Title: L.L.N. v. J. Gibbs Clauder
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP002084
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2084 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
L.L.N.,   
        Plaintiff-Appellant-  
        Cross Respondent,  
         v.  
J. Gibbs Clauder,   
        Defendant,  
Roman Catholic Diocese of Madison, Inc.,   
        Defendant-Respondent-  
        Cross Appellant-Petitioner,  
ABC Insurance Company,   
        Defendant,  
Research Products Corporation, a Wisconsin  
Corporation,   
        Subrogated Party.  
  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  203 Wis. 2d 570, 552 N.W.2d 879 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 23, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 4, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
George Northrup 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J. dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-cross appellant-
petitioner there were briefs by Donald L. Heaney, Kenneth B. Axe, 
Peter A. Martin and Lathrop & Clark, Madison and oral argument by 
Donald L. Heaney. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross respondent 
there was a brief by David E. McFarlane, Melanie Cohen and 
LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison and oral argument by David 
McFarlane. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2084 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
L.L.N., 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
J. Gibbs Clauder, 
 
 
Defendant, 
 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Madison, Inc., 
 
          Defendant, Respondent-Cross 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
Research Products Corporation, a Wisconsin 
Corporation, 
 
          Subrogated Party. 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 23, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  L.L.N. alleges that J. Gibbs 
Clauder, a priest assigned as a hospital chaplain by the Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Madison, Inc. ("Diocese"), abused his 
position as chaplain to engage her in a sexual relationship. 
Based on this, L.L.N. filed suit against the Diocese, claiming 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
2 
that: (1) the Diocese negligently supervised Clauder; and, 
(2) the Diocese is vicariously liable for Clauder's actions.
1  
The Circuit Court for Dane County, George A. W. Northrup, Judge, 
entered an order granting summary judgment
2 to the Diocese on all 
counts.  In a published decision,
3 the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Diocese on 
the vicarious liability claims.  However, the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the 
negligent supervision claim.  The Diocese seeks review of this 
reversal.   
¶2 
Accordingly, the only issue before this court is 
whether the Diocese is entitled to summary judgment on L.L.N.'s 
claim that it negligently supervised Clauder.  We conclude that 
it is.  First, we hold that the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits L.L.N.'s negligent supervision 
claim.  Second, even if we assume that the First Amendment does 
not preclude L.L.N.'s claim, we conclude that the undisputed 
                     
1  L.L.N. also filed suit against Clauder personally for 
sexual exploitation by a therapist under Wis. Stat. § 895.70 
(1987-88).  This claim continues in the circuit court, and is 
not before this court on review. 
All further references are to the 1987-88 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
2  The circuit court's order stated that it was granting the 
Diocese's motion to dismiss.  However, since the circuit court 
accepted and considered affidavits and deposition transcripts 
submitted by both parties, we treat the motion as one for 
summary judgment.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(b); L.L.N. v. 
Clauder, 203 Wis. 2d 570, 575 n.2, 552 N.W.2d 879 (Ct. App. 
1996).   
3  L.L.N. v. Clauder, 203 Wis. 2d 570, 552 N.W.2d 879 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
3 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom do not 
establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
Diocese knew or should have known about Clauder's alleged 
propensity to use his position as chaplain to sexually exploit 
patients whom he counseled.  Thus, the Diocese is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law on this basis as well.  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
¶3 
In 1984, the Diocese assigned Clauder to serve as the 
chaplain at Meriter Hospital
4 in Madison, Wisconsin.  While 
working at Meriter, Clauder resided at St. Bernard Catholic 
Church in Madison.  Father John Hebl was the parish pastor at 
St. Bernard.
5  While Clauder lived at the parish, Hebl had no 
supervisory authority over him.  In addition, Clauder had no 
parish 
responsibilities 
at 
St. 
Bernard, 
although 
he 
did 
occasionally assist when asked.  
¶4 
In November 1988, L.L.N. was hospitalized at Meriter 
Hospital for complications with her pregnancy.  Hebl asked 
Clauder to visit L.L.N., who was a member and employee of St. 
Bernard.  Clauder met with L.L.N. at least once in the hospital, 
during which time they discussed her pregnancy, politics, and 
their interest in the pro-life movement. 
¶5 
In December 1988, L.L.N. was again hospitalized at 
Meriter Hospital.  After having a miscarriage, L.L.N. asked 
                     
4  At the time Clauder was assigned as a chaplain, Meriter 
Hospital was known as Madison General Hospital. 
5  Hebl was employed by St. Bernard, which is a separate 
religious corporation from the Diocese. 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
4 
Clauder to visit her, which he did on one or two occasions.  
They discussed her grief over losing the baby.  After L.L.N. was 
discharged, Clauder telephoned her at home to check on her 
recovery.  L.L.N. subsequently sent Clauder a thank-you note and 
invited him to lunch, an invitation which he accepted. 
¶6 
In the following months, L.L.N. and Clauder continued 
to meet outside the hospital.  They dined together, visited art 
museums, 
attended 
pro-life 
rallies, 
exchanged 
gifts, 
and  
discussed politics, personal problems, and life in general.  
L.L.N. alleges that she viewed Clauder as her pastoral counselor 
and therapist during these meetings, because he gave her advice 
to help her cope with stress and depression.  
¶7 
On June 29, 1990, Clauder invited L.L.N. to his 
family's cabin near Rhinelander, Wisconsin.  During this visit, 
they engaged in sexual intercourse at a hotel in Rhinelander.  
They continued their sexual relationship until May 1991. 
¶8 
Both Clauder and L.L.N. attempted to keep their 
relationship secret, often using aliases.  However, on June 16, 
1991, after she had ended the relationship, L.L.N. notified 
Bishop Cletus O'Donnell by letter of her sexual involvement with 
Clauder.  It is undisputed that the Diocese had no actual 
knowledge of Clauder's involvement with L.L.N. before this time. 
  
¶9 
Subsequently, Auxiliary Bishop George Wirz asked Hebl 
whether he had ever noticed anything suspicious in regard to 
Clauder.  Hebl informed Wirz of an incident he had observed 
several years earlier between Clauder and another woman, T.E.  
Specifically, one evening around 9:00 p.m., Hebl heard Clauder 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
5 
yell for help from his private room in the rectory.  When Hebl 
entered Clauder's room, he found Clauder restraining a woman on 
the floor by straddling her body and holding down her hands.  
Clauder was bleeding from a bite on his wrist.  Hebl recognized 
the woman as T.E., whom he had met on a few occasions when 
Clauder had invited her to the rectory for meals.  Hebl 
separated Clauder from T.E., and escorted T.E. out of the 
rectory. 
¶10 Hebl did not report this incident to anyone until 
after L.L.N wrote the letter revealing her relationship with 
Clauder to the Bishop.  In addition, Hebl never investigated the 
matter any further.  In his deposition, Hebl explained his 
perception of the incident in this manner: 
 
Q. 
Among other things, did it raise the question in 
your mind about whether there were some sexual 
activities going on between Father Clauder and [T.E.]? 
 
A. 
Let me put this kind of spin on it . . .  
obviously she attacked him, it seemed that way, and he 
was defending himself.  You can put any interpretation 
you want on that.  I saw no visual signs, none 
whatsoever of any sexual attack or intimacy or 
behavior, none whatsoever.  Now, a person out there 
could say, "Well, that must have happened or could 
have happened."  I did not put that spin on it. 
 
Q. 
Was that a concern or suspicion that you had or 
did you dismiss that as not a realistic possibility? 
 
A. 
I never accused him ever of anything along this 
line, any of the priests.  I just don't, wouldn't 
think that's their behavior. . . . 
 
Q. 
Now, even though you didn't accuse [Clauder] of 
any sexual involvement with [T.E.], was that a thought 
that was in your mind as a possibility? 
 
