Title: State v. Icard
Citation: 363 N.C. 303
Docket Number: 236A08
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2009

Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 236A08
FILED: 18 JUNE 2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
LORI SHANNON ICARD
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 190 N.C.
App. 76, 660 S.E.2d 142 (2008), finding no error in part in a
judgment entered on 1 December 2006 by Judge Robert C. Ervin in
Superior Court, Catawba County, and remanding for further
findings in part.  Heard in the Supreme Court 15 October 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
C. Scott Holmes for defendant-appellee.
EDMUNDS, Justice.
This case presents the question whether a police
encounter with defendant triggered defendant’s Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable seizure.  We conclude that a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have felt
free to refuse an officer’s request to search her purse or
otherwise terminate the encounter under the totality of
circumstances that here included the officer’s initiation of the
encounter, his declaration to defendant and her companion that he
was investigating drug crimes and prostitution, his call for a
backup officer, his persistence when defendant did not respond to
his initial efforts to make contact, his request that defendant
-2-
produce identification, and his requests to defendant that she
both exit the vehicle with her purse and allow him to ascertain
its contents.  Accordingly, we determine that defendant was
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Because the
taint of the illegal seizure of defendant had no opportunity to
dissipate before the search of her purse, we hold that the trial
court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
At defendant’s trial, the State presented evidence that
at approximately 12:30 a.m. on 21 September 2004, Maiden Police
Department Officer Curt Moore drove into the parking lot of
Fairview Market, a truck stop on the corner of West Maiden Road
and Startown Road in Maiden, North Carolina.  Officer Moore
considered Fairview Market to be a high crime area because of
complaints of prostitution and drug-related activity there.  As
he entered the parking lot, Officer Moore noticed a pickup truck
approximately fifteen feet from the northwest corner of the
Fairview Market building.  He did not then see anyone in the
truck.  Although the truck was taking up two spaces, it was not
illegally parked.
Officer Moore drove past the truck from behind, then
circled the building.  As he again approached the truck, he
observed a silhouette above the steering wheel that, because of
the lighting, he could not identify.  Officer Moore parked his
police vehicle directly behind the truck with his headlights on
and his blue strobe visor lights activated.  The truck was not
pinned in by the police car.  Officer Moore provided the truck’s
plate number and description to his dispatcher.
-3-
Officer Moore, who was in uniform with his service
revolver visible, exited his vehicle and walked toward the
driver’s side door of the truck.  As he approached, the driver
partially lowered his window and Officer Moore observed two
individuals sitting in the truck.  He subsequently learned that
the driver was Carmen Coleman and the passenger was defendant
Lori Icard.  Officer Moore requested Coleman’s driver’s license
and vehicle registration and also asked why he and defendant were
parked at Fairview Market.  Coleman explained that they were from
Connelly Springs, North Carolina, and were waiting to meet a
friend named Jody who was coming from Taylorsville, North
Carolina.  Officer Moore advised Coleman that he and defendant
were being “checked out . . . because of the numerous complaints
of prostitution and drugs in that area.”  He took Coleman’s
driver’s license and registration back to his police vehicle,
where he requested a warrant check, a license check, and backup
assistance.  Although these checks did not reveal anything
suspicious, Officer Moore held on to Coleman’s license and
registration.
Responding to Officer Moore’s call for backup, Officer
Darby Hedrick arrived in a marked police car and parked behind
Coleman’s truck, parallel to Officer Moore’s vehicle.  Officer
Moore turned off his visor lights and Officer Hedrick activated
his take-down spotlights to illuminate defendant’s side of the
truck.  Officer Moore approached the truck door on defendant’s
side, while Officer Hedrick stood behind him at the midpoint of
the truck bed.
-4-
Officer Moore rapped on defendant’s side window with
his knuckles, but she did not respond.  He rapped again, and when
defendant again did not respond, Officer Moore opened the truck
door, identified himself as a police officer, and asked if she
was carrying identification.  Although defendant answered that
her ID card was in her other purse, Officer Moore pointed to a
small black zippered bag on the truck’s floorboard and asked if
the ID might be inside.  Defendant opened the bag and removed a
billfold, from which she produced a North Carolina identification
card.  Officer Moore looked at the card, then asked defendant to
bring her purse with her to the back of the truck, where both
officers proceeded to question her.  During the questioning,
Officer Moore asked if he could look in defendant’s purse.  She
responded by handing it to him.  Officer Moore searched the purse
and in it found several bullets, a glass tube that appeared
burned at one end, and a clear plastic bag containing a residue
that was later determined to be methamphetamine.
