deductions
obtain employee's authorization and comply with
additional limitations before using payroll deductions
for 'political purposes' (defined)."
		All petitioners assert that, as petitioner Nesbitt puts
it,  the Attorney General's "no" vote result statement "simply
tells the voters that a 'no' vote will reject what has already
been described [as] the result of the 'yes' vote."  That,
petitioner argues, means that the "no" vote result statement
provides no further information to the voter, thereby rendering
the statement essentially pointless.  In so arguing, petitioners
rely on Kain v. Myers, 335 Or 228, 64 P3d 1129 (2003), a case
also involving a proposed initiative measure relating to
permissible use of money obtained by payroll deductions.  In that
case, as here, the Attorney General's "no" vote result statement
essentially mirrored his "yes" vote result statement, introduced
by the word "reject."  This court observed:
"Petitioners further argue that the Attorney
General's 'no' vote result statement is not 'simple and
understandable,' as the statute demands * * *.  We
agree with petitioners that the statement is not
understandable, because it provides no new information
to the reader.  Instead, it simply attaches the word
'rejects' to the same summary of the proposed measure
that appeared in the 'yes' vote result statement.  That
is, the substantive message of the Attorney General's
'no' vote result statement is that '"no" rejects
"yes".'  That is not a sufficient explanation to meet
the requirement of ORS 250.035(2)(c)." (4)
Id. at 234-35.
	The Attorney General makes three discrete responses to
petitioners' argument.  He argues, first, that what this court
actually ruled with respect to the original "no" vote result
statement was that "the proposed measure would not affect current
law and, as a result, the 'no' vote result statement should not
describe current law."
	That is not what we stated.  The Attorney General's
original "no" vote result statement provided, in part, that a
"'[n]o' vote retains, without modification, current provisions
governing payroll deductions."  What we stated about that part of
the original "no" vote result statement was that the reference to
"current provisions" was misleading, because some provisions (we
cited several) would not be modified, whether or not the proposed
measure is adopted.  Nesbitt, 335 Or at 225-26.  That was a
limited holding.  It did not address the permissibility or the
possibility of saying something else about the state of existing
law that properly would contrast with the result of a "yes" vote
on the proposed measure.  In short, our previous holding in this
case is no barrier to a discussion of what the present state of
the law is with respect to who may receive payroll deductions or
to what purposes those deductions, once received, may be put.
	The Attorney General next argues that, 
	"even if this court * * * intended that the modified
'no' vote result statement say something about the
current law a 'no' vote would 'retain,' the Attorney
General has been unable to discern an accurate way to
describe retained current law within the [statutory]
25-word limit [set by ORS 250.035(2)(c)]."
We do not wish to be understood as in any way denigrating the
time-pressured nature of the Attorney General's task in writing
(or, in this case, rewriting) ballot titles.  Still, we find the
Attorney General's assertion that he cannot discern any way to
make a valid reference to existing law in the space allowed
surprising.  It surely is possible, for example, to refer to the
fact that no current law limits the uses to which properly
deducted funds may be put or to the fact that no current law
requires that such funds that are earmarked for "political
purposes" be segregated by the entities that use them.  
	We do not assert that there never will be a time when
it is permissible, under ORS 250.035(2)(c), for the Attorney
General to certify a "no" vote result statement that simply
inserts a "rejects" in front of the words of the "yes" vote
result statement.  Each case will have to be judged on its own
merits.  But, as this court explained in Kain, a statement that
says no more than that "'no' rejects 'yes'" does not much advance
any voter's understanding of the choice that a proposed measure
represents.  Certainly, before resorting to the "'no' rejects
'yes'" statement as a default position, the Attorney General
needs to be reasonably satisfied that he cannot compose other
possible formulations of the "no" vote result statement that will
provide the voter with a greater amount of information.  In this
case, he has not persuaded us that that is true.
	Finally, the Attorney General argues that 
	"a 'rejects' formulation is entirely consistent with
the pertinent statutory requirements.  A 'no' vote
would, in fact, have the result of rejecting the new
limitations that the proposed measure would impose. 
Therefore, it is accurate to say that a 'no' vote has
the result of 'rejecting' the proposed measure's new
provisions.  Indeed, ORS 250.035(3) expressly provides
that a 'yes' vote result statement and a 'no' vote
result statement 'shall be written so that, to the
extent practicable, the language of the two statements
is parallel.'  That language implicitly authorizes a
'rejects' formulation that parallels a 'yes' vote
result statement, even if that means the 'no' vote
result statement provides little or no new
information."
In other words, this court now should withdraw its holding in
Kain.  
		We decline the invitation.  The function of the "no"
vote result statement is to provide a voter with a "simple and
understandable statement of not more than 25 words that describes
the result if the state measure is rejected."  ORS 250.035(2)(c)
(emphasis added).  That emphasized wording, examined in light of
the contrasting information that ORS 250.035(2)(b) requires in a
"yes" vote result statement, in our view, states an expectation
that, when possible, the "no" vote result statement will provide
information that should assist the voter to understand the state
of affairs that will exist if the voters reject the proposed
measure.  It is no news to a voter that voting "no" means "not
yes."  Thus, although simple parallelism may fulfill the
emphasized statutory goal in the abstract, it will do so only
mindlessly in many cases.  
		We hold that the present case is not one in which the
Attorney General has shown that a "no" vote result statement
paralleling the "yes" vote result statement meets the requirement
of ORS 250.035(2)(c) that the "no" vote result statement be a
simple and understandable statement "describ[ing] the result if
the state measure is rejected."  Accordingly, the matter once
again must be referred to the Attorney General.  ORS
250.085(10)(b).
THE SUMMARY