A. 
Oh, yeah, I think with the circumstances under 
which 
this 
happened, 
there 
could 
be 
that 
possibility, . . . but . . . I 
would 
never, 
never 
accuse him of it. . . . 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
6 
(R.30 at 116-17.)  
¶11 If Hebl had investigated this incident further, he 
would have discovered that T.E. and Clauder did not have any 
sexual contact on that day.  However, Hebl also would have 
discovered that Clauder and T.E. were involved in a sexual 
relationship.  Specifically, Clauder had become friends with 
T.E.'s family approximately fifteen years earlier, while Clauder 
was assigned as a priest at St. Dennis Catholic Church in 
Madison, 
at 
which 
T.E. 
and 
her 
family 
were 
members.  
Subsequently, T.E. and Clauder developed a more intimate 
relationship.  They frequently dined together, went to social 
events, and Clauder even traveled to Japan to meet T.E. on one 
occasion.  According to Clauder, T.E. wanted to marry him, but 
he refused. 
¶12 L.L.N. alleges that, because of the T.E. incident that 
Hebl witnessed, the Diocese knew or should have known that 
Clauder posed a risk of abusing his position as a hospital 
chaplain to sexually exploit patients whom he counseled.  
Accordingly, L.L.N. filed a claim for negligent supervision 
against the Diocese on May 28, 1993.  On May 31, 1994, the 
Diocese filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the 
negligent supervision claim is precluded by the First Amendment 
because it would require the court to determine the standard of 
care owed a parishioner in the supervision of clergy.  At a 
hearing held on January 3, 1995, the circuit court granted 
summary judgment to the Diocese on this basis.  The court of 
appeals reversed, concluding that "[t]o resolve L.L.N.'s claim, 
a factfinder need not interpret or weigh church doctrine but 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
7 
merely determine, under neutral rules of law, whether, under the 
facts, a reasonable person would know or should have known that 
Clauder's placement as hospital chaplain was likely to result in 
harm."  L.L.N. v. Clauder, 203 Wis. 2d 570, 585-86, 552 N.W.2d 
879 (Ct. App. 1996).       
II. 
¶13 Procedurally, this case is before the court pursuant 
to the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Diocese. 
 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 
standards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) in the same manner 
the circuit court applies them.  See, e.g., Kafka v. Pope, 194 
Wis. 2d 234, 240, 533 N.W.2d 491 (1995); Voss v. City of 
Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 748, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991).  
Specifically, a court first examines the pleadings to determine 
whether a claim for relief is stated and whether a material 
issue of fact is presented.  See, e.g., Voss, 162 Wis. 2d at 
747; Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). 
 When examining the sufficiency of a complaint, a court takes as 
true all facts pleaded by the plaintiff and all inferences that 
can reasonably be derived from those facts.  See Voss, 162 Wis. 
2d at 748.   
¶14 If the pleadings state a claim and demonstrate the 
existence of factual issues, a court next considers the moving 
party's affidavits or other proof to determine whether the 
moving party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
8 
under § 802.08(2).
6  See, e.g., Voss, 162 Wis. 2d at 747-48; 
Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338.  If a moving party has made a prima 
facie case for summary judgment, the opposing party must show, 
by affidavit or other proof, the existence of disputed material 
facts or undisputed material facts from which reasonable 
alternative inferences may be drawn that are sufficient to 
entitle the opposing party to a trial.  See, e.g., Voss, 162 
Wis. 2d at 748;  Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338.  Such proof may be 
less than is sufficient to prove the opposing party's case, but 
must be substantial and raise genuine issues of material fact. 
See Leszczynski v. Surges, 30 Wis. 2d 534, 539, 141 N.W.2d 261 
(1966).     
¶15 Therefore, 
in 
order 
to 
be 
entitled 
to 
summary 
judgment, the moving party must prove that "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
7  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2); see also Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338.  The affidavits 
and other proof submitted by the parties are viewed in a light 
most favorable to the opposing party.  See Delmore v. American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 510, 512, 348 N.W.2d 151 
(1984).  Likewise, any doubts as to the existence of a genuine 
                     
6  If the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must 
establish a defense that defeats the plaintiff's cause of 
action.  See Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 748, 
470 N.W.2d 625 (1991). 
7  As this court has stated:  "The purpose of the summary 
judgment procedure is not to try issues of fact but to avoid 
trials where there is nothing to try."  Rollins Burdick Hunter 
of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 N.W.2d 
752 (1981). 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
9 
issue of material fact are resolved against the moving party.  
See, e.g., Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. 
Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 N.W.2d 752 (1981) (quoting 
Maynard v. Port Publications, Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 555, 562-63, 297 
N.W.2d 500 (1980)); Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338-39.  However, 
evidentiary facts set forth in the affidavits or other proof are 
taken as true by a court if not contradicted by opposing 
affidavits or other proof.
8  See Leszczynski, 30 Wis. 2d at 539. 
      
¶16 The issue of whether the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits L.L.N.'s claim for negligent 
supervision is a question of law.  See Association of State 
Prosecutors v. Milwaukee County, 199 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 544 
N.W.2d 888 (1996).  We review questions of law de novo, giving 
no deference to the lower courts.  See, e.g., id. 
III. 
¶17 We first must examine the pleadings to determine 
whether a claim for relief is stated and whether a material 
issue of fact is presented.  In her complaint, L.L.N. alleges 
that "the Diocese was negligent in that it . . . [f]ailed to 
properly supervise Clauder . . . ."  (R.2 at 8.)   This court 
has not determined whether a claim for negligent supervision 
exists.  See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 
302, 325, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 
(1996); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151-53 
                     
8  "Pleadings are ineffectual as proof because facts stated 
in an affidavit take precedence over inconsistent allegations in 
a pleading."  Leszczynski v. Surges, 30 Wis. 2d 534, 539, 141 
N.W.2d 261 (1966). 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
10
(E.D. Mich. 1995).  However, for purposes of this case, we 
assume that such a claim exists, without deciding the issue.  
See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 325-26 (assuming, without 
deciding, that a claim for negligent supervision exists).  
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the pleadings state a claim. 
 In addition, the Diocese denied L.L.N.'s allegations in its 
answer.  (R.4 at 6.)  Thus, we also conclude that the pleadings 
present the existence of factual issues.   
¶18 We therefore must examine the affidavits and other 
proof submitted by the Diocese to determine whether it has made 
a prima facie case for summary judgment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  The Diocese sets forth two grounds upon which it 
is entitled to summary judgment.  First, the Diocese contends 
that L.L.N.'s claim for negligent supervision is prohibited by 
the First Amendment.  Second, based on the undisputed facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the Diocese argues 
that it neither knew nor should have known about Clauder's 
alleged propensity to use his position as chaplain to sexually 
exploit patients whom he counseled. 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
11
A.  Constitutional QuestionsFirst Amendment 
¶19 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
9 
provides: 
"Congress 
shall 
make 
no 
law 
respecting 
an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . ."  The first clause is referred to as the 
Establishment Clause, and the second as the Free Exercise 
Clause.
10  See 4 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on 
Constitutional Law:  Substance & Procedure § 21.1, at 446 (2d 
ed. 1992).  The entanglement doctrine, which prohibits excessive 
governmental entanglement 
with religion, springs 
from the 
Establishment Clause.
11  See Holy Trinity Community School, Inc. 
                     
9  See Holy Trinity Community School, Inc. v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 
2d 139, 150, 262 N.W.2d 210, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 823 (1978); 
4 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional 
Law:  Substance & Procedure § 21.1, at 446 & n.2 (2d ed. 1992). 
   
10  In making its constitutional arguments, the Diocese 
relies primarily on the Establishment Clause.  See Petitioner's 
Brief, at 19, n.17.  
11  Specifically, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
where 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
Establishment Clause is alleged, a court must apply a three-part 
test 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
challenged 
law 
passes 
constitutional muster:  (1) the law must have a secular 
legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must 
not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 
Id. at 612-13; see also Holy Trinity Community School, Inc., 82 
Wis. 2d at 150 (explaining three-part test). 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
12
v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 150, 262 N.W.2d 210, cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 823 (1978); 4 Rotunda & Nowak, supra § 21.3, at 457. 
¶20 It 
is 
well-settled 
that 
excessive 
governmental 
entanglement with religion will occur if a court is required to 
interpret church law, policies, or practices; therefore, the 
First Amendment prohibits such an inquiry.  See Isely, 880 F. 
Supp. at 1150 (collecting cases); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 
863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1137 
(1994); Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 327-29.  However, it is 
equally well-settled that a court may hear an action if it will 
involve the consideration of neutral principles of law.  See 
Isely, 880 F. Supp. at 1150; Moses, 863 P.2d at 320. 
¶21 We therefore must consider whether the determination 
of L.L.N.'s claim for negligent supervision would allow a court 
to 
apply 
neutral 
principles 
of 
law. 
 