The officers had separated defendant from Coleman to
determine whether they gave consistent stories.  When Coleman was
questioned, Officer Moore took a lockblade clip-type knife from
Coleman’s pocket.  Coleman also handed Officer Moore a clear
plastic bag containing marijuana, and another clear plastic bag
containing a white- and tan-colored powder.  Coleman then
struggled briefly and unsuccessfully with Officer Moore.  Once
Coleman was subdued, a search of the truck revealed glass pipes
commonly used to inhale controlled substances, crack pipes, a
-5-
digital scale, a loaded Rossi .357 pistol, and a transparent
yellow plastic bag containing tan powder.
Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a
law enforcement officer, possession with intent to sell and
deliver cocaine, possession with intent to sell and deliver
marijuana, possession with intent to sell and deliver
methamphetamine, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of
drug paraphernalia.  At trial, defendant made an oral motion to
suppress the State’s evidence.  The trial court conducted a voir
dire hearing on defendant’s motion outside the presence of the
jury.  In addition to the evidence recited above, Officer Moore
testified that he had not observed any contraband and did not
have a reason to pat down defendant for weapons when he asked her
to step out of the truck.  Officer Moore believed his encounter
with defendant was consensual because she complied with his
verbal instructions.  However, Officer Moore testified that he
did not tell defendant she was free to leave, that in fact she
was not free to leave, and that he would not have allowed
defendant to walk away from the truck.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress,
orally stating that, as a matter of law, defendant was not seized
at the time she consented to the search of her purse.  In its
subsequent written order, the trial court made findings of fact
that Officer Moore “did not pat down or frisk the defendant for
weapons,” “did not threaten the defendant in any way,” and “did
not place his hand on her at any time.”  The court also found
that while Officer Moore carried a service weapon, “[h]e did not
-6-
remove that weapon from its holster.”  Finally, the trial court
found that Officer Moore “did not apply physical force, make any
threat of force or make a show of authority at any time prior to
the discovery of the drug paraphernalia in the defendant’s
purse,” and “did not coerce the defendant’s cooperation with his
requests.”  Based upon “the totality of the circumstances,” the
trial court concluded as a matter of law that “the defendant
would not have felt that she was not free to terminate the
encounter or decline [Officer] Moore’s requests,” and that
“[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant
cooperated with [Officer] Moore’s requests and her cooperation
was not coerced by physical force or a show of authority.”
When the case was called for trial, the State
voluntarily dismissed the charge of possession with intent to
sell and deliver cocaine.  Defendant moved to dismiss all the
remaining charges at the close of the State’s evidence, and the
trial court allowed defendant’s motion as to the charges of
possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana and carrying
a concealed weapon.  The court also dismissed the charge of
possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine, but
found sufficient evidence to support submission of the
lesser-included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine. 
The court denied defendant’s motions to dismiss the charges of
possession of drug paraphernalia and resisting and obstructing a
law enforcement officer.  The jury found defendant guilty of
simple possession of methamphetamine and acquitted her of the
remaining charges.
-7-
Defendant appealed her conviction and sentence to the
Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in concluding
that the episode was a noncoercive encounter between citizen and
officer that fell outside the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.  The Court of Appeals majority found that Officer
Moore seized defendant and that, as a result, the search of
defendant’s purse was subject to Fourth Amendment analysis. 
State v. Icard, 190 N.C. App. 76, 660 S.E.2d 142 (2008).  The
majority emphasized that defendant did not live near Fairview
Market and that to terminate the encounter, defendant would have
had to leave the Market and enter a high crime area on foot,
after midnight.  Id. at 84, 660 S.E.2d at 148 (“At 12:30 a.m. in
an area known for drug activity and prostitution, any passenger,
particularly a female, would undoubtedly have felt uncomfortable
or unsafe by attempting to leave the parking lot on foot.”). 
Because the trial court had not made findings of fact as to
whether defendant’s consent to search her purse was voluntary or
coerced, the majority remanded the case to Superior Court,
Catawba County for additional findings.  Id. at 86, 660 S.E.2d at
149.
The dissent argued that the majority’s emphasis on the
location of the encounter was misplaced and that a police
officer’s “words and actions” effect a seizure.  Id. at 89, 660
S.E.2d at 150 (Bryant, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Finding no “show of authority amounting to a restraint
on [d]efendant’s liberty,” the dissenting judge would have
affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to
-8-
suppress.  Id. at 89-90, 660 S.E.2d at 151.  The State appealed
to this Court as a matter of right.
On appeal from denial of a motion to suppress, the
trial court’s findings of fact are binding when supported by
competent evidence, while conclusions of law are “fully
reviewable” by the appellate court.  State v. Brooks, 337 N.C.
