Title: Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pinkerton, et al., Appeal of: Interthal; No. 20wap2002, et al.; J-121A-D-2002 (Concurring Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2003

[J-121A-D-2002] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOLLY LYNN PINKERTON, PAUL R. PINKERTON, P.G. PUBLISHING COMPANY, FRANCIS E. PFEDERHIRT, MARK R. INTERTHAL AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY APPEAL OF: MARK R. INTERTHAL STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant v. RANDALL P. CRALEY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JAYNEANN M. CRALEY, RANDALL P. CRALEY, PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF KEITH P. CRALEY, A MINOR, AND RANDALL P. CRALEY, IN HIS OWN RIGHT AND GLORIA M. CRALEY AND LAWRENCE W. CRALEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE, Appellees : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 20 WAP 2002 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered November 19, 2001 at No1175WDA2000 quashing the appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County entered June 15, 2000 at NoGD98-9431. ARGUED: September 9, 2002 No. 28 MAP 2002 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered September 26, 2001 at No1117MDA2000 quashing the appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County entered April 26, 2000 at No97-9019. ARGUED: September 9, 2002 [J-121-2002] - 2 PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee v. SHIRLEY HASSON AND ARTHUR E. HASSON, II, Appellants HOMESTEAD INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant v. PENJERDEL REFRIGERATION COMPANY AND EPISCOPAL HOSPITAL, Appellees : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 42 MAP 2002 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered October 10, 2001 at No319EDA2001 quashing the appeal of the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, entered January 5, 2001 at No98-15206. SUBMITTED: September 9, 2002 No. 48 MAP 2002 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered November 5, 2001, at No1993EDA2001 quashing the appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, entered June 20, 2001, at No92-05134. ARGUED: September 9, 2002 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: AUGUST 20, 2003 With good reason, the majority seeks to implement a rule governing appeals that is consistent as between civil actions generally and declaratory judgment proceedings, at least with regard to orders and/or judgments that follow a trial. The Court has reconciled such rule with Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000), by concluding that the rule-based, post-trial motions procedure is an integral component of the fact-finding process, which the Declaratory Judgments Act [J-121-2002] - 3 specifies should be governed by prevailing rules of civil procedure. See Chalkey v. Roush, 569 Pa. 462, 470-71 n.13, 805 A.2d 491, 496-97 n.13 (2002). Nevertheless, in its present effort to encompass cases decided on agreed facts within Chalkey's general rule, and to reconcile such treatment with Wickett, the majority must ultimately rely upon the Court's own rules to bridge the gap, rather than any exception that can be discerned from the Declaratory Judgments Act. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 10-11 ("[T]he Explanatory Comment to [Pa.R.C.P. No. 1038.1] could not be more clear that the procedure in such trials 'follows an existing model, that of a nonjury trial with respect to the decision, post-trial practice and appeal.' As such, orders following trials on stipulated facts must be treated just like orders following other trials, i.e., in both situations, parties who wish to appeal must first file post-trial motions." (citation omitted)). The majority seems to overlook, however, that the general principles of appealability pertaining to pre-trial orders such as were at issue in Wickett were no less clear, see Pa.R.A.P. 341, but nevertheless, the Court deemed them preempted by the Declaratory Judgments Act. See Wickett, 563 Pa. at 603-04, 763 A.2d at 818. I join the present disposition for the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in Chalkey. See Chalkey, 569 Pa. at 472-74, 805 A.2d at 497-99 (Saylor, J., concurring). Respectfully, however, I remain of the belief that it would be better for the Court to recognize the consequences of a faithful application of Wickett's statutory construction analysis, and to reassess that decision in such light. See Chalkey, 569 Pa. at 773-74, 805 A.2d at 498-99 (Saylor, J., concurring).