We 
considered 
a 
substantially similar issue in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 920 (1996).  Judith M. Pritzlaff alleged that Father 
John Donovan used his relationship and his position as a priest 
to coerce her to have a sexual relationship with him.  Id. at 
308.  Pritzlaff brought claims against the Archdiocese for 
                                                                  
However, in the 1990s, the Supreme Court has neither 
consistently applied this three-part test nor formally rejected 
it.  Yet, the Supreme Court has continued to focus on the 
concept of religious neutrality in making decisions involving 
the Establishment Clause.  See 4 Rotunda & Nowak, supra § 21.3, 
at 86 (Supp. 1996).  In fact, the concept of neutrality is a 
central principle under both of the religious clauses of the 
First Amendment.  Id. § 21.1, at 447 (2d ed. 1992).  Therefore, 
our analysis focuses on whether the negligent supervision claim 
would involve the application of neutral principles of law, 
rather than the Lemon test. 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
13
negligently hiring, retaining, training, and supervising the 
priest.  Id. at 309-10.  Pritzlaff further claimed that the 
Archdiocese knew or should have known that the priest had "a 
sexual problem."  Id. at 310.  Subsequently, the Archdiocese 
brought a motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds.  Id. 
¶22 This court first determined that the First Amendment 
prohibits claims against a religious entity for negligent hiring 
or retention, because such claims would require a court to 
develop a "reasonable cleric" standard of care, which would 
involve the interpretation of church canons and internal church 
policies.  Id. at 326-28.  Second, this court concluded:   
 
Although 
state 
inquiry 
into 
the 
training 
and 
supervision of clergy is a closer issue than inquiry 
into hiring and retention practices because under some 
limited circumstances such questions might be able to 
be decided without determining questions of church law 
and policies, it is nonetheless prohibited by the 
First Amendment under most if not all circumstances. 
Id. at 328 (emphasis added).  The court further explained: 
 
[A]ny inquiry into the policies and practices of the 
church Defendants in hiring or supervising their 
clergy raises the same kinds of First Amendment 
problems of entanglement discussed above, which might 
involve the court in making sensitive judgments about 
the propriety of the church Defendants' supervision in 
light 
of 
their 
religious 
beliefs . . . . 
The 
traditional 
denominations 
each 
have 
their 
own 
intricate principles of governance, as to which the 
state has no right of visitation.  Church governance 
is founded in scripture, modified by reformers over 
almost two millennia. 
 
. . .  
 
It 
would 
therefore 
also 
be 
inappropriate 
and 
unconstitutional for this Court to determine after the 
fact that the ecclesiastical authorities negligently 
supervised or retained the defendant Bishop.  Any 
award of damages would have a chilling effect leading 
indirectly to state control over the future conduct of 
affairs 
of 
a 
religious 
denomination, 
a 
result 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
14
violative of the text and history of the establishment 
clause. 
Id. at 329 (quoting Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).  Applying these principles, this court held 
that Pritzlaff's claim for negligent supervision was precluded 
by the First Amendment because it would require an inquiry into 
church laws, practices, and policies.  Id. at 330. 
¶23 In Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult 
Constitutional & Institutional Liability Issues, 7 St. Thomas L. 
Rev. 31 (1994), an article cited several times by the Pritzlaff 
court,
12 James T. O'Reilly and Joan M. Strasser further elaborate 
on the reasons why "the measurement of duty and reasonableness 
needed to find negligence will inevitably entangle the civil 
court in the nuances of religious discipline practices."  Id. at 
39.  For example, O'Reilly and Strasser state that the Roman 
Catholic Church has internal disciplinary procedures that are 
influenced by a religious belief in reconciliation and mercy.  
Id. at 36.  They explain: 
 
The reconciliation and counseling of the errant clergy 
person involves more than a civil employer's file 
reprimand or three day suspension without pay for 
misconduct.  Mercy and forgiveness of sin may be 
concepts familiar to bankers but they have no place in 
the discipline of bank tellers.  For clergy, they are 
interwoven in the institution's norms and practices. 
Id. at 45-46.  Therefore, due to this strong belief in 
redemption, a bishop may determine that a wayward priest can be 
sufficiently reprimanded through counseling and prayer.  If a 
court was asked to review such conduct to determine whether the 
                     
12  See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 
302, 316 n.3, 326-27, 330 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 
(1996). 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
15
bishop should have taken some other action, the court would 
directly entangle itself in the religious doctrines of faith, 
responsibility, and obedience.  Id. at 31, 43-46; see also 
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 329 (quoting Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 
332).   
¶24 Likewise, O'Reilly and Strasser explain that negligent 
supervision claims would require a court to formulate a 
"reasonable cleric" standard, which would vary depending on the 
cleric involved, i.e., reasonable Presbyterian pastor standard, 
reasonable Catholic archbishop standard, and so on. See Schmidt, 
779 F. Supp. at 328; Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. 
Ct. App. 1994), writ denied, 650 So. 2d 253 (1995);
13 O'Reilly & 
Strasser, supra, at 43-46.  Such individualized standards would 
be required because, as previously mentioned, church doctrines 
and 
practices 
are 
intertwined 
with 
the 
supervision 
and 
discipline of clergy.  O'Reilly & Strasser, supra, at 43-46.  
However, as O'Reilly and Strasser state: "Our pluralistic 
society dislikes having its neutral jurists place themselves in 
the role of a 'reasonable chief rabbi,' 'reasonable bishop,' 
etc., because of the degree of involvement that must accompany 
such decisional framework for the civil tort judge."  Id. at 46. 
 This further explains why this court held that negligent 
supervision claims are "prohibited by the First Amendment under 
most if not all circumstances."  See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 
328.  
                     
13  Schmidt and Roppolo were cited with approval in 
Pritzlaff.  See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 329. 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
16
¶25 Turning to the present case, L.L.N. argues that this 
case is distinguishable from Pritzlaff because Clauder was a 
hospital chaplain whom L.L.N. viewed as her pastoral counselor, 
whereas Pritzlaff involved a sexual relationship between a 
priest and a parishioner.  On the other hand, the Diocese argues 
that this case is indistinguishable from Pritzlaff, because 
priests and hospital chaplains essentially perform the same 
functions.   
¶26 A chaplain takes care of the spiritual needs of 
hospital patients and their families.  (R.13 at 2; R.15 at 105; 
R.30 at 58, 145.)  According to Clauder, a Roman Catholic 
chaplain accomplishes this task by saying daily mass, visiting 
patients, 
administering 
the 
sacraments, 
satisfying 
prayer 
requests, and counseling individuals or groups. (R.30 at 145.)  
Clauder testified in his deposition that the duties of a 
chaplain are different from a parish priest in that they are 
more focused on the spiritual and possibly emotional needs of 
hospital patients.  (R.30 at 58-59.)   
¶27 Therefore, a chaplain's duties appear similar to the 
duties of a parish priest, albeit more focused in a hospital 
setting.
14  In particular, although a chaplain may provide 
counseling 
to 
patients, 
this 
function 
is 
not 
unique 
to 
chaplains.  Parish priests also counsel members of their 
congregations.  See Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 327 (stating that 
                     
14  Although nothing in the record explicitly sets forth the 
duties of a parish priest, Clauder testified in his deposition 
about the similarities of the duties of a parish priest and 
chaplain.  (See R.30 at 58-59.)  In addition, during the oral 
arguments, 
the 
attorney 
for 
the 
Diocese 
detailed 
the 
similarities. 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
17
clergy of most denominations provide counseling to members of 
their congregations); Moses, 863 P.2d at 328 (indicating that 
the priest counseled parishioners at the church).  Accordingly, 
the fact that Donovan was a parish priest and Clauder was a 
chaplain does not constitute a reason to distinguish Pritzlaff 
from this case.  
¶28 Furthermore, in Pritzlaff, Pritzlaff alleged that the 
priest involved used his position as a priest to develop a 
"friend like" relationship with her while she was a student, and 
then abused that relationship by coercing her to have sex when 
she was an adult.
15  See Pritzlaff's Complaint, contained in 
Petitioner's Appendix in Pritzlaff, at 34; see also Respondent's 
Brief in Pritzlaff, at 2.  Similarly, in this case, L.L.N. 
stated in her letter to Bishop O'Donnell: "[Clauder] met me in 
the hospital at a very low point in my life and befriended me.  
He became a significant part of my personal life and used me to 
meet his own needs."
16 (R.15 at 141.)  Allegedly, both Clauder 
and Donovan used their position as priests to induce their 
victims to trust and rely on them, and then abused that trust 
and reliance to coerce their victims into having sex; therefore, 
                     