132, 141, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Here, the trial court made numerous findings of fact
that are supported by substantial competent evidence presented at
the suppression hearing.  However, two of the trial court’s
concluding three findings of fact are as follows:
37. [Officer] Moore did not apply
physical force, make any threat of force, or
make a show of authority at any time prior to
the discovery of the drug paraphernalia in
the defendant’s purse.
. . . .
39. [Officer] Moore did not coerce the
defendant’s cooperation with his requests. 
Moore did not tell the defendant that she was
not free to terminate this interaction.
Although labeled findings of fact, these quoted findings mingle
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  For instance, that
Officer Moore did not apply physical force is a finding of fact,
but the statement in Finding No. 37 that Officer Moore’s actions
did not amount to a show of authority resolves a question of law. 
The finding that Officer Moore did not tell defendant she was not
free to terminate the encounter is a factual matter, but the
court’s determination in Finding No. 39 that Officer Moore did
not coerce defendant is a conclusion of law.  While we give
appropriate deference to the portions of Findings No. 37 and 39
-9-
that are findings of fact, we review de novo the portions of
those findings that are conclusions of law.  Id.
An individual is seized by a police officer and is thus 
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment when the officer’s
conduct “would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he
was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his
business.’”  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 115 L. Ed. 2d
389, 400 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
569, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 569 (1988)) (describing the above-quoted
standard as “the crucial test”).  A reviewing court determines
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter by
examining the totality of circumstances.  Id. at 436-37, 115 L.
Ed. 2d at 400; Brooks, 337 N.C. at 142, 446 S.E.2d at 586.
The totality of circumstances “test is necessarily
imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect
of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on
particular details of that conduct in isolation.”  Chesternut,
486 U.S. at 573, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 572.  Moreover, “an initially
consensual encounter between a police officer and a citizen can
be transformed into a seizure or detention within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave” or otherwise terminate the
encounter.  INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247,
255 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bostick,
501 U.S. at 436-37, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 400.  
-10-
Although the standard is not satisfied when a police
officer merely engages an individual in conversation in a public
place, see, e.g., Brooks, 337 N.C. at 142, 446 S.E.2d at 586,
additional circumstances attending such an encounter may reveal
that the individual is not participating consensually but instead
has submitted to the officer’s authority, see Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398 (explaining that a police officer
may seize an individual through a “show of authority” that
“restrain[s] the liberty of a citizen”).  Relevant circumstances
include, but are not limited to, the number of officers present,
whether the officer displayed a weapon, the officer’s words and
tone of voice, any physical contact between the officer and the
individual, whether the officer retained the individual’s
identification or property, the location of the encounter, and
whether the officer blocked the individual’s path.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002);
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389; State v. Farmer, 333
N.C. 172, 424 S.E.2d 120 (1993).
The State cites State v. Brooks, where this Court
conducted a totality of the circumstances review of an encounter
in which a uniformed SBI agent approached the defendant as he was
sitting in the driver’s seat of a car parked at a nightclub.  337
N.C. at 136-37, 446 S.E.2d at 583.  The driver’s door was open
and the defendant had been talking with another individual
outside the car who hastened away as the agent approached.  Id.
at 142, 446 S.E.2d at 586.  The agent observed an empty unsnapped
holster within the defendant’s reach, and when the agent asked,
-11-
“Where is your gun?,” the defendant responded, “I’m sitting on
it.”  Id. at 137, 446 S.E.2d at 583.  Under the totality of
circumstances present in Brooks, this Court held that the agent
did not seize the defendant by approaching his open car door and
asking a single brief question.  Id. at 142, 446 S.E.2d at 586. 
Instead, we concluded that the defendant’s response gave the
officer probable cause to believe the defendant was carrying a
concealed weapon and justified the defendant’s arrest.  Id. at
145, 446 S.E.2d at 588.
In contrast, the encounter between the officers and
defendant in the case at bar was significantly longer in duration
and more intrusive in substance.  The record reveals that much of
the evidence presented to the trial court during the voir dire
hearing regarding the seizure was not contested.  According to
this uncontested evidence, Officer Moore parked directly behind
the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, with his blue
lights flashing.  Officer Moore, who was in uniform and armed,
told Coleman in defendant’s presence that the two were being
checked out because the area was known for drugs and
prostitution.  When Officer Moore requested assistance, Officer
Hedrick arrived in a marked police car and used his take-down
lights to illuminate defendant’s side of the truck.  Both
officers then approached defendant.  When defendant twice failed
to respond to Officer Moore’s attempts to initiate an exchange,
the officer opened defendant’s door, compelling contact.  Officer
Moore requested that defendant produce her identification, then
asked defendant to come with her purse to the rear of the vehicle
-12-
1 We do not hold, as the dissent suggests, that the
circumstances here “convert” every similar encounter between a
law enforcement officer and citizen “to an unlawful seizure.”  We
hold only that the totality of circumstances establishes that
defendant was seized.  While such seizures are lawful when
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the State did not argue
where he and Officer Hedrick continued to ask questions.  When
Officer Moore left defendant to deal with Coleman, he did not
return her purse but instead handed it to Officer Hedrick.  The
encounter took place late at night, some distance from the
address listed on defendant’s identification.
