Title: State v. Yanich
Citation: 110 Ariz. 172, 516 P.2d 308
Docket Number: 2275
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: November 19, 1973

110 Ariz. 172 (1973) 516 P.2d 308 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. George YANICH, Jr., Appellant. No. 2275. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. November 19, 1973. Rehearing Denied January 8, 1974. *173 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Peter M. Van Orman and Richard Klauer, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Sherman R. Bendalin, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from jury verdicts and judgments of guilt to the crimes of offering to sell marijuana, § 36-1002.07 A.R.S., as amended 1961, and sale of a dangerous drug, to wit: LSD, § 32-1964(A)(7) and § 32-1975 A.R.S., as amended 1967, together with concurrent sentences of not less than six years nor more than ten years on each count. The defendant raises the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. In December of 1968, an undercover agent of the Phoenix Police Department purchased ten tablets of LSD and made arrangements to purchase a kilo of marijuana from the defendant. The officer paid $50 for the tablets and turned over $110 for the marijuana. The marijuana was not delivered and the money was returned. On 16 January 1969, a criminal complaint was filed charging the defendant and two other co-defendants with the crimes of offering to sell marijuana and sale of dangerous drugs. The defendant was arrested in Nevada in January of 1969 on another charge. The defendant fought extradition and the proceedings were dismissed in Nevada on 30 July 1969. On 3 April 1970, defendant was arrested in California pursuant to the instant criminal complaint. Defendant fought extradition and arrived in Arizona on 13 June 1970. After a preliminary hearing at which time defendant was represented by counsel, the defendant was held to answer. In the Superior Court the defendant moved that his attorney be discharged and that he be allowed to proceed in propria persona. The motion was granted and the minute entries reflect: Later, pursuant to further motion of the defendant, the court directed: Further motions were made by defendant concerning the restrictions being placed upon him by the jailors which the court denied, though the court did order: Defendant also asked and was granted a continuance of the trial date from September of 17 November 1970. From verdicts and judgments of guilt, sentences, and denial of motions for new trial, defendant appeals. IS THE ARIZONA MARIJUANA STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL? Defendant first contends that § 36-1002.07 A.R.S. is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution in that "to classify marijuana as an addictive drug flies in the face of the vast weight of medical knowledge on the subject." In rejecting a similar contention we have stated: DENIAL OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL Defendant next contends that he was denied his right to speedy trial. We disagree. We have stated: In the instant case the defendant left the jurisdiction shortly after the commission of the offenses charged. He resisted extradition in both Nevada and California. There was no demand by him that he be brought back and tried as soon as possible as was the case in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969), and once he was returned, much against his will, he was the cause of further delay. Regardless of the confusion resulting from the attempt to extradite the defendant from Nevada, after extradition from California the State of Arizona proceeded diligently to try him. A reading of the transcript indicates no prejudice caused by the delay nor denial of defendant's right to speedy trial. INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF Defendant contends that his motion to proceed in propria persona was conditioned on the exercise of his rights upon "full access to the courts." It is defendant's position that the conviction must be set aside *175 because the conditions of this waiver of counsel and election to represent himself were not met. At one point in the proceedings the following transpired: And: The Arizona Constitution reads as follows: And in Arizona an accused has a right to represent himself as well as to have an attorney. State v. Van Bogart, 85 Ariz. 63, 331 P.2d 597 (1958). This does not mean, however, that a defendant who waives his right to an attorney and exercises his right to represent himself has a unlimited right to books, witnesses, investigators, and other items that he may feel necessary in order to adequately represent himself. In the instant case the defendant was given a public defender to assist him. The record before this court indicates that books were provided for him and that the Public Defender's Office assisted defendant to the extent that it could, considering the attitude of the defendant in making unreasonable demands on the one hand, and, on the other, not communicating to the Public Defender concerning areas in which he could be of genuine help. It is also noted that defendant's activities were restricted at one time because he became a disciplinary problem. While we agree that a person who represents himself must be given a reasonable opportunity to conduct his defense and reasonable access to law books and source materials necessary, we do not find in the instant case that unreasonable restraints were placed upon the defendant. A person has the right to represent himself but he does not have the right to expect that his representation will be effective. Indeed, experience shows that just the opposite is more likely to be the case. In addition, there are physical limitations that necessarily follow when the defendant is held in custody pending trial. By electing to represent himself, the defendant in custody may not expect to receive favored and privileged treatment even though the result may be that he is less effective as his own attorney. Neither do we believe that the defendant may attempt to place unreasonable conditions on his waiver of his right to counsel and then when he finds to his sorrow that he was not the lawyer he thought he was, assign the failure to comply with these conditions as a basis for overturning the trial. We find no error. WAS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR NOT TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION REGARDING AGENCY RELATIONSHIP? Defendant next contends that it was reversible error to fail to give defendant's requested instruction regarding the agency relationship. Defendant requested the following instruction: This is not a correct statement of the law and it would have been error for the court to give the instruction under the facts in the instant case: MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. After the trial in this matter defendant, still representing himself, moved for new trial which motion was denied. Notice of appeal was filed, and new counsel was appointed to assist defendant. Upon motion, the appeal was suspended and the matter remanded to the Superior Court for a new hearing on defendant's motion for new trial. A five day hearing was held at which time defendant called the witnesses he would have called at the original trial as well as others concerning defendant's treatment while in jail prior to and during the trial. Defendant contends that new and material evidence was presented which was not known by defendant prior to the trial and that the treatment he received while attempting to represent himself amounted to a denial of a fair and impartial trial. The witnesses the defendant produced at the hearing on the motion for new trial were all known to him at the time of the trial. One was his brother-in-law and another a close friend who testified on behalf of the defendant at his motion for reduction of bond prior to the trial. There were no new witnesses. A new trial should not be granted to permit testimony from a witness whose identity was known by the defendant at the time of the trial. State v. Baker, 100 Ariz. 339, 414 P.2d 153 (1966); State v. Dixon, 7 Ariz. App. 457, 440 P.2d 918 (1968). Defendant further contends, however, that he was prevented from properly subpoenaing his witnesses. The testimony of the attorney assigned to assist defendant indicates that the defendant did not allow the attorney to assist in this matter: And: And concerning the witness Kendall: By the time the subpoenas were given to the investigator for the Public Defender it was too late even though the testimony of the investigator indicates a diligent effort to serve the witnesses. A review of the testimony on the motion for new trial, particularly the testimony of the so-called "alibi" witnesses indicates no error in denying defendant's motion for new trial. IS THE CALIFORNIA DETAINER VALID? As to the detainer placed by the State of California, there is nothing in the record that would allow us to decide this matter. The question of the detainer is a matter peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the California courts. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKYMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.