15  It is unclear whether Pritzlaff viewed the priest as her 
pastoral counselor, because the record before the court in 
Pritzlaff appears to have been very limited.  See Pritzlaff, 194 
Wis. 2d at 306-11; Petitioner's Brief in Pritzlaff, at 2-7; 
Respondent's Brief in Pritzlaff, at 2-3.  This is likely because 
Pritzlaff was before the court on a motion to dismiss, and 
therefore the court only considered the pleadings to determine 
whether Pritzlaff had stated a claim for relief.  See Pritzlaff, 
194 Wis. 2d at 311-12. 
16  However, it should be noted that L.L.N. testified at her 
deposition:  "I'm no longer comfortable calling it friendship 
after what I've learned."  (R.15 at 29.) 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
18
it appears that Clauder's alleged relationship with L.L.N. was 
similar to Donovan's alleged relationship with Pritzlaff.  Thus, 
we do not agree with L.L.N. that this case is factually 
distinguishable from Pritzlaff on this ground.         
¶29 We do recognize, however, that this case differs from 
Pritzlaff in that it involves a very specific allegation of 
notice to the Diocese.
17  In particular, L.L.N. argues that Hebl 
was obligated to inquire into Clauder's relationship with T.E. 
after witnessing the incident in the rectory.  L.L.N. claims 
that if Hebl had investigated further, he would have discovered 
Clauder's sexual involvement with T.E.  Therefore, L.L.N. 
contends that, through Hebl, the Diocese had constructive 
knowledge of the T.E. incident and Clauder's sexual relationship 
with T.E.  Based on such constructive knowledge, L.L.N. claims 
that the Diocese should have known of Clauder's propensity to 
abuse his position as chaplain to become sexually intimate with 
patients.  
¶30 However, these specific allegations of notice only 
further establish that a court would be required to interpret 
ecclesiastical law in order to decide L.L.N.'s negligent 
supervision claim.  First, under agency law, a principal only 
has imputed knowledge of information which an agent gains while 
acting within his or her authority to bind the principal, or of 
information which an agent has a duty to give the principal.  
                     
17  Because of the limited record in Pritzlaff, the court 
only considered the bare allegation in Pritzlaff's complaint 
that: "The ARCHDIOCESE knew or should have known that DONOVAN 
had a sexual problem prior to 1959 . . . ."  Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 
2d at 310. 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
19
See Ivers v. Pond Piano Co. v. Peckham, 29 Wis. 2d 364, 369, 139 
N.W.2d 57 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1957).  
In this case, in order to determine that Hebl was acting within 
his authority to bind the Diocese when he witnessed the T.E. 
incident, or had a duty to give the Diocese information about 
Clauder, a court would be required to consider church law, 
policies, or practices.  This is because the undisputed record 
indicates that the Diocese did not assign Hebl to a position of 
authority over Clauder, such as an employer or supervisor.  Hebl 
stated in an affidavit:  "I had no authority over Gibbs Clauder 
in my capacity as pastor of St. Bernard Church or otherwise."  
(R.33 at 2.)  Therefore, Hebl had no responsibility to report 
Clauder's behavior to the Diocese, other than any responsibility 
he may have had under church law, policies, or practices.  Thus, 
a court would not be able to apply solely neutral principles of 
law to determine whether the Diocese had constructive knowledge 
of the T.E. incident, contrary to the First Amendment.
18 
¶31 Second, even if we assume that the Diocese had 
constructive knowledge of Clauder's relationship with T.E., we 
further conclude that a court would be required to consider and 
interpret the vow of celibacy in order to determine whether the 
                     
18  This decision should not be interpreted to mean that a 
court can never determine whether a cleric is an agent or 
employee of a religious organization, whether a cleric is acting 
within his or her authority to bind a religious organization, or 
whether a cleric has a duty to give a religious organization 
information.  Such an inquiry may be possible without violating 
the First Amendment.  However, such an inquiry is prohibited 
here, where Hebl's authority to bind the Diocese or duty to give 
the Diocese information can be determined only by reference to 
church law, policies, or practices.  
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
20
Diocese 
negligently 
supervised 
Clauder. 
 
The 
deposition 
transcripts submitted by the Diocese demonstrate that T.E. was 
not a patient whom Clauder counseled, but instead was a family 
friend and adult parishioner at the church where Clauder was a 
priest. 
 
The 
deposition 
transcripts 
also 
establish 
that 
Clauder's relationship with T.E. was an extensive one that 
involved numerous meals, social activities, and even a trip to 
Japan. Since these deposition transcripts are unopposed, we must 
accept them as true.  See Leszczynski, 30 Wis. 2d at 539.   
¶32 These undisputed facts demonstrate that Clauder, a 
single man, engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with an 
adult, single, female non-patient.  L.L.N. argues that because 
of the Diocese's constructive knowledge of this, the Diocese 
should have taken some other action in supervising Clauder, such 
as removing him as chaplain.  However, in order to hold the 
Diocese liable for breach of a duty of care to L.L.N., a court 
would be required to determine that constructive knowledge of 
Clauder's 
involvement 
with 
T.E. 
should 
have 
triggered 
a 
different response by the Diocese, because such involvement 
exposed a bad attribute of Clauder's character.  See Moses, 863 
P.2d at 327-29; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1957).  
Yet, in order to make this determination, a court would be 
required to consider the vow of celibacy, since sexual acts 
committed by single consenting adults are not legally wrong,
19 
but instead become wrong only under church doctrine. See 
                     
19  Sexual acts committed by single consenting adults would 
only be legally wrong if committed in the presence of others.  
See Wis. Stat. § 944.20(1)(a). 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
21
Roppolo, 644 So. 2d at 208.  Accordingly, L.L.N. is essentially 
arguing that the Diocese owes a heavier duty to her than a non-
secular 
employer 
would 
because 
of 
a 
religious 
doctrine.  
However, as one court has stated: 
 
The vow of celibacy by clergy is a religious decision 
based upon religious belief; it does not create a 
civil duty.  Under the free exercise clause of the 
First Amendment, the state may not compel affirmation 
of a religious belief nor impose requirements based on 
belief in any religion.  [Citation omitted.]  Thus the 
church had no greater civil duty based upon its 
religious tenets. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 399, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  Similarly, another 
court has indicated: 
 
What may be viewed as sexual misconduct by one 
religion may be permitted or even encouraged by 
another.  To do as plaintiff requests would require 
this Court to apply different standards to different 
litigants depending on their religious affiliations.  
This is a secular court.  If sexual or other conduct 
of a priest violates secular standards, e.g., child 
molestation, this Court will impose whatever civil or 
criminal secular sanctions may be appropriate.  But 
this Court has no authority to determine or enforce 
standards of religious conduct and duty. 
Roppolo, 644 So. 2d at 208.  
¶33 Moreover, to determine whether Clauder violated his 
vow of celibacy, a court would be required to consider the 
parameters of the vow.  For this court to examine the vow of 
celibacy, and the church's action or inaction when faced with an 
alleged violation, would excessively entangle the court in 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
22
religious affairs, contrary to the First Amendment.
20  See 
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 328-30.   
                     
20  The dissent questions why a court would be required to 
interpret and consider the vow of celibacy, since "Clauder's 
breach of his celibacy vow alone proves nothing of legal 
significance."  Dissenting op. at 8.  However, in this case, 
L.L.N. claims that the Diocese had constructive notice of 
Clauder's risk of sexually exploiting women precisely because 
Clauder allegedly breached his vow of celibacy with T.E.  This 
is clear from the following exchanges made during oral arguments 
among the justices and David McFarlane, attorney for L.L.N.: 
Justice Bablitch:  . . . . Even if I were to accept, 
counsel, your statement that there is an obligation to 
make some inquiry, and assuming that the inquiry 
revealed what the record today reveals about [Clauder 
and T.E.'s] relationship, . . . why would that have 
any relevance, any relevance whatsoever, to the issue 
here, which is that the Diocese was somehow put on 
notice that this man was a sexual predator of 
patients? 
McFarlane:  Because it showed that he had no regard 
for his vow of celibacy. 
. . . . 
Justice Geske:  . . . . But the question that you did 
not 
want 
to 
answer 
is 
whether 
or 
not 
it 
is 
fundamentally wrong for somebody, a single person, to 
have sexual relations with another single person, [or 
whether or not it] only becomes wrong in the context 
of the church doctrine in which this priest engaged in 
a vow of celibacy. 
McFarlane:  I'm not saying that that's wrong, your 
Honor.  I'm saying that that should have triggered 
some response. 
Justice Geske:  That the church doctrine should have 
triggered the inquiry.  It's the church doctrine that 
does it. 
McFarlane:  It's the whole context of facts, including 
the vow of celibacy.  
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
23
¶34 Thus, the Diocese has made a prima facie case for 
summary judgment by establishing that, in order to decide 
L.L.N.'s claim, a court would be required to examine the vow of 
celibacy.  In addition, the Diocese has established that, in 
order to determine that Hebl was acting within his authority to 
bind the Diocese when he witnessed the T.E. incident, or had a 
duty to give the Diocese information about Clauder, a court 
would 
be 
required 
to 
consider 
church 
law, 
policies, 
or 
practices. L.L.N. has not shown, by affidavit or other proof, 
the existence of disputed material facts or undisputed material 
facts from which reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn 
that are sufficient to entitle her to a trial.  Accordingly, the 
Diocese has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law because a court would not be able to apply 
neutral principles of law; therefore, the First Amendment 
precludes L.L.N.'s claim for negligent supervision.           
  B. Sufficiency of NoticeAssuming No Constitutional Violation 
¶35 Even if we assume that the First Amendment does not 
prohibit L.L.N.'s claim, we conclude that the undisputed facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom do not establish a 
genuine issue of material fact in regard to the element of 
notice.  Therefore, the Diocese is also entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law on this basis.   
¶36 Since this court has not explicitly recognized the 
existence of a claim for negligent supervision in Wisconsin, we 
must look to other jurisdictions to determine the elements of 
the claim.  In Moses, 863 P.2d at 329, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado quoted the Restatement of Agency in order to delineate 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
24
such elements.
21  The Restatement of Agency provides in pertinent 
part: "A person conducting an activity through servants or other 
agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his 
conduct if he is negligent or reckless . . . in the supervision 
of the activity . . . ."  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 
(1957), quoted in Moses, 863 P.2d at 329.  Comment d to § 213 
states:  
 