 Under the totality of these uncontradicted
circumstances, we conclude that the officers mounted a show of
authority when:  (1) Officer Moore, who was armed and in uniform,
initiated the encounter, telling the occupants of the truck that
the area was known for drug crimes and prostitution; (2) Officer
Moore called for backup assistance; (3) Officer Moore initially
illuminated the truck with blue lights; (4) Officer Hedrick
illuminated defendant’s side of the truck with his take-down
lights; (5) Officer Moore opened defendant’s door, giving her no
choice but to respond to him; and (6) Officer Moore instructed
defendant to exit the truck and bring her purse.  By the time
defendant stepped out of the truck at Officer Moore’s request, a
reasonable person in defendant’s place would have shared the
officer’s belief that she was not free to leave or otherwise
terminate the encounter.  See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 115 L.
Ed. 2d at 400.  Therefore, we find the trial court erred when it
concluded as a matter of law that defendant’s interaction with
Officers Moore and Hedrick was consensual.1
-13-
either at trial or on appeal that particularized suspicion exists
in this case.  Once defendant was seized, the immediately
subsequent search of her purse was not consensual. 
In so holding, we acknowledge that this encounter
between defendant and the officers began legally.  Police are
free to approach and question individuals in public places when
circumstances indicate that citizens may need help or mischief
might be afoot.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,
906-07 (1968); State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 208, 195 S.E.2d
502, 505-06 (1973).  Here, the officers’ instincts were sound, as
evidenced by Coleman’s guilty pleas to several felonies. 
Nevertheless, because the search of defendant’s purse occurred
after she was illegally seized but before the taint of the
illegal seizure could have dissipated, see Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 457 (1963), we
conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion
to suppress the fruits of the search, see Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 496-97, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 235-36 (1983) (plurality).
For the reasons stated above, we affirm that part of
the decision of the Court of Appeals which held Officer Moore
seized defendant and that, as a result, the search of defendant’s
purse was subject to Fourth Amendment analysis.  We reverse that
part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which remanded the
matter to Superior Court, Catawba County for additional findings
of fact as to whether defendant’s consent to search her purse was
voluntary or coerced.  We remand this matter to the Court of
Appeals for further remand to Superior Court, Catawba County with
-14-
instructions to grant defendant’s motion to suppress and for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
No. 236A08 - State of North Carolina v. Lori Shannon Icard
Justice NEWBY dissenting.
This Court substitutes its judgment for that of the trial
court and grants defendant a new trial by re-weighing the
evidence and concluding the search of defendant’s purse was
illegal because she had been unlawfully seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.  This decision fails to give proper
deference to the factual findings of the trial court and
misapplies federal and state jurisprudence long understood to
mean that not all personal exchanges between police officers and
citizens involve a seizure.  The Court’s analysis also leaves law
enforcement officers without adequate guidance needed to enable
them to enforce the laws of the State and protect its citizens. 
Because I believe the evidence supports the decision of the trial
court that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of her
purse, I respectfully dissent.
The standard of review under which we evaluate the denial of
a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the
trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusions of law.  See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 337
N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994).  The trial court’s
findings “are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.”  State v.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001).  The
trial court determines the credibility of the witnesses who
testify, weighs the evidence, and determines the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom.  Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C.
355, 359, 160 S.E.2d 29, 33 (1968).  If different inferences may
-16-
be drawn from the evidence, the trial court decides which
inferences to draw and which to reject.  Id.  Appellate courts
are bound by the trial court’s findings if there is some evidence
to support them, and may not substitute their own judgment for
that of the trial court even when there is evidence which could
sustain findings to the contrary.  In re Montgomery, 311 N.C.