		As noted, the Attorney General's modified summary
states:
		"SUMMARY: Amends Constitution.  Measure prohibits
entities receiving payroll deductions from using those
deductions for 'political purposes' (defined below)
without employee's permission annually granted on form
used for this purpose; legislature must ensure personal
information is neither on form nor publicly available. 
Measure defines deductions used for 'political
purposes' as deductions for which any portion is:
contributed to candidate, political committee, party;
or spent supporting/opposing ballot measure or public-office candidate.  Deductions are not used for
'political purposes' when spent lobbying, unless spent
on communications identifying public-office candidate
within 60 days of election.  Entities receiving payroll
deductions to be used for "political purposes" (defined
above) must place them in segregated accounts and
cannot commingle political funds with other funds. 
Establishes penalties for violations.  Other
provisions."
		In our earlier opinion, we stated the following
respecting the Attorney General's original summary:
	"[P]etitioners challenge the Attorney General's use of
a part of the summary to refer to provisions of law
that would not be affected if the proposed measure were
to pass.  We agree with petitioners that devoting too
extensive a part of the summary to that topic does not
further the summarization either of the measure or its
major effect.  We conclude, therefore, that its
inclusion is inappropriate * * *."
Nesbitt, 335 Or at 226-27.  As can be seen, the Attorney
General's response to that criticism was to omit from the summary
any discussion at all of present law.  Petitioners now complain
that that is an overreaction that denies to voters the necessary
context within which to understand the scope and effect of the
changes that would come about if the proposed measure were
adopted.  The Attorney General essentially defends his choice by
asserting that it follows from this court's critique of his
original summary.
	We disagree with the Attorney General to the extent
that he appears to be arguing that this court's earlier opinion 
required (or even authorized) him to omit any discussion of
current law, even where that discussion provided relevant context
for the voter's choice.  Indeed, that is precisely the reason
that this court stated only that "too extensive" a part of the
original summary was devoted to current law "that would not be
affected if the proposed measure were to pass."  Id. at 226. 
	Petitioners specifically complain that the original
summary's inclusion of a description of current legal limitations
on the uses to which unions may put payroll deductions was
relevant (and even necessary) context that should be included in
the new summary.  We do not believe that we should address that
argument now.  The Attorney General's defense of his choice to
omit any discussion of current law was based on his understanding
from this court's earlier opinion that such a categorical
omission was appropriate.  We now have explained that his
understanding was not correct.  With that clarification, we
assume that the Attorney General will make permissible choices
respecting which current law to discuss, based on his estimation
of the relative value of including that information and omitting
other information that his present summary contains.
	In summary, we hold that the Attorney General's
modified ballot title fails to comply with the requirements of
ORS 250.035.  The modified ballot title must be referred to the
Attorney General.  ORS 250.085(10)(b).
	Modified ballot title referred to Attorney General for
modification.	


1. 	ORS 250.085(9) limits further challenges, once the
Attorney General has filed a modified ballot title, to "any of
the parties to the ballot title review proceeding [who] timely
files a petition objecting to the modified ballot title." 
Petitioners here meet the foregoing qualifications.

2. 	We have considered the separate argument of petitioners
Kain and Bosak respecting the Attorney General's modified
caption.  It is not well taken.

3. 	We have considered the separate argument of petitioners
Kain and Bosak respecting the Attorney General's modified "yes"
vote result statement.  It is not well taken.

4. 	We also were critical of a similarly constructed "no"
vote result statement in our earlier opinion respecting the
ballot title for this proposed measure.  Nesbitt, 335 Or at 226. 
However, we did not refer the "no" vote result statement to the
Attorney General on that ground, because there was another basis
for declaring that the statement as written did not conform to
the requirement of ORS 250.035(2)(c).  See Nesbitt, 335 Or at
225-26 (form of reference in "no" vote result statement to
existing statutory law failed to comply with ORS 250.035(2)(c)).