Liability results under the rule stated in this 
Section, not because of the relation of the parties, 
but because the employer antecedently had reason to 
believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because 
of the employment.  The employer is subject to 
liability only for such harm as is within the risk.  
If, therefore, the risk exists because of the quality 
of the employee, there is liability only to the extent 
that the harm is caused by the quality of the employee 
which the employer had reason to suppose would be 
likely to cause harm. 
                     
21  Although the Moses court relied on the Restatement of 
Agency, note that a claim for negligent supervision "is not 
based upon any rule of the law of principal and agent or of 
master and servant." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 cmt. a 
(1957).  Instead, such a claim "is a special application of the 
general rules stated in the Restatement of Torts."  Id.  
Therefore, a claim for negligent supervision is distinct from a 
claim for vicarious liability, in that the former is based on 
tort principles and the latter is based on agency principles.  
More specifically, with a vicarious liability claim, an employer 
is alleged to be vicariously liable for a negligent act or 
omission committed by its employee in the scope of employment.  
See Shannon v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 364, 370, 289 
N.W.2d 564 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1).  
Thus, vicarious liability is based solely on the agency 
relationship of a master and servant.  In contrast, with a 
negligent supervision claim, an employer is alleged to be liable 
for a negligent act or omission it has committed in supervising 
its employee.  Therefore, liability does not result solely 
because of the relationship of the employer and employee, but 
instead because of the independent negligence of the employer.  
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 cmt. d.   
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
25
Id. at § 213 cmt.d.  Therefore, an employer is liable for 
negligent supervision only if it knew or should have known that 
its employee would subject a third party to an unreasonable risk 
of harm.  See id.; Moses, 863 P.2d at 329. 
¶37 In the present case, it is undisputed that the Diocese 
had no actual knowledge of Clauder's alleged tendency to abuse 
his position as chaplain until after the sexual relationship 
between L.L.N. and Clauder ended.  However, the parties disagree 
as to whether the Diocese should have known about Clauder's 
alleged propensity to abuse his position.  As previously 
explained, L.L.N. argues that the Diocese had constructive 
knowledge of the T.E. incident and Clauder's relationship with 
T.E. through Hebl.  Based on such constructive knowledge, L.L.N. 
claims that the Diocese should have known about Clauder's 
propensity to use his position as chaplain to sexually exploit 
patients.  
¶38 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
undisputed 
facts 
and 
all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom do not demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Diocese should 
have known about Clauder's alleged propensity to use his 
position as chaplain to sexually exploit patients.  Even if the 
Diocese had constructive knowledge of Clauder's relationship 
with T.E., this would have put the Diocese on notice, at most, 
that Clauder may again have consensual sexual relations with a 
single, adult, non-patient.  However, it is illogical to 
conclude that such constructive knowledge was sufficient to put 
the Diocese on notice that Clauder was likely to abuse his 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
26
position as chaplain to engage vulnerable patients in sexual 
intercourse.  
¶39 To illustrate this point, consider the same set of 
facts in a non-secular setting.  Suppose that an employer of a 
single counselor witnessed the counselor in a situation similar 
to the T.E. incident.  Suppose the employer investigated into 
the matter, and discovered that the counselor was involved in a 
sexual relationship with this woman, who was not a patient and 
was a single adult.  Surely, this alone would not put the 
employer on notice that the counselor was likely to sexually 
exploit his patients.  At most, it would provide notice to the 
employer that the counselor was not celibate.  The same is true 
in this case.  
¶40 At least one court has agreed with this rationale in 
an analogous setting.  In Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego v. 
Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the 
plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old female, alleged that the church 
was negligent in hiring a priest because, if it had asked the 
priest if he had problems with his vows of celibacy, the church 
would have discovered that the priest had been involved in three 
sexual relationships with adult parishioners.  Id. at 405.  The 
court concluded:  "Even if the church had learned of [the 
priest's] prior sexual affairs with adults, it is illogical to 
conclude the church should have anticipated that [the priest] 
would commit sexual crimes on a minor."  Id.  Similarly, even if 
the Diocese had constructive knowledge of Clauder's sexual 
relationship with T.E., this would not have put the Diocese on 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
27
notice of Clauder's alleged propensity to abuse his position as 
chaplain to engage patients in sexual intercourse.  
¶41 Thus, the Diocese has made a prima facie case for 
summary judgment in regard to the element of noticewhether the 
Diocese knew or should have known that Clauder would subject 
L.L.N. to an unreasonable risk of harm.  L.L.N. has not shown, 
by affidavit or other proof, the existence of disputed material 
fact 
or 
undisputed 
material 
facts 
from 
which 
reasonable 
alternative inferences may be drawn that are sufficient to 
entitle her to trial.
22  Accordingly, since the undisputed facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefore do not demonstrate 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding notice, the Diocese 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
¶42 In response to the dissenting opinion's conclusion 
that the T.E. incident in the rectory raises a reasonable 
inference that Clauder was engaged in "sexually assaultive 
behavior" toward T.E., we acknowledge that the selectively 
chosen facts as characterized by the dissent could raise such an 
inference if viewed in isolation.  However, the dissent fails to 
consider the facts before us in the context of the entire 
                     
22  Counsel for L.L.N. asserted at oral arguments that there 
is a genuine issue of material fact in regard to whether T.E. 
was a patient whom Clauder counseled.  However, L.L.N. has not 
submitted evidentiary facts in the affidavits or other proof to 
support this assertion.  To the contrary, the affidavits 
submitted by the Diocese indicate that T.E. was a family friend 
that Clauder met while he was a priest assigned to St. Dennis.  
Since this fact is not contradicted by opposing affidavits or 
other proof, we must take it as true for purposes of summary 
judgment.  See Leszczynski, 30 Wis. 2d at 539.  We therefore 
conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether T.E. was a patient.  
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
28
record, which we are required to do on summary judgment.  See 
Oosterwyk v. Bucholtz, 250 Wis. 521, 523, 27 N.W.2d 361 (1947) 
(court must consider whether a jury question is raised based "on 
the whole record made on the motion for a summary judgment"). 
¶43 The T.E. incident, viewed in the context of the whole 
record, does not raise a reasonable inference that Clauder was 
engaged in "sexually assaultive behavior."  Rather, when viewed 
without hyperbole, an entirely different picture is presented.  
In particular, it is undisputed that T.E. and Clauder were 
engaged in a relatively long and consensual relationship.  It is 
undisputed 
that 
Clauder 
and 
T.E. 
attended 
social 
events 
together, traveled abroad together, and often dined together in 
the rectory with other residents, including Hebl.  
¶44 Likewise, it is undisputed that on the night of the 
incident, it was Clauder, not T.E., who called for Hebl's help. 
 It is undisputed that when Hebl entered the room and told 
Clauder to stop restraining T.E., Clauder responded, "No, I 
can't, she's going to hurt me."  (R.30 at 113.)  It is 
undisputed that once Hebl separated Clauder and Hebl, they were 
both very calm.  It is obvious that Hebl thought T.E. had 
attacked Clauder.  Hebl stated in his deposition: "I mean, 
obviously she attacked him, it seemed that way, and he was 
defending himself.  You can put any interpretation you want on 
that.  I saw no visual signs, none whatsoever of any sexual 
attack or intimacy or behavior, none whatsoever."  (R.30 at 116) 
(emphasis added.)  Finally, it is undisputed that on that night, 
Clauder and T.E. had not engaged in sexual conduct. 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
29
¶45 Thus, in light of the entire record, there simply are 
no disputed material facts or undisputed material facts from 
which a reasonable inference may be drawn that Clauder was 
engaged in "sexually assaultive behavior" toward T.E. on the 
night Hebl witnessed the incident.  Although the dissent 
suggests that such an inference exists because Hebl answered 
affirmatively when asked in a deposition whether it was within 
the "hypothetical 
realm 
of 
possibilities," 
the 
deposition 
questions and answers in no way give rise to a reasonable 
inference that Clauder in fact engaged in "sexually assaultive 
behavior" toward T.E.  In fact, no one, not even L.L.N., has 
ever argued that the facts give rise to such an inference.
23  The 
dissent stands alone in making this assertion.  
¶46 In summary, we conclude that the First Amendment 
precludes L.L.N.'s claim for negligent supervision because the 
claim would not involve consideration of neutral principles of 
law.  Instead, the claim would require a court to interpret 
church law and policies, which would result in excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion.  In particular, in 
order to determine that Hebl was acting within his authority to 
bind the Diocese when he witnessed the T.E. incident, or had a 
duty to give the Diocese information about Clauder, a court 
would 
be 
required 
to 
consider 
church 
law, 
policies, 
or 
                     