101, 110-11, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252-53 (1984).  “Where the findings
of fact support the conclusions of law, such findings and
conclusions are binding upon us on appeal.”  State v. Wynne, 329
N.C. 507, 522, 406 S.E.2d 812, 820 (1991) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
At trial, the encounter with defendant was described by
Officer Curt Moore of the Maiden Police Department, a twenty-two
year veteran of law enforcement who had previously worked for the
North Carolina State Highway Patrol, the Hickory Police
Department and the Catawba County Sheriff’s Department.  On 21
September 2004, Officer Moore was on duty as a supervisor of the
night patrol division, which required him to monitor the security
of businesses and people within the city limits and to address
any problems that arose during the shift.  One such business was
the Fairview Market, a gas station and sandwich shop situated at
the intersection of West Maiden Road and Startown Road in Maiden,
North Carolina.  On the side of the building that faced the road
was a large, private parking lot for automobiles and tractor-
trailers containing three rows of parking spaces.  Two “No
Trespassing” signs were posted on either side of the front of the
building stating that violators after business hours would be
-17-
subject to law enforcement by the Town of Maiden.  Officer Moore
recalled that this particular area was known for its high rate of
criminal activity, that there had been numerous complaints
regarding drugs and prostitution in the area, and that he had
made several arrests there.
At approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer Moore pulled into the
parking lot of the Fairview Market to perform an after-hours
check of the premises because the business had closed at 10:00
p.m.  While turning into the lot, he noticed only one vehicle
there--a pickup truck pulled diagonally across two parking spaces
in the front row within fifteen feet of the side of the building. 
Although the truck was not parked illegally, the abnormal
positioning caused Officer Moore to observe it more closely as he
drove past.  When his headlights crossed through the back
windshield, the cab of the truck appeared to be unoccupied. 
Officer Moore continued past the truck and circled around the
building.  As he rounded the front corner of the building, his
headlights illuminated the front windshield of the truck and he
saw a silhouette about six inches above the steering wheel.
Officer Moore drove around the truck and, upon parking
behind it, noticed movement in the cab.  He stated that although
the truck would have been unable to back up because his car was
parked directly behind it, it could have freely driven forward at
any time to leave the lot.  Officer Moore was driving a low-
profile police car which had police department decals on each
side but did not have the standard light bar on top of the roof. 
In order to identify himself as a police officer, he left his
-18-
headlights on and activated his blue visor lights.  He then
called the Catawba County Justice Center to give them a
description of the vehicle and the license plate number.  As
Officer Moore approached the driver’s side of the truck, he
noticed a passenger, who was later identified as defendant.  The
driver partially rolled down his window to speak with Officer
Moore and eventually opened his door to continue the
conversation.  After examining his driver’s license and
registration, Officer Moore asked the driver his purpose for
being there.  The driver responded that they had come from
Connelly Springs to meet their friend “Jody” who was driving down
from Taylorsville.  Officer Moore inquired further because the
Fairview Market in Maiden seemed to be an illogical and
geographically inconvenient place to meet, or in his words, “way
out of the way.”  He also informed the occupants of the truck
that his purpose for speaking with them was related to the
numerous complaints regarding drugs and prostitution in the area. 
At that point, he returned to his police car with the driver’s
license and registration to begin an “identification process,”
which he testified is a standard procedure when the police find a
vehicle at a business after hours.  Because there were two
occupants in the truck, Officer Moore called his secondary patrol
officer, Officer Darby Hedrick, and requested that he report to
the location as back-up.  Officer Moore waited in his vehicle for
results of the identification process and for Officer Hedrick to
arrive.
-19-
After a minute or two, the license, registration, and
warrant checks were verified.  Officer Moore turned off his blue
visor lights before approaching the vehicle for a second time,
this time on the passenger side where defendant was sitting.  By
that time Officer Hedrick had arrived and parked his marked
police car parallel to the right side of Officer Moore’s car with
his headlights and stationary, front-facing spotlights shining
toward the truck.  Officer Moore briefly explained the situation
to Officer Hedrick before they approached the truck.  When he got
to the passenger’s door, Officer Moore attempted to gain
defendant’s attention by tapping on the window with his knuckle,
but defendant did not respond.  Officer Hedrick remained several
feet away, near the middle or rear of the truck bed.  Officer
Moore tapped on the window a second time, and when defendant
again did not respond he opened the truck door, identified
himself, and requested her identification.  Defendant replied
that she did not have a driver’s license or identification card
with her because it was in another purse.  However, visible at
her feet on the floorboard was what appeared to be a purse. 