23  Although the dissent claims that L.L.N. impliedly argued 
that Clauder engaged in "sexually assaultive behavior" toward 
T.E., see dissenting op. at 10-11, this is not the case.  To the 
contrary, during oral arguments, Justice Geske asked L.L.N.'s 
attorney, "Is there any evidence of sexual assault in this 
case?"  The attorney replied, "Not in this case, but there was 
certainly some physical contact with T.E." 
 
 
No.  17042.rtf 
 
 
30
practices.  In addition, in order to determine whether the 
Diocese breached a duty owed to L.L.N., a court would be 
required to interpret a priest's vow of celibacy. Furthermore, 
even if we assume that the First Amendment does not bar L.L.N.'s 
claim, we conclude that the undisputed facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom do not establish a genuine issue of 
material fact in regard to whether the Diocese knew or should 
have known about Clauder's alleged propensity to use his 
position as chaplain to sexually exploit patients whom he 
counseled.  Thus, the Diocese is entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law on this basis as well.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
 
 
No. 95-2084.WAB 
   
 
1 
¶47 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Concurring). I join that part 
of the majority opinion that holds that the Diocese is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law as to the element of 
notice.  However, I would not reach the First Amendment issue.  
The court does not generally decide constitutional questions if 
the case can be resolved on other grounds.  Labor and Farm Party 
v. Election Board, 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984). 
 I state no opinion as to that issue. 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
1 
¶48 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting). I dissent.  After 
reviewing the record in this case, I conclude that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Diocese should 
have known that Clauder's placement as a hospital chaplain was 
likely to result in harm to a third party.  I also conclude that 
the majority has unnecessarily reached and erroneously resolved 
the First Amendment issue presented in this case. 
¶49 For L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim
24 to survive 
the Diocese's motion for summary judgment, the record must 
support the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the 
following issues: 1) that Clauder was an employee of the Diocese 
at all relevant times; 2) that Clauder engaged in sexually 
harmful behavior toward T.E., and later used his position as a 
hospital chaplain to sexually exploit L.L.N.; 3) that Hebl knew 
or should have known that Clauder engaged in sexually harmful 
behavior toward T.E.; and 4) that Hebl's knowledge is imputable 
to the Diocese.  The majority reverses the court of appeals and 
reinstates the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the 
basis that the record is devoid of facts or inferences from 
facts tending to establish that the Diocese was on notice of 
Clauder's alleged tendency to sexually exploit women.  I 
disagree.   
¶50 If the record supported only the proposition that the 
Diocese was on notice that Clauder had broken his vow of 
                     
24 Like the majority, I assume without deciding that 
Wisconsin recognizes a claim for negligent supervision. 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
2 
celibacy, the Diocese would be entitled to summary judgment. 
While Clauder failed to abstain from sex, such a strictly 
ecclesiastical indiscretion is a stranger to the secular law.  
There are, however, other facts and inferences from facts in the 
record which raise a genuine issue of material fact on the 
notice element of L.L.N.'s claim. 
¶51 One evening around 9:00 p.m., Hebl entered Clauder's 
living quarters after hearing Clauder cry for help.  Upon 
entering, Hebl observed the following: Clauder was straddling 
T.E.; T.E.'s blouse was torn; and Clauder's hand was bleeding 
from a bite wound.   
¶52 Critical 
to 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
of 
summary 
judgment 
is 
its 
narrow 
view 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
its 
characterization of the T.E. incident as a "consensual sexual 
relationship."  The majority concludes that "[t]hese undisputed 
facts demonstrate that Clauder, a single man, engaged in a 
consensual sexual relationship with an adult . . . ."  Majority 
op. at 20.  I submit that encountering Clauder, who was bleeding 
at the wrist from a bite, and was straddling T.E. while she was 
lying on her back on the floor with a ripped blouse, can lead to 
a reasonable inference that this is something other than a 
"consensual sexual relationship."  It can lead to a reasonable 
inference that Clauder was engaged in sexually assaultive 
behavior. 
¶53 Hebl knew T.E. as a woman who had on prior occasions 
visited Clauder at the rectory.  He knew that Clauder had 
traveled to Japan to spend time with her.  He even acknowledged 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
3 
that at the time of the encounter he thought that something 
sexual might have been going on between Clauder and T.E.  Later, 
after L.L.N. notified the Diocese of her alleged injuries, he 
reported this encounter to the auxiliary bishop and described it 
as "suspicious." 
¶54 However, at the time of the incident he asked no 
questions and made no reports.  Why?  As explained by Hebl: 
"This was such a disappointment to me, I just wanted to forget 
about it." 
¶55 Two expert witnesses for the plaintiff opined that the 
incident should have triggered an awareness by Hebl and the 
Diocese that Clauder might have a tendency to engage in 
inappropriate behavior with women and such awareness should have 
led to an evaluation.  Dr. Gonsiorek stated: 
 
In this situation, it was negligent of the Diocese of 
Madison to continue to place Reverend Clauder as a 
hospital chaplain without such evaluation.  In that 
placement, the Diocese should have known that Reverend 
Clauder would have close personal contact as a 
counselor with adult women, some of whom would be 
vulnerable 
because 
of 
the 
severe 
emotional 
difficulties they were experiencing as part of their 
hospitalization. 
¶56 On a motion for summary judgment, a court takes as 
true all facts pleaded by the plaintiff and all inferences 
reasonably derived from those facts.  Voss v. City of Middleton, 
162 Wis. 2d 737, 747, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991).  Here, the 
affidavits and other proof must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.  Lisa's Style Shop, Inc. v. Hagen 
Ins. Agency, 181 Wis. 2d 565, 569, 511 N.W.2d 849 (1994).  Any 
doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
4 
must be resolved against the moving party, here the Diocese.  
Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 
462, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989).  The incident witnessed by Hebl may 
have been, as the majority asserts, "a consensual sexual 
relationship" between adults.  However, considering Clauder's 
straddling of T.E. on the floor, the ripped blouse, and the 
bloody bite on Clauder's wrist, it is also reasonable to infer 
that this was sexually assaultive behavior.  I conclude that the 
reasonable inference from these facts, together with the 
affidavits of the plaintiff's experts, support the existence of 
a genuine issue of material fact. 
¶57 The majority confuses the use of the entire record 
with the use of hyperbole.  It declines to acknowledge excerpts 
and inferences from the record which are inconsistent with its 
conclusion, and labels the use of such excerpts and inferences 
as hyperbolic or excessive.  I submit that at this summary 
judgment stage it is not excessive, indeed it is required, that 
we review the entire record, including excerpts of depositions 
and affidavits which may give rise to alternative inferences. 
¶58 Curiously, the majority refuses to acknowledge that 
part 
of 
Hebl's 
testimony 
which 
supports 
the 
reasonable 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
5 
alternative inference of sexually assaultive behavior.
25  For 
example, the majority emphasizes Hebl's statement that he "saw 
no visual signs, none whatsoever of any sexual attack or 
intimacy or behavior, none whatsoever."  Majority op. at 29 
(emphasis omitted).  Yet, the majority attaches no significance 
to material on the very next page of Hebl's deposition:  
 
Q: 
Now, even though you didn't accuse him of any 
sexual involvement with [T.E.], was that a thought 
that was in your mind as a possibility? 
A: 
Oh, yeah, I think with the circumstances under 
which this happened, there could be that possibility, 
you know but, you know gee, I would never, never 
accuse him of it. . . .  
Q: 
I understand, but the main and only point I'm 
trying to talk about now is whether you remember when 
this happened, having the thought in your mind of 
whether something sexual had been going on between 
those two. 
A: 
What I thought in my mind, you know, I said so 
many things so fast that I won't deny that I could 
have said, you know, to him in the course of my 
conversation, you know, "She could turn this whole 
thing around and accuse you of rape," or something 
like that. . . . 
¶59 Elsewhere in Hebl's deposition appears the following 
exchange, which the majority declines to acknowledge: 
 
Q: 
And isn't, at least in the hypothetical realm of 
possibilities, another of the possibilities is that he 
may have attacked her? 
                     
25 In disputing the inference of sexually assaultive 
behavior, the majority notes that Clauder and T.E. had a 
"relatively long and consensual relationship," and that the two 
attended social events, traveled, and dined together.  Majority 
op. at 28.  I am not sure what relevance these facts have to a 
determination of whether a reasonable inference exists that Hebl 
knew or should have known of sexually assaultive conduct by 
Clauder on the evening in question.  General evidence of good 
times together does not negate a specific incident of sexually 
assaultive behavior. 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
6 
A: 
That's why I didn't want to make any judgments as 
to who was at fault here.  I was not pointing the 
finger at her or him. 
Q: 
So are you accepting that it is equally possible 
that he attacked her as it is that she attacked him? 
A: 
 I 
would 
certainly 
not 
throw 
out 
that 
possibility.  It's nothing that I myself would accuse 
him of. 
Q: 
But it is a possibility? 
A: 
Sure.  I did not accuse her of anything.  I did 
not accuse him of anything.  I just simply wanted them 
separated and her out. 
¶60 In yet another part of the record, Hebl makes the 
following statement:   
 
No, I don't remember me saying to him, accusing him of 
anything, if that's what you're looking at by saying 
did the thought enter into my mind, maybe.  That's the 
best I can give you.  It could have, it could not 
have.  I suppose we're reasonable people, and we would 
say this could be one of the possibilities but, you 
know, amongst many. . . .  Let me just add to that, we 
could turn this around and say she attacked him, or 
she came on to him or something like that, and he was 
defending himself.  Now, that's the other side of the 
coin. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶61 The 
majority 
is 
unable 
to 
muster 
from 
Hebl's 
statements the reasonable inference that Hebl knew or should 
have known that the incident he witnessed between Clauder and 
T.E. was sexually assaultive in nature.  Yet, far from the realm 
of "hyperbole," Hebl's own deposition testimony shows that 
reasonable people could draw such an inference.  I do not deny 
that Hebl made other statements elsewhere in his deposition that 
are apparently at odds with those I have excerpted.  However, 
the majority assumes a jury's role by choosing to credit some of 
Hebl's statements while discarding others.  I conclude that in 
arriving at its determination that there exists no genuine issue 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
7 
of material fact, the majority declines to acknowledge adverse 
facts in the record, and thereby usurps the jury's function. 
¶62 Instead of ending its inquiry with a finding of an 
absence of facts supporting L.L.N. on the notice element of her 
negligent supervision claim, the majority goes on to find that 
L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim is barred under the First 
Amendment because it would require excessive court entanglement 
in matters of ecclesiastical law and internal church policies.  
Majority op. at 19.  It is by now well established that, as a 
basic rule of judicial decision making, a court should not reach 
a constitutional issue unless it is essential to the disposition 
of the case.
26   
¶63 I am perplexed.  What prompts the majority to 
unnecessarily reach out to tackle a constitutional issue?  I 
agree with the concurrence that since this case is decided on 
summary judgment grounds, the majority should refrain from 
reaching the First Amendment issue.  Violating a fundamental 
rule of judicial restraint, the majority reaches beyond the 
                     
26 See, e.g., City of Franklin v. Crystal Ridge, Inc., 180 
Wis. 2d 561, 573 n.8, 509 N.W.2d 730 (1994); Ziegler Co. v. 
Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 612, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987); S.B. 
v. Racine County, 138 Wis. 2d 409, 412, 406 N.W.2d 408 (1987); 
Labor and Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 
N.W.2d 177 (1984); Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 
313 N.W.2d 47 (1981); State v. State Fair Park, Inc., 21 Wis. 2d 
451, 453, 124 N.W.2d 612 (1963); Witek v. State, 2 Wis. 2d 404, 
407, 86 N.W.2d 442 (1957); Smith v. Journal Co., 271 Wis. 384, 
390, 73 N.W.2d 429 (1955); State ex rel. Rosenhein v. Frear, 138 
Wis. 173, 176, 119 N.W. 894 (1909).    
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
8 
purported 
factual 
deficiencies 
of 
L.L.N.'s 
claim 
to 
unnecessarily, and incorrectly, decide a constitutional issue. 
¶64 L.L.N.'s claim is precluded by the First Amendment, 
according to the majority, because it cannot be resolved without 
two constitutionally impermissible judicial inquiries.  First, 
in order to determine that the Diocese had constructive 
knowledge through Hebl of Clauder's sexual relationship with 
T.E., "a court would be required to consider church law, 
policies, and practices."   Majority op. at 19.  Second, "a 
court would be required to consider and interpret the vow of 
celibacy in order to determine whether the Diocese negligently 
supervised Clauder."  Id. at 20.  The majority errs on both 
grounds of its First Amendment ruling.  That portion of the 
majority's holding dealing with the vow of celibacy is most 
easily disposed of, and I deal with it first.
27  
¶65 The majority concludes that knowledge of a clergyman's 
breach of a vow of celibacy cannot possibly give a religious 
organization notice that a clergyman is disposed to sexually 
harmful or deviant behavior.  Majority op. at  26-27.  I agree; 
                     
27 For purposes of considering the First Amendment issue, I 
take as a given, as I must in a motion for summary judgment, the 
existence of facts necessary to support L.L.N.'s negligent 
supervision claim.  Thus, I assume the following: 1) Clauder was 
an employee of the Diocese at all relevant times; 2) Clauder 
engaged in sexually harmful behavior toward T.E., and later used 
his position as a hospital chaplain to sexually exploit L.L.N.; 
3) Hebl knew or should have known that Clauder sexually harmed 
T.E.; and 4) Hebl was an employee of the Diocese, and his 
knowledge was thereby imputable to the Diocese.  These facts 
must be assumed because in their absence, there is no negligent 
supervision claim, and therefore no First Amendment defense. 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
9 
Clauder's breach of his celibacy vow alone proves nothing of 
legal significance.  It is therefore inconsistent for the 
majority to use the "necessity" of an inquiry into celibacy as a 
basis for barring the negligent supervision claim on First 
Amendment grounds.  Id. at 20-22.  Because the celibacy vow is 
irrelevant to a negligent clergy supervision claim, it simply 
cannot be that L.L.N.'s claim "require[s a court] to consider 
and interpret the vow of celibacy in order to determine whether 
the Diocese negligently supervised Clauder."  Id. at 20.   
¶66 It is axiomatic that a claim does not "require" 
consideration of a fact which fails to aid in proving the claim. 
 Because proof of Clauder's disloyalty to his vow of celibacy 
adds nothing to L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim, a court 
has no occasion to consider or interpret the vow.  The First 
Amendment is therefore not implicated. 
¶67 The majority is incorrect in asserting that L.L.N.'s 
negligent supervision claim against the Diocese is premised 
solely on Clauder's breach of his vow of celibacy with T.E.  
Majority op. at 22 n.20.  To the contrary, the plaintiff's 
complaint makes only the general assertion that the Diocese 
breached its duty to "supervise and oversee all priests with 
respect to sexual improprieties."  None of L.L.N.'s claims 
against the Diocese even mentions the word "celibacy." 
¶68 The majority also erroneously states that this dissent 
is alone in asserting that the facts of this case give rise to 
an inference "that Clauder was engaged in 'sexually assaultive 
behavior' toward T.E."  Majority op. at 29.  Such an assertion 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
10
is subsumed within L.L.N.'s allegation of "sexual impropriety."
28 
 The affidavits of the plaintiff's expert witnesses also refer 
to the Diocese's constructive notice of Clauder's propensity to 
engage in inappropriate sexual behavior.  Furthermore, Hebl 
conceded under questioning that sexually assaultive behavior by 
Clauder was one reasonable inference that could be drawn from 
the T.E. incident.   
¶69 According 
to 
the 
majority, 
L.L.N.'s 
negligent 
supervision claim also creates an unconstitutional requirement 
that a court ascertain the relationship between Clauder and the 
Diocese, Hebl and the Diocese, and Clauder and Hebl.  The nature 
of Clauder's connection with the Diocese is relevant because 
                     
28 The majority incorrectly relies on the following exchange 
at oral argument for the proposition that there is no reasonable 
inference that Clauder engaged in sexually assaultive conduct 
toward T.E.: 
 
Justice Geske: "Is there any evidence of sexual assault 
in this case?" 
 