Officer Moore asked if there were any forms of identification in
the purse.  Defendant replied that she did not think it contained
any, but voluntarily reached down, picked up the bag, and
unzipped it.  Immediately visible near the top of the bag was a
bifold wallet from which defendant produced a North Carolina
identification card.  Officer Moore asked defendant if she would
step out of the truck and bring her purse to the rear of the
vehicle where Officer Hedrick was standing.  Defendant agreed,
-20-
and as she walked towards the rear of the truck she was still
“fumbling” through her purse.  Officer Moore asked defendant for
permission to look through the bag and then inquired as to
whether there was anything in the purse that she needed to tell
him about.  Defendant answered in the negative, consented to a
search of the bag, and handed it to the officer.  Visible in the
center of the bag, lying loose on top of some other items, was
the blackened end of a glass pipe which, based on Officer Moore’s
training and experience, appeared to be a “crack pipe.”  Officer
Moore also saw an open pouch that held some bullets and the other
end of the glass pipe, and a clear plastic bag with a stamp of a
skunk on the outside containing a substance that later tested
positive for methamphetamine.  Before he could finish the
interview with defendant, Officer Moore was distracted by
suspicious movements in the cab of the truck by the driver, who
appeared to be sliding towards the passenger side.  He handed the
purse to Officer Hedrick and walked around to the driver’s side
of the truck where he was involved in an altercation with the
driver.  The incident resulted in the arrest of both defendant
and the driver, and a search of the vehicle that yielded a loaded
handgun, a knife, drugs, and drug paraphernalia.
Based upon this evidence, the trial court made the following
pertinent findings of fact:
19.
When Moore arrived at the passenger door
of the truck, he tapped on the window. 
The defendant did not respond.  Moore
knocked on the window a second time and
the defendant again did not respond.
-21-
20.
Moore identified himself to the
defendant and he was wearing his police
uniform at the time of this incident.
21.
Moore then opened the passenger door of
the truck.
22.
Moore asked the defendant for her
identification.
23.
The defendant told Moore that she had
left her identification in another
purse.
24.
Moore observed a purse or bag in the
floorboard of the Dodge truck at her
feet.
25.
Moore asked about that purse and the
defendant said that she didn’t think her
identification was in that purse.
26.
The defendant then reached down and
unzipped the purse.  There was a bi-fold
billfold on top and the defendant
fumbled through it.
27.
The defendant produced her
[identification card] for Officer Moore.
28.
Moore then asked the defendant to step
out of the Dodge truck.
29.
Once the defendant got out of the truck,
Moore asked her to accompany him to the
back of the truck.  The defendant
complied with Moore’s request.
30.
Moore asked the defendant if he could
look in her purse and if there was
anything in her purse that she needed to
tell him about.
31.
The defendant said no and handed her
purse to Officer Moore.
32.
When Moore looked inside of the
defendant’s purse he observed a piece of
glass pipe and several bullets.  The
glass tube had a burned or smoked area
on one end.  Moore was of the opinion,
based on his training and experience,
that the glass pipe was a crack pipe.
-22-
. . . .
34.  Moore did not pat down or frisk the
defendant for weapons.
35.  Moore did not threaten the defendant in
any way and he did not place his hand on
her at any time.
36.  Moore had a handgun on his person.  He
did not remove that weapon from its
holster.
37.  Moore did not apply physical force, make
any threat of force or make a show of
authority at anytime prior to the
discovery of the drug paraphernalia in
the defendant’s purse.
38.  The defendant consented to producing her
identification to Officer Moore and she
agreed to go to the back of the truck. 
The defendant also agreed to permit
Moore to examine the contents of her
purse.
39.  Moore did not coerce the defendant’s
cooperation with his requests.  Moore
did not tell the defendant that she was
not free to terminate this interaction.
Based on these findings of fact, which were supported by
competent evidence, the trial court made the following
conclusions of law:
1.
No one is protected by the Constitution
against the mere approach of police
officers in a public place.  State v.
Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 662, 617 S.E.2d
1 (2005); State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132,
141, 446 S.E.2d 579 (1994).
2.
Thus, a communication between the police
and citizens involving no coercion or
detention falls outside the compass of
the Fourth Amendment. Brooks, 337 N.C.
at 141.
3.
Police officers may approach individuals
in public to ask them questions and even
request consent to search their
belongings, so long as a reasonable
-23-
person would understand that he or she
could refuse to cooperate.  Brooks, 337
N.C. at 142. 
4.
A seizure does not occur simply because
a police officer approaches an
individual and asks a few questions. 
Such encounters are considered
consensual and no reasonable suspicion
is necessary.  Campbell, 359 N.C. at
662; Brooks, 337 N.C. at 142. 
5.
The test for determining whether a
seizure has occurred is whether under
the totality of the circumstances a
reasonable person would feel that he was
not free to decline the officers’
request or otherwise terminate the
encounter.  Brooks, 337 N.C. at 142.
6.
The encounter will not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its
consensual nature.  Only when the
officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a seizure has occurred. 
Campbell, 359 N.C. at 662.
7.
Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant would not
have felt that she was not free to
terminate the encounter or decline
Moore’s requests.  
8.
Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant cooperated
with Moore’s requests and her
cooperation was not coerced by physical
force or a show of authority.
Each of the trial court’s conclusions is supported by the
findings of fact and is based upon an accurate assessment of the
law.  As previously stated by this Court, “‘not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involve ‘seizures' of
persons.’”  State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 662, 617 S.E.2d 1,
13 (2005) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.
Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (quoting Terry v.
-24-
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889, 905 n.16 (1968))), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 126 S.
Ct. 1773, 164 L. Ed. 2d 523 (2006).  It is well established that
“‘[l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by
approaching individuals on the street or in other public places
and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.’” 
Campbell, 359 N.C. at 662, 617 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 153
L. Ed. 2d 242, 251 (2002) (alteration in original)).  An
encounter is consensual and does not constitute a seizure “[S]o
long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the
police and go about his business.”  Campbell, 359 N.C. at 662,
617 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct. at
2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698
(1991)).  “‘Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a “seizure” has occurred.’”  Id.
(quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct. at 2386, 115 L. Ed.
2d at 398 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. at 1879
n.16, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905 n.16)).
In determining whether the officer’s actions constituted a
show of authority that implicates the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, the question is “not whether the citizen perceived
that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether
the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a
-25-
reasonable person.”  California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628,
111 S. Ct. at 1552, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 698 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).  This objective test permits a trial court to
conclude that a seizure has occurred “only if, in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave,” United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980); or to “decline the officers’ requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter,” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438, 111
S. Ct. at 2389, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 402.  Likewise, the Fourth
Amendment does not include a consideration of the officer’s
subjective intent, and his motive will not “invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action.”  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116
S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98 (1996) (quoting Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L. Ed.
2d 168, 178 (1978)).  
In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court of the United States
enumerated several circumstances that could support the trial
court’s determination that a show of authority had occurred, such
as “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of
a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” 
446 U.S. at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509
(citation omitted).  Hearing live testimony, the trial court is
in the best position to weigh the evidence.  In the case sub
-26-
judice, the trial court properly considered each of these
circumstances and made detailed findings that Officer Moore did
not make a show of authority during the encounter.  Pursuant to
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the trial court’s
decision should be affirmed because it is based on sound factual
findings and an accurate application of the law.
The majority, however, isolates two phrases in the trial
court’s findings, characterizes them as conclusions of law, re-
weighs the evidence, and makes its own findings to support its
conclusion that defendant was seized and her consent involuntary. 
As noted in the majority opinion, “The totality of the
circumstances ‘test is necessarily imprecise, because it is
designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken
as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that
conduct in isolation.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
After correctly stating the applicable test, the majority then
misapplies it.  The trial court made thirty-nine detailed
findings of fact, considering the encounter between defendant and
Officer Moore in its full context; the majority focuses on two
“particular details of th[e] conduct in isolation.”  After
discussing the circumstances of the encounter, the trial court
states in Finding 37: “Moore did not apply physical force, make
any threat of force or make a show of authority at anytime prior
to the discovery of the drug paraphernalia in the defendant’s
purse.”  In Finding 39, the trial court states: “Moore did not
coerce the defendant’s cooperation with his requests.  Moore did
not tell the defendant that she was not free to terminate this
-27-
interaction.”  The majority admits that most of these statements
are factual, yet determines the findings, “Moore did
not . . . make a show of authority” and “Moore did not coerce the
defendant’s cooperation with his requests,” are conclusions of
law.  However, as noted by the trial court, even these two
findings contain both factual and legal components.  This duality
was considered by the trial court as it analyzed the “show of
authority” and “coercion” elements in its findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  Viewed in the context of the other findings
of fact, there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s
factual determinations that Officer Moore did not “make a show of
authority” and “did not coerce the defendant’s cooperation,” and
these findings should not be subject to de novo review.  Instead
of looking at the totality of the circumstances, the majority
isolates these two findings, which have both factual and legal
components, ignores the role of the trial court in weighing the
factual nature of the findings, and substitutes its own judgment
for that of the trial court before which the testimony was given. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial
court found in Finding 38: “The defendant consented to producing
her identification to Officer Moore and she agreed to go to the
back of the truck.  The defendant also agreed to permit Moore to
examine the contents of her purse.”  In assessing the
voluntariness of the search, the majority ignores this crucial
finding and recharacterizes the critical events of the encounter
between Officer Moore and defendant.  When Officer Moore opened
the door of the truck and asked defendant for her identification,
-28-
she did not communicate any desire for the encounter not to
occur.  She responded to his question and stated she did not have
any identification, having left it in a purse at home.  Officer
Moore noticed the purse on the floor of the truck and asked
defendant if her identification could be in it.  The encounter
could have ended at that juncture.  A reasonable person would
have believed she could have terminated the encounter, having
stated that she left her identification at home.  Defendant,
nonetheless, voluntarily picked up the purse and opened it. 