Mr. McFarland (L.L.N.'s attorney): "Not in this case, 
but there was certainly some physical contact with 
T.E." 
 
Majority op. at 29, n. 23.  It is unclear from the phrase, "Not 
in this case," whether Attorney McFarland was stating that there 
is no evidence of sexually assaultive conduct toward L.L.N. 
alone, or that there is no evidence of sexually assaultive 
conduct 
toward 
either 
T.E. 
or 
L.L.N. 
 
Only 
the 
latter 
interpretation would provide support for the majority's ultimate 
conclusion.  I submit that it is unlikely that Attorney McFarland 
abandoned in oral argument a legal theory subsumed in L.L.N.'s 
assertion of "sexual impropriety," pursued vigorously in the 
deposition of Hebl, and supported by the facts in the record.  
See supra at 5-6. 
 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
11
L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim fails in the absence of a 
employer-employee relationship between Clauder and the Diocese. 
 See Midwest Knitting Mills, Inc. v. United States, 950 F.2d 
1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1991)(describing negligent supervision 
liability of "masters" [employers] for acts of "servants" 
[employees]).  The relationship between Hebl and the Diocese is 
also critical, because L.L.N. must be able to impute Hebl's 
asserted knowledge of Clauder's sexually exploitive tendencies 
to the Diocese.  This can only be done if an agency relationship 
exists between Hebl and the Diocese.  See Ivers & Pond Piano Co. 
v. Peckham, 29 Wis. 2d 364, 369, 139 N.W.2d 57 (1966). 
¶70 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the Diocese may 
be charged with constructive notice through Hebl regardless of 
whether he supervised Clauder.  Hebl's knowledge will be imputed 
to the Diocese so long as Hebl obtained the knowledge in the 
course of his employment and within the scope of his authority. 
 See Ivers & Pond Piano Co., 29 Wis. 2d at 369; 3 C.J.S. Agency 
§ 432 (1973).  The majority does not dispute that the Diocese 
placed Hebl and vested him with the authority to maintain order 
at St. Bernard's parish. Hebl's authority at St. Bernard's is 
demonstrated in his own deposition testimony, in which he stated 
that it was his policy that prevented nonfamily members from 
staying in priests' rooms, and it was he who informed each 
priest of the policy.  There is no assertion that Hebl was 
acting outside of his authority when he investigated the cry for 
help and discovered T.E. in Clauder's room.  Consideration of 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
12
these facts in no way requires a court to stand in judgment of 
church policy or practice. 
¶71 Religious organizations, like any non-human entity, 
can "act" only through their agents and employees.  Accordingly, 
respondeat superior and negligent supervision claims, which are 
predicated on an employer-employee relationship, are perhaps the 
only means of imposing tort liability on a church or similar 
institution.  If courts were not permitted to determine the 
legal relationship between religious organizations and their 
clerics, religious organizations would be effectively immunized 
from tort liability. 
¶72 The 
First 
Amendment 
does 
not 
imbue 
religious 
organizations with blanket immunity from tort liability.  See 
Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 314 (Colo. 1993).  A 
court is free to apply "neutral principles" of state law to 
religious organizations without implicating the First Amendment. 
 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)("[t]he neutral-
principles approach cannot be said to 'inhibit' the free 
exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions 
of state law governing the manner in which churches own 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
13
property, hire employees, or purchase goods").
29  In determining 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists between a 
religious institution and its clerics, a court does not 
implicate First Amendment considerations so long as the question 
may be decided without "determining questions of church law and 
policies."  Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 
302, 328, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  
¶73 While Pritzlaff announced that negligent supervision 
claims would be barred in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
the court did not create an across-the-board proscription on 
such claims.  Critically, negligent supervision claims are 
precluded only when they would require an inquiry into church 
policies and doctrine.  In that sense, Pritzlaff is consistent 
with those jurisdictions holding that negligent supervision 
claims are not necessarily precluded on First Amendment grounds. 
 See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 
66 (D. Conn. 1995); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Moses, 863 
P.2d 310. 
                     
29 See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)(stating that "a law that is 
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the 
incidental 
effect 
of 
burdening 
a 
particular 
religious 
practice"); Employment Div., Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)(noting that the United States 
Supreme Court has "never held that an individual's religious 
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.  On the 
contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise 
jurisprudence contradicts that proposition"). 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
14
¶74 The First Amendment does not prevent a court from 
determining whether an agency or employer-employee relationship 
exists between a religious organization and its clerics.  Such 
an inquiry does not focus on the commission of an act which is 
"rooted in religious belief."  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
215-16 (1972).  The question also does not embroil the judiciary 
in a church's internal dispute over matters of ecclesiastical 
policy and procedure.  See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 
344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
¶75 I agree with the court of appeals that to ascertain 
the nature of the relationship between Clauder and the Diocese, 
and between Hebl and the Diocese, the circuit court need only 
apply the neutral rules of agency to the Diocese in the same 
manner as it would to a secular entity.  The court would not be 
required to resolve disputed issues of religious doctrine or 
practice.  I therefore conclude that such an inquiry is 
permissible under the First Amendment. 
¶76 The majority's reasoning that the First Amendment bars 
consideration 
of 
the 
relationship 
between 
a 
religious 
organization and its clergy has implications far beyond cases 
dealing with sexual intercourse between clergy and adult 
parishioners.  If courts cannot take notice of the relationship 
between a church and a cleric, then respondeat superior and 
negligent supervision claims can never be maintained against a 
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
15
religious organization, regardless of prior notice or the degree 
of sexual deviation.
30 
¶77 For 
example, 
suppose 
that 
a 
church 
knows 
with 
certainty that one of its priests is inclined to sexually molest 
children.  The church places the priest in a situation where the 
priest has regular, unsupervised access to children.  The priest 
molests a child.  Under the majority's view, a negligent 
supervision claim is precluded because the claim requires a 
court to ascertain whether an employment relationship exists 
between the priest and the church. 
¶78 Why should a diocesan decision to let a known 
pedophile work unsupervised with children enjoy ecclesiastical 
protection? Is the answer to be, as the majority opinion 
suggests, that "due to [a] strong belief in redemption, a bishop 
may determine that a wayward priest can be sufficiently 
reprimanded through counseling and prayer," and that "mercy and 
forgiveness are interwoven in the institution's norms and 
practices"?  Majority op. at 14-15.  This reasoning, which 
                     
 
30 The majority does not attempt to explain, because it 
cannot, why an inquiry into Clauder and Hebl's employment 
relationship with the Diocese is constitutionally barred in this 
case, but "may be" constitutionally permissible in other cases.  
Majority op. at 19 n. 18.  An inquiry into the existence of a 
cleric's employment relationship precedes and is independent of 
an inquiry into the nature of the alleged tortious conduct; the 
analysis is the same in every case.  There is therefore no basis 
for the majority's statement that its decision might allow a 
court in a future case to determine the nature of a cleric's 
employment relationship with a religious organization.  In truth, 
the majority's reasoning operates in every instance as an 
absolute bar to an inquiry into the existence of a cleric's 
employment relationship.     
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
16
stretches the fabric of the First Amendment to provide blanket 
protection to the Diocese in all cases, is erroneous. 
¶79 If after this case the Diocese were to reinstate 
Clauder as a hospital chaplain, and Clauder were to use that 
position to obtain sexual gratification from patients, I cannot 
accept that the First Amendment would act to bar a negligent 
supervision 
claim 
against 
the 
Diocese. 
 
The 
"mercy 
and 
forgiveness" of a religious organization toward a known sexually 
exploitive clergyman does not excuse the organization from 
responding in damages when the cleric uses his position to 
procure his next victim.  No secular entity enjoys such a broad 
immunity from tort liability.  If a secular employer fails to 
supervise a servant with known dangerous inclinations, that 
employer faces liability when the servant uses his or her 
position with the employer to commit a tortious act.  So should 
it be when a religious organization fails to supervise a cleric 
known to commit sexually harmful or exploitive acts. 
¶80 In conclusion, there is a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the Diocese should have known that Clauder's 
placement as a hospital chaplain would likely subject a third 
party to an unreasonable risk of harm.  The Diocese is therefore 
not 
entitled 
to 
summary 
judgment 
on 
L.L.N.'s 
negligent 
supervision claim.  Furthermore, I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim is barred 
by 
First 
Amendment 
considerations 
of 
excessive 
court 
entanglement in religious affairs.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent.  
 
 
No. 95-2084.AWB 
 
17
¶81 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson joins this opinion.