Disproving defendant’s prior statement, the identification was in
the top of the purse.  Contrary to the evidence and the findings
by the trial court, the majority characterizes these critical
events of the encounter by simply stating: “Officer Moore
requested that defendant produce her identification.”  After
voluntarily opening the purse and revealing her identification,
defendant agreed to exit the truck, bringing her purse with her. 
As explicitly found by the trial court, defendant then consented
to the search of her purse.
The majority concludes with a list of six events it
determines amounted to a show of authority, converting the
voluntary encounter to an unlawful seizure.  This analysis could
well describe most police encounters.  Further, it again reweighs
the evidence, substituting the judgment of an appellate court for
that of the trial court that heard the testimony.  The first
event listed is “Officer Moore, who was armed and in uniform,
initiated the encounter . . . .”  Defendant was in a truck parked
in a public area outside a closed business.  Under these
-29-
circumstances an officer should investigate.  The driver of the
truck could have driven away, but chose to stay.  Further, it is
almost invariable that law enforcement officers will be “armed
and in uniform.”  These circumstances do not preclude voluntary
cooperation.  As the case law directs and as observed by the
trial court, the pertinent inquiry is whether the officer did
more than simply have his weapon in its holster.  The next factor
is that “Officer Moore called for backup assistance.”  It is
standard procedure to have backup when the initial officer
observes more than one individual in a vehicle.  In hindsight,
having backup was prudent as the officers subsequently determined
there was a loaded pistol in the truck.  The majority also finds
pertinent the fact that “Officer Moore initially illuminated the
truck with blue lights.”  While Officer Moore at first utilized
his blue visor lights to identify himself as a police officer, he
subsequently turned them off before his encounter with defendant. 
Similarly, the majority’s test includes the finding that “Officer
Hedrick illuminated defendant’s side of the truck with his take-
down lights,” however, the use of Officer Hedrick’s spotlights
was necessary for the safety of all in the dimly lit parking lot.
The final elements relied upon by the majority are newly
minted factual determinations based on its interpretation of the
evidence.  The majority states that “Officer Moore opened
defendant’s door, giving her no choice but to respond to him.” 
Although Officer Moore’s actions made a response from defendant
likely, there is nothing in the record that requires a finding
that he gave her “no choice but to respond to him,” and the trial
-30-
court did not so hold.  As stated above, this finding is
contradicted by the facts as found by the trial court; defendant
had the opportunity to decline further interaction, but
voluntarily picked up her purse, opened it, and produced her
identification.  Whereas the majority says, “Officer Moore
instructed defendant to exit the truck,” the trial court found
the officer “asked the defendant to step out of the . . . truck”
and that she did so voluntarily.  From these circumstances, the
majority concludes that defendant was seized “by the time [she]
stepped out of the truck at Officer Moore’s request.”  However,
the evidence and factual findings support the trial court’s
conclusion that defendant voluntarily interacted with Officer
Moore, willingly exited the truck, and consented to the search of
her purse.  While a trial court might have found the facts as the
majority has done, the trial court in this case did not.  The
majority’s re-weighing of the evidence in order to support its
determination that defendant was seized violates our standard of
deference to the trial court.
Considered in light of the facts as found by the trial
court, the actions of the law enforcement officer were supported
by law.  While the truck in this case was not violating any
traffic laws, Officer Moore is permitted by law to approach a
person or vehicle in a public place, Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434,
111 S. Ct. at 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398, ask questions of the
driver and passenger, including their reasons for being there, if
they are willing to listen, Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200, 122 S. Ct.
at 2110, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 251, request to examine the
-31-
individuals’ identification, see INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255 (1984), and
request consent to search their luggage, Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229,
236-37 (1983), so long as the officer does not use coercion or
require compliance with the requests.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435,
111 S. Ct. at 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398-99.  Officer Moore was
properly and legally performing his duties when he stopped to
investigate the lone vehicle parked in the Fairview Market’s
parking lot after business hours.
In order to protect citizens from unlawful seizures while
still effectively enforcing the criminal laws of our State, this
Court must provide clear guidance so that law enforcement
officers are able to determine when they must terminate an
investigative encounter or articulate a reason for continuing. 
The majority opinion fails to give the useful instruction needed
by our law enforcement officers and our trial courts.
I believe competent evidence supports the trial court’s
findings of fact, and the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law.  The trial court’s holding that defendant
voluntarily consented to the search of her purse should be
affirmed.  I respectfully